BY THE SAME AUTHOR.
THE  STORY  OF GOETHIE'S LIFE.
1 vol. 12mo. $1 50.
PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
VOLS. II. AND III.
[Inr Preparation. ]
JAMES R. OSGOOD & CO., Publishers,
BOSTON.




PROBLEMS
OF
LIFE AND MIND.
BY
GEORGE HENRY LEWES.
Prot etrter.
THE FOUNDATIONS OF A CREED.
VOL. I.
BOSTON:
JAMES R. OSGOOD AND COMPANY,
LATE TICKNOR & FIELDS, AND FIELDS, OSGOOD, & CO.
1874.




AUTHOR'S EDITION.
From  Advance Sheets.
UNIVERSITY PRESS: WELCH, BIGELOW, & CO.,
CAMBRIDGE.




PREFACE.
THE work, of which this is the first volume, has been
many years in preparation; indeed, its origin may be said
to go so far back as 1836, when with the rashness of ambitious youth I planned a treatise on the Philosophy of
the Mind in which the doctrines of Reid, Stewart, and
Brown were to be physiologically interpreted. In 1837
I gave a course of lectures on the subject in Fox's Chapel,
Finsbury. The scheme was abandoned, partly because of
a growing dissatisfaction with the doctrines of the Scotch
School, and partly perhaps from a misgiving as to my
physiological knowledge. Other studies and other labors
occupied me until 1860, when I believed that my researches into the nervous system had placed in my hands
a clew through the labyrinth of mental phenomena; and,
misled by the plausible supposition that the complex
phenomena in Man might be better interpreted by approaching them through the simpler phenomena in Animals, I began to collect materials for a work on Animal
Psychology. This also proved to be premature. Rightly
to understand the mental condition of Animals, we must
first gain a clear vision of the fundamental processes in
Man; since, obviously, it is only through our knowledge




vi                    PREFACE.
of the processes in ourselves that we can interpret the
manifestations of similar processes in them; and here we
are hampered by the anthropomorphic tendency which
leads us to assign exclusively human motives to animal
actions.
In 1862 I began the investigation of the physiological
mechanism of Feeling and Thought, and from that time
forward have sought assistance in a wide range of research. Anatomy, Physiology, Pathology, Insanity, and
the Science of Language, have supplied facts and suggestions to enlarge and direct my own meditations, and to
confirm and correct the many valuable indications furnished by previous psychological investigators. Let me
not be thought ungrateful to my predecessors, some of
whose contributions are of imperishable value, if, while
acknowledging the illumination I have received from
their labors, I declare my conviction that, in spite of all
they have achieved, Psychology is still without the fundamental data necessary to its constitution as a science;
it is very much in the condition of Chemistry before
Lavoisier, or of Biology before Bichat. Isolated discoveries, however valuable, do not suffice. A science is constituted - that is, has received its definitive construction
and place in the hierarchy of Philosophy- when its object
is circumscribed, its phenomena defined, its Method settled, and its fundamental principles established, so that
henceforward the development is progressive, the discovery of to-day enlarging and not overturning the conception of yesterday, each worker bringing his contribution to a common fund, not presenting it as a reversal
of all that predecessors had done.




PREFACE.                   vii
To note a deficiency is one thing, another to remedy
that deficiency.  Clearly as the want of fundamental
principles appeared to me, I was under no illusion as to
my being in possession of the necessary inductions; and
I therefore only contemplated working at special questions, without reference to their common connections. A
varied set of detached investigations had grown into a
huge mass of heterogeneous MS. before any central licght
appeared to shape the chaos into a system.  When I
began to organize these materials into a book, I only
intended it to be a series of essays treating certain problelms of Life and Mind. But out of this arose two results, little contemplated.
The first result was such a mutual illumination from
the various principles arrived at separately that I began
to feel confident of having something like a clear vision
of the fundamental inductions necessary to the constitution of Psychology; hence, although I do not propose
to write a complete treatise, I hope to establish a firm
groundwork for future labors.
The second result, which was independent of the first,
arose thus: Finding the exposition obstructed by the existence of unsolved metaphysical problems, and by the
too frequent employment of the metaphysical Method,
and knowing that there was no chance of general recognition of the scientific Method and its inductions while the
rival Method was tolerated, and the conceptions of Force,
Cause, Matter, Mind, were vacillating and contradictory, I
imagined that it would be practicable in an introductory
chapter, not indeed to clear the path of these obstacles,
but at least to give such precise indications of the princi



Viii                  PREFACE.
ples adopted throughout the exposition as would enable
the reader to follow it untroubled by metaphysical difficulties. That introductory chapter has grown insensibly
into a substantive work; and the two volumes of which
it consists are but a portion of what has been written.
Not only has the chapter grown into a work, the work
itself has grown into a systematic introduction to the philosophy of Science; and what was intended merely as a
preparation for a Psychology discloses itself as the Foundations of a Creed.
This brief sketch of its history may not only explain
and partly justify the somewhat ambitious pretensions of
this work, it will also explain and partly justify certain
defects in its composition. Having grown up heterogeneously, its structure is heterogeneous.  Sections now
brought together have been wrought out at the distance
of years, and without reference to each other; while
during repeated revisions and remodifications many repetitions and cross-references have been inserted, and sentences bearing the obvious trace of 1872 or 1873 appear
in pages originally written perhaps eight or ten years previously. The reader is also sometimes called upon to
accept results for which the evidence can only be produced in subsequent chapters or volumes. I have so far
guarded against this evil that in such cases I have only
asked for provisional assent.
The Foundations of a Creed ought to have sufficient
standing-room for antagonistic schools. The general consideration that every philosophical opinion must have
some truth sustaining it, is here adopted; and therefore




PREFACE.                   iX
due weight is attempted to be assigned to adverse arguments,  for example, those which affirm and those which
deny the possibility of Metaphysics, or the existence of
Innate Ideas; the facts which favor, and the facts which
exclude, the spiritualist hypothesis and the materialist
hypothesis. While cordially agreeing with those philosophers who reject both Spiritualism and Materialism, I
do not agree with them in their conclusion that we know
nothing whatever of Mind or Matter. I hold with their
antagonists that we know a great deal of both. I cannot
agree that Philosophy gains any refuge from difficulties
by invoking the Unknowable; though it may admit the
existence of the Unknowable, this admission is transcendental, and leaves all the purposes of Philosophy unaffected. Deeply as we may feel the mystery of this universe and the limitations of our faculties, the Fondcatiolns
of a Creed can only rest upon the Known and Knowable.. The second volume, completing this First Series, is
now under final revision.
THE PRIORY, Se2tenzber, 1873.








CONTENTS.
INTRODUCTION.
PART I. —TTHE  METHOD OF SCIENCE AND ITS APPLICATION TO METAPHYSICS.
CHAPTER I.
PAGE
THE CONFLICT OF OPINION AND THE ISSUE.               1
CHAPTER  II.
THE CONDITIONS STATED                                12
CHAPTER III.
THE METHOD.........  26
CHAPTER IV.
OBJECTIONS TO METAPHYSICS.                           56
CHAPTER V.
THE PLACE OF METAPHYSICS AMONG THE SCIENCES          65
PART II. —THE RULES OF PHILOSOPHIZING    81
PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES                             101
BIOSTATICS.........   106
PSYCHOSTATICS                                    109
THE METHOD OF PSYCHOLOGY                         115




xii                     CONTENTS.
THE BIOLOGICAL DATA.                              119
PSYCHODYNAMICS.                      124
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SPECTRUM..... 135
THE SOCIOLOGICAL DATA                               140
REASONED REALISM.                             162
PROBLEM I. —THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.
CHAPTER I.
THE PRINCIPLE OF RELATIVITY..                     183
CHAPTER II.
THE SENSATIONAL AND A PRIORI HYPOTHESES... 191
(JIstifncl).......   208
CHAPTER III.
THE SENSIBLE, THE EXTRA-SENSIBLE, AND THE SUPRA-SENSIBLE  229
(T/le Extra-Sensi6le World)..                      238
(The Smprca-Sensible lWorld)...   243
CHAPTER IV.
THE REALITY OF ABSTRACTIONS...... 253
(Co-ordinationi)...                    257
CHAPTER V.
IDEAL CONSTRUCTION IN SCIENCE...... 262
(fIoral Types).......   279
CHAPTER VI.
WHAT ARE LAWS OF NATURE?..                        282
CHAPTER VII.
THE USE AND ABUSE OF HYPOTHESIS.                      288




CONTENTS.                      xiii
CHAPTER VIII.
THE PASSAGE FROM THE ABSTRACT TO THE CONCRETE.         313
CHAPTER IX.
IDEAL CONSTRUCTIONS IN METAPHYSICS.                    318
CHAPTER X.
THE SEARCH AFTER CAUSES.                               327
(The Ideas of Cause and Sabstance)                  329
(The How and te    )....... 332
(The lTwo Conceptions of Law)                       335
CHAPTER XI.
INTUITION AND DEMONSTRATION                             338
CHAPTER XII.
AXIOMS AND THEIR VALIDITY                               353
CHAPTER XIII.
NECESSARY TRUTHS                                        359
CHAPTER XIV.
MATHEMATICS AN EMPIRICAL SCIENCE.                      382
CHAPTER XV.
SOME OBSERVATIONS ON KANT                               401
CHAPTER XVI.
THE PLACE OF SENTIMENT IN PHILOSOPHY.... 418








INTRODUCTION.
PART I.
THE METHOD OF SCIENCE AND ITS
APPLICATION TO METAPHYSICS.
PART II.
THE RULES OF PHILOSOPHIZING.




" England's thinkers are again beginning to see, what they had only
temporarily forgotten, that the difficulties of Metaphysics lie at the root
of all Science; that those difficulties can only be quieted by being
resolved, and that until they are resolved, positively whenever possible,
but at any rate negatively, we are never assured that any knowledge,
even physical, stands on solid foundations."
STUART MILL.
"Ich erkiihne mich zu sagen, dass nicht eine einzige metaphysische
Aufgabe sein mitisse, die hier nicht aufgel6st, oder zu deren Aufl6sung
nicht wenigstens der Schliissel dargereicht worden."
KANT.




INTRODUCTION.
PART I.
THE METHOD OF SCIENCE AND ITS APPLICATION
TO METAPHYSICS.
CHAPTER I.
THE CONFLICT OF OPINION AND THE ISSUE.
1. No one meditating on the present condition of the
intellectual world can fail to be arrested by the evidences
of its deep-seated unrest. Yeast is working everywhere.
Ancient formulas and time-honored creeds are yielding as
much to internal pressure as to external assault. The
expansion  of knowledge is loosening the very earth
clutched by the roots of creeds and churches. Rejoice
over this or deplore it, the fact is unmistakable. Sects
and parties, in the endeavor to sustain their positions, and
to preserve at least their watchwords and the outward
semblance of their creeds, nowadays snatch eagerly at
compromises which a few years ago would have been
scouted as heresies. Science is penetrating everywhere.
and slowly changing men's conception of the world and
of man's destiny. Doctrines which once were damnable
are now fashionable, and heresies are appropriated as aids
to faith.  Ours is no longer the age described by Carlyle,
"destitute of faith, yet terrified at scepticism."  It is an
age clamorous for faith, and only dissatisfied with scepti1                            A




9           PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
cism when scepticism is a resting-place instead of a starting-point, a result instead of a preliminary caution. The
purely negative attitude of Unbelief, once regarded as
philosophical, is now generally understood to be only
laudable in the face of the demonstrably incredible.
2. The great desire of this age is for a Doctrine which
may serve to condense our knowledge, guide our researches, and shape our lives, so that Conduct may really
be the consequence of Belief. We are growing impatient
of futile compromises and half-beliefs; we see that it will
not do to believe, or pretend to believe, one theory of the
universe, yet show, in every way wherein confidence can
show itself, that our lives are ruled by another theory.
In consequence of this desire, while thinking men appear,
on a superficial view, to be daily separating wider and
wider from each other, they are, on a deeper view, seen
to be drawing closer together,- differing in opinion, they
are approximating in spirit and purpose.
There is a conspicuous effort to reconcile the aims and
claims of Religion and Science, - the two mightiest antagonists. The many and piteous complaints, old as Religion itself, against the growing infidelity of the age, might
be disregarded were they not confirmed on all sides by
the evidence that Religion is rapidly tending to one of
two issues, - either towards extinction or towards transformation. Some considerable thinkers regard the former alternative as the probable and  desirable issue.
They argue that Religion has played its part in the evolution of Humanity,- a noble part, yet only that of a
provisional organ, which, in the course of development,
must be displaced by a final organ. Other thinkers —
and I follow these - consider that Religion will continue
to regulate the evolution; but that to do this in the comingc ages, it must occupy a position similar to the one it
occupied in the past, and express the highest thought of




SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN METAPHYSICS.         3
the time, as that thought widens with the ever-growing
experience. It must not attempt to imprison the mind
in formulas which no longer contain the whole of positive
knowledge. It must not attempt to force on our acceptance, as explanations of the universe, dogmas which were
originally the childish guesses at truth made by barbarian
tribes. It must no longer present a conception of the
world and physical laws, or of man and moral laws,
which has any other basis than that of scientific induction. It must no longer put forward principles which
are unintelligible and incredible, nor make their very unlintelligibility a source of glory, and a belief in' them a
higher virtue than belief in demonstration.  In a word,
this transformed Religion must cease to accept for its
tests and sanctions such tests as would be foolishness in
Science, and such sanctions as would be selfishness in
Life. Instead of proclaiming the nothingness of this life,
the worthlessness of human love, and the imbecility of
the human mind, it will proclaim the supreme importance of this life, the supreme value of human love, and
the grandeur of human intellect. Those who entertain
this hope, and this view of a Religion founded on Science
expressing at each stage what is known of the world and
of man, believe - and I share the belief - that the present antagonism will rapidly merge in an energetic cooperation. The internecine warfare which has so long
disturbed Religion and obstructed Science will give place
to a Doctrine which will respect the claims of both, and
satisfy the needs of both.
3. This future may be undetermined, but it will come.
It will not come without contention. The ground will be
contested inch by inch. The pathway of Progress will
still, as of old, bear traces of martyrdom; but the advance
is inevitable.  The signs of the advent are not few.
Looking at them with some closeness, one observes that




4            PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
Science itself is also in travail. Assuredly some mighty
new birth is at hand. Solid as the ground appears, and
fixed as are our present landmarks, we cannot but feel
the strange tremors of subterranean agitation which must
erelong be followed by upheavals disturbing those landmarks. Not only do we see Physics on the eve of a reconstruction through Molecular Dynamics, we also see
Metaphysics strangely agitated, and showing symptoms
of a reawakened life. After a long period of neglect and
contempt, its problems are once more reasserting their
claims.  And whatever we may think of those claims, we
have only to reflect on the important part played by MIetaphysics in sustaining and developing religious conceptions, no less than in thwarting and misdirecting scientific
conceptions, to feel assured that before Religion and Science can be reconciled by the reduction of their principles
to a common!M~ethod, it will be necessary to transform
lMetaphysics, or to stamp it out of existence.  There is
but this alternative. At present -Metaphysics is an obstacle in our path: it must be crushed into dust, and our
chariot-wheels must pass over it; or its forces of resistance must be converted into motive powers, and what is
an obstacle become an impulse.
4. It is towards the transformation of Metaphysics by
reduction to the MIethod of Science that these pages tend.
Their object is to show that the MIethod which has hitherto achieved such splendid success in Science needs only
to be properly interpreted and applied, and by it the
inductions and deductions from experience will furnish
solutions to every metaphysical problem  that can be
rationally stated; whereas no problem, metaphysical or
scientific, which is irrationally stated, can receive a
rational solution.  I propose to show that metaphysical
problems have, rationally, no other difficulties than those
which beset all problems; and, when scientifically treated,




SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN METAPHYSICS.          5
they are capable of solutions not less satisfactory and
certain than those of physics.
To one class of readers this announcement will perhaps seem extravagant, and the attempt absurd; to another class the limitation to scientific Method will seem
narrow and insufficient. But if I succeed in showing the
first that solutions can thus be reached, and in showing
the second that odnly thus can any solution be reached,
the gain will be obvious; not only will a vast region of
speculative disorder be reduced to order, not only will
one obstacle to the reconciliation between Religion and
Science be removed, but we shall be in possession of a
Method which will make Peligion also the expression of
Experience, and thus dissipate the clouds of mystery and
incredibility which have so long concealed the clear
heavens.
5. Should these pages fall into the hands of readers
who on former occasions have given me their attention,
they will doubtless feel some surprise at this announcement of my present aim. I may here seem to be unsaying what it has been the chief purpose of my labors to
enforce. But it is not really so. I have indeed incessantly, for some thirty years, tried to dissuade men from
wasting precious energies on insoluble problems; that
purpose still animates my efforts.  But, although formerly
I regarded problems as insoluble which I now hold to be
soluble, there has been no other change than this, that I
now see how problems which were insoluble by the
lMethod then in use, are soluble by the Mlethod of Science.
This is not a retreat, but a change of front.  Throughout
my polemic against Mletaphysics, the attacks were directed
against the irrational Mlethod, as one by which all problems whatever must be insoluble.
6. Descartes opened Modern Philosophy by his famous
"Discourse on Method."  It was a brilliant effort, but the




6           PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
consecration of experience has been wanting to it. History proves that it was not really capable of furnishing
any satisfactory solutions.
Auguste Comte opened the new era by his great conception of Method, namely, the extension to all inquiries
- even morals and politics - of those inductive principles which alone have been found fruitful in any inquiries.
I shall not be supposed to underrate the value of the Positive Philosophy, as conceived by Comte, in pointing out
a defect of that scheme which has often been pointed out
by its opponents, namely, that it displays no effort to apply the positive Method to one great branch of speculation, - that of Metaphysics.  He peremptorily excluded
all research whatever in this direction, declaring metaphysical problems to be essentially insoluble, consequently idle and mischievous. Nor can there be any dispute
that the speculations he had in view are inane, when pursued on the Method traditionally followed; but an extension of the principles of positivism may legitimately
include even these speculations; and Scientific'Method,
rightly interpreted, will find its employment there.  It
is surely more philosophical to bring metaphysical problemls under the same speculative conditions as all other
problems, than to exclude them altogether, since our ignoring them will not extirpate them. The problems exist,
and form obstacles to Research. Speculative minds cannot resist the fascination of Metaphysics, even when forced
to admit that its inquiries are hopeless. This fact must be
taken into account, since it makes refutation powerless.
Indeed, one may say, generally, that no deeply rooted
tendency was ever extirpated by adverse argument. Not
having originally been founded on argument, it cannot be
destroyed by logic. The very mind which admits your
evidence to be unanswerable will swing back to its old
position the instant that the pressure of evidence abates;




SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN METAPHYSICS.          7
and the opponent whom you left yesterday seemingly converted, is found to-day no less confident than of old. Contempt, ridicule, argument, are all vain against tendencies
towards metaphysical speculation.  There is but one effective mode of displacing an error, and that is to replace.
it by a conception which, while readily adjusting itself to
conceptions firmly held on other points, is seen to explain
the facts more completely.  Thile one permanent victory
over a false Method is by philosophizing better. The disciples of Descartes were not drawn over to the side of
Newton by arguments exposing the imperfections of their
system, but by examples of the greater sweep and efficiency of the Newtonian system, interpreted on principles
common to Descartes and Newton: the hypothesis of
vortices gradually sank into neglect when the law of gravitation was seen to be equally consistent with the mathem-atical principles advocated by Descartes, and more
competent to explain the phenomena.
7. No array of argument, no accumulation of contempt,
no historical exhibition of the fruitlessness of its effort,
has sufficed to extirpate the tendency towards metaphysical speculation.  Although its doctrines have become a
scoff (except among the valiant few), its Method still survives, still prompts to renewed research, and still misleads
some men of science. In vain History points to the unequivocal failure of twenty centuries: the metaphysician
admits the fact, but appeals to History in proof of the
persistent passion which no failure can dismay; and hence
draws confidence in ultimate success.  A cause which is
vigorous after centuries of defeat is a cause baffled but not
hopeless, beaten but not subdued. The ranks of its army
may be thinned, its banners torn and mud-stained; but.
the indomitable energy breaks out anew, and the fight is
continued.  Nay, - instructive fact - even some great
captains of Science, while standing on triumphal cars in




8           PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
the presence of applauding crowds, are ever and anon
seen to cast lingering glances at those dark avenues of forbidden research, and are stung by secret misgivings lest
after all those avenues should not be issueless, but might
some day open on a grander plain. They are not quite
at ease in the suspicion that other minds confessedly of
splendid powers can deliberately relinquish the certain
glories of scientific labor for the nebulous splendors of
Metaphysics.  They are not quite at ease lest what to
their unaided vision now appears a nebula may not one
day by aided vision resolve itself into stars. This hesitation is comprehensible: it is due in some measure to
an imperfect appreciation of the limits and possibilities
of Research, and in many cases due to the fact that many
minds well trained in Science are imperfectly trained in
Philosophy; hence a want of harmony in their conceptions leads them to follow implicitly in one direction the
principles which they peremptorily reject in another.
8. Few researches can be conducted in any one line of
inquiry without sooner or later abutting on some metaphysical problem, were it only that of Force, Matter, or
Cause; and since Science will not, and Metaphysics cannot solve it, the result is a patchwork of demonstration
and  speculation very pitiable to contemplate.  Look
where we will, unless we choose to overlook all that we
do not understand, we are mostly confronted with a
meshwork of fact and fiction, observation curiously precise beside traditions painfully absurd, a compound of
sunlighlt and mist. Thus in various writings we come
upon Laws which compel phenomena to obey their prescription, - Plans and Archetypal Ideas which shape the
course of events, and give forms and functions to organisms, - Forces playing about like sprites amid Atoms
that are at once contradictorily indivisible and infinitely
divisible, - Bodies acting where they are not, and Non



SCIENTIFIC MIETHOD IN METAPIHYSICS.          9
Being (pure space) endowed with physical properties,
among others that of resistance (since Forces in spite of
their alleged independence of Matter are supposed to be
diminished by the spaces they traverse); — these and many
analogous phantoms, more or less credited, too frequently
hover amid phenomena, and convert speculation into
what Hegel in another connection sarcastically calls a
"true wvitches' circle." *
9. Why is this?  Mainly because men of science are
generally trained either to ignore all metaphysical questions, or to regard them as " mysteries which must be accepted."  Some of the first have their confidence shaken
by the steadfast faith of the metaphysician that the mlysteries can be unveiled.  Some of the second are found
expressing decided opinions on those very mysteries declared to lie beyond human ken.  Both argue from metaphysical assumptions and traditions as from  acceptable
data.  Both resemble those theologians who solemnlly
affirm  God to -be unknowable, yet nevertheless have no
hesitation in assigning attributes to his nature, and purposes to his creations.
The continuance of metaphysical inquiry is, for the
present at least, inevitable.  The continuance of the
metaphysical Method is a serious evil, and is evitable.
It sustains and fortifies those theological conceptions
which would be seen to be preposterous, were it not for
the dialectical dexterity which presents them  in a light
assuredly no less rational than that in which many metaphysical conceptions are presented.  It is this which
causes the adhesion of so many enlinent men of science
* "In der That befindet man sich in einer Art von Hexenkreise
worin Bestimmungen des Daseyns und Bestimmungen cler Reflexion,
Grund und Begriindetes, Phnenomene und Phantome in unausgeschiedener Gesellschaft clurch einander laufen und gleichen Rang mit einander
geniessen." - Logick, II. 93.




10           PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
to theological dogmas flagrantly at variance with their
positive knowledge. Renouncing all hope of a rational
solution, yet unable to release their minds from the pressure of certain problems, they fly to Faith for refuge.
One of the sincerest of men and one of the most cautious
of investigators, - Faraday, - when asked by a friend
how he could believe the astounding propositions current
in the religious sect to which he belonged, replied: "I
prostrate my reason in this matter; for if I applied the
same process of reasoning which I use in matters of science I should be an unbeliever."  It was in a less philosophical spirit that Pascal wrote: "Je trouve bien qu'on
n'approfonclisse pas le systeme de Copernic."  Pascal carried even into Science his theological terror at the possible consequences of reasoning when a dognma seemed in
peril; Faraday kept the two provinces and their two
Methods distinct.  It is remarkable that both these great
men were not reassured by the certainty that no truth in
one direction can really contradict another; and Faraday
Inight have been told that the legitimate application of
those tests and sanctions which he regarded as sufficient
in physical research, might, if applied to metaphysical or
theological questions, make him an unbeliever in the doctrines of his sect, but not an unbeliever in the truths
which replaced them.
10. It may be noted that Metaphysics refusing to
adopt the Mlethod of Science has received the protection
of Theology, but only such protection as is accorded to a
vassal, and which is changed into hostility whenever their
conclusions clash, or whenever argument threatens to disturb the secular slumber of dognma. Treated as a vassal
by Theology, it is treated by Science as a visionary.  Is
there no escape from this equivocal position?
We have two cardinal facts to consider: first, that
certain problems, though incessantly grappled with, have




SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN METAPHYSICS.       11
yielded no permanently accepted solutions; secondly,
that in spite of constant failure they press on our attention with ever-renewed solicitation. Here, then, is ample
justification for the attempt to create a doctrine capable
of emnbracing all that Metaphysics rationally may seek
and all that Science finds, by the reduction of both to
common principles and common tests. One Method, one
Logic, one canon of Truth and Demonstration, must be
applied to both. Which must it be? Not the one hitherto employed in Metaphysics: its incompetence is manifest in the unprogressive nature of its results. There is,
therefore, only the alternative of prolonging this uncertainty, or of adopting the Method which has been uniformly successful wherever rightly employed.




12          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
CHAPTER II.
THE CONDITIONS STATED.
11. WHAT is here proclaimed is the possibility of finding rational solutions to questions which have hitherto
baffled effort. And this will be effected by invoking
those principles only which are invoked in physical research. The probabilities which guide us, and the certainties on which we rest in Science, will guide us here.
In such an attempt, precisely because it is a first attempt,
there will assuredly be much imperfection; but the
-reader's agreement is far less claimed in respect of any
particular solutions here offered, than in respect of the
conditions of the search. No one thinks of discrediting
scientific Method because the particular conclusions of
the physicist or biologist are often debatable and sometimes false. All I claim is a recognition of the legitimacy of the attempt to apply the rational procedure of
Science to every question which may rationally be asked.
This is founded on the conception that under the two
cardinal points of view - -,t/at is to be known, and htow
it can be known - the object and the logic- there is
the same accordance between Metaphysics and Physics
as between any two branches of inquiry, - Mathematics
and Biology, for example. What is known, what is knowable, and what is unknowable in the one, and why these
are so, having their counterparts in the other. The several sciences differ amongst each other by reason of the
differences in their sensible data, and the complexity of




SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN MIETAPHYSICS.       13
the phenomena they investigate.  With these differences
necessarily arise different means of investigation, different
tests, and different degrees of certainty. Each science has
thus its special logic. The means and tests which suffice in
Mathematics are no longer sufficiently comprehensive for
Physics; the looic of Biology is, in special characters,
unlike that of Chemistry. Yet one Method, one Logic,
rules throughout; and this general Method may be applied to problems - social or metaphysical - which have
hitherto been investigated in a quite different spirit, and
under different tests. When so applied, it will reach
results having scientific certainty, because conforming to
the conditions of Science.  Mlore cannot lawfully be
claimed. If after all efforts there still loom in the distance vast stretches of untrodden ground, and beyond
these a region inaccessible to man, - this is equally true
of all research.  I do not claim  a wider reach nor a
higher validity for metaphysical conceptions than for
scientific conceptions; but I claim one equivalent reach
and validity. To many minds this holds out promise of
but a meagre result: impatient to pass beyond the limits
of Experience, they will reject a solution which confines
them within the human horizon. That which fascinates
them is the hope of passing beyond this horizon. It will,
therefore, be incumbent on me to show that such a hope
is futile; and 9per contrac that every question which can be
stated in terms of Experience is capable of an answer on
the Experimental iMethod.
12. Not unfrequently in recent times'have men professed to apply the Inductive Method to Mletaphysics;
and proclaimed that they were guided by it in their
speculations.  Nay, even the very pretension of deducing
metaphysical conclusions from the data of Experience has
not been wanting. But to the best of my knowledge all
such pretensions have been illusory, partly because the




14          PIROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
writers imperfectly understood the'Method of Science,
and mainly because they did not consistently apply it.
The idea of applying such a procedure is one thing; /,how
it can be applied, is another. At this present moment I
have a conviction that the Differential Calculus coucld be
applied to Psychology, and will be in some future time;
but I have no distinct vision of how to make the beginning, because I cannot yet determine the co-ordinates,
cannot put the questions in a calculable shape. It has
been thus with philosophers who talked of applying Scientific Method to Metaphysics.  Unless I deceive myself
these pages will show how the problems may be presented in a soluble shape; how they may be affiliated to all
other soluble problems.
13. By way of preliminary I will ask permission to
coin a term that will clearly designate the aspect of Metaphysics which renders the inquiry objectionable to scientific thinkers, no less than to ordinary minds, because it
implies a disregard of experience; by isolating this aspect in a technical term we may rescue the other aspect
which is acceptable to all. The word, Metaphysics is a
very old one, and in the course of its history has indicated many very different things.  To the vulgar it now
stands for whatever is speculative, subtle, abstract, remote
from ordinary apprehension; and the pursuit of its inquiries is secretly regarded as an eccentricity, or even a
mild form of insanity. To the cultivated it sometimes
means Scholastic Ontology, sometimes Psychology, pursued
independently of Biology, and sometimes, though more
rarely, the highest generalizations of Physics. In spite of
this laxity in its use, the term is so good a term, and has
had godfathers so illustrious, that if possible it ought to be
preserved. And it may be preserved if we separate it from
its Method, and understand it in its primitive sense as
~Ta ye'ra'     ra OVaLKo', that which comes cfter Physics, and




SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN METAPHYSICS.        15
embraces the ultimate generalizations of Research. It thus
becomes a term for the science of the most general conceptions. This is the Aristotelian view of it, adapted to
modern thought.  It is also in accordance with the
scheme of Bacon, which represents Philosophy as a pyramid, having the history of Nature for its basis, an account of the powers and principles which operate in Nature (Physics) for its second stage, and an apex of formal
and final causes (Metaphysics) for the third stage.*  Let
us only modify the Baconian conception by substituting
"the highest generalization of Research," in lieu of the
"formal and final causes," and we have a grand province
to bear the ancient name.
14. But what is implied in this arrangement? That
since we are to rise to Metaphysics through Science, we
must never forsake the Method of Science; and further
that, if in conformity with inductive principles we are
never to invoke aid from any higher source than Experience, we must perforce discard all inquiries whatever
which transcend the ascertained or ascertainable data of
Experience. Hence the necessity for a new word which
will clearly designate this discarded remainder,- a word
which must characterize the nature of the inquiries rejected.  If then the Emtpirical designates the province we
include within the range of Science, the province we
exclude may fitly be styled the Jietelegpiriccl.
The terms Empiricism, Empiricist, Empirical, although
commonly employed by metaphysicians with contempt,
to mark a mode of investigation which admits no hilgher
source than Experience (by them  often unwarrantably
restricted to Sensation), may be accepted without demur,
since even the flavor of contempt only serves to emphasize the distinction.  There will perhaps be an equivalent
* Compare the passage, too long for extract, ill SECCHI, L'2uiti deall
Folrze Fisiche, p. 470. Rome, 1864.




16           PROBLEMIS OF LIFE AND MIND.
contempt in the minds of positive thinkers attaching to
the term  Metempirical; but since this term is the exact
correlative of Empirical, and designates whatever lies beyond the limits of possible Experience, it characterizes
inquiries which one class regards as vain and futile,
another as exalted above mere scientific procedure.  Nor
is this the only advantage of the term; it also detaches
from  Iletaphysics a vast range of insoluble problems,
leaving behind it only such as are soluble.
15. Thus whatever conceptions can be reached through
logical extensions of experiecnce, and can be shown to be
conforvmcable wuit it, are legitimate products, capable of
being used as principles for further research. On the
contrary, whatever lies beyond the limits of Experience,
and claims another origin than that of Induction and Deduction from  established data, is illegitimate.  It can
never become a principle of research, but only an object
of infertile debate.  The metempirical region is the void
where Speculation roams unchecked, where Sense has
no footing, where Experiment can exercise no control
and where Calculation ends in Impossible Quantities.
In short, Physics and Metaphysics deal with things and
their relations, as these are known to us, and as they are
believed to exist in our universe; lMetempirics sweeps out
of this region in search of the othlerness of things: seeking
to behold things, not as they are in our universe, - not
as they are to us, —it substitutes for the ideal constructions of Science the ideal constructions of Imagination.
16. The reader may here ask how it is that great metaphysicians, like Descartes, Leibnitz, and Kant, who were
also great scientific thinkers, failed to perceive that the
Afethod they followed in Mathematics and Physics was
equally applicable in Metaphysics? The answer is simple. The traditional influence of metempirical conceptions, and the potency of certain prejudices, which Science




SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN METAPHYSICS.           17
confessed its inability to justify or eradicate, prevented
these philosophers from  even conceiving the possibility
of excluding metempirical data.  Kant who, in his exposition of the relativity of knowledge, came so near a true
conception of Method, not only missed the truth, and fell
back upon the traditional prejudice of Innate Ideas, or cb
p'riori Forms of Thought, as the source of knowledge, but
expressly declared that "the fountain of Metaphysic can
in no sense be empirical, its axioms and principles must
never be drawn frorn Experience, either inward or outward," X - a declaration which ceases to be even plausible
when his unwarrantable restriction of Experience to mere
sensation is set aside. Nor is this all. Granting that
AMetaphysic could dispense with the inductions of Experience, all that it could effect for Philosophy would be
the superfluous explanation of phenomena which lie outside the circle of Experience; whereas Philosophy aims at
an explanation of the world in which we have our being.
Consider this: If abstract Science, which obtains its
principles through  concrete phenomena, is confessedly
incapable of explaining concrete phenomena, but only
capable of guiding us to their explanation, how much less
hope can there be of an explanation of concrete phenomena from principles that do not pretend to an empirical
basis! Kant displayed great ingenuity in proving that,
the empirical and metempirical worlds (by him called the
phenomenal and noumenal) having nothing in common,
no conclusions formed respecting the one could have any
validity when extended to the other.  Why, then, did he
continue to coquet iwith Metempirics, after having struck
such blows at its foundation?  I believe it was partly
* KANT, Prolegomnena zm jedler kZiiftigyen cetaphysikj, ~ 1. It is true
that by Metaphysic he sometimes only means the inquiry into the limits
of knowledge; but at others he means what is usually meant by the
word, namely, metempirical inquiry.
B




18            PROBLEMS OF LIFE  AND MIND.
the consequence of the traditional conception that metempirical knowledge was possible; and partly the want
of any clear conception of how  the Method of Science
could be applied to questions which insisted on an answer.
17. Hegel, on the other hand, is urgent for treating
Metaphysics and Science on the same Method.  Unhappily
he has a very erroneous view of the conditions of inquiry;
and in point of fact reverses the principle I am here proclaiming, and  instead of treating Metaphysics by the
Method of Science, treats Science by the Method of Metaphysics.   He separates the philosophical sciences into
empirical and speculative.  The empirical embrace those
which furnish axioms, laws, theories, —the thought of
what is actual.  So far he seems to be arguing on our
side; but he adds, "However satisfactory this knowledge
may be in its own field, there are other subjects which it
does not include, -  Freedom, Mind, God."     And elsewhere (~ 37) he characterizes the tendency to prove
everything by finite consideration as "Empiricism, which,
instead of seeking truth in Thought itself, seeks it in
groping amid Experience inward and outward"; adding
that consequent Empiricism  excludes all knowledge whatever of the Suprasensible.  It is unnecessary to pause
and consider unr under what aspects Hegel's view coincides
with the strictly positive conception of Research; all we
have here to note is the retention of those very metem"'Wir heissen jene Wissenschaften, welche Philosophie gennant
worden sind, empirische Wissenschaften, von dem Ausgangspunkte den
sie nehmlen. Aber das Wesentliche das sie bezwecken und hervorschaffen
sind Gesetze, allgemeine sitze, eine Theorie; die Gedanken des Vorhandenen.... So befriedigend zunlchist liese Erkenntniss in ihren Felde
ist, so zeigt sich fuirs erste noch ein anderer Kreis von Gegenst0nden die
darin nicht befasst sind — Freiheit, Geist, Gott. Sie sind auf jenem
Boden nicht dartum zu finden weil sie der Erfahrung nieht angehbren
sollten." - HEGEL, Encykllopddie der Philos. TWissenschacften, ~ ~ 7, 8.




SCIENTIFIC MIETHOD IN METAPHYSICS.      19
pirical elements, which it is the aim of Science to exclude. In point of fact, when we see Hegel at work we
find that the metempirical is not kept apart from the
empirical, but dominates it; and his inquiries inl Physics
no less than in Psychology are all vitiated by this.
18. Thus while metaphysicians have never really applied scientific Method, because they have never relinquished their faith in the Metempirical, men of science
have never thought that their Method could be applied to
M{etaphysics, because they imagined that Metaphysics
was inseparable from Metempirics.  It is this misapprehension we must rectify by showing that the problems
rightly stated are empirical precisely in the degree that
physical problems are so, and that both are in an equal
degree metempirical when improperly stated.  Scientific
thinkers, viewing certain questions solely in the light in
which metaphysicians were accustomed to place them,
and seeing that to these no application of ordinary tests
was applicable, declared- and the declaration rapidly
became a dogma-that "all such questions relate to
mysteries beyond human ken." With this magisterial
phrase they justified their neglect of problems they were
unable to solve.
19. Such lavish humility is far from admirable. Such
readiness to admit mysteries is misleading. We have no
right by self-abasement to abase Humanity, and thus present our own incompetence as the standard of power.
Particularly objectionable are these professions of h-umility when accompanied, and they often are, by exaggerated
pretensions, so that the man who considers it almost a
religious duty humbly to avow his eternal ignorance of
Cause, Force, Mind, and the like, has no hesitation in
expressing decided and precise opinions respecting their
nature and modes of operation. It is thereby manifest
that the ignorance on which he eloquently insists is your




20           PROBLEIMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
ignorance rather than his.  Nay, even when this is not
so, and he avows his ignorance sincerely, lie is too apt to
regard the avowal as an act of piety, — a confession of
his "nothingness."
Philosophy, thus boasting of its own impotence, is a
tradition of that theological spirit which, terrified at the
free exercise of Doubt, yet conscious of the necessity of
Doubt for the activity of Reason, excommunicated the
Intellect as an heresiarch, after having vilified this life as
a theatre for Satan.  There was a timne when all knowledge was considered dangerous, except for theologians
and lawyers; for others it was of the nature of Magic.
The tradition still lingers, and a vague horror hangs over
all "prying into the mysteries of the universe."  It may
be noticed influencing audiences at almost every scientific
lecture not addressed to students.  Ludicrous, were it not
painful, would be the eagerness of delight with which
every acknowledgment of ignorance and incompetence is
saluted by the listeners.  Although they are seated there
to learn what has been discovered respecting the processes of Nature, they are never so well pleased as when
told that what has been discovered is nothing compared
with the undiscoverable. Let but the lecturer say, - and
he must often say it, -" Here Science pauses.  Beyond
this we cannot go.  Beyond this lie mysteries before
which the wisest philosopher is no better than a child,"
- immediately a round of applause bursts forth; numnerous feet stamp approval; flattered Ignorance feels at ease,
and shakes its head significantly.  "Ah  you see, Science
is vain there. In spite of its proud boasts, there are mysteries it cannot penetrate!"
Now surely it is.no matter of exhilaration, but rather
of deep regret, that we find ourselves in a universe of
mystery, compelled to grope our way amid shadows, with
terrible penalties affixed to each false step. To resign




SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN METAPHYSICS.              21
ourselves to this condition is one thing; another to exult
in it, and claim the exultation as an- act of piety.  Among
the many strange servilities mistaken for pieties, one of
the least lovely is that which hopes to flatter God by
despising the world and vilifying human nature.*
20. There is no intention here of applauding the unthinking confidence which leads many minds to pursue
inquiries beyond their powers, nor of underrating the
lessons which dissuade us from  such efforts.  It is of
supreme importance that -we should ascertain the limits
of Research.  But these limits must be ascertained, not
arbitrarily assigned.  Before declaring any subject inaccessible, to others no less than to ourselves, we must
clearly see the grounds why it is so; and before attempting to reach one that is accessible, we must have some
vision of the path by which it may be reached.t  Inaccessibility is relative, and science has answered questions
which, to minds unfamiliar with its data and procedures,
might seem hopelessly beyond human power; which indeed, in the absence of such data and procedures, would
be beyond it.  What, for example, could be more absurd
than for one of the laity to attempt to measure and weigh
stars many millions of millions of miles removed from
his grasp, or to  ascertain the velocity of Light, or of
the translation of our solar system towards the constellation of Hercules?  Yet Geometry, Trigonometry, and
]Dynamics render these thinfgs possible.  We believe the
statements that the sensation of violet is produced by the
striking  of the ethereal waves against the retina more
* The Author of Creation is the only author who is supposed to be
flattered by our lavish assurance that his works are imbecile.
t The padre Secchi, noticing the readiness with which men conclude that nothing is -known on certain subjects, quietly remarks that
this is a conclusion " che se onora il filosofo ove manchi fondamento alla
deduzione, lo degrada ove derivi dal non saper intendere il linguaggio
della Natura." - L' Unitct delle Forze Fisichle, p. 51. 1864.




22          PROBLEMS IN LIFE AND MIND.
than seven hundred billions of times in a second, and
that our sun and its planets are moving through space
with a velocity of many millions of miles in a year; but
these statements are accepted on trust by us who know
that there are thinkers for whom they are irresistible conclusions; the facts belong to mysteries penetrable only
through a mathematical initiation.
21. It is thus also with Metaphysics. Its problems
are inaccessible, and must remain so to minds which will
not approach them through the only accessible path.
But there is a path through which they may be accessible; all depends on our selecting it. A few years since
it would have been preposterous to speculate on the present chemical constitution of the sun's atmosphere; it
would have been one of the mysteries which no astronoiner would consider investigable. AVhy? Simply because there were no accessible data. The question was
one wholly beyond the known paths. It was so obviously
metempirical that even metaphysicians abstained from
speculating on it. Suddenly the discovery of spectrum
analysis placed an instrument in our hands by which the
presence of gases and vapors in the sun's atmosphere
could be ascertained as rigorously as their presence in our
laboratories. The mystery submitted to demonstration.
Newton's feat of interpreting celestial Mechanics by the
laws of motion detected on our planet (with the consequent reflected improvement in the definition of those
very laws) was supplemented by the identification of the
chemistry of the stars with that of our planet, and the
consequent revelation of new substances in our earths and
waters, which might otherwise have remained unsuspected. In like manner one may hope that the application of scientific Method to problems hitherto inaccessible
may reflect light on questions of Science otherwise hopelessly obscure. (Compare ~ 62 a.)




SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN METAPHYSICS.              23
22. In saying that all depends on the selection of the
right path, I may appear to be uttering a truism, the
very difficulty being precisely this selection.  It is, however, only a truism to those who believe such a path
may be found. The majority do not believe it, but insist that Metaphysics is essentially removed from any
access through Experience. There is something gained,
then, if we gain the admission that a pathway through
Experience is possible. To effect this it may be requisite
to show  that unless some stringent proof be advanced
in support of the assumption that the human mind is
endowed with a special organ for the perception of metempirical relations, there must be either a total abandonment of metaphysical Speculation or an adoption of the
empirical Method.  And I hope to show that there is no
such special organ.  Meanwhile let us here consider two
favorite arguments for the continuance of the old speculations, with which lmetaphysicians vindicate their neglect of science.
23. First, it is said that "a noble impulse moves the
soul to rise above the sordid aims of Science, which is
mainly  anxious  to  satisfy  our vulgar  needs."   This
ascription of a nobler aim must be rejected, not only
because of its unwarrantable self-complacency,* but because of its misrepresentation of the true position of
Science, which - as will hereafter appear (Prob. I. Chap.
V.) - is purely that of an Ideal Construction. Science is
* It is in this sense that Hegel likens a people without Metaphysic to
a temple without its Holy of Holies.  "These be brave'orts," as Sir
Hugh Evans would say; and would be justified if the pretensions of
MIetaphysic were justified; but when we examine these we come to
Trendelenburg's conclusion respecting the Hegelian procedure: "Man
fragt nicht mehr was mizt zenschlichea 2Iitteln geschehen kcatnn, sondern
was nach h6heren Ideal geschehen sollte. Man nimmt die Absicht der
Dialektik fiir die That. Aber weil sie hoch greift, hat sie nicht das
H6he ergriffen; und weil sie mehr verspricht, ist das Versprochene noch
nicht da." - Logische Unterstlchungen, I. 105. 1862.




24           PROBLEMS IN LIFE AND MIIND.
an idealist, moving amid the world of realities as if thcy
were but fleeting shadows, and as if the only permlanent
existences were Abstractions.  But were this otherwise,
and were the satisfaction of our commonest needs the
only aim, the objection would be none the less mlisplaced.  There is no greater vulgarity than that of despising the common needs of life as vulgar.  It is the
greatness of Science, that, while satisfyingO the spiritual
thirst for knowledge, it satisfies the pressing desire for
guidance in action; not only painting a picture of the
wondrous labyrinth of Nature, but'placing in our hands
the Ariadne-thread to lead us through the labyrinth.
24. The second plea urges that, granting the study to
be doomed to failure, the mere energy it evokes is so
strengthening' and ennobling  that Aletelmpirics must
always be an admirable course of intellectual gymnastics.
The answer to this is simple.  Without denying that
intellectual athletes may find in it an arena for the exercise and display of their powers, we may urge that there
are other and nobler arenas than the Gymnasium, where
the greatest powers may not only be freely exercised, but
exercised for the welfare of mnankind.  The measureless
region of scientific Research is not only capable of calling
out every intellectual faculty, but is one in which no
exercise is sterile.*  Incapable of application to concrete
phenomena and the practical needs, incapable of demonstration because incapable of verification, the most splendid
achievements in the metempirical arena are sterile displays.
25. Although it is true that only those problems which
are capable of solution can profitably employ mankind,
the common assertion that metaphysical problems are
incapable of solution is true when  there is a tacit assumption that they can only be investigated on the
Ml[etaphysical MAethod.  But the whole subject changes
Compare on this subject COMITE, PolitiqZe Positive, III. 13, 14.




SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN METAPHYSICS.                 25
its aspect directly we institute the distinction between
Metaphysics and Metempirics.   Unless this distinction
be  clearly  maintained, call problems  whatever become
hopeless, and we are incapable of explaining the simplest
phenomenon; with this distinction, all problems whatever become capable of solution, under empirical limits.
26. The objection will doubtless be raised that such a
procedure as that of excluding all mnetempirical data, and
rejecting all metempirical inquiry, is an obliteration of
the characteristic peculiarity of Metaphysics, and an evasion of the difficulty.  It will be urged that an empirical
answer to  speculative  questions can  never satisfy the
mind yearning for insight into the world of things behirnd
phenomena,-  for knowledge of the otherness of thins, 
for glimpses of " the light that nLeveer was on sea or shore."
This is so.  But we must remember that whatever speculative curiosity may prompt, our real and lasting interest
is in ascertainingr the order of the things we know.  A
sublime aspiration after the otherness of things is sublimely irrational.  To know things as they are to us, is
all we need to know, all that is possible to be known: a
knowledge of the Suprasensible, were it gained, would,
by the  very fact of coming  under the conditions of
knowledle, only be knowledge of its relations to us; the
knowledge would still be relative, phenomenal.*
W What Professor Tait says of Quaternions may here be made to illustrate the distinction between the empiricist and metempiricist, if we
allow the pure mathematician to stand for the latter: " In the eyes of
the pure mathematician Quaternions have one grand and fatal defect.
They cannot be applied to space of n dimensions; they are contented to
deal with those three poor dimensions in which mere mortals are doomed
to dwell.  From the physical point of view this, instead of being regarded as a defect, is the greatest possible recommendation.  It shows, in
fact, Quaternions to be a special instrument so constructed for application
to the Actual as to have thrown overboard everything which is not absolutely necessary, without the slightest consideration whether or not it was
thereby being rendered useless for application to the Inconceivable."Address before the Jlcethematical Section of the British Association, 1871.




26          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
CHAPTER III.
THE METHOD.
27. A MOMENT'S reflection will show that the Experiential Mlethod is by no means restricted to that enumeration of particulars and classification of sensations which
is assumed to be its scope by those philosophers who
vilify it under the name of Empiricism, and those
rhetors who declaim against it as dealing with nothing
but what can be seen and felt. It is the methodizing
of what is known. The range of the known embraces
much more than the sensible.  (See Prob. I., Ch. IV.)
Not only the direct presentations to Sense, but the indirect representations, - the verifiable Inferences from
Sense,- constitute its elements.  Not only the individual experiences, slowly acquired, but the accumlulated Experience of the race, organized in Language,
condensed in Instruments and Axioms, and in what may
be called the inh/erited Intuitions, - these form the multiple unity which is expressed in the abstract term
Experience.  This being stated once for all by way of
forestalling hasty criticism, let us now proceed with our
exposition.
28. WThether the object of research be Nature, Alan, or
Society in general, or some special group of their phenomena, we always find it presenting three aspects: 10,
the positive or known; 2~, the spieculative or unknown
though knowable; 3~, the tunkncowacble. The two first are
empirical; the third is metempirical.  The two first rest




SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN MIETAPHYSICS.               27
either, 1~, on direct Sensation and verified Inference,* or,
2~, on Intuition and logical deductions from   Intuition,
which are verifiable by direct or indirect reduction  to
Sensation.   The third  rests on no such bases, and is
therefore distinguishable from  the two former in  kind,
not simply in degree.
29. By way of illustration, suppose the object investigated is the motion of the heavenly bodies. The first
step is to determine the positive, or known, elements of
the question, namely, that all the planets move round the
sun in the same direction and in nearly the same plane,
and that, inasmuch as their orbits are nearly circular,
they  describe  paths which  are  parallel.  This general
plane of circulation is very nearly the plane of the sun's
equator.  The same facts are ascertained respecting the
motion  of the satellites round  their planets, although
their equators have various inclinations to the plane of
the sun's equator. This leads to the inference that the
two circulations of planets and satellites, although independent as facts, depend on the same principle, and have
a common origin.  What is that?  This question brings
forward  the  speculative  aspect.  The principle  sought
cannot be seen, it must be deduced.  Speculation is seeing with the mind's eye what is not present to Sense or
to Intuition.  It is ideal construction,  and begins with
conjecture, — too often, alas! ending where it began.
* "In the experimental department," says Professor Challis, "a law
is a grouping of observed facts; in the theoretical, the law is shown to
be the consequence of certain primary facts. Every fact and every law
which experiment makes known is a problem for the theorist to solve by
mathematical reasoning," - aided by Conjecture, let us add. Thus Kepler discovered the fact that the radius vector of each planet describes
round the sun equal areas in equal times, and conjectured that each
planet tended continuously towards the sun, -in consequence, he thought,
of a magnetic power; this was a conjecture supporting a conjecture.
Newton grasping the fact observed, and the fact conjectured, solved the
problem by mathematical reasoning which dispensed with the hypothetical magnetic power and disclosed the law.




28          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
The satellites present also another remarkable law,
their rotation on their own axes being executed in the
same time as their rotation round their planets (hence we
always see the same face of the moon). This law is positive; it is the observed order.  But the cause, i. e. that
it depends on tidal friction in the satellite while it was
still in motion, is at present speculative.
Suppose now the astronomer, after expounding the positive and speculative aspects of the planetary lmotions,
is led to expound his conception of the plr1)ose which
these laws were intended to fulfil in creation, and his
estimate of the wisdom and benevolence in so disposing
them, and not otherwise, - is it not obvious that in this
teleological explanation he quits the ground of Experience
to enter on that region where all sensible data and all
verifiable inferences vanish?  His conjectures on this
point may be approximately right or absurdly wrong; no
possible means of determining whether they are right or
wrong exist. If he regard them as no more than subjective fancies wherewith to satisfy his own feelings, we
cannot object.  But if he regard them as in any degree
entering into astronomical science, and if he permit any
deductions from them to modify the positive and speculative data or in any way to modify the course of astronomical thought, he violates the first principle of Method,
by suffering the empirical to be controlled by the metempirical, and allowing the unknowable to distort the
known.
30. Having thus sharply defined the three aspects
which every question may present, and which every one
would always present had not men long ago quietly set
aside the metempirical aspect in most questions of practical aim and most questions of scientific research, I need
scarcely insist that in dealing with the speculative we
ought to follow the same canons as in dealing with the




SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN METAPHYSICS.                29
positive, except that we are forced to substitute analogies
for perceptions, forced to employ hypotheses and rely on
inferences.  When a platinum  vwire is raised gradually to
a white heat, we see a succession of combinations of more
and more of the primitive colors, but we do not see the
motions of the wire which successively determine these
colors, nor the tremors of the optic tract which are determined by these motions and produce these colors.  WVe
only see the changing colors.  We infer the rest.  But
these inferences have been verified a thousand times, and
are but reproductions of analogical experiences. Our mental
vision is a reproduction of the past and application to the
present. It is Experience - our own or that of others -
on which we rest.  WVe are not at liberty to inlvent Experience, nor to infer anything contgcrary to it, only to extend
it analogically.  Speculation to be valid must be simply
the extension of Experience by the analogies of experienCeS.*
31. The  speculative begins where the positive ends;
and where the speculative quits the ground of Sense and
Verification, the region of the AMetempirical begins.  It
is possible to move securely on the ground of Speculation
so long as we carefully pick our way, and consider each
position insecure till what was merely probable becomes
* "From a starting-point furnished by his own researches, or those of
others, the investigator proceeds by combining intuition and verification.
He ponders the knowledge he possesses, and tries to push it further; he
guesses, and checks his guess; he cpnjectures, and confirms or explodes
his conjecture. These guesses are hdb no means leaps in the dark; for
knowledge once gained casts a faint1 light beyond its own immediate
boundaries.... The profoundest minds know best that Nature's ways
are not at all times their ways, and that the brightest flashes in the world
of thought are incomplete until they have been proved to have their
counterparts in the world of fact. Thus the vocation of the true experimentalist may be defined as the continued exercise of spiritual insight,
and its incessant correction and realization." - TYNDALL, Frdcgme~nts of
Science, p. 110. 1871.




30          PIROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
proven. But in the rnetempirical region we have not
even probability as a guide; it is a morass of uncertainty where all footing yields and all tests fail. In this
region, conjectures, however fantastic, are as valid as
conceptions which seem rational. They maintain their ascendency over the mind which has once admitted them,
because being, by the nature of the case, incapable of
proof, they are incapable of refutation; they never approach near enough to the truths of Experience for us to
show how widely they diverge from or contradict it.
32. Whenever a question is couched in terms that ignore Experience, reject known truths, and invoke inaccessible data, - i. e. data inaccessible through our present
means, or through any conceivable extension of those
means, -it is metempirical, and Philosophy can have
nothing to do with it. We need not trouble ourselves
with it, until in possession of the requisite means; it is
cwy'o2mned, not suppressed.  Perilous it may be to set
bounds to human possibilities, and to forejudge what
future inquiries may disclose; but there is no peril in
standing inflexibly by the rule which declares all questions to be unanswerable when the means of answeringi
them are not at hand. He who propounds an answer is
called upon to show that he has the requisite means.
What is invisible to the naked eye may be made visible
by nMicroscope or telescope. Let these be produced, and
their powers demonstrated. No assertion, however confident, will suffice; no "inner vision" which dispenses
with verification. Roger Bacon passionately declared
that lhe comld construct an instrument which would make
objects visible at a distance of many miles; and because
such instruments have been constructed, he is believed to
have anticipated the discovery, whereas, in point of fact,
he not only made no such discovery, but showed, in his
very statement of the conception he had formed, that he




SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN METAPHYSICS.        31
had not mastered the elementary principles which were
requisite. The theories of many speculators are in this
not unlike the telescope of Roger Bacon.
33. While no question which cannot be couched in
terms of Experience, and answered on its data, ought for
a moment to be entertained, any question which can be
so asked and answered is admissible. In Science this
has long been understood; in Metaphysics it is ignored.
No geologist, no biologist, would listen patiently if asked,
What is the succession of strata in Sirius? WVhat are
the leading characters of the flora and fauna of Saturn?
Yet metaphysicians patiently listen to questions of equal
irrelevance; nay, confidently give answers to them.
WVithout travelling so far as Sirius, suppose we present
a new substance to the chemist, and ask himn what are its
properties, and what reactions it will exhibit under given
conditions. He will decline to answer until he has sufficiently examined the substance and classed it among
substances already known; because he is aware that any
guess he nmay make before trial munst be valueless unless
guided by analogy; in as far as it is like known substances he will infer that it has like properties.  Guessing is
only fertile in proportion to the fertility of the experiences it reproduces. If a man knows little, he can infer
but little. All knowledge is reproduction of experiences,
the direct'or indirect assimilation (making like) of the
new phenomena to phenomena resembling them, formerly
experimented on. Ask the profoundest analyst to resolve an equation numerically, and he is silent unless the
values of the coefficients are assigned; nor can the child
tell the result of multiplying 5 by 5, until he has learned
the multiplication-table.
34. Must not this be equally true in Metaphysics?
To ask the metaphysician to answer questions respecting
things per se (or what is lieually understood by them),




32           PROBLEMS OF LIFE AN D MIND.
and to tell us their nature and properties, is asking him
to resolve equations numerically,without assigninrg their
several values to the coefficients.  Nay more, these values caCnzot be assigned, for the symbols profess to be
symbols of what was never presented in Experience.
But if instead of this irrational procedure we give the
metaphysician verifiable data, he can deal with thenm as
the physicist and chemist deal with theirs; and his answers will be as valid as theirs, if his data and mlethodl
be like theirs.
35. Hitherto metaphysicians have asked, What is Matter? WVhat is Force? What is Cause? And these words
are symbols of an imaginary class of Noumena, Dingc-ansich, Things as they ccar and underlying the Things which
crplccav, - a world behind phenomena, incapable of being
sensibly grasped, but supposed to have a more perfect
reality than the phenomenal world.  Because questions
thus irrationally put are found to yield no rational answers, one class of thinkers hurries to the conclusion that
this impotence proves all metaphysical inquiries to be
icdle; another class infers that knowledge of this superior
world must be gained through another source than that
relied on in the investigation of phenomena.  BEut we
may urge that all inquiries are not idle because some are
improperly conceived; nor is any special organ needed
for the interpretation of questions rationally put.  Since
it is a fact that we have ideas of Matter, Force, Cause,
etc., and that these words are symbols of sensible experiences, the genesis of such ideas and the interpretation
of such symbols are not less legitimate objects of inquiry
than the genesis and interpretation of our ideas of AnimIal, Plant, Planet, or Cosmos. I shall hereafter endeavor
to make clear that these abstract ideas are integrant parts
of what I call the Lohgic of Feeling, before they are raised
into terms of the Logic of Signs. They are threads




SCIENTIFIC 2,IETHOD IN METAPHYSICS.     33
woven into the web of Experience; and because they
have this warp and woof they are capable of being raised
into the tissue of Abstraction, —they are experiences
before they are signs. The Method which enables us to
unravel the complex threads in the one case will aid us
in the other.
36. As already hinted, the chief source of perplexity is
the irrationality of the terms in which the questions are
propounded.  But although this defect is specially flagrant in the case of Metaphysics, it is frequently noticeable
in Physics. Take, for example, the puzzle concerning
the communication of motion from one body to another,
either through impact or " action at a distance." This
communication is accepted as a fact, and declared to be
beyond our comprehension.  The inconceivability of the
statement is not allowed to suggest a doubt respecting its
certainty. But the inconceivability, when closely examined, will be found to rest entirely on the irrational mode
of expressing the fact observed; instead of stating what is
observed in simple terms, the statement is made in terms
of an hypothesis which cannot be steadily conceived.
What is observed is that one body in motion-that is to
say, in changing space relations - is succeeded by changes
in the space relations of another, and that there is a constancy in this sequence. This not being held sufficient,
there is invented a hypothetical Motion (not an abstract
symbol, but a physical entity), which is passed from one.
body to another like so much milk poured from one jug
into another; and to complete the hypothesis, this Motion
is imagined under the control of the body moving,since this body divides its qzantity of Motion, keeping
one portion to itself and contmuniccatin the other portion
to the other body! Is it strange that having travestied
the observed phenomena in this way, and accepted our
metaphorical language as exact, we marvel that the entity
2*                            c




34            PROBLEMIS OF LIFE AND MIND.
thus created is  beyond  comprehension?  Instead  of
throwing' the onus on human incompetence, suppose we
aslk whether it may not rest on the illusory statement.
Analyze the real data, and it will then be seen that the
"communication of AMotion" is one of those metaphorical
phrases which (as Lagrange remarks, on a somewhat similar occasion ) are supposed to reveal the essence of
Nature's laws, and which can "par quelque vertu secrete
eriger en causes finales, de simples resultats des lois connues de la mecanique."  We first raise a dust and then
exclaim, " Impossible to see through it!"
37. Of a similar kind is the puzzle respecting Force
inherent in Matter.  Neither abstraction is reduced to its
concretes, neither term accurately defined; and then such
questions as the following are asked (which I cite from a
distinguished mathematician and physicist, Maupertius):
" Qu'est-ce que cette force impulsive? comment reside-telle dans les corps? qui efit pu deviner qu'elle y reside
avant que d'avoir vu des corps se choquer?  La rdsidence
des autres proprietes n'est pas plus claire.  Comment
l'impenetrabilite et les autres propri6tes viennent elles se
joindre a l'etenclue?" --
When such questions are detached from  a work and
seriously considered, it seems difficult to uncderstand how
any thinking mind could have propounded them.  Yet,
having puzzled himself with irrational questions, Maupertius evades them with the customary formula: "These
must ever remain mysteries for us."  Mysteries no doubt;
but mysteries quite needlessly fabricated.
38. Examples need not be multiplied; enough if we
understand that every problem  is mysterious when irrationally stated; but, when rationally stated, there is no
greater mystery in the existence of an external world, or
* LAGRANGE, ll]eCCntiqluc Analytiq[ue, I. 245. 1811.
+ MAUPERTIUS, Ser lesficseqres des astres; U(Euvres, p. 65. Dresden, 1752.




SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN METAPHYSICS.         35
the relation between Object and Subject, than in the relation between activity and waste in the tissues, the relation between heat and expansion, or the relation between
an arc and its chord.  The successful interrogation of
Nature mainly depends on the selection of the question
to be put, and the ability with which it is expressed in
terms that admit of an answer.  Hence the first operation in dealing with any metaphysical problem must be
this:
To disengage the metempirical elements, and proceed to treat the empirical elements with the view
of deducing from them the unknown elements, if
that be practicable, or, if the deduction be imnpracticable, of registering the unknown elements as
transcendental.
This procedure seems very simple.  It is the ordinary
procedure of the analyst, whose first operation is to disengage the unknown quantity,   and of the physicist, who
always seeks to eliminate whatever is irrelevant or indetermr:inate, replacing it by exact data, so that nothing
finally remains for exploration but what is expressible in
calculable terms. Yet simple as the procedure may seem,
it lhas rarely been adopted by metaphysicians; and never,
I believe, avowedly stated as a principle of research.  On
the contrary, there has been a confused mincgling of ema
pirical and imetempirical elements, sensations and abstractions, inferences and traditions, exact quantitative data,
and imaginary unquantitative data, facts and phrases,
phenomena and phantoms, - and then it is thought
marvellous that such a network of cordage and cobweb
should let everything run through 
39. Our first operation must be  to disengage  the
unknown quantity, and endeavor to ascertain whether it
is knowable or unknowable; and this will determine
whether it is empirical or metempirical.




36             PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
In every question, from that presented by the growth
of a blade of grass to that presented ill the evolution of a
social organism, from  the chemical union of two gases to
the  formation  of ideal types, there must necessarily be
certain transcendental elements, not determinable by us,
znexljlorecd reccmainders after the most exhaustive exploration.  These may be grouped under three heads:1~. Elements known to be present in the phenomena,
but not yet qluantitatively appreciable, and therefore now
incalculable;
2~. Elements not certainly known to be present, but
assumed hypothetically for the sake of provisional explanation;
3~. Elements which, lying beyond all possible appreciation, because incapable of being brought within  the
range of Sense and Inference, are to be set aside, and not
allowed in any way to enter into the explanation.
40. An illustration or two may here be useful.  Geometers agree that the exact ratio of the circumference of a
circle to its diameter cannot be accurately expressed in
ordinary finite numbers, although the real value may be
approached as nearly as we please.*   They indicate this
* The impossibility of squaring the circle is the attempt to find a
straight line the square on which shall be exactly equal to a given
circle.
The impossibility of expressing the ratio of diameter and circumference in finite numbers was first demonstrated by Lambert in 1761, according to De Morgan.  I imagined from Euler's language that the use
of the symbol 7r was proposed by himself (Imntrocl. A l'Acalyse des infimimexts petits, Chap. VIII. Traduit par Pezzi.  Strasbourg, 1786), but a
friend informs me that this is not the case. Euler gives 128 decimal
places; subsequently Vega carried the expression as far as 140 places.
Now, when it is considered that the first decimal involves only a defect
of hundreds, and ten decimals a defect less than one inch compared with
the circumference of the whole earth, we may say with Leslie that Vega's
was the " luxury of calculation, and, though superfluous, might convince
any judicious person of the impossibility of stating the ratio in finite
terms."




SCIENTIFIC IMETHOD IN  METAPHYSICS.                37
ratio by the sign  r, -  a sign which dispenses with a long
series of figures and an unexplorecd recmainlder.  This sign,
although  entering  into  the expression of the  quantities
compared, does not enter into  the  expression  of their
rctios, but vanishes from  the final equation.  Thus the
surface of a sphere, and the surface of a great circle of
that sphere, are two  quantities which  cannot be accurately expressed in numbers, because 7r enters into  both,
and  this 7r containing  an  unexpllored  r'emcainder must
remain transcendental.  Nevertheless the presence of this
transcendental element produces no disturbance in  the
calculation; for we are certain  that the first quantity is
exactly  the  quadruple  of the  second, whatever values
these  may  have.  Thus  the  transcendental  element,
which exists in both quantities, disappears from  the ratio
of the one to the other.
We thus lay down the important formula: —
Tlhe  existence  of  ant  unknown  quanztity  does  not
necesscarily  disturb  the  accuracy  of calculations
founded  on  the known functions of that quantity.*
41. If in  MIathematics we can thus deal with transcendentals without peril to the exactness of our deduc* Thus, although we may be wholly unable to answer the question,
" What is the result of adding 5 z to 7 x?" so long as x remains without
an assigned or assignable value, we are absolutely certain that the sum
will be 12 x, whatever value c may have.
On this point let Euler be cited.  " On rencontre quelquefois des fonctions algebriques dont on ne peut donner une valeur absolue et degaggee.
Z est une fonction de cette nature de z, si Z se trouve dans une equation
de ce genre Z5 = a z z Z3 - b Z4 Z2 + c z3 Z- 1; mais quoi qu'on ne puisse
pas resoudre cette equation, il est clair cependant que Z est egal a- une
certaine expression de z melee de constantes, et que ainsi Z est une fonction de z. Quant aux fonctions transcendantes il est ia remarquer qu'une
fonction est de cette nature lorsque non seulement l'operation transcendante y entre, mais qu'elle affecte encore la variable; car si les operations
transcendantes appartinment aux seules constantes la fonction n'en sera
pas mioin alg6briques." - Itrod. c l''lnalyse des ininiments petits, p. 4.




38           PRPOBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
tions, the question arises whether in other sciences and
even in Metaphysics the same procedure may not be
adopted with similar effect.  My purpose is to show that
this procedure can be followed; and that in all inquiries,
rzcexploredcl r'cmainders must be eliminated, and our deductions be confined to the known functions of these
unknown quantities. The profitless discussions upon
Space and Time have been profitless, because of the nonrecognition of the transcendental elements and their consequent separation from the positive elements.  What is
Time?  This philosopher holds it to be an objective
existence, which must be accepted as ultimate.  Another
holds it to be a purely subjective Form of Sense. A
third says it is a Form of Sense because it is a Form of
Things.  Others are fascinated by Lagrange's definition
of it, "a fourth dimension of Space."  Mathematicians
are content with Newton's conception of it as a fluent
which has no variable fluxion, the only independent variable which "flows equally without regard to anything
external and by another name is called Duration." X
Without pausing to choose between these conceptions,
or to trace the genesis of the abstraction and its relations
to the concretes it expresses, we simply note that each
conception leaves something indeterminate, none accurately conveys all that is meant by Time.  A mystery
always remains unexplained, unexplorable.  Let this be
granted, let the presence of a transcendent element be
insisted on, how you will, the truth is, that in the only
use we ever make of the conception of Time - i. e. in its
known functions, the lecasmremcznt of,in)tervals - this
* NEWTON, PrincipiaC; ScholiUm to t/he Definitio1ns. " This conception
of time as the one absolute and independent variable is undoubtedly one
of the most splendid and fruitful in the history of human thought." -
PROFESSOR ROBaERTSON SMITHI, 0n2 IfTqcl C7and the Hlftcgphysics of the
Fllxional Calczulius. (Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh,
XXV. 495.)




SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN METAPHYSICS.             39
transcendent disappears, the mystery vanishes.  Whatever Time may be, the intervals, which are all we deal
with, are equal or unequal, and our equations are rigorously exact.
42. It is the same with Space.  VWhether we are to
regard it as an entity or an abstraction, is a question for
Psychology.  What Space is may be left undetermined.
Tilhe vulgar imagine it to be pure Nothing,-  which nevertheless does mysteriously contain all things, holding
them  like a vessel.  They speak of it as of an infinite
air-pump, empty of all contents.  They do not ask themselves what need Being has of Non-Being  to contain it,
what need Existence has for another Existence in whtich
to exist. The psychologist may be called upon to explain
the genesis of such conceptions, but Science and Practice
detach themselves from  such puzzles, and without endeavoring to lay hold of the transcendental element in
Space, are content to meascure spcaces with rigorous precision. *
43. Matter and Motion, Force and Cause, have also
their transcendental elements, and it is the province of
Metaphysics to demarcate these from  the known and
knowable elements.   Character, again, involves many
incalculable elements, organic, historic, social; yet this
does not prevent our comparison of one character with
another, or with the different manifestations of one character under different conditions.  Vitality, again, presents certain aspects which, if only from  their speciality,
must al-ways distinguish organic from inorganic existence.
* "Absolute Space in its own nature, without regard to anything external, remains always similar and immovable. Relative Space is some
movable dimension or measure of the absolute spaces, which our Senses
determine by its position to Bodies. Because the parts of Space cannot
be seen or distinguished from one another by our Senses, therefore in
their stead we use sensible measures of then." - NEAwTo, P~rimcipia;
Scholiistu, to the Dcfinitiogis.




40              PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND  MIND.
Although many vital phenomena have been assigned to
physical and chemical conditions, there still remain unexplored  remainders after all our analysis.  These  we
may assign either to some special Agent, the supposed
vital Force, or to  some special Agency, some  peculiar
combination  of  physical forces,  not  yet  determined.
Whichever hypothesis  we  adopt, the  presence  of the
transcendental need in no way disturb the accuracy  of
our calculations, if we deal with it properly, and eliminate it from  the equations.  We may compare one vital
phenomenon with  another, or with  its conditions, as we
compare one sphere with another, or any one function of
an unknown quantity with another; and the comparison
may yield exact results, although we remain eternally'
ignorant of the excluded  elements.
44. The initial defect in transcendental Philosophy
and all metempirical inquiry is not the admission of
transcendental elements    as facts  and  mysteries, but
* Kant designates by trcanscendetcal that which is anterior to all Experience; transcendent, that which is beyond all Experience.  The words
thus respectively stand for c6 priori and metempirical.  Denying the
transcendence of the mental forms which Kant assumes, I use the words
" transcendental " and " transcendent " according to their mathematical
analogies. "Toute fonction mathematique," says the philosophical mathematician Cournot, " qui ne se trouve pas comprise dans la difinition des
fonctions algebriclues est reputee transcendante."  (TraitM des Foactiolns
et dcle Ccalectl infitzitesimecd, I. 24. 1841.) That is to say, whatever cannot
be expressed in the terms of the science is transcendental to that science:
]iology, containing phenomena not expressible in terms of Physics, is
transcendental to Physics; and Sociology is transcendental to Biology on
similar grounds.  Whatever is Suprasensible cannot be expressed in
terms of sensible Experience, and is therefore transcendental to Experience, - metempirical.  But whenever, by any means, what is now transcendental becomes expressible in terms of Experience it will thereby
cease to be metempirical. The term "transcendental," therefore, designates
not only that which can never be brought within the range of Experience,
owing to the constitution of things, but also that which cannot at present be so brought, owing to the condition of our knowledge: it is the
unexplorable remainder and the unexplored remainder.




SCIENTIFIC MIETHOD IN METAPHYSICS.         41
the admission of them amCon2 the calcdlCable elenents; and
the supposition that by means of guesses and constructions in which these incalculable data enter as components,
lmann can reach a higher truth than is attainable through
Experience.  It will indeed be urged by metaphysicians
that althouoh the transcendental elements are not calculable fiom  data furnished by Sense and Understanding',
they are directly knowable and calculable through the
so-called V6erulmjft, or Intellectual Intuition, which deals
with them  as Understanding deals with the data of
Sense.  I do not pause here to consider this argument
which will occupy us further on, but continue my exposition of the Method by which metaphysical problems
may be treated without the assumption of any such
special faculty for the discernment of the transcendental.
If I can succeed in extricating such questions from  the
confusion which results when two diametrically opposite
Alethods are employed, and if I can thus confine the
metempirical NMethod to the metempirical aspects of each
question, it will then be time to examine the pretensions
of the Intellectual Tntuition.
45. Our first step then is to state each question in such
a way that the "unexplored remainder" is diseng'aged
from  the positive and speculative aspects, and carefully
lkept apart as a transcendental, not allowed to enter into
the equations.
The second step is the analysis by which we ascertain
whether this unknown quantity is to be accepted as
an ultimate fact, a fiction, or a phrase.  We inquire, 1],
whllether it is ultimate, as in itself beyond analysis, incap-able of reduction to some nzore general fact; 2~, whether
it might possibly be analyzed were certain data secured;
but, these not being secured, we make a provisional guess,
throwing out some hypothesis which, if correct, would
link the phenomena into intelligible unity; 3~, or failing




42           PROBLErMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
even this speculative aid, we adopt a phrase which, although explaining nothing, serves at least to baptize the
unknown, and is thus often of advantag'e (somletimes the
reverse) in keeping under one rubric phenomena which
lhave essential points of similarity along with manifold
differences.
46.. These three modes of dealing with the unknown
quantity may be thus exemplified.  A biologist having,
ascertained that organic phenomena always require special
combinations of oxygen, carbon, hydrogen, and nitrogen
for their basis, and are never found where these are
absent, accepts the ultimate fact of Vitality dependent on
this combination.  It is a fact no more explicable by
reduction to solme other fact, than -why the ratio of.3 is the
ratio of 4- or -s-. The fact is so, is observed to be so; uahy
it is so admits no further answer (for the present) than
that whatever is is.
46 a. The speculative biologist is dissatisfied, and thinks
this dependence may be explained by the introduction of
an Ag'ent, visible to his speculative eye. He creates the
fiction of a Vital Principle, which no one has seen, which
no one can connect with positive data; and endows it
with whatever properties are needed for the results obsreved.  He invents an Imponderable, a Force, which has
the power of fashioning the  Ponderable,- which can
select and combine physical and chemical elements, and
can animate lifeless matter.
We see that this is a fiction; but we do not on that
account reject it.  Fictions are potent; and all are welcome if they can justify themselves by bringing speculative insight within the range of positive vision.  What
then nmnust be our attitude with respect to this Vital Principle?  AWe must submit it to all the tests by which
hypotheses are controlled, - tests which, while allowing
the freest scope to the energy of Imagination, prevent that
energy from degenerating into license.




SCIENTIFIC METIIOD IN METAPHYSICS.          43
This fiction has been tested, and has proved a failure:
it explains nothing.  Nevertheless it has left behind it a
convenient phrase; and now positive biologists are quite
ready to speak of Vital Force, or the vital forces, as brief
ways of designating phenomena.  There is indeed always
danger in thus appropriating the phrases of rejected fictions,- tile danger lest insufficient vigilance allow thle
phrases to be interpreted in their old meanings; and an
ilnmense service to Science would be effected by some
notation which would always accompany hypotheses and
hypothetic phrases, — a sort of algebraic x, keeping alive
our sense of the presence of an unknown quantity.*
47.  The  metaphysical problems of Matter, Force,
Cause, Law, Soul, etc., likewise present elements positively known, elements speculatively knowable, and elements that lie  beyond all reduction  to  Experience,
positive or speculative.  The novelty of the procedure
followed in this work consists in treating these problems
on the same 1Method as that followed in Science, first
separating the three aspects, and then  seeing how far
inductions will carry us.
No one can have studied the history of physical investig(ation without seeingo that progress has been mI'ainly
effected by the habit of more or less consciously eliminating from each question the nzetemnpirical aspect.  It is
strikingly Inanifest in the labors of Galileo and Newton,
when compared with those of Kepler and Descartes.
But in instituting this comparison we must guard against
the common confusion of the speculative with the metempirical point of view, -a confusion explicable enough
when no sharp definition of the'metemnpirical had been
given.  It is a serious error to imagine that the true
* Fontenelle charmingly says: "I1 faut etre presentement sur ses
gardes pour ne pas lmi imaginer quelque realit6: on est expose au peril
de croire qu'on l'entend."    Eloye dce Newton.




44             PROBLEIMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
scientific spirit is opposed to the speculative, because it
is opposed to the metempirical. The error arises partly
because the Looic of Speculation has not yet been organized with sufficient precision, -its tests and canons are
left undisciplined; hence, because Speculation is conternlinous at one side with Metempirics, it has frequently
been carried by its ardor over its own lawful boulndaries
into that nebulous region where all tests fail; and thus
the speculative thinker is regarded with distrust by positive thinkers.  Nor is the distrust surprising, when we
see the discordant minigling of unprovable fictions with
provable conjectures in the writings of even such splendid workers as Kepler and Descartes.
48. To confirm our vindication of the speculative procedure, it is enough to glance at the labors of the two
supreme positive inquirers, Galileo  and Newton.  Illustrious judges have declared that Galileo's conception of
the laws of Motion is his g'reatest achievement.*  If we
examine his famous dialogue we find that it is mainly
theoretical; experiment is rarely invoked, though everywhere implied.  Let us, he says, conceive the simplest
and most perfect rule, and we shall form  the most probable hypothlesis.  If we follow  out the consequences of
this rule, and express them  in mathematical theorems,
we may  do  so without peril.  "CGcomGtry has already
studied numerous curves ncver mnet with  it  reality, and
detected in them  wonderful properties; and to geometry
* Thus Lagrange, speaking of the discovery of the Composition of
Motions, says that although during his lifetime it brought him less
celebrity than his astronomical observations, "elle fait aujourd'hui la
partie la plus solide et la plus reelle de sa gloire. Les decouvertes des
satellites de Jupiter, des phases de Venus, des taches du soleil, etc., ne
demandaient que des telescopes et de l'assiduit; mais il fallait un genie
extraordinaire pour d6meler ces lois de la nature dans des phenomrnnes
qu'on avait toujours eus sous les yeux, mais dont l'explication avait
neanmoins toujours echappe aux recherches des philosophes." — Ieccanique Analytique, p. 221.  1811.




SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN METAPHYSICS.        45
our conclusion also will belong even if exr2eriment is Lnable to confirm them."  Here there is an explicit announcement of the deepest conception of scientific Method, and
the conjunction of the principle of Ideal Construction (on
which see Prob. I. Chap. V.) with the principle of Sensible Verification. The separation and co-operation of the
speculative and positive points of view could not be more
clearl y stated.  Galileo knew that such a conception as
Velocity was ideal; and that the proportionality between
the velocity of a falling body and the time of its fall
could never be directly verified in experiment; but he
knew also that it could be indirectly verified through
consequences accessible to observation and experiment.
His laws  of Motion would have been speculatively true,
like those of geometry, even could they never have
received positive verification; and I shall hereafter show
that they are only rigorously true in the region of Abstraction, and are not true of actual motions.
49. The reader was perhaps somewhat incredulous on
finding  Newton cited as an example of speculative greatness.  The veneration which consecrates the name of
Newton has so far failed to dignify his practice, that the
simple characterizing of that practice wears the air of
paradox.  Was he not the ideal of a positive thinker?
Did he not protest against Speculation?  It is true.
But although Newton's language is sometimes directly
counter to his practice, and is vitiated by the misplaced
alarm which he shared in common with all the reformers
of that day, at the chaotic consequences of speculative
inglenuity, this was mainly due to the absence of a clear
discrimination between speculative and metempirical inquiry. At any rate, it is the fact that Newton's glory is
founded quite as much on the purely speculative as on
the purely positive part of his labors; while nearly all his
popularity, outside the mathematical circle, is due to it.




