UNIVERSITY OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL 10001517404 <8ntoer*ftp of Bout Carolina THE LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL ENDOWED BY THE DIALECTIC AND PHILANTHROPIC SOCIETIES D2$8 .G 11 1889 ::iL APR J 3 W4 This book is due at the LOUIS R. WILSON LIBRARY on the last date stamped under "Date Due." If not on hold it may be renewed by bringing it to the library. DATE DUE RET. DATE DUE RET. I "' ..i /*Pf 7 . i 1 7 ill / ZF — — - NOV 7 1996- t UJUQlfe <* •' -a- MAR16 MAR ft 4 19 FEB 1 5 20' JuujjagMW Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2013 http://archive.org/details/thirtyyearswar1600 Epochs of History EDITED BY EDWARD E. MORRIS, ALA. THE ERA oe THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR, 1618-1648. S. R. GARDINER. EPOCHS OF ANCIENT HISTORY Edited by Rev. G. W. Cox and Charles Sankey, M.A. Eleven volumes, i6mo, with 41 Maps and Plans TROY— ITS LEGEND, HISTORY. AND LITERA- TURE. By S. G. W. BeQ>amvQ. THE GREEKS AND THE PERSIAN& By G. W. Cox. THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE. Ev G. W. Cox. THE SPARTAN AND THEBAN SUPREMACIES* By Charles Sankev. THE MACEDONIAN EMPIRE. By A. M. Curteis. EARLY ROME. Bv \V. Ihne. ROME AND CARTHAGE. Bv R. Bosworth Smith. THE GRACCHI, MARIUS, AND SULLA. By A. H. Beesley. THE ROMAN TRIUMVIRATES. By Charles Meri- vale. THE EARLY EMPIRE. By W. Wolfe Capes. THE AGE OF THE ANTONINES. By W. Wolfe Capes. EPOCHS OF MODERN HISTORY Edited by Edward E. Morris Eighteen volumes, iomo, with 77 Maps, Plans, and Tables THE BEGINNING OF THE MIDDLE AGES. By R. W. Church. THE NORMANS IN EUROPE. By A. H. Johnson. THE CRUSADES. By G. W. Cox. THE EARLY PLANTAGENETS. By Wm. Stubbs. EDWARD III. By W. Warburton. THE HOUSES OF LANCASTER AND YORK. By- James Gairdner. THE ERA OF THE PROTESTANT REVOLUTION. By Frederic Seebohm. THE EARLY TUDORS. By C. E. Moberiy. THE AGE OF ELIZABETH. By M. Crcighton. THE THIRTY YEARS WAR. 1618-1648. By S. R. Gardiner. THE PURITAN RE\OLUTION. By S. R. Gardiner. THE FALL OF THE STUARTS. By Edward Hale. THE ENGLISH RESTORATION AND LOUIS XIV. By G^roond Airv. THE AGE OF ANNE. By Edward E. Morris. THE EARLY HANOVERIANS. By Edward E. Morris. FREDERICK THE GREAT. By F. W. Longman. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND FrRST EM- PIRE. By W. O'Connor Morris. Appendix by Andrew D. White. THE EPOCH OF REFORM. 1830-1850. By Justin Macarthy. CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS Prostestant Lay State* f 1 Catholic Do. □ GERMANY at the commencement of TFTR THIRir -£E£RS "WAB Bp.of -p |o U-Braneii/ »i $53 <0_ \Eiigen. SEA j Danzig <> Le J! iSu r gv „ / J / 2 n CnW O V -Bo"{< I Ml">, -u- Vj> I Thirty Years' War 1618-16*8 Br SAMUEL RAWSON GARDINER Late Student of Christ Church flntkor of 'History of England from the Accession of fames I. t* tSi Disgrace of Justice Coke' and 'Prince Charles and the Spanish Marriage' NEW YORK CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 1921 PREFACE. If the present work should appear to be written for more advanced students than those for whom most if not all the other books of the series are designed, the nature of the subject must be pleaded in excuse. The mere fact that it relates exclusively to Continental history makes it unlikely that junior pupils would ap- proach it in any shape, and it is probably impossible to make the very complicated relations between the German states and other European nations interest- ing to those who are for the first time, or almost the first time, attempting to acquire historical knowledge. Every history, to be a history, must have a unity of its own, and here we have no unity of national life such as that which is reflected in the institutions of Eng- land and France, not even the unity of a great race of sovereigns handing down the traditions of government from one generation to another. The unity of the *ubject which I have chosen must be sought in the growth of the principle of religious toleration as it is adopted or repelled by the institutions under which Germany and France, the two principal nations with which we are concerned, are living. Thus the history . 821774 vi Preface. of the period may be compared to a gigantic dissolving view. As we enter upon it our minds are filled with German men and things. But Germany fails to find the solution of the problem before it. Gradually France comes with increasing distinctness before us. It succeeds where Germany had failed, and occupies us more and more till it fills the whole field of action. But though, as I have said, the present work is not intended for young children, neither is it intended for those who require the results of original research. The data for a final judgment on the story are scat- tered in so many repositories that the Germans them- selves have now discovered that a complete investi- gation into one or other of the sections into which the war naturally falls, is sufficient work for any man. There must surely, however, be many, as well in the upper classes of schools as in more advanced life, who would be glad to know at second hand what is the result of recent inquiry in Germany into the causes of the failure of the last attempt, before our own day, to constitute a united German nation. The writer who undertakes such a task encounters, with his eyes open, all the hazards to which a second-hand narrative is liable. His impressions are less sharp, and are ex- posed to greater risk of error than those of one who goes direct to the fountain head. He must be con- tent to be the retailer rather than the manufacturer of history, knowing that each kind of work has its use. Not that the present book is a mere collection of other men's words. If I have often adopted without much change the narrative or opinions of German Preface. vii writers, I have never said any thing which I have not made my own, by passing it through my own mind. To reproduce with mere paste and scissors passages from the writings of men so opposed to one anothei as Ranke, Gindely, Ritter, Opel, Hurter, Droysen, Gfrorer, Klopp, Forster, Villermont, Uetterodt, Koch, and others, would be to bewilder, not to in- struct. And in forming my own opinions I have had the advantage not merely of being in the habit of writing from original documents, but of having studied at least some of the letters and State papers of the time. I have thus, for example, been able, from my know- ledge of the despatches of Sir Robert Anstruther, to neglect Droysen's elaborate argument that Christian IV. took part in the war through jealousy of Gustavus Adolphus ; and to speak, in opposition to Onno Klopp, of the persistence of the Dukes of Mecklenouig in Lie support which they gave to the King of Denmark. More valuable than the little additional knowledge thus obtained is the insight into the feelings and thoughts of the Catholic princes gained by a very slight acquaintance with their own correspondence. To start by trying to understand what a man appears to himself, and only when that has been done, to try him by the standard of the judgment of others, is in my opinion the first canon of historical portraiture; and it is one which till very recent times has been more neglected by writers on the Thirty Years' War than by students of any other portion of history. My teachers in Germany from whom I have bor- rowed so -freely ? and according to the rules o£ the se- riii Preface. ries, without acknowledgment in foot-notes, will, 1 hope, accept this little book, not as an attempt to do that which they are so much better qualified to exe- cute, but as an expression of the sympathy which an Englishman cannot but feel for the misfortunes as well as the achievements of his kindred on the Con- tinent, and as an effort to tell something of the by- gone fortunes of their race to those amongst his own countrymen to whom, from youth or from circum- stances of education, German literature is a sealed book. I have only to add that the dates are according to the New Style. Ten days must be deducted to bring them in accordance with those used at the umi in England. CONTENTS. Gvrntt in English History not noticed in the text, or euly rtferrtd t» are printed in Italics. CHAPTER I. CAUSES OF THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR. SECTION I. — Political Institutions of Germany (1440-1317). PAG* National institutions of Germany defective . . . 1 (a) As regarded the Emperor I (b) As regarded the great vassals .... 3 Attempts made to introduce order by giving a regular form to the Diet 5 These, though only partially successful, are not altoge- ther useless . 6 Constitution of the Diet „ 6 Section II. — Protestantism in Germany (1517-1570). Protestantism acceptable to the majority of the na- tion, but rejected by the Emperor and the Diet . 8 The result is a civil war, resulting in a compromise, called the Peace of Augsburg (1555). Its terms be- ing ambiguous on some important points, give rise to controversy ia But as Protestantism is on the increase, the ambiguous points are, at first, construed by the Protestants in their own favour ....... 11 ix % Contents. MSI The main points at issue relate to the right of Protest- ants to hold bishoprics, and to the right of Protestant princes to secularize church lands . . . . la Section III. — Reaction against Protestantism (1570-1596). Theological controversies are carried on with bitterness amongst the Protestants ...... 13 The Catholics, accordingly, begin to gain ground . 14 And having the Emperor and Diet on their side, are able to use force as well as persuasion . . . 14 Want of any popular representation prevents any fair settlement of the dispute 15 Section IV. — Three Parlies and Three Leaders (1596-1612). Catholics, Lutherans, and Calvinists are respectively guided by Maximilian Duke of Bavaria, John George Elector of Saxony, and Christian of Anhalt . . 15 Character and policy of Maximilian dangerous to the Protestants ........ 15 The Protestants of the south more alive to the danger than the Protestants of the north . . . .17 Spread of Calvinism, especially in the south, ac- counted for by the greater danger from Catholic States 17 Character and policy of Christian of Anhalt . . . 18 1603 Accession of James I. of England 1605 Gunpowder Plot 1607 Donauworth occupied by Maximilian . . . . 19 1608 Formation of the Protestant Union and the Catholic League .si 1609 The quarrel for the succession of Cleves does not result in open war 21 1612 John George fruitlessly attempts to mediate between the Catholics and the Calvinists sa t6i3 Marriage of Frederick V., Elector Palatine, to Eliza- beth, dauglUer of James J. of England Contents. xi CHAPTER II. THE BOHEMIAN REVOLUTION. SECTION I. — The House of Austria and its Subjects (1600-1618). PAGB Political and religious dissensions between the rulers and their subjects 24 1609 The Emperor Rudolph, as King of Bohemia, grants the Royal Charter to Bohemia 25 161 1 He is succeeded by Matthias in spite of the intrigues of Christian of Anhalt 26 Matthias erades the charter 27 1617 Ferdinand accepted by the Bohemian Diet as King by hereditary right ........ 23 1618 The Protestant churches on ecclesiastical lands de- clared illegal by the government of Matthias ; one at Braunau shut up, one at Klostergrab pulled down . 29 Section II. — The Revolution at Prague {March-May 1618). Mar. 5. Meeting of the Protestant Estates of Bohemia . . 29 May 23. Attack headed by Thurn upon the Regents at Prague. Martinitz and Slawata thrown out of win- dow. Beginning of the Thirty Years' War . . 30 Appointment of Thirty Directors as a Revolutionary Government in Bohemia 31 Section III. — The War in Bohemia {May 1618-February 1619). Aug. 13. Bohemia invaded by the Emperor's general, Bucquoi. The Bohemians look abroad for help. Mansfeld brings troops to them. He besieges Pilsen, whilst Thurn makes head against Bucquoi . . . -33 Nov. 21. Pilsen surrenders 34 Christian of Anhalt urges Frederick V., Elector Pala- tine, to intervene on behalf of the Bohemians, and asks the Duke of Savoy to help them . . -34 T6t9 The Duke of Savoy talks of dividing the Austrian do- Fcb, minions with Frederick . . » . ' , . 35 xii Contents. SECTION IV. — Ferdinand on his Defence (March-November 1619). PAGB Mar. 20. Death of Matthias 36 June 5. Vienna besieged by Thurn. Ferdinand threatened by a deputation from the Estates of Lower Austria 36 He is delivered by a regiment of horse, and Thurn raises the siege 37 Aug. 28. Ferdinand II. elected Emperor . . . .38 Aug. 26. Frederick, Elector Palatine, elected King of Bohe- mia, Ferdinand having been previously deposed . 38 Nov. 4. Frederick crowned at Prague 39 CHAPTER III. IMPERIALIST VICTORIES IN BOHEMIA AND THE PALATINATE. Section I. — The Attack upon Frederick (November l6ig-January 1621). 1619 Maximilian of Bavaria prepares for war . . .39 Vienna fruitlessly attacked by Bethlen Gabor . . 40 Frederick finds no support in the Union . . .41 1620 The North German Princes agree to neutrality at Mar. Muhlhausen 43 June 3. Spinola, the Spanish General, prepares to attack the Palatinate, and the Union, being frightened, signs the treaty of Ulm, by which it agrees to observe neutrality towards the League . . . .4a June 23. Maximilian, with Tilly in command of his army, enters Austria and compels the Austrian Estates to submit, whilst Spinola reduces the Western Pala- tinate 42 Maximilian joins Bucquoi, and enters Bohemia . 43 Sep. 28. Frederick, having failed to organize resistance, joins the Bohemian army 44 Nov. 8. Defeat of Frederick at the Battle of the White Hill, 1619 and submission of Bohemia to the Emperor . . 45 Jan. 22. Frederick put to the Ban of the Empire . . .46 Contents. xiii Section II. — The War in the Upper Palatinate {January- October 1621). PAGB 1621 Frederick does not abandon hope of regaining Bo- Jan, hernia 47 Ap. 12. The Treaty of Mentz dissolves the Union . . .47 Bad character of Mansfeld's Army . . . .48 May. Mansfeld takes the offensive 49 Aug. Recommencement of the War in the Lower Palatinate 50 Oct. Mansfeld unable to hold out in the Upper Palatinate 50 Oct. 10. Signs an engagement to disband his forces, but escapes with them to Alsace 50 Section III. — Frederick's Allies {October 1621-May 1622). 1621 James I. of England proposes to take Mansfeld into his pay, but he cannot agree with the House of Commons, and is therefore in want of money . 50 1622 He then tries to obtain a settlement of the German disputes with the aid of Spain . . . .51 May. A conference for the pacification of Germany held at Brussels 52 Frederick prepares for War, with the help of Mans- feld, the Margrave of Baden, and Christian of Brunswick, the latter being a Protestant Adminis- trator of the Bishopric of Halberstadt . . .S3 He ravages the diocese of Paderborn . ■ . .55 Section IV. — The Fight for the Lower Palatinate {April- July 1622). Ap. 12. Frederick joins Mansfeld. Tilly defeats the Mar- May 6. grave of Baden at Wimpfen 57 June. Frederick, hopeful of success, refuses to consent to a treaty, and seizes the Landgrave of Darmstadt . 58 But is driven by Tilly to retreat . . . .59 June 30. Defeat of Christian of Brunswick at Hochst . . 59 July. Mansfeld abandons the Palatinate, and Frederick, after taking refuge at Sedan, retires to the Hague . 6a xiv Contents. CHAPTER IV. MANSFELD AND CHRISTIAN IN NORTH GERMANY. Section I.— Mansfeld' s March into the Netherlands {July- November 1622). PAG3 1622 Tilly proceeds to reduce the fortified places in the Lower Palatinate 60 1623 The Electorate transferred from Frederick to Maxi- Feb. 13. milian 61 1622 Change of feeling in North Germany . . . 61 Aug. Mansfeld and Christian establish themselves in Lor- raine, and then try to cut their way through the Spanish Netherlands to join the Duke . . .63 Aug. 28. Battle of Fleurus. Christian loses his arm . . 63 Nov. Mansfeld establishes himself in East Friesland . . 64 Section II. — Christian of Brunswick in Lower Saxony (November 1622-August 1623). 1622 The Lower Saxon Circle urged by Tilly to join him against Mansfeld, and by Christian of Brunswick to join him against Tilly ...... 64 1623, Feb. Warlike preparations of the Circle . . .65 Aug. 6. Christian expelled from the Circle, and defeated by Tilly at Stadtlohn 66 Section III. — Danger of the Lower Saxon Circle (Augustr- December 1623). 1623 The North German Protestant Bishoprics in danger . 66 Aug. Alarm in the Lower Saxon Circle . . . .68 Dec. But nothing is done, and its troops are disbanded . 68 Section IV. — England and France ( October 1623-August 1624). Oct. Foreign Powers ready to interfere . . . .69 Return of the Prince of Wales from Madrid . . 70 1624 Divergence between the English House of Commons Feb.-May. and James I. upon the mode of recovering the Pa- latinate ......... 70 Position of the Huguenots in France . , .73 Contents. xv Section V. — Rise of Richelieu {August i6a4-September 1625). PAG* Aug. Lewis XIII. makes Richelieu his chief minister. He is divided between a desire to combat Spain and a desire to reduce the Huguenots to submission . 72 Richelieu's position less strong than it afterwards became. He has to make great allowances for the King's humour 74 Dec. French attack upon the Spanish garrisons in the Valtelline 75 1625 Failure of Mansfeld's expedition intended by James Jan.-June to recover the Palatinate 76 Jan. Richelieu's plans for engaging more deeply in the war frustrated by the rising of the Huguenots of Rochelle ........ 77 Sept The Huguenot fleet is defeated, but Rochelle holds out 77 CHAPTER V. INTERVENTION OF THE KING OF DENMARK. SECTION I. — Christian IV. and Gustavus Adolphus (1624). Character and position of Christian IV., King of Denmark ........ 78 Genius of Gustavus Adolphus 79 Sketch of the earlier part of his reign . . .80 His interest in German affairs 82 Section II. — English Diplomacy {August i(s2\-July 1625). 1624 The Kings of Denmark and Sweden asked by James Aug. I. to join him in recovering the Palatinate , . 84 1625 The English Government, thinking the demands of Jan. Gustavus exorbitant, forms an alliance with Chris- tian IV 8j June. Meeting of the first Parliament of Charles I, xvi Contents. PACK June. Gustavus directs his forces against Poland . .86 Mar. 27. Death of James I. Accession of Charles I. . . 86 July 18. Christian IV., at the head of the Circle of Lower Saxony, enters upon war with the army of the League commanded by Tilly 87 Aug. Dissolution of the first Parliament of Charles I. Section III. — Wallenstein's Armament (July 1625- February 1626). The Emperor needs more forces . . . .87 Wallenstein offers to raise an army for him. Account of Wallenstein's early life . ... 89 The system by which the army is to be supported is to be one of forced contributions . . . .90 Oppressive burdens laid thereby on the country . 91 Wallenstein enters the dioceses of Magdeburg and Halberstadt, and lies quietly there during the win- ter 92 C626, Feb. Failure of negotiations for peace . . . .93 Section W.— Defeat of Mansfeld and ChrUtian IV. {February-August 1626). 1626 Numerical superiority on the side of the King of Feb. Denmark, but the Imperialists are superioi in other respects 94 Failure of the supplies promised to Christian by Charles 1 95 Feb. Meeting of the second Parliament of Charles I. — Impeachment of Buckingham Ap. 25. Mansfeld defeated by Wallenstein at the Bridge of Dessau 96 June. Dissolution of the second Parliament of Charles I. Aug. 27. Christian IV. defeated by Tilly at Lutter . . . 97 Wallenstein pursues Mansfeld into Hungary . . 97 Contents. xvii CHAPTER VI. STRALSUND AND ROCHELLE. Section I. — Fresh Successes of Wallenstein {August 1626- October 1627). PAGB 1626 Divergence between the League and Wallenstein . . 98 Nov. Wallenstein advocates religious equality and the pre- dominance of the army 98 1627 He persuades Ferdinand to increase his army, and is Jan. created Duke of Friedland, in spite of the growing dissatisfaction with his proceedings . . . 100 May-Aug. The King of Denmark hopes to resist Tilly, but Wallenstein returns from Hungary, and gains pos- session ol Silesia 101 Sept. 20. Defeat of the Margrave of Baden at Heiligen-hafen 102 Oct. Christian IV. flies to the Island of Fiinen, leaving Jutland to Wallenstein 102 Section II. — Resistance to Wallenstein in the fflnpire (October 1627-February 1628). t627 Meeting of the Electors at Miihlhausen. They com- Oct. piain of Wallenstein 103 1628 The commercial towns of North Gewnany jealous of Wallenstein 105 Feb. The Emperor declares the Dukes of Mecklenburg to have forfeited their lands and titles, and pledges the territory to Wallenstein 106 Wallenstein tries in vain to gain over the Hanse Towns 106 He attempts to establish himself on the coast of the Baltic by getting possession of the towns . . 108 Section III. — The Siege of Stralsund (August-February 1628). Feb. As Stralsund refuses to admit a garrison, it is at- tacked by Wallenstein's orders .... 108 May. It is succoured by Denmark and Sweden . . . 109 Aug. 3. The siege is raised no B xviii Contents. Section IV. — The Siege of Rochelle (1625-1628). PAGI 1625 Richelieu would have made peace with the Hugue- nots if he had been able na 1626 An agreement is effected, but comes to nothing through the jealousy of Charles 1 11a 1627 War between France and England, Buckingham's expedition to Rhe 113 Nov. Richelieu besieges Rochelle 114 1628. Mar. Meeting of the third Parliament of Charles I. May. Failure of an English fleet to succour Rochelle . 115 June. The Petition of Right granted Aug. Murder of the Duke of Buckingham . . .113 Nov. 1. Surrender of Rochelle 113 Contrast between France and Germany. Toleration granted to the Huguenots nsembly at Leipzig 133 Tilly attacks the Swedes, but is driven to retJ-eat . 134 Ap. 26. Treaty of Cherasco between France and the English 135 May 15. Convention between Gustavus and the Elector of Brandenburg 136 May 20. Magdeburg stormed, plundered, and burnt . . 136 The Emperor refuses to cancel the Edict of Restitu- tion 137 xx Contents. CHAPTER VIII. THE VICTORIES OF GUSTAVUS ADOLPHU3. Section I. — Alliance between the Swedes and the Saxont (June-September 1631). PA.GB June 21. Gustavus compels the Elector of Brandenburg to an alliance 138 Tuly. Gustavus at the Camp of Werben .... 138 Aug. Tilly summons the Elector of Saxony to submit . 139 Sept. He attacks Saxony, upon which the Elector forms an alliance with Gustavus ...... 139 Gustavus joins the Saxons ..... 140 Section II. — Battle of Breitenfeld (September 1631). Sept. 17. Victory of Gustavus over Tilly at Breitenfeld . . 141 Wallenstein's intrigues with Gustavus . . . 142 Wallenstein and Gustavus unlikely to agree . . 143 Political and military designs of Gustavus . . 144 He looks for a basis of operations on the Rhine . 146 Section III. — March of Ghistavus into South Germany (October 1631-May 1632). Oct. March of Gustavus to Mentz , . . . . , 148 1632 In spite of the objections of the French, he attacks ' Bavaria .149 Ap. 14. Tilly defeated and mortally wounded at the passage of the Lech 149 May 17. Gustavus enters Munich 150 Section IV. — Wallenstein's Restoration to command . (September 1631-June 1632). ^ Sept. Wallenstein breaks off all intercourse with Gustavus 151 Nov. Attempts to reconcile the Elector of Saxony with the Emperor 15a Dec. Is reinstated temporarily in the command of the Im- perial Army 153 Contents. xxi PAGB 1632 Character of that Army 153 April. Wallenstein permanently appointed Commander . 155 May. Offers peace to the Saxons, and drives them out of Bohemia 155 June. Gustavus does not approve of the terms of peace of- fered by Wallenstein 156 Section V. — Struggle between Gustavus and Wallenstein {June-October 1632). June. Gustavus and Wallenstein opposed to one another at Nuremberg 157 Efforts of Gustavus to maintain discipline . . 159 Sept. 4. Fails to storm Wallenstein's lines .... 160 Sept. 18. Gustavus leaves Nuremberg ..... 160 Oct. Wallenstein marches into Saxony . . . 160 Section VI. — The Battle of Lutzen {October-November 1632). Oct. Gustavus follows Wallenstein into Saxony . . 161 Nov. 16. Battle of Lutzen 162 Death of Gustavus ....... 163 Victory of the Swedes 164 Irreparable loss by the death of Gustavus to the Pro- testants 164 CHAPTER IX. THE DEATH OF WALLENSTEIN AND THE TREATY OF PRAGUE. Section I. — French Influence in Germany {November 1632- April 1633). 1633 Differences between Bernhard and Oxenstjerna . 166 Ap. 23. The League of Heilbronn signed .... 167 Firm establishment of Richelieu's authority in France 168 Richelieu's interposition in German affairs . . 169 xxii Contents. Section II. — Wallenstein's Attempt to dictate Peace (April-December 1633). PAGB 1633 Wallenstein's peace negotiations with the Swedes and Saxons ........ 170 Oct. He drives the Saxons out of Silesia .... 172 Nov. Ratisbon taken by Bernhard 173 Spanish opposition to a peace which would leave Spain exposed to French attacks .... I73 Dec. Wallenstein thinks of making peace, whether the Em- peror consents or not ...... 175 Section III. — Resistance to Wallenstein' $ Plans (January-February 1634). 1634 Onate, the Spanish Ambassador, persuades the Em- Jan, peror that Wallenstein is a traitor .... 175 Ferdinand determines to displace Wallenstein . . 176 Feb. 19. Wallenstein engages the Colonels to support him . -177 Section IV. — Assassination of Wallenstein (February 1634). Feb. 18. Wallenstein declared a traitor 179 Feb. 21. The garrison of Prague declares against him . . 179 Feb. 24. Wallenstein at Eger 179 Feb. 25. He is assassinated ....... 181 Comparison between Gustavus and Wallenstein . 181 Section V. — Imperialist Victories and the Treaty of Prague (February 1634-May 1635). 