I - 3/ 1 ‘Q?/33 ” iilfigiv 4/ L .- I? @ 87-464 L CRS REPORTS TO CONGRESS fi“‘%urwwwd»«mw _fi3%§é.§§9§3@$ 7”“??? fl ‘a ' ' ‘M’ 1%‘-«»-~I' xiii **‘«“\,.i.:si:%’°’ ATTACK ON THE U.S.S. STARK: CURRENT EDITORIAL%{} ‘fiy 5 333? , WV -. , N 3 .3 5”} Q A V *' -“~~* -‘«‘="-M 2-.,"*z..a (Received between May 19 and May 29, 19§%¥&S1LHW(jlEJF€iJf%1w€§E&9““ ’ G . . I E 1‘ overnment Publications Unit AUG 7 7 2994 W h . , as gift?” 9"”’9’S!ty ubraries ‘MS. MO 63130 Library Services Division May 29, 1987 niversi ouri O10-’|i||O394O C II 5 U mbi IIIHH 4 a 0 Miss mwi The Xgressional Research Service works exclusively for th.e.sChugress, conducting research, analyzing legislation, and »i‘f$h‘i‘Ciing information at the request of committees, Mem- ent, their staffs. A Ighe“ Serveite makes such research available, without parti- _«~san bias, in many forms including studies, reports, compila- tions, digests, and background briefings. 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The enclosed packet contains all editorials on this topic that were received by the Library Services Division between May 19th and May 29th 1987. newspapers from around the country for which we periodically receive the editorial pages are: Albuquerque Journal Anchorage Times Argus Leader Arkansas Gazette Atlanta Constitution Billings Gazette Birmingham News Burlington Free Press Casper Star-Tribune Charleston Gazette Chicago Tribune Christian Science Monitor Clarion-Ledger Concord Monitor Courier-Journal Daily Oklahoman Dallas Morning News Denver Post Des Moines Register Detroit Free Press Forum Gazette Journal Hartford Courant Honolulu Star-Bulletin Idaho Statesman Indianapolis Star Kansas City Times Lincoln Journal Miami Herald Milwaukee Journal Minneapolis Tribune New York Times News and Observer News Journal Oregonian Orlando Sentinel Philadelphia Inquirer Plain Dealer Richmond Times-Dispatch Sacramento Bee St. Louis Post-Dispatch St. Petersburg Times Salt Lake Tribune Seattle Times Star-Ledger State Sun Tennessean Times-Picayune Wall Street Journal Washington Post Washington Times Wichita Eagle-Beacon The packet does not necessarily reflect the full range of views in these newspapers due to the timing of editorials and the dates that we receive them. Some of the Qhiragn fliibnne 7%? /4, /W6 /0. /$/ 4: 2. 953 7 Reproduced with Permission. Chicago Tribune Harm’s Way in the Persian Gulf The deadly attack on a U.S. frigate in the Persian Gulf leaves both Iraq, whose aircraft apparently launched the missile strike, and the United States with a lot to answer for. Iraq has registered its regret about the incident, but it is going to have to do better than that. It is going to have to explain how one or more of its airplanes happened to fire on an American ship in international waters. It is going to have to explain how such a thing can happen by‘ accident, if it was an accident, and what will be done in the future to guarantee the safety of neutral crafl. * It will not do simply to say that the Persian Gulf is a dangerous place, though it certainly is that, or that the United States had no business sending warships there, which it certainly did. The threat posed to neu- tral shipping by the belligerents in the Iran-Iraq war is reason enough for a U.S. Navy presence. And unless Iraq comes up with some satisfactory answers and assurances, the military situation is bound to escalate. But the United States has some explaining to do, too. The USS Stark was not defenseless. It was equip- ped with antimissile weapons that were supposed to provide some protection from Exocet missiles, which since the Falkland Island War have been developing a reputation as seagoing giant-slayers. Why did the de- fensive systems fail? One possible explanation is that they did not work, which would have ominous implications for U.S. naval strategy. Another is that they were not engaged at the time of the attack. But this, too, has some serious implications. Have we sent U.S. sailors in harm’s way under restrictions on their ability to shoot back that make them sitting ducks to anybody who "has bought an Exocet missile off the shelf at the international anns bazaar? The United States has shown considerable for- bearance since the Sunday afternoon attack on the USS Stark. That is appropriate because everyone in- volved needs time to sort out exactly what happened and why. The United States does not want to help Iran, which is gloating over the incident, by launching reprisals against Iraq. But already President Reagan has made it clear that he sees this incident as evidence that it is in the U.S. interest for the war to come to an end. And unless a lot of answers are forthcoming, the pressure to do something to strike back will mount. DETROIT FREE PRESS ma? /4, MM!» /a. /44 :’?-3.‘ Reproduced with Permission. Detroit Free Press TRAGEDY AT SEA; Deaths of 28 US. sailors add to Mideast chaos AS MANY as 28 U.S. sailors are dead I today as the result of a missile attack on the guided missile frigate U.S.S. Stark by Iraqi warplanes in the Persian Gulf. While both the governments of Iraq and the United States are saying that Sunday's attack was a case of Iraqi pilots mistaking the ,Stark’s identity, the fact remains that missiles were fired in a powder-keg kind 0f,,environment in which all sides should beat all times acutely aware of what they ' are doing and of the potential.conse- quences. It seems evident that the commander of the Stark, aware of just such tension, calculated that the approaching aircraft were friendly but tried contacting them ‘anyway to make that identification crys- tal clear. Even after radar indicated that the missile had been fired, the Stark's commander did not return fire in the 60 seconds or so left to him, so surprising and unexpected was the Iraqi attack. The attack came in international wa- ters; the Stark is one of seven U.S. vessels «in the Middle East naval force assigned to escort American merchant ships through ‘the troubled Persian Gulf. The Stark may also have been part of a U.S. effort, requested by the government of Kuwait, to_provide protection for Kuwaiti freight- ers bound to Iraqi ports with oil and arms to aid Iraq in its bloody war of attrition with Iran. The United States has declared neutral- ity in that war,.but‘th our velations of U.S.. arms sales to Iran to g . ‘ ‘ hostages certainly cloudqthe matter. In fact, the U.S. policy and position in that Mideast conflict seems muddled. There is no doubt from an historical perspective that Iran is an enemy of the United States. The Ayatollah Khomeini and his syco- phants express that feeling with depress- ing regularity. Even the putative effort of the Reagan administration to make a separate peace with “more moderate ele- ments” in Iran that might be expected to succeed the ayatollah’s reign of terror does not seem to be part of a coherent policy. Thus the 28,sailors who died in the course of duty aboard the Stark are vic- tims of extremely tense times in a part of the world where chaos reigns and human suffering and death are staples of every- day life. The Stark had every right to be where it was, protecting the freedom of international waters. Iraqi government officials have expressed regret over the attack and promise a full accounting-. Such an accounting, however, will be of little comfort to the families and friends of the dead sailors. If the Iraqis are sincere in their regret and wish truly to make amends, they might at the very least order their fighter pilots to have certain knowledge of their targets’ identities before they attack. Oth- er U.S. ship commanders are now un- doubtedly prepared for the worst and will react to the approach of air and naval craft as they would if at war. The consequences that loom in such a scenario are monumen- tal and must be avoided. _,---_1"_-,!!iu_vym! , 5‘ "' ' l'P,- " q :-,I'. '" ' :1 {I05 Angeles Glimes Iraq owes the United‘ States A speedy and complete explanation of the deadly missile attack ‘Sunday on the American frigate Stark. And the U.S. Navy owes the survivors of the dead crewmen, and the American people, an explanation of why the Stark apparently made no move to defend itself. ' The Stark was patrolling in international waters .and not the Iraq-Iran war zone,. was one comment. .Ship’s officers were aware of at least one Iraqi fighter in the area, but Iraqi warplanes had not threatened American ships in the past. In fact, the United States has been attempting to improve _,relations with Iraq and to restore this country's 1' claim to “neutrality" in the Persian Gulf conflict. 