SPEECH

 R. ‘WEB ST E B.»
21% THE smzsfiwrm, A  _

EN REPLY we MR. CALHOUN’S SI.’I:‘.EU1~I,

501%’ THEE-3 BILL


“ F‘urt.l1er to Prmvifle for tlué Collection of Dnnticza on ;»E,;,!i!.‘Xl}i¢I1?l«“'Ui»93
‘Wk’, 9.‘ ‘

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. M.-_ ,'

Defiliverecl on the 16th of'1"eb1'u‘.~.1'}*, ii"-£3f:'§.

WASHINGWJN;

pn1i¥;TEn‘1n* GALES vmm s:=:A"r0N.

 

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srnnon.

On the 531st of January, 1833, Mr. VVILKINS, Chairmanof the J u-
aiiciary Committeie, introduced the bill further to provide for the col-
lection of duties. p G H to * '

On the 9nd day of the same, month, Mr. CALHOUN submitted the
following resolutions:

“ Resoloecl, That the people of the several States composing these United
‘States are united as parties to a constitutional compact, towhich the people
of each State acceded as a separate sovereign community, each binding itself
‘by its own pai-ticulari ratification; andthat the union, of which the said com-
gpaotliis the bond, isa union between the States ratifying the same. -

' *"“‘ ;Resolved, That the people of the several States, thus united by the con-
stitutional compact, in forming that instrument, and in creating a General (30-
vernment to carry into eii"e'ct the objects for which they were formed, delega-
ted to that ‘Government, for that purpose, certain definite powers, to be exer-

. cised jointly, reserving at the same time, each State to itself, the residuary
mass of powers, to be exercised by its own separate Government; and that
whenever the General‘ Governtnentassumes the exercise of powers not clele-i
gated by the compact, its acts are unauthorizecl, and are of no effect; and that
the same Government is not made the final judge of the powers delegated to
it, sincejthat would make its disc1~etion,,,;,1__11d not the constitution, the measure
of its powers; but that, as in all other caseswof compact among sovereign parties,
without any common judge, each has anequal right to judge for itself, as Well
of‘ the infraction as of the mode and measure of redress.

“Resolved, That the assertions that the people of these United States,
taken collectively as individuals, are now, or ever have been, united on the prin-
ciple of the social compact, and as such are now formed into one nation or peo-
ple, or that they have ever been so united in any one stage of their political exist-
enoe; that the people of the several States composing the Union have not, as
members thereof; retained their sovereignty; that the allegiance of their citi-

‘ zens has been transferred to the General Government; that. they have parted
‘With the right of punishing treason through their respective State Governments;
and that they have not the right of judging in the last resort as to the ex-
tent of the powers reserved, and of consequence of those delegated; are not
only without foundation in truth, but are contrary to the most certain and plain
historical facts, and the clearest deductions of reason; and that all exercise of
power on the partiof the General Gorernjment, or any ofiits dep'artrnents,
claiming tauthority from such erroneous assumptions, must of nccessity,b~e..1m-

- *¥ionstitutional—-éeniust}tend,idirectly and ‘inevitably, to subvert the”sover¢jg~ntyf

of the States,_ to destroy the federal; character ofthe Union, andto rear on its
ruinsa consolidated Government, a without constitutional check or limitation,

and which must necessarily terminate in the loss of liberty itself.”
On Saturday, the 16th of February, Mr. Carlnoonspoke in opposi-
tion_totheibi1l. ‘ ‘ t i j i l ‘
Mr. ‘nnisujnn fhllowecl him-

4

The gentleman from South Carolina, said Mr. VVr.nsTr:n, has ad»
monished us to be mindful of the opinions of those who shall come
after -us. We must take our chance, sir, as to theilight in which pos-
terity will regard us. I do not ‘decline its judgment,nor withhold
myself from its scrutiny. Feeling that I am performing my public

duty with singleness of heart, and to the best of my ability, I fear- I

lessly trust myself to the country,_now and hereafter, and leave both
my motives and my character to its decision.

The gentleman -has terminated his -speech in a tone of threat and
defiance towards this bill, even should it become a law of “the land,
altogether unusual in the halls of Congress. But I shall not sutfer
myself togbei    his denunciation of the mea-
sure which I support. Among the feelings which at this moment
fill my breast, not theleast is that of regret at the position in which
the gentleman has placedhiinself. Sir, he does himself no jus-

 

tice. The cause which he has espoused finds no basis in the consti-

tution, no succor from public sympathy, no cheering from a patriotic
community. He has no foothold on which to stand, while he might
display the powers~ot'.his acknowledged talents. Every thing beneath
his feet‘ ishollowand trcacheropus; I He is like a stronginan strug-
gling in amorassg every eflbrt to extricate himself, only sinks him

, deeper and deeper. And I fear the resemblance may be carried still

further; I fear that no friend can safely. come to his relief, that no one
can approach near enough to hold out a helping hand, without danger
of going down himself, also, intoptlie bottomless depths of this Serbo—
nian bog. V _  I
The honorable gentleman has declared that on the decision of the
question, now indebate, may depend the cause of liberty itself. I am
of the same opinion; but then, sir, the liberty which I think is staked
on the contest, is not political liberty, in any general and undefined
character, butour own, well understood, and long‘ enjoyed .flmerz'can
liberty. " p I
Sir, I love libertypno less ardently than the gentleman, in whatever
form she may have appeared in the progress of human history.  as
exhibited inthe master States»ofrantiqupityg tasoétbreaking out again
from amid st the I darkriidisis of the middleii if ages,   the

formation of new communities, in modern Euro-pe, she has, always and ‘

every where, charms for n1e.l~V Yet, sir, it is our own liberty, guarded

I byconstitutions and secured by union; it is that liberty which is our

paternal inheritance, it is our established, dear bought, peculiar Ameri-
can liberty to which I am chiefly devoted, and the cause of whichl
now mean, to? the utmost ofmyipowel-, to maintain and defend.  .

Mr. President, if I considered the constitutional questilorntr*nbtv before I

us as doubtful as it is important, and if I supposed that its .decision,
either in the Senate or by the country, was likely to be in any tlegree

5

iuntiuenced by the manner in which I might now discuss it, this would
be to me a moment oftdeepl solicitude. ‘Such a moment has once
existed. There has been a time, when, rising in this place, on the same
question, I felt,  must confess, that something»for good or evil to the
ioonstitutionof the country might dependon an effort of mine. But
ci1*cu1nsta*nhes are changed. Since that day, sir, the public opinion
has become awakened to this great .question; it has grasped it, it has
reasoned upon it, as becomes an intelligent and patriotic community,
and has settled it, or now seems in the progress ef settling‘, it, by an
authority which none can disobeyw--the authority of the people them-
selves.‘   W »  ,

I shall not, Mr. President, follow thelgentleman, step by step,

" through the course of his speech. Much of what he has said, he has

deemed necessary to the just explanation and defence of his own po-
litical character and conduct. On this, [shall olferno comment.

Much, too, has consisted of philosophical remark upon the_general»

nature of political liberty, andthe history of “free institutions; and of
other topics, so general in their nature, as to possess, in my opinion,
only a remote bearing on the immediate subject of this debate;

But the gentleman’s speech, made some days ago, upon introducing
-his resolutions, those resolutions themselves, and parts of the speech
now just concluded, may probably be justly re,garded as containing
the whole South Carolina doctrine. That doctrine it is my purpose
now to exami.ne,?and to compare it with the constitution of the United
States. t I shall not consent, sir, to piakewany new constitution, or to
establisli another form of Gove1'nme1Tt. ‘I will not undertake td say
what a constitution for these United States ought to be. That ques~t
tion the people have decided for themselves, and I shall take the in-
strument as they have established it,‘aud shall endeavor to maintain

-it, in its plain sense and meaning, against opinions and notions which,

in myrjutlgment, threaten its subversion. i

The resolutions introduced by the geiitleman. wereapparently
drawn up withrcare, and “brought forward‘ upon deliberation. I
shall not be in danger, therefore, of misunderstanding him, or those
who as-gree with him, if I proceed at once to these resolutions, and

consider them asan authentic statement of those opinions, upon the A‘

great constitutionai question, by -which the recent proceedings in

Souttli Carolina are attetnptetldto be justified. t i t *

These resolutionsarethree inrnumber. ‘ - ~ i t

l  third seems intended to enumerate, iandrto deny, the several t
opinions expressed in the President’s proclamation, respecting the  

nature and powers of this Government. , this third resolution, I
propose, at present, to takeno particular notice. J t t  i

The two first resolutions of the honorable member aliirmrthese
propositions, viz. ‘ A r i    T

6

I. That the political system,und‘er which we live, and under iwhich
Gongress is now assembled, is a compact, to which*tl1e~ people of the

. several States, as separate‘ and sovereign communities, are the parties.

2. That these sovereign parties have at right to judge,.each for itself,
of any alleged violation of the constimtion by Congress; and, in case
of such violation, to choose, each for itself, its own mode and measure
of redress. , p ,

It is true, sir, that the honorable member calls this a ‘i‘ constituv
tz'onaZ” compact; but still he aflirms it to be a compact between so——
vereign States. Whati precise meaning, then, does he attach to the
term co,nst_itut'ionc_zl?.._.» laen_,ap~plied toicompacts between sovereign;
States, the term constitution-all affi-ices to that word compact no definite-
idea. "Were we to hear of a constitutioizal league or treaty between;
England and France, or a constitutional convention between Austria
and Russia, we should not u~nderst_a.nd what could b.e intended by such;
a league, such a treaty, or such a convention. In these connexioxis,
the word is voidof all meaning; and ‘yet, sir, itis easy, quite easy, to-
see why the honorable gentleman has usedit in these resolutions. He;
cannot open thebook, and look. upon our written frame of Grovernm.ent,.
without seeing that it is called a con.stt’mt'ion. This may well be appal-
ling to lfxim. It threatens. his whole doctrine of compact,. and iis dar-
ling derivatives, nullificction and secessiom. with instant confutation.
Because, if he admits our instrument of Government to be a constitm
tion, then, for that very 1*eason:,,it is not a compact between sove-
reigns; aconstitution of Government, and a ic'0m-pact between so-ve-l
reign Powers, being things esse'ntial:ly unlike in their very n-at'u~res,.
and incapable of ever being the same. Yet the word constitution is,
on the very frontof the instrument. He cannot overlook it. He seeks,
therefore, to compromise the matter, and to sink. all _the substantial

~ sense of the Word, while he retains a resemblance of its sound. Hey

introduces a new word of his own, viz. compact, as importing the-.

principal idea, and designed to play the. principal part, and degrades. ~

constitution into an “insignificant, idle epithet, attached t_o,;confzpoct..
The whole then stands. as a E‘; co~2i3tilu£io12al;,co'mpact.!”‘ Amid in this

way he hopes toilpass ca‘ a plausible gloss, asiisatisfyingftihe’ wordstiof ,

the instrument; but he will find himself disappointed. Sir, I must.
say to the honorable gentleman, that, in our American political gram-«
mar, CONSTITUTION is a noun substantive; it imports a distinct and
clear idea, of itself; and itfikis not to lose its importance and dignity,
it is not to be turned intoa poor, anibiguons, senseless, unmeamng
adjective, for the purpose of accommodating any new set of political
notions. Sir, we reject his new rules of syntax altogether. VV'e will
not give up our forms of political speech .to the grammarians of the
school of nullification. By the constitution, we mean not a “ iCl0?’2..Si‘f'I.-

rational compact,” but, simply and directly, the coizsiiitnion, the fun-.~.

7

l idarnental law‘; and if there be one word in the ilangn-"age, which the

people of the United States understand, this is that word. VVe know
no more of a ‘constitutional! compact between sovereign Powers, than
we know of a constitutional -in-denture of copartnershipi, a constitzo
ézional deed olfrconv-eyance, oria .constz'Zzztio;naZ bill of exchange. But
we know what the constitution is; we t-know what the plainly written
fundamental flaw is; we know ~what‘«the hood of our Union and the
rsecurity of our l-ibeerties is; and weanevan to maintain and to defend
it, in its plain sense and unsophisticated meaning. l

The sense of the .gentleman’s -proposition, therefore, is not at all
~*a'fi"ected., one way -or the ot—.he'r, by the use‘ of this word. That propo-
sition still is, that our system of Government is -but a -compact between
{he people of separate and sovereign Estates.

Was it Mirabeau, Mr. President, or what other master of the
iiiuinan-passions, who has told us that words are things? They are
=-°in‘deed‘i»thifl’gS, and tl1ingS‘Of~ mighty influence, notonlyin addresses
{to the passionsland liigh-iwrrought feelings of mankind, but in the dis-
cussion of legal and political questions also; becausea just conclusion
is often avoided, or a false one reached, by the adroit substitution of
«one iphrase, or one word, for another. Of this we have, I think,
ranothier example in the resolutions before us. ‘

The fiI‘St. resolution declares that the people of the several States
“i‘ occede,d’i’ to the constitution, or to the constitutional compact, as it
is called. This word “ accede,” not found either in the constitution
itself,o’r in the ratification of it by any one of the States, has been
chosen for use here, doubtless not without a well considered purpose.

