nive siT of MiSSOUl"l 1 SEFMCE $ 010- 0 860635 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS ONGRESSIONAL Humij RESEARCH INTELLIGENCE COHHUNITY: REFORM AND REORGANIZATION ISSUE BRIEF NUMBER IB76039 AUTHOR: Lowenthal, Hark M. Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE HAJOR ISSUES sxsrsu naés oarexnaransggggzgzg DATE UPDATED 9 0 9 FOR ADDITIONAL INFORHATION CALL 237-5700 0307 CRS- 1 IB76039 UPDATE-03/06/80 j§E§-2§£ZEl2l.E Investigations into the activities of the intelligence community during 1975 and 1976 by both the Executive and Congress revealed a number of illegal actions and abuses of authority, which in turn raised serious questions about the activities and organization of the various intelligence agencies and the community as a whole. The Murphy Commission, the Rockefeller Commission, and the House and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence proposed a number of organizational and procedural reforms. President Ford made some changes and‘ introduced further legislative proposals, and on Jan. 2a, 1978, President Carter signed an Executive order codifying major changes in organization and practice. During the 95th Congress, charter and reform legislation for the Intelligence Community was introduced and initial hearings held. A revised draft, 5. 228a/H.R. 6588, was introduced in the Senate on Feb. 8, 1980 and in the House on Feb. 25, 1980, and will be the major intelligence item on the agenda for second session of the 96th Congress. . A number of other recent events continue to focus attention on intelligence reform. The espionage trial of William Kampiles has raised questions about CIA security. More significantly, on Nov. 11, 1978, President Carter sent a memorandum to his leading security advisers int which he reportedly complained about the quality of the current political vintelligence he was receiving. A subsequent House Intelligence Committee evaluation has underscored these complaints. To a certain extent, reform of the intelligence community and the prevention of future abuses is dependent I reorganization to assure proper command, control, and oversight. 7 The Ccntroversy over Soviet troops in Cuba has also raised questions about Intelligence Community operations and products. These proposed reforms and organizational changes and continuing controversies raise important questions about the efficiency and effectiveness of intelligence operations, the legality of these operations, the quality‘ and evaluation of intelligence products, effective mexecutivei command hand control and congressional oversight, and the restoration of public confidence. 1 1.3.A.C.E§1l9.EB.2.A!..2QLl§¥...A.1!l.i.1-.l§.1.$. The modern organizational structure of U.S. intelligence originated in the National Security Act of 19fl7 (P.L. 80-253), which created the National Security Council (NSC), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and an unified military establishment. In part, the purposes of this act were to coordinate ‘intelligence produced in various departments, and to centralize those intelligence functions to whatever extent was deemed feasible. Placing the\\\\ CIA under the NSC, which in turn is responsible to and chaired by the President, centralized the intelligence function and gave it a firm place in the national security policy process. 5 :This basic structure had not been changed to any significant degree from 19a? to, 1975, although it has been modified and enhanced. These modifications have basically fallen into two categories, (1) new: management 1 .rds: Unitedn States Intelligence Board (USIB, 1956: coordination and management), and the Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee (IRAC, 1971: managerial control of the intelligence community's budget); and (2) increased rationalization of functions: National Security Agency (NsA,m 1952: security of U.S. communications, and intelligence collection from foreign CRS-2 IB76039 UPDATE-O3/O6/80 communications), State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR, 1957: intelligence collection and analysis for the State Department), and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA, 1961: as a move toward unified military intelligence). ’ A I g The major departure from agencies of this type was the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), created in 1956 in response to recommendations from the Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence, which reported on June 29, 1955. PFIAB was intended to serve as an alternative source of advice for the President on intelligence management, beyond the intelligence community. The Hoover Commission, in the first overall assessment of the community, showed great concern over the lad: of a regular review and oversight mechanism to prevent abuses of authority and to maintain high public confidence. The task force recommended the creation of a committee of experienced private citizens to examine foreign intelligence activites and report to the President. In addition, the task force recommended the creation of a Joint Congressional Committee and that the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) be relieved of many of his daily administrative chores so that he could undertake broad overall direction of the CIA and the entire intelligence effort. Neither of these last two recommendations was enacted, the first because Congress had already established permanent subcommittees to deal with intelligence, the second because Allen Dulles did not see his role as DCI in this way. i These two concepts, more effective external oversight, and a DCI with community-wide responsibility, became recurring suggestions for reforming the intelligence community. RESTRICTIONS ON COVERT ACTION on Jan. 11, 1980 the New York Times reported that President Carter was seeking a revision of the Hughes-Ryan amendment, which establishes reporting requirements for covert action to Congress, partly in response to the crisis in Iran. A number of bills changing this provision have been introduced, and new provisions are also in the charter legislation. [For more details on this issue, see IB80020: Intelligence Operations: Covert Action.] ‘THE INTELLIGENCE COHHUNITY AND SOVIET TROOPS IN CUBA Late in August 1979 it was revealed that a brigade of Soviet combat troops was in Cuba. This has led to further controversy for the Intelligence Community. Questions have been raised about when these troops arrived, when U.S- intelligence discovered their presence, and when this was made known. on Sept. 26, 1979, it was reported that President Carter had formed an ad hoc panel of outside national security experts to advise him on this matter, including a review of the intelligence. President Carter addressed the nation on this issue on Oct. 1, 1979, and stated that D.S. intelligence had "obtained persuasive evidence that some these Soviet forces [i.e., those which had stayed in Cuba after the 1962 crisis] had been organized into a combat unit.“ The President also stated that a review of past intelligence data led to the conclusion that this unit had existed for several years, "probably since the mid-1970's and possibly CR5-3 IB76039 UPDATE’O3/06/80 longer." ¥ As part of the U.S. response to this situation the President announced: ‘e are enhancing our intelligence capability in order to monitor Soviet and Cuban military activities —- both in Cuba and throughout the world. We will increase our efforts to guard against damage to our crucial intelligence sources and methods of collection, without impairing civil and constitutional rights." THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE CRISIS IN IRAN on Jan. zu, 1979, the Subcommittee on Evaluation of the House Intelligence Committee released a report evaluating the Intelligence Community performance on Iran up to November 1978. The subcommittee found that both the Intelligence Community and intelligence users were responsible for a poor performance, which included inadequate warning, unchallenged preconceptions and policy preferences, and poor intelligence collecting and reporting in the field. The report also criticized the entire National Intelligence Estimate (HIE) process, finding that it is too cumbersome for a fast-moving situation, and not sound intellectually. Finally, the report raised renewed questions about the DCI's dual role and the advisability of separating him from the CIA. Moreover, the fall of the Shah resulted in the loss of U.S. monitoring sites in Iran, which has led to a debate over the ability of the U.S. to adequately monitor SALT [see IB79096 for more details]. ”"TIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES National Intelligence Estimates (RIEs) are the premier product of the U.S. intelligence community, representing the collective wisdom of the community on prospective foreign trends which will have some effect or influence on U.S. security. 1 Until 1973 the CIA's officey of National Estimates produced the NIES through inter-agency working groups under the direction‘ of a Board of National Estimates. In that year DCI James Schlesinger decided to abolish the Board and transfer its functions to a group of National Intelligence Officers (NIOS) who had either regional or functional areas of responsibility, a move carried out by his successor, William Colby. some NIOS and their assistants were seconded from other agencies of the intelligence community. 9 I This reorganization aroused controversy in 1976-77 when the NIE on Soviet intentions was challenged by a group of outside analysts. on Mar. 30, 1977, DCI Turner selected Prof. Robert R. Bowie of Harvard University to be Deputy DCI for National Intelligence, responsible for the NIES. Bowie was subsequently redesignated Director for National Foreign Assessment. Bowie resigned on Aug. 15, 1979, and was succeeded by Bruce C. Clarke. 9 . On Jan. 1, 1980, the National Intelligence Council was formed, under the direction of Richard Lehman, and consisting of the N105. This represents a compromise between the RIO system and the old Board of Estimates. Among the goals of the Council are improvements in the quality and timeliness of the I CRS- u IB76039 UPDATE-03/O6/80 NIEs. PROBLEMS IN "CURRENT" IHTELLIGENCBE on Nov. 11, 1978, President Carter reportedly sent a memorandum to DCI Turner, Secretary of State Vance, and National Security Assistant Brzezinski, in which the President complained about the quality of the current political intelligence he was receiving. It is believed that this is related to failures to predict the recent unrest in Iran, as well as certain events in Rhodesia. This complaint underscores once again questions about the quality of intelligence products, the management on the Intelligence Community, and current methods of evaluating these products. It also indicates the difficulty involved in monitoring world events, especially violent changes, in such a way as to be able to predict them. MURPHY COMMISSION In 1972 Congress established the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (P.L. 92-325), headed by Robert Murphy. This commission made a wide-ranging study of organizational and methodological components and activities «related to the formulation and implementation of foreign policy, and issued its report on June 28, 1975. To a certain degree the work of the Murphy Commission was overtaken by that of the Rockefeller Commission, which issued its report some two weeks earlier. This, however, did not preclude the Murphy Commission's making in own recommendations. Proceeding on the primary criteria of responsiveness to the needs of decision-makers and economy of operations, while leaving the question of public confidence to the current executive and congressional inquiries, the Commission found that the "...current performance of the intelligence community can be improved," but that vthere were considerable difficulties in doing so which were "rooted in the very nature of the intelligence community." The major flaw in the community cited by the Commission was the large number of separate agencies with different missions and lines of command, resulting in "some excesses in the collection of information and gaps in its analysis; the occasional development of costly systems not because requirements demanded them but because technology permitted them; as well as occasional failures to observe .those standards of conduct which should distinguish the behavior of agencies of the U.S. Government." I The Commission concluded "that firmer direction and oversight of the intelligence community are essential." 