SPEECH OF THE :a3@@iecl,t11ipposcsttlie necepslitylpf rea mcr iem W1 1 res ec . n we 1l‘S ace, 1 ma sa‘ e e deniedfthat the stoclctldf the Bank is any) more valu)hbl.e ted to- reigners thanour own citizens, or an object of greater desire to them, except _in sofar as capital may be more abundant in the foreign country, and therefore its owners more in want of ‘oppor- tunity of investment. The foreign stockliolder enjoys no es.ernp- tion from taxation. He is, of course, taxed by his own govern- ment for his incomes, derived from this as well as other proper- ty; and this is a full answer to the Whole staternent. But it Inlay be added, -in the second place, that it is not the practiceof c1v1- lized states to tax the property of foreigners under such C1I‘Cum- stances. Do we tax, or did we ever tax, the foreign holders of our public debt? Does Pennsylvania, New York, or Ohio, tax. . the foreign holders of stock: in the loans contracted by either of these states? Certainly not. ‘Sir, I must confess, I had little expected to see, on such an occasion as the present, a lab_oure_d and repeated attempt to produce an impression on thepublic opp- nion, unfavourable to the Bank, from the circumstance that fo- 12 reigners are among its stockholders. I have no hesitation in saying that I deem such a. strain of remark as the message con- tains, on this point, coming from the President of the United States to be injurious to the credit and character of the country abroad; because it manifests a jealousy, a lurking disposition not to respect the property of foreigners, invited hither by our own -laws. And,sir, what is its tendency but to excite this jealousy and create groundless prejudices? From the commencement of the government it has been thought desirable to invite, rather than to repel, the introduction of foreign capital. Our stocks have all been open to foreign subscriptions; and the state banks in likermanner are free to foreign ownership. Whatever State has created a debt, has been willing that foreign- ers should become purchasers, and desirous of it. How long is ' it, sir, since Congress itself passed a law vesting new powers in the President of the United States over the cities in this district, for the very purpose of increasing their credit abroad, the better to enable them to borrow money to pay their subscriptions to the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal? It is easy to say that there is dan- ger to liberty, danger to independence, in a bank open to foreign stockholders--—--because it is easy to say any thing. But neither reason not experience proves any such danger. The foreign stockholder cannot be a director. He has no voice even in the choice of directors. His money is placed entirely in the ma- nagement of the directors appointed by the President and Senate, and by the American stockholders. So far as there is depend- ence,~or‘ -influence, either way, it is to the disadvantage of the foreign stockholder. He has parted with the control over his own property, instead of exercising control over the property or over the actions of others. And, sir, let it now be added, in further answer to this whole class of objections, that experience has abundantly confuted them all. This government has existed forty-three years, and has maintained, in full being and operation, a Bank, such as is now proposed to be renewed, for thirty-six years out of the forty-three. We have never for a moment had ‘a Bank not subject to every one of these objections. Always, foreigners might be stockholders; always, foreign stock has been exempt from state taxation, as‘ much as at present; always the same power. and privileges; always all that which is now called a “ monopoly,” la “ gratuity,” a “ present,” has been possessed by the Bank. And yet there has been found no danger to liberty, no introduction of foreign influence, and no accumulation of irre- sponsible power in a few hands. I cannot but hope, therefore, imthat the people of the United States will not now yield up their judlgmenlt; to those notions, which would reverse all our past ex- perience,and persuade us to discontinue a 'useful‘institution', from the influence of vague and unfounded declamation against its danger to the public liberties. Our liberties, indeed, must 13 stand upon very frail foundations, if the government cannot, without endangeringthem, avail itself of those common facilities, in the collection of its revenues, and the management of its finances, which all other governments, in commercial countries, find useful and necessary. In order to justify its alarm for the security of our independence, the message supposes a case. It supposes that the Bank should pass principally into the hands of the subjects of a foreign country, and that we should be involved in war with that country, and then it exclaims, “ what would