LC /'4. 55/;2~ S13 7<1oCI CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 7 NO LONGER PROPERTY Q i‘ O L I N 3 E3 RA RY ‘sfWa:~;,?':ing%€on Umversitv Issue Brief . V... — :*~2.-‘V 72 »< _,.t\ l_A.n.v-2/ 7} ‘-..‘_'_ /‘ H: r. .5 <._ ‘ .K‘.\j:\‘ 3: Q (_;f.$i V‘ v\ I . ., ,-.-;V- x ;=..~.;. .r'»'--’«':' ‘! V--‘-§-’-'’3‘'§,5- *1; F2. ‘[1 E’? f g .3 ‘---.m. 2 E ‘‘Q{ 1'.‘ 1., ." ,, fi\‘\i,,; ‘X1 :...;..;:xx 3°55 .. NW 17 3983 . / N’ y‘ *7 .N RLE auér‘ ¢="‘*\.'. W '1'?‘ E‘: ”~' QT. Lé..,}“i..§ agar,» ‘‘<’§~ - 4-n _. .Iv1u er.-. NUCLEAR POWER: THREE MILE ISLAND ACCIDENT--CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE AND INVESTIGATIONS ISSUE BRIEF NUMBER IB79097 AUTHOR: Donnelly, Warren H. Senior Specialist, Energy Kramer, Donna S. 0ffice of Senior specialists THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE HAJOR ISSUES SYSTEH DATE ORIGINATED 9 DATE UPDATED 9;; FOR ADDITIONAL INPORHATION CALL 287-5700 0307 {J CRS- 1 iIB79097 UPDATE-03/O6/80 l§§Q§-2§§lE£2lQE on Mar. 28, 1979, an accident occurred at the Three hile Island nuclear powerplant, near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, which was the most serious nuclear accident in the United States to date. While it did not cause any immediate casualties, it constituted a heavy financial blow to the metropolitan Edison Co. and its customers, and the utility faces a long, expensive, and probably controversial attempt to restore the damaged Unit-2 to operation. The accident triggered major investigations by Congress, the executive branch, and others. Hany hearings have been held and more are likely. Legislation to impose conditions upon licenses of nuclear powerplants now in operation is pending. The accident has presented Congress with the issue of nuclear safety and how to deal with risks that, although low in probability, would be high in consequences. §§§§§BQE!2-iND PQLICX_A§&LZ§l§ BACKGROUND E-e-29!er2lant The accident involved one of two nuclear power reactors at the Three Mile 1 }and nuclear powerplant of the Metropolitan Edison Co., located at Goldsboro, Pa., about 10 miles southeast of Harrisburg. Both units ’were pressurized water reactors supplied by the Babcock and Wilcox Company. Commercial operation of the unaffected unit began in September 197a while that of the reactor in which the accident occurred began in May 1978. The Metropolitan Edison Co. operates the plants for a consortium of utilities owned by General Public Utilities Corporation. Ihe-A92ide2t The accident began at #:00 on har. 28, 1979. As it evolved, there were fears of a catastrophic release of the intensely radioactive materials within the reactor, but this did not occur. The accident caused Governor Thornburgh of Pennsylvania to close nearby schools and to advise pregnant women and pre-school age children within 5 miles of the site to leave, and people within 10 miles to stay inside. Evacuation of from 200-300 thousand residents was planned but not ordered. The accident caused public fear and confusion and some voluntary evacuation, and triggered a renewed controversy over the safety of nuclear power. no detectable injuries or casualties to the public occurred, although some nearby residents were exposed to comparatively small amounts of radiation. Sone utility workers received more radiation exposure than is permitted by regulation, although not enough to cause short-tern injury. Detectable amounts of radioactive materials were found in the environment, but below limits that would cause official concern a L action. The greatest effect to date is the financial loss to the utility. For further details about the accident, see archived issue brief 79035. 339 lQV9§El9§EiQE§ CRS- 2 11379097 UPDATE-O3/06/80 As would be expected, the NRC began several investigations of the accident. To date it has published an abnormal occurrence report on t : accident, a report from its "Lessons Learned Task Force," and a report from its Division of Inspection and Enforcement. The NRC has also named Hitchell Rogovin, a Washington attorney, to conduct an independent investigation. Details on these investigations follow: The-Eagle.A222rna;-Q222rre22e-re22r: Section 208 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, requires the NRC to put out information on abnormal occurrences, which are unscheduled incidents or events that the NRC determines are significant from the standpoint of public health and safety (Cf. Federal Register, Feb. 24, 1977, 42 PR 10950). On August 3 the BBC stated in the Federal Register that the Three uile Island accident was determined to be such an occurrence (44 FR H5802). The NRC also included a description of the accident and briefly listed the remedial actions taken. Updates on the accident and its impact on operating reactors and reactor licensing are to be provided in the NRC'c quarterly abnormal occurrence reports to Congress. Ihe_!£§:§-Le§§en§.Learned-Ia§h_E9r2e The NRC established a “Lessons Learned Task Force" to identify and evaluate those safety concerns originating with the accident that require licensing actions. In addition, the Task Force was charged to identify, analyze, and recommend changes to licensing requirements and the licensing process for nuclear powerplants. The Task Force looked into seven technic - areas covering: (1) reactor operations, including operator training and licensing; licensee technical qualifications; reactor transient and accident analysis; licensing requirementsv for safety and process equipment, instrumentation, and controls; on-site emergency preparations and procedures; the NRC's accident response role, capability, and management; and feedback, evaluation, and utilization of reactor operating experience. i The Task Force completed its report in July 1979, which the NRC subsequently published (Report NUREG-0578). Briefly, the Task Force said its review of the accident had disclosed a number of actions relating to design and analysis and plant operations that it recommended be required in the short term to provide substantial additional protection for the public health and safety: “All nuclear powerplants in operation or in various stages of construction or licensing action are affected to varying degrees by the specific recommendations." The Task Force said it was continuing work relating to general safety criteria, systems design requirements, and nuclear powerplant licensing and operations. The Task Force's recommendations covered nine aspects of design and analysis and three aspects of operation. On August 13 the NRC's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards reported its review of the short-term recommendations of the cTask Force. The ACRS said that an orderly and effective implementation and appropriate level "f review and approval by the NRC staff of the recommendations would require i somewhat more flexible, and in some cases more extended, schedule than is implied in the Task Force report. mas for the recommendations, the Committee agreed with their intent and substance with four exceptions, where it made recommendations of its own. cns- 3 1379097 upnamz-o3/05/so The-§E§:e-;§_inze§:i9ati2n Another NRC response was to direct its Office of Inspection and Enforcement (IE) to investigate the facts of the accident and to evaluate the performance of the licensee as a basis for corrective action or enforcement action. It was headed by Victor Stello, Jr., director of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement. The IE report was completed in July 1979 and was published by the NRC in August (HUREG-0600). The IE investigation supported earlier estimates that the collective radiation dose to the population from the accident for the period of Har. 28 to Apr. 7, 1979, represented minimal risks of additional health effects. IE identified several inadequacies of radiation protection within the plant and criticized the measurements of off—site radiation made by the licensees. The investigation also substantiated earlier conclusions about the causes of the accident and factors affecting its severity. Inadequacies were confirmed in the following six areas: equipment performance, transient and accident analyses, operator training and performance, equipment and system design, information flow, and emergency planning. According to the IE investigation, the most disturbing result was confirmation of earlier conclusions that the accident could have been prevented in spite of inadequacies found: "The design of the plant, the equipment that was installed, the various accident and transient analyses, and the emergency procedures were adequate to have prevented the serious consequences of the accident, if they had been permitted to function or be carried out as planned." Noting considerable evidence of a "mind set," the IE report said that without this "mind set“ the ( :rators might well have acted to preclude or better mitigate the accident. According to the IE investigation, substantial effort is needed, by both the NBC and the industry, to ensure that the lessons of the accident are implemented at other facilities. It concluded that further study is clearly needed about the contributions of other organizations that can influence the operation of nuclear powerplants, including designers, reviewers, builders, vendors, and regulators. A full assessment of all the underlying causes of the accident must await completion of these studies. $11.e-B<.