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THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 
 
Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 in 2013 
 
 http://archive.org/details/captureoffortfisames 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 
 
 BY 
 
 BREVET MAJOR GENERAL ADELBERT AMES, U.S.V. 
 
 PART I. 
 
 About the first of December, 1864, when in command of 
 the Third Division, Twenty-fourth Corps, of the Army of the 
 James, then before Richmond, Va., I was notified I had been 
 selected to lead my division in a movement, by sea, against 
 some point of the Confederacy on the Atlantic coast. 
 
 At that time Wilmington, N.C., was the port through 
 which the Confederacy received a large part of its munitions of 
 war, and whence was shipped to England, in payment therefor, 
 much of its cotton and tobacco. Wilmington was situated on 
 the east bank of the Cape Fear River, thirty miles from its 
 mouth, which was guarded by Fort Fisher. 
 
 Our Navy was untiring in its efforts to blockade that port, 
 but was not successful. 
 
 The order from General Butler to General Weitzel relative 
 to the expedition December 6th, 1864, was: "The Major 
 General commanding has entrusted you with the command of 
 the expedition about to embark for the North Carolina coast. 
 It will consist of sixty-five hundred infantry, two batteries and 
 fifty cavalry. The effective men of General Ames's division of 
 the Twenty-fourth Corps will furnish the infantry force. 
 General Paine is under your orders and General Ames will be 
 ordered to report to you in person immediately." 
 
 My division, of three brigades, was composed of New Hamp- 
 shire, New York, Pennsylvania, and Indiana troops, about thirty- 
 three hundred in number. General Paine had a division of 
 colored troops. 
 
 271 
 
272 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 We embarked at Bermuda Hundreds, Va., December 8th, 
 and our transports reached the place of rendezvous off New- 
 Inlet, N.C., Thursday, the 15th. Friday, Saturday, and Sun- 
 day, we awaited the coming of the Navy. 
 
 Admiral Porter, commanding our fleet, arrived Sunday 
 evening, the i8th v The next day the water was too rough to 
 make a landing on the ocean beach. Towards evening a north- 
 east gale coming up, the transports were sent to Beaufort for 
 coal and water, as the ten days' supply had run short, where 
 they were delayed by the weather and the difficulty of getting 
 coal, until Saturday, the 24th. 
 
 I did not go to Beaufort, as my ship, on which was one of 
 my brigades, was well prepared for such an emergency. 
 
 General Butler, followed by his fleet of transports, returned 
 to New Inlet on Saturday, the 24th of December, between four 
 and five o'clock in the afternoon. 
 
 The powder boat, which played such a notorious part in this 
 expedition, had been exploded at about two o'clock on the morn- 
 ing of the same day. 
 
 The idea of the powder boat was General Butler's, but it was 
 approved of and adopted by the Navy, which furnished the vessel 
 and its share of the two hundred and fifteen tons of gun-powder 
 used. The Navy held control of this experiment from first to last. 
 
 The explosion was untimely, and a failure. Commodore 
 Jeffers of the Navy reports : "A part of the programme re- 
 quired that the vessel should be grounded, which appears not to 
 have been the case." 
 
 Commander Rhind writes : " That, owing to the want of 
 confinement and insufficient fusing of the mass, much of the 
 powder was blown away before ignition and its effect lost." 
 
 Admiral Porter reports : " That the powder was finally 
 exploded from the effects of a fire kindled in the forecastle. 
 No results of value were to be expected from this mode. It was 
 proposed only as a final resort, in order to prevent the vessel, 
 in any contingency, from falling into the hands of the enemy." 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 273 
 
 Commander James Parker, U. S. Navy, stated to the New 
 York Loyal Legion, October 5, 1892 : "We all believed in it (the 
 powder boat) from the Admiral down, but when it proved so 
 laughable a failure we, of the Navy, laid its paternity upon 
 General Butler." 
 
 Colonel Lamb, in command, describes Fort Fisher as fol- 
 lows : " At the land-face of Fort Fisher the peninsula was about 
 half a mile wide, Cape Fear River being on one side and the 
 Atlantic Ocean on the other. This face commenced about a 
 hundred feet from the river with a half bastion, and extended 
 with a heavy curtain to a full bastion on the ocean side, where 
 it joined the sea-face. The work was built to withstand the 
 heaviest artillery fire. The outer slope was twenty feet high 
 from the berm to the top of the parapet, at an angle of forty- 
 five degrees, and was sodded with marsh grass, which grew 
 luxuriantly. The parapet was not less than twenty-five feet 
 thick, with an inclination of only one foot. The revetment was 
 five feet nine inches high, from the floor of the gun chambers, 
 and these were some twelve feet or more from the interior 
 plane. The guns were all mounted in barbette, Columbiad car- 
 riages ; there was not a single casemated gun in the fort. Be- 
 tween the gun chambers, containing one or two guns each 
 (there were twenty heavy guns on the land-face), there were " 
 (some eighteen) " heavy traverses, exceeding in size any known 
 to engineers, to protect from an enfilading fire. They extended 
 out some twelve feet on the parapet, running back thirty feet 
 or more. The gun chambers were reached from the rear by 
 steps. In each traverse was an alternate magazine or bomb- 
 proof, the latter ventilated by an air-chamber. Passageways 
 penetrated the traverses in the interior of the work, forming 
 additional bomb-proofs for the reliefs of the guns. 
 
 "The sea-face was a mile long, and for a hundred yards 
 from the northeast bastion was of the same massive character as 
 the land-face. 
 
