THE ATONEMENT: 
 
 A CHARGE 
 TO. THE CLERGY 
 sisi 
 PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH 
 IN PENNSYLVANIA. 
 
 DELIVERED IN ST. ANDREW’S CHURCH, PHILADELPHIA, MAY 16th, 18388; 
 
 AT THE OPENING OF THE CONVENTION. 
 q 
 
 BY THE RIGHT REV. HENRY U. ONDERDONK, D. D. 
 
 BISHOP OF THE DIOCESE OF PENNSYLVANIA. 
 
 PUBLISHED IN CONFORMITY WITH A REGULATION OF THE CONVENTION. 
 
 PHILADELPHIA: 
 
 JESPER HARDING, PRINTER. 
 
 1838 
 
4 
 
 don, the divine favour, all blessings whether providential or gracious 
 here, and glory hereafter. These two points, the sacrifice and the 
 obedience of Christ, are obviously distinguishable, and should be kept 
 distinct in such portions of our study of the subject as may require it. 
 And the particular branch to which chiefly I now ask the attention of 
 my Rev. Brethren, (referring also to the appended matter to be pub- 
 lished, ) is, the Aronine Sacririce made by the Lamb of God. Ad- 
 dressing the Clergy, it is not my province to treat the subject practi- 
 cally, in its direct bearings on personal faith and conduct. My object 
 is, to invite them to some reflections on a mode of explaining the doc- 
 trine, which to me appears erroneous, yet which is sometimes broadly 
 maintained, but oftener vaguely held and perhaps incautiously defended, 
 by those, with whose general creed it seems utterly at variance. In 
 doing this, I trust I shall not be suspected of setting my wisdom above 
 that of others: in so profound a study, we all are but learners; and 
 though it belongs to my office to address my Clergy on such matters as 
 I deem worthy of their notice, I do it with entire deference to their in- 
 dividual judgments. Above all, I hope I shall not be suspected of the 
 folly of attempting to pry into the secret things which belong unto God: 
 nothing of the kind is intended; but as an erroneous theorv is current, 
 it is proper to show its defects, and even to propound a better explana- 
 tion, to relieve that class of minds which desire to apprehend somewhat 
 at least of the reasonableness of their faith. 
 
 I am aware that it is not unusual to retreat from all argument on 
 this subject, and plead that we are too ignorant and too feeble to inves- 
 tigate it; that to assert the doctrine in the mere language of scripture, 
 is the limit beyond which we ought not to venture: and no one respects 
 more than I do the lowly piety which carries out this principle, and 
 really superadds no theory whatever. But | fear there are not many 
 who thus restrict their minds; very few, I apprehend, guard themselves 
 entirely from the unsuspected entertainment of theological expositions 
 of the atonement: and those who do not will imbibe the opinions most 
 current; which unfortunately are intermixed with error. There are 
 then but a small-number who exclude a// speculation on the subject. 
 The majority wild exercise their understandings, whether accurately 
 or not, and whether by their own enquiries or those of others. And so 
 Jong as this is natural to men, so long will it be useful to provide argu- 
 ment on the side of truth, to meet the argument on the side of error. 
 The doctrines of the gospel, though sometimes above reason, are always 
 so consonant with it, that human wisdom, when denying or perverting 
 evangelical truth, may be met and repelled by efforts of the same 
 wisdom in behalf of sounder views. As such a corrective, I desire that 
 this composition may be regarded. 
 
) 
 
 The propriety of arguing the theory of the Atonement will be per- 
 ceived, when the unsound opinions very plausibly connected with. the 
 doctrine are brought into view. We are told that the blood of Christ 
 bought off from the curse those only who will attain final bliss, and that 
 those who are not saved could not have been included in the ransom; 
 and it often is further alleged, that the stipulated price being paid, all 
 for whom it was paid must unconditionally and infallibly be saved. 
 Another very different doctrine rests on the same theory; that Christ 
 purchased heaven for all men, and therefore that all will certainly ob- 
 tain everlasting happiness. The theory common to these two conflict- 
 ing doctrines, presumes that a certain amount of debt is due from the 
 sinner, and is demanded by the Justice of God, and that when Christ 
 pays that debt, the sinners for whom it is paid are no longer the debtors 
 of Heaven; these exonerated sinners being regarded in the one case as 
 the elect only, in the other as all mankind. ‘T’his theory is readily com- 
 prehended, for it presumes the work of Christ to resemble a common 
 business of life; and because of its easy comprehension, it pervades, not 
 only those classes of the Christian community who maintain one or other 
 of the doctrines adverted to, but other classes likewise who admit neither 
 of them. Its clearness however is no suflicient recommendation, if it 
 
 be contrary to truth. And that it is untrue, may be seen at a glance; — 
 for it allows no proper forgiveness; the whole debt is paid by the Sa- — 
 viour, every thing is discharged, nothing is remitted. Let me introduce | 
 
 therefore the. better theory, which addresses the atoning sacrifice 
 
 to the Houiness of God, meaning thereby his absolute purity, his 
 
 entire separation from sin, and abhorrence of sin. ‘This view is: not 
 immediately so clear as the former one, because it does not present so 
 perfect an analogy with any transaction in this lower world. Sin does 
 not resemble a pecuniary debt, which may be discharged by a substi- 
 
 tute: when it takes that name, its punishment, like that of a criminal — 
 
 offence, is a-debt which the individual himself must pay; or else, he 
 
 ; 
 
 | 
 
 must be forgiven, and the debt never be paid. Forgiveness therefore, — 
 
 not payment, is to be procured by the atonement. Andas the holiness i 
 
 of God is the final obstacle to the remission of sin, to that attribute, it 
 is but natural to presume the blood of Christ to be rendered. The par- 
 don of sin being made consistent with the holiness of God, all men may 
 be forgiven; but he is not obliged to forgive, as he would be were his 
 justice fully satisfied; conditions may be imposed. Justice being satis- 
 fied, there is no option, in the nature of things, concerning the release 
 of the debtor; but holiness being vindicated, an option in the matter is 
 left, to be exercised as the wisdom. and benevolence of God shall dic- 
 tate. And thus we are enabled to say, without any latent contradic: 
 -tion whatever between the two propositions,—that Christ tasted death 
 
 : 
 
 a ae 
 
6 
 
 for every individual man,—while yet many for whom Christ died will 
 be destroyed, punished everlastingly. 
 
 A full examination of the respective claims of these two theories 
 would exceed the limits of a Charge. 1 trust however, that enough ar- 
 gument can now be adduced, toshow which of them is to be preferred. 
 
 For the one theory it is alleged, that the death of Jesus is called in 
 scripture a “price;” but I answer, not in the sense of paying the debt of 
 another, but always as meaning a “ransom;” just as the word “redemp- 
 tion” signifies buying out of captivity: Christ has bought for all mena 
 release from the bondage of sin, leaving to them either to improve their 
 liberty or remain in their fetters. For the other theory, besides the 
 general argument for the interpretation of such scriptures, we may offer 
 the passage which declares that “God, sending his own Son in the like- 
 ness of sinful flesh, and for sin, [or, for a sacrifice for sin,] condemned 
 sin in the flesh” of that Son, The phrase ‘condemned sin” is very re- 
 markable and apposite. To condemn a sinner, belongs to either holi- 
 ness or justice, though to the former chiefly as the fundamental attri- 
 bute; but to “condemn sin,” belongs only to holiness, not to justice. 
 Christ, in his “flesh” or human nature, represented “sin;” in the sacri- 
 fice therefore of his flesh or human nature, sin was condemned; and 
 this was done for the purpose of showing or evincing that God lowers 
 not his abhorrence of sin, but most: feta rity repels it, though he par- 
 dons the penitent sinner. 
 
 Another passage will be claimed for the former theory, which how- 
 ever will be found to belong to the latter—“that God might be just, 
 and the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus.” ‘The popular sense, 
 at the present day, of the word “just” is ‘giving to every one his due;’ 
 but this is only a portion of its meaning, for it is also defined in the Greek 
 and Latin, ‘upright, righteous, or correct, and even pious,’ and in Eng- 
 lish, ‘virtuous, innocent, pure,’ and these significations are equivalent to 
 ‘holy.’ In scripture especially, we often find the word in this sense: 
 “the resurrection of the just” or good; ‘ta just man falleth seven times 
 and riseth again;” “sendeth rain on the just and the unjust” or the godly 
 and the wicked; “the path of the just is as the shining light;” Noah and 
 others are called “just” men; *‘the wicked plotteth against the just” or 
 good; “just persons who need no repentance;” “the just man walketh in 
 his integrity:” all these passages, and there are manv more, refer to the 
 practical holiness which pertains to justified persons. Another text re- 
 fers to perfect holiness, as not existing in men, ‘‘there is not a just man 
 on earth”’—just, in what sense?—“who doeth good and sinneth not.” 
 And it is in this sense, that our Saviour is denominated “the just” or 
 holy person “suffering for the unjust” or unholy: he is «Jesus Christ the 
 Righteous,” or the “Just One:” he is likewise called ‘the tholy One 
 
7 
 
 and the Just” or innocent, as contrasted with the murderer whom the 
 people ‘‘desired” Pilate to release. So it is declared of the Deity, “the 
 just Lord will not do iniquity, but the unjust [the bad man, in what- 
 ever department] knoweth no shame.”* We have then the proper 
 key to the passage before us; it means, “that God might remain per- 
 fectly good, innocent, correct, holy, in pardoning the sinner who be- 
 lieves in Jesus.” Not that the word “just” in the passage need be 
 changed, for it is a proper translation; but that our conception of its 
 meaning ought not to be formed on its present popular use: the word 
 ‘righteous’ would perhaps be less liable to be misunderstood.t There 
 are theologians who regard the atonement as addressed to the justice of 
 God, who show in their expositions, that they mean, or at least include, 
 and principally, that sense of justice which agrees with rectitude, puri- 
 ty, or holiness.[ But in order to secure this meaning, it is proper to 
 contrast that theory with the one which gives to the word justice its 
 narrow sense, whether distributive or commutative, or which makes 
 that sense predominant: and this can best be done, by leaving it in this 
 popular acceptation during our discussion, and placing beside the theo- 
 Ty thence resulting the other, which addresses the atonement to the 
 holiness of God. ‘To this comparison, therefore, of the two expositions, 
 I now ask the attention of my Rev. Brethren. | 
 
 It is argued, I have remarked, that we owe a debt to the Almighty; 
 that his justice forbids our exoneration; and therefore Christ pays what 
 we owe, and thus satisfies justice. And it is added, that those who are 
 exonerated may, through the acceptance of this payment, claim their 
 pardon and heavenly crown as a right, and hold the Deity to his nego- 
 tiation. This would be true, if the analogy of a debt and a discharge 
 were applicable; for nothing is clearer than that, in the case of a pecu- 
 niary obligation, if the required sum be paid, come it from whom it 
 may, the creditor is satisfied and can ask nothing more. But in the 
 case of moral debts, no commutation can be made; enlightened law and 
 
 * See Appendix B. 
 
 + In Poole’s Synopsis, the commentary on this word is—‘‘Justus, t. e. sanctus et 
 rectus, justusin se, justus vindex gloriz sve,” &c: ‘just, that is, holy and righteous; 
 just (holy and righteous] in himself; the just [holy and righteous] vindicator of his own 
 gloty.’ It is proper to add, however, that the word “just’’ in this passage may have. 
 the sense of ‘justified,’ as it frequently has elsewhere; and the sense would then. be, 
 ‘that God might be justified,’ both to himself and his intelligent creatures, and yet ‘the 
 justifier of him which believeth in Jesus.” This brings the same result. The point 
 requiring ‘justification’ or vindication is God’s rectitude, purity, holiness, in pardoning 
 the sinner; that being, if we may so speak, the central attribute of Deity, and the stan- 
 dard by which the other moral attributes are regulated.—See the extracts from Saurin 
 and Tillotson in Appendix B. 
 
 ¢ See Appendix C. 
 
