_g CONGRESSIONAL * RESEARCH SERVICE RRRRRRR OF CCCCCC SS aallttiiflwufi °' ' O-1039392 AV NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SAFETY AND LICENSING ISSUE BRIEF NUMBER IB8008l AUTHOR: Robert Civiak Science Policy Research Division THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE MAJOR ISSUES SYSTEM DATE ORIGINATED O8/l5/BO DATE UPDATED O7/16/82 FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL 287-5700 0721 CRS- l IB8008l UPDATE—O7/I6/82 LSSUE DEFINITION Government policy regarding the regulation of nuclear power plants is a subject of continuing debate between those who advocate stricter regulatory requirements and others who would like to streamline the reactor licensing process. The divergence stems in part from differing views regarding the safety of nuclear power. This issue brief discusses nuclear power plant safety, including past accidents and estimates of future accident probabilities, and then addresses current issues in nuclear power plant licensing and regulation, including suggestions for modifying the license process and funding measures for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS Approximately 13% of the electricity generated in the United States is now produced in 78 operating nuclear power plants, and an additional 77 plants are being built or are on order. While no lethal releases of radioactive materials have yet occurred, serious questions remain regarding the safety of nuclear power plants. Questions have been raised regarding the construction quality of nuclear power plants, their operation, and the siting of plants in relation to population centers, as well as basic design features. The first part of this issue brief examines the risk of an accident at a nuclear power plant. However, the question of power plant accident risks is only a part of the broader question of the safety of nuclear power. A full examination of nuclear safety requires assessing the risk from all stages of the fuel cycle, from the mining of uranium to the disposal of wastes and comparing that to the risk from the alternatives to nuclear power. Several reports listed in the REFERENCES section perform such comparisons. NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SAFETY Possible Nuclear Power Plant Accidents Commercial nuclear reactors are fueled with approximately 100 tons of enriched uranium dioxide, a solid ceramic-like material. About 3% of the uranium is the fissionable isotope, uranium 235, and the rest is uranium 238. Fresh fuel is only weakly radioactive and could be held in one's hands without harmful effects. As the reactor operates, uranium atoms are split (fissioned), and highly radioactive fission products accumulate in the fuel. After 1 year of operation, the fission products contained in the fuel are about one billion times more radioactive than the fresh fuel. These fission products could present a significant health hazard if dispersed into the biosphere. A series of barriers prevent the dispersal of radioactive materials. The first barrier is the fuel itself. Most of the fission products are either solid materials that are incorporated into the fuel or gases that are trapped within the fuel and released at very slow rates. Hence, there must be damage CRS- 2 IB8008l UPDATE-O7/l6/82 to the fuel in order for large amounts of radioactivity to be released. The other barriers to the release of radioactivity are sealed zirconium metal tubes enclosing the fuel pellets, an 8- to lQ-inch thick steel pressuz vessel, which surrounds the reactor core, and a steel lined concrete containment building, which is several feet thick and encloses the reactor vessel, the primary reactdg cooling system, and its auxiliary equipment. In addition to the physical barriers, exposure of large populations to possible radioactive releases is limited by remote siting of nuclear power plants and the preparation of emergency evacuation plans. However, effective evacuation may not be possible around certain plants. In order for large numbers of people to be endangered, radioactive materials must be widely dispersed over a populated area. The probability of such an occurrence is a matter of considerable controversy (see below), but it can be stated with certainty that there is no way for radioactive materials to be dispersed through a nuclear explosion like that which occurs in an atomic bomb. An atomic bomb requires a much higher concentration of fissionable materials than is present in a power reactor and also requires special means of bringing these materials together rapidly, which are not present in a nuclear reactor. The kinds of accidents that might result in large releases of radioactive materials all involve overheating and melting of the reactor fuel. In normal operation the heat produced in the reactor core is carried away by water circulated through the core. Even if the fission process is stopped, sufficient heat is still produced by the radioactive fission products for many hours to begin to melt the core unless some cooling is maintained. (Complete melting of a reactor core is called meltdown.) If an accident causing the cooling water to be lost should occur (loss or coolant accident -- LOCA), two separate means of supplying additional cooling water, which comprise the emergency core cooling system (ECCS), are available. These backup systems are designed to be extremely reliable and are tested often. It is rare that they will be needed and rarer still that they will fail. Nevertheless, it is possible that both the normal and the emergency cooling systems might fail, in which case a meltdown of the reactor core could in some circumstances occur. However, a meltdown does not automatically lead to a disaster, as many people believe, but is only a first step that must be followed by additional events Iof low probability before large radioactive releases could occur. While most meltdown scenarios would not lead to an explosion, a situation is possible in which a meltdown would be followed by a steam or a hydrogen explosion which could rupture the reactor vessel and the containment building and release large amounts of radioactive materials into the atmosphere. Under the worst circumstances, this could result in several thousand immediate deaths, tens of thousands of additional deaths over a 30-year period due to radiation—induced cancers, and an uncertain number of genetic mutations. (The number of genetic mutations is expected to be smaller than the number of cancer deaths, and most mutations do not have harmful effects). Containment rupture is unlikely to occur even after a meltdown. In addition, the rupture would have to occur soon after the core melting for't*e maximum release of radioactive materials. For the largest number casualties, the wind direction and other weather conditions would have to be right to carry the materials released toward a populated area. Finally, this series of events would have to occur before the population could take action, CRS- 3 IB8008l UPDATE-O7/l6/82 such as shelter or evacuation, for