 " As a defence against infantry there was a system of sub- 
 
2/4 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 terre torpedoes extending across the peninsula, five to six hun- 
 dred feet from the land-face, and so disconnected that an 
 explosion of one would not affect the others ; inside the torpe- 
 does, about fifty feet from the berm of the work, extending 
 from the river bank to the seashore, was a heavy palisade of 
 sharpened logs nine feet high, pierced for musketry, and so laid 
 out as to have an enfilading fire on the centre, where there was 
 a redoubt guarding a sally-port from which two Napoleons were 
 run out as occasion required. At the river end of the palisade 
 was a deep and muddy slough, across which was a bridge, the 
 entrance on the river road into the fort ; commanding this 
 bridge was a Napoleon gun. There were three mortars in rear 
 of the land-face." 
 
 This strong work had, at the time of our first expedition, a 
 garrison of fourteen hundred men, nine hundred of whom were 
 veterans. 
 
 Colonel Lamb had been incited to the utmost by General 
 Lee, who had sent him word that he "must hold the fort or he 
 could not subsist his army." 
 
 On the morning of the 24th the fleet of Admiral Porter 
 moved in towards New Inlet and opened fire on the fort. The 
 character of this bombardment and the demands made by the 
 Admiral on his ships and sailors I will let him tell. 
 
 In his letter to the Secretary of the Navy of the 24th of 
 December, 1864, he says: "I have the honor to inform you 
 that I attacked the forts at the mouth of the Cape Fear River 
 to-day at 12.30. . . . After getting the ships in position we 
 silenced it in about an hour and a half, there being no troops 
 here to take possession. I am merely firing now to keep up 
 practice. The forts are nearly demolished, and as soon as 
 troops come we can take possession. We have set them on fire, 
 blown some of them up, and all that is wanted now is troops to 
 land and go into them." The Admiral failed to mention, in his 
 letter, the fact that I had offered one thousand men and co- 
 operation, although, in his testimony before the Committee on 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 275 
 
 the Conduct of the War, he said : " General Ames had a thou- 
 sand men there, and he sent on board and told me he was ready- 
 to land." 
 
 In his letter of the 26th he says, referring to the bombard- 
 ment of the 24th : " In an hour and fifteen minutes after the 
 first shot was fired not a shot came from the fort. Finding that 
 the batteries were silenced completely I directed the ships to 
 keep up a moderate fire in hopes of attracting the attention of 
 the transports and bringing them in." In this same letter of 
 December 26th Admiral Porter says, speaking of the bombard- 
 ment of the forts on December 25th : " The firing this day was 
 slow, only sufficient to amuse the enemy while the army landed. 
 In the bombardment of the 25 th the men were engaged firing 
 slowly for seven hours. . . . Everything was coolly done 
 throughout the day, and I witnessed some beautiful practice." 
 
 In a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, December 29, 
 after the fleet had left and the transports had gone back to 
 Hampton Roads, he writes : " At no time did I permit the ves- 
 sels to open on them with all their batteries, limiting some of 
 them to about two shots a minute, and permitting the large 
 vessels to fight only one division of guns at a time ; and the 
 bombardment cost only a certain amount of shells, which I 
 would expend in a month's target practice anyhow." Such are 
 the salient features of the reports of Admiral Porter. 
 
 General Whiting, who was in the fort, and who commanded 
 that military district, says the slight damage done by this 
 cannonading was repaired at night, and that "the garrison 
 was in no instance driven from its guns, the palisade was in 
 perfect order, and the mines the same, the wires not having 
 been cut." 
 
 General Weitzel testified before the Committee on the Con- 
 duct of the War : " I made a reconnoissance of the fort and saw 
 that the work, as a defensive work, was not injured at all, except 
 that one gun about midway of the land face was dismounted. 
 I did not see a single opening in the row of palisades that was 
 
276 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 in front of the ditch; it seemed to be perfectly intact." All in 
 the fort agree that Admiral Porter was mistaken as to the effects 
 of the cannonading. 
 
 So much as to the condition of the fort. 
 
 On the morning of the 25th all our transports anchored 
 near the shore some two or three miles north of the fort, and 
 the troops immediately began to land. 
 
 I had been selected to storm the fort with my division. 
 
 My report on December 28th is as follows: "Brevet Brigadier 
 General Curtis and five hundred of his brigade were the first to 
 land, and were taken towards the fort by General Weitzel for a 
 reconnoissance. ... It was dusk when I reached the front. 
 I then heard that the First Brigade was to remain where it was 
 until further orders, and that if any attack was made the respon- 
 sibility would rest with the officer in immediate command. At 
 this time I did not know that it had been decided not to attack 
 the fort. Upon the report of Curtis that he could take the 
 fort I sent his brigade forward to make the attempt." In his 
 report Curtis says : " On my arrival at this point I received 
 orders from General Ames to return and re-establish my lines as 
 they were, and, if possible, to occupy the fort, and I at once 
 ordered my skirmishers forward, etc. . . . The enemy, having 
 cover of the darkness, opened on the skirmishers as they ad- 
 vanced with musketry and canister, but did not prevent their 
 establishing the line in its former position, with the reserves in 
 close proximity." Curtis made no further effort to take the 
 fort, as I had ordered him to do, but sent word to me that 
 he was " occupying his former position." Why he failed to 
 assault the fort after I assumed the responsibility and gave 
 the order I have never known. At this time an order reached 
 me to return to our ships, which we did, and the first expedition 
 ended. 
 
 An incident occurred which had much to do in giving an 
 erroneous idea of the condition of the fort and garrison. 
 
 One of our lieutenants approached the fort and captured its 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 277 
 
 flag, which had been shot away by the Navy, and which had 
 fallen with the flag staff on the outer slope of the parapet to the 
 ditch. 
 
 On this point General Weitzel testifies : " I sent for Lieu- 
 tenant Walling and questioned him about it, and he told me that 
 a shell had knocked the flagstaff outside and on top of the 
 parapet, and the flag hung over into or outside of the ditch. 
 Thinking that probably the rebels had not observed it, he crept 
 up on his hands and knees to the palisading, found a hole in it 
 that one of the shells had made, crept through the hole and 
 up to the flag, and got it and got away with it without being 
 observed." 
 
