MANUAL
OF
POLITICAL BTHICS,
DESIGNED CHIEFLY
FOR THE USE OF COLLEGES AND STUDENTS AT LAW.
Lex, communis reipublica: sponsio.-SENECA.
BY
FRANCIS LIEBER, LL.D.,
CORRESPONDING MEMBER OF THE INSTITUTE OF FRANCE, ETC.;
AUTHOR OF' ON CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT," "PRINCIPLES OF LEGAL AND
POLITICAL INTERPRETATION," ETC., ETC.
VOL. II.
SECOND EDITION, REVISED.
EDITED BY THEODORE D. WOOLSEY.
PHILADELPHIA:
J. B. LIPPINCOTT & CO.
LONDON: TRU'BNER & CO.
I876. 
C
Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year I874, by
MATILDA LIEBER,
In the Office of the Librarian of Congress at Washington.
I 
CONTENTS.
BOOK  III.
CHAPTER IV.
PAGE
Ambition.-Its various  Manifestations.-Is  it radically bad?-Political
Apathy a great Evil.-Political Ingratitude.-Jealousy.-Political Mod  esty.-Self-Esteem.-Vanity.-Titles without Office, and External  Dis tinctiol-s, such as Ribbons. -The  Chinese.- De  Ruiter. -Personal
Affection.-Friendship: in ancient Times; in modern.-Its high Value.
-Epaminondas.-Abuse of Friendship and of the Word.-Favoritism:
in Monarchies; in Ministers and all other Citizens.-Its ruinous Effects.
-Washington and Pym.-Family Affection.-Providing for Members
of the Family.-Papal Nepotism.-Its Character when highest.   9.   9
CHAPTER V.
Gratitude fully discussed.-Ingratitude.-Excess of Gratitude aids Usurp  ers.-Cesar, Napoleon.-Distinction between Gratitude and Popularity.
-Popularity.-Sudden and Passing Popularity;  Lasting Popularity.  We  have no Right to seek Popularity, but must suffer it to seek us.  Power of spontaneous Popularity; peculiar Power of spontaneously re turned  Popularity.-Slavery of Popularity.-Danger  of Popularity, in
Free Countries, to the Individutal.-CroNwds to receive  distinguished
Men.-Great  Danger of Personal Popularity for Liberty.-Pericles.  Demagogues.-Athenian   Demagogisrn.-Monuments.-The  Duty  of
Attention.-Observation of Primary Agents and Elements.-Truth and
Justice connected with it.-Obligation to study the History of our
Country, its Institutions and their Classical Periods.-It is necessary in
modern Times to read Newspapers...... 35
CHAPTER VI.
Continency.-Political Evils of Incontinency; of Prostitution.-The  pri  mary Foundation of Society, the Family, is undermined by it.-Evils of
general Incontinency in the highest Classes, and the lowest.-Religion.
-Its Universality.-Its importance  far Morality; for Society; for the
State.-Fanaticism.-Fanaticism of any kind.-Religious Fanaticism. The   Bible.-Revelation.-Both  exclusively  religious.-Persecution.
3 
CO.A7E,l'TS.
PAGE
Direct and indirect Persecution.-Political and social Persecution.Hypocrisy and Desecration of Religion.-Regulation of political or
social actions by Tenets.........
CHAPTER VII.
Patriotism.-The Patriotism of the Ancients; of the Moderns.-Some
have rejected Patriotism. —National Conceit, Pride.-Narrowness of
Feeling a Counterfeit of Patriotism.-What is true Patriotism?-It is
noble and necessary for ITiberty.-ILoyalty.-Public  Spirit.-What it
consists in.-Calamitous Consequences of a Want of Publ)lic Spirit.  Veneration for the Old; Forefathers.-How far just, necessary.-When
injurious. —The Age of Action under Forty; of Conservatism over
Forty.-Do  Times  grow wAorse?-When  are we  more  experienced
than our Forefathers?-Stagnation and Heedlessness...
BOOK IV.
CHAPTER I.
Education.-What it is.-Strong and universal Tendency to form Habits
and continue them.-Great Impocrtance of Education iil Politics, not
only of elementary and general School Systems, but also of superior
Education and literary Institutions.-Expeditions, Libraries, Museums.
-Industrial Education.-The Rich as wNell as the Poor ought to be
actively engaged in some Pursuit, whether purely mental, or industrial.  Law of Solon.-Connection of Crime with want of regular industrial
Education in modern Times.-Statistics.-Habits of Industry, of Obe  dience, of Independence, of Reverence, and of Honesty.-Ancient His  tory for Children.-Concentric Instruction.-Gymnastics.-Sexes.-The
Woman.-Difference of physical Organization, Temperament, and
Powers in Woman and Man.-IThe Family (and through it the Society
of Comity and the Country) is the sacred Sphlere of Woman's chief
Activity.-The  Connection of Woman's Activity with the  State.  Woman is excluded from Politics.-She is connected with the State
by Patriotism.-Lady Croke.-Thle Petitioning of Women.-Lady Rus  sell a Model.-History of Woman.-Is the Woman represented though
she cannot vote at the Poll?........
CHAPTER II.
Obedience to the Laws.-How highly the Greeks esteemed it.-Obedi  ence to Laws one of Man's Prerogatives.-Absolute Obedience impos  sible.-Ad Impossibilia Nemo obligatur.-Ad Turpia Nemo obligatur.
-Viscount Orthes.-Unlawful Demands made by lawful Authority.  High Importance of the Judiciary with reference to Obedience to the
4
63
8o
los 
CONTENTS.
5
PAGE
Law.-Not all that is not prohibited may be done by the Citizen, any
more than all that is positively permitted.-Penalties are not equivalents of Crime.-Malum in se, Malum prohibitum: Is the distinction
essential, ald can we found any Rule of Action upon it?-The Question of Obedience to Laws a Question of Conflict.-Obedience in the
Army and Navy.-Articles of War.-Obedience in the Civil Service.
-How  far is the Citizen bound to obey the Laws?-Justifiable Disobedience.-Necessary  and  morally demanded  Disobedience.-Noncompliance with the Laws, or passive Resistance.-Active Resistance.
-Armed Resistance.-Insurr-ection.-Revolution.-Resistance formerly
considered lawfuil and received in the Char-ters.-Mobs and Mob-law,
so called.-Duty of Informing: in the Officer; in the Citizen at large.
-Professional Informers for Rewards.-Secret Police.-Delatores and
Mouchards.-The Obligation of Informing against intended or committed Offences..........
CHAPTER III.
Associations.-Associated Means, Endeavors.-Associations for the Pro motion of Morals.-Pledges.-Trades-Unions.-Ancient  Guilds.-Un lawful Combinations for Purposes lawful if pursued by the Individual.
-Evil Effects of Trades-Unions.-Disclosures respecting them in Scot land and England..........
CHAPTER IV.
Liberty of the Press.-Primordial Right of Communlion.-Journalism.  High moral Obligations of Editors.-Temptations in the Way of Editors.
-Power of Leaders, good or bad, rests upon their seizing upon that
Principle which is the moving Agent of the Mass.-In what the Power
of leading Papers  consists.-Conditions which give great Power to
single Papers.-Populous Capitals in Connection with the Influence of
Papers.-Obligation of Ver-acity peculiarly strong for Editors.-Political
Importance of gentlemanlike Tone.-Publishing private Letters.-Dan gers of Newspaper Flippancy.-Thle Political Position of the Clergy man.-Opinion of ancient Theologians.-How far the Clergyman ought
to share in the Politics of his Country.......
BOOK V.
CHAPTER I.
Voting.-Principle of Unanimity; of Maiority and Minority.-Deliberative
Procedures.-All who have a Right to vote ought to vote.-Accord  ing to what Rules.-(Election Statistics.)-Voting for Officers.-When
we ought to abstain from Voting.-Infloencing Elections.-Canvassing.
139
194
205 
CONTENTS.
PAGE
-Intimidation, individual and official.-Bribery.-Severe Laws against
it at Athens.-Mutual Insurance Companies for Bribing at Athens.Bribes of common Voters.-Bribing Judges; Legislators.-Bribes by a
Government of its own Citizeniis.-Bribes by foreign Powers.-Betting
on Elections.-Election Riots and Disturbance around the Poll.Various other Election Malpractices.......
CHAPTER II.
Parties.-Has  any free Country  existed without Parties? -Can
Country possibly exist without Parties?-Is  it desirable  that
Country should exist without Parties?-Historical Parties and p
ones.-Conservative and Movement Parties.-Characteristics of a
Party.-Dangers of Party Zeal and factious Passion.-Party  S
Misunderstanding of Language in high Party Spirit.-Ought a co
tious  Citizen to attach himself to a Party?-The Law of  S
Independents.-Trimmers.......
CHAPTER III.
Opposition.-Government.-Administration.-What  is a lawful  Opposi tion.-A well-understood Opposition the essential Safeguard of Liberty.
-Thc Opposition a great Institution of Modern Times.-As such it
dates more especially from the Times of Walpole and Pulteney.-It is
lawful to oppose the Majority, which is not always right.-(Order of
Sitting in Legislative Assemblies.)-Public Opinion and General Opin ion.-Ethical Rules relating to Opposition and to Parties in general. HIow far ought a Citizen to go in his Opposition, especially in times
of War?-Coalitions.-Parties formed on the Ground of foreign National
Extraction............
CHAPTER IV.
Public Men.-Leaders.-Self-examination before a Citizen embarks in
Public Life.-Physical, Moral, and Mental Qualities desirable in a
Public Man.-Necessary Knowledge for a Public  Man.-Caution in
entering upon Public Life.........
BOOK VI.
CHAPTER I.
Extra-constitutional Meetings.-Their Necessity.-The Representative.  Summary of his Duties.-He is the Guardian of the public Treasures.
-When ought he to vote liberally?-The Framing of Laws.-Legis lation upon the Principle of mutual Accommodation.-Importance of a
6
226
. 252
265
284 
CONTENTS.
PAGE
gentlemanly Character for the Representative.-Ihstruction.-History
and the various Constitutions show that the Right of Instruction has
been claimed and disclaimed as promoting and as injurious to Liberty,
according to the Circumstances of the Times.-The Representative Government is not a mere Substitution for direct Democracy.-Essential
character of the Representative Government.-The different characteristic Principles of Ancient States, the Middle Ages, and Modern States.
-Nationalization of States; Socialization  of  Population.-National
Representation the great Feature of Modern Times.-Difference between Deputative and Representative Systems.-Oath in New Jersey
and the Netherlands to promote Public Welfare.-How does the Representative faithfully represent?-Advantages of Representative Government.-Objections to the doctrine of Instruction.-Instruction belongs
to the Deputative System.........
CHAPTER II.
The Subject of Instruction with particular Reference to the United States.
-The ancient Articles of Confederation founded upon the Deputative
System.-The Articles of Confederation compared to the Constitution
of the former United Provinces of the Netherlands, the Swiss Act of
Mediation, the present Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, and the
Germtanic Confederacy.-The Constitution of the United States boldly
changed the former deputative character of the Confederacy into a repre  sentative one.-Senators are not Ambassadors.-In Leagues the strongest
Member of those on terms of parity according to the letter must sway.
-Hegemony in Greece, Phoenicia, the Low Countries, etc.-Relation
of the State Legislatures to the respective Senators elected by them.  The History of Instruction in modern times, as connected with the
Representative System.........
CHAPTER III.
Responsibility of the Representative.-Pledges.-Implied  and positive,
general and specific Pledges.-Are Pledges moral, and consistent with
general Liberty and Justice? —When are they so?-Pledges originated
with the Court Party and Aristocracy.-Strong Power of Implied
Pledges.-Breaking Implied Pledges, and throwing one's self upon
the Constituents by Resignation.-Duties of Presiding Officers of de  liberative Assemblies; Speakers........
7
295
339
363 
CONTENTS.
BOOK VII.
CHAPTER I.
PAGE
Executive Officers.-Difficulty of controlling them.-Their Interference
with Elections: in Athens, Rome, France, England, the United States.
-Plato's Opinion of the Duties of Officers.-Post-Office.-The Chief
Executive Officer.-Confidential Officers.-Official Interpretation of Con stitutions and Laws.-The Veto.-Ancient and Modern Veto.-Absolute,
suspensive, and conditional Vetoes.-Privilege of Pardoning in Mon archies; in Republics.-Danger and Difficulty in Republics.-For what
Purpose is it granted?-Rules which ought to be observed in making
use of the Power of Pardoning............          373
CHAPTER II.
Judge, Juror, Advocate, and Witness.-Official, external and moral Inde  pendence of the Judge.-Sanctissimus Judex of the Romans.-The
Judge, where there is doubt, must interpret in Mercy, in Penal Cases; in
Favor of civil Liberty, in all.-The Institution of the Jury.-The sacred
Office of the Juryman.-What is he to do when the Law is contrary to
the universal Conscience? —The Institution of the Advocate.-Moral
Obligation of the Advocate.-Political Relations of Lawyers in Free
Countries.-Duties of the Witness...........          401
CHAPTER III.
War.-Definitions.-Present  -Exaggerations against War.-Christian Re  ligion does not prohibit just War; neither the Bible, nor the early
Writers of the Church.-Objections against War on the Score of Moral  ity; of Reason; of Political Economy.-Just and Patriotic Wars have
morally raised Nations.-Eternal Peace.-Arbitration by a Congress of
Nations.-Just Wars. —National Debasing Effect of suffering national
Insult and Illjustice without Resistance.-The Age of Louis XIV.  Wars do not absolve from Obligations to the Enemy.-Who is the
Enemy?-Are Citizens of the hostile State Enemies?-What Means of
injuring the Enemy are admissible?-Treaties containing Provisions for
the Case of War between the Contracting Powers.-Shall Confidence
be abused in War?-Does War allow Deception?-Capitulations are
sacred.-Destruction in War.-Carrying off Works of Art, Archives, etc.
Duties of the individual Soldier........
8
426 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
BOOK  III.
(Conlinued.)
CHAPTER IV.
Ambition.-Its various Manifestations.-Is it radically bad?-Political Apathy a
great Evil. -Political Ingratitude. -Jealousy.-Political  Modesty.-Self Esteem.-Vanity.-Titles without Office, and External Distinctions, such as
Ribbons.-The Chinese.- De Ruiter.-Personal Affection.- Friendship: in
ancient Times; in modern. - Its high Value. — Epaminondas. - Abuse of
Friendship and of the Word.-Favo'itism:  in Monarchies; in Ministers and
all other Citizens.-Its ruinolous Effects. -Washington and  Pym.-Family
Affection. -Providing for Members of the Family. -Papal Nepotism.-Its
Character when highest.
XXXVI. THE English word ambition is used for very different degrees of the same affection of the human soul, from
its laudable original principle to its immoral or criminal excess,
for which some other languages have different words. This
want of terms has not unfrequently exercised an unfavorable
influence upon the views which have been taken of the subject.  By ambition we designate a desire of distinction or
superiority, whether it only prompts to legitimate emulation,
increases to a longing for distinction, or degenerates into a
craving and ultimately into an ungovernable passion for it.
If we comprehend all these gradations under one term, namely
that of desire of distinction, I believe that we do no violence
to language. Of course we must waive the Latin etymology
of the word ambition, since the meaning originally attached
to it in that language has entirely faded away in our own
9 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
idiom. The question is, Is ambition a legitimate desire, laudable, beneficial, or must a conscientious citizen extinguish it,
and can he do it, or is it an original, elementary, and therefore necessary principle in our soul, so that we ought to
cultivate and moderate rather than eradicate it?
We have seen that men are ordained to exist as individuals,
not only physically so, like the animals, not only each with
his own moral value, but also with an infinite variety in the
combination of mental faculties and ethical inclinations, a
variety far greater and more surprising than that which we
observe in the combination of matter around us. Diversity,
taken in its deepest meaning, and not sameness, is the law of
everything that lives; the propelling agent, most especially,
of society. Closely connected with, and indeed directly resulting from it, are emulation and competition. Without them
little energy would be roused, and it is not only justifiable in,
but it is demanded of us, that in whatever line we are conscious
of possessing peculiar powers we should strive to emulate
those who are before or above us, to rise, if possible, superior
to them, since we have enjoyed already the advantage of their
example and acquisitions. Desiring, then, to distinguish ourselves is far from necessarily implying vanity, but it may, and
indeed ought to, be a desire to develop our individual nature,
stamped upon us as our peculiar intellectual compound character, to the utmost extent, so that we may be all that which
our Maker destined us to be, and distinguish ourselves by
perfection, if he has given us peculiar faculties. In this view
ambition, or a desire of distinction, is not only legitimate, but
it is one of our great duties. Skill, knowledge, wisdom, and
virtue may thus become in a variety of spheres, humble or
high, the object of laudable ambition, the vis motrix of society
and civilization. Without it there would be stagnation, inanity
-listless barbarity. But it has been asked, How is this ambition compatible with that modesty which all systems of
morals must hold up as a virtue, that humility of mind which
the Christian religion especially demands?   I believe the
question would never have been asked, had not an erroneous
IO 
POLITICA L E TIEICS.
view respecting men and society been taken, according to
which a state of perfection, towards which we were bound to
strive, was believed necessarily to consist in a state of sameness; but we have already seen that where there is individuality there is diversity, and this diversity of combination seems
to be one of our Maker's greatest laws of life, by which his
greatness, inconceivable by man, appears nevertheless the
more holy the longer and deeper man contemplates it and
follows it out as far as his limited faculties will sustain him.
If we take the opposite view, that perfection of life does not
consist in infinite combinations of character and infinite mutual relations, necessary in order to keep society joined together, but also necessarily founded upon variety and contrast,
because without it society would dissolve into equal and
equally inert atoms, we must ultimately arrive, if we consistently reason, at that state held up by the wisest Hindoos as
the state of perfection, in which we are "indifferent to'all
pairs of opposite things, as honor or dishonor, and the like,
remaining absorbed in the Divine Essence."I
XXXVII. Desire of distinction is just and all depends
upon these points, that we desire to excel or distinguish ourselves in something laudable, that after calm examination this
appears to be within the reach of our faculties, endowments,
and position, so that we mistake not the aim pointed out to
us by our individual combination, that the desire do not become excessive, or a diseased function of the soul, and that
consequently we do not desire distinction because it is such
but because it is in a good cause and our duty calls us to
excel in it as we have the endowments for it, and therefore
do not envy or hate those who excel in the same paths, but,
on the contrary cherish, them as striving for the same good
and noble end.' Many persons have entirely missed their
I Ordinances of M nu, translated by Sir William Jones, London, I799, vol.
iii. p. 237.
-2 * The very ruinous effect of small  nity, which is highly dangerous in all truly
free governments, is strikingly illustrate: in the following extract from Sir Samuel
I I 
POLITICAL E7HICS.
aim by striving to excel in poetry while they were made perhaps to be sound practical men; many have ruined the usefulness of their life and their happiness by not proportioning
their ambition to their faculties or other means; many, by
placing it upon worthless subjects; many, again, by criminally
placing it upon subjects legitimate in themselves. And in this
latter point of view, in which it becomes especially important
in politics, we must not forget that it is closely coupled in
gifted minds with that urgency to action which we find always
to exist in proportion to a man's faculties, and friom which rises
the love of power, not wrong in its principle, but often carried
to such insatiate excess that it bewilders the mind, deranges
all other functions of the soul, and ends in a monomania.
Yet, though ambition has frequently intoxicated superior
minds and led less gifted ones to many follies, we can in
politics as little dispense with ambition as in the arts, sciences,
or literature, in the school, the house, or the various avocations of practical life. For if ambition in those gifted citizens
vlho by their peculiar mental organization are fitted for officers or as leaders is extinguished, either by disgust at a de
Romilly's Narrative of his own  life, in Memoirs of the Life of Sir Samue
Romilly, 2d( edit., London, I84o, vol. i. p. 107. He had paid a visit to Paris at
the beginning of the revolution, and says, "What struck me as most remfarkal)le
in the dispositions of the people that I saw, was the great desire that everybody
had to act a great part, and the jealousy, which in consequence of this was entertained of those who were really eminent.  It seemed as if all persons, from the
highest to the lowest, whether deputies themselves, declaimers in the Palais
Royal, orators in the coffee-houses, spectators in the gallery, or the populace
about the door, looked upon themselves individually as of great consequence in
the revolution.  The man who kept the hotel at which I lodged at Paris, a certain M. Villars, was a private in the National Guard.   Upon  nmy returning
home on the day of the benedcliction of their colors at Notre Dame, and telling
him that I had been present at the ceremony, he said,'You saw me,  sir?'  I
was obliged to say that I really had not.   He said,' Is that possible, sir? You
did not see me!  Why, I was in one of the first ranks-all Paris saw me!'  I
have often since thought of my host's childish vanity.  What he s okle w,as felt
by thousands.   The most important transactions were as nothing 1)ll as they
had relation to the figure which each little self-conceited hero acted in them.  To
attract the attention of all Paris, or of all France, was often the motive of con.
duct in matters which were attended with most momentous consequences."
I2 
FOLITfCA1L E~THICS.
generate state of things or their own haughtiness, and if it
be not properly kindled in the rising generations by directing
their attention to the noblest examples of civic worth in the
history of their country or that of other great nations, one of
the greatest and most ruinous evils of a state must unavoidably befall it, that of political apathy or indifferentism, which
always foments political demoralization, as it partly arises
from it; until it finally extinguishes all public spirit and
patriotism.
If the best, the well-informed, the honest, do not strive for
the honors of the commonwealth, the wicked, ignorant, or
dishonest will; -if all matters of political distinction, be it in
the way of parliamentary honor, distinction of high office, onl
the bench, or in whatever other manner, be disregarded or
derided, matters of justice and politics themselves soon will be
treated so too.  If the substantial citizens become indifferentists and do not vote, perhaps because they are too proud to
mingle in the crowd, or unwilling to exercise so high a privilege of liberty at the expense of some personal inconvenience,
they ought to know that others will not do the same, and that
the "fax infimna populi," where such have a right of voting,
will infallibly be at the poll. Indifferentism in politics leads
to what was called in a previous passage political atony, a
dissolution of the political ties, and of course to the death
of justice and liberty, an awful state of things, out of which
convulsive revolutions alone, accompanied with suffering and
violence, can develop a new order of things.
XXXVIII. We ought not to forget that distinction in
sciences or other branches may be acquired not indeed without sacrifices, for there is no good to be acquired without
proportionate exertion and sacrifice, but without those sacrifices from which nobler minds would shrink. The movements of liberty, however, are in their nature not unfrequently
of a rough character, because they are the affairs of masses, in
which we cannot always expect delicacy of relations.  Without ambition, without love of distinction, there would then not
I 3 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
exist sufficient incentive for those who have the mind and
mould of soul to become great citizens.
For this reason, however, it is also necessary not to withhold from the excellent or great the just reward of their ambition, not to instil into them by unworthy ingratitude the
poison of jealousy, or contempt of popular acknowledgment,
not to permit that honorable ambition, which respects and
obeys the public voice, to degenerate into the love of power for
its own sake, the most reckless and unscrupulous of passions.
Habitual ingratitude produces one of two things: either it
leads those who long for power to use thepeople while they
despise it, or it drives the best minds from the stage of politics. Niebuhr, in his History of Rome, says, "M. Manlius,
the preserver of the capitol, of whom the chronicles relate
that in birth and valor he was second to none, and in personal
beauty, exploits, eloquence, vigor, and daring superior to all,
found himself bitterly disappointed in his claims to gratitude
and honor.  Camillus, his enemy, to whom  he felt himself
at least equal, who had not shared in the distress of the
siege, who had imprecated curses on his country, was repeatedly raised by the houses to the dictatorship, and by the
comitia, which were under the influence of the aristocracy,
to the military tribunate: while he, though a consular, found
himself excluded from all dignities. This insulting neglect
in return for an action standing foremost but not alone in a
heroic life, the energy of which was still unexhausted, poisoned his heart with virulent rancor. He was one of those
powerfuil-minded men who have received a calling to be the
first among their countrymen, and feel an unconquerable longing to fulfil it, while low minds, envying and disliking them,
are resolved to keep them back from the place which is their
due; one of those, the superhuman vehemence of whose character, when drawn forth by such a conflict, makes even honest but timid natures shrink. For indeed it is their doom to
be haunted by a spirit against the snares of which nothinb
can protect them but the confidence and esteem of honorable
minds. God will require their souls from those who have
I4 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
driven them into fatal courses: their faults he will judge more
mercifully than the faults of those who ruined- his noblest
work. These mighty characters have always an intense inborn feeling in behalf of justice, truth, and whatever is glorious; they are animated by love and pity, by hatred and
indignation of the right sort: these become subservient to
their fierce passions, but do not die away: it is glaringly
unjust, even when they have gone irretrievably astray, to regard actions, which in a man of blameless life would be extolled as noble and praiseworthy, in any other light in them,
although vulgar souls may do the same things fi-om selfish
motives."  So far the historian of Rome.  We shall return
to the subject of gratitude and popularity in politics.
XXXIX. If excessive or unfounded jealousy towards great
,and honorable citizens is blamable, it marks no less an evil
disposition if the ambitious show it towards one another, and
allow themselves to be carried away so far as to sacrifice their
country, or even its partial welfare, to these animosities which
are below a truly great mind.
The danger when a man's ambition is greater than the resources within him, has been already alluded to. If his position is such that he cannot effect much except by the power
which he could only acquire by a superior mind, the injury
is not only on his side.; he will earn disgrace; but it is also
greatly owing to this disproportion in the endowments of
many men that we meet with so many restless, turbulent, and
noisy politicians in their limited spheres, men who have too
much ambition to remain quiet, and too limited a mind to
comprehend what is truly noble, great, or good, and whose
petty pride makes them jealous of all true distinction and
influence in others.  They are very troublesome members of
the community, and become sometimes highly injurious. It
is the duty of every true citizen to keep within his proper
sphere.   This disproportion between the impulse and  the
x Eng. trans., Amer. ed., ii. 451.
I5 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
faculties is of immense danger in disturbed times, when
rapid changes are unavoidable, and in persons who by their
position, acquired by adventitious circumstances, have for a
time at least power or influence. How easily may not a
country be ruined by the ambition of a weak-minded man,
whether monarch or demagogue, in such times of danger!
The duke of Norfolk, who conspired against Elizabeth, in
order to marry MAary of Scots, queen of England, is represented by Hallam, to have been such, and therefore to have
fallen by "a sentence amply merited, the execution of which
was indispensable." The French revolution shows many
examples of this species of character in a most glaring and
appalling light.
XL. Ambition, as first limited, is not incompatible in any
way with modesty, a virtue which is indeed no less amiable in,
private life than in public. Nor is modesty incompatible with
self-esteem.2   Anaxagoras, when  exiled  in  Lampsacus, was
pitied because  he  now  was  deprived  of Athens:  "' Rather
Athens of me," he replied.3 Whether this proud answer was
well founded in the case of Anaxagoras, is not the place here
to investigate; but certain it is that there are great men who
are as valuable to their country as that is to them, who, because they are of a great and comprehensive intellect, cannot
but see clearly their position, and surely would not act morally
if they should attempt to hide the consciousness of their own
Constitutional History of England, vol. i. pp. i8i, I82.
2 * Pitt (afterwards Lord Chatham) is said to have expressed, in I757, these
words to the duke of Devonshire: "My lord, I am sure I can save this country,
and nobody else can." Walpole's Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 27I.
So did his son William Pitt, at a very early period, "prefer the profession of
the law to any official connection with an administration of which he did not
form a part."  Soon after he declared publicly that he had determined "never
to accept any subordinate office,-meaning an office which did not entitle him
to a sea in the cal)inet."  (Tomline's Memoir of William Pitt, 2d ed., vol. i. p.
66.) The consciousness of his talents entitled him to do this. Cases of great
emergency would of course make an exception.  The delicate hand of a Phidias
would be justly placed to the rope in cases of impending shipwreck.
3 Diog. Laert., ii. Io.
i6
I 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
importance by hypocrisy, one of the great evils in politics.
Yet, as in all morals so in politics, we must beware of extremes, and political arrogance is as dangerous a rock in
politics as hypocrisy is undermining. Theodatus Gozon, as
we learn from the chronicle of the Rhodian Knights, in addressing the conclave which had convened for the purpose
of electing a grand master of that heroic order, after making
a review of all the qualities and virtues necessary for a
commander of the illustrious order in its dangerous duty of
warding off the Mohammedans and of preventing them from
overflooding western Europe, and mentioning the solemn oath
he had taken to propose the proper person, uttered these
closing words: "Thus, I find no one fitter to rule the order
than myself." He was almost unanimously elected, and the
order found no reason to rue the election., These are extraor
I Having mentioned the Order of the Knights of St. John on account of this
instance of political self-esteem, I cannot forbear mentioning it on account of the
glorious and almost superhuman perseverance of the Knights in resisting the
gigantic power of Mahomet II., who intended to conquer the West of Europe,
and, though death prevented him from carrying his cherished plan into execution,
had it engraven on his tomb-stone, "I meant to conquer Rhodes and fair Italy."
If we thus see in the resistance of the OQrder under Villiers a noble instance of
fortitude and calm perseverance, coupled with the greatest heroism, we find in
that same siege an instance of the infamous guilt to which jealousy may lead,
in the case of Amaral, who, forgetting duty, religion, humanity, was bent on delivering Rhodes into the hands of the Turks and thus laying open to them a
farther progress towards the West. The siege of Rhodes is an instance of some
political virtues so nobly displayed, and its history is every way of so thrilling an
interest, that it cannot fail to sink deeply in the mind of the reader, especially
of the young, whence it may rise again as a supporting and encouraging example
in a time of need. Vertot, History of the Knights Hospitallers, 5 vols., Edinburgh, 1770.
In appending this note I am reminded of two striking instances of self-esteem
or consciousness of worth, though not of a political kind. Most of my readers
will remember the clause in Lord Bacon's Testament, "My name and memory I
leave to foreign nations; and to mine own coutntrymen, after some time be passed
over." In Eckermann's Conversations with Goethe during the Last Years of his
Life, 2 vols., Leipsic, I836 (in German), we are informed (vol. i. p. I43) of the
f6llowing and, in my judgment, just opinion which Goethe had of himself:
" Tieck [a distinguished German poet] is a star of superior order, and no one
can appreciate his merits more than myself, but when they attempt to elevate him
VOL. 11.                           2
17
I 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
dinary cases, and in general it may be given as a sign of political modesty if a citizen betrays no eagerness for place or
honor, but dutifully accepts whatever place he is called to and
for which he feels himself capable, always keeping strictly the
public benefit in view. There is perhaps no more striking
trait in the whole life of Washington than that on no occasion
during his whole political career did he seek or solicit a single
place or appointment, still less, of course, did he intrigue for
one. Yet in paying this just and great tribute to that illustrious citizen let us not be unjust towards others, and not
forget that this abstinence from striving higher is not always
possible and would not be right for every citizen.  The American revolution was no internal revolution; it was the severing
of colonies from their mother country. When intestine wars
devastate a country, when the horrors of civil war demand a
remedy at the moment, a citizen who is conscious of resources
within and power without would certainly neglect his duty
were he not boldly to strive for that position in which alone
he could be of service. Would Spain, in her bleeding state
not bless such a citizen, if there were one sufficiently great
for the task?
XLI. True ambition is incapable of vanity, a vice by which
rulers but too often have found it possible to attach to a bad
cause numerous men who without it might have well deserved
of their country. Ambition seeks distinction in reality; vanity
is satisfied with outward distinction, or its form, without substantial basis, and if common and habitual in a nation it
deprives it of the proper manliness indispensable for civil
liberty. Marks of distinction seem not only to be wise but
just, because by it the opinion which is invisible and may be
evanescent is embodied and condensed in a permanent sign;
above himself, and to raise him on a level with me, they err. I may say this as a
plain matter of fact, for what is it to me? I have not made myself. It would
be the same if I were to compare myself to Shakspeare, who neither made himself, and yet is a being of a superior kind, to whom I look up, and whom I
must venerate." Eckermann was the daily and domestic companion of Goethe.
0
I8 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
it is gratitude made visible and symbolically expressed; the
person who receives it is by the feeling of acknowledgment
and gratitude in turn more closely connected to those who
thus palpably show their feeling towards him, his friends feel
cheered in the acknowledgment of merit in him, and the com munity at large have in their act a representation of the virtue
or merit which dwells among them, and the encouragement it
meets with at their hands. It is the same principle which
prompts the passengers of a wrecked vessel to present a silver
tankard to the pilot who may have saved their lives. Among
these public marks I count the thanks of Congress or Parliament, swords voted to deserving officers, the bestowing bounties upon meritorious citizens-for instance the land granted
to Lafayette-the civic crown of the Romans, the sword of
honor bestqwed by Napoleon upon the brave, or, where there
exist different privileges in the civil fabric of a nation, the
bestowing of these upon the most meritorious. If France
believes that peers for life are necessary or salutary in the
organization of her government, I consider it as a very noble
trait, and am bold enough to claim it as a general good sign
of the times, that she raises to this political dignity and influence, among others, men who have evinced the influence
which they exercise by no other power than that which the
gifted always must exercise over the less gifted minds —in
short, to literary and scientific men. There are now above
sixteen peers in France who had no other claim to the peerage
than that of thought. He who denies that such examples are
not inciting to others has in my opinion no correct view of
mankind. Britain, though formerly far in advance of France
by admitting commoners to the high peerages; has now remained behind her; and all the distinction that science can
aspire to in England by way of political honor is knighthood,
once so degraded under James I. that people would pay fines
rather than accept it. Strange that no minister has sought
additional strength by boldly bestowing the peerage on scientific men; while mere riches in many cases have obtained
the peerage. Yet, if the French have thus nobly broken the
Ig 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
path-it was Napoleon who first saw how wise it was-thiey
stand in another respect much behind the English, namely,
by promoting petty vanity in the citizens through the profuse
bestowment of those outward signs-ribbons-which appear
to the national taste of the Anglican race beneath a manly
spirit. A friend of liberty could not read, without a degree
of mortification, the many debates on the "cross of July"
which began almost as soon as the smoke of the guns at the
barricades had vanished.   Ribbons, and titles unless they
serve for an expression of something substantial, for instance
as that of peer of France, which in fact is no title, but merely
the name of a station, are mere play of vanity, and cannot
possibly be conducive to a lastingly healthy state of the public. The world has done without mere titles, and it will do so
again. Already is no title of nobility conferred upon a French
commoner when made peer. Canova, the great sculptor, was
made marquis of Ischia. Who knows it? He himself never
used the title. But when Frederic the Great ordered the
number 66 to be placed in the coat of arms of Major Chazat,
whose regiment had taken sixty-six standards in the battle of
Hlohenfriedberg, there was more substance in the token. The
whole continent of Europe has greatly suffered in consequence
of the trifling and unworthy spirit manifesting itself in empty
titles, that is, titles of offices without office, or of rank without privilege. These and crosses and orders came into vogue
when popular liberty and substantial civismn gave way more
and more to court politics and court government; and in the
same degree as civil liberty shall return to those countries
where the abuse exists now, empty titles and unmeaning ribbons will give way, because in popular and national politics
the question is respecting the real character which a citizen
has been able to found for himself. The Chinese government
is also in this respect of much interest to us, because similar.
causes have produced similar effects. We find there, as in
some European continental states, a court government with a
thoroughly organized and vast hierarchy of officers, and we
find there likewise a variety of merely honorary titles, pro
20 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
motions of rank independent of promotion of offices, and signs
of court favor and official distinction, such as the peacock
feather, together with presents which seem to correspond to
the snuff-boxes with brilliants frequently given by continental
monarchs to favored persons., These marks of distinction,
essentially belonging to the epoch of court politics, have already, it would seem, begun to diminish, both in frequency
and the estimation in which they are held.
Filippo Strozzi, the distinguished Florentine and opponent
of the Medicis, though connected with them by marriage,
said, when his fellow-citizens would give him the title of
Messire (Mr.), "My name is Filippo Strozzi; I am a Florentine merchant, and whoever gives me a title offends me."
Orders bestowed by the executive alone should always be
considered as injurious to true liberty; for they give a considerable power founded upon a paltry motive, and may be
entirely independent of all that which ought to confer real distinction.  The grants of the order of the Legion of Honor
by Louis XVIII. furnish a striking instance.
In matters of morality examples are cheering and reassuring. I may be permitted, therefore, to conclude these observations with mentioning the great admiral de Ruiter, as an
example of great modesty united to undaunted courage and
valor, in which Lord Collingwood was not unlike him. That
great naval hero of the United Provinces often said, "I willingly dispense with all praises if I only satisfy my conscience
and follow the commands sent me." He would never grant
X* Yet it is very curious that distinction not only by title, but actually by ribbons, crosses, and stars, seems to have had a very decided effect upon the whole
career of Nelson, and he owed his death to the wearing of his orders in the
battle at Trafalgar. See A Narrative of the Battle of St. Vincent, with Anecdotes of Nelson before and after that Battle, by Col. Drinkwater Bethune, F.S.A.,
author of the History of the Siege of Gibraltar, 2d edit., 8vo, pp. 97, London,
I840. Colonel Bethune was present and reports a curious conversation with
Nelson after the battle of St. Vincent, showing how eagerly Nelson coveted the
order of the Bath. Extracts from the above book are to be found in the London
Literary Gazette of August 8, I840. See likewise the extract from the London
Literary Gazette of May 2, I840.
21 
POLICTI CAL ETHICS.
permission to publish from his log-books the most important
acts of his eventful life. His repeated answer was, "Not I,
God has done it." Frequently, when relating some of his
remarkable exploits, he would suddenly stop when his sonin-law asked for the date of an event, because he was afraid
it would be used for a biography. The king of Spain made
him a duke, but the patent arrived after his death; his son
requested the king to grant him a more modest title.,
XLII. Personal affection between particular individuals,
whether it grows out of relations of consanguinity, out of the
difference of sexes, out of a proportional coincidence and
disagreement of dispositions, gifts, and acquisitions, or out of
mutual service, belongs to the primary agents of all human
society. Let us consider the last-mentioned affection, friend ship, first. The ancient philosophers held friendship to be a
subject worthy of their fullest attention. Aristotle treats of
it in two books, the eighth and ninth, of his Ethics; Plato,
Pythagoras, and after them Cicero, speak of it as one of the
most sacred means of cultivating virtue. The poets celebrate
this union of souls no less, from Homer, Who ends his eighth
song with the words, "Not less indeed than even a brother of
the same blood is an honest friend, kind and judicious in
m nd," down to the latest. The ancients indeed considered
friendship a wedding of the souls, and not unfrequently the
act of concluding friendship was accompanied by religious
consecration.    The  same  intensity and  specific character
of friendship, perhaps, no longer exist; the causes of this
fact may be various. Our practical life is more movable,
our social intercourse and hence our personal acquaintance
vaster and more changeable, our mind is occupied with a
much larger variety of subjects in science as well as literature, our states are wider, and our religion points at a morally
perfect being towards whom all minds are directed as their
I Brandt, De Ruiter. Van Kampen, History of the Netherlands, Hamburg, 1833.
22 
POLITICA4L ETHICS.
great example, so that necessarily, it would seem, the attention to a specific personal relation must be lessened, unless
very extraordinary causes are added. The same perhaps
would be applicable to our matrimonial relations, which
nevertheless are certainly stronger and intenser, generally
speaking, than in ancient times; but the reason of this apparent inconsistency seems to lie in the circumstance that the
position of woman has risen in the course of civilization; and
the greater importance of the family with us is of itself one
of the causes to account for the phenomenon of which we
speak.
Yet, although friendship may not any longer be so often as
in antiquity of that fervor and religious intensity with which
the ancients considered it, it remains an important element
of society, and, like every moral good, ought to be carefully
cultivated; the nobler the souls the greater the blessing of
friendship. Friendship is a mutual affection, or intensity of
feeling towards another, arising from an inmost pleasure in
the soul of a good man, which it feels in honoring, admiring,
and cherishing what is good, pure, or great, and in being
honored and cherished by the good and pure, together with
the feeling of delight which the soul enjoys at being fully and
wholly understood in this world of general misunderstanding
or necessary difficulty of mutual comprehension,-the thrilling delight of confidence, of mutual repose.   There is an
essential approach of souls in friendship as in love of the highest sort, or a finding out of 6ne another's essence, stripped
of all adhesion, accident or what may arise from different
position, nay, even sometimes stripped of the difference of
opinion; and as we fervently believe that the Creator will
develop in another world that which was good and pure in
each man here beneath, though single and separate, and
which led the different individuals in this nether world to different or even opposite opinions, and separated the republican
from the monarchist, the rationalist from the enthusiast, the
cautious from the bold, and will thus expand and mature
what He laid in each individual, and unite them all in greater
23 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
perfection, so does He allow men in this world faintly to fore taste in friendship the bliss of a future world, where no acci dent of difference can any longer exist.
As the love of Romeo and Juliet elevated their souls above
the strife of their houses, so can friendship elevate two hearts
above the struggles of their time, though the individuals be
even engaged in it; while those friends who happily walk the
same path cheer and strengthen each other by their mutual
example; and, since essential confidence can exist between
good men only, they propel each other in the path of virtue:
for it is a primary law of all intercourse, that if two or more
of the same inclination, pursuit, or character-good, frivolous,
or wicked- are brought into close contact with one another,
in that same direction they will propel one another still more
rapidly.  Friendship'must rest on mutuality; it is one of its
essential qualities; for one of its requisites and blessings is
the enjoyment of confidence-a luxury to good men; and
Aschylus is right when he says that kings suffer one evil,
they do not know how to confide in friends; while the reason
that was given of Trajan's having friends, is that he was a
friend himself.' 
Friendship thus cultivates disinterestedness, forbearance,
liberality, kindness, and generosity; it improves our judgment
by admitting the counsel of the friend in whom we confide,
and who views our case, though interesting, yet less personal
to him, as a physician prescribes for a brother of his profession
in his illness; it makes the cultivation and practice of that
primary virtue, justice, easier to us, because it accustoms the
mind to view occurrences not solely with reference to ourselves; and since friendship is partly founded upon the peculiar personalities of men, and these personalities may on
I " Habes amicos quia amicus ipse es." (Plin., Panegyr.) Christ, to prove
to the apostles that they are what he calls them, his friends, mentions confidence,
the fact that he trusted the highest truth to them: "Henceforth I call you not
servants; for the servant knoweth not what his lord doeth; but I have called
you friends; for all things that I have heard of my Father I have made known
unto you." John xv. 15.
24 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
account of some prominent feature lead to the friendship with
one person, and on account of some other prominent feature
to the same or a similar relation with another, it unites mediately more than two individuals. Friendship thus becomes a
ramified bond of society, a tie of good will between individuals
who otherwise might remain insulated.
XLIII. It is evident from the foregoing remarks how very
important an element friendship is in the social order, and
how carefully we ought to cultivate it wherever it is offered
by the circumstances of our life; for being an affection it
cannot be forced. Yet although a man may be more or less
successful in meeting with that individual whose nature is so
happily conformed to his own that the relation of friendship
follows as a matter of course, it may be safely assumed that
in a community in which free and various action is not suppressed, and in which, especially, public life exists, a man who
has never succeeded in forming some strong friendship or
other must, if not unusually unfortunate, look for the causes
of this great privation within himself-to his egotism.
That friendship, as designated above, in its highest degree,
cannot be obtained by every one is clear, and, as is the case
with all other relations, it necessarily exists in a variety of
gradations; but it is an abuse of terms, too common at
present, to apply this sacred word to the relation subsisting
upon mere acquaintance, to persons perhaps known to us
only by a chain of intermediate recommendations, or among
those who but temporarily are united for some selfish or evil
ends. Those are companions or followers, but not friends, of
whom the Bible gives so severe a test. (John xv. I3.)
As a rule for a life in general as well as in politics in particular, it is far more important, in order to secure all the
advantages of friendship, moral or practical, to make one or
a few close friends who will "stick closer than a brother"
(Prov. xviii. 24), than many whose friendship consists rather
in the negative character of an absence of ill will, or merely
in a general and undefined but not very active good will, not
25 
POLITICCAL ETHICS.
in a positive affection of the inmost soul, which rejoices at the
success of the friend and grieves at his grief.  "It is of far
greater importance to a statesman" (it is so to every man) "to
make one friend who will hold out with him for twenty years,
than to find twenty followers in each year, losing as many."'
And here a question of importance offers itself: "How far,
in politics, should we carry our friendship, taking the term in
its intense meaning? Of course we are not allowed to assist
in doing the wrong which the friend may contemplate or
actually commit, or to do injustice to others, to sacrifice truth
or public welfare to this special relation; but there are cases
which are not so easily decided. Our friend may have committed an error which we would disapprove of and would
loudly censure were we his opponents; or our friend may
commit a positive fault: how then? I would answer, The
more you find that public clamor sets violently in against
your friend, the more loudly his fault is discussed, and the
more vehement the cry against him, the more consider yourself in this public trial his natural advocate, endeavoring, as
in a trial of justice, to show whatever may be favorable for
him, which no one will do if you do not, so that whatever is
redeeming in your friend may not be swept away in the general excitement. Stand by him so long and so far as your
conscience will permit, and as your perfect consciousness of
your own disinterestedness supports you, and believe that by
exhibiting an example of generous faithfulness, and of trying
all in your power even for a fallen friend, you do a great ser-'
vice to public morality.   But of course this allows of no
weakness, of which such innumerable instances are preserved
in history, of men who disapproved thoroughly of a measure,
who declared it criminal, and yet, when they found their
friend irresistibly bent on it, finally yielded and assisted. It
is a great thing to know we have a friend who will stand
by us; it is a great misfortune to have none who will boldly
sacrifice us, if unfortunately bent on wrong, to justice, right,
I Taylor, The Statesman, London, I836.
26 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
and truth. We may firmly cling to Plato, but must cling more
firmly to Truth.
The friendship of great souls, founded upon pure patriotism, may produce the greatest effects. It may shine on a
Thebes like a suddenly rising sun. Whether the friendship
as it existed between Pelopidas, the rich and ardent, and
Epaminondas, the poor and far-seeing, be the noblest and most
inspiring example of the excellence of friendship between two
patriotic souls and have its equal in history or not, I feel convinced that my younger readers will do themselves a great
service by reading the biography of Pelopidas in Plutarch.
No heart in which there is a generous spark can ponder it
without delight at their nobleness, patriotism, mutual love,
absence of jealousy, and disinterestedness, despite their great
diversity of character and fortune.
XLIV. Quite different from friendship, and yet frequently
cloaked with its name, because the term "friend" is abusively
extended to followers, adherents, and adherents' adherents, is
what we will call favoritism in politics, the bestowing of favors
without regard to justice, merit, and public welfare, or in
direct contradiction to it.  Favoritism is one of the most dangerous vices of governments, because it may steal in under
the garb of that which in itself is good and right, of gratitude
to those who served us, of liberality, or, as we have seen, of
friendship. We need not discuss that favoritism which sets
out from vice or from an egregious affront to all justice, as
we see it exemplified in the "minions" of some of the most
corrupt periods of the French court or that of Spain, or in
the Dorsets and Buckinghams, Gavestons and others in England, or in the corruptest periods of some republics, since
it is too glaringly vicious to deserve especial notice. We
might with equal justice treat of murder as a highly reprehensible crime in rulers. But favoritism is highly dangerous
also in other places, and arising out of sources which may
be originally pure, as more difficult to resist. Elizabeth, the
great statesman, as Richelieu called her, earned no substantial
27 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
advantages from her partiality to Leicester or Essex.   Is it
not, then, a bitter condition of monarchy that rulers must
studiously avoid allowing personal inclinations, the friendships of private life, to acquire such control that they can no
longer be resisted, but have acquired a preponderance over the
interests of the public welfare? Undoubtedly it is so; but
we must not forget that although monarchy is necessary for
many states, it is in itself an expedient to avoid certain evils;
it is a government which, not viewed with regard to practical
utility but in the abstract, contains always this contradiction,
that we adopt for the highest, most important place a principle which civilization steadily eliminates in wider and wider
circles, as injurious to society, respecting all other offices of
any importance,-that of inheriting them without reference to
capacity. Even those who do not see in the monarch the
highest officer, but something more and higher, must at least
admit that among other things he is an officer or magistrate
likewise, unless they claim a confused essence in the monarch,
according to which he is the mystic shrine of sovereignty, a
view which I endeavored to refute in the first volume. But
nowhere can we depart from strict principle and resort to compromising expediency, however necessary or right, without
proportional sacrifice.  The monarch who does not obtain
his place by his talent must allow himself to be surrounded
with fetters which for the private citizen would not be endurable.
The favoritism of a monarch becomes still more serious in
countries in which the expediency of hereditary government
is carried still farther against abstract principle, and the crown
is suffered to descend upon that sex which otherwise is justly
excluded from all public employment. While favoritism has
with female sovereigns the additional incentive of difference
of sex, which by no means needs on that account to be
founded upon unlawful affection, it is, generally speaking, for
them more difficult to overcome the feeling of partiality by
reason alone; since the soul of the woman is by nature more
active in the spheres of affection and feeling than in that of
28 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
the reasoning judgment.  It is necessary therefore that ruling
princesses and their advisers most especially guard against
this dangerous political fault. These remarks do not hold
good against real friendship in a monarch. On the contrary,
if he is himself capable of friendship, and if he has a friend
on terms which are very different from capricious favoritism
in the one or interested submission in the other, friendship is
one of the greatest blessings to monarchs. I do not know
that anything in Henry IV. of France is a truer sign of greatness of soul than that he could be so true a friend as he was
to Sully, nor could any event in his reign be called happier
than that he found Sully and concluded a friendship with
him. They were united in the great desire to live for France,
in a generous, candid, manly friendship. But the narrower
the mind of the monarch, or of any man of power, the more
danger exists that favoritism will steal in under the garb of
friendship.
Favoritism is, however, not only dangerous in monarchies,
or there in the monarch only; it is equally dangerous in republics, and in every citizen according to his sphere. If it
becomes general, it tramples justice, the foundation of the
state, under foot; it stifles virtue and exertion of talent, because they do not avail; it leads to party rancor, because it
bestows places of profit or honor upon "fi-iends" alone, not
for past merit and future benefit to the commonwealth, but
for past and future party services; or it substitutes altogether
caprice for reason, and leads infallibly to a state of general
public dishonesty, in which public places are considered as
berths of enrichment, of pilfering, or of family aggrandizement; it leads to the appointment of incompetent men and to
general public disgrace and apathy, to servile adherence and
ruinous flattery. There are letters of Washington's which
might show how utterly unjust and subversive of the best interests of the state he considered favoritism. Pymn is another
striking example of perfect freedom from this vice. "He
knew neither brother, kinsman, nor friend, superior nor inferior, when they stood in the way to hinder his pursuit of
29 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
the public good." It was a saying of his, "Such a one is my
entire friend, to whom I am much obliged, but I must not pay
my private debts out of the public stock."'  "To such a degree and with such sincerity did he act upon this principle,
that when his friends frequently put him in mind of his children and plressed upon his consideration that although he
regarded not himself yet he ought to provide that it might be
well with them, his usual answer was,'if it were well with the
public his family was well enough."'
XLV. The family is not only important for the stricter
political reasons which have been dwelt upon in previous pas sages, but likewise as affording those relations out of which
mutual affections grow, feelings strongly connected with pub lic spirit and patriotism.  The love of our family, of our kins men, is not only innocent, but necessary and a powerful agent
in society, an incentive to exertion and a source of public
spirit. Yet, like all other original agents, it must be judiciously watched lest it grow stronger than it ought to be,
lest it transcend its legitimate and natural power. Not to
have greater forbearance towards members of our own family
than to others, so long as strict duty allows of this forbearance, would certainly be wanting in duty; but to allow family
considerations to outweigh higher and the highest considerations is either pusillanimous or dastardly. If William III.
saw, as I for one believe that he did, that England was in
danger of being ruined and of being forced into retrograde
steps or into a political system similar to that of France and
Spain, appalling indeed to every honest man; if he felt convinced that James had become a rebel against the country and
constitution, and saw that he himself could rescue England,
when called upon by circumstances and by many of the endangered nation, he would have shown extreme weakness of
x These two extracts are from Stephen Marshall's Sermon preached before
Parliament at the Funeral of Mr. Pym, 4to, I644, as quoted in the Westminster
Review for July, x833, in an article on the life of Pym, from which likewise the
next following quotation in the text is taken.
3o 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
mind in allowing family relations to weigh against this sacred
calling of the welfare of Britain and of Europe.
Yet as the undue attachment to friends or favorites assumes
the dangerous form of favoritism, so does the excessive attachment to the members of one's family become nepotism. The
name of this political vice comes from the government of the
papal hierarchy, and has been chiefly restricted to it; but the
evil principle is visible elsewhere too, and there is no reason
why we should not use the term in a general sense. Nepotism, or the showering of riches, power, and honors upon
the nephews (nepoti) of the pope (hence the name), became
actually a state institution, not unlike to the keeping of royal
mistresses in France, until, finally, endowed and powerful relations of the pope were considered necessary for the honor
of the pope and despatch of business, even by some of the
highest clergy in Rome, who do not always seem to have
had flattery in view., Indeed, the government was so badly
contrived, the cardinals so divided and subservient to foreign
courts, and the state of Italy so utterly demoralized, that the
pope was not expected to trust all his secrets to any stranger
out of his family; yet the business required some minister
or other who had the confidence of the pope. Who then
could be this person except a relation of his?
There is indeed no danger at present that nepotism, as it
existed towards the end of the fifteenth and the beginning of
the sixteenth century, can reappear there or in any other
state; yet it is one of our duties to weigh attentively any institution or fact in which we find a general principle, good or
bad, developed distinctly and in all its consistency, in all its
beauty or hideousness. We shall then better understand the
- I believe that papal nepotism, in its various historical phases, has nowhere
been so thoroughly and amply represented as by Ranke, History of the Popes,
Eng. trans. (in the Amer. ed. of I841. See especially vol. i. pp. 46, 5I, 99,
274, 275,301I).  See also the remarks of Macchiavelli on this subject in the first
book of his History of Florence. That not only nephews were promoted by this
nepotism, but, under the name of nepoti, the natural sons also of popes, as for
instance under Alexander VI., is a well-known fact.
3I 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
less distinct manifestations of the same principle at other
periods or in other spheres. The crime and plunder which
were connected with nepotism were appalling: state property
was alienated and changed into hereditary principalities for
the nepoti, until at last these treasonable procedures were
prohibited by the pope and cardinals themselves; the nepoti
obtained money for selling justice, or, what is perhaps most
curious and strikes a professional politician, as a choice rarity,
-as the naturalist is interested by some peculiar monstrosity,
-the "cardinal nepote" gave (and of course sold) "non graveturs," which were immunities against all future procedures by
way of justice, amounting to more than an anticipation of
pardon of a general kind, as the English kings formerly gave
them in cases of impeachment., Lorenzo de Medici writes to
Pope Innocent VIII. that other popes had not waited so long
in bestowing property upon their family, and that should he
hesitate longer, other reasons would be suspected. "Zeal and
duty," he continues, "oblige me to remind your holiness that
no man is immortal; that a pope signifies as much as he
chooses to signify; his office cannot be made hereditary;
only the honor and benefices which he bestows upon his
family he can call his own."2  The very theory followed by
some prime ministers! Washington, in a letter, dated February 20, I797, to John Adams, when president, expresses his
hope that promotion will not be withheld from Mr. John
Quincy Adams "because he is your son." 3 Equally striking are letters written by that pure and single-hlearted man,
x Under Urban VIII., for instance. See Ranke, as above, vol. i. (also vol. ii.,
i.e., vol. iv. of Princes and Nations of Southern Europe), p. 442, extract from
MS. ly Cardinal Cecchini.
2 In Fabroni Vita Laurentii, ii. 390.
3 This letter happens to be preserved in a pamphlet entitled Correspondence
between the IHon. John Adams and William Cunningham, Boston, 1823, published by the son of the latter. Washington adds that if he were now to be
brought into the diplomatic line he would not disapprove of the caution hinted
at in Mr. Adams's letter, "upon the principle which has regulated my own conduct," but he says that the case differs. The question is only promotion of a
valuable public servant.
32 
POLITICAL ETilCS.
when president, to relatives who solicited offices.' It is universally considered odious to see the relatives of a minister,
distant or near, like so many birds feasting upon the carcass
of the public revenue, and mere decency ought to prevent an
undue favor towards relations;2 though it is true, on the other
hand, it would look much like political prudery if relationship
should actually impede. It is advisable on the score of mere
prudence that a high officer should never appoint a near relative to another high office near him, for the public feel insecure and naturally uneasy at it. Very many constitutions
prohibit such appointments. Brothers and sons of the doge
of Venice were excluded from high appointments. The constitution of Geneva prohibits more than two persons of the
same name and family from sitting in the council of state,
Washington's Writings; such letters as those to Bushrod Washington, New
York, July 27, I789, and to Benjamin Lincoln, Mount Vernon, March II, I789.
Mr. Sparks gives part of a letter in a note to page 478, vol. ix., which contains
the following passage: "Among all these anxieties, I will not conceal from
you, I anticipated none greater than those that were likely to be produced by
applications for appointments to the different offices which would be created
under the new government. Nor will I conceal that my apprehensions have
already been but too well justified. Scarcely a day passes in which applications
of one kind or another do not arrive; insomuch that had I not early adopted
some general principles I should before this time have been wholly occupied in
this business. As it is, I have found the number of answers which I have been
necessitated to give in my own hand an almost insupportable burden to me.
"The points in which all these answers have agreed in substance are, that,
should it be my lot to go again into public office, I would go without being under
any possible engagements of any nature whatsoever; that, so far as I knew my
own heart, I would not be in the remotest degree influenced, in making nominations, by motives arising from the ties of family or blood; and that, on the
other hand, three things, in my opinion, ought principally to be regarded,
namely, the fitness of characters to fill offices, the comparative claims from the
former merits and sufferings in service of the different candidates, and the distribution of appointments in as equal a proportion as might be to persons belonging to the different States in the Union."
2 Earl Grey, universally esteemed, even by the opposition, probably suffered
no severer attacks than those founded upon the reproach that he provided too
anxiously for his extensive family relations.  It will be remembered that it was
favoritism and nepotism which furnished Junius with the materials for some of
his most caustic sarcasms.
VOL. II.                           3
33
4 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
composed of twenty-four members, and more than five individuals of the same name and family in the representative
council, composed of two hundred and seventy-four members.x In so small a state, where frequent intermarriages produce powerful family affiliations, this may be a serviceable
law; but since the powerful agency of the public press has
become a vital political agent, such matters are in most cases
better left to public opinion, until it shall be found insufficient. Besides, laws of this sort rarely prevent the evil, if
there is a disposition to engender it, except that it is well
enough thus decidedly to express by a law the opinion which
society entertains of the subject.
I Constitution du Canton de G6neve, tit. iv. 89, and tit. iii. 42.
34 
CHAPTER V.
Gratitude fully discussed.-Ingratitude.-Excess of Gratitude aids Usurpers. Caesar, Napoleon. - Distinction between Gratitude and Popularity. - Popu larity.-Sudden and Passing Popularity; Lasting Popularity.-We have no
Right to seek Popularity, but must sutiffer it to seek us.-Power of spontaneous
Popularity; peculiar Power of spontaneously returned Popularity.-Slavery of
Popularity. - Danger of Popularity, in Free Countries, to the Individual. Crowds to receive distinguished Men.-Great Danger of Personal Popularity
for Liberty. - Pericles.-  Demagogues. - Athenian  Demagogismn. - Monu ments.- The Duty of Attention.- Observation of Primary Agents and Ele ments.-Truth and Justice connected with it.-Obligation to study the History
of our Country, its Institutions and their Classical Periods.-It is necessary in
modern Times to read Newspapers.
XLVI. INGRATITUDE has at all times been held one of the
worst of vices; it proceeds from meanness of soul, and annihilates one of the indispensable and most genial ties among
men. To requite good with evil, or to remain untouched by
the good conferred upon us, shows a callous heart; and of
whatever changes the human heart is capable, the change
from meanness or callousness to nobleness or warmth is the
rarest of all, because a whole deep-rooted disposition and
turn of feeling and thought is to be changed, which can be
effected by a long training only; but this requires in the
commencement a degree of nobleness of purpose. Gratitude,
in all its manifestations, towards the living and the dead,
who directly or indirectly have conferred good upon us, even
though it be in no other way than by leaving us an encouraging, cheering, or inspiring example, ought to be cultivated
from the earliest period in education. Public ingratitude,
wanton disregard of the best men and the best exertions and
purest sacrifices, is no less vicious and injurious to public welfare than private ingratitude is in its own sphere. It proceeds
from sordidness and promotes it. Noble souls find a pleasure
and deep enjoyment in warmly acknowledging real benefits
35 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
and genuine kindness, and in reverencing what is good and
great; it is the little-minded and narrow-hearted, or the evildisposed, who are troubled and haunted by fretting jealousy,
who see in all greatness of action or elevation of thought,
and in the acknowledgment by the public of the virtues of
others, a reflection on themselves, as well as a danger to the
public. They, judging from their own selfishness, believe that
no greatness can exist without injury to the common liberty,
and have at times even publicly proclaimed the "danger of
talent," thus becoming rebels against God's own order of
things and the fairest works of his hands; but "there is a congeniality between vast powers of thought and dignity of purpose. None are so capable of sacrificing themselves as those
who have most to sacrifice, who in offering themselves make
-the greatest offerings to humanity."' The wicked and the
little-minded are ever leagued against grateful reverence of
high-minded patriotism; and he that cannot be grateful or
feel esteem deserves neither love nor esteem. His soul is
void of some of the best impulses.
Why do we love liberty? Why does mankind eternally
struggle for it? If liberty necessarily required the sacrifice
of the noblest traits and imprints of humanity, if the sameness of mediocrity were its condition, it ought to be shunned
as the most unfortunate state in which society can be placed.
We love liberty, we sacrifice everything to her, as the last
and highest good, because it is that state of things which
most corresponds to God's order of things, which promotes
the freest development of thought and action; because man,
made for thought and action, is most really man if protected
by her.  Were it otherwise, liberty would be the most unnatural state, opposed to the highest calling of humanity. Let
a nation for any length of time systematically cast aside its
best and loftiest characters, those of which it ought to be
proud as finding its spirit and endeavors nobly represented
and concentrated in them; let a community for a series of
I Rev. Dr. Channing.
36 
POLITICA4L ETHICS.
years reward its purest and most gifted citizens with ungrateful neglect, and with unworthy partiality for servile flatterers;
let a monarchy adopt the policy of overlooking those upon
whom public opinion bestows grateful honor, or a republic
requite faithful and generous patriotism, civic wisdom, and
stanch justice with petty jealousy or chill disrespect, and they
will soon lose public dignity, morality, and elevation, and sink
into sordid and corroding egotism-the most unfailing of
national dissolvents.
XLVII. Yet is it not true that nations have as often sinned
by way of gratitude as of ingratitude? Have not free nations,
in far the greater number of cases, lost their liberty because
they were intoxicated with gratitude or admiration of real
or imagined benefits received at the hands of the usurper?
-Is not the willingness with which the mass give up their
liberties, with which they sometimes press upon the usurper
the surrender of freedom on their part, frequently due to this
cause?  By what indeed are in most cases usurpers supported
and emboldened, if not by the acclamation of the people?
To destroy the rights or liberties of one part they must necessarily have the support of the other, if the question is of
intestine revolutions and not of conquests by foreigners.
In order to answer these questions correctly and see the
subject in all its bearings, it is necessary to make careful
distinctions.
In some cases the act of the usurper is but the final accomplishment and ratification of a radical change prepared and
effected throughout a social system from a period long antecedent to that of the usurpation; and the existing system,
bestowing franchises upon some, once salutary, has, by the
change of circumstances and of the people's spirit, become
galling or ruinous to the mass, or the people have become
unable any longer to uphold the institutions of former liberty.
Such was the case when Cesar grasped the reins.  Rome was
no longer Rome. It is indeed no subject fit for the present
occasion to inquire whether Caesar belonged in mind to the
37 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
class of mean usurpers, who prefer the purple and an elevated
throne in the hall of audience to a lofty place in history, and
are willing to exchange for a regal title, which has graced the
worst as well as the best, the proud name of a great citizen;
but certain it is that even if Caesar had been one of the best,
full of calmness of soul and love of justice like Washington,
placed as he and the Roman commonwealth were, rotten as
the whole framework of government and demoralized as the
public spirit were, he would have been bound, with his power
and insight, to consummate the fall of the old order of things
and establish a new one. The constitution of Rome, grown
out of a totally different state of things and calculated for it,
had become a nuisance.  Civil war and fermentation were the
order of the day; the aristocracy factious, the democracy lawless and indolent, while both were rapacious. In a crisis of
this serious import it is very natural that the people should
willingly throw more power than hle before had into the hands
of a powerful man, and should even rejoice, by a natural instinct, if he assumed more and more, because they first of all
desired protection against bloodshed and extortion. Whether
we ad'mire Napoleon or not, whether we consider his saying
to Las Cases, "If I had. aped Washington I should have been
guilty of a mere silliness; all that I could strive for was to be
a crowned Washington," as empty words or not, whether we
be'ieve that he criminally abused his power and neglected
every opportunity of developing a civic spirit or of sowing its
seeds, as the only means of strengthening, restoring, and permanently healing France, there can be no manner of doubt
that, had he been as pure as Doria,, he still would have been
I Andrew Doria, whose name, the historian Rotteck says, calls up the name
of Timoleon, was born at Genoa, in I466, a period when his republic was rent
by factions and northern Italy was the unceasing battle-field of the European
continental powers. Genoa had lost her fairest dominions. Galeazzo Sfor-za,
duke of Milan, ruled likewise over Genoa, once free and powerful.  He had
ordered to draw ropes where walls should be erected from the castle to the sea,
as an additional means of security against the Genoese.   The assembled nmultitude was gaping at this token of subjugation, when a bold man, Lazzaro Doria,
stepped forward and severed the ropes in presence of Galeazzo's servants. The
38 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
called upon to break up the ill-jointed and injuriously-working machine of government that then existed, and popular
applause would have been justly bestowed upon him.
XLVIII. Secondly, we must not mistake popularity, of
whatever sort, for the expression of public gratitude, which
was designated above as a virtue of high importance in politics. Popularity is a subject of magnitude, and it behoves us
to examine it well.
What is popularity? To speak plainly, it is the being liked
and cherished by many; being acceptable to the people. A
man, a measure, a tune, a color, may thus be popular. The
power of popularity, therefore, rests essentially on sympathy,
people were roused; but their excitement vanished; the best citizens emigrated,
to avoid servitude. Columbus left Genoa at this time, and Andrew Doria, having
served against the Turks, went to Urbino. Genoa revolted against Mantua, and
acknowledged France. Doria took service under the king, Louis XII., but he
never forgot his country. When Francis I. had succeeded Louis, had broken
his oath taken to Charles V., and suddenly fallen upon Italy, and the troops of
Charles fled to Naples, and everything seemed to indlicate the ascendency of
Francis, feared by all Europe, and Italy especially, Doria hoisted the imperial
flag and turned the scale.  He  acted very differently from the Constable Bourbon; Doria was not subject to France; and Francis tyrannized over Genoa. She
hoped for deliverance at the hands of this hero. He entered the city victoriously,
and expelled the foreigners; the people, carried away by gratitude, greeted him
as their prince. Doria might undoubtedly have established a dynasty, nor did he
need to found it with blood.  His fellow-citizens urged a crown upon him; but
he was greater: he declined, although his family had been for centuries allied
with emperors and kings. He exhorted his fellow-citizens to be united and virtuous, that they might be free, in a speech which ended, "With pride and emotion I call myself a free citizen of Genoa. This and your friend I desire to be,
not your ruler; and may it never be said of Doria that when he served his
country he had selfish ends in view." He used the favorable spirit of the people
to establish with their co-operation a new constitution, by which the tyranny of
the aristocracy and the lawlessness of the people, which had so often distracted
Genoa, were avoided-a constitution which lasted three hundred years, until the
great revolutions of Europe hurried away this with so many others, in their
sweeping course.  Doria died ninety-four years old, honored and loved as a very
father by his republic.  His tomb bears this inscription: "Andreae Aurim, civi
optimo, felicissimoque Vindici atqut Authori publicas Libertatis, Senatus Populusque Genuensis posuit."
39 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
the adaptation, assimilation, or prominent development of the
feelings and likings of the community, or the set of people
with whom we are popular. This leads us at once to two dis tinctions. The feelings from which this sympathy arises may
be good or bad; a leader of robbers may be popular with his
band by humoring or satisfying their bad feelings and propensities, as Doria was popular with the good by good measures; and popularity may be passing or lasting, suddenly
excited by suddenly humoring a feeling strongly excited at
the moment, or well founded upon the esteem of some prominent quality which is valued as an important one by the
people, and which they have reason to believe exists in an
eminent degree in the popular person.
The good citizen can of course cherish the popularity of
the good only, as a welcome cheering on the path of duty and
a power to do good. But how must he obtain it? Popularity is not an ultimate object; the ultimate object is to do
right. We are not allowed, therefore, to obtain popularity by
sacrificing right or duty. We must not seek popularity as an
end, which may ultimately determine our actions, because
thereby we should establish an arbitrary and extra-ethical
standard for our actions. We must allow popularity to come
to us; if it comes in'consequence of our acting right, and
gaining the sympathy of fellow-citizens because we feel in
common with them and for them, well and good; if it does
not, we have not to answer for it. No moral code makes
the demand, Thou shalt be popular. The moral code says,
Try to obtain the esteem of the good, but before all act
right, although all should abandon you. It is a happy fact,
however, that, with very few exceptions, no surer means
exists to obtain lasting popularity, a popularity which, though
it may be lost for a time, will return, and, if so, with redoubled strength, than that which is founded upon the esteem
of our fellow-men. Esteem does not necessarily constitute
popularity, which, we have seen, rests on sympathy, and
there are many reasons which thus may withhold it from an
honorable man. He may not share the feelings of the public;
40 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
all his chief endeavors may be directed to a point uninteresting to the community; his manners may not be pleasing.
Nor is popularity the infallible reward of the good for good
and pure endeavors. The best may be misunderstood, the more
easily so the farther they are in advance of their age, while less
elevated endeavors, perhaps mediocrity, for the very reason
that it can be understood by the many, may meet with general popularity, if it happens successfully to strike common
sympathy. How many instances are recorded in history of
overwhelming popularity of contemporaries, which vanished
like clouds with posterity, and of neglect by contemporaries
of men whose names posterity has placed highest on the list
of great and wise men!  Popularity, therefore, is as little an
ultimate criterion as it is an ultimate moral object. But this
remains certain, that esteem forms necessarily an essential ingredient of lasting political popularity with the good; and
such alone we ought to value.
XLIX. Popularity is pleasing, it delights the heart, not
only in politics, but in all spheres. How could it be otherwise for man, a being created for society? This is only a
stronger reason why we ought not to make it the standard of
our actions. So soon as a man does this, he submits to the
worst species of slavery-that of mind and heart. He throws
away his own standard within, and seeks for one without, a
changeable one withal; he loses self-esteem and strict rectitude, and in short is a mental slave. There is no institution
in this nether world which has not together with its advantages its dangers, and the danger of civil liberty and publicity
of politics-the one cannot exist without the other-is the
danger of popularity. The power of public opinion, the just
principle that we ought in many cases-not indeed in allultimately to submit to it, and in part to regulate our conduct
by it, are so many inducements which will lead the fainthearted to yield to this servitude. The dread of unpopularity has ruined many statesmen, led authors to abjure truth,
seduced citizens to crooked paths, and shows its unfortunate
41
t 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
effect with the young in the schools and colleges of free countries. There is no teacher, I suppose, who has not seen or felt
the evil influence which a positive desire of popularity or fear
of unpopularity exercises upon many young men in institutions for education, seducing not a few even to vice and final
ruin. It is, therefore, one of the first duties of the young, early
to learn manfully and unequivocally to do right for its own
sake; and for their teachers to imbue their souls early and
deeply with this element of rectitude. It will be one of the
best preparations for future and public life, for the support of
the commonwealth and genuine patriotism. Once more, the
danger of free countries is morbid desire of popularity.
L. The ingredients of sound popularity are esteem at home
and the sympathy of the people. This popularity in truly
free countries begins generally at home, a circumstance of
still greater importance in vast countries, in which the people
at a distance cannot judge of the private character of a citizen
except by the name and standing he enjoys at home. Popularity begins in the house and family, extends to village,
county, state, and moves in concentric circles over the
country. Keep, therefpre, your house and affairs in good
order, treat your wife well, and educate your children carefully; be a benevolent neighbor and public-spirited member
of the community; and you will generally lay a firm foundation for popularity.  Or if degenerate times despise these elements, if the people banish even an Aristides, all you have to
remember is that popularity is no duty, but only a welcome
effect of duty if it comes of itself. On the other hand, as
popularity is a power, and, if just, a lawful power, as in many
cases the leading citizen cannot act without it, and as it depends at the same time upon sympathy, it is clear that he
I Mirabl)eau frequently exclaimed, "J'expie bien cruellement les erreurs de
ma jeunesse," and Dumont says hlie knew that Mirabl)eau would hlave gone
through fire to clear himnself, not, certainly, on account of morlality itself, but on
account of the injury his popularity continued to suffer from his former reputation.-Dumont, Souvenir sur Mirabeau, etc., chap. xiv.
42 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
must not slight it. There are national feelings, and even
prejudices, unimportant in themselves yet strong on account
of extensive and historical or other associations, which it
would be wanton unnecessarily to offend; and by "unnecessarily" I mean if they do not stand in the way in the obtaining of a laudable object, or actually produce evil. In the
latter case it may not be your duty to attack them, either because you are not quite certain regarding them, or because
you have no adequate power to overcome them and by an
attack upon them would fritter away the influence and means
you might use for other purposes.   One  man cannot do
everything. A citizen engaged in reforming the penal laws
of his country may observe great and even injurious errors in
the literary taste of his countrymen. He is not bound on
that account to engage in a contest against perverse taste.
Very many citizens have deprived themselves of all power to
do good by attacks which did not come from an intention to
overcome and extirpate an error, but rather from a weakness
which deprived of the power of silence-a power as great as
that of speech. But in no case ought one to favor directly or
indirectly what he believes to be absolutely wrong, or sacrifice
to it; in no case ought he to give way to national follies; he
should make due allowance for prejudices, and not ruin the
best cause by throwing away the whole because he can only
obtain part, or by presumptuously setting up a standard of
perfection; but in no case should he administer to passion,
wickedness, or crime, either by remaining silent when silence
must be construed into approval or by giving in a cowardly
manner a qualified approval.'
.   Within sixty years there were executed in Geneva one hundred and fifty
witches; yet Calvin does not once express his dissatisfaction with this error in his
many wvritings and innumerable letters. We are justified, therefore, in concluding
that he shared the general error of the times, although he does not speak in
favor of the ti'ials, because we must expect that he would otherwise have felt
himself bound to pronounce his opinion; his silence necessarily appears as
qualified assent.  That Calvin does not pronounce dissent, I mention on the
authority of Mr. Henry, Life of John Calvin, in German, page 489.
43 
4JOLITICAL ETHICS.
The citizen who is to act must be understood by the
community; but we are not understood by word of mouth
only; we must have the sympathy of the hearer,-this constant interpreter of human words, which are but broken accents without it. "How difficult is it," exclaimed Cato when
the last time before judges, "to defend one's self before men
with whom one has not lived!"
LI. There is a subject not unconnected with that of popularity, which deserves a mnoment's attention-the crowds
which at times receive distinguished citizens. As a faithful
and distinguished citizen must be scrupulously on his guard
against the full tide of popularity in general, since it is but
too apt to throw him off his guard, under most pleasing, stirring, or even inspiring forms, so he must not mistake the
meaning of crowds. It may be well imagined that it must
be animating to a citizen or general to see thus visibly and
strikingly the feeling of his country towards him represented
by thousands of eyes turned upon him, as perhaps the sole
cherished object of the attention of all. Who would envy
him the enjoyment of so elating and electrifying a moment if
he deserves it? But he must remember that of itself it shows
little,-proves nothing; for, though thousands may be present, many more thousands may not be. When Charles II.
made his entry into London after the death of Cromwell, and
saw the many people rejoicing at his return, he exclaimed,
"Where are my enemies?" There were enough, but they were
not present, or, if so, could of course not be discerned. Who,
that ever has seen it, can forget how multitudes and crowds
were never wanting to stare at enemy after enemy that made
his entry into a populous city, during the many changes in
the times of the wars of Napoleon? When Riego entered
Madrid, he was greeted by crowds; when Ferdinand followed,
he was greeted likewise. It is not necessary to suppose that
these crowds were entirely composed of the same persons;
but it shows that crowds in large cities prove little, unless the
mere excitement itself may, as in fact sometimes it does,
44 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
prove something; as when a citizen not high in official station is received by thousands. There are always very many
who go to see a sight-no matter of what kind-because
others go, and very many people to whom huzzaing of itself
seems to be an enjoyment. There are persons who, when the
bells begin to toll in indication of fire, will suddenly break
forth in a lusty shout, as if an opportunity only had been
wanting for their shouts to go off. The same persons will
throw their hats and hurrah loudly for any one, whoever he
be. Yet princes are very frequently deceived by assembled
crowds and their huzzas. I do not speak of those crowds
which the police at times have paid for hurrahing; but bona
fide crowds with bona fide shouts amount to little, and are
rarely faithful indexes of anything which might be of importance, except they are overwhelmingly strong, or are silent,
for "the silence of the people is the censure of kings."
Princes, instead of allowing flatterers to pay them compliments upon the assembled multitudes, would feel rather humbled, if they considered that it is the show which brings the
greater number together. They can serve as no foundation
for any political satisfaction. The coronation of few monarchs
was attended more numerously than that of Charles X., yet
his crown was not for all that the faster on his head.
LII. Popularity, if sought as an object worth obtaining for
itself, is not more dangerous to individuals seeking it than it
is to the people, who do not grant it for virtue and talent but
on personal or capricious grounds and in spite of the law.
Nothing indeed is more dangerous to liberty than the permitting a citizen to lead or rule on account of great popularity, and the greater the popularity and the longer the sway,
the more ruinous will be the effect; because the political
energy of the state concentrates in him, and receives from
him its impulse, the institutions lose their energy, the law as
law loses its vigor, and the community becomes unfit for civil
liberty. If the leader, thus placed beyond the line which
no citizen ever should be allowed to overstep, is restless and
45 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
nuprincipled, he may become a usurper; but even if he be
naturally of a most generous mind, and have the general welfare alone before his eyes, the effect is always disastrous. If
the people are willing to confide the government into the
hands of even so glorious a leader as Pericles, on account of
his personal popularity, and allow him momentous influence
besides and beyond the law, because he is great and glorious,
if they confide in him, the individual, because they are
charmed by him and not because he acts out their institutions, they must be content to follow, when the mortal lot
befalls this glorious leader, so low and puffed-up a demagogue
as Cleon. So no monarch properly provides for his state
who does not powerfully promote institutions, but makes the
government essentially dependent upon his personality, however brilliant this may be. The most gifted monarchs are
frequently those who are most easily betrayed into this
political error.
LIII. Free nations who value their liberty ought jealously
to frown down all leading and ruling popularity which does
not strictly keep within the limits of the law, and to allow no
essential influence except within its institutions, none whatsoever on account of a mere personal, still less a capricious,
popularity. This does not exclude a sound and healthy opposition, of which we shall treat presently. I speak of that popularity which does not merely oppose the administration but
infringes the laws and their spirit, and stands instead of administration. Out of this spirit arise demagogues-men who
gain popularity and sway by unlawful or wicked means and
by flattering or pampering the evil dispositions of men. After
Pericles, or through him, demagogism was raised in Athens,
we might almost say, to a state institution, as we have seen
that nepotism was under the popes of the fifteenth centurya most melancholy condition for democracies. For it has this
peculiarity, that while it clips and stints more and more the
lawful operation of established institutions, which demagogues
never fail to do in order to flatter the crowd, it gives on the
46 
POLITICAL ETHICS.4
other hand more and more essential power to the undefined
and unrestricted influence of the demagogue, under the delusive garb of giving power to the people-another and substantial reason against democratic autarchies, in addition to
those which we found in the first volume. Neither Pericles,
the guardian of Alcibiades, nor Socrates, his teacher, was able
to regulate his ambitious temper, because the indulgent love
of the people spoiled and ruined him. He became a traitor
to his country. The history of Athens after Pericles almost
concentrates in a series of demagogues, Cleon, Hyperbolus,
Callias, Alcibiades, and whatever their names were. Opposite
to the demagogue rose the oligarchist, dealing in treachery,
and a vile tribe of sycophants prospered in the struggle, while
the people were carried madly to their ruin.,
LIV. Before we dismiss the subject of national gratitude I
desire to add a few words on statues and other monuments
erected in honor of events or persons by authority or the
community at large. Ought we to erect such? It has been
often said," Much better that the memory of a person or event
live in the hearts of the people than that it be perpetuated in
stone."  No doubt it is; so it is better that knowledge be in
the head than in books, but still books are not only useful
but necessary. I for my part am decidedly in favor of judicious
Frederic the Great has a whole chapter on flatterers in his Anti-Macchiavelli.
There is a remarkable passage in the Memrnorial de Sainte-Hele6ne, which I
give because worthy of reflection, and, though we shall not entirely agree with
Napoleon, that which he advances respecting what people say applies at least more
or less to all excited times. The emperor, having spoken of popularity and debonnairete, adds, "Thus we ought to serve the people woi'thily, and not occupy ourselves with pleasing them. The best way of gaining them is by doing them good;
nothing more dangerous than to flatter them: if after that they do not obtain all
they desire, they become irritated and believe that faith has not been kept with
them; and if we resist, they hate so much the more, as they believe themselves
duped. The first duty of a prince is doubtless to do that which the people wants;
but that which a people wants is hardly ever that which it says: its will, its
wants ought rather to be in the heart of the prince than in his mouth."   Page
Ilo, vol. ii., Paris ed., I824.
47 
POLITICA4L ETHIICS.
monuments, and my reasons are these. I consider them moral,
honorable, elevating, and useful.
Whatever has a tendency to impress man with the fact that
he is a member of society, influenced and influencing-of a
society which is closely connected with the past; whatever
leads man to feel attached to mankind has a tendency to elevate him, to suppress or soften that which is selfish or brutish;
whatever tends to insulate man, to stifle the consciousness in
him that he is an integrant part of society, produces egotism
and crime, because it weakens humanity in him, which is in
a great manner founded upon sociality. Hence the great use
of studying history: it makes us conscious that we belong to
a great union of beings, existing for important purposes.
Sismondi, in his History of the Fall of the Roman Empire,
-justly says, "The morality of a nation is preserved by associating its sentiments with all that is stable and permanent:
it is destroyed by whatever tends to concentrate them on the
present moment. So long as our recollections are dear to us,
we shall take care that our hopes be worthy of them; but a
people who sacrifice the memory of their ancestors or the
welfare of their children to the pleasures of a day are but
sojourners in a country-they are not citizens." The study
of history and every means of commingling its reminiscences
with our soul make us modest, yet firm and persevering;
history gives substance, earnestness, and a necessity of action,
not of talk, to the mind. All periods which have been most
fruitful to a nation or mankind at large, most active in building and sowing, not in destroying and uprooting, have ever
distinguished themselves by an earnest zeal to understand the
past ages, which generated the present; all periods which
destroyed and ruined without developing, which are distinguished for superficial clamor and theories without character,
substance, or sense, are distinguished for arrogant disregard
of any knowledge beyond the present day, which is considered
as overflowing with wisdom. Man never studies the past
without earnestly thinking of the future; but so soon as man's
thoughts dwell upon the past and meditate the future destinies
48 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
of that which surrounds him, so soon as his affections are
roused by that which is absent, he feels elevated, and returns
to the consideration of that which now exists and is close before him, to the present moment and himself, with an expanded
heart and a greater soul; and he is only thus able to consider
the present and himself individually without selfishness. So
soon as man, on the other hand, dwells upon the present
without any connection with the past and the future, he exposes himself to sordid views and arrogant conceit. The
truth of this position may be tested in a proportionate degree
by every one in his daily life and smallest transactions, as in
the actions and performances of whole nations. Since monuments, however-be they columns, inscriptions, entire fabrics,
or whatever else-are means to connect our thoughts with
the past, and thus lead us to dwell upon the possible future,
they are desirable for any nation which feels that its destiny
is higher and nobler than the mere care for the present moment could indicate. Monuments are impressive tokens and
illustrations of history, and not merely for those who do not
read, nor even most so for them, but the impressions received
through the eye in shape and form are strong and lasting. A
thoughtful man will dwell upon a monument with fruitful
thoughts, while the volatile are arrested for a moment, reminded of one that was great, good, heroic, and one more
name, one more date, will be stored up in vivid remembrance.
The image of a statue or monument, frequently passed by the
school-boy, will sink with many associations deeply into his
heart, so that the busiest life of later periods will not make it
vanish again. A public monument honors those who erected
it.  In viewing it we feel that a debt of gratitude in some
manner is paid; we feel that we live in a community sensible
to worth, merit, nobleness of action, and willing to acknowledge them.  To the active, monuments are incentives: no
Boston school-boy feels the worse for having viewed Chantrey's
statue of Washington, and if he could view in his early dreams
another of Hancock it would not harm him. A column has
been erected to Walter Scott in Glasgow, with the inscrip   VOL. II.                   4
49 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
tion, "that it may record their [the citizens of Glasgow] admiration of his genius, their deep sense of the honor which his
name reflects on his country, and their gratitude for the delight
which they have received from his writings." A statue of
Fulton, with some similarly appropriate inscription, in some
conspicuous landing-place at New York, would be a just
tribute, harm no one, and do good to many. The lion erected
at Thermopylae in honor of Leonidas must have told a pregnant story to many a Greek. Monuments show and testify
palpably and strikingly that society is not always occupied
with material interests alone, but allows the nobler sentiments
their proper sphere. Whoever can view Westminster, or the
Pantheon in Paris, without stirring feeling, must be without
sympathy for anything great; whoever can believe that those
places do not exercise their moral and inciting influence, not
only on those who visit them but on the nation at large, cannot be acquainted with the human heart. By monuments we
take the fine arts, one of the choice flowers of civilization, into
public service, and in turn promote them; and society is
deeply interested in their promotion. They humanize, soften,
and refine, and at the same time elevate the standard of taste,
one of the most efficient agents of national industry.' Bacon
says, "Imo citra omnem controversiam, artes emolliunt mores,
teneros reddunt, sequaces, cereos, et ad mandata imperii ductiles: ignorantia contra, contumaces, refractories, seditiosos:
quod ex historia clarissime potet, quandoquidem tempora
maxime indocta, inculta, barbara, tumultibus, seditionibus,
mutationibusque maxime obnoxia fuerint."2
The expense of money for monuments or other works of
art is one of the most common objections against them. If
money is spent in erecting them, and objects of more press
On this subject I have given my views more fully in the Report on Girard
College.
Repeatedly has the vast usefulness of diffused taste and pleasure in the fine
arts, with reference to industry, and the duty of governments to promote them as
far as in them lies, been amply acknowledged in the British parliament.
2 De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarutm, lib. i.
50 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
ing necessity are neglected, it is of course folly, in this as in
any other case, to attend to the less important in preference
to the more important. On the other hand, if there are sufficient means for both,-and judiciously managed means may
effect much,-it must not be forgotten that money laid out
in anything which promotes essential civilization promotes
thereby, directly or indirectly, harmony of thought and feeling, and peace among individuals, security, intercommunion,
and the standard of social life and comfort; and thus not only
is the value of exchangeable articles enhanced, but civilization
imprints, with every progress, the character of exchangeableness upon things, performances, and various species of skill
and labor, which without it remain without any exchangeable value. We have but to look around us, and every day
will furnish us with numerous examples. We must never
forget that taste forms an essential ingredient of national industry no less than necessity; that the wants of civilization,
upon which all industry is founded, consist as really in the
wants of taste as of necessity. If the leading motives to industry are wants and security, both are more or less directly
promoted in part by the cultivation of the fine arts.
Monuments promote-who would seriously deny it?glowing patriotism. Whatever is good or great it is well to
impress symbolically and compactly on the mind. It is not
because we are of a gross nature that we require this; it is
because concentrated signs and forms make concentrated impressions. The badge of office makes a sudden, palpable impression. No German passing through Wittenberg requires to
be reminded that this is the place where Luther lived, fought,
and died; his mind will be filled with recollections and reflections. Still, the iron statue of the Reformer at that place will
contribute to present still more vividly the man and the period
which affected his country so deeply and lastingly. Few men
who travel to the battle-field of Luitzen will stand in need of
being reminded that there Gustavus Adolphus fell. Yet is
there a great difference between this general reminiscence of
history, and the ideas which crowd upon the mind when we
5 I 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
sit down near the stone which marks the spot where the great
man fell, or when we see the spot in the town-house of Luitzen
which to this day exhibits the floor marked by the blood of
the expiring king.   It was a praiseworthy custom of the
Romans to deposit the ashes of their distinguished men in
suitable tombs near the high-roads. In travelling along between rows of sepulchres a man was reading the annals of the
great state written in deeply impressive symbols.
It shows no grossness if we love to admire the wisdom of
God in the wonderful construction of a small insect's wing
and make it thus a symbol of his vast power. So it is not
gross when we present great deeds, illustrious men, or periods
to which we owe what we are, symbolically in form and shape,
by monuments or statues, and when the ingenuity of men is
employed to find fit forms delicately to express complicated
actions or characters, the spirit of exalted periods, or the
sentiments of the founders of states.
But have not monuments been greatly abused? Has not
repulsive flattery often erected them? So has religion, so has
everything of any general interest to men, been abused. Nor
is the love of the fine arts an infallible indication of elevation
of the soul. It is not-an unfrequent phenomenon that peculiarly corrupt natures, even cruel to excess, have a strong
tendency to sentimental emotions, and please themselves  in
them;' but would these enormities be seriously urged against
the general influence of the fine arts, if, as is always made a
condition, other important objects are not neglected, and the
object is the erection of patriotic monuments?  Let it be
adopted as a rule that\no statue shall ever be erected to a
living person, but only after the survivors or posterity have
pronounced upon the merit, as the censors used to give their
judgment upon the doges of Venice after their decease. If,
Several Roman emperors are striking instances. In I830, a woman, Miargaret Gottfried, was executed for having successively poisoned more than thlirty
people, and to her last day she liked sentimental emotions and would at times cry
at the recital of poems.  See her Biography, published by her counsel, Bremen,e
I831.
52 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
however, monuments do exist, it is a sacred duty of the citizen
to preserve them inviolate, and to bring up the young with a
fear of falling into the vandalism of injuring public property
in them or in any other shape.
LV. There is a general duty and consequent virtue of the
last importance, which for want of a better term we may call
the virtue of attention, comprehending therein observation and
reflection upon what has been observed. We have seen that
the intellect forms an ingredient of man's ethical character,
and that the human race constitutes a continuous society, collecting and transmitting knowledge and improving by experience. The animals, "quae natura prona atque ventri obedientia finxit," I have but a limited degree of observation; man's
erect posture, "his eyes turned towards heaven," no more
indicate his destiny, as the ancients said, than his duty of free
observation around him. We cannot learn and reflect without
observing the phenomena around us, and our mind, like our
eyes, remains dull and unable to distinguish, if not trained by
practice. Observation and attention do not mean a hasty and
fretful curiosity, undirected by a concentrated and composed
mind which glances at the surface without receiving a lasting
impression-mere craving for news and change;  but they
mean that attention which is the effect of a desire to know
the elements of things or principles of phenomena, and their
mutual connection with and bearing upon one another-the
truth of things, their essential character. Every experience or
observation, without it, is shallow and unsound, and propriety,
judiciousness, wisdom, and even that primary virtue, justice,
depend essentially upon this attention. If we pay the slightest
attention to the subject, we shall find that every man is successful in his sphere, from the humblest to the most elevated,
useful to his neighbors, and efficient in his calling, in the
same degree as he unites with a peculiar skill or talent for his
specific calling a knowledge of his subject which is the fruit
I Sallust, Bell. Catilin., i.
5 3 
POLITICAL ETICS.
of patient attention to its primary elements and agents alone.
We receive no proper knowledge of a tree by satisfying ourselves with a general view of its outward size and bulk. To
know it thoroughly we must examine, among other things, a
fibre under the microscope. We are cheered in our attention
when by closely observing one fibre we gain the knowledge
of millions of fibres of the same class.
Those men who may be considered the leaders of mankind,
the philosophical minds,-by which I mean all who with a
philosophical, that is accurate, analyzing, and comprehensive,
mind, examine and grasp their subject, historians, rulers or
statesmen, poets, artists, and moral teachers,-will be found
to have influenced society so far as and no farther than they
combined with a native activity of mind a penetration of reality
around them, a comprehension of the nature and operation of
the elements or integrant parts of society and all its relations
and conditions, and discarded wayward or arbitrary fancy.'
In this as in so many other respects the ancients ought to
serve us as models. Their laws as well as their literature show
in an eminent degree, which cannot be sufficiently weighed by
us, their clear and lively perception and keen penetration of
the real state of things.2 In this alone lies the advantage of
experience, in this the power of the school of misfortune. They
I [Polybius has a fine passage (ix. 22) in speaking of Hannibal. Dr. Lieber
cites the passage in his manuscript notes.  "So truly great and wonderful is a
man and a soul properly fitted according to the original constitution of its nature
to any human work to which it may bend its efforts."]
2 I have elsewhere spoken of our obligation not to lose by negligence what
has been gained at earlier periods and under more fortunate circumstances for a
particular subject, but perhaps at great expense to society or under totally different circumstances, which it is not in our power to bring back, or not right
for us if we could.   Christianity and modern civilization have very materially
changed the relation in which the individual stands with the world. We have a
world within, with which we strive to bring the outer world in connection and
harmony. The real world was the problem of the ancients. We ought surely
not to return to their view, but are in duty bound to learn whatever good may
have been produced by it without paying the same price. We theorize too eas'ly;
we start from ideas and carry them over into the material world: the arncints
started from thefact, the object without.
54 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
force knowledge and penetration of reality upon us; if they
do not succeed in doing this, they have no improving effect,
as we may frequently observe with persons of a dull mind.
The necessity of observation, which Bacon so urgently and
solemnly presses upon the student of nature," is no greater for
him, not even as great as for the student of men and society.
Many sufferings and misfortunes have afflicted. mankind because their rulers or legislators perceived the important phenomena of society outwardly only, and did not penetrate to the
component parts and to their principle of action and mutual
relation to one another. Frederic the Great acknowledged
that as an administrator of a realm he had gained invaluable
knowledge when his father obliged him to act the part of a
subaltern officer in one of the administrative courts at Cuistrin.
He there studied the fibres, the first and last operation of the
agents of society, those minute elements which make up the
bulk of what we call society or state; he became acquainted
with the action of laws, not only with their words. The
essence of a law does not lie in what its words decree, but in
the effect which they have upon the given state of things.
Nor is it difficult to perceive by perusing the letters and biography of Niebuhr, alluded to before, how that historian was
enabled shrewdly to unravel some of the most perplexing
questions in Roman history, and to penetrate Roman and past
reality, by his constant attention to present reality around him,
by never sneering at any knowledge, however humble in appearance, provided it led him to perceive the connection of
things. His knowledge of the various relations of the soil to
its owners in his native country alone gave him an important
key to the corresponding relations with the Romans. So
Gibbon, in his Miscellaneous WTorks (vol. i. p. I36, ed. 1814),
says of himself, "My principal obligation to the militia was
the making me an Englishman and a soldier. In this peaceful
service I imbibed the rudiments of the language and science
of tactics, which opened a new field of study and observation.
Novumn Organum.
55 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
The discipline and evolutions of a modern battalion gave me
a clearer notion of the phalanx and the legion; and the cap tain of the Hampshire grenadiers (the reader may smile) has
not been useless to the historian of the Empire."
It is painful indeed to observe how many persons walk
through life with an obtuse mind and dull eye and yet do not
feel prevented from boldly pronouncing their opinion upon
all occasions. Many persons are not struck either by the
characteristic form or even the color of things, and when
they have to give an account it is undefined, unsatisfactory,
erroneous, or exaggerated, one way or the other. The most
delicate phenomenon in nature, the surprising and admirable
connection of a chain of'causes and effects, agents of awful
simplicity and magnitude, can be laid before them without
eliciting their inquiry. Nothing which constitutes the framework of society and gives it its peculiar character attracts
them: they do not ask in what relation the tiller of the ground
stands to the owner of the soil; how the taxes are decreed,
assessed, and levied; what are the pastimes of the people;
how often they eat meat in a week; what their standard of
comfort, their habits of cleanliness are; in what relation their
religion stands to their morality or practical life; whether the
people read or not, and'what. Still less do they inquire into
the most important institutions, and how they became such.
They never look, as Bacon calls it, "abroad into universality."
Without this attention we insulate our mind, or the things
which may happen to interest us, and cannot see them in their
connection, that is in their truth.
LVI. This duty of attention, enjoined upon man because
he has received reflective faculties and has the general obligation of truth in all its bearings, is of singular importance
in politics, for every one who has to act; hence in free countries for all citizens. The virtue of attention is one of those
which require most practice; it cannot begin too early. Whatever we see or hear we ought to try to understand, attempt at
least to learn its connection; of a word, term, thing, institu
56 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
tioii, person, or event, its peculiar character, meaning, history, elements, and causes. A single set of casters on our
dining-table, if viewed in all their connections, may teach a
vast lesson of political economy, geography, and civilization.
We ought not to read the name of a place without combining
the idea of its situation with it, or of a law without that of its
operation. We thus not only acquire the knowledge of the
thing itself, but our horizon expands, one species of knowledge
supports others in our mind, our intellect acquires the proper
classification of things-a fixed frame-work for further acquisition; it gains clearness and retentiveness, and above all we
learn to see things more and more in their true light and
bearing, and as our knowledge becomes firmer, truer, and
more substantial, we enable ourselves to become juster, and
are less exposed to be swayed by casualties or impulses which
originally mnay not have been bad.  The judgment of some
men upon the whole English revolution has been swayed by
the exclamation of James II. when he returned to London
and found that Princess Anne had fled: "Good God, my child
too has left me!" He who can read this without emotion
must have a hard heart; but so natural an exclamation of the
afflicted father will weigh very little with him who views the
infatuated king in his whole connection with the country over
which he so injudiciously ruled. Hardly had the world ceased
to applaud the French for manfully resisting a criminal executive outrage, when many not only lavished their sympathy
upon the duchess of Berry for attempting to raise a civil
war, and in their admiration of her spirited conduct forgot
her licentious course of life but actually turned their feeling
against Louis Philippe. It may be hard for the duke of Bordeaux to be deprived of a throne, but if we view him in his
whole connection we may not find reason to wish him back
in the Tuileries.
LVII. We must gather experience: without it no man
would be wiser at forty than he was at fifteen, nor England be
safer after her Protestant settlement, with its various organic
57 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
laws, than she was under Charles II. But what is experience?
It is not the mere witnessing or going through the perils or
drudgery of a thing, nor the bare knowledge that a fact has
happened. It is the knowledge we derive by reflection upon
that which happens. Men may pass through a variety of
scenes without gathering any experience, as an obstinate
physician may kill hundreds by the same physic in the same
cases, because he refuses to reflect upon what he witnesses.
Attention, therefore, to what we witness, see, or learn, constitutes an ingredient of experience, and this experience may be
personal or not, that is, we may see with our own eyes or not,
perceive with our own senses or not. This distinction, however,
is far less definite than is generally supposed. For if personal
experience relates to effects upon my own senses or person
alone, it is necessarily extremely limited. If we extend its
meaning, and would comprehend within it what has happened
at our own times, the distinction becomes arbitrary; for we
may or may not know an event of our own times more
thoroughly than one of past periods. It is the certainty of
knowledge which is important, and this may at times be
much greater when we were not present at an event than
when we were. Experience, true knowledge, a just view of
the things and relations among which we live, or whatever
we may call it, demand of every citizen two things, that he
know the society he lives in as thoroughly as with his means
he is able to do, and, in order to do it, that he know the history of its growth and of the development of its character (its
generic history).