the largest numbers of people to be affected. While explosive rupture of the containment vessel following a meltdown would lead to the largest releases of radioactivity, it is also possible for radioactive materials to be released if the core melts through the bottom of the steel reactor vessel and the floor of the concrete containment building and continues to melt into the earth below. This event has been called the "China Syndrome." A molten core might cool before it melts through the floor of the containment building, but if it does melt through, it does not necessarily lead to the dispersal of large amounts of radioactive materials. Studies indicate that most of the radioactive gases would remain in the containment building if a core melted. through the floor. The remaining radioactive materials would probably cool and remain beneath the containment building and not represent a major immediate hazard to people off the power plant site. However, the core might come in contact with water which could disperse a limited amount radioactive materials beyond the plant boundary. Reactor Accident Experience to Date To date, nuclear power plant accidents in the United States have caused few, if any, deaths among the public. The largest radioactive release from a power plant accident in the United States occurred during the l979 accident at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant. It is estimated that from O to 2 people may eventually die as a result of the -radioactivity released from Three Mile Island. ’ Three accidents in the history of commercial nuclear power in the United States stand out from all other events’ because of their seriousness or significance and are discussed briefly below. Enrico Fermi Plant -- October l966 -- A piece of metal inside the reactor at this plant near Detroit broke loose and impeded the flow of coolant to some of the fuel elements in the reactor core, leading to the partial melting of some of these fuel elements. The majority of the core was undamaged, and the reactor was shut down without injury or release of radiation. The power plant did not resume operation until May l968 and was dismantled four years later for economic reasons. The seriousness of the accident at the Fermi reactor remains problematic. Nuclear proponents claim there was never any danger to the public, while critics claim there was great danger. Browns Ferry Plant -- March l975 4- In an instance of poor design, electrical cables for two operating nuclear units, and a third under construction, passed through the same confined area. After installing new cables for the third unit, a workman testing for air leaks with a candle accidently started a fire which burned for several hours and disabled vital power and control cables for both normal cooling systems and the emergency core cooling system. Although damage to control systems was heavy, the operators were able to safely shut down the reactors by using backup equipment. No damage was done to the reactor core, no radioactive materials were released, and both affected units were restarted several months later. Nevertheless, this accident is an example of an instance in which a single event (in this case, a fire) caused several supposedly independent safety-related systems to fail simultaneously. Such an event is called a common mode failure. The possibility of occurrence of future common mode failures has been a focus of concern of critics of nuclear safety since the Browns Ferry accident. CRS- 4 IB8008l UPDATE-O7/l6/82 Three Mile Island —— March 1979 -— The accident which began at the Three Mile Island (TMI) Nuclear Plant on Mar. 28, l979, is the most serious the has occurred in the United States. A combination of equipment failures and inappropriate operator actions led to insufficient cooling of the reactor core for several hours and severe damage to more than half of the fuel rods, including possible melting of some fuel. Additional failures, which allowed water containing radioactive gases to be pumped out of the containment building, led to the release of some of these gases into the atmosphere. Uncertainty regarding the possibility of a full-scale meltdown of the core and conflicting statements from the NRC and others responsible for the plant over a 4-day period caused great anxiety in the population around TMI. While the accident at Three Mile Island was serious, it was not a disaster from a public health standpoint. A commission appointed by President Carter (The President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island, commonly called the Kemeny Commission) to investigate the accident determined that the radiation released as a result of the accident has a statistical probability of causing 0.7 deaths over the next 30 years. This figure can be compared to 250,000 cancer deaths that will occur during that time, from other causes, in the population surrounding the plant. The Kemeny Commission further found that even if there had been additional problems leading to a full meltdown, it is unlikely that there would have been a significant release of radioactive materials outside of the plant. However, the Kemeny Commission was ,very critical_ of the NRC and the nuclear industry. The commission report stated that "the accident had already gone too far to make it tolerable" and that "to prevent nuclear accidents as serious as Three Mile Island, fundamental changes will I necessary in the organization, procedures, and practices...of the Nuclea. Regulatory Commission and...of the nuclear industry." Estimation of the Risk of Nuclear Power Plant Accidents -— The Rasmussen Report Since reactor meltdowns are rare but potentially disastrous events, it is necessary to resort to calculations rather than historical frequencies to estimate the probability of a future accident. The Reactor Safety Study (RSS), commissioned by the Atomic Energy Commission in 1974 and released in 1975 was the first comprehensive attempt to estimate reactor accident risks. The publication of the findings of the study is commonly called the Rasmussen Report, or WASH-1400. The RSS attempted to enumerate all sequences of events that might possibly lead to a release of radioactive materials and to assign probabilities, based on the known historical failure rates of individual components and systems, to those events and sequences which are most significant. While one can never be certain that all all significant event sequences have been analyzed, the RSS used a systematic approach based on techniques known as "event tree" and "fault tree" analyses in its examination. Over 500,000 sequences were analyzed 'to estimate the probability of release of various quantities of radioactive materials. Detailed models based on the population’ distribution nearby nuclear power plants, the dispersion of airborne radioactive materials under various meteorological conditions, and the health ,effects of the radioactive materials that were assumed to be released were then used to calculate t health impact of reactor accidents. Some of the