The natural converse of accession is secession; and, therefore,
'-when it is stated that the people of the States acceded to the Union,

it may be more plausibly argued that they may secede from it. I f, in i

adopting the constitution, nothing was done but acceding to a com-
  pact, nothing would seem necessary, in order to break it up, but ‘to
"secede from the same eompact._ i But the term is wholly outof place.
.dccession,as a word applied to political associ_ations, implies coming
into aleague, treaty, or confederacy, by one hithertoia stranger to it;
and secession implies departing from -such league or con-federacy.
The people of the United States” have used no such form of expres-
j’s'1_on,«in1 establishing the present Government. Theyydo not.say that
they accede to a ,,league, but they declare that they ordain and i establish
a constitution. Such are the very words of the instrument itself; and

in allthe States, without an exception, the language used by their

"conventiofnswas, that they “ratz:fied the constitution,-”. some of them .
leniploying the additional words “ assented to’? and “adopted,” but
all of them “ ratifying-;.”ll There is more importance. than may, at

first sight, appear, in the introduction of this new word by the honor- .

able mover of these resolutions. Its adoption and use are indispen-

8r

sable to maintain thoselpremises, from which his main conclusion is
to be afterwards drawn, I But, before showing that, allow me to re-
mark, that this phraseology tends to keep out of sight the just view
of our previous- political history, as well as to suggest wrong ideas as
to what was actually done when the present constitution was-agreed;
to. In 1’.789,and- before this constitution was adopted, the United
States had already been in a Union, more or less close,» for fifteen
years. At least as far back as the meeting of the first Congress, in
1774, they had been, in some measure,-and to some national lpurposes,
united together. Before the confederation of 1781, they had declared
independence jointly, and had carried on the war jointly, both by sea
and land; ,and this, not as separate. States, but as one people. ‘When,
th.erefore,th*ey "formed. that coinfeldieratilon,and adopted its articles as
articles of perpetual union, they did not come together for the first
time; and, therefore, they did not speak of the States as acceding to
the confederation, although it was a league, and nothing but a league,
and rested on nothing but plighted faith for its performance. Yet,
even then, the States were not strangers to it each other; there was a
bond of union already subsisting; between the1n;...t_hey were associated,
UnitedStates;l and the object of the confederation was to intake a
stronger and better bond of union. Their 1~epresentatiyes deliberated
together on these proposed articles of confederation, and, being an-~
thorized by their respective States, finally 9‘ ratified and confirmed”
them. In as much as they were already in union, they did not speak
of acceding to the new articles of confederation, but of ratifying and

confirming them; and this language was not used iriac'1vertently',,

because, in the same instrument. accession is used in its proper sense,
whenl applied to Canada, which was altogether a stranger to the exist-
ing Union. ’ “ Canada,” says the 11th article,“ acceding to this con-
federation, and joining in the measures of the United States, shall be
admitted into the Union.” , U '

Having thus used the terms ratify and confirm, even in regard to
the old confederation, it would have been strange, indeed, if the
people of the United States, after its formation‘, and when theycame
to establish the present constitution, had spoken of the States, or the
people of the States, as acceding to this constitution; suea1angu’age
would have been ill suited to the occasion. It would have impliedlan
existing separation or disunion among the States, such as never has
existed since 1774. No such language, therefore, was used. The
language actually employed is, adopt, ratify, ordain, esfablislz,

‘Therefore, sir, since any State, before she can prove her right to
dissolve the Union, must show her authority to undo what has been

done, ‘no State is at liberty to secede,on the ground that she and other
Statesiliave done nothing but accede. She must show that she has a
right to reverse what has been ordained, to unsettle and overtlzrow

is

what has been established, to reject what the people have adopted, and

I to brealc up what they have ratified; because these are the «terms

which express the transactions which have actually taken place. In
other words, she must show her right to make a revolution.

If, Mr. President, in drawing these resolutions, the honorable mem-
ber had ‘confined himself to the use of constitutional language, there

would have been a wide and awful hiatus between his premises and

his conclusion. Leaving out the two words compact and accession,
which are not constitutional modes of expression, and stating the
matter precisely as the truth is, his first resolution would have af-
firrned that the people of the several States rat-;'.fiea’ this constitution,
or form of Government. These are the very words of South Carolina
herself, in her own act of ratification. Let, then, his first resolution
tell the exact truth; let it state the fact, precisely as it exists; let it
say that the people of the several States ratified a‘ constitution, or
form of Grovernment; and then,‘ sir, what will become of‘ his interj-
encein his second resolution, which is in these words, viz. pf‘ that, as

r in alfh'“tlier' cases qf compact, among sovereign parties, each has an

equal right to judge for itselfi, as well of the infraction as of the
mode and measure of redress.é9” It is obvious, is it not, sir, that this
conclusion requires for its support, quite other premises; it requires
premises which speak of access-ion and of compact between sovereign
Powers, and, without such premises, it is altogether unmeaning.

Mr. President, if the honorable member will truly state what the
people did in forming this constitution, and then state what they must
do if they would now undo what they then did, he will unavoidably
state a case of revolution. Let us see if it be not so. He must state,
in the first place, that the people of the several States adopted and
ratified this constitution, or form of Government; and, in the next
place, he must state that they have a right to undo this; thatistosay,

', that theyhave a right to discard the form of Government which they

have adopted, and to break up the constitution which they have rati-
‘lied. Now, sir, this isneithermore nor, less than saying that they
have a right to make a revolution. To reject an established Govern-
ment, to break up a political constitution, is revolution.

I deny that any man can state, accurately, what was done by the
people, in establisliing the present constitution, and then state, accu-
rately, what the people, or any part of them, must now do to get rid
of its obligations, without stating an undeniable case of I the overthrow
of Government. I admit, of course, that tliedpeople Inlay,’-tif they
chodsei,"overth/row the Grovernment. But, then, that is ‘revolution.

The doctrine now contended for is, that, by nullificalion o1'seceesion, i r I

the obligations and authority of the Government may be set aside or
rejected, without revolution. But that is what I deny; and what I
say is, that no man can state the case with historical accuracy, and in

to

constitutional language, without showing that the honorable gentle-
man’sright, as asserted in his conclusion, is a revolutionary right
merely; that it does not, and cannot exist, under the constitution, or
agreeably to the constitution, but can come into existence only when
the constitution is overthrown. This is the reason, sir, which makes
it necessary to abandon theuse of constitutional language for a new
vocabulary, and to substitute, in the place of plain historical facts, a
series of assumptions. This is the reason why it is necessary to give
new names to things, to speak of the constitution, not as a constitu-
tion, but as a compact, and of the ratitications by the people, not as
ratifications, but as “acts of , accession. _ i H _ ‘ V
 Sir, I intend to »no:1a the 1-igrentlemantor their writtenrecord. In the
discussion of a constitutional question, I intend to impose upon him
the restraints of constitutional language. The people have ordained a
constitution; can they reject it without revolution? They have es»
tablished a form of Government; can they overthrow it without revo-
lution? These are the true questions.

,.Allow me now, Mr. President, to inquire further into the extent of
the propositions contained infther resolutions, and their necessary con-
sequences. ‘ u up i

‘ ‘Where sovereign communities are parties, there is no essential dif--
terence between a compact, a confederation, and a league. They all
equally rest on the plighted faith of the sovereign party. A league, or
confederacy, is buta subsisting or. continuing treaty. .

The gentleman’s resolutions, then, aifirm, in effect, that these
twenty--four United States are held together only by a subsisting treaty,

a resting for its fulfilment and continuance, on no inherent power of its

own, but on the plighted faith of each,State;,or,iin other words, that
our Union is but a league; and, as a consequence from this proposition,
they further atfirm that, as sovereigns areisubject to no superior power,
the States must decide, each for itself, of any alleged violation of the
league; and if such violation be supposed to have occurred, each may
adopt any mode or measure of , redress which it shall think proper.

Other consequences naturallrypfollonr, too, from the main proposition-
If a league betweeln sovereign Hpowersi haven. no limitation astogtl1:e time
of its duration, and contain nothing making it perpetual, it subsists

1 only during the good pleasure of the parties, although no violation be

complained of. If, in the opinion of either party, it be violated, such.
party may say that he will no longer fulfil its obligations on his part,
ybutttwilliconsiderp the whole league or compact at an end, although it.
might be one of its stipulations that it should be perpetual. Upon this

 ip1'inci_.gle, the,_,Congress of the United States, in 1798, declared nuli

flanldfisiroid the treaty of alliance between the United States and France,

wthougli itprofessed to bee perpetual alliance.

 If the violation of the league be  accompan.ied with serious injuries

11'

the suffiering party, being sole judge of his own mode and measure of
redress, has a right to indemnify himself by reprisals on the offending
members of the league; and reprisals, if the circumstances of the case
require it, may be followed by direct, avowed, and public war.
'];‘heinecessaryin1port of the resolutions, therefore, is, that the United

istates are connected. only by a league; that it is in thegood pleasure

of every State to decide how long she will choose to remain amember
of this league; that any State may determine the extentof her own ob-
ligations under it, and accept or reject what shall be decided by the
whole; that she may also determine whether her rights have been vio-
lated, what is the extent of the injury done her, and what mode and
measure of redress her wrongs may make it tit and expedient for her
to adopt. The result of the whole is, that any State may secede at
pleasure; that any State may resist a law which she herself may choose
to say exceeds the power of Congress; and that, as a‘ sovereign power,
she may redress her ‘own grievances, by her own arm, at her own dis-
cretion;f she‘ may make reprisals; she may cruise against the property
of other members of the league; she may authorize captures, and make
open war. " ,

If, siiy this be our political condition, it is time the people of the

' United States understood it. Let us look for a moment to the prac-

tical consequences of these opinions. One State, holding an embargo
law unconstitutional, may declare her opinion, and withd raw from the
Union. She secedes. Another, forming [and expressing the same
judgment on a law laying dutieson imports, may withdraw also. Size
secedes. And as, in her opinion’, money has been taken out of the
pockets of her citizens illegally, under pretence of this law, and as
she has power to redress their wrongs, she may demand satisfaction;
and, if refused, she may take it with a strong hand. The gentleman
has himself pronounced the collection of duties, under existing laws,
to be nothing but robbery. Robbers, of course, may be rightfully dis-
possessed of the fruits, of their flagitious crimes; and, therefore, repri-
sals, impositions on the commerce of other States, foreign alliances
against them, or open war, are all modes of redress justly open to the
discretion and choice of South Carolina; for she is tojudge of her own
rights, and to seek satisfaction for her own wrongs, in her ownrway.
‘But, sir, at/zird State is of opinion, not only that these laws of im-
post are iconstitutional, but that it is the absolute duty or Congress -to
pass and to maintain such laws; and that,  omitting to pass and
maintain them, its constitutional obligations wonlidlbe grossly disreu
gar-ded. ‘Slierelinquislied the power of protection, she miglit allege,
and allege truly, herself, and gave it up to Congress, onitlie faith that
Congress would exercise it. If Congress now refuse to exercise it,
Congress does, as she may insist, break the condition of the grant, and
thus manifestly violate the constitution; and for this violation of the

I2

constitution, she may threaten to secede also. Virginia may secede,
and hold the fortresses in the Chesapeake. The Western States may
secede, and take to their own use the public ltanpls. Louisianaimay
secede, if she choose, form a foreign alliance, and hold the mouth of
the Mississippi. If one State may secede, ten may do so——-twenty may
do so-t—-twenty-three may do so. Sir, as these secessionsigo on, one
after another, what is to constitute the United States? ‘Whose will be
the army? VVhose the navy? "Who will pay the debts? W110 fulfil
the public treaties? Who perform the constitutional guaranties? Who
govern this District and the Territories? Who retain the public pro-
perty? ?   _

Mr. President, every man must‘ see that these are all questions
which ‘can arise only “after attrevolution. U Theyipresupipose the break-
ing up of the Government.‘ Wliile the constitution lasts, they are re-
pressed; they spring up to annoy and startle us only from its grave.

The constitution does not provide for events which must be preced-
ed by its own destruction. SECESSION, therefore, since it must bring
these consequences with it, is REVOLUTIONARY.‘ And NULLIFICATION
is equally m:vo:_c.UTIoNAnv. lW'hat is revolution? Wliy, sir, that is
revolution, which overturns, or controls, or successfully resists the
existingipublic authority; that which arrests the exercise "of the su-
preme power; that which introduces a new paramount authority into
the rule of the State. Now, sir, this is the precise object of nullifica—
tion. It attempts to supersede the supreme legislative authority. It
arrests the arm of the Executive Magistrate. It interrupts the exer-
cise of the accustomed judicial power. Under the name of an ordi-
nance, it declares null and void, within the State, all the revenue
laws of the United States. Is not this revolutionary? Sir, so soon as
this ordinance shall be carried into effect, a ‘revel-ution will have
commenced in South Carolina. , She will have thrown off the autho-
rity to which her citizens have heretofore been subject. She will
have declared her own opinions and her own will to be above the
laws, and above the power of those who are entrusted with their ad-
ministration. If she makes good these declarations, she is revolution-

ized. As toher, it is as distinctly a. change of the suoprieme, power, as is
the American revolution of 1776. That revolution did not subvert

Government in all its forms. It did not subvert local laws and mu-
nicipal administrations. It only threw off the dominion of a Power,
claiming to be superior, and to have a right, in many important-re~
spects, to exercise legislative authority. Thinking this authority to
have been usurped or abused, the American‘ colonies, now the ‘United
States, badeit defiance, and freed themselves from it ‘by means of a
revolution. But that revolution left them with their own municipal
laws still,and the forms of local Government. If Carolina now shall
et’feictually~,resist the flaws of Congress, if she shall be her own jutlge,

13

take her remedy into her own, hands, obey the laws of the Union
when she pleases, . and disobey them when she pleases, she will relieve
herself from aparainount power as distinctly as the American colonies
did the saint: thing in 1776. In other words, she will achieve, as to
herse,lt<','a revolution. 
 sir, while practical nullification in South Carolina would be,
 as to herself, actual and- distinct revolution,_its necessarytendency
must also be to spread revolution, and to break up the constitution,
as to all the other States. It strikes a deadly blow at the vital princi-
,ple of the whole Union. ‘ To allow State resistance to the laws of
Congress to be rightful and proper, to admit nullitication in some
States, and yet not expect to see a dismemberment of the entire Go-
vernment, appears to me the wildest illusion, and the most extrava-
gant folly. The gentleman seems not conscious of the direction or
the rapidity of his own course. The curiezit of his opinions sweeps
him along, he knows , not whither. To begin with nullification, with
the avowed intent, nevertheless, not to proceed to secession, dismem-
berment, and general revolution, is as if one were to take the plunge of
Niagara, and cry out that he would stop half way clown. In the one
case, as in the other, the rash adventurer must go to the bottom of the
dark abyss below, were it not that that abyss has no discovered bottom.
Nullitication,if successful, arrests the power of the law, absolves
citizens from their duty, subverts the foundation both ofprotection and
obedience, dispenses with oaths and obligations of allegiance, and
elevates another authority to supreme command. Is not this revolu-
tion? And it raises to supreme command four and‘ twenty distinct
powers, each professing to be under a General Government, and yet
each setting its laws at defiance at pleasure. Is not this anarchy,
as well as revolution? Sir, the constitution of the United States was
received as a whole, and for the whole country. If it cannot stand
altogether, it cannot stand in parts; and if the laws cannot be executed
every where, they cannot long be executed any where. The gentle-
man very ‘well knows that all duties and imposts mugt be uniform
throughout the country. He knows that we cannot have one rule or
one law for South Carolina, and another for other States. He must
see, therefore, and does see, every man sees, that the only alternative
is a repeal of the laws, throughout the whole Union, or their execu-
. tion in Carolina as well as elsewhere. And this repeal is dernanded‘
because a single State interposes her veto, and threatens' resistance!-
The result of the gentleman’s opinions, or rather the very text of his
doctrine, is, that no act ot'Congress can bind all the States, the con-
stitutionality of which is not admitted by all 5 ‘or, in other words, that
no single State is bound, against its own dissent, by a law of imposts.
This _is precisely the evil experienced under the old confederation,

 ....  gandfor remedy of which this constitution was adopted. The leading

14

object in establishing this Government, an object forced on the coun-
try py the condition of the times, and the absolute necessity ofithe

law, was to give to Congress power to lay and collection posts/witlzpout t

the ‘consent of parziicular States. The revolutionary debt remained
unpaid; the national treasury was bankrupt; the country was desti-

tute of credit; Congress issued its requisitions on the States, and the

States neglected them; there was no power of coercion,but war; Con-
gress could not lay irnposts, or other taxes, by its own authority; the
whole General Government, therefore, was little more than a name.
The articles of confederation, as to purposes of revenue and finance,
were nearly a dead letter. The country sought to escape from’ this
condition, at once pfeebleand disgraceful, by constituting a Govern-
ment which shlouldl have ipiower,*iof‘its;elf, to lay duties and taxes, and
to pay the public debt, and provide for the general welfare; and to
lay these duties and taxes in all the States, without askingthe con-
sent of the State Governments. This was the very power on which
the new constitution was to depend for all its ability to do good; and,
without it, it can beno Government, now or at any time. Yet,sir, it.
is precisely against this power, so absolutely indispensable to the

 very beingof the Governmllent, that South ;Carolina directs her or~

dinance. l She attacks the Government in its authority to raise reve-
nue, the very main spring of the whole system; and, if she sue»-
ceed, every movement of that system must inevitably cease. It is
of no avail that she declares that she does not resist the law as a reve-
nue law, but as a law for protectingmanufactures. It is a revenue law;
it is the very law by force of which the revenue is collected; if it be
arrested in any State, the revenue ceases in that State; it is," in a
word, the sole reliance of the Government for the means of maintain-
ingitself and performing its duties. , j l .