 Let us see why our expedition terminated thus abruptly. 
 
 Weitzel had been ordered by Butler to land and make a 
 reconnoissance. In his testimony before the Committee on the 
 Conduct of the War he gave his experience during the war in 
 charging and defending field works, and continuing, said : 
 " After that experience, with the information I had obtained 
 from reading and study — for before this war I was an instructor 
 at the Military Academy for three years under Professor Mahan, 
 on those very subjects — remembering well the remarks of the 
 Lieutenant General commanding, that it was his intention I 
 should command that expedition, because another officer selected 
 by the war department had once shown timidity, and in face of 
 the fact that I had been appointed a major general only twenty 
 days before, and needed confirmation ; notwithstanding all this, I 
 went back to General Butler, and told him I considered it would 
 be murder to order an attack on that work with that force." 
 
 Colonel Lamb says, in reference to the loss of his flag : " I 
 had no fear of an assault, and because, during a bombardment 
 which rendered an assault impossible, I covered my men, and 
 a few straggling skirmishers, too few to attract attention, got 
 near the fort, and some gallant officers thought they could have 
 carried the work, it does not follow that they would not have 
 paid dearly for their temerity if they had made the attempt." 
 
278 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 General Whiting speaks to the same effect. 
 
 Now, who is to say that Weitzel, Whiting and Lamb were 
 mistaken as to the situation that day ? Is it the brave soldier, 
 who crept unseen through a hole in the palisade to the parapet 
 and took a flag from a staff which had been shot away ? 
 
 Is it Admiral Porter, who wrote to the Secretary of the 
 Navy January 17th, 1865: "I have since visited Fort Fisher 
 and the adjoining works, and find their strength greatly beyond 
 what I had conceived. An engineer might be excusable in 
 saying they could not be captured except by regular siege. I 
 wonder, even now, how it was done. The work, as I said 
 before, is really stronger than the Malakoff tower, which defied 
 so long the combined power of France and pngland." In a 
 letter of the 16th of January to the Secretary of the Navy, he 
 says : " I was in Fort Malakoff a few days after it surrendered 
 to the French and English ; the combined armies of the two 
 nations were many months capturing that stronghold, and it 
 won't compare, either in size or strength, to Fort Fisher." 
 
 I have no hesitancy in saying that they were not mistaken, 
 though it is true that without personal knowledge of the charac- 
 ter of the fort, and, for the time, believing Curtis, I ordered 
 him to take it on his assertion that he could do so. 
 
 What was not possible December 25 th, was made possible 
 January 15th, through an efficient bombardment on the part of 
 the navy and the co-operation of two thousand sailors and 
 marines and an additional force of one thousand four hundred 
 infantry. 
 
 January 1st, 1865, Grant wrote to Secretary Stanton: "The 
 fact is, there are but two ways of taking Fort Fisher, operating 
 from the water ; one is to surprise them whilst there is but a 
 small garrison defending the place ; the other is for the navy to 
 send a portion of their fleet into Cape Fear River. ..." He 
 continues : " In the three days of good weather which elapsed 
 after the army had reached the scene of action, before the navy 
 appeared, our troops had the chance of capturing Fort Fisher 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 279 
 
 whilst it had an insufficient garrison to hold it. The delay gave 
 the enemy time to accumulate a force. . . . The failure before 
 was the result of delays by the navy." 
 
 So, of Grant's two ways of taking the fort, one by surprise 
 failed, as he said, because of the delay of the navy, and as to the 
 other, Colonel Comstock reports to Grant, January 9th : " There 
 is no hope, at least at present, of the admiral's trying to run by 
 Fort Fisher." 
 
 Grant ordered and intended that Weitzel should have com- 
 mand of the expedition. North Carolina was in Butler's military 
 department. His order retained Weitzel as his subordinate. 
 
 Though Grant may have intended and ordered certain action 
 on the part of our expedition in December, 1865, on the first of 
 January, 1865, he wrote the Secretary of War, as just quoted, 
 that there were but two ways to take the fort — by surprise or 
 by the occupancy of the river by the navy. There was no sur- 
 prise, the navy was not in the river, the bombardment of the 
 fort was ineffectual, Weitzel decided against an assault, Butler 
 acquiesced and ordered the expedition back to Virginia, saying 
 to Weitzel at the same time that he, Butler, would assume all 
 responsibility, as he could stand the blame better than could 
 Weitzel, the professional soldier. 
 
 The Committee on the Conduct of the War was composed of 
 the leading men in Congress at that time. Much experience 
 in the investigation of military affairs had made them, to say the 
 least, fairly capable judges. They could command any witness, 
 they were critical and severe in their examinations, and their 
 conclusions were reached without fear or favor. Honest Ben 
 Wade was their chairman. This is their decision : 
 
 " In conclusion, your Committee would say, from all the testi- 
 mony before them, that the determination of General Butler not 
 to assault the fort seems to have been fully justified by all facts 
 and circumstances then known or afterwards ascertained." 
 
 Few can comprehend the penalty General Butler had to pay 
 for his action on this occasion. The war was within a few 
 
280 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 months of its end, and he had hoped for a share of the honors 
 conferred on those who served faithfully and well, but he was 
 sent home, and the whole nation condemned him for the failure. 
 General Weitzel, one of the best of men, and one of our ablest 
 generals, was humbled in spirit before the storm of censure 
 and ridicule. But all that came after the capture of the fort on 
 our second expedition. 
 
 PART II. 
 
 The second expedition was started without delay. January 
 2nd, 1865, General A. H. Terry was put in command. On the 
 3rd we left camp, began re-embarkation on the 4th, and com- 
 pleted it on the 5 th. / 
 
 I had thirty-three hundred picked men in my division. Gen- 
 eral Paine had the same number in his. There were added a 
 brigade of fourteen hundred men under Colonel J. G. Abbott 
 and two batteries of light artillery of three and six guns each. 
 Colonel Comstock, who represented Grant on our first expedi- 
 tion, returned with us on the second. 
 