findings from the Reactor Safety Study are: CRS- 5 IB8008l UPDATE-O7/l6/82 -- Accidents with small releases of radioactivity are expected to occur more frequently than large accidents; -- Significant releases of radioactivity can occur only in connection with a core meltdown; -- A meltdown can be expected to occur once in every 20,000 years of power plant operation; -- With 100 reactors operating in the United States, an accident that would result in as many as l00 cancer deaths over a 30-year period could be expected to occur only once every 400 years and an accident resulting in 5,000 cancer deaths once in l0,000 years;: -- The worst accident considered, resulting in 2,000 immediate deaths and 50,000 cancer deaths over a 30-year period, would occur only once in lo million years with 100 reactors in operation; -- The average number of deaths from all accidents is calculated to be 0.02 per year per reactor in operation. The Rasmussen Report has been strongly criticized. A typical comment, from the book Nuclear Power: The Fifth Horseman, by Denis Hayes states: "...this calculation presumes that the reactor will be built with flawless workmanship and flawless materials, that it is operated only by skilled experts, that neither God nor terrorists intervene with unscheduled events, and that Dr. Rasmussen's assumptions are all correct." Supporters of the Rasmussen Report counter that flaws in workmanship and materials are considered in the calculation through the use of actual failure rates for real pumps, pipes, electrical systems, and so forth, and that operator error is implicitly included in the same manner and explicitly considered in many event sequences. In 1977, the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) published a detailed review of the Rasmussen Report, criticizing the methodology and conclusions of the Reactor Safety Study. The UCS was critical of the RSS's ability to include all accident causes; the treatment of human error; the consideration of events which might cause two or more systems to fail simultaneously ("common mode failures"), such as earthquakes and sabotage; and the model used to calculate health effects. The Union of Concerned Scientists claimed that the overall accident risk should be more than 100 times greater than that stated in the Rasmussen report, or 2.4 deaths per reactor per year rather than 0.02. In response to such criticism the Nuclear Regulatory Commission chartered 1 Risk Assessment Review Group (RARG), headed by Dr. Harold Lewis to review the Rasmussen Report. Their findings, released in September 1978, both praised and criticized the report. The RARG determined that, CRS- 6 IB8008l UPDATE-O7/16/82 "WASH—l4OO was a conscientious and honest effort, and was a substantial advance over previous efforts", but "There are many technical faults in WASH-1400, some leading to underestimates of the risk and some to overestimates... Therefore, it is impossible to state whether the final probability numbers are high or low, but the uncertainties in them are surely substantially greater than is stated in WASH-l400." On the basis of the RARG findings, on Jan. 19, 1979, the NRC withdrew its endorsement of the flawed Executive Summary of the Rasmussen Report and affirmed that the numerical estimate of the overall ~risk of a reactor accident presented in the Rasmussen Report is not reliable. However, following the accident at Three Mile Island, the probabalistic risk analysis (PRA) methodology of the Reactor Safety Study has received increasing support. It was found that the Rasmussen Report had analyzed an accident similar to the one that occurred at TMI and also had predicted that an accident with the health consequences of TMI should have been expected to occur. Both the Kemeny Commission and the NRC's special Inquiry into TMI recommended increased use of PRA methods. PRA is now being widely applied to individual nuclear power plants to identify and evaluate significant accident scenarios. ' - The overall quantitative estimates of the Rasmussen Report remain controversial. However, recent independent probabalistic risk analyses have estimated lower accident risks than those of the RSS. The results of comprehensive reactor risk study coordinated by A. Birkhofer for the German Federal Minister of Research and Technology were released in August l979. The German risk estimates were generally lower than those in the Rasmussen Report. In January 1982, Commonwealth Edison released a lo-volume probabalistic safety study of its Zion station. That plant, located about 35 miles from Chicago, has one of the highest surrounding population densities of nuclear plants in the United States. Nevertheless, the risk of deaths in that population from accidents at the Zion station was estimated by Commonwealth Edison to be lower than the Rasmussen Report risk. Nuclear Reactor Safety Since the Three Mile Island Accident NRC Safety Initiatives The accident at Three Mile Island caused many to question whether NRC was adequately performing its duty to protect public health and safety. Numerous studies and reports on the accident analyzed the event and its causes, and the steps to be taken by NRC to improve the safety of nuclear plants and forestall a recurrence of the TMI event. The Commission itself imposed a Q3 facto moratorium for l7 months after the accident on issuing new operating licenses while it reviewed its procedures and decided on safety measures to be imposed on already licensed plants. It has not yet issued a construction permit since the accident. In June 1980, the NRC commissioners approved an "Action Plan" (NUREG-O66 detailing the steps judged appropriate by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to correct or improve the regulation and operation of nuclear facilities, based on experience from the accident at TMI. For each of approximately 200 CRS- 7 IB8008l UPDATE-O7/l6/82 measures to be taken, the Action Plan established the objective of the measure, the NRC action required, the industry action required, and an estimate of the schedule and resource requirements for implementation. .ction Plan requirements and schedules were refined in NUREG-0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements, issued in November l980. Most Action Plan requirements for operating reactors have been implemented. However, the NRC is still considering additional new requirements in areas such as personnel staffing and training, instrumentation to analyze and control damaged reactors, and emergency planning. Nuclear Industry Safety Initiatives TMI demonstrated to nuclear utilities that an accident at one power plant can have negative consequences for all nuclear plant owners. Two new industry-wide organizations —— the Nuclear Safety Analysis Center (NSAC) and the Institute for Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) -— have been established since TMI to improve safety. The Nuclear Safety Analysis Center was established in May l979 to provide a technical study of the accident at TMI and to assist utilities in implementing