3. , The Stark apparently attempted to identify itself to the Iraqi aircraft. The Americans certainly would not want to attack an Iraqi fighter without provocation. But why hesitate at firing against incoming missiles, if that was the case? A i The Stark was equipped with .a rapid-fire ‘:1 987 Reproduced with Permission. Los Angeles Tlmes Tragedy in the Persian Gulf Phalanx system to defend against missile attack, V and reportedly had 60 to 90 seconds of warning. , Perhaps there was some technical reason for not having the Phalanx armed to fire automatically as soon as the missiles were detected. If so, that should be explained. . The attack—accidenta1 or not, in international waters or not—makes it clear that the Persian Gulf is a de facto war zone and American ships operate there~at risk. . A As Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger noted, American fighting men are in the gulf “not as referees or dispassionate observers," but to maintain U.S. commitments to allies in the region and to protect shipping from the critical oil fields of the Middle East. And properly so. A At this point, there are more questions about the Stark affair than answers. But it does seem that if the United States is to be an effective peacekeeper in the Middle East, it must first make certain it defends its own forces adequately. 3119 New ark Eimes W /4/‘M #56’ ‘”i/ /’ °l 987 Reproduced with Permission. New York Times The Attack on the Stark Iraq’s blundering attack on the frigate Stark should not change America’s aims or means in the Persian Gulf. A military presence is needed to reas- sure the Gulf states against encroachment by Iran, and warships play a necessary role. But the death of 28 sailors and the crippling of their vessel by a sin- gle Exocet missile weighs heavily. All the more so, since the Navy still hasn't explained why the Stark failed to defend itself, even though it was aware it was under attack. Modern warships are crammed with flamma- ble equipment but carry little armor. Missiles that elude their defenses are almost certain to wreak havoc. A single Exocet, whose warhead didn't even explode, sank the British destroyer Sheffield in the 1982 Falkland War. Because of the Sheffield’s fate, frigates like the Stark carry electronic jammers, dispensers of metallic chaff to decoy radar-guided missiles away from the ship, and Phalanx guns for close-in defense. That’s why, when Iran earlier this , year deployed Chinese missiles at the mouth of the Gulf, the Navy expressed confidence that its frig- ates could protect themselves. None of this deflects responsibility from Iraq and its policy of indiscriminate attacks on shipping. But whatever the Iraqis’ fault, the Navy should have been prepared, even for accidental attacks. The Iraqi missile, fired from only 10 miles away, had a minute's flight, giving little time for reaction. But the Stark knew it was being illumi- nated by the attacker’s radar and detected the mis- siles being fired. Even so, its Phalanx gun did not fire a single round nor did its chaff dispensers try to divert the missile. The interesting question of whether these systems would have worked as well as the Navy believes has been preempted by an- other: Why they weren't used? While that issue is being resolved, there is no reason for American ships to quit the Persian Gulf. They are there not merely to show the flag, but to deter attacks on Gulf shipping. And until America weans itself from Persian Gulf oil, the stakes are too high to do nothing. All the more reason for the Navy to learn why the Stark wasn't better able to defend itself, and for the’ Reagan Administration to press Iraq hard for an accounting. I \ "1 . __ “* . ’ ’. .r..r_ . : I . 0- . ,, /4 r, W24? /9/ H571’/0.5/7 C1987 Reproduced with Permission. The (Baltimore) Sun Questions about the Stark it is a testament to the courage and skill of the men aboard the USS frigate Stark. and of those who rushed to its assistance, that the ship itself was not lost after so terrible a blow as a missile strike broadside. Sunday's attack. unprovoked and without warning, must be thoroughly investi- gated. Why did the Iraqi pilot fail to heed radio warnings that the Stark was a neutral warship? U.S. AWACS surveillance planes reportedly watched the incident and identified the attacker as an Iraqi: why didn't they tell the Stark it was being fired upon? if they did. or if the Stark's own radar operators knew the Mirage F-l was locking in its targeting radar. why did the ship's Close in Weap- ons System missile defense fail to fire? A deeper question is why such a lightly armed and armored vessel as the Stark was on patrol in an area in which nations fighting a seven-year war regularly fire on neutral vessels. U.S. naval authorities acknowledge that the Stark's weapons could not take on a supersonic fighter such as a Mirage F-1. The Stark. one of the 51-ship Oliver Hazard Pen'y class. has a steel hull but an alumi- num superstructure. Similarly constructed British ships were set ablaze by missile and cannon-firing aircraft during the Falklands conflict. and reports from the Persian Gulf indicate the same thing happened to the Stark. The French-made Exocet apparently struck where the aluminum super- structure met the steel hull. ripping a gaping hole and starting fires that were diffi(‘ult to put out. Quick action by the crew, and by American. Saudi and Bahraini units saved most of the Starks per- sonnel. But a better armed. all-steel vessel. with weapons capable of reaching out and plucking an Exocet from the air before it got close. might not have suffered the Stark‘s terrible damage. President Reagan is right to demand a full ex- planation from the Iraqi government. He has maintained a careful balance in his remarks about the incident and the war which caused it. He and his military advisers owe the American people some answers as well. however. Twenty-eight U.S. servicemen have died and 21 were injured. Before more U.S. lives are put at risk. the policy of send- ing them into hostile waters under rules of engage- ment that hamper their ability to protect them- selves must be changed to give them a better chance. Moreover, better protection. from better- armed warships such as Aegis-equipped missile defense ships and. if necessary, carrier-based air- craft seems prudent. In war. accidents sometimes happen. Ways must be found to minimize the ter- rible cost such accidents can bring. THE WALL STREET JOURNAL W7 /2 W5’; P. 25 The unprovoked Iraqi missile at- tack on the Navy frigate USS Stark, with the deaths of 28 American sailors. is a reminder of the high stakes of the competition in the Per- sian Gulf—not only among warring Iran and Iraq and their neighbors. but also between the U.S. and Soviet Un- ion. The incident raises serious ques- tions about the battle readiness of the ship and about U.S. military commit- ment and readiness in the region. It further suggests that Washington is far toosanguine about the intentions of the Iraqi regime. The Persian Gulf is, of course, a vital shipping lane in the supply of oil to much of the Free World. The U.S. has long recognized this strategic truth and has maintained a naval presence there since shortly after the end of World War II. U.S. naval forces in the region were increased following the taking of U.S. hostages in Tehran in 1979 and, later, after the outbreak in 1980 of the Iran-Iraq War. The Stark is part of a