- - -C) C — - f~~~~// SOME ELEMENTS OF RELIGION SOME ELEMENTS OF RELIGION Lent iLftvett 1870 BY H. P. LIDDON, D.D. CANON OF ST. PAUL'S NEW YORK SCRIBNER, WELFORD, & ARMSTRONG i872 Perche, se tu alla virtui circonde La tua misura, non alla parvenza Delle sustanzie che t' appaion tonde, Tu vederai mirabil convenenza, Di maggio a piui, et di minore a meno, In ciascun cielo, a sua intelligenza. PAR. xxviii. 73-78. TO.3abMtia liam Ogle, (t+zq aunt. OF TRINITY COLLEGE, OXFORD WHOSE WORK AND CHARACTER SUGGEST MANY PRECIOUS LESSONS WHICH HE NEVER THINKS OF TEACHING ADVERTISEMENT. THESE Lectures were delivered in St. James' Church, Piccadilly, during the Lent of 1870. They were, at the time, through God's mercy, of service at least to some minds,-anxious, if it might be, to escape from perplexities which beset an age of feverish scepticism. It was accordingly difficult to resist the practical reasons which were urged in favour of publishing the Lectures; but the announcement of their intended publication was, perhaps, made, before the drawbacks which must necessarily accompany the rhetorical treatment of such a subject as the present, in a permanent form, had been sufficiently considered. Moreover, a fulness and method of discussion which satisfies the purposes of a Lecture, and which indeed is all that an audience will bear, must fall altogether below the standard which may be reasonably looked for in a book, supposed to make viii / A dvertisenzenZ. any pretension whatever to claim the character of a formal treatise upon a wide and serious subject. Of this, upon further reflection, the writer became so strongly convinced as to have entertained the design of expanding these fragments into a larger work. But, apart from the pressure of other duties, he could not but feel that such an attempt would destroy, together with the identity of the Lectures, any moral or spiritual associations that might cling to them; and, in working for the cause of Faith, as in other matters, "Un sou, quandcl i est assnre, Vaut mllieux, que cinq en esperance." The Lectures are therefore published as they stand. It will be borne in mind that they suggest only a few thoughts on each of the points of which they treat; that they cannot but raise some difficulties which they leave unanswered; and, in a word, that their limits are not in any sense determined by those of the general subject, but only by the number of Sundays in Lent. WHITSUNTIDE, 1872. CO N T E N TS LECTURE I. ffTiht Zunla~ in itent. THE IDEA OF RELIGION. Ps. cxliii. 8. PAGE Shew Thou mne the way that I should walk in, for I lift up my soul unto Thee 1 LECTURE II. cnab;urnTha~ in fitnt. GOD, THE OBJECT OF RELIGION. Ps. xlii. 2. My soul is athirst for God, yea even for the living God: when shall I come to ap7pear before the presence of God... 39 LECTURE III. Efrb uinba2 izn Lnt, THE SUBJECT OF RELIGION-THE SOIJL. Ps. viii. 4. What is man, that thou art mindful of him?... 81 x Contenzs. LECTURE IV. fouttj SWunbal in Lent. THE OBSTACLE TO RELIGION-SIN. S. JAMES i. 15. PAGE When desire hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin; and sin, when it is finished, brinzyeth forth death. 128 LECTURE V. fiftf Sunba in LLent. PRAYER, THE CHARACTERISTIC ACTION OF RELIGION. S. MATT. vii. 7. Ask and it shall be given you..... 166 LECTURE VI. V aim 5unbar. THE MEDIATOR, THE GUARANTEE OF RELIGIOUS LIFE. S. MATT. xxiii. 41. Jesus asked them, saying, What think ye of Christ?.. 204 LECTURE I. Sirot Zuntlfap3 in tftnt. TIHE IDEA OF RELIGION. Ps. cxliii. 8. Shew T7ou me the cway that I should walk in, for I lift uzp my soul unto T'lee. xU2i age, it has been said, longs to be religious. If this is too unguarded an assertion, it is at least true that the instinct or sentiment of religion is treated among us with more respect and sympathy than has been the case at some past epochs of our national history. Amid the debaucheries of the Restoration, and the shallow habits of thought on the gravest subjects which marked portions of the last century, Religion, in the broad sense of the term, was largely discredited, even when it was not openly scouted as a weakness or a superstition. Whereas in our day religion is named, even by the irreligious, with the forms if not with the sincerity of respect. And some men interest themselves'in religion as an abstract good, with very great sincerity, who oppose by turns all that asserts its power and presence in the world. Thus they declaim B 2 _Re/ziov, hozw far welcozmed [LECT. against churches, while they explain that in doing this they are befriending that true Religion which churches misrepresent. Or, they would do away with priesthoods; but then they are only anxious, while rescuing the fair jewel of religion from clerical keeping, to make its sway more imperial, by making its mien and countenance more human. Or they make war upon theology-the theology of Apostles, Fathers, Creeds; but theology, they declare, again and again, is a pedantic product of the clerical understanding, and they for their part are passionately interested on behalf of the religion of the human heart. They discredit " book revelations," and insist upon errors of fact or errors of morals, which they hold to be discoverable in the Bible; but they are all the more eager to profess and feel a zeal for that unerring and sublime essence of religion, which is not bound, as they phrase it, to the letter, and which fires their enthusiasm in renouncing the letter. And thus, however warmly the institutions, the ministers, the beliefs, the sacred literature of religion, may be successively assailed, religion itself, we are assured, is respected; or rather it is respect for and loyalty to religion-to religion divested of accretions which have gathered round it and obscured its beauty during the lapse of time,-which is in fact the animating motive of this most friendly and discriminating opposition. That religion should be thus safeguarded as an idea, when all that secures its practical power is by turns objected to; that the abstract, disembodied, intangible essence I.] ic tI/e- Malodernz orldo. 3 should be so sedulously honoured, while its concrete forms, its living and working embodiments, are opposed and denounced, is a fact which must engage attention. How are we to account for it? Is it that we live in a "period of transition," when men have not yet faced the last consequences of the principles which they are are adopting, and hang with a pardonable, althouglh illogical tenderness between premiss and conclusion? Does the sacred name of religion still command an awe which, while it is not strong enough to protect many practical interests, can yet hedge around a remote object with the forms of popular respect? Is it that, as of old, barbarian invaders, who will without scruple devastate the precincts and sack the interior of the temple, are pausing involuntarily, spell-bound, almost terrified, upon the threshold of the sacred shrine? Or does the -esthetic feeling of our time, looking at human life with the eye of an artist rather than with the eye of a statesman or philanthropist, prompt this interest on behalf of religion, as alone adequately representing and uphlolding the ideal side of human existence? Does it anticipate, not without reason, the dull, barren, uninteresting, prosaic level of existence to which we should be reduced, if all that points upward in thought and feeling could be utterly stripped from us, and eliminated; if human life, could be robbed of the most refining and stimulating influences that can be brought to bear on it? Or is this reserve of interest on behalf of religion at bottom a social, or political -if you 4 Why rYzei-/iolz is respeced. [LECT. like, a selfish-class instinct? Is it order cowering before approaching revolution, and endeavouring to support its regiments and its policemen with forces summoned from some higher world, whether of fact or fancy; with invisible powers capable of making their way into the very heart of the enemy's camp? Is it that we of this generation,who have read in the annals of a neighbouring country the stern lessons taught by eighty years of active or suppressed anarchy, are more keenly alive than were our ancestors to the tremendous force of the volcanic passions latent in human nature? Are we willing to grant that some religion at least is a social necessity; a necessity iin the sense of Machiavelli, if not in the sense of Jesus Christ? Are we satisfied that the brute within us, if he is to be chained and imprisoned at all, can only be taken captive by a superhuman mlaster, and will never forfeit his destructive liberty, except at the bidding of an unearthly creed? Undoubtedly, it may be admitted that religion owes somethling, on the score of respect yielded to her as an abstract idea, to each of these causes. The awe which a reasoned scepticism cannot always crush, the perception of what it is that constitutes beauty in life, combine with the stern practical instincts of social safety, with the love of order, and the anxiety to make property and life secure, to insist that man must have something in the way of a religion. Schemes of independent morality, even if they were theoretically defensible, are not equal to resisting the impetuosities of passion, or the exorbitant demands of a low self-interest. " Take my I.] IV jluence of Mke szluecIzvJe syu21it. 5 word for it," said a great statesman, " it is not prudent as a rule to trust yourself to any man who tells you that he does not believe in a God or in a future after death."' But a deeper reason for the fact we are considering, is to be found in the wider conviction that religion is, if I may so express it, an indispensable part of man's moral and mental outfit. Two causes have contributed to deepen this conviction in modern times. The first is the subjective spirit of the age, which insists on looking at truth, not as it is in itself, in its utter independence of the mind of man, but as it presents itself to man's mind, or rather as man's mind in very varying moods apprehends it. This spirit, while it has weakened the public hold upon Creeds and Scriptures, has directed attention, with an intensity unknown before our day, to the needs of the human mind, and among them to its supreme need of a religion. It has indeed exaggerated this into maintaining, as with Feuerbach, that all existinSc religions are but the creations of human thought, which, while it is really doomed to ain uninterrupted contact with the world of sense, aspires to create, if it cannot discover, an ideal world beyond; but this paradox only yields an additional testimony to the need we have, as men, of some religion, in order to do justice to our humanity. Religion, says a modern English writer, who certainly will not be suspected of any desire to exaggerate its influence, is that " which gives to man, in the midst of the rest of creation, his special i Sir Robert Peel. 6 Ifzezence of zislor/ca sluclies. [LECT. elevation and dignity."l And it was perhaps, upon the whole, the most marked feature in the work of Schleiermacher, that when groping his way back from the grim intellectual desert into which many of his countrymen had been led, under the guidance of the older Rationalism, he insisted with such emphasis and success upon the necessity of religion in order to the completion of human life. Beyond any of his contemporaries, he saw and pointed out that by our capacity for religion; by our power of looking beyond this deceptive and passing world of sense to a higher world, invisible and eternal; by loyalty to the obligations which that clearer sight imposes on us, we men are best distinguished from the brutes around us. Language itself, the physical dress in which we clothe our thought, is not more distinctly royal among our outward human prerogatives, than that upturned countenance which, as the heathen poet divined, is the symbol of our intelligent capacity for a higher life. The indispensableness of religion to human life has also been forced on the mind of this generation by a deeper study of history. The more we know of the annals of our race, the more clearly is it seen how the greatest catastrophes, and the most profound and far-reaching changes, have really turned upon religious questions; and that the stronger and more definite has been the religion, the more fundamental and striking have been these results. Thus, for instance, the modern history of Europe has been little else than a i Froude': Hist. Engl. xii. 535. 1.] XA mlore ermvazenz carzse. 7 history of struggles fundamentally religious. A recent historian of civilisation has indeed maintained that this is true only of the past, 1 and that the present age has more and more learned to restrict its enthusiasm to material objects. But he forgets that religion does not cease to influence events among those who reject its claims: it excites the strongest human passions not merelyin its defenders,but in its enemies. The claim to hold communion with an unseen world irritates when it does not win and satisfy. Atheism has again and again been a fanaticism; it has been a missionary and a persecutor by turns; it is lashed into passion by the very presence of the sublime passion to which it is opposed. WVe of to-day know full well that no political subjects are discussed so warmly as those which bear even remotely upon religion. " The deepest subject," says Goethe, " in the history of the world and of mankind, and that to which all others are subordinate, is the conflict between faith and unbelief." 2 While these causes make an interest in religion, of whatever kind, inevitable among thoughtful men in our day and generation, they only reinforce, they do not obscure or supersede, those permanent reasons for its influence, which are part of our natural and human circumstances. Amnong these it may suffice to mention one. It is a fact, certain to each one of us, that we shall individually die. If science could arrest the empire of death, as it has limited that of disease; if thought, in its onward march throughout the centuries, could rob us utterly of the presentiment of an im1Buckle: Hist. Civ. i. 241-325. 2 Qu. by Luthardt. 8 W/hal/ is rezg-izonz [LECT. mortality and of our aspirations towards a higher world, then religion would retain, in the fixed circumstances of life, no ally of anything like equal power. But there is the certainty, present to each one of us in our thoughtful moments, never entirely absent from the thought of those who seriously think at all, that an hour will come when we shall face the problem of problems for ourselves and alone; when we shall know by experience what really is beyond the veil, and how it is related to that which we see and are here; and it is impossible, with this prospect before us, to treat the voice and claims of religion as wholly trivial or unimportant.' But here the question arises as to what it is that man seeks in seeking religion. Or rather, what is religion? We know it when we meet it in life; we know it by its bearing, by its fruits, by the atmosphere with which it surrounds itself. But what is it within the soul? what is its chief element or substance? What is this power which does not meet the eye, but which we trace in its results? what is the true psychological account that must be given of it? As we repeat the question, "What is religion," we find ourselves, it may be, in the position of standing face to face 1 This is admitted, although, of course, in terms which the writer would not adopt, by Mr. Buckle. Hist. Civ. i. 113. I.] Does zi consiszt r Yrzg-tIfeefdizg-? 9 with a very old acquaintance, with whose countenance and habits we have been familiar all our lives, but of whose real self we cannot but feel we have a somewhat shadowy perception. 1. Is religion, then, in the heart of man, to be looked upon chiefly as the highest and purest form of feeling? Is feeling the essential thing in true religion? So thought no less a person than Schleiermacher.1 He makes religion to consist in feeling —notably in our feeling of dependence on a Higher Power; and his influence has won for this representation a wide acceptance in modern Protestant Germany.2 Such in England is, or has been at times, the practical instinct, if not the decision, of Wesleyanism and kindred systems.3 Feeling, not knowledge; feeling, not morality; feeling, not even conscience, is the test of acceptance-that is to say, of satisfactory religion. Acceptance is warranted by the sense of acceptance; religious progress is measured by the sense of enjoying more and more the raptures of the religious life. Nor, if we look either into the recesses of the human heart, or into the historical expressions of religious earnest1 Schleiermacher, Christliche Glaube, i. pp. 6-14. He is expanding the proposition that "Die Frdmmigkeit, welche die Basis aller kirchlichen Gemeinschaften ausmacht, ist rein ftir sich betrachtet weder ein Wissen noch ein Thun, sondern ein Bestimmtheit des Gefiihls oder des unniittelbaren Selbstbewusstseins." Compare p. 16. I)as gemeinsame aller derjenigen Bestimmtheiten des Selbstbewusstseins, we!che iiberwiegend ein Irgendwohergetroffensein der Empfhnglichkeit aussagen, ist dass wir uns als abhitngig fiihlen. 