be our condition!” Why, sir, it is plain that all the advantages would be on our side. The Bank would still be our institution, subject to our own laws, and all its directors elected by ourselves: and our means would be enlianced, not byrthe confiscation and plunder, but by the proper use of the foreign capital in our hands. And, sir, it is singular enough, that this very state of war, from which this argument against a Bank is drawn, is the very thing which, more than all others, convinced the country and the government of thenecessity of a National Bank. So much was the want of such an institution felt, in the late war, that the sub- ject engaged the attention of Congress, constantly, from the declaration of that war down to the time when the existing Bank was actually established; so that, in this respect, as well as in others, the argument of the message is directly opposed to the whole experience of the government, and to the general, and long settled convictions of‘ the country. I now proceed, Sir, to a few remarks upon the President’s , Constitutional objections to the Bank; and I cannot forbear to say, in regard‘ to ttheni, that heltttappears to ‘mete have assutmed very extraordinary grounds of reasoning.“ He denies, that the constitutionality of the Bank, is a settled question. If it be not, will it ever become so, or what disputed question ever can be settled? I have already observed, that for thirty-six years, out of the forty-three, during which the Government has been in be» ing, a BANK has texisted, such as is now proposed to be con- tinued; I it ‘ I it “ I I i As early as 1791, after great deliberation, the first Banks Charter was passed by Congress and approved" by President Wasliington. It established an Institution, resembling in all things, now objectedto, the present Bank. That Bank, like this, could take landsin payment of its debts; that charter, like the present, gave the states no power of taxation; it allow- ed foreigners to hold stock, it restrained Congress from creating other Banks. It gave also, exclusive privileges, and in all par- ticulars it was, according to the doctrine of the message, as ob- jectionable as that now existing. That Bank continued twenty) . years. In 1816, the present Institution was established, and asbeen, ever since, in full operation. Now, Sir, the question’ of the power of Congress to create such institutions, has been 14 contested in every manner known to our Constitution and Laws. The forms of the government furnish no new mode, in which to try this question. It has been discussed over and over again, in Congress; it has been argued and solemnly adjudged in the Supreme Court; every President, except the present, has considered it asettled question; many of the State Legis- latures have instructed their Senators to vote for the Bank 5 the tribunals of the States, in every instance have supported its constitutionality; and beyond all doubt and dispute, the general public opinion of the country, has at all times given, and does now give, its full sanction and approbation to the exercise of this power, as being a constitutional power. There has beenno opinion, questioning the power, expressed or intimated, atany time, by either House of Congress, by any President, or by any respectable judicial tribunal. Now, Sir, if this practice of near forty years, if these repeated exercises of the power, if this solemn adjudication of the Supreme Court, with the concurrence and approbation of public opinion, do not settle the question, how is any question ever to be settled, about which any one may choose to raise a doubt? The argument of the message, up- on the Congressional precedents, is- either a bold and gross fal«- lacy, or else it is an assertion without proofs, and against known facts. The message admits, that in 1791, Congress decided in favour of a Bank; but it adds that another Congress, in 1811, decided against it. Now, if it he meant that in 1811, Con»- gress decided against the Bank on Constitutional grozmcl, then the assertion is wholly incorrect, and against notorious fact. , It is perfectly well known, that many members, in both Houses, vo- ted against the Banlt, in 1811, who had no doubt at all of the constitutional power of Congress. 1 They were entirely governed by other reasons given at the, time. I appeal, Sir, to the Hon. member from Maryland, (Gen Smith) who was then a member of the Senate, and voted against the Bank, whether he, and others, who were on the same side, did not give those votes on other well known grounds, and not at all on the constitutional ground? , [Gen. Smith, here rose and said, that he voted against the Bank in 11811, but not at all on constitutional grounds, and had no doubt such was the case with other members.] 