seven-ship U.S. Navy task force that patrols the gulf south of the Iran-Iraq war zone in an effort to offer some protection to neu- tral shipping. Both Iran and Iraq have been step- ping up their attacks on neutral ship- ping in the gulf. But as Pentagon offi- cials said yesterday, never before the attack on the Stark has an Iraqi air- craft flown so far south in the gulf. Still. the Navy had ample warning that an Iraqi aircraft for two planes, accounts vary) was headed toward the U.S. frigate. Radar had tracked the plane from takeoff some two hours earlier (and later tracked the return). The Stark also was aware that the Iraqi plane's radar had locked onto the frigate. The frigate's sensors reg- istered the firing of the Exocet missile about 60 to 90 seconds before the im- pact ripped open the ship's port side. °l9 87 Reproduced with Permission. The Wall Street Journal The Stark Attack Vice Adm. Henry Mustin. deputy chief of Naval Operations. said that the Stark had enough time to launch countermeasures to destroy the in- 'coming missile. He told a Pentagon news conference yesterday that the frigate is armed with at least five de- fensive systems—includiug the Vulcan Phalanx system—that are capable of shooting down Exocet-type missiles. The ship's crew was also on “height- ened alert" status. as is routine in the gulf. with a third of the crew on watch and all weapons stations manned. Adm. Mustin couldn't explain why the captain of the Stark hadn't or- dered retaliatory fire against the Exo- cet missile tor the aircraft). All indi- cations are that the Stark “didn't fire anything," he said. The standing "or- ders of engagement,“ he added, would have permitted such retaliation. Pentagon officials said that they are reviewing U.S. naval forces in the gulf both in light of the attack on the Stark and also because the U.S. is now negotiating with Kuwait to protect 11 of its 21 tankers under the U.S. flag. Increased naval strength might in- clude an Aegis cruiser and an aircraft carrier to provide better protection against hostile aircraft and missiles. The Soviet Union. too, recognizes the importance of the oil-rich Persian Gulf and has been active in the re- gion—most notably in Iraq. The So- viets have heavily armed the forces of President Saddam Hussein (though the fighter and missile that attacked the Stark were French-made) and maintains a “Treaty of Friendship" with Iraq. More recently, the Soviets have begun to establish a regular na- val presence in the gulf. The Soviets have two warships in gulf waters and two more in the In- dian Ocean near the vital Strait of Hormuz. In April. the Soviet Union won an agreement to lease three tankers to Kuwait, carrying with them the protection of the Soviet flag. One of the tankers. the Marshal Chuikov, hit a sea mine on Saturday in neutral waters near Kuwait: the explosion blew a large hole in the hull. but no deaths were reported. On May 6, Iran- ian Revolutionary Guardsmen in a speedboat attacked a Soviet freighter in the gulf with rocket-propelled gre- nades. Officials in the White House, State Department and Pentagon responded charitably to the Iraqi attack on the Stark. They used such terms as “inad- vertent," “no indication of any delib- erate, hostile intent" and “a mistaken attack." . This is but a continuance of a dubi- ous policy of winking at Iraqi mis- deeds in hope of rapprochement. The State Department in 1982 took Iraq off the list of international terrorist coun- tries. even though Iraq long has been identified with terrorism. Iraq had been the headquarters of the Abu Ni- dal terrorist group until it moved to Syria and Libya a few years ago, and last year the PLO moved its military command to Baghdad. The Hussein regime has an extensive history of crimes against its domestic political foes. It has broken international law‘ by using poison gas against Iranian soldiers. And, of course, Iraq started the war. Since we are dealing here with the duplicitous Middle East, we may never know why the Stark was at- tacked. But it stretches credulity to imagine that the highly trained pilot of an advanced fighter purposely flew down the Persian Gulf, locked his ra- dar on a U.S. frigate and fired a mis- sile by “inadvertence." The Pentagon and State Department might profit from being less quick in granting for- giveness and more vigorous in de- manding to know why the Stark was | I attacked and why it wasn’t ready. 4,- Elie tllus 1111191011 39.051 /2 /7X7/- /0. 4/97 '31 987 Reproduced with Permission. The Washington Post Hit in the Gulf warship in the Persian Gulf Sunday night, killing 28 sailors and disabling the ship, appear to have been fired by an Iraqi fighter that mistakenly thought it had an Iranian ship on its radar. The United States said so quickly after examining the intelligence, and the Iraqis at once indicated they accepted that version of events. Neither country wanted this terrible incident to get in the way of the business they are doing together. It's important business. Having watched seem- ingly helplessly as the war between Iran and Iraq entered its seventh year, the United States is now embarked on a quiet but momentous strate- gy to bring it to an end. It is doing so by intervening on Iraq's side in the aspect of their war that the two sides conduct by interdicting each other’s shipping in the Persian Gulf. By protecting Iraq's shipping but leaving Iraq free to attack Iran's, the United States is helping Iraq strange Iran's oil exports, which provide the means to keep Tehran in the war, and nullifying the thneat of Iranian retaliation. In a strange identity of superpower interest, the Soviet Union is moving to conduct exactly the same policy. T HE TWO missiles that struck an American The hit on the Stark was, it seems, one of those hard-to-anticipate misfortunes that tend to hap- pen when weapons are set on a hair trigger in circumstances of stress. The incident should make the United States think much harder about ways to diminish the hazards of duty in and about a Third World war zone. It is bound to freshen the running debate over the uses of fast, accurate, cheap missiles against big, slow, costly targets at sea. Still, the strategic situation in the Gulf is what counts most now. The Americans are finally taking advantage of the unique condition that both combatants——-especially Iran-have oil-based economies dependent on ships that must run the gamut of the Gulf. For the first time, the United States has found an acceptable way to put military power behind its long-stated goals of a cease-fire, which would leave Iran inoccupation of a slice of Iraq, and then a negotiation that would respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of both sides. The Kremlin reinforces this plan, and the other Arabs and almost everyone else nervously support it. The risks, including not just accidental attack by Iraq but deliberate attack by Iran, are evident. But the goal is the right one. Efjc lliastjingtun Eimc-3 7%? /2 M56 /I W‘ Blood in the Gulf The easy response to the Iraqi attack on the USS Stark, and the death of over two dozen American seamen, is to call for a retali- atory blood-letting. But retaliation would be neither just nor expedient, judging from what now is known: Both the Iraqi ambassa- dor in Washington and his principals in Bagh- dad were abject in their apologetic profusions, and there seems little reason to doubt at least their anxiety. What the attack may represent is an omi- nous precedent. The war zone in the Gulf has witnessed hundreds of similar onslaughts, mostly intentional and mostly on merchant ships, by Iraq and Iran over the past three years. Prior to this nasty episode, the bloodiest was the attack in 1986 on a Pana- manian freighter in which 10 seamen were killed. Now that the toll has escalated and a U.S. naval vessel has been bombarded, how- ever inadvertently, it is reasonable to expect similar attacks in the future, and not only on American ships. Iraq, which has enjoyed a steadily