>92z.i.n..r.e2e1.=.:c. Within weeks of the accident, the NRC instituted a special inquiry to review and report on the accident. Its principal objectives were to determine what happened and why, to assess the actions of utility and NRCI personnel before and during the accident, and to identify deficiencies in the system and areas where further investigation might be warranted. To conduct this inquiry, the NRC in June 1979 contracted with the Washington law firm of Rogovin, Stern 8 Huge, specifying that it would have full independence. The Rogovin report was presented to the Commission on Jan. 2a, 1980, in two volumes. The first describes the events following the accidents and the findings and recommendations of the Special Inquiry Group. The second contains detailed technical and analytical backup. The central theme of its conclusions was that the principal deficiences in commercial reactor safety are not hardware problems, they are management problems. They regulatory ;_stem is well equipped to review safety of nuclear reactor designs, but has failed to take timely account of actual operation of existing plants. The NRC is not focused, organized, or managed to meet today's regulatory needs; it is incapable in its present form of managing a ,comprehensive national safety program for existing nuclear powerplants and those scheduled for operation. However, the Special Inquiry Group concluded that while major changes must be made, these changes will make commercial nuclear power much cns- 4 1379097 UPDATE-03/06/30 safer than it is today. some of the Rogovin report recommendations included: -- establishment of stringent remote siting criteria; -- a major strengthening of NRC inspection and enforcment; —— a zone step licensing process for standard designs; -- a moratorium on construction permits until recommended changes are made; _W+- creation of a nationa; reactor operating_ggmpany;_and -- possible prohibition of one company from both generating and selling electricity from nuclear power. §EQ.§tn§ie§ The Council on Environmental Quality has contracted with the Environmental Law Institute to study the legal and technical implications of requiring consideration of environmental impacts from accidents like the Three Bile Island accident in environmental impact statements for nuclear plants. 1 It has also contracted with Princeton University's Center for Environmental Studies to determine what the extent of long-term health and environmental impacts would have been if the accident had been worse (Nucleonics Week, Aug. 23, 1979: 2). Bre-iéee::§-§92mi§§i9e-2n-the-A29i§e2:-et.Ihree.§ile_I§len§ 12he-§eme.z-.2mmi§§iemL on Apr. 11, 1979, President Carter signed executive order 12130 and established the President's Commission on the Accident at Three uile Island. The 11-member commission was headed by John Kemeny, President of Dartmouth College. Its purpose was to conduct a comprehensive study and investigation of the accident. The Commission's study and investigation was to include: (a) a technical assessment of the events and their causes; this assessment shall include, but shall not be limited to, an evaluation of the actual and potential impact of the events on the public health and safety and on the health and safety of the worker; (b) an analysis of the role of the managing utility; (c) an assessment of the emergency preparedness land response of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and mother Federal, State, and local authorities; (d) an evaluation off the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's licensing, inspection, operation, and enforcementi procedures as applied ton this facility; (e) an assessment of how the public's right to information concerning the fevents~at Three Mile Island was served and other steps that should be taken during similar, emergencies to provide the public with; laccurate. comprehensible, and timely information; and (f) appropriate recommendations based upon the Commission findings. The Commission is to prepare and send a report to the President of its -findings and recommendations by Oct. 25, 1979. CRS- 5 IB79097 UPDATE‘03/06/80 At a meeting with the Commission on Apr. 25, 1979, President Carter said 1 2t when it made its recommendations to him, he intended to carry them out "within the bounds of his authority and responsibility as President" (Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Apr. 30, 1979: 692). On June 10, however, in a meeting with newspaper editors, the President said he would carry out the Commission's recommendations "if they are at all practical" (Nucleonics Week, Aug. 20, 1979, special issue, p. 1). On Oct. 22, 1979, the President's Commission on the Accident at Three mile Island released its report and findings. Among its recommendations were: (1) to abolish the existing NBC and replace it with a new agency to be headed by a single administrator (appointed from outside the present agency); (2) to establish an oversight committee on nuclear reactor safety to examine the performance of this new agency and the nuclear industry; to retain the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; (3) to place the responsibility for safe operation of plants with the licensee; (U) to site new plants in areas remote from population centers, and (5) to require the agency, on a case-by—case basis, to assess new safety improvements, review the training program and competency of the licensee, and condition licenses upon review and approval of State and local emergency plans. After the report was released, President Carter commissioned a panel to review the paper submitted by the Kemeny Commission. The panel was to draft an option paper and submit it to the President within 30 days. The group was co-chaired by Frank Press, the President's science adviser, and John Deutch, undersecretary of the Department of Energy. On Dec. 7, 1979, President Carter announced isteps to help ensure that nuclear powerplants operate safely. He said, "Safety has always been, andi will remain, in my top priority," and that nuclear power is an energy source of last resort, but that we cannot shut the door on it. The President said he would: (1) Send an NRC reorganization plan to Congress, which would preserve and strengthen NRC‘s commission form (thus rejecting a principal recommendation of the Kemeny commission). (2) Appoint a new NRC chairman. In the interim, NRC Commissioner Ahearne would serve as chairman, replacing Dr. Hendrie. (3) Direct the Federal Emergency Hanagement Agency to head up all off-site emergency activities and to review emergency plans in all states with operating reactors by June 1980., “ (H) Direct NRC and other agencies to accelerate placement of resident Federal inspectors at every reactor site. (5) Ask all relevant agencies to implement virtually all of the other Kemeny Commission recommendations. The President also called on the nuclear industry to make three changes: (1) to develop enhanced safety standards for design, operation, and construction of powerplants; (2) to develop and maintain a comprehensive training, examination, and evaluation program for operators and supervisors; and CRS- 6 IB79097 UPDATE-03/06/80 (3) to modernize, standardize, and simplify control rooms to permit better informed decision-making in an emergency. As for licensing of nuclear powerplants, the President endorsed the NRC's temporary "pause" in issuing new licenses and construction permits, but urged NRC to complete its corrective work as quickly as possible, and no later than June 7, 1980. W ;§§EQE§§;Qirtfi;LE“CT9§r"THfiE5trY”" The overall response of the nuclear industry has been to establish a central coordinating committee, an analytical center, and an institute for nuclear powerplant operations. Zhe-AI§1§.P2liez-§2nm;ttee on F2ll9m:Q2-t2.the.2nI.Asrider: Shortly after the accident, the Atomic Industrial Forum (AIF) formed a Policy Committee to consolidate the industry's response to lessons learned at THI. In August 1979 the committee commented to the NRC on the first phase of NRC's "lessons learned" task force report, finding most NRC staff recommendations generally acceptable. Subcommittees prepared a Nuclear Power Emergency Response Plan, helped to create the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations; and made recommendations for design criteria and other technical matters. $22-32-;eer.