4 To achieve this purpose a number of reforms were proposed: (1) In order to make clear the CIA's mission, it should be renamed the lForeign Intelligence Agency (PIA), with the DCI becoming the Director of Foreign Intelligence (DFI). (2) That the DFI serve as the President's principal intelligence adviser, in close working contact with him, and spending more time with him. In order to achieve this the Deputy DFI would take over more of the direction of the CRS- 5 IB76039 UPDATE—O3/06/80 agency itself. (3) Further, that the DFI have greater responsibility for community-wide -anning and budgeting, including multi—year planning and budgeting subject to annual review. (4) Strengthening PFIAB both as a source of independent advice for the President, and as a means of independent oversight. (5) Regular and frequent use of the NSC Intelligence Committee to resolve differing perspectives of intelligence consumers and producers. (6) The establishment of a high quality staff to draft and review National Intelligence Estimates, working closely under the DFI. A The uurphy Commission also recommended that Congress establish a Joint Committee on National Security which would have oversight responsibility for intelligence, including annual authorization of funds. Clearly, these recommendations were not very different from those proposed by the Hoover Commission, again featuring more vigorous oversight and an upgrading and broadening of the role of the DCI. As noted, however, the Murphy Commission report was largely overtaken by the events surrounding the Executive and Congressional investigations of the community, and so it is difficult to assess the report's overall impact in this area. THE ROCKEFELLER COMM ISSION‘ In December 197a a number of articles appeared in the .Newi York Times charging that the CIA had violated its charter by conducting domestic spying against American citizens. In response to these charges President Ford named a Commission on CIA Activities within the United States on Jan. a, 1975 (Executive Order no. 11828), headed by Vice President Rockefeller. i The Commission reported to the President on June 6, 1975, and the report was made public on June 10, 1975a The report substantiated that the CIA had undertaken certain domestic spying and surveillance activities, as well as activities in other areas which were unlawful and violated the CIA's charter. The Commission also found that there were statutory ambiguities with regard to the permissible limits of CIA activities within the United States inx pursuit of the agency's authorized mission; that new congressional and executive oversight mechanisms were necessary, both for control and for the restoration of public confidence; and that the DCI bore a heavy burden between his community-wide role and the demands of running the CIA. The Rockefeller Commission made 30 recommendations, many of which‘ dealt vwith specific past abuses, their correction and future prevention or investigation. A Joint Congressional Oversight Committee was I also recommended. Others dealt with the organization and reform of the community: (1) That the activities and operationsl of the CIA, ‘including the protection’ of sources and methods, be Aexplicitly related tot foreign intelligence. (2) That CIA participation in any inter-agency intelligence committee, be CRS- 6 IB76039 UPDATE-O3/O6/80 restricted to foreign intelligence matters. (3) That the DCI be limited to a term of 10 years. (4) That there be two Deputy Directors of the CIA, one to relieve the DC; of administration of the agency, the other to deal with relations with the military and the needs of military intelligence. (5) That the jurisdictional lines between the DCI and the Director of the FBI be clarified and effective liaison on joint matters be established. (6) That PFIAB's functions "be expanded to include oversight of the CIA," including its compliance with statutory authority and an evaluation of its operations, products, and management, and that PFIAB make recommendations with respect to these areas to the President, the DCI and, when appropriate, the Attorney General. These recommendations again included the familiar features of relieving the DCI of much of his administrative work related directly to the CIA, ‘thus freeing him for his broader role as a focal point for the entire intelligence community, and a strengthening of external control by Congress and by PFIAB. Again because of the number of concurrent recommendations from the Murphy Commission, House and Senate Select Committees, and President Ford's own reorganization, it is difficult to isolate the precise influence of these suggestions. HOUSE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS The House Select Committee on Intelligence conducted an inquiry into the activities of the intelligence community, and submitted its recommendations on Feb. 11, y1976. As with the Rockefeller Commission, a number of recommendations dealt with the prevention of a repetition of past abuses; others sought improved congressional oversight. (For summaries of these investigations and proposals, see Issue Briefs 75037, Intelligence Community Investigation, and 77079, Intelligence Community: Congressional Oversight. The organizational recommendations of the Committee are: (1) That the NSA be made a separate agency under civilian control by specific legislation. (2) That the DCI be separate from any agency and have overall coordination and oversight authority over the intelligence community in order to prevent duplication of effort and to promote competition, and that he be the chief intelligence officer of the U.S. with responsibility for supervision and control of all 0.5. foreign intelligence agencies, including budget evaluation, national intelligence estimates and the work of an independent Inspector General for Inte1ligence. M (3) The creation of an independent Inspector General for Intelligence. (H) That the DIA be abolished and its functions transferred to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the CIA.i (5) That all intelligence agency activities except those related solely to CBS- 7 IB76039 UPDATE-03/06/80 the gathering of intelligence be overseen by a Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the NSC. (6) That the House of Representatives create a standing Committee on intelligence with legislative, oversight and authorization responsibility for all intelligence activities. ‘ PRESIDENT FORD'S PROPOSALS AND REORGANIZATION On Feb. 17, 1976, President Ford announced changes he was making and would propose that Congress make in the intelligence community [see S. 3197, 9uth Congress]. The President's immediate changes were made through an omnibus Executive Order, No. 11905, Feb. 18, 1976, the chief provisions of which were: (1) The NSC continues to exercise overall policy control over the foreign intelligence community, and will hold semi-annual policy reviews of foreign intelligence activities. (2) The DCI is the President's primary adviser on foreign intelligence. He is responsible for the production of substantive national intelligence, and has general community-wide duties regarding security of intelligence systems, information and products, multi-disciplinary analysis, "criteria for the identification, selection, and designation of relative priorities for the transmission of critical intelligence," and “ensure the timeliness, relevancy, and quality of the intelligence-product." (3) To assist the DCI, a Deputy DCI for the Intelligence Community on the CFI was established, and day-to-day operations of the CIA were delegated to the Deputy Director of the CIA. I T (H) USIB, IRAC, NSC Intelligence Committee and the‘ 40 Committee were abolished. (5) An Intelligence oversight Board of three members was established to assist the President, NSC, and Attorney General in overseeing the intelligence community, to monitor community activity, prevent and report illegal activities, and receive and consider reports from the Inspectors General and General Counsels and review their practices and procedures. These three members were also named to PFIAB, which President Carter has now abolished. He has also replaced the original members of the oversight board, Robert Murphy, Leo Cherne and Stephen Ailes. These changes are more wfully described below. F i(6) The President's reorganization also defined] the responsibilities of the various intelligence components, and placed restrictions on intelligence activities. 1 (7) President Ford made some changes in the NSC, which have since been superseded by further changes under President Carter, described below. Under President Ford's arrangement a Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI) was eated, chaired by the DCI and reporting directly to vthe NSC, and having management and resource control of the foreign intelligence community. The CFI controlled budget preparation and resource allocation of the national foreign intelligence program, management policies and carried out NSC wpolicy decisions, with particular emphasis on the collection and ’production of CBS’ 8 IB76039 UPDATE-03/O6/80 foreign intelligence. Under President Carter the CPI has been redesignated the Policy Review Committee, with different membership and duties, described below. President Carter also replaced the Operations Advisory Group of the NSC created by President Ford which was the successor of the U0 Committee a* responsible for covert operations and certain sensitive foreign intelligence operations. These functions are now handled by the Special Coordinating Committee of the NSC. President Ford's plan followed the periodic suggestions of elevating the DCI to a community-wide role and removing much of the burden of daily administrative operations of the CIA, and strengthening Executive oversight and control, in this case through the Intelligence Oversight Board and the CPI. By making the three members of the Intelligence oversight Board members of PEIAB, the President in effect made the Oversight Board a subcommittee of PFIAB, although President Carter has now changed this. These changes raised a number of questions: (1) Is an Executive Order a safe and permanent way to make such reforms, subject as it is to changes by each succeeding President? would legislation be a better method as suggested by the Senate Intelligence Committee? the House Armed services Committee, May 15, 1979 (H.Rept. 96-127, Part 2). (2) Can the members of the Oversight Board be effective as long as they are parttime advisers? Is an internal oversight board a realistic safeguard? (3) How would these reforms relate to legislation considered by Congress as a result of its own investigations? A major impetus for these reforms and reorganizations has been the pa. abuses of the intelligence community, and some critics felt that these changes did not appreciably alter the situation under which these abuses first occurred, and therefore they would not be able to prevent their repetition. Hany parts of this order were superseded by President Carter's own Executive order. President Ford's order resulted in three further organizational changes. on Mar. 29, 1976, Vice Adm. Daniel J. Murphy was appointed Deputy Director for relations between the CIA and other intelligence agencies. Murphy retired from the Navy and took a post with Defense intelligence in June 1977, described below. The Deputy Director with administrative responsibility is John E. Blake, who became Acting DDCI upon the the resignation of E. Henry Knoche on Aug. 1, 1977. on Dec. 22, 1977, Frank C. Carlucci, Ambassador to Portugal, was chosen to succeed Knoche. Second, on Bay 6, 1976, DCI Bush established the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) under his authority as granted by the President's executive order to establish such committees as he deems appropriate. NFIB is an advisory body whose task is to review and coordinate the production of A national intelligence and to improve coordination between collectors, producers, and users of intelligence. These functions had been carried out basically by the USIB, which the executive order disbanded. However, responsibility for the pproduction of national intelligence was not transferred from USIB to NFIB; this function now is vested in the F 2 himself. The membership of HFIB is the same as that of USIB, with the addition of one member. The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community serves as Vice-Chairman of NFIB, replacing the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for the CIA, who was Vice-Chairman of USIB, cns- 9 IB76039 UPDATE-O3/O6/80 but who remains a member of the new board. Under President Carter's reorganization of the intelligence community announced on Aug. 4, 1977, NFIB is also responsible for advising the DCI on the intelligence community zdget. Third, on Bay 1Q, 1976, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Ellsworth. announced the establishment of a Department of Defense Inspector General for Intelligence with oversight responsibilities. The Inspector Generaln reports directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and works closely with the Intelligence Oversight Board. on Aug. 3, 1976, Carl E. Feldbaum was named Inspector General for Defense Intelligence; his experience in this field includes work on the Watergate Special Prosecution Force studying intelligence gathering abuses by the CIA, FBI, and local law enforcement agencies and participation in the Justice Department investigation of intelligence abuses by FBI agents. Staff and line authority over Defense intelligence activities were vested in the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence), who was designated Director of Defense Intelligence. The Directors of DIA and USA reported to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary through the Director of Defense Intelligence. The GDIA was reorganized in order to reduce the number of people reporting to the Director. Finally, a Defense Intelligence Board of senior military and civilian defense policy officials was established on a trial basis "to improve intelligence quality and responsiveness through more direct communications between operational users and intelligence producers." These changes were designed to meet the purposes of the President's executive order, and also reflect recommendations made by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel review chaired by Gilbert Fitzhugh in 1969-1970. These changes were largely voided by a further reorganization of Defense intelligence undertaken by Secretary Brown in Mar. 1977, noted below. In addition to these changes made by President Ford, Attorney General Edward H. Levi issued guidelines to the Justice Department to prevent a repetition of the abuses which took place under the now defunct counterintelligence program (COIHTELPRO) of the FBI. These guidelines went into effect on Apr. 5, 1976, and are enforced by a three-member panel which monitors FBI activities in this area and reports to the Attorney General on a periodic basis and during specific investigations. on Nov. 9, 1977, the GAO issued a report which found that these reform tguidelines were largely working. President Ford also had legislation introduced which would require that a court order be obtained before electronic surveillance is undertaken for foreign intelligence or counterintelligence purposes [S. 3197 and H.R. 12750]. Both the Senate and House Judiciary Committees held hearings on this bill, and the Senate Judiciary Committee reported it out favorably, 11-1, on June 15, 1976; the Senate Intelligence Committee reported this bill out with amendments on Aug. 24, 1976, by a vote of 14-1. However, it was not considered by the Senate before adjournment.’ Similar legislation has been introduced in the 95th Congress. on Aug. 11, 1976 FBI Director Clarence H. Kelleyn announced a reorganization of the FBI in order Ato prevent future abuses and improve control. Investigations of domestic radical and terrorist groups twill be transferred from the Intelligence ‘Division to the General Investigations Branch, and the Inspection Division, which handles internal problems, will be merged with the Office of Planning and Evaluation and will report to the rector. SENATE INTELLIGENCE COHHITTEE RECOHHENDATIONS cas-no IB76039 UPDATE-03/06/80 on Apr. 26 and 28, 1976, the Senate Select Committee issued its final report, detailing its .findings [summarizedv in IB75037] and making 183 recommendations to prevent further abuses and to reform and reorganize tl intelligence community. In general the Committee made recommendations designed to strengthen internal and external oversight and to more clearly define the roles and permissible activities of the intelligence agencies. In some instances the Committee accepted those organizational reforms made by President Ford, but desired to see them formalized into law. A §gg5_; of the report deals with Foreign and Military Intelligence, the major recommendations of which are: I Ng§;ggg;_§ggg;ity_ggt; This act should be recast to define the purpose of national intelligence activites, the relationship between Congress and Executive Branch - intelligence agencies, the structure, role and‘ responsibilities of the intelligence community, and prohibitions or limitations on certain activities. Furthermore, that all intelligence organizations, including the CIA, NSA and DIA, have their roles defined by charter. . A Ngtiggg;_§ggu;;ty_ gggggilg The NSC would direct and provide policy guidance for U.S. intelligence activities, including intelligence collection, counter-intelligence and covert actions. This would include oversight and review of these activities similar to the provisions enacted in President Ford's reorganization. 2irest2r-2£.§e2tr2l_ Intelligence; The DCI would be the President’ principal foreign intelligence adviser, and would probably be divested c- direct managerial responsibility for the CIA. He would have wcommunity-wide authority for coordination of activities and programs, budgets, overall national intelligence requirements and allocation of community-wide resources including those under the Department of Defense, with his own staff and a board of outside senior advisers for review. The creation of an additional deputy DCI is agreed to. ggnt;al_ ;g§gl;iggggg_ Agency; Within the CIA, national intelligence production analysis would be separated from clandestine activities and other collection functions in order to produce better intelligence analyses. Strict limitations on CIA relations with domestic institutions, businesses, private citizens and domestic operations would be established. The NSC would review CIA activities annually. ggyg;§_Qpg;§tiQg§: only the CIA would be allowed to undertake covert operations, and these would be limited to "extraordinary circumstances when no other means will suffice." Prior congressional consent would be necessary, and the DCI would report on all ongoing operations semi-annually. Certain types of operations, including political assassinations and the subversion of democratic governments, would be forbidden. The NSC would review all covert operations via the new Operations Advisory Group or some similar group. Qygggightg Congress would authorize the national intelligence budg annually and have authority to approve covert operations. The role of the Attorney General in oversight would be greatly broadened, by making him la member of the NSC and giving him an oversight role for the CIA. The role and position of the CIA's General Counsel and Inspector General would be CBS-11 11375039 UPDATE-O3/06/80 strengthened; CIA employees with knowledge of illegal activities would be allowed to go to either of these officers or wthe DCI, who would in turn report to the Attorney General. §ggk_;; deals with Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, the major recommendations of which are: Qgg;;§;_ ;g§e;;;gegge_ Agency; Strict limitations are placed on CIA domestic security activities, including a prohibition on electronic surveillance, unauthorized entry or mail openings within the U.S. for any purpose, and limitations on the physical surveillance of groups in the 0.3. and information collection on Americans at home or abroad are also recommended. The DCI would be responsible for coordinating the protection of sources and methods. Internal_§ey§gge_§ggyige; Limitations would be placed on the gathering of information, investigations and the release of information, restricting these solely to the enforcement of tax laws. Investigations of tax and non-tax matters would be initiated by the Attorney General or Secretary of the Treasury, with Congressional oversight in either case. The Attorney General would be informed of all releases or transfers of information. gg§ta;_§ggy;gg; Hail inspections and surveillance would be limited, and controlle by the Attorney General and the Department of Justice. Qemeeris-§s9urir2-Inze§ti9etiemsl The FBI would be the center eof all domestic security investigations, all to be overseen by the Department of ’ustice. Investigation and information gathering on political beliefs or .sociations would be limited to real threats or reasonable suspicions of threats. Preventive investigations would be confined to terrorist or foreign intelligence activites. All of these investigations, and background investigations of employees, alleged security risks and alleged unauthorized disclosures of information could be undertaken for limited periods of time only, unless extensions were granted by the Attorney General. Limits would be set on the use of covert agents, and on the maintenance and dissemination of information collected in these investigations. I §ede;a;_§g;gau_gf_;gyg§t;gat;gn; In addition to the above restriction. the FBI would be the responsibility of the Attorney General, the Director being subject to his supervision andv control. It is suggested that the Attorney General consider using his power to appoint Assistant Directors of the FBI, and that a maximum term he set for the Director and for the Assistant.Director of the Intelligence Division. I §§tigna;_§egQ;;ty_ Aggggy; The NSA would bee banned from tdomestic security activities, and limits would be established won the monitoring of communications by Americans. Qg§gg§g_Qgpgg§mggt; DOD activities would be limited to investigations vpertaining to the security of installations and property, to maintain, order and discipline in the ranks, to criminal investigations only, on military bases or concerning military personnel, or to enforce the Uniform Code of 2 Xitary Justice. Covert surveillance of American citizens would be limited and would require prior FBI approval. Qgg;§ight;- Much of the internal oversight function would again wfall to the Attorney General, and to the General counsels and Inspectors General of CR5-12 IB76039 UPDATE-O3/O6/80 the various agencies. Annual statutory authorization for FBI and other intelligence agency programs would be required. "Vigorous, Senate oversight...through a new permanent intelligence oversight committee" was also endorsed. A These recommendations, some of which are embodied in the President's reorganization, represent the most comprehensive reforms proposed since 1947. They rely on much stricter definitions and limits on intelligence agency activities, and stronger oversight provisions, especially in the role of the Attorney General. In some respects, especially the proposed change in the role of the DCI, they are similar to past recommendations. PROBLEHS AND CHANGES UNDER THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION Even before President Carter took office an intelligence controversy arose over the NIE on Soviet intentions. An outside group of analysts, so-called Team B, were invited to review the NIE and concluded that the nature and extent of the Soviet threat had been underestimated. This controversy has raised a number of questions including those on the usefulness of such analyses by specialists from outside the intelligence community, on the effects of Schlesinger's reorganization of the ‘NIB process, and on the accuracy of the NIEs themselves. A In February 1977 reports appeared in the press concerning CIA payments over the years to a number of foreign leaders. President Carter ended these payments, which have again raised questions about the control, extent and propriety of covert operations. Reports on these payments also alleged that the Intelligence Oversight Board had found these payments to be impropex However, President Carter said that his review of CIA operations has "not found anything illegal or improper." A President Carter has already made several changes in the intelligence organization. Under Executive Order 11985, May 13, 1977, the NSC was reorganized. There are now two NSC Committees: (1) The Policy Review Committee -- Vice President, representatives of State, Defense and CIA, Chairman of JCS and the National Security Adviser, as well as other executive agency representative as needed; the PRC handles long-term projects and issues, and oversees the foreign intelligence program under Executive Order 12036, described below. (2) The special Coordination Committee -- National Security Adviser (chairman), Vice President, and representatives of State, Defense and CIA; the SCC deals with crisis situations, covert operations and issues transcending departmental lines, such as arms control. President Carter has named Adm. Stansfield Turner as DCI, after his first nominee, Theodore Sorensen, withdrew in the face of strong opposition in the Senate. Shortly after assuming office Secretary of Defense Harold Brown appointed a panel headed by Dr. Eugene Fubini to review Defense intelligence, includi roles, missions, analysis and its relationship with the intelligence fcommunity. A report embodying the first phase of this panel's work, regarding current organization and reorganizationx concepts and containing broad recommendations was submitted to the Secretary on Apr. 19, 1977. The CBS-13 IB76039 UPDATE-03/06/80 report on the second phase, regarding the quality of intelligence, was submitted on June 10, 1977. on Mar. 11, 1977, Secretary Brown issued a directive reorganizing Defense intelligence.. The office of Assistant ,cretary of Defense (Intelligence)/Director of Defense Intelligence and that of Director, Telecommunications and Command and Control Systems were combined into a new office, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Communications, Command, Control and Intelligence). Gerald Dineen, formerly Assistant Secretary (Intelligence) has been named to this new p0St, which has responsibility for communications, command and control, and intelligence resources including related warning and reconnaissance activities, and the allocation of resources for intelligence activities except those "organic to combatant forces and those intelligence support activities specifically delegated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff." The position of Director of Defense Intelligence is abolished, and DIA and NSA now report directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. This change would seem to indicate a change in orientation for Defense intelligence, away from a more analytical mode to a more "hardware" and technology oriented approach. on June 16, 1977, Admiral Daniel Murphy (Ret.), formerly Deputy Director of the CIA for its relations with other intelligence agencies, became Director of Policy Review in the Defense Department, as part of its continuing reorganization. This position puts Murphy in charge of the substantive side of defense intelligence, including requirements, policy, priorities, and staff supervision over all defense intelligence activities. The allocation of resources to carry out these tasks will be under the Assistant Secretary for Communications, Command, Control and Intelligence. on Oct. 28, 1977, Adm. Murphy's position as Director of Policy Review was resesignated Deputy Under Secretary for Policy, in line with other changes in tense Department organization. I on Apr. 19, 1977, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) announced reorganization plans slated to go into effect on Hay 1, 1977, whereby the Verification and Analysis Bureau, which had theoretical responsibility for all verification questions in ACDA and contained the agency's Intelligence Staff, would be disbanded and its functions put into the various specific negotiating components, such as SALT and HBFR. It was also mannounced that Brig. Gen. John E. Ralph would be appointed chief ACDA liaison with the intelligence community. on Apr. 27, 1977, during testimony before the Budget Subcommittee of the Senate Intelligence Committee, DCI Turner said that the Administration would be willing to allow the release of a single, inclusive Intelligence Community budget figure, but would object to any further disclosures or more detailed breakdowns. This did represent a major change of policy,‘ however, from previous Administrations. on may 16, 1977, a bill (S. 1539) was introduced in the Senate authorizing $8,950,000 for the Intelligence Community Staff, i.e., the staff which supports the DCI in his community-wide functions. This authorization is $1.5 million less than requested. It represents the first open intelligence authorization. S.Res. 207 embodiesw the .proposal to disclose the aggregate foreign intelligence budget. 