There is an absolute duty of the citizen to make himself
acquainted with the history of his country, for, whatever it is,
it did not spring forth yesterday, but it became such gradually, and the institutions which surround the citizen, which
form the essence of his government, are not known from their
casual appearance as it may strike him at first glance, but
from their operation, which is but their history; nor can we
possibly know whither they tend, and whether they work
good or evil, without knowing the causes from which they
58 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
sprang, and the mode in which they have operated. Besides,
no genuine and firm patriotism is possible without its receiving aliment from the knowledge of our institutions, the
history of our country. Without it we shall feel and act as
selfish insulated ephemerals-" sojourners in our country, not
citizens," as Sismondi expressed it. Cicero very truly compares those who do not know history to children, because
they are deprived of experience. To rule or legislate for one's
country, one must know it; to know it, one must study it; but
our country is not these few millions who happen to be alive at
this precise moment, nor this land on which they stand, which
they cultivate-but our country, patria, is this land, with all
the relations subsisting between it and the dwellers upon it,
their institutions, their growth and history. "In it alone can
the citizen study his obligations and rights,", which he really
enjoys and ought carefully to preserve, and transmit inviolate
to his children; through it alone he can learn how to appreciate what is good in it, and discover what requires amending,
and how it ought to be amended.
A nation does not live an equally active and productive life
at once in all spheres.  A variety of circumstances must combine in order to produce a period in which, by the united
activity of many, a certain branch, a certain institution, a certain part of the public law, will be cultivated with peculiar
felicity and effect. General attention is directed with peculiar
intensity to one or the other subject; many of the most gifted
minds being-engaged in the same pursuit or animated by the
same idea propel one another in their common or similar career; one discovery leads to another; while the public, being
influenced by the same spirit and common circumstances, incite and reward by their interest the peculiar votaries of that
branch which is the flourishing one of the times, and at the
same time public opinion, keen as to this branch, acquires
tact and taste, and modifies what may be extravagant or retards what may be over-zealous in those who give their whole
I Jovellanos, Complete Works, Madrid, I830, vol. ii. p. 43$.
59 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
mind to that particular subject. Thus are produced what I
have called on another occasion the classical periods of these
peculiar branches., It is thus in literature and the arts, in law
and politics. If, then, we do not study history, and try faithfully to learn in what persons have excelled, what are the results of a specific branch in its own classical age or in the
period in which it was cultivated with success, when by fortunate circumstances the public mind was rendered peculiarly
sensitive respecting it, we neglect the true fruits of civilization
and disregard one of the most solemn duties of man as a social being; that is, as a being who is not only called upon to
live in social relations with the living, but who owes his social,
his human relation to the continuity of society and is socially
connected with past generations-that he is a social being not
only within the limits of his generation, but also by a lineal
connection with the past generations,  through  influences
derived from them, and with the future generations, by influencing them. In order, therefore, that man may know his
true position, he must understand the past likewise. This is
the solemn and sacred character of history. 
If we do not train our minds in duly finding and appreciating the elements of phenomena around us, we shall be
unguarded against that fault in reasoning to which all men,
without exception, are but too liable, namely, the mistaking
of the co-existence of two things for a sufficient proof that
they stand in the relation of cause and effect-a fault which
has produced very grave evils in politics. Nothing is more
common than that public men or an administration are
charged with the evils under which the country happens to
suffer, merely because those men happen to be at the helm,
although there may be no more connection between the two
than between a general epidemic and the administration at
the time. If we do not learn to discover the elements of the
phenomena around us, we shall continually fall into that
grave error which has convulsed large nations, namely, the
I I have dwelt upon this subject at some length in the Hermeneutics.
6o 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
mistaking of great social evils for merely political evils; for
a remedy of which we seek, therefore, in a change of laws
or institutions, while the seat of the disease is in a totally
different region, and the cure must, consequently, come from
different remedies.
As to the general duty of attention to the present society
and times, in and through which we are what we are, I wish
to add only that, since we do no longer assemble in the market, and our states have become extensive political societies,
and since, at the same time, printing has become so powerful
and active an agent of transmitting knowledge and thoughts,
it is our duty not to slight those vehicles which bring us
information of the daily occurrences of life, near and far,
important and trivial, cheering and saddening-in short, of
life such as it is.  It is the duty of a free citizen to read
attentively some newspapers. Without it he lives in the dark
as an Athenian would have done who had not visited the
agora.   We seize with avidity upon  the letters written in
past periods, even the gossiping ones, because they bear the
imprint and breathe the spirit of the period in which they were
penned.  Newspapers are letters.  It indicates, in my opinion,
very little knowledge of our whole human character and calling, if persons, as I have actually found some, assert with
superciliousness that they never look at a paper. Let the
newspapers of some countries differ ever so far from what
they ought to be, or the feeling of hauteur at the society
around those persons be ever so great, still the papers are the
channel through which alone a mass of the most important
knowledge respecting our society can be obtained, and the
country remains the society in which we live and to which
our sympathies ought to belong. The noblest and the worst
things may happen, and to penetrate reality we ought to
know both. A Ross may return from his three years' expedition and be received by the people of Hull in a manner
which reminded the public of the reception of Columbus after
his first voyage public defalcations may be discovered, improvements of all sorts may  talke place; crimes or noble
6i 
POLITICAL. STHICS.
deeds may be performed, or portentous signs foreboding evil
may show themselves, without ever being noticed by so negligent a citizen. Only let us read the papers attentively, and
not merely to fill vacant time. The gradual enlargement of
knowledge by a serious and regular newspaper reading, with
the proper aid of books of reference, is very great, and-it
ought to be observed, especially for the young-there is much
knowledge of details irretrievably lost, knowledge perhaps of
great importance at some future period, when unexpectedly we
may greatly need to possess it, in the sweeping course of the
news of the European race, if we do not store it up gradually
as it is offered, and endeavor to keep on a level with facts and
events in the political as well as scientific life of the civilized
nations. This species of acquiring knowledge can be abused,
.ike everything else. As to the importance and duties of
editors, they will be touched upon farther below.
62 
CHAPTER VI.
Continency.-Political Evils of Incontinency; of Prostitution.-The primary
Foundation of Society, the Family, is undermined by it.-Evils of general In continency in the highest Classes, and the lowest.-Religion.-Its Univer sality.-Its importance for Morality; for Society; for the State.-Fanaticism.
-Fanaticism of any kind.-Religious Fanaticism.-The Bible.-Revelation.
-Both exclusively religious.-Persecution.-Direct and indirect Persecution.
-Political and social Persecution.-Hypocrisy and Desecration of Religion.
-Regulation of political or social actions by Tenets.
LVIII. CONTINENCy, a virtue demanded by all moral systems and purer religions, is a moral element of great importance in a civil point of view. The legislators of all times have
acknowledged it, both by the direct support and countenance
given to lawful marriage and well-constituted families, and
the serious discountenance given to prostitution, from ancient
times to modern. Hardly had the attempt been made during
the first French revolution to pronounce by law that dissolution of some of the most elementary ties of human society,
which had been eating itself into its vitals for upwards of two
centuries, when, on the simple ground of public necessity,
many of the violent political fanatics petitioned for legislative
repression of universal profligacy, or, placed in authority,
urgently recommended measures of the kind., It is not only
I Some of these reports are contained in a work of the saddest, indeed, but
also the deepest interest for every reflecting man who studies human society with
that earnestness and truthfulness which is anxious to know the real state of things
and society in all its elements, not shuddering or averting the face from truth
and fact, even though it be loathsomely hideous, as no physician allows himself
to be repelled by the most sickening suffering, or, if he does, is a worthless
votary of the healing art.   I allude to the work  De la Prostitution dans la
Ville de Paris, considerle sous le Rapport de l'Hygiene publique, de la Morale
et de l'Administration, etc., par A. I. B. Parent-Duchatelet, Paris, 2d ed., I837,
2 vols. 8vo.  It is a work of the first importance to the moralist, philosopher,
63 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
because prostitution at large is invariably coupled with crime
that it becomes so dangerous to the state, as the experience
of all periods and all nations, ancient and modern, without
exception, proves that general incontinency becomes a dangerous political vice. There is another reason, and, in my
opinion, of much greater import still. We have seen how indispensable the family is for civilization as well as virtue; we
called it the hearth of the best traits of man, of virtue, of generosity, of patriotism. We have seen that monogamy is justly
considered as one of the most important elements, perhaps
the most important'of all to which Europe owes her early
and great superiority over the Eastern world, where yet civilization was of much earlier date.  If we carefully examine
Roman history, I believe no one can fail to observe that a
very great part of all that we feel ourselves bound to admire
in it, the great power which the word law acquired in that
city, and that peculiar trait in her politics which we may call
Roman steadiness, was owing to the early acknowledgment of
the family in its sacredness, and  the consequent esteem of
womankind, especially of wives and mothers-the high character which the Roman attributed to the matron, who therefore stands prominent in their history from an early period,
some of the traditions of which are mixed with fiction, but
which nevertheless prove, even in this shape, the state of national feeling.  We shall return to this subject when we treat
of Woman. In the middle ages, and especially in that period
which more particularly is designated as the age of chivalry,
few things served to restrain the lawlessness of the times, in
some degree at least, more effectually than the rising esteem
of woman, extravagant and distorted as even this feeling generally was, or however extravagant the views of many persons to this day respecting the universal purity of this feeling
at those times may be. It is a fact that it formned one of
politician, criminalist, and statistician, to every one who studies man considered
individually or socially, and gives a deep insight into one of the darkest, lowest
sinks of vice, avarice, and crime.
64 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
the essential points from which modern civilization started
anew."
LIX. If the family, however, is so important, it is evident
that continency, its very support and life-blood, is so likewise.
The former cannot exist in its purity and in that solidity which
is necessary to make it a substantial element of political welfare, without the latter, without the purity of woman. Yet
this does not exhibit the whole importance of continency. So
soon as continency is generally disregarded or slighted, selfishness will likewise become general, because families are not
formed-that circle where disinterestedness is fostered most,
-and the more lasting connection between the two sexes, if
formed, is founded upon selfish gratification only; the claims
of children upon their parents for education, the pride of
parents in their children, that they may do honor to the
name, is weakened or entirely destroyed; and woman sinks
from the position of a companion to the father and an honored
mother to the offspring, to a mere means of gratification.  In
short, the first principle from which civilization starts, and
that from which at all periods it draws the most substantial
support, is undermined.  There are four different impulses
which, more than any others, prompt man to generous actions,
elevate him above the calculation of interest, and imbue his
soul with those motives without which utility and expediency
would remain as the only causes and prompters of action:
these four are religion, love, patriotism, and the feeling of
justice.  Love, that peculiar sympathy between men, and
which we have considered in friendship, one of its prominent
manifestations, is intensest and most general in the sympathy
which exists between the two sexes, so much so that the poets
of all ages have been naturally led to it, as the surest means
to excite interest on the largest scale. That disinterested
spirit of love, which is often called the romantic spirit, has
I Hallam's History of the Middle Ages, mentioned here, out of so many others,
only on account of its greater accessibility to most readers.
VOL. II.                           5
65 
POLITICAL ETIlCS.
not unfrequently led to extravagances, errors, sometimes to
vices and crimes; yet this is only because it is so general, and
if it were blotted out from the human heart it would scarcely
be possible to keep human society together, aside from the
extinction of many of the noblest exertions.   But general
profligacy does extinguish it, and we find therefore that at all
times those classes which are not touched by public opinion,
and give themselves up to libertinism, which become callous
and selfish, disavow the obligations of continency and of family
life, and in doing so become dead to many of the most sacred
calls of morality, are of extreme danger to the whole commonwealth; whether such a class be in the social scale at the
head, as the libertine nobility in France, England, and several
other countries in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
or at the bottom of that scale, as the poorest classes are at
present, in England, for instance, and several other highlypeopled countries.' Whether squalid wretchedness or arrogant profligacy deaden the power of public opinion, the effect
and the danger, though not the same, are equally great, with
this difference, perhaps, that the wretched may still be coerced
by a strong government into submission to the laws in some
degree, while the others soon may become daring rebels
against the most sacred interests of society, having necessarily
a considerable part of authority and power in their own hands.
In this respect, too, the history of Roman dissoluteness furnishes us with admonishing facts and experience. There were
many reasons why France could not remain without a deeply
penetrating revolution but one of them will always be found
I I refer here to the various Reports of the Poor Laws Commissions to Parliamelt since the whigs have formed the administration.  The work I have used
in particular is the Report from  the Commissioners for inquirillng into the Administration and practical Operation of the Poor Laws, published by Authority,
London, I834.  Several works of value have been published by private individuals on subjects connected with the above, for instance, "The Manufacturing
Population of England, its Moral, Social, and Physical Conditions," etc., by P.
Gaskill, ILondon, I833. Some of the first British political economists have likewise written on the subject; nor can Malthus on Population be forgotten here
where we speak of the effect of general unchastity in a political point of view.
66 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
to have consisted in the profligacy and shamelessness of a
very large part of the higher classes, which made even Burke
give so sad and contemptible a picture of the French nobility
before the revolution, so much more dangerous, though probably not in itself greater, than that of the court of Charles II.
and James II., because it had lasted longer and settled down
far more into a certain code and system.
LX. Society is deeply interested in religion. If we comprehend within this term all belief, true or erroneous, in an
agent or agents overruling the actions and destinies of men,
possessed of a power surpassing human power, which extends
to the changes in the physical world, we shall find that men
have never existed without some religion, whether it be in the
form of the grossest fetish religion, adoring bodies which do
not even represent real or imagined animate beings, or polytheism, or monotheism. The consciousness of our dependence and of the great limitation of our power, fear or hope,
desire of superior aid, or a longing for support and comfort
in adversity, which every man feels that he himself or his
fellow-man are incapable of affording, has invariably led man
to acknowledge a superior agency of some sort or other.
Man has always adored. If, therefore, there were no other
reason why we should promote pure religion-and there are
many indeed-this would be a strong one, that man will not
and cannot live without some religion, of whatever character;
and if he has not a true one he will embrace a false one; if
he has not belief or a pure faith he will resort to superstition,
x The historical memoirs, a branch of literature so peculiar to France, furnish
most melancholy proofs of the enormous height to which unchlastity as a social and
political evil had risen in that country. Quite lately a new contribution to this
history of vice has been made in the Memoirs of the Duchess of Nevers from
17I3 to I793.  We  can hardly trust our eyes when we  read the attending circumstances of the well-known fact that Cardinal  Fleury, prime minister of
France, was the person who deliberately seduced the then young monarch, Louis
XXV., still attached to his wife, to adopt the countess du Mailly as his mistress,
and thus began a career of vice which  during a long reign extended its fatal
influence over a country doomed to the greatest sufferings.
67 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
or rather his heart will naturally engender it. But if a religion
acknowledges a God "who is of purer eyes than to behold
iniquity," who is love and all-pure, it needs no farther discussion to show how deeply the whole society is interested in
maintaining the diffusion of such a faith, which affords the
two most powerful agents of morality, namely, on the one
hand, the mental communion with a being who is purity himself, and, being omniscient, does not judge by signs or outward actions but searches the motives in the deepest recesses
of our heart, and who, being almighty, affords support to all
who seek it in purity from him; and on the other hand, the
belief in the immortality of the soul. It extends at once the
whole sphere of action; its effects and tests go beyond the
mere calculation of expediency, and thus the belief must
needs become the most powerful primitive impulse to good
action, uprightness, disinterestedness, kindness, love of truth,
and admiration of what is truly good, beautiful, noble, and
great.
The promotion of religion in a community takes place
chiefly by instruction in the family, and by that society which
is founded upon the principle of religion, called the church.
It belongs to the province of natural law to inquire whether
the state as such, that is the jural society of men, has the
right, and, under certain circumstances, the duty, to support that particular ecclesiastical society or church which is
founded upon the religion professed by all members of the
state or the majority, and to exercise a supervising or regulating authority over all the religions professed by the various
members of the state. But to the science of politics proper
it belongs to discuss those means which may be best warranted by experience as well as by principles of strict right to
carry out that supervision or direct promotion, should it be
found either that it is necessary or right; in short, to discuss
the important subject of how far any connection between
church and state can or ought to subsist, for instance as in
England, where the established church has, in some respects,
a political form and substance, or as in France, where the
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POLITICAL E7HICS.
churches of the various denominations are supported by the
state, but otherwise distinctly separate from it, since the revolution of I830. WVe have already seen, in the first volume,
that in no case whatever has the state the right to interfere
with the religious belief of the individual, that is with his relation and communion with his Maker. A few remarks on
religion will be added when we shall come to treat of education. In political ethics one of the subjects connected with
religion, which claims especially our attention, appears to me
to be fanaticism.
LXI. By a fanatic we understand an individual who is actuated by a false zeal for some general principle or truth, real
or supposed, so far that he commits wrong.  A bigot is, in the
attachment to what he holds to be true, illiberal and narrowminded to those who think differently. Fanaticism includes
bigotry, but the bigot need not be a fanatic. The falseness of
the zeal in the fanatic may consist in the excess of its degree,
or a zeal for something wrong of itself, or in the fact that the
zeal and fervor of the individual nislead him to carry principles and standards of action into spheres which ought to
remain entirely foreign to them. It was fanatical when a revived spirit of religion, after papacy had sunk lowest, carried
some popes to the destruction of ancient works of art; it
was fanatical when the admiration of the fine arts in antiquity
induced people to write against Christianity. I believe that
according to common adaptation the word fanatic always implies action injurious to others, especially persecution, or to
ourselves (as persons have crucified themselves), while the
word enthusiast, perhaps, denotes only the excess of zeal. So
long as the two musical schools in Paris at the time of Rousseau carried their zeal only to an excess of love of music,
forgetting in their ardor many important duties, we would call
them musical enthusiasts; but when they began to injure one
another, I believe we must call them musical fanatics. It is
very clear that the enthusiast will in most cases be ready, if
opportunity offers, to become a fanatic.
69 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
As the zeal with which we are animated for the prosecution
of anything may degenerate into excess, so there may be
fanaticism in the pursuit of any truth or principle, real or
pretended. The Nominalists and Realists in the middle ages
became actual fanatics in their philosophical zeal. So there
have been frequently political fanatics, who have persecuted
one another for the sake of political principles or truths, and
all party excitements are liable to the danger of political
fanaticism. Indeed, whenever we forget the aim, and in excessive zeal mistake the means to obtain the aim for the aim
itself-the very general error of which I have spoken already
-we are close upon the limit where fanaticism begins.  Anything engaging the zeal of men may degenerate, I repeat, into
enthusiasm, as the innocent love of flowers did at one time
degenerate into the actually disastrous tulipomania; and so
soon as enthusiasm acts injuriously to others, by blinding men
to their due interest or inciting to injustice and persecution, it
is fanaticism. I remember an instance when a juryman could
not be persuaded by his eleven fellows to agree to a verdict of
guilty, although the evidence of theft left no doubt whatever
of the crime, and finally declared he would not consent to the
verdict, because the prisoner belonged to his own political
party. If this was not on the ground of some sordid interest,
it was, I believe every one will agree, political fanaticism. But
no species of fanaticism has been more common or more disastrous than religious. The reasons are clear. Religion, true
or false, is, as we have seen, one of the most universal principles, and hence its fanaticism is likewise so. All feel interest
in some religion or other; not all in the fine arts or in philosophical systems. As religion occupies itself with the relation
of man to his supreme ruler, men who take a confined view
of religion and of their maker, as all fanatics do, imagine that
religion, with reverence be it spoken, is the peculiar province
of God, and forget that every truth and true principle, for instance justice and its pure administration, is his likewise.
The religious fanatic believes that everything which does not
belong to religion as he imagines it is worthless or the evil
7o 
POLITICAL E TIlCS.
production of man. God willed the state and the relations
of justice among men as much according to his divine intentions as he willed the church. The fact alone that he willed
it is proof of the truth; for in him everything is infinite and
eternal, and in his will every principle is of equal importance.
The struggle of the Catholic church and some other denominationis to supersede the state and make it a mere vassal
of the church was founded upon this erroneous view. The
religious fanatic believes that God is peculiarly honored by
peculiar measures, and therefore proportionably offended by
their omission or opposition. Everything, therefore, in his
opinion, ought to give way to these particular measures, even
justice, which he conceives to be of human origin. Crimes
have been at times committed or palliated because it was blasphemously believed that they were for the promotion of the
cause of God, as if the purest being, and the only all-pure
and all-powerful being, could be served by untruth, or injustice, or impurity; as if his honor could in any way depend
upon the actions of finite and impure beings, and as if there
was any other way of serving him than that of truth and
right. The enthusiast, moreover, has arrived at his views by
processes which are not deducible from reasoning; there is
therefore in him that instinctive and restless fear of unsoundness or of taking offence at others not agreeing with him, as
if their disagreement cast reflection upon his belief-sentiments which, in default of the power of truth, lead to persecution either by way of revenge or propagation of its tenets.
Radical conviction is calm; superficial conviction restless,
heated, angry.'
I,XII. These remarks apply to fanaticism in all religions;
but there are some features peculiar to Christian fanaticism,
arising out of the peculiar character of the Bible, that code on
which the faith of the Christian is founded. The Bible is a
z [Enthusiasm in a good sense is a generous ardor for that which is good, true,
humane. In a somewhat degenerate sense it is ardor disproportionate to the
magnitude of the object. Fanaticism is that one-sided zeal united with hatred.]
7I 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
book composed of various parts, which have a different char acter; it contains inspired truths and revelations, it contains
records of facts, or, in other Words, historical accounts, and the
political laws calculated for a peculiar government, a theocracy
of a particular nation, the Hebrews. To what melancholy
errors and unspeakable sufferings the mistaken impression
has led, that those historical parts which record facts contain, in addition to the truths legitimately drawn from their
aim and purpose, others applicable in totally different spheres,
for instance in science and politics,-how consciences have
been coerced and the purest religion has been degraded into
a handmaid of sordid passions, every one who has but glanced
at history knows well. The whole code of laws destined for
the Jews and adapted to the specific state of their civilization
and to the object to be obtained by that specific theocracy,
has led to fearful fanaticism, applied, as it has been, to objects
for which it was never intended. The Mosaic law of property, of government, of administration of justice, especially
the penal laws, would be subversive of the most sacred interests of society if put in practice in our times, for many of them
are repulsive to the feelings of humanity which have become
developed by the intervening diffusion of Christianity, in consequence of that very civilization which those laws contributed
to bring about.
The Bible has not nullified man's moral or intellectual
character; it contains absolute prescriptions of principles, not
absolute prescriptions of specific actions, such as the officer
for instance receives from his commander.
LXIII. Respecting the inspired parts of the Bible, which
reveal religious truthls, I must remind the reader of what was
said in the first part, of the character of those truths which
Christ taught, namely, that he limited himself strictly to religious truthls. A similar remark applies to the whole Bible.
Two different views may be taken of revelation through the
mouth of man. Either the inspired writer utters words by way
of dictation, or hle pronounces in human language what reve
72 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
lation, a direct communication from the divine to the human
mind, leads the latter to pronounce. The translations of the
Bible into modern languages will somewhat explain the latter
view. They contain the full revelation, yet the words conveying them were not inspired dictation.  Whichever view
may be taken, it appears that the inspiring Spirit did not purpose to stop by this act the course of the development of
mankind, but only to reveal so much as was necessary for
religion; and therefore religious truths only.   The inspired
men were not made divinely omniscient; their minds were
led to promulgate truths, and these alone were inspired.
As they had to deliver their inspiration in human language,
so they remained men of their own times, in all that had no
direct relation to religion, in many of their views respecting
public or domestic government, for instance, the arts, the
sciences, or other branches; and God has allowed other nations far to exceed the Hebrews in very many branches, which
yet are of the highest importance to mankind. The Greeks, for
instance, far excelled the Jews in the fine arts, in composition
and criticism, and'in all the sciences; and it would be no
greater error to seek for the principles of architecture, mathematics, dramatic poetry, or botany, in the Bible, than to derive
an equitable and safe system of justice or the organization of
government for a civilized and free people of our times from
the laws of the Jews. The Bible was not intended to make
men inert copyists. We are destined to exert ourselves, and
to pursue with those powers with which the Creator has benignly endowed us the aims he has prescribed in his wisdom.
Still less are we justified in accusing those of irreligion who
conceive the Bible to be a book of religion, and I believe they
act impiously if they take it as a book of science, politics, or
the arts. There are very strong passages in the works of some
of the Reformers against the abuse of the Bible in using it
for foreign purposes. A modern writer, archbishop Whately,
speaking of the unhallowed attacks which have been made
upon political economy under the cloak of religion, makes
some remarks which agree so well with what I hold to be
73 
PO LITICAL E7HICS.
true that I shall be excused for subjoining an extract firom
them.' Who would doubt but that by the revelation of a few
" CC Till the advocates of Christianity shall have become universally much better acquainted with the true character of their religion than universally they have
ever yet been, we must always expect that every branch of study, every scientific
theory that is brought into notice, will be assailed on religious grounds, by those
who either have not studied the subject, or who are incompetent judges of it; or,
again, who are addressing themselves to such persons as are so circumstanced,
and wish to excite and to take advantage of the passions of the ignorant.' Flectere si nequeo Superos, Acheronta movebo.'
"Some there are who sincerely believe that the Scriptures contain revelations
of truths the most distinct from religion. Such persons procured accordingly a
formal condemnation (very lately rescinded) of the theory of the earth's motion,
as at variance with Scripture.   In Protestant countries, and now, it seems, even
in Popish, this point has been conceded; but that the erroneous principle-that of
appealing to revelation on questions of physical science-has not yet been entirely
cleared away is evident from the objections, which most of you probably may
have heard, to the researches of geology. The objections against astronomy
have been abandoned rather perhaps from its having been made to appear that
the Scripture accounts of the phenomena of the heavens may be reconciled with
the conclusions of science, than from its being understood that Scripture is not
the test by which the conclusions of science are to be tried. And accordingly,
when attention was first called to the researches of geology, many who were
startled at the novelty of some of the conclusions drawn, and yet were averse to
enter on a new field of study, or found themselves incapable of maintaining many
notions they had been accustomed to acquiesce in, betook themselves at once to
Scripture, and reviled the stfidents of geology as hostile to revelation; in the
same manner as, in pagan and Popish countries, any one who is conscious of
crime or of debt flies at once to the altar and shelters himself in the sanctuary."
... "Historical or physical truths may be established by their own proper
evidence; and this, therefore, is the course we are bound to pursue. The Clhristian will indeed feel antecedently a strong persuasion that such conclusions as I
have been speaking of, or any others which are really inconsistent with the Bible,
never will be established; that any theory seemingly at variance with it will
either be found deficient in evidence, or else reconcilable with the Scriptures.
But it is not a sign of faith-on the contrary, it indicates rather a want of faith,
or else a culpable indolence-to decline meeting any theorist on his own ground,
and to cut short the controversy by an appeal to the authority of Scripture. For if
we really are convinced of the truth of Scripture, and consequently of the falsity of
any theory (of the earth for instance) which is really at variance with it, we must
needs believe that that theory is also at variance with observable phenomena, and
we ought not therefore to shrink from trying that question by an appeal to these.
The success of suchl an appeal will then add to the evidence for the truth of the
Scriptures, instead of burdening them with the weight of defending every point
which they incidentally imply. It is for us to' behave ourselves valiantly for our
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POLITICAL ETHICS.
principles in natural philosophy for instance, or political
economy, many of the gravest errors and much consequent
bloodshed might have been prevented; yet he who did not
choose to reveal these principles and allowed mankind in due
time to find them out must have had his wise ends.  Since
he has denied revelations except on religious truths, we act
irreligiously if we misapply his revelations for ends for which
they were not intended.
The government of the Hebrews was a theocracy, and
everything in it was subservient to this one great object, the
protection of the worship of a single God against contamination, until at length monotheism should cease to be a national
religion and become that of the world. So soon as this moment had arrived, the Hebrew government, solely calculated
for that object, and for the Jews in their then state, lost its
meaning, and it is utterly unfit to be imitated by other
nations, who have to solve totally different problems. It is
just, therefore, to say that no book is less fit to be imitated
in politics than the Old Testament, because no system of
politics has been calculated for so entirely peculiar a state of
things; and yet, since Christ does not touch politics, we find
that at all times fanatics, if they turn for politics to the Bible
at all, will naturally be chiefly attracted by the Old Testament. I have mentioned elsewhere already for what opposite
and often awful political systems and pretensions the Bible
has been abused to serve as a foundation. Catholics and Protestants have equally erred on this subject, and while some
denounced all force and constraint exercised by government,
and preached the most revolting licentiousness, all the time
pretending to rely for every proposition of theirs on the Bible,
Bossuet could write his Polities drawn from the proper words
country and for the cities of our God,' instead of bringing the ark of God into the
field of battle to fight for us.  He will, at all events, we may be sure, defend his
own cause, and finally lay prostrate the Dagon of infidelity, but we, his professed
defenders, more zealous in reality for our own honor than for his, shall deserve to
be smitten before the Philistines."   Lect. ii., Introductory Lectures on Political
Economy, London, 1831.
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POLITICAL ETHICS.
of holy writ, almost entirely in biblical phrases, and yet produce a work in the spirit of his absolute master, Louis XIV.,
and in his own spirit of a careful courtier-prelate to 1such a
master.
LXIV. If we call religious fanaticism all perversion of our
actions by undue application or influence of religious doctrines
in spheres which are not strictly religious, we sh.all be led to
the following truths and rules respecting political and other
social relations:
Persecution is not only irreligious, but there is likewise no
earthly right of using political power and authority for religious persecution, because political power is power arising
out of the state, which is the society of right, and right has
nothing to do with matters of faith.
Persecution, however, though it be not of a political character, may be highly oppressive and yet remain essentially
social. A man may be deprived of his good name, necessary
intercourse or subsistence, by social action, and yet be unable
to use political protection against it. It is one of the worst
species of persecution, because there is no protection against
it.  But lately a very disgraceful instance took place in England. The bishops of Durham and Norwich, having subscribed for a copy of a work written by a Unitarian, were so
loudly and vehemently clamored against by clergymen and
laymen that they believed themselves obliged to write what
cannot be termed other than submissive letters.,   Thus a
x The letter of the bishop of Norwich bears date November I, 7838. The
bishop of Durham had previously written one. Both found it necessary to excuse their subscribing on the ground that they did it on account of politeness
to Mr. Turner, the Unitarian author, according to them a man of unblemished
character and great talent. Requisitions to the archbishop of Canterbury, to
institute an episcopal commission to inquire into the conduct of the two bishops
" in having subscribed to a work intended to promulgate the infidel heresy of
Socinianism," were signed by the clergy of the several dioceses. The epithets
given to the two prelates remind one of the worst and bitterest times of controversy when the church preached and supported the doctrine of divine right and
absolute obedience.  They were called "consecrated culprits," "obscene and
76 
POLITICAL ETHI-C 7S.
theologian would not even be allowed to study all books on
theology. The articles written and the speeches made against
them showed sufficiently the profane hypocrisy and political
rancor against these two prelates, they having been appointed
by the whig administration in power. And this is one of the
necessary consequences of all fanaticism, that it lends aid to
and promotes hypocrisy, and on the other hand seeks for the
proof of essential religion in specific acts, without consideration of their whole bearing, thus making of the most spiritual
and divine things a gross matter of outward signs.
The same must be said of that indirect persecution which
favors, in the mutual dependence of society, persons according to tenets. The danger is invariably that on our own part
we expose ourselves to all the dangers of fanaticism, because
we are carrying by this very means principles of religion into
spheres to which they are alien; for instance, if we decline to
buy from an honest and poor merchant, because he is not of
our sect. And on the other hand we promote hypocrisy and
desecrate religion, because we make tenets the test of actions
and of intercourse which ought to have nothing to do with
them. I know of instances where commercial credit was given
on a recommendation of a minister on strictly so-called religious grounds. Is not this desecration? The only safe rule,
I believe, is this, that we regulate our intercourse of mutual
dependence solely by the honesty, purity, skill, and claims of
flippant pamphleteers," "time-serving remonstrants," "rotten liberals," "hardened criminals," " men at the thought of whom the soul sickens," " liberal andcl
Protean bishops," "loose and lowly priests," "Judases," " perfidious prelates,"
"surpliced traitors," " white-robed ministersof Satan," " pet sons of the devil,"and many more names as disgusting. All these invectives were in articles of tory
papers, which sanctimoniously pretended to write for the true cause of Christ,
and the crown of England, frequently in strains of blasphemous hypocrisy.  Indeed, seeing at the distance, as we did, those articles of virulence and acrimony
garnished with passages from the book of peace and love, we could hardly li)elieve that they belonged to our times. It is the duty of every well-wisher of his
species firmly to look truth in the face, and fix upon evils, if dangerous, without
fear.  It is in this spirit that this note has been written.  Let us all take anl example, an(l call scandal what is scandalous, disgracelful what disgraces, and gloss
nothing over iil fear or sectarian party spirit.
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POLITICAL ETHICS.
dependence in the individual himself. For, the moment that
we direct our daily actions of common intercourse by the
profession of religious tenets, we desecrate religion, and pro mote hypocrisy on the one hand or chilling and ruinous irre ligion on the other.
In doing this we likewise fetter the mind, and prevent free
and conscientious inquiry, and expose ourselves to one of the
most grievous errors, that of hiding the faults or crimes of
those who profess the same tenets with ourselves. The Cath olic orders as well as many Protestant sects have frequently
committed this grave fault of mistaking the means, the uniting
into a sect or church, for the object, truth, religion, active
piety. I have mentioned already the just view of Augustine
on this subject, that it is better that scandal arise than that
truth and justice suffer.  This false spirit is not peculiar to
religious societies; all bodies of men have that esprit du
corps and weakness of shrinking from exposing their fellowmembers; but, as fanaticism always believes that everything
it does or suffers is for the honor of God, so is religious fanaticism peculiarly apt to mislead in this particular.
Of vast danger is religious fanaticism in politics if it seizes
upon free nations and introduces into politics the test of religion-whlich, if this word is applied to large masses and by
way of distinction, means of course the profession of certain
tenets. The state is the jural society, and as conscientious
citizens we have no right to judge by anything but relations
of right. We act unconscientiously if, for instance, in voting
for or against a citizen, we are influenced by other tests than
his uprightness, honesty, capacity, and general fitness for the
particular object.  It is indirect persecution if we are influenced by dogmas, for he has a right to have his own, as we
have ours; we turn the state from its true end, we promote
the mere profession of tenets, that is hypocrisy, and may, for
aught we can calculate, pave the way to open and cruel persecution. The history of the Western and Eastern Empires
after the conversion of Constantine, when dogmas became the
most active elements of politics, and led to indescribable
78 
POLITICAL E7TIICS.
misery and wretchedness, physical and mental, as well as the
many instances of the unfortunate and unhallowed application
of dogmas to politics by both Protestants and Catholics, arising
out of the religious struggle of the times of the Reformation,
ought to be taken as a lesson too grave ever to be disregarded.
I repeat that persecution may be violent, undermining, and
ruinous, without showing itself in bloodshed. It may be
strictly social, and thus may degrade that which is the best of
all things that man can possess-a pure and true religion. The
more a man values his religion and the sacred communion
which the infinite Deity permits a finite individual to hold
with himself, the less he will be apt to desire its desecration
by making his belief a test of'external intercourse with society at large. The more men pretend to intermix politics or
the intercourse arising out of mutual exchange with religion,
the surer we may always be that they are either blinded by
fanaticism or prompted by selfish ends, or, as is most common,
jointly by both.
79 
CHAPTER VII.
Patriotism.-The Patriotism of the Ancients; of the Moderns.-Some have re jected Patriotism.-National Conceit, Pride.-Narirowness of Feeling a Coun terfeit of Patriotisin.-What is true Patriotism?-It is noble and necessary for
Liberty.-Loyalty.-Public Spirit.-What it consists in.-Calamitous Conse quences of a Want of Public Spirit.-Veneration for the Old; Forefathers. How far just, necessary.-When injurious.-The Age of Action utinder Forty;
of Conservatism over Forty.-Do Times grow worse?-When are we more
experienced than our Forefathers?-Stagnation and Heedlessness.
LXV. WE have seen, in the first volume, that with the
ancients the individual, as far as rights were concerned, was
almost absorbed by the state; all they were felt to be they
were in and through the state; and not only was their state
a political institution, but a separate religion, with peculiar
national deities and distinct national dogmas, was closely
interwoven with it. The national religion thus aided in separating the specific state or nation from others-a circumstance
powerfully promoted by another fact.  The Greeks, and after
them the Romans, were so far advanced in civilization beyond
the other tribes known to them that they looked down upon
them as benighted beings of an inferior kind; the stiranger
was a barbarian. In the attachment, therefore, which an ancient felt for his state, in his love of country, his patriotism,
were united and amalgamated nearly all the intensest affections
which animate the human breast-religion, with all the powerful associations of poetry, legends, and mythologic history; the
affection for his kindred tribe and native land, its institutions
and history, its language and literature; and consciousness
of superiority, disdain of foreigners, and hatred when they
became invaders and threatened to smother this superior
civilization. When the Persian attacked the Greek, not only
were his life and property endangered, but his higher- life,
his whole being as an individual, which we believe will last
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POLITICAL ETHICS.
beyond this earthly existence, was in jeopardy. Patriotism,
therefore, comprehended the acme of all virtuous feelings, of
piety, of love of civilization; it was the meridian of man's
most noble existence. Christianity severed religion from the
soil, from earthly citizenship. He was told that religion is
above, beyond the difference of language, color, kindred,
descent, or country. Chivalry arose, and became a tie beyond national affection; the church with its monasteries
became a super-national society, which with its common language, the Latin, with the monastic orders extending over
many political limits and under one common discipline, the
seminaries, mingling the youths of various nations, the pilgrimages to distant lands,, and the frequent emigrations of
priests, produced a common feeling, despite the many feuds
between parts and particles in this European society. Vast
enthusiastic movements, such as the crusades, aided still
more, if not in cementing nations (for the feudal systems prevented this), in extinguishing that form of patriotism which
it had naturally assumed among the ancients. In the course
of time, however, three great historical processes took place
in the European race: first, that which we may call the
nationalization of tribes and governments; France became
gradually one France, Spain one Spain; then the growth of
national languages, poetry, and literature, in opposition to the
Latin, by the rise of nations and great minds among them.
Dante, who dared to sing in "vulgar Italian," and pressed at
once the seal of his genius upon the idiom of the unlettered,
felt still obliged to ask pardon that he did not continue to
compose in Latin, as he had begun, on so sacred a subject as
x' Aimong others, Frederic Riiuhs, in his Mainual of the History of the Middle
Ages, Berlin, I8i6, mentions the pilgrims as one of the means by which mutual
knowledge of one another among the nations of Europe was kept up, a slender
mean-, yet in the absence of other and powerful ones in the darkest periods not
uncldeserving of attention.  I quote from memory, uit believe I am correct as to
the al)ove author. \Whether this be so or not, I consider it a fact that the innumerable pilgrimages, attended with many evil consequences, had also the mentioned
good effect of aiding to keep alive sympathy among  the Western Christian
nations.
VoTL. II.                          6
8 i 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
his was. Finally, the Reformation. This event or process
of civilization broke in many countries the uniting tie of the
church.  But a new common bond had arisen, and was rapidly
increasing in strength, a general pursuit of knowledge, the tie
of common European science, promoting in its turn intercommunication, both mental and, owing to the gradual fusion of
the sciences and arts, physical also, which was still more increased by the greater security caused by the gradual nationalization of states and governments. Sciences naturally lead
to general views; they have, in the main, a strongly cosmopolitan character; and, above all, we have seen that natural
law, that science which treats of the rights of men, flowing
from their nature, of justice, and not merely of positive or historical law, arose, and was and is cultivated by the moderns,
while the Christian religion must.ever continue to exercise a
more and more cosmopolitan character, the more purely it
dwells among men. There was thus no possibility of a return
of patriotism in its ancient manifestation.
LXVI. It was felt and seen that ancient patriotism, heightened to national or state egotism, could no longer exist or be
endured.  "The barriers are broken which severed states and
nations in hostile egotism. One cosmopolitan bond unites at
present all thinking minds, and all the light of this century
may now freely fall upon a new Galileo or Erasmus."I On
the other hand, it was observed how churlish, narrow, unjust,
or even wicked that frequently is which is claimted as patriotism, how directly opposed to truth, how blind in its selfishness.
I do not speak here of clannishness, which is at its height
and extreme perhaps in the Scotchman, and which by the
great painter of his country's customs has been represented, no
doubt in strong yet in true colors, as rising at times beyond
everything, even the fear of final eternal doom;2 nor of the
I Schiller, Inaugural address on: "What is, and for what purpose do we study,
universal hlistory?" first delivered in 1789.  It is contained in his works.
2 Walter Scott depicts this fearful feeling of attachment to the chief of the clan,
family, etc., in Elspeth in "The  Antiquary," etc., especially in chap. xii. vol.
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POLITICAL ETIZICS.
petty and selfish feeling, the utmost extent of which is the
town limit; but I speak of that national egotism which is
blind to truth and callous to justice beyond the nation's frontier, and which has been used for various and opposite evil
ends, so much so that men have not been wanting who not
only looked upon patriotism as beneath a true elevation of
mind, but have actually declaimed against it. A late writer
exclaims, "What misery has not already been caused by the
love of country!  How much has not this counterfeit virtue
excelled all acknowledged vices in wild fury! Is the selfishness of a country less a vice than that of an individual? Does
justice cease to be a virtue so soon as we exercise it towards
a foreign nation? It is a fine species of honor, indeed, which
prohibits us from declaring ourselves against our country
when justice no longer stands by its side!",  If patriotism is
founded upon selfishness, and therefore cannot but lead to injustice, if it tends to blind us against truth, then indeed it is
one of our first and most sacred duties to pluck this rank
ii., in colors wahich every foreigner would certainly consider beyond all possibility,
did he not know that Scott never, probably), gave a wrong account of manners,
national feelings, etc., except from want of knowledge, which in the above character cannot well have been the case.
Louis Borne, a late German writer of much keenness and boldness, who was
obliged to leave Germany and take up his abode at Paris, where he wrote many
a bitter, many a witty, many a true, and many a false thing.  He belonged to a
party, if such it can be calledl, in Germany, who wish to unite their endeavors
with that which gives itself the singular name of la jeune.i)ance, thus raising,
probably for the first time, age into a political party distinction. These parties
seem to think that liberty has yet to be born, and that this new god will be
brought forthl by the union of the two great nations to whom all this procreation
of new liberty seems to have been assigned, the French and the Germans. The
Anglicani tree of liberty, which is an oak of centuries, is thus treatel as if its
mighty branches did not reach already over many countries, and over France and
Germany too.  But I must stop, lest I should make of a note an historical discussion.  As to the above passage, to which this note is appended, I have for the
present to say only that the author is mistaken as to the degree of fanaticism
which has arisen out of patriotism. I know of no fanaticism which has so repea'tedly affected mankind in so great a degree as religious fanaticism.  His
whole argument would thus turn more strongly still against religion were it correct in its conclusion.
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POLITICAL ETHICS.
weed out of our heart. Justice is above all; truth is the only
legitimate sphere of the human mind and soul.
LXVII. If patriotism consisted in national vanity, pride, or
self-sufficiency, which are its counterfeits, and one or the other
of which we meet with in all nations from the Chinese to the
Americans, it should be avoided by every wise man.   But is
it so? does there not exist a real virtue, compatible with
purity of heart and general good will, and which has produced the best effects, which is deeply planted in the human
breast and ought to be most carefully awakened and cultivated? I
Reflecting men have frequently fallen into two serious
errors, of which the one is, indeed, a consequence of the
other.  In seeking for truth, and hence for distinctness and
clearness, they have often conceived that only to be real,
sound, or true which can be established by the calculating or
analyzing understanding, of which the plain end and object,
I To give instances of national vanity would be a task difficult on account of
the difficulty of choice only.  I will merely mention that quite recently I have
met with a passage in a distinguished French work, which speaks of the French
as being at the head of civilization with an assurance which resembles the manner in which Napoleon spoke of "the Great Nation."   In another work, soon
after, I saw it stated that Prussia stands at the head of European civilization.
In an address of a large sect to Queen Victoria, the British nation was called the
greatest on the face of the earth; and that the Americans in their turn are the
first in the world, we may easily find by turning to ally of their endless and innumeralble addresses. Of all the feelings connected with this subject pride is
nevertheless the least evil, while small conceitedness, as we find its prototype in
the last stages of Athenian democracy, is a serious disease without any redeeming quality. It affords a handle to narrow-minded demagogues and unfits the
people for any just or enlarged views and elevated feelings. There are rules ot
good breeding of social intercourse gradually settled by good sense and mutual
regard.  Among these rules it is now universally adopted that gross flattery
shows excessive ill breeding, and is taken rathler as an insult than a complin)ent.
When shall we have our rules of good breeding in politics? When will flat and
gross, dull and cumbrous flattery in a public speaker be taken as an insult l)y his
hearers,-as a young lady would feel grossly offended were we to address speeches
to her which were given as pattern speeches to ladies in works on politeness two
hundred,years ago?
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POLITICAL ETHICS.
the use as well as the origin, can be stated in so many
words; forgetting at once that as finite beings we must begin
to reason from a finite beginning, and that the ultimate object
must be beyond utility, because utility expresses only a ser
viceableness for an object, so that the ultimate object itself
must be good in its own nature. We may show how one
thing serves for another; but we must needs end somewhere,
that is, we must arrive at a final object which is its own
end.,
The second error is that men have been misled to consider
their subject as totally separate and insulated, forgetting that
everywhere there are gradual and connecting transitions between those points where things show themselves in their
fullest and most developed character-transitions which exist
no more between the animal and the plant, for instance, than
between the arts, or institutions, or ideas, as the Useful and
the Ornamental, the Just and the Fair, or anything that is
mental, social, or human.   It is not only sight but necessary,
in order to obtain the clearest possible insight into any subject, first to consider it absolutely, that is in its essentials, by
which it wholly differs from all other things, for which purpose we must examine it when at the highest degree of perfection peculiar to itself. If we omit this, we shall obtain but
indistinct ideas, leading to a thousand erroneous conclusions.
But having done this it is equally important to view the same
subject in all its transitions, through which it is affiliated and
joined, in the various directions, to other things. By doing
this we can alone discover its position and bearing. As an
instance I will take the courts of justice. They have to administer justice, they have to do with right. This is the
characteristic of this institution. The opposite extreme to
strict justice is self-denying love.  Between the two stands
~ I have met with an old German sermon in pamphlet form, entitled "The
Utility of Eternal Bliss" (Ueber den Autzen ewzier Gilckseligkeit). It was in
the hands of a seller of old books, and I have often regretted that I did not purchase it; but I did not then know how often in my life I should be reminded of
this unique instance of extravagant consistency in the utilitarian theory.
85 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
fairness; and we shall not obtain a perfect and partial view of
courts of justice if we do not consider, among other things,
the very subtle transition from the strictly just to that which
is fair, and if we do not consider that, although the law is the
rule by which the judge is bound to decide, this very law,
being made by man and drawn up in human language, is not
absolute like a mathematical formula, but in many cases must
be interpreted in its application. These rules, the omission
of either of which has misled many philosophers, are of great
importance in all meditations on subjects connected with the
state, and, as we shall see presently, on patriotism.
LXVIII. One of the strong impulses to action is interest,
but alone it would altogether fail to effect many necessary
things; and a stronger impulse than is afforded by interest is
that of sympathy. It gives in many cases the first impulse to
action, and often supersedes interest or that which is clearly
to be proved by tlhe understanding. Men were destined, as
we have seen, to establish families; from them civilization
proceeds: yet neither did men originally nor do they generally now unite in marriage after having calculated their
interest, nor, in most cases, after having clearly represented
to themselves the pleasure they may derive from domestic
happiness. Sympathy attracts them, and weds closer than
either of the other two motives could do. Nor does a man
who feels deeply attached to one woman among so many
thousand thereby declare that he holds her to be better,
wiser, purer than all the rest. lie merely shows that sympathy draws him to her in particular. WVe are commanded
to love our parents, which means of course to love and
cherish them in particular, but by obeying this commandment we do not mean to express that we consider them
better than all the rest of mankind, nor that we hate the
others because we love these in particular. The commandment directs particular attention to the lawful effect of a peculiar sympathy, and to the callousness of a heart in which
this primary sympathy has no effect. Yet it cannot be proved
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POLITICAL ETHICS.
by the mere understanding, The parents in many cases nlay
indeed not deserve the warm thanks of their offspring; they
may have done no more than what in the common relations
of society they could not well help doing. The children may
have many reasons for dissatisfaction, and yet sympathy is
not on that account extinguished.   It is the same  with
patriotism: it is not to be calculated according to interest,
nor is it a duty first established by a train of reasoning; but
we reason upon the feeling already existing, and then find
how great an agent it is in God's household.  The immense
power of association, in all its varieties, from the nursery song
to the highest national epic, forms, sounds, colors, things and
persons, joys and pains, all have seized upon us, and we feel
attached to our country, we love it; but we do not hate
others on that account.   We  may value other countries
higher, in the abstract. We might say, We believe if we were
to be born again, and were to have the choice, with present
knowledge and without present feelings, we would choose a
certain other, and yet would love our country, such as we
now are, because our soul feels there at home. We may see
our country engaged in a wrong war, and yet we shudder at
the bare idea of fighting against her.  We  may reprove her
follies or vices, may strive to correct them and justly acknowledge that other countries have no such vices, and yet we feel
closely attached to her. We may not be able to arrive by
mere reasoning at the result that we should labor for our
country or sacrifice ourselves for her.  We  might say, Is not
the state that institution which exists for the great purpose,
among others, of protecting my life? how then is it reasonable to expect that I should expose it for the state, or rush to
offer it when not called upon? and yet would feel th/zat within
us which prompted Sir John Eliot calmly to as:sign over
every portion of his extensive estates to relatives in trust
for the benefit of his famnily, make all directions respecting
the education of his children, dearly beloved by him, and
then go to the "great, warm, and ruffling" parliament of
I626, where he expected, and, unfortunately, met with, all the
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POLI OTICAL ETHICS.
danger for which he had prepared himself.' We may honor.
Eversteen of Holland, whose father and four brothers had
fallen by the eremy, who yet asked for re-appointment in service, so that he might likewise fall "on the bed of honor." 2
We honor Aristides, whom injustice banished, and who still
loved Athlens. And why? Because we love our country.
LXIX. But it is not sufficient that we see that it is so.
The question is whether it ought so to be.  Most assuredly
it ought to be so. For all nobler pursuits there must be one
primary impulse, beyond interest, and which binds us religiously to that pursuit. We ought to do good even without
any selfish ends; why? Because the love of the good impels
us to acknowledge it. It is the religion of morals. The
scholar pursues his science; for interest's sake?  It may be
directly against it. For the promotion of ease, or quiet of
mind? He may be led to much anxiety, and yet not give
up his career. It is the religious love of truth which impels
him, the yearning for action, for the use of those faculties
with which he is peculiarly endowed. The artist produces
his works of art. He might enjoy greater tranquillity, perhaps, in other spheres: His religious love of the beautiful
impels him.  The patriotic citizen acts for the benefit of
others; not for his interest, but because that sympathy and
impulse, patriotism, impels him to share dangers, to work out
liberty for those who are not yet born, to preserve liberty.
Patriotism is the religion of liberty and the state, and at
all times have tyrants and sordid politicians been at pains
to deride it, unless they expected to turn it to their own
account.
Without patriotism, we might easily show that a free
state could not possibly endure, for, extinguish patriotism or
public spirit, a species of the former, and all must dissolve
into dreary, heartless egotism.  But even to regret such an
Forster's Life of Sir John Eliot, vol. ii. p. 38, of British Statesmen.
2 Van Campen, History of the Netherlands, vol. ii. p. I96.
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POLITICAL ETHICS.
occurrence and strive to prevent it requires patriotism in all
cases when we can gain nothing for ourselves, or when in all
probability we shall sacrifice more than we can obtain. We
can see its necessity from those higher points of view from
which we perceive that society is a continuous union, with the
great ends of justice and civilization; but no man indeed can
prove by enlightened self-interest what earthly interest I ought
to take in future generations, or what it matters to me personally whether the literature of my country flourishes or is
eradicated by a barbarian foe.
LXX. Patriotism forms likewise the transition and link between the state as the jural institution, and the society as the
aggregate of living men, with their associations arising out of
their history and the soil-in short, the country; it stands between the abstract demand of justice and love of kindred. It
is that sympathy which brings affection into the state, and
without which the state would often be deprived of its primum
mobile; for right is based, as we have seen, on individuality;
interest may unite, but it may also sever. Without patriotic
spirit, men would separate into different sects, hostile parties,
companies, schools of science; and interest alone or abstract
right would not be able to supply the bond. Those Asiatic
tribes which for centuries have passed from one conqueror to
another, and Rome ever since the downfall of the republic,
afford us melancholy instances of the absonce of patriotism.
If then we mean by patriotism the "whole body of those
affections which unite men's hearts to the commonwealth,",
it is for any nation a most indispensable element of civil success, which cannot be supplanted by any utility; it infuses life
and vigor into all parts of the nation, and produces mutual
support, magnanimity, and elevation of public action; it is a
virtue as much as the love of parents. Still, we do not say
that it is an affection to which all others must absolutely give
I This is the definition which Mackintosh gave of public spirit in Peltier's trial.
(State Trials, vol. xxviii. p. 573.) But I believe it designates patriotism.
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POLITICAL E THICS.
way. "Patria cara, carior libertas." If those elements which
make up what we call our country (patria) - the land, the
people, their history, their institutions, their liberty-separate,
we must adhere to the higher and highest, in preference to the
lower. If we cannot have liberty in our native country, and
cannot aid in establishing it there, if we are oppressed, we
are surely not bound to stay, although we may feel pain at
the separation even then, and often look back with a homesick heart.
Patriotism is an affection for our country, made up, as are
all deep-rooted affections, of a thousand associations and influences. Patriotism in modern times, when the stages of
action, knowledge, and our very feeling to all men are so much
enlarged, in comparison with what they were in ancient times,
requires a country, to be deep and fruitful. Our reminiscences
and attachments must be national; the glory in which we
delight must be that of the country, the glory acquired by
our nation in the fields of science and the arts, of literature,
and of arms in defending her institutions and liberty; the
sympathy and powerful associations must be sufficiently distinct from those of the men of other countries, to make patriotism an intense feeling,; but a small community, for instance
a city, does not supply a sufficient amount of affections to
seize upon the whole inner man, and consequently does not
afford a marked line by which to distinguish these strong
affections from those of others; as for instance the patriotic
affections of a German for Germany are distinguished from
those of a Frenchman for France. In ancient times this was
different. Languages, literature, historic reminiscences, extend over coiuntries. And even in ancient times, when was the
Greek more nobly and more admirably and truly Greek than
when he was Grecian in a national sense? Whether at Olympia or at Marathon, he was greatest when he felt himself
wholly Greek. Sismondi's work on the Italian Republics in
the Middle Ages contains a passage in one of the concluding
chapters (end of chapter cxxvi., vol. xvi., ed. of I8SiS) which
illustrates the preceding remarks in a pointed manner: "Italy,"
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POLITICAL ETHICS.
says the celebrated historian, "towards the end of the eighteenthl century had always soldiers, riches, a large population,
flourishing agriculture, commerce and manufactures which
presented still great resources, men versed in the sciences,
others whom nature had made fit to acquire them soon; but
the feeling and life were missing; and when the French revolution broke out, there was no one in Europe who could not
see that Italy had neither the will nor the power to defend
her independence, and that a nation which had no longer
a country (paire) could not resist, either to defend itself or its
neighbors." Mr. Von Raumer, speaking, in the sixth volume
of his History of Europe, of the endless sufferings to which
Germany was exposed by Louis XIV., says that so it always
will be when the Germans forget that they have one common
country, and that they ought to have one common national
feeling, into however many parts they may be politically
divided.
Patriotism is much connected with loyalty, a warm attachment to the institutions of our country, and an upright desire
to act according to the true spirit of its laws. In monarchies
loyalty has often been used to designate a warm attachment
to the royal person, which has not unfrequently existed indeed, but has also often been supposed to exist when the real
feeling was for the country, and the monarch was only its visible sign, its standard —a distinction which is seen as soon as
the monarch ceased to represent the country. The history of
all times, especially since Napoleon, who produced so many
changes, furnishes many examples. The attachment is warmest
for the country, that is for the land, the people, and their history; that for a king, personally, must always be comparatively
weak in a vast country. When Nelson meant to inspire his
sailors before the battle of Trafalgar, he told them that England expected every man to do his duty. It told well. Had
he said, parliament expects, it would have been much weaker,
yet not without effect, for it is a vast institution. Had he said,
the king expects, it might have had very little effect; and
surely it would have sounded very odd, and stirred no soul,
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POLITICAL ETHICS.
had he said, George III., or the regent, expects, etc. The
name of an institution is well calculated to inspire men with
a feeling of duty by way of obedience. Congress have sent
orders to such or such an effect, would be a weighty expression with an officer in war; but if men were expected to act
with noble inspiration, it would be necessary to remind them
of "their beloved country."
LXXI. It was significant that with the Romans the word
imizpizis comprehended at once failing against the gods, the
country, and the family. They felt that a temerity or baseness of heart subverting society in its elements was requisite
for impiety in all three cases.  Patriotism is founded upon
what was called in the first volume national allegiance, that
indestructible sympathy and attachment which every uncorrupted heart feels towards its own country, not necessarily
the native land, but the land of one's parents and history;
that "allegiance" which in reality and not in theory "is of a
greater extent and dimension than laws or kingdoms, and
cannot consist by the laws merely, because it began before
laws, it continueth after laws, and it is in vigor when laws'are
suspended and have had their force," I as Lord Bacon said of
personal allegiance. This allegiance can consist, as we have
seen, with a desire or duty of emigration, but it will ever prevent a man of any true feeling from fighting against his
country, except perhaps in cases of invasion of his adopted
country by an army of his native one. A man who can do
it has ever been despised as a dastard. It is not easy in some
cases to say where or what the country is. On the one hand
z State Trials, vol. ii. p. 596. Bacon as well as Coke was desirous, as is well
known, to prove in Calvin's case that the post-nati, or Scots born after the accession of James I. to the throne of Ellgland, were natural subjects of the king of
England, and they did it by claiming personal against national allegiance. I
have spoken more fully of the subject in the first volume. Every one must now
admit how untenable a ground is the principle advanced by Bacon; for it places
the king, and the primitive relation of the subject to him, entirely beyond the law.
The whole famous case contains many positions that are more than doubtful.
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POLITICAL ETHICS.
it is sufficiently plain that Thrasybulus did not fight against
his country when he returned to Athens with his army to
deliver her from the Spartan yoke+ on the other, no one
fails to be struck with the arrogance of the French emigrants
during the first revolution, who actually called their assemblage at Coblentz, France. It is likewise plain enough that
calling in armed foreigners and fighting with them against
the army or part of the army of our own country is one of
the greatest evils. The French have often declared it to be,
under any circumstances, treason of the worst kind, and have
never forgiven Moreau for having joined the allied princes,
nor Bernadotte for having commanded his Swedes against
France.  Of the latter case we do not speak.  A king is an
institution, and Bernadotte would certainly have acted treacherously towards his new country had he consulted for one
moment his own feelings. Although he was not then king
but only crown-prince, the crown was already fixed upon his
brow. Had he, in that situation, not felt wholly assimilated to
Sweden, but, as Napoleon demanded, remained a Frenchman,
because he was so before he entered into a solemn covenant
with Sweden, and had he allowed his actions to be influenced
by this feeling to the injury of his adopted country, treason
would have lurked in his heart. In the case of Moreau, our
decision must partly depend upon the point whether he considered Napoleon and his government national, or not. If he
faithfully believed that France was irrecoverably tyrannized
over so long as Napoleon ruled, and, besides, that a change
would be produced long ere the allied powers should enter
France, he certainly cannot be placed on a par with Hippias,
who infamously led the way for the Persians to his native
Attica and Greece.  Yet, though we do not feel the execration at Moreau which the baseness of Hippias excites, does
not every one feel the strongest repugnance, and pause
with pleasure, in the account of the same wars, at the example of Carnot, who had never joined Napoleon, but the
momnent when foreigners set foot on French soil forgot the
government, thinking but of France, and offered his services?
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POLITICAL ETHICS.
His gallant defence of Antwerp showed how earnest he
was.
How carefull we ought to be in pronouncing upon this subject an absolute rule, declaring, for instance, that without
exception the bringing of foreigners into our country is the
greatest of all calamities, is shown by the case of William III.
Were not those Englishmen right who came over with him
and were ready to fight against the established government
of the country? Would they have deserved well had they
scrupled to go over from Holland with a foreign army? The
circumstances were peculiar, I own. The fact that the republic of the United Provinces was comparatively but a small
power, so that a conquest could not take place, and the chief
work must remain to be done by the English themselves,
either by fighting for William or by readily receiving him,
was of the greatest importance. This shows that there are
exceptions. On the other hand, all that Demosthenes said of
foreigners being called in against Philip remains generally
true, and the consequences proved that the Athenian was
right. We do not here speak of cases such as that of the
duke of Bourbon's leaving the French army and  fighting
against his native country. He merited the reproach of the
dying Bayard.
LXXII. That genuine patriotism enlarges instead of narrowing our views, should have appeared from the previous
passages.  It is therefore a poor counterfeit of patriotism or
public spirit if foreigners, though their services should be
considered necessary, are excluded from this service. It is
against the spirit of our times, which acknowledges a general
union of civilization too much to admit of so narrow a view.
In sciences and arts in particular, foreign scholars and artists
have for centuries received calls from one country into another.
If it is Ferhaps less so at present in some countries than in
the middle ages, it is only because the chairs can now be more
easily filled with natives. Spain, which rapidly rose under
Ferdinand and Isabella, owed her glorious rise in a great
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POLITICAL ETHICS.
measure to her rising universities, which no natives probably
contributed so much to elevate as the foreigners placed in
their chairs, as for instance Peter Martyr. Erasmus in England is another striking instance.
Among the foremost citizens in loyalty when times are
gloomy, foreigners who are citizens by choice and not by
chance will always be found. The American revolution is
full of such examples; nor should we forget the names of
Columbus, Vasco da Gama, Cabot, William I. of Orange,
William III., all of whom served in faith and peril or brought
glory to their adopted countries.
LXXIII. The term public spirit has often been used for
patriotism, the word patriot having become somewhat objectionable at some periods. Words are unimportant. By
patriotism we designate perhaps more specifically that sacred
enthusiasm which prompts to great exertions and has the
welfare, honor, reputation of the country at large in view; by
public spirit, a practical disinterestedness and cheerful readiness
to serve the community and promote its essential success in
every way.  A perfect stranger to a country might still show
much public spirit.
I-Iume says, "A  man who loves only himself, without regard to friendship and desert, merits the severest blame; and
a man who is only susceptible of friendship, without public
spirit or a regard to the community, is deficient in the most
material part of virtue.",  The freer a country, the more it
Essay III., on Politics a Science.- Self-forgetting, not self-denial, delights
us wherever wve meet with it, so universal is the admiration of disinterestedness, the dislike of selfishness, although our interests betray us continually into
it.  If we are attentive, we shall find in how great a degree in all branchles the
principle exists.  An author delights most when we see he has entirely forgotten
himself and is but the spokesman of his subject; we admire a work of art when
we see how entirely free from vanity and selfish conceit the artist was, and that
he forgot himself entirely in his workl.  It goes so far that a sentence or a conceit never intended to be heard or seen frequently gives pleasure, although it is
neither witty nor interesting enough to do so, so soon as we know it was not
intended to be heard. Nothing touches the heart so deeply as to become ac
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POLITICAL ETHICS.
stands in need of public spirit and the more baneful becomes
isolating selfishness. But it may well be asked, How far shall
public spirit prompt a man to act? There are some who ruin
their own affairs or who become burdensome in consequence
of mistaken public spirit. A citizen who attends every meeting but neglects his own affairs, or lectures on education and
brings up his own sons as idlers, cannot be said to have
public spirit, for one of those things in which a community is
primarily interested is that every one keep his own affairs in
a sound state. Public spirit shows itself chiefly in substantial
and noiseless ways, and prompts the citizen to perform those
elementary functions on which he knows the existence of
society depends, even at the price of some inconvenience or
loss of time, without ally hope of reward in public acknowledgment. A public-spirited man will vote, though he need take
no active part in party measures; he will willingly serve on a
jury, and he will aid in his proportion with money and time
in any fair and reasonable project, without seeking to promote
thereby his own interest." It has been mentioned too often
already to dwell here any longer on this subject, how useless
all laws become, and that no community can expect success,
when public spirit has fled; but the reader will find below to
quainted with great or good deeds long after they were performed in a manner
which shows that they were done without any expectation of their ever becoming
known.
We were once marching on a road broken up by the rain and the passing of
many troops. At each step wve sank deep in the clay. It was a toilsome mnarch;
and any impediment in the road was much disrelished by the weary men.  In
the midst of this road happened to lie a stone covered by the mire, b)ut of sufficient size to hurt any one who knocked against it.  Each soldier, as he knocked
himself, grumble(l and passed on.  The colonel observed this, and stoppedl, whllilst
the troops passed.  At last a soldier arrived wvho likewise knocked and hurt himself severely. He showed it l)y the expression of his face, but immedliately went
to work to remove the stone, and then passed on.  "Stop," called the colonel:
'what's your name?  More than ten men have passed here andl hurt themselves,
and you are the first who had public spirit enough to remove the stonle.  You
shall be one of the first corporals."  This was real public spirit, in however
humble a sphere.
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POLITICAL ETHICS.
what political misery and extravagance the absence of this
elementary principle may lead.'
Where sound patriotism and healthy public spirit are wanting, factious spirit
and selfishness united with boldness must be rife. This selfishness may have
ends of avarice, ambition, or revenge. We all know into how deplorable a state
the South American States have been thrown in consequence of their want of
public spirit, of disinterestedness applied to politics, since they have broken their
allegiance to Spain.  Even that public spirit which may partly arise from interest,
yet interest well enlightened respecting its real advantage, is entirely wanting in
the great mass of the people. We not unfrequently meet with accounts from
those regions that the polls of a certain place were entirely deserted, no citizen
appearing to think it worth his while to vote. Apathy leads to, or is the effect
of, anarchy and lawlessness; armed faction succeeds faction; and so frequent has
this been in some states that a judicious traveller, Mr. Chevalier, was enabled to
write a certain theory of these factious movements in Mexico. As the causes
and men are always similar, it is very natural that the different stages of an
insurrection should succeed in a similar and certain order.  " In Mexico," says
Mr. Michel Chevalier, in a series of letters written from that country, and published, in I837, in the Paris journals, "insurrections have become an act of mere
common life. There have gradually been established perfectly well-defined forms
for it; which, like the rules of the noble game of tric-trac or the receipts of the
cuisiniire bourgeoise, it is understood, admit no deviation.  The procedure is
sufficiently simple, and in Mexico sufficiently humane likewise: it resembles, if
not a battle at the opera, at all events a harmless enough guerilla warfare. The
first act of a revolution is called pronunciamiento. An officer of any grade, from
that of general to that of lieutenant downwards, bronounces himself against the
established order of things, or any institution which he does not approve of, or
anything else of any description. He collects a party, a company, or a regiment,
which generally hastens to place itself at his disposal. The second act of the
revolution is called grito-the cry, in which the motives and obljects of the insurrection are reduced to three or four heads or articles. When the subject is of
some importance, the cry assumes the name of a plan. In the third act, the insurgents and partisans of the government come into each other's presence. There
are skirmishes, there are reconnoissances of their respective forces.   In the fourth
they come to action definitively. But, according to the improvements which have
been introduced recently into the art of revolution-making, this is done in the
most guarded manner and at the most respectful distance. There must, however, be a victor and a vanquished.  If you are beaten, you unpronounce yourself;
if victorious, you march upon Mexico. In the fifth and last act, the conqueror,
whoever he is, makes his triumphal entry into the capital, whilst the vanquished
embarks at Vera Cruz, or Tampico, with all the honors of war."  With the exception, perhaps, of the bloodlessness of these movements, which reminds us of
the captains in Italy towards the end of the sixteenth century counting the num    VOL  II.                            7
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POLITICA L ETHICS.
LXXIV. The word old, denoting in its strict and primary
sense a length of time that an object has existed," came, by a
natural transition from designating the old people, also to
designate the times in which they lived, and these once being
called old, the previous ones would be still older; old came to
be used for expressing what we now more strictly call ancient;
in short, old is used not only to denote length of years but
also distance of time in the retrospect, an ambiguity which
has at times exercised a certain effect in politics; which obliges
us to dwell for a moment upon this subject. In treating of it
I shall not restrict myself to the consequences of the ambiguity alone, but treat of old applied to the living, to ancestors,
and to institutions, in so far as this is of moment in politics.
It belongs to the province of ethics in general to point out
the respect, forbearance, and peculiar kindness we owe to
old age, and the reasons why this is a duty, the absence of
which is always considered by the virtuous as an indication
of a heart in which anything which might be called generous
must have given way to obdurate selfishness or a callousness
which easily may pass over into brutality.   We not only feel
a degree of respect for gray hairs, but it affects us deeply to
see an old man arraigned or convicted of a crime, because
it contends so directly with the feeling which we desire to
entertain for advanced age. A feeling so general, the absence
of which indicates so much more than a mere dereliction of
a single duty, is of course of itself important to the community in politics.  Its extinction would  indicate general
selfishness and callousness, incompatible with the essential
success of any community. Montesquieu goes so far as to
say that "nothing maintains morals more firmly than an extreme subordination of the young towards the old." This,
it would seem, is extravagant; for the veneration of the old
bers opposed to each other, without fighting, the same theory applies pretty much
to the changes in Portugal.
x The word old is derived from the root al, to "grow,"  Latin al- and ol- in
adolesco; Gr. perhaps in o,aoC, and found also in Gothic, High German, and
Irish. Comp. Curtius, Gr. Etymol., 4th ed., No. 523, b.
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POLITICAL ETHICS.
may be coupled with or arise from other causes not propitious to morals. In no country is the subjection of the
young to the old more complete and systematically as well
as religiously carried out than in China, a country which we
would certainly not place at the head as to morality, however
willingly we may acknowledge its superiority in this respect
over most other Asiatic countries.   But this is certain, nowhere can sound morality subsist, or liberty endure and be
prevented from degenerating into licentiousness, folly, fickleness, where the young are without modesty, respect and
deference for superior age and experience, and a sincere veneration of those who by their works and continued labors
have proved the sincerity of their zeal or have added hlonor to
their community or country.
LXXV. Authority, which begins in the family and passes
over to the similarly situated elders of the tribe, is naturally
connected in all early times with old age, so that the names
of offices and judicial or legislative institutions are in most
early nations derived from the words indicating old age.'
They by the mere fact of being older enjoy a degree of respect, they have experience and know the laws better than
the young, because the latter have not yet been able to learn
them from tradition. When nearly all that can and must
be learned respecting public affairs is to be learned by oral
transmission, and when the various classes of society are as
yet little separated from one another, but the education and
knowledge of all are nearly on a par, old age of itself must
necessarily be of considerable importance and weight. It is
different when laws, finances, and other branches require
study, and study leisure, which by the difference of fortune is
allotted in very different degrees to the various classes.  In
this state of society it is frequently the case that a young man
x It will be hardly necessary to remind the reader of the word senatus derived
fromr senex, of the Greek yepovaia, counsel or senate, from yipwv, an old man, and
many corresponding terms in ancient times and the middle ages, as Signior,
Patrician, Alderman, Presbytery, Council of the Ancients.
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POLITICA4L ETHICS.
may have read, heard, seen-in fact, lived more-than an old
one; and in a state of a populous society far advanced in civilization we cannot any longer assign the same official importance to old age which naturally is attached to it in earlier periods. Men but too frequently ru.n into extremes, and, while
we allow the above position, we must also acknowledge the
absurdity of attaching wisdom to youth, and making youtlh, as
it were, a party-sign and qualification, as seems now to be
actually the case in some countries. That there have been
great and rare minds who at the age when others are yet
learning wielded the helm of vast affairs or brilliantly shone
in the sciences, we all know. Pitt, Napoleon, De Witt, Grotius, Laplace, and many other distinguished names among
the moderns and ancients, prove it abundantly; but they were
extraordinary men, geniuses, the very character of which consists in leaping beyond what for others is the natural course.
From exceptions we cannot draw our rules.   Macchiavelli
rightly observes, "If we choose a youth, he must have shown
himself already worthy of this election by something distinguished." It is right, then, not to withhold from them a station due to their genius and nobleness of soul; but we must
first have this pledge, and not trust to favorites, to Buckinghams, despite their youth.
In the common course of things we know that the young
are the readier and bolder for action, prompted by a more
lively temperament, and not yet tamed and chilled by repeated
failures and bitter disappointments. The distinctive age as to
readiness of action is about the fortieth year. The average
age of the signers of the American Declaration of Independence was nearly forty-four; yet if we deduct of the fifty-five
signers the age of seven citizens who were sixty years old or
above, the average age comes down to forty., Most of those
who first embraced the Reformation were about forty years
z Of fifty-five signers there were under thirty years 2, both twenty-seven years
old; thirty, and less than forty, I7; forty, and less than fifty, 22; fifty, and less
than sixty, 8; sixty, and less than seventy, 6; seventy, I.
IOO 
POLITICA4L ETHICS.
old, or younger., Far the greater number of the most distinguished generals have been young, and, when all other
circumstances were nearly equal, the young general opposed
to an old one has almost always been victorious.2
Those governments therefore which contain the principle
of movement, which give a field or call for prompt action,
I The Venetian ambassador at the court of France, Micheli, reported in 156I
to the doge that except among the common peasantry, "who continue to visit
the churches zealously," "the young men under the age of forty, almost without
exception," belong to the new doctrine-that is, Protestantism. According to a
despatch in 1562 from the Venetian ambassador in Spain, there were many
Huguenots throughout Spain. (Ranke, History of the Popes, etc., vol. ii. pp. i6
and 21.) Passion and action together belong chiefly to the male sex from
twenty to thirty, during which age therefore by far the greatest number of crimes
are committed.
2 We must remember here, however, that these young generals had always
tried and experienced soldiers around them. They counselled and planned; the
young gave energy, promptness, boldness, on which victory, after a good plan
has been made, so much depernds.  Alexander, Caesar, Frederic, Napoleon, were
young when first victorious; Themistocles, at Salamis, twenty-six; Leonidas,
when he fell, twenty-one; Scipio Africanus, when he conquered Hannibal, little
above twenty; Eugene, at the battle of Mohacz, twenty-four; Charles XII., at
Narva, eighteen; and many more might be cited.  Camillus is said to have
been but fifteen years old when he performed the heroic deed which soon elevated him to the censorship, and in his eightieth year he was dictator the fifth
time-a full life indeed!
[Dr. Lieber's examples are to be taken cumgrano salis. Themistocles, if born,
as seems probable, in 5I4 B.c., was thirty-four years old at the sea-fight of Salamis.  Leonidas had been king, before he fell, nine years.   His niece and
wife was, according to:Clinton, twenty-nine at that time. His brother Doricus,
soon after the accession of their half-brother Cleomenes, who reigned nineteen
if not twenty-nine years (Clinton), left Sparta to found a colony, and Leonidas
was born, as Herodotus'says, "right after Doricus."  (V. 41.)  All this shows
the story that he was only twenty-one at Thermopylae to be a fable. Scipio
Africanus, again, probably born B.C. 234, and seventeen years old at the battle
of the Ticinus, when he first encountered and defeated Hannibal at Zama in 202
was thirty-two. Prince Eugene did not command at Mohacz, but the duke
of Lorraine.   His great victory at Zenta, of which Dr. Lieber was probably
thinking, was gained in i697, when he was thirty-four.  The story of Camillus
being chosen a censor not long after he was fifteen is ridiculous. He was censor probably in 403 B.c., and died in 365, so that, if eighty years old at his death,
he was forty-two when elected censor. Charles XII. remains,-hare-brained in
his youth, hare-brained until his death.]
Io[ 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
bring men upon the stage of action at a comparatively early
age. Many of the most prominent Athenians were very
young when they first acted; while in Sparta, founded upon
conservatism, the citizens acquired consideration and privileges with the different advances of age. Liberty in general
is favorable to bringing forward men in the prime of life.
On the other hand, the conservatism which is an indispensable element of all true liberty, and not a cant or desire to
retain what ought not to be retained, the spirit which arises
out of a conviction that no healthy government can spring
into existence as by a magic wand, but that development of the
laws wisely founded upon the existing facts is necessary,-this
is more generally a characteristic trait of those beyond forty
years of age. They have experience, not only the mere knowledge which amounts to no more than the remembrance of
that which we have seen, but the convictions and impressions
and vivid consciousness with which the operations and effects
of laws and institutions, and the forcible illustrations and interpretations of history afforded by what we witness ourselves
in practical life, deeply imbue our mind; they, the old, have
in many cases acquired tact or instinct of great importance in
those numerous cases in which mere reasoning and counterbalancing the advantages and disadvantages, as Cecil used to
do, cannot lead us to a decisive result. This tact, indispensable wherever we have to act in very complicated cases, may
be native in genius, but its possessor must be a genius if it be
native. If the old are on some occasions too reluctant to do
what ought to be done because it is new, the young are on
the other hand apt to adopt measures because they are new.
In times therefore like ours, in which new and powerful
moving agents have been brought into play in politics, such
as the power of the daily papers and the swift mails, it behoves us to allow their full share to the principles and elements more strongly represented by the old in public matters.
LXXVI. Veneration for our forefathers arises, if real,-and
we do not occupy ourselves here with hypocritic cant,-from
I02 
t
POLITICAL ETHICS.
two causes; the one just, the other erroneous. It is one of
the most indelible feelings in the human breast that we honor
the memory of our parents. The basest criminal, dead to
almost all other feelings, will resent a reproach cast upon his
parents; few things sting the heart of a man so deeply, even
of the vulgarest, as reproach cast upon father or mother. A
good name is, with all honorable men, an expression of vast
import. Nothing is so sad for the receding Indian as when
he "takes leave of the land in which the bones of his fathers
lie;" nothing so solemn in the Old Testament as when the
Hebrew is admonished by the God of his forefathers.
It would seem that Providence has made this feeling one of
the primary agents to unite society, one generation with the
other, to make of communities continuous societies, and to
prevent them from crumbling and disintegrating into mere
masses of selfish particles. This feeling, as we have seen, extends farther back than to our own bodily parents. We feel
grateful for the blessings, which may be the effects of the
endeavors of our forefathers, perhaps of their struggle and
suffering. If we enjoy well-founded liberty, it is they who
must have established it or provided for its growth; if it cost
them sacrifices, they must have been prompted to bear them
by the consciousness that they would thereby obtain it for us;
they lived, toiled, and died for their country, and that country
includes the thought of future generations. If, however, we
ascribe superior wisdom to our forefathers, we must have a
specific reason for it; they may have established an institution
when peculiar circumstances favored them to obtain superior
wisdom as to this subject, or to see with greater disinterestedness, because the times may have been fitter for it. Enthusiasm for what is great and good may have been more general,
as, for instance, when our forefathers struggled for independ ence.  But this may also not be the case.  An  Englishman
who should carry his veneration for his forefathers so far as to
look upon the courtiers of Charles II. or his judges as upon
men of superior probity or wisdom would deviate from all
truth. If, however, we have reason to be grateful to them, it
I03 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
must be an active gratitude, not an oral one, which frequently
is but a cloak to our own indolence, or our vanity, or pride of
descent,-to lower others by comparison. Our gratitude must
consist in acting out farther and farther what they have begun,
not in a desire to remain stationary and to consider that which
they were able to obtain under their circumstances as the last
degree of perfection that may be obtained. The ideal of a
nation, that for which it strives, must lie onward, not be be lieved to consist in something absolute established in former
ages and the keeping of which in that precise state forms the
highest duty.  The Hindoos, the Chinese, thus look back, not
forward. The excellence of all laws depends upon their fitness- that is, upon the sound principle judiciously applied to
the existing state of things; these things, however, change in
the course of time; real standing still is therefore impossible,
and if we do not move onward, if we force the same laws
upon changed circumstances, we must ruin the state.
The erroneous cause of the veneration of our forefathers is
the popular and very old belief that times grow worse and
worse; not a little promoted by the feeling of discomfort
which must befall all old people when men and things around
them change. This belief is very old. Even Homer makes
Pallas say, "Few children indeed are equal in virtue to their
father, many are worse, and but very few better.", History
does not justify this dictum, and Homer himself, since he has
been quoted once, says in another passage, "We claim to be
much better than our fathers." Hallam, treating of the period
of Elizabeth, and speaking of the Tower, says, " It seems like
a captive tyrant reserved to grace the triumph of a victorious
republic, and should teach us to reflect in thankfulness how
highly we have been elevated in virtue and happiness above
our forefathers." And in a note appended to this passage he
adds, "There is no line in Homer which I repeat more frequently or with greater pleasure than the boast of Sthenelus:
'H)UE~q TOt raT-pwo P#Lr' a o Ez6p,.Eo' e t-a. This is a truth of
I Odyssey, ii. 277.
I04 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
which the impartial study of history persuades us; and yet,
like other truths, it has its limitations."' Let us not forget
that even the Spartans, certainly the most conservative of the
prominent Grecian tribes, appeared at one of their national
festivals in different choruses. The chorus of the ancients
chanted, "We were brave in days gone by." The chorus of
men  responded, "We  are brave, come who may to try it;"
when the chorus of the boys concluded, "Brave we shall be;
our deeds shall outshine yours." In the only branch in which
the Spartans were proud to excel, they acknowledged that an
onward endeavor was the only spirit to maintain what they
valued most highly-national valor.
Not only has it been believed that a regular course of moral
degeneracy is going on, but at a very early period it was believed that men became feebler and more diminutive with
every generation.
The reason of so general a belief is that we see and feel the
evils of the present time, but not those which belong to the
past, while dissatisfaction with the present time or real suffering causes us to magnify the virtues of our ancestors, to which
a general respect for our own parents and grandparents already
naturally inclines us.
LXXVII. The advantage which old persons possess over
young ones is experience. Respecting the world in general,
then, we are the old ones compared to our forefathers, provided always we have endeavored to possess ourselves of their
experience and that of our own times, and do not presumptuously think that the mere fact of our being born after them
makes us wiser. We must truly study and respect their endeavors before we can say that we are wiser. Bacon's remark
to this purpose appears to be a mere truism as soon as distinctly stated; yet not unfrequently the old times are appealed
I Constitutional History of England, i. 202.
2 There existed formerly a nursery-story, founded upon this belief, which predicted that men would become so small that the ovens used by us would become
their palaces.
Io5 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
to as authority as we would appeal to old persons.' But it is
very necessary to keep some points distinctly in our mind
respecting old institutions. I will state them briefly:
The more ignorant aperson, and the less acquainted therefore with what has been done, said, tried, suffered, what has
miscarried or succeeded, what difficulties are in the way, or
what evils, no longer visible, have been suppressed by a certain institution not inconvenient itself; the less a person is
conscious of the great multiplicity of actions and operations
in society; the more forward he will be found to intrude his
new thought or system upon men, as if happiness or sense
should date only from the day when his system was introduced; the more he believes in an absolute goodness of laws;
and the less substantial the qualities of his mind; the more
-prone he will be to destroy rather than maintain, develop,
enlarge.
The inexperienced and ignorant alone believe that a projected institution can, in all its bearings, be comprehended at
once without practical application, and that laws and institutions are finished if drawn up on paper, regardless of the state
of things in and with which they have to operate.
Those institutions are the best which, if good at all, have
their roots deep in the soil of the nation, whose body of laws
consists mainly in the alluvial soil deposited by the course of
time, since thus alone institutions which have grown and
have developed themselves in the course of time meet with
the spontaneous action of the people; they have been checked,
expanded, fashioned as the course of history required, and
have become endeared to the nation as blessings, as realities.
Old institutions have the advantage of being tried, and
Bentham calls the reason which is derived from the oldness of an institution
alone in its favor the Chinese argument. Archb)ishop Whately, in the Appendix
to his Elements of Ilogic, has a few words on the term "old."
2 Cicero de Respubl., ii. I.  " Nostra republica non unius Lest] ingenio sed
multorum; nec una hominis vita sed aliquot constituta saeculis et atatibus;...
neque cuncta ingenia conlata in unum tantum posse uno tempore providere, ut
omnia complecterentur sine rerum usu et vetustate."
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POLITICAL ETHICS.
hence are known, while of new ones we have yet to see how
they operate, and what ultimate effects they produce.
Old institutions ought not to be pulled down except evil is
perceived to be produced by them.
We must be especially careful in touching those laws which
were made by those whom we know to have lived in better or
more favorable periods.
It is a wicked idolatry to sacrifice the living to the memory
of the dead, and obstinately to insist upon old laws simply
because they are old, although bad, and perhaps cruel.
Stability is of itself a most desirable thing; it promotes
probity, and gives moral tone to society; but to preserve that
which is bad is either foolish or immoral. The star-chamber
was an old institution: should it have been preserved? The
institution of the vizier in Asiatic despotism is older than any
British one: is it on that account good?  The cause of civilization and of a liberty worthy of man is neither promoted by
Asiatic stagnation,-whose Koran says, Every new law is an
innovation, every innovation is an error, and every error leads
to eternal fire,-nor by the arrogance of a jacobin declaring
war against everything that exists and has existed.,
I Dumont, speaking of Paine, in the Souvenirs sur Mirabeau, ch. xvi., says,
" He was a caricature of the vainest Frenchman. Paine said to Dumont that
if it were in his power to annihilate all libraries he would do it without hesitation, in order to destroy all the error deposited in them, and to commence a new
chain of ideas and principles with the Rights of Man." How many Paines in
their respective spheres, and more or less bold, have we not seen since, and are
we not seeing daily!
I07 
BOOK IV.
CHAPTER I.
Educaticn.-What it is.-Strong and universal tendency to form Habits and
continue them. - Great importance of Education in Politics, not only of ele mentary and general School Systems, but also of superior Education and
literary Institutions. - Expeditions, Libraries, Museums. - Industrial Educa tion. - The Rich as well as the Poor ought to be actively engaged in some
Pursuit, whether purely mental, or industrial.- Law of Solon.   Connection
of Crime with want of regular industrial Education in modern Times. Statistics.-Habits of Industry, of Obedience, of Independence, of Reverence,
and of Honesty.- Ancient History for Children. -Concentric Instruction. Gymnastics. -Sexes.-The Woman. -Difference of physical Organization,
Temperament, and Powers in Woman and Man.-The Family (and through
it the Society of Comity and the Country) is the sacred Sphere of Woman's
chief Activity. -The Connection of Woman's Activity with  the  State. Woman is excluded from Politics. - She is connected with the State by Patri otism.-Lady Croke.-The Petitioning of Women.-Lady Russell a Model. History of Woman. - Is the Woman represented though she cannot vote at
the Poll?
I. EDUCATION, the transmission of knowledge, skill, and
morality, that principal tie by which one generation is connected with another and thus mankind becomes a continuous society, is a subject of the first magnitude in everything
that relates to society. I waive the great importance of
education in developing and perfecting, humanizing and
elevating the individual as such, on which a few words were
given in the first volume, when the views taken by the ancients respecting education were compared with the light in
which this subject appears to the civilized modern nations.
Society is deeply interested in general education: in no
subject more so; in very few equally so. In educating we
ought to strive by aiding and cultivating to develop the whole
man, as much as all the given circumstances admit. We have
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POLITICAL ETHICS.
seen throughout this work that man, destined for civilization
as well as moral independence, has a social and individual
destiny, and man to be fully man must be a citizen, that is a
member of the state. It is one of the unalterable destinies
prescribed by Providence for our existence. The future citizen, or active member of the state, is then to be included in
the objects of education. All education consists in storing
and training the mind, if we comprehend within the latter
term the purifying guidance in morals and religion as well as
the training of the intellect, imparting method and vigor by
exercise and habit; and, finally, the imparting of sound habits,
which again may be moral, intellectual, and social habits, a
subject of the utmost importance, because it is, as Bacon
already quoted said, custom that governs man in far the
greatest number of practical cases hourly occurring. Indeed,
the constant tendency of man to custom and habit, to uniformity in manner, opinions, and desires, "the centripetal
power of custom," as Hallam calls it, is one of those agents
without which society could not possibly exist, which operates
long before reflection makes us conscious of it, and after reflection has made us conscious operates far more effectually,
generally, and constantly than mere reflection would be capable of doing. This primitive tendency, strongly founded upon
the impulse of imitation, from which the development of the
mind in earliest childhood starts, but which remains a powerful agent throughout life, naturally carries along with it its
evil effects;- as we have observed, in previous passages, of
other elementary agents or impulses in the human soul. It
leads men to perpetuate evil customs, to accommodate them
selves to erroneous opinions, to continue upon bad precedents;
but it would be as impossible, and, were it possible, as disastrous to society, to extinguish this elementary tendency of
uniformity and custom, of imitation and perpetuation, on account of its evil effects, as it would be to quench the desire of
union between the different sexes on account of its evil effects;
as, we all know, has been attempted by many enthusiasts of
all periods for many thousand years, if not in all mankind at
Io9 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
least in certain classes and societies and as an additional
means of attaining greater perfection. Customs, habits, therefore, will be formed; and, for the same reason which was
adduced respecting religion, we are bound to cultivate good
habits, even had we not other and urgent considerations for so
doing. If we do not cultivate the habit of industry, we may
be sure that by this very neglect we cultivate the habit of indolence; if we do not promote the habit of propriety and
modesty, we directly aid in forming the habit of indecency
and boldness.
II. The reader will, of course, not expect in the present
work a sketch of a whole system of education. I must confine my remarks to a few general observations, and some hints,
which experience has taught me to consider as not unimportant with regard to education as related to politics. Education,
we have seen, aims at developing the whole man: we may
consider man, however, either as a moral and religious being,
as an intellectual being, as a social being, as a physical being,
or as an esthetic being, that is a being endowed with taste,
in other words, who has a sense for the beautiful; and as no
man can be a good and sound citizen who is not a good and
sound man, so the best education for future citizens will be
that which is the completest and fullest education of the individual as an entire man.   Let us keep in mind that all education, adapting itself to man in his various capacities just
mentioned, may be training, that is invigorating and producing
habits, or storing, that is imparting knowledge. Finally, all
education is either domestic education, school education, industrial education, - by which, for want of a better word, I
mean all education for a trade, profession, or station in life;
or social education, by which we may designate that indirect
yet highly important training which every man receives by his
living in and with a society-the formation of his mind by the
influence of his society and age.
III. How importa.tt nay, how indispensable, domestic edu
IIO 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
cation is, both in training and storing, morally, intellectually,
and physically, is clear to every one who has paid the slightest
attention to the subject. For it is in the family where those
earliest impressions are received and habits formed which
adhere longest to a man, or go with him as far as to the last
goal of his life. Example, powerful everywhere, is most so at
home; because it there presents itself earliest, most frequently,
and most authoritatively-in that authority which is stronger
than that of king or law, the authority of the parent. Yet
division of labor, necessary everywhere, is likewise so in education: hence the necessity of school education; and as it is
out of the power of many whole comnmunities, and of large
classes in most communities, to provide for a sound school
education, either for want of individual means or knowledge
sufficient to select or obtain the best teachers, general systems of school education have become highly important for
all civilized nations. It is one of the peculiar traits of the
latest times that all the most civilized and elevated nations
have with much care and earnestness established general
school systems or are actively striving to establish them.
And it is a fact no less pleasing that of late the whole science
and practice of education have become so diffused and honored that in some countries, for instance in Germany and partially in France, the word School is used. in as comprehensive
a meaning as the word Church was used in former times, or
as we are wont to use the word Law or Bar, meaning thereby
the whole system, organization, members, and the distinct
acknowledgment of its importance by society. Jovellanos
said perhaps too much when he pronounced that "the fountains of social prosperity are many, but all originate from one
and the same well, and this is public instruction;"I but, although using too strong terms when he recommended a
measure so much neglected by his countrymen, this excellent
man was certainly not far from truth and only erred in the
expression of a principle itself true and essential. Modern
I Complete WVorks, Ma(lrid, I831, vol. iii. p. 292.
I I I 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
nations cannot fulfil their duty, nay, they cannot even protect
themselves sufficiently against evils otherwise unavoidable,
the consequences of civilization and density of population,
without general and public instruction.,
* Although single persons may have the means to provide
for the education of their children at home, the sons nevertheless should go to school. Every one is destined for civilization, for society, and an education is very incomplete if the
mind of the boy has not been fashioned among others, under
the influences of society. This begins earliest and most effectually in the school. In the school the boy steps out of the
close family circle, where it is possible to pay attention to a
thousand minute details, into a larger society, yet not so public as public life-but still it is a sort of public life.  There
the boy forms the earliest attachments beyond those of kindred, has his angular points rubbed off, learns to judge for
himself more freely, and stands much more upon his own
legs. The King of the French has shown in a remarkable
manner how strong national society is at present by sending
his sons to the schools of Paris, open to all citizens' boyscommon schools inasmuch as they are open to every one.
IV. It is, however, a grave error into which some have
fallen, who believe that the state as such, or civil society, is
interested only in the promotion of education among the poor,
in other words in systems of public instruction restricted to
the diffusion of elementary knowledge among large masses.
This is the opposite error to that which in former ages so frequently induced governments richly to endow a few institutions of learning and totally to neglect common education.
A  complete system of public instruction comprehends all
institutions which are necessary for the society, and which
nevertheless cannot or will not be established by private
means. Society at large, down to the lowliest cottager, is
I I must again refer, respecting this point, to my Letter on the Relation between Education and Crime.
I12 
POLITICAL  ETHICS.
deeply interested in the highest possible degree of cultivation
of the sciences; for they shed light and diffuse civilization by
a thousand rays and in a thousand channels over the whole
of society. If science, untrammelled and unconcerned about
any immediate application, does not boldly press forward,
since its application to practical life always necessarily follows at a considerable distance, the actual state of science will
stand still or retrograde. The Chinese, spurning every species
of knowledge, every experiment, which cannot be proved at
once to be of direct use, furnish us with a very impressive
illustration of this fact. Had Laplace always thought how
his soaring calculations might be applied at once to navigation, he would never have produced his Celestial Mechanics,
which nevertheless will effect great practical benefits, not only
by having led our race a step farther on its great road of civilization, but by way of actual use. Science is not a mere
luxury. Well it is that science is a luxury to some minds to
reward them for many privations or disheartening disappointments. For society the sciences are of imperative necessity,
and fall entirely within the province of that civilization which
we found to be the destiny of man. The sciences are like the
sun of heaven. When his rays descend upon the blade, the
blossom of the tree, you do not see them unfold themselves
at once. Yet when he has passed onward in his heavenly
course, the ray of noon is still effecting its enlivening and
transforming processes even in the humblest and minutest
herb or the moss which derives its modest existence from the
bounty of the lofty tree. The state is directly interested in
sustaining the highest institutions of learning, which require
means hardly ever at the disposal of private individuals; nor
has it any right to wait for private contributions towards the
foundation of public seats of learning, however cheerfully it
may receive them if offered. Every citizen, as such, low or
high, simply as a member of the state, has an undoubted right
to demand this, just as much as he has an absolute, natural,
primitive right to demand an establishment of some sort
or other to administer justice. Even if political society were
VOL. II.               8
I I3 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
nothing but an agglomeration of atoms, if it were not as we
have found it to be a continuous society, it would still be the
state's duty to promote these institutions, for on the one hand
they are of general utility, on the other hand the pursuit
of the sciences requires means which the individual, who
must turn his industry towards objects which by direct exchange will furnish him the means of subsistence, does not
possess. These means are chiefly leisure and money. Instruments, libraries, those conductors, concentrators, and bridges
of civilization, collections, expeditions, measurements, scientific surveys, are all wholly or in part of a character not to
be obtained or executed by private means, especially by the
means of those who generally are the peculiar votaries of
knowledge and feel the greatest direct interest in these subjects.  Had not governments effected the measurements of a
degree, what private person would or could have done it?
Yet the more accurate knowledge of the earth's formation has
already proved of great importance to society at large in a
thousand ways. The more knowledge multiplies and branches
out, the vaster our experiments and inquiries become, the
more time the various patient investigations require, the more
necessary also becomes public support of knowledge. Had
the Greeks felt the same want, had sciences obtained with
them the same importance, and their pursuit been attended
with the same difficulties, as with us, they would have simply
taxed their Girards or Rothschilds with a "liturgy," to send an
expedition to the north pole. We cannot and must not do
this. Who, then, can do it? Society, of course; and let me
add, how small are these expenses compared to so many
others of less and even of doubtful importance! how incalculable their benefits!
The fine arts are, as we have seen, of great national importance, in an industrial, moral, and patriotic point of view.
Museums, therefore, if more important subjects are not sacrificed to them, and if they remain national institutions and
national schools, are subjects justly claiming their due and
proportionate support of the state.
II4 
POLITICAL ~ETHICS.
V. Let us return to the subject of general education. If
general school education, imparting that ele m'entary knowledge without which an individual nowadays is a sort of
outcast from the common pale of civilized society, is of great
importance in politics, that species which was called industrial education (by which, I beg to remind the reader, I intend
by no means a training in schools for certain trades) is not
less so, and is perhaps even more so. Every citizen without
exception, in some sphere of activity or other, strictly industrial or mental, should apply himself, and manifest himself as
a real and active member of his society. Without it he loses
his hold upon society and becomes dangerous, whether he
be prompted to do so by riches or poverty. Man is not made
for indolence; he loses his inward equipoise, and becomes
morbid or criminal, fanciful or self-willed, if he is not acting.
He neglects his duty towards society if he thus severs himself from the common course of action and plunges into undefined and indolent selfishness. As to those who cannot be
seduced into such a course because they do not possess
wealth, it is necessary to observe that among the most fruitful sources of all crimes a neglected habit of industry is the
foremost.  Solon, according to Plutarch, decreed that the son
was not bound to support his aged father-one of the most
sacred obligations in his code-if the latter had not brought
up his son to some trade. This is very striking. Very positive experience must have induced that sage to express in so
forcible a form the observation of a political result. Observation in modern times will furnish the same facts. I do not
speak of riots, or political disturbances, which, when they are
not founded on a substantial evil, are in most cases chiefly
promoted by those who are not engaged in industrious pursuits, but limit myself to the commission of crime., In my
Idleness as a political evil reached its " classical age" in the worst periods of
Grecian democracy, and in Rome.  In the former, presence in the popular assellmbly came to be paid for, as in the worst time of the French revolution.  During
the decline of Rome, the idling wretches sank so low that, too cowardly to
march against the conquering tribes, they ineveitle'less were delighted at seeing
II5 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
inquiries respecting education, industry, and crime, I have
found among other remarkable results this: that of three
hundred and fifty-eight criminals two hundred and twentyseven had never been bound out to any trade or regular occupation, seventy-nine were bound out but ran away before they
had stayed out their time, and only fifty-two were bound out
and remained with their respective masters until the completion of their proper time; and that the average time of the
sentence of imprisonment in the case of those who had served
out was a little less than four years, but of those who ran
away, a little above five years, thus indicating a much greater
degree of criminality. Here it might be objected that the
running away from the master is the effect of vicious habits,
and not the cause of the future crime; but whether the one
be the cause of the other, or both the effect of the same cause,
it is for our purpose the same: it shows how closely the want
of industry is connected with viciousness and  criminality,
and how right it is, like Solon, to insist upon universal industrial education.
It would be well could the right of voting be connected not
only with a degree of education, but also with some steady
employment. This, hlowever, belongs to Politics proper.
I ought to observe here for the general reader, that binding
out is not restricted to mechanical trades, but extends, with
us, to agricultural pursuits likewise." The facts ascertained
the agony of the dying gladiator. When Treves was devastated by German
predatory tribes, the first thing which the inhabitants, deprived of house and
property, asked for, was Circensian games. Salvian de Gub. Dei, vi. I46.
I Mr. Wood, warden of the Eastern Penitentiary in Pennsylvania, and Mr.
Yard, keeper of the New Jersey Penitentiary, have with much kindness made at
my request inquiries and furnished me with statements respecting the industrial
education of criminals, and the age at which criminals lost their parents, of
high interest, the results of which I shall not omit to make public on some
proper occasion. The Rev. Mr. Barrett, chaplain to the Connecticut State
Prison, has furnished me likewise with valuable statistics as to the age
when the criminals lost their parents. I made this point one of my inquiries,
because it shows the probability of moral and industrial neglect in the convict
when young, if he has lost his parents early; the great value, therefore, of sound
education, and-it may be added-of judicious-orphan asylums.   For some im
I
Ii6 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
in other countries corroborate the observation made above.