§efet1-Anel1§i§-Qsnter-l!§A21 In May 1979 nuclear utilities formed the NSAC at the Electric Power Research Institute in Palo Alto, California. Headed by E. rzebroski, its initial objectives were yto get the best possible understanding and ’documentation of what happened at THI, the contributing factors, and what the accident‘ implies for safety management. NSAC also provides technical coordination and a clearinghouse function. NSAC made an initial report on the accident in July 1979. ‘It identified roughly 2M contributing factors. If almost any one of those factors had been slightly different, there would have been no THI damage. NSAC cautions against trying to correct all of the factors because some remedies might conflict with others. Instead, it called for attention to a few very important remedies which can apply to most plants. 2he.;n-:i:2:e-2f-fln2lgar.222er_Q2era:i9-§r1IEEQL Early in 1980 the nuclear utilities brought into being an Institute of Nuclear Power Operation (INPO), which is dedicated to ensuring ‘high quality operation of nuclear powerplants. Its purposes arei to establish industry-wide benchmarks for excellence in nuclear operation and to conduct independent evaluations to assist utilities in meeting those benchmarks. It will determine educational and training requirements for operating personnel and will accredit training organizations. The Institute has established offices in Atlanta, Georgia. 1 Q2n2rs§§i2n2l-§§§22n§§ By the time of the first anniversary of THI, ten subcommittees of. the Congress had held hearings on one or another aspect of the accident. uhmong these, the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment of the House- Committee on CRS- 7 IB79097 UPDATE-03/O6/80 Interior and Insular Affairs had completed extensive hearings into almost \ ary phase of nuclear power, and the Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation, Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, had in progress an investigation and a set of studies. The principal legislative response appeared in the NRC's authorization bill for FY80, still in conference as of Bar. 3, 1980, which, among other things, would tie further licensing of nuclear powerplants to the existence of State nuclear emergency plans. On Jan. 31, 1980, Hr. Udall, as chairman of the Interior Committee, introduced a comprehensive bill (H.R. 6390) designed to reduce the risk of nuclear accidents, establish a nuclear waste disposal plan, and give local communities more voice in siting of nuclear powerplants. one provision would forbid the NRC to issue operating licenses for new plants until it certifies that the lessons learned from Three Mile Island have been incorporated into the plant's design, operating procedures, and emergency plans. For further information, see Part II of the chronology, below. POLICY ANALYSIS The Three Mile Island accident has revived opposition to nuclear power among various groups and has.kindled fresh controversy over the future of nuclear power. what Congress does as the various investigations reach their conclusions and the Administration and the NRC decide upon their positions can greatly affect the future of nuclear power in the United States. Likely policy issues for Congress for the short and long term include the following: §h2rs:ssss.2zsrsi9st issues (1) Finding out what happened in the accident and why and how it happened. How close to disaster did it come? (2) Determining what were the risks to the public health and safety and to the health of the plant operators. (3) Determining how well various Federal and. State agencies and the nuclear utilities and industry responded to control the accident. (3) Establishing the costs of the accident - who is to pay what part of them and what the effects will be upon the electricity rates charged by the utility. (5) Monitoring what Federal and State agencies do to reduce the risks of such accidents in other nuclear powerplants now operating or in construction. (6) Assessing the effectiveness of nuclear accident and disaster planning. (7) Determining how well the nuclear insurance system worked to reimburse losses of the public. Lssszssrs.2zsrsi9hs-issnss (1) What long-term effects can be expected from radiation exposure of the public and workers? (2) What effect will the accident have upon nuclear energy in the United States and upon Government energy policies and plans? CRS- 8 IB79097 UPDATE-03/O6/80 (3) What will be the future of Unit-1 of the Three-Mile Island plant? (Q) What will be done with the radioactive wastes and damaged fuel fr the accident? (5) Can the damaged Unit—2 be returned to service? (6) How will NRC decide whether the damaged plant can be returned to service or if it should be decommissioned? If NRC decides the plant can be returned to service, how will it verify the integrity of _thoseZ partsd that were mostwexposed to the effects‘of the accident? L229-§sru_22li2z-end.le9i§latize-issue§ (1) How are the risks of nuclear power and its benefits to be balanced? (2) What is the future of nuclear energy in the United States? Should it be promoted, be kept as an energy source of last resort, or be shut down? (3) How can the NRC be reorganized to increase the effectiveness (of its nuclear safety responsibilities? (Q) Is a moratorium on further licensingof nuclear powerplants desirable? For what purposes? Under what conditions? (5) Should State emergency plans he made a prerequisite for licensing operation of new nuclear powerplants? (6) Under what conditions should nuclear powerplants now nearing completion be licensed for operation? (7) To what extent can the nuclear power industry police itself for safety and for training of its operators? L§§I§LATI9fl Q222le:ed.le9i§la:i2n POLO (SoJoReso Confers subpoena power upon the Presidential Commission appointed to investigate the Three Mile Island nuclear powerplant accident to require the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of evidence relating to the accident. Permits the issuance of an order for the inspection of the powerplant at Three Mile Island. Introduced May 17, 1979. Passed by Senate may 17.? Passed by House May 22. Signed into law May 23. Proposed leigslatign uany bills were proposed soon after )the accident. Host proposed suspensions of licensing either temporarily or permanently. These bills are listed in archived issue brief 79035. On Jan. 31, 1980, Representati vfldall, chairman of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, introduced H.R. 6390 as a result of his committee's extensive hearings into the accident and nuclear power. H.R. 6390 (Udall) CRS- 9. IB79097i UPDATE—O3/O6/80 Reduces the rrisk of nuclear «accidents, establishes a nuclear waste disposal plan, and gives local communities a greater voice in the siting of nuclear powerplants. Introduced Jan. 31, 1980; referred jointly to Committees on Interior and Insular Affairs and on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. L§9i§lati92.in-2r9§r2§§ At the time of writing the only legislation that had received any action which responded to the accident was the NRC's authorization for FY80 (S. 562 and H.R. 2608): The-§HQ1§.a2:h2£iza:i2n-:2£.21§Q-1§;.