 The transports put to sea on the morning of the 6th. 
 A severe storm drove them into Beaufort. 
 
 The troops were landed on the 13th, some two miles north 
 of the fort. 
 
 Upon landing the first work on hand was to establish a line 
 of breastworks from the ocean beach to the river to keep the 
 enemy in the direction of Wilmington from interfering with our 
 operations. 
 
 A reconnoissance was made. Terry reports : " As a result 
 of this reconnoissance, and in view of the extreme difficulty which 
 might be expected in landing supplies and the materials for a 
 siege on the often tempestuous beach, it was decided to attempt 
 an assault the next day, provided that, in the mean time, the fire 
 of the navy should so far destroy the palisades as to make one 
 practicable. This decision was communicated to Admiral Porter, 
 who at once placed a division of his vessels in a position to 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 281 
 
 accomplish this last-named object. It was arranged, in consul- 
 tation with him, that a heavy bombardment from all the vessels 
 should commence early in the morning and continue up to the 
 moment of the assault, and that even then it should not cease, 
 but should be diverted from the points of attack to the other 
 parts of the work. It was decided that the assault should be 
 made at 3 p.m., that the army should attack on the western half 
 of the land-face, and that a column of sailors and marines should 
 assault the northeast bastion. The fire of the navy continued 
 during the night. At 8 a.m. of the 13th all of the vessels, 
 except a division left to aid in the defence of our northern line, 
 moved into position, and a fire, magnificent alike for its power 
 and accuracy, was opened," and continued all day Saturday, 
 Saturday night and Sunday, till 3.30 p.m. "Ames's division had 
 been selected for the assault. ... At 3.25 p.m. all the prep- 
 arations were completed, the order to move forward was given to 
 Ames, and a concerted signal was made to Admiral Porter to 
 change the direction of his fire." 
 
 The situation at this time was as follows : Some two miles 
 north of the fort General Paine had established a line of breast- 
 works, from ocean to river, facing north, with his own division 
 on the left and Colonel Abbott's brigade on the right. On the 
 sea-beach, about half a mile from the fort, were two thousand 
 sailors and marines under command of Fleet Captain K. R. 
 Breese. On the east were sixty-four ships of war, under Admiral 
 Porter, cannonading the fort. My three brigades were in line, 
 one behind the other, ranging from three to five hundred yards 
 from the fort ; the left of each line nearly opposite the middle 
 of the land-face of the fort, the right near the river. A body of 
 sharpshooters were pushed forward, and the whole division was 
 covered from the fire of the enemy, as far as possible, by the 
 inequalities of the ground and slight pits formed by throwing up 
 the sand. 
 
 Terry, Comstock and I were in a small advanced outwork 
 about half a mile from the fort. My able and gallant Adjutant 
 
282 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 General, General Charles A. Carleton, has made the following 
 record : " General Terry turned to General Ames and said : 
 ' General Ames, the signal agreed upon for the assault has been 
 given.' General Ames asked : ' Have you any special orders to 
 give ? ' General Terry replied : ' No, you understand the situa- 
 tion and what is desired to be accomplished. I leave everything 
 to your discretion.' " Thus was given me the unrestricted 
 command of the fighting forces. 
 
 At once I directed Captain Lawrence of my staff to order 
 Curtis, commanding the First Brigade, to charge, striking the 
 parapet at the end nearest the river. The palisade had been 
 sufficiently broken and shot away by the fire of the navy to 
 permit the passage of the troops. As I approached the fort I 
 watched with anxious eyes the charge of the First Brigade. 
 
 Captain Lawrence heroically led the charge of that part of 
 the brigade which advanced at this time. He was the first 
 through the palisade, and while reaching for a guidon to plant 
 on the first traverse, his hand was shot away and he was danger- 
 ously wounded in the neck, but with this lodgement on the first 
 traverse, the force of the charge was spent. I quickly ordered 
 Colonel Pennypacker's brigade, which was close at hand, to 
 charge and sweep down the parapet to the ocean. 
 
 I will not attempt a description of the battle. It was a 
 charge of my brigades, one after the other, followed by desperate 
 fighting at close quarters over the parapet and traverses and in 
 and through the covered ways. All the time we were exposed 
 to the musketry and artillery of the enemy, while our own Navy 
 was thundering away, occasionally making us the victims of its 
 fire. 
 
 The official reports of my officers gave no adequate idea of 
 their gallant deeds, but they must supply the form and coloring 
 of the warlike scenes of that eventful Sunday. 
 
 Colonel Daggett, in command of the First Brigade, January 
 17th, reports : "At about 3 p.m., General Curtis having received 
 orders to that effect from General Ames, through Captain Law- 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 283 
 
 rence, the brigade advanced to the charge, so as to strike the 
 sally-port, that having been deemed the only vulnerable point of 
 the work, and, after a desperate struggle, the advance of the 
 brigade reached the parapet of the fort and scaled it to the first 
 traverse, where the guidon of the 1 1 7th New York was planted 
 — the first colors on the fort." 
 
 Major O. P. Harding, who came out of the fight in command 
 of the Second Brigade, reports : " The brigade was ordered to 
 assault the fort, which was done in a gallant manner and under 
 a heavy fire of grape and musketry, and entered the fort through 
 a sally-port near the river. The 203rd Pennsylvania, com- 
 manded by Colonel J. W. Moore, was the first to enter the fort, 
 closely followed by the 97th Pennsylvania, commanded by First 
 Lieutenant John Wainwright. The colors of each of those regi- 
 ments reached the parapet about the same time, those of the 
 97th borne by Colonel Pennypacker, and of the 203rd by Colonel 
 Moore. Colonel Pennypacker was seriously wounded while 
 planting his colors on the third traverse, and Colonel Moore fell 
 dead while passing the second traverse, waving his colors and 
 commanding his men to follow. After entering the fort the 
 brigade became somewhat broken up ; nevertheless, both officers 
 and men behaved gallantly until its capture." 
 