1 S We all know, sir, (continued Mr. Webste1') the fact to be as the gentleman from Maryland has stated it. Every man who recol- lects, or who has read, the political occurrences of that day, knows it. Therefore, if the message intends to say, that in 1811,1Congress denied the existence of any such constétutiona.l power, the declaration is 1 unwarranted-—--is altogether at variance with the facts. If, on the other hand, it only intends to say, that Congress decided. against the proposition then before it, on some other grounds, then, it alleges that which is nothing at all to the purpose. The _argument, then, either assumes for truth that which is not true, or else, the whole statement is immaterial and futile. 15 But whatever value others may attach to this argument, the mes- sage thinks so highly of it, that it proceeds to repeat it. “ One Congress,” it says, “ in 1815 decided against a. Bank, another in 1816 decided in its favour. There is nothing in precedent, therefore, which if its authority were admitted, ought to weigh in favour of the act before me.’’_ Now, sir, since it is known to the whole country, one cannot but wonder how it should remain unknown to the President, that Congress did not decide against a Bank in 1815. On the contrary, that very Congress passed a bill for erecting a Bank by very large majorities. In one form, it is true, the bill failed in the House of Representatives; but the vote Was reconsidered, the hill recommitted, and finally passed by a vote of one hzmclrecl and twenty to tlti9'ty-nine. There is, therefore, not only no solid vgrounldjbut"inot'"ev‘eni any plausible pretence, for the assertion that Congress in 1815 decided against the Bank. That very Congress passed a bill to create a Bank, and its decision, therefore, is precisely the other way, and is a direct practical precedent in favour of the constitutional power. iWhat are we to think of a constitutional argument which deals, in this way, withahistorical facts’! When the message declares, as it does declare, that there is nothing in precedent which ought to weigh in favour of the power, it sets at nought repeated acts of Congress aflirrning the power, and it also states other acts, which were in fact, and which are well known to have been directly the reverse, of what the message represents them. There is not, sir, the slightest reason to think that any Senate or any House of Representatives everassernbled under the constitution, icontai=n:edaf majoritythatdoubted the constitutional existence of the power of Congress to establish“aIBanlr. , gWheneveirUthei ques- tion has arisen, and has been decided, ithas bcenalways decided one way. The legislative precedents all assert and maintain the power; and these legislative precedents have been the law of the land for almost forty years. They settle the construc- tion of the constitution, and sanction the exercise of tlrerpower in question so far as these ends can everbe acconiplishecly by any legislative precedents whatever. But the President does not admit the authority of precedent. Sir, I have always found, that those who habitually deny most vehemently the general force of precedent, and assert most strongly the supremacy of private opinion, are yet, of allmen, most tenacious of that very authority of precedentwlienever it happens to be in their favour. I beg leave to ask, sir, upon what ground, except that,of precedent, and.” precedent alone, the President’s friends have placed his power of removal from ofiice? No such power is given by the constitution, , in terms, nor any where intimated, throughout the whole of it; 1 no paragraph or clause of that instrument recognizes such .a power. To say the least, it is as questionable, and has been as Oftengquestioned, as the power of Congress. to create -‘.1 Bank; and 16 ‘enlightened by what haspassed underour own observation, we now see that it is of all powers the most capable of flagrant abuse. Now, sir, I ask again, What becomes of this power, if the autho- rity of precedent be taken away’! It has all along been denied to exist, it is nowhere found in the constitution, and its recent eX- ercise, or to call things by their right names, its recent abuse, has more than any other singletcause, rendered good men either cool in their affections toward the government of their country, or doubtful of its long continuance. Yet this power has’ prece- dent, and the President exercises it. We know, sir, that without the aid of that precedent, hisacts could never have received the sanction of this body, even at a time when his voice was some- what more potential here than it now is,*or, as Itrust, ever again will be. Does the President then reject the authority of all pre- cedent except what it is suitable to his own purposes to use’! And does he use, without stint or measure, all precedents which may augment his own power, or gratify his wishes’! But, if the President thinks lightly of the