Mr. President, the alleged right of a State to decide constitutional
questions for herself, necessarily leads to force, because other States
must have the same right, and because different States will decide
difi"erently; and when these questions arise betiveen States, if there
be no superior power, they can be decided only by the lawof force.
On ‘entering into the Union, the people of i_'_eacl1 Statei gave up“ a
part of their own power to make laws " for o1emse1ves,,in coinsiden
ration that, as to common objects, they should have a part in malt»-
ing laws for other States. In other words, the people of all the
States agreed to create a common Government, to be conducted
by common councils. Pennsylvania, for example, yielded the right
of laying imposts in her own ports, in consideration that the new Go-

.vernment,,in which she was to have a share, should possess the '

  power of laying imposts in all the States. » If South Carolina now re-
fuses to submit to this power, she breaks the condition on which other
States entered into the Union. She partaltes of the common councils,

15

and therein assists to bind others, while she refuses to be bound herself.
It makes no difI'erenc,e,in the case whether she does all this without rea-

r son or pretext, orllwhetlier she sets up as a reason that, in her judg-

ment, the actsrdomplained of are unconstitutional. In the judgment of
other States, they are not so. It is nothing to them that she offers some

1'eason~or"some apology for her conduct, if it be one which they do-not

wattinit. It is not to be expected that any State will violate her duty

without some plausible pretext. That would be too rash a defiance
of the opinion of mankind. But if it be a pretext which lies in her
own breast; if it be no more than an opinion which she "says she has
formed, how can other States be satisfied with this? How can they
allow her to be judge of her own obligations? Or, if she may judge of
her obligations, may they not judge of their rights also? May not the
twenty-three entertain an opinion as well as the twenty-fourth? And,
if it be theirright, in their own opinion, as expressed in the common
council, to enforce the law against her, how is she to say that her right
and her opinion are to be every thing, and their right and their opinion
nothing? i S t l S - ‘

Mr. President, if we are to receive the constitution as the text, and
then to lay down, in its margin, the contradictory commentaries which

have been, and which may be, made by different States, the whole page «

would be a polyglot indeed. It would speak with as many tongues
as the builders of Babel, and in dialects as much confused, and mum»
ally as unintelligible. The very instance now before us presents a
practical illustration. The law of the last session is declared uncon~
stitutional in South Carolina, and obedience to it is refused. In other
States it is admitted to be strictly constitutional. You walk over the
limit of itsauthority, therefore, when you pass a State line. On one
side, it is law; on the other side, a nullity; and yet it is passed. by
a common Government, having the same authority in all the States.

Such, sir, are the inevitable results of this doctrine. Beginning
with the original error, that the constitution of the United. States is
nothing but a compact between sovereign States; asserting, in the next
step,that each State has a right to be its own sole judge of the ex-.

tent of its own obligations, and consequently of the constitutionality of '”

laws of Congress; and, in the next, that it may oppose Whatever it
sees fit to declare unconstitutional, and that it decides for itself
onthe mode and measure of redress, the argument arrives‘ at once at
the conclusion that what a State dissents from, it may nullify; what
it opposes, it may oppose by force; what it decides for itself, it may
execute by its own power; and that,_in short, it is, itself, supreme over
the legislation of Congress, and supreme over the decisions of the
national judicature; supreme over the constitution of the country,
supreme over the supreme law of the land. However it seeks to

 rotectitslelf against these lain inferencesib saline“ that an uncon-
M W as 9 2::

is

stitutional law is no law, and that it only opposes such lawsas are
unconstitutional, yet this does not, in the slightest degree, vary the
result; since it insists on deciding this question for itself; and,in oppo-
sition to reason and argument, in opposition to practice and experience,
in opposition to thejudgment of others, .having an equal right to judge,
it says, only, “ Such is my opinion,.and my opinion shall be my law,
and irIi will support it by my own strong hand. I denounce the law;
I declare it unconstitutional; that is enougl1; it shall not be executed.
Men in arms are ready to resist its execution. An attempt to enforce
it shall cover the land with blood. Elsewhere, it may be binding; but
here, it is trampled under foot.”

. This, sir, is practical; nultllficatlflll

 

And now, sir, against all these theories and opinions, I maintain—+
1. That the constitution of the United States is not a league, con»
federacy, or compact,between the people of the several States in their

a sovereign capacities; but a Government proper, founded on the adop-

tion of the people, and creating direct relations between itself and in-
dividuals. p p  ‘ t it ' l S S

,2. Thatno State authority has power to dissolve these relations;
that nothitng can dissolve them but revolution; and that, co,*},se.qusen‘t’-
ly, there can be no ‘such thinlgplas“”seces“sion"l““wtt'li“o“n rsvsra"a'c”m.

3. That there is a supreme law, consisting of the constitution of
the United States, acts of Congress passedin pursuance of it, and
treaties; and that, in cases not capable of assuming the character of
a suit in law or equity, Congress must judge of, and finally interpret,
this supreme law, so often as it has occasion to pass acts of legislation;
and, in cases capable of assuming, and actually assuming, the charac-
ter of a suit, the Supreme Court of the United Statesis the final in-
terpreter. ‘ S .

4. That an attempt by a State to abrogate, annul, or nullify an act
of Congress, or to arrest its operation within her limits, on the ground
that, in her opinion, such law is unconstitutional, is a direct usurpa-
tion . on the just powers of the General Government, and on the
equal rights of other States,a plain violation of the constit’ution, and a
proceeding essentially’ revolutionary‘ in its character and tendency.

"Whether the constitution be a compact between States in their so-
vereign capacities, is a question which must be mainly argued from
what is contained in the instrument itself. We all agree that it is an

S instrument which has been, in some way, clothed with power. VVe all
‘admit that itspeaks with authority. The first question then is, what

does itsay of itself? What does it purport to be? Does it style itself
a league, confederacy, or compact between sovereign States? It is to

be remembered, sir, that the constitution began to speali only after
its adoption. » Until it was ratified by nine States, it was but a pro-

posal, the mere draught of an instrument. It was like a deed, drawn,

17

but not executed. The convention had framed it, sent it to Congress
then sitting under the confederation, Eongress had transmitted it to
the State Legislatures, and by these last it was laid before convene.
tions of the people in the several States. All this while it was inope-
rativepaper. It had received no stamp of authority, no sanction; it
spoke no language. But when ratliiied by the people in their respec-
tive conventions, then it had a voice, and spolteauthentically. Every
word in it had then received the sanction ofthe popular will, and
was to be received as the expression of that will. What theconstitu-
tion says of itself, therefore, is as conclusive as what it says on any
other point. Doesmit call itself a compact? Certainly not. It uses
the word compact but once, and that is when it declares that the
States shall enter into no compact. Does it call itself a league, a con-
federacy, a subsisting treaty between the States? Certainly not.
There is not a particle of such language in all its pages. But it de-
clares itself a CONSTITIITION. ‘What is a corzstilut-ion? Certainly not
a league, compact, or confederacy, but a fzmdamental law. That
fundamental regulation which determines the manner in which the
public authority is to be executed, is what forms the constitution of a:
State. Those primary -rules which concern the body itself, and the very
being of the political society, the form of government, and the man»
ner in which power is to he exercised--—all, in a word, which form toge-
ther the constitutioiz of a Strife, these are the fundamental laws. This,
sir, is the language of the public writers. But dolwe need to be in-
formed, in this country, what a corzatiitmfoaz is? Is it not an idea per-
fectly familiar, definite, and well settled? ‘We are at no loss to un-
derstand what is meant by theconstitution of one of the States; and
the constitution of the United -States speaks of itself as ‘being an in-
strument of the same nature. It says, this constitution shall be’ the
law of the land, any thing in any State constimtiorz to the contrary
notwithstanding. And it speaks of itself, top, in plain contradistinc-—
tion from a confederation; for it says that all debts contracted, and
all engagements entered into by the United States, shall be as valid
under this constituliorz, as under the confeclerczlion. It does not say,
as valid under this compact, or this league, or this confederatiomas

7‘ p under the former confederation, but as valid underthis constitutions V
" QThis;, then, sir, is declared to be a lconsstitution. A constitutiontuis. _

the fundamental law of r the State; and this is expressly declared to
be the supreme law. It is as if the people had said, “ we prescribe
thisfundamental law,” or “this supreme law,” for they do say that
they establish this constitutiomand that it shall be the supreme law.
They say that they ordain and establish it. Now, sir, what is the
common application of these words? We do not speak of ordaz'm'n.g
leagues and compacts. if this was intended to be a coinpacft or league,
and the States to be parties toit, why was it not so said? VVhy is
Q

118

there found no one expression in the whole instrurment indicating suolis
intent? The old confederation was expressly called a league; and
into this league it was declared that the States, as States, severally

entered. Why was not siinilar language used in the conzstituetion,

if a similar intention had existed? ‘Why was it not said, “ the States
enter into this new league,” “the States form this new confedera-
tion,” or “ the States agree to this new compact?” Or, why was it
not said, in the language "of the gentleman’s resolution, that the peo-
ple of the several States- acceded to this compact in their sovereign
capacities? Wliat reason is there for supposing that the framers of the

constitution rejected expressions appropriate to their own meaning,»

and adopted others wholly attlwar witlr that nieaningi i i -c

Again, sir, the constitution speaks of that political system which it i

established as “the Government of the United States.” Is it not
doing strange violence to language to call a league or a compact be»
tween sovereign. Powers a G0verrm:2.ent? The Government of a. State
is that organization in which the political power resides. It is the
political being, created by the constitution or funclamental: law. The
broad andoclear difference between a Government andaleague, or

compact, is, that a Government is a body politic; it has a will of its

own; and it possesses powers and faculties to execute its own pur-
poses. Every compact looks to some power to enforce its stipulations.

I Even in a compact between sovereign communities, there always

exists this ultimate reference to a power to ensure its execution; al-
though, in such case, this power is but the force of one party against;
the force of another-—that is to say, the power of war. But a Govern»
ment executes its decisions by its own supreme authority. Its use of
force in compelling obedience to its own enactments, is not war. It
contemplates no opposing party having a right of resistance. It rests

on its own power to enforce its own will; and, when it ceases to pos- '

sees this power, it is no longer a Government.

Mr. President, I concur so generally in the very able speech of the
gentleman from Virginia, near me, [Mr. RIVES] that it is not without
difiidence and regret that I venture to differ with him on any point.
His opinions, sir, are redolentof the doctrinesof a verydistinguished~
school, for which I have the highest regard, of whose doctrines I can
say, what I also can say of the gentleman’s speech, that, while I con-
cur in the results, I must be permitted to hesitate about some of the
premises. I do not agree that the constitution is a compact between
States in their sovereign capacities. I do not agree that, in strictness
of language, it is a compact at all. But I do agree, that it isfaunded

on consent, or agreement; or on compact, if the gentleman prefers that

word, and means no more by it than voluntary consent or agreement,
The constitution, sir, is not a contract, but the result of a contract;
meaning, by contract, no more than assent, Founded on consent, it

19,

is a Government proper. . Adopted by the agreement of the people of
the United States, when adopted, it has become a constitution. The
people have agreed to make a constitution; but when made", that con-
stitution becomes what its name imports. It is no longer a mere agree-
ment. Our laws, sir, have their foundation in the agreement, or ‘con-
sent, of the two Houses of Congress. We say, habitually, that one
House proposes a bill, and the other agrees to it; but the result of this
agreement is not a compact, but a law. The law, the statute, is not
the agreement, but something created by the agreement; and some?
thing which: when created, has a new character, and acts by its own
authority. So the constitution of the United States, founded in or
on the consent of the people, may be said to rest on compact, or con-
sent; but it is itself: not the compact, ‘but its result. Wlien a people
agree to erect a government, and actually erect it, the thing is done,
and the agreement is at an end. The compact is executed, and the
end designed by it attained. Henceforth, the fruit of the agreement
exists, but the agreement itself is merged in its own accomplishment;
since there can be no longer a subsisting agreement, or compact, to

form a constitution or government, after that constitution or govern-
ment has been actually formed and established.