1634 The King of Hungary reorganizes the imperial Feb. army 181 Sept. 6. In conjunction with the Cardinal-Infant, he defeats Bernhard at Nordlingen 183 Consequent necessity of an increased French inter- vention 184 1635 Peace of Prague 184 May 30. It is not universally accepted 185 Miserable condition of Germany. Notes of an Eng- lish traveller . . . r, . . . '. 187 Contents. xxiii CHAPTER X. THE PREPONDERANCE OF FRANCE. SECTION I. — Open Intervention of France (May 1635). PAGE 1635 Protestantism not out of danger . . . .189 May. Close alliance of some of the Princes with France . 190 Importance of the possession of Alsace and Lorraine 191 May 19. France declares war against Spain .... 192 Section II. — Spanish Successes (May \63$-Dccer>iber 1637). 1635 Failure of the French attack on the Spanish Nether- lands 192 1636 Spanish invasion of France 193 Oct. 4. Baner's victory at Wittstock 194 1637 Death of Ferdinand II. Accession of Ferdinand Feb. 15. Ill 194 Imperialist success in Germany . . , .195 Section III. — The Struggle for Alsace {January 1638-July 1639). 1638 Bernhard's victories in the Breisgau and Alsace . 195 July 8. Death of Bernhard 196 Section IV. — French Successes (July 1639-Dec. 1642). French maritime successes 197 1639 Spanish fleet taking refuge in the Downs . . . 198 It is destroyed by the Dutch 198 1640 Insurrection of Catalonia 199 Nov. Independence of Portugal ..... 200 1641 Defeat of the Imperialists at Wolfenbuttel . . 201 1642 Defeat of the Imperialists at Kempten . . . 201 Aug. Charles I. sets up his standard. Beginning of the English Civil War Dec 4, Death of Richelieu 201 xxiv Contents. SECTION V. — Aims and Character of Richelieu {December 1642- May 1643). PAGB Richelieu's domestic policy 201 Contrast between France and England . . . 203 Richelieu's foreign policy ...... 203 1643 Moderation of his aims 204 May 14. Death of Lewis XIII 205 Section VI. — More French Victories {May i6^-Augv^t 1645). 1643 Rule of Cardinal Mazarin 205 May 19. Enghien defeats the Spaniards at Rocroy . . . 206 The French kept in check in Germany . . . 207 1644 Enghien and Turenne. Battle of Freiburg . . 208 July. Battle of Marston Moor 1645, Aug. 3. Second Battle of Nordlingen .... 208 Mar. 6. Swedish victory at Jankow ..... S09 CHAPTER XI. THE END OF THE WAR. Section I. — Turenne's Strategy {June \6$$-Octobcr 1648). 1645 Negotiations for peace begun 209 June. Battle of Naseby Aims of the Emperor and the Duke of Bavaria . . 210 1646 Turenne outmanoeuvres the Imperialists . . . 213 1647, May-Sept. Truce between the French and the Bavarians 213 1648, May 17. Defeat of the Bavarians at Zusmarshausen . 213 Section II.— The Treaty of Westphalia {Oct. 1648). 1648 Terms of the peace 213 Oct. 24. How far was toleration effected by it . . . 214 General desire for peace 217 Contents. xxv SECTION III. — Condition of Germany. PAGB Debasing effects of the war 217 Decrease of the population 218 Moral and intellectual decadence .... 218 Disintegration of Germany ..... 220 Protestantism saved, and with it the future culture of Germany 220 Section IV. — Continuance of the War between France and Spain (1648-1660). 1648 Recognition of the independence of the Dutch Republic 221 1649 Execution of Charles I. The Fronde 222 . 223 . 223 . 224 Continuance of the war with Spain . Alliance between France and Cromwell 1660 Treaty of Pyrenees .... French greatness based on Tolerance Intolerance of Lewis XIV. and downfall of the French monarchy 226 THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR. CHAPTER I. CAUSES OF THE THIRTY YEARS* WAR. Section I. — Political Institutions of Germany. It was the misfortune of Germany in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that, with most of the conditions requisite for the formation of national unity, . .,...?*■ Want of she had no really national institutions, national insti- — , i i i j tutions in There was an emperor, who looked some- Germany, thing like an English king, and a Diet, or General Assembly, which looked something like an English Parliament, but the resemblance was far greater in appearance than in reality. The Emperor was chosen by three ecclesiastical electors, the Archbishops of Mentz, Treves and Cologne, and four lay electors, the Elector Palatine, the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg, pe ror . e m and the King of Bohemia. In theory he was the successor of the Roman Emperors Julius and Con- stantine. the ruler of the world, or of so much of it at least as he could bring under his sway. More particu- larly, he was the successor of Charles the Great and Otto 2 Causes of the Thirty Years 1 War. 1440-15 17. the Great, the lay head of Western Christendom. The Emperor Sigismund, on his death-bed, had directed that his body should lie in state for some days, that men might see ' that the lord of all the world was dead.' ' We have chosen your grace,' said the electors to Frederick III., ' as head, protector, and governor of all Christendom.' Yet it would be hard to find a single fragment of reality corresponding to the magnificence of the claim. As far, however, as the period now under review is concerned, though the name of Emperor was retained, it is unnecessary to trouble ourselves with the man kingship* rights, real or imaginary, connected with the imperial dignity. Charles the Great, before the imperial crown was conferred on him, ruled as king, by national assent or by conquest, over a great part of Western Europe. When his dominions were divided amongst his successors, the rule of those successors in Germany or elsewhere had no necessary connexion with the imperial crown. Henry the Fowler, one of the great- est of the Kings of the Germans, was never an emperor at all, and though, after the reign of his son Otto the Great, the German kings claimed from the Pope the im- perial crown as their right, they never failed also to re- ceive a special German crown at Aachen [Azx-ta-C/ia' pelle) or at Frankfort as the symbol of their headship over German lands and German men. When, therefore, the writers of the 16th or 17th centu- ries speak of the rights of the Emperor in Germany, they , . really mean to speak of the rights of the Em- U- Its con- . , . . ,-,. , • nexion with peror in his capacity of German king, just as, mpire. w j ien t ^ e y S p ea k f the Empire, they mean what we call Germany, together with certain surround- ing districts, such as Switzerland, the Netherlands, Lor- raine, and Eastern Burgundy or Franche Comte, which I44 0_I S I 7- Political Institutions of Germany. 3 are not now, if Alsace and the newly-conquered part of Lorraine be excepted, included under that name. In the Eame way the mere fragments of feudal supremacy, and the payment of feudal dues which the emperors claimed in Italy, belonged to them, not as emperors, but simply as Italian kings, and as wearers of the iron crown of Lombardy, which, as the legends told, was formed of nails taken from the Saviour's cross. Not that it would be wise, even if it were possible, to do otherwise than to follow the practice of contem- poraries. The strange form, Emperor of Germany, by which, at a later period, men confusion unfamiliar with Germany history strove to reconcile the old claims with something like the actual fact, had not been yet invented. And, after all, the confusions of history, the use of words and titles when their meaning is changed, are so many tokens to remind us of the unity of successive generations, and of the impossibility of any one of them building anew without regarding the foundations of their fathers. All that is needed is to remember that the emperor of later times is a personage whose rights and functions can be profitably compared with those of Henry VIII. of England or Lewis XIV. of France, not with Julius or Constantine Whose successor he professed himself to be. ' Take away the rights of the Emperor,' said a law «oook of the fifteenth century, in language which would have startled an old Roman legislator, ' and „ mi § 0. The who can say, "This house is mine, this vd- great lage belongs to me?'" But the princes and bishops, the counts and cities, who were glad enough to plead on their own behalf that their lands were held directly from the head of the Empire, took care to allow him scarcely any real authority. This kingly dignity 4 Causes of the Thirty Years' War. 1440-15 17. which passed under the name of the Empire was indeed very weak. It had never outgrown the needs of the Middle Ages, and was still essentially a feudal kingship. From circumstances which it would take too much space to notice here, it had failed in placing itself at the head of a national organization, and in becoming the guard- ian of the rights of the tillers of the soil and the burghers of the towns, who found no place in the ranks of the feudal chivalry. The immediate vassals of the Empire, in fact, were almost independent sovereigns, like the Dukes of Nor- mandy in the France of the tenth century, independence. or tne Dukes of Burgundy in the France of the fifteenth century. They quarrelled and made war with one another like the Kings of England and France. Their own vassals, their own peasants, their own towns could only reach the Emperor through them, if anybody thought it worth while to reach him at all. The prospect of reviving the German kingship which was veiled under the august title of Emperor seemed far distant at the beginning of the fifteenth cen- of order.° SpeCt tury. But whilst the Empire, in its old sense, with its claims to universal dominion, was a dream, this German kingship needed but wisdom in the occupant of the throne to seize the national feeling, which was certain sooner or later to call out for a national ruler, in order to clothe itself in all the authority which was needed for the maintenance of the unity and the safety of the German people. That, when the time came, the man to grasp the opportunity was not there, was the chief amongst the causes of that unhappy tragedy of disunion which culminated in the Thirty Years' War. In the middle of the fifteenth century an effort was made to introduce a system of regular assemblies, un- I44° -I 5 I 7' Political Institutions of Germany 5 der the name of a Diet, in order to stem the . . 2 9- Attempt! tide of anarchy. But it never entered into to introduce the mind of the wisest statesman living to summon any general representation of the people. In the old feudal assemblies no one had taken part who was not an immediate vassal of the Empire, and the Diet professed to be only a more regular organization of the old feudal assemblies. From the Diet, therefore, all subjects of the territorial princes were rigorously excluded. Whatever their wishes or opinions might be, they had neither part nor lot in the counsels of the nation. There was nothing in the Diet answering to those representatives of English counties, men not great enough to Diet,or geno- assume the state of independent princes, nor ^^Empire. small enough to be content simply to regis- ter without question the decrees of those in authority who with us did more than any other class to cement town and country, king and people together. Nor did even the less powerful of the immediate vassals take part in the meetings. Like the lesser barons of the early Plantagenet reigns, they slipped out of a position to which they seemed to have a right by the fact that they held their few square miles of land as directly from the Emperor as the Dukes of Bavaria or the Electors of Saxony held the goodly principalities over which they ruled. Such a body was more like a congress of the repre- sentatives of European sovereigns than an English Par- liament. Each member came in his own \ %%. The right. He might or might not speak the fit^eforThe sentiments of his subjects, and, even if he Diet - did, he naturally preferred deciding pretty much as he pleased at home to allowing the question to be debated 6 Causes of the Thirty Years' War. 1440-15 17. by an assembly of his equals. An Elector of Saxony, a Landgrave of Hesse, or an Archduke of Austria knew that taxes were levied, armies trained, temporal and spiritual wants provided for at his own court at Dresden, at Cassel, or at Vienna, and he had no wish that it should be otherwise. Nor was it easy, even when a prince had made himself so obnoxious as to call down upon him- self the condemnation of his fellows, to subject him to punishment. He might, indeed, be put to the ban of the Empire, a kind of secular excommunication. But if he were powerful himself, and had powerful friends, it might be difficult to put it in execution. It would be necessary to levy war against him, and that war might not be successful. Still, at the end of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth centuries some progress was made. An Imperial Court {Reichskammergcricht) came sortoforder into existence, mainly nominated by the established. ■ r .* -r> j ^i_ j .. princes of the Empire, and authorized to pronounce judgment upon cases arising between the rulers of the various territories. In order to secure the better execution of the sentences of this court, Germany was divided into circles, in each of which the princes and cities who were entitled to a voice in the Diet of the Empire were authorized to meet together and to levy troops for the maintenance of order. These princes, lay and ecclesiastical, together with the cities holding immediately from the Empire, were called _, the Estates of the Empire. When they met g 13. The . * . J three Houses in the general Diet they voted in three houses. The first house was composed of the seven Electors, though it was only at an Imperial election that the number was complete. At all ordi- nary meetings for legislation, or for the dispatch of busi- I44° _I 5 I 7- Protestantism in Germany. 7 ness, the king of Bohemia was excluded, and six Electors only appeared. The next house was the House of Princes, comprising all those persons, lay or ecclesiasti- cal, who had the right of sitting in the Diet. Lastly, came the Free Imperial Cities, the only popular element in the Diet. But they were treated as decidedly inferior to the other two houses. When the Electors and the Princes had agreed upon a proposition, then and not till then it was submitted to the House of Cities. The special risk attending such a constitution was that it provided almost exclusively for the wants of the princes and electors. In the Diet, in the circles, and in the Imperial Court, the princes and electors g I4 . The exercised a preponderating, if not quite an Cltles to ° weak - exclusive influence. In ordinary times there might be no danger. But if extraordinary times arose, if any great movement swept over the surface of the nation, it might very well be that the nation would be on one side and the princes and the electors on the other. And if this were the case there would be great difficulty in bringing the nation into harmony with its institutions. In England the sovereign could alter a hostile majority in the House of Lords by a fresh creation of peers, and the constituencies could alter a hostile majority of the House of Commons by a fresh election. In Germany there was no House of Commons, and an emperor who should try to create fresh princes out of the immediate vassals who were too weak to be summoned to the Diet would only render himself ridiculous by an attempt to place in check the real possessors of power by the help of those who had the mere appearance of it. Section II. — Protestantism in Germany. When, in the sixteenth century, Protestantism sud- C 8 Causes of the Thirty Years' War. 151 7—1552. denly raised its head, the institutions of the \ 1. The * . ' German peo- Empire were tried to the uttermost. For ProtesuntLm ; tne mass of the nation declared itself in the Diet op- favour of change, and the Diet was so com- Dosed to it. h ' posed as to be hostile to change, as soon as it appeared that it was likely to take the direction of Lutheranism. In the Electoral House, indeed, the votes of the three ecclesiastical electors were met by the votes of the three lay electors. But in the House of Princes there were thirty-eight ecclesiastical dignitaries and but eighteen laymen. It was a body, in short, like the Eng- lish House of Lords before the Reformation, and there was no Henry VIII. to bring it into harmony with the direction which lay society was taking, by some act equivalent to the dissolution of the monasteries, and the consequent exclusion of the mitred abbots from their seats in Parliament. To pass measures favourable to Protestantism through such a house was simply impossi- ble. Yet it can hardly be doubted that a really national Parliament would have adopted Lutheranism, more or less modified, as the religion of the nation. Before Pro- testantism was fifty years old, in spite of all difficulties, ninety per cent, of the population of Germany were Pro- testant. In default of national action in favor of Protestantism, it was adopted and supported by most of the lay princes and electors. A new principle of disinte- \ 2. Most of . . , the lay princes gration was thus introduced into Germany, a opt ' as these princes were forced to act in op- position to the views adopted by the Diet. If the Diet was unlikely to play the part v: \ 3 The Em- peror Charles of an English Parliament, neither was the Emperor likely to play the part of Henry VIII. For the interests of Germany, Charles V., who I 5 I 7 -I 55 2 - Protestantism in Germany. 9 had been elected in 1519, was weak where he ought to have been strong, and strong where he ought to have been weak. As Emperor, he was nothing. As feudal sovereign and national ruler, he was very little. But he was also a prince of the Empire, and as such he ruled over the Austrian duchies and Tyrol. Further than this, he was one of the most powerful sovereigns of Europe. He was king of Spain, and of the Indies with all their mines. In Italy, he disposed of Naples and the Mila- nese. Sicily and Sardinia were his, and, under various titles, he ruled over the fragments of the old Burgundian inheritance, Franche Comte, and the seventeen pro- vinces of the Netherlands. Such a man would influence the progress of affairs in Germany with a weight out of all proportion to his position in the German constitution. And unhappily, with the power of a foreign sovereign, he brought the mind of a foreigner. His mother's Spanish blood beat in his veins, and he had the instinc- tive aversion of a Spaniard to anything which savoured of opposition to the doctrines of the Church. 'That man,' he said, when he caught sight of Luther for the first time, ' shall never make me a heretic' Of this antagonism between the minority of the princes backed by the majority of the nation, and the majority of the princes backed by an Em- i 552 . peror who was also a foreign sovereign, Convention civil war was the natural result. In the end, of Passau - the triumph of the Protestants was so far secured that they forced their opponents in 1 552 to yield to the Conven- tion of Passau, by which it was arranged that a Diet should be held as soon as possible for a general pacification. That Diet, which was assembled at Augs- 1555. burg in 1555, met under remarkably fa- peace of 6 vourable circumstances. Charles V., baffled Au s^ nir 8r io Causes of the Thirty Years' War. 1555. and disappointed, had retired from the scene, and had left behind him, as his representative, his more con- ciliatory brother Ferdinand, who was already King of Hungary and Bohemia, and was his destined successor in the German possessions of the House of Austria. Both he and the leading men on either side were anxious for peace, and v/ere jealous of the influence which Philip, the son of Charles V., and his successor in Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands, might gain from a continu- ance of the war. There was little difficulty in arranging that the Pro- testant princes, who, before the date of the Convention , ,. , of Passau, had seized ecclesiastical property I 6. Its terms. . r tr J within their own territories, either for their own purposes or for the support of Protestant worship, should no longer be subject to the law or authority of the Catholic clergy. The real difficulty arose in pro- viding for the future. With Protestantism as a growing religion, the princes might be inclined to proceed further with the secularizing of the Church property still left un- touched within their own territories ; and besides this, it was possible that even bishops or abbots themselves, being princes of the Empire, might be inclined to aban- don their religion, and to adopt Protestantism. The first of these difficulties was left by the treaty in some obscurity ; but, from the stress laid on the aban- ? 7. Might donment by the Catholics of the lands se- sefzi"more cularized before the Convention of Passau, lands? j t would seem that they might fairly urge that they had never abandoned their claims to lands which at that date had not been secularized. The second difficulty led to long discussions. The Protestants wished that any bishop or abbot who pleased might be allowed to turn Protestant, and might then x 555- Protestantism in Germany. n establish Protestantism as the religion of g 8. Might his subjects. The Catholics insisted that t ; cs turn p r0 "_ any bishop or abbot who changed his religion testants? should be compelled to vacate his post, and this view of the case prevailed, under the name of the Ecclesiastical Reservation. It was further agreed that the peace should apply to the Lutheran Church alone, no other confession having been as yet adopted by any of the princes. Such a peace, acceptable as it was at the time, was pregnant with future evil. Owing its origin to a Diet in which everything was arranged by the princes and electors, it settled all questions as if nobody but princes and electors had any interest in the matter. , _ J § g. Dangers And, besides this, there was a most unstates- of the future, manlike want of provision for future change. The year 1552 was to give the line by which the religious institutions of Germany were to be measured for all time. There was nothing elastic about such legislation. It did not, on the one hand, adopt the religion of the vast majority as the established religion of the Empire. It did not, on the other hand, adopt the principle of reli- gious liberty. In thinking of themselves and their rights, the princes had forgotten the German people. The barriers set up against Protestantism were so plainly artificial that they soon gave way. The princes claimed the right of continuing to secularize Church lands within their territories as inse- croachments"* parable from their general right of providing IjP°? Church for the religion of their subjects. At all events they had might on their side. About a hundred monasteries are said to have fallen victims in the Pala- tinate alone, and an almost equal number, the gleanings of a richer harvest which had been reaped before the 12 Causes of the Thirty Years' War. 1555-1570. Convention of Passau, were taken possession of in Northern Germany. The Ecclesiastical Reservation applied to a different class of property, namely, to the bishoprics and abbeys held immediately of the Empire. Here, too, jii. The Ec- / v ' ' cicsiastical the Protestants found an excuse for evading the Treaty of Augsburg. The object of the reservation, they argued, was not to keep the bishoprics in Catholic hands, but to prevent quarrels arising be- tween the bishops and their chapters. If, therefore, a bishop elected as a Catholic chose to turn Protestant, he must resign his see in order to avoid giving offence to the Catholic chapter. But where a chapter, itself already Protestant, elected a Protestant bishop, he might take the see without hesitation, and hold it as long as he lived. In this way eight of the great northern bishoprics soon came under Protestant rule. Not that the Protest- _ ant occupant was in any real sense of the £12. The , northern bish- word a bishop. He was simply an elected testant. "" prince, calling himself a bishop, or often more modestly an administrator, and look- ing after the temporal affairs of his dominions. In some respects the arrangement was a good one. The populations of these territories were mainly Protest- ant, and they had no cause to complain, bad side of the Besides, if only a sufficient number of these arrangement, bishoprics could be gained to Protestantism, the factitious majority in the Diet might be reversed, and an assembly obtained more truly representing the nation than that which was in existence. But it must be acknowledged that the whole thing had an ugly look ; and it is no wonder that Catholics pronounced these ad- ministrators to be no bishops at all, and to have no right X 57 0_I 595- Reaction against Protestantism. 13 to hold the bishops' lands, or to take their seat as bishops in the Diet of the Empire. Section III. — Reaction against Protestantism. In course of time Protestantism, in its turn, exposed itself to attack. Each petty court soon had its own school of theologians, whose minds were . _,. , . . * \ 1. lheologi- dwarfed to the limits of the circle which they cai deputes influenced with their logic and their elo- tenants.