authority of Congress, in con- struing the constitution, he thinks still more lightly of the autho- rity of the Supreme Court. He ‘asserts a right of individual judgment, on constitutional questions, which is totally inconsist-= ent with any proper administration of the government, or any regular execution of the laws. Social disorder, entire uncertainty in regard to individual rights and individual duties, the cessation of legal authority, confusion, the dissolution of free governmentlme all these, are the inevitable conseqiuence~s.,,»of the principles adopted by the ymessagepwheinever they shall be carried to their full extent." Hitherto, it has been thought that the final decision of constitutional questions, belonged to the supreme judicial tribunal. The very nature of free government,‘it‘has been supposed, en}- joiins this; andour ‘constitution, moreover, has been understood so to provide, clearly andrexpressly. It is true, that each branch of the legislatureihas an undoubted right, in the exercise of its func- tions, to consider the constitutionality of a law proposed to be passed. This is naturally a part of its duty, and neither branch can be compelled to pass any law, or do any other act, which it deoerns to be beyond the reach of its constitutional power. The ; Presidentphas the same right, when a bill is presented for his approval; for he is doubtless, bound to consider, in all cases, whether such bill be compatible with the constitution, and whem ther he can. approve it consistently with his oath of ofiice. But when a law has been ‘passed by Congress, and approved bythe President, it isnow no longer in the power, either of thesame President, or his successors, to say whether the law is constitu- t tional"jorWnot. He is not at liberty to disregard it; he is not at liberty ~t‘o,ii‘3e‘e‘l,yor to afiiect “constitutional scruples,” and to sit in judgrnent himself on the validity. of a statute of the govern- "ment, and to fit, if he so chooses. After a law has passed 17 through all the requisite forms; after it has received the requisite legislative sanction and the executive approval, the question— of its constitutionality then becomes a judicial question, and a judicial question alone. ‘In the Courts that question may be raised, argued, and adjudged; it can be adjudged no where e1se.; , T The President is as much bound by the law as any private citizen, and can no more contest its validity than any private citizen. He may refuse to obey the law, and so may a private citizen; but both do it at their own peril, and neither of them can settle the question A of its validity. The ‘President may say a law is unconstitutional, but he is not the judge. Who is to decide that question? The Judiciary, alone, possessthis unquestionable, and liitherto ufnquiestiofnetdt‘ right. , 'f]§f1,;;e_, Judi. ciary is the constitutional tribunal of appeal, for the citizens, against both Congress and the Executive, in regard to the con- stitutionality of laws. It has this jurisdiction‘ expressly conferred upon it, and when it has decided the question, its judgment tlnl-15-in‘ from-the very nature of all judgments that are final and from _which there is no appeal, be conclusive. Hitherto, this opinion, and a correspondent practice, have prevailed, in America, with all wise and considerate , men. If it were otherwise, there would be no government of laws; but vveshould all live under the government, the rule, the caprices of individuals. If We depart from the observance of these, salutary principles, the executive power becomes at once purely despotic; for the Presi- dent, if the principle and the reasoning of the message be sound, may eitherrigetxeoutei ;t;n-at t;ene.cute, the laws of the land, accord- ing to his sovereign pleasure. Herman, refuse ,to,,;pm;,into execu. tion one law, pronounced valid by all branches of the govern- ment, and yet execute another, which may have been by constitutional authority pronounced void. On the argument of the message, the President of the United States holds, under a new pretence, and a ‘new name, a clirsperzsing power over the laws, as absolute as was claimed by James the Second of England a month before he was compelled to fly the kingdom. That which is now claimed for the ,President, is, in truth, nothing less, and nothing else, than the old .dispensing power asserted by the kings of England in the Worst of times—:-the very climax, indeed, of all the preposterous pretensions of the Tudor and the Stuart races. According to the doctrines put forth. by the President, although Congress may have passed at law, and although the Supreme Court may have pronounced it constitutional, yet, it is, neverthe- less, no law at all, if he, in his good pleasure, sees fit to deny it effect; in other vvords to repeal and annul it. Sir, no President, and no public man ever before