8 
 
 equity demand ‘that the offending party, and he only, suffer the penalty, 
 if it be a personal infliction; and even pecuniary ‘forfeitures are pre- 
 sumed to come’ from him, and so are. proportioned to his means, 
 estate, expectations, or credit. When an innocent person is’ requir- 
 ed to'suffer' in place of the guilty, we do not argue that' justice de- 
 mands the commutation; for, whatever may be said of rude administra- 
 tions, enlightened justice will not allow it.’ A punishment ‘inflicted on 
 the innocent is rather to be traced to the mere sovereignty of the pow- 
 er that orders it. And the motive of this sovereign demand may be, 
 either wanton domination, or else some beneficial object'sanctioned by 
 correct policy.. A tyrant, for’ example, may indulge his despotism by 
 inflictions on the guiltless friends of a fugitive or concealed malefac- 
 tor. <A less objectionable authority, as another instance, in order to 
 maintain public faith, and vindicate national rights, may, when such 
 faith and rights are violated, sacrifice the hostage left by a foe as secu- 
 rity, though he is. personally innocent of the violation. | In such cases, 
 we ascribe the condemnation, not to justice, in the sense of giving to 
 every one his due, which has no demand except on the guilty them- 
 selves, but to mere sovereignty, acting either for arbitrary or for bene- 
 ficial purposes. | 
 
 So far then as-analogy may determine, it cannot be held that the 
 sufferings of an innocent Saviour in place of guilty men, were accepted 
 as the payment of their debt. They were exacted by ‘the sovereign 
 power of the Majesty on high. And. the motive which my argument 
 suggests for: requiring this atonement, was, that the divine holiness 
 should be vindicated when the divine mercy grants pardon to the sin- 
 ner; it was, that mercy and truth might meet together, that righteous- 
 ness and peace might embrace each other. There is mercy in God, but 
 there are'truth also'and righteousness, which are another name for ho- 
 liness. And while mercy pleads that the penitent sinner be! not given 
 to perdition, truth expostulates that the Holy One ought to maintain his 
 moral perfection, for hisown sake; and also, for the sake of others, not 
 relax his discountenance of sin. To pardon any being in whom the 
 least sin remains, on the ground of his being good enough, would be to 
 yield so far God's moral perfection, and relax his discountenance of 
 évil. Hence the penitent is forgiven, not in any degree on account of 
 his imperfect goodness, but because the sufferings of Christ the Victim 
 attest that God’s moral perfection yields not, and that his discounte- 
 nance of sin is not relaxed: so that those sufferings become the sole pro- 
 curing cause of the penitent’s pardon. Thus it is that mercy can act 
 without contradicting truth, without infringing on holiness. And though 
 we do not fully understand why God inflicts his abhorrence of evil on 
 the person of a different being from those who have sinned, the doctrine, 
 
9 
 
 besides resembling in part certain providences of the innocent suffering 
 for others, is not contrary to reason, as that doctrine is which compares 
 sin toa pecuniary debt, and would thus make the Redeemer to have 
 paid our moral debt. Expiation and payment are radically different: if 
 they were not, one might pay beforehand for the privilege of offending. 
 In the sacrifice of Christ, the divine purity or rectitude shows its infinite 
 indignation against evil. On him who, having no sin of his own, agreed 
 to represent, our sins for this purpose, and who consented that for this 
 great object the Lord should lay on him the iniquity of us all,—on Him is 
 exercised the pure and awful indignation of a holiness perfect and re- 
 pulsive of every stain. Strictly speaking, Christ does not undergo a pe- 
 nalty or punishment, for that is remitted; he suffers to attest that God 
 is truly angry with sin, the anger being that of principle, not of pas- 
 sion: and this holy anger, we may remark, has no relation to placabili- 
 ty; for placability in a matter of principle, if the word has meaning 
 with such a reference, is so much surrender of principle. ‘This holy 
 anger having had its course, the cross may be appealed to, as the proof 
 that God has surrendered nothing of his moral perfection, in granting 
 pardon to the sinner, when he repents, though in a degree he is a sinner 
 still. 3 
 
 It may be objected, that this theory leaves the divine justice unsatis- 
 fied. It certainly does, in the sense usually intended; and for the ob- 
 vious reason, that that attribute, in the limited popular signification of 
 an unyielding claim of the rights of God over the sinner, appears entire- 
 ly incompatible with our salvation. Strict justice requires that the of- 
 fender, the offender himself, be consigned to eternal wo. And yet mer- 
 cy pleads for that very offender. One of two results then must follow; 
 either justice must yield to the remission of the punishment; or mercy 
 must be violated by that punishment’s being exacted... An apostle has 
 named a principle which decides this issue, “mercy rejoiceth against 
 judgment;” which mercy would not do, if judgment were inflicted, even 
 on asubstitute.. And the very term ‘‘forgiveness” or “remission” im- 
 plies that God relinquishes his right, that justice foregoes its claim, and 
 bends to the milder attribute, as soon as God’s holiness is, by the cross, 
 guarded from all dishonour. Still. no zmjustice is done. None to God, 
 for it is the prerogative of sovereignty to remit the demands of justice. 
 No injustice to Christ, for his offering was voluntary; and his human na- 
 ture is rewarded for enduring the cross, by its obtaining the joy once set 
 before him, by its exaltation to the right hand of the Father. Nor 
 does this pardon of the penitent have an unjust or injurious effect on 
 moral creatures, whether angels or men, by encouraging them to do 
 evil in the expectation that grace will abound; for, while the atone- 
 ment, Christ in agony and on the cross, speaks: peace to the godly, it 
 
10 
 
 declares indignation and wrath for the wicked; for if God, through hig 
 deep abhorrence of sin, bade his sword awake against the man who was 
 his own fellow, how much more terrific will be its execution on the frail 
 but obstinate creatures who despise both the divine threatenings and 
 the divine mercy! The triumph therefore of compassion over justice, 
 through Christ crucified, involves no injustice. 
 
 The substitution of one person for another, for the infliction of a legal 
 penalty, is not, we have seen, the dictate of enlightened justice. But 
 we are clear of this difficulty in regard to the Saviour’s vicarious func- 
 tion, when we address the atonement to God’s holiness. Christ does 
 not bear our sentence, as due to justice by the divine law, for that is 
 remittéd; but other griefs, a burden peculiarly his own. We often see 
 one man suffering for another, suffering for the good of many, the inno- 
 cent even for the guilty, in the course of providence; but this is not pe- 
 nal substitution, which is the only kind at which our natural judgment 
 revolts.* Other substitutions than penal we daily observe, as results of 
 God’s sovereign administration, though not on so grand a scale, or con- 
 cerning matters so hidden from our search, as that of the Redeemer ex- 
 plating the sins of a world. ‘The scriptures which declare the substi- 
 tution of Christ for us, do not require the penal construction of his suf- 
 ferings. ‘I'he chastisement of our peace was upon him;” not our chas- 
 tisement, but that which brought us peace. ‘The Lord hath laid on 
 him the iniquity of us all;” our iniquity he bore as representing sin, and 
 he bore also a suffering for sin as such a representative, but not the 
 penalty of our iniquities. “He was wounded for our transgressions, and 
 bruised for our iniquities, and by his stripes we are healed;”’ but the 
 wounding, the bruising, the stripes, were not penal, but a substitution 
 of the other sort. “The just suffered for the unjust,” not penally, but 
 as we often see in the course of God’s sovereign providence. ’ “Christ 
 hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us;” 
 he was “made a curse” of the sacrificial kind, but this is wholly differ- 
 ent from bearing the very “curse of the law.”t That the sufferings of 
 
 * Bishop Butler terms ordinary providential substitutions “punishments.’? This, [ 
 apprehend, is an extended use of the word; which in some writers might be deemed a 
 petitio principii, but not in Bishop B., as he endeavours to avoid all theories of the 
 atonement. (Analogy, Part 2, Chap. 5.) All sufferings of men are either,—punish- 
 ments of their own respective sins generally, but not of the sins of others in which they 
 have not perticipated,—or else, chastisements ‘ ‘for their profit,’’—or the two combined: 
 both occur frequently, What are called national punishments are an example; the 
 wicked of the nation suffer for their sins; those who are innocent of the public defec- 
 tion, though included in the suffering, undergo it, not as a penalty, but a chastisement 
 for their good. Punishment falls on the nation as such, and on open who make it bad; 
 on the others, the rod of love. 
 
 { See Macknight on Gal, ili. 13. 
 
11 
 
 Christ, though vicarious, were rot penal, is further evident from their 
 result; they brought hima reward, an infinitely higher reward than be- 
 longs to the best of the creatures, to even the most exalted of the 
 angels; whereas penal sufferings, when complete, do but discharge the 
 offender. The suffering and death of Christ were a voluntary obe- 
 dience of the will of God; penal suffering and death however, are not 
 obedience, but a forced submission, and are not voluntary, but unwil- 
 lingly received: or, in the few cases in which they are welcomed by the 
 victim, he regards them as martyrdom, not as a penalty,—as one of 
 those acts of providence, in which an innocent person is allowed to suf- 
 fer, for the furtherance ultimately of the benevolent plans of the Deity 
 towards others. Such appears to be the nearest analogy to the vica- 
 rious pains of the Redeemer. 
 
 On the principle that the same offence ought not to be twice punish- 
 ed, or the same debt twice’ paid, justice having no demand after being 
 once satisfied, those for whom Christ bore the legal sentence cannot 
 themselves be punished. If so, and if Christ ‘‘died for all,” and bore 
 the sentence for “the whole world,” then all must escape punishment 
 hereafter, and besaved. Or else, the elect only being saved, Christ was 
 sentenced and made payment for none but them; and then, of course, he 
 did not “taste death for every man:” and there is but a step between 
 this consequence and a decree of reprobation on all other human beings. 
 Thus the doctrine that the atonement was addressed to the justice of 
 God, in the popular sense, leads, unavoidably I think, either to univer- 
 salism, or to absolute predestination, and so impugns those scriptures 
 which declare an everlasting punishment for the wicked, or those which 
 affirm that Christ was “the propitiation for the sins of the whole world.” 
 —But no such consequences result from the theory that the atonement 
 was addressed to the boliness of God. It ig not a penalty endured for 
 all, or a sum paid for all, which cannot be again claimed from any; or 
 for a few only, making their safety unconditional, and leaving all 
 others without its benefit. Dut it is a transaction which, rendering 
 the pardon of sinful men consistent with God’s moral perfection, 
 has procured a pardon for all sinners, which will be granted to all 
 who accept it; while those who will not accept it, are not released, 
 as if their debt was paid, or their penalty fulfilled, but are still sub- 
 ject to the indignation of that divine holiness which they obstinately 
 
 continue to dishonour. The ransom is paid for all; but those who pre- 
 
 fer the bondage of sin remain captives. Thus we have a theory of the 
 Atonement which has no affinity whatever with either of the erroneous 
 
 _ doctrines to which I have referred. 
 
 By addressing the atonement to the justice of God, in the popular 
 sense, we take away the divine mercy from the Father, and appropri- 
 
12 
 
 ate it all to the Son. Man is fallen, and under. condemnation; and 
 Christ has mercy on him, and offers an atonement; which atonement is 
 accepted by the justice of the Father, as the whole amount of the debt, 
 and so sufficient for man’s discharge. Such an atonement is all that 
 justice can require; and thus, as a defender of this theory most incau- 
 tiously remarks,—-and sorry I am to say that it is the celebrated Mr. 
 Faber,—thus, the “very attribute of justice, justice not mercy, 
 was now as much concerned in pardoning the sins of every faithful pe- 
 nitent, as it was before concerned in punishing them.”’* If such a prin- 
 ciple be sound, where is the tender feeling of the ‘“#ather of mercies?” 
 and how is he ‘the Lord God, gracious and merciful!” He has accept- 
 eda full equivalent for the penalty of our sins, on the very principle of 
 an equivalent: and be it reverently asked, in illustration, should we call 
 
 * Faber’s Sermons, vol. 1. p. 37. Philadelphia, 1817. These remarks of Mr. Faber’s 
 led the author of the Charge, many years ago, to study somewhat minutely the doctrine 
 
 of the atonement, and bring into more complete order the sentiments before obscurely » 
 
 held as results of his theological reading. Mature reflection has confirmed him in 
 these opinions, as now offered to his Clergy.—The quotation from Mr. Faber occurs 
 in this passage: ‘‘The complete penalty of sin was exacted even to the uttermost far- 
 ‘thing: and the most ample satisfaction was made to the divine justice; but it was 
 ‘done, not by the sufferings of the guilty, but by the sufferings of one piaced in their 
 ‘stead. The divine attribute of justice being now perfectly satisfied, and a punish 
 ‘ment completely equivalent to the sins of the whole world having been inflicted; that 
 ‘very attribute of justice, justice not mercy, was now as much concerned in pardoning 
 ‘the sins of every faithful penitent, as it was before concerned in punishing them, not- 
 ‘ withstanding his repentance. For, precisely as it would be unjust to punish a man 
 ‘twice for the same offence, so it would be unjust to punish those, whose punishment 
 ‘ had already been undergone by their surety, Christ.” Here is the whole theory I have 
 censured, It consists of erroneous premises, carried to their just conclusions. 
 
 Matthew Henry was more consistent, yet in error, when he wrote,—‘“It is now be- 
 come not only an act of grace and mercy, but an act of righteousness in God, to pardon 
 the sins of penitent believers, having accepted the satisfaction that Christ, by dying, 
 made to his justice for them. It would not stand with his justice to demand the debt 
 of the principal, when the surety hath paid it, and he hath accepted that payment in 
 full satisfaction.’ (On Rom. iii. 26.) The ‘satisfaction to justice” being ‘‘full,”’ it is 
 not easy to comprehend that “grace and mercy”? were exercised in receiving it from a 
 substitute instead of the sinner. ‘ 
 
 Dr. Wardlaw denies that the sufferings of Christ were “an exact equivalent,”—ad- — 
 
 dresses the atonement to the ‘spirit of the claims of God’s justice,’—[which spirit 
 however is the dictate of holiness,—] and says, “the blood of Christ may be infinite in 
 its atoning value, and yet limited in its atoning efficacy; sufficient for the salvation of 
 all, and yet effectual to the salvation of comparatively few;” and thus he reaches the 
 ‘sound conclusion, that‘‘even when we come in the name of the Mediator, we are taught 
 to approach as teins rather than as claimants; not demanding a debt, but entreat- 
 ing for a favour.” (Discourses, p. 204—206.) 
 
