' CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS UITI [jl Ill 3861 3 9 INDOCHINESE REFUGEE EXODUS: CAUSES, IMPACT, PROSPECTS ISSUE BRIEF NUMBER IB79079 AUTHOR: Niehaus, Marjorie Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE HAJOR ISSUES SYSTEH DATE ORIGINATED 91119413 DATE UPDATED ggggggg FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL 287-5700 0702 cRs- 1 1379079 upnarn-05/30/so IS SUB DEFINITION Vietnamese and Heng Samrin forces crossed into Thailand on June 23, 19805 and attacked two Khmer refugee encampments in the Thai-Khmer border area north of Arnyaprathet, and several Thai villages about two miles inside Thailand. After two days of fighting Vietnamese troops pulled back from Thai territory. The premeditated incursion caused about 100 Thai and Vietnamese military killed, and about 1,000 Khmer refugees either wounded or killed. as many as 100,000 Khmer fled the refugee encampments in the border area. i Among the causes of the Vietnamese attacks were the recent repatriation of Khmer and the international border assistance programs which Hanoi views as aiding Khmer resistance forces. Since June 17, the Thai military and officials of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have been repatriating several thousand Khmer who had volunteered to return to their homeland. Hanoi and Phnom Penh denounced the voluntary repatriation program as an attempt to strengthen Khmer Rouge and other resistance forces inside Kampuchea. According to Western diplomatic sources, only a few thousand of the hundreds of thousands of displaced Khmer in the border areas actively support resistance forces, but as many as three-quarters of the 8,000 repatriated Khmer might be supporters of the resistance groups. The repatriation program was to be followed by other movements of Khmer 1 zhin Thailand. The objectives of these movements were: (1) to allow the Khmer who wanted to return home to do so; (2) to reduce the size of Khao I Dang holding center (130,000) to a manageable number; and (3) to empty Sakeo A I before the monsoon rains make the low-lying camp uninhabitable. More than 0 million Khmer are dependent on external aid for their basic needs. In late 1979, famine conditions, as well as increased hostilities in Kampuchea (Cambodia), caused 150,000 Khmer to cross the Thai border. An additional 600,000 Khmer moved to encampments straddling the Thai-Khmer border which received food and medical assistance from international groups; A generous international response helped avert hunger and disease of hundreds of thousands of Khmer. As many as one-third of the people who came to the border in late 1979 returned home in spring 1980. However, according to recent estimates, 200,000 tons of foreign food shipments and fl0,000 tons of rice seed, fertilizer, and pesticides are needed to avert a 1980-81 famine in ‘Kampuchea. In the monsoon season, June-October, if hostilities and food shortages increase, additional thousands of Khmer might cross into Thailand, and as many as 1 million Khmer might push to the border. International and private assistance programs are underway for the Khmer inside Kampuchea, those in the Thai-Khmer border area, those outside Kampuchea, and the displaced Thais. U.S. initiatives have expanded and expedited these programs. However, political and logistic considerations blocked full scale distribution of humanitarian assistance to the Khmer people. The recent refugee exodus from Kampuchea compounded a larger scale Indochinese refugee problem which began in April 1975. In addition to the Khmer refugees near the Thai-Khmer border, more than 200,000 refugees from Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea live in crowded, temporary Southeast Asian camps and transit centers. Approximately 18,000 refugees from Laos and Vietnam iarrived during Hay 1980. CRS- 2 1379079 UPDATE-06/30/80‘ Although more than 800,000 Indochinese refugees have already be snpermanently resettled in Western countries and China, more than 200,0uu resettlement opportunities are needed. The first—asylum countries view the refugee problem primarily as a threat to their internal security, as well as a major cause of instability in the Southeast Asian region as a whole. The Vietnamese incursion of Thai territory in June 1980 increased these concerns. The United States, ASBAN members, and China have pledged to counter any 9 threat to Thailand's sovereignty. As of June 1, 1980, the major locations of first asylum for Indochinese refugees were: Thailand (138,000 in UN-sponsored camps, 165,000 Khmer in holding centers, and 110,000 in encampments along the Thai-Khmer border); Hong Kong (44,000); Malaysia (23,000), Indonesia (13,000); Philippines (3,436 in camps and 9,257 in reprocessing center); uacau (4,000); and Singapore (2,690). Refugees from Laos and Kampuchea are housed in large numbers only in Thailand. ' The major countries of permanent resettlement for Indochinese refugees were: the United States (360,193); China (255,000); France (63,771); Canada (55,676); Australia (39,053); West Germany 12,000); United Kingdom (9,fl70)k Switzerland (4,000); Belgium (3,000); Netherlands (3,000); Malaysia (2,000); New Zealand (2,000); and Italy (2,000). * §.3.§E§EQ!.1!2-A.1l2-2QLl§Z-AflALX§l§ Since the establishment of Communist governments in Indochina in 197., more than 1-8 million refugees have fled their homelands in‘ Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea due to poor economic and human rights conditions in those countries. According to some estimates, as many as one-third of these persons died in the search for temporary shelter, and another 1 million may flee in the months ahead. After 1977, the number of refugees increased substantially because of the implementation of certain economic measures, increased restrictions on civil and personal liberties, and an acceleration of armed conflict in each of the Indochinese states, highlighted by Vietnamfie invasion of Kampuchea in December 1978, and China's punitive strike intb Vietnam in February 1979. ' Also, in late 1978, the Vietnamese government began a systematic campaign of expulsion of ethnic Chinese and other potentially dissident groups. After international pressure was brought to bear on Hanoi concerning its role in the exodus of large numbers of refugees, the rate of the refugee exodus fro Vietnam greatly declined from 60,000 in mid-1979 to less than 3,000 by the year's end. i Vietnam There have been four phases in the Vietnamese refugee exodus: (1) the initial exodus in April 1975 of about 200,000 refugees, including tme v'evacuation of 135,000 Vietnamese for the United States; (2) a steady flc overland and by sea, of approximately 1,500 per month, which took place between mid—1975 and late 1977; (3) a heavy flow of refugees after 1971, largely directed by Hanoi, which reached more than 60,000 per month by June 1979, of which large numbers were Vietnamese of Chinese extraction; and (0) .after July 1979, when Hanoi altered its role in the refugee exodus and the numbers of refugees from Vietnam declined from 60,000 to about 3,000 per cns- 3 1379079 UPDATE-06/30/80 month. ghg§g_Qgg; In the first phase, flight was motivated chiefly «by fear of Communist reprisals and by hopes of finding better living conditions in the United States than those expected under a Communist regime. Many of the 135,000 Vietnamese who fled to the United States in April 1975 had worked with the U.S. Government or the Thieu government, or had friends and relatives in the United States. A small number, perhaps 3,000 persons, subsequently returned to Vietnam under UN auspices. 0 gha§g_Tgg: The second phase consisted mainly of a steady stream of approximately 1,500 refugees per month who fled Vietnam in small boats to Malaysian, Thai, and other Southeast Asian ports. A smaller number of Vietnamese escaped overland through Laos or Kampuchea into Thailand, and several thousand Vietnamese who had been living in Kampuchea fled into Thailand during this period. Host of ‘the refugees have said they fled Vietnam because of economic hardships, loss of personal freedoms, and fear of being sent to the "reeducation camps" or tx>the New Economic Zones (NEZS). The "reeducation camps" were established by Hanoi to deal with those southerners who, according to the Communists, were in need of "changes in attitude” before they could participate in the new society. Hanoi officials have stated that.50,000 persons were being held in camps, but according to refugee reports and other sources in Vietnam, the number of detainees is 100,000 — 300,000. Refugee reports and French research indicate that life ih these camps was extremely hard, that many detainees died of malnutrition» disease, and mistreatment, including torture. The NEZ plan consisted of relocating persons to remote parts of the country where they were resettled as farmers. In the north, since 1961, more than one million persons have been relocated. In the south, about 1.5 million persons have been assigned to NEZs, but because of harsh conditionsg inexperience in clearing land and in agricultural production, and dislocations suffered as a result of the border wars, thousands of southerners deserted the REZS, slipping back into the urban areas or fleeing the country. 3 gha§e_gh;gg; Whereas before 1978 those fleeing Vietnam were predominantly ethnic Vietnamese from the south, beginning in April 1978 the refugees from Vietnam included high percentages of Sino-Vietnamese from both the north and the south. Major causes of the change in rate and composition of the refugee exodus appeared to be Hanoi's implementation of restrictive economic and social measures throughout the country, and the deterioration of Sino-Vietnamese relations which precipitated a harsh attitude toward the ethnic Chinese minority on the part of the Vietnamese. The historic Vietnamese struggle to withstand Chinese dominance contributed to the strong anti-Chinese sentiment. Sino-Vietnamese relations worsened in 1978 because of China's support of the Pol Pot regime's border war with Vietnam; Vietnam's close ties with the Soviet Union; and the termination of Chinese aid to Vietnam, which in recent y'1rs, had totalled $300 million annually. The Sino-Vietnamese dispute became public in the spring of 1978 when more than 160,000 Vietnamese of Chinese origin fled overland into China from northern Vietnam before China sealed its land borders in July 1978. (Subsequently an additional 70,000 refugees fled by boat into China.) The Vietnamese government claimed that China had incited these refugees to flee CRS- is 1379079 UPDATE-0 6/30/ego in order to deprive Vietnam of skilled workers such as coal miners and do.