~ E NGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 1 B RA RY \Ng:;3hingYO!‘! University ...-«,~<—r:L-;:.'.:':r‘ ., H - ._‘;,S=-r:‘g_.§..\_ ,.- - v- ‘V’ ‘V ,, . .__ ».~~_ ‘.4. Lo"'~ . . v - . 7;“ 3 - ,—\ . . ._ \ _. ’ M _ _._ ‘ 1 , ._ I 7 . -. :‘ xv. » v E f '_\ "4 c“ _ V . . l 1 . .‘ \~ ‘ V P .«_ ~- 7 ‘ . 4 V {£5 -.2 L‘ , ._ V .. 1 .‘ / . .57 ‘vi 3‘ ' ' ‘ . - ,- 7 ‘ > , -2.; 7. urmsuxacznnqg Xx. .,~;,«.-_,-:‘ _.rn"' ' ":9 ‘fig $1 - ,'_r:r ‘ I» ’ ‘ A’. '. " ‘ ‘ “\- x? V O K, _ __n N ‘,3 . W; ‘x 3 _-ta ;: ' I {Z ‘ I 5*’ u__ 5 \ 2. v , - x « ‘ . '-V ' _ " :2 '—. ‘V " : g <- .‘.- 4. »§ - . .‘ 2 * .2 . E,-v -. ; -- ' 1. 1-: ’ "4 ,2 ‘ :13 '- Li I H ~. H ‘. M .. . , ' ’ . Q4 L‘ ,. L, ’ ,1 -r . ,, I L K '18»-id‘ £T.:'§:«\!.".:‘.’5:'n-"‘.‘~"~=~\-"-‘ ‘ ‘V ' M souri o Hflu iii ll Immijiiimlmwllm mImii"Tif "[11 01 - 0386125 POLLUTION-‘i;1Eé£)1§T;3.OL-:~ TAXES, BFrAL1DnN*ri~:cHAns2s, AND D'rHi:m‘?AAAALTERNATIVES ISSUE BRI‘E.i‘F~”NUMBER 11377009 AUTHOR: Biniek, Joseph P. Environment and Natnral Resourbes Policy Division THE LIBRARY 0? concnnss CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE MAJOR ISSUES SYSTEM DATE ORIGINATED..;,A_QgAQ_8_A‘Z.'Z DA1-E UPDATED ggglgggg FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL 287-5700 0814 cas- 1 ‘ 1377009 UPDATE-O8/12/80s ;§§UE QEFIHITIOQ The Clean Air Act of 1970 and.the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 utilize regulations and enforcement to achieve ambitious schedules associated with air’ and- water quality standards which were established to protect human health and welfare. The regulatory program has achieved some notable successes. Nonetheless, there is criticism of the approach and a call for a pricing approach to the problems of pollution. Critics argue that little progress will be made in attaining or maintaining environmental quality until pollution is recognized as an .economic problem and treated as such. Regulation does not assure cost effectiveness or allow yfor full consideration of marginal costs, markets, efficiency, weguity, or even benefits and costs, according to the critics, and therefore they propose that pollution taxes be utilized as an alternative to encompass these economic measures. Consequently, the issue centers on whether pollution taxes can be more efficient and equitable than the current regulatory-enforcement approach to abating and preventing pollution. §A£3.E§BQ9.!2-A.lJ.2_.13Q.L lS.!-A!L1L1.-..Y.§.I.§ Environmental legislation, as with all human . endeavors, involves objectives, assumptions, and data that society or individuals may agree or disagree with, or be totally indifferent tcn Thus, the methods of achieving -he objectives to protect and enhance air quality (Clean Air Act) and to restore the integrity of the nation's waters (water Pollution Control Act) are.subject to diverse views and debate. Each pollution control strategy includes separate articulations of the objective assumptions and each implies its unique interpretation of the data. Currently, there are four broad strategies, available or potentially available, for resolving the Nation's pollution problems: 1. Qi;ggt_ gggglatign: includes licensing of products, permits, enforcement of standards, new source performance standards, product standards and the use of litigation and penalties to achieve prescribed goals of environmental quality. 2. gggggtiggs: includes grants, payments, tax incentives, and subsidies - in the form of investment tax credits, rapid depreciation on pollution control equipment, and other grants, loans, or cash payments for reducing pollution discharges. 3. §;§;gggt_ghg;gg§: (a) User charges or service charges to recover cost of treatment or disposal. Usually associated with sewage treatment or solid waste disposal. (b) gggghgggg, an additional charge to distribute fairly the cost of treatment or disposal, e.g., a charge based on wastes discharged above a specified guantity. « u. gages: (a) ggg;tige_t§; on effluents or emissions (non- market units) established at a rate to induce abatement by a firm or individual polluter. (b) g§g;§g_1a;_Qr_gther levies: imposed on market goods or services that pollute, or are in short supply. Usually associated with revenue generation. CR5‘ 2 IB770G9 GPDATE*G8/12/80 The gggglgtggy approach, based on standards