the lessons learned. NSAC provides technical support to the industry regarding reactor safety, acts as a clearinghouse for technical information on safety issues, addresses generic questions of reactor safety, and makes recommendations on changes in safety systems and modifications of procedures to improve safety. ' The Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, which began functioning in early 1980, is aimed at improving the operation of nuclear power plants. It has established industry-wide standards (called "benchmarks" by INPO) for excellence in nuclear operations and conducts evaluations of individual utilities to assist them in meeting these benchmarks. INPO also assists nuclear plant owners in education and training activities for all levels of personnel, and reviews licensee event reports (LERS) to assist members in learning from the experience of others. Congressional Safety Initiatives Nine subcommittees of Congress held hearings on the accident at TMI in the first 6 months following the accident. The initial congressional response, including a listing of all the relevant hearings held and bills introduced in the first 6 months following the accident, is detailed in CRS Report No. 79-225 ENR (see REFERENCES). The most significant nuclear safety legislation passed by the 96th Congress was the FY80 NRC Authorization Act (P.L. 96-295). In addition to authorizing $426 million for the NRC, the Act: increased the maximum fine which can be levied by the NRC for safety violations from $5,000 to $100,000; banned the issuance of operating licenses by the NRC unless an emergency preparedness plan approved by the NRC in consultation with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) exists for the area; upgraded siting criteria regarding the population around nuclear facilities; increased by 146, the number of NRC resident inspectors at power plant sites; directed the NRC to provide new reactor operator training programs; and directed the NRC to identify all important safety regulations, evaluate all operating plants with regard to their compliance with those regulations, and report to Jongress. CRS- 8 IB8008l UPDATE-O7/l6/82 REGULATION OF NUCLEAR POWER Licensing of Power Plants Licensing of nuclear facilities by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is governed by two major statutes, Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (P.L. 83-703; 42 U.S.C. 20ll-2282) the NRC is authorized to issue licenses to those who "observe such safety standards to protect health and to minimize danger to life or property as the Commission may by rule establish." Under the National Environmental Policy Act (P.L. 91-190; 42 U.S.C. 4321-4327) it must consider the environmental effects of all major actions, including the issuance of power plant licenses. The NRC meets these requirements in a two-stage process by issuing first a construction permit to build a plant, and then an operating license to run it. The licensing procedures that have evolved are lengthy and complex. The process is started when the plant owner files an application for a construction permit, which generally comprises ten or more large volumes of material. The NRC staff then performs separate safety and environmental reviews, producing an Environmental Impact Statement and a Preliminary Safety Evaluation Report. The NRC staff also performs separate reviews of the plans to protect against the diversion of nuclear materials to weapons purposes and of antitrust aspects of the plant ownership. Next, a safety review required by law is conducted by the independent Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). This is followed by a mandatory public hearing that is conducted by a three-member Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB), which makes an initial decision as to whether a construction permit should be granted. This decision is subject to appeal ‘before an -Atomic Safety a" Licensing Appeal Board (ASLAB) and may then go to the Commissioners for final NRC decision. The law provides for appeal beyond the Commission in the Federal courts. " In some cases, the NRC may grant a Limited work Authorization (LWA) to allow certain preparatory work to begin at a site prior to the final decision on the construction permit. A similar process is followed for the granting of an operating license. The application is filed, NRC staff and the ACRS review it, and a Final Safety Evaluation Report and an updated Environmental Impact Statement are issued. A public hearing is not mandatory at this stage, but one may be held if requested by affected members of the public, and generally there is such a request. The appeal process is the same as that for a construction permit. Criticism of the Licensing Process Both supporters and opponents of nuclear power have criticized the way nuclear power plants are licensed in the United States. The regulatory process has been characterized as too lengthy, adversarial, legalistic, and cumbersome. The process has been called detrimental to safety by both sides in the nuclear debate. A major complaint of the nuclear industry is that there are unnecessarv costly delays in obtaining construction permits and operating licenses. 1 : time between the ordering of a power plant and the beginning of operation has risen to between 12 and 15 years. The time required was 6 to 8 years during the 1960s in the United States and is still about 8 years in France and CRS- 9 IB8008l UPDATE‘O7/16/82 Japan. Much of that increase may be due to causes other than the regulatory process, but the time needed to obtain construction permits and operating ‘icenses has gone from about 1 years to 3 years for each. Another complaint by the nuclear industry is that there is too much instability in the regulatory process. The industrya maintains that‘ it is costly to meet what it sees as constantly changing regulatory requirements that must be incorporated into designs midway through construction or "backfit" to completed plants. .The industry has charged that the NRC does not have a consistent set of criteria to use in establishing requirements, rather that it overreacts to recent events and political pressure. some nuclear proponents believe that much of the regulatory uncertainty could be removed if the NRC would establish a comprehensive "safety goal" and rely more on probabilistic risk analysis to determine its requirements. Nuclear critics complain that there is insufficient opportunity for public participation in the licensing process. They maintain that public input is used at too late a stage in the licensing process and that the financial resources of public interest groups is insufficient to properly oppose well funded nuclear power plant owners. NRC Regulatory Reform Initiatives The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has recently taken and/or proposed a number of measures aimed at regulatory reform. Some measures require legislation and are described below. NRC activities not requiring legislation include development of a safety goal, establishment