It appears to me, Mr. President, that the plainest account of the
establishment of this Government presents the most just and philoso-
phical view of its foundation. The people of the several States had
their separate State Governments; and between the States there
also existed a confederation. With this condition of things the peo-
ple were not satisfied, as the confederation had been found not to
fulfil its intended objects. It was proposed, therefore, to erect a new,
common, Government, which should possess certain definite powers,

suchias regarded the prosperity of the people of all the States; and to

be formed upon the general model of American constitutions. This
proposal was assented to, and an instrument was presented to the
people of the several States for theirkconsideration. Theyapproved
it, and agreed to adoptit, as a constitution. They executed that
agreement, they adopted the constitution, as a constitution, and hence-

, forth it must stand as a constitution until it shall be altogether dew ,

stroyed. Now, sir, is not this the truth of the whole matter? and is not
all that welhave heard of compact between sovereign States the mere ef-
fect of a theoretical and artificial mode of reasoning upon the subject? a
mode of reasoning whichdisregards plain facts, for the sake of hypo-
thesis? , ‘ ‘

Mr. President,the nature of sovereignty, or sovereign power, has
been extensively discussed by gentlemen on this occasion, as it gene-
rally is, when the origin of our Government is ldebated. But I con-
fess myself not entirely satisfied with arguments and illustrations
drawn from that topic. The sovereignty of government is an idea

9.0

belonging to the other side of the Atlantic. No such thing. is known "

in North America. Our Governments are all limited. In Europe,
sovereiig11ty‘is of feodal origin, and imports no more than the state of
the sovereign. It comprises his 1~igl1ts,. duties, exemptions, preroga-
tives, and powers. But, with us, all power is with the people. They,
alone, are sovereign; and they erect what Governments they please,
and confer on them such powers as they please. None of these Gro-
vernments is sovereign, in the European sense of ' the word, all being
restrained by written constitutions. It seems to me, therefore, that
we only perplex ourselves when We attempt to explain the relations’
existing betweenthe General Government and the several State‘Go-

veinrnents, according tn‘-tl10S‘e‘ Vitleas of sove1'eign,ty,,wl1icl1 prevail under’

systemsressentiallyi different "from our own. i _
But, sir, to return to the constitution itself, let me inquire what it
relies upon for its own continuance and support. I hear it often
suggested that the States, by refusing to appoint senators and electors,
might bring this Government to an end. Perhaps that is true; but the
same may be said of the Etate Governments themselves. Suppose the
Legislature of a State, having the power to appoint the Governor and
the at J udges, should omit that duty, would not the State Government
remain unorganized? No doubt, all elective Governments maybe
broken u p, by a general abandonment, on the part of those entrusted
with political powers, of their appropriate duties. But one popular
Government has, in this respect, as much security as another. The
maintenance of this constitution does not depend on the plighted faith
of the States, as States, to support it; and this zigzeiin shows that it is
not a league. It relies on individual duty and obligation. l
The constitution of the United States creates direct relations between
this titovermnent and individuals. This Government may punish in-
dividuals for treason, and all other crimes in the code, when committed
against the United States. It has power, also, to tax intlivitluals, in
any mode, and to any extent; and it possesses the further power of
deznaiiding from individuals miiitary service. Nothing, certainly, can
more clearlyidistinguisli a Grove: nment from a conl’edera'tion of Stéites,
than the possession of these powers. No closer relations can exist be-
tween in"tl,ivitlualls.and anyiGovernrnent. l l ' i i A
On the other hand, the Government owes ‘high and solemn duties
to every citizen ofthe country. It is bound to protect him in his most
important ri,e;ht:-3 and interests. it makes war for his protection, and

no other Government in the country can make war. It makes peace ,

for his protection, and no other Government can make peace. It main-
tains armies ami navies for his defence antlsecurity, and number Go-
vernment is allowed to maintain them. He goes abroad beneathitsflag,
and carries over allthe earth a national character impa-rtetl 3".» him by
this Government,‘ and which no other Government can impart.  In
whatever relates to war, to peace, to commerce, he knows no other

131':

9.1

Government. All times, sir, are connexions as dear and as sacred as
can bimlinclividuals to any Government on earth. It is not,therefore,a
compact between States, but a Government proper, operating directly
upon individuals, yielding to them protection on one hand, and de-
manding from them obedience on the other. J
There is no language in the whole constitution, applicable to a con-
federation of States. If the States be parties, as States, what are
their rights, and what their respective covenants and stipulations?

And where are their rights, covenants, and stipulations expressed?‘

The States engage for nothing, they promise nothing. In the articles
of confederation, they did make promises, and did enter into en--
gagenients, antidid plight the faith of each State for their fulfilment;
-but, in the constitution, there is Iiotliing of that kind. The reason
is, that, in the constitution, it is the people who speak, and not the
States. The people ordain theiconstitution,andtherein address them-
selves to the States, and tothe Legislatures of States, in tlieianguage
of injunction and prohibition. The constitution utters its behests in

the name and by authority of the people, and it exacts not from States
any plighted public faith to maintain it. On the contrary, it makes
its own preservation depend on individual duty and individual on-

ligation. Sir, the States cannot omit to appoint senators and elec-
tors. It is not a matter resting in State discretion or State pleasure.
The constitution has taken better care of its own preservation. It
lays its hand on individual conscience, and individual duty. It in-capa-
citates any man to sit in the Legislature ofa State, who shall not first
have taken his solemn oath to support the constitution of the United
States. From the obli§;at.ion of this oath no State power can discharge
him. All the members of all the State Legislatures are as relig,iously
bound to support the constitution of the United States, as they are to
support their own State constitution. Nay, sir, they are as solemnly
sworn to support it as we ourselves are, who are members of Congress.

No member of a State Legislature can refuse, toproceed, at the pro-
per time, to elect senators to Congr'ess, or to provide for the choice of
electors of President andVice President, any moretlian the members
of this Senate can refuse, when the appointed day arrives, to meet the
members of the other House to count the votes for those otficers, and
ascertain _Wl10 are chosen. In both cases, the duty binds, and with equal

strength, theconscieiice of the individual member, and it is _imposerd?;,§qn 
all by an oathin the.same words. Let it, then, neverbe said, sir, that

it is a matter of discretion with the States, whether they will continue
the Government,or break it up by refusing to appoint senators and to
elect electors. They have no discretion in the matter. The members

of their Legislatures cannot avoid d“oing either, so often as the time ar-.

rives, withouta direct violation of their duty and their oaths; such
a violation as would break up any other Government.

.12

Looking still further to the provisions of the constitution itself, in
order to learn its true character, we find its great apparent purpose to
be, to unite the people of all the States under one General Govern-
ment, for certain definite objects, and, to the extent of this union, to
restrain the separate authority of the States. Congress only can do-
clare war~—--therefore, when one State is at war with a foreign nation,
all must be‘ at war. The President and the Senate only can make
peace; when peace is made for one State, therefore, it must be made
for all. .

Can any thing be conceived more preposterous, than that any State
should have power to nullify the proceedings of the General Govern-
ment, respecting peace and vvari? When. war is declared by a law of

.Congress%, can a single State nullify that law, and remain at peace?

And yet she may nullify that law, as well as any other. If the Presi-
dent and Senate make peace, may one State, nevertheless, continue
the war? And yet, if she can nullify a law, she may quite as well nullify
a‘ treaty.

The truth is, Mr. President, and no ingenuity of argument, no sub-A
tlety of distinction, can evade it, that, as to certain purposes, the peo-

ple of the United States are one people. They are one in making war,

and one in making peace; they are one in regulating cornn1erce,Vand

- one in laying duties of imposts. The very end and purpose of the

constitution was to make them one people in these particulars; and it
has effectually accomplished its objects. All this is apparent on the
face of the constitution itself. I have already said, sir, that to ob-
tain apower of direct legislation over the people, especially in re-
gard to imposts, was always prominent as a reason for getting rid of
the confederation, and forming anew constitution. Among innumera-
ble proofs of this, before the assembling of the convention, allow me to
refer only to the report of the committee of the old Congress, July,
1785. -
But, sir, let us go to the actual formation of the constitution, let us
open the journal of the convention itself, and we shall see that the very
first resolution which the convention adopted, was, “THAT A NATIONAL
Govnnnmnnrr onerrrwro BE ESTABLISHED‘, coxs1s'rING or A surname
LEGISLATURE, JUDICIARY, AND EXECUTIVE.” ‘ S
This itself completely negatives all idea of league, and compact, and
confederation. Terms could not be chosen, more fit to express an in-
tention to establish a National Government, and to banish forever all
notion of a compact between sovereign States. V S
This resolution was adopted on the 30th of May. Afterwards, the
style was altered, and, instead of being called a National Government,
it was called the Government of the United States: but the substance
of this resolution was retained, and was at the head of thatlist of reso-
lutions which was afterwards sent to the committee who were to frame

the instrument.

9.3"

It is true, there were gentlemen in the convention, who were for re-
taining the _confede1'ati_on, and amending its articles; but the majority
was against this, and was for a National Government. Mr. Patter-
son’s propositions, which were for continuing the articles of confede-
ration with additional powers, were submitted to the convention on
the 15th of June, and referred to the committee of the whole. And the
resolutions forming the basis of a National Government, which had
once been agreed to in the committee of the whole, and reported, were
recommitted to the same committee, on the same day. The conven-
tion, then,’in committee of the whole, on the 19th of June, had both
these «plans before them; that is to say, the plan of a confederacy, or
compact between States, and the plan of a National Government.
Both these plans were considered and debated, and the committee
reported, “ That they do not agree to the propositions o_fi“erecl by the
honorable Zllr. Patterson, but that they again submit the resolutions

formerly reported.” If, sir, any historical factin the world be plain
andundeniable, it is that the convention ’de1iberated on the expediency
of continuing the confederation, with some annendinents, and rejected
that scheme, and adopted the plan of a National Government, with
a legislature, an executive, and a judiciary of its own. They were
asked to preserve the leagueg. they rejected the proposition. They
were asked to continue the existing compact between States; they re-
jected it. They rejected compact, league, andconfederation; and set
themselves about framing the constitution of a N ational Government:
and they accomplished what they undertook.

If meniwill open their eyes fairly to the lights of history, it is im-.

possible to be deceived on this point. The great object was to super-
sede the confederation, by a regular government; because, under the
confederation, Congress had power only to make requisitions on States;
and if States declined -co1'nplia.nce,*aS they did, there was no remedy
but war against such delinquent States. It would seem, from Mr.
Jeti'erson’s“correspondence, in 1786, and 1.787., that he was of opinion
that even this remedy ought to be tried.- gt‘ There will be no money
in the treasury,” said he, “till the confederacy shows its teeth ;” and
he suggests that a single frigate would soon levy:, on the commerce of
a delinquent State, the deficiency of its contribution .But this would
be vvarg and it was evident that a confederacy could not long hold to-—
gether, which should be at war with itsmembers. The yconsvtittfttion
was adopted to avoid this necessity. It was adopted, that there 

  

girl-ti  " i»

be a government which should act directly on individuals,  7

‘borrowing aid from the State -Governments. This is” clear as light
itself on the very face of the provisions of the constitution, and its
whole history tends to t-he same conclusion. Its framers gave

' this very reason for their work in the most distinct terms. Allow

me to quote -but one or two proofs, out of hundreds. That State, so

£4

S small in territory, but so distinguished for learning and talent, Con»

necticut, had sent to the general convention, among other members,
Samuel Johnston and Oliver Ellsworth. The constitution having been
framed, it was submitted to a convention of the people of Connecticut
for ratification on the part of that State, and Mr. Johnston and Mr.
Ellsworth were also members of this convention. On the first day of‘
the debates, being called on to explain the reasons which led the con-
vention at Philadelphia to recommend such a constitution, after show-
ing the insufiiciency of the existing confederaoy, inasmuch as it ap-
plied to States, as States, Mr. Johnston proceeded to say--—~ l. t
_“ The convention saw this imperfection in attempting to legislate for States
“ in their political capacity.-, that the coercion of law can be exercised by no-
“ thing but a military force. They have, therefore, gone upon entirely new
“ ground. They have formed one new nation out of the individual States.
9? The constitutio,n vests inthe General Legislature a. power to make laws in
“ matters of national concern; to appoint judges to decide upon these lawssancl
“ to appoint ofiicers to carry them into execution. This excludes the idea of an
“ armed force. The power which is to enforce these laws, is to be a legal power,
“ vested in proper magistrates. The three which is to be employed, is the ener-
“ y of law; and this force is to operate only upon individuals, who fail in their
“ duty to their country. This is the peculiar glory of the constitution, that it
“ depends upon the mild and equal energy of the rnagistracy for the execu»
“ tion of the laws.” ‘  t i
In the further course of the debate, Mr. Ellsworth said:
"i In republics it is a fundamental principle that the majority govern, and that

A “ the minority comply with the general voice. How contrary then to republi-.~

“‘ can principles, how humiliating, is our present situation. A single State can

“‘ rise up, and put a veto upon the most important public measures. VVe have
“ seen this actually take place.-,. a single State has controlled the general voice

‘f of the Union, a minority, a very small minority, has governed us. So far is

“ this from being consistent with republican principles, that it is in ofi‘ect“tl1e

“ worst species of’ monarchy. S

“ Hence we see how necessary for the Union is a coercive principle. No

“ man pretends the contrary. Vie all see and feel this necessity. The only ques-

“ tion is, shall it be a coercion of law, or a coercion of arms? there is no other
" possible alternative. ‘Where will tlidse who oppose a coercion of law come

‘.‘ out? Where will they end? A necessary consequence of their principles is

“a war of the States one against another. I am for coercion by law; that

“' coercion which acts only upon delinquent individuals. This constitution

“ does not attempt to coerce sovereign bodies, States, in their political caps.»

“ city. N o coercion is applicable to such bodies, but that of an armed force.

“ If We should attempt to execute the laws of the Union, by sending" an armed , ,

“ force against a delipquent State, it would involve the good and bad, the in-
“ nocent and guilty, in the same pcalamity. But this legal coercion singles out
“ the guilty individual, and punishes him for breaking the laws of the Union.”

Indeed, sir, if we look to all cotemporary history, to the writings of

the Federalist, to the debates in the conventions, to the publications of .

friends and foes,” they all agree, that a change had been made from a
confederacy of States, to a difierent system 3 they all agree, that the
convention had formed a constitution for a National Grovernment.

,With this result, some were satisfied, and some were ‘dissatisfied; but
all admitted that the thing had been done. In none of these various
productipons and publications, did any one intimate that the new con--

as

stitution was but another compact between States in their sovereign
capacities. I do not find such an opini_on advanced in a single instance.
Every where, the people weretold that the oldwconfederation was to
be abandoned, and a new system to be tried; tiat a proper Govern-

ment was proposed, to be founded in the name of the people, and to
it  in regular organization of its own. Every where, the people were

told that it was to be a Government with direct powers to make
laws over individuals, and to lay taxes and impost without the consent
of the States. Every where, it was understood to be a popular con-
stitution. It came to the people for their adoption, and was to rest
on the same deep foundation as the State constitutions themselves.
Its most distinguishetl advocates, who had been themselves members
of the convention, declared that the very object of submitting the con—
stitution to the people was, to preclude the possibility of its being re-
garded as a more compact. “ However gross a heresy,” say the
writers of the Federalist, “ it may be to maintain that a party to a
compacthas a right to revoke that compact," the doctrine itself has
had respectable advocates. The possibility of a question of this na-
ture, proves the necessity of laying the foundations of our national
Government deeper than in the mere sanction of delegated au-

'thority. The fabric of American empire ought to rest. on the solid

basis of THE CONSENT on THE PEOPLE.” ~ .

Such is the language, sir, addressed to the people, while they
yet had the constitution under consideration. The powers con-
ferred on the new Government were perfectly well understood to
be conferred, not by any State, or the people of any State, but by
the people of the United States. Virginia is more explicit, perhaps,
in this particular, than any other State. Her convention assembled
to ratify the constitution “in the name and behalf of the people of

S Virginia, declare and make known, that the powers granted under the

constitution, being derivedfrom the people of the United States, may
be resumed by them whenever the same shall be perverted to their
injury or oppression.?’

‘Is this languagelwhich describesthe formation ofa compact between

States, or language describing the grant of powers to a new Govern-

ment, by the whole people of the I/'nitetZ States?
Among all the other ratitications, there is not one which speaks of

the constitution as a compact between States. .Those of Miass’a.chu—‘

setts and ’New Hampshire express; the” transactiloin, in my opinion‘,
with suficient accuracy._ They recognise the Divine goodness “in
atfordiiig THE PEOPLE on THE UNITED STATES anopportunity of en-
tering into an explicit and solemn compact with each other, by as-
senting to and ratifying ll new consz‘itutz'on.”’ You will observe,
sir, that itwis the PEOPLE, and not the States, who have enteredinto
this compact, and it is the raor-ma of all the United States. These con-—

£6

ventions, by this form of expression, meant merely to say, that the peo-
ple of the United States had, by the blessing of Providence, enjoyed
the opportunity of establishing a new constitution, founded in the
consent of the people. This consent of the people has been called
by European writers the social compact; and, in conformity to this
common mode of expression, these conventions speak of that assent,
on which the new constitution was to rest, as an explicit and solemn
compact, not which the States had entered into with each other, but
which the people of the United States had entered into.