and compliance schedules, assumes that man and his activities are responsible for pollution which must be curtailed to protect human, health and welfare. Proponents of thi strategy hold that a uniform requirement for reduction of pollution provides a degree of equity since it precludes geographic relocation of production to avoid pollution restraints or to gain a comparative economic advantage. They argue that specific goals -based- on ~environmental ~guality protection and compliance schedules to achieve the goals ensure protection of human health and welfare. Furthermore regulations are relatively easy to establish and administer and allow for responsive action in case of an emergency situation. Opponents of regulation stress that this: strategy does, not‘ provide an economic incentive and, therefore, it is not cost effective. Uniform pregulations ignore the marginal costs of pollution control and, therefore, the total cost of control may be excessively high. The use of pollution taxes instead of regulatory programs ‘is strongly endorsed by economists. The .outgoing _Secretary .of Commerce, Eliot Richardson, took this view: There is a definite lack of flexibility in much of the environment legislation enacted by Congress. Economic considerations are grossly under-represented. For instance, the Clean Air Act makes no specific allowance for consideration of economic or technological feasibility. Regional differences are generally not taken into i account. Pacific Northwest Pulp and Paper Mills, discharging waste» into Puget sound -- a deep, fast-mowing body of water with great assimilative capacity -- must meet the same technological standards as pulp and paper mills located on small inland streams. (fi§!_XQ£E_gi!§§, Jan 20, 1977, p. 27). It is noted with respect to either approach that pollution control expenditures need not be non-productive. Business Week reports the 3M Company saved $10 million annually by averting pollution (Business Week, Nov. 1976, p. 72). The ggggnal of Qgmmgggg (July 30, 1976, p. 3 and 5) reports that an air pollution solution reduced the energy costs at a Putnam-Gellman Corp. plant by $1,000 a week with the reccwery of investment in about 2 years. These examples illustrate that regulation can-provide an incentive,‘ at least in certain circumstances, and lend some support to Baumol's assessment of regulation: ...what experience we have had with, for example, the reduction of waste discharges into waterways suggests that processes involving the recycling and reuse of waste materials can frequently be achieved at surprisingly modest cost. In such cases, the rationale for the imposition of environmental standards is clear, and it seems to us that the rejection of such crude measures on grounds that they will probably violate the requirements of optimality may well be considered a kind of perverse perfectionism. (saunol. 1'.h.e2_1'he<.>rz.<_>f_§I.11r.j1.1=.2I.2mental.._.129li21r 1975 9- 151) - Inc§gtiv§§o in the form of grants, investment tax credits,in rapid depreciation, loans, and other assistance programs are used extensively‘ to encourage compliance_with regulatory schedules. These programs reduce the economic impact of abatement and lessen the potential for dislocation, CBS? 3 IB77009 GPDATE—08/12/80 bankruptcy, and other adverse impacts while providing society with a cleaner environment. Critics, however, argue that equity principles are violated by these incentives. For example, industries or municipalities that abated pollution earlier bore the full cost of control while those not achieving the environmental goal received.assistance. Furthermore, mthey argue that the general public is paying for pollution abatement rather than the pollutor. Q§g;_gha§gg§, commonly known as sewer charges, are-used extensively in the United States. They are charges imposed by municipal governments to recover some of the costs of sewage treatment. In most cases they are surrogate charges based on water use. -- gggghgggeg are additional charges based on the "strength - guantity and intensity -- of waste discharges in relation to "normal" sewage. These ‘charges serve two major purposes. First, the charges reallocate the costs of treatment and, second, they provide an incentive to industry to reduce the quantity and the