improv- ing though not entirely deserved relationship with the United States, has little reason to add to her troubles by alienating Washington; but her enemies (and ours) in Tehran do not share this perspective. The Iranians re- sponded with their usual elegance to the in- cident. “Great Satan (the United States) has been miserably trapped in this event,” Iranian prime minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi brayed, calling the event a “divine blessing” that would help “liberate" (i.et, deliver to Iranian hegemony) the Gulf by encouraging $198 7 Reproduced with Permission, The Washington Times the departure of the ships of the great pow- ers. Speaking of great powers, the Soviet Union also would like to create and then fill any vacuum in the Gulf, and it has already deployed at least four naval vessels there for the purpose of protecting its freighters, one of which was blasted by the Iranians a couple of weeks ago. A U.S. exit from the Gulf now would not only leave American merchant ships naked to both combatants but would be an invitation to more jolly tarskis from Mos- cow. The Soviets as well as the United States are now registering Kuwaiti vessels under their flags as means of protecting them from attack, though Iran has averred it will not be deterred by such flags of convenience. The presence of the superpowers in the region raises the stakes, and the risks, for everyone. The seven U.S. naval vessels in the Gulf lack an Aegis anti-air defense system, which provides shipboard early warning of low- flying missiles. Perhaps there was no reason to have it — until this weekend — but, then again, perhaps naval vessels in a war zone in which one side uses Exocets and the other never ceases to kick us in the teeth should have been adequately protected. The history of failure in war, said Douglas MacArthur, may be summed up in the words “too late.” The bloody and tragic events of the weekend again show the truth of his maxim, but the object now is not revenge but future security for our men and ships and a vital region of oil and rising tension. THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR The Christian Science Monitor I _ °l987 Reproduced with Permission. M7 24 /M /e /5‘ The West’s Gulf role that left at least 37 Americans dead and many others wounded is a reminder of why many Pentagon oflicials refer to the current period as an “era of violent peace.” ‘ The United States, in the Gulf as elsewhere, is not at war. Yet the US cannot be said to be at peace, either, as testified to by the seven—ship Navy task force in the Gulf - stationed there to protect oil shipping from that region to Western industrial nations and Japan. For frigates like the USS Stark, the tactical situation quickly becomes particularly dangerous in such a twilight zone of conflict — where US ships are ostensibly neutral but find themselves caught up against the backdrop of the Iran- Iraq war. Surely, this is a moment for compassion and support for the crew of the USS Stark and their families. Washington will have many questions to ask the ship's officers. Whatever was known by the ship's crew, US Air Force planes apparently knew of the Iraqi jets. Was there no communication to the Stark? Why did the Stark not take evasive action before the missile attack, or, alternatively, directly engage the aircraft? Were the frigate's defensive systems oper- ational? Who was on duty on the Stark? The Navy has now sharpened the rules of engagement for its warships remaining in the Gulf. That is reasonable. But broader concerns need to be addressed — including the role of the US task force in the Gulf and the appropriateness of efforts taken to date T HE Iraqi attack on a US Navy frigate to end the Iran-Iraq war. All appearances, as of this writing, suggest that the Iraqi attack was just what it seemed to be, a terrible mistake, though Congress will want to explore that issue. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein has indi- cated as much in his message to President Reagan. And even for the crew of the Stark, there are mitigating circumstances: The attack took place at night — a time in which there have been relatively few direct attacks on vessels. The frigate, which was on so- called “picket duty,” keeping a radar eye on air and sea shipping lanes, was not in a main war zone, such as around Kharg Island, where frequent missile hits take place. Still, attacks on shipping in general have hardly been uncommon, including recent hits on Soviet tankers. Beyond the missile attack is the larger matter of the American presence in the Gulf. The US has a right to be there; the Stark was in international waters. More important, the US has an obligation to help keep open international shipping lanes. But should the US be carrying this responsibility alone? What about, as Congressman Lee Hamilton asks, greater support from other Western nations also dependent on Middle East oil? The Stark incident suggests that Wash- ington needs to have better defined rules of engagement for its ships in the Gulf, as well as clearer foreign policy objectives in that region. And the West needs to intensify efforts to bring an end to the Iran-Iraq war, lest an inadvertent incident bring into the conflict the great powers themselves. DETROIT FREE PRESS 7'mt,7 Zfl/ /7.97; ,0. /2 A '3’. 95 7 Rebroduced with Permission. Detroit Free Press : The US. Navy’s role is clear; the dangers should be, too THE MISSION of the U.S. Navy in the Persian Gulf is clear enough: the Middle East task force is safeguarding the inter- ests of the Western world in the oil-rich gulf. This is a legitimate and critically . important objective, and the U.S. presence in the region must continue despite the tragic loss of as many as 37 American lives. Consistent with its traditional role as a defender of free navigation on interna- tional waterways, the United States has- been attempting to calm down the so- called “tanker war,” in the course of which Iran and Iraq have hit some 230 merchant ships in the Persian Gulf and lgilled more than 100 civilian sailors. An- other U.S. goal is to preserve the delicate political and economic balance among the gulf states. The Iraqi attack on the USS Stark, however, and the fact that for some still undisclosed reason the warship ap-' parently didn't attempt to defend itself, raise some important questions. How do we’ actually go about achieving those general objectives? Do the U.S. govern- ment and military realistically evaluate the‘ risks involved? It appears that it was unforeseen, either by the Navy command or the White House, that Iraq or Iran might attack, inadvertently or otherwise, a U.S. Navy ship. The rush in Washington to portray the attack as an Iraqi blunder and the belated putting of the Navy task force on a higher alert status only feed this suspi- CIOII. What the incident has proved is that Americans cannot wander into the world’s war zones, especially in the Mid- dle East, assuming innocently that their superpower status alone will protect them in all circumstances. The reality is that, in some instances, our military will need the ' right to defend itself. Otherwise, its pres- ence on the scenes of regional conflicts makes no sense. No one wants the Navy to -be trigger-happy and add to the level of violence in the Persian Gulf, but turning our warships into sitting ducks in those troubled waters does not help U.S. inter- ests either. As the U.S. presence in the gulf increases along with the tension in the region, those questions are gaining in importance. -lo- “/“V147 25/ /W7/. p. /M The Iran-lraq war has gone on so long and so inbonclusively that only now. in the bitter after- math of the USS Stark tragedy. will the American people realize there has been an important escala- tion in the U.S. military role in the Persian Gulf. ‘ ,1 Until 1984. U.S. naval vessels in the area spent tiibst of their time making visits to friendly ports of call. It was a symbolic mission in support of the Carter Doctrine