 Mr. Faber and M. Henry, I apprehend, give the true result of Sddtane the atone! 
 ment to God’s justice, in the popular sense. Dr. Wardlaw regards it as “a general ma- 
 nifestation of the righteousness of Gad,” and hence, though employing the word “jus- 
 tice”? ua well as “holiness,” he escapes this unseemly result. 
 
 | 
 
 ! 
 
13 
 
 that man merciful, who received his full demand from a friend of the 
 debtor, instead of.the debtor himself? He might be just, and his act ho- 
 nest and fair; but mercy would have no operation insucha case. By the 
 other theory however, that which directs the atonement to the holiness 
 of God, the attribute of mercy, instead of being obscured, is made con- 
 spicuous, and even fundamental. ‘The mercy of the Father prompted 
 the whole labour of love... Mercy interceded for the sinner; holiness, 
 being the essence of God’s moral perfection, must not yield, but on 
 the pleading of mercy allows a vindication by the atonement; justice, 
 having in the sense here used a mere claim, foregoes that claim, for 
 the same plea of mercy. And thus ‘“‘mercy rejoiceth against judgment,” 
 and God’s “tender mercies” take rank “over all his works.” 
 
 The theory I have rejected throws no light on the benefit derived by 
 departed infants from the death of Christ. Infants are not subjects of 
 justice; not being responsible; not having. attained that ripeness of the 
 moral faculty which only can give moral character to obedience or dis- 
 obedience. They are indeed, by the innate depravation of their na- 
 ture, unfit for the undeviating rectitude originally required of man; 
 they are incapable of moral perfection; , their very innocence is not a 
 moral quality, it is the mere absence of actual transgression. But, until 
 they incur personal responsibility by intentional sin, the justice of God, 
 whether commutative or distributive, has no demand on them... And if 
 they die in this early condition, and are saved,—as they require no 
 atonement to the divine justice, their salvation is not due to the cross, 
 according to this theory of its benefit: justice has no claim against them, 
 till they “know to refuse the evil, and choose the good.” Adopt how- 
 ever the other theory, and there is no derogation from the honour of 
 Christ. The divine holiness must view with repugnance a creature 
 who is born radically incapable of pure and perfect obedience, and who 
 ‘ will not live long enough to gain the victory over this depraved nature. 
 That divine repugnance requires an atoning intervention: and there- 
 fore the moral unfitness of an infant is laid, with all other human de- 
 fects and. blemishes, upon the Victim of the cross; the acceptance of the 
 infant is. thus. rendered compatible with God’s holiness; it has this large 
 share in the Redeemer’s benefits. And, dying without actual sin, it is 
 through Him, cleansed from its pollution of nature, and thus has access 
 to the Father, and admission to heavenly bliss. ‘Through the atone- 
 ment, the divine purity is vindicated in receiving an infant to glory, 
 though it bore a stain through its whole earthly existence. 
 
 By addressing the atonement to the holiness of God, instead of his 
 justice in the popular sense, we give the doctrine a more fundamental 
 character, Holiness is the fundamental divine attribute, the compre- 
 hensive attribute, sustaining, regulating, including all the moral attri- 
 
14 
 
 butes: it is the counterpart, so to speak, of the eternal order, har- 
 mony, and fitness of things. The other moral attributes, truth, 
 love, justice, mercy, have reference to the creatures; but holiness, 
 the divine purity, is as perfect without creatures as with them. 
 The theory therefore which I commend goes deeper than the otheri 
 holiness is a principle, and justice (in the restricted meaning) one 
 of the rules of action founded on that principle; and if the prin- 
 ciple be satisfied or vindicated, concerning any part of the divine 
 counsel, no rule founded on that principle can be an obstacle; and thus 
 when God’s holiness is propitiated, justice retains no longer its demand. 
 Justice has regard to the law; holiness, to the reason or basis of the law;* 
 which is the eternal order, harmony, and fitness of things. Law, mere- 
 ly as such, is changeable; as in the transfer of the Sabbath from the 
 seventh day to the first. ‘The general law of God has often been made 
 to yield, that is, has been superceded for a time by special commands; 
 those, for example, which ordered the extermination of various tribes, 
 and the slaying of individuals. And the non-observance of a law has 
 been tolerated, to such an extent even as to be a custom; as in the case 
 of polygamy. But the dasis of law, the order, harmony, fitness of 
 things, never changes, and never is allowed to yield; it dictates the ex- 
 ception when a law is divinely countermanded, as well as the rule when 
 the law retains its force: so that we may regard the fitness of things, 
 which holiness corresponds to and maintains, as law in the abstract, and 
 particular obligations or commandments as deductions from it, or reve- 
 lations concerning it. ‘Hence, were justice to accept a commutation 
 for infraction of the law, holiness would still require vindication be- 
 fore the offender could be consistently pardoned: whereas, if holiness be 
 vindicated, the difficulty arising from principle is removed, and the pe- 
 nalty of the law cancelled, and so nothing is left for justice to adminis- 
 
 * T use the word “law” in its current sense. It has however more ample significa- 
 tions, one at least of which is not far removed from ‘holiness;’ which variety of mean- 
 ing appears to have produced vagueness in some expositions of the atonement. Hooker 
 says, “The being of God is a kind of law to his working; for that perfection which 
 God is, giveth perfection to that he doth.” ‘The law whereby he worketh, is eternal, 
 and therefore can have no show or colour of mutability.” “Now that law, [for the 
 creatures,] which, as it is laid up in the bosom of God, they call eternal, receiveth, ac- 
 cording unto the different kind of things which are subject unto it, different and sun- 
 dry kinds of names”—as the law of nature—a law celestial, for the angels—-the law 
 of reason—divine law, given by special revelation—human law, gathered from that of 
 reason or of God. He thus makes “a twofold law eternal;”’ the first that by which God 
 himself worketh; the second, that “laid up in the bosom of God,” and emanating from 
 thence tothe creatures. What is “laid up in God’s bosom,” law at its fountain-head, 
 is of course the prompting of perfect rectitude or holiness; and what emanates from 
 thence, law in the ordinary sense, flows from that prompting. (Eccl. Pol. B. 1. sect 
 2, 3.) 
 
15 
 
 ter. As also law, simply considered, is changeable, but its basis, the 
 eternal fitness of things, unchangeable, it is clear that law is stern, not 
 of itself, but only as resting on this fundamental principle. The stern- 
 ness or inflexibility ascribed to law is properly the sternness or in- 
 flexibilty of this principle,—or rather, of the divine holiness, which 
 is the living quality of which that principle is the type or pattern. 
 And as this inflexibility or sternness is the obstacle to the sinner’s par- 
 don, it is plain that the atonement, which is to remove that obstacle, 
 must be addressed to the holiness of God. ¥% 
 
 The effect of the two theories, respectively, on the doctrine of the 
 exclusive merits of Christ, as connected with that of conditions of salva- 
 tion, deserves particular notice. | have remarked, that if the divine 
 Justice accepts the atonement as the full discharge of our debt or our 
 penalty, there is no room for conditions. ‘To make room for them, the 
 discharge must be less than full; our repentance and faith, such as they 
 are, being the balance. And this assumption clearly gives them the 
 nature of a valuable consideration; in other words, of merit. But Ho- 
 liness, though it demands repentance and faith, is not by them vindi- 
 cated in the pardon of sin; because they are defective in themselves, 
 they are not the complete graces becoming fallen men, but perpetually 
 require improvement; and because they reach not the standard of perfect 
 obedience, the unimpeachable moral rectitude proper in intelligent 
 creatures. And hence, while the divine holiness is perfectly vindicated 
 by the atonement, so that all human sin is pardonable, it yet makes the 
 change to a new heart the consideration on which sin will be actually 
 pardoned, the consideration by which distinction is made between the 
 godly and the ungodly in their final portions,—but not the valuable consi- 
 deration.* ‘This sort of consideration, a renewed mind, is indeed de- 
 manded by God’s holiness, as is the avoidance of any given transgression 
 in those who commit other transgressions: but, as we would not allege 
 that the thief is meritorious, or satisfies the divine holiness, in so far as he 
 does not murder, since his character is unworthy independently of the 
 latter crime, so we may not regard the new heart and life as merito- 
 rious, or satisfying the divine holiness, in so far as it is an improvement 
 on the former condition, since the character is still deficient. From the 
 nature of the demands of Justice, he who performs one demand, though 
 not another, is so far justified as he is obedient; but holiness makes an 
 undivided demand, which cannot be discharged in part; it must be en- 
 
 * The distinction between a consideration and a valuable consideration, may be found 
 in the cures effected in looking on the brazen serpent. The ‘‘looking” was a conside- 
 ration, and an indispensable one, but not a valuable one. That was only in Christ, 
 procuring of God this, as he does every, mercy,—For a fuller view of this matter, see 
 Appendix D. 
 
16 
 
 tirely fulfilled, or holiness will not be satisfied in any degree. The 
 claim of Justice, in the popular sense, is separable into as many parts 
 as there are virtues or vices in the composition of character; but the 
 claim of Holiness is one in its very nature, though it be divided for the 
 
 mere elucidation of law and duty; single points of innocence do not make» 
 
 a holy character. He who commits no murder, and has no desire of 
 the sort, so far fulfils the requisition of Justice, and may, in that light, 
 stand on the merit of his innocence in this respect, whatever be the ba- 
 lance of ‘his character. But under the eye of Holiness, there must be 
 no balance against him: if. there be, he has no merit, but only demerit 
 and condemnation. Hence the inspired declaration, ‘whosoever shall 
 keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all;” 
 not guilty of all kinds of sin, obviously; but guilty of unholiness, which 
 violates the ‘‘whole law” whose concentrated precept is “be ye holy.’’* 
 So clearly does the theory which builds the atonement onthe divine 
 holiness exclude all human merit, yet exact all possible human obe- 
 dience. Repentance and faith then, the new heart and life, not being 
 positive holiness, or innocence, are not in themselves acceptable to God}; 
 yet being comparative holiness, they may, through Christ, be accepted, 
 while the character which is without this comparative quality, impeni- 
 tent character, will be rejected. And thus the theory I recommend 
 allows fully that salvation is conditional, without the slightest interfe- 
 rence with the doctrine of the exclusive merits of the Redeemer.t 
 
 No further contrast of the two theories appears requisite, my Rev. 
 Brethren; and I trust, no further commendation of the one I offer to 
 your consideration. Ido nct pretend to have fathomed the depths of so 
 profound a subject, in which the brightest intellects have acknowledged 
 mystery after their best elucidations. But I hope I have shown that 
 we may reject that explanation of it, which, rightly followed out, leads 
 to the denial of future everlasting punishment, or to the doctrine that 
 
 * What is termed by some theologians the ‘‘remedial law,” or the ‘‘new law,” usual- 
 ly regarded as.erroneous doctrine, because affording a pretext for human merit, belongs 
 to the Justice theory. The atonement satisfies the justice of God for the penalty of so 
 much of the perfect law as is beyond the ability, under grace, of fallen man. Thus the 
 law is reduced, from requiring innocence, to requiring repentance and faith; and these 
 
 man fulfils, and by fulfilling them escapes the remaining portion of the penalty. . Christ. 
 
 has the, merit of lowering the law; mao, the merit of obeying it as lowered. By th 
 
 Holiness theory how ever, the ‘remedial law” is superfluous; for were Christ to vindi- 
 cate the divine holiness in reducing the perfect law, he would vindicate it in accept- 
 ing repentance and faith, which are but moral imperfection at best: in other words, 
 holiness requires the atonement for both branches of this process, for the entire’ mercy. 
 proposed; and thus the interposing of a “remedial law” is gratuitous. a. 
 