strength of waste discharges by modifying the production process, changing raw materials, pretreating wastes, or recycling water. Waste water treatment programs in the, Ruhr complex in West Germany; Cincinati, Ohio; Otsego, Michigan; the Greater Winnipeg Sanitary District; and Springfield, Missouri are classic examples of surcharge use. Kneese and Bower illustrate the effectiveness of the program in Springfield, Missouri: As a first step, the city conducted an extensive sampling program to determine the volume and characteristics of the various waste discharges. Industrial plants with discharges below the specified strength limits were exempted from the surcharge. Each of the other plants was notified of the amount of the prospective surcharge, and of the fact that the city would review the assessment whenever a plant made operational changes. Even before the first official billing, some plants began to take action. A packing plant that faced assessment of about $1400 per month modified its production processes and ended up with a sewer bill of only $225 per month. (Kneese and Bower, =Hanaging Water Quality: Economics, Technology, Institutions,= 1968. p. 169.) ’ ggni§iyg_t§gg§ or pollution taxes are imposed on a pollutor as a deterrent to encourage reformation of production operations to 'reduce pollution. In contrast to excise taxes which are imposed to raise revenue by raising the price of a marketable unit of production, punitive pollution taxes are imposed on nonmarketable effluents and emissions. A punitive tax might be imposed on emissions such as sulfur dioxide or particulate emissions from a smokestack. §xgi§g_t§gg§ are internal taxes levied, often assessed as a license or fee, on the manufacture, sale, or consumption of a commodity in a country. These taxes are generally designed to generate revenue, for example, taxes on cigarettes, automobile tires, jewelry, furs, beverage containers, highways, parking, etc. However, excise taxes can be imposed on market commodities that are in short supply or that pollute. Such a tax, to be effective, must be high enough to discourage use of the product. gyhe standards for quality established for the Clean Air Act of 1970 and .ne Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 are based on criterial documents. These documents are expressions of scientific assessments of the relationship between various concentrations of pollutants CRS- fl IB77009 UPDATE-08/12/30 and their affect on people and the environment. They identify levels of pollutants that injure or are considered likely to injure human health and welfare. ' To achieve these standards, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) developed guidelines for pollution control based on studies of existing and potential waste treatment and control technologies including the cost .of alternative control and treatment technologies. ~ u These documents serve as the scientific and technical framework for environmental goals and the regulatory basis for protecting human health and welfare. The decisions to use the current system of standards, regulations, and enforcement were not made without debate and consideration of the alternatives. ‘The issue of pollution taxes was discussed as early as 1965 by ythe Environmental Pollution Panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) in its report "Restoring the Quality of the Environment" (1965, p 17). The following year, the Council of Economic Advisors called for pollution taxes. The Council stated: ...the Federal Government cannot.and should not finance local waste treatment indefinitely. -In the long run, localities should collect revenues from the pollutors, adequate to sustain the system and to expand it in line with normal growth. Charges based on the use of treatment facilities provide long-run incentives for the abatement of pollution. Effluent charges on pollutors in sections of the river where there is no municipal treatment could have a similar effect: when waste discharges cost the industrial firm a certain amount for every pound discharged, the volume of wastes will be reduced and the revenue collected will help to pay for collective treatment.t (Economic Report of the President, 1966, p- 124). Revenue collection has been incorporated