The training for vice, as testified to before parliamentary committees, and the harvest of crime growing on the luxuriant
soil of indolence, is appalling.,
VI. Besides the habit of industry, the four following are of
much importance in education applied to politics; the habit
of obedience, of independence, of reverence, or whatever it be
called,-by which term I wish to express that earnestness in
contemplating things which strives to know their real character and connection, and the absence of arrogant forward
ness and self-sufficiency, which considers everything silly,
useless, or unmeaning because not agreeing with its own
views or not showing its character at once to the superficial
observer,-and, lastly, the habit of honesty. We have seen
that it is the high prerogative of man to acknowledge superiors and inferiors, to have laws and to obey them; but since
individual interest as well as the pleasure or allurement of
resistance and opposition is in itself frequently very strong,
as selfishness is but too apt to grow up like a rank weed, we
ought to imbue the young early with true loyalty, that is with
a sincere desire to act as members of a society, according to
rules not arbitrarily prescribed by themselves, and with a
submission of individual will and desire to that of society.
They ought to learn that it is a privilege of men to obey laws,
and a delight to obey good ones. That these habits, early
and deeply inculcated, may lead to submissiveness and want
portant remarkls on the connection between hlabits, morality,, and  labor, and  its
quality, see H. C. Carey, Principles of Political Economy, Philadelphia,  1838
vol. ii. p. 207, et seq.
An article in the Londlon Times,.of December, 1838, contains extracts from
statements made before parliamentary committees in I837, respecting the careful
and effectual education in crime practised in London, of great importance to the
criminalist and philosopher.  Mr. Wakefield has attentively inquired into this
hideous subject, and written upon it. It were desirable that the French penal
statistics, issued yearly with such laudable zeal by government, would in future
include some statement by which the industrial education might be ascertained,
as likewise statements of the age when the convict lost one or both his parents.
I 17 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
of independence, is only to be feared where education is imperfect or liberty at a low ebb.   The  greater the liberty
enjoyed by a society, the. more essential are these habits,
especially in modern times, when various new and powerful
agents of intercommunication and diffusion of knowledge
have produced a movability and thirst for inquiry which cannot leave in us any sincere fear on the ground of dull tameness in the adult, wherever liberty is at all established. The
ancients knew the value of these habits, and all their wise
men insisted upon them.   Nations which lose the precious
habit of obeying, that is of self-determined obedience to the
laws  because they are  laws, lose invariably likewise  the
precious art of ruling.   Greece, Rome, and Spain, for the
last centuries, as well as the worst times of the feudal ages,
are examples.
I believe, moreover, that an individual destitute of that reverence by which he feels linked to his fellow-men, present and
past, is as unfortunate as he is dangerous.  It is a sad thing
to be imprisoned in selfish arrogance. The habit of independence includes the love of justice, of right, of acting manfully by principle, of disdaining popularity when need be, of
holding up the head. in spite of the heavy blows which fate
may inflict-of being honestly, bravely, yet calmly, a true man.
Lastly, the habit of honesty in the smallest details, and apparent trifles, both as to truth and property, cannot be too
early and too anxiously cultivated.  It is not sufficient that
the young learn early to shun pilfering, but it is necessary
that a sacred regard for property, in all its manifestations, be
early instilled into their souls; a regard which must increase
in the same degree as the protection of property is wanting,
and towards public property, even though consisting only in
the school or college utensils, as much as towards private
property. That greatest aim of all moral education, to make
men just and true, kind and self-controlled, is also the most
important moral education for the state. Let men be just
and true, and what is not gained!
As regards the instruction of the child with reference to its
II8 
POLITICA4L ETHICS.
future citizenship, I would mention that the soul of the child
is best awakened by noble examples. We ought to make it
early acquainted with some of the best in history, and, as ancient history is far more striking and symbolical, simpler and
more direct, as well as more significant in forms and signs,
than modern history, which is more complicated and covered,
if I may use this expression, the former will always be found
to be far more appropriate to warm, incite, and occupy the
child. Plutarch, or some parts of Herodotus, cannot be supplanted by books on the history of late centuries. At the
same time, that coiiceztric instruction which starts from what
is near us and extends in wider and wider circles, indispensable, in my opinion, for leading the child to vivid perceptions,
is highly advisable likewise in leading the. young to a just
appreciation of distant actions and institutions and to a habit
of observation and attention. It is in political instruction s
in geography, in which the course of the largest rivers, and
the laws which they obey, can be best shown by followingr
the course of a rill or rivulet near at hand. At a successive
period the history of our own country in connection ought to
follow, and finally a more particular acquaintance with our
political duties and responsibilities, for which the instruction
in history gives opportunity in a desultory yet very important
manner firom its first commencement. The attempt to teachl
political economy to children is one of the ludicrous effects
in our times of a disregard of the various conditions resulting
from different ages, sexes, and other circumstances-a folly
resulting from superficiality, not unfrequently from  sordid
desire of gain in those who offer instruction, and of ignorance
in the parents, who do not know that learning formulas by
heart, and printed answers for printed questions, drawn up
moreover not unfrequently in an injudicious manner, does not
constitute teaching and cultivating the mind of the young.
Conscientious education cannot be carried on in so hasty or
wholesale a manner.
It is hardly necessary to mention gymnastics. They are of
such decided moment that I do not know what to say of
II9 
POLITICA L ETHICS.
them except that they are even morally of the first importance, without entering into a discussion the length of which
would be unsuited for the present work.  They are far too
little regarded as an indispensable branch of education, and
ought invariably to be connected with public instruction. Our
climate, with its great changes of heat and cold, our exceeding ease of travelling without physical exertion, our free institutions, and our entire dependence upon the people at large
for the defence of the country, demand it imperatively.
VII. I have spoken here chiefly of elementary education
only. As to superior education, the classical department will
always be of the highest importance. It is a principle in all
education that its efficiency, thoroughness, and completeness
depend in a high degree upon the question whether it is
founded upon the main elements of that civilization in which
the individual to be educated lives and has to act, and which
he is expected to promote in turn. Now, the factors of that
product which we call our civilization-the civilization of the
West Caucasian race-besides those factors without which no
civilization whatever can exist, namely, accumulated experience (knowledge) and accumulated labor (skill and capital), are
Christianity, antiquity, and the Teutonic element. From these
three elements arose, and still arises, our peculiar and high
civilization, through them alone we can find a key to it, and
upon them we must found our education, if we endeavor
thereby to develop the mind in such a manner that it may
harmonize with the civilization we breathe. Every time that
an attempt has been made to discard one or the other, experience has shown that injurious deficiency must be the consequence. The history of education amply proves it.
It appears to me that the gigantic effect of Chinese education is owing to the fact that it is strictly founded upon the
factors of Chinese civilization. Whatever we may think of
the latter, and however fettering instead of developing and
invigorating we may consider Chinese education, it cannot be
denied that the effect is gigantic; perhaps more so than that
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POLITICAL ETHICS.
of any other extensive national education. Nearly four hundred millions of bustling and industrious people, in an overpeopled country, without a religious element which induces
them to consider this life as a minimum existence to be regulated in part with reference to an endless existence hereafter,
-or if part of these people, the Buddhists, believe in a fiuture
existence, they believe it to depend upon certain performances
rather than the morality of their acts in this life -and all
these many people under a weak government, which does not
even share in this latter religion-and yet they live in peace,
and form an unbroken whole. It is by education alone that
the Chinese government rules this colossus, and this education does produce this surprising effect, as it appears to me,
only because it is strictly founded upon the chief factors of
their peculiar civilization, being entirely a civilization of their
own. It is not a patriotic education, but a most essentially
Chinese one. I need not repeat that I have mentioned this
instance only with reference to the magnitude of its effect.
VIII. In the whole scale of our terrestrial creation we find
that the higher life rises in its functions, and therefore the
nobler the organism is of which it is the result, the more distinct and prominent becomes the difference of sexes. Vegetable as well as animal life exhibits this important phenomenon. In the very lowest animals no difference of sexes
exists; with the higher station of the animal in the long
chain of organic bodies the marked distinction of the sexes
increases, until we find it in man, the concluding link, more
prominent and thorough than in all other animals. It is a
divine order of things, and has been early acknowledged as
such by the various nations, as the ancient religions and
systems of philosophy show. So striking is this difference in
the great household of organic life that men have frequently
applied the same principle to inorganic matter, and even to
abstract principles,, while they likewise naturally expressed
x Most of the religio-philosophical systems of the East have adopted in their
accounts of creation a principle by which they typify a mysterious union of
I2I 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
their feeling and conceptions by applying the different gramrhatical genders to inanimate objects around them, as the
early and original languages do, I mean those idioms which
did not originate by the process of mixture at a period when
the people were comparatively advanced and reflection prevailed over impulse.
The female of the human species is smaller, the chest narrower, the muscular system little developed, the voice an octave higher, and the nervous system predominant; hence her
sensibility is greater. The peculiar state of her lymphatic and
cellular systems, and the circumstance that her sanguineous
system is less active than in man, are the causes of her greater
whiteness and transparency of skin and roundness of form, in
short of her greater charm, of her less activity, and of a
greater want of fiercer passions, which characterize the bilious
temperament. She is framed and constituted more delicately,
and in consequence of this marked difference of organization
has advantages and disadvantages compared to the male sex,
differences which are fundamental and of the last importance
for the obtaining of those ends for which man and mankind
are placed on this globe, and from which likewise different
positions, callings, duties, and spheres of activity result.
The woman is more timid, more affectionate, keener in feeling, hence sprightlier in those thoughts which originate from
acute sensitiveness; she is less ardent in far-reaching plans,
more uninterruptedly busy in a sphere of quiet activity, more
graceful in soul and body, more attractive, more patient and
the masculine and feminine principles, from which the first existence of things
takes its origin. The dogma, in certain mythologies, of the supposed intervention of a masculo-feminine principle in the development of the mundane egg,
bears a singular parallel to the Chinese Tai-Ky, a mystic figure which represents
the union of Yang and Yn, the male and female principle. [The Tai-Ky really
denotes the absolute, that beyond which there is nothing more.  Wuttke, Gesch.
Heidenth., ii. I4.]  Davis, The Chinese, vol. ii. p. 65, gives an account of it.
Respecting the Hindoo philosophy on this point I must refer to the History of
Ancient Philosophy, by Ritter (iii. 349-418, Hamb., I834).  So did the Pythagoreans enumerate among the primeval elements of nature the Masculine and
Feminine. Arist., Met., i. 5, 6.
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POLITICAL ETHICS.
cunning in obtaining her objects, more confiding and believing. Man is stronger, bolder, more energetic and active,
and of consequence more exhausted by his efforts, thus standing in greater need of deep repose; he is more judging and
inquiring, hence more just if his passion is not roused; less
patient and enduring; less willing calmly to submit; more
ardent and much stronger in the powers of combination and
comprehension; his mind has greater grasp; he is more independent, freer in action and thought, bolder in braving the
opinion of others. These mental differences are no less important for the constitution of the family (as it rises in character with the progress of civilization) than the physical
difference which the Creator has ordained as the necessary
condition of procreation for nearly all organic life, and upon
which- those differences of disposition and faculties are
founded.
IX. From this different organization arise different relations, as has been observed already. The woman is fitter for
all those actions which must be impelled chiefly by affection;
hence she is more fit to foster and educate the young, and to
nurture in turn their hearts with affection; she is more disposed to cling to a protector, and far readier to consent to
sacrifices; she graces society, and-sentiment being one of the
spheres in which she is most active, and chastity her first
virtue and honor-she is the chfiief agent in infusing delicacy,
gentleness, taste, decorum, and correctness of morals, so far
as they depend upon continency, into society at large.  These
in turn attract the male sex, and inspire the sterner bosom of
man with those feelings of romance and delicate reverence
which form, however extravagant they may at times appear,
not only a salutary but a necessary element of high civilization. It belongs to the province of general ethics to discuss
the question, why continency is the chiefest virtue of the
woman and inseparably connected with her honor, and why,
according to the universal sentiment of mankind, incontinency
in the male sex, however immoral, does not create the same
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POLITICAL ETHICS.
feeling of disgust with which it is viewed in the other sex.
Thus much only may be stated here, that Providence, ordain ing that the family in its purity and inviolateness should form
the nucleus of civilization, and that it should be formed by
the union of sexes, seems to have imposed as one of the primitive elements of human society, on man, not only the desire
for this union, but the choice of his desire, on the one hand,
and the acute feeling of bashfulness of woman on the other
hand, so that man's desire should partake of reverence and
be more than mere appetite, from which circumstance attachmnent and perpetuity of union arise. If the desire in man
were not strong, selfishness might prevent the existence of
families; if the woman were not bashful, an equal disorder
would arise. When the family has been formed, the actual
knowledge of the chlild's parentage-that knowledge which
is derived from the evidence of the senses, and not from moral
conviction-is confined to the woman alone; and as the
family, with the affections between the parents and their offspring, forms an absolutely necessary element of man's ethical
and political relations, the continency of the woman, on which
the purity and intenseness of family feeling depend, becomes
naturally the more important, so that moral conviction of the
child's parentage as far as concerns the father may fully supplant the want of conviction by the senses.
X. The true sphere of woman's best and noblest activity,
and a sacred one it is, assigned to her in the distribution of
the degrees of affection and intellect, ardor and reliance, is the
family, where she acts as wife, mother, daughter, and sister,
and through it that society which we have called the society
of comity, where she graces, humanizes, and reconciles, and,
through both, the country. In what way her activity is connected with the country, and mediately with the state, is the
subject which will now occupy us.
The nature and consequent duties of woman exclude her
from public life; her timidity, bashfulness, delicacy, and inferior grasp of mind, as well as the necessity of acting out
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POLITICAL ETHICS.
those sacred duties more especially assigned to her, require
her being more retired than the other sex. A woman loses
in the same degree her natural character, as woman, as she
enters into publicity. There are, of course, women whose
extraordinary mental organization is such that they form exceptions; but wherever this fundamental principle is abandoned as a general rule, evil ensues, as in every other case of
deviation from the laws of nature. The woman cannot defend the state: if she were physically able to do it, she would
necessarily lose her peculiar character as woman, and thus a
necessary element of civilization would be extinguished. Here,
too, emergencies may make exceptions-exceptions of the
noblest and proudest kind; but should they cease to form
exceptions, a subversion of the whole moral order of things
would- be the consequence. She does not preach, she does
not judge in court, nor debate in the legislative halls, nor take
a direct part in politics; if she does so, it is always to the
injury of society, be it by way of court intrigue, as was the
case in so eminent a degree in France before the first revolution, or by way of popular excitements, as was frequently the
case in Scotland during its most agitated periods in the seventeenth century," or in a hideous degree during the French
revolution.
We have seen that the family in its unity and purity is
necessary, and that to produce and maintain these the retiredness of woman is equally necessary. A natural consequence
of this circumstance, in addition to the fact that her affections
and feelings are stronger than those of man if not blunted by
corruption or absurdity, is that she is naturally less apt to
judge of public business, and to allow the principle of right,
of justice alone, full weight. Her situation in the family gives
her less opportunity to cultivate this feeling of mere justice
than she otherwise might do. Women, therefore, are carried
away by that which naturally operates most actively in them,
I Raumer, History of the Sixteenth and Sevenfeenthl Centuries, illustrated by
Original Documents, London, i835, vol. ii. p. 337, and previous passages.
I25 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
by sentiment, even in spheres where it is of the utmost importance to repress it as much as human frailty will permit.'
Hence the fact that if women once enter into politics, and
especially take part in party strifes, they show themselves less
scrupulous than men, are apt to be entirely carried away by
personalities, and to trespass much farther than men upon the
limits of fairness, justice, and truth.
There are other reasons, however, why women should be
strictly excluded from active politics.  The woman, weakler
by nature, hence gentler and more dependent, is naturally
given more to intrigue if she once transgresses the line of her
proper sphere. Boldness, strength, and public action being
denied her, originally or as a natural consequence of her
position, she will the sooner resort to intrigue, and as she
naturally acts more by attraction and charm she becomes
necessarily the more dangerous. No true civilization is possible where there does not largely exist that chivalric feeling in
man which gladly yields, wherever possible, to the weaker and
more delicate, gentler and more graceful sex. This feeling,
however, operates in politics, where Right should rule alone,
very dangerously. If woman were to be admitted to an active
participation in politics, she must do it at the price of her
whole peculiar nature, her grace and her attraction, and would
henceforth be distinguished from man by her greater weakness alone, and in consequence become greatly oppressed.
If woman claims to be admitted as a member of a jury, she
must allow herself to be sworn in as a constable. The woman
who should go to the poll must have disrobed herself of her
essential nature as woman, and either be treated as men are,
which would lower her character and position in society, or
she must be treated with deference, which would be disastrous
to the fundamentals of the state.
The family is necessary not only for procreation, but for the
promotion of morals and civilization; unity, love, forbearance
x In this respect women are like people living in countries in which there is no
public political life'  They do not learn to modify their opinion b)y seeing it
opposed, or to respect the perfect right of others to oppose it.
I26 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
in it are necessary; the woman stands in need of protection
and support; the man, of being led to the sphere of affections,
to the unselfish love of his wife and children. But if the
woman were to take an active part in the politics of free
countries, the unity would be disturbed, husband and wife
would no longer be one; the most gloomy consequences
must follow, it would be impossible for womankind long to
retain modesty and continency, and thus society would hasten
to speedy dissolution. She would likewise lose her great
privilege of softening and pacifying society, of being the bond
which unites many discordant elements. If we look around
us, we see how daily and hourly woman, because she enjoys
her peculiar position, brings elements in contact, if she does
not reconcile them, which otherwise would bitterly war with
one another. "She shall have peace in market or fair, whether
the feud among men be never so great," says the ancient law
of the Visigoths. The most sacred interests, then, of man,
of woman, and of society demand, as much as strict justice,
that she should not meddle with politics.
XI. There is, nevertheless, a cord by which the woman is
strongly connected through her liveliest sentiments with the
state-it is patriotism.  Let it not be said that this virtue cannot be strong in her if we deny her an active part in the daily
political affairs. On the contrary, that feeling is frequently
strongest by its native vigor in those individuals whose feelings have not been exposed to the blunting effects of political
strife and rancor, for patriotism is the love of country, not the
love of the state only.  Through her husband and children
and brothers she is connected with the actions of the state;
let her cultivate the noblest feelings, let her be both a support
and an incentive to her husband, let her in herself represent
to him the country which is worth living, toiling, dying for,
let her early imbue her children with this sacred love, and,
when finally need shall be, let her act boldly and heroically
if she have the constitution, bestowing an honor upon her
country. Let the woman look upon the numberless Roman
I27 
POLITICAIL ETHICS.
wives and mothers who, though so strictly domestic, willingly
could die for their country, and then say whether their lot is
low. I believe it can be said without contradiction that in all
periods of free nations, in which the noblest deeds have been
performed and the greatest sacrifices made to liberty, and in
which the nation has evinced a spirit that stands as an en kindling example to the latest periods, woman has stood in
this her true position, as wife and mother, linked most closely
to her country through husband and son.
It seems to me one of the great destinies of woman that,
not being ordinarily called upon in the great order of things
to mingle in the turmoil of life, in the strife and struggle of
the times and the bustle of business, or in those pursuits of
knowledge or practical life which make men acquainted with
the selfish, criminal, and foul aberrations of human nature, she
is more able to keep the simple and elementary sentiments
and impulses untainted in their native freshness and purity.
Men in this respect appear to me like the lawyers or judges,
who, by long practice, seeing so much, weighing so much
for and against, must frequently become blunted in their native quick feelings of right; but women, like the lookers-on,
unprofessional yet deeply.interested in the issue. And should
it be necessary to add that men, frequently seeing so much
corruption abroad, are apt to be influenced by the lower
standard around and above them?  It becomes, therefore, the
more necessary that in the wife, not exposed as she is to
these unhallowed effects, and cultivating as she does in the
stillness of the house the virtue of her children, the broad arind
pure principles of patriotism should continue to be represented.   When  the sentence respecting Hampden's  evermemorable ship-money case was to be pronounced, and the
British court used its whole influence to obtain an opinion of
the bench favorable to the unlawful usurpations of the crown,
but subversive of one of the most elementary principles of the
British constitution, and nearly all the judges, dependent creatures of the crown, had made up their minds to support them
at all hazards, Justices Crokle, Hutton, and Denliam alone
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POLITICAL ETHICS.
dared to side with justice, honor, truth, and their country.
Croke, however, before he gave his final opinion, had wavered,
not because undecided as to the great question of right, but
because he saw that his seat on the bench was at stake. It
was then that his patriotic and high-minded wife "implored
him not to sacrifice his conscience for fear of any danger or
prejudice to his family, being content to suffer any misery
with him rather than to be an occasion for him to violate his
integrity." Her name ought to be held dear and in living
remembrance forever.
XII. It is high-minded patriotism which, among other deepseated motives, may induce women in times of emergencies
to perform the most heroic deeds, boldly braving danger or
supporting all the suffering that human nature can endure.
We need not seek for instances in Telesilla, who valiantly
defended Argos when the youths of her country were slain,
or in Leana, who, tortured by Hippias to compel her to betray the secrets of her lover Aristogiton, bit off her tongue
for fear she might be unable to resist the pain; we find
many of the proudest instances of heroism and devotion in all
periods of struggle for a noble.object. The history of the
Dutch war of independence is full of the brightest examples,
and we have seen in our own times the women of Saragossa
abide by their fighting, husbands unto death,2 and the Prussian
women of all ranks attend the hospitals, in organized societies,
and do every work, the most arduous or loathsome not excepted, which the state of the wounded required, in the years
I8I 3 and I8S4, when every able-bodied man was in the field:
at which time they did not shun the malignant typhus fever,
then raging in the hospitals and carrying off many of these
ministers of humanity, who did not exclude from their care
their wounded enemies! It is sufficient to read the papers
of the day in order to be satisfied, by the accounts of ship
I [Comp. Plut. de Mulier. Virt., iv.; Pausan., i. 23.]
2 Napier, Peninsular War, book v. ch. 3.
VOL. II.
I29
9 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
wrecks for instance, of what heroism woman is capable.T Yet
let us remember that in those periods of extremity in which
woman has performed so noble a part, she had not prepared
herself for these arduous deeds by previously misplacing herself in society, or by intruding into spheres which would have
deprived her of her character. It was the loving mother, the
faithful wife, not the female politician or the spinster who had
delivered public speeches, that could suddenly step upon the
wall and look into the enemy's face.
I believe, then, that the most important calling of the
woman respecting politics is, that, as wife, she identify herself
with her husband in his best endeavors, and aid him in keeping alive and active the purest principles, and as nmother, that,
besides the whole cultivation of her children, which in so
eminent a degree depends upon her, she sow with religious zeal
the seeds of lofty patriotism in their hearts from early infancy.
For this purpose she ought to make herself acquainted with
the best examples in the history of her own and other countries. A story received in early youth from a mothler's lips'
sinks deep into the soul, and becomes a very part of it.
On the other hand, I believe that woman transgresses the
proper line, to her owrn injury and the detriment of society at
large, if she takes public part in the ordinary politics of the
day. I think it highly objectionable, unfair, and injurious if
women canvass for elections,2 and highly dangerous for their
position and character if they hold public meetings and publicly debate, as several times they have done of late in Eng
* It is a great omission that the French women of the revolution were not
mentioned here; for, while the fishwomen of Paris were loathsomely vile and
bloodthirsty, all France literally abounded with the greatest heroines, who sacrificed themselves, as wlves, mothers, sisters, daughters, and friends. See by all
means Raumer, Histor. Taschenb., Neue Folge, vol. i., I840, essay 3: "die
Fraten der Franzo.s. Revolution."
2 There is perhaps no more striking instance of ladies canvassing for election,
however common in England, on record, than when, previous to the famous
Westminster election in I784, the duchess of Devonshire and Mrs. Crewe canvassed for Fox, and the countess of Salisbury for Sir Cecil Wray.   Wraxall
gives an account or it in his Posthumous Memoirs.
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POLITICAL ETHICS.
land; I and I believe it manifestly out of place if they petition
legislative bodies respecting public measures, unless it be
against a direct injustice done to them as women, of which
indeed they do not stand in much danger in our times.
Women ought to abstain in particular from petitions for pardoning criminals. Their sentiment as well as their want of
acquaintance with practical life inclines them naturally towards
charity as soon as sentence is pronounced upon a convict;
they forget his crime, and the cause of mnorality and society,
little thinking what injury may be inflicted by frustrating the
course of law, and in particular by the new crimes which
the pardoned criminal will not be unlikely to commit. I shall
say more on pardoning in general in another place; suffice it
here to say that petitions for pardon from women are unjust
and unfair- in the highest degree. Either they study the particular case or not: if they do not, it is preposterous to solicit
a pardon; if they do, they throw away one of their first privileges in life, that of being exempt from the necessity of
making themselves acquainted with the foulest diseases of
society. I speak here of those written petitions with a number
of names, of which we all know with what degree of ignorance
of the case in question they are signed. Who would consider
it wrong in a single woman to implore mercy in cases which
do not touch common and base crimes and which interest her
individually?
Were I asked which of the women known in history signally embodies those qualities which appear to me essential
to the modern woman, not by way of exception or rare distinction for talents, but as eminently showing those qualities
which ought to be in all, in short showing the modern wife
and mother in the noblest light, I should point out Lady
Russell, wife of Lord William Russell. Kind and considerate
to children and husband, she always invited him to unbosom
x I would certainly not go so far as to pronounce against all meetings of
women, placed in so peculiar a situation, for instance, as those working in some
of the American factories.  But even there they ought always to take care not
to endanger their essential female character by entering into publicity.
I 3 I 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
himself to her in his patriotic anxieties; she understood him;
she felt with him; when he was imprisoned, she did all possible service to him; when he was tried for his life, she was
not overwhelmed, but stepped forward in court and took notes
for him; when he was sentenced, she lost no time in bewailing his doom, but attempted every lawful means to avert the
blow, and to comfort her lord in prison by her own highminded composure; and when, on the evening before his
execution, she took her last farewell from a husband she
loved better than aught on earth, and whom she knew to be
unrighteously sacrificed, even then she had the greatness of
soul to stand the trial. " He kissed her four or five times;
and she kept her sorrow so within herself that she gave him
no disturbance by their parting.", This fortitude, and the
patience with which she bore her affliction through the rest
of her life, was greater heroism than any ancient or Asiatic
self-immolation could have proved.2
I s After she was gone," continues Burnet in his journal, from which this account was taken, "he (Lord Russell) said,'Now the bitterness of death is past,'
and ran out into a long discourse concerning her-how great a blessing she had
been to him; and said,' what a misery it would have been to him if she had not
had that magnanimity of spirit, joined to her tenderness, as never to have desired
him to do a base thing for the saving of his life, whereas, otherwise, what a week
should I have passed, if she had been crying to me to turn informer and 1)e a
Lord Howard!'"   Lady Russell's whole character may be seen from Lord John
Russell's Life of William Lord Russell. I hope I do not trespass the limits of
a note, if I add a few words on the widow of Barneveldt. Maurice, stadcltlolder
of Holland, caused the wise patriot to be executed; at any rate, he did not, as
he had the power to do, prevent it, when the most unfortunate religious excitement against the poor Remonstrants ran high.  When, some time after, the son
of Barneveldt had shared in a conspiracy against Maurice, and been sentenced
to die, the mother threw herself at the stadtholder's feet to implore mercy for
her son. He asked why she could beg now for her son, and had not done so
for her husband,-whom, it ought to be mentioned, the stadthlolder declared
himself at the time ready to save, if he would implore mercy; but the old man
would not belie his innocence, as Russell declined the same. The heroic answer
of the afflicted mother but proud widow was, "My  husband was innocent, my
son is guilty."  Her prayer was not granted.  Van Campen, History of the
Netherlands, vol. ii. p.43.
2 See also Letters of Lady Rachel Russell, from the Manuscript in the Library
at Woburn Abbey, etc., 6th ed., London, 18oI.
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POLITICAL ETHICS.
XIII. The history of woman in her domestic and social as
well as in her civil relations, and more particularly in her jural
position and social influence, is one of the most interesting
and important branches of the history of civilization, which,
so far as my knowledge of literature extends, has not yet been
treated with the profoundness of thought and extent of knowledge that the subject deserves, although valuable materials
have been collected for this inviting task.,
In the earliest times, when physical subsistence and bodily
protection form the absorbing objects of human activity, it is
natural that woman should occupy a very subordinate position.
She was not only considered mentally, but also morally, inferior to man, as she was physically inferior to him.  She
was so little considered a human individual of herself, that
not only-most essential rights were denied her, but, as a
natural consequence, also moral responsibility, even to a late
period, not only metaphysically but legally, so that it became necessary to restore legal responsibility to her.2 Man,
being conscious of the necessity that the woman should
associate with him and form an ingredient of the family, could
not at once acknowledge this necessary association and yet at
the same time her entire moral individuality.  Though from
early ages affection has prevailed over power, the daughter,
like her brother, was considered the property of her father,
and when married she was sold to the wooer. The ancient
There have been several collections of the biographies of distinguished women.
Alexander, History of Women, 2 vols. 4to, I779; Segur, Les  Femmes, 3 vols.,
1802; Communications from the Lives of Distinguished Women  (in German),
Stuttgard, I828; with many other works. Meiners wrote a History of the Female Sex (in German), Hanover, I788-1800, 4 vols.  For any one who desires
to inquire thoroughly into what has been written on this subject, as well as on
the influence of Christianity upon the position of woman, and other points coniected with the general subject, it would be well to examine the list of works
appended to the article Woman (Frau) in Krug's Dictionary of Philosophical
Sciences; though it is far from being complete.
2 King Magnus Erichsen of Sweden "w as able to decree, in 1335, that'the
woman shall suffer for her crimes like the man, especially for crimes touching
life.'" Geijer, History of Sweden, Hamburg, 1832, vol. i. p. 273. The words
"was able" are very significant.
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POLI17CAL ETHICS
history of Asiatic nations, for instance the Bible, and of other
tribes, shows this, as well as the customs observed to this day
by the tribes of the East., Polygamy, legitimate even with
the Hebrews,2 though not favored or general,3 did not rapidly
promote the jural or social emancipation of the woman. In
Europe, among the Greeks and Romans as well as other tribes,
monogamy existed from early times, and we consequently find
the woman there in a very different position. She has now
become the companion of the husband. Greek history records
many of the brightest examples of women as wives or mothers,
but the annals of no nation probably exhibit so many as those
of Rome; instances of heroic devotion, which continue far
into the corrupt periods of the Western empire. The Teutonic tribes, which hastened the downfall of crumbling Rome,
showed, from the earliest periods in which we find them mentioned, no less than in their whole mythology, a peculiar regard
for the female, which, together with the humanizing influence
of the church in general, and its direct efforts in many instances
to improve the position of woman, had a salutary effect on
the European population.  When chivalry sprang up, in which
religious ardor, desire of adventure, and devotion to woman
were romantically blended, the exaltation of woman became,
in one class at least, an absorbing concern of life. Though
this adoration of woman led to many fantastic and even immoral aberrations,4 and had far less effect upon the essential
I Niebuhr the elder, Burckhliardt, and all the other travellers in the East. So
do we find instances of the buying of wives in Odyss., xi. 28I; Iliad, xi. 244;
Herod., i. I 96; Strabo, p. 745, etc.
2 Michaelis, Mosaic Law, ii. 85; Saalschutz, Mos. Recht, chap. I03.
3 Michaelis, ii. 95; Jahn, Arch., i. 2.
4 The morals of the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries were of the
most licentious character. Chateaul)riand, in the third volume of his Etudes
HIistoriques, gives instances, such as establishments ill imitation of nunneries
with vows of immorality. Whoever is in the least acquainted with the morals of
those ages, with the peculiar government and corporate privileges of the prostitutes
in the various cities during former periods and with the courts and monasteries of
those times, will consider the advance of morality in our race during the last
two centuries, despite all existinig irregularities, as one of the most signal traits
134 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
position of woman in general, and the morals of the age, than
many persons, satisfied with insulated and poetic accounts,
rashly believe, still every one acquainted with the history of
civilization will admit the romantic devotion of the middle
ages to have been one of the factors in producing a better
state of things and in somewhat tempering even the miseries
of part of the worst periods. The cities, with their industry
and wealth, rose in power and number, governments became
more general institutions, the feudal lords more subdued;
peace was more and more established, and the rights of the
commons, of the people in general, and also those of the
women in particular, became gradually more clearly defined,
extended, and valued. Woman was more and more acknowl
edged in her own moral capacity. Laws became juster towards her. When the period of re-discussion of all human
rights began during the last century, inquiry naturally was
extended to the position and rights of woman, which, the
more these attracted attention, became in many instances very
limited indeed as to extent, though acute as to the single
object which happened to be under discussion; and finally a
series of writings appeared, beginning perhaps with Mary Wollstonecraft's Vindication of the Rights of Women, published
towards the end of the last century, which, in determnining the
proper sphere of action in society and the state for man and
wotnan, altogether lost sight of the different organization of the
two sexes, and the pervading divine order of things founded
upon it. One step led to another, and finally writers appeared, both male and female, who endeavored to break  up
that institution which was already considered by the ancient
philosophers, poets, and priests as forming together with the
institution of property the only firm foundation of all civilization-the institution of matrimony. Two late writers in particular, a man and a woman, have written upon this subject
and the intercourse between the two sexes, with so disgusting
in modern history.  The change  which has taken place is far beyond what any
one who has not perused the histories and chronicles of the times can imagine.
135 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
a temerity that I seriously doubt whether any previous period
has keen disgraced by compositions of equally loathsome immorality, pitiful and superficial reasoning, and gross ignorance.
XIV. Neither the literary progress of women and their dis tinction in the province of letters, on the one hand, nor, on the
other, the question why females should be allowed to sit upon
a throne, when excluded from all other public business, is a
subject to be discussed here. The one belongs to the history
of literature or female civilization, the other to politics proper.
It is nothing more than a mere question of high political expediency. Yet although the subject of voting by females does
not belong, strictly speaking, to our province, but to natural
law and politics proper, as defined in the first part, I may be
allowed to give here a very few additional remarks on the
subject.
Either we acknowledge the difference of sexes, and consequent different spheres of action, as necessary and founded in
th,e great order of things, or not.  If the former, then there
is no more denial of right in excluding women from public
business than there is in not calling on them to take up arms or
to work, by way of taxation, in repairing high-roads. If the
latter be the case, we ought not only to allow them to vote,
for that is a very specific and limited political act indeed, but
they ought to be in every respect admitted and consequently
called upon to do all that men do. It is erroneously supposed
by some that voting is a natural and absolute right, inherent
in each individual. This is a very great mistake; for though
every one's interest ought to have its due weight in the devising of public measures, whose degree of justice depends
upon the average benefit they bestow upon the whole, it is not
necessary that this be effected by his voting. Universal suffrage is a term too vast for what is meant to be expressed.
There are always persons excluded from voting. Soldiers do
not vote, and ought not to vote for instance in their barracks;
the French constitution of Herault de Sechelles excluded domestics from voting, because too dependent in their situation;
I36 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
many constitutions exclude the clergy from voting, because
their influence, always great, is feared if they interfere with
politics. Nor is the question of universal suffrage to be otherwise decided upon abstract ground. Universal suffrage in
Illyria or in any semi-barbarous tribe in near contact with
civilization would be a very melancholy thing. So no civilized nation in which, from whatever cause it may result, there
are vast classes, ignorant, rude, and poor, excluded from the
common stream of civilization, can endure universal suffrage.
Those who insist on the natural birthright of man  to vote
cannot in my opinion demonstrate the legality of a representative government, nor of any other government except that
of a tribe which daily decides by a simple numerical majority
of all its members upon every subject.  Yet we are told that,
allowing - all these positions, the woman is not even represented. This too rests upon an error. Is not the whole life of
the husband daily, hourly, and most thoroughly influenced
by her and by his position towards her? And if he takes, as
he necessarily must do, this whole frame of mind with him
into legislative proceedings, is his wife unrepresented? The
agriculturist is far less sure that a merchant of his district will
represent his interest than the wife is that her husband represents her., How are the sick or the old represented who
cannot go to the poll? If indeed by true representation be
meant that each one should have a direct spokesman, and not
the political organism through which we arrive at the public
opinion and public will of the whole, after those of the parts
of society have modified one another, I do not see how indeed
the minority is represented in any representative government,
or how a law of the majority in an absolute democracy can
It is always a painful, sometimes a dangerous, task to be obliged to touch
upon important and highly debated points without being able to give and develop
the whole  for it is not agreeable to be misunderstood on such topics.  I can of
course not explain my whole view of governments, etc., but I may be allowed to
add at least that I consider it a principle in politics that the right of voting, if it
exist at all, ought to be extensive, and not restricted, or it will work far more
mischief than good.
I37 
POLITICAL ETIICS.
have any binding power upon the minority. For it is certain
that in the former case the representative does not directly
represent the minority, since he says and does things totally
at variance with their opinion; nor is the law in the latter case
the direct law, that is the public will of the minority.
I conclude with a passage of Mr. Guizot's, and only add
that he is the husband of a lady highly distinguished even in
literature. He says, "Society, however simple may be its
structure, has other affairs than such as are merely domestic
to engage its attention; affairs that demand an extent of capacity not possessed by females and minors. Let us suppose
a discussion to arise in some savage tribe, or in some state
already civilized, relative to a warlike expedition or the adoption of a civil law: neither women nor minors are capable of
-deciding upon interests of this description; Providence has
destined the former for a state of existence purely domestic,
while the latter have not yet attained to the plenitude of their
individual existence and the full power of their faculties.
Naturally, then, and by the operation of one of those truly
providential laws in which fact and right are so very hlarmoniously blended, the right of suffrage does not belong to them
Capacity, then, is the principle, the necessary condition, of
right. And the capacity here spoken of is not merely due to
intellectual development or to the possession of this or that
particular faculty; it is a complex and profound whole, comprising spontaneous authority, habitual situation, and natural
acquaintance with the different interests to be regulated; in
fact, a certain aggregate of faculties, knowledge, and methods
of action which animate the whole man, and which decide,
with more certainty than his spirit alone, upon his course of
conduct and the use which he will make of power."
I38 
CHAPTER II.
Obedience to the Laws.-How highly the Greeks esteemed it.-Obedience to
Laws one of Man's Prerogatives.-Absolute Obedience impossible.-Ad Im possibilia Nemo obligatur.-Ad Turpia Nemo obligatur.-Viscount Orthes. Unlawful Demands made by lawful Authority.-High Importance of the Judi  ciary with reference to Obedience to the Law.-Not all that is not prohibited
may be done by the Citizen, any more than all that is positively permitted.
-Penalties are not equivalents of Crime.-Malum in se, Malum prohibi tum:  Is the distinction essential, and can we found any Rule of Action
upon it?-The Question of Obedience to Laws a Question of Conflict.-Obe dience in the Army and Navy.-Articles of War.-Obedience in the Civil
Service.-How far is the Citizen bound to obey the Laws?-Justifiable Dis obedience.-Necessary and morally demanded Disobedience.-Non-compli ance with the Laws, or passive Resistance.-Active Resistance.-Armed
Resistance.-Insurrection.-Revolution.-Resistance formerly considered law ful and received in the Charters.-Mobs and Mob-law, so called.-Duty of
Informing: in the Officer; in the Citizen at large.-Professional Informers for
Rewards.- Secret Police.-Delatores and  Mouchards.-The  obligation of
informing against intended or committed Offences.
XV. "STRANGER, tell the Lacedaemonians that we lie here
in obedience to their laws."  This was the simple inscription,
composed by Simonides of Ceos, to commemorate the heroic
and conscious devotion of the faithful band of Leonidas at
Thermopyla; and in which a nation of peculiar sagacity, and
promptitude of mind as well as ardor of soul for liberty, a nation with whom " freedom was what the sun is; the most brilliant and most useful object of creation-a passion, an instinct,"
thought to express the highest acknowledgment of a deed
which every Greek remembered with national pride. It was
not merely the happy conceit of an individual; it was the
true expression of the public spirit. Of all that was noble
and great in this patriotic act, the noblest and greatest seemed
to them that the gallant citizens had been obedient to the
x Herodotus, vii. 228.
I39 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
laws and their country even unto death. Youthful reader,
whose noble and happy lot it is to be born in a free country,
an heir to the laws of liberty, weigh well this inscription, in
which one of the noblest nations of the earth has concentrated
its lively spirit and dear experience, a lesson for every one
who cherishes freedom, and intends to make it prosper, as far
as in him lies, as the best cause of mankind.
XVI. To make, acknowledge, and obey laws is one of the
high prerogatives as well as duties of man among all the animate beings of the visible creation. Obeying a Iaw, in this
case, means conforming our actions willingly to laws, that is,
to rules in which principles, as applied to a class of cases, are
pronounced. The individual himself, as well as society at
large, stands in need of laws; without them there would be
physical and moral disorder.  The individual who does not
adopt general laws of conduct or principles of action is exposed to all the dangers of being carried away by impulses
which may arise from causes wholly unconnected with what is
good, right, or wise, by selfishness and vices; and society does
not only stand in need of laws that it may avoid violence and
consequent suffering, but also because without laws society
would lose its moral character, man would forfeit his destiny
as a social being, and civilization, that produce of united exertion, would be impossible. Man is wholly man only in
society; society is what it ought to be only through laws;
laws are virtually laws only when obeyed: therefore man's
destiny requires obedience to laws. Obedience to laws, then,
is necessary, for without their being followed they are no
longer laws in essence, because no longer rules of action.
Habitual disregard of laws in a society not only produces
confusion and clashing of action, but it leads to a want of
energy, of mutual reliance, and of public spirit, as well as to
a want of manly independence in the individual. It invigorates the soul, lends energy and gives precision of action, and
promotes a general feeling of right, if the individuals obey the
laws they have chosen to obey. Few things promote more
I40 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
the formation of a manly character and a deeply-seated sense
of justice in the young, than decisive and good laws or precepts, strictly acted out. Even the severest laws, if but clearly
pronounced and strictly enforced, may leave some feeling of
independence; but dependence upon humor gives an insuperable feeling of slavishness. He who obeys laws only as so
many insulated regulations, depriving him of more or less individual liberty which he has given up for the public good,
has not penetrated to that high degree of civic sense which
makes obedience to the laws an inspiring cause of nobility
of character.
Yet we have seen that man cannot divest himself of his
moral individuality and responsibility; the will of another
cannot virtually become his own will; and, therefore, absolute obedience is impossible, and, were it possible, immoral.
Every approach to it becomes in the same degree immoral.
Absolute obedience can be claimed for the commandments of
the Deity alone; but even here it must be observed that the
evidence that such commands do proceed from the Deity
is to be judged of by the individual; reason and conscience
must decide upon the character of the authority which demands compliance with the command presented as coming
from the Deity. A law presented by Mohammedans as a divine
law would not be obeyed by Christians in Turkey, at least
not as a divine law. In all matters between man and man
absolute obedience would destroy the moral as well as the
jural ground on which their relations are founded.. Nevertheless, passion, as well as temerity of partial reasoning, has
repeatedly induced man to claim absolute obedience for some
authority or other, in ecclesiastic spheres as well as political.
I have stated already that it seems to me to be one of our
obligations to pay serious and particular attention to any act
or institution in the whole range of history or of our own observation in which a principle, virtue, error, or vice has been
most consistently carried out. In the one case we become
acquainted with a degree of perfection perhaps unattainable
at the times we live in, yet worthy of being approached as
I4I 
POLITICAL ETItICS.
much as possible; in the other case we see the evil acted out
in all its hideousness, and therefore the danger increasing
with every degree of approach: they distinctly say to us,
"To this it will come." In either case we observe truth in its
fulness. Respecting absolute obedience I know of no more
striking instance of its being carried out in daring consistency
than that which the Jesuits demanded from the inferior to the
superior, and we may well say to those who demand it in
any other sphere, "To this it will come." 
XVII. Indeed, all promise of absolute obedience would virtually amount to taking archbishop Laud's famous and absurd
"Et-Catera Oath," by which people should bind themselves
to "maintain the government of the church by archbishops,
-I " But one thing shall exist instead of every other relation, every impulse of
activity, namely, obedience, obedience without any reference to what it extends."
(Epistle of Ignatius "Fratribus Societatis Jesu qui sunt in Lusitania," 7 Kal. Apr.
I553, 3.) The superior shall appear as the representative of Divine Providence,
the " Locum Dei tenens" (pars 5, cap. 3, Constit. ITgnat.); even a sin, if demanded in the name of Christ, or in virtute obedientire, shall be committed.
Well may Mr. Ranke, in quoting the two following passages from the " Conlstitutiones" of the society, add, "we hardly trust our eyes when we read this:"
Et sibi quisque persuadeat, quod qui sub obedientia vivunt, se ferri ac regi
a divina providentia per superiores suos sinere debent, perinde ac cadaver essent."
Constit., vi. I.
"Visum est nobis in domino... nullas constitutiones declarationes vel ordinem ullum vivendi posse obligationem ad peccatum mor-tale vel veniale indu.
cere, si superior ea in nomine dominli Jesu Christi vel in virtute obledientiac
juberet."  Const., vi. 5.
Is it to be supposed that this iniquitous passage was understood to mean that
nothing, in reality a sin, would be demanded in the name of Jesus Christ,
although, according to all appearance and common notion, it might appear so to
the inferior? If this be the case, waiving the still remaining audacity and danger, it would only prove that absolute obedience cannot he carried through, and
must stop somewhere.  The passage contained in part vi. ch. I of Colst. Ignat.
is not much better: " Nec solumn in rebus ol)ligatoriis, sed etiam in aliis, licet niill
aliud quam signuin voluntatis superioris sine ullo expresso proecepto videretur."
Bacon, although he has but just bestowed fulsome flattery upon a menarch at
once one of the meanest and most arrogant, says, even to a James I., "Nam qui
caecam ol)edientiam fortius obligare contenderit quam officium oculatum, una
opera asserat, c-ecum manu ductum certius incedere, quam qui luce et oculis
utitl r." De Dignitate Scient., i.
14? 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
bishops, deans, chapters, et cetera."' I Yet, although absolute
obedience has been so frequently demanded in theory, practice has always shown its impossibility, and those who demanded it most have generally proved the least ready to submit to it, so soon as it did not suit their position. The Jesuits
hlave had at times violent struggles within the bosom of their
society; though they took the additional vow to go whithersoever the pope might send them, they would not obey him
had he commanded anything against the doctrine of the
church.  They would say that he does not do this as pope;
and this is all that ever a sober mind has insisted upon for the
vindication of the right and duty of disobeying laws-that is,
that they are no longer, or never were, lawful; or that the
authority demanding it is not, in doing so, any longer lawful.
There- is no government ever so absolute in theory which
has not sanctioned acts of disobedience even to the command
of the prince, because done on account of the still more important interest of the same prince. How often have monarchs
wished that they had been disobeyed! Napoleon was, according to Bourrienne, on some occasions highly pleased
when he learned that he had not been obeyed. In short,
obedience is always acknowledged in practice as something
relative, and of this the individual, of course, must judge.
Nowhere in political spheres, probably, was the theory of
absolute obedience more roundly acknowledged than in the
Prussian army, to its head, the king, under Frederic \Villiam I.; yet when his son was tried for attempted escape
from his insufferable treatment, and the king appeared at
least to insist upon the blood of his son, a colonel 2 rose, tore
open his vest, and said, "If your majesty want blood, take
mine: that there you shall not have as long as I can utter a
word." The king, vehement as!he was, did not carry out the
theory of absolute obedience, but was silent; and the colonel
was not prevented from promotion.
-  Laud caused this oath, attached to certain new canons, to be passed by the
convocation of I640.
2 The name of this independent man was Buddenbrock.
143 
t POLITICAL ETHICS.
From ancient times the maxim has been acknowledged, Ad
impossibilia nemo obligatur; that which is impossible, there fore, need not be attempted, though ordered; nor is the
omission of attempting it punishable; and, farther, that Ad
turpia nemo obligatur; no one is bound to do what is iniqui tous. Mankind have uniformly agreed in applauding resist ance to that which is iniquitous, because they have always
either acknowledged or at least felt that man cannot lose his
own moral value, his independent moral individuality, and
that authority, even if supposed to rest upon some divine
origin, may be and ought to be either disobeyed or opposed
if it perverts its character and demands thlings against God's
laws, as expressed by revelation, nature, the feeling of humanity, morals, reason, or physical necessity. When Charles IX.
of France, or his mother, issued orders to slaughter the Protestants in the provinces as they had been murdered in Paris
on the eve of St. Bartholomew, several governors and other
officers - Sully mentions seven-declined obedience.  Viscount Orthes, or Ortez, commandant at Bayonne, wrote back,
"Sire, I have found in Bayonne honest citizens and brave soldiers only, but not one executioner.   Therefore they and
myself supplicate your majesty to use our arms and lives in
possible (feasible is the original) things." I He was right to
call this demanded murder an impossible, an unfeasible thing
for an honest man. Iniquitous things (turpia) are as to obedience as impossible (imnpossibilia) as physically impossible
things.
The difficulty, however, which arises out of the two necessities, that I cannot give up my individuality, my responsibility and judgment, on the one hand, and that I am obliged
to obey the laws, on the other, is not thus easily solved.
There are laws which though not atrocious ought to be dis
z The original is, "Sire, je n'ai trouve6 parmi les habitans et les gens de guerre
que de bons citoyens, de braves soldats, et pas un bourreau.  Ainsi eux et moi
sulpplions V. M. d'emnployer nos bras et nos vies i choses faisal)les."  All the
original historians of the times have it. Count de Tende was another officer who
dared to disobey. Both died soon after, it was supposed by poison.
I44 
POLITICAL ETIICS.
obeyed, others which may be disobeyed, and still others
which may be or ought to be resisted; and again there is
a difference between a just law and its unjust execution or
the mere order of an officer, even in countries where this distinct difference has not, as in England or the United States
it has, been acknowledged. These points I propose to consider in the following sections. Long and vehement as the
discussions of the right of resistance have been, they seem
to me not to be more important nor so difficult as a clear
view of the various questions touching obedience and noncompliance which are of daily occurrence.  We  have seen
that obedience is necessary, in general; disobeying or noncompliance is the exception; hence it is difficult to find general principles of solid and practical value; yet the subject
is so important that it deserves our fullest attention, and,
remembering Bacon's "Ut nihil veniat in practicam  cujus
non fit etiam doctrina aliqua et theoria," we must endeavor
to discover this general theory or those principles which may
guide us.
XVIII. The freer a state, the greater is the authority of the
law, as such and not as the personal direction of an individual,
and less circumscribed at the same time is individual action.
These are not so much, as we have seen, necessary consequences of civil liberty, as essential attributes.   The freer,
therefore, a state, the greater is the necessity of reverence for
the law. Despotic governments may far more easily dispense
with moral compliance to the law; they may coerce, and thus
maintain their character; free states stand in need of willing
compliance with the law, because it is law; otherwise disorganization, instead of advance of society, must follow. Civil
liberty shows in this, as in so many other respects, its superior
character. Force may greatly support absolutism; liberty is
of a moral nature. Yet we must needs know what is the law.
Is every demand in the name of the law, every order of an
individual clothed with authority by the law, that law which
the conscientious citizen is desirous of obeying?  Can no law
VOL. II.                   10
I45 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
though made by the proper authority transgress its rightful
limits? Do not laws themselves, if applied to practical cases,
contradict each other at times, so that it becomes impossible
to obey both at once? And, finally, cannot laws, the organs
of the state, injure or destroy the very objects of the state,
and are there no cases in which refusal of compliance or even
positive resistance becomes the necessary and the only duty
of the citizen? All these questions have been, at various
times, more or less comprehensively discussed, generally
under the excitement of disturbed times, when passionate par tiality, or a judgment warped by considerations foreign to the
jural character of the state, has induced men to assert extravagant opinions beyond the proper limits of truth one way or
the other. Or men, anxious to carry out with consistency
one theory or the other, have arrived at opposite results, the
one as far removed from truth as the other. It was natural,
besides, that the views entertained of this subject should partake of all the errors or necessary peculiarities incident to the
gradual progress of political civilization. Power is the most
striking attribute of the state, and we have seen already that
that part of government which wields it most signally is, in
the course of political progress, for a long time mistaken for
the government itself, a mistake which misleads farther, so
that he or they who have supreme public power come to be
considered the state itself. Had these political errors not
existed, disobedience to officers would not have been considered equivalent to disobedience to law, non-compliance
with law ar refusal to yield obedience to orders of one branch
of government only equal to resistance, and resistance equivalent to insurrection. So deeply seated has become, in the
course of time, the idea that the executive, or the executive
in conjunction with the law-making power, is the whole government, that many writers to this day, although belonging
to -the liberal portion of mankii.d, consider the acknowledgment of the principle that somewhere in the state an authority
,may exist which can decide upon the legality of government
measures, to be an "engrafting of revolution upon the state,"
I46 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
classing the ancient Justicia (chief justice) of AragonI in the
same category with the ephori of the Spartans or the council
of the hundred in Carthage. We cannot discuss here the
best means of watching over the legality either of executive
measures or of laws themselves, in how far they agree with
or differ from general laws or principles declared to be fundamental. It is a subject which belongs to politics proper; but
the principle, so far from being revolutionary, is the only conservative principle of free and civilized nations, as we have
seen when speaking of the all-important subject of an independent judiciary. It is a fact that an authority, for the purpose of watching over the lawful course of the high authorities of the state, either has or has not power superior to them.
If it have not, it is inefficient, and becomes only the more
dangerous- by apparently legalizing the respective measures;
if it -have, it is the supreme authority, and requires in turn to
be restrained and watched. It seems, therefore, that no expedient will be discovered so efficient, safe, and lawful in its
operation as the independence of a judiciary, which in each
practical case may declare unlawful and without authority an
order, measure, or decree purporting to be a law; an operation
far more extensive than at first glance it might appear, because
every decision of a single case settles or distinctly pronounces
the essential principle involved in the whole class of cases.
The independence of the judiciary may, indeed, frequently be
x If the reader will refer to the Introduction of Prescott's Ferdinand and Isabella, he will find the high authority of the Justicia, and admit, I suppose, that
although those early times had not yet discovered many expedients which we
possess to insure the easy operation of the law against executive encroachment,
nor that of makling responsible ministers answerable for every act of the monarch,
yet the essential idea in the Justicia was the insurance of the law against power,
and that this institution, considering the general state of the times, so far from
engrafting revolution on the state, was, on the contrary, fitted to insure much
more quiet.  That it di(- not develop and modify itself, and become more and
more a blessing to the state, seems to be owing far less, if at all, to any inherent
incongruity with sound government than to powerful extraneous circumstances,
-the vast and rapid increase of power in Spain in general, connected as much
with domestic as with general European causes.
I47 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
unable to calm the high seas of power, but it may, like firm
rocks on shore, break the single wave and disperse it into
harmless spray.'
The danger that in turn the judiciary may become the supreme authority and may err as well as the others, is greatly
obviated by the following circumstances, which have in part
been mentioned already. The judiciary has neither honor nor
places to bestow; it is accompanied by no pageant; its power
rests more essentially upon mnoral power than that of any
other branch; it gives the reasons of its decisions after discussion; it is comparatively no compact body, and its decisions may in time be overruled. I cannot conclude this
I In England, proclamations, etc., of the executive are, as a matter of course,
subject, as to their legality, to the decisions of the courts, and every officer executing an unlawful order, even were it from the king in council, does it at his
own peril. But Lord Coke (8 Coke, I I8), Chief-Justice I-Hobart (in Day vs. Savage, Hob. 87), and Chlief-Justice IIolt (City of London vs. Wood, I2 Mod. R. 687)
held and decided that even in England, where parliament is technically termed
omnipotent, acts of parliament may be cont-olled either by common  law or by
natural equity.  This natural equity is what Cicero beautifully calls the reason of
God'   " Lex vera atq(lue princeps, apta ad julbendum et ad vetandum, ratio est
recta summi Jovis."   (De Legg., ii. 4.)  In the United States, as was observed
in the first part, the proper courts must decide whether a law, made  by a legislature acting under a constitution, is in conflict with the supreme law, or riot. In
the state courts or circuit courts of the United States the principle had long been
actel upon, when in the case of Marl)ury vs. Madison, Secretary of the United
States (I Cranch, I37), in I803, the supreme court of the United States, through
the chief' justice Marshall, dleclared it to be " the power and duty of the judiciary
to disregard an unconstitutional act of congress or of any state legislature,"-" an
argument approaching to the precision and certainty of a mathematical demonstration," as Chancellor I(ent (Comment., vol. i. 453, or part iii. lect. xx.) expresses it.  (See the same Commentaries, vol. i. p. 448.)  The report of the case
is likewise contained in the collection of Chlief-Justice MIarshall's most important
Writings upon the Federal Constitution"  (Boston, I839), consisting of the
opinions of that eminent man, delivered in the supreme and circuit courts
on constitutional questions of vital importance.   It is a valuable compilation, of
great interest to every student of constitutional history and politics.  As to obeying officers demanding unlawful things, of which I have twice already spoklen,
there is no civil liberty possil)le where the principle of the armies is followed,
that the citizen must first obley, and then complain, and where the judiciary has
not to decide on each particular case in due form of justice, whether the demand is lawful or not, and whether the citizen therefore is not right in disobeying.
148 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
section without remarking that since the first part of this
work has been published I have been asked, from a distant
country, what I precisely understand by an independent judiciary. I own that my previous observations on the independence of tile judiciary were calculated for Americans or
Englishmen. I will add here that the chief demands of an
independent judiciary are that the decision upon law be
wholly left to it, and that in no case the judge demand explanation of the law in a pending case from any person or
branch soever except the law itself; that the judiciary decide
in cases between the citizen and the executive; that the judge
be in a situation which shall insure moral independence as
much as possible; that therefore he be not removable except
with comparative difficulty, for instance by impeachment, and
that he hold his office during good behavior.  For further
remarks I must refer the reader to the chapter on judges,
farther below.
XIX. Before I proceed to the consideration of the subject
proper, I may be permitted to make the following brief remarks, connected with obedience to the laws..We have seen
already that a conscientious citizen is not at liberty to do all
that is directly permitted by law: unjust, immoral, and cruel
things have at times been permitted.  When the English law
made it felony to teach a Catholic child in Ireland, and the informer was remunerated out of the forfeited property of the condemned, an honest citizen was not on that account in conscience
allowed to make use of the law. As the British courts of
law hold him answerable who does anything against law,
though directed to do so by lawfully constituted authority,
as having acted in that single case unlawfully, so we may
suppose, if there be any responsibility at all, will God hold
him responsible who does anything upon the authority of
injustice passed in the form of law against his eternal laws
of justice, reason, and humanity.  The law does not make us
unthinking and unjudging beings; it does not substitute itself
for individual responsibility.  We cannot, consequently, allow
I49 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
ourselves either to do all that is permitted or that is not pro.
hibited. There are many evil, and even wicked things, which
cannot be prohibited, or whose prohibition has not yet been
called for, as the ancient Roman laws, we are told, were silent
upon parricide.
A sheriff in the state of Kentucky, in a contested election
case,' withheld the ballot-box, because the returns were
against his party. There was indeed no specific positive law
prohibiting this daring offence against all reason and justice.
Was he on that account justifiable in doing so? The state
soon after made it felony for the future. When Tiberius
Gracchus ordered the clerk to promulgate the motion of his
first agrarian law, his colleague Octavius steadily forbade the
clerk to read it, no tribune being allowed to read it himself
Octavius had the general tribunal power of vetoing, but he
nevertheless acted unjustly.
Nor are punishments equivalents to offences, or compositions, as the fines for most crimes were called in the early
penal tariffs so peculiar to the Teutonic tribes. WVe are therefore by no means allowed to commit offences or disobey laws
merely on the ground that we have previously made up our
minds to submit willingly to the appointed penalty. Not to
speak of the fact that, even taking the penalty as an equivalent of the offence, we should remain debtors to society so
long as we have not submitted to the penalty, there remains
always the moral consideration of the individual case, the injury we do to the sufferer, and to society at large; for, though
all offences should be punished, increase of crime would remain
equally deplorable, and punishment is by no means intended
as a moral or social atonement for the offence. Yet nothing
is mnore frequent than this belief of offenders, even though
they have committed the blackest crimes.  All who are acquainted with the moral treatment of convicts know well that
this supposition, that the moral account is balanced by the
- In the contested case between Mr. Moore and Mr. Letcher, in Lincoln, Kenrtucky.
15o 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
suffering of penalty, as debt and credit are in money matters,
is one of the most common obstacles to finding entrance into
an obdurate heart., It is well known that fines are-frequently
the avowed equivalents for acts demanded by authority, without any reference to morality or offence; in many cases they
are preferred. That these fines, not being penalties, have no
connection with the above question is evident, but it is necessary not to mistake fines intended as penalties for offences for
fines intended as equivalents for services. Whenever a fine is
imposed for a service which may be fully obtained for that
service, we have a right to consider the fine as an equivalent
for the service. But it is necessary that this service must be
f.lly obtainable for the money paid as fine.  If the service is
such that besides the work to be done it is important on account of public opinion that every citizen should cheerfully
join, we must not consider the fine as a full equivalent. If
the demanded service, for instance, is a share of labor in the
building of a public road, the corresponding fine may in ordinary times be considered an equivalent. But if the citizens
of a beleaguered town are requested to throw up redoubts,
and it is imiportant that every one should contribute to keep
alive patriotic cheerfulness and readiness to do all in his power
to save the town, the fine would not be an equivalent. That
fines for omissions by which the community is endangered, for
instance for omitting the sweeping of chimneys, or for actions
by which the rights of others are endangered, as for trespassing
on their grounds, cannot be considered as equivalents of the
acts or omissions, is clear.
XX. The peculiar view taken of an original state of nature,
according to which the state appeared something made, artificial, and not unfrequently arbitrary-a view which I have
I Even that remarl-kabl)le criminal,  the woman  Gottfried, already cited, expressed repeatedly, during her last days, that a person could do no more than
die for his sins, and several other opinions, which clearly indicated that she considered her moral account perfectly )alanuced.  It will be remembered that she
poisoned above thirty persons, including her parents, children, friends, etc.
I 5 I 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
endeavored to show in its whole untenableness in the first
part of tile work-has affected no part of the theory of law
more strangely than that which treats of the degree of obedience due to the laws according to their presumed original
source, namely, nature, revelation, and positive human legislation. As the original view was founded upon an error, so
was the view of the obedience due to the laws equally erroneous.  Jurists distinguished between  mala in se, that is
actions pronounced immoral by conscience according to nature or revelation, and mala prohibita, that is actions "simply
and purely penal, where the thing forbidden or enjoyed is
wholly a matter of indifference, and where the penalty inflicted is an adequate compensation for the civil inconvenience supposed to arise from the offence." (I Blackstone, 58.)
The commentator, who has previously called the legislating
authority of the state an "inferior authority," that is inferior
to the natural law, thus arrives actually at what was termed
in a previous passage a tariff of penalties, and positively states
that conscience is no farther concerned in the non-compliance
to the law "than by directing a submission to the penalty in
case of the breach of those laws" (the commission of mala
prohibita, see the same place as above). Errors in original
notions necessarily lead to inconsistencies, and thus we find
grave ones in those passages of Blackstone in which he treats
of the present subject.  He instances the case of a poacher
as one in which the offender may simply take the penalty as
an equivalent for the malum prohibitum; but I apprehend it
would be very difficult to make out that transportation, and not
fine, is equivalent for unlawfully shooting deer. On the other
hand, Blackstone concludes his passage on mala prohibita;
and the penal theory founded on the idea of equivalents, with
these remarkable words:" But where disobedience to the law
involves in it also any degree of public mischief or private
injury, there it falls within our former distinction, and is also
an offence against conscience." Now, with what earthly subject has the state a right to meddle by way of penal law
except it involve "public mischief or private injury"?
I52 
POLITICAL ETTHICS.
XXI. The distinction which is imagined by some writers to
exist between natural law, and the law made by the "inferior
authority" of the law-makers, vanishes if the view of the state
which I lhave labored to establish be correct, namely, that the
state is the sole state of nature of man.  It is one of God's
highest ordinances, if in a human manner we may distinguish
between them, that man should live in the state.  He wills
the state through the laws he planted in our reason and the
principles he  established in our physical constitution.  A
legislature making laws is no less natural than the original
feeling of right in man. Every wise and just law is willed by
God as much as he wills that the infant receive nourishment
from the mother, or that man, gifted with reason and hands
and having the earth before him, shall plough it up, sow, and
reap; for our intellect is his gift, our living in the state his
ordinance, and hence our providing for ourselves by laws, his
work.  "In every law positive well made is somewhat of the
law of reason and of the law of God; and to discern the law
of God and the law of reason from the law positive is very
hard." I
Secondly, the relation which the revealed law bears to the
state can only be appreciated if wve remember that the state is
emphatically the jural society, that is, it has to do with right
only, so that the revealed law can enter into state law so far
only as it has to do with right; which idea of right implies,
among other things, that if more mischief ensues from state
interference than from leaving an evil untouched, it ought to be
left untouched. Thus, natural as well as revealed law prolhibits
theft.  Nevertheless, most codes declare that a child living in
the house of its parents cannot commit theft against the
latter.  Yet the moral evil remains;  the child commits  a
grievous siiz, but the state thinks it wiser not to make it a
punishable crimne.
The reason why all mankind feel that there is a great differ
I Words quoted in Chlristianl's note to I Blackstone, 58, from the Doctor and
Student, Dial. I. chap. 4.
153 
POLITICAL ETHIICS.
ence as to the degree of guilt in various actions is twofold:
first, the degree of danger to which the act exposes may be
different, and I speak here of moral danger as well as physical    secondly, the law in question may be viewed differently
by different persons as to wisdom, if it is enacted for some
convenience, or it may relate to a principle which every one
without exception acknowledges, such as the broad and fundamental principles of morality. Blackstone calls mala in se
acts which are "naturally and intrinsically wrong."  But acts
of themselves are never intrinsically wrong; it is the principle
alone which makes them so. Thus, killing is not intrinsically
wrong, for there is justifiable homicide and demanded homicide, if, for instance, I defend my wife against pirates. If a
shepherd makes a fire in the field, it may be a very innocent
act, but it is a highly penal act in many countries.  Nor is
it intrinsically wrong if the same shepherd makes a fire near
the sea-shore, where vessels are constantly passing, thus exposing the lives and property of many fellow-creatures to
destruction.
The difficulty, therefore, as to conscientious obedience to
the laws does not lie in distinguishing between mala in se and
mala prohibita, because as the general rule it is malum in se, it
is tatllraIlly and iniztrinsically wrong-a positive moral wrongto disobey the law; for it is the will of God and demand of
nature that we have laws, and consequently obey them. The
difficulty arises solely, as in the other cases of duty, out of
conflict. No man has a right to disobey a law without reason, but he may and in many cases must disobey it when that
law conflicts with superior laws; and the difficulty for the conscientiouls man lies in settling in many cases which is the superior law. It is in politics as in other spheres. We must obey
father and mother. Yet Christ says the son will be against
the father for his sake.  The difficulty, in many practical cases
arises out of the difficulty of ascertaining to the satisfaction of
I I have given my view respecting the moral and physical danger in the Letter
on Subjects of Penal Law.
I$54 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
the conscience whether there be a sufficient reason to disobey
so true and holy a law as that requiring obedience to father
and mother. It is the object of the following passages to
discuss these cases of conflict in politics.
XXII. In obeying laws we must guard ourselves against
interpreting them too loosely or too strictly in favor of individual interest, andagainst a pedantic observance of their
letter beyond their spirit. In either case we do not act according to the true sense of the law. When Napoleon returned in
October, I799, from Egypt, expected by France to rescue her
from anarchy and advancing enemies, it was natural for him
not to stop at Frejus, his landing-place, to perform quarantine, and for the people, believing him to be the only one who
could-save the country, to break through all the sanitary
regulations. The rule in these cases is the common moral
rule, that the important, essential, and general prevails over
the trivial or particular. The practice of this rule is daily and
hourly called for in life.  The same applies to clashing laws.
I have given my ideas more fully on this subject in the Legal
and Political Hermeneutics, to which I must be permitted to
refer.
We must observe here that as "it is an established rule in
the exposition of statutes that the intention of the lawgiver
is to be deduced from a view of the whole and of every part
of a statute, taken and compared together,"I so it is in doubtful or conflicting cases the obligation of a citizen to examine
and understand a whole law as a part of the whole political
system, and to understand it in that sense in which alone any
authority can be vested in the lawgiver, that is, as limited by
the lawful objects of the state and the immutable principles
of right and wrong. All that is to the contrary is not lawful,
and, strictly speaking, not law at all, because ordained or demanded against legitimate authority. The principle is sufficiently evident and simple; the application not so, because
I Kent, Comment., i. 461.
I55 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
the opinions of men  differ or are strongly affected by the
prevailing interest at the time.
XXIII. The efficiency of the land and naval forces depends
so essentially upon unity, quickness, and energy'of action,
that at all times stricter and far less limited obedience has
been exacted in the army and navy than in any other branch.
The Roman soldier stood, in many respects, in the relation of
a slave to his commanding general.  Armies without discipline are not only of no use, but they are positive evils to
their country; and discipline consists mainly in a universal
habit of obedience throughout the whole body. History is
full of the most striking instances: take, for instance, the
efficiency of the navy under Cromwell, and the respect in
which England was universally held as a maritime power, on
the one hand, and the lax state of the navy under Charles
II., when De Ruyter swept the Thlames and naval disaster
followed disaster, on the other hand, because there was no
discipline, no obedience in the navy, most of the captains
being young noblemen of families in high favor at the corrupt court, as we most abundantly learn from Pepys's Diary.,
Not that discipline can become a substitute for patriotism or
that ambition with which a great captain knows how to inspire
his army.  One Spartan who glories in falling for his country
is worth twenty Medes who, as Herodotus tells us, were
whipped into the fight by their officers against the Grecian
band at Thlermopyle. Patriotism in an army, however, will
become efficient only in the same degree as it is coupled with
discipline. The Prussian militia in I8I3 were animated by
the best spirit; they loved to fight for their country; they
willingly died for it; yet they became truly efficient and
averted danger only in the same degree as they became disciplined. The history of the American war of independence
shows the same.
X Diary of Pepys [especially notices in i666, I667; and comp. Knight's History of England, vol. iv. chap. xviii.].
I56 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
Yet even in the army and navy absolute obedience is not
and cannot be demanded. Disobedience to commands of
superiors in these branches of the service may take place because the command may be unlawful. Or the command may
be lawful, yet the inferior may be absolutely convinced that it
was given under misapprehension, and that the superior would
not have given it had he possessed the samne knowledge which
he, the inferior, possesses of facts as they really were at the
time when the command was given, or as they have come to
be since it was given; or that the execution of the command
would be absolutely destructive; or, fiiially, that the command
or order, though lawful according to the letter of the law, is
unlawful according to the general and immutable objects of
all law and government, that is, the security and welfare of
the state, or, in free countries, the safety, prosperity, and liberty
of the people.
XXIV. As to the first,-disobedience to unlawful commands, because contrary to the established law of the land,it is now settled in England and the United States that an
officer of the forces who executes the unlawful order remains
personally answerable.   If the highest  in command, the
British monarch himself, order, contrary to law, an officer to
quarter his soldiers upon the citizens, to annoy and oppress
them, as Chlarles I. did, the officer remains responsible in the
fullest sense of the term to the law of the land. All that has
been gained by the arduous and protracted struggle which
began to show itself most signally under Charles I. may be
summed up in the few words, that the law shall be superior
to all and every one and to every branch of government; that
there is nowhere a mysterious, supreme, and unattainable
power which despite the clearest law may still dispense with
it or arrest its course. This is the sum total of modern civil
liberty, the great, firm, and solid commons' liberty. The
British and American articles of war demand obedience to all
lawful commands.'
Article ix. of thle American Rules and Articles of War says, "Any officer or
I57 
POLITICAL ETH1CS.
As obedience to commands and thorough discipline are so
absolutely necessary to obtain those objects for which the
forces are maintained, and as, therefore, the power given to a
superior over his inferiors is much more extensive and dis cretionary than in any other branch, the inferior, before he
disobeys, ought to be convinced that the command is most
clearly illegal. He must decide it at his own peril or respon sibility. But even in absolute monarchies, where the executive
and legislative are one, and where the principle is adopted that
all right of complaint or hope of redress is forfeited at once
by not first of all obeying the superior, it is always acknowledged that under certain circumstances the inferior may disobey; for instance, if the superior were to command the inferior
to commit a palpable crime or treason, or if he should show
himself palpably cowardly in sutrrendering a fortress.   The
oath to be taken by every soldier, according to the Prussian
articles of war, ends with these words: " I will everywhere obey
the articles of war now read to me, and conduct myself, in
the execution of all my duties, always in such a manner as is
proper and fit for an honorable (the original is czrlieberiid, that
is, honor-loving) and undaunted soldier." He clearly can do
nothing, then, against honor and conscience.
Respecting the second point, disobedience on the ground
that the comm-nander could not possibly have been sufficiently
informed, we find in all wars instances which have been acknowledged as lawful. An officer would make himself highly
responsible were he  pusillanimously to allow a manifest
advantage or victory to escape, when it was evident that the
commniander in giving his order could not have considered or
soldier who shall strike his superior officer, etc., being in the execution of his
office, on aly pretence whatever, or shall disobey any lawfzl command of his
superior officer, shall suffer death, or such other punishment," etc.  Article xiv.
Of the Naval Laws, page 95 of the Red Book, Waslington, I826, says likewise,
No officer or private in the navy shall disobey the 4zz7fSi% orders of his superior
officer," etc.  So the 3British articles of the navy, which have served as a model
to the American, say (Art. xxii.), "And any person presuming  to quarrel with
any his superior officer, being in the execution of his office, or disobeying any
lawzvfzl command of any his superior officer, shall suffer death or," etc.
I58 
POLITICAL ETIICS.
known of the particular combination of circumstances. There
are instances of this in the wars of Napoleon. Yet here again
the inferior must act upon his own responsibility, and a very
high one it is: yet it is nothing more than a natural consequence of the fact that those who command are but limited
and finite men, and that those who obey do not cease to be
individual men with their own power and duty of reflection
and responsibility. Sully, in his Memoirs, speaking of the
war of Henry IV. against the duke of Savoy, says, "I did
not scruple to disobey his (the king's) orders by forwarding
the ammunition," etc., The case is far more difficult when
the inferior officer disobeys, not because he is convinced that
the superior was insufficiently informed or circumstances have
changed since the order was given, but because he sees the
com,nander was in error, and a great advantage is to be gained
by disobedience, perhaps impending ruin to be averted. Delicate and dangerous as these cases are, yet there have been
such as would not only warrant but even demand disobedience
of an honorable man. There are exceptions when we must,
as in other cases of grave conflict, seriously weigh the matter,
and if we feel bound to obey the higher commands of conscience, h]onor, and patriotism, we must do it with a full consciotsness and readiness to abide by the consequences of the
strict law of martial discipline should they eventually fall upon
us. Of Nelson himself it was said that at times "he would
look at signals, given him in battle, with his blind eye."2 If
the plain and direct order has been disobeyed, it has been generally held that the disobeying officer should be made strictly
answerable, without regard to the success, even if it were bril
I Memoirs of Sully, book xi. vol. ii. p. 26, London, 4to, ed. of 1761.
2 * A courier arrived just before the battle of Zentha, and Prince Eugene told
him to wait until after the battle.  He would not open the dispatches, knowing
their contents.
Major Saldern resolntely declined the plundering of Hubertsburg Castle in
176I, as "contrary to honor and duty," which Frederic the Great had ordered.
Frederic ordered Icilius to do it, and was obeyed.   Saldern lost nothing of the
high favor in which ie stood with the king. Preuss, Leben Fried. d. Gros., p. 249.
I59 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
liant, of his disobedience; and this is right; for so great is the
general necessity of strict obedience, and in many, nay, most
cases, the impossibility of penetrating all the combinations of
the commander in issuing his orders, that disobedience, were
it authorized, would bring on ruin. A man who loves his
country and knows-likewise the nature of the service will be
ready to satisfy the discipline by manfully bearing the consequences of his disobedience, which nevertheless he thinks
right.  Such a conflict may end tragically; yet should not
a man know how to die willingly for his country, even if
her call presents itself in this stern demand of her military
law?
The last case is that when we know the order to be lawful
according to the letter of the law, but wickedly intended
against the objects for which these laws were established.
This is a case of the uttermost responsibility; yet it is nevertheless true that all obedience without exception, even the
military oath of obedience, is conditional; that it can be demanded only with reference to the ultimate ends of all government, the eternal objects of mankind organized in a state.
The military man does not become an unfeeling, unthinking,
unseeing, absolute instrument. Yet when is hle to resort to
this last and highest authority? Again, it is impossible to
give rules, for these are cases of extremity, nor can any one
else decide for the individual placed in that difficulty. If before his God he is plainly convinced that the orders of his
superiors are palpably at variance with the essential objects
of the state and therefore traitorous to his country, and if at
the same time he is fully convinced that his disobedience, or
resistance, if need be, does not bring on greater calamity than
the execution of the orders, he is in conscience bound to
disobey.  According to the British law, the monarch is commander-in-chiief of all the forces, and disposer of peace and
war. Admiral Pennington had been sent by Charles I., amid
the acclamations of England, seemingly to carry out a humane
treaty with the oppressed and besieged Huguenots at Rochlelle; but hlie had no sooner arrived at the place of his des
I 63, 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
tination than he found himself under secret orders to give up
his vessels to French command in a "murderous warfare
against British honor and the Protestant religion." Here was
a flagrant conspiracy of Charles and Buckingham against the
state, an outrageous abuse of power executed with criminal
deception, and Pennington was right not to obey, and to draw
up his high-minded protest; the sailors were right who wrote
"what is called a round robin against the service, and laid it
under the Bible of their admiral, whose sentiments accorded
with their own."2  An officer of Charles X. of France who
in I830 was convinced that it was the government, not the
people, which had daringly broken the fundamental law, was
right in not firing upon the latter; the soldiers were right,
they were in honor bound to join them. An English soldier
who was wholly convinced that James II. had become a
usurper by breaking down the law of the land was right in
joining William III. So long as there is doubt in the breast,
it is honorable to remain even with the unsuccessful commander; that moment at which it becomes clear to us that
country and commander stand opposite to one another, the
name of honor used to designate obedience to the commander
has no longer any meaning; for there is no honor without
doing right, and it is right to abide by the country in preference
to all else.
XXV. The civil service not requiring that instant energy
and decisive unity of action which is necessary to make  the
army and navy answer their ends, it follows that less absolute power ought to be given to the superiors, and that civil
officers have a wider scope to consider the legality of an
order, or may take more time for farther information from
their superiors before they obey orders, than military officers.
As to free countries, where, as has repeatedly been remarked,
Bo(lie, History of the British Empire, Edinburgh, 1822, vol. ii. p. 70. Also,
Lord( Ntiuenit, Memorials of John HIampd(len, London, I832, VOl. i. p. iOO, and
Appendix A of vol. i., where the instructions are given.  See also note 2 to p. 35
of vol. ii. of Forster's British Statesmen, in Lardoer's Cabinet Cyclopedia.
VOL. II.                          II
I6I 
POLITICA,L ETHICS.
the lawis supreme, it is clear that no officer is bound or
ought to obey an illegal order. When Charles X. shortly.
before the last French revolution sent orders to the civil
officers throughout the kingdom to vote for certain candidates
for the chamber of deputies, the officers were clearly free of
all obligation to obey such mandates. That the civil officer
has the same right, and, as the case may be, the same duty in
cases of extremity to disobey a command although within
the letter of the law, with the officer of the army or navy, is
evident. In ancient and modern times laws have been issued
which demand disobedience to the orders of superiors under
certain circumstances." I shall speak more fully on some
obligations of the officers belonging to the executive department in another place, and at once turn to the subject of the
disobedience to law of the citizen at large.
In countries in which the people are not conceived to
form the state, which is understood to be one and the same
with the government, it is very clear that proportionally high
notions of the duty of obedience are entertained by the rulers.
If, however, the view of the state as given in the first volume
is correct, many cases of ju,st non-compliance or actual disobedience take place.. We call that citizen loyal who, satisfied with the main principles of his government, although he
may be very strongly opposed to the characteristic features
of the administration for the time being, conscientiously endeavors to act in the main not only according to the letter,
but also and rather according to the true spirit, of the laws of
his land, so long as he can conscientiously do it. Laws may
be, or under certain circumstances must be, disobeyed, if they
are contrary to the fundamental law of the land, if they are
I Majorian, that excellent emperor of Rome, too late, however, to find a sphere
for his noble soul, prohibited the infamous pulling down of ancient monuments
for private purposes, and decreed the severest penalties to be inflicted upon every
subordinate officer who should obey his superiors in these scandalous grants.
(Gil)bon, chap. xxxvi., or vol. iv. pp. 63, 64, Bohn's ed.) The Norwegian Constitution (of November 4, I814) says,. 85, "He who obeys an order whose object
is to disturb the liberty or safety of the storthing makes himself guilty of treason
against his fatherland.
I62 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
against the law of God, that is of morality, nature, and conscience, against primordial rights, against the spirit of the
times, if I am driven by superior force to comply with other
commands, and, in general, if I cannot obey otherwise than
by disobeying a superior law.
XXVI. We are citizens because we are men, and in order
to obtain our ends as men; and we shall continue to be moral
individuals long after we have ceased to be either citizens or
men. The demands of the state, therefore, are by no means the
sole or ultimate laws by which in cases of extremity we must
regulate our conduct. If a law prohibits, under certain circumstances, giving a degree of education to my child which
I nevertheless may be convinced that its peculiar capacity
deserves, I am not bound to obey; for it is one of the very
first objects of man to become all that God has given him the
capacity to become. In Hesse-Cassel it was found that far
too many young men received a university education, thus
preparing them for careers in which they could not succeed,
owing to the number of applicants. A law was passed which
allowed the children of certain parents only to study in the universities. Yet if a father in that country should have seen that
his son was peculiarly fitted for the sciences, would he have
been chargeable with any dereliction of duty if he should have
evaded the law and sent his son to some foreign university?
Dissenters were formerly not allowed to keep schools in England; yet in many districts there were none other but dissenters' schools. Was it disloyal for dissenters to keep a
school despite the law? Was it not, on the contrary, a manifest duty to disobey, provided there was the slightest chance
of success, because the state glaringly transcended its legitimate sphere? I A law may be disobeyed if unlawful authority
z Lord Russell, Memoirs of the Affairs of Europe from the Peace of Utrecht,
says, " The Schism Bill was introduced by Sir William Wyndham,-one of the
chief ornaments of their party. Its object was to prevent the education by dissenters in any way; and it went to prohibit them from keeping schools even for
their own children." So I find it quoted; I have not the work at hand.
I63 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
has issued it, or rather it is no law, because against the fundamental law, for instance when James I. bestowed unlawfully
the soap monopoly upon favorites. We must not forget that
laws may be passed in regular and lawful form, and yet be
clearly against the plainest rights of the citizens, although
outwardly conformable to the fundamental law. There is,
however, a fundamental law superior to any fundamental
charter, that is reason, right, and nature, and that superior
fundamental law of all humanity requires, in cases of high
conflict, first to be obeyed. An immoral law is no law, and
my yielding to it or not is a mere question of expediency, just
as I may or may not yield to the demands of a robber. If
my government prevents me from importing what books I see
fit to use for the pursuit of my studies, I have an undoubted
right to evade the law if I deem it expedient, for the pursuit
of truth is a law of infinitely greater authority, and therefore
infinitely more demands obedience, than any law enacted by
temporary authority ever can.
Laws which are manifestly against the spirit of the.time,
which cannot be obeyed whatever the law may demand, may
and must be disobeyed. If the government neglects changing
the laws according to the change of circumstances, it is not
the obligation of the citizen to adhere to the law. Such are
laws manifestly fallen in disuse, of which some striking ones
have been mentioned in previous passages, laws which it
would be morally impossible to obey. It is true, indeed, that
by tlie strict principles of the common law an act of parliament cannot be repealed by a "non-user;"I yet where are
2 Term Rep. 275; 2 Dwarris on Statutes, 672.  But the contrary has been
laid down by a writer of authority, Wooddeson's Elements, 63, and it is also to be
found in the Roman law, Digest, lib. i. tit. 3, ~ 32.  I must be permitted here to
give the whole of that section, because it contains true principles of right, and
many of my readers out of the profession of the law may not have an easy olpportunity of perusing it.  The Digest says, "Respecting those matters for whlich we
have no written law, that must be followed which has been introduced by custom and manners, and if this does not exist respecting a subject, that must be
followed which lies nearest and that which results from analogy of similar cases:
if nothing else can be obtained even in this way, the custom of the city of Rome
i 64 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
there more laws virtually fallen into disuse, which it would
be impossible to act out and which it is, consequently, not
immoral to disobey, than in England? Let us not forget that
even Lord Mansfield, when acting as the highest organ of the
law itself, told the jury to find a verdict of theft for an amount
far less than the articles before the eyes of the jury evidently
amounted to, in order to rescue the prisoner from the effects of
a law wholly dissonant with the spirit of the time, and to give
her the benefit of more humane and more efficient modes of
punishment, discovered since the establishment of the ancient
law. Whatever reason there was in early times for punishing almost any theft with hlanging, in England, whether the
state of society then required it, or whether even then the law
was injudicious, sure it is that Lord Kenyon pronounced no
more than- a solemn truth when he said, when a girl, sentenced to be hung for her first theft, dropped down dead in
court, "I then felt, as I now feel, that this was passing sentence not on the prisoner but on the law."'
If a law is against nature I am at liberty to disobey. It is
God's order that all animal life shall be sustained by food; if
then government lays so high a duty on necessary articles of
food that it becomes impossible properly to support the body,
as has been the case and that repeatedly, I have a right, if I
am able and see fit in other respects, to import the food
against the law. The duty on salt was in some parts of
France before the first revolution so exorbitant that the
people could not purchase it.  Had the most conscientious
must be followed. All rooted custom is justly followed as law, and that which
has been founded by custom is law. For if the laws themselves bind us for no
other reason than because they have been adopted by the pronounced will of the
people, that likewise binds justly every one which the people have sanctioned
without writing; for what matters it whether the people declared their will by
voting or by the thing and fact itself? It has therefore with perfect justice likewise been adopted as a rule that laws may be abrogated not only by the pronounced will of the lawgiver, but also in consequence of universal tacit consent
by disuse."
I Related by Mr. Morris, in the house of commons, in I8II.-(English) Law
Journal, May, i837, 296.
I65 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
citizen to reproach himself in any degree if he smuggled salt
for his family? What is more natural than language? what
more ungodly and tyrannical than to make the use of one's
mother tongue penal?   Yet governments have repeatedly
passed laws to that effect. If laws are passed respecting religious beliefs, they are naught in themselves, because they
aim at that which is impossible,-to believe according to command. And if I believe that a certain service is essential to
my religion, I have certainly an undoubted right to disobey
the law and celebrate it in secret, if I thereby do not injure
any one else. If, finally, I am forced by a conqueror or
usurper to obey his orders contrary to the laws of the land, I
am not answerable for disobedience, for one of the first objects
and duties of all governments and laws is to protect me; if
they fail to do so, I am not bound, though I may choose to
do so, to expose myself to the penalties of the rulers in actual
possession.
To sum up the whole, then, it is evident that in obeying
laws we must, wherever laws clashl, obey the superior in
preference to the inferior; and this superior law may, in
many cases, be one that was never enacted, perhaps for the
very reason that it was of itself universally binding, like the
demands of physical nature; farther, in many cases of this
conflict, nothing can decide which is the superior law, and
whether disobeying the inferior law be justified, except the
conscience of the individual. I am well aware that hasty and
forward citizens, fanatics, and wicked men have asserted that
their conscience commanded them to disobey, when it ought
to have told them the opposite.  South asserts the truth when
he says, "No such instrument to carry on a refined and wellwoven rebellion as a tender conscience and a sturdy heart.
He who rebels conscientiously rebels heartily." Abuse, however, does not disprove the rule. Men have often pretended
to change their religion for conscience' sake, when sordid interest or turpitude guided them. Should we establish on that
account the rule that the conscience must not decide upon the
change of one's religion?
i66 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
XXVII. Merely disapproving of a law by no means gives
us a right to disobey it; we must be clearly and conscientiously convinced that it may be disobeyed upon one of the
main grounds enumerated, or'that it does not come from lawful authority, when in fact it is not law but the semblance of
law. Another question is, whether we may under any circumstances make use of or profit by a law of which we disapprove. If the law goes against our own main principles we
must not expect to stay its own evil effects by partial compliance; for instance, if we were in times of violence to accept
of confiscated property with a view to restore it to the owner
or to rescue it out of the hands of the despoilers. That this
is, however, very dangerous is very clear, for the feeling of
every one marks such a procedure as a partial co-operation,
and no one at present will read without disapproval or very
reluctant excuse the account that some persons, otherwise
standing high for their virtuous character, accepted at the
hands of James II. the lands confiscated in consequence of
Jeffrey's sanguinary procedures, with the declared view of
making the best use of them and preventing their falling into
the hands of his greedy and licentious courtiers.t
XXVIII. So far we have considered only the cases when a
conscientious citizen may disobey or must disobey; for the
latter must depend upon his conscience alone. If he believes
that by obedience he positively co-operates in the fuirtherance
of iniquity, he must disobey. This is the ground upon which
the Quakers decline paying taxes towards the army. Still, it
is not to be forgotten in any of these cases that obedience to
the laws'is of itself a duty so long as we can conscientiously
obey, and that the penalty is not an equivalent; and that we
must carefully guard ourselves against presumption, that is
setting up our conscience against that of all who made or
favor the law. The case, therefore, must always be a strong
one.
x See Mackintosh's History of the Revolution of i688.
I67
. 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
Another question is, has the citizen the right to resist, and
can he under certain circumstances go so far as to take up
arms against those in power? Despite the vehement discussions on this point at periods when it was of practical importance, there has been but little difference as to the actual
theory. Those monarchs who have most strenuously maintained the principle of" absolute non-resistance," for instance
the Stuarts, have fostered and fomented resistance against the
governments established in consequence of their own dethronement.  George III., who maintained very high notions
respecting the obedience due to a government, not only connived at but promoted the plan of Queen Matilda of Denmark, then residing at Zelle, to overthrow the existing
Danish government, and to make herself, not what she had
been before the execution of Struensee, but actually regent
of the kingdom.,   Ferdinand  VII. rewarded  the persons
who had resisted the cortes and himself, after he had been
re-established in absolute power by the assistance of Louis
XVIII. The duchess of Berry incited the people to civil
war, from whom she claimed the throne on the principle of
legitimacy. The pope has in repeated instances promoted
resistance and fostered revolt.
So far the question has only respected resistance to the
whole government on account of its entire unlawfulness.
Another is, may a lawful government be resisted in unlawful
demands? and, finally, may a people take up arms against a
whole government, previously considered lawful?  When
this question has been discussed without peculiar reference to
practical cases of deep interest at the time, the greater number of jurists and philosophers have allowed that there are
cases in which it is lawful and necessary to resist with arms,
that is to resort to insurrection. Generally writers have restricted the cases of justified resistance against monarchs to
resisting atrocities on the part of the prince; in short, they
Wraxall, Posthumous Memoirs Li. 374-418. Compare what Lord Mahon says
in his History, v. chap. 50o, note.]
I68 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
have maintained that armed resistance is admissible only
against tyrants, and among the characteristics of a tyrant, who
was generally depicted in such a manner that there was no
necessity of telling people that it was lawful to resist such a
monster, atrocious cruelty was generally one. This was partly
because writers were afraid to speak out, partly because they
really feared to make  resistance too easy.   Times  have
changed, however. Physical cruelty is no longer considered
as the only ground upon which resistance is admissible.
Already have German and other continental writers expressed themselves very differently., As to the principle
there can be no doubt whatever. Every unlawful government ought to be resisted and permanently changed, if it
permanently and obstinately insists upon a course injurious
to the people, and if the evils accompanying the change are
not greater than the blessings to be obtained by the change.
In the abstract we might easily go farther; we might say,
Government ought to be resisted whenever it acts unlawfully.
But there arises the unavoidable difficulty of deciding when
it acts unlawfully; for the people may be mistaken as well as
the government. Our forefathers enacted in many cases that
if the ruler distressed the people against law, it was lawful to
resist him.2  The difficulty adhering to all discussions on the
One of the early writers who treats the subject with great freedom is Hubert
Lahnguet, in his Vindicie contra Tyranno., sive de Principis in Populum Populique in Principem legitima Potestate, Stephano Junio Bruto, Celta Auctore,
Edinburgi, I579.  A work I recommend to the student.
2 Charles the Bald, grandchild to Charlemagne, was obliged to sign in 856
A.D. a charter ini which it was pronounced that the nobility should have the right,
unitedly, -and with arms, to resist whenever the emperor should demand anything
unjust.  The Magna Charta says, " Ipsi Barones cum communitate totius terrae
disttingent et gravabunt nos modis omnibus quibus poterunt, scilicet per captionem
castrorum, terrarum, possessionum, et aliis mod(lis quibus potuerint, donec emendatum fuerit secundum arbitriuttm eorum." [But in the Chlarta this is made the
end of a series of attempts to obtain justice.  See art. 70.]  Andrew  II. of
Hungary granted the right of resistance in case the then concluded compact
should be broken.   King John of Denmark acknowledged the right in the three
kingdoms subject to his power, if le should not listen to their complaints of
grievances.  (Scliltz, Universal History, v. I94.)  Alphonso III. of Aragon
i6g 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
practical application. of the right of resistance, which has ever
been acted upon by the people when it comes to the last, and
will be acted upon so long as the world stands, has been increased by the two circumstances of which we have spoken
already; that the executive has been, and still frequently
is, mistaken for the government, and resistance against the
executive, though it should be in defence of the law, as
in France in I830, is taken for resistance against the whole
government; and, secondly, that monarchs have been erroneously surrounded with an extra-political halo. A relation
between the subject and the monarch on religious grounds
beyond the foundation of the state and law is imagined; a
sacred, indelible, and indestructible allegiance is supposed to
exist.  Yet that the Bible does not teach the theory of nonresistance we may easily gather from the Old Testament;
and it is a fact that Christ does not speak of politics, and that
none have so much disagreed on the subject as the thleologians. Indeed, they have advocated resistance, under cir-.
cumstances which to them seemed to warrant it, more freely
and positively than any other writers. No set of theologians
have, I believe, so stanchly and unequivocally, though by no
means in all cases consistently, maintained the principle of
non-resistance as the writers of the Church of England during
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  They did not in
granted in 1287 to the barons by the two Pacts of Union the right of insurrection
against the king if their liberties should. be infringed after they had protested.
(Prescott, Ferdinand and Isabella, Introduction, xci.) Of the Polish rocoss I
have spoken previously.  I might increase the instances.  [See what Mr. Guizot
says of the right of resistance in feudalism, History of Civilization i. 1ioo, and
History of Civilization in France, iii. 96, 97, Amer. ed. of transl.]
I Even Luther did not hesitate to sanction resistance to the emperor who will
not follow "signed privileges" (beschriebene Rechte), and considered an emperor lawfully dethroned if the empire and electors unitedly dissolve the allegiance. Luther saw this case of a German emperor clearer because he was an
elected l-rince.  For us there is no difference.  All princes are conditionally
monarchs, that is for the good of the people. None is by intrinsic legitimacy
so. The mild Melanchthon thought tyrannicide admissible. Loci Theologici,
De Magistr.
170 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
deed maintain the doctrine of absolute obedience, for they
demanded " passive obedience" only, and allowed therefore
non-compliance.'
XXIX. Of the force of allegiance we have spoken already.
Yet even where the theory which I have endeavored to establish in the first volume is not admitted, it is certain that no
man can be lawfully bound or lawfully promise to do what is
unlawful.  This is self-evident.  Even the canon law says, "In
malis promissis non expedit servare fidem." So that neither
allegiance nor oath can bind to obey that which is unlawful.
This therefore would absolve every one from absolute obedience. Yet if we merely decline to co-operate or obey but do
not in cases of uttermost emergency resist, we leave all power
to do that which we hold to be unlawful in the hands of the
government. In the opinion of those who sincerely believe
that dynasties or certain specific- governments are from Gctd,
we ought to suffer everything at their hands as so much punishment inflicted by the Deity. That this idea does not agree
with our views of government supported throughout this work
is clear. The government is an organism for the purpose of
obtaining the great ends of the state, the state an institution
to secure the great social and individual ends of humanity,
and if the former ceases to obtain its object, either from want
of energy or because it endeavors systematically and constantly to undermine and destroy those ends, society has no
doubt the simple right of establishtng a new one, even where
there is no particular compact between the rulers and the
ruled. The government is no longer a lawful one, though
established according to all the formalities of the law, because
no longer answering the purpose or obtaining the ends and
objects of the law. Mankind have always acted upon this
principle. Yet so necessary is a government, so unrighteous
is it not to deliberate in all matters relating to society whether
X Hallam, Constitutional History, in various places, among others, vol. ii. p. 625,
et seq.
17I 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
we may not injure others more than we assist them, so doubtful, calamitous, and frequently demoralizing are the effects of
insurrection and of civil war, so easily is the individual deceived respecting his own rights and the probable success of
measures which may appear suitable to the temperament of
our mind at the time, so much increased is the evil of tyranny
in case of unsuccessfil attempts at resistance, so frequently
does resistance, even though successful against the government, lead to a tyranny worse than the previous one -to
military government-and so often does it open an arena for
the worst passions and for a shallow mediocrity, noisy, forward, and unconcerned about the harm it produces, that he
who on slight grounds resorts to force against the existing
government indeed commits treason against society.'
.An insurrection may take place on the strict ground of resistance; that is, people may take up arms to resist every
attempt to enforce a certain law or measure, without the intention of going farther than this resistance.   This may
especially take place when single provinces rise. In very
many cases in history such insurrections have had salutary
results; because government learns practically that it cannot
go beyond a certain line.  Every measure of sufficient magnitude and radical importance may be sufficient to warrant
armed resistance; but as it necessarily leads to political interruption, and especially as a partial insurrection may lead to a
revolution though originally intended for armed resistance
only, it is necessary both that the cause be of sufficient magnitude, and that all common and regular means of redress
have previously been fairly and honestly tried.  By revolution
I understand a violent change of the fundamentals, or one
fundamental, of the government; a violent change of the administration would be a rebellion, or rebellious riot. Aristotle
(Pol., v. I, 4) mentions two species of revolutions, those by
which the constitution is changed, and those which leave the
' See the judicious remarks of Mackintosh in his History of the Revolution
of I688, chapter ix.
I72 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
constitution but bring another set of men into power: he does
not mean, however, by another set, another administration,
but other rulers, for he instances the monarchy and oligarchy.
The change of persons in these states, that is, the change of
the power-holders, is evidently a change of one of the fundamentals of the government, and thus falls within our definition.
As to revolutions, they can never be justified by a single
executive measure-except it be a coup d'etat-but by a perverse course of ruinous, unjust, and malevolent or infatuated
measures, and after all civil means of redress have been tried
in vain; and there must be either fair hope of success, or the
people be driven to desperation, so that a serious risk shall
seem more endurable than the existing state of things. For
revolutions are most grave, bitter, and uncertain processes.
On the other hand, it must be admitted that there exists
no nation with well-established freedom which has not been
obliged to resort at some period to resistance and does not
owe some of its choicest blessings and most deeply-founded
liberties to armed resistance or revolution. There is rarely a
clear understanding between the government and the people
of free nations unless at some period or other they have
passed through this process and crisis. It is a maxim ascribed
to the duke de Sully, and adopted by Burke,' that there are
no unprovoked revolts. If we understand by revolts insurrections of the people, and not conspiracies of the nobility' or
generals, the remark is certainly true. Thus Sully must have
meant it, for otherwise his own times would but too abundantly furnish us with instances to the contrary, while we
have but to look at South America to see unprovoked army
revolts happening in almost uninterrupted succession. Revolutions are fearful, yet they are at all times not only unavoidable but salutary. The whole political institution of a country
may become so corrupt or so thoroughly unfit for the existing
I Stlly's Memoirs, and Burke, Thoughts on the present Discontents [Works,
i. 3io, Bohn's ed.].