0 on may 5, 1977, President Carter abolished PFIAB,m pointing out they e"istence of other new oversight bodies within the executive and_ Congress. a : President also replaced the membership of the Intelligence Oversight Board created by President Ford, naming Thomas L. Farmer (chairman), and former Senator Albert Gore and former Governor and UN Ambassador. William Scranton as the new members. CRS-1Q IB76039 UPDATE-O3/06/80 On May 17, 1977, the Office of National Security, a supportv unit within the Office of the Secretary of the Treasury responsible for Treasury Department liaison and support with other intelligence agencies, was reduced in size and function, and renamed the Office of Intelligence Support. The question of foreign surveillance activities in the United States has also become an issue, particularly Soviet interception of electronic communications. Bills to control these activities (3. 1950, H.R. 8683) have beeniintroduced. On Aug. 4, 1977, President Carter announced a major reorganization of the intelligence community. These changes were codified through Executive Order 12036, Jan. 2fl, 1978, and are described below. On Aug. 16, 1977 President Carter nominated Judge Frank Johnson of Alabama to succeed Clarence Kelly as Director of the FBI. Judge Johnson withdrew his name on Nov. 29, 1977, for reasons of health. Director Kelley has agreed to stay on until Feb. 15, 1978, and on Jan. 19, 1978, Judge William H. Webster was named as the new Director. On Oct. 3, 1977, Lt. Gen. Frank A. Camm (Army, Bet.) was named Deputy to the DCI to head the National Intelligence Tasking Center, part of the new organization. Camm resigned on Sept. 24, 1979, and was succeeded by Ernest J. Zellmer. On Oct. 11, 1977, the Directorate of Intelligence (DDI) of the CIA, responsible for the production of finished intelligence, was redesignated the National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC). On Oct. 31, 1977, DCI Turner began to carry out his previously announce- personnel reduction in the Directorate of Operations (DDO), announcing that 198 people would be dismissed effective March 1978. It was expected thaty another 600 to 700 people in DDO would be dismissed, mostly among personnel involved in operations in Indochina, although subsequent reports indicated that these dismissals had been reduced in size. On Nov. 9, 1977, the GAO presented a report to, the House Judiciary Committee's Civil and Constitutional Rights Subcommittee which found that the FBI had sharply curtailed its domestic intelligence operations and was complying with reform guidelines implemented by Attorney General Edward Levi in 1976. won Dec. 2, 1977, the CIA announced the adoption of new regulations governing its dealings with U.S. journalists and media organizations. The new regulations essentially bar the use of journalists or media organizations for intelligence activities or cover activities. The DCI can apparently authorize exceptions. The regulations permit "open relationships" for translating services or lectures, and unpaid relationships with those volunteering information to the CIA. On Dec. 22, 1977, it was announced that Frank C. Carlucci, Ambassador to Portugal, had been chosen as the new Deputy DCI. A number of other personnel changes have been made in the CIA, including top positions, and the dismissal? of a number of employees in the Directorate of Operations. On Apr. 25, 1979, Attorney General Griffin Bell established the hposition of Counsel for Intelligence Policy and the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review in the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel. The Counsel will cns-15 IB76039 UPDATE-«O3/O6/80 serve as advisor to the Attorney WGeneral on intelligence-related matters, coordinate the development and implementation of Justice Department policy on intelligence and national security matters, and represent the department on .e NFIB . V §Z§§Q2lE§.QB2§B-lZQ§§ on Jan. 2%, 1978, President Carter signed Executive Order 12036. setting forth new regulations for United States foreign intelligence activities. To a certain extent this order codifies a number of changes already made by Presidents Ford and Carter. The order sets forth new details on the tasks of the various intelligence agencies, although some remain "classified because of the sensitivity of the information and its relation to national security." It also details new and broader restrictions on intelligence activities in order to "protect constitutional rights and privacy...." The major provisions of Executive Order 12036 are as follows: National Security Council. The leading role of the NSC in national foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities is confirmed, as is the reorganization of the NSC into the two new committees, the Policy Review Committee (PRC) and the Special Coordination Committee (SCC). When dealing with intelligence matters the PRC will be chaired by the DCI, and will handle national foreign intelligence requirements, priorities, budget proposals, and resource allocations, and review and assess ongoing intelligence activities. The SCC will be responsible for "special activities," presumably a euphemism for covert operations; “sensitive foreign intelligence collection '*erations"; and "counterintelligence activities." All SCC members must be present when such activities and operations are considered.’ PRC and SCC decisions may be appealed to the President by any member. 1 Nati2nel-E9rei9n- ;ntelli9ense- Peerdg The existence of the NFIB is recognized, chaired by the DCI with representatives of all major military and civilian intelligence agencies, as well as the Departments of Justice, Treasury, and Energy. NEIB will advise the DCI on intelligence production, review, and coordination; the intelligence budget; interagency exchanges of foreign intelligence information; agreements with foreign governments on intelligence; and other matters. ‘ Netienel-In2elli9ense.Ta§hin9-Een:e2; The NITC. under the DCI. has the responsibility for translating NSC/PRC requirements andm priorities into specific collection objectives and targets, assigning these tasks to proper agencies, expediting the dissemination of intelligence, and coordinating the ~collection of information from agencies not regularly a part of the national foreign mintelligence program. The NITC has the authority to resolve ‘conflicts over priorities; these decisions may be appealed to the PRC. The iPresident can transfer the NITC to the authority of the Secretary of Defense. Qigggtgg_g§_§ggt;§;_;ntel;igggggg -The central role of the DCI in the foreign intelligence community and as "primary adviser to the President and the NSC on national foreign intelligence" is confirmed. .This central role is largely Rcarried out through those organizations and responsibilities « scribed above, and include budget, requirements, priorities, tasking, and products. \ 1g§§lliggggg_§ggggt; uThe DCI has "full and exclusivev authority for approval of the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget...." The DCI CR5-16 IB76039 UPDATE-O3/O6/80 will provide program and budget guidance to the relevant zdepartments and agencies, who will submit their budget proposals to the DCI. These submissions will then be reviewed by the DCI with the advice of NPIB, after which the budget will be presented to the President through OMB. The DCI 5 responsible for the presentation before Congress. The DCI's budget and program decisions may be appealed to the President. Qgtig§_agg_§g§pgnsibilitigsq The intelligence duties and responsibilities of the CIA; the Departments of State, Treasury, Defense, and Energy: the DIA, NSA, FBI, and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) are detailed, some for the first time publicly, although not completely in the cases of the DIA and NSA for reasons of security. The primacy of the CIA in overseas intelligence operations and of the FBI in domestic operations is specified and maintained. Reference is made to consultations to minimize unnecessary overlapping and duplication between national foreign intelligence programs and Defense Department intelligence programs. The NSA is given exclusive control over signals intelligence. T IH I -.11s§sric.’2i9I.1.§ gg;;eg§igg_ggghg;qgg§; A number of "collection techniques" ‘on United States citizens or permanent resident aliens are subject to limitation, and cannot be undertaken without a warrant unless the President and the Attorney General approve on the probable cause that the target is an agent of ;a foreign power. These "collection techniques" include electronic, mail, and physical surveillance: television or other monitoring; and physical searches. gthgrq Limiggtigggq Limitations are also placed on "undisclosed participation in domestic organizations"; the "collection of nonpubliclv available information"; the examination of tax returns or informatioa research or experimentation on human subjects; undisclosed contracting for goods or services; and detailing employees to other federal agencies. Assassinations are specifically prohibited. Controls on "special activities" by non-intelligence agencies are detailed. III.-...0...VeI;..9.si 1.2.‘; The four major components for oversight are: ;gtg;;iqgngg_ Qgg;§;qh;_ ggardz The IOB consists of three members, appointed by and reporting to the President, which reviews intelligence activities with special attention paid to their legality, the ‘practices and procedures of the Inspectors General and General counsels of the various agencies and their oversight role, and with regard to the adequacy of internal guidelines. The IOB will report at least quarterly and report questions of legality or propriety to the President "in a timely manner." A Inspectors G§Q§;§;_gg§_§gggg§;_QQgQ§§l§; These officers serve as the primary link between the IOB and their respective agencies and are expected to oversee agency activities on their own for illegal or improper actions, which are to be reported to the IOB. A§§grggy_§gg§;a;; The Attorney General receives and considers IOB reports and is a major link between the IOB and the President. The Attorney Genet’ also informs the IOB of legal opinions affecting intelligence activities and will establish or approve procedures for the conduct ofintelligence activities. These -procedures will include means to minimize _necessary intrusive activities, and to safeguard and restrict the use, dissemination CBS-17 IB76039 UPDATE—03/06/80 and storage of information about United States persons obtained through intelligence activities. T ggnggggs; The order mandates that the two Intelligence Committees be kept fully and currently informed concerning intelligence activities, including any significant anticipated activities," although not necessarily prior disclosure; and also mandates access_ by the committees to pertinent information or documents and "timely" reports concerning illegal or improper activities and their correction. ; In summary, this order confirms the central position of the DCI through his major role in deciding requirements, priorities, tasks, and budgets, and the final production of intelligence. However, it does allow for dissenting views at various stages. This is also the first comprehensive publication of charters for all intelligence agencies or groups and of specific restrictions on certain types of activities. It is expected that legislation will be introduced by the Senate and House Intelligence Committees to enact these provisions into law. SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE *- FIRST ANNUAL REPORT On May 18, 1977, the Senate Intelligence Committee issued a report on its first year of operation. Among its findings are: —— "...that the intelligence agencies are now functioning under the control of the President, the DCI...and that they are now fully and properly accountable to the Congress...” —- that with current oversight procedures and the enactment of necessary legislation "...we will not see a repetition of the widespread abuses of the past." -- “...that intelligence activities are necessary for the security and well—being of the country..." - that "...for the foreseeable future a joint committee does not seem desirable or possible." The committee states that the agencies have been forthcoming, although there have been some procedural difficulties, especially in the areas of clandestine collection and foreign agents in the United States. The ~committee has been informed of every covert action requiring. a Presidential finding prior to implementation, and has formally voted on all covert action projects in the new authorization bill for all intelligence activities. AA number of studies are still in preparation for forthcoming legislation, including the question of intelligence activities and ithe rights of Americans, proper classification and the problem of leaks, and. charters and guidelines for the “missions, guidelines, procedures, prohibitions" for each of the intelligence agencies and an "umbrella" charter for the national intelligence community setting out structure and authorities. These charters are deemed necessary for safeguarding the legitimacy andw accountabilityt of i ‘elligence activities. Case studies analyzing past performances and stadies on intelligencei capabilities for continuing problems are also underway, including SALT verification and the energy crisis. Among the reorganization proposals being considered is a strengthening of CRS-18 IB76039 UPDATE-O3/06/80 the authority \of the DCI, perhaps elevated to Director of National Intelligence under the NSC and with the principal responsibility "...to insure that the national policymakers receive the best possible intelligence...." The Director would have clear community—wide authority fr the direction, coordination, regulation and administration of al- intelligence activities, including the budget. SENATE INTELLIGENCE COHHITTEE: SECOND REPORT On May 14, 1979, the Senate Intelligence Committee issued its second report, detailing its activities from May 16, 1977, to Dec. 31, 1978. The report notes both improvements and continuing problems in the Intelligenc Community as well. Among the findings and activities reported are: 1 gQgg;t_ Qperagigns: each project is reviewed and voted oni by the Committee; as a result of these votes several projects have been modified and one was terminated. D A glagggstine Qgllggtiggz this has proven to be the "most difficult area of oversight." Intelligence An ;y§i§: “significant improvement needs to be made." ;n§g;l;geggg_ Qgmmun;§y_ gggale: the numerous organizational changes, adjustments, etc. "havei inevitably caused strain in the intelligence community," although this period is largely over. However, some serious problems remain, particularly in counterintelligence, analysis, and the Directorate of operations (DDO). §gdgg§:. the application of the zero—based budgeting concept has been successful, and in a budgetary sense the Intelligence is responsive to policymaker needs. Certain continuing problems are noted. 