46           PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
He who declared that he made no hypotheses - insisting
that they could have no place in experimental philosophy
— has raised his name out of the very small circle of
mathematicians, where he must ever occupy a glorious
position, into its leadership among philosophers, by virtue
of his splendid speculative insight, the daring  keenness
of his venturesome imagination in creating hypotheses.
It was an hypothesis, and a daring one, by which he instituted the Infinitesimal Calculus, introducing  velocities,
under the name of Fluxions, whereby the correlative
values of two variables were supposed to increase together.
The element of Velocity was as pure an hypothesis as
the element of Ether in the explanation of Light, or of
Electricity or Nervous Fluid in the explanation of Neurility: it was, moreover, an accessory hypothesis, -- an
artifice, not an inference.  Again, his identification of
celestial and terrestrial motions was an hypothesis; so
was the extension of gravitation beyond the solar system;
an hypothesis his conception of the attraction exercised
by spherical bodies on a point beyond or within their
spheres;* an hypothesis his conception of attractive and
repulsive forces similar to positive and negative quantities in Algebra, the former vanishing where the latter begin; an hypothesis that AMotion is constantly destroyed,
and consequently that the universe requires active Principles, "such as the cause of gravity, by which planets
and comets keep their orbits, and bodies acquire great
motion in falling; and the cause of fermentation by
which the heart and blood of animals is kept in constant
motion and  heat"; an hypothesis that Light consists of
corpuscles emitted from the luminous source; an hypothesis that "the Senses are not for enabling the soul to
perceive the species of things in its sensorium, but only
for conveying them thither "; - these, and several other
* Comp. POIN:SOT, ElGmzents de Statique, 5th ed. ~ 66.




SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN METAPHYSICS.                47
queries propounded in the 1Optics, are surely strange contradictions to the often-quoted and much-misunderstood
h2ypotheses non fittgo.
49 a. It may be objected that some of these hypotheses
he himself brought so near to demonstration that they
have taken place among established truths, and that they
were legitimate constructions on mathematical principles.
This does not alter their speculative  character.  And
while we know that some of his illustrious contemporaries regarded these hypotheses as revivals of a scholastic
spirit, rejecting  Attraction  because  it was  an  occult
quality,- we also know that Science, which has accepted
some  of the  hypotheses, has recognized others as nonverifiable, and some as false, nay, even absurd.  Be this
as it may, our purpose is simply to recognize the large
latitude given by this mighty investigator to the operation
of that speculative imagination which he is commonly
supposed  to have discredited.  In this connection it is
piquant to observe that in the very passage which follows
his famous denunciation of hypotheses, he has no hesitation  in propounding a view  which in these days must
startle the most speculative by its wildness: —
"And now we might add something concerning a most
subtle Spirit which  pervades and  lies hid in all gross
bodies; by the force and action of which Spirit the parti* Huyghens and Leibnitz, so eminently qualified to comprehend the
mathematical theory of attraction, rejected it as unworthy of examination. In writing to Leibnitz, before he had seen the Princilpia, Huyghens
says: " I am anxious to see Mr. Newton's book. I am content at his
not being a Cartesian, provided always he does not thrust forward such
suppositions as that of attraction."  After having read the book he says:
"The explanation of the cause of reflux of the tides does not in the least
satisfy me, nor all those other theories which he founds on his principle
of attraction, a principle that seems to me absurd. I am amazed to see
any one taking so much trouble and entering into calculations so elaborate founded on such a principle." - See BERTRPAND, Les Fondateurs de
l'Astronomie JIodecre, 311.




48           PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
cles of bodies mutually attract one another at near distances, and cohere if contiguous; and electric bodies
operate to greater distances, as well repelling as attracting
the neighboring corpuscles; and light is emitted, reflected,
refracted, inflected, and heats bodies; and all sensation is
excited, and the menmbers of animal bodies move at the
command of the will, namely, by the vibrations of this
Spirit, mutually propagated along the solid filaments of
the nerves from the outward organs of sense to the brain,
and from  the brain into the muscles.  But these are
things that cannot be explained in few words, nor are
we furnished with that sufficiency of experiments which
is required to an accurate determination and demonstration of the laws by which this electric and elastic spirit
operates."
50. In presence of evidence like this one may well ask,
What meaning is to be attached to the famous dcicltt,
and what is the vindication of Newton's practice which
so obviously departs from that dictum?  The answer is,
that Newton had thoroughly grasped scientific Method;
and his magisterial superiority is nowhere more lucent
than in its clear and careful distinction between the
positive and speculative aspects of each question. The
positive part of his work always consists of geometrical
and dynamical facts and deductions.  The precision and
reach of this are uncontested, incontestable.  Then comes
a speculative part, brilliant, seductive, and peculiarly
acceptable, because it fulfils the primary condition of
affording facilities to calculation.  But this part is always
questionable, hypothetical. Observe how clearly he separates these very different aspects in the declaration
\which opens the exposition of the system of the world in
Book III.:
"In the preceding books I have laid down the principles of philosophy, principles not philosophical but




SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN METAPHYSICS.      49
mathematical; such, to wit, as we may build our reasonings upon in philosophical inquiries. These principles
are the laws and conditions of certain motions and
powers or forces, which chiefly have respect to philosophy. But lest they should have appeared of themselves
dry and barren, I have illustrated them here and there
with some philosophical scholiums, giving an account of
such things as are of more general nature, and which
philosophy seems chiefly to be founded on."
And towards the close of the general scholium he says:
"Hitherto we have explained the phenomena of the
heavens and the sea by the power of gravity, but have
not yet assigned the cause of this power.... I have not
been able to discover the cause of those properties of
gravity from phenomena, and I frame no hypotheses.
To us it is enough that gravity does really exist, and act
according to the laws which we have explained, and
abundantly serves to account for all the motions of our
celestial bodies and our sea."
From this alone it would be evident that he did not,
as is often said, discourage inquiries into the cause of
gravity, but simply discouraged the facile and illusory
explanations which were constructed out of arbitrary
suppositions, instead of out of observed phenomena.
"Physics, beware of AMetaphysics," was his warning.
He was ready enough to speculate as to the cause of
gravity, but well knew that his speculations were mere
gropings in the dark, not to be placed beside the positive
principles he had so laboriously brought to bear on the
facts observed. The cause, whatsoever it might be, he
declared was an active Principle, not an occult quality
supposed to result from the specific Forms of Things,
but one of the "general Laws of Nature" by which the
things themselves are formed; "their truth appearing to
us by phenomena, though their causes be not yet dis3                            D




50          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
covered. For these are manifest qualities, and the causes
only are occult. And the Aristotelians gave the name
of occult qualities not to manifest qualities, but to such
only as they supposed to lie hid in bodies, and to be the
unknown causes of manifest effects, - such as would be
the causes of Gravity, and of magnetic and electric
attractions and of fermentations, if we should suppose
that these forces or actions arose from qualities unknown
to us, and incapable of being discovered and made manifest. Such occult qualities put a stop to the improvement of natural philosophy, and therefore of late years
have been rejected. To tell us that every species of
things is endowed with an occult specific quality by
which it acts and produces manifest effects, is to tell us
nothing. But to derive two or three general Principles
of Motion from  phenomena, and afterwards to tell us
how the properties and actions of all corporeal things
follow from these manifest Principles, would be a very
great step in philosophy, though their causes were not
discovered." *
In the preface to the Principia he says: "For all the
difficulty of philosophy seems to consist in this, -fromn
the phenomena of Motion to investigate the forces of Nature,
and then from these forces to demonstrate the other phenomena. And to this end the general propositions in the
first and second books are directed.  In the third book is
given an example in the explanation of the System of the
World. For by the propositions mathematically demonstrated in the first book, we there derive from the celestial
phenomena the forces of Gravity with which bodies tend
to the sun and the several planets. Then from these
forces, by other propositions, which are also mathematical,
we deduce the motions of the Planets, the Comets, the
Moon, and the Sea. I wish we could derive the rest of
~ Optics, Book III., subfinem.




SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN METAPHYSICS.       51
the 2phenomena of Natutre by the same kind of reasoning
from nvzatheelatical 2rincitples. For I am  induced by
many reasons to suspect that they may all depend upon
certain forces by which the particles of bodies by some
causes hitherto unknown are either mutually impelled
towards each other and cohere in regular figures, or are
repelled and recede from each other; which forces being
unknown, philosophers have hitherto attempted the search
in vain. But I hope the principles here laid down will
afford some light either to that or some true method of
philosophy."
And again, towards the close of the Optics, he says:
"As in Mathematics, so in Natural Philosophy the investigation of difficult things by the method of analysis
ought ever to precede the method of composition. This
analysis consists in making experiments and observations,
and in drawing general conclusions from them by induction, and admitting of no objections against the conclusions, but such as are taken from experiments or other
certain truths.  For hypotheses are not to be regarded
in experimental philosophy. And although the arguing
frome experiments and observations by Induction be no
demonstration of general conclusions, yet it is the best
way of arguing which the nature of things admits of, and
may be looked upon as so much the stronger by how
much the Induction is more general. And if no exception occur from phenomena, the conclusion may be pronounced generally. But if at any time afterwards any
exception shall occur from  experiments, it may then
begin to be pronounced with such exceptions as occur.
By this way of analysis we may proceed from compounds
to ingredients, and from motions to the forces producing
them; and in general from effects to their causes, and from
particular causes to more general ones, till the argument
end in the most general."




52          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
This, then, was Newton's doctrine, and it was also his
practice in general; although he sometimes so far forgot
his own principles that he allowed theological and
metempirical elements to mingle with the inductions of
Experience.
51. The reader has already seized my drift, which is
that Metaphysics can be pursued on the Method of Science, provided it accepts all the tests and conditions of
that Method, and keeps within the range of Experience.
Thus treated, its dangers and difficulties would be no
greater than those of Science, its certainties would have
the same foundation. In both we have to disengage the
known and knowable from the unknown and unknowable; and having disengaged the known quantities, we
proceed to operate on them in the detection of the
unknown. In every problem we have to determine, —
1~, Is there a known Agent or Agency, which will furnish the answer? 2~, By what operations can the presence of this be made manifest? by what tests can we
assure ourselves that the Agent is the one which we have
assumed, or that this Agency has the requisite law, or
order?
52. Now the common error of metaphysicians, and one
not uncommon also among men of science, is hastily to
assume an unknown Agent or Agency, or to assume the
presence of one known, and then to operate on that
assumption as on a solid basis. There is one aspect in
which such a procedure is perfectly legitimate, namely,
when it is avowedly conducted as a tentative hypothetical mode of establishing an equation, afterwards to be
verified when the values are assigned. The procedure is
fatal when this artifice is forgotten, and is made to solve
the problem without verification of the assumed values.
The geometer resolves his problem by deriving the prop



SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN METAPHYSICS.       53
erties of the figure from those already known and analogous; having before him the laws to which the several
parts of the system conform, he deduces from these the
quantities sought, and thus constructs his figure.  To
obtain his equation he assumes the problem to be already
solved, and constructs a figure according to the hypothetical state of the known and unknown quantities. Thus,
so far from  dispensing with Hypothesis, the geometer
largely invokes its aid, only he never foryets the nature of
the aid invokecd. He is mostly guided by probabilities,
which he intends reducing to certainties; he anticipates
by divination what is afterwards to be reached through
demonstration. The chief distinction between his probabilities and those of the physicist or biologist lies in the
greater simplicity or unequivocalness of his terms, and
the consequent greater facility of their verification.
Sometimes he finds his construction leads to a nugatory
solution, and he here sees that the hypothetical figure
does not agree with the question, and that somewhere
some contradictory conditions have been introduced. In
this case he constructs another, invoking fresh hypothesis, and thus he tries one after the other, until he hits
upon that which will satisfy the equation.
53. The procedure of the physicist is similar. He
constructs a hypothetical scheme of the dependent parts
of the phenomenon from those already known, and by
processes of Verification ascertains whether this scheme
agrees with Observation and Deduction. If he has introduced into the scheme contradictory conditions, or has
left out conditions that are co-operant, the discrepancy
between Observation and Calculation warns hin of his
error; and he tries another scheme. Although the task
of Verification is usually more arduous and delicate than
in Geometry, it is essentially the same. Dealing as the
*physicist does with data which are more complicated, less




54          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
accurately definable, and dependent on minute and numlerous observations and inductions, he is more easily
led to accept a complex condition for a simple one, and to
disregard conditions which seem insignificant because he
is not alive to their significance.
54. If the physicist is thus hampered, still more are
the biologist, psychologist, and metaphysician hampered,
because their data are excessively complex, and their
definitions fatally equivocal. Yet their Method should
be the same. Couid they pursue it with the same rigorous regard to its tests and canons, their results would
be as exactas those of the physicist and geometer. The
common notion of the exclusive superiority of what are
called the exact sciences I hold to be an error. There is
always an admitted inaccuracy, or incompleteness, in
every geometrical solution, except in the region of Abstraction, i. e. ideal construction; and in that region the
solutions of Biology or Metaphysics mlay have equal accuracy. In Mathemlatics,which consists of operations on symbols, the exactness is ideal; when the results thus obtained
are applied to reality they are approximately true in as
far as the symbols express real terms; but mathematical
operations may be equally exact when their symbols are
avowedly unreal; and it has been possible to ingenious
geometers to construct a non-Euclidian geometry, on the
assumption that Euclid's postulate is false. Hence we
may conclude that Metaphysics, consisting of operations
on symbols of Force, may be equally exact, and their
results approximately true in regard to reality, the degree
of approximation depending on the reality of the terms.
The presence of transcendent elements need not disturb
us. Every physical problem involves metempirical elements beside those which are empirical; but Physics sets
them aside, and, dealing only with the empirical, reaches
conclusions which are exact, within that sphere. N1o dis



SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN METAPHYSICS.           55
turbance in the accuracy of calculation follows from the
existence, outside the calculation, of elements which are
incalculable. The law of gravitation, for example, is exact, although its transcendental aspect- -namely, what
gravitation is in itself, whether Attraction, Undulation,
or Pressure —is not merely left undetermined, but by
the majority of physicists is not even sought. The law
of Association of Ideas is equally exact, although not
quantitatively expressible. The dependence of Sensation
upon Stimulus is not less so, and has received a quantitative expression.* The laws of Causation may be formulated with equal precision.  And exact knowledge of
Force, Cause, Matter, ought to be attainable, in spite
of their transcendental elements, by the one procedure of
elminating- these, and operating solely on the empirical.
Hence the conclusionThe scientific canon of excluding from calculation all
incalculable data places Metaphysics on the same
level with Physics.
* The ratio of the increase of a sensation to the increase of its stimulus
is that of a logarithm to its number. (FECHNER., Psychophysik, Bd. II.
p. 11. 1860.)




56          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
CHAPTER IV.
OBJECTIONS TO METAPHYSICS.
55. THE Method just sketched in outline must be
exhibited in practice through the subsequent chapters.
What has already been said purports only to show that
Metaphysics is possible under certain limitations which
apply to all Science; and under this programme may be
included everything that is rational in the persistent
effort of mankind to solve certain problems, while at
the same time firm hold is kept of that Method which
alone has rewarded effort. "Tout est permis au philosophe," says Maupertius truly, "pourvu qu'il traite tout
avec l'esprit philosophique." All problems are open to
the metaphysician, provided he treat them on scientific
principles. All? Yes, all that can be brought under
the conditions and limitations which regulate research.
But problems which cannot be so treated are idle and
mischievous.
56. There has probably arisen in the minds of some
readers a feeling of uneasy distrust, and in others a feeling of surprise, at finding me advocating the study of
Metaphysics. " Timeo Danaos," will be the remark of the
former. "He has relinquished the Positive Philosophy,"
will be the remark of the latter. The first suspicion I
cannot remove. The second may be easily answered.
PReferring to what was said in ~ 5, I may add that the
exclusion of all metempirical questions, and the rejection
of the metempirical Method, is the cardinal position of
the Positive Philosophy; which also admits much of,




SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN METAPHYSICS.       57
what is here called Metaphysics, namely, the highest
generalizations of the several sciences, though it excludes
the problems of Matter, Force, Cause, Life, Mind, Object,
and Subject. Why does it exclude these?  Simply on
the ground of their being insoluble, metempirical.  But
this rejection seems to me somewhat arbitrary, when the
state of the case is examined; and injudicious, when we
find that it not only irritates those who might be convinced, but irritates them by a misconception. All who
put their trust in the Positive Philosophy must regret
that it should alienate instead of alluring speculative
thinkers, capable of extending its reach; and it alienates
them by the supercilious assertion that they are, and
have been, wandering on the wrong path; which may be
true, is true, but which would be better enforced by
pointing out their point of divergence from the right
path, so that their steps might be retraced. NXor can the
appeal to History suffice; at the utmost it can only be
somewhat of a reductio ad absnqcrldum, - a procedure which
even mathematicians now agree to regard as cumbrous,*
since it constrains assent in lieu of enlighteningr conviction,
and is therefore inferior to demonstration.  Instead of a
supercilious negation or unsatisfactory historical refutation, it will surely be a gain if the problems are admitted,
and shown to be soluble on the positive Method.
57. The grounds of opposition to metaphysical inquiries may be grouped under two heads: 10, that they move
in a world of Abstraction regardless of concrete realities,
-consequently their solutions can never be more than
purely subjective constructions without objective validity; 2~, that they seek to penetrate Causes and Essences,
which are necessarily unknowable.
There is truth in both objections, as applied to the
common practice of metaphysicians; but we have only to
* See DUnHAMlEL, Cours d'Analyse, I. 3. 1841.
3*




58          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
rectify that practice by a more rational statement of each
question, and the objections fall away. For nothing is
more clearly demonstrable than that what is called exact
Science is also a purely ideal construction, dealing primarily with abstractions, and not with concrete realities;
so that the valid objection against any system of Metaphysics is not that it moves in a world of ideal conceptions, but that its conceptions have been illegitimately
constructed or illogically applied. Further, I shall hope
to show that the search after Causes, nay, efficient Causes,
is the aim of Science, and that the aim is attainable.
But to understand this it is necessary that we set out
with a clear conception of what it is we seek, and how it
may be found: the search after Causes is futile or fertile
accordingly. In like manner, according to the meaning
assigned to the term, there will be a truism  or a
falsism inl the common declaration that the human
mind is incapable of knowing the Essences of things.
A traditional perversion makes the essence of a thing
to consist in the relations of that thing to something
unknown, unknowable, rather than in  its  relations
to a known or knowable, i. e. assumes that the thing
cannot be what it is to us and other known things, but
must be something "in itself;" unrelated, or having quite
other relations to other unknowable things. In this contempt of the actual in favor of the vaguely imagined possible, this neglect of reality in favor of a supposed deeper
reality, this disregard of light in the search for a light behind the light, metaphysicians have been led to seek the
"thing  in itself" beyond the region of Experience. To
reflective minds it was early apparent that such a qucesitum
was a phantom; and because it could not be grasped,
they declared, not that this phantom-essence was beyond our reach, but that all essences were impenetrable
lmysteries. With the reality before them  they declared




SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN METAPHYSICS.       59
it was a phantom, and that the shadow was the reality,
the essence!
58. No wonder if questions thus inappropriately conceived were condemned to remain without answers. Were
a mathematician asked, What is the essential color of a
circle? he would reject the question as not geometrical.
The circle has no color. But any circular figure may
have any color, and that color is essential to it. Were a
physicist asked, What is the nature of the emotion felt
by a mass when undergoing molecular change? he would
reject the question as not physical.  Emotion does accompany certain molecular changes, but, as far as we
know, this is only under very special conditions, and
the phenomenon lies wholly beyond the province of
Physics. But if such questions can receive no answer.
because not put in answerable terms, how much more so
the questions which- avowedly travel quite beyond all
range of Experience, and ask, What is the thing in its
relations to something unknown? To know a thing is to
know its relations; it is its relations. Therefore to ask,
What are its relations to an unknowable? is absurd.
59. Under this bias men declare, truly enough, that
Metaphysics belongs to a condition of culture from
which Europe has finally, though with immense difficulty,
emerged; a condition in which men, instead of interrogating Nature, please their fancy with trying to discover
the general character of Being in the abstract. But although there is truth in the contemptuous phrase designating Metaphysics as the pursuit of ontological chimeras,and it is the conviction of this which has caused metaphysical study to be abandoned, - there is also truth in
the rejoinder that Metaphysics may be fruitful although
the efforts of metaphysicians have hitherto been failures;
and it is the conviction of this which sustains inquiry
among the valiant few.




60          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
60. What is our position in this controversy?  It is
that there is Ontology, and Ontology: il y a fagots, et
fagots.  There is Ontology pursued on the Metempirical
Method; and this, like all inquiries so pursued, is necessarily fruitless.  There is Ontology pursued on the Empirical Method, and this is Abstract Science, which is
occupied with the general laws of Being. A moment's
consideration will make this clear.  What is the object
of each science? It is to detect the general order of
Things, as manifested in particular groups of phenomena,
i. e. the abstract laws of Being under particular conditions. It is not moving bodies in all their complex
relations, but laws of Motion; not living organisms, but
laws of Life; not thinking organisms, but laws of Mind;
- it is these which are the objects of Science; and the
particular substances, plants, and animals which manifest
such laws, are used only as stepping-stones to reach those
higher points of view.  The reproach, if it be a reproach,
conveyed in the term  " ontological" when applied to
Metaphysics, is shared by Science.  In both the search is"
after abstract Being, not after concrete individual fact.
Rightly understood, there is truth in saying that a metaphysician may have a knowledge of 1Being as certain as
the mathematician's knowledge of Magnitude, as the
chemist's knowledge, of Affinity, as the biologist's knowledge of Life, as the sociologist's knowledge of Society;
and this knowledge may be gained in the same way.
61. By way of illustration consider the positive science of Crystallography, and presently it appears that
the mineralogist is studying the abstract Crystal, its geometrical laws and its physical properties.  He constructs
this abstract conception out of data furnished by many
individual minerals; but although these are necessary
stepping-stones, they and all their individmal characters
disappear, leaving only the general characters common of




SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN METAPHYSICS.          61
all; from these is obtained the abstract conception, The
Crystal. Now, when the mineralogist expounds the principles of his science he is obviously dealing with the
laws of abstract Being exemplified under the special conditions of crystallography.  It is the same with the biologoist; in expoundin g the laws of Life he is dealing with
Ontology.  The crystal does not exist as a phenomenon,
neither does the animal; they are ideal creations, and iil
this light may stand beside the entities of the Schoolrnen,
or the o'VTs ov of the Eleatics; but although the ancient
and the modern Ontologies are alike ideal creations, they
differ profoundly in their construction: the one is seen to
be incarcpable of a r-eduction to sensible experience, the facts
are not resolvable into assignable factors; the other is
seen to be only an abbreviated symbolical expression of
the observable order in things.  The constructions of the
ancients admitted metempirical elements beside the empirical, and endowed possibilities with the value of realities; they differ from those of positive Science as fallacies
and paralogisms differ from facts and syllogisms.
62. There is then a rational and an irrational Ontology,
an empirical and a metempirical Metaphysics.  It is
wholly a question of the manner in which the abstractions are formed, and not of the degree of abstractness.
The scientific acceptance of Laws and Properties is quite
as metaphysical as the scholastic acceptance of Entities
and Quiddities; but the justification of the one set is
their objective validity, i. e. their agreement with sensible Experience; the illusoriness of the other is their
incapability of being resolved into sensible concretes.
So nearly are the two allied that many an incautious
scientific speculator treats the Laws precisely as the
Schoolmen treated Entities; and thus we so often see a
Law supposed to rule the phenomena, as if from the
outside; and the Property of a substance is often an ill



62           PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
disguised Quiddity. The current notions about Force are
as irrational as anything to be found in Scholasticism.
63. With this rectification of the prejudice against
Ontology, which is one with that against Metaphysics,
we may say that understanding by Ontology the science
of the abstract laws of Being, it is the science of those
highest generalities which emerge from the study of
Things, and there can be no difference between Science
and Metaphysics except in the degrees of generality.
In other words, every science has its metaphysic; and
our definition of empirical Metaphysics (we recognize no
other) will be "the science of the most general principles." This definition resembles that of Aristotle in its
terms, though of course widely different in its meaning.
Thus conceived, Metaphysics holds a position with respect to Science somewhat analogous to the position held
by Algebra with respect to Arithmetic. The objects of
Arithmetic are quantities; the objects of Algebra are not
quantities, but the relations of quantities.  In like man-'
ner the objects of Science are the laws of sensible phenomena; the objects of Metaphysics are not these, but
laws of the laws, - the Calculus of operations. Although
dealing with the generalities of general principles, as the
Transcendental Analysis deals with relations of equations,
the equations having been furnished by Algebra, and the
values by Arithmetic, - Metaphysics must not be otherwise detached from the grounds and limitations of Experience. Unless its general principles have been securely
established by Science, its operations will be as chimerical as those of a Calculus of imaginary equations; and
unless its operations be verifiable, they will be worthless.
Its point of departure and its point of arrival must be
Reals. All its intermediate positions may be far removed
from sensible reality, nay, considered in themselves, they
may be impossible as Reals, provided they re-enter the




SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN METAPHYSICS.       63
domain of Reality, and conduct us to our goal; that is
all we ask of any operation. When we desire to reach
the summit of a mountain whose sides are too steep for
ascent, we may quit the firm earth, and trust ourselves to
the yielding air, if a balloon be ready to carry us through
it. The result justifies the means. Most of our scientific
operations have this airy character. But there are others - and all metempirical hypotheses are of this class
which, instead of the balloon firnished by Science, and
proved to be effectual, call upon the poet's Hippogriff, and
hope by it to be carried through the air. They never
reach the summit.
63 a. Metaphysics then, as we often say, comes after
Physics, does not precede but follows the establishment
of relations. From the laws of the Cosmos discovered by
Science it elicits certain general relations, which are then
visible in phenomena, just as the theory of Gravitation,
originated by inductions from terrestrial physics, was confirmed by inductions from celestial physics, and when
thus established was afterwards reflected back on terrestrial physics, disclosing unexpected relations there. This
reflected light discloses unsuspected equations, and is
always regulative of Research. The conception of what
is called the Correlations of Force, or more suitably the
Transformation of Energy, is a metaphysical conception,
and has led to the discovery of unsuspected relations.
The relation of Function and Organ, although a biological
law, could hardly have been established except as a deduction from the metaphysical conception first gained
through Mechanics, and then seen to be universal, — I
mean the relation of Dynamic and Static. Thus between
Science and Metaphysics there is a constant give and take.
And this give and take we find between sensation and
idea, induction and deduction, particular experiences and
general Experience; and it is itself a luminous example




64           PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
of the metaphysical Law of Polarity, which we shall hereafter have to consider as the expression of that Twofold
Aspect under which all Experience presents itself.
Not to anticipate more than is absolutely needful here,
I will content myself with suggesting that Experience
has two grand divisions: the Cosmos, or Object-world; and
the Consciousness, or Subject-world. Both are subdivided
into Static and Dynamic aspects.  The Cosmos is conceived as Existence, and as Cause: Existence is the static
aspect of Cause; Cause is the dynamic aspect of Existence.  The Subject-world is conceived as Organ and
Function.  The relations of Object and Subject which
Psychology discovers are carried up into the region of
Metaphysics, as the relations of the Cosmos are; that is
to say, they remain strictly matters of Science while restricted to particular divisions, and become matters of
Metaphysic when they are extended to several or all
divisions.  But this point we must discuss in the next
chapter.




SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN METAPHYSICS.        65
CHAPTER V.
THE PLACE OF METAPHYSICS AMONG THE SCIENCES.
64. HAVING agreed that Metaphysics, or the science of
the highest generalities, is possible, we may now inquire
whether it should be detached from the sciences which
severally furnish those generalities, and be erected into a
separate Discipline (to use the German term), just as there
is a separate Discipline of Logic formed out of the several logics; or whether, in conformity with Comte's classification, Metaphysics should not be thus detached, but
distributed among the sciences from which its data are
drawn.
Mr. Mill has objected to Comte's scheme, in relation
to Logic, that while furnishing an organon of Discovery
it omits the organon of Proof, so that the ancient Discipline finds no place assigned to it. The answer to this
objection is, that in point of fact the organon of Discovery
includes the organon of Proof; to discover a process is
to prove it; and the several sciences furnish their own
methods of Proof. But it may still be urged that Comte's
scheme does not exhibit the extraction of these methods
and their systematization in a special Discipline. He
seems to have had some misgiving on this point when, in
his latest work, he proposed to identify Logic (in its restricted sense) with Mathematics; although by Logic in
its widest sense he meant all intellectual construction.
In the former sense, he identifies it with the Calculus,
Geometry, and Mechanics, because the sole existence which
E




66           PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
is common to all appreciable beings is reducible to the
three attributes, - number, extension, and mIovement.*
65. Let us pause a moment to consider the very different meanings assigned to the word Logic. It commonly
stands for: 10~, the art of reasoning; 2~, the theory of
reasoning; 3~, Reasoning itself; 4~, the laws of mental
operation, irrespective of the symbols operated on (Formal
Logic); 5~, the rules of Proof.
The first of these I hold to be absurd.  There is no
more an art of Reasoning then there is an art of Breathing or Digesting.  But so little is this understood that
even thoughtful writers will be found declaring that-we
must learn how to reason, as we learn how to fence or to
swim.  In consequence of this misconception, certain
studies, notably Mathelnatics, are popularly believed " to
strengthen the Faculty," to develop the logical powers, to
" invigorate the Judgment."  The psychological notions
which lie at the basis of such declarations are sadly defective.
The second and third meanings of the word are objectionable because restricting Logic to the process of Ratiocination when the ratios are abstract.  This restriction is
got rid of in the fourth and fifth meanings, which may be
accepted as comprehensive.  The fourth designates the
universal Logic, it includes all Laws of Grouping (Xe7yetv
means to bind together, to group), and is therefore applicable to Feeling and Thought (in the subjective world),
and to Cause (in the objective world).
The fifth has the technical and restricted meaning of a
Codification of the rlleles of Proof.  In this last sense only
can Logic be a separate Discipline.  It may be llkened to
the science of Grammar apart from Language.  Thus the
speech of men of various nations embodies and exhibits
certain general rules, or tendencies, according to which
* Co'rTE, Sylthse Sutbjective, p. 71.




SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN METAPHYSICS.       67
words are grouped. These tendencies grammarians detach and treat separately as Laws of Speech, Rules of
Grammar. Logicians may in like manner detach certain
general procedures of the investigating intellect, and treat
them apart as the Rules of Rational Inquiry.
66. Having fixed on the meaning Logic may bear when
employed for a special Discipline, namely, the Codification of the rules of Proof, we may complete it by assigning to Metaphysics the parallel position of a Codification
of the laws of Cause. It will thus occupy very much the
place assigned to it by Hegel, namely, that of Objective
Logic. The Object and the Subject world have one general Logic, separately viewed as the Logic of Intelligence,
and the Logic of the Cosmos. In the Cosmos, viewed objectively, things influence each other and events succeed
each other according to invariant tendencies, or laws.
lWhen these phenomena are reproduced in Consciousness
they are also reproduced according to invariant tendencies; and thus it is that a law of Cause becomes a rule
of Proof. Logic in its widest sense is Grouping. The
laws of Grouping are the general tendencies of Things
and the general tendencies of Thought. The common
separation of Thought from the Things thought of is an
artifice; but it is one so deeply inwoven with our philosophy and practice that the mind, untutored in such researches, is astonished and distressed at the statement of
the identity between Thing and Thought, Object and
Subject. With what qualifications this statement has to
be received we shall hereafter discuss. Here I am only
concerned to define the position of Metaphysics as Objective Logic, - the Codification of the most abstract laws
of Cause. The subjective Logic takes no account of the
special instruments and processes by which each science
reaches Proof, it is occupied solely with the codification
of the processes. In like manner the objective Logic dis



68             PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND,,MIND.
regards special details in the processes of Causation, solely
occupied with codifying the most abstract results. Subjective Logic rejects whatever lies beyond the range of
Verification, and thus demarcates Reality from Possibility, Fact from Fiction. Objective Logic rejects whatever lies beyond that world of sensibles and extra-sensibles
which can come within the range of Experience, and
thus demarcates Metaphysics from Metempirics.
67. This distinction between the two aspects of Logic
represents the distinction between Knowing and Being;
and the identity underlying this diversity is also represented. In one we find the laws of Investigation, the
abstract conditions to which all knowledge is subject.
In the other we find the laws of the Investigated, the abstract conditions to which the Knowable is subject.  Only
on the assumption of the invariability of relations objective and subjective is Philosophy possible.  In the most
abstract of the sciences, that of Number, this identity is
manifest. No arithmetical operation would be valid were
there not this accord between the internal and external;
and the assumption of such an accord runs throughout
Science.  Indeed, the axioms of Logic and the axioms of
Science are the concave and convex aspects of the same
curve.*
68. The Positive Philosophy may in one sense be said
* Since this was written Mr. Spencer has propounded a new view of
Logic. Starting from the position that the syllogism refers to the dependencies of Things and not of Thoughts, he comes to the conclusion
that Logic must be carried over entirely to the Object-world. He therefore places it beside Mathematics, - as it is placed in Comte's latest
scheme. He holds that "it formulates the most general laws of correlation among existences considered as objective." Referring the reader to
Mr. Spencer's exposition (Psychlolgqy, II. ~ 302 et seq.), I will merely
here add that my chief divergence from it arises from my inability to
accept his conception of there being only a symbolic correspondence between the inner and outer worlds. I hope to make it clear that the correspondence is real.




SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN METAPHYSICS.:69
to absorb Metaphysics, for it claims to be the Codification
of the laws of the Cosmos. Nor, except as a matter of
special classification, should I have any objection to this,
were it not accompanied by the peremptory exclusion of
certain questions which can and must be answered. And
with respect to the classification there is precisely the
same difficulty with Logic.  Comnte insists that Logic
should never be separated from Science: "Car en n'etudiant chaque partie de la methode inductive qu'avec les
doctrines qui l'ont specialement suscitee, on sent aussit6t
que son usage doit etre conforme aux notions fondamentales que cette science reqoit de la precedente." *  True
and valuable as this consideration is, there are nevertheless several considerations which justify the erection of
Logic as a special Discipline; and these equally apply to
Metaphysics.  There are many speculative advantages in
having the highest generalizations of Objective and Subjective existence classed together and apart from the sciences which furnish them.  When Logic is seen  to
embrace both, under its twofold aspect, the ancient barrier between Matter and Mind so longo regarded as impassable vanishes, to reappear under the intelligible forms of
concave and convex. Idealism is vindicated in all that
it has of truth, and Realism is rescued.  The Inner and
Outer forms of Consciousness, the Subjective and Objective forms of Existence, are no longer antagonistic, but
homogeneous and differentiated.
69. The identity of Fact and Idea, general Law and
general Conception, is more readily appreciated in the
higher sphere of Reason than in the lower spheres of
Perception, because in the higher sphere the Object seems
detached from Sense and is transformed into pure
Thougaht.  Thus in investigating the processes of Induction and Deduction we abstract these operations from
* COMTE, Politique Positive, I. 518.




70          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
their sensible elements, we let drop all the ministrations
of Sense and fix attention solely on the mechanism of
Thought; by a similar abstraction the mathematician detaches Extension from Matter and Motion from Solidity,
althoughli perfectly aware that pure Extension and pure
Motion are impossible in the concrete. But no one believes that inductive and deductive processes can go on
without at every step involving sensible correspondences.
So long as we are observing and calculating the changes
in objects, our conception of these changes as taking place
in the objects, and not in us, is fixed, undisturbed. The
objective aspect is the aspect presented to Consciousness.
But no sooner do we pass from the observation of the
changes to the conception of their Law, than the distinction between Conception and Law begins to fade: we
recognize that the Law is not in the facts but in our
mlinds; if we elicited it from the facts we constructed it
anew, and replaced it among the facts. Whether this
construction is to be regarded as an objective Law or a
subjective Conception depends on our point of view; it is
both, or either.
70. This will seem very unacceptable to those, and
they are the majority, who imagine that phenomena are
ruled by law in a literal sense, and who think that laws
exist in the objective world as general facts which deter-,mine particular facts.  It is thus that, in Pindar's phrase,
the very Gods are subject to law, like mortals: —
N6Ouos 6 -7rtvrwv fao'tAi
Ovr TV rTe Kct l daavarXv.
And if the Gods, of course the fleeting phenomena. And
yet we may hear utterances of this kind: " The comets
follow no law in their motions through space," - which
simply means that no conception has been formed by astronomers of all the determining conditions, and by them
placed among the facts observed of the planetary courses.




SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN METAPHYSICS.        71
The purely ideal construction of Law will hereafter be
expounded (Prob. I. Chap. VI.); suffice it here to say that
it throws no uncertainty over the results of investigation.
The conception we form of a process in Nature may be
no less accurate as a symbolical expression of the reality,
than the perception we form of an object in Nature is an
accurate sensible expression of the reaction of Consciousness under the stimulus of the object, and of what' that
reaction will be under all similar conditions.  Both conception and perception are logical constructions, and are
verifiable by similar tests.
71. If Laws are simply our Conceptions, and these are
the Notations of what Experience has revealed to be the
Order in which phenomena coexist and succeed each other,
it is clear that Idealism demands a basis in Realism, and
that our Conceptions to be valid, when regarded objectively as Laws, must be capable of reduction to a sensible
origin, each of their constituent elements must be a real
experience, and the order of their combination must be
real.  If we find among the constituents any element not
thus reducible to Sense or to Intuition, that element must
be set apart and treated as a transcendental.  Thus
treated, there need be no misgiving as to its part in the
construction, nor as to the certainty of the results reached
through that construction.  The identification of Law
with Conception will by no means warrant the too common procedure of metaphysicians who endeavor to explain the Order in Things, by unfolding atn Order in
Thought, and propound theories of the Universe which
rest mainly on the "clear ideas " whose genesis is not
inductively verifiable.  It is quite possible to have very
clear ideas which are inexact expressions, and very logical arrangements which do not conform to the Order of
Experience.  Although  Science constantly anticipates
Observation by a far-reaching Deduction, and reveals hid



72          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
den facts by simply unfolding the consequences shut up
in general conceptions, this is only possible when the
general conceptions have been framed from and express
actual relations, and thus include what is deductively concluded.  Because they are conceptions which were abstracted from realities, they can in turn be applied to all
similar realities.  Tangents, sines, and cosines are not
things found isolated in Nature, but because they are
abstractions from realities, they are applicable to Nature.
No one observing a curvilinear motion can see in it the
double motion in the tangent to the curve and towards
the centre of the curve,- no one in watching a beam of
light can see the slightest indication of what the geometer finds there (or places there), viz. that the luminous
vibrations are perpendicular to the line of propagation;
in other words, that each vibration takes place at each
instant on the surface of a sphere which has for its centre the point from which the ray diverges. Tangents,
centres, vibrations, perpendiculars, - these are constructions of the intellect, not facts of sensible concretes. Yet
such constructions are by no means arbitrary, - they are
all reducible to Sense and Intuition, they all conform to
rigorous objective tests; and because they are so, and
because objectively found to reconcile Calculation with
Observation, they are stamped u6pon phenomena as laws.
Is it necessary to add, that, although every law is a conception, every conception is not to be accepted for a law?
It is necessary, because we frequently overlook the distinction, and give out the forms of our own fancies for
forms of phenomena. There is an order in our sensations,
and an order in our thoughts; but even these orders do
not always coincide. There is, further, an order in things
on which the order in sensations and thoughts depends.
But the dependence is particular, — that is to say, the
order in our sensations will depend on the momentary




SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN METAPHYSICS.                73
order in things, but this may or may not be an order
which is general. Now it is only the general order in
things with which Philosophy is concerned, and which is
expressed in laws; particular events are evanescent and
only interest the moment; Philosophy seeks to  frame
conceptions which represent the Order in things, not at
one instant and under particular exceptional conditions,
but at all times, and under varying  conditions.  Such
conceptions obviously cannot be framed irrespective of
particular experiences, but they must nevertheless be abstracted from particulars and represent what is common
to all.*
72. What has been already said will perhaps suffice to
justify confidence in the recognition of Metaphysics as a
possible branch of Science. For what constitutes a science? The co-ordination of facts. By what characters
may it be recognized?  A science exists, 1I, when it has
a clearly defined object; 20~, when it has a clearly defined
place in the region of research, a place not occupied by
any other; and, 3~, when it has a clearly defined Method
of applying the results of Experience to the extension of
experience.
All these characters are recognizable in Metaphysics.
Its object is the disengagement of certain most general
principles, such as Cause, Force, Life, Mind, etc., from the
sciences which usually imply these principles, and the
exposition of their constituent elements, - the facts, sen* " Toute science consiste dans la coordination des faits; si les diverses
observations etaient entierement isolees, il n'y aurait pas de science. On
peut meme dire generalement que la science est essentiellement destinee a
dispenser, autant que le comportent les diverses phenomenes, de toute
observation directe, en permettant de deduire du plus petit nombre possible de donnees immediates, le plus grand nombre possible de resultats.
N'est-ce point la l'usage reel, soit dans la speculation soit dans Faction
des lois que nous parvenons a dicouvrir entre les phenomenes naturels?"
- COMTE, Philosophize Positive, I. 131.
4




74          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
sible and logical, which these principles involve, and the
relations of these principles. Its place, as a special Discipline, is that of all Objective Logic. Its method is that
of dealing exclusively with the known functions of unknown quantities, and at every stage of inquiry separating the empirical from the metempirical data.
73. It may be expected that most metaphysicians will
accept our premises, but with a reserve which will cause
them  to reject our conclusion. They will proclaim that
what is here called MIetempirics is equally the co-ordination of facts; and they will urge that the range of facts
to be co-ordinated and the Method of co-ordination are
unwarrantably restricted to the facts of Experience and
the procedures of positive Science. The facts which we
declare to be unknowable, they affirm to be knowable and
known. The debate on this point can only be settled by
an analysis of Knowledge, and agreement as to its necessary limitations. We shall therefore have to treat this
at length.
And with regard to Method they urge that what is
usually understood as Science cannot fitly grapple with
the highest problems of Metempirics, because, dealing
only with the particular and contingent, it cannot rise to
universal and necessary truths, - cannot pass into "the
field behind phenomena."  This also we shall have to
debate. Without venturing here to assume that every
reader will find me expressing his conclusions on these
two deeply interesting points, I am content to rest my
case on the indisputable ground occupied by both schools,
namely, that whether we have, or have not, a class of
facts which transcend Experience, and a special organ —
the so-called Intellectual Intuition — by which such
facts may be apprehended and co-ordinated into a system,
there still remains that marked separation indicated in
the terms Metaphysics and Metempirics; and hence I




SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN METAPHYSICS.        75
affirm that the only fruitful procedure in the treatment
of metaphysical problems is the disengagement of their
metempirical elements.
74. Kant tells us that a rational theory of Nature only
deserves the name when its laws are ca priori and cannot
be gained through Experience; indeed, only becomes rational in proportion as it admits of mathematical treatment. This is plausible if we accept his unacceptable
definition of Experience, his eminently questionable view
of dc priori truths, and his assumption that Mathematics
has not an empirical origin. Fichte consistently declared
that all natural laws, from the law by which a blade of
grass will grow to the law which keeps the planets in
their orbits, might be deduced from first principles.* The
deduction was attempted; and whoever desires to see
with what result, may open Oken or Hegel. Closely connected with this reliance on the M priori procedure is the
significant fact that every metaphysical thinker, who pretends to bring a contribution towards the explanation of
things, has his own personal system, and would be offended by any accusation which implied the contrary.
Nay, it is a boast that "Philosophy is not to be learned
like Mathematics, or like a trade."  Each philosopher
holds himself independent of fellow-workers, like an
artist expressing his individual conceptions.  Hence
Fichte can truly say, "the kind of Philosophy which a
man chooses depends upon the kind of man." Contrast
this with Science. Who would think of choosing his astronomical or biological system? Who would speak of
Faraday's Physics or Liebig's Chemistry as he speaks
of Kant's Psychology and Hegel's Logic? Absurd as it
is, this notion of a personal choice in Philosophy is very
common, and finds its analogue in the personal choice of
a Religion. Consistently with this there is a demand on
* FICHTE, Werke, I. 64, 65.




76          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
the part of the public that the philosopher's system should
sustain the Theology and Polity of his age and nation.
The public, which insists, and rightly insists, on an artist's
not outraging the taste and moral convictions of his audience, is consistent in demanding a like conformity to prejudices and doctrines on the part of the philosopher, if
that philosopher desires recognition for his system as an
individual conception. Schelling was justified in declarinc that a system of Philosophy which contradicted the
moral feelings could never be a system of Reason but
only of Unreason.*  But he omitted to add the qualification, namely, that men too readily assume their own personal views to be those which cannot be contradicted
without contradiction of the moral consciousness.  Unless
Philosophy be an Art, and wholly personal, we must
agree with Kant that there is something preposterous in
demanding enlightenment from it, and at the same time
prescribing the opinion it is to enforce.
75. Philosophy, like everything else, is evolved from,
pre-existing conditions, and the novelty of any valid system should consist in supplying some missing links or in
formulating some unformulated evidence, thus extending
and systematizing the known. When, therefore, I claim
novelty for the conception of applying to Metaphysics
the procedures consciously and unconsciously applied by
men of science in all successful investigation, I do not
mean that the conception is now for the first time originated, but that now for the first time it is definitely
expressed in its principles and bearings.  Many have
thougght, and some few have proclaimed, that Metaphysics
should be based on facts, and its problems resolved on the
principles of Experience. But no one -to my knowledge - has explicitly stated how this was to be effected.
* SCHELLING, Werke, VII. 413.




SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN METAPHYSICS.       77
After all, the question of originality is of quite minor
importance; that of efficiency most concerns us. Convinced that all germinal conceptions are the product of
their age rather than of any individual mind, I should
look at any conception of mine with extreme suspicion
if it wore the air of other novelty than that of added precision or of extension; for, as De Morgan felicitously
remarks in tracing the discovery of the Differential Calculus, "A great method is always within the perception of
many before it is within the grasp of one."
76. Is it not a justifiable hope that, by applying the
Method of Science to all questions, England may some
day possess a Philosophy, the absence of which during
the last two hundred years has been a serious defect in
her culture? Science she has had, and Poetry, and Literature, rivalling when not surpassing those of other
nations. But a Philosophy she has not had, in spite
of philosophic thinkers of epoch-making power: Hobbes,
Locke, Berkeley, Hume, have produced essays, not systems. There has been no noteworthy attempt to give a
conception of the World, of Man, and of Society, wrought
out with systematic harmonizing of principles. There
has not been an effort to systematize the scattered labors
of isolated thinkers. Mr. Herbert Spencer is now for the
first time deliberately making the attempt to found a
Philosophy.
While no one can deny that there has been this deficiency, many will declare it to have been an advantage.
In some respects it was. So long as the ground was unprepared for a stable edifice, the collection and sifting of
the materials was the best work to be done. In other
respects the disadvantage has been palpable. Philosophic
research has lost itself in out-of-the-way corners. It has
never placed itself on a height from which a wide view
of the universe could be had. This was inevitable, be



78     ~      1PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
cause its Method isolated it from  Science. With our
Philosophy, as with our Politics, the parochial point of
view has supplanted the cosmopolitan. The same spirit
which manages the affairs of the Nation too much through
Parish Boards, forgetting that the Nation is an intenrant
part of the living world, has parcelled out the Universe
into " Sections " of a British Association, and from those
sections has carefully excluded not only Psychology,
Ethics, Metaphysics, and Religion, but anything wearing
the aspect of a general doctrine embracing all research.
77. In this respect Germany has had all advantage
which has outweighed the serious evils of a radically false
Method. The habit of philosophizing - that is, of taking
general views, and connecting special truths with them
has become, so to speak, organized in the German
mind; and its influence on culture has been highly beneficial. It percolates the soil, and is felt even when metaphysical problems are not directly touched on, - in the
treatment of History, Language, Politics, Criticism, etc.
No doubt this has its drawbacks. Our parochial system
will sometimes be favorably contrasted with the results
of their world-system; sometimes also unfavorably. Our
system has kept closer to reality; theirs has oftener been
allured by phantoms. ~We shook off Scholasticism; they
retained it. But in shaking it off we also shook off the
speculative passion for nice accuracy of distinction, and
for wide general conceptions; and they, now that they
have learned to look more closely at realities and trust
less'in logical legerdemain, still retain the old love for
systematic and exhaustive treatment. The German Philosophy of recent years has become more and more infused with the scientific spirit.
78. In conclusion, I may here simply state my conviction that the Philosophy in the construction of which
the efforts of all nations converge, is that Positive Phi



SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN METAPHYSICS.       79
losophy which began with Kepler and Galileo, Descartes
and Bacon, and was first reduced to a system by Auguste
Comte: the Doctrine embracing the World, Man, and So~ciety on one homogeneous Method. The extension and
perfection of this Doctrine is the work of the future.
The following pages are animated by the desire of extendillng positive procedures t those outlying questions which
hitherto have been either ignored or pronounced incapable of incorporation with the positive doctrine.
Kant asks: " If Metaphysics is a science, how comes it
that she cannot boast of the general and enduring approbation bestowed on other sciences? If she is no science,
how comes it that she wears this imposing aspect, and
fascinates the human understanding with hopes inextinguishable yet never gratified?  We must either demonstrate the competency or incompetency; for we cannot
longer continue in our present uncertainty." *
The answers to these questions which Kant gave not
having been satisfactory, a new attempt, under more favorable conditions, is made in these pages.  To render
this attempt satisfactory we must first clearly understand
the conditions of metaphysical inquiry.  The initial condition - that of separating the insoluble from the soluble
aspects of each problem - would be accepted by all. But
the question would everywhere arise: What is insoluble?
How is this ascertainable? There are problems which are
recognized as insoluble because of their conditions. For
example, it is impossible to extract the square root of a
number which is not made by multiplication of any whole
number or fraction by itself. To all eternity this must be
impossible. Yet an approximation is possible which may
be made near enough for any practical purpose. There
are other problems, again, which do not admit of even ap* KANT, Prolegomena zu einer jeden kiinftigen Xletaphysik: Einleitung.




80          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
proximative solutions. No one really tries to solve what
he is already convinced is an insoluble problem. But one
man thinks the problem soluble which another pronounces
not to be soluble. What then is our criterion? We say
the metempirical elements must be thrown out of the construction. But what are the metempirical elements?
Here we find ourselves fronting the great psychological
problems of the Limitations of Knowledge, and the Principles of Certitude. To settle these it will be necessary
to examine the pretensions of the cc priori school. Our
first labor, then, will be to examine the principles of positive and speculative research, and then to show that the
principles of metempirical research must either be unconditionally rejected, or, if accepted, must be isolated from
all departments of Knowledge and restricted solely to the
Unknowable.
By way of introduction to these, and to the problems
which will succeed, it may be useful to group together in
an accessible form the principal Rules of Philosophizing
which ought to regulate our efforts.




INTRODUCTION.
PART II.
THE RULES OF PHILOSOPHIZING.
AT the opening of his Third Book, Newton sets forth
the Rules of Reasoning in Philosophy, which in England
have been generally accepted with an almost unquestioning reverence. Yet Newton himself never professed them
to be exhaustive; and indeed, as Whewell remarks, they
were obviously constructed with an intentional adaptation
to the case with which he had to deal, - namely, the induction of universal gravitation, - and are meant to protect the reasonings before which they stand.  It is not
strange, therefore, that, when considered under other aspects, these Rules should prove to be defective both in
precision and in range. Whewell has criticised them
without hesitation.  Instead of criticising, or defending
them, I here propose certain Rules which, while including
those of Newton (with such modifications as may bring
them into closer accordance with my views), will serve
also by their wider range to protect the reasonings which
will follow in the course of this work. There may be
some temerity in deviating from Newton, for it is with
Newton as with Shakespeare, - the genuine reverence of
the Few has become stiffened into the superstition of the
Many; and the formalism of superstition is always outraged by a suggestion of dissent. Men who have seldom
or never turned over the leaves of the Principia are ex4*                           F




82          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
asperated when they hear that any one who has studied
and been strengthened by that work ventures to hint at
flaws in it. Never having slaked their own thirst at the
Holy Wtell, they hear with impatience of drinkers who
presume to reject the weeds and dead leaves which float
in its pure water.
Newton is not, however, directly here in question.
What the following Rules profess is no more than certain
general results of philosophic reflection on the conduct
of Research, which are offered to the attentive meditation
of the student.
RULE I. - No problem to be mooted unless it be presented
in terms of Experience, and be capable of empirical
investigation.
REMARK.
The proper statement of a question often carries with
it the answer. When the answer is not at once conspicuous, a proper statement limits the field of search by
disengagement of the unknown elements, which are then
examined in order to determine whether, 1~, they are
unknown, and unknowable because metempirical; or, 2~,
they are unknown only because the requisite conditions
of knowledge lie beyond our present data.  In the former
case research ceases. In the latter case it proceeds, and
is guided by the following rules:RULE II.- Any contradiction of fundamental experiences
of Sense or Intuition to be taken as evidence of some flaw
either in the data or the calculation.
REMARK.
This seems a truism, yet it is a rule fatally disregarded,
partly owing to impatience, which leads men to accept




THE RULES OF PHILOSOPHIZING.          83:
even logical contradiction rather than remain without an
explanation; partly to the conviction that many of the
most certain results of science seem in contradiction with
ordinary experience. But, in truth, what seems a contradiction proves to be due either to the contradictory
mode of statement, or to an erroneous inference from
experience; sometimes it is the substitution of a prejudice or tradition for experience.
The I~ule simply asserts that since the direct experiences of Sense and Intuition (the perception of objects,
and the perception of the relations of objects) have the
highest possible validity, and form the basis and the test
of all Demonstration, they cannot be contradicted by any
real deduction from them; so that, whenever our deductions or hypotheses involve this logical inconsistency, it
is the indication of something somewhere wrong. Does
the error lie in our assuming that the experience we
declare to be fundamental is direct, whereas it proves by
analysis to be indirect, derivative, and possibly imperfect? Critical examination must decide. The question
must be reduced to its components. Thus the old
opinion respecting the sun's revolution round the earth
seemed to be a fundamental experience which Copernicus
contradicted. It was nothing of the kind. It was an
inference from experience; and what the Copernican
hypothesis contradicted was not the visible fact, but the
inference respecting the invisible cause of that visible
fact. Although we believe that the earth revolves round
the sun, and that this motion has the effect of making the
sun seem to describe the circle, yet what we see is not the
motion of the earth, and for most practical purposes the
old hypothesis is still employed.
The application of this Rule requires great tact and accurate knowledge. It is violated in many theories which
have gained a wide acceptance, and its value is great in




84           PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
keeping the mind open to new evidence, and warning us
that any conclusion which violates it must be wrong. The
notion of " action at a distance," which still finds energetic
defenders, could never have gained acceptance had this
Rule been clearly recognized.
RULE III.-" The qualities of bodies which admit neither
of intension nor remission of degrees, and which are
found to belong to all bodies within the reach of ours experiments, are to be esteemed the universal qualities of all
bodies."
REMARK.
This is 1N'ewton's Third Rule.  On it he remarks:
"For since the qualities of bodies are only known to us
by experiments, we are to hold for universal all such as
universally agree with experiments, and such as are not
liable to diminution can never be quite taken away. We
are certainly not to relinquish the evidence of experiments for the sake of dreams and vain fictions of our own
devising; nor are we to recede from the analogy of Nature, which uses to be simple and always consonant to
itself..... We no otherways know  the extension of
bodies than by our senses, nor do these reach it in all
bodies; but because we perceive extension in all that is
sensible, therefore we ascribe it to all others also. And
this is the foundation of all philosophy."
Professor Challis calls this a golden rule. Whewell
speaks slightingly of it; and indeed it accords ill with his
system. To me it seems absolute, if taken with the qualification involved in Rule X. When we generalize experience, and conclude what will be from what has been, it
is obvious that our justification rests on the assumed homogeneity of the terms: the event predicted must be of
the same nature as the event observed, otherwise the Rule
cannot be fitly applied.




THE RULES OF PHILOSOPHIZING.          85
RULE IV. - No Agent to be admitted unless it have a sensible basis; nor any Agency unless it be verifiable or calculable.
REMARK.
This relates chiefly to Hypothesis.  It permits the
adoption of any conjecture as to Agent or Agency, provided such conjecture facilitates calculation. But so long
as the verifiable nature of either is uncertain, the conjecture must be  kept apart from  all the positively
ascertained data, and rigorously shut out from the final
conclusion. In other words, the solution of an equation
must always express the unknown quantity in terms
of the known quantities; and every interpretation of
a phenomenon must be the interpretation of it in terms
of Feeling.
RULE V. —" We are to admzit no more causes of natural thlings than such as are both true, and s.ficient to
explain the appearances."
REMARK.
This is Newton's First Rule; and, though not expressed
with perfect precision, is pregnant with wisdom. The
objection may be raised that, inasmuch as causes avowedly
not true can gain no acceptance, the whole question turns
on the validity of the causes invoked. What is a vera
causa?  Newton obviously means by it an Agrent or
Agency already known to exist, and seen to be sufficient
to account for the phenomena if its presence be admitted.
Whewell objects that if we never look for a cause except
among those already familiar, we shall never become acquainted with any new cause. This objection misses its
mark. New Agents or Agencies, when discovered, may




86          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
be seen to be the causes of phenomena hitherto unexplained; but to attempt to explain by unknown causes
is futile; and the Rule is directed against this very
futility.
Curiously enough, Newton himself in his remark on the
Rule violates it: "To this purpose the philosophers say
that Nature does nothing in vain, and more is vain when
less will serve; for Nature is pleased with simplicity,
and affects not the pomp of superfluous causes." Now
who shall say that Nature doing nothing in vain is
a " true cause," or that Nature's " pleasure" can be
known?
The Rule is important by its exclusion of unknown
causes, and by its correction of the tendency to multiply
causes. We often find philosophers dissatisfied with an
explanation which is stlfcient, and seeking additional
causes among data that are not given but assumed for the
purpose. They fail to recognize that when we have discovered the law of a series, the form of a function, we
have reached the limit of research.
RULE VI.- Each cause must always and everywhere have
the same effect; and never more than this.
REMARK.
This will be much disputed, owing to the wavering
interpretation assigned to the idea of cause. We often
hear that different effects arise from the same cause, and
that every cause has many effects: in this way Indigestion is said to be the effect of overwork of the brain or
the effect of eating raw apples. This is utterly unscientific. Owing to the current laxity of conception even
Newton has expressed himself timidly on this point in
his enunciation of the Rule: "Therefore to the same




THE RULES OF PHILOSOPHIZING.           87
natural effects we must as far as possible assign the same
causes."
The unalterable rigor of the canon is necessary to the
integrity of the conception of every phenomenon every
process, every law. All experience, all science, would be
a mere sand-heap without it. If the same cause could
have different effects, or even slightly varying amounts
of the same effect, prevision would be impossible.  What
we call the different effects, are the differences resulting from  new combinations of causes. When I come
to treat in detail the Problem  of Cause, it will be made
clear that whether we speak of complex or of simple
phenomena there must necessarily be at least two factors for every product; hence, if we sum up the factors
in the term Cause, and name the.product Effect, it
is obvious that the Effect is always the Procession of
its Cause: the dynacnical aspect of the statical conditions.
Not to enlarge on this point here, let us only remark
that the Rule reminds us that no verified fact can be contradicted by any other fact: each has its own intrinsic
validity.  When two observations seem contradictory, or
when the same facts present two different aspects to two
observers, this is an indication of some alteration in the
conditions, either of the fact itself, or of the observer's
position.  Under the same conditions phenomena are unalterable.
WVe may also see that no process can destroy another,
although it may be so compounded with it that the resultant of the two will present a different aspect from that
of either of the components. Causes, like motions, may
be superposed, each acting independently; or combined,
each acting as a factor: but whether superposed or fused,
each cause is invariant; it is only the phenomena that
are variable.  Hence




88         IPROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
RULE VII. - No proof can be valid beyond the range of
its data; no conclusion is exact which shuts in what is
not included in its premises.
REMARK.
The violation of this is seen when conclusions reached
in one department of phenomena are extended to departments wherein their premises are not the only premises.
Although each science throws its light on every other,
owing to the interdependence of phenomena and the
community of Consciousness, yet no science can be controlled by the results of another, and this because phenomena are independent not less than interdependent.
Mathematics cannot receive laws from Chemistry, nor
Physics from Biology; the phenomena studied in each
are special. But underneath the special differences there
are interdependencies, communities, whereby mathematical laws enter into chemical and biological explanations,
physical laws into chemical, and chemical into biological.
These laws are absolute at their points of intersection,
but not beyond. That is to say, the mathematical law is
absolute for the mathematical relations of the physical,
chemical, or biological phenomenon, but not beyond; and
so of the others. The validity of each vanishes with
its limit. In the development of an ovum, for instance,
it is demonstrable that physical and chemical laws are
involved, and that these are absolute in their order; but
more than these are involved, since by none of the laws
hitherto detected in operation among inorganic phenomena is it possible to explain the biological laws of Nutrition, Evolution, Reproduction, and Decay.  Should
Molecular Dynamics one day be in a position to furnish
such a deduction (which is probable), there would still
remain the speciality of organic phenomena dependent
on a speciality of concurrent causes, which would con



THE RULES OF PHILOSOPHIZING.          89
tinue to separate biological from physical and chemical
laws.
RULE VIII. —Because the significance of a phenomenon
lies wholly in its relation to other phenomena we must
never isolate it fromz this relativity, and draw conclusions
respecting it per se.
REMARK.
It is the constant error of metaphysical speculation to
attempt a real distinction corresponding with the analytical distinction of a thing from its relations. The thing is
its relations, and although analytically we may separate
them, attending now to this relation, now to that, we
-must never imagine the separation to be real.
RULE IX. -  We are not to conclude the properties of elements frovm the properties of the groups they form,; nor
vice versa.
REMARK.
This, which is the direct consequence of Rule VIII.,
although obvious enough in many cases, often requires
delicate tact in application. No one commits the mistake
of supposing that either of the elements of water has
when separate the properties of water; no one supposes
that the properties of each element combined in water
could be deduced from the observed properties of the
combination; no one supposes that from the observed
properties of oxygen and hydrogen, separately considered,
the properties of water could be deduced. Yet analogous
mistakes are often committed.  Many philosophers assunme that atoms, or the ultimate elements of Matter,
must have the properties observed in masses; and still
more assume that the properties of an object belong to it
apart from the subject, not as elements of the combined




90          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
object-subject, but as qualities of the thing per se; while
still greater is the number of those who assign to one
factor in a causation the character noted in a result due
to several factors.
Every mathematician knows that there are numberless
theorems true of integers which are not true of the fractions, the properties of the fractions often widely differing from the properties of the integers.
The mistake here pointed out often arises from not discriminating between component parts and constituent
elements.  Wthat is true of the mass is generally true of
any part of that mass, the difference being only quantitative. A molecule of water has the properties of a
gallon of water. But even this is true only of those
properties not directly dependent on quantity; for experiments on finely divided substances show that many a
substance begins to lose its molar properties in becoming
molecular, since some of the effects which depend on the
individual molecules, and which in the mass were mutually balanced, then begin to manifest themselves, the
balance being disturbed.
The distinction here indicated between Components
and Constituents, or between Parts and Elements, will be
seen hereafter to have its importance. All quantitative,
relations are componental; all qualitative relations elemental.  The combinations of the first issue in Resultants, which may be analytically displayed; the combinations of the other issue in Emergents, which cannot be
seen in the elements, nor deduced from them. A number
is seen to be the sum of its units; a direction of movement is seen to be the line which would be occupied by
the body if each of the incident forces had successively
acted on it during an infinitesimal time; but a chemical
or vital product is a combination of elements which cannot be seen in the elements. It emerges from them as a
new phenomenon.




THE RULES OF PHILOSOPHIZING.          91
RULE X. - The validity of conclusions rests on the preservation of homogeneity in the terms and the identity of
their ratios.
REMARK.
This extremely important Rule we shall often have to
invoke. It will be brought prominently forward in the
discussion of Necessary Truths. One of the commonest
sources of error is that of unconsciously changing the
terms of a proposition without at the same time making
the corresponding change in the ratios. Valid generalization can only be effected by extending to many or to
all what is positively true of some, it being therein assumed, or proved, that the many, or all, do not differ from
the some in the characters ascribed. For example, when
we generalize from masses to molecules, it is like passing
from  large numbers to small numbers, so long as the
molecules are assumed, or proved, to possess all the characters known of masses; but if we observe — and we
often do observe — that the masses tend to lose their
homogeneity in becoming molecular (which is the passage
to their heterogeneity in becoming resolved into their
constituent elements), our conclusions respecting their
properties tend to become more and more uncertain. TWe
cannot deduce the relative movements in a system from
our observation of the movements of that system,the movements of animals from the movement of the
earth, — the rotation of the earth from the movement
of the solar system; or, vice versa, the orbital movements
of the earth from  the relative movements of its bodies. Each problem  has its equation of condition; and
it is only by generalizing this, that is to say, preserving the homogeneity  of its terms and  ratios, that
any conclusion can be established beyond the particular
case.




92          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
RULE XI. - Science is built up from  Abstractions, and
these are built up from Concretes.  No Abstraction must
contain more than is warranted by its Concretes.
REMARK.
When the Abstraction expresses more than is given in
the Concretes, it must be understood as the geometer understands a transcendent; however useful in preserving
the symmetry of expressions, it must never enter into the
final equation. We may employ the abstraction Life to
express all the concrete phenomena observed, and the
unexplored remainder; but it is only the former that we
must admit into our theoretical explanation: the unexplored remainder must not be treated as if it had been
explored and mastered. We may employ a fourth coordinate to facilitate calculation, but must never allow
this symbol to be mistaken for the sign of a concrete
reality.
RULE XII. -  Carefully to discriminate between the abstract or analytical point of view and the concrete or
synthetical point of view.
REMARK.
Experience is the registration of feelings and the relations of their correlative  objects.  Science is the
explanation of these feelings, the analysis of these
objects into their components and constituents, which
are then held to be the factors of the facts.  These factors are of various kinds, real and ideal, concrete and
abstract, appreciable by Sense, and appreciable by Intuition.
Considered subjectively, the real is what is either felt
or perceived; the ideal is what is either imaged - that is




THE RULES OF PHILOSOPHIZING.           93
to say, the feeling reproduced in the absence of its external object -or conceived, i. e. the feeling represented in
a symbol. The real is what is actually given in Feeling.
The ideal is what is virtually given, when Inference anticipates what would be Feeling, were the objective causes
in direct relation with Sense. Thus the direct experience
of the one is supplemented by the indirect experience
of the other: vision is completed by prevision: real observation by ideal construction.  No sooner has the
construction been verified, all its inferences reduced to
sensations, all its inductions to deductions, and its deductions to intuitions (by a process we shall hereafter consider), than ideal factors take the place of real factors,
prevision of vision, and the truths of ideal relations are
recognized as having the same validity as the truths of
real relations, for the ideas are virtual feelings. But the
process of verification is both complex and delicate, so
that wvhenever an ideal relation is inconsistent with the
corresponding real relation, and  prevision contradicts
vision, the error must lie on the side of the ideal construction.
The starting-point is always Feeling, and Feeling is
the final goal and test.  Knowledge begins with indefinite Feeling, which is gradually rendered more and
more definite as the chaos is condensed into objects,
effected through a rudimentary analysis determined by
the fundamental Signatures (Qualities) of Feeling, namely, Tension, Intension, Extension, Duration, Likeness,
Unlikeness.
Each object is by a subsequent analysis resolved into
its components; these again are resolved into their constituents; and these in turn into their constituents, if the
regressive analysis be practicable or serviceable.  Thus
water is a real object, a concrete fact of our experience.
We learn its properties, and we also learn that it is a




94          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
mass of molecules, each molecule having the properties
of water, and that the weight or force of the mass is the
sum of the molecules. Analysis of this mass will resolve each of the molecules into its constituent elements,
oxygen and hydrogen gas: these have their properties,
not the properties of water, and they have their movements, which are not the movements of the molecules.
Analysis is still within the region of the sensible, for
the water is only the molecule "writ large"; but now
it takes a further regressive step, and decomposes each
molecule of the gases into constituent atoms, or ultinlate elements. These are purely ideal. They cannot be presented to Sense, but are presented to Intuition, and are seen by the mind, not as reals, but as
logical postulates, symbols to assist calculation. Thus
a curve is a real, but the infinitesimal straight lines
into which it is ideally analyzed are symbols only, not
reals.
Analysis is descriptive when it deals with components
and genetic when it deals with constituents. The one is
proximate, sensible, and generally certain; the other remote, extra-sensible, and liable to error: it is always an
attempt to explain the known by the less known, sometimes by the unknown but hypothetical, consequently it
must always have less validity than the synthesis it is
invoked to explain. I mean that a fact must always be
more certain than the factors by which we elucidate its
origin.
Analysis always requires the verification of synthesis.
Having taken an object to pieces, we cannot be sure
that we have in the pieces all the components or constituents unless we can, really or ideally, build up
again the object from those pieces. The failure to rebuild indicates the oversight of one or more of the constituents.




THE RULES OF PHILOSOPHIZING.          95
RULE XIII.- Philosophy, being the harmony between the
concrete and abstract, the synthetic and its explanatory
analytic, demands that everywhere the abstract be subordinate to the concrete in respect to validity, though it is
superior in point of dignity.
REMARK.
This is insisting on the subordination of means to ends.
The purpose of knowledge being the guidance of primitive
Impulses for the satisfaction of Desires, obviously Speculation must be subordinated to the Practice which it is
intended to serve; and all conceptions of Reason, however lofty, must have perception and action for their final
aim: they are intermediates between the feeling which is
an impulse and the feeling which is the result of that
impulse in action.
But although the end is more important than the
means, and although Feeling is final, and Thought has
only validity in accordance with Feeling, in point of dignity (that is, of governing value) Thought is supreme, and
abstract conceptions are of far higher moment than concrete perceptions. The animal life is higher in dignity
than the vegetal; the social life is higher than the individual. Yet the animal functions depend on the vegetal,
the social on the animal. Theories which embody multitudes of relations are more dignified than facts which
embody particular relations; but the theories are subordinate to the facts. The Nation is of more importance
than any one Family, and the Family than one of its
members; nevertheless the dependence of the Family on
its members, and of the Nation on its Families, is absolute.
Hence the fallacy must be guarded against which
assumes that general laws, or axioms, because of their
superior dignity, have a deeper validity than particular




96          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
truths.  Connected with this is the fallacy that laws rule
phenomena, determine them; whereas they only express
the phenomena in a formula.
One consequence of this fallacy, which has many, is the
error of deducing from  averages conclusions which are
not of average but of particular relations, - e. g. when
the average amount of food consumed by a hundred
men is taken as the guide for the rations of the individuals, each man being taken as if he were a unit of
the average; whereas, in fact, each man is markedly
different from every other, and the average eliminates
the differences.
On the other hand, the Law, or abstract formula of the
concretes, is valid when once verified; any contradiction
to such a law must be assigned either to a misinterpretation of its terms, or to a misapplication of it to the case
in point. An example of misinterpretation is the commnon opposition to Mr. Buckle's statement that the number of marriages in a community is regulated by the price
of corn, and not at all by the inclinations of the sexes.
He has expressed this law so unguardedly that readers
in general have rejected it with indignation. But if we
reflect that the inclinations of the sexes are constant
factors which would determine the marriage of all men
and women, were their inclinations left unopposed, and
if we recognize among the grounds of opposition none at
once so general and so imperative as the need of sufficient food, we see that food must be the variable factor
determining the variation in the number of the unmarried, which variation it is that the statistical law formulates. Mr. Buckle was injudicious and wrong in saying
that the inclinations have nothing to do with marriage;
what they have nothing to do with is the variable number of the unmarried, a number expressive of the perturbations to which sexual unions are subjected.




THE RULES OF PHILOSOPHIZING.          97
RULE XIV.- " In experimental philosophy we are to look
upon propositions collected by general induction from
phenomena as accurately or very nearly true, notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses that may be imagined,
till such time as other phenomena occur by which they
may be made more accurate or liable to exceptions."
REMARK.
This is Newton's Fourth Rule, and he remarks that
we must follow it in order that the argument of induction may not be invaded by hypothesis; in other words,
without too confidently relying on the universality of
an induction, we must always prefer it to any reasoning
not founded on an inductive basis.
RULE XV. — "Always to prefer the simplest hypothesis
compatible with all the observed facts."
REMARK.
This is Comte's first law of Primary Philosophy; and
however self-evident it may appear, is very frequently
disregarded, because the scientific use of Hypothesis is
so little understood.
That many more rules might be added is indisputable;
but these fifteen are all that I deem necessary for my
present purpose. They will be implied throughout the
following investigationis, and from time to time specially
invoked.
5                             G








PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.
ALSO bestimmt die Gestalt die Lebensweise des Thieres;
Und die Weise zu leben sie wirkt auf alle Gestalten
MIachtig zuriick. So zeiget sich fest die geordnete Bildung
Welche zum Wechsel sich neigt durch iusserlich wirkende Wesen.
GOETHE, Die Metamorphose der Thiere.
Entre l'Homme et le Monde il faut l'lHumanite.
AUGUSTE COMTE.




NOTE.
AL'rRoGHn the arguments set forth in the following pages ought to
carry with them their own evidence, it may not be without advantage
to them if I here set down the Principles adopted from previous writers
or arrived at in my own researches, and give a general sketch of what
it is proposed to establish in several of the Problems to be successively
treated. A systematic treatise on Psychology seems to me premature
until there is something like general agreement on many questions of
fundamental importance, these being partly metaphysical and partly
biological. Instead, therefore, of a treatise, I have here sketched the
programme of Psychology; and in the ensuing pages have undertaken
the examination at some length of those questions which seemed most
pressing.
What is here set down must be accepted as a programme only. I do
not pause to prove the positions; in many cases I do not even illustrate
them. The reader is not called upon to assent to them; he is only asked
to consider that they are the positions on which I have founded my arguments. They may, perhaps, also be accepted as suggestions to further
inquiry.




PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.
1. MAN is not simply an Animal Organism, he is also
a unit in a Social Organism. He leads an individual
life, which is also part of a collective, life. Hence two
classes of Motors: the personal and the sympathetic,the egoistic and the altruistic. From these chiefly issue
the Animal sentient life, and the Human intellectual and
moral life.
Human Psychology, therefore, the science of psychical
phenomena, has to seek its data in Biology and in Sociology. The great mistake hitherto has been either that of
metaphysicians, seeking the data solely in introspective
analysis of Consciousness; or that of biologists, seeking
the data in the combination of such analysis with interpretation of nervous phenomena.
2. The biologist who is true to scientific Method accepts Vitality as an ultimate fact, of which he only seeks
the factors, i. e. its conditions, and its laws of manifestation. He leaves to metaphysicians the ulterior task of
settling, if they can, what Life is, apart from these, or
in the general system of things. The mathematician
does not concern himself with what Quantity, Space, and
Time are; nor the physicist with what Force is; nor the
biologist with what Life is.
The psychologist likewise must accept Consciousness,
or, to speak more precisely, Sensibility, as an ultimate




102         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
fact, of which he only studies the factors, - its conditions
and laws.
The analogy of Life and Mind is the closest of all analogies, if indeed the latter is anything more than a special
form of the other. Hence what is known of Life will be
the best guide to what is knowable of Mind.  Both are
processes, or, under another aspect, functional products.
Neither is a substance; neither is a force. To speak of
Vitality as a substance, would shock all our ideas; but
many speak of it as a force. They might with equal
propriety hold Mortality to be a force. What, then, is
meant by Vitality, or vital forces? If the abstraction be
resolved into its concretes, it will be seen that a certain
process, or group of processes, is condensed into a simple
expression, and the final result of this process is transposed from a resultant into an initial condition, the name
given to the whole group of phenomena becomes the personification of the phenomena, and the product is supposed to have been the producer.  In lieu of regarding
vital actions as the dynamical results of their statical
conditions, the actions are personified, and the personification comes to be regarded as indicating something
independent of and antecedent to the concrete facts it
expresses. The vital force manifested by an Organism
may be likened to the mechanical force manifested by a
Machine. No  one really tries to reach and  modify
the mechanical force (which is a pure abstraction); he
only tries to reach and modify the mechanical conditions
(which are reals), certain that if he lessen the friction of
the parts he will increase the mechanical product. In
like manner, no philosophic biologist now tries to reach
and modify a vital force, but only to reach and modify
those biostatical conditions which, when  considering
them as causes, and condensing them all into a single
expression, he calls Vitality or the Vital Forces. When




PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.         103
we speak of electrical force, cohesive force, attractive
force, and the like, we are using abstractions which condense a vast amount of concrete observation; but it is
not on these abstractions that our experiments lay hold,
it is on the concrete phenomena themselves.
The same is true of Sensibility. Vitality and Sensibility, Life and Consciousness, are abstractions having real
concretes. They are compendious expressions of functional processes conceived in their totality, and not at any
single stage. A function is the activity of an organ.
And since Function is a conception which is in its very
nature distinguished from the material conditions, obviously both Life and Mind are terms which designate
phenomena that are immaterial, the tvre conceptions of
Matter and Motion, although correlative, being mutually
exclusive. In so regarding them, however, we are not to
conclude that this exclusion justifies the spiritual hypothesis of Life and Mind. This hypothesis is simply a
reintroduction of an unknown kind of Matter to serve
as the Substance, in lieu of the known Matter which
is presented by the Organism. Who does not see the
contradiction of requiring a substance for that which
by its definition is not substantial at all, but pure dynamism?
3. We cannot be sufficiently on our guard in the use
of abstractions, and especially against our tendency to
confound ideal separations with real separations. It is
this tendency which keeps up the tradition of Mind
existing apart from Life, and following other laws. We
separate, for convenience, mental phenomena from other
vital phenomena, and then again separate mental phenomena from neural phenomena; this done, we overlook
the real identity, and do not see that every mental phenomenon has its corresponding neural phenomenon (the
two being as the convex and concave surfaces of the same




104         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
sphere, distinguishable yet identical), and that every ne~ural phenomenon involves the whole Organism; by which
alone the influence of the body on the mind, and of the
mind on the body, can be explained.
Among the broad distinctions of phenomena those of
Physical, Chemical, and Vital must be maintained, expressing as they do the characteristic motions of propulsion, motions of combination, and motions of evolution. A
chemical combination, even if finally reducible to physical laws, is markedly distinguished by presenting new
structural relations. A still broader demarcation is given
in the vital phenomenon of Evolution (characterized
by Nutrition, Development, and Decay, through serial
changes), distingluishable from the chemical combinations
out of which it emerges. Not only is it impossible to
deduce the phenomenon of Evolution from the phenomena of chemical combination, not only is it impossible to
explain Nutrition by Chemistry, unless we replace tile
Laboratory by the Organism, and thus introduce the special evolutive conditions, namely, the presence of organic
substance formed into histological elements (cells, fibres,
tubes); but it is _c pFriori evident that a phenomenon
differing so widely from all chemical phenomena must be
due to widely different conditions. We may never know
all these conditions; but that analysis will ever resolve
them into simple chemical conditions irrespective of the
speciality of their theatre, may confidently be denied. It
is an old remark that Life escapes under the scalpel, leaving only a dead "subject" for dissection. Life equally
vanishes under chemical analysis.
A similar mistake perverts the effobrts of most psychologists. They do not keep in view the speciality of the
psychological theatre, nor allow for the continual presence
of those sentient conditions implied in the general term
Soul. The spiritualists are prone to split up the sentient




PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.          105
organism into independent Faculties, dividing it into
Sense, Understanding, Reason, Volition, etc. The materialists split it up into independent Organs. Thus both
schools - the school which affirms the unity of the Soul
in its spiritual substance, and the school which affirms
the dependence of the Soul on its cerebral substance -
practically deny their principle when they come to treat
mental phenomena in detail.
And in both cases the source of the error is the exclusive employment of Analysis without the due regard to
its needful correction by Synthesis. Theoretically taking
the Organism to pieces to understand its separate parts,
we fall into the error of supposing that the Organism is
a mere assemblage of organs, like a machine which is
put together by juxtaposition of different parts. But
this is radically to misunderstand its essential nature and
the universal solidarity of its parts. The Organism is
not made, not put together, but evolved; its parts are not
juxtaposed, but differentiated; its organs are groups of
minor organisms, all sharing in a common life, i. e. all
sharing in a common substance constructed through a
common process of simultaneous and continuous Imolecular composition and decomposition; precisely as the great
Social Organism is a group of societies, each of which is
a group of families, all sharing in a common life, - every
family having at once its individual independence and
its social dependence through connection with every
other. In a machine the parts are all different, and have
mechanical significance only in relation to the whole.
In an Organism the parts are all identical in fundamental
characters, and diverse only in their superadded differentiations: each has its independence, although all cooperate. The synthetical point of. view, which should
never drop out of sight, however the necessities of investigation may throw us upon analysis, is well expressed by
5*




106         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
Aristotle somewhere to the effect that all collective life
depends on the separation of offices and the concurrence
of efforts. In a vital organism every force is the resultant of all the forces; it is a disturbance of equilibrium,
and equilibrium is the equivalence of convergent forces.
When we speak of Intelligence as a force which determines actions, we ought always to bear in mind that the
efficacity of Intelligence depends on the organs which
co-operate and are determined: it is not pure Thought
which moves a muscle, neither is it the abstraction
Contractility, but the muscle, which moves a limb.
To those who, having relinquished the spiritualist
hypothesis, have adopted the view that Mind is only one
of the forms of Life, and that Life is not an entity but an
abstraction expressing the generalities of organic phenomena, it is obvious that Psychology must endeavor to
ascertain the conditions of these phenomena, both general
and special. These may be classed (by a serviceable extension of'the term statics) under the heads of Biostatics
and Psychostatics.
BIOSTATICS.
4. Owing to the necessary abstraction which characterizes all analytical investigation, we are too prone to
neglect that restitution of the omitted elements which is
needful when we would complete the analysis by a real
explanation. It is thus that we separate each organ or
function from its complications with all the others, and
forget that it is really only a part of a living whole, and
explicable only through the whole Organism. It is thus
that we consider only one factor in studying a product,
and forget that every product necessarily has at least two
factors each equally indispensable. When, therefore, we
define an Organism it should always be with clear vision
of its relation to a Medium; and when we define a func



PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.          107
tion as the activity of an organ, we should always distinctly recognize the fact that this activity does not take
place in vacuo, but involves the co-operation both of that
which is acted on and of that which acts. The function
of an organ is as rigorously determined by the stimulus
which excites it as by the structure which is excited;
unless this unification of the two factors takes place there
is no product at all,- the organ is not active because not
adequately stimulated.
I shall repeatedly have occasion to invoke this principle, and here simply invoke it in reference to the nutrition of the Organism, the structure of which is built
up from materials originally drawn from the external
MIedium, but proximately drawn from its internal Medium, or plasma. Between the  reception of this external material and the assimilation of it by the tissues (of
plant or animal), there is always an intermediate stage
passed through, the inorganic, unvitalized material becoming there transformed into organizable, vitalized material.
What this special change is we do not know; we only
know that until it has taken place the inorganic material
is not assimilable; it must enter as a constituent of the
Biopglasm to form part of what Claude Bernard calls the
Physiological Medium, before it can become a constituent
of the tissues. The supposition that plants are nourished
cirectly by inorganic substances drawn from the soil and
atmosphere, is now proved to be erroneous: the Nutrition
of plants takes place through processes similar to those in
animals. The inorganic has in both to pass through the
organizable stage, and form proximate principles, before it
can become organized into elements'of tissue.
5. Among the most important laws of Biostatics may
be named the following: —
I. Thle Law of Correlated Developmzent. —There is a
marked tendency in organic substance to vary under




108           PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
varying excitations, which results in the individualization
of the parts, so that growth is accompanied by a greater
or less differentiation of structure. Were this tendency
uncontrolled, there would be no organic unity: the organism would then be simply an assemblage of organs.
But owing to the solidarity which underlies all differentiation, the parts are not only individualized into tissues
and organs, but are all connected. Thus each new
modification of structure is secured, each organ is independent yet subordinated to the whole; and instead of
being an obstacle, this independence becomes, through
the consensus and co-operation of each, a source of enhanced power in the organism.  In organic, as in social
life, the indispensable condition of perfect action is the
co-operation of independent agents, -  the Freedom which
is subordinated to Law, and the Law which secures
Freedom.
II. The Law of Adaptation. -  Although an organ can
only respond to a stimulus according to its own modes,
which depend on its structure, and which vary with the
variations of structure, yet the very reaction itself tends
to establish a modification which will alter subsequent
reactions.  It is in this sense, and this alone, that we
must understand the statement that organs are created by
functions.  What is exact in the statement is that by the
exercise of an organ its structure becomes differentiated,
and each modification renders it fitted for more energetic
reaction and for new modes of reaction.* But we must
* How important this principle is in the evolution of our moral no less
than our intellectual aptitudes may be seen in the growth of the sympathetic tendencies. " Telle est la douceur naturelle des bons sentiments
que, de quelques excitations que provienne leur dveil, ils tendent a se
developper par leur propre charrme, quand ils ont une fois surgi, meme
d'apres un motif personnel, trop souvent indispensable a leur torpeur
primitive." —CoMTE, Politique  Positive, II. 119. Unhappily our bad
sentiments follow the same law, and become intensified by exercise.




PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.           109
never lose sight of the absolute principle that Function is
the action of Organ, and can never be dynamically other
than what its statical conditions permit.
III. lT/e -Law of Heredity. - The modifications of
structure acquired through Adaptation tend to become
transmitted to offspring, and would always in effect be
transmitted were it not for perturbations of the result owing to the action of external forces during the embryonic
development, and to the influence of the other parent.
PSYCHOSTATICS.
6. Let us now pass from Life to Mind.  The vital organism we have seen to be evolved from the Bioplasm, and
we may now see how the psychical organism is evolved
from what may be analogically called the Psychoplasm.
The Bioplasm is characterized by a continuous and simultaneous movement of molecular composition and decomposition; and out of these arises the whole mechanism,
which is also sustained and differentiated by them.  If,
instead of considering the whole vital organism, we consider solely its sensitive aspects, and confine ourselves to
the Nervous System, we may represent the molecular
movements of the Bioplasm by the neural tremors of the
Psychoplasm: these tremors are what I term neutral utnits:
the raw material of Consciousness; the several ~neural
grotups formed by these units represent the organized
elements of tissues, the tissues, and the combination of
tissues into organs, and of organs into apparatus. The
movements of the Bioplassm  constitute Vitality; the
movements of the Psychoplasm constitute Sensibility.
The forces of the cosmical medium which are transformed
in the physiological medium build up the organic structHerein lies the supreme importance of an Education which is directed
towards the development of aptitudes by their effective exercise, rather
than by the inculcation of rules.




110          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
ture, which in the various stages of its evolution reacts
according to its statical conditions, themselves the results
of preceding reactions. It is the same with what may be
called the mental organism. Here also every phenomenon is the product of two factors, external and internal,
impersonal and personal, objective and subjective. Viewing the internal factor solely in the light of Feeling, we
may say that the sentient material out of which all the
forms of Consciousness are evolved is the Psychoplasin
incessantly fluctuating, incessantly renewed.  Viewing
this on the physiological side, it is the succession of neural tremors, variously combining into neural groups.
7. An organism lives only in relation to its medium.
What Growth is, in the physical sense, that is Experience in the psychical sense, namely, organic registration
of assimilated material.  The direct relation of the organism is to the internal medium, the indirect relation is to
the cosmical medium. The Bioplasm is constituted out
of the fluids which bathe the tissues, and from which
each tissue derives its nourishment, molecule by molecule. It is necessarily liquid because in a tissue liquidity is requisite for chemical action. Hence Claude Bernard suggestively notes that the cellular elements of the
tissues are veritable aquatic organisms. The internal
medium is incessantly fluctuating, - a point to which especial attention must be given.  Materials are incessantly
absorbed from without, and are there elaborated, made fit
for assimilation. Materials are also incessantly thrown
into it as products of waste of tissue, and have to be excreted. Thus does the Bioplasm contain the materials of
Yesterday, the materials of To-day, and the materials of
To-morrow. Nutrition may, to speak mathematically, be
designated a function of three variables, namely, tissue,.internal medium, and cosmic medium.  A  little more
heat or a little less of carbonic acid, or of oxygen, press



PSYCHOLOGICAL PItINCIPLES.         111
ure, etc., in the external, will accelerate or retard the
evolutions of Nutrition by its effects on the internal
medium. But no variation in the cosmic medium which
does not affect the internal medium will have any modifying influence on the organism. This also it is important
to bear in mind. The direct relation is between the organism and the internal medium: these two factors therefore
comprise the Biostatical conditions; and the influence of
the external medium is through these. Food is not food,
nor is poison poison, until it has passed into the Bioplasm.
8. The reader sees at once how this applies to the sentient organism. We have already spoken, metaphorically, of the Psychoplasm, or sentient material forming
the psychological medium from which the Soul derives
its structure and its powers. It is the mass of potential
Feeling derived from all the sensitive affections of the
organism, not only of the individual, but, through Heredity, of the ancestral organisms. All sensations, perceptions, emotions, volitions, are partly connate, partly
acquired: partly the evolved products of the accumulated
experiences of ancestors, and partly of the accumulated
experiences of the individual, when each of these have
left residace in the modifications of the structure.
Thus Vitality and Sensibility may be said to rest on
seriated Change. If the changes were simply movements, propulsive or combined, physical or chemical, they
would not present the phenomena of Life or of Consciousness. The changes must be serial, and what we
term organized, to present the phenomena of Evolution.
That Life is Change, and that Consciousness is Change,
has always been affirmed.  We have only to add that the
changes are serial, and convergent through a consensus
determined by essential community of structure, and we
have characterized the speciality of organic change, demarcated Life and Mind from all inorganic change.




112         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
9. Corresponding with the Biostatical laws previously
formulated there are three Psychostatical laws.
I. The Law of Interest. — It has long been observed
that we only see what interests us, only know what is
sufficiently like former experiences to become, so to speak,
incorporated with them, - assimilated by them. The
satisfaction of desire is that which both impels and quiets
mental movement. Were it not for this controlling effect
of the established pathways, every excitation would be
indefinitely irradiated throughout the whole organism;
but a pathway once established is the ready issue for any
new excitation. The evolution of Mind is the establishment of definite paths: this is the mental organization,
fittingo it for the reception of definite impressions, and
their co-ordination with past feelings.
II. The Law of Signature. - Every feeling being a
group of neural units, and varying with the varying units,
or varying groups of such groups, has its particular signature, or mark in Consciousness, in consequence of which
it acquires its objective Localization, i. e., its place in the
organism or in the cosmos.
III. The Law of Exzperience. - This is only the mental side of the laws of Heredity and Adaptation.  Experience is the registration of Feeling.  Through their registered modifications, feelings once produced are capable
of reproduction; and must always be reproduced, more
or less completely, whenever the new excitation is discharged along the old channels.
The laws just formulated are special forms of the
primary law, which in Biology is expressed in the formula: Every vital phenomenon is the product of two factors, the Organism and its Medium; and in Psychology is
expressed in the equivalent formula: Every psychical
phenomenon is the product of two factors, the Subject and
the Object. The importance of keeping these steadily




PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.          113
before us in all detailed investigation, and the frequent
mistakes which arise from overlooking them, will appear
in the course of this work. Note, in passing, that the
latter formula replaces the old Dualism, in which Subject and Object were two independent and unallied existences, by a Monism, in which only one existence, under
different forms, is conceived. The old conception was
of Life in conflict with the External; the new conception recognizes their identity; and founds this recognition on the demonstrable fact that so far from the
external forces tending to destroy Life (according to
Bichat's view), they are the very materials out of which
Life emerges, and by which it is sustained and developed.
10. There are of course several other derivative laws,
but these three are the principal, and are all that need be
noted here. A glance at them suffices to discredit the
old idea that the Senses directly apprehend- or mirror - external things. It is equally mistaken to suppose
that sensitive impressions are the itmmediate motors.
Each excitation has to be assimilated,- taken up into
the psychological medium and transformed into a sensation or perception, - a process that will depend upon the
psychostatical conditions at the time being. The different ways in which the same external stimulus affects
different organisms, or the same organism at different
times, are thus explicable. Think of the diversities of
feeling produced by the image of a sheep on the retina
of a man and a wolf, or of an artist and a grazier. Think
of the dissimilar effects produced by the same musical
intervals on the organism of an Asiatic and on that of a
European. Or, take an example from Insanity: A visceral disturbance, especially in the digestive or the generative organs, will cause a perversion of Sensibility
from which will arise abnormal sensation, hallucination,
H




114         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
moods, melancholy, depression, etc. These prompt the
intellect to explanation. External causes are imagined;
and the wildest hypotheses of persecution, divine or diabolic communication, are invented. As the disturbance
spreads and the organism becomes more and more abnormal, the ideas become more and more incoherent, till
Dementia supervenes.
This influence of the psychostatical conditions in
determining the character of every psychical phenomenon
suggests an important distinction which must be established between Animal Consciousness and Human Consciousness, one far greater than any other distinction to
be established between Animals and Man. It is formulated by Auguste Comte in that phrase which is placed
as an epigraph to this chapter, although the phrase was
not by him understood precisely in the sense here
assigned. We have seen how between the Cosmos and
the Consciousness there is interposed a psychological
medium, briefly designated by the term Experience.
This applies both to animals and to man. But in man
we must recognize another medium, one from which his
moral and intellectual life is mainly drawn, one which
separates him from all animals by the broadest line:
this is the Social Medium, - the collective accumulations
of centuries, condensed in knowledge, beliefs, prejudices,
institutions, and tendencies; and forming another kind
of Psychoplasm to which the animal is a stranger. "The
animal feels the Cosmos, and adapts himself to it. Man
feels the Cosmos, but he also thinks it; again he feels
the Social world, and thinks it. His feelings and his
thoughts of both are powerfully modified by residlae.
LHence the very Cosmos is to him greatly different from
what it is to the animal; for just as what is organized
in the individual becomes transmitted to offspring, and
determines the mode in which the offspring will react on




PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.          115
stimulus, so what is registered in the Social Organism
determines the mode in which succeeding generations
will feel and think.  By Tools and Instruments, by
Creeds and Institutions, by Literature, Art, and Science,
the Social Organism acquires and develops its powers;
and how even simple perceptions are modified by social
influences will strikingly appear in a subsequent part of
this work, wherein it will be shown that all perceptions
are the results of slow evolution, as the organic forms
are; and not only will it be shown that many thousands
of years passed before even man was able to perceive the
color blue for instance (though of course he felt a difference between a blue object and a brown one), it will be
shown that no animal can possibly perceive blue as we
perceive it; and the reason in both cases is not to be
sought in physiological processes of Vision, but in psychological processes of Thought.  The possibility of this
perception is dure to Language; and Language exists only
as a social function.
THE METHOD OF PSYCHOLOGY.
11. Here we may briefly indicate the Method to be
pursued. The mental life of man has two sources: 1~,
the animal organism, and 2~, the social organism. Man
apart from Society is simply an animal organism; restore
him to his real position as a social unit, and the problem
changes. It is in the development of Civilization that we
trace the real development of Humanity. The soul of
man has thus a double root, a double history. It passes
quite out of the range of animal life; and no explanation
of mental phenomena can be valid which does not allow
for this extension of range. Nevertheless I believe this
necessity of extending the survey is now  for the first
time placed on its true footing; nor was it, indeed, even
recognized, until Comte, in his second great work, insti



116            PIlOBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
tuted his theorie de l'dme by the combination of the biological and the sociological points of view.*
12. For a very long period philosophers deemed it
enough to study Mind with little reference to its dependence on the Organism; the introspection of Consciousness was supposed  to  be sufficient.   Nay, even  when
Physiology began to furnish indications of the connection between vital and psychical phenomena, and to exhibit the dependence of mental states on neural states,
the psychologists pointed to the  fact that Consciousness
told us nothing of such dependence; and hence they
concluded  that Psychology, occupied solely  with Consciousness and its changes, need  not concern itself with
Physiology and its laws. Rightly interpreted, this very
fact that Consciousness tells us nothing of its physiological conditions would have been recognized as fatal to the
pretensions of the introspective  Method.  Indeed, Psychology without illumination from  Biology is something
like the Astronomy of the Chaldeans without the aid
* In the present brief indication of my scheme I cannot pause to assign
to each philosopher the conceptions adopted from him, nor will the wellread student need such references; but, as Comte's Politique Positive will
be known to few of my readers, justice demands a summary statement
of the fundamental agreement and difference between his conception and
my own. They agree in regarding Science as a social product stimulated
by social needs, and constructed by the co-operation of successive generations, so that civilization and Humanity are developed paroi passy. They
agree in subordinating individual introspection to the study of the collective evolution.  " Quand j'eus fonde ia sociologie," says Comte, "je
compris enfin que le genie de Gall n'avait pu construire une veritable physiologie du cerveau faute de connaltre les lois de l'dvolution collective qui
seule en doit fournir a la fois le principe et le but."  (I. 729. Compare
III. 45, 46.) But they differ primarily in this: he holds that Humanity
develops no attribute, intellectual or moral, which is not also to be found
in Animality (1. 624), whereas I hold that the attributes of Intellect and
Conscience are special products of the Social Organism, and that although animals possess in common with man the Logic of Feeling, they
are wholly deficient in the Logic of Signs, which is a social, not an animal function.




PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.          117
of Mathematics; watching the stars however patiently
would no more disclose the laws of their movement than
watching the changes in Consciousness would disclose
their laws. Not only were centuries of such observation
inadequate, but we now know that some of the elementary facts escaped notice, and must forever have escaped
it unless otherwise aided.
This need not be insisted on, however, since there is
now an almost universal agreement respecting the necessity of studying the organism; and many psychological treatises are avowedly based on the Physiology of
the Nervous System, while all largely invoke physiological aid. We may observe, indeed, in most of these'
a disposition to translate psychological observations into
physiological language, and to accept this as biological
illumination; which not unjustifiably excites the scorn of
the pure psychologist. One example of this translation
may be given here: some anatomists having conceived
the infelicitous idea of distinguishing nerve-cells into
sensory, motor, and sympathetic, this nomenclature, so
misleading even when it is not profoundly unphysiological, is adopted by several writers, who first establish the
illusory distinctions of sensational cells, ideational cells,
and emotional cells, and then proceed to explain the
mental mechanism by these imaginary cells.
The early chemists paid no attention to the part played
by the air in Combustion; nay, it was long before the
fact of its materiality was vividly realized, and a century
after Torricelli it was first recognized as an agent in Combustion.  No wonder, therefore, if for a long while
Biology paid insufficient attention to the Medium as a
necessary co-operant, and directed its study mainly to the
Organism.  This mistake has been rectified, and now the
true relation is always recognized.  There must be a
parallel rectification in Psychology; the co-operation of




118         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
Object and Subject must never for a moment be lost
sight of.
Yet even this will only furnish one-half of the necessary data. Let us suppose the student equipped with all
the aid which the science of the day will supply, not
only respecting the normal actions of the nervous system,
but also respecting its abnormal actions, especially in
Insanity, he will still need to invoke another aid, for lie
will only have what may be called biological data, and
will still need the equally important sociological data.
Having studied the Organism in relation to its Medium,
lie has only studied the Animal side of the problem;
there still remains the Human side, and lie has to study
the Organism in relation to the Social Medium, in which
man lives no less than in the Cosmical Medium. If
there is a valid objection against the functions of the
brain being investigated in the cabinets of metaphysicians,
there is an equally valid objection against intellectual
and moral processes being sought in the laboratories of
physiologists. To understand the Human Mind we must
study it under its normal conditions, and these are social
conditions.
And it may be observed that the psychologist, moralist,
and politician often disregard a fundamental truth which
is never disregarded by the physicist,- the truth that it
is vain to expect a result in the absence of its necessary
conditions. The politician who will cordially admit the
axiom that " Constitutions are not made but grow," will
nevertheless daily be found endeavoring to remedy social
evils by legislative enactments, which leave the conditions
unchanged.  The moralist will be found passionately
arguing that the conduct of men, which is simply the
expression of their impulses and habits, can be at once
altered by giving them new ideas of right conduct.
The psychologist, accustomed to consider the Mind as




PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.            119
something apart from the Organism, individual and collective, is peculiarly liable to this error of overlooking
the fact that all mental manifestations are simply the
resultants of the conditions external and internal.
THE BIOLOGICAL DATA.
13. In'its relations to the Cosmos, and under what
may be called the purely biological aspect, the Organism  presents two points of study: the biostatical and
the biodynamical,  i. e. the consideration of the structure ready to act, and the consideration of the structure
acting.
14. The statical aspect of the Organism is that of the
balance of its nutritive forces developed in the molecular
movements of composition and decomposition.  The balance itself is incessantly fluctuating; for the Organism,
although a mechanism, is specially distinguished from
every other kind of mechanism by the instability of its
materials.  A watch wound up to-day is the same as it
was yesterday, and will be to-morrow. No Organism is
so, for it is living, growing, changing. The structure and
actions of the watch are unaffected by the surrounding
changes, unless these changes have a direct relation to it.
It is unaffected by a snow-storm, a dog in the room, a
political crisis; all of which affect the Organism, or may
affect it.  Moreover, the Organism  is affected by its own
internal changes, by the food it has eaten, the feelings it
has felt, the dreams that have varied its sleep, etc.
15. The force stored up in the tissues through nutritive changes is liberated by stimuli internal and external.
This is the biodynamical aspect, including the physiological properties of the tissues.  From various combinations
of the tissues result organs; from various combinations of
the properties result functions. (It is of supreme importance to bear in mind the distinction between the




120           PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
property of a tissue, and the function of an organ, or group
of organs.)
16. The Organism exhibits three fundamental modes:
Assimilation, Sensibility, and Motility.  From  the first
of these issue the general laws of Nutrition, - whence
Growth, Development, and Reproduction.' From the second issue the general laws of Feeling, using that term in
its widest sense, including Sensation, Perception, Emotion,
Volition, and Intelligence, and also Instinct (which is
Impulse and organized Intelligence.)* From the third
issue the general laws of Action, including Impulse,
Automatic Movement, Reflex Movement, and Voluntary
Movement.
17. This separation must be understood as purely analytical.  In reality the three modes are inseparable.  Assimilation may perhaps take place without the intervention of Sensibility, - at least in Plant organisms, - but it
is certain that the processes of Growth, Development, and
Reproduction are in the Animal very much determined
by the reactions of Sensibility; while it is obvious that
they require Movement, molecular and molar.
Sensibility, in turn, requires the incessant co-operation
of Assimilation, from which is drawn the material of the
sensitive structure and the force expended in its function.
Motility, again, requires both the stimulus and the guidance of Sensibility.  The animal must feed to live; it
must move its organs to get and eat the food; it must
feel the stimulus of hunger to impel its movements, and
* Dr. Johnson, on being asked whether there was not Imagination in
a certain poem, answered, " No, sir, there is what was Imagination
once." In like manner we may say that in Instinct there is not Intelligence, but what was once Intelligence; the specially intelligent
character has disappeared in the fixed tendency.  The action which
formerly was tentative, discriminative, has now become automatic and
irresistible. But the impulse is always guided by feeling. See farther
on, ~ 30.




PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.            121
tile satisfaction of desire to determine its selection of
food; in this Discrimination lies the germ  of Intelligence.
18. All sensitive affections have the quality of Pleasure, or its correlative Pain. These qualities tend to fade
into relative indistinctness with the decrease in energy
consequent on ease of neural discharge, consequent on
frequency of repletition at brief intervals.
19. All sensitive reactions have their Signatulres.  In
proportion as their intensity and massiveness decrease
they become more and more Signs, and thus become fitted
to enter into intellectual operations which are purely
symbolical. The least sensible of the Senses, if the
expression may be allowed, is Si(ght, and therefore it is
the most intellectual.  It is the most imtpersonal, - that
which draws with it the least amount of feeling.  In
looking at an object, it is the object out of us which most
calls upon the attention.  Only when we touch, taste,
or smell the moving object, does it seem  to enter into
personal feeling.  On the other hand, a more subjective
feeling, say of sound or taste, becomes objective so soon
as it is connected with a sight or a touch.
20. Sensations are usually, but improperly, restricted
to the reactions of what are called the Five Senses, and
which are commonly spoken of as the Senses.  This is
doubly wrong. A sensation is not a simple excitation of
the sensory organ, but a compound of that with the consequent excitation of a Perceptive Centre. The excitation of the sense organ is only one element in a complex
process. Divide the optic nerve before its entrance into
the optic ganglion, and no excitation of the retina will
produce a luminous sensation; cut off an animal's leg
and stimulate the sciatic nerve, the leg will move, but no
sensation will have been produced.  Nor is this all.  Unless the excitation is assimilated by the psychological nme6




122          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
diurr it does not become sentient; and unless it becomes
sentient it cannot become a sensation.
Quitting the analytical point of view, we at once recognize the fact that every perception, instead of being the
reaction of a single organ, is the resultant of the combined reactions of the whole Organism; the only question in each case being the relative proportions of the
parts involved, and how far the irradiation has been restricted to certain channels. The several Senses are no
more vicarious than the several Secretions; and when we
see an apple we do not in the visual sensation include
the sensations of taste, fragrance, resistance, etc., which
are all included in the perception of an apple, because all
more or less excited by the irradiation of the optical
stimulus.  It is the non-recognition of this which originates many of the difficulties touching the theory of
Vision. The organic seat of Vision is too often assumed
to be the retina; whereas that is only the seat of the visual excitation, which in the Perceptive Centre is blended
with the residua of other excitations.
21. The same is true of all sensations, the Systemic no
less than those of the special Senses.  And this leads me
to the second error just referred to, the restriction of Sensation to the reactions of the Five Senses. Physiology
teaches us that there is another and indeed far more
important class of sensations, arising from what I have
proposed to call the Systemic Senses, because distributed
through the system at large, instead of being localized in
eye, ear, tongue, etc. Althouogh not so easily and deflinitely assigned to special organs, they may be classified
as the Nutritive, Respiratory, Generative, and Muscular
Senses.  The feelings accompanying secretion, excretion,
hunger, thirst, etc., belong to the first.  The feelings of
suffocation, oppression, lightness, etc., belong to the second.  The sexual and maternal feeelings belong  to the




PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.          123
third; while those of the fourth enter as elements into
all the others.
The Systemic Sensations not only blend with those of
the Five Senses to produce Desires, Emotions, Instincts,
etc., they make up the greater part of that continuous
stream of Sentience, on which each external stimulus
raises a ripple.
22. One aim of Psychology is to reduce sentient facts
to physiological facts. Consciousness precedes Science.
WVe learn slowly to assign certain feelings to the Five
Senses because the stimuli of these Senses are objectively
appreciable, — we can see the object we have touched,
and taste the object we have seen. Not so with the
Systemic feelings. Their stimuli, because internal, cannot be alternately submitted to various Senses. Still
further removed from such objective appreciation are the
central processes of Judgment, Memory, Imagination,
etc.; and hence the disposition to regard these feelings as
due to another source: it is even paradoxical to speak of
such processes belonging to Feeling, and to affirm that
the Laws of Thought are identical with the Laws of
Sensation, differing not as operations, but only in the
materials operated on. The paradox disappears when we
learn to consider psychical phenomena in the true synthetic way (~ 3).
23. The sensations of the Five Senses are more impersonal than those of the Systemic Senses; hence their
greater importance in the construction of objective
knowledge.  They are pre-enminently intellectual, not
only on this ground, but also because of their inferior
massiveness and diffusiveness, and of their greater capability of definite loccalization; hence they are fitted to
become signs.  The systemic sensations have, however,
great importance, and their immense superiority as motors
has been singularly overlooked. They make up by far




124-        PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
the larger portion of our sentient material, since from
them mainly issue the Emotions, Sentiments, etc., combined indeed with the objective sensations, but subordinatingT these as means to their ends, inasmuch as we only
see what interests us.
Note here, in passing, the error which arises from not
viewing the organism  synthetically, but detaching the
Intellect, and treating it independently.  Having separated it from the Feelings, philosophers have been led
to pay exclusive attention to the Five Senses, overlooking
the necessary subordination of these to the more fundamental and energetic Systemic Senses. Hanmann picturesquely expresses the general error when he says: "The
Five Senses are the five loaves with which Jesus fed the
multitude."  I hope to show in detail that it is cnot these
which supply our highest spiritual food; and that the
doctrine of the Sensational School is wholly untenable,
partly because  our highest knowledge is not gained
through the Senses in any such way, but is gained
through psychological evolution of sociological material;
and partly also because, if we isolate the Animal from the
Social Organism, the Senses furnish only a small quota
to the mass of human Experience.
PSYCHODYNAMICS.
24. From the biological stand-point our first division
of the Organism is into Affective and Active, which
division represents the reception of stimulus and the
discharge of force, - sensation and movement.
The physiological fact, first enunciated by me, and nowA
adopted by some teachers of great eminence (Vulpian,
Gavarret, etc.) that nervous tissue is identical thro#ughout in
Property as in StractuTre, has extremely important consequences.* For if the Property be everywhere the same,
* The only psychologist whom I can cite as having adopted this physio



PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.             125
all the Functions, into which that property enters, must
have a common identity; differing quantitatively amongc
themselves only so far as neural processes are concerned,
they will of course differ qualitatively in so far as other
elements enter into the functions: thus the Neurility
which stimulates a muscle is identical with the Neurility
which stimulates a gland, but the functions of Locomotion and Secretion, involving different organs, are qualitatively different.
The great problem of Psychology as a section of Biology
is, in pursuance of this conception, to develop all the
psychical phenomena from  one fundamental process in
one vital tissue. The tissue is the nervous; the process
is a Grouping of neural units. A neural unit is a tremor.
Several units are grouped into a higher unity, or neural
process, which is a fusion of tremors, as a sound is a fusion of aerial pulses; and each process may in turn be
grouped with others, and thus, from  this grouping of
groups, all the varieties emerge.  What on the physiological side is simply a neural process, is on the psychological side a sentient process.  WVe may liken Sentience
to Combustion, and then the neural units will stand for
the oscillating molecules. Sentience may manifest itself
under the form  of Consciousness, or under that of SubConciousness, - which may be compared to Combustion
manifesting itself in Flame and in Heat.
25. The grouping, or active aspect of the affective or
sentient state, is what may analytically be called the Logical element. Logic we have already seen may comprise
all the laws of grouping, subjective and objective (Introd.,
~ 65). I institute a marked division into the Logic of
logical principle, and extensively applied it in the investigation of mental
phenomena, is Adolf Horwicz, whose Psychologische Analysec  auf physiologischer Grundlage (Halle, 1872) may be recommended to the attentive
study of all interested in this subject.




126          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
Feeling and the Logic of Signs; ranging under the first
all the laws of grouping manifested in Sensation, Perception, Emotion, Instinct, with a further subdivision into
the Logic of Images, which is intermediate between that
of Feeling and that of Signs; under the second head,
all the laws of Conception, or what is specially termed
Thought.  It is necessary to distinguish Conception, or
the formation of symbols expressing general ideas, from
Perception, or the formation of particular ideas by synthesis of sensations. Conceptions are no more like real
objects than algebraic formulse are like the numbers whose
relations they symbolize. Our perception of an animal
or a flower is the synthesis of all the sensations we have
had of the object in relation to our several senses; and it
is always an individual object represented by an individual idea: it is this animal or this flower. But our conception of an animal or flower is always a general idea,
not only embracing all that is known or thought of the
class in all its relations, but abstracted from all individual
characteristics, and is not this animal or this flower, but
any one of the class; just as a and b in Algebra are not
quantities and magnitudes, but their symbols. Perceptions are concerned directly with the terms of Feeling;
Conceptions with the ratios of those terms.  Hence the
real nature of the one, and the symbolical nature of the
other.
26. Another biological principle teaches that an Organism, being a structure in relation to a Medium, is
determined to action by a stimuli, both external and internal, and therefore its most general characteristic is that
of Reflex action, - the issue of an excitation in a movement. A stimulus is reflected from one part of a tissue
to another, and (owing to the continuity of the tissues)
from one organ to another, till it terminates in a movement which may either be the move:nent of some special




PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.          127
organ or of some component part of an organ; in every
case the motion which originally came from the external
Medium is restored to it again, and, so far as the Organism is concerned, it there comes to an end.
27. This REFLEX is a process of Grouping underlying
all psychical phenomena.  Its summma genecra are FEELING
and ACTION.
The Organism is stimulated to action by Sensation, and
guided by Intelligence, - the affective becomes active, not
in the sense in which one phenomenon is succeeded by a
different phenomenon, but in the sense in which vis tensionis passes into vis viva. The determinations of this
process are logical, even in the simplest and most rudimentary cases; for the neural units must be grouped, if a
sensation is to result.
Intelligence, which in its rudimentary form is simply
Discrimination in Feeling, becomes, in its highest forms,'the Discrimination of remote means towards desired ends.
In what is called pure Thought, the means are so remote
from the ends that the ends are scarcely recognizable;
these means then become ends for the Intellect.
28. The popular classification which condenses one
large group of phenomena under Feeling, and another
under Intellect, - the one eminently personal, the other
impersonal, - would have been more serviceable had it not
been hampered by two misconceptions, - one respecting
the assumed independence and autonomy of the Intellect,
the other respecting its superior energy and importance.
Although it is pretty generally acknowledged that ideas
have their origin in sensations, it is rarely acknowledged,
and is often expressly denied, that all the Feelings, whether
those of the Five Senses, specially styled sensations, or
those prompted by the Systemic Senses, and more often
called impulses, emotions, desires, etc., are the real Motors,
and that it is they, not ideas, which determine actions.




128         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
The Intellect, even at its highest, is a guide, not an impulse, - it shows the way, it does not cut the way.
29. Whenever the mental phenomena are considered
as wholly within the Organism, they are Sensation, Emotion, Impulse; when passing out of the Organism, they
are Perception, Ideation, Volition.
The Feeling which is Sensation or Emotion has little or
no reference to any object causing the feeling; whereas
Perception, or Ideation, passes beyond the personal circle,
projects the Feeling outside as an object. The infant feels
a sweet taste or a soft surface, and feels anger or terror,
long before it has assigned sweetness and softness to objects as qualities, or learned to form any idea of objects.
Such discriminations are the germs of Intelligence, and
when Intelligence itself becomes developed by the large
acc-umulations of such discriminations, it reacts on the
feelings, guiding them  more and more, and converting
blind Impulse into clear Volition.
30. Actions are the energies of organs, and the synergies of groups of organs. They are of two kinds, — 1~,
the Fixed, or directly reflex; and, 2~, the Facultative, or
indirectly reflex, spontaneous. The Fixed Actions are
those which uniformly result from excitation of their
organs, - such are the energies of the Senses, and the
actions classed under Impulses, Habit, etQ. The Facultative Actions are those which, although ultimately dependent on the energies of the organs, are yet neither
inevitably nor uniformly produced when the organs are
stimulated, but, owing to the play of forces at work, take
sometimes one issue and sometimes another. No organ
has a power of control; but the Organism  will control an
organ. The individual man is powerless against Society;
but Society can, and does, compel the individual. This
does not prevent the individual from initiating a change,
which may be passed on from one to another like yeast



PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.          129
cells growing in a fermenting mass; and in this sense
Society is of course affected by the actions of individuals,
since, indeed, it is itself only the sum of individuals.  We
may note as one broad characteristic of the social organism, that it is constituted by organs which are independent, and which voluntarily co-operate, the strength of
each residing in the measure of its co-operation. A man,
although powerless against Society, becomes a power with
Society.
31. Although all actions are prompted and really
guided by Feeling, many of them have so little accompaniment of what is usually designated Consciousness that
they are said to be insensible. Mlany of these are called
automatic, they are the inevitable activities of the energies or synergies; many of them are called invol-,untary, and are supposed to be the precursors of the
voluntcry.
These conceptions need modifying. It can be shown
that Sentience is involved in all actions, even the automatic and involuntary; and that the actions which are
now involuntary were originally voluntary, if by voluntary we understand the presence of Intelligence. I mean
that all such distinctions are psychological, not psychogenetical.  They mark differences which now exist, but
they do not mark differences in the genesis of the phenomena. The facts of congenital Instincts and of acquired
Habits, which operate so rapidly and so securely that all
the intermediate stages between impression and motion
escape notice, has led to the denial of these stages. Thus
the uniformity of the earth's movement causes us to consider it at rest; we know the movement only through indirect sources.  By indirect methods we may also learn
that when involuntary or instinctive acts are slackened
or thwarted their sentient and selective characters appear.
Knowing how actions which were once slow and laborious
6*                            I




1 30        PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
become rapid and easy, and how  what cost us painful
efforts to learn is now performed without sensible effort,
we understand how the voluntary lapses into the involuntary and we may be sure that, however easy and rapid
the process may become, it must necessarily pass through
the stages originally followed, though without the irraciationl of nascent impulses in other directions.
32. This question of Instinct will occupy us more fully
when we come to treat of the origin of knowledge (Prob.,
1. ~ 21). Enough here to define it as lapsed or  dcliscursive Intelligence, - the fixed action of an acquired organization, transmitted from ancestors who acquired it through
Adaptation, whereby what was facultative became fixed,
what was voluntary became involuntary.
The objection will doubtless be raised that Instinct is
wholly destitute of the characteristic of Intelligence in
that it has no choice; its operation is fixed, fatal.  The
reply is twofold: in the first place, the objection, so far
as it has validity, applies equally to Judgment, where,
given the premises, the conclusion is fatal, no alternative
being open.  Axioms, in this sense, are logical instincts.
Thus the highest intellectual process is on a level with
this process said to be its opposite.
And in the second place; the element of choice always
does enter into Instinct; although the intelligent discrimination of means to ends may be calmost absent, it
never is enttirely. The guiding sensation which directs
the impulse is always selective. If we restrict Intelligence to the Logic of Signs,- to ideas, - there cannot
of course be anything intelligent in Instinct; but if we
extend it - as we must — to the Logic of Feeling, the
dispute will cease.
33. Neural processes which formerly were accompanied
by Consciousness sink into Sub-Consciousness, and on
occasion re-emerge into distinct light of day. But even




PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.           131
in the sub-conscious stage they are always sentient.  The
practice, too frequent, of speaking of actions as unconscious, is more than a contradiction in terms.  "Unfelt
feelings" are altogether inadmissible. On the other hand,
to speak of Consciousness (meaning thereby a particular
aspect) as the substance of Mind, the universal condition
of psychical phenomena, is also misleading. What is universal is the neural process, which on the subjective side
is the sentient process.  Sentience may assume the form
of Consciousness, or the form of Sub-Consciousness; as
Vision may take place when the central point of the retina is impressed, and then the effect is most distinct, or
when any point of the area of the retina is impressed,
and then the effect is less and less distinct as it is farther
from the centre. Sentience is always sentient, as Vision
is always visual.
34. The region of Sub-Consciousness is much the
larger region.,There is more heat than flame. The difference between them  depends on the greater or less
irradciation of an excitation.
Here we may note two Psychodynamic laws, — 1i, of
Irradiation, and, 2~, of Restriction. Although Anatomy,
for its purposes, divides the nervous system into several
different orrans, this division is only an artifice, and
must not permit us to overlook the cardinal fact that the
nervous tissue is one, and has one general Property,Neurility, -- and one general Function, - RIeflexion.  No
stimulus can excite a single part of this whole without
indirectly exciting all the other parts. Hence the law of
Irradiation: every excitation must be propagated; it cannot cease with itself, for this would violate the first law
of motion.  But the directions in which it will be propagated (the law of Restriction here emerges) are determined by the structural conditions at the time being.  It
is probable that irradiation is vague so long as it takes




132           PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
place through neulroylia,* and becomes definite conduction when it is restricted in its course by the cells and
fibres. Be this as it may, we must understand that while,
according to the abstract law of Irradiation, every excitation is diffused throughout the tissue, terminating only in
a muscular excitation, this diffusion is in effect always
controlled by the law of Restriction, and the pathway of
discharge becomes more or less defined. The concrete
facts of excitation no more agree with the abstract law,
than the actual motions of bodies agree with the abstract
law of uniform rectilinear Motion. Every real excitation
is subject to the statical conditions of the Organism at the
time being; that is to say, what are the lines of least resistance along which a motion will be propagated must
necessarily be determined by the state of the structure
at the time being; any paths which have formerly been
traversed by an impulse will be more ready to yield an
issue to the new impulse.  These formedpaths therefore
restrict the irradiation, which would otherwise be indefinite.
35. Many  obscure  facts receive their explanation
through this law of Irradiation.  Two only need here be
specified for illustration: the fact that Extension is felt as
a continluum, although the feeling arises from  the excitations of discrete nerve-fibrils and discrete pulses on those
fibrils, has greatly puzzled some investigators, most of
whom have been led to invent an extra-neural agency to
explain it. Irradiation suffices, since by it there is a
necessary blending of the discrete points, a fusion of the
similar tremors.
The second fact may be the obverse of this. It was
* 2euroglica is the name given by Virchow to the interstitial substance
connecting the nervous elements, - nerve-cem)ent. It is peculiarly interesting from its close resemblance to other connective tissues, since it is
the link, so to speak, which enables us to understand how nerve-tissue
arises.




PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.           133
noticed by Aristotle that knowledge begins with vague
conceptions, and increases with increasing definiteness in
the conceptions. All impressions must at first be irradiated, and produce a chaos of vague sentience; as these
irradiations gradually become restricted, the processes are
grouped, the paths are defined, distinctions are established.
It is conceivable how differentiations in the tissue arise
from differentiations of the pathways of discharge; how
the nerve cells and fibres, the magazines of conductible
energy and the channels of conduction, arise amid the neuroglia; and how old age or disease increasing the relative
proportions of neuroglia and nerve elements reduces the
mental functions to infantile or imbecile states; finally,
how the tendency of Restriction is, as old age advances,
to prevent new acquisitions, and resist new combinations.
36. Although when viewed synthetically every sensation, every perception, every conception, is a unit, viewed
analytically and genetically, it is a compound.  There is
no single sensation which is an element, i. e. irreducible.
This is to be considered in reference to the disputes respecting the unity of Consciousness, the simplicity of the
Ego. Every act of Consciousness is one; every Ego is a
unity. But analysis, which resolves a sensation into its
constituent neural elements,' resolves Consciousness into
its constituent processes, and the Ego into a consensus of
psychical activities. The demonstration that thinking is
seriation, and that a series involves Time, disproves the
notions of ultimate unity and simplicity assigned to a
Thinking Principle.  In any positive meaning of the
term, that Principle is not an antecedent but a resultant,
not an entity but a convergence of manifold activities.
37. This convergence is a necessary consequence of the
synergy of the organs dependent on Irradiation. The
seriation depends on the law of Reinstatement or Reproduction, by which one neural process tends to re-excite




134           PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
those processes which formerly were excited in conjunction with it, or which are anatomically linked with it.
Those pathways of discharge which were once determined
by the combined action of the stimulus and reaction of
the Organism  are the pathways which will be statically
connected, and hence they will form the lines of least resistance along which any fresh excitation will pass.
38. But this law of Reinstatement whereby one feeling
calls up associated feelings, is itself only the expression
of the statical conditions.  We are not therefore to expect
that a given stimulus will always re-excite a given group
of feelings; we can only formulate the general tendency,*
in  virtue of which a sensible stimulus draws with it
fainter feelings of previous impressions, so that they are
grouped into a judgment or perception. This group is, in
turn, the element of some wider group, whenever it is not
directly reflected in discharge on some organ.  But in all
cases an action of some kind results; directly or indirectly, every sensation is completed in an action; and thus
Action is the pole-star of even the most wide-wandering
Speculation.
39. Thus the three terms of the progression from Stimulus to Reflex, are respectively, Feeling, Logic, and Action; or Impulse, Guidance, and Result.
Let me again remind the reader that he is by no means
called upon to adopt the foregoing conclusions until he
has had laid before him in detail the anatomical, physiological, and psychological evidence.  There is much that
will no doubt seem inadmissible, much questionable.  He
is only asked to accept whatever he can, and to suspend
his judmlYlent on the rest.
* Tendelcy is the ideal summation of the statical conditions which
tend to a dynamical result; or, to express it less technically, it is one
gathering up into a picture of all the events which we foresee will succeed
each other when the organism is set going, and of the final result.




PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.          135
I will now state a principle which hereafter will be extensively applied. It wears so paradoxical an air, that I
should not venture to bring it forward until the evidence
had been duly exhibited, but that the explicit announcement here will protect me against a possible anticipation
on the part of some other writer. While lingering over
the execution of the present work, I have more than once
had the mingled pleasure and pain of finding results I
had laboriously reached, arrived at by other writers; and
as I believe that the Psychological Spectrum is physiologically demonstrable, the possibility of some one else
discovering it is worth taking into account.
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL SPECTRUM.
40. Briefly, then, the principle may tlhus be formulated.
The optical spectrum  is constituted by three fundamental colors, red, green, and violet, which are due to three
modes of vibration affecting the rods and cones of the retina, or perhaps to three different sets of rods and cones;
and each sensation of an individual color depends on the
proportions in which these modes - the number of pulses
in a second - affect the retina. Each color also contains
all the characteristic vibrations of the others, and consequently each color owes its individuality, not to vibrations which the others want, but to a precdominanzce in a
certain order of vibration. Thus there is a special rapidity in the pulses on the retina in the waves producing
red; but in every red there are waves of fainter rapidity
such as produce green and violet when they are dominant.  In the color green, there are likewise the red and
violet waves; in the color violet, there are red and green
waves.
41. The analogy of Vision and Consciousness, so usefully employed by many writers, may justify my use of
the term the Psychological Spectrum, which likewise is




136           PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
constituted by three fundamental modes of excitation,
namely, Sensation, Thought, and Motion.  I shall show
that these three orders of nervo-muscular excitation are
involved in every sensation, perception, image, or conception; and of course also in every emotion, desire, volition,
etc.  In other words, the psychical process is everywhere
a triple process. Every psychical fact is a product of
sense-work, brain-work, and muscle-work.  Each sentient
phenomenon (perception, emotion, conception, or volition)
is individualized by, and receives its specific character
from, the prledominance, of one of the three orders; and
one feeling is distinguished from another of the same kind
by quantitative differences in their constituent units. All
varieties among the several mental states are due to the
varying degrees of energy with which Sensation, Thought,
and Motion co-operate. Each mental state is thus a
fJunction of three variables.*
42. Leaving this to the reader's meditation, I now pass
to the consideration of another result of the law of Reinstatement, which law is another aspect of the law of Registration. A sensation or perception, once produced, may
of course be reproduced by a recurrence of the original
conditions; but it may also be reproduced with fainter
energy, as an inmcte, when the original objective conditions are absent, and only the subjective conditions are
present in the modification of structure. That is to say,
the original feeling is registered in  the organism  as a
modification, and whenever this neural tract which was
* Combining this conception with Fechner's law of the proportionality
of sensation to stimulus, the reader may perhaps seize my meaning when
I said (Introd., ~ 12) that the Differential Calculus might some day be
applied to Psychology. Another indication is furnished by Helmholtz,
when he assumes that the local feelings derived from the different points
in the retina more closely resemble each other the closer the points are,
so that the kind of local feeling is a continuous function of the co-ordinates of the retinal points." - Physiol. Optic, p. 800.




PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.            137
originally in action, is again excited, the old feeling will
be reinstated. The sight of an orange thus recalls the
associated feelings of taste and smell, and perhaps of the
person who gave the first orange, or the plate on which it
was handed.  In this series the visual sensation is directly
reproduced under conditions closely resembling its original production; therefore the energy of this feeling is incomparably greater than that of the indirectly reproduced
feelings of smell, taste, etc. Whatever antecedent may
stimulate the neural tracts, any one of these may re-excite
the others. Thus the mere name of the person or the place,
the sight or sound of the word " orange," will suffice.
43. All sentient acts are acts of Presentation or of RePresentation, usually called Sensation and Idea.  The
Germans distinguish the directly excited feeling as "the
feeling in us," — Empfindung; and the indirectly excited
feeling as "the placing before us," -  Vorstelltng.  We
have no such happy terns, but Sensation and Image, or
Idea, serve pretty well.
The sensation, or presentation, is fitly considered r-eal,
because it has objective reality (res) for its antecedent
stimulus.  The re-presentation, whether image or symbol,
is icdeal, because its antecedent is a subjective state.
Reality always indicates that antecedent which excites
sensation when in direct relation with the censory organism.  Hence we say that a feeling is real when it is felt,
ideal when it is only thought, not felt.  To feel cold, and
to think of cold, are two markedly different states.
44. An image, therefore, - being a representation, a
Vorstelluncg, an  indirectly excited  feeling,-  may be
called the ideal formn of a sensation.  It is a transition
between the pure real and the pure ideal, i. e. between
sensation and symbol. Because of its connection with
sensation, it passes into pure sensation when the energy
of its tremors is greatly increased; as in Hallucination,




138            PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
wherein the feeling, although excited by internal stimuli,
having its antecedent in a subjective state and not inl
some objective Yes, does assume all the energy of a sensation objectively excited. WAe may consider the gradations
of Sensation, After-sensation, Imagination,* and Hallucination, as the varying energies of the same neural tracts.
Owing to the indirect, representative origin of Imagination and its ideal character, there are important differences between it and Sensation, and After-sensation; one
of these being that Imaces are facultative, and are thereby
capable of entering into intellectual constructions.
45. Sensation,  Perception, and Imagination, all involve
the co-operation of the Logical or Grouping element,
whence Judgment, and of the Motor element, whence
Action (~ 41).
By including under these rubrics the phenomena of
Cognition and Conation, and treating  in due order the
Appetites, Emotions, and Volitions, we shall exhaust the
Biological Data of Psychology, if to  this examination
of the structure and functions of the Animal Organism
in detail we add a consideration of it as a Whole.  From
this point of view we must consider certain general
results.
46. Of these general results perhaps the most perplexing, as it assuredly is the most interesting, is Consciousness, which may be pictured  as the mass of stationary
waves t formed  out of the individual waves of neural
X This word must be understood literally, i. e. as the image-forming
process; not metaphorically, as the poet's fantasy.
t Stationary waves play a great part in the speculations of modern
physicists. They may be thus illustrated: If the surface of a lake is set
in motion by the various streams which enter it from various points, each
stream diffuses waves over the surface, and these finally reach the shores,
whence they are reflected back towards the centre of the lake. The reflected waves meet with new incoming waves, and the product of the two
is a stationary wave, forming, so to speak, a pattern on the surface. This




PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.               139
tremors.  Next comes what may be called the psychical
mood or attitude. Each individual feeling has its special
sijnatzre, so likewise the resultant general feeling has its
signature; and we are at each moment conscious of a
vague massive feeling of comfort or discomfort, exhilaration or despondency, joy or grief, fear, rage, kindness, etc.
There is also a logical attitude which is called Attention,
itself the product of feeling, and one of the necessary
factors in Perception.
47. When this survey has been completed we have the
final task of exhibiting how the sentient phenomena may
be explained by neural phenomena.  The structure and
action of the Organism  have to be psychologically interpreted.  This will require a new anatomy of the nervous
system.  What now  exists, although of immense value,
is defective in many respects. Not only must each function be traced to its special organ, and the part played
by each constituent assigned to it; not only must the
connection of the parts be displayed, but there must be
taken into account the very important element of Vascular Irrigation.  The distribution of the arteries is an
essential element in the biostatical estimate.  Arterial
territories have to be defined.  Many individual variations in mental character depend on the variations in
the calibre of the cerebral and  carotid  trunks;  and
many variations in the intellectual, emotive, and active
tendencies depend on the relative importance of the
pattern is of course a fluctuating figure depending on the concurrent
waves. Now when a fresh stream enters the lake its waves will at first
pass over this pattern of stationary waves, neither disturbing nor disturbed; but after reaching the shore they will in turn be reflected back
towards the centre, and there mingling with incoming waves from the
same source, they will, according to circumstances, either markedly alter
the pattern of the stationary waves, or modify it but slightly: analogically, in the one case there will be an appreciable change in Consciousness, in the other none.




140         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
cerebral and carotid trunks.  The energy of the Brain
depends mainly on the calibre of its arteries; the special
directions of that energy depend on the territorial distribution.
48. But when this programme is thoroughly worked
out, it will only present one half of Psychology. It will
embrace the Logic of Feeling, common to animals and to
man, but it will still leave undeciphered that which constitutes the wonder and glory of man, -his intellectual
and moral life. Rising, out of the Logic of Feeling there
is the Logic of Signs, which is to the former what Algebra is
to Arithmetic (~ 25). Rising out of the Animal Organism
there is the Social Organism, the collective life of all the
individual lives; and if we desire to decipher Human
Psychology we must study the Human Organism in its
relations to the Social Medium as well as in its relations
to the Cosmos.
THE SOCIOLOGICAL DATA.
49. It is now almost universally admitted that animals and men having similar structures must have similar
functions; and further, that the mental manifestations
being determined by organic structures, the mental functions of animals and men must be essentially similar.
That animals have sensations, appetites, emotions, instincts, and intelligence, - that they exhibit memory,
expectation, judgment, hope, fear, joy, — that they learn
by experience, and invent new modes of satisfying their
desires, no philosopher now denies.  And yet the gap
between animal and human intelligence is so wide that
Philosophy is sorely puzzled to reconcile the undeniable
facts. WVhen it was customary to attribute to Instinct
all the manifestations of Intelligence in animals, and to
Reason all the similar manifestations in men, this difficulty was not felt. A phrase did duty for an explana



PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.           141
tion. To say that man was endowed with a Rational
Soul, inhabiting the organism yet independent of it, and
altogether distinct from the Vegetative Soul which ruled
the body, seemed an easy way of accounting for all the
observed facts.
50. Untenable as this hypothesis is, I am disposed to
regard it with more favor, in some respects, than the crude
materialist hypothesis; for I, too, hold that the superiority of human Intelligence is due to the presence of an
important factor, one wholly wanting in the animal. Instead of regarding the differences between man and animal simply as differences of degree, I hold that by no
conceivable extension of animal faculties, uncaiccd by this
important factor, could the highest of the animals be
raised into that moral and intellectual world which is the
habitual medium of the civilized human soul.  Believing',
as I believe, in the evolution of the higher from the lower,
and disbelieving therefore in any abrupt break in the continuity of evolution, I still say that in so far as we are
justified in classing phenomena into distinct groups, and
thus distinguishing the products of complex factors from
the products of simpler factors, the group recognized
under the class " Human Intellig(ence " is so different from
the group " Animal Intelligence" that it requires for its
analytical interpretation different factors of corresponding
importance.  The circle and the ellipse are different figures, the former having but one centre with all its radii
equal, the latter having two foci and unequal radii.  Circles differ from circles in degree; they differ from ellipses
in kind.  Whether large or small the circle has the same
properties, and these are different from the properties of
the ellipse. It is true that by insensible gradations the
circle may flatten into an ellipse, or the two foci of the
ellipse may blend into one, and form a circle.  But so
long as there are two foci, the ellipse has its characteristic




142         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
properties. In like manner the boundaries of the animal
and human may be found insensibly blending at certain
points; but whenever the "animal circle" has become
transformed into the "human ellipse," by the introduction of a second centre, the difference ceases to be one of
degree, and becomes one of kind, the germ of infinite
variations.
The question arises: What are these respective foci?
What are the respective centres of animal and human
Intelligence? I answer: The Logic of Feeling and the
Logic of Signs; or, in more familiar terms, Feeling and
Thought: the one belonging to the Animal Organism, the
other rising out of this and out of the Social Organism.
51. The answers hitherto propounded hlave been either
founded on the spiritualist hypothesis, endowing man
with a Soul of spiritual structure; or on the biological
hypothesis (materialist or not), deducing all the mental
phenomena from the animnal functions in adaptation to
the Cosmos.
Eminent thinkers still cling to some form or other of
the spiritualist hypothesis, repelled from the biological
hypothesis by their sense of its inadequacy.  They admit that all our bodily functions depend on bodily organs.
They admit that among these functions are those of Feeling with its varieties and complications. But they also
know that animals having organs closely resemblingl our
own, and feelings closely resembling our own, have little
or nothing of the highest order of mental activity: Animals are intelligent, but have no Intellect; they are
sympathetic, but have no Ethics; they are emotive, but
have no Conscience.
When it is said that Animals however intelligent have
no Intellect, the meaning is that they have perceptions
and judgments, but no conceptions, no general ideas, no
symbols for logical operations. They are intelligent, for




PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.           143
we see them guided to action by Judgment; they adapt
their actions by means of guiding sensations, and adapt
things to their ends.  Their mechanism  is a sentient, intelligent mechanism.  But they have not Conception, or
what we specially designate as Thought, - i. e. that logical function which deals with generalities, ratios, symbols,
as Feelincr deals with particulars and objects, -a finction sustained by and subservient to impersonacl, social ends.
Taking Intelligence in general as the discrimination of
means to ends, - the guidance of the Organism towards
the satisfaction of its impulses, - we particularize Intellect as a highly differentiated mode of this function,
namely, as the discrimination of symbols.  This differs
from the rudimentary mode, out of which it is nevertheless an evolution, as European Commerce differs from the
rudimentary Barter of primitive tribes.  Commerce is impossible except under complex social conditions out of
which it springs; and its operations are mainly carried
on by means of symbols which take the place of objects:
the bill of invoice represents the cargo; the merchant's
signature represents the payment. In like manner Intellect is impossible until animal development has reached
the human social stage; and it is at all periods the index
of that development; its operations are likewise carried
on by means of symbols (Language) which represent real
objects, and can at any time be translated into feelings.
52. It is obvious that the biological data can only resolve one half of the psychological problem, only present
one of the foci of the ellipse, since by no derivation froim
the purely statical considerations of man's animal organism can we reach the higher dynamical products.  Isolate
mall from the social state, and we have an animal; set
goin(r his organism simply in relation to the Cosmos, without involving any relations to other men, and we can get
no Intellect, no Conscience.  Whence are these derived?




144          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
The organism of the anthropoid apes is very little differenced from ours; their sensory organs, nay, even their
brain (the so-called "organ" of the mind), can be distinguished from ours only by trifling deviations; but with this
external structural resemblance, what an infinite mental
disparity! Biology forces us to seek for a status corresponding to this diversity.  Between the various types of
vertebrate structure there are gradations; but between the
vertebrate and invertebrate there is a gap. The internal
skeleton characteristic of the Vertebrate is approached in
the Cephalopoda; the symmetrical arrangement of nervecentres is seen in the Articulata; but in spite of these
and other indications of a general resemlblance, the marked
types, Vertebrate and Invertebrate, stand out distinct. So
between the extremes of hutman Intelligence - say a Tasmnanian and a Shakespeare - there are infinitesimal gradations, enabling us to follow the development of the one
into the other, without the introduction of any essentially
new factor. But between animal and human Intelligence
there is a gap, which can only be bridged over by an
addition from without. That bridge is the Language of
symbols, at once the cause and effect of Civilization.
53. The absurdity of supposing that any ape could
under any normal circumstances construct a scientific
theory, analyze a fact into its component factors, frame to
himself a picture of the life led by his ancestors, or consciously regulate his conduct with a view to the welfare
of remote descendants, is so glaring, that we need not
wonder at profoundly meditative minds having been led
to reject with scorn the hypothesis which seeks for an explanation of huian Intelligence in the functions of the
bodily organisln common to man and animals, and having
had recourse to the hypothesis of a spiritual agent superadded to the organism.
54. Yet the spiritual hypothesis is scientifically unten



PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.           145
able. It is an imaginary hypothesis, and has not only
the defect of being incapable of verification, it has the
more serious defect of being incapable of extending our
insight: it gives a name to the facts observed, it throws
no light on them, connecting them with others; nor does
it enable us to discover unsuspected relations. Further, it
is the introduction of an cn/known to take the place of
a knowable.  The spirit is proposed as an agent; yet of
its nature and agency we know absolutely nothing.
And if, for the sake of argument, we grant the existence of a spirit, and accept it as the agent, the same objection rises against it which rose against the materialist
hypothesis, namely, that it fails to cover the facts.  Man,
possessing this spirit but isolated from Society, could no
more manifest the activities classed under Intellect and
Morality than the animal could. He would still require
that his Spiritual Organism should be in relation to the
Social Medium.  For one thing he would be without the
mighty instrument Language, which we shall prove to be
indispensable to the creation of abstract Thought. He
would only have perceptions, and the Logic of Feeling;
he would be without conceptions, and the Logic of Sits.
Then, again, he would have none of the many needs
which arise from  social relations; nor the accczezdlation
of experiences which form the material of scientific evolutions.  This is demonstrable from many sides. Here we
simply note the fact that our intellectual wealth is not
only capitcalizedl Exerience, but is always in strict accord
with social development; so that the savage is not less
incompetent than the animal to originate or even understand a philosophical conception; the peasant would be
little better than the ape in presence of the problems of
abstract science; and it would be hopeless to expect
either of them to weigh the stars, or to understand the
equations of curves of double curvature.  Nor are the
7                              J




146          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
moral conceptions of the savage much higher than those
of the animal.  His language is without terms for Justice, Sin, Crime; he has not the ideas.  He understands
generosity, pity, and love little better than the dog or the
horse does.  His intelligence is mainly confined to perceptions and sentiments.  His aims are almost all immediate and practical, rarely remote, never theoretical.  The
most intelligent inhabitants of Guiana, though far removed from  primitive savagery, could not believe that
Humboldt had left his own country and come to theirs
"to be devoured by mosquitoes for the sake of measuring
lands -w7hich were not his own."
There is a further ground, still more decisive, against
the spiritualist hypothesis, namely, that we have no need
of an imaginary agent to explain what can be perfectly
explained by a real agent,- the Social Organism.  Not
having this conception, the spiritualists imagine that to
deny the existence of the Spirit is to deny the existence
of the Soul. It is no more a denial of the Soul, than the
rejection of the old hypothesis of a nervous fluid was a
denial of nervous physiology. All the facts of Consciousness, all the marvels of Thought, remain, whatever changes
may take place in our theories respecting them. It is
scarcely necessary to add that biologists may quietly disregard the common rhetorical objection  against their''mechanical viewes," as if such views were self-condemned.  No sooner does any philosopher attempt to
substitute clear conceptions of the processes of Nature,
for vague speculations incapable of verification, than the
framers of such speculations and the acceptors of them
with one accord exclaim, "This is degrading human nature!" as if to leave men in ignorance were to sustain
them in their dignity.
55. If man is a social animal, which is undeniable, the
unit in a living whole, just as any one organ is the unit




PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.           147
of an organism, obviously his functions will be determined not only by his individual structure, but also by
the structure of the Collective Organism.  The functions
of the liver or of the kidneys are determined partly by
their structure, partly by influences from the other organs.
Man's individual functions arise in relations to the Cosnlos; his general functions arise in relations to the Social
Medium; thence Moral Life emerges. All the animal
Impulses become blended with human Emotions.  In the
process of evolution, starting from the merely animal appetite of sexuality, we arrive at the purest and most farreaching tenderness; from the merely animal property of
Sensibility we arrive at the noblest heights of Speculation.  The Social Instincts, which are the analogues of
the individual Instincts, tend more and more to make
Sociality dominate Animality, and thus subordinate Personality to Humanity.
56. All the attempts to explain Mind without taking
the social factors into account have been signal failures;
but especially mistaken have been the estimates vainly
founded on anatomical data, and above all on the measurements of crania, and the weighing of brains.  The
spiritualists were more philosophical in demanding another agent and another test. The anatomical estimates
proceed on three assumptions generally regarded as axions, - 1, that the brain is the " organ of the Mind "; 2~,
that the mental diversities observable between men and
animals, and between different races of men, are due solely
to differences of cerebral mass; 3~, that these diversities
can be approximately estimated by estimates of volume
and weight.
We must reject all three.  The first, because to seek
for can organ of the Mind is not less preposterous than to
seek for acn organ of the Life. Nor is this difficulty
avoided by those who regard the brain simply as the or



148         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
gan of the Intellect; for the Intellect is also an abstraction, and if we reduce the abstraction to its concretes we
have acts which involve sensory and motor organs, and
groupings of their reactions. The brain may be the organ
in which sensory processes are finally grouped before they
are reflected on other organs; but it is only in artificial
analysis that we can consider the process of grouping independently of the materials grouped. Let us, however,
for a moment grant that the brain is the organ of the
Mind; this will not justify the second assumption. No
one will suppose that I deny the cerebral structure to
be one of the determinants in all mental manifestations;
but the same scientific evidence which necessitates this
conclusion, necessitates the rejection of that precipitate
conclusion which assigns the whole product to one of its
factors. The co-operation of the MIedium is not less indispensable than that of the Organism; and, in the case
of man, the Medium is constituted by the education of
the race and of the individual; so that the state of social
evolution which has been reached at any given time in
any given place, will be one of the necessary determinants
in every individual mind.  I shall recur to this presently;
here it is enough to point out that, admitting the general
mental resemblances, dependent on community of structure and of the general Medium, we cannot assign the
diversities of the mental manifestations of such common
powers to structural differences alone. Every organism
has not only an inherited and gradually modified structure
which is one of the determinants of its history, it has also
a history of incident, that is of transient conditions, which
may lead two similar organisms along divergent paths,
and determine them to different manifestations.
And this leads me to the third assumption.  The differences of cerebral structure which are evolved in the
education of the race, and which are necessary conditions




PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.           149
of the observed diversities in mental manifestation, can
no more be estimated by measurements of volume and
mass, than the skill of a Joachimr, as distinguished from
that of an old crowder playing a popular jig, could be
estimated by taking the size and weight of his arms and
finglers.
57. We return then to our position that Mind cannot
be explained without constant recognition of the staticodynamical relations of Organism and Social Medium.
To understand the first we must regard it physiologically and anatomically.  It is not a passive recipient of
external impressions, but an active co-operant.  It has
not only its own laws of action, but brings with it that
very elementary condition of Consciousness which most
theorists attempt to derive ab extra.  I mean that the
sensitive mechanism is not a simple mechanism, and as
such constant, but a variable mechanism, which has a
history. What the Senses inscribe on it, are not merely
the changes of the external world; but these characters
are commingled with the characters of preceding inscriptions.  The sensitive subject is no tabulca rasa; it is not
a blank sheet of paper, but a palimpsest.  The sensational
school was strangely blind to the very conditions of the
results it intended to explain.  It treated Thought as
"transformed Sensation," without seeing that the presence of the grouping faculty, on which Thought depends,
was necessary both for the Sensation and for the transformation.  Not aware of the fact that the Organism is an
evolution, bringing with it, in its structure, evolved modes
of action inherited from  ancestors, these writers overlooked the fact that the Organism brings with it inherited
Experience, i. e. a mode of reaction antecedent to all
direct relation with external influences, which necessarily
determines the results of individual Experience. There
is thus what may be called an & priori condition in all




150          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
Sensation, and in all Ideation.  But this is historiccd,
not trazescendentctl; it is itself the product of Experience,
though not of the individual. Our perceptions are evolutions; and, having necessarily a history at their back,
it is clear that all perceptions are Inodified by pre-perceptions, all conceptions by pre-conceptions.  Hence mental
diversities.
58. We are not, however, to conclude that this a  l'riori condition is metempirical. It is an inheritance of
acquired modification.  It may, analytically, be separated
from  the c yosteriori experiences, as the Organism  may,
analytically, be separated from its functions; and in this
way we may accept Kant's position that the d praiori
Forms of Sense and Understanding render Experience
possible.  But this is only saying that function is determined by structure; and we must wholly reject his position that these Forms are transcendental, and are not
only antecedent to and independent of all Experience
whatever, ancestral and individual, but are sources of a
higher truth than can be gained through individual experiences.  They are congenital modifications, and are a'
priori because congenital.
59. It is important here to remark, that while function is necessarily determined by structure, - being nothing but the structure in action co-operating with the
Illedium, — the transmission from  generation to generation is confined to the structural Irnodification, not ineluding the incide'nts which caused that modification, nor
any of the special actions which were the prl9odo cts of
that modification in combination with special incidents.
What we inherit is the modified structure, and, with
that, the aptitude to act in a certain way under certain
stimuli; but the inheritance of the historical result is not
the inheritance of the incidents which severally converged to that result, nor of the consequences which is



PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.           151
sued from the result under special conditions.  Thus the
tissue of the lungs subjected to certain influences becomes so modified that tubercle is formed.  The child
may inherit a tuberculous diathesis, but cannot inherit
the causes which originated the tubercle, nor the peculiar mental experiences which resulted from  the influence of tubercle in the parent organism; these being
due to a complex of conditions never recurring in the
child's experience.
In discussions on Heredity it has not been sufficiently
recognized that only results can be inherited, and that
every modification of structure is the issue of many comnplex experiences. Could one experience be isolated from
prior and posterior experiences, it might be transmitted
from  parent to child; but each experience is not only
complicated by prior experiences, its transmission is complicated by the influence of the other parent.  A musical
cAptitdcue will be inherited, but no particular melody.
The aptitude represents a modification of structure whereby the response to auditory stimuli takes a melodic form;
but any particular melody is the form which this general
aptitude takes under very special and complex conditions.  In other words, the inherited organism is predisposed to play tunes of a certain character, but the music
it will give forth must depend on the player.  Here once
more we see the necessity of allowing for the objective
factor no less than for the subjective factor. Certain external influences co-operating with the organism  have
modified the structure of that organism, and produced
what may be called a musical instrument; could the external influences which were originally grouped into a
definite melodic form be repeated, the result would be
repeated, and the musician's child would again create de
noro the melody created by his parent.  The chances are
infinite against such a recurrence in the order of the




152          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
stimuli. But there are, in other regions, necessary recurrences in the order, so that every mind rediscovers the
most general truths for itself, because every mind has
presented to it the same phenomena in the same order.
60. This is a biological doctrine of Innate Ideas,
which we shall have presently to consider at length.
Here we must be content with saying that in the old
meaning the doctrine is untenable. There are no innate
ideas, no innate truths, no thoutghts having a metempirical source, - simply innate tendencies, congenital alptitudes,
which cause us to respond in certain ways to certain
stimuli; but if the stimuli differ in kind, or in degree, or
in their order of presentation, the responses must proportionately differ.
In this sense we have Moral and Intellectual Instincts,
— the action of congenital arrangements in the mechanism when set going under appropriate stimuli.  Thus
defined, it is clear that we are born with Logical Instincts.
Strictly speaking, we no more learn to reason than we
learn to see. In one sense we learn both, since Experience (the action and reaction of Organism and Medium)
is requisite for both; and in both we have to acquire
what is but partially given at birth, namely, the structure capable  of co-ordinating impressions.  Wlhat we
learn, what we acquire, both in reasoning and vision, is
the result of the aptitudes evolved through external
influences acting on a primitive arrangement of nervous
tissue. If any one contemplating the infant, so obviously incapable of seeing or of reasoning, should demur
to our presentation of Reason as congenital, he must
equally demur to the universal acceptance of the sexual
instinct as congenital; all three functions are only congenital in the sense in which the oak is said to lie ready
in the acorn. The oak will not be developed unless
under the appropriate conditions, and every variation in




PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.           153
the soil or atmosphere will impress corresponding variations on the structure of the developed product.  But the
acorn inherits certain structural tendencies, which will manifest themselves in definite forms. The nervous organism
also inherits certain tendencies, and whether these are early
or late in evolution is quite a subsidiary consideration.
61. Our activities are of two classes,- the personal
and impersonal.  The personal comprise Sensation, Perception, Imagination, Judgment, Volition, - all directed
to the satisfaction of egoistic impulses or primary needs:
the need of Food, of Exercise (with its correlative, iRepose), of Expression, and of Reproduction. The ilupersonal are directed to the satisfaction of sympathetic
impulses, —the need of Affection, and the need of
Knowledgce.  Intelligence, in the one case, is the conquest of means for immediate ends; Intellect, in the
other, is the conquest of means for remote ends.
The animal has sympathy, and is moved by sympathetic impulses, but these are never altruistic; the ends
are never remote.  AMoral life is based on sympathy: it
is feeling for others, working for others, aiding others,
quite irrespective of any personal good beyond the satisfaction of the social impulse.  Enlightened by the
intuition of our community of weakness, we share ideally
the universal sorrows. Suffering humanizes. Feeling the
need of mutual help, we are prompted by it to labor
for others.  The egoistic impulses are directed towards
objects simply so far as these are the mecan.s of satisfying
a desire. The altruistic impulses, on the contrary, have
greater need of Intelligence to understand the object
itself in all its relations.  Hence so much immorality is
sheer stupidity.
62. Thus it is that we are to seek in the Social
Organism  for all the main conditions of the higher
functions, and in the Social Medium of beliefs, opinions,
7*




154          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
institutions, etc., for the atmosphere breathed by the
Intellect.  MaIl is no longer to be considered simply as
an assemblage of organs, but also as an organ in a
Collective Organism.  From  the former he derives his
sensations, judgments, primary impulses; from the latter
his conceptions, theories, and virtues.  This is very clear
when we learn how the Intellect draws both its inspiration and its instrument fromn the social needs. All the
materials of intellect are imlages and symbols, all its processes are operations on images and symbols.  Language -
which is wholly a social product for a social need - is the
chief vehicle of symbolical operation, and the only means
by which Abstraction is effected. Without Language
there can be no meditation, no theory, no Thought, in the
special mneaning of that term. A perception condenses
many feelings into one, and is so far knowledge. A word
-the symbol of a conception - condenses many perceptions into one; and is thus not only knowledge of a
wider range, but is a knowledge Nwhich is fcucZltcative,
and capable of transmission and preservation.
63. Language is the creator and sustainer of that Ideal
World in which the noblest part of humnan activity finds
a theatre, the world of Thought and Spiritual Insight, of
IKnowledge and Duty, loftily elevated above that of
Sense and Appetite.  Into this Ideal World man absorbs
the universe as in a Transfiguration.  It is here that he
shapes the programme of his existence; and to that programme he makes the Real World conform.  It is here
he forms his highest rules of Conduct.  It is here lie
plants his hopes and joys. It is here he finds his dignity
and power. The Ideal World becomes to him the suprelie Reality.  It multiplies his pleasures and  his
pains.  Its phantoms haunt him, - filliing life with infinite misery, such as never troubles less gifted creatures;
setting tribe against tribe, brother against brother, father




PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.          155
against son, spreading bitter hate and the intolerable
tyrannies of Superstition.  Its fantasies animate him,filling life with infinite and subtle joy, and in many ways
aggrandizing  his capacities and aims. This is man's
spiritual being; who would renounce it for the comparative calmn of the most fortunate brute?
64. An animal suffers fromn a physical calamity, seeks
to escape from  it, but never seeks to understand and
modify its causes. The savage also suffers, and seeks to
escape. But he wonders, speculates on the causes, hopes
to master them, by invocations or incantations. The
civilized man tries to understand the causes that he may
modify them when they are modifiable, and resign himself to them when they are unmodifiable. The animal
has only the Logic of Feeling to guide his actions. He
observes and concludes, never explains. The man has
besides this, the Logic of Signs: he observes, and explains
the visible series by an invisible series. The one has
only knowledge of particular facts; the other a knowledge
of general facts. The knowledge of the one is fixed, that
of the other facultative.
Between the Logic of Feeling and the Logic of Signs
we must intercalate the Logic of Images, since the
passage from Perception to Conception is effected through
Imagination.  Images, although reproductions of perceptions, possess a property not possessed by perceptions,
namely, that of facultative reproduction, which enables
them  to be abstracted from the sensible order of presentation, and combined and recombined anew. Animal
Imagination is reproductive but not plastic; it never
constructs.
65. It is in Imagination that must be sought the first
impulse towards Explanation; and therefore all primitive
explanations are so markedly imaginative.  Images being
the ideal forms of Sensation, the Logic of Images is the




156          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
first stage of intellectual activity; and is therefore
predominant in the early history of individuals and of
nations.  The first attempts to explain a phenomenon
must be to combine the images of past sensations with
the sensations now felt, so as to formn  a series.  In the
next stage, words, representative of abstractions, take
the places both of images and objects. Thus the Logic
of Signs replaces the Logic of Images, as the Logic of
Images replaced the Logic of Sensation.  Imagination
precedes Science; Poetry precedes Prose; Ornament precedes Comfort.
66. The Logic of Signs is a higher development of the
Logic of Feeling, but its processes are similar.  The
differences do not spring from the laws of neural groupingc, but from the groups that are grouped. Sensations
are groups of neural tremors; perceptions are groups of
sensations; therefore Perception may be styled constr'uction in thle sphere of Sense.  Intuitions are perceptions of
relations, - ideal observation. Conceptions are groups
of intuitions symbolized in words.  Conception therefore
may be styled construction in the sphere of synmbols.
But symbols are representatives of values; it is only
by their possible reduction to Reals - i. e. to feelings -
that their employment can be justified. A bank-note is
a symbol representing so much gold, which in turn
represents so much food or labor.  But it is always
assumed that the bank is solvent, and that gold is a
current article of exchange.  A  forged note, or a note
issued by an insolvent bank, may pass from  hand to
hand, but its final object is not accomplished.  Thus all
our reasonings by means of symbols proceed on the
assumption that the symbols can at any time have their
values assigned, and that they represent Reals, which
will excite feelings. Our perceptions proceed on the
assumption that the qualities not felt, but inferred to be




PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.           157
coexistent with those now felt, do really coexist as virtual
feelings, to become actual feelings when the object is
brought into direct relation with the respective Senses.
67. The Real is that which is felt.  An object is to us
what it is felt or thought by us. Knowledge is virtual
Feeling: it is pre-vision of what will be vision, under
sensible conditions, because it, or something like it, once
was vision.  Theory is virtual Experience, reproducing
past experiences, and anticipating the effects of real
presentation.
Sensation and Intuition always carry Belief. Inference is Expectation, or qualified Belief.  We cannot
resist belief in a sensation, though we may doubt any of
the inferences it awakens.  WVe cannot resist belief in an
intuition, though we may doubt whether the relations
intuited be real or not. In the act of intuiting, our
feeling of security is undisturbed.
The distinction between Observation and Inference is
the distinction between the real and ideal, the actual
and virtual. But in point of fact pure Observationi. e. sensation wvholly unlingled with Inference - is impossible; it is so by the Laws  of Reinstatement.  Pure
Theory - i. e. logical combination of relations unmingled
with related terms - is also impossible.
68. The purpose of Intelligence being to direct our
impulses towards their satisfaction, and the purpose of
the Intellect being to accomplish this this through a wider survey of means and possibilities, we learn how on the one
hand all Intelligence must have its final test in Rleality,
and on the other how the Intellect, which is the highly
developed form of Intelligence, has erected means into
ends, and now pursues these proximate ends in oblivion
of the ultimate end, and will even substitute fictions in
place of facts, abstract types for concrete things.  The
direct object of the Intellect is not Reality; that, how



1 8          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
ever, is its ultimate object. The progress of development
is an ever-increasing tendency towards more and more
remote conceptions and indirect methods, detaching the
nlind more and more from sensible observation.  It may
be illustrated by the stages of numerical calculation.
Man begins by counting things, grouping therm,  visibly.
He then learns to count simply the numbers, in the absence of the things, using his fingers and toes for symbols.  He then substitutes abstract signs, and Arithmetic
begins.  From this lie passes to Algebra, the signs of which
are not only abstract but general; and now he calculates numerical relations, not numbers. From this he passes to the
higher calculus of relations of relations.
It is the same with the development of Commerce.
Alen begin by exchanging things.  They pass to the exchange of values.  First money, then notes or bills, is
the symbol of value.  Finally, men simply debit and
credit each other, so that inimmense transactions are affected by means of this equation of equations.  The complicated processes of sowing, reaping, collecting, shipping,
and delivering a quantity of wlheat are condensed into
the entry of a few words in a ledger.
69. In consequence of this development of Intellect 
i. e. of the interest in remote means substituted for direct
ends — man acquires his immense superiority over animals in achieving the final end.  It is thus, and thus
only, that lie is enabled to modify the course of events.
It is thus that Sentience becomes Science, facts are condensecl  into laws, and direct vision is multiplied and
magnified by remote pre-vision.
But while insisting on the claim of Intellect to pursue
its ideal objects, and to be uncontrolled in its prosecution
of even the remotest research, we must never forget that
its ideal ends are only sanctified by the final end, - by
that correspondence with Reality which was its starting



PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.          159
point and must be its goal. No speculation, however
wide of actual experience, can be valueless, if, in any
way, it enlarge our vision of the Real, but this is its
final test. If with mighty span of wing it soar above the
sphere of the Real, it must not keep hovering there, but
must at some point re-enter the sphere. Ideal construction is unlimited in freedom, on the understanding that
it must always submit to real verification, and have
values assigned to its symbols.
70. Thus the human Intellect emerges from animal
Intelligence, and develops a vast inldependent creation,
having the whole Cosmos and Humanity for its material.
Concurrently with this, the Moral Intelligence develops
its system.  Both Intellect and Conscience are products
of the animal impulses and social impulses acting and reacting. While the Intellect is mainly occupied with the
relations of the Cosmos and its History, having the ultimate aini of making these subservient to practical needs,
the Conscience or AMoral Intelligence is mainly occupied
with the relations of Humanity, - human needs and human actions, - having the ultimate aim of conforming our
conduct to those relations, harmonizing our impulses with
the impulses of others, thus aiding others and gratifying
ourselves.
The Intellect, although under sympathetic conditions,
since it depends on others for its activity, and for the
means by which the activity may be guided, and since,
moreover, its results are achieved for all, - is not so directly sympathetic as the Conscience.  Could we suppose
a man born with his inherited aptitudes, left solitary on
an island, before havingr had access to any of the stores of
knowledge accumulated by the race, he might acquire a
rudimentary knowledge of cosmical relations, although
without Language, or any accessible store of the experience of others on which to proceed, this would neces



160          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
sarily be little above that of an animal. But of Moral
Intelligence there would not be a trace.  There cannot
be moral relations apart from  Society.
71. Hence two noticeable facts: the part played by
Sentiment in Philosophy is of immense importance in so
far as the problems involve elements of social relations;
but is simply perturbing and obstructive in problems of
cosmical relations.  WVe ought not to deny the admission
of Sentiment, but we must definitely assign its sphere. A
social theory which omitted it would be as defective as a
cosmical theory which admitted it.  If Evangelical Geology or High Church Chemistry would be absurd, equally
so would be an exclusively physical theory of Marriage,
or of the filial and parental relation.
72. The Intellect and the Conscience are social functions, and their special manifestations are rigorously determined by Social Statics,- i. e. the state of the Social
Organism at the time being,- which they in their turn
determine.  The LanguaCge we think in and the conceptions we employ, the attitude of our minds and the means
of investigation, are social products determined by the
activities of the Collective Life. The laws of intellectual
progress are to be read in History, not in the individual
experience.  We breathe the social air; since what we
think, greatly depends on what others have thought.
The paradox of to-day becomes the commonplace of tomorrow.  The truths which required many generations to
discover and establish are now  declared to be innate.
Even discovery has its law, and is only an individual
product, inasmuch as the individual voice articulates what
has been more or less inarticulate in the general thought.
The great thinker is the secretary of his age.  If his
quick-glancing mind outrun the swiftest of his contemporaries, he will not be listened to; the prophet must find
disciples.  If he outrun the majority of his contempora



PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.          161
ries, he will have but a small circle of influence, for all
originality is estrangement.
Not recognizing the social influence, men seldom appreciate the true point of view in discussions respecting
ancient and modern Literature. It is undeniable that
Sophocles, Plato, Aristotle, Hipparchus, and Galen were
not less splendidly endowed than Shakespeare, Bacon,
Newton, Comte, or Helmholtz, - their intellectual lineaments may have been as grandly drawn, but it is absurd
to pretend that the products of the ancient and the products of the modern mind are of anything like equal value.
73. Some of our Impulses are simply organic activities,
others are Instincts. There is no Instinct to breathe, to
dcgest, to secrete, etc., for there never was a time when an
alternative action was possible with these organs under
their appropriate stimuli, - the actions were necessarily
determined in one way only: But food is selected by Instinct; the bird flies, and the mammal walks by Instinct:
these actions are tentative, and guided by discerning
Feeling. The sexual instinct is obviously an impulse
guided by Discernment.
Directly connected with the Nutritive Instinct are
three egoistic Impulses, offensive and defensive, which
may be characterized as the Aggressive Instincts. The
animal must destroy, or it could not feed. A rival threatening to take some of this food rouses Anger, the emotion
of a thwarted impulse. The thwarted sexual impulse
calls out the same feeling. Derived from this will be in
the higher imaginative animals the love of Domination;
the desire to make others afraid of, or subservient to us.
Where food is abundant, and accessible, there is little
development of these tendencies; as may be observed in
the herbivora, who rarely fight unprompted by the sexual
impulse. Tigers would be sociable were animal food as
abundant and accessible as vegetable food. War is the
K




162         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
outcome of this tendency. In Trade we see the war spirit
animated by the desire for Property.
The so-called instinct of Self-preservation is a fiction.
The only impulse at work there is the shrinking from
Pain; and this in the matured experience leads to the
intelligent act of self-preservation.
As the Aggressive Instinct springs from the Nutritive,
so the Sexual Instinct springs from the lReproductive. It
is the first of the sympathetic tendencies, the germ of
Altruism. Love, which is the social motor, has this origin.
Thus modified, the tendency to Domination becomes the
love of Approbation; it is the sympathetic form of the
egoistic impulse. The love of wife and children extends
to relatives and friends, to the tribe, to the nation, to Hlmanity.
How intimately the social and religious emotions are
connected with this primary fact of the mutual dependence of two human beings, and how from it slowly emerge
all the marvels of Art and Science, must be exhibited in
detail.
REASONED REALISM.
74. Having briefly indicated the Psychological Principles, I will now indicate what is their outcome with
respect to the great metaphysical question touching an
external reality. It will be argued at length in a separate
Problem; but as the publication of this Problem is distant,
and as its conclusions will everywhere be implied, I take
this opportunity of clearly marking my position.
The doctrine of this work, then, may be called Reasoned  Realism. It is distinguished from the Natural
Realism, the Hypothetic Realism, and the Symbolical or
Transfigured Realism  of modern thinkers, no less than
from the unhesitating Realism of unreflecting minds. It
is a doctrine which endeavors to rectify the natural illu



PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.           163
sion of Reason when Reason attempts to rectify the supposed illusion of Sense. I call it Realism, because it
affirms the reality of what is given in Feeling; and Reasoned Realism, because it justifies that affirmation through
an investigation of the grounds and processes of Philosophy, when Philosophy explains the facts given in Feeling.
75. The reality of an external existence, a Not-self,
is a fact of Feeling so indissolubly woven into Consciousness, that the very terms in which Idealism seeks to
disprove it are themselves derived from  it. Now this
fact, because it is a fact of Feeling, and ultimate, can
neither be got rid of nor explained by interpretation of
it into terms of some more general fact. Why then has
Philosophy persisted in the attempt to explain it?
Simply because Philosophy, being in its very nature
Explanation, persists in attempting to explain even the
inexplicable; dissatisfied with ultimates, it is prone to
ask what is their ultimate? This search for light behind
the light is the natural illusion of Reason, the will-o'-wisp
of Philosophy; and this can only be rectified by showing
what are the grounds and what the limitations of Knowledge.
76. The facts of feeling are directly given. All the
phenomena constituting the external reality to us are
presented discontinuously; and it is the office of Philosophy so to connect them that their actual continuity
be discerned; and we thus not only have the separate
feelings, but also a feeling of the relations of these feelings. The Logic of Feeling, which is primary, has to be
supplemented by the Logic of Signs, which is derivative.
Analysis attempts to display, in symbols, what has been
implicit in sensation. But - and this is the point too
commonly overlooked   all interpretation must finally
be a reduction into terms of Feeling, all the symbols
must signify sensations. Feeling is tie starting-point




164          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
and goal of investigation. All that we can know of the
external is what we have felt or might feel.
77. This being the ground, what is the limit of Knowledge? The limit is attained when we have attained
what in Algebra is called the "form of a function."  In
Mathematics a "function" is the quantity which varies
when some other quantity varies. When observation of
two phenomena discloses that the one - say the density
of a gas - varies with another, - say its pressure, - the
density is said to be a function of the pressure; when
vital activity is observed to be exalted or depressed with
increase or decrease of respiration, the activity is said to
be a function of the respiration. Such knowledge of a
function is valuable, but it is obviously not final. What
is still needed is the form of the function, -the manner
in which the two quantities are combined.  When this
is reached the limit is reached.  When the law of a
series is found, nothing remains to be sought.  When we
know the how, it is idle to ask the why.  The fact is
what it is, and lewhat its factors are: if we know the fact
and the factors, to ask for more is to ask?why 2 X 2 =4.
The gas presses against the sides of the containing vessel,
because the gas is composed of movable molecules clashing about in all directions with various velocities, and
the amount of this pressure must of course increase in
proportion to the diminution of the space in which these
motions take effect, since on every inch of surface there
will then be a proportionately greater dashing of molecules. Thus the smaller the vessel becomes, the greater
must be the density of the gas contained in it, since the
gas fills the vessel; and the greater the density, the
greater will be the pressure excited by the gas. Now if
it be true that the gas molecules in their movements
repel each other inversely as the fifth power of the
distance (or, indeed, if any other law of repulsion can be




PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.           165
established), we shall then be in possession of the form
of the function, and the final result of analysis will be
reached.  To go beyond this, and to ask why the molecules repel according to this law, is irrational, because
travelling beyond the real limits and conditions.
78. Now it may seem a very bold thing to say, but I
hope to justify the assertion, that with respect to the worldold debate on the relation of Object and Subject we have
not only a knowledge of the function, but of the form of
the function; or, to put it in more familiar language, we
not only know that an external Not-self exists, - know it
with the same assurance that we know an internal Self
to exist, - but we also know the manner in which the
two are combined in Feelino and Thought.
Fully aware of the paradoxical aspect this statement
must present to allnost every reader, I only ask him to
suspend his judgment on it until he has accompanied
ne through all the evidence which this work will offer.
Having made my statement, I will here say no more, but
call attention to the unsatisfactory nature of the position
commonly held. The ordinary man believes that the
objects he sees, touches, and tastes do veritably exist, and
exist as they are seen, touched, tasted.  They have the
qualities he feels in them. The philosopher, dissatisfied
with the facts directly given in Feeling, though he, no
more than the ordinary man, doubts that these qualities
are felt, endeavors to explain vwhy it is that they are so.
To explain a fact is to interpret it by its factors, to
analyze it into its constituents; which again means to
interpret a feeling in terms of feeling. This need for an
explanation is exclusively human.  No animal explains;
he feels, and his action is the direct consequence. But
man desires to understand what he feels, in order that he
may modify the course of events, by rearranging their
separate factors. To do this he must take the complex




166          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
whole to pieces, and see of what it is composed. The
speculative intellect carries out in the remote regions of
knowledge, what the practical intellect daily performs in
the familiar regions of Practice; it takes the object to
pieces.
79. Great and beneficent as the results of this analytic
tendency have been, there have also been attendant
drawbacks. By cultivating this tendency to look away
from the given reality, in search of its prior conditions
or its presumed factors, men have learned to slight the
plain indubitable facts of Feeling, in favor of the obscure and doubtful representations of these facts in
Thought, - that is to say, replacing perceptions by conceptions, facts by theories and hypotheses, men have
come to distrust the Logic of Feeling, even within its
own domain, and to rely on the Logic of Signs, even
when it contradicts that of Feeling.  Accustomed to
attach exclusive importance to symbols irrespective of
the realities, they have forgotten that ideas can be valid
only as representative of sensations, and symbols can be
useful only when capable of interpretation. For what
was the starting-point of every theory? An observation.
And what is the test of the theory? A reduction of its
inferences to sensations. The theory started to explain a
fact; the inferences were intended to re-present what
would be presented in Feeling, were the inferred facts,
facts perceived. Obviously, therefore, every theory must
be a failure which ends in denying, or ignoring, the original fact. Yet this assuredly is the case with the current
theories of Perception, idealistic and realistic.  The original fact given to all, is that of an external reality present
in Feeling; the fact that a Not-self exists, that objects
affect us by their presence, and have qualities variously
felt by us, - this, I say, may possibly be explained, interpreted in other terms of Feeling, and classed with other




PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.           167
facts, but cannot be ignored, or denied, without violation
of first principles.
80. Yet this is done by metaphysicians under various
forms. What they have to explain is not the fact which
is ultimate, but the factors of the fact, i. e. the indirect
conditions of this direct reality, the invisible constituents,
objective and subjective, of this visible phenomenon.
That is to say, to exhibit in analysis what was given in a
synthesis; to reach if possible the " form of the function."
How have they proceeded on this quest? From of old
they made the false step of proclaiming the natural illusion of Sense; founded on a precipitate conclusion from
practical mistakes, this notion of the Senses as sources
of deception led to the conclusion that Reason was the
only ground of security. If Sense deceived us, Reason
corrected the false reports. Reason henceforward became
authoritative, final. This, which may in turn be called
tile natural illusion of Reason, can only be dispelled by
a thorough investigation of the genesis of Reason; and
since that genesis exhibits it in the light of a derivative
form the primary facts of Feeling, - the virtual representation of what would be actual presentation, - we cannot
hesitate to assign a lower validity to its symbolical constructions than to the primary facts which those constructions render intelligible.  It is surely obvious that
no theory of Perception can have the certainty that
belongs to the Perception itself; no explanation of a
conclusion can be valid which ignores the very facts concluded, shut up in the starting-point.
81. It was to explain the perception of an external
reality that Philosophy started on its quest. The Idealist
schools find the explanation to be, - that there is really
nothing to explain except the illusion that an external
reality exists.  The Realist schools, while admitting that
an external reality veritably exists, declare that it can




168          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
never be known by us as it exists, but only under some
form in which we clothe it; there is, therefore, still a
touch of the old illusion lingering in it, and our surest
knowledge is after all phantasmal.
82. The Reasoned Realism of this work denies altogether the assumed distinction between noumenon and
phenomenon, — except as a convenient artifice of classification by which the unknowable otherness of relations is
distinguished from the knowable relations: that is to say,
noumena standing for things in their relations to other
forms of Sentience (if there are such) than our own; and
phenomena standing for things in any conceivable relations to Sentience like our own. Getting rid of the
Ding ae, sich, or nounienon, as a phantasm that has no
existence for us, consequently cannot come within our
perceptions, nor within any theory of perception, and is
therefore altogether banished from the sphere of Knowledge, we are led through our psychological analysis back to
the synthetic starting-point, - namely, that the external
world exists, and among the modes of its existence is the
one we perceive.  Rationally interpreted, we may accept
the ordinary belief that color is a quality of the object
seen, that heat is in the fire, roughness is in the rough
surface, etc.; and at the same time we may accept the
philosopher's assertion, that all these qualities in objects are feelings in us.  Psychogeny will show us that
color, heat, etc., are, from one point of view, both in the
objects and in us; from another point of view, they are
in neither.
83. Let me explain. When first men began to analyze their perceptions, they were so greatly impressed by
the importance of the subjective aspect, and the dependence of Feeling on the state of the sentient organism,
the same object producing such various sensations at different times, that they reversed their primary and in



PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.           169
stinctive judgment, and instead of saying, "qualities belong to objects," they now said, " it is we who invest objects with the qualities of our feelings." From that time
the subjective aspect has so predominated that Psychology has almost lost its hold of the objective world; and
in many treatises resembles an Astronomy which should
record the laws of planetary movement, ignoring the existence of planets and perturbations; or a Biology which
should explain Life by processes of composition and decomlposition, denying that there were any organisms in
relation to a medium to manifest these.
84. Kant boldly carried out this reversal of the primary judgment of Feeling.  The external phenomena Mwere
to him only "objects" in virtue of the Mental Forms imposed on the noumenon.  I do not discuss the question
here; but only say that the doctrine of this work stands
by the primary judgment of Feeling, and is a Reasoned
Realism because it does so. The external world must be
at first simply a confused chaos, without shape or order,
when reflected in a Sentience which has not acquired
shaping reactions. But as the sentient Organism develops, the external Order emerges; not because this Order
is the creation of the Organism, sttcanped ulpon the chaos,
but because this Order is cassimilcted by the Organism,
— selected, according to its shaping reactions, from the
larger Order of the Real.  The undifferentiated animal
substance slowly develops into highly differentiated tissues and organs, through the action on it of the external
agencies, which leave their traces in a modified structure
and capability of reacting: the pulpy mass of the brain
acquires, through manifold experiences, a structure more
and more variously definite, with corresponding reactions; and as Feeling becomes differentiated and defined,
Qualities arise in the Felt.  It is thus that the nebula of
the external is condensed into objective phenomena, and
8




170          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MINTD.
the confused irradiation of Sensibility is grouped into
feelings.
85. Is this figured Cosmos figured in Feeling through
the adacctation of the sentient organism to the external
Real, or is it simply a subjective construction - the figuration of Sensibility - which we illusively project outwards and receive back again in reflection? Do we see
objects colored because objects colorably affect the retina?
or do we see them  colored because the retina casts its
tints upon them?  Do we acquire our modes of sentient
reaction through modifications impressed by the actions
of the external? or do we bring with, us, and fiom
another source, the -Mlental Forms in which the unshaped
external takes shape?
These different statements of the same fundamental
problem  suggest somewhat different answers.  Between
Realism  and Idealism, I should say that the question
must be rendered more definite by a preliminary settlement as to whether we ask a question of Psychogeny
or a question of Psychology.  If it is the genesis of our
modes of sentient reaction, and their relation to the external, which we consider, then the answer will take the
realistic form; since Psychogeny, tracing the evolution of
Sensibility in the organic world, must conclude that it is
the External Order which determines the Internal Order,
by determining the organic structure of which Sensibility
is the property: the evolution of perceptions, instincts,
volitions, conceptions, is through successive adaptations
of the successively modified structure; precisely as the
evolution of all the vital phenomena is through successive adaptations.* But if the question be not one of
genesis, if it assume the existence of the organized structure with its developed aptitudes, the answer will be a
sort of compromise between the realistic and idealistic
* This has been shown in a masterly manner by MIr. Herbert Spencer.




PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.            171
answers. Psychology accepting the developed Organism,
as one of the factors in the fact of Perception, estimates
the influence of this co-operant, and concludes that since
the Organism necessarily reacts according to its modes, it
may be said to color objects, although this mode of reaction is itself a mode originally due to the action of objects.
It is Light which fashions the retina to luminous responses. Not that the external Real which stimulates
the retina can be supposed to be itself luminous: it is
only one factor of the luminous product.  Nor can the
retina, apart from stimulation, be luminous: it also is
only one factor.  But Light — the Object - is both factors: thus the object is necessarily object-subject; and
subject is equally subject-object. I do not agree with
those realists who conceive the thing represented in Perception, in the way nlathematicians regard an algebraic
function as represented by a curve, -object and subject
forming a Dualism having something of a pre-established
harmony, but no real union.  I would rather liken the
Thing represented in Perception, to the weight of the atmoosphere represented by the height of the mercury in the
barometer; while the differences between weight and
height, and between atmosphere and mercury, are wide,
both rest on a common identity of pressure. The pressure of the atmosphere is the pressure exerted on the
mercurial column, and the barometrical expression of this
pressure is, in one sense, no more like the object expressed,
than a feeling is like the vibrations it expresses; yet, in
another sense, the barometrical expression is what it expresses, and the feeling is what it expresses.
86. It seems to me a grave objection to Idealism that
there is no possibility of separating Object from Subject,
or Subject from Object, in Feeling, but only in Reflection;
and Reflection is not primary, but derivative. Nay, even
here it soon appears that the distinction is simply that of




172         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
aspects. We declare the existence of a Real apart from
Feeling, and of events linked together by other ties than
those of our modes of conceiving them; because if we
assume such an existence it enables us to explain the
phenomena which agree with, and the phenomena which
contradict our previsions. Granting this assumption to
see what are its consequences, we find that, having through
successive adaptations acquired an order in our feelings
corresponding with the order in things, we can from it
predict what will be the order of events on a future occasion; and this prediction is verified, not simply in respect
of the events following the order wche have prefigured, but
the order which will appear the same to others who have
no such prefiguration of it, and cannot therefore be supposed to have introduced their subjective constructions
into it. A chemist, suppose, has learned the order of
events by which salts are produced. He can produce a
salt where there is no salt. If his conception of the real
order were a subjective construction without objective
correspondence, he could only see what he had foreseen,
and the salt would inevitably appear to him. But on proceeding to realize his conception he sometimes stumbles
on a contradiction: no salt is produced: he sees what he
had not foreseen. Why?  Because he had assumed that
the order of real events would be that of his ideal scheme;
whereas in reality there has been some other order, some
events not included in his construction, and he has to
seek these out, reform his construction, and then proceed
to verify it when thus reformed.
87. But while Idealism tries to get rid of the primary
fact that Not-self is the correlative of Self, and in no
wise a product or projection of Self, but a given factor
in Consciousness, having the same validity as Self, all
the schemes of Realisml with which I am familiar err
on the side of neglecting the one factor or the other.




PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.          173
The ordinary man, undisturbed by philosophic speculation, accepts a Dualism  of Mind and Matter, and
imagines the External Order to be something wholly
independent of the Internal Order, imagines Things to
exist precisely as they are felt and thought, even when
there is no sentient subject to feel and think them.
But the philosophic realist also more or less avowedly
accepts a Dualism; since, although he may reject the
crude distinction of Mind and Matter, he keeps to the
wide distinction of Motion and Feeling, with its correlative distinction of Object and Subject, as two parallel
existences which call never approach each other, much
less unite. The Subject is conceived under the likeness
of a kaleidoscope; every external force will disturb its
arrangement of colors, and the rearrangement will accurately represent the amount and direction of the external
force, but will have no other similarity or point of
community with it. In this view our perceptions are
symbols of the external reals, but have no more likeness
to the reals, no more community of kind, than a numerical figure has to the figures of the numbered objects.
88. This view has advocates so eminent that I must
decline the discussion of it until the fitting occasion
arrives for treating it exhaustively.  Here, where I am
avowedly indicating my own position, and not endeavoring to prove it, the statement must suffice that I regard
the Subject in no such alienation from the Object; and
regard Perception as the assimilation of the Object by
the Subject, in the same way that Nutrition is the
assimilation of the Medium by the Organism.  Out of
the general web of Existence certain threads may be
detached and rewoven into a special group, - the Subject,
and this sentient group will in so far be different from
the larger group, -the Object; but whatever different
arrangement the threads may take on, they are always




174         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
threads of the original web, they are not different threads.
The elements of the sentient Organism are the elements
detached from  the larger group; the motions of the
sentient Organism are the motions of these elements.
AVe do not suppose that when what is called the physical
motions of molecules are grouped into what is called
the chemical actions, and surprisingly novel phenomena
emerge, there has been anything essentially superadded to
the primitive molecules and their forces. Nor do biologists now suppose that when physical and chemical actions are specially grouped and vital phenomena emerge,
anything essential has been superadded to the primitive
threads of objective existence. The chemical phenomenon is new, the vital phenomenon is new; but the novelty
is one of special grouping of the old material and the old
energy. In like manner, when the psychical phenomenon emerges from the vital, and the social phenomenon
from the psychical, there is a regrouping, not the introduction of new material, above all, not a casting away
of the old. The Subject is inseparable from the Object,
in any real sense; is only separable ideally.  As the
flower which comes into existence through the action
of the sun incorporates the energy of the sun, and grows
by what it takes from the sun, so the sentient Organism
incorporates the energy of the External, and reproduces
all that produced it.
89. To those who have accepted the view of Life being
an emergent, not due to a conflict between the external
and internal, but to their co-operation, the extension of
the view to Perception lies near at hand. To those who
have accepted the view of Mind drawing material from
the Social Medium, and who admit that the human being
lives, feels, and thinks by the continual assimilation of
such material, the following question may be submitted:
When the mind perceives any social fact, and apprehends




PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.           175
its social significance, is the fact real, or not? Let the
fact be a religious service performed in a cathedral, or a
political service performed in a legislative assembly.  The
sensible phenomena are of course perceived through sensible channels, and are interpreted with more or less accuracy according to the registered experiences of the observer; precisely as any cosmical fact will be perceived
and interpreted. In both cases there is a synthesis of
sensible impressions, feelings reproducing former feelings;
and if these are interpreted, it is by an ideal construction
which is determined by previous constructions. By an
animal, or a stranger, the sensible phenomena which the
religious service presents would be very differently interpreted; but the sensible phenomena presented in any
cosmical process would also be differently interpreted by
them; since interpretation means mental assimilation,
the significance of the phenomena must depend upon the
pre-perceptions and pre-conceptions which they arouse.
Nevertheless, wide as the gap may be between the interpretation of the savage and the interpretation of the citizen, the reality of the religious service is unaffected: it is
to each what they feel it to be, and it is to each what
they think it to be; in other words, they have been sensibly impressed by certain reals, and have interpreted these
impressions by means of certain'symbols.  From  these
subjective differences it has been concluded that there is
an objective existence independent of all, and  znlike
each; I hold, on the contrary, that the objective existence is to each what it is felt to be.
We have already (~ 25) briefly indicated what must
hereafter be exhibited in detail, that whatever is felt is
necessarily real, since Reality and Feeling are correlative.
Feeling only arises in the sensible excitation of the Organism by something acting on it, whereas whatever is
tho#ught, conceived, is necessarily symbolical, since con



176          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
ceptions are not perceptions but symbols: they are not
the sensations themselves in a synthesis, but general
signs indicating such synthesis; as algebraic letters are
not the numbers and mag(nitudes themselves, but symbols
of their relations.  This, which is obvious enough in the
case of general conceptions, - Life, Cause, Nation, Virtue,
etc., - is perhaps less obvious yet equally demonstrable
in the case of less general conceptions, - Flower, Horse,
River, etc., which are markedly distinguishable from  the
perceptions of a Flower, a Horse, or a River, which are
always syntheses of feelings, and are real.because both
the elements (the sensations) and the synthesis are the
actual and direct products of the external and internal
factors; whereas the conceptions formed out of these
perceptions, although they have only validity in so far as
they accurately represent real syntheses, are in themselves indirect products, mere symbols.  The conception
of Virtue, for example, is altogether unlike the concrete
actions which it signifies; unlike in its elements, unlike
in its synthesis.  It is not a real, i. e. an external agent
capable of exciting a corresponding perception, but an abstraction, a symbol expressing the many feelings which
the concrete actions are capable of producing; and is
comparable to the algebraic symbols, which, though utterly unlike the quantities they represent, do nevertheless
stand for those quantities, and are operated on with equal
facility.  In somne of our conceptions and in some of our
pictorial symbols, there is a sensible suggestion of likeness between the sign and the thing signified; in the
conception of Flower - or in the symbol of a Lion representing the kingly attributes of a Chief - there can be
traced some perceptive sutggestion.  But in other conceptions and symbols no resemblance, no perceptive suggestion, is traceable; if there were originally a suggestion, it
has long since faded from the view; and in all cases the




PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.             177
symbol is constructed out of different elements in different ways, so that it is really unlike what it stands for, is
different from what it signifies.
This contrast between Conception and Perception, between the Symbolical and the Real, which is a fundamental point in Psychology, renders intelligible what was
said (~ 63) respecting the Ideal WTorld absorbing the universe in a Transfiguration; and at the same time miarks
my dissent from the theory of Transfigured Realism, upheld by Helmholtz and Spencer; for that theory professes
to be a theory of Perception, and declares Perception to
be symbolical; whereas, according to the principles here
expounded, Perception being the resultant of the two factors, internal and external, the conclusion deduced is that
the object thus felt exists precisely cas it is felt; existing
for us only in Feeling, its reality is what we feel.  The
great thinkers whom I am  here opposing fully admit the
premises of this conclusion, with this reservation: they
hold that since the internal factor is a necessary co-operant, it must alter by its co-operation the character of the
external, and the product of the two will be unlike either.
Having for many years maintained this position, I am not
insensible to its significance.  I shall endeavor, however,
to reconcile the differences, and to show that Perception,
because it is a resultant, not a symbol, does not alter the
Real; on the contrary, an object only is to us what we
feel it to be, - it exists in that relation. This does not,
of course, exclude the possibility of the external factor
having anothe7r existence in relation to other factors; all
that can legitimately be affirmed is that this particular
thing in this particular relation is what it is in this relation, i. e. what it is felt to be.  What we mean by saying
that a thing is real simply amounts to this: it will
always in such or such relations have such or such modes
of existence, and in all similar relations similar modes.
8*                              L




178         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
This conclusion is as absolute as that two multiplied by
two will always be four, and that two multiplied by three
will always be six.
This question of the reality of an external world will
have to be treated at length in a separate problem; I
here indicate simply the principal lines of the conclusion
to which I have been led. Neither crude Realism nor
any form of Idealism satisfies all the conditions of the
problem.  The world conceived by us, the world in
Thought, is demonstrably not a picture of the Existence
lying outside of us and unrelated to us: it is a Transfiguration effected by the ideal construction of real presentations in Feeling.  Were this External, such as we
conceive it, existing objectively, Science would not have
been in travail for centuries; the objective existence
would have been plain to Sense, needing no Science to
make its order plain.  On the other hand, were this External a purely subjective creation, the projection of an
ideal order, it would have needed no study to understand
it, for it would have spontaneously unfolded its mysteries before our gaze. The necessity of long-continued
observation and reasoning, the necessity of analytical
operations to make clear the sequences of observed
events, the changes in our knowledge, and the slow
evolution of our conception of the External Order, disprove both Realism  and Idealism. The psychological
facts that Existence is directly perceived and indirectly
conceived, that what is felt is real, and what is thought
is symbolical of what is felt, suffice to justify the theory
of Reasoned Realism.
90. No little confusion arises from an almost inevitable
ambiguity. We apply the term  Object to the Not-self.
This Not-self may be either the objective aspect of the
world felt and thought, i. e. of the External in actual and
virtual relation to Sentience; or the universe of existence,




PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES.           179
conceived in its totality, including that smaller section of
it which is grouped by a Subject. When we say that
there is identity of Object and Subject, the meaning ought
to be that in respect of Existence in its relation to Consciousness, Object and Subject may abstractedly be considered under different aspects, but they are one and the
same phenomenon.
"INichts ist drinnen, Nichts ist draussen,
Denn was innen, das ist aussen,
So ergreifet ohne Siumniss,
Heilig iffentlich Geheimniss."
But this can no longer be said of the Universe considered as the totality of Existence, under which aspect the
Object is not the other side of the Subject, but the larger
cir-cle which includes it.  This is, however, a topic which
must be discussed hereafter.
Reasoned Realism not only justifies the primary judgment of Feeling, but gets rid of the notion that because
Knowledge is necessarily relative therefore it cannot be
real. I hope to show that instead of invoking an Unknowable as the dark Dynamis to which all researches
point, -instead of concluding that knowledge of things
as they are is impossible, and that our most certain
results are only symbols of an unknown reality, — the
conclusion will be, that although the region of the Unknowable may be infinite, within the region of the Knowable we do know things as they are, know them absolutely,
comprehensively, - in any rational sense to which the
term  Knowledge ever was applied.
This chapter may be fitly closed with the words of
Auguste Comte: "Le but le plus difficile et le plus important de notre existence intellectuelle consiste'a transformer le cerveau humain en un miroir exact de l'ordre
exterieur. C'est seulement ainsi qu'elle peut devenir la
source directe de notre unite totale, en liant la vie affec



180           PIROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
tive et la vie active a leur commune  destination.  La
possibilite d'une telle transformation repose sur la part
nllcessaire de l'ordre exterieur dans notre propre exercice
mental, dont il fournit toujours les premiers materiaux.
Outre cette alimentation  el6erlentaire, il y influe aussi
conmme stimulant, et meme  cornme  regulateur, ainsi
qu'envers toutes les autres fonctions vitales, veg6tatives
ou. aniniales." *
* Politique Positive, II. 382.




PRO B LEM  I.
THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.
" It is the very essence of Philosophy to rest upon the foundation of
common perceptions, and by reasoning from these to account for phenomena. "
PROF. CHALLIS, Philosophical Hacgazine, XXVI. 285.
"Alles ist in der Empfindung und, wenn man will, Alles was im
geistigen Bewusstsein und in der Vernunft hervortritt, hat seine Quelle
und Ursprung in denselben; denn Quelle und Ursprung heisst nichts
anders als die Erste unlmittelbarste Weise in der etwas erscheint."
HEGEL, Encyhlclopccdic, ~ 400.








THE  LIMITATIONS  OF KNOWLEDGE.
CHAPTER I.
THE PRINCIPLE OF RELATIVITY.
1. HODGE, who has never left his native village, knows
little of this wondrous planet, and less of the wondrous
universe of planets; yet something of it he does know,
and this knowledge is real, if narrow, nor would it be
made more real by a wider horizon. The cattle grazing
in the meadow, the pigs foraging through the quiet street,
the apple-blossoms brightening the orchard, the rooks cawing aimong the squire's elms, the children at his hearth,
the neighbors in the parlor of the King's Arms, the parson, the doctor, the squire, - these, and the other objects
of his world, are realities, not phantasms; nor are Hodge's
affections and duties illusions. His world is bounded by
a not very distant horizon. Visitors passing through his
village now and then bring news from the larger towns.
Newspapers carry to him murmurs of the far-off roar of
things. These tell him that his world is not the whole
world; and the death of those dear to him tells dimly
of a world of mystery surrounding all he knows. But
these intimations of a larger life do but intensify the
reality of his village life.
Hodge has a brother, who early left home, travelled
far, learned something of other villages, cities, continents;
passed into strange lands where alien faces and unfamiliar voices obtruded on his notice. His conception of the




184         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
world widened. The details of external nature acquired
new significance for him. Things passed from the commonplace into the grandiose.  The sun no longer pleasantly warmed, it scorched; the wind became a whirlwind;
the rain a deluge; woods were forests, hills mountains,
cats tigers. In the moral world the chancges were equally
great. That which in one place was duty, in another
place was sin, in a third was indifferent; what inspired
honor here was held as infamy elsewhere. Yet under all
these varieties there came to him no deepened sense of
reality; mtore relations of things were learned, but Life
still remained at once the old revelation and the old
mystery.
Hodlge is the common mall; his brother a philosopher.
The parochial conception of the world formedl from the
experience of the one is different from the provincial
conception of the other; but neither conception embraces
the whole Universe, though both conceptions are real, and
relatively true.
2. The principle of the Relativity of Knowledge, which
is indicated in these sentences, is sometimes resisted on
the ground of its leading to universal scepticism. The
fact, however, is otherwise, and may be shown to be so by
the teachings of Psychology and the examples of History. The certainty of knowledge is not affected by its
circumscription.  The principle of Relativity furnishes
a Criterium  which is coextensive with the domain of
intelligence.  The opposing principle is productive of
scepticism, because it has no Criterium.  It remains fluctuating, because its data are personal, and cannot be communicated.  Those who, affecting to despise the certainty
attainable through Sbience, because it can never transcend
the relative sphere, yearn for a knowledge which is not
relative, cheat themselves with phrases; and were it not
so, we might still fall back on the position that relative




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.           185
knowledge is all we need. The aim of Science is prevision,-the guidance and regulation of action.  Our ancestors guided their course by the stars, without knoNing
much about the stars; the ascertainment of a few relative
positions sufficed. Their successors constructed an elaborate science of Astronomy without inquiring into the
nature of gravity, contented with the ascertainment of
its law.  And so throughout.  What is positive may be
absolutely certain and available, although it is but a small
section of the circle swept by Speculation.
3. The world is to each man as it affects him; to each
a different world. Fifty spectators see fifty different rainbows in the sky, and all believe they see the same one.
Nor is this unanimity delusive; for "the same" here
means the similarity in their states of consciousness.
Whether we affirm the objective existence of something
distinct from the affection of consciousness, or affirm that
this object is simply a reflection from  consciousness, in
either case we declare that the objective world is to each
man the sum of his visionary experience, - an existence
bounded on all sides by what he feels and thinks, - a
form shaped by the reactions of his organism. The world
is the sum  total of phenomena, and rphenomena are (ffections of consciousness with external signs.
4. We may for the present set aside the questions
whether there is one Existence (Matter), and another Existence in every way contrasted with it (Mind); or only
one Existence, Matter or Mind; enough if we recognize
the fact that among phenomena there are two classes
broadly distinguishable,- the material and the psychical.
These classes require corresponding names, even should
we finally regard them as only different aspects of a common reality, and with Fechner regard material and psychical as the convex and concave of the samle curve.*
* FE(CHNER, Zendavesta, II. 340. 1851.




186          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
At the outset, therefore, we declare the limitations of
Research to be fixed by the natural limits of Consciousness. A truism, no doubt, but not to be despised. We
can determine what problems are inaccessible (as distinguished from  those which are simply unapproached) by
ascertaining the conditions under which objects do affect,
or could affect us; and we can determine what elements
in every problem are unapproachable, by ascertaining if
they lie outside the sphere of Experience.
Nor would this position be disputed, in its first clause
at least, even by those who believe in the possibility of a
knowledge of things transcending Experience; for they
claim their t priori organ as a " fact of consciousness";
and they affirm that because it is a' priori its verdicts
have a higher validity than those of inductive reasoning.
In presence of such a school we must be careful not to
affix limits to the reach of Investigation, which this
school would reject. It would be absurd to exclude an
organ so important as that named Intellectual Intuition
(or its equivalent fund of Innate Ideas, Fundamental
Truths, c' priori Forms of Thought), unless we could show
either that this faculty does not exist, or, granting its
existence, that its products must be so removed from all
Verification as to be of no avail in Research.  The former alternative — that no such faculty exists —cannot
be demonstrated; since its assumed range of operation
lies beyond the sphere of demonstration; the latter alternative - that it lies beyond the sphere of Verificationis implied in the very statement of its pretensions. Philosophy, therefore, is not called upon to take any account
of it, since for all the purposes of Research it is nonexistent.* It is a musician playing on a violin without
* Hegel sarcastically says of this Intellectual Intuition: "Es ist die
bequemste Manier die Erkenntniss darauf zu setzen - auf das was einem
einfdllt."- Gesch. d. Phil., 111. 655.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.         187
strings, in the halls of a castle in the air. Fancy may
endow this musician with superhuman skill, since Fancy
has created him; but the melodies are too subtle for
human ears.
5. Rejecting, as I think we must, the notion of a
possible source of Knowledge transcending Experience,
we may admit that the notion has had some justification
in the great imperfection of the psychological analysis
put forward by the Sensational School. Striking as
have been the merits of that school, which explain its
survival in the face of violent opposition and virulent
criticism, and its gradual extension over the convictions
even of opponents, these merits have not sufficed to
displace altogether the doctrine of its opponents; and
very eminent thinkers still reject with scorn the conception of Knowledge being limited by Experience. This
implies one of two things: either the doctrine itself is
imperfect, or there is a radical imperfection in the statement of its principles and canons. I think both causes
operate in keeping up the fundamental discordance
between the empirical and metempirical schools. Let
us first glance at the difficulties which beset not only
the investigation but the exposition of metaphysical
questions, difficulties not found in science.
6. Suppose we have to ascertain the changes in
Sensibility produced by some modification of a nervecentre, or the introduction of some poison into the blood.
Complex as the question is (how complex only those can
appreciate who have made the experiment), it is at any
rate free from doubts overhanging the very instruments
we employ, and the laws by which the effects are measured. If in physical research we use a thermometer,
or a thermo-electric pile, we have no need to pause and
investigate the theory of the instrument, or to prove that
its indications are quantitatively exact. AVe accept from




188          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
the chemist the reagents we employ, and the ascertained
laws of their properties.  We never need argue respecting the accuracy of chronometer or hygrometer. All the
primary physical facts are ready to hand, and have not
now first to be established. Quite otherwise is it with
Metaphysics.  There  every problem, besides its own
obscurities, is overshadowed by the uncertainties hovering round its data.  We cannot, for instance, accept
Force as the cause of motion unless Cause and Motion
have already been clearly defined; and they are as
obscure as the Force they are employed to render intelligible.  We cannot stir a step in the exposition of the
relation of Object and Subject without presupposing to be
already settled fundamental points of Psychology which
are still under discussion. No explanation can be given
of Matter which does not involve a conception of Force.
Thus the inter-connections which are potent aids in
physical inquiry are so many obstacles in metaphysical
research.
7. Over and above these difficulties there is the special
difficulty arising from the misleading influence of language.  The sciences have each their technical terms,
terms which, however arbitrary, are exact, terms which
mean always the same thing, and not various things.
Exaggerated as Condillac's notion was of Science being
simply une langue bien faite, - a notion which reappears
in the writings of those who hold that Mathematics is
founded solely on its definitions (as if the objective relations thus defined were not real), - there is an important
truth in it; and no one can doubt that the superior
exactness of Mathematics would vanish if the language
in which its operations are expressed were tainted with
the laxity so common in Metaphysics.  No equations
could be successfully treated if 5 were sometimes the
* CONDILLAC, Langue des C'alculs, p. 7.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.         189
symbol of 4 + 1, sometimes of 4 + 3, and sometimes 2 + 1.
Yet such variation in the values is trifling compared with
the variation in many metaphysical terms. Probably no
two men mean precisely the same thing by the word
Sensation, or Thought, or Cause, or Force. If these
terms agree pretty well in their dentotations, they differ
greatly in their connotations. Thus the proposition that
thought is a transformed sensation, may appear preposterous, or indisputable, according to the meaning assigned
to the terms. We often hear a dispute dismissed as "a
dispute about terms."  In Metaphysics, a dispute about
terms is frequently the whole of the question: that once
settled, Logic takes its course, and all differences disappear. I have already compared a metaphysician to
the algebraist who does not assign arithmetical values
to his symbols; and it is obvious that the chief difficulty in Metaphysics, as in Algebra, is finding the value
of the unknown quantity which will satisfy the equation.
8. The great dispute respecting the origin of knowledge
is a very striking example of this laxity in the use of
terms; and as the question is fundamental, we must
pause here to consider it with some attention. Each
school has seized one aspect of the truth; and a reconciliation may be effected if we can point out the
common ground of agreement, and their points of divergence.  In attempting such a reconciliation I am  not
unaware of the position which a mediator between contending schools must necessarily seem to occupy; mediation always carries with it an air of superiority which is
resented by both the antagonists; nor will any disclaimer
of such an assumption allay the irritation. On the other
hand, the first lesson in controversy is to unlearn our
native tendency to treat our adversaries as fools. If we
learn this lesson, and try to seize the aspect of the truth




190          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
which presents itself to their minds, we may find that
this aspect which represents their experience also represents our own, and that the points of difference are reducible to differences in the data, leading to errors of
interpretation.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.         191
CHAPTER II.
THE SENSATIONAL AND A PRIORI HYPOTHESES.
9. THE school of Locke maintains that "there is
nothing in the Intellect which was not previously in Sense;
all the differences between our thoughts and our sensations are due, not to differences of origin, but to differences
of combination."  The rival school of Leibnitz says:
"Besides the mnatercials furnished by Sense there must be
taken into account the forms furnished by the Intellect."
So far the two schools are but little opposed. The point
of separation is in the assumption of a special source of
knowledge in the Intellectuls ipse, -- an entity, or faculty,
which has no community with Sense, and which not only
furnishes Sense with forms, but also furnishes mnate7rial,
namely, certain Innate Ideas, or Fundamental Truths,
which relate to existences beyond the range of Sease.
Instead of simplifying the question by thus' stating
their common ground, and their point of separation, the
two schools have been fighting on the supposition that the
question was, "Is there anything in the Intellect which
cannot be traced to Sense?" Such a question could not be
answered unless a distinct understanding of its terms was
arrived at. This was not done. The answers were consequently acceptable, or absurd, according to the meanings
each school assigned to the terms.
10. The sensational hypothesis is acceptable if by Sense
we understand Sensibility and its laws of operiation. This,
indeed, which includes all the Biostatical and Biodynam



192          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
ical conditions, external and internal, is an extension of
the term, and obliterates the very distinction insisted on
by the other school; but since it includes all psychical
phenomena under the rubric of Sensibility, it enables
psychological analysis to be consistent and exhaustive.
Although such was obviously the dimn meaning of the sensational school, one must admit that their language very
imperfectly expressed it, and to some extent justified their
adversaries in supposing them  to mean by Sense simply
the Five Senses; and thtus interpreted, the reduction of
all knowledge to a sensuous origin is absurd.
11. The hypothesis of the c priori school is acceptable
if by Intellect be meant the _process by which many different sensations are grouped together, thus forming products unlike any of the several components; and since
this process of grouping may be extended from the elements to the groups, the products will, after successive
evolutions, be so far removed from all resemblance to the
original sensations as to appear due to a different source.
This is only another and a better way of expressing the
sensational doctrine. It demarcates the process of grouping from the elements grouped; the operation from the
symbols: a convenient demarcation, but liable to mislead
the unwary into the belief that the separation is real, and
that Intellect is a special faculty having no community
with Sensibility and its laws. Once detached from Sensibility, it is easily imagined to be capable of operating on
symbols that have no sensible values; transcending the
range of Sensibility, it can deal with transcendentals, as
Sense deals with sensibles.
The error of both schools will be more fully exemplified when, in a future problem, we come to examine the
relations of Feeling and Thought, and see reason to conclude that Sense and Intellect so thoroughly interpenetrate each other that it is no less impossible to conceive




TtHE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.        193
Sensation which does not embody the logical processes
supposed to be peculiar to Thought, than to conceive
Thought which does not embody the neuracl processes
specially named Feeling. Meanwhile let us remark that
both schools fall into the error of confounding a question
of Psychogeny with a question of Psychology, - an error
similar to that frequently occurring in Biology, where
questions of Anatomy are confounded with questions of
Morphology. Thus the point at issue is, what is the genesis of mental products, their origin and evolution? Instead of retracing this genesis by analysis, the debaters fix
their attention on the full-statured mind,- or at any rate
on some stage far removed from the embryonic, - and the
constituent forms there discovered are accepted as initial
phases: the results which have been evolved through successive experiences are accepted as the primary conditions of all Experience; the inductions are made to precede the particulars from which they were generalized.
12. Before entering on an examination of this question
it may be well to state here briefly the leading conclusions which will guide us throughout our criticism of the
two schools. The main question must remain nebulous so
long as we are without a precise definition of Experience.
The'term is very variously and very laxly used. I have
defined it "the Pegristration of Feeling."  And what is
Feeling?  It is the reaction of the sentient Organism
under stimulus.  Observe, it is not the reaction of an organ, but of the Organism, -a most important distinction,
and rarely recognized. This reaction is a resultant of two
factors,- one factor being the Organism and the other
being the Stimulus. VWe are not to accept every response
of an organ as a feeling; nor every feeling as an experience. The secretion of a gland is a response physiolocically similar to the response of the eye or ear; but it is not
a feeling, although entering as an element into the mass of
9                            M




194         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
Systemic Sensation. Nor will the response of a sensory
organ, even when a feeling (through its combination with
other sentient responses), be an exylerience, unless it be
registered in a modification of structure, and thus be revivable, because a statical condition is requisite for a dynamical
manifestation. Rigorously speaking, of course there is no
body that can be acted on without being modified: every
sunbeam  that beats against the wall alters the structure of
that wall; every breath of air that cools the brow alters the
state of the organism.  But such minute alterations are
inappreciable for the most part by any means in our possession, and are not here taken into account, because, being
annulled by subsequent alterations, they do not become
registered in the structure.  We see many sights, read
many books, hear many wise remarks, but, although each
of these has insensibly affected us, changed our mental
structure, so that " we are a part of all that we have met,"
yet the registered result, the residuum, has perhaps been
very small. While therefore no excitation of Feeling is
really without some corresponding modification of Structure, it is only the excitations which produce permanent
modifications that can be included under Experience.  A
feeling passed away, and incapable of revival, would never
be called an experience by any strict writer. But the
feelings registered are psycho-statical elements, so that
henceforward when the Organism  is stimulated it must
react along these lines, and the product will be a feeling
more or less resembling the feeling formerly excited.
The two biological principles -that an Organism  is
evolved throuTgh successive modifications, each of which
is a reaction on stimulus, and that the dynamnical effect
is necessarily determined by its statical conditions, the
function by the organ - assure us that what the Organism is at any stage determines what will be the kind of
sentient reactions it is capable of.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.           195
Such being our view of Experience, the conclusion lies
near at hand that every Organism  must bring with it,
involved in its structure, the statical conditions of those
dynamical results traceable in all Perception, Judgment,
Instinct, etc.  In other words, the Laws of Thought, or,
more accurately, the Mental Forms, are connate, and so
far a' pjriori.  But they are as much part and parcel of
Experience as any individual perception, judgment, or
acquired ability can be. All that can be said to difference
them is that, for the most part, they are parts of the Expelience of ancestors, - the feelings registered in modifications of structure which have been transmitted from
parent to child, so that
" All experience past became
Consolidate in mind and frame."
How much of any one mental manifestation is due to
ancestral feelings registered in the modified structure inherite(l, and how much is clue to the individual feelings
and their modifications acquired through the direct relation of the Organism  to its stimuli, cannot accurately be
determined.  It is like the wealth whvlich a merchant
acquires through his own efforts, by employing the accumulated results of the efforts of previous generations.
But when the argurnent turns solely on the empirical or
metempirical origin of knowledge, there is no need to
determine this; if wTe can show that all our knowledge
arises from, and is limited to, the reactions of the Orgtanism  under stimulus, the question reduces itself to the
point whether over and above the Organism known as
a complex of physical, chemical, and vital conditions,
there is also a Spiritual Organism interfused through this,
and bringing spiritual properties to co-operate with vital
properties.  The vital Organism we believe to have been
evolved through a succession of nmodifications due to its
adaptations to the external Medium; consequently, we




196         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
believe all its functions or manifestations to have been
evolved through Experience. If, however, the spiritualist
hypothesis be accepted, all this argument founded on
Evolution comes to naught; or it will come to naught if,
instead of relying on the spiritualist hypothesis, we accept
the creative hypothesis, and declare that the Organism was
created from the first that which we see it now, equipped
with all its aptitudes and modes of reacting. It is one
of these two hypotheses which underlies the argument of
tile  priori school. Nor can they be directly refuted.
Indirectly, however, they may be discredited by showing
that while they are wholly without positive evidence, they
are imagined only to explain the existence of those very
aptitudes, connate tendencies, Laws of Thought, etc., which
can be explained without such imaginary data, namely, as
the necessary consequences of Experience.
13. Descending from these preliminaries, we see that
the true question Psychology has to determine concerning
the origin of knowledge is, whether over and above the
recognized avenues of Sensibility there are other avenues,
in no one respect allied to them, through which Consciousness may be affected, and thus revelations reach the mind
which, having no sensible origin, are not amenable to the
canons of sensible Experience. But the dispute seems to
turn on the very different question, whether the material
furnished by Sense constitutes the vwhole product of Mind.
The battle has been bloodless and endless, simply because
the adversaries have never actually met on a common
ground.  The empirical proclamation, Nihil in intcllectu
nisi _prils in senset, was answered by the counterblast
NVisi ipse intellectus.  But this was no assault on the
empirical position, simply because the assertion, that the
Intellect existed, left wholly untouched the question as
to how that Intellect could be reached, and on what
material it could operate.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.         197
Both schools rested on the traditional assumption of
the existence of a Mind endowed with certain Faculties.
This Mlind was supposed to be called into activity, and
made to exercise its Faculties of Perception, Imagination,
Memory, Attention, Reasoning, etc., by the influence of
external objects (according to one school), - by the influence of external objects acnd native forms (according to
the other). Now, it was obviously no answer to the
sensationalists to proclaim what they never denied, - the
existence of Mind. What was required was to show that
this Mind is furnished with conceptions not in any way
reducible to sensible experiences or combinations of such
experiences; to show, in fact, that there were innate ideas
and truths, whose origin trcanscended Experience. On this
point the argumentation of Locke is so triumphant that
the doctrine of innate ideas has long been given up, - or
rather has become transformed into a doctrine, which,
while seeming to occupy the old position, does in truth
relinquish it, but brings into prominence a truth never
sufficiently allowed for by the school of Locke, — I
mean the part played by the Organism and its inherited,
modes of reaction.
14. The psychologist finds among the phenomena
classed under Mind two very distinct groups: perceptions
and conceptions, - images of concrete objects, and abstract symbols from which all trace of an image has
escaped.  He calls the one the products of Sense, and the
other the products of Intellect.  Not understanding their
genesis, and impressed by their disparity, unable to detect
any common measure between them, and persuaded that
very many of our most important ideas cannot be analyzed into mere affections of Sense, the ac priori philosopher takes his stand on this evidence of the speciality of
Intellect, and impatiently rejects the empirical hypothesis.
It is clear that out of mere sensations as affections of the




198           PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
organism we cannot get negative conceptions and abstract
notions.  What is the sensible representative of our idea
of Mind?  What is that of Life?  Granting these, and
all other abstractions, to have originally had sensible concretes, it is still indisputable that these objects of Thought
never could have been objects of Sense.  Whence are
they derived?  If Sensation be restricted to- the passive
affections of Sense from  which the co-operation of the
logical processes is excluded, there is a radical defect in
the sensational hypothesis.  But the ca priori hypothesis
only cloaks this defect by a phrase; it does not explain
the phenomena. When Kant says that in order to render
any sensible phenomenon intelligible, the Understanding
must add the notion of Substance, a notion which cannot
be given through Sense, the statement really amounts to
this: before a phenomneiooi ca~n be raised into the logical sphere
it?mist submit to logical cortlitions; before the sensible can
become in~telligible it must assume intelligible characters.
No one would dispute the position.  No one would deny
that there are logical processes which may be called Laws
of Thought, the operation of which is as indispensable in
the formation of judgments, as the laws of Geometry in
the construction of figures.  The question of vital importance is: What are these Laws, and whence their origin?
Kant declared that they were antecedent to all Experience, and made Experience possible; he would not allow
them to be innate.ideas, but he refrained from specifying
what they were, except that they were native elements of
Mind.* The modern biological school of psychologists
* His language is so confused and contradictory that by turns he is
seen espousing the sensational and e. priori hypotheses. Emphatically
declaring against innate ideas, he is yet frequently found employing A
priori concepts; on the one hand declaring that we have only connate
aptitudes, on the other that we have concepts antecedent to all Experience.  Herbart's criticism on Kant's distinction between the Faculty
of Representation and its products is unanswerable. Herbart perenip



THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.              199
fully admitting the operation of logical processes, and the
wide differences between such processes and passive affections of Sense, endeavors to trace the genesis of these,
their organic evolution, and their identity  throughout
psychical phenomena, from the simplest perception up to
the most complex conception.  It admits that the Mind,
considered psychostatically, in the developed state, has certain endowments, or modes of operation, which determine
the forms and products of its thinking; and these are
general laws which determine ac priori, so to speak, even
particular opinions, as general laws of Motion determine
particular motions. It further admits that these endowments, these Laws of Thought, and the conceptions which
are their products when combined with sensible experiences, are assuredly not reducible to any individual experience, but to the evolved Experience of the race.
15. These large admissions, rightly interpreted, give no
support to the ca priori school. In interpreting them it is
necessary to guard against the illusion incident to Abstraction, and the illusion incident to Metaphor.  The
Mind is commonly spoken of in oblivion of the fact that
it is an abstract term expressing the sum of mental phenomena (with, or without, an unexplored remainder, according to the point of view); as an abstraction it comes
to be reoarded in the light of an entity, or separate source
of the phenomena which constitute it.  A thought, which
as a product is simply an embodied process, comes to be
reoarded in the light of something distinct fromr the process; and thus two aspects of one and the same phenomenon are held to be two distinct phenomena. Because we
torily rejects the notion of a Faculty which fashions sensations as a potter
fashions clav.  The Faculty and its Product are one thing, not two
things. " WVe have no Sensibility (although we have sense organs) before
the sensible feelings, no Memory before the stored-up material, no Understanding before the concepts, etc." - Aphorismen zur Psychologie, IWerke,
VII. 611.




200         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
abstract the material of an object from its form, considering each apart, we get into the habit of treating form as
if it were in reality separable from material.  By a similar illusion we come to regard the process (of thinking)
apart from the product (thought), and, generalizingc the
process, we call it Mind, or Intellect, which then means
no longer the mental phenomena condensed into a term,
but the source of these phenomena. This illusion is
further strengthened by the metaphors in which it is
commonly expressed. We speak of the Mind being furnished with material by Sense; or we liken it to a loom
which weaves the threads of Experience into a wondrous
web. But if we substitute for these metaphors another
more nearly resembling the fact, and instead of a machine
take the vital organism for comparison, we may parallel
the aphorism: "Nothing in the Intellect not previously
in Sense," by the aphorism: " Nothing in the Organism
not previously in Food." On hearing this latter statement, a biologist who had no conception of the evolution
of an organism, individual and ancestral, might patiently
ask: " But whence came this organism? whence its power
of fashioning the food? I see no trace of the organism
and its functions in the nutritive materials; hence I conclude that these pre-exist, and because they are preexistent there is the possibility of nutritive materials becoming food."  It is thus the ac priori psychologist asks:
Whence the Mind and its Forms of Thought? Whence
those conditions which render it possible for sensitive
impressions to become Experience?
The answers to such questions must depend on whether
we are considering the functions, or their genesis. It is
indisputable that every particular man conmes into the
world with a heritage of organized forms and definite tendencies, which will determine his feeling and thinking in
certain definite ways, whenever the suitable conditions




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.          201
are present.  And all who believe in evolution believe
that these forms and tendencies represent ancestral experiences and adaptations; believe that not only is the
pointer born with an organized tendency to point, the
setter to set, the beaver to build, and the bird to fly, but
that them man is born with a tendency to think in images
and symbols according to given relations and sequences
which constitute logical laws, and that what he thinks is
the necessary product of his organism and the external
conditions.  This organism itself is a product of its history; it is what it has become,; it is a part of the history
of the human race, and in so far resembles that of other
members of the race; it is also specially individualized
by the particular personal conditions which have distinguished him  from his fellow-men.  Thus resembling all
men in general characters he will in general feel as they
feel, think as they think; and differing from all men in
special characters, he will have personal differences of
feeling and shades of feeling, thought and combinations
of thoulht.  All this is equally true of the organism and
its food.  The body is built up out of elements furnished
in the food, and this not simply by a juxtaposition of
the elements, but by their selection, combination, recombination, and assimilation (or making like); and this assimilation is rigorously determined, 1~, by the special
properties of the elements themselves in these relations;
and, 2~, by the special properties of the tissues which
assimilate them; and these latter are determined by inherited tendencies of the organism.  Thus only those
elements in the food supplied which admit of being assimilated under these conditions are incorporated in the
organism, and help the growth and preservation of the
organism; the other elements are rejected, and are, so
to speak, non-existent for the organism.
The case is parallel in mental assimilation. The reac9* 




202           PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
tions of Feeling are determined by the general laws of
Sensibility and the special modes of the individual.  The
Mind is built up out of assimilated experiences, its perceptions being shaped by its pre-perceptions, its conceptions by its pre-conceptions.  Like the body, the Mind
is shaped through its history.* It is in this sense - and
this only -  that we ought to speak of Intellect as a process apart from its products, and continue the metaphor
of sensations being the food of the Intellect.  Food, regarded  objectively, is something not belonging to the
organism;   although, strictly, a substance never is food
except in becoming part of an organism.  In like manner
Sensation is held to imply an element foreign to Mind, in
contradistinction to Thought, which like the air we breathe
seems part of ourselves.  It is reflection and experiment
which convince us that the air is a Inaterial object capable of being weighed and measured.  It is reflection and
experiment which convince us that Thought is an embodied process, which has its conditions in the history of the
race no less than in that of the individual.
16. Thus explained the doctrine of the sensationalists
may be accepted; all ideas may have a sensible origin
assigned  them  when  Sensation itself is understood to
involve the primary condition of an organized structdure
* George Eliot in The Spanish Gypsy expresses a profound truth in
saying: -
"What! shall the trick of nostrils and of lips
Descend through generations, and the soul,
That moves within our frame like God in worlds,
Imprint no record, leave no documents
Of her great history? Shall men bequeath
The fancies of their palates to their sons,
And shall the shudder of restraining awe,
The slow-wept tears of contrite memory,
Faith's prayerful labor, and the food divine
Of fasts ecstatic, - shall these pass away
Like wind upon the waters tracklessly? "




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.           203
whose functionl is logical * (i. e. constituted by the grouping of neural units) and whose aptitudes are inherited
Experiences.  And, thus explained, the doctrine may be
reconciled with all that is valid in the a priori hypothesis, namely, that which insists on the necessary co-operation of logical processes with organized aptitudes.  The
crude sensational doctrine is equivalent to the crude
statement that the Organism and its functions are given
in the food.  Whether any reputable thinker ever really
maintained this doctrine, may reasonably be doubted;
many writers have seemed to maintain it, owing to the
imperfect precision of their language; yet all would admit that no analysis of food, irrespective of the Organism
and its assimilative processes, would yield an explanation
even of food, much less of vital phenomena; nor would
analysis of external stimuli, irrespective of the sensitive
nechanisnm, yield an explanation of Sensation, much less
of higher phenomena.  The resistance of the 4c priori
school to such crude explanations has been of decided
utility.
Respecting the so-called Mental Forms both schools
are right, though standing at different points of view.
The psychological fact tells us that the Forms are connate,
therefore   _ priori; the psychogenetical fact tells us that
the Forms are products of ancestral Experience, and
therefore a posteriori.  But the vital question is not
whether we have modes of feeling and thinking  which
determine the nature of our feelings and thoughts, but
whether we can have any knowledge of things which
have not been felt, i. e. whether there is a sensible basis
and sensible test requisite for every conception, or whether
a Supra-sensible is knowable.
17. The transformations which hypotheses undergo have
* To be fully explained in the Problem on Feeling and Thought. Meanwhile see Psychological Principles, ~~ 24, 25.




204          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
been instructively illustrated by WThewell. "When a
prevalent theory is found to be untenable, and consequently is succeeded by a different or even by an opposite
one, the change is not made suddenly or completed at
once, at least in the minds of the most tenacious adherents of the earlier doctrine; but is effected by a transformation or series of transformations of the earlier hypothesis, by means of which it is gradually brought nearer
and nearer to the second; and thus the defenders of the
ancient doctrine are able to go on as if still asserting their
first opinions, and continue to press their points of advantage, if they have any, against the new theory.  They
borrow or imitate, and in some way accommodate to their
original hypothesis the new explanation which the new
theory gives of the observed facts; and thus they preserve
a sort of verbal consistency; till the original hypothesis
becomes inextricably confused, or breaks down under the
weight of the auxiliary hypotheses thus fastened upon it
in order to mlake it consistent with the facts." *  Such
has been the case with the hypothesis respecting the
origin of knowledge.  Each school has modified its views
to include what is valid in the doctrine of its opponent.
When the arguments of Gassendi and Hobbes made
Descartes aware of the mIanifest impropriety of supposing
that the infant came into the world ready furnished with
ideas of objects which could only be presented to Sense,
and of ideas which could only be furnished by combinations and abstractions from  sensations,- with ideas of
Geometry before there had been sensible experiences of
Extension, etc., - the philosopher declared that his meaning had been misinterpreted.  He declared that he never
conceived that the infant had more than an innate faculty
of acquiring such ideas under suitable conditions. His
admirers and followers have been at some pains to show
* WHEWELL, Philosophy of Discovery, p. 493.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.              205
that this was his meaning. Thus interpreted, the doctrine of innate ideas amounts to the evident proposition
that the native construction of the human mind is such
that when given conditions are present given results must
follow; when objects are apprehended there will be certain ideas formed, and when certain propositions expressive of the relations of such ideas are stated, the truth
of such propositions is seen at once. No sensationalist
would demur to this.
18. Let us for a moment glance at the statement of
this doctrine by two illustrious defenders of it.  Schelling
argues thus: All knowledge in as far as it is the product
of the Ego is a plrioi; but in as far as it is unconsciously
produced it is ca posteriori.  There are therefore c priori
concepts, without there being innate concepts.  The concepts are not innate; but our nature and its mechanism
is innate.*  Leibnitz is equally explicit: " Philclegthe.  S'il
y a des verites innees ne faut il pas qu'il y ait des pensees
innees?  TLe'ophile.  Point du tout, car les pensees sont
des actions, et les connaissances ou les verites, en taut
qu'elles sent en nous quand meme on n'y pense point,
sont des habitudes ou des dispositions."
In this statement of the doctrine the absurdity is escaped; but at the same time its significance vanishes.
We have only to open Locke to see that in this form he
frankly accepted it.  "I imagine," he says, "any one will
easily grant that it would be impertinent to suppose ideas
of colors innate in a creature to whom  God hath given
sight and a power to receive them by the eyes from external objects: and no less unreasonable would it be to
attribute several truths to the impressions of nature and
* SCHELLING, System des Trans. Idealismus, pp. 316 - 318. And elsewhere in the E}rster Edtwu9f e~iles Systems der N.aturFphilosophie, p. 15, he
says: "Sobald ich die Einsicht in die innere Nothwendigkeit eines
Erfahrungsatzes erlange, wird er ein Satz ca priori." - Comp. Hegel in
his critique on Locke, Gesch. Der. Phil. III. 421.




20 6        PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
innate characters when we may observe in ourselves faculties fit to attain as easy and certain knowledge of them
as if they were originally imprinted on the mind."  Indeed the very distinction on which stress is laid, between
capacity and knowledge, is thus expressed by Locke:
"The capacity they say is innate; the knowledge acquired.
Put then to what end such contest for certain innate
maxims?"
19. This is the real point: the "capacity to acquire"
must be presupposed in the case of maxims avowedly the
products of Experience, no less than of mnaxims declared
to be anterior to Experience; on the other hand, "the
knowledge acquired" must be the product of Experience
in both cases. Leibnitz says that wAhen a man at fifty
learns the proposition of the square of the hypothenuse " he
acquires an innate idea "; and thus all the truths of Geometry are innate, though millions of men never acquire
theim.  This position, which was reproduced by Whewell
in his controversy on the subject with Mir. Mill and myself,* simply amounts to asserting that the mind is so
constituted as inevitably to form certain conclusions under
certain conditions.  Who ever doubted this? It is wholly
irrelevant.  ATe are so constituted that under certain conditions inevitably we have sensations of color, sound, taste,
etc.; yet no one considers the ideas of color, sound, and
taste to be innate. The mind is so constituted as inevitably to conclude (until better instructed) that the sun
turns round the earth, moving from east to west, but no
one would admit this conclusion to be innate.  It is with
the functions of our intellectual organs as with the functions of our vital organs, - when the organ is mature, is
healthy, and is stimulated, its action is irresistible; and
when similar organs in various organisms are stimulated
under similar c6nditions, the action is in each case similar.
* Compare his Phlilosophy of Discovery, p. 530.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.          207
20. That all men should form the same conceptions, -
mathematical or metaphysical, — under conditions that
are universal, is not surprising; but it is surprising, at
first, to observe the strange yet identical conceptions
formled by lunatics under external circumstances of the
widest dissimilarity; and the surprise only ceases when
we discover the cause of this identity to be the similarity
of cerebral conditions.  In the course of my observations
in English and German asylums I have been forcibly impressed with the fact, abundantly illustrated in the records
of Insanity, that patients belonging to very different classes
of society and to different nations have precisely similar
hallucinations, which they express in terms so closely
alike, that the one might have been a free translation of
the other. The pauper lunatic in England will often
have the same illusion as the insane German merchant;
and the insane soldier in Bohemia will seem to be repeatino the absurdities of the insane farmer in Sussex.  Not
only does the fact of cerebral congestion determine hallucination in the Englishman as in the German, but determines the precise form which that hallucination will take.
Twenty different patients of both sexes and of different
age, country, and status, will be found having similar
morbid sensations; and will all form a similar hypothesis
to explain what they feel. Not only will they agree in
attributing their distressing sensations to the malevolent
action of invisible enemies, but will also agree in describing how these enemies molest them; even when such imaginary explanations take peculiar shapes, - for example,
that the enemy blows poisonous vapors through the keyhole, or chinks in the wall, strikes them  with galvanic
batteries hidden under the table, roars and threatens them
from underground cellars, etc.  To hear in Germany a
narrative which one has already heard in Enoland, gravely
particularizing the same preposterous details, almost as




208           PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
if the thoughts of the one were the echo of the thoughts
of the other, has a startling effect.  I do not refer simply
to the well-known general types of hallucination in which
patients fancy themselves emperors, Christs, great actors,
or great statesmen, or fancy themselves doomed to perdition, made of glass and liable to break in pieces if they
move, -I refer to the singular resemblance noticeable in
the expression of these forms, so that one patient has the
same irrational conceptions as another.*  This identity of
conception rests on identity of cerebral congestion.  Remove the congestion and the hallucination vanishes.
INSTINCT.
21. And here I will digress a little on the subject of
Instinct, which, because it is so frequently cited to prove
the doctrine of Innate Ideas, may best serve to illustrate
the doctrine of evolution. The marvel and mystery
of Instinct naturally render it a favorite topic in the
writings of those who oppose the experiential School.
Instinct is often regarded as so superior to Intelligence in
the certainty of its action, that nothing except Creative
Wisdom  is admitted in  explanation of it; while from
other sides it is regarded as so removed from all community with Intelligence, that it is declared to be the blind
action of a mechanism, not the operation of a rational
Soul.
Psychogenesis seems to me to teach the direct contrary
of all this.  It teaches that Instinct is organized Experience: i. e.  cndiscursive Intelligence; that is to  say,
while the neural and logical processes are the same in
* "On ne veut pas s'apercevoir que les memes sens, les memes op6rations, et les mnmes circonstances doivent produire partout les memioes
effets. On veut absolument avoir recours a queolque chose d'innee ou
de naturel qui preeede l'action des sens, l'exercise des operations de l'ame,
et les circonstances communes."- CONDILLAC, L'Art de Pen$ser, Chap.
V. p. 47.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.          209
both, the operations in what is specially termed Intelligence are facultative, and involve the element of choice in
the selection of means to ends; Intelligence is therefore
discursive; whereas in Instinct the operations are fixed,
uniform, with no hesitation in the selection of means.
That Instinct, although in the individual it precedes
Experience, is a product of what was Experience in the
ancestral organisms from which the individual has inherited his structure, may best be shown by tracing its
genesis from actions that at first were tentative, in other
words intelligent. We have already (Psychological Priinciples, ~ 52) established the needful distinction between
Intelligence and Intellect, and characterized the former
as the discrimination of means to ends, - the guidance
of the Organism towards the satisfaction of its impulses;
and (Ibid., ~ 30 and ~ 74) we have distinguished Instincts
from Impulses solely on the ground of the former being
guided by discernment of relations. So that the three
orders of phenomena may be thus characterized: in cases
where there never was an alternative open to an action,
the action being the necessary activity of the stimulated
organ, - as in Secretion, Respiration, etc., - the action is
impulsive; in cases where there was once an alternative,
and when the action may still be controlled or modified in
consequence, and is always guided by cliscernment of relations, the action is instinctive: however fixed now, it was
not always so, and will vary with variations in the conditions; in cases where there are alternatives which may
determine the action, the means being various and those
that are selected in one case being rejected in another,
the action is intelligent, discursive. Thus the nutritive
Impulse which urges an animal in search of food is to be
distinguished from the Instinct which causes it to select
only one kind of food from out of several kinds accessible,
all of which would be nutritious, or causes it to procure
N




210          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
that one kind only in the ways followed by its ancestors,
though many other ways are really open to it.  The
peculiarity of Instinct is that although guided by discernment of relations which is intelligent, it is restricted in
its pathway and rendered undiscursive by an organized
tendency of structure resulting from ancestral restrictions.
The character of uniformity so often insisted on arises
naturally from the success of the means chosen; the
Impulse having been satisfied by the object selected, no
other object is sought, and the choice once made is made
forever.  But that the object cwas chosen is proved by
the fact that when, under other conditions, it no longer
satisfies the' impulse, it is rejected, and another sought;
moreover, not only is the old object rejected when it
ceases to satisfy the Impulse, but a new object will be
selected in preference if it gratifies the Impulse. Thus
we see insects in our conservatories select their food and
niclus anmongr tropical plants which could not live in the
open air which these insects were born and bred in; thus
indigrenous plants which have formed the nidus and the
food for generation after generation, are neglected in
favor of the new plants which the insects now first discover.  Every one who has watched birds knows that
they always select the best materials for their nests, and
will leave untouched material they and their kind have
been accustomed to select, if softer material is at hand.
The fact of choice is further confirmed by the fact that
Instincts are slbject to illusions as ZReason is.  I shall
hereafter harve occasion to specify many striking examples.
The daily facts of Habit show how easily tendencies
become organizedl, how the actions which at first were
tentative, laborious, slow, become inevitable, easy, rapid;
and the notorious facts of Heredity show how habits once
organized may become transmitted to descendants, so that
the unnatural action of "beggin," when a dog is taught




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.             211
to perform it, may become a natural action in its descendants, requiring no teaching.  Nay, this very process underlies all development.  The voluntary actions become
involuntary, the involuntary become automatic, the intelligent become habitual, and the habitual become instinctive.  It is the same in the higher regions of Intellect:
the slow acquisitions of centuries of research become condensed into axioms which are intuitions.
However undiscursive Instinct may be it has always
the intelligent character of discernment of relations and
consequent control.  For example, the instinct in anl alry
man to strike the offender, or in a dog to bite, is not, as
Bossuet* and other writers suppose, a blind impulse unprescient of means and end; on the contrary, the manll,
however angry, will not strike an offender before whom,
he stands in awe, or for whose weakness he has pity; nor
will the dog bite his master.  It is instructive to observe
a dog whose tail is pinched by one he loves; the pain
excites the impulse to bite, the mouth is rapidly brought
down upon the offendingo fingers, but the biting impulse
is restrained, and the teeth do not close on the fingers;
whereas if it is a stranger's fingers that have caused the
pain, the biting instinct has free play.
21a. The general notion that voluntary movements
arise out of involuntary movements is only acceptable
when by Volition is meant the determination of an impulse by a guiding idea: but if we disengage it from this
place in the intellectual reg'ion, and restore it to its primary position in the Logic of Feeling, -  and otherwise we
must deny Volition to animals and infants, - it seems to
* " Un arc bandG ne tend pas plus a tirer que le corps d'un homme en
colere ta frapper l'ennemi.... La seule impression de l'objet optre en
nous cette action..... Les actions animales s'operent par la seule
force de l'objet mtme plus sfirement qu'elles ne feraient si la reflexion
venait s'y meler." - BOSSUET, De la CoeCnnaissance de) Die-Z, Chap. III.
~ 2, Chap. V. ~ 3.




212          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
me demonstrable that the movements now involuntary
were originally voluntary, precisely as the instinctive actions were originally intelligent, the undiscursive discursive (Psychol. Princilples, ~ 31]).  One illustration may
suffice.  The movements of the eye are generally acknowledged to be involuntary; that they are originally voluntary, and have still their guidance in discriminative sensation, and their pole-star in the external object, will be
evident to apy one who studies their mechanism.*
Now since we know that many Instincts which are
manifested as soon as the organisms have acquired the
requisite development and are appropriately stimulated,
were originally acquired in ancestral experiences, - a
striking example being that of the instinctive terror of
man felt by animals, a terror which was organized in their
immediate ancestors, and was absent from their remote
ancestors, - since we know that Instincts like many Diseases are due to registered modifications of structure,
transmitted by Heredity, and since these registrations are
themselves acquired results, the conclusion that all Instincts are acquired becomes irresistible.  Indeed we have
only to remember that every rmental manifestation is
simply the activity of an organized structure, and is rigorously determined by that structure, to see that if the
present structure is acquired through successive modifications of pre-existent structures, the present manifestation
must have been acquired.  It is forgetfulness of this cardinal principle, of the necessary dependence of the dynamical effect on the statical conditions, which yenders
the interpretation of some familiar facts so uncertain.
Thus when the helplessness of the human infant is contrastecl with the helpfulness of the young animal, so that
what requires a long initiation of experience in the one
is seen to be present from the first in the other, and the
* See HELMHOLTZ, Physiol. Optic., pp. 473, 474, and 772.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.          213
necessity which the infant is under of learning to walk,
learning to see, learning to localize its sensations, is not
observable in the rabbit or the bird, it is concluded that
these actions have a different genesis in each. Hence one
party holds that our perception of Space is innate, because
the bird manifests it on quitting the shell]; another party
holds that our perception of Space is acquired, because the
infant has to learn how to see, and how to estimate positions.  The truth seems to be that the bird quits the shell
in a far more developed condition than the infant on entering the world,- has its organism and its visual organs
more ready to enter upon their normal activities, and
therefore more quickly manifests what the infant will
only manifest when a corresponding development has
taken place.  On the other hand, in observing how the
infant slowly acquires the perception of Space we learn
what has been the process of registration in the development of the bird-structure. The state of the infant organism, before it has been modified by the registration of
changes produced by reactions on external stimuli, represents what was the state of the ancestral organism before
it had been so modified.  Embryology teaches us that the
embryonic phases of the higher animals repeat the phases
of development at which the lower animals are arrested.
It is because the immature brain of the infant represents
a stage when the Experience was immature, that the infant cannot manifest aptitudes which depend on subsequent Experience; and it is because the stafges of subsequent development will take place under similar conditions
to those which have occasioned the development of the
parents, that the functions of the infant will in time come
to resemble the functions of the parents.  Let the infant
be developed under dissimilar conditions, and it will proportionately deviate in structure, consequently in functions, from the parents. A child born blind will bring




214          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
with it the requisite conditions for subsequently acquiring
the perception of tactual Space, but will obviously never
acquire the perception of optical Space. A  child born
deaf and dumb will bring with it the conditions requisite
for the acquisition of visible and tactual symbols, but not
for the acquisition of verbal symbols.  To these organic
conditions let us now  add the external conditions.  A
child born with eyes, but kept in constant darkness, or
with only intermittent and brief excitations of light, or
born with vocal and auditory organs, but in a society
of deaf and dumb companions, rarely hearing the speech
of man, - this child will never acquire the perception of
visible space, nor the use of verbal symbols which characterize ordinary mlen.  What the child brings with it into
the world is an immature organism  which under similar
conditions will develop into an organism similar to that
of other men.
21b. How intimately the functions depend upon the
organism may be illustrated in this striling  example:
The tadpole of the salamander is a vegetable feeder; although it is also an animal feeder, it is not exclusively
nor mainly this; but in its mature phase, when it has
acquired its distinctive structure as a salamander, it is
wholly an animal feeder, and cannot be induced to take
vegetable food, even when starving.  There is one kind of
salamander (scalcancdrac atrc) which is peculiarly interesting from the fact that it is born a salamander, and not a
tadpole, -  passing through its tadpole mnetamorphoses
while still in its mother's womb.  Now no one will dispute
that the selection of food is an Instinct, and that one animal is herbivorous, another carnivorous, just as one animal is aquatic, another amphibious, and a third terrestrial,
in accordance with its Instinct.  Well, this salamander
which is instinctively carnivorous, is in its tadpole stage
instinctively herbivorous and carnivorous.  I found that




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.            215
if it wvere taken from the wonmb while still a tadpole, it
would live in water, and feed on vegetable and animal
substances.  Let it complete its metamorphoses, within
the womb, or without, and no sooner does it acquire the
organization of the salamander than it acquires the carnivorous Instinct.  Again: a pigeon has the Instinct to
preen its feathers, and to sleep with the beak under its
wing.  It does not manifest these tendencies from the
first, but always acquires them  sooner or later; when
once acquired, these actions are performed even after its
cerebral lobes have been removed; but it never acquires
them if the cerebral lobes be removed before the inechanisml has been established.  Here we have Instincts manifestly acquired, just as the child acquirres the Instinct to
scratch itself when it itches; being for a long while unable to localize its sensations, and consequently unable to
scratch itself however it may itch, it does nevertheless
inevitably, in the course of time, acquire the Instinct.
But compare this with the same Instinct congenital in
animals who are able to scratch themselves from the first.
So indubitably is this tendency an organized inherited
tendency that it is manifested even when some congenital
imperfection prevents its perfect realization.  Thus Gudden had a rabbit born with paralysis of the hinder legs,
incapable therefore of scratching, and this rabbit which
had never scratched itself would, \when tickled, turn its
head to and fro towards the motionless hinder legs; thus
in part realizing the inherited tendency which it was incapable of completely carrying into effect.*
These, and multitudes of other examples which might
be cited, prove, what is evident theoretically, that the
manifestations, whether under the form of perceptions or
instincts, are rigorously determined by the state of the
Organism.  Indeed the Organism  is an ensemble of stati-' See Archivfiir Psychictrie, II. 697. 1870.