Finally, sir, how can any man get over the words of the constitu-
tion itself P—-~“ WE, THE PEOPLE or THE UNITED STATES, no onmxu
AND ESTABLISH THIS CONS'1‘I'I‘U’I‘IiON.” These words must cease to be
a part of the constitution-—*-‘—tliey must i be obliterated from the parch-
ment on which they are written, before any human ingenuity or hu-.
man argument can remove the popular basis on which that constitu~
tion rests, and turn the instrument into a mere. compact between
sovereign States.

The second proposition, sir, which I propose to maintain, is, that
no State authority can dissolve the relations subsisting between the
Gov=ernme¥1t,,,.,..0f the United States and individuals; that nothing can
dissolve these relations but revolution; and that, therefore, there
can be no such thing as secession without revolution- All this fol-
lows, as it seems to me, as a just" consequence, if it be lirst proved
that the constitution of the United States is a Government proper,
owing protection to individuals, and entitled to their obedience.

' The people, sir, in every State, live under two Governments. They
owe obedience to both. These Governments, thoughdistinct, are
not adverse. U Each has its separate sphere, and its peculiar powers
and duties. It is not a contest between two sovereigns for the same
power, like the wars of the rival Houses in England; noris it a dis—
pute between a government ale facto, and a government de jure. It
is the case of a division of powers, between two governments, made

by the people, to which both are responsible. Neither can dispense“
T with the duty which individuals owe to the other; neither can call

itself rmaster of the others: the people are masters of both. This di-
vision of power, it is true, -is in a great measure unknown in Europe.
It is the peculiar system of America; and, though new and singular,
it is not incomprehensible. The State constitutions are established
by the people of the States. This constitution is established by the
people of all the States. How, then, can a State secede? How can
a State undo What the whole people have done? How can she ab-
solve her citizens from their obedience to the laws of the United
States? How can she annul their obligations and oaths? How can
the members of her Legislature renounce their own oaths? Sir, se-
cession, as a revolutionary right, is intelligible; as a right to be pro-

32?

»claimed in the midst of civil commotions, and asserted at the head of

armies, I can understand it. But, as apractical right, existing under
the constitution, and in conformity with its provisions, it seems to
me to be nothing but a plain absurdity: for it supposes resistance to
Government, under the authority of Government itself; it supposes

dismemberment, without violating theiprinciples of union; it sup-

poses opposition to law, without crime; it supposes the violation of
oaths, without responsibility; it supposes the total overthrow of Go-
vernment, without revolution. '

The constitution, sir, regards itself as perpetual and immortal. It
seeks to establish a union among the people of the States, which shall
last through all time. Or, if the common fate of things human must
be expected, at some period, to happen to it, yet that catastrophe is
not anticipated.

The instrument contains ample provisions for its amendment, at all
times; none for its abandonment, atany time. It declares that new

. States may come into the Union, but it does not declare that old

States may go out. The Union is not a temporary partnership of
States. It is the association of the‘ people, under a constitution of
Government, uniting their power, joining together their highest inte-
rests, cementing their present enjoyments, and blending, in one
indivisible mass, all their hopes for the future. VVhatsoever is stead-
fast in just, political principles-«whatsoever is permanent in the struc-
ture of human society----whatsoever there is which can derive an endur-
ing character from being founded on deep laid principles of constitutional
liberty, and on the broad foundations of the public will, all these
unite to entitle this instrument to be regarded as a permanent consti-
tution of Government.

In the next place, Mr. President, I contend that there is a supreme
law of the land, consisting ofthe constitution, acts ofCongress passed
in pursuance of it, and the public treaties. This will not be denied,
because such are the very words of the constitution. But I contend
further, that it rightfully belongs to Congress, and to the courts of the
United States, to settle the construction of this supreme law, in doubt-
ful cases. This is denied; and here arises the great practical ques-
tion, W720 is to construefinally the constitution of the United States?
We all agree that the constitution the supreme law; but who
shall interpret that law? ‘In our systemfof the division of powers be-
tween different Governments, controversies will necessarily sometimes
arise, respecting the extent of the powers of each. Who shall decide
these controversies? Does it rest with the General Government, in
all or any of its departments, to exercise the oflice of final interpreter?
Or may each of the States, as well as the General Government, claim
this right of ultimate decision? The practical result of this whole de-
bate turns on this point. The gentleman contends that each State
may judge for itself of any alleged violation of the constitution, and

as

may finally decide for itself, and may execute its own decisions by its
own power. %All the recent proceedingsin South Carolina are founded
on this claim of right. Her convention has pronounced the revenue
laws of the United States unconstitutional; and this decision she does
not allow any authority of the United States to overrule or reverse. Of
course she rejects the authority of Congress, because the very object
of the ordinance is to reverse the decision ot'Congress; and she rejects,
too, the authority of the courts of the United States,because she ex-
pressly prohibits all appeal to those courts. It is in order to sustain
this asserted right of being her own judge, that sheipronounces the con—
stitution of the United States to be but a compact, to which she is a
party, and a sovereign party. If this be established, then the inference
is supposed to follow, that, being sovereign, there isno power to control
her decision, and her own judgment on her own compact is and must
be conclusive.

I have already endeavored, sir, to point out the practical conse—
quences of this doctrine, and to show how utterly inconsistent it is,
with all ideas of regular government, and how soon its adoption would
involve the whole country in revolution and absolute anarchy. I hope
it is easy nowto show, sir, that a doctrine, bringing such consequences
with it, is not wellfounded; that it has nothing to stand on but theory
and assumption; and that it is refuted by plain and express constitu-
tional provisions. I think the Government of the United States does
possess, -in its appropriate departments, the authority offinal decision
on questions of disputed power. Ithink it possesses this authority,

both by necessary implication, and by express grant. ~

It will not be denied, sir, that this authority naturally belongs to all
Governments. They all exercise it from necessity, and as a conse-

quence of the exercise of other powers.» The State Governments
themselves possess it, except in that class of questions which may arise

between them and the General Government, and in regard to which
they have surrendered it, as well by the nature of the case, as by clear

constitutional provisions. G In other and ordinary cases, whether a par-‘

ticular law be in cont'orrnity to the constitution of the State, is a ques-
tion which the State Legislature or the State Judiciary must determine.
We‘all know that these questions tarise daily in the State Governments,
and are decided by those Governments; and I know no Government
which does not exercise a similar power.

Upon general principles, then, the Government of the United States
possesses this authority; and this would hardly be denied, were it not
that there are other Governments. But since there are State Govern-
ments, and since these, like other Governments, ordinarily construe
their own powers, iflthe Government of the United States construes
its own powers also, which construction is to prevail, in the case of op-
posite constructions? And again, as in the case now actually before

‘:29

us, the State Governments may undertake, not only to construe their
own powers, but to decide directly on the. extent of the powers of Con--
gress. Congress has passed a law as being within its just powers;
SouthiCarolina denies that this law is within its just powers, and in-
siststliat she has the right so to decide this point, and that her decision

H is final. How are these questions to be settled?

In my opinion, sir, even if the constitution of the United States had
made no express provision for such cases, it would yet be difiicult; to
maintain that, in a constitution existing over four and twenty States,
with equal authority over all, one could claim a right of construing it for
the whole. This would seem a manifest impropriety--—-‘incleed, an ab-
surdity. Ifthe constitution is a government existing over all the States,
though with limited powers, it necessarily follows that, to the extentof

those powers, it must be supremef Ifit be not superior to the authority ‘

of a particular State, it is not a national (_i‘roV_ernnieI1t. lint  it is a
Government, as it has a legislative power of its own, and a judicial

G power‘coextensive with the legislative, the inference is irresistible, that

this Government, thus created by the whole, and for the whole, must
have an authority superior to that of the particular Government of any
one part. Congress is the"Legislature of all the people of the United
States; the Judiciary of the General Government is the Judiciary of all
the people of the United States. To hold, therefore, that this Legis-
lature and this Judiciary are subordinate in authority to the Legisla-

ture and Judiciary of a single State, is doing violence to all common J

sense, and overturning all established principles. , Congress must
judge of the extent of its own powers so often as it is called on to ex-
ercise them,or it cannot act at all; and it must also not independent of
Statecontrol, or it cannot act at all. r V
The right of State interposition Sl1I'lls'.8S at the very foundation of
the legislative power of Congress. It possesses no efihctive legis-
lative power, if such right of Stateiinterposition exists; because it
can pass no law not subject to abrogation‘. It cannot make laws for
the Union, ifany part of the Union may pronounce its enactments void
and of no etiiect. Its forms of legislation would be an idle ceremony,

‘if, after all, any one of four and twenty States might bid defiance

to its authority. ‘Without express provision in the constitution,
therefore, sir, this whole question is. n,ece,ssa1fily_ clecided by those
provisions which createiailegislative power and a judicial power.
If these_e.\*ist, in a Governmentrintended for the whole, the inevi-
table consequence is, that the laws of this legislative power, and
the decisions  this judicial power, must be binding onand over the
whole. No man can form. the conception of a Government existing

"over four and twenty States, with a regular legislative and judicial

power, and of the existence, at the sarnetime, of an authority, residing
elsewhere, to resist, at pleasure or discretion, the enactments and the
decisions of such a Government. I maintain, therefore, sir, that, from
the nature of the case, and as an inference wholly unavoidable, the

SO

acts of Congress, and the decisions of the national courts, must be of
higher authority than State laws and State decisions. If this be not
so, there is, there can be, no General Government.

But, Mr. President, the constitution has not left this cardinal point
without full» and explicit provisions. First, as to the authority of
Congress. Having enumerated the specific powers conferred on Con-
gress, the constitution adds, as a distinct and substantive clause, the
following, viz: “ To make all laws which shall. be necessary and pro-
per for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other
powers vested by this constitution in the Government of the United

States, "or in any department or ofiicer thereof.” If this means

any thing, it means that Congress may judge of the true extent
and just interpretation of the specific powers granted to it; and
may judge also of what is necessary and proper for executing those
powers. If Congress is to judge of what is necessary for the execu--
tion of its powers, it must, of necessity, judge of the extent and inter-
pretation of those powers.

And in regard, sir, to thejudiciary, the constitution is still more ex»

. press and emphatic. It declares that thejudicial powershall extencl to

all casesin law or equity arising under the constitution, laws of the Unit-
ed States, and treaties; that there shall be one Supreme Court, and that
this Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction of all these cases,
subject to such exceptions as Congress may make. It is impossible
to escape from the generality of these words. If a case arises under
the constitution, that is, if a case arises depending on the construction
of the constitution, the judicial power of the United States extends to
it. . It reaches the case, the question; it attaches the power of the
national judicature to the case itself, in Whatevercourt it may arise or
exist; and in this case the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction
over all courts whatever, ‘No language could provide with more
effect and precision, than is here done, for subjecting constitutional
questions to the ultimate decision of the Supreme Court. And, sir,
this is exactly what the convention found it necessary to provide for,

r and intended to provide for. It is, too, exactly what the people were

universally told was done when they adopted the constitution. One
of the first resolutions, adopted by the convention, was in these words,
viz: “that the jurisdiction of the national judiciary shall extend to
cases which respect the collection of the national revenue, and ques-
tions which involve the national peace and harmony.” ' Now, sir,
this either had no sensible meaning at all, or else it meant that the ju--
risdiction of the national judiciary should extend to these questions.
-with a paramount authority. It is not to be supposed that the conven-
tion intended that the power of the national judiciary should extend
to these questions, and that the judicatures of the States should also
extend to‘ them, with equal power qffinal decision. This would be

 31

-to defeat the whole object of the provision. There were thirteen ju-

dicatures already in existence. The evil complained of, or the danger
to be guMa.rd"el:l against, was contradiction and repugnance in the deci-
sio_,n,s~o't' these judicatures. If the framers of the constitution meant to

altiiciiieate a fourteenth, and yet not to give it power to revise and control

the decisions of the existing thirteen, then they only intended to aug-
ment the existing evil, and the apprehended danger, by increasing, still

further, the chances ofdiscordant judgments. Why, sir, has it become A

a settled axiom in politics, that every Grovernment_must have a judi~—
cial power co-extensive with its legislative power? Certainly, there
is only this reason, viz: that the laws may receive a uniform interpre-
tation, and a uniform execution. This object can be no otherwise
attained. A statute is what it is judicially interpreted to be; and if it
be construed one way in New Hampshire, and another way in Georgia,
there is no uniform law. One Supreme Court, with appellate and final

jurisdiction, is the natural and only adequate means, in any Govern»

ment, tosecure”this"iinitbrmitly. The convention saw all this clearly;

and the resolution which I have quoted, never afte1*w”ai"d”s““res”6lii?iitliie(.l,i

passed through various modifications, till it finally received the form
which the article now wears in the constitution. It is undeniably true,
then, that the framersof the constitution intended to create a national
judicial power, which should be paramount, on national subjects. And
after the constitution was framed, and while the whole country was
engaged in discussing its merits, one of its most distinguished advo-
cates, (Mr. Madison) told the people, that it was true that, in con-
troversies relating to the boundary between the two _jzm'sdictions, the
tribunal which is ultirnately to decide is to be e.s-tablzls/zecl under the
General Government. ,Mr. Martin, who had been a member of the
convention, asserted the same thing to the Legislature of Maryland,
and urged it as a reason for rejecting the constitution. Mr. Pinckney,
himself also a leading member of the convention, declared it to the
people of South Carolina. Everywhere, it was admitted, by friends
and foes, that this power was in the constitution. By some it was
thought dangerous, by most it was thought necessary; but, by all, it
was agreed to be a power actually contained in the instrument.
The convention saw the absolute necessity of some control in the
National Government over State laws. Difi”'erent modes‘ of esta-
blishing this control were suggested and considered. At one time it
was proposed that the laws of the States should, from time to time,

be laid before Congress, and that Congress should possess a negative“.

over them. But this was thought inexpedient and inadmissible; and

it in its place, and expressly as a substitute for it, the existing provision

was introduced; that is to say, a provision by which the federal
Courts should have authority to overrule such State laws as might be

in manifest contravention ofithe constitution. Therwriters of the

7/”

Federalist, in explaining the constitution, while it was yet pleading h

before" the people, and -still unadopted, give this account of the m_atter

in terms, and assign this reason for the article as it now stands. By

a lZ:l_1l§ provision Congress escaped from the necessity of any revision of,

State laws, left the whole sphere of State legislation quite untouched,
and yet obtained a security against any infringement of the con--
stitutional power of the General Government. Indeed,‘ sir, allow