§§2_and-H;§;-2é9§L; The Senate bill was reported from the Environment and Public Works Committee on Ray 15 (s.Rept. 96-176) after amendment by Senator Hart to prohibit the NRC from issuing operating licenses for nuclear powerplants until it has approved State emergency plans and also to require shutdown of existing nuclear powerplants if their State emergency plans are not approved by the NRC within 6 months. The Committee included in its report a statement of principles proposed by its Nuclear Regulations Subcommittee which deal with remote monitoring, the NRC's emergency response, resident NRC inspectors, training of reactor operators, and other matters. The Senate amended and passed the bill on July 17, 1979. The House bill was reported from the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs on May 15 (H.Rept. 96-194, part I) after adoption of 10 amendments of the Energy and Environment Subcommittee and H c .er amendments; including one for a 6-month moratorium on issuance of new construction permits and one to prohibit issuance of an operating license until a State emergency evacuation plan has been approved by the NRC. It was subsequently reported from the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce with amendments on June 29, 1979 (H.Rept. 96—19u, part 2). Conference meetings have begun but have not yet produced agreement. E§ABl!§§ U.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Subcommittee on Energy. Nuclear powerplant shutdowns -- who pays? Hearing, 96th Congress, 1st session. Apr. 5, 1979. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. 55 p. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Environment and Public Works. Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation. c Three Mile Island nuclear powerplant accident. Hearings, 96th Congress, 1st session. Apr. 10, 23, and 30, 1979. Part I. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. off., 1979. 491 p. “Serial no. 96-1fl12“ U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Labor and Human Resources. Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research. Three Mile Island nuclear accident, 1979. Hearing, 96th Congress, 1st session. Apr. 4, 1979. Washington, U.S. Print. Off., 1979. 140 p. cns-10 1379097 UPDATE-O3/O6/80 §2QB2§ AN2-C0N§E§§§lQEAL QQQQPEETS Hart, Gary. Remarks in the Senate. Discussed "setbacks" at the Three-Hile Island nuclear powerplant; urged NRC investigation and said he will introduce legislation : requiring~NRG~towmaintain~continuoussremote—monitoring~sww~~ :—*s of nuclear powerplants; included articles. Congressional record [daily ed.]. Apr. 2, 1979: S3824-S3827. Hart, Gary. Remarks in the Senate. Important lessons of Three Mile Island. Congressional record [daily ed.] June 13, 1979: S7597-$79603. Hart, Gary. Remarks in the Senate. The meaning of Three Mile Island (Address given to the National Press Club). Congressional record [daily ed.] may 21, 1979: S6283-S6286. Sandman, Peter M. and Mary Paden. At Three Mile Island. Columbia journalism review, v. 18. July-Aug. 1979: 43-50, 52, Sn-58. Udall, Morris K. Remarks in the House. Nuclear power and Arizona. (Summary statement of his views on nuclear power.) Congressional record [daily ed.] Sept. 18, 1979: E4582-R0583. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities. Civil defense and the Three Mile Island nuclear accident. Dec. 18, 1979. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. 11 p. (96th Congress, 1st session) I ----- Civil defense aspects of the Three Hile Island nuclear accident. Hearings, may 16, 17, 23 and June 14, 1979. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. 243 p. (96th Congress, 1st session. Report H.A.S.C. no. 96-111) U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. ‘Emergency planning around U.S. nuclear powerplants: Nuclear Regulatory Commission oversight. Fourth report by the Committee on Government Operations ‘together with additional and dissenting views. 105 p. (96th Congress, 1st session. House.‘ Report no. 96-H13). 0.5. Congress. House. Committee on Governmental Operations. Subcommittee on Energy, Environment and Natural Resources. Response to Committee report on emergency planning and related safety issues: Nuclear Regulatory Commission oversight. Hearing, Nov. 1, 1979. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. 0Off., 1980. 303 p. (96th Congress, 1st session) ,U.S.- Congress. House. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Accident at Three Hile Island nuclear powerplants: oversight hearings. Ray 9, 10, 11, and 15, 1979. Washington, 0.5. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. 267 p. CR5-11 1379097 UPDATE-O3/O6/80 (96th Congress, 1st session House. Report no. 96-8, part 1). * -—-- Authorizing appropriations to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; H.R. 2608. Hay 15, 1979. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. H5 p. (96th Congress, 1st session- House. Report no. 96-194, part 1). ---- Oversight hearings. May 21 and 2a, 1979. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. 400 p. (96th Congress, 1st session. House.1 Report no. 96-8, part II) U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment. Accident. Nuclear safety, v. 20, Sept.-Oct. 1979: 613-612. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Technology. Subcommittee on Energy Research and Production. Nuclear powerplant safety systems. Hearings, 96th Congress, 1st session. may 22-2a, 1979. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. 1169 p. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Technology. Subcommittee on Natural Resources and Environment. Three Mile Island nuclear plant accident. Hearing, June 2, 1979. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. 251 p. (96th Congress, 1st session) U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Environment and Public Works. Nuclear Regulatory Commission authorizations; S. 562. May 15, 1979. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. Q7 p. (96th Congress, 1st session. Senate. Report no. 96-176) ‘ U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Environment and Public Works. Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation. Three Mile Island nuclear power plant accident. Hearings, Oct. 2 and 3, 1979. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1980. #52 p. (96th Congress, 1st session) U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Environment and Public Works, Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation / House. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment. Report of the President's Commission on the Three Kile Island Accident. Joint hearing, Oct. 31, 1979. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1980. 15H p. (96th Congress, 1st session) s"‘9n>_1-.061 or 22.2.3.2: PART I 906/07/80 --President Carter's target date for the NRC to complete its internal reorganization and work before resuming licensing construction and operation of nuclear 03/1H/80 06/00/80 02/19/80 02/13/80 01/31/80 o1/21:/so 01/04/80 01/02/80 - 12/07/79 -* a~accidentaconstitntedaan~“extraordinarywnuclear~w—has cns-12 11379097 UPDATE-'03/O6/80 powerplants (Cf., his statement of Dec. 7, 1979, on the Kemeny Commission). Target date for FEMA to complete its review of State emergency plans for States with nuclear reactors (Cf., the President's Dec. 7, 1979, statement on the Keneny report). New deadline for NBC determination whether the TMI occurrence " (Federal Register, Feb. 19, 1980: 10990). NRC appointed a special task force to study cleanup operations at Three Bile Island (NRC release 80-36). NRC announced extension of deadline for determining if the THI accident constituted an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence." New deadline Ear. 1a, 1980 (Federal Register, Feb. 19, 1980: 10990). NRC staff placed new conditions on Three Mile Island Unit 2 (NBC release 80-31, Feb. 13, 1980). Representative Udall, chairman of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, introduced a bill (H.R. 6390) designed to reduce the risk of nuclear accidents, establish a nuclear waste disposal plan, and give local communities a greater voice in the siting of nuclear powerplants. The bill results from the Committee's hearings on the Three Mile Island accident. The NRC received and was briefed on the report of its Special Inquiry (The Rogovin report). A panel of senior NRC staff found that the required criteria were not met regarding the waiver of Price-Anderson Act defense provisions to be applied to law suits arising from the TMI accident. The panel recommended that the Commission determine that the accident was not an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" under the law. The Commission invited comments from the public to aid it in making its decision (Federal Register, v. 45, Jan. H, 1930: 1180). The NRC staff issued letters and orders to utilities on lessons learned from the THI accident. These went to utility operators of 68 commercial nuclear (power reactors and set deadlines for completing design, procedural, and staffing improvements. with some exceptions, if licensees do not provide adequate justification the plants must implement the changes by Jan. 31 or be shut down. President Carter announced steps he is taking as a result of the Kemeny Commission report to help ‘ensure that nuclear powerplants are operated safely. 