2 As with Nitzsch, Twesten, and others. Cf. Grinmm, Inst. Th. Dogm. p. 19. 3 Compare the remarks in 2outbley's " Life of WVMesley,' p. 267. To "Fceli.zg" in I/ke Psaller and S. Pail. [LECT. ness, can the high place of feeling in the religious life be rightly depreciated. Feeling is the play of our consciousness coming into contact with its object: it varies in intensity according to the interest we take in that object: it is a totally different thing in the case of a casual acquaintance and of a near relative. When, then, the soul is in intimate contact with the Object of objects-with God, -feeling, the purest and the most intense, is not merely legitimate, but ordinarily inevitable. How much of the Psalter is feeling-the tenderest, the strongest, the most loyal, the most affectionate! "Like as the hart desireth the water-brooks, so longeth my soul after Thee, 0 God. My soul is athirst for God, yea, even for the living God: when shall I come to appear before the presence of God?" "TWhom have I in heaven but Thee, and there is none upon earth that I desire in comparison of Thee!" "My soul hangeth upon Thee: Thy right hand hath upholden me." " Do not I hate them, O Lord, that hate Thee, and am not I grieved with those that rise up against Thee: yea, I hate them right sore, even as though they were mine enemies!" 1 How profoundly is the religion of S. Paul, as we study it in his Epistles, penetrated by feeling! Always in felt contact with an unseen Master; he is tender, he is vehement, he burns, he is melted: his dispositions towards his fellow-llen are so various and keen, because in him feeling has been educated in a higher Presence.-"The love of Christ constraineth us:" "To nme to live is Christ:" "Who's. xlii. 1; lxxiii. 2.5; lxiii. 8; cxxxix. 21-22. I.] "'FeeAiino" uzlSi have a tZrle objectd. I shall separate us from the love of Christ?" " I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me:" "Itf any man love not the Lord Jesus Christ, let him be anathema maranatha."' But the question is not whether feeling be an element of sincere religion; but whether it be the one most essential element. And here two observations cannot fail to strike us. In the long run, there can be, for well-ordered minds, no strong play of feeling apart from a sense of the intellectual truth of the object upon which feeling is bestowed. To lavish feeling, if it be possible to do so, upon a personage who is even suspected of being mythical or half mythical, is to prostitute feeling. Some idea, then, of the object of feeling must precede the feeling, as well as a conviction of the truth of the object so conceived of. We are told that religious feeling is especially the sense of entire dependence upon a Higher Power: man's inmost soul hangs confidingly upon the Power in which we live and move and have our being. But, then, what is this power? That is a question which must be answered before feeling can determine its complexion. Is this power an impersonal force? is it a blind fate or destiny? is it some vast machine, having neither heart nor will, but moving onwards through endless cycles of destructions and recombinations, of life and death, unceasingly, resistlessly, inexorably? If so, feeling at least cannot take the form of absolute dependence: there is no such thing as surrendering yourself in trustful resignation to a piece of machinery, 2 Cor. v. 14; Phil. i. 21; IRom. viii. 25; Gal. ii. 20; 1 Cor xvi. 22. 12 "Feelz'iZg " inzCst lead lo r'Zlpracttice. [LECT. which may crush you to death at any moment in its advance. Trustful dependence is only possible when that on which we depend is seen to be a Person, and a moral Person, that is to say, holy, truthful, compassionate, just. But here we pass out of the region of feeling. It appears that before feeling can trust itself, something is wanted to guide and colour it. Knowledge is at least as essential to religion as feeling; and knowledge of the Object of religion, expressed in clear and precise terms, is after all only another name for dogma. But, moreover, feeling, even if intelligent, must accompany right moral effort, in order to be religious. Feeling, even when directed to heavenly objects, may be, in its substance, partly physical; and there is no necessary connection between feeling so originating and moral earnestness, or even a right morality. Nay, it is very possible for those who feel warmly to imagine, mistakenly enough, that warm-^ feeling is the same thing as, or an adequate substitute for, acting rightly. He who said, " If ye love Me, keep My commandments,"' implied that there are forms of religious passion, distinct no doubt from the true Christian grace of love, which may co-exist with disobedience, and may even appear to compensate for it. The Galatians had not been the less willing to "pluck out their own eyes," out of devotion to S. Paul, at the time of their conversion, because they afterwards looked on him as a personal enemy for telling them the truth about the Judaisers.2 The I S. John xiv, 15..2 GAal. iv. 15, 16. I.] Is religion a kild of kizowledg-e' 13 Apostle was not insincere who protestcd, " Though I should die with Thee, yet will I not deny Thee;"l albeit a few hours later, at the crisis of danger, he could exclaim, "I know not the Man." 2 Feeling is not necessarily moral purpose; and its possible deficiencies on this side, as well as on the side of knowledge, shew that we cannot regard it as alone forming the raw material of religious life.3 2. Is it then more nearly true to say that the one essential thing in religion is knowledge knowledge of God and of the things of God? Somewhat of this kind was the opinion of the Gnostics of the second century. They regarded the Christian doctrines as simply an addition to the existing stock of current human speculations, and they ventilated what appear to us nothing less than the wildest fancies under the protection of current Christian phrases, which served to decorate and recommend speculations that often had nothing to do with Christianity. They thought that the Apostles had been unintellectual persons, upon whose well-meant efforts they had thenmselves improved.l Since faith has in it a large moral element, their watchword was, not fcaith, but knowvledyge; and, 1 S. Matt. xxvi. 35. 2 S. Matt. xxvi. 72, 74. 3 Hegel, Werke, xvii. 295 (qu. Grimm). Grtindet sich die IReligion im Menschen nur auf ein Gefiihl, so hat solches richtig keine weitere Bestimmung als das Geftihl seiner Abhtagigkeit zu seyn, und so wfire der Hund der beste Christ, denn er trigt dieses am stirksten in sich, und lebt vornellmlich in diesem Geftihile. Auch erlosulngsgeftihle hat der Hund, wenn seinem Hunger duech einen Knochen Befriedigung wird." This does not exclude the truth that the affectionate loyalty of a dog for his master is a rebuke to the coldheartedness of Christians; but it is rightly implied that the religion of humanity mnust be based on something more than feeling. 4 S. Irenneus, Har. III. 12, 12. 14 "KInozA oedg'e" necessary lo rezgzon, [LECT. in their own phrase, this knowledge was to be the salvation of souls. 1 The history of the human mind repeats itself, and a position which is at bottom akin to the foregoing, is familiar to some of us in the philosophies of Schelling and Hegel. Here too faith is only the lower grade, the popular form of the religious consciousness; its most cherished doctrines are only parables of the realities open to the eye of science upon which the modern thinker may gaze. His religion is thus mainly an effort of the intellect, which is perpetually engaged in disentangling and distilling from the rude forms of old-world creeds those abstract scientific conceptions which are better suited to the palate of modern philosophy. 2 It has already been implied that knowledge-true knowledge of truth-is of vital importance to religion. No one would question this, except in the interests of a morbid fanaticism. Religion is impossible without some knowledge of its object; and our capacities for true religious life must, to a certain extent, vary with our varying degrees of religious knowledge.3 "This," says our Saviour, "is 1 Compare the account which S. Irenaeus gives of the Valentinians, Hser. i. 6, 2. Their contemptuous estimate of Catholic Christians is expressed in the phrase "oi 1i fpywv Kca 7rTo-reWs ptkLXs PE/3PatoCtecvo Kat lr T'77p -reXefav 7yYvsev EXovTrs." 2 In the words of a more recent Hegelian writer, " Dass der Inhalt der Religion und Philosophie derselbe sey, indem den Vorstellungen des religiiisen Bewusstseyns ein ihner fern liegender Sinn untergelegt wird, den man unverholen auszusprechen sich nicht getrauen darf. Daurver, Andeutung eines Systemes speculativer Philosophie, p. 45, qu. by Grimm. 3 Rom. x. 2; Eph. i. 17; iv. 13; Phil. i. 9; Col.. 9, 10;ii. 2; 1 Tim. ii. 4; 2 Tim. iii. 7; Heb. x. 26; 2 Pet. i. 2, 3, 8; ii. 20. I.] bZlZ it nuZsl be accomjanied by love. I5 life eternal; that they may know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, Whom Thou hast sent."' The knowledge spoken of here, and elsewhere in the Bible, is indeed not merely intellectual: it is knowledge in act; it is the knowledge which is won by love and obedience, as distinct from, although together with, intelligence. Nevertheless, knowledge, in its ordinary sense of information apprehended by the undclerstanding, is indispensable to religion. Sight is not the power of walking or working; but we cannot work or walk blindfolded without disaster. Yet no mere action of the intelligence, however active, upon the subject-matter of religion, is the true back-bone of religion. Knowledge alone may only enhance responsibility. If Christ had not come and spoken to the Jews, they had not had sin: as it was, they had no cloke for their sin.2 S. Paul contrasts a merely intelligent apprehension of religious subjects with love. "Knowledge," he says, "puffeth up, but charity edifieth."3 The whole drift of S. James' Epistle goes to shew the worthlessness, religiously speaking, of unfruitful knowledge. The hearer of the Word who is not a doer, is compared with the man who continueth in the perfect law of liberty besides looking into it. The first does but realize a fleeting and unproductive impression; the second has undergone a change of life.4 The most intellectual of the Greeks, whose thoughts about God and the soul might at times almost seem to anticipate 1S. John xvii. 3. 2 S. John xv. 22; ix. 41. 1 Cor. viii. 1. 8S. James i. 22-24. 1 6 Is relikzion azol/er zname for moral!ty P [LECT. Christianity, as they have been welcomed with the respect of many a generation of Christians, has unwittingly warned us of the religious impotence of mere culture, by staining his pages, not once or twice, but habitually, with sympathetic references to crimues,tolerable enough to the public sentiment of Athens, but the very names of which are defiling to Christian lips. The most intellectual Gnostics were sensualists; sensualists upon a theory and with deliberation.l And modern history, if it were worth our while to consult it here, yields many a warning that intellectual culture about religious things is one thing, and genuine religion quite another. Henry VIII., who had been destined for the English Primacy, was among the best read theologians of his day; but whatever opinion may be entertained of his place, as a far-sighted statesman, in English history, no one would seriously speak of him as personally religious. Intelligence indeed, however cultivated, is only a department of human life. Man is something greater than a cultivated intellect; even than an intellect cultivated by study of the highest objects that can be presented to it,-by study of the things of God. More than this is needed to constitute religion; which, if it be not merely a sentiment or passion, so certainly it is more than an intellectual effort, however serious be its purpose or sublime its goal. 3. Are we then to say, with a large section of the nmodern world, that the essential thing in religion is morality? This 1 S. Irenaeus, Hser. i. 6, 3. 6to 65 Kal Tr& aretp-y/Cvca 7rdvra di6eos oL XEeNota-Tot 7rpdITovoltv, aWTwv, wrepl Wv a ypa~4at raLfi6taroGLvTac, TobS aotoUVTas aTa faoLhXetcav OeoO r) KX7pOPO/o'U7ELV. Cf. 1 Cor. vi. 9, 10. I.] Moralzty essenliael o trzle relizgon. I 7 was the teaching of Immanuel Kant. Religion, as he phrases it, is a practical recognition of the Divine origin of the moral law.1 And it is a doctrine which constantly meets us in the society and the general literature of our own country at the present day. Its popularity is easy of explanation in an age when belief in the Unseen has been seriously weakened among those classes of the people to which the political necessity of strengthening virtues which purify life and uphold society is pre-eminently obvious. And certainly we must admit that religion has no more appropriate work than the regulation of human life in accordance with moral truth: it is in this province especially that we look for evidences of its reality and its power. "By their fruits ye shall know them," 2 said its one great Master, of certain religious aspirants. "Pure religion," according to His Apostle, "and undefiled before God and the Father, is this, to visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction, and to keep himself unspotted from the world."3 In other words, it is abtive philanthropy and personal purity. The language used to describe it in the Bible, implies that knowledge of religion and religious emotion are, as we have seen, worse than incomplete, if they do not lead to active goodness. 4 What a man knows or feels is of little import, until it is ascertained what he does, or rather what he is. 5 But it by no means follows that morality can be truly described as the essence of religion. It differs from religion 1 Quot. in Luthardt: Apologetische Vortriige, 1. 6. 2 S. Matt. vii. 16. 3 S. James i. 27. 4 S. Matt. vii. 22, 23; 2 S. Pet. ii. 20, 21. 5 Ps. xv. i. sqq.; xxiv. 3, 5; Rom. viii. 13, 14. C Is8 Morality, hozw related to relzgioz. [LECT. in this, that morality is conformity to a law of right, while religion is essentially a relation towards a Person. A perfect, absolute morality will cover the same practical ground as true religion. But if men endeavour to treat morality as the only essential element in religion, and accordingly attempt to plant it on some independent basis, physical or otherwise, of its own —two things will happen. Such a morality will be much narrower than a religious morality; it will, in the judgment of religious men, present an incomplete view of the real cycle of duty; notably, it will fail to recognize that most important side of duty which we owe exclusively to God. But, besides this, morality, divorced from religion, will tend more and more, from the nature of the case, to approximate to a department of mere human law; to concern itself only with acts and not with motives; to make the external product, and not the internal governing principle, the supreme consideration. Morality, severed from religious motive, is like a branch cut off from a tree: it may, here and there, from accidental causes, retain its greenness for a while; but its chance of vigorous life is a very slender one. Nor is it possible to popularize a real morality, a morality that shall deal withi motives as well as with acts, without unveiling to the eye of the soul something more personal than an abstract law. It is when man has caught sight of the one Perfect Being, and in the effort to escape from the weakness and degradations of his own earthly life, " lifts up his soul" to this unseen, all-powerful, all-bountiful Friend, I.] Re,'oioni a bonzd betweezn mnz azd God. 19 that he may hope to discover the true ideal of'his life, and to realize it. Religion is thus the constant spring and best guarantee of morality; but morality is not the " essence of religion." Religion consists fundamentally in the practical recognition of a constraining bond between the inward life of man and an unseen Person.1 The ancients were fond of discussing the derivation of the word religion; and Cicero refers it to that anxious habit of mind which cons over again and again all that bears on the service of heaven.2 Lactantius may be wrong in his etymology, but he has certainly seized the broad popular sense of the word, when he connects it with the idea of an obligation by which man is bound to an invisible Lord.3 With this the Biblical phraseology is in substantial harmony. The expressions which describe the religion of the earliest Patriarchs are in point; and, like much else in the Pentateuch, they mould the later language of the Psalter. Enoch and Noah are said to have "walked with Godl;" Abraham was bidden " walk before the face of God, and be perfect."' Here God is represented as the bounden Companion of a man's life, as well as his all-surveying Judge and Master; and this idea of religion as personal devotedness to God underlies all the representations of Scripture 1 Compare Eus. Preep. Ev. 1, 2. X 7rp0S 7TO Eva Kac /4yvov ws arXrOes o4o0Xo'yovule6Yv v 7e Kai 6vT'a Oedv adve'Evets Kati 7 KaTa TOVTOYv >X. 2 Nat. Deor. ii. 28. Qui omnia quae ad cultum deorum pertinerent, diligenter retractarent et tanquam relegerent, religiosi dicti sunt ex relegendo. 