lllllflllllllllllllllllllllllflwlflflllllllllll 0-10393 OLYEPIC GAMES: REPERCUSSIONS OF THE AFGHANISTAN CRISIS ISSUE BRIEF NUMBER IBSOO11 AUTHOR: Lockwood, David E. Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE MAJOR ISSUES SYSTEM DATE ORIGINATED ggggggg DATE UPDATED gggog (FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL 287-5700 0306 CRS- 1 IBBOO11 UPDATE-O3/O6/80 £§§E§-2§§l-l$lQ§ The Soviet Union's military intervention in Afghanistan represented a bold challenge to the United States and has placed considerable strain on the relationship between the two superpowers. A series of policy decisions has been announced by President Carter to underline this country's displeasure with the Soviet aggression and his determination to make Moscow pay some penalty for its adventure. Included in these actions is the threat of an American boycott of the 1980 summer Olympic games in Moscow. A number of questions have been raised by the President's Olympic initiative, such as the appropriateness or adequacy of the boycott threat, the extent to which other countries will join ranks with the United States, and, of course, the extent and character of its potential impact on the Soviet Union. v EACKGBOUFD AND P0Ll§Z-A§ALX§l§ U.S. THREATENS BOYCOTT The invasion of Afghanistan by a large number of soviet combat troops in te December produced an outcry of opposition around the world. It was the first time that the Soviet Union had intervened militarily on such a massive scale in a country-outside its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe since World War II. Several nations, led by the United States, took retaliatory steps in response to the military intervention. President Carter immediately moved to curtail the shipment of U.S. grain to the Soviet Union, offer assistance to neighboring Pakistan, and terminate sales of high technology items to the Russians. He also warned, in an address to the American people on Jan. H, 1980, that the United States might, boycott the summer Olympic games in Moscow unless the Soviet troops were withdrawn from Afghanistan. Pronosals t2 Shif2-rhe-§nmmer-§ame§ The President's threat of a boycott was followed by proposals to shift the summer Olympics away from Moscow to some other more acceptable site. Vice President Mondale and Mrs. Carter, campaigning in Iowa, expressed their preference for such a change in location. Shortly afterward, Canada's Prime Minister, Joe Clark, questioned the appropriateness of holding the summer games in Moscow and said that he was prepared to consider a request fromw the International Olympic Committee to transfer the games to Montreal, the site of the 1976 summer Olympics. The proposal for a site change had two major elements of appeal not found 5“ the call for a boycott. First, it would allow participation in the 1980 1 gmpic games for U.S. athletes, many of whom have prepared intensively for years for the events. Second, it would represent a sharp rebuke to the Soviet government by a broad segment of the international community, and, unlike a boycott by a single or even several nations, it could not be easily disguised or explained away. case 2 1330011 UPDATE-O3/O6/80 In:§rna2i2nal_Qlzm2is-£9mmittes-§ea2:i9n The major difficulty associated with trying to shift the location of the summer Olympics would be the need to gain the support of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), which organizes and runs‘ the games. The IOC nominally represents, through its many component national committees, the private citizens of the world. It has no official ties with governments, “ individually or collectively. Thus, there would be no binding requirement for the IOC to change the site of the games at the urging of one, a majority, or even all, of the governments whose citizens were scheduled to participate. From the outset, the IOC has expressed its complete opposition to anyi change in the location of the summer Olympics- Its spokesmen have, argued that such a move would not be possible at this late stage, considering the massive preparations required to accommodate the thousands of athletes expected to compete. They have stated also that shifting the site of the summer games would violate a central principle of the Olympics; namely, the separation of politics and sports. It would open the door, they warn, to retaliation of a kind that would almost certainly destroy the Olympic movement as it exists today. The IOC president, Lord Killanin, issued a statement in mid-January pointing out that there were no "sporting grounds" for withdrawing the games from Moscow. He explained that the national Olympic committees could choose individually to compete or not -- it was ‘up to them. A » §z2luti2n-2:.E.§;-§oIsott Policl The strong position adopted by the IOC appears to have had the effect of refocusing efforts of the Carter Administration »toward a tboycott as the principal instrument of leverage against the Soviet Union. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance said, in an interview appearing in the press on Jan. 16, that the United States should not participate in Moscow if the current situation in Afghanistan did not improve, and that as a practical matter a decision would have to be made by the middle of February. On the same day, White House spokesman Jody Powell said that President Carter shared the view of Secretary Vance on American participation in Hoscow under existing circumstances. The Carter Administration has expressed confidence that the U.S. Olympic Committee (USOC) would comply with a government decision to boycott the games, even though vthe committee, is technically insulated from direct political influence by its charter. Procedurally, a U.S. withdrawal from the . games would have to be voted on by a majority of the 86 voting members of the USOC's executive board. In early January the ’executive board voted to “resist political intrusion into the games." Subsequently, President Robert Kane and other board members publicly expressed their strong opposition to a U.S. boycott. ,They have acknowledged, however, that they would have no choice but to go along with the Administration lif it were to decide to withdraw the U.S. team from the games. After carefully reviewing the alternatives available to him, Preside , Carter announced on Jan. 20, during a television interview on "Meet the Press," that he had asked the U-S. Olympic .Committee to lead a worldwide effort to remove the summer Olympic games from Hoscow unless the Soviet Union withdrew all of its troops from Afghanistan by Feb. 20. He made it clear that if the International Olympic Committee refused to move or postpone the event, the United States would boycott the Moscow games. He also said that cRs- 3 IBBOO11 UPDATE—O3/06/80 he would oppose American participation even if no other country supported the nited States. He added that he favored establishment of a permanent site for the summer Olympics in Greece and another permanent, unspecified site for the winter games. The President's action was endorsed overwhelmingly by Congress when it .reconvened for the new session on Jan. 22. Both Houses passed by large margins resolutions in support of the President's stand, further testifying to the increasingly widespread backing by the American people for the boycott policy. assent Qevelemmemzs The next major point of decision in the drama over an Olympics boycott came with the meeting of the International Olympic Committee at Lake Placid, N.Y., just prior to the opening of the winter games there. At the meeting (Feb. 9-12), the USOC argued that Moscow was an unsuitable host for games dedicated to peace and goodwill, and urged the IOC to put off a decision for a month or two, in the hope that the circumstances would change for the better. But the IOC president, Lord Killanin, rejected any form of delay as a sign of weakness or indecision. The IOC proceeded to proclaim that "the Games will be held in Moscow and attended by all those who accept ‘ invitations." It was pointed out that the IOC had no rules or provisions for calling off the games because of sparse participation, though the door was left open for reconsidering the just-announced decision if a significant amber of national Olympic committees expressed their intention not to attend the Moscow summer games. A State Department official revealed shortly after the IOC announcement that "about 50 governments,“ of the .1u0 to which President Carter sent ymessages concerning the Olympics, had indicated, publicly or privately, their preference for declining invitations to the Moscow games. The deadline for accepting invitations to Moscow is May 2H, eight weeks before the scheduled July 19 opening of the summer games, at which time national Olympic committees must inform the Moscow Olympic Organizing Committee of the sports and events in which they plan to enter teams. MA number of observers believe that the Soviet Union will make a conciliatory gesture - perhaps a partial withdrawal of troops -- far enough after Feb. 20 to make it seem that it is not capitulatory to President Carter, but before the other nations make their final decisions. A PRO-CON ANALYSIS OF U.S BOYCOTT E9li:i2§_§hould Be Ke2t.§s2ara£e frem_§2ert§-a§-a_hatter-2£_2rim2i2;e gggp The modern Olympic movement has survived for over 80 years because has been shielded from the political designs hof individualw nations or groups of nations. While intrusions have occurred from time to time, the principle of non-politicization has been reasonably well respected and protected. President Carter's boycott initiative, however, runs the risk of shattering the delicate balance between ideal and reality maintained for so long by the International Olympic Committee. He may be successful in making his point regarding the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan, but at iCRS- u 4 IB80011 UPDATE-O3/06/80 enormous expense, potentially, to the Olympics and other international sports meetings. ‘If the ideal of separating politics and sports has not always been observed rigorously and without compromise, at least it has been a traditional standard against which the behavior of athletes and their respective countries have been measured. gong The United States government should not be singled out for special -condemnation because of President Carter's stand on a boycott of the summer Olympics. That the conditions have reached the point where the President feels he has little or no choice but to threaten withdrawal from the Moscow games is regrettable, but it is a development for which the IOC and the Soviet government must share the preponderant burden of responsibility. To allow Hoscow to become the site of the 1980 summer games betrays an unseemly cynicism and lack of respect on the part of the IOC for its own‘ high ipronouncements regarding the need to separate politics and sports. As for the Soviet Union, its actions in Afghanistan have not only