- workers. According to some observers, the Chinese contributed to the exodus by encouraging the feelings of insecurity on the part of the ethnic Chinese minority in Vietnam. However, according to refugee reports and sources inside Vietnam, the single major reason ethnic Chinese fled into China frdm the north in 1978 was harassment from Hanoi in terms of greatly increased taxes, loss of jobs, intimidation and abuse»by officials, and many social restrictions. The third phase of the refugee exodus (April 1978-July 19795 « appeared to be encouraged by Hanoi as a means to rid Vietnam of those persons . in the north and south who might pose security risks during a Sino-Vietnamese 1 conflict, or those who resisted the newly implemented economic measures. When Hanoi ordered the elimination of private commerce, including the confiscation of more than 30,000 private businesses in southern Vietnam in March 1978, and the amalgamation in may of the dual currencies which had existed for north and south since 1975, the~majority of those most adversely affected were Vietnamese of Chinese origin, who for generations had played a large part in Vietnam's commerce. Generally associated‘ with merchant and middleman roles in the Vietnamese economy, the ethnic Chinese came under growing pressure from a Communist regime that sees those roles as unproductive and exploitive. By mid-1978, increasing pressure was exerteh against the ethnic Chinese either to flee the country for a fee or to tufin their property over to the state and be sent to a New Economic Zone. Harshness toward the ethnic Chinese in the north and the south accelerated _after China's military strike into Vietnam during February 1979. During this same period, more than 500,000 refugees fled from southern Vietnam, with many losing their lives en route to shelter. At least one-third of those who reached safe haven were ethnic Chinese, many of whom paid Vietnamese officials $2,000 per person in gold to flee in groups of several thousand aboard overcrowded freighters. According to sources withih Vietnam, Hanoi set up a boat building industry specifically to move ethnic Chinese and other "undesirables" out of the country. The refugee exodusg which was estimated by some analysts to earn the Vietnamese government $115 million in 1978, became the major source of foreign exchange for Vietnamgx International banking sources in Hong Kong reported in mid-1979 that overseas Chinese, in efforts to help their relatives in Vietnam, remitted several hundred million dollars to the Bank of Vietnam in 1979. Much of the amount was designated to pay the boat passages for fleeing ethnic Chinese. At UN conferences on Indochinese refugees held in December 1978, May 1979, and July 1979, several delegations raised the issue of Hanoi's encouragement viof the large refugee exodus as a means to rid Vietnam of those "ideologically unsuited“ for Vietnam's economic and social structure, at the same time collecting the gold and currency it had failed to exproriate in other ways. A Vietnam's representatives denied the charges and described the refugees as a small minority who had become used to "unproductive consumption." Hanoi also accused China of inciting refugees to flee from the north. * Another factor compounding the political.problems in Vietnam were sever” shortages of food and goods. These shortages resulted from the impact poor management and natural disasters. In September and October 1978, Vietnam suffered the most severe flooding in its recent history. Droughts, typhoons, cold spells, scarcities of fertilizers, insecticides, and equipment, and the resistance by some to nationalization of private assets resulted in the need to import large amounts of grain, including two million ’tons of rice. cRs- 5 1379079 UPDATE-06/30/80 In addition, conflicts with Kampuchea and China in 1978 and 1979 diverted V tnam's scanty resources from the tasks of reconstruction and appeared to bog down Vietnam's army, which might have helped tremendously in reconstruction works. since the Chinese strike into Vietnam in February 1979, Hanoi has increased the number of troops near the Chinese border from 70,000 to 200,000. Also, at least 170,000 troops are engaged in combat and occupation activities in Kampuchea. gha§g_§9g;; After July 1979, the numbers of refugees from Vietnam reaching first—asylum locations greatly declined. Whereas in May 19795 60,000 Vietnamese sought asylum,. by October less than 3,500 Vietnamese refugees reached first-asylum countries. Hajor reasons for the lower numbers were: (1) international criticism of Hanoifis role in the exodus which led Hanoi to announce in July that it would "make every effort to stop illegal departures;" (2) Vietnam's interests in implementing an “orderly departure" program of 10,000 persons per month; and (3) stricter ASEAN patrols prohibiting refugees from entering the waters of some first-asylum countries. (1) lntsrna:i2nal-2;itisi§n_9:.Ea29;; In view. of the more than 60,000 refugees per month fleeing from Vietnam by mid-1979, the ASEMN nations, the United States, a majority of Western countries, China, and other nations strongly criticized the policies of Hanoi, which, according to these nations, provided conditions so deplorable that hundreds of thousands of people chose to flee Vietnam despite enormous risk and hardship. Many analysts estimated that 30% to 70% of those fleeing Vietnam in mid-1979 lost their lives on the sea- some were the victims of pirate raids. Others were f ‘ned back once they reached foreign territories and subsequently died of emposure or drowning. In order to address the problem of the refugees from Vietnam, UN Secretary Kurt Haldheim convened a conference in Geneva on July 20-21, 1979, which was attended by delegations from more than 60 nations. One result of the conference was a pledge from Hanoi "that for reasonable period of time it will make every effort to stop illegal departures." Despite skepticism on their part, the ASEAN nations were pleased with the Vietnamese pledge. other delegations, however, expressed concern that Hanoi's efforts to halt the flow of refugees might include restrictions on free emigration and might encourage harsher internal conditions. The United States had hoped that Hanoi's response would have permitted free emigration especially for family reunification and humanitarian reasons, and at the same time would have applied humane internal policies so that large numbers of its people would not feel forced to escape their homeland. « (2) !;s$nam:§_£9;és;lz-Qe2artnrsfl-2r2gram; In January 1979. Hanoi announced a program of "orderly departure" or direct emigration of 10,000 persons per month "who want to work abroad or for the purpose of family reunification.“ Subsequently, Vietnamese cificials said that as many as 600,000 persons might emigrate from Vietnam. In may 1979, the UNHCR and Vietnam reached an agreement by which persons w ‘e to qualify for the program by appearing on both the list given to UNHCR by Vietnam, and one given to UNHCR by the receiving country. By early 1980; about 900 persons had left Vietnam under this program, including 350 to the United States. Some analysts predicted that Vietnam might revert to encouraging large numbers to flee if the pace of departures by direct emigration did not increase. ‘ I CBS= 6 IB79079 UPDATE-06/30/30 The United States, as well as other Western nations, welcomed in princip‘* the plan for direct emigration, but difficulties have arisen with the plan,, implementation. One major problem involves who should emigrate. Whereas tme United States and other nations were concerned with the thousands of family reunification cases, Hanoi appears to view the program as a means to alloy 9 unwanted citizens to leave the country. For example, a predominant numbem, if not all, of the 21,000 persons on the lists provided by Hanoi in October 1979 were ethnic Chinese. There were also administrative problems, such as the sparse information concerning the potential emigrees provided by Hanoi. Also, the United States had requested that four 0.5. consular officers be mplaced under the UNHCR office in Ho Chi Minh City to process emigration forms. Hanoi rejected the request, and has delayed in permitting pre-process data gathering. 1 (3) A§§;g_pat;9l§: After June 1979, the ASEAN states, with the exception of the Philippines, grefused to accept additional refugees and threatened to expel those already in the temporary camps on their soil unless the refugees were resettled in other countries in a reasonable time. Tme anxiety concerning the refugee influx was based on fear of involvement in an armed conflict; fear of domestic racial conflicts; and economic pressures. Thai troops forced back 42,000 Khmers into Kampuchea, and Malaysian military turned away more than 55,000 boat people. Also, an ASEAN joimt border patrol limited the number of refugees reaching first-asylum territories after July 1979. However, after the Geneva conference solicited 160,000 additional resettlement opportunities through 1980, and after the” numbers fleeing Vietnam declined, Thailand, Malaysia, and cmher ASEAN states modified their policies and again provided temporary asylum to Indochinese refugees. ‘ EQEEEEQEE There have been three major waves of Khmer refugees. The first occurred eafter the establishment of Pol Pot's regime in April 1975. The second wave followed the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in late 1978 and the subsequent ouster of Pol Pot's government from Phnom Penh. The third wave began in September 1979 after famine conditions inside Kampuchea had reached crisis proportions and after hostilities increased between the Vietnamese and the reamining resistance forces in the western and southwestern sections of the country. 0 w 2h§§g_Qng: Throughout Indochina, social conditions have been harshest in Kampuchea after the Khmer Rouge took control of Phnom Penh on Apr. 17, 1975. In the first months, there were summary executions of approximately 100,000 persons, mostly soldiers and officials of the former government and enforced mass movement of people from the urban areas into the countryside. According to a British Foreign Office report, nearly 3 million persons died of mistreatment, malnutrition, and disease as a result of government campaigni The Pol Pot regime made an abrupt break with the past and eliminated privat, property, education, currency, and most social institutions. The refugees who fled both into Vietnam (150,000) and into Thailand (33,000) spoke of brutal killings, shortages of food and medicine, enforced hard labor, and disease. The numbers of refugees was undoubtedly limited both by the Pol Pot ‘regime's extensive control of population mcwements and by the large numbers killed. CRS— 7 IB79079 UPDATE-06/30/80 §§§§§_2!Q; After the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and the subsequemt ouster of the Pol Pot regime from Phnom Penh in January 1979, more than 100,000 Khmer fled into'Thai1and. The Thai government did not consider these Khmer to be "refugees" in the strict sense, arguing that these persons wanted to return to their homeland after the conflict was ended. Thailand as-well as other ASEAN members feared that a depopulated Kampuchea would sooner or later be colonized by Vietnam. Accordingly, the Royal Thai Army strongly discouraged, sometimes by force, the Khmer from crossing intb ’ Thailand. In June more than 02,000 Khmer were forcibly returned to Kampuchea by Thai troops. Others who crossed the border ‘were kept outside the UN, camps, although the Thai government prcwided them with some food and supplies. 2 ghg§g_gh§eg: Another wave of Khmer began in September 1979 after famine conditions inside Kampuchea had reached crisis proportions and after the Vietnamese began a dry-season offensive against the remaining resistance, forces in the western and southwestern sections of the country. After strong international pressure to do so, including demarches from Members of Congress, and for humanitarian reasons, in late October, Thailand altered its refugee policy and began accepting all Indochinese refugees for temporary asylum on Thai soil. By June 1980, more than 150,000 Khmer were in TN holding centers in Thailand, more than 110,000 Khmer were in encampments straddling the Thai-Khmer border, and more than 300,000 Khmer travel by oxcart, bicycle or foot from interior Kampuchea to receive food and medicine 2 border distribution points. In total, more than 500,000 Khmer are fed ,1 “rough the border distribution system. In June 1980, the UNHCR began voluntary repatriation of Khmer from holding centers Khao I Dang and Sakeo. The program was denounced by Hanoi and Phnom Penh as an attempt to strengthen Khmer Rouge and other resistance forces inside Kampuchea. Vietnamese forces attacked Khao I Dang and the area north of Aranyaprathet, Thailand, on June 23, 1980, and forcibly stopped the repatriation program. UN officials said that Khmer refugee casualties were high and that the Vietnamese incursion sent about 75,000 Khmer fleeing into Thailand from the camps straddling the border. I §§g;gg_Qgnd;t;gg§_;n_Kagpgghg§; In August 1979, authorities in Phnom Penh estimated that, to prevent the starvation of 2.25 million people, at least 165,000 tons of assistance should be distributed over a 6-month period. Less than 10% of the arable land had been planted; fewer than 50 doctors were in the country. A decade of war and brutal regimes had destroyed traditional Khmer society. In addition, both Vietnamese and resistance troops have used food as a weapon, engaging in crop destruction and denial tactics. After months of tedious negotiations, in October 1979 ICRC/UNICEF began La relief operation into Kompong Som and Phnom Penh and coordinated relief efforts in the Thai-Khmer border area. ’ The international aid effort was reasonably successful on the ThairKhmer b *der where approximately 700,000 Khmer were fed and given medical a-sistance through the ICRC/UNICEF distribution system. By June 1, 1980; more than 86,000 tons of food and medicine had been distributed. Recently 15,000 tons of rice seed has been distributed. some aid was sold on the black market; some reached Khmer Rouge troops. é However, the Western aid effort in Vietnamese-controlled areas of cRs— 3 1379079 upnATm—o5/30/ab Kampuchea continued to be blocked by logistic and political considerations By June 1, 1980, more than 70,000 tons of Western aid had been delivered Kompong Son or Phnom Penh, but only half of it had been distributed. Soviet and East European humanitarian aid, which, according to Phnom Penh authorities, amounted to 193,000 tons of food, medicine, and transportation equipment, was being distributed in noncontested areas to both civilians and military personnel. Government employees and the military get larger rations than the ordinary Khmer, and receive it sooner. But little or no aifi appeared to be distributed in areas with populations whose loyalty was suspected by the Vietnamese and Soviet-backed authorities in Phnom Penh. The Vietnamese and the Soviets claimed that the West exaggerated the disease and starvation of the Khmer as a means to aid the Pol Pot forces and other resistance forces. The Phnom Penh authorities were skeptical of Western assistance, and suspected that U.S. proposals to aid the Khmer disguised plans to aid the resistance forces. 