of a Committee to Review Generic Requirements, and establishment of a Regulatory Zeform Task Force. Development of a "Safety Goal" The Atomic Energy Act directs the NRC to license nuclear power plants under such rules and regulations as are necessary to. protect the public health and safety, but it does not give the NRC any explict guidance regarding what constitutes an adequate level of protection. Both the Kemeny Commission and the NRC3s Special Inquiry Group on TMI (the Rogovin Committee) recommended that the NRC be given by Congress, or develop on its own, a safety goal and specific criteria for making safety-cost tradeoffs. Congress has shown interest in the development of a safety goal on several occasions. The FY81 NRC authorization bill passed by the Senate (S. 2358) would have required the NRC to develop a safety goal, but there was no similar provision in the House version of the bill, and for unrelated reasons, the two Houses did not agree on an NRC authorization bill for 1981. On Feb. 17, 1982, the NRC published a Proposed Policy Statement on Safety Goals for Nuclear Power Plants. The statement proposes both "qualitative safety goals" and "provisional numerical guidelines" for determining safety. The two qualitative safety goals are: -- Individual members of the public should be provided a level of protection from the consequences of nuclear plant accidents such that no individual bears a CRS-l0 IB8008l UPDATE-07/l6/82 significant additional risk to life and health; and —- Societal risks to life and health from nuclear power plant accidents should be as low as reasonably achievable and should be comparable to or less than the risks of generating electricity by viable competing technologies. The provisional numerical guidelines proposed are: -- The risk to an individual or to the population in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant site of prompt fatalities that might result from reactor accidents should not exceed one-tenth of one percent (0.1%) of the sum of prompt fatality risks resulting from other accidents to which members of the U.S. population are generally exposed; and —- The risk to an individual or to the population in the area near a nuclear power plant site of cancer fatalities that might result from reactor accidents should not exceed one-tenth of one percent (0.1%) of the sum of cancer fatality risks resulting from all other causes. In addition, the Commission proposed a benefit-cost guideline for safety improvements to reduce risks already below the numerical guidelines. This proposed guideline is: —- The benefit of an incremental reduction of risk below the numerical guidelines for societal mortality risks should be compared with the associated costs on the basis of $1,000 per man-rem averted. The basis for the choice of safety goals is explained in NUREG-0880 (see REFERENCES). There is also some discussion in NUREG-880 of how the goals might be used in regulation. However, there has been criticism that the goals themselves are of little meaning until the NRC specifies how they will be used in the regulatory process. Committee for Review of Generic Requirements To better control and coordinate requirements imposed’ on ‘licensees, in October 1981, the NRC established a Committee for Review of Generic Requirements (CRGR). Before any new requirement developed by the NRC staff can be implemented, it must be reviewed by the new committee, which then recommends to the Executive Director for Operations (EDO) whether it should be adopted. Before recommending approval of a new requirement, the CRGR must determine that the requirement will contribute effectively to health and safety and will not place unnecessary burdens on licensee or NRC resources. Since its inception, the committee has slowed considerably the rapid rate of introduction of new requirements that the NRC adopted following TMI. Regulatory Reform Task Force In November 1981, the NRC formed an internal Regulatory Reform Task For to evaluate the licensing process for nuclear power plants and to recommend actions that can be taken to improve the effectiveness and to streamline that process. The Chairman of the task force is James Tourtellotte. The CRS-ll IB8008l UPDATE-O7/16/82 Regulatory Reform Task Force developed the legislative proposal for licensing reform described below. It is also considering measures that can be taken without legislation. Among the measures the task force is reportedly :onsidering are: -- developing a new standard for changes that must be backfit to plants already operating or under construction; -— removing the NRC staff as a formal party (on the side of the applicant) to licensing proceedings; —- removing the consideration of NEPA requirements from adjudicatory hearings and limiting public input to written comment on these matters; and -= implementing measures to increase the use of standard plant designs and reduce the issues that must be considered during individual plant licensing proceedings. Legislative Proposals for Licensing Reform Both the NRC and the Department of Energy have prepared separate legislative proposals for licensing reform that are currently being circulated in draft form prior to formal submission to Congress. NRC Proposal The NRC published and requested comments on the proposed "Nuclear Standarization Act of l982" in the June 2, l982 Federal Register. The proposal would make the following changes: -- Provide for approval of suitable nuclear power plant sites prior to construction permit application; -- Provide for one-step licensing (i.e., combined construction permit and operating license) for standardized plant designs; on Allow the NRC to make major modifications in the_ ’.hearing process including the possibility of eliminating adjudicatory hearings in certain cases; -— Allow the NRC to defer to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) for decisions regarding the need for power; and -4 Modify the licensing fee schedule to provide incentives for early site approval and standard plant licensing. The comment period on the proposal expired July 16 and the NRC is currently considering changes in the legislation before submitting it to Congress. Department of Energy Proposal CRS-12 ’ IB8008l UPDATE-O7/16/82 The Department of Energy has prepared a legislative proposal for ,nuclear power plant licensing reform and reportedly obtained concurrence from the Office of Management and Budget in June 1982, but has not yet submitted tr proposal to Congress. According to the June 25, 1982 issue of Inside Energy, the DOE proposal would: —- Require full Commission approval of new backfitting requirements, which would be based on a need to reduce risk only to an acceptable level rather than as low as reasonably achievable; -- Allow the NRC to grant combined construction and operating licenses (one-step license) to any plant (the NRC proposal allows one-step licensing for standardized_plants only); ‘ -- Allow for "need for power determinations" to be made by the States; -— Establish a hearing process in which "formal" hearings would be held only to resolve significant issues of dispute; -- Allow for pre-approval of standardized designs for certain plant subsystems, as well as for complete power plants; -- Allow for early site approval, i.e. prior to construction permit application; and -- Require the NRC to implement a safety goal. Additional Nuclear Licensing and Regulatory ISSUES Of Congressional COHCGFD Additional nuclear power plant licensing and regulatory issues that are now before Congress, or may soon come before Congress, are discussed below. TMI Related Licensing Delays No operating licenses were granted for a year and a half following the TMI accident, and the first construction permit has not yet been granted. Toward the end of 1980, Congress began to become concerned that several completed and soon to be completed nuclear plants would have to sit idle because of delays in the licensing process. In its report on the FY81 Energy and water Development Appropriation Bill (H.Rept. 96-1093), the House Appropriations Committee directed the NRC to issue a monthly report (now known as the Bevill Report) detailing projected nuclear power plant licensing delays. In the March 1981 Bevill Report, the NRC estimated that 13 nuclear plants to be completed by the end of 1982 would be delayed a total of 102 months by the licensing process. These large projected delays prompted several members of Congress to pressure the NRC to take action to reduce the delays. The NRC subsequently reassigned staff, increased work hours, and made several procedural changes in the hearings process and the time for review. licensing decision that, combined with a slippage in the completion dates of several plants, have resulted in a reduction of the projected delay in the operation of nuclear power plants from 102 months to only 3 months, according CRS-13 IB80081 UPDATE-O7/16/82 to the June 30, 1982 Bevill Report. The NRC FY82—83 authorization bill (H.R. 2330/S. 1207), passed by both the louse and the Senate and currently in conference, would further reduce the effects of potential licensing delays by amending the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to allow the Commission to issue interim operating licenses for nuclear power plants prior to the completion of public hearings, if all other requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 have been met. The bill would allow interim licensing at an initial level of only 5% of full power, but higher power levels could be allowed after a subsequent NRC review. License Amendments and the Sholly Decision “ Any amendment or change in the technical specifications of a nuclear plant license must be approved by the NRC. The NRC receives about 400 requests for amendments to plant technical specifications each year, most of which are for minor adjustments in operating conditions or procedures. In the past the NRC has approved license amendments, without holding public hearings, if it determines that the license amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. However, in an opinion handed down by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia on Nov. 19, 1980, in connection with a lawsuit (Sholly v. NRC) evolving from cleanup activities at the Three Mile Island Plant, the court disallowed that practice. The appeals court ruled that an interested person who requests a hearing regarding a proposed license amendment is entitled to such a hearing, before the amendment becomes effective, even if the NRC rules ’that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The NRC has stated that this ruling could lead to numerous plant shutdowns for what it sees as minor matters. The courts decision has been challenged, and on May 26, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear appeals this fall by the NRC and Metropolitan Edison relating to the Sholly decision. However, the case could become moot if Congress provides a legislative solution. Both the Senate and House versions of the FY82/FY83 NRC authorization bill currently in Conference Committee would amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to authorize the Commission to issue and make immediately effective an amendment to a license upon a determination by the Commission that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, notwithstanding a pending request for a hearing on the amendment. The proposed legislation does not affect the opportunity for a hearing after the amendment has been issued. Consideration of Mental Health Impacts in Licensing Process In a decision with potentially wide ranging impact for ‘the licensing of all nuclear power plants, in January 1982 the U.S. Court of Appeals in Washington ordered the NRC to restrain from ruling on whether to allow the restart of Unit-l of the Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant until an environmental assessment of possible psychological effects of the restart is concluded. The NRC has prohibited Unit-1, which was not directly involved in the accident at TMI, from operating since the accident, but was hearing a lecision on restart when the court issued its order. In a 2-1 decision, the Appeals Court ruled that the NRC failed to follow CRS-l4 IB8008l UPDATE-O7/16/82 the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) when it excluded psychological considerations from the TMI N Unit-l restart proceedings. However, the dissenting judge noted that the psychologica health of residents neighboring a project covered under NEPA has never before been considered as covered by the Act. The immediate effect of the ruling is to further delay the restart of Unit-l of TMI. However, if the decision should stand, it might become necessary to consider psychological impacts in connection with licensing of all new nuclear plants and other Federal activities covered by NEPA. Early in July, General Public Utilities (GPU), the powner of the TMI plants, asked the U.S. Supreme Court to reverse the Appeals Court's decision. Both the NRC and the lands division of the Department of Justice have requested the U.S. Solicitor General to support GPU's request. State Prohibitions. Seven States (California, Connecticut, Maine, Montana, Maryland, Oregon, and Wisconsin) have passed laws that severely restrict or prohibit construction of nuclear power plants. Two California utilities (Pacific Gas & Electric and Southern California Edison) have challanged the California law on the basis that it preempts Federal authority to license nuclear plants. The utilities were successful in two Federal District Courts in California but the decisions were overturned on appeal by the State of California in the U.S. Court for Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In June l982, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the utilities“ case. Invalidation of the S-3 Table. The NRC has allowed license applicants to refer to a listing (S-3 Table) of environmental impacts of the full nuclear fuel cycle in their applications rather than requiring them to calculate individually those impacts. In