 + See Appendix E. ie th 
 
 tpy at 
 
17 
 
 all but the elect are brought into life, and carried through life, without 
 any provision for their escaping the eternal penalty, or any possibility 
 of doing so: the latter, owing to the state of the christian world about 
 us, is the error to which we are most exposed. To that error, the theo- 
 ry faulted has a direct tendency; and many of ys would fall into it, 
 were it not for the counteraction of our general code of doctrine, and 
 our predominant standards of theological study; and also, were it not 
 that the human mind often acts inconsistently, and maintains both a 
 tenet and its opposite at the same time,—for, to say that the whole 
 debt of all sinners has been paid, yet that some must hereafter pay their 
 portion of that debt themselves, is to affirm a contradiction. ‘This con- 
 tradiction is unavoidable, in those, who, asserting a final perdition for 
 the ungodly, believe also in an universal atonement, yet address it to 
 the justice of God in the restricted sense. And though this inconsisten- 
 cy is better than maintaining a limited atonement, yet like all inconsis- 
 tency it is undesirable, nay an evil. Nor, if we surrender the defec- 
 tive theory, is there any difficulty in escaping the dilemma; for, by ad- 
 dressing the atonement to the justice of God in its more important sense 
 of rectitude or moral accuracy, or, in better theological phrase, to the 
 holiness of God, all the incongruity vanishes. God’s moral perfection 
 never succumbs to sin; and when it is so vindicated that there will be 
 no such yielding in pardoning the sinner, he may be pardoned, every 
 sinner may be pardoned; while yet there is no obligation, as there 
 would be were the entire debt paid, to pardon every degree of sinful 
 character; so that a distinction may rightly be made between the peni- 
 tent and believing sinner, and the impenitent and unbelieving. These 
 are the great points to be secured; that Christ died for all men, so that 
 all may be saved; and that those who are not saved owe their perdition 
 to themselves, and not to any want of provision for their safety in the 
 divine counsels or transactions. My revered predecessor has adduced 
 very strong approbation of these points of doctrine from two of the mar- 
 tyrs df the Reformation:—from Bishop Hooper, “the promise of grace 
 appertaineth to every son of manin the world, and comprehendeth them 
 all; howbeit, within certain limits and bounds, the which if men ne- 
 glect or pass over, they exclude themselves from the promise of Christ: 
 as Cain was no more excluded, till he had excluded himself, than Abel; 
 Saul than David; Judas than Peter; Esau than Jacob:’—from Bishop 
 _ Latimer, “Christ shed as much blood for Judas, as he did for Peter;’’* 
 _ anassertion utterly at variance with the theory | disavow, but perfect- 
 _lyagreeing with the oneI would recommend. I think also that 1 have 
 
 the concurrence, substantially, of my able predecessor, in addressing 
 
 * Bishop White’s Comparison, V. 2. p. 86, 90. 
 B 
 
18 
 
 the atonement to the divine holiness rather than to the divine jus- 
 tice.* . 
 
 I repeat however, that had the word justice been allowed to retain 
 its large meaning; and not been restricted to the popular confined sense, 
 there would be no necessity for this distinction, and none of course for 
 such a discussion as I have now brought before my Rev. Brethren. 
 And as words are of comparatively small moment, when the truth they 
 are to convey is duly understood and secured, I object not to the use of 
 the word Justice, instead of Holiness, in stating what I regard as the 
 sound doctrine of the Atonement; provided there be no narrowing of 
 the full signification of that word, whether by definition, or by modes 
 of illustration which imply its limited sense. For myself, I prefer the 
 phraseology I have here employed. But others areas free to decline 
 its use, as they are to withhold their approbation from the theory I have 
 submitted, or to modify it, as their own deliberate judgments may deem 
 proper. 
 
 Allow me to introduce a few remarks concerning the other branch 
 of the work of Christ, mentioned in the beginning of the Charge,—his 
 obedience, as man, to both the law, and that further will of God which 
 ordered him suffering and death though he was innocent and without 
 offence. Human salvation is of Christ alone, because he made the sa- 
 crifice for the pardon of our sin, and also because ,he procured for us, by 
 the merit of his obedience, all other favours, life and grace here, immor- 
 tality and glory hereafter. ‘Though pardon is offered us in the cross, 
 and though the conditions of pardon are fulfilled by us, we still are sin- 
 ners; hence, though punishment be remitted, we deserve no reward or 
 positive favour. But a part of the reward gained by the perfect obe- 
 dience of Christ, is to have ws favoured and rewarded. Such benefits 
 God does not confer immediately on us who deserve them not, but me- 
 diately, granting them to Christ as Ais recompense, and to us only 
 
 * Bishop White, denying that the atonement “involves an impeachment of the be- 
 nevolence of God,” thus proceeds: “That he is a holy being, and that sin is opposed to 
 his perfections and a rebellion against his authority, is agreed on both sides. It is as 
 foreign to the purpose to contend, that he might pardon it without such a substitu- 
 tion, as to say that he might puta stop to moral evil, without the many miseries 
 both of mind and body, which we perceive to be entailed on it. . . It. 
 may be said, that what is evil in itself may be overruled to good, by the wise Being 
 who permitted it. This, is, indeed, the proper solution of the difficulty. But let a si- 
 milar mode of reasoning be allowed on the present subject: and then, who will pre- 
 sume to say, that the honour of the moral government of God may not finally be promoted 
 by a dispensation, which, without disparaging his attribute of mercy, shows in the strong- 
 est point of view the deadly nature of sin, as a breach of the order of the universe?” 
 
 (Lect. on the Catech. p. 257, 258.) 
 
19 
 
 through Christ, and under his title to them. We obtain them through 
 the merit of Christ’s obedience exclusively; not indeed without repent- 
 ance and faith on our part: yet not as if such qualities in us were in any 
 degree meritorious. ‘The best of penitents not being meritorious, the 
 benefits of the Redeemer, divine favour and reward of every sort, are 
 even to the best entirely free. And none being meritorious while un- 
 der the power of sin, the impenitent have not even a plausible claim to 
 them. Hence, though Christ merited reward sufficient for al] men, we 
 are to regard him as not accepting more. or not transferring more, of 
 this branch of his own remuneration, than will give existence and 
 earthly supplies to all, probation and initial grace to all but dying 
 children and the weaker kind of idiots, fuller grace to those who im- 
 prove that already bestowed, and heaven to those who die in the Lord. 
 On this topic, no further enlargement is required by the subject princi- 
 pally before us. 
 
 In conclusion, I have only to submit again this course of argument 
 to the judgment of my Rev. Brethren,—and to suggest, that in bringing 
 such views before their flocks, should they think fit to do so, some hints 
 for the christian improvement of their hearers flow naturally from our 
 lofty theme. 
 
 The doctrine of the Atonement, as now developed, requires for a due 
 conception of it, most elevated ideasof the purity of God. Fallen 
 creatures become holy by conquering sin. Creatures not fallen are 
 holy by not committing it, but obeying God. With God, however, sin 
 is impossible: for it is declared, that, ‘‘it is ¢apossible for God to lie,” 
 and that “he cannot deny himself.” The least unholiness on his part, 
 and the least countenance of evi’ in his creatures, are against his very 
 nature: in other words, we deny, God’s divinity, by supposing him to 
 yield to sin in any degree whatever. With sucha thought, how impres- 
 sive will be our admonitions to those under our charge, ‘to be holy as 
 God is holy!’ How impressively do such thoughts declare, that virtue is 
 to be desired forits own sake! 
 
 In the doctrine of the Atonement is found the deepest lesson of Au- 
 mility. One sort of natural religion encourages men to compromise 
 for sin by such regular conduct as is within their power,—poor, feeble, 
 and unworthy as their character will be at best. Another code of na- 
 tural religion prescribe’ various degrees of mere penitent feeling, and 
 a corresponding life, yet without that sense of God’s unbounded indigna- 
 tion against evil which leaves. the sinner no hope in himself. But the 
 sacrifice of the cross, where the Victim isconsumed by the severity of 
 the divine holiness, bids the sinner prostrate his soul even while it lays 
 hold on that altar, and be humbled as into nothing in awe of a purity 
 
20 
 
 so inflexible. How forcibly may we thus inculcate on our flocks, that, 
 to have both the benefit and the entire comfort of the cross, they should 
 know nothing but the cross ! 
 
 Connected with these views of the Atonement, is its illustration of the 
 unbounded evi/ of sin. Our corrupt and weakened minds know not 
 enough of the nature of things, to understand why the least transgres- 
 sion is intrinsically bad and of bad effect, is unqualified mischief; innu- 
 merable misdeeds are concealed; innumerable others are disregarded; 
 and the world proceeds as well to appearance, as if they had not been 
 committed: and we are thus tempted to believe that light offences, 
 though best avoided, are not essentially baneful. But in the sacrifice 
 rendered to God’s holiness, we learn how these things are accounted of 
 in that world where there is no illusion. Not the least of them 
 is pardonable without the Atonement: not the least of them therefore, is 
 other than morally base, without any qualification, and radically inju- 
 rious, without the slightest intermixture of a beneficial property. And 
 though some for whose souls we watch, may regard this as but a dull 
 truth, of no exciting interest, those who have so improved the Holy Spi- 
 rit as to have pure moral sensibility, will find it a crushing thought 
 when they reflect on their many infirmities. Tell them, and tell your 
 every hearer, that, as God has “condemned sin,” all sin, in the person 
 of Christ, they must ‘condemn all sin’ on their parts. They will ‘“con- 
 demn sin,” by convicting themselves of all the depraved conduct and de- 
 praved thoughts they indulge in; by forsaking them all, as base, and un- 
 worthy of a candidate for heaven; by continuing humble after their best 
 reformation, and feeling themselves still “unprofitable servants;” and by 
 renouncing the whole idea of merit before God, in even their most vir- 
 tuous deeds and affections, and so pleading no ground of mercy 
 but the Atonement of Jesus. Tell them, that to make this plea ge- 
 nuine, they must remember, practically, that our Lord was made “in 
 the likeness of sinful flesh,” that their souls might in all things be 
 “conformed to his pure image.” 
 
 Lastly: In viewing the Atonement, our nature is wrought upon, in 
 the cause of holiness, by its senstbzlities, which are, under grace, our 
 deepest and most effectual controlling power. We see the Victim bend- 
 ing under his weight of sorrows.* Were he the criminal his enemies 
 declared him to be, we should pity him, though we deemed his punish- 
 
 * It was sorrow, for a divine person to have the sensations and anxieties of a crea- 
 ture. It was sorrow, for a divine person to be humbled to the society of fallen beings; 
 deeper humiliation than for an honest man to be sent to keep company with thieves; 
 or a virtuous woman to be compelled to associate with female vagabonds. The sorrows 
 of the agony, the buffetings, the scourge, the insults, the thorns, the cross, speak for 
 themselyes. 
 
21 
 
 ment just. But he knows no sin; no guile is found in his mouth: our 
 pity therefore is unchecked; and we sympathise with him, as we would 
 with the martyr at the stake, or the babe tortured and slowly murder- 
 ed by a savage. Nay; not only is he innocent, but we are guilty; and 
 it is to avert from us the indignation of God’s holiness, that he is led to 
 the slaughter. Here is the deep source of our tears. We have too 
 much at stake to object to the sacrifice; pardon, life, grace, eternity, all 
 depend on his woful labour of love; we cannot say, nay, to even one of 
 the agonies of the immaculate Son of God. Yet we may shed the tear 
 of commiseration, and pour out the whole heart, at the thought that he 
 dies for us. And it is in this tender disposition—so we all know, my 
 Rev. Brethren, and so we will all assure our flocks,—it is in this tender 
 disposition, that we are most strongly moved to abhor and to relinquish 
 the sins which cost him so much for their expiation. In this tender dis- 
 position, constantly cherished, we shall be most strongly moved to love 
 our Redeemer always, and be faithful to Him until death. 
 
APPENDIX A.—page 3. 
 
 THE LARGER DOCTRINE OF MEDIATION. 
 
 Christ is “heir of all things,—he is before all things, and by him all things consist 
 by him are [exist] all things, and we [exist] by him,--all things were made by him, 
 and without him was not any thing made that was made,—all things are delivered 
 into his hand, and given to him by the Father,—because he became obedient unto 
 the death of the cross, God hath highly exalted him, and hath given him aname which 
 is above every name, that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in 
 heaven, in earth, and under the earth, and that every tongue should confess that he is 
 Lord, to the glory of God the Father.” Thus it is that the “fulness” xAveane is “his,” 
 the infinite dominion of the Supreme Being: of which “fulness' have all we received,” 
 life and all temporal and spiritual blessings here, and the hope of glory hereafter: 
 
 Lord Bacon, in his Confession of Faith, gives the following statement of what I 
 have called the larger doctrine of the Mediation: — 
 
 “T believe that God is so holy, pure, and jealous, as it is impossible for him to be 
 pleased in any creature, though the work of his own hands; so that neither angel, 
 man, nor world, could stand, or can stand, one moment in his eyes, without beholding 
 the same in the face of a Mediator; and therefore, that before him with whom all things 
 are present, the Lamb of God was slain before all worlds; without which eternal 
 counsel of his, it was impossible for him to have descended to any work of creation ; 
 but he should have enjoyed the blessed and individual society of three persons in 
 godhead for ever. 
 
