LC 14. 13/2. - :$1";N ‘E RARY 3 Z ilnivarsfiy . . . wA$H5Ef{§%?f,§3N M1n1 Bnef NOV 17 1989 _ , .. . ~ ' .»_. ..—-om ' - 9: 1 V .. ' ‘ . g-_ ._,_ if c. I ” bi 11.111111111111111: igj{1j1I611i111fi1,§1E1i111i111w111: [ M CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 0 LIBRARY OF - CONGRESS NUCLEAR POWER: SAFEGUARDS HINI BRIEF NUMBER BB78212 AUTHOR: Donnelly, Warren H. Senior Specialist, Energy THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE MAJOR ISSUES SYSTEM DATE ORIGINATED ggggggzg DATE UPDATED gggggggg FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL 287-5700 0317 CRS- 1 HB78212 UPDATE~O2/29/80 T~§i3.§.3.'=‘.._2§....I§?..3.3..'.3;Q§. Deterring the further spread, or proliferation, of nuclear weapons and the ability to make them is the purpose of the safeguards systems of national governments and of the International Atomic Energy Agency. This issue brief provides summary information about these systems. BACKGROUND In international usage, "safeguards" refers to a system of recordkeeping, audits, and inspections intended to deter the diversion of nuclear materials to military uses and particularly to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices by imposing risks of discovery and counteraction. In U.S. usage, "safeguards" is also defined to include physical protection and security to prevent theft of dangerous nuclear materials. Effective safeguards are necessary if the use of nuclear power is to present the minimum risk of contributing to proliferation. Safeguards alone, however, are not sufficient. other measures too are needed. This brief deals with the international safeguards that are emphasized in the Huclear Non Proliferation Act of 1978, P.L. 95-242. Safeguards are intended to deter a nation or others from attempting to divert or steal nuclear materials usable to make nuclear weapons by making such action more difficult and by presenting a probability of detection early enough to assure timely warning and to afford opportunity for counteraction. r.e scope and comprehensiveness of safeguards varies with the kind of nuclear materials to be protected. Plutonium, uranium-233, and uranium highly enriched with U-235 are materials that require the most rigorous and effective safeguards because they can be used directly to make nuclear explosives. Slightly enriched uranium and normal uranium can be safeguarded by less stringent systems because neither material is a nuclear explosive. Safeguards systems have national and international parts, both of mhich must work effectively. National safeguards systems are the responsibility of national governments and vary widely in scope and nature, depending upon the quantities and kinds of nuclear materials to be safeguarded. The international safeguards system of the IAEA consists primarily of two similar systems that nonetheless have some significant differences. One is for use in nations that have ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty (HPT) and therefore -— except for nuclear weapons states -- are committed to place all of their nuclear materials and facilities under IAEA safeguards. The other is designed for non—HPT states that have made no such commitment; it usually applies only to nuclear materials and facilities imported from a nuclear supplier state such as the United States, France, or West Germany. host nuclear supplier states, including the United States, require that IAEA safeguards be applied to their nuclear exports. Before the IAEA vas established, the United States applied its own safeguards to its nuclear exports within the importing states, including inspection by U.S. inspectors. Once the IAEA was ready, the U.S. arranged for importing countries to put F ‘. nuclear exports under the agency's safeguards. IAEA safeguards for NET states differ from those for non-EFT states in several ways. The purpose of the HPT safeguards is to ensure “the timely detection of diversion of significant guantities of nuclear material from CRS- 2 flB782 12 UPDA’;‘E"'O2/29/80 peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices...and deterrence of such diversion by risk of early detection.“ Hon-EPT safeguards seek to ensure that nuclear assistance provided by or at the request of the Agency is not used to further any ilitary purpose. NPT safeguards apply to all nuclear facilities and materials for peaceful purposes in an NPT state - except for the nuclear weapons states. Non-NPT safeguards apply only to facilities and materials that are placed under safeguards by an agreement between the possessing state and the Agency. NPT safeguards focus upon materials throughout the state and emphasize sampling, measurement, and statistical analysis rather than total inspection. They require a national system of accounting for and control of nuclear materials, which the Agency audits and inspects to verify findings of the national system. Non-NPT safeguards require only those records and reports as agreed upon between the supplier state, the receiving state, and the