3 Inst. Div. iv. 28. Vinculo pietatis obstricti, Deo religati sumus, unde ipsa religio nomen cepit. Compare the hostile phrase of Lucretius, " religionum se nodis solvere." Cf. St. Aug. Retract. 1. 13; de vera relig. xli. 55. Gen. v. 24; vi. 9; xvii. 1. 20 Religionl a "covenant I" and "comm'union." [LECT. on the subject. Religion in the understanding, is the knowledge of God,l —of His will and commandments; it is the knowledge of His "mystery" or secret counsel revealed in Christ.2 When the Jewish law had been given, religion was practically a "walking in the law of the Lord;" 3 when the Christian revelation has been made, it is an "acknowledgment of the truth which is after godliness." ~ But in this truth, in that law, it seeks a Person; it is fundamentally the maintenance of a real relation with the Personal God, or with a Divine Person really incarnate in Jesus Christ. Accordingly, religion, both Jewish and Christian, is described as a covenant; it is a bond or understanding between the nation or the soul and God; or, still more, from the point of view of a faith that worketh by love, it is personal communion with God. "That which we have seen and heard," says S. John, "declare we unto you, that ye also may have communion with us, and truly our communion is with the Father, and with His Son Jesus Christ." 5 Thus religious life is more than feeling, since feeling may be physical, misdirected, selfish. It is more than knowledge, which, even if it be complete and accurate, may fail to govern the moral nature. It is more than obedience to a nmoral code, because such obedience, if sufficiently complete to be religious, already implies relations to the Lawgiver. And yet religion is feeling; it is mental illumination; it is especially moral effort; because it is that which implies, and comprehends, and combines them all. It is the sacred 1 Hos. iv. 1. 2 Eph. i. 17. 3Ps. cxix. 1; Cf. S. Luke i. 6. 4 Tit. i. 1. r 1 S. John i. 3. I.] Characlerislics of a lrzie yrezgio-z. 2 I bond, -freely accepted, generously, enthusiastically, persistently welcomed, whereby the soul engages to make a continuous expenditure of its highest powers in attaching itself to the Personal Source and Object of its being. It is the tie by which the soul binds itself to God, its true friend. To be thus bound to a person is to cherish strong, nay, passionate feelings towards him; it is to seek to know all that can be known about his wishes and character, and to register this knowledge in exact terms; it is to obey scrupulously all that is clearly ascertained to be his will. " Shew Thou me the way that I should walk in, for I lift up my soul unto Thee." This is the language of feeling, pure and strong; it is the language of intelligence, ever desiring a higher knowledge of its Highest Object; it is the language of obedience, the most absolute that man can proffer. It is these, because it is the voice, the exceeding great cry, of that unquenchable passion, of that irrepressible aspiration, whereby'the soul of man shews forth its truest dignity and highest virtue in seeking the better to know and love and serve its Highest and Invisible Object; because, in a word, it is the language of religion. II. If the prayer of the human soul be granted, can we infer from the needs of the suppliant any of the necessary 22 I. llysle.riozSZZess ofa tr'ze relibZious creed. [LECT. characteristics of the great gift which is to relieve them? To say that we can do so will not be " cldictating terms to God," because He is not more the author of a religious Revelation than of the moral and mental instincts which demand it. To say that we can do so will not involve our " paying court to the corrupt instincts of a fallen nature;" because it certainly is not these instincts which seek a close approach to a nearer vision of the Throne of Moral Purity and Light. 3Nor will it compromise the True Faith by drawing attention to some features which are, and must be, more or less common to it with the false faiths whereby man, again and again, during his long and weary history, has sought to satisfy the noblest of his passions, even when lie has only lighted up the dark canopy of heaven from fires kindled by himself on earth. For in order to exist at all, false beliefs must embody some, even considerable elements of truth; and conversely, the True Faith, in order to be itself, must have something, both in its form and in its substance, common to itself and to every falsehood that opposes it. 1. First of all, then, an answer from God to the religious needs of man will be, at least in some degree, a mysterious answer: it will half unveil much which shades off into the unknown and the incomprehensible. To profess to reveal the Infinite, and yet to undertake to explain everything to the perfect satisfaction of a finite understanding, is worse than unreasonable. And a creed which should discover nothing that lies beyond the province of our experience, can I.] Wky a yure religion is mnyslerious. 23 have no pretensions to be a religious creed at all. For religion is not a relation to or communion with nature, or with any natural force or law; it is communion with an Invisible Person. Certainly, we hear men speak of a religion of art, of a religion of work, of a religion of civilisation. HIarmless metaphors these, if it be only meant that all the occupations of life can and should be penetrated and sanctified by the sense of God's Presence and Will; but mischievous and misleading to the last degree, if it be suggested that either art, or work, or civilisation is in itself an end worthy of the highest energies of the human spirit. He only who made us for Hinmself-the Infinite and Eternal God —can be the object of religion, and any serious answer to the religious aspirations of humanity must point to Himt. " Our preachers," said a German writer, referring to his university some thirty years ago, " having got rid of the Christian doctrines by means of the higher criticism, are now insisting with mnuch earnestness upon the importance of taking regular exercise." 1 Regular exercise is no doubt a matter of real importance in its way: but an advocacy of its advantages, however impassioned, says nothing to that side of our being which breathes the prayer, "Shew Thou me the way that I should walk in, for I lift up my soul unto Thee." That Christianity is mysterious,is no new objection against it. Unquestionably it is mysterious. In the year 1702, Toland undertook to prove that " Christianity is not nmysterious:" but he only succeeded in leading a certain numI Dr. Tholuck to Dr. Pusey. 24 2. DefaziiZeness of OIrze rezigpiozz. [LECT. ber of minds to a belief that it is false. That " the Gospel contains nothing contrary to reason" is the conviction of every Christian, who knows that right reason and revelation are alike gifts of God. That the Gospel "contains nothing above reason," is an assertion so paradoxical, as to be undeserving of a reply from those who believe that the historical and doctrinal statements of the New Testament are integral elements of the Gospel. Toland, indeed, could only make any approach to demonstrating his thesis, by tampering with the ordinary and world-wide sense of the term " Mystery;" and since the days of Toland science herself has, by her discoveries, made men feel more keenly than did our fathers the mysteriousness of Nature, and through Nature, of Nature's GOD. 2. Next, God's answer to man's prayer must, at least within limits, be definite. An answer made up altogether of vague hopes, aspirations, surmisings, guesses, probabilities, whatever its other merits, will not meet the specific needs of man. What does man seek in seeking a religious creed? He seeks intellectual satisfaction and moral support. His intellect asks for reliable information upon certain subjects of the most momentous importance. How does he come to be here? Whither is he going? What is the purpose and drift of the various forms of existence around himnt? Above all, what is the nature, what are the attributes and dispositions, of that Being to Whom the highest yearnings of his inmost self constantly point as the true object of his existence? In asking that the answers to these questions shall be I.] Jioral and izlellec/zal reasons for ii. 25 definite, that what is certain shall be affirmed as certain, what is doubtful as doubtful, what is false as false, he is only asking that his religious information shall be presented in as clear and practical a shape as his information on other subjects. In no department of human knowledge is haziness deemed a merit: by nothing is an educated mind more distinguished than by the resolute effort to mark the exact frontiers of its knowledge and its ignorance; to hesitate only when hesitation is necessary; to despair of knowledge only when knowledge is ascertainably out of reach. Surely on the highest and most momentous of all subjects this same precision may be asked for with reverence and in reason; surely the human mind is not bound to forget its noblest *instincts when it approaches the throne and presence of its Maker. Yet more necessary are definite statements of truth and duty to the moral side of human life. To obey at all, we must know what are the true limits of obedience, and what the nature and authority of the lawgiver. A soldier under fire has two things to do: first to attend to the word of his commanding officer, and then to strengthen his will by all the considerations which may enable him to do his duty. Man, as a moral being, is engaged in a perpetual campaign against the invading forces of temptation which assail him from without, and the insurrectionary outbreaks of lawless passions from within. If he is to make a successful resistance, he must be penetrated by a conviction that it is of vital importance to resist to the last extremity. This 26 T/eology izecessary lo reizglion. [LECT. conviction must itself be made up of and depend upon other convictions, such as the sanctity of God, His power, His omnipresence, the interest which He takes in our success, the strength with which He supplies us, the certainty that He will come to judge us. A faltering, hazy representation may feed an aimless sentimentalism; it is useless for the purposes of an earnest moral struggle. An exact creed and code of conduct is therefore a need of man's mental and moral nature, and all religious systems, whatever their truth or falsehood,have attempted to satisfy it. The answer to this need, with which we are familiar, is that contained in the Christian theology; and we use that word in its broad sense, as including the whole cycle of revealed doctrine and morals. Theology, in its scientific exhibition, results from the effort which the Christian mind makes from age to age to reduce to a precise and working form the deposit of truth committed at the first to the Christian Church. It is the elaborate inventory which century after century the Church has been taking of the priceless treasures which were committed to her keeping in the age of the Apostles. What doctrines may and may not be catalogued in that inventory without serious inaccuracy, is a point upon which, unhappily, there are wide divisions in the Christian world; but in the fifty generations of Christians from the first until the present age there has never been any sort of question as to the duty of ascertaining, as correctly as may be, what are the truths which Christ and His Apostles have taught, what is the exact area and I.2].Est hetic objeclions to defiCnieness. 27 import of these truths, what their moral and social significance, what our practical duties towards them. Yes; but it is said, has not this inveterate instinct of the Christian mind been fatal to the beauty of religious truth? Is not religious truth better left in the vague, hazy distance of popular thought? Is it not vulgarized by this nearer probing, by this inquisitive anxiety to make out exactly what it is? Is not the New Testament vague and undecided, and are we likely to improve upon it? Are not the clergy, too, under a temptation to confuse between their professional instinct of making the most of their title-deeds, and the real broad interests of Christendom? Has not Christendom, in fact, suffered by over-definitions, by false definitions; and this in former ages as certainly as in our own? Certainly there are arguments which may be urged against definitions; and first of all on aesthetic grounds. A picture of Turner's is a more beautiful thing than a working drawing; but if your object be to give the measurements of a public edifice, Turner's picture would not be the more useful guide of the two. It is easy to advise a man to "study and admire the poetry of Isaiah and S. John, without troubling himself with the truth of their theological dogmas, or even of their historical statements." No doubt the poetry of the Evangelist and of the Prophet is of consummate beauty, but it is not their poetry which has impressed them on the thought and heart of the Christian world. The really important question about both these writers is, what do they exactly teach 28 DefizzZeness of /te Newz Teslamenil. [LECT. upon the gravest subjects that can interest thoughtful men? And next, is their teaching true? The answer to this, to be worth having, must be a sharply defined answer; and art, if needs be, must make a sacrifice to the demands of truth. That there have been unnecessary definitions, rash definitions, false definitions in Christendom, must be frankly granted; that they are still possible cannot be denied, in view of contemporary events; that they have injured the cause of Christ cannot be doubted. But the question is as to the principle of definiteness, not as to its abuse: false definitions, like false miracles, imply the true, of which they are a counterfeit and caricature. As to the New Testament, those who speak of its teaching as indefinite, appear to confuse between its substance and its form. Made up as it is of four biographical sketches, of one narrative of the lives and works of some missionary teachers, of twenty-one letters, six of them addressed to individuals, and of one description of a heavenly vision, its form is, of necessity, unmethodical; it is, if you will, anti-scholastic. But its form is distinct from its substance; and from age to age the clear import of its substance is pressed upon the imagination and heart of the world by the matchless beauties of its form. The teaching of the New Testament indefinite! It is simple paradox. What can be more definite than the account of Clhrist's Birth, of His Miracles, of His Resurrection, of His Ascension into heaven, in the first three Gospels? What more definite than the awful representation of His Person in the fourth? I.] Diefitzzeness of te iVezo Teslamenmf. 29 Is the account of justification in the Epistle to the Romans and the Galatians indefinite? Or that of the Eucharist and the supernatural gifts of the Spirit in the First Epistle to the Corinthians, or that of the incorporation of the Church with the living and triumphant Christ in the letters to the Colossians and Ephesians, or that of its organization in the Pastoral Epistles? Is it not rather true that the New Testament is much too definite for modern unbelief, and that the real crime of the Church is, not that she has added the quality of definiteness to the writings of the Apostles and the Evangelists, but that she has persistently called attention to that quality which from the first, and front the nature of the case, belonged to them? How, indeed, could it be otherwise? How would the cry of humanity for light and guidance have been answered? how would it not rather have been mocked and scorned, by a revelation of the indefinite; by a revelation of mists whereof none could decide the frontiers, or unfold the meaning, or insist upon the worth? Such a revelation would have in fact revealed nothing; nothing that might not have been in sonie degree surmised by reason; nothing that could invigorate the heart or control the will. And in Christianity God has not disappointed us. He has not contrived to say much without asserting anything. If our Heavenly Father has not answered the petition of His children for the solid bread of truth with a stone, He as certainly has not met it with a transcendental vapour. 