 " After the fall of Lieutenant Colonel Lyman, 203rd Penn- 
 sylvania, who fell on the sixth traverse, I commanded the regi- 
 ment until about 5 p.m., when ordered by General Ames to 
 take command of the brigade, which I immediately organized." 
 
 Captain H. B. Essington, commanding 203rd Pennsylvania, 
 reports : " The regiment charged on the right of the Second 
 Brigade, and was the first regiment of the brigade to enter the 
 fort, going in with the First (Curtis's) Brigade. After having 
 assisted in capturing the first two mounds, a portion of the regi- 
 ment went to the right and stationed themselves behind a bank 
 in the open field south of the fort. The latter portion then 
 charged across the plain, by order of the commanding general 
 (General Ames), until opposite the seventh or eighth traverse, 
 
284 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 where they threw up an embankment with their tin plates and 
 shovels, which they held until the fort surrendered, keeping up 
 a steady fire on the enemy." 
 
 Let me say, in passing, that Colonel Pennypacker's conduct 
 in leading his brigade with the colors of his own regiment, 
 placed him second to none for gallantry that day. It would be 
 difficult to overestimate the value of his example to his brigade. 
 
 Entering the fort and passing to the rear of the parapet at 
 the west end, I made an examination of it from that position, 
 and decided to use my third brigade, Colonel Bell's, with its 
 left by the parapet, right extended south and west inside the 
 fort, and charge into the angle formed by the land and sea faces. 
 I ordered Bell forward with his brigade to report to me. Lieu- 
 tenant Colonel Johnson, commanding the Third Brigade, Jan- 
 uary 1 9th, reports : " Colonel Bell was ordered by General Ames 
 to remain near him for the purpose of receiving orders," Un- 
 fortunately Colonel Bell was killed in the advance, gallantly 
 leading his brigade. The part of his brigade which reached me 
 was in a somewhat disorganized condition. I formed it as best 
 I could for the charge. Owing to the obstructions of the de- 
 molished quarters of the garrison and the fire of the enemy from 
 the front (the angle had been partially filled in and was pro- 
 tected by a curtain), and from the right, as well as the fire of 
 our Navy, the advance was checked. The men were in a very 
 exposed position, and as no advantage could be gained there I 
 ordered them to join the other troops in pushing seaward on the 
 land-face of the fort. Lieutenant Colonel Johnson further re- 
 ports : "The brigade entered the fort conjointly with a portion 
 of the First (Curtis's) Brigade, at the left bastion, a portion 
 moving along the -terre-plain and a portion on the ramparts, 
 parapets and slopes, some of the officers and men in the advance 
 with officers and men of other brigades, all vying with each 
 other." 
 
 Owing to the contracted space in which the fighting was 
 done, brigade and regimental formations were impossible. What 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 285 
 
 was accomplished was through the heroic efforts of small bodies 
 of officers and men. 
 
 From time to time I sent to Terry, who was in the earthwork 
 half a mile away, reports of the progress I was making. 
 
 I had previously learned that the sailors and marines who 
 had made an attack on the sea angle had been quickly repulsed. 
 
 As the sun sank to the horizon, the ardor of the assault 
 abated. Our advance was but slow. Ten of my officers had 
 been killed, forty-seven wounded, and about five hundred men 
 were killed and wounded. Among the killed was one brigade 
 commander, the other two were wounded and disabled. I now 
 requested Terry to join me in the fort. It was dark before he 
 and Comstock arrived. I explained the situation. 
 
 Colonel Abbott's brigade, which had been relieved from its 
 position in the line facing Wilmington, by the defeated sailors 
 and marines, had been ordered to report to me. 
 
 I decided to make my chief effort with the reinforcements 
 by moving the troops by the flank between the palisade and the 
 foot of the fort until the head of the column should reach the 
 northeast angle by the ocean, then face to the right and rush 
 the men up and over the parapet ; and at the same time continue 
 the struggle for the traverses. Colonel J. C. Abbott, command- 
 ing Second Brigade, First Division, in his report of January 
 1 5th, says : " Reaching the fort about dark I reported to 
 General Ames. By order of General Ames I first threw the 
 3rd New Hampshire Volunteers, Captain Trickey commanding, 
 along the portion of the north face of the work already occupied 
 by his troops and relieved them ; also by General Ames's order, 
 I threw out the 7th Connecticut Volunteers, Captain Marble 
 commanding, as a picket in rear of the work, the right of the 
 line resting on Cape Fear River. During this time the enemy 
 occupied all the eastern and about one-third the northern face 
 of the work. At about 9 o'clock, by order of General Ames, 
 I then proceeded to dislodge the enemy from the remainder of 
 the fort. I then advanced the 7th New Hampshire, Lieutenant 
 
286 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 Colonel Rollins commanding. They at once and gallantly 
 charged up the slope enveloping the sea angle of the work, 
 meeting a sharp fire from the enemy, who were stationed behind 
 the parapets, and in rear of the main work." 
 