April 1982 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ruled, in a suit brought by the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), that the S-3 - Table iS invalid because it fails t0 allow fOI.' proper consideration Of the health, socioeconomic, and culmulative effects of fuel-cycle activities. The ruling threatens numerous plant licenses; however, the NRC has requested the Justice Department to ask the court to stay its mandate until the case can be heard before the Supreme Court. Funding The following table provides a summary of the funding for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission from FY81 to FY83. CRS-15 IB8008l UPDATE-O7/l6/82 SUMMARY OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FUNDING (millions of dollars) Budget Actual Approp. Request FY81 FY82 FY83 Nuclear Reactor Regulation 80.6 87.0 93.1 Inspection and Enforcement 52.7 66.2 69.9 Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards 33.9 38.9 37.4 Nuclear Regulatory Research 227.3 222.7 219.7 Program Technical support l8.7 22.6 23.4 Program Direction and Administration 35.4 37.4 36.0 TOTAL OBLIGATIONS - DIRECT PROGRAM 448.7 474.8 479.5 Reimbursable Program 0.4 0.5 0.5 TOTAL OBLIGATIONS 449.1 475.3 480.0 Net prior year balances —8.2 -9.1 0.0 Transfers from other agencies -0.3 -0.5 -0.5 TOTAL BUDGET AUTHORITY 440.6 465.7 479.5 Source: Appendix to the Budget for Fiscal Year l983.’ CRS-16 1B80081 UPDATE-O7/16/82 LEGISLATION P.L. 97*l2, H.R. 3512) H.R. 3400 Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions Act, 1981. H.R. 3400 as reported by the House Appropriations Committee (H.Rept. 97-29) May 4, 1981, rescinded $10 million in FY81 funding for the NRC and included provisions restricting the items that could be considered in NRC licensing proceedings. The House passed-H.R. 3512, which included the rescission, but not the licensing provisions, May 13, 1981; approved as amended by the Senate, May 21 (S.Rept. 97-67) with no rescission of NRC funds. The conference report (H.Rept. 97-124) agreed to by both houses June 4, rescinded $5 million in NRC funds. The bill was signed into law June 5, 1981. . P.L. 97-88, H.R. 4144 Energy and Water Development Appropriation Act. Includes FY82 appropriation for the NRC. Reported by the House Committee on Appropriations (H.Rept. 97-177) on July 14; providing $477.5 .million ‘to the NRC; passed House July 24. Passed Senate, amended, Nov. 5, (S.Rept. 97-256) providing $465.7 million to the NRC. Conference Report (H.Rept. 97-345) field Nov. 19, providing $465.7 million. Funding for line items are the same as in the Administration's request, but a general reduction of $35’ million is added. Agreed to by both Houses Nov. 21; signed into law Dec. 4- H.R. 2330 (Udall)/H.R. 4255 (Udall et al.)/S. 1207 (Simpson) NRC authorization for FY82 and 83. Introduced Mar. 4, 1981; Different versions of H.R. 2330 were reported by the Interior and Insular Affairs and Energy and Commerce Committees (H.Rept. 97-22, parts 1 and 2). A compromise bill (H.R. 4255) was introduced on July 23 by the chairmen and ranking minority members of both committees. The compromise bill authorizes a total appropriation for the NRC of $486 million for FY82 and $513 million for FY83. The bill includes provisions for interim licensing of power plants at first for up to 5% of full power and subsequently, and continginent upon licensee application and Commission approval, at full power. It also authorizes the NRC to issue license amendments without holding a prior hearing upon a determination that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. H.R. 2330 was approved by the House, Nov. 5, 1981, after inserting the text of H.R. 4255 as a substitute and defeating an amendment that would have removed the interim licensing provisions. The Senate version, approved March 30 (S.Rept; 97-113), authorizes $485 million for FY82 and $530 million for FY83. The bill includes similar provisions as the House bill regarding interim licensing and the issuance of license amendments. It also includes an amendment submitted by senator Hart prohibiting the transfer, use, or reprocessing of plutonium from commercial powerplants for weapons purposes. The Conference Committee has met several times, but not yet reached agreement on the bill because of differences regarding uranium mill tailings. HEARINGS Numerous congressional hearings are held each year on nuclear safety and regulatory issues. The fO"llOWi1'19' is 1101.’. a comprehensive list, but rather a selectio U.S. REPORTS CRS-17 IB8008l UPDATE-07/16/82 n of recent hearings that have appeared in print. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Subcommittee on Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources. Response to committee report on emergency planning and related safety issues: Nuclear Regulatory Commission oversight. Hearing, 96th Congress, lst session. Nov. 1, 1979. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 303 p. 1980. 97th UGSO Nuclear Safety: Is NRC enforcement working? Hearing, Congress, lst session. December 14, 1981. Washington, Govt. Print. Off., [1982]. 120 p. Congress. House. Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment. Nuclear Regulatory Commission operating license process. Oversight Hearing, 97th Congress, lst session. Apr. 9, 1981. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1981. 275 p. Congress. House.. Subcommittee on Energy Research and Production. powerplant safety systems. Hearings, 96th Congress, May 22-24, 1979. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1169 p. Committee on Science and Technology. Nuclear lst session. 1979. Nuclear Safety Research and Development Act of 1980. on H.R. 7190 (H.R. 7865), 96th Congress, 2d session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1980. 93 p. Hearings, June 19, 1980. Congress. Senate. Committee on Environment and Public Works. Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation. Nuclear powerplant licensing delays and the impact of the Sholly versus NRC decision. Hearings, 97th Congress, lst session. Mar. 25 and 31, 1981. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 307 p. . 1981. AND CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS U.S. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Inspecting operating nuclear powerplants: shortcomings in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission program. Fourth report together with additional views. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1981. 50 p. . (97th Congress, lst session. House. Report no. 97-144.) Ninth UOSO Licensing speedup, safety delay: NRC oversight. report together with additional views. Washington, Govt. Print. Off., 1981. 54 p. (97th Congress, lst session. House. Report no. 97-277.) Congress. House. Committee on Science and Technology. Subcommittee on Energy Research and Production. Nuclear powerplant safety after Three Mile Island. March 1980. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1980. 74 p. At head of title: 96th Congress, 2d session. "Serial JJ" Committee Print. Congress. Senate. Committee on Environment and Public Works. Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation. at Three Mile Island: States Senate. l980. At head of title: "Serial no. CRS=l8 IB8008l UPDATE-07/l6/82 Nuclear accident and recovery a special investigation: report to the United June 1980. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 423 p. Committee Print. 96th Congress, 2d session. 95-14" CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 06/02/82 02/17/82 01/19/82 01/11/82 01/00/82 ll/19/81 11/18/81 08/21/80 The NRC published in the Federal Register a proposed "Nuclear Standardization Act of 1982" for comment that would reform licensing procedures including providing for one-step licensing of nuclear power plants. The NRC published in the Federal Register a proposed policy statement.on safety goals for nuclear power plants. The goals include numerical guidelines for determining safety to be evaluated by probabalistic risk estimation techniques. The NRC fined the Boston Edison Co. $550,000 for violations at the Pilgrim Nuclear Plant. The fine is the largest ever imposed by the NRC. The U.S. Court of Appeals in Washington ordered that before allowing the restart of Unit-l of the Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant the NRC must consider possible psychological effects of the restart on residents near the plant.i This ruling could be applied to all nuclear plant licensing proceedings. Commonwealth Edison released a probabalistic risk analysis of its Zion nuclear plant. The Zion plant, about 35 miles from Chicago, has one of the largest surrounding populations of U.S. nuclear plants. Nevertheless, Commonwealth Edison's estimate of the risk from that plant is lower than the risk estimate of the l974 Reactor Safety Study (Rasmussen Report). The NRC suspended the operating license for Unit 1 of the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant. This unprecedented action was taken in response to inadequacies that have been revealed in the quality assurance program at Diablo Canyon. (For further details see archived CRS Mini Brief 81262.) The NRC announced the formation of an internal Regulatory Reform Task Force to recommend actions that can be taken to improve the effectiveness of the licensing process and to streamline that process. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued a license to the Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO) for operation of unit 2 of the North Anna Power Station. This was the first license issued CRS-19 IB8008l UPDATE-07/16/82 since the accident at Three Mile Island. 05/00/80 -- The Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), an organization established by the nuclear industry to assist utilities in improving safety, completed its first formal evaluation of a utility's operations. l0/30/79 -- The President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island presented its report to the President. The report (Kemeny Report) was highly critical of the NRC and the nuclear industry, and found that "fundamental changes were necessary" in order to prevent future accidents as serious as TMI. 03/28/79 -- An incident that became the worst nuclear power plant accident * to occur in the United states to date began at unit-2 of the Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant near Middletown, Pennsylvania. 01/19/79 -- The NRC issued a policy statement and press release which wrepudiated the Executive Summary of the Rasmussen report. 09/00/78 -- The NRC released the report of the Risk Assessment Review Group chaired by Harold W. Lewis. The group found that the uncertainties in the risk figures given in the Rasmussen Report should be much greater than stated in that report. 10/00/75 -- The NRC released the final version of the Reactor Safety Study (Rasmussen Report). Considerable controversy ensued over the quantitative estimates given in the report of the risk of nuclear accidents and the presentation of these estimates which equated the risk of dying in a nuclear accident to the chances of being hit by a meteorite. ‘ - ADDITIONAL REFERENCE SOURCES Ad Hoc Risk Assessment Review Group (H.W. Lewis, Chairman). Risk Assessment Review Group report to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1978. 66 p. NUREG/CR-0400 ‘ Allsion, Graham, et al. Governance of nuclear power. Submitted to the President's Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee. September 1981. 49 p. Kendall, Henry W. (study director). The risks of nuclear power reactors: A review of the NRC Reactor Safety Study WASH-I400 (NUREG-75/014). Cambridge, Mass., Union of Concerned Scientists, 1977. 210 p. Lewis, Harold W. The safety of fission reactors. Scientific american, v. 242, no. 3, March 1980. p. 53. MITRE Corporation. Nuclear power: issues and choices: report of the Nuclear Energy Policy Study Group [sponsored by the Ford Foundation administered by the MITRE Corporation]. Cambridge, Mass., Ballinger Publishing Co., 1977. 405 p. President's Commission on the accident at Three Mile Island report; the CR8-20 .. IB8008l UPDATE-07/l6/82 need for change. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979. 201 p. (Kemeny Commission Report) Rolph, Elizabeth S. Nuclear power and the public safety: a study in regulation. Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1979. 213 p. U.S. General Accounting Office. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission: more aggressive leadership needed; report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States. EMD-80-l7, Jan. l5, l980. Washington, l980. 93 p. U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Coal and nuclear power policies: seeking protection from iuncertain risks. Report No. 80-140 SPR, by Langdon T. Crane, Washington, l980. l37 p. ----- Congressional response to the nuclear accident at Three Mile Island, March through September l979: A 6-month status report.. Report No. 79-225 ENR, by Warren H. Donnelly. Washington, 1979. 42 p. 9 —=~-— Nuclear energy policy. [by] Robert L. Civiak et al. (Continuously updated) Issue Brief 78005 ----- The Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Report No. 81-147 SPR, by Robert L. Civiak. Washington, l98l. 82 p. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Clarification of TMI action plan requirements. Washington, 1980. l vol. in various pagings. NUREG-0737 ‘ ----- NRC action plan developed as a result of the TMI-2 accident. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., l980. 2 vols. NUREG-0660 ----- Reactor safety study: an assessment of accident risks in U.S. commercial nuclear power plants. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975. 198 p. plus ll appendices in 6 vols. WASH-1400 (NUREG-75/014) (Commonly called the Rasmussen Report) ----- Safety goals for nuclear power plants: a discussion paper. Washington, Feb. 1982. 1 vol. in various pagings. NUREG-0880 ----- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission policy and planning guidance l982. Washington, Jan. 1982. 14 p. ' NUREG-0885