30 3. Positive character of a trze religion. [LECT. 3. Thirdly, a real answer to the religious needs of man must be positive. It must state what is truth, and not merely what is not truth. The soul of man does not look inward and upward only in the hope of detecting falsehoods: its deepest desire is to know, not what is not, but what is. Merely negative teachers are as the wind; they destroy but they cannot build; at their best they do but sweep away the unsubstantial fictions of human fancy or human fraud, but they erect nothing solid in the place of the discarded fictions. Positive truth alone can feed, sustain, invigorate the soul. It is no support in the hour of despondency or in the hour of temptation to reflect or to be told that such and such a doctrine or system is false. Possibly enough it is false; but what then? Does a sense of its falsehood nerve the will to do and the heart to sustain when action and endurance are hard? A sense of falsehood only supplies moral power so long and so far as you are confronted with the falsehood. You hate the lie, and your hatred imports force into your contradiction; you loathe the idol, and a righteous scorn nerves your arm to shatter it. But when the idol has been pulverized and the lie is exploded, your force is gone. Your force was purely relative to the objects of its animosity, and it perished with them. Nay, more; even while they lasted, your force was good for nothing beyond and beside the function of destroying them. Such force is like Jehu; it is trenchant energy so long as vengeance has to be wreaked upon the house of Ahab; but it is abject impotence when the time comes for settling the polity of Israel, on a sure foundation, and of I.] Unfrziilfulzness of religiozs negationzs. 31 storing up a legacy of strength and safety for the coming times. Positive doctrine, on the other hand is, or ought to be, moral power. The whisper in the heart of the moral fool, " there is no God," can never add to his stock of moral strength. The faith of the Psalmist, " the Lord liveth," is at once followed by the exclamation, "and blessed be my strong Helper, and praised be the God of my salvation."1 The soul cannot rest upon the void which is the result of that vast negation: it can and does draw comfort, strength, support, determination, as it grasps and leans upon this greatest of all assertions. This is a point which requires insisting on, especially in an age of criticism. Here and there criticism may vindicate an affirmation; its more ordinary occupation is to destroy. It almost proceeds upon the assumption that the soil of truth is encumbered on all sides with brushwood and rubbish, and that it can scarcely do wrong in burning and clearing away for ever. We may allow that there is legitimate and useful work for it to do; but it is not the less true that the temper of mind which it creates is prone to entertain a most serious misapprehension on religious matters. It tends to beget the notion that religious truth is simply negation-negation of false beliefs, negation of superstitious practices, negation of the errors and mistakes of other people; but scarcely anything that is really positive, with a body and substance of its own. Very many people in this country, especially among the educated Ps. xviii. 47. 32 A Irue religion has negative aspec/s. [LECT. classes, conceive of religion in this way, and to their own unspeakable loss. What God is not, what Christ is not, what the atonement and work of Christ are not, what prayer is not, what sacraments are not;-these are the questions with which they concern themselves almost exclusively. Yet the only question that is lastingly practical is what God, Christ, the atonement, prayer, the sacraments are. The negative conclusion does nothing beyond removing one or more misconceptions, or being supposed to do so; or rather it does something which were better undone. It satisfies the vague sense that religion is too important a concern to be entirely passed by: it furnishes a form of interest in religion, of strictly intellectual interest, that may be warranted to entail no practical consequences. And thus the half-awakened conscience is again lulled to sleep, by encountering a religious idea which only presents itself to be discarded; and the eyes of the spirit close, perhaps for ever. Do I say that a true faith has no negative aspects? Certainly not. The Jewish faith was a negation of Polytheism: Christianity is a negation of Polytheism, and of much besides. The most characteristic writings of the great Apostle are protests against false ideas of the work of Christ: the most elaborate of the Catholic creeds contains a repudiation of errors which deny the truth of the Divine Nature, or the truth of the Person of Jesus. But in these cases the negation does not stand alone; it is only the inevitable corollary of a greater affirmation. Unlike the dreary criticism which makes a solitude in the human I.] 4. Absoluieness of the true religion. 33 spirit, and then sardonically calls it peace, the negations of the Creed do but remove obstructions to its positive statements: they clear a space in thought for laying the foundations and raising the walls of a solid edifice, within which the Divine Architect has provided for the most urgent wants of man. 4. Yet again, if man's deepest needs are to be satisfied, he must believe that his creed is absolutely, and not merely relatively, true. Relative truth-truth which is true only to certain persons or under certain circumstances-ceases to be truth when those persons and circumstances pass. It is transient; and to say that truth is transient, is to qualify the idea of truth by an attribute which destroys it. Relative truth is not truth, in the plain sense of the term; it is only opinion; it is opinion which in the event proves to be unfounded. We are often told that Christianity, like the other positive religions of the world, is relatively true; and hard words are used of Christians, who say that its truth is absolute if it be true at all. Yet how can a creed profess to be relatively true without admitting itself to be really false? It was pardonable in Benhadad's Syrians to suggest that the God of Israel was only a God of the hills; but no believing Israelite could have granted this without denying the first article of his creed. And Philosophy has sometimes meant to befriend Christianity, by asserting that it teaches a relative truth. She bids believers make the best of it, on the ground that if not absolutely true, it is a phase of truth, D 34 Worth of "realaive" lruZh in relizionz. [LECT. true to the believer, true provisionally, although liable to be superseded by a higher truth in days to come. But who could make the most of a creed with such an estimate of its worth as this? Would any sensible man die for a "relatively true" religion? Could it teach him the duties of prayer or self-sacrifice? Would he live for it? Would he be even interested for long in a philosophy which he believed to be only relatively true? While the Ptolemaic system of the heavens lasted, it was supposed to be absolutely true: Would the ancient world have listened quietly to the Ptolemaic teachers had it suspected, however distantly, the advent of a Copernicus? The ceremonial element in the Jewish dispensation, as S. Paul has taught us, was only of relative authority. But it was believed by the Jews to be absolute. To see in it "a figure of the time then present," was already to have become a Christian. Any creed, whether true or false, must claim to be absolute, or it must make no claim at all, since upon faith in its absolute truth depends the necessity and reasonableness of all the acts, habits, efforts, sacrifices, which constitute its practical side —all the ventures, in short, which men make on account of it. To say that Christianity is only relatively true; that it is but the prelude and introduction to some broader religion of humanity, which will in time supersede it, is, in fact, to reject Christianity. For from the first Christianity has claimed to be the Universal Religion. It was destined from the first to embrace the whole world; it was to last through I.] Tuhe fniversal religizon muzsZ be absohtZe. 35 out the ages. "Go ye," said its Founder, "and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost;" and, "lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world." 1 In this claim of universality, whether in time or range of empire, there lay the implied and further claim to be the Absolute Religion-the one final unveiling of the Universal Father's mind before the eyes of His children.2 This conviction underlies S. Paul's earnest apostolate of the Gentiles in the face of active Jewish prejudice. He "owed "3 the absolute religion, as he could have owed no relative religion whatever, to the Greeks and to the Barbarians alike, to the philosophers and to the uneducated. To his eye all the deepest divisions of country, race, and station vanished entirely as men passed within the Church. "There is," he exclaimed, "neither Greek nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, Barbarian, Scythian, bond nor free, but Christ is all, and in all." 4 A religion conscious of being suitable only to particular dates or localities could never have originally aspired to bring within the range of its influence all the varieties of race and thought that are found in the human family. It would feel its unsuitableness to some races, to some civilizations, to some historical periods, if not to all. " To make all men see what is the fellowship of the mystery which from the beginning of the world hath been S. Matt. xxviii. 19, 20. 2 Baur: Vorlesungen fiber Neutestamentliche Theologie, p, 131. 3 Rom. i. 14. 4 Col. iii. 11; cf. Gal. iii. 28. 36 5. Provision for the heart and will. [LECT. hid in God,"l was an ambition appropriate "to the faith once for all delivered to the Saints." 2 5. Lastly, if man's religious wants are to be answered, his creed must speak, not merely to his intelligence, but to his heart and will. He cannot really rest upon the most unimnpeachable abstractions. Heneeds something warnmer than the truest philosophy. He yearns to come in contact with a heart; and no religion therefore can really satisfy him which does not at least lead him to know and love a person. An unseen Friend, who will purify, and teach, and check, and lead, and sustain himr:-that is his great necessity. And this want, this last but deepest want of man's religious life, Christianity has satisfied. As humanity, "sitting in darkness and in the shadow of death," pleads with the Power Whom it feels but cannot see-" Shew Thou me the way that I should walk in, for I lift up my soul unto Thee "-lo! the heavens drop down from above, and the skies pour forth righteousness. And One fairer than the children of men presents Himself to all the centuries and countries of the world with the gracious bidding, "Come unto Me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest." 3 In the Lectures which are to follow during the succeeding Sundays of Lent, an attempt will be made to insist upon some of the truths which are most fundamentally related to the soul's religious life, as they come into contact with some forms of modern thought. Of so vast a subject a few fragments are all that, from the nature of the case, Eph. iii. 9. 2 S. Jude 3. 3 S. Matt. xi. 28. I.] Anticizpaions and caztziozs. 37 can possibly be offered. If we could say all that could be said, such truths must still shade off into the unknown. But we may at least endeavour to trace what we can see of their real outline, to quicken our sense of their positive contents, to deepen our convictions of their absolute and unchanging significance, to enhance the influence which they already exert over our moral natures. It is not well that such topics should be approached with no higher purpose than that of an intellectual enterprise. If we do not mean the cry, "Shew Thou me the way that I should walk in, for I lift up my soul unto Thee," it were better not to enter on the holy ground. Religion indeed must always command the attention of practical men, because it is, at least, one of the most powerful forces, because it shapes the strongest passions, that can govern the conduct of large masses of mankind. It also will ever be interesting to serious thinkers, whether they accept its authority or not; for without controversy it has a word to say upon the highest objects of human thought. But for those who look at it, not only from without but from within, not as a toy of the intellect, but as a necessity of the soul, it must be something more than this. If there be any truth in its teachings at all, if its aspirations be anything more than a waste of heart and effort, lavished through centuries upon what are after all only weird or graceful phantoms of the brain, then nothing that can occupy our thoughts can really compare with it in point of absorbing and momentous import. Beyond everything else, it must have imperious claims upon the time and 38 A nliclaptions and cactions. [LECT. I. thought and working power of every human being who has ever felt, in any serious degree, the unspeakable solemnity of life and death. May God endow us with a sense of this interest in that which binds us to Himself, or may He deepen it; and then, in answer to the longings which in every sincere soul it will assuredly foster, may He this Lent be merciful to us, each and all, and bless us, and shew us the light of His countenance, and be merciful unto us 1 1 Ps. lxvii. 1. LECTURE II. ~cont ~unta~ ir ent. GOD, THE OBJECT OF RELIGION. Ps. xlii. 2. My soul is athirst for God, yea even for the living God: when sh/all I come to appear before the presence of God? THERE is scarcely, even in the Psalter, a more touching psalm than this. The Psalmist is probably an exile of the early Assyrian period. In the land of his captivity, he is surrounded by all the institutions of an established idolatry, and, as he sadly reflects, he is far removed from the Holy Home of the race of Israel; from the place which the Lord had chosen to put His name there; from the worship and fellowship of the sacred commonwealth. His thought spans the intervening desert, and he dwells with a full and aching heart on all that lies beyond it. He remembers the festival services in Jerusalem in bygone years, when he went with tbe "multitude keeping holyday," when he, too, had his share in the "voice of joy and praise." As he calls up in memory this cherished part, he pours out his soul in secret grief; and while the cruel heathen around taunt him with the 40 The " livizg" God. [LECT. insulting question, Where is thy God? he can. only find refuge in tears; his tears, as he tells us, flow by day and by night. When will the long years of exile have an end? When will he come to " appear before the presence of God"? He is like the thirsty stag, panting after the distant waterbrooks; his inmost being is " athirst for God, yea even for the living God." " The living God!" What a strange, yet what a pregnant phrase! Surely, the Author of Life Tmust live; yet here is an expression which hints at the idea of deities who are not alive. It was thus that the Hebrews distinguished the true God Who had revealed Himself to their ancestors from the false gods of the nations around them. " As for all the gods of the heathen, they are but idols; but it is the Lord that made the heavens." The heathen deities were so much carving, sculpture, and colouring; or they were so much human imagination or human speculation; they had no being independent of the toil, whether of the hands or of the brains of men. They had no existence in themselves; they did not live, whether men thought about them or not: as we should say, they had no objective existence. It was true that evil spirits, by lurking beneath the idol forms, or draping themselves in the debasing fancies of the heathen world, might contrive to appropriate the homage which the human heart in its darkness lavished upon its own creations; and thus the Canaanites are said, in their cruel Moloch-worship, to have sacrificed their sons and their 1 Ps. xcvi. 5. II.] Elermenus of jrutl iin eafleinism. 41 daughters unto devils.' But the broad contrast, latent in.the expression " the living God," is the contrast between imagination and fact; between an Existing Being and a collection of fancy personages; between a solemn truth and a stupid and debasing unreality. We are not here concerned to inquire what elements of truth there may have been in the forms of heathen worship with which the Jews came into contact.2 Some truth there certainly was in the most degraded of them; since a religion which is pure undiluted falsehood could not continue to exist as a religion, and the false religions which do exist, only exist by virtue of the elements of truth which in varying proportions they severally contain. The lowest fetichism witnesses to the great truth, that man must go out of himself in order to seek for an adequate object of his heart-felt devotion-of his highest enthusiasms. And no instructed Christian would deny that certain forms of heathenism embrace incidentally the recognition of considerable districts of fundamental truth. If, indeed, as S. Paul says, God teaches all men up to a certain point through nature and conscience,3 it could not be otherwise; and this intermixture of truth, which is thus latent in all heathenism, 1 Ps. cvi. 37. 2 On the "Dispensation of Paganism," see Newman's "Arians of the Fourth Century," pp. 87-91; and the quotation from S. Clem. Alex. Strom. vii. 2. " He (the Word) it is who gives to the Greeks their philosophy.. His revelations, both the former and the latter, are drawn forth from one fount; those who were before the Law, not suffered to be without Law; those who do not hear the Jewish philosophy, not surrendered to an unbridled co'rse." 3 Rom. i. 19, 20. 