 Captain William H. Trickey, commanding 3rd New Hamp- 
 shire Regiment, reports January 1 8th : " I was directed by 
 Colonel Abbott, commanding brigade, to move my regiment to 
 the extreme advance held by the Second Division and open fire 
 upon the enemy ; was thus engaged for nearly an hour, having, 
 to a great extent, silenced the enemy's fire ; was then directed 
 by Colonel Abbott to take and hold, with twenty men, the next 
 traverse in front, the remainder of my command being left in 
 several traverses to keep up the fire upon the enemy. We 
 took the traverse, as directed, driving the enemy out. Think- 
 ing we could go farther, we charged and took the next two, 
 with a like result. After taking the third traverse, having met 
 with considerable resistance, I did not deem it prudent to go 
 farther with so few men, and opened a vigorous fire upon the 
 enemy, who was rallying for the recapture of the traverses ; we 
 held the enemy in check until the arrival of the 7th New Hamp- 
 shire and 6th Connecticut, who charged and took the remainder 
 of the work." 
 
 Lieutenant Colonel Rollins reports: "At 10 p. m. moved 
 my regiment inside the fort, and was ordered by General Ames 
 to take two traverses, and three, if possible, the number not 
 then taken. I moved over the third traverse of the fort, and 
 advanced rapidly inside the stockade until I reached the battery 
 on the northeast angle of the fort, where I formed the right 
 wing of the regiment, leaving the left in support. I then 
 ordered a charge and captured the three remaining traverses 
 and batteries, then pushed on by the right flank, and by so 
 doing cut off the angle of the fort, moved to the right, and by a 
 rapid and determined advance, captured the remaining traverses 
 and batteries of the fort proper." 
 
 Thus, after some seven hours' fighting, more than five of 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 287 
 
 which were after dark, the land-face of the fort was occupied 
 and all resistance ceased. The enemy fled to the shelter of 
 Battery Buchanan, at the end of the point, two miles away. 
 Terry took Abbott and a part of his brigade and marched to 
 Battery Buchanan. Abbott reports : " I was met by the 
 Adjutant General of the General commanding the enemy's 
 forces, who tendered the surrender of the battery, upon which 
 I referred to General Terry, who would soon arrive. . . . 
 General Terry having arrived, received the surrender of the 
 work and the force." 
 
 Colonel Abbott was mistaken. Terry was too late. Captain 
 Lockwood of my staff had already received the surrender. 
 
 It was after ten o'clock. The task set for us at half-past 
 three was finished. Our work was done. 
 
 The statement of their achievement is the highest eulogy 
 that can be passed upon our soldiers. 
 
 A grievous accident occurred early the next morning, which 
 killed and wounded one hundred and thirty of our gallant heroes. 
 It was the explosion of the magazine of the fort. A board of 
 enquiry was organized and found, "that the following are the 
 main facts, viz. : 1, immediately after the capture of the fort, 
 General Ames gave orders to Lieutenant Colonel Samuel M. 
 Zent to place guards on all the magazines and bomb-proofs. 
 2, Lieutenant Colonel Zent commenced on the northwest corner 
 of the fort, next the river, following the traverses round, and 
 placed guards on thirty-one entrances under the traverses. The 
 main magazines, which afterwards exploded, being in the rear of 
 the traverses, escaped his notice, and, consequently, had no 
 guards from his regiment or any other." 
 
 General Bragg reports that the defenders of the fort num- 
 bered, all told, about one hundred and ten commissioned officers 
 and twenty-five hundred men — their casualties being over four 
 hundred. A few escaped across the river, in boats, under cover 
 of the darkness ; the rest became our prisoners. 
 
 Mr. Stanton, the Secretary of War, had been visiting Sher- 
 
288 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 man at Savannah after his march through Georgia, and on his 
 way north called at Fort Fisher, where he had an interview with 
 Terry. 
 
 Upon Stanton's arrival at Fortress Monroe, Va., he sent a 
 despatch to President Lincoln marked "official," dated Tuesday, 
 io a.m., January 17, 1865. In this despatch Stanton mentions 
 Terry, my brigade commanders and some regimental com- 
 manders, but omits my name altogether. Among other things 
 he says : " The assault on the other and most difficult side of 
 the fort was made by a column of three thousand troops of the 
 old Tenth Corps, led by Colonel Curtis, under the immediate 
 supervision of General Terry." 
 
 This is not true, as the official reports show, in any other 
 sense than that Curtis's brigade first reached the fort under 
 my immediate orders with Terry half a mile away. An earlier 
 attempt to make public these facts has been impracticable, as 
 the volume of the war records covering this event was not 
 published till 1894. 
 
 With this as a preface I will add to the extracts of the 
 reports of some of my subordinate officers already given, the 
 report of General Terry, who was my only superior officer. He 
 says : " Of General Ames I have already spoken in a letter 
 recommending his promotion. He commanded all the troops 
 engaged and was constantly under fire. His great coolness, 
 good judgment and skill were never more conspicuous than in 
 this assault." 
 
 These official reports show, as Terry says, that I "com- 
 manded all the troops engaged " from the first act, when my 
 aide, Captain A. G. Lawrence, led the first brigade into the fort, 
 to the last act, when the garrison surrendered to my aide, 
 Captain H. C. Lockwood. 
 
 The sailors and marines who assaulted in column the north- 
 east angle of the fort along the sea beach, were a body of two 
 thousand men, made up of detachments from different ships. 
 Naturally enough, Captain Breese found it, as has been stated, 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 289 
 
 an unwieldy mass. The sixteen hundred sailors were armed 
 only with pistols and cutlasses. They were quickly repulsed. 
 Few reached the parapet. Once checked, they turned and fled, 
 losing three hundred in killed and wounded. Admiral Porter 
 testified : " I suppose the whole thing was over in fifteen minutes, 
 as far as the sailors were concerned, for they were cut down like 
 sheep." 
 
 Later, this force was sent to the line of intrenchments facing 
 Wilmington, relieving Colonel Abbott's brigade, which reported 
 to me. Of course Admiral Porter expected his sailors to carry 
 the fort, but, alas ! he had been deceived as to its defensive 
 capabilities, which deception resulted in the apparently needless 
 sacrifice of his gallant sailors. 
 