™ quence. The healthful feeling which springs from action on a large stage was wanting to them. Bitterly wrangling with one another, they were eager to call in the secular arm against their opponents. Seizing the opportunity, the newly-constituted order of Jesuits stepped forward to bid silence in the name of the reno- vated Papal Church, alone, as they urged, able to give peace instead of strife, certainty instead of disputation. The Protestants were taken at a disadvantage. The enthusiasm of a national life, which repelled the Jesuits in the England of the sixteenth century, and the enthu- siasm of scientific knowledge which repels them in the Germany of the nineteenth century, were alike wanting to a Germany in which national life was a dream of the past, and science a dream of the future. Luther had long ago passed away from the world. Melanchthon's last days were spent in hopeless protest against the evil around him. ' For two reasons,' he said, as he lay upon his death-bed, ' I desire to leave this life : First, that I may enjoy the sight, which I long for, of the Son of God and of the Church in Heaven. Next, that I may be set free from the monstrous and implacable hatreds of the theologians.' In the face of a divided people, or self-seeking princes, and of conflicting theories, the Jesuits made 14 Causes of the Tliv'ty Years' War. 15 70-1 59 6. their way. Step by step the Catholic reac- Catholics tion gained ground, not without compulsion, \n e progress, j^ ^^ nQt without that moral force which makes compulsion possible. The bishops and abbots gave their subjects the choice between conversion and exile. An attempt made by the Archbishop of Cologne to marry and turn Protestant was too plainly in contradic- tion to the Ecclesiastical Reservation to prosper, and when the Protestant majority of the Chapter of Stras- burg elected a Protestant bishop they were soon over- powered. A Protestant Archbishop of Magdeburg offer- ing to take his place amongst the princes of the Empire at the Diet was refused admission, and though nothing was done to dispossess him and the other northern ad- ministrators of their sees, yet a slur had been cast upon 'their title which they were anxious to efface. A few years later a legal decision was obtained in the cases of four monasteries secularized after the Convention of Passau, and that decision was adverse to the claim of the Protestants. Out of these two disputes — the dispute about the Pro- testant administrators and the dispute about the secular- l 3. The dis- ized lands — the Thirty Years' War arose. Fed finally to The Catholic party stood upon the strict let- war - ter of the law, according, at least, to their own interpretation, and asked that everything might be replaced in the condition in which it was in 1552, the date of the Convention of Passau. The Protestant view, that consideration should be taken for changes, many of which at the end of the sixteenth century were at least a generation old, may or may not have been in accordance with the law, but it was certainly in accord* ance with the desires of the greater part of the popula* tion affected by them. 1596-1607. Three Parties and Three Leaders. 15 There is every reason to believe that if Germany had possessed anything like a popular representation its voice would have spoken in favour of some , . $ 4- Nopopu- kind of compromise. There is no trace of far represen- ,,.,., , , tation. any mutual hostility between the popula- tions of the Catholic and Protestant districts apart from their rulers. Section IV. — Three Parties and Three Leaders. Two men stood forward to personify the elements of strife — Maximilian, the Catholic Duke of Bavaria, and the Calvinist Prince Christian of Anhalt, whilst „ _ i 1. Tne the warmest advocate of peace was John leaders of George, the Lutheran Elector of Saxony. Maximilian of Bavaria was the only lay prince of any importance on the side of the Catholics. He had long been known as a wise administrator of his own domin- ions. No other ruler was provided with so , I 2. Maximi- well-filled a treasury, or so disciplined an lianoftsava- army. No other ruler was so capable of forming designs which were likely to win the approba- tion of others, or so patient in waiting till the proper time arrived for their execution. ' What the Duke of Bava- ria does,' said one of his most discerning opponents, ' has hands and feet.' His plans, when once they were launched into the world, seemed to march forwards of themselves to success. Such a man was not likely to take up the wild theories which were here and there springing up, of the duty of uprooting Protestantism at all times and all a 3 His love places, or to declare, as some were declar- ofle g allt y- ing, that the Peace of Augsburg was invalid because it had never been confirmed by the Pope. To him the Peace of Augsburg was the legal settlement by which all 1 6 Causes of the Thirty Years' War. 1596-1' ^7. questions were to be tried. What he read there was hostile to the Protestant administrators and the seculariz- ing princes. Yet he did not propose to carry his views into instant action. He would await his opportunity. But he would do his best to be strong, in order that he might not be found wanting when the opportunity ar- rived, and, in spite of his enthusiasm for legal rights, it was by no means unlikely that, if a difficult point arose, he might be inclined to strain the law in his own favour. Such an opponent, so moderate and yet so resolute, was a far more dangerous enemy to the Protestants than ^ the most blatant declaimer against their I 4. Danger & of the Protest- doctrines. Naturally, the Protestants re- garded his views as entirely inadmissible. They implied nothing less than the forcible conversion of the thousands of Protestants who were inhabitants of the administrators' dominions, and the occupation by the Catholic clergy of points of vantage which would serve them in their operations upon the surrounding dis- tricts. It is true that the change, if effected would sim- ply replace matters in the position which had been found endurable in 1552. But that which could be borne when the Catholics were weak and despondent might be an intolerable menace when they were confident and ag- gressive. Resistance, therefore, became a duty, a duty to which the princes were all the more likely to pay attention be- cause it coincided with their private interest. g 5. Danger of the Protest- In the bishoprics and chapters they found provision for their younger sons, from which they would be cut off if Protestants were hereafter to be excluded. The only question was in what spirit the resistance should be offered. The tie which bound the Empire to- 1596-1607. Three Parties and Three Leaders. i"] gether was so loose, and resistance to law, \ 6. Protest- or what was thought to be law, was so like- north and ly to lead to resistance to law in general, south - that it was the more incumbent on the Protestants to choose their ground well. And in Germany, at least, there was not likely to be any hasty provocation to give Maximilian an excuse for reclaiming the bishoprics. Far removed from the danger, these northern Lutherans found it difficult to conceive that there was any real dan- ger at all. The states of the south, lying like a wedge driven into the heart of European Catholicism, were forced by their geographical position to be ever on the alert. They knew that they were the advanced guard of Protestantism. On the one flank was the Catholic duchy of Bavaria, and the bishoprics of Wurzburg and Bamberg. On the other flank were the ecclesiastical electorates on the Rhine and the Moselle, the bishoprics of Worms, Spires, and Strasburg, the Austrian lands in Swabia and Alsace, and the long line of the Spanish frontier in Franche Comte and the Netherlands garri- soned by the troops of the first military monarchy in Europe. What wonder if men so endangered were in haste to cut the knot which threatened to strangle them, and to meet the enemy by flying in his face rather than by awaiting the onslaught which they believed to be in- evitable. Under the influence of this feeling the princes of these southern regions for the most part adopted a religion very different from the courtly Lutheranism , ? 7- Spread of the north. If Wurtemberg continued of Calvinism. Lutheran under the influence of the Univer- sity of Tubingen, the rulers of the Palatinate, of Hesse Cassel, of Baden-Durlach, of Zwei-Briicken, sought for strength in the iron discipline of Calvinism, a form of 1 8 Causes of the Thirty Years' 1 War. 15 96-1 607. religion which always came into favour when there was an immediate prospect of a death-struggle with Rome. Unhappily, German Calvinism differed from that of Scotland and the Netherlands. Owing to its adoption , c by the princes rather than bythepeople.it character of failed in gaining that hardy growth which Germany. made it invincible on its native soil. It had less of the discipline of an army about it, less resolute defiance, less strength altogether. And whilst it was weaker it was more provocative. Excluded from the benefits of the Peace of Augsburg, which knew of no Protestant body except the Lutheran, the Calvin- ists were apt to talk about the institutions of the Empire in a manner so disparaging as to give offence to Luther- ans and Catholics alike. Of this Calvinist feeling Christian of Anhalt became the impersonation. The leadership of the Calvinist states in the beginning of the seventeenth j? 9. Frede- rick IV., century would naturally have devolved on Palatine. Frederick IV., Elector Palatine. But Fred- erick was an incapable drunkard, and his councillors, with Christian at their head, were left to act in his name. Christian of Anhalt possessed a brain of inexhaustible fertility. As soon as one plan which he had framed ap- peared impracticable, he was ready with ? 10. Chris- r _*; , ,. , / , tian of another. He was a born diplomatist, and all the chief politicians of Europe were in- timately known to him by report, whilst with many of them he carried on a close personal intercourse. His leading idea was that the maintenance of peace was hopeless, and that either Protestantism must get rid of the House of Austria, or the House of Austria would get 1607. Three Parties and Three Leaders. 19 rid of Protestantism. Whether this were true or false, it is certain that he committed the terrible fault of under- estimating his enemy. Whilst Maximilian was drilling soldiers and saving money, Christian was trusting to mere diplomatic finesse. He had no idea of the tena- c ? *"y with which men will cling to institutions, however rotten, till they feel sure that some other institutions will be substituted for them, or of the strength which Maxi- milian derived from the appearance of conservatism in which his revolutionary designs were shrouded even from his own observation. In order to give to Protes- tantism that development which in Christian's eyes was necessary to its safety, it would be needful to overthrow the authority of the Emperor and of the Diet. And if the Emperor and the Diet were overthrown, what had Christian to offer to save Germany from anarchy ? If his plan included, as there is little doubt that it did, the seizure of the lands of the neighbouring bishops, and a fresh secularization of ecclesiastical property, even Pro- testant towns might begin to ask whether their turn would not come next. A return to the old days of private war and the law of the strongest would be welcome to very few. In 1607 an event occurred which raised the alarm of the southern Protestants to fever heat. In the free city of Donauworth the abbot of a monastery 1607. saw fit to send out a procession to flaunt its ? n. The banners in the face of an almost" entirely of Donau" Protestant population. Before the starting- wSrth - point was regained mud and stones were thrown, and some of those who had taken part in the proceedings were roughly handled. The Imperial Court (Reich- skammergericht) , whose duty it was to settle such quar- rels, was out of working order in consequence of the 2o Causes of the Thirty Years' War. 1608. religious disputes ; but there was an Imperial Council (Reichshofrath), consisting of nominees of the Emperor, and professing to act out of the plenitude of imperial au- thority. By this council Donauworth was put to the ban of the Empire without due form of trial, and Maximilian was appointed to execute the decree. He at once marched a small army into the place, and, taking pos- session of the town, declared his intention of retaining his hold till his expenses had been paid, handing over the parish church in the meanwhile to the Catholic clergy. It had only been given over to Protestant wor- ship after the date of the Convention of Passau, and Maximilian could persuade himself that he was only carrying out the law. It was a flagrant case of religious aggression under the name of the law. The knowledge that a partial tribunal was ready to give effect to the com- a 12. The plaints of Catholics at once threw the great Protestant cities of the South — Nuremberg, Ulm, and Strasburg into the arms of the neighbouring princes of whom they had hitherto been jealous. Yet there was much in the policy of those princes which would hardly have reassured them. At the Diet of 1608 the representatives of the Elector Palatine were foremost in demanding that the minority should not be bound by the majority in questions of taxation or religion ; that is to say, that they should not contribute to the common defence unless they pleased, and that they should not be subject to any regulation about ecclesiastical proper- ty unless they pleased. Did this mean only that they were to keep what they had got, or that they might take more as soon as it was convenient ? The one was the Protestant, the other the Catholic interpretation of their theory. 1609. Three Parties and Three Leaders. 21 On May 14, 160S, the Protestant Union, to which Lu- therans and Calvinists were alike admitted, came into existence under the guidance of Christian . 2 1 3- Forma- of Anhalt. It was mainly composed of the tion of the princes and towns of the south. Its ostensi- ble purpose was for self-defence, and in this sense it was accepted by most of those who took part in it. Its leaders had very different views. A Catholic League was at once formed under Maximi- lian. It was composed of a large number of bishops and abbots, who believed that the princes . . . § 14. Forma- of the Union wished to annex their territo- tion of the ries. Maximilian's ability gave it a unity of action which the Union never possessed. It, too, was constituted for self-defence, but whether that word was to include the resumption of the lands lost since the Convention of Passau was a question probably left for circumstances to decide. Whatever the majority of the princes of the Union may have meant, there can be no doubt § 15. Revoiu- that Christian of Anhalt meant aggression, c^ofthe He believed that the safety of Protestantism Uoion. could not be secured without the overthrow of the Ger- man branch of the House of Austria, and he was san- guine enough to fancy that an act which would call up all Catholic Europe in arms against him was a very easy undertaking. Scarcely had the Union been formed when events occurred which aknost dragged Germ-any into war. In the spring of 1609 the Duke of Cleves died. 1609. The Elector of Brandenburg and the son of §16. The sue the Duke of Neuburg laid claim to the sue- cieves! ° cession. On the plea that the Emperor had the right to settle the point, a Catholic army advanced 3 2 Causes of the Thirty Years' War. 1612. to take possession of the country. The two pretenders, both of them Lutherans, made common cause against the invaders. Henry IV. of France found 1610. . J in the dispute a pretext for commencing his long-meditated attack upon Spain and her allies. But his life was cut short by an assassin, and his widow only thought of sending a small French force to join the English and the Dutch in maintaining the claims of the two princes, who were ready to unite for a time against a third party. It was not easy to bring the princes to an arrangement /t>r the future. One day the young Prince of Neuburg proposed what seemed to him an excellent $17. Vhe box way out of the difficulty. ' He was ready,' on the ear. k e sa j j ) < to maiT y the Elector's daughter, if only he might have the territory.' Enraged at the impudence of the proposal, the Elector raised his hand and boxed his young rival's ears. The blow had unex- pected consequences. The injured prince renounced his Protestantism, and invoked, as a good Catholic, the aid of Spain and the League. The Elector passed from Lutheranism to Calvinism, and took a more active part than before in the affairs of the Union. That immediate war in Germany did not result from the quarrel is proba- bly the strongest possible evidence of the reluctance of the German people to break the peace. The third party, the German Lutherans, looked with equal abhorrence upon aggression on either side. Their leader, John George, Elector of Saxony, stood ?i8. John aloof alike from Christian of Anhalt, and tor°o7saxony. from Maximilian of Bavaria. He. was at- tached by the traditions of his house as well as by his own character to the Empire and the House of Austria. But he was anxious to obtain security for 1 613. Three parties and three Leaders. 23 his brother Protestants. He saw there must be a change ; but he wisely desired to make the change as slight as possible. In 1612, therefore, he proposed that the high- est jurisdiction should still be retained by the Imperial Council, but that the Council, though still nominated by the Emperor, should contain an equal number of Catho- lics and Protestants. Sentences such as that which had deprived Donauworth of its civil rights would be in future impossible. Unhappily, John George had not the gift of ruling men. He was a hard drinker and a bold huntsman, but to convert his wishes into actual facts was . beyond his power. When he saw his plan weakness of threatened with opposition on either side he left it to take care of itself. In 161 3 a Diet met, and broke up in confusion, leaving matters in such a state that any spark might give rise to a general confla- gration* CHAPTER II. THE BOHEMIAN REVOLUTION. Section I. — The Hottse of Austria and its Subjects. At the beginning of the seventeenth century the domi- nions of the German branch of the House of Austria were parcelled out amongst the various descen - Austrian dants of Ferdinand I., the brother of Charles V. The head of the family, the Emperor Rudolph II., was Archduke of Austria — a name which in those days was used simply to indicate the archduchy itself, and not the group of territories which are at pre- sent ruled over by the Austrian sovereign — and he was also King of Bohemia and of Hungary. His brothel Maximilian governed Tyrol, and his cousin Ferdinand ruled in Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola. The main difficulty of government arose from the fact that whilst every member of the family clung firmly to the old creed, the greater part of the no- # 2. Ans- ° r r tocracyand pulation, excepting in Tyrol, had adopted Protestantism. ,, , . .. . ., the new ; that is to say, that on the great question of the day the subjects and the rulers had no thoughts in common. And this difficulty was aggravated by the further fact that Protestantism prospered mainly from the support given to it by a powerful aristocracy, so that political disagreement was added to the difference in religion. Ferdinand had, indeed, contrived to put down with a strong hand the exercise of Protestantism in his own dominions so easily as almost to suggest the inference that it had not taken very deep root in those Alpine regions. But Rudolph was quite incapable of 24 1609^ The House of Austria and its Subjects. 25 following his example. If not absolutely insane, he was subject to sudden outbursts of temper, proceeding from mental disease. In 1606, a peace having been concluded with the f urks, Rudolph fancied that his hands were at last free to deal with his subjects as Ferdinand had J 1606 dealt with his. The result was a general \ 3. Rudolph uprising, and if Rudolph's brother Matthias had not placed himself at the head of the movement, in order to save the interests of the family, some stranger would probably have been selected as a rival to the princes of the House of Austria. In the end, two years later, Austria and Hungary were assigned to Matthias, whilst Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia were left to Rudolph for his lifetime. The result of Rudolph's ill-advised energy was to strengthen the hands of the Protestant nobility. In Hungary the Turks were too near to make . 1609. it easy for Matthias to refuse concessions to a 4. The a people who might, at any time, throw f°Bohemi" e * themselves into the arms of the enemy, and in Austria he was driven, after some resistance, to agree to a compromise. In Bohemia, in 1609, the Estates ex- torted from Rudolph the Royal Charter {Majesiatsbrief) which guaranteed freedom of conscience to every inha- bitant of Bohemia, as long as he kept to certain recognised creeds. Bnt freedom of conscience did not by any means imply freedom of worship. A man might think as he pleased, but the building of churches and the per-, formance of divine service were matters for the authori- ties to decide upon. The only question was, who the authorities were. By the Royal Charter this authority was given over to members of the Estates, that is to say, to about 1,400 of 26 7 he Bohemian Revolution. 1609. the feudal aristocracy and 42 towns. In an agreement attached to the charter, a special exception was made for „ . . the royal domains. A Protestant landowner $ 5. Position J of the land- could and would prohibit the erection of a Catholic church on his own lands, but the king was not to have that privilege. On his domains worship was to be free. From this bondage, as he counted it, Rudolph strug- gled to liberate himself. There was fresh violence, ending in 161 1 in Rudolph's dethronement tiies to get in favour of Matthias, who thus became king of Bohemia. The next year he died, and Matthias succeeded him as Emperor also. During all these troubles, Christian of Anhalt had done all that he could to frustrate a peaceful settlement. , „, . . ' When Hungary, Moravia, Austria, and jf 7. Christian _ ° ' of Anhalt Silesia are on our side,' he explained.be- generai fore the Royal Charter had been granted, to confusion. & diplomatist in his employment, ' the House of Hapsburg will have no further strength to re sist us, except in Bohemia, Bavaria, and a few bishop- rics. Speaking humanly, we shall be strong enough not only to resist these, but to reform all the clergy, and bring them into submission to our religion. The game will begin in this fashion. As soon as Bavaria arms to use compulsion against Austria,' (that is to say, against the Austrian Protestants, who were at that time resisting Matthias) ' we shall arm to attack Bavaria, and retake Donauworth. In the same way, we shall get hold of two or three bishops to supply us with money. Cer- tainly, it seems that by proceeding dexterously we shall give the law to all, and set up for rulers whom we will.' For the time Christian was disappointed. The do- minions of Matthias settled down into quietness. But (6i 7- The House of Austria and its Subjects. 27 Matthias was preparing another opportunity for his an- tagonist. Whether it would have been possible in those days for a Catholic king to have kept a Protestant nation in working order we cannot say. At all events, Matthias did not give the experi- thias King of r . . 1TT ,.. .. , . Bohemia. ment a fair trial. He did not, indeed, attack the Royal Charter directly on the lands of the aristocracy. But he did his best to undermine it on his own. The Protestants of Braunau, on the lands of the Abbot of Braunau and the Protestants of Klostergrab, on the lands of the Archbishop of Prague, built churches for themselves, the use of which was prohibited by the abbot and the archbishop. A dispute immediately arose as to the rights of ecclesiastical landowners, and it was ar- gued on the Protestant side, that their lands were tech- nically Crown lands, and that they had therefore no right to close the churches. Matthias took the opposite view. On his own estates Matthias found means to evade the charter. He appointed Catholic priests to Protes- tant churches, and allowed measures to be . 2 9. He taken to compel Protestants to attend the evades the Catholic service. Yet for a long time the Protestant nobility kept quiet. Matthias was old and infirm, and when he died they would, as they supposed, have an opportunity of choosing their next king, and it was generally believed that the election would fall upon a Protestant. The only question was whether the Elec- tor Palatine or the Elector of Saxony would be chosen. Suddenly, in 1617, the Bohemian Diet was summoned. When the Estates of the l6 kingdom met they were told that it was a ? IO -, *"«■<«- ' nana pro- mistake to suppose that the crown of Bo- posed as king , . , . „ . . of Bohemia. hernia was elective. Evidence was pro- 2 8 The Bohemian Revolution. 