42 feal/Tenizism, hozw estimaled iz Sczrip hre. [LECT. yields the best starting-point for convincing heathens of the errors which they admit, and of the truths which they deny beyond.' In this sense, undoubtedly, the science, which has been of late named Comparative Theology, may be made really serviceable to the interests of Christian truth. It is a widely different thing to start with an assumption that all the positive religions in the world, the Jewish and Christian revelations included, are alike conglomerate formations in very varying degrees, partly true and partly false; and that the religion of the future-an etherealized abstraction, to be distilled by science from all the creeds and worships of mankind-will be something beyond, and distinct from all of them. Certainly heathenism is not treated, either in the Old Testament or in the New, with the tenderness which would befit such an anticipation as this. Practically speaking, and as contrasted with the revealed truth, whether Jewish or Christian, heathenism is represented as a lie. To live within its territorial range is to live in the kingdom of darkness; 2 to practise its rites is to be an enemy to God by wicked works; 3 to go after false gods is to have the earnest of great trouble,4 and to provoke the anger of the real Lord of the Universe. The Assyrian idols did not raise in the exile's mind any question as to the stray elements of truth whlich might be underlying so much tawdry and impure error. "My soul," 1he cried, "is athirst for God, yea even 1 So S. Clem. Alex. speaks of Greek philosophy as brro3dpOpav oiuav zrTs raTao XapLto' 0LtXooo0laCs.-Strom. vi., qu. by Newman, ubi sup. 2 Is. lx. 2; 1 Pet. ii. 9. 3 Col. i. 21. I Ps. lxxviii. 59, 60; cvi. 36-40. II.] God, the object of Ihe Soul's thirst. 43 for the living God: when shall I come to appear before the presence of God?" The language of this exile is in truth the language of the human heart, under the stress of the purest and deepest desire that man can know. In this life man is an exile; he is parted from his true home and country; he is the victim of an unconquerable restlessness. This restlessness of the mnind —this "wasting fever of the heart" of man-this unwillingness to be satisfied with any earthly goodattracted the attention of ancient thinkers. But they did not understand its secret. They would fain have accounted for it by pointing to some fatal warp or flaw in human nature; or they would have silenced it by the tentative guesses of successive philosophies, moving in cycles which ended in proclaiming that nothing beyond the province of sense is trustworthy; or they would have buried it beneath the cares of business, or the cares of empire, or the grosser attractions of sensual pleasure. But again and again the human heart has protested against these endeavours to crush the noblest of its aspirations; and history again and again has echoed with the cry, "My soul is athirst," not for pleasures which may degrade, nor yet for philosophies which may disappoint, but for the Pure, the Absolute, the Everlasting Being. "My soul is athirst for God: when shall I come to appear before the presence of God?" Was this cry ever heard more distinctly by those who have ears to hear the voices of the spiritual world than in 44 The Ihirsi of the Soul, hozw [LECT. our own generation? The passion, or, as the Psalmist phrases it, the thirst for God-the strong desire of the soul mounting towards Him with all the agonized earnestness of a clisappointed and tortured sense-speaks, not merely or chiefly in churches and pulpits, but in magazines, in newspapers, in social gatherings, in political assemblies, with a fervour and decision which would have startled the age of George III. The pulse of this desire is felt outside the Christian camp; it quickens the very enthusiasms of error and paradox; often enough, it mistakes friends for foes and foes for friends; but it is generally sincere, vehement, intolerant of delay and trifling. " AMy soul is athirst for God, yea even for the living God," is the desire of desires; it really underlies and explains all others that are not purely brutal in this Europe, this England of the nineteenth century. Let us see how it fares-this thirst for God —at the hands of some great speculative systems which more particularly challenge attention in the present day. High in the world of thought, if we determine its place by the intellectual forces which it can at present muster, while we refuse to adopt any truer and worthier rule of measurement, lies the camp of the Materialists. Materialism is sometimes digested into a system; sometimes it is little more than an intellectual tendency. Occasionally it II.] satisyfed by Malerialism. 45 displays the constructive enthusiasm together with the stiff, and, perhaps, pedantic livery of Positivism: more frequently, it is shy of committing itself to positive theories, while it is consistently earnest in resenting all attempts to base knowledge upon anything besides the verdict of sense. It bids us believe what we can see and smell, and taste and touch; it invites us to make such generalizations as we can out of the report which our senses bring to us. Thus, it assures us, will the mighty universe in which we live reveal itself to us; and we shall learn to perceive in it two, and only two, elements in the last analysis,-a kingdom of matter, that is apparently eternal, unceasingly, infinitely modified by eternal force. How this force and that matter came to be. it knows not: it affirms, as it denies nothing. A philosophy that is positive does not concern itself with the origin of the universe, " if it ever had one," or with what happens to living beings after their death.l Of this eternal interfusion of force with matter, man himself is only a ripe and very complex product. There is nothing in him for which his chemistry cannot give an account: his intelligence is exactly proportioned to the mass of his brain: his thought is " but the expression of molecular changes in the physical matter of his life:" 2 his thought is impossible without phosphorus; his consciousness is only a property of matter: 3 his virtue is the result of a current of electri1 Paroles de Philosophie Positive, p. 31, qu. by Bp. Dupanloup. 2 Fortn. Rev., 1869. 3 Biichner, Kraft und Stoft, ~ 122. Ohne Phosphor kein Gedanke, auch das Bewusstsein ist nichts als eine Eigenschaft des Stoffes. 46 The hkirst of the Sotl, how [LECT. city; his virtue and his vice are strictly due to his natural organization, they are " products in the same sense as are sugar and vitriol." All that he can do, either with himself or with the world around him, ils to search out and to register the several qualities of matter, and to number and measure the ever-shifting forms of the force which governs it. There may be something beyond matter and force -who knows? But science, which deals only with positive realities, cannot concern herself with, as she does not need, "such an hypothesis " as God. Can God be verified by the senses? Is He not a phantom that belongs properly to the childhood of humanity? Is He not an anachronism in a scientific age?1 What is He, then, whom men commonly name God? God, says Fenerbach, whose Pantheism is really Mlaterialism, is only "the nature of man regarded as absolute truth;" " that which is given to man's God, is in truth given to man himself;" "what a man declares concerning God, he in truth declares concerning himself;" "the Divine activity is not distinct from the human;" " in God man has only his own activity as an object;" " the mystery of the inexhaustible fulness of the Divine predicates is nothing else than the mystery of human nature considered as an infinitely varied, infinitely modifiable, but consequently phenomenal being." 2 In other words, God does not exist apart from the mind and imagination of man; He is only its creation, and has no 1 See Conservation, R&volution, Positivisme, p. 70, qu. by Dupanloup, l'Athdisme, p. 70. 2 Feuerbach, Geist des Christenthums, ~ 2. II.] satisfed by Maieriadism. 47 rightful place in the region of serious and scientific thought. This is not, I trust, a misrepresentation of the language of contemporary Materialism: and whatever else may be said of it, this at least is certain, that it does nothing whatever towards satisfying that great desire or "thirst" for communion with a Higher Being, of which, in his best and highest moods, man is so profoundly conscious. It denies, if not that any such being really exists, at least that we can know Him to be really existing. They who have no satisfaction to offer to a need naturally condemn the demand for one: they who have no answer to give, would rather not be questioned. And yet the religious side of man's nature is a fact of which a philosophy of experience should surely take account. Upon what is man's religious instinct to spend itself in the Materialistic universe? Upon that. phantom-god who, as we are told, is only a pale reflection of human vanity? But the soul asks for reality, and cannot occupy itself with a confessed shadow. Upon that eternal flux of self-existent matter? upon that ceaseless activity of self-existing force? But is there anything in mere force or matter, or in both combined, I will not say to satisfy a passion which is purest and strongest in saintly men, but even to have any contact with or relation towards it whatever? How can that which is purely physical touch the sense which appreciates a moral world? It is a merit of Auguste Comte to have recognized the necessity of some answer; and he tells us that it is our privilege and our 48 Tke Posilivist deity. [LECT. business to love, reverence, and worship " a Being, immense and eternal —Hunanity."l1 Not, mark you, a sinless and Divine representative of the race, such as we Christians adore in the Incarnate Jesus, seated as He is at the right hand of the Father. Not even an idealized abstraction, which, in the pure realms of thought, might conceivably be separated from the weaknesses and degradations of the sum-total of human flesh and blood. But this very collective human family itself, in all ages and of all conditions, viewed as one organism; this human fanlily, not merely illuminated by its struggles, its sufferings, its victories, but also weighted with its crimes, its- brutalities, its deep and hideous degradations. It might be thought that "we men know man too well to care to worship him." Yet, seriously, this is the god who is to supersede the Most Holy Trinity, when Positivism has won its way to empire in European thought. Will he, think you, satisfy the mighty thirst of the human soul? What does this thirst mean but man's endeavour to escape from himself, to rise to an ideal, or rather to a reality above himself, to lose himself in a Being who is greater, wiser, better than himself? Yet here he is bidden, in the name, if without the sanction of the most recent science, to seek the object of his trust and worship within himself, since nothing higher than himself is really cognizable by his understanding. It is clear that teachers who do not believe in a living God must leave one side, and that the highest, of human 1 Cat. Pos. Int. II.] Revolt of ihe hztma mind cagainst A Ztezsm. 49 nature altogether uncared for; since in truth they have nothing to say to it. And history does not smile upon materialistic attempts to bribe the religious yearnings of the soul of man. Atheism could indeed, on one fatal day, throne naked vice as the goddess Reason upon the high altar of a Christian basilica, while an apostate archbishop lent his presence to the hideous ceremony; but it was one thing to obey the interested or sentimental fanaticism of the Jacobin Clubs, and quite another permanently to control the heart and convictions even of the Voltairianized multitudes of Paris.' The realities of religion might have been hated; but this godless parody of worship could only provoke a languid contempt. II. Against Materialism, in all its forms, the common sense of man, not to speak of his religious instinct, will ever protest. The idea or presentiment of God, everywhere rooted in the mind of man, is a fact sufficiently important to be treated as something better than a superstition by those who put forward any serious doctrine about human 1 Pressens4, L'Eglise et la Revolution Frangaise, p. 280. " II ne resta de ce jour que le souvenir d'une stupide parodie qui vengeait h elle seule la religion sainte que l'on avait voulu fouler aux pieds. C'est en vain que pour ranimer la ferveur on remplaga h Paris et dans les d6partements les actrices par les prostitutes. L'ennui et le ddgoft frappbrent le nouveau culte des ses d6buts. E 50 The zoorld-wide feeling after God. [LECT. nature. A mental fact is as worthy of attention as any fact which can be appraised in a chemical laboratory or on the roof of an observatory. Cicero's statement' that there is no nation so barbarous and wild as not to have believed in some divinity, is still, notwithstanding certain apparent exceptions, true. A nation of pure Atheists is yet to be discovered.2 Unworthy and degraded as are many of the beliefs on the subject of a Higher Power that are to be found in the heathen world, some groping after the Great Unseen, some tentative intuition, some shadowy belief there is to be found always and everywhere. Man thinks of a HIigher Power as naturally as he thinks of the world 1 Cic. de Legibus, i. 8. Itaque ex tot generibus nullumn est animal prneter hominem quod habeat notitiam aliquam dei: ipsisque in hominibus nulla gens est neque tam immansueta neque tam fera, quse non, etiam si ignorat qualem habere deum deceat, tamen habendum sciat. Tuscul. Disput., i. 13. Ut porro firmissimum hoc afferri videtur, cur deos esse credamus, quod nulla gens tam fera, nemo omnium tam sit immanis, cujus mentemn non imbuerit deorum opinio:-multi de diis prava sentiunt (id enim vitioso more effici solet); omnes tamen esse vim et naturam divinam arbitrantur: nec vero id collocutio hominum aut consensus effecit; non institutis opinio est confirmata, non legibus. Omni autem in re consentio omnium gentium lex naturae putanda est. 2 Cf. Diderot, Philosophie des Canadiens. CEuvres, I. p. 433. AMlIax Miiller, " Chips from a German Workshop." " There is perhaps no race of men so low and degraded as the Papuas. It has frequently been asserted that they have no religion at all, and yet these same Papuas, if they want to know whether what they are going to undertake is right or wrong, squat before their karwar, clasp the hands over the forehead, and bow repeatedly, at the same time stating their intentions. If they are seized with any nervous feeling during this time, it is considered as a bad sign, and the project is abandoned for a time; if otherwise, the idol is supposed to approve. Here we have but to translate what they in their helpless language call' nervous feeling' by our word'conscience,' and we shall not only understand what they really mean, but confess, perhaps, that it would be well for us if, in our own hearts, the karwar occupied the same prominent place which it occupies in the cottage of every Papua." II.] 7hethIhoutghof God latentisz ti e knman milnd. 5 I around him, or of himself. Nay, he thinks of Truth; and truth is no mere abstraction; it is a Real Being; it is God.l He thinks of the Infinite, says Fenelon, as he thinks of the circle, of the line, of the distinction between whole and part.2 The spontaneous activity of his consciousness brings with it, contains in itself, the thought of One who is greater, if not also stronger, wiser, better than all else; and that man should thus think of Him, is of itself a presumption that He really exists.3 This instinctive perception and affirmation of God is indeed not merely an act of the intellect; it is also, as will be insisted on presently, perhaps it is chiefly, an act of the moral sense, an act of the conscience. It is that upward attraction of the'Plat. Repub. vii. 517. 2 De l'existence de Dieu, lere partie, p. 60. L'idee de l'infini est en moi comme celle des nombres, des lignes, des cercles, d'un tout et d'une partie. Changer nos idles ce serait andantir la raison meme. 3 The ontological " argument " for the existence of God is stated in varying degrees of completeness by S. Augustine, Boethius, S. Anselm, and Descartes. To cite the two last, S. Ans. Proslog. 2, convincitur etiam insipiens (Ps. xiv. 1) esse vel in intellectu aliquid quo nihil majus cogitari potest. Et certe id quo majus cogitari nequit non potest esse in intellectu solo. Si enim vel in solo intellectu est, potest cogitari esse et in re quod majus est. Si ergo id quo majus cogitari non potest est in intellectu; id ipsum, quo majus cogitari non potest est quo majus cogitari potest: sed certb hoc esse non potest. Existit ergo procul dubio aliquid quo majus cogitari non valet, et in intellectu et in re. Descartes observes (Medit. de Prim. Philos. 