 ‘ But that, out of his eternal and infinite goodness and love, purposing to become a 
 Creator, and to communicate to his creatures, he ordained in his eternal counsel, 
 that one person of the godhead should be united to one nature, and to one particular of 
 his creatures; that so, in the person of the Mediator, the true ladder might be fixed, 
 whereby God might descend to his creatures, and his creatures might ascend to God; so 
 that God, by the reconcilement of the Mediator, turning his countenance towards 
 creatures (though not in equal light and degree) made way unto the dispensation of his 
 most holy and secret will; whereby some of his creatures might stand, and keep their 
 state; others might possibly fall and be restored ; and others might fall and not be re- 
 stored to their estate, but yet remain in being, though under wrath and corruption ; 
 all with respect tothe Mediator, which is the great mystery, and perfect center of 
 all God’s ways with his creatures; and unto which, all his other works and wonders 
 do but serve and refer. 1 Sbholat Armed, V. I. p. 2, 3.) 
 
 The author of the Charge takes the liberty of suggesting, that the “ bowing at 
 the Name of Jesus” done in form (and presumably in spirit) in the Creed, is a 
 solemn confession of his mediatorial lordship. ‘The worship of him as God is a dis- 
 tinct act. So is the recognising of his intervention, in praying, &c., through him. 
 His high function and prerogative as the universal mediatorial Lorp is the matter al- 
 luded to in Philip. ii. 10,11; and inthe Creed. This relation of Christ to us, differ- 
 ent from any borne by the other divine persons, appears to demand a distinct and 
 explicit act of homage; and on no occasion can it be more appropriately rendered 
 than in reciting the Creed. F 
 
APPENDIX B.—page 7. 
 
 MEANINGS OF ,THE WORD JUSTICE. 
 
 To scholars and literary persons, the sense of the words just and justice given in this 
 part of the Charge, is familiar. But as the rule of the Convention, to publish these 
 episcopal documents, will bring it into a more generai circulation, and as all may 
 wish to have the matter fresh before them, some further authorities may properly be 
 adduced. 
 
 Archbishop Cranmer and the Reformers who acted with him say, in the Necessary 
 Doctrine and Erudition, &c.,—“without whose grace no man can do no good thing, 
 but following his free will in the state of a sinner, increaseth his own injustice, and 
 multiplieth his sin.” By ‘ injustice” is meant ‘unrighteousness or wickedness ;’ jus- 
 tice of course is the opposite. (Man*’s Appeal to the Gospel, p. 264.) It may be, that 
 the word “injustice” means here ‘want of justification,’ i. e. condemnation. 
 
 Bishop Hooper, in the Preface to his Exposition of the Ten Commandments, says, 
 —*as by the sin and offence of one man, death was extended and made common to 
 all men unto condemnation; as Paul saith, Rom. v. so by the justice of one, is de- 
 rived life unto all men unto justification.” In our present translation, the word is 
 “righteousness,” meaning the holy obedience of: Christ.—(Bishop White’s Compari- 
 son, V. 2, p. 84.) 
 
 In the Homilies, the words before us are used in various senses; of which a sufhi- 
 cient illustration occurs on page 19 of Swords’ edition. 1. The word justice is put 
 for Christ’s atonement, and his righteousness, obedience, or holiness, ‘Three things 
 must go together in our justification. Upon God’s part, his great mercy and grace; 
 upon Christ’s part, justice, thatis, the satisfaction of God’s justice, or the price of our 
 redemption, by the offering of his body, and shedding of his blood, with fulfilling of the 
 law perfectly and thoroughly; and upon our part, true and lively faith,” &c.... “so 
 that in our justification, there is not only God’s mercy and grace, but also his [Christ’s] 
 justice, which the apostle calleth the zustice of God, [the translation “ righteousness” 
 is given on the opposite page of the Homily,] and it consisteth in paying our ransom, 
 and fulfilling of the law:” again, “that which their [men’s] infirmity lacked, Christ’s 
 justice hath supplied.” 2. The word is put for the divine attribute of justice, but 
 whether in the merely popular sense noticed in the Charge, or in the more general 
 one of “righteousness” above adverted to, is not clear in this place. We read, “the 
 satisfaction of God’s justice,” already quoted; also, ‘‘ whereby our ransom might be 
 fully paid, the law fulfilled, and his justice fully satisfied.” On p. 17, we read, “ to 
 make a sacrifice and satisfaction, or (as it may be called) amends to his Father for 
 our sins, to assuage his wrath and indignation conceived against us for the same;” and 
 in the Homily for Good Friday it is called ‘the ransom and whole amends,” the 
 “penalty,” the ‘ payment” “to discharge us quite;” which expressions favour the 
 doctrine founded on the popular sense of justice. Yet the word “ransom,” and calling 
 the atonement ‘‘a manifest token of God’s great wrath and displeasure towards sin,” 
 and using it as an argument for us “to abhor sin thoroughly,” (p. 359, 360) all which 
 point rather to the attribute of holiness, allow us to suppose that the word “ justice” 
 
a4 
 
 is employed ina sense not entirely definite. 3. It signifies assumed innocence in 
 man, and the assumed sufficiency of his works; “the grace of God doth not shut out 
 the justice of God, [meaning as before, the righteousness. of Christ, } in our justification, 
 but only shutteth out the justice of man, that is to say, the justice of our works, as to 
 be merits ofdeserving our justification: man’s innocence and sufficiency are excluded 
 under the name of justice. 4. It signifies the obedience of a believer, neither inno- — 
 cent, nor sufficient, nor meritorious; “neither doth faith shut out the justice of our 
 good works, necessarily to be done afterwards of duty to God:” the obedience of a 
 godly life, is the obvious meaning. 5. The word “just” is used for justified; “it ex- 
 cludeth them, [our good works,] so that we may not do them to this intent, to be made 
 just by doing of them.” There are thus no less than five meanings of these words 
 on one page of the Homilies. But the predominant sense, the only one under heads 
 3, and 4, the only one pertinent under head 1, corresponds with holiness; that marked 
 2 is uncertain; and that marked 5 is not relevant. 
 
 Bishop Jeremy Taylor quotes to the same effect from St. Bernard:—“our innocence, 
 which in strictness of divine judgment would be found spotted and stained, by the 
 mercy of our Saviour may be accepted. St. Bernard expresses this well; Nostra 
 siqua est humilis justitia, recta forsitan sed non pura; our humble righteousness is 
 perhaps right in the eyes of God, but not pure; that is, accepted by his merey, but it 
 is such as dares not contend in judgment.” (Sermons, vol. 3. p, 50.) 
 
 The Saxon Confession says—“Originall sinne is a want of originall justice which 
 ought to be in us.” (Ely’s Contrast, p.'74.) The meaning is plain. It agrees with 
 our Article 9th, which declares that by original sin “man is very far gone from origi- 
 nal righteousness;” in the Latin, “ab originali justitia quam longissime distet.” 
 
 Jones, of Nayland, in his second Lecture on Hebrews, says,—“it is an universal 
 doctrine, common to all ages, which a prophet delivered and an apostle hath confirm- 
 ed, that ‘the gust shall live by faith.’ Let him be as gust as he will, his life is not 
 from his justice, but from his faith;” &c. Jn other words, ‘let him be as holy as he 
 will, his life is not from his holiness.’ 
 
 Dr. Hammond, on Matth.i. 19, “Joseph being a just man,” paraphrases it “a mer- 
 cifal pious man,” and says in a note that the word “signifies ordinarily works of mercy, 
 charity.” On Rom. iii. 26, “that God might be just,” he gives this paraphrase, 
 “whereby God appears to all tobe a most gracious and merciful God;” and in the 
 note he adds,—*the word seldom in these books, if ever, belongs, or is applied to the 
 act of vindicative or punitive justice, but (as in the case of Joseph) for the abating 
 of the rigour of exact law, and bringing in moderation, or equity, or mercy instead of 
 it:” he grants however that God may also be denominated “just in that other respect,” 
 though it be not the sense of this pasaage. 
 
 Calmet gives these definitions. “Justice is generally put for goodness, equity, that 
 virtue which renders to every man his due; often for virtue and piety in general; 
 lastly, for the conjunction of all those virtues which make an honest man. See Ezek. 
 xviii: 5—9. [*If'a man be just, and do that which is lawful andright...... hath 
 walked in my statutes, and hath kept my judgments, to deal truly; he is just, he shall 
 surely live.”] Justice is placed in opposition to mercy; as a virtue which severely 
 avenges the dishonour offered to God by sin. For the clemency, mercy and indul- 
 gence which God shows to sinners. It is frequently taken in this sense in Isaiah. It 
 is used sometimes when we are speaking of a good-natured, mild, indulgent man. 
 Thus St. Matthew tells us that Joseph being a just man,” &c. 
 
 Calvin rejects this construction of the conduct of Joseph, and makes “the joteee 
 which is here commended to consist in the hatred and detestation of wickedness;” 
 
| 25 
 
 i. e. to be synonymous with holiness. And so I understand his exposition of Rom. 
 lil, 26. ' t 
 
 Dr. Campbell, in Matth. 1. 19, translates, “Joseph being a worthy man.” In the 
 note, he says—‘Every body knows that the word dixzioc admits two senses. The first 
 is just, in the strictest acceptation, attentive to the rules of equity in our dealings, 
 particularly in what concerns property and judicial proceedings. ‘The second is 
 righteous in the most extensive sense, including every essential part of a good cha- 
 racter. In this sense it is equivalent as Chrysostom remarks, to the epithet avagsros, 
 virtuous, worthy, upright.” 
 
 Dr. Dwight, in his 10th Sermon, has the following remarks.—“1. Justice, as ap- 
 applied to cases in which property is concerned, denotes the exchange of one thing 
 for another, of equal value..... This is called Commutative Justice. 2. As ap- 
 plied to the conduct of a magistrate towards subjects, it denotes exactly that treat- 
 ment of the subject which his personal conduct merits. ... Justice, in this sense, is 
 properly called Distributive Justice. 3. Justice, in a mtuch more extended sense than 
 either of these, denotes that which is right upon the whole, in all cases; that which 
 is fittest and most useful to be done: in other words, that which will most promote the 
 universal good. In this sense, justice is, together with its corresponding term, right- 
 ousness, used as synonymous with benevolence or virtue; and involves the whole of 
 moral excellence. ‘This is sometimes called General Justice. This use of the word is 
 very frequent; and many persons appear to make no distinction between this sense of 
 the word and the last mentioned. Yet the meanings are widely different. In the former 
 sense, justice isthe conduct of a ruler only; in the latter, it is applicable to adZ intelli- 
 gent beings: in the former, it isa course of conduct respecting a single object, ac- 
 cording to his merit or demerit; in the latter, it always respects the universe.— 
 Justice, when considered as an attribute, is the disposition which gives birth to these, 
 or to either of these, kinds of conduct.” As Dr. Dwight does not treat of the divine 
 holiness, as an attribute, it may be inferred that in these remarks on justice, in its 3d 
 sense, he has given the substance of what he would have said, had he adopted thatas 
 a distinct topic. The remarks are not so full as might be desired. But they show a 
 predominant sense of the word justice widely different from the popular restricted one. 
 
 Sauria is more satisfactory. In his discourse on the Holiness of God, he has this 
 line of argument.—“We cannot help acknowledging, when we reflect on our own 
 ideas, that. the difference between a just and an unjust action is not founded on inte~ 
 rest only. And since we cannot help venerating the Supreme Being more when he 
 follows certain laws than when he violates them, it is plain we cannot help acknow- 
 ledging that there is a yustice independent on the supreme law which hath pre- 
 scribed it. Should any one require me to give him a clear notion of this justice, this 
 order, or holiness, which is neither founded on the interest of him who obeys it, nor on 
 the authority of the Supreme Being who commands it; this should be myanswer. By 
 justice I understand that fitness, harmony, or proportion, which ought to be between 
 the conduct of an intelligent being, and the circumstances in which he is placed, and 
 the relations that he bears to other beings. . . . . All mankind have a general notion 
 of this proportion, harmony, or fitness. ..... Always when a man perceives that 
 a particular action hath sucha fitness or hath it not, he will declare without hesita- 
 tion that the action is gust or unjust. . . . This isa general notion of holiness. . . - 
 The general principle of holiness, as hath been already shown, isa perfect proportion, 
 harmony, or fitness between the conduct of an intelligent being and his relations to 
 other beings. ‘The holiness of God is that perfect harmony, proportion, or fitness 
 that subsists between his conduct (if | may be allowed thus to speak of God) and his 
 rejations to other beings... . . on the nature of those relations depends the nature 
 
26 
 
 of that order, justice, or holiness, which he inviolably maintains in respect to them, 
 . -. The holiness of God is complete in all its parts. He hath all virtues, or rather 
 he hath one virtue that includes all others: that is, the love of order. He is equally 
 just in his laws, true in his language, his promises are faithful, and his thoughts 
 are right.”—Beautiful illustrations of the wide and full meaning of justice! it is an- 
 other name for holiness. It may however be added—that the holiness of God is also 
 “that perfect harmony, proportion, or fitness,” that regulates his conduct with refe- 
 rence to his own perfection. On this principle I interpret a further remark of Sau- 
 rin, in the same discourse, “God is the happy God, because he is the holy God.” 
 