1 HOUSE INTELLIGENCE COHHITTEE - FIRST ANNUAL REPORT On Oct. 14, 1978, the House Intelligence Committee submitted its first annual report. The report details the work of the committee over the past year in a number of areas, and makes the following findings, among others: Regarding the quality of intelligence it_ was found that reporting is generally responsive to user needs, but that improvements could be made in "estimating, forecasting and trend analysis reporting..."; that the Intelligence Community concentrates too much on improving collection "while other fundamental problems go relatively unattended"; and that there were problems in the Executive in setting forth intelligence-user requirements. The report also questions the designation of authority of the DCI over "national" intelligence, noting that modern technology has tended to blur the distinction between this facet and "departmental" or "tactical" intelligence. Exchange of information between producers and usersi was also seen as 1 problem. Morale within the Intelligence Community was found to be goon, although it had suffered as a result of revelations and the investigations. It was also felt that the Executive bureaucratic mechanism established to authorize covert actions might be too cumbersome, leading to either failures CR5-19 IB76039 UPDATE-O3/06/80 to approve necessary actions, or bypassing in certain instances. On the question of a future Joint Committee, the report notes the pfferences between the roles of the Senate and House and differences in the charters of the two Intelligence Committees. It is noted that, joint briefings had been held, and it was felt that these should continue for the foreseeable future. Finally, the report publishes a Glossary of Intelligence Terms and Definitions produced by NFIB. CHARTER LEGISLATION on Feb. 8, 1980, members of the Senate Intelligence Committee introduced 5. 2284, the National Intelligence Act of 1980. Similar legislation, H.R. 6588, was introduced in the House on Feb. 25, 1980. This is the second draft of the charter legislation. Its major provisions are as follows: Title I: Authorization for Intelligence Activities A. §ind;gq§‘_gg;pQ§g§‘_De§igitiggs: finds that intelligence should be timely, accurate and relevant; that intelligence collection avoid waste and unnecessary duplication; and that supervision and control are necessary to ensure that intelligence activities do not abridge Constitutional rights. B. §§gg;a;_;ntg;l;ggngg_AgthQritig§: Authorizes intelligencel activities by components of the Intelligence Community under the direction and review of the National Security Council (NSC), in accordance with the provisions of this Act. The NSC shall provide the highest level of review, guidance and direction for intelligence activities. Specific duties include: national intelligence requirements and priorities and the responsiveness of programs and budgets to these priorities; qualitative review of intelligence products; policy guidelines for counterintelligence and counterterrorism activities; policy for communications security. The organization and membership of relevant NSC committees is left to the President. C. =Special Activities: Special activities (i.e., covert action) are to be undertaken only in support of important national security interests when overt means are not likely to achieve the intended objective, when the activities are consistent with U.S. aims, values and policies, and when the anticipated benefits justify foreseeable risks and likely consequences. Special activities may be carried out only by the CIA, or bye the ,Defense Department during time of declared war or hostilities under the war Powers Act. other agencies may be called on to* support such activities, if the President approves, in cases involving substantial resources, risks or consequences, or if the NSC approves in other cases. Proposals for special activities shall be reviewed by the NSC or an NSC committee, which must include the following members or their representatives: 2 the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, and the redesignated Director of National intelligence. The review must include CR5-20 IB76039 UPDATE—03/06/80 ?an assessment and recommendation as to whether the activity is consistent with the purposes of this legislation, cited above. NSC recommendations must include dissenting views. The President -must authorize special activities. Those involving substantial risks, resources or consequences require a finding that the activity is important to U.S. national security. The President may also find that a category of special activity is important to U.S. national security. The NSC is then responsible for each activity under that finding. Activities which last more than one year or which are substantially changed in form or purpose require reaffirmation by the President and review by the NSC. Each Presidential finding, either of an activity or category of activity, must be reported to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees on a prior basis, except in extraordinary circumstances when such notification may be limited for #8 hours to the Chairmen and ranking minority members of the Intelligence Committees, the Speaker and Minority Leader of the House, and the Majority and Hinority Leaders of the Senate, after which the Intelligence Committees must be informed. The President shall also establish approval procedures for sensitive foreign intelligence collection, counterintelligence and counterterrorism activities which may require review or findings by the President, NSC, Director of National Intelligence, etc. D- Linitatigns-2n-Ints;;i2ense.Anth2£ities= Assassination is forbidden- Guidelines must be established to safeguard the integrity and independence of private institutions. The following groups may not be used for cover for foreign intelligence or special activities: U.S. religious groups; U.S. media organizations; U.S. educational institutions: the Peace Corps; U.. Government cultural exchange programs. Voluntary contacts with these groups are permitted. These restrictions may be waived by the President during time of war or under the War Powers Act, with a "timely notification" of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees. 2 There are also restrictions on covert domestic publication designed to influence 0.5. public opinion; concealed contacts with educational, institutions or contacts for other than routine services without the Attorney General's approval; encouraging others to undertake activities prohibited by this act. E. -Qyg§§;qht_ ggg_ ggggggtabiligyz Gives statutory basis for the Intelligence oversight Board (IOB), to be appointed by the President from outside the Government. The IOB will report to the President on the legality and propriety of intelligence activities, and is empowered to conduct inquiries. Each intelligence agency will also have a General Counsel to review the legality of its activities, rules, etc., and an Inspector General to investigate its activities. These officers will report to the IOB. The Attorney General is also given responsibility for reporting questionable intelligence activities to the IOB, and seriously questionable ones to the President. Disciplinary penalties for violations are established. The House and Senate Intelligence Committees are to be kept "fully and currently informed" of all intelligence activities, included anticipat activities, although this does not imply the need for prior Congressional consent. The maintenance of records and regulations by intelligence agencie is mandated. _cRs--21 IB76039 UPDATE—O3/O6/80 The Intelligence Committees shall report annually. Procedures for the sharing of information with other Committees or Members, access to information, and the authorized disclosure of information are established. Intelligence funds may not be appropriated without legislative authorization. All appropriated funds will be subject to audit and review by the Comptroller General at the request of either Intelligence Committee. Requests by other Congressional committees regarding agencies or activities over which they have legislative jurisdiction must be approved by the Intelligence Committee of that House. Title II: Standards for Intelligence Activities Establishes statutory authority and standards for intelligence activities concerning U.S. persons, including the basis for collection, retention, and dissemination of such intelligence. Approval procedures for such activities are the responsibility of the Attorney General. I Covert foreign intelligence collection against U.S. persons is limited to counterintelliqence or counterterrorism, save in extraordinary circumstances, ywhich then require a Presidential finding and NSC approval. Domestic clandestine foreign intelligence collection can only be undertaken by the FBI with notice to the Attorney General; by the Hilitary Services against military personnel; by NSA against foreign communications; by the CIA with Attorney General approval against senior foreign officials. Counterintelligence and counterterrorism activities against U.S. persons y only proceed on the basis of reasonable assumption that they are engaged in such acts. Procedures are detailed for planting employees in organizations, mail covers, and physical surveillance. I Any authorized activity lasting longer than one year must be reviewed at least annually. Also establishes court order procedures for the use of extraordinary techniques similar to the procedures in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. However, evidence of a criminal violation is not required if there vis probable cause that the target has the required information or if it is . likely that hostile activities will ensue. Emergency approval by senior officials without a court order is limited to 72 hours. Penalties for violation and rules for redress of violations are iestablished. Title III: Intelligence Community Creates the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, a Director (DMI) and Deputy Director.» Both can serve for no more than 10 years, and must be confirmed by the Senate. A military officer may Abe appointed, but either the DMI or Deputy must be a civilian. The DHI is the principal foreign intelligence officer of the U.S., serving under the NSC, and is responsible for the central coordination and direction of national intelligence activities, including collection, production, Aanalysis, dissemination, and evaluation of intelligence; counterintelligence \ cns-22 1375039 UPDATE—03/O6/80 and counterterrorism and special activities; and has exclusive authority over the national intelligence budget. The President may appoint up to five Assistant DNIs, of whom only two me“ be military officers. A General Counsel for the office may also b» appointed, subject to confirmation by the Senate. The DNI will make an annual public report on the activities of the Intelligence Community, with provisions for safeguarding identities and necessary classified information. Titl e IV : CIA Establishes the CIA to perform "necessary" intelligence activities. The DNI will be the Director of the CIA unless the President appoints the Deputy DHI or an Assistant DNI, subject to confirmation by the Senate. The Director and Deputy Director of CIA are limited to 10 year terms; only one may be a military officer. A The CIA is responsible for: clandestine foreign intelligence collection; counterintelligence and counterterrorism activities; special activities; processing, analysis, production, and dissemination of national intelligence;y support for technical reconnaissance. Permitted activities within the U.S. must be coordinated with the FBI and approved by the Attorney General or FBI. Title V: FBI Authorizes the FBI to perform certain intelligence activities under ti supervision and control of the Attorney General. The Director of the FBI is given principal responsibility for the conduct and coordination of counterintelligence and counterterrorism activities within the U.S.; those outside the 0.5. shall be coordinated with the CIA. Title VI: National security Agency Establishes the NSA by law and authorizes signals intelligence and communications security activities necessary for U.S. foreign policy, to be conducted by NSA. The Secretary of Defense will supervise NSA. There are a Director and Deputy Director; only one may be a military officer, and one must have cryptologic experience. Each must be confirmed by the Senate, and serves for 6 years, with a 6-year reappointment also subject to confirmation allowed, for a maximum term of 12 years. The Director is the principal signals intelligence and communications ysecurity officer of the Government, and his responsibilities include management and supervision of signals intelligence requirements, activities, and program budget. He will recieve guidance from the Secretary of Defense on tactical~ and departmental programs, and from the DNI on national intelligence programs. Title VII: Protection of Identities of Certain Intelligence Officers I Establishes criminal penalties and fines for the disclosure of classified cxs-23 IB76039 UPDATE-03/06/80 information that identifies an undercover intelligence agent, whether the disclosure is made within or outside the U.S. L Title VIII: Physical Searches Within the U.S. Amends the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, extending its approval procedures to "physical searches,” i.e., the searching of property or opening of mail within the U.S. where privacy is expected and where a warrant would be necessary under law enforcement procedures. Probable cause of criminal activity by a U.S. person is still required before a warrant may be issued. Title IX: Miscellaneous Amendments The Hughes-Ryan amendment is repealed. Based on the hearings held on the first charter legislation (S. 2525, 95t Congress) the following areas will probably be controversial: f (1) The possibility that the DNI will not also direct the CIA, thereby depriving him of an institutional base within the Executive and perhaps subjecting him to additional pressure from intelligence consumers. (2) The limits and permissible covers for intelligence activities raises once again the problem of finding adequate cover for agents overseas, as the past use of Foreign Service cover is widely recognized. w(3) According to press accounts the Executive disagrees with the provision requiring prior notification of special activities, which the Congress feels is necessary for meaningful oversight. I Hearings on 5. 