in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (P.L. 92-500) Sec. 203 (b). Industries discharging into municipal sewer systems are required to pay a share of capital and operating costs. However, an amendment to impose a more comprehensive pollution tax system to this legislation was defeated (Legislative History of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, p. 1316-1336). - An economic approach argues that the costs or damages imposed on society by pollution are a direct result of the failure of markets to reflect the full cost of production. These damages (externalities), according to the argument, can be incorporated into the market system by imposing a pollution tax. The economic rationale suggests that firms will seek to avoid this tax by abating pollution in an optimum manner up to the point where marginal costs of control equal the tax. Since pollution abatement costs may vary within an industry, the firms with lower abatement costs will reduce pollution more than firms with higher costs. The desired pollution reduction will be attained at a lower total cost than would be possible under uniform regulation or prohibition of pollution. Thus, the pricing scheme, the arguments state, is more efficient, gives greater freedom to respond to the market in an optimal manner, and is more cost effective. -31 An elaboration of these basic assumptions and the essential arguments" for” the pollution tax approach were summarized succinctly by N.K. Lee in a review of three texts on environmental economics: CRS- 5 IB77GG9 UPDATE—G8/12/80 ...there can be little doubt that the interpretation of environmental problems as external diseconomies lies closest to public policy. t(0dd1y, public law is still very much committed to government regulation -- anathema to market-minded economists.) The skeleton of the analysis is plain. From economic theory, we adopt three axioms: (i) individual self interest underlies human behavior; (ii) prices act as signals guiding this behavior; (iii) trade-offs -- more elaborately, decisions derived from ~cost-benefit analyses -- can be steered by suitable management of prices. This set of assumptions permits, in principle, the implementation of an optimal allocation of resources, within the framed -- if ever unobserved --free market. From our recent environmental past, we add three conditions: (i) goods formerly free, including air, water, and some land, have become scarce; (ii) but the market has not properly assigned them prices, because they are in a crucial respect common property -- namely, the costs of maintaining environmental quality are difficult to apportion, even when the benefits to be derived from despoiling the environment are quite divisible; thus (iii) intervention by government is required. What sort of ' intervention? when one considers the difficulty of enforcing most forms of regulation, all three texts argue, it becomes impressively clear that only so-called "shadow prices," by which individuals and firms pay to pollute, will work. This is the rationale for the effluent charge, as this kind of shadow price is called. (ggigggg, Vol. 182, Nov. 30, 1973, p. 911).n Although the foregoing arguments appear theoretically sound, Baumol cautions that. "a number‘ of widely held views about the theory of externalities are unfounded" and "several (frequently undetected) booby traps...threaten the unwary in the use of the theory" (Baumol, 1975, p. 7). Furthermore, critics argue that establishment and collection of pollution taxes would require an extreme amount of monitoring. In addition, if taxes are too low, no pollution reduction would occur, thus, establishing a license to pollute. If taxes are too high, industry might be forced to close. Since there may be no specific relationship between "economic fine tuning" and the levels of pollution that affect public health, the most logical compromise might incorporate quality standards and pollution taxes. The omission of the pricing scheme in pollution control legislation is often attributed to the »failure of legislators and environmentalists to understand the economic rationale for pollution taxes. But the omission may stem in large part from~ ambiguity in the literature of proponents of pollution taxes. Pollution taxes, user charges, polluter pay, effluent