216          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
cal conditions, and its dynamical tendencies vary with
these. It is thus that we see temporary states successively manifesting tendencies which are classed as Instincts; and the epileptic patient may be observed passing
successively through phases which manifest homicidal,
kleptomaniacal, and pyromaniacal Instincts, which are
temporary if their statical conditions are temporary.  Or,
since this illustration may be disputed, consider the periodicity of the sexual Instinct in animals, which is assuredly due to a periodicity in the statical conditions.  But
although the sexual Instinct is less disputable than those
fleeting manifestations observable in Insanity, I adduce
the evidence of the latter for the sake of illustrating the
position that Experience depends on the registration of
Feeling, and exists only so long as the registrations, i. e.
modifications, exist.  For many of these passing states
of Insanity, however violent their manifestations, are
forgotten like the visions of a dream, when the abnormal conditions give place to normal conditions, and
the over-excited brain resumes its former state. If the
statical modification become permanent, there is registration of the feelings, and the patient is permanently insane; if they are fleeting there is no registration, and the
patient returned to his normal state has no Experience of
all that occurred during his abnormal state.
22. WVe do not usually class any of the  fleeting
manifestations under the general term Instinct, though
obviously some of the Instincts are but temporary manifestations of temporary states, nor do we class any manifestations that are peculiar to individuals as Instincts,
but rather as Idiosyncrasies.  Only those manifestations
that are common to the species, and are responses to external stimuli of common recurrence, are classed among
the Instincts. There are certain statical conditions which
are invariable, - such are those dynamically represented




TIlE LIMITATIONS OF KNO'WLEDGE.           217
in Space, Time, Causation, etc., which may be set apart,
and considered, on this account, as specially entitled to
the character of &6 2priori Mental Forms, not indeed in the
Kantian sense, but in the sense in which Biology understands organized forms.  lWhat concerns us here, however, is not the psychological but the psychogenetical
interpretation, -  not whether man comes into the world
with an organized structure the activities of which necessarily lead to the peirccltions of Extension, Duration,
Causation, etc., and also to the conceptions of Space, Time,
Cause, etc., but whether these perceptions and conceptions have any higher source and deeper validity than
the perceptions and conceptions which arise fromln individual experiences.  Neither observation nor reflection
warrants the supposition that the infant, in  spite of
inheritance, has on entering the world innate ideas of
Space, Time, Causation; what is innate, or connate, is
the structure which wvill react under stimulus in certain
definite ways, and these reactions will depend on the degree of development which the structure has acquired.
The infant whose optical organs are imperfect will never
react on the stimulus of light in the same way as another
infant whose organs are more developed.  At birth  no
child sees.  It usually takes several days before the child
makes any movement of the head towards the light, and
four or five weeks before lie learns to converge the axes
of both eyes."  7But, could the infant see at birth, this
would not indicate that the perception of Space or of external objects was innate; only that the structure was
ready for its function; and how that structure came to
be formed would still remain a question.  And there is
* There are great varieties in this, and indeed, in all other points of
development at birth. Thus Donders, whose authority on such a matter
is supreme, records a case in which he observed an infant distinctly converge the eyes and follow an object only a few minutes after birth.
tArchivfiir 02lpChlm., XVII. 34. 1871.
10




218          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
one argument which is decisive.  Even if we assume,
with the adlvocates of creation, that the structure was not
evolved througll modifications impressed on organic substance by successive adaptations of the Organism  to the
external MAedium, - that the eye, for example, was created, and not evolved by the action of light upon the
sensitive surface, - created with all the powers which it
is known to mlanifest, — still there would remain the
necessity of this eye being brought into the appropriate
relation with the external object; and in the absence of
this, in thle absence of light to call the energy of the eye
into existence, there would be no visual perception, much
less an idea of Space.  Nor would this be denied; certainly not by Kant.  Yet its admission is an admission
of the cardinal principle of the Empirical doctrine, that
all perception, consequently all conception, is the product
of the reactions of the Organism stimulated by the Cosmos; which is saying in other words that all our knowledge has its origin in Experience,- the registration of
such reactions.  And this is further confirmed by the
fact that on the one hand the development of the OrgTanism has its prescribed course, any interference with the
series of successive stages causing another form of structure to result, while on the other hand any interference
with the normal course of experience will correspondingly
affect the result, so that even results which hlave the
fixed character of Instincts may be frustrated by all interruption of the prescribed course of evolution.  nMany examples might be given, but it will suffice to mention the
Instinct of sucking, which is manifested by all mammals
very soon after birth.  Here is a structure ready for reaction in a particular way directly the appropriate stimulus
is felt.  But (the observation had not escaped Harvey) if,
instead of being put to the breast, the child be fed from  a
spoon, in a few days it loses the power of sucking the




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.                 219
breast, and can only feed from  the spoon.  Obviously the
explanation of this is that the Organism, having been induced to react in a way unlike the normal way, becomes
in consequence so modified that it will no longer react in
the normal way even when the normal stimulus is applied.*
23. This digression has been made to fix our notion of
what is really valid in the doctrine of Mental Forms, as
organized tendencies acquired through successive experiences; and to disprove the conclusion that the existence
of such Mental Forms indicates metempirical sources of
knowledge.  When we admit the existence of  t pjiori
tendencies, we do not admit the existence of ca _3)riori
truths, i. e. conceptions of sensible facts irrespective of
Experience, or of supra-sensible facts which  no Experience could furnish.  When we admit that there are in
the organism  statical conditions which must determine
the directions of its manifestations, so that every MAind
must necessarily feel in certain ways and think in certain
ways, we do not admit that the feelings, and the truths
* Since this was in the printer's hands, some ingenious and instructive
experiments have been published by Mr. Spalding (lfacasillacv's illagcazinee, February, 1873; compare also the discussions in _N2ature during the
months of March, April, and May), which strikingly confirm what is said
in the text respecting the variation of Instincts under varying conditions,
and on the effects of any interruption of the normal experiences. Mr.
Spalding also tells me of a firiend of his who reared a gosling in the
kitchen away from all water; when this bird was some months old, and
was taken to a pond, it not only refused to go into the water, but when
thrown in scrambled out again as a hen would have done. Here was an
instinct entirely suppressed. What I have said about the instinctive
selection of food is also confirmed by the following observation ~  Every
chicken, as far as my observations go, has to learn not to eat its own
excrement. They made this mistake invariably; but they did not repeat
it oftener than once or twice. l[Many times they arrested themselves when
in the very act, and went off shaking their heads in disgust, though they
had not actually touched the obnoxious matter."




220          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
which are their results, are engraven on the Mind, and require no excitations from the external world to elicit them;
still less that they can reveal to us a world which never
was presented in Experience.  The Forms of Sense and
the Forms of Thought are evolved, as the branches and
foliage of an oak are evolved from the acorn. No one
now supposes that the oak is ready formed in the acorn,
lying there in miniature.  The oak is quite as much in
the atmosphere and soil; it really is in neither, but will
be evolved from both.  Given the two factors, - an Organism and its Medium,- and the product will necessarily be evolved; and will be according as they are. Thus
the seed of the poplar and the seed of the chestnut are
different structures, and will evolve into different trees.
We learn by individual experiences, registrations of
feeling, rendered possible by ancestral experiences. The
individual structural evolution, in its embryonic phases,
rapidly runs through all the grades of vertebrate developmrent.  The individual mental evolution in its early
phases likewise runs rapidly through all the general experiences of the race; and youth acquires ideas, the products
of such experiences, by going through similar successions
of feeling. What marvel is there that constant conditions acting upon structures which are similar should
produce similar results? It is in this sense that the paradox of Leibnitz is true, and we can be said " to acquire
an innate idea "; only the idea is not acquired independently of Experience, but through the process of Experience similar to that which originally produced it. The
truth that a straight line is the shortest line between two
points, is one which millions of men pass to their graves
without acquiring; yet it is a truth which may justly be
called innate in so far as it lies involved in the sensible
experiences from which Philosophy extricates it, — I
mean, it is necessarily given in the Logic of Feeling, be



THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.            221
fore Psychology recognizes it as an Intuition.*  The rational instinct which makes a man infer a cause wherever
he observes a change, is in one sense connate, in another
acquired,- it is the acquired result of a connate tendency, quite as much as the sexual Instinct, which seeks the
gratification of desires by union with another, is the acquired result of a connate tendency: both are developed
some time after birth, the development of both requiring
a special state of the Organism, and a special excitation
of that state.  The infant has no more the idea of Causality, than it has the feeling of sexuality.  I shall hereafter show that Causality is an inwoven law of Feeling, not
primarily an Induction: it may be said to precede Feeling, and render Experience possible, in so far as it is an
organized tendency of Feeling to connect a consequent
with an antecedent; it may be called an Intuition in so
far as it is the perception of the relation of equivalence;
and it may be called an Induction in so far as this perception is raised into a conception, and extended from
the particular to the general, raised from a fact of Feeling
into an universal Law of Nature.
24. With this view of the genesis of c _priori truths
it is obvious that the ordinary argument which relies on
these for an extra-experiential origin and a deeper validity cannot be accepted. True it may be that conceptions
which demanded centuries of research are no sooner
reached than they are seen to be axiomatic, irresistible;
but the fact that they required this research is sufficiently
instructive respecting their origin; and if their presence in
the primary conditions of Feeling be detected, so that we
discover them to be inwoven with our earliest experiences,
this does not give them a higher validity than Feeling.
It is Kant's fundamental mistake, which will be eluci* If bees had the Logic of Signs they would know the geometry which
they feel in constructing their cells.




222         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
dated farther on, to treat the ca priori conditions of Knowledge as evidence of our possessing ]K[owlcoegec which is
itself ac priori and metempirical, — to assume that because knowledge is rendered possible by organic conditions, and these are not present in the external causes
of excitation, therefore there is a Knowledgle which is
anterior to all excitation, independent of all Experience.
But if we get rid of this view we may reasonably admit
that there must be ca priori conditions which render
Knowledge possible; and we may also conveniently establish a distinction between c priori and c( posteriori
knowledle, - not that either of them can be supposed to
have originated independently of Experience, ancestral
and individual, or to be founded on different processes,
but that the one embraces conceptions which must inevitably and always be formed, because their conditions -
psychical and cosmical - are constant, whereas the others
are contingent, depending on variable conditions.  In illustration take Mathematics and Biology. The former is
an a6 priori science, not that it is in any sense independent of Experience (see Chap. XIII.), but that its data
and results are invariable: the logical conditions and the
external conditions are constants: what is seen to be true
of one circle is seen to be true of every circle; therefore
the knowledge of one includes a\ 2riori the knowledge of
all, and there is no need of experiment or comparison to
determine whether each new case is identical with the
known cases. Not so with Biology,- except when its
abstract propositions are dealt with. The state of our
scientific experience is here a variable factor, and the external conditions are likewise variable.  AVe can imagine
a variety of hypotheses to explain every unexplained phenomenon, and it is only by successive tentatives that
we reach any reliable explanation. More than this, the
most accurate knowledge of any one phenomenon does




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.           223
not enable us a' p)riori to conclude respecting every other
that may resemble it; each fact demands ca p1osteriori
verification of its explanation, since we cannot always be
sure that it resembles in all respects those which it is
seen to resemble in some respects.
Kalt erred, I think, in two ways: first, in accepting the
traditional Dualism which regarded Mind in the light of
a separate entity, having its inherent Forms, or Laws,
which had no community with the Laws of the Cosmos;
secondly, in limiting the number of these Forms, and not
seeing that as evolved products they were necessarily
enlarged by increasing Experience.  With this rectification, we may accept the position that there are d lpriori
Forms of Sensibility necessarily inherent in the organized
structure; and these, which may be classed under Forms
of Feeling and Forms of Thought,  are correctly said to be
connate, in precisely the same way that the vertebrate
form, or the special forms of the several organs, are connate.  Since the manifestations of the organism must be
determined by its modes of reaction, obviously the experience of each individual will be rendered possible by the
connate Forms; and if we constructively CanticicpatC  what
nmust necessarily result w hen this organism is placed under
stimulus, we may say that the resulting experience, or
knowledge, is connate.  In this sense it is true that man
brings with him  into the world the potential knowledge
that a straight line is the shortest line between two points,
and that every effect must have a cause, just as lhe brinCgs
with him the potential knowledge that sugar is sweet and
roses are red; but in no other sense.
The Mental Forms are general and special, i. e. common to an entire group of feelings, and particular to
special groups. The ao-y0r7a cKOLVa', or analytical Forms
of Feeling, are Extensity, Intensity, Pleasure (and its
correlative Pain), Duration, Motion, Difference.  There




224          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
is no sensation which does not involve magnitude, degree,
a pleasurable or painful quality, a motor quality, a duration, and a discrimination separating it from  other sensations.  From  these are abstracted the vorTa Kotva, or
analytical Forms of Thought, such as Quantity, Relation,
Change, Coexistence, Succession, etc., which are raised
from the Logic of Feeling into the Logic of Signs. ~ What
may be called the particular Forms are those of the
Special Senses, such as Color, Odor, Taste, etc.
But these Mental Forms, like the so-called Laws of
Nature, are not to be conceived as antecedent and independent realities ruling mental and cosmical phenomena.
They are only ct prliori in our theoretical constructions.
They are not properly speaking conditions which precede
the phenomena, but modalities under which the phenomena appear, and which Analysis separates, and then
assigns them logical priority.
25. WVe may here bring this discussion to a close in
the hope that it has exhibited the promised reconciliation
between the experiential and C' priori schools, by elucidating what is valid in both, and rectifying what is
erroneous in both.  Although I have argued the question
in my own way, it is proper to add that the point of view
here advanced is historically to be assigned to the labors
of Gall, some modern physiologists, and above all Mlr.
Herbert Spencer. In Gall's system it is a vital point
that our various aptitudes, instincts, and faculties are
connate.  Hie particularly distinguishes it from  the hypothesis of innate ideas and innate principles, on the one
hand, and from  that of mere passive capacities on the
other, -  as if the organism were a block of marble ready
to be shaped according to the fancy of the sculptor.*
"J'entends par dispositions innees, des aptitudes industrielles, des
instincts, des penchants deternlinds, des facult6s, des talens determines.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.                225
But Call's analysis, apart from  many imperfections, is
simply psychological, whereas Mr. Spencer's is psychogenetical.  He not only recognizes the existence of the
modalities, he explains their genesis; and by showing
that the constant experiences of the race become orcganized
tendenzcies which are transmitted as a heritace, he shows
that even such c' pyriori forms as those of Space, Time,
Causality, etc., which must have arisen in Experience,
because of the constancy and universality of the external
relations, are necessarily connate. Just as the optical
structure of the eye has been, so to speak, fashioned by
the external influences incessantly modifying the primitive tissues, and thereby rendering possible and inevitable the functional reaction of that organ, so the cerebral
structure has been fashioned by the necessities of internal
adaptation to external influences, and thus the constant
relations of Space, etc., organized in us.
Such is one of the many profound conceptions with
which this great thinker has enriched Philosophy; and
it ought to have finally closed the debate between the
ca lriori and the experiential schools in so far as both
admit a common  ground  of biological interpretation;
thoulgh of course it leaves the metempirical hypothesis
untouched.  The metempiricist not only maintains that
there is a something in the mind over and above the mere
capacity to know, something not belonging at all to the
Organism, but he concludes that we have evidence of this
Jentends que chaque organe cerebral est empreint d'une tendance determine; que chaque organe jouit d'un apergu interieur, d'une force, d'une
faculte d'une impulsion, d'un penchant, d'un sentiment particuliers. Ici
rien n'est vague et incertain, ni d'une influence exterieure, ni d'une abstraction interieure. Aussitot que les organes relatifs ont acquis leur
parfait developpement et leur entiere activite, les fonctions qui en resultent, sont aussi ddterminees que les dispositions elle memes dont ces
organes sont les d6positants." - GALL, SuGr les fonctions du cerlveaz, I.
63. 1822. Comp. also pp. 66 - 70.
10                                   o




226          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
in a higher source of knowledle than can be gained
through Experience of the individual or the race.  I-Ie
maintains that a mark exists by which this can be recognized; and that mark is the twofold character of Universality and Necessity.  I shall hereafter devote a chapter
to the discussion of this point.  Here I can only notice
its bearing on the question respecting innate ideas.  Obviously since the experiential doctrine admits the universality and necessity of mathematical truths (though M/r.
Mill and some others would restrict even these), this
character will not of itself suffice to prove the c priori
position. The origin of these truths still remains a question.  Both schools agree that the mind is so constituted
as irresistibly to form these conclusions when experience
presents the sensible occasions; both schools agree that
until such sensible occasions are presented no such conclusions can be formed. The dc priori school maintains
that, although Experience may be necessary to call the
latent trutlls into emergent consciousness, it only calls
them out, it does not originate them, for Experience itself
is only rendered possible by their pre-existence.
Let us view this hypothesis in a parallel case.  Chlorine is so constituted that whenever it combines with
hydrogen there is formed hydrochloric acid. From this
a metempirical chemist might deduce that hydrochloric
acid is innate in chlorine, since chlorine has within it
something which shapes the hydrochloric acid into - hydrochloric acid. This something is itself neither cl-lhlorine
nor hydrogen, nor is it a combined result of the two,
but a something which renders the combination possible.
The positive chemist is aghast at such a deduction; yet
if we replace the terms hydrochloric acid and chlorine
and hydrogen by the terms Experience and sensible perception, the argument will be that of the c' priori school.
That school affirms that there is a something independent




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.          227
of the chlorine and the hydrogen, namely Affinity, and it
is this which combines the two gases in hydrochloric
acid. Affinity is neither the gases nor their product, but
a power which renders the product possible.
25a. I do not pretend in this place to discuss the arguments on which the a priori school defends its thesis;
anything I nlight have to say on such a subject would be
necessarily based upon psychological analysis which can
only be attempted at a later stage. What I am here
concerned with is to break down the barriers -which have
so long prevented the two schools from meeting on a
common around.  This is effected when the admission is
gained that all ideas are the products of two factors, the
Subject and the Object, and that no ideas belong exclusively to one of the factors. Whether by Subject we
understand the Mind and its connate aptitudes, or the
Organism and its organized tendencies, matters nothing
in the present question; the admission required is that
there is a predisposition to act in certain necessary ways
whenever sensible stimuli call the mind into activity.
Descartes and Leibnitz, as also Kant and his followers,
expressly declare that no truths, not even c prio'ri truths,
are seen (emerge in consciousness), unless the relations
formulated are presented in Experience. The co-operation
of the Object is therefore demanded.  What they insist
upon is that the mind brings with it at birth a structure
which renders certain conclusions necessary.  This admitted, there arises the further question: why is the proposition that acids redden vegetable blues of inferior
validity to the proposition "two parallel lines cannot
enclose space"? The first is said to be gathered from
Experience, and therefore of inferior validity to the
second, which is shown not to belong to Experience
because of its universal validity. This is an interesting
question, which will hereafter occupy us; meanwhile




228          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIIND.
observe that the answer cannot properly rest on an
assumed predisposition of the mind, since that is common
to both examples, the mind having a native predisposition towards all the results of Experience, when the
terms of those results are presented.  The body has
likewise a native predisposition to move in any direction
which is free from  obstacles; it is the existence of obstacles, together with the direction of the impulse, which
determine what shall be the direction taken by the body.
In like manner the presence of external relations impresses certain directions on the course of thought, and
this course is determined by the disposition and predisposition of the mind.
Since, then, the character by which certain truths are
distinguished from others cannot lie in the structure of
the Mind itself, it must lie in the nature of the relations
presented: in the Necessity and Universality of the relations formulated. And this is the character fixed upon.
Now without here assuming, what will hereafter be
proved, that the celebrated distinction of Necessary and
Contingent Truths conceals a fallacy, we may remark
that even an admission of the distinction by no means
justifies the deduction: and for these reasons, 1i, the
character of Necessity cannot be assigned as a special
mark of native predisposition, innate capacity, but only
as a mark of a particular class of objective relations; 20,
the only intelligible meaning of innate capacity by which
these ideas are said to be formed is one which irresistibly
extends to all faculties and to all ideas.  Truths, whether
universal or particular, necessary or contingent, are still
truths evolved in and through Experience, and are subject to all the conditions of Experience.




THE LIMIITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.       229
CHAPTER  III.
THE SENSIBLE, THE EXTRA-SENSIBLE, AND  THE SUPRASENSIBLE.
26. THE discussion of the origin of Knowledge which
has just occupied us is chiefly important in reference to
the possible range and validity of Knowledge; although
primarily a question of Pyschogeny, and therefore interesting only to special students, it is secondarily the vital
question of Philosophy, since on it rests the whole of
philosophical Method. All that has been written on
Method is imperilled if there can be any valid evidence
for the existence of an avenue through which knowledge
may be reached without recourse to Experience. The
metempirical school explicitly, or implicitly, affirms that
there is such an avenue, and that it is revealed in Consciousness. Now Psychology being the science of Consciousness, and receiving all its material from  Biology
and Sociology, we may reduce this great question to
something like definiteness by asking whether in the data
furnished by IBiology, or in the data furnished by Sociology, there is the evidence of a metempirical factor? In
the biological phenomena there is assuredly no trace of it.
The animal may indeed be said to have Knowledge;
though that is often denied, because of an unwarrantable
restriction of the term. But Mlthough he has knowledge,
i. e. such registrations of Experience as suffice to guide
his actions in the satisfaction of immediate impulses, the
Animal is not supposed to have speculative knowledle,
certainly nothing resembling Science. For him, and for




230         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
the infant and the rudest savage, Knowledge consists of
the synthesis of the feelings produced by external objects.
For him  the Supra-sensible does not exist, even in
Thought. The world for him is simply a felt world; and
his Knowledge never ranges beyond Feeling.
We must seelk then in sociological phenomena, if anywhere, for the mnetemlpirical data. And we shall seek in
vain. Neither in Social Statics, nor in Social Dynamics,
is there a trace of the Supra-sensible; but there is a very
clear indication of the genesis of its conception, and its
position in the world of Thought.  If we interrogate History and Science we learn, indeed, that the conception of
a Supra-sensible very early arose in the visionary schemes
by which men attempted to explain the order of phenomena; but we also learn that this conception, which was
at first only a subtilized expression of Sensible experience, became indeed less and less like sensibles as the
refinements of Abstraction assumed the character of independent entities, then everywhere gradually vanished
before advancing Science, so that the progress of each
science was accompanied by the inevitable elimination
of every metempirical idea. Nothing can be plainer than
the teaching of History on this point. Both animals and
men have to learn the facts of the External Order with
which they come into relation, and to control these facts,
as far as possible, adapting them  to their needs, and
adapting themselves to the facts. But man alone endeavors to explain the facts, that he may the better
control them; he alone constructs Instruments in consequence of his Knowledlge, and greatly enlarges Knowledge by the construction of Instruments. The history of
Science, and indeed of Social Development, is the history
of this perpetual action and reaction of the creation of
Instruments and the enlargement of Knowledge. History records but little of Primitive Man, and nothing of the




TIlE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.             231
state of his theories of the External Order; but it records
distinct evidence that in the remote periods which preceded the earliest known form of civilization there were
rude stone implements,* and some means of producing
fire. The period between the age of flint axes and the
age of steam-engines, vast though it is, will one day be
recognized as a slow  evolution of continuous growth,
through  the successive modifications of Instruments by
Knowledge, and of Knowledge by Instruments.  For, indeed, Knowleldge itself is only an Instrument.  That the
Primitive AMan did endeavor to understand phenomena, at
least so far as to enable him  to modify them, is obvious.
Tile changes he wrought by his instruments became facts
that were known, facts that led him  to foresee consequences; and his powers grew with his knowledge.  But
at each step he only knew what he had seen, and could
foresee.  At no stage could he see the invisible, or modify
the intangible.  He mioht imagine the presence of invisible Agents, and attempt to control them  by invocations
and  incantations; but this imagination  was visionary,
and never served the office of Knowledge, except in so
far as it reproduced Experience; nor were any changes
wrought in the external visible order by invocations of
the invisible Agents.  Slowly  the  conviction  emerged
that man's power over the external order is limited to his
knowledge of its sensible conditions, and of the means by
which such conditions could  be rearranged.  It is this
conviction which has animated Science.
But although in the evolution of history we see the
supernatural explanations giving place to the metaphysi* It is an interesting fact that the stone is the first approach to an
instrument which may be seen in the animal kingdom. Mlontagu observes that the thrush breaks the shells of the univalves on which it feeds
by knocking them against a stone; and many readers must have seen
monkeys breaking with a stone the nuts too hard to be cracked with
their teeth.




2392        PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
cal, and the Metaphysical to the scientific (according to
Comlte's law). we do not at any stage see that Knowledge
was more than a systematization of Feeling, or that Feeling was more than the reaction of the Organism according
to its modes, when stimulated by external forces.  There
is no trace of a Supra-sensible stimulus, either in our perceptions of the external world, or in those of the social
world.  I am far from  implying that a Supra-sensible
does not exist.  I only affirim that it does not exist for us
as an object of positive knowledge, though forced upon us
as a negative conception; since it could only be knowable by first becoming sensible: it must be positively felt,
before it could be positively thought.  To know anything
is to assign properties to it, and properties involve the
co-operation of the subjective factor.  Once within the
range of Feeling an object otherwise Supra-sensible comes
within the range of Experience,
We have thus prepared the way for the application of
Rule I., and this will be more evident when we recognize
that the main defect in the sensational hypothesis, and
the mainstay of its opponents, lies in the seeming discrepancy between the notorious fact that knowledge does
extend far beyond the reach of Perception and the range of
sense; while on the other hand Psycho'geny, seeninr to
contradict this, sustains the axionm that all knowledge has
its origin in Sense, its limnits being the limfits of the Sensible. This discrepancy disappears if we divide the field
of Speculation into the Sensible World, the Extra-sensible World, and the Supra-sensible World: a division
corresponding with our previous distribution of positive,
speculative, and metempirical.
27. The Sensible World, or total of sensible phenomena, comprises the direct reactions of Sensibility in contact
with the External Order.  Phenomena I have already
defined as the affections of Consciousness with exter



THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.         230
nal signs. That we only know things in their effects
on us, and through the reactions of our Sensibility, may
now be taken for granted. Nevertheless it is indisputable that in our conceptions of external things there are
elements which cannot be reduced to mere sensation, elements which never were presented to Sense.
The Sensible comprises but a small portion of that External Order which is believed to exist. There is therefore
an Extra-sensible existence; and it is revealed through
various indications. An examination of the sensitive process discloses that we only receive definite sensations, i. e.
groups capable of becoming elements of Consciousness,
when the impressions exciting the neural process are of a
definite quantity. The neural units which form the elements of such a process are severally non-existent for
Consciousness; they must first be grouped under definite
conditions.  As a matter of fact, we know that the external must incessantly be impressing the organism; nevertheless the reactions of the organism in Feeling only take
place under definite conditions of mass, intensity, and
duration.  The sensory organ needs to be impressed with
a certain energy, and for a certain time; neither too
small an energy nor too great an energy, otherwise there
is not the reaction which is specifically a sensation.
There must be a disturbance of nervous tension.  The
vibrations of the Ether when they disturb the tension of
the retina, and this disturbance is propagated to the optic
centre, produce the sensation of light. But we know
that at one end of the spectrumn there are vibrations not
visible because the pulses are too rapid and -the waves
too short. At the other end of the spectrum there are also
vibrations which are invisible because they are too slow
and their waves too long. Retinal tension is undisturbed
by both these agents.  This example shows that among
the myriads of impressions to which the retina is sub



234            PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
jected only some of them  are responded to as Feeling;
hence the range of Feeling is quantitatively determined.
Artificial aids may, and do, extend that range, but the
quantitative law remains.
28. Ancd what is true of the eye is true of all the other
senses.  When a note is sounded by one chord it will set
vibrating any other chords which are in sympathy with
it, and only those.  It is thus also external voices awaken
sympathetic tones in us.  The eyes of animals may possibly be susceptible to vibrations which awaken no response in man.*  It is probable that the antennc    of insects respond to stimuli which leave us insensible, while
stimuli which affect us leave them. undisturbed.  Their
sensations imay begin at that point in the scale  where
ours end.  Be this as it may, the range of Sense in them,
as in us, is demonstrably too limited to embrace the objective totality, nay, even to embrace that small portion
of it which is in contact with the organism.  And if we
supplement the deficiency of one sense by the efficiency
of another, -  as when the air which is invisible can yet
be weighed, taken to pieces, and used to stuff cushions or
propel machines, -  the  limits  are soon  reached.  YWe
know there are a thousand tremors in the air which beat
upon our ears unheard; and if more sensitive organs are
capable of hearing some of these, there must be tremors
which no organism  can feel.t
X This statement needs qualification. Since it was written the experinments of MI. Bert have shown that the tiny crustaceans common in
ponds and polpularly called water-fleas (Dc2phniatj) are susceptible to the
same luminous vibrations as men and the higher animals, and only to
these. The parts of the spectrum most vividly luminous to us are so
to them, and those parts that are invisible to us are invisible to them.
Arc]hics de Physioloyic, p. 548. 1869. It is nevertheless certain that
even among men some retinas are not susceptible to the same vibrations
as other retinas; and sounds become inaudible to some ears while still
audible to others.
t "INothing can be more surprising," says Herschel, "than to see




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.              235
29. The Relativity of Feeling -  the basis of the Relativity of Knowledge - must also be taken into account.
Thus when a weight, say of three pounds, presses on the
hand, a distinct sensation is produced; but no increase in
that sensation follows an addition to that weight, if the
addition be less than one pound.  Although the pressure
of half a pound, nay, half an ounce, will be distinctly felt
by itself, any quantity less than one pound when added
to three pounds will fail to produce the slightest change
in the sensation.  This important principle, which has
been experimentally verified in the case of each sense,
wrill occupy us hereafter; it is here mentioned in illustration of the Relativity of Feeling.
Hence may be seen the truth of the old proposition,
that it is wve who create our owni world.  Diminish the
avenues of Sensation, or restrict the varieties of stinluli,
and to  that extent our world becomes impoverished;
increase the avenues, or enlarge their range, -  either by
Instrumlents or the Mental Instruments called Hypothesis, Induction, etc., -- and to that extent the world becomes enriched.  We thus formulate a law which lies at
the basis of Rule I., namely:The sphere of KInowledcle is limited, 1~, by Sensible
Impressions, i. e. definite Sensations; 2~, by Inferences, which are the reproductions and recombinations of such Impressions.
The second clause extricates the sensational doctrine
from  its seeming discrepancy with observation.  By it
knowledge is carried beyond the range of Sense into the
two persons, neither of them deaf, the one complaining of the penetrating
shrillness of a sound, while the other maintains there is no sound at all.
Thus while the person mentioned by Wollaston could but just hear the
note four octaves above the middle E of the piano, others have a distinct
perception of sounds full two octaves higher. The chirrup of a sparrow
is about the former limit, the cry of the bat about an octave above it,
and that of some insects probably another octave."




236          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
vast Extra-sensible; and the limitations of Feeling give
place to the inexhaustible varieties of Thought. Let us
therefore pause a moment to consider the nature of Inference.
30. It is perfectly familiar that the feeling originally
due to the objective presence of the stimulus may be
revived in the objective absence of -that stimulus, by the
excitation of the neural process through one or more of
the feelings associated with it. The object is a group
of sensibles; any one of these is capable of reviving the
feeling of the others.  Inference thus lies at the very root
of mental life, for the very combination of present feelings with past feelings, and the consequent inference that
what was formerly felt in conjunction with one group of
feelings will again be felt if the conditions are reinstated,
-that the sweetness and fragrance formerly experienced
in conjunction with the color and form  of the apple are
again to be revived when the organs of Taste and Smell
are brought into relation with this colored object, - this
act of inference is necessary to the perception of the object " apple," and is like in kind to all other judgments.
Inference is "seeing with the mind's eye," - reinstating
what has been, but now is not, present to Sense.
Consciousness is admitted to be the only ground of
certitude. All Sensation is certain, indisputable.* The
test and measure of certitude is therefore in Sensation.
To have a feeling is to be incapable of doubting it.  The
only possible opening for doubt is not respecting the feeling itself, but respecting some inference connected with
it.  When I say "I see an apple there," I express an
indisputable fact of feeling in terms which imply disputa* "Sonnenklar ist nur das Sinnliche, nur wo die Sinnlichkeit, anfingt hbrt aller Zweifel und Streit auf. Das Geheimniss des unmittelbaren Wissens ist die Sinnlichkeit." —FEUERBACH, Gruntdsatzen der
Philos. der Zukunft.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.          237
ble inferences. The fact is that I am affected now in a
way similiar to that in which I was formerly affected
when certain colored shapes excited my retina; and this
affection reinstates the feelings which accompanied it on
those occasions; the whole group of feelings being named
apple, I say, " There is an apple." The inference may be
erroneous; on proceeding to verify it by reducing it to
sensible experiences I find that the colored object is not
an apple, i. e. has not the taste, fragrance, etc., which are
elements in that complex perception; the color and form
which led to the inference are found to belong to a marble or wooden body; or to some other fruit resembling the
apple in some respects, differing in others.
31. With Inference begins error.  Since in a simple
case of direct Perception we are liable to err, it is intelligible how great must be the liability in more complex
mental operations.  If Perception is mental vision, in
which the unapparent sensibles are rendered apparent, —
if it is an act of Judgment involving the assumption of
homogeneity which everywhere underlies Judgment,* -
and if there is even here need of Verification, this is
obviously still more urgent in Ratiocination, i. e. that process of mental vision in which ideas are reinstated in
their sensible series, and the relations of things are substituted for the things themselves.  A chain of reasoning
however involved is nothing but a series of inferences,
i. e. ideal presentations of objects not actually present to
Sense.  Could we realize all the links in this chain, by
reducing conceptions to perceptions, and perceptions to
sensibles, - and this would be effected by placing the
corresponding objects in their actual order as a sensible
series, - our most abstract reasoning would cease to be
anything but a succession of sensations.  In astronomical
phenomena we really see nothing but the directions, sim* Compare Rule X.




23'8         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
ultaneous and successive, according to which the mind
constructs the form of the motion which the eye cannot
embrace. In biological phenomena from a few data we construct a scheme; and this scheme, say that of the evolution
of an embryo, represents to the mind the successive stages
which might as easily be presented to the eye by a series
of embryos at different epochs of development.  The only
test we have of the validity of our scheme is to translate
ideas into sensations. Any point which may be doubtful
is tested by ascertaining its sensible basis.  We have mentally arranged the facts in one order, assuming that to be
the order in which we should see them; and we pronounce
this mental order inexact wrhen we find that what is inferred ldoes not correspond -with what is seen.  Correct
reasoning is simply the ideal asseniblage of reals.  Bad
reasoning results from  overlooking either some of the
reals, or some of their relations.  Thus the timid traveller
sees a highwayman, where his calmer companion sees only
a sign-post in the evening light.  Both infer the existence
of objects, which if they could be presented in all sensible relations would affect them  as a highwayman in the
one case, a sign-post in the other.  Which inference is
correct?  Only reduction to Sensation can decide.  This
reduction effected, the timid traveller finds that he has
allowed emotional suggestions to fill up the gap of unapparent details, and fromn these has constructed his erroneous vision of a highwayman.
THE EXTRA-SENSIBLE WORLD.
32. It is by the aid of Inference that we generalize.
Since we have positive proof that the Sensible World
conmprises only a portion, and an insignificant portion of
Existence, we must ascertain how the vast outlying province of the Invisible can be accessible, and how we reconcile our knowledge of it with the principle of a sensible
origin.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.          239
It has been shown that even our Sensible World,
though resting mainly on Sense, and though all certainty
respecting it is the imzmediateness of Sensation, also rests
on Inference which is qmecdiate Sensation; since there can
be no Perception of an object, - nothing but vague Feeling, - unless with present sensations there are linked
other sensations in ideal reproduction.  In like manner
the Extra-sensible WVorld, though resting mainly on Inference, or ideal presentation of reals absent from Sense,
necessarily implies the  presence of a sensible basis.
What is now ideal reproduction was once real production; what is now mediate was once immediate.  But -
and here lies the point of intersection between perception
of the Sensible and perception of the Extra-sensible -the
reproduction is never a mere repetition, it is always and
necessarily somewhat different from the original production. The neural units in the two cases are never precisely the same: an image is always quantitatively different fromn its sensation. When we are said to perceive an
existence, or conceive a process, lying beyond the range of
actual presentation, one therefore which never could have
been given to Sense, the only test of accuracy open to
us, the only mark by which it can be discriminated from
a mere illusion, fantasy, or illogical conclusion, is the
demonstration of its rigorous correspondence with sensible
experience.
33. That there is a knowledge of the Extra-sensible,
- a mental vision of the sensibly Invisible, - admits of
no dispute; the only hesitation permissible is respecting
its validity. We do not actually experience through Feeling a tithe of what we firmly believe, and can demonstrate to Intuition. This Invisible is like the snow at the
North Pole; no human eye has beheld it, but the mind is
assured of its existence; and is mnoreover convinced that,
if the snow exists there, it has the properties found else



240           PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
where.  Nor is the Invisible confined to objects which
have never been presented to Sense, although they may
be presented on some future occasion; it also comprises
objects beyond even this possible range, beyond all practicable extension of Sense.  It presents objects to the
mind's eye such as no bodily eye could discern: molecules and waves having their precise measurements and
laws, planets and their stages of evolution before man
was.* Only one condition is affixed to the inclusion of
this region within the circle of Science, namely, that the
objects be in such rigorous agreement with sensibles as to
be presentable to Intuition with a certainty almost equivalent to that of Sensation. The limit of mental vision is
the limit of verification. And what is that? It is the
reduction of Inference to Sensation, or to Intuition.  This
reduction may be direct, or indirect, the final guaranty is
the same. We measure the distances and calculate the
masses of the heavenly bodies, not indeed with a foot-rule
and balance, yet the foot-rule and balance are our guaranties.  We infer the existence of sodium  in the atnmosphere of the sun; we cannot see or handle it, but we
know it is there, with a certainty based on grounds similar to those on which we believe in its presence in our
laboratories, namely, by its reactions.
34. Whenever an Inference is in agreement with the
positive data of Sense, whenever the Invisible is only
an extension of the Visible, we pronounce it rationally
certain.  There is indeed an assumption here of perfect
* " Indeed the domain of the senses in Nature is almost infinitely
small in comparison with the vast region accessible to thought which lies
beyond them. From a few observations of a comet when it comes within
the range of his telescope, an astronomer can calculate its path in regions
which no telescope can reach; and in like manner, by means of data
furnished in the narrow world of the senses, we make ourselves at home
in other and wider worlds, which can be traversed by the intellect alone."
- TYNDALL, Rede Lecture on Radiant Heat.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.          241
homogeneity in the two cases.  But this assumption lies
at the root of all induction, all generalization. It is
on this that Mathematics founds its superior exactness.
After calculating a sufficient number of the terms of
a series to have seized its law, we do not require to repeat the calculations for all the succeeding  terms, but
having found that when the law holds for any one term
it holds for the next, we have proved it to be general.
Such dispensing with calculation is only justifiable, however, on the assumption that the law is universal; and
since there is always a possibility that the law will
change after a certain number of terms, we have to
guard against that possibility whenever the result is important.  So long as the Invisible reveals by its functions
that it is strictly in accordance with the Visible, we can
deal with it in confidence, and verification is open to us;
when this boundary is passed, we are helpless. In other
words, since all Knowledge is the extension of Experience, bringing what -was unknown under the rubric of
the known, whenever the Extra-sensible is disengaged
from  conformity with the Sensible, it is no longer an
object of Knowledge, but remains metenmpirical until the
conformity can in any way be established. Just as the
base line, when accurately measured, gives the indirect
yet accurate measure of the otherwise inaccessible side
of the triangle, to know the one involving a knowledge
of the other, so the phenomenon presented to Sense gives
the accurate though indirect measure of its equivalent
beyond Sense.
35. The objects of this Extra-sensible World with
which Science is chiefly occupied are the objects either
of Inference or Abstraction. Since the inference is only
a reproduction of sensations formerly felt, or the extension of such to some new yet similar case, its validity
can never surpass that of the original experience; and
11                            P




242          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND
since the  abstraction is a reproduction, in an abridgment,
of concrete experiences, its value must always be determined by those concretes.  Thus, whether we are dealing
with extra-sensible concretes, such as ether, or vibrations,
or molecules; or with abstractions, such as Mlind, or
Cause, or Force, - the process of Verification is equivalent to that with which we prove the reality of a perceived object.  To prove that my perception of an apple
is no illusion, I have simply to reduce the inferences involved in the perception to their sensibles: the sweetness,
fragrance, solidity, etc., which I do not now feel, but infer,
are then transformed from inferences into sensations.  To
prove that my conceptions of an Ether and its vibrations
are representatives of objective reals, though more laborious as an effort, is similar as a procedure: the inferences on which the conceptions are founded, the inductions
through which the conclusion is reached, must severally be
reduced directly or indirectly to sensations or intuitions;
that is to say, either to sensibles or to inductions already
established on a sensible basis. An inference, once verified,
becomes eqclally valid wcith a sensation. It is henceforward
a logical unit; a standard by which we can compare reals
and relations otherwise inaccessible.  To know that one
thing' is heavier than another, we need only lift the one
after the other at intervals sufficiently brief for memory
to retain the sensible impressions; to know how much the
one is heavier than another cannot thus be determined:
we need a nmeasure; and this involves the inference that
if one thing contains the measure more times than the
other it. will be so much the heavier, - an inference which
is an intuition and has been verified.
36. These brief indications suffice to show both the
vastness and the limitations of the Extra-sensible, the
sweep of possible  Science, and the conditions under
which the imagination may display its energy.  After




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.            243
such an exposition, it will be idle to object to the doctrine of the sensible limitations of knowledge, on the
groundcl that the greater part of the objects known never
were, never could be, presented directly to Sense. In a
future chapter on the Ideal Constructions of Science this
will be more amply carried out; and the reconciliation
between the experiential and the dc p1riori schools will be
effected, in as far as it can be effected by the exhibition
of their common ground.
THE SUPRA-SENSIBLE WORLD.
37. The two divisions of Existence which have just
been considered comprise all that is accessible to Experience, and consequently all that is admissible in Science.
There is, however, a third division claimed by Theology
and Metempirics, the region of the Supra-sensible, or
Metempirical, which is closed indeed against the Method
of Science, but is open to Faith and Intellectual Intuition.
Thinkers who believe in such a world of possible knowledge will reject with scorn the inadequate exposition of
the genesis and limitation of knowledge set forth in
these pages.  They hold the soul to be equipped with
powers radically independent of any excitation through
Sense, anterior even to the very existence of the organism, and exercised on materials that were never given in
feeling.*  By these powers the soul is said to penetrate
far beyond the range of the Sensible and Extra-sensible,
and is brought face to face with ultimate Existence, the
ground of all Reality.  So far from this Invisible World
being interpretable by the laws of the Visible, it needs
a ligher reach of Intuition, and Methods of its own.
Schelling in the preface to his work Von, Ich scornfully
* JACOBI, TFerke, II. 59. " Wie es eine sinnliche Anschauung giebt
eine Anschauung durch den Sinn, so giebt es eine rationale Anschauung
durch die Vernunft."




244         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
admits that systems which only hover'twixt heaven and
earth without the courage to push onwards to the ultimate goal are less liable to error, but he prefers the
system which, taking a bolder flight, will either have the
whole truth or none.
38. Even those who refuse to accept the special organ
which Sclhelling calls the Intellectual Intuition, are forced
to accept its equivalent, when they maintain the possibility of nmetempirical knowledge. YWhether called Reason,
Fundamental Ideas, Innate Ideas, or Forms of Thougllht,
its one characteristic is that it is an organ of the soul
having no community with the organs of Experience; and
its products are therefore not amenable to the canons of
Experience. " Transcendental Philosophy," says Schelling,
meaning the only true Philosophy, " must always be accompanied by the Intellectual Intuition; all the presupposed incomprehensibility of such philosophizing rests on
no incomprehensibility of the ideas themselves, but on
the absence of the requisite organ to grasp theml. Without this Intuition there is no substratum to support this
Philosophizing.  It is what Space is to Geometry." *  He
declares the Transcendental Philosophy to be like Geometry a science constructed from  postulates. But he
overlooks the distinction that Geometry is, and his
Transcendental Philosophy is not, constructed from sensible postulates, and is thereby applicable to sensible
experience.
AMetempirical speculators cheerfully admit the claims
of Science within its own sphere, and admit that there
the inaccessible lines can only be measured by the assumled correspondence with lines that are accessible. But
they affirm that in Theology and Metaphysics such a
procedure is fallacious, because the problems lie wholly
boyond the range of Science, and therefore require other
Trans. Idealismus, p. 51.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.              245
Methods.  This is paralleled by the inventors of perpetual motion who admit that in all machines hitherto constructed the law is absolute which says " what is gained
in force must necessarily be lost in velocity "; but this
does not deter them from attempting to construct a machine which shall escape the law.  They are confident
that their sagacity will detect some unknown resource
which will extricate the machine from the tyranny of
mechanical laws; and as Carnot well says, " Ils se croient
d'autant plus surs de la rencontrer qu'ils s'eloignent davantage de tout ce qui paroit avoir de la relation avec les
machines usitees, parcequ'ils s'imaginent que la theorie
etablie pour celles ci, ne peut s'etendre a des constructions
qui leur semblent n'y avoir aucun rapport." *
39. WVhat can be said to such speculators? Refutation
is impossible. They deny the validity of our tests, the
applicability of our Methods.  To the inventor of a perpetuurn mnobile the mechanician says: "Produce it, and
you will prove our arguments erroneous; but till you
have produced perpetual motion we shall continue to
hold the attempt chimerical."  To the metempirical speculator we may say: "All Experience is against you;
yet if you have any means of proving the existence
of an organ which grasps realities beyond those given
through sensible Experience, we shall admit our error;
but till this is proved, we must hold your efforts to be
misdirected." t
40. There is one thing, however, which is not permitted
* CARNOT, Principes Fondamenztazx de l'tquiibre et du Mouveement,
Preface, xviii. 1803.
+ Schelling places us out of court by declaring that "whoever has not
the Intellectual Intuition knows not what it is, understands not what is
said of it. A negative condition of its possession is the clear and inner
vision into the nothingness of all finite knowledge...... As to the
pretended fluctuations in Philosophy, they are merely the appearances of
change to ignorant ninds." - Vorlesunge, iaber die Mfethode, p. 96.




246           PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
to the metempirical speculator, even on the largest allowance of liberty of speculation, and that is, to control by
his results the results of empirical research, - to interpret
the positive or speculative teachings of scientific inquiry
by doctrines framed on the metempirical Method.  If we
grant the existence of a Supra-sensible possible to be
known, and admit that it is wholly distinct from the Sensible World, we must insist on the two never being confounded; whereas if they are identical they must never
be separated.  Thus is the Supra-sensible wholly excluded
from the field of Research.  Whatever conclusions Speculation may reach respecting Existence lying beyond the
sphere of sensible phenomena, must be 7lept in that outlying region.  If they are brought into the sphere of phenomena, they become amenable to the canons of sensible
Experience.
41. Here the reader sees the application of iule III.
adopted from Newton.*  He is requested to ponder that
Rule and to compare the criticism  of a celebrated metaphysician, Herbart; a criticism all the more remarkable
because Herbart claims to found Metaphysics on a scientific basis.  After quoting passages from  Haiiy and Biot
which are only different expressions of Newton's Plule, he
remarks: "WVe are then to collect and to connect facts as
far as possible, and to keep our eyes open that we be not
taken by surprise when facts present themselves.  Perception must so far precede Thought that both may stand
in assured harmony. WVe have also to ignore all assump* Which has also been casually expressed by Descartes, who, however,
frequently violated it in his own speculations: "Nec puto queinquam
ratione utentem negaturum, quin loinge melius sit, ad exemplum eorum
qui in magnis corporibus accidere sensu percipimus, judicare de iis qune
accidunt in minutis corpusculis, ob solam suain parvitatem  sensum
effugientibus, quam ad heec explicanida, novas res nescio quas, nullam
cum iis quae sentiuntur simnilitudinem habentes excogitare."- Principia,
IV. cci.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.          247
tions and forced interpretations. Well and good. Thus
far there is no dispute.  But I venture to go further and
remark that this method ignores an essential element,
namely, that Thought must not only harmonize with Perception, but also with itself."*
Now  this element, which is said to be ignored in
Newton's Rule, and which would indeed be a fatal omission, is really there in the only meaning of it which has
a justification, but is not there in the meaning which it
may easily be made to bear, and which is the latent
poison of all metempirical speculation, namely, the release of Thought from the control of sensible verification.
All that Herbart says in his exposition of Method will be
accepted by the positive thinker; who will, however, add
that the phrase "harmony of Thought with itself" has
positive value only when interpreted as the harmony of
one induction with another, and the harmony of inference
with sensation. A bank-note is only money when convertible into gold, which in turn is convertible into goods;
so longr as the pecunia really represents the pecus, there
is no need to drive actual cattle into the market; the
transference of the money being equivalent to the transference of the cattle which the money will buy. The
mistake of the speculative thinker is that he is too apt
to interpret the "harmony of Thought with itself" in a
more independent way.  He is satisfied with a logical
harmony; if no logical contradiction presents itself, he
relies on there being a corresponding order in things.
The note for twenty pounds of which he makes entry in
his ledger may have been issued from an insolvent bank,
or may be a forgery, and its worthlessness will never
appear in his ledger, but only when an attempt is made
* "Das Denken soll nicht bloss mit dem Anschauen, sondern auch
mit sich selbst iibereinstimmen." - HERBART, Allgccmeilne Mlfetaphysik,
U/erke, IV. 12.




248          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
to convert it into gold or goods; the induction which
took its logical position in his speculation could only be
proved worthless by objective verification. Thus there
is no logical contradiction in the existence of a spiritworld in all its features entirely unlike the sensible world.
We cannot say that such a world is impossible; we can
only say, that, if it exist, it is to us inaccessible, because
to become accessible it must pass into the sphere of the
Sensible, and in the passage will cease to be Suprasensible.
42. While therefore Herbart's position, in as far as it
concurs with Newton's Rule is entirely acceptable, in
the only direction of departure from that Rule it is the
reintroduction of the metempirical fallacy, that is to say,
the release of Thought from the conditions of sensible
Experience.
I will add, however, that Newton himself on one remarkable occasion carries his Rule so far as to identify
Spirit with Matter with a strict consistency which must
be painful to minds accustomed to venerate Newton, and
to execrate Matter. The passage has already been quoted
(Introd., ~ 49a), and may fitly here be followed by Dr.
Thomas Young's attempt to improve on it, while still
adhering to the Rule. " We see forms of matter," he says,
"differing in subtility and mobility under the names of
solids, liquids, and gases; and above these there are semimaterial existences which produce the phenomena of
electricty and magnetism, and either caloric or an universal ether; higher still perhaps are the cause of gravitation and the immediate agents in attractions of all
kinds, which exhibit some phenomena apparently still
more remote from  all that is cornmpatible with material
bodies; and of these different orders of beings the more
refined and immaterial cappear to pervade freely the gr#osser.
It seems therefore natural to believe that the analogy




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.           249
may be colztinuecl stillfurther until it rises into existence
absolutely imnlaterial and spiritual." *
43. In reading such a passage, and remembering the
greatness of its author as an investigator, one is painfully
impressed by the treacherous nature of the "harmony of
Thought with itself," - unless one attributes the passage
to the influence of tradition.  Did Young ever attempt to
verify the sensible meaning of semi-matercial existences?
Had he done so he must have seen that they could only
be either bodies of greater tenuity than those from which
they are distinguished, - or bodies one half material, the
other half non-material.  In the first case they are sensibles, or extra-sensibles, and subject to all the canons of
sensible Experience; in the other case they are unthinkables, no definite conception of such hybrids being possible.  The popular notion indeed of soul and body united
in one organisml  may seem to render the conception of
semi-material bodies intelligible; but this notion, when
exact, is of two things, body and soul, not of one thing
half and half.  In fact semi-material bodies are contradictions; like loud circles, or red tastes, they cannot be
united in thought. To pass, as Young does, from material solids to gases, and from gases to bodies that are semimaterial, and from these to bodies that are wholly spiritual, is as rational as to pass from one term of a series of
numbers to a number which is an integer lulus blue, and
fromn this blue integer to a pure blue, and thence tto no
color at all. He professes to be guided by Analogy.
But this guidance has its conditions; and Newton would
have reminded his great disciple that in passing from
one form  of Matter to another and subtler form, we
must carry with us all the inductions of sensible Experience, and not gradually drop these to replace them "by
dreams and vain fictions of our own devising." The only
* YOUNG, Lectures on.Yatural Philosophy, I. 610. 1807.
11*




250          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
corrections needed are those suggested in Rules VII.
and IX.
44. The following passage written by one of the founders of the experimental doctrine of the Conservation of
Foce, the Danish physicist, Coldcling, exhibits the same
fallacy: "The first idea I conceived of the relationship
between the forces of nature was the following.  As these
forces are something spiritual and immaterial, entities
whereof we are cognizant only by their mastery over
Nature, these entities riust be, of course, very superior to
anything material in this world; and as it is obvious that
it is through them only that the wisdom we perceive and
admire in Nature expresses itself, these powers must evidently be in relationship to the spiritual and intellectual
power itself that guides Nature in her progress; but if
such is the case it is quite impossible to conceive these
forces as anything naturally mortal or perishable.  Surely, therefore, the forces ought to be regarded as absolutely
imperishable?" *
Althouigh this is not worse than may be found in hundredcs of speculative writings, it is vworth holding up as a
warning against the practice of "harmonizing Thought
with itself," irrespective of any criticism of the ideas harmonized.  There is no fault in the logic.  An accountant
might balance his ledger without rectifying a sinlle entry.
But on presenting the bills and checks for payment
there would be everywhere the answer, " No effects."
Colding begins by an arbitrary distinction, separates one
class of phenomena — forces - from  Nature, and then
assigns to them a mastery over Nature.  Grant this, and
grant that the forces are spiritual intelligences, and the
consequences follow swiftly and surely.  Let us propound
a musical theory, on a similar method: we class violinists apart from  the human nature which is thrilled by
* Philos. JIag., XXVIII. 57. 1864.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.           251
their performances; and as these thrilling tones are
" evidently related" to the music of the spheres, it follows
that violinists are imperishable.  How far such a theory
will illuminate and advance the art of violin playing, we
shall not pause to consider.
45. One more example, and it shall be taken from the
writings of one to whom Physics is deeply indebted, J. R.
Mayer.  The more illustrious the teacher of an error, the
more instructive the example.  "(' In Nature," says Mayer,
" there are two kinds of causes between which Experience
tells us of no intermediate link.  The one kind comprises
those causes which are ponderable and impenetrable, i. e.
MIatter.  The other kind comprises the causes which are
without these properties, i. e. Forces, which are named the
Imponderables.  Forces are therefore indestructible, variable, imponderable objects." *
The objection to such a separation of Force from Matter is twofold: It misrepresents the fact of both being
pure Abstractions; and it transforms a logical into a physical distinction; thus creating two entities, and replunging Speculation into that Scholasticism from  which the
emergence was so laborious.  It reintroduces the old
Dualism in which matter is passive, destitute of qualities
though capable of receiving Motion, capable of housing
qualities, and of becoming the temporary tenement of
wandering Forces.  In this scheme, qualities are merely
superadded, and are consequently capable of being separated.  The dream  of the Alchemists — and of Francis
Bacon also- was to effect this separation.  They believed that the transmutation of metals into gold would
be easy if they could only hit upon a plan of isolating
the Form of gTold; and easy it would be,- the difficulty
lies in the first step.
* J. Pa. MAYEn, Die mIecacik der WTirme, p. 4. 1867. This is a republication of all his essays on Force.




252         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
46. Mayer's conception is one which can lead to nothing, but confusion. The same must be said of all attempts
to give expression to the Supra-sensible. The range of
possible knowledge is too wide for man ever to exhaust
it; and there is no need to render Research more laborious by impatient rebellion against the inevitable limitations of our faculties. Within the sphere of the Sensible,
with its Extra-sensible extensions, there is more than
enough to occupy us. To see how Research can effectively be conducted within that sphere, we must examine
the various principles it invokes, the Method it employs.
That we may do this on a secure foundation, we must
first inquire into the nature of Abstraction.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.         253
CHAPTER IV.
THE REALITY OF ABSTRACTIONS.
47. No reproach is more frequently urged against
metaphysicians than that they confound abstractions
with realities, and treat the figments of the mind as
objective existences. Nor is it to be denied that the
reproach is often deserved, for the error is one to which
our native infirmity predisposes all of us. But the gravamen lies not in the "realizing of abstractions," -since
that is a process which Science pursues with advantage,
— it lies in an imperfect recognition of the nature and
validity of the process, and a consequent confusion of the
products. Alarmed at the excesses of the Schoolmen
and their modern followers, many writers have run into
the opposite extreme, and denied all reality to abstractions; whereas the true position is that which assigns
to abstractions precisely the degree of reality which pertains to the concretes which have furnished them.
48. The usual explanation of Abstraction limits it to
the Logic of Signs.  It is said to be "the power which
the mind has of attending to one aspect of a complex
object, disregarding all the other aspects." Thus, although
we have no possible experience of Motion which is not
that of a moving something, no experience of Color
without Extension, we can and do abstract each from the
other, and regard each by itself. There is no objection
to this explanation, except its limitation. This process
of Abstraction is equally operative in Perception; a fact




2154         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
which introduces two important considerations into the
question. First, it discloses the criterion to be employed
in all Abstraction. Secondly, it discloses that the process
is not due to a power which the mind can employ, by an
effort of will, but a process which it mutst follow.  Perception, while it groups round a present sensation many
absent sensations, never recalls all the details previously
experienced in conjunction, but always detaches some of
these, leaving the rest in twilight vagueness, or complete
obscurity.  In our perception of a horse, for example,
there is not present to consciousness a tithe of the sensations which that object has formerly excited, but only an
abstract of these sufficient for recognition.  And this by
a law of Sensibility: whatever is out of focus is necessarily more or less disregarded, since it can only bet regarded
by being brought into focus.  Abstraction is focussing,
whether by Sense or Intellect.
49. In an interesting work on modern English Psychology* M. Plibot calls attention to a point seldom
clearly apprehended, namely, that Abstraction  has its
degrees as Number its powers; and that some confusion
would be avoided if Philosophy had a precise notation
for the ascending degrees of Abstraction, corresponding
with the increasing powers of Number, thus exhibiting
at a g'lance whether the abstractions were based on abstractions of a lower decgeee, or on concretes.  WThiteness,
for example, is an abstraction of the first degree, and
expresses simply the quality common to all white objects;
Extension again is like-wise of the first degree; so is
soldier, or simply fighting-man.  But Army is an abstraction of a higher degree, based on the abstraction soldier;
expressing, however, far more than soldiers, because in-' RIBOT, La P]sych7lologie Avgaise:.Eco~e ExpiriteZtcntgle. Jamnes Mill,
Stuart Mill, Bainz, Spencer, Lewes, Bailey, Morell, irlfurphy. P. 67.
1871.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.         255
eluding elements of military organization. War again is
an abstraction still more remote front its concretes, and
expressing in an abbreviated form a heterogeneous assemblage of military and political abstractions.  Man, Nation,
and Humanity are three degrees of Abstraction: the two
first being Notations of the concretes given in Experience;
the third being not only further removed from all such
concretes, but also including the ideal conceptions we
form of the capabilities and possibilities of human nature,
if it were once freed from present hindrances. It is obvious that the trcclscncdent element is involved in each
of these abstractions, but in very unequal degrees; the
transcendence in Man being not only carried into Nation
and Humanity, but being there complicated by the transcendence which is involved in the conception of Nation,
which is in turn complicated by that involved in the conception of Humanity.
50. And here we become aware of the paramount
danger which besets speculation in dealing with abstraction. It is that of not eliminating the transcendent
element, but of introducing it into the calculation, and
subsequently personifying the abstraction. Having once
detached an aspect, and considered it apart, the mind is
prone to assign an objective reality to this separated
aspect; and having once transformed a predicate into a
subject, the logical tendency is further carried out, and
predicates are assigned to this predicate. The danger is
slight with abstractions of the first degree. Probably no
one ever personified Whiteness, as Virtue and Nature
have been personified.  Though when we remember that
Boundary had its god Terminus, Marriage its god Hymen,
and Sleep and Dreaming their gods, it is conceivable that
even Whiteness may have passed from a Notation into
a Personification.  Be this as it may, PRule XT. furnishes
a decisive test, by which all abstractions whatever may be




256          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
used with license and safety.  Remembering that in all
cases there is some concrete Feeling with its objective
correspondent, and on the other hand that in no case is
the whole of the concrete reality expressed in the Notation, we conclude that a careful analysis will reveal the
precise degree of reality which pertains to every abstraction; it is only necessary to pass from the symbol to the
things symbolized, to re-immerse the abstraction in the
concretes out of which it emerged, and we may reduce all
that is inferential to pure sensible Experience.
51. Having said so much of the process, let us now
say something of the products. The metaphysician who
realizes abstractions errs, indeed, when he does not follow
Rule. XI.; but the man of science is liable to the same
error; while some men of science, in alarm at the error,
deny all reality whatever to abstractions.  The doctrine
of a Vital Principle once universal, and still lingering
in a few minds, is an example of both mistakes. One
school so far realized the abstraction as to believe that a
Vital Principle, distinct from  and independent of the
concrete forces grouped together in an organism, existed
objectively, and not simply in the mind as a shorthand
expression of the various concretes known to Feeling;
while another school, recognizing the subjective creation
of this abstraction, denied that it had any objective
reality: one transformed a subjective process into an
objective entity; the others forgot that objective concretes were expressed by the subjective Notation.
52. When the question of reality is raised, we should
first define the term. Is it simply the existence of a
group of sensibles indicated by our idea? then the reality
of an army is as indisputable as the reality of a soldier;
the reality of a river is as positive as that of its constituent molecules. The army is a group, the river is a
group; the group has laws not directly deducible from




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.          257
the laws of its constituents, but belonging to it as a
group.  But there is not an army andcc  its soldiers;
there is not a river and its molecules.  There is but one
reality which, under different aspects, abstract and concrete, group and constituents, furnishes different conceptions.
CO-ORDINATION.
53. How ready physiologists have been to commit the
error with which metaphysicians are reproached, is patent
to every well-informed inquirer.  Let us select Co-ordination for our example. Certain sets of muscles actingl
frequently together, as in locomotion, this united action
is called their co-ordination.  The term  expresses compendiously what has been Observed and inferred.  It is
then generalized, extended to all united actions of muscles, or other organs, and the abstract conception of
Co-ordination emerges.  But now the common tendency
towards personification begins to operate, and this abstraction is transformed into a Faculty, almost an Entity.
This operation once effected, we must not marvel if we
find anatomists eagerly seeking for the seat of this Faculty. They soon believe that they have found what they
sought. They observe some part of the motor mechanism
which, when injured, alters or destroys the Co-ordination;
and they rush to the conclusion that this part is the coordinating organ. The Cerebellum is the organ most in
favor; and such is the laxity of opinion on this subject,
that the Cerebellum continues to be credited with this
imaginary function of Co-ordination, in spite of the indisputable and varied evidence, both of experiment and
pathology, that the Cerebellum may be destroyed, or
removed, without the destruction of Co-ordination, and
conversely that the "organ" may be intact while this
"function" is abolished!
G




258          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
Co-ordination is an abstraction; what are its concretes?
Our knowledge of the motor mechanism is our knowledge
of its interdependent parts, the nerves, nerve-centres,
muscles, ligaments, bones, etc.; each of these parts must
co-operate with the others, or the effect will be wanting;
when these have been enumerated and their interdependence assigned, there is nothing over and above this mutual interaction in the shape of a Co-ordinatiom requiring
a special organ: the Co-ordination simply is this interdependent action; the co-ordinating organ is this group of
organs.  In any act of locomotion various stages may be
specified. There is first the neural act, - the stimulus
of a sensory nerve transmitted to its centre; next a
psychical act, the volitional reflex on a motor nerve, an
act that may be conscious or unconscious; then a physiological act, the muscular contraction; finally a mlechanical act, the movement of the limbs against gravity.
Co-ordination is the compendious expression for this
mechanism  in action. We may for brevity's sake describe the nerve-centre as co-ordinating the various nuscles, grouping their several contractions towards one
particular end; but this grouping is only possible because the organic mechanism has already been so constituted that the muscles will respond to a given stimulus
in this particular manner, - this flexor relaxing when
that extensor contracts, and so on. The part played
by the centre is doubtless important, - it is the mainspring of the watch; but neither centre, nor main-spring,
has anything resembling a "faculty of co-ordination";
and the acceptance of such a faculty is a "realization
of abstractions " on a par with any metaphysical chimera.
54. Anatomists endeavoring to detect the seat of Coordination, not in the whole of the co-operant organs, but
in some one organ, may be compared with those who im



THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.             259
agine they have detected the seat of the Mlind in the gray
matter of the Cerebrum; though both would laugh to
scorn the announcement that the seat of Life was in the
mucous membrane of the alimentary canal: a localization
which is quite as rational.  Co-ordination, Mind, and
Life are abstractions; they are realities in the sense of
being drawn from real concretes; but they are not realities existing apart from their concretes, otherwise than in
our Conception; and to seek their objective substratum
we must seek the concrete objects of which they are the
symbols.
55. Language is another abstraction which has been
personified as a Faculty.*  Of late years certain pathological phenomena of great interest, classed under the
general term  Aphasia, have misled many physiologists
into the error of localizing this pretended Faculty in the
third convolution of the left anterior lobe of the Cerebrum. I shall hereafter have occasion to discuss this
anatomical question; at present I allude to it simply as an
example of the loose way in which men of science often
deal with abstractions. Theology has explained the phenomena of Language in a characteristic way, which is
little less scientific.  It assumed Language to be a gift
to man direct from the Creator, - handed over to him,
in short, as a thing. This explanation has been ridiculed
by men who see nothing ridiculous in the supposition of
Language being a " Faculty," or as some say a " Property
of a cerebral convolution." And yet in my judgment the
only superiority which the latter can claim over the theological hypothesis is that of directing attention to the
physiological mechanism, though only to one part of the
* To what lengths this tendency towards personification may be carried
by speculative thinkers is seen in the hypothesis of Becker, reported by
Steinthal in his Abriss der Sprachwissenschaft, p. 47, 1871, where Becker
presents Language as the human Logos incorporating itself in sensuous
reality, just as the idea of Life realizes itself in the organism.




260          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
mechanism, and thus keeping the hypothesis within the
sphere of possible verification.
Language is an abstraction; its concretes are the articulate sounds of the vocal organs, expressive of emotions
and ideas; and the mechanism is necessarily that of ideation and vocal expression: a very complex mechanism,
composed of many parts.  It is absurd to confound this
with a particular Faculty, or a Property of tissue; absurd
to seek for a particular seat, or tissue, as its " organ."
56. Psychology has long been obscured by a cloud of
such personified abstractions, - processes transformed into
Faculties. Memory, for example, has not only been made
a special Faculty with its special organ, it has even been
separated into two Faculties: the one, Reminiscence, a
passive retention of images; the other, Recollection, an
active reproduction of images.  What wonder if the science is in a backward condition, when such is the Method
employed!
5 7. One point more is worthy of remark. Abstractions,
like all other symbols, can only be used safely by those
who are careful in assigning the sensible values, whenever
reasoning quits the symbolical sphere. Abstractions are
words having the values of things only so far as they
express sensible concretes.  They are counters, and sometimes also counterfeits; they are Notations of objective
experiences, and also of arbitrary combinations. As symbols it is of little consequence if they have no other
community with the things symbolized than that of a
conventional sign to represent them. The gold coin,
ducat or sovereign, which represents the exchangeable
value of the thirty or fifty things it will purchase, has
no other community with these things; it is simply an
abstract symbol of their concrete values, and as an abstract is perfectly generacl, that is, represents all equivalent
values. Virtue is, in like manner, the abstraction of the




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.         261
moral qualities in human actions. The coin is not only
a symbol of value, it is a concrete thing having precise
properties. The word Virtue is also a concrete fact, the
conception it expresses is a determinate group of neural
units, having the properties of neural groups. The coin
may be debased by alloy, the word may be perverted by
an inclusion of heterogeneous meanings. The coin has to
be weighed, the word translated into its concrete meanings, when any doubt arises respecting the exchangeable
value of the one, or the objective reality of the other.




262         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
CHAPTER V.
IDEAL CONSTRUCTION IN SCIENCE.
58. "No priestly dogmas," says Hume, "invented on
purpose to tame and subdue the rebellious reason of
mankind, ever shocked common-sense more than the
doctrine of the infinite divisibility of extension with its
consequences, as they are pompously displayed by all
geomnetricians and metaphysicians with a kind of triumph
and exultation. A real quantity infinitely less than any
finite quantity containing quantities infinitely less than
itself, and so on in infinitum,,; this is an edifice so bold
and prodigious that it is too weighty for any pretended
demonstration to support because it shocks the clearest
and most natural principle of human reason. But what'
renders the matter more extraordinary is that these
seemingly absurd opinions are supported by a chain of
reasoning the clearest and most natural; nor is it possible to allow the premises without admitting the consequences."
59. This is an echo of the arguments put forward by
Berkeley in his famous Analyst, wherein he endeavors
to justify the incomprehensible dogmas of Theology by
arraigning the not less incomprehensible dogmas accepted
in Mathematics. Hume does not intend it simply as a
retort, but as an argument to support the sceptical position that Reason is incompetent to solve her own doubts,
and that these doubts, which cannot be answered by
Philosophy, are nevertheless suppressed by Action. The




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.               263
fallacy of this argument will appear when we see that
the absurdities and incomprehensibilities with which
Mathematics are arraigned do not exist.  It is true that
many fictions and conventions are introduced, but they
are never made to take the place of realities; zero is
made a quantity, and a curve a straight line, without any
misgiving; ima-ginary     quantities and  impossible quantities are freely  employed;  but the  question  is not
whether  conventions  are  made  which  deviate  from
common-sense, the  question  is, What are the uses to
which these conventions are applied?  Every one admits
that the language of Mathematicians is often contradictory and ambiguous; we must also admit that their conceptions are sometirnes wanting in the precision which
would enable a logical justification to be given for operations which practice justifies.  We need a Philosophy of
Mathematics to show  that an impossible quantity is a
possible operation on quantity; and that infinity, which
is indeed inconceivable as a magnitude, all magnitudes
having fixed limits, is perfectly intelligible as a variable
limit, dependent on  our will and  pleasure.  Literally
interpreted, nothing can be less conceivable than infinitesimals which are sometimes treated as if they were
real cquantities, at  other times as  zeros, "and  seem
by their equivocal properties to be something between
existence  and  nothing."   Mathematically  interpreted,
* Thus suppose b is greater than a, and the difference is c, then a - b
is an impossible quantity, for you cannot subtract the greater from the
less. But cc - b is nevertheless a possible operation: it is a - (a + c)
which is a - a - c, and the result of the operation is -c.
"It may seem strange," says Whewell, commenting on Fresnel's application of his formula to the case of internal reflection at the surface of
a transparent body, " to those who are not mathematicians, but it is undoubtedly true that in many cases in which the solution of a problem
directs impossible arithmetical or algebraical operations to be performed,
these directions may be so interpreted as to point out a true solution of
the question." - History of the Inductive Sciences, II. 337. 1857.




264           PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
however, they are operations on quantities, which may be
made as small as we please without thereby altering the
quantities of which we seek the relations.* They are
instruments of construction, not elemzents of construction:
hypotheses, not factors.  In interpreting  an  algebraic
operation it is the result, and not the operation, which
fixes attention; as in the construction of a palace it is
the building itself, and not the scaffolding, which has to
be judged.
From  this point of view a logical justification may be
reached for all the seemingly absurd artifices employed
by  mathematicians.  If the theologian were to imitate
the practice of the mathematician, and eliminate from his
rgesults all that was arbitrary and fictitious in his operations, not allowing his incomprehensible data to enter into
the final equations, not allowing what was assumed in the
premises to be more than an assumption in the conclusion,
then indeed Berkeley's arg'ument would be irrefragable.
60. But Hume is more directly concerned with the
incompetence of Peason.  Reason, no less than Perception and Intuition, is liable to error.  The errors of each
may be rectified through similar tests.  When Perception
errs, - when there is what men call an error of Sense, -
how is it rectified?  Lafontaine charmingly says:"Quand l'eau courbe un baston ma raison le redresse,
La raison decide en maitresse,
TMes yeux moyennant cc secours
Ne me trompent jamais en men mentant toujours."
And Kant declares the  vulgar objection  against the
veracity of the senses to be the foolishest that can be
urged, "not because the senses always judge correctly,
but because they never judge at all." t The stick which
* CAlNOT, Itacl/Iysiquc dm Cd CICdl Infilitesimal7z8, Chap. I.
f KANT, Anthro2ologyie, ~ 10. In the way Kant understands Judgment this is true; but I hold that the logical process technically called




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.             265
appears bent when seen in the water does not give a false
impression of the stick in the water; but the inference
that this stick will present this aspect when out of the
water is precipitate and false.  The falsity is shown by, reducing Inference to Sensation, -  by removing the stick
from the water, and then looking  at it.  This once done,
the memory of it enables Rteason on any future occasion to
redress, not the error of Sense but the error of Inference.
Intuition, when it errs, may be corrected in the same
way. It is mental vision, and is as liable to error as
optical vision. Reasoning is also Inference, mental vision,
and is corrected by reducing judgments to their sensible
elements.
61. Hunme did not clearly understand that Science is
essentially an ideal construction very far removed from a
real transcript of facts.  Its most absolute conclusions are
formed from  abstractions expressing modes of existence
which never were, and never could be, real; and are very
often at variance with sensible Experience. It not only
deals with  data that are extra-sensible, but with data
avowedly fictitious. The point, the line, and the circle
are abstractions; they are elements of ideal, not of sensible space. Nevertheless out of these abstractions a
science is constructed which is rigorously exact in itself,
and is found to harmonize with that very Experience
which it appears to contradict. In the presence of such
a fact the question may well arise: How can such abstractions have a positive value, an objective validity, yet
mnetempirical abstractions be rejected? or, to put it in
Berkeley's way, A7Why do you trust the mathematician,
and distrust the theologian? The answer to this quesJudgment is inseparable from sensation. Aristotle may be interpreted in
the same sense:    y' uv y&p aO'tls rcl iiCev l aPi a e XrO s, a'i 7ralv v7rdcpXe,
Trots tots, &cavo&LCOatL 6E'vxeratc Kati Cev6s, KaL ouSev 5v7rCPXEt c 1ir KaC
X6TQs. De A4nima, lib. III. Chap. III. 20.
12




266            PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
tion must be postponed till we have examined more
closely the procedure of Science, and recognized its essentially ideal construction out of real experience.
62. I say ideal construction, and emphasize it, with
the  intention  of meeting the vulgar objection, iterated
from  all sides, against the Experiential Method, whose
followers are said "to believe only in what they can see
and touch"; whereas the truth is that Science Inounts on
the  wings of Imagination into regions of the Invisible
and Impalpable, peopling these regions with Fictions
more remote fromn fact than the fantasies of the Arabian
Nights are fron  the daily occurrences in Oxford Street.
The fictions of the  thinker differ from  the fictions of
the poet in not being wayward caprices; they are constructed in  obedience to rigorous canons, and moulded
by the pressures of Reality; two conditions absent in
the fictions both of Fairyland and of MIetempirics. It is
worthy  of remark that the two regions of indisputable
certainty are the extremes of the mental world, -  Sensation and Abstraction.  There is no doubt possible in
Sensation, whatever doubt may hover round  Inference
from it.  There is no doubt possible in Abstraction, whatever doubt may hover round its concrete reality. The
intermediate region of Inference is the sphere of doubt.*
63. Now inferences are hypotheses; and these become
* " Les notions les plus abstraites, celles que le commun des hommes
regarde commne les plus inaccessibles, sont souvent celles qui portent avec
elles la plus grande lumiere: l'obscurite semble s'emparer de nos idees a
mesure que nous examinons dans un objet plus de proprietts sensibles;
l'ilnpenetrabilite, ajoutee a l'idee de l'6tendue semble nous offrir un mystere de plus; la nature du mouvement est une enigme pour les philosophes; en un mot plus ils approfondissent l'idee qu'ils se forment de
la matiere plus cette idee s'obscurcit et paroit vouloir leur kchapper;
plus ils se persuadent que l'existence des objets exterieurs appuy6e sur le
temoignage equivoque de nos sens est ce que nous connaissons le moins
imparfaitement en eux."-  D'ALEIMBERT, Traict  de Dynarmique, p. ii.
1796.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.              267
less and less doubtful in the exact proportion of their
reduction to Intuition or Sensation.  We shall presently
see the part played by Hypothesis; here let us be content
with the significant fact that Science is so truly ideal,
without pretence  of reflecting  real existence, that it
avowedly relies on data known not to  be true, except
within its own sphere of Abstraction.*
Note, however this essential point: the abstraction
must not have been arbitrarily formed if it is to be subsequently applied to reality: it must have been formed
from concretes (by the substitution  of ideal limits for sensibles); and this condition having been fulfilled, the sensible concretes which are its elements not having been
capriciously introduced, we may be certain that the abstraction is as true in its sphere, as the sensibles were in
theirs. A ratio once abstracted from numbers is as true
as the numbers from  which it was abstracted.  In this
way an abstraction becomes a truth of Nature, though
departing from the phenomena of Nature by its disregard
of details.
64. The first law of Motion is an absolute truth.  But
the supposition that any real body will pursue an uniform
movement in a straight line, is flagrantly at variance with
all observation, and with what is even physically possible.
No such phenomenon wvas ever seen.  No such phenomenon could present itself in an universe like ours, where
Motion is always accelerated or retarded, and always more
or less divergent from  a straight line.  The ideal law is
absolute within ideal space: it is the identical proposition
that no change in velocity or direction can occur unless
the factors of such a chance are operant.  But within real
* " I importe pen aux geomietres qu'il existe physiquement une sphere
parfaite, un plan parfait; ces figures ne sont que les limites intellectuelles
des grandeurs materielles qu'ils considerent." - MONTUCLA, Hist. des
Xathnmatiques, I. 27.




268             PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
space the requisite conditions are unrealizable: the presence of other bodies in movement must always obstruct
the realization of the conditions: the factors of a change
are always present.
65. There is a real law  of Motion, one to which all
movements  conform  without variation; it may  be expressed in the  formula, MVAotion always pwLrsues the line
of lccst resistance.  This formula has the utmost generality. It does not formulate the process as if Miiotion
were necessarily  rectilinear; that is quite an  arbitrary
assumption, and is open to Comnte's criticism;* but it
says  that whatever the  direction  impressed, that, and
that only, will be preserved, until another impress
modify it.t
66. The ideal law  sets aside all resistances.  From  the
Pisgah of whact is, the  mind sees what will be, or what
wolcd be, if all conflicting  movements were allowed to
neutralize each other.  Laws are indeed nothing but general formulhe expressing general facts from  which all disturbing particulars are eliminated.  They do not describe
the path which bodies actually pursue, but the path
the bodies tend to  take, and would take were  the obstacles removed.  Thus, to cite the law  of the tides,* "A l'origine du mouvement il est clair que la trajectoire du corps
n'a point encore de caractere geometrique determine, et que c'est seulement apres que le corps a parcouru un certain espace qu'on peut constater
quelle ligne il decrit.  I1 est evident par la geometrie que le mouvemnent
initial au lieu d'etre regarde comme rectiligne pourrait etre indiffiremment suppose circulaire, parabolique, ou suivant toute autre ligne tangente i la trajectoire effective, en sorte que la mnime argumentation repetee
pour chacune de ces lignes conduirait i une conclusion absolument indeterminee." -COITTE, Philosopzhie Positive, T. 558.
+ Compare the celebrated "principle of least action" formulated by
Maupertius: "La trajectoire d'un corps soumis a l'action de forces quelconques devait necessairement etre telle que l'integrale du produit de la
vitesse du mobile par l'dlement de la courbe ddcrete fit toujours un ~minimumn, relativement i sa valeur dans toute antre courbe."