3, 4, sub fin.) "notiones nostras esse anut adventitias, aut factitias, aut innatas. Ideam de Deo non esse adventitiam, Deum enim non experientif duce reperiri; neque factitiam, nam non arbitrio a nobis effictam esse; ergo esse innatam, sive a Deo ipso nobis suppeditatam." This is undoubtedly the weakest of the arguments for God's existence; but its real value should not be mistaken on account of the facility with which it lends itself to the Hegelian doctrine that " God is only God in so far as He has knowledge of Himself; but His self-knowledge is'sein selbst bewusstseyn in Menschen und das Wissen des Menschen von Gott"' (Encycl. p. 576, qu. by Grimm). 52 Instinctive ay5Cyrehensio pYrecedes roof: [LECT. soul upon which Plato dilates;1 it is the universal hypothesis which Aristotle registers;2 it is the world-wide prejudice of Epicurus; it is the "anticipation" naturally imbedded in the human mind, of Cicero.3 It precedes demonstration; it is out of the reach of criticism; it resists hostile argument. It is, speaking philosophically, a fact in psychological science, and a fact so fruitful and stimulating, that to it must be traced all in human life and effort that looks really upward, —man's love of truth, his clinging to a coming life, his aspirations to rise above the level of animal existence. It is, speaking religiously, in its way, a revelation; it is a revelation of God within, as S. Paul says, answering to the revelation of God from without; it sets man's, thought in motion as he gazes upon the natural world, and bids him not to rest until he has wrung from it a disclosure of the highest truth which it has to teach him. And thus, with this preparatory idea or intuition of a Divinity, the human mind approaches what are called the 1 Cf. the whole passage in Plato, de Legibus, ix. x. 899, c. d. e., qu. by Staudenmaier, Dogm. II. 22. 2 Arist. de Ccelo, 1-3. rdv'res y&p avOpw'ro 7repi Oewv gXovutc vi7rdO'XrtLv, KaCt rdres rbv Tavw-dT'w 7i Gielp rOrov aro&o6aoat. Referred to by Staudenmaier, ubi. sup. 3 Cic. de Nat. Deorum, i. 16. Solus enim vidit [Epicurus] primum esse deos, quod in omnium animis eorum notionem impressisset ipsa natura. Quse est enim gens, aut quod genus hominum, quod non habeat sine doctring anticipationem quandam decorum? quam appellat 7rpdrXvqtv Epicurus, id est anteceptam animo rei quandam informationem, sine qua nec intelligi quidquam, nec quneri, nec disputari potest. Cujus rationis vim atque utilitatem ex illo ccelesti Epicuri de regulM et judicio volumine accepimus. II.] The Cosmologicad Argument. 53 proofs of God's existence. Looking out upon the universe around it, the mind seeks for its productive cause. 1 Whatever efforts may have been made by recent writers to reduce causation to mere antecedence, the law of causation is at once a primary law of human thought and of the world without us.2 What cause, what force, preceded and brought into existence this universe? All the causes with which we come in contact here, are, as we term them, second causes; but they point to a cause beyond themselves, to a cause of causes, to a supreme all-producing Cause, Itself uncaused, unoriginate. The heavenly bodies move on unceasingly in their orbits, obedient to the laws of gravitation, but no law of gravitation could have assigned them their place in space.3 The whole universe bids us look beyond itself for the adequate explanation of its existence. "So far is it from being true," says Lord Bacon, "that the 1 The cosmological proof of God's existence is stated with great beauty and variety of illustration by Fenelon, Trait, de l'existence et des Attributs de Dieu, c. 1, 2. To the original form of the argument which, looking upon the world as an effect, seeks for its cause, Leibnitz adds a second, based upon the contingent nature of the world and its several parts, which obliges us to seek in the -rpWTOv KtoOvv, or First Cause, the Unchanging and intrinsically Necessary Being. This Necessary Being is not, as Strauss says, the "ewiges Grundwesen der Welt," or the permanent material of the universe, as distinct from its ever-changing forms; because the necessity of seeking a first cause obliges us to go beyond the universe, which, as a whole, is an effect. On the other hand, the cosmological argument does not of itself lead us to a moral God, such as would satisfy the instincts of pietythe "thirst " of the soul. 2 Cf. I'Cosh, s" Method of the Divine Government," Appendices III. and IV. 3 Newton, Philos. Nat. Princip. L. III. schol. gen. Perseverabunt quidem in orbibus suis per leges gravitatis, sed regularem orbium situm primitus acquirire per has leges minimb potuerunt. 54 The frst cause the Hzg/hesi I~tellizence. [LECT. explanation of phenomena by natural causes leads us away from God and His Providence, that those philosophers who have passed their lives in discovering such causes can find nothing that affords a final explanation without having recourse to God and His Providence."1 The father of the inductive philosophy does but speak the common sense of religion; but will it be maintained, except by writers who are prepared to deny the existence of causation, that he does not also utter the common sense of scientific thought? Does the universe tell us anything as to the nature of its First Cause? Surely we may at least presume that the Author of the natural world must be higher and greater than anything in the natural world.2 Water will not rise above its source; and it is inconceivable that, if there be an Author of nature at all, His Self-existent Life must not be higher and nobler than any life which He has bestowed. Who does not see the force of the Psalmist's argument, "He that made the ear, shall He not hear? and He that gave the eye, shall He not see?"3 Above the life of the 1De Augm. Scient., iii. 4. Adeo ut tantum absit ut causne physicse hominem' Deo et Providentig abducant, ut contra potis philosophi illi qui in iisdem eruendis occupati fuerunt, nullum exitum rei reperiant, nisi postremb ad Deum et providentiamn confugiant. 2 That the one true God may be known from His works in Nature is taught, as against Gentile idolatry, in Isaiah xliv.; xlv. 18, sqq.; Acts xiv. 15-17; xvii. 22, sqq.; Rom. i. 19-20. That the natural world witnesses to the beauty of His Being and Attributes is implied in Psalms viii. 2-4; xix. 1, sqq.; civ., passim, &c. Holy Scripture, of course, does not demonstrate the existence of Him Whose true Nature it unveils; but it points to the natural world as involving for all reasoning beings the privilege and the responsibility of some knowledge of its Author's existence, and of His character. 3 Ps. xciv. 9. II.] The Teleological Argzwevl. 55 tree, there is that of the animal; above that of the animal, there is the life of man. Man, with all his ingenuity and will, cannot produce a leaf or a shell-fish: and is it to be supposed that the author of man's life is less endowed with thought and volition than man? We may paraphrase the Psalmist: He That made the human intellect, shall He not think? And how came it to exist, if He did not make it?1 There are chasms in the natural world which no theories substituting a fated self-development for the free action of God will really bridge over. There is the chasm between the inorganic and the organic; the chasm between the lifeless and that which lives; the chasm between animal instinct and the reflective consciousness. At each of these levels of creation we seem to feel more sensibly than elsewhere the fresh intervention of a creating Intelligence; and our conviction of His activity is strengthened when we observe the interdependence and harmony of the universe as a whole, in which each part is necessary, in which nothing is really out of place, and between the several elements of which new relations are continually coming to light, as if to justify His foresight and to enhance our estimate of His inexhaustible resources.2 "Those 1 Bossuet, CEuv. i. 79. Si nous etions tous seuls intelligents dans le monde, nous seuls nous vaudrions mieux avec notre intelligence imparfaite, que toute la reste, qui serait tout-a-fait brute et stupide, et on ne pourrait comprehendre d'ou viendrait dans ce tout qui n'entend pas cette partie qui entend, l'intelligence ne pouvant nfitre d'une chose brute et insens6e. 2 The teleological argument for the existence of God, which sees a purpose in the forces and laws of the natural world, and in the events of human history, has been chiefly discredited in modern times by the popular supposition that modern attacks upon the doctrine of final causes have been really 56 God, how related to t/he Cosmos. [LECT. persons," says Montesquieu, "who maintain that a blind fate has produced all the effects we see in the world, maintain that which is a great absurdity; for what absurdity can be greater than a blind fate producing intelligent beings?"1 How do you know, a Bedouin was asked, that there is a God? "In the same way," he replied, "that I know, on looking at the sand, when a man or a beast has crossed tlhe desert-by His footprints in the world around me,")) III. Thus does the common sense or reason of man lead him up to recognizing One Supreme Intelligence as at least the original cause of all that he is and sees around him. But then the question arises, what is the relation that actually subsists between this Highest Intelligence and the universe? To this question there are two leading answers. successful. For a partial and popular consideration of some recent objections to Final Causes, urged by Mr. Herbert Spencer, Mr. Lewes, and others, cf. M'Cosh, Christianity and Positivism, pp. 78-88. Even if a doctrine of evolution should in time be accepted as scientifically, and so as theologically certain, such a doctrine would not be inconsistent either with that belief in the original act of creation which is essential to Theism, or with " the recognition of plan and purpose in the number and variety of animated beings." "Evolution," from a Theistic point of view, is merely our way of describing what we can observe of God's continuous action upon the physical world; and because the phrase seems tacitly or poetically to invest the universe with a power of self-unfolding, it does not follow that the question of an Intelligent Creator and Ruler is thereby decided in the negative by those who employ it. 1 Esprit des Lois. Cf. Ps. xiv. 1. II.] God anished from the Zorld by Deistm. 57 The Deist so far agrees with the Christian, as to admit that God is related to the world as its Creator; and that He must have made it out of nothing by the fiat of His Will. But with this admission —momentous as it is-the old Deism practically closes its account of God's free personal action upon His work. Since the creation, God's action is represented as being practically superseded by a system of unchangeable routine; and this routine is conceived to be so strictly invariable, as to bind the liberty of the presumed Agent. The Deistic theory of the universe might remind us of the relations which, at least until some very recent events, were understood to exist between the Government of Egypt and the Sublime Porte. There was occasionally a formal recognition of the sovereign power on the part of the nominal dependency, but Egypt was governed by a practically independent Viceroy; the Suzerain's name was mentioned rarely, or only in a formal way; his active influence would have been at once resented, the real power being lodged elsewhere. According to the old Deism, God created the world; but He cannot be supposed ever to interfere with the ordinary laws of its government. He cannot work miracles; He is, in no tangible sense, a Providence. He is well out of the way of active human interests: it is not to be supposed that He can hear the prayer of a worm writhing on one of His planets; that the happiness or misfortunes of a larger sort of animalculse can give Him any real concern. So He is throned by the Deistic writer in magnificent inactivity 58 Deislic apo/heosis of Nature. [LECT. at a very remote corner of the universe, while a new power has practically taken His place. In the last century, at the first great outburst of Deistic thought, Nature practically superseded God. Men talked and wrote persistently about the laws of Nature, the moods of Nature, the religion of Nature: Nature was so vividly and constantly personified in conversation and in literature, that the European world might be supposed to have lighted upon a new goddess, charged, in a very special sense, with the interests of humanity. We live in a more positive and realistic age; and where our fathers talked of Nature, modern Deism names "laws." What is lost in picturesqueness is gained in truth. There is no such person as Nature; but there are observable modes of the Divine activity, which may never vary within the experience of a race. Order is, as Christians know, a characteristic of all God's works; but He, the Almighty, is so little enslaved by the rules which He freely observes, that moment by moment He wills the very order that seems to bind His liberty. Deism, however, really means by "laws "-forces which have become somehow independent of God; fatal forces, which defy His power to innovate upon their resistless play. But what can this impotent Deistic God, from whose control his universe has so escaped as to constitute itself a self-governing machine, —say or do to meet the aspirations, or relieve the despondencies of the human soul? If we cannot love and trust volcanic forces, or vital forces, the laws of growth or the laws of decomposition; II.] nDeistic exferizmenls of Robes5ierre. 59 can we love and trust a being who has left this universe to itself; who surveys it, if he does survey it, in the cynicism of an unbroken silence from a very distant throne; to whom its vast oceans of hope and fear, and struggle and disappointment, and triumph and failure —all the mysteries of its moral life, are of no more concern than they are to the rocks and seas around us? No, the god of Deism does not quench the religious thirst of the soul. The soul of man seeks the Living God, not a deity who is as remote from human interests as was the Jupiter of expiring Paganism. The French Revolution was fertile in religious or irreligious experiments; and as it endeavoured to satisfy the human soul with Atheism, so it made yet more strenuous effort to satisfy it with Deism. 1 Robespierre had publicly' So Alison. Compare Pressens6, l'Eglise et la Revolution, p. 294. La fete eut lieu le 20 prairial. Lien n'avait 4te 6pargne pour la rendre grandiose et cependant elle n'4vita pas les puerilites ridicules. Robespierre, president de la Convention, en bel habit bleu, avec un bouquet de fruits et d'4pis dans les mains, prit place avec tous ses collegues sur l'amphith8etre 4lev6 au milieu des Tuileries. Aprbs un pompeux discours, il en descendit pour incendier la statue de l'Atheisme, promptement remplac~e par celle de la Sagesse qui parut malheureusement trbs enfumee. Des Tuileries la Convention se rendit au Champ de Mars, entouree et comme enlac6e d'un ruban tricolore, que portaient des enfants ornes de violettes, des adolescents ceints de myrtes, des hommes d'age miAr couronn6s de feuilles de chgnes et des vieillards par4s de pampre et d'olivier. Un char bucolique charge d'instruments aratoires suivait la Convention, trainm par les inevitables bceufs'a comes dordes et suivi par les non moins inevitables jeunes filles en blanc. Au Champ de Mars la Convention se plaqa sur une montagne artificielle, monument flatteur pour les deput6s de la majorite. Le president perora, les jeunes filles chanterent, les vieillards donnbrent leur b6nediction, les canons tonnurent et tout se termina par le cri de vive cl Repjublique. Ces pompes d'opera comique, ces symboles ridicules et ces rites glaces apprenaient'a la France qu'il est plus facile de dc'creter un changement de religion que de l'op6rer. Jamais le deisme ne fondera un culte et tout ce qu'il essayera dans ce genre tombera 6o The Soul's thirst unsatisJfed by Deism. [LECT. declared that Chaumette deserved death for the abominations which accompanied the Feast of Reason in Notre Dame, on November 7, 1793; and he took a leading part in the Feast of the Supreme Being, which was celebrated in the gardens of the Tuileries and in the Champ de Mars, on June 9, 1794. The Convention decreed that he should discharge the duties of Supreme Pontiff on the occasion. The Deism of Robespierre was sufficiently vivid to admit of his believing that God does rule the affairs of men; he maintained with particular earnestness that God hates kings and priests. The undeniable eloquence of the president of the Convention, the art and industry of the painter David, the music, the costumes, the political enthusiasm at fever height, did all that could be done for the success of the festival. But you cannot lash a multitude into devotion to a remote and hypothetical abstraction by any elaborate display of ceremonial; and the real deity of the occasion was Robespierre. As he marched along, overshadowed with his plumes, and adorned with his tricolor scarf, while the air resounded with cries of "Vive Robespierre," his countenance, says the historian, was radiant with joy. " See how they applaud him," said his colleagues. "He would become a god: he is no longer the High Priest of the Supreme Being." History does not ascribe to this attempt any special efficacy in reviving among the French sous la risee publique. La fete fut trouv6e bien longue, surtout pour ceux qu'irritait le r61le pr6ponderant de Robespierre. On raconte qu'un repr6sentant moins patient que ses collbgues lui dit en termes d'une trivialit6 energique: " Tu commences h nous ennuyer avec ton Etre Supreme." II.] God zuried in the world by Pantheism. 