confirmed the IOC's lack of good judgment, but also provide more than adequate grounds for postponing or shifting the location of the games. The Intrusien 0,§...BQ.l.itis=.s..Q9nlQ- Lees‘-._ '22 Hovement the Deetruetien- of the Qlznnis Egg; President Carter's threat to boycott the summer games in Moscow, no matter how justified it may seem to be in the context of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, will almost certainly lead to retaliation at some other time and some other place. The Russian authorities have made veiled suggestions that the Soviet Union might boycott the 198R summer Olympic games in L: Angeles if the United states goes through with its decision to withdraw this year. Such an escalation of tension could very well destroy the modern eolympics as we know them today- While they have not been perfect int every respect, it is not unreasonable to argue that they have been, in balance, better than nothing at all. h Cultural and political barriers have been reduced, and who is to say that world peace and stability have not prospered accordingly. gong There is no certainty that the Olympic movement will be destroyed by an American boycott of the Moscow games and subsequent acts of retaliation. However, even if it should turn out to be true, a successor wmovement might emerge from the debris that more clearly and unequivocally fulfills the spirit and ideals of the Olympic games; namely, emphasis on amateur athletics as well as separation of politics and sports. It is possible, in fact, thati the U.S. boycott initiative may strengthen the current Olympic movement by hforcing the IOC to review its procedures for selecting locations. One option that is available to Lord Killaniny and his associates is to accept the standing offer of the government in Athens to return the Olympics to Greece on a permanent basis. In the last analysis, of course, the survival of the Olympics must take second place to considerations of U.S. national security as determined by President Carter. A Boygett Will Eat Succeed in.§han9in9.§9ziet.2e1isz torard Afghanistan Egg; The U.S. threat to boycott the summer Olympics will have, negligible T impact on the Soviet Union's policy in Afghanistan. The intervention in that country was taken, undoubtedly, because of Soviet perceptions that its security interests were involved to a major degree.‘ The threat of a boycott by the United States and any number of. other countries will not weigh cns- 5 1330011 UPDATE-03/O6/80 significantly, if at all, in any decision to withdraw the occupying troops. vdeed, it may prolong their stay, since’the Russian leaders will not want to be seen as capitulating to pressure from the West. Q93; While the Soviet Union may very well refuse to pull ‘out of Afghanistan under pressure from the United States, a boycott will call I continuing international attention to their failure to do so, and serve as an important, symbolic gesture to show that Americans are united in their determination not to ignore or trivialize such blatant acts of aggression. Also, it may have the effect of deterring the Russians from intervening similarly in other nearby crisis spots, such as Iran, especially if the United States is joined in its boycott movement by a large number of other countries. A Boycott ImnoseA.hz_Qnl1-2-Ee2-§2untrie§_Hill.§eze- Little. 2;. E9 zunitize Lunar: Egg: There is little hard evidence to date that many countries will join the United States in a boycott of the summer Olympic games in Moscow. Without widespread support, the U.S. action will have minimal impact, psychologically and politically. The IOC has declared in no uncertain terms that the games will go on as scheduled and at the presently designated ‘location. If only a few countries decide to join ranks with the United States, the American boycott may, indeed, backfire. ‘In the absence of U.S- athletes, the Russians will dominate the events as never before and reap pa blic relations windfall that will more than offset the embarrassment of .a partial boycott. ggg: Despite lukewarm reaction so far, it is wrong to underestimate the extent to which the U.S..boycott movement may spread to other countries in coming weeks and months. But, even if the number of countries joining the United States is small, the psychological impact is likely to be substantial —- especially in the Soviet Union. The Olympic games have, for many years, unofficially represented a level vof competition between the strikingly different political systems of East and West. It is no secret that the Soviet Union's athletic programs have been exploited extensively for political and propaganda ends. Thus, by depriving the Soviet Union of a matchup at home with its principal rival, the United states, the boycott would deal an embarrassing setback to its leadership. A-§2z99:t Will Mean Year§_9f-Ea§ted-§ff9rt.9n.the-£art of U-S- Athletee grgg Although it is by no means the most important argument iagainst a boycott, the sacrifice required of American athletes in the event of such action needs to be mentioned. Years of dedicated commitment to excellence, involving rigorous training schedules and considerable financial cost, have gone into the making of U.S. Olympic contestants. If they are not allowed to compete, they will experience great frustration and loss. It is important, therefore, for the Carter Administration to consider other, perhaps more Eective, means of showing its displeasure and putting pressure on nthe Soviet Union. 