1617. duced that for some time before the election of Matthias the Estates had acknowledged the throne to be heredi- tary, and the precedent of Matthias was to be set aside as occurring in revolutionary times. Intimidation was used to assist the argument, and men in the confidence of the court whispered in the ears of those who refused to be convinced that it was to be hoped that they had at least two heads on their shoulders. If ever there was a moment for resistance, if resist- ance was to be made at all, it was this. The arguments of the court were undoubtedly strong, but a Bohemians skilful lawyer could easily have found tech- him'aTthefr 6 nicalities on the other side, and the real king. evasion of the Royal Charter might have been urged as a reason why the court had no right to press technical arguments too closely. The danger was all the greater as it was known that by the renunciation of all intermediate heirs the hereditary right fell upon Ferdinand of Styria, the man who had already stamped Protestantism out in his own dominions. Yet, in spite of this, the Diet did as it was bidden, and renounced the right of election by acknowledging Ferdinand as their hereditary king. The new king was more of a devotee and less of a statesman than Maximilian of Bavaria, his cousin on his » I2 His mother's side. But their judgments of events character. were formed on the same lines. Neither of them were mere ordinary bigots, keeping no faith with heretics. But they were both likely to be guided in their interpretation of the law by that which they conceived to be profitable to their church. Ferdinand was personally brave ; but except when his course was very clear before him, he was apt to let difficulties settle themselves rather than come to a decision. ioiS. The Revolution at Prague. 29 He had at once to consider whether he would swear to the Royal Charter. He consulted the Jesuits, and was told that, though it had been a sin to grant it, it was no sin to accept it now that it was the law of the land. As he walked in state to his coronation, he turned to a nobleman who was by his side. . ' I am glad,' he said, ' that I have attained takes the the Bohemian crown without any pangs of Royal conscience.' He took the oath without Charter - further difficulty. The Bohemians were not long in feeling the effects of the change. Hitherto the hold of the House of Austria upon the country had been limited to the life of one old man. It had now, by the admission of the Diet itself, fixed itself for ever upon Bohemia. The proceedings against the Protestants on the royal domains assumed a sharper character. The Braunau worshippers were rigorously excluded from their church. The walls of the new church of Klostergrab were actually levelled with the ground. Section II. — Hie Revolution at Prague. The Bohemians had thus to resist in 1618, under every disadvantage, the attack which they had done nothing to meet in 1617. Certain persons named Defensors had, by law, the right of sum- ji. The t , r , . . j. Bohemians moning an assembly of representatives of petition the Protestant Estates. Such an assembly Matthias, met on March 5, and having prepared a petition to Matthias, who was absent from the kingdom, adjourned to May 21. Long before the time of meeting came, an answer was sent from Matthias justifying all that had been done, and declaring the assembly illegal. It was believed at 30 The Bohoytian Revolution. 1618. I 2. Reply of ^ e time, though incorrectly, that the answer Matthias. was prepared by Slawata and Martinitz, two members of the regency who had been notorious for the vigour of their opposition to Protestantism. In the Protestant assembly there was a knot of men, headed by Count Henry of Thurn, which was bent on the dethronement of Ferdinand. They re- counse'u. ent solved to take advantage of the popular feeling to effect the murder of the two re- gents, and so to place an impassable gulf between the nation and the king. Accordingly, on the morning of Mav 23, the ' begin- ning and cause,' as a contemporary calls it, ' of all the coming evil,' the first day, though men as nitz and Sla- yet knew it not, of thirty years of war, out of vrifr" Thurn sallied forth at the head of a band o\ dow ' noblemen and their followers, all of them with arms in their hands. Trooping into the room where the regents were seated, they charged the obnoxious two with being the authors of the king's reply. After a bitter altercation both Martinitz and Slawata were dragged to a window which overlooked the fosse below from a dizzy height of some seventy feet. Martinitz, struggling against his enemies, pleaded hard for a confessor. ' Commend thy soul to God,' was the stern answer. ' Shall we allow the Jesuit scoundrels to come here ? ' In an instant he was hurled out, crying, "Jesus, Mary ! ' ' Let us see," said some one mockingly, ' Whether his Mary will help him." A moment later he added : " By God, his Mary has helped him." Slawata followed, and then the secretary Fabricius. By a wonderful pre- servation, in which pious Catholics discerned the pro- tecting hand of God, all three crawled away from the spot without serious hurt. 1618. The Revolution at Prague. 31 There are moments when the character of a nation or party stands revealed as by a lightning flash, and this was one of them. It is not beginning, in such a way as this that successful revolu- tions are begun. The first steps to constitute a new government were easy. Thirty Directors were appointed, and the Jesuits were expelled from Bohemia. The Diet met . „,, . . ? 6. The re- and ordered soldiers to be levied to form an voiutionary army. But to support this army money governmen wo_uld be needed, and the existing taxes were insuffi- cient. A loan was accordingly thought of, and the nobles resolved to request the towns to make up the sum, they themselves contributing nothing. The pro- ject falling dead upon the resistance of the towns, new taxes were voted ; but no steps were taken to collect them, and the army was left to depend in a great mea- sure upon chance. Would the princes of Germany come to the help of the Directors ? John George of Saxony told them that he deeply sympathized with them, but that „ M ... . 9. 7- The rebellion was a serious matter. To one who Elector of asked him what he meant to do, he replied, w t^h^ y f r ' Help to put out the fire.' P eace - There was more help for them at Heidelberg than at Dresden. Frederick IV. had died in 1610, and his son, the young Frederick V., looked up to Chris- tian of Anhalt as the first statesman of his Elector Pala- age. By his marriage with Elizabeth, the outhopes of daughter of James I. of England, he had assistance - contracted an alliance which gave him the appearance rather than the reality of strength. He offered every encouragement to the Bohemians, but for the time held back from giving them actual assistance. 5 2 The Bohemian Revolution. 1618. Section III. — The War in Bohemia. The Directors were thus thrown on their own re- sources. Ferdinand had secured his elec- ofwar." tion as king of Hungary, and, returning to Vienna, had taken up the reins of govern- ment in the name of Matthias. He had got together an army of 14,000 men, under the command of Bucquoi, an officer from the great school of military art in the Netherlands, and on August 13, the Bohemian frontier was invaded. War could hardly be avoided by either side. Budweis and Pilsen, two Catholic towns in Bo- hemia, naturally clung to their sovereign, and as soon as the Directors ordered an attack upon Budweis, the troops of Matthias prepared to advance to its succour. The Directors took alarm, and proposed to the Diet that new taxes should be raised and not merely voted, „, _, and that, in addition to the army of regular 3 2. The Bo- . ' ° hemians vote soldiers, there should be a general levy of a ject 'to paying large portion of the population. To the taxes. j eV y ^g r^jet consented without difficulty. But before the day fixed for discussing the proposed taxes arrived, the majority of the members deliberately returned to their homes, and no new taxes were to be had. This day, August 30, may fairly be taken as the date of the political suicide of the Bohemian aristocracy. In almost every country in Europe order was are not likely maintained by concentrating the chief 1 ""'"'' powers of the State in the hands of a single governor, whether he were called king, duke, or elector. To this rule there were exceptions in Venice, Switzer- land, and the Netherlands, and by-and-by there would be an exception on a grander scale in England. But the peoples who formed these exceptions had proved j6iS. The War in Bohemia. 33 themselves worthy of the distinction, and there would be no room in the world for men who had got rid of their king without being able to establish order upon anothel basis. Still there were too many governments in Europe hos- tile to the House of Austria to allow the Bo- 3 4 . Help hemians to fall at once. Charles Em- irom &ilvo *- manuel, Duke of Savoy, had just brought a war with Spain to a close, but he had not become any better dis- posed towards his late adversary. He accordingly en- tered into an agreement with the leaders of the Union, by which 2,000 men who had been raised for his service were to be placed at the disposal of the Bohemian Di- rectors. The commander of these troops was Count Ernest of Mansfeld, an illegitimate son of a famous general in the service of Spain. He had changed his 3 5 . Mans- religion and deserted his king. He now eld- put himself forward as a champion of Protestantism. He was brave, active, and versatile, and was possessed of those gifts which win the confidence of professional soldiers. But he was already notorious for the readiness with which he allowed his soldiers to support themselves on the most unbridled pillage. An adventurer himself, he was just the man to lead an army of adventurers. Soon after his arrival in Bohemia, Mansfeld was em- ployed in the siege of Pilsen, whilst Thurn was occupied with holding Bucquoi in check. The failure » 6 ^ forced in obtaining additional taxes had led the ' oan - Directors to adopt the simple expedient of levying a forced loan from the few rich. For a time this desperate expedient was successful. The help offered to Ferdinand by Spain was not great, and it was long in coming. The prudent Maximilian ve> 34 The Bohemian Revolution. 16 tj. fused to ruin himself by engaging in an ap- oftheBo- parently hopeless cause. At last the Silc* ' sians, who had hesitated long, threw in their lot with their neighbours, and sent their troops to their help early in November. Bucquoi was in full re- treat to Budweis. On the 21st Pilsen surrendered to Mansfeld. Further warfare was stopped as winter came on — a terrible winter for the unhappy dwellers in Southern Bohemia. Starving armies are not particular in their methods of supplying their wants. Plunder, de- vastation and reckless atrocities of every kind fell to the lot of the doomed peasants, Bucquoi's Hungarians being conspicuous for barbarity. Meanwhile, Christian of Anhalt was luring on the young Elector Palatine to more active intervention. The . _ _ , Bohemian leaders had already beeun to talk {J 8. Scheme . J ° of christian of placing the crown on Frederick's head. Frederick, anxious and undecided, consent- ed on the one hand, at the Emperor's invitation, to join the Duke of Bavaria and the Electors of Mentz and Saxony in mediating an arangement, whilst, on the other hand, he gave his assent to an embassy to Turin, the object of which was to dazzle the Duke of Savoy with the prospect of obtaining the imperial crown after the death of Matthias, and to urge him to join in an attack upon the German dominions of the House of Austria. The path on which Frederick was entering was the more evidently unsafe, as the Union, which met at Hcil- _ , bronn in September, had shown great cool- \<). Coolness , * _, . . c of the ness in the Bohemian cause. Christian of Anhalt had not ventured even to hint at the projects which he entertained. If Vie was afterwards de- serted by the Union he could not say that its members as a body had engaged to support him 1619. Ferdinand on his Defence. 35 The Duke of Savoy, on the other hand, at least talked as if the Austrian territories were at his feet. In August 1618 he had given his consent to the pro- l6l „ posed elevation of Frederick to the Bohe- ^^ ^ e avoy mian throne. In February 1619 he ex- gives hopes, plained that he wished to have Bohemia for himself. Frederick might be compensated with the Austrian lands in Alsace and Swabia. He might, perhaps, have the Archduchy of Austria too, or become King of Hungary. If he wished to fall upon the bishops' lands, let him do it quickly, before the Pope had time to interfere. This sort of talk, wild as it was, delighted the little circle of Frederick's confidants. The Margrave of Anspach, who, as general of the army of the Union, was admitted into the secret, was beyond measure pleased : ' We have now,' he said, ' the means of upsetting the world.' For the present, these negotiations were veiled in secresy. They engendered a confident „ . . 1 xr - Conser- levity, which was certain to shock that con- vative feeling servative, peace-loving feeling which the Bohemians had already done much to alienate. Section IV. — Ferdinand on his Defence. If the assistance of the Union was thus likely to do more harm than good to the Bohemians, their hopes of aid from other powers were still more delu- a 1. The Bo- sive. The Dutch, indeed, sent something, fejd n f r0 m k and would willingly have sent more, but they fore 'g n powers, had too many difficulties at home to be very profuse in their offers. James of England told his son-in-law plainly that he would have nothing to do with any en- croachment upon the rights of others, and he had under- taken at the instigation of Spain a formal mediation between the Bohemians and their king — a mediation 36 The Bohemian Revolution. 1619. which had been offered him merely in order to keep his hands tied whilst others were arming. On March 20, before the next campaign opened, Matthias died. Ferdinand's renewed promises to respect the Royal Charter — made doubtless under upon Vienna. tne reservation of putting his own interpreta- tion upon the disputed points — were rejected with scorn by the Directors. The sword was to decide the quarrel. With the money received from the Dutch, and with aid in money and munitions of war from Hei- delberg, Thurn and Mansfeld were enabled to take the field. The latter remained to watch Bucquoi, whilst the former undertook to win the other territories, which had hitherto submitted to Matthias, and had stood aloof from the movement in Bohemia. Without much difficulty he succeeded in revolutionizing Moravia, and he arrived on June 5 under the walls of Vienna. Within was Ferdi- nand himself, with a petty garrison of 300 men, and as many volunteers as he could attach to his cause. Thurn hoped that his partisans inside the cities would open the gates to admit him. But he lost time in negotiations with the Austrian nobility. The estates of the two terri- tories of Upper and Lower Austria were to a great extent Protestant, and they had refused to do homage to Fer- dinand on the death of Matthias. The Lower Austrian? now sent a deputation to Vienna to demand permission to form a confederation with the Bohemians, on terms, which would practically have converted the whole coun- try, from the Styrian frontier to the borders of Silesia, into a federal aristocratic republic. In Ferdinand they had to do with a man who was not to be overawed by personal danger. He knew well that by yielding he would be giving a legal basis to a system which he regarded as opposed to all law, human 1 6 1 9 . Ferdinand on his Defence. 3 7 and divine. Throwing himself before the . b I 3. Ferdi- crucifix, he found strength for the conflict nand resists into which he entered on behalf of his fami- of'theTower ly, his church, and, as he firmly believed, ^f a c ^ n of his country and his God — strength none the less real because the figure on the cross did not, as men not long afterwards came fondly to believe, bow its head towards the suppliant, or utter the consoling words: ' Ferdinand, I will not forsake thee.' To a deputation from the Austrian Estates he was firm and unbending. They might threaten as they pleased, but the confederation with Bohemia he would not sign. Rougher and rougher grew the menaces addressed to him. Some one, it is said, talked of de- g 4 R escue throning him and of educating his children arnves - in the Protestant religion. Suddenly the blare of a trumpet was heard in the court below. A regiment of horse had slipped in through a gate unguarded by Thurn, and had hurried to Ferdinand's defence. The deputation, lately so imperious, slunk away, glad enough to escape punishment. Little would so slight a reinforcement have availed if Thurn had been capable of assaulting the city. But, un- provided with stores of food or siege muni- 3 . The tions, he had counted on treason within. sie s e raised. Disappointed of his prey, he returned to Bohemia, to find that Bucquoi had broken out of Budweis, and had inflicted a serious defeat on Mansfeld. Ferdinand did not linger at Vienna to dispute his rghts with his Austrian subjects. The election of a new Emperor was to take place at Frankfort, . „, , . . . - ?• 6 The and it was of importance to him to be on imperial the spot. To the German Protestants the e ec 10n- transfer of the Imperial crown to his head could not be 38 The Bohemian Revolution. 1619. a matter of indifference. If he succeeded, as there seemed every probability of his succeeding, in re-estab- lishing his authority over Bohemia, he would weigh with a far heavier weight than Matthias upon the disputes by which Germany was distracted. The Elector Palatine and his councillors had a thousand schemes for getting rid of him, without fixing upon any. John George of Saxony, in 1619 as in 161 2, had a definite plan to pro- pose. Ferdinand, he said, was not in possession of Bohemia, and could not, therefore, vote as King of Bo- hemia at the election. The election must, therefore, be postponed till the Bohemian question had been settled by mediation. If only the three Protestant electors could have been brought to agree to this course, an im- mediate choice of Ferdinand would have been impossi- ble. Whatever might be the merits of the proposal itself, it had the inestimable advantage of embarking the Lu- „ ,. therans of the North and the Calvinists of I 7. Ferdi- . nand chosen the South in a common cause. But Frede- mperor. ^.^ distrusted John George, and preferred another plan of his own. John George lost his tempei, and voted unconditionally for Ferdinand. Frederick, if he did not mean to be left alone in impotent isolation, had nothing for it but to follow his example. He had no other candidate seriously to propose ; and on August 28, 1619, Ferdinand was chosen by a unanimous vote. He was now known as the Emperor Ferdinand II. Two days before, another election had taken place at Prague. The Bohemians, after deposing I 8. Frede- 9 • , . . r & rick elected Ferdinand from the throne, which in 1017 Bohfmia. they had acknowledged to be his, chose Frederick to fill the vacant seat. Would Frederick accept the perilous offer ? Opinions i620. The Attack upon Frederick. 39 round him were divided on the advisability of the step. The princes of the Union, and even his own coun- cillors, took opposite sides. In his own , . ? 9- He family, his mother raised a voice of warn- accepts the ing. His wife, Elizabeth of England, the beautiful and high-spirited, urged him to the enterprise. The poor young man himself was well-nigh distracted. At last he found a consolation in the comfortable belief that his election was the act of God. Amidst the tears of the good people of Heidelberg he set out from the proud castle, magnificent even now in its ruins as it looks down upon the rushing stream of the Neckar. ' He is carrying the Palatinate into Bohemia,' said his sorrowing mother. On November 4 he was crowned at Prague, and the last act of the Bohemian Revolution was accomplished. CHAPTER III. IMPERIALIST VICTORIES IN BOHEMIA AND THE PALATINATE. Section I. — The Attack upon Frederick. The news of Frederick's acceptance of the Bohemian crown sent a thrill of confidence through the ranks of his opponents. 'That prince' said the , . . ' ? 1- Maximi- Pope, ' has cast himself into a fine laby- lian prepares rinth.' 'He will only be a winter-king,' whispered the Jesuits to one another, certain that the summer's campaign would see his pretensions at an end. Up to that time the Bohemian cause stood upon its own merits. But if one prince of the Empire was to be al- lowed, on any pretext, to seize upon the territories of another, what bulwark was there against a return of the E 40 Imperialist Victories in Bohemia. 1620 old fist-right, or general anarchy ? Frederick had at- tacked the foundations on which the institutions of his time rested, without calling up anything to take their place. Maximilian saw more clearly than any one the mis- take that had been committed. In an interview with the new Emperor he en^aired to forsake his a 2. Makes use of inaction. Hitherto he had kept quiet, be- nilstakes. S cause he knew well that the apparent ag- gressor would have the general opinion of the world against him. Now that the blunder had been committed, he was ready to take advantage of it. At the same time, he did not forget his own interests, and he stipulated that, when all was over, Frederick's electo- ral dignity — not necessarily his territory — should be transferred to himself, and that he should retain Upper Austria in pledge till his military expenses had been re- paid. The effect of the change from the passive endurance of Ferdinand to the active vigour of Maximilian was immediately perceptible. His first object Gabor attacks was to gain over or neutralize the German Protestants, and events in the East were seconding him to a marvel. About one-fifth only of Hun- gary was in Ferdinand's possession. The rest was about equally divided between the Turks and Bethlen Gabor, the Protestant Prince of Transylvania, a semi-barbarous but energetic chieftain, who hoped, with Turkish sup- port, to make himself master of all Hungary, if not of Aus- tria as well. In the first days of November, his hordes, in friendly alliance with the Bohemians, were burning and plundering round the walls of Vienna. But such armies as his can only support themselves by continuous success ; and Bethlen Gabor found the capture of Vienna 1620. The Attack upon Frederick. 41 as hopeless in the winter as Thurn had found it in the summer. Retiring eastwards, he left behind him a bit' ter indignation against those who had abetted his pro- ceedings, and who had not been ashamed, as their ad- versaries declared, to plant the Crescent upon the ruins of Christianity and civilization. Such declamation, overstrained as it was, was not without its effect. German Protestantism had no enthu- siasm to spare for Frederick's enterprise in ? 4. The Bohemia. At a meeting of the Union at t o support Nuremberg, Frederick's cause found no Fredenck - support. Maximilian could well afford to leave the Union to its own hesitation, and to think only of concili- ating the Elector of Saxony and the North German princes. That John George should have taken serious alarm at his rival's increase of power is not surprising. Not only did it assail whatever shadow still remained 1620. of the protecting institutions of the Empire, | g reement of but it did so in a way likely to be especially Muhihausen. disagreeable at Dresden. The revolution at Prague did not simply raise an otherwise powerless person into Ferdinand's place. It gave the crown of Bohemia to a man whose territories were already so extensive that if he managed to consolidate his new dominion with them he would unite in his hands a power which would be unequalled in the Empire, and which would bring with it the unheard-of accumulation of two votes upon one person at imperial elections. John George would de- scend from being one of the first of the German princes to a mere second-rate position. John George was not to be won for nothing. At an assembly held at Muhihausen in March 1620, the League promised that they would never attempt to 4.2 Imperialist Victories in Bohemia. 1620. J 6. The ec- recover by force the lands of the Protestant clesiastical . . . lands held by administrators, or the secularized lands in guaranteed the northern territories, as long as the juwjercondi- holders continued to act as loyal subjects; and this promise was confirmed by the Emperor. That this engagement was not enough, later events were to show. For the present it seemed satisfactory to" I 7. Spinola John George, and Maximilian was able to attackHe turn his attention to the actual preparations Palatinate. f or wan j n M a y orders had been issued from Madrid to Spinola, the Spanish general in the Netherlands, to make ready to march to the Emperor's defence ; and on June 3 the frightened Union signed the treaty of Ulm, by which they promised to observe neu- trality towards the League, thus securing to Maximilian freedom from attack in the rear during his march into Bohemia. The Union, however, if it should be attacked, was to be allowed to defend its own territories, including the Palatinate. At the head of Maximilian's army was the Walloon Tilly, a man capable of inspiring confidence alike by the l 8. The probity of his character and by the posses- mvasions. sion of eminent military capacity. On June 23 he crossed the Austrian frontier. On August 20 the Estates of Upper Austria unconditionally bowed to Fer- dinand as their lord and master. Lower Austria had already submitted to its fate. About the same time John George had entered Lusatia, and was besieging Bautzen in Ferdinand's name. Spinola, too, had marched along the Rhine, and had reached Mentz by the end of August. The army of the Union was drawn up to oppose the Spaniards. But there was no harmony amongst the 1620. The Attack upon Frederick. 