0; Aam222he§- .. — * 1 B9li:i2al_and_ Legietieal- Obstasles :9. Relief. Efferte- Kampuchea is torn by warfare. The main contenders are: ' (1) the authorities in Phnom Penh, who are supported by 200,000 Vietnamese troops on Cambodian soil; (2) the 25,000—or-so Khmer Rouge forces headed by Pol Pot, who had been ih control of Cambodia from April 1975 until his ouster from ,Phnom Penh in January 1979; and (3) the several other smaller groups of forces iwho oppose the Vietnamese-backed government of Heng Samrin as well as the Khmer Rouge. Although pockets of resistance to Phnom Penh are scattered throughout the country, most opposition forces are concentrated in the western and southwestern sections near the Thai border. ' In addition to political considerations, extensive logistic problems inhibited the distribution of aid within Kampuchea. After a decade of war and domestic turmoil of a most violent nature, the infrastructure of. Kampuchea is in shambles. The roads are in disrepair; docks have been destroyed. Among the Khmer people themselves, there are few persons capable of directing or implementing an aid distribution system. Also, travellers through Kampuchea in February 1980 warned that by June 1980, Kampuchea's ride harvest of 1979, estimated at only 10% of its normal volume, would be used u and that the population would again desperately need external aid. % §§9§ Resistance to the Pathet Lao government, which came to power in 1975 with the help of Hanoi, has been fierce, and Vietnamese assistance in suppressing resistance has been vital to the Lao government. More than 60,000 former officials and others were held in "reeducation camps." The hill tribes, who for centuries resisted attempts to be pacified, have offered the strongest resistance. Approximately 60% of the Lao refugees were Hmong tribesmen, many of whom had been recruited in the 1960s by a 0.5.-backed army to fight the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao. Since _1975, these tribesmen ‘have fled into Thailand to escape campaigns of extermination waged against them by the Lao and Vietnamese forces. However, CRS- 9 IB79079 UPDATE-06/30/80 t‘e flow of refugees also included city-dwellers and villagers, members of t 3 lowland Lao, Black Thai, Khmu, and other ethnic groups, who appear to be fleeing severe economic conditions aggravated by poor weather, and loss of personal freedoms. Since 1975, approximately 300,000 Laos, from a population of 3 million, have fled their country. IMPACT OF REFUGEES ON REGIONAL STABILITY EQEEQEQEEQ In summer 1979, when more than 60,000 refugees per month were arriving in first-asylum countries, the ASEAN governments refused to accept additional refugees and threatened to expel the fl00,000 refugees already in temporary camps in their countries if the crisis worsened. Their anxiety was based on fear of involvement in an armed conflict, of domestic racial conflicts, and of economic pressures. Many Southeast Asian officials accused Vietnam of using the refugees to destabilize the non-Communist states of Southeast Asia. some suspected that Communist agents ordered to strengthen local Communist movements in their countries were among the refugees. I 1-22.1;e;1.:ie.l...1_?.1s2§.2§.i9.n-9f._§9I;:lis:. ' Thailand, which borders Laos and Kampuchea, appeared highly vulnerable to \ atnamese expansion. The Soviet-Vietnamese friendship treaty, signed in November 1978, and Vietnam's subsequent invasion and occupation of most of Kampuchea, with Soviet help, increased Thai fears of Vietnamese expansionism. The presence of hundreds of thousands of Khmer refugees and Khmer—Rouge and Khmer Serei troops encamped on the Thai-Khmer border threatened to spread armed conflict between the Vietnamese army and Khmer resistance forces into Thai territory. More than 70,000 Vietnamese troops were stationed near the Thai border. In June 1980, about 2,000 Vietnamese forces crossed into Thailand and forcibly stopped a‘UNHCR repatriation program of Khmer which was in progress. The United States, ASEAN, and China had pledged to counter any threat to Thailand's sovereignty. While most analysts discounted a direct Vietnamese attack on Thailand, they expected that Vietnamese troops would continue to cross the Thai border in "hot pursuit" of resistance forces and thereby make contact with Thai forces. These analysts also predicted that Vietnamese border attacks could cause as many as 700,000 Khmer refugees to flee into Thailand and overwhelm refugee facilities. More than 75,000 Khmer fled into Thailand as a result of the June 1980 Vietnamese incursion. gagia;_Tensions The possible invasion of Thailand by Vietnam and potential great power involvement in such a conflict were grave concerns throughout Southeast Asia. However, in summer 1979, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore were concerned primarily about the large number of ethnic Chinese among the boat people ercamped in their territories, who, according to ASEAN, had been forced to f ;e Vietnam. The recent, stable racial balance among Malays, Chinese, and Indians in these states has been a key’ to political stability there. Although the overseas Chinese have played an essential role in the economies of these states, racial prejudice has been strong in the region. The management of ethnic conflict has been a major challenge to Southeast Asian .leadership. ’ CR5-10 1379079 upnA1n;o5/3o/an. §s9n2m;2-B£e§§2£e§ The countries of first asylum, which are poor, overpopulated and economically depressed, feared the political and economic consequences of the continued presence of Indochinese refugees. These countries contended that the refugee camps, which featured black markets and ethnic rivalry, caused high inflation and unrest among local inhabitants, who resented twe vdistribution of free food and other benefits among the refugees. These countries also feared that the West eventually would refuse the permanenfi resettlement of many refugees, such as the more than 120,000 Lao in Thai camps. In addition, first-asylum countries have spent extra funds for refugee—related security purposes. Many Southeast Asians who view the refugee problem as a security problem see themselves as victims of gremt power rivalries. According to this perspective, Vietnam's expulsion qf ethnic Chinese from Vietnam and Kampuchea was motivated by Vietnam's fear qf subversion by Vietnamese or Kampucheans of Chinese extraction. uoreovefi, Vietnam's treaty relationship with the Soviet Union is seen as inhibiting the international community from pressuring Vietnam to halt its actions. The Vietnamese government, on the other hand, argues that a large numbet of the refugees are fleeing because Vietnam is poor and in need of mofie international assistance. Many of the ethnic Chinese, Hanoi has argued, wefie duped into fleeing by the P.R.C. in order to harm Vietnam's economy, or they fled because they refused to contribute to the common welfare rather than t“ seek personal gain. According to the Soviet and Vietnamese position concerning the Khmer refugees, the Western countries and China have exaggerated the famine conditions in Kampuchea as a means to get assistance to the Pol Pot forces and other resistance groups. ~ ;-§e§29n§e-:9.Lhe-§ef2gee§L_§£fect en Southea§:-A§ia Many Members cited the importance to 0.5. interests of the economic add political independence of the non-Communist states of Southeast Asia, and they supported the increasing cohesiveness of ASEAN. In order to ease the refugees‘ economic and political impact on the first-asylum ASEAN countriesy the Congress expanded economic assistance programs to several ASEAN members. Also, the Congress approved more than $000 million in military credit sales to Thailand, a substantial increase from the $100 million in arms purchased by Thailand in 1978. In addition, the Congress approved the Administration request to transfer to Thai ownership $11.3 million worth of U.S. ammunition stored in Thailand since the Vietnam war. And strong support from Congress accelerated military deliveries to Thailand. flanyi members, considering Thailand the key to Southeast Asian stability, supported the Administration's reaffirmation in February 1979 of the U.S. commitment in the Manila Pact of 1950 to assist Thailand in the event of armed attack. INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS Q2i2ed-!a:i2n§-§igh_§2m2i§§i2ner-f2r-B2f29ee§_lUN§Q§L In July 1975, UNHCR established an Indochinese refugee assistance programc cns—11 1379079 UPDATE-06/30/80 It extended international protection, including temporary care and m 'ntenance, to Indochinese who no longer enjoyed national protection; and it sought, and helped finance, permanent solutions to refugee situations by voluntary repatriation, permanent resettlement in the first-asylum country, or permanent resettlement in a third country. ‘ Under the program, UNHCR provided funds to the first—asylum governments and to voluntary agencies working within these countries. They, in turn; provided to the refugees food, shelter, medicine, limited educational and training opportunities, and other basic. services. Although UNHCR field representatives monitor refugee camp conditions and the distribution of goods to refugees, UNHCR has no control over the operations of government agencies or the voluntary agencies. Moreover, the UNHCR monitoring ability is limited by staff size and concern that UNHCR not endanger the programs in Southeast Asian countries by alienating first-asylum governments. w Resettlement assistance is a major part. of the UNHCR program. Field representatives record each refugee's basic:biographica1 data in order to expedite his or her application for resettlement. The UNHCR contracts with _the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEH), an independent non-political organization, to arrange for transporting the refugees within the first-asylum countries and from the first-asylum country to the countries of permanent resettlement other than the United States, which maintains its own contract with ICEH for movement of refugees from Asian camps to U.Su cities. Both the United States and_UNHCR reimburse ICEM for transportation costs and related services such as medical examinations, fingerprinting, and f >tographs. \ From August 1975 through 1978, the UNHCR's Special Program for Indochinese Refugees received about $70 million. About half of that amount came from the United States. In 1979 and 1980, Japan provided 50% of the UNHCR refugee assistance programs. Q!