11/21/79 11/15/79 11/09/79 11/05/79 10/25/79 10/02/79 09/16/79 09/10/79 CR5-13 IB79097 UPDATE-03/O6/80 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission held a one~day informal hearing on whether the accident at Three Bile Island should be considered an extraordinary nuclear occurrence. Senator James Hcclure addressed the annual conference of the Atomic Industrial Forum stating that the pro-nuclear audience should fight for the moral platform on which the anti-nuclear opposition had set itself. The NRC informed the White House that it agrees with the majority of the recommendations in the President's Commission on the Three Mile Island Accident report, with a few exceptions, and has active programs under way which address most of the Kemeny commission’s concerns. In a letter to Frank Press, presidential science adviser, and in a 30-page document detailing agency actions and plans, NRC chairman Joseph Hendrie said that based "on the results so far of our own internal reviews of the accident, we have generally found that the actions recommended by the President's commission in the areas of human factor, operational safety, emergency planning, nuclear power plant design and siting, health effects, and public information are necessary and feasible." The NRC adopted an interim statement of policy on the licensing of nuclear powerplants to be followed while the Commission considers a range of options dealing with the extent to which its regulatory structure should be modified as a result of THI. Representative Morris Udall announced that his Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment would begin work on legislation to amend the Atomic Energy Act. He stated that he is seeking to modify Federal law in light of what was learned from the Three Mile Island accident. Due date for the report of President Carter's commission to investigate the nuclear powerplant accident at Three hile Island. 9 NRC chairman Hendrie, during a hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation, said that the NRC might take over control of a stricken nuclear powerplant in the event of another accident like TMI (The Washington Post, Oct. 4, 1979: A2). The NRC staff recommended that the Government consider the accidental release of dangerous radiation when deciding on location of new reactors (The New York Times, Sept. 17, 1979: A1, A19). NRC licensing work to proceed, but in time with Kemeny Commission work (Nucleonics Week, special issue, Sept. 10, 1979). c1-‘cs-1u 11379097 UPDATE-03/06/80 08/23/79 --Members of the Kemeny Commission criticized a decision of a top NRC official to resume licensing of new reactors. Later, the official, Harold R. Denton, reversed his decision (The New York Times, Aug. 20, 1979: A1). -- Nuclear plant management and operators must understand what they are doing and not blindly follow rules, as they apparently did at Three Mile Island, said ~—~ * — —€ ana daa9a9'~s/A/tomicaa E—n—ergy*c.-‘on—t-ro/1 sB*o*ardt‘preas~:i:d-ent , Jo/n+ raw Jennekens (Nucleonics Week, Aug. 23, 1979: 7). 08/16/79 - Nuclear electricity production in the U.S. could drop significantly in 1979 and 1980 as a result of regulatory and policy actions attributable to the Three Hile Island accident, according to a DOE analysis requested by Senator Mark Hatfield (Nucleonics week, Aug. 16, 1979: 10). 08/10/79 - President Carter told newspaper editors that he will carry out the recommendations of the Kemeny commission “if they are at all practical" (Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Aug. 17, 1979: 1428). —— The Kemeny Commission, in an executive session, decided to sever all ties with its citizens‘ advisory group in reaction to a dispute over the group's role in the investigation. The Commission decided not to form a replacement group and, instead, decided to write to some 200 public interest, industry, and other groups to solicit suggestions and advice on any aspect of the investigation (Nucleonics Week, Aug. 9, 1979: 5). 08/03/79 —— The NRC published its determination that the Three Mile Island Accident was an abnormal occurrence (44 FR u5802).. 07/12/79 - THI-induced nuclear cutbacks could hurt the Southeast more than other parts of the 0.5. by causing higher energy costs, greater oil and gas consumption, and more sulfur dioxide emissions (Report of a study by the National Economic Research Associates. Hucleonics Week, July 12, 1979: 8) 07/08/79 - Ralph Nader's group, Critical Mass, accused the 9 Nuclear Regulatory Commission of a conflict of interest in the way it measured radiation doses at Three Mile Island. 07/02/79 —— The NRC ordered Metropolitan Edison to keep the ’ iundamaged unit-1 at Three Mile Island shut down until the agency can draft specific restart procedures and hold a public hearing. The utility had kept I the unit shut down voluntarily following the March 28 accident at unit-2 (Nucleonics Week, July 5, 1979: 8). O6/18/79 06/1 Ls/79 06/11/79 O5/2H/79 05/23/79 05/21/79 05/17/79 05/07/79 nopponents, CR3-15 IB79097 UPDATE-03/O6/80 The House passed the NRC appropriations bill (H.R. #388) after defeating Hr. Weaver's amendment to prohibit use of funds for licensing a nuclear powerplant in a state that lacks an emergency evacuation plan that has been tested and submitted to the NRC. The NRC named Rashington attorney Hitchell Rogovin to head an independent investigation of events surrounding the nuclear plant breakdown at Three Mile Island (The Washington Post, June 15, 1979: A10). An industry task force of the Edison Electric Institute reported searching for ways to spread the risks of consequential damages arising from major nuclear accidents. The group is headed by vice chairman Gordon Corey of the Commonwealth Edison Co. (Electrical Week, June 11, 1). 1979: The Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works reported S.Res. 171, to provide $flO1,692 for an investigation of the Three Mile Island accident (S.Rept. 96-19h). President Carter signed into law P.L. 96-12, conferring certain powers on his Commission to investigate ‘ the Three Mile Island nuclear accident. The House passed S.J.Res. 80, to confer certain powers on the Presidential Commission to investigate Three Mile Island (Congressional Record, may 21, 1979: H3480-H3u81). NRC staff announced a 3-month freeze on issuing of operating licenses and construction permits for new nuclear powerplants while experts assess the implications of Three Mile Island (The New York Times, flay 22, 1979: A1-A18). The President's Commission halted its first hearings on Three Bile Island because it had not yet received authority from Congress to subpoena witnesses and evidence. The Senate passed S.J.Res. 80 to confer subpoena power on the President's Commission to investigate Three Mile Island. Senator Hart, Chariman of the Nuclear Regulatory Subcommittee said, in a speech at the National Press Club, that there should be a moratorium on the issuing of operating licenses for any new nuclear poverplants until the state involved has prepared a comprehensive emergency plan and had it approved by the NRC. Senator Kennedy, during discussion with nuclear