228a began before the Senate Intelligence Committee on Feb. 21, 1980. DCI Stansfield Turner was the first witness, and while he supported the charter legislation effort, he also raised a number of points which he felt required redrafting or substantial amending, as follows: I (1) the general organizational sequence of the hill; (2) the need for a general waiver of any provision of the Act by the President during wartime or under the war Powers Act. At present there is only a limited wartime waiver regarding the use of certain institutions for cover purposes; I A (3) the requirement for prior notification of special activities. Based on his testimony, Turner evidently would prefer to keep this requirement vague so that while prior reporting would go on as it generally does under present oversight requirements, this would not be made a regularly mandated requirement; Q (H) the absence of any provision regarding the duty of the DNI to protect iintelligence sources and methods, and an ability to withhold limited types of information under this duty, of a type not requested ‘by the oversight 1 xmittees at present; (5) the enactment of restrictions on the use of certain institutions for cover. Turner feels the self-imposed regulations of the CIA are sufficient, but that a statutory prohibition would be too restrictive; cns-2a 1375039 UPDATE—O3/O6/80 (6) the need to include NSA, FBI and other intelligence components under the exemption from certain Freedom of Information Act provisions, and the need to broaden the category of those persons liable for the unauthorizr‘ disclosure of agents‘ identities to include accomplices; and (7) further modifications in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to broaden targeting standards and to extend the emergency surveillance period. Based on the initial hearings the question of prior notification of special activities will be one of the more contentious issues. ISSUES In the wake of the three investigations of the intelligence community and numerous reforms and reform proposals, the following central issues have emerged: (1) Does the current organization of the intelligence community promote the production of reliable advance information and intelligence, conduce toward a fair return on its budget, minimize overlapping and duplication of functions, and assure proper coordination? and control of activities and dissemination of information? , (2) How can the prevention of further abuses by intelligence agencies best be attained? will the provisions of S. 228fl be sufficient? Are they overly restrictive? I (3) How can public confidence in the intelligence community best be restored? (Q) Are current evaluation methods for Intelligence Community products sufficient? If not, what additional or alternative methods are available? In addition, a number of specific proposals have been made by observers and veterans of the_Intelligence Community which may affect the community's future structure: (5) To what extent should the DCI be removed from his responsibilities for the CIA and elevated to a solely community-wide role in the hope of achieving proper coordination and control? would such a step subject the DCI to undue pressure to produce intelligence estimates which are subjective and calculated to fit in with assumptions within the policy-making apparatus, as the DCI would then be working directly under the President and would not have an analytical and support base of his own? (6) Should the analytical functions and covert operations functions of the CIA be separated, perhaps into separate agencies? What coordinative and control problems would such a separation cause? would this "divorce analysis from reality?" (7) To what extent is there overlapping and duplication of function in t'i intelligence agencies? Should they be reduced in number and their functionsi rationalized?i Does the current arrangement promote competition between intelligence producers, leading to differing views and thus better analyses than would be possible where one very homogenized product resulted? cns-25 IB76039 UPDATE-O3/O6/80 .2§£§§A2I.._...0N P.L. 96-100 (S. 975) \ FY80 authorization for intelligence activities, Intelligence Community Staff, and CIA Retirement. Reported favorably and unchanged from the Senate Intelligence Committee on Apr. 18, 1979 (S.Rept. 96-71). Passed the Senate, amended, June 20, 1979. Passed the House, amended, July 10, 1979, in lieu of H.R. 3821. Conference held. Conference report filed in the House (H.Rept. 96-512) Oct. 12, 1979; agreed to in Senate Oct. 17 and in House Oct. 24. Signed into law as P.L. 96-100 Nov. 2, 1979. Repeals the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-511), and allows greater latitude in the interception of wire or oral communications. Introduced on Jan. 15, 1979, and referred to the Judiciary . and Select Intelligence Committees. H.R. 1&6 (Bennett) Amends the National Security Act by specifically restricting the CIA to foreign intelligence activites; also defines the means by which the CIA can protect "sources and methods of foreign intelligence from unauthorized disclosure." Introduced on Jan. 15, 1979, and referred jointly to the Armed Services and Select Intelligence Committees. H.R. 261 (Dellums) Omnibus Intelligence Community Reorganization and Reform Act of 1979. Effects a major reorganization of the Intelligence Community and its methods, including: (1) the creation of three committees on the National Security Council —— Foreign Intelligence, dealing with administrative aspects of the Intelligence Community; Foreign Activities, to advise the President on sensitive collection activities; and Counterintelligence, to review and coordinate counterintelligence activities; (2) the separation of the DCI from any agency, giving him authority over‘ the entire foreign intelligence community; (3) the creation of an Inspector General for the intelligence community; of an Intelligence Research and ;Analysis Agency for the production, analysis, and dissemination of foreign intelligence; and of la Special Prosecutor for intelligence crimes; (H) the prohibition of all covert operations not related to counterintelligence, except in time of war; (5) the limitation of the CIA to counterintelligence; and of the FBI director to la 10-year term; (6) the removal of the National Security Agency from the Defense Department; (7) the abolishment of the FBI's Internal Security Branch, terminating its functions; and of the Defense Intelligence .Agency, limiting Defense intelligence activities; (8) establishment of warrant requirements for certain investigative techniques; and of limitations, penalties, and punishments to prevent repetition of past abuses; and (9) nprovides for a more detailed intelligence budget presentation to the Congress; and for a requirement that directors and deputy; directors of all ; ;elligence agencies would have to be civilians and that their; terms nwould not exceed 8 years. The bill was referred jointly to the House Committees on Armed Services, the Judiciary, and Ways and Means, and the Permanent Select 9 Committee on Intelligence. CBS-26 IB76039 UPDATE-O3/O6/80 H.R. 1068 (ucclory) Adds a new title to the National Security Act to protect- foreign intelligence information from unauthorized disclosure. Sets forth authorit' by which the DCI can designate or remove the designation of sensitive intelligence from information, and defines the offenses, penalties, prosecution and jurisdiction for the unauthorized disclosure of such information, including the identity of certain individuals. Introduced on Jan. 18, 1979, and referred to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. (See also H.R. 5615.) H.R. 2827 (Boland) Intelligence Community authorization bill for FY80. Contains a provision which would limit through specification the duties for which CIA personnel may carry firearms while in the United States. This provision was dropped in the bill as reported (H.R. 3821). Introduced Mar. 13, 1979, and referred to. the House Intelligence Committee. (See H.R. 3821.) H.R. 3356 (Wilson of Texas), H.R. 3357 (wright, et al.), H.R. 3096 (Neal), H.R. 3762 (Bennett), H.R. 5615 (Boland et al.) Protects the confidentiality of the identities of certain employees of the CIA, setting forth criminal penalties for the unauthorized disclosure of such information. The bills were introduced on Mar. 29, 1979, and referred to the House Intelligence Committee, which held hearings on Jan. 30-31, 1980. (See also S. 191.) H.R. 3821 (Boland) Intelligence Community authorization bill for FY80, as reported by the House Intelligence Committee (see H.R. 2827 for bill as introduced). Does not have provision concerning CIA personnel carrying firearms in the U.S. Increases FBI counterterrorism funds by $1.8 million, but reduces funds for Intelligence Community Staff by $1.1 million. Also authorizes supplemental funds for FY79. Favorably reported by the House Intelligence Committee, May 8, 1979 (H.Rept. 96-127, Part 1), and the House Armed Services Committee, May 15, 1979 (H.Rept. 96-127, Part 2). Passed the House, amended, July 10, 1979, and then laid on the table, with S. 975 passed in lieu. H.R. H705 (Rodino) Establishes procedures for criminal cases involving classified information. Bill stems from congressional concern over "graymail," i.e., instances where cases were not prosecuted for fear of~ revealing classified information. Introduced July 11, 1979; referred to House Committees on 2Judiciary and Intelligence. 3.3. 5666 (Derwinski et al.) Provides death gratuities for the survivors of CIA employees who die as a result of injuries sustained outside the U.S. from hostile or terrorist activity or in connection with an intelligence activity having a substantial element of risk. Introduced Oct. 22, 1979; referred to House Intelligen Committee. (See also S. 1930.) H.R. 6293 (ucclory) Repeals the Hughes-Ryan amendment, and amends the National Security Act, CBS-27 A IB76039 UPDATE’03/06/80 requiring that no special activity may be undertaken without a Presidential pfinding as to its importance to U.S. national security, and that a "timely" report of the description and scope of the activity is sent to the House and ‘enate Intelligence Committees. Introduced Jan. 2a, 1980; referred jointly -o the House Foreign Affairs and Intelligence Committees. . H.R. 6310 (Symms and Bouguard), H.R. 6316 (C.W. Bill Young): H.R. 63fl7 (Luken), H.R. 6384 (John J. Duncan) Intelligence Reform Act of 1980. Companion bills to 5.1 2216 (see below). Bills were introduced beginning Jan. 28, 1980, and referred jointly to the House Foreign Affairs and Intelligence Committees. H.R. 6385 (Evans of Delaware) Amends the Hughes-Ryan amendment, limiting the reporting requirement to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees. Introduced Jan. 31, 1980; referred jointly to the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Intelligence. iH.R. 6588 (Boland) National Intelligence Act of 1980. Companion bill to S. 228fl (see below). Introduced Feb. 25, 1980; referred to the Committee on Intelligence. 3. 191 (Bentsen) Protects the confidentiality of the identities of certain) CIA employees, setting forth criminal penalties for the unauthorized disclosures of such information. Introduced on Jan. 23, 1979, and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee. (See also H.R. 3356 and H.R. 3357, H.R. 3396, H.R. ‘62, H.R. 5615. I S. 1982 (Biden et al.) Establishes procedures ‘for criminal cases involving classified information. Bill stems from congressional concern regarding "graymai1,“ i.e., instances where cases were not prosecuted for fear of revealing classified information. Introduced July .11, 1979; referred to Senate Judiciary Committee. (See also H.R. u7u5.) S. 1930 (Bentsen) Provides death gratuities for the survivors of CIA employees who die as a result of injuries sustained outside the U.S. from hostile« or terrorist activity or in connection with an intelligence activity having a substantial element of risk. Introduced Oct. 14, 1979; referred to) Senate Intelligence Committee. (See also H.R. 5666.) S. 2216 (noynihan et al.) Intelligence Reform Act of 1980. Amends the Hughes“Ryan Amendment, stating that them CIA may not undertake special activities without a Presidential_finding as to its importance to U.S. national security, and that the President reports "as soon as possible" the description and scope of the activity to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees, or if the President f ids that a category of special activities is limportant to U.S. national sccurity and reports this finding to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees, and the ‘HSC determines that an activityw falls within this category but does not involve substantial resources and risks. This bill also exempts certain CIA information from the Freedom of Information Act, CR5-28 IB76039 UPDATE-03/06/8G except for U.S. citizens and resident aliens seeking information concerning themselves; and establishes penalties for the unauthorized disclosure of the identities of intelligence personnel. Introduced Jan. 24, 1980, and referred to the Senate Intelligence Committee. (See also H.R. 6314.) 