_Confe£ence on_§s:nqes§-£;2m-!ie£nam; In July, the major countries of permanent resettlement attempted to broaden the global response to the problem of the boat people and to halt the heavy flow at its source in Vietnam by bringing world pressure on Vietnam to stop forcing its ethnic Chinese population to flee by the thousands. To meet these goals, an international conference, sponsored by the United Nations in Geneva, was held July 20, and was attended by delegations from more than 60 nations. The conference generated additional permanent resettlement opportunities which, in turn, prompted a relaxation of policies on the part of the first-asylum countries who had been prohibiting new refugee arrivals; an acknowledgement by Hanoi of its role in the refugee flow; and a pledge from Vietnamese officials to halt the flow. Many observers, however, expressed concern that Hanoi's efforts to halt the flow of refugees might include restrictions on free emigration and might encourage harsher internal conditions. V The major results of the Geneva conference on Vietnamese refugees were: (1) pledges for $190 million in financial contributions to UNHCR for refugees in the Southeast Asian camps; (2) new offers of permanent resettlement, bringing the total available to more than 260,000 through 1980; (3) agreement by Hanoi to curtail "illegal departures" for a reasonable period of time; (4) an offer from the Philippine government to provide a site for a refugee lprocessing center to accommodate up to 50,000 refugees awaiting departure to CRS—12 1379079 UPDATE-06/30/30 permanent resettlement countries; and (5) an announcement that the Unit States would use the Seventh Fleet to aid refugees in distress on the high seas. The new pledges to permanently resettle Indochinese refugees included a French commitment to accept 10,000 refugees above the existing French quota of 1,000 per month, a Canadian pledge to resettle 50,000 additional refugees over the next 18 months, a British commitment to accept 10,000 refugees over the next year, a U.S. commitment to accept 14,000 refugees per month through September 1980, and smaller increases of resettlement opportunities from Sweden, Switzerland, West Germany, and other nations. QE-A§§i§:ens§-£r29ra2§ to_Aid the-§hner After urging from Western countries, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the UN Childrens' Fund (UNICEF) opened negotiations in July with the Vietnamese-backed authorities in Phnom Penh, and in August with the Pol Pot forces, in an attempt to reach an agreement by which humanitarian relief could be transported to Khmer civilians. On Sept. 26, ICRC and UNICET announced that the Heng Samrin government had agreed to let them open offices in Phnom Penh in order to administer a proposed 165,000-metric-ton relief effort for Kampuchea. The UN agencies alsc>said that the Khmer Rouge had agreed to the plan. : "A subsequent broadcast from Phnom Penh, however, said that the governme would accept international relief supplies only if none of the aid was distributed to the Khmer Rouge or other resistance forces. Phnom Penh also said the “imperialist and reactionary forces“ were taking advantage of the humanitarian problems to insist on giving aid to both sides. Neverthelessq on Oct. 13, 1979, ICRC and UNICEF established an 11-man mission in Phnom Penh and began a daily airlift into Phnom Penh of 15 tons of assistance. At the same time, supplies were dispensed from the Thai-Khmer border into Kampuchea. UNICEF/ICRC took responsibility for the border feeding stations, and UNHCR was the lead agency for the holding centers inside Thailand. I In order to solicit financial and political support for the international relief effort, UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim convened a pledging conference in New York City on Nov. 5, 1979, which was attended by 75 nations and observer delegations. ICRC/UNICEF requested $250 million for a 1-year's program of assistance for the 2.25 million people in desperate need in Kampuchea, and the UHNCB sought $60 million for an 8-month program to care for the 500,000 to 1 million Khmer fleeing into Thailand. The conference yielded pledges of $210 million in cash and supplies, and broad political support for internationally sponsored relief efforts to Khmer civiliansu After the conference, there was agreement that political concerns primarily stymied the aid efforts. All factions appeared to be using humanitarian assistance as a weapon. As of June 1980, more than 70,000 tons of food and medicine were delivered to Phnom Penh and Kompong Son, but it is estimat that only half of it has been distributed. However, the international aid effort was reasonably successful 0 the Thai-Khmer border where approximately 700,000 Khmer were fed and given medical assistance through the ICRC/UNICEF distribution system. In addition, »more than 150,000 Khmer were being cared for in holding centers within Thailand which are maintained by the UNHCB. CBS-13 1379079 UPDATE-05/30/80 !E_§9n:eren9e.9n-§hmer-§eliera-_§a1-2Zl_12§Q After international assistance programs successfully prevented disaster in Kampuchea between October 1979 and-March 190, UN officials estimated that $262 million was needed for the second phase of humanitarian assistance programs for Kampucheans, Apr. 1—Dec. 31, 1980. A meeting of Q3 donor nations was held in New York City on Mar. 26, 1980, requesting emergency funds for the first 90 days of the second phase. About $80 million was pledged at this time. In Geneva, on May 27, Secretary-General Waldheim appealed for $181 million in additional aid to avert a new wave of famine in Kampuchea. The aid would also be distributed to Khmer in holding centers in Thailand and in border area encampments, and to Thais displaced by the refugees. The United States pledged a new $29.6 million and pleaded with the Vietnamese and the authorities in Phnom Penh to distribute the aid to those in need. The Soviet Union and Vietnam boycotted the meeting, criticising the international community for interfering in Khmer affairs. ‘ U.S. INDOCHINESE REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROGRAHS As of June 1, 1980, the United States has resettledi about 305,600 1 lochinese refugees, of whom 85% were from Vietnam, 10% were from Laos and _ 5% from Kampuchea. The percentage of Vietnamese refugees has been high because they more easily fit into the U.S. categories for refugee selection: (1) relatives living in the United States; (2) former employees of the U.S. Government; (3) closely associated with the United States through former employment (U.S.-backed governments or U.S. firms) or other relationships; and (H) humanitarian grounds. In response to legislation passed in 1978, at least 7,500 Khmer refugees in 1979-80 would be admitted in the same order of eligibility. From April 1975 through Dec. 1, 1979, approximately $1.4 billion in Federal funds have been appropriated for assistance to Indochinese refugeesnf The total expenditures by Federal, State, and local governments for refugee assistance abroad and domesticly is estimated to be $1.7 billion in FY80, and $2.112 billion in FY81. The majority of these costs are designated for Indo-Chinese refugees. In addition, assistance has been provided by private nonprofit voluntary agencies and individual contributions. Refugee resettlement in the United States is carried out primarily by nine voluntary agencies, which use State Department grant funds and private contributions to finance the resettlement efforts. The Department of Health, Education, and welfare also administers several programs for the assistance of refugees. State and local governments are reimbursed with Federal funds through HEW for assistance distributed to Cuban and Indochinese refugees. Most of the 345,600 Indochinese refugees who have entered the United States have done so under the parole provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act which gave the Attorney General authority to parole temporarily any alien into the United States in emergency situations or in the national interest. Prior to exercising his parole authority in new ,situations, the Attorney General consulted with "members of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. Subsequent to the initial influx of CR5-1Q 1379079 UPDATE-06/30/8D approximately 135,000 Indochinese refugees in 1975, parole was authorized for 11,000 refugees in may 1976, 15,000 in August 1977, 7,000 in January 197’ 25,000 in June 1978, 21,875 in December 1978, and 40,000 in April 1979. in June 1979, the monthly quota was increased from 7,000 to 14,000 per month through September 1980. The appropriate paroles were issued in October and December 1979. ' ' The Refugee Act of 1980, signed into law on Mar. 18, raised the ceiling for the normal flow of refugees to 50,000 per year for three years, and it allowed the President, in consultation with Congress, to raise the number if humanitarian concern or national. interest warrants more refugees to he admitted. The U.S. Government intends to admit 14,000 Indochinese refugees per month through September 1980, after which the 0.5. quota is expected to decline. Es£22ee§-fr2a.!ie§nan The Congress pushed for a higher U.S. quota for resettling Indochinese refugees, and authorized the necessary funds for the increased programs. In November legislation was approved which provided for $207.3 million in additional aid for Indochinese refugees in FY80, and $203.6 million in additional aid in FY81. Congress was instrumental in the convening of the Geneva conference in July 1979 which discussed the refugee crisis. Many Hembers of Congress had called for Seventh Fleet assistance to the boat people months before t“ announcement of such efforts at the Geneva conference. Also, several congressional contacts, both direct and indirect, were made with Hanoi in attempts to persuade Hanoi to modify its role in the refugee exodus. At the same time, congressional initiatives encouraged the ASEAN countries to continue their cooperation as first-asylum countries. As in past years, the Congress prohibited bilateral aid to Vietnam. It also went on record as being strongly opposed to international financial institution loans to Vietnam. These actions were based on the argument that unless Vietnam received economic sanctions from the non-Communist world, its domestic policies would not change and the refugees would continue to flee harsh conditions. A ‘ However, there were those Members who argued that severe restrictions on multilateral or bilateral aid to Vietnam might encourage Vietnam to become more dependent on Soviet support, and cause Vietnam to implement more repressive domestic measures. Accordingly, some Members of ‘Congress have suggested granting humanitarian assistance to Vietnam. Others have considered relaxing the u.s. trade embargo with Vietnam and allowing U.S. companies to help Hanoi in oil exploration on condition that Vietnam cooperate on the refugee issue. Some Members have called for diplomatic relations with Hanoi as a means to more efficiently resolve outstanding 3.5.