vow that “any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be repelled by any means. . . including military means." ‘_;”.What happened in 1984 was the outbreak of the “tanker war” as a corollary to the bloody trench warfare that has killed 400,000 soldiers. Both combatants tried to inhibit shipping with attacks on merchant vessels and port and oil in- sfallations. Since that time, an estimated 230 Ships have been hit — none with more fatal con- sequences that the 37 U.S. sailors lost» on the Stark. This was a development not anticipated by the Carter Doctrine. which was aimed almost ex- clusively at the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the U.S. naval mission changed from one of showing the flag to one of escorting merchant vessels. The Stark affair coincides with a Reagan ad- ministration decision to place a number of Kuwaiti ships under the U.S. flag and under the command of U.S. captains — this in response to a Soviet decisionto do the same. One of the supreme ino- nies in this conflict is that both superpowers tilt c1987 Reproduced with Permission. The (Baltimore) Sun . The Carter Doctrine Revisited toward Iraq because a victory by Iran would be too destabilizing for either to tolerate. For the Soviet Union. Iran's brand of Islamic fundamentalism could well cause unrest among Muslim popula- tions within its borders. For the United States, Iranian domination of the Persian Gulf would threaten Saudi Arabia and hence the supply of oil to the non-Soviet world. Yet there is an irony within this irony. Despite superpower fears of an ascendant lran. Iraq has been the chief aggressor in the “tanker war" as it was in launching the land war in 1980. The re- gime of President Saddam Hussein was intent on provoking Iran to take retaliatory action that then would draw the superpowers in on its side. The strategy was only partly successful. Iran declined to be provoked to the point Iraq had hoped. But it did strike back enough times to trigger the Kuwaiti development and. more important. make maritime operations so dangerous that the U.S. Navy would take on escort duties. ’ Is the expanded U.S. mission justified or pru- dent? Or was it one of those incremental develop- ments that grow like Topsy into a policy never adequately plotted or thought through? Senate Re- publican leader Bob Dole believes the United States should “rethink exactly what we are doing in the Persian Gulf ." He wants to assess the risks and measure the potential costs. We agree. The lessons from the Stark need to be learned quickly and the Carter Doctrine updated. Ebc lliasljingtun Eimcs Wt/c7 ZQ /7572 /0. 7/4 31987 Reproduced with Permission. The Washington Times Sixty seconds in the Gulf One minute may not seem like a long time, but under combat conditions it can assume the dimensions of a geological era. For the commander and 200 crewmen of the USS Stark. it was an interval that could have been used to destroy the incoming Exocet missiles from an Iraqi Mirage that took the lives of over three dozen American seamen this Sun- day. The question today is: Why was this time not so used? The tragedy in the Persian Gulf does not appear to be the result of faulty intelligence. The AWACS system in the area picked up the Iraqi warplane as soon as it left the ground, and relayed messages to the ship, which also perceived its attacker on its own radar as the aircraft left the coast and passed well beyond the normal radius of Iraqi missions. Nor was the carnage due to a lack of ade- quate weaponry. The Stark possesses three different air defense systems by which the plane or its missiles could have been de- stroyed or deflected, and routine procedures on board call for all weapons stations to be manned at all times. Yet, as we learned in the aftermath of the mass slaughter of U.S. Marines in Beirut in 1983, the way it's supposed to be is not always the way it is, and the rules of engagement under which American troops and seamen are dispatched on their missions are not al- ways properly spelled out. Ever since Secre- tary of Defense Robert McNamara tried to redefine the ancient craft of the warrior in terms of “systems analysis," management ef- ficiency, and other brainstorms from the ex- ecutive suite. the defense establishment has displayed tendencies to place victory and se- curity second to administrative coherence. The result has often been neither, and the most recent price of such ill-considered re- forms may be floating today in the blood- drenched waters of the Persian Gulf. Itioreovgr, the mission of the Stark and the six other naval vessels stationed in the Gulf has not been clear. Their purpose has evolved from amiable flag-showing in the ports of the Gulf to protecting merchant shipping from combatants. The different rules that govern the changing missions of the vessels may compromise their effectiveness and their preparedness for surprise attacks. Spell it out, Mr. President, loud and clear. Under the rules of engagement that pre- vailed for the Stark and its sister ships. ade- quate defensive measures could have been taken; but these rules were not designed for the actual conditions that exist in the area. It is all very well for Pentagon officials to say that the Stark was in international waters. 40 miles from the war zone, and had no reason to expect an attack from the Iraqis. In an area in which over 200 ships have been attacked in the past three years, that does not help the dead, the maimed, and their families. It is all very well for President Reagan to say — 24 hours afterwards — that our forces in the Gulf can fire at hostile planes; but if there was ambiguity in the mind of Cmdr. Brindel at the time he needed this au- thorization, it may explain why he did not more profitably make use of those sixty sec- onds that stretched between life and death. Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn stated, in the aftermath of the bloody event, “There‘s going to have to be a change in the rules of engagement for U.S. ships.” The change should not be limited to present missions in the Gulf, but extend also to the way we have come to think about war itself. lIo5Ange1es Glimes m,/2; mg ,0. 4, sxzz‘ °l 987 Reproduced with Permission. Los Angeles Tlmes A Dubious Explanation Defiant in defeat, said Winston Churchill, magnanimous in victory. President Reagan would have it the other way around. In defeat he is ma/gnanimous, absolving Iraq for its deadly attack on the Navy frigate Stark, blaming Iran instead because it refuses to end the 6-year-old Persian Gulf war. If Reagan had not earlier- approved the inept scheme to supply arms to Iran, he would not now be trying to create his own reality to excuse the blunder of an Iraqi pilot and the policy of his masters. It is an injustice to the 37 lost crewmen of the Stark to seek to shift the responsibility for their deaths in an effort to curry favor with a regime that is Iran's mortal enemy and America's dubious friend. ’ The responsibility for the attack on the Stark is I clear. It is equally clear that U.S. officials have a lot to explain. The admiral commanding U.S. naval forces in the Persian Gulf says the Stark was ‘unprepared for hostile action because its officers hadno reason to fear Iraq. That is a statement of astounding implications. The Stark and other U.S. ships patrolling the gulf war zone are supposed to be serving the neutral purpose of keeping an essential interna- tional waterway open. They are not there in unannounced aid of an alleged ally, least of all Iraq, which far more than Iran has tried to sink non-belligerent ships. Who decided in these perilously uncertain circumstances that Iraq was no threat, that Iran was the only power to be feared and repelled? Who determined that the Stark should not be ever-alert to attack from either side? Firm in its resolve, even if still muddled about its purposes, the Reagan Administration has respond- ed to the attack on the Stark by moving additional war ships closer to the gulf. What