0 Qgn; The interests and feelings of ‘approximately 500 U.S. Olympic competitors are of concern to President Carter, but cannot weigh very heavily in the scales of U.S. foreign policy decisionmaking. The Carter Administration is making every effort to have the summer games shifted to CRS- 6 ’ IB80011 UPDATE-O3/06/80 another location or to set up alternate games ins which Americans could participate. But, if these efforts fail, the U.S. Olympic team members may be asked to make a sacrifice in the national interest, similar to that of t-, American grain farmers affected by the President's embargo instituted earlier. gggg In threatening to withdraw from the summer Olympics, insufficient weight has been given to the benefits of American contact with Sovietl athletes andgthe general public. The liberalizing effect of this kind of association may be hard to prove or measure in quantifiable terms, but most people who have taken part in international sporting events will agree that the experience leads to a breakdown of cultural and political barriers and dissemination of ideas that would tend to temper Soviet stereotyping of the West. These results contribute to, rather than detract from, prospects for understanding and peace throughout the world. One must ask, therefore, if President Carter's threat of declaring a boycott will involve costs greater than the anticipated gains. ggn; A U.S. boycott of the Moscow games is likely to have a greater liberalizing effect on the athletes and public than that which might occur as a result of American participation in the games.” The absence of U.S. athletes, and possibly those of many other countries, would be a development that Soviet authorities could not easily disguise or explain away. The 1i'” between the boycott and the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan wi,- be unmistakable to the Russian people. The intensity and unity of U.S. opposition to Soviet expansionism would be underlined by a boycott and should stimulate some questioning about the character and quality of the Soviet Union's leaders. SURVEY OF REACTIONS !9rth-Atlenti9_Treasz_Qr9enizatien >wIn an emergency meeting of NATO representatives. convened on Jan. 1 to discuss the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan, the idea of a boycott of the Olympic games in‘Moscow was first aired. West Germany's Ambassador to NATO, Rolf Pauls, raised the boycott issue as a question. would it be possible, he asked, to participate in the Moscow games as if nothing had happened? It is reported that he compared the current situation to that before the 1935 summer Olympics in Berlin, the capital of Nazi Germany. He then said that a boycott of the 1936 games might have changed the course of events leading to world War II. “ ‘ Ambassador Pauls' observations were greeted with interest, but no attempt was made by the NATO representatives to reach a collective decision. In t’? immediate aftermath, no strong signs of support for a boycott developed an Western Europe. There was moderate expression of interest mfrom Britain; France said clearly that it would refuse to join a boycott. On Jan. 11, ;Prime Minister Clark of Canada announced a series of sanctions against the Soviet Union and said that he would take the lead in attempting to have the summer Olympics moved to another country. At a follow-up meeting of NATO ens- 7 IBBOO11 UPDATE-O3/O6/80 representatives on Jan. 15, a movement toward boycott seemed to be forming. A large number of allies expressed interest in trying to convince world ublic opinion that the summer Olympic games should be moved from Moscow if the Soviets did not withdraw their troops from Afghanistan. In agreeing to study the idea further, they referred to the strong opposition that had been voiced to such an action by the independent national Olympic committees who organize and run the games. On Jan. 22, British Prime Minister Margaret -Thatcher followed President Carter's lead and asked the country's National Olympic Committee not to take part in the games. The foreign ministers of nine European Common Market countries took up the issue of the Olympics boycott during a meeting in Brussels in early February. They warned that, unless the Soviet Union reduced international tensions, conditions would make it difficult for all other countries to take part in the summer games. They stopped short of an outright threat of a boycott, deciding to set a final joint policy on participation at a later meeting of the same group. There were reports of considerable disagreement among the leaders on whether boycotting the Olympics was a good idea or whether the nine governments could convince their athletes and national Olympic committees to go along with the boycott even if it became Common Market policy. West Germany and Britain appear to be the countries most solidly behind President Carter's initiative on the summer Olympic games. The British government expressed its position forcefully in the immediate wake of the IOC decision to go ahead as scheduled with the summer games in Moscow. It issued a statement on Feb. 13 repeating its support of President Carter's stand and .id it would convey its objections to participation in Moscow to the British Olympic Association before the latter group met to consider the matter on Mar. H. Also, the British government said that it would continue "to consult with the growing number of countries that share this view and will consider with them what options are open to us following this decision.