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.           269
there never is, in fact, sufficient time for the sea to assume
the form  towards which it tends, and which it would
assume were the period longer; the mathematician disretards this fact, and substitutes his ideal law in its place.
If, on this principle, a woman were to argue that her
hunchback lover had a form  of graceful symmetry, because his back would be straight were there no curvature
of the spine, we should point out that she confounded the
concrete with the abstract, the real with the ideal. In
like manner were any one to declare the law of the tides
to be false, because the observed facts did not conform to
it, we should point out that laws being ideal constructions
are not transcripts of real particulars.
67. Again: the path of a planet is said to be an
ellipse. Every one knows that the real orbit is nothing
of the kind.  The ellipse is not to be found in the heavens, but in the calculations of astronomers. The path
would be elliptical if there wvere only one planet moving
round the sun; but as, in fact, there are many planets,
all acting on each other by forces varying with their varying positions, the planets ccannzot move in exact ellipses.
the radius vector of each does not pass over equal areas
in equal times. The orbit is not only not an ellipse, it
is not any regularly formed curve; nor is the same curve
described in successive revolutions.
Are then Kepler's laws illusions? By no  means:
they are abstractions; they are Types erected by scientific Imagination, which moulds the elements of concrete
observation into abstractions by getting rid of all perturbing particulars. The planet is supposed to move in
an ellipse, by assuming the elements of the ellipse to
have been perpetually altering. The supposition is a
fiction, and is justified by its results.  The reader sees at
once that by similar fictions Ptolemy and his successors
represented the movements of the planets, adding epi



270            PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
cycle on cycle to make theory approximate to observation.*
Sir John  Herschel reminds us that Kepler's laws are
to be regarded as only first approximations to the. much
more complicated ones which actually prevail, and that
"to bring the remote observations into rigorous and
mathematical accordance  with  each  other, and  at the
same time retain the extremely convenient nomenclature
and relations of the elliptic system, it becomes necessary
to modify to a certain extent our verbal expression of the
laws, and to regard the numerical data or elliptic elements
of the orbits as not absolutely permanent, but subject
to a series of slow and almost imperceptible changes.
These changes may be neglected when we consider only
a few revolutions; but going on from  century to century
and continually accumulating, they at length produce
material departures in the orbits from their original
state." t
68. Another fiction is that by which solids are distinguished  from  fluids; it assigns to  the molecules of
fluids  an  independence as respects  cohesion, enabling
them  to move freely among each other.  This is needful for calculation, though obviously untrue in reality,
many of the observed phenomena of fluids being due
* "Pour representer le mouvement de la planete les astronomes imaginent un astre fictif qui se meut circulairement autour du soleil dans le
plan de lorbite; qui part du perihelie au meme instant quela planete, et
dont la distance angulaire a ce point est toujours egale au premier terme
st de la valeur v. Le rayon vecteur de cet astre se meut uniformement
et fait ai chaque instant avec celui de la planete un angle egal ai 2 e. sin.
sct. Cet angle variable s'appelle l'equcation de centre.  Lorsque langle v
est egal ai deux ou i quatre angles droits, les deux angles vi et nt sont
dgaux; par consdquent l'astre fictif passe a l'aphdlie et revient au perihelie
en meime temps que la planete; mais dans la premiere moitid de la revolution la planete prdcede lastre, et dans la seconde lastre pr6cede la
planete." - PoissoN, Traitg de Mllecanique, I. 369. 1811.
+ HERSCHEL, Astronoimy, Art. 489.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.            271
to the cohesion of their molecules, a cohesion less energetic but similar in kind to that in solids; and this
fact occasions many discrepancies between theory and
practice, notably in the flow  of liquids from  an orifice. Indeed it is perfectly well understood that all
the applications of theory to practice are only approximations. " Take for instance the very simple case of
a crow-bar employed to move a heavy mass.  The accurate mathematical investigation of the action would
involve the sinultaneous treatment of the motions of
every part of bar, fulcrum, and mass raised; and from
our almost complete ignorance of the nature of matter and molecular forces, it is clear that such a treatment of the problem is impossible. It is a result of
observation that the particles of the bar, fulcrum, and
mass separately retain throughout the process nearly
the same relative positions.  Hence the idea of solving, instead of the above impossible problem, another
in reality quite different, but while infinitely simpler
obviously leading to nearly the same results as the former. The new form is given at once by the experimental result of the trial.  Imagine the masses involved
to be _perfectly rigid (i. e. incapable of changing their form
or dimensions) and the infinite series of forces reclly actinqg may be left o0?t of consideration; so that the mathematical investigation deals with a finite (and generally
small) number of forces instead of a practically infinite
number." *
69. WVere the whole circle of the sciences to pass before us, each would in turn display the essentially ideal
nature of its construction, and wide departure from reality, either in its abstractions or in its hypotheses.  The
abstractions necessarily disregard particulars. The laws,
usually accepted as absolutely exact (and justly so in the
* THOMSON and TAIT, Nactural Philosophy, I. 337. 1867.




272          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
region of Abstraction), are "only general truths always
more or less falsified in every particular case." *
The hypotheses are fictions, provisional guesses. So
far from Facts, Perceptions, constituting the material. of
Science, as is often said or implied, they are simply the
elements out of which its material is constructed. Perception gives the naked fact of Sense, isolated, unconnected, merely juxtaposed with other facts, and without
far-reaching  significance.  To the brute simplicity of
Sensation must be added the artifice of Construction.
Science looks throutgh the brute fact, to contemplate
the Abstraction which gives it connection, significance.
Hence the paradox that we understand the fall of bodies
only through the movements of the planets; the growth
of a plant only through biological laws. It is through
the manifold ideal constructions of the Possible that we
learn to appreciate the Actual.  Facts are mere letters
which have their meaning only in the words they form;
and these words again have their meaning, not in themselves alone, but in their positions in the sentence.
The point here insisted on has always been familiar to
philosophers in each particular case, but I am not aware
of any philosopher having boldly generalized the observation, and proclaimed the introduction of Fiction to be a
necessary procedure of Research. The dread lest the admission of Fiction should throw doubt over the certainty
of the conclusions reached by its aid, may probably have
prevented the generalization; especially when no sharp
distinction had been drawn between the fictions of Science and the fictions of Poetry.  But perhaps the most
deterrent influence has been due to the erroneous conception, almost universal, of the phenomena of Nature being
* "Seulement des verites gednrales toujours plus ou moins faussees
dans chaque cas particulier."' JAMIN, Cours de Physique de l'aEcole
Polytechnique, I. 28.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.            273
determined by Law.  This must be replaced by the more
accurate conception of the Law being deternmined by the
phenomena.  What we call Laws of Nature are not objective existences, but subjective abstractions,  formulae in
which the multifarious phenomena are stripped of their
variety and reduced to unity.
70. Before proceeding to give precision to this perhaps
paradoxical view of Law, we may pursue the illustration
of the scientific employment of Fiction, especially in the
creation of Abstract Types.  It has already been shown
that the first law of Mlotion is no expression of the actual
movements, but simply the ideal standard by which all
movements may be measured.
The mathematician knows that when a point moves
along a curve there is inaccuracy in saying that it moves
in any one direction through any arc however small.
But a straight line may be found at every point which
more nearly than any other straight line represents the
direction of the motion.  In the same way no motion can
be uniform, no velocity can be uniform, but we can at
every instant assign an uniform  velocity which shall
more nearly than any other represent the rate at which
the body is moving.  This is obviously an ideal construction, not a real transcription.  Assuming that if there
were no force traversing the direction of a body, then the
body would proceed in a straight line, we are enabled to
estimate the forces in any cdeviation from  that straight
line. Rectilinear MIotion, thoughll never possible, is thus
the ideal Type to which all actual motions are ideally
made to conform.  We must regard it purely in abstraction,-the ideal limit replacing the real limit, -otherwise the law is false.*
* "La direction d'une force est celle de la ligne suivant laquelle le
point se mouvrait en vertu de son action, s'il etait entierement libre." —
DUHAMIEL, llwIcacniqe, I. 28. But as the point never is entirely free,
12*                             R




274          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
71. Schellingr well says * that " the necessary tendency
of all Science is to pass from:Nature to Intelligence.
The highest perfection of research would be the thorough
spiritualization of natural laws, reducing them to laws of
Intuition and Thought.  The material phenomena must
give place to their laws. Optical phenomena are nothing
but a geometry whose lines are drawn by light; and this
light itself is of dubious materiality."
It may not at first be apparent why, since we have always to'deal with concretes, we must always transform
them into abstractions; why, having to understand the
phenomena presented to Sense, we effect this through
Laws that are intelligible but not sensible.  An examination, however, of the conditions of Knowledlge discloses
that Science differs from Sensation in being indirect and
constructive, — that Abstraction is a primary condition
of Perception, - that Inference, or hypothesis, is largely
mingled in what seems simple sensible experience.  Thus
it appears that among the preliminaries of exact knowledge there are two which have the paradoxical aspect of
looking away from  the data directly presented, and of
guessing the presence of other data, - looking away from
the particular object, to find some general object which
includes this particular one without including its individual characters, seeking Man in Socrates and the Rodent in this rabbit.  Instead, therefore, of vaguely warning Philosophy against the dangers of Abstraction and
Hypothesis, - real as these dangers are,- we  should
openly avow them  to be indispensable aids, and, by a
clear recognition of the aid they furnish, learn wherein
their dangers lurk.
the straight line is imaginary. Nevertheless, the admirable artifice which
resolves all forces into two, and gives their resultant as the diagonal of
the parallelogram formed by these components, presents the Calculus
with a straight line never presented in Nature.
* SCHELLING, Transcend. Idealismus, p. 3.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.          275
72. Let us glance at one or two transcendental conceptions, and note the value of a purely imaginary Type.  And
first of the conception by which the great poet Goethe
illuminated the whole of Vegetal Morphology, one of those
germinal conceptions which change the state of a science
Amid all the diversities of sensible experience he saw the
typical form of the Leaf present in every organ of the
Plant, and conceived the Plant itself to be only a variously transformed Leaf, a Type which, developed in spirals
in the stem, was also developed or aborted in calyx, stamen, and pistil, but always under every variety presenting constant relations, aRnd preserving one typical order.
Schiller's objection, which irritated him so much, that the
Leaf was an idea, though true enough in fact, was irrelevant as an objection.  The Leaf was an idea, but an idea
which had sensibles for its concrete elements.  A similar
conception was applied by Goethe to the skeleton of vertebrates; and, in the hands of his successors, the Vertebral Type has been a potent instrument of morphological
research.  Of the same order is the conception of the Animal Series, first suggested by Aristotle, but brought into
effective clearness by Lamarck, Geoffroy St. Hilaire, and
still more luminously by Mr. Darwin.
73. It is, however, a profound mistake in regard to
Nature, and no less in regard to lIethod, when such
Types are wrested from their position among Ideals, and
offered as Reals.  There is not in Nature, there never
was, a typical Leaf, a primitive Vertebra, or an existent
Series, from which all plants, vertebrae, and animals have
successively varied. There never was a Plan laid down,
according to which the organic world was constructed,
after the manner of a plan prearranged by an architect for
the builder's guidance.  On the contrary, this Plan and
these Types are our after-thoughts, abstractions formed
out of the sensible data presented by various plants, ver



276            PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
tebre, and animals; they are  ideal construotions from
reals, obtained by the mind's grouping together the dominant resemblances, and setting  aside  all the nlany diversities.  The theologian and metaphysician, by a procedture familiar to them, seize hold of these Types and
present them  as indices of a Plan in Creation.  But this is
the VrJepop Wrpo0rEpov fallacy of supposing a resldltcant to
have been the dtciermtiuatt.  All that Experience warrants is the assertion that the original protoplasm, which
was wholly destitute of plant-formn, leaf or other, and the
germinal membrane equally destitute of vertebral form,
did, in the successive stagCes of evolution, pass through
many forms, each new  form  being  determined by that
whlich preceded it, and by the external pressures of the
mnedium  in which it was evolved; consequently, in so far
as these external influences had a general resemblance,
the resultant forms were necessarily similar.  The Type
is an abstract expression of this general similarity.
Such  is the positive  doctrine of Morphology.  The
speculative doctrine which finds favor with  theologians
and  metaphysicians  teaches that the Type pre-existed
in the Divine Mind, or at any rate in Nature; or teaches
that somewhere there was a vertebra formed, and from
this vertebra  all the other bones were constructed  by
modification of its special parts, and so the skull was a
modification of the spinal column, etc.*
~ In the following passage Prof. Mlax Muiller combats an analogous
error: " There never was a common uniform Teutonic language; nor is
there any evidence to show that there existed at any time a uniform
High-German or Low-German languane, from which all High-German
and Low-German dialects respectively are derived. All we can say is,
that these dialects passed at different times through the. same stages of
gramnmatical growth. We may addcl  that with every century thalt w-e go
back the convergence of these dialects becomes more and more decided;
Tlbt there is no evidence to justify us in admitting the historical reality
of one primitive and uniform Low-German language, fi:om which they
w-ere all derived. This is a mere creation of grammarians, who cannot




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.          277
74. The scientific value of Types is that of being ideal
guides, not real facts.  They are standards by which
deviations may be appreciated.  It is because so few
writers, even of those who adopt the Evolution Hypothesis, remember' that it is only an hypothesis, and being all
Ideal cannot be accepted as a Real, that opponents deland - and advocates endeavor to supply - evidence of
its ecality.  The Animal Series is an ideal construction.
Writers who forget this, not content with the inductive
data for a speculative insiglht, demand -and evolutionists
endeavor to supply — evidence which, could it be furnished, would at once transform the hypothesis into a
demonstration, the problem into a theorem.  Thus one of
the commnonest objections urged is, that were the hypothesis true we ought to find a gradual and continuous line
of organic development, front one group to another, and
one species to another; whereas, in point of fact, what we
do find is group sharply demarcated fromn group, species
separated by an unbridgeable gulf from species; and these
gaps the imag'ination is baffled in attempting to fill up,
so as to render the transition from one form to the other
apparent to Sense. The objection is wholly irrelevant;
and although one cannot but be grateful for the interesting researches of those zoblogists and paleontologists who
endeavor to supply the evidence of "missing links," —
ograteful because all extensions of our knowledge of or( anic forms is valuable, - one cannot applaud them for
thius attempting to answer the objection, or for evading
it by refuge in our geological ignorance. The objection is
based on a twofold misconception.  Continuity of form
- in the sense demanded - is incom7patible with that
variety of form which Evolution postulates and Observation discloses. Such continuity would make the whole
understand a multiplicity of dialects without a common type." -Lectures
on the Science of Laengage, I. 205. 1871.




278          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
organic world one form. The Type would cease to be an
abstraction, and degenerate into a concrete sensible.  Between any two forms, however similar, short of identity,
there must, cx vi telrini, be a solution of continuity; if
the incident forces which determine the form be unequal,
the resultant must necessarily be a variation. Thus, suppose we have two samples of protoplasm identical in all
respects, but subject to forces which vary in some respects,
the resultant forlms must be separated by a gap which is
indefinite.  It is an elementary deduction from mechanical principles, that when a body susceptible of various
positions of stable equilibrium is m-oved in various directions on a plane, the changes from one position to another
jnust be abrupt, without any stable intermediates.  If two
forms differ, and they must if they are two, then their
difference is a solution of continuity, though it may be
accompanied by resemblances. There can be no stable
transition between an exogen and an endogen, between an
animal with a shell and an animal without a shell, more
than between a crystal and its solution, or between sugar
and oil, both hydrocarbons.  We may regard all sensations as modifications of Sensibility, but there is no
transition between one sensation and another; and just
as Sensibility is the abstract expression for all concrete
sensations, and comes into existence with them, so Animal is the abstract expression for all concrete animals.
75. The distinction between Types and IReals was
entirely overlooked in the famous controversy between
Cuvier and Geoffroy St. Hilaire, and is equally so in tlhe
controversy now raging between the opponents and adhlerents of Darwinism.  It will one day be likened to the
controversy raised by the first promulgation of the Differential Calculus, the logical basis of Awhich even Leibnitz
himself very imperfectly conceived, and which even in our
own day is generally acknowledged to be incomprehensi



THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.            279
ble, because, as I hinted before, quantities are not. discriminated from operations on quantity.  Leibnitz when
pressed by objections declared that he regarded infinitesimals as incoctmparables * which might be disregarded
in reference to finite quantities as grains of sand in
reference to the sea; a defence which Comite remarks
completely vitiates the analysis reducing it to a mere calculus of approximation, " Qui sous ce rapport serait radicalement vicieux puisqu'il serait impossible de prevoir a
quel point les operations successives peuvent grossir ces
erreurs premieres, dont l'accroissement pourrait meme
evidemment dlevenir ainsi quelconque."-t
WVithout pausing here to exhibit the logical justification,
let us ask, how did mathematicians practically justify the
new Calculus?  By showing that it enabled them to solve
problems hitherto insoluble.  In like mnanner the adherents of the Evolution Hypothesis may answer the objections urged against it by showing -  and they do show -
the vast reach of' organic phenomena, hitherto inexplicable, which are rendered intelligible by its aid.  This will
not prove the hypothesis to be true; but it proves it to
be effective, which is all an hypothesis can pretend to be.
Infinitesimals may not exist in Nature; the Animal Series may have no real correspondent; but the calculus and
the evolution hypothesis are ideal constructions of vast
power in scientific research.
MORAL TYPES.
76. As a final example let us not omit to mention the
creation of Moral Tapes, the standards for our conduct in
life. It is often made an objection against moral and religious conceptions of Duty that they demand for their
realization a perfection which is not human. Certainly
* LEIBXITZ, Opera, Ed. Dutens, II. 370.
f COMTE, Phzilos. Positive, I. 242.




280         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
no man ever did, or could, realize in conduct the exalted
ideal of life which he may have formed, or accepted from
others. " 0, would that for one single day we had lived
in this world as we ought!" is the passionate exclamation
of A'Kempis (or whoever wrote the Imitation).  It has
been most keenly felt by those whose lives have been
most free from reproach. The objection to ideals, on the
ground of their surpassing human nature, is a misconception of their function. They are not the laws by which
we live, or can live, but the types by which we measure
all deviations from a perfect life. The mind which has
once placed before it an ideal of life has a pole-star by
which to steer, although his actual course will be determined by the winds and waves. The pole-star is not the
helm, nor is the helm more than one of the active agents.
Our passions and our ignorance constantly make us swerve
from the path to which the pole-star points; and thus the
ideal of a Christian life, or the ideal of Marriage, are
never wholly to be realized, yet who denies that such
ideals are -very potent influences in every soul that has
clearly conceived them? It is a truth, and not an idle
phrase, that man does not live by bread alone; that it is
his privilege to live by aspiration, hope, and love, to be
moved by ideal impulses which cause him to check the
impulses of a lower self, to forego the transient pleasure
of Sense, and passionately strive after the nobler pleasures
of heart and intellect. We all place before ourselves the
ideal of a noble life, the type of a grander character than
our infirmities enable us to realize; and we do not look
on that ideal as a fiction, on that type of character as a
falsehood, because we fail to realize it. Like the typical
laws of physical processes, these conceptions are solid
truths although they exist only as ideals; and he who
imagines their validity impugned because human nature
can but imperfectly realize them, is as ignorant of Life as




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.        281
he would be who should deny the validity of natural
Laws, because of the perturbations observable in natural
events.
The contrast between a real law and an ideal law, such
as we find in the second law of Motion (formulated by
Galileo in the parallelogram of forces) and the first law,
which is only the formula of what would be the motion
were all disturbing conditions absent, is equally exhibited
in the moral law that " the habit of right action is the securest preparation for acting rightly under emergencies,"
- and the ideal law that " we should love our neighbors
as ourselves." No moving body does move uniformly in
a straight line; no man does love his neighbor as himself.
All bodies do move in the diagonal of the parallelogram
of two incident forces; and all men are trained to act
rightly on emergencies by what is a kind'of moral instinct,
organized in previous habits of acting rightly.
77. It would be of eminent service if a classification
of the Laws - real and ideal - were drawn up, so that in
every case there might be distinct understanding whether
we were dealing with a Type which pretended to no
objective reality, or with a Notation of the real process
observed, and only varying from observation as the general
varies from the particular. To effect this it would be
necessary first to settle the question mooted in the succeeding chapter.




282           PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
CHAPTER VI.
WHAT ARE LAWS OF NATURE?
78. REFERRING to what was briefly stated in our Inroduction (On7 the Methocd of Science, ~ 70 et ser.), we there
saw that Law was orioinally supposed to have not only
an objective existence in the phenomena, but an objective
existence independent of the phenomena; and this ancient
error is still alive.  By one of the illusions into which
Philosophy easily glides, a Law of Nature is supposed to
hold a position with respect to natural objects which is
analogous to that held by a legislative enactment with
respect to social life.   Laws are a kind of wise police
keeping Nature in order.  How  far the connotations of
Language inevitably transfer this conception of the regulation of conduct to the regulation of Nature, it may be
difficult to say; but the fact is that, having once named
Process by the word Law, we have great difficulty in
keeping  the two  conceptions  distinct.   Even  careful
writers are apt to express themselves ambiguously on this
point;* and the majority of writers assuredly suppose
that Law is independent of the phenomena which it rules.
Strongly impressed with the mischievous tendency of its
* To give a single instance, Archdeacon Pratt in his important treatise
The Jfthcmetcmaiccl P, rinci 2les of ilfechcicitc P/zilosophy,? (1836) opens with
the following statement: "The uniformity which characterizes the operations of nature leads to the conjecture that the phenomena of the material
world [not then the phenomena of the spiritual world?] are regulated by
certain fixed laws.  N'umberless appearances strengthen the suspicion
that they are the necessary consequences of some universal principles with
which matter has been endowed by the Creator."




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.            283
suggestions, I was many years ago led to propose the
abandonment of the word Law in relation to physical
phenomena; but I soon found that the reform  was impracticable; the word is too deeply rooted. Instead, therefore, of attempting to get rid of it, we must be content
with a recognition of its imisleading  connotations, and fix
in our minds that Law is only one of two conceptions,
1~, a notation of the process observed in the phenomena,
which process we mentally detach and generalize by extendingo it to all similar phenomena; 2~, an abstract Type,
which although originally constructed froml the observed
Process, does nevertheless depart from  what is really observecl, and substitutes an Ideal Process, constructing what
would be the course of the process were the conditions
different from  those actually present.
79. The first conception is so far real that it expresses
the observed series of positions.  It is the process of phenolmelna, not an ag(ent apart from them, not an acgency dete6rminiinig th/em, but simply the ideal slnmmnation of their?positions.  The story of a man's life is not a theorem
which he has to work out, but a story which we elicit
from all the events, and exhibit in its leading directions.
Phenomena, in as far as they are ruled, - regulated, deterimined in this direction rather than in that, and necessarily determined in the direction taken, - are dcleterminecl
by no external agent corresponding to Law, but by their
co-operant factors internal and, external: alter one of these
factors, and the product will be differently determined.
It is owing  to the very  enleral misconception of the
nature of Law that there  arise the misconception of
Necessity; the fact that events arrive irresistibly whenever their conditions are present, is confounded -with the
conception that the events mnlst arrive whether the conditions be present or not, boingC fatally predetermined.
Necessity simply says that whatever is is, and will vary




284          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
with varying conditions.  Fatalism  says that something
must be; and this something cannot be modified by any
modification of the conditions.
Every Law has two aspects, one concrete and experimental, the other abstract and theoretical.  In the experimental department a Law is simply the notation of
observed facts; in the theoretical department this is exhibited as the necessary consequence of certain other and
more fundamental facts; and, as Prof. Challis reminds
us, " every fact, every law  which  experiment makes
known, is a problem for the theorist to solve by mathematical reasoning." Kepler discovered that the radius
vector of each planet wozuld describe round the sun equal
areas in equal times, were there no perturbing conditions;
and he grouped the observed facts under this Law. Then
came Newton, who deduced this Law, not from the observed facts, but from the primary fact of which it was
the necessary consequence, namely, the Law that gravitation is a force acting in the line of the attracting and
attracted bodies.
80. A PReal Law differs from an Ideal Law, or Type,
not in being less of a subjective conception, but in being
less of a construction, - not in having an existence independent of objects and of us, in contradistinction to the
Ideal Law supposed to be entirely our own creation,
but in expressing more rigorously the results of observation, and being thus reducible to sensible experience.
It so far agrees with the Type that it is not any one
series of observed positions, but a generalized series,an abstract group of resemblances from which differences
are rejected.  By this generalization a particular series
becomes a general Law, under which all resembling phenomena are classed, and the notation is made once and
forever. We are said to have explained any particular
fact when -we have ranged it under the series to which it




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.          285
belongs, in other word, assigned its Law. What is this?
simply the series of positions which each phenomenon
occupies under definite conditions.  The position is not
determined by the series; the phenomenon is not coerced
by the Law, but each successive position is assumed because that, and no other, is the resultant of the co-operant
forces. And when observation discloses a disc'repancy
between a fact and its Law, do we not at once declare
this to be dclue to some difference in the factors? do we
not preserve the integrity of the Law by invoking the
presence of some 2perturbtion?  Now this is clearly the
substitution of one series for another.  Perturbations are
mere figments of the mind, cloaks for ignorance, unless
we acknowledge them to be'positions which we do not observe, and which if observed would reveal that this series
was not the series expressed in our Law.  For in truth
the so-called inviolability of Law is absolute only in so
far as whatever is is, and cannot be otherwise. It declares
the facts to be unchangeable so long as their factors are
unchanged.
"Every process," we are told, " has laws known or unknown, according to which it must take place."  I regard
this as very inexact or very misleading.  The law is the
process; and there is no other 1tmust in the case than is
involved in the identical proposition that the process must
be the process.  When comets are said to have laws in
obedience to which they return at the times predicted,
this obedience is metaphorical; the comets, in fact, sometimes do not " obey" the prescribed law, the prediction is
falsified because the positions have been different.  If it
be replied that this only proves our conception of the
process to have been inaccurate, and that we neglected in
our formula certain elements which were co-operant, this,
although perfectly true, only restates the argument that
the real law of cometary movement is the series of




286          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
cometary positions; and this must in each case be what
it is.
81. But if in this sense the Real Law is inviolable
because it is simply the expression of wthat is, and all the
so-called perturbations are different Laws, the Ideal Law
is of course inviolable, because it is abstracted not only
from all perturbations but from all real processes.  It expresses not wuActt is, but what cwoucld be under other conditions. lMotion never is uniform, never rectilinear; the
stamen or pistil of a plant never is a leaf; the bones of a
skull never are vertebrae; the planet never does describe
an ellipse, - these and all other Ideal Laws are abstract
truths; and they can only be applied in explanation of
concrete facts by a constant rectification of our natural
tendency to mistake abstractions for realities.
82. The distinction here established is not quite the
same as that proposed by Mr. Mill, who divides laws into
Ultimate and Derivative. He assigns inferior importance
to the Derivative Laws, and will not allow them  to be
Laws of Nature.  According to the views exposed in this
chapter the Derivative Laws are those understood as
Laws of Nature, while the Ultimate Laws are cnot Laws
of Nature, but subjective constructions having no corresponding objects.  Mr. Mlill holds that the three laws,
1~, air has weight; 2', pressure on a fluid is propagated
equally in all directions; 3', pressure in one direction not
opposed by equal pressure in the contrary direction produces motion, -- are three Laws of Nature.  I agree;
but cannot follow him when he adds that although from
the combination of these Laws we can predict the rise
of mercury in the barometer, this last is not a Law of
Nature, but simply a derivation from  three Laws, —a
case in which all three co-operate.  It seems to me that
the law of atmospheric gravity is a case of the general
law of gravitation, and the law of fluid pressure is not




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.          287
less derivative than that of the rise of mercury in the
barometer; the equal propagation of the pressure is a
fact reducible to factors, namely, the uniform  disposition
of the molecules of the fluid and the laws of motion of
those molecules.  Tile only Laws that can with strictness
be called ultimate, in Mr. Mill's sense, are those of Number, Position, and Force in the object-world, and those of
Sensation and Grouping in the subject-world; all phenomena may be reduced to cases of these Laws.
83. This mode of regarding Laws, namely, as Processes
briefly formulated in their essential characters, and as
Types by which Observation may be guided, enables us
to escape the fallacy of supposing phenomena to be deteruinmed by their otn'resultcants.
Ideal Laws, or Types, stand somewhat in the relation
to Real Laws, or Generalization, that Hypotheses do to
Theories.  There can be no doubt respecting their immense service in Research, and yet they wear the paradoxical aspect of assisting Observation by deliberately
neglecting it in favor of Ideal Construction.  Before considering the limitations which this employment of Ideal
Construction demands, it will be needful here to come to
a distinct understanding on the use of hypothesis.




288          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
CHAPTER VII.
THE USE AND ABUSE OF HYPOTHESIS.
84. COULD we obse-rve the processes of nature we
should need no Science to excplain them: Perception would
suffice.  Blut we cannot observe them, or can observe
them only in fragmnents; we must therefore imagine what
we cannot see, and link the fragments into a whole.
Explanation of phenomena is always a making visible to
the mind's eye of what is invisible in the facts presented:
it is the rendering conspicuous of those inconspicuous
Relations of coexistence and succession through which
one phenomenon co-operates with, and thus determines a
change in, another.  When this is seen, there is an intuition of the truth that ezverywhc-re a recurrence of these
Relations, or of similar conditions, must be accompanied
by this change, or a similar change.  This is the intuition
which rests on the assumption of homogeneity (Rule X.)
and is justified by the logical principle of Equivalence
(to be hereafter expounded).
85. Not only does Science pass from the consideration
of isolated visible facts, to their co-ordination and consolidation in general, invisible facts; but it necessarily
tends to generalize more and more, to become more and
more abstract, less and less ocupied with concrete observation; and this because every concrete observation is
limited, whereas the grasp of a few general facts enables
us to anticipate an endless nmultitude of observations, and
that in cases where Observation would be difficult, some



THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.          2891
times impossible.  Science is fertile, not because it is a
tank, but because it is a spring.  The grandest discoveries, and the grandest applications to practice, have not
only outstripped the slow march of Observation, but have
revealed by the telescope of Imagination what the microscope of Observation could never have seen, although it
may afterwards be employed to verify the vision.
No reader of these pages will misunderstand the reach
of this remark, or suppose that it warrants any neglect of
Observation through a too confident reliance on Imagination and Reason; for Imagination and Reason are only
powerful as the organized results of previous Observation.
If Types are to be valid they must be formed by abstraction from concrete experiences, thus enabling Prevision
to be only an extension of Vision, and enabling Deduction to rest securely on a basis of Induction.  It is the
neglect of this single, but indispensable condition, that
constitutes the danger of Hypothesis.
86. Certain facts are observed to coexist, or to succeed
each other, but the process of their connection is hidden,
and we seek to drag into light the facts which come between the facts which are seen. There is a gap to be
filled up. How? Not by direct vision.  Then by indirect vision.  WATe guess, and our guess has a Greek name,
Hypothesis, namely, that which is plicecl under, and supports the observed facts; it is the imaginative arch
thrown over the gap which we may traverse as a bridge.
Unless this arch rests on solid supports, it will not bear
our weirght; and many a visionary hypothesis turns out to
be no better than the arch of the rainbow, beautiful to
look upon, impossible to walk upon.
Tt is therefore of the utmost importance to ascertain
the conditions of solid support.  Guessing has a wide
and capricious range; it is oftener wrong than right;
but worse than all is the fatal facility with which the
13                             s




290          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
mind accepts a guess in lieu of vision, believing in the
image it has formed out of materials from within, as if it
were an image formed of materials from without; and
thus, while the probabilities of error are enormous, the
pertinacity with which error once formed on very slight
evidence is held, resists all but demonstrative evidence
against it. Hypothesis thus becomes pernicious. It retards Science by arresting inquiry; it quiets the unrest
of the mind with the anodyne of a phrase, and seems to
explain what it only rebaptizes. It also retards Science
by nmisdcirecting inquiry, stimulating the mind to seek
direct relations where none exist.
87. These dangers have been eloquently exposed by
many writers, and need not here be illustrated.  Yet
while it would be difficult to express too strong a condemnation of the lax unscientific use of Imagination,
which has brought Hypothesis into disrepute, it would be
difficult to exaggerate the immense, the indispensable
service of Hypothesis in the construction and advancement of Science.  How largely Newton availed himself
of its aid, and how he reprobated it, have already been
indicated (Introd., ~ 49). When Newton said that Hypothesis had no place in experimental philosophy, he
probably meant that we must not take fancies for facts,
guesses for conclusions; which is a warning not the less
needed because it seems so obvious. But if we regard
Hypothesis in its true light, namely, that of ideal experiment,- the  tentative process of trying which among
many possible conceptions best accords with perceptions,
-tlhat experimental character will place it beside the
tentative process of trying which among many physical
conditions will determine a modification of the result.
Cuvier, in his dispute with Geoffroy St. Hilaire, was
always insisting on the dangers of Hypothesis; and elsewhere proclaimed it his guiding principle to adhere sire



THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.               291
ply to the " exposition of positive facts"; a declaration
which occasionally meets with the fatal objection that
what he expounds as facts have been proved to be fictions; and which may always be met by the undeniable
statement of Laplace, that if men had limited their efforts
to the collection of facts, Science would have been only a
sterile nomenclature, and would never have revealed the
great laws of Nature.  Without Hypothesis no step could
be taken. Our very perceptions involve it. Nay more,
I venture to affirm that the wildest flights of Imagination
consciously sweeping round the circle of Experience, and
alighting whhere it pleases, are legitimate tentatives of
scientific Research, if only they submit to the one indispensable condition (unhappily too often neglected) of ultimate verification.  The profound remark of Copernicus,*
that the value of an hypothesis consists in reconciling
Calculation with Observation, has not been duly appreciated; so little has it been appreciated that most people
would echo Bacon's sneer at Copernicus as "the manll
who thinks nothing  of introducing fictions of any kind
into  Nature, provided  his calculations turn  out well."
The answer to this sneer is the triumphant achievements
which are effected by the introduction of avowed fictions
among the artifices of Research.
88. It is not only in Algebra that in endeavoring to
form an equation we often begin by assigning any. value
we please to the unknown quantity, and submit this to
all the operations necessary for ascertaining whether it
answers the conditions or not, so that the result is to the
* From Gassendi's work, lVicolai Copernici Vita, p. 319. 1655. I find
that the remark to which reference is made in the text was perhaps only
due to Copernicus in the sense that he countenanced its publication, for it
was not written by him, but by his disciple Osiander in the preface which
he added when he gave the work of Copernicus to the public. It may
therefore have been simply utne precaution oratoire to render the heretical
doctrine of the earth's movement less offensive.




292           PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
correct one as the assumed value is to the unknown one.*
Ae may employ what materials we please for our scaffolding, on the sole proviso that since this scaffolcling is
not the house, it must be carefully taken away again,
when the holse is constructeld; we must not allow  the
beams, ropes, and ladders, used as auxiliaries, to thrust
themselves discordantly into  the structure itself.  No
doubt great skill is needed in the selection of auxiliaries,
and in avoiding the danger of thrusting parts of the scaffolding into the structure; and the formation of true hypotheses is the severest task for the scientific imagination;
while the invention of false, or illusory, hypotheses is
the sterile abundance of an untrained imagination.  The
principle here proclaimed is the absolute freedom  of introducing any elements in the formation of an equation,
on the understanding that nothinCg fwhich is inztroduced as
an auxiliacr,y be per7m-itted to ap)pecar in the result.  On this
principle we may admit the conception of Atoms, even if
we regard them  as pure fictions: and we may endow
these Atoms with any shape, size, or qualities we please,
if thereby calculation can be aided; provided always that
we assume nothingo absolutely contradictory of experience,
but only what is in harmony with experience; that is to
say, the Atoms must be Extra-sensible, not Supra-sensible.  The truth, or falsity, of the existence of these Atoms
is another question altogether; and ileed never be raised
so long as we treat them purely as auxiliaries, not realities.  Thus, suppose I assume the Atoms to have the
shape of an ellipsoid, and to be capable of moving only in
rotation about three fixed axes, but incapable of vibration
or translation.  The assumption is inadmissible, because
* "Personne ne revoque en doute l'exactitude des rdsultats qu'on
obtient par le calcul des imaginaires, quoiqu'elles ne soient que des. formes
algebriques et des hieroglyphes des quantites absurdes." - CAnNOT, La
2itca2)hysique do Calcul In finitdsimal, p. 120. Compare also FECHNErt,
Psychoylhysik, II. 40.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.          293
it is contradictory of experience, wh1ich rejects the idea
of rotation as an exclusive form of motion.  If, however,
I merely assume that under given conditions the only
motion possible is that of rotation, and I deduce from this
somne exact results, not otherwise obtainable, my assumption is valid, since it is proved thereby to represent sourme
relation of the real agents.  But that this relation is only
one among many is proved by the simple fact that bodies
expand, which would be impossible unless there were internal motions, not necessarily of vibration.
89. Again, the hypothesis of an undulating Ether, so
largely employed in modern inquiries, is perfectly legitimate, and is proved to be so by its results.  The vast
array of phenomena which it explains, and the striking
anticipations of Observation \which it has effected, do not
indeed prove the reality of the Ether, though they render
its existence highly probable.  The hypothesis with its
dependent calculations brings into view a larger nunmber
of conditions which must be accepted as true, even when
the ether itself is rejected.
The controversy on this question is too often confused
by the want of a clear recognition of the principle I am
here expounding, namely, that the value of the hypothesis is one thing, its evidence for the reality of an Ether is
another.  WVe are not bound to prove the existence of the
Agent, so long as we confine ourselves to the hypothesis
of an Agency acting on hydrodynamic or molecular dynamic laws; and so long as we do not allow more than
the demonstrated Agency to enter into the final equation;
such as would be the case if from any assumed, but not
demonstrated, properties of the Ether we deduced conclusions at variance with, or not verifiable by, experience.
And the reason of this reliance on the Agency, irrespective of the reality of the Agent, is that at any rate what
is thus demonstrable must be true of the relations of the




2 94         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
Agent, be that Agent what it may.  Let this Ether be
only an attenuated form of ponderable Matter, or a fluid,
or a solid, szi generis, we know at least that its mode of
action in certain pihenomena is explicable on dynamic
laws.  But there are phenomena which these laws have
hitherto failed to explain.  Hence -we conclude that the
Agent las other modes of action besides those already
revealed, that the dynamic laws require to be supplemented by some other laws of molecular movement.
90. Some years ago I suggested a course of inquiry
which was unhappily beyond my own power, but which
in the hands of a powelful  analyst might resolve some
of the difficulties at present attending the undulatory
theory.  That theory only regards the movements of vibr~ation, leaving out of sight the movement of rotation.
But if the Ether be assumed as atomic, these atoms must
have form; their geometric properties entail corresponding dynamic properties; and they cannot have movements of translation without also having rotation.  Now
if the mathermatical investigation of the movements.of
translation were supplemented by an investigation of the
movements of rotation, it is eminently probable that this
new analysis would disclose the equations necessary for
the reduction of those phenomena which still resist mathematical analysis.*
91. Be this as it may, the achieved results are ample
justification of the hypothesis of an. Ether.  I cannot,
therefore, agree with Conate in his polemic against the
hypothesis, a polemic which could only avail against those
who proclaimed tile reality of the Ether.  But he will
not allow  it to have even an auxiliary value.  "A  la
vdrite les physiciens se defendent vivement aujourd'hui
* Prof. Tait informs me that some distinguished investigators, notably
Professors Thomson, Rankine, and Clerk Maxwell, have been working at
this subject for years. 3My absence from Englanud during the printing of
these sheets prevents my giving more precise informlation on this point.




THE LIMITATIONiS OF KNOWLEDGE.          295
dl'attacher aucune realite intrinseque a ces hypotheses,
qu'ils preconisent seulement cornme des moyens indispensables pour faciliter la conception et la combinaison
des phenoinenes.  Mais n'est ce point la l'illusion d'une
positivit' incomplete, qui sent la profonde inanit' de tels
systemles et pourtant n'ose point encore s'en passer? "*
To this question I answer, No; and in so answering it,
believe I am  standing strictly within the sphere of positive science.  But as Comte's view is shared by some
eminent writers, we are bound to consider it carefully
and impartially.
Hypotheses relate either to the Agents, or the Agencies, which link together the observed phenomena, i. e.
the qualitative or quantitative elements which are the
determinants of the phenomena.  Sometimes we know
the determlinant (Agent, or Substance), but are ignorant
of its mode of operation in effecting the change observed.
Sometimes we know this mode of operation, or Agency,
but are ignorant of the Agent.  Thus we know  that
oxygen is the agent in the transformation of venous into
arterial blood, and in the decomposition of the tissues
necessary to the liberation of organic force; but the mode
in which this is effected, whether by direct or indirect
oxidation, is still a mystery.  On the other hand, we
know that the agency of Light is that of wave-movement;
but the moving agent is unknown.  The mode of operation of what is called chemical Affinity is known, but
Affinity itself is unknown.  We know as an experimental
fact that Heat is Motion, and therefore the laws of Motion
are laws of Heat; but we are still unable to explain
many of the phenomena, " because wve do not know ~what
is moving nor how it moves.  Results of the theory in
7wihic7h these acge not involved are experimentally verified." t
* Philos. Positive, II. 441.
t THOMPSON and-TAIT, NTatural Philosophy, I. 311.




296          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
92. Now, any hypothesis introduced either respecting
the Agent or the Agency is justified if it facilitates Research and conforms to the test of Verification; and it
can only be called upon to show evidence for its reality,
when we declare it to be the 9real Agent, and when as
such it enters into the final equation.  Whether the
Agent which determines the orbit of a planet be an Angel seated in the sun, or an Attraction issuing forth from
the sun and the planet, is a matter of indifference, so
long as we admit nothing but the law of the Agency into
our final equation, and allow neither any assumed properties of Angels, nor any assumed properties of an occult
Attraction, to find expression. Again, whatever hypothesis we form respecting the Agent of Heat will be indifferent, so long as we confine our. equation to the Agency.
Thus, while assuming Heat to be Motion, we only select
from all the possible forms of Motion those of Vibration
and Rotation, which constitute the known Agency; and
since the results of calculation thus obtained agree rigorously with observation, we conclude that we have detected
something, at least of the real locle of operation, let the
Agent be a peculiar substance moving amid the particles
of the heated body, or simply the molecules of the body
itself in a state of agitation.  Comte is right in saying
that it would be difficult to see how the dilatation of a
body by heat is explained by the idea of an imaginary
fluid interposed between its molecules, tendincg constantly
to augment their intervals, since we should then have to
inquire whence the fluid gained its elasticity, which is
assuredly less intelligible than the primitive fact. But
although the introduction of a fluid as an Agent explains
nothing, the fluid as an Agency - i. e. its hydrodynamic
laws - explains much.  Of course, any other hypothesis
-that, for instance, of expansion being due to the increased oscillation of the molecules - may take the place




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.          297
of this hydrodynamic hypothesis; and it will remain for
the advocates of each to justify the preference by the
greater sum of verified results.  The two hypotheses of
Light both explained many of the phenomena; and the
one was finally victorious only when it succeeded in explaining what its rival stumbled over as a contradiction.
The undulatory hypothesis itself, as usually stated, may
perhaps hlave to yield the place to another.
93. Let us never forget that the agreement of observation with calculation does not prove the reality of the
Ether as an Agent; it only proves that the mode of
operation of the real Agent (whatever that may be) is to
some extent such as we assume; and it is only because
we are in doubt of the reality that we call upon hypothesis to aid us.  WVere the reality proved, there would be
no longer an hypothesis, the supposition would give place
to a demonstration.  To demand that what are avowedly
fictions should be called to prove their reality, is inconsistent.  Hypotheses are guesses, aids to research, and
not to be treated like the results.  There are good and
bad guesses; and unhappily their inventors are generally
careless in verifying them.  Sometimes verification is,
in the nature of the case, not attainable; we then rely on
probability.  Our guesses may be ranged under three
classes: 1~, the Real Hypotheses, which being intrinsic
are explicative; 2~, the Auxiliary Hypotheses, which
being extrinsic are merely aids in construction; 3~, the
Illusory Hypotheses.
94. A -Retl Hypothesis is one which explains observed
phenomena, and anticipates the results of future observation, by means of some Agent or Agency ~knoW1n to be
present amrnong the elements of the observed phenomenon,
the precise relations of which, however, as determinants,
are not known.  Thus the phenomenon of Expansion in
gases and solids is explained as the wider sweep of the
13*




298          PROBLEMIS OF LIFE AND MIND.
oscillating molecules.  That the molecules are in a state
of oscillation is known; the laws of oscillation are sufficient to account for the phenomenon, without the intervention of any extrinsic agency.  If a vibrating fluid be
introduced to account for the oscillation of the particles,
and be absolutely restricted to the simple office of transmitting vibrations, without any admixture of undemonstrable properties, the hypothesis still keeps within the
sphere of the known; and all the demand we can make
on it is that it shall explain what we observe.
95. When the z is obtained in an equation, what is
known of it (its functions) must satisfy the equation,
otherwise no step in advance is made.  Thus, if we introduce a Spirit as the Agent in certain chances, how does
this enlighten us, unless we know the prolperties of the
Spirit and its lawcs of action?  Whereas if instead of a
Spirit we introduce Attraction, although we may be
equally ignlorant of this Agent, if we know the laws of its
action, through these kno-wn laws the equation is satisfied.
Newton's great hypothesis is a fine example.  It was what
I have called a Peal Hypothesis, - -what lie would have
put forward as legitimate because it was " cdeduced from
the phenomena."  He began by assuming that the force
which at each instant deflects a planet from its tanglent
(the observed fact of deflection leading to the assumption
of a deflecting force), and which causes the planet to
move in a curve round the sun (another observation), is
a force tending directly towards the sun.  He then
showed that, on such premises being granted, the conclusion follows that the planet will describe equal areas in
equal times,- and this conclusion Kepler's first law had
already established (subject to the qualification I have
before noted, and accepting the law in its ideal aspect).
Newton further showed that if the deflecting force did
not tend towards the sun, the planet would not describe




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.         299
equal areas in equal times.  Having thus demonstrated
that the hypothesis necessarily carried the conclusion
which observation disclosed, and that a contradictory hypothesis would not carry such a conclusion, his assumption was established as a truth, his guess was "deduced
from the phenomlena."
96. It is characteristic of all Real Hypotheses that
they pass by Verification into inductive truths.  Since
they admit nothinig extrinsic to the phenomena, directly
the right guess has been intuited the process of demonstration requires no elimination of auxiliary elements.
Hence it is obvious that our first aim should be to frame
hypotheses of this kind, and to seek for an explanation of
phenomena in Agents or Agencies already known, or
surmised to be present (Rule XV.).  But it is no less
obvious that were we to confine Inquiry to such a procedure, the advance of Science would be extremely slow,
since it is seldom that we have this solid foundation to
stand on, and it mostly happens that we do not know but
are forced to guess, what is the Agent or Agency in operation.  Hence the employment of Auxiliary Hypotheses.
An Auxilia'ry HJtyothcsis is a conscious fiction by
which Imagination pictures what would be the effect of
a given Agent, or Agency, qf _recsent.  It is purely a tentative process, like that of assigning an arbitrary value to
an unknown quantity.  The advantage of such a tentative process will of course depend on the degree in which
the imagined agency resembles the actual agency; and
for this purpose it must be of a character strictly analogical with those of the elements known to be present in
similar phenomena (Rule XV.)  For example, the comlplications of the planetary movements would baffle all
rational theory were it not for the various fictions by
which astronomers turn the difficulty; and especially by
that of the Type presented in the problem of two bodies,




300          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
one of which is assumed to be fixed.  It is to this Type,
avowedly a fiction, that the real movements are reduced
by successive approximations; and its completion is
Lagrange's celebrated theory of the variation of arbitrary
constants, which treats the effective movement of any
planet as if it were really elliptical, but with variable elements instead of constant elements.
" So many of the properties of matter," says Professor
Clerk Maxwell, " can be deduced from  the hypothesis
that their minute parts are in rapid motion, the velocity
increasing with the temperature, that the precise nature
of this motion becomes a subject of rational curiosity.
Daniel Bernouilli, Herapath, Joule, Krbnig, Clausius, etc.,
have shown that the relations between pressure, temperature, and density in a perfect gas canl be explained by
supposing the particles to move with uniform velocity in
straight lines, striking against the sides of the containing
vessel and thus producing pressure.  It is not necessary
to suppose each particle to travel to anly great distance in
the same straight line; for the effect in producing pressure will be the same if the particles strike against each
other; so that the straight line described may be very
short.  Clausius has determined the mean length of path
in terms of the average distance of the particles, and the
distance between the centres of two particles when collision takes place.  We have at present no means of ascertaining either of these distances; but certain phenomena
such as the internal friction of gases, the conduction of
heat through a gas, and the diffusion of one gas through
another, seem to indicate the possibility of determining
accurately the mean length of path which a particle describes between two successive collisions.  In order to lay
the foundation of such investigations on strict mechanical
principles, I shall demonstrate the laws of motion of an
indefinite number of small, hard, and perfectly elastic




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.            301
spheres acting on one another only during impact.  If the
properties of such a system of bodies are found to correspond to those of gases, ac  importcant physical analogy'will
be estacblished wthich may lead to more accutrate  towtVlcYge of
the pIroperties of matter.  If experiments on gases are inconsistent with the hypothesis of these propositions, then
our theory, though consistent in itself, is proved to be incapable of explaining the phenomena of gases.  In either
case it is necessary to follow out the consequences of the
hypothesis.
"Instead of saying that the particles are hard, elastic,
and spherical, we may, if we please, say that the particles
are centres of force of which the action is insensible except at a certain small distance, when it suddenly appears
as a repulsive force of very great intensity.  It is evident
that either assumption will lead to the same results." *
97. The freedom  which Imagination is here allowed
in the creation of conscious fictions does not prevent
these guesses being submitted to the most rigorous tests;
and the value of such fictions appears in the aid they
furnish to calculation.  WVe find Mr. Maxwell not only
explaining the pressure of a gas by this assumption of
elastic particles moving in straight lines, -  the square of
the velocity being proportional directly to the absolute
temperature and inversely to the specific gravity of the
gas at a constant temperature, -  but also that the number of particles in a unit of volume is the same for all
gases at the same pressure and temperature: a result in
striking accordance with the chemical law that equal volunnes of gases are chemically equivalent. Again, it is a
pure fiction which transfers the circular nature of the
Earth and all the geometrical properties of the circle to
the Heavens.  That the Earth is a sphere, or approxi* MAXWELL, Illustrations of the Dynamical Theory of Gases. Philos,
glag., p. 19. 1860.




302          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
mates to one, is a fact; but that it is enclosed in a
heavenly sphere is a sheer fiction; yet it is the celestial
circles by which the terrestrial latitudes and longitudes
are calculated; and were it not for this fiction, which
connects Geography with Astronomy, our geographical
science could not bave been constructed.
98. It is necessary to insist on the strictly scientific
use of the Imagination in constructing these auxiliaries,
because Newton has in emphatic language condemned
them, though his own practice we have seen to be a splendid vindication of them. He pronounced hypotheses illegitimate which were not deduced from the phenomena;
in fact it was these only that he called hypotheses.
" Whatever is not deduced from the phenomena," he says
in the famous Scholium, "is to be called an hypothesis;
and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, have
no place in experimental philosophy."  The weight of his
authority has pressed Hypothesis into the mire, where it
is trodden on by the feet of writers who are by no means
slow to profit by its services; and thus, in spite of its
services, Hypothesis has become the pariah of research.
99. The rival hypotheses respecting Light are manifestly auxiliary.  The corpuscular is now discredited, but
it was once, if erroneous, effective.  Some writers declare
that there was this initial defect in it, that only on the
supposition of a corpuscle being visible and tangible,
could the hypothesis have been justifiable. This is precisely the objection urged by Comte, 1Mill, and others
against the undulatory hypothesis.  If the Ether be admissible, although no one has seen or could see it, then
surely luminous corpuscles are admissible? Neither of
these Agents is known to be present in luminous phenomena; neither is positively known to exist.  But the
valid ground for the rejection of the one hypothesis is
not that the Agent is proved to be absent, but that the




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.             303
Agency invoked as an auxiliary fails to explain the phenonmena; whereas the Agency invoked in the other case,
although still incompetent to explain all the phenomena,
explains so many, that its aid is more eff'ective, and therefore preferred.
The vortices of Descartes have long since passed into
the rag-shop of worn-out finery; and those who see the
hypothesis huddled among many others equally discarded,
forget that it was once a part of the furniture of Science.
In estimating all opinion we must always take the historical stand-point; for the suggestion which f'rom  a later
stand-point appears inept, may be recognized as ingenious
from the earlier.  The vortices of Descartes thus viewed
present an example of the three stages through which
most hypotheses must pass, its stage of indispensable
though temporary aid, its stage of application and verification, and its stage of final displacement in favor of some
more successful rival.  Placing ourselves for a moment at
the point of view prevalent when Descartes devised the
vortices, we at once see the enormous and indispensable
aid it furnished, simply by the introduction of the idea of
mechcbanical law where even the great Kepler could only
conceive the action of genii.  A  philosophy which explained phenomena by the aid of such genii could only be
set aside by a philosophy which explained the phenomena
on mechanical grounds.  And although when Celestial
Mlechanics had received a sure foundation by tile discovery of gravitation, the hypothesis of Vortices was an obstruction, not an aid, its doom was not sealed until geometers and astronomers proved that it was in contradiction
with  known facts and known mechanical laws; * and
* " Rien ne serait plus satisfaisant pour l'esprit que la physique celeste
de M. Descartes si elle e/it pu soutenir l'6preuve de l'exarnen et de 1' observation."-IMOloTUCLA, irst. des IMsthtematiqes, II. 537. Compare NEWTON, Pririjia,, Book II., Sec. XI., Schol., to Prop. 411; and the general
Scholium to Book III.




304          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
proved that anot!ler hypothesis accomplished all it pretended, and explained what it left inexplicable.  Here, as
elsewhere, those who declared that it was impossible to
theorize without such an aid were answered by a more
effectual theorizing with another.
100. Amonog auxiliaries a distinction is to be made
between those nwhich relate to Agencies and those which
relate to Agents.  In the first class are the quantitative
hypotheses of mathematical physical physics, where, in entire ignorance of the Agents, we can, from mathematical laws,
at least deduce their mnode of operation.  The nature of
Heat, Electricity, or AMagnetism  may be unknown, but
some of their quantitative laws are absolutely known. Yet
auxiliary hypotheses have always to be treated as auxiliary, and, when applied to physical facts, require numerous modifying and limiting considerations, such as are
always requisite in passing from the abstract to the concrete.  Thus Newton says; " I use the words attraction
and impulse not defining the species or physical qualities
of forces, but investigatinng the quantities and mathematical proportions of them.  In mathematics we are to investig'ate the quantities of forces with their proportions
consequent upon any conditions supposed; then when rwe
enter upon physics we compare those proportions with
the phenomena of Nature, that we may know what conditions of those forces answer to the several kinds of attractive bodies.  And this preparation being made we
may agree more safely concerning the physical species,
causes, and proportions of the forces.*
"The history of physical science," says Prof. Challis,
"seems to show that theoretical investigation proceeds ill
but one course, that of deducing quantitative laws, by
neans of solutions of equation, from known or hypothetical principles."
* Prinzcipia, Book I., Section XI., Scholium.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.        305
101. The second class of hypotheses is of smaller value.
Unless we already know the law of the Agency, our guess
at the Agent is almost certain to be erroneous; a consideration which should make us particularly cautious.
Even when we know the law, there is great danger of
missing the one out of many possible Agents which may
be involved. For example, the Electrodynamic theory of
Ampere merely expresses the law of the Agency: the experimental data of the action of closed currents on each
other give expressions for the mathematical law of the
action which one element must exert on another. But
Weber seeks the Agent, and his hypothesis is that of an
electric current formed by the motion of particles of two
kinds of electricity moving in opposite directions; an hypothesis which is open to many objections.*
102. Another example is the hypothesis propounded
by Young, and adopted by Helmholtz, of three special
retinal fibres for the three primary colors; or the kindred
hypothesis of Helmholtz, that the auditory nerve has
special fibres for notes of particular pitch. I shall examine this more in detail in a subsequent Problem. Enough
for the present to remark that these different fibres are
assumed Agents, and there must first be demonstrated the
presence of fibres having different structure and properties; no attempt has been made to demonstrate this, and
we cannot accept them merely on the ground of the
Agency, i. e. merely because the known law of distinct
primary colors suggests the presence of distinct fibres.
The more so because the Agency may be otherwise interpreted. I shall hope to make clear that the Agency can
be rigorously deduced from the general Law of Grouping
which determines all sensitive phenomena, each color and
each tone being simply a special group of neural units.
We do not need three different fibres, since one fibre can
* See THOMSON and TAIT, Natural Philosophy.
T




306          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
readily be conceived vibrating with different nodes, like a
rod or cord; and the principle of the superposition of
small oscillations may be applied to nerves as to rods.
103. Whether an hypothesis refers to the Agent or the
Agency, the one thing needful to be steadily borne in
mind is the one thing comm-only neglected, namely, that
while any supposition which can furnish aid is justified
by the assistance we derive from it, no supposition can be
accepted for more than instrumental aid, no supposition
can be allowed to take the place of a truth, until it has
itself been submitted to the operations which establish
a truth.  An hypothesis may be false, yet help us to a
truth; but no demonstration of the truth of any process
proves that the hypothesis which explains the process is
true.  The existence of Ether is not demonstrated because
the hypothesis of an Ether is the most satisfactory means
we have at present of explaining luminous phenomena;
all that is proved is that the hypothesis is effective.  This
caution is the more needful because of our tendency to
consider the verification of a result as a proof of the independent truth of the hypothesis.  Because the supposed
Agency is adequate, is it therefore to be held as existent?
Laplace mentions an example of the danger Nwhich besets
auxiliary hypotheses, " quand on les realise au lieu de les
regarder comine des mooyens de soumettre les observations
au calcul."  Dominic Cassini, lie says, in forming a table
of refraction, started from the simple supposition of a constant density in the atmosphere.  This table was exact at
the heights at which the stars are usually observed, and
was adopted by astronomers; and the hypothesis that the
refraction augments with the elevation gained universal
acceptance until Bouger proved, by observations made at
Quito, that the refraction at that heiglmt instead of being
inlcreaseci was dim-inished.*
* LAPLACE, Ezxposition du Syste7e dcl l~onde, 1. 191.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.                307
104.'Were [Newton's dictum  to be followed, no auxiliary hypothesis would  be  permitted.  If, however, we
clearly understand its nature, and do not confound an instrumnent of construction with an elenment of construction,
we mnay allow  Imagination  unrestricted  license.  Any
operation is legitimate by which we can submit observations to calculation, or by which new  observations are
rendered practicable.  Suppose I am studying the evolution of an ovuni, and unable by the microscope to see the
mutual relations of its parts, which could be seen were a
thin section made of it; the delicacy of the structure prevents my making such a section; I must therefore seek
some external aid.  A  solution of chromic acid hardens
the ovum  sufficiently to  enable a section to  be made.
Nothing can be more foreign to the organic tissue than
this chromic acid; yet by its aid I am enabled to detect
certain constituent elements in that tissue; and no one
would object to my employing it, on the ground that it
was extra-organic.  But if, after employing chromic acid
as an auxiliary, I allowed it to enter into the construction,
i. e. if in treating  of the chemical and physical comlposition of the tissue, I introduced among the constituents
those results which were due to the agency of the acid,
then, indeed, every one would rightly object to the procedure.  And it is this error which is committed when
hypotheses originally introduced as aids in bringing' phenomena into appreciable relation, are finally allowed to
appear in the result.*
"L'objet de tout calcul se reduit b trouver les relations qni existent
entre certaines quantites proposees, mais la difficulte de trouver imm-ldiatement ces relations oblige souvent de recourir 5 l'entremise de
quelques autres quantites qui ne font point partie du systeme propose,
mais qui par leur liaison avec les premieres peuvent servir conrme interdcliaires entre elles. On cotimmence donc par exprimer les relations
qu'elles ont toutes ensemble; apres quoi on dlimine du calcul celles qui
n'y sont entr6es que comme auxiliaires afin d'obtenir entre les quantites




308          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
105. T]he Illusory  Hypjotzhesis must be broadly distinguished from the other two classes. It is not deduced
from the phenomena; it is not an aid; it is simply a restatement of the observed facts in a compendious, and
generally ambiguous phrase. It rebaptizes an observation.  Yet such is the influence of mere naming, that the
rebaptism of our ignorance seems to be an illumination,
and exercises a charm that is all the more obstructive to
Research, because we often find a positive advantage in a
phrase which condenses a multitude of details; and the
advantage of the formula leads us to confound it with a
principle.  To many minds the word Affinity is more
than a term; and when chemists say that oxygen unites
with hydrogen because these gases have a strong Affinity,
many persons accept this as an explanation.  In former
days a multitude of phenomena were condensed in the
formula of the fuga vacui.  Nature was said to "abhor a
vacuum."  This phrase named, and by naming linked together, observed facts of suction, breathing, the rise of
water in a tube, etc.; and had it been limited to the
simple expression of the observed facts, it would, like the
term  Affinity, have been of unimpeachable advantage.
The error lay in taking the formula for a principle, and
supposing that it explained what it simply named. Believe to be a principle, its action was necessarily generaized beyond the sphere of observation; and thus Mersenne
imagined a siphon which should go over a mountain;
whereas the real law of suction, on which the siphon depends, is limted to drawing water to the height of 34 feet,
above that, the "horror of a vacuum " ceases.
106. In our own day writers who ridicule the fuga
vacni are quite ready to invent or accept Illusory Hypotheses of the same calibre.  They confidently assign
proposees seules les relations immediates qu'on voulait decouvrir."CARNOT, La 316taphysique du Calcul Infinitesimal, p. 21.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.         309
phenomena to Electricity, Ozone, Polarity, Nervo-atmospheres, Repulsive atmospheres, Psychic force, Vital force,
and the like.  Nay, it is popularly supposed that the
invention of such hypotheses is an exercise of the Imagination; and on this ground soberer thinkers are wont to
decry Imagination, believing it to be the pest of Science.
Such hypotheses are indeed a pest; but so far from their
source being Imagination, it is precisely a defect of Imagination which forms their nidus. To imagine a natural
process is to see the Agents or Agencies which are really
operative, or which, if present, would act so as to produce
the result observed. But this mental picture of the unseen process is given only to the highest minds equipped
with exact' knowledg'e.  In Science, as in Art, any feeble
mind can satisfy itself by vaguely supposing that something tmay in some wcay or other (not specified) determine
the changes which take place; the difficulty is in precise
vision. But precision is the one quality which impatient
minds least appreciate; and therefore Illusory Hypotheses
spring up like mushrooms in half-cultivated minds, and
are readily accepted by the uncultivated, who see no
difficulties because they have no vision of the requisites:
marvels are not marvellous to them, for ignorance does
not marvel.
107. Whenever an hypothesis suggests itself it should
be submitted to the following conditions: first, the supposed Agent or Agency must be a trite cause. This does
not mean that it should be a cause already known to be
in operation here, but one known to be in operation somewuhere, so that from its known properties the phenomena
may be deduced. " Nature's horror " and " Psychic Force "
are clearly not brought from some other part of our experience to explain a present difficulty, but are invented for
the nonce. " Nature's horror" and " Psychic Force " must
first be made known to us by their properties in other




310         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
cases before we can explain any phenomena by their
presence; or conversely, if we assume that the present
phenomena clearly suggest the presence of these agents,
we must show that these agents are operative elsewhere;
and this must be done by direct demonstration of their
existence, or by the indirect demonstration that no other
agents will suffice. Having, laid hold of a vera cclcsa,
we must next render intelligible how its known properties in action agree with the phenomena it is brought
in to explain. That is to say, suppose Electricity be the
Agent assumed, we must show how the known laws of
electrical action lead deductively to tlhe facts observed;
or if any laws of electrical action be assumed for the
nonce they must not be in contradiction with known
laws, nor in contradiction with any of the observed
facts. Having got thus far there remain two final conditions: it is not sufficient that the phenomena can be
deduced from the hypothesis, there must be also a deduction of new phenomena not hitherto observed, or an
extension of the hypothesis to other cases, thereby justifying the hypothesis as at least an aid in enlarging
knowledge, and not simply a rebaptism of the known;
and, secondly, there must be proof that no other hypothesis will at once explain the old observations and lead
deductively to the new. Kepler's hypothesis of the elliptical orbit of the planets did not satisfy Dominic Cassini,
who proposed to replace it by a curve of the fourth degree roughly resembling an ellipse in certain cases, and in
which the product of the focal distances, instead of their
sulm, remained invariable.  But why have astronomers
rejected this Cassinocid, and retained the ellipse? Simply
because the one does not, and the other does, reconcile
calculation with observation.  Again, of the four hypotheses suggested to explain meteoric stones, some facts are
explicable on all four; and by turns it may appear that




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.         311
the meteorites are products of volcanoes in the moon,
volcanoes in our earth, or condensations of atmospheric
particles; but a wide survey of the facts, and comparison
with these three hypotheses in all their consequences,
leaves each defective, and the fourth hypothesis (of the
cosmical oricgin of these bodies) takes their place by right
of conquest over the phenomena.
108. To conclude: all hypotheses are illusory which
cannot justify themselves by enlarging knowledge; and
if their inventors would hesitate to put them forth until
they had submitted them to the requisite tests, or shown
what ezw results are obtainable by the hypotheses, the amplest scope would be given to their inventive powers, without any evil accruing.
109. Having thus described the use and abuse of Hyr
pothesis, I must, before quitting tile subject, notice a restrictionl on its effective range, placed by Comte and Mill,
which is a departure from the principle I have adopted
from Copernicus.  Mr. Mill considers it allowable to assurie the law of what we already know to be the cause,
but not to assume the cause itself. " It is allowable, useful, and even necessary to begin by asking ourselves what
cause ~lma;y have produced the effect, in order that we may
know in what direction to look out for evidence to determine whether it actually did. The vortices of Descartes
would have been a perfectly legitimate hypothesis, if it
had been possible by any mode of explanation to bring
the reality of the vortices as a fact in Nature conclusively
to the test of observation. The hypothesis was vicious
simply because it could not lead to any course of investigation capable of converting it from an hypothesis into a
proved fact." *
This argument is equally destructive of the Nebular
Hypothesis and the Evolution Hypothesis, both of which
* MILL, Logic, II. 19.




312         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
Mr. Mill regards in the light of genuine scientific procedures. Nay, it is destructive of the hypothesis of universal Gravitation (which, indeed, Mr. Mill hesitates to
accept). No one of these is capable of being brought to the
test of observation, of being converted into a proved fact.
Indeed the restriction placed by Comte and Mill would
interdict all speculation respecting geological and astronomical phenomena which, dependent on past causations,
cannot receive verification except by reflection from present causation. If such indirect evidence be inadmissible,
vainly will astronomers, geologists, and biologists accumulate evidence. The various phases of the earth's evolution, the various stages of animal evolution, are explained
on the assumption that causes similar to those now observed in operation were formerly the agents in bringing
about the evolution; and the assumption is admitted, but
no one pretends that there is proof of the hypothesis.
The Nebular Hypothesis and the Evolution Hypothesis
have amply justified themselves by the aids they have
furnished to Research; but few imagine them to be demonstrable; nor can we assert them to be final.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.          313
CHAPTER VIII.
THE PASSAGE FROM THE ABSTRACT TO THE CONCRETE.
110. THE recognition of the fact that Science is in no
respect a plain transcript of RPeality, in no respect a picture of the External Order, but wholly an ideal construction in which the manifold relations of Reals are taken
up and assimilated by the min d, and there transformed
into relations of ideas, so that the world of Sense is
changed into the world of Thought, -this fact leads to
the deeply interesting question, How can Science avail
in our search after the External Order, and explain the
real relations of Things? Its own domain is exclusively
ideal. Yet it seeks to reveal the processes of Reals, the
Laws of Things, that thereby we may so modify the conjunctures of events as to render events our servants; or
so modify our attitude towards events as to reconcile us
to the fatalities we cannot alter.  Its vision is directed to
processes rather than to objects, and it regards objects
solely in the light of necessary materials for the construetion of general conceptions which are to guide action.
This comparative disregard of the concrete in favor of the
abstract, this transformation of the particular into the
general, of the sensible into the intelligible, is the necessary consequence of our mental limitation.  Every Real
is the complex of so many relations, a conjuncture of so
many events, a synthesis of so many sensations, that to
know one Real thoroughly would only be possible through
an intuition embracing the universe.  This being impos14




314          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
sible, we can only approach a knowledge of an object by
separately studying its several relations, so far as each
can be laid hold of by itself, i. e. by Abstraction. The
nature of our organism  prevents our having more than
one aspect of an object at each instant present to Consciousness; so that relations which are objectively simultaneous are by us perceived successively. In succession
we feel that a thing is visible, tangible, resistant, etc., and
such successions are condensed into a single perception.
Any one element of this group becomes the sign of all the
rest.  Every perception is also an act of judgment which
classes the present feeling with past feelings, and assumes
the presence of unfelt relations. The validity of the perception is the possibility of converting the unfelt into felt
relations.  A scientific conception differs from the simple
perception mainly in its higher degree of abstraction and
generality.  It has constructed general formulas of the
relations of visibility, tangibility, etc., which it extends to
all similar cases, real or imaginary, and thus is furnished
with the Law or condensed synthesis of experiences.
The Laws of Light, of Vision, of Motion, of Muscular
Sensation, of Quantity, of Combination, etc., are all separately studied,- are abstractions from  the processes
actually observed. The mathematician keeps to Quantity,
never allowing himself to be perplexed by considerations
of Quality.  The astronomer fixes attention on the movements of the planets without regarding the structure and
composition of these masses.  The physicist and chemist
separate the molecular relations from  all the phenomena
of Life, and the biologist studies the phenomena of life
apart from historical and social relations. In every science the concrete Real is stripped of all its qualities
except those which the science specially needs for its
construction.  The  actual sensible thing is set aside.
Nor is this all.  The substitution of an ideal object for a




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.            315
sensible object, an abstract for a concrete, is the substitution of a general relation for a particular relation. The
relation of weight in this mass is the relation which will
exist in all similar masses similarly placed; the resistance
recognized in this body is seen to belong to all bodies.
To the geometer a circle is not the round figure visible by
his eye, but a figure visible by his mind, in which all the
radii from  the centre are absolutely elqual; it is not this
particular sensible circle, it is the ideal circle   To the
physicist Heat is not a sensation, but a vibration  of
molecules; to the physiologist it is not a vibration of
molecules, but an affection of a sensory nerve.  The sciences of Thermotics and Acoustics are not records of the
actual phenomena  observed in thermal and sonorous
events, but general relations detached from  them.  The
first effort of the physicist is not to enumerate all the
facts, but to reduce the multiplicity to certain elementary
relations of a mechanical kind; these are then translated
into mathematical formulas, which are operated on as if
they were Hieat and Sound.
111. The universe presented to us is constituted by
Elements, Groups of Elements, and Groups of Groups.
The combinations being practically infinite we can never
know them all, and being complex, we can only approximuate to the knowledge of any.  Imperfect as our knowledle is, it may be absolutely certain, to the extent of its
own reach; and this certainty is secured whenever the
boundaries are not overstepped.  A particular relation is
absolutely certain under the particular conditions; if we
generalize it we must at the same time generalize the
conditions, or else we are substituting a new proposition
in place of the old one.  "That I feel warm at this mloment," is an irresistible truth, though not one valuable to
science.  " That I shall always feel warm," is equally certain, if I generalize the present conditions: but if I sim



316         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
ply assert that I shall always feel warm irrespective of
any change whatever in the conditions, it is clear that I
violate the first principle of rational judgment, unless
I have previously established the fact that warmth is
wholly independent of conditions.
112. Now the power of Science consists in this:
having seized upon the relations that are uniform amid
the relations that are various, and having formulated the
conditions under which phenomena occur, it is enabled to
generalize these, and say " whenever such conditions are
present such phenomena must be present," no matter how
various may be the accompaniments. And observation
having  disclosed that some conditions are very general,
others universal, these are formulated as Laws of Phenomena.  But as all these must be first disclosed by
observation before they are generalized, - as all deductions rest on inductions, and all inductions on sensible
experiences, - Science, which seems to depart from Experience in its pursuit of abstractions, is only a reproduction
of Experience, - a translation of the heterogeneous facts
observed, into the homogeneous relations thought, - and
it errs whenever its abstractions admit any elements not
given in the concretes.
113. The passage from  the abstract to the concrete
can only be the inverse of the passage from the concrete
to the abstract. What was dropped out of sight in establishing the ideal -namely, all the details which particularized the particular phenomena - must be restored in
each particular case. The law of uniform Motion was
reached by abstracting it from all the variations to which
every moving body is subject; in applying this ideal law
to any real case we must compound it with the observed
variations.  That all bodies fall to the earth in equal
times is ideally true, but really false; to make it accord
with fact, we must abstract the resistance of the air,




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.          317
which, inappreciable in the fall of condensed masses, is
appreciable in the fall of masses with surfaces which are
broad compared with their thickness. And so with all
other laws. Applied Mechanics presents us with the
best illustration of ideal laws, true in their generality yet
falsified in every particular case, which are nevertheless
because of their ideal truth the most invaluable guides in
practice.




318          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
CHAPTER IX.
IDEAL CONSTRUCTION IN METAPHYSICS.
114. IN the foregoing exposition of the nature of
Science, stress has been laid on  its being ideal construction and not faithful'2elpresentation of what is, has been,
or could be presented to Sense.  The philosopher looks
away from the Visible and Actual, endeavoring to form a
picture of the Invisible and Possible.*  He strives to
discover not what we should see with sharpened faculties,
but what would be seen were the constitution of things
different from  that which it is.  Philosophy is not an
instrument like the telescope or microscope, intended
only to magnify the powers of Sense, but an organon of
Imagination by which to reconstruct an ideal world of
Abstraction. The first operation of the scientific explorer, either through Speculation or Experiment, is to
strip the phenomlenon under investigation of every character which individualizes it, makes it the particular
phenomenon it is, and to carry this residuum into the
region of generalities, where it finds its place amid others
of a similar order.  The experimenter removes the object
from its normal conditions, placing it ulnder conditions
unlike those in which it is naturally observed, sometimes
under conditions which could not coexist in Nature,- as
when elements are isolated (in retorts) which always rush
into combination when such violent restriction to their
* " In der That ist das Denken wvesentlich die Negation eines unmittelbar Vorhandenen." - HEGEL,.EncyFklopccdic, ~ 12.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.            319
movement is no longer present; and thus we see in the
Laboratory of the Chemist what cannot be seen in the
Laboratory of Nature.
115. It appears, then, that the search in all Science is
never for the Visible whicll Sense reveals, but for the
Irnvisible which Sense obscures.  If, therefore, Truth is
the conformity of Inferences with Sensation, all Science
must be false.  And yet we declare Science to be true;
and moreover declare that its truth  is only reached
through  the ministration of Sense.  A paradox.  Where
is the issue?  It has already been indicated with sufficient clearness.  The truth of Science is the truth of
ideal construction; and  because  its abstractions  are
formed out of sensible concretes, its truths are applicable
to reality in the 2precise degree to w7hich7 the ideaGl comzstrsCetions express the real facts.  Thus the truths of Dynamics
are absolutely exact only in the ideal region, - in mathematical abstraction; and they would be rigorously true
even if they wAere never applied to concrete cases, where
they are necessarily always inexact.  It is because in
the difficult passage from  the ideal to the real, from the
abstract to the concrete, we reverse the process of ideal
construction, and restore the elements which abstraction
has let drop, that ideal truths become realized in observation.  It is because we can show that the abstraction is
only an abbreviated expression of what is constant in the
concretes, that we declare it to be an expression of the
real process of Nature.
116. AVWhen, therefore, the metempiricist proposes his
ideal constructions as guides for Speculation, and asks us
to accept his abstractions with the same reliance that we
yield to those of the mathematician, or physicist, are we
to deny him  that license of Imagination  so  liberally
accorded to the scientific seeker? and if so, on what
grounds?  Ahy may one seeker deliberately look away




320         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
from the plain and palpable order of things revealed to
Sense, in favor of another order constructed by Imagination; whereas the nmetemnpiricist is told that his search is
hopeless because he is wandering beyond the landmarks
of Sense? The experimenter is sufferedlto wrest hydrogen from all its many compounds that it may be studied
in itself; why may not the metaphysician strip an object
of all its sensible qualities to study it in itself?
Whoever can satisfactorily answer this question has
settled for himself the old dispute between Metaphysics
and Science. It has already been answered implicitly in
the preceding pages. An explicit answer may now be
given. Let me premise that in what follows a metaphysician is considered to be one who pursues the metaphysical Method, and constructs his conceptions without
regard to the control of olbjective verification, and is
therefore willing to admit metempirical and empirical
elements among his data.  This Method would be justifiable if the problems mooted had no objective application.
The ideal world of the metempiricist would be as valid as
the ideal world of the empiricist, if by it no attempt, were
made to explain the real world.' The conceptions of the
theologian relating to a world beyond might be irresistibly consistent if confined to that world; but when he
pretends by such conceptions to regulate our condcuct in
this world, we have to demand that he exhibit the necessary connection between the premises and consequences,
and shows us the passage from his abstract conception to
the concrete realities. If he gained his abstract conception by abstraction from real concretes, the reversal of
the process will be a demonstration of the truth of his
conclusion. If he gained it thus his Method was scientific, and his results must be tested by the canons of Science. But if he framed his conception on the subjective
MIethodl, and attempts to explain the External Order by




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.           321
laws not originally gathered from experience of it, we reject the validity of his procedure.  What is here said of
the theologian applies equally to the metaphysician.
117. The ideal constructions of Science are built up
from the real elements of Experience.  The abstractions
are raised from verifiable facts.  If the law of Motion is
never actually presented in Nature, its elements are presented; and experiment can demnonstrate - i. e. reduce to
Intuition - what sensory organs can never see. The intuitions. of Science are not gleams of Fantasy, not arbitrary assumptions, not traditional assents for which no
better reason can be given than that they are in the mind
and are held to be truths; they are organized experie~nces,
which although often no longer decomposable into their
elements, and therefore presenting themselves as instantaneous and indubitable acts of Thought, are nevertheless
composite, and disclose to analysis the sensible elements
from which they were constructed, - these elements call
be recognized no less indubitably than the carbon and
oxygen can be recognized in the carbonic acid which presents itself in chalk.* Inferences are only reproduced
sensations; they become so welded with their sensible
accompaniments that at length the groups are indissoluble; they are then known as intuitions, i. e. as instantaneous undecomposable acts of mental vision.  Just as we
have all an intuition of distance in every vision of an object, so we have an intuition of a mathematical, or of a
causal, relation in every presentation of terms that are
familiar.  That 7 + 5-12, or that central forces decrease according to the inverse squares, is seen with nearly
the same rapidity, and with a certainty quite the same as
that an object is distant. Remote as the intuition of central forces is from its sensible data, there is no doubt that
it was originally constructed from  such data; and only
* Compare here HEGEL, E2cykllo2pcedie, ~ 66.
14*                            U




322          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
by an inverse reduction to these data can it be dqemonstrated to one who disputes its validity.
118. The abstractions and intuitions of Science being
always expressions of sensible Experience can always be
verified; whereas the abstractions and intuitions which
play a great part in Metaphysics often want this basis;
and are seen, on analysis, to be traditional prejudices, or
unverified assumptions, — OVK     C aaOTcv, as Aristotle
says of the Pythagorean notions.  Take an example:
Science regards Motion as an ultimate, consequently declines to seek for its cause.  Not so Metempirics: "Les
philosophes,' says Maupertius, "qui ont mis la cause dlu
mouvement en Dieu, n'y ont et6 reduits que parcequ'il
ne savoient ou la mettre.  Ne pouvant concevoir que la
matiere eut aucune efficace pour produire, distribuer, et
detenir le mouvement, ils ont eu recours a un i9tre immnateriel." That is to say, dissatisfied with an ultimate, they
had recourse to a fiction..... "Mais lorsqu'on saura
que toutes les loix du mouvement et du repos sont fondees sur le Principe du  fieux, on ne pourra plus douter
qu'elles ne doivent leur etablissement'a un ~tre tout ]puissant et tout sage..... Ce n'est done point dclans Ic me'anique que je vais cehercher ces loix; c'est dans la sagesse de
I'~teGc sup2reme." *  And it is on the strength of this principle that he deduces his famous "principle of least action,'principe si sage, si digne de l'E]tre supreme.'"  The intuition of a Supreme Being may indeed be advanced as a
ground for the inference that he would act in the most
intelligent manner; and Maupertius is strictly logical in
assuming that since the principle of least action appears
both wise and worthy of the Supreme Being, it may be
accepted as the principle in operation. But who can fail
to see that this Intuition, and the assumed wisdom of the
principle, are altogether wanting in a sensible basis; arind
* MIAUPErTIUS, Essai de Cos2nologie; (Euvres, p. 18. Dresden, 1752.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.              323
that a simple denial of the Being, or denial of the wisdom
of this procedure, leaves the argument powerless?  Nothing would then be left to Mlaupertius but to reiterate the
assertion of his intuition. The fact that the " principle
of least action" has been turned to account by mnathematicians rests solely on the logical truth it involves, and
not at all on its being the intuition of a Best.
119. By similar intuitions the Pythagoreans justified
their doctrines.  "Since ten appeared to them the perfect
number, potentially containing all numbers, they declared
that the moving celestial bodies were ten in number; and
because only nine bodies are visible, they imagined a
tenth, -  the Anticthone." *
120. The metaphysician may object that I have here
adduced exploded errors; I will therefore adduce one not
open to this criticism, namely, the assumption - which
is frequently passed off as an intuition not to be disputed
- of the Soul being a simple substance because it is the
opposite of Matter.  That it is a substance at all ought
first to be established; whether or not the substance is
simple would be a subsequent point for research. But
the assumption once made, there are deduced from it the
necessary consequences of freedom and immortality,which conclusions were in fact the grounds of the original
assumption. I do not intend here to discuss this question,l- I only wish to point out that we have no sensible
data into which such an intuition can be resolved: we
have no experience from which the simplicity of the
A*,ISTOTLE, Xletaplh., I. 5.
1 Whether the soul is or is not a simple substance is of no consequence
to us in the explanation of its phenomena. For we cannot render the
notion of a simple being intelligible by any possible experience sensuously
or ins concrete. The notion is therefore quite void as regards all hopedfor insight into the cause of phenomena, and cannot at all serve as a
principle of the explanation of that which internal or external experience
supplies. - KANT, Prolegonzena, ~ 44, trans. by _JLahc]ffy, p. 129.