favored a nuclear construction moratorium. CR5-16 IB7 9097 UPDATE-O3/O6/80 said it would be out of the question operating nuclear powerplants, but minimize the need for their use. President Carter to shut down all he would like to formal order directing the shutdown of three Babcock and Wilcox nuclear power reactors still operating. The utilities had previously volunteered to shut them down for safety modifications and additional operator training. The NRC issued a O5/03/79 OH/26/79 O4/Q5/79 OH/23/79 OH/19/79 ou/16/79 % 0%/12/79f O4/11/79 mhpr. radiation exposure was higher than Secretary of HEW Califano said that from the Three flile Island accident originally estimated. As a result, the statistical probability indicated that at least one to ten cancer deaths caused by radiation could be expected among the two million people living within 50 miles of the plant [The New York Times, May 4, 1979: A1). President Carter swore in the eleven members of his panel to investigate Three Mile Island. The group is headed by John G. Kemeny, president of Dartmouth College. The NRC announced that the Three nile Island Plant 2 should be in a stable shutdown in one week (May 2, 1979). Harold Denton of the NRC said he believed the accident was caused more by human than mechanical error. He enumerated four major mistakes. At least one violated NRC rules and all four involved poor judgement by the operators who were on duty. N The Atomic Industrial Forum created a special committee to coordinate the nuclear industry's activities in the aftermath of the Three Mile Island accident. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued new operating instructions to reactor operators calling for reassessment of certain operating procedures and ordered careful review of all plants to avoid future Three mile Island incidents. The senior nuclear safety expert of the Tennessee Valley authority said that almost 11 months before the March 28 accident he warned the manufacture of the reactor (Babcock and Wilcox) that there was a possibility that a similar accident could occur. The NRC instructed licensees of 3“ nuclear powerplants to beware of the kinds of mistakes and breakdowns that caused the accident at Three Mile Island. President Carter appointed a commission to investigate the accident at Three Mile Island and to make recommendations to prevent any future accident [The New York Times, 12, 1979: A1, A20]. on/10/79 - 0“/09/79 - OH/05/79 Ofl/04/79 - CRS-17 IB79097 UPDATE-03/O6/80 The Edison Electric Institute appointed an ad hoc committee to oversee the coordinate efforts of the industry to address the impacts of the accident, and invited representatives of public power systems to participate. The committee is chaired by Floyd W. Lewis of Middle South Utilities, Inc. ,(Nuclear News, Hay 1979: 50). President Carter said in a news conference that it is not possible to abandon nuclear power in the foreseeable future and that a bureaucratic nightmare or maze of red tape would not contribute to more safety of nuclear reactors. NRC Chairman Hendrie, at a hearing of the Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulations of the senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, said "we cannot have an acceptable nuclear power program in this country if there is any appreciable risk" of other accidents like the one at Three Hile Island. The Chairman and his fellow commissioners testified that there must be a searching review and evaluation of NBC policies and procedures. NRC spokesman Dr. Denton declared that the crisis at Three mile Island was over with regard to the status of the core. Governor Thornburgh rescinded his evacuation recommendation and said it was considered safe for pregnant women and preschool children to return to their homes within a 5-mile radius of the site. The Governor also declared that all schools not already reopened would do so, that state offices would return to normal business, and that local civil defense forces would step down from full alert status [The New York Times, Apr. 10, 1979: A1]. President Carter, in his address on national energy policy, mentioned the Three Mile Island accident twice. He said the accident had demonstrated dramatically that the nation has other energy problems and that the accident obviously "...causes all of us concern." He said he had directed the establishment of an independent Presidential commission of experts to investigate the cause of the accident and to make recommendations on how "...we can improve the safety of nuclear powerplants." There will be a full accounting. The General.Accounting Office transmitted its report to Congress on emergency response planning and capabilities at nuclear facilities. Ur. Udall, chairman of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs and of its Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment, announced plans for a sweeping inquiry into the role of nuclear power in the United States. OH/O3/79 - -”‘- v-W"-Hcsovern-said he-would-introducevlegislation-to-hait—al1 OH/02/79 - Ofl/01/79 -- 03/30/79 -- CRS-18 IB79097 UPDATE—O3/06/80 Dr. Harold Denton, spokesman for the NRC, said the risk of a dangerous gas explosion within the damaged reactor had been eliminated. The Union of Concerned Scientists called for the resignation of Chairman Joseph M. Hendrie of the accusing him of being not fit to be the nation's nuclear regulator. At the UCS press conference, NRC, chief Senator nuclear plant construction and licensing until a comprehensive, independent review of possible safety defects in nuclear plants was conducted [The New York Times, Apr. 4, 1979: A16]. Robert Pollard, a former NRC reactor expert, now with the Union of Concerned Scientists, briefed several Congressman and their staffs on the accident and recommended the immediate shutdown of all Bahcock and Wilcox plants unless the operators can provide convincing evidence that the general problems have been corrected. Senator Kennedy, speaking at the Council on Foreign Relations, called for a review of nuclear power's role in reducing United States dependence on oil imports from the Middle East and urged a.fresh examination of the nuclear weapons risks arising out of the wide international use of atomic energy. He also urged tightened procedures for licensing nuclear powerplants. According to Press Secretary Jody Powell, President Carter ordered a federal inquiry into all aspects of the Pennsylvania accident. He stated that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as well as the Department of Energy were among agencies involved in the Carter order for the Federal Study Group. Senator Gary Hart spoke on CBS's "Face The Nation." He said that he would introduce legislation requiring the federal government to maintain a continuous monitoring of reactors and to assume full control immediately in the event of a crisis. The Senate Democratic leader Robert Byrd (west Virginia) said that "the Pennsylvania accident raised serious questions about the safety of nuclear power." He urged a shift toward greater reliance on coal and transferring research funds from nuclear energy to coal. President Carter toured the Three Bile Island nuclear plant. Both the President and his nuclear safety advisers stressed that conditions were stable. At approximately 11:30 AM the Chairman of the NRC, 03/29/79 CBS-19 IB79097 UPDATE-O3/06/80 John Hendrie, suggested to the governor of Pennsylvania, Richard Thornburgh, that pregnant women and pre-school children in the area within five miles of the plant site be evacuated. An onrsite state of emergency was called by Governor Thornburg after an uncontrolled release of radiation that initial readings showed to be as high as 1,200 millirems per hour were detected. The governor went on Civil Defense Radio and regular radio to warn persons from within a five to ten mile radius to stay indoors and to advise pregnant women and preschool children to evacuate the premises. President Carter was in touch with Governor Thornburgh and offered federal assistance if needed. He also offered the same assistance to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The President established an interagency task force in the National Security Council to deal with the problem (Federal Emergency Management Agency). Senator Gary