I73 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
and changed state of things that it engenders misery and
political immorality and altogether loses its jural character.
Revolutions then become unavoidable and just; nor should
any conscientious citizen then shrink from them. What the
great Boerhaave says of fevers, " Febris sepe sanationis optima
causa," applies with equal force to political diseases. I do
not speak here of separations of colonies from their mother
countries, which we call likewise revolutions in the English
language though they differ materially from domestic revolutions.' Whatever power affections may have, and they are in
many instances salutary, it is certain that so soon as a distant
colony has the power of maintaining its independence, and can
promote the whole social interest by independent domestic
laws, she has the right and, it may be, the sacred duty of
entering into the lists with independent nations.
XXX. If there is danger in the right and necessity of resistance or in justifying revolution, there is much more danger
in the doctrine of non-resistance; for, while power naturally
and by inherent quality tends to increase, the people are reluctant to resort to resistance except in cases of extremity,a powerful and privileged class always excepted. The uncertainty of success, the difficulty of united action, the natural
disposition in the citizen to follow the law and authority much
rather than to disobey it, are no mean guarantees against the
wicked application of the right of resistance. Moreover, we
I Revolutions may be of a very different character. They may be revolutions
of the people against the domestic government, as the English and French revolutions were; or against foreign, imposed governments, as the revolution of
Portugal against the Spaniards, that of Masaniello in Naples, or of Hofer in
Tyrol, if the latter be not called mere insurrections on account of failure of success; or the separation of colonies or distant provinces, as the North and South
American revolutions; or the separation of part of the country, as in the late
case of Belgium; or the re-establishment of independence, as in Portugal when
the Spaniards were expelled; or the expulsion of one branch of the family by
another without participation of the people, as not unfrequently in Asia; or a
revolution of the prince against the state, for instance when an elective monarch
makes himself hereditary.
I74 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
ought to remember that the resistance or revolt of no people
is so fearful and calamitous as that of those who have not been
accustomed to freedom. The resistance of the freest nations
has been the freest from those atrocious crimes which sully
the civil wars of nations that shake off the chain of bondage;
so that the very acknowledgment of the right of resistance, as
an accompaniment of liberty, becomes a guarantee of its being
used rarely and of its being attended with less evil than if the
right were denied.
The necessity of resistance has, as we have seen, often been
acknowledged. I will not speak of the emperor Trajan, who,
when he handed the sword of the.praetorian prefect to Saburanus, said, "Use it for me if I rule well, if not, against me.",
As a sentiment it is fine for a Roman emperor; but acted
upon as- a political principle it would be a sort of janizary
constitutional law, and make Saburanus a strange superemperor. Hume says that the laws ought to be silent on the
right of resistance, but he guards himself against the suspicion that he desired to prevent its discussion. If by resistance
is meant the citizen's resisting any procedure against him
contrary to the law, then the laws of England and the United
States have in a great measure sanctioned it, and there is
indeed no firm and substantial civil liberty imaginable without
its acknowledgment. If resistance against laws themselves, as
contrary to the fundamental law or on any other ground, be
meant, it would be useless and inconsistent were the laws to
acknowledge it beforehand; for who shall decide whether the
law be lawful or not?  If the citizen for himself, nothing is
gained; if some authority, except the courts in the regular
course of expounding and administering law as to the specific
case, then this authority again, whoever it might be, might
abuse its power. The constitution must acknowledge some
highest legislative power, and cannot at the same time call
upon the people to resist if this power should be abused; this
I [Dion Cass., lxviii. i6;  Victor, de  COes., I3, who mentions the  prefect's
name.]
I75 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
would require another power to resist the abuse of the latter.
The French therefore had gained nothing when they declared
in the rights of men enumerated in the constitution of'I793, "If
the government violates the rights of the people, insurrection
is for the people and for every portion of the people the most
sacred and most indispensable duty." Insurrection belongs
strictly to political ethics, and must in cases of extremity be
decided upon by the most solemn act of the conscience; it
cannot be made a subject of politics proper and be drawn into
positive law; but resistance may so far be made matter of
positive law that an authority may be appointed by the constitution which shall decide-after the resistance has taken
place-whether the resisted law, measure, or demand was
conformable to the fundamental law or not, and, consequently,
wYhethler or not resistance was warranted.  And the courts of
the United States have actually such power.
XXXI. Entirely different from resistance, yet frequently
confounded with it, or justified on the same ground, is what
by a contradiction in the term itself has been called of late
mob law. A mob-the o'7%2o; of the Greeks, and turba of the
Romans, is a lawless multitude impelled by a common desire
for the obtaiing of some immediate object, or drawn together
by a common impulse, for instance curiosity. A mob, it
Mob is the abbreviation of mobile (the movable), which we find used at
length in the diaries and familiar letters written at the time of James II. and
Charles II.  I do not remember that it occurs in Pepys.  It is of frequent occurrence in the Ellis correspondence, edited by Lord Dover, London, I828. The
abbreviation was probably b)rought into use by the newspapers, like so mnany
others, for instance scrip. Whether the word mobility, which Walter Scott puts
in the mouth of a courtier of James I. (in the Fortunes of Nigel), it should be
presumned without anachronism, preceded the introduction of the word mobile,
or vice versa, I do,not know. It is evidently a word of derision closely resembling that of nobility, and must have come in use when the masses attracted at
least so miuch notice as to be derided by the privileged, which always precedes
that period when the masses really obtain power.   It was so in Rome, the
Netherlands, France, England.   For t'ie barbarous word moblocracy, that is the
aristocracy of the mob, though properly speaking the rabble is meant in this case,
I76 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
would appear, need not be the rabble, by which we designate
more especially a tumultuous congregation of the vulgar or
their aggregate in the abstract.  The term "dregs of the people," the faex,fwx infiiza, of the Romans, designates the abject class of a population visited with ignorance and poverty
and consequently stricken with vice and crime. They were
also most significantly called by the Romans, carrying out
the trope of the vessel of the state, the bilge-water of the
republic, expressing at once their loathsomeness, danger,
and fickleness, which, together with a gust of wind, may
indeed throw the vessel on her beam-ends.  "Sin tu exieris,
exhaurietur ex urbe tuorum comitumn  magna et perniciosa
sentina rei publicae." Cic., Cat., I, 5, I2.
When Suetonius (Julius, xiv.) tells us that, when Caesar insisted upon punishing the Catiline conspirators by confiscation
alone, "a body of the equestrian order, holding up their arms,
threatened him with immediate death," they acted as a mob,
though they were originally lawfully assembled there as a
guard. Thus the British commons have been hyperbolically
called at times a mob, to designate their occasional planless
procedures.   I have already spoken  of the grievous  and
mischievous error in politics, when a mob take the law into
their own hands, as it is inappropriately called, for the law
ceases to be such at the instant it is taken out of the hands
of the legitimate officer, be this by prince, officer, or mob.
On that occasion the error was chiefly considered in the
light of justice and natural law. In this place I shall add
a few observations respecting the ethical character of the
subject.
The most noticeable political effects of mobs are when they
pretend to deal out justice, when they overawe the legislature
or administration of law and destroy property for their own
that caricature of government when the mob claim the privileges of exemption
fiom law, the Greek term was 6X,iyparia. It is one of the most uncompromising
species; of aristocracy.
z See on Lynch Law, in Part First.
VOL. II.                         I2
0
I77 
POLITICAL ETIIICS.
supposed interest and necessary support; as was the case
with the machline-breakers in England some time ago.,
Although the people composing mobs will generally confess that in interfering with the regular course of justice they
only do so by way of exception, it must not be forgotten that
no moral phenomenon is more common, of which every one
upon reflection finds instances in his own life, and of which
we have spoken already, than that interest, excitement, or
passion presents to us that case which excites us as a particular one, deserving of exception from the principles we may
have laid down for the guidance of our own action in calmer
moments. One of the main objects of all justice is protection by the interposition of law between blinding interest or
excited passion and the object complained  of.  The mob
tramples down this wall of safety, and derides the majesty of
the law-a term of the greatest import, however shamefully
it has been abused in periods of political and legal degeneracy.
The very existence of the mob is, in most cases, evidence of
the excitement, hence of its unfitness to judge or execute
judgment. The mob, generally, consists of the most movable part of the population, not of the steady laborer or mechlanic, hence of the least reflecting and most excitable people;
and of those whom it is not difficult to guide with any
moderate skill in the art of the demagogue.   The London
apprentices, so conspicuous in British history, afford instances.
In delicate times, when the best patriots labor to secure great
blessings by a steady and considerate course, and when it
requires all the consideration of the calmest minds not to
trespass a distinct line beyond which all becomes insecure
and dangerous, a mob not unfrequently rends the whole.
The mob disregards property; and everything which ren
How ill-guided the destroyers of the machinery were, who believed that they
should lose their bread, can now be incontrovertibly proved by statistics.   Machinery made cotton goods so cheap that millions could use them who formerly
could not, and consumption altogether increased in an unexampled manner, so
that far more hands are now employed with the machines to satisfy the increased
demand than formerly with()ut them.
I78 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
ders property insecure, by whatsoever means, be it by un settled and partial taxation,' or government oppression, or
insecure inheritance, or mob violence, destroys one of the
chief objects of the state, security of property, a chief object
not only on account of mere safety, but also because insecurity of property injures the steady and moderate pursuit of
property, and engenders idleness, immorality, and unfitness
for substantial liberty. The fact that either there is no chance
of acquiring property, or little chance of preserving that which
has been acquired, has the effect, not to cause people now to
strive to obtain the more in order to be the better able to
sustain partial loss, but to give up altogether the accumulation
of property.
The suspicion and fear of being overreached, want of confidence in themselves, and consequent fretfulness arising from
the absence of organization; the consciousness of unlawful
and very brief power, and consequent thirst for making rapid
use of it; the fearful and natural operation of mutual excitement, of which I have spoken before; the absence of individual responsibility,2 and the desire in many of outdoing in
boldness the rest, with the unrestricted action of revenge and
final cruelty, are so many reasons why mobs, when they take
it upon themselves to execute what they believe to be justice,
interfere most injuriously with the lawful state of mankind;
and no one who loves his country, respects the dignity of
man, has regard for the sacred objects of society, or reverence
I Boeckh, in his Political Economy of Athens, translated from the German, 2
vols., London, 1828, specifically mentions the liturgj,, or special and heavy
charge of rich individuals for the performance of some public act, as one of the
causes of public ruin by rendering property insecure, and the author substantiates
his case, not without the aid of ancient authors themselves.
There is a saying of Napoleon's, in Las Cases, not unworthy to be mentioned
here.  At St. Helena he found an old Malay, of the name of Toby, who had
been kidnapped and sold at that islandl.  Napoleon was much affected by his recital, and said, amonr  other things, "If this crime has been commnitted by the
captain alone, he is no doul)t one of the worst of men; but if it has been committed by the whole crew unitedly, it may have been done l)y persons who, after
ill, are not so wicked as one would think at first."  Vol. ii. p. 26, ed. of I825.
I79 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
for truth and justice (which is truth enacted), will talk slightly
or speak jocosely of them; which, nevertheless, is but too
frequently done in our papers. The hanging at the lantern
in the beginning of the French revolution, the awful and unrighteous excitement and cruelty in the times of Titus Oates,
the barbarous slaughtering of the prisoners of war in Spain,
when a commanding officer declared by proclamation that the
people demanded the slaughter of fifty-five persons, and
rather justified the act upon this ground,, evidently from fear,
the procedures in our own country at Vicksburg in i8352
and at Boston against a convent, are warnings which no one
ought to leave unheeded. No one who has not been present
at such unfortunate procedures can have any idea of the
rapidity with which suspicion rises, is received, passes on, increases, and terminates in a sanguinary act of revenge. The
multiplying power of excitement in a mob by rapid circulation is perhaps the most conspicuous example of the power
of reciprocal influence and sympathy lodged ill our nature
that human life ever presents.
To overawe the legislature or courts of justice is equally
pernicious and unjust. We can trace in the history of every
revolution the fact that evil consequences of the gravest kind
have attended it.  In France the sans-culottes at the bar, in
England the people in the galleries in the times of the ascend
We find, in the year I838, Juntas of Retaliation formed in Spain, and the
Paris-journals published a proclamation of the general commanding at Valencia,
which contains the following deplorable passage: "Brave national guards and
inhal)itants of Valencia: The Junta of Retaliation began its labors yesterday.
Conformably to its advice and the general clamor of the people, although much
against my inclination and painfully for my heart, I find myself under the necessity of causing to be shot fifty-five of the Carlist captives in the prisons of this
city, etc.... The fatal system of moderation which we  have followed must
cease.  The enemies of the throne and of liberty treml)le in learning  ihat her
majesty's government has recovered all its energy and suppressed forever all
that benevolent sentiment which made us regard them only as erring Spaniards.
If the despot pretends to subljugate us by blood, it is in blood that we will extinguish his projects, and it is witt blood that we will consolidate the constitutional
throne of Isabella and liberty."
2 Niles's Register, Baltimore, August I, I835.
I80 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
ency of the Presbyterians and Independents, and the boisterous people in the hall of the cortes in I82I, are all instances
of what is nere maintained; and little do those who invoke
this overawing by the mob know what chains at that moment
they rivet on their own limbs. Silence, therefore, in legislative halls and courts is not only a debt of respect and decency,
but a political duty of grave import; not to speak of other
inconveniences arising out of habitual applause or disapprobation from the galleries. It is one of the surest means to
give confidence to those insipid yet ever-ready talkers of
whom every assembly has some, and who constitute a political as well as social nuisance. Overawing by the mob does
not only occur in times of revolution: we find an instance of
it during peace, in Walpole's day, in the commons, when an
outcry was made against the excise bill," the people being
heated into fury by the frauds of stock-jobbers at the time of
the South Sea bubble; and of late, in the legislature of one of
our states, another of a very serious character.
When we come to speak of the nature and essence of the
representative government, we shall see how utterly incompatible with it is the influence of mobs upon the representatives-mobs which daringly assume the name of people.
Mobs, if in any way allowed to influence assemblies, produce
those bursts of passion or excitement, so much to be dreaded
in all politics, monarchical or republican, for which the French
during the first revolution had a technical term, calling them
decrets d'enthousiasme, so that Dumont, in his Memoirs of
Mirabeau, gives us an instance of a decree of enthusiasm of
war. There is, we all know, such a thing as passing a proposition by acclamation; but in excited times it is exceedingly
difficult to distinguish between universal enthusiasm and universal bawling respecting the passage of a measure, either to
urge it forward or to denounce it. When on February 7,
I1787, Sheridan brought forward his fourth charge against
Hastings, and had charmed the audience by his most brilliant
I Robert Walpole's Memoirs, vol. iii., ed. of i8i6.
i8I 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
display so much that members, peers, and strangers expressed
their approbation by long-continued applause-a procedure
new and irregular-an adjournment of the debate was moved
and carried "to afford time for the dispassionate consideration
of the question, and to avoid coming to a vote while the
minds of members were under the fascinating impression of
that speech." Tomline calls this reason justly an "unprecedented" one, although just. Fox opposed it, but it was carried
without a division.
XXXII. The obligation of informing the proper state
authority against offences before or after the fact has at all
times been considered a very serious one, and demands our
attention. The whole subject may be considered first in regard to government officers, and secondly respecting the citizen at large. That every officer has not only the right but
the duty to inform against all offences belonging to his proper
sphere which come to his notice, and diligently to trace them
out, is evident. For what else is he appointed, if not to support and assist in the regular course of law? An officer,
therefore, is bound by the relation in which through his office
he stands to society, and the object for which power and authority have been delegated to him, not only to take proper
notice of offences relating to his department, if he has undeniable evidence of them, but also diligently to trace out the
truth so soon as he has reasonable ground of suspicion. With
respect to offences which do not touch his particular department, he has only, it seems to me, the obligation common to
all citizens at large. Before we treat of this latter subject, it
will be necessary to speak of some dangers and evils connected with informing.
Governments have not unfrequently held out regular rewards, proportioned to the offence or crime of which information is given. It was formerly so in England. The more
a government is a government of law, and not of executive
I Toniline, Memoirs of Williamn Pitt, vol. ii. p. 27I, 2d ed.
182
I 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
management alone, the less effective must necessarily become,
upon the whole, a preventive police; for one of the main
ideas of a strict government of law and of civil liberty is that
the citizen be allowed to do all he chooses, provided hle do not
offend against the laws, and that proper notice shall be taken
of the offence only, and then only according to law, after an
abuse of that right to do what one chooses has taken place,
in other words, after an offence has been committed. I do
not mean to say that all preventive police is contrary to civil
liberty. On the contrary, it is infinitely better to prevent
crimes than to punish them; and one of the means to prevent
them is a preventive police. Yet it is certain, on the other
hand, that a preventive police cannot and ought not to be
established on so expensive and thorough a plan in a free
country-as is possible in a well-regulated and carefully organized absolute monarchy.,
The comparative inefficiency of a thoroughly organized preventive police, under institutions of civil liberty, might induce
us to consider this additional means of detecting offences by
holding out a regular reward for information, as peculiarly
necessary in free countries; for the necessity of punishing
offences remains in all societies the same. But we must consider that none but the abject portion of the community will
show themselves willing to make a profession of informing
for money, people who are incapable, perhaps, owing to their
I * There are two questions not distinctly stated here: Is a man bound to inform? and when is he bound not to inform? For the latter compare the following words of Lord Mansfield, when speaking of the laws against the Catholics, in
the case of James Webb, at the suit of Payne, a " common informer" of that
period:
"But now the case is quite altered.  The pope has very little power, which
seems to grow less and less daily. As for Jesuits, they are now banished out
of most kingdoms in Europe; so that there is now nothing to fear from either of
these quarters, and consequently no necessity of enforcing these laws; neither
was it ever the design of the legislators to have these laws enforced by every
common informer, but only at proper times and seasons, when they saw a necessity for it, and by proper persons appointed by themselves for that purpose; and
yet more properly speaking, they never were designed to be enforced at all, but
were only made in terrorem." From J. I-toliday's Life of Mansfield, I797, p. I79.
i83 
I POLITIJCAL ETHICS.
lost reputation, or unwilling, to make a living in the steady
and industrious pursuit of a regular trade. These informers,
therefore, will not limit themselves to informations of fullycommitted crimes and to lawful evidence of them, but they
have always been found prone to foment crimes, to mature
offences, which otherwise would not have been consummated,
with whatever care they could, to invent evidence and procure
perjured witnesses who share in their reward; so that the
professional informers themselves become in turn a most
criminal portion of the community, and constitute a most
alarming evil, totally inadmissible in a well-regulated society.'
I do not mean to discuss here how far the police should feel
authorized in thickly-settled countries, and especially in very
I Various acts to encourage the apprehending of felons were passed in England, in 1692, I694, I699, I707, I720, 174I, and I742, granting rewards from
~io to ~5o sterling. By the statute of I699, besides the ~4o, an immunity from
all parish offices was allowed to any person who should prosecute to conviction
a felon guilty of certain crimes.  The Tyburn tickets, as the certificates of exemption were called, were sold at high prices, even to ~306. In I8 13 the rewardmoney amounted to ~i8,ooo.  Officers would seduce poor people, especially, to
utter counterfeit money, in order afterwards to prosecute them.  A  certain
M'Daniel confessed, in 1756, that he had caused by his testimony seventy men
to be condemned to death. When he was tried with two others, the people feared
so much his acquittal upon some flaw or other that they were killed on the spot.
In I792 a.similar case happened, in which twenty men had become the victims
of an informer. In I8I7 four police-officers conspired against pool men and were
sentenced to death, but released upon judicial informalities by the twelve judges.
These conspirators had induced poor women to pass counterfeit money and seized
them in the act; they frequently changed small offences into capital ones, for instance if a work-bag had been stolen they swore that it had been tied with a
string to the arm and torn from it by violence, thus theft became robbery, and
they received ~50. Another revolting case happened in I817, when two soldiers
wrestled for a wager of one shilling, and with the greatest difficulty escaped death,
the sentence for robbery having already been pronounced, through the perjured
exaggeration of the police. Counterfeiters, well known to the police, were frequently not prosecuted, because good customers,- b)ut only the utterers. Alderman Wood asserted in I8i8, in parliament, that visiting the prisons he had found
thirteen men, mostly Irish or Germans, who had received counterfeit money to
buy bread, and were seized upon in the act of passing it by the police. These
iniquitous rewards were at length abolished in i8i8 by an act 58 George III.,
c. 70; but the abuse respecting counterfeit bank notes, for the convicted utterance
of which banks pay ~30, remained.
I84 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
populous cities, for the necessary protection of the community, to make use of crime and vice itself to obtain hints and
clues of the criminal doings in the community, for instance
by pardoning criminals on condition of their informing the
proper authority in future of the procedures of their former comrades. I am too well acquainted with the fact that
criminals in large cities act upon most extensive and ingenious
plans, and carry on crime upon systems ramified in a thousand directions, including distant agents to dispose of goods,
and men who know the law to defend them with perjured witnesses and for rewards which are a share of the criminal plunder. Constables of large cities and experienced agents of
prisons are the only ones who have a sufficient knowledge
of these often frightfully extensive ramifications, necessarily
hidden from the honest part of the community.  *So much,
however, is certain, that although the protection of the honest
may render these operations of the police excusable, they are
wholly incompatible with right, justice, and sound government, so soon as they are made use of for anything farther
than to obtain clues of crimes afterwards fully to be proved
upon regular evidence and not on that of the criminal informer
alone, or so soon as they are carried to such an extent as to
foment and prosper crime.
XXXIII. I have referred so far to common crimes only; but
when a government keeps spies, or establishes what is called
"a secret police;" to report upon the doings and the disposition
of the honest part of the community, especially upon their
political sentiments, it is engaged in a ruinous and criminal
course of measures. To watch and mislead men under false
pretences has at all times been considered so dishonorable and
shameful an occupation, even by the employers of the spies,
that none but the worthless and abandoned will enter upon so
disgraceful a trade. All the dangers mentioned in the previous
section are in this case increased, for here the question is of
dispositions which cannot be strictly defined, and the innocent may be affected; the citizen has no remedy against such
i$85 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
espionage, because the reports are made secretly, and therefore
may, and generally do, vastly differ from truth; it is of itself an
unlawful proceeding of government, which is established to
protect and to acknowledge, pronounce and maintain right and
law, not to pry into the thoughts and dispositions of the citi zens; and the knowledge of the existence of spies and secret
police, besides destroying candor, frankness, and the spirit of
mutual reliance, engenders immorality by the conviction which
the people have that the government consider themselves sepa rate from and opposite to the people. Of all the unfortunate
features of that institution which, view it in whatever light we
may, appears as one of the worst, most immoral and demoral izing, if indeed there is another equally unjust one in history
-the  Inquisition, the most deplorable perhaps was that it
rendered an extensive system of spies - called familiars -
necessary, and, by the help of fanaticism, made espionage and
informing honorable among all classes; for there were familiars among the highest nobility and poorest pedlars. And,
ruinous as this whole institution has been for Spain, this part
of its operation had probably the most mischievous effect upon
the national character of the Spaniard, who thereby became
distrustful. If we are told that by a system of informers many
offences may be discovered which otherwise might never be
brought to light, we shall place the whole question at once on
its proper ground, by asking that question which we are bound
to ask whenever we wish to judge correctly of an institution:
What is among other effects its moral operation, always of
greater importance than the physical? The many sacrifices
which have been offered by the Inquisition are doubtless a
grave subject, but it is of little importance that the various
writers differ by many thousands. It is the moral effect which
this baleful institution has had, which is infinitely greater
than all the physical pain which it inflicted with fiendish zeal.
Those who were burnt would at any rate slumber now in
the grave, but the nation where it flourished continues to be
ruined.
The history of every despotic government is replete with
z86 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
proofs of the misery entailed by informers and a secret police.
The informers during the Roman empire form one of its worst
features; they grew out of the pestilence of demoralization,
and flourished by the public ruin. All that Tacitus says of
the delatores, the vermin and pests of humnan society, and
whom he calls "genus hominum publico exitio repertum," is
but too true. The secret informations and summary actions
upon them in the former republic of Venice were often awful.,
All the imprecations in France against the "mouchards" were
but too well founded.2  The secret police under Napoleon in
France and all the countries he conquered, in all classes from
the highest to the lowest, and the counter secret police to
observe the first, were some of the most melancholy traits in
that grave period. To the shame of our advanced race, we
find that the Chinese penal code makes all anonymous informination against a penal offence punishable with death, whether
the information be true or not, and any officer who taklces upon
I The brass lion hollow and with open mouth in front of the doge's palace
received the anonymous informations.
2 Within our own times a case has occurred which shows the effects of such a
system in all its horror. The elder branch of the Bourbons, after their restoration, soon found that they were not the'race of the people,-not national. Their
government became uneasy. Conspiracies were suspected; a desire to punish
soon grew up. Carron, an officer residing at Colmar, in Alsace, was in 1822
abused by a diabolical intrigue of the ultra-party to commit himself so that a
show of an intended insurrection in Alsace might be made.   Kochlin, deputy
from that part of France, intrepidly published in I823 the whole plot, for which
he was punished.   A  court-martial sentenced Cartn to death; letters to bring
the sentence before the court of cassation at Paris, to which Carron had a right
by law, were retained by the post-office for some days, and an application to the
keeper of the seals for staying the execution until the court of cassation should
decide, received answer from Mr. Peyrounet, then keeper of the seals, that he
would consider it after a few days, on October 4. In the mean time a telegraphic
despatch had ordered the execution of Carron on the 2d October, when it actually
took place.  And now for the "mouchards."  Two of them, sergeants, were
made officers; a captain was made chef d'escadron; the two former and another
sergeant received each one hundred and fifty francs, and others still the cross of
the legion of honor.  The French dictionary says, ad verbum Mouchard, with
much lnavete, "Those who have the misfortune to employ these abject persons
think to disguise their contemptibleness by calling them observers."
187 
POLITICA4L ETHICS.
himself to proceed upon such anonymous information shall
receive one hundred blows, while no individual shall be punishable upon evidence thus obtained. I do not even find that
high treason makes in this case an exception, though the code
exempts cases of treason from almost every advantage granted
to the accused., In Spain the Inquisition proceeded not only
upon secret information, but the accused could not learn the
accuser and informer-a right frequently though unsuccessfully asked for by the descendants of the Jews and Moors,
who were willing to pay for it a high sum.
Governments are frequently desirous either to get rid of
individuals against whom they have not sufficient evidence to
justify any serious procedures, or to obtain more power by a
show of danger. For this purpose they ensnare their victims
in. pretended conspiracies, or induce them to utter unlawful
cries, and the like. This diabolical procedure, to which all
despotisms resort if convenient, was technically termed trepanning, under Charles II. and James II. The public trials for
treason at the time are full of evidence of this infamous measure, and the diaries and correspondence of the times show
us the use of the term. Any free people who omit promptly
to impeach a minister guilty or strongly suspected of this
crime of trepanning, or even of establishing a system of mouchlards, omit one of their most urgent public duties.
The Greeks had probably no systematic secret police, except under the tyrannis. There we find perfect models of it.
Hiero I. used to send listeners to the banquets of citizens.
The Greeks have various names for these instruments of
tyranny.2 But the absolute democracy of Athens had, if
not a regularly organized secret police, its sycophants or informers, a shameless class of men, who were as mischievous
in the passionate, wavering, and arbitrary administration of justice of the times of democratic absolutism as the demagogues
I Sir G. T. Staunton's translation, p. 360.
2 Aristotle, P'ol., v. ix. 3, speaks of them. They were called IIora,aywyid at
Syracuse.  IIlpoaaycjyevc was another term for a mouchard.
I88 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
were in its politics. The sycophants were considered by the
ancients as a natural and unavoidable consequence of absolute
democracy, and in this as in many other instances we see
the great similarity which all absolute governments, of whatever form, bear to each other, a fact on which we have dwelt
already in the first volume., The worst period of the French
revolution shows the same.
It is a different question whether governments have a moral
right to allow a crime, of which they have knowledge, to
mature to a certain degree. Undoubtedly it is a principle of
justice as well as of policy rather to prevent crime than to
punish it when committed, as has been stated already; but it
is not unfrequently of great importance for the public service
to punish or otherwise extinguish a criminal act, for instance
a conspiracy, of which government may have evidence sufficient for moral but not for legal conviction. Were a government in these cases to proceed in the prosecution at too early
a stage of the crime, it would only turn public opinion against
itself, by showing itself unable to sustain its charges, and would
thus in many cases strengthen the offenders. A government
has certainly not an absolute obligation to stay crime of which
as yet there exists no legally.convincing proof; but it has no
right to allow the crime to mature to such a point that citizens suffer thereby, if it have any convincing proof; still less
to favor the consummation of crime in any way whatsoever.
XXXIV. Most codes of civilized nations make it a punishable act to omit informing either the proper police authority
or the-endangered person of an intended crime against the
safety of society or the life, health, honor, reputation, or
property of an individual, if it can be done without endangering one's self or any third person. The Englishl law does not
acknowledge this obligation except in cases of conspiracies
against the community or state.  The former codes on the
x See, for instance, Athen., iii., 74; Schol. Aristoph., Plut., 3I; Simoniles,
apud Plutarch., Timol., 37.
I89 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
continent of Europe made informing after the fact likewise a
legal obligation; but all inflicted only a very slight punish ment for the omission, because the informer, if not bound by
his office, has at all times been held "in universal and natural
abhorrence, which  the legislator has reasons to esteem."
The lightness of the penalty shows that, even in countries
where informing is obligatory, the penalty for the omission
may be fairly considered as belonging to those which I have
a right to consider as an equivalent for the offence, to which
I may willingly expose myself if I have reason to disobey
the law. Informing, therefore, becomes everywhere an act
wholly or nearly wholly one which we must strictly consider
as falling within the sphere of political ethics.
On the one hand, a frank and honorable intercourse among
the members of society is so necessary for its whole wellbeing, and informing, without urgent reasons, has been
always so much abhorred by honorable  men, and, on the
other hand, the condign punishment of crime is so necessary
for the physical and moral welfare of society, that the rules
for an upright citizen need to take both these considerations
into account.  The establishment of a government in itself in
a very great measure relieves the private citizen from the
obligation of informing; for all the sacrifices of time, property, and other things  made  to the government, and the
restrictions to which he submits are, for the very purpose,
among others, that the government shall protect him and
shall find out, prosecute, and punish offences. This is its
business. The more a government circumscribes individual
action, the less obliged is the citizen freely to assist. This
has always been felt. The more restricted a government is,
on the other hand, the more it becomes the affair of the
people, and the greater ought also to be, and generally will be,
the people's readiness to assist the government. Now, I hold
it to be a sound rule that a citizen has a fair right to leave it
x Remarks on the Penal Code of Bavaria, Munich, I813, published by authority, vol. i. p. 22I, also p. 2II.
I9o 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
wholly to his government to look after all minor offences, for
otherwise a citizen might lose his whole time. Police offences,
except those of a generally dangerous character, for instance
against general  health, belong to this class.  The citizen,
however, ought freely to inform against grave offences or
crimes, unless the information would militate against other
sacred duties or ties, for instance those of near consanguinity.
Yet it must be observed that the citizen is not bound to ferret
out the crime if he suspects it only upon rumor or insufficient
indications, nor will he find himself obliged or at liberty to
inform of offences the apportioned punishment for which he
holds to be wholly out of proportion. No honorable man
would have felt himself at liberty to inform against a shoplifter while the English law existed which punished even the
first offence with death., Or who would inform, except in
cases of utmost extremity, against near relations? The family
ties are so sacred and of such primary necessity for society that
they must be respected. The Chinese code makes information against superior relations a punishable act.  (Staunton's
transl., p. 37I.) But it is pusillanimous not to inform against,
or, where the law allows of individual prosecution, to prosecute crimes or offences which endanger society, its safety or
liberty, and the penalties for which are in due proportion to
reason and justice. The citizen who omits to take the proper
step to bring a murderer, a public defaulter, a conspirator
against public liberty, or a traitor, to his just punishmnent, or
who allows a fellow-creature whom he knows to be innocent
to be prosecuted or his reputation unjustly injured, loads his
conscience with a great offence, and promotes the disregard
of public morality, without which society cannot obtain its
According to the Spanish law, the descendlants of a convict in thle first and
second degrees are incapable of holding office.  What Spaniard would not
have condemned a person who shouldl have informed against such a person who
might have succeeded in obtaining an office, the crime of the father being forgotten?  What must every man think of Lord Bristol, himself a Catholic, when
he impeached Lord Clar-endon, in I663, among other things, for having endeavor-ed to bring in popery?.Comppare Pepys's Diary under July Io, I663.
igi 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
highest and noblest ends. He gravely offends against the
general moral law. Public spirit and patriotism require him
to act even at the price of his own inconvenience.' Informing
becomes an especial duty when the committed offence continues to affect the rights or essential interests of others, for
instance, as observed above, if an innocent person is considered guilty or even only prosecuted, if a slur remains upon
the reputation of a man, if he continues to be deprived of
lawful property, as by documents we know to be falsified, if
the committed crime is an indication that similar ones will be
committed, such as theft or the fabrication of false documents,
and if the offence is against the liberty and protection of the
people, like that of unlawful voting, or falsified returns of
polls. Of course it must depend upon the citizen whether
he thinks it more advisable to inform the authority or the
interested individual.
These rules relate to offences already committed. Respecting inchoate crimes, or any offences of a graver sort, with
which an honest citizen may become acquainted, it is too
clear upon all grounds of morality, and the love of our neigh
I There existed a short time ago, and probably still exists, in one of the American cities, a society of gentlemien mutually pledged to inform against the committing of a certain offence which they considered of great injury to society. That
division of responsibility, if I can so call it, so frequently used for iniquitous purposes, was applied here for a good end.  The obligation was entered into upon
general grounds. Thle odium attached to individual information, therefore, did
not exist; and when the individual case occurred, the odium or reluctance
caused by the individual case and by the temporary office of prosecutor vanished
and was merged in the general and distinct obligation into which many had pr-eviously entered.  We have only to glance at history to observe how frequently a
similar division has served for the same reason, namely on account of the apparent extinction of personality in thle case, for evil ends. I have spoken of this
in the lIegal and Political Hermeneutics.
2 The Motives of the Penal Code for the Kingdom of WUirtember-g, I835, say
(page 92) that the new code abolishes the general obligation of denunciation existing. accord(ling to the old laws, because informing is against the general sentiment.  Exceptions, however, are made respecting crimes of general danger or
if innocent persons are under trial, firom which, again, are excepted cases where
the accused is by blood or marriage a relative of the individual who might inform,
or where knowledge of the fact has been obtaine(Sby religious confession.    -
192 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
bor, both in relation to the party who intends to offend and
that against whom the offence is intended, that the citizen
acquainted with the projected evil is bound to prevent the
offence, as far as in him lies, either by dissuading the evildisposed party, or, if this be impossible or promise no success,
by informing the endangered party.
VOL. II.
I93
11 
CHAPTER III.
Associations.-Associated Means, Endeavors.-Associations for the Promotion
of Morals.-Pledges.-Trades-Unions.-Ancient Guilds.-Unlawful  Combi nations for Purposes lawful if pursued by the Individual.- Evil Effects of
Trades-Unions.-Disclosures respecting them in Scotland and England.
XXXV. DIVISION and combination of labor, of energy, or
of means, and the tendency to association, are, as we have seen,
two of the main elements of all civilization. Both develop
themselves more distinctly and forcibly with each step of
the progress of society, and associated endeavors in a great
variety multiply with every advance of civil liberty. Despotism naturally dislikes association; yet each association, if not
carefully regulated, bears within it the germ of more or less
despotism, either towards others or its own individual members, for the simple reason that it increases intensity of action,
separates in some degree at least the associated members from
the rest of the community, and subjects them to separate rules
of action. We have associations for the promotion of mutual
industrial interest, such as insurance companies, for public
convenience, or objects of public spirit, or, as is frequently the
case, for both ends united; associations for the promotion of
knowledge in the higher spheres, as academies of sciences, or
for the diffusion of general knowledge, common schools, etc.;
associations for the promotion of charity or other moral ends,
such as societies to promote prison discipline, temperance,
or vaccination; religious associations, such as the monastic
I General insecurity as well as the religious spirit produced innumerable fraternities and associations, sometimes of a purely devotional character, at others for
the purposes of public utility and safety, yet connected with religious usages.
Such were, for instance, the fratres pontifices, or bridge-brethren, in the south of
France, from the thirteenth to the fifteenth century, for the building and supporting of bridges, roads, ferries, hospices, and their safety and police. They
degenerated, and were abolished by Pope Julius II.
194 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
orders and Bible societies'; and political associations. These
may be either for mutual protection, as in times of great
danger or feebleness of a government, when it is unable to
perform certain acts which are nevertheless necessary for men,
like administering justice, or common protection in general;
or for the obtaining of certain rights or privileges; or, finally,
for. opposing and ultimately changing a government. These
are generally and necessarily for a time secret societies.
It is evident that there are societies which combine several
of these objects at once. In I584 an association was formed
in England the object of which was to protect Queen Elizabeth against eveqry attack upon her or her government; a
similar one, it is well known, was formed under William III.
in I696, and in a degree made compulsory.,  The  Spanish
Hermandad was a league of numerous cities to protect their
liberties in seasons of civil war-so common in the feudal
times.2 But these associations of cities, of great importance
in the middle ages, and which did the greatest service in the
advance of civilization and of the civil liberty of the commons,
may be more properly called leagues. The Carbonari were a
secret Italian society for the promotion of certain political
ends. Ireland has seen of late many political associations,
among the rest the so-called precursor society, formed by Mr.
O'Connell. The clubs in France at the time of the first French
revolution were political associations, which have acquired
great notoriety.
Not  unfrequently associations, temporary or permanent,
have been formed to carry elections, defray their expenses, or
pay counsel at disputed elections. We shall find a more convenient place to consider all these strictly political associations,
after having spoken of the subject of parties. At this opportunity we shall consider associations in a moral point, and
such as exist in the regular state of society, when government is in full operation and neither anarchy nor revolution
I Trevor, William III., vol. ii. p. 29I.
a See, for instance, Prescott, History of Ferdinand and Isabella, Introduction.
I95 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
demands peculiar protection. Finally, we may mention those
societies which preserve some religious, moral, or other mystery. In the early stages of society it can be easily imagined
that the ignorance and vehement superstition of the whole
people at large should make it necessary to make of some
great religious truth, for instance the belief in one God, perhaps introduced from some distant and more advanced region,
a mystery, for fear that if not kept as such it would soon be
entirely eradicated. So likewise may certain scientific truths,
militating with the common belief, be exposed to total extirpation by fanaticism, if not kept within a circle of initiated
persons; but it seems that knowledge and religion with the
white race have become so diffused that no such mysteries are
any longer necessary, and that we are thus likewise spared
the dangers to which these societies must  always expose
themselves as well as others.
XXXVI. The law must determine what are lawful combinations and associations and what are not; but there are
many which the law cannot and ought not to prohibit, which
nevertheless, being either dangerous or injurious, ought to be
avoided by the conscientious citizen. The law of all countries
says in general that every combination is unlawful which interferes with the just and fair rights of others or of society;
but political ethics demands that we should avoid not only all
associations which interfere directly with the rights of others,
or in a manner that it may be cognizable by law, but also
those which have a tendency indirectly to do so, or which in
the nature of things lead to that indirect persecution which
although not cognizable by law may nevertheless be very
oppressive.
The first rule, then, is that we should inquire, Does the
association directly or indirectly abridge the free exercise of
any fair right of those who do not belong to it? Such associations will in general be the most harmless as have a simple
clearly-defined object, openly stated; and especially if they
are for mutual industrial interest or the promotion of arts or
I96 
POLITICAL ETHIC-S.
sciences only. But when the moral conduct becomes the object of associations, it must be remembered that they easily
superinduce a spirit of exclusiveness, of supposed superiority,
of indirect injury to others by advancing the members of the
association only, in the various ways of mutual assistance, and
of hypocrisy in some, who, seeing that they are in need of the
aid of such an association for worldly purposes, accommodate
themselves outwardly to it. Nor must it be forgotten that no
moral phenomenon is more common than that the more compact an association becomes, the more its members are apt, be
it by the common esprit de corps or by an erroneous feeling
of honor, to value the interest of the association higher than
any other, and sometimes, as has but too frequently happened,
to end in adopting a moral code or standard of their own, to
be judged of only by the promotion of the interests of that
association. In a free country there is this additional danger,
that such associations once formed, and having obtained a
strong hold upon the affections and sympathies of its members, most easily become channels and vessels of political agitations and dissensions. Political unions, however, in themselves,
have always been so interesting to all members of free states
that they alone, without any additional aid, have a sufficient
tendency to create divisions and separations, frequently disturbing the plain and easy intercourse of society. Nor can it
be denied that experience amply proves that, whenever mixed
up with extraneous matters, such clubs become injurious
and may easily end in fanaticism of one sort or another.
Morality is a general obligation, and every individual ought
to promote it as much as in him lies, and keep himself as
much untrammelled respecting all moral action as possible.
Speaking in a general way, specific pledges will not easily
improve the state of society at large, which is promoted by
general improvement, instruction, and general diffusion of
morality. Yet it cannot be denied that there is a great moral
power in mutually countenancing one another by association,
and vices may have become so general or have obtained such
strong hold upon society at large that the individual, such as
I97 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
most men naturally are, will be too weak or frail to make a
bold stand against them. Suppose, for instance, that the vice
of gaming has become so general in some or all classes that
it actually has infused itself into the whole intercourse of society, and that a man who should make a bold stand against
it would not only be derided, but actually cut off in a great
measure from that intercourse which is nevertheless necessary
for him.  Such a state of things has existed.  Even then I
believe it is far more thoroughly beneficial for society, in most
-cases, for the individual to take his stand boldly, prevail on
others to join his endeavors and promote their common
views, than to form a specific society for that purpose. The
operation may be at first slower, but will be safer and more
radical, without exposing us to the inconveniences or dangers
indicated before.  Dissension, hypocrisy, pride, the error of
seeking the essence of virtue and distinction of goodness in a
few definite outward actions only, and indirect oppression are
evils carefully to be avoided. Still, it will be admitted that
cases of extremity make here as everywhere exceptions. Intemperance has been to this day a national calamity in our
country. Innumerable other vices and crimes as well as great
misery arise out of it.  Temperance societies have had, in
many parts of our country, a beneficial effect. Yet even a
society with so simple an object has led in, some instances to
dissension and indirect oppression. It is safe to say, then, that
all associations formed for the avowed purpose of regulating
the moral conduct of its members by means of pledges should
be resorted to by way of exception only. We might otherwise dissolve society into numberless associations of a similar
kind, and coercion and violence instead of freedom of conscience would be the consequence.
* XXXVII. A species of association which has lately acquired great importance requires to be mentioned here in
,particular;  I mean the trades-unions, or those associations
of mechanics which -have for their purposes the regulation of
wages and time of labor, as well as the turns in which the
I, ) 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
members of the union shall find employment, or the proportion in which the employment of the unskilled shall stand to
that of the skilled.
In former times there existed all over Europe corporations
or guilds of mechanics, with monopolies and political privileges. They were necessary for the protection of the humble
burgher and infant industry against an unruly aristocracy, as
well as in some cases for the transmission of knowledge and
skill. Moreover, it was the prominent feature of the times
that every mass of men in any way whatever associated was
also incorporated. Without them the cities would never have
performed their high service in the promotion of civilization
and the acknowledgment of the burgher's rights. The various trades were separated by these guilds, but within them
the employer and employed had a common interest. The
French revolution abolished these corporations, which in turn
had, in many cases, become oppressive in the highest degree.
Many other countries, for instance Prussia, followed the example, and in England their political influence was totally
overthrown by the late reform act. The administration of
justice has become general, governments have become national, and skill and knowledge are so diffused that no special
protection by way of monopolizing corporations is any longer
deemed necessary. The more enlightened countries acknowledge it as one of the most substantial blessings of civil liberty
and order that labor, skill, and industry find their proportionate reward in the market open to all.  But now associations
were formed for the above-named purposes; they divided the
employed as a class distinct firom and opposite to the em)ployer. Trades-unions may be considered in their relations
to law, morals, political economy, and politics in general, as
to their general influence upon the safety of society.
Not a few persons believe that all lawful acts may likewise
be lawfully done in regulated combination with others; yet it
is a principle of the law of all civilized nations that not only
unlawful acts become the more criminal if done by combination of many, but also that lawful acts may become unlawful
I99 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
by combination, if the just exercise of the rights of others or
the lawful operation and necessary intercourse of society is
thereby infringed. Such combination is called conspiracy, and
the conspiracy is committed when such a combination has
been entered into, though no further combined act may have
taken place. An officer may throw up his commission whenever he likes, but if a number of officers combine to throw up
their commissions at the same time it justly Jbecomes a punishable act.' All this has been repeatedly decided in England
and America,2 and Mr. Livingston in his projected code defines
conspiracy, in Art. 683, thus: "Conspiracy is an agreement
between two or more persons to do any unlawful act, or any
of those designated acts which become by combinations injurious to others." In Art. 689 he says that the agreement
"stipulating that the parties to it will not give more than a
certain price for any particular species of service or property,
or that they will not furnish or render any such property or
service for less than a stipulated price, is injurious to that free
competition necessary to commerce. And if such agreement
be made between two or more persons, not being partners, it
is a conspiracy, and shall be punished," etc. It is needless to
quote other codes. All, I believe, agree in considering a combination to extort higher prices as unlawful; few, however,
declare it with sufficient distinctness equally unlawful for
employers to extort by combination lower wages; although
the cases do not differ for the political economist, who well
knows that the latter combination falls entirely within the
sphere of the first; for if the employer extorts lower wages
he only extorts a higher price (that is, demands more labor
done) for the money which he pays, as in the reversed case
the workman wants more money for his labor. That simple
I It was decided by Lord Mansfield, Burr. 2472, Vertue vs. Lord Clive; lb.
2419, Parker vs. Lord Clive.
2 Mod. R. Io; Ib. 320, The King vs. Edwards et al.; 2 Mass. R. 329, The Commonwealth vs. Dryden and others.  So in New York, by the Supreme Court, in
the case of the People vs. George M. Fisher, Stephen Fowler, and Anthony C.
Hoyt.
200 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
principle of political economy, that if I buy a barrel of flour
for six dollars from A B, A B likewise buys six dollars for a
barrel of flour from me, is, though so evident and of primary
importance in judging of a thousand relations both of exchange and of right, continually forgotten; in other words, it
is always forgotten that money is nothing but a commodity,
although the most desired by all. Justice therefore demands
as a matter of course that a combination among employers
for the purpose of denying higher wages or of lowering the
same is as unlawful as that of the employed not to take anything less than a certain amount.  Indeed, the act is morally
more unlawful, inasmuch as it is easier for the employers to
combine than for the day-laborers, and they can generally hold
out longer.
XXXVIII. The evil effects of these trades-unions, as they
have appeared of late, in many countries, may perhaps be
summed up thus: They are oppressive to the employer, who
cannot freely choose the workmen he prefers; they interfere
with society at large, by interrupting the free course of demand and supply, create unnatural prices, or wholly interrupt entire branches of industry; they necessarily therefore
drive capital to other regions, where it will find its natural
market, and thus the workman is injured; they promote idleness by procuring for the unskilled the same chance of labor,
and, when once established, are oppressive to apprentices, of
whom they admit but a small number in order not to increase
the number of workmen and consequently the chance of labor;
they intimidate and oppress masters and those workmen who
are not members; they promote expense and immorality
among the members by the strikes, and  have it always in
their power to injure grievously their employers by selecting
periods for their strikes when they are under heavy engagements; they hurt themselves by actually raising wages in
many cases above the natural price, and thus make industry
flow to other countries; they are the more apt to adopt and
follow their own code of morals, the more secret and unlaw
201 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
ful they know their proceedings to be; they impose heavy taxes
upon the intimidated and fearfully support the guilty of their
association. In brief, they form a most oppressive, flagrant,
and unrighteous aristocracy, knowing no interest or moral
code but their own.
According to our principle, that we ought always to pay
proper attention to those cases in which the principle of the
subject under consideration has most strongly, distinctly, and
consistently shown itself, I will give here a few facts respecting the trades-unions in England and Scotland elicited by
several trials and statements before parliamentary committees.!
Of course it is not meant that all have committed the same
outrages, but these are the evils to which they may lead.
Trades-unions are originally voluntary associations, but they
easily intimidate those workmen who will not join them;
they force the masters to employ men of their union only;
they fix the proportion of the number of the skilful workmen
to the apprentices to be employed; they elect their overseer;
they regulate wages and time of labor; and woe to him who
disobeys.   In many cases refractory workmen  have been
murdered, or were made blind by vitriol being thrown into
their eyes. The colliers of Lanarkshire, taking advantage of
the great demand for iron in 1835 and 1836, issued a mandate
-that no colliers should work more than three days or four in
the week, and at the utmost five hours in each day. The
order was implicitly obeyed, not only there but in many other
counties. They held out several months, and the price of
coal was immeasurably raised, so that the total loss from
coal monopoly and strike caused by the colliers' combination in eighteen months amounted to ~678,oo000 sterling.
The master is forced to employ those whose turn it is on the
list: thus the main inducement to industry and skill is annihilated, and the inferior workmen, always more numerous
Report of the Trial of Thomas Hunter, Peter Hacket, etc., Operative Cotton
Spinners in Glasgow, before the High Court of Justiciary at Edinburgh, January,
I838, for the crimes of illegal conspiracy and murder. By Archibald Swinton,
Edinburgh, I838.
C0d 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
than the skilful, are encouraged. To keep the union from
increasing too much, a very large entrance-fee is demanded,
and the time of apprenticeship made very long.   High rewards are paid for discovering any disobedience, or even for
"unshopping," that is, throwing out of employment, highly
skilful hands.  Secret oaths were taken to keep the first oath
itself secret, to inform against refractory workmen, and even
to commit assassination of obnoxious masters, if commanded
by the secret committee elected by intermediate elections.
High sums were paid for assassination, the defence of the
assassins carried on by common expense, and false alibis
easily sworn to.  In single cases the unions  must be almost
always successful; because, as was stated already, they select
for their strikes those periods, if possible, when the employers
are most embarrassed and heavy bills are running against
them, while those that strike are supported from the common
fund. The trades-unions wean the members from their families, and crimes, as is exhibited by statistical tables, have increased lamentably with their increase. The enormous losses
which the community at large has suffered during the fifteen
years when the unions have been in most vigorous action, and
which were ultimately likewise sustained as a matter of course
by the working classes, are almost inconceivable. Never has
aristocratic monopoly been probably carried out more sternly,
ruinously, and barbarously than by the Scottish trades' unions.,
If it should be objected that the abuse here stated, and undeniably proved by judicial and patient trials as well as by
minute statistical inquiries, proves no more against tradesunions in general than murders would prove the unlawfulness
of keeping arms in general, we must observe that the cases
~~~~~~~_            __
With regard to Ireland, see Mr. O'Connell's speech, Mirror of Parliament,
February 4, 1838.
I would refer the reader to an article on Trades-Unions and Strikes, in the
Edinburgh Review for April, I838, replete with most interesting facts and
statistics.
See also Miss Martineau's Tale of the Manchester Strike.
Respecting combinations in general, see Hansard's Parliamentary Debates,
I825. Also, T. Gibson's opinion, in Hall's Journal of Jurisprudence, 226.
203 
24POLITICAL E~THICS.
are not the same, for trades-unions, if they are for the purpose of extorting higher wages, are in their principle unlawful
as well as unjust on moral grounds; that according to the
natural course of things, according to the universal character
of man, they must lead to oppression and great abuse, as they
have done everywhere, though they need indeed not lead to
assassination; but that with regard to this latter point we
ought also to remember that these awful effects of tradesunions took place not in nations where  murder is comnmon,
but among the Scotch-a people not prone by any means
to violent crimes.
It is not necessary here-to mention that unions among the
working classes for charitable purposes and mutual support
in distress are lawful and highly laudable.
0
204 
CHAPTER IV.
Liberty of the Press.- Primordial Right of Communion.-Journalism.- High
moral Obligations of Editors. — Temptations in the way of editors.- Power
of Leaders, good or bad, rests upon their seizing upon that principle which
is the moving Agent of the Mass. -In what the Power of leading Papers
consists.- Conditions which give great power to single Papers.- Populous
Capitals in Connection with the Influence of Papers. - Obligation of Veracity
peculiarly strong for Editors.-Political Importance of gentlemanlike Tone. Publishing private Letters.-Dangers of Newspaper Flippancy.-The Political
Position of the Clergyman. - Opinion of ancient Theologians. - How far the
Clergyman ought to share in the Politics of his Country.
XXXIX. IT has been seen that the liberty of the press, or
communion by print, belongs properly to the general and
primordial right of communion, and ought to be abridged,
among those nations which under the developing influence of
civilization have arrived at a distinct perception of rights, only
in exceptional cases, for instance in a besieged fortress. Communion is absolutely necessary for men, and the free intercommunion of minds by means of print is as necessary for
the existence of civilized society as the word of mouth for 
the daily intercourse of men.  The story reported by  Elian
is too pointed a caricature of the restriction of communion
not to be mentioned here., A certain tyrant Tryzus prohibited talking, in order to prevent dangerous combinations
among the citizens. They resorted to communion by gestures; these too were prohibited. The citizens obeyed; but
it so happened that some general misfortune touched all of
them so deeply that they were on the point of breaking forth
in tears. These symptoms of their feelings would likewise
have been a sort of communion, and Tryzus ordered his police
to prevent and prohibit weeping in the market. Upon this, at
-I
I.Elian, Var. Hist., xiv. 22.
205 
POLITICIIL ETHICS.
length, some idea of individual and primordial right, above
the government-and that of sighing or crying, it would
appear, must be acknowledged to be one-occurred to the
patient burghers: they revolted, and the tyrant was slain.'
The press is a power, a gigantic power; and can it not in
turn become tyrannical, as well as other powers can? The
press, and  specially the newspaper press, which with its
whole organization and all its qualities and powers is now
termed journalism, has been mentioned already as one of the
mightiest agents in all that interests society, and especially in
politics, peculiar to our own times, of which neither the ancients nor the nmiddle ages knew anything. It not only gives
increased rapidity; and, in many cases, greater vigor, at least
for a time, to political action for better or worse, but it gives
to public opinion a new intensity as well as rapidity of action,
and even where it is best regulated draws before the public a
thousand transactions or events which without it would have
remained strictly private, and by the force of public sentiment
submits individuals to some sort of public trial.  I do not
speak here of common cases of slander, but of cases which,
however private in their origin, oblige the individual to pay
regard to public opinion simply because the case has once
been touched upon by the papers and the reputation of an
individual is at stake, or in which it is otherwise necessary to
disabuse the community. For instance, a London physician
of eminence was lately suspected not to have rendered that
speedy.and humane assistance to a friend travelling in his
company on the railroad and suddenly falling sick, which it
was believed he ought to have rendered. A long controversy
and several statements by the physician and his friends, exculpating. him by proof of facts, were the consequence. It
would have availed the physician little to go to law, for some
* The Spanish government published an order by beat of drum, at Madrid,
prohibiting all persons from speaking of the destruction of the Spanish fleet off
Sicily by Admiral Byng (Viscount Torrington) on the IIth of August, 17I8.
Dispatch of St. Aignan to the Regent of France, M6moires de Noailles, vol. v.
p. 96.  I quote from Lord Mahon's History of England, i. 477 (i. 33I).
206 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
thing was at stake which never could have been fully established by a legal trial, bound as it necessarily is to fixed forms
within a fixed sphere.  Here the press subjected a private
individual to a trial of its own.  Similar instances are daily
occurring.  It is not maintained that this is to be deplored. I
merely speak for the present of the fact as showing the new
and great power of the press. Very frequently, indeed, it
re-establishes reputation, however bitter the trial may be to
which the individual must submit in being unceremoniously
handled by just and unjust, honorable and- malignant editors.
But for the press, rankling slander would go on, without
being openly inquired into or satisfactorily contradicted, and
would be taken for truth in that circle in which it became
known, or would leave sinister suspicion.
Whenever a vast new agent of society is brought into play,
it takes some time before it and the laws become mutually
adapted; it was so when Christianity became a vast social
agent, when the commons or third estate rose in importance,
power, and political consciousness, when  the Reformation
became a great agent and diffused knowledge: hence it appears
to me that upon examination it will be found that one of the
main problems of our times is, and for a long time to come
will continue to be, how this agent of the public press,. unequalled perhaps in power, at any rate in movability, by any
previous one, is properly to co-exist with the rights of the
individual, of society, and of the state at once.  The struggle
through which all great problems must necessarily pass has
only begun, and we find on the one hand as much tyrannical
abuse of this mighty power as on the other hand we find
fruitless or ruinous endeavors to disown its naturalness and
x The recent case of Lady Flora Hastings is strikingly in point. Bitter indeed
as for her this public trial must have been, is it not upon the whole better for her
that all has thus become known than that infamy should carry on covert slander?
The above was written and going to press when the news of the death of this
lady arrived. What was stated in the previous lines has been still: more strikingly
illustrated. The injured maiden made a dying request that her innocence should
be proved by a post-mortem examination.. It has been done, and the papers are
carrying the certificate of the physicians into all parts of the reading world.
20,, 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
its necessary place in the course of civilization, as indeed
has always been the case when new agents come into existence and play. Crowns have been lost because those who
wore them shut their eyes against the press or attempted to
strangle it; and societies have been convulsed because the
press would act as though it were an agent which justly possessed absolute power. The ministers of Charles X., in their
report of July 26, i830, which preceded the fatal decree that
"The liberty of the periodical press is suspended," had this
passage: "At all periods, indeed, has the periodical press
been only, and it is in its nature to be only, an instrument of
disorder and sedition." I The same has been said at times, for
similar reasons, against printing in general, against the claim
of the people freely to read the Bible, against natural philosophy, the study of which was actually abolished in the Spanish
universities by a decree of Ferdinand VII., and indeed against
all inquiry. The press is like a thousand other things; the
question is not, shall we rule without it? It may be interesting by way of speculation to inquire whether it would be
better for mankind were there no press; but this is a wholly
fruitless inquiry in politics, for the press is afact, a given condition of our period, just as much as the soil forms one of the
given conditions for each country, or the clime for each region.
The statesman has not to speculate about them, but his laws
must take them as facts, and be shaped accordingly. The
only question is, how shall we regulate and preserve liberty,
x This report, signed by seven French cabinet ministers, is a valuable document, which I would recommend for perusal, not to satisfy curiosity respecting
what a party considered tyrannical has to say,-tlhis is not the true use which we
ought to make of historical documents of such importance,-but because it probably embodies the most important views of one of the two contending parties on
that subject in our times. We must never forget that the true principle respecting subjects of magnitude develops itself out of the struggle, and is never produced at once in an absolute and finished manner. United with this report and
the subsequent ordonnances must be the spirited protest of the Paris journals and
that of the deputies. I believe we do not venture too far if we say that the
liberty of the press and consequently the journals had become the pledge and
symbol of civil liberty.
208 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
public and private, with the press? It is as natural and necessary now as crying was to the subjects of Tryzus. The same
question might be raised respecting large cities: do they or
do they not promote crime, tumults, rebellions? this is not
the question. We have them, we ought to have them, civilization requires them, there they are; the question can
only be, how shall we maintain order and liberty with them?
A distinguished writer of the last century discussed the
subject whether, upon the whole, the disadvantages of easy
intercommunication by good roads, especially in cases of invasion, did not overbalance their advantages? He is, upon
the whole, against rhany good roads. But this is not the
problem. Roads belong to the social agents of civilization;
the question can only be, how shall we govern with them?
It would be as rational to ask whether it would not be easier
to govern a state composed of blind people.  It is for the
science of politics proper to indicate how this great agent is to
be reconciled and amalgamated with all the other great and
indispensable objects of the state or of society at large:'
here our object can only be to consider the ethic points
involved in the great subject.
XL. The whole periodical press, literary, religious, and
political, is of vast importance to society; the diffusion of
knowledge, truth, error, or falsehood is multiplied. The
press at the same time is not unfrequently conducted, partly
or wholly, by persons so unqualified and upon principles of
moral responsibility so doubtful that it most assuredly deserves the closest and frankest attention. But the general
- Thus, it has been proposed in an article ascribed to one of the most eminent
men of our age that protective societies should be formed against newspaper
slander and all attacks upon reputation, partly to discourage subscription to slanderous papers, partly to prosecute them at law with the rigor of united means;
and possibly such protective societies may become necessary in some parts of the
world. If the press really becomes tyrannical, and the individual should be
incapable of resisting it single-handed, societies of this kind would be as necessary as protective unions were necessary in the middle ages against feudal aristocracies.
VOL. II.                           I4
209 
POLITIC4L ETHICS.
subject of the present work requires that we should limit our
inquiries to the political press. Of this the newspapers form
of course the most prominent part, although it seems that history will point out the influence of some quarterly periodicals
as very great, because they offer an opportunity for discussions
extensive enough to be thorough or detailed, and yet too
short to form a work; which discussions often would not have
found half as many readers had they been issued as separate
books. The periodical reappearance of these works, and
therefore the periodical rediscussion of important subjects in
their various aspects, increases greatly their power.
Newspapers have become the substitutes of the oral communion in the ancient market, when cities were states; but
their action is in some respects greater and more lasting, because print lasts. Journalism is communion multiplied and
of swifter action than oral communion; what orally would
slowly travel from mouth to mouth, or drop before it had
become extensive rumor, is now conveyed within a few hours
to many thousands. All the moral obligations, therefore, of a
man and citizen which refer to communion in general, hold
likewise respecting this species of communion, with this additional characteristic, that in the same degree as this communion is vaster and more powerful, so do all the moral
responsibilities connected with it increase in intensity. This
appears to be evident: if a man says an untrue thing of his
neighbor to a single person, it is an offence of which he
ought to be ashamed, yet not so great an offence as if he says
the same in an assembly; this again is not so great as if he
writes it in a letter to be shown to many; this in turn is a less
offence than when the same is coolly stated in a pamphlet.
Yet party excitement seems to have almost established it as a
principle that the wider and more rapid the action of communication, the less binding are the moral obligations of him who
makes them. If there is a class of men upon whom it would
be more binding to be good men, good citizens, and true gentlemen than upon any other, that class are editors. To me,
the calling of an editor, be it as promulgator, instructor, guar
2IO 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
dian, or leader, seems a very grave one, however many of
them may disregard it themselves; they have peculiar charges
in the service of modern civilization, taking this word in its
most comprehensive meaning.
Yet every fair observer will acknowledge that many difficulties are inherent in and peculiar to this branch of industry,
such, for instance, as that a newspaper, while on the one hand
it assumes the charge of informing if not always of instructing, is on the other hand an article of merchandise, and subject, as a matter of course, to all the laws which regulate
every demand and supply; and that, owing to the multiplicity
of papers, a certain strong language. is necessary to effect only
a hearing which by language far less strong is obtained in
private intercourse, or in works in which arguments may be
developed-at their full length; or that when a newspaper belongs avowedly to a party it becomes in a degree its organ,
and will be, therefore, more careful in not allowing advantages
to the opposite party than the private citizen as member of a
party feels called upon to grant, while this circumstance likewise is a strong temptation to trench upon the cause of truth.
For these and many other reasons it becomes only the more
necessary to consider the ethical obligations of conductors of
papers. On the one hand we have seen that unshackled liberty
of the press is not only a most valuable right of freemen, but
society at large is deeply interested in seeing free discussion
of all public measures and men protected in as wide a range
as public security and morality as well as private rights admit;
on the other hand, the licentiousness of the press and its
tyranny is a great calamity, and it is exceedingly difficult to
maintain the precise line between the two by positive law,in many cases is absolutely impossible. The moral obligation
of the conductors of the press, therefore, becomes the greater
from whatever point of view we may consider it. For this
purpose it is necessary to dwell on some particulars for a
moment longer.
XLI. Some persons believe that the power of newspapers
2II 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
to lead the public is far greater than it actually is; others undervalue their power. In general it may be observed, as has
been alluded to already in a previous part of this work, that
leaders, be they citizens in private or in official situations,
editors, parliamentary leaders, legislators, reformers, or even
monarchs, possess power only in so far as they have the penetration, intellectual or moral vigor, sagacity, instinct, greatness
of soul, divination, or whatever else it may be, to seize upon
the principal moving agent of the masses or times, to pronounce clearly what the masses feel, and to act out what all
more or less consciously strive for or the circumstances of the
times demand. This may be for better or worse according to
the tendency of that body of men whose feelings or purposes
the leader sagaciously pronounces or represents. The chief
of a piratical expedition is in this respect as much a leader as
the wisest statesman or purest patriot may be for a whole
nation in its noblest and grandest efforts. It is true, therefore,
that a leader can be such only and in so far as he follows the
general impulse or acknowledges the common principle of
movement; but it is likewise true that, this once done, a leader
greatly concentrates, invigorates, propels, and accelerates. In
a leader a party or society becomes conscious of its own
wants, endeavors, and energies.
These remarks apply to newspapers according to the degree
of leadership which they possess. A remarkable instance
seems to be on record. It is confidently reported that when
the question of British reform was on the eve of being seriously discussed in the commons, the proprietors of the London
Times newspaper sent agents into various parts of England
to ascertain how the great body of the people seemed actually
disposed respecting this intended great measure. The report
was that the people were in favor of it. This once done, no
one, I believe, will deny that this paper, in conjunction with
others, such as the London Chronicle and the Globe, were of
decided and marked service in bringing about this measure.
They acted like burning-glasses. Where there are no rays,
the burning-glass cannot collect them; but where they are
2I2 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
scattered about it, may collect them and direct them powerfully to one point. A paper, the Rhenish Mercury, edited in
I8I3 and I8I4, when the allied powers warred against Napoleon, was, somewhat hyperbolically, yet not without truth, frequently called "the fifth ally,"  the other four being Great
Britain, Prussia, Austria, and Russia.
The chief papers of the various countries occupy, in this
respect, different positions. The more populous the capital
of a country, and the more the political and social life of a
whole nation is concentrated in such a capital, and at the same
time the more the laws or other circumstances prevent a multitude of papers, the greater will be the specific influence of
single ones; because the subscription-list of the papers will
be greatly increased, which of itself would enhance their influence, and the income of the paper being so much larger, its
proprietors have it in their power to unite higher and more
varied talent in its service. Papers may thus acquire a power
which may be very dangerous or salutary, according to circumstances. In no country, I believe, have papers within
their respective countries a greater influence than in France,
owing to the peculiar position which Paris as a capital enjoys.
Subscription-lists of daily papers have amounted there to
twenty thousand. Each paper is not only read by several
persons, as is common everywhere, but there are "reading
cabinets" in which people throng from morning to night to
read them, and some places where a person reads the most
important parts to audiences around them.  In England,
owing to the very different position which London, although
much larger than Paris, as being the capital of a less numerous nation, occupies, and because the political life is far more
diffused in all parts of the country, papers do not exercise
such dictatorial power. In France likewise it is, as it seems,
on the decrease in the same proportion as the communities at
large acquire more and more distinct political life and action.2
z By Mr. Gorres.
2 An extensive view of the circulation, and remarks upon the influence, of the
213 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
In the United States, where there is no capital to be compared
to Paris or London, where the political action which otherwise
might become dictatorial is broken by the circumstance of
the population being scattered over a vast country, by the
numerous state legislatures, and by the great political action
each community enjoys, the leading influence of the papers is
comparatively small. Yet all papers, it will be allowed, possess a propelling power in their sphere. Even if we consider
many papers as nothing more than letters written to subscribers, they receive an influence from their uniformity in
writing the same to many, from their constant repetition, and,
what is not the least, from the fact that anything in print, even
although he who prints may not be held in universal esteem
either for rectitude of conduct or capacity of mind, has for
most men some sort of authority; at any rate, whatever stands
before our eyes in print receives more attention than what is
uttered by word of mouth, or pen and ink alone.
London papers and periodicals are to be found in a work entitled "The Great
Metropolis," I837, London and New York. The facts collected there are of high
interest.  The article "Newspapers" in McCulloch's Commercial Dictionary
contains most valuable statistical information, especially respecting Great Britain.
For remarks on the history of Newspapers, and their existence in the various
countries in the world about ten years ago, see the article " Newspaper," in the
Encyclopaedia Americana. It is well known that within the last few years a
government paper in Turkish has been established in Constantinople; while the
Sandwich Islands as well as New South Wales have theirs. About eight years
ago a weekly paper called the Cherokee Phoenix was established at New Echota,
in the state of Georgia, printed partly in Cherokee, partly in English. Gradually,
however, the Cherokee part in it seemed to diminish, and I am not aware whether
it still exists. The newspaper has become so decided an accompaniment of our
civilization that wherever it extends the newspaper likewise takes its root. Even
the negro colonists at the infant colony of Liberia have their paper.-For a
general estimate of the papers issued by the American press, see the American
Almanac, annually issued in Boston.-The newspaper is emphatically a concomitant of modern European civilization. The Chinese have long possessed a
paper in their capital; but it is only an official promulgator. [A number of
newspapers now published in the United States (I874) for number of subscribers
compare with the most popular European ones, and for enterprise in collecting
news from various parts of the world far outstrip, it is believed, any published
outside of England.]
2I4 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
XLII. Though daily or weekly papers are expected to give
an account of all the most interesting facts which occur, to
be in a degree the cast of actual life as it passes on, presented
for the calm consideration of the beholder, it is advisable for
every paper that it should have one branch of communication
in which it is peculiarly strong and may be depended upon,
of whatever sphere this may be. Thus alone it can calculate
upon lasting and  considerable influence.  Steadiness and
singleness of purpose have here as everywhere else a great
effect. Let the editor clearly know himself, in what branch
he is capable of being a guide, and in what he ought to
attempt merely to be a reporter of what occurs.
It is not only allowable, but, I believe, desirable and necessary, that parties, societies, institutions, of importance and
engaged- in a decisive movement, should have their avowed
organs, papers to which the community can at all times look
for the particular view which that part of society'takes of
specific cases. But this in no way disengages such an organ
either from the common and eternal obligation of truth or plain
morality, which must ever regulate the intercourse of men, if
society is to be maintained; still less does it allow any one
actually to sell his talent or conscience either for specific reward or for the profit expected from subscription.,  This
would be a prostitution of mind and soul. In no case whatsoever can an editor be allowed to utter a known or suspected
falsehood, or imprudently to assert anything against the reputation of individuals or societies. It is his bounden duty first
to inquire. The assertion that if false it will be contradicted
is of no avail. This would equally well apply to many falsehoods in private life, and the obligation of truth is general;
but though falsehoods uttered in papers may in many cases
be expected to be contradicted in large cities, where there are
many opposite papers, or if vented against eminent men, it
It has happened that an English paper wilfully slandered a respectable lady,
merely to come into notice by the ensuing trial, which was worth more to the
paper than it lost by the fine. Goede, if I recollect right, mentions a case in his
England, Wales, etc., Dresden, i8o6.
2I5 
. POLITICAL ETHICS.
must not be forgotten that the contradiction does not necessarily flow in the same channel and to the same parts of the
country. There cannot be any doubt that a man may be
seriously injured by false assertions, leaving, even if contradicted, shades of suspicion, which all who are vain of their
own peculiar sagacity are ever ready to adopt, especially if
the attack be systematically repeated. Not only may contemporaries be deceived, but posterity likewise. A newspaper
ought ever to keep in mind that it acts in a most unfair and
ungentlemanly manner by using that advantage which it
daily has over a private individual of uttering to many hearers
whatever it pleases. If hints and insinuations are highly
reprehensible in private intercourse, they are on this account
far more so in newspapers.
It would be hardly necessary to mention that if in any situation the pampering of vitiated or criminal appetites is one
of the greatest derelictions from duty, it becomes tenfold so
in newspapers. It is no answer that the respectable or moral
part of the community will not read them. Perhaps not; but
many do read them who are vitiated by these accounts and
become more and more confirmed in their disposition. Any
person who has paid attention to the unfortunate portion of
the other sex, and to criminals in general, well knows that
lascivious papers as well as the constantly repeated detailed
accounts of atrocious crimes do infinite mischief in all countries.T There is not the slightest testimony of competent
Reports of trials are necessary; the public are deeply interested in them;
but they differ from those accounts of crime and atrocity which depict merely to
satisfy a vicious craving for atrocious stories, or represent vices and offences
with levity. There are weekly papers which occupy a large part of their columns
with these accounts, accompanied by disgusting wood-cuts.   There exists an
American weekly periodical, called the Terrific Register, etc., the title itself
being a register of everything that is loathsome and criminal. Quite similar
periodicals exist in England and France.  There are several mentioned in "The
Stranger in America." Many criminals have not only been originally familiarized with crime by such accounts, but, as they have confessed, their appetite was
first excited by it. This is not a fit place to discuss the psychologic phenomenonthe fact may well be mentioned-that frequently the desire of incendiarism, and
sometimes that of poisoning, is awakened by accounts of these crimes.
2i6 
POLITICAL ErTICS.
persons to the contrary, that I am aware of But we need
not speak of these two extremes only. There are many other
injurious dispositions or inclinations which may be pampered,
developed, sped to a ruinous extent, by the papers.   Ridiculing whatever commands respect, with that zest which for
many persons mere boldness or impudence ever has, and
which is so often mistaken for wit; attacking directly or indirectly private character; seasoning with gross personalities
excitement of all sorts arising from political and religious
fanaticism, hypocrisy, or narrow-mindedness; making light of
the laws of the land;-all these evils may be greatly promoted
by newspapers. They may indeed be caused by any writing;
but newspapers are more widely diffused and constantly renewed, hence if bad their danger is greater. Many papers
act in times of excitement as though there were no danger in
throwing brands at random among combustibles, as if their
highest duty were to foment and disturb, and as if they were
not conscious of the infinite concatenation of everything good
or bad in the millions of elements constituting society, intercourse, and national life.
In continually making overstatements,! or, what is of course
still worse, habitually employing misrepresentations, which
generally are far worse than positive falsehoods, because so
much more insinuating, language loses its proper value, and
part of the community accustom themselves to look upon all
similar assertions as not to be trusted, so that truth can no
longer rouse from torpor or find entrance with those to whom
it is not advantageous or palatable. This is a state of things
which very frequently takes place in times of great excitement.
The spirit of veracity and with it of honesty and courtesy flies,
and a considerable part of the community becomes morally
I Instances are unnecessary: still, one may stand here for many, and is extraordinary enough. A London daily paper, one of the first of its party, said in
August, 1838, that every true Englishman's blood must curdle at the idea that
Lord Durham had proposed, at a public entertainment in Canada, the health of
the President of the United States. Even merely as an entertaining anecdote I
think it is not undeserving of a place in a note.
2I17 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
blunted. Society is not only interested in a general gentlemanlike intercourse on account of general convenience and refinement, but free states are, in my opinion, for political reasons
deeply interested in a general esteem of gentlemanly propriety, founded upon a nice feeling of that honor which is
ashamed of doing anything even slightly mean, upon mutual
acknowledgment and readiness to serve, or absence of selfishness, and upon habitual avoidance of what may hurt one's
neighbor, which elements are perhaps the most prominent in
the character of the true gentleman. In this respect politeness, decorum, acquire political importance.   Cicero and
Washington fully acknowledge it in their writings. Newspapers, however, may very largely and essentially contribute
to lower this sentiment by ungentlemanly personalities, and
in general by discarding those rules which are universally
acknowledged in well-bred society and from which they can
never be absolved.  "Nothing is easier," wrote Erasmus
(Jortin's Life of Erasmus, i. 257), "than to call Luther a blockhead; nothing more difficult than to prove him one." Editors
ought to remember, likewise, that, as a uniformly gentlemanlike behavior gives, according to all experience, great influence
in deliberative assemblies, so does a paper acquire a very
powerful aid from a uniformly unruffled gentlemanlike tone.
Its words will be taken in their full value; its arguments will
be allowed more readily; its sincerity will find greater credence.
Is it necessary to mention here that editors sport with most
sacred rights if they publish private letters without being
authorized, and that in these cases they constitute themselves
what we have seen to be one of the most hateful features of
despotism-a secret police?2 It is not unfrequently the case
That scurrilous papers use all sorts of language is natural; but both in England and America leading papers forget themselves frequently. A distinguished
citizen of the United States was frequently called, during one of the late most
exciting discussions, by opprobrious names, that alluding to his name not excepted.  A leading London paper of December 22, I834, speaks of the "goosehead patriot of Charing Cross." The duke of Wellington was called "blockhead"
during the reform excitement.
2 * That to do this is against law unless permission of the writers [or thei
2I8
4N 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
that single editors, and among them many who have had no
other preparation for their task than that of having been compositors, assume the task of judging of all subjects, of politics,
literature, theology, or the fine arts. Leaving their presumption out of the case,-which must draw the ridicule of the
considerate upon them,-they lower that tone of reverence
which, whatever may be said to the contrary for the sake of
flattering, is indispensable for the true life of every individual
and of all society. Where skill, talent, industry, knowledge,
learning; perseverance, proved rectitude, experience, professional reputation, no longer receive that due share of regard
and influence which talent, virtue, and reputation ought to
enjoy, to distinguish human society from animal herds, it
cannot, it will not prosper. Folly must necessarily supersede
wisdom, arrogance must outweigh worth. I cannot conclude
this section without mentioning the disingenuousness of giving
garbled reports. It is a mere subterfuge, unworthy of an age
in wVhich it is largely acknowledged that in all human interests
common sense must aid us in ascertaining and maintaining
truth, to say that in having given mutilated and garbled reports
we have asserted nothing false. Such a report may be one
of the worst, nay, most infamous, falsehoods.'
It does not lie within our scope to speak of the general
advantages and disadvantages of an extensive news press, the
diffusion of knowledge on the one hand which it undoubtedly promotes, and the superficiality and hastiness of argument on the other; or the unity of feeling which it creates in
large countries by aiding that general sympathy and greater
uniformity of feelings and desires, without which liberty cannot avoid constant exposure to partial and provincial com
heirs or other representatives] be obtained was fully settled in the case of Pope
vs. Curll, June 5, 174I, by Lord Hardwicke, quoted by Lord Mansfield in the
famous case of Miller vs. Taylor, respecting the unauthorized print of Thom son's Seasons, 4 Burr. 2303. Holliday's Life of Mansfield, p. 216.
I An article, ascribed to Lord Brougham, on the Abuses of the Press, in the
Edinburgh Review for April, 1838, deserves to be read: though the author al)ppears to place some evils in too bold a light.
219 
POLiTi'CAL ~tIS.
motions. Upon the whole, the good derived from newspapers
is decided, and, though it were not, it is certain that they form
one of the conditions of modern social life: we must endeavor, therefore, to have them as sound, respectable, and true
to every good cause as possible. All are interested in this.
Vicious papers should be frowned down and lose all support;
active and good ones ought to meet with all possible fair
support.
XLIII. It is desirable that we should consider the press in
one more view.  The state or a society cannot be supported by
those three branches alone of which we have spoken on previous occasions  namely, the legislative, judiciary, and executive.  A  power is necessary which penetrates where those
powers cannot reach: it is the censorial power, that power
which watches over morality, private life, and industrial economy, so far as they form integrant elements of the commonwealth. The ancients embodied this power in institutions.
In Rome it was the censorship, which Cicero calls the magistratus pudoris et modestiae. But the sphere of the censor
extended farther than merely to what we should strictly
express by morals: the censor watched, for instance, over the
agriculture and took official notice of a neglected farm. The
areopagites in Athens, and the Spartan ephori, had a similar
tutorial power. We moderns have not enacted this censorial
principle into an institute, but our states are societies like
theirs, and we cannot dispense with the principle any more
than they could; that is, we too want a power which will
impel the indolent and restrain the licentious. We do not
constitute, however, this power into an institution; we leave
the censorial action of society, with very few exceptions, which
include as a matter of course public immorality, to the general action of public opinion. This public opinion, which we
have acknowledged already as so mighty a power, appears,
therefore, in this case likewise as an indispensable agent of
society. It is not necessary to investigate here how far the
press may be considered as leading public opinion: it suffices
-220 
POLITICAL ETHIICS.
to consider that they are closely connected. We all know,
moreover, that wherever there exists in cases like the present
any connection at all, there is likewise a continual reciprocal
action and reaction. The papers, therefore, stand in a close
connection with this censorial power of the state-necessary,
and yet so easily becoming tyrannical in its exercise; a power
which it may be as wrong to weaken by making light of vice,
as to use despotically to the discomfort of the individual.
XLIV. Owing to the peculiar relation in which the clergyman stands to his flock, it is necessary that we should consider
for a moment his position with reference to political ethics. It
is a question solely appertaining to politics proper, whether
it be wise or necessary that the clergy should be represented
as a separate body in the legislative assemblies, whether it
ought not, or under what circumstances it ought, to be considered as forming a separate "estate" by itself. We can
occupy ourselves only with the question whether there are
any rules applicable peculiarly to the clergy to guide their
action in matters relating to politics.
The sacred charge which a priest, clergyman, or minister
has of instructing and guiding the people is so necessary and
constant a one, that from the earliest to the latest times of
Christianity there have been distinguished theologians who
have maintained and urged that not only should the clergy
nowise occupy themselves with politics, but that they should
continue faithfully to discharge their sacred duties unconcerned about the government, even though a usurper swayed
the supreme power. It is, so maintained those theologians,
no matter of theirs., I am well aware that in the earlier times
I Among the many passages which might be quoted I will instance but the following.  See the History of the Gallican Church (in French), vol. i. I, 2, year
383, respecting the conduct of the Spanish and Gallic bishops, and of St. Martin
himself, towards the tyrant Maximian; the letter of St. Ambrosius (Ep. lvii., ad
Eugen.) to the usurper Eugenius, who was placed on the throne by Arbogastes
the Frank when Valentinian II. was strangled; the letter of Gregory the Great
to Phocas, who had massacred the emperor Maurice and his family (lib. I3,
22I 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
of Christianity this view was sometimes taken partly on the
ground, or at least partly originated from the belief, that the
clergy were too sacred to occupy themselves with the so-called
merely worldly affairs of the laymen., Such views were natural when an ascetic spirit was likewise natural; and, considering the turmoil and warring confusion of the times, it was a
view not without its salutary effects. Nor am I ignorant that
in not a few cases the Catholic church maintained this view
to make the clergy, the church, the more independent and
compact in itself. But these were not the only grounds, nor
were they the lasting reasons, upon which the above view was
supported.
XLV. Our times have arrived at different convictions. We
believe that governments exist according to the decrees of
God, which ordained man to be a social being, and to have
reason that he might maintain right; we believe that civil
freedom is as sacred and holy a cause as any on earth, and
that every one ought cheerfully and conscientiously to contribute his aid for supporting it. A minister or priest, there
Judic. vi., Ep. xxxi., ad Phocam); the protocols of the clerical assemblies of
France (in French), vol. iii. p. 686, et seq.; and, on pages 9go and 9I, the answer
of pope Gregory XIII., which ever since has been considered as a rule of conduct. We all know very well that the church has but too frequently meddled
with politics; but these were at least the professed and acknowledged principles.
As to Protestant theologians, there have been some, indeed, who taught contrary
principles, but far more professed the same. Quite recently, in 1839, the Methodist conference in New Jersey passed a resolution, if the papers have reported
correctly, declaring that any clergyman who should hereafter become a candidate
for-the state legislature or congress would receive the general disapprobation of
the conference.
x Eusebius says, "One description of Christians live a higher life than that of
the founders of Greek and Roman freedom.... He who has chosen out this
life to himself, who is dead to the lower life of mankind, who lingers on earth
with his body only, and dwells in thought and with his soul in the heavens,
looks down on this world as it were contemptuously, like a deity." In another
passage the same author calls the laity the lower class, because they care for
household concerns, engage in judicial business; carry on trade or agriculture,
and for learning and hearing the word of God have appointed fixed days only.
222. 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
fore, ought to give a good example in the performance of our
civil duties. I think they ought to vote whenever called upon,
if it does not interfere with their clerical duties, or if they have
not otherwise specific reasons to abstain from it. But it seems
that no one ought to guard himself more strictly against meddling, directly or indirectly, with politics, taking part with
one or the other side, than the clergy.  There are many
powerful reasons, which perhaps may be comprehended under
the following heads.
A minister will necessarily lessen his influence and the good
he may do, as the messenger and fosterer of peace and love,
in the same degree as he sides strongly for or against a measure or party. All are Christians, and to all he should be a
friend, an unsuspected and unprejudiced friend.
The more ministers meddle with politics, the more, in the
natural course of things, is religion carried over into politics,
and the more we are, consequently, exposed to fanaticism and
persecution, open and violent, or secret and indirect. We
cannot be too careful of leaving these two elements separate.
Shall history have recorded so innumerable and melancholy
accounts in vain? so many proofs that religion, instead of
being the balm of life, becomes, if once brought into contact
with party strife, the fiercest of all excitements? The history
of the Netherlands, when most of the ministers had become
politicians, and persecutions and executions of the wisest and
purest, such as Barneveldt, were the consequences, would alone
suffice, if honestly and attentively perused, to check our rashness in this respect forever.
It is not only against the most essential interests of the
minister and of the cause for which, if pure, he lives, when
the pulpit is turned into a rostrum of political strife; it is also
unfair in the highest degree.  The minister has not been appointed nor is he supported for that purpose. Merely retarding him as a gentleman, he ought never to make use of that
place where no one can answer him, to debate politics. Is
he not, among gentlemen, considered peculiarly exempt from
insults because he is known to be unable to answer them like
223 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
other men? On a similar principle he ought to abstain from
political discussions or allusions in the pulpit.
Ministers, like all other men whomsoever, from the president
to the constable, are apt to mistake opposition to them personally, or to certain steps of theirs, for opposition to their
whole cause and to the principles or systems which they
defend. But as the cause of the ministers, for which they
professionally live, is religion, they are, upon this principle
common to all men, apt to mistake any opposition or resistance to them for an opposition to religion. Hence partly the
great vehemence and inveteracy whenever religion is mixed
up with politics.
The minister or priest has naturally much influence over
part of his flock: on this ground it becomes dangerous to the
people if they abuse this influence in making it serve for
political ends. Civil liberty can nowhere exist where the
clergy act thus against their own sacred calling. That the
clergyman cannot observe these rules if he strives for or accepts of political offices, and must interfere by doing so with
his own essential efficiency as a clergyman, is evident.  The
English revolution, as well as the history of the British court,
furnishes ample proofs.
XLVI. I do not recommend political indifferentism. On
the contrary, I believe that, generally speaking, the clergy in
our times urge far too little the importance and sacredness of
all civil duties and political virtues upon the people.  Let
them cultivate and expound the holiness of obedience to the
laws of the land, of love of liberty, of the fruitfulness of public spirit for the community as well as for him who possesses
it, of the inspiration of patriotism, of the instructive, invigorating, and tempering effect of the study of our own history;
and if they make these virtues gush forth from the heart like
pure and native streams to nourish and irrigate a thousand
different plants, the ministers will not be idle as citizens, but
will form, even in a political point of view, a most invaluable
class of men. But so soon as they turn the Bible to support
224 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
or attack one measure or the other, they cannot but diffuse
mischief. In cases of extremity, when the land is in danger
by invasion, when liberty is to be defended by war, then indeed let them mount the pulpit and inspire their hearers with
all the life they can; when citizens, faithful to their country,
suffer hunger and plague, besieged by the enemy, let them
exhort and comfort and strengthen, as those of Leyden did
against the Spaniards, as George Walker did in Londonderry
in I689.' Who that. believed William III. a benefactor to
England would not thank Walker for his conduct? On the
other hand, we have the instance of the herinit Nicolas of
Fluie, who, when the Swiss cantons in 1481 were on the point
of disunion because they could not agree on a division of
Burgundian booty, and when the danger had reached its
highest point, darted forth from his solitude, went among the
confederates, and called for peace in the name of that God
who had given them so many victories.  His words were
penetrating, his admonition powerful; he saved his country.
He could not have done it had he habitually or occasionally.
interfered with politics.2 The Rev. Dr. Witherspoon was
one of the signers of the American Act of Independence.
Those times were of an extraordinary character; but even in
those excited times he continued to exhort from the pulpit,
to show a spirit strong in resisting any call to surrender the
rights of freemen, yet ready for reconciliation upon the condition of the security of those rights.3
Nearly the same may be said of the ethico-political obligations of schoolmasters with reference to their pupils. Let
them cultivate true and generous patriotism.
Trevor, Life of William III., vol. ii. chap. 3.
2 Johannes von Miller, Swiss History, vol. vi. p. 299. A very brief account
may be found in the Swiss History forming part of Lardner's Cabinet of History..
3 For instance, in his Pastoral Letter from the Presbyterian Synod of New
York and Philadelphia, in 1775, written after the battles of Bunker Hill and
Lexington.
VOL. II.                           X5
225 
BOOK V.
CHAPTER I.
Voting. Principle of Unanimity; of Majority and Minority.-Deliberative Pro cedures.-All who have a right to vote ought to vote.-According to what
Rules.-(Election Statistics.)-Voting for Officers.-When we ought to abstain
from Voting.-Influencing Elections. Canvassing. Intimidation, individual
and official..-Bribery.-Severe Laws against it at Athens.-Mutual Insurance
Companies for Bribing at Athens.-Bribes of common  Voters.-Bribing
Judges; Legislators.- Bribes by a Government of its own Citizens.-Bribes
by foreign Powers.-Betting on Elections.-Election Riots and Disturbance
around the Poll.-Various other Election Malpractices.
I. VOTING is the usual way of ascertaining the disposition
of any number of men or a society respecting the adoption or
rejection of a certain measure or person.  Whenever a number of men must come to a final conclusion and joint action,
voting must be resorted to if there is not unanimity among
them. By voting on'a large scale, public opinion passes into
public will. The ancients were acquainted with voting, and
had largely introduced it into politics; they had majorities
and minorities; but in the middle ages the principle of unanimity, and, in cases where mere rejection of some proposed
measure did not suffice, of forced unanimity, a principle we
act upon still in England and America in jury verdicts, was
in many cases adopted. The election law of the German
emperor, of I356, called the Golden Bull, decrees that if the
electors shall not have chosen an emperor within thirty days
they shall have nothing but water and bread until choice be
made, and that when the election has ultimately taken place
it shall always be considered as unanimous.' A single voice
I Constitutio Aurea Bulle, tit. ii. 5 and 6.
226 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
against a bill at the diet of Poland was sufficient for its defeat.
Any single member of the ancient Aragonese Cortes had the
power to put a stop, by his dissent, to the progress of any
measure during the whole session., Many instances might
be added. In other cases, for instance when the council of
free cities voted, a majority of three-fourths was requisite for
the passing of a proposition.2  There were many reasons why
procedures appearing to us so surprising were natural in those
ages. In a future part of this work we shall recur to this
subject, when we have to treat of the citizen as representative,
and of Instruction. Here it may be observed that the deputies in the middle ages were agents sent from more or less
independent bodies or corporations, not representatives of
nations, which nations or states were not yet considered and
felt to be-one organic whole; people had not yet re-learned
for the experience of the ancients had been lost-that the
excellence of a measure is not an absolute one, that people
therefore may widely differ in their views respecting laws,
even though passed; and parliamentary management and the
laws of deliberative assemblies had not yet become settled
and developed; nor is it so even to this day in many nations
whose state is one of political infancy.3
Prescott, Ferdinand and Isabella, 2d edit., Introd., xciii.; Schmidt, History
of Aragon, Leipsic, I828 (in German), 6th division, Constitution.
2 Among other Works, see Sismondi's History of the Italian Republics, vol. xiv.
ch. 126.
3 The American or English reader, brought up almost from early youth in an
acquaintance with, and in many respects even under the influence of, the parliamentary law and usage-for it extends to our very schools-considers  many
things indeed most natural and hardly worth reflection which nevertheless required ages to become acknowledged, and for want of which civil liberty, or at
least the expedition of the common business, could not prosper.  All usages and
laws which relate to debating, such as we know them, for instance as they are
embodied in Hatsell's Precedents of Proceedings in the House of Commons or
Jefferson's Manual of Parliamentary Practice for the Senate of the United States,
are of essential importance to liberty itself, and they must be considered as one
of the safeguards of liberty which we possess in advance of the ancients. Jeremy
Bentham has systematically treated of this subject in his Tactics of Legislative
Assemblies-a work which contains much  that is excellent.  To form an idea
227 
POLITICAL ETIIICS.
The more civil liberty becomes acknowledged and protected, the more important also becomes the subject of voting.
There is no subject connected with voting, that I can think
of, wvhich is not deserving of great attention, from the question who shall have a right to vote and for what, to the mere
external conveniency and security of the poll and other
measures of election police. The extent of the right of voting,
as to citizens, and the subjects which shall depend upon
voting, the expediency of frequent voting, of direct or mediate
election, the age of voters, their registering, the open vote or
the vote by ballot, the legal obligation of voting, the distribution of polls, their accommodation, what subjects shall depend
upon mere majorities, what shall require two-thirds of the
votes, the question of majorities and pluralities, of judges of
-elections, of their managers,-all these subjects are either in
how piteously people had formerly to struggle, for want of experience in this
means of ascertaining and guarding deliberative truth, and how difficult it was
for them, with the best wishes, to observe deliberation and come to any conclusion, the reader may peruse, for instance, the account given of the French diet
in 1614, in Raumer's History of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, illustrated by Original Documents, vol. i. p. 438, et seq. Well may Mr. Raumer
end this communication with the words, " All these manuscript sources of information confirm the fact that fixed form and rights were wanting to these assemblies.
There was much ado about nothing."  The whole first French revolution is one
continued melancholy instance of the want of this law and usage. For a whole
week the members of the assembly would debate and inflame one another, with.
out having even so much as a question before the house. Dumont, the wellknown editor of Mr. Bentham's works, relates, in his Reminiscences of Mirabeau
and the two first Assemblies, edited by J. L. Duval, an instructive anecdote.  He
says, "These primary assemblies [to elect deputies] were at a loss how to
organize themselves and to make  an election.   During breakfast, at Montreuil-sur-Mer (if I recollect right), our landlord gave us an account of the
tumnult and embarrassment of their meetings: two or three hours had been
lost already in palavering and disorder; a president, a secretary, ballots or
votes, counting the votes, all this was unknown.   Dumont and his friends, in
mere joke, drew up some regulations. The host, delighted, took it, and when
Dumont arrived at Paris the papers bestowed much praise on the commune of
Montreuil, on account of the greater order with which the election had been
carried on than anywhere else." In order to have a just idea of British constitutional history it is necessary likewise to follow up the history of parliamentary
usage.
228
4 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
principle or practice of the greatest importance, and must be
treated of in politics proper.
II. The question has been made, whether a citizen, possessing the right to vote, ought not to be legally bound to
vote for general elections, as the citizen is obliged to serve
on juries., Why, it is asked, should those, for instance, who
possess most property and receive the full benefit of the law,
from indolence, superciliousness, or cowardice be allowed to
refuse to join in that manner of expressing public opinion or
of appointing law-makers which the law of the land establishes?  It cannot be denied that affixing a penalty for unexcused omission of voting would have this advantage at
least, that the public opinion respecting the obligation of
every citizen lawfully to aid in the politics of his country, and
the discountenance given to political indifferentism, would be
fixedly pronounced by law. - But there would also be difficulties in the way, deserving attention. If the penalty were
imprisonment, it would be a very harsh measure in many
cases; if it were a fine, it would be difficult either to make it
expansive enough to strike the rich and poor with equal force,
or to prevent tyrannical exaction, to which all extensive fines
are but too liable. The case, in whatever light it may be
viewed, however, differs essentially from that of the jury, as
the slightest attention will show.  The subject, as being one
of right alone, belongs properly to politics; but it is for political ethics to consider the moral obligation of the citizen to
go to the poll. We have treated already of the bad motives
and mischievous tendency of political apathy or supercilious
The ancient Galli punished, according to Cesar, B. G., v. 56, absence from
or coming too tardy to armed popular assemblies, with death. This is somewhat
strong.  In Athens, those who attended received three oboli, called the ~KZICatactLtK6v, except such as came too late, as the sans-culottes of Paris were paid for
attendance when the first revolution was highest. This is dragging the suffrage
into the mire at once. It draws the poorest, even the paupers, to the poll, and
they, finding their account in elections, will increase their number. It makes of
elections schools of idleness, which we have seen it is one of the first interests
of society to repress, and extinguishes every spark of public spirit.
229 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
ness. A man who from indolence or blamable disdain does
not go to the ballot-box knows little of the importance of
the whole institution of the state, or must be animated by
very little public spirit; or he deserves the mantle of lead
which Dante apportions to cowards in the lower regions.
There seem to me to be two rules of perfect soundness'and
elementary importance in popular politics.
I. There is no safer means of preventing factious movements of any kind, and the state from falling a gradual prey
to calamitous disorders, wherever the franchise of voting is
enjoyed on an extensive scale, than the habitual steady voting
of all who have the votive right at all primary elections;
and
2. The moral obligation of depositing without fail one's
vote increases in the same ratio as the right of suffrage ex tends, which right will necessarily more and more extend
with modern civilization, so that with increasing civilization
this obligation of voting increases.
When democratic absolutism and fearful corruptions had
reached their height in ancient Greece and several places of
Lower Italy, it was natural that some philosophers laid it down
as a maxim that a man who loved wisdom should not meddle
with politics, and included in this meddling with politics the
voting in the place of assembly. When the ascetic spirit of
the middle ages, partly from misunderstood disregard of this
world, and the transplanting of asceticism from Asia into
Europe, and partly from the troubled state of Europe, was a
natural effect of the state of things, we cannot be surprised
at finding it again and again recommended that we should
withdraw as far as possible from this wicked world and all its
affairs. Our times, however, move on a different principlethat of substantial, practical, civil liberty, in conjunction with
open, public civilization and knowledge, not merely contem plative knowledge retired within itself.  There is no great
principle which has ever actuated mankind that has not had
likewise its inconvenience for the individual; so has the main
moving principle of our times; but we are not on that account
~ 230 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
absolved from conscientiously acting upon it and acting it out.
Therefore, if we have, a mind honestly to join in the great
duties of our period, we must act as conscientious citizens, and
if we mean to do this we must go to the poll. It is, I repeat
it to my young readers, of primary importance, and the more
they read history the more they will feel convinced of it. The
more extended the elective franchise is, the nmore it must likewise extend to those persons to whom time is of little value,
to people who make a feast-day, perhaps a riotous day, of the
election-time. They whose voting is the least desirable are
the surest to be at the poll; but the industrious mechanic, the
laborious farmer, the man of study, the merchant and professional man, in short all those who form the sinew and substance of the state, feel it a sacrifice of time to go to the place
of voting, where they are not unfrequently delayed for a long
time by the other class from depositing their vote, especially
in populous places. They are, therefore, the more imperatively called upon to keep constantly before their minds how
important it is that they should vote, and not leave the election to be decided by those who have the smallest stake in
society. Let no man be prevented from voting by the con sideration of the loss of a day's labor, or the inconvenience to
which he may expose himself'in going to the poll.,
Election statistics are of much interest. Among other things, they show the
interest taken in elections.
In Athens not more than 5000 votes were generally given on the most interesting questions. (Tllucyd., viii. 72; Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens, Eng.
trans., vol. i. page 309, note.) For ostracism 6oo000 votes were requisite.'The
whole number of citizens-that is, as I understand it, of voters, not the children
included-amounted to about 20,000 or 25,000.  (Boeckh, i. book i. 7.) So that
about the fifth man made use of his franchise.
In France we find that in I834 the number of electors was I7,01I5, the
number of real voters 129,211I. In I837 there were I98,836 entitled to vote,
and I51,720 did vote. That is, in I834 there were I5I votes given out of 200,
and in I837, I53 out of 200. (Paris papers of September, I837.) Thus, in
France about three voted out of four who had the right.
The proportion greatly decreases with the extension of the franchise, as will
be seen from  the following statistics of the United States.   The reason is
probably twofold. First, the extension of the franchise itself is, unfortunately, a
231 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
III. If it is important for every one to vote who has this
right, it is of course of great importance to know how the
individual should be influenced in giving his suffirage. The
object of primary elections is either the appointment of men,
or the settlement of a law or measure which may come before
the primary elective bodies directly, for instance when the final
adoption of a constitution, or amendments, are proposed to
them, or indirectly, when we know that the election of an
individual mainly or solely turns upon the final adoption or
rejection of a certain law.
cause of decrease in interest. The, individual thinks his single vote will not
make much difference. Secondly, where the franchise is universal many persons
find it inconvenient to leave their work, or to move to a distant county poll, while
in France the elective franchise is restricted to the class which lives in ease.