43 leaders ; no spirit in the troops. Falling | u 9 bdu ^ s pi t n ^ a upon one town after another, Spinola now Western brought into his power nearly the whole of that portion of the Palatinate which lay on the left bank of the Rhine. The army of the Union retreated help- lessly to Worms, waiting for what might happen next. Maximilian was now ready to attack Bo- , .... g 10. Inva' hernia. He soon effected a junction with sionof Bucquoi. Frederick's position was deplor- able. At first he had been received at Prague with tha liveliest joy. When a son was born to him, who was in after days to become the Prince Rupert |n, Grow- of our English civil wars, every sign of re- ianty"of >PU " joicing accompanied the child to the font. Frederick. But it was not long before Frederick's Lutheran subjects were offended by his Calvinistic proceedings. In the royal chapel pictures of the saints were ruthlessly torn down from the walls, and the great crucifix, an object of reverence to the Lutheran as well as the Catholic, was tossed aside like a common log of wood. The treasures of art which Rudolph II. had collected during his life of seclusion were catalogued that they might be offered for sale ; and it is said that many of them were carried off by the officials entrusted with the duty. And besides real grievances, there were others that were purely ima- ginary. A story has been told which, whether true or false, is a good illustration of the impracticable nature of the Bohemian aristocracy. Frederick is said to have convened some of them to council early in the morning and to have received an answer that it was against their privileges to get up so soon. The Bohemians were not long in discovering that no real strength had been brought to them bv Frederick, 44 Imperialist Victories in Bohemia. 1620. I i2. Frede- He had been set upon the throne, not for strengthM* the ms personal qualities, but because he was Bohemians. supposed to have good friends, and to be able to prop up the falling cause of Bohemia by aid from all parts of Protestant Europe. But his friends gave him little or no help, and he was himself looking tranquilly on whilst the storm was gathering before his eyes. In his ranks there was neither organization nor devotion. Christian of Anhalt had been placed in command of the army, but, though personally brave he did not inspire confidence. The other generals were quarrelling about precedence. New levies were ordered, but the men either remained at home or took the earliest opportunity to slink away. Those who remained, scantily provided with the necessities of life, were on the verge of mutiny. On September 28 Frederick joined the army. He still cherished hope. Bethlen Gabor, who had deserted his cause a few months before, had repented his dcfec- ., , tion, and was now coming to his aid. Sick- jS 13. March . ° ofi'iiiy and ness was raging in the enemy's camp. Yet, in spite of sickness, Tilly pressed on, taking town after town, and choosing his positions too skilfully to be compelled to fight unless it suited him. On the morning of November 8 the Imperialists were close upon Prague. The enemy was posted on the White Hill, a rising ground of no great height outside the walls. The Imperial army had been weakened by its suffer- ings ; and Bucquoi still counselled delay. But Tilly knew better, and urged an immediate advance. As the commanders were disputing, a Dominican friar, who ac- companied the armies, stepped forward. ' Sons of the church,' he said, ' why do you hang back ? We ought to march straight forward, for the Lord hath delivered ►ne enemy into our hands. We shall overcome them as 1620. The Attack upon Frederick. 45 sure as we are alive.' Then showing them a figure of the Virgin which had been defaced by Protestant hands, ' See here,' he said, ' what they have done. The prayers of the Holy Virgin shall be yours. Trust in God, and go boldly to the battle. He fights on your side, and will give you the victory.' Before the fiery utterances of the friar Bucquoi withdrew his opposition. It was a Sunday morning, and the gospel of the day contained the, words, ' Render unto Caesar the things that be Caesar's,' and the warriors of the . „ . g 14. The Caesar at Vienna felt themselves inspired to battle of the fulfil the Saviour's words. The task which they had before them was more difficult in appearance than in reality. Frederick was inside the city entertain- ing two English ambassadors at dinner whilst the blow was being struck. Some Hungarians on whom he chief- ly relied set the example of flight, and the day was irre- trievably lost. Frederick fled for his life through North Germany, till he found a refuge at the Hague. The reign of the Bohemian aristocracy was at an end. Tilly, indeed, had mercifully given time to the leaders to make their escape. But, blind in adver- f . ? £ 5- Sub- sity as they had been in prosperity, they mission of made no use of the opportunity. The chiefs °' emia ' perished on the scaffold. Their lands were confiscated, and a new German and Catholic nobility arose, which owed its possessions to its sovereign, and which, even if the Royal Charter had remained in existence, would have entered into the privileges which allowed their predecessors to convert the churches in their domains to what use they pleased. But the Royal Charter was declared to have been forfeited by rebellion, and the Protestant churches in the towns and on the royal es- tates had nothing to depend on but the will of the con- 46 Imperialist Victories in Bohemia. 1620. queror. The ministers of one great body, — the Bohe« mian Brethren — were expelled at once. The Lutherans were spared for a time. Was it yet possible to keep the Bohemian war from growing into a German one ? Ferdinand and Maximi- lian were hardly likely to stop of themselves rick put to in their career of victory. To them Frede- the ban. . , , ., rick was a mere aggressor, on whom they were bound to inflict condign punishment. Would he not, if he were allowed to recover strength, play the same game over again ? Besides, the expenses of the war had been heavy. Ferdinand had been obliged to leave Upper Austria in pledge with Maximilian till his share of those expenses had been repaid to him. It would be much pleasanter for both parties if Maximilian could have a slice of the Palatinate instead. With this and the promised transference of the electorate to Maxi- milian, there would be some chance of securing order and a due respect for the Catholic ecclesiastical lands. On January 22, therefore, Frederick was solemnly put to the ban, and his lands and dignities declared to be forfeited. Whether Ferdinand was justified in doing this was long a moot point. He had certainly promised at his _ election that he would not put anyone to the 2 17. Danger of the Pro- ban without giving him the benefit of a fair trial. But he argued that this only applied to one whose guilt was doubtful, and that Frederick's guilt had been open and palpable. However this may have been, something of far greater importance than a legal or personal question was at issue. For Frederick there was little sympathy in Germany ; but there was a strong feeling that it would not do to allow a Protestant country to fall into Catholic hands, both for its own saka and for the sake of its Protestant neighbours. r62i. Hie War in the Upper Palatinate. 4 J Section II. — The War in the Upper Palatinate. If Frederick could only have made it clear that he had really renounced all his pretensions to meddle with other people's lands he might possibly have ended i F ^^ his days peaceably at Heidelberg. But he rick does not . , . i-i r ■ • i • give up hope. could not give up his hopes of regaining his lost kingdom. One day he talked of peace; another day he talked of war. When he was most peaceably in- clined he would give up his claim if he could have an amnesty for the past. But he would not first give up his claim and then ask for an amnesty. Even to this he had been driven half un- , _ jS 2. Part taken willingly by his father-in-law. The King by James of of England charged himself with the office ng an of a mediator, and fancied that it was unnecessary to arm in the meantime. The states of the Union were in great perplexity. The Landgrave of Hesse Cassel was compelled by his own subjects to come to terms with Spinola. „ . . I 3- Dissolu- The cities of Strasburg, Ulm, and Nurem- t'ionofthe berg were the next to give way. On April 12 a treaty was signed at Mentz, by which the Union dissolved itself, and engaged to withdraw its troops from the Palatinate. On the other hand, Spinola promised to suspend hostilities till May 14. The danger to which the Palatinate was exposed, and the hints let drop that the conquest of the Palatinate might be followed by the transference of the . - , , ?, 4- Chances electorate, caused alarm m quarters by no in Frederick's means favourable to Frederick. John George began to raise objections, and even the Catholic eccle* siastics were frightened at the prospects of the enlarge ment of the war, and at the risk of seeing many pow°*"} 4-8 Imperialist Victories in the Palatinate. 1621. hitherto neutral, taking the part of the proscribed Elec tor. The claim kept up by Frederick to Bohemia was something more than a claim to an empty title. He had appointed Mansfeld to act there as his gene- Z 5. He still rr & holds places in ral ; and, though Mansfeld had lost one post after another, at the end of April he still held Tabor and Wittingau in Frederick's name. The appointment of Mansfeld was unfortunately in it- self fatal to the chances of peace. Ever since the capture of Pilsen, his troops, destitute of support, had been the terror of the country they were called upon 1 6 Mans- J ' r fold's army. to defend. In those days, indeed, the most disciplined army was often guilty of excesses from which in our days the most depraved outcasts would shrink. The soldiers, engaged merely for as long a time as they happened to be wanted, passed from side to side as the prospect of pay or booty allured them. No tie of nationality bound the mercenary to the stan- dard under which accident had placed him. He had sold himself to his hirer for the time being, and he sought his recompense in the gratification of every evil passion of which human nature in its deepest degradation is capable. Yet, even in this terrible war, there was a difference between one army and another. In an enemy's country all plundered alike. Tilly's Bavarians had g 7. Soldiers . of the Thirty been guilty of horrible excesses in Bohemia. But a commander like Tilly, who could pay his soldiers, and could inspire them with confidence in his generalship, had it in his power to preserve some sort of discipline ; and if, as Tilly once told a complain- ing official, his men were not nuns, they were at all events able to refrain on occasion from outrageous vil- i O2 1. The War in the Upper Palatinate. 49 (any. A commander like Mansfeld, who could not pay his soldiers, must, of necessity, plunder wherever he was. His movements would not be governed by mili- tary or political reasons. As soon as his men had eaten up one part of the country they must go to another, if they were not to die of starvation. They obeyed, like the elements, a law of their own, quite independent of the wishes or needs of the sovereign whose interests they were supposed to serve. Before the end of May the breaking up of the army of the Union sent fresh swarms of recruits to Mansfeld's camp. He was soon at the head of a force . r {S 8. Mans- of 16,000 men in the Upper Palatinate. The feid takes the inhabitants suffered terribly, but he was strong enough to maintain his position for a time. Nor was he content with standing on the defensive. He seized a post within the frontiers of Bohemia, and threat- ened to harry the lands of the Bishop of Bamberg and Wurzburg if he did not withdraw his troops from the army of the League. He then fell upon Leuchtenberg, and carried off the Landgrave a prisoner to his camp. The first attack of the Bavarians failed entirely. Bethlen Gabor, too, was again moving in Hungary, had slain Bucquoi, and was driving the Empe- „ . . 2 9- A truce ror's army before him. Under these cir- impossible cumstances, even Ferdinand seems to have hesitated, and to have doubted whether he had not bet- ter accept the English offer of mediation. Yet such was the character of Mansfeld's army that it made mediation impossible. It must attack somebody in order to exist. Yet it was in the Lower, not in the Upper, Palatinate that the first blow was struck. Sir Horace Vere, who had gone out the year before, with a rejri- ? «>■ Vere '■ *•',.., . the Lower ment ot English volunteers, was now in Palatinate. 50 Imperialist Victories in the Palatinate. 1621. command for Frederick. But Frederick had neithei money nor provisions to give him, and the sup- plies of the Palatinate were almost exhausted. The existing truce had been prolonged by the Spaniards. But the lands of the Bishop of Spires lay temptingly near. Salving his conscience by issuing the strictest orders against pillage, he quartered some of his men upon them. The whole Catholic party was roused to indignation. 1 11. War re- Cordova, left in command of the Spanish in'the Lower troops after Spinola's return to Brussels, de- Palatmate. clared the truce to have been broken, and commenced operations against Vere. By this time Mansfeld's power of defending the Upper Palatinate was at an end. The magistrates of the towns were sick of his presence, and pre- 2 12. Mans- . . , . ... feld driven ferred coming to terms with Maximilian to U ppcr submitting any longer to the extortions of Palatinate. their master's army. Mansfeld, seeing how matters stood, offered to sell himself and his troops to the Emperor. But he had no real intention of carrying out the bargain. On October 10 he signed an engage- ment to disband his forces. Before the next sun arose he had slipped away, and was in full march for Heidelberg. Tilly followed hard upon his heels. But Mans- feld did not stop to fight him. Throwing himself upon Alsace, he seized upon Hagenau, and converted it into a place of strength. Section III. — Frederick's Allies. The winter was coming on, and there would be time for negotiations before another blow was struck. But to I 1. Proposal give negotiations a chance it was necessary feld into Eng- th at Mansfeld's army should be fed, in order giish pay. t h at h e might be able to keep quiet while the diplomatists were disputing. James, therefore, wise- 1 6 2 2 . Frederick ' s A Hies. 5 1 ly proposed to provide a sum of money for this purpose But a quarrel with the House of Commons hurried on a dissolution, and he was unable to raise money sufficient for the purpose without a grant from Parliament. James, poor and helpless, was thus compelled to fall back upon the friendship of Spain, a friendship which he hoped to knit more closely by a marriage to b e equally united in the Em- pire. Rebellion would then be the only punishable crime ; loyalty, and especially the loyalty of his own of- ficers, the only virtue to be rewarded. Another question between the two powers reached almost as deeply. The League demanded that Wallen- j! 3. Comes stein should support his army upon supplies triththe' 51 taken from the Protestants alone. Wallen- >^ague. stein asserted his right, as the Emperor'* r62G. Fresh Successes of Wallenstein. 99 general, to quarter his men where he would, and to levy contributions for their maintenance even on the terri- tories of the League. For the first time for many a long year, a friendly voice had been heard urging the Emperor in the only wise direction. Ferdinand, turning aside from the \ 4. Walien- ,- r iv t t- stein could promotion of a sectional policy, was, 11 he not found would listen to Wallenstein, to place the unity umt y- of the Empire above the interests of the princes, by rest- ing it on the basis of religious equality. Unhappily that advice was tendered to him by a man who could not offer him security for the realization of so wise a policy. To stand above parties it is necessary to obtain the con- fidence of a nation, and how could men have confidence in Wallenstein ? Durable institutions may be guarded by the sword. They cannot be founded by the sword. All that was known of Wallenstein in Germany was that he was master of an army more numerous and more oppres- sive than that of Tilly. German unity, coming in the shape of boundless contributions and extortions, and en« forced by the example of starving peasants and burning villages, was not likely to prove very attractive. It is strange that the better part of Wallenstein's pro- gramme did not repel Ferdinand at once. But Ferdi- nand never made up his mind in a hurry \ 5. Wallen- when there were difficulties on both sides, ference'with and he was accustomed to defer to the opi- Eggenberg. nion of his chief minister, Eggenberg. In November Wallenstein held a conference with that minister. He unfolded all his scheme. He would increase his army, if it were necessary, to 70,000 men. With such a force he would be able to avoid a pitched battle, always dan- gerous to troops not thoroughly inured to campaigning. By the occupation of superior strategical points, he would I oo Stralsund and Roche lie. 1 6 2 7. be able to out-manoeuvre the enemy. And then Fer- dinand would be master in Germany. The whole of the Empire would be brought under contribution. There would be submission at home, and abroad no power would be strong enough to lay a finger upon the re-esta- blished Empire. Eggenberg was easily persuaded, and when Eggenberg was won, Ferdinand was won. In January, Wallenstein was created Duke of Friedland, a higher 1627. I 6. Ferdi- title than that of Prince of Friedland, which ports Wal- ne already bore, in token of the Emperor's lenstein. approbation. If only Wallenstein could have shown Ferdinand the way to win the hearts of Germans as readily as he showed him the way to over- power their resistance, the history of Germany and of Europe would have been changed. The resistance of the Protestants to the institutions of the Empire had hitherto failed. They had been weak because there had been something revolu- j? 7. Prepon- , derance of tionary in all their proceedings. And now those institutions, which up to this time had been working harmoniously, were giving signs of break- ing-up. There was a little rift in them which might any day become wider. " Is the Emperor," asked Wallen- stein, " to be a mere image which is never to move?" "It is not only the Empire," answered the representa- tives of the League, " which is bound to the Emperor. The Emperor is also bound to the Empire." There was nothing to reconcile the opposing theories. The Em- peror who claimed to be something had been the tool of a few bishops; he would be, if Wallenstein had his way, the tool of a successful general. The Empire, in the mouth of the representatives of the League, meant riot the populations of Germany, not even the true inter- 1627. Fresh Successes of Wallenstein. 101 est of the princes, but simply the interest of the bishops and their Church. The time had not yet come for an open quarrel. The enemy, though weakened, was still powerful. Charles I., by dint of a forced loan, which campaign of every Englishman except himself and his * 7 ' courtiers declared to be in violation of all constitutional precedents, contrived to get some money into his exche- quer, and Sir Charles Morgan was sent over to the King of Denmark's aid with an army nominally of 6,000 men, but which in reality never reached two-thirds of that number. Thurn, the old hero of the revolution at Prague, and the Margrave of Baden-Durlach, brought their ex- perience, such as it was, to Christian's aid, and a younger brother of John Ernest's, soon to be known to fame as Bernhard of Weimar, was also to be found fighting under his banners. Strong towns — Wolfenbiittel, Nordheim, and Nienburg — -still held out on his side, and peasants and citizens were eager to free the land from the oppres- sions of the soldiery and the yoke of the priests. Once more the Protestants of the north looked anx- iously to the east. But Bethlen Gabor did not stir. Without Turkish help he could do nothing, . _ , . {S9. Submis- and the Turks, involved in a war with Per- sionofBeth- sia, resolved to negotiate a peace with the Emperor. When peace was agreed upon in September Bethlen Gabor was powerless. Wallenstein's hands were freed as soon as these nego- tiations were opened. John Ernest of Weimar had died the year before, but his lieutenants were still , „, , # 10. Wal- in possession of Silesia. In May, Wallen- lenstein in stein sent Duke George of Liineburg to cut off their retreat. In July, he was in Silesia himself. His men were three to one of the enemy. Place after plac© to2 Stralswid and Rochelk. 1627. surrendered. Only once did lie meet with an attempt at resistance in the open field. Before the end of August the whole of Silesia was in his hands. Fifty-five standards were sent in triumph to Vienna. The Silesian towns were set to ransom, and the money of the citi- zens went to swell the military chest of the Emperor's general. When Silesia was lost Christian sought to avert de- struction by offering terms of peace. But the two generals would accept nothing less than the surrender of Holstein, and to that Christian refused to accede. Wallenstein „ , and Tilly joined their forces to drive him g ii. Combat J J of HeiHgen- northwards before them. By this move- ment the Margrave of Baden was cut off from the rest of the Danish army. Making his way to the coast near Wismar, he had long to wait before trans- ports arrived to carry him across the sea to join the King of Denmark. Scarcely had he landed at Heiligenhafen when a large body of imperialist troops arrived, and at once commenced the attack. He himself and a few of his principal officers escaped on ship-board. His men, seeing themselves deserted, took service under Wallen- stein, and seven of the best regiments in the Danish army were lost to Christian. Tilly found occupation for his men in the seige of the strong places in Lower Saxony. Wallenstein quest of"" undertook to follow up the King of Den- Schleswig mark. Before the end of the year all and Jutland. » Schleswig and Jutland, with the exception of two or three fortified towns, were in Wallenstein's hands. A few sieges, and all, it seemed, would be over. Wal- lenstein had begun to cherish the wildest plans. Whes 1627. Resistance to Wallenstein. 103 resistance had been put down in Germany, 1 iii 1 • 1 r i 1 1 r $ lr *- Wailen- ne would place himself at the head of stein's 100,000 men and drive the Turks out of sc emes ' Constantinople. Such dreams, however, were to remain dreams. If Denmark had been beaten down, Tilly was still there, and Tilly represented forces with which the new military Empire was certain sooner or later to be brought into collision. Section II. — Resistance to Wallenstein in the Empire. In October, the electors in person, or by deputy, met at Miihlhausen to take into consideration the condition of the Empire. The Ecclesiastical electors „ „,, ■ g I. The urged that the engagement given in 1620 to Assembly of the Protestant administrators was no longer valid. They had been told that they would not be dis- possessed by force if they acted as loyal subjects. But they had not been loyal subjects. They had joined the King of Denmark in a war in which, with the aid of foreign powers, he had attempted to dismember the Em- pire. It was now time for justice to prevail, and for the Church, so far as the Peace of Augsburg allowed, to come by its own. To this reasoning the new Elector of Bava- ria gave the whole weight of his authority, and even the two Protestant electors did not venture to meet the argu- ment by an open denial. The circle of Lower Saxony had entered upon the war against the advice of John George, and he held that the administrators were only reaping the consequences of neglecting his counsel. The Catholic electors felt themselves within reach of the settlement which they had long proclaimed as the object of their desires. They then pro- . _ ? 2. The ceeded to kick away the ladder by which Catholic they had climbed so high. It is not dero- complain of gating from the merits of Tilly and his vete- Wallenstein - 1 104 Stralsund and Roche lie. 1627. rans to say that without Wallenstein they would have been unable to cope with the forces opposed to them. Wallenstein's army had driven Mansfeld back, had hemmed in Bethlen Gabor, had recovered Silesia, had contributed to the victory of Lutter. And yet that army threatened to establish itself upon the ruins of the au- thority of the princes and electors, and to set up a mili- tary despotism of the most intolerable kind. Every- where Wallenstein's recruiting officers were beating their drums. Quiet episcopal cities in the south of Germany, which hoped to have seen the last of their troubles when Mansfeld vanished westward out of Alsace in 1622, found themselves suddenly selected as a trysting-place for some new regiment. Rough men poured in from every direction to be armed, clothed, lodged, and fed at their expense. The alarming doctrine that the army was to support itself, that men were to be raised for the purpose not of fighting the enemy, but of pressing contributions out of friends caused universal consternation. Wallen- stein's officers, too, had been heard to talk with military frankness about pulling down princes and electors, and making a real sovereign of the Emperor. The voice of complaint swelled loudly. But those who raised it did not see that their own policy was at fault; that but for their refusal to yield on 3 3. Yet they cannot do the question of the bishoprics, there would wit ou im. nave been no need for Wallenstein's army at all. What they were doing required the aid of over- powering military force, and they were startled when he who wielded the sword insisted on being their master. For the present, therefore, the electors did not venture on anything more than a gentle remonstrance with Wal- lenstein, and a petition to the Emperor to remove the abuses which, as they well knew, were radically con- nected with the new system. 1 62S. Resistance to Wallenstein. 105 The dislike of the rule of the sword which was felt amongst those for whom that sword had been drawn was sure to be felt far more strongly in the Pro- testant cities of North Germany. Up to ?4. The , TT „ . , ^, . 1 commercial Wallenstein s appearance the commercial towns of the oligarchies by which those cities were go- north- verned, had shown themselves at the best but lukewarm in the Protestant cause. The towns of the south had been the first to desert the Union. The towns of the north had been dragged half against their will into the Danish war. To them the imperial sway was connected by a tradition of centuries with support against the en- croachments of the princes. But they had no traditions in favour of an army living at free quarters amongst them, of bullying colonels and hectoring soldiers. Mag- deburg braved all the terrors of Wallenstein's anger rather than admit a single company within its walls. Hamburg declared itself ready to submit to the Emperor's authority, but closed its gates against his army. And though Magdeburg might be besieged when there was leisure, Hamburg and the other maritime towns were less easily to be gained. All-powerful on land, Wallenstein's authority ended at low-water mark. The King of Den- mark had fled to his islands. The King of Sweden was master of the Baltic. If it was doubtful whether they could set an army in battle array in Germany, at least they could throw provisions and munitions of war into a besieged seaport town. If the Empire was to be secured, these sea- ports must be brought under the Emperor's authority. Here, therefore, in the midst of the danger Wallenstein determined to plant himself g s Wallen- firmly, with the instinctive conviction that the stein in p? s " ' session ot post of danger is the post of power. The the Duchy of Mecklen* two Dukes of Mecklenburg had steadily sup- burg. io6 Stralsund and Rochelle. 1628 ported the King of Denmark in his struggle against the Em- peror. In 1627, when most of the other states ceased to pay any contributions towards the war, they had continued to fulfil their engagements, and though they now pro- fessed their readiness to make their submission, it was Wallenstein's interest to make the most of their treason, and the least of their repentance. In February, 1628, the Emperor, using the rights which he had claimed in the case of the Elector Palatine, declared them to have forfeited their lands and dignities, and placed the Duchies in Wallenstein's hands as a pledge for the payment of military expenses which still remained to be liquidated. It was significant of the change of feeling in Germany that the ecclesiastical electors, who had seen nothing amiss in the deprivation of Frederick, had not a good word to say for this concession to Wallenstein. In Mecklenburg the imperial general had gained a footing on the Baltic coast. But more than that was needed if he was to be safe from attack. All $ ft. Negotia- . . tion with the through the winter negotiations had been Hanse Towns. . >j. »l ti f *.-l gomg on with the Hanse Towns, the man- time cities of the old commercial league, which had once taken up a dominant position in the north, and which, though shorn of its ancient glory, was still worth courting by a power which aspired to rule in Germany. Reasons were not wanting to induce the Hanse Towns to accept the Emperor's offers. There was something very tempting in the notion of having the I 7. Wallen- y , , . . . . , ,, , , stein's offers power of the imperial armies to tail back tempting. U p n in their conflicts with foreign states. Hamburg especially had been the object of the jealousy of these states, as the mart from whence the western nations supplied themselves with the materials used in ship-building. The King of Denmark had built Gliick- 1628. Resistance to Wallenstein. 107 stadt, lower down the Elbe, in the hope of intercepting so lucrative a trade. The King of England had block- aded the river, and carried off Hamburg vessels which he suspected of being freighted with timber and hemp for the use of his enemies in Spain. From the growth of a national authority in Germany, therefore, the Hanse Towns would have had . . § 8. But they everything to gain. But Ferdinand was are repelled not, could not be really national. What he understand had to offer was a special agreement with hls plan- Spain, which would have given them the monopoly of the trade between Germany and the Spanish dominions. Such a trade could only be supported by war. It was a privilege which would bring with it a deadly conflict with England and Holland, perhaps with Denmark and Sweden as well. And the prospect was none the more alluring because Wallenstein was to play the principal part in the design. The general of the imperial forces was appointed Admiral of the Baltic, and the Hanse Towns were expected to find him a fleet. What a prospect for a body of calculating traders. The Spanish monopoly, under such circumstances, was hardly to be recommended as a prudent in- vestment. The Emperor's overtures were decline to politely declined. Wallenstein, when he acce P thls r * ' proposal. heard of their answer, rated them soundly. He had means, he said, to shut up their trade by land, and to seize goods which they might import either from England or the Netherlands. He would deal with them, in short, as Napoleon was to deal with them two centu- ries later. Wallenstein's thoughts, however, were more imme- diately directed to the towns on the Baltic. He had 1 08 Stralsund and Rochelle. 1627. I *?■ Walien- Ion? been alarmed at the danger whicn Jtein and the ° . ° Baltic towns. threatened him from Sweden. In Novem- ber, 1627, he had entered into negotiations with an adventurer who offered to set fire to the ships in the Swedish harbours. But as the project had broken down there was nothing for it but to gain posses- sion of the port towns on the Baltic coast, and to bar them against the enemy. For no man could expect that Gustavus would look on quietly, whilst a great military power was forming on the southern coast of the Baltic. Wismar was soon in Wallenstein's hands. The har- bour of Rostock was blocked up by a line of sunken ships. Though Boguslav, the Duke of Pomerania, pro- mised to keep his long line of coast safe from attack, he 1 11. Growth was compelled to admit a strong imperialist o is power. f orce w ithin his territory. Everything seemed to be succeeding as Wallenstein wished. Section III. — The Siege of Stralsund. One town alone held out. Stralsund was not a free city of the Empire. But though it was nominally depen- „ , dent on the Duke of Pomerania it was prac- { 1. Stral- . . K »und holds tically its own mistress. The citizens had no wish to put themselves forward in oppo- sition to the Emperor, far less to assist a foreign power to gain a footing in Germany. But they would never admit a garrison of such troops as Wallenstein's within their walls. Wallenstein would have all or nothing. He ordered his commander in those parts, the Lutheran Arnim, to enforce submission. " I will never," he orders die wrote, " allow them to keep anything back siege to be from me, lest others should be encouraged commenced. ° to do the like." Arnim, already master of Rugen, seized Danholm, a smaller island commanding '628. The Siege of Stralsitnd. 109 *«e mouth of the harbour. In February hostilities were commenced. In March the citizens attacked the impe- rialists in Danholm, and drove them out of the island. It was Wallenstein's first check, and desperately did he struggle to wipe out the disgrace. Every day the spirit of the citizens was rising. There were „ 1 . ? 3- Wallen- old soldiers there, fugitives from the Danish stein's first war, and peasants who had fled from their desolated homes, and who had terrible tales to tell of the wretchedness which followed in the track of Wal- lenstein's soldiers. In April, all within the town bound themselves by a solemn oath to defend their religion and their liberty to the last drop of their blood, and to admit no garrison within their walls. In the midst of their resistance they still kept up some recollection of their nationality, so far as any tie of nationality could still be said to exist. The name of the Emperor was care- fully avoided, but they professed attachment to the Em- pire and its laws. Practically, however, the shape in which the Empire presented itself to them was that of Wallenstein's army, and if they were to resist that army, the ? 4- Succour Stralsunders must, whether they liked it or from Denmark 1 vi. ,i i and Sweden. not, make common cause with those who were hostile to the Empire. In May a Danish embassy appeared amongst them, and the King of Sweden sent a present of gunpowder. When the siege was formally opened, these overtures were followed by a succour of armed men. Sweden and Denmark were working to- gether to break up the new military Empire, and their forlorn hope was thrown into Stralsund. Wallenstein saw that the case was serious, and came in person to the help of his lieutenant. According to a doubtful story, he exclaimed, 'I will have no Stralsttnd and RotJi elle. 1 6 2 8 . J 5. Wallen- Stralsund, even if it be fastened by chains stein aoandons . ' the siege. to heaven.' It is certain that when a depu- tation from the citizens pleaded with him that he would abandon his demand that they should admit a garrison within their walls, he drew his hand along the surface of a table before him, and answered sternly, 'Your town shall be made as flat as this.' But the problem of over- coming the resistance of a fortress open to unlimited suc- cours by sea is one of the most difficult in the whole art of war. Still, however, there were fearful odds in favour of the besiegers. Without the walls Wallenstein had no enemy to fear. He was himself Duke of Mecklenburg. With the Elector of Brandenburg and the Duke of Po* merania he was on friendly terms, and he had received the support of the latter in his attempts upon the town. Within the walls there was no certainty of ultimate suc- cess. Those who had anything to lose placed their property on shipboard. Many sent their wives and daughters to seek a safe refuge in Sweden. But what- ever doubts might arise the defenders of the town fought sturdily on. Week after week passed away, and Stral- sund was still untaken. Wallenstein lowered his terms. He ceased to demand entrance for a garrison of his own men. It would be enough, he now said, if the citizens would entrust their walls to troops of their own ruler, the Duke of Pomerania, and would in this manner tear them- selves away from the connexion with foreign powers hos- tile to the Emperor. And to this offer the governing council of the town was ready to assent. But the gene- ral body of the citizens rejected it utterly. They delibe- rately preferred the alliance of the two foreign kings to submission, however indirect, to the Emperor's authority. Before this resolution, Wallenstein, with all his armies, was powerless. On August 3 he raised the siege. £6zS. The Siege of Rochellc. m Wallenstein's failure was an event of incalculable im- portance in the history of Germany. It was much that one, and that not one of the first, towns of ' {> o. Lnarac- the Empire should have beaten back the terofthe tide of conquest. But it was more that the resistance should have been attempted in a case which sooner or later would be the cause of the great majority of Germans. Ferdinand had floated to power because he personified order as opposed to anarchy. The Stral- sunders fought for the Protestant religion and freedom from the presence of a garrison. Ferdinand's order meant the rule of the priest, and the rule of the soldiers. Slowly and unwillingly the citizens of Stralsund declared for the presence of foreigners as better than such order as this. Section IV. — The Siege of Rochelle. The tide was on the turn in Germany. But the tide was not on the turn in France. There, too, a maritime city, greater and wealthier than Stralsund, „ 3 & ' § i. Stral- and supported by fleets and armies from sund and beyond the sea, was defending the cause of Protestantism against the central government. Mainly because in France the central government represented something more than' the rule of the priest and the soldier, the resistance which was successful in Germany- was overpowered in France. During the year 1625 the coolness between England and France had been on the increase. The persecution of the English Catholics by Charles, in con- travention of his promises, had greatly ex- ? 1. Englana asperated Lewis, and the seizure by the an rance - English cruisers of numerous French vessels charged with carrying on a contraband traffic with the Spanish t i * Stralsund and Rochelle. 1626. Netherlands had not contributed to calm his indignation, Charles, on the other hand, regarded himself as the natural protector of the French Protestants, and made demands in their favour which only served to make Lewis more resolved to refuse every concession. Richelieu had therefore a hard part to play. He knew perfectly well that the government had violated its en- l Riche- gagements with the Huguenots, especially in lieu would keeping up the fortifications of Fort Louis, a have made . ,. peace with work commanding the entrance to the har- ness if'he 6 " hour of Rochelle, which it had long ago could. promised to pull down. If Richelieu had had his way he would have pulled down the fort, and by generous concessions to the Huguenots would have car- ried them with him to the support of his foreign policy. But such a policy, in appearance so rash, in reality so wise, was not likely to be palatable to Lewis, and Riche- lieu had to steer his way between the danger of offending the king and the danger of lighting up still more vividly the flames of civil war. In the course of the winter all that could be done he did. Deputies of the Huguenot towns appeared to negotiate a peace, with the support of two English ambassadors. But they were instructed to demand the demolition of the fort, and to this the king steadily refused his consent. The priests and the friends of the priests were delighted at the prospect of another civil war. The 1626. assembled clergy commissioned one of their agreement number to offer to the king a considerable effected. sum f mone y f or the suppression of rebel- lion. The time was appointed for his audience, but Richelieu contrived to put it off for a few hours longer, and, by a representation of the dangers of the situation, induced the Huguenot deputies, with the support of the 1627. The Siege of Roehette. 113 English ambassadors, to be satisfied with a loose verbal promise from the king. When the clerical train swept into the royal presence it was too late. The king had already promised the Huguenot deputies that if they be- haved as good subjects he would do for them more than they could possibly expect. His ministers had already assured them that these words pointed to the demolition of the fort. If a peace thus made was to be enduring, it would be necessary to keep up for a long time the appearance of its being a submission and not a peace. . & * ? 5. Inter- Unhappily, the intervention of the King of vention of England was not likely to help to keep up appearances. He urged Lewis to engage in the war in Germany in the exact way and to the exact extent that suited the English government, and he put himself osten- tatiously forward as the protector of the Huguenots. Such conduct awoke once more the susceptibilities of Lewis. It was bad enough to be bearded by his own subjects. But it was worse to be bearded ^ Lewis by'a foreign sovereign. A group of Hugue- indl s nant - not communities in the south of France supported in practical independence by England would be as insup- portable to him as the resistance of the Hanse Towns was two years later to Wallenstein. Fort Louis, therefore, was not demolished. A peace was patched up between France and Spain. Charles grew more and more angry with Lewis for 1627. deserting the common cause. Fresh seiz- ? 7. War ures of French ships by English cruisers France and came to exasperate the quarrel, and in the En & land - early months of 1627 war existed between the two na- tions, in reality if not in name. In July a great English fleet, with a land army on board, appeared off Rochelle, r 1 4 Stralsund and Rochells. 1627. under the command of Charles' favourite, Buckingham. A landing was effected on the Isle of Rhe, and siege was laid to the principal fort of the island. At last the gar- rison was almost starved out, and the commander offered to come the next morning into the English quarters to treat for terms of surrender. That night a stiff easterly breeze sprung up, and a French flotilla, heavily laden with provisions, put off from the main land. Some of the boats were taken, but most of them made their way safely through the English guardships, and delivered their precious store under the guns of the fort. Buck- ingham lingered for some weeks longer. Every day the besiegers swept the horizon in vain with theii glasses, looking for succour from England. But Charles, vithout parliamentary support, was too poor to send off skv.-tm.-s hurriedly, and when they were at last ready a long con- tinuance of westerly winds prevented them from leaviug the Channel. Before they could put to sea, a French force was landed on the island, and Buckingham, to save himself from defeat, was forced to break up the siege and to return home discomfited. Richelieu and the king were now thoroughly of one mind. The French city which could enter into an under- l s Siese of standing with the foreigner must be reduced Kochelle. to submission. An army of thirty thousand men gathered round the walls, and on the land side the town was as hopelessly blocked up as Stralsund. The only question was whether it would be possible to cut off the entrance of English supplies by sea. By the end of November a commencement was made of the mole which was to shut off Rochelle from all external help. Piles were driven in with stones between them. Heavily laden vessels were scuttled and sunk. Richelieu himself di- rected the operations, this time with the full support of 1628. The Siege of Rochelle. 115 the clergy, who poured their money lavishly into the royal treasury. In May, 1628, the work, in spite of the storms of winter, was almost completed. An English fleet, which came up to the succour of the town, retired without accomplishing anything. Inside the town distress was rapidly growing unendur- able. The mayor, Jean Guiton, was still the soul of the resistance. But he had to struggle against g 9 . in- an increasing number who counselled sur- spondencyln render. He did not venture to appear in the town - the streets without a pistol in his hand and half-a-dozen stout guardians around him, The only hope for Rochelle lay in the great armament which was known to be prepared in England, and which was to be conducted by Buckingham in g 10. Failure t'i. tt c f -L j of the English person. The House of Commons had pur- atte mptto chased the Petition of Right with large sub- succourit - sidies, and Charles, for the first time in his reign, was enabled to make an effort worthy of his dignity. But the -popular hatred found a representative in the mur- derer Felton, and a knife struck home to the favourite's heart put an end to his projects for ever. The dissatis- faction which arrayed the English people against its government had found its way into the naval service. When the fleet arrived in September, under a new com- mander, all was disorganization and confusion. It returned to England without accomplishing a single object for which it had been sent forth. The surrender of Rochelle followed as a matter of necessity. On November 1 the king entered . the conquered town in triumph. The inde- render of pendence of French cities was at an end. The different success of the two great sieges of the year may partly be accounted for by the difference ol 1 1 6 Siralsund and Roche lie. 1 6 2 3. vigour in the powers to which the threatened towns looked for succour. Charles was very far from f> 12. Cause . . * of Richelieu's being a Christian IV., much less a Gus- tavus Adolphus; and if England at unity with itself was stronger than Sweden, England distracted by civil broils was weaker than Sweden. But there were more serious reasons than these for Richelieu's victory and Wallenstein's failure. Richelieu represented what Wallenstein did not — the authority of the state. His armies were under the control of discipline ; and, even if the taxation needed to support them pressed hardly upon the poor, the pressure of the hardest taxation was easy to be borne in comparison with a far lighter con- tribution exacted at random by a hungry and rapacious soldiery. If Richelieu had thus an advantage over Wallenstein, he had a still greater advantage over Fer- dinand and Maximilian. He had been able to isolate the Rochellese by making it clear to their fellow Huguenots in the rest of France that no question of religion was at stake. The Stralsunders fought with the knowledge that their cause was the cause of the whole of Protestant Germany. The Rochellese knew that their resistance had been tacitly repudiated by the whole of Protestant France. When Lewis appeared within the walls of Rochelle he cancelled the privileges of the town, ordered its walls _ ,. . to be pulled down and its churches to be i 13. Religious liberty of the given over to the Catholic worship. But under Richelieu's guidance he announced his resolution to assure the Protestants a continuance of the religious liberties granted by his father. No towns in France should be garrisoned by troops other than the king's. No authorities in France should give orders independently of the king. But wherever a religion 1628. Oppression of the Protestants. 117 which was not that of the king had succeeded in esta- blishing its power over men's minds no attempt should be made to effect a change by force. Armed with such a principle as this, France would soon be far stronger than her neighbours. If Catholic and Huguenot could come to regard one another as Frenchmen and nothing else, what chance had foreign powers of resisting her? She had already beaten back the attack of a divided England. Would she not soon acquire a preponder- ance over a divided Germany ? It is time for us now to ask what steps were being taken in Germany to meet or to increase the danger. CHAPTER VII. THE EDICT OF RESTITUTION. Section I. — Oppression of the Protestants. It was not at Stralsund only that Wallenstein learned that he could be successfully resisted. Stade had sur« rendered with its English garrison to Tilly in ° ' . 1628. April, but Gliickstadt still held out. In vain a 1. Siege of Wallenstein came in person to Tilly's aid. The Danish cruisers kept the sea open. Wallenstein was obliged to retire. In January, 1629, the works of the besiegers were destroyed by a sally of the garrison. Wallenstein, the great calculator, saw that peace with Denmark was necessary. The Swedes and the Danes were beginning to act together, and resist- ance to one nation, if there must be re- ^ 2 ' ¥he sistance, would be easier than resistance to Lub e e c £ f two. Much to his satisfaction he found Christian not unwilling to listen to the voice of hia charming. Just as the eagle eye of Gustavus descried n8 7 he Edict of Restitution. 1629. the first feeble beams of light on the horizon, the King of Denmark, weary of misfortune and vexed at the pros- pect of having to crave help from his old competitor of Sweden, laid down his arms. On May 22, 1629, a treaty of peace was signed at Lubeck. Christian received back the whole of his hereditary possessions. In return he resigned all claim to the bishoprics held by his family in the Empire, and engaged to meddle no further with the territorial arrangements of Lower Saxony. If the Peace of Lubeck was really to be a source of strength to Ferdinand it must be accompanied by some such measures as those with which Richelieu \ 3. Neces- sity of heal- was accompanying his victory at Rochelle. ing measures. Ti , , . , r It was not enough to have got rid of a foreign enemy. Some means must be found to allay the fears of the Germans themselves, which had found ex- pression in the resistance of Stralsund. That there was much to be done in this direction was openly acknowledged by almost all who had been con- ^ . cerned in the imperialist successes. Maxi- f 4. Opposite views as to milian and the League held that it was above what measures ,, ,,. . . ., are needed. all things necessary to restrain the excesses of Wallenstein and his soldiers. Wallenstein held that it was above all things necessary to restrain the excessive demands of Maximilian and the clergy. Ferdinand, the man in whose hands fortune had placed the decision of the great question, probably stood alone in thinking that it was possible to satisfy both the sol- diers and the priests without weakening his hold on the Empire. The first act of Ferdinand after the signature of the treaty was to invest Wallenstein formally with the Duchy of Mecklenburg. Offence was thus given to those who believed that the rights of territorial sovereignty had 1629. Opprex iio?i of tfie Protestants. 119 been unduly invaded, and who were jealous of the right claimed by the Emperor to supersede by his own au- thority a prince of the Empire in favour of a successful soldier. On the other side offence was given still more widely co those who wished to maintain the rights of Protestant- ism. Without wishing to enter upon a eene- . f 5 l 5. HI treai- ral persecution, Ferdinand was resolved to meat of the allow no rights against his church to those who could not conclusively prove to his own satisfaction that those rights were under the guarantee of unassaila- ble law. He had begun in his own hereditary dominions. It is true that in Bohemia and Austria no tortures were inflicted, no martyrs suffered either at the stake or on the scaffold. But it was found that the stern, relentless pres- sure of daily annoyance was sufficient for the purpose of producing at least external conformity. By 1627 the desired result had been obtained, and Protestantism existed only as A -proscribed religion. Then came the turn of the Palatinate. For a. time there had been no open persecution. In 1625 Maximilian had written to the governor of Heidelberg not to let any opportunity slip, if he could find an excuse for turning out a Pro- testant minister from his parish and replacing him by a Catholic priest, in February, 1628, the Jesuits were able to report that they had made 400 converts in Heidelberg itself, and 1,200 in the neighbouring country districts. Then came a further change. In March an agreement was drawn up between Maximilian and Ferdinand. The Emperor received back Upper Austria, and made over to the Elector of Bavaria, in its stead, the Upper Palati- nate and that part of the Lower Palatinate which lies on the right bank of the Rhine. Maximilian held that by this transfer he had acquired the full rights of a territo- K. lao 7ke Edict of Restitution. 1629. rial prince, and that amongst these rights tras mat of dis- posing of the religion of his new subjects. In June all noblemen residing in the country were told that they must either change their religion within two months or go into exile. In September the order was extended to the inhabitants generally. The year 1628 was a year of alarm over all Protestant , South Germany. There at least Ferdinand cities of South was ready to carry out the wishes expressed by the Catholic electors at Muhlhausen the year before. Whilst Maximilian was threatening th« Palr.tinate, imperial commissioners were passing through the other territories and cities, taking account of churches and church property which had come into Protestant possession dice the Convention of Passau. To the wishco of the populations not the slightest attention was paid. In Nordlingen, for instance, not a single Catholic was to be found. Every church in the place was none the less marked down for re-dclivery to the Catholic clergy. In some places to which the commissioners came, Shylock-like, to claim their pound of flesh, they demanded more even than the strict letter of the law allowed them,, Not content with restoring to the Catholic worship churches which had with general consent been in the hands of Protestants for half a century, they pro ceeded to compel the inhabitants of the towns to attend the mass. The success of these outrageous measures in the south encouraged Ferdinand to pursue the same course in the _ north. There he had to deal not merely i 7. The * Edict of with scattered towns, or a few abbeys, but with the great lay bishoprics, many of which were extensive enough to form the domain of a duke 01 a landgrave. On March 29, 1629, before the Peace of tbzg. French Intervention in Italy. \2\ Liibeck was actually signed, he issued the fatal Edict of Restitution. With a stroke of his pen, the two arch- bishoprics of Magdeburg and Bremen, the twelve bishop- rics of Minden, Verden, Halberstadt, Liibeck, Ratze- burg, Misnia, Merseburg, Naumburg, Brandenburg, Havelberg, Lebus, and Camin, with about a hundred and twenty smaller ecclesiastical foundations, were restored to the Catholic clergy. The wheel had come full circle round since the day when Christian of Anhalt had planned the great uprising to sweep away the Catholic bishops and the Hcuse oi Austria. The House of Austria was weakness of firmer in its seat than ever. The Catholic e mperc> bishops were triumphant. But in the midst of their triumph the enemies of the Empire were watching them keenly, and judging that both they and the Emperor were all the weaker for this grand vindication of legality. Section II. — French Intervention in Italy, In the north Gustavus had an eye not likely to be deceived for the joints of Ferdinand's harness. In the west Richelieu was preparing for the day g T Gustavus when he too might aid in the overthrow of the a - nd Rlclieheu - Colossus. It is true that his first thought was of Spain and not of Germany. But he could hardly be brought into collision with one branch of the House of Austria without having sooner or later to deal with the other. In Italy, the death of the Duke of Mantua and Mont- ferrat without near heirs had given rise to war. "Tie next heir was a very distant relation, the . m , ?. 2 - The Duke of Nevers, whose family had long Maimum been naturalized in France. To Spain the presence of a dependent of France so near her posses sions in the Milanese was in the highest decree undesi- 122 The Edict of Restitution. 1629. rable, and she called upon Ferdinand to sequester the territory till another way of disposing it could be found. If in Germany before Ferdinand's election the rights of the Emperors had been but a shadow, those which they possessed in the old kingdom of Italy were but the shadow of a shade. But whatever they were, Ferdinand was the man to put them forth, and whilst Richelieu was engaged at Rochellc, Spanish troops had overrun Man- tua, and in conjunction with the Duke of Savoy, ready now to seek his own interests by fighting for Spain, as in earlier days to seek his own interests by fighting against her, were besieging the Duke of Nevers in Casale, the only fortress which remained to him. This intervention of the Spaniards in the Emperor's name caused even greater indignation in Italy than their intervention in the Palatinate had caused in Germany. For in Germany the Emperor's name was in i 3. Italian . J \ feeling against 1 62 1 still connected with the ideas of law mperor. an( j order. In Italy it reminded men of nothing but foreign domination, a memory which was none the less vivid when the Emperor used his au- thority, whatever it might be, to support the real foreign domination of the immediate present, the Spanish domi- nation in Milan. The Italian princes took alarm. Venice and the pope summoned France to their aid, and in March, 1629, Richelieu, taking Lewis with him across the snowy passes of the Alps, reduced the Duke of Savoy to submission, and forced the Spaniards to raise the siege of Casale. Casale was the Stralsund of Italy. A power which g 4. Check had ventured to clothe itself in the attributes him by °" of a national authority , with even less reason Richelieu. t } ian ; n Germany, had found its limits. Richelieu had the general feeling on his side. 1629. French Intervention in Italy. 123 He did not venture to do more in Italy. The Duke of Rohan, the brother of that Soubise who had begun the war of Rochelle in 1625, had roused the , _, , ? S. The last Huguenots of Languedoc and the Cevennes Huguenot to* a fresh attempt at resistance, half Pro- testant, half aristocratic. As if the Rochellese had not sufficiently suffered for the mistake of calling in foreign aid, Rohan followed their example, and was foolish enough to ask for help from Spain. But the Spanish troops came not to his aid. Richelieu hurried back from Italy, made peace with England, and pitilessly crushed the rebellion in the south. Once more the victory was attended by the confirmation of the religious liberties of the Huguenots. They might worship as they pleased, but political independence they were not to have. The French monarchy was stronger for external en- terprise than ever. By crushing all resistance, it had no longer to fear occupation for its energies at home, and by its tolerance of religion it had of Fran^f* rendered itself capable of accepting the ser- vice of all its subjects, and it could offer its alliance to Protestant states without fear of suffering a rebuff. Richelieu was again able to turn his attention to Italy. In the summer of 1629 an imperialist force of 20,000 men descended from the Alps and laid siege „ ■ ? 7- Riche- to Mantua. Ferdinand, having established lieu and the peace in Germany, fancied that he could & Fuly. S take up again in Italy the work which had been too great for Barbarossa. Spinola came to his aid with an army of equal force, and recommenced the attack upon Casale. In the spring of 1630 Richelieu was once more in Italy. Cardinal as he was, he was placed in command of the army. But instead of marching against the Spaniards, he turned first upon the Duke of Savoy- 124 The Edict of Restitution. 1630. Seizing Pignerol and Saluces, he gained possession of the Alpine passes. Then, with Piedmont at his feet, he passed on to relieve Casale, and forced the Spanish be- siegers to retreat. But Richelieu was prudent as well as daring, and he left Mantua for the present in the hands of Spain and the Emperor. It was a hard thing to attack the united forces of Spain and the Empire face to face. It might be easier to 3 8 State of support their enemies abroad, and to favour Germany. dissensions at home. In the Netherlands, the Dutch, encouraged by the diversion of the Italian war, were at last taking the offensive, and entering upon that aggressive warfare which ended by bringing the whole of North Brabant under their authority. In the north, Gustavus had concluded a peace with Poland, and was making preparations for actual intervention in Ger- many. In all this Richelieu was deeply interested. An ambassador of Lewis was engaged in arranging with Gustavus the terms on which France should assist him in the attack upon the Empire which he already con- templated. Not that even Richelieu foresaw the possibility of the magnificent results which were to follow from that enter- , R . , prise. In 1630, as in 1624 and 1625, he would fieu's expec- have preferred that a Protestant power should not be too successful. He would rather conquer with Sweden than not at all. But he would rather conquer with the help of the League than with the help of Sweden. Gustavus might be pushed on to do his best. He would effect a diversion, and that would be enough. Section III. — Wallenstein deprived of his Command. The long expected breach between the League and the Emperor's general had come at last. Instead of re* 1630. Wallenstein deprived of Command. 125 ducing his forces after the Peace of Lubeck, 2 1 -. Strong position of Wallenstein had increased them. He was WaUeastein. now at the head of 100,000 men. From a military point of view no one could say it was too much. He had Mantua to defend, the coasts of the North Sea to watch, perhaps France to guard against, and that too with all the princes and peoples of Germany exasperated against him. Some efforts he made to curb the vio- lence of his soldiers. But to restrain the monster he had created was beyond his power. And if his soldiers bore hard upon burgher and peasant, he himself treated the princes with contemptuous scom. He asked why the electors and the other princes should not be treated as the Bohemian nobles had been treated. The Estates of the Empire had no more right to independence than the Estates of the kingdom. It was time for the Empe- ror to make himself master of Germany, as the kings of France and Spain were masters of their own dominions. All this made the electors above measure indignant. "A new domination," they told Ferdinand, "has arisen for the complete overthrow of the old and praiseworthy constitution of the Empire." A reconstruction of that old rotten edifice would have done no harm. But its overthrow bv military „ „„ violence was another matter. A new torra could he of government, to be exercised by a soldier with the help of soldiers, could never be found in justice, For always formidable was the league And partnership of free power and free will. The way of ancient ordinances, though it winds, Is yet no devious path. Straight forward goes The lightning's path, and straight the fearful path Of the cannon-ball. Direct it flies, and rapid, Shattering that it may reach, and shattering what it reaches. Schiller'^ PiccoXemitu, act i. scene 4. 126 The Edict of Restitution. 163a Even whilst he was defending the universality of op- pression on the principle that it was but fair that all estates should contribute to the common partiality. defence, he was exhibiting in his own case an extraordinary instance of partiality. Whilst all Germany was subjected to contributions and ex- actions, not a soldier was allowed to set foot on Wallen- stein's own duchy of Mecklenburg. And if the Catholic electors had good reason to com- plain of Wallenstein, Wallenstein had also good reason to complain of the electors. The process of Edict of carrying out the Edict of Restitution was Restitution . .. , f , . . ,.m, carried out. increasing the number of his enemies. The Emperor," he said, " needed recruits, not reforms." Ferdinand did not think so. He had per- suaded the chapter of Halberstadt to elect a younger son of his own as their bishop. He induced the chapter of Magdeburg to depose their administrator, on the ground that he had taken part in the Danish war. But, in spite of the Edict of Restitution, the chapter of Magde- burg refused to choose a Catholic bishop in his place, and preferred a son of the Elector of Saxony. John George was thereby brought by his family interests into collision with the Edict of Restitution. The city of Magdeburg had not been on good terms with the chapter. Wallenstein offered to support its re- ,.. , sistance with the help of a garrison. But the i 5. Magdc- , . . burg refuses city refused, and Wallenstein, in the face ol the growing opposition, did not venture to force it to accept his offer. Of the fact of the growing opposition no one could be doubtful. As to its causes there was much difference of I 6. Growing opinion. The priests ascribed it to the bar- WattaMeia. barities. of the soldiers. Wallenstein ascribed 1630. Wallenstein deprived of Command. 127 it to the violence of the priests, and especial!/ to the vigour with which they were attempting to reconvert the inhabitants of the archbishopric of Bremen, which they had recovered in virtue of the Edict of Restitution. On every side the priests and their schemes were in the way of Wallenstein's dazzling visions of a grand im- perialist restoration. The Pope, as an Italian , * , r j) 7. He talks prince, had sympathized with France. "It of attacking is a hundred years," said Wallenstein, " since Rome has been plundered, and it is richer now than ever." On July 3, 1630, Ferdinand assembled round him the princes and electors at Ratisbon, in the hope of inducirg them to elect his son, the King of Hungary, as King of the Romans, and therefore as his \# Ration/ successor in the Empire. But to this project the electors refused even to listen. All who attended the assembly came with their minds full of the excesses of Wallenstein's soldiery. The commissioners of that very Duke of Pomerania who had served the imperial cause so well in the siege of Stralsund, had a tale of dis- tress to pour out before the princes. His master's sub- jects, he said, had been driven to feed upon grass and the leaves of trees. Cases had occurred in which starv- ing wretches had maintained life by devouring human flesh. A woman had even been known to feed upon her own child. Other tales were told, bad enough, if not quite so bad as this, and the misery of the populations \ 9 . The gave support to the political grievances of J waHenstein their rulers. Ferdinand was plainly told dem * nded - that the electors did not mean to be subjected to mili- tary despotism. He must choose between them and Wallenstein. 128 The Edict of Restitution. 1630. Behind the Catholic Electors was Richelieu himself. Together with the recognized French ambassadors, the _. , Capuchin Father Joseph, Richelieu's trusted i 10. Richc- r 1 1 J fieu'sin- confidant, had come to Ratisbon, encoura- ging the opposition to Wallenstein, and urg- ing the electors to demand the neutrality of the Empire, if a war broke out between France and Spain. Unhappily for Germany, the policy of the electors was purely conservative. There was nothing constructive even in Maximilian, the greatest of them p it. Policy 6f the all. The old loose relationship between the princes and the Emperor was to be restored whether it was adequate to the emergency or not. At the very moment when he had every need of conciliating opposition, he and his brother electors were refusing the petition of the deputies of the Duke of Pomcrania that their masters might be allowed to keep possession of the bishopric of Camin. 1 12. Landing At the moment when the offence was of Gustavus. given, it was known at Ratisbon that Gus- tavus Adolphus had landed on the coast of Pomerania. Five years before Gustavus had refused to stir against the Emperor without the aid of a powerful coalition. He _ now ventured to throw himself alone into ( 13. Gus- tavus comes the midst of Germany. He had no certainty without allies. r r* » ■ j r™ t- , , even of French aid. The French ambassa- dor had offered him money, but had accompanied the offer by conditions. Gustavus thrust aside both the money and the conditions. If he went at all, he would go on his own terms. He knew well enough that the task before him, appa- rently far harder than in 1625, was in reality far easier. He saw that between the ecclesiastical Elec- bopofulncss. tors on the one hand, and Wallenstein on #630. Wallenstein deprived of Command. 129 the other, the Protestant princes must cling to him for safety. To one who suggested that even if he were vic- torious the princes would seek to profit by his victory, he answered, with the assurance of genius, ' If I am victo- rious, they will be my prey.' Events were working for him at Ratisbon. Before the persistent demand of the electors for Wallenstein's dis- missal Ferdinand was powerless. Even ■ _. 1 § 15. Dis- Wallenstein would not have been strong missal of enough to contend against the League, backed by France, with a whole Protestant north burst- ing into insurrection in his rear. But, in truth, neither Ferdinand nor Wallenstein thought of resistance. The general, strong as his position was, at the head of the mos\ numerous and well-appointed army in Europe, retired into private life without a murmur. He may, perh tps, have calculated that it would not be long be- fore he would be again needed. That Ferdinand felt the blow keenly it is impossible to doubt. He thought much of the main- ,,_,,. . $ l6 - Ferdi- tenance of the imperial dignity, and the up- nand's rising of the electors was in some sort an posi '" uprising against himself. But the system which had fallen was the system of Wallenstein rather than his own. He had sanctioned the contributions and exactions, feebly hoping that they were not so bad as they seemed, or that if anything was wrong a little more energy on Wallen- stein's part would set things straight. As to Wallen- stein's idea of a revolutionary empire founded on the ruins of the princes, Ferdinand would have been the first to regard it with horror. His policy was in the main far more in accordance with that of Maximilian than with that of Wallenstein. Wallenstein's dismissal was not the only sacrifice to 130 The Edict of Restitution. 1630. I 17. Conces- which Ferdinand was obliged to consent. sions of perch- . nand in Italy. He agreed to invest the Duke of Nevers with the Duchy of Mantua, hoping in return to se- cure the neutrality of France in his conflict with Sweden. The result of that conflict depended mainly on the attitude taken by the Protestants of the north, whom ? 18. Tilly Ferdinand, in combination with the Catholic in command. electors, was doing his best to alienate. Tilly was placed in command of the army which had lately been Wallenstein's, as well as of his own. The variety of habits and of feeling in the two armies did not promise well for the future. But, numerically, Tilly was far superior to Gustavus. Section IV. — The Swedes establish themselves on the Coast of the Baltic Gustavus, on the other hand, commanded a force in- ferior only in numbers. Thoroughly disciplined, it was a 1. The instinct with the spirit of its commander. It Swedish army. s h are d hj s religious enthusiasm and his devotion to the interests of his country. It had followed him in many a hardly-won fight, and had never known defeat under his orders. It believed with justice that his genius for war was far greater than that of any comman- der who was likely to be sent against him. The first attempt of Gustavus to win over a prince of the Empire to his side was made before Stettin, the capital 1 1. The Duke of the Duke of Pomerania. He insisted on submits to"* a personal interview with the aged Boguslav, Gustavus. the last of the old Wendish line. Boguslav had ever been on good terms with the Emperor. He had helped Wallenstein at Stialsund. But his deputies had pleaded in vain at Ratisbon for his right to retain 1630. The Swedes on the Baltic Coast. 131 the bishopric of Camin and for some amelioration of the misery of his subjects. He now pleaded in person with Gustavus to be allowed to remain neutral. Gustavus, like Tilly in 1623, would hear nothing of neutrality. The old man could hold out no longer. " Be it as you wish, in God's name," he said. He begged the king to be a father to him. " Nay," replied Gustavus, " I would rather be your son." The inheritance of the childless man would make an excellent bulwark for the defence of the Baltic. For some time longer Gustavus was busy in securing a basis of operations along the coast by clearing Pomerania and Mecklenburg of imperialist garrisons. But, as yet, the northern princes were un- Elector of willing to support him. In vain Gustavus prefe^neu- 8 reasoned with the ambassador of his brother- trallt y- in-law, the Elector of Brandenburg, who had come to announce his master's neutrality. " It is time," he said, "for his highness to open his eyes, and to rouse himself from his ease, that his highness may no longer be in his own land a lieutenant of the Emperor, nay, rather of the Emperor's servant. He who makes a sheep of himself is eaten by the wolf. His highness must be my friend or enemy, when I come to his frontier. He must be hot or cold. No third course will be allowed, be you sure of that." The words were thrown away for the present. There may have been something of mere cowardice in the Elector's resistance to the overtures made to him. Frederick had failed, and Christian had failed, and why not Gustavus ? But there was something, too, of the old German feeling remaining, of unwillingness to join with the foreigner against the Empire. "To do so," said the Brandenburg ambassador, " would be both dishonoura- ble and disloyal." 132 The Edict of Restitution. 1631. Gustavus had but to wait till Ferdinand's repeated blunders made loyalty impossible even with the much- enduring George William. Fortunately for tiationslje- Gustavus, he was now in a position in which twcen Sweden ^ e was ab i e to wait a little. An attempt had and trance. r been made in France to overthrow Riche- lieu, in which the queen mother, Mary of Medici, hnd taken a leading part. Richelieu, she warned her son, was leading him to slight the interests of the Church. But Lewis was unconvinced, and Mary of Medici found that all political authority was in Richelieu's hands. The complete success of the princes opposed to Wal- lenstein had perhaps exceeded Richelieu's expectations. ,6 3T A balance of power between Wallenstein Treat T1 ^f anc ^ t ^ ie League would have served his pur- Birwaide. pose better. But if Ferdinand was to be strong, it did not matter to France whether the army which gave him strength was commanded by Wallen- stein or by Tilly. Richelieu, therefore, made up his mind to grant subsidies to Gustavus without asking for the conditions which had been refused in the preceding spring. On January 23 the Treaty of Barwalde was signed between France and Sweden. A large payment of money was assured to Gustavus for five years. Gus- tavus, on his part, engaged to respect the constitutions of the Empire as they were before Ferdinand's victories, and to leave untouched the Catholic religion wherever he found it established. Out of the co-operation of Catho- lic and Protestant states, a milder way of treating reli- gious differences was already arising, just as the final establishment of toleration in England grew out of the co-operation between the Episcopal Church and tha Nonconformists. 1631. The Fall of Magdeburg. 133 Section V. — The Fall oj Magdeburg. Further successes marked the early months of 1631. But till {he two Protestant Electors could make up their minds to throw in their lot with Gustavus, „ „ . ji I. Hesita- nothing serious could be effected. John uonofthe George felt that something ought to be done. Saxony.° All over North Germany the Protestants were appealing to him to place himself at their head. To say that he was vacillating and irresolute, born to watch events rather than to control them, is only to say that he had not changed his nature. But it must never be forgotten that the decision before him was a very hard one. In no sense could it be regarded otherwise than as a choice between two evils. On the one side lay the pre- ponderance of a hostile religion. On the other side lay the abandonment of all hope of German unity, a unity which was nothing to Giistavus, but which a German Elector could not venture to disregard. It might be, indeed, that a new and better system would arise on the ruins of the old. But if Saxony were victorious with the aid of Sweden, the destruction of the existing order was certain, the establishment of a new one was problematical. A great Protestant assembly held at Leipzig in March, determined to make one more appeal to the Emperor. If only he would withdraw that fatal Edict . _ . . ? 2. The As- of Restitution, the Protestants of the north sembiyat would willingly take their places as obedient Lip2Ug - estates of the Empire. No foreign king should win them from their allegiance, or induce them to break asunder the last ties which bound them together to their head. But this time the appeal was accompanied by a step in the direction of active resistance. The Protestant estates represented at Leipzig agreed to levy soldiers, in orde* to be prepared for whatever might happen. »34 Ike Edict of Restitution. 1631. Time was pressing. The Treaty of Barwalde had opened the eyes of Maximilian and the League to the danger of procrastination. If they had en- fn 3 the Lorth. tertained any hope that France would leave them to contend with Gustavus alone, that hope was now at an end. Tilly was despatched into the north to combat the Swedish king. Ferdinand had despised the danger from Gustavus. " We have got a new little enemy," he said, laughing, „ „.„ , when he heard of the disembarkation of the g 4. Tilly s advmce and Swedes. Tilly knew better. He pressed rapidly forward, hoping to thrust himself between Gustavus in Pomerania and his lieutenant, Horn, in Mecklenburg. If he succeeded, the invading army would be cut in two, and liable to be defeated in detail. Success at first attended his effort. On March 29, whilst the princes were debating at Leipzig, he took New Brandenburg, cutting down the whole Swedish garrison of 2,000 men. But Gustavus was too rapid for him. Uniting his forces with those of Horn, he pre- sented a bold front to the enemy. Tilly was driven back upon the Elbe. The remaining fortresses on the Baltic, and the important post of Frankfort on the Oder, gar- risoned with eight imperialist regiments, fell into the power of the conqueror. A greater and more important city than Frankfort was at stake. The citizens of Magdeburg had raised the t - Maede- standard of independence without waiting ° ur z- for leave from John George of Saxony. Gus- tavus had sent a Swedish officer to conduct their defence. But without the support of the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg, he durst not bring his army to their as- eiitance. The imperialists were gathering thickly round Mag- 1 63 1 . The Fall of Magdeburg. 135 deburg. On April 26 a treaty was signed at Cherasco, between France and the Empire, which re- stored peace in Italy, and set free the Em- °f cherasoo. peror's troops beyond the Alps fur service in Germany. If Tilly saw matters still in a gloomy light, his fiery lieutenant, Pappenheim, thought there was no reason to despair. "This summer," he wrote, "we can sweep our enemies before us. God give us grace thereto." As the siege went on, Gustavus, writing under his enforced inaction, pleaded hard with the two Electors. From the Elector of Brandenburg he de- manded the right to occupy the two for- f; 7 n w i°hlhe" tresses of Kiistrin and Spandau. Hopes Braudenbanj were held out to him of the surrender of Kiistrin, but he was assured that Spandau should never be his. Accompanied by a picked body of troops, he marched straight upon Berlin. On May 13, outside the city gates, he held a long conference with his brother-in- law, the Elector. He argued in vain. To one of the Dukes of Mecklenburg, who had accompanied him, he spoke in bitter words. " I am marching," he said, " upon Magdeburg, to deliver the city. If no one will assist me, I will retreat at once. I will offer peace to the Emperor, and go home to Stockholm. I know that the Emperor will agree to my terms. But you Pro- testants will have to answer at the day of judgment that you would do nothing for the cause of God. In this world, too, you will be punished. Magdeburg will be taken, and, if I retire, you will have to look to your- selves." The next day the conference was resumed. P'rom early morning till nine at night the Elector per- sisted in his refusal. But the armed men who stood behind Gustavus were the most powerful of arguments. 136 7he Edict of Restitution. 1631. At last the Swedish king had his way. On the 15th the gates of Spandau were thrown open to his troops. But, if the Elector of Brandenburg had given way. the Elector of Saxony was not to be moved. He had not yet received an answer to his appeal to the anceofthe* Emperor ; and till that arrived he would Saxon 1 ° f enter into no alliance with a foreigner. Fur- ther advance was impossible. Cut to the heart by the refusal, Gustavus withdrew, leaving Mag- deburg to its fate. That fate was not long in coming. The city was hardly in a state to make a desperate resistance. The council had levied men to fight their battle. I 9. Storm- ° mg of Mag- But amongst the body of the townsmen there were some who counselled submission, and others who preferred taking their ease whilst the hired soldiers were manning the walls. On May 20, Pappen- heim stormed the city. In those days the sack of a town taken by storm was claimed as a right by the soldiers, as firmly by those of Gustavus as by those of Tilly and Wallenstein. But a few weeks before, the Protestant population of Frankfort had been exposed to the violence and greed of the Swedish army, simply because they had been unable to prevent the imperialists from defending the place. But the sack of Magdeburg was accompanied by circumstances of peculiar horror. Scarcely had the first rush taken place over the walls when, either inten- tionally or by accident, some of the houses were set on fire. In the exeitement of plunder or of terror no one thought of stopping the progress of the flames. The conquerors, angered by the thought that their booty was being snatched away from before their eyes by an enemy more irresistible than themselves, were inflamed almost to madness. Few could meet that infuriated soldiery 1 63 1 . The Fall of Magdeburg. 137 and live. Whilst every form of death, and of outrage worse than death, was encountered in the streets, the shrieks of the wretched victims were overpowered by the roaring of the flames. In a few hours the great city, the virgin fortress which had resisted Charles V. and Wallen- stein, with the exception of the Cathedral and a few houses around it, was reduced to a blackened ruin, be- neath which lay the calcined bones of men, of tender women, and of innocent babes. For the horrors of that day Tilly was not personally responsible. He would have hindered the storm if he had been able. The tales which carried , _. • § IO - Tilly s through all Protestant Germany the evil part in the deeds of the old warrior, and represented him as hounding on his men to the wretched work, were pure inventions. He had nothing to gain by the de- struction of Magdeburg. He had everything to gain by saving it as a basis of operations for his army. But if Tilly was not responsible for the consequences of the siege, he and his masters were responsible for the policy which had made the siege possible. That cathedral standing out from amidst the policy which ruins of Magdeburg was but too apt a sym- j^^y bol of the work which he and the League had set themselves to do. That the rights of the clergy and the church might be maintained, all the homes and dwellings of men in Germany were to be laid waste, all the social and political arrangements to which they had attached themselves were to be dashed into ruin. Even now Ferdinand was preparing his answer to the last appeal of the faithful Protestant estates. The Edict of Restitution he would maintain ? I2 ; Fe , rdi - nand refuses to the uttermost. Of the armament of the to cancel the , r Edict of princes he spoke in terms of contemptuous Restitution. l$8 Victories of Gustavus Adolphus. 1631. arrogance. Let John George and his companions in ill- doing dismiss their soldiers, and not presume to dictate terms by force to the head of the Empire. Ferdinand had declared the law as it was, and by the law he meant to abide. CHAPTER VIII. THE VICTORIES OF GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS. Section I. — Alliance between the Swedes and the Saxons. A great fear fell upon the minds of all Protestant men. The cities of the south, Augsburg and Nuremberg, which had begun to protest against the execution 2 1. The camp of the edict, fell back into silence. In the north, Gustavus, using terror to counteract terror, planted his cannon before the walls of Berlin, and wrung from his reluctant brother-in-law the renunciation of his neutrality. But such friendship could last no longer than the force which imposed it, and John George could not be won so easily. William of Hesse Cassel was the first of the German princes to come voluntarily into the camp of Gustavus. Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar came too, young as he was, full of military experience, and full too of memories of his forefathers, the heroes of that old Saxon line which had forfeited the Saxon Elec- torate for the sake of the Gospel. But neither William nor Bernhard could bring much more than their own swords. Gustavus dared not take the offensive. Throw- ing up an entrenched camp at Werben, where the Havel joins the Elbe, he waited for Tilly, and repulsed an attack made upon him. But what was such a victory worth ? Hardships and disease were thinning his ranks, and unless aid came, the end would be very near. 1631. Alliance between Sweden and Saxony. 139 The aid which he needed was brought to him by the blindness of Ferdinand. At last the results of the treaty of Cherasco were making themselves felt, g 2 Til iy The troops from Italy had reached the north, reinforced. and, in August, Tilly was at the head of 40,000 men. With the reinforcements came orders from the Emperor. The tame deflection of John George from the line of strict obedience was no longer to be borne. Tilly must com- pel him to lay down his arms, or to join in the war against the foreign invasion. These orders reached Tilly on August 18. On the 24th he sent a message to the Elector, ask- \ 3. Sum- • ing him by what right he was in arms against George "to" the laws of the Empire. John George had dlsarm - some difficulty in finding an answer, but he refused to dismiss his troops. If Tilly had only let the Elector alone, he would pro- bably have had nothing to fear from him for some time to come. But Tilly knew no policy beyond * 4 Attacks the letter of his instructions. He at once Saxon y- crossed the Saxon frontier. Pappenheim seized Merse- burg. Tilly reduced Leipzig to surrender by the threat that he would deal with the city worse than with Magde- burg. The Elector, so long unwilling to draw the sword, was beyond measure angry. He sent speedy couriers to Gustavus, offering his alliance on any terms. Gustavus did not wait for a second bidding. The wish of his heart was at last accomplished. He put his forces at once in motion, bringing the Elector of §5. Union of Brandenburg with him. The Saxon com- andtheT eS mander was the Lutheran Arnim, the very Saxons - man who had led Wallenstein's troops to the siege of Stralsund. The Edict of Restitution had taught him that Wallenstein's idea of a Germany united without respect £4° Victories of Gustavus Adolphus. 1631. for differences o.* .•eligion was not to be realized under Ferdinand. He had thrown up his post, and had sought service with Jonn George. Without being in any way a man of commanding ability, he had much experience in war. The Saxon soldiers were a splendid sight. New clothed and new armed, they nad with them all the pomp J 6. The an d circumstance of glorious war. But they baxon troops. ha( j ^ad no experience of fighting. They were as raw as Wallenstein's troops had been when he first entered the diocese of Halberstadt in 1625. The Swedes were a rabble rout to look upon, at least in the eyes of the inexperienced Saxons. Their new m , allies lausdied heartily at their uniforms, rasr- 2 7- The . ° } ' s Swedish ged with long service and soiled with the troops. ^ ust q £ t k e cam p an( j j.jjg bivouac. But the war-worn men had confidence in their general, and their general had confidence in them. Such confidence was based on even better grounds than the confidence of the veterans of the League in Tilly. Tilly was simply an excellent com- tavusasa mander of the old Spanish school. He had comman er. won ^. g battles ^y j^g p 0wer f vvaiting till he was superior in numbers. When the battles came they were what are generally called soldiers' battles. The close-packed columns won their way to victory by sheer push of pike. But Gustavus, like all great commanders, was an innovator in the art of war. To the heavy masses of the enemy he opposed lightness and flexibility. His cannon were more easily moved, his muskets more easily handled. In rapidity of fire he was as superior to the enemy as Frederick the Great with his iron ramrods at Mollwitz, or Moltke with his needle-guns at Sadowa. He had, too, a new method of drill. His troops were 1631. The Battle of Breitenfeld. 141 drawn up three deep, and were capable of maneuvering with a precision which might be looked for in vain from the solid columns of the imperialists. Section II. — The Battle of Breitenfeld. On the morning of September 17 Swede and Saxon were drawn up opposite Tilly's army, close to the village of Breitenfeld, some five miles distant from Leipzig. Gustavus had Reed of all his skill. B r eitenfeid° Before long the mocking Saxons were flying in headlong rout. The victors, unlike Rupert at Marston Moor, checked themselves to take the Swedes in the flanks. Then Gustavus coolly drew back two brigades and presented a second front to the enemy. Outnum- bered though he was, the result was never for a moment doubtful. Cannon shot and musket ball tore asunder the dense ranks of the imperialist army. Tilly's own guns were wrenched from him and turned upon his in- fantry. The unwieldy host staggered before the deft blows of a more active antagonist. Leaving six thousand of their number dying or dead upon the field, Tilly's veterans, gathering round their aged leader, retreated slowly from their first defeat, extorting the admiration of their opponents by their steadiness and intrepidity. The victory of Breitenfeld, or Leipzig — the battle bears both names — was no common victory. It was the grave of the Edict of Restitution, and of an effort to establish a sectarian domination in the ^a"; m p & l rt- guise of national unity. The bow, stretched *? ce of tiie ' victory. beyond endurance, had broken at last. Since the battle on the White Hill, the Emperor, the Imperial Council, the Imperial Diet, had declared them- selves the only accredited organs of the national life. Then had come a coolness between the Emperor and 142 Victories of Gustavus A Jolphus. 1631, the leaders of the Diet. A good understanding had been re-established by the dismissal of Wallenstein. But neither Emperor nor Diet had seen fit to take account of the feelings or wants of more than half the nation. They, and they alone, represented legal authority. The falsehood had now been dashed to the ground by Gus- tavus. Breitenfeld was the Naseby of Germany. Like Naseby, too, Breitenfeld had in it something of more universal import. Naseby was the victory of dis- ciplined intelligence over disorderly bravery. of 3 intel'n- 0ry Breitenfeld was the victory of disciplined gcnc.e over intelligence over the stiff routine of the routine. ° Spanish tactics. Those tactics were, after all, but the military expression of the religious and political system in defence of which they were used. Those solid columns just defeated were the types of what human nature was to become under the Jesuit organiza- tion. The individual was swallowed up in the mass. As Tilly had borne down by the sheer weight of his veterans adventurers like Mansfeld and Christian of Brunswick, so the renewed Catholic discipline had borne down the wrangling theologians who had stepped into the places of Luther and Melanchthon. But now an army had arisen to prove that order and obedience were weak unless they were supported by individual intelligence. The success of the principle upon which its operations were based could not be confined to mere fighting. It would make its way in morals and politics, in literature and science. Great was the joy in Protestant Germany when the news was told. The cities of the south prepared once . w .. more to resist their oppressors. All that wns stein's in- noblest in France hailed the tidings with Gustavus. acclamation. English Eliot, writing from 1631. The Battle of Breitenfeld. 143 his prison in the Tower, could speak of Gustavus as that person whom fortune and virtue had re- served for the wonder of the world ! Even Wallenstein, from his Bohemian retreat, uttered a cry of satisfaction. For Wallenstein was already in communication with Gustavus, who, Protestant as he was, was avenging him upon the League which had assailed him and the Em- peror who had abandoned him. He had offered to do great things, if he could be trusted with a Swedish force of 12,000 men. He was well pleased to hear of Tilly's defeat. " If such a thing had happened to me," he said to an emissary of Gustavus, " I would kill myself. But it is a good thing for us." If only the King of Sweden would trust him with men, he would soon bring together the officers of his old army. He would divide the goods of the Jesuits and their followers amongst the soldiers. The greatest folly the Bohemians had committed, he said, had been to throw Martinitz and Slawata out of window instead of thrusting a sword through their bodies. If his plan were accepted he would chase the Emperor and the House of Austria over the Alps. But he hoped Gustavus would not allow himself to be entangled too far in the French alliances. Wallenstein's whole character was expressed in these proposals, whether they were meant seriously or not. Cut off from German ideas by his Bohemian birth, he had no roots in Germany. The Sesigns'. S reverence which others felt for religious or political institutions had no echo in his mind. As he had been ready to overthrow princes and electors in the Emperor's name, so he was now ready to overthrow the Emperor in the name of the King of Sweden. Yet there was withal a greatness about him which raised him above such mere advenatrers as Mansfcld. At the head 144 Victories of Gusta vus A dolphus. 1 6 3 1 . of soldiers as uprooted as himself from all ties oi home or nationality, he alone, amongst the leaders of the war, had embraced the two ideas which, if they had been welcomed by the statesmen of the Empire, would have saved Germany from intolerable evil. He wished for union and strength against foreign invasion, and he wished to found that union upon religious liberty. He would have kept out Gustavus if he could. But if that could not be done, he would join Gustavus in keeping out the French. Yet between Wallenstein and Gustavus it was im- possible that there should be anything really in common. Wallenstein was large-minded because he sibility of an was far removed from the ordinary preju- "ng between dices of men - He was no more affected by Wallenstein tne i r habits and thoughts than the course of and (justavus. a balloon is affected by the precipices and rivers below. Gustavus trod firmly upon his mother earth. His Swedish country, his Lutheran religion, his opposition to the House of Austria, were all very real to him. His greatness was the greatness which rules the world, the greatness of a man who, sharing the thoughts and feelings of men, rises above them just far enough to direct them, not too far to carry their sympathies with him. Such a man was not likely to be content with mere military success. The vision of a soldier sovereignty to be shared with Wallenstein had no charms \ 7. Politi- cal plans of for him. If the Empire had fallen, it must be replaced not by an army but by fresh in- stitutions; and those institutions, if they were to endure at all, must be based as far as posssible on institutions already existing. Protestant Germany must be freed from oppression. It must be organized apart sufficiently 1 03 1. , T7ie Battle of Br eitenf eld. 145 for its own defence. Such an organization, the Corpus Eva7igelicorum t as he called it, like the North German Confederation of 1866, might or might not spread into a greater Germany of the future. It would need the sup- port of Sweden and of France. It would not, indeed, satisfy Wallenstein's military ambition, or the more legitimate national longings of German patriots. But it had the advantage of being attainable if anything was attainable. It would form a certain bulwark against the aggression of the Catholic states without necessitating any violent change in the existing territorial institutions. If these were the views of Gustavus — and though he never formally announced them to the world his whole subsequent conduct gives reason to believe $ 8. Mis that he had already entertained them — it military becomes not so very hard to understand why he decided upon marching upon the Rhine, and despatching the Elector of Saxony to rouse Bohemia. It is true that Oxenstjerna, the prudent Chancellor of Sweden, wise after the event, used to declare that his master had made a mistake, and later military historians, fancying that Vienna was in the days of Gustavus what it was in the days of Napoleon, have held that a march upon Ferdinand's capital would have been as decisive as a march upon the same capital in 1805 or 1809. But the opinion of Gustavus is at least as good as that of Oxenstjerna, and it is certain that in 1631 Vienna was not, in the modern sense of the word, a capital city. If 2. His pro- treated m common by all the cities and posal mnac- princes interested. " In that ease," he re- cepta plied, bitterly, " the Elector of Saxony will dispute for half a year in whose name the summons to the meeting ought to be issued. When the cities, too, send deputies, they usually separate as they meet, discovering that there is a defect in their instructions, and so refer every- thing home again for further consideration, without coming to any conclusion whatever." Can it be doubted that the political incompetence of the Germans, caused by their internal divisions and their long disuse of such 158 Victories of Gustavus Adolphus. 1632. institutions as would have enabled them to act in com- mon, was a thorn in the side of Gustavus, felt by him more deeply than the appearance in the field, however unexpected, of Wallenstein and his army ? That army, however, must be met. Wallenstein had 60,000 men with him ; Gustavus but a third of the num- l 3. Gustavus ber. The war had blazed up along the stein at en Rhine from Alsace to Coblentz. Pappen- Nuremberg. heim was fighting there, and the Spaniards had sent troops of their own, and had summoned tne Duke of Lorraine to their aid. By-and-by it was seen how rightly Gustavus had judged that France could not afford to quarrel with him. Though he had dashed aside Richelieu's favourite scheme of leaving the ecclesiastical territories untouched, and had refused to single out the House of Austria as the sole object of the war, Richelieu could not fail to support him against Spanish troops. In a few weeks the danger in his rear was at an end, and the scattered detachments of the Swedish army were hurrying to join their king at Nuremberg. Gustavus was now ready for a battle. But a battle he could not have. Wallenstein fell back upon his old ?4 ; Wallen- tactics of refusing battle, except when he trenches \ia& a manifest superiority of numbers. He himself. entrenched himself near Fiirth, to the north of Nuremberg, on a commanding eminence overlooking the whole plain around. For twelve miles his works protected his newly-levied army. House, villages, ad- vantages of the ground were everywhere utilized for defence. In the meanwhile, scarcity and pestilence were doing their terrible work at Nuremberg. The country people had flocked in for refuge, and the population was too great to be easily supplied with food. Even in the army 1632. t Gustavus and Wallenstein. 15a want began to be felt. And with want came . 2 5. Wants the relaxation of that discipline upon which of the Swedish Gustavus prided himself. He had large army- numbers of German troops in his army now, and a long evil experience had taught Germans the habits of marau- ders. Gustavus was deeply irritated. Sending for the chief Germans in his service, he rated them soundly. " His Majesty," says one who de- remonstrates"' scribed the scene, "was never before seen in such a rage." "You princes, counts, lords, and noblemen," he said, " you are showing your disloyalty and wickedness on your own fatherland, which you are ruining. ; J & ? 7. His You colonels, and officers from the highest speech to the to the lowest, it is you who steal and rob every one, without making any exceptions. You plunder your own brothers in the faith. You