Hart held a news conference in Washington on the Three Mile Island incident. NRC officials reported that the failure at the Three Mile Island Plant was regarded as the most serious accident in the United States to date. A congressional delegation headed by Senator Hart visited the site to ascertain the potential harm to the public's health and safety. Senator Edward Kennedy, Chairman of the Energy Subcommittee of the Joint Economic Committee, asked~ Secretary of Energy James Schlesinger to reconsider his decision to submit a bill to speed up the I licensing of nuclear powerplants. In a letter to the Secretary, Kennedy asked for five safety measures to be considered before a license would be issued. These were (1) require a final design before a construction permit is issued, (2) establish a deadline for the resolution of unresolved safety problems, (3) upgrade safety of existing power plants, (a) establish definitive siting criteria for tpopulation density, and (5) allow assumption by the NRC of direct responsibility for quality assurance activities. fihite_House Press Secretary Jody Powell said that President Carter was concerned about the radiation leak at Harrisburg and was getting I information on it from the National Security O3/28/79 - Council. At approximately fl:OO AM at 98% power, the secondary feed pumps of the Three Mile Island Unit -- 2 in Hiddletown, Pennsylvania tripped due to a feedwater The Sena E 2 an ’ !nslser-BsQ lezaenl- rllllljl/Qazlfls::;The,snhcommitteelconclndedlhearingslonlthelcost_gf cns—2o 1379097 UPDATE-O3/O6/80 polishing system problem, thus beginning the accident. PART II CHROHOLOGY OF COMMITTEE RESPONSES ittee on Enzir9nnen:_ a.d- 2ubl;2- E-r£§. énbsennissss- en ’ §enar9r-§arz-§ar:l.2hairman; recovery and cleanup operation at TMI. 11/08/79 ——-The Subcommittee began hearings on the cost of recovery and cleanup operations at THI. 1Q/31/79 —— Joint hearing held on the report of the President's Commission on the accident (The Kemeny Commission) with the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. 10/02/79 -10/O3/79 - Hearings on the NRC's immediate response to 05/10/79 ” the accident. The subcommittee ordered reported the NRC's authorization for FY80, S. 562, with an amendment to shut down all operating nuclear powerplants in any State that cannot produce an NRC-approved emergency evacuation plan within six months, and to halt issuance of new operating licenses in such States, and an amendment to provide $uo1 thousand for the subcommittee's investigation of the accident. 05/O9/79 — O5/10/79 - Hearings held on the Federal Government's os/o9/79 -- ou/30/79 - 04/27/79 - responsibility for radiation protection and on emergency planning for nuclear power accidents. Appearing before the National Press Club, subcommittee chairman Hart called for a moratorium on the issuing of operating licenses for any new nuclear plant until the State involved has prepared a comprehensive emergency evacuation plan and had it approved by the NRC. He outlined other steps to be taken or considered by the Federal Government that included: a system of NBC monitored radiation detection devices near every nuclear reactor in the U.S.; continuous on-site inspection by the NRC; more training and revised licensing requirements for reactor operators; remote monitoring of key instruments in each reactor; establishment of a specially trained and licensed "elite nuclear SWAT team" by the NRC to assume control of a reactor in an emergency; and a 1985 deadline for the Administration and the industry to come up with an acceptable plan for waste disposal. Hearings on the accident and the NRC decision to temporarily close other Babcock and Wilcox nuclear power reactors. Hearings on the accident. CRS-21 IB79097 UPDATE-O3/06/80 on/1o)79 -- Hearings on safety procedures by the NBC in relation to the accident. O4/09/79 -— Senator Hart introduced S.Res. 13a to authorize funds for the Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation to make a special investigation into the accident [Congressional Record, daily edition, Apr. 9, 1979: SQZO1-S3205]. O3/30/79 - »Senator Hart held a press conference on the accident in Washington. 03/29/79 -* Senator Hart led a Senate delegation to visit the accident site. " Ehe-§s2e:e.§9nni2:s2-9n- §9zernnen:e__ Affairs - éuheennitzes- 92- E22292. Ens;922-229l;£eratien-e.d-£ederel Servicesi Senet0r-£0hn Glenn:-eheir2en; 05/09/79 - 05/10/79 - Hearings on the Federal Government's responsibility for radiation protection and on emergency planning for nuclear powerplant accidents. $he-§eee:e.§9nait§ee.2n-Leh2r-§nQ-E2men-3e§22r2e§l.§2hs2nu;::ee 92. Health end-§sienti£;2.§e§eer2h;-§ena:9r-§d!erd-§e2ne§1._9he;rnan; on/on/79 -- Held a hearing on the health implications of the accident. The Joint E62 - ..._ - §2h.2nnii:es- en- E.er9z.- §eneter- Edzard O4/O4/79 - on/05/79 - Held a hearing on the cost of the clean-up and power replacement caused by the accident. $he-§92§e-§2nni:ts--en-Arued_§erzi9s§; 06/1n/79 --Hearings continued. O5/23/79 - ~Hearings continued. 05/16/79 - 05/17/79 —- The Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities held hearings on the civil defense aspects of accident. §99§s-§enni::ee-92-§§2ea:;9n-and-Leh9r..§nhs9nu;:res-en- Layer- §t-néerd§. §QzerQ-£;.§eerdl-§hai-ne2; 05/2h/79 -- Hearing held on occupational diseases with attention to ionizing and non-ionizing radiation. £he-§99§e-§9nni::ss-92.§2zernzent-Q2era:ien§;-§uh292mi2£se.22 Enzirennensl §ner92-end.Eai2rel-§e§e§r2e§.-2eh1-§e:£e::.-shei_2an; 02/13/80 -- Hearing held on the Rogovin report. 11/01/79 —- Hearing held on responses to the Committee report on emergency planning and related safety issues. O8/O8/79 -- The Committee published a report on emergency be . ipl_a_n,n_ing_;_ CRS—22 IB79097 UPDATE-O3/06/80 planning around U.s. nuclear powerplants (H.Rept. 96-413), with additional and dissenting views. Summarized, its five recommendations to the NRC, which could be implemented within current authority, were that the Commission should: (1) Bake clear that it considers severe nuclear accidents possible, not hypothetical, occurrences for emergency, planning; involving itself more directly in emergency _andireviewitheiHECLs_resource,commitmentsifor sufficiency. (2) Upgrade NRC standards for emergency planning to meet seven specific requirements; and incorporate these into ‘a Commission rule and apply the nre rule retrospectively. (3) Review and upgrade its own requirements for State and local emergency plans; incorporate these into a Commission rule; review State plans; require as a condition for a construction permit the existence of both a State emergency plan and a local plan. (a) Abandon the "Low Population Zone" approach and replace it with an "Emergency Planning Zone" approach as developed jointly by the NBC and EPA; require State and local ~authorities to have a plan for the "plume and ingestion 05/o7/79 - 10/31/79 -- 10/16/79 - Emergency Planning Zones around each nuclear powerplant...." (5) Review existing emergency response capability and determine the maximum-sized zone around each plant for which evacuation is feasible for various warning times and advise the Committee of its findings within 180 days: and require that effective emergency response capability, including evacuation, be established in the licensing process. Hearing on NRC review of off-site emergency plans for nuclear powerplant accidents. Joint hearing held on the report of the President's Commission (The Kemeny Commission) with the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works. The Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment began markup of nuclear policy review legislation.v 09/21/79 -O9/25/79 -— Concluded hearings into the THI accident, 06/11!/79 - with emphasis on industry's response. Continued oversight hearings on security in the domestic nuclear industry. 