charges, emission taxes, and a myriad of other terms are common in the literature on pollution control and the reader is not always certain whether an author is referring to a sewen.charge, surcharge, a punitive tax to induce abatement, an excise tax to reduce pollution and/or generate revenue. That pollution taxes could be used to generate revenue which then could be used to compensate those harmed by pollution or to finance other sound objectives is 7ten cited as an advantage of the approach. The difficulty with this reasoning arises from the conflicting objectives of revenue generation and environmental protection. CBS- 6 IB77009 »UPDATE-08/12/30 The Clean Air Act-Amendments of 1977, (P.L. 95-95) provide for penalties designed to make noncompliance more expensive than compliance. Assessments of penalties are required on a quarterly basis and the assessment is not * equal less than the quarterly equivalent of capital costs of compliance and debt service over the amortization period, plus the value of foregone operation and maintenance costs, plus the economic value gained by delay in compliance. ’Penalties assessed by States will be paid to the State and those assessed by the Federal Government will be paid to the U.S. Treasury. * Section 6 of the Clean Water Act (P.L. 95-217) allows the use of an ad valorem tax system to satisfy the user charge requirements established by Section 204 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendment of 1972, provided the tax results in an equitable distribution of costs among classes of users. ' - ' ' P.L. 95-600 (H.R. 13511), the Revenue Act of 1978, amends the Internal Revenue Code of 195a to provide for full investment credit in a pollution control facility where a 5-year amortization has been elected. However, where the facility has been financed by tax-exempt industrial development bonds, the credit is available for only 50%»of the investment. The debates and action to date still leave a number of issues unresolved. Among these are: A- ‘ 1. What is the size of the charge, surcharge or punitive tax that- would achieve goals comparable to those provided by the Clean Air Act and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act? 2. Can pollution taxes be more cost effective in controlling pollution than regulations and incentives? 3. Should pollution taxes be utilized in conjunction with standards? 1 4. Although surcharges appear to be effective in water pollution control, can similar charges be established for air in view of the ubiquitous nature of air pollution and current inability to establish comparable waste treatment for air pollution? ' L§§l§LAI 0! H.R. 5339 (Seiberling et al.) Amends the Internal Revenue Code of 195a to provide that a taxpayer may, with respect to any pollution control facility used in connection with a plant or other property in operation before Jan. 1, 1971, elect a 12-month amortization of such facility or a 20% investment tax credit. H.R. 5394 (Atkinson) Amends the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to allow the rapid amortization of federally required capital expentitures. Introduced Sept. 25, 1979; referred to Committee on Ways and Means. 1 S. 935 (Chafee et al.) CRS- 7 6 1377009 UPDATE-08/12/80 Amends the Internal Revenue. Code of 1954 to provide an election to depreciate property eligible for the investment credit over 5 years, to allow, the amoritization of pollution control equipment over 2 years, and has other purposes. 0 ;» . §§ABlfl§§ 0.5. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Subcommittee on Natural Resources and Power. Water pollution control and abatement. Hearings, 88th Congress, 1st and 2d sessions. Washington, 0.5. Govt. Print. Off. 1966. 0.5. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government. Economic analysis and the efficiency of government. Part C: economic incentives to control pollution. ‘Hearings, 92d Congress, 1st session. July 12 and ‘19, 1971. Washington, 0.3. Govt. Print- Off. . 0.5. Congress. Senate. Committee on Public Works. Panel on Materials Policy of the Subcommittee on Environmental Pollution. To consider the effects of product disposal charges on municipal recovery and reuse. Hearings, 90th Congress, 2d session. ‘Washington, 0.3. Govt. Print. Off., 1976. §§£Q§I§-A!2-§Q!