it should be i doing instead is demanding that other countries share more of the burden and the risks of assuring free movement of oil through the gulf. What it should be doing instead is forgetting about its ill-conceived plan to put Kuwait's oil tankers under the supposed protection of the American flag. Until it can be shown that U.S. ships can protect themselves against a fourth-rate military power, it is imprudent to offer to defend anyone else. ’ I The Stark, part of the Reagan Administration's enormously expensive build-up to a 600 ship Navy, was armed with highly sophisticated military technology. In the end, its only warning of imminent attack came from the the visual obser- vation of a seaman on watch, hardly an improve- ment over the system Columbus used 500 years ago. There is a lot to be explained about what happened last Sunday in the Persian Gulf, and there is a lot to answer for as well. ..]3_ ’a,‘1)c illasliiugton 13051 77//cu7Z§ /75% //Z3 01987 Reproduced with Permission. The Washington Post 3 7 Dead Stark did not electronically detect and then take defensive action against the Iraqi mis- siles that struck the ship on Sunday night in the Persian Gulf. The death toll has climbed to 37 in this tragic incident, and naturally there is dismay and great curiosity over how this modern, well- armed ship with an experienced skipper and a trained crew did not realize it was under fire until a lookout sighted a missile that was only seconds away. The inquiry presumably will supply a definitive answer. The commander of the American force in the Persian Gulf suggests, however, that the ship simply did not expect to be fired at by a “friend- ly” plane from Iraq. Literally hundreds of similar Iraqi air missions had been recorded in the Gulf, and none of them had been directed against US. flag vessels—merchant or Navy. The attack, Secretary of Defense Weinberger said, repre- sented “a single, horrible error on the part of the Iraqi pilot.” Official Iraqi accounts are consistent with this version of events. T HE NAVY is to investigate why the USS Obviously it makes no sense to require that Navy ships be constantly on guard against the possibility of attack by friendly ships or planes. The highest standards of vigilance and responsi- bility are necessary anywhere near a combat zone, but a rule of reason must be applied. The sort and number of contingencies that must be anticipated are large but finite. Still, it is hard not to be struck by the repetition of surprise disasters in military operations. From the Iran rescue mission to the Beirut Marine barracks, immensely chastening things seem to keep happening. The premise of inquiry in these incidents always is, and always must be, that lessons can be learned that will prevent a repeti- tion of the mishap. But a measure of humility is in order. Any place where modern weapons are deployed, and the combat enviromnent in general, is a place where uncertainty flourishes and where the potential for sudden devastation cannot be banished. Plans, military or political, that do not build in adequate respect for this chance factor are bound to be flawed. V -14- Chicago Cfrihune wig...’ 27., /7871‘ /’- '0 egg 7 Reproduced with Permission. Chicago Tribune U.S. allies should share Gulf risk The loss of 37 American lives in the Iraqi rocket attack on the USS Stark is a grievous and heart- breaking price to pay for maintaining freedom of navi- gation in the Persian Gulf. It would be a price at least somewhat easier to bear, for the families of the dead and for all Americans, if our allies would behave more like allies. President Reagan has said that “our ships are de- ployed in the Gulf in order to protect the United States interests and maintain freedom of navigation and access to the area’s oil supplies.” This country does have an interest. More than that, as the leader of the free world, this country has an obligation to protect the freedom of the seas. But some of our allies have aneven more immediate and urgent interest. Western Europe and Japan get most of the oil that fuels their economies from the Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia. The United States takes only about 3 percent of its oil from the region. The allies, however, contribute little or nothing to" the task of safeguarding those oil deliveries and seem sometimes to go out of their way to give the U.S. the back of their hand. The Japanese this week, for instance, arrested four Japanese on espionage charges for selling information about the American F-16 warplane to the Soviets- but, inexplicably, allowed the Soviet operative involved to catch a plane back to Moscow hours before they issued a warrant for his arrest. The Saudis, who are forever leaning on this country to sell them more-- and more sophisticated—weaponry, were requested to have two of their American-made F-l5s shoot down' the Iraqi plane that rocketed the Stark. They declined.’ And Portugal, one of our NATO allies, chose this week to warn that it might break its agreement on US.‘ bases there if Congress makes further cuts in American aid. Even in the wake of the calamitous attack on the USS Stark, the U.S. is now proceeding to put itself at greater risk in the Gulf in order to keep the seas free in the midst of the Iran-Iraq war. It plans to reregister 11 Kuwaiti tankers as American ships that will fly the American flag and carry American captains, and that will have the U.S. Navy running interference for them to keep the oil flowing. And what are the allies doing? Well, Defense Secre- tary Caspar Weinberger told Senate .Majority Leader Robert Byrd this week that he is trying to organize a “combination” air defense force of British, French, Saudi Arabian and U.S. warplanes to provide air cover for the American Navy ships patrolling the Gulf. That would be a start. But on past performance, don’t count on it. -15‘- @119 New fiork Eimes 7'1/1&7, 22/ /7??) /9. 30 5], 987 Reproduced with Permission. New York Times Lessons of the Stark, Not All Costly Cheap Exocet missiles crippled the frigate Stark this week and devastated the British de- stroyer Sheffield in the 1982 Falkland war. But these products of 1960's technology are not magic weap- ons. Despite their ferocity, they are easy to decoy. The question is why the Stark let down her guard and why, once hit, damage and casualties were so heavy. The answers to those questions may contain some heavy lessons for the Navy. . As has long been known, the Exocet missile’s radar guidance is easily distracted. One way is to fire chaff — a cloud of reflecting metal strips that presents a larger radar target. Another is to tow a raft with a radar reflector, luring the missile to zero in on its ‘own amplified echoes instead of the ship. Some 60 radar missiles were fired at Israeli ships during the 1973 war. Israeli crews listened alertly and fired chaff. Not one ship was hit The Stark carried chaff dispensers and a Pha- lanx gun for close-in defense. Her captain, Glenn Brindel, says neither was used because of the lack of warning, since for some reason the ship's elec- tronic system failed to detect the missiles as they detached from the attacking airplane. He says the Phalanx gun was not kept on automatic for fear of hitting innocent targets. Understandable, maybe, but a defense system useless against surprise at- tacks is not very useful. Passive, off-board defenses like decoy rafts are cheap and effective, unlike the very expensive gear that engages the attention of the naval electronics community. Iranian warships are said to use such rafts. “We don't use those because we feel we have better methods,” says a Navy spokesman. Its “bet- ter methods” need to be supplemented with ones that actually work. In war, navies build ships out of steel and asbes- tos. More convenient materials creep in during peace, like aluminum, a metal that burns fiercely at high temperatures. Perry-class frigates like the Stark are crammed with flammable gear but are unarmored, because of