 Archbishop Tillotson defines justice very closely in the popular sense, But his re- 
 marks on holiness may properly be introduced in connexion with the admirable ones 
 just given. ‘The holiness of God is not a particular, but an universal perfection, and 
 runs through all the moral perfections of the divine nature; it is the beauty of the 
 divine nature, and the perfection of all his other perfections: Take away this, and you 
 bring an universal stain and blemish upon the divine nature; without holiness, power 
 would be oppression; and wisdom, subtilty; and sovereignty, tyranny; and goodness, 
 malice and envy; and justice, cruelty; and mercy, foolish pity; and truth, falsehood. 
 And therefore the scripture speaks of this, as God’s highest excellency and perfec- 
 tion. God is said to be glorious in holiness: Exod. xv. ii. holiness is called God’s 
 throne. Ps. xlvii. 8. He sitteth upon the throne of his holiness. This is that which 
 makes heaven.” These further remarks are valuable. “If holiness be a perfection 
 of the divine nature, and a property of God; if, in the notion of God, there be included 
 an everlasting separation and distance from moral] imperfection, and eternal repug- 
 nance to sin and iniquity: from hence we may infer, that there is an intrinsical good 
 and evil in things; and the reasons and respects of moral good and evil do not depend 
 upon any mutable, and inconstant, and arbitrary principle, but’ are fixed and immuta- 
 ble, eternal and indispensable. Therefore they do not seem to me to speak so safely, 
 who make the divine will, precisely and abstractly considered, the rule of moral good 
 and evil; asif there were nothing good or evil in its own nature antecedently to the 
 will of God, but that all things are therefore good or evil because God wills them to 
 be so: For if this were so, goodness, and righteousness, and truth, and faithfulness, 
 would not be essential and necessary, and immutable properties of the divine nature, 
 but accidental and arbitrary,and uncertain, and mutable; which is to suppose that God» 
 if he pleased, might be otherwise than good, and just, and true. . . . . . And 
 this does no ways prejudice the liberty of God; for this is the highest perfection, to be 
 necessarily good, and just, and true; and a liberty or possibility to be otherwise, is im- 
 potency and imperfection. For liberty no where speaks perfection, but where the 
 things and actions about which it is conversant are indifferent; in all other things it is 
 the highest perfection not to be free and indifferent; but immutable and fixed, and ne- 
 cessarily bound up by the eternal laws of goodness, and justice, and truth, so that it 
 shall not be possible to swerve from them; and this is the perfection of the divine na- 
 ture, which we call his holiness.” (Serm. fol. V. 2. p. 587, &c.) 
 
 ij 
 a 
 
 ont 
 
APPENDIX C. Page 7. 
 
 THE TENDENCY OF CERTAIN DIVINES TOWARDS THE 
 DOCTRINE OF THIS CHARGE. 
 
 es 
 
 Some theologians address the atonement to God’s justice and holiness conjointly. 
 To me there appears an incongruity in such reasoning; at the least, it goes beyond the 
 necessity of the case. Holiness is a vrinciple; justice (in the popular sense) is one of 
 the rules of action prescribed by that principle; and ifthe principle be satisfied or vin- 
 dicated, the rule so far ceases to be obligatory. If therefore God’s holiness be recon- 
 ciled, his justice requires nothing more. This class of theologians therefore, approxi- 
 mate the doctrine of the Charge. 
 
 Others make the atonement a vindication of the honour of God’s law. But justice 
 (in the popular sense) is concerned only with the administration of law, and an ho- 
 nourable administration of it. The honour of the law itself means either the person- 
 al honour of the sovereign Lawgiver, or the trueness (to moral perfection) of the prin- 
 ciple which dictated the law: and that principle, in the case before us, is the divine 
 holiness; in which centres also the personal honour of the sovereign Lawgiver. 
 
 If these remarks are allowed to be just, there will be an apology for appending 
 quotations enough to satisfy the claims of the subject. 
 
 Stackhouse, referring to Bates’ Harmony, thus writes:—‘To declare God’s hatred 
 against sin, which is essential to the perfection of his nature; to prevent the com- 
 mission of sin, by preserving in men an holy. fear of offending; and to maintain the 
 honour of God’s laws, which would otherwise fall under contempt; it was expedient 
 that the breach of his commands should not go unpunished. But then, how, or on 
 whom, this punishment was to be inflicted, is the question,” &c. Now, “hatred 
 against sin” is a dictate of holiness; and the “honour of God’s laws” pertains to the 
 same attribute. Hence it was natural, in this worthy compiler, while declaring the 
 atonement to be a “satisfaction to the divine justice,” to argue likewise that it was 
 “for the vindication of his honour, [as well as] the reparation due to his justice,” and 
 even to assert explicitly that “the holiness and justice of his nature . . . would 
 preponderate with him to exact the penalty.” (Body of Div. fol. p. 578.) 
 
 Archbishop Tillotson. ‘Therefore to maintain the honour of his laws, rather than 
 
 sin should pass unpunished, God would lay the punishment of it upon his only begot- 
 ten Son, the dearest Person to him in the world: which is a greater testimony of his 
 high displeasure against sin, and of his tender regard and concernment for the honour 
 
 of his laws, than if the sinner had suffered the punishment due to it in his own per- 
 son.” As before, the “honour of his laws’ and “his high displeasure against sin” are 
 
 _ topics which refer to the holiness of God; yet they are here connected with his ‘“jus- 
 
 tice,” as is frequently declared in the sermon. It is singular that the distinguished 
 q M oy 
 
 _ author did not see that he made justice receive more than its due, an infliction “great- 
 er” than the “punishment due in the sinner’s own person:” such a view seems fatal 
 
 to that theory. But an atonement to holiness bears no relation to the amount supposed 
 to be due from the sinner: it must simply be a sufficient vindication, whether the suf- 
 
 _ fering be in the same measure, or less, or greater. (Serm. V.1. p. 447.); 
 
28 
 
 Bishop Horsley, I cannot but think, must have used the word “justice” in its large 
 sense, not in the restricted popular one, in the passage I shall quote: for, the “declaring 
 a disapprobation ofsin” is but incidental to the administration of justice, not its primary 
 object; and “good policy” belongs altogether to sovereignty; and “securing the ends of 
 punishment” is not inflicting punishment itself, though it may produce other suffering: 
 as usual however withdivines who adopt the Justice theory, Bishop H. is not entirely 
 free from incongruity; the sufferings of Christ being called the “punishment” of our 
 ‘ouilt,” in the next paragraph but one, After remarking, against those who allege 
 that the atonement presumes God to be an implacable being, that his anger is but 
 figurative, since “the divine nature is unsusceptible of the perturbations of passion,” 
 Bishop Horsley proceeds: ‘But nothing hinders but that the sufferings of Christ ,;which 
 could only in a figurative sense be an appeasement or satisfaction of God’s wrath, 
 might be in the most literal meaning of the words, a satisfaction to his justice. It is 
 easy to understand that the interests of God’s government, the peace and order of the 
 great kingdom over which he rules the whole world of moral agents, might require 
 that his disapprobation of sin should be solemnly declared and testified in his manner 
 of forgiving it: It is easy to understand, that the exaction of vicarious sufferings on 
 the part of him who undertook to be the intercessor for a rebellious race, amounted to 
 such a declaration. These sufferings, by which the end of punishment might be 
 answered, being once sustained, it is easy to perceive, that the same principle of wis- 
 dom, the same providential care of his creation which must have determined the 
 Deity to inflict punishment, had no atonement been made, would now determine him 
 to spare. Thus, to speak figuratively, his anger was appeased, but his justice was li. 
 terally satisfied; and the sins of men no longer calling for punishment when the ends 
 of punishment were secured, were literally expiated. The person sustaining the 
 sufferings in consideration of which the guilt of others may consistently with the 
 principles of good policy, be remitted, was in the literal sense of the word, so literal- 
 ly as no other victim ever was, asacrifice, and his blood shed for the remission of sin, 
 was literally the matter of the expiation.”’? (Nine Sermons, p. 195,196.) It seems 
 evident that justice is here used in its large sense, of which holiness is the predomi- 
 nent idea; if so, the doctrine coincides with that of the Charge, if not, the word is 
 employed somewhat vaguely, and the doctrine is but an approximation. 
 
 In Poole’s Annotations, the phrase “that he might be just” (Rom. iii. 26) is ex- 
 pounded— “That no wrong might be done to the essential purity of his nature, or rectt- 
 tude of his will, nor yet to his zmmediate justice, by which he cannot but hate sin, and 
 abhor the sinner as such.” ‘The expression “immediate justice” seems to imply tha 
 the annotator regarded it as a less fundamental point in the doctrine of the atonement, 
 than God’s ‘‘essential purity, or rectitude.” 
 
 Baxter says—‘ ‘The reasons of Christ’s sufferings, were as.a sacrifice to expiate ou 
 sins by his suffering in our stead, to demonstrate the holiness of God, his justice and 
 truth, and the authority and equity of his law, that God and his laws may not be des- 
 pised, nor the world encouraged by impunity to unbelief andsin. ...... And 
 Christ’s sufferings are satisfactory to divine justice .... because they better attained the 
 ends of the Governor and Lawgiver, than the damnation of allthe world would have 
 
 done.” Now, we cannot conceive that the “ends” of mere justice, in the popular 
 
 sense, could be “better attained,” than by the infliction of the penalty, “damnation,” 
 on all who deserved it. The “ends” therefore “ of the Governor and Lawgiver,” 
 referred to by Mr. Baxter, must have been either different or more comprehensive. And 
 
 thus the word “justice” must be understood in its larger sense, or rather in that portion 
 
 of its meaning which quadrates with holiness: the atonement was designed, as the 
 extract declares, “to demonstrate the holiness of God;” and the reasoning would have 
 
29 
 
 been clearer had no allusion been made to his‘justice.” (Pract. Works, fol. V. 4. 
 p. 234, 235.) Elsewhere, Mr. Baxter enumerates “the ends of government, viz. 
 God’s glory, and man’s obedience, and the common good;’” and he adds—“Christ’s 
 satisfaction is at least as excellent a means for the attainment of the said ends of 
 government, as the punishment of the sinner would have been; seeing in this there 
 is as full a demonstration of governing, justice, wisdom, and power, and of God’s 
 holy sin-hating nature, and as full a vindication of the law from contempt, and as full 
 a warning to sinners that they presume not, as if themselves had suffered.” On this 
 I remark, as before, that a “demonstration of justice,’ in the popular sense, is not so 
 completely made by substitution, as by the suffering of the offenders personally; of 
 course the word should have its larger meaning, and agree with God’s “holy sin-hat- 
 ing nature.” The illustration of the divine “wisdom and power” by the atonement 
 has no reference to the present discussion. (V. 2. p. 228 ) 
 
 Macknight also appears to use the word justice in the larger sense. On Rom. iil. 
 26, he says, “Now, as in this and in the preceding verse, the apostle assures us, that 
 Christ’s death is a proof of God’s righteousness, both when he passed by the sins of 
 mankind before Christ came, and when in the present time he passes them by, we 
 are led therefrom to conclude, that Christ’s death hath rendered these exercises ot 
 God’s mercy consistent with his character as the righteous moral governor of the 
 universe: ....that he should be just in such an act, might have seemed incredible, 
 had we not received such an account of the atonement.” On verse 25, he writes, 
 “God’s righteousness or justice might have appeared doubtful, on account of his hav- 
 ing so long passed by the sins of men, unless, in the mean time, he had made a suffi- 
 cient display of his hatred of sin. But such a display being made in the death of 
 Christ, his justice is thereby fully proved.” The “hatred of sin,” 1 repeat, is a dictate 
 of holiness; and justice, in the restricted popular sense, is but one of the rules of ac- 
 tion prescribed by this all-governing principle in the Deity. And God’s ‘* character 
 as the righteous moral governor” is better resolved into his universal holy character, 
 than into the one rectitude of magistral justice. As Dr. Macknight was a very cau- 
 tious writer, it seems but proper to think that he used the word justice in its compre- 
 hensive meaning. On 1Johni. 9. he comments, “God is faithful to his promise, and 
 just to his Son whom he sent to save sinners, so that he can forgive sins to us,” &c. 
 In the popular sense, God would be but “just” to those whose debts were paid by 
 Christ, not to exact them again; as is argued by Faber, and as is included by Dod- 
 dridge on this text. But thisidea is avoided by Macknight; and the fair inference is, 
 that he did not regard the atonement as addressed to God’s justice in this sense. 
 - God’s being “just to his Son,” in forgiving penitents, is a topic not included in the 
 particular argument before me. ‘The interpretation given to this passage by Dr. 
 Hammond appears to be the true one,—“God having promised pardon to all humble 
 penitents upon sincere reformation, is obliged in fidelity and justice to make good 
 this promise to you;” the meritorious cause of this favour is given in verse 7, “the 
 death of Christ is beneficial (to us, who thus imitate his purity) to cleanse us from all 
 the guilt of past sins, and present infirmities.” 
 