“ 2he-§2ziet-Qmi2n For a period of 9 days following President Carter's threat of a boycott, the Soviet Union carefully avoided comment in an apparent decision to test world opinion. On Jan. 13, however, a top official of the Soviet Olympic organizing committee said that opponents to holding the summer games in Moscow "do not make honest, businesslike critical remarks but are attempting to use the present situation in the world for imposing the idea of boycotting the Moscow games. This'is not the first such attempt," he added. "All the previous attempts have flopped." His reference was to talks of a. Western lboycott of the 1980 games following a series of dissident trials in Moscow in 1978. Official Soviet spokesmen have stressed that a boycott is incompatible with the idea of the Olympics, and that any such move would surely put an end to the modern Olympic movement. Veiled threats have been made to the effect that a boycott by the United States of the Moscow games could open the door to retaliatory boycotts of the 198R summer Olympic games in Los Angeles. While the leaders and official media have sharply criticized President t ;ter for unwarranted injection of politics into the Olympics, they have made a point of not mentioning his Feb. 20 deadline. $he-2-ir§.Eerld CRS- 8 IB80011 UPDATE-O3/06/80 Host of the developing and nonaligned countries generally adopted a wait-and-see attitude toward the proposed boycott of the summer Olympics in Moscow. A notable exception was Saudi Arabia, which became the first country to withdraw formally from the games. The head of the kingdom's Olympic committee announced the decision on Jan. 6, explaining that the boycott was decided upon "in protest.over the Soviet aggression against the friendly and brotherly Hoslem nation of Afghanistan." Following President Carter's .statement on Jan. 20, setting the conditions and deadline to be met if the United States were to participate, -Egypt immediately agreed to join the United States. A number of other countries, including Turkey and Pakistan, V have expressed interest in a possible boycott if there is wide backing for such an idea among other countries. Foreign ministers from 35 Islamic nations met in Islamabad, Pakistan, in late January, and issued a sharp‘ denunciation of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. One part of the resolution passed by the conference members called on Muslim nations to consider “nonparticipation" in the summer Olympic games in Hoscow as a imeans of showing their displeasure. Eleven of the members present, however, lodged reservations, which had the effect of substantially weakening the impact of the resolution. The list of Third World countries which have announced their decision to boycott the summer Olympic games in uoscowi continued to grow during the months of January and February: Zaire, Kenya, Liberia, and Malaysia. To help muster Third world support for his boycott policy, President Carter enlisted the assistance of former world heavyweight boxing champion nuhammad Ali, who visited five black African countries in early February. I §;§:.2E§1ic 0913192 In the early stages of the debate over a U.S. boycott, news reports "were dominated by expressions of dismay and opposition from members of the U.S. ‘ Olympic Committee, as well as from a number of athletes interviewed. Since then, however, mounting evidence suggests that a large and increasing, number of Americans are in favor of a boycott or similar action that would demonstrate the unwillingness of the United States to go to the Hoscow games and carry on as if it were business as usual. Among strong advocates of ,a boycott are many well-known and respected editorial writers and political as well as sports columnists. The latter have been among the most fervent and unequivocal in their stand. A column, written by Red Smith, calling for the yimmediate U.S. withdrawal from the summer Olympics, was so crusading in spirit that the editors of the New York Times felt compelled to refuse to publish it. Hany writers compared the present situation to that which existed at the time of the 1936 summer Olympics. As Shirley Povich of the Washington Post explained: The 1936 Berlin Olympics were used by Hitler as a showpiece to glorify the Nazi party, with displays "that exceeded all previous pageantry. He had already invaded the Rhineland, was meddling in Spain, and had Austria and Czechoslovakia in mind. The Olympics were supposed to give him some kind of international dignity. And now, an years later, the Games are being given over to another totalitarian tyranny.... In a statement to the press on Jan. 18, Representative Clement J. Zablocki of the House Foreign Affairs Committee said that the Olympic issue had raised a groundswell of public support in favor of a U.S. boycott and that it would CRS- 9 IBBOO11 UPDATE*03/O6/80 be given "a high order of business" when Congress reconvened the following vcek. Public opinion polls have confirmed that a significant majority of rrericans support the President in his boycott initiative. An ABC News-Harris survey, released Jan. 22, indicated that 55% of the public favored a decision not to send U.S. athletes to the Olympic games in Hoscow, while 39% were opposed. «A subsequent poll conducted by the Washington Post during the last week in January showed that two out of three people (67%) .said the United States should boycott the Moscow