.me to ask again, if, the national judiciary was not to exercise a pow-

er of revision, on constitutional questions, over the judicatures of
the States, why was any national judicature erected at all? Can any
man give. a sensible reason for having a judicial power in this
G.o‘vernment,, unless it be forthe sakeof maintaining. a uniformity
of decision, on questions arisingliundter the constitution and laws of
Congress, and insuring its execution? And does not this very idea of
uniformity necessarily imply that the construction given by the na-
tional courts is to be the prevailing construction? How else, sir, is
it possible that uniformity can be preserved? ,

Gentlemen appear to me, sir, to look at butone side ofthe question.
They regard only the supposed danger of trusting a Gover.nxnentivith
the interpretation of its own powers. But will they view the question
in its other aspect; willishey show us how it is possible for a Govern»
ment to get along with four and twenty interpreters of its laws and
powers? Gentlemen argue, too, as if, in these cases, the State would
be aiways right, and the General Government always wt-one‘. But,
supptise the reverse; suppose the State wrong, and, since they differ,
some of them must be wrong, are the most important and essential
operations of the Government to be embarrassed and arrested, because
one State holds a contrary opinion? . Mr. President, every ianguinent
which refers the constitutionality of acts of Conegress to State deci-
sion, appealsfronithe majority to the minority; it appeals from the
common interest to aparticular interest; from the councils of all to

the council of one; and endeavors to supersede the judgment of the
l - whole by the judgment ofa part. . ‘

I think it is clear, sir, that the constitution, by express provision, by
deiinite and unequivocal" words, as "well as by necessary implication,
has constituted the Supreme Court of the United States the appellate
tribunal in all cases ofa constitutional nature which assume the shape
of a suit, in law or equity. And I think I cannot do better than to
leave this part of the subject by reading the remarks made upon it by
Mr. Ellsworth, in the Convention of Connecticut; a gentleman, sir,‘

who has left behind him, on the records of the Government ofwhisrt 

country, proofs of the clearest intelligence and of tl1e,deepestt'”i.s2iWEalc:ity,
as well as of the utmost purity and integrity of character. “ This

constitution,” says he, “ defines the extent of the powers of the Gene-s

ral Government. If the General Legislature should, at any time,

l or

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as it a,

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everleap their limits, the judicial departtnent ish constitutional phecki; "
If the United States go beyond theirtpowe1~s5. if they make a law whicli
the constitution does not authorize}, it is void 3‘ and the judiciary power,-

the nation-elrjudges,:aVl1o, to secure their jimpalptiality, are to be -made»
independent, will declare it to be void. On” the other hand, if the

States go beyond ~thsliir limits; if tiipeypniake a law which is a usurpa-
tion upon the General Government, the law is: void, and upright, in‘--~
dependent judges will declare it to base.” 1, so

And let me now only add, sir, that, in the very fil'SiZ session of the
first Congress, with all these Well known objects, both__of the Conven-
tion and the people, full andfresh in his mind, Mr. Ellsworth reported
the bill, as is generally undersjtoocl, for the organization of the judicial
department, and, in that bill, made provision for the exercise of this
appellate power of the ,_Supreme Court,- in all the proper cases, in
whatsoever court arising,-, and that this appellate power has now
been exert;,jsed,.for more than forty years, without interruption, and
without doubt; a i

As to the cases, sir, which do not come before the courts, those po-
litical questions whichjterminate with the enactments of Congress, it
is of necessity that these should be ultimately decided by Congress
itself. Like other Legislatures, it must be trusted with this power.
The members of Congress are chosen by the people, and they
are answerable to the people; like other public agents, they are
bound by oath to support the constitution. These are the securities
that they will not violate their duty, nor transcend their powers.

They are the same securities as prevail in other popular Governments; M

nor is it easy to see how grants of power canjjjbe more safely guarded,
without rendering them nugatory. If the case cannot come before

thercourts, and if Congress be not trusted with its decision, who shall i

decide it? The gentleman says, each State is to decide it for herself.
If so, then, as I have already urged, what is law in one State is not
law in another. Or, if the resistance of one State compels an entire.
repeal of the law, then a minority, and mate small one, governs the
Whole country. in "p ‘ 

Sir, those who espouse the doctrines of nullification, reject, as it
seems to me, the first great principle of all republican liberty; that is,
that the majority must govern. In matters of common concern, the

, judgment of a majority must stand as the judgment of the whole. This

is a law imposed on us by the absolute necessity of the case; and if
lwejtlrropnot actlupon it, there is no possibility of maintaining any Go-
vernnient but despotism. We hear loud and repeated denunciations

“against what is -called majority government. It is declared, with

much warmth, that a majority government cannot be maintained in
the United States. ‘What, then, do gentleman wish? Do they wish

i to establish a minority government? Do they wish to subject the will

0

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34

of the many to thewill of thefewi   The honorable gentleman from:
South Carolina has spoken of absolute majorities, and majorities clon-
current; language wholly unknownto our constitution, and to which
it is not easy to atlix definite‘ ideas. As far as I understand it, it
would teach us that the absolute mqjorz'zfy may be found in Congress,

but the mcy'o.rity concurrent must be looked for inthe States. That

is to say, sir, stripping the matter of this novelty of phrase, that the
dissent of one ‘or more States, as States, renders void the decision of a
majority of Congress, so far as that State is concerned. And so
this doctrine, running but a short career, like other dogmas of the
day, terminates in n'ull‘ification.

If i this veherncnt invectijve against mry'o7'ities meant no more than
tliat,.in the ~consti1'u,ctionl~ *G1overnmentl[, ittllis wise to provide checks
and balances, so that there should be various ,limitations on the power
of the mere majority, it would only mean what the constitution of the
United States has already abundantly provided. It is full of such
checks and balances. In its very 0l"gi1IllZ3.lIl0I1, it adopts a broad and
most effectual principle in restraint of the power of mere majorities.
A majority of the people elects the House of Representatives, but it
does not elect the Senate. The Senate i_s elected by the States, each
State having, in this respect, an equal power; Nolaw, therefore, can
pass, without the assent of a majority of the Representatives of the

people, and a majority of the Representatives of the States also. A _

majority of the Representatives of the people must concur, and a ma-
jority of the States must concur, in every act of Congress; and the
President is elected on a plan compounded of both these principles.
But, having composed one House of Representatives chosen by the
people in each State, ac'c‘o1'dingf to_ its numbers,and. the other, of an
equal number or members from every State, whether larger or smaller,
the constitution gives to majorities in these Houses, thus constituted,
the full and entire.poWe1'ofpassi‘n,e,' laws, subjectalways to the consti-
tutional restrictions, and to the approval of the President. To sub«-
ject them to any other power, is clear usurpation. The majority of
one ‘House may be controlled by the majority of the other; and both

, may be ~restrai,ned.by the President’s negative. Theseiare checks and

balancesprovided by the constitution, existing in the Government
itself, and wisely intended to secure deliberation and caution in legis-
lative procerecliiigs. But to resist the will of the majority in both
Houses, thus constitutionally exercised; to insist on the lawfulness
of interposition by an extraneous power; to claim the right of defeating
the will of Congress, by setting up against‘ it the will of a single State,

1 is neither more nor less, as it strikes me, than a plain attempt to over-

throw. the Government. p The constituted authorities of the United
States are no longera Government, if they be not masters of their

own will; they ase no longera Governnienti, if an external powerrnay r

‘S5

arrest their proceedings; they are no longer a Government, i if acts
passed by both Houses, and approved by the President, may be nulli-

fied by State vetos or State ordinances. Does any one suppose it

could inakei any ditiieretice, as to the binding authority of an act of
Congress, and of the duty of a State to respect it‘, whether it passed
by a mere majority of both Houses, or by three-fourths of each, or the
unanimous vote of each? ‘Within the limits and restrictions of the
constitution, the Government of the United States, like all other
popular Governments, acts by majorities. It can act no otherwise.
Whoever, therefore, denounces the Government of majorities, de-
nounces the GOV€l‘I11D.€1'1l2 of his own country, and denounces all free
Governments. And whoever would restrain thesermajorities, while
acting within their constitutional limits, by an external power, what-
ever he may intend, asserts principles which, if adopted, can lead to
nothing else than the destruction of the Government itself,

Does not the gentleman perceive,» sir, how his argument against
majorities might here be retorted upon him"? Does he not see how co-
gently he might be aslted, whe.th'er it be the character of nullificationt
to practise what it preaches? Loci; to South Carolina, at the presen
moment. How far are the rights «of minorities there respected? I
confess, sir, I have not known, in peaceable times, the power of the
majority carried with a higher l and, or upheld with more relentless

disregard of the rights, feelings, and principles of the minority: a-

minority, embracing, as the gentleman himse‘ll' will admit, a large por-
tion of the worth and respectability of the State; a minority, com-
prehending, in its numbers, men who have been associated with him,
and with us, in these halls of legislation; men who have served their
country at home, and honored it abroad; men who would cheerfully
lay down their lives for their native State, in any cause which they
could regard as the cause of honor and duty; men above fear, and
above _repro‘ach 5 whose deepest grief and distress spri1‘t_g from the con-

viction, that the present proceedings of the State must ‘ultimately re- ~

1‘leot,,discredit uponher: how is this mintority, how are these‘ men
regarded? They are enthralledand disliranchised by ordinances and
acts of legislation; subjected to tests and oaths, incompatible, as they
conscientiously think, with oaths already talten, and obligations al-

ready assumed; they are pl“O§3CI'll):et.li  denounced, as recreants to
duty and patriotism, and slaves to a~fore,ign‘fPovver: both the spirit

which pursues them, and the positive ineasureswhich emanate from
that spirit, are _harsh and prescriptive, beyond all precedent within my
knowledge, except in periods oi sroliessed revolution. A g

It is not, sir, one would think, for those who approve these proceed-
ings, to complain of the power of majorities.

Mr. President, all popular Governments rest on two principles, or
two assumptions: i ’

36

First, That there is so far a common interest, among those over
whom the Government extends, as that it mayprovide for the defence,
protection, and good government of the whole, without injustice or”
oppression to parts. - i S

Second, That the representatives of the people, and especially the
people, themselves, are secure against general corruption, and may
be trusted, therefore, with the exercise ofpower. l i

Whoever argues against these ptinciples, argues against the practi-— r

cability of all free Governments. And whoever admits these, must.
admit, or cannot deny, that power is as safe in the hands of Congress
as in those of other representative bodies. Congress is not irrespon-
sible. Its‘ members are agents of the people, elected by them, an-
swerable to them, and ilziable to be idis“placed‘o"r superseded at their
pleasure; and they possess as fair a claim to the confidence of the pee»
ple, while they continue to deserve it, as any other public political
agents.

If, then, sir, the manifest intention of the convention, and the cotem-
porary admission of both friends and foes, prove any thing 3, if the plain
text of the instrument itself, as well as the necessary implication from
other provisions, prove any thing; if the early legislation of Congress,
the course of jud'ici'al decisions, acquiesced in by all the States for
forty years, prove any thing, then it is proved that there is a supreme

law, and a final interpreter.

My fourth, and last proposition, Mr. President, was, that any at»
tempt by a State to abrogate or nullify acts of Congress, is a usurpa-
tion on the powers of the General Government, and on the equal rights
of other States, a violation of the co.nstitution,and a proceeding essen-
tially revolutionary. This is undoubtedly true, if the preceding propo-
sitions be regarded as proved. If the Government of the United States
be trusted with the duty, in any department, of declaring the extent of
its own powers, then a State ordinance, or act of legislation, autho.-
rizing resistance to an act of Congress, on the alleged ground of its
unconstitutionality, is manifestly a usurpation upon its powers,

haveequal rights, in" matters concerning the whole,

  up her judgmlent againstthe judgmental _ of t the
rest, and to insist on exgecuting that judgment by force,is also a rnani-

3

a test usurpation on the rights of other States. A

If the constitution of the United States he aGovernment proper,
with authority to pass laws, and to give them a uniform interpretation
and execution, then the interposition of a State, to enforce her own
construction, and to resist, as to herself, that law which binds the
other States, is a violation of the constitution. t G

And if that be revolutionary which arrests the legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial power of Government, dispenses with existing oaths
and obligations of obedience, and elevator another power to supreme»

317

dominion, then nullification is revolutionary. Or if that be revolu-
tionary, the natural tendency and practical effect of which is to break
the Union into fragments, to sever all connexion among the people of
the respective States,“ and to prostrate this General Government in the
dust, then nullification is revolutionary. "
,‘Nullification, sir, is as distinctly revolutionary as secession; but I
cannot say that the revolution which it seeks is one of so respectable
a character. Secession would, it is true, abandon the -constitution al-
together; but then., it would profess_to abandon it. Whatever other
inconsistencies it might run into, one, at least, it would avoid. It
would not belong to a Government, while it rejected its authority. It
would not repel. the burden, and continue to enjoy the benefits. It
would not aid in passing laws which others are to obey, and yet reject
their authority, as toitself. It would not undertake to reconcile obe-
dience to Phblic autliority, with an asserted right of command over
that samegauthority.~. It would not be in the Government, and above

‘ the Government, at the same time. ‘ But, however more respectable a

mode secession may be, it is not more truly revolutionary than the
actual ‘execution of the doctrines of nullification. Both, and each,
resist the constitutional authorities; both, and each, would sever the
Union, and subvert the Government.