§E§§§lQ!AL_2Q§Q!E!I§ Aspin, Les. Taxing the profits out of pollution. Progressive magazine, March 1972. Congressional record, v. 118, Mar. 1, 1972: 6n70-6472- 0.5. Congress. Conference Committees, 1977. Clean Air Act Admentments of 1977; conference report to accompany H.R. 6161. Washington, 0.5. Govt. Print. Off., 1977. 189 p. (95th Congress, 1st session. House. Report no. 95-564.) 0.5. Congress. Conference Committee, 1977. Report to accompany H.R. 3199. Dec. 6, 1977. Washington, 0.3. Govt. Print. Off., 1977. (95th Congress, 1st session. House. Report no. 95-830) 0.8. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Views of the governors on tax incentives and effluent charges. Union Calendar no. 567. Mar. 15, 1966. Washington, 0.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1966. (89th Congress, 2d session. House. Report no. 1330) 0.5. Congress. House. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977; report to accompany H.R. 6161, together with additional, separate, and supplemental views, and including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office. May 12, 1977. ‘Washington, 0.5. Govt. Print. Off., 1977. (95th Congress, 1st session. House. Report no. 95-294) CRS- 8 . IB77009 UPDATE-O3/T2/30 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Ways and Means. Material related to the administration's proposal for environmental protection. Washington, 0.3. Govt. Print. Off., February 1972. At head of title: 92d Congress, 2d session. Committee print. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Environment and Public Works. Clean Air Amendments of 1977; report together with additional views to accompany S. 252. May 10, 1977. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977. (95th Congress, 1st session. senate. Report no. 95-127) ---- Pollution taxes, effluent charges, and other alternatives for pollution control. A report prepared by the Environment and Natural Resources Policy Division of the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, at the request of senator Edmund S. uuskie. [Washington, U.s. Govt. Print. Off.] May 1977. At head of title: 95th Congress, 1st session. ‘Committee print. . . . "Serial no. 95-5" ---- The Clean Water Act showing changes made by the 1977 amendments. December 1977. ‘Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977. _ At head of title: 95th Congress, 1st session. Committee print. 3 "serial no. 95-12“ 0-5. Congress. Senate. Committee on Public Works. Legislative history of the water pollution control act amendments of 1972. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. 0ff.: 1316-1357. At head of title: 93d Congress, 1st session. Committee print. §§§QHQLQ§I_QE-§!EEI§ 11/06/78 -- H.R. 13511 enacted (P.L. 95-600). 12/27/77 -- H.B. 3199 enacted (P.L. 95-217). 08/07/77 -- H.R. 6161 signed into law (P.L. 95-95). A22l1lQEAL-§§E§B§E§§-§9QBQ§§ Anderson, Frederick R., and Allen V. Kneese et al. Environmental improvement through economic incentive. Resources for the Future. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 1977. Anderson, Robert J. Jr., and James E. Wilen. The proposed pure air tax act of 1972: some cautionary comments on missionary zeal. National tax journal, v. 27, March 197a: 151-162. Baumol, William J. and Wallace B. Oates. The theory of environmental _policy. Englevood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, Inc., 1975. Buchanan, James. M. and Gordon Tullock. Polluters' profits and political response: direct controls versus taxes. American CRS- 9 IB77009 UPDATE-O8/12/80 economic review, v. 65, march 1975: 139-1u7. ---- Polluters‘ profits and political response: direct control versus taxes: ~reply. American economic review, v. 66, no. 5. December 1976: 983-984. - Cannon, W. Daniel. A pollution tax won't help control pollution. Remarks before the Environmental Study Conference. United States Congress. [Washington, D.C.] may 26, 1976 (mimeo). . Coelho, Philip R. P. Polluters profits and political response: direct control versus taxes: ‘comment. American economic review, v. 66, no. 5, December 1976: 976-978. Devees, D. N., C. K. Everson and W.A. Simms. Economic analysis of environmental policies. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1975. Dorfman, Robert and Nancy S. Dorfman, editors. Economics of the "environment: selected readings. New York, W.H. Norton and Company, Inc., 1972. Economics of transfrontier pollution. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.‘ Paris, 1976. Effluent charges on air and water pollution. 'A conference report of the Council on Lav-Related Studies. Washington, D.C., Environmental Law Institute, 1973.. — Fiessinger, Francois,.and P.'.l'. Teniere-Buchot. Pollution fees are for real in France. Water spectrum.. Spring—Summer, 1976: 29-35." . . Freeman, A- Hyrick III and Robert H. Haveman. Residual charges for pollution control: a policy evaluation. Science, v. 177, July 28, 1972: 322-329. Freeman, A. nyrick III and Robert Haveman and Allen V. Kneese. The economics of environmental policy. New York, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1973. Hausgaard Olaf. Proposed tax on sulfur content of fossil fuels. Public utilities fortnightly, Sept. 17, 1971: 27-33. Hill, Robert L. Pollution: how much per pound? Public utilities fortnightly, v. 97, no. 13, June 17, 1976. Hite, James C., Hugh H. Macaulay, James M. Stepp and Bruce Yandle Jr. Economic measures for pollution abatement, chapt. 6 in "The economics of environmental quality." Washington, D-C., American Enterprises Institute for Public Policy Research. 1972. Hubbard, Ivan. Foster children of economics. The journal of environmental education, v. 7, no. 3, Spring 1976: 11-19. Implementation of pollution charges. Organization for Economic &A.Cooperation and Development. Paris. 1976. Irwin, William and Richard Liroff. 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People and taxes, v. 4, January 1976: 10-11. Lumb, Harold C. Fallacies of a pollution tax. _Industrial water engineering, April 1971. p. 15-18. « Hacaulay, Hugh H. Use of taxes, subsidies, and regulation for pollution abatement. Report no. 16. Water_Resources Research Institute. Report No. 43. Clemson University, Clemson, S.C., uay‘1973. Hccloskey, Michael and Julia Hillis. Economic deterrents, penalizing polluters, part I. Sierra Club Bulletin, v. 56, no. 9, Nov. 1, 1971: 9-13. Main, Robert S. and Charles W. Baird. Polluters' profits and political response: direct control versus taxes. Comment. American ' economic review, v. 66, no. 5, December 1976:‘ 979-980. Aandelker, Daniel R. and Thea A. Sherry. Emission quota strategies as an air pollution control technique. Ecology law quarterly, v. 5, no. 3, 1973: ‘H01-431. nan, materials and environment. A report for the National Commission on Haterials Policy by the Nationa1.Academy of Sciences. National Academy of Engineering. Barch 1973. 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Should we now turn to effluent charges —— another weapon available for the war against pollution? CF Letter. 6-71. The Conservation Foundation. Washington, D.C., June 1971. Solov, Robert H. The economist's approach to pollution and its control. Science, v. 173, August 1971: #98-503. Taxable band option examined. Tax notes. Mar. 29, 1976. v. IV, issue no. 13. Tax analysts and associates. Arlington, Va.: 3-23. Tunderman, David W. Economic enforcement tools for pollution control: the Connecticut plan. Remarks before the Environmental Study :'~‘€Lut.115)v_p:.J_,-;13,_»‘.__-,,,_,_‘1.,_‘,L__x___“ 1 (_ ; CR3-‘I2 IB77009 UPDATE‘-08/"'12/' Conference. .U.S. Congress, Hay 26, 1976 (nimeo). Turning the tables on polluters.‘ Coalition to tax polluters. Washingtor DoCo' PO port to Congress: 0.5. Environmental Protection Agency. Second re 109-112. resource recovery and waste reduction, 197a: ---- Third Report to Congress: resources recovery and waste reduction, 1975: 24-31. white, Lawrence J. Effluent charges as a faster means of achieving 1, Winter 1976: pollution abatement. Public policy, v. 24, no. 11-125. . ‘ white, Ron D. The anatomy of non—market failure: an examination American economic review, v. 66, of environmental policies. Hay 1976: HSQ-H58. Yohe, Gary W. Polluters' profits and political response: direct control versus taxes: comment. American economic review, v. 66, no. 5, December 1976: 981-982. L’-~’?'~‘—*'1" !a'r ‘:3:-‘.1: ' ‘ Ti§$. . ”"“:'“"‘l—‘|fl'-I-K.-'.-..--:.~,.~;_«‘., M 3 F113: RY p er "s:*’5‘:»¥';.v‘i3T:;é$'7§ H 5 N 1.3)} {1K'f ‘. __ ._ _ M “as 11",: 9;? :_--;5: * \,’’rb--' 7?‘-Ir » .. ‘ _r _ Er’ 1?‘ '; :v -::.'-.r.~ -\