games because of the Afghanistan invasion. L§§l§LA2lQ! when Congress reconvened on Jan. 22 for its new session, a large number of resolutions calling for relocation or boycott of the summer Olympic games were introduced. On Jan. 23, the House Foreign Affairs Committee held hearings on the issue, with testimony from USOC President Robert Kane and Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher. At the conclusion of the hearings, the committee approved, with only one dissenting vote, a resolution (H.Con.Res. 2&9) introduced by Chairman Clement T. Zablocki and 31 others. It called for the USOC to honor the request of the President that it propose to the IOC that the Hoscow games be shifted to an alternative site or be cancelled in repudiation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. If the IOC rejects the proposal, the resolution urges that the USOC and the Olympic committees of other countries not participate in the 1980 summer games and instead conduct alternative games of their own. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on Jan. 28 to consider a similar resolution (S.Con.Res. 70), introduced by Chairman Frank Church and others. ~At the end of the day's testimony, the committee voted unanimously to urge Americans not to participate in the summer Olympic games in aoscow. yThe following day the resolution was passed by the full Senate, 88 to 4. The House and Senate resolutions are nonbinding and contemplate no coercive action, such as passport restrictions to bar travel to Moscow by athletes or spectators. ' 0 QEBQEQLQGY OF EV§§$§ 03/04/80 - »The British Olympic Association made clear its intention to participate in the summer Olympic games in uoscow, although it postponed formal acceptance of the invitation for 3 weeks. 02/20/80 - State Department spokesmen announced that, since the deadline set by President Carter.a month earlier for withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan had passed unheeded, the United States definitely would not participate in the summer Olympic games in uoscow. 02/10/80 - »The USOC said that it would comply with President Carter's request not to send a team to the summer Olympic games in noscow, but added that it would take no formal action until April. 02/12/80 -— An hour after the IOC vote in Lake Placid, White House press secretary Jody Powell said: "Under the circumstances, neither the President, the Congress, nor the O2/O9/80 - 02/05/80 —- 02/O3/8O - O1/26/80 - CBS-10 IB80011 UPDATE-O3/O6/80 American people can support the sending of the United States team to Moscow this summer. The President urges the United States Olympic Committee to reach a prompt decision against sending teams to the games.“ The International Olympic Committee rejected the U.S. proposal that the summer Olympic games be moved from Moscow, postponed, or canceled in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, but indicated it might reconsider if a substantial number of countries decide not to send their athletes to Moscow. IOC session at Lake Vance forcefully In a speech formally opening the Placid, Secretary of State Cyrus presented the U.S. position that the summer games should be moved from Moscow, postponed, or canceled if Soviet troops were not removed from Afghanistan by Feb. 20. The nine European Common Market countries moved closer to President Carter's position on the Olympic boycott, warning the Soviet Union that it must reduce international tension and "Create conditions so that everyone can participate" in the summer Moscow games. At the request of President Carter, former world heavyweight boxing champion Muhammad Ali began a visit to five African nations (Tanzania, Kenya, Nigeria, Liberia, and Senegal) to enlist support for the U.S. boycott initiative. The Senate passed a resolution (88-4) urging that the United States boycott the summer Olympic games in Moscow unless they are moved to another location or postponed. The Senate resolution went beyond the House version in dropping any conditional language regarding a Soviet troop withdrawal by Feb. 20. As part of a resolution strongly condemning the Soviet "military aggression” against Afghanistan, the foreign ministers of 35 Islamic countries, meeting in Islamabad, Pakistan, called on Muslim nations to "envision" their "nonparticipation" in the summer Olympic games in Moscow. This element of the resolution was substantially weakened, however, by the fact that 11 countries lodged reservations. The executive board of the U.S. Olympic Committee voted unanimously to present to the International Olympic Committee President Carter's request that the Olympic games in Moscow be moved, postponed, or cancelled in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. O1/24/80 - The USOC deferred action on the President's further request that American athletes boycott the Moscow games unless Soviet troops are fully withdrawn from Afghanistan by Feb. 20. The House of Representatives strongly supported President Carter's boycott initiative by passing a 01/22/80 01/20/80 - 01/19/80 01/18/80 01/16/80 .01/14/80 CBS-11 IBBOO11 UPDATE-03/D6/80 resolution (386-12) favoring American withdrawal from the summer Olympic games in Hoscow, unless Soviet troops are withdrawn from Afghanistan within a month. The reported detention and exile of Andrei Sakharov, Nobel laureate, by Soviet authorities was deplored in a statement issued by a U.S. government spokesman. Western diplomatic sources said that the detention