Agency. According to the IAEA, in 1978 it had concluded safeguards agreements with 61 of the 103 non-nuclear weapons states that have ratified the NPT, 31 of which had significant nuclear activities. Agency safeguards applied to 373 installations which contained 65 metric tons of plutonium, 11.8 metric tons of highly enriched uranium, 10,300 metric tons of slightly enriched uranium, 29,200 metric tons of source material (mainly natural uranium). Of the plutonium, 19 metric tons was in separated form, 21 metric tons was in spent fuel, and 25 metric tons was in nuclear fuel in reactors. During 1978, the Agency's nuclear materials bookeeping handled some 213,000 entries. In the United States, national responsibility for safeguards is divided betueen the Department of Ener9Y: the Department of Defense, and the Huclear Regulatory Commission. DOE is responsible for safeguarding the nuclear .terials and facilites used to make atom bombs, and nuclear fuel for the nuclear navy, including materials in transit. DOD is responsible for nuclear weapons and nuclear fuel in its possession. The NRC regulates licensees who possess nuclear materials and facilities. In the United States most of the dangerous nuclear materials and producing facilities belong to the Federal government and are under government safeguards, physical protection, and security.’ The nuclear materials held by licensees consist mainly of natural uranium and slightly enriched uranium, which can not be used directly to make nuclear explosives. A few licensees hold highly enriched uranium or plutonium for experiments. The safeguards of the DOE and DOD are wholly controlled, funded, and applied by these executive branch agencies. Safeguards under the HRC are funded and applied by licensees in compliance whith license terms and standards and regulation. The DOD and DOE can immediately order change in safeguards. The NRC can publish changes in its regulations for comment and, after the changes are finally issued, can enforce them through inspection for compliance. A few NRC licensees probably will be placed under IAEA safeguards in fulfillment of a pledge made by President Johnson when he signed the NPT in 1968 that the United States would permit the IAEA to apply its safeguards to all nuclear activities in the United States, excluding only those pertaining directly to national security. This pledge was made to neutralize the complaint of some industrial Pruntries party to the NPT who did not have nuclear weapons and who argued t it it was unfair for the U.S. nuclear industry not to be under IAEA safeguards. The United States has negotiated a safeguards agreement with the Agency, which President Carter sent to the Senate for approval as a treaty on Feb. 9, 1978. CRS-— 3 MB78212 UPDATE-O2/29/80 while effective safeguards are considered necessary for the nuclear power, some observers have expressed concern about the ability of safeguards to deter proliferation. pone argument is that the Agency's systems do not extend » physical control and security for nuclear materials and facilities. The nations that established the Agency (which included the United. States) left this function and responsibility to national governments. So no IAEA guards or security forces are to be found at nuclear installations and the Agency has no authority to set and enforce mandatory standards for protection and security. It has, however, issued a suggested guide. a Another reason for concern is secrecy of IAEA audits and inspections. The nations that created the Agency specified in its international statute that inspection results would not be disclosed by the Agency to other nations or even to the Board of Governors. also the Agency can only inspect those facilities that are identified in secret supplements to its safeguards agreements. The Agency has no independent way of verifying whether or not a nation's declaration of nuclear facilities is complete and accurate. It has no intelligence function and its inspectors can not roan at will in member states to look for clandestine facilities. i » As for the safeguards systems, there can be questions about the adequacyl of some national systems upon which the IAEA must rely in HPT states. Transcending political and technical problems of safeguards is the question of resident inspectors at facilities where the flow or storage of dangerous nuclear materials are such that continuous surveillance is necessary to overcome limitation of safeguards systems. ~ On the whole, to be effective, safeguards must have political and shnical credibility. Where political and technical measures reinforce each other, reliable safeguards are possible with a consequent lessening of proliferation risks for the benefit of global stability. An effective safeguards system must be both sound and seen as such. But the national and IABA safeguards systems can only be as reliable and persuasive as its participants want then to be. LIBRARY OF WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY 8T- LQ_!J|JS.: M9-