5. 223a (Huddleston et al.) National Intelligence Act of 1980. Comprehensive charter legislation for the Intelligence Community. Authorizes intelligence activities in - general. Gives the NSC overall responsibility for intelligence activities. Authorizes special activities (covert action), requiring a Presidential finding and NSC review, and prior notification of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees. Also authorizes counterintelligence and counterterrorism activities. Prohibits certain domestic activities and contacts, and the use of certain domestic groups as cover for intelligence activities. Prohibits assassination. Executive oversight is the responsibility of the Intelligence oversight Board and the Attorney General: Congressional oversight rests with the House and Senate Intelligence Committees. Establishes authority and standards for intelligence activities concerning 0.3. persons. Creates a Director of National Intelligence as the principal foreign intelligence officer of the U.S., under the NSC. Establishes legislative charters for the CIA and NSA, and for certain FBI intelligence activities. Establishes criminal penalties for the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence agents‘ identities. Provides approval mechanism for "physical searches" within the U.S. Repeals the Hughes-Ryan amendment. Introduced Feb- 8, 1980, and referred to the Senate Intelligence Committee. (See also H.R. 6588.)(Eor greater detail on provisions, see text above.) 1l§1i‘BI.1l§§ U.5. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Impact of intelligence reassessment on withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea. Hearings, 96th Congress, 1st session. June 21, July 17, 1979. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. 101 p. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Justice Department treatment of criminal cases involving CIA personnel and claims of national security. Hearings, 9uth Congress, 1st session. July 22, 23, 29, 31, and Aug. 1, 1975. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1978. #31 p. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights. FBI oversight. Hearings, 95th Congress, 1st session. Washington, 0.5. Govt. Print. Off., 1978. 239 p. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee I on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Hearings, 95th Congress, 2d session, on H.R. 7308. June 22, 28, and 29, 1978.‘ Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1978. 183 p. U.S. Congress. House. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Disclosure of funds for intelligence activities. Hearings, 95th Congress, 2d session. Jan. 2Q, 25, 1978. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. 0ff., CBS-29 IB76039 UPDATE‘03/06/80 1978. 185 p. The CIA and the media. Hearings, 95th Congress, 1st and 2d sessions. Dec. 27, 1977...Apr. 20, 1978. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. off., 1978. 627 p. ---- Espionage laws and leaks. Hearings, 96th Congress, 1st session. Jan. 2a, 25, 31, 1979. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. off., 1979. 280 p. ---- Foreign Intelligence Electronic Surveillance. Hearings, 95th Congress, 2d session. Jan. 10...Feb. 8, 1978. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. off., 1978. 305 p. U.S. Congress. House. Select Committee on Intelligence. U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities: (Part I-Intelligence Costs and Financial Procedures, Part 2--The Performance of the Intelligence Community, Part 3++Domestic Intelligence Programs, Part 4--Committee Proceedings--I, Part 5-Risks and Control of Foreign Intelligence, Part 6--Committee Proceedings--II). Hearings, 9nth Congress, 1st and 2d sessions. Washington, U.s. Govt. Print. off., 1975-76. 2315 p. U.S. Congress. ,Senate. Committee on Human Resources. Human drug testing by the CIA, 1977. Hearings, 95th Congress, 1st session, on S. 1893. Washington, 0.5. Govt. Print.9 off., 1977. 219 p. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures. Foreign Intelligence Act of 1976. Hearings, 9flth Congress, 2d session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. off., 1976. 1H4 p. ---- Foreign Intelligence.Surveillance Act of 1977. Hearings, 95th Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. A Print. off., 1977. 159 p. U.s. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. Hearings, 95th Congress, 2d session. July 19, 21, 1977 and Feb. 8, 2h, 27, 1978. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. off., 1978. 315 p. --r ‘National Intelligence Reorganization and Reform Act of 1978. Hearings, 95th Congress, 2d session, on S. 2525. Apr. 4-Aug. 8, 1978. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. off., 1978. 1101 p. . ---- Nomination of Admiral Stansfield Turner. Hearings, 95th Congress, 1st session. Feb. 22 and 23, 1977. Washington, U050 Po ----- Nomination of Theodore C. Sorensen. Hearings, 95th Congress, 1st session. Jan. 17, 1977. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. off., 1977. #3 p. A » U.S. Congress. senate.A Select Committee on Intelligence./ Committee on Human Resources. Project HKULTHA, the REPO mU.S. CR5-30 IB76039 UPDATE-03/06/80 CIA's program of research in behavioral modification. Hearings, 95th Congress, 1st session. Washington, 0.5. Govt. Print. Print. 0ff., 1977.8 171 p. U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. (v. 1-Unauthorized Storage of Toxic Agents, v. 2--Huston Plan, v. 3-—Interna1 Revenue Service, v. H--Hail Openings, v. 5-‘The National security Agency and Fourth Amendment Rights, v. 6-Federal Bureau of Investigation, v. 7——Covert Action). Hearings, 9flth Congress, 1st session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976. RT3-A!2-C0-§B§§§1QEéL-2Q§E§§!2§ Intelligence Oct. 7 p. 96-512) Conference Committee, 1979. fiscal year 1980. rint. Off., 1979. House. Report no. U.S. Congress. Activities Authorization Act, 1979. Washington, U.S. Govt. (96th Congress, 1st session. 12, Intelligence Ray 15, 1979. (96th Congress, on Armed Services. fiscal year 1980. Off., 1979. 3 p. 96-127, Part 2) Congress. House. Committee Activities Authorization Act, Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. 1st session. House. Report no. ---- Report on impact of intelligence reassessment on withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea. Sept. 7, 1979. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. 9 p. At head of title: 96th Congress, 1st session. Committee print. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Justice Department handling of cases involving classified data and claims of national security. June 18, 1979. A Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. off., 1979. 28 p. (96th Congress, 1st session. House. Report no. 96-280) U.S. Congress.‘ House. Select Committee on Intelligence. Recommendations of the final report, reported together with additional, supplemental, and separate views pursuant to H.Res. 591. Feb. 11, 1976. Washington, 0.5. Govt. Print. off., 1976. 29 p. (94th Congress, 2d session. House. Report no. 9u—833) U.S. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. 14, 1978. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. (95th Congress, 2d session. House. Congress. House. Annual report. Oct. Off., 1978. 72 p. Rept. no. 95-1795) Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978; report together with supplemental, additional, and dissenting views. June 8, 1978. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. 0ff., 1978.1 121 p. (95th Congress, 2d session. House. Report no. 95-1283, Part 1) --—- Intelligence and Intelligence-Related Activities Authorization Act for FY80. A 6 may 8, 1979. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. 12 p. (96th Congress, 1st session. House. Report no. 96-127, Part 1). cns-31 IB76039 UPDATE-03/O6/80 Intelligence on the world energy future. Dec. 1979. Washington, At head of title: 96th Congress, 1st session. Committee print. —---- Iran: evaluation of U.S. intelligence performance prior to November 1978. January 1979. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. 8 p. At head of title: 95th Congress, 2d session.( Committee print. ---- Security clearance procedures in the intelligence agencies; staff report. Sept. 1979. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1978. 34 p. At head of title: 96th congress, 1st session. Committee print. ----- Report ... pursuant to Sec. 108(b) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.... Oct. 26, 1979. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print Off., 1979. 11 p. (96th Congress, 1st session. House. Report no. 96-558) 1 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Authorizing appropriations for FY80 for intelligence activities of the United States Government. June 11 1979. Washington, 0.3. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. R p. (96th Congress, 1st session. Senate. Report no. 96-206) 1 U.S. Congress. Senate. -Committee on the Judiciary. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1976; report together with additional and minority views. July 15, 1976. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976. 179 p. (94th Congress, 2d session. Senate. Report no. 94-1035) Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1977; report, together with minority views. Nov. 15, 1977. Washington, u.s. Govt. Print. Off., 1977. an p. (95th Congress, 1st session. Senate. Report no. 95-60H) U.S. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. Annual report to the Senate, together with additional views. may 18, 1977. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977. H3 p. (95th Congress, 1st session. Senate. Report 95-217) ---- Authorizing appropriations for FY80 for intelligence activities of the United States government...Washington, Apr. 18, 1979. U.S. Govt. Print. off., 1979. 6 p. (96th Congress. 1st session. Senate. Report no. 96-71) r‘-—-Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1976. Report, together with additional views. Aug. 2a, 1976. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. off., 1976. 77 p. (94th Congress, 2d session. Senate. Report no. 9U-1161) -+-- Foreign Intelligence Act of 1978; report together with additional views. Ear. 1Q, 1978. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1978. 96 p. (95th Congress, 1st session. Senate. Report no. 95-701) ---- Implementation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act cns-32 IB76039 UPDATE-03¢/O6/80 of 1978. Oct. 25, 1979. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. 8 p. (96th Congress, 1st session. Senate. Report no. 96-379) --~-- The National Intelligence estimates A-B team episode concerning Soviet strategic capability and objectives; report, together with separate views. Feb. 16, 1978. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1978. 14 p. At head of title: 95th Congress, 2d session. Senate. Committee print. -rrrr Principal findings on the capabilities of the United states to monitor the SALT II treaty. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. 0ff., Oct. 1979. 5 p. At head of title: 96th Congress, 1st session. Committee print. Report to the Senate, covering the period Bay 16, 1977—Dec. 31, 1978, 95th Congress. Kay 14, 1979. Washington, U.s. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. 75 p. (96th Congress, 1st session. Senate. Report no. 96-141) 0.5. Congress. Senate. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. Final Report, together with additional, supplemental, and separate views. Book I: Foreign and Military Intelligence. Book II: Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans. Book III: Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans. Book IV: Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Foreign and Hilitary Intelligence. Book V: The Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy: Performance of the Intelligence Agencies. Book VI: Supplementary Reports on Intelligence Activities. Apr. 26, 1976. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976. 2685 p. (94th Congress 2d Session. Report no. 94-755) U.S. President, 1974 - 1977 (Ford). Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1976: communication from the President. [Washington, U.S. , Govt. Print. Off., 1976] 6 p. (94th Congress, 2d session. House.) Document no. 94-422) Communication dated Mar. 24, 1976. organization and Control of the Foreign Intelligence Community; message from the President. [Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976] 6 p. (94th Congress, 2d session. 9House. Document no. 94-374). Message dated Feb. 18, 1976. EEQEQLQGYIQF EEE !I§ 02/25/80 - H.R. 6588, the National Intelligence Act, was l introduced in the House. 02/08/80 -- S. 2284, the National Intelligence Act, comprehensive charter legislation, was introduced in the Senate. 