-Vietnamese issues such as refugees, family reunification cases, and the MIAS. §:£22t§-:2-A;d-:he Khmer People From the time of the Vietnamese invasion in late 1978, some Hembers of ‘Congress have raised the question of an appropriate U.S. response to severe cRs—15 1379079 UPDATE-O6/30/80 food shortages in Kampuchea. They called upon the Administration to e ourage and partake in international efforts to aid the Khmer people inside Kanpuchea as well as those fleeing into Thailand. The American people's awareness of the widespread starvation and disease inside Kampuchea was raised by the visits to the refugee camps of several congressional delegations. Senators Sasser, Danforth, and Baucus travelled to Thailand and Phnom Penh in mid-October. They proposed to Vietnamese officials and the authorities in Phnom Penh that 1,000 tons of assistance per day be trucked inside Kampuchea from the Thai border by the international agencies. '* Although the "land-bridge" idea has not yet been accepted, the Senators? proposal focused world attention on the situation and prompted a generous outpouring of contributions from the American people and from other nations, I Official trips by Hrs. Carter, a delegation of 0.3. Congresswomen ip early November, and other congressional delegations reinforced tme congressional resolve to aid the Khmer people. Int early Novemben, legislation (P.L. 96-110) was approved providing $99 million in paid to the Khmer: $25 million in Food for Peace commodities; $14 million for Khmer along the Thai-Khmer border; $30 million in transfer authority from other disaster funds to aid the Khmer (McGovern amendment); and $30 million in new funds (Zablocki—Danforth amendments) which needed 1980 appropriation. These funds, based on congressional proposals rather than Administration reguestsy were approved with unanimous support from both Houses. * The U.S. Government, as of June 1, 1980, had spent more than $100 million for Khmer relief. These funds were given to ICRC; UNICEF; the .World Food Program (WFP); the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNBCR); and several voluntary organizations. % The Congress recognized the logistic problems in distributing aid within Kampuchea where the infrastructure was in shambles, where many areas were contested militarily, and where there were few persons, among the Khmer themselves, capable of directing or implementing an aid distribution system. However, most Members expressed the view that political considerations also blocked the aid effort. ? In response to the poor aid distribution, the Senate approved S.Res. 277 which called upon the "great power supporters of the factions in Cambodia" to recognize their international responsibility for averting a famine. Also; congressional demarches were made to Soviet and Vietnamese officials by the Senate and House leadership and other Members in attempts to open Kampuchea to full scale humanitarian assistance. 1 I Congress also recognized the importance of working toward a political solution to the conflict in Kampuchea. Before adjourning for the Christmas holidays, both Houses passed concurrent resolutions calling for an international conference to work for a political solution which would ensure the survival of the Khmer race and the Khmer -nation. The accompanying I iorts noted that at this time the parties directly involved in the conflict gave no indication of interest in such a conference. However, the reports asserted that until hostilities have ended, and population dislocations and food production disruptions have ceased, the grave humanitarian problems of the Khmer people cannot be solved. i Be£u9§s§-:r92_L29§ CBS-16 1379079 UPDATE-O6/30/8D Congressional activities also focused on the refugees from Laos. As e- June 1, 1980, more than 100,000 refugees from Laos were living in UN camps in Thailand. The majority of them were Hmong tribesmen, many of whom had been recruited by U.S.—backed armies to fight the North Vietnamese and the Pathet Lao. Since 1975, these tribesmen have fled into Thailand to escape what refugee reports describe as campaigns of extermination waged against them by the Pathet Lao and the Vietnamese forces. some Hembers visited Lao refugee camps in Thailand in order to investigate the possibility of expanded resettlement opportunities for the Lao. By June 1980, approximately 30,000 refugees from Laos had been resettled in the United States. ” Through interviews with Hmong tribespeople, the Congress became aware of Vietnamese and Pathet Lao poison gas attacks against the Hmong. After hearings and further investigations, the House approved H.Res. 512 (378-1) on Dec. 20, 1979. The resolution stated that in view of substantial evidence that lethal chemical agents have been used against the Hmong in Laos and ih -parts of Kampuchea, the House requested the Administration, through the Um, to reach agreement with the Soviet Union on the complete prohibition of chemical warfare. Hany Members of Congress held the Soviet Union responsible for the use of the lethal chemical gas in Indochina since neither Vietnam ndr Laos possessed the capability of producing a chemical weapon of the type that was used. ' ' 'U.S. PUBLIC OPINION CONCERNING THE REFUGEE ISSUE Although there is widespread sympathy in the United States for the sufferings of the Indochinese refugees, and there has been a great outpouring of private American assistance, there appears to be no clear agreement on an appropriate U.S. Government response. There are indications that domestic economic constraints will curtail support for an expanded Federal financial commitment to the resettlement of refugees. For example, constituent criticism was strong in mid-1979 when the quotas for the resettlement of refugees was raised from 7,000 to 10,000 per month. The results of four nationwide polls conducted in July and August 1979 indicated that more than 60% of the American people opposed the increased admissions of boat people from Vietnam. The majority of arguments were based on domestic economic constraints. some observers, especially those of minority and low-income groups, have expressed concern that scarce jobs and shrinking social services no longer allow the United States so generously to resettle foreigners. In addition, there are those who argue that the refugee problem needs an international solution. The first wave of refugees, in April 1975, was widely viewed as an American responsibility due to the U.S. role in the Indochina war. However, the latest group of refugees, some of whom are former Viet Cong and Khmer Rouge, are not considered by some Americans to be a U.s. problem alone, but a global one. ’ On the other hand, some favor an expanded U.S. resettlement program on the grounds that the Indochinese who have permanently settled here have adapted well, and, far from becoming burdens on the U.S. economy, have become vital contributors to it. Also, the public'response to the needs of the ‘starving Khmer people, which received heavy media attention in late 1979, was generous and widespread. By April 1980, more than $fl2 million had been cns-17 1379079 UPDATE-06/30/80 raised by private voluntary organizations, and additional private fund drives 5 ;e launched to raise $100 million more. some analysts have noted that the act of donating funds for distribution in Southeast Asia might be preferred by some Americans to the resettling of refugees in the United States, given the growing domestic economic problems of unemployment and inflation. LEGISLATION P.L. 95-110 (3.3. u955/s. 1668) Migration and Refugee Assistance Act. This law provides for the following major assistance for Indochinese refugees: R §22-2illi9n-f2r_aid.:9-:h9.£hmer —- $25 million for Food for Peace - -- $14 million for Khmer along Thai-Cambodian border -— $30 million in transfer authority from other disaster funds to aid to Khmer (McGovern 1 amendment) -- $30 million in new funds (Zablocki-Danforth amendments). These funds need 1980 appropriation. Adéiiignal-ei9-:2r_Q;§i-Iud99hine§9.r9"u92e.2r99ran -- $207.3 million in FY80 -- $203.6 million in FY81. The law extends through 1981 the overall.authorization for U.S. programs aiding Indochinese refugees. ’ P.L. 96-212 (5. 6&3) Refugee Act of 1980. Establishes a systematic procedure for the admission of refugees (Title II amends the Immigration and Nationality Act); and establishes uniform provisions for assistance to refugees (Title III amends athe Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962). Raises the ceiling for the normal flow of refugees from 17,000 to 50,000 per year for 3 years, and allows the President, in consultation with Congress, to raise the number if humanitarian concern or national interest warrants more refugees to be admitted. The Refugee Act of 1980 encourages more extensive consultations with Congress. Traditionally, Congress has not had a statutory role in determining the national origin or the number of refugees admitted into the United States, except through appropriations for refugee programs. Passed the Senate Sept. 6, 1979; passed the House, amended, Dec. 20, in lieu of H.R. 2816. Conference reports filed in the House Feb. 22, 1980 (H.Rept. 96-781) and in the Senate Feb. 25 (S.Bept. 96-590). Signed into law (P.L. 96-212) Mar. 17, 1980. H.Con.Res. 219 (Solarz et al.)/S.Con.Res. 59 (Kennedy et al.) Calls for an international conference on Cambodia which would bring together all those claiming to represent the people of Cambodia, as well as those nations which have a special interest in the Cambodian situation, and which would have as its purpose ending the conflict in Southeast Asia and working for a political solution that would ensure the survival of the Khmer race and the Khmer nation. Passed the House Dec. 17, 1979. Passed the isenate Dec. 19, 1979. CR5-18 1379079 UPDATE-06/30/80 H.Con.Res. 321 (Zablocki et al.) Calls on the Secretary-General of the UN to convene immediately an emergency session of the General Assembly to deal with the refugee crisis in Southeast Asia. Passed the House June 18, 1979. (Incorporated in H.R. 332m, which was enacted into law as P.L. 96-53.) H.Res. 509 (Boggs)/S.Res. 316 (Glenn et al.) Conmends the Government of Thailand for its assistance to Khmer refugees and assures Thailand of continued U.S. support "to save the Khmer nation and people from extinction." Passed the House Dec. 18, 1979. Passed the Senate Dec. 20, 1979. H.Res. 512 (Leach) Condemns the use of chemical agents in Indochina. House approved Dec. 2d, 1979, by a vote of 378-1. * A S.Con.Res. 72 (Levin et al.)/H.Con.Res. 270 (Zablocki et al.) Expresses the sense of the Congress that the President request the UN flo establish an international presence in the refugee encampments on the Thai-Khmer border- Passed the Senate Feb. 19, 1980. S.Res. 277 (Javits, Baucus, Danforth, Sasser) Calls upon the "great power supporters of the factions in Cambodia" to recognize their international responsibility for averting a famine in Kampuchea. Passed the Senate Nov. 16, 1979. I S.Res. 367 (Weicker) Condemns the use of lethal chemical agents against the people of Indochina and Afghanistan. Introduced Feb. 8, 1980; referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. [For legislative background information, see Issue Brief IB77120, Refugees in the United States: Laws, Programs, and Proposals.) §§ABlE§§ U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Use of chemical agents in Southeast Asia since the Vietnam war. Hearing, 96th Congress, 1st session. Dec. 12, 1979. Washington, 0.5. Govt. Print. Off., 1980. B§EQBI§-AEQ-§QH§§E§§l0N3L_D0CQ!ENT§ U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Asian security environment: 1980; report of the Special Study Mission to Asia, Jan. 5-23, 1980. U.S. Govt. Print. Off.: May 1980. 96 p. 06/26/80 06/25/80 06/24/80 CRSQT9 IB79079 UPDATE°O6/30/80 In response to Vietnamese military incursions into Thailand, the United States provided to Thailand: (1) a $2 million grant for assistance to Thais displaced by the Vietnamese military action; (2) an accelerated delivery of 35 M48 tanks, small arms, and other equipment previously ordered by the Thais; and (3) the U.S. began loan procedures to allow additional Thai purchases. In Kuala Lumpur, Secretary of State Muskie and Assistant Secretary Holbrooke conferred with ASBAN foreign ministers about the Vietnamese incursion of Thailand, Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea, and other related issues. C At Vietnam's embassy in Bangkok, U.S. officials informed the Vietnamese that Washington held Hanoi responsible for the safe return of two U.S. photographers and two Red Cross officials uho were captured June 26 by Vietnamese troops at Nong Chan, a Thai-Khmer border refugee encampment. The four were released unharmed at the border on June 29. The United States again urged Vietnam and the U.S.S.R. to halt Vietnamese attacks inside Thailand. Ambassador Abramowitz met with Co Thach in Bangkok, and in Washington the Soviet Ambassador was called to the State Department. Secretary Muskie condemned the Vietnamese attack inside Thailand and called on the U.S.S.R. to use its influence to bring an end to the present conflict. The ASEAN members issued a joint statement strongly condemning Vietnam for its premeditated armed incursion into Thai territory as an "irresponsible and dangerous act" that constituted a grave and direct threat to the security of Thailand and the Southeast Asia region. In Peking, a Chinese Foreign Ministry statement wanred the Vietnamese of grave danger if they persisted in military adventure inside Thailand, and said that China would resolutely support Thailand's efforts to defend its sovereignty. After a second day of fighting, Vietnamese troops withdrew partially from the refugee endampments at Nong Chan and Nong nak Mun, and several Thai villages which they had occupied on June 23. Estimated casualties included 2h Thai military, 25-75 Vietnamese military, and about 1,000 Khmer refugees either killed or wounded. 