6 i people a sense of their duties towards their forgotten Maker. The most tangible result of the day was the decree proposed by Couthon, for increasing the powers of the Revolutionary Tribunal. To the question, What is the relation between the universe and the Supreme Intelligence? another and a very different answer has been given. If Deism practically banishes God from the world, Pantheism, at least, sees what it calls God everywhere, and in everything.l The Pantheistic god is the common principle which not only is held to constitute the unity of, but which is, the universe. According to Benedict Spinoza,2 God is the one eternal substance, which makes its appearance in the twofold realm of thought and of matter. Out of it all individual forms of existence are constantly emerging, and like waves upon the ocean, they are as constantly sinking back into, and being absorbed by it, as the common stream of universal life. God alone is, says Fichte, and apart from Him is nothing, 3 —a great truth in one sense, and a great falsehood in another. Hegel teaches that the Absolute is the universal reason; which, after having buried and lost itself in nature, recovers itself in man, in the shape of self-conscious thought. Man's thought of God, therefore, is the true God, the only existing God. God exists only in human thought; 1 Wegscheider, Inst. p. 240. Pantheismus-ea sententia qua naturam divinam mundo supponant et Deum ac mundum unum idemque esse statuunt. 2 Cf. Tractat. de Deo. c. 2. Suppl. ad. opp. Amst. 1862. For his Theory of Substance, cf. Ethic, p. 1, Def. 5. 3 Fichte, Von Sel. Leben, ~ 143. 62 Secrel of /Zhe srezngthk of Pazzikeism. [LECT. human thought is the reason of nature arriving at selfconsciousness. Man thinks of God, and, in man's thinking, God exists; He has no independent or personal existence.' The great attraction and strength of Pantheism lies in the satisfaction which it professes to offer to one very deep and legitimate aspiration; it endcleavours to assure man of his real union with the source of his own and of the universal life. It is this profound idea, this most fascinating allurement, that can alone explain the empire, which, in various ages and under various forms, Pantheism has wielded in human history. It inspires Eleatic and Indian philosophies; it is the animating principle of such worship of the generative and life-sustaining powers in nature, as was, for instance, that of the Phcenician Baalim. Since Lessing, Spinoza has almost reigned in certain districts of cultivated Europe, and Germany is by no means the only home of the thought of Schelling and of Hegel. In its later forms Pantheism is, speaking historically, a reaction from and a protest against the older Rationalistic Deism. It often represents a noble plea that God shall not be banished by modern thought from all real contact with humanity: nay, it would fain essay to do in its way what the Divine Incarnation has actually done; it would make men partakers of the Divine Nature. And this, its religious aim, is beyond question a main secret of its power. 1 Hegel's fundamental error consists in his identification of the "abstract thought" of man with the "Absolute Thought." Fichte (Zeitschrift ftir Philosophie, Bd. 17, ~ 292) says that this is " nicht ntir hiichst willkurlich und grundlos, sondern eine contradictio in adjecto." Qu. by iettinger; cf. Hegel, Phil. der Rel. ~~ 207, 261, 263; Encycl. ~ 56. II.] Does il satisfy the thirst of Mte Soid? 63 Yet does the Pantheistic deity afford any real satisfaction to the needs of the soul of man? Can he be the object of any serious religious effort whatever? What is there in him to which the life of religion can possibly attach itself? He is not a person: for Pantheism necessarily denies the existence of personality. He is not a cause: for Pantheism cannot tolerate any doctrine of causation. He is not even, as the Absolute Substance, in anywise distinct from phenomena; for, while it is loyal to its central position, Pantheism cannot afford to admit the correctness of such a distinction. ~What is he then? He is only a fine name for the universe. He has no existence apart from it: he is the universal life, of which you and I are transient manifestations or forms. You may indeed encounter him draped and veiled in a phraseology so reverent and tender, that it milght seem to have been borrowed froml the inmost shrines of Christian mysticism; but when you force yourself to look at the hard reality beneath, you find that it is practically identical with that presented by Materialism.n If God be in reality only the spirit or life of the universe, how can He provoke the yearnings of the soul, or how satisfy its aspirations? How can He be the object, whether of religious homage, or of religious trust? How can we yield love, obedience, worship to a mere torrent of existence that flows onwards inexorably beneath our feet; we, the ripples, who do but rise upon its surface to sink away 1 Strauss, G1. 1, ~ 517. Seine Existenz als wesen ist unser denken von ihm; aber seine reale Existenz ist die Natur, zu welcher das ehi.zelne Denkende als Moment gehirt. 64 Pantheism, I/e sanction of joral evil. [LECT. after our little moment of undulation? Or how can a sensible and modest man love, trust, worship, his own selfconsciousness, under the idea that in each reflecting mind God has become conscious of HIimself? Nay, if religion has anything to do with reverence for goodness and with abhorrence of moral evil, if it is not a sentiment that has been rendered by modern speculation wholly independent of moral truth, how can we worship either an inner self into which, as we must each of us know, evil penetrates so constantly and so pervadingly; or an universal life of which in its highest, that is its human, manifestation, evil is, as a matter of fact, more frequently an accompaniment than good? How, I say, can such an absolute principle be the object of religion, if its activity be manifested not less truly in murder and lust than in heroism and unselfishness; if the darkest forms of evil stand to it in a relation just as necessary as do the highest forms of good; if by it, in a word, all moral distinctions whatever are really annihilated? Between Pantheism and an earnest hatred of moral evil there is accordingly a necessary opposition, and this reason alone establishes a permanent divorce between it and any true effort at communion with the All-Pure, such as all that is best in us enjoins. But further, that which in a Christian, as in any earnest Theist, makes Pantheism impossible, is the first article of his creed: " I believe in God the Father Almighty, Mcaker of heaven and earth." As the act of creation was not witnessed, so it cannot be demon II.] Relayse of Pantileism inilo M/ateirialisr. 65 strated. " By faith we understand that the worlds were made by the word of God."l Creation interposes an immeasurable chasm between the Creator and the creature; between that Pure and Awful Life Which is indebted to none else either for existence or support, and this life of dependence, weakness, corruption. And belief in creation is a necessary outwork of any true theism whatever: deny I Heb. xi. 3. That God created the universe is the first truth which Scripture teaches us about Him, Gen. i. 1. Cf. Job xxxviii. 4-7; Ps. xxxiii. 6-9, thus revealing His majestic beauty; Ps. xix. 1-7; xcvii. 1-6; cxix. 64. The Jews knew that this creation involved not merely the bringing order and life, e dai/dpqou Vilus, Wisd. xi. 17, but also originally the calling this formless material itself into being, Ed o0K OzvTwv, 2 Mac. vii. 28. In the New Testament, creation is generally referred to as furnishing arguments for moral truths or duties; as by our Lord, Matt. xix. 4-6, for its witness to the indissolubility of the marriage tie; and by S. Paul, as yielding proof of God's real relation to the world, Acts xvii. 24; or of His interest in the whole human family, and of our duty of seeking Him, ib. 26; for the refutation of a false dualistic asceticism, 1 Tim. iv. 3; cf. Eph. iv. 6. That He has created all things and for Himself is His title to praise and adoration, Rev. iv. 11. Although the New Testament does not in express terms speak of creation out of nothing, it implies this truth. S. Paul's arguments in Acts xvii. 24, and I Tim. iv. 3, would lose their force, if it were true that God was not the maker of matter as well as the artist who gave it form, while the doxology of Rev. iv. 11 could not be truthfully addressed to a Being who had not created matter, or who had formed anything out of pre-existent material which he did not create. The aALopPos VXsr of S. Justin Martyr (Apol. i. 10), and even the f"X I Xpovos of Clement (Phot. Bibl. cod. 1C9) is not necessarily eternal; the creation of matter out of nothing, and of the world out of matter, were distinct events, separated by intervals that distance all human thought. Tertullian pointed out that Hermogenes, in teaching the eternity of matter, was really a Ditheist (Adv. Herm. c. 4.) The general teaching of the ancient church is expressed by S. Augustine (De fid. et symb. c. 2): Credimus omnia DIeum fecisse de nihilo, quia, etiamsi de aliquA materi' factus est mundus, eadem ipsa muateria de nihilo facta est, ut ordinatissimo Dei munere primo capacitas formarum fieret, ac deinde formarentur qunecunque formata sunt. Hoc autem diximus, ne quis existimet contrarias sibi esse Scripturarum sententias: quoniam et omnia Deum fecisse de nihilo scriptum est, et mrundum esse factum de informi materiA. F 66 Thze COrealor ipresenl in His Works. [LECT. creation and you deny God. If God in His unfettered freedom did not summon into existence all that is, if the universe escaped from Him against His will, He is not alone the Omnipotent: if anything that we term matter or spirit has from the beginning co-existed side by side with Him, He is not alone the Eternal.l The difficulty is not met by phrases about the eternal Idea passing into reality; since it will be asked how such a passage could have been effected, or rather, why it should have taken place at all? A- creative Will having no limits to its power, is at least intelligible, but the mind refuses to dwell seriously on such a process as a transmutation of thought into matter. In its attempt to explain itself, Pantheism practically sinks back into Materialism; it has no expedients equal to the task of saving its god from burial beneath the materialistic chaos of matter and force. Will it be said that to believe in a Creator-God is to close the eye to the presence of God in creation? But who that believes in the Omnipresent can limit His presence? Is not the original act of creation a warrant for the Creator's continued presence with and action upon His work? 2 The Apostle who taught the Athenians that God made the world and all things therein, taught them also, and in the same great sermon, that "He is not far from every 1Cf. S. Aug. Conf. xii. 7. Fecisti ccelum et terram non de Te, nam esset equale Unigenito Tuo, et aliud praeter Te non erat, unde faceres, ideo de nihilo fecisti ccelum et terram. S. Iren. H-er. ii. 10, 4. Homines quidem de nihilo non possunt aliquid facere, sed de materia subjacenti: Deus autem materiam fabricationis sue, cum ante non esset, ipse adinvenit.'S. John v. 17. II.] S. Azguslzine ozi God and the Uznzverse. 67 one of us, for in IIlim we live and move and have our being." 1 To assert God's presence in His works is one thing; to identify Him with them is another. His omnipresence is a necessary attribute of His Deity; while if He could be identified with nature He would cease to be. If the mystery of life, which attests God's presence in the natural world, was ever felt in all its awe and its beauty by any human soul, it was felt by the great Augustine. Witness the often quoted passage of the Confessions in which he tells us why nature was in his eyes so beautiful, by telling us how nature had led him up to God. "I asked the earth, and it said:'I am not He;' and all that is upon it made the same confession. I asked the sea and the depths, and the creeping things that have life, and they answered:' We are not thy God; look thou above us.' I asked the breezes and the gales; and the whole air, with its inhabitants, said to me:'Anaximenes is in error, I am not God.' I asked the heaven, the sun, the moon, the stars:' We too,' said they,'are not the God Whom thou seekest.' And I said to all the creatures that surround the doors of my fleshly senses,'Ye have said to me of my God that ye are not He; tell me somewhat of Him.' And with a great voice, they exclaimied' He made us.' "' 1 Acts xvii. 27, 28. 2 S. Aug. Conf. x. 6. Interrogavi terram et dixit: non sum; et qumecumque in eAdem sunt idem confessa sunt. Interrogavi mare et abyssos et reptilia animaruml vivarum, et responderunt: Non sumus Deus tuus, quzere super nos. Interrogavi auras flabiles, et inquit universus aer cum incolis suis: Fallitur Anaximenes, non sum Deus. Interrogavi ccelum, solem, lunam, stellas: Neque nos sumus Dens quem quneris, inquiunt. Et dixi 68 God more Mianz tMe Highesl Intellizgece. [LECT. IV. So long as the human mind only conceives of God as a Supreme Intelligence, it will oscillate hesitatingly between these two errors; between a sterile Deism which banishes God from the world, and a reactionary Pantheism which buries Him in it. It is when we gain a height beyond, and observe the third great form of argument with which man clothes and fortifies his presentiment of God, that we are saved from this liability. Here a view of God's Nature opens out upon us, which is at once conservative of His moral Purity and distinctness from created life, and which also does justice to the intimacy of His contact with the world and with humanity. The philosopher of Konigsberg, who in his Critique of Pure Reason has made the most of some well-known objections against those arguments for God's existence, which are drawn from the existence and structure of the universe,2 insists with great force upon the strength of the inference by which the human conscience ascends to the recognition of God. If Kant is a sceptic in the domain of speculative thought, his doubts vanish altogether when, entering that of the practical reason, as he terms it, he listens to the commands of moral truth. 1 This practical reason is wholly independent of any discovery or decision external to itself: omnibus iis que circumstant fores carnis mese: Dixistis mihi de Deo meo quod vos non estis, dicite mihi de illo aliquid. Et exclamaverunt voce magna: Ipse fecit nos. 1 Luthardt, Apologet. Vortr. L. iii. Scholten, Phil. in Rel., p. 100. 2 Iritik d. reinen Vernunft, Abt. ii. B. 2, kap. 3, ~~ 4, 5, 6. II.] zInfe:rence of tie practzlical reason. 69 it apprehends the good as such without waiting for the judgment of experience. Its commands are issued without limit or reserve; they have an objective certainty; they "judge all things, while they themselves are judged of no man." They lead us to recognize as necessary truths, first, the freedom of man's will; next, a future life; thirdly, the existence of God. The voice of the practical reason, " Thou oughtest," implies "Thou canst"; the categorical imperative is meaningless in the absence of moral freedom. lMan is free, and his conscience perpetually affirms that he must do good at all costs, even although doing good should not make him happy. It affirms no less clearly that if he is really virtuous he should be happy. Yet, in the experience of life, the good man who does good is often unhappy, while vice is not unfrequently salaried and crowned with rewards that are denied to virtue. The sight of this contradiction forces the conscience to infer a life to come, and a Moral Being Who, in His justice, will re-establish those relations between happiness and virtue which it persistently recognizes as necessary. Thus the practical reason reaches God, not by a demonstration of His existence, but as a postulate of its own activity. Speculation may mislead, but duty is a certainty; and duty is no arbitrary creation either of our reason, or of our self-interest; it is not an abstraction which rests on nothing beyond itself; it is out of the reach of merely speculative criticism, yet it leads us to the Master of the moral world. Those clear, precise, categorical orders which are imposed in varying degrees 70 Cozscience not a product of eduzcalion. [LECT. of urgency upon all human wills, point to a really living Ruler of men, in Whom man cannot disbelieve without doing violence to himself. Certainly Kant would have had little patience with the theory that conscience itself is only a collection of prejudices received from childhood, and incorporated with the moral life; that it is simply the result of early training, and has no real basis in the soul. For this theory confuses the furniture of the conscience with the conscience itself; the acquisitions of a faculty with its existence. It might be contended with equal justice that the human mind does not exist because it is developed by exercise, and enlarged by information.l Certainly conscience may be enlightened or it may be misinformed by education. But the original faculty which perceives the existence of some right and of some wrong, whatever may be apprehended as such, and which refers actions to such right and wrong; the faculty which under all circumstances pronounces in favour of truth, and justice, and self-sacrifice, and courage, and purity, wherever these can be found, because it intuitively perceives their necessary excellence;-this faculty demands God. Conscience is unsatisfied, according to Kant, unless there exists some Being above the world, Who can hereafter reconcile the discrepancies which exist between virtue and fortune in this present life, in His quality of an arbiter of human conduct. Here Atheism, especially in its Positivist guise, pleads the disinterestedness of real virtue, 1 Kritik der Reinen Yernunft, pp. 462-491, ed. Rosenkranz. Siimmtt. Werke, 2er Theil. These criticisms are discussed by Kleutgen, Theologie der Vorzeit. BId. ii. p. 46, sqq. Philosophie der Vorzeit, ii. diss. 9, 1. II.] God a Jostzlale of the conscience. 