advanced. suchdoctrines inthe face. of the nation. C There never before was a moment in which any President would have been tolerated in asserting such a claim to despotic power. After Congress has passed the law, and after 3 , 18 the Supreme Court has pronounced its judgment, on the very point in controversy, the President has set up his own private judgment against itsconstitutional interpretation. It is to be remembered, sir, that it is the present law, it isthe act of 1816, it is the present charter of the Bank, which the President~pro- nounces to be unconstitutional. It is no Bank tobe created, it is no law proposed to be passed, which he denounces; it is the law now misting, passed by Congress, approved by President Madison, and sanctioned by a solemn judgment of the Supreme Court, which he now declares unconstitutional, and which, of course, so far as it may depend‘ on him, cannot be executed. If these opinions of the President’s” be maintained, there is an end of all law and all judicial authority. Statutes are but recom— mendations, judgments no more than opinions. Both are equally destitute of binding force. Such an universal power, as is now claimed for him, a power of judging over the laws, and over the decisions of the tribunal, is nothing else than pure despotism. If conceded to him it makes him, at once, what Louis the Four- teenth proclaimed himself to be, when he said “ IAM THE swarm.” . The Supreme Court has unanimously declared and adjudged that the existing Banlt is created by a constitutional law of Con- gress. As has been beforeobserved, this Bank, so far as the present question is concerned, is like that which was established in 17 91, by Washington, and sanctioned by the great men of that day. In every form, therefore, in which the question can be raised, it has been raised, andhas irbieei1lsettl'ed. S Every process and every mode ofvutrial, known to the constitution and laws, has been exhausted; and always,and without exception, the decision has been in favour of the validity of thelaw. ‘But all this practice, all tliisrprecedent, all thispublio approbation, all this solemn adjudication directly on the point, is to be dis- regarded, and rejected, and the constitutional power flatly denied. And, sir,iif we are startled at this conclusion, our surprise will not be lessened when we examine the argument by which it is maintained. By the constitution, Congress isauthorised to pass all laws “necessary and proper” for carrying its own legislative powers into efiect. Congress has deemed a Bank to be “ necessaryland proper” for these purposes, and it has therefore established a Bank. But although the law has been passed and the Bank established, and the constitutional validity of its charter solemnly adjudged, yet, the President pronounces it ‘unconstitutional, be‘- vcausesome of the powers bestowed on the Bank are, in Iris opinion, not neceyssary or proper. It would appear, that powers, which in 1791, and in 1816, in the time of Washington, and in the time of Madison,were deemed “ necessary and proper,” are no longer to be so regarded, and therefore the Bank is unconstitutional. It has really comel tothis, that the constitutionality of c Bank is 19 to depend upon the opinion which one particular man may form of the utility or necessity of some of the clauses in its charter. If that individual chooses to think that a particular power con- tained in the charter is not necessary to the proper constitution of the Bank, then the act is unconstitutional! i Hitherto it has always been supposed that the question was of a very different nature. It has been thought that the policy of granting a particular charter may be materially dependant on the structure, and organization, and powers of the proposed institu- tion. .But its general constitutionality has never before been understood to turn on such points. This would be making its constitutionality depend on subordinate questions, on questions of expediency, and questions of detail; upon‘ that which one man may think necessary, and another may not. i If the constitutional question were made to hinge on matters of this kind, how could it ever be decided’! all would depend on conjecture, on the com» plexional feeling, on the prejudices, on the passions of individuals; on more or less practical skill, or correct judgment, in regard to banking operations, among those who should be the judges; on the impulse of momentary interests, party objects, or personal purposes. Put the question, in this manner, to a court of seven judges, to; decide whether a particular. bank was constitutional, and it might be doubtful whetherthey could come to any result, as they might well hold very various opinions on the practical utility of many clauses of the charter. V t » The question, in that case would be, not whether the Bank, inits genera+I»:it«=i:ti a