324           PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
soul's substance can be a necessary conclusion analogous
to the conclusions of Science. It is founded on the negation of Matter.  AVe imagine that it must be whatever
Matter is not.  But negations furnish no positive data.*
121. Hegel saw that Philosophy is the transformation
of sensations and perceptions into abstractions; yet in
his own system it is obvious that abstractions are sometimes raised from  concrete experiences, and sometimes
from intuitions which are defective in their sensible basis.
Although admitting Experience to be the sole foundation,
he objects to the Empirical Method because, he says, it
contains within it no unviersality, no necessity: it is
occupied wholly with particulars and cannot rise to generals.
Were this objection true in fact, it would be fatal in
effect.  It is, however, false.  Its plausibility is dependent on the unwarrantable restriction of Experience to
Perception, - a restriction which is one of the commonest
of philosophical mistakes.  In virtue of this it appears
that the Empirical Method can only deal with particulars,
and can never reach universal and necessary truths.  This
is the cleval de batacille of Metempirics, and I shall presently devote a chapter to its refutation. If, however,
the Empirical Method is incompetent, where are we to
seek an explanation of universal and necessary conditions?
In the laws of Thought, says Hegel; and these laws he
admits belong to Experience, though he is not successful
* Exploded errors are instructive, we may therefore profit by such
argument as Frascotorio advances in his once celebrated Itomocentriac to
prove that the stars cannot have independent motion, this being " totally
at variance with our notion of a simple and undecaying substance like
the heavenly bodies. For that which is simple is altogether single, and
singleness is only of one nature, and one nature can only be the cause of
one effect." It had not occurred to him that before a fact could be discredited by its variance from our notion, the absolute accuracy of the
notion itself needed demonstration.




filHE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.        325
in deducing them  from  it. What is the consequence?
It is that the deductions drawn by him from these said
laws of Thought are often found to be absurdly at variance with Experience; and that so far from his laws of
Thought being in accordance with the laws of Things
reached inductively, they are at times positively ridiculous in their misrepresentations.  His mistake is that
while avowing the origin of Knowledge to be sensible
experiences, yet because Reason is a higher development
of these experiences, he imagines that deductions from
rational premises have a higher validity than the inductions from  sensible premises; forgetting that these
rational premises themselves receive their validity from
the sensible inductions.  The prejudice in favor of the
higher validity of rational premises is very intelligible.
We find that particular experiences have often little
value because they are particular, whereas generalities
include multitudes of experiences, and have a multiform
value. Hence the philosopher takes his stand upon generalities as upon some sacred mount from whence are
delivered the texts of a higher revelation. It is the purpose of his labors to apply these texts to the confused
tumult of sensible experiences, interpreting the manycolored phenomena of the world by the pure light of
reason.
122. To conclude: Science owes its certitude to the
power of resolving its ideal constructions into elements
of sensible experience; Mletempirics owes its incessant
incertitude to the Method on which it is pursued not
requiring, and very often not being able to effect, the
reduction of its intuitions to sensations, its abstractions
to sensible concretes. Because it disdains the Empirical
Method of construction and step-by-step verification, it is
obliged to assume principles which no Experience has
guaranteed and which none can confirm. The Supra



326          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
sensible is got at analytically by analysis of analysis.
Why may it not be as legitimate as analysis of sensibles?
or as differentials of differentials? Because it cannot be
sensibly integrated.  No synthetic verification is possible,
- no re-entrance from the abstract into the concrete.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.        327
CHAPTER X.
THE SEARCH AFTER CAUSES.
123. PHILOSOPHY is the generalization of Research.
What is sought? The causes of visible appearances; not
the appearances themselves, for they are already found.
On this point there is unanimity. Yet observe the contradiction! Many philosophers, metaphysical and positive, declare that causes cannot be known. If beyond
knowledge, why then are they sought? Comte is less
paradoxical than those metaphysicians who hold causes to
be inscrutable; for he consistently declares that the search
after a cause is frivolous because futile; they admit it to
be futile, yet pronounce it to be man's highest prerogative.
124. Here, as in so many other cases, the initial defect
is in the presentation of the problem. The terms are
used in fluctuating senses, the conclusions fluctuate with
them. There has been a general outcry against Comte's
condemnation of the search after causes; and it has been
in so far merited that his polemic is rather against the
term and its connotations than against the idea of Cause.
In practice he is found introducing Law in the place of
Cause; and what philosophers denote by Cause is simply
what he denotes by Law. What many of them connote
both by Cause and Law he rejects, and in this rejection
he is supported by all scientific teachers. There is a
metempirical conception of Law which is the precise
equivalent of the metempirical conception of Cause.
There is also an empirical conception of Cause which is




328         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
the precise equivalent of Law. We need not therefore
adopt Comte's rejection of a term which is familiar, and
may be made precise; we have only to make ourselves
fully aware of its metempirical connotations, and eliminate them, as we eliminate all metempirical elements.
125. Phenomena present themselves in Experience as
dependent on other phenomena which precede and coexist with them,- varying as these vary, being theirfunction (to speak mathematically). We detach these dependencies and connections, and call the abstractions cainses.
Obviously the search after these is strictly scientific;
Science has no other object. But metempirical philosophers have been dissatisfied with such results. Seeking
for revelations of Existence which transcend the concrete
revelations of Experience, they presuppose a mysterious
something over and above the mere relation of dependence, a Power by which the connection is affected (the
Efficient Cause), or a Purpose for which it was effected
(the Final Cause). It is this conception of a transcendental'Causality, efficient and final, which Comte condemns,
and which must be condemned by all who recognize the
fault against rational Method which transforms knowable
dependencies into unknowable entities. I believe, however, that if we eliminate the metempirical elements from
the conception of efficient causes, the search after efficient
causes is not only justifiable, but may be successful.
126. The metaphysician who discards the Method of
Science, and believes in the possibility of our knowing
the Supra-sensible, will of course demur to such an elimination. His constant complaint against our Method is
that its field of vision is too narrow. "Granting all you
claim," he says, "you can only expound the How, and
must ever remain silent respecting the lWhy. A miserable restriction! The impatience of the soul to apprehend
the Why has urged in all past ages, and in all ages to




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.          329
come will urge men to the noble study of Philosophy.  It
is this which inspires the divine desire to penetrate the
secrets of the plan divine. It is restless until the causes
have been found, and however baffled, it will not be appeased by an exposition of mere laws of connection and
dependence.  To know that the facts are thus or thus is
useful, and by such knowledge Science subserves the uses
of mankind.  But utility is not Philosophy; and is far
below the sublime aspiration of knowing uwhy the facts are
thus or thus, and knowing that the course of Nature must
be what it is, and why it must be so."
A sublime aspiration, it may be, but it is only an aspiration, - a mere breath. This is evident when we come
to learn the genesis of knowledge and its limitations.
Then we see the WVhy resolved into the How; then we
see that it is a verbal distinction, not a real distinction;
and that it is only by an artifice that Cause can be separated from Conditions.
THE IDEAS OF CAUSE AND SUBSTANCE.
127. The investigation of any phenomenon, or group
of phenomena, may be likened to the exploration of the
sources of a river. The wanderer follows the river from
the sea through valleys and watercourses till it is lost
in a lake. The exploring mind is unsatisfied, and asks,
Whence the lake? From streams that have their origin
in rivulets, and these rivulets in water-threads oozing
from  the mountain-side.  He ascends the steep sides,
guided by the trickling brightness, till finally he arrives
at the vast snow-fields of the summit.  There, where earth
ceases, he stands thrilled, awed, perplexed. Before him
lies the wide expanse of snow, above him the wider sweep
of sky. All traces of the river have vanished, and this
mystery fionts him. The restless craving for a cause, or
origin, is unappeased. The snow was the origin of the




330         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
river, but whence the snow? It must have a cause. It
is not an origin, but a landing-place. The river was only
the snow fluent.  Onwards the exploring mind proceeds,
following the snow into the clouds, where it appears as
delicate vesicles of water enclosing air.  This water,
whence? It rose in exhalations from the sea. The explorer thus returns to his point of departure. And whence
the sea? It is not the origin of the water, since it visibly
receives the water from the land. Thus the circle of
movement runs.  Further examination discloses that
every single particle of water persists unchanged through
all its changing fellowships with other particles, and with
changing Heat, Air, Salts, etc., as it successively forms an
integer of rivulet and river, cloud and snow. It is these
particles which alone are real. Rivulet or river, cloud or
snow, is an abstraction, - a group of events.  The form
of the river, and its course through the land, give it individuality as a phenomenon; but these are obviously determined by the conjunture of external events.  Its individuality at each stage expresses these conjunctures; and
that which was a babbling brook is now a navigable river
only by the co-operation of new conjunctures; the thread
of light, the cloud of spray, the floating mist and leaping
cataract, the snow-flake and the breaker, are embodied
histories. Each successive form is a succession of events,
each event having been determined by some prior group.
This is the circulation of Cause.  Causation is immanent
Change.
128. Throughout these transformations there has been
something persistent, something that has not changed,
namely, the Existence we call Substance; and it is this
persistent Value whose changing Positions have determined the events.  If the clhanges are causes, the chang#ed
is substance. Cause and Substance, Force and Matter,
are the indissoluble elements of every phenomenon.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.          331
129. Corresponding with these two divisions of the
one Existence there are two lines of incluiry. Either we
seek to know what is, or how it came to be what it is:
the thing, or its history; Ontology or Ontogeny. The
first goal is reached when we have defined the thing, and
described the phenomenon under those aspects which it
presents to Sense, or Intuition; with the implied understanding that under similar conditions it will present
these to all minds.  The second goal is reached when we
have described the antecedent and coexistent conditions
which determine the phenomenon to be what it is; and
since each of these conditions is itself a phenomenon,
having its history therefore, and being a complex of
events, the pursuit must be interminable if not arbitrarily
limited. This ar7bitrarcintess in the definition of Cause
will have to be invoked by and by; enough for the present to have indicated it.
130. We conclude, then, that a thing is what it cppears.  It is the expression of a particular history of
events, the group of conditions which are said to determine it. We may abstract these conditions, and consider
each of them by itself, or two or more together; but in
this abstraction the thing disappears, and we have only
one or more of its causes. Again, we may consider the
whole group of conditions, and then the thing reappears
as the expression of this totality. There is nothing in
the object that is not in the conditions, unless we artifically eliminate the conditional substance; there is nothinc in the conditions- thus defined- that is not in the
object.  Our logical separation of a Thing from its Relations is only possible in so far as we can severally consider any one aspect of a Thing, without considering the
Thing as a complex.
131. The search for a cause, origin, or history is a
speculative instinct prompted by our needs and cherished




332            PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
by constant experience of events depending on other
events.* But this instinct, like most other instincts, is
sometimes misleading, and is peculiarly so in Philosophy,
where it manifests itself as a craving for double sight:
dissatisfied with a vision of what the thing is, we desire
to know what it is not and cannot be, — and we are
under the stranoe hallucination that this imaginary state,
this aspect which the thing does not and cannot present
to us, is more real and enduring than the fleeting phenomenal aspect which alone it can present to us!  Not
content with a vision of the group of relations actually
existing, and of those which preceded it, Speculation
craves for a vision of the thing, or event, in itself, -  i.e.
unrelated: in  other words, as it does not and cannot
exist.t
THE HOW  AND THE WHY.
132. Our restless impatience,  dissatisfied  with  the
How, demands a Why, andsseeks a cause of the cause.
We see that oxygen unites with hydrogen, the product
being water.  This is hoow  water is'formed; but this is
not enough for us, and we ask, Why?  And the question
is answered when the chemist shows how certain conditions of motion, pressure, and temperature determine the
result, - how the loss of a given amount of heat from the
" Notre tendance intellectuelle a chercher les causes de tout objet qui
frappe notre attention," says Sophie Germain, one of the few women
who have been distinguished mathematicians, "me paraltrait indiquer
que nous n'apergevons pas l'objet dans son entier.  11 s'offre' nous avec
le caractere fractionnaire; nous demandons quelle en est l'unite.  Nous
le voyons comrne etant une partie; nous voulons connaitre le tout
auquel cette partic appartient." - Consid'rations gnircbdcs szr lI'tat des
sciences, p. 41. 1833.
t "Das Dingansich als solches," says Hegel, "ist nicht Anderes als
die leere Abstraction von aller Bestimmtheit, von dem man allerdings
ntichzts wissen kann, eben darum weil es die Abstraction von aller Bestimmnung seyn soll." - Logikc, II. 127.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.        333
two gases causes their condensation into water. The
Why or How is simply the conditions under which the
union takes place, or (as it is otherwise phrased) the conditions by which the effect is produced, caused. When
these conditions are enumerated, the IWhy is given.
There is no other Why in operation; - unless indeed we
choose to consider as a part of the operant conditions any
or all of the antecedent conditions which determine these.
But as this would involve a regress of causation through
the whole past history of the Cosmos, no one thinks of
such an extension of the inquiry.
133. But while the positive thinker affixes these
limits, and accepts the immediate conditions as the causal
conditions, accepting these as full explanation of the
Whlly, - since it is an explanation of the How, — the
metaphysical thinker demands that the How of the HFlow,
or the Why of the How, should be explained; and is not
satisfied by a regress to antecedent conditions; on the
contrary, he demands a transcendental condition. Over
and above those sensible conditions, which the physicist
assigns, he believes there is an undefinable Something,
named Power, which causes the oxygen to unite with hydrogen,- a something which gives these conditions their
efficiency. This Power he either conceives to be external
to the substances, or immanent in them; in the one case
he regards it as the action of the Deity, operating on and
through the gases; in the other case as the action of a
Force, - Affinity; in both cases the Power is assumed to
be the efficient Agent; and this Agent some thinkers believe to be knowable through an Intuition not dependent
upon Experience; other thinkers declare to be unknowable, thoulgh undeniable.
134. The objection to both these views is that the
assumed Power is wholly without a basis in sensible Experience, and must be excluded from the province of




334         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
Research, to be relegated to the province of the Suprasensible, which demands a special organ, and has no
community with positive knowledge. Nor is this all.
Granting the presence of such an Agent, it would be
powerless in the absence of the substantial conditions,
and would vary in its effect with every variation of these
conditions. Since, therefore, the knowable effect depends
on and varies with the known conditions, and since,
moreover, nothing is given in Experience except the fact
of the union, and the fact of the conditions, it is clear
that the introduction of a Power, over and above these, is
superfluous.  If any one ask, Why is the planetary path
elliptical? he is answered when the conditions are enumerated which determine that path to be elliptical, and
not otherwise. If this How be further questioned, and a
Why be sought, it again resolves itself into another How,
and so on in endless regress of conditions, unfolding dependencies on dependencies, till the final pause: " This
is so because Nature is so, or because God has willed it
so.,
135. No one asks for a WVhy in mathematics; to show
the How, to demonstrate the proposition, is enough. No
one asks why a circle has every point of its circumference equidistant from the centre, or why all its radii
must be equal. But one may ask why it is impossible
to draw such a circle on paper; and the question is
answered by showing how from the necessary unevenness
of the surface there must be unevenness in the tracing.
So long as the circle was ideal it was perfect, for it
depended solely on ideal conditions; directly it was
dependent on real conditions it expressed those and their
departures from the ideal definition. The ideal conditions are unalterable for they are self-contained; the real
conditions are variable for -they have varying dependencies on others.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.          335
136. Hence the distinction between the How and the
Why expresses something like the distinction between a
consideration of the object and a consideration of its history; and as the object is truly its embodied history, - it
being simply the group of Relations, — the How and the
Why are essentially one.
THE TWO CONCEPTIONS OF LAW.
137. I said there was a conception of Cause which
was the precise equivalent of the conception of Law,
whether the empirical or the metempirical point of view
be taken; Comte's rejection of the term Cause and his
substitution of Law, therefore, could only be justified on
the ground of his understanding the one term in its metempirical, and the other in its empirical sense.
138. The metempirical conception of Law  is that
phenomena are rcegulated, determined by certain active
Agencies, very much in the manner of passive bodies
coerced to obey external forces. The Laws of Nature are
regarded in the light of Statutes.  These statutes men
are said occasionaly to violate; and God is supposed to
suspend their action in Miracles.  Even minds of a less
theological leaning regard the Laws of Nature as Powers
attendant on, or immanent in, Matter.
139. The empirical conception of Law is that of an
abstraction of observed dependencies. It is thus another
term for Cause, another aspect of a Fact. It is a term for
Cause when it expresses the process and the conditions of
a change, - e. g. the law of Gravitation.  It is a term for
Fact when it expresses these conditions solely, without
reference to change, - e. g. the fact of Gravitation, the
fact that air has weight, or that pressure in a fluid is
propagated equally in all directions. Since facts and
causes are innumerable, and are of various dearees of importance and frequency, it is useful to have a term which




336         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
designates those facts or causes which have a special importance; the term selected has been Law.
140. Had the essential identity of Law, Cause, and
Fact been duly apprehended, much misty speculation
would have been dissipated.  IMen would have recognized that by Law or Cause, they were only expressing
what had been observed, or inferred as Fact. Tile new
term implied no addition to the old. But unhappily the
tendency to suppose that'a distinction in terms denotes a
corresponding  distinction in things early led men to suppose that Law really denoted something over and above
Fact. A Law of Nature is not an Agent nor an Agency
by which substances are coerced, but an abstract expression of the series of positions which substances assume
under given conditions. It is not a creator of the phenomena, it is their formula. It does not precede and
coerce them, it is evolved by them. No positive biologist imagines that the Laws of Life determine animal and
vegetal forms; the metempirical biologist imagines this,
and believes in the objective existence of Types. What
Types are in Biology, Laws are in Philosophy: ideal constructions expressing the observed uniformities among
phenomena. But these uniformities do not depend on
some agency apart from the constituent integers of the
phenomena, they- are simply the expression of the Coexistent Values.*
141. That Law and Cause are the same, appears directly we restore the concretes from which they are abstracted. Thus the law of gravitation is the cause of
gravitation, whether regarded as immanent or external,
i. e. as the gravitating process of the bodies in motion
towards each other, or as the external pressures moving
the bodies. The cause of planetary motion - or its law
-may be described as the motion determined by tan* See Prob. II. for a fuller elucidation of this term.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.            337
gential and centripetal motions, or as the motion due to
the sun's position; in the one case the cause is regarded
in its immanence, in the other case in its externality.
When thus we eliminate from the conception of Cause
all its metempirical connotations, it becomes identical
with the empirical conception of Law; and the search
after causes - nay, after efficient causes -is strictly
philosophical.
15                              v




338          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
CHAPTER XI.
INTUITION AND DEMONSTRATION.
142. THE main positions occupied by those who defend
the Metaphysical Method, and by those who believe in the
possibility of Metempirics, are the evidences of a source
of knowledge which is antecedent to and independent of
Experience, and of a kind of knowledge which transcends
Experience.  W~e must have a higher organ, it is said,
because we have the higher knowledge. That organ is
Intuition, that knowledge is Necessary Truth.
All that has been written in the preceding pages would
be either set aside as erroneous, or disregarded as irrelevant, if these two positions were left in the possession of
our antagonists.
143. The ancient doctrine of Innate Ideas having been
relinquished, or modified till it became ineffectual, the
doctrine of Intellectual Intuition was put forward in its
place. The most precise form this doctrine assumed was
that given it by Jacobi, when he affirmed that over and
above the intuitions of sensible objects, we had a special
organ of rational intuition for the perception of supra-sensibles.*  He admitted that its special intuitions are given
in the overflow of feeling (in iiberschcdngylichen Gefiihle),
but declared these to be nevertheless truly objective.  It
was this organ which Schelling christened the Intellectual Intuition, and to it assigned the principle of Demonstration and final ground of Certitude.
* JACOBI, Wetrke, II. 55. " Die Vernunft ist das unkbrperliche Organ
fiiu die Warhnehmungen des Uebersinnlichen." Comp. also p. 59.




filHE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.         339
144. Jacobi was misled, I think, by an imperfect appreciation of the nature of Demonstration.  He said that
the conviction gained through demonstration is a certainty at second hand; it rests on comparison, and can
never be perfectly secure. "If, then, every opinion is
Faith, which does not issue from Reason, so must conviction from rational grounds issue from Faith, and owe its
force to Faith alone."*  There is an equivoque here.
Conviction is assuredly a feeling, and Reason has only
force in proportion to the feeling involved. But although
the certainty of a demonstration may be reached by a
comparison of feelings, and is thus second-hand, what is
usually understood by Faith is not this comparison of
feelings, not the reduction of inferences to sensations, but
the reliance on unverified inferences. Granting that Feeling is the common basis of sensible and rational inference, we cannot admit that any unverified inferences are
to be accepted as objective truths.  My conviction that
the object before me is an apple, and my conviction that
the riots in Ireland are parts of a "providential scheme,"
may be equally true expressions of my state of feeling, -
I who have these convictions cannot doubt that I have
them, - but one or both may be absolutely false expressions of the objective realities; and their truth or falsehood can only be demonstrated by the reduction of what
is inferential in each to its correspondent sensibles.  In
the case of the apple such a reduction may be easy.  In
the case of the providential scheme it is impossible, simply because the providential scheme is a conception framed
out of data which never were and never could be sensible.
And herein is displayed the futility of this pretended organ.  It professes to deal with supra-sensibles, yet these
can only be thought of under sensible forms.  Nor let it
be urged that precisely this is the course followed with
* JACOBI, Wrerfke, IV. 210.




340         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
respect to extra-sensibles. The only test there admitted,
namely, the reduction of the extra-sensibles to the sensible standard, is the very test which the theologian and
metemnpiricist reject.  For if that test be admitted, it
brings the Supra-sensible within the range of Experience,
and thus Religion and Mletaphysics become amenable to
the MIethod of Science; a AIethod which, by excluding
whatever cannot be verified, at once sets aside a mass of
speculations declared to be unverifiable, and a mass of
dogmas declared to be absurd.
145. No reader firmly persuaded that the mind of man
is endowed with the power of apprehending the Suprasensible can be expected to relinquish that belief, coerced
by the arguments here advanced; it is with himn a question of Faith, and cannot be shaken by Logic.. But in
opposition we may say to him: "The existence of such a
power requires proof, and when proven it can only serve
to construct a system of conceptions which have no analogy, or point of intersection, with the conceptions conlstructed out of sensible  experiences; this being so,
whatever range it may have it must be excluded from all
theories having reference to the sensible world."
Our Method does not exclude mystery from the Universe, it only excludes it from  Science, and assigns it
to the region of the Metempirical,"whose margin fades
forever and forever as we move."  The doctrine of Intellectual Intuition is not only disputable, it is futile. But
while rejecting its pretensions we may with advantage
accept and interpret the facts it improperly classifies, and
admit the existence of Experiential Intuition.  This we
will here consider.
146. Demonstration is the showing to Sense or Intuition, in other words, the reduction of Inference to its
corresponding sensations, either directly through Sense,
or indirectly through Intuition.
VL LILLIVVV I~VLIV0




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.               341
If I wish to demonstrate that three objects added to
three others will form  a group numerically equivalent to
another group, named six, this can be done by a direct
appeal to Sense, placing the groups side by side; or, by
an indirect appeal through Intuition, the ratio symbolized in 3 + 3 = 6 being intuited with a certainty equal
to that which accompanied the vision of the groups.  For
this intuition to be possible, the sensible experiences must
have preceded it; but once formed, the sensible experiences pass into symbols and are intuited. Just as Algebra
in virtue of its generality can effect operations which are
difficult to Arithmetic, and operations which are impossible to Arithmetic, so Intuition can detect relations which
are obscure to Sense, and relations inaccessible to Sense.
Thus although it it easy to see that three objects placed
beside three others form  a group equivalent to a group
of six, the acutest eye would fail to detect at a glance
that sixty objects placed beside sixty others were equivalent to a group of one hundred and twenty; but where
Sense is bewildered by the multiplicity of objects, Intuition sees at a glance the equivalence of their ratios.
We may therefore define Intuition as Mental Vision, or
as the Perception of Relations.*  It is differenced from
Sensation on the one hand in that it sees objects not only
as they affect Sense, but also in their relations to each
other, and sees these present as constituent elements of
the group; so that the intuition of an object includes a
much wider range of Experience than a perception of the
* "In English writers this term has of late been vaguely used to express all convictions which are arrived at without conscious reasoning,
whether referring to relations among our primary perceptions or to conceptions of the most derivative and complex nature. But if we were
allowed to restrict the use of this term we might conveniently confine it
to those cases in which we necessarily apprehend relations of things truly
as soon as we conceive the objects distinctly." - WHEWELL, T,~e l~echanical Euclid, p. 182. 1849.




342          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
object. From Conception, on the other hand, it is differenced by its restriction to definite particular objects and
relations, always therefore reproducing the forms of sensible experiences; whereas Conception never does this,
being in its nature analytical, general, abstract.
It is often impossible to demonstrate (to Sense) what
it is impossible to doubt when intuited.  Thus after
proving that the area of a spherical triangle depends on
the sum of its angles, we cannot exhibit to Sense that any
two spherical triangles which have their sides and angles
equal, each to each, have equal areas; because if they are
symmetrical angles they can no more be made to coincide
than a right and left hand can get into the same glove.*
But the intuition of equality is perfect in this case.
147. This perception of ratios or intuition of equality,
that two things equal to a third must be equal to each
other, is in constant requisition. If I have a vacant space,
and a box which I wish to place in it, my sensible perception of the relation between the boundaries of the
space and those of the box is too imperfect for guidance;
I cannot see the equality, but I can measure with a footrule both the space and the box, and finding that each
contains this measure the same number of times, I conclude that the box will not go into the space; or, if the
space contains the measure and something over, I conclude the box will go into it.
148. Intuition under its ideal aspect is Judgment.
Demonstration is the exhibition of the grounds. WVe
call judgment, 1~, itnuitive, when the relations seem to
embody experiences which are not specified or cannot
now be specified, although originally they were capable
of being so; and, 2~, discursive, when many or all of the
experiences are or can be specified. The conclusion which
is seen so rapidly that its premises are but faintly or nob
* Comp. on this point KANT, Prolegomena, ~ 13.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.            343
at all recognized is said to be seen intuitively: it is an
organized judgment.  Its rapidity and certainty, together
with our reliance on all spontaneous actions, have led to
the notion, that Intuition is a source of peculiar validity.
But Intuition is ideal vision, and. is no less liable to error
than sensible vision. It also has its illusions, and needs
the control of Verification. In the perception of an ob(ject we are unconscious of the many evanescent muscular
feelings by which its distance is estimated and its shape
inferred.  These relations are intuited; and because the
judgments are so rapid, and so inevitable, we regard the
perception of distance and the shape of the object as
given in an immediate apprehension.  Analysis, however,
discloses that the evanescent processes of whlich we are
unconscious must have taken place; and in the early
days of Experience the processes took place slowly, consciously.  All our other intuitions are organized experiences, groups of neural processes which originally were
isolated. They are to the mind what automatic actions
are to the body.  Their mechanism  is concealed because
their action is so easy and so rapid. Among the automatic actions there are tricks of Habit, peculiar to the
individual, tricks peculiar to his family, and tricks peculiar to his race; these are all perfectly irresistible, although often serving no purpose, and representing no vital
necessity.  Among our intuitions there are likewise tricks
of Thought and Feeling, i. e. some personal prejudices, or
traditions of the family, sect, nation; and these are irresistible even when Reason sees theml to be absurd.  We
have to be on our guard against illusory Perception, we
must be equally on our guard against illusory Intuition.
In both cases the illusion arises from accepting what is
only inferred as if it were really seen.
149. I wvill select examples of illusory intuition not
from Theology or Ethics, where some intuitions which




344          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
are demonstrable fallacies are often appealed to as final
arbiters, but from  Science, e. g. the once common, now
exploded, induction of "Nature's horror of a vacuum,"
and the more common and still popular induction of
weight being inherent in bodies: two judgments which
had become so organized that they passed for intuitions.
The first has long been recognized to be a fiction; the
second, which seems like direct experience, is an illusion.
When daily and hourly familiarity showed that bodies
had weight, and that no alteration in their condition
affected this weight, but that whether solid, liquid, or
aeriform, the balance proved them to preserve this quality throughout these  changes, experiment seemed to
guarantee the intuitive judgment; and the most sceptical regarded weight as an absolute quality belonging to
the very nature of bodies, since it was a quality which
did not alter under changing conditions.  Now as a judgment expressing the facts of experience this intuition of
weight was exact; but as an inference respecting the
absolute quality inherent in bodies, the intuition was
illusory, that is to say, it was an induction, not a real
intuition.  It was proved to be illusory when NTewton
showed that gravity was a relation dependent on the position of bodies.  The weight of a body was unaffected
by any change in the condition of form, structure, or
combination of that body, simply because these conditions were not co-operant factors; the phenomenon did
not express them, did not depend on them, therefore it
could not vary with their variations.  No sooner were
the real factors of gravity detected than weight awas
found to vary with them, and thus, like all other qualities, was seen to be variable and relative.* The illusion
* Comp. PoissoN, TraitM de MJecaniqgue, I. 280. The attraction of
gravity varies as the inverse square of the distance from the earth's centre,
if we disregard the flattening at the poles acnd the centrifugal force, and




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.             345
consisted in inferring that what was true of bodies under
all changes which had been investigated, would be equally
true of bodies under all changes whatever, and that no
investigation of other relations would disclose a variation
in weight.  But this inference needed verification; and
it needed it all the more because when ren observed that
bodies did not vary under certain varying conditions, they
ought to have suspected that this constancy was an indication of the observed conditions not being factors, since
the real factors could not vary without a corresponding
variation in the phenomenon.
150. The reader has doubtless noticed with surprise
and misgiving that in the foregoing passage the word
Intuition has a wider range than usual, wider indeed
than my own definition of it as the perception of relations.  Not only does it there represent Judglment, but
even Induction.  MAy purpose was to fix attention on the
possible illusions of Intuition, because so many writers
regard it with a sort of superstitious reverence, as if coming from  a supra-natural source; and further I wished
to insist on the essential uniformity in all psychical processes.  Intuition is beholding: A/scchan Icung, the Gerlmans
call it.  We have sensible intuitions, rational intuitions,
and moral intuitions, each of \which is liable to the same
possibility of illusion.  Our intuitions of Space, Time, Motion, Quantity, etc., are constructed out of sensible experiences which lie so far back in the dim  past that the
subtlest analysis is taskedl to detect their elements, and
therefore nmany philosophers regard these intuitions as
anterior to all Experience, being original endowments of
the organism.  The sense in which this is acceptable is
expounded in ~ 23.  A  similar remarlk applies to our
rational intuitions, such as Substance, Cause, Equality,
conceive the earth to be, what it is not, a spherical mass. But in the interior of the earth gravity followrs a new law. - II. 28.
15 *




346          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
etc., which, in the gratuitous and restricted meaning of
the word Experience (that of sensible affection), never
could have been experienced. In a less degree there is a
similar difficulty with respect to such mloral intuitions as
Freedom, Responsibility, Duty, etc.
151. The validity of all these intuitions depends on
their reduction to identical propositions; in other words,
whether the relations are what we see them  to be.  The
possibility of error lies in the possibility of our supposing
that we see what we only infer.  Intuition must therefore be distinguished from  Induction as vision is from
Inference. Intuition is the clear vision of relations; Induction is the inferelnce that the phenomena now seen in
this particular case, or these few cases, will be equally
visible in many, or all, cases resembling these.  That the
angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal, or
that the square of 5 is 25, are intuitions, and admit of no
doubt when the relations are clearly seen.  We then
know that the relations are what they are seen to be: for
we have before us all the elements expressed by the
propositions.  But " all crows are black" is an induction:
it is an inference that whenever a bird is found presenting
the general characters classified under crow, it will also
present this one character of a black plumage.  The uncertainty of this inference lies in our not having before
us all the generating conditions, and therefore we cannot
know  that there are not birds possessing all the other
characters of the crow, and with these a white or gray
plumage.  We cannot reduce our proposition to an identical proposition; although if we choose to throw it into
that form and say "all black croiws are and must everywhere be black," it has the same irresistible certainty that
belongs to our propositions about angles and squares.
159. It is important to bear in mind the grounds on
which we admit the validity of intuitions, because, as




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.          347
was formerly hinted, there are judgments which have the
characters of intuitions (namlely, immediate apprehension
and irresistible conviction) which are nevertheless illusions, - are spurious intuitions.  On the other hand there
are inductions which although formulated without a clear
vision of the generating conditions, are nevertheless freed
from all uncertainty by being enrunciated so as to include
these, and to exclzude all other conditions.  The uncertainty
lies precisely in the ignorance of whether the cases to
which our induction is extended are, or are not, legitimately classed with the cases which furnished the inference; and it would necessarily cease if this assumed
hormogeneity could be verified; or if the induction were
converted into an identical equation.  Thus although we
do not know all the conditions which determine the
death of animals, the induction that all animals must die
is reducible to an identical proposition by the assumed
homogeneity of the terms: we know that all animals
must die if " all animals" include only animals precisely
similar in nature to those that have died, and are placed
under precisely similar conditions; and if with this intuition of known terms we exclude all unknown terms, our
proposition becomes equally certain with a proposition
about angles.  Nor is this invalidated by the possibility
that in other worlds or in other times there may be
animals precisely resembling those known to us which
will not die. That is to introduce the very element our
proposition has excluded. In a space of two or of four
dimensions many geometrical propositions which relate
to a space of three dimensions would not be true.  Who
doubts it? Who expects that the same results can be
the product of different factors?
153. " Our judgments," says Reid, " are distinguished
into'intuitive, which are not grounded upon any preceding judgment, and discursive, which are deduced from




348          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
some preceding judgment by reasoning."c   In psychological strictness every intuition is grounded upon some
preceding experience, and this may be either simple perception, or a group of complex judgments.  The difference
between the intuitive and discursive judgments lies in the
different degrees of rapidity with wlhich the constituent
elements of the groups are apprehended.  Suppose I see
a glass accidentally swept from  the table, I have an intuition of the consequences; this makes me snatch at
the glass, to prevent its falling.  The judgment and the
action are instantaneous;,anud if I am asked why I exerted myself to catch the glass, I answer that I knew the
brittle nature of glass, and saw that if it reached the
ground it would be smashed.  But these reasons which
are furnished by Reflection were not distinctly present to
my mind, although they were the organized experiences
which determined my act.  The proof that they were so
is evident in the fact that if a child or savage had
witnessed the fall no attempt would have been made to
arrest it; or if instead of a brittle glass, a tin mug had
fallen, I should have been impassive.*  A  discursive
judgment is therefore what in its more exact and verifiable form is called a demonstration, namely, a judgment
of which the constituent elements are shown instead of
being simply felt.
154. Intuition is distinguished from Demonstration as
an operation indicated but not performed.  By an intuition the ratio of the square root of a to the square root
of b may be seen to be identical with the fraction -. To
demonstrate this is to perform  the operation indicated,
and to show that if the value of a is here 4 and the value
of b is 9, while the square root of 4 is 2 and that of 9 is
3, the conclusion that  = — 2 is the identification of
Vb   3
* REID, -Essays on the Intellectlual Powers, Ess. VI. Chap. I.
+ Comp. HELMIIHOLTZ, [Fissensch/iftiiche o-ortrteige, II. 88.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.                349
the two expressions, since Vac is 2 and /b is 3.  Obviously
the correctness of this operation, whether indicated or
performed, whether intuited or demonstrated, depends on
the correctness of the primary assumption that the values
assigned to ct and b are 4 and 9.
155. Intuition is of much greater range than Demonstration, because the greater fund of Experience on which
we rely is too complex, and drawn too much from the forgotten past for us to be capable of showing all the successive steps which Demonstration requires.  All the great
discoveries were seen intuitively long before it was possible to exhibit the correctness of their grounds, and to disentangle the involved data.*  But we must not on this
account place unrestricted confidence in Intuition, for we
know  but too paiilfully how  nmany absurd speculations
have been propounded on "intuitive cgrounds."  Demonstration is not an instrument of discovery, but a means
of control.  Intuition is seeing; Demonstration is showing.  What is seen, and ~what is shown, may be illusory;
they are only proved to be objectively valid when each
inference has been reduced to its corresponding sensible.
156. "The method of demonstration in Matleat          tics,"
says Hutton,t "is the same with that of drawing conclusions from  principles in Logic.  Indeed the  demonstrations of mathematicians are no other than a series of
enthynmemes; everything is concluded by force of syllo* "En reflechissant sur les phenomenes les plus familiers il arrive
souvent qu'on entrevoit certains principes auxquels sans doute il seroit
dangereux de se livrer avant qclue d'etre parvenu a leur. donner la precision et la rigueur mathematiques.... ces principes ont 6te cl'abord
en quelque sorte apergus dans le vague comme par instinct et appuy9e
plutot sur leur conformit6 avec les resultats particuliers auxquels on
arrivait par d'autres voies, qlue sur des ddmonstrations generales et rigoureuses. "-CARNOT, Prinzcijpes de l'-qz6ilibre et die Mouzvemewt, p. 89.
1803.
+ Mathematical Dictionary, Art. Demonstration.




350         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
gism, only omitting the premises which occur either of
their own accord or are collected by means of quotation."
In other words, it is the exhibition of a necessary connection, or identification of the conclusion with its premises.
Mathernatical demonstration is the type of exactness because the validity of the premises is never questioned,
they are either intuitively evident, or have been rendered
irresistible by previous demonstration.  When the premises are thus unquestionecl the certainty of the result is
necessary.
A demonstration is the exhibition of a necessary connection between the proposition to be demonstrated and
one or more other propositions which have already been
shown to be true, or may be assumed to be so. This assumption will not affect the rigor and consistency of the
operation; but it may be wholly at variance with objective
fact. The terms may be absurd, yet the form of the operation correct. The truth of a proposition is not given simply
by showing that it is a necessary consequence from some
preceding proposition; that is only showing the logical
operation to have been irreproachable; and an operation
may be accurately performed although its premises are
inexact. A proposition is objectively true only in as far
as it exhibits the equivalence of inferenc and sensation;
and this equivalence may be exhibited directly or indirectly: an inference, or a demonstration, once verified,
has all the value of the sensations by which it was verified; that the square root of 25 is 5, is not less absolutely
certain than that 5 is 5.
157. Demonstration is the exhibition of the equivalence of propositions, the presentation of some object or
property which is ~not apparent, through its equivalence
with some object or property which is apparent.  Since
the presentation is thus always mediate, - always by
means of something else seen by Intuition to be equiva



THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.                351
lent, and therefore convertible, the mediation of Intuition
may be effected by a succession of equations, or by one.
But whether the demonstration depend on a succession
of steps, or on only one step, it is always an intuition of
equivalence.
158. Had this been clearly apprehended there would
perhaps have been less misplaced ingenuity exerted by
mathematicians in efforts to demonstrate, geometrically,
propositions which are capable only of logical intuition,
and for which geometric constructions are superfluous,
the intuition being a mental construction.  For example
the proposition respecting parallel lines: attempts without number have been made to demonstrate it, and all
attempts have failed; yet Laplace admits that the "enunciation alone carries along with it the fullest conviction";
why then seelk for evidence of what is intuitively evident? *  That a geometric proof is impossible, does not
disturb  the certainty that a line perpendicular to one
parallel is perpendicular to the other,- a certainty which
belongs to all identical propositions, and which cannot be
increased by any geometric exhibition.  Mr. De Morgan,
indeed, denies that the  definition  of parallel lines"lines which are'equidistant from one another at every
point " — gets rid of Euclid's postulate; for he says, "in
this case before the name parallel can be allowed to belonc to anything, it must be proved that there are lines
such that perpendicular to one is always perpendicular to
* " Ii ne faut qlue de mediocres connaissances en geometrie elementaire,
et un peu de reflexion, pour se convaincre que l'imnperfcctiomn de la theorie
des paralleles (powur employer le mot consacrS) tient au refus d'admettre
comme notion natureile et primitive, la notion de la similitude, ou l'idde
qu'une figure dtant donnle, on peut toujours en imaginer une autre qui
ne diffire de la figure primitive que parcequ'on a change l'echelle de construction." - COURNOT, Essai sitr les fontdernmets de nos coneaissances, II.
55. 1851.  Aristotle justly comments on the absurdity of seeking a
proof of that which is clearly seen, and for which all the conditions of a
correct intuition are present. - Physica, VIII. 3; Metap., IV. 4.




352          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
the other, and that the parts of these perpendiculars intercepted between the two are always equal."  Mr. De
Morgan thinks that in defining parallel straight lines to
be such that any two points in the one are at equal distances from  the other there is an assumption without
proof, - since it cannot be stated ca plriori of two straight
lines that more than two points of the one shall be at
equal distances from the other.  I admit that there is an
assumption here, but it is the asswmlp2tion of holmogeneity
which is fixed in the definition.  Two equidistant points
suffice, — and to prove that they are equidistant is to
prove that A is A.  WVhat is meant by parallelism  is
eqnidistance; the two points are prolonged indefinitely,
and as according to the assumption of homogeneity the
lines are ntowlhere chanyged, nowhere cease to be parallel,
what was true of the two points remains true of their
infinite prolongation. The one act of Intuition by which
the relation of two parallel lines, however small, is
perceived, is the Intuition of the relation prolonged to
infinity by universalizing the terms.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.          353
CHAPTER XII.
AXIOMS AND THEIR VALIDITY.
159. THE preceding considerations must be completed
by an examination of Axioms, which, owing to a philosophical prejudice often greatly misleading, are supposed
to have a higher validity than Theorems, all truths of a
wide generality being held to be more certain than particular truths; and from this higher validity there is often
deduced the conclusion of a deeper origin. Because an
axiom expresses universal experience, is confirmed from
all sides, and admits of no doubt whatever, it is said to
be "self-evident," and because it is self-evident, self-luminous, needing no reflected light, it is held to be above
Experience.
There are many conveniences in the separation of selfevident truths from reflected truths; unhappily, like most
verbal distinctions, it has come to be regarded in the light
of a real distinction; being classed apart, Axioms have
come to be considered as due to another origin.  This is
untenable when we learn that Axioms have no such exclusive certainty, but arise from the general ground of
Experience, out of which all truths arise. The logical
processes which constitute the group in a general truth
are precisely the processes which constitute a particular
truth,-the c~ifference lies in the terms, not in the forms;
in the symbols, not in the operations. The widest of
all axioms -- "whatever is is " - cannot be more certain,
more irresistible, than the most fleeting of particular
w




354          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
truths, e. g. "I am sad."  The axiom " If equals be taken
from equals the remainders are equal," may indeed be
more rapidly intuited than the particular truth respecting
the square of the hypothenuse in the forty-seventh of
Euclid, which can only be seen by a mind that has followed the steps of the demonstration; but this greater
ease and rapidity of vision does not endow the seen with
greater certitude; and the second truth is equally irresistible with the first, when once the relations are intuited.
160. Since, then, the characteristic of superior certitude must be given up, and the superiority rest upon the
ease with which the conclusion is reached, shall we still
adopt the common opinion that the distinguishing mark
of an axiom is its self-evidence?  Let us first understand
what is affirmed. If a truth is self-evident only when it is
self-luminous, i. e. when its luminosity is absolutely independent of all reflection from Experience whatever, being
cc priori not only to this experience and to that, but to
all, — then I assert that the axiom of equality is not
more self-evident than the 47th prop. of Euclid; for to
the mind of the infant neither truth is evident.  But if a
truth is self-evident when the conclusion is evident in
the premises, - self-luminous because its rays issue from
within, and the mind in the very act of apprehending the
terms apprehends the equation of those terms, - this
definition may be accepted, and we should all agree to
call a truth self-evident when no other evidence is neededc
outside the terms of its expression, because no other relations are implied beyond the relations specified.  But
this is no mark of aG priori truths, as distingcuished from
demonstrated truths. To the mind which has once learned
the properties of numbers, the proposition 2 + 2-4 is
self-evident.  The terms mean that, and nothing else.
But to the mind uninstructed in such properties, the
proposition so far from  being self-evident is not evident




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.         355
at all; it may be made so, by placing a group of pebbles,
naming it folur, and then dividing it into two groups each
of which is named two, when the mind sees that four is
the group made by two and two.
161. Newton has been censured for the laxity with
which he uses the term axiom. Technically his practice
may be questionable, psychologically it is defensible. I
think he is correct in applying the term to the fundamental principles of Dynamics: axiomata sire leyes. The
laws of Motion have the same certainty and self-evidence,
when their terms are apprehended, as the axioms of Geometry; neither have these characters when the terms
are imperfectly apprehended; both demand that the mind
should already be in possession through Experience of
the specified relations.
Is there, then, no distinction between axioms and particular propositions? Assuredly. Axioms express truths
of universal application; and some of them inevitably
arise in every man's experience, or may be extricated
from it; whereas particular propositions are limited to
special experiences.  The former are self-evident, i. e.
requiring no extraneous proof, because no doubt is suggested by contradictory experiences.  Every instant of
our lives we have evidence that a thing is what it is; and
this evidence needs no confirmation, because we have never
any experience that a thing can be and not be at the same
instant. Every instant of our lives we see things change
their positions in space after some other thing has been
brou-ght into new relations with them; and we express
this constant experience in the axiom " Every effect has a
cause." Such axioms obviously need no confirmation from
particular experiences, because being expressions of universal experience they admit of no doubt. It is otherwise with particular propositions, in which the terms
express inconspicuous relations, or relations that are




356         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
hypothetical; though even particular propositions become
irresistible when their terms are conspicuous and real.
If the proposition be neither self-evident nor illumlinated
from general Experience, — as, for example, when first
the proposition respecting the square of the hypothenuse
is presented, - we have to ascertain what are the relations specified in its terms; these are shown to us, demonstrated; and from that moment the particular proposition
is no less irresistible than an axiom. The relations are
what they are, and cannot be other than what they are;
and we have ascertained what they are. The contingency
which existed at the outset has vanished forever.  So
long as these terms preserve their homogeneity, so long
will the proposition preserve its necessity. Every schoolboy who has learned his multiplication-table sees at once
that 6 multiplied by 6 gives 36; this intuitive judgment
is axiomatic; but although he may not see at once that
the cube of 6 is 216, because he cannot at once intuite
the relations, yet after rendering these inconspicuous
relations conspicuous (after calculating), his discursive
judgment becomes axiomatic: he is not less assured that
the cube of 6 is 216, than he is that when equals are
taken from equals the remainders are equal.
162. Our conclusion therefore is that axioms have a
wider application than particular truths, but not a higher
validity, not another origin.  Having a wider application,
they have a higher scientific value.  But they had their
origin in Experience, and cannot have a wider. range than
the inductions from Experience, which proceed on the
assumed homogeneity of the unknown or unspecified relations with those that are specified.
I do not wish to be understood as adopting the view
that Axioms are founded on Induction; on the contrary, I
hold them to be founded on Intuition.  They are founded
on Experience, because Intuition is empirical. But it is




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.          357
a mistake to present them as founded on any compacrison
of instances, or as primarily established by Induction.
Indeed the very conception of Induction is so far antagonistic to that of Axiom, that it includes the acknowledgment of a contingency which the Axiom excludes.
There is an assumption of homogeneity underlying both.
The assumption in the case of an intuition is that the relations are what they are seen to be; in the case of an induction it is that the relations are what they are iifer)redc
to be. Now the Axiom which universalizes an intuition
assumes the homogeneity of the terms it formulates; and
if these are invariant the conclusion is necessary. One
act of Intuition establishes an Axiom, for the Axiom is
simply the universalization of its terms.  That the whole
is greater than any one of its parts, is not indeed self-evident, in the rigorous sense of the words; but when its
evidence has been seen, in the intuition of its relations,
when in any one case the meaning of the terms has been
apprehended and the Logic of Feeling has passed into the
Logic of Signs, so that a sensible mass is shown to be
divisible into smaller masses, and the former is now understood to be what is called the lwhole, while the latter are
called thlep arts, - the relations being intuited, the Axiom
is complete, now and forever; and every future whole is
seen to be greater than any of its parts, no other intuition
being possible so long as the terms intuited are unchanued.
It is possible, indeed, to mistake inductions for intuitions and prejudices for axioms; but that is only when we
fail to discriminate between what is seen and what is
inferred. Hence the need of Verification.
163. Only one point more needs to be touched on
here. Axioms are commonly said to be indemonstrable
judgments.  This theory of their lying outside Demon



358          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
stration is another form of the theory of their being selfevident; but if the views respecting Demonstration put
forward in the preceding chapter are correct, the theory
is inadmissible.  Admitting Demonstration to be the exhibition of the intuited equivalence, - the sh/owing of
what may be seen in the terms, - we must admit that it
is even easier to demonstrate the axiom, "A  whole is
greater than any of its parts," than to demonstrate a
particular proposition, "Water is composed of oxygen and
hydrogen."  Nay, even the axiom " Whatever is is " may
be demonstrated, for we canll exhibit the equivalence of
each side of the equation; indeed the axiom only is irresistible on the assumption of this equivalence, i. e. that
what we express by the word is on the one side, we also
express by the same word on the other.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.         359
CHAPTER XIII.
NECESSARY TRUTHS.
164. Two errors have been rife in modern Philosophy:
0~, the reliance on Demonstration when the operation has
been accurately performed, without regard to the intuitions, - in other words, whether the symbols operated on
have, or have not, assignable values; 2~, the reliance on
clear ideas as objectively axiomatic, and on axioms as objectively true. The first of these errors may be traced in
Matllematics and in Metaphysics; the second is sometimes avowed, and alwvays implied, in Mietaphysics.
In the preceding chapters we have seen that axioms,
intuitions, and demonstrations all need critical control,
control not only of the operations but of the premises;
verification of the premises consisting in the reduction
of every inference to its corresponding sensation. A
little reflection shows that clear ideas may be treacherous
grounds of reliance, clearness of conception being no evidence of the existence of any corresponding perception.
It is notorious that propositions may be perfectly clear,
and even coercive, yet prove on inspection to be illusory.
Nothing was clearer and for centuries nothing could be
more irresistible, than the conception of the sun revolving
round the earth; it is now rejected from Science. The
proposition that mercury is lighter than water is clearer
— more readily intelligible- than  that two parallel
lines cannot enclose space. The falsehood of the one,
and truth of the other, must be proved on quite other




360         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
grounds than that of clearness; although when proved
the two propositions previously obscure will become
transparent, and by this transparency the first proposition will be seen to want objective correspondence. No
sooner are the properties of parallel lines and of mercury
and water ascertained, than the truth and falsehood of
the propositions which formulate these properties become
evident.
165. Hume asserted that only the sciences of Quantity admit of demonstration; "all other inquiries regard
only matters of fact and existence, and these are evidently incapable of demonstration.  Whatever is may not be."
This argument has been urged a thousand times, no one
seeming to have suspected its paralogism, namely, that
two different propositions are involved in the sentence,
" Whatever is may not be."  But of this anon. Hurle
continues: "No negation of a fact can involve a contradiction. The non-existence of any being, without exception, is as clear and distinct an idea as its existence. The
proposition which affirms it not to be, however false, is
no less conceivable and intelligible than that which affirms it to be. The case is different with the sciences
properly so called. Every proposition which is not true
is there confused and unintelligible." *  This seems to
me false in every respect. It is not true of any proposition; or is true only by a substitution of terms which
would make it equally true of mathematical propositions.
W~hen Hume says that the proposition which affirms a
thing not to be, however false, is as conceivable as the
proposition which affirms it to be, he confounds a verbal
with a real proposition.  No one can conceive the thing
now existing to be now not existing. He can state this
verbally, he cannot realize the symbols. He can indeed
conceive that, under other conditions, what is now exist* HUME, Essay on the Academzical Philosophy.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.          361
in(g might not exist, or might exist differently; but this
change of terms substitutes in the place of the one proposition, " The thing exists," another wholly different proposition, " The thing no longer exists."  Now by similar
changes in the terms it is equally easy to conceive two
parallel lines enclosing space, - the lines originally parallel are replaced by lines converging; and we, preserving the integrity of our proposition in spite of the change
in the meaning of terms, say parallel lines may enclose
space.
166. Here most of my readers will doubtless consider
that I overlook the distinction between the contingency
of the proposition in the one case, and the necessity in
the other.  It is not that I overlook, but that I deny,
this celebrated distinction.
The position to be attacked is this: some truths, indeed most truths, are contingent, general or particular;
others are necessary, and universal. The one class expresses facts which we easily conceive might have been
otherwise, and for which there is no guaranty that in
other times, or in other worlds, they would be what they
are at this time, and under these conditions. They are
therefore contingent.  Contrasted with  them  are the
truths that express facts which are not only seen to be
facts now, and under the present conditions, but are seen
to be facts which no effort of imagination can figure
otherwise.  Here and everywhere, nowv and always, they
must preserve their unalterable characters.  That acids
redden vegetable blues, and that bodies unsupported
must fall, are general truths, inductions contingent on
certain conditions. WNe recognize in them  no internal
necessity why the facts nmust be so. We easily imagine
a state of things in which the results would be different;
nor indeed have we any guaranty that in other planets
they are not different. But the truths that " Every effect
16




362          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
nmust have a cause," and that " Two parallel lines cannot
enclose space," have an internal necessity, - no intellectual ingenuity can conceive a variation in them.
167. Such is the thesis.  First, remark the confusion
of contingency in a proposition with conting'ency in a
truth.  Because there are propositions which express or
imply contingency outside the conditions, the mind easily
glides into the supposition that there is a contingency
inside the conditions; because a group of phenomena may
changre, that group itself is held to be not what it is. A
little reflection discloses that a proposition is either a true
statement of the facts expressed in it, or a false statement
of theml; if true, it is necessarily true, and universally
true, whenever and wherever those facts recur unchanged;
but, of course, if anywhere, at any time, a change occurs
in the facts expressed by the proposition, then the old
proposition no longer truly expresses the new group of
facts.  That a body moving under certain conditions as
if attracted by a force varying inversely with the square
of the distance will describe an ellipse having the centre
of attraction in one of the foci of the ellipse, is a proposition which when demonstrated — found to be a correct
expression of the terms — is a truth having no contingency whatever: it is as necessarily true as the axiom
respecting parallels.  That the earth is a body under approximately similar conditions, and consequently describes
what approximates to an ellipse, is also a proposition
which having been verified is seen to be true, and will
eternally be true so long as the conditions Twhich are the
terms of the proposition are unchanged.  It is indeed
conceivable that under other geometrical conditions - in
a space of two, or of four dimensions - neither proposition may be true; or that even in our own space of three
dimensions the second proposition may cease to be applicable because of some slight change in the co-operant




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.          36 
factors.  But this contingency — that the factors might
be otherwise -in no degree affects the necessity of the
truths: that the facts are what they are. Ingenious
geometers have of late years shown that even the muchrelied-on axiom  respecting parallels is affected with an
analogous contingency; it would not be true in a space
of four dimensions; while Mr. Mill and others have questioned the legitimacy of extending the axiom of causation
beyond our world.  I am unable to accept either of these
positionls; but I certainly admit that if the view  of
necessary truth which is current in Philosophy is to be
accepted at all, it logically forces the acceptance of this
contingency in the axioms.  In other words, all truths
are necessarily true, and all propositions are liable to a
double contillgency, -first, the contingency of enumercation (i. e. whether all the factors are, or are not, taken into
account)  secondly, the contingency of cpplication (i. e.
whether the old formula is applied to the old conditions,
or to changed conditions, which would require a new formula). The only necessity is that a thinlg is what it is,
and cannot be other than what it is; the only contingency
is that our proposition may not state what the thing is.
168. The c priori doctrine maintains that only those
truths are necessary which formulate facts transcending
Experience by their universality, and are therefore incapable of direct verification; they are seen intuitively to
be unchangeable.  In opposition to this I maintain that
all propositions are contingent which formulate anything
transcending Experience, direct or indirect, — in which
the co-operant factors cannot be enumerated and verified;
whereas on the contrary, every verified proposition, whatever its nature, is necessarily true, and universally true,
- under the formulated conditions.
Note this final clause. It is the pivot of the question.
That a particular acid does redden this vegetable blue is




364         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
a proposition in no respect contingent; that hitherto all
known acids have been found to redden all vegetable
blues, when applied under certain conditions, is also a
proposition having no contingency; but if for these intuitions we substitute an induction, —if from these two
necessary truths we infer that all acids will under all circumstances redden this or all vegetable blues, the proposition,is contingent with a double contingency: it has not
been and cannot be verified; the reddening depends on
factors which may or may not be co-operant in any particular case; and because we are unable to enumerate
what will be the factors, our proposition must be contingent; but if we could enumerate them the contingency
would vanish. It is because we can be assured of our
factors that most mathematical propositions have no other
contingency than that of a possible miscalculation or uncertainty as to the condition. Thus if n be a whole number, the existence of the equivalent series for (1 + x)4 is
necessary, because the operation which gives it may be
accurately defined. On the contrary, if n be not a whole
number but a general symbol, then, because we cannot define the operation by which we pass from (1 + x)' to its
equivalent series, a series which exists under such conditions only by virtue of the principle of the permanence
of equivalent forms, the connection is contingent; the
series becomes necessary when its existence is assumed;
in other words, "if such an equivalent does exist it must
be the series in question, and no other." *
169. The arguments which support the ac priori view
have been ingeniously thrown into this syllogism by Mr.
Killick: The necessary truth of a proposition is a mark
of its not being derived from Experience. (Experience
cannot inform us of what must be:) The inconceivability
of the contracdictory is the mark of the necessary truth of
* PEACOCK, Algebra, Preface XIX. 1830.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.           365
a proposition: Therefore the inconceivability of its contradictory is a mark of a proposition not being derived
from.Experience.*
This syllogism is perfect in form, but has a radical defect in its terms. The inconceivability of a contradictory
results from the entire absence of experiences on which
a contradiction could be grounded. If there were any
truths independent of Experience, contradictions to them
wculd be conceivable, since there would be no positive
obstacle to the conception; but a contradiction is inconceivable only when all Experience opposes itself to the
formation of the contradictory conception.
170. There are truths which can be intuited, seen at a
glance, because they express relations simple, constant,
familiar; there are other truths which cannot be seen
until the complicated relations formulated are unfolded,
and presented to Intuition: and there are truths which
can be seen at a glance, but which, formulating particular
relations seen to exist in the present conjuncture of
events, but known not to be constant in recurrence, yield
no assurance that they will not be contradicted to-morrow.  There can be no objection against a classification
of such truths into universal, general, and particular, or
into necessary and contingent, if we mean no more by
contingency than the impossibility of determining beforehand what will be the co-operant factors.  When it is
said that a necessary truth is one seen not only to be
true, but one which there is no possibility of our conceiving otherwise; this can only be valid on the assumption
that no change be made in the terms formulated: on
this assumption, however, all truths are equally necessary; without this assumption no truth is so.
170a. What is Possibility?  It is the ideal admission
* KILLICK, The Stzudet's Handbook, synoptical and explanatory of
Mr. JM1ill's Logic, p. 77. 1870.




3 6 6        PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
as present of absent factors: it states what wouldc be the
fact, if the requisite factors were present.  What is Contingency?  It is the ideal admission that certain factors
now present matcy be on any other occasion absent; and
when they are absent the result must be different from
what it is now.  VWhat is Necessity?  It is thQ, intuition
of the actual factors,- the perception of adequate relations, - the recognition that what is, must be what it is.
All inductions are contingent because they are generalizations of experience under the assumption of homnogeneity; and the contingency lies in this, that the unknown
cases which Mwe assume to resemble the known cases in
all the characters which constitute the terms of our proposition may not resemble them in some of these characters.  All identical equations are necessary, and universal
when we universalize the terms.
171. This understood, awe may set aside the serious
and very common error which asserts that an universal
proposition is truer than a general proposition, a general
proposition truer than a particular proposition.  Nine
philosophers in ten will declare the proposition "Every
effect must have a cause," to be more certainly true than
the proposition "Sugar is sweet."  But the case is really
this: the universality of a proposition carries Awith it the
predicate of necessity in virtue of the assumed homogreneity of its terms; the generality of a proposition carries
with it the predicate of constancy in virtue of the same
assumption of homogeneity; the particularity of a proposition carries writh it the predicate of contingency in
virtue of an assumed heterogezity in its terms: so long
as its terms remain under the limitation of specified conditions, its truth remains unshakable.
In Rule X. attention is drawn to this assumption of
homogeneity, which underlies all Inference, and all Generalization.  We construct a triangle, or define its terms.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.                 367
This done once is done forever.  The truths respecting
triangles are not generalizations but intuitions, universalized by universalizing the terms, not generalized  by
comparing  all known  triangles, and  concluding  from
them  to the unknown.  Wee operate on the triangle, not
on triangles.  When any modification of the terms introduces a new kind, -  as for instance a spherical triangle,
-  there comes a corresponding modification in our propositions, and some that are true of rectilinear triangles
are no longer true of spherical triangles.  It is here that
Verification steps in.  WVhat we have to do in any particular case is not to ascertain whether a proposition is
necessary or contingent, but whether it is true, expressinc the actual factors of the fact; and what we have to
do in any general case is to ascertain -whether all the
particulars thus generalized preserve that homogeneity
which justifies the extension; and whenever an exception
appears, -we klnow that this nmust be due to some heterogeneity in the terms, -  in other words, that for this case
a new proposition is neededl.*
172. It is one thing to state a proposition in terms
which themselves involve no contradiction, another thino
to state it in  termns which  correspond with fact.  The
objective truth  must be verified, i. e. the  conceptions
must be reduced to perceptions, the inferences to sensations, and, when verified, its certainty is not deepened by
assuming an universal expression,.nor endangered by a
particular expression.  VWhen we say that the proposition
* "Until very lately all analysts considered functions which vanish
when x -- a as necessarily divisible by some positive power of x- a. This
is only one of a great many too general assumptions which are disappearing
one by one from the science.  It appeared to be true from observation of
functions, adcl is so in fact for acl the ordilnary forvzs of alcebra. But
observation at last detected a function for which it could not be true, as
was shown by Professor Hamilton in the Transactions of the Irish Academly." -DE MORGAN, Differential Calcculzs, p. 176.




368          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
which is true now and here, may not be true to-morrow
and elsewhere, we speak elliptically; written out in full,
the statement would run thus: to-morrow and elsewhere
the circumstances may be so far changed that the result
now observable will no longer present itself; and it is
because we do not know whether there will or will not
be a change in the circumstances that we call our proposition contingent. There are indeed some propositions
which exclude this possibility of change.  That the
whole is greater than any one of its parts, or that two
things equal to a third are equal to each other: these are
unassailable, because they are reducible to identical propositions.  It is a mistake, however, to class these apart
as necessary truths since all truths maybe exhibited as
propositions of identity; nor is any proposition verified
until this has been effected.  To make the argument
plain consider the  following  contrasted  propositions.
"This bit of iron," says Prof. Bowen, "I find by direct
observation melts at a certain temperature; but it may
well happen that another piece of iron, quite similar to
it in external appearance, may be fusible only at a much
higher temperature, owing to the 7,nsps2pected iresence"
[Note this clause] "in it of a little more or less carbon in
composition.  But if the angles at the base of this triangle are equal to each other, I know that a corresponding
equality must exist in every figure wchich conforms to the
definition of an isosceles triangle; for that definition excltudes every disturbingf element." *
Here we have a contingent and a necessary truth accurately indicated. Wbhy is the first contingent? Simply
because one bit of iron may structurally differ froml
another, although resembling it in external appearance;
and the fusibility does not depend on the external ap* Quoted by Prof. Jevons in his suggestive work, The Substitution
of Similcars.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.           369
pearance, but on the molecular structure or composition
of the iron, i. e. depends on that factor which is assumed
to be the same in' both, but may really be different in
both.  The "unsuspected presence of more carbon" is
not excluded by the external resemblance.  But the
presence of any disturbing element is excluded from the
isosceles triangle, by the definition of the triangle, and
the conclusion that corresponding equality must exist in
every iigure which conforms to the definition is irresistible; but a similar conclusion may be established by a
similar artifice with respect to the iron; and we may
state the identical proposition that not only will this bit
of iron always melt at this temperature under these conditions, but every piece of iron having a similar molecular
structure and composition will melt at this temperature
under these conditions.  Our propositions respecting triangles will be not less contingent than our propositions
about iron ores, if iwe admit the element of contingency
(~ 170a) and leave undetermined whether the term " triangle" designates a scalene, isosceles, equilateral, or spherical triangle.
173. It was perhaps with surprise that the reader
just now saw the statement that the proposition " Sugar
is sweet" was a necessary truth; yet lie may now be
prepared to admit this, under the same limitations as
apply to all necessary truths, namely, that no change be
made in the terms.  It simply formulates the fact that a
given substance, A, in relation to a given organ of sense,
B, has the sensation, C, for its product. We learn that
in the many substances grouped under the general name
"Sugar," and in the many sensory organs named " Taste,"
there are many variations, so that different sugars produce different sensations in the same organ of taste, and
the same sugar will produce different sensations in different organs of taste.  The formula " Sugar is sweet" is
16*                              x




370         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
independent of all these variations; it is wholly abstract,
A + B -- C, and is necessarily true in abstraction.  If in
particular concrete cases we find Ax or Bx we no longer
conclude the product will be C, but Cx. This is equally
necessary.
The proposition "Two parallel lines do not enclose
space and would not meet were they produced indefinitely" is a necessary truth; but if any one alters the
terms, and under the name of parallels includes two lines
concave to each other; or if he admits the contingency
that the straight lines may at any point alter their equidistance, then indeed the truth is no longer necessary,or rather one necessary truth is displaced to make way
for another.
174. Those ingenious geometers who have endeavored
to show that if our bodies had no thickness and if we
lived in the surface of a sphere, our Geometry would be
very different frorn that now regarded as necessarily true,
- that in such a world there would be an infinite nulmber of curved lines between two points which would be
shorter than a straight line, and that parallels would end
by enclosing space, - may claim  to have shaken the
serenity of those who rely on the superior necessity of
mathematical truths; since this imaginary geometry
shows that the axioms are not true of every conceivable
space, but only true of our known space; but so far as I
understand the argument it fails altogether in throwing
doubt on the only correct interpretation of an universal
and necessary truth.  Every truth is necessary; every
truth is universal, when its conditions are universalized.
When we assert that parallel lines do not meet, we stand
upon our sensible intuition of the actual fact; when we
assert that they can never meet, we stand on our rational
intuition of the virtual fact; we assume that the lines
will be what they are, and cannot be other than what




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.        371
they are, so long as the identity of the terms is preserved.
Any change in the conditions which would make the
lines approach each other would require a new proposition
to express the changed terms.
Is it not owing to neglect of the need of intuition of a
figure that the geometers of fictitious space are able to
argue that the angles of a triangle would always more or
less exceed two right angles? Is not their whole arguinentation based on the disregard of the psychological
principle that symbols are only valid when their sensible values can be assigned?
175. In the next Problem we shall consider more at
length the position already indicated that every truth is
an identical proposition, or is capable of being reduced to
one. A truth is the assertion that something is, and,
being what it is, cannot be different, unless the conditions
of its existence change. The proof of such an assertion
in every particular case is direct, or dependent. The
direct intuition of equality in A = A gives an identical
proposition. The indirect demonstration of equality in A
-- C gives a dependent proposition which is established
through two intuitions, - since A = B and B = C, then
A -  C. The conclusion here is necessary; yet there is
a contingency, unless the homogeneity of the terms be
assumed; for the equations A =- B and B = C, although
exact under the defined conditions, may be false under
others; we must universalize the terms to make an universal truth.
176. Here one may remark how the common (and
useful) distinction between necessary and contingent
truths may take its place beside the algebraic distinction of identical ezquations and equations of condition.
An identical equation is one of which the two sides
are but different expressions of the same number, thus
h X b = a.  This is true for any value whatever that




3 72         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
may be assigned to each symbol. An equation of condition is one which is true only in the case specified,
there being but one assignable number which will satisfy
the equation.  Thus a + 7 -  20 is true only when the
value of a is 13; no other value would satisfy the equation. Although this equation of condition is a new kild,
and is particular because confined to the particular number which must be found in the equation itself, yet no
sooner is the number found, than the identity is disclosed,
and the truth a +  7 =  20 is necessary, and universal
under the stated conditions.
177. Let us take a more familiar illustration.  "Fire
burns" would be called a contingent truth.  It may be
so; it may also be a necessary truth, - an identical proposition.  The fact that the conception of Fire is the conception of something which burns combustible things is
not rendered dubious, contingent, by the fact that we can
conceive Fire placed in relations which would not be
those of combustion.  When we affirm  that fire must
burn combustible paper if the requisite conditions are
present, our affirmation is simply the expression of certain
verified facts; and this expression is not disturbed by the
discovery of incombustible paper, is not affected by the
substitution of new conditions requiring a new expression.  That under particular conditions, the thing we
designate Fire will burn the thing we designate Paper, is
a contingent proposition, an equation of condition, which
must be verified, i. e. the number found; when verified,
it is not only a necessary truth from which all contingency has vanished, but easily assumes the universal
form, namely, "Fire of this kind under these conditions
will always and everywhere burn paper of this kind."
178. There are certain relations which are invariable
in our experience, others which are variable.  Identical
equations, and equations of condition, comprise both




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.        373
orders.  Every proposition is contingent which in its
expression admits the possibility of a variation in its
terms; every proposition is necessary which excludes such
variation; and whether the contingent or the necessary
proposition be ttue, or not, depends on its being, or not
being, reducible to an identical proposition. The square
root of an unknown quantity may be any quantity so
long as x has no value assigned; but given the value of
x as a function of y, and the square root is determined
forever. If only one black ball be placed in a box with
a thousand white balls, there is very little probability of
the black beino withdrawn on a first trial; but thouogh
not probable the withdrawal is possible,- it is therefore,
before trial, a contingency; after the trial there is no
contingency whatever. From a box containing nothing
but white balls it is absolutely certain that no black ball
can be withdrawn. In the former case our ignorance of
the position of the black ball and of the direction of the
drawer's hand render the withdrawal of a black ball contingent; if we knew these the contingency would vanish.
In the second case, in spite of our ignorance of the positions of the balls, and the direction in which the hand
will move, there is no contingency whatever in the conclusion that no black ball will be drawn, for we know
one condition which absolutely excludes it, namely, there
is no black ball present. Apply this to parallels. That
parallel straight lines can never meet, is a necessary
truth; their meeting is excluded by the conditions of
the problem, no less than the withdrawal of a black ball
is excluded when no black ball is present. Should a
black ball appear, we know that these conditions have
been violated, and that in a box, assumed to be without
a black ball, there was a black ball present. Should the
parallel lines deviate in direction, the conditions of the
problem have been violated.




374         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
179. It is a necessary truth that when several events
are equcally likely to happen, let one be proved to happen
all the others must also happen; or if one be proved
not to have happened this will be proof that none
have. Obviously the cogency of this conclusion rests
on the assumed homogeneity.  Should one of the events
happen, and any one of the others be shown not to
happen, we conclude that there was some error in the
original classification, and that the conditions present
in all the other cases were not present in this one.
Here as elsewhere it may be said that the necessity
of a proposition depends on the transparency of its
terms, the contingency on the opacity of the terms; in
other words, whenever we have distinct intuition of all
the generating conditions, we know  the only possible
result; whenever our vision of the generating conditions
is obscure, we do not know the only possible result. In
Mathematics we always have an intuition of the generating conditions, and hence the unalterable necessity of
the conclusions.
180. It is because philosophers have failed steadily to
bear in mind that the truth of a proposition subjectively
is rigorously limited to the terms of the proposition, and
objectively that the fixity of a result is coexistent with
the fixity of its conditions, - that there has arisen this
supposition of a class of truths, or class of results, essentially distinct in origin.  W~hat I have been in various
ways endeavoring to make clear is that all true propositions are necessarily true, their truth when generalized
depending on the generalization or assumed homogeneity
of their terms; whereas, whenever a proposition adclnitted to be true under the defined conditions presents the
character of contingency, and the mind recognizes the
possibility of error in generalizing the proposition, and
sees that the result now certain might have been uncer



TIHE LIIITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.        375
tain, there has been the Unconscious substitution of new
terms in 2clace of the old, making in fact a proposition
framed to express one set of conditions the expression of
another set. This fallacy is common. When we say
that what has occurred once will occur again, and will
alvays recur, we mean (or ought to mean) that under
precisely similar conditions there must always be similar
results. If A   B, or fire burns paper, under cany conjunctures, it must do so always under these conjunctures.
WAhen we say that what has occurred to-day may perhaps never recur, or will recur but seldom, we mean that
the conditions are likely to be changed, and with any
change in the conditions there must necessarily occur a
chanae in the result: instead of A — B there will be
A — C or Ax - Bx. This latter proposition is equally
necessary with the former, but is obviously a different
proposition.
Those who speak of the Laws of Nature being contingent truths, meaning that a modification or reversal of
such Laws is conceivable, and that under changed conditions the propositions would be changed, seem not
to be aware of the fallacy. A Law formulates certain
specified conditions, and in itself is not at all contingent; it is either a true formula, or a false formula;
by altering the conditions specified, substituting new
conditions, and applying the old formula, we do not
disturb the truth of the Law.  The contingency lies
elsewhere: it lies in our ignorance of the generating
conditions.
181. "The belief in the uniformity of Nature," says
Mr. Mansel, " is not a necessary truth, however constantly
guaranteed by our actual experience. We are not compelled to believe that because A is ascertained to be the
cause of B at a particular time, whatever may be meant
by that relation, A must therefore inevitably be the cause




376          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
of B on all future occasions." *  This is undeniable, but
only by the concealed equivoqule lying in the words " on
all future occasions."  If the co-operant conditions which
now determine B to succeed A are preserved unaltered on
all future occasions, the result must be then what it is
now; but if we are at liberty to suppose, or have any
reason to suspect, that on some future occasions the cooperant conditions will be altered, we conclude on the
same principles that A will not be followed by B.  Get
rid of this equivoque by the phrase "on all similar occasions under similar conditions," and the truth that A is the
antecedent of B becomes necessary.  While every contingent proposition becomes necessary if its terms are made
invariable every necessary proposition becomes contingent
if its terms are contingent.  If we define and thus s2pecify
the generating conditions of an equilateral triangle as a tri-.
angle thaving its three si(les equal to each other, or define
the growth of an organism by specifying the generating conditions, - the simultaneous process of molecular composition and decomposition, - tle one proposition is not more
necessary than the other; both express ideal constructions
from real intuitions.  The mathematician, indeed, who is
occupied with ideal figures, is so far at an advantage that
he is not like the biologist called upon to regard any
possible variation in the objects of the terms of his propositions.  The circles and angles of which he treats are
not the figures drawnr on paper, but the figures conceived
in his mind.  But this advantage ceases when he comes
to apply his mathematical propositions to real figures.
The biologist also when dealing with general principles
disregards all variation: it is the ideal organism, the ideal
tissue, not the real objects which his truths formulate.
Tile organisnm is an abstraction.'the tissue is an abstraction, -a group of organic elements which approximates
a MANSEL, HetCaphysics, p. 267.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.         377
to the defined limit. But just as no mathematician ever
saw a circle absolutely corresponding with his conception, so no biologist ever saw a tissue absolutely corresponding with the histological definition of it; but from
the complex and variable group of organic elements, he
extricates certain elements and names the abstraction,
purified of all variation, a tissue.  The ulterior questions
whether there are in nature objects which approximate
to the definition, circle and tissue, and whether these
objects have the properties deduced from these definitions
or seen by intuition, may be debated; but once demonstrated, there is no more contingency in a true biological
proposition than in a true mathematical proposition.  If
we have shown to intuition that the circle has the property of comprising the maximum area with the minimum
perimeter, or if we have shown that the nerve-tissue has
the property of transmitting a stimulus from periphery to
centre, from centre to centre, and from centre to periphery,
-the certainty of the one is not less absolute than that
of the other.  N-or let it be urged that the property of the
circle is' necessarily universal, true of all circles and in all
places; whereas the property of nerve-tissue is contingent, particular, subject to variation, being dependent on
variable conditions: this is so; but the objection rests on
a fallacy. The circle is no real figure, but the ideal figure defined by the geometer, and this ideal transported
into distant times and places carries witll it all its characters unchanged.  The nerve-tissue similarly treated
shows an equal constancy; and when we speak of its
properties as variable, we draw on our experience of the
variable conditions under which real tissues exist; we
know that sometimes the nerve is exhausted by action,
or by disease; we know that its properties depend on
many complex conjunctures; and since we cannot at any
moment be sure of knowing all the generating conditions,




3978         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
Mwe say that the property is contingent.  There would be
the same contingency respecting circles were our propositions respecting them supposed to refer to real figures.
I mean that if the necessity of a truth respecting nerves
be denied because in reality nerves are observed under
conditions which seem to contradict this truth, on such
grounds the necessity of a truth about circles should be
denied, since in reality it is never true that a real circle
is a figure having every point in its circumference equidistant from the centre. If I define a nerve to be a part
of a living organism capable of transmitting stimuli, and
define a circle a plane figure having every point of its
circumference equidistant from its centre, - the propositions which are true of either are true necessarily, universally; whereas if I displace this nerve and substitute for
it something else which deviates from  the terms of my
definition of nerve, -or if I replace the circle by an
ellipse, - the old propositions no longer apply, new propositions are needed to express the new terms. That
equal forces perpendicularly applied at the opposite ends
of equal arms of a straight lever will exactly balance each
other, is an absolute truth, and is reducible to a series of
identical equations.  But that two particular objects', supposed to be equcal in weight, will exactly balance each other
on the arms, sup2p9osed to be equal of this particular lever,
sup2posed to be sup29oported at its centre, - this is a contingent
truth, comparable to that which says that any given nerve
when stimulated will excite the contractility of the muscle in which it terminates. The three suppositions here
specified are of generating conditions; and it is only by
assuming the presence of such conditions that we can
apply our abstract proposition.  Is it not obvious that if
we are allowed to assume the presence of generating conditions in the case of nerve-action, our propositions will
have equal necessity?