 Saurin, though he speaks of “conciliating God’s justice with his love,” shows that 
 he intended it in the large sense, so admirably illustrated in the extracts already made. 
 ‘“* What saith the grand mystery of religion,.... I mean the mystery of the cross? 
 _ Doth it not declare that God is supremely holy?” Again; without an atonement, “his 
 |. love of order and his veracity would be blemished.” (V. 1. p.298, 245.) 
 
 Bishop Burnet on the second Article, explains the atonement without employing 
 the word justice, and in such a way as will agree with the other theory. “Thus it 
 is plain, that Christ’s death was our sacrifice: the meaning of which is this, that God, 
 
30 
 
 intending to reconcile the world to himself, and to encourage sinners to repent and 
 turn to him, thought fit to offer the pardon of sin, together with the other blessings of 
 his gospel, in such a way as should demonstrate both the guilt of sin, and his ha- 
 tred of it; and yet with that, his love of sinners, and his compassions towards them. 
 A free pardon without a sacrifice had not been so agreeable neither to the majesty of 
 the great governor of the world, nor the authority of his laws,” &c. If by the “guilt 
 of sin’ he meant its evil, or what the apostle terms it, “sinfulness,” the ‘“demonstra- 
 tion” of its guilt was required by holiness. If the guilt of the sinner be meant, i. e. 
 his obligation to be punished, (see Bishop Pearson,) the mere “demonstration” of that 
 fact was not a work of justice, in the popular sense, but was rather a demand of the 
 holiness of God. - The tone of the extract is entirely to that effect. In speaking of 
 the agony of Christ, in the same paragraph, Bishop B. says, “We can only imagine a 
 vast sense of the heinousness of sin, and a deep indignation at the dishonour done to 
 God by it,” &c. All this refers to holiness: the Saviour could scarcely have been 
 “indignant” while paying a debt to justice which he had assumed to pay; but he 
 might well share in the “indignation” of divine holiness against the sin which requir- 
 ed his agonising atonement. 
 
 Archbishop Magee says, ofa sacritice for sin—“The whole may be considered as a 
 sensible and striking representation of a punishment, which the sinner was conscious 
 he deserved from God’s justice: and then, on the part of God, it becomes a public de- 
 claration of his holy displeasure against sin, and of his merciful compassion for the 
 sinner;” &c. The sacrifice, being but a “representation” of punishment, was not 
 punishment itself; and this excludes the idea of its being addressed to justice, in the 
 restricted sense. And God’s “holy displeasure against sin” arises from his attribute 
 of holiness.—Such appears a fair view of this definition; but as Dr. Magee speaks 
 elsewhere of a “transfer of the penal-effects” of men’s iniquities to the victim, his 
 meaning may have been different. I think however, he may be claimed as tending 
 to the theory of the Charge. (Magee on Atonement; New York, 1813, p. 36,50.) 
 
 Tam indebted to Archbishop Magee for, the following extract from Dr. 8S. Clarke: (p. 
 115,) “the death of Christ was necessary to make the pardon of sin reconcilable, not 
 perhaps absolutely with strict justice, (for we cannot presume to say that God might 
 not, consistently with mere justice, have remitted as much of his own right as he 
 pleased)—but.... to make the pardon of sin consistent with the wisdom of God, in 
 his government of the world; and to be a proper attestation of his irreconcileable ha- 
 tred against all unrighteousness.” 
 
 Dr. West, of Massachusetts, offers the following definition,—“the true reason why 
 God required an atonement for sin was, that the real disposition of his own infinite 
 mind, toward such an object, might appear; even though he pardoned and saved the 
 sinner: could the character of God, the disposition of the divine mind both toward 
 holiness and sin, otherwise appear to equal advantage; there is not the least reason 
 to imagine that he would ever have required an atonement.” ‘This definition directs 
 the atonement to the preservation of God’s holy “character” as judged of by intelli- 
 gent creatures; and is so far correct. Had it gone farther, and addressed it to the 
 vindication of the attribute itself, Dr. W. would not perhaps have written, on a sub- 
 sequent page, “Tne death of the sinner is a glass in which we see the righteousness, 
 the punitive justice of God: So, also, is the death of Christ.” Not so: the accurate 
 doctrine is, that, through Christ, “punitive justice” foregoes its claim beyond the pre- 
 sent life, and yields to mercy; the holiness of God being vindicated in consenting to 
 this remission. (West on Atonement, 2d edition p. 15, 64.) 
 
 Dr. Chalmers, in his sermon on the Necessity of a Mediator, (the 6th in the volume 
 re-published in New York, 1819) speaks vaguely on the point before us; by the 
 
31 
 1 
 atonement, “every attribute of the Divinity is exalted;” “without one perfection of the 
 Godhead being surrendered;” “to bend, as it were, the holy and everlasting attributes 
 of God.” In the last sermon, however, the 17th, there is this plain language,—“not 
 till we see the blended love and holiness of the Godhead in our propitiation..... not 
 till we look to that great transaction, by which the purity of the divine nature is 
 vindicated, and yet the sinner is delivered from the coming vengeance, shall we be 
 freed from the dominion of sin,” &c. 
 
 Dr. Wardlaw mingles the two theories, yet appears to me to favour most that of 
 Holiness. Out of many passages, I select the two following:—“the atonement.... 
 where God appears in all the majesty of offended holiness and inflexible justice, and 
 at the same time delighting inmercy. The two characters, ‘God is Light,’ [holiness, | 
 and “Ged is Love,’ are alike illustrated by the atonement of Jesus....... so that 
 while we approach with boldness to the throne of grace, we are not allowed to forget 
 that it is a throne of holiness:’—‘The display of holy indignation was made by the 
 God of love: and the display of love, equally conspicuous in the same event, was made 
 by the God of holiness.” (Discourses, Andover, 1815, p. 243, 250.) 
 
 Dr. Dwight has these remarks. ‘“'This atonement I have explained to consist in 
 making sufficient amends for the faults which they have committed, and placing the 
 Jaw and government of God in such a situation, that when sinners are pardoned, both 
 shall be equally honorable as before. ‘The motives to obedience, also, must in no de- 
 gree be lessened. Further, the character of God, when pardoning sinners, must 
 appear perfectly consistent with itself and exactly expressed by the law. TF mally, 
 God must be seen to be no less opposed to sin,and no less delighted with holiness, 
 than when the law was formed.—This doctrine is completely established by the text, 
 God is here said to have set forth Christ to declare his righteousness, or as is better 
 rendered by Macknight, for a proof his own righteousness in passing by the sins, 
 ....- Inthis passage, the end for which Christ was set forth to be a propitiation, is 
 asserted tobe, that Christ might declare, or be a proof of, the righteousness of God, 
 in passing by or remitting sins which were past, and of his righteousness also, at the 
 present time, when justifying believers. In these assertions, we are taught in the most 
 unambiguous manner, that, unless Christ had been set forth as a propitiation, the 
 righteousness of God, in remitting past and present sins, would not have been mani- 
 fested. It is also declared in the same decisive manner, that, if Christ had not been 
 setforth as a propitiation, God would not have been just, when justifying believers. 
 Christ therefore, in the character of a propitiation, and only in this character, has 
 made the pardoning or justification of sinners consistent with the justice of God.” 
 As there is an apparent distinction made here between the “righteousness of 
 God” and his being ‘‘just,” Dr. D. may have intended to use the latter word in its 
 popular sense; but such a distinction, if it were designed, will not avail for the Justice 
 theory; as the passage first quoted may evince; [as will further appear in the note 
 given below;]* and as will more fully be proved by one of the concluding paragraphs 
 of the Sermon. (56th.) “Ifthe atonement of Christ consisted in making such amends 
 for the disobedience of man as should place the law, government, and character, of 
 
 * After inserting in the manuscript the extracts from Dr. Dwight, the following 
 paragraphs were observed, in Sermons 57 and 64, ‘*There is no substantial resem- 
 blance between the payment of a debt for an insolvent debtor, and the satisfaction 
 rendered to distributive justice for a criminal. The debtor owes money; and this is all 
 he owes. If then, all the money which he owes is paid and accepted, justice is com- 
 pletely satisfied, and the creditor can demand nothing more ...... But, when a crimi« 
 nal has failed of doing his duty, as a subject, to lawful government, and violated laws 
 which he was bound to obey, he has committed a fault, for which he has merited pun- 
 
32 
 
 God in such a light, that he could forgive sinners of the human race without any in- 
 consistency; then these amends, or this atonement, were all absolutely necessary, 
 
 ishment. In thia case, justice, not in the commutative, but in the distributive sense; 
 the only sense in which it can be concerned with this subject; demands, not the future . 
 obedience, nor an equivalent for the omitted obedience, but merely the punishment, of 
 the offender. The only reparation for the wrong which he has done, required by strict 
 Justice, is this punishment: a reparation necessarily and always required. There are 
 cases however, in which an atonement ..... may be accepted: an atonement by which 
 the honour and efficacy of the government may'be preserved, and yet the offender 
 pardoned.’”’ [To what is this atonement addressed‘ not to ‘strict justice,’ it would 
 seem, for that required the ‘punishment’ of the offender, the offender himself, as the 
 ‘only reparation.” Dr, D. proceeds.] £*In such a case however, the personal charac- 
 ter of the offender is unaltered. Before the atonement was made, he was a criminal. 
 After the atonement is made, he is not less a criminal. Asa criminal, he before merit- 
 ed punishment. Asa criminal, be no less merits it now. The turpitude of his charac- 
 ter remains the same; and while it remains, he cannot fail to deserve exactly the same 
 punishment. After the atonement is made, it cannot be truly said therefore, any more 
 than before, that he does not deserve punishment. But if the atonement be accepted, 
 it may be truly said, that, consistently with honour of the government, and the public 
 good, he may be pardoned. This act of grace is all that he can hope for. ........ 
 From these observations it is manifest, that the atonement of Christ in no sense makes 
 it necessary, that God should accept [pardon] the sinner on the ground of justice; but 
 only renders his forgiveness not inconsistent with the divine character.” [There being 
 ‘satisfaction rendered to distributive justice,’ for the sinner, why is not God bound to 
 ‘accept’ o1 pardon him ‘on the ground of justice” criminal as he remains, justice once 
 ‘satisfied’ has no demand on him; whatever be his demerit, justice, being ‘satisfied,’ 
 has no claim on him for punishment; justice itself therefore must let him go free. I 
 charge not this incongruity on Dr. Dwight, but on the Justice theory. Had he omit- 
 ted that, and addressed the atonement merely to the ‘divine character’ and the ‘honour 
 of the divine government,’ in other words, to God’s holiness and holy sovereignty, the 
 inconsistency would have been avoided.—TI subjoin the other extract.] “Christ in his 
 sufferings and death made a complete atonement for the sins of mankind. In other 
 words, he rendered to the law, churacter, and government of God such peculiar honour, 
 as to make it consistent with their wnchangeable nature and glory, that sinners should, 
 on the proper conditions, be forgiven. But the atonement inferred no obligation of 
 justice, on the part of God, to forgive them.” [Why not, if justice was ‘satisfied’ by 
 the atonement?] ..... “The supposition, incautiously admitted by some divines, that 
 Christ satisfied the demands of the law by his active and passive obedience, in the same 
 manner as the payment of a debt satisfies the demand of a creditor, has, if I mistake 
 not, been heretofore proved to be unfounded in the scriptures. We owed God our 
 obedience, and not our property; and obedience, in its own nature, is due from the 
 subject himself, and can never be rendered by another. In refusing to render it, we 
 are criminal; and for this criminality merit punishment. The guilt thus incurred is in- 
 ‘herent in the criminal himself, and cannot in the nature of things be transferred to 
 ‘another, All that, in this case, can be done by a substitute, of whatever character, is 
 ‘to render it not tmproper for the Lawgiver to pardon the transgressor. No substitute 
 can, by any possible effort, make him cease to be guilty, or to deserve punishment.” 
 {And therefore justification or salvation is of free grace, even with the atonement; in 
 which, the point argued by Dr. D. in these extracts, heis right. But, however punish- 
 ment may be deserved, it clearly is not due to justice, after justice is ‘satisfied.’ ‘The 
 words in italics show that the better theory was blended with the worse, in the mind 
 of this venerable theologian. ] 
 
33 
 
 in order to render such forgiveness proper, or consistent with the law and char- 
 acter of God, in a single instance. ‘The forgiveness of one sinner, without these 
 amends, would be just as much a contradiction to the declarations of the law, as the 
 forgiveness of a million. If then the amends, actually made, were such that God could 
 consistently forgive one sinner, he might, with equal consistency and propriety, for- 
 give any number, unless prevented by some other reason. The atonement, in other 
 words, which was necessary for a world, was equally necessary, and in just the same 
 manner and degree, for an individual sinner.” Most clearly, such an atonement is 
 not to either commutative or distributive justice: the debt of one sinner, equal in 
 amount to the debt of a world! the penalty of one, as great an accumulation of 
 punishment as the penalties of a million! But the vindication of holiness required for 
 the pardon of one sinner, may well be deemed a sufficient vindication for making 
 pardon accessible to all. I have no right to say that Dr. Dwight meant this; as I do 
 not find that he used the word holinessin this connexion, nor even the phrase “general 
 justice,’ already quoted from him. But I think the views he has given belong to that 
 theory, not to the other. Hence the two final paragraphs of the sermon, perfectly 
 explicit on the subject of conditions, accord entirely with its genera] tone. “Should 
 it be asked, why then are not all men pardoned? I answer; because all mankind do 
 not evangelically believe in this atonement, and its Author. No man is pardoned 
 merely because of the atonement made by Christ; but because of his own acceptance, 
 also, of that atonement, by faith. ‘The way is open, and equally open to all; although 
 all may not be equally inclined to walk in it.—The proffers of pardon on the very 
 same conditions are made, with equal sincerity and kindness, to every man. He who 
 does not accept them, therefore, ought to rerhember, that nothing stands i in his a hei 
 but his own impenitence and unbelief.” 
 
 itt 
 re 
 
APPENDIX D, Page 15, 
 
 eee 
 
 CONDITIONS ARE UNCONNECTED WITH HUMAN MERIT. 
 