 Our Navy, in its ships and armament, was the most powerful 
 that ever existed up to that time. In officers and men it never 
 had its equal, and never will till an equally enlightened, powerful 
 and liberty-loving people again rise, in their might, in a struggle 
 for self-preservation. 
 
 As to the effect on the fort of the second bombardment, 
 Colonel Lamb writes : " The land armament, with palisades and 
 torpedoes, had been destroyed. For the first time in the his- 
 tory of sieges the land defences of the works were destroyed, 
 not by the act of the besieging army, but by the concentrated 
 fire, direct and enfilading, of an immense fleet, poured upon 
 them without intermission, until torpedo wires were cut, palisades 
 breached so that they actually afforded cover for assailants, and 
 the slopes of the work were rendered practicable for assault." 
 
 Why the first expedition was a failure and the second a 
 success has never been rightly understood. The military situa- 
 tions have been obscured by the contention between General 
 Butler and Admiral Porter, though the most amicable relations 
 existed between the army and navy. 
 
 It has been believed that the fort was in the same condition 
 on both occasions, and that it was but poorly garrisoned on the 
 first. Those who so held were in error in both particulars. 
 
290 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 According to Badeau, Grant's historian : " Curtis declared 
 that the fort could have been carried on the first expedition, and 
 that at the moment when they were recalled they virtually had 
 possession." This declaration has been accepted as the truth. 
 
 We can examine the facts, now that the official reports have 
 been published, and form our own opinions on this point, which 
 has been the pivot of the whole controversy. 
 
 It appears from Curtis's report that he had "pushed the 
 right of his skirmishers to within seventy-five paces of the fort 
 and had sent back to his reserves for two hundred men with 
 which to possess the fort, but his messenger was there informed 
 that orders from the department commander bade him retire," 
 which he did. 
 
 Let us see what these two hundred men would have had to 
 do to make what Curtis calls a "virtual," an actual possession of 
 the fort. 
 
 Colonel Lamb had a force of fourteen hundred men, nine 
 hundred of whom were veterans. Whiting, Lamb and other 
 officers commend the discipline, skill and gallantry of the gar- 
 rison. I will not take time to quote from their reports. They 
 all show that the officers of the fort were keenly alive to our 
 movements. Colonel Lamb states that he intentionally kept 
 his men hidden from view. He was perfectly familiar with the 
 surroundings, both within and without the fort. 
 
 Now, the one question to decide is, could those two hundred 
 men, sent for by Curtis, have taken possession of that palisaded 
 Malakoff fortress, with its garrison of fourteen hundred men ? 
 
 Lieutenant Colonel Barney, who commanded our forces 
 behind the picket line, nowhere intimates that we had any kind 
 of possession of the fort. 
 
 Even Curtis reports, officially, that his skirmishers were met 
 with musketry and canister, and that he retired under a heavy 
 fire. 
 
 In making a decision, Lamb's report must not be overlooked. 
 He reports : "That it was dark at 5.30, when the fleet ceased 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 291 
 
 firing. No assault could be made while the fleet was firing. 
 When the firing ceased the parapets (which were twenty feet 
 high) were at once manned and half of the garrison (seven hun- 
 dred men) were stationed outside the work behind the palisade, 
 which was nine feet high and pierced for musketry." What 
 soldier will say we had "virtual" possession of the fort under 
 such circumstances ? 
 
 The second expedition took this question from the realm of 
 speculation. 
 
 Three weeks after the first attempt we were back again 
 before the fort, which, because of the efficient bombardment of 
 the Navy, was far less capable of resistance. A column of two 
 thousand sailors and marines were to make a gallant assault on 
 the sea angle simultaneously with ours, thereby to create a 
 diversion, greatly to our advantage. 
 
 Curtis had in his brigade, now forming the first line, more 
 than twice as many men as he had before the fort on the first 
 expedition. Again I gave him the order to take the fort. Did 
 he take it ? No. His brigade, led by Captain Lawrence, made 
 a lodgment on one corner of it — a lodgment so uncertain that 
 I immediately ordered up Colonel Pennypacker's brigade, which, 
 inspired and led by him and Colonel Moore, reached the third 
 traverse and made our foothold secure. Such are the official 
 records of the battle. 
 
 I wish to touch one other point. Badeau writes in this same 
 history : " The fighting was continued from traverse to traverse, 
 until at 9 o'clock the troops had nearly reached the bastion. 
 Bell had been killed and Pennypacker wounded, and Curtis now 
 sent back for reinforcements. The advance party was in 
 imminent peril, for the guns from both bastions and the mound 
 batteries were turned upon them. At this crisis a staff officer 
 brought orders from Terry to stop fighting and begin intrench- 
 ing. Curtis was inflamed with the magnificent rage of battle, 
 and fairly roared at this command, ' Then we shall lose whatever 
 we have gained. The enemy will drive us from here in the 
 
292 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 morning.' While he spoke he was struck by a shell, and fell 
 senseless to the earth. The hero of Fort Fisher had fallen, and 
 the fort was not yet carried. Ames, who was near him, sent an 
 officer to Terry to report that Curtis was killed, and that his 
 dying request was that the fighting might go on. It was also 
 Ames's opinion that the battle should proceed. Terry caught 
 the contagion, and determined to continue the assault, even if it 
 became necessary to abandon the line of defence towards Wil- 
 mington. Abbott's reinforcements were at once ordered for- 
 ward, and as they entered the fort the rebels on the bastion gave 
 way and Fort Fisher was carried." It is due to Badeau to state 
 that he says in a note that he "obtained the account of this 
 assault from a paper written by an aide-de-camp to General 
 Curtis." 
 
 This remarkable statement deserves a moment's considera- 
 tion. If it be true, then all the chief honors must fall on one 
 head. But it is not true. If Terry gave orders to stop fight- 
 ing and begin intrenching, who can believe that it was through 
 the " contagion caught " by him from Curtis that the fight 
 continued, or that he would "abandon the line towards Wil- 
 mington " to try uncertainties at the fort ? 
 