moves reinforce the views of those who are urging a boycott of the Hoscow Olympics. In several recent interviews, Sakharov had supported the boycott movement. President Carter asked the U.S. Olympic Committee to lead a worldwide effort to remove the summer Olympic games from Moscow unless the Soviet Union withdraws all of its troops from Afghanistan by Feb. 20. Declaring that "deeper issues are at stake" than the spirit and survival of the Olympics, the President called for an American boycott of the Moscow games if the International Olympic Committee refuses to move or postpone the event. The Republican National Committee, ending the winter meeting in Washington, D.C., passed a resolution saying U.S. participation in Hoscow "would tend to legitimize what the Soviet Union has done,“ and called upon the IOC to remove the games from Hoscow. Chairmen Frank Church of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Clement J. Zablocki of the House Foreign Affairs Committee both said, in comments to news reporters, that they would give high priority to resolutions calling for relocation or boycott of the noscow Olympics when Congress reconvenes. Secretary of State Vance and two senior level assistants met at the White House with U.S. Olympic Committee President Robert J. Kane and Executive Director F. Don Miller. The USOC officials requested the meeting to voice their objections to any boycott request by the Administration. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance said in an interview published in the New York Times that it was his view that the United States should not participate in Hoscow if the current situation prevails in Afghanistan ,and that, as a practical matter, a decision would have to be made by the middle of the next month. In an interview from his Dublin home, IOC president Lord Killanin said, "It would be physically impossible to move [the games] at this stage." In a separate statement he said, "Up to this date there are no sporting grounds for the IOC to withdraw the games from Moscow." He added, "We would remind that the games are for the athletes, not for the officials or the politicians.“ 01/13/80 - 01/11/80 “’ 01/10/80 01/08/80 01/07/80 01/06/80 CR5-12 IB80011 UPDATE-O3/06/80 In the Soviet Union's first response to calls for a boycott of the summer Olympic games, a top official of the Moscow organizing committee accused President Carter of "political black mail." Veiled threats of retaliatory boycotts of the 1984 summer games in- Los Angeles also were reported to have been made by senior sport officials. Prime Hinister Joe Clark of Canada said that his government "questions the appropriateness" of holding the Olympic games in Moscow and that he would take the lead in attempting to have them moved to another country. Speaking at a news conference, he said that he was prepared to consider a request from the International Olympic Committee to shift the games to Hontreal. State Department spokesman Hodding Carter said that the President viewed the possibility of a boycott as a "live and open question." He said that the United States traditionally has preferred to keep the games above politics but added that this was not an inflexible principle. "This attitude cannot be taken as a never-to-be-deviated-from precedent when unprecedented actions are taken," he stressed, referring to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In a television interview, Red Smith, columnist for the New York Times and one of the most admired sports writers in the country, said, "We ought to deliver the message to the Soviets that even if they withdraw troops from Afghanistan they have done something in the international scene we will not soon forget." He added, "I'd love to see America lead a world boycott." Vice President Walter Mondale said, while campaigning in Iowa, that the 1980 summer Olympics should be moved out of the Soviet Union because to hold the games in Hoscow would grant "legitimacy" to a country that has “committed an outrageous and_indecent act of aggression." ' ‘ The NCAA voted overwhelmingly to support President Carter if he should order U.S. athletes to boycott the Moscow Olympic games. David Sweet, president of Rhode Island University, sponsored the resolution. He said the Soviet Union‘s invasion of Afghanistan made it crucial for the United States to avoid participation in the worldwide sports spectacle. The 86-member executive board of the U-S. Olympic Committee voted to "resist political intrusion into the games," despite U.S. concern over Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia became the first country to withdraw formally from the 1980 Moscow Olympic games. The decision was announced by the head of the CR5-13 IB80011 UPDATE‘-03/06/80 Olympic committee, who explained the action was a “protest over the Soviet aggression against the friendly and brotherly Moslem nation of Afghanistan." 01/05/80 - In a telephone interview, Robert J. Kanes, president of the U.S. Olympic Committee, said that he was "a little bit shocked" by the President's warning of a possible boycott of the summer games. "I hate to see the games used as a ploy,“ he said, " and I don't favor the concept of an Olympic boycott.“ 01/OH/80 --President Carter, in announcing a series of punitive moves against the Soviet Union, warned that "continued aggressive actions" could jeopardize the participation of American athletes in the summer Olympics in Moscow this year, as well as travel to Moscow by American spectators. 