71 which is good and does good for the sake of goodness, seeking no reward, and daunted by no misfortune.1 But when Kant maintains that there must be a moral God, he does this not in the interests of a mercenary virtue, but in those of an absolute and consummate justice, which proclaims in every human conscience the necessity of establishing an harmony or correspondence between the conditions of human existence on the one hand, and man's demerits or deserts on the other. Thus it is that conscience demands God; and the atheistic whisper in the fool's heart of which the Psalmist speaks, belongs in truth to moral rather than to intellectual folly. It is ultimately traceable to a failure to perceive and feel the mighty and abiding contrast which exists between moral good and moral evil, and the necessary bearing of this contrast upon the ultimate destinies of the universe. In a good man, belief in God results from belief in the invincibility of good; the intensity or feebleness of a man's belief in God is a spiritual thermometer, whereby the temperature of his moral being may be pretty accurately measured. When the moral sensibilities are weakened or blunted by culpable indulgence until known sin is tolerable or even welcome, then the intellect is always open to theories which represent good and evil as alike forms of the Universal Life, or as equally fatal results of that " unreasoning and irresistible piece of machinery which we name 1 Cf. too Strauss Glaubensl. 1, 393, qu. by Luthardt, Lect. III., whom I here follow. 72 Conscience, hozu far ajffecled by /Se Fall. [LECT. the Universe." But although the human conscience is an earnest theistic apologist in exact proportion to its vitality, its affirmation of God should not be dclivorced from the intellectual inferences which the universe suggests to us. The evidential strength of Theism, like that of Christianity, lies not in any single proof, but in the collective force of the various evidences which are producible in its favour; and of these, the cry of conscience, if the strongest practically, is, after all, only one. Nor does it follow that because conscience is a true guide towards the throne of a Living and a Moral God, it is therefore an infallible judge in reviewing all that He may reveal to us about Himself or the laws of His government. We may reasonably accept the witness of the universal conscience of good men in favour of Theism, without binding ourselves to accept all that has been pleaded by individuals in the name of conscience against portions of the Jewish history, for example, or the doctrine of the Atonement. If it be urged from another side that it is after all "the conscience of fallen man upon which we rely for this great affirmation of God," the reply is, that the Fall cannot have destroyed our powers of apprehending truth, or it would have destroyed our responsibility, and that it is not the weakness which the Fall has wrought in human nature, but the strength which still survives it, whereby man affirms the existence of a M[oral God and seeks Him. So far as man is a fallen being, no doubt, at the approach of the Lord God, he " hides himself amid the trees of the garden," to the end of time. But those truth-seeking II.] Feebleness of couscienzcewilkozdta Revelcdozon. 73 I. 73 elements of his spiritual nature which, as the Christian creed teaches, were in Paradise invigorated by a robe of supernatural grace, afterwards forfeited by the sin of our first parents, are throughout heathendom still kindled into activity by the prevenient grace of the Holy Spirit, breathing as He wills across the deserts; and thus fallen man seeks the Lord, if haply he might feel after Him and find Him, though He be not far from every one of us,l instinctively assured, as all good men must be, of His existence, and hoping that He may be fully unveiled at last. Yet the feebleness of conscience in fallen man is a fact of significance. Although conscience seeks in God, not merely, as does intellect, a solution of the problem of the universe, but a Legislator Who has given and Who will enforce the law of right and wrong written in the human heart, conscience is nevertheless in the mass of men, if left to itself, too enfeebled to keep a Moral God clearly in view, even when it has caught sight of Him. It requires an aid external to itself, a token from its Object that it is not mistaken about Him. It requires a revelation. Without a revelation, historical theism is either the fruitless speculation of a few isolated thinkers, or the underlying idea of a popular superstition which obscures and degrades it. In a certain true sense it is itself a revelation; but its utterances require a countersign in the world without, which may make it certain that the inner legislator is also the Ruler of the Universe. Conscience itself, exactly in the 1Acts xvii. 27. 74 Ideun'iy of 1ze God of Conscience and /he [LECT. ratio of the clearness with which it discerns the moral nature of God, discerns the implied necessity of a revelation. It is sure that He Who is Himself just and merciful, cannot leave men altogether to themselves: that the All-Good cannot permanently disappoint the desires and powers which He has Himself implanted. And thus the antecedent probability of a revelation is to a good man not less than overwlhelming; and Christianity assures us that his conviction is warranted by the fact. The substance of the Christian revelation of God consists not merely in the teaching of Jesus Christ, together with the old Hebrew literature on which He sets His seal, and the apostolical doctrine which He warrants by anticipation, but also in His life. His life was an unveiling of God to the eye of man's sense, that the eye of man's spirit might understand Him. Christ's life, not less than His teaching, confirms the highest instincts of the human conscience, and educates them up to a point which of themselves they could never have reached. But how is man enabled to identify the Author of this law within him, perfectly reflected, as it is, in the Christ, with the Author of the law of the universe without him? The answer is, by miracle. Miracle is an innovation upon physical law,-or at least a suspension of some lower physical law by the intervention of a higher one,-in the interests of moral law. The historical fact that Jesus Christ rose from the dead identifies the Lord of physical life and death with the Legislator of the Sermon on the II.] Cod of iNabc re cerfticacd by liracle. 75 Mount. Miracle is the certificate of identity between the Lord of Nature and the Lord of Conscience,-the proof that He is really a Moral Being Who subordinates plhysical to moral interests. Miracle is the meeting-point between intellect and the moral sense, because it announces the answer to the efforts and yearnings alike of the moral sense and the intellect; because it announces revelation. It may be asked whether miracle, in revealing God, is not subversive of the idea of God, Whom it reveals. Does it not postulate in Him two contradictory wills, the one whereby He enacts a permanent law, the other whereby He suspends it? And is not this irreconcileable with the highest views of His nature, as the Immutable, Who is what He is unchangeably, because what He is, is absolutely the best? No. For this is to apply to the Divine Mind a human standard of measurement. Succession is a law of human thoughts; because the mind of man is finite. If I resolve to spend each day for the next six months in a given way, and then, three months hence, determine that I will spend one particular day very differently, I am without doubt guilty of traversing my original and general intention by a second and particular intention which contradicts it. But with God, no such self-contradiction is possible; because in the Divine Mind there is no succession, whether of ideas or resolves. The Eternal Being sees the end in the beginning; He sees the exception together with the rule so simultaneously, that it is untrue to say that He anticipates it. It is a simple, indivisible act of will, where 76 Dignily of God nol compyromised [LECT. by He everlastingly wills the rule together with the exception-the exception with the rule. With Him is "no variableness, neither shadow of turning." 1 The idea that God, in working a miracle, contradicts His own earlier purpose in giving to the physical world unchangeable laws, not merely betrays a conception of law as something independent of the free activity of God, but introduces into our conception of the Divine Mind the finite and human idea of succession in thought and will. Whereas, in truth, He, the Infinite, embraces, by one single act, present, past, and future, the general and the particular, the individual and the universal; reaching, as the Wise Man says, "from one end to another, mightily, and smoothly and sweetly ordering all things." 2 But does God compromise His dignity by working a miracle, or by exerting a special Providence over His works? It is pleaded, indeed, that He must do so. It is said to be inconceivable that the Maker and Monarch of all these suns can interest Himself in the concerns of one of the smallest of His planets; in a particular race of creatures on its surface, in individual members of that race, in you and me. To imagine this, we are told, is only to indulge human self-love, which interprets all things, even the Deity Himself, by the promptings of its own boundless self-complacency. And yet, what kind of "dignity" is it which is thus pleaded in order to depreciate the freedom, energy, and 1 S. James i. 17. 2 Wisd. viii. 1. II.] by miracles wzhic altest His moralily. 77 ubiquity of God's Providential Rule? It is at best the dignity of an oriental despot; he is too engrossed in the cares of personal government, or in the pursuits of personal indulgence, to listen to the voices and to study the wants of the poor, who struggle and suffer around the walls of his seraglio. The notion that a really great intelligence will concern itself only and exclusively with broad principles and general interests, to the neglect of particulars and details, is, even when we are speaking of human minds, a mistaken notion. This vulgar contempt for details belongs to the pretentious incitation rather than to the reality of mental power. A really great intelligence combines the observation and study of details with the firm grasp of comprehensive principles; and in this power of combining things, which in lower minds are found apart, lies the strength and secret of its greatness. Nor is this less, rather it is much more the case, with the Eternal Mind. God is not less Divine in literally numbering the sparrows that fall to the ground, and the hairs of the human head, than in formulating the highest laws which govern either planetary systems or spiritual intelligences; while this comprehensive and penetrating interest and action, spending itself upon the whole outward and inward life of His creatures, is the symptom and expression of the moral interest which the reasonable creation commands in the heart of the Creator. No; God's greatness is not enhanced by systems which would banish Him from the world, or condemn Him to 78 God revealed lo the sozul in CGhrist. [LECT. impotence. The miracles of Christianity are so far from compromising its Theism, that they illustrate and secure it. The God of Christianity is no mere First Cause, or Supreme Intelligence. He is a Moral God. If He is Power and Wisdom, He is also Sanctity, Justice, Providence, Mercy, Love. According to the Gospel, Love is His Essence; and love is interest in, and self-sacrifice for that which is its object. It is such a God as this alone Who can be the adequate object of religion. Traceable everywhere in human history, traceable especially in the history of one separated and chosen race, the interest of the Perfect Moral Being in the moral and thinking creatures of His hand culminates at Bethlehem and on Calvary. The Incarnation of the Eternal Son, the manifestation of the Divine life of Love, and Justice, and Compassion, and Purity, flashing through a veil of flesh, and leading up to a death of agony and shame, which alters the whole existing moral relation between earth and heaven; this is the glorious creed which rivets a Christian's conviction of the moral intensity of the life of God. " God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son." What could He do more in order to con-. vince us that He is not merely a Force or an Intelligence, but a Heart? At the feet of Him who could say, " He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father," we understand, and feed upon the certainty, that God is moral as well as intellectual " light, and that in Him is no darkness at all." W~hen a man's hold upon this creed is gone, his thought II.] Practical consideraZiozs. 79 falls back, at best, upon the more rudimentary and less adequate ideas of the Godhead; the darker mysteries of the world's history present themselves with more painful force; and the mind tends inevitably, in the last resort, either to Deism or to Pantheism; to a Deism which just permits God to create, and then dismisses Him from His creation; or to a Pantheism which identifies Him with all the moral evil in the universe, and ends by propagating the worship of new Baals and Ashteroths. A few words in conclusion. God being really alive, His existence is a fact'with which no other fact that the human mind can come to recognize will possibly compare. Nothing among created things that can engage and stimulate thought, nothing that can warm and expand affection, nothing that can invigorate will and purpose, ought, in the judgment of any thinking human being, to compete with the Eternal God. Our reasonable duty towards God is " to believe in Him, to fear Him, and to love Him, with all the heart, with all the mind, with all the soul, and with all the strength." And yet that unbegun, unending, self-existent Life; that boundless Intelligence administering a boundless Power; that long array of moral Attributes which win our love while they must also move our reverence and fear; what is I-e, our God, to us? Do we thirst for God? As the days, and months, and years pass, do we ever look out of and beyond ourselves upon that vast ocean of Uncreated Life Which encircles us, Which penetrates our inmost selves? Do we ever think steadily, so as to o80 Praclical considerations. [LECT. II. dwell with a real intellectual interest upon Him Who is the first and highest of truths, to Whose free bounty we ourselves owe the gift of existence, and to Whom we must one day account for our use of it? Do we ever sincerely desire to love Him, and to live for Him? Or are we constantly hurrying along our solitary path from one vanishing shape towards another, while we neglect the Alone Unchangeable? Be sure that, if we will, in God revealed in Christ, the soul may slake the thirst of the ages; and the dreariest, and darkest, and most restless existence may find illumination and peace. "This God is our God for ever and ever: He will be our guide unto death, and beyond it." To each one of us, now, He is, if we will; if we will, He will be, for ever, to each the Eternal Truth, wherein thought can never find its limit; the Uncreated Beauty, "most Ancient, yet always Fair," whereof affection can never tire; the Perfect Rule, existing eternally in the Life of the Necessary Moral Being, whereunto each created will may perpetually conform itself, yet never exhaust its task. Without this Awful and Blessed Being, man has no adequate object, even during these days of his brief earthly existence; his thought, his affection, his purpose spring up and are exercised only that they may presently waste and die. With God, the human soul not merely interprets the secret of the universe; it comprehends, and is at peace with, itself. For God is the satisfaction of its thirst;-He is the object of Religion. LECTURE III. Citrb