At the election for governor in Connecticut, in I830, it will be found that the
seventeenth person of the whole population voted. Yet where there is universal
suffrage it is certainly not beyond truth if we suppose that every fifth or at least
sixth person has a right to vote. Suppose that the many manufactories in Connecticut, employing a large number of females, increase the proportion, we may
at least say, with perfect safety, that every seventh man has a right to vote. Hence
less than half who had a right to vote did vote. In the same state there were
given, in I839, for governor, 43,578 votes, which, if the papers have reported
correctly, would indicate a very highly increased interest. [In I873 the votes for
governor were 86,88I, or more than I to 3y/ of all the males.]
In Pennsylvania I find that i' I830 (when the census was taken, and the population therefore is known) every tenth man voted. The late propositions in that
state, first to hold a convention to amend the constitution, and afterwards upon
the proposed amendments, excited of course much interest.  According to the
official journals, there were polled for a convention 86,670, against it 73,166,
together, therefore, I59,836; and for the amendments to the constitution, proposed by the convention,  113,97I, against them II2,759, together, therefore,
226,730. This would give about the sixth man of the whole population, and, if
we take the fifth man entitled to vote, it shows a very intense interest indeed.
At the presidential election of 1828, the votes given throughout  the Union
amounted to 1,200,000; the white population, at the same time, amounted to
9,500,000: hence every eighth white man voted, which shows much interest in
the election. In 1836 the votes polled for the presidential election amounted to
1,498,885, while the white population in I830 amounted to 10,526,248. Considering the increase of the population from 1830 to I836, we shall find that only
one out of eleven white persons voted. In the above votes those of South Carolina are not counted, because the legislature then elected the presidential electors
in that state. This circumstance would slightly alter the proportion in favor of
the interest shown in the election.
232 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
Respecting the election to single offices it ought to be
hardly necessary to mention that a citizen should give his
vote for that individual only who unites with general worth
and fitness the peculiar capacity requisite for the specific office
in question. Yet it is unfortunately but too frequently the
case that the citizens of free countries at large, as well as the
appointing officers in free or unfree countries, are swayed by
totally different considerations, and quiet their conscience by
the consideration, "he will do well enough." The appointment of incapable officers, however, and the habitual appointment to offices on considerations wholly foreign to the office,
be it family interest, court favor, party reward, or clannishness,
is equally detrimental to free and to absolute states. It lowers
the whole standard of morality, capacity, and activity in the
public service, and with it the public morality of the community at large; it deprives the state of that necessary promotion
of the public good'which can be effected only by having
sound and capable officers devoted to the public service, and
makes them satisfied with barely coming up to the words of
their patent in the fulfilment of their duties; it begets b'oldness in the incapable or dishonest.   These  remarks must
appear almost superfluous, if thus stated; yet the importance
of the subject invites attentive reflection in all its bearings. The history of Spain during the last century, and that
of Athens after Pericles, give proper illustrations of the above
remarks.
If a citizen has to vote for an individual in a more or less
representative character, he ought to be influenced by the
candidate's wisdom, probity, and general tenor of life respecting those principles which the voter holds to be essentially
important. If there are other more or less strong additional
guarantees, for instance that a candidate is bound to these
principles by his connections, his family, or any strong interests of a worldly character or of reputation, so much the
better. But neither single sayings nor single transient actions
nor protestations ought to weigh much. (As to regular
pledges, I shall speak of them in treating of representatives.)
233 
P OLITICAL ETHICS.
We do not judge of a character in history by single anecdotes;
we must take the whole man, and above all the tenor of his
actions, unless the very character of a single act or saying is
in itself sufficient to show the mind of the man.,  "I ask,"
says Montesquieu in the preface to his Spirit of the Laws, "one
favor of the reader, which I fear will not be granted, namely,
not to judge by the perusal of a moment the work of twenty
years; to approve or to condemn the whole book, and not
some passages. If we are desirous of discovering the plan of
the author, it is not possible to do it except in the plan of the
entire work." No one can deny the reasonableness of this
request; and may it not with equal force be applied to public
characters and the whole lives of men? Have they not the
very fair right of asking to be judged by "their work," that
is, by their actions taken in connection? Has he who wishes
to judge of the man, generally, anything else by which he
could do it conscientiously? Is not many a man justly
acquitted  in court  from apparently very strong charges,
simply because it is impossible to imagine any connection
between the single offence charged to him and the undeviating tenor of his life?  Yet no blindness is recommended,
nor can the principle of law that a man shall be considered
innocent until proved to be the contrary be transferred to
politics, so that a man  shall be considered capable until
proved the contrary. We want positive proofs and facts in
order to elect a man.  "Les gens de bon sens jugent des
faits," said Napoleon, according to Las Cases.
IV. Absolute knowledge is possible in human life only in
a few cases, and our judgment respecting our votes is subject
to the same rules for forming an opinion to which our judgment is always subject. We judge directly where we can,
mediately through those of whose sound judgment and
agreement with our principles we have sufficient knowledge,
See Legal and Political Hermeneutics, where I speak of the interpretation
of spoken words.
234 
POLITICA/L ETHICS.
or by strong probabilities, derived from past facts. If, however, a citizen is incapable of deciding respecting a man or a
measure by his own knowledge or capacity, and if he finds
that those he has most reason to trust are divided upon a
measure or course of policy which nevertheless strongly
affects his country, in that case, it seems to me, he ought not
to be swayed by extraneous circumstances, but to abstain
from voting; for this omission to vote in such a case seems
to me to be even necessary for a substantial representation
of public opinion upon such a measure.  This is one of the
very few and rare cases in which a citizen should consider
himself absolved or even prohibited in his conscience from
casting his vote.
If he must give his vote on a measure, directly or indirectly, - as mentioned above, let him in no case whatsoever
forget to ask himself, how will the law operate in given circumstances? The essence of the law, the reality of the law,
consists neither in its wording nor in its professed principles
of themselves, but in the action of those principles upon the
material. If you read a proposed law, imagine it passed, and
say to yourself, "And what then?" Try to see it operate in
advance; represent it clearly and in a lively picture to yourself; but do not suffer yourself to be disposed one way or the
other by party vanity-a very powerful agent-dislike, revenge, or merely the pronouncing of a favorite principle or
political idea of yours. This question respecting the actual
operation of a law becomes, perhaps, most important when we
abolish institutions. Laws and institutions ought to be abolished, not with our faces turned backward to the principle
from which we started, but with the principle in our mind
turned forward to anticipate its operation; for surely we do
not make laws for the pleasure of proclaiming themn, but for
their action. The wisest is he who, like Janus, may look at
once back into history and forward at the future operation.
Quacks or deceivers always deal most in general principles;
honest and wise men know and feel their sacredness and
prove them by facts.
235 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
V. All popular representation rests essentially upon election; everything, therefore, which in any way interferes with
election, either by demoralization of the voters or by disturbance or falsification of the election, is a grave offence against
public liberty; but in a representative republic, in which the
whole government rests on representation and supreme power
is in the people, we cannot but consider every such offence as
a crime against the majesty of the people, a crimen laes
majestatis. As it is treason in monarchies to falsify acts of the
prince, or to control his actions by combination around him,
as it has been punished as treason strongly to influence the
prince to the detriment of the people's liberty, so we cannot
but acknowledge that in principle every forcible or malicious
influence upon elections, or their unlawful interruption or
falsification,-by false votes or false returns,-is treason against
the people in an elective and representative republic; for it is
a hostile act against the fundamental principle of the body
politic. I do not know that a greater political outrage can be
committed than to surround the poll with a set of stout fellows and thus forcibly prevent all voters of the opposite side
from depositing their vote. It is the use of brutal force in a
place allthe meaning and sense of which is that the opinion
of the assembled citizens shall be ascertained. It amounts to
waylaying and carrying off the monarch in order to extort his
assent to certain acts. When Huskisson was candidate for
Dover, in 1802, he was opposed by Mr. Spencer Smyth, whose
brother, Sir Sidney, had got possession of the church in which
the election was held with his boat's crew, and effectually
prevented the approach of any voter for Huskisson. No year
passes in which similar outrages are not committed in the
largest cities of America and England. As to bribes, they are
prostitution in the bribed, simony in the briber-ai simony of
the worst kind-and treason in both. We shall return to the
subject of bribes.
Elections may be wrongfully influenced by unjustly influencing the voters before they give their votes. I do not speak
here of maliciously publishing falsehoods-though every elec
236 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
tion in America and England exhibits instances of this political immorality, which is too clear in itself, nor of the grave
offence of influence on elections by officers, as I shall return
to this subject on another occasion. Canvassing may be unlawful, permitted, or desirable.   How  jealously the early
Romans considered the abuse of canvassing appears from
the origin of the word ambitus, from ambire, to "go about,"
though afterwards it was done most publicly and the crimen
ambitus included all electioneering offences, bribing, etc., and
all ways of obtaining an office by unlawful means, except, as
it would seem, the ambire itself.  Canvassing is not only
allowable but necessary in many cases. The people ought to
know their candidates, and if these are young, or if a particular
question is pending, they or their friends ought publicly to
avow their views. In this respect hustings and speeches "on
the stump," if unaccompanied by feasting and riot, are on
occasions advisable in thinly-settled countries or where the
people have not known their representative personally. Personal intercourse and political contact between representative
and constituents are necessary in order that the representation
shall be real. But I believe all individual canvassing by men
or women-and the latter often takes place in England,-all
individual canvassing in the houses of voters or elsewhere, to
be objectionable, both in itself and because it leads but too
naturally to the greatest of all evils in representative governments, bribery, whether direct or indirect.  There are cases,
it is readily allowed, of very little difference as to the choice
between the candidates, for instance when both belong to the
sanme party and are not in the least opposed to one another,
The term crimen ambitus, in the French brigue, which is retained in the law
of countries that have adopted the civil law, refers to the obtaining of an office
by unlawfully influencing some person or persons, and signifies with reference to
government officers something similar to simony respecting ecclesiastic appointments.  The German word for ambitus is very significant, and means theobtaining of an office )y fawning and creeping (Ar4serschleichung). Simony, according
to the canon law, embraces, in its widest signification, nineteen chief crimes, of
which the ambitus ecclesiasticus is a species. Feuerbach, Manual of the Common
German Penal Law,  I 8I, et seq., and note to { I84.
237 
POLITICAL ETIHICS.
but merely try both their chance of election. It would seem
that these cases are very rare in England. In America they
occur occasionally, and not only when the election is for inferior places, for I have known two friends of the same party
to run for the governorship of a state without opposing one
another farther than by thus aiming at the same place.  In
these cases individual canvassing by the friends of one or the
other candidate might be harmless; but such cases are rare, and
if common would introduce a dangerous custom. Properly
speaking, individual canvassing is the opposite of what it often
pretends to be; it is saying to a citizen, We know or suspect
that you care so little about giving your vote conscientiously
that we come to beg you to throw it into our scale.'
There is an interesting passage in a letter from Mr. Macaulay in reply to one
from the secretary of the Leeds Political Union respecting certain questions
previous to Mr. Macaulay's election. I quote from the Spectator of August 15,
1832:
"The practice of canvassing is quite reasonable under a system in which men
are sent to parliament to serve themselves; it is the height of absurdity under a
system in which men are sent to parliament to serve the public. While we had
only a mock representation, it was natural enough that this practice should be
carried to a great extent. I trust it will soon finish with the abuses from which
it sprang. I trust that the great and intelligent body of people nwho have obtained
the elective franchise will see that seats in the house of commons ought not to be
given, like rooms in an almshouse, to urgency of solicitation; and that a man
who surrenders his vote to caresses and supplications forgets his duty as much as
if he sold it for a bank-note. I hope to see the day when an Englislhman will
think it as great an affront to be courted and fawned upon in his capacity of
elector as in his capacity of juryman.   In the polling-booth, as in the jury-box,
he has a great trust confided to him-a sacred duty to discharge: he would  be
shocked at the thought of finding an unjust verdict because the plaintiff or the
defendant had been very civil and pressing; and, if he would reflect, he would,
I think, be equally shocked at the thought of voting for a candidate for whose
public character he felt no esteem, merely because that candidate had called
upon him and begged very hard and had shaken his hand very warmly.  I am
delighted, though not at all surprised, to find that the enlightened and publicspirited gentlemen in whose name you write agree with me on this subject.  My
conduct is before the electors of Leeds; my opinions shlall on all occasions be
stated to them with perfect frankness: if they approve that conduct, if they concur in those opinions, they ought, not for my sake but for their own, to choose
me as their member.  To be so chosen I should indeed consider as a high and
enviable honor; but I should think it no honor to be returned to parliament by
238 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
All intimidation previous to an election, all personal or
official bullying," all threats, as for instance of withdrawing
employment of workmen, which happens with us on account
of the extended franchise, or of shopkeepers, which happens
frequently in London, all intimidation of tenants, as often in
England, or of government officers hoding their appointment
at the pleasure of some superior officer-are high political
offences.   The worst of all election offences, however, is
bribery.
VI. Whatever offence or crime may be committed, it becomes doubly loathsome if committed for the consideration of
money-if to the offence itself the meanness of doing it for
gain or hire is added.  At all periods have laws pronounced
the public abhorrence of bribed voting, and all states where
this evil has become common have been irretrievably lost.
The laws of Athens were severe against bribing of any kind,
both against the briber and the bribed.2  But when Athens
sank into licentious democratic absolutism, bribing became
so common that bribing companies were formed, called synomosies (,Tvv,woTc'a, an association upon oath)-a sort of mutual
immoral insurance companies to bribe the judges, the council,
and popular assemblies, for the benefit of the members,3 not
unlike the companies formed towards the end of the thirteenth
century in England to bribe judges, whose bribes had risen
since the high penal laws passed against them under Edward I.4
persons who, thinking me destitute of the requisite qualifications, had yet been
wrought upon by cajolery and importunity to poll for me in despite of their better
ju dgment."
I know of a case, which happened some fifteen years ago, when a notorious
duellist of great courage carried numbered ballots to the voters, telling them
that he would fight every one whose respective numbered vote should not appear
on counting the votes.
2 Aeca6, the office of bribing; 6rpo(5oMia, of being bribed.  [See Meier u.
Schom., Att. Prozess, p. 35I.]
3 Thucyd., viii. 54;  Xenophon,  de Republ. Ath., iii. 7; Pollux, viii. 121;
Demost., Or. poster. in Steph., p.11 I37.
4 Hume, History of England, chap. I3.
z39 
POLITITJCAL ETHICS.
[At Rome, in the worst times of the republic, bribery was
even more common than at Athens. In the latter state there
were public prosecutions (rpaac') of both givers and receivers
of bribes, and it lay with the judges to estimate the amount of
the penalty, which, it is probable, might even be the loss of
life. At Rome the multitude of laws concerning ambitus would
be a proof of the frequency and inveteracy of the crime, if
history did not furnish us with clearer proofs.] The Romans
bribed in the way of giving festivals, as well as money directly
on the largest scale, as soon as public offices were sought for
the profit they afforded, and the sums previously spent to
obtain them were looked on as a mere outlay, to be largely
refunded by plunder and extortion after the office was obtained.
This cancer had long been eating in the vitals of Rome, until
at length it was with criminal shamelessness sanctioned in
the case of the election of Vatinius, a partisan of Caesar's, to
the pratorship, to the exclusion of Cato. The consuls had
largely bribed the people, and, to escape the danger of heavy
penalties on account of the crimen ambitus, they moved in
the assembly of the people a resolution, which passed, to the
effect that the new praetors should not be liable to any punishment for illegally obtaining their election: "ne qui praeturain
per ambitum cepisset ei propterra fraudi esset"! 
The English laws are very severe against  bribing,2 but
I Cicero, pro Planc., ~ 15-19, Ccel., ~ 7, Sest.,  Is5, ad frat., ii. 3, iii. I, 5I;
Plutarch, Vit. Caes., ~  2I, 28, 29, Pomp., ~ 5I, Cato Min., ~ 44;  Sueton., Vit.
Jul. Cabs., ~ i9; Appian, Bell. Civ., ii. 19.
2 The following is an extract as they now stand:
First, as regards the bribed.
Every person having, or claiming to have, a right to vote,
Who shall take, or even ask for, any money or other reward, by way of gift,
or loan, or any device;'
Or who shall agree or contract for any money, gift, employment, or other
reward whatsoever  Either to vote, or to forbear from voting-is subject
First, to a penalty of ~500, which may be recovered, together with all costs
of suit, by any person who thinks proper to sue for the same.
Secondly, to indictment or information, and, upon conviction, to fine and imprisonment.
240 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
the crime is common, as it is in many large cities with us
despite our laws against it. Livingston, in his code for
Thirdly, on judgment being obtained against him in any such action, or on
any such indictment or information, he becomes at once forever disabled to vote
in any future election; as well as,
Fourthly, disabled to hold or exercise any office or franchise to which he may
then or afterwards be entitled as a member of any city or borough, the same as
though he were naturally dead. Thus, if a burgess of any city or borough, he
loses his burgess right forever.-Statute 2 Geo. II., c. 24.
And any person who shall accept any money, gift, or reward, or any promise
thereof, or who shall accept any office, place, or employment, upon any engagement to procure, or endeavor to procure, the return of any person to parliament,
shall forfeit the value of any money so received to the queen, and he shall
forfeit any such office, place, or employment:
And shall besides forfeit a penalty of ~500, to be recovered, with full costs of
suit, by any person who shall sue for the same.-Statute 49 Geo. III., c. II8S.
Secondly, as regards the briber.
Any person who shall by any gift or reward, or by any promise or agreement
for gift or reward, corrupt or procure any person to vote, or to forbear to vote,
is subject   First, to a penalty of r~5oo, to be recovered, with full costs of suit, by any
person who shall sue for the same.
Secondly, to fine and imprisonment.
Thirdly, to the loss of his vote forever.
Fourthly, to disability to hold any office or franchise, as member of any city
or borough, as in the former case.  Statutq 2 Geo. II., c. 24, sec. 7.
And any person who shall give, directly or indirectly, or promise to give, any
sum of money, gift, or reward, to any person, on an engagement to procure,
or endeavor to procure, the return of any person to serve in parliament, shall  If himself returned, be incapacitated to sit in parliament on such election.
If not returned, shall forfeit the sum of ~Iooo, to be recovered, with full
costs of suit, by any one whc may sue for the same.-Statute 49 Geo. III., c.
I18, sec. I.
For a history of the laws against bribing, see Hallam, Constitutional History,
vol. iii. p. 405, et seq., and other passages, for which see his index.-According
to the English papers themselves, bribery at elections has increased much of
late. The following is a case of interest, Rogers vs. Mills, tried at Lewes in
i837.  The action was brought to recover the ~5oo penalty accorded by the Act
of George III., and was instituted by Henry Rogers against James Mills (agent of
Mr. Easthope, one of the proprietors of the Morning Chronicle) for having on
1 7th April last corrupted one James Baker at the election for Lewes, to give his
vote for John Easthope, a candidate, by giving to him ~15, which was given as
a reward for his vote, whereby the defendant forfeited for his offence ~5oo. The
case was ably argued, and the trial lasted eighteen hours. In summing up, Mr.
Justice Littledale said the matter charged was equally an offence whether the
VOL. II.                           i6
241 
POL I TICAL. ETHICS.
Louisiana, is no less severe.' Yet it is but too true that if
the people at large are so debased that bribing for elections
becomes morally possible, laws against it will avail very little,
simply because public opinion is already corrupt. If, then,
history holds up such fearful examples; if the universal spirit
of mankind, expressed in the laws of all ages, points out
bribing as a shameless crime; if conscience tells us unequivocally that it is a crime; if we know that a representative government becomes a melancholy farce when we acknowledge
the form and violate the principle; if we remember that all
nations, Asiatic or European, however widely different the
principles of their political and domestic life, have invariably
felt or pretended to feel the same disgust at bribery, for the
pretence shows in this case as much the truth of the principle
as the feeling itself-no citizen who values either his own
honor or conscience, or the safety of the state, or the essence
of civil liberty, or right, or virtue, ought on any account to
offer or receive a direct or indirect bribe, however safe the
latter might be against any punishment according to the letter
party to whom the money was given were corrupted or not.  The question was,
whether or not Baker was mistaken in saying that Mills was the man who gave
him the fI5; and the jury would decide whether the admission of Mills that
he gave the money was spoken in a serious manner or merely as an interrogation.
The jury retired for about a quarter of an hour, and found a verdict for the
plaintiff of ~5oo; costs, 40s.
There exists probably far less bribery with us, owing to the greater extent of
the franchise, and thinner population; on the other hand, we never prosecute a
case of bribery.
Before a member of the Netherlandish chamber is admitted to the oath as
representative, the constitution demands of him to take the following oath:
"I swear that I have neither promised nor given, neither shall I promise or
give, any gift or present, direct or indirect, under whatsoever pretence, to any person in or out of office, in order to obtain my election as member of the second
chamber of the States-General." Constitution of the Netherlands, { 84.
Code of Crimies and Punishments, Title vii. chap. i., "Of Bribery and undue
Influence." The first article punishes offering or receiving bril)es to influence
votes at public elections with a fine not less than one hundred dollars nor more
than five hundred dollars, forfeiture of all political rights (the Greek alimia), and
imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than one year. The penalty
for bribing judg(es is still higher, as might be supposed.
242 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
of the law. In monarchies it is held that the subject owes
allegiance to the prince whether the latter be actually
crowned or not, or the former have actually taken the oath
of allegiance or not. Is there no natural allegiance to truth
and liberty, whether we have taken our oath in court or not?
We have called certain acts in voting, falsifications, treason against liberty; bribery is the worst of these treasons.
It would amount to treason of the highest kind in a monarchy to substitute a changeling for the legitimate infant
who is heir of the crown.  Is it less criminal to substitute
a counterfeit for a genuine public opinion, for what the true
election returns ought to be-the foundations on which the
fabric of civil liberty greatly rests?  And do we not commit
these substitutions if we allow ourselves in any way to be
bribed,-hat is, if we allow ourselves by any considerations
of interest or favor to vote differently from what our judgment
tells us we ought to do? Does it not amount to perjury if I
solemnly deposit a vote-that vote which the most fundamental laws of the state carefully, jealously, and solemnly
secure for me-which is against my conscience? Is this act
not a guiltier lie than a false zvord in a mere account of an
event? There are many lies infinitely worse than the lies in
words-they are the lies of actions, of the tenor of our life.
Since then laws cannot avail much in this particular, and ruin
must inevitably follow, if bribery becomes common, it is for
each citizen to hold himself bound by all that is true and holy
and just and pure to crush this crime wherever he meets it,
as infallibly as he would rush to arms should he discover a
band of enemies in the midst of his own camp.,
x The classical age of Bribery is when the Roman empire was sold by the praetorians, and the zenith of this splendid period is when the praetorians sold it by
auction to the highest bidder after the death of Pertinax; when Didius Julianlus
obtained it against the bidding of Sulpicianus, father-in-law of Pertinax.  Still,
the public would not, depraved as it was, b)rook this; and Severus made it the
reason why he disbanded the praetorians.
A most startling instance of regular bribery reduced to a proper price current
is given in Raumer's Europe from the End of the Seven Years' War to the
American War, from Documentary Source's, vol. i., where he speaks of the in
243 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
In writing this I am not unmindful of that trial of a good
citizen, one of the severest he can be placed in, when he sees
that the malignant and shameless are ruining his own beloved
liberty by the infamy of bribery, and that would he but resort
by way of defence to the same expedient he might, apparently,
save it. Has he not the right to defend himself, as against a
murderer or in war, by the same means that are employed
against him? No, he has not. The difference is essential.
Killing is in itself not criminal; bribing is. We might thus
protect ourselves by perjury against perjury. If I kill a man
who strives to murder me, I do not commit murder. Bribery
remains bribery. Besides, what is gained? If bribe be opposed to bribe, general demoralization is only consummated
the sooner, while one party's abstaining from it may become
the germ of a better state of things, and may indeed save the
country.
"Corruption wins not more than honesty.
Still in thy right hand carry gentle peace,
To silence envious tongues. Be just, and fear not:
Let all the ends thou aim'st at be thy country's,
Thy God's, and truth's."       SHAKSPEARE, Henry VIII.
trigues of France, England,' Russia, etc., in Sweden, previous to the Revolution
in I77I,-when the king, Gustavus IlII., upset the old constitution,-especially on
pages 216, 222, and 234. The diplomatic dispatches say that the present diet
will cost us so much, for we require so many votes: the votes of the nobility cost
so much, those of the clergy so much, the election of the speaker of the cities so
much, that of the speaker of the peasants so much.  See this especially on page
235, where the British minister writes home, March 24, I769. He makes a
classification of votes, namely: I, votes to be had by the highest bidder; 2,
those who have taken their resolution but require pay to go to the diet to vote
according to their resolution (that is Bacon's selling justice, but not injustice);
3, unbribable ones.  Three thousand dollars were needed  for a vote of the first
class; two thousand dollars for a vote of the second. The election of the
speaker of the citizens will cost one hundred thousand dollars, of the peasants
thirty thousand. The whole diet will cost thirty-four thousand five hundred and
forty pounds. Later dispatches say the clergy may be had for six thousand
pounds.  Russia had spent three hundred thousand rubles, Denmark one hundred
thousand rix-dollars, and added later ninety thousand; France paid four million
five hundred thousand livres. The bribing of the diet was estimated to cost the
various powers three hundred and seventy thousand pounds.
244 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
VII. The bribing of judges is so vile an outrage, and,
thanks to the advances of society in the most civilized countries, so unheard-of a crime, at least with reference to direct
bribes, that I abstain from dwelling upon it. It is like poisoning a well from which hundreds of beings must draw
their water.' Bribing legislators, however, is not by any
means so unheard of; and yet is it not a fearful crime?
Legislators indeed have been known to consider themselves
fairly" retained" by the receipt of a fee, and have argued that
the retainer was received by them simply, as they said, that
they should use their influence in expediting a measure,
whether the result should prove favorable or unfavorable;
thus cloaking over what cannot be and never has been otherwise considered than bribery. Such a case I believe was
that of Sir John Trevor, speaker of the commons, who was
expelled from the house in I694 for having received one
thousand guineas for expediting a very just and humane
bill respecting certain property and privileges of the London
orphans.2  So we have seen that Bacon in his case of bribery
made a distinction between" sale of justice," which he avowed
he had done, "and of injustice," which he had not committed,
in the which, Lord Nugent says,3-and let us mention it to
rejoice at the improved state of things-he was" countenanced
by long-prevailing practice in that court (the chancery court)
and by such examples as it would be shameful to urge in
excuse of such a man."
All bribes offered to members of legislative bodies, as in
I That this crime may be still now and then committed in the United States,.
Germany, England, or France, in the most secret darkness, is possible; that even
some trial of a judge for this crime may have occurred of late, without my knowledge, I will certainly not deny; but I consider it well worth stating as a fact,
that, being no inconsiderable reader of the newspapers of various countries, I do
not remember having met with such a case, or so much as the breathing of suspicion of bribery against a judge, in any paper, say for the last ten years. [Dr.
Lieber could not have written this in I874.]
2 Trevor's Life of William III., vol. ii. c. 15.
3 Lord Nugent, Some Memorials of John Hampden, his Party and Times, Lon.
don, 2 vols., I837, vol. i. p. 44.
245 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
deed all bribes, may be classed under the heads of direct,
indirect, and unconscious bribes. Direct bribes given by.
private individuals to legislators are now exceedingly rare, or
perhaps do not occur at all, owing chiefly, it is probable, to
the Argus-like press, to the dread of inevitable ruin should it
ever be divulged, and to the great probability that some day
or other the evil deed will transpire, and, once transpiring, will
be most extensively known through the papers. But bribes
proceeding from the government are not of rare occurrence
either in England, the United States, or France. They consist generally in the direct promise or intimation of preferment, or elevation of rank, either with reference to the general
course on which a legislator shall proceed, or to his vote and
influence respecting some specific, important measure. Direct
money bribes offered by governments are probably now rare;
they are difficult to be kept from detection, owing to the
better state of the control of finances. Yet Lord Russell tells
us in his History of England that the favorite ministerialists
under Lord North's administration were permitted to take
part in the loans, which they sold directly at ten per cent. advance, that Fox charged Lord North repeatedly with having
sacrificed nine hundred thousand pounds sterling of a loan in
order to buy votes, and that some members of parliament at
that time received money directly for their votes. Indirect
bribes occur frequently, though they are sufficiently open to
be branded at once in the eye of every honest citizen with
their true character, and though their shape can appease only
those consciences which are ready to derive comfort from the
forms and not the essence of transactions.  The promise to
legislators in America of the privilege of subscribing for a
certain number of bank shares, and the guarantee of a fixed
advance on the par price, provided a bank charter, yet pending, should pass, is no less than a direct bribe amounting to
the sum thus guaranteed in advance, whatever the form of the
bribe may be.  According to the English papers, it appears
that sometimes considerable sums are given to members of
either house, but especially to lords, in order to induce them
246 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
to vote for canals, roads, or railroads, if they pass through and
injure the property of those members. It has been frankly
maintained that this is fair, for it was certain that the person
in question would not vote to his own injury if no equivalent
were paid. If, however, we consider the case plainly, it will
appear to be indirect, perhaps even direct, bribery; for the
legislator ought not to vote in his private and interested
capacity, but in his legislative. As the juryman must give
his verdict according to evidence and nought else, so must
the legislator vote for the general welfare to the best of his
judgment, and for nought else.
I would call that person unconsciously bribed who  unconsciously allows himself to be swayed in his judgment
respecting his vote as legislator by advantages probably
accruing to him or his friends from the passing or defeat of a
bill. We are all exposed to this error, and must be the more
careful to avoid it, the more easily it may steal upon us. But
above all, let no legislator under any circumstances allow
himself to be rewarded, directly or indirectly, in any way
whatsoever, for his vote. It must needs ultimately lead to
that system of pilfer and pillage of which we have spoken
several times; it takes away from the representative or legislator all feeling of manly independence and bold reliance on
his own honor, and diffuses a general depression of morals,
substituting sordid selfishness for public spirit.
There is one species of bribes, of great importance in history, and happily likewise on the decline in our timesnamely, the influence which foreign powers once exercised
by gratifying the sordid interest or vanity of citizens, ministers, or even monarchs. The pensions paid by Louis XIV.
to so'many ministers of other states; the money he gave to
Charles II. on condition that he should do what the latter
knew to be unlawful; the regular presents, that is pensions,
which the cardinals formerly received from the chief monarchls, especially from Spain and France, and according to
which they were openly divided into French, Spanish, or
other "factions," that is parties, which followed distinct
247 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
leaders, acknowledged as such by the respective foreign monarch; the unhallowed gold which flowed so abundantly from
Persia into Greece, that Boeckh considers it as an important
source of the increase of gold in Europe, and which set
Greek against Greek; the snuff-boxes with diamonds, portraits with brilliants," the titles, orders, and estates offered
to a foreign minister if a proposed peace should be brought
about-all these belong to this species of international bribes,
and ought not to be suffered in any shape.
VIII. A practice which affects elections in an immoral and
mischievous manner, and which has become very widely
spread in the United States, according to the proofs in the
newspapers as well as the charges of various grand juries,2 is
betting on elections. The practice is not new: we meet with
bets in Rome on papal elections, three centuries ago;3 but
The American Constitution prohibits every officer from taking any present
whatsoever from foreign powers or in the course of any public transaction. In a
very few cases it was believed necessary to accept them; but they have been invariably deposited with the United States. It was lately mentioned by the papers
-it is to be hoped with truthb-that the late signing of the treaty between the six
powers relative to Belgium and Holland would be the second signing of an
important treaty without the usual presents of snuff-boxes, rings, etc., to the
respective diplomatists. The treaty when these presents were first dispensed with
was said to have been the alliance between England, France, Spain, and Portugal, respecting the two latter countries.
2 At a sitting of the court of common pl)eas, in Bucks county, Pennsylvania, in
December, I834, Judge Fox very properly called the attention of the grand jury
to the prevailing practice of betting on elections, and to the law on that subject.
The Bucks County Intelligencer says, "The judge said he intended hereafter to
bring this subject to the attention of the respective grand juries: he believed it
to be pregnant with the most pernicious consequences to society, and indirectly
subversive of the purity and fairness of the elective franchise. He said, the law
prohibitory of such practice ought to be known, and, being known, he should enjoin it upon grand juries, hereafter, t6 observe its letter and spirit.  IHe referred
to the election in Philadelphia, and said that betting, there, had become a complete system of gambling, and was the pursuit of many men, during the excitement which precedes elections."
3 Odds, we are told, were very strong against cardinal Monte; yet he was
elected pope, in I550. Monte called himself Julius III. Ranke, History of the
Popes, etc., vol. i. p. I77 (Eng. trans., i. I72).
248 
POLITICA4L ETHICS.
the betting persons were not voters themselves. Everything
is to be much dreaded which leads elections in any way whatever from their true and straight channel. By bets, persons
frequently the most doubtful in character among the voters
become deeply and passionately interested in the elections,
and when high sums are at stake, as is frequently the case,
use any illegal means to insure their winning. It is frightful
indeed to behold-by the offers which many brokers publicly
make in the papers or in their shop-windows, or by the clusters of persons who offer or accept election bets at certain
places in some of our large cities previous to elections-an
election turned into a lottery affair or the sport of gamesters.
In many states the laws are against it; everywhere they ought
to be enacted; for they would at least prevent public offers of
bets, which cannot be considered other than a glaring political
indecency.,  In England a vote is invalidated if a man is
x I copy the following advertisement from the Albany Argus of October 17,
1832. These advertisements are quite common, and I merely select this because
it happens to be at hand: 
"Bets-To all persons who feel the least confidence in the success of the opposition tickets. The following bets, or hazards, have been left with the subscribers, for negotiation. Responsible persons, desirous to take them up, will
please call at our office.
First Bet.
$500 That the Jackson electoral ticket will be elected in Pennsylvania.
$500 That Andrew Jackson, if he lives, will be elected president of the United
States.
$500 That William L. Marcy will be elected governor of this state at the
ensuing election.
$5oo00 That the Jackson electoral ticket will be elected in the state of New
York.
Second Bet.
$oo000 That Andrew Jackson, if he lives, will be elected president of the
United States.
$oo0o That Martin Van Buren, if he lives, will be elected vice-president of the
United States.
Third Bet.
$too That the Jackson electoral ticket will be elected in Ohio.
$Ioo          do.         do.          do.        do.     Kentucky.
$100oo        do.         do.          do,       do.      Louisiana.
$Ioo          do.          do.         do.        do.     Pennsylvania.
29 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
proved to have been interested in a bet.,  This is right, but
by no means sufficient. No good citizen ought to suffer himself to promote or be drawn into an evil by which an additional vicious and most active passion, that of gaming, is
connected with politics; for to protect politics against passions which it naturally produces, without perplexing it by
additional ones, has been at all times the most difficult problem
of the wisest legislators and best citizens. What would the
public think if it should become known that physicians of a
hospital were in the habit of betting on the chances of recovery
of the patients under their charge? The case seems to me very
similar. We should feel disgusted if they, appointed to heal
and save if possible, allowed frivolous ideas of gain, which
might even influence their actions, to mix up with their calling.
IX. The process of election itself may be seriously disturbed by the riot and drunkenness which in many places
accompany it.  It is humiliating indeed to think, what is
nevertheless a fact, that on election-days, the days when the
$Ioo That the Jackson electoral ticket will be elected in Illinois.
$100oo         do.          do.          do.        do.     Indiana.
$l00oo        do.           do.          do.        do.     Missouri.
$Ioo          do.           do.          do.        do.     Mississippi.
$IOO          do.           do.          do.       do.      Alabama.
$IOO          do.           do.          do.       do.       New Jersey."
Here follow the names of the brokers, with other lottery advertisements.
x In I838, the Youghal election committee of the British commons was occupied a whole day with the following case:
"The petitioners objected to the vote of James Browne on the ground that he
had betted a new hat on the result of the Youghlal election, by which act it was
contended that he had become interested in the event, and had consequently
rendered himself utterly incompetent to exercise the franchise with which he had
been intrusted. The case excited the deepest interest throughout the day, and so
nicely were the arguments on both sides balanced, so equal the weight of authority adduced, that it was not till about three minutes before the speaker was
at prayers that the committee were able to come to a decision, that as Browne
was offered the bet with a fraudulent motive, his vote should be held good. It
appeared that an unscrupulous non-elector had basely betrayed James Browne
into the business expressly in order to invalidate his vote, which alone induced
the committee to come to the above favorable decision." London papers of
March, I838.
250 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
people ought to appear in their most solemn capacity, that
of manifesting their integral and substantial citizenship, more
crime probably is committed than on any other. An English
clergyman of late strongly denounced the corruption, the
drunkenness, the poisoned state of the public mind, and the
violation of truth at elections, and probably with good reason.,
In many places in the United States we all know that drunkenness is frequent at elections.2 A great evil is the disturbance of the poll, or the besieging it so that none except of one
party can approach, or at least not without great difficulty:
the falsification of elections by bringing electors of other
wards or places, or people who have no right to vote at all,
causing them perhaps to commit the additional crime of perjury; the falsification of returns by destroying the votes of
one or more voters [ballot-stuffing, as it is called]; the annoyance of well-known citizens-these are all serious and
deplorable offences. Every citizen ought to feel disposed to
prosecute all of such offences that are at all punishable by
law. To do this, however, he ought first of all to free himself
of having directly or indirectly taken part in any election malpractice.  The time may come-it has perhaps arrived-in
which a society for the promotion and maintaining of fairness
and justice at elections should be formed. As it is an object
of political importance itself, yet in itself of no partisan color,
there could be no objection against it; and a society of this
sort would frequently make salutary agreements between two
parties to give up some election abuses; while attention and
discussion would be drawn to these important subjects, and
better laws be promoted.
x A Sermon preached by a curate at Hounslow, in October, 1837.
2 In some Swiss cantons all disturbance, noise, drinking, standing in large
numbers around the election-house, are prohibited. According to a law of December I8, I832, of the Pays de Vaud, against Brigues, that is ambilus, the electoral college (election judges) have the right to order any tavern, inn, or other
public house to be closed during election-day, and to order all customers away
if they see fit. The law, consisting of twenty-six chief points, contains some
interesting features.  Under William III. a statute was passed against giving
beer at elections. Trevor's Life of William III., vol. ii. p. 255.
25 I 
CHAPTER II.
Parties.-Has any free Country existed without Parties?-Can a'free Country
possibly exist without Parties?-Is it desirable that a free Country should exist
without Parties?- Historical Parties and passing ones. -Conservative and
Movement Parties.-Characteristics of a sound Party.-Dangers of Party Zeal
and factious Passion.-Party Signs.-Misunderstanding of Language in high
Party Spirit.-Ought a conscientious Citizen to attach himself to a Party?
The Law of Solon.-Independents.-Trimmers.
X. IF I have felt upon some occasions, while writing this
work, more deeply impressed with the solemnity and greatness of its subject, and more ardently desired that my pen
might be guided by the spirit of truth, discernment, and the
power of clothing my thoughts with accurate and appropriate
language, than upon others, I have never felt more so than
now that I propose to write upon the subject of parties. Cato,
when he stood the last time in the presence of judges, exclaimed, How difficult it is to defend ourselves before persons
with whom we have not lived! But it is more difficult still
to be plainly understood by contemporaries upon matters
which greatly agitate the times. To mould the result of our
experience and reflection into words which convey all we are
anxious to say and no more, and to avoid the danger of unbidden associations, is difficult indeed; yet when the word has
been uttered with due consideration, how few are there who
endeavor to understand it in any other sense than that with
which accidental association in the individual reader happens
to invest it!  I premise these remarks for my  younger
readers, that they may bestow upon this subject all the attention which its urgent importance on the one hand, and its
many dangers on the other, demand, and that before all they
may avoid the drawing of hasty conclusions apparently justifying what indeed is to be carefully shunned as a wasting
disease of the commonwealth.
252 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
XI. By a party we understand a number of citizens who,
for some period and not momentarily, act in unison respecting some principles, interest, or measure, by lawful means,
keeping therefore within the bounds of the fundamental law
and for the real or sincerely supposed common good of the
whole commonwealth. If either of these latter roquisites be
wanting; if that body of citizens act by unlawful means or
for sordid, selfish ends, or strive, secretly or openly, beyond
the fundamental law-that is, if they no longer strive for a
change of the administration or of some laws, but for a change
of the government itself-they are called a faction., All parties
are exposed to the danger of passing over into factions, which
if carried still farther may become conspiracies.
Before we attentively consider the various bearings of this
vast subject, it will be well briefly to answer three questions.
First, has ever any free country, at anyperiod of history, existed
for any length of time without parties? Secondly, can we
possibly expect any free country to exist without parties?
And thirdly, is it desirable that a free country should exist
without parties? Has there ever existed a free country for
any length of time without parties? This is a question of
fact, and can be decided by history alone; and, that no misunderstanding may exist, I will add that by a free country I
mean here any country in which the citizen, according to the
law or custom of the land, has a right to take, and does take,
a more or less direct and positive, and not a mere indirect or
negative, part in the acts of government; in short, a body
politic in which there is a widely diffused political action
among the citizens at large. After this explanation I avow
that, as far as my knowledge goes, I know of no instance of a
free state without parties. Forms may deceive; a state may
have a republican formn, for instance, yet be hemmed in by
overwhelming power, like the republic of Cracow, and parties
may indeed not exist; but does there exist there any free
~ If they act overtly and physically, they become either insurgents or rebels, as
the case may be.
253 
POLITICAL ETItIC,C.
political action?  The history of many free countries exhibits
brief periods, indeed, in which common and imminent danger,
or a universal and pure enthusiasm produced by a happy
combination of circumstances, quiets all existing differences
for the time; but I believe that there never existed a free
country actively developing within its bosom constitutional
law, and feeling deeply interested in the great problems of
right and public justice, in which there were not also parties.
For neither in the physical world nor in the moral or intellectual is anything great to be obtained without struggle, and
where there is struggle there must be two sides, two parties.
Indeed, we must answer at once the second question, that it
is impossible for civil liberty to exist without parties. Politics
does not differ in this respect from any other sphere of untrammelled action whatsoever. Where there is free action of whatever sort, political, scientific, or in the fine arts, and especially
where men thus situated strive to obtain some common end,
to establish some principle, or to act out some idea, those who
hold to the same principles will naturally and must necessarily unite in some degree and combine their endeavors,
strength, and energy. Without such union it would be as
impossible, in many cases, to remove some impediment in the
course of civilization, or to introduce some truth into practical
life, as it would be to remove a physical obstacle without a
union of several forces.  Parties exist not only where there is
political liberty, but, as was just observed, wherever there is
freedom of action. Thus, as soon as an absolute monarch,
with a superior mind and iron will, ceases to force all around
him to walk in his prescribed patlhs, we shall find divisions,
parties, factions of the court.  We  may lay it down, then, as
a principle, that in the same degree as there is room for combined and self-directing action in any sphere, so likewise must
parties exist.
Thirdly, upon many  grounds it is desirable that parties
should  exist.   Without  parties there could be  no loyal,
steady, lasting, and effective opposition, one of the surest
safeguards of public peace, as we shall see hereafter, for the
254 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
want of which parties became in antiquity and the middle
ages so much more frequently factions than in modern times
in those nations which best understand the practical operation of civil liberty. Without parties many of the wisest
measures could never be carried, and many of the best intended measures would remain harsh, unmodified, absolute;
the polity of a free commonwealth would greatly lose its
proper character. Without parties well understood, restless,
shallow, ambitious theorists, the mischievous appendages of
modern liberty, would worry society in a manner which, in
many cases, would lead to serious reactions. Every vain,
loud, and inexperienced innovator would harass society far
more than such persons are now capable of doing. Lastly,
the freedom of action in which civil liberty consists must
leave a-great degree of combination at the option of the citizens, which liberty will naturally be made use of in many
cases by men misguided either by error, evil design, or fanaticism.  How then are we to counteract them otherwise than
by counter-combination? how is it possible to displace a
vicious administration except by a combination of efforts?
Yet let us always and at every stage of this inquiry remember that parties themselves are exposed and expose
others to much danger. This consideration, and the fact that,
on thle other hand, they are both unavoidable and useful,
must prompt us the more honestly, manfully, and practically
to inquire into the very essence of the matter, so that the
subject may become the more and more justly understood.x
XII. There are two great classes of parties-historical and
passing ones. By historical parties I understand those which
are founded in the history of their country through a long
I In this respect the subject of parties only resembles a thousand others, for
instance that of power, of punishment, of all the primary impulses, such as the
desire of property, the wish to convince others of what we hold to he true our
'selves, the union of the sexes, the partiality for our kindred, the very love of ourcountry, nay, the first physical impulses, of eating and drinking: all are unavoidably necessary, yet expose men to moral or physical danger.
255 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
series of years, parties which adhere to certain political ideas,
which have been handed down from generation to generation,
developed and modified by repeated practical application, and
expanded into a certain system and doctrine, having taken
root in the practical life of the nation. They become the
more especial representatives of their respective ideas, and the
nation at large becomes well acquainted with their actions and
operations, not their professions only; the nation knows how
to appreciate them. Such, for instance, are the Tories and
Whigs in England. It is a great advantage for a free state if
its history has been propitious to the growth of such parties.
They greatly aid in the steady development of substantial
liberty.
Passing parties, on the other hand, are those formed for
momentary purposes only, as for the carrying of some single
measure, or merely the displacing of an administration, to
which species coalitions generally belong; or for the sole
object of" getting in," not in order to obtain power for the
purpose of carrying out some principles or plan, but only for
the sake of the power and emolument itsel~f. It is one of
the worst political accidents if the parties are merely divided
into "ins" and "outs." They can hardly ever escape becoming factions. There are, moreover, two traits which
generally, and especially in modern times, although we can
discern them very frequently in antiquity, particularly in
Rome and Athens, distinguish one or the other party. There
are those that adhere to what exists, who strive to maintain
and preserve, who represent the necessary stability of the
state, without which no society can exist; and those who
look forward, desire to change, improve, and develop; they
represent the movement, without which it is, on the other
hand, impossible for any society to exist. The former frequently carry their endeavors too far, and wish to preserve
indiscriminately, so that conservation alone becomes the
watchword. But that which is bad, inconvenient, or mischievous ought not to be retained; and Raumer, the historian,
justly observes that it has been frequently as revolutionary to
256 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
preserve as to destroy.  The others often go too far in their
turn, disregarding the gradual nature of all development, that
it is always necessary and unavoidable for one generation
to grow out of a preceding one, and they desire change without experience or modification-change for its own sake.
We do not observe these two distinctive traits in politics
only: they appear in religion, in science, in philosophy, in
taste; they appear more or less clearly everywhere.
XIII. A sound party, which the conscientious citizen may
join, ought to have the following characteristics. Its principle, upon which it exists or claims to act, or its object,
ought to be an enlarged and great one, a noble principle
worthy of moving masses; its numbers ought to be, if possible, large, or at least the ground on which it is formed
ought to be such that the party may have the power of becoming national; its consistency and mutual adherence ought
to be chiefly a moral or mental one, and it should have its
strength in physical organization; its members ought to feel,
and act as if they felt, that before all they are citizens of their
country, and that their position as such is not changed by the
party, consequently that the party does not treat itself as if it
were the country, or a sort of privileged aristocracy to which
the others are to be made passive subjects only, and that it
does not show a spirit of bitter persecution as soon as a
member feels himself conscientiously bound to dissent on
some measure from the prevailing opinion.
Without the first, an enlarged principle or worthy and great
object, parties become  only the supporters or promoters of
meanness, intrigue, or cabals.x  All paltriness in matters of
The word cabal, as is well known, is now generally believed, according to
Hume, ch. 65, to have been composed of the letters with which the names of the
five dangerous ministers of the time began,-namely, Clifford, Ashley, Buckingham, Arlington, and Lauderdale.  (Burnet, Own Times, an. i672.)  Others
derive it from the Hebrew Cabala, denoting a mysterious philosophy brought
from Egypt. [It is certain that cabal was used to denote a faction or junto
before the time of Charles II.  It was borrowed from the French, who derived
it from Cabala.]
VOL. II.             17
257 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
union among men lowers the mind, depresses the moral standard, and in politics leads to factiousness. The second is likewise important; it prevents, in a great degree, intriguing; for
large masses cannot easily be intrigued with, and, as Napoleon said," the really guilty ones are the intriguers of all'colors
and all doctrines." I Every party must act with some sort of
uniformity, otherwise its object of united action would be lost;
public meetings and the meeting of delegates, as well as a
certain mutual support in what is considered of general advantage, and, in the case of members of legislatures, preparatory meetings for the management of questions of great
import, are indispensable, and have at all times been held, in
ancient and in modern.   In fact, without them very little
business of importance or advantage would be transacted.
But nothing is more to be shunned than regular party organizations, with lists of admission and erasures of expelled
members, with regular party assessments and distinct party
obligations, with absolutely dependent papers dictated to by
a leading paper, which is servilely re-echoed by the other
party organs. Parties so organized are factions, or stand at
any moment on the point of becoming such, and gather
strength from the two facts that they are removed out of the
common politico-legal operation of the state, and yet are close
societies, so that they easily supersede the government. They
may easily become what the fearful French clubs were during
the first revolution of France; and, although it will be readily
admitted that much of the insane cruelty perpetrated by the
Jacobin club was owing to a number of quite peculiar circutmstances, yet no one can study well the history of those clubs,
especially of the Jacobin club, without perceiving that the
dangers of close parties or clubs are demonstrated there in
fearful consistency and glaring light, and no change of circumstances could prevent great evils from growing out of
similar institutions.  To speak briefly, a party ought not to
I,, Les vrais coupables sont Ies intrigans de toutes les couleurs et de toutes
les doctrines."   Mom. de Sainte-Uelene, vol. iii. p. 30, Paris edit. of 1824.
258 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
be a society, lest it expose its members to all the dangers
which have been noticed when we treated of societies, more
especially of trades-unions.   At Athens  there were  many
political clubs, Lraep.-ae, not without sacramental obligations.
When democratic madness raged in that city, we cannot
wonder that some citizens fled to this last hope., We cannot
treat here of what may become necessary in cases of utmost
extremity. No principle is truer than that, if a nation were
in a state of dissolution, the best citizens might act wisely and
rightly in forming societies to administer justice.
XIV. Let us now consider the danger to which all party
combinations are exposed, so that we may the better avoid
them.
Every individual pursuing with earnestness a certain object
of importance is exposed to the error of pursuing it to the
exclusion of other objects equally important, of becoming
"one-sided." This is the case in all spheres, the sciences,
the arts, religion, politics, the pursuit of wealth, in education,
-in short, everywhere.  The danger naturally increases both
with the degree of power we may possess, and of opposition
which may be offered; for the one stimulates our eagerness,
the other lends the means to act it out. Parties, however,
always meet with opposition, else they would not exist; and
they combine the endeavors, energy, and powers of many,
countenancing one another; so that they are more exposed
to the error of one-sidedness than men who pursue their
object individually, with whatever eagerness.
The next danger, equally great, if not greater, is that the
individual will lose his moral  independence, and the party
become too close, when it is exposed to all the perils which
we have viewed under the head of associations,-in short,
that the party will become factions; that the parties foment
the spirit of dissension, while it is the duty of every citizen to
assuage discord and allay civil strife as much as possible;
x Thucydides, viii. 54.
1   
259 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
that we shall deceive ourselves in taking the opinion of our
party for that of our nation, or that of a fraction of our party
or a mere political coterie, for the opinion of the whole party;
that party spirit will run into a variety of channels, such as
religious distinction, the various classes of society, or separate
trades, while the health of a commonwealth consists greatly
in the close and intimate union of all classes, professions, and
employments; that our own judgment2 and even moral feeling may become warped and distorted, and that we shall
judge of those things by which alone parties can be truly
measured, such as justice, the prosperity of the whole country,
truth, right, which are indeed the first principles upon which
all politics shall move, by the standard derivedfrom the party,
thus making that which ought to be the standard the thing
to be measured, and that which ought to be measured the
standard, as inflamed sects will sometimes measure the truth
by their tenets, not their tenets by the truth. The danger is
that we shall look upon the party as the end and object,
striving to make the community subservient to it, while that
only which can give sense and meaning to a party is the community, the commonwealth, the country. In this latter respect we are all apt to. forget the primary end and object, as
indeed all men in all pursuits, when earnestly striving for
some object, are prone to forget the end and place instead of
it that which originally was but the means to obtain it. Gen
- There is hardly any danger which besets men in civilized life, and especially
those in the higher classes, more constantly than the mistaking of coterie talk for
public opinion, coterie opinion for public judgment. Private individuals, authors,
politicians, statesmen, and monarchs are equally exposed to it, and Charles X.
of France lost his crown by mistaking a court coterie for the national ]arty.
Few men, indeed, have sufficient sagacity and elevation of mind to withstand the
power of repetition in their circle, or to rise above it and see life and reality
untainted by it. Observe real life, and do not neglect signs and clear tokens or
proofs because they disagree with what you hear around yourself.
2 Even so considerate and calm a man as Newton, it would appear, did not
withstand party acrimony in his transactions with Flamsteed. This is not mentioned to justify us, inferior to him, but to serve as a still more significant
beacon.
26o 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
erals forget the object of the war; lawyers, that the ultimate
end is not the rescuing of a criminal but the doing of justice. Pope Paul IV. (Caraffa) desired assistance from the
Protestants, and urged the Turks to attack Naples and Sicily.,
In brief, the danger is that we forget for what the party struggle is, and liken it to a war, the end of which is victory in
itself, by whatever means or stratagems. Lastly, this blinding party zeal may pass over into factious passion and fury.
Dumont, in his Reminiscences of Mirabeau, ch. xviii., says
of Brissot-it is indifferent for the present purpose whether
with perfect correctness or not, for it is at any rate a correct
picture of the malady of which we speak-" Brissot was one
of those men in whom party spirit was much stronger than
all morals, or rather who saw no morals except in the party;
he had more of monastic zeal than any one else; as a Capuchin he would have loved his vermin; as a Dominican he
would have burnt heretics; as a Roman he would have shown
himself not unworthy of following Cato or Regulus; as a
French republican he was bent on destroying the monarchy,
and neither disdained to calumniate nor to persecute, nor
himself to perish upon the scaffold, so that he obtained his
obj ect."
Considering the danger of fomenting dissension, we ought
ever to be careful not to let party distinction and animosity
pass over into private life. It is delightful to see men who
rigorously oppose one another upon conscientious grounds
remaining in a strictly gentlemanlike or perhaps friendly private intercourse, a circumstance which can take place only
where there is great liberty. For liberty accustoms men to
respect the opinion of others, while absolutism or want of
freedom so thoroughly weans men from this noble mutual
justice that if for some reason dissension does break out it is
x His confessions on this head are given in Bromato, Vita di Paolo IV., vol. ii.
p. 369, cited by Ranke (History of the Popes, ii. I84, transl.). The pope called
upon Suleiman I. to give up his wars in Hungary and to throw himself with all
his power upon Naples and Sicily. This was done to strengthen himself against
His Most Catholic Majesty of Spain.
26I 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
invariably vehement and inveterate, and every opponent is at
once considered as an enemy. While the party spirit between
the Union men and States'-right party ran highest in Charleston, several of the mnost active leaders of the opposite parties
remained on terms of amity, and showed themselves to be so
in public.
All party signs are to be deprecated, except it comes to an
extreme, when indeed the question touches no longer the
subject of parties, and a sign is taken as the symbol and eloquent pledge of the struggle, such as the tricolor in France in
I830. The fool's cap and beggar's bag of the Gueux in the
Netherlands did great service. Signs rouse the inert, and
commit the active irreversibly; they pledge and compromise,
and are therefore useful in insurrections, but not until then.
So long as peace can be maintained, party signs are much to
be dreaded, whether they consist in the color of the cap distinguishing the theological factions at Constantinople, or in
the Guelf's wearing the plume on the right side and the
Ghibelline's wearing it on the left," or in the "blue and buff"
of the Whigs in the times of Fox, or the orange opposed to
the green in Ireland.
Party spirit may run so high that the greatest link and tie
of humanity, language, loses its very essence, and people
cease tounderstand one another, when even the best-intended
words, as in the theological controversies of religiously excited times, are unintentionally yet passionately or wilfully
wronged, misconstrued, wrung from their very sense; such as
Thucydides says was the case in Greece during the Peloponnesian war, "when the received value of names imposed for
the signification of things was changed in an arbitrary way;
inconsiderate boldness being counted true-hearted manliness;
provident deliberation, a specious fear; modesty, the cloak of
The distinction of party signs showed itself in the cutting of bread, in the
wearing of the girdle, etc. (Ranke, communicating it from a relazione, in his
Popes, etc., vol. i. p. 250, of the translation, Amer.  ed.)  The Chronicle of
Cologne says that the two parties distinguished themselves even by their manner
of husbandry. Biographical Notices of B. G. Niebuhr, vol. ii. p. 38I.
262 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
cowardice; to be cautious in everything, to be lazy in everything. A furious suddenness was reputed a point of valor.
To re-advise for the better security was held to be a fair pretext for tergiversation. He that was fierce was always trusty;
and he that was the opposite of such a one was suspected.
He that laid a snare, if it took, was a wise man; he that
could find out the trap was a cleverer man than he; but he that
had been so provident as not to need to do one or the other
was said to be a dissolver of fellowships, and one that stood
in fear of his adversary. In brief, he that could outstrip
another in the doing of an evil act, or that could persuade
another thereto that never meant it, was commended." The
vivid description of that excellent historian goes on much
farther, exhibiting to us the ripe fruits of those seeds which.
all of us carry within us; and if I have previously referred to
the history of the Jacobin club as instructive for every citizen,
I do so with no less earnestness to this whole part of the
Grecian history; I urgently refer to it my younger readers.t
It is very true, indeed, that our danger is not so great as that
of ancient times, because our states are vaster, our race is less
apt to be moved by masses, we value individuality higher, our
religion, so long as it is unsullied by fanaticism, is of a tenmpering character, and, above all, we act through representative
governments.   Where the democracy is absolute, and the
state small,-the one indeed requires the other,-it is difficult
Thucydides, iii. 7-85.   I recollect having seen, in a Madrid paper of the
year 1822, this passage in an account of some tumult in the Spanish capital:
"The infamous cry, Long live our country! was heard." Archbishop Parkel,
"who had been reckoned moderate in his proceedings towards Catholics, cornm.
plained of what he called'a Machiave government;' that is, of the queen's
(Elizabeth's) lenity in not absolutely rooting them out."  (Hallam, Constitutional
History, vol. i. p. I91.) The note whlich Hallam appends to that page gives instances, if indeed they were needed, of the truth contained in the remarks of
Thucydides respecting the perversion of language in times disordered by the fury
of party, and which are but too applicable to all parties at the period of the Reformation.  In the first French revolution the words virtue, patriotism, consistency,
had received entirely new meanings, as the word Thorough had between archbishop Laud and Lord Strafford, and probably among their whole party.
263 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
to see how any party can be secure against breaking out into
passion. Let us, then, upon this ground among so many
others, value and foster the more earnestly our representative
system. Yet, despite all difference, the danger still exists;
and will exist so long as men on the one hand cherish freedom of action, and on the other are, and in their nature ought
to be, according to God's wvill, mental and moral individuals,
differing therefore in their dispositions, and so long, as they
pursue with zeal what they hold to be true or right.
XV. Ought a well-meaning citizen to attach himself to
some party, and to act with it? If he joins a party, how far
ought he to act with it?  When ought he to leave his party?
These are questions of great moment, as all know who have
practical knowledge of the politics of liberty.
The law of Solon, according to which a man who stands
neuter in time of sedition is punishable with "atimia," or loss
of civic rights, has been called by Plutarch peculiar and
surprising.  Solon, even though he may have erred in procuring the passage of this law, must nevertheless have had
strong reasons. Undoubtedly he strove by this very law to
z Plutarch, Solon, 20; Cicerb, ad Att., 10, I; Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae, i.
2, C. 12  " Solon capite sanxit, si qui ill seditione non alterutrius partis fuisset."
I own this seems to me to be one of those many laws which express a principle
or theory, and may he repeated for centuries, but of which a man acquainted
with the practical part of civil liberty cannot easily see the operation. One or
the other party engaged in the sedition must be victorious. Suppose it is that
party which was opposed to the administration in power. Can we imagine the
successful party to begin their administration with indicting all citizens who did
not take up arms against them, or punishing all who remained neutral, while they
leave unpunished those who  fought against  them? But if it is expected that
they will punish the neutrals, or passi e, and all who fought against them, the
law must needs work very mischievously.   Indeed, it seems that the law of Solon
would, if acted out, forestall every amnesty, with which peace must necessarily
begin after civil commotions.  I am not acquainted with a case of atimia having
been inflicted for this offence of neutrality.  When  Emeric Tokeli was appointed commander of the Hungarian insurgents against the emperor Leopold I.
in I678, he proclaimed that he would suffer no neutrals. Since he fought
against the imperialists, it is evident that he meant every one should be bound
to take up arms with him. [Comp. Grote's History, vol. iii. p. I9o.]
264 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
prevent broils and tumults, which, it has been observed already, must be frequent in small democracies if any excitement exists; on the other hand, he was probably aware of
the fact that nothing favors strife and political turbulence
more positively than when apathy or fear of mixing in the
contest keeps the large mass of well-disposed citizens from
taking part in politics. It surrenders the whole field to the
restless and wicked, who certainly will try to occupy it, as
they always have done. I do not know how it is now, but
once the crime of murder was greatly promoted at Havana
by the circumstance that as soon as the cry of murder was
heard in a street, every one hurried away as fast as possible,
the.t he might not become a witness and expose himself either
to the revenge of the murderer's associates or the dangers
anj sufferings of the badly-conducted trials which were common in the Spanish colonies. We have spoken already of the
general obligation of voting as resting on every one who has
a right to vote. But the obligation of attaching one's self to
a party is not so general, although I believe that in contests of
great political importance it allows of but few exceptions. A
rian may be occupied with absorbing subjects lying wholly
out of the sphere of politics, or he may, as actually will happen, expose himself and his family to danger or loss by
decidedly joining a party. Yet, I repeat, these are but exceptions, and upon the whole it strikes me that the rule will
hold, that a citizen ought, in times of great political danger,
to attach himself to some party or other, if he can possibly
find a party by taking part in which he does not do violence
to his conscience, and if he has not very specific reasons for
the contrary. There are, indeed, some men who are naturally
timid, both in thought and in action. Their character is such
that they may be useful members of society, if left alone;
they are conscientious, and will not knowingly do wrong, but
they become useless, and even dangerous, if they are forced
out of their retired position, which is the element that the
whole compound of their temperament requires. These two
constitute exceptions.
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POLITICAL ETHICS.
XVI. Respecting the relation in which citizens may stand
to parties, they may be classified, I think, under the following
heads: apathists, neutrals or independents, party-members,
partisans or zealots, factionists, and trimmers.
Of apathists, and their danger in free countries, we have
spoken. If we understand by neutrals or independents those
citizens who do not attach themselves to any existing and
exacting party, and do not consider themselves pledged or in
any way bound to vote with it on all those questions which
in themselves are indifferent but become important on party
grounds only, and who consider themselves perfectly free and
disengaged to vote for whomever they think best I speak of
citizens at large-they form a highly valuable class of the
community, and may contribute much to extricate their
country from undue excitement and party action. But it must
be well remembered that it is absolutely impossible for any
person to have sufficient opportunity or grasp of mind to judge
thoroughly and conscientiously upon every subject. Ttiose
who merely call themselves independent are not unfrequently
influenced by ill-judging vanity; refusing to acknowledge that
due influence which the opinion of friends and the aggregate
opinion of that body of men whom one has reason to trust
should always exercise over a rational man. The developments of events, of laws, and of institutions reflect themselves
in parties, and we ought not to set up our stolid self-sufficiency against this fact. Of course, no man of self-esteem
will consider himself so bound by his party as not fully to
reserve his private judgment, to strike off from ballots, for
instance, whatever names he thinks he ought conscientiously
to leave out. Nor should he feel himself bound to stand up
as a defender not only of all that the leaders of a party do,
but of every single member, and of his private life as well as
his political acts. Excited party-men not unfrequently make
this demand; but this is partyzealotism, and is as injurious to
a sound state of the country at large as to a party itself. It
weakens of necessity; while acts rising by way of justice,
generosity, or truth above the party never fail to gain great
266 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
strength for the party in the end; for they gain general confidence, which is power. Huskisson, when a member of the
cabinet, went so far as to oppose, in I822, a measure brought
forward by the government through the leading minister in
the commons; and he opposed it successfully. In the case of
the East Retford Disfranchisement Bill he likewise opposed
the government to which he belonged.'  Very frequently,
however, citizens call themselves independent in order to
cover political vacillation, from weakness, inconsistency of
temperament, or self-interest. They are the independent men
whom Fox, if I mistake not, humorously defined when he
said, an independent man is a man you can never depend
upon. The latter, those who fluctuate between courses of
action, are properly called trimmers, a term taken from nautical terminology, which has lost, I believe, much of its use
since the times of Charles II. and James II., when everybody
who was attached to the cause of royalty, and even ready to
wink at much abuse, was stigmatized with the name of trimmer as soon as he showed himself unwilling to support and
defend all the atrocities and corruptions of the court party.
Real trimmers are to be shunned in politics as in every other
sphere of action; for they are lacking in perseverance and
manliness.
The remaining important questions respecting parties will
be more conveniently treated of in the chapter on the opposition, which comes next in order.
I [Mr. Huskisson having in i828 voted for transference of the franchise of
East Retford to Birmingham, which the government opposed, resigned his seat
in the cabinet on that account, with Lord Palmerston and others.]
267 
CHAPTER III.
Opposition.- Government. - Administration. - What is a lawful Opposition. A well-understood Opposition the essential Safeguard of Liberty.- Tile Op position a great Institution of Modern Times.- As such it dates fromin the
Times of Walpole and Pulteney. -It is lawful to oppose the Majority, which
is not always right. -  (Order of Sitting in Legislative Assemblies.)- Public
Opinion and General Opinion.-Ethical Rules relating to Opposition and to
Parties in general.- How far ought a Citizen to go in his Opposition, espe cially in times of War?-Coalitions.-Parties formed on the Ground of foreign
National Extraction.
XVII. GOVERNMENT, we have seen, is that establishment
which has been agreed upon in order to obtain the ends of
the state. It is the machinery of the state. We understand
by government chiefly the characteristic and fundamental organism of the jural society, through which it acts as a jural
society, including in monarchies the ruling family, inasmuch
as the established dynasty is considered as one of the fundamental and, so long as that government exists, unchangeable
features of the state machinery. The constitutional monarch
is an institution.  By administration we understand the application of those characteristic and fundamental principles to
the occurrences of the day, and, more especially, the chief
appliers of those fundamental principles; the chief officersthe cabinet ministers, who for the time have the application,
the acting out, of the executive laws and government principles as they understand them, in their hands. Now, this administering of government, this application of the principles
to practical cases, may not only be carried on in the spirit of
wisdom, justice, conscientiousness, and soberness, or of folly,
injustice, wickedness, and profligacy; but the best and calmest
men may perfectly agree as to the principles of government
but totally differ in opinion as to their application in specific
and yet highly important cases. All those who desire a
change of this spirit of application, and consequently of the
268 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
chief persons-officers or law-makers-whose business it is to
make this application, from whatever motive their desire may
arise, and who unite in a party in order to prevent, by united
efforts, the administration from the adopted course as much
as possible, in order to dislodge those who occupy the chief
places, so as to place in.their stead persons of their own views,
are called the opposition. An opposition is under and within
the fundamental law, in England against the minister, for instance Walpole, in America against the president; but if in
the former case the opposition went beyond Walpole and
worked against George the First or the Second, as the Jacobites did, or if in the latter case an opposition should strive to
subvert congress or the constitution, they cease to be oppositions, and become factions, treasonable bodies, or insurgents,
as the ease may be. Oppositions, therefore, are lawful; they
are not only to be suffered, but they are, if not factions, of the
greatest usefulness; and when the government itself becomes
rebellious as to the fundamental law within and traitorous as
to the relations of the country without, as for instance Charles
II. became in the treaty of May 22, I670,' with France, oppositions are the only safeguards to rescue a nation. Without
well-understood, lawful, and loyal opposition, that support of
all substantial civil liberty, namely, that the minority be protected and have every fair chance secured to them of converting the majority, would be either a mockery, or lead to
continual violences; for opinion is like the air, harmless and
easy if allowed freely to expand, but of tremendous power
and danger if compressed.
XVIII. Withoutwell-understood opposition, liberty cannot
I The treaty of Charles with France, after the conversion of Charles and
James to Catholicism, in the second article of which it is declared that the king
will make public his conversion, and receives the promise, from the king of
France, of assistance by armed force in the carrying out of this design in Great
Britain.  For the copy of the original of this second article, see Life of William
Lord Russell, i. 5I, ed. 3.  [Comp. Hallam, Const. Ilist., ii. 5I8.]
269 
POLITICAL E THICS.
co-exist with peace and order., Hence the many sufferings
of the republics in the middle ages. Nor is any state safe
which excludes lawful opposition and treats all disagreement
from the opinion of those in power as sedition or treason.2
The fact is well known, that formerly the discharging of a
minister from the divan of the Porte was always accompanied
at least with banishment, and frequently with the silken cord:
it was considered natural that he who is discontented must
become, or thereby is already, a traitor. In most absolute
monarchies, the displacement of a minister is called disgrace,
and not unfrequently accompanied by a suggestion not to
approach the capital within a certain circuit.  So late as in
I6IO, when after the assassination of Henry IV. the imbecile
French cabal had resolved to change all the political principles-upon which that great king had conducted his government, Sully, his almost equally great minister, when informed
of this change, said to his wife, "If I am wise, I shall quietly
resign all my posts and employments, withdraw all my money,
or as much as I can, with part of it purchase some strong
castle in one of the most distant provinces, and keep the remainder for any exigencies that may happen."3  So, absolute
democracies or aristocracies could not endure opposition, not
even the passive existence of those who were known to belong
to the opposite side.  Banishment followed banishment.  Any
administration in our modern representative states, which
stigmatizes every opposition as factious, shows that it is either
very weak or factious itself, and ought not to be borne with
by the mass of substantial and good citizens.
i Mr. Ellice called Sir Robert Peel, in a speech relating to Lord Durham's
mission to the Canadas, in January, I838, if the papers be correct, the leader of
her majesty's opposition. There is a deeper sense in this than that of mere pleasantry.  The representative government of a free country is not complete without
a lawful opposition.  A proper lever is wanting.
2 * In order to show the necessity and salutariness of opposition, I ought to
have shown historically how often the principles of right and liberty have been
insisted upon and carried by the way of excellent measures by the opposition,
whether tory or whig. There must then be some classes of measures which can
be more truly viewed by the opposition, simply because it is not in power.
3 M[emoirs of Sully, vol. iii. p. 260, Loud. edit. of I76I.
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POLITICAL ETHICS.
As to the history of this great institution, for thus I feel
tempted to call it, I believe we cannot date its perfection farther back than under George II. against Walpole, after the
Jacobites  had  given up the idea of restoring the  Stuarts, and
when Pulteney (afterwards Farl Bath) vigorously, yet not, at
times, without the spirit of faction, led it. There existed, indeed, a regular opposition against William III., but it was
generally more or less revolutionary; that is, it was in the
interest of the Stuarts. The opposition in France mixes up
frequently the two revolutionary parties of the legitimists and
republicans, which is unavoidable so soon after the expulsion
of a dynasty,'
The manner in which members of legislative bodies place themselves is not
a subject without importance in constitutional legislative police. It belongs to
the external arrangements or police of parliamentary politics, hence to politics
proper; yet I may be permitted to say a few words on it by way of note. The
British commons sit on benches, close together, in rows on the right and left side of
the speaker. On the right is the bench usually called the treasury bench, because
the ministers take their seats there by custom, be they whig or tory. The administration pa.rty, therefore, sits always on the right, and the opposition opposite to
them. In France the members, likewise at liberty to choose their places, arrange themselves according to party colors. The seats are disposed of in a semicircular form. The extreme right is always occupied by the party claiming to be
the most royalist, or, as is the case now., super-royalist, that is, by the party who
are for thle old Bourbons; the extreme left, by those who claim to be the most
liberal, or by republicans. Between them we have the right, the right centre,
the centre, the left centre, and the left. Of whatever party the administration
may be, these groups do not change their places. The ministers sit on distinct
places appropriated to them. At one period during the first French revolution the
Jacobins occupied the upper tiers, and were therefore called the Mountain party,
while the Girondists occupied the lower seats, and were called the Valley. The
American distribution of seats differs from both the present English and French
arrangement. Each American member of a legislative assembly selects any one of
the unappropriated seats which he likes, and keeps it throughout the session. I
know of no exception in the various state legislatures. All party colors are mixed;
administration and opposition are not represented to the eye. Each member has a
desk, with writing-materials, drawers, etc., and the members sit in arm-chairs.
This different arrangement may have originated from the fact that at the period
when the like subjects were not yet settled by custom there was such unanimous
spirit respecting the administration of General Washington that there existed no
open, compact opposition. At present the disposal of the seats according to the
choice of the first comer has been adopted in most of the standing rules of the
legislatures. At first glance it might appear that the American method is prefer
27I 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
XIX. If there were any more truth in the pretended maxim
that the majority is always right, and that it is the foundation
of republican liberty, than in the monarchical, that the king
can do no wrong, that is, if it were anything more than a
political fiction to lay down rigid rules for the control of legislative bodies and citizens in their choice of measures, every
opposition would be factious or treasonable as soon as the
sense of the majority had been ascertained and an administration formed accordingly. We have seen in the case of the
trades-unions that the majority may not only be grievously
wrong, but they may naturally form the inferior body, and be
disposed to oppress the superior-in that case the most skilled
and most industrious. Republican liberty lies far deeper than
in a maxim, such as that the majority is always right-a positiona thousand times contradicted by history. Republican
liberty consists, among other things, in the unrestrained right
of the minority, of a fraction, nay, of an individual, to convert,
if it can be done by lawful means, the majority; republican
safety consists in the fact that the measures of those who have
the power, even be they the representatives of an overwhelming majority, may become modified by opposition; for right,
if we speak of any continued course of action, is never absolutely on one side. We may go farther: the more overwhelming a majority becomes, the more necessary, steady,
yet lawful, opposition may become, and in most cases actually
does become, lest government approach to the vortex of absolutism.  The history of all civilization, and that of political
is not excepted, presents hardly any other picture more fi-equently than that of an orderly succession of changes produced by minorities hardly visible in their origin, gradually
able, inasmuch as it might be supposed that it does not aid at least in increasing
undue party spirit; but, upon the whole, the English arrangement strikes me as
far the best, and the American as the least eligible. The sitting close together,
according to parties, and especially without desks, is a decided preventive of
those interminable speeches with which the smallest-minded always beset assemblies most, while the expediting of business is much promoted by sitting close
and in parties together.  The desks are objectionable, and ought to be abolished.
[At present seats are taken more or less by lot.]
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POLITICAL ETHICS.
swelling in number and power, and enlarging in thought,
modified by experience, and ultimately growing into a majority, supplanting a former one which has been gradually
dwindling into a minority. A majority does not always even
indicate public opinion, although it may show momentary
general opinion, to which rumor belongs.. By public opinion
we must understand that opinion of the community which has
been influenced either by the modifying correction of time, or
the talent or knowledge of those who are peculiarly able to
judge upon the subject in question. General opinion may be
and very often has been egregiously mistaken. Error, want
of information, fear, excitement, revenge, thirst for gain,
pride, superstition, fanaticism, false shame-all these may be
common to most or all members of a community, and consequently influence general opinion, and mislead entirely.
Public opinion indicates always some settled more or less
digested opinion respecting subjects which involve matters
of right, the true appreciation of which consists in the due
counterbalancing of a number of considerations.  For this
reason it is so important when it is turned towards these subjects; but as to matters of knowledge only a single individual
may, and often has, justly set up his own thorough knowledge against the whole general opinion of his age and many
antecedent centuries. It might perhaps be appropriately expressed thus, that by general opinion we mean simply the
aggregate opinion of many individuals singly taken, an opinion which is general to many individuals; by public opinion
we understand the opinion of the community as a connected
and organized body, the ultimate result of mutually modifying or counterbalancing opinions of men who as the members
of a community mutually influence and depend upon one
another. But even well-settled and clearly-pronounced public opinion may be erroneous, and greatly so. It cannot be
denied that it was public opinion at Athens that she should
side with Philip. Yet Demosthenes was right. Public, at
least general opinion, it was that cried out, Crucify, crucify.
On the other hand, it will have appeared, from the remarks
VOL. II.                  18,
273 
POLITICAL ETIIICS.
on public opinion in the first volume, that it is always entitled
to the greatest respect, and that a citizen ought to follow it
unless he have distinct and powerful reasons for not doing so;
and that indeed he makes himself a very annoying member
of the community, if he opposes it from supercilious vanity
or wrong-headed arrogance, or a factious member, if he does
so from sordid interest or sinister ambition. A means of
judging with a degree of fairness between both parties is to
consider them as if both were recorded on the pages of the
past, as if you met with them in history; disentangle yourself from the meshes of self-interest, and before all apply the
plain yet very powerful test of asking yourself, Would you
frankly acknowledge yourinmost motives-forwhich, however,
you must diligently or honestly search-before posterity?
To return once more to public opinion. We have first to
inquire whether the subject at issue is one on which there can
exist any public opinion at all, so that we do not mistake
general opinion for public. If millions believe certain statements touching matters of fact, of which I have undeniable
evidence contrary to the general belief; if I live among people who yet judge by the mere appearance of the heavenly
bodies, and who believe that the moon is larger than all the
stars, or who pronounce a general for having lost a battle incapable, or perhaps a traitor, while I may have the undeniable
knowledge to the contrary, or am perhaps acquainted with the
opinion of a great captain who pronounces that general to
have shown the greatest skill and talent in that very battle
which he lost-in all these cases general opinion has no sort
of wveight, and I should prostitute my mind, perhaps my conscience, were I to follow it.  The same is the case in many
trials. There may be a very general opinion, loudly, clamorously expressed, respecting the guilt or innocence of the
arraigned person, and yet the juryman before whom the facts
are divulged in their successive order and in their true bearing ought to pay no regard to any opinion of any person
or of the public except the judge only. Nevertheless, real
public opinion is carefully and respectfully to be consulted, for
274 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
the two reasons, first, that there is a very great chance that if
it be settled, and, of course, touches a subject on which there
can exist any public opinion, it is upon the main correct, and
if not, that there is at any rate much to be learned from it;
secondly, that it is the greatest, mightiest of all powers, and
therefore not to be slighted. It must be observed, however,
that it requires tact and honest observation to ascertain public
opinion. Clamor is not public opinion. The organs of a
nation, of whatever kind they be, for instance the members
of legislatures, the public press, the courts, pronounce sometimes not only hastily, but repeatedly, one thing, while facts,
carefully observed, show at the same time that public opinion,
the settled sentiment of the people, takes its current in an
entirely contrary direction. It is the discovery of the latter,
and the acting boldly upon it, which has given some statesmen so great a power in executing vast designs, apparently
in direct contradiction to public opinion, because opposed to
what those organs, for some reason or other misrepresenting
public opinion, pronounced. A common case of this sort is
when parliamentary bodies opposed to an administration are
dissolved, and an "appeal to the people" is made, who by
their new elections show that they side with the administration, and that the former therefore misrepresented public
opinion.  Finally, a shrewd statesman may know that though
this public opinion of the great mass, upon which he is desirous to found his strength against what he conceives to be
the misrepresenters of public opinion, does not yet exist, the
elements for it are there, and that it will rise and support him.
This it was that Napoleon meant when he said that he was
often obliged to act against all those who could express or
represent public opinion, knowing that the masses would
support him.
XX. If then a citizen is in the opposition-and indeed most
of the ensuing remarks relate to parties in general, whether in
or out-he ought to observe, it would seem, the following rules:
The mnoment that justice is sacrificed to party interests, the
275 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
party or individual so doing becomes factious; for justice
being the grand object of the law, of the constitution, of the
state itself, the party sets itself above these, and makes itself
its own object, while a party can have no right to exist except
so far as it is formed for the public good.  In denying justice
the party turns into a faction. No party consideration, therefore, ought in any case to influence votes on private bills,
especially not if the restitution of reputation or property be
in question.  If the old proverb, Fiat justitia et pereat mundus, has any meaning-and why else has it been handed down
so many centuries?-it is certainly much truer still, fiat justitia et pereant partes.
There are many measures, for instance appointments for
offices, which may be fairly and justly influenced by party
considerations, provided always the honesty and fitness of the
applicant be kept in view. We have seen already that it is
ruinous to the whole state if persons are habitually appointed
without regard to their fitness. As to appointments of broad
utility for the people at large, and not merely for simple executive places, party considerations ought to have no sway,
for it is the public service, not party service, which is the
object. Appointments for critical transactions of great moment, for scientific tasks, for the administration of justice,
ought to be influenced by party considerations only when
there is actually a suitable choice left, which is not very frequently the case. It gives great strength to a party if it rises
above itself and gives a frank vote on the mere consideration
of public utility, nay, even of rewarding high individual worth,
and sees only the honor and reputation of the nation at large
reflected in such preference on account of talent and character.
There are measures which are of public utility, nay, of puLblic necessity, and which an honest opposition may nevertheless oppose without becoming factious, because to adopt them
would give new vigor to an administration which the opposition holds to be ruinous or vicious. One of these cases is
the common one of supplies. A man in the opposition votes
against supplies, not because he means to say that they ought
276 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
not to be passed, but simply because he desires to deprive
the administration of the means of getting on. But if the
proposed measure is one of broad and lasting utility to the
people, and would materially suffer, or even be only endangered, from not being passed now; it is factious to oppose it
though its passage would strengthen the administration. If
a citizen in the opposition were to oppose an advantageous
treaty, in order to prevent an administration which he considers vicious from gathering new popularity, it would be
highly factious.  But the rule does not merely apply to the
more important class of measures.  Suppose an opposition
member in the United States should be convinced that for the
essential benefit of the whole the decennial census ought to
be connected with an extensive collection of statistics, and
that this could not be executed without creating some new
offices, and yet, on the consideration that this would give new
strength to the administration, he should oppose it; such an
act would be reprehensible. The great question how far an
opposition ought not only to yield, after war has once been
declared, but to aid patriotically in carrying it to a glorious
end, belongs to this class of measures. Wars may be wicked,
nay, infamous or stupid; they may be undertaken for the
very purpose of distracting public opinion and turning it
against popular liberty; or they may be undertaken by a
large majority of the people, and yet against the decided
opinion of the opposition. Now, I believe that a rule, which
allows of but very few and peculiar exceptions, is this: If
your nation engages in the war, and not simply a preposterous adninistration, against your opinion, you may act in the
relations of a private citizen as you like, provided always you
do in no sort or manner aid directly or indirectly the enemy,
-although a patriotic citizen will not doubt what he has to
do; but if you are a representative or officer, you are bound
first of all to bring the war to a happy and glorious end, and
not to cripple the administration. The latter would be treasonable. Remember that it is your state, your nation, that
declares and fights out the war, not this or that minister;
277 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
remember that the' honor and history of your country are
engaged; that, however conscientious you may be in your
opposition, you may err after all; that you cannot oppose the
administration without strengthening the enemy who has unsheathed his sword against your kindred, and that, whatever
your opinion was as to the beginning of the war, all considerations absolutely cease when the enemy approaches your own
country.' A traitor is he who will not gladly defend his own
country.   If an opposition feels really and conscientiously
convinced that the war is inexpedient, let them follow the old
Roman rule: treat after victory, but fight until then. The
English history from the times of Henry VIII. is full of instruction respecting all different sorts of war, but mean,-imnbecile as the government of Charles II. was, I suppose no one
would call him a true Englishman who, however opposed to
his corrupt court, should have embarrassed the administration
after De Ruyter had swept the Thames with his broom on the
quarter-deck. We must not forget that nations as a whole
have their meaning and destiny; not the individual only.
In brief, if you are conscientiously in the opposition, annoy
the administration as much as you think you can answer for,
but do not harass the public or embarrass public service, and
do not forget, while you make a distinction between the administration which you believe you may lawfully oppose, and
public service on account of which you claim lawfully to
oppose the administration, to make likewise the proper distinction between your opposition and the public; do not believe that everything which suits your party is on that account
beneficial to the public because you believe the administration
in the wrong.2
lntewo
* Fox went altogether beyond the proper line of lawful opposition when, in
I792, he sent Mr. Adair, as his representative and with his cipher, to St. Petersburg, there to frustrate the objects for which the minister from the crown was
authorized to treat.  He succeeded in this design, and did actually frustrate the
kiug's minister in some of the objects of his negotiation.  This was justly called
treasonable misdemeanor at least. (Tomline, Mem. of Pitt, 2d edit., vol. iii. p.
3Io, etc.) Fox did it on his own account. The party did not know it.
2 [The author would doubtless limit these remarks to cases of expediency, as
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POL ITICAL ETHICS.
XXI. As to our own judgment in party matters, we ought in
all matters of expediency to yield fairly to the collected opinion of our friends, and not set up our self-sufficiency against
them.' If it comes to principles, if, after careful examination,
we believe that a compromise of principle is demanded, or
that our party has become factious, we must either act for ourselves in the respective single case, or entirely abandon the
party, all the clamor about deserters and traitors to the contrary;-though no good or prudent citizen will do this upon
slight grounds.
The remark which was made, that a party ought always to
take a broad national ground, as being the best preventive of
pettishness or factiousness, applies especially to oppositions.
In studying the times or history, we sometimes observe little
oppositions which  remind us of a dog tied behind a fastrolling wagon. The animal opposes indeed, but, although its
four feet are stiffly set against the wagon's motion, the four
horses move on unconcerned about the opposer behind, who
is obliged to follow, and, if he would but give up his opposi
where there was just or lawful ground for war, but the war would be hurtful to
national interests. An unjust war, like any other unjust transaction, must be
opposed by all, whether in the opposition or on the side of the party in power.]
I Lord Durham said in I837, "I have already, in parliament, proposed household suffrage and triennial parliaments, and my opinions are still the same. But
at the same time I am not prepared to press them obstinately against those of
other reformers; for, though I will not yield under any circumstances whatever
to our enemies, yet I am not ashamed to say that when true and real reformers
differ from me I give way to their particular views. As to vote by ballot, you
are all aware, gentlemen, that considerable difference of opinion prevails upon
this question.  Some think it not advisable, and somewhat inconsistent with the
practice of a free state; but I tell you that my opinion is decidedly in favor of
the ballot. This is not a declaration made to serve a momentary purpose. Those
who know me best know that I have long entertained that opinion, and that I
have acted upon it....
Let me observe that when I alluded to the subject of compromise I meant
compromise with an enemy, not that fair concession which may and must occasionally take place with a friend. There is no real reformer but will yield his
opinion on minor points to those who are actuated by the same princil)les with
himself; but what I object to is the system of mutilating and compromnising to
gain an enemy who cannot be conciliated."
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POLITICAL ETHICS.
tion, might trot comfortably enough between the wheels-nay,
in the end might be taken up perhaps by the coachman, on
the box. In short, if we do not oppose on broad grounds,
we expose ourselves to that fault which we have called polit ical grumbling, or-what is equally to be shunned-to spend ing the force of an opposition in merely harassing the other
party. All broad, bold, open, straightforward, and perse vering opposition earns esteem, but harassing embitters the
opponent. By political harassing I mean all opposition for
the sake of annoying. If the reduced party offers the annoy ance, it will only irritate the other party still more and lead it
on to violence; if the reduced party suffers the annoyance, it
may be driven on to desperation; it is always embittered.  In
every political sphere, not only among parties, spite, annoy ance, and wilful humiliation are as much to be shunned as in
private intercourse, and they have ruined many a party, class,
or government.  They are forms of revenge, and therefore,
with all kinds of revenge, totally to be discarded.
The question of coalitions of parties is not so important in
an ethical point of view as in a merely prudential. If parties
believe that they can conscientiously unite, without compromising principles which they hold and have ever proclaimed
to be essential,-for without this they amount to factious conspiracies,-there is of course no objection on the score of
morality. But it must be observed that although parties at
variance as to essential principles may unite for some definite,
well-understood, and publicly proclaimed end, as for the overthrow of an administration, after this each party is again to
stand on its own ground. There is always great danger of
contamination of principle, and that the broad moral principle
of the party should be forgotten or overshadowed in the expediency of the case. Coalitions generally arouse distrust in
the public mind against the coalescing parties, and if a
coalition has been formed not only for attack, but also for
continuance after the dislodgment of the administration, it is
exceedingly difficult to give it that moral strength which a
pure national party alone can have.  Coalitions must, in their
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POLITICAL ETHICS.
nature, be in most cases weak after they come into power:
it is easy to oppose unitedly, as men of all different qualities
may easily pull down a house, but their different opinion,
taste, and skill would appear the moment that they came to
rebuild it. In coalitions, one party is generally the dupe of
the other. The coalition of Fox and Lord North was made
to last, and not for opposition only; the coalition of part
of the whigs and tories, the latter then generally Jacobites,
against Walpole was such that a compromise of principle
seemed evident, and the public very generally considered it
as factious on that ground.  The  late coalition in France
against Count Mole is perhaps the most interesting on record
as for the mere purpose of opposition. It united, for the time,
the extreme left with the extreme right, republicans with
legitimists, with almost all intermediate shades, and nearly all.
the many ministers whom France had since the year I830 and
who supplanted one another in the various changes of administration.   Of course, no one could believe that these
many fragments could keep one moment together after their
common object, the displacement of the administration, should
have been obtained.
XXII. I believe I ought not to conclude my remarks on
this subject without adding a word on parties or fractions of
parties formed on the ground of extraction or foreign nationality, a subject of importance in the United States, If a
country is so happily situated as to be able to afford a ready
reception to emigrants from distant countries, and the nation
which inhabits it so liberally disposed as to offer their own
citizenship, in its fullest and almost unlimited2 extent, upon
I A remarkable coalition was that in Belgium preceding the revolution, by
which the professed unbelievers united with the ultra-Catholic party.  However,
this has happened before, as for instance in England, even when persecutions
were going on for heterodoxy.
2 The foreigner by birth who has become a citizen of the United States is in
every way whatsoever equal to the native citizen, except that the constitution
does not allow him to become president of the United States unless he was a
citizen at the time when the constitution was adopted.
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POLITICAL ETHICS.
easier terms than those of the naturalization of any other
country, it appears to me, from whatever point of view we
may take, even that of mere national courtesy not excepted,
entirely inadmissible to form unions, of whatever consistency
they may be, for political purposes on the avowed ground of
different national extraction. Generally speaking, it is well, I
believe, if an emigrant, after having become a citizen, abstains
from all party matters proper, though he ought under the
general obligation of the citizen conscientiously to vote, and
thus may usually vote with a party. This, however, he must
decide for himself; yet it strikes me that no choice is left him
as to the other point, namely that of forming a party on the
distinction of birth. He must decide for himself whether he
will accept of the citizenship or prefer to remain an alien:
when once, however, the oath is taken, he is bound by all
moral and political considerations to be, act, and pass himself as a bona fide citizen of his adopted country, and not
to abuse national hospitality in so glaring a manner as to
throw the entirely extraneous element of foreign national feeling or animosity into the party movements and excitements
of his adopted country. It strikes me as a very great dereliction of duty, and as a high-handed offence against true and
conscientious allegiance-an ill return for liberal laws. There
is nothing more dangerous to a country than the dissension
of its citizens on the score of national extraction. We have
the case of Canada before us. The Athenians and Romans
would hardly have hesitated to treat such combinations as
treasonable, if indeed they would not have spurned the idea
of suffering them to grow into any sort of importance. The
spirit of exclusiveness of the ancients, according to which all
distant foreigners appeared as barbarians, would indeed have
been sufficient to prevent the like affiliations on the basis of
foreign nationality together with the enjoyment of full citizenship; but, though our religion as well as the diffusion of a
common civilization over many nations teaches us far different
sentiments regarding foreigners, I still believe that every citizen of a free country should cherish his own citizenship with
282 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
sufficient patriotism, pride, and jealousy to prevent him from
associating the names of foreign countries, however noble or
endeared to him they may be, however sacred he may keep
their names in the inmost recess of his soul, with affairs peculiarly those of his country. There is no just middle term,
that I can think of, between an alien and a bona fide citizen
joining heart and hand in the weal and woe of the country
whose citizenship he has, by choice and not by force, received.
If these remarks are founded in truth, it is clear that it is
equally offensive in native citizens to foment this improper
spirit, to make use of national inclinations and dislikes for
party purposes, and to call upon those adopted citizens as the
natives of foreign countries and according to their various
nationalities. Is the citizenship of a free country so light a
thing that it can be changed like a vestment and be put on
temporarily only for convenience' sake, so that under it the
foreigner remains a foreigner, unchanged, unaltered by the
new oath of allegiance? We ought to change the ancient
saying, "the sea washes off all evil," into "let the sea wash
off all difference."I But what shall we say of those native
citizens who make use of the ignorance or criminal levity of
the lowest portion of emigrants, to bring them to the polls
long before the law permits it, and who make these poor
beings begin their career in the new country which they mean
to adopt with a flagrant breach of its sacred laws, with a
bribe and perjury? That they fully share in the guilt of this
treble crime.  If it is the fundamental law of a country that
the majority of the lawful votes lawfully polled shall be the
last decision, the final supreme authority, which decides and
can be appealed to, it amounts to a contamination of the
supreme authority when we corrupt it by the introduction of
any foreign element. But enough was said on this subject
when we treated of bribery.
I,62acaa    lc2,;t iruvra TvOp67ov icaica.  Eurip., Iphig. in Taur., I193.
283 
CHAPTER IV.
Public Men.-Leaders.-Self-examination before a Citizen embarks in Public
Life. - Physical, Moral, and Mental Qualities desirable in a Public Man. Necessary Knowledge for a Public Man. - Caution in entering upon Public
Life.
XXIII. IN all free countries there are citizens who, owing
to the influence they exercise over a portion of their fellowcitizens and in guiding orimpelling the public mind, have
left the sphere of the private citizen proper, and who may at
times actually be charged with public offices, but need not be
so, while yet they essentially influence the politics of their
state. These men we call public men, and, according to their
influence, leaders. Their influence depends upon themselves
and upon circumstances. They may actually rule, and yet be
not officers but simply public men. The most remarkable
instance is probably afforded in the case of Pericles, who
swayed the destiny of Athens for upwards of forty years, and
yet was but a public man or leader. Where there is a real
active political life, it is natural that there are public men,
more or less influential, or important, according to the wider
or narrower circle of the respective community in which they
move. Every county, every village, even every ward in a
large city, has its public men. From these, in the natural and
salutary course of things, are generally taken those citizens
whom the public of free states charges with offices, especially
the representatives and all elective officers.
Now, whenever a man fails in his calling, mistakes his
powers, and deceives himself as to his proper strength and
natural vocation, bitter disappointment, perhaps an acrid temper, and, above all, the despairing consciousness of having
failed in active usefulness and in gathering the harvest of a
well-guided life, on the one hand, with a more or less direct
284 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
injury to the community on the other, are the infallible consequences. How many men have learned with sorrow, in the
middle of life, that they had wholly mistaken their powers,
inclinations, or peculiar strength! All writers upon the various professions have endeavored to exhibit the characteristics
necessary for the several callings, and the obstacles unavoidably met with in them, so that the aspirants may calmly
examine themselves before they make so important a choice,
which must very powerfully influence.their peace and contentment through life. A proper self-examination of this sort,
however, is more important before a citizen fairly embarks or
suffers himself to be drawn into public life, than when he contemplates entering into other spheres of action. For of all
the agents which may prompt a citizen to do this, a degree of
ambiti-on will almost always be one; and bitter indeed is the
darkness of chill neglect which follows the bright dreams of
ambition. The acquisition of wealth is but very rarely and
by way of exception connected with politics in a free and
comparatively pure country; yet though the citizen, when
young, may have no desire of wealth, the years may come
when he sees his former companions accumulating wealth
and amply providing for their offspring, and when he regrets
having pursued what now perhaps appears to him a bauble.
Success in politics requires a peculiar compound of temperament, which is the free gift of nature and cannot be made
at will; which does not, indeed, insure success, but without
which success can rarely be calculated upon. Politics is an
exciting pursuit, and whoever is accustomed to excitement
finds without it an intolerable void, so that, once accustomed
to excitement, the citizen will continually return to it, though
he is conscious that he ought to give up a political career and
that it is not his proper calling. And, finally, the freer a
country, the more frequently are chances offered for embarking in politics.  Yet a man who was not destined to be a
public man, but nevertheless continually obtrudes himself into
this sphere, is a great annoyance to a free community, and
may, if he chances to obtain an influential employment, be
285 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
come a very dangerous and injurious member of a political
society without even suspecting it himself, through his mistake
of his own powers. We see, then, that a citizen owes it to
himself, his family, and his community, not heedlessly to enter
politics. Every man is a valuable member of the community
if he is in his proper place, sphere, and utility; but a man
who might have pursued the profession of medicine with real
delight may feel himself daily disgusted with the profession
of the law, and may do much harm to his fellow-citizens; and
vice versa. A man that meets with constant disappointment
as a merchant, or misses his true aim of life as a clergyman,
might have made a contented, useful, active farmer, contributing his essential share to the common  stock of national
success. Philip III. of Spain, it is reported, exclaimed in anguish, on his death-bed, "Oh that I had never ruled! that I
had rather been the poorest man!" Are there not many citizens who in the secret of their hearts feel something similar
respecting their pursuit of politics?'
In order to see more clearly to what points this examination
ought to be directed, it will be serviceable to inquire into the
most necessary qualities of a public man, especially of a leader,
as experience suggests them, or as we may learn what they
are from the best leaders in history. Afterwards we may make
the necessary and individual deductions from this image, when
we look at the more reduced spheres of various classes of
public men. I do not mean to say that no one can hope
for success who does not combine all the qualities which will
be exhibited. Genius, peculiar circumstances, may become
powerful substitutes. Zisca commanded his army when blind.
Nor do I say that the union of these qualities will insure
* Many consider themselves, and are considered by others, most capable,
until the real opportunity of showing it arrives, when at once it is seen that they
seemed to be worthy of power only so long as they were out of it.  "Omnium
consensu capax imperii, nisi imperasset." (Tacit., Hist., i. 29, of Galba.) Out
of power we may shine by speeches; in power action is necessary, not single
actions, but substantial action throughout; tha.t is, we must have sound fundamental or main ideas, of which the actions are but the overt facts.
286 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
success; but certain it is that without the conjunction of
many or most of them a citizen cannot calculate upon or even
hope for success. Nor is it sufficient to say that the freer a
people the easier they will be the judges of the capacities
required. No one who knows the least of the operation of
politics in free countries will assert this. A man must have
shown himself ready in some sort before they can choose him.
Town meetings must lead to parliament or congress.
XXIV. A public man ought to be of a strong constitution,
enjoy a free flow of health, and have naturally sound digestive
organs; for the excitement and labor of public life, especially
parliamentary excitement and long speaking, will affect even
the best; but a deranged digestion is apt to deprive memory
of its full retentiveness, the brain of its easy action, and to
render a man nervous, and nervously sensitive. But a nervous man will ruin himself if he meddles with politics, unless,
indeed, he confines himself to writing. He ought to have a
fair and clear memory, or he will be continually defeated by
surprise; exactness of mind, a natural tact of observation, of
dissolving whatever appears around him into its elements and
seizing upon what constitutes its vital principle; and that
power of imagination which combines what is separated by
time or space and grasps and seizes upon masses.  He ought
to have a ready eye for facts, for reality, and a keen mind to
understand them thoroughly and to see beyond them-to
divine.  One of the greatest minds of the age has said, He
who cannot read between the lines of a book cannot understand a great work. WVell m2y'it be said, He who cannot see
between facts cannot understand a great nation or a great period, present or past, be he statesman or historian. A leader
ought to have the native inventiveness of mind and elevation
of soul which together produce that fecundity of which Cicero
speaks when he says, "Periclem censet Socrates uberem et
fecundum fuisse."' He ought to have that noble quality of
I [But Cicero, Or., 4, I5, attributes these qualities of Pericles to the instructions
287 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
communicating to others the moral sparks of his inmost
activity, and the higher he rises the more he must trust in his
own principles and purposes and freely leave to others their
own respective departments in carrying them out. Defeat
must not deject him; he must esteem his friends, and not
reject their advice with obstinacy, yet be constant and firm.