cost and the burden of extra weight in chasing submarines, their primary task. When hit, wild fires may follow. The Stark’s over- heated aluminum superstructure kept reigniting fires for two days. Could the ship have been made more survivable? Even without armor, much can be done to mini- mize damage. The Navy pays close attention to fire control, and has recognized the faults of aluminum superstructures by reverting to steel in its latest hulls. But it has long resisted live-fire tests — test- ing survivability by firing missiles into hulks config- ured to resemble new ships. Instead it relies on computer simulation, a pallid substitute. Since its inventory of aluminum ships will take years to re- place, no effort should be spared to enhance their survivability, starting with live-fire testing. The Senate rightly demands to be told how American ships will protect themselves, and Ku- waiti oil tankers flying the American flag, and how America would respond to Iranian attacks. In the meantime, the warships in the gulf can defend themselves. With better preparedness the chaff dis- pensers should work. The elderly Exocet is no rea- son to change American policy in the gulf. -19.. ’C,'l).c iU.L15l)ii1gi.on 13051 “WW7 Z2, M372 /. 42¢ 01987 Reproduced with Permission. The Washington Post The Saudi Planes AWACS aircraft flying a Gulf loop picked up the rising fighter early and summoned two Saudi fighters into the sky just before the strike on the USS Stark. At American urging, a Saudi controller aboard the AWACS and then a Saudi officer on the ground requested that the two Saudi F 15s intercept the attacking plane in order, depending on what developed, to identify it, make it land or shoot it down. But the two planes did not have the orders permitting them to fly that mission, and not enough time was available to go up the chain of command and obtain the requisite authority. As first reported, this story was set in the context of flaring Pentagon anger at the spectacle of a friendly country doing less than it might at a moment of American distress. And-it is distress- ing to see would-be comrades standing on proto- col instead of instinctively trying to help. Except that this was merely one more aspect of the same basic element of unpreparedness for this particu- lar contingency that had left the Stark vulnerable to the deadly missiles of the Iraqi plane in the first IT SEEMS that an American early-warning place. An American pilot who, without orders, put himself—that is, put his government—into a whole new realm of chance and risk in a war zone would not necessarily be decorated for it. It seems unreasonable to demand that a Saudi pilot take such a risk. There is much turbulence in the waters and skies of the Persian Gulf region, and more planning is needed to be ready for it. Unfortunately, this is not the end of the story. The theme of ostensible Saudi unreliability was quickly taken up by some American friends of Israel as ammunition against an administration proposal to sell F153 to Saudi Arabia. This is petty and mischievous. The new planes are re- placements that would merely keep the Saudi supply level. It is conceivable that one reason the Saudi F15s could not linger for further orders in the Stark incident is that their fuel capacity had been limited to keep them from being flown against Israel. The Stark incident was bad enough without having it made worse by careless reactions that pile up new tensions between the United States and its exposed, nervous friends in the Gulf. ...['z.. Ebc lliasliingtnn Eimc-3 WQVZZ, /7%?’/./5% 5198 7 Reproduced with Permission. The Washington Times The Gulf: fantasies and fallacies With California Democrat Tom Lantos avowing that the United States is not heavily dependent on oil imports from the Persian - Gulf, the premise of a flawed isolationist syl- logism has been enunicated. The next step in the argument, also made explicit by Mr. Lan- tos, is that “we’re about to cross the Rubicon in the Iran-Iraq war and become a party to that.” The occasion for these reflections, of course, is the Iraqi attack on the USS Stark and the consequent deaths of 37 American seamen last Sunday. , The conclusion that Mr. Lantos and like- minded legislators are drawing is that the appropriate response to the attack would be to stay well away from the Rubicon and get out of the Gulf. Mr. Lantos’s argument is based on — to say the least — a rather quaint perception of American interests. While only 15 percent of U.S. oil imports last year derived from the Persian Gulf, Japan takes from that strategic region 60 percent, and Western Europe 35 percent, of the liquid gold that fuels their economies. But what his logic ignores is that both Japan and Western Europe are U.S. al- lies, and both their economies and their po- litical stability are part of the broader na- tional interest of the United States that all U.S. presidents and most responsible statesmen have recognized since 1945. Despite the isolationist vibrations that are emanating from certain congressional sources — reinforced by the usual legalistic pother about the dubiously constitutional War_Powers Resolution —- the United States, as President Carter stated in 1980, possesses a “vital interest” in the Persian Gulf, and we have every reason to maintain its indepen- dence and security. But — and here Mr. Lantos’s rerriarks are usefully suggestive — so do the _Europea_n_s (and for that matter the Japanese), and more directly than we. Given the vitality of the Gulf to them, Americans are entitled to ask why the dickens aren’t more of their ships there too? A few British and French -— and the ubiquitous Soviet — warships now patrol in the Gulf, but the NATO states’ dependence on oil from the region ought to pull some more vessels into its tides. Why, for that matter, was it a French Exocet and a French Mirage that the Iraqi pilot was using? And what, finally, is the proper role of the United States in the Gulf? The latter question assumes more omi- nous proportions in the context of the agreement, announced by the administration Tuesday, to provide flags of convenience for 11 Kuwaiti oil tankers plying their lawful trade in Gulf waters. Despite the prompt brake on implementation of the agreement that both House and Senate applied in the next days in lop-sided votes to hold it up until a full report on our goals and methods in the Gulf is submitted by the administration, an expanding and active U.S. naval presence in the dangerous waters seems likely. Asst. Sec- retary of State Richard W. Murphy says the agreement should deter Iran from attacking such vessels, and thereby encourage a wind- down of the war. But surely neither Mr. Murphy nor anyone else in the West indulges the fantasy that we have yet succeeded in penetrating the exotic thought-processes that twinkle among what is left of the Ayatollah Khomeini’s aging neu- rons. How he and his mates would react to the sight of the Stars and Stripes in the Gulf is anybody’s guess, but one reasonable pre- diction is that it would only goad them to more violence against the “Great Satan” and our allies in the region. The presence of U.S. warships in the Gulf and the proliferation of flags of convenience thus raise serious questions about our goals and purposes there and what rules should govern our conduct. Capt. Glenn Brindel of the Stark may have been confused himself, since even after two unacknowledged warn- ings to the incoming Mirage, he still did not activate his antimissile defenses. While he had authority to fire on hostile targets, he had, he says, no reason to think the plane was hostile until he saw the missile, and there are also apparent discrepancies between Capt. Brindel’s concept of hostility and that out- lined by his commander, Rear Adm. Harold J. Bernsen. The Stark was “out of the war zone,” you see, and everybody knows that war proceeds by clear rules and procedures, that it does not involve the unexpected, and that it always respects the artificial lines that cartogra- phers like to draw and lawyers like to pretend are real. Whatever confusions and ambigu- ities existed among the commanders in the Gulf last week, they are going to be com- pounded in the very near future by the new responsibilities we are assuming, by the es- calated‘ risks of violence that now pertain, and by the decisions that men on the spot will have to make. It is nothing new for the United States to bear responsibilities for Western Europe — we have done so twice in this century — though it does become stale after a while. Nevertheless, let us once more seek to drag leaders of the West from the illusions in which they like to burrow, and, whatever tasks they are willing to share in the Gulf for their own benefit and ours, let President Rea- gan and the Congress think hard and speak clearly about what we are doing in the Gulf and how we should do it. -;8 - ll @112 New fiork fiimes ‘Ma? 2’; MXZ70. 