06/23/80 06/19/80 06/17/80 05/27/80 05/21/80 05/10/80 03/30/80 03/27/80 03/26/80 ACRS-20 In Washington, State Department spokesman Tom Reston denounced the Vietnamese aggression in Thailand, and reaffirmed the 0.5. committment to the security of Thailand under the Manila Pact of 1954. About 2,000 Vietnamese forces crossed into Thailand north of Aranyaprathet and forcibly stopped UNHCR repatriation programs of Khmer. The fighting between Vietnamese and Thai troops had heavy casualties and caused about 75,000 Khmer to flee into Thailand from camps straddling the border. I - 06/22/80 -- In Jakarta, Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar and Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thach discussed bilateral issues. Mochtar reaffirmed the need to carry out the UN resolution for withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea. Thach said that ASEAN should put pressure on China to stop its threat to Vietnam and Kampuchea if a solution was to be found for Kampuchea. Thai military and UNHCR officials began a voluntary repatriation program of Khmer. Hanoi and Phnom Penh denounced the program as a Western attempt to strengthen Khmer Rouge and other resistance forces. About 5,000 of the 160,000 Khmer in holding centers in Thailand are returning to their homeland, many from Sakeo I, a 'Khmer Rouge-influenced camp. In Geneva, an international conference was held to elicit support for the second phase of Khmer relief programs, estimated at $262 million through December 1980. In Bangkok, Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thach said that a withdrawal of ASEAN diplomatic and material support from the Khmer Rouge would not automatically lead to a withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea. Thach said the Vietnamese troops were in Kampuchea in response to the Chinese threat to Indochina. UNICEF officials appealed to Moscow to provide helicopters and crews for an airlift of assistance within Kampuchea. Several American and European private humanitarian groups, in cooperation with the UNHCR, have made a tentative agreement with the Government of Guyana for the settlement of 1,500-30,000 Hmong refugees now encamped in Thailand. In Kuantan, Malaysia, Malaysian and Indonesian leaders said that a key to stability in Southeast Asia was Vietnam's independence from the influence of both the U.S.S.R. and A the P.R.C. A UN pledging conference requested $l00 million for Khmer relief over the next SD days. The United States 03/25/80 03/15/80 03/07/80 02/29/80 02/25/80 ““ O2/22/80 -- CRS—21 IB79079 UPDATE~06/30/80 announced an $8 million contribution, but said that further aid would depend on Heng Samrin authorities‘ cooperation with the relief agencies and "the verifiable extent to which needy Khmer receive relief supplies." Many Western donor nations questioned whether the UN aid goals were practical, given the political situation in Indochina, but most nations supported additional aid to the Thai-Khmer border. Assistance Secretary Holbrooke said before the Senate Subcommittee on Eastern Asian and Pacific Affairs that the Soviets now have round-the-clock access to Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay, and were supporting Vietnam with more than $3 million a day. Vietnam rejected a United Nations Human Rights Commission resolution that condemned "the invasion and occupation of certain regions of Cambodia by foreign forces and the resulting violation of human rights." Radio Hanoi said that, “like other UN resolutions on the so—called Cambodia issue, this one is of no value because it has been sponsored by the imperialists and the Peking reactionaries." Inta joint statement, the foreign ministers of the European Common Market and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) condemned the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the Vietnamese invasion of Kanpuchea that would provide for its self-determination, independence, and neutrality under a representative government. In an effort to gain support from Western nations for the Khmer Rouge guerrilla war against the Vietnamese, Khieu Samphan and other Khmer Rouge leaders gave interviews to several Western journalists in jungle base camps inside Kampuchea. Khieu Samphan admitted that excesses had taken place under the Pol Pot regime, but that the Khmer Rouge had modified its policies and had support from the Cambodian people against the Vietnamese. The United Nations World Food Council called on the UN system to provide "massive and immediate assistance" to rehabilitate Kampuchea's agricultural production facilities. According to the Council's estimates, 200,000 tons of foreign food shipments and 40,000 tons of rice seed, fertilizer and pesticides are needed to avert a 1980-81 famine in Kanpuchea. These estimates cover only the areas of Kampuchea under the control of the Vietnamese-backed Heng Samrin authorities. Reports from Bangkok indicated a growing number of Vietnamese refugees are crossing the Thai-Khmer border after travelling from Vietnam through Kampuchea. Many of them said they have paid bribes or fees at several points on their route. 02/21/80 02/19/80 01/30/80 01/29/80 01/26/80 01/03/300 01/02/80 01/02/80 «After the Vietnamese and Phnom CRS-22 IB79079 UPDATE-06/30/80 Prince Norodom Sihanouk arrived enlist support for a Khmer army Vietnamese occupying Kampuchea, the future leader of a neutral, in Washington, D.C., to to fight the and to promote himself as independent Kampuchea. The Senate approved S.Can.Res. 72, expressing the sense of the Congress that the President request the United Nations to establish an international presence in the refugee encampments on the Thai-Khmer border. (H.Con.Res. 274 was introduced Feb. 12.) More than 150 American and European celebrities, religious leaders, and others marched to the Thai-Khmer border with 20 truck loads of food and medicine. Penh authorities refused to allow the aid to be taken.in to Kampuchea, it was distributed to Khmer at the border encampments. State Department spokesman Hodding Carter said that heavy fighting was reported between Vietnamese troops and Khmer resistance forces close to the refugee encampments straddling the Thai-Khmer border. An international food relief convoy turned back from a border feeding point at Phnom Chat because of shelling only 1,000 yards from the border. . firs. Carter convened a White House meeting of the National Cambodia Crisis Committee, comprised of business, labor, and religious leaders and entertainers, to launch a 6-month private fund raising drive for aid to the Khmer. The Department of State issued a statement of concern about large Vietnamese troop»deployments on the Thai-Khmer border which posed "a potential threat to the security of Thailand." some officials thought that Vietnam might be preparing to use force to disperse the more than 500,000 Khmer refugees in border encampments. Fierce fighting broke out among rival anti-Vietnamese Khmer guerrillas which killed at least 20 persons and forced thousands of refugees to flee encampment 007 near Nong Samet. Apparently the conflict erupted over weapons and potential joint efforts against the Vietnamese and Heng Samrin forces. After travelling through Kampuchea on highways 5 and 6, representatives of international relief agencies warned that within 2 months Kampuchea's 1979 rice harvest, estimated at only 10% its normal volume, would be used up and that the population would then desperately need external aid. They also said that over 50,000 tons of Western assistance remained in warehouses in Kompong Som and Phnom Penh. The UN World Food Program suspended emergency food aid to Kampuchea because supplies already delivered have not been distributed, according to an announcement from program director Garson Vogel. 12/31/79 .. 12/21/79 -- 12/17/79 12/10/79 12/11/79 12/07/79 12/03/79 11/28/79 .. Khmers. CRS—23 IB79079 UPDATE-06/30/80 Thailand requested that the UN dispatch a security force to the Thai—Khmer border to supervise the demilitarization of two large camps which currently house Khmer refugees and Khmer Serei troops. According to the Thai position, once the camps become civilian facilities only, the Vietnamese would have no excuse for shelling the areas. The New China News Agency reported that Khieu Samphan replaced Pol Pot as Prime Hinister of Democratic Kampuchea, the government ousted from Phnom Penh by Vietnamese troops in January 1979. some analysts said that Khieu,Samphan's appointment was an attempt by the Khmer Rouge to improve their international image and to find someone who can be accepted by most However, Pol Pot remained head of the Khmer Rouge party as well as supreme commander of the Khmer Rouge troops who have waged a protracted guerrilla war against Vietnamese and Heng Samrin forces. According to Western press reports out of Bangkok, two Vietnamese army deserters who recently crossed into Thailand said that the Soviet pilots have flown numerous Vietnamese transport planes into western Kampuchea. One also said that he saw 50-70 Soviet technicians working on aircraft at Siam Reap airport. ICRC officials in Geneva might withdraw from distribution within (International Committee of the Red Cross) said that the agency Phnom Penh if aid Kampuchea is not improved. Japanese news reporters published filmed and recorded interviews with Pol Pot along the Thai-Khmer border. Pol Pot was quoted as saying that he has 50,000 troops under his command. The White House called upon the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and all countries with influence in Phnom Penh to allow and encourage the speedy distribution of humanitarian aid to those in need in Kampuchea. The statement also severly criticized those responsible for blocking aid to needy civilians. The Thai government cut off food and water to an anti—communist camp on the Thai-Cambodian border which houses more than 300,000 Cambodians, becuase the free Khmer leaders of the camp would not cooperate with the Thai military's efforts to evacuate the camp's civilians to safer areas inside Thailand. It appeared that the guerrilla leaders feared that they would lose their political power base if the people were removed from them. Western news media in Bangkok reported that according to interviews with Khmer refugees who recently crossed the Thai border, the Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea 11/27/79 11/18/79 11/15/79 11/12/79 11/08/79 11/05/79 *- cns-24 IB79079 UPDATE—O6/30/80 are diverting international food aid from the civilians, and they are mining rice fields to prevent harvesting in order to get seed grain for next year's harvest. parliament delegation which across Kampuchea, said that aid "seemed to us to be deliberately its objectives...." In Paris, a French recently travelled international food diverted away from Thailand opened its borders to the 600,000 to 1 million Khmer who are gathering along the Thai-Cambodian border. Many of these persons are not controlled by either the Khmer Rouge or Vietnamese troops. Experts have predicted that most of these refugees are suffering from disease and starvation. Receiving centers inside Thailand are being prepared by international and private relief agencies. A five-nan UN fact-finding team began an investigation of the Thai—Cambodian border problem in response to a Thai government request. Thailand favors a UN presence near the border or in Bangkok for monitoring border incidents and investigating allegations that Thailand is supplying the Khmer Rouge. The UN General Assembly, by a 91-21 vote, with 29 abstentions, approved an.ASEAN-sponsored resolution which called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Kanpuchea and for a UN conference on Kampuchea. Six U.S. Congresswomen and 2 Australian officials visited the Thai-Cambodian border and Phnom Pehn on a humanitarian mission to expand and expedite the international aid effort to Khmer civilians. First Lady Bosalynn Carter visited refugee camps in Thailand, Khmer settlements along the Thai-Cambodian border, and the Lnmphini transit center in Thailand. She described her experiences as "emotionally overwhelming" and she said she "would do all we possibly can to help." Nearly 100 Khmer refugees and Khmer and Thai soldiers were killed after Thai troops shelled Khmer Serei camp 511 located along the Thai-Cambodian border. According to some reports, the Thai troops reacted to an attempted hijacking of Thai weapons and ammunition. Sixty—six House Members proposed a joint U.S.