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.         379
182. This will be disputed by the a priorists.  They
affirm that it is precisely the inability we are under of
assuming the presence of the generating conditions which
renders physical truths of inferior certainty to mathematical. We do not know, it is argued, why a nerve
excites a muscle at all, and we call easily conceive a state
of things in which such a property would not belong to
nerves; whereas it is impossible to conceive a state of
things wherein mathematical truths should not be precisely what we now know them to be.
I admit this fully; but reject the conclusion founded
on it. I admit the contingency which hovers over our
application to particular cases of general propositions
respecting nerves; but while admitting the contingency
in any particular case,- that is, while assuming the possibility or probability that in the particular case there
will be other conditions present than those which the
general proposition formulates, - I wholly deny that the
general proposition is thereby invalidated as a general
proposition. We do not indeed know why a nerve excites
a muscle, as we know why the three angles of a triangle
are equal to two right angles: we have not in the one
case a clear intuition of all the generating conditions, as
we have in the other.  But if we know the fact that a
nerve does excite a muscle, under certain conditions, we at
the same time know that it will always and everywhere
do so under the same conditions. We generalize the fact
in generalizing the conditions.  And this is all we are
enabled to do in Mathematics.  We do not there treat of
variable but of invariable conditions: it is the triangle, in
the abstract, of which we speak.  And if we treat of the
nerve acting on the muscle, there is a similar certainty.
The abstract biological truth is not invalidated because
of its failure to embrace all concrete cases, when these
cases present relations not expressly included in it. The




380          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
abstract mathematical truth is not invalidated because of
its failure to embrace particular cases when these involve
relations not formulated by it; and this is always observed
in Applied Mathematics.  Fix the terms, specify all the
relations formulated, and a biological truth stands on the
same level of certainty and universality as a mathematical
truth. If nerve and muscle are terms which designate
objects partly known, partly unknown, all propositions
whwich include the co-operation of the unknown factors are of
course hypothetical, contingent; but if the terms simply
designate the knownl factors, and the propositions simply
formulate these, the contingency vanishes, the propositions become identical; and having been verified once, are
necessarily true in all identical cases.
183. The very great importance of the question here
discussed must be my excuse for having, with perhaps
wearisome iteration, presented my solution of it under
various aspects. It is a fundamental question, and of
late years all metaphysical discussion may be said to
turn on it.  More than twenty years have elapsed since
I first suggested the solution  here  reproduced; but
although it has been reargued in the second, third, and
fourth editions of my History of Philosophy, I have not
observed that any English writer has adopted or refuted
it.  This silence warrants. the suspicion that I had not
presented the arguments with sufficient clearness, or else
that the view itself is radically defective. Naturally I
prefer the former supposition; and I am confirmed in
this conclusion by the gratifying fact that a distinguished
foreign thinker, who shows no trace whatever of acquaintance with my writings, has put forth a view substantially similar, in two works * to which I wish to
express many obligations.  Believing, then, that the view
* DELB(EUF, Prolegomrnnes philosophiques de la Geometrie, Liege, 1860;
and Essai de Logique Scientifique, Liege, 1865.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.          381
is a real contribution to the philosophy of the subject,
I have endeavored by a fuller and more varied illustration to carry it home to the conviction of every reader.
Those who still hesitate to accept it are referred to the
further elucidation which will be reflected from the next
chapter.




382         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
CHAPTER XIV.
MATHEMATICS AN EMPIRICAL SCIENCE.
184. BY a splendid tour de force Kant answered the
question, How are Metaphysics possible? He approached
it through the more fundamental question, How  are
judgments independent of Experience possible? Since
Metaphysics claimed to solve problems which avowedly
transcended the reach of Experience, it was indispensable
to prove that the human mind was not restricted to experiential judgments, but was capable of forming judgments independently. Kant rightly saw that Metaphysics
might be possible if Mathematics were possible; but lie
failed, I think, in proving that c priori metempirical
judgments were possible in Mathematics, and therefore
were possible in Metaphysics. His conclusion is logical
enough could we accept the premises; but as these involve the fallacy of necessary truths having a metempirical character, the premises cannot be accepted.
Our purpose will be to reverse Kant's procedure, and
show that mathematical judgments are absolutely and
entirely dependent on Experience, and are limited to the
range of Experience, sensible and extra-sensible.  While,
before Kant, the theory of Experience assumed that the
Mind was a kind of mirror in which the inmages of things
were reflected; after Kant, it became the fashion to reverse this theory, and to assume that the unknown Existence (Ding an sich) was the darkened side of a mirror
from whose bright surface were reflected the forms of our




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.          383
minds, the reflected images being the objective phenonzena known to us. Both explanations were radically defective, since they both involved the fallacy that a 12prodnCt could be the product of one factor.  The proof which
Kant offered in support of his position was the existence
of certain judgmllents which must have been anterior to all
Experience, because from the nature of the case no Experience could furnish them, since they transcended its
range. The proof that no Experience could furnish them
was seen in the characters of Necessity and Universality
which belonged to their essence; for as no Experience
could be universal, none could exclude contingency.
185. But having seen the characters of Necessity and
Universality to belong to all truths, or to none, we cannot accept those characters in proof of the existence of
a particular class of truths independent of Experience;
hence the conception of a Mind existing anterior to all
sensible experiences, and capable of framing legitimate
conceptions respecting supra-sensible existences, must be
placed on another foundation, or given up altogether. I
am as firmly convinced as Kant himself (and have argued
it fully in Chap. II.), that every experience, and every
judgment grouping experiences, must be referred back for
one of its factors to a prior result, a judgment already
organized, and in this sense d priori, since it is prior to
and helps to form the latest experience; but I can see no
tittle of evidence for an ca plriori in Kant's sense, i. e. of
antecedence to all Experience; or that we bring with
us at birth a Mind equipped with Forms and Faculties.
But, if we do not bring wiith us this full-statured Mind, if
the stature is acquired through growtlh and development,
then the experiential origin and limitation of all knowledle follow irresistibly.
186. Should any of the truths of Mathematics be shown
to have an origin lying beyond Experience, or a range




384          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
lying beyond the logical deductions from Experience, the
claims of Metempirics will so far be made good that we
shall be compelled to admit the possibility of metempirical knowledge.  I purpose to show not only that the
science of Mathematics has its origin in Experience, but
that it differs from  every other science only as each science differs from  every other: it differs from  Physics as
Physics differs from Chemistry, or Chemistry from  Biology, in the circumscription of its object, and the nature of
its abstractions; but it has a similar origin, a similar
Method, a similar validity, and similar limitations.
187. The majority of mathematicians and philosophers
resist the notion of Mathematics being classed among the
sciences of observation and experiment; a classification
which is supposed to degrade Mathematics from  its supreme position, and to introduce contingency into its
results.  Because it is with intelligible and not with sensible
space that Geometry deals, and because its constructions
are purely ideal, - because the line without breadth, and
the surface without thickness, the perfect circle, or perfect parallels do not exist as reals, it is concluded that the
science of these cannot be classed with sciences of Observation, Experiment, and Induction, which treat of real
objects. The chapter on ideal construction in Science
will have prepared us for an entire rejection of these positions (~ 110).  The properties of Space and Number are
assuredly discovered by Observation and Experiment, and
their Laws are reached, like all others, through Intuition,
hypothesis, Induction, and Deduction being indeed simply
formulae of the conditions specified, and only true under
such conditions. The primary facts, the sensible intuitions forming the basis of this great superstructure, are so
general and familiar, are so inevitably given in Experience, that we cannot imagine a mind in which they should
not be present, - implicitly or explicitly. Hence by an




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.           385
easy transition they have come to be considered innate,
antecedent to Experience. But' they are no miore innate
than the primary facts of Chemistry or Biology. Although given in most sensible experiences they require to
be observed, and reflected on, equally with less familiar
facts.
188. A single body, seen and touched, presents Extension and Form; several bodies present Plurality,- Nuinber.  The bodies thus perceived are groups of sensibles,
from which we abstract the qualities of Extension, Form,
and Number.  The bodies are also perceived in motion,
i. e. changing their places without at the same time
undergoing any change in their qualities.  Place thus
becomes detached from the bodies to be considered by
itself; and the abstract of all places is Space.  This Space,
which is filled by all bodies, - occupied by their Extension,-is only sensible or intelligible as Extension: the
characteristic quality of bodies has been transferred to
this abstract Space, and as all places are extended, Space
is Extension.
189. The science of Geometry may be defined, -the
study of the properties of Extension; as Mathematics in
general may be defined, - the study of the indirect measurement of magnitudes.  Both Extension and Magnitude
are qualities of reals. The properties of Space are observed, classified, reduced to Types and Standards, in precisely the same way as all other properties are observed,
classified, idealized.  They are first found in sensible
intuitions of figures; and although rapidly carried up into
the region of Conception, where they seem to depart from
the reals of Perception, this is equally the case in all
other sciences.  The ideal constructions of Biology are
never found realized in Nature.  It is no more the sheer
observations of the biologist than it is those of the mathematician which constitute the material of construction;
17                             Y




386         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
nevertheless without the observations no science would
be possible.  The mind intuites what the eye cannot see.
Not- as is generally supposed — because the mind is
independent of sense; it is dependent on sense as Algebra
is on Arithmetic; and we could never intuite the mathematical and biological Types, had we not seen the real objects of which these Types are the ideal forms. So far
fromn the mathematical intuitions being Innate, the majority of mankind pass to the grave without a suspicion of
them, - without making explicit to their Consciousness
what, as elements of the Logic of Feeling, are implicitly
present there. No one supposes biological intuitions to
be innate; yet the majority of philosophers hold that
mathematical truths carry with them, in the characters
of necessity and universality, evidence of their metempirical origin.  How comes it, then, that the savage arrives
at explicit biological truths long before he arrives at mathematical truths; knows, and can state his reasons for
knowing, that air is necessary to respiration, and food to
growth, long before he has any suspicion that two things
equal to a third must be equal to each other, or that parallel lines if prolonged would not meet?
190. The objects of mathematical study are reals, in
the same degree as that in which the objects of any other
science are reals. Although they are abstractions, we
must not suppose them to be imaginary, if by imaginary
be meant unreal, not objective. They are intelligibles of
sensibles: abstractions which have their concretes in real
objects. The line and surface exist, and have real properties, just as the planet, the crystal, the plant, and the animal exist, and have real properties.  It is often said, that
"the point without length or breadth, the line without
breadth, and the surface without thickness, are imaginary:
they are fictions; no such things exist in reality."  This
is true, but misleading. These things are fictions, but




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.          38 7
they have a real existence, though not in their insulation
of ideal form, for no idea exists out of the mind.  These
abstractions are the limits of concretes. Every time we
look on a pool of water we see a surface without thickness; every time we look on a party-colored surface we
see a line without breadth as the limit of each color.
Both surface and line as mathematically defined are unimaginable, for we cannot form images of them, cannot
picture them  detached; but that which is unpicturable
may be conceivable; and the abstraction which is impossible to Perception and Imagination is easy to Conception.  It is thus that sensibles are raised into intelligibles,
and, in the constructions of science, conceptions take the
place of perceptions. But the hold on Reality is not loosened by this process.  When we consider solely the direction of a line, we are dealing with a fact of Nature, just
as we are dealing with a fact of Nature when we perform
the abstraction of considering the movement of a body,
irrespective of any other relations.  We no more think
that the line is unreal, than that motion is unreal; we no
more believe that a surface can exist without an under
surface, than we think that a movement can take place
without a moving body.  M. Delbceuf pertinently remarks
that if Mathematics be called imaginary, there would be
equal justice in our saying to Newton and Laplace:
" Your celestial mechanics is false, for there are not in
Nature bodies which are only heavy." 
191. Not only is it misleading to call the objects of
Mathematics imaginary, it is also incorrect to call theam
generalizations. They are abstractions and intuitions.
Any particular line that we can draw, or imagine, has
breadth; any particular circle is imperfect; consequently
generalized lines and circles must have breadth and inmperfection.  Whereas the line, or circle, which we intuite
e DELB(EUF, Prolegosnbnes de ic Geoine'trie, p. 16.




388         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
mathematically is an abstraction, from which breadth or
imperfection has been drop ed, and the figures we intuite
are these figures under the form of the limit.
192. Unless the objects of Mathematics were real, in
the sense just explained, it would be absurd to suppose
that the relations intuited could be applied to the discovery of other real relations. A moment's inspection shows
that the properties of angles and circles are discovered
and demonstrated by the same principles that are applied
to the discovery of gases or organic processes.  Gauss,
whose authority on such   a such a subject weighs against a whole
academy, declared Geometry to be the "science of the
eye"; and Prof. Sylvester, also a very considerable authority, declares that most if not all the great ideas of
modern Mathematics had their origin in Observation.
Amoncg the surprising examples cited by him  may be
named Sturm's theorems on the roots of equations " which
stared him in the face in the midst of some Inechanical
investigations connected with the motion of compound
pendulums," and the discovery of the method of continned fractions by Huyglhens, "to which he was led by the
construction of his planetary automaton." *
Hence it is that most of the difficulties in this science are difficulties rather of Intuition than of Reasoning;
and most of the "vexed questions " which have occupied
geometers -notably that respecting parallels and that
respecting a fourth dimension in space - have arisen
from neglect of Intuition.  Because analysts are accustomed to operate on symbols they at last begin to assign
a sort of talismanic virtue to symbols which will evoke
results in defiance of intuitions. But here the words of
the illustrious Poinsot deserve attention: " Ce n'est done
pas dans le calcul que reside cet art qui nous fait decou* Address to the Mathematical Section of the Brit. Association, 1869.
Reprinted in Nature, I. 238.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.            389
vrir; mais dans cette consideration attentive des choses
of l'esprit cherche avant tout' s'en faire une icle, en
essayant, par l'analyse proprement dite, de les decomposer
en d'autres plus simples, afin de les revoir ensuite comme
si elles etaient formees par la reunion de ces choses simples doent il a une pleine connaissance." *
193. Even in the higher developments of the Calculus,
where sensible experiences seem  most widely departed
from, it is easy to trace a sensible origin for the extrasensible intuitions; precisely as in Dynamics and Physics
we detect the sensible origin of intuitions which transcend Sense, e. g. uniform rectilinear Motion and Atoms.
If there is one conception which might be supposed to
justify a mnetempirical origin, it is that of infinitesimals.
Now we have this conception, it seems that it might
have been evolved ac priori, and that the active intellect
of the Greeks might have reached it through their Method
of Exhaustions.  What is the fact, however?  It is that
the ingenious Greeks were arrested in their course by the
impossibility of reaching a conclusion now seen to lie so
near at hand.  Nor was it until Mathematicians had
mastered the theory of the composition of motions, by
which the path of a projectile was seen to be compounded
of two straight lines in different and unceasingly changing
directions, that the conception of infinitesimals arose.
194. Enough has been said, some will think more than
enough, to establish the first part of our thesis, that
Mathematics is a science of Observation, dealing with
reals, precisely as all other sciences deal with reals. It
would be easy to show that its Method is the same; that,
like other sciences, having observed or discovered properties, which it classifies, generalizes, co-ordinates, and subordinates, it proceeds to extend discoveries by means of
Hypothesis, Induction, Experiment, and Deduction.  On
* POINSOT, Theorie nozuvelle de la rotation des corps, p. 78.




390          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
the large use of Hypothesis and Deduction there need be
nothing said here, since no one disputes their importance.
Induction and Experiment, however, demand consideration.
195. By some minds the very suggestion of mathematical truths being reached by Induction is resisted;
yet it is certain that not only does Induction play a part,
but according to some writers that part is very considerable. "Induction and analogy," says Professor Sylvester,
" are the special characteristics of modern Mathematics in
which theorems give place to theories, and no truth is
regarded otherwise than as a link in the infinite chain."
Some of the divergence on this point must be attributed
to the divergent conceptions of what constitutes Induction, much that is even by Mr. Mill included under that
head being either Intuition or Description.  No one can
refuse to recognize it as purely inductive when having
calculated a number of terms of a series, and ascertained
the law of the series, we fill up the succeeding terms
without calculating them; the induction here consisting
in our inference that the succeeding terms will conform  to the law  of the calculated terms; an inference which may be false in special cases. It was assuredly an induction by which Fermat concluded that
2n + 1 is always a prime number when n has the fornm
2X1, i. e. is 2, 4, 8, 16...; but Euler showed that the induction was erroneous when n was 32; for 232 + 1 is not
prime.
196. If these are pure inductions, the same cannot be
said of numerous other examples, also classed under this
head. Thus it is no induction by which we conclude
that two straight lines having once met do not meet
again, but continue divergent; we do not infer this truth
from comparison of instances, we intuite it. Axioms are
not inductions, nor can they have been inductively




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.            391
reached; they are intuitions universalized. I should
therefore propose to qualify Mr. Mill's statement "that
every induction which suffices to prove one fact proves an
indefinite multitude of facts "; the ambiguity which lies
in the word "multitude" renders this proposition misleading.  An induction cannot prove an indefinite multitude of facts, unless the facts be all repetitions of the one
first proved; if the multitude include any facts having
other relations than those proved, the inference is erroneous.  On this ground it is misleading to call axioms
inductions. Let us take a case selected by Mr. Mill.*  He
says that when we have to determine whether the angles
at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal or unequal,
our first consideration is, what are the indcluctions from
which we can infer equality, or inequality?  He specifies
eight axioms. Recourse to inductions is necessitated because " the angles cannot be perceived intuitively to have
any of the marks " specified in the axioms, although on
examination it appears that they have such marks.  I
agree with him  in considering this a case of discursive,
and not of intuitive judgment (~ 153), and that the relations of equality are not immediately presented, but have
to be soughyt and comln-/cared.  But I cannot consider that
the axioms, "Things which being applied to each other
coincide are equals," or "The whole and the sum  of its
parts are equals," have the characters of Induction; they
are identical equcations, - propositions which exclude all
contingency by  excluding  all inference.  No one has
more clearly shown than Mr. Mill the distinction between
inductions properly so called, and "generalization in
which there is no induction because there is no inference; the conclusion is merely a summing up of what was
* See also on this question a paper by Professor Robertson Smith in
the Proceedings of the Royal Society of Edintburgh, translated in the Revue
des Coours Sciemtifiqeues, VII. 190.




392         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
asserted in the various propositions from which it was
drawn" (I. 324). On this ground we must refuse the
character of Induction to those axioms which are simply
intuitions generalized. With reference to the particular
case chosen, instead of the roundabout demonstration of
Euclid, or that proposed by Mr. Mill, we might reduce it
to two intuitions: 1~, The isosceles triangle has equal
legs; this equality is intuited in the terms defined; 20,
The legs being equal, what is seen of the one is seen of
the other, i. e. the angle formed by one leg with the
base will be equal to the angle formed by the other.
197. Were Mathematics founded on induction there
would be contingency in all its propositions which extend beyond particular cases; and each conclusion would
require experimental verification, direct or indirect. But
this is true only of portions of the science.  The greater
part is founded on Intuition, and its conclusions are universal.  We are not, however, to suppose that Experiment
has little to do here. "A science is experimental," says
Mr. Mill, "in proportion as every new case which presents any peculiar features stands in need of a new set
of observations and experiments, and a fresh induction."
Mathematics is experimental therefore in this, that for
every step in advance, as Professor IRobertson Smith has
well said, everything not the result of calculation or deduction, there is needed a new figure and a new intuition.
The experimentation is easier, less complicated, than ill
Physics or Chemistry, the elements are more manageable,
because more sharply defined, and we are under no misgiving in dealing with them lest they should include any
unknown elements which could affect the result. We are
perfectly sure that in bringing a right line into relation
with another, it is only this relation we have to deal with;
whereas in bringing a gas into relation with a solid we do
not know all the co-operant factors; and our experiment




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.            393
reveals only some of the actual results.*  But although
easier, the procedure is similar.  The necessity for a new
figure, and a new intuition, is shown at every step. We
could not reach the simplest proposition without these.
Ask any one, not already instructed, whether it is possible to let fall from  a point more than one perpendicular
on a straight line; or whether all parallelograms between
the same parallels are equal when their bases are equal.
These propositions are so far from being self-evident, or
capable of being deduced from the axioms and definitions,
that he cannot answer until he has seen the figures and
intuited the relations. It is by experiment alone that he
can determine the eqmality of spaces included in figures
so unequal as an oblique and a perpendicular parallelogram on similar bases. The chemist has his elements,
or what he regards as such, and these he conmbines and
recombines, in various ways, to watch the reactions, and
detect the constant results.  The geometer has his elements (points, lines, planes) which he combines and recombines, watching the results.  HIe draws a circle, and
divides it by a straight line into  equal halves.  This
straight line he again divides by another, and thus forms
four right angles which fill the space circumscribed by the
circle.  He goes on adding figure by figure and detecting
new relations.  Like the chemist he gets at constant results, which enable him to foresee what will be the effect
of new combinations: he can calculate as well as count.
But although Deduction will carry him much further than
it will the chemist, because of the greater homog'eneity
of the elements he deals with, it will not suffice without
* Kant remairks that philosophy is occupied with clearing up the
obscure and complicated Notions which it finds in the mind, whereas
Mathematics starts from clearly defined Notions and sees what will issue
from their combination. - Ueber die Deutlichkeit der Grutndsdtze, Werke,
I. 68.
17*




394         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
Experiment, Verification.  The man who first discovered that 7 + 5 - 12, did so by a synthesis, which was
experimental, not less than that by which the chemist
discovered that two volumes of hydrogen and one volume
of oxygen constituted water.
198. If in cases so simple Experiment is needed, it
may readily be understood how in more complex cases
the mathematician essays the demonstration of a problem
through a series of tentatives, till he hits upon the construction which discloses the solution, or finds that no
solution is possible under the given conditions. Suppose,
for example, he asks himself whether there may not be a
quadrilateral figure having equal sides, and having two of
its angles equal to three right angles: he cannot construct such a figure; the attempt would at once disclose
that such a figure was inconsistent with the properties of
quadrilaterals.
Kant has shown that even identical propositions such
as a-a, or the axiom " The whole is greater than its part,"
are admissible only because they can be presented in Intuition; and we formerly saw that even these are demonstrable, and demonstrable only on the assumption of
homogeneity. Whence we conclude that Mathematics
must be dependent on and limited by Experience, which
furnishes intuitions.
199. There has been much dispute as to whether
-Mathematics is founded on Axioms or on Definitions.
This dispute may be cleared up by a more rigorous interpretation of the terms. In the sense commonly assigned,
it is neither to Axioms nor to Definitions that the foundation can be ascribed, but to Intuitions; and to Axioms
and Definitions only in virtue of their expressing Intuitions. Nor let this be considered idle cavilling'.  For
those who take their stand on the Axioms, hold that the
whole science is nothing but the analytical unfolding of




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.              395
the few Axioms placed at the opening of each treatise;
and this seems to be doubly erroneous; first, because
those Axioms are too few for the purpose, - each step
requiring a new intuition, which, when generalized, becomes a new Axiom; secondly, because they derive their
whole validity from  Intuitions.  Both objections may be
condensed  in one: the science is synthetical and not
analytical.
Take the Axioms of Euclid and try by them  alone to
deduce the Pythagorean theorem, and it will be found as
idle as the attempt to deduce the action of a poison from
the axiom " Every effect has its cause." Dugald Stewart,
fully alive to the barrenness of Axionms, sought in Definitions for the real foundation.  But the same argument
applies here.  Unless the Definitions are intuitions of the
figures and relations defined, they are also barren.* Definitions, moreover, must not be arbitrary, if they are to
lead to other than arbitrary conclusions.  We may, if we
please, define parallel lines, lines concave to each other;
or define 5 to be the sum 2 +  2.  But in this case all
our deductions must be consistent with these assumptions; and we cannot then say that two parallel lines will
never meet when prolonged, nor that 5 is 3 + 2 or 10 -. 2.
The mathematician does not beoin by assuming the properties of figures, and after defining them proceed to ascertain whether such figures exist; le begins by ascertaining
that such figures and such relations do exist, and then
defines them. as he finds them.  In other words, Definitions are the expressions of the figures, not their founda* Thus, from the definition of a cycloid, " the curve described by a
point in the circumference of a circle while the circle itself rolls in a
straight line on a plane," we may intuite the truth of Roberval's discovery that its area is equal to thrice that of the generating circle; but
we require this to be shown to us through other intuitions, we cannot see
it in the definition.




396             PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
tions. With Definitions we can take no step in advance,
we can only analyze them.*
200. In  the  Imaginary  Geometry  of Lobatschewsky
and Beltrami we have indeed a theory of parallels founded
on Definitions.  Instead of the intuitions really presented
to us by the figures, the definitions are made to express
relations different from  those intuited; they are arbitrary,
and although the deductions from them  are consistent with
these arbitrary premises, and are therefore logically accurate, they  are intaplglicable to the real objects given  in
our Experience. Lobatschewsky's arbitrary definition of
parallelism t is as wide a departure from the real intuition expressed in Euclid's definition, as the definition of
5 = —  2 +  2 is from  our definition of that number.
201. Not only do we find Observation, Hypothesis,
Induction, and  Experiment everywhere  underlying  the
constructions of Mathematics, as in any other science, we
also find that in both the abstractions are all raised from
sensibles and extra-sensibles by a similar process. The
argument that they cannot have been derived from  sensi* "De la definition du triangle et de la definition de la bissectrice
d'un angle, vous ne tirerez pas que les trois bissectrices des angles d'un
triangle se coupent au meme point; iffaut one contstruction. Le raisonnement, si raisonnement il y a, consiste toujours dans l'enumeration des
parties de la figure; ceci est un angle, cela une bissectrice, c'est-i-dire
une ligne equidistante des co8ts, etc.  De mnme le chimiste se dit: j'ai
mis la autant d'oxygBne, le double d'hydrogine; j'ai maintenant de
leau, done," etc. - DELBCEUF, PrIlicuinaires de e la Cforz-tiSe, p. 79.
+ " Toutes les droites tracees par un mmne point dans un plan peuvent
se distribuer, par rapport i une droite donndee dans ce plan en deux
classes, savoir  endroites quci couplent la droite donnee, et en droites qui
ne la coucpent pas.  La droite qui forme la limZite commune de ces deux
classes est dite parallgle it la droite donnie." - LOBATSCHEWSKYn, tludes
Geomentriquoes sur la theorie des paorailles; tradczit par Houel, p. 3.
Paris, 1866.  In a subsequent work M. Houel admits that the conclusions of Lobatschewsky are in contradiction of Experience but not of
Logic. -Essai critique sucr les princcipes fonddaenentaux de la Gomentrie
ilgnentairce, p. 77.  1867.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.          397
ble concretes, because our senses never present them
under the forms dealt with by mathematicians, may
equally be applied to other sciences: the heavens show no
elliptical orbits; our laboratories show no perfect gases;
our islands and continents show no species. And there
is good reason why this must be so. Science deals with
conceptions, not with perceptions; with ideal not real
figures. Its laboratory is not the outer world of Nature,
but the inner sanctuary of Mlind. It draws indeed its
material from Nature, but fashions this anew according to
its own laws; and having thus constructed a microcosm,
half objective, half subjective, it is enabled to enlarge its
construction by taking in more and more of the macrocosm.
Science everywhere ainms at transforming isolated perceptions into connected conceptions, — facts into laws.
Out of the manifold irregularities presented to Sense it
abstracts an ideal regularity; out of the chaos, order. The
imperfectly straight real lines give place to lines ideally
straight. Having to introduce Likeness (equations) amid
a manifold Unlikeness, we begin by reducing to a first
Likeness all the diversities of spaces and numbers presented to Sense, and thus get ideal Space everywhere
homogeneous, and ideal Number. And so with the rest.
But this recognition of the ideality of Mathemnatics must
not cause us to overlook the fundamental fact that only
in so far as the ideals are constructed from reals can they
have any validity in reference to Veals. Kant teaches
that objects conform themselves to our modes of Sensibility, and that it is we who invest them with our forms,
which is all we know of them; and he denies that the
things themselves determine our forms. I have already
stated in what sense I regard this as true, and in what
as false; it is irreconcilable with the ideality of Science;
for were it true that objects received their forms entirely from us, we should find in Nature those very forms




393          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
which we do not find there, - the perfect circle, the pure
gas, the defined species, the histological tissue.  These
exist, but they exist in our conceptions, not in our perceptions. How they arise in conception, as abstractions
from  perceptions, we know very well; whereas, if we
only saw in Nature what the Mind brought with it' and
reflected on objects, we should see the perfect abstractions,
and not the imperfect concretes: and we should see these
unaided by Science.
202. Having pointed out the cardinal characters in
which Mathematics resembles other sciences, we have
finally to inquire if there are any other essential characters which would suffice for a genuine difference. There
is one character which will be considered decisive, and
that is the apodictic certainty belonging to mathematical
conclusions.  Kant in the preface to his Practical Reason
declares that we might as well attempt to squeeze water
from  pumice-stone, exz pmice Caqarm, as to get at necessary and universal truth through experience.*  We, on
the contrary, have seen that all truth is necessarily true,
under the specified conditions; all truth is universally
true if the conditions be universalized; and in these
respects Mathematics has no superiority over Biology.
But, it may be argued, mathematical truths have an
universality denied to all other scientific truths, in that
they relate to fundamental aspects under which all things
are perceived by us, -  thus all things whatever are numerable, and all things are extended.  But mathematical
truths are not true irrespective of conditions; and their
universality is restricted to our universe.  The space of
geometers is a space of three dimensions; and many of
their truths would cease to be necessary and universal in
a space of two or four dimensions.  WTe must say, therefore, that the truths of Mathematics, like all other truths,
* KANT, Kritik derprakticshen FerlnuTft. Vorrepe, d. 107. Werke, IV.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.          399
have their origin in Experience, and are true only of the
universe known through Experience.
203. The superior certainty of Mathematics arises from
the superior facility with which certainty is reached and
exhibited to others.  There can be but one certainty, -
that of an identical equation, or identical proposition, -
and this admits of no degrees; it is, or is not.  Nor does
the equation of condition admit uncertainty, directly the
condition which satisfies the equation has been found.
The laws of Motion, Affinity, Life, and Mind, although
in successive degrees less general than the laws of Quantity, are not less exact, less certain. The terms in which
they are expressed may be less exact, and their application to particular cases may be far more contingent, than
is the application of the laws of Quantity; but when the
laws formulate real relations, and are true, their certainty
is unaffected by contingencies of expression and application. A general law is raised by abstracting the constants
from the variables, - out of many particular cases we let
drop all the special circumstances which individualize each
case, and the residuum  is the generalized law. When
this law has to be applied to some new case, we have to
modify it by the reintrolduction of such special circumstances as will individualize the case: unless we do this,
the law will not hold good, the case will not fall under it.
Now it is our very uncertainty respecting these special
circumstances which constitutes the contingency of the
law. Could we be assured, as in mathematical questions
we commonly are, of having all the co-operant factors
within our grasp, contingency would vanish. In many
scientific propositions this condition is fulfilled; the abstract truth in Biology is as absolute as the abstract truth
in Geometry.  If this condition is rarely or never fulfilled
in concrete Biology, the same must be said of Applied
Mathematics.  The proposition: "Water is indispensable




400          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
to the vitality of a tissue," is not less exact, not less certain, than the proposition: "In a right-angled triangle
the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the squares of
the two other sides." Neither proposition is self-evident;
both have to be shown by experiment; and when shown,
each is seen to be an identical proposition. The intermediate steps through which it is shown that Vitality is
never found without chemical change, and that water is
necessary for such change, may pair off with the steps
by which it is shown that in the parallelograms on equal
bases, between parallels, the triangles are equal.  In both
cases a series of identical propositions forms the substance of the conclusions, and the conclusions therefore
are equally identical propositions.
But now observe: although it is indisputable that
alcohol in sufficient quantity, or concentration, will withdraw from a tissue in contact with it so much water as to
destroy the vitality of the tissue, - and although it is an
indisputable corollary that drinking alcohol in such quantity must cause a man's death, - the inference, which to
many seems logical, that any quantity of alcohol must, if
not destroy, at least diminish, Vitality, is an inference
wholly contingent.  Every one knows that quantitative
differences must have corresponding functional differences.
Because a certain quantity of alcohol will destroy a tissue, we are not to conclude that any smaller quantity will
do more than disturb its molecular equilibrium, which
temporary disturbance may be a positive advantage to
the organism.  We are here in the midst of indeterminate
quantitative relations, and must call in the aid of experiment to determine whether certain quantities are or are
not injurious.  Could we once ascertain the precise quantities which had precise functional consequences, our
treatment of the alcoholic question would be rigorously
exact.  But at present it is no more capable of a solution
than an equation of the sixth degree.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.        401
CHAPTER XV.
SOME OBSERVATIONS ON KANT.
204. OuR survey of the Limitations of Knowledcge may
end here, since to carry it further we should have to invoke the results of an examination into the psychological
mechanism, which must be reserved for future Problems.
All that now remains is to point out the radical difference between the empirical. and metempirical philosophies; and since all modern Metempirics is either
IKantian, or founded upon Kantian principles, we shall
best achieve our purpose by confinling our criticism to
Kant's fundamental positions. No attempt to estimate
Kant's work, his position in the history of speculation,
can be thought of here. I have attempted this elsewhere; and any reader who considers that in the following remarks the constant antagonism seems to imply an
undervaluing  of Kant's greatness, may be referred to the
more general estimate in the second volume of the fourth
edition of my History of Philosophy.
205. Noticeable at the outset is the great general resemblance between the outcome of Kant's argumentation
and the outcome of our own; whence it may at first appear that Kant, having fought our filght, should be welcomecl as a powerful ally. But it turns out otherwise.
He is claimed by our antagonists. The reason of this
contradiction it will be profitable to ascertain.
First of the agreement: It was his purpose to define
the Limitations of Knowledge, and to prove the relativity
z




402          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
of all human conceptions. In strict logical result, the
Supra-sensible was thus excluded from his philosophy no
less than from ours. He did exclude it from the Speculative, but opened a back entrance for it in the Practical.
He taught that our faculties are unable to transcend the
limits of possible Experience, and that we only cognize
in thing's, ci priori, what we ourselves have placed there.
His aim, like our own, he declares to be to revolutionize Metaphysics by applying to it the Method of mathematicians and physicists.  He affirms, as we do, that
intuitions and conceptions make up the sum of Knowledge; and Intuition is the fiuntion of the Mind in the
sphere of Sense, while Conception is the function of
Mind in the Sphere of Understanding, or Judgment.
The first has the power of receiving sensuous impressions, the second of knowing by means of these. He
shows that " although our pure concepts of the understanding and our principles are independent of Experience, and despite of the apparently greater sphere of
their use, still nothincg whatever can be thought by them
beyond the field of Experience, because they can do
nothing but merely determine the logical form of the
judgment relatively to given intuitions.  But as there is
no intuition at all beyond the field of the sensibility,
these pure concepts, as they cannot possibly be exhibited
in concreto, are then totally without meaning."  And later
on he says: "After all the very cogent proofs already
adduced, it were absurd in us to hope to know more of
an object than belongs to the possible experience of it, or
to lay claim to the least atom of knowledgoe about anything not assumed to be ass  to be an object of possible experience
which would determine it according to the constitution
it has in itself..... And a still greater absurdity if we
wished to have the principles of the possibility of experience considered universal conditions of things in them



THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.            403
selves." *  Not only does he thus clearly formulate the
conclusions of the Experiential Philosophy, he no less
clearly marks the illusions of Speculation when it passes
beyond.  "It first separates the elementary cognitions
which inhere in the understanding prior to all experience, but yet must always have their application in experience.  It gradually drops these limits; and what is
there to prevent it, as it has quite freely derived its principles from  itself?  And then it proceeds first to newly
imagined powers in nature, then to beings outside nature,
— in short, to a world for whose construction the materials cannot be wanting, because fertile fiction furnishes
them abundantly, and though not confirmed is never refuted by experience." t
206. Now as to differences: In spite of all this, and so
much more to the same effect, Kant not only sustained
the old metempirical tradition, but by his supposed discovery of the d priori elements in knowledge furnished
the ground for subsequent speculators.  Fries, Fichte,
Schelling, Hegel, Schopenlhaer, and the rest, founded
their systems on this. In the great debate respecting
the origin of Knowledge, whether it is wholly due to Experience, or partly due to Experience and partly to a
higher source, Kant adopted the ambiguous position of
declaring that we hazve a source of Knowledge which is
independent of Experience, but that all such knowledge
is illusory beyond the range of Experience.  His successors fastened on the positive part of his teaching, and rejected the negative.  I accept the negative, and reject
the positive; or to speak more precisely, I interpret the
positive in another way.  In -what sense we can be said
to bring with us d  priori conditions of Knowledgce, and
even ca prioori Experience (paradoxical as the phrase may
* Prolegomena, ~~ 35, 37 (Mahaffy's translation, p. 96, 150).
t Ibid., ~ 36.




404          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
sound) which must determine the result of our individual
a posteriori experiences, has already been shown (~ 22).
IKant could not have so interpreted the facts, simply
because Biology and Psychology were not sufficiently
advanced in his day to suggest such an interpretation.
He was hanlpered by two traditional conceptions, which
to his mind were irresistible, namely, the conception of
M/lind as an entity, and the conception of Necessity and
Universality as tests of a truth transcending Experience.
207. The reader must be reminded that the important
point in the following discussion is not whether d priori
elements can be detected in knowledge, but whether
those elements were or were not originally formed out of
ancestral sensible experiences; because it is on the decision of this point that the conclusion will rest whether ca
priori elelents prove a supra-sensible origin, and carry a
higher validity.
208. Since Kant undertakes to show that the Mind
brings with it a fund of ca priori knowledge in which no
empirical influence, personal or ancestral, is traceable, we
must first see what it is he means by Experience. On
this, and indeed on most points, his language is very contradictory.  The following passages are, however, such as
will generally represent his position:"Experience consists of intuitions which pertain to
the Sensibility, and of judgments which are entirely the
work of the Understanding."  "Experience consists in
the synthetical connections of phenomena (perceptions)
in consciousness, so far as this connection is necessary."
(Prolegormena, I. ~~ 22, 23.)  "The reader has probably
been long accustomed to consider experience a mere empirical synthesis of perception, and hence not to reflect
that it goes much further than these extend, as it gives
empirical judgments universal validity [ let this be noted ]
and for that presupposes a pure unity of the understand



THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.         405
ing which precedes c priori."  (Ibid., ~ 26, p. 87, of
Mahaffey's translation, which occupies the third volume of
his Critical Philosophy for English Readers, 1872.)  Thus
when defending Experience he is careful to separate it
from "a mere aggregate of perceptions" on the one hand,
and from a mere sensuous impression on the other.  But
in the course of his argument he is frequently found
using the term  Experience simply for sensuous impression: and much of his argument depends on this restriction of the term.
209. Observe the contradiction into which he is led.
First, he declares that Experience demands the combination of sensitive receptivity with logical spontaneity:
the one giving the objective matter, the other the subjective form.  "It is the matter of all phenomena that is
given to us d posteriori; the form must lie ready d priori
for them in the mind."  Having thus emphatically stated
the two requisites of all Experience, - the c' pFriori conditiQn and the aC posteriori condition, - he nevertheless
presents us with this paradoxical statement, that although
all knowledge begins with Experience (as just defined),
some knowledclge is antecedent to and independent of Experience.  I do not mea.n to say that this contradiction is
expressly stated by him; but I do say that such is the
plain interpretation of his confused statements.  I believe
that he unwittingly confounded one factor with the product of two factors, so that after first defining knowledge
to be the product of a subjective element and an objective element, calling the one a priori and the other ca posteriori, he henceforward treated the subjective element as
if it alone constituted a peculiar kind of knowleclde, and
not simply one of the factors of all knowledge. It was
open to him to call the cc priori condition of Experience
Knowledge, if he wished it; but it was not open to him
to do this without due warning; and, above all, it was




406         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
not open to him after he had expressly defined all knowledge as arising in Experience.  The a posteriori factor is
not less indispensable than the a priori factor.
210. Let me first exhibit the evidence on which Kant
is arraigned; the explanation of how he came to fall into
the contradiction may then be suggested.  The asserted
contradiction is that of concluding the existence of c priori knowledge, because Knowledge presupposes an a
priori Faculty of Knowing'; in other words, when he argues
that before sensuous impressions can be transformed into
Experience they must be moulded by the M\ental Forms
of sensible Intuition and logical Conception, he does
indeed assert the existence of an ac priori element, a
condition rendering Experience possible; but in flagrant
contradiction with his own principles he concludes from
this that this element is Knozlecdge.  Granting (what
indeed must be rejected) the rationality of supposing a
Faculty to exist independent of and anterior to its active
realization, — granting this potential existence of a Cognitive Faculty before there is any Cognition, and of Laws,
or Forms, of Experience, before there is Experience,we nmust still separate what he confounds, namely, the
Faculty of Knowing, or Laws of the mental organism,
from the Knowledge which is the product of those oLaws,
under objective stinmulus.  On his own showing it is not
the Knowledge which is ca priori, antecedent to all Experience, but the element added to sensuous impression,
supplied frorm the Mind itself.  He has expressly told us
that Experience is much more than sensuous impression,
more even than an aggregate of perceptions. It is a synthesis, "a mode of cognition which requires the co-operation of the Understanding."  He says: "Before objects
are given to me, that is a priori, I must presuppose in
myself laws of the Understanding which are expressed in
conceptions a priori. To these conceptions all objects of




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.               407
Experience must necessarily conform."  (Preface to second
ed. of iKritiA.)  Still this is only presupposing one of the
two conditions of Knowledge.~  But havincg  identified
the product with one of its factors, he grounds on it a
further distinction. "IKnowledoe of this kind," he says,
"is called c' piriori in contradistinction to empirical knowledgTe which has its source 4 poester'iori, that is, in experience."  He confounds ac pr7iori knowledge with  an ac
priori coondition of knowledge, and sets apart this a priori knowledge as something radically distinguished from
c posteCiori knowledge,- although  his own  definition
of the  4c posteriori declared it to be empirical, and he
assumed  knowledge to be possible  only  through  the
co-operation of this c4 jriori and a posteriori.
211. Many more passages might be given; they would
be superfluous.  It only now  remains to  suggest the
explanation of how so great a thinker came to commit so
great an oversight.  We must try and place ourselves in
his position. The question in the schools had been that
of innate ideas. Unless the existence of such ideas could
be established, the whole range of Meteinpirics would of
course prove to be a dream.  To prove that we have any
knowledge not ultimately reducible to sensible experience, it was necessary to prove the existence of data inaccessible to Experience.  The school of Locke had indeed
presupposed the existence of the Faculty of Knowing,
and only asserted that what was Known had an external
origin, -  that is to say, the Faculty was called into ac* "Our nature is so constituted that intuition with us can never be
other than sensuous, that is, it contains the only mode in which we are
affected by objects. On the other hand, the faculty of thinking the object
of sensuous intuition is the understanding. Understanding cannot intuite, the sensibility cannot think. In no other way tha~n from the Lunited
operation, of both can khowledge arise. But we must not on this account
overlook the difference of the elements constituted by each." -Z I.ritik,
Transc. Logikc, I. 88.




408         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
tivity through Sensible Experience. What Locke vaguely presupposed, was definitely and expressly brought
forward by Leibnitz. This was an important step. "The
senses," he said, " although necessary for all actual knowledge, are not sufficient to give us all of it." This is also
Kant's fundamental position. That which the senses do
not give is the character of necessity. "Mathematics
must have principles of which the proof does not depend
upon examples, nor consequently upon the senses, although without the senses one would never have thought
of them. So also Logic, M/Ietaphysics, and Morals are
full of such truths, and consequently their proofs can
only come from  those internal principles which  are
called innate."
212. Let me pause a moment here to remark that
there is a fallacy in saying the proof of a mathematical
truth does not depend upon examples; it does not depend on any number of repetitions, or any variation of
the examples, but it does depend on the intuition of the
example intuited. Thus 2 + 2 =- 4 is not proved by
repeating the formula, or varying the numbered objects;
but is proved by intuition of the numerical relations.
When Leibnitz says that without the senses we should
never have thought of such a truth as 2 + 2 =4, he
might have added, nor would the truth itself have been
demonstrable.
All that Leibnitz effected was therefore to render explicit what had been implicit in the aroument of Locke.
He vindicated the active co-operation of the subjective
factor. Kant came, and by his theory of the Mental
Forms gave greater precision to this factor. Following
Leibnitz he assumed, as incontestable, that the characters of universality and necessity proved the non-experiential nature of every truth which contained them.
This position I have argued against at great length, and,




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGt.           409
I trust, to the reader's satisfaction; but of course since
Kant adopted it we must allow him  all that he can
deduce from  it.  I think his deduction faulty in this
respect: granting their d6 priori character, this does not,
by his own s10howing, establish more than that certain cog'nitions, derived through Experience, are distinguishable
froml others by subjective conditions not traceable in the
others.  tWhether any cognition has or has not these
characters, it is always the product of two factors, objective stimulus and subjective reaction, the matter and the
form.
213. There are three meanings to be assigned to a'!priori knowledge.  First, there is that which belongs
to all Deduction, - i. e. we have already established by
Induction a general principle, from  which ac priori we
conclude some particular result.  This meaning Kant
explicitly sets aside.  He will only recognize as pure a
priori that which is absolutely independent of all experience whatever.
Secondly, there is the meaning I have already considered (~ 22), namely, the organized experience usually
termed Instinct which we inherit from our ancestors, and
which forms, so to speak, part of our mental structure.
In this sense we may be said to be born with a knowledge of Space, with a knowledge of Causality, etc., because althoucgh these registered tendencies were originally
framed out of sensible experiences, we who inherit the
structure so mllodified only need the external stimulus,
and forthwith the action of that structure produces the
predetermined result.  The cllicken, which two or three
hours after escaping fronm the shell captures an insect,
puts in action the organized experiences of space, food,
etc., which were acquired by remote ancestors.
This meaning Kant also rejects, and indeed it would
not have served his purpose.  "It is quite possible," he
18




410          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
says, "that some may propose a kind of pre-formation
system  of Pure Reason in which the Categories are
neither self-conceived c_ priori first principles of Knowlecdge, nor derived from Experience; but are merely aptitudes for thought implanted in us contemporaneously
wvith our existence."  And this, which would reconcile
his doctrine of Mental Forms with psychological facts,
is rejected, because "the Categories thereby lose their
character of objective necessity.  Nor would there be
wanting persons to  deny their subjective necessity,
though compelled to feel it.  Certainly we could never
dispute with any one about that which merely depended
on the manner in which he was organized."
214. Hav\ing thus excluded the only two meanings of
c' 2'riori knowledge which embrace Experience, he is
forced to fix on that which is altogether aloof from every
empirical element.  Only thus indeed could he carry on
the traditional doctrine which held Mind to be an entity,
mysteriously inhabiting the organism, looking at the external world through the organism, but with visions also
of an existence not included in this sublunary sphere.
Plato and Leibnitz were consistent in holding this opinion, but Kant was not consistent; for he had expressly
declared that call knowiedge had its r-ise in Experience,
although it was not all constitztced by Experience, since
for Experience itself there was needed an c' prfiori no less
than an ci posteriori condition; in other words, all knowledge depends upon material furnished in Sensation, and
on form  furnished by the KnLowing Faculty.  Now observe two points: first, the union of ca pr'ior'i and ci 2posterion-i is necessary for every cognition; secondly, and as
a corollary, no cognition can be furnished by the Knowing Faculty alone, since Knowing involves a Known.  It
is because Kant forgets his own definitions, and speaks
of Experience as if it were sensuous impression without




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.            411
the co-operation of the a priori element, that he is led to
regard what is logically separable from this ac priori condition as if it were really separable, and thus to speak of
the Knowing Faculty as pure a priori cognition.
215. Taking his analysis, and accepting  Space and
Time as the forms of Sensibility, and the Categories as
the forms of the Understanding, these formns are only 4
pl)iori conditions of knowledge, and cannot of tAemselves
constitute a cognition.  By themselves they are as powerless as the external conditions.  There never was, and
never could be, a cognition constituted out of the forms
alone.*
That my interpretation is exact may be seen in Kant's
letter to Eberhard  (Wetrke, ed. Rosenkrantz I. 444),
wherein he says that the ]K'ritik " allows of no innate or
unacquired (unerschafcgee) representations, all of them,
intuitions and conceptions, are acquired.  But there is, to
speak with jurists, a p1rintitive acquisition or inher~'itance,
consequently of that also which previously did not exist,
and hence belonged to nothing before this act.  Such are
the form of things in Space and Time, and the synthetic
unity of the manifold in conceptions, for neither of these
are drawn from objects, as givenlto our cognitive faculty,
but are brought c4 priori by that faculty out of itself.
The firstformal cond'ition of the possibility of an intuition of Space is innate, but not the representation of
Space itself."
Nothing can be plainer; yet because in the course of
his arcgument, he frequently employs the term Experience
in the restricted meaning of sensuous impression, and the
c priori formal condition in the improperly extended
meaning of / prniori knowledge, he is led to maintain that
the Mind brings with it knowlecdge wholly destitute of
empirical elements.  By a similar substitution he some* Compare Kritik, Transc. Analytik, ~ 13.




412          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
times speaks of Intuition and Conception as pure forms,
formal conditions; and at others treats them as the products of the forms ancd the matter, namely, as intuitions
and conceptions.  Only thus can he instance Mathematics
in illustration of pure d priori knowledge.  It is obviously
nothing of the kind, in his meaning of c& priori.  The
pure formal condition of Space is not, he admits, the repr'esenlation of Space; the pure formal condition of Quantity is not any representation of Quantity. Although
these forms may accompany, as condclitions, every particular experience of space relations, and every particular
judgment of quantitative relations, they cannot in themselves be other than pure forms. The conception of causality may be a condition of our judgment, may necessitate the conclusion that every change we observe must
have had an antecedent cause; but it can tell us nothing
more, it can throw  no light on any particular cause in
any particular change.  Manipulate the conceptions of
Space and Magnitude in the abstract how you will, you
cannot get out of them any geometrical knowlecldge, simply
lbecause knowledge, geometrical and other, needs sensuous
iltuition, needs particular experiences to which the ca
)priori forms can be applied.  Has not iKant laid it down
at the very outset of his exposition that the only mode
Iy which our knowledge can relate to objects is by intuition?  "To this as the indispensable groundwork all
thoulghlt points.  CBut avn inttuitioln can take place only in
so far cas the object is given to us.  This again is only possible, to man at least, on condition that the object affect
the mind in a certain manner..... By means of sensiIility objects are given to us, and it alone furnishes us
\vith intuitions; by the understanding they are thoug/lht,
and from it arise conceptions.  But all thought must directly or indirectly by means of certain signs relate ultimuately to intuiftions; consequently to sensibility, because




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.          413
in no other way can an object be given to us." (MeiAlejohn's trans., p. 21.)  Again: "Pure intuition contains merely the form under which something is intuited,
and pure conception only the form of the thought of an
object.  Only pure intuitions and pure conceptions are
possible c'  p~io-r; the empirical or c_ postcriori " (p. 45).
216. How in the face of declarations so explicit is he
enabled to propound the hypothesis that we have pure a
rriori knowledge? It is that besides the unconscious
substitution of one meaning for another in the terms
employed, he fixes on the characters of necessity and universality as infallible tests of ac priori knlowledge. At all
points this argument meets us.
He divides judgments into those which are subjectively
valid, and those which are objectively valid. The first
are judgments of Perception (Wcah~rneh7tmnqslertheile);
the second are judgments of Experience (E~c:fc/hrungsusrtheile). Although all judgments of Experience are empirical, i. e. have their ground in the immediate sensuous
perception, all empirical judgments, he says, are not judgments of Experience. Does this seem contradictory? It
is explained thus: over and above the empirical element
given in sensuous Intuition there is required the additional element of conceptions (Begirffe), which have their
origin, c priori, in the pure Understanding; and under
these every perception has to be subsumed before it can
be changed into experience.  All our judgments are at
first judgments of Perception; they are simply the logical connection of perceptions in Thought, and are consequently only valid for the thinker at that particular
moment. But afterwards we place them in a new relation, namely, to a world outside the thinker, and insist on
their validity for all thinkers and for all time. Hence
objective validity and necessary universality are reciprocal notions.  "Judgments of experience take their objec



414         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
tive validity not from the immediate knowledge of the
object (for this is impossible), but from the conditioln of
cuniversal vcalidity in emtpirical jdclments, which rest not
on empirical or sensuous conditions, but on pure conceptions" (Proley., ~ 19; AMahaffy, p. 70). He illustrates
the two judgments thus: When I say the room is warm,
I by no means require that every one shall always find
this true as I do now. I only express the relations of
two sensations to my present self; consequently my judgment is not valid for the object: it is simply a judgment
of Perception. Very different is the other kind, which
teaches me that whatever Experience reveals under certain circumstances, it must always reveal to me and to
every one; its validity is not confined to the subject, nor
to the particular moment, but to the object for all time.
Before a judgment of Perception can become a judgment
of Experience, it must be subsumed under a Conception.
For example, " When the sun shines on the stone, the
stone grows warm," is a jdclgment of Perception.  No
matter how often it may have been perceived by me and
others, it contains within it no necessity. But if I say,
" The sun warms the stone," I add to my perception of
the effect the conception of cause which necessarily connects the conception of sunshine with that of heat. The
judgment then becomes universally valid, and is converted into experience.
"But how," he asks, "does this proposition, that judgments of Experience contain necessity in the synthesis of
perception, agree with my statement, that Experience as
knowledge a' posteriori can give only contingent judgnents? When I say Experience teaches me something,
I only mean the perception which lies in it: for example,
that warming of the stone always follows the shiling of
the sun on it, and thus the propositio,) of Experience is
always so far contingent.  That this warming necessarily




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.          415
follows from the shining is indeed contained in the jzcygment of Ex:perieclce (by means of the conception of cause);
but I do not learn1 that through _Experience; on the contrary, Experience is first constituzted by this addition to
perception of this conception of cause" (Proleg., ~ 24,
note.)
217. Without pausing to inquire how far he has resolved the contradiction here indicated, we may simply
note the reappearance of the old confusion of Experience
as constituted by arn c priori and a.n ac 2posteriori element,
with Experience as only c4 posteriori.  He argues that
wherever we find the characters of necessity and universality, there we have pure ac priori knowledge. Mierely
noting that on his own explicit statement, constantly
repeated, this would only show an element of knowledge,
let us ask what proof lie offers in support of this argument? It is the old assertion: "Experience never gives
us strict and absolute, but only comparative universality
gained by induction, and which asserts that so far we have
found no exception. Empirical universality is, then, but
an arbitrary or contingent exaggeration from the cases we
and others know to all cases; whereas strict ~univcrsality
is essential to the judclgnent icn which it is foztnd, and
points to a peculiar source of knowledge which we have
designated 4 priori."  But if universality is essential to
the judgment in which it is found, and if, as he asserts,
it is always found in a judgment of Experience (for without the c' priori addition Experience cannot be constituted), how in the name of all Logic can he pretend to
show that Experience never gives universality, and that
the presence of universality is a proof of 4c priori knowledge? It is like saying that the working of a steamenCgine is effected by the steam and the engine, and then
arguing that because the engine is powerless without the
steam, this proves another source of the power that is to




416         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
be found in the steam and the engine. By dropping out
of consideration the agency of steam, it is easy to show
that the engine cannot be the source of steam-engine
operation.  By restricting Experience to the mere external action of objects on Sense, dropping out of consideration the reaction of the mental organism, it is easy to
show that Experience will not suffice.
218. The truth is, Kant tried to hold contradictory
positions. The whole drift of his polemic against the
ontologists was to show that knowledge was limited, relative, and could not extend beyond the sphere of possible
Experience; but while thus cutting the ground from
under the ontologists, lie was also anxious to cut the
ground from the sensationalists and sceptics, and therefore tried to prove that the Mind brought with it an
ac priori fund of knowledge. Nay, so resolute was he
to break away from the experiential doctrine in respect
of the origin of knowledge, that he refused to accept
the very explanation which was at hand to reconcile his insistance on the cl priori element, and his insistance on the limitations of experience, - I mean the
recognition of the Laws of Thought as Laws of the Organism.
219. It is unnecessary to prolong this discussion and
to show that when he attempts to prove Mathematics to
be ac priori because founded on the pure c' priori intuition of Space, his argument rests on the confusion of the
two meanings of the word "intuition," one in which it
stands for the primary condition, the Form of Sensibility,
and the other in which it stands for the product of that
Form  and sensible excitation. Blank Space, the pure
form, can never generate geometrical figures; and without
the intuition of figures there can be no geometrical propositions.
220. Rejecting Kant's arguments in favor of a source




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.      417
of Knowledge not directly dependent on the Organism
and its relations to the Cosmos, and not evolved through
Experience which condenses these relations, we need not
here pause to consider the arguments of any other thinker,
but may be content with the manifold evidence brought
forward in the preceding chapters respecting the range
and limitations of Research.
18                         A A




418         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
CHAPTER XVI.
THE PLACE OF SENTIMENT IN PHILOSOPHY.
221. OuR survey of the sources and limitations of
Knowledge would be manifestly incomplete if it omitted
the element of Sentiment, or Emotion, which obviously
plays a considerable part in the construction of social
and religious theories, and less obviously, but yet demonstrably, in the construction of even common perceptions.
It cannot therefore be excluded from the data of a Philosophy which aims at explaining the World, Man, and
Society. The pzurpose of Knowledge being to regulate
Conduct, and the ncat.ure of Knowledge being that of,virtual Feeling, the importance of Sentiment both as
regulative and representative iS indisputable. None but
shrivelled souls with narrow vision of the facts of life
can entertain the notion that Philosophy ought to be
restricted within the limits of the Logic of Signs; it has
roots in the Logic of Feeling, and many of its products
which cannot emerge into the air of exact science nevertheless give the impulse to theories, and regulate conduct.
222. While thus proclaiming the necessity of its inclusion, we must be careful to assign the limits of its
range. Appeals are often made to Sentiment, and questions peremptorily decided by it, which are wholly beyond
its proper jurisdiction. Rhetoric and Prejudice are thus
called upon to do the work of Reason and Demonstration,
in cases where Verification, and not Conviction, is the
immediate object of research, - where we are not inquiring into the fact of whether a certain conviction exists,




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.             419
but into the ponderable evidence for its truth, -not
whether some men. or many men feel disgust or admiration, wrath or compassion, but whether this sentiment
which has its personal grounds has also impersonal and
rational grounds, such as must coerce every impartial
mind desirous of ascertaining the truth.  Hence the facts
of Sentiment need to be interpreted with the same caution
as the facts of the External Order; and this interpretation is never complete until we reach those limits which
are the ultimates of all research.
223. WVe  live  encompassed  by mysteries; we are
flooded by influences of awe, tenderness, and sympathy
which no words can  adequately  express, no theories
thoroughly explain. These are ultimate facts of Feeling
which we simply accept.  For instance, we have Moral
Instincts and IEsthetic Instincts which determine conduct
and magnify existence; but of these desires for the welfare of others, and this enjoyment of Beauty, we can give
no better account than that we find them  as facts of
human nature; and no better justification, when questioned, than that their influences are beneficial.  \We can
give no better reason why we ought to care for the welfare
of others, -  suffering from  their sufferings and rejoicing'
in their joys, — than why sugar is sweet to the taste:
they are facts of the human organism; which facts Psychologv and Plhysiology may approximately explain by
exhibiting the factors, pointing out the observed reactions
of the orcganismn under certain conditions; but which in
a last resort can only be justified by asserting that the
facts are so.  To use Cicero's pregnant phrase, "Nature
SIas inclined us to love men; and this is the foundation
of the Law." *  If a man is insensible to the welfare of
* "Ubi enim liberalitas, ubi patrime caritas, ubi pietas, ubi aut bene
m-nerendli de altero, aut referendcen gratim voluntas poterit existere? nami
lhc nascuntur ex eo quod natura propensi sumus ad diligendos homines;
quod fundamnentum juris est." - CicEmno, Dc Legibus, I. 15.




420          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
others, we can no more convince him that he ought to
feel for them, than we can convince the blind man that
he ought to see the glories of color. If a mail is insensible to the mystery of the universe; if his soul, like that
of an animal, is unvisited by any suggestions of a lif'e
larger than his own, and of any existence where his feelings have no home; if he is blind to the visible facts of
evolution mlanifest in the history of the world and the
progress of his race, deaf to the cries of pain and struggle
which deeply move his fellows, dead to the stirring impulses of pity which move others to remedy the sorrows
and enlarge the pleasures of mankind, - by what array
of argument could we hope to make him feel what his
nature does not feel?
Happily there is no such man. There are only men
who feel less vividly than others; none are wholly without the feelings. And it is on this foundation that a
Moral Science is possible; which proceeds like Physical
Science by an exact classification of the observed facts,
and their co-ordination.  The facts are more complex,
the co-ordination is more delicate and difficult; but their
analysis and synthesis, if accurately performed, must
yield results of equal validity.
224. All depends therefore on the interpretation of
the facts. The inconsiderate way in which Sentiment is
suffered to mingle with and pervert rational research, in
matters beyond its jurisdiction (as when geological or
biological inquiries have been arrested or perverted by
alarmed Theology or national Prejudice), has given rise
to an impatient distrust of its admission anywhere in
Philosophy.  Not only is the physicist justifiably indignant at the idea of his procedures being controlled by
appeals to feelings which are not directly implicated in
his researches, not only does he reject all personal considerations as irrelevant to the impersonal relations he is




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.           421
considering, but by the violence of reaction against this
foolish interference lie is swung into the opposite foolishness of altogether denying a place to Sentiment in Philosophy.  He insists that Sentiment be excluded from the
Laboratory; and this is wise.  But he also often insists
that it be excluded from the teacher's chair: and this is
unwise.  Limiting his conception of Science to its procedures, and not taking into account its social inspiration
and its social purpose, he divorces it from R.eligion, and
firom  all connection with Sentiment; although such a
divorce at once abdicates the highest position, converting
Science into the sheer occupation of an unsocial curiosity,
and leaving Religion to teachers who pretend to explain
the universe without the aid of positive knowledge.
225. No reader of this work will, I presume, so far
misunderstand this protest as to suppose that it implies
the slightest approval of the appeals to Sentiment in
inquiries which directly concern the objective relations of
things, and makes personal feelings or traditional dogmas
the arbiters of facts.  The investigation of fact is one
thing; the interpretation of the significance of this fact
in the general system of things is another.  Sentiment is
only admissible when the relations investigated are relations of Feeling; as, for instance, when doctrines of
Political Economly are considered in their social, not in
their purely commercial aspects; the law of supply and
demand, being one or the other, according to the indirect
or direct point of view. This will become clearer when
we appreciate the psychological principle which necessitates the admission of Sentiment.
226. We have already seen that everywhere the final
test of philosophical interpretation is Feeling.  Every
demonstration rests on the reduction of inference to sensation or intuition.  WVe have also seen that what is perceived, whether outward or inward, depends for one of




422          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
its factors on the psychostatical condition of the percipient, -what is felt and thought being felt and thought
thus, and not otherwise, in consequence of the mental
state, and this mental state being itself a product of historical evolution. The light of the past mingles with the
light of the present.  This being the case even with simple perceptions, how much more must it be the case with
complex conceptions compounded out of simple feelings,
and still more with those larger conceptions which constitute Philosophy.
227. If we desire to see the part played by Preconception in the construction of conceptions we may advantageously conltemplate its action in the abnormal cases of
Insanity, which are only exaggerations of normal processes.
Cervantes, who has admirably painted the wayward logic
of the insane, makes Don Quixote fashion a pasteboard
helmet, and test its strength by a blow with his sword.
The helmet is smashed, and the Don is much displeased
at this fiagility of a defence on which he had counted.
lHe thereupon makes another helmet, and remains so perfectly satisfied with its strength that instead of once more
putting it to the test he regards it as a helmet of the
finest temper.*  Again, when he has assumed that Haldudo is a knight, he meets the contradiction that the
man is a shopkeeper by asking, What does that matter?
There may be Haldudos who are knights.'j
228. To descend from  Fiction to Fact, M. Tr6lat had
a patient firmly convinced that he had discovered perpetual motion.  All reasoning of an adverse order left him
unshaken; but he was at last brought to confess that if
Arago declared him to be mistaken he would bow to that
* "El quecl6 satisfecto de su fortaleza, y sin querer hacer nueva experiencia della la diputo, y tuvo por celada finisima de encoje." - Don
Qui;jote, Cap. I.
+ "Importa poco eso respondio D. Quijote, que Haldudos puede haber
eaahalleros." - Cap. IV.




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.         423
authority.  An interview was arranged. Arago, Humboldt, and some others listened with patience to the
arguments by which he pretended to demonstrate the
possibility of his machine. Arago then explained the
mechanical impossibility, and thus concluded: "You were
good enough to say you would accept my verdict. I give
it you, and believe me that all present think as I do,
that you are in error."  The patient was for a moment as
if stunned, and then burst into tears. Arago and Humboldt were much affected at the sight, and Trelat had
strong hopes that the hallucination was dispelled. But
they had not left the house many minutes before the patient's eyes were dry again, and raising his head proudly
he exclaimed: "No matter. Arago is wrong.  I have no
need of a motor power: my wheel turns of itself!" *
229. M1. Despine had a patient who fancied that poison was constantly mingled with her food. In vain
he argued with her, in vain he accumulated proof on
proof, her quiet answer was: "You may be right, but I
feel that it is as I say, and nothing will ever remove that
idea or prove the contrary."  Her language accurately
expressed the fact; she did not say "I know," but "I
feel."  She did not invoke material or rational evidence,
but the evidence of her feelings.t
230. Examples of this order abound in medical literature; but we need not seek them there, for our daily
experience furnishes an ample supply. No one can have
argued against a superstition without noticing an entire
insensibility to the plainest evidence when it opposes a
conviction. Usually even an exposure of imposture, or
the plainest contradiction, has but a temporary effect.
The staggered believer quickly recovers his old position,
and snatches at some suggestion which will explain the
* TRtLAT, CLa Folie Lucide, p. 116. 1861.
t DESPINE, Psychologie Naturelle, II. 43. 1868.




424          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
contradiction.  He may admit imposture in this particular case, but " is sure" there was none in the undetected
cases.  He cheerfully admits that the facts asserted are
in contradiction with all recorded experience, but he is
sure that there " is more between heaven and earth than
is dreamt of in our philosophy," - and these facts are
precisely of this mysterious class.  In truth his mind has
received a deep impression; a conception has been fixed
there, and his feelings keep it supplied with energy sufficient to bear down any opposing conception.
231. The doctrine which to one mind seems transparently absurd, because it is opposed to the mass of
conceptions which have previously been formed, is not
absurd, it is simply mysterious, to another mind, and
although mysterious is eagerly welcomed because it is in
harmony with some conceptions already formed.  The
mind which to-day sees the absurdity of the doctrine,
may hereafter come to proclaim its truth. The conversion
may be either due to intellectual readjustment, through
the gradual infusion of new conceptions, or to emotional
influence gradually changing the attitude of the mind,
and its consequent receptivity.  AVhen we see men holding certain theological opinions which are flatly contradictory of their scientific opinions, we are not, on this
ground alone, to conclude them  to be hypocrites.  Each
position may be held in perfect sincerity, though not
with perfect logicality.  The one set of conceptions being
in a great measure the expression of their emotions, Sentimnent not Rleason weaves the web of argument.  The
other set of conceptions being impersonal, objective, unconnected with emotions, Reason is left free to estimate
the objective relations.*
* Steinthal mentions the case of a distinguished anatomist who made a
pilgrimage to the relics of a saint, and whose edification at the sight of
the sacred bones was not in the least disturbed by the fact that he recog



THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.              425
232. A conviction having once been formed, no matter
on what evidence, the strength of this conviction is derived from the amount of Feeling it engages, and not at
all from the ponderable evidence; so that evidence which
to other minds seems overwhelming will be set aside
impatiently with some such remark as this: " That is all
very well, but I feel I am right.  I can't pretend to answer your arguments, but somehow I am convinced that
the case is what I state."  Although such declarations
often betray profound irrationality, the speaker not seeing
that the fact of his conviction is one thing and its truth
another, while the point in question is not the state of
his feeling but the state of the case on which lie passes
judgment, still such a position is less discredited and
less discreditable than it would otherwise be, owing to
our general recognition of the truth that many of our
judgments were formed upon evidence so complex and
evanescent that rwe cannot now recall it.  When conclusions have become organized in our minds the data are
usually quite irrecoverable; yet we may be fully assured
that originally the evidence was present, and could be
again produced were ample time and opportunity allowed
us.  If we have a rational conviction, although we cannot
produce the grounds on which it rested, and cannot therefore force it upon others, why are we to scout the declaration of the man who relies on a conviction for which lihe
can assign no reasons?  AWhy do we treat our conviction
as rational, and his conviction as irrational? It is because we assume that our forgotten evidence, if produced,
would not simply justify our conviction, but would harnized them as the bones of an animal. - Abriss dm Sp)rachqwisseclsclhft,
p. 2285. 1871. It seems difficult not to suspect the sincerity of this;
and yet not only is there psychological ground for accepting such a
duality of conception, but a similar contradiction, on a smaller scale, is
incessantly brought under our observation.




426         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
monize with the evidence which is now present; whereas
he resists the evidence produtced, and relies on evidence
which is not producible. Every investigator may have
the consciousness of having carefully examined facts before he adopted their results; and suspects, generally with
justice, that those who manifestly disregard the evidence
gnow before them, because it contradicts their conclusions,
were not very scrutinizing in their examination of the
facts on which their conclusions were originally formed.
No one who has been long occupied with investigating a
subject is unaware of the growth of convictions stronger
than the available evidence seems to warrant.  It is this
experience which cannot find its accurate expression that
justly endows an investigator with authority. But no
worker hopes to impose his conviction on his contemporaries in the face of available evidence which contradicts
it; and all sincere minds are alive to the human infirmity
of grasping at evidence which harmonizes with our views,
rejecting those which oppose it, or seeking to nullify their
force by extraneous considerations, - an infirmity not less
chargeable on philosophers than on ordinary men.
233. Here again we see how needful it is to make
clear to ourselves the kind of evidence on which we rely.
People will oppose the rational interpretation of admitted
facts on the ground that such an interpretation is in
"contradiction to their holiest instincts."  This rejection
or instinctive repulsion may be eminently wise, or eminently foolish.  It is foolish when in the hardihood of
ignorance men rely on Instinct as necessarily unerring,
having a higher source than Reason; for the fact is that
instincts are variable, and often fatally misguided. The
instinct which urges the moth into the flame, or which
makes the insect deposit its eggs in a fetid plant when
that plant has the odor of putrid meat (whereby the eggs
are hatched in a nidus where they perish from want of




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.                   427
food), these are but two of the many examples of Instinct
fatally misleading.*   Nor are our instinctive judgments
to be trusted.  The judgment of the child that the moon
may be grasped by its tiny outstretched hand, -  the j udgment of the ordinary man that the redness of the rose
is a part of the rose, and present in the darkness where
there is no lighllt reflected from  it, no eye to see it,-  these
and other judgments teach us how  little we can rely on
Instinct, even in  simple cases.
To any one who objects to some social change, not because it is demonstrably inconsistent with social welfare,
but because he infers that it is so "since it excites his
instinctive repulsion," we may justly ask, What are the
experiences organized in that repulsion? You feel that
tihe proposed change will be injurious, - it excites images
of alarm; but what is the origin of your feeling? upon
what social induction  does it rest? what guaranty have
you that the images of alarm  are not unreasonably  excited. When he can state the grounds of his repulsion
as we can state the grounds of our proposal, there is a
X " I one day met with a curious example of failure of instinct, which,
by showing it to be fallible, renders it very doubtful whether it is anythilng more than hereditary habit dependent on delicate modification of
sensation.  Some sailors cut down a good-sized tree, and, as is always
my practice, I visited it daily in search of insects.  Among other beetles
came swarms of the little cylindrical wood-borers and commenced making
holes in the bark. After a day or two I was surprised to find hundreds
of them  sticking in the holes they had bored, and on examination discovered that the milky sap of the tree was of the nature of gutta-percha,
hardening rapidly on exposure to the air, and gluing the little animals
in self-dug graves.  The habit of boring holes in trees in which to deposit
their eggs was not accompanied by a sufficient instinctive knowledge of
trees which were suitable or trees which were destructive.  If, as is very
probable, these trees have an odor attractive to certain species of borers,
it might very likely lead to their becoming extinct; while other species
to whom  the same odor was disagreeable would avoid the dangerous
trees, and would survive and be credited by us with an instinct, whereas
they would really be guided by a simple sensation." - WALLAC E, Thle.ialay A.zrchipelago, II. 275.  1869.




428          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
weighing of evidence possible. But the mere repulsion,
though not to be disregarded, is only a warning, it is not
evidence.  It may indicate the presence of some condition which ought to be taken into account; but unless it
spring from one of the deep-seated instincts which express the moral experiences of the community, it is no
more than an indication; and even then, we must bear in
mind that our moral experiences widen with advancing
civilization, the deep-seated instinct of the community of
to-day will not correspond with the enlarged social experiences of to-morrowT, for there is evolution of the NMoral
Instincts no less than of the Rational Judgments: we
learn to feel differently respecting social relations, as we
learn to think differently of the cosmical relations.  The
boast of one age may become the infamy of another.
Granting, therefore, its due weight to Sentiment and to
Conviction irrespective of producible evidence, we tmust
still say that any proposition opposed by these ought not
to be rejected until their sources and range have been
scrutinized.  Scrutiny will often detect that the repulsion
is due to some unconscious desire to preserve the existing
order, because agreeable to our prejudices or interests;
sometimes it is due to confidence in an old custom, or a
venerated teacher; and then we may ask: On what was
the custom founded? What means of knowing' the truth
had the venerated teacher? and what part did his feelings
play in interpreting the evidence?
234. The legitimate influence of Sentiment in determining Belief, and thus regulating conduct, is a delicate
question.  Theologians have not been wrong in ascribing
Faith and Incredulity to moral predispositions, and inll
affirming that religious conviction mainly depends upon
religious feeling. But they have been wrong in assumgiltg
that religious feelingy canll be reached by arguent, or created, where it is absent, by an effort of the will.  It is




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.           429
not true that a man can believe or disbelieve what he
will.  But it is certaikn that an active desire to find any
proposition true will unconsciously tend to that result,
by dismissing importunate suggestions which run counter
to the belief, and welcoming those which. favor it.  The
psychological law that we only see what interests us, and
only assi.milate what is adapted to our condition, causes
the mind to select its evidence.
235. Further, in respect of religious convictions we
must distinguish between. the personal or subjective aspect, and the impersonal or social aspect, -between the
truth which is a law to the man himself, and the truth
which is a law for the community.  The feeling which
determines the actions of the man is valid for him: what
he feels, he feels; what he thinks, lie thinks.  But this
may not be communicable to others, cannot be made
guides for them.  For communicable truths, two things
are requisite, - the possibility of showing them  in their
objective relations, or by intelligible symbols, and the
mental state ready to grasp these.  The beauty of a
statue is felt by twenty spectators in a somewhat similar
manner, owing to a similarity in their minds, and for all
these it would be a true proposition to affirm " This statue
is beautiful."  It would not be true for other spectators,
insensible to the -esthetic charm.  Here is a truth vlwhich
in the nature of things is limited: we may generalize it,
and affirm that many minds, perhaps the majority, will
feel this pleasurable emotion; but we never assume that
the truth represents an invariable relation for all minds,
like that of parallel lines, or the composition of water,
which express objective relations that are invariable and
undisturbed by any subjective variations; these latter
are communicable truths which all minds must apprehend when the terms are distinctly presented.  No one
will say that a personal incommunicable truth is less cer



430         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
tain than an impersonal communicable truth. If I say,
" There I see an apple," this expression of a subjective
fact requires no evidence; but if it be affirmed as an
objective fact affirming the present existence of the apple
and not merely my present feeling, evidence is needful.
I can conmmunicate to others the fact of my feeling, but I
can only communicate to them the fact of the existence
by placing their senses in relation to the object. W~hat
I see may be no apple, but an imitation in stone. My
inference from the visual sensation may have been false,
and my affirmation in such a case would be subjectively
true, objectively false: true in that I had the visible
feeling which an apple would excite; false in that I concluded from this to the existence of an apple there present. Nor would the testimony of fifty thousand people
all affirming that they saw the same apple, all declaring
that what they saw really was an apple, add one tittle of
objective validity to my assertion.  This is a paradox only
to those who do not appreciate the nature of evidence.
Because we habitually find our inferences confirmed, or
corrected, by the testimony of others, we fall into the
mistake of counting testimony instead of weighing it, and
suppose that many spectators are more to be trusted than
one; whereas it is not the multitude of observers but the
variety of the means of observation which gives value to
their testimony.  The concurrent testimony of fifty thousand persons would only prove that they were visually
affected in the same way, and had inferred the same
thing; and unless these observers were placedcl under different conditions, fifty thousand observations are no better than five. A miracle performed in the presence of a
multitude has no greater credibility than the same'miracle performed in the lonely chamber of a solitary, -
unless some among the multitude have sources of experience on which to ground their inferences, which were not




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.          431
open to the solitary.  VWhen wonder-workers ask for our
belief because their assertions are certified by hundreds
of respectable witnesses, they should be told that neither
numbers nor respectability have scientific weight, when
all the witnesses are under the same  disadvantages
respecting the reduction of their inferences to sensations;
the same assertion repeated many times, however varied
its expression, is not made more credible by repetition.
All that the testimony of a multitude of witnesses really
amounts to is that they had certain sensations, from
which they inferred certain corresponding events.
236. During M'Clure's Polar Expedition the watch one
night saCt a bear on an iceberg.  He called to his mates,
and they hlaving armed themselves cautiously approached
the spot where the bear stood.  To the astonishment of
all, this visible bear rose in the air and flew away. They
had mistaken an eagle for a bear; yet not one of them
had doubted his inference fromn the optical sensation common to theml  all. Had they not alarmed the eagle, or
had the spot been inaccessible, they would all have sworn
sincerely that they had seen a bear. Would a million of
such witnesses have rendered this statement more credible?  But now suppose the sailors to have returned to
the ship because they found it difficult to approach this
bear, and only two of them had remained behind hoping
to find a more accessible path; one of these remaining on
the watch while the other seeks a path, presently the
watcher sees the eagle rise and fly away; and on his
return to the ship he tells his companions what he saw.
They may or may not believe his statement, according
to their trust in his veracity or the intensity of their previous conviction; and if now the other sailor returns
with the eagle which he has just shot, the conviction is
complete.
237. All Knowledge, being virtual Feeling, is only




432         PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
communicable through Feeling. A man may communicate to me the fact that he has a sensation, a perception,
or an emotion, but lie can only awaken similar sensation,
perception, or emotion in me by placing me inll similar
conditions, objective and subjective.  He may tell me that
a certain fruit has a sweet taste, and I may believe this
statement to be objectively valid; but I must myself taste
the fruit before I call share his feeling. He may tell me
that he has a mnisgivin(, but that misgiving  can only be
awakened in me by a presentation of its grounds. There
are degrees of communicability. If I am told by some
one that he has seen a dog, I have so distinct an image
raised by that word that I can understand his feeling, and
in a sense share it. If I am told by the same person that
he has seen a gangrened limb, the absence of experience
will make me very imperfectly understand him. If he
tells me he has had a bilious attack, my apprehension is
vague. If he tells me that the summer dawn fills him
with religious joy, and an autumnal evening'with religious awe, my apprehension is still more vague. I too may
have many times been touched by the tender lights of a
summer dawn, but unless there is some communicable
mlark by which these reactions of feeling can -be seen to
resemble those reactions in him, our two experiences
remain personal, subjective, incommunicable.  Hence it
is that Sentiment only passes into Science when it is
capable of being trctaslatecd into objective sqa.ns. The sensations of color and sound must be translated into vibrations, and then the reactions of Feeling are measured with
reference to their objective vibrations. Every variety of
tone, however distinct to Feeling, was a personal fact of
no value to exact Science, until it thus became interpretable through its objective sign. This connection once
established, Science had its instrument. Every single
tone had its dynamical sign, — every subjective fact its




THE LIMITATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE.         433
correlative external fact, — and then whatever could be
deduced from dynamical laws of vibration was inferable
of Sound; thus were discoveries made by mathematical
analysis which could never have been approached through
analysis of Feeling.
238. In conclusion, we may say that the part played
by Sentiment in Philosophy is very large, and is admirable, or the reverse, according to circumstances. It is
necessary and admirable as an inspiration, when duly
controlled by verification. It is admirable, and its jurisdiction is final, when feelings form the subject-matter of
the debate. It is disastrous when it takes the place of
verification and substitutes personal for impersonal relations.
Among the curious features of our mental organization
must be noted that by which on all subjects of immediate
practical importance we always proceed at once to verify
any conjecture we may have formed, whereas on subjects
of speculative importance we are too impatient to await
this control, and in our eagerness for an explanation
readily accept conjectures as truths. The anticipatory
rush of thought prefigures qualities and foresees consequences; instead of pausing to ascertain whether our anticipations do or do not correspond with fact, we proceed
to argue and to act on them as if this mental vision were
final. Native indolence unchastened by repeated failure,
and native impatience unchecked by caution, are sustained by the energy of our confidence in what we think.
Even a false explanation is preferred to the unrest of
doubt; and a plausible explanation is so gratifying to the
feelings by quieting this agitation of unrest, that we cling
to it in spite of adverse evidence. Who has not observed,
even in himself, the eagerness with which some argument
is snatched at, and some statement credited, when these
seem to confirm his own view of the case? To submit
19                          BB




434          PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND.
our conclusions to the rigorous test of evidence, and to
seek the truth irrespective of our preconceptions, is the
rarest and most difficult of intellectual virtues.
How then can truth be decided?  What are the tests
of certitude?  These questions must be examined in the
next Problem.  Hitherto we have examined the range
and limitations of Knowledge, and have only touched
incidentally on the nature of Certitude; henceforward we
shall have to apply the principles here expounded.
END OF VOLUME I.
Cambridge: Electrot yped and Printed by Welch, Bigelow, & Co.