He must be cautious, yet have the courage finally and de cisively to make up his mind and boldly to act accordingly,
even where many reasons are for and against opposite meas ures. Let him be liberal in opinion and expense; a man of
action, and of contemplative mind; love his kind, and be free
from selfishness. He ought to be of a naturally confiding
disposition, and not of a suspicious temper. We gain confi dence by confiding. He will be deceived; yet if he trusts no
one he will lose more, or rather gain nothing.  He  ought to
be a firm friend, and be of that temper which can commune
with minds in a sphere above the temporary questions which
divide parties.
A leader ought to be a man of untarnished integrity and
tried reputation; he must have sufficient ambition to impel
him, and faith in those whom he leads.' Men cannot for any
length of time be led by mere imposition, nor can imposition
sufficiently animate the leader.  People soon find out whether
he who wants their support despises them or has faith in them
or his time. He oughtto be a man of strong nerve, of elevation and purity of soul, rather than of delicate susceptibility;
of tenacity of purpose, yet esteem for'the opinion of others.
He must know that his best-meant actions will be misrepresented, and that a thousand annoyances will be tried to disgust him. Let him disregard all attacks upon his motives
and his character; his friends will take care of that.  Pitt
never answered a single one of the thousand slanders levelled
against his motives; but when an editor accused him of
speculating in the stocks while minister of the finances, he
of Anaxagoras, and refers to Plato (Phmdr., 270, A.), where Socrates makes a
similar remark.  Inventiveness and elevation of soul are not referred to.]
288 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
promptly brought a suit of slander against him.  A  public
man must not shrink fi-om having his most private affairs
scanned and misrepresented.   As to his capacity, let him
prove it by works and actions, not by words; it is the only
effectual answer, the only convincing reply, in any sphere
whatever. An ungrateful son represented Sophocles as in his
dotage and unfit to manage his affairs; Sophocles read his
(Edipus at Colonos, just finished, to the judges, and he was
carried home in triumph. Aristophanes held up Socrates
to ridicule in the theatre: the sage, after the conclusion of
the satiric comedy, is said to have risen up out of his seat in the
theatre, that strangers to him might have a view of his person.'
When the fate of sacred music depended upon the sentence
of the papal committee, of which the strict and devoted
Charles-Borromeo was a member, and much was urged to
endanger it, Palestrina composed a work, on the manuscript
of which are found the words, " 0 God, enlighten my eyes,"
and his work brought victory for his cause.
The public man must be a man of no timidity; he must be
able to speak boldly before those who dislike his truth, and
he must have courage to take his stand decidedly.2 He ought
[For the first anecdote see Plut., an seni ger., l 3, p. 785, c.; for the second,
El., Var. Hist., ii. I3.  Both need better vouchers.]
2 As a striking instance of self-knowledge, not indeed otherwise to be imitated,
I copy the following passage of one of the letters of Erasmus. " I see now," says
he, "that the Germans are resolved at all adventures to engage me in the affair
of Luther, whether I will or not.  In this they have acted foolishly, and have
taken the surest method to alienate me from them and their party.  Wherein
could I have assisted Luther, if I had declared myself for him and shared the
danger along with him?  Only thus far, that, instead of one man, two would
have perished.  I cannot conceive what he means by writing with such a spirit:
one thing I know too well, that he hath brought great odium upon the lovers of
literature. It is true that he hath given us many a wholesome doctrine and many
a good counsel; and I wish he had not defeated the effect of them l)y his intolerable faults.  But if he had written everything in the most unexceptionable manner, I had no inclination to die for the sake of truth. Every man hath not the
courage requisite to make a martyr; and I am afraid that, if I were put to the
trial, I should imitate St. Peter."  Jortin's Life of Erasmus, London, I8o8, vol.
i. p. 250.
VOL.  II.                          I9
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POLITICAL ETHICS.
to be a man who can resolutely make up his mind, and,
having made up his mind, promptly act; he must not be by
natural constitution a man of timid hesitation or of that degree of scrupulosity which prevents one from finally making
up his mind. When young, he ought to be careful before
he compromises himself; at the same time he must know
that he has no lever for whatever energy he may possess until
fairly committed to some great principle.,  No pilot can steer
a vessel through a winding channel by orders from the shore;
he must join his danger and hope with those of the crew.
He must be frank, and his sympathies must be those of the
people; without it they do not understand one another; he
must be of enlarged liberality, yet keep out of debt, and conmmand respect by all his domestic affairs; he must be calm,
-and in all the excitement around him be able to seize upon
what is real and substantial, and separate it from what is but
spray washing over the deck. He must be active, and a man
of business. "Par negotiis nec supra," is a phrase of great
import. Clarendon, no friend of Hampden, yet describes him
Few things more strengthen the action of a man, whether in politics or any
other sphere, than to be fairly and wholly committed to some great principle.
It gives a steady direction and consistency to all the single actions, promotes
self-respect and character, and gives efficiency to life, while in the public it inspires steady regard, and the important conviction, that the individual may be
relied upon.   That devotion to his principles alone, which the public can judge
of only by a series of actions, will bring back to a man the public esteem that
may have left him for a time.   But a public man, as in truth any man who moves
in any active life, cannot take too much care to avoid committing himself too
easily in regard to minor points; for this must produce fluctuation. This danger
is best avoided, not by subtlety or intrigue, but by silence-that silence, I mean,
which is broken only when necessary.  There  are many garrulous men  who
daily commit themselves either upon points not sufficiently known or weighed, or
farther than they intended; they then lmust retract, or modify-all which weakens.
There is a great power in silence; a great manliness in suffering the actual cases
to arrive, as the judge on the bench does, and decide when fully heard.  Still, no
man, of whatever genius in his respective sphere, can avoid committing errors.
If such is the case, there is again great power in candor, in positively and frankly
acknowledging a mistake.  Only we must take heed, in this case again, to be
-calm and considerate, and not to be rash ill pronouncing judgment upon our
own error, as we were before in committing it.
290
I. 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
as peculiarly made for a leader, and. dwells repeatedly upon
his calmness and activity, and on the fact that he was "not
to be tired out."  Alexander Won his battles because he
moved briskly about on horseback, while his stately enemy
was enthroned on a scaffold or high wagon, that all soldiers
might see him. Neither stately speeches nor senatorial mantles can lead; Napoleon was never so much himself as in his
gray coat. It is action that gains respect and sways. Exactness and activity have given to many a citizen an influence
far superior to that acquired by men of much greater capacity
who were indolent. A public man must be a man of veracity;
no arguments ever so conclusive will convince, if the hearers
first of all do not believe that the speaker himself believes in
them; he must be honest in money matters to a degree of
minute scrupulosity; he must be ever ready to retire, content
with his own merit, without grumbling; he must be prepared
to meet with ingratitude, as every one must who follows
him or serves those that have power. Let him be a man of
fervent religious veneration; without it the busy life, practical turmoil, the immundicity through which he must wade,
the thousand impurities with which he becomes acquainted,
will infect him and make him sordid. His religion therefore
must be of that true and genuine kind which enlivens and
purifies, and rejoices in adoring and loving, and not that
unhappy counterfeit of religion which benumbs the heart by
encotnpassing it with dogmatic bitterness and narrow illiberality, or equally unjust and unholy fanatical excitement. His
manners ought to be affable, yet never cringing; he ought at
any moment to disregard his comfort, to revere justice, and
love his country.
XXV. A public man ought always to know well the elements of his own society, be it small or large, its whole public
and social economy.   He must know how the things that are,
the laws and customs, operate, and how they become such as
they are.  The history of the institutions of his country is
indispensable for him, or he will commit a thousand errors or
m
291 
POLITICA L ETHICS.
dangerous faults. He ought especially to study those periods
in which the most important institutions rose to their highest
action or showed their vigor in struggling into life. In brief,
he ought to know the constitutional history of his country
well, and if a nation has branched out from another at a time
when the latter had already many settled and important institutions, as our nation from the British, hle must connect the
study of these latter with it. To these hle ought to add the
study of Greece, especially of Athens, and of Rome, because
they were great nations, belong to the past, afford an undisturbed study, and unite with the glory of their rise and high
civilization the pointed lessons of their decay and ruin.
A public man, acting in a wide or elevated sphere, will derive great benefit firom the minute and deep study of some
great man who with few means produced vast results, to
whom he feels especial inclination. If he feels attracted by
the peculiar character of a man such as Washington, Chatham, De Witt, Sully, and has the means of carefully tracing
his character and actions, he will invigorate his soul and
enlarge his mind by penetrating them and making them his
own more and more. Fortunate will it be if, in addition to
this, the literature of his own country furnishes him with a
truly great poet, who has exercised a vast influence upon his
nation and thereby shows that the vigor of his mind knew
howto seize upon the vital principles of man's life in general
and of his nation in particular. The English and Americans
are peculiarly fortunate in their Shakspeare. A public man
cannot read him too much. Not that he should learn particular lessons of public action in specific cases from this
great poet, although even as to this point he furnishes golden
passages which in times of need will suddenly rise up in the
mind of ode who is familiarized with his immortal works.
But the reasons why I would recommend the ever-repeated
perusal of his unrivalled poems are of greater extent. There
is so vast a stage of action in his works, such a quintessence
of all human life, such a vigorous delineation of character and
such depth of observation, such an exuberance of thought, of
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POLITICAL ETHICS.
subtle penetration, and endless variety of sentiment, all the differently combined motives of the infinite multitude of human
individualities are so impartially viewed and given from a
point so high above them, vulgarity is drawn so truly, and
human greatness, joy, and misery are presented with such
loftiness, that his works are like a concentration of all that is
essential in the active life-of men, of what ephemerally passes
or historically lasts, so that no one can penetrate into his
works without having his mind invigorated and enlarged and
his vision tnade keener as well as loftier.,
XXVI. Every one, therefore, before he embarks voluntarily
There is a remarkable passage in Las Cases, containing Napoleon's opinion
of the poet Corneille and the influence which so great a poet exercises on a
nation.  Napoleon was then emperor, and ended with the words, " Yes, gentlemen, were he living now I should make him prince." Though he probably
would not have done so, it sufficiently shows in what manner he viewed a great
dramatic poet. Las Cases, vol. ii. p. 344, Paris ed. of 1824.
The passage of Mackintosh's pamphlet, A Discourse on the Study of the Law
of Nature and Nations, in which he defends Grotius and speaks of his quoting
poets and orators, deserves here to be. mentioned.   " He  was not," says  Sir
James Mackintosh, "of such a stupid and servile cast of mind as to quote the
opinions of poets and orators, of historians and philosophers, as those of judges
from whose decision there is no appeal. HIe quotes them, as he tells us himself,
as witnesses whose conspiring testimony, mightily strengthened by their discordance on almost every other subject, is a conclusive proof of the unanimity of the
whole human race on the great rules of duty and the fundamental principles of
morals. On such matters poets and orators are the most unexceptionable of all
witnesses, for they address themselves to the general feeling and sympathies of
mankind; they are neither warped by system nor perverted by sophistry; they
can attain none of their objects, they can neither please nor persuade, if they
dwell on moral sentiments not in unison with those of their reader: no system
of moral philosophy can surely disregard the general feelings of human nature
and the according judgments of all ages and nations. But where are those feelings and that judgment recorded and observed?  In those very writings which
Grotius is gravely blamed for having quoted. The usages and laws of nations,
the events of history, the opinions of philosophers, the sentiments of orators and
poets, as well as the observations of common life, are, in truth, the materials out
of which the science of morality is formed; and those who neglect them are
justly chargeable with a vain attempt to philosophize without regard to fact and
experience, the sole foundations of all true philosophy.
293
0 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
in the rough and rolling vessel of politics, or suffers himself
to be imperceptibly drawn into the currents of public life,
ought to ask himself whether he be willing or able, according
to his mental and bodily frame, to make all the sacrifices
which'he assuredly will be called upon to make, and whether
public life might not become to him a continued chafing and
disturbance of mind; whether other pursuits would not suit
his particular temperament, constitution, and taste far better,
and afford him that superior repose which our souls always
derive from continued useful action blessed with success, or
from mental activity which is peculiarly their own, and in
which we feel we are completely what we were'intended to
be. There are some men so framed as to be strong, original,
acute, and bold in the stillness of retirement, and to be capable of sending forth from thence many works of extensive
and essential influence, affecting whole ages; or so organized
that they are of substantial usefulness in all the varied social
relations of their community, while unconnected with politics;
but so soon as they are brought into contact with the concrete dealings political life involves, where things must needs
be taken in mass, they shrink and lose their vigor..
Yet it may be asked, how is it possible to know before
trial whether we are calculated for public life or not? The
only rule, it seems, that can be given respecting this subject, is, first, that a citizen, doing all acts to which he thinks
active public spirit should prompt him, should allow public
opinion to concentrate upon him, that he should let public
opinion seek him, and not himself seek public opinion for
single employments or elevations, and that he should follow
this rule throughout life, which guards even established public
men against many errors; and, secondly, that having once
begun his public career, he should be exceedingly cautious
before he commits himself too much, while he has a fair
earnest of public life and still is not yet so deeply affected by
its peculiar character that a retreat would be too difficult.
t
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BOOK VI.
CHAPTER I.
Extra-constitutional Meetings.-Their Necessity.-The  Representative.-Sum mary of his Duties. —le is the guardian of the public Treasures.-When
ought he to vote liberally?-The framing of Laws.-Legislation upon the
Principle of mutual Accommodation.-Importance of a gentlemanly Character
for the Representative.-Instruction.-History and the various Constitutions
show that the Right of Instruction has been claimed and disclaimed as pro moting and as injurious to Liberty, according to the Circumstances of the
Times.-The Representative Government is not a mere Substitution for direct
Democracy.-Essential character of the Representative Government.-The
different characteristic Principles of Ancient States, the Middle Ages, and
Modern  States.-Nationalization of States; Socialization of Population.  National Representation the great Feature of Modern Times.-Difference be  tween Deputative and Representative Systems.-Oath in New Jersey and the
Netherlands to promote Public Welfare.-How does the Representative faith  fully represent?-Advantages of Representative Government.-Objections to
the doctrine of Instruction.-Instruction belongs to the Deputative System.
I. THE true and easy operation of a representative government, and, still more, the entire realization of national civil
liberty, that is, of civil liberty as appertaining to a national
state, not to a city-state, of which presently more,-depends in
a very great measure upon those many extra-constitutional, not
unconstitutional, meetings, in which the citizens either unite
their scattered means for the obtaining of some common end,
social in general, or political in particular, or express their
opinion in definite resolutions upon some important point before the people. These meetings may be entirely unofficial;
sometimes they are semi-official, at others they are conventions of delegates, sent by the people, and yet they proceed
altogether from the spontaneous action of society, without
being called into existence by the prescribed rules of the
constitutional law. No nation can hope for substantial civil
liberty before it is well acquainted with this important social
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POLITICAL ETHICS.
agent, so indispensable for modern, that is national, liberty.
Many attempts at liberty have failed, because the people had
no idea of these free extra-constitutional meetings, and ex pected constitutions to operate without them. In these meet ings society frequently acts as such, separate from the state,
for instance when they consist of members sent for industrial,
or, as we have lately seen, for scientific purposes, from vari ous countries; sometimes they are greatly abused and made
the seat of party excitement; but, generally speaking, it is
undeniable that they are at once the generators of that interior
power which makes the machine of a constitutional govern ment move and work in a national spirit, and the safety-valves
through which the superabundant volume of that power
escapes, when otherwise it would cause fearful explosions.
If we comprehend under these meetings all those which
are composed either of the people themselves, or of delegates
having an extra-constitutional character, we shall see at once
that they are of great importance in order to direct public
attention to subjects of magnitude, to test the opinion of the
community, to inform persons at a distance, representatives or
the administration, for instance, of the state of public opinion
on certain measures, whether yet depending or adopted; to
resolve upon and adopt petitions; to encourage individuals
or bodies of men in arduous undertakings requiring the
moral support of well-expressed public approbation; to effect
a union with others, striving for the same ends; to disseminate
knowledge by way of reports of committees; to form societies for charitable purposes or the melioration of laws or
institutions; to sanction by the spontaneous expression of the
opinion of the community measures not strictly agreeing with
the letter of the law, but enforced by necessity; to call upon
the services of individuals who otherwise would not feel warranted to appear before the public and invite its attention, or
feel authorized to interfere with a subject not strictly lying
within their proper sphere of action; to concert upon more
or less extensive measures of public utility, and whatever else
their object may be. It does not seem, however, necessary
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POLITICAL ETHICS.
to dwell upon them particularly with reference to political
ethics, except that, as they are necessary and salutary if freely
and calmly operating, it becomes the greater dereliction of
duty in influential men to use them for selfish ends, so that
the country, instead of reaping the benefits of a steady operation of social agents from them, is exposed to all the feverish
and withering effects of passionate, fluctuating, and wild agitation. A citizen of probity ought to remember two things:
first, that he deceives himself who feels flattered by the exciting agitation which he has been able to produce-for it is
frequently very easy to produce this effect, and the easier the
less proud we should feel of those upon whom excitement
has been produced. It is the calm and substantial actionaction which bears within it the genial power of vivifying the
seeds of-action in others-of which alone a true man feels
proud. Secondly, that the extra-constitutional meetings resemble in their necessity and usefulness, and at the same
time in their possible abuse, other primary agents of society
and of nature: they are salutary, if in their proper path;
fearful, if in irregular licentiousness.
Those who are not personally acquainted with the practical
operations and necessities of civil liberty are apt to consider
all popular meetings as so many deviations and exceptions
from the regular government, and ask, where is the guarantee
against their abuse? The guarantees against the abuse are
varied, manifold, and mutually connected; to a great extent
they consist in mutual modification. An absolute guarantee
exists against their abuse no more than against that of any
primary vast principle. Great as the principle of modern
hereditary monarchy is, and forming and having formed one
of the agents of modern European civilization as it does, where
is the final guarantee against the chances of birth, of contractedness of mind, or weakness of conscience, except in the
mutual modification of a number of other political agents?
The sun warms and enlivens, but we have no guarantee
against all the injury he may do, and actually does in a
thousand instances, in parching the soil or breeding fever.
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POLITICAL ETHICS.
The citizen ought to keep in mind that unnecessary meetings either excite and stir uselessly, and therefore injuriously,
or lessen the interest in public meetings, which is equally undesirable, and may be injurious to public liberty; and that, on
the other hand, it is unbecoming a free man, who values his
liberty, to be prevented by civil indolence from taking those
measures which through public meetings would produce
demonstrations of public sentiment sufficient to arrest danger,
pusillanimity, or civil immorality. If a citizen is sent as a
delegate to a meeting for a specific end, especially political,
he must be the more careful not to transgress the lines
which we have endeavored to ascertain as the proper limits of
party movements, the more definite the end is for which he
has been sent, and the more decidedly he has been sent,
.perhaps, on party grounds; in brief, the more avowedly the
end of the meeting is one of a party character, the more
imperative becomes caution against being betrayed into factiousness.'
II. Before we proceed to consider the citizen in office,
having viewed him in his capacity as an individual member
of the state, we have to examine him in one of the most im
The pamphlet is one of the great agents of-modern liberty, and of the greatest
usefulness, in nations who value it. Some English pamphlets have acquired historical importance. They are excellent vehicles for certain communications, but
they do not dispense with the public meeting.  The public meeting is always
necessary for action. Nations who neglect the public meeting and rely on the
pamphlet alone for discussion of subjects of the deepest interest will not come to
energetic action.  Dumont goes so far as to express the opinion that the parties
which multiply pamphlets weaken their power and hold on the public: they accustom themselves to talk instead of acting.  I counted in the publishers' catalogue of I838, sent me from Germany, one hundred and thirty writings, more or
less voluminous, on the question of the archbishop of Cologne. In the United
States there is a deluge of pamphlets, but on a thousand different and very frequently wholly uninteresting subjects. The unfortunate fashion of asking every
one that delivers some public speech or other for a copy, and to print it-a
fashion so common that it is no longer any honor, while its omission conveys
a reflection-deprives the American public of all courage to look at anything
issued in pamphlet form.
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POLITICAL ETHICS.
portant stations in which he can be placed, a position peculiarly belonging to modern civilization-namely, as a representative of his fellow-citizens, that is, as elected by a number
of them to share in and contribute to the legislation of their
jural society or state. On what he ought to legislate, and
how he ought to do it, are questions to be answered by the
science of politics, and involve in fact the whole subject of
legislation, political society, social and public economy and
can of course not be expected to be developed here, nor indeed in any work, with specific reference to the representative.
In general, it is his duty to make himself acquainted to the
best of his ability with all the subjects essentially affecting
public welfare, and especially affecting that portion of the
society which he represents. On the other hand; it appears
manifest that all the general rules given in the preceding
pages as applying to the conduct of the citizens in general or
of public men in particular receive additional force if viewed
in connection with the representative; for he stands not for
himself alone; his conduct, influenced by and reflecting in
a great degree the general temper of the society which he
represents, strongly influences it in turn. All his responsibilities as a man and citizen are infinitely multiplied, as are
likewise, in many cases, his temptations-for instance, in party
matters the temptation to transgress the proper line between
party and faction. Yet it may not be without some profit
if we reconsider or point out in particular a few principles of
especial importance regarding the representative; after which
I propose to inquire into the important question of instruction, which involves that of the essential character of the
representative.
Perhaps we may sum up the most important points in the
following manner:
Justice, truth, and disinterestedness are with him above
every other consideration, and lend far greater strength than
their dereliction ever can do.
The true representative is in the service of the public: he
is sent neither for his own ambition or gain, nor for his party,
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POLITICAL ETHICS.
neither to serve exclusively a certain privileged class, nor
a single division of the nation according to occupation or
interest.
Liberty demands for him ample freedom of speech: hence
his conscience alone must in most cases regulate the use which
he makes of this great liberty of speaking before his nation,
both as to the time which he occupies and takes from the
furtherance of other business, and as regards either the principles or views he may thereby disseminate among the people
at large, the standard of his respective assembly, which he
may thus contribute to raise or lower, and the character of
individuals which he may injure.  No representative ought
ever to speak except for the furtherance of that business which
is actually before the house; and then always to the point.,
There is no real, no masterly, eloquence except that which is
strictly to the point.  Demosthenes, Cicero, Chatham, Burke,
Foy-I abstain from mentioning living orators-amply prove
it,2 and their best passages most so. HIabitual, loose, prolix,
I * Simple as the following rule may be, it is of very great importance both to
the community and to your own influence:
Speak never unless there is an especial reason for it, and this can consist only
in this:
That you know the subject, or some part of it, thoroughly, or better than any
one else
That you are universally expected to speak, and silence would be misconstrued;
To justify your own vote, to the community;
To repel an attack upon yourself if very marked or peculiar, upon a particular
friend, upon your constituents or part of country;
To explain;
If your constituents are the particular subject. At least, in such case, if all that
is to be said has been said and well said, you ought to rise and say so, and that
you mean to vote one way or the other. It is decent towards your constituents.
To talk against time may be an excusable artifice for some high purpose, but
it is very rarely so.
If you are known to speak only if you have anything to say, you derive great
influence from this fact alone.
But to speak for two or three hours solely to have your voice heard is folly.
2 The more active men's thoughts are on a subject which engages their attention, and the better it is understood, the plainer, simpler, and more forcible are
the discourses respecting it, in books as well as in speeches, on religious as well
300 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
and low speaking, without the nerve of thought and high
sentiment, has a very decided and injurious effect upon the
public at large. Every), man who is really filled with his object,
that is, whose soul and life belong to it, and who, therefore,
acts for it, is brief-spoken. Soldiers, physicians, ministers,
Christians, who are what they are wholly and thoroughly, act,
and do not talk much of their action.
The honesty of the representative, applied to money matters, comprehends care with regard to himself individually
that he propose or vote for or against no measure on account
of any individual advantage, direct or indirect, out of the
money of the people. According to the peculiar development
which the representative system has taken in the European
race since the middle ages, he is and ought to be the especial
guardian of the public money. W7aste in governments is not
only oppressive to those from whom alone the money can
come for any length of time and to any amount-the people;
it is not only a great injustice, but wastefulness is immoral
in its character. It leads the government from its true end
and object, begets a desire for wealth without labor, and thus
trains men in corruption, to the destruction of public spirit,
independence, and virtue. Monarchies and republics are
as on political matters. Not that I undervalue, in any degree, true eloquence:
I hold ready, striking, and elevated eloquence as one of the very noblest manifestations of the human mind; but it is this very eloquence which suffers and is
stifled by a flowing style, tasteless disquisitions, or far-fetched comparisons. How
simple are Demosthenes and Chatham!  Any one who has read the speeches of
the deputies composing the estates at the beginning of the modern age will have
observed how unwieldy and pointless their words are, and-what is indeed a
necessary consequence-how obscure they leave the main sul)ject.  To give
but one instance, I would refer to the French diet of I593, of which Raumer
gives contemporary accounts in his already quoted History, etc., vol. i., towards
the end.  The Old Testament, and natural history and philosophy as then understood, are ransackled before an idea is expressed, such as that the third estate,
though inferior to clergy and noblility, still forms part of the state. The history
of British eloquence, as it may be gathered from various historical works, and on
which it is high time that we should be furnished with a thorough and philosophical treatise, shows the same progress, namely, that the simplicity and truth
of eloquence increase together.
30I 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
equally bound to shun wastefulness. A nobility feeding and
feasting upon the money of the people recklessly squandered
away by a corrupt court, like that of Charles IV. of Spain,
Charles II. of England, or Louis XV. of France, is as dan gerous as the Athenian demagogue or Roman seducer of
the people who distributed the public treasure among the
populace.
Yet parsimony is not saving, but waste in disguise, in all
human affairs, in public not less than in private.  Jealous
of all public expenditure to a degree of rigidness, the representative ought ever to be liberal first of all in every case of
justice, which ranks above all things, and surely above the
popularity of the representative and the disposition of his
constituents. Indeed, giving every one his due cannot be
called liberality. Therefore, the representative must readily
vote for the discharge of all debts of the public to individuals,
and punctiliously for the fulfilment of all engagements for
which public faith stands pledged.   The force of the law
which binds the intercourse between citizen and citizen ought
to be felt most imperatively when the question is one of engagements between the state or any part of it on the one
hand, and individuals or other states on the other. Prudence,
happily, coincides here with justice; for. nothing opens greater
resources for a state in a thousand different ways than undeviating justice and honesty in all its engagements. If representatives would consider how small the amount of the state's
just dues become, when one compares the public means for
paying them with the public gain obtained by the act of justice, they would never hesitate to vote frankly and readily for
the discharge of any honest debt. History furnishes abundant
examples both of encouragement and of warning.
The representative ought liberally to give his vote for all
expenditures, commensurate to the means of his society, for
the essential promotion of education, that is for the elevation
and extension of knowledge, and for promoting the elevation
of mind, be this by way of diffused knowledge or the promotion of discovery and of the arts. He ought liberally to vote
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POLITICAL ETHICS.
for all improvement of intercommunication,' if it cannot be
obtained by private means; for appropriations demanded by
the needs of administration, public justice, and public security.
The representative ought readily to vote for what is due to
faithful and efficient service, according to the general standard
of reward in the community at the period in which he lives.
One of the main objects of all calm and settled governments
must be to render justice as purely and effectually and to
protect society within and without as powerfully as possible,
and, in striving for these objects, to press as little upon the
people as possible: these ends are accomplished, not by contriving that the citizens shall pay little or less than is necessary (which indeed makes a very expensive government), but
that they shall receive the fullest possible equivalent for the
justly decreed and levied taxes which they pay. There were
few, and frequently no, systems of constant taxation in the
middle ages; every free and elevated nation at present has
many. Yet our present governments in the end are cheaper
than those of the middle ages. If, for instance, the regular
administration of justice by sufficiently paid judges demands
a greater outlay than irregular justice dealt out occasionally
by officers appointed likewise for other purposes, as for the
executive and military command of a county, which was frequlently the case in the middle ages, we must not forget the
immense gain of the people in the rise of property and value
of labor, effected by regular and systematic law courts.
In framing or voting for a law, the representative ought to
consider well whether the law, intended as it is to be general,
rests on a general principle and is not a mere expedient; and,
on the other hand, how it will operate, together with its general principle upon, or by means of, the given circumstances
of the society for which the law alone is calculated: yet he
ought never to introduce a law for its supposed philosophical
principle alone, which is but a misnomer; for no law is philo
z [Qu. by incorporations only, or by money grants to private individuals or
companies?]
303 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
sophical which does not grow out of the given circumstances
-out of that society for which it is calculated. They are but
the productions of the brain. Locke's constitution for South
Carolina, and the first French republican constitution (the
second in number of the many constitutions which that coun try has witnessed since the first revolution), are illustrations.
A wise law must have these two requisites: it must be called
for by the circumstances, and must consist in a just principle
judiciously applied to these circumstances, which implies
that it be harmoniously applied to the whole state system
and do not jar with it. The representative ought to test the
bill upon all imaginable adverse grounds; for he may rest
assured that, in the endless variety of combined cases which
practical life daily offers, all the weak or mischievous points
.of the law will some time or other come into play or develop
themselves. In finally making up his mind as to all that is
urged for and against a general law, it is average justice which
must guide him. In this consists one of the great differences
between the legislator and the judge, who must not decide
by average justice but deal out specific justice. Finally, the
representative ought on no account to change partially or
entirely an organic law of the state in order to suit a particu lar and momentary end, whatever the excitement or strong
desire of the moment may be.  To do so is the worst of all
legislation, even if not against the solemn oath of the law making department.
The representative, like every public man, must prove in
all his acts that he is actuated by public spirit, by patriot ism, leading him not only to self-denial, but also controlling
him in all the wider circles of his political activity.   He
oubht to obey the law which prevails throughout the uni verse, that the greater, wider interest prevail over the lesser
and narrower. The interest of the country or of the state
must be preferred to that of the province; that of the prov ince to that of a county; that of a county to that of the
town; that of the town to that of a street; that of the street
to that of a house; that of the whole house to that of an
304 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
individual in it; that of our whole family to that of ourselves
individually.
The fact that every law ought to have the nerve of a general principle, that it ought to stand the test of general consideration, even though it be a private bill or a bill directly
affecting but a part of the community, prevents, if conscientiously acted upon, that public calamity of legislation arising
out of the mutual accommodation of separate and selfish
interests, which on a gigantic and enormous scale was acted
out when the Roman triumvirs made the grand compromise
of their proscription-list, and which is always in principle
equally immoral.  It is, as we shall see more fully below,
directly opposed to the true representative principle, and was
one of the great difficulties in the way of safe politics in the
states of-the middle ages.  In a limited degree it is unfortunately still acted upon in some legislatures, and has received
in one of the American states the vulgar but not unmeaning
name of log-rolling, because when the people clear the aboriginal forests they unite their labor in removing each other's
heavy logs. The simile of this union of labor truly applies
to the mutual support in the state, but the comparison of the
log with a bill to be passed is seriously vicious. It was an
awful log-rolling of this character indeed when, as alluded
to, Antony, Octavius, and Lepidus united and gave up each
other's friends and their common country. In principle, all
political log-rolling amounts, more or less, to conspiracy.
The representatives are deeply interested in always supporting the character of the true gentleman. Whatever the apparent sacrifice for the moment may be, they will greatly gain
in the end by it: their example strongly affects the manners
anid intercourse of the community, and large and gentlemanlike conduct in all transactions of life is of moral and political importance, as has been mentioned before.  The whole
character, efficiency, and wise action of a deliberative assembly depend in a very great degree upon the habitual gentlemanlike conduct and intercourse of its members. Decorum
in the speech and manners of legislative assemblies has the
VOL. II.                   20
305 
. fOLITICAL ETHICS.
same important bearing on their dignity, their self-respect,
and, conIsequently, on the respect paid by others to their manly
action and moral deportment, which universal decorous habits
of a nation in dress and domestic life have on a universal feel ing of independence, self-respect, and political dignity. Per sonalities, therefore, are usually against order in these assem blies;' nor will a member be apt to resort to them who values
even his own influence. It is generally one of the greatest
advantages which a member can throw into the hands of an
opponent, if he deals in personalities and the other does not
retort on him, but shows his respect to the assembly by an
unruffled reply.
Lastly, the representative must be the true representative
of his constituents. What is the entire meaning of this expression? It is the answer to this question which will occupy
our attention on the following pages.
III. According to the natural order of the subject, I ought
to treat first of pledges, and then of the right of instruction;
I Hence very properly it is out of order in the British parliament and in all
American legislatures and cpngrcss to speak of a member by name.   The rules
of order can, however, carry decorum too far; especially if the order is that
members must appear, or at least speak, in a particular dress.  This is against all
business-like debating, and leads to that unfortunate custom of reading prepared
discourse after discourse without any reference of one to another.  Louis XVIII.
dwells on the importance of his prescription of the robe in which alone the deputies were allowed to speak. He was right from his point of view; it was to
restrain genuine debate; but where real liberty and conformable legislation is
the object, the matter assumes a different aspect.  It is for business these as.semblies meet, and not for parade; and no one can have seen the former French
chamber of deputies-I do not know the precise character of their present transactions-and the British commons, without perceiving at once that legislative
debating is wholly a natural, genuine thing with the latter, which it had not yet
become with the former.  As to the members keeping their hats on, as the British
commons do, and the members of congress did until I837, unless speaking, a
certain taste of course can alone decide.  I confess, I rather liked it; it showed
the business style of the house; and there Is history in it, as well in the case of the
Englishl parliament in particular, as that in general the cap, the hat, and to remain
covered, have always been with the western race, from the times of the middle
ages, the emblems and evidences of liberty and independence.
3o6 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
but the latter involves a discussion of the true character of
representative governments, and many points which materially
serve in solving the question of pledges, so that it will be
advisable to treat of instruction first.
By instruction of a representative we understand, in the
politics of representative governments, his being directed by
his constituents, subsequent to his election, to vote on a
question yet depending, in a manner pointed out to him; or
the command over the vote of a representative by his constituents. The relations of representatives to those who elect
them are different, and the subject of instruction has been
viewed accordingly. If a political. body, organized and belonging itself to the government, elect representatives, as is
the case with the senators of the United States, who are
elected by the state legislatures, instructions are held by
many to have mandatory power; that is, they must be obeyed.
If the constituents, it is farther maintained by some, are the
people themselves, and the convening of them, except at the
election, is not regular or in forms prescribed by law, the
instruction can have no mandatory power, but ought to be
unreservedly obeyed as soon as the representative is convinced that the instruction expresses the opinion of the
majority of his constituents.
I shall treat of the subject in as far as it relates to the
United States senators separately, and first view the matter in
general.
Before we proceed, however, it is necessary to divest the
question of all the undue associations that generally cling to
every subject which has strongly and in opposite directions
interested large numbers. The most important of these is
the belief of many persons that an adherence to the doctrine
of instruction is naturally coupled with a warm affection for
general liberty, and that those who disclaim the doctrine belong necessarily to that class of men who habitually distrust
the. masses or are shy of general liberty. It is easy to be explained why this view should be prevalent now on account of
the late history of this doctrine; yet the view is unfounded,
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POLITICAL ETHICS.
as can be shown from history. It was the very instructions
received by the members of the medieval estates which prevented the nations, with the exception of England, from rising
to general civil liberty; and, on the other hand, the second
republican constitution of France, of I795, surely not wanting in democratic spirit, contains the following paragraph
(~ 52): "The members of the legislative body are not representatives of the departments which have elected them, but
of the whole nation, and no specific instruction shall be given
them." The same expression is to be found almost verbatim
in the constitution of the Cisalpine republic of I797. In all
the constitutions established under the dictatorship of Napoleon, the terms national representative and national representation are carefully avoided; and when he was greatly
dissatisfied with the deputies, convoked, in consequence of his
disastrous campaigns, in 1813, after they had been disregarded
during his imperial reign, he said to a deputation of them,
"And who are you?  Not the representatives of the nation,
but the deputies of the departments."I On the other hand,
again, we find in article ninth of the constitution or" Edict"
of the grand duchy of Hesse, of I820o-an instrument which
no reader of Anglican views would consider liberal-that no
member of the first or second chamber can exercise his vote
by proxy, or receive instructions for his vote.2 So has the
constitution of the Batavian republic, of I805, by which Na
I It was on the same occasion, January I, 1814, that Napoleon strilingly expressed the view he took of his whole position: "You strive, in your address,
to sever the sovereign from the nation. I alone am the true representative of the
nation, for who of you would be able to take upon himself this burden? The
throne is a thing of wood covered with velvet; only he who occupies it gives
meaning to it," etc.  I have heretofore remarked that Napoleon was the French
democracy grown into monarchy; his power rested, like that of the Rotman emperors, upon popular absolutism. See the end of book second. How different
from this avowal is the British expression, " The queen is an institution."
2 The prescribed oath, taken by every deputy, runs thus: " I swear fidelity to
the grand duke, obedience to the law, punctual observance of the constitution,
and to further the common weal only, in the meeting of the deputies, according
to my own best conviction, uninfluenced by any charge" (instruction).
308 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
poleon, having crowned himself as emperor of the French,
made that state approach more nearly to monarchy, for which
he had destined it, the following provision (Art. 23): "Their
high mightinesses (that is, the representatives) vote singly
according to their personal opinion, without mandate or instructions received from the departments. They are in no
manner answerable to the departmental meetings for their
conduct in the hall of their high mightinesses." The anxiety
to sever the representative from his constituents is here evident. LIastly, I may mention here the bill of rights, preceding
the constitution of North Carolina, adopted in I776. Article
eighteenth of that bill says, "That the people have a right to
assemble together, to consult for the common good, to instruct
their representatives, and to apply to the legislature for redress
of grievances."  But what, according to the public law of that
state, this instruction precisely is is not clear; for the legislature of North Carolina passed, in I838, certain resolutions
with reference to the votes to be given by her senators in
congress on a question of importance then pending; and
when the senators asked whether they should consider these
resolutions as instructions, the legislature passed a resolution
declaring that they had spoken clearly enough, and declining
any more distinct or mandatory instruction.
In short, if we peruse the one hundred and thirty or forty
written constitutions, more especially so called, which the
European race has produced, we shall find that instruction
has been declared inadmissible sometimes because the powerholders granting the constitutfon were afraid of too direct a
connection between the representative and his constituents,
sometimes because the people establishing the constitution
felt that it was impossible otherwise largely to protect civil
liberty and give it that guarantee which advanced political
civilization and national liberty demand. Adherence to the
doctrine of instruction, therefore, is of itself in no way a
sign of liberal politics. Instruction has been claimed and
disclaimed on entirely opposite grounds, according to the
peculiar circumstances of the time.
309 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
IV. The doctrine of instruction, as it is now presented by
its advocates in the United States, may be stated thus: The
representative ought, as far as he is able, truly to represent the
wishes of his constituents, and if on any important question
the views and desires of the majority of his constituents are
made known to him in any manner which convinces him that
it is really the voice of the majority, he ought either to obey,
or, if he cannot conscientiously do so, to resign. An attempt
is thus made to give to the representative a character between
that of a representative and a deputy, the difference between
whom we shall presently consider more accurately.   The
chief arguments urged in favor of the above doctrine, and in
fact, as far as my knowledge extends, the only ones, are these:
That, could the people meet, as in ancient times, in the market, they would act for themselves, each according to his
interest and views, and that now, when the number of inhabitants or extent of country prevents them from meeting in a
general and primary assembly, it is clear that those vlwho are
sent for the mere sake of expediting the business, instead of
the people's convening themselves, must speak as the people
themselves would have spoken. The representatives are the
speaking-trumpets of their constituents, and nothing more.
Secondly, which in fact is but the above in other terms, the
representative is the servant of his constituents; and how can
he be called a servant if he does not their will? See Tucker's
Blackstone, Appendix,  IG2, et seq., where Judge Tucker
quotes with entire approbation a passage from Burgh's Political Disquisitions, from which it appears that both of them
had in mind, when speaking of popular liberty, what was
called in the first part of this work democratic absolutism,
seeking for the essence of liberty in the entirely unrestrained
execution of the will of the people, which is in practice, as a
matter of course, of the multitude or the majority; but not-in
guarantees, checks, and organic laws, controlling the will of
the supreme power, whoever may be its holder. The question does not, indeed, seem to be solved, according to their
own argument, in this manner; for tlhe term people is in this
3IO 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
case, as in so many others, taken in different meanings in the
same argument. First, when it is maintained that the representative is the representative of the people, the word is used
as meaning the aggregate of all men of a certain society; a
groundwork is thus obtained for the right of instruction; but
when it comes to the most important point of the right of instruction, namely the guidance of the individual representative, the word people does not mean any longer the aggregate
of all the citizens as imagined in the agora, but the small part
only who elected the particular representative. If the representative is merely a speaking-trumpet of the people who can
no longer assemble, it appears to me perfectly clear that consistency would actually demand that he should speak say
three hours for a measure and one against it, if he has been
elected by six thousand votes against two thousand, for these
two thousand would or might have spoken in the general
assembly and laid their views before the assembly. I beg to
observe that this is not advanced in a sportive sense but
gravely. If we are to have absolute democracy with agents
who do not speak for the minority, this minority loses all the
right which it had in the primary assembly.
Thlose who build the theory of instruction upon the fact
that the representatives are the servants of the people, do not
inform us who are meant by the people, whether the voters
only, that is the majority of the voters, or the people at large,
of whom many may not have the right to vote but certainly
are members of the state and ought to be represented, for instance where freeholders or householders alone possess the
elective fi-anchise.
Now,- at no time has the doctrine been maintained that
the laws of the assembled citizens should be adopted according to a balance and calculation of the individual and selfish
interests of each individual; but, the frequent practice to
the contrary notwithstanding, it has always been maintained
that even when the citizens assembled in the agora they
were expected to judge of general measures with reference
to general welfare, according to the light which they might
3II 
POLITi,CAL ETHICS.
receive then and there. The contrary has always been considered as detestable meanness, or even selfish treason, and
acts of egotism were positively punished in Athens on the
ground of egotism. The more corrupt the times in those
republics founded upon direct and absolute democracy were,
the more frequent and loud we find the demagogues in their
protestations that they act for the public benefit only. Where
has there ever yet been a man who recommended a measure
except on the real or pretended ground of public, that is general, benefit? If the Athenian citizen had not been expected
to vote with reference to this public and general advantage,
but with reference to his tribe, section, or street, I do not see
where we can stop until we come down to the individual himself; and what becomes of public spirit, country, and all that
is good and glorious in political life? No people ever were
farther from such views than the ancients. But if the representative has to obey the so-called instruction of the people,
that is the instruction of the majority of voters, which may
indeed be a small minority of the people, the result would be
far worse than the one resulting from absolute democracy
founded upon mere individual selfishness; because ire the
ancient forum each voter heard at least what was urged for
and against the subject in question, not indeed elicited by
debate or deliberation proper, but at least in the various discourses delivered to them; while in our case, if instruction is
believed to be absolute, the vote cannot be affected by the
light which may be thrown upon the matter, and a representative instructed to vote against war, because it would ruin
the wealth of his manufacturing or commercial constituents,
would have no right to vote for war, though he had become
convinced, since he met in the assembly of the representatives,
that war alone might save the counitry from servitude or disgrace. The citizen in the agora of the ancient city-state would
have had, in a corresponding case, the enviable privilege of
voting patriotically for a war which he nevertheless knew
would make him individually a poor man, or expose the quarter of the city in which he happened to live to fearful ravages.
312 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
V. If we resort to representatives only because we cannot
any longer meet in the agora ourselves, the whole representative system amounts to nothing more than a second-hand
contrivance, something which may be good enough and with
which we must put up, since unfortunately we cannot any
longer have the true and essential thing itself, the ancient
pure, real, aid visible market-democracy; a political pis-aller
at best; something indirect and circuitous.
Yet in reality the representative system is a flower of civilization, such as neither antiquity nor the middle ages either
enjoyed or conceived of, something direct and positive in
itself, an institution having its own full, distinct, and independent character, the excellence of which is not to be measured by asking how closely it may approach to something
beyond it, which would be the best thing could we but have
it, but which for some reason or other we must needs resolve
to give up forever. The representative system seems to me one
of the very greatest of the political institutions that adorn the
pages of the history of civilization, for through it alone can
be obtained real civil liberty, broad, extensive national liberty, founded upon equally extensive political societies, and
not on narrow city-communities.
We might ask, indeed, Why not return to the ancient state
of things? Why not split into a number of city-states again?
If direct democracy is the only political truth, and the other
systems but approximations to it, more or less successful semblances of this truth, why do we not strive for this real good,
and why are we satisfied with shadows? Increased population in modern times cannot be the chief reason which prevents us from doing so. Very few parts of the United States,
for instance, are now as peopled as Etruria, Sicily, Greece,
the Greek colonies, and Phoenicia were, when all these regions
were divided into numberless independent states, working out
in their way and according to the proper means of their time
their own task of civilization.  Perhaps we are answered  It
might be done, but it cannot be done, because the people will
not do it. And why not? Why should they dread the idea
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POLITICAL ETHICS.
of shivering their society into numerous parcels in the manner
of the ancients, and why could they not do it, even should
they attempt it? Because their feeling, sympathy, and very
instinct prevent it; not the accidental taste of the time, but
the very genius and character, the moving principle of modern
times prevents it. Because the people have tasted the sweets
and securities, the mutual support and mutual elevation, which
modern political society, enlarged as it is yet forming one organized and united thing throughout,-the social guarantee
which the modern state alone affords, and can afford; and
because this political form, a nationialied society and socialized population, stands on an enlarged and broad foundation,
is the essential form of our times independent of the denser or
sparser population, and is the only form which can satisfy the
many high, great, and noble demands which, in the course of
civilization, men have come to urge in our present perioddemands never made in ancient times or the middle ages.
The free ancient states have been spoken of in the first part
of this work. We observed that their character designated
them essentially as city-states, and that their liberty consisted
mainly in the equal participation of each citizen in government, not in the broad protection of the individual and his
peculiar individual rights. The ancients knew of no nations,
in the modern acceptation of the term. There were tribes
and races, coalesced or superinduced one upon the other;
there existed vast empires, but they were only annexations
of countries over which one victorious tribe the Mede, the
Persian, the Arab-ruled, without fusing the many discordant
components into one society, one organized thing, one nation
which should be animated and impelled, in some respect or
other, by one moral agent, one vital social principle, or impulse extending through all parts and throughtl a series of
periods. [In fact, the Median, Persian, and Arabic political
forms themselves arose out of some coalescence of earlier
tribes of blood-relations under one government, and that
not without the help of force.]
In the middle ages, again, we find no state, if we give to that
3I4 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
word the sense in which we generally take it, that is, a clearly
organized, enlarged political society, until after the time when
the free cities had raised themselves into existence. In the
earlier times of the middle ages there was but a concatenation,
and frequently hardly anything more than a co-existence, of
numberless almost independent communities, a feature which,
though gradually vanishing, continued to appear down to, the
beginning of modern history. Everything in the middle ages
had a tendency to individual and isolated independence, a
condition of things most necessary in the course of civilization, but below our broad civil liberty. The castles, cities,
bishoprics, republics, communities, or whatever the character
of the various independent groups and clusters was, were not
strictly socialized with one another, that is, they had not
grown into one comprehensive society; one active political
system did not pervade and unite the whole, though in most
cases the various independent bodies were founded upon the
same principle. The various populations had not, properly
speaking, become nationalized.x This spirit of establishing
independent circles was not territorial, but any mass of men
united for some permanent purpose was forthwith incorporated, with rights and prescribed actions peculiarly its own.
Every trade, profession, or occupation, even dishonorable
occupations 2 formed separate corporations. I do not say that
I I beg the reader to keep in mind that I mean by nationalization of the
populations the growing of a people, which did not exist in the strictly feudal
times, and by nationalization of governments, something entirely different from
mere centralization of government. Centralization is the convergence of all
the rays of power into one central point; nationalization is the diffusion of
the sanme life-blood through a system of arteries, throughout a body politic;
indeed, it is the growing of the body politic as such, morally and thoroughly
cemented, out of a mass otherwise uncemented.  The following sections, I trust,
will make the subject clearer than it will appear at the present stage to those
unversed in the history of the periods touched upon.
2 Prostitutes were frequently incorporated.  There is a curious passage in
Thourel's Histoire de Gen.ve depuis son Origine jusqu'a nos Jours, I833, relating
to the women of the town before the Reformation: "Pour que suivant l'ancienne
coustume ces pecheresses soyent mieux dirigees, elles pourront eslire et se constituer une reine, laquelle prestera serment en leurs mains, sur les saints 6van.
3I5 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
these corporations are necessarily hostile to general liberty,
nor that they have not been at times too much abandoned in
the modern era. We have not to investigate this subject here.
But such as the corporations show themselves in the middle
ages, they evidently belong to the general spirit of forming
little independent circles and appearing each to every other
as one separate whole only-circles which are in a greater or
less degree approximations to sovereignties.
These independent territories were indeed, in many cases,
in contact with one another, but not joined; connected, but
not united.  It is the characteristic trait of the feudal times.
Indeed, at one time there was such a total dissolution into
unconnected baronies, jarring or in open hostility with one
another, that an event like the crusades, animating and impelling once more whole masses with one and the same idea,
became in the opinion of some great historians a real blessing
to the Western world.,
giles, d'exercer le dit emploi bien et fiddlement de tout son pouvoir, sans affection
ni haine."
The crusades, though much deplored by some, for instance Sismondi, are
nevertheless held b)y many of the calmnest historians to have been one of the most
powerful means by which Providence has rescued the Western world from barbarity and led it on in its amazing'career of civilization. Iteeren, the historian,
places them in this light at the beginning of his essay on the Political Consequences of the Reformation (translation, Oxford, I836), in dwelling on the new
impulse they gave to the mental life of Europe, the great political changes which
they produced in Europe itself; though their immediate object was no more obtained than that for which Columbus started into unknown seas. Abel Remusat,
the French Orientalist, among others, has well traced the intercourse of Europeans with Asiatic princes, which, relighting as it (lid the ardor for knowledge,
was first of all brought about by the contact of the West and East during the
crusades.  (See Memoires sur les Relations politiques des Princes chr6tiens avec
les Empereurs Mongols.)  The discovery of America is doubly connected with
thecrusaders,-internally and externally: the first, because that indomitable desire
of discovery, adventure, enlargement of knowledge, and of striving physically
and mentally beyond the known limits, that peculiar longing for the distant,
which characterizes the period of maritime discoveries, standing in close connection with the information continually brought from the East, was first of all
caused by the crusades; the latter, because the great Columbus was actually in
search of the Zipang" of Marco Polo, when he stumbled on America because it
lay across his way.
3i6 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
While these many separate districts, in the course of civilization, could not withstand the gradual and growing socialization, and were forced into closer contact, they met together,
nevertheless, in a very great degree as separate elements, with
s parate interes's and desires, separate rights, privileges, charte s.  Tl-e estates of the middle ages consisted of deputies,
strictly instructed, limited, and fettered; sending for new instru-tions on each new question which might turn up; jealously, often hostilely, extorting from one another; granting
and demanding, like separate sovereigns; little concerned
about the advantage of the other parties or general justice and
universal fairness; treating as now a congress of plenipotentiaries, sent from various independent nations would do, but
upon no broad or social and mutual principle: thus, Guizot
observes that "the cortes, like the states-general of France,
have been an accident in history, and never a system, never a
political organization or regular means of government;"-only
we must give a correct sense to the term "accident in history." I In the feudal times we have many independent
I The term Accident is so totally denied by some, and, again, superficial ob servers please themselves so much in ascribing the vastest historical phenomena
to accident, that I believe an explanation of this term is not undeserving the
brief space of a note.
If we call accident a fact which has been produced by causes wholly extraneous
to a subject but which materially influence the latter, we may certainly say that
a man died by accident if his skull was broken by a tile which the violence of
the wind tore from a roof, in contradistinction to a death which is the neces sary consequence of causes in the system of man in general or of this individual in
particular. Inl the highest point of view there are no accidents, inasmuch as we
imagine  Provi(1ence overruling the universe in all its elements.   In a historical
point of view there are few accidents, far less than many superficial observers
imagine, who ascribe wars to momentary indispositions of monarchs and the
like. Yet there are certainly accidents of momentous importance. That Gus  tavus Adolphus was shot in the battle at Luitzen was, historically speaking, an
, accident; for it was a fact brought about by causes not founded in or growing
out of the necessary development of society.  There was no connection between
the social state of Europe and the pistol fromn which the ball was fired. Yet this
accident was [seemingly] of the most momentous consequences for all civilized
mankind..Iow differently, in all probability, would history have turned out had
Gustavus Adolphus lived to makie himself Protestant emperor of Germany! But
3I7 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
authorities; but not public authorities; royal power itself is,
down to the times of Louis XI. in France, and of Isabella
in Spain, but an isolated feudal power. There were in France
pays d'obeissaniice-le-roi, pays des barons, and pays hors l'obeissance-le-roi. Much of this is, doubtless, to be ascribed to
baronial arrogance and lawlessness, but this very baronial
arrogance is a thing peculiar to those times, at least in its
extent and prevalence. We find in the middle ages power
enough, but not public power; an infinity of institutions, but
not public institutions; numberless chartered and frequently
highly valuable privileges, but not what we now term public
law. We have, in brief, as indicated already, separate yet
clustered independence, not individual yet public liberty.
Civil liberty, something very different from feudal independence, became establ3ished only in the same degree in which
these many separate groups united into a society, these isolated
parts into nations, and in which the deputies of the separate
estates were transformed into national representatives - a
career in the history of civilization in which England long
preceded all other nations, and for the want of which other
countries, such as Germany, Italy, France, and Spain, failed
so long to obtain liberty, or fail to this day to enjoy it.  For,
though the British parliament, having grown into a national
body, a body that belonged to and represented political society
at large, was also for that reason, in periods when civil liberty
was yet but indistinctly felt and seen, more subservient to the
when some superficial writers tell us that the Reformation was causedby the accident that a bungling seller of indui.genllces, Tetzel, happened to meet with so
fiery a man as Luther, they show how little they know of mankind, society,
and the connection of social phenomenla.  The Reformation must have not only
taken place, but pretty much at that period, though neither a Tetzel nor  a
Luther had ever lived.  The estates, therefore, were very far from being accidents; they were most necessary and  natural phenomena in the course of the t
social development of civilized manklindl; I)ut we might call them accidents withi
reference to the effects which some of them had in producing national representation, because they arose out of caJuses which had nothing to do directly with a
national representation, but on the contrary were founded upor an opposite prinn
ciple, that of chartered, insulated independence.
3I8 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
monarch, as for instance under Henry VIII., than the deputies
of estates in other countries, for instance in Spain, might have
proved, still the broad foundation of civil liberty was laid;
and when the period of absorbing centralization of power
arrived for the continent of Europe, the British alone of all
were able to withstand it, though they had monarchs as wise,
and wiser, and as tn uch disposed for centralization, for instance
Elizabeth, as much so as Ferdinand the Catholic or Philip II.
in Spain, or Louis XI. and Louis XIV. in France. Prescott
even distinctly says that the extraordinary power committed
to the commons in Castile was unfavorable to their liberties.,
The reason is, as I said before, these independent territories
prevented the growth of a foundation for national representation, and that broad, mutual support in the cause of liberty,
which cannot be built upon any other foundation; and when
the time came that the many loosely connected political parcels grew into one real body politic, a firmly knit political
society, —which process all nations had to follow, because their
languages, laws, literatures, and, with many, their churches,
necessarily became national,-there was no other large power
left but the general government, the monarch. It will always
remain a characteristic and peculiar feature of British liberty
that England passed over from the feudal independence of
estates or single communities to national and public liberty,
without the intermediate process of entire concentration of
power; or that, at any rate, the attempt at it-under the Tudors, who did it judiciously, and under the Stuarts, who did it
injudiciously-did not succeed, but led at once to determined
resistance.  On the continent of Europe power was firmly
concentrated, or where this did not take place, on account of
I History of Ferdinand and Isabella, page 50, Introduction. I would likewise refer to pages 6o and 80 of the same Introduction, as in fact to the whole
of it. The reader finds there repeated proofs of the important fact that it was
owing to the want of nationalization of the deputies that Castile and Aragon,
whose estates enjoyed greater liberties than those of any other extensive countries in the middle ages, did not obtain modern civil liberty, and are now in such
painful travail to give birth to it.
3I9 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
the imbecility of government, not of the resistance of the
people, as in Spain, a state of things still worse, that of
planless interference, a restless and aimless despotism, was
the consequence.
It was, therefore, an immense step made in the cause of
French liberty, and indeed the one from which it dates, that
in I789, at the convocation of the estates under Necker, after
very protracted debates on the question whether the "cahiers"
(instructions) of the deputies should be considered absolutely
binding,-while many of the nobility desired to join the third
estate, but scrupulously doubted whether they were not bound
to adhere to their instructions as members of another estate,
-at length the deputies declared themselves representatives,
and the estates changed into a national representation.
It does not belong to our present inquiry to show how
truly fortunate England was, that amid circumstances frequently disastrous in their immediate effect, yet beneficial in
breaking the power of the barons and producing national
representation, this prodigious civil change did not fuse all
estates into one chamber, but suffered the idea of estates so
far to continue as to assign a separate house to the high nobility, from which fact the highly important political institution of two houses, or the bi-cameral system, arose. Any one
who wishes to convince himself of the actual misery-we
cannot call it otherwise-attending all the debates, if such
they can be termed, of the feudal estates, where the necessity
of a national system began strongly to be felt, but was prevented by the relations of the deputies to their principals,
must read the detailed accounts of the French estates, or of
the diets of the German empire.
The great change of the British deputy into a national
representative was consummated in the sixteenth century,
especially when the old law, requiring members of parliament
to be resident burgesses to make the elections valid, fell into
entire disuse. Hallam (Constitutional History, i. 362) says,
of a debate on the proposed abolition of the law in I57I,
"This is a remarkable and perhaps the earliest assertion of an
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POLITICAL ETHICS.
important constitutional principle, that each member of the
house of commons is deputed to serve not only for his constituents, but for the whole kingdom; a principle which marks
the distinction between a modern English parliament and such
deputations of the estates as were assembled in several continental kingdoms; a principle to which the house of commons
is indebted for its weight and dignity, as Well as its beneficial
efficiency, and which none but the servile worshippers of the
populace are ever found to gainsay."  Here I have only to
observe that not only worshippers of the populace gainsay it,
but persons of the opposite character likewise, because opposed in their whole view to modern popular liberty, which
they see well is so closely connected with broad, national
representation.   Niebuhr, in one of his letters, written in
I8o8, says of Mirabeau, of whom he has just spoken in high
terms, "Assuredly he is likewise innocent of the terrible idea
of a general representation" ("schreck.liche Idee der allgemeinen Reprasentation." Biographical Notices, vol. ii. p. 72.)
Both the licentious demagogue and he who fondly clings to
the past age of corporative separation and the consequent
systems of mere deputations are right, each in his way, in
opposing the vast principle of national representation.
VI. It appears then, and I confidently state, that every page
of history will furnish to the student ample evidence of the
fact that ancient politics was characteristically city politics;
that a leading political trait of the feudal times was a number
of almost independent power-holders under a suzerain, defying, and extorting from, one another; and that the prominent
I With reference to various subjects touched upon in the previous section, as
well as in several antecedent passages of this work, I would recommend to the
reader the perusal or reperusal of the concluding chapters of Sismondi's History
of the Italian Republics in the Middle Ages, beginning with chapter 126. The
historian gives in them so lucid a view of his opinions upon a variety of subjects
connected with ancient and modern liberty, and his opinions are entitled to so
much respect, that attentive reflection upon them must be fruitful to the reader
even though he should differ in some points, as in fact the writer of these lines
does, from the philosophical historian.
VOL. II.                            2I
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POLITICAL ETHICS.
feature of political activity in modern times consists in the
endeavors to establish broad civil liberty, guarantees, checks,
and justice, on extensive national grounds, not on accidental
specific grants. Hence the universal establishment of constitutions so peculiar to our times. The European race has only
stepped over the threshold of this third period, having in
many cases as yet to struggle against centralization of yower,
which frequently was nevertheless necessary in order to annihilate feudal baronies. Our modern civil liberty demands
justice broadly diffused throughout a state, not chartered or
wrung from some one contesting it, obtained separately and in
a variety of degrees by the different communities; it demands
the broad guarantee of society, not the specific and chartered
ones of essentially independent corporations. An instance
will serve as illustration. Where do we expect a firmer guarantee of the free exercise of religion, or for Protestantism in
particular?-in modern France, where society hat large has
pronounced by the constitution that every man shall be allowed peaceably to exercise his religion, or after the wars of
the League, when the edict of Nantes granted to the Protestants a number of fortified places exclusively, and the right to
keep armed men? Where do we expect less hardship and
burden? from a general taxation as in our states, or from the
separate and tenaciously contested grants or even immunities
and exemptions in the middle ages? In short, where is there
more justice, more knowledge, more action, and higher activity, and greater impulse-in our bodies politic or socialized
states, or in the many smaller or larger circles in the middle
ages?
These enlarged societies, however, cannot obtain or-guarantee liberty, except by representation, and their representation
must be social, national, that is, it must represent not only the
separate component parts but the totality of society as one
organized whole. The representation itself must form a faithful organ of the entire and unbroken society, which, to repeat,
is not an agglomeration of severed atoms, but a union of parts
belonging to one organic whole.
322 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
It is by this representative system alone that mutual support, mutual reliance, mutual protection, and mutual elevation
can be effected, which, as we have seen, constitute the enviable trait of modern times. The representatives must, in order
to be the true representatives of society, which is one organized, living thing, with nerves and arteries of life ramified
throughout, represent this whole society as such; they again
form one whole organ, and though there are only a few constitutions which actually impose an oath upon every representative "not to assent to any law, vote, or proceeding which
shall appear to him injurious to the public welfare" (Constitution of New Jersey, adopted in I777, par. 23), or that "to the
best of his power he will contribute to the advancement of the
public welfare, without swerving from it on account of individual or provincial interest" (Constitution of the Netherlands,
of I815, par. 84), yet is not this oath written in every man's
heart, is it not actually imposed in our times upon every honest
man by plain common sense?
And here it ought to be observed that the above oath quoted
from the Constitution of the Netherlands is imposed upon the
members of the states-general, who are nevertheless elected
by the provincial estates, corresponding to the former sovereign provinces' of the United Provinces.
VII. The representative of modern times, therefore, differs
materially from the deputy of the feudal estates. Yet shall
he not represent the sense and sentiment of his constituents?
The United Provinces formed, as is well known, a confederacy of sovereign
states, which sent deputations, not representatives, to the States-General, not
very unlike the Swiss confederacy of the present day, though even less cemented,
I believe, than these, according to the law. The confederacy of the Netherlands,
which furnishes such a noble chapter to the history of the world, could not act
with enough of social organic power, because it did not abandon the feudal
idea of deputies and rise to a representation. The confederacy rapidly sank in
power and consideration. On the restoration of the independence of the Low
Countries, after having formed part of the French empire, we find, therefore, in
the constitution, the following paragraph as the first of the division on the StatesGeneral: "The States-General represent the nation."  Par. 77.
323 
P POLITICAL ETHICS.
He. must emphatically do so, not as a deputy of a separate
feudal body, representing their limited or perhaps selfish de sires, but representing them as part and parcel of the state, as
a living limb of the whole body politic. That the body of
representatives may form a real representation of the whole,
it is necessary that the wishes and views of all parts shall have
an organ. The representative is not appointed by a few, as a
deputy, or minister to carry certain points, but he is elected
by the concurrence of voices of his fellow-citizens for the
pledges which his constituents find in his whole life: he is
elected because his constituents believe that his views, princi ples, and.sympathies are identified with their own, and because
he will speak and act as the organ of their public opinion, not
as the instructed deputy who shall wring advantages from the
others. If it were so, he should receive instructions before hand. But he represents his constituents fully and wholly,
that is, as a body connected with the whole, whose entire
public opinion, thus brought together from various parts, mutually modifying one another, and insuring the prevalence oi
general justice and fairness, passes over through these various
organs into the public will of the whole, which is into law.
It is evident, therefore, that the representative is bound by
these two great duties; arising out of the essence of the representative system itself. On the one hand he must represent
as closely and as conscientiously as possible the interests and
opinion of the whole district which sends him.  He does not
only represent the majority of his voters, but the minority
likewise; otherwise insufferable party aristocracy would be at
once established; and if the election has chiefly turned upon
some prominent measure, and he be elected by a very small
majority of a large number of voters, he is in conscience
bound to allow to the views of his minority a very different
weight in his judgment from what he would be called upon
to do had he been elected by an overwhelming majority. He
is farther the representative of the more especial interests of
all the non-voters of his district, of the men without votes,
of the women, the children, for they are all component and
324 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
essential parts of the community which he represents for the
purpose of finally making up public opinion, and law. On
the other hand, he is bound to represent his community, not
as a detached part, independent in the feudal sense, but as a
living limb of his state or nation, and hence bound to allow
the public opinion of the whole its due influence in modifying
the opinion which he has brought from his particular section.
Else why should he be sent to commune with the other representatives?   Why  should debates precede  the passing of
bills? Why, in particular, should, in cases of joint appointment, a difference of opinion be permitted? If they are the
deputies of their respective constituent circle only, this would
amount to absurdity. In France the elective franchise is
comparatively much restricted. On an average each department has.but two thousand two hundred electors, each commune but five. Is the representative sent to represent these
five men in each commune only, or all men, women, children,
and even property? The French representative, the moment
that he is elected, is the national representative, whether he
be elected by many or by few.
That in all the business which has exclusive reference to
his section, or to individuals in it, the representative is the
peculiar and proper servant of the public, and must give his
whole time and exertion to their benefit, and serve them, to
the best of his ability, and conscientiously, in endeavoring to
obtain all that is right and fair, is evident.
We see, then, that all that is sacred in civil liberty makes
political society equally interested in the two following points:
The representative ought frequently to give his trust back to
the people, and pass the trial of election, so that he may remain the true representative of his constituents and of his
community. The word frequent is of course a relative term,
and must receive its true meaning from a variety of circumstances; for there are as many evils in unnecessarily frequent elections as there are in those which occur at too long
intervals. Secondly, the true character of a representative
government does not admit of mandatory instructions to the
-325 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
representative, for it makes at once of the representative a
mere deputy, who ought to have his instructions from the
beginning. But in this case he ceases to be the representative
of the people, and becomes a mere plenipotentiary either of a
party or corporation. Yet it is true, again, that real public
opinion and public will can only be elicited by the closest
possible attention of each representative to the interests and
desires of his constituents and community; he therefore will
cheerfully be influenced by petitions, resolutions, or any other
information from  his constituents, a circumstance of the
greatest and especial importance in monarchies, in which the
influence of the crown must always be great and the representative is easily seduced from the people. But it would be
a serious mistake to believe that special instructions are the
best guarantee of the people against the seductions of the
crown.   Special instructions fetter as often as they lend
power, and the crown, or indeed any powerful executive, of
whatever name, can be effectually opposed only by free,
united, broad, national opposition. The history of England, on
the one hand, and that of the continental estates, on the other,
prove this fact most abundantly.   There are several other
considerations against binding representatives by instructions,
especially in states where there exist written constitutions,
which will presently be given.
For the present I would sum up the previous remarks thus:
The true representative is bound to represent his constituents
closely, honesty, and patriotically: closely, so that by the
union and mutual modification of the opinion of all parts
strictly represented a true opinion of the whole may be formed;
honestly, so that he neither meanly nor weakly desert his
constituents, nor basely obey the dictates of passing passion
or excitement in the district from which he comes; and,
lastly, patriotically, so that he can sacrifice his own advantage or that of any part of the state to the benefit and advancement of the whole state.
These principles will lead to the rule, which I believe will
be admitted to be correct, that the representative, constitu
326 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
tionally elected for a fixed term, as he is bound to maintain
the fundamental law in every way, is also, in his own case,
not to infringe it by receiving specific mandatory instructions,
since the constitution does not acknowledge them; but, on
the other hand, he will feel obliged, in order to maintain close
representation inviolate, to resign as soon as he is convinced
that the public opinion of his district decidedly differs from
his, not on a single measure, but on a continued course of
actions and series of views respecting important political subjects, and that they would differ had they all the knowledge
which he has acquired in the necessary contact with the other
organs of the public opinion of his state. The representative
must feel convinced that he differs seriously and permanently,
and that the difference does not arise from any sudden and excited change in his constituents; for in the latter case it is one
of the very objects of the constitution, which says that he shall
be elected for such a term, to avoid sudden and passionate
changes. If one or the other be neglected, it seems to me
that the essential character of a representative government is
seriously impaired.
VIII. The meaning of a representative government, it appears, then, is very different fromn and far nobler than a mere
approach to something we cannot obtain, the government of
the people in the forum, or the ecclesia, to use the Athenian
term. It has a great, a deep meaning of its own, and from
what has been observed in the first part of this work, when
we considered the nature of power and the necessity of its
restriction, in whose hands soever it may be lodged, as well
as from the remarks just made, it will sufficiently appear that
-the following are among the vast advantages which we obtain
by this institution which the historian, it may be ventured to
affirm, will always consider with reverence and rejoicing.
Masses are always impetuous. I do not speak of the
rabble or mob; I speak of every mass, high, low, or mixed,
as such. Every one of us is impetuous as soon as he belongs
to a mass. The reason is simple: so long as we belong to a
327 
POLITICAL ETJICS.
mass, brought together by the same impulse, desire,, or interest, each individual has but that one object in view, else
he would not have joined or been drawn into that mass which
strives for it., The moment we are singled out to act for
the mass, that moment one of two things must happen: either
responsibility is lawfully thrown upon us by the process of
some appointment or election, when we feel at once the necessity of circumspection and moderation, because we act for
others, and are answerable for the consequences; or some
reason or other, arising out of the impulse or excitement of
the agitated mass itself, devolves the duty of leader upon us.
The leadership, thus acquired, depends upon the impulse itself,
and we feel naturally tempted to lead on the mass in this impulse, for every one is careful to maintain that foundation
upon which his power or authority rests. Now, as masses
cannot in most cases act directly, but must have leaders of
some sort or other, these become, in the natural course of
things, the rulers or leaders of the unmitigated masses. But
by the representative system we obtain these two advantages:
we restrict the impulse which is inherent in the mass as such,
and must be restricted, because every power-holder needs a
check; and we avoid being ruled by one leader, as the Athenians always were in the later portion of their history. We,
the people, therefore, are not absent from the legislative halls
only because, for local reasons, we cannot be there, but because we ought not to be there as a people, as a mass, for the
same reason that in monarchies the king is not allowed to be
present in the halls of justice, or as the legislators cannot
debate in the presence of the monarch. In both cases the
reason is the same. The prince, that is, the power-holder (be
he the people or the monarch), must be limited and circumscribed by law, especially in republics, because, as we have
I [In a note Dr. Lieber corrects what he says in the text, adding that "masses
are impetuous for two reasons. I. They feel they are not organized, and their
action therefore is insecure;  they are hasty, anxious.   2. Masses cannot be
reasoned with, nor can the members reason with one another. That which is
bold, violent, striking, alone can obtain attention and command."]
328 
POLITICA L ETHICS.
seen in Part First, the power of the people is never a theory,
as that of a monarch frequently is, but irresistible reality; that
is, for the same reason that the power-holder must not sit in
judgment, his presence must not overawe the legislature.
It was right that all the commons were silent when Charles
I. went to them on January 4th, I642, to demand Pym and
the four other members from among them; and it was right
for the British judge to tell the king that he must not come
into court.
The government of a free state must act out public opinion.
To do this, two things are necessary: first, it must know
public opinion, and, secondly, its action must be the regular
action of society, not an irregular series of accidental impulses. Public opinion, however, can be ascertained by the
sifting process of a representative system only. Otherwise,
general, momentary opinion, rumor, even whim, will rule, instead of true, settled public opinion. The representative must
truly obey public opinion, not momentary impulse, excitemnent, panic, fear, revenge, spite, or fanaticism-all of which
may seize and have seized masses because they seize upon
the individuals composing them., The representative, standing at a distance, being separated from the crowd, feels, in
many cases at least, the necessity of calm reflection and of
opposition to the sweeping current of excitement.
I " I did not obey your instructions: No.   I conformed to the instructions of
truth and nature, and maintained your interest, against your opinions, with a
constancy that became me. A representative worthy of you ought to be a person of stability. I am to look, indeed, to your opinions; but to such opinions
as you and I must have five years hence. I was not to look to the flash of the
day. I knew that you chose me, in'my place, along with others, to be a pillar
of the state, and not a weathercock on the top of the edifice, exalted for my
levity and versatility, and of no use but to indicate the shiftings of every fashionable gale. Would to God the value of my sentiments on Ireland and on America
had been at this day a subject of doubt and discussion! No matter what my
sufferings had been, so that this kingdom had kept the authority I wished to
maintain by a grave foresight and by an equitable temperance in the use of its
power." Burke, in his Speech to the Electors of Bristol in 1780. It will be
well for the  mrerican reader to consider what the instructions were he considerately disregarded.
329 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
All unmeditated action in politics is dangerous, because it
is power, for unrestricted power, be it physical, mental, or
moral, is hazardous and dangerous. But not only this; impetuous and direct action, mischievous as it may be at the
moment, is apt suddenly to lose its hold again. It is the
gradual but well-directed action, in almost all cases, which is
certain. The British house of commons, which at present has
in reality the appointment of ministers, acts much more safely
and powerfully than when in I64I, and on some other occasions, it aimed at direct appointment. It may safely be said
that upon the whole the commons have an infinitely stronger
influence over the ministers now than they would have were
the appointment thrown upon them.
Masses are swayed by gratitude or the imposing pageantry
of power, and, enraptured or bewildered, grant away their
rights; the representative acts for others, and is cautious, provided only there are sufficient means to make him always a
true representative.
By a representative government alone we can arrive at
political truth.
By it alone, deliberation, debate, which neither absolute
democracy on the one hand nor instructed deputations on the
other admit of, becomes possible; and debate, whatever its
frequent abuses may be, is of the utmost importance for civil
liberty. Frequently, indeed, precious time is wasted by point
less speeches of unreasonable length; but we must not forget
the mass of political information which thus is daily thrown
among the public. Frequently members will be infatuated by
party spirit, so that they will not listen to truth; but we ought
to remember that debate also, in many cases, prevents them
from becoming so infatuated.   Debate, well guided, is an
indispensable palladium of civil liberty. Instruction would
make, and unfortunately has made, out of deliberative assemblies, assemblies without freedom of deliberation and without
freedom of thought, which is a tyranny with painful consequences. Indeed, directing men to vote one way or the other,
in a case in which it is nevertheless maintained that previous
330 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
inquiry ought to guide, is repugnant to all respect for truth
and for conscience. Napoleon, so it is said, directed at times
courts-martial to find persons guilty before the trial had commenced. It may not be true; but what does every reader feel
in reading it?
By the representative system alone we can act upon the
salutary principle of the majority, the social principle, to the
exclusion of the unanimity principle or principle of feudal
independency. On this point presently more.
By the representative system, that is, by a representation
gathered from the whole society, upon uniform and extensive
principles proportionally applied to that society, we alone are
able to gather public opinion. The'deputy system does not
aim at arriving at the public opinion of the state; it merely
strives to redress single "grievances." Hence it could happen
and be tolerated that the deputation from one city represented
many cities, that of Salamanca, for instance, about a hundred places, from which it received their various instructions
and acted accordingly. To have the "grievances" redressed
was the main business of the deputy; to have public opinion
gathered and acted out is the essence of representation.
By the representative system alone can be secured publicity
of governmental action, which cannot be done in absolute unrepresented democracies, because there cannot be there real
debates. By the representative government alone the extension of a political society can be united with substantial public
liberty; the necessary energy. of a government with its equally
necessary control; and by it alone we can safely steer between the fanaticism of theorists and unprincipled expediency
-one of the great objects of good government.
IX. From the foregoing remarks it will appear, therefore,
how little.those writers on politics have penetrated into the
essence and real meaning of the representative principle, who
consider it as the main problem to unite the extension of
states with the ultimate rule and sway of the multitude alone,
as ascertained by a census. The true and difficult object in
33I 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
politics, as everywhere where men have to act, is to secure by
wise, that is by safe and appropriate, means, the discovery of
truth and the empire of mind over matter, chance, force, and
bulk. The mere number of itself does no more guarantee
truth than the chance of birth. There can be no doubt that
an overwhelming majority of all the inhabitants of the earth
believe that the sun moves and not the earth, or that the
chief object in punishing offenders is to deter others by the
acuteness of suffering inflicted upon the former. Yet both
opinions are equally wrong: and we justly prefer to adopt
the opinion of those comparatively few whom we have good
reason to believe well acquainted with the truth, the opinion
of countless millions to the contrary. Few, indeed, of all
the men that people our globe believe in one God, spiritual,
oQmnipotent, and omniscient; yet we hold fast to the belief
in him.   Suppose, however, that we had agreed that the
opinion of the mere number should sway, that is, as we
termed it, the general opinion, and not the public opinion,
which is, I repeat, the opinion of society as an organized
thing, settled and influenced by the knowledge of those who
best understand the respective subject, their views and conclusions having been likewise influenced and modified both by
the action of society upon them in forming their views and in
receiving them-suppose we had agreed to this abstract
principle, we should be still as far from the ultimate object as
before. For if the mere theorist says that each man shall
vote, and that nothing shall be law unless directly voted for
by the majority of all the individual men composing the respective political society, the question arises at once, Who
are these men that must have the right? Shall women vote?
and if not, why? Shall children vote? and if not, upon what
abstract ground do we decide that the twenty-first year, for
instance, shall mark the distinction between the mature and
the immature intellect? Many a youth is wiser at twenty
than other persons at fifty years of age, as our daily experience proves. Nay, more, how is it that the principle of
maturity of mind is suddenly added to the theory which
332 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
nevertheless was originally founded upon the principle of
number alone?
James Harrington, the celebrated author of the Oceana,
which was published during the protectorate and intended to
be the image of a pure republic, provides in that work that
the people shall elect a senate, and this senate the highest
officers with a strategus at the head. The senate alone has
the right of proposing laws, on each of which the people vote
and adopt. or reject it accordingly. This is the idea upon
which the right of direct and binding instruction is demanded,
carried out consistently. Not to regard, however, the utter
impracticability of this constitution, it would nowise guarantee
the ascertaining of true public Opinion, for" reasons given
above.
It is a universal law, pervading all physical and intellectual
creation, so far as human observation and experience reach,
without one exception, that the higher or nobler the thing,
being, or object to be produced or obtained, the longer
and more varied is the chain of processes, and the more organic are these processes, by which it has been matured; and
the lower the thing or creature, the more it is determined
by agents from without; the higher it is, the more active
becomes its own organization' within. A mushroom starts
into existence perfect, within a few hours, so soon as the
necessary agents from without exist, but it takes a long
time and requires a variety of processes, one connected with
the other, before the flower of the magnolia adorns the rich
foliage of its noble tree. The infusory animal detaches part
of its body, and a new being moves quickly for itself, but ii
requires a long time before man's body and mind arrive at
maturity; and before he comes into existence as a detached
individual he has undergone a long series of the most wonderful processes and transformations in order to become sufficiently matured for parturition. The same principle obtains
in the intellectual and political world. For a gross nation,
gross despotism, perhaps determined by gross chance or the
equally gross principle of mere force, may suffice. The little
333 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
of opin on which exists in a tribe on the pampas of America
or the steppes of the East is easily ascertained. The signal
is given, the men assemble, a proposition is made, assent or
dissent is expressed, and the whole process is at an end; but
the public opinion of an extensive, civilized, and organized
society is neither so rapidly generated nor so rapidly ascertained. The farther society advances, the higher it rises, the
more organic must be the process by which it is ascertained,
and stripped of casual adhesion due to prejudice, interest, or
excitement; and this organic process for producing the flower
of public opinion upon the many-branched tree of society is
effected, so it seems to me, by the representative system. In
this consists its highest meaning, and as such it has a high
value of its own, not a mere relative one by way of approximation to something beyond our reach-a value which we
shall honor and cherish the more, the better we become
acquainted with the true spirit of past ages and the occurrences of the day, and which will the more inspire us with
an ardent desire to cultivate, perfect, and expand, not to stint
and cripple it, the more we penetrate its essence.
X. If the doctrine of instruction be right, I hold it to be
evident that it is entirely inconsistent to allow an instructed
member, who disagrees with his instruction, to resign before
he has voted. He who acts the part of a deputy or plenipotentiary is bound first to vote according to instruction, and
then he may ask leave to resign; otherwise his constituents
lose unjustly their vote or share of influence upon final action.
Such action would have been expected of every deputy in the
middle ages, and to this day would be expected of an ambassador, who may conscientiously do thus because he is nothing
but an agent sent for the very purpose of voting, if any voting
is to be done, in a prescribed way; but who is a representative
in no real sense of the word, and is only so called because he
resembles one in the outward form. But what honorable and
independent man would degrade himself so low as to defile
his lips by a vote against his conscience and judgment, when
334 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
he was sent-under oath-to vote according to truth, to the
fulness of conscience and the best of his judgment? If representatives are nothing but deputed officers, why would it be
considered an outrageous act of immorality if a representative
coming from a manufacturing or agricultural district were to
take money for defending the interests committed to him, as
the lawyer does, and as the deputies in the middle ages frequently did, or as to this day advocates do when sent by some
corporation or society to the bar of the commons? No one
finds fault with them. If we have the right bindingly to instruct after the election, we have likewise a right to elect on
condition of certain instructions, and may exact "elective
capitulations," as the conditions were called upon which the
German electors used to elect the emperor.' Suppose our
electors of the President of the United States were either to
agree upon such an elective capitulation before the election, or
to send him instructions after election: would not the whole
people scorn the idea, or consider it as a most arrant conspiracy? Yet this is quite imaginable, and there is not one
argument brought in favor of instruction of representatives
which would not apply to the assumed case. If the doctrine
of instruction is sound, it is but the legitimate inference that
the constituents should have'also the right to recall their
representative, as the deputies of the former estates were frequently recalled. Yet why do the constitutions of representative governments nowhere give this very important power, but
universally prescribe the term for which a representative is to
be elected, which was rarely done in the ancient estates and
only where they approached the representative system? Because it has been universally felt that a representative differs
in character from the deputy.' We may go farther: if the
I One of the senators of the United States, from Virginia, who was instructed
to vote for the well-known expunging resolution, says, indeed, in his letter of
February 27, I836, to the legislature of Virginia, when declining to comply with
their behest, "I do not hesitate to declare that if you had, as the accredited
organs of the people, addressed me a request to vacate my seat in the senate,
your request would have had with me the force of law: not a day or an hour
335 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
representative is the mere agent acting under instruction of
those who unfortunately cannot be present themselves, I
maintain that not only ought the constituents to have a right
to recall him, but they ought to have the undeniable right of
vetoing his vote, as was actually proposed by some theorizing
politician in the French constituent assembly. He was perfectly
consistent, if he believed the representatives to be assembled
there merely because all France could not be present. The veto
of the supreme executive upon any treaty signed by a plenipotentiary is now universally acknowledged, and the same ought
to hold good if our representatives are but plenipotentiaries.'
It is said the representative is elected by his constituents,
he is their servant, and must do their bidding, "otherwise it
is a confined aristocracy, in which the people have nothing
more to do than to choose their rulers, over whose proceedings, however despotic and repugnant to the nature and principles of the fundamental laws of the state, they have no
control."2  If this be true, the Americans live most assuredly
under a confined monarchy, for no president would obey an
instruction; nor would this absence of all confidence be in
the slightest degree a guarantee against despotic proceedings.
A mere term has considerably misled in this inquiry, as in
so many others. The representative is called a servant of the
people; so is the president of the United States called, and
he frequently calls himself, a servant of the people; but the
word "servant," from the servus servorum, as the pope signs
himself, down to the menial negro, is used in very different
could I desire to remain in the senate beyond that hour wherein I came to be
informed that it was the settled wish of the people of Virginia that I should
retire from their service." This is introducing a very extraordinary and serious
power, of which the constitution knows nothing, if it mean that in instructing
the legislature really expresses the "settled wish of the people."  How can we
know that they do? They were not elected, according to the constitution, to
express such an opinion.
x [For this, which is not universally acknowledged in regard to treaties concluded according to full powers and secret instructions both, see Wheaton,
Elements, part iii. 2,    257-263.]
2 Tucker's Blackstone, Appendix, p. I93.
336 
pOLITICA L ETHICS.
meanings. It may signify one that serves another, labors for
him, or one that mechanically does as he is bid to do. It is
always considered an honor to be a representative, but there
is no honor in doing the bidding of any one, people or monarch, without individual independence. The representative
system requires not only men of talent, but of manly independence; liberty is not efficiently served by menials, or by
men who do not think independently and who shrink from
speaking and voting in candor and conscience. The doctrine
of instruction greatly favors hypocrisy, for cases have occurred
when representatives, seeing that measures upon which they
stood compromised were fast losing ground, sent home to be
instructed to vote contrary to the votes formerly given by
them., Where there is a constitution-and properly speaking
there is a constitution that is fundamental law wherever there
are representatives-but especially where there is a written
constitution, upon which the representative takes his oath, the
right of instruction becomes especially incongruous, for the
representative is a guardian and trustee of and under the constitution upon oath-that constitution which is far above him
and his constituents. It cannot be maintained that if he is
instructed to do what he holds to be contrary to the constitution-as when the Virginia senators were instructed by their
legislature to vote for the renowned expunging resolutionthe very fact that his own constituents, the very makers of his
authority, view it differently, shows him that he must yield.
The legislature of South Carolina elects the supreme judges
of the state; the judge takes the oath upon the constitution, and may be called upon not only to act dissentingly from
the legislature which actually made him, but as judge may
declare a law which it has passed unconstitutional. How is
this, if the relation of the electors and the elected necessarily creates the relation of master and servant, ordainer and
It is a well-known anecdote, that John Wilkes, with whom the modern history of the instruction question may be said to begin, when asked how it was
possible to allow his judgment to be fettered by such a rabble as had instructed
him, answered, "Oh, as to that, I always take care to write my own instructions.,
VOL. II.                            22
337 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
obeyer? How is it in the militia, where officers are elected
by the rank and file?
The advocates of the right of instruction appear to forget
one fact, which seems to me very weighty. Among other
political guarantees we have constitutions, fundamental laws,
we have representatives, and fixed periods for renewed elections, for the purpose of protecting the community, for the
continuity of views and opinions for a certain space of time in
the legislation of the country; and we have laws to secure
that manner of election by which the state hopes to secure
best the rights of all citizens,-that is, impartial elections
and certainty of election. Whatever the representative, thus
elected by the organic law of the state, does, he does constitutionally, so long as he remains within the strict sphere of the
constitution.  But suddenly we have an extra-constitutional
interference; men hold a meeting unappointed by law, unguaranteed as to its regularity, and they assume not to select an
organ of legislation but something far more, to bid this organ
already elected to legislate one way or the other. In Virginia,
cases have actually occurred when papers were carried to the
constituents to sign their names whether for or against the
proposed instruction. The minority may be deeply interested
in not having the member instructed thus extra-constitutionally; they are wronged out of their right; it becomes tyrannical ex parte legislation. The right of instruction may be
easily made use of by skilfully seizing upon some excitement
to "instruct a representative out of his seat," who may be disagreeable to some of his party. And, in general, it is highly
dangerous to allow any man or any number of men or any
authority to arrogate power not strictly laid down by the law.
It is incompatible with all civil liberty. Binding and commanding instruction seems to me to loosen the very foundation-stones of true essential modern liberty in its broad, noble,
and elevated character, because it defeats one of the essential
features of the representative system, without which modern
liberty cannot exist.   Washington was averse to positive
instruction. (Sparks's Writings of Washington, i. 49I.)
338 
CHAPTER II.
The Subject of Instruction with particular Reference to the United States.-The
ancient Articles of Confederation founded upon the Deputative System.-The
Articles of Confederation compared to the Constitution of the former United
Provinces of the Netherlands, the Swiss Act of Mediation, the present Constitu tion of the Swiss Confederation, and the Germanic Confederacy.-The Consti tution of the United States boldly changed the former deputative character of
the Confederacy into a representative one.-Senators are not Ambassadors.-In
Leagues the strongest Member of those on termns of parity according to the
letter must sway.-Hegemony in Greece, Phcenicia, the Low Countries, etc.
-Relation of the State Legislatures to the respective Senators elected by them.
-The History of Instruction in modern times, as connected with the Repre sentative System.
XI. IN order to show completely the relation of moral responsibility in which I hold a representative to stand to his
constituents, it will be necessary to treat of the subject of
Pledges. Before we proceed to it, however, I must say a few
words on the right of instruction, with peculiar reference to
the relation in which the senators of the United States stand
to the several legislatures by which they are elected.
Very rarely indeed has the doctrine of instruction been
acted upon in the United States by the primitive constituents
of a representative in congress. The whole discussion as a
practical question seems to have reference to the senators exclusively, and the reason can easily be perceived. As to the
representatives the case is too clear; they are real representatives of the people, not deputies, forming a national representation, not states-general; and whatever the theory may be, or
jealousy or love of power may prompt some to assert, sound
instinct, produced by long valuable political tradition in the
Anglican race, and good common sense require the people
at large to view their representative only in the light of a
representative and not in that of a circumscribed or fettered
deputy. It is different with regard to the senators; their
339 
'POLITICAL ETHICS.
election, as well as the formation of the senate, differs materially from that of the representatives, and it is necessary,
therefore, that we should ascertain the precise character of the
senate of the United States. Thus alone we shall be able to
judge correctly of the right of instructing its members.
The confederacy of the United States under the ancient
Articles of Confederation of I778 was nothing more than a
league of entirely independent states (politically independent
though united by feeling and sympathy), connected only by
whatever might be agreed upon by their deputations, according to certain principles primarily adopted by the states;
without any system or government proper; resembling the
union of the former United Provinces of the Netherlands, or
of the Swiss Cantons [under the Constitution of I8I5]. In
some respects the American Confederacy was a closer union,
in others it was a looser one, but, if I mistake not, congress
had the nature and character of states-general, and nothing
else. The members of congress were deputies, and no more.
This appears clearly from the Articles of Confederation themselves, and, among other points, from these: The states
appoint the delegates as they think best, and may recall them
in order to send others (art. 5, I); their number is left to the
option of the states,' although for the sake of expedition of
business and for other reasons the minimum of two, which
became the prototype for the later number of senators under
our present constitution, and the maximum of seven, were
fixed (5, 2); each state was to maintain her delegation, because she alone was interested in it (5, 3); each state was to
have but one vote, as a matter of course, according to the
common principle in the feudal estates applicable to communities, professions, provinces, classes, and estates, because the
deputies represented their respective primaries as a whole, and
only them. If the deputies of any state were equally divided,
the state lost the vote. Upon all the material points of the
confederacy nine assenting states were necessary (9, ~ 6).
Let us compare these features with the corresponding ones
in the most prominent confederacies of modern times.  The
340 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
Netherlands, as I mentioned before, never elevated themselves
to broad social or national representation; their governments,
provincial or general, never became enlarged social governments, but remained chains of more or less connected independent communities; even the single cities had supreme or
"sovereign rights," of which it was a natural consequence on
the one hand that no resolution of the provincial states was
considered binding unless it passed by unanimous concurrence,
and on the other hand that the utmost inequality of representation existed: the cities formed the powerful aristocracy, the
farmers were almost entirely disregarded., The reader will remember an instance I mentioned, when speaking of the love of
power, in the first part of this work. \Ve must always keep in
mind that the principle of the feudal times was mutual exaction
of liberty, or at least separate conquest of liberty; the motto,
get as much as you can, without reference to proportion, to
general fairness, to common welfare. The principle of modern
liberty, of socialized states, is public liberty, public, that is,
common and mutual guarantee, public check, universal justice. The oath of fidelity by the stadtholder and soldiers was
taken to the "confederate states of the Low Countries, that
is, to the higher and the inferior orders of nobles, and to the
magistrates of the towns of Holland," etc. Nothing can show
more clearly the difference which I have endeavored to ex
In addition to the striking instance alluded to, I will mention here that ill the
province of Holland the independent communities of the province were represented by nineteen deputies chosen out of the nobility, the senators, and magistrates (that is, city authorities); the nobles having but one voice, the cities
eighteen.  The farmers, who bore the heaviest public burden, were neglected.
Amsterdam had but one single voice in the states, and the smallest city in the
province likewise. I believe the constitutional history of no state after that of
Great Britain is so instructive to an American as that of the United Provinces,
such as we may learn it from Basnage, Annales des Provinces Unies depuis la
Negotiation pour la Paix de Munster, avec la Description historique de leur
Gouvernement. The ancient cortes of Castile excluded many old cities, and
would not readmit their deputies, after they had omitted to send them, and Prescott justly says they "imprudently" excluded the old cities, because, as I observed before, it was an additional obstacle in the way of the formation of a
national or social representation.
34I 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
hibit between the feudal principle of independence, with the
consequent deputative system, on the one hand, and the
modern social states-principle of civil liberty and civil guarantee, with the consequent representative system, on the
other. The effects of this system were consistent; the statesgeneral of the United Provinces could decide upon war and
peace, treaties of commerce, and all taxes and impost, by
unanimous concurrence only.
I have on a former occasion briefly touched upon the principle of unanimity and majority in voting; we shall now be
Fable to understand what otherwise appears so absurd, that a
single man should have had the right of vetoing the procedure of an assembly, as it is frequently expressed, in the old
estates. The expression is not accurate. The term veto expresses the idea of nullifying the action of some united body;
but the old deputies were not such; unanimity was with them
as natural, according to the principle which gave them existence, as it is now with a congress of ambassadors; each party
is bound only so far as it has assented, because entirely independent; so that defeating a general result by a single dissent
was as little a veto with those ancient estates as it would be
with ambassadors at present. If the principle of unanimity
was, nevertheless, in many minor cases abandoned, it was
because the mere furtherance of business required it.  But
the principle appears more or less in all the most important
estates (cortes, diets, etc.) in the middle ages, strongly at first,
and the less so the more the various countries became nationalized and the interest of the different parts began more and
more to affect one another.  The salutary majority principle
could only become known and well introduced with the complete victory of representation over deputation.
The Grand Pensionary of Holland, the chief officer of the
chief province, and, indeed, virtually, the executive and chief
magistrate of the whole United Provinces, took place after
the deputies, because the latter represented independences,
corporations with "sovereign rights." The members of the
states-general came to no resolution without instruction and
342 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
specifc authorization from home; the provinces sent two
or more members at pleasure, but the votes were given by
provinces, not by the single voices of members; the time of
service for deputies was differently regulated in the various
provinces, as if it were a matter of utter indifference to the
states-general; some were chosen even for life., I have mentioned already the amended constitution of the Netherlands
of I815, which declares each member of the states-general to
be a national representative, and gives him, consequently, a
vote belonging to his moral, individual self as representative,
not to his deputed authority as a mere deputy, nor depending
on instructions, and settles their number, though they are
elected, as formerly, by the provincial states. (Constitution
of the Netherlands, ~ 83.)
The Swiss Act of Mediation (of February 19, I803), digested under the direct influence of Napoleon,2 in order to
abolish the democratic concentrated government then lately
established in imitation of France, ordains that each canton
shall send one deputy to the general congress (Tagsatzung),
that they shall have definite instructions and powers of attorney, and shall not vote against their instructions. (Ch. 20,
tit. I, ~~ 25, 26.) And by the Swiss Act of Union of August
7, I81  5, it is ordained that congress (Tagsatzung) shall consist
of "ambassadors from the sovereign estates," meaning the
cantons. They are the ambassadors of the twenty-two cantons and are bound to vote by their instructions. Each canton
has one voice. Three-fourths of the votes are necessary for
war or peace, treaties, and some important internal affairs.
(Act of Union, ~ 8.) Lastly, let us throw a glance at the
-  The deputy is the special agent or ambassador of the body which sends him;
he has no general character as a member of one common system, as the representative has. What did it matter to the powers assembled in the congress of
Vienna whether the minister of one or the other was recalled and another sent?
The case of the deputy is similar.
2 Napoleon, in the days of his greatest power, called himself emperor of the
French, king of Italy (not of the Italians), protector of the Rhenish Confederacy,
and Mediator of Switzerland.
343 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
present Germanic confederacy [I838]. If ever a government
unfolded itself under most unfortunate circumstances, it was the
former Germanic empire, which had all the vices and organic
defects of an elective monarchy, with this evil superadded, that
while in other countries the nobles were reduced and national
monarchy rose, the nobles in Germany reduced the emperor
and made themselves independent, while the subjects lost the
advantages which they would have derived from a national
government. The imperial monarchy had the effect of producing the independence of all the princes and petty states of
the empire, and the consequent exposure and humiliation of
Germany. Napoleon consolidated them considerably; and
when he fell, the German princes felt that a union of some
sort or other was deeply founded in the spirit of the nation
and called for upon the score of common safety; consequently
the Germanic Act of Union of I815 was adopted at the Congress of Vienna. The Germanic confederacy is a league of
princes and states, who send ambassadors to the diet, which
ambassadors, of course, act by regular instruction; the members vote in two different ways, either in the "closer meeting,"
in which the larger Germanic powers have each one vote, but
three, four, or five together of the petty states only one; or
they vote in "plenum," some states, as Austria, Prussia, etc.,
having four votes, others three, two, and each member of the
Union at least one. Austria has the permanent precedency.
This brief exhibition alone will suffice to show its unnational,
unrepresentative character, in which the people at large have
indeed little interest, as to their advantage. The Act of Confederation of the Rhine (of July I2, i8o6), under the protectorship of Napoleon, needs not to be mentioned here: it was
a mere league of princes.'
~ [The present constitution of the latest German empire, framed in 1870, says
of the Reichstag, or house elected by direct vote of the people, that the members
"are representatives of the people as a whole, and not bound to commissions
and instructions." (Art. 29.) It is otherwise with the Bundesrath, or Federal
Council. Art. 7.]
344 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
XII. How much superior, how lofty and great, appears our
federal constitution, the very first in history in which the bold
attempt has been made of substituting the representative system for the deputative in a confederation, thus adapting it to
the necessary tendency of modern public liberty, and securing
those advantages which such a system alone can possibly
guarantee! As a federal charter, it is a matchless monument
in history-matchless, indeed, despite the faults which it may
be supposed to have on general grounds, for it is the work
of men, and some of which it is not difficult now to discover;
yet the historian, without blind or slavish idolatry, cannot
help frequently gazing with reverence at this grand fabric,
built upon such simple principles and on so vast a scale.
That the deputative character of the ancient congress was
boldly and grandly transformed into a representative, we see
from the constitution of the United States; and especially I
beg the reader to compare the following points with those
of the Act of Confederation which I cited above in order to
prove the deputative character of the ancient congress.
First of all the constitution establishes an entire government with separate and regular branches, and it establishes
not only a separate legislative branch, but this branch on the
principle of two chambers whicti belongs to the representative
system; it separates from "congress" the executive, elected
by the people of all the states at large, and unlike an executive committee of deputies chosen from among themselves,
such as the former "committee of the states." (Articles of
Confederation, ~ 5.)
The first paragraph of the "constitution" (no longer called
articles of confederation) establishes a house of representatives (no longer mere delegates). (Art. I, sect. I, ~ I.)
The time for which the senators and representatives are
elected is fixed. (Art. I, sect. 2, ~ I, sect. 3, ~ I.)
The number of senators to be sent from each state is fixed,
yet one individual vote is constitutionally secured to each
senator. They vote personally or individually, not deputatively [and an organic character is given to the senate as a
345 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
whole by the provision that one-third is renewed every second
year]. (Ibid.)
Congress may make all elective regulations, except as to
the places of choosing senators. (Art. I, sect. 4, ~ I.)
Each house is to judge of the election returns and qualifications of its own members, which is incompatible with deputations. (Art. I, sect. 5, ~ I.)
A majority of each house forms a quorum. (Ibid.)