 Terry reports : " When Bell's brigade was ordered into 
 action I foresaw that more troops would probably be needed, 
 and sent an order for Abbott's brigade to move down from the 
 north line, at the same time requesting Captain Breese to 
 replace them with his sailors and marines. I also directed 
 General Paine to send me one of the strongest regiments of 
 his own division ; these troops arrived at dusk and reported to 
 General Ames. " 
 
 This treatment of Terry and the ignoring of division, 
 brigade and regimental commanders find no justification in the 
 facts. Terry is entitled to every honor due his position. 
 Pennypacker and Bell cannot be swept aside so lightly, nor 
 the regimental commanders, whose names I need not give 
 here. 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 293 
 
 I would say specifically to that reference to myself, that I 
 did not send any request, " dying " or other, from Curtis to 
 Terry that the fighting might go on. 
 
 If Terry intended my division to stop fighting and begin 
 intrenching he did not send the order to Curtis, one of my 
 brigade commanders, nor would Terry send reinforcements to 
 Curtis over my head. 
 
 According to this aide, Curtis was wounded at 9 o'clock 
 while criticising Terry's order to stop fighting and begin 
 intrenching. I say in my report that Curtis was wounded "a 
 short time before dark " on that brief winter's day. 
 
 I saw him in and emerge from a covered way at the west 
 end of the parapet. He approached me and began to speak ; 
 almost at the same time a shot struck him down. Colonel 
 Daggett, who succeeded to the command of Curtis's brigade, 
 reports two days after : Curtis was seriously wounded about 
 4.30. General Carleton, who was with me at the time, and 
 picked up his sword as he fell, says Curtis was shot at about 
 4.30. 
 
 And yet Badeau would have us believe that Curtis was 
 wounded while criticising Terry's order to stop fighting and 
 begin intrenching, at 9 o'clock, some four hours after Curtis fell 
 senseless at my feet. 
 
 In fact, he was wounded before dark, about an hour and a 
 half after the battle began, and some four hours before the fort 
 was taken. The exact minute is of no importance. Partici- 
 pants in a battle are poor judges of passing time. 
 
 In this instance it is fixed accurately enough in the official 
 reports of Daggett, Abbott and myself, as well as Carleton's 
 statement of his recollections. 
 
 General Terry says in his official report of the battle : 
 "Brigadier General Curtis and Colonels Pennypacker, Bell and 
 Abbott, the brigade commanders, led them with the utmost 
 gallantry. Curtis was wounded after fighting in the front rank, 
 rifle in hand ; Pennypacker while carrying the standard of one 
 
294 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 of his regiments, the first man in a charge over a traverse ; Bell 
 was mortally wounded near the palisade."' 
 
 This is all, literally all, Terry says of exceptional services by 
 Curtis. "Fighting in the front rank, rifle in hand" is most 
 commendable under the circumstances, but it does not in itself 
 justify claims for exceptional honors. 
 
 My report says : " The conduct of the officers and men of 
 this division was most gallant. . . . Where the name of every 
 officer and man engaged in this desperate conflict should be 
 submitted, I shall at present only be able to give a few of those 
 most conspicuous. It is hoped all may be properly rewarded. 
 
 "Brevet Brig. General N. M. Curtis, commanding First 
 Brigade, was prominent throughout the day for his bravery, cool- 
 ness and judgment. His services cannot be overestimated. He 
 fell a short time before dark, seriously wounded in the head by 
 a canister shot. 
 
 " Colonel Pennypacker, commanding the Second Brigade, 
 was seriously wounded while planting his colors on the third 
 traverse of the work. This officer was surpassed by none, and 
 his absence during the day was most deeply felt and seriously 
 regretted. 
 
 " Colonel L. Bell, commanding Third Brigade, was mortally 
 wounded while crossing the bridge in advance of the palisading. 
 He was an able and efficient officer ; one not easily replaced. 
 
 " Colonel J. W. Moore, 203rd Pennsylvania Volunteers, be- 
 haved with the most distinguished gallantry. He was killed 
 while passing the second traverse of the fort, in advance of his 
 regiment, waving his colors. Few equalled, none surpassed 
 this brave officer." 
 
 My report on Curtis is not less generous than Terry's ; but 
 it was not intended to, and I doubt if it does, sustain his pre- 
 tensions of this day. 
 
 The official records, written thirty-two years ago, must be 
 the foundation for all claims of honor and distinction. Nothing 
 can now be added to them or taken from them. By them we 
 all must be judged. 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 295 
 
 Misrepresentations greatly injured General Butler, and deeply 
 humiliated General Weitzel. Truth has been outraged — truth 
 overslow in the pursuit of falsehood, not always the most agree- 
 able company. 
 
 In this paper I have attempted to right a wrong. I have 
 given few opinions of my own. I have called up the actors 
 themselves, and have let them speak in their own words — some- 
 times under oath — always under a sense of grave responsibility. 
 
 [The writer wishes to state to those who heard the paper read before the 
 Commanderies of the Loyal Legion of the States of Massachusetts, November 4th, 
 1896, and New York, February 3rd, 1897, that, in the accompanying pamphlet, in 
 which it is reproduced, he has omitted reference to the time when a flag was cap- 
 tured and the time and place a Lieutenant was made a prisoner, and also as to 
 having heard of and from General Curtis. 
 
 This has been done because the accuracy of these statements has been ques- 
 tioned, and also because, accurate or inaccurate, they are immaterial to the issues 
 involved. 
 
 He prefers to stand on the official records made at the time and not on recol- 
 lections after a period of thirty-two years. 
 
 If, however, any of his hearers offers the slightest objection to this action, 
 whatever the motive, the writer is quite willing to be held to the text as read.] 
 
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