01/02/80 ——-The executive director of the U.S. Olympic Committee, P. Don Hiller, issued a statement opposing the use of the Olympic movement for international politics. “It would appear to us," he explained, "that there are many other alternatives available to us ... to resolve this situation as opposed to utilizing the Olympic movement, which has been in existence for more than 80 years and has been a significant force in creating international amity and engendering goodwill among the youth of the world." -—-The Olympic boycott suggestion aired in the meeting of NATO representatives was quickly opposed by Lord Killanin, president of the International Olympic Committee, and the presidents of national Olympic committees in the United States and throughout Europe. They said they would fight any boycott move and emphasized that only their committees could decide who would participate in the games. 01/01/80 - In an emergency meeting of NATO representatives in Brussels, the question was raised as to whether the Western allies might want to withdraw from participating sin the Moscow Olympic games as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. West Germany's Ambassador to NATO, Rolf Pauls, raised the issue and then compared the current situation to that which existed before the 1936 Olympic games in Berlin. Since the end of world War II, numerous countries have boycotted or threatened to boycott the Olympic games. _ Listed below in reverse chronological order are the eight summer Olympic games held between 1908 rand 1976, along with a brief description of boycotts and related incidents. 1976, flontreal -- The Republic of China (Taiwan) did not participate in the Montreal games because the Canadian government refused to issue visas to its athletes as representatives of the Republic of China. Canada said that they would be admitted only as representatives of Taiwan. The People's cns-1a I38 001 1 upnarn-03/05/no Republic of China ended its longstanding boycott and competed in the games. The African states that were members of the Organization of African "Unity boycotted the Olympics because the IOC rejected their demands that New Zealand be barred for having sent a rugby team to play in South Africa in 1976. Bans against South Africa and Rhodesia remained in effect. .1972, Munich -- Rhodesia was barred from the Olympic games after ' many black African countries threatened a boycott unless such action was taken. The ban against South Africa was retained as well. The People's Republic of China continued its boycott of the "games because of disagreement over the Republic of China's participation. i 1968, Mexico City ~— Shortly before the games, the International Olympic Committee decided to lift its ban against South Africa. However, it was reinstated after almost all the black African states as well as many others, including the Soviet Union, threatened to boycott the games if the decision were not reversed. The ?eople's Republic of China continued its boycott of the Olympics over the issue of Taiwan's participation. 196R, Tokyo -— South Africa was barred from participating in the ~i games because of its apartheid policy, which was viewed by the IOC as a violation of its rules. An indirect threat had been made by black African nations to boycott the games if such action were not taken. Indonesia and North Korea both boycotted the Olympics when some of their athletes were barred for having participated in earlier contests sponsored by GANEFOR (Games of the New Emerging Forces), an organization that had been created for political and ideological reasons. The People's Republic of China again continued its boycott of the games. 1960, Rome - The People's Republic of China continued its boycott of'the games for the same reason as in 1956. Although the IOC decided that "the Taiwan committee could be recognized as the Olympic Committee of the Republic of China,” it required that its ahtletes must compete "solely under the name of Taiwan (Formosa)." 1956, Melbourne -- The People's Republic of China did not participate I in the games because the IOC refused to bar participation by the Republic of China (Taiwan). The Netherlands, Spain, and Switzerland withdrew from the games in protest against the Soviet Union's invasion of Hungary. Switzerland reconsidered its decision, but could not transport its athletes to Melbourne in time and, therefore, did not participate. Lebanon and Iraq also withdrew 1952, Helsinki - 19u8, London cns-15 IB8oo11 from the games in protest against the invasion of Egypt, which itself had pulled out of the games earlier for financial reasons. The.Rationalist Chinese (Taiwan) decided to boycott the games because the IOC had recognized two Chinese Olympic committees, one from the People's Republic of China and one from the Republic of China (Taiwan). The athletes from . the ?eople's Republic of China arrived at Helsinki too late to participate in the games. Arab countries threatened to withdraw from the Olympics if Israel were permitted to participate in the games. The IOC declared Israel ineligible on a technicality. According to its reasoning, the Palestine Olympic Committee, which earlier had been invited to participate, had changed its name to the Israeli Olympic Committee when that country declared its independence. Since the Palestine committee no longer existed and since Israel had not applied for recognition, it was declared ineligible. UPDATE-O3/06/80