Each house may punish its members for disorderly behavior, and even expel a member by two-thirds of the votes.
(Art. i, sect. 5, ~ 2.)
The yeas and nays may be easily demanded, that is, it is in
the power of one-fifth of those present to throw each member
upon his individual responsibility and representative character.
(Art. I, sect. 5, ~ 3.)
Senators and representatives are compensated out of the
treasury of the United States (Art. I, sect. 6, ~ I), and not
paidjby the bodies who send them.
Congress legislates for the people of the United States, not
for the states separately. If a tax is levied it is upon the people;
the quotas are not sent to the state legislatures; which must
have been done upon the feudal deputative principle.
Let us now see what is the true respective character of the
senate and the house of representatives, according to the constitution. What is their difference?  The senators have frequently been called the ambassadors or ministers of the states.
It is an unbefitting term.  He would be but a poor ambassador who is not instructed beforehand, and cannot be recalled at any moment, but is appointed for a definite period
of six years, and who joins a body of co-ambassadors, presided
over, not by a member elected from among themselves and
by rapid rotation, as was the case in the freest of the former
estates, but by an officer in the origin of his authority wholly
extraneous to the senate-an officer who does not come from
a particular state, but from the people at large, like the president of the United States. The constitution thus links the
senate, coming from the states as such, to the general system
346 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
of government, of which it forms a part. But a body of ambassadors must be wholly independent, or it has no meaning.
How could a body of independent ambassadors possibly form,
not the supreme body of some confederation, but an integrant
and permanent part of a continuous regular government of
a union? The constitution gives one separate vote to each
senator, even though the two senators from one state disagree, which is inconsistent with the function of a deputy and
an ambassador, being strictly and wholly representative. For,
besides the moral importance and influence upon society of
seeing the two senatorial colleagues vote openly, even if opposed to one another, the subject becomes still more important in those cases in which two-thirds of the votes are
required, as in impeachments of the president of the United
States or of any other officer, or in cases when treaties with
foreign powers are submitted to the senate (Art. I, sect. 3, ~ 6,
Art. 2, sect. 2, ~ 2), or in all cases where pluralities only and
not majorities are required, and finally in all cases in which the
two respective senators are opposed to each other and one
happens to be absent, which of course must frequently happen.
The senate, moreover, is a deliberative assembly in its very
nature; but ambassadors do not freely deliberate, they only
negotiate; they try to persuade others to agree to subjects
already settled in their mind, and for which they are particularly sent.
The representative character of the senators, therefore, is
incontrovertible, yet they differ from the members of the
house of representatives. The problem of the framers was
to unite the representative system, without which, as I shall
presently show, we must have been exposed to great disorder,
with the system of a confederacy.  If I do not misunderstand
the history of our constitution, the true character of the senator and representative of the United States is that the senator
is the representative, but not the deputy, of his state as such,
that is as a political society of itself, yet a member of a union,
in which capacity of course all members, that is, states, are
equal, and for which reason an equal number of these state
347 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
representatives is fixed for all; and the members of the house
of representatives are the direct representatives of the people,
hence they are,-in justice, apportioned according to the population all over the land.  That those from one state will act
in many instances unitedly is natural, for the interest and
public opinion of their constituents will lead them to do so;
yet that they do not do so in a thousand cases, and ought not
to do so, we all know. I hold it to be a principle of the last
importance, that the representative in congress is a national
representative, not only for the general reasons urged in previous passages, but also for one which relates to confederacies in particular.  If this position of ours is correct, it
appears that it is not acting upon the true principle of the
constitution of the United States if members of the house of
representatives of congress are elected by general state tickets,
as [was formerly] done in four states, and not by separate
district tickets. The states as states are already represented
by the senators.'
XIII. Wherever mere leagues or confederations on the
deputative principle are formed, and where the states meet
as absolutely equal, or on terms of parity according to the
letter of the compact, without the mediating representative
principle, inequality in fact, notwithstanding parity in terms,
must exist; that is, in the natural course of things the most
powerful must necessarily sway where individuals as separate
individuals meet. He that is the strongest governs. There
is not one exception in history. The Greeks could not help
leaguing together; their whole national spirit, always more
powerful than single institutions or laws, led them to it; common language, religion, extraction, recollections, and similar
laws, were so many ties counteracting governmental separations. But, as they had no representative system ramifying like
[Since Dr. Lieber wrote this, a general law passed by congress in I842
provided for a common plan of election in all the states. This requires that
election shall be by districts, choosing one congressman each, and it overthrew
the general ticket system of five states.]
348 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
a nervous system through'the whole, one state or the other,
Athens, Lacedaemon, or Thebes, must needs have the sway,
or supremacy-the hegemony, as they called it. The Amphictyonic council was a general institution indeed, and not
without some occasional influence, but it consisted of ambassadors or deputies only; it was a general institution in which
most of the Greeks-as tribes and not as city-states-had
a share, but, strictly speaking, not a national one,,-frailer still
than the American confederacy under the ancient Articles.
A large part of Greek national history, therefore, is one continued struggle of this inward yearning for union, or impulse
of native national sympathy, on the one hand, and the struggle
for and against the preponderance-the hegemony-on the
other; a struggle of great bitterness. For tribes and states
follow in this respect the same law which regulates the intercourse of private individuals; that is, the more sympathy or
natural relations tend towards union, the more bitter will be
the conflict if this inner urgency is counteracted by external
separation. In the confederacy of the independent Phoenician
cities, Tyre, Sidon, or some one of the richest and most powerful had the hegemony. A similar phenomenon is observable
in the ancient Hansa, in the old city-union in the South of
Germany and in Northern Italy, in Catalonia, and wherever
we may direct our attention. When the Low Countries separated from Spain, the seven provinces, each independent and
sovereign, confederated, and Holland, the strongest, necessarily obtained the hegemony-so decidedly indeed that a
citizen like De Witt, pensioner of Holland, became the virtual
regent and ruler of the United Provinces, and one of the most
influential European statesmen of his age. The Swiss cantons
have formed a confederacy in the ancient style, and Bern
sways in a considerable degree; while the Germanic states
formed a confederacy, in which Austria and Prussia had the
controlling influence; and however daring and fruitless it may
I F. W. Tittmann on the Union of the Amphictyons (in German), Berlin, 1812.
[E. A. Freeman, History of Federal Governments, vol. i., London and Cambridge, I863.]
349 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
generally be in politics to deal in suppositions as to that
which might or would have been the case, I believe that there
can be no manner of doubt that, if our former confederation
had continued to exist upon its ancient articles, New York
must by this time have been in possession of the American
hegemony, or, what is more likely, repeated wars for the
American hegemony between such states as Virginia, which
was indeed wellnigh obtaining it or may be said to have
possessed it already in a degree, Pennsylvania, and New York,
must have disturbed our social system. We have only to
imagine the election of representatives for congress all over
the Union to proceed by a" general ticket" throughout each
respective state, to see at once the consequences. Pennsylvania and New York, or New York and Ohio, leagued together, would almost infallibly sway the whole con'gress.
It is on this point in particular that our constitution appears
to me deserving of our deepest veneration and gratitude.  By
introducing the representative system, that is, proportioizal and
social representation, and not representation of the states as
corporate bodies alone, by nationalizing the house of representatives, all struggle for the hegemony which drowned the
glory of Greece in the torrents of the Peloponnesian war
was avoided. Am I not'justified, then, in calling the framing
and adoption of the constitution a great historical act?
XIV. It will now be easy for us to view the question of
senatorial instruction in its true light. The legislatures of the
different states elect the senators of their respective states.
This is admitted; the constitution commands it. But we have
seen already, in the case of the presidential election and in
that of judges or militia officers, that election alone constitutes
no sort of foundation for the right of instruction. This right,
if it exists, must be proved on distinct grounds. The different state legislatures elect the senators in virtue of a common constitution. The constitution does not say that the
senators are their ambassadors; and the legislatures have no
more right to issue mandatory instructions than the electors
350 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
of the president of the United States have to instruct the
president, or than a state governor has who may have appointed a senator to fill a sudden vacancy. If he is elected
directly by the people, as he is in all the states at present,
such a governor stands in the relation of an intermediate
party between the people and the senator whom he thus appoints. But who would tolerate it if the governor should
undertake to instruct?
The legislatures are bound to elect for six years; they have
no right given them to recall the senators, which at the time
of the adoption of the constitution was demanded in one or
two cases, but largely overruled. We all know perfectly well,
however, that the right of instruction amounts in almost all
cases of real importance, that is, when the instructed differs
in opinion from his instructors, to a virtual recall; for if both
parties agree, the instruction can have value only by way of
moral weight.  The legislatures have sworn to maintain the
constitution, and must not arrogate so important a power as
to interfere with and virtually to abrogate one of its most
important provisions-nay, to blot out one of its leading features. The constitution gives no right to recall the resisting
senator; but what does the right of instruction amount to, if
there be no means of enforcing it? It is answered, the instructed senator is morally bound to obey or to resign. If he
is morally bound, and not constitutionally, it follows that he
likewise has to judge of the case. The right of instruction
is said to be implied in the idea of representation.  Does implication' differ in this case fiom construction? Is, not, then
the right which the state legislatures assume in instructing a
constructive right, and dangerous to civil liberty? That according to my view it does not follow from the general principles of representation has been seen. Below are instances
to show that this feature-election of senators for six years,would be totally erased from the constitution if mandatory
instruction were introduced'
I The following is a passage of the speech of Senator Southard [of New Jersey]
in the senate of the United States on February 22, I835:
35I 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
The constitution of the United States has introduced the
system of two houses, so justly dear to the whole Anglican
race as one of the happiest expedients which has been adopted
by all nations that follow in their path of political civilization.
But what is the true meaning of this system of two houses?
It is a political guarantee, a check, and one of peculiarly beautiful operation. Masses, we observed, are impetuous; houses
of representatives likewise as masses become impetuous. It
is important, therefore, to have two houses so organized that
they will not be easily swayed by the same impetuosity,-in
other words, that the two houses be founded upon different
principles.  If not, as is the case in the present Belgian constitution, according to which the senate is elected by the
representatives from among themselves, little more than the
" It may, it often does, happen that the political character of the legislature is
frequently changed. Upon this theory there must be a new senator upon every
change. In Rhode Island, if I recollect correctly, the changes have been such
that she might have had, nay, ought to have had, six senators in two years. So
in Ohio: last year she instructed her senators: one of them disobeyed; if he had
resigned, the present legislature, which is of a different political aspect, would
have instructed his successor, and we should have had two new senators upon
the floor, and the state had five in a little more than one year. The rebellious
one of last year might have been restored; unless indeed the legislature should,
as they ought under such circumnstances, spurn him from their confidence for his
servility, as destitute of that moral courage and independence of character without which a public agent is a public curse. The history of my own state is not
destitute of facts to illustrate this doctrine. The changes which have taken place
in the political parties there since I824 would have given to us some six or eight
different members, and this resulting from no versatility or changeableness in the
character of her people. The number of our counties is small-only fourteen.
The parties throughout the state have long been nearly balanced. In several
of the counties the change of a few votes, or the neglect of a small number to
attend the polls, would not only give a new representative in the legislature, but
change its political character; a little more than one hundred votes, in one or
two of several counties, would have changed the late instructions. There are, I
believe, about twenty members of the majority who hold their seats by an average of not more than one hundred and twenty votes; some of them by less than
one hundred. Suppose there should be a small alteration of opinion, resulting
from some general or local cause; the political aspect will be changed. Shall
the legislature again instruct, drive the recently elected senator from his seat before he has had time to become familiar with it, and restore the one whose office
is about expiring?"
352 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
outward form of the bicameral system is obtained. Now, if
our representatives come fresh from the people at short intervals, and the state legislatures, coming from the same people
at equally short intervals, undertake to instruct the senators,
who are elected for six years, the system of two houses as a
guarantee, most wisely established, is evidently destroyed, and
we have upon all important questions but one house, though
sitting in two different places; only two bureaux, as the French
would call it, of the same body.
It has been objected, however, Suppose that the representatives or senators should really vote against the dearest interests
of their constituents; in fact, I have heard it asked, what
should we do if our representatives should vote for a law
directly in contradiction to the fundamental law? All I would
answer is, Suppose, on the other hand, the representatives will
not vote for such a law but should be instructed to do so?
One is as imaginable as the other. These are extravagant
suppositions, against which no human system can provide,
and the victorious power of public opinion, utinder which the
representative emphatically stands, is altogether forgotten. A
thousand similar suppositions might be made respecting the
ultimate point of any constituti9nal institution. The British
monarch can make an unlimited number of peers, and when,
under Walpole's ministry, the earl of Sunderland proposed to
close the list of peers forever, the commons most strenuously
opposed depriving the crown of this prerogative, and to the
objection that the crown might make a hundred peers in one
creation, gave answer that the responsible minister stands
under public opinion-that many things which mig/zt be done
nevertheless cannot be done. Our congress has the right of
expelling any member by two-thirds of the votes: suppose
the members should league together to expel in the regular
way tlhe representatives of a certain district. All this might
be done, but it cannot be done unless public opinion sinks so
low as to permit it Thlere is no form, no guarantee, which
can protect a degraded people; no senate could protect under
a Tiberius, for all were degraded.
VOL. II.                  23
353 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
Another objection is, that although it be admitted that a
constant recurrence to the right of instruction would deprive
a parliamentary body of its deliberative character, yet it will
be resorted to only in cases of extremity.  This, however, is
by no means so very certain; custom and repetition might
soon reduce the representative system to one of mere deputies.  But let us admit even that this would not probably be
the case, all guarantees and checks are most important when
cases of magnitude arrive; they exist for that very purpose.
The most varied and even opposite forms are frequently indifferent in the common run of cases; but when the periods of
difficulty arrive it is the very time they must show their essence. We try the wisdom of a political law of importance
not by common cases but by great emergencies. The trial
-by jury is not of so great importance for the punishment of
petty thefts; other forms of trial might sometimes be even
preferable; but when difficulties arrive, when power of office
and public opinion, resentment of the judge and unbiassed
fairness, struggle with one another, then the trial by jury must
show whether it is justly held dear by the Anglican race or
not.
I know full well that it would be trying to see a senator
perseveringly vote against what, according to the existing
opinion, seems to be decidedly the general opinion of the
state, without having the power to correct him according to
the doctrine of instruction adopted by some states. But let
us weigh well whether it is not one of the very objects of the
constitution which orders him to be elected for six years, that
upon occasions he should not quickly follow a sudden turn
in the opinion at home; and, above all, whether, however
wrong or obstinate he may be, it is not upon the whole infinitely better to suffer this passing and specific evil than to
suffer the subversion of the representative character of the
senate-of the constitution itself.  Is there no such necessity
in politics as moral restriction, and manly suffering of an evil
in order to avoid a still greater one?  We  must ask again,
has public opinion no ultimate force in a free country? I be
354 
POLITIC,AL ETHICS.
lieve that no senator could possibly withstand for any length
of time the course of settled public opinion if opposed to his
course of action; though he may, as has often happened,
oppose the drift of general opinion on specific, single measures. He has, in my opinion, received his peculiar authority
by the constitution, among other reasons, for the very reason
that he may do so. WThen is it that a senator is generally instructed, or that this whole subject becomes important? Not
when he agrees with the instructions, nor when he flagrantly
abandons his former course upon which he was elected. He
cannot, in the nature of things, frequently dare to do so. He
knows too well that his character would be gone forever. Instruction, then, becomes important generally in those cases in
which not the senator but the opinion at home has suddenly
changed -since his election.  Is it not for these very cases that
the constitution grants him a term of six years, while it grants
only the brief period of two years to the representatives? Is
not the claim to the right of instruction by the state legislatures the old desire of power for more power, which steals so
easily upon all of us, and to check which is one of the objects
of fixed fundamental laws?
I do not believe that it has ever been maintained, even in
impassioned controversy, that the legislatures would have the
right to instruct when the senate was sitting as a high court
of impeachment. There seems to be something so revolting
in the case, reminding so directly of the worst cases under
the Stuarts, when the judges were distinctly told by the court
how to sentence, that I do not believe the right of instruction
has ever been claimed for these cases. But why not? Because the senators sit as judges, and because to judge without
trial, that is, to judge without conscientious conformity of
the judgment to what appears upon trial and with regard to
something else, is felt at once by every one to be the highest
iniquity.   But is it less unwise to legislate on any other
grounds except the information brought to us by the debate,
than it is iniquitous to judge except upon the information
brought to us by the trial? Does not a single legislature by
355 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
instruction assume to legislate for the Union, because it directs
the vote of one who still continues to enjoy by the constitution the character and influence of a legislative representative;
-thus assuming to decide the case, while the other uninstructed senators continue to be influenced by the debate and
the opinion of society at large as elicited by the deliberation?
Upon the general ground upon which the state legislatures
claim to instruct senators in legislative business the respective
governors might claim, and, in my opinion, with much more
plausible right, to instruct the senators upon executive business; for the governors, especially where they are elected by
the people directly, are the true representatives of the people
for all executive business. Yet this has never been claimed.
In giving these my views, I am well aware that I have expressed myself directly against what some distinguished men
have stated as their deliberate opinion, men in intellect and
experience much superior to me. Yet the opinions of other
great men support the views here given, and I believe it is
riot difficult to see that the former may have erred, as every
one is apt to err, by regarding the opposite of wrong to be
right., If we have to combat one evil we are apt to go too
far on the other side.  If there were not a corrective process
in the course of time, and if succeeding generations should
not take deeper and more enlarged views, no advance of civilization would be possible, and we should become Chinese,
looking back to their Confucius and Mencius as unalterable
types.  Not Plato, but Truth.
XV. It is evident from the previous remarks that the subject of instruction could not become matter of discussion so
long as the system of deputation existed; for this was founded
upon it. But when the deputies had changed into representa
x * The great, although natural, mistake of continental liberals towards the end
of the eighteenth century, and of Americans after them, was this, that they thought
that the establishment of liberty consisted ill the transmission of the assumed
powers and rights of the despot to the people. Liberty consists in something
essentially different.
356 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
tives, and the British parliament had gradually become more
and more distinctly acknowledged as the national representation, it was natural likewise that the precise relation in which
a representative, though national, still continues to stand to
his particular constituency, and his obligation to represent
their especial wishes, should become matter of earnest discussion. I believe the beginning of the history of this more
earnest discussion must be dated, as already mentioned, from
the time when- John Wilkes was elected by the Westminster
constituents, and more especially from Mr. Burke's speeches
to the electors at Bristol in November, I774. Mr. Burke, as
we have seen, maintains that the imperative duty of the
British representative requires him to attend to all the interests and desires of his constituents to his utmost power,
but likewise to vote to the utmost of his conscience as the
broad national interest demands, even should he go against
the supposed or actually expressed wishes of the majority of
his constituent-voters. The war between Great Britain and
America, as well as the whole spirit of the eighteenth century,
led many reflecting men to inquire, among other subjects,
into the precise character of a representative. The British
commons were, as is well known, under the almost total sway
of the aristocracy of the land, and far from representing in
many cases the people at large. In addition to this sway, the
powerful influence of the crown, and the protracted period of
seven years for which a member of the commons is elected,
since the passing of the septennial bill in I716, were causes
tending to separate the interests of the members of the house
of commons from the great mass of the people. These considerations, and the erroneous idea that the whole meaning
of the representative government was that of an expedient
and substitute for the meeting in the forum, made necessary
by increased population, prevailing among most liberally educated men towards the end of the last century, led many of
the prominent English advocates of parliamentary reform to
the opposite of the evil of which they complained, as is nearly
always the case during the first period of opposition to a deep
357 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
rooted error or other evil. Men like Burgh, in his Political
Disquisitions, and Major John Cartwright asserted that the
representative is (and they actually called him so) "the legislatorial attorney" of his constituents: at least this is the expression of Cartwright-thus reducing the representative to a
mere deputy of the feudal ages. The cause of this error is
now easily seen.  These men, whenever they spoke of liberty,
had in mind what was called in the first part of the present
work democratic absolutism. Their error, which was natural
in the course of this discussion, has, I hope, been exhibited.
A collection of "legislatorial attorneys" would be far worse
than an "ecclesia" of the ancient absolute democracy, as we
have seen, because in the latter the individual voting for himself alone may be influenced by the demands of the public welfare, which the former cannot be, bound, mind and conscience,
as he is by his instruction and power of attorney. Indeed,
there is some contradiction in the term legislatorial attorney,
for a legislator must needs weigh and reflect, and shape his
course according to weighty considerations, even were lie to
legislate merely according to interested views. In the middle
ages the instructions were no contradiction, for in most cases
the deputies were not legislators proper, not at all so if we
compare their functions with those of our representative
bodies; they assembled chiefly for the granting of subsidies,
acknowledgizng laws or persons, or exacting franchises.  It is
now amply settled that the British member of parliament is
the representative of the nation.'
As late as 1837, the radical member for Leeds, being applied to by the secretary of the Leeds Commnittee for giving relief to certain people of Leeds, said in
his answer-if the papers reported correctly-that he was the representative of
England, Scotland, and Ireland, and not of the borough of Leeds, and that he
could not provide for all the needy of the realm.  (London  Ledger, October
I837.)  Hume gives a few remarks on instruction, with particular reference to
the then existing British system of representation, in a note appended to Essay
IV. of his Moral, Political, and Literary Essays. The fourth Essay is on the
Principles of Government. These Essays were published in I792, after Mr.
Burke, therefore, had treated of the subject. Hume's remarks, however, are
quite passing only.
358 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
In France, as we have seen already, the opposite course
took place: liberty became closely allied with the defeat of
specific instructions and the elevation of the deputy to the
dignity of a national representative; and in the many phases
through which the cause of liberty has passed in that country
during the last hlalf-century the representative was always repressed into a deputy whenever the cause of absolute power
was in the ascendant.   When  Louis XVIII. returned to
France in I814 the name of deputy was retained, as it well
agreed with the general spirit of the charter promulgated by
him-an  instrument which cautiously granted the least degree of liberty compatible with the urgent demands of the
nation, and with the necessity on the part of the Bourbons of
creating some sort of support for themselves. When in 1830
the charter was amended, and the power of the chamber of
deputies greatly increased, the name was not changed; but
the present French deputy is essentially and avowedly a
national representative, not a departmental deputy.
In the United States the subject of instruction has become
especially interesting on account of the senators.   Many state
legislatures have passed resolutions "to instruct the senators
and request the representatives" to oppose or promote certain
measures; but many senators have likewise resisted, and of
course, as there is no power conferred by the constitution to
remove a non-complying senator, have done so successfully.
Indeed, instruction by legislatures cannot be said to have as
yet assumed any higher authority than that of very distinct
and implicit information, to which of course the senator is
bound in strict conscience to pay the highest regard, as a
governor, elected by the people, would pay due regard to
powerful petitions or resolutions of powerful and respectable
meetings in cases of great emergency, but would not receive
instructions. In the state of Virginia alone it is considered
by many that the right of instruction has, in a sort, become
common law of the state; that is, a citizen accepting the
senatorial chair might be considered as having accepted it on
the implied condition of acknowledging instruction, provided
359 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
always this citizen have not during his previous life candidly
and openly expressed his opinion; or distinctly, previously to
his election, to the contrary. Yet even in Virginia the diffi culty is by no means removed which must forever arise outt
of the contradiction which necessarily lies in instruction in
America, for the two simple reasons that the so-called right
of instruction, though of organic and fundamental importance,
is merely imnplied, nowhere granted, hence is without means
for its enforcement, and consequently unsubstantial; and that'
a senator, who must be supposed to be a conscientious man
and hence feel the sacred obligations of oaths, takes a solemn
oath upon a distinct law and instrument, called the constitution, which is above him, legislature, and all, as much as the
law of nature and God is above king and subject. This plainly
appeared in the case of Mr. Watkins Leigh, in I836, as mentioned above.  The argument of his letter is this: "I fully
acknowledge the right of instruction, but only within the constitution, by which all of us are primitively bound. If, therefore, you instruct me against the constitution, I cannot obey
without perjuring myself." Mr. Leigh did not resign, yet, as
he himself informs us in his letter, he was the citizen who
in I812 drew up the resolutions by which the legislature of
Virginia endeavored to establish the right of instruction, and
he endeavors to show that those resolutions do not apply to
his case in I836.' The legislature in such cases of course
I It is not easy to say what is the precise doctrine at present of Virginia, however simple the subject may appear at first glance. Mr. Leigh says in the letter
above cited that "the resolutions of the legislature in I812 were the work of his
own hands without assistlance fromi any other person whatever, and drawn up (as
he but too well remembers) with a haste which in his own apprehension at the
time materially impaired its value." However, he says that upon a recent and
careful review he finds no reason to retract or modify anything. Yet these very
resolutions were assumed and quoted in I836 as the rules upon which Mr. leigh
was instructed, and by him as supporting him in not obeying the instructions.
The instructions of I836 state that they merely "reassert" the right, which "surprises" Mr. Leigh. No one who knows the high integrity of this gentleman will
entertain for a moment any doubt that hlie expresses his real sentiments. I will
su/oin one of the resolutions of I836, because it seems to me very strongly to
360 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
answers, What is instruction, if not to guide you when we
differ? When we agree, there is no necessity for it; now, this
is a case of disagreement because we do not believe that what
we demand is against the constitution. It amounts in these
cases, indeed, precisely to the same dispute which has frequently occurred in the Catholic church, when a person acknowledged the infallibility of the pope upon all matters upon
which the decision belonged to him, matters of doctrine under
the dogma of the church, but denied that the specific subject
under question belonged to this class; while, on thle other
hand, the pope declared that his infallibility would amount to
nothing if it was not he himself who should determine whether
this was a case within his competence to decide or not. The
dispute of the Roman curia and the Jansenists turned upon
this very point. It is worthy of observation that if the Virginia theory of instruction were adopted the senate would be
a more changeable body than the house of representatives,
because many state legislatures are changed every year, at
least in their lower branch; and if they instruct accordingly
the senate is also changed yearly, and thus one of the most
fundamental features of our constitution would be annihilated.
From what has been stated before, it must clearly appear
that the author, in his humble judgment, considers the Virginia doctrine unwarranted, inconsistent, and unconstitutional.
Yet it is necessary for the reader to inform himself thoroughly
upon the subject; and I believe that the chief periods during
which the subject of instruction was most discussed and became more and more settled in Virginia are when the Bank
show how boldly men must always act in politics if they abandon the safe rule
of law and constitution.  It runs thus: "That after the solemn and now repeated
expression of the opinion of the general assembly on the right of instruction and
the duty of obedience thereto, no man ought henceforth to accept or retain the
appointment of senator of the United States from Virginia who does not hold
himself bound to obey such instructions or to resign the trust with which he is
clothed." If all legislatures make similar proclamations, an entirely new provision is evidently added to the constitution of the United States, without pursuing the constitutionally prescribed course.  Power, and nothing but arrogated
power, would in that case have changed the constitution.
36I 
POLITICA L ETHICS.
of the United States was chartered in I79I, when the renewal
of the charter was discussed in congress in I 8 I,I and when
the Virginia senators in I836 were instructed to vote for the
before-mentioned expunging resolution, upon which occasion
one of the senators declined to give the vote required, but resigned, while the other declined both the vote and the resignation, on the ground, as we have seen, that the instruction
was against the constitution. I must refer to the debates,
resolutions, and letters relating to the subject.
x See Mr. Giles, senator from Virginia, on this occasion, against instruction, in
the Legislative and Documentary History of the Bank of the United States, Clarke
and Hall, Washington, I832; and the resolutions of the Virginia legislature,
passed in February, I812, drawn up, March 2, I836, by Mr. Leigh.  There is no
point at which arrogation of power can stop. Although Mr. Watkins Leigh is
-the author of these resolutions, he quoted them in his own defence for not complying with the instruction in I836, but without effect upon the legislature: on the
contrary, they passed very strong resolutions against "the two several letters of
Benjamin Watkins Leigh," in December, I836. i (See Niles's Register.) Several of the debates on the adoption of the constitution of the United States, as
published by congress, contain interesting passages respecting this subject.
There is a series of articles against instruction.by Mr. Hopkinson, of Philadelphia,
Circuit Judge of the United States, of great merit, and for instructions, by an
author with whose name I am unacquainted, in several numbers of the Literary
Messenger, published at Richmond, Virginia, of the year 1837.  The judge delivered likewise a speech against instruction on the floor of congress, in I812.
The Federalist (especially the remarks of Mir. Madison) is of course to be consulted. It will sound, I allow, strange if an author refers his reader to a work
which is not yet published and with the contents of which hle is entirely unacquainted, and yet I cannot but refer to the Madison Papers, now printing by congress; for I cannot doubt that they must contain much valuable matter bearing
upon the point of our discussion, since they contain the debates of the constituent
congress on the constitution then forming, and I humbly yet confidently hope that
they will support the arguments of the text, especially the chief one, that it
was the very intention of the constituent congress to superinduce the representative system upon the former deputative, as established in the Articles of
Confederation.
362 
CHAPTER III.
Responsibility of the Representative.-Pledges.-Implied and positive, general
and specific Pledges.-Are Pledges moral, and consistent with general Liberty
and Justice?-When are they so?-Pledges originated with the Court Party
and Aristocracy.-Strong Power of Implied Pledges.-Breaking Implied
Pledges, and throwing  one's self upon  the Constituents by Resignation. Duties of Presiding Officers of deliberative Assemblies; Speakers.
XVI. WE have found that one of the most essential results
of a well-regulated and truly representative government is
the security and protection of public liberty, that is, of civil
liberty- as appertaining to and extending over the whole state,
the whole jural society as one organic thing, and not as a
loosely connected chain of separate  independences.  This
broad, extensive public liberty consists, together with the
protection of all essential individual-or, as we have called
them previously, primordial-rights, in the sway of public
opinion, and its regular passing over, by a safe and organic
process, into public will-that is, law.  This public opinion
which becomes public will is the well-ascertained and clearlysettled opinion of the whole jural society or state, sifted and
freed from the adhesions of momentary excitement, of sordid
and local selfishness, and of the tyrannical dictation of one part
of society over the rest. The elements of which this supreme
public opinion is formed are the opinions of the several parts
of that society, closely and truly represented or enunciated
by their respective representatives, gathered according to an
even, fair, and proportionate distribution over the whole of
the society, upon principles which appear to that particular
society the best adapted for collecting the opinion of the
whole, and modified by mutual influence according to the
main and fundamental principle upon which all legislation and
execution rest, that is, general justice and public welfare. An
additional and equally important feature of the representative
363 
POL ITICAL ETIICS.
government is that civil liberty requires that no one should
finally act in any matters of the state without responsibility:
where this principle is abandoned, there is absolutism. As
the prince, therefore, in constitutional or representative monarchies cannot dictate laws at will, although he be, within the
constitution and as long as it lasts, personally irresponsible,
so does public liberty on the other hand, and especially in
republics, where the people are the acknowledged powerholders, require that they do not dictate directly their laws
upon no responsibility, which would constitute democratic
absolutism, but through responsible intermediate personsthe representatives; although the people, as the monarch in
the previous case, are irresponsible in their suffrage for representatives. The representative who has received these constitutionally-not morally-irresponsible suffrages is bound
in alil his actions, so soon as elected, by the constitution of
the land, and is responsible to the people, who pronounce
upon him by their next election, but not in each single case
in which he votes; for this last would establish at once direct
dictation of the power-holder and defeat one of the main
objects of representative government.
The representative, then, must represent his constituents
closely, under the mediating and uniting influence of general
welfare, and hold himself responsible to the people. These
considerations, I think, will lead us safely in discussing the
subject of pledges.
XVII. Representative pledges are assurances or gages given
by a candidate respecting his future course as a representative,
should he be elected. They may be implied or positive, and
the latter may be general or specific. Frequently it is impossible for the electors to have a sufficiently accurate knowledge
of the candidate's views respecting subjects of great importance in their estimation. Meetings therefore will propound,
through committees, certain questions, which the candidate
is required to answer, and on which the suffrages of the
querist are made to depend. -Since the representative is bound
364 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
in duty to discharge his office with strict honesty, a perfect
understanding between the constituents and himself is important, and, in order to give him the necessary weight in his
elevated position, indispensable. So long, therefore, as the
pledges touch principles and views they are right; but the
sacred duty of the representative-and he has none so sacred
as this-to do all he can for the public benefit according to
his best judgment, which consists of the opinion of his constituents brought along with him, but enlightened and regulated by the contact with that of other parts, represented and
pronounced by his fellow-representatives, must prevent him
from giving pledges as to any definite measures or laws, for in
this case he robs other citizens of their undoubted right to
state their opinion through their representative and ask a
proper share of influence upon the opinion of the legislative
body for it before the law be finally passed.
There are times of the utmost exigency in which everything
seems to turn upon one mneasure which for years has been
discussed by the nation at large and as to which a candidate
is undoubtedly authorized to give a more definite pledge than
is compatible with his duty in common cases. Such a one I
take to have existed when, in I832, the question in England
was reform or not reform. Yeti here again itwould have been
very presumptuous in a candidate to promise that he would
only vote for such or such minute details as might be laid
before him on the hustings. Every one sees that pledges of
detailed laws are nothing less than antecedent instruction, so
that they would amount to a bargaining for votes, and would
raise party power and exclusion very high; because a voter
might desire to vote for a candidate on account of one pledge,
but not of others.  Definite pledges, therefore, either beyond
principles or great outlines of important broad measures
which had long been before the people and had formed per.
haps for periods broad party distinctions, would at once defeat
the object of representative government, and cannot be given
by an honest citizen who religiously loves his country; but
they are as a matter of course very readily proffered by dema
365 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
gogues, the fawning courtiers of the people, just as some
judges were ever ready to inform James I. how they would
give judgment in such or such a case should it be brought
before them.
Pledges, like instructions, have often been believed to. be
necessarily connected with the popular or liberal cause, but
history shows the fact to be very different.  Pledges to the
court and ministers were formerly common, and Lord
Brougham showed in parliament that ministerial and aristocratic pledges were common and customary at the time when
one lord would return ten or fifteen members, and that no
pledges were exacted on the popular side, but that they did not
originate, as had been stated, with the reform of parliament
in I832.'  Lord Brougham is decidedly opposed to pledges,
as highly injurious to the cause of liberty and the necessary
character of a member of the commons as a representative
of the nation. I subjoin the opinion of a gentleman who has
distinguished himself alike for sound thought and liberal feeling, and who was foremost in the cause of reform.' There are
I Hansard, xxx., page 590, debate of August I7, T835.-James II., desirous
to have his decreed "liberty of conscience" sanctioned by the parliament to be
assembled, sent, in I687, military officers, civil officers, priests, and laymen of
influence, into various counties, to obtain pledges of certain persons that if
elected they would vote for the king's measure. " The most general answer
appears to have been that, if chosen to serve in parliament, the individuals to
whom the questions were put would vote according to their consciences, after
hearing the reasons on both sides; that they could not promise to vote in a manner which their own judgment after discussion might condemn; that if they
entered into so unbecoming an engagement they might incur the displeasure of
the house of commons for betraying its privileges; and that they would justly
merit condemnation from all good men for disabling themselves firom performing
the duty of faithful subjects l)y the honest declaration of their ju(dgmienct on those
arduous affairs on which they were to advise and aid the king." Mackintosh,
Reviesv of the Causes of the Revoluttion in i688, chapter vi.
2 Mr. Macaulay, in the Letter to the Secretary of the Leeds Political Union, in
August, I832, quoted in a previous passage, where I treated of Canvassing, says,
"I wish to add a few words touching a question which has lately been much
canvassed,-I mean the question of the Pledges.  In this letter, and in every
letter which I have written to my friends at Leeds, I have plainly declared my
opinions.  But I think it, at this juncture, my duty to declare that I will give NO
366 
POLITICAL ETIICS.
several striking instances of manly resistance against pledges.
A near connection of Lord Brougham's resigned his place
l LEDGES. I will not bind myself to make or to support any particular motion.
I will state as shortly as I can some of the reasons which have induced me to form
this determination.  The great beauty of the representative system is that it
unites the advantages of popular control with the advantage arising from a d(ivision
of labor: just as a physician understands medicine better than an ordinary man
-just as a shoemaker makes shoes better than an ordinary man-a person whose
life is passed in transacting affairs of state becomes a better statesman than an
ordinary man. In politics, as well as every other department of life, the public
ought to have the means of checking those who serve it. If a man finds that he
derives no benefit from the prescription of his physician, he calls in another; if
his shoes do not fit him, he changes his shoemaker; if his representatives misgovern him, he can discard them at the next election: but when he has called
in a physician of whom he hears a good report, and whose general practice he
believes to be judicious, it would be absurd in him to tie down that physician to
order particular pills and particular draughts; while he continues to be a customer of a shoemaker, it would be absurd in him to sit by and meet every motion
of that shoemaker's hand; and in the same manner it would, I think, be absurd
in him to require positive pledges and to exact daily and hourly obedience from
his representative.  My opinion is that electors ought at first to choose cautiously,
then to coiifi(le liberally; and when the term for which they have selected their
member has expired, to review his conduct equitably and to pronounce on the
whole taken together.
Consider, too, that the business of a member of parliament is the pursuit,
not of speculative truth, but of practical good; and that though, in speculation,
every truth is consistent with every other truth, yet in practice one good measure
may be incompatible with another. It is often absolutely necessary to bear with
a lesser evil in order to get rid of a greater.  For example, I think the corn-laws
an evil; but if there had been in this parliament a hundred or a hundred and
fifty members absolutely bound by pledges to attempt the abolition of the cornlaws, there would have been a division in the ranks of the reformers; the tories
would have triumphed; and I verily b)elieve that, at the moment at which I am
writing, Lord John Russell's bill would have been lost, and the duke of Wellington would have been prime minister.  Suchl cases may and will occur again.
Some such cases I can, I think, distinctly foresee.  I conceive, therefore, that it
is the true wisdom of electors to choose a representative whom they believe to be
honest and enlightened, and, having chosen him, to leave him a large discretion.
WVhenl his term expires-when he again presents himself before them —it will be
their duty to take a general survey of his conduct, and to consider whether he
have or have not pursued that course which  has, under all the circumstances,
most tended to promote the public good.
"If the people of Leeds think] fit to repose in me that confidence which is
necessary to the proper discharge of the duties of a representative, I hope that I
367 
t POLITiCAL ETHICS.
because he would give no pledges, though he agreed with his
constituents on all points on which they asked pledges."
XVIII. Implied pledges, for the reason that they are inmplied, have a very strong power, as they necessarily have
everywhere with a gentleman. Implied pledges are derived
from the life of the individual, his professed principles, his
habitual siding with one or the other party, or from some
definite action which may justly induce the voters to believe
that it indicates some distinct view or other. The implied
party pledge can never go farther, as must clearly appear from
what was stated on parties as well as on the general character
of pledges, than the broad civil principles and views upon
which the party is avowedly built; they cannot bind the individual to vote on all important occasions blindly with the
party. On the contrary, it is just these highly important
occasions on which the citizen may feel himself conscientiously bound to leave the party. Suppose a member has
been elected as a member of one party, and after his election
the question of war or peace, and, as he believes, dishonor
and  nmisfortune, comes up.   His party votes against war,
which he conscientiously believes to be necessary for the
country.   In this case he cannot be considered as being
bound by an implied or moral pledge to his constituents to
vote against the war, for the great pledge of public welfare
shall not abuse it. If it be their pleasure to fetter their members by positive
promises, it is in their power to do so. I can only say that on such terms I cannot conscientiously serve them."
I ought to refer the reader back to the passage previously quoted, because part
of it very strongly bears upon the present point.
The scene which happened when Mr. Poulett Thomson was nominated at
Manchester, Ellgland, in I835, as reported in the London papers of the time, is
sufficiently characteristic and instructive. The candidate underwent a long and
detailed pul)lic examination which he sustained with dignity and apparent honesty, without binding his conscience by absolute pledges.   The account was
copied into the American papers, for instance the National Gazette, Philadelphia,
of June, 1835.
368 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
stands first; nor ought he to resign before voting, for it may
be very important in his conscientious opinion for the country
that he should give his vote. In these cases, however, in
which he changes but his constituents do not, it will be
honorable, honest, and gentlenianlike to throw himself upon
the judgment pf his constituents by a resignation, as of course
also it will be in those cases in which the representative has
knowingly broken the implied pledge on grounds of unavoidable urgency. Sir Robert Peel justly resigned his seat
for the university of Oxford, February 4, 1829, because he had
determined to introduce measures for the relief of the Roman
Catholics, while previously, and before matters assumed so
dark an aspect of threatening civil war in Ireland-as Lord
Wellington at least confessed in the lords-he had always
strenuously opposed Catholic emancipation, and he knew perfectly w'ell that of all bodies in the world the university of
Oxford would probably be the very last to send a member
who should profess liberal principles towards the Catholics.t
The implied pledge seems to me to require the tenderest
regard.
XIX. A  subject which demands the faithful attention of
the representative, wherever the modern representative system
exists, is the interpretation of the fundamental law, and its
construction in those cases for which it does not specifically
provide, but which nevertheless must be judged by that instrument.  In the ancient deputative system, the deputy being
directly occupied with the advantage of his corporation and
of the estate to which it belonged, the case was not so difficult. Charters or other fundamental laws might be inter
x When Sir Francis Burdett, elected as a whig, openly became a tory in I837,
he resigned his seat, at the request of some of his constituents, to stand a new
election at Westminster, and, by the great exertion of the tories, was re-elected
against Mr. Leader. Had he not done so, it is evident that he must have lost
all power, influence, and consideration, for it would have been a palpable desertion and betrayal of his constituents.
VOL. II.                           24
369 
0  POLITICAL ETHICS.
preted with much ease by them, as by special attorneys, by
lawyers in their special pleading. The case is very different,
however, where public liberty is sought for with a legislation
based upon public spirit, and where the representative is
bound to understand and interpret-for whatever consists in
human words must be interpreted-the constitution, as the
conscientious representative of the whole society. It was at
this stage of my work that I originally intended to give my
views of interpretation and construction, but, as I have indicated in the preface, my remarks increased to such an extent,
without the possibility of curtailing them so as not to injure
the clearness of the subject, that I resolved to follow the advice of publishing them separately.,  I consider, however, the
subject of interpretation so closely connected with political
ethics, not indeed in its distinct rules, but in their faithful
application, that I feel bound to refer the reader to the work
alluded to, as to a complement of this work.
XX. The experience of all constitutional countries has
amply shown-what every one who has ever been a member
of a deliberative assembly with power to decree is fully convinced of-that no such assembly can in the least degree approach the object for which it meets, if considerable power be
not given to its presiding officer, especially when it consists
of many members, like the British commons or the French
deputies, who amount to nearly six hundred. The history of
the first French revolution proves the lamentable consequences of a want of knowledge in managing the debates
and rules of order, as I have stated before; and Dumont,
teh judicious and experienced author of the Reminiscences
of Mirabeau and of the two first legislative assemblies, enumerates among the nine chief causes of the unfortunate turn
taken by the French revolution as the third, "the bad mode
I Legal and Political Hermeneutics, or Principles of Interpretation and Construction in Law and Politics, with Remarks on Precedents and Authorities. 2d
edition, Boston, 1839.
370 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
of deliberating;"' in which opinion every one who knows
the details must readily agree with him. The importance of
judicious parliamentary debating has been spoken of: here it
must be observed that the chief part of this vitally important
subject is formed by the rules to be enforced by the speaker,
to which many other important duties are generally added,
especially that of appointing committees. Even if a speaker
had no other duty and power than that of granting the floor
by "catching the eye of a risen member, "-and he or some
individual must needs have this power,-and that of appointing committees, his power must be very great indeed, and
may be very outrageously abused to the detriment of all fairness and free representation. The presiding member who has
the power held by the American and English speakers-that
of the presiding lord on the woolsack is considerably lessmust always remember that he holds one of the most exalted
stations; he presides over and in a measure guides the representation of the whole nation; to whatever party he may have
belonged, the moment he is elected he ought to remember
the words of Louis XII., who had been duke of Orleans, when
he became king: "The king of France must not revenge the
injuries done to the duke of Orleans;" for as the whole representative organism is the nation's, so is the speaker emphatically a national officer; upon him rests in a great measure
the whole operation of the representative system; he may
promote a free hearing of all parties, for which they are sent
there, if he do his duty, or debar it by injustice. A speaker
ought to remember that he is speaker of the whole house,
that is, of the whole representation of the whole nation, and
not of a party; that in giving an opportunity of speaking,
therefore, and in appointing upon committees, justice and fairness ought always to guide him, as in all other acts done by
the authority of his chair. The more necessary the great and
discretionary power is which he exercises, the more is he
I Souvenirs sur Mirabeau, ouvrage posthume publi6 par J. L. Duval, Brussels,
1822, chapter xvii.
371 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
bound morally to exercise as a true citizen, justly, judiciously,
and patriotically.,
I The r~glements of the various legislative bodies on the continent, as the
French call all that part of our parliamentary law and usage which relates to the
internal management of the house itself, are interesting on this account. It is by
far the best r~glement, here as in so many other cases, if public opinion is so
strong that it prevents the speaker from widely swerving from his duties. Long
custom and the conviction that strict justice in the speaker is to the advantage of
all cause the speaker of the British commons to act, upon the whole, with great
justice and high-minded impartiality.
372 
BOOK VII.
CHAPTER I.
Executive Officers.-Difficulty of controlling them.-Their Interference with Elec tions: in Athens, Rome, France, England, the United States.-Plato's Opinion
of the Duties of Officers.-Post-Office.-The Chief Executive Officer.-Confi dential Officers.-Official Interpretation of Constitutions and Laws.-The Veto.
-Ancient and Modern Veto.-Absolute, suspensive, and conditional Vetoes.
-Privilege of Pardoning in Monarchies; in Republics.-Danger and Diffi culty in Republics.-For what purpose is it granted?-Rules which ought to
be observed in making use of the Power of Pardoning.
I. "How can a man serve the public? When out of office,
his sole object is to attain it; and when he has attained it, his
only anxiety is to keep it. In his unprincipled dread of losing
his place he will readily go all lengths." These words sound
as if they were taken from a modern debate or a discussion in
our papers of recent date, yet they were spoken two thousand
five hundred years ago by the greatest sage of a people at the
other end of the world, uttetly independent in its whole civilization upon the western, Caucasian race to which we belong;
they are the words of the Chinese sage Confucius,x in which I
have substituted only the word public for that of prince,-not
an illegitimate substitution; for even the Chinese acknowledge in their laws, their classical works, and in the prayers
offered up by the emperor, that he is the vicegerent of heaven
for the maintaining of justice, order, morality; in short, for
the benefit of the people.
The Greeks found the same difficulty of controlling their
executive officers. Their whole history testifies to the fact.
It is shown also by the constant, generally annual, rotation
- Lun-yu, Conversations and Sayings of Confucius, recorded by his Disciples,
chap. I7, sect. I6, quoted from Davis's "The Chinese." [Liin-yiu has been
translated by Schott, I830.]
373 
t POLITICAL ETHICS.
in office, and the drawing of lots in some cities for offices and
magistracies; by the very extensive system of checks, which,
in Athens for instance, was carried out into the minutest de tails, as the reader may see in Boeckh's Public Economy, book
ii. 8; by the repeated and periodical inquiry not only into the
accounts of officers, but into the whole administration of their
office-the eb,Vn,, which the Greeks valued very highly, and
upon the absence of which in the Lacedamonian council
Aristotle animadverts (Politics, ii. 9;)-and by the Athenian
nomophylakes, the office intended for the purpose of control ling the officers. And to mention no other of the many laws,
institutions, and events which prove the fact, we actually meet
with insurrections of the people against the officers, who,
it was believed, had established themselves as a party and
become an unlawful oligarchy, such as that of the Thespians mentioned in Thucydides, book vi. 95. Comp. also
Aristot., Pol. vi. 7, I9.
The whole Roman history is one continued commentary
on the difficulty and danger to be encountered in the solution
of the grave political problem, how to give sufficient power
to the officers, and at the same time to prevent them from
arrogating more, and uniting into a formidable aristocracy of
placemen.
Modern monarchies and republics offer no different spectacle. The crown or executive has the command over the
legion of executive officers, and must have it in a high degree,
for otherwise no government would be able to obtain its end;
and, on the other hand, this influence is abused for purposes
separate from the interests of the state, or directly hostile to
the liberties of the people, and to the very objects for which
alone the whole government is established, and for which the
different officers have received authority under and within the
same. Every chief executive officer of whatever name, king,
president, or consul, and every subaltern under them,-indeed,
every one that has power,-feels, when opposed, the desire
rise in his bosom to carry his point and to interrupt the steady
course of law by the "per speciale mandatum regis," by which
374 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
the Stuarts would have set at nought all British liberty, had
they been suffered to do it. The whole struggle for civil
liberty in England turns upon what the commons thought
undue influence of the executive in setting aside acts of parliaments, despite special acts of parliaments against this
license and against the boldly arrogated influence and direction of elections on the part of the executive, which forms a
peculiar difficulty in all representative governments.
In France, to speak but of the latest times, we find that the
first charge against Polignac, when impeached after the July
revolution of I830, was that of having unconstitutionally interfered with the freedom of election, by sending circulars to all
public functionaries, requiring them to vote for the ministerial
candidates, in addition to which, written evidence was exhibited.showing that places and offices had been promised in
return for votes.2
In the United States we find in the report made by a committee sent in I839 by congress to the city of New York, to
inquire into certain affairs connected with the custom officers
of that city, that they had been assessed, not indeed by authority, in proportion to their salaries to furnish contributions
towards election expenses. Nor is it possible here to pass
over in silence the open interference of the office-holders with
the election laws of the state, which occurred in the state of
Maryland in the year I836.
II. The difficulty then has been felt at all times and in all
governments, but in some respects it greatly increases with
the establishment and firmer securing of modern liberty, such
as it has been characterized in the previous book. A government whose only object is security and justice, not liberty,
It is perhaps not useless for me to refer here, among the many authors and
collections relating to this point, to Brodie's British Empire, vol. i. p. I 13, et
seq., and, indeed, to the whole of his Introduction; the reader will find there
and in Hallam's Constitutional History all the necessary references carefully
collected.
2 English Annual Register of I830, published in I831, p. 224.
375 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
has to watch over the honesty, efficiency, and obedience of
the officers only; but where the additional and highly important object of government is the security and protection of
liberty, the people have a right to watch over the officers that
they do not interfere with it, especially with the elections, the
primary means by which we endeavor to secure it. If the
officers paid by the state to serve as agents of the government
interfere with it, this virtually amounts to conspiring against
one of the greatest of state objects: it is a capital usurpation.
We have seen that the very idea of modern liberty-stateliberty as contradistinguished to feudal corporation libertyrequires enlarged societies and continuous and systematic
governments. These again require a large number of officers
well united into one coherent system, and thus, of course, expose society in the same degree to the danger of seeing those
who were intended to be the mere agents of the law and government becoming the masters or leaders, secure in their
places, from which it may become the highest interest of
society to dislodge them. There is no single and absolute
principle, however, by strict adherence to which we may be
sure to avoid all difficulty, as by the fixed operation of a
machine. The contrary has been often erroneously supposed.
The Greeks at length threw aside all consideration of talent
and peculiar moral fitness, and resorted to the lot., The state,
as was natural, rapidly declined, and bribery and dishonesty became the order of the day. Incessant rotation begets evils as
great as the danger intended to be avoided by it. It prevents
any one from making himself thoroughly acquainted with his
official duties, deprives society of the service of many most
qualified persons, and, by holding out a hope to the least
qualified to have their turn of office, begets a general gree.iness and thirst for it, and a mean anxiety for salary among
those who either are unfit or indisposed for any steady, regular, and laborious trade or profession,-to the exclusion of
I [The author seems to think the lot universal in Greece, but it belonged to
extreme democracy, and became more common with time; but even at Athens
sundry officers were chosen by chirotonia.]                            p
376
t 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
those to whom an office no longer affords any inducement,
either by way of remuneration or honor, to interrupt their
own proper pursuits. Thus the government sinks gradually
more and more, and becomes the most expensive of all; for
t ere is nothing more expensive than to feed indolence and
incapacity, while a state loses just so much in nerve and
healthiness as the desire to obtain money without labor increases, and as offices are bestowed for other reasons than
merit and capacity. The more an officer knows that he does
not stand upon his own merit and capacity, so much the more
dependent he feels himself to be upon his employers, and considers himself their tool and servant, not the public's, a mere
party follower whom good luck has thrown into a good berth,
of which, therefore, he must make the best while the time
lasts. Want of high-toned honor, genuine love of liberty
and country, ready devotion to her best interests, whole and
entire, and pride of his citizenship, must give way to-a spirit
of dishonor and dishonesty; he sinks from a citizen of his
country to a lackey of his party; from a deserving citizen who
is conscious that the workman is worthy of his hire, to a pilfering or blood-sucking slave.  The system of throwing all
appointments into the hands of the people affords no certain
guarantee in itself; for if the general spirit of honor and lib-i
erty is depressed, this system will only make of every idler a
petty demagogue, hurrying on general decay. The system
of mutual check and periodical inquiry-of the last importance, and far too much neglected in many modern states-is
still not sufficient alone to guard against the danger; witness
its little utility in Athens. We must acknowledge, then, that
in addition to wise laws relating to the tenure of offices, to the
real responsibility of those who hold them, and to the power
of appointment and removal, conscientious discharge of official
duties and jealous watching over them on the part of the
people are of the highest importance, and cannot be dispensed
with, whatever laws or principles we may resort to. It is the
error of those who fail in experience, or take but superficial
views of the affairs of men, to believe that a sort of govern
377 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
ment machine can be possibly invented, or some principle be
discovered, which must operate exactly, independently of the
character of its agents. Were it so, man would no longer be
the moral being which his Creator made him. The science
of politics has to treat of the laws and principles by which
men will be most likely to secure a discharge of official actions consentaneous to the constitution and the objects of the
state; it is for political ethics to consider the duties of official
men, and impress them upon the citizen. Let us keep strictly
in our mind that as the great problem of our times is to unite
civil liberty with extensive, socialized states, which as we
have seen is to be obtained by the representative system, so
it is one of the more important of our problems to make a
large number of officers compatible with civil liberty-a
problem the solution of which we can hardly say has as yet
fairly begun, and which, like every great political problem,
cannot be solved by merely proclaiming and inconsiderately
carrying through some apparently very simple and symmetrical theory, but must be solved by results obtained by
lofty views applied with careful observation, conscientious
love of truth, and wise consideration of all the given circumstances, and of the gradual development of the many relations
which constitute the state."
III. All those duties and principles which are most important respecting executive officers are so simple, so clear and
If we study history with that spirit of truth which alone makes it a wise instructor, we shall find that no men have been greater benefactors to their countries or times than those whose moral and intellectual loftiness led them to adopt
great and elevated principles, and whose comprehensive and penetrating mind
enabled them to apply them wisely for the whole of society, who, therefore, even
while they struggled actively and zealously against obstacles, comprehended,
nevertheless, in their true and ultimate object the whole; and that none have
done more injury than those men who, possessed of a narrow mind, were nevertheless placed in high stations, either by birth or circumstances, and whose confined intellect made them settle upon some general theses and adore them with
obstinate idolatry without regard to reality. Some of the prominent actors in the
French revolution, and James II. of England, are instances of the latter; Henry
IV. of France, and Washington, of the former.
378 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
evident, that they are hardly ever denied by word of mouth;
yet it is very different if we consider men's actions. We must
pay, then, some attention to points which otherwise it would
be gratuitous in an author to touch. Though truisms, they
must be repeated.
Cicero says in his Offices, "Those who design to be partakers in the government should be sure to remember those
two precepts of Plato: first, to make the safety and interest
of their citizens the great aim and design of all their thoughts
and endeavors, without ever considering their own personal
advantage; and secondly, to take care of the whole collective
body of the republic so as not to serve the interest of any
one party to the prejudice or neglect of all the rest: for the
government of a state is much like the office of a guardian or
trustee, which should always be managed for the good of the
pupil, and not of the persons to whom he is intrusted; and
those men who, whilst they take care of one part of the citizens, neglect or disregard another, do but occasion sedition
and discord." (Offices, i. 25.) No one dares to deny the
truth of these words, yet thousands act in opposition to them.
The officer is the officer of the government which is for the
benefit of the people, and "by the word people is signified a
community taken as a whole; but an oligarchy means only
a party." (Athenagoras in Thucydides, vi. 39.)
From this fundamental truth it naturally follows that the
officer must not abuse his position for his own interest or that
of his friends or party, nor to the injury or detriment of the
people, and he must conscientiously strive to obtain the object for which he is appointed, that is, first, to act according
to the true spirit of the laws, and secondly, to do as much
essential service to the public as he can. Respecting the first
point, dishonesty, as well as the pampering of any passion or
lust, is wholly and essentially against the oath, nay, the very
sense, of office. No charge has ever been held more odious
than that of official filching or robbing on a large scale. We
have sufficiently considered this subject under the head of
Honesty. The officer acts equally against this fundamental
379 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
principle when he supports matters personal to himself by
official power, be this on a small scale in an underling, or
on a large scale by designating those who oppose him as opponents to the public welfare. Parties are very apt to confound these two points which are yet distinct: they frequently
go so far as to stigmatize every one who is not the open,
active friend of their leader as not only hostile to him but to
the public at large. The ministerialists under George III. of
England and Charles X. of France called themselves the
king's friends, and Mr. O'Connell, on the accession of Victoria, wrote a letter to Ireland to form a party to be called the
queen's friends. In the United States those who oppose the
administration, or only a single measure, have been repeatedly
termed enemies of the constitution.
As an officer is grossly dishonest who uses official information for his own pecuniary advantage, or furnishes early information to his personal or political friends, so is he likewise
grossly dishonest who uses the power and influence, or even
the means which he obtains through his well-earned salary,
for party purposes, especially for elections. This the laws
and political procedures of all free nations corroborate. Of
all usurpations one of the most odious and unwarranted is
an oligarchy of place-holders, men who use the very means
granted them by the people against them-for they use their
power against the people as soon as they interfere with the
free operation of elections, whether this be by influence beforehand, or by making themselves active at the polls. I have
seen in the United States sheriffs, who have no official business at the polls as they have in England, taking a most
offensive part in "bringing up" voters, and other procedures.
It is surprising that all the world agrees to set down a man as
an offender who uses a power of attorney for his own benefit
or against his employer, and yet that the officer, under oath
to keep the laws of the land, and having received his office,
directly or indirectly, only for the intended benefit of his employers, should not be considered such when he does the
same thing. All political deliberations in the army or navy
380 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
are justly looked upon by free nations with a jealous eye, and
in most nations are punishable acts; but so ought likewise
the executive officer to be disfranchised as long as he holds
his office, and where this is not the law he ought in common
decency to abstain from such arrant political interference.
Still more odious and intolerable it becomes if whole institutions, established for the convenience or protection of the
people, are made use of to serve the partial interests of those
who happen to have authority over them. There is no institution more necessary for modern civilization, more directly
for the convenience and necessary wants of the people, and
the officers of which ought to consider the performance of its
duties more religiously sacred, because it exists by trust and
confidence alone, than the post-office. And yet this offers a
most wide-spread means of usurped influence, and of seriously
injuring some of the most essential interests of the citizen.
In several countries this sacred agent of European and American civilization has been shamelessly abused by its officers
for prying into the political sentiments or plans of the citizens;
and the large and peculiarly well organized, affiliated, and diffused body of postmasters has been made subservient to the
administration, thus superinducing a usurping government
upon that granted by law, which it is exceedingly difficult for
the citizens to shake off.,
IV. The duties of a superior or chief executive officer
necessarily embrace those of the citizen and of the subordinate officers in general, but the higher he stands, the more
imperious are the claims of duty upon him: especially is this
true of the chief magistrate, for he must be in many cases
the last resort, upon whom the ultimate decision depends.
As regards his more particular actions I propose to consider
I * It is to be considered whether the post-office ought not to be made independent. What has the postmaster to do with the cabinet? I have written an
article for the New York Review on the subject, at the suggestion of Senator
Preston. May, I84I.
38I 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
them in the following order:-his appointment of officers,
and discharging them, the use he makes of his personal in fluence and power in the legislation of the country, before a
bill comes fairly before him for approval, and the conformity
of his actions to the spirit of the laws and their interpretation, which is closely connected with the legitimate use which
he ought to make of peculiar privileges, for instance of the
power of pardoning.
As to the pervading and general principle of his conduct,
he, before all, ought to realize in his actions the great end and
object of the state, that is, justice; truth and justice on the
one hand, prudence and wisdom on the other, ought to be to
him what the light and heat of the sun on the one hand, and
care and foresight on the other, are to the husbandman.
When Charles V. had cited Luther before the diet at Worms,
and many high prelates importuned the emperor not to keep
his promise of safe-conduct to the heretic, the youthful monarch exclaimed, "If faith and truth are banished from all the
world, they must find with me a refuge."
The chief magistrate is the magistrate of the state, of the
whole.  He cannot too frequently represent this to his mind;
not only in order to avoid acts of injustice and low partiality
(do we not expect the same of every mayor, captain, schoolmaster, or father of a family?), but also in order to shape his
course and guide the government. All the science of ruling,
in whatever narrow or extensive sphere, resolves itself into
aiding the society over which we rule, and not part of that
society merely, in obtaining its greatest and highest end;
all the art of ruling resolves itself into reconciling, through
lofty principles, the opposites, mediating contrasts, and making
all parts, however opposed to one another, move towards the
same great and common goal. We rule, when we seize upon
the principle of life in each component part and make it aid
and support every other part; we only conquer or destroy
when we oppress or suppress one part by the help of another.
It has been mentioned several times how baneful it is for a
country if, in the appointment of officers, no regard is paid to
382 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
capacity; still worse if moral unfitness is disregarded, and
men with tainted or actually wrecked reputation, disowned by
the society of the honest, are seen clothed with public office,
to the detriment of that public moral feeling without which
political vigor and the necessary buoyancy of civic spirit cannot exist. Republics and monarchies are equally interested
in the appointment of fit and honorable persons., If capacity
for office no longer constitutes a title for office, general corruption and universal public robbery follow, while the affairs
of the commonwealth, conducted by imbecile men, are neglected, and a state of things is produced against which excited
party passion may be blind at the time, but which never fails
to produce melancholy and universally felt consequences for
the next generation.
That a chief officer will prefer a citizen of his own party if
he has the choice, is clear; he is in many cases bound to do
so; but, as has been remarked already, to appoint a less fit
person because he is one of our party, when a fit person might
have been found of different political opinions,-only he must
not be a zealot of his party,-is placing the party above the
public. Those officers who have to advise the chief magistrate,
or who fill offices the faithful execution of which requires an
I General Washington's views respecting appointments are given in his own
words in Sparks's Writings of George Washington, vol. i. p. 455. It is true that
Washington had to contend with no party; but there would have been parties
under almost any other mortal. I cannot forbear giving here Montesquieu's
impressive words respecting the court-government of Louis XV., for the French
government, after the injudicious total severance of the government from the
people, destroyed institutions and was embodied in the personality of the monarch. Montesquieu's words apply likewise to the Roman history, and partially,
mutatis mutandis, to some existing states as well: "L'ambition dans l'oisivit6, la
bassesse dans l'orgueil, le de6sir.de s'enrichir sans travail, l'aversion pour la vrit6,
la flatterie, la trahison, la perfidie, l'abandon de tous ses engagements, le m~pris
des devoirs du citoyen, la crainte de la vertu du prince, l'esperance de ses faiblesses, et plus que tout cela, le ridicule perpetuel jett6 sur la vertu, forment, je
crois, le caractere du plus grand nombre des courtisans. Or il est tres-malais6
que la plupart des principaux d'ut 6tat soient mal-honn.tes gens, et que les inferieurs soient gens de bien; que ceux-la soient trompeurs, et que ceux-ci consentent
t n'.tre que dupes
383 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
indispensable agreement of political principles as well as of
views and dispositions with those of the chief executive offi cer, in short, confidential officers, must, as a matter of course,
change with a change of the administration; but it produces
very evil consequences if it comes to be considered that a
change of the administration is the signal of a universal turning out of office, and if every minor officer is declared to be a
confidential one. Such a procedure produces a general thirst
for office and consequent subserviency in the party that is to
come in; it engenders a spirit of spoliation, and makes the
office to be considered a spoil won by victory, so that the
public service, the people, are forgotten; and when the party
is in, it makes the office-holders fearful to act openly as just
citizens in their simple and primary civil duties. A degree of
political recklessness is necessarily diffused in the state, and
'if it is not low sordidness which prompts to these actions, it is
the political bigotry which declares every one dissenting in
opinion to be opposed to public welfare, or even destitute of
honesty. James II., when heedlessly rushing on in his mad
career of projected absolutism, after the fashion of Louis XIV.,
declared (in I686, to Lord Rochester, Clarendon Correspondence, ii. I I7, and other works) that no one should retain an
office who was not "of his (the king's) opinion."   He must
have no other interest but what he acknowledges, supports,
and promotes. A compact and subservient body with official
subordination is thus formed; an aristocracy of officers, far
worse than an aristocracy of birth, is thus produced, and a
number of citizens are led meanly to betray their best rights
for fear of losing their posts; in short, the saying of Confiucius placed at the head of this chapter becomes amply verified. The French lately felt it with the greatest indignation
that some of the officers were turned out because they had
voted against the Mole ministry in I839. I repeat, all confidential officers ought to be changed if a different party comes
into the administration; but it is vicipus to make all subaltern
officers, for instance, those of the custom-house, confidential,
that is, to compel them to assist the administration, beyond
384 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
what the public service demands of them in their respective
places.,
z There are some passages of interest with reference to this subject in the late
speeches of Lord Russell and Sir Robert Peel on the vote of confidence respecting the administration of Ireland, in April, I839. I ought to add that the whole
question of discharging officers, which is important already but will grow in
magnitude with the increased demand of liberty and increased extent of states,
is very differently viewed on the continent of Europe and by the Anglican race.
In Germany and France there is such an immense number of government officers,
and government employment offers so regular and steady a career, that numbers
choose it as their regular profession, for which in not a few countries regular
preparatory studies are demanded.   The officers form a hierarchy, and calculate
upon regular promotion as the reward of honesty and talent, precisely in the same
way that with us or ill England an individual chooses the army or navy for his
profession.  It is evident that where this state of things exists, the question of
the power of discharge is of vital interest to thousands, and it has been held that
no officer ought to be discharged without inquiry and giving reasons; especially
is it so where there is no public liberty.  In these latter countries honor, title,
consequence, support, and future promotion depend upon the office. To be discharged is disgrace and ruin, as it is for the mandarin to be struck from the list.
In brief, in those countries discharge without reason or'sufficient inquiry is considered as exceedingly tyrannical. With the Anglican race the question assumes
a totally different aspect, for two reasons: first, the number of general government
officers is comparatively small, and many officers have retained their civil character; citizens fill the office for a time and leave it again; secondly, since civil
liberty exists with them on a large scale, changes of administrations have happened more frequently. These changes, however, have required several further
changes in the efficers, so that on the one hand it is no disgrace to be turned out,
on the other hand the offices, being few in number and insecure, are not calculated upon as a regular pr-ofession-there is no officer-hierarchy.  The latter is a
necessary effect of centralization of government power, the prominent feature of
the European continental history of the last century, and will and must vanish
again with it. Yet I do not say that the question is solved; it will form one of
the most interesting questions of politics to ascertain how a sufficiently free power
of discharging in the executive-which in free countries must exist-is to be
united with that degree of security for the officer which shall protect him against
executive tyranny.  It forms a very different question.  In monarchies which are
not firee, the security of the officer against being turned out without some legal procedure is, not without reason, considered as a sort of guarantee against ministerial
and monarchical despotism.  Free nations want far different guarantees, and,
though the question of appointment and discharge always remains an important
one, it never can acquire with them that grave importance which, to judge from
various works, it has acquired on the European continent, where, as I have said
already, the only remnant of public life is the service in government office.
Since the above was written, the speeches of Sir Robert Peel and the duke of
VOL. II.                           25
385 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
The. executive has repeatedly endeavored to influence the
votes of the legislative body by open declaration of his sentiments, or he has beforehand declared that he would use his
authority of non-approval if such or such a bill should be
passed. The constitution cannot prohibit such declarations, or,
if it did, could effect nothing, because there would be always
means enough to evade the prohibition; but such acts of an
executive are certainly directly against the spirit of a truly
constitutional country, where legislation must be as free and
unfettered as possible until it comes to be connected with the
executive by his approval or rejection. The English are at
present peculiarly jealous of perfectly untrammelled debate,
and it would lead to very serious consequences should now a
member of either house make a declaration similar to that of
earl Temple in the lords, that the king would consider every
one his enemy who would vote for the East India Company
bill brought in by the coalition ministry.
Wellington, on May 13 and 14, 1839, to explain their proposed change of some
ladies of the court of Victoria which led to a failure of Sir Robert's attempt to
construct an administration, have reached us. They are not without interest
respecting one of the most important points in constitutional monarchy.  They
touch upon a question which will become more important every year.
x  This was in December, 1783.  Fox and his friends were vehement against
"secret inifluence," "secret cal)al;" and Mr. Baker, seconded by Lord Maitland,
proposed the following motion in the commons: "That it is now necessary to
declare that to report any opinion or pretended opinion of his majesty upon any
hill or other proceeding depending ill either house of parliament, with a view to
influence the votes of the members, is a high crime and misdemeanor, derogatory
to the honor of the crown, a breach of the fundamental privileges of parliament,
and subversive of the constitution of the country."  William Pitt warded it off.
(Tomline, Memoirs of Pitt, vol. ii. p. 225.) The clamor against the use of the
king's name in this affair was, however, so great that Lord Temple gave back
the seals lie had received three days before.  (Tomlinie, as above, p. 23I.)  The
letter which George I1I. wrote on MIarchl 20, t785, to Pitt, after he had laid his
plan of a reform of parliament before the king, who was unfriendly to the measure, is worthy of the reflection of any chief magistrate.  George states that he
should think it very lbase in him to influence members upon so momentous a
question, and that hlie should think very ill of any man who would vote on stuch
a question biassed by friendship.  Hie moreover declares that he never had given
his opinion, nor should he do so before parliament had discussed it. (Tomline,
as above, vol. ii. p. 4o.)
386 
POLITICAL ETHIICS.
The earliest period when the principle that the executive
should not influence debates by declaring his decision beforehand came to be more particularly discussed, or at least when
it was stated that despite such a declaration debate on the
respective subject is not useless, because the executive may
be induced by that very debate on the strength of the vote
to yield, is probably that period when Charles II. opened
several parliaments by declaring that he would grant all
reasonable demands, but that they must not touch the hereditary succession (that is, exclude his brother James), and the
tories told the whigs that all their attempts to exclude James
were useless, since the king would never concur; whereupon
the whigs answered that kings had often yielded, and that at
any rate the houses must do what they consider their duty,
and leave it to others to do theirs. They justly observed that
constitutionally no person can know the king's mind or be
charged to declare it upon a subject which has not yet been
brought constitutionally before him; that, therefore, all these
declarations of his intended veto are but surmises or suspicions, not sufficient to be made by the houses the foundations of actions of the highest magnitude.
Declarations not unlike this have been made in congress;
at least, members believed, and in fact known, to be personal
friends of the executive have declared that it was useless to
debate on a certain subject, because the executive would veto
the bill if it should pass. This is as much against parliamentary dignity and decorum as against true constitutional
spirit. One of the great objects of constitutions is to secure
independent action to various branches, and to produce by a
union of all a well-poised result. These gentlemen could not
have considered what frightful consequences might ensue
from this incipient abuse. If it were carried out with any degree of consistency, it would soon virtually deprive the legislature of its initiative power, and make it a body which has
only to confirm or reject measures proposed by the adininistfration; and in whatever degree it might be acknowledged, it
would effectually forestall all necessary reforms, to which, for
387 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
the time being, the majority as well as the executive were
known to be opposed all those "annual motions" which
have in most cases succeeded by dint of unconquerable perseverance. Who does not know that it is frequently of the
greatest importance first of all to start the discussion on a
subject at large in the country by a debate in the house?
Those who made that unconstitutional declaration forgot that
a house of representatives is very different from a body of
mere deputies. The house of representatives is, as we have
seen, the organ of public opinion, with the power of making
it public law, and it is one of its most important fuinctions
that it represents public opinion also in this, that the incipient
nucleus of a minority, nay, individual opinion, may grow into
the opinion of a majority, if it have the internal strength of
truth and be supported by perseverance.  Whether the executive shall veto or not must remain to be seen, after he is
acquainted with the arguments and with the greater or smaller
majority which carried a bill. Still worse is it if the chief
officer endeavors personally to influence elections by requests
or threats.  Charles X. sent letters signed by himself to the
various officers to inform them how to vote, and that the ministers were acting in his spirit.  If this were suffered, it would
of course destroy all constitutional responsibility of ministers
and all check upon the monarch. It is held that the British
monarch cannot give personal instructions.   If it is inadmissible in the subaltern officer to influence elections, it is
evidently a far greater dereliction of duty in a chief magistrate. Nor does it add to his strength, for every movement
beyond the limits of constitutional law and propriety betrays
weakness, lowers him in the eye of the people, and will ultimately recoil upon him.
V. I have shown on another occasions that it is absolutely
I Legal and Political Hermeneutics, where the reader will find also some
remarks on the subject of Precedents, which is of much interest in executive
questions.
388 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
impossible for the human mind to devise any written law
which can possibly provide for all cases, or the sense of which
may not be stretched or narrowed according to the interpreter's disposition. As the interpretation of the chief magistrate is of the last importance, it is equally important that he
should never abandon the two main props of all sound interpretation, \without which the most liberal constitution may be
made to mean the most servile things, and the wisest provision may be made to cover the most selfish designs;- I
mean good faith and common sense. These must be the
main guides in the interpretation of the constitution, of the
laws which he is charged to execute, and of the privileges
bestowed by the former upon him: he must fairly interpret
according to the spirit of the law and constitution, of constitutional and representative liberty in general, and of the
genius and history of his people in particular. The constitution of the United States gives the right of nominating officers
to the president, but the senate of the United States must confirm the nomination, except in the case of inferior officers,
where by law the full appointment is vested in the president
or some other chief officer. The president, several'years ago,
nominated a person to a certain office, but the senate declined
approving the appointment. The moment the senate had
adjourned, the same person was re-nominated, and when the
senate met again the new nomination was laid before them.
This was certainly not in the spirit of the constitution, which
can have no other meaning than that there shall be a check
upon the presidential nominations, and that if some nominated person is rejected some other should be chosen; else
of what use could be the whole provision? Yet the act of
the president was in conformity with the letter or form of the
law. Thie constituent people of Texas, who adopted their
constitution soon after this event, seem to have taken counsel
in it, for they added a provision to their constitution that the
chief magistrate shall have no power to re-appoint a person
rejected by the senate.
389 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
The executive veto, absolute, conditional, or suspensive,"
that is the necessity of concurrence on the part of the chief
executive or monarch in a bill before it becomes law, and
consequently his power to deny his concurrence, is a point
of much importance in political law. It has misled many
writers and politicians, that they treated of the veto as a
separate privilege, a prerogative which seemed to be given
directly to interfere with the acts of another branch, as the
veto of the Roman tribunes in many cases actually was, for
their specific sanction was not necessary to make a bill a law;
they had the power of the intercession or veto as such; they
were not asked to approve, but they had the prerogative of
interposing in other cases as well as with reference to laws
they could veto, that is, stop the farther procedure in the
comitia, they could suspend the administration of justice, the
execution of a sentence, and could interfere even with the
procedures of the consuls. Indeed, the origin and essence of
the tribunitial power was an interference with a particular act
of a consul for the purpose of protecting a man of the plebs or
common people. It is different with us: according to modern
constitutional law, it is believed necessary that the executive
should have a concurrent authority in making laws, partly in
order to prevent the absolute tyranny of the legislature, of
which history gives many instances, partly to pledge the executive to the execution of the laws by securing his consent
to their enactment; to prevent him also from becoming a
mere committee, as it were, of the legislature, and for various
An absolute veto is possessed, in theory, by the king of England; a suspensive veto by the king of Norway.  If he declines concurring, the same bill may
be proposed by the next storthing (parliament); if the king declines again, and
if the next storthing after passes the same bill, it becomes thereby a law without
the concurrence of the king.  This provision belongs to the constitution of I814:
in I824 the king desired such an alteration of the constitution as would give him
an absolute veto, but the Norwegians repeatedly declined. The president of the
United States has a conditional veto: if he declines concurring, the senate and
representatives may repass the bill by a majority of two-thirds, whereby the bill
becomes law; but whatever has happened in one congress, which lasts two
years, can in no wise affect the next.    *
390' 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
other reasons. This constitutional concurrence will be found,
upon thorough inquiry, to belong to those main constitutional
discoveries characteristic of modern times, and to those political guarantees which are peculiar to civil liberty. For it is
very clear that without it the executive either loses all energy
or is at war with the legislature; in either case factions must
decide, and the sway of public opinion is impaired or annihilated.  But while this privilege of the chief magistrate's
concurrence allows public opinion to acquire a greater degree
of power, his frequent use of his power of non-concurrence
meets with an obstacle in the same public opinion.  Still, this
concurrence or non-concurrence is quite different from the
vast, absolute Romian veto.  That our veto is no  original
privilege of itself is clear, among other things, from the fact
that most modern constitutions of any degree of liberality
settle the form in which the chief executive shall withhold his
approval or sanction; in most constitutions it is expressed in
a courteous form, such as, the king will think about it, or will
examine. The veto question, in modern political law, can
never be properly treated, except as part of the greater question of executive concurrence in the great political act of
making laws.  This concurrence is the primary question, the
veto a consequence only. The concurrence, however, is, as
it appears to me, one of those necessary conzciliatory principles
so indispensable in politics. But it must appear, likewise,
plain that the veto, being but incident to the concurrence,
while the concurrence is the last finish given to a law, not the
essential production and generation of it, which is the province proper of the legislature, ought to be used with the
utmost caution and only when it appears to the executive
that insurmountable obstacles are in the way of his sanctioning the proposed measure. The veto question is more important in governments like that of the United States, where a
disagreement between the executive and legislature may exist
not only in theory but practically, since there is no practical
means of enforcing harmony at the instant, no constitutional
conciliatory principle untildlew elections take place. At least
391 
PO PLITICAL ETHICS.
no such means has as yet worked itself out in practice. Congress has no means indirectly to coerce the executive into
compliance, as parliament has by refusing supplies, which
would not have the same effect in the United States; nor has
the executive any power to produce compliance if it should be
diametrically opposed.
In constitutional monarchies, where the monarch is above
and outside of the administration, we all know the practical
operation of the conciliatory principle, which has worked
itself out of the supplies on the one hand, and out of the constitutional impossibility of regal action without ministerial cooperation on the other. Hence the king of England has not
declined concurring for above a century, except, indeed, by
anticipating the necessity of non-concurrence by proroguing
parliament. The president of the United States may veto,
and has often done so. It becomes therefore the more
urgently necessary for him to do so faithfully, conscientiously, and cautiously, in the constitutional spirit of his
country; not in the narrow limit of a party.
VI. In most countries in which there exist constitutions,
the privilege of pardoning and reprieving is conferred upon
the chief executive, with few or no limitations, if we speak of
the punishment for common offences only. The restrictions
relate in almost all states exclusively to impeachments and
political offences, to protect which the executive might feel
tempted or which may involve the executive itself.  The
question of pardoning t:as not received by any means that
degree of attention which it deserves, since the time of the
essential change which has taken place in the spirit of penal
laws on the one hand, and the more decidedly acknowledged
sway of the law as indissolubly connected with substantial
civil liberty on the other. Montesquieu says that pardoning is
the most beautiful attribute of sovereignty;' a recent writer
on constitutional law2 calls it the most precious right of the
I Esprit des Lois, vi. 5.
2 Aretin, Staatsr. d. constitutioneller Monarchie, i. 205.
392 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
monarch. Whether these assertions are exaggerated or not
it is not necessary to examine here. Certain it is that when
Montesquieu wrote, and when the penal law bore the imprint
of a spirit of revenge and indignation at rebellious disobedience against the will of the power-holder, mercy in pardoning
justly appeared to be a most beautiful attribute; and we can
understand the meaning of pardoning hundreds and thousands at a time, on some joyous occasions, though there was
also a wrong idea always connected with it. In our times it
becomes flagrant violation of the law if whole numbers of
common criminals-not of political offenders-are pardoned,
and the community is thus exposed again to all the dangers
to life and property, as was for instance lately the case when
a son was born to the king of Naples. If it was unnecessary
to keep the criminals imprisoned, it was shocking to retain
them at all; if it was right and necessary to retain them, it
was shocking to let them loose upon the community.  To
make either dependent upon the birth of a prince, a wholly
extra-judicial and extra-legal event, is contrary to the spirit
of the law and the duty of the executive.  The king might
have pardoned all whom he conceived to have offended him
or his authority more individually; but he evidently abused
his prerogative in pardoning common criminals.  It may be
very consonant to a father's heart bounding with joy to give
joy to hundreds, in a moment of happy exultation, but it is
no pleasure to the honest to have criminals turned upon them
by the hundred, most of whom, there is not the slightest
doubt, committed new crimes before three days had passed.
Yet the incalculable mischief caused by unwarranted and
injudicious pardons in monarchies hardly deserves mention
if wve compare it to the evil caused by this interruption of the
proper course of law in the United States, already so mild in
many parts, and yet so often set aside upon the most frivolous
grounds, indeed very frequently upon no grounds at all, except that some persons, who allow their zeal to be stirred
more by sympathy with the guilty than with the honest
obtain a number of signatures to a petition. "Foreasmuch as
393 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
many doe offend in hope of pardon that pardons be very
rarely granted," has been said already by Lord Coke.' In
some of the United States pardon almost amounts to certainty; and, were we not warranted in drawing the conclusion
from statistics, we have the confession of the criminals themselves, to the effect that the impunity held out by constant
pardons has influenced them greatly, either in a direct way, 
or indirectly by lessening the fear of the law in general. Yet
this is not the greatest of the evils caused by injudicious pardoning. Clergymen who injudiciously collect signatures for
pardons little think of the incalculable injury they do to many
young persons by aiding the propagation of crime, by returning unpunished and hardened criminals upon the community,
and to society by loosening the necessary framework of the
law. This, however, is not the place fully to expose all these
many evils. It belongs to criminal statistics, and to the whole
science of punishment, and I must refer the reader for further
discussion of the subject to works relating to those branches
especially.2 But one remark I wish to make for charitably
disposed persons, who see in the punishment of a sentenced
criminal some evil or other befalling an individual only, and
forget his previous crime, the welfare of society, and the
will of God that we should have laws, and that therefore we
should obey and not interfere with them. My remark to
such persons is this, that if they knew the affiliation and
what might be called the whole economy of crime, they
would know among other things that an immense number of
offences remain untried, and an immense number of tried
offences unpunished, and that the common offender stands
already, in all countries in which the summary process is
I 3d Institute, 243.
2 Beaumont and Tocqueville, The Penitentiary System in the United States,
translated and provided with Notes by myself, Philadelphia, 1833, ill the Introduction to which, p. xxix., I have given my views on pardoning; and my Letter
on Subjects of Penal Law, published by the Philadelphia Prison Society, I838.
The repeated Reports of the Agents of Penitentiaries, and many persons in high
employ in pr-ison-matters in Europe, all concur that injudicious pardoning is a very
great dereliction of duty in him who has the power. [Cf. Civil Liberty, App. II.]
394 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
justly abandoned, a great chance of escape, without holding
out to him this additional hope of ultimate impunity, after
tiresome proof and conviction.
VII. Nevertheless, it is necessary that the pardoning power
exist somewhere, even where the laws are conformable to the
spirit of the age, and imprisonment is not of a kind to expose
the prisoner to contamination and greater corruption. For it
is impossible for any legislator to frame his laws in such a
manner that their application to some complex cases should
not operate against their own spirit or object. Other considerations, such as imperative demands of public welfare, may
exist, which make the suspension of the rigorous course of
the law advisable or necessary; or actual mistakes may happen, so that the execution of the sentence would be no longer
the execution of the law, but unlawful barbarity.  A Frenchwoman, Elizabeth Colliaiix, was sentenced, in consequence of
an error which the jury themselves had noticed, to five years'
imprisonment.  The jury, who expected her acquittal, were
surprised at her sentence, and prayed at once for pardon.
Strange to say, she was not pardoned on the day of St. Charles,
when many real criminals were; she was put in the pillory
and branded.,
On the other hand, a pardon or reprieve, being an interruption of the law, is of itself dangerous in all states in which
the supremacy of the law is justly considered the main shield
of civil liberty. This difficulty is much increased in republics,
because in them the supremacy of the law is of the very last
importance, and at the same time the chief magistrate is so
easily accessible that resistance against solicitations for pardon
becomes the more difficult. By what principles ought those
magistrates, then, to whom this prerogative is confided, or the
ministers of the crown who propose pardons, to be guided? I
believe by the following:
z All France was deeply affected at this heart-rending event. Gazette des
Tribunaux, No. I347 of I1829.
395 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
Pardoning power has been granted by the state to an indi vidual only for the better obtaining of the true ends of the
law, or the better fulfilment of its true spirit and not of its
mere form. The contrary would imply an absurdity. It would
be absurd, indeed, first to make laws with great expense and
trouble, then to make offenders amenable to these laws with
still greater expense, and finally to invest an officer with a
privilege to set at naught all these ends, unless it were meant
that this privilege should aid in obtaining the general end of
all law, that is, right and justice. There ought always to
exist peculiar and strong reasons, not why the law ought to
be adhered to, but why its regular course ought to be interrupted. A case actually occurred a few years ago, when the
governor of one of the largest western states of the Union
respited a criminal sentenced for murder in open daylight,
"in order that the sentiments and wishes of the people of [a
certain] county might be known," declaring "that if at the
expiration of the time he could be satisfied that it is the wish of
the citizens of [said] county generally that this sentence should
be commuted to that of imprisonment for life, their wishes
could then be complied with." Thus the governor introduced
on his own responsibility the entirely new system of making
the execution of the sentence, after having been delivered in due
course of law, dependent upon the "wishes" of the majority
of that county to which the criminal happened to belong.
What a view of general law and general justice!
If, therefore, a case is brought before the chief magistrate
who has the power of pardoning, he ought to inquire whether
there are any strong palliating circumstances of which the
law could not take notice, or circumstances which render the
sentence, although in strict conformity with the law, severer
than the intention of the law-makers themselves can fairly be
supposed to have been. If such be the case, a partial or entire
pardon is proper.
If the law is manifestly and offensively against the more
humane spirit of the age, especially if old laws demand cruel
punishments and tortures, a pardon is right; for it is fair and
396 
FOLITICAL ETHICS.
just to suppose that this is one of the cases for which the
privilege was granted, namely, to temper the law by equity
and mercy.  The code of Prussia decrees for some crimes the
punishment of breaking on the wheel; the judges are bound
to award it; but the king invariably issues an order to strangle
the criminal before his body be broken on the wheel, or commutes the punishment into simple beheading.
The more recently, therefore, the laws have been revised,
and the more the process of revision has been such that we
may suppose it to have been fairly influenced by the spirit of
society, the more rarely pardon ought to be exercised.
It is dangerous, however, in the highest degree, if pardons
are granted from a merely private compassion for the offender,
or from any other motive unconnected with the welfare of the
state or the peculiar hardship of the single case. The enormous abuse of pardoning in the United States has contributed
to undermine political morality, and has seriously interfered
with the greatest safeguard of right and liberty, the government of law. If a case presents circumstances which can
leave no feeling heart without regret, which yet are the necessary consequences of the law, known perfectly well by the lawmakers at the time of making the law,-for instance, the affliction of a respectable family by the committal of a degenerate
son to prison, or the want and poverty of a mother with her
children in consequence of her husband's having been sentenced for a crime,-the pardon must necessarily be refused;
for the magistrate is not charged to consider these circumstances."
I I cannot forbear transcribing here a passage from Beccaria's Essay on Crimes
and Punishments, Engl. transl., Edinburgh, I807, chap. xlvi. Beccaria will be
allowed to be the best authority for a lenient spirit:
"As punishments become more mild, clemency and pardon are less necessary.
Happy the nation in which they will be considered as dangerous!  Clemency,
which has often been deemed a sufficient substitute for every other virtue in sovereigns, should be excluded in a perfect legislation, where punishments are mild
and the proceedings in criminal cases regular and expeditious. This truth will
seem cruel to those who live in countries where, from the absurdity of the laws
and the severity of punishments, pardons and the clemency of the prince are
297 
POLITICAL E7tHICS.
Every pardoni granted upon insufficient grounds becomes a
serious offence against society, and he that grants it is, in jus tice, answerable for the offences which the offender may com mit, and for the general injury done to political morality by
undue interference with the law. The pardoning magistrate
ought never to forget that society and the criminal form two
parties, the one invisible as a whole and unrepresented, the
other under sufferance before him and hence engaging his
feelings very differently; and that, mnoreover, while it is but
natural that our feelings should turn somewhat in favor of the
prisoner the moment that sentence is actually pronounced,
because he appears as the vanquished party, these feelings
must not sway him in whose hands society has in part
intrusted the maintenance not the subversion of law, the
protection not the undermining of society.  Still more objectionable is it if considerations such as the female sex of the
offender are urged in favor of a pardon. Is then woman not
a moral and a responsible being, and shall we again disgrace
her by holding her unaccountable after she has been raised
by positive laws to moral accountability?  The Chinese wife
is not morally emancipated to this day. They have a maxim
to this day that a " married woman can commit no crime; the
responsibility rests with the husband."  How degrading for
the woman! I have cited on anothler occasion the Swedish
law of 1335 by which the woman of that country was made
amenable to the laws in her own individuality., Lately, some
respectable British papers expressed the hope that an atro
necessary.  It is, indeed, one of the noblest prerogatives of the throne, but, at
the same time, a tacit disapprobation of the laws.  Clemency is a virtue which
belongs to the legislator and not to the executor of the laws; a virtue which
ought to shine in the code, and not in private judg,ment.  To slow' manklind
that crimes are sometimes pardoned, and that punishment is not the necessary
consequence, is to nourish the flattering hope of impunity, and is tlhe cause of
their considering every l)unishmnent inflicted as an act of injustice an(l opl)pression.
The prince, in pardoning, gives up the public security in favor of an indlividual,
and, by ill-judged benevolence, proclaims a public act of impunity.  Let, then,
the legislator be tender, indulgent, and htimane.
x My letter to the Philadelphia Prison Society, p. 39.
398 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
cious murderess would be pardoned, because she was a woman
and the monarch was of the same sex! Nor do those who
so readily claim pardons for women because they are women
seem to be aware that a woman once a criminal generally
belongs to the very worst and most dangerous class of offenders. " \What use is there in dragging a weak woman to
.prison?" is current cant assuming the garb of generosity,
while it is in fact the effect of an unfortunate laxity in all
views of public morals, of right, and the most sacred principles of society and mankind.
If doubts are proved as to the correctness of the verdict or
of the sentence, pardon ought to be granted.
If for whatever reason the punishment becomes severer
than the sentence intended it to be, for instance by the
prisoner's becoming consumptive in a prison in which proper
medical aid or care cannot be obtained by him, pardon may
be granted under certain circumstances, although it is not
necessary that it should be.
If the offence has been committed in the opinion that it was
a right or perhaps a praiseworthy act and no danger accrues
from pardoning, pardon ought certainly to be granted on all
fair grounds, for instance in cases of political offences.
If the law is cruel or obviously against the spirit of the
whole society, there is no harmn if the magistrate forms a rule
for himself to grant conditional or entire pardons in all such
cases, for instance if no children are ever executed in England although they are sentenced to die. But it becomes
highly dangerous if by this privilege a chief magistrate sets
himself up against a law which he individually considers inexpedient; for instance if he should be opposed to capital
punishment and on that ground were to pardon all convicts
sentenced to die. He would leg(islate in a very important
sphere alone and uncontrolled by society, for he would evidently change the law, which he was acquainted with before
entering office, and to maintain which he took a sacred oath.
The reported reformation of the convict must in no case
form tl-he sole ground for pardoning.  This is acknowledged,
399 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
I believe, by almost all penologists of note and practical
knowledge; and where it has been tried to hold out an
abridgment of the punishment as a reward for good behavior, the consequences have been found to be bad, as for
instance in France, where the officer who drew up the law
holding out that reward petitioned, after having observed its
operation, for its abolition., I speak here always of revised
laws, and proper systems of punishments, for nothing can be
given as a rule for bad laws and worse punishments. The
hope of pardon for good behavior, which of course can never
be absolutely known, leads to hypocrisy, and prevents the
very reformation sought for, because it does not allow the
prisoner to enter into that state of calm resignation which,
according to all experience in criminal psychology, is an indispensable requisite for reformation.  If the punishment is
mild, and the penitentiary system sound, the truly reformed
convict himself will hardly desire a pardon.
The pardoning magistrate ought to be influenced, in conjunction with other considerations, by the nature of the guarantees the individual to be pardoned can offer, such as whether
he knows a trade, has received some education, has honest
relations who acknowledge him or not, and can give other
pledges of a probably steady life.
I Mr. de la Ville de Mirmont, Inspector-General of the Central Prisons, says
in his work, Observations sur les Maisons Centrales de Detention i l'Occasion de
l'Ouvrage de Beaumont et Tocqueville, Paris, I833, p. 55, et seq., that he was
the one who obtained the law ill I8i8, and that he often repented of it.  The
Bavarian code offers pardon after thlree-fourths of the time of imprisonment have
elapsed, if the conduct has been correct. Of course the apportionment of punishments is made accordingly. I do not know how the law operates.
4O0 
CHAPTER II.
Judge, Juror, Advocate, and Witness.-Official, external, and moral Independ ence of the Jud(ge.-Sanctissimus Judex of the Romans.-The Judge, where
there is doubt, must interpret in Mercy, in Penal Cases; in Favor of civil Lib erty, in all.-The Institution of the Juiy.-The sacred Office of the Juryman. What is he to do when the Law is contrary to the universal Conscience?-The
Institution of the Advocate.-Moral Obligation of the Advocate.-Political
Relations of Lawyers in Free Countries.-Duties of the Witness.
VIII. FROM all that has been said of justice as the main
and broad foundation of the state, of the superior sway of law
as an indispensable requisite of civil liberty and the necessary
independence of the judiciary, it must appear that there is no
member of the state or officer of government superior in importance to the judge, and indeed very few of equal importance with him. All mankind, if at all advanced in political
civilization, have agreed that an unjust judge defiles the very
altar for the service of which he was ordained a priest. The
religious codes of the most remote antiquity, the law-books
of the absolute governments of the East, fettered by hereditary castes, pronounce this universal feeling as distinctly as the
religions, laws, or poetry of the modern or freest nations-the
Vedas as well as Shakspeare. A truckling judge fawning on
power, whoever may possess it, whether monarch or people,
is one of the most offensive and humiliating sights, and a demoralizing example to a nation. If it be shameful or criminal
for a citizen, to whom no peculiar charge has been confided, to
betray his country, it is doubly so in a judge to betray justice
and liberty by yielding to power, and swerving from what is
just, true, and right, because to him in particular has their custody been confided, and in forsaking justice and liberty he
betrays his country. It is painful to peruse the bad periods of
monarchies or republics, when judges are found ready to bend
the law according to the desire of the monarch or ruling party,
VOL. II.                   26                      401 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
and it is comforting indeed when we find, on the other hand,
men who comprehended the lofty character of the judge, and
had sufficient firmness to stand as the independent interpreters
or pronouncers of the law, for or against whomsoever this
might be. The names of judges great in their views, calm in
their decisions, and pure in all their life, who are known by
the whole people to have distinguished themselves by unswerving honesty and stout hearts, judges whose grasp, penetration, and blandness of mind were equally great, form a
moral element in the history of a nation; they constitute a
most valuable part of the inherited and traditional stock of
national virtue, and give a moral tone and stability to the
community, for which nothing else of equally great effect can
be substituted. Those great judges whom England counts
in her history have done more of good than the infamous
ones who have disgraced the British bench have been able to
do of evil. The greater the liberty the greater likewise, as is
natural, the necessity of unbiassed, clear, learned, and strongminded judges-that is, oracles of the law. This truth of
general import has fully appeared from all the preceding parts
of this work.; but it is necessary to mention here in particular
that the moral independence of the judge is of most particular
importance in republics founded upon an extensive popular
principle: this is owing to the fact which has been touched
several times, that resistance against the crown has something
heroical in it and will seldom fail to awaken the sympathy of
the multitude, while resistance to popular clamor, passion,.or
interest appears in the eye of the excited many as sin and
heresy. The American history offers instances of judges who
either have been overawed by the clamor of the people, or,
which is equally to be shunned, have participated in the
general excitement.
The idea which the Romans entertained of the judge, the
Sanctissimus Judex (Cic. pro Planc., xiii. 32), and indeed the
very origin of the word Judex,T are characteristic, and distin
z Judex from jus-dicere, as vindex from vim-dicere. The judex, therefore, was
not in the eye of the Roman the avenger, as he is called in several languages. So
402 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
guish them strikingly, and in this particular favorably, from the
Greeks. The latter likewise acknowledged the law, not only
as infinitely superior to the individual charged to execute it,
but also as that which alone should have true supremacy.
Yet this was the case with respect to law in general only. The
Greeks never sufficiently separated judicial law from political
and administrative;  the judge, therefore, with them never
appeared in so sacred a light as with the practical and honest
Romans.' It might, indeed, be observed here as a general
remark that the Sacrosancta Auctoritas inherent in the highest
offices is quite peculiar to Rome, and indicates one of the
most essential features by which that republic so remarkably
differed from the Grecian states.
If the judge, then, ought to be independent in every way,
he ought'to be, as we have seen in the first part of this work,
independent of the executive and power-holder, unswayed by
prince or pedple;2 he ought to be made independent in his
situation; his salary ought to be sufficient both to elevate himn
above want and its influences and to command the highest
talent; for in every well-regulated commonwealth a judgeship
should always be the last and highest goal the lawyer looks for:
his salary, again, ought to be fixed, not dependent upon fees,3
and so not dependent, in appearance at least, upon those whom
are Justice and Revenge or Retribution in many idioms one and the same word;
but Judlex meant the pronouncer, declarer of right.  [But jus denoted originally
id quod populus jubet. The moral sense came into it.]
[The Romans lost this feeling of the sacredness of the judge at length.  For
instance, the (question between senate and e(luites, as to the order from which the
judices should be drawn, had for its motive in part to screen persons under
accusation for peculation, maladministration, etc.]
2 This applies in a great measure to all law-officers whose ultimate end is the
administration of justice.  Erskine calls Lord Coke-even Coke-" the infamous
prosecutor of Raleigh." (Defence of Thomas Hardy, for High Treason.) The
dereliction of duly is equally great if the sovereign is not the monarch but the
people, though it may not appear so at the time.
3 There is a strange anomaly in the British high court of admiralty. Thile judge
has no salary, and consequently very little indeed in peace, but in times of war his
salary amounts to about eight thousand pounds.  Nothing is more directly against
all true principles of government than to give part of confiscations to the judges
403 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
he judges, nor diminished whilst he holds his seat, lest he
become or be suspected of being dependent upon his employers, the legislature or executive. His independence implies, as we have seen previously, his immovability from office,
except by impeachment. Finally, it is not sufficient that the
judge be placed in a state of independence: he must place
himself so as much as in him lies.  Lord Brougham lately
pronounced himself against judges having any seat as mnembers of elective legislatures, so as not to be influenced by their
constituencies.z It is of course impossible to draw with any distinction the line beyond which a judge ought not to go in his
participation in public political meetings; but certain it is that
he injures the sacredness of his office in the same degree in
which lie becomes a partisan, and that he ought ever to be
mindful that his moral power in pronouncing judgment according to the law already made will be impaired, if he mixes
in the excitement which may be connected with the making
of it.  His moral weight, of the greatest importance in every
free country, is derived greatly from the fact that he can say,
"Not I, directly or indirectly in any way whatever, but the
law, which is given to me and is my master, says thus."
As it is a rule that where a law leaves any doubt it shall be
interpreted in mercy for the prisoner, so ought the judges in
a wider sphere to consider themselves as the perpetual servants of civil liberty and of strict government by law, and
never to join either the executive or any party, political or
religious, in persecutions, in injurious interpretations or distortions of law, or in any even the slightest oppression.