Mr. President, having detained the Senate so long already, I will
not now examine, at length, the ordinance and laws of South Carolina.
These papers are well drawn for their purpose. Their authors un-

i derstood their own objects, They are called a peaceable remedy, and

we have been told that South Carolina, after all, intends nothing but
a law-suit. A very few words, sir, will show the nature of this
peaceable remedy, and of the law-‘suit which South Carolina con-
templates. ,
‘the first place, the ordinance declares the law of last July, and
allother laws of the United States, laying duties, to be absolutely null
and void; and makes it unlawful for the constituted authorities of the
United States to enforce the payment of such duties. It is, therefore,
sir, an indictable offence, at this moment, in South Carolina, for any
person to be concerned in collecting revenue, under the laws of the
United States. a It being declared unlawful to collect these duties by
what is considered a fundamental law of the State, an indictment lies,
of in course, against any one concerned in such collection,‘ and he is, on
general principles,'liable to be punished by fine and imprisonment. The
terms, it is true, are, that it is unlawful “ to enforce the payment of
duties;” but every custom—house oflicer enforces payment while he de-
tains the goods, in order to obtain such payment. The ordinance,
therefore, reaches every body concerned in the collection of the duties.
This is the first step in the prosecution of the peaceable remedy.
The second’ is more decisive. By the act, commonly called the re-

SS

plevin law, any person, whose goods are seized or detained the
collector for the payment of duties, may sue out a writ of replevin,

’ and, by virtue of that writ, the goods are to be restored to him. A
it writ‘of replevin, is a writ which the sheriff is bound to execute, and

for the execution of which, he is bound to employ force, if necessary.
He may call out the posse, and must do so, if resistance be made.
This posse may be armed or unarmed. It may come fortliyvi-tl1 mili-
tary array, and under the lead ofimiliitary men. ‘Whatever number
of troops may be assembled in Charleston, they may be summoned,
with the Governor, or commander-in—chief, at their head, to " come in
aid of the sheriff. It is evident, then, sir, that the whole military
power of the State is tobe employed, whenever necessary, in dis-
possessing the customdionselro‘fiicser‘s,t and in seizing and holding the

goods, without paying the duties. This is the second step in the

peaceable remedy.
“Sir, whatever pretences may be set up to the contrary, this is the

direct application of force, and of military force. It is un"lawful, in

itself, to replevy goods in the custody of the collectors. But this un-
lawful act is to be "done, andit is to be done by power. Here is a
plain interposition, by physical force, to resist the laws of the Union.
The legal mode of collecting; duties is to detain the goods till such
duties are paid or secured. But force comes, and overpowers the col-
lector, and his assistants, and takes away the goods, leaving the
duties unpaid. There cannot be a clearer case of forcible resistance
to law. And it is providedtl‘1atthe goods thus seized shall be held
against any attempt to retake them, by the same force which seized
them. i it i r i  " t ’ c
Having thus dispossessed the oflicers of the Government of the
goods, without payment of duties, and seized and securedthem by

r the strong arm of the ‘State, only one thing more remained to be done,

5

and that is, to cut ofi' all possibility of
accomplished, or thought to be accomplished. The ordinance de-
clares, that all jmlicial p7*oceedz'ngs,fozz2zde(Z on the revenue laws,
(iinclutling, of “course, proceedings inlthe courts of ttlie-United States,)
s_hall.i 'Be=t'§n:*ulZtrl   A  ,
United States.‘ ‘Then’comes ;the test-—oath“ act.’ “This  all
State judges and jurors in the State courts to swear that they will
execute the ordinance, and all acts of the Iuzgislature passed in pur-
suance thereof. The ordinalicepdeclares, that no appeal shall be al-
lowed from the decision of the State courts to the Supreme Court of
the United States; and the repleyinact makes it an inclictableoffence
‘fortany clerk to furnish_ a copy of the record, for the ‘purpose of such
appeah i "ii. i l r «t

 

 r The two principal provisions on which South Carolina relies, to re-

sist the laws of the United States; and nullify litheautliorityrrof this
Government, are, therefore, these: , _

legal redress; and that, too, is y

89

1. Aforcibleseizure of goods, beforeduties are paid or secured, by
the_ power of the State, civil and military. M 
l  The taking away, by "the most effectual means in herypower,
of all legal redress in the courts of the United States; the confining
all judicial proceedings toher own State tribunals; and the compel-

ling of her judges and jurors of these, her own courts, to take an oath, U

"beforehand, that they will decide all cases according to the ordinance,
and the acts passed under it; that is, that they will decide the cause
one Way. They do not swear to try it, on its own merits; they only

~ swear to clecide it, as nullific/ation requires. r

V The character, sir, of these provisions, defies connnenlt. Their ob-
ject is as plain as their means are extraordinary. They propose di-
rect resistance, by the whole power of the State, to laws of Congress,

and cut oft", by methods deemed adequate, any redress by legal and ~

judicial authority. They arrest legislation, defy the Executive, and

T “’~bcmz'shr‘rrttl1e judicial power of this Government. They authorize and

-comtnand acts to be done, and done by force, bothof {numbers and
of arms‘, Wlllcll, if done, and done by force, are clearly acts of rebel-
lion and treason. ‘ i

Such, sir, are the laws of South Carolina; such, sir, is the peaceable
remedy of nullification. Has not nullification reached, sir, even thus
early, that point of direct and forcible resistance to law, tovvhicli I inti-

U mated, three years ago, it plainly tended?

And now, Mr. President, what is the reason for passing laws like
these? Whattare the oppressions experienced, under the Union, call-
ing for measures which thus threaten to sever and destroy it? Wliat
invasions of public liberty, what ruin to private happiness, what long
iist of rights violated, or wrongs unredressed, is to justify to the coun-
try, to posterity, and to the world, this assault upon the free consti-
tution of the United States, this great and glorious work of our fathers?

‘At this very moment, sir, the whole land smiles in peace, and rejoices

in plenty. A general and a high prosperity pervades the country;
and, judging -by the‘ common standard, by increase of population and
vvealth; or, judging by the opinions of that portion of her people not
embarked in those dangerous and desperate measures, this prosperity
overspreads South "Carolina herself.

“ it Tihus,_happy at home, our country, at the same -time, holds high the
~character. of her i~.nstitu=tions, ‘her ‘power, ‘her: rapid growth, and other

__future destiny, in the eyestof all foreign States. “One danger, only,
e:~c-sates hesitation; one doubt only exists, to darken the otherwise un-

elouded brightness of that aspect, which she exhibits to the view, and
to the admiration, of the world. Need I say, that that doubt respects

A the permanency ofiour Union; and need I say, that that doubt is now i

caused, more than by any thing else, by these very proceedings of
South Carolina? Sir, all Europe is, at this moment, beholding us,

40

and looking for the issue of this controversy; those who ‘hate free in- 
stitutions, with malignant hope; those who love them, with deep anxie-

ty and shiveringfear. . .  ,. ,-
r The cause, then, sir, the cause! Let the world know the cause, which
has thus induced one State of the Union to sbid defiance to the
power of the whole__, and openly to talk of secession. ,
Sir, the world will scarcely believe that this whole controversy,
and all the desperate measures which its support requires, have

' no other foundation than a difierence of “ opinion, upon aprovision

of the constitution, between a majority of the people of South Caro-
lina, on one side, and a vast majority of the whole people of the
United States, on the other. i It will not credit the fact, it will not
admit «the possibility, (that, inpanlenlightenediage, in a*free popular
republic, under a Government where the people govern, as they must
always govern, under such systems, by majorities, at a time of un—
precedentc<.l happiness, without practical oppression, without. evils,
such as may not only be pretended, but felt and experiencetl; evils,
not sliglit or temporary, but deep, permanent, and intolerable 5 a single
State should rush into confiict with all the rest, attempt to put down
the power of the Union by her own laws, and to support those laws
by her military power, and thus break up and‘ destroy the world’s
last hope. And well the world may be incredulous. ‘ We who
see and hear it, can ourselves hardly yet believe it. Even after all
that had preceded it, this ordinance struck the country with amaze-
ment. It was incredible and inconceivable, that South Carolina should
thus plunge lieadlong into resistance to the laws, on a matter of
opinion, andpn a question in which the preponderance of opinion, both
of the present day anchof all past time, was so overwhelmingly, against
her. The ordinance declares that Congress has exceededrits just

power, by laying duties on imports, intended for the protection of
.manufactures. This is the opinion of South Carolina; and on the
,s,trength of that opinion she nullifies the laws. Yet has the rest of

the country no right to its opinion also? Is one State to sit sole

larbitressi‘ She maintains that those laws are plain, deliberate, and

it to decide this'matter;  

palpable lviolatiotus   cons:    serereisn right‘
 U   U a, so idlecidedi, ‘she i‘si‘author-izzed
to resist their execution, by her own sovereign power; and she de—-
clares that she will resist it, thouggh such resistance should shatter
the Union into atoms. ‘ V .

Mr. President, I do not intend to discuss the propriety of these

    

~ laws, at large: but I will ask, how are they shownto be thus plainly

and ‘palpably unclonstitutionali Have they no countenance, at all, in
the constitution itselt"P* Are they quite new in the history of the Go-

vernment? “Are they a sudden and violent usurpation on the rights

of the States? Sir, what will the civilized world say, what will pos~

41

terity say, whenpthey learn -that similar laws have existed from the

very foundationof the Government; that for thirty years the power » i

was never questioned; and that no State in the Union has more freely‘
. and unequivocally admitted it than South Carolina herself?

. To. lay and-collect duties and imposts, is an ea3P’""3s Ziowe"? g"a“ied
by the constitution to Congress. It is, also, an 337d“3’W“-’ 130w3’"_5 for
the constitution as expressly prohibits all the States from exercising
it themselves. This express and exclusive power IS -Ul'lllm1t€C.l In the
terms of the grant, but is attended with two sPeC1fiC 1“~’35t"1°t1°n3‘
first,’ that all duties and imposts shall be equal in all theStates; sef
cond, that no duties shall be laid on exports. The power, then, being
granted,.and being attended with these two restrictions, and no more,
Who is to impose a third restriction on the g;eneral words of the grant?
If the power to lay duties, as known among.-all other IIMIOIJS, and as
known in all our history, and as it was perfectly understood when the

~4*-W-~+t:'ort1s.titution was ad~opted,:includes a right of discriminating, while

exercising the power, and of laying some duties heavier, and SOYIIO
lighter, for the sake of encouraging our own domestic products, what
authority is there for giving to the words used in t‘”
new, narrow, and unusual meaning? All the 1i11‘1i’Efifi011S Whicllw the
constitution intended, it has expressed; and What it has left Unre-
stricted, is as mucha part of its will, as the restraints which it has
imposed.  i ’ i .
But these laws, it is said, are unconstitutional on account of the
motive. I-low, sir, can a law be examined on any such ground? How
is themoti-ve to be ascertained? One House, or one member, may have
one motive; the other House, or another member, another. . One mo-
tive may operate to—day, and another to-morrow. Upon any such
mode of reasoning as this, one law might be unconstitutional now,
and another law, in exactly the same words, perfectly constitutional
‘ next year. Besides, articles may not only be taxed, for the purpose
of prrotecting home products, but other articles may be left free, for,
the same purpose, and with the same motive. A law, therefore, would
become unconstitutional from what it omitted, as well as what it con—
tained. Mr. President, it is a settled principle, acknowledged in all
legislative halls, recognised before all tribunals, sanctioned by the
general senseand understanding of mankind, that there‘ can be no
inquiry into the ‘motives of those who pass “laws "for the purpose of
determining on their validity.* If the law be within-the fair meaning
of the words in the grant of the power, its authority must be admitted
until it is repealed. This rule, everywhere acknowledged, every
where admitted, is so universal, and so completely without exception,
as that even an allegation of fraud, in the majority ofa Lregisilature, is ,
not allowed as a ground to set aside a law. , i t l
But, Si:‘, is it true, that the motive for these laws is such as is stated?

ne constitution a 

453

I think, not. The great object of all these laws is, unquestionably,
REVENUE. If there were no occasion for revenue, the laws would
not have been passed; and it is notorious that almost the entire reve-

’"nue of the country is derived from them. And, as yet, we have col-
lected none too much revenue. The treasury has not been more ex-

hausted for many years than at the present moment." All that South
Carolina can say is, that, in passing the laws which she now under-

takes to nullify, _7Jar2.’2'c'u,Zcu' articles were fasted from a regard to the it

protect2'on of domestic articles, lziglzer than they would have been had
no such regczra? been enzferzninecl. And she insists that, according to the
constitution, no such discrimination can be allowed; that duties should
be laid for revenue. and revenue only; and that it is unlawful to have
reference, in any case, to-"protection. In other vvords,"she denies the
power of DISC}-“CIMINATION. She does not, and cannot, complain of
excessive taxation; on the contrary, she professes to be willing to pay
any amount for revenue, merely as revenue; and up to the present
moment there is no surplus of revenue. Her grievance, then, that
plain and palpable violation of the constitution which she insists has
taken place, is simply the exercise of the power of DISCRIMINATION.
Now, sir, is the exercise of this power of discrimination plainly and
palpably unconstitutional? .

I have already said, the power to lay duties is given by the con
stitution in broad and general terms. There is also conferred on
Congress the whole power of regulating commerce, in another dis~
tinct provision. Is it clear and palpable, sir, can any man say,‘
it is a case, beyond doubt, that, under these two powers, Congress
may not justly d’l:SCT?i7n?:7’l.al8, in laying duties for the purposelof
comzlervailing the policy of foreign nations, or of favoring our
own home productions? Sir, what ought to conclude this question
forever, as it would seem to me, is, that the regulation of commerce,
and the imposition of duties, are, in all commercial nations, powers
avowedly and constantly exercised for this very end. That unde-
niable truth ought to settle the question; because the constitution

ought to be considered, when it uses well known l'anguage, aslusing
it inits well. 7known rsenlse. , But it isaequallyy ,;un_deniable,ithat‘ it has i

seen, from the very first, fully believed that this power of discrim'ina~
tion was conferred on Congress; and the constitution was itself re-
commended, uxggetl upon the people, and enthusiastically insisted on,
in: some of the States, for that very reason. Not that, at that time,
the countrywas extensively engaged in manufactures, especially of
those kinds now existihv. But the trades and craftsof the “seaport
towns, the business of the artizans, and manual laborers, those em-
ployrnents, the work in which supplies so great a portion of the daily
wants of all classes, all these looked to the new constitution as a
source of relief from the severe distress which followed tlieivvar. It

'3

4s

would, sir, be unpardonable, at so late an hour, to go into details on p

this point; but the, truth is "has I have stated. 'I‘he papers of the day,
the resolutions of public meetings, the debates in the conventions, all
that we open our eyes upon, in the history of the times, prove it.
Thelhonorable gentleman, sir, from South Carolina, has referred to
two incidents connected with the proceedings of the Convention at
Philadelphia, which he thinks are evidence to show that the power of
protecting manufactures, by laying duties, and by commercial regu~
lations, was not intended to be given to Congress. ~ The first is, as he
says, that a power to protect manufactures was expressly proposed,
but not granted. I think, sir, the “gentleman is quite mistaken in re-
lation to this part of the proceedings of the Convention. The whole
history of the Occurrence to which he alludes is simply this: Towards
the conclusion of the Convention, after the provisions of the constitu—
tion tad been tiigpiglxggreecl upon,‘ after the power to lay duties and

)$§v1‘4‘lPT‘r”i‘F,'i:t’I“i’rli¥d:ii*‘lfi.l»‘l;~!:;‘ilui’i3i¢@«1§),:

wM’dM1evipotvet' to :~egd’late  teypglga long list of
propositions was made, and referred to the committee, ciiiifaiiiiiig va-
rious miscellaneous powers, some or all of which it was thought might
be properly vested in Congress. Among these, was a power to esta-

ii blish a university; to grant charters of incorporation; to regulate stage
coaches on the post roads; and also the power to which the gentleman
refers, and which is expressed in these words: “ To establish public
institutions, rewards, and iinmunities, for the protnotion of agriculture,
commerce, trades, and manufactures.” The committee made no re—
port on this or various other propositions in the same list. i But the
only inference from this emission is, that neither the committee nor the
Convention thought itproper to authorize Congress “ to establish pub-
lic institutions, rewards, and imvnun-flies” for the promotion of man u-
factures, and other interests. The Convention supposed it had done
enough, at any rate it had done all it intended, when, 'iti~had given to
Congress, in general terms, the power to lay iinposts and the power
to regulate trade. It is not to be argued‘, from its omission to give
more, that it meant to take back what it had already given. It had
given the impost power; it had given the regulation of trade; and it
did not deem it necessary to give the t'nrther anti distinct power of
establishing public institutions. , '

The other fact, sir, on which the gentletnan relies, is itlieideclaratioti C

of Mr. Martin tn? the Legi‘slat,urelof Maryland. The gentleman sup-
pgges M r. Martin to have urged, against_th_e constitution, that it did not
ct>ntiiiiiii‘“lt‘lie power of protection. But, if the gentleman will look again

at what Mr. Martin said, he will find, I think, that what Mr. Martin
complained of was, that the constitution, by its prohibitions on the

C States, had taken away from the States themselves the power of pro-
tecting their own manufactures by duties on imports. This is un-

doubtedly true; but I findno expression of Mr. Martin intimating ,

' which it had thus taken from the States.