 (aoe ne! 
 
 The object of this Appendix is, to prove that the doctrine of the Charge concerning 
 the requirement of a consideration not valuable, as distinguished from the valuable 
 consideration, in other words, the requirement of conditions,as discriminated from 
 the cause of salvation, involves in no degree that of human merit. The scriptural 
 creed is, that Christ by his passive and active merits, exclusive of all other agency 
 whatever, has gained benefits for men,—which benefits he bestows on them if they 
 perform certain conditions: my topic is, that the latter proposition does not contradict 
 the former. . 
 
 Let me first say however, that to call the pious fulfilment of conditions, a considera- 
 tion, is clearly justified by scripture. ‘*God is not unrighteous, adixec, to forget your 
 work,” éc: if God would be “unrighteous” were he to forget our works, the perform- 
 ance of them is plainly a consideration with his rectitude, inducing him to remember 
 them; yet not the valuable consideration, because they deserve nothing, and are re- 
 warded only through the merits of Christ. “It is a righteous thing dmzoy with God, 
 to recompense tribulation to them that trouble you; and to you that are troubled, rest 
 with us,” &c: if it were “righteous” for God to “recompense” with favour those who 
 endured persecution faithfully, that faithful endurance was a consideration, with 
 which, in the divine rectitude, the grant of the recompense was connected, though 
 not the valuable consideration. ‘Let Poole’s Annotations expound the difference: ‘“The 
 righteousness of God dispenseth both these recompenses, [that of the wicked, and that 
 of the: godly;] but yet the righteousness in both is not alike; strict justice dispenseth 
 the one, and the punishment of the wicked riseth from the nature of their sin, and 
 the merit of it; but it is only equzty that dispenseth the other, and that not so much 
 with respect to the nature of the saints’ duties or sufferings, as the promises and ordi- 
 nance of God, and the merit of Christ for them.” So much for scriptural authority 
 in this matter. I proceed to show, that the doctrine of conditions does not infer that of 
 buman merit. , 
 
 A perfect illustration is found in certain miraculous cures. Miracles are the work 
 of God alone; the cures were the work of God alone: yet sometimes conditions on the 
 part of man were required. Naaman is told to wash in Jordan; while he refused, he 
 reinained a leper; when he obeyed, he became clean; here was a condition, and an es- 
 sential one; but neither he nor any person ever thought of detracting from the exclu- 
 sive glory of God, by ascribing the cure in any sense or degree to his performance of 
 that condition, essential as it was. The blind man whose eyes Jesus anointed with 
 clay, is desired |to go and wash in the pool of Siloam; he did so, and received sight; 
 here was a condition, and it was performed; yet no one sees in it the least derogation 
 from the exclusive agency and honour of Jesus, in effecting the cure. So with the 
 ten lepers, sent to the priests. ‘So with those whoreceived miraculous favours “ac- 
 cording to their faith:” their faith was a condition, and ‘‘according”’ to the existing 
 fulfilment of this condition was the benefit they received; while yet the miracle is not 
 ascribed to their faith, but only to the divine power of Christ. To affirm, therefore, 
 
| 
 
 j 
 
 ——————— ee 
 
 35 
 
 that God’s blessings are contingent onour performance of conditions, does not involve 
 the supposition that that performance is the cause or any part of the price of the bless- 
 ings granted, or diminishes in the least the freedom of the grant. Earthly favours as 
 well as heavenly, miraculous as well as ordinary, were obtained for men by Christ; 
 this is sound doctrine; still the examples quoted prove that the favours are not given 
 into our possession till we do what is required of us. 
 
 Similar, though more impressive, is the instruction afforded in the case of the bra- 
 zen serpent. Fiery serpents wounded the Israelites mortally; and Satan has wounded 
 mortally our souls. God lifted up the brazen serpent as a certain cure; and Christ ie 
 lifted up for the healing of our inner man. In both cases, it is God’sact of curing, 
 not man’s; God’s exclusively, not man’s in any sense or in any degree; the Israelites 
 could do nothing for themselves which had healing power or a healing tendency; 
 neither can we. In both cases the cure is free; all Israel] were sinners, none deserved 
 mercy; and such is our state likewise. Yet in both cases, conditions are required and 
 made indispensable; the Israelites must ‘look’? at the brazen serpent, or they die; 
 and we must look to Christ lifted up, with a lively and fruitful faith, or we die the 
 second death. Here then isa free gift, yet with an indispensable condition. Here 
 is an indispensable condition, yet no merit in performing it. Here issomething done 
 by man, and done to purpose, so that without it the blessing would have been lost; yet 
 no disparagement of the exclusive glory of God in effecting and in granting that 
 blessing. 
 
 Further illustration may be drawn from human affairs. Thus:—A monarch gives 
 an estate to a subject as a mere favour, yet on the condition of his doing homage and 
 bearing true allegiance. This isa free gift; for the things required did not procure 
 the estate, though they are essential to getting possession of it and retaining it; neither 
 are they in any sense a payment for it. And faith and repentance, which are our 
 homage and allegiance to Christ, and the conditions of our salvation through him, pro- 
 cure it not and are in no sense a payment for it, though requisite to make it actually 
 ours. Conditional as are the grants in both cases, they yetare perfectly free. Thus, 
 again:—A man who has made a fortune of his own, bequeathes it to some poor prodi- 
 gal on the condition of his reforming. Here isa free gift; for the heir did not amass 
 one cent of it, nor does he pay one cent for it, nor is his reformation a valuable consi- 
 deration to the giver. Yet it is an indispensable consideration or condition. So is the 
 reformation of the sinner an indispensable condition of his becoming the heir (in pos- 
 session) of what Christ has gained; but after all, we say, with scripture, “Is it any 
 pleasure [valuable consideration] tothe Almighty, that thou art righteous? or is it gain 
 to him, that thou makest thy ways perfect?” “If thou be righteous, what givest thou 
 him? or what receiveth he of thine hand?” 
 
 In the Charleston Gospel Messenger, I find another illustration of conditions of sal- 
 vation, as distinguished from merit or its causes, taken from Walter’s Lectures. 
 
 “Suppose the govérnment of this country (England) should reward the services of 
 an able general with large territorial grants in one of its colonies; suppose also, that 
 being desirous of encouraging the growth of some particular production of that colo- 
 ny, they should make the grant conditional, and insert a clause, that the heirs of said 
 general should only hold the estate by the tenure of producing in the king’s courts a 
 certificate, that two acres of ground, at least, had been that year devoted to the pro- 
 duction required in that deed ofgrant. Now, surely, any descendant of that general 
 would be thought to use very incorrect language, if he should boast that his estate was 
 to continue in his hands for his merit, in annually cultivating two acres with the pre- 
 
36 
 
 scribed production. He would immediately be told, that is the condition indeed on 
 which you hold your land; but the cause of your riches is the valour of your ancestor. 
 On the other hand, should he foolishly neglect to comply with the condition, he would 
 be told, at once, that he had thrown away all claim to the estate. 
 
 ‘Just so, God has been pleased to make us an offer of ‘glory, honour, and immortal- 
 ity,’ for Christ’s sake. Desiring also the propagation of virtue, as best harmonizing 
 with his own pure and perfect nature, and as most productive of happiness among his 
 creatures, he has made our endeavours after perfect virtue the condition on which 
 we are allowed to take hold of his most gracious offer.” 
 
 So clear is it, that the doctrine of conditional salvation has no affinity with that of 
 human merit. All men will be recompensed “according to their works;” and the bad, 
 for their bad works; but the good, not for their good works, but only for Christ’s sake, 
 who transfers to them so much of his own reward. 
 
APPENDIX E. Page 16. 
 
 FURTHER REMARKS. 
 
 To carry outa theory of the Atonement to minute reasonings, as part of the doc- 
 trine, is wrong; and to this cause may probably be ascribed the interweaving of so 
 much error with that which addresses it to the justice of God. For, had the idea of 
 a debt, and that of the penalty, or of a penalty, discharged by the divine Substitute, 
 been avoided, justice would have retained its broad sense; and so the theory might 
 have escaped the dilemma of leading to either universal salvation or limited redemp- 
 tion.’ On this account, the author hasendeavoured to keep his Charge clear of a simi- 
 lar fault; going no farther with his theory, than to presume the atonement to be ad- 
 dressed to some attribute of God, selecting that of holiness, and regarding the sacri- 
 fice as vindicating that attribute in conceding pardon to the sinner; and also intima- 
 ting, that the vindication was both of God to himself, and of God to his intelligent 
 creatures. The theory, perhaps, would be sufficiently complete without these two 
 intimations; for theology is not bound to explain every matter under its cognisance; 
 and those who wish, may subtract so much from the theory advocated. But as the ob- 
 stacle to remission of sin must lie more in the divine nature, than in the creatures, it. 
 seemed but proper to include the former particularly, with the latter, in explaining 
 the difficulties obviated by the cross. 
 
 Having thus disclaimed the connexion of needless matter with the body of the theo- 
 ry, the author submitsa few Further Remarks, as a mere exercise in philosophical 
 divinity; regarding them, and asking others to regard them, as not involved in the 
 main subject. | ‘i 
 
 The divine holiness, in its relation to sin, is total abhorrence of it. This abhor- 
 rence, in its relation to the commission of sin, is indignation towards the sinner, 
 the indignation, not of passion, but of principle. Abhorrence and indignation are, in 
 themselves, but sentiments; and if not carried into effect, by a being who has the 
 power and the right to do so, they are but inoperative sentiments. To make them 
 operative, suffering is awarded to the sinner. But,the sinner being capable of such 
 a restoration as will fit him for heaven, mercy intercedes and asks forbearance. The 
 obstacle to forbearance is, that holiness will, by that indulgence, be but an inoperative 
 sentiment, and thus (be it reverently argued) of no sterling value; like faith without 
 works in men, or profession without practice, or good feelings unproductive of corres- 
 ponding actions; all which ought to be held valueless in the judgment of their posses- 
 sor, and are so held in that of other persons if they are true minded. God’s love or 
 benevolence, for example, would have been inoperative had he not formed creatures. 
 How then shall the holiness of God, his abhorrence of sin, and indignation towards 
 the sinner, become operative, and be practically carried out? By the infliction of suf- 
 fering,is the reply. But ifthis be on the sinner, mercy fails in its intervention in his 
 behalf. It must therefore be on a different being,—and that being is Christ. Christ: 
 as the representative ot human sin, undergoes suffering, in humiliation, in bodily pain, 
 in anguish of soul, in death. His humiliation is that of a divine person to the human 
 nature, to the likeness of sinful flesh, to being numbered with the transgressors. His 
 
38 
 
 pain of body and anguish of soul, so much of them as constituted the unknown agony 
 and the unknown dying passion, were also sustained by him in virtue of his divine na- 
 ture. And the union of divinity with humanity for these purposes, illustrates the 
 greatness of the holy abhorrence and indignation thus carried into effect.—That vir- 
 tuous indignation should act as such, is a natural thought. That it should act upon an 
 innocent person, instead of the guilty, is a mystery: but its mysterious character is 
 much qualified by the considerations,—that in the common course of providence, per- 
 sons often suffer for the good of others,—that, if fit to be rewarded in heaven, they 
 will there be amply recompensed for these sufferings, as Christ has been for his,— 
 and that, in the case of the Redeemer, he agreed to become the representative 
 of sin, in order that “sin might be thus condemned in his flesh.” In that condemna- 
 tion of sin, the sentiments of holy abhorrence and indignation become operative; and 
 this their fearful action, incalculably tremendous, is the vindication of God’s holiness 
 in forgiving the sinner. 
 
 Still it does not result, that all sinners for whom this sacrifice was made, will be 
 pardoned. The sacrifice renders sin pardonable in all men, and is the sole procuring 
 cause of pardon in those who receive that grace. But the scheme is open to condi- 
 tions; and these are annexed in the revelation of the scheme. On this point, enough 
 has been said in the Charge.