Where there is doubt at all on points of public or constitutional law, the judge ought always to interpret in favor of
civil liberty; and, in fine, he ought not in penal cases to consider the mere disobedience to the law in itself an additional
offence besides the crime or offence committed-a view which
as reward for their alacrity in prosecuting, as we give a small piece of the hunted
game to the hounds who pursue it, to incite their future zeal.
X In the Lords, February 12, 1839.
404 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
formerly led but too frequently to harsh punishments, and
afforded a basis for the inadmissible penal theory which derives the punitory power of the state from public vengeance.
IX. By the institution of the jury two great ends, the one
of liberty, the other of the administration of justice, have been
united- namely, direct participation of the people in the dispensing of justice and the preventing of it from falling entirely
into the hands of the executive or of a separate and closed
caste. - From whatever point of view we may examine this
peculiar institution as it has developed itself in the Anglican
race-and it may be viewed in a great many, all equally important-it will always appear that the citizen cannot act in
any more solemn capacity than that of a juror: in my opinion,
in no capacity so solemn and important. Society requires the
state; the state acts through laws; the laws are the great
organs of human society, of combined reason; and now, when
the very moment ultimately arrives for which the law was
made, when it is finally to be applied as a general rule to a
practical and concrete case, when, in short, the abstract principle is to be realized in practical life, for weal or woe, for the
protection of some or the punishment of others, all this is in
a great measure left to the juror, to the citizen taken fresh
from the people. The jurors, therefore, are justly called by
the British law the country."  There is a deep meaning in
this expression, as it has grown in the course of centuries;
for the jury truly and practically represent the country to the
person that is to be tried. The law is the expression of public will, and the jury represent the jural society, in judging
whether in the given case the facts warrant the application of
the law. The jury represent the country, not the government;
they judge of facts according to rules and laws indeed, but also
with the feelings of living men, and not merely as if they repre
x For instance, when the clerk, reading the indictment, concludes thus: "Upon
this indictment, gentlemen, the prisoner has been arraigned; upon his arraignmenrit he pleaded not guilty; and for trial hath put himself upon God and his
country; which country you are," etc.
405 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
sented the abstract law as it is written down. To represent
this a learned judge would be sufficient. The jury represents,
or rather is, whenever faithful, the living, operating law. Indeed, it may justly be said that though for a brief time, yet,
for this brief time, a jury represents more fully and entirely
human society as formed into a state, with its great objects,
than any other person or body of men, even the monarch's
person not excepted. Not that I mean to intimate the idea
as if on this account the jury were released either from strict
obedience to law or proper advice. Even though they were
the very sovereign, we have seen on a previous occasion that
sovereignty and absolute power are very different. On the
contrary, the jury according to the essence of their character
are strictly bound by the law, yet by the law as their country
requires it or must be supposed to require it, applied to the
particular and, probably, complex case before them.
A juryman, therefore, ought to serve with the deepest impression of the grave responsibility which his oath has imposed upon him: he sits there for his country, he acts for the
country; the laws must be applied through him, they must
strike or protect through him. The foundation of the state
is justice; the country asks it at his hands for the prisoner.
The just object of the state is protection; the country demands
it against crime at his hands. The juryman therefore must not
trifle with his duty, either by discharging it lightly or indolenttly; he does not sit there to dispense with the laws, or set
them at naught by ill-advised and weak compassion for guilt,
but to apply the law;  and he is bound  by sacred ties to
his country and mankind to receive the law at the hands
I I have seen a juryman asleep during a trial for murder.  It is true it was hot,
and in the afternoon.  Feuerhachl, in Considerations on Public and Or-al Administration of Justice, Giessen, I825, vol. ii. p. 221, says that he has seen the judges
in Paris repeatedly sleep on the bench; but it ought to be observed that there are
several judges, and that Feue-rbach does not speak of the presiding judge or
president; as, indeed, in the above case it was not the foreman who slept. The
author adds in a note an extract from a French Dictionary, published in 1778,
according to which sleeping and talking about the news of the day was then not
uncommon for judges when in audience.
406 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
of the judge, wherever necessary. No consideration, private favor or disfavor, no political bias, must influence his
judgment. All this indeed amounts to embracery on an enlarged scale: although it cannot be made indictable, yet it
has all the guilt of embracery, which is the offence of improperly influencing the jury.  The juror, as he is always
instructed to do, must judge by the evidence which is brought
before him, and nowise by the capricious impression which
he may have received elsewhere. Respecting this point, he
must remember that the words of the verdict "not guilty" are
not of absolute import, but have a legal meaning; that is, the
jury, in delivering the verdict, do not mean to say, We absolutely declare the prisoner at the bar not guilty, nor even that
they are morally convinced of his innocence. All that a verdict of not guilty can mean is this, that according to the distinct rules of law and the evidence as now laid before us in the
course of the trial, the prisoner cannot in the sense of the law,
according to such application of it as society demands, be
called guilty; or, in other words, according to those rules
which society wills us strictly to obey in judging of the
prisoner, he has not been proved guilty.
X. Here I have arrived at'a question of a peculiarly serious
and delicate character, which it is nevertheless necessary candidly to discuss in a work that occupies itself professedly with
ethics in connection with the state, or thle subject of right.
The question is, Can a jury, under any circumstances, bring a
verdict of Not Guilty, if, according to evidence as well as
the letter of the law, their verdict ought to be Guilty, without
perjuring themselves? Many distinguished jurists have unqualifiedly answered that, whatever the law may be, the jury
are bound to go by its letter: it is no province of theirs to
judge of the law and its mild or severe effects. This is undoubtedly true in all cases except those of extremity, and
these are the very ones which constitute the difficulty. So it
is not for the soldier to judge whether what his officer bids
him to do is right; yet in cases of extremity lie will and must
407 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
do so. Mankind will not and cannot be reasoned out of their
original and natural sentiments; and so, as obedience to the
laws is a general duty, while resistance adopted as a general
principle would necessarily dissolve human society, we dis obey and resist in the extreme case when a government
openly, directly, and repeatedly acts against the very objects
for which it was established. So it is absolutely impossible
to force mankind into an obedience to laws which directly and
palpably militate with the conscience of every one, whatever
learned men may have said to the contrary. If an ancient law
punishes the pilfering'of a trifle with death, it is absolutely
impossible to force a jury who, with the whole age in which
they live, consider the law murderous, into what they would
feel to be directly opposite to the ends of all law, that is justice and protection.  If the law-maker neglects to adapt the
law to the altered circumstances and the spirit of the whole
age, the law may indeed remain undisturbedly upon the books,
but the inevitable difficulty of applying that law to real cases
is not thereby avoided. The jury will not bring a victim to
so barbarous a law, nor load their consciences with having
contributed in destroying him. Some of the most eminent
judges have evidently entertained the same opinion. Lord
Mansfield, as I have mentioned already, instructed a jury to
find a verdict for theft of less than twenty shillings, when the
amount of stolen goods had been proved to be worth far
more; because the case was of a very peculiar character and
the prisoner would otherwise have been hanged. Now, on
what ground could the judge instruct thus or the jury bring
a verdict against the truth before them? Were they then not
perjured? They could, it seems to me, bring this verdict,
which was clearly at variance with the real state of things
before their eyes, on the ground that the words of the verdict
have a meaning relatively to the law, the case, etc. If a jury
formerly, although the crime was proved, brought a verdict
of not guilty for a prisoner, say twelve years old, charged with
shoplifting, for which the law said that he should be hanged,
the words of the verdict mean, I take it, Not Guilty in the
4o8 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
sense in which the country wills the law to be understood ("in
mitiori sensu," as it were)-the law which has a sense and
meaning only in so far as it is for the benefit and not the ruin
of society, and the letter of the law, which in this case, when
a boy of tender years would be hanged for an offence arising
out of juvenile thoughtlessness, palpably militates against the
very objects of the state. I am well aware that nothing is
more dangerous than to look habitually towards the effect of
the law, for a jury who ought in common cases to decide
only on what is submitted to them. But I speak of extraordinary cases, which do occur in some instances, and, despite
their danger, must be decided one way or the other.  Nor do
we gain anything by deciding them theoretically, against the
universal conscience of mankind. For the practice will prove
too powerful for the theory. Where the laws, however, are
mild, perhaps already too mild, where many pardons are injudiciously granted, a jury ought to consider nothing but the
peculiar questions before them, and consider neither condition, sex,' nor any such circumstance in making up their verdict.2  The jury ought never to forget that the cases spoken
of above remain exceptions.3
I It is lowering the character of the woman, if juries are influenced by the fact
that the arraigned prisoner is a female, br by her beauty; though this has frequently happened.
2 The utmost attention and care are necessary in juries; sad mistakes have
taken place, and are on the records of legal history. I would refer the reader
to Blackstone, iii. pp. 378-385; Kent's Commentaries in the proper places. The
Guides for Jurymen, with which I am acquainted, relate more to the business
than to the ethical relations of the juryman.
3 [The author here substantially invests the jury with a pardoning power. This
ground is a dangerous one: his extreme cases must multiply, if all persons admitted that the jury had anything to do besides saying that the facts were proved.
One man would never find guilty in cases where the punishment was capital;
another, where it seemed to him of great general evil to society.  All biasses
which prevent a juryman from looking at the question of fact, of guilty or not
guilty, are wrong. All meanings given to guilty or not guilty, relatively to the
benefit of society, are false meanings.  The jury could recommend for mercy,
they could even protest against the law; but they must not take their oath in a
non-natural sense.]
409 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
XI. Wherever nations have arrived at any high degree of
political civilization, so as to value the protection of individual
rights, we find the institution of the advocate, which, such as
we  know  it, we may  consider as peculiarly belonging to
Western or European life.  We  find, indeed, attorneys and
"the borrowing of another's mouth" in Sumatra,l among some
of the Hindoo nations, and in Morocco  2 but neither Turkey,
Siam, Persia, nor China has advocates proper, whose order
the venerable D'Aguesseau calls "as ancient as the office of
the judge, as noble as virtue, and as necessary as justice."3
This is certainly a little French, and, whatever we may think
of the second position in particular, it is nevertheless true
that the institution is absolutely necessary for the true empire
of the law. Despotism sees very little or no difference between civil and penal actions; all actions become penal, they
are trials, and all trials are conducted upon the principle of
inquisition on the part of the judge;4 and the trials are by no
means conducted on the principle of the greatest possible protection under the law so far as the ends of the law and justice
admit.
XII. That it is dishonorable for a lawyer to foment disputes-as there are th6se who do in all countries-is too clear
to need any consideration. It amounts to actual robbing of
the clients.  Physicians might as well first promote sickness
in order to have afterwards the benefit of curing. Nor does
"  Pinjam mulut;" Marsden, History and Description of Sumatra.
2 Host, Information of Morocco.
3 D'Aguesseau, Discours sur l'Ind~pendance de l'Avocat. CEuvres, tom. ii.
p. 4, Yverdun edit.
4 In despotic empires exists what Montesquieu calls " la magistrature unique,"
that is, there is but one judge, and not a number of judges. Feuerbach, in his
Considerations on Public and Oral Administration of Justice (in German), vol.
i. p. 354 et seq., has many pertinent remarks on the sulbject.  He there exhibits
also the great error of Montesquieu, who asserts that "in despotic governments
there is no law; the judge is his own rule" (Esprit des Lois, vi., ch. i. 3), when
in fact the body of Turkish, Chinese, and Ifindoo established and collected laws
equal or exceed in bulk those of Rome or England.
4IO 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
it require our attention to consider how much more honorable it is if he who knows the law uses his knowledge in
giving advice to prevent rather than profit by litigation. In
this respect, honorable lawyers of extensive practice are real
blessings to a community. Let us proceed at once to the
consideration of some of the prominent duties of the advocate
during trial, as they interest political society at large, leaving
all the other duties to the consideration of those who may
make hereafter legal ethics the peculiar subject of their
studies. It certainly deserves the fullest attention; and many
points would then be examined by reflecting men which at
present have in some countries hardly attracted any notice,
while in others they are considered with great rigidness.
The advocate, wherever the institution exists, enjoys various
privileges. In some countries he is actually considered an
officer. For what purpose are those privileges granted him?
The  state, on the one hand, must needs act upon  the
principle that the law is known to every one, or may be
known to every one, if he chooses to know it; while on the
other hand it knows full well that in every civilized society it
is impossible that the law in its whole extent can be actually
known to every citizen. The advocates, therefore, as a class,
are favored by society, tlhat they may freely give advice
before a lawsuit has commenced, and may freely speak for
the client, with all their knowledge of the law, during the
trial. Secondly, the state, desiring to extend to every one
full protection and civil liberty, is as much interested in seeing the full protection of the law realized in each case, that
is, that no more be demanded than what the law does demand, and that all the advantage granted by the law be
actually enjoyed, as it is in seeing every wrong suppressed
and  right secured or re-established wherever it has been
interrupted.
To obtain these various equally important objects, the institution of the advocate is established; and from these premises
we shall be able to derive some very important ethical conclusions.
4II 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
The advocate exists for the better obtaining of justice and
protection. It would be absurd to imagine that human society
first makes laws with great pains and expense, and then suffers
or charters a whole class of skilful men to defeat them. All
the conclusions, therefore, which people have drawn from the
analogy between warfare and a lawsuit are utterly inadmissible. It has been even asserted that the counsel are permitted
to state what is not true, just as the soldier is permitted to
deceive the enemy. Nothing can be more erroneous. That
which characterizes war is the fact that the belligerents appeal
from reasoning to the use of force; the lawsuit, however, and
the whole administration of justice, are founded upon the
very ideas of truth, justice, and reasoning, according to sound
rules of judgment and proof. The lawsuit is part and parcel
of the intercourse of the citizen in peace and witMii the sphere
of law: it is, in short, the very opposite to war in every respect. So it has been said that the lawyer has nothing whatsoever to do with the morality of the case which he defends,
and that hlie lets out his talent and knowledge to his client,
who, if he himself possessed it, would use it in every way for
his advantage. This again is erroneous; for, first, no man
can divest himself of his moral individuality, as we have seen
before: else the hired assassin would be right, who says, My
employer hires me; he has not sufficient physical strength or
courage; these I lend him for money; but I have nothing to
do with the morality of the murder. Secondly, even if it were
so, it would be wrong in the client to state falsehoods; and,
finally, if it were actually so, the state could do nothing better
than speedily to abolish so dangerous a class of men. If it
means that the lawyer should defend every case if called upon,
that he ought to do everything consistent with law and morality which may be advantageous to his client, this is correct,
as we shall see presently more fully.
Lastly, it has been said that the lawyer has no more to do
with the morality of the case offered to him than the physician
who may be called upon to save a man whom he knows to
be an injury or dishonor to his country. Thus, though the
4I2 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
lawyer fully knows that the case which he defends is founded
upon fraud, and that if he succeeds he will rob others of their
property, say an orphan in defending the case of a fraudulent
guardian, he has nothing to do with the causes and possible
effects of the case, but merely to handle it according to the
best knowledge of the law and the skill which he possesses, as
the physician, called upon to attend the patient who when in
health ill-treats his wife and children, has nothing whatever
to do with any other consideration than how, with his experience, he can soonest cure his patient.-  But the sole object of
the whole healing art is the re-establishment of plhysical health,
or, where this cannot be done, the greatest possible diminution
of physical suffering. The object of all administration of justice is Right; and the vocation of the advocate has a sensible
meaning only as forming part of this administration of justice.
He is allowed to speak for another on so solemn an occasion
as that of a trial, for the very purpose that truth may be better
known and justice better done, but not to veil the one or to
defeat the other, knowingly and purposely. It would be, as
was said before, absurd.
It is believed that the ends of justice are best promoted,
among other things, if every person charged with an offence
have counsel; versed in the law, both to protect him against
unlawful oppression and to obtain all the advantages for him
which the law may offer; but the state cannot sanction immorality or the infringement of the rights of others. That
my remarks do not apply to suspicions and rumors must be
clear; I speak here of wrong only that is positively known by
the advocate.
XIII. The rules of action for the counsel are twofold, as
appears to me-the common ethical rules, and those which
are peculiar to his profession.
As to the first, the advocate does not cease to be a human
being with all his ethical and religious obligations, a citizen
with all his political obligations to his country and her laws,
and a gentleman with all the obligations of honor and civil
'4I3 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
intercourse. He is no morally privileged person, as no man
can be. The more justice and due protection of the citizen
require that he should have great freedom of speech and ac~
tion in court, the more'he is bound to regulate his conduct
towards a witness by genuine courtesy, and towards the court
by due deference to the cause of justice partly represented by
the bench. Yet a true advocate will never forget that in de fending a citizen he is as much the representative of the law
of the land, which wills protection to every one, as is the
judge, and, with all proper respect for the bench, he will, if
the case calls for it, stand for his client's rights as Erskine did
in the trial of the dean of St. Asaph.'
As to the second class of rules, he must abide by the rules
agreed upon among the members of the bar as best calculated
to promote professional intercourse and the advantages of the
profession, so far as they agree with the advantages of the
commnunity.
As it is the object of the institution of the advocate that
every person should have all the advantage which the law
affords, and that final sentence be given only after all that
may be urged on both sides is said and sifted, there is no case
in which a person charged with an offence should not be defended. Many codes enact this principle as law. There are
not a few persons who revolt at this idea, conceiving of a case
in which the guilt of the offender is known to every one.
Defending, however, does not necessarily mean representing
the prisoner as innocent, but merely, first, seeing that the guilt
be actually proved,-for every man, as is well known, must
be held innocent until proved guilty,-and, secondly, that no
more than what is strictly warranted by the law should be
awarded. Nothing is more common than that counsel give
up a case as absolutely hopeless; but still they must continue
In the trial of Shipley, the dean of St. Aqaph, for libel, Justice Buller said,
" Sit down, sir; remember your duty, or I shall be obliged to proceed in another
manner."  Mr. Erskine answered, "Your  lordship may proceed in whlat manner you think fit: I kInow my duty as well as your lordship knows yours.  I shall
not alter my conduct."
I
4I4 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
to protect the client against a privation of any advantage
which the law warrants, for instance that the sentence be not
too severe.
I do not know that anything redounds more to the honor
of the Americans than the readiness with which in I770 the
British soldiers who had fired upon the people in Boston
found counsel even during that great excitement which preceded the Revolution, and that counsel, too, men who, as
American citizens, were enthusiastic for the popular cause.
There is a remarkable letter in the Life of Josiah Quincy, jun.,
of Massachusetts (written by his son, Josiah Quincy, Boston,
1 825). He had been engaged for one of those soldiers, and
his father inquired with great anxiety whether it was true that
his son had become "an advocate for those criminals who are
charged with the murder of their fellow-citizens. Good God!"
-he continues, "is it possible? I will not believe it." The son
answered, in a noble letter, that they had not yet been found
guilty, but were only charged with the guilt.,
Cicero says that the judge must always follow out the truth,
but that the advocate may defend what is but the semblance
of truth, though it be short of truth.  I think the truth on
this point is that the advocate has no more right to abandon
truth than any one else in the whole world, but he is bound
to represent his case in the best possible light consistent with
the truth; so that if there be any substantially good point it
may be found out. Cicero is not altogether very distinct or
precise in this passage: thus, he says, "we need not, on the
other hand, make any scruple of speaking sometimnes in be
The work is written by the son of its subject, Josiah Quincy, President of
Harvard University, Boston, i825.  The letter of the father is of March 22, 1770,
that of the son, of March 26 of the same year.  It is historically important and
highly honorable to the people then on the eve of a revolution, that the most
prominent men in the community where blood had been spilt, such as Adams,
Hancock, Warren, Cooper, Henshaw, Cuthing, Moleneutx, Pemberton, Philipps,
strongly advised and urged Quincy to undertake the defence of the indicted soldiers.  It is the evident manifestation of the Anglican veneration for the law,
even in the midst of much excitement, and inll the face of much popular odium
which mig,ht have visited a zealous advocate with bitter hostility.
415 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
half of the guilty, provided he be not wholly villanous and
abominable." But what is wholly villanous and abominable?
Every one ought to be defended, that is, be it repeated, he
ought to be so protected that he may receive all the advan tage which the law justly and wisely affords and which his
peculiar case allows. Escape of the client is not the ultimate
object, but justice alone.
An advocate has not the right of injuring knowingly and
willingly another person, either in reputation or property, in
order to save or serve his client. It is evident that he cannot
have the right knowingly to rob another for his client, or
make aspersions upon the honor and reputation of an innocent man. He would certainly load his conscience with heavy
guilt were he to exert his skill in defending, for instance, what
.he actually knew to be a forged will,-and such a case may
be imagined; or were hle to defend a criminal for a fee consisting, to his knowledge, of the very goods for stealing which
the prisoner is indicted. This may not only be imagined, but
has taken place. Nor is this surprising, for where the profession of the law is extensive-and it will always be extensive
where civil liberty is enjoyed in a high degree-it is but
natural that many of the best and some of the meanest
citizens should belong to it. Every person charged with an
offence ought to be defended, that is, duly protected; but this
differs widely from aiding a client in committing a crime by
gaining a fraudulent lawsuit, for instance by making use for
his defence of documents most strongly suspected by the
advocate to be forged. There may be many cases of this sort
imagined in which no honorable lawyer would be willing to
engage.
The advocate ought on no occasion to fmi'stat  thl law, or
endeavor to mislead the judge, or to misstate a fact in order
to deceive the jury. This of course does not exclude the endeavor to make the best of the law for his client, or to present
the more favorable points of the law or facts with peculiar
force. Morality and prudence coincide here, as they so often
do: for an advocate will but little advance his reputation as a
4i6 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
lawyer, and consequently as little his, worldly interest, by
habitual disingenuous handling of the law or the fact." It
lends considerable power to a lawyer if judge and jury listen
to him with the belief in his honesty.
There is a consideration which I submit to the peculiar reflection of those who intend to become members of the profession, because it is of grave importance to society, and yet
perhaps but little known to lawyers themselves. From frequent and free conversations with convicts in the penitentiaries I know it to be a fact that many criminals have been
led on in the path of crime by the circumstance that when
young and indicted for the first offence, perhaps for a petty
theft, and when they were deeply impressed with the consequences to which their guilty thoughtlessness had brought
them, they became  reassured when  hearing their  counsel
boldly utter things in their defence which the young offenders
knew that their counsel well knew not to be true. If, in particular, a verdict of not guilty was the effect, the young criminal came out of the trial with his previous rashness confirmed
into conscious and settled purpose.
It is a serious evil which is necessarily connected with all
public trials and defences in the presence of the criminal, both
that he learns many ways and means intended by the law as
An honorable barrister will never misstate either law or facts within his
own knowledge; but he is justified in urging any argument, whatever may be his
own opinion of the solidity or justness of it, which he may think will promote the
interests of his client, for reasoning in courts of justice and in the ordinary affairs
of life seldom admits of geometrical demonstration: but it happens not unfrequently that the same argument which appears sophistry to one is sound logic in
the mind of another, and every day's experience proves that the opinions of.a
judge and an advocate are often diametrically opposite. Many circumstances
may occur which will justify or compel an individual member of the profession
to refuse the defence of a particular client, but a cause can hardly be conceived
which ought to Le rejected by all the bar, for such a conduct in the profession
would excite so strong a prejudice against the party as to render him in a great
degree condemned before his trial." (Christian's note to 4th Blackstone, 356.)
But there are cases, as mentioned before, in which the aid of the advocate is required(, in order that with his knowledge fraud may be committed; which of
course must be declined by all honest men.
VOL. II.                          27
417 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
the protection of innocence, but, of course, used also by the
guilty as a screen for nefarious doings, and that he becomes
more hardened by hearing the counsel speak so confidently
and openly in his favor. The necessary assurance of the advocate becomes shamelessness in the offender. He accustoms
himself to consider the whole trial a game of skill and cleverness, and no more.   This evil, great as it is, cannot possibly be separated from public and oral trial, the many and
substantial advantages of which, and, indeed, the necessity of
which for civil liberty, make us endure it. Still, we ought to
remember that the evil exists, and that it is a great one. The
advocate, for this very reason, ought not to increase the evil by
adding his authority, in the mind of the criminal, to his own
disregard of right and wrong.
From all that I have been able to learn from convicts as
well as the most intelligent superintendents in the penitentiaries, I cannot but consider the circumstance just spoken of
as an active cause in the diffusion and propagation of crime,
and deserving, therefore, I feel sure, the fullest attention of
every honorable advocate.
Few things are more important for the upright advocate
than to scrutinize with the utmost delicacy of honor and
tenderness of conscience all opportunities of increasing his
wealth which may accrue out of his legal transactions, except
those of receiving fees in the strictest sense of the term; nor
must he ever be unmindful of the object for which he is employed by his client, that is, the client's advantage, which includes the quickest possible termination of the particular case,
or, in other words, that he is in the service of the client and
that his client is not his prey.
If the advocate is a prosecutor for the public, or, as it is
called in monarchies, for the king, it is very necessary for him
never to forget that, although it is the advocate's bounden
duty to represent a case in the best possible light when he is
counsel for the private party, it by no means follows that it is
his duty, when he prosecutes for the public, to represent the
case in the worst possible light, or to aim always at the high
4I8 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
est damage or penalty which the case may allow. This would
amount to reasoning backwards, and is therefore wrong. The
defending counsel must represent the case in the best possible
light, for the very reason that he defends a being prosecuted
by public power; he defends the individual against the society.
But to draw from this fact the conclusion that because the
case of the accused person is presented by his counsel in the
best possible way, the first and originating party, that is, the
state, ought therefore to present it in the worst possible light,
would be turning the effect of the briginal danger, that power
may be too strong for the individual, into a new cause of its
own increase. And, be it observed, this remark holds equally
good where the criminally indicted prisoner has no counsel
allowed to him: the prosecuting officer in such a case is in
conscience bound to consider himself the protector of the prisoner," the impartial substitute for the counsel who ought to be
I Christian, in his note to 4th Blackstone, 356, says, "HIence, in all criminal
prosecutions, especially where the prisoner can have no counsel to plead for him
[the writer therefore includes all cases, and says indeed as fully as I have said
in the text, that a prosecuting officer is not allowed to make the case as black as
his ingenuity will permit], a barrister is as much bound to disclose all those circumstances to the jury, and to reason upon them as fully, which are favorable to
the prisoner, as those which are likely.to support the prosecution." It is right
to give this as a rule, but it is likewise right to consider man's nature, and that
few are willing and still fewer capable of thus willing a thing (the accusation
an-I representation of guilt of a man) and at the same time of throwing all possible obstacles (the reasons for the prisoner) in the way. Indeed, the theoretical
junction of the British prosecutor and defensor in penal cases is contradictory in
itself, and, speaking in reference to legal philosophy, as absurd as the threefold
person "as which we are told we must consider the judge in the inquisitorial
process (the one in practice in most countries in which the civil law has been
adopted),- namely "as representative of the offended state, inasmuch as he is
bound, in its place, to see right done according to the penal law; as representative of the accused, inasmuch as he is hound at the same time to find out and
represent everything on which the innocence or a less degree of criminality can
be founded; and, finally, as judge, inasmuch as he must judge of and decide
upon the given facts." (Feuerbach's Manual of the Comnmon German Penal Law,
ioth edit., { 623.)  I know of no higher authority than Feuerbach; I know of no
passage ever written by the adversaries of the inquisitorial process which sets forth
half so well its general badness and its utter incompatibility with civil liberty as the
quoted one. One mortal man shall be at once accuser, defender, and judgeI
419 
0  POLITICAL ETHICS.
assigned to him. Nor ought a citizen ever to be placed ill a
state of accusation on insufficient grounds, for the reason that
the state has provided for him ample means of defence and
barriers of security. An individual is to be defended because
accused, but not to be accused because he will be defended.,
Although we do not suffer the evils of an inquisition, whose
mere accusation is blasting although acquittal follows, still
the prosecuting officer should never forget that he cannot calculate or know how much suspicion may deface a man's character even after a fair acquittal. Since the only true object
of society in prosecuting is justice, he has no manner of business to involve the accused in greater difficulty, or to throw a
heavier cloak of suspicion over him, than the simple facts of
the case warrant and the objects of political society demand.
A penal case is not a case between two equal parties, nor a
trial of skill and ingenuity between two advocates, nor a matter of legal reputation for the respective lawyers, but it is a
very grave case between the state and an individual charged
with-that is, until proved, strongly suspected of-an offence;
it is the case of Justice one and indivisible alone, not a tournament of legal dialectics.2
In cases where affection is' not the foundation, as in the family, but where
right forms the sole basis! There are some advantages connected with the inquisitorial process, indeed, which the process of accusation lacks; but what are
these advantages, compared to this startling jumble of the most opposite characters? Where is there the slightest guarantee for times of usurpation? To prevent misconceptions, however, I ought to mention that, though the judge is also
defender, a separate defender is assigned to the indicted person, and, what is remarkable, in most countries a person cannot be sentenced for any high offence
without having been defended, even though the defender should plead guilty.
Yet the defences by such a defender sound to us, accustomed as we are to the
freest and often boldest scope of counsel, very tame indeed, and the court
frequently rebukes where we should not see any boldness in his words or
arguments.
[Dr. Lieber, in a manuscript note, here discusses malicious prosecution and
prosecution on insufficient grounds. The substance of his remarks is inserted in
his Civil Liberty, chap. vii. p. 77.]
2 I must refer the reader for some more remarks on the ethical relations of a
barrister, especially with respect to his obligations connected with interpretation,
and the important question whether he may feel himself at liberty, as a strictly
420 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
XIV. Where there is enduring civil liberty, the supremacy
of the law must be acknowledged; where the supremacy of
the law is acknowledged, the lawyers must necessarily possess much influence. It is so at present with all free nations,
who are not merely enjoying a transient period of liberty, but
have founded it on lasting institutions; and it was so in ancient times, in which the freest republics have probably never
suffered so much from professional lawyers as from demagogues who were not members of their profession., Their
constant occupation with the laws of the land and questions of right, and their habit of consecutive reasoning, as
well as the necessity in which they constantly find themselves of viewing a subject in its different lights, make them
more fit to grapple with many questions which involve the
rights and interests of many and opposite parties, than other
people, as well as more liberal, upon the whole, towards those
who dissent from their opinion, and bolder in asserting rights
where theie is danger in doing so, because they are better
able to find out the firm ground of positive law and of wellacknowledged precedent. These advantages, however, have
also their counterbalancing evils. The professional lawyer,
accustomed to seek the best arguments for any side on which
he may be engaged, not unfrequently loses the original impilse of the first principle from which matters of state derive
their value or want of value. The professional lawyer carries
at times the habit of special pleading into the halls, where
subjects are to be treated of on the broad principles of general
good; and this may be the cause that we find few of the greatest British statesmen and great parliamentary leaders to'have
moral man, to make use of" artful interpretation," to my Legal and Political
Hermeneutics.  Mr. Justice Story speaks of the general duties and elevated
position of the advocate in his inaugural address as Dane professor in the law
school of the University at Cambridge, Massachusetts (Miscellaneous Writings,
p. 452). He likewise touches upon the subject in his Law of Agency, Boston,
I839, page 25. [Comp. Dr. Lieber's Civil Liberty, chap. xx. p. 239, et seq.]
- [In free Greece there were rhetoricians and teachers of rhetoric, but no lawyers. In Rome the profession was but in its infancy when the republic fell.
That lawyers thrive in a country is no proof of free institutions.].
421 
2POLITICAL ETHICS.
been professional lawyers, or, if they had entered the bar, like
Pitt, they can hardly be called virtual lawyers.   Impulses
towards great reforms in legislation have rarely, I believe,
proceeded from the profession.,
The lawyer, always looking up to the law as his great authority, which, as was mentioned, makes him frequently the
bolder in asserting right, becomes generally rather the representative of that which exists than the advocate of that which
ought to be; still farther, he is not unfrequently blinded by
existing laws and institutions, and resists improvements which
must be judged of upon strict principle and consist in a change
of what exists. For this reason it is always desirable that the
lawyers take an active part in the legislation of a country; for
it is most necessary that the existing state of things be fairly
represented, and that the legislators of a state do not precipitate the state into heedless speculation or untried experiments,
appearing brilliant to the unexperienced; but their number
* There is a very excellent passage on this subject in the reflections of Sir
Samuel Romilly on himself and the good he might do should he be appointed
lord chancellor, page 384 et seq. of vol. iii. of his Memoirs, 2d edit., Lond., 1840.
He says, "It is not from such [men as have for a long period been  appointed
to the chancellorship] that we should expect comprehensive reforms or important
alterations in the law. His education, his inveterate habits, the society he has
lived in, the policy by which he has always regulated his conduct, have all tended
to inspire him with a blind reverence for every part of that system of law which
he has found established. When we reflect on this, when we trace the former
lives of all the chancellors of modern times,-when we see them, from the momnent when they quitted college, giving up their whole time to the study of one
positive science and cultivating no faculty of the mind but memory, the talent of
discovering and pursuing nice and subtle distinctions and forced analogies, and
the art of amplifying and disguising truth,-when we see them stunned, as it
were, during the best years of their lives, by the continual hurry of business, reading nothing but what relates to the particular cases before them, shutting out all
liberal knowledge from their minds, and contracting their views to the little
objects with which they are continually occupied," etc.
The passage must be read much farther.
With reference to America, however, we must observe that the lawyers as a
class form the most liberal part of the people, and withal the only large class
who attain anything like a gradual political education and represent more than
mere momentary excitements and measures.
-x 422 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
must not overbalance the other portion of the legislators, who
view the existing law without that charm with which it is invested to the eye of the lawyer, and without that fond pertinacity which arises from-the pains the lawyer has taken to
learn the law with all the intricate difficulties attending it.
The greatest part of the most important, radical, and salutary
reforms have not originated with lawyers, as was mentioned
already: still, we must not forget that Pym was probably as
great a man as Hampden, and quite as indispensable to his
great party.
When power struggles with liberty, and yet is forced to derive an appearance of support from law, as is the case when the
crown or a despotically disposed party endeavors to arrogate
undue power over a people still cherishing their rights and
the endeared tradition of liberty, it is natural that the party
of power should always find many valuable aids among lawyers, because there are men in all professions who desire their
advancement at any price, and it is the willing lawyer who, in
the cases alluded to, is of the greatest value on account of his
peculiar species of knowledge. When the state of things is
such that clergymen can better or equally well give their aid
to existing power, there are never members of that profession
wanting that are ready to degrade their skill, knowledge, and
influence in a like manner. Indeed, the clergy have more
frequently and more extensively sided with power and authority, in states where government can offer any preferment,
than the lawyers. Though the British prerogative-lawyers
have prostituted their knowledge to the essential injury of the
people, we must also remember that liberty owes to the aid
afforded by the profession of the advocate some of the greatest achievements in the cause of national progress. Laud and
Strafford hated the lawyers most cordially: their instinct taught
them rightly; How much has not Erskine done for the assertion and clearer representation of many valuable constitutional
points!  Does not our whole race owe much, ii the cause of
freedom, to such judges as Lords Somers and Camden?
If a lawyer then becomes a member of legislating assem
423 
t POLITICA L ETHICS.
blies, he must carefully strive to elevate his mind above the
level of special pleading, so as not to be the mere advocate of
his party or of power, and to view subjects on the ground of
broad national interest. That in smaller matters he must not
carry the dust of the courts adhering to his vestments, with
all the petty manceuvring to which a circumscribed practice
frequently leads, into the halls of the legislature, need not be
mentioned.
XV. The importance of the pure administration of justice for
the state in general, as well as for individuals, lends of course
proportionate importance and solemnity to every part and
element of this administration, whether it consist in applying
the law and giving every one his due after the truth is known,
or in aiding to find out this truth. Among the elements of
the administration of justice belonging to the latter class the
witness is the most important. A witness upon the stand,
whoever may have called him there, whether the government
or a private party, ought ever to consider himself as being for
the time in the service of Justice herself, and unbiassed truth
becomes his binding, solemn, and sole obligation. The oath
or affirmation to tell "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth," puts a very serious, solemn, and great obligation upon the witness; for it is necessary that as witnesses we
abstain first from every falsehood, even the smallest; secondly,
from everything which in one sense may be true, but in the
sense in which it will be probably taken by the adverse party
or the court is not true; thirdly, from all omissions which
materially interfere with the whole truth; and fourthly also
that we solemnly bind ourselves to state nothing in rashness,
nothing which we believe to be true but which nevertheless
is only a framework of facts filled up with the productions of
a lively imagination, so often repeated in our mind that they
appear to us perfect truth-an evil to which women in particular are subject. Nor must we allow our feelings to be
wrought up so that something may appear to us true at the
moment we are testifying, which nevertheless is not true or
424 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
not precisely as we state it.  The holy cause of justice depends in a degree upon every word that drops from the lips
of a witness; and the oath hle takes, which to his fellow-men
becomes the most solemn of all pledges of truth, ought to be
within him a fervent prayer that his memory may be correct
and his mind calm and clear, so that he himself mistake not
semblance for truth and that he be in a frame of mind to
choose the proper words precisely to express what he wishes
to express. A witness must take care, therefore, not to suffer
his temper to be ruffled, even though the questioning advocate should forget his duty by impertinence and arrogance.
In all such cases it is by far the best for the witness to appeal
at once to the court for protection, and not to enter by pert repartees into a contest with an insolent lawyer. A witness ought
to prepare himself for the discharge of his duty, especially
when he has to testify to facts either long gone by, or observed by him when he himself was excited, or which happened
surrounded by tumultuous agitation. Few who have not made
some careful experiments upon themselves have any idea how
far we allow ourselves to be deceived by our constantly working and combining, picturing and deceiving imagination, and
in what degree we may succeed in undeceiving ourselves and
unravelling the mazes of our own fancy.  Persons of a lively
imagination are especially bound to review facts well and to
endeavor to sift and prune what the imagination may busily
have added, before they asseverate anything as witnesses for
or against any man. The law makes a considerable difference
between questions which may or may not be put to a witness
under different circumstances; but whatever the law does
allow to be asked-over which the court watches-must be
answered in the spirit of absolute veracity.  There is in the
oath or affirmation of witnesses no different kind or degree of
obligation to state the truth; all witnesses, whether for or
against the prisoner (virtually they are all for Justice), solemnly pledge themselves to tell the truth, the whole truth,
and niothing but the truth.
425 
CHAPTER III.
War.-Definitions.-Present Exaggerations against War.-Christian  Religio n
does not prohibit just War; neither the Bible, nor the early Writers of the
Church.-Objections against War on the Score of Morality; of Reason; of
Political Economy.-Just and Patriotic Wars have morally raised Nations. Eternal Peace.-Arbitration by a Congress of Nations.-Just Wars.-National
Debasing Effect of suffering national Insult and Injustice without Resistance.
-The Age of Louis XIV.-Wars do not absolve from Obligations to the
Enemy.-Who is the Enemy?-Are Citizens of the hostile State Enemies? What means of injuring the Enemy are admissible?-Treaties containing Pro visions for the Case of War between the Contracting Powers.-Shall Confidence
be abused in War?-Does War allow Deception?-Capitulations are sacred.
— Destruction in War.-Carrying  off Works of Art, Archives, etc.-Duties
of the individual Soldier.
XVI. IN this last chapter it is proposed to give a few remarks on War, as connected with our subject. I am well
aware that the whole subject of war belongs properly to the
so-called law of nations and international ethics; yet so much
has been advanced of late regarding war as affecting the
morality of the individual, and so many cases which are to be
decided on ethical grounds by the individual necessarily occur
in every war, that I feel obliged to add this chapter to the
present work, although international ethics in general have
been excluded from it. I shall confine myself, however, to
some remarks touching in general the admissibility of war
among rational and moral beings, and some respecting the
conduct of the individual who takes part in a war, excluding
from our inquiry the whole important field of the law of war
proper.
War is a state of enmity between two parties, in which each
is known by the other to be ready to obtain its ends by other
means besides intellectual ones, especially by force and stratagem. We generally use the word War as applied to considerable masses, and of a protracted contest; hence partly the
426
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POLITICA L ETHICS.
term "state of enmity" has been used; for the word protracted
is not sufficiently definite.  Otherwise the following might
be the simplest and most comprehensive definition: War is
protracted and active enmity.
That it has been found difficult to give an exact definition
of war is owing to the fact that the term is used for almost all
shades of contest and continued enmity, more or less metaphorically. Most definitions which have been given of war
would apply equally well to mere battles, or they exclude the
various means besides force which we make use of in war in
order to obtain our object, for instance, cunning, intimidation,
the devastation of one's own country to deprive the enemy of
sustenance, etc.,
Cicero, in saying in his Offices that " there are two kinds of contests between
men, the one by argument and the other by force," though undoubtedly meaning
by the latter war, cannot have meant to give a strict definition, for this would apply
to single battles likewise. But a war generally comprehends battles, on the one
hand, and on the other there have been wars without battles. Grotius saw this
deficiency distinctly. Albericus Gentilis, in his work De Jure Belli, Oxon.,
I588, says, "War is a just contention of the public force."  Surely, in that case,
Ferdinand of Aragon and Louis XII. could never have been at war, despite all
the blood with which their captains drenched the fields of Italy. Or, if Aragon
pretended to be right in spoliating her poor kinsman, how should we call wars
professedly undertaken for robbing? [Albericus means just in idea, as a judge
may give an unjust decision in a court of justice.]  Hugo Grotius says, "War is
the state of contending parties, considered as such" (bellum status per vim certantium, qua tbles sunt). (De Jure Belli et Pacis, cap. i. 2.) Puffendorf calls
war the state in which those are who in turn harm one another and repel the
harm by force, or who strive to obtain their due by force. (Lay of Nature and
Nations, i. ch. I, 8.) Bynkershoek, in his excellent treatise on the Law of War,
says, "War is a contest carried on between independent persons, by force or
fraud, for the sake of asserting their rights." This would exclude civil wars,
and apply to the single battle as well as the whole war.   Vattel says,  "War is
that state in which we prosecute our right by force." (Book 3, ch. i.) There
have been wars in which actually the possession of no rights was pretended.
I have mentioned one in Book I. { xxxix.-But was this no war? See also
Wheaton's Elements of International Law, 8th edition, i866, { 295, et seq. —
General Clausewitz, in his work On War (Vom Kriege), Berlin, 2 vols., I835,
says, "War is the act of compelling an opponent to submit to one's will.  Thus,
force is the medium, and submission the object, and the latter can only be ob tained by the development of the former. In order to effect this, the enemy
42,7 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
XVII. War may be considered in various points of view, for
ins ance, that of religion, of pure morality and right, of utility,
and with regard to its effects. On all these and other grounds
war has, at times, been represented as entirely inadmissible
among rational beings, and, as is usually the case in discussions of this sort, men have gone all sorts of lengths, some
from sincere zeal, others from vanity, and still others from
sinister views. While some political economists and pulpit
orators have maintained, in contradiction to facts and history,
that nations in no case gain by wars anything to be compared
to the loss sustained thereby, or that war may be the interest
of one man but can never be that of the people, others have
gone still farther in their exaggeration, and denied that greatness of intellect is shown and proved by great generalship; as
if we could without paradox possibly deny energy and independence of thought, elevation and firmness of character, intensity of action, vastness of combination, inventive fertility,
penetration into the simple elements of what is complicated,
confused, and hidden, and that peculiar attribute of greatness
of intellect by which it communicates the spark of moral electricity to others and obtains mental dominion over them, the
command of souls, to men like Hannibal, Caesar, Gonsalvo of
C6rdova, William I. of Orange, Gustavus Adolphus, De Ruy
must be rendered powerless. This is the grand aim of all hostilities." This
definition does not include the defence of small states against attacks of large
ones, whom they cannot intend, because they cannot hope, to render powerless.
Have not small communities, when attacked, gone into war, resolved to sacrifice
themselves, and knowing that this would be the end? Yet this was, nevertheless, war.
The word War is radically the same with the German Wehr, meaning arms
and protection, defence; Wehren, the verb, means defending and interfering
with something, and is, radically, the same word with the Anglo-Saxon Weran,
Swedish Varja, Icelandic Veria; which we have still in Beware, which means
to take care, guard one's self; as the German  Bewahren means to preserve and
keep properly. The French Guerre, Spanish Guerra, and the corresponding
terms in the other Romanic languages are all derived from the Teutonic War or
Wehr, the w changing into gu, as it does frequently, for instance in the names
of Witt, Vitus, into Guido, Guy. [War, Anglo-Saxon Werra, is more naturally
connected by philologists with Werran = Wirren, German, to confound, disturb.]
428 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
ter, Frederic, Napoleon, Nelson, or Wellington., If some of
these men have committed acts which we disapprove, or are
supposed to have used the greatness of their intellect altogether for evil ends, it does not invalidate the position that
the fact of their having been trutly great generals shows also
the greatness of their intellect, any more than the fact of
Bacon's soiling his pages with unworthy flattery of a puerile
monarch proves him not to have been a great philosopher, or
of Lord Coke's having disgraced himself by some of the most
servile arguments in favor of the crown and to the ruin of the
persecuted disproves his having been a capacious and penetrating lawyer. Views like these have generally been maintained by persons who have an inadequate idea of what war
actually is, what a general has to do, and into what parts war
resolves itself. They see troops moving by command on the
drilling ground, and think armies are commnianded in a like
manner and as easily, and that moral vigor is altogether out
of the question. Others have pushed the argument so far as
boldly to assert that soldiers never fight from patriotism, and
that, if they did, it would not be worth much, patriotism being
altogether worth little to a Christian! Verily, it is seen that
[" A nation's external life, then; is displayed in its wars, and here history
has been sufficiently busy: the wars of the human race have been recorded when
the memory of everything else has perished. Nor is this to be wondered at; for the
external life of nations, as of individuals, is at once the most easily known and the
most generally interesting. Action, in the common sense of the word, is intelligible
to every one; its effects are visible and sensible; in itself, from its necessary connection with outward nature, it is often highly picturesque, while the qualities
displayed in it are some of those which by an irresistible instinct we are most
led to admire. Ability is the adaptation of means to ellds, courage, endurance,
and perseverance, the complete conquest over some of the most universal weaknesses of our nature, the victory over some of its most powerful temptations: these
are qualities displayed in action, and particularly in war. And it is our deep
sympathy with these qualities, much more than any fondness for scenes of horror
and blood, which has made descriptions of battles, whether in poetry or history,
so generally attractive. He who can read these without interest differs, I am inclined to think, from the mass of mankind rather for the worse than for the better:
he rather wants some noble qualities which other men have, than possesses some
which other men want."-]'naugural Lecture, Lectures of Modern History, by
T. Arnold, D.D.]
429 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
these writers can never have taken up arms in defence of their
country, or have been ready to shed their blood for it without
earthly reward.   How much are those to be pitied whose
hearts remain cold at some of the choicest pages of history
that testify to every glowing bosom the nobleness of human
nature! A devoted, humble citizen bleeding and dying for
his beloved country, her laws and liberty, the freedom of his
children, their religion, their language, for their very intellectual existence, is nothing to them.,
It is not difficult to see why men at our time should urge
the inadmissibility of war, or assert the extravagant extremes
just mnentioned, more loudly than perhaps at any previous
period.  Europe had seen most melancholy and unrighteous
wars during the seventeenth century.   Most governments
strove for concentration, and military service was the best
rewarded and most honored of professions. While thus good
and pious as well as judicious men naturally began to raise their
voices against war, it was likewise an inducement for the bold
and witty to speak against great generals as if no better than
common robbers either in capacity or morality, and a Shaftes
z Mr. J. Dymond, in his Inquiry into the Accordancy of War with the Principles of Christianity, etc., 3d edition, Philadelphia, I834-a work which would
seem to embody all the objections that' have been raised on the ground of the
Christian religion against war, and on this account is to be consulted by the student-declares that soldiers do not die for their country, and seeks to prove
it by asserting that no one of them would be willing quietly to be executed for
his country in a distant land: hence, he thinks, it is clear that glory alone
prompts him to fight for his country. As to the first point, it must be observed
that no doubt there are some who would willingly lay down their lives for their
country. If his own heart does not tell him that there are some such, let him
look at history, which will give him instances of men who willingly died for
their country but could not have expected their names ever to be known.
Why not deny the same respecting religion? Regarding the second, I do not
know how glory can be the all-powerful agent in a national war such as the
Dutch war of independence was against the Spaniards. Soldiers know that their
names will not be gazetted. I do not see what glory there was to be earned by the
poor penl)le of Leyden, who still held out against the Spaniards, when reduced to
famished skeletons, despite ravenous hunger, fever, and total exhaustion, unless
we call glory that which a man feels within him when he sacrifices himself to
his duty, to the liberty of his country, to the cause of mankind and his religion.
43o 
POLITICAL E TICS.
bury, strange to say, came to agree with bishop Watson. At
a still later period, political economy, viewing national transactions chiefly in the light of their immediate and pecuniary
results, was more and more studied, while, on the other hand,
wars on a gigantic scale were carried on by Napoleon, and
many states since then have enjoyed the sweets and rapid
improvements of peace.   Thus people were easily carried to
another extreme, and while in former times military glory
was almost the only, certainly the highest, title to political
distinction, now persons are induced to decry military talent
as having a merely brutal character, and glory, even though it
be earned in a noble cause, as ludicrous; nay, even patriotism
as beneath either high religious feeling, or pure utilitarian
perception unalloyed by any dross of feeling.
XVIII. A just war implies that we have a just cause, and
that it is necessary; for war implies suffering on the part of
some, and it is a principle of all human actions that, in order
to be justified in inflicting suffering of any kind, we must not
only be justified, but that there is a necessity for the infliction. I shall speak more of just wars further below.
If a war is just, the Christian religion does not prohibit it.
If it did, one of two things must be true, either war must be
directly prohibited, or the prohibition must be fairly implied in other direct commandments. This would be necessary for the Protestant; for the Catholic there might be a third
supposition, namely, that the church from earliest times should
have traditionally prohibited all war. Neither of these positions, however, can be maintained; while there are strong
biblical reasons which support the advocates of just war. The
Bible nowhere directly prohibits war.   Indeed, it may be
answered, So there are many vices and offences not specifically
prohibited, for instance suicide.   But war is positively enjoined in the Old Testament,'and not only war but even conquest; while in the New Testament it is not prohibited,
although war was raging in the world, and the subject was
brought almost directly before Christ and the apostles: still
43I 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
they said not a word of it. Compare, for instance, Luke vii.
8 and iii. I4.1  To this we may add Paul's words, "For he
[the ruler, magistrate] beareth not the sword in vain." (Romans xiii. 4.) What is the sword? An edged weapon to
compel if need be by force, even at the risk of the opponent's
life.  If Paul acknowledges this power to compel or overawe
as lodged in some one at home, if he acknowledges in the
ruler not only the, right to wear the sword but to use it, for
"he does not bear it in vain," if he acknowledges the right
of having armed servants, for this is evidently meant by the
sword, since the ruler alone cannot use the sword, and of using
these armed servants not'only to compel subjects and citizens
but actually to avenge, it is very plain that the ruler must have
a still greater right to protect his subjects against unjust aggression and oppression; for, be it said at this early stage of
our inquiry, the question as to the original and moral legality
of war is no other than the general one of resistance-that is,
ought force to be resisted by force?
Lastly, the fathers of the church amply acknowledge the
right of war, and not only this, but it is acknowledged that
war once declared and justly declared, the Christian may carry
it on by open force or by fraud, that is, stratagem. See St.
Augustine, Quest. Io0, in Josuam.2
Against this it is said that our religion is eminently peaceful in its character, commands that we should love one another, prohibits revenge and hatred, commands to overcome
evil with good, that we should be meek, etc.3 Some point at
passages such as, "I say unto you, that ye resist not evil, but
whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him
the other also" (Matthew v. 39), and, "Put up again thy sword
X Both passages mentioned by Paley, Moral and Political Philosophy, vi. ch. xii.
2 [The words are, "cum justumn bellum susceperit, utrum aperta pugna utrom
insidiis vincet, nihil ad justitiam interest."  Quest. in Heptateuch, on Joshua,
cap. viii. (iii. I, 906, Paris reprint of Benedict. ed. 1836). All sorts of fraud are
not here allowed.]
3 See the cited work of Dymond, and the last chapter of Wayland's Elements
of Moral Science, New York, 1835.
432 
POLJITICAL EiTHICS.
into his place, for all they that take the sword shall perish
with the sword" (Matthew xxvi. 52), or the commandment,
"Thou shalt not kill," as containing more direct or typical
commands for the Christian never to use the sword.
Upon this it is to be answered, that although Christ came
among other things to preach and diffuse love, forbearance,
charity, and even love of our enemy, he by no means intended
to abolish thereby all relations of right, all law, all defence of
right, for this would necessarily lead-and actually has misled
crazy religionists more than once-to the abolition of all
magistracy and of the institution of the state itself. How
often in history has not this advent of dissolution been
preached by fanatics, such as the Anabaptists, who ended, as
nearly all these fanatics do, by using every species of cruelty
and ferocity in order to compel others into their belief of
non-resistance! Christ came to infuse the spirit of kindness,
not to abrogate the principles of God's creation. A stone is
attracted by the centre of the earth now, as before Christ; a
conclusion drawn according to the logical laws of reasoning
is now as binding as before Christ; and the eternal principles
of justice are now as strong, as imperative, and as sacred
as before Christ.  Let the law do justice and full justice
alone, and leave love to the individual; for, sacred as it is,
it becomes so only if added to justice, but not if put in the
place of justice.  Every one ought to be reminded again and
again that mutual love is a great virtue, but before all we
must be just, which is not so easy.
Christ as well as the apostles acknowledged positively law,
the state, and the magistracy. A citizen who fights because
called upon by his government, a man who fights in a just
cause, does not on that account hate his military enemy; he
does not shoot at him from hatred or revenge. He would do
It is well known that enemies, as soon as overcome, that is, as soon as made
harmless, treat each other without any feeling of personal malignity, and even
with chivalrous ac',nowledgment of their gallantry.  Whatever cases may occur
to the contrary, they are, among civilized nations, considered with universal disapproval, and form exceptions. A very striking instance that war does not beget
VOL. II.                            28
433 
POLITICA L ETHICS.
this if he were to fight for the sake of fighting, but the object
of just fighting is peace, the obtaining of right and its protection, and he fights against the enemy only because he cannot
obtain these ends without removing the wanton obstacle in
the way of obtaining it-that is, the enemy.   This appears
from the fact that all personal cruelty is prohibited, and that
after a battle the wounded enemy is taken care of equally with
the wounded friend.
As to the supposed injunctions never to fight, we must
understand these passages as all the others, and as anything
expressed in human language, that is, in conjunction with
other passages, in the spirit of the whole document or text,
and without losing sight of the first key of all interpretation,
that is, of common sense and good faith; we must take what
is tropical as tropical, what is hyperbolical as hyperbolical.
It stands, Thou shalt not kill. Does not this mean, Thou shalt
not unjustly kill? For killing means violently depriving of
life. If we apply the commandment to every violent extinction of human life-and it is difficult to see how this can be
done, since the commandment is in the Old Testament, in
which war was absolutely commanded by the same authority from which this commandment proceeded-we may as
well extend it to all animal life, as indeed some sects have
done. Nor is there any reason why we should stop here.
Plants have undoubtedly life too, and the commandment
might be supposed to extend to vegetable as well as animal
life.  Here, every one would exclaim, This is against all
sense! This is precisely the answer which is the correct one
to be given to those who take the precept literally.
The other passage must be likewise understood in conjunction with the whole Bible; and lie have seen already that
personal hatred occurred in the year I838, when Marshal Soult, who had commanded the French in the Peninsular war against the British under Wellington, visited England. The marshal was received by the duke, as well as by the
whole British people, wherever he went, with the greatest respect, and a warmth
of feeling which was acknowledged by Soult himself as well as by the French
nation was highly conducive towards increasing the good feeling now subsisting
between those two great nations.
434 
POLI17CAL ETHICS.
Paul speaks of the necessity of the sword to the magistrate,
and that Christ does not seize upon those opportunities
which we may fairly suppose he would have improved had
he intended to prohibit war altogether. The expression that
when smitten on one cheek we ought to turn the other
is as evidently hyperbolical, in order to teach in a strongly
impressive figure of speech the general principle of love and
forgiveness, as are the similar passages which command us to
give our cloak when robbed of our coat, or when compelled
to go a mile to go twain.  Christ taught principles, not absolute mathematical formulas, but addressed them to rational
beings, who therefore must apply them with reason. If the
various passages of the Bible were to be taken literally, no
book would contain greater contradictions or render it more
impossible for any one to obey all commands at the same
time.   In addition it ought to be observed  that I should
actually commit a moral wrong in literally following these
precepts and in not resisting without hatred wicked attacks,
for I should thus induce the evil-doer to commit still more
wrong or crime. Literally when asked for a coat to give a
cloak besides, to offer the one cheek if the other has been
smitten, to walk two miles if bidden to march one, would
amount to an invitation to the robber, the insolent, and the
oppressor to proceed in their path of crime.  Respecting the
typical sense of Christ's command to his disciple to put up
the sword, we must observe that no typical sense can be
supposed to exist where we have not otherwise the means to
find out that it is typical; else how could we know that it is
typical? In this case, we ought to know from other parts
of the Bible that war is absolutely prohibited before we can
maintain that this passage is typical. It would be surprising
indeed if a command should be given in typical form and
leave men therefore in doubt!
XIX. On the score of ethics alone the objections against
war may be comprehended under the following divisions:
Men-that is, rational beings-ought to contend with one an
435 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
other by argument, that is, by the strength of reason, and not
by force, by which they sink to the level of animals. We do
not prove our right even if we obtain victory, which is, nevertheless, doubtful.   In war those suffer who probably had
little or no hand in bringing it about. War is immoral, because it is a cessation of morality, and in addition it breeds
immorality. The effects of the most successful wars are always disproportionate to the evils which they entail. Finally,
war being necessarily caused by an act of injustice, of immorality on one side if not on both, it is at least evident that
it must cease with a state of diffused morality, and might be
stopped, on a very large scale at any rate, if a large number
of independent states would adopt among themselves the same
rule which the various civilized societies adopt within themselves, namely, to prohibit the obtaining of right by force, and
to allow it to be obtained by argument, by reasoning, on the
powerful ground of justice alone.
XX. As to the first objection, that men are rational beings
and ought to decide all differences by reason, we have to observe that although they ought to do it there are many who
will not do it, and that it is not in the power of the good
always to prevent those who will not from doing so. Throughout human life we resort to force if we cannot obtain our
right otherwise. Resorting to physical force is not on that
account brutish. Raising a wall around our garden, fasfening our doors by locks and bolts, is resorting to physical
means, because we know the thief would not allow himself
to be argued away, or we have no time or obligation to watch
the door until he come that we may argue with him. We
chastise a child, that is resort to force, when it is so young
that we cannot yet reason with it and an evil disposition
shows itself so prominently as to need to be controlled. We
prevent people from using a path by blocking it up, that is
we resort to physical force, because a mere tablet, with a request to passengers not to use it, would be without effect.
Going to law, is in all cases in which there is a malign intent
436 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
on one side, resorting to force, only with this difference, that
we wisely give up, or are forced to give up; private force, and
resort to public. For we all know full well that our unjust
adversary would not do the bidding of the court and abide
by its decision were it not supported by public force. We do
not go to the court to convince our adversary, but to convince
the judge. A lawsuit against a wicked person amounts to
this: A has wronged B; B goes to the executive and demands
assistance against A. The executive says, "I will lend assistance, but I must first be convinced that you are not mistaken, or that A did not mean, perhaps, to wrong you. Go
to C, who has been appointed to see, in such cases, who is
right. He is a judge; and if he says that you are right, come
back, and I will lend you force to obtain right from A." Let
us go farther. My child is attacked by a murderer: have I
not the right in this case to protect him, which protection
may make absolutely necessary not only the parrying off of
the assassin's blows but also the rendering him innocuous? I
have the right to kill an animal which attacks me and endangers my life. If a murderer attacks me he thereby lowers
himself for that moment to an animal, and he puts it out of my
power to use any other means than those I would use against
the animal, so long as I must avert the danger to which, like
an animal, he exposes me; and whatever danger or suffering
accrues from it is his own doing, not mine. I am bound to
protect my life, for my Creator has given it to me for various
solemn purposes. Were I not to protect it, brute force would
rule, and the most sacred ends of humanity would be set
at naught. Man is a reasonable being indeed, but he is not
ordered to act by reason alone. But against killing a human
being this objection has been made: You settle the doom of
the killed. The answer is, that if a human being is killed
according to the principles of justice and perfect right and the
necessity of the case brought on by the assailant, we must
needs suppose that this was intended to be his final hour,
whatever consequences may be attached to it, because the
principles of justice and right come from the Creator and are
437 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
essentials in his vast system. If then they were to militate
with others of his intentions, there would be contradiction in
his government of the world, which it is absurd to suppose.
In brief, the ancient "vim vi repellere licet" is not only justifiable, but is one of the principles of God's whole creation,
and the abolition of it would create universal moral and
physical disorder.
We do not prove our right by victory. This is very true,
as it is likewise true that our injustice is not proved by defeat;
but no one maintains that wars are undertaken to prove anything; they are not, like the ancient ordeals, a supposed trial
of justice. We undertake wars in order to obtain right, and
if victory is doubtful and we still undertake it, we do so because we believe the loss by submission would be so great
that we must at least try to protect ourselves and hope that
God will grant victory to the just cause: with such a hope
the Swiss fought for their liberty against Austria; and the
Americans resorted to arms because without it they were to
be subjected by British arms, or made to submit to legislation
which they thought disgraceful.
In war those suffer generally most who were least the cause
of wrong. This is undoubtedly true; but first it is not in the
power or the choice of those whom we suppose unjustly assailed to avert the evil,-they only protect themselves; and
secondly the evil, though great, as has been admitted, is not
so great as is often supposed. For it is the plan of the Creator that government and people should be closely united
in weal and woe: no state of political civilization, no high
standard of national liberty and general morality, is possible
where this is not the case. History offers no more deplorable
objects for the historian's contemplation than those nations
which, owing to whatever cause, take no part in their government, are unconnected by feeling with it, and change allegiance as rapidly as the fate of battle may change, like the
people of the kingdom of Naples in the seventeenth century.
If, however, this union of government and people is desirable,
the evil above alluded to cannot be averted. But, however
438 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
this may be, it is not for those who are threatened with war
to submit because innocent persons under the assailing government may suffer. The same principle applied to municipal
matters would infallibly bring confusion and ruin upon society; for there is hardly a single sentence inflicted upon a
criminal which does not affect in the infinite catenation of
human connections, morally or physically, some innocent
person-children who depend upon the father, a mother who
mourns the disgrace of her son, or an innocent wife or a
friend.
XXI. We come now to consider the last positions: War is
immoral and begets immorality; it never furnishes advantages
which can compensate for the evils it entails; and, as rational
beings, nations ought to settle, and might easily settle, their
differences in the same way as those of individuals are
settled.
An unjust war is not only immoral, but it is one of the
greatest crimes-murder on a large scale; wars undertaken for
plunder, or for the unrighteous end of compelling men in their
belief, beget immorality and crime, annihilate the fixed standard of morality and pure justice, and are on this account alone,
were there no other reasons, destructive to civil liberty, the
government of law and right. So is unjust litigation immoral
in its effects as well as in its cause. Yet, for all this, there
would be much greater immorality and unrighteousness were
there no courts of justice, and were people to suffer the wicked
to commit their wrong without any litigation. So-called religious wars, or wars of plunder, are ruinous in the very highest degree both to society at large and to the individuals who
engage in them. But just wars are not demoralizing. As
protracted peace is not unalloyed with evil (for instance, in
frequently begetting sordid selfishness and degrading submissiveness, increasing with each generation, as we see to be
the case in China), so is a just war not without its great advantages. Public spirit, founded upon the very principle of
unselfishness, is roused by few national events so much and
439 
POLITICA4L ETHICS.
raised to such a pitch as by a just war. The tone of morality
of those who engage in a patriotic war is eminently raised; no
one who is acquainted with all the details can deny that the
whole moral tone of the German nation was greatly raised by
their struggle for national independence against the French
in I812-I4-a moral elevation which showed itself in all
spheres and all branches; and it was universally observed at
the time that the soldiers had returned from those wars with
high and elevated tone of moral feeling. The Americans certainly came out of their revolutionary struggle none the worse
in their morals; and is not the nation to this day intellectually
and morally feeding, as it might be called, upon their struggle
for liberty? Whence do the Americans habitually take their
best and purest examples of all that is connected with patriotism, public spirit, devotion to common good, purity of motive
and action, if not from the daring band of their patriots of the
Revolution? If war frequently, nay generally, makes party
spirit run high in a free country, and very often leads to calamitous consequences, we must not forget that, notwithstanding all warmth and undue, nay dangerous, zeal, parties during
wars are generally much purer than those which, growing
up in protracted peace, are founded, like court factions of
corrupt monarchies, on the worst principles of selfishness,
intrigue, and avidity for plunder. The British parties of
Pitt and Fox are certainly not the worst in English history.
High as the American parties ran during the last war, who
would-say that they were not purer than those of some later
periods in the American history? Many nations have been
morally rescued by wars, which imparted new vigor to them.
In no situation whatever are so frequently pure, close, and
lasting friendships concluded, after the first period of unsuspicious youth has passed, as in a just war. Is this not an act
eminently moral in its character? To no period whatever do
men look back in their old age with such animating delight
as to that in which they fought for a good cause. Poets cannot delight or animate a nation except by that which is founded
or finds a responding chord in the better part of the human
440 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
soul, as has been already observed by Mackintosh; but what
has been the most unceasing theme of all the inspired bards
of all nations and all periods-times of general depravity only
excepted, when tartness of spicy wit must succeed to generous
feeling which no longer exists, or satire against vice must
stand in the place of admiration of virtue and greatness-if
not death for our country? Has this been so by agreement,
or were the poets paid for it, or is it not the general, spontaneous burst of men's noblest emotions? Wherever we find
in a nation or period a general incapacity of feeling the heartstirring beauty of this theme, we may set them down as lost
to every thing that goes beyond self-interest and consequently
appertains to the best traits of human society. Soldiers are
proverbially known for frankness and generosity. Who that
has any practical knowledge would be so bold as to assert
that the soldiers engaged in a national war are as a class immoral? Who, indeed, would maintain that the officers even
of a standing army are less moral than any other class on a
similar level of education? Who would maintain that officers
are less moral, for instance, than lawyers? Facts speak
against it. Actions in court against officers are in fact peculiarly rare. But though the severest charges against war and
soldiers on the score of diffusing immorality were true, it is
equally true that the immoral consequences of submission to
foreign conquerors, and of habitual submission to injustice,
plunder, and insult, are still greater, and penetrate deeper, for
they tend to extinguish that lively feeling of justice without
which no free state can flourish.
XXII. That wars never compensate for the evils which they
entail is as sweeping a remark as if a person were to assert that
men would be all the healthier for having no such profession as
that of medicine. Even if it were true in a physical point of
view, the remark would yet be far too sweeping. But it is not
true even thus considered. Nations are sometimes so situated
that, for instance, the possession of the estuary of their largest
river is of the greatest importance to their whole industry,
441 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
while those who inhabit the country around the mouth of
that river may likewise be greatly benefited by being united
with the interior, and a war which unites both may become
a great and lasting advantage to both. The continual efforts
requisite for a nation to protect themselves against the everrepeated attacks of a predatory foe may be infinitely greater
than the evils entailed by a single and energetic war which
forever secures peace from that side. Nor will it be denied, I
suppose, that Niebuhr is right when he observes that the ad
vantage on the score of power and national vigor to Rome of
having conquered Sicily were undeniable. But, even if it were
not so, are there no other advantages' to be secured? No
human mind is vast enough to comprehend in one glance,
nor is any human life long enough to follow out consecutively,
all the immeasurable blessings which have resulted to mankind from the ever-memorable victories of little Greece over
the rolling' masses of servile Asia, when they were nigh
sweeping over Europe like the high tides of a swollen sea,
carrying ruin over all the germs of civilization, liberty, and
taste, and nearly all that is good and noble. Think what we
should have been had Europe become an Asiatic province,
and the Eastern principles of power and stagnation so deeply
infused into her population that no process ever after could
have thrown it out again. Has no advantage resulted from the
refusal of the Hebrews in the times of the Maccabees' to
be ground in the dust, and ultimately annihilated, by stifling
servitude, and from the wars which followed their resolution?
The war of independence in the Netherlands has had a penetrating and decided effect upon modern history, and, in the eye
of all who value the most substantial parts and elementary
ideas of modern civil liberty, a highly advantageous one, both
directly and through Great Britain. Wars have frequently
been, in the hands of Providence, the means of disseminating
civilization if carried on by civilized people, as in the case of
Alexander, whose wars had a most decided effect upon the
intercourse of men and extension of civilization; or of rousing
and reuniting people who had fallen into lethargy, if attacked
442
A 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
by less civilized and numerous hordes. Frequently we find
in history that the ruler and victorious tribe is made to revive
civilization, as it were already on the wane, in a refined nation.
Paradoxical as it may seem at first glance, it is nevertheless
amply proved by history that the closest contact and consequent exchange of thought and produce and enlargement
of knowledge between two nations otherwise severed is frequently produced by a war.  War is indeed a state of suffering, but it is often one of those periods of struggle without
which no great and essential good ever falls to the share of
man. Suffering, merely as suffering, is not an evil. Religion,
philosophy, every day's experience, prove it. No maternal
rejoicing brightens up a mother's eye without the anxiety of
labor.
Of what good, however, it has been asked, is war to those
who fail in a war by which we may suppose one nation ultimately to be benefited? Both the merest utilitarian and many
religious people have fallen into the error of never considering
man except in his isolated capacity, the one with respect to
material advantages, the other with regard to mental. Men,
however, are social beings, not only as they are destined to
help out one another better to obtain their isolated benefits,
but because societies, nations, have their destinies as such,
and men are destined to live for one another, one man for his
brother, and one generation for another. All that is noblest
in man is connected with his sociality, his denial of self, and
his living and striving in close union with others. If it were
not so, nothing could be more absurd, and indeed a more
direct self-contradiction, than the idea of sacrificing one's self
for another, for one's children, one's country, for truth, which
of course can mean only truth in so far as it shlall become
known by and therefore part of others; yet "greater love
hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his
friend."
XXIII. One word respecting theyproposed plan of settling
national disputes by a congress of nations, according to an
443
I 
4  POLITICAL ETHICS.
international code, on the plan of a petition lately laid before
the congress of the United States.I
The idea of a perpetual peace has been repeatedly conceived
by modern writers, as by St. Pierre, Benthiam, and Kant, and
has been a favorite one with associations for the promotion of
peace. The way of settling amicably what at other times would
have led to bloodshed has of late become more frequent, and
is undoubtedly upon the whole an evidence either of a more
generally diffused love of peace, or of the fact that governments have, in the course of civilization, more or less changed
their character from cabinet governments to national governments. Nations also have not in the present state of things
as frequent desires for war as formerly, or as individuals may
be supposed to have; though we should be unjust if we were
to ascribe the many former wars always to the warlike spirit
of princes. It was the spirit of the times, and in not a few
cases were the princes urged by the people to a war in which
they reluctantly engaged.
Yet we err if we suppose that the settlement of international
questions by congresses of ambassadors has not had in some
cases most grievous consequences for some nations. It is
impossible to bring nations into such close contact as those
congresses allow, and yet to separate the international ques
I I would refer the reader to a very able report made by Mr. Legare, from the
committee on foreign affairs of the house of representatives, June I3, I838, on a
memorial of the New York Peace Society, praying to refer the subject in dispute
between the United States and Mexico to a third power for arbitration, and that
the government of the United States should send a proposal to those of other
nations "that they would unite with it in the establishment of a great international
board of arbitration, or a congress of nations, to which to refer international disputes; and also for the purpose of digesting and preparing a regular code of
internationallaw, obligatory on such nations as may afterwards adopt it."
[Of the two, a congress of nations and compromissory arbitration by arbiters
whom the parties choose, the latter, of which many instances are to be met with
in modern diplomacy, has in the present state of the world the advantage.]
2 On Perpetual Peace, a Philosopbical Sketch, written in 1795, in vol. vii. of
Kant's Complete Works, Leipsic, I838.-This paper, much as there is contained in it for reflection, belongs certainly to the weaker productions of that
philosopher.
444 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
tions strictly from questions which, though domestic, are of
general interest. Domestic interference is an almost necessary consequence.  Wherever people meet, the most powerfill must sway, in politics as in every other sphere; and
wherever parts of nations or entire nations meet nominally on
terms of parity, it is unavoidable that the most powerful must
sway the less powerful. Independent national development,
therefore, one of the most necessary requisites of a general,
diverse, and manifold civilization, in law, language, custom,
and literature, would be as seriously interfered with by such
a proposed congress of nations as it was for a long time in the
middle ages by the papal power. All legislation at a distance
becomes inconvenient, not unfrequently ruinous, because unadapted to the specific case. A congress on the banks of the
Po, or on the Bosphorus, for Asia, Europe, and America,
would make galling decisions for people near the Rocky
Mountains. All the inconveniences and hardships of socalled universal monarchies would be felt. Nor can many
international questions possibly be settled like mathematical
questions. The difference of nations, which nevertheless is
necessary, must needs lead to very different wants and views.
Something similar takes place in many law cases. Right and
wrong are frequently not so strictly divided in complex cases
that we can demonstrate it with absolute mathematical certainty.  Still I may be answered, They are settled by the
courts. They are settled, indeed; but how? Are both parties satisfied? They abide by the decision for two reasons:
because public opinion compels them to do so, and because
if they would not, there is the executive, the compelling
power, without which no state could exist. The one of these
agents would be very weak, the other would not exist at all,
in those decisions of a supposed congress. Moreover, international law is one of the proudest victories of civilization,
despite whatever incongruities there may still exist in it as it
appears in the best authorities. Yet why is it so? Where
does its force lie? Because it has gradually developed itself
out of the intercourse in peace and war of civilized nations,
445 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
and a united feeling of justice or fairness, mutual advantage
and honor; but a mere legislation even of the wisest men of
all nations, should we  suppose them ever to agree, would
fall to the ground like any other legislation, if not founded
upon existing circumstances and customs. Finally, we Americans should be the very last to propose such a congress,
because we might be sure that 6ur republican ministers would
play a very subordinate part in a congress of ambassadors
consisting almost entirely of monarchical deputies, whose
principles. and views, therefore, would always be prevalent.
XXIV. A war, to be justifiable, must be undertaken on just
grounds-that is, to repel or avert wrongful force, or to establish a right; must be the last resort-that is, after all other
means of reparation are unavailable or have miscarried; it
must be necessary-that is, the evil to be averted or redressed
should be a great one; and it must be wise-that is, there
must be reasonable prospect of obtaining reparation, or the
averting of the evil, and the acquiescence in the evil must be
greater than the evils of the contest.,
The following passage on war comes from so excellent a writer, and contains
such just views, that I feel authorized in transcribing it:
"The war of a people against a tyrannical government may be tried by the
same tests which ascertain the morality of a war between independent nations.
The employment of force in the intercourse of reasonable beings is never lawful
but for the purpose of repelling or averting wrongful force. Human life cannot
lawfully be destroyed, or assailed, or endangered, for any other object than that
of just defence. Such is the nature and such the boundary of legitimate selfdefence in the case of individuals. Hence the right of the lawgiver to protect
unoffending citizens by the adequate punishment of crimes hence, also, the
right of an independent state to take all measures necessary to her safety, if it be
attacked or threatened from without; provided always that reparation cannot
otherwise be obtained, that there is a reasonable prospect of obtaining it by arms,
and that the evils of the contest are not probably greater than the mischiefs of
acquiescence in the wrong; including, on both sides of the deliberation, the ordinary consequences of the example, as well as the immediate effects of the act.
If reparation can otherwise be obtained, a nation has no necessary, and therefore
no just, cause of war; if there be no probability of obtaining it by arms, a gov
ernment cannot, with justice to their own nation, embark it in war; and if tht
evils of resistance should appear, on the whole, greater than those of submission
446 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
just wars may be:
Wars of insurrection, to gain or regain liberty, as in the
late case of the Greeks; for man is not bound to suffer
oppression. His moral character is deeply involved in it.
Wars of independence; for instance, if a colony has grown
into sufficient strength to provide for its own safety by independent legislation [and is treated oppressively by the mother
country].
Wars to quell armed factions, like those of Henry IV. in
France.
Wars to unite distracted states of the same nation, or in a
country destined by nature to form one political society, as
the wars of the Swedish monarchs who united the conflicting
states and parts of Sweden.
Wars of defence; for instance, against invasion or conquest.
A war may be essentially defensive, and yet we may begin it,
for instance, if we must prevent an invasion which is under
preparation. Wars undertaken to assist an ally according to
a previous treaty of common defence are wars of defence.
Wars of chastisement. A nation which habitually would
suffer insult, depredation, and plunder would soon sink into
meanness and lose its own respect. What in the first generation might have been mistaken generosity-I say mistaken,
for it is the business of the state to protect its subjectswould be meanness in the next. It is one of the prominent
wise rulers will consider an abstinence from a pernicious exercise of right as a
sacred duty to their own subjects, and a debt which every people owes to the
great commonwealth of mankind, of which they and their enemies are alike
members. A war is just against the wrong-doer when reparation for wrong cannot otherwise be obtained; but it is then only conformable to all the principles
of morality when it is not likely to expose the nation by whom it is levied to
greater evils than it professes to avert, and when it does not inflict on the nation
which has done the wrong sufferings altogether disproportionate to the extent of
the injury. When the rulers of a nation are required to determine a question
of peace or war, the bare justice of their case against the wrong-doer never can
be the sole, and is not always the chief, matter on which they are morally bound to
exercise a conscientious deliberation. Prudence in conducting the affairs of their
subjects is, in them, a part of justice." Mackintosh, History of the Revolution
in i688, chap. ix.
447 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
features in the Roman history, which showed that they had
an elevated view of the state, that at an early period they
considered the state pledged to protect the individual against
foreign injury. They early saw the essence of the state. The
Roman ambassador, when sent to remonstrate with the Epi   rote queen for the piracies committed by her and her sub   jects against Romans, said, "We Romans have the admirable
custom of avenging with the whole force of the state offences
done to private individuals, and aiding those who have under   gone injustice. By the aid of the gods, therefore, we shall
speedily and vigorously endeavor to constrain you to amelior  ate the royal regulation of Illyria."
The German empire and the republic of the Netherlands,
but a short time previously so great and powerful, and indeed
all the neighbors of France, were fast sinking into degradation
and sustained incalculable moral and physical evil when they
allowed Louis XIV. to commit his endless and insulting
iniquities in robbing land and cities, and in other ways, during
times of peace, from the conclusion of the Peace of Nimeguen
to the breaking out of the third war in I688; and no man can
calculate what would have become of all Europe, how deep
it might have sunk in utter degradation, through the loss of
the sense of justice and love of liberty, had not salvation
ultimately come from England, whence, as William justly
wrote in I68I to Lord Hyde (Clarendon Corresp., i. 56, 59),
salvation for Europe alone was possible. We are apt to con  sider the revolution of I688 only in its mighty effects upon
British and, through it, upon European and American civil
liberty. But William is no less a great British king than he
is a great European hero, for having stemmed the current
which was fast enslaving and politically demoralizing all Eu  rope, and was the more dangerous as it was accompanied by
the dazzling yet unsound grandeur of an unprincipled mon  arch. The year I688 was probably no less portentous for
Europe than the years 590 and 580 before Christ had been,
when the gallant Greeks stemmed the Asiatic invasion. A
nation which at the proper time does not know how to un
448 
POLITICAL ETHICS
sheathe the sword can never be considered as resting its
liberty or morality on a certain and firm basis.
Those cases of war where the possession of some place or
province becomes absolutely necessary for the safety or existence of a state or nation, clearly seeing that its destiny is to
exist as a nation and to manifest itself as such, to which I
have alluded before, must be considered as exceptions produced by the clashing interests of various parties. Although
these cases have been frequently made the iniquitous pretexts
for the worst wars, truth, nevertheless, binds us to acknowledge that such cases of extreme necessity do actually occur.,
XXV. War does not rest on the contest of argument or
reason; but it by no means absolves us from all obligation
towards the enemy, for various reasons.   They depend in
part on the object of war, in part on the fact that the belligerents are human beings, that the declaration of war is, among
civilized nations, always made upon the tacit acknowledgment
of certain usages and obligations, and partly on the fact that
wars take place between masses who fight for others or not
for themselves only.
I repeat that I do not intend by any means to give here an
outline of the law of war, but shall merely touch upon some
points of importance in public ethics.
War does not absolve us from all obligations to the enemy.
The Romans acknowledged-no matter how far they practised upon it-that "war had its rights as well as peace, and
that.the Romans had learned to conduct war justly no less
than gallantly." These are, according to Livy (v. 27), the
words of Camillus. (" Sunt et belli sicut pacis jura, justeque
ea non minus quam fortiter gerere didicimus.") Cicero, de
Leg. ii. I4, acknowledges the same principle. What then is
permitted, and what not?
So soon as war is declared, or the respective parties are
-  [Rather dangerous ground.  What is the necessity of a nation's existence,
compared with the necessity of adherence to the right?]
VOL. II.                          29
449 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
fairly in a state of war, it is understood that they appeal to
force and stratagem. I may deceive the enemy whenever, and
must injure him wherever, I can., Deceit is allowed, but not
perjury; and as to the injury I do to the enemy, it must be
remembered that I must injure him as an enemy, that is, so
far as he is there to oppose me in obtaining the ends which I
consider as the next object of the war-for instance, that of
obtaining possession of the capital or the country, or that of
gaining the ultimate object of the war, which among civilized
nations is always peace, on whatever conditions that may be.
"Truth and Peace" was Cromwell's remarkable watchword in
the battle of Winceby, or Horncastle, near Lincoln.2
From these positions we shall derive important consequences, after having settled who the enemy is. Properly
speaking, the enemy is the hostile state, next represented for
the belligerent in the hostile army, but also represented in
all its citizens from whom the means of carrying on the war
are drawn or who furnish them. The armed enemy, therefore,
whether he actually have arms in hand or not (Bynkershoek,
Law of War, ch. i.), provided he would or can use them, must
be repelled and injured by arms; the unarmed enemy, in supplying the means for the war directly or indirectly.
I have not the eight to injure my enemy without reference
to the general object of the war or to that of the battle. We
do not injure in war in order to injure, but to obtain the object
of war. All unnecessary infliction of suffering, therefore, remains cruelty as among private individuals. All suffering
inflicted upon persons who do not impede my way, for instance
upon surgeons or other inoffensive persons, if it can possibly
be avoided, is criminal; equally so is all turning of the public
x " The law of nature," says Heeren, "as applied to war, or pure military law,
recognizes no further principle than' I injure my enemy wherever I can.'"  An
Examination of the Questions respecting the Claims of the Armed Neutrality. In
e his Historical Treatises, translation, Oxford, I836. I remind the reader of the
necessity of remembering who the enemy is.
2 Which took place October I I, I643. Forster's Cromwell, vol. vi. of Eminent
British Statesmen, London, I838.
450 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
war to private ends, such as extorting money for private use,
all use of arms or of the powelr which I enjoy as a soldier for
private purpose.,s, as for the satisfaction of lust, all unnecessary
destruction of private property,l all avoidable destruction of
works of art or science in particular, and all unnecessary destruction of any kind.  No pain can be inflicted nor harm be
done in war which does not aid the operations of war directly.
As soon as an enemy is rendered harmless by wxvounds or
captivity, he is no longer my enemy, for he is no enemy of
mine individually.  On the same ground I have no right to
employ assassins, even if the general principle of honor did
not make us abhor it. I ought not only to abstain from injuring the harmless, but to protect them against the unlawful
attack of others, simply because this becomes a perfectly
private case.
XXVI. On the other hand, I am not only allowed-which
is altogether an unimportant question in war-but it is my
duty to inflict on my enemy, as stuch, the most serious injury
I can, in order to obtain my end, whether this be protection
or whatever else. The more actively this rule is followed outt,
the better for humanity, because intense wars are of slhort
I The question of privateering cannot be dcliscussed here.  I will only say that
those who defend it do it chiefly on the ground that when war is declared my
avowed object is to injure my enemy as much as possible, in order to compel
him to peace at my will.  So far as this object is in view, I use and have a riight
to use all means. Capture of private property in land wars is not generally r-esorted
to, because it would not serve the purpose; but no general would be pardoned
for not taking it if it were to support the enemy in his endeavors to injure me,
for instance if it consisted of grain.  Now, there is very frequently no other way
of injuring the enemy so that he feel it than by making maritime prizes. Ten
captured vessels may dispose the enemy more to peace than a lost battle.  The
injustice of the case, it is maintained, is lessened, so far as the war is with the
state; and all are bound to one fate, although it is admitted that it is a peculiarly
hard case for those who lose the prize, yet no more than, for instance, in the
case of the soldier who is crippled.  This too is an individual hardship.
[Since this was written, most of the nations of Christendom have agreed to
abolish privateering, and to allow enemies' goods on neutral vessels engaged in
innocent trade to go unharmed. Every merchant can now put his goods on a
safe vessel, so that nearly entire exemption from capture is already reached.]
451 
POLITICAL ETIICS.
duration. If destruction of the enemy is my object, it is not
only my right, but my duty, to resort to the most destructive
means. Formerly, when there were so many wars, in which
only the amount of suffering interested the nations concerned,
and which the belligerents were often conscious of undertaking for trifling or unjust causes, it was natural that many
niceties should be considered as laws of war. Wars were
somewhat like duels, or tournaments, and the laws which
reg(ulated them were carried over to the wars.  Certain arms,
advantages, and means of destruction were declared to be unlawful, or not considered honorable. The "Chevalier" lost
his battle against King George, because he thought it unfair
to take advantage of the battle-ground! When nations are
aggressed in their good rights, and threatened with the moral
and physical calamities of conquest, they are bound to resort
to all means of destruction, for they only want to repel. First,
settle whether the war be just; if so, carry it out vigorously:
nothing diminishes the number of wars so effectually. It was
formerly much debated whether it was right to poison wells,
on the ground that it was not fair, because the enemy was not
prepared for it. But it is one of the things I want against a
wrongful aggressor in war that he be not prepared.  Should
I not surprise him? Who would blame the Athenians if, in
retiring from Attica to their ships, they had poisoned the
wells, in order to make the Persians retire the sooner? A
just war is not made for the pleasure of fighting. The only
consideration can be this: Do we inflict an evil upon the
individual which will cruelly afflict him after he has ceased
to be an enemy, and which we can avoid? If so, let us avoid
it by all means. As for the destruction alone, in whatever
number or by whatever means, it is lawful and advisable, for
the reasons already given.,
See Bynkershoek, Law of War, translated by Peter S. Duponceau, Philadelphia, i8Io, chap. i.-[In I863, Dr. Lieber prepared a code of laws of war at
the request of the United States government, which is entitled Instructions for
tl,e Government of Armies of the United States in the Field. He there says
(article 70, under section iii.), " The use of poison in any manner, be it to poison
452 
POLITICAL ETHICS.
Respecting deception we must observe that within the
sphere of war it is perfectly lawful, but not beyond. Hence
capitulations must be kept; for peace is the end of war; peace
is founded upon confidence, but the breaking of capitulations
would destroy it. A capitulation or any agreement, for instance an armistice, or a permitted convoy, is evidently
above the declaration of war; an exemption from it; founded
upon confidence, otherwise it would not be made. For the
same reason we are bound to observe those provisions of
treaties which were made for the case that war should break
out at some future period between the contracting powers.
These stipulations must be faithfully kept; if not, it was absurd to make them, and the confidence necessary for the basis
of a future peace is destroyed; but, as was observed, peace
being the ultimate object of just war, we destroy the very
object of the war in which we are engaged. Indeed, if no
degree of confidence remained between the belligerents, every
war would become an internecine war; and such is the case
between all savage tribes, who have lost all confidence in one
another. The treaty between the United States and Prussia
of I785 (Treaties of the United States, I87I, p. 706 and onw.)
stipulates, among other things, that in case of war merchants
of either nation residing in the country of the other shall
have nine months' time to wind up their business, and be authorized to carry off all their property; no artisan, etc., thus residing is to be molested; no letters of marque are to be given,
wells or food or arms, is wholly excluded from modern warfare. He that uses
it puts himself out of the pale of the law and usages of war."   He had, as this
shows, learned something since this chapter was published, in which he seems to
follow too much the somewhat savage and questionable doctrines of Bynkershoek
in his Quaest. Jur. Publ., book first.  Great lawyers are apt to be harsher than
great military officers who are not imblruted by selfish lust of acquisition; f()r
the former see war only in its abstract features, the latter see it written out in
letters of blood.  Dr. Lieber here approves of poisoning, but two pages  back
justly condemns the employment of assassins. But to kill a general in an underhand way is surely no worse than to poison half a regiment.  Our author's m,ture and well-digested opinions in the code of war do him the highest honor, ati(l
modify what he says in this chapter in several particulars.]
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4  POLITICAL ETHilCS.
and private property is to be safe on land or sea; prisoners are
not to be sent into unhealthy climates, etc. In all treaties between maritime powers, a certain time is stipulated, in case of
wars, for private vessels in distant regions, during which they
shall not be molested though war be declared.  Such conditions ought to be most punctiliously and most cheerfully
fulfilled, for they are the moral points remaining in a state of
force. Yet they have often been broken-for instance, when
Charles II. seized the Dutch vessels in the Mediterranean, in
1672, long before six months after the declaration of war
had'elapsed, although by the Peace of Breda this time had
been stipulated to give the citizens of the two states time to
remove their property. (State Tracts of William III., i. 35.)
For the same reason that capitulations or treaties must not
be broken, perhaps, or because the injury done in war beyond
the necessity of war is at once illegitimate, barbarous, and
cruel, works of art generally ought not to be carried off by the
victorious party; because it galls the conquered nation beyond
the time of war, and, as peace requires mutual good will, and
war of itself causes irritation, the carrying off of these works
would awaken feelings opposed to continued peace. Yet I candidly confess that I cannot see the jural ground on which the
right of carrying off books and works of art, provided they
belong to the nation, is denied. It is' universally admitted that
levying a contribution for the sake of chastisement for a wrongful war, beyond the expenses of the war, is lawful, as it undoubtedly is. Why then should it be wrong to carry away
works of art for the'sake of chastisement? If they are truly
national, connected with the history and feelings of a nation,
and were carried off for vain-glorious exhibition, it would be
cruel. Nothing must be done in war but what is considered
necessary. The destruction of works of art is vandalism, and,
as their removal exposes to destruction, this is an additional
ground why it ought but very rarely to be resorted to. Still,
this is merely an adventitious reason, not one founded in the
subject itself. The works of art may thus be injured; but
they may also not. They may be saved from destruction by
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POLII'ICAL ETHICS.
being carried off by the victor. \What should we possess
of the wonders of ancient art, lhad Rome's conquering sword
not collected them? There would be no Vatican.
VVars are undertaken under the silent acknowledgment of
certain usages, which, therefore, must be kept; both on the
common ground of hlonor, and because they are necessary,
either for mitigating the evils of war and bringing it within
the sphere of civilization, or for obtaining the end of peace.
Thus, flags of' truce must be honored; heralds were sacred
in most ancient times; indeed, with them begins, we may say,
international law.  Envoys must be kept sacred; they are,
indeed, the remainring representatives of reason, in the state
where force is chiefly appealed to.,
I do not know that the entire denial of our right to use arms, or, in other
words, of the legality of war, was ever adopted into any system, except by Quakers,
before the publication of Wayland's-Elemients of Moral Science, New York,
1835.  It may be proper, therefore, to notice his objections in detail.   On page
443, under the head of Redress of Grievances, under which he comprehends the
violation of treaties, he says,  I. That the fact that a nation solely relied upon the justice of its measures
and the benevolence of its conduct would do more than anything else to prevent
the occurrence of injury.
This might be true in some cases, in others not.  Besides, there are two points
left out of consideration.  National measures are in many cases not so absolutely
just or unjust that they cannot appear in very different lights to different persons.
We see this daily with respect to municipal questions; but respecting international questions there is the additional difficulty of nations forming separate
communities, large enough to be, in a degree, their own world, and separated by
language, history, law, views, prejudices, desires, etc.  Secondly, benevolence is
a delicate feeling, depending upon the individual view and disposition of men.
Where many have to decide, as is the case in national questions, it is not often
possible that problems be solved by delicacy of feeling, which depends so much
on in.ividuality.  All we can and ought to desire is to see the questions solved
upon the rules of strict justice; and even upon this it is not always easy to unite
a number of men.  We must not forget that governments have their power in
trust, andi as I might do a thousand things with my own money which I dare
not do if I am a guardian, so government cannot act in many cases by way of
benevolence, but must go by the principles of justice.
2. If wrong is done, the proper appeal for moral beings upon moral questions
is not to physical force, but to the conscience of men.
This prohibits us from going to war before we have tried every other means.
But it is not wrong to trust to physical force against a thief —for instance, as was
455 
POLITICAL ETIllCS.
XXVII. Connected with the subject of war is that of armies.
All we have to observe with regard to the soldier, to his con
said above, by way of a lock. Those who deny the right of using physical force
almost always commit the error of arguing against force altogether. Yet no
Quaker hesitates in using strictly defensive force-for instance, an iron chest.
The question then is not, as stated here by Wayland, whether we are permitted
to use force instead of applying to conscience, but whether we are allowed to uIse
compelling force, and, above all, whether we are allowed to kill fellow-nen in
our endeavor to apply compelling force. For, I repeat it, neither destruction nor
killing is the object of war.  Thie object of war is either my defence or the compulsion of another, and ill effecting this, owing to my being impeded in my way
by the enemy, arms are used.  If the question is thus reduced, it remains to be
answered whether we are prevented from killing men under any circumstances.
The Quakers say yes; we deny it.  If I am attacked by a murderer, I hold it to
be my solemn duty to kill him in order to save myself, because God does not
want murder to triumph, because it is right according to the moral order of
things that the wicked meet with their desert, because my life, being that of an
innocent man, is worth more than the murderer's, and for a number of other
reasons, unnecessary to state here.  Puffendorf says, very justly, " If, then, some
one treads the laws of peace under his feet, forming projects which tend to my
ruin, he could not without the last degree of impudence  (impudeotissiume) pretend that after this I should still consider him as a sacred person who  ought
not to be touched; in other words, that I should betray myself and abandon tle
care of my own preservation in order to give way to the malice of a criminial
that he may act with impunity and with full liberty.  On the contrary, since he
shows himself unsociable towards me, and since he has placed himself in a
position which does not permit me safely to practise towards him tllh uIlties of
peace, I have only to think of preventing the danger which menaces me; so(
that, if I cannot do this without hurting hinm, he has to accuse himself only, since
he has reduced me to this necessity."  (De Jure Nat. et Gent., lib. ii. chl. v. I.) Tlhe
same applies to wars.  I would recommend the perusal of the whole second
book with reference to this subject.
3. Suppose this method to fail, that is, the appeal to the consciences of men;
why, then let us suffer the injury.
I have already shown the reasons why I believe this to be against the Bilb)le,
against God's law " written in our hlearts," against reason, and subversive of all
right and righteousness. Why not apply the same principle much sooner to the
daily and'mtnicipal intercourse of men? Reason with a defaulter or a rol))er,
and if he will not listen, why, suffer the evil.  For it will not be said that in appealing to courts we appeal to reason alone. Courts are not arbitrations. They
decide upon reason, no doubt, but their decision is to be enforced if not willingly
obeyed. All the arguments of the first part of p. 444 of Wayland's work would
apply with much more strength to municipal courts.
By adopting the law of benevolence, as Wayland calls the adoption of the
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POLITICA L ETHICS.
duct towards his own country, and to his right of independent
action, is this
i —ec does not decide upon the justness of war, and is free of
all obligation respecting this point.'  Cases of the utmost extri-emity, such as revolutions, when, as mentioned, he is ordered
to fire upon his fellow-citizens for resisting unlawful and ruin(o)us decrees of government, form exceptions, and caninot be
brought under any general rule. He must decide whether it
is a catse of utmost extremity and whether the most sacred
clduties do conflict.  In all other cases obedience for him is a
p1rinciple never to use force between men, a nation would render the event of
being subjugated highly imrprobable. -He adds, "There is not a nation in
Europe that could be led on to war against a harmless, just, forgiving, and
defenceless people."
But history does not only show that states or societies have been attacked
ag ain and again that would not fight, but even such as could not fight have been
attacked and swallowed up, just as readily as the ancient New Englanders used
force with the Quakers, despite their non-resistance principle. The fact is, an
undefended state known to have the rule of sufflering everything would become
the prey of all the others.  What should prevent the African or Asiatic pirates
from plundering suchl a nation —for instance, from attacking our vessels trading to
Clhina, should we adopt the " law of benevolence"?
If, however, says Wayland, such a case of subjugation should n-evertheless
occur, we ought to suffer.
We must not forget that an individual in bondage may be free, but a nation
cannot: for the individual may have a rare elevation of mind and be born free;
were he born in a jail, he could not but be base, unless he were particularly instructed. Every nation in servitude becomes debased. Strange, indeed, that we
are expected willingly to sacrifice everything divine-our moral elevation, civilization, government of law and right, and God's own liberty for which he made
men-simply in order to avoid doing one single thing, that is, resisting; as
if it were said anywhere that this was absolutely the greatest evil. As life is not
the greatest good, so dying is not the greatest evil.
* A  question which in 1846, when the United  States went to war with
Mexico, became of great practical importance, is, whether a man whose government has gone to war has a rifht to volunteer, if he considers the war unjust,
-whether he can say, In my individual opinion the war is wrong, but it is, after
all, an individual opinion, and my country has thought differently, and I am not
answerable for it.  But who is the country?  For instance, in the present case
the president plunged us into the war, and congress was obliged to follow. Had
it not been for this ethical consideration, I should probably have solicited a
commission, and, I dare say, should have got one.
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POLITICAL ETHICS.
principal point of honor. The very meaning of an army is
founded  upon  obedience.    He  therefore  destroys  his own
character if he does not obey and does not do this as a duty.
He may rest assured that in the same  degree as he aids to
infuse any other spirit than that of patriotism, obedience, and
gallantry into the army, he injures the cause of liberty. A
disobedient army is a curse to its country. The soldier, therefore, must under no circumstances allow the army to become
deliberative, or a politically agitated body. Let the soldier,
if he have a right, go to the poll, but the necessity of subordination ought to deprive the army of its political character.
I believe officers in actual service ought not, in political delicacy, to offer themselves as candidates for the place of representative where they are allowed to sit in the legislature.
Never, except in cases of the utmost extremity, ought the
citizens of a republic to elect an officer of the army, in service,
as their chief magistrate. The Americans have had a glorious exception in General Washington; but the exception
cannot invalidate a rule so sound and clear in itself, and so
well proved by all history and our own times. When civil
feud distracts the country, such a selection may become necessary. So are many evils necessary to overcome greater ones.
But where it is customary to select candidates for chief
magistracy from the army, we must not look or hope for
liberty.,
I [Since this was written, two men, never distinguished in civil life, have been
elected presidents of the United States on account of their reputation as military
officers, and two others were brought into notice, although insignificant enough
in themselves, by their participation in war. With a great army in a country this
would be dangerous.  But as supplies, recruiting, and much else must precede
the subversion of the national liberties, the danger from military officers in this
country is not very imminent. There are in this country so few prominent persons, and of these the real statesmen are so far above the power of the people to
estimate them, that some conspicuity is needed in the head or the figure-head of
a party of a sort to strike the popular mind.  Our problem must be to carry
government on with the minimum of talent. Add to this that politicians have
been before the country and have nmde enemies.  A new man comes in more
easily.  Moreover, the people justly dread the schemes, bargains, mutual insurances and assurances of old foxy politicians.]
458
I 
POLITICAL ETHIJCS.
Lastly, it is the imperative duty of the soldier, that is, of
every man under arms regularlyembodied in a corps, to show
himself superior to adversity, to show his courage and strength
as much in suffering and in performing harassing service as
in fighting, to observe the strictest discipline, not to murmur
for want of pay, dress, or food, to show great moral strength
and alacrity in tiresome sieges, not to maraud or oppress, to
alleviate as much as in him lies the evils of war, neither to
be rash nor backward, to remember the great cause which is
at stake in a just war, and that the success of war depends
mainly upon the willing and perfect performance of duty by
every individual: and let his country and his God be ever
before his eyes.
TTE END.
459