06/04/79 —-06/05/79 -— Continued oversight hearings on nuclear regulation. cns—23 1379097 UPDATE-03/O6/80 OS/21/79 - O5/24/79 - Hearings were held on nuclear safety and 05/09/79 05/07/79 05/OH/79 OH/04/79 O3/29/79 the accident, and on the report of the Committee's task force. The subcommittee approved an amendment to the NRC's authorization for FY80 (H.R. 2608) to prohibit use of funds for issuance of construction permits for the period Oct. 1, 1979, to Apr. 1, 1980, and an amendment to prohibit use of funds for issuance of an operating license unless the NRC has received and approved from the State involved an emergency evacuation plan. The task force, together with NRC Commissioner Gilinsky, visited the Three Mile Island nuclear powerplant and interviewed operating personnel there. Afterwards, Hr. Udall told reporters that nuclear power technology may be so complex as to be beyond the ability of even well-intentioned people to control, and that the future of nuclear power hangs in doubt [The New York Times, May 8, 1979:v A18]. Hr. Udall announced an agenda for a comprehensive review of the nation's nuclear power and the creation of a task force of subcommittee members to investigate the accident. The task force is to conduct interviews and meetings from May 7 through may 18. Mr. Udall announced he would call for a major inquiry into every phase of nuclear power generation to find out if the nation should remain committed to nuclear power. The NRC briefed the subcommittee on the accident in a public session. 11/05/79 -- Subcommittee on Energy and Power held a hearing on the OH/27/79 findings and recommendations contained in the report of the President's Commission on Three Hile Island. A GAO investigation of the accident and its implications and a hearing on the Price-Anderson Act were announced by Chairman Dingell. The GAO investigation would go into whether safety concerns were conpromised in order to bring the plant on line early so the utility could obtain certain tax advantages; the adequacy of the Federal response and the NRC reaction to the accident; the thoroughness of reactor personnel training; the adequacy of regulatory standards; and the implications of the accident for other nuclear reactors [EEI Washington letter, Apr. 27, 1979: H]. e.§2mmitfee-2.-§sien2e- end- Teshnelegzl- §2h2222i:§ee- 92- §ne.31 d.£r9du9tienl.§ihe”!e§erme2h.-§heirman; 11/1n/79 - 'The Subcommittee on Energy Research and Production held CRS—2H IB79097 UPDATE-O3/06/80 an oversight hearing to consider the findings of the President's Commission on the accident at Three Hile Island. O9/19/79 - Hearing on plans for improving safety of nuclear plants. 06/13/79 -06/15/79 - The Subcommittees on Energy Research and Production and on Natural Resources held joint hearings on low-level ionizing radiation with special emphasis on risk estimates for nuclear power. O5/22/79 - 05/2n/79 - Hearings were held on nuclear reactor safety systems. 04/03/79 -“ Hr. Mccormack announced hearings for May 22, 23, and 24 on nuclear reactor safety, including implications of the accident, and hearings on June 5, 6, and 7 on low—level radiation [Congressional Record, daily edition, Apr. 8, 1979: E1531]. Renee- Qeamittee- en- §2ienee_ and- Te-hn2l29zl §!2EQ!!;EE§§- 92 Return; B-§22r2e§-en§.the-§nzir.n2ent. O6/O2/79 -- Hearing held on the Three Mile Island nuclear plant accident. 1 §92§e-§2mmittee- en- éeienee- and- $§§§BQlQQX:. §nbeemmi22ee§- 22- £22292 §e§earsh_and-2r2dn2:i2nl.and-2n-!atnral-§e-2nr2e§-and_£he-§nzi.2n2en:; 06/13/79 - 06/15/79 - Joint hearings on low-level ionizing radiation with special attention to risks from commercial nuclear power. Civiak, Robert and Carl Behrens. Nuclear power: report of the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island. Issue Brief 79119. Regularly updated Congressional response to the nuclear accident March through September 1979: a . Donnelly, Warren. at Three hile Island, six—month status report. 42 p. buccullough, James. Comments on the health effects of radiation from nuclear power plants as compared with the effects of environmental radiation. CRS report. Mar. H, 1976. 6 p. Heltz, Robert. pwhether the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has statutory authority to assume control of a nuclear power plant during an emergency. CR5 memo, Sept. 1a, 1979. 3 p. Profozich, Russell; Alvin Kaufman; and Susan Bodilly. Threei CR5-25 IB79097 UPDATE-03/06/80 bile Island -- a study of the regulatory implications for ratepayers. CRS Report 79-192, Sept. 5, 1979. 26 p. Profozich, Russell J. Three Mile Island: who'll pay the bill? CRS Update, Jan. 1980: 13-15. Q:hsr-§e£srs2ss§ Analysis of Three Mile Island - unit-2 accident. Prepared by the Nuclear Safety Analysis Center. Palo Alto, Calif.: Electric Power Research Institute, July 1979. Report no. NSAC-1, various pagings. Carter, Jimmy. Remarks on announcing the establishment and membership of the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, Apr. 11, 1979. Weekly compilation of presidential documents, v. 15, Apr. 16, 1979: 657-662. ---- Remarks at a meeting with the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, Apr. 25, 1979. Weekly compilation of presidential documents, v. 15, Apr. 30, 1979: 690-693. Castro, W.W., and William B. Cottrell. Preliminary report on the Three uile Island incident. Nuclear safety, v. 20, July-August 1979: 483-H90. Congress takes hard look at Nuclear power. CQ Guide. Fall 1979: 17-22. Cottrell, William B. Development pertaining to the Three Mile Island accident.~ Nuclear safety, v. 20, Sept.-Oct. 1979: 612-623. Gilinsky, Victor. Nuclear energy and Three Mile Island. Remarks before the American Newspaper Publishers Association. Sept. 19, 1979. The effect of Three Bile Island on America's nuclear policy. Remarks before the New York Chapter of the American Jewish Committee. Oct. 22, 1977. ---- Nuclear reactor regulation after Three Hile Island: What is happening and what does it mean? Remarks at Brown University. (NRC press release S-14-79, Nov. 15, 1979) Gilinsky, Victor and others. Atomic power and Three Mile Island. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, Jan. 1980: Kemeny report: abolish the NRC. Science, v. 206. Nov. 16, 1979: 796-798. Kennedy, Richard T. Nuclear energy after THI - a regulator's perspective. Remarks before the Edison Electric Institute, June 12, 1979. NRC press release S-8-79, June 12, 1979. 7 p. tcn S-26 IB 7 9 09 7 urn ATE -0 3 /0 6/8 0 Marshall, Eliot and Luther J. Carter. The crisis at Three Mile Island: nuclear risks are reconsidered. Science, v. 209, Apr. 13, 1979: 152-155. A two part discussion of the nuclear accident at Three mile Island near Harrisburg, Pa. /_,_fjj" T — Report of the President's Commissigprgn_thelAccident—at~Threet .lhiletIsland1~”The“need”f6f”change: the legacy of THI. Washington. October 1979. 201 p. Rogovin, Mitchell and George T. Frampton, Jr. Three Bile Island. A report to the Commissioners and to the public. Huclear Regulatory Commission Special Inquiry Group, v. 1 (undated). 183 p. (Released Jan. 29, 1980) Three Mile Island and the future of nuclear power. IEEE Spectrum. November 1979. (A special issue with six articles) U.S. Comptroller General. Letter to Senator Richard S. Schweiker from the Comptroller General providing a prompt analysis of the NRC's program for licensing nuclear powerplant operators. 16 p. Bay 15, 1979. (Report no. EMD-79-67). -—--- Report to the Congress. Areas around nuclear facilities should be better prepared for radiological emergencies. Har. 30, 1979. 77 p. (Report EHD-79-110) ---— Report to the Congress. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission: more aggressive leadership needed. Jan. 15, 1980. 93 p. (Report EHD-80-17) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Abnormal occurrence event; nuclear accident at Three Hile Island. Federal Register, Aug. 3, 1979: H5802-45811. [The NRC's determination that the accident was an abnormal occurrence plus detailed preliminary information on the accident, its consequences and measures to prevent similar accidents.) u.s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Office of "Inspection and Enforcement. Investigation into the nar. 28, 1979, Three flile Island accident. Washington, 1979. Various pagings. (NHREG-0600) ----- Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force status report and short-term recommendations. July 1979, (NUREG-0578). 20+ appendices. U.S. President. Statement by the President on the report of the President's Commission to investigate the accident at Three Mile Island nuclear power plant. Dec. 7, 1979. Office of the White House Press secretasy. 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