422 c1987 Reproduced with Permission. New York Times Fast, and Hasty, Draw in the Gulf Talk about confusion. Iranian attacks on Amer- ican vessels in the Persian Gulf could provoke war with the United States, a State Department official said last week. What did the White House think of that? “We disagree,” a spokesman said the next day. Months ago, Pentagon officials insisted that American warships in the gulf had the capability“ and authority to defend themselves. Now, 10 days after the attack on the Stark, White House officials complain that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have just got around to establishing clear rules of engagement for the warships. With such confusion, it’s no wonder Congress has turned squeamish and is asking a lot of tough questions. Once again, as in the Lebanon tragedy, the Administration seems to be drawing its pistol without doing its planning. That's lamentable be- cause the Administration's aims — protecting ship- ping and maintaining presence in a critical arena — make sense. But sound principle can be overwhelmed by poor practice. Deterring attacks on peaceful ship- ping sounds fine, but if deterrence fails, what retali- ation and what risks does «the Administration have in mind? And what capability does the Navy have in fact? Can American warships defend themselves, let alone friendly shipping? it shouldn’t have taken the tragic Iraqi attack on the Stark for the Administration to know it had no business sending ships sailing into harm's way without having thought through such questions. What the Iraqis did was inexcusable. But Adminis- tration action bears the stamp of recklessness or carelessness as well. The White House must now ex- plain its means as well as defend goals that should not have required defense. There's no quarrel with sending American war- ships to escort American commercial ships into and out of the gulf, even though Iran and Iraq have at- c tacked only I percent of the sea traffic there. The war between these two countries creates dangers, and the Navy is supposed to guard freedom of peaceful navigation. Thus far, the warships have de- terred Iranian attacks on American vessels. What about escorting non-American ships? After Kuwait sought protection for its shipping from the Soviet Union, thelAdministration arranged to put the American flag on 11 Kuwaiti tankers. The motive was to forestall a greater role in the’ gulf for Moscow. It's fair to ask whether this was a reflexive anti-Soviet move. Still, the Soviet Union and Amer- ica are genuine competitors for power in this re- gion. American credibility would have been frac- tured had Washington failed to respond positively. Escorting other countries’ shipping presents another matter entirely. The Saudis have capability to take care of themselves. As for other gulf states, Europe and Japan, Secretary of Defense Weinber- ger rightly tells them to contribute to the common effort. Beyond these policy questions lies a practical one. The Navy claims its warships can defend them- selves and protect nearby cargo ships. But does the White House share that confidence? This question is only partly technical. It's far from clear that cap- tains can realistically be asked to walk the fine line between being prudent and being trigger-happy. There's no evidence that policy makers have thought through the consequences of military en- gagement. If Iran sank an American-flagged vessel, for instance, would the U.S. strike back against Ira- nian territory? That would entail obvious risks — risks that cry out for Congress and the country to examine. . It's not enough for the President to reach for his six-shooter, snorting “Makemy day." In the end, even worthy goals falter without the means and public~support to implement them. It's up to the President to make his case. Elyc lU.asl;ingt.on jgost 74017 687/ /75% /9' ’4Z‘/ °l987 Reproduced with Permission. The Washington Post What Is U.S. Policy in the Gulf? nicator," President Reagan is failing to explain his policyin the Persian Gulf. His lieutenants offer explanations that are incom- plete, often do not track and invite congressional harassment as well as anxiety. The president himself has not sorted out the separate tones in which he must speak to the American public and to Iran. This poses a double danger. The Ameri- can public could back off, and Iran could mistake the American intent. The American interest could suffer. American policy in the Gulf, as we understand it, starts from the proposition that what happens there matters deeply to this country because of oil and the geopolitical stakes. It proceeds to a basic purpose of trying to bring the Iran-Iraq war to a fair, negotiated end——-an end respecting the territorial integrity and sovereign interests of both sides—in order to strengthen ties between the Gulf and the West. It rests on a demonstrable tactical requirement to bring Iran to the table by providing Iraq, which was falling back in the land war, some indirect help at sea—by dispatching naval convoys to the Gulf and “reflagging” Ku- waiti tankers. Why Kuwait? Though the United States is intervening in its fashion to even the odds and promote a negotiation, it is not protecting Iraq's shipping. That would be direct and undue inter- vention in the war. But Kuwait is 1) a major ally of Iraq, 2) friendly to the West, 3) in the moderate Arab camp, 4) relatively democratic, 5) brave in fighting Iranian terrorism, 6) important in oil and F OR ALL of his repute as the “great commu- 7) desperate. A pretty good set of claims on American constancy. In fact, the Iran-contra affair had left the administration ready to seize the next chance to show good faith to Arabs. And Kuwait forced the American hand by going to Moscow for naval protection. But what this reminded Washington of was something central: to allow an agile Kremlin to establish an unchallenged premier presence in the Gulf would be a political embarrassment and a geopolitical disaster. Is the policy dangerous? Ships and planes near a war zone are always in danger, and not just from accidents. But the assigned mission is to protect neutral shipping; American officials, by the way, should stop the misleading talk of “maintaining the free flow of oil,” since the United States has no interest in stopping Iraq from blocking Iran's oil. The risks of engagement must be set against the costs of disengagement. The U.S. Navy, furthermore, is not a force lightly challenged. Iran cannot fail to note that Soviet ships are sailing a parallel mission for a parallel diplomatic purpose. And though NATO as an alliance does not accept military missions outside Europe, Brit- ain and France have ships in the Gulf, and they and the Japanese and other beneficiaries of Gulf stability can be and should be pressed to do more. In short, American power is being applied in the Gulf for the limited and valuable purpose of producing a fair end to a dangerous war. A strong case is there waiting for the administration to inakeit -20- uaRAnv OF - % WASHINGTON umvansrrv ST. LOUIS’ - MO.