-Soviet airlift of aid into Kampuchea. At the UN conference for aid to Kampuchea, Secretary of State Vance formally announced a U.S. contribution of $69 million. Vance also called for pursuit of every avenue and every means to transport food and medicine into Kanpuchea whether by land, sea, or air. 10/28/79 10/26/79 10/23/79 ‘- CBS-2S IB79079 UPDATE-06/30/80 In New York City, UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim convened a pledging conference for humanitarian aid to Kampuchea. The conference, which was attended by 75 nations and observer delegations, raised $210 million in cash and supplies, and demonstrated broad political support for internationally sponsored relief efforts to Khmer civilians. The Vietnamese delegation, however, said that reports of widespread famine and disease were exaggerated. In a statement distributed by Vietnam's UN mission, the authorities in Phnom Penh agreed to open the Mekong River for the transport of relief suuplies. Experts estimated that up to 8,000 tons of supplies a month can be transported via the Mekong River.v Artillery shells from Cambodia hit Thailand's crowded frontier black market killing several Cambodians who had crossed the border in search of supplies. The official New China News Agency reported that Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaping said that China would side with Thailand if the Thais were attacked by Vietnam. The Phnom Penh authorities "vigorously rejected" the plan for a truck convoy proposed by a U.S. Senate delegation on October 2a. The convoy would have moved food through militarily contested areas and was rejected by the authorities because it would create an excuse for "interference" in Cambodian internal affairs. The port at Kompong Som and the airport at Phnom Penh were adequate to receive supplies from UNICEF and the International Committee of the Red Cross, the authorities said. A delegation led by Senators James Sasser (D-Tenn.), flax Baucus (D-Mont.) and John Danforth (R-Mo.), flew to Phnom Penh and proposed a plan for food aid. The Senators had been in Thailand since October 19 examining the Khmer refugee problem and famine conditions in Cambodia. The Senators‘ aid plan entailed the opening of a "land bridge“ of trucks for food supplies from the Thai border from Phnom Penh. The truck convoy could provide 30,000 tons of food a month. In Phnom Penh, the Senators were told by Foreign Hinister Hun Sen and officials there that 2.25 million people faced severe hunger and that 165,000 tons of food were required within the next six months. President Carter pledged $69 million in,aid to Cambodia. $30 million of this sum was the official 0.5. response to an international appeal made by UNICEF and the Red Cross. an additional $9 million will go to Thailand for aid to Cambodians who have taken refuge there. The remaining $30 million is 10/20/79 10/19/79 10/11/79 10/10/79 09/27/79 09/26/79 cns—25 1379079 UPDATE-O6/30/Bb I disaster relief aid for Cambodians that was subsequently authorized in the Migration and Refugee Act (P.L. 96-110). A Pravda interview quoted the Phnom Penh Defense Minister, Pen Sovan as saying that "no ae is dying of hunger in our country." International aid for the "alleged" famine in Cambodia.is largely a cover for illicit military assistance to surviving enemies of the new Cambodian government, he continued. The Vietnamese Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Nguyen Co Thach, said in Bangkok that Vietnamese troops operating in Cambodia would not enter Thailand in pursuit of guerrillas loyal ito the ousted Pol Pot. Thailand reversed its policy toward the people fleeing from Cambodia and agreed to grant them temporary asylum. The Thai Prime Minister said that a personal tour of the Thai-Cambodian border camps has caused him to change the Thai policy. The Vietnam 1 News Agency protested that Thailand was aiding the "bandit remnants" of the Pol Pot regime. A Radio Phnom Penh commentary protested that international aid distributed through Thailand went to the Pol Pot remnant troops and not to the hungry. In the face of renewed fighting between Vietnamese troops and the guerrilla troops of Pol Pot, between 5,000 and 10,000 Khmer civilians and’ soldiers crossed into Thailand in the largest exodus from Cambodia since June.i By the end of October 1979, more than 100,000 Cambodians crossed the border into Thailand. In Phnom Penh, the Vietnamese-backed government of Heng Samrin said it would accept international relief supplies provided that none of the aid was distributed to the Pol Pot forces. It also said that "imperialist and international reactionary forces" were taking advantage of the humanitarian question to insist on giving aid to both sides. After months of negotiations, the ICRC and UNICEF announced that the Heng Samrin government had agreed to let them open offices in Phnom Penh in order to administer a proposed $100 million relief effort for Kanpuchea. The UN agencies also said that the P01 ?ot faction had agreed to the plan. However, a subsequent Phnom Penh broadcast denied that the ICRC and UNICEF had been given permission to open offices in Phnom Penh. 09/22/79 —— According to Western reports, a UNICEF official visiting 09/21/79 -- 08/22/79 -- 08/09/79 - 08/03/79 - 08/02/79 -- o1/23/79 —— 07/23/79 -- CBS-27 IB79079 UPDATE-06/30/80 Phnom Penh said that 80% of the children in Kampuchea were suffering from the severest form of malnutrition and he estimated that at least 600 tons of rice per day would be needed from abroad to prevent starvation conditions for nearly 3 million people. By a vote of 71-35, with 34 abstentions, the UN General Assembly seated the delegates of the Pol Pot government as the legal representatives of Kampuchea in the United Nations. The United States voted for the UN recognition of the Pol Pot government. During the debate on Kampuchean representation, U.S. Ambassador Petree said that the Vietnamese dry-season offensive against the Pol Pot forces had begun. ‘International aid organizations and the Vietnamese-backed government of Heng Samrin reached an agreement by which emergency assistance worth $100 million would be distributed in Kampuchea. ' A State Department spokesman.said that the United States is prepared to contribute "within the limits of U.S. law to an international effort" to forestall a disastrous famine in Kampuchea. The United States has contributed $300,000 to the ICBC to aid Kampucheans in Thailand, and $325,000 to a private voluntary agency, the Catholic Relief Services, to ~provide assistance in the Thai-Kampuchean border area. In an interview with Western journalists in Vietnam, UNICEF officials reported that their July 1979 fact—finding trip into Kampuchea revealed that nearly 2.25 million Kampucheans faced starvation. They also said that they had seen evidence of systematic torture inflicted by the Pol Pot Government. Vietnam demanded that the United States stop efforts by the Seventh Fleet to rescue Indochinese refugees in the South China Sea, charging that the operation was a "show of force," and that it "incited" further illegal departures. A U.S. State Department spokesman said that the ships were performing "humanitarian work” which would continue. Vietnamese refugees picked up by the USS Wabash said in an interview with western journalists in Thailand that although they had been planning to leave Vietnam for weeks, they set off after they heard via BBC broadcasts that U.S. ships would aid them on the seas. This report increased the concern of those who feared that such U.S. naval activities might have a “magnet effect" in Vietnam, that is, encourage more people to flee. A U.S. Seventh Fleet task force began a "special cRse28 1379079 UPDATE—06/30/8D alert" under which: (1) Navy planes seek out refugees in distress on the seas; (2) refugees on seaworthy vessels are offered supplies and directions; and (3) those in grave danger are taken aboard U.S. vessels and transported to the next port of call with U.S. guarantees that they would be resettled in the United States if no other opportunity is available. 07/20/79 - 07/21/79 - Vice President Mondale addressed the Geneva o7/18/v9 07/15/79 07/14/79 07/10/79 07/07/79 conference on refugees and spoke of Vietnam's "callous and irresponsible policies toward the boat people." He outlined new U.S. assistance to the Indochinese refugees including: increased U.S. contributions to the UNHCR; increased quotas for resettlement in the United States (168,000 through September 1980); "$20 million for transit centers; Seventh Fleet activities to aid the refugees on the seas; and a U.S. proposal for a $200 million fund (U.S. offered a $20 million contribution) to help developing countries resettle refugees. UN Secretary—General Waldheim announced in Geneva that Vietnam "has authorized me to inform you, that for a reasonable period of time” it will make every effort to stop illegal departures.” In a protest over the refugee crisis, the House of Representatives by a 290-122 vote approved an amendment to the FY80 foreign aid bill that would prohibit the use of U.S. contributions to»the International Development Association from being used for Vietnam. In a Pravda article and other recent Soviet commentaries, Moscow described the current Indochinese refugee crisis as "an artifically instigated campaign of political and ideological sabotage conceived and implemented by the forces of imperialism jointly with China." According to a CBS/New York Times poll, 62% of the persons questioned did not favor an increased U.S. quota for resettlement of Indochinese refugees from 7,000 to 14,000 per month. However, the same poll indicated that 60% of those questioned would welcome the refugees into their own neighborhoods. About 1,000 of the more than fl2,000 Kampucheans forcibly returned to Kampuchea in June were permitted to cross back into Thailand. Thai authorities took ‘this action, which they made contingent upon the Kampucheans' resettlement outside Thailand within 60 days, in response to requests from UNHCR and individual nations. The Vietnamese government rejected charges that it is responsible for the large number of Indochinese refugees, stating that, "It is United States imperialism and the Peking authorities that have triggered the 07/06/79 07/02/79‘ 06/30/79 06/29/79 06/28/79 cas-29 1379079 UPDATE-06/30/80 outflow of hundreds of thousands...." In Kuala Lumpur, about 200 persons protested that the United States was resettling only skilled refugees from Malaysia's camps. The protestors also accused Hanoi of mass expulsion of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam. The Foreign Ministers of ASEAN members, meeting in Bali, jointly accused Hanoi of flooding Southeast Asia with Indochinese refugees and urged the international community to stop the flow at its source, Hanoi. The ASEAN members also appealed to Hanoi to withdraw Vietnamese troops from the Thai—Kampuchean border. Japanese Foreign Minister Scnoda announced in Bali that Japan would quintuple its aid to Indochinese refugees by providing 50% of the cost of a $105 million UNHCR refugee assistance program for 1979. In addition, Japan offered to pay half of the $13-million refugee processing center to built on the Indonesian island of Galang. UN Secretary—General Waldheim invited 71 countries to a meeting on Indochinese refugees, to be held in Geneva July 20-21, which would be "purely humanitarian," and would seek permanent settlement opportunities for Indochinese refugees. In Bali, the foreign.ministers of ASEAN member states agreed "to take firm and effective measures" to prevent refugees from landing on their shores, and warned that they would expel refugees already in the camps if they were not resettled within a reasonable time. In Shanghai, China's public health minister told visiting U.SZ officials that Peking was giving "active and urgent consideration" to a UN proposal that China establish a processing center for refugees from Vietnam. Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish leaders joined in an appeal to President Carter, Members of Congress, and UN Secretary-General Waldheim to find more permanent resettlement opportunities for the Indochinese refugees, to establish additional transit camps, and to use U.S. military transport to move refugees to the United States. President Carter announced that the United States increased the quota of Indochinese refugees accepted for permanent resettlement from 7,000 to 10,000 per month. This decision was contingent upon congressional appropriation of funds. The heads of government of Japan, France, Canada, Britain, West Germany, Italy and the United States, meeting in Tokyo at an economic summit conference, stated that their nations "will significantly increase their contributions _ to the Indochinese refugee relief and resettlement...." O6/26/79 O6/Zfl/79 06/23/79 06/21/79 06/20/79 06/19/79 06/18/79 06/15/79 -- CRS-30 IB79079 UPDATE‘06/30/80 A Malaysian Home Affairs Minister called on the United States to establish processing centers on U.S. territory to accommodate 200,000 Indochinese refugees, charging that the refugee crisis is "the hangover of U.S. involvement in Vietnam." Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said in a television interview that he did not favor the United States increasing its quota of Indochinese refugees because the United States "already is shouldering more than its fair share.“ The Department of State said the United States would be very seriously concerned if Vietnamese troops crossed the Thai border and would be prepared to invoke the iManila Pact, an agreement under which the United States and Thailand consult if aggression is waged against Thailand. — According to western news reports, President Carter raised the question of the Indochinese refugee crises with Soviet President Brezhnev at the Vienna summit, but Brezhnev replied that the Soviet Union would not interfere in Vietnam's internal affairs. some analysts charged that the Soviets viewed the refugee exodus as a means to destabilize Southeast Asia. According to a Radio Hanoi statement, Vietnam blamed the United States for initiating a mass evacuation from South Vietnam in 1975 on the eve of the Communist victory there, and it accused China of inciting ethnic Chinese in Vietnam to leave the country so as to use them as a fifth column in Southeast Asian countries. The Senate and House of Representatives approved resolutions calling for an emergency UN General 0 Assembly session to address the Indochinese refugee Crisis. In Bangkok, Thai Prime Minister General Kriangsak Chamanan said that Thailand could no longer accept refugees or illegal immigrants and would have to push them out. Malaysian Prime Minister Datuk Hussein Onn said that any refugee boat trying to enter Malaysian waters or attempting to land would be towed away, but that it would be given assistance to continue its journey. He said Malaysia had reached the limit of its endurance, and refusing additional refugees was "the only way to contain the problem which has severely affected the country.“ He also stressed that "Malaysia would not allow itself to be saddled with the residues of these boat people, and if they were not resettled Malaysia would send them out. Malaysia's Deputy Prime Minister announced that Malaysia will expel by boat more than 75,000 refugees, 06/13/79-- 06/12/79 -- 06/08/79 - 05/16/79 “ ‘on the Hanoi regime. CBS-31 and will seek legislation to allow patrols to "shoot on sight“ refugees seeking to enter the country. (This policy later was modified, and no orders to "shoot" were given, but Malaysia turned away about 55,000 refugees seeking asylum during June 1979.) ' Atya hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Chairman Lester Wolff called the Indochinese refugee situation a disaster, similar to the Nazi purge of Jews, which threatened to explode in death for 500,000 persons. Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke, in testimony before the committee, agreed with the Nazi analogy, and blamed the crisis The subcommittee recommended a House resolution to call for an emergency session of the UN General Assembly. Thai authorities allowed Thai troops to push back into Kampuchea 42,000 persons*who.had sought refuge i Thailand. ’ Vietnam signed an accord with UNHCR to facilitate the "orderly departure" of persons wanting to leave Vietnam for family reunion or other humanitarian causes. However, western diplomatic sources were reported as saying that Hanoi had rejected lists of wpersons who had relatives in western countries, and the agreement was not expected to reduce the large numbers of 60,000 per month who were fleeing Vietnam. The conference on refugees approved in principle the establishment of a refugee "processing center" on an Indonesian island in which up to 10,000 refugees already approved for permanent asylum could await their departure and thereby vacate places for new refugees in other Southeast Asian camps. 05/15/79 - 05/16/79 - At a 2u—nation conference on refugees in on/27/79 - Jakarta, Indonisia, Vietnam announced that it was ready to release approximately 10,000 refugees per month for direst resettlement elsewhere. In view of the more than 250,000 Indochinese refugees already waiting in Southeast Asian camps for permanent resettlement opportunities and the continued escape of about 25,000 Indochinese per month, a permanent solution to the refugee problem appeared remote, according to western press reporting. . In Manila, U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs Dick Clark and other 0.5. officials met with Indonesian, Philippine, and UN officials to discuss the possible use of Indonesian and Philippine Islands as processing centers for Indochinese refugees. 1379079 UPDATE-06/30/80‘ 04/26/79 03/15/79 03/14/79 03/06/79 02/26/79 01/24/79 - 01/19/79 -- cns-32 IB79079 UPDATE-06/30/80 After consulting with the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, Attorney General Bell approved plans under his parole authority to admit 35,000 additional Indochinese refugees between Apr. 30 and Sept. 30, 1979. To date, the United States has admitted about 223,000 Indochinese refugees. The UNHCB urged the Philippines and Indonesia to lend one small island each to serve as processing centers for Indochinese "boat people." Ambassador Dick Clark said before the Senate "Judiciary Committee hearing that the administration's proposed refugee legislation would allow 50,000 or more refugees annually to permanently resettle in the United States. "Refugee" was defined "as someone outside his or her country who is unable or unwilling to return to that country because of possible persecution." Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Holbrooke told newsmen in Tokyo that the United States had urged Japan to increase dramatically its assistance to Indochinese refugees. Dale de Haan, UN Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees, said that a new program had been worked out with Hanoi officials which "will regularize the departure of those who wold leave anyway." He said that Hanoi.has pledged that former southern officials and those in reeducation camps will be eligible for emigration. U.S. Representative Elizabeth Holtzman said after an investigation at Southeast Asian refugee centers and a trip to Hanoi that she estimated that refugees had paid about $30 million in bribes to Vietnamese officials in order to flee Vietnam. Also, she said that Vietnamese officials admitted that some corruption existed among lower level bureaucrats, but said that new regulations have been promulgated to allow orderly emigration. The Australian government suspended its $7.1 million aid program and cultural exchanges with Vietnam in protest against Vietnam's;military involvement in Kampuchea and Hanoi's refugee policy. Australian officials claimed that "Vietnam is involved in the movement of people for money, casting them off ...and assuming other nations will solve the problem.“ The Administration announced that it will establish an office for refugee affairs, headed by former CBS-33 IB79079 UPDATE-O6/30/30 Senator Dick Clark who will be named as Ambassador-at-Large. The refugee office will help to establish a continuing U.S. policy to deal with refugees, and will address the problem of more than 200,000 refugees in Southeast Asian camps. -- Hong Kong authorities agreed to give temporary shelter to more than 3,300 Vietnamese refugees who had been waiting for aid for nearly 1 month outside Hong Kong's territorial waters on the Taiwan—owned freighter, the Huey Eong. 01/15/79 -- Malaysia's Prime Minister Datuk Hussein Onn announced that Vietnamese refugees will no longer be allowed to land in Malaysia because of domestic humanitarian considerations and national ’security reasons. Hussein was quoted in the Far Eastern Economic Review as saying " ...If the Vietnamese Government is actively threatening our security, by sending out Communist agents, then I will not hesitate to break off diplomatic relations with Vietnam." gpnlgggyar REFERENCE soungrs Brown, Robert.” The Indochinese: an incredible tragedy. American federationist, v. 86, August 1979: 1-5. Chanda, Nayan. Hanoi ponders its strategy. Far Eastern ' economic review, Dec. 7, 1979: 21-23. Deathwatch: Cambodia. Time, v. 114, Nov. 12, 1979: Q2-50. Ellis, William 5. Hong Kong's refugee dilemma. National geographic, v. 156, November 1979: 709-732. Heder, Stephen. Kampuchea's armed struggle: the origins of an independent revolution. Bulletin of concerned Asian scholars, v. 11, 1979: 2-2H. Kamm, Henry. Life in liberated Cambodia. New York times magazine, Hay 18, 1980: 76-87. Kurth, James R. Refugees: American must do more. Foreign policy, fall 1979: 12-19. Luce, Don. The Boat People. Progressive, v. 43, September 1979: 27-29. Nations, Richard. Battle for the hearts and stomachs. Far Eastern economic review, Dec. 7, 1979: 14-21. Osborn, Hilton. The Indo-chinese refugees: cause and effects. International affairs. (London) v. 56, January 1980: 37-53. Ray, Hemen. The China-Vietnam conflict. Internationales Asienforum, v. 10, 1979: 121-159. cns-3a ‘ 1137 9079 gUPDA‘J.'E-0 5/30;/so Saving the Boat People. Atlas World press review, v. 26, September 1979: 35—#0. Shawcross, William. Refugees and rhetoric. Foreign policy, fall 1979: 3-11. ' Simon, Sheldon H. Kampuchea: Vietnam's:"Vietnam.“ Current f history, December 1979: 197-223. Ts'ao, Ignatius J.H. Vietnamese refugees and the conscience iaiof mankind. Asian thought and society, v. 5, April 1980: 74-80. Vanderxroef, Justus M. The Vietnamese refugee problem. World affairs, summer 1979: 3-16. Wain, Barry. The Indochina refugee crisis. Foreign affairs, fall 1979: 160-180. ’ Young, Stephen B. Vitenamese marxism: transition in elite ideology. Asian survey. August 1979: 770-779. _{‘ ."‘a“-““3'k—*'«-1-fEnA.£A.'-‘n)‘ht.'.r\:- ;--,.u.__ I L i..CHJ!:’~3 - w3_ “i 3? 5 v\.'A¢si~;5sx: "3f'!L3ré\£ ’ Lmavrmsmw’ i .3