01/11/30 01/01/80 10/0 1/79 09/26/79 09/24/79 08/15/79 O5/11$/79 OR/25/79 11/11/78 10/25/78 10/1H/78 04/10/78 02/24/78 CR5-33 IB76039 UPDATE-O3/O6/80 The New York Times reported that President Carter was seeking revision of the Hughes-Ryan amendment on covert action. The National Intelligence Council was formed to improve National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs). In a national address on Soviet troops in Cuba, President Carter announced the enhancement of worldwide intelligence efforts to monitor Soviet and Cuban military activities, and increased efforts to guard against leaks without impairing civil and constitutional rights. ’ CBS News reported the formation of an ad hoc panel of outside experts headed by Clark Clifford to advise the President on the issue of Soviet troops in Cuba. The panel is reviewing available intelligence on this issue. Lt.Gen. Camm resigned as Director of the National Intelligence Tasking Center (NITC), and was succeeded by Ernest J. Zellmer. Robert Bowie resigned as Director of the National Foreign Assessment Center (NFAC), and was succeeded by Bruce C. Clarke. R Senate Intelligence Committee released its second report to the Senate. Attorney General Bell established the Counsel for Intelligence Policy and the office of Intelligence Policy and Review in the Justice Department. President Carter sent a memorandum to DCI Turner, Secretary of State Vance, and National Security Assistant Brzezinski, reportedly complaining about the quality of the political intelligence he was receiving, referring specifically to the recent unrest in Iran. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act was signed into law (P.L. 95-511). The House Intelligence Committee issued its first Annual Report. Former Acting Director of the FBI Patrick Gray and two other former high FBI officials were indicted for conspiring to deprive citizens of their civil rights by authorizing break-ins and searches without warrants in FBI activities against the radical Weather Underground. The Justice Department dismissed, charges against John Kearney, an FBI official in New York. William Webster was sworn in as Director of the FBI. O2/10/78 oz/o 9/78 01/2 '4/78 01/19/78 01/01/73 12/28/77 12/22/77 12/02/77 11/29/77 11/09/77 11/04/77 10/31/77 10/11/77 cns-3n IB76039 UPDATE-03/06/80 Frank Carlucci was sworn in as Deputy DCI. Senate Intelligence Committee introduced 5. 2525, the National Intelligence Reorganization and Reform Act, setting forth statutory charters and lguidelines for the intelligence community. The Senate confirmed Frank Carlucci to be Deputy DCI and William Webster to be Director of the FBI. President Carter signed Executive Order 12036, confirming the central role of the DCI, setting forth charters for all intelligence agencies, and restrictions on certain types of activities. Judge William H. Webster was named to be the new Director of the FBI. 9 DCI Turner appointed John E. Koehler to the new position of deputy for resource management, effective Feb. 1, 1978. CIA confirmed that William W. Wells, Deputy Director for Operations, would retire at the end of the year and be replaced by John N. ucuahon, who had been serving as acting Deputy DCI. Frank C. Carlucci, Ambassador to Portugal, chosen to be Deputy DCI. wThe CIA announced the adoption of a new set of regulations to govern its dealings with U.S. journalists and media organizations. Judge Frank Johnson, nominee for new FBI Director, declined the appointment for reasons of health. FBI Director Kelley will stay on until Feb. 15, 1978. GAO issued a report which found that the FBI had restricted its domestic intelligence work and was largely complying with reform guidelines established by Attorney General Levi in 1976. Former DCI Richard Helms was fined $2,000 and given a 2-year suspended prison sentence, following a "no contest“ plea to two misdemeanors. Former CIA Director Richard Helms pleaded “no contest" to two criminal misdemeanors, charging him with failing to testify "fully, completely and accurately“ before a Senate committee. DCI Turner began his announced personnel reduction in the Directorate of Operations, announcing that 198 employees would be dismissed effective March 1978. The Directorate of Intelligence (DDI) of CIA was redesignated the National Foreign Assessment Center 10/03/77 08/16/77 08/09/77 08/08/77 08/04/77 O7/14/77 07/05/77 06/16/77 06/10/77 05/18/77 05/17/77 05/16/77 05/05/77 on/27/77 CRS-35 IB76039 UPDATE—O3/06/80 (NFAC). Robert Bowie, Director for National Intelligence, has since been redesignated Director for National Foreign Assessment. Lt. Gen. Frank A. Camm (Army, Ret.) appointed Deputy to DCI Turner, to head the National Intelligence Tasking Center. President Carter named Judge Frank Johnson to he the new Director of the FBI. DCI Turner announced a planned reduction of 800 positions in the Directorate of Operations, largely at headquarters, to be carried out basically through attrition. Vice President Mondale discussed the Administration's plans for charters for the intelligence agencies to prevent future abuses of rights of Americans. President Carter announced a major reorganization of the intelligence community, giving the DCI greater central authority over intelligence priorities, tasking and budgets. The House, by a vote of 227-171, established a Select Committee on Intelligence. Deputy DCI Knoche tendered his resignation, effective Aug. 1, 1977. Adm. Daniel Murphy became Director of Policy Review, in control of substantive aspects of defense intelligence.‘ Fubini Panel on Defense Intelligence submitted second part of report, on quality of intelligence, to Secretary Brown. a Senate Intelligence Committee released annual report covering its first year of operation, and discussing possible legislation the committee would be introducing for better operation and control of the intelligence community. The office of National Security, an intelligence liaison and support unit in the Department of the oTreasury, was reorganized and renamed the office of Intelligence Support. 5. 1539, first public budget authorization bill for intelligence activities, introduced. President Carter named three new members to the Intelligence oversight Board and abolished PFIAB. DCI Turner said the Administration would go along with the release of a single inclusive Intelligence 00/19/77 03/30/77 o3/1 1/n 03/09/77 02/25/77 O2/QR/77 02/23/77 02/07/77 01/17/77 12/23/76 11/Zn/76 08/10/76 08/03/76 07/07/76 05/19/76 CBS-36 IB76039 0PDATE—O3/06/80 Community budget figure. The Pubini Panel on Defense Intelligence gave the first part of its report, on organization, to Secretary of Defense Brown. ACDA announced planned reorganization, affecting the Verification and Analysis Bureau and its intelligence staff, and ACDA's liaison with the intelligence community. Prof. Robert R. Bowie of Harvard chosen to be Deputy DCI in charge of NIEs. Secretary of Defense Brown reorganized Defense intelligence, combining offices to create the Assistant Secretary for Communications, Command, Control and Intelligence, and having DIA and NSA ,report to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Adm. Turner sworn in as DCI. Gerald Paul Dineen nominated to be Asst. Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and Director of Defense Intelligence- President Carter stated that his review of CIA operationsp had "not found anything illegal or improper." Adm. Turner was unanimously confirmed by the Senate to be DCI. President Carter named Adm. Stansfield Turner, currently Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces in Southern Europe, to be DCI. ‘ ” Sorensen announced at his confirmation hearing that he was asking President—elect Carter to withdraw his nomination as DCI. President—elect Carter announced his choice of Theodore Sorensen as new DCI. DCI Bush announced he would resign, effective Jan. 20, 1977.1 FBI Director Kelley announced a reorganization of the Bureau to prevent future abuses and to improve control. Carl E. Feldbaum appointed Inspector General for Defense Intelligence. E. Henry Knoche sworn in as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence with administrative responsibility for the CIA, succeeding Lt. Gen. Vernon A. Walters. The Senate, 72-22, established a Select Committee on Intelligence to oversee intelligence activities. This new committee will have exclusive legislative and authorization jurisdiction over the CIA and sequential 05/14/76 05/06/76 OH/26/76 04/05/76 03/29/76 02/18/76 CBS-37 IB76039 UPDATE—03/06/80 concurrent jurisdiction over DIA, NSA, INR and FBI intelligence activities. It is presumed that this committee will handle any proposed reforms stemming from the Final Report of the Intelligence Committee. Deputy Secretary of Defense Ellsworth announced realignments in Defense Intelligence in accordance with President Ford's executive order. DCI Bush established NFIB to assume former USIB functions of reviewing and coordinating the production of national intelligence and to improve coordination among collectors, producers and users of intelligence. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence issued its final report, containing 183 recommendations for the reform and reorganization of U.S. intelligence. Attorney General Levi put into effect guidelines to prevent illegal domestic intelligence activities by the FBI. Vice-Admiral Daniel J. Murphy appointed Deputy Director for relations of CIA with other intelligence agencies.y President Ford issued Executive Order No. 11905 broadening the role of the DCI; creating the Committee on Foreign Intelligence under the DCI with management and resource control over the foreign intelligence community; creating a Deputy DCI for the Intelligence Community; replacing the no Committee with the Special Operations Advisory Group, with review and advisory role over covert and sensitive tintelligence operations; and creating an Intelligence 02/11/76 - 06/2 8/75 -- 06/10/75 -- Oversight Board to help oversee the intelligence community and prevent future abuses. House Select Committee on Intelligence recommended that the DCI be separate from any agency and be given overall coordinative and oversight authority throughout the intelligence community; that a separate Office of Inspector General for Intelligence be created; that the NSA be made a separate agency with a civilian head through specific p legislation; and that the DIA be abolished and its functions. transferred. ‘ Murphy Commission report released, making recommendations Avery similar to those of the Rockefeller Commission, primarily based on a stricter charter for the CIA, a broader overall role for the DCI, and a strengthening of PFIAB as a source of independent advice and independent oversight. Rockefeller Commission report made public, documenting a number of illegal activities by the CIA, and recommending a stricter charter for the CIA, divesting the DCI of many of his daily administrative functions in order to assume a broader role over the entire intelligence community, and a stronger role for PFIAB. CRS-38 IB76039 UPDATE-03/06/80 01/OH/75 --President Ford created the Commission on CIA Activities within the United States (Executive Order No. 11828), the Rockefeller Commission, to investigate allegations of CIA spying within the U.S. on American citizens. 02/06/55 -—-President Eisenhower appointed PFIAB (Executive Order No. 10656), to give the President independent evaluations of the intelligence community. 06/29/55 -— Hoover Commission Task Force on Intelligence issued report recommending creation of PFIAB, and divesting DCI of much‘ of his daily administrative role in order to take a broader role over the entire intelligence community. 07/26/T7 - Enactment of the National Security Act, establishing the CIA, NSC and the basic modern U.S. intelligence establishment. Cline, Ray 5. Secrets, spies and scholars. Washington: Acropolis books [1976] 29¢ p. Commission on CIA Activities within the United States. Report to the President. [Hashington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] June 6, 1975. 299 p. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government. Intelligence activities. A Report to Congress. [washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] June 29, 1955. 76 p. Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy. Report. [washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] Fain, Tyrus, ed., et al. The Intelligence community. New York: R.R. Bowker and Company [1977] 1036 p. Kirkpatrick, Lyman 8-, Jr. The U.S. intelligence community. New York: Hill and Wang [1973] 212 p. Ransom, Harry Howe. The intelligence establishment. Rev. ed. Cambridge, Hass.: Harvard University Press [1970] 309 p. U.S. Library of Congress. The Central Intelligence Agency: organizational history [by] Hark H. Lowenthal. Aug. n, 1978. '[Washington] 1978. 62 p. Multilith 78-168? ---- Intelligence community: congressional oversight [by] Mark H. Lowenthal. [Washington] 1980. (Updated regularly) Issue Brief 77079 ~ ---- Intelligence community investigation [by] Richard Grimmett. A Jan. 12, 1977. [Washington] 1977. 28 p. Issue Brief 75037 ---—- Intelligence operations: covert action [by] Mark M. Lowenthal. CBS“-.39 IB76039 UPDATE-‘O3/G6/8!. faashingtonj 1980. (Updated regularly) Issue Brief 80020 ---- Legislation introduced relative to the activities of U.S. intelligence agencies, 1947-1972 [by] John Costa ana Gary Lee Evans. Dec. 153 3972. [Washington] 1972. 63 p. Mnltilith ?3—22F Legislation introduced relative to the activities of the U.S. intelligence agencies, 19?3~7fl {by} William N. Raiford. Feb. 5, 1975. {Washington} l9?5. 2 p. Mnltilith 75-76? -~-we Legislative history of the Central Intelligence Agency as documented in published congressional sources [by] Grover S. Williams. Jan. 8, 1975. [Washington] 1975. 307 p. fiultilith 75-Sn ---—- The National Security Council: organizational history [by] Mark M. Lowenthal. June 27, 1978. [Washington] 1978. 52 p. 9 fiultilith 78-EGHF The Presidentis Foreign Intelligence advisory Board: an historical and contemporary analysis (1955—3975) [by] John Steven Chwat. Nov. 13, 3975. [Washington] 3975. 33 p. 9 Multilith 75-225? _ VLIBRARY OF WA$H I NGTON UNIVERSITY ST. LOUIS - MO.