44

that the constitution had not conferred on Congress the same power

 

But, sir, let us go to the first Congress; let us look in upon this and
the other House, at the first session of their organization.

We see in both Houses, men, distinguished among the framers,
friends, and advocates of the constitution. We see in both those who
had drawn, discussed, and matured the instrument in the Convention.
explained and defended it before the people, and were now elected
members of Congress to put the new Government into motion, and
to carry the powers of the constitution into beneficial execution.

At the head of the Government was Wasnxncrron himself, who had
been President of the Convention, and in his cabinet were others most
thoroughly acquaintedwith_thei history of the constitution, and dis-
tinguished for the part taken in its discussion.

If these persons were not acquainted with the meaning of the con»
stitution; if they did not understand the work of their own hands,
who can understand it, or who shall now interpret it to us? i

Sir, the volume which records the proceedings and debates of the
first session of the House of Representatives, lies before me. I open
it, and -I find that, having provided for the administration of the ne-
cessary oaths, the very first measure proposed for consideration is,
the laying of imposts; and in the very fitst Committee of the Wliole

into which the House of Representatives ever resolved itself, on this A
its earliest subject, and in this its very first debate, the duty of so  

laying the irnposts, as to encourage manufactures, was advanced, and
enlarged upon, by almost every speaker, and doubtediordenied by none.
The first gentleman who suggests this as the clear duty of Congress,
and as an object necessary to be gttended to, is Mr. Fitzsimons, of
Pennsylvania; the second, Mr. VVhite of Vxnemra; the third, Mr.
Tucker, of SOUTHOAROLINA. i

But the great leader, sir, on this occasion, was Mr. Madison. Was
he likely to know the intentions of the Convention and the people?
Was he likely to understand the constitu tionf’ l

Atthe second sitting of the committee, Mr. Madison explained his
own opinions yeti the duty of ®en?gnessl,; fully and explri-eitlryi. I must
not detain you, sir, with more than a few“ short extracts from these
opinions, but they are such as are clear, intelligible, and decisive.

“ The States,” says he, “‘ that are most advanced in population, and a

ripe for manufactures, ought to have their particular interest attended
to, in somedegree. VVhile these States retained the power of mak-
ing regulations of trade, they had the power to cherish such institu-
tions. By adopting the present constitution, they have thrown the

exercise of this power into other bands; they must have done this with
i an expectation that those interests would not be neglected here.”
In another report of the same speech, Mr. Madison is represented A

45

as using still stronger language; as saying, that the constitution, having
taken this power away from the States, and conferred it on Congress,
it would be a fraud on the States and on the people were Congress to
refuse to exercise ‘it. i T
Mr. Madison argues, sir, on this early and interesting occasion,
very justly and liberally in favor of the general principles of unrestrict-
ed commerce. But he argues also, with equal force and clearness, for

a certain important exceptions to these general principles.

The first, sir, respects those manufactures which had been brought
forward under encouragement by the State Governments. “ It would
be cruel,” says Mr. Madison, “ to neglect them, and to divert their
industry into other channels, forit is not possible for the hand of man
to shift from one employment to another without being injured by the
change.” (Again: “There may becisiome manufactures which, being

it   n i . s perfection without any adventitious
aid; while others, for we   , t,_will
be unable to go on at all. Legislative provision, therefore, will be
necessary to collect the proper objects for this purpose; and this will
form another exception to my general principle.” And again: “The

   

T next exception that occurs is one on which great stress is laid by some

well-informed men, and this with great plausibility: that each nation
shouldhave, within itself, the mean,s_ of defence, independent of for-

eign“ supplies; that, in whatever relates to the operations of war, no “"

State ought”to-- depend upon a precarious supply from any part of the
world. it There may be some truth in this remark, and therefore it is
proper for legislative attention.”

V In the same debate, sin Mr. Burk,from SOUTH CAROLINA, support-
ed a duty on hemp, for the express purpose of encouragingits growth on
the strong lands of South Carolina. “ Cotton,” he said, “ was also in
contemplation,-among them, and,if good seed could be procured, he
hopedrmight succeed.” Afterwards, sir, the cotton seed was obtain-
ed, its culture was protected, and it did succeed. Mr. Smith, a very
distinguished member from the samrs STATE, observed: “ It has been
said, and justly, that the States which adopted this constitution ex-
pected its administration would be conducted with a favorable hand.

The manufacturing Sprites wishedthe enrcouragernentief manufactures ;.

the maritime States the encouragementoliiship-building;

and tithe agri-
cultural States the..,,encouragement_of agriculture.” 

 -, wjlpleegydetain the Senate by reading no more extracts from these i

debates. I have tiliieady shown a majoritydrof the members of SOUTH
CAROLINA, in this very‘ firstisession, acknowledging this power of pro-
tection, voting for its exercise,.and proposing its extension to their
own products. Similar propositions came from Virginia; and, indeed,
sir, in the whole debate, at whatever page you open thevolume, you
find the power admitted, and you find it applied to the protection of

4 6

particular articles, or not applied, accoi"ding to the discretion of Con«»
gress. No man denied the powe’r~—-—no man doubted it; the only ques-

_ tions were, in regard to the several articles proposed to be taxed,

whether they were lit subjects for protection, and what’ the amount of
that protection ought tobe. Will gentlemen,‘ sir, now answer the
argument drawntroin these proceedings of the first Coin;-r,x‘essi° ‘Will
they undertal<.'e to deny that that Congress did act on the avowed prin-
ciple of protection? Or, if they admit it, will they tell us how those
who framed‘ the constitu tion ‘fell, thus early, into this great tnistalte
about its 1neaningP ‘Will they tell us how it should lizippeii that they
had so soon for,<._:,'otten their ‘own sentiments, and their own purposes?

, I confess Ihave seen no answer to thisargument, nor any respectable

attempt to answer it. 7And, sir, how did thisdebate terminate? ‘What
law was passed? There it Stands‘, sir, among the statutes, the second
law in the book. It has a preuiiwlc, and that Dlt'011l1ll.)l@ expressly re—_
cites, that the duties which it imposes are laid ‘’'‘‘lor the support of
Government, for the discharge of the debts of the United States, and
the erzcowrrzgemerzt and protection ofmantr,fczcl'ures.” Until, sir, this
early legislation, thus coeval with the constitution itself, thus full
andexplicit, can be explained away, no man can doubt of the mean-
ing of that instrument. , " ,

Mr. President, this power of cZiscr2'mi-nc_zlz'0n, thus admitted, avown
ed, and practised upon, in the first revenue act, has never been denied
or doubted, until within a few years past. It was not at all doubted,
in 1816, when it became‘ necessary to adjust the revenue to a state
peace, On the contrary‘, the power was then exercised, not vvithou
opposition as to its expediency, but, as far as I remember, or have
understood, without the slightest opposition founded on any supposed
want of constitutional authority. Certainly, SOU'I‘It CAROLINA did not
doubt it. The tariit of 1816 was introduced, carried ll}l‘(f)l.lgl‘l, and
estab_lished, under the lead of South Carolina. Even the mmirrzmn
policy isof South Carolina origin. The honorable getitleinaii liirnself
supported, and ablysupported, the tarifl? of 1816. He has inforniecl

, us, sir, that his speech on that occasion was sudden“ and oitlliancli, he

ibiein‘glr’r‘c‘alled*up"iby re9qn.e“%‘oitiV»a~=frietnd..?<  sure the gentleinan
so remembers it, and that it was so; but there is, nevertheless, much
method, arrai1g,e1nent, and clear exposition, in that eiztempore speech.
It is very able, very, very much to the point, and very decisive. And.
in another speech, delivered two monthsearlier, on the proposition to
repealthe internal taxes, the honorable gentlenian had touched the
same subject, and had declared, “ that at certain encot.tra,g'emen£
ought,‘ 10118 emterzclecl, cztlleast to our woollmz cm.d.cotz,'o~n marmfac—
lures.” I do not quote these speeches, sir, for the purpose of show-
ing that the honorable gentleman has changed his opinion: my object
is other, and liiglier. I do it for the sake ,of7saying,, that that cannot

47
be soplainly and palpably unconstitutional, as tovvarrant resistance
to law, nullification, and revolution, whichthe honorable gentlemaii
and his friends have heretofore agreed to, and actedupon, without

' doubt, and without hesitation. i gSir", it is no answer to say, that the
tariffof 1816 was a_ revenue. bill. So are they all revenue bills. The

point is, and-the truth is, that the tariff‘ of 1816, like the rest, did ciisé .

crz'mz'naz‘e,- it did distinguish one article from another; it did lay duties
for protection. Look to the case of coarse cottons, under the mini-.
mum calculation: the duty on these was sixtyrto eighty per cent.
Sometliing beside revenue, certainly, was intended in this; and,in
fact, the law cut- up our whole coinmerce with India in that article.
It is, sir, only within a few years that Carolina has denied the
constitutionality of these protective laws. The gentleman himself
has narrated to us the true history of her proceedings on thispoint.
  p  _ law  despairing then
of being able to abolish the systemof p1'otectio11,i‘p ”w'ent
forth among the people, and set up the doctrine that the system
was unconstitutional. “ find the people,” says the honorable gentle»
man, “receiver! the doctrine.” This, I believe, is true, sir. The
people did then receive the doctrine: they had never entertained
it before. Down to that period, the constitutionality of these laws had
been no more doubted in South Carolina, than elsewhere. And I sus-
pect it is true, sir, and I deem it a great misfortune, that, to the pre-
sent moment, a great portion of the people of the State have never
yet seen more than one side of the argument. I believe that thou-
sands ofhonest men are involved in scenes now passing, led away by
one-sided views of the question, and following their leaders by the
impulses of an unlimited confidence. Depend upon it, sir, if we can
avoid the shock of arms, a day for reconsideration iandpreflection will
come; truth and reason will act with their accustomed force, and the

      

public opinion of South Carolina will restored toits usual consti- I

tutional and patriotic tone, -I I
But, sir, I hold South} Carolina to her ancient, her cool, her u.niniiu-
, enced, her deliberate opinions. I hold her to her own admissions, nay,
to her own claims and pretensions, in 1789, in the first Congress, and
to her aeknowletlglrents and avowed sentiments tl1rot1gl1~a ltong series
of succeetling yearlsfiitll hold hen to the principles on which she led
‘Con,gressAto act .im5v1.816;tor-,iif she have changed herown opinions, I
  for those who still retain the same opinions. . I say
she is preclutledWi?iiin”‘"a‘srse1'ting that doctrines, which she has herself
so long and so ably sustained, are plain, palpable, and dangerous vio-
lations of the constitution. ‘ ..
Mr. President, if the friends of nullification should be able to propa-
gate their opinions, and give them practical effect, they would, in my

 

judgment, prove tlieniselves the most sltilful “ architects of ruin,” the ,

most“ elfectual extinguishers of high raised expectation, the greatest

483

bl'asft?ers of human hopes, which any age has produced. They would

stand up to procl‘airn, in tones which vvoulcl pierce the ears of half the

human race, that, the last great experiment of representative govern-
ment had failed.’ They would send ~lhrtl_t sounds, at the hearing of

which the doctrine of the divine rigli:t.io‘t',Kings would feel,even inits
~ grave, a returning sensation of vitalityand resuscitation,:;%:Mil_lions"of

eyes, of those who now feed tlieirpinoherent love of liberty on the suc-
cess of the American example, would i turn, away from obeholding our
dismemberment, and find no placeon earthwhereon toilrest their gra-

. tified, sight. Amidst the incantations. and orgies of nul-lification, seces-

sion, disunion,' and revolution, would bewcelebratecl the fune&x'al,~‘,,rites of

constitutional and republican 1*iherty._ : I ,;,  .

But," sir, if the Grovernmentdo its duty, if "it not withifirmness and
with moderation, these opinions cannot prevail. Be assured, sir, be
assured, that, among the political sentiments of this people... the love of
union is still uppermost. Tl‘l1ey“:fwilloo stand fast by the constitution,
and by those who defend it. I I relyfion no temporary expedients, on
no political combination; but I rely on the true American feeling, the

.genuine patriotism of the people, and the impeniativeoodecision of the

public voice. Disorder and confusion, indeed, may arise; scenes of
commotion and contest are threatened, and perhaps may come. W’ith
my whole heart, I pray for the continuance of the domestic peace and
quiet of the country. I desire, most ardently, the restoration of alien-
tion and harmony to all its parts. I desire that every citizen of the
whole country may look to this Government, with no other sentiments
but those of grateful respect and attachment. But I cannot yield,

even to kind feelings,the cause of the constitution, the true glory of

the country, and the great trust which we liold incur hands for suc-

must come. We cannot, we must not, we dare not, omit to do that

_ Which, in ourjudgment, the safety of the Union1'equi1'es. Not regard,-so
 less of consequences, we must yet meetconsequences;seeing the.haz-

ard's‘,vvhicl1osuirroundthe discharge of public duty, itlniust yet be dis—
lcharged.. it nor; mysefljfi, si.r;,‘.~.I[=i-~1t£+shun~i nod ;resp»o  _justly_ , devolving
on me, here or elsewhere, in attempting to maintain the cause. I am
tied to it byiindissoluble bands of affection and duty, and I shall cheer-

 

‘ fully partake in its fortunes and its fate. I am ready to perform my
1 own appyropriate part whenever and wherever the occasion-may call, on

me, and, to talceuny chance awmotng those upon whom=bl0.ws_mfay fall
first andifall thickest. I shall exert etgery. faculty I possess in aiding
to prevent_the constitution from being,nullified,_destroyed, or int-

he ceeding ages. If the constitution cannot be mtiintairied without meet; I
ring these scenes of commotion and contest, hovveverunwelcome, they

11

paired; and. even should I see it fall, I will still, vvithia voice,;fee,bl,e,,i

perhaps, but earnest as ever issued fromphuman lips, sands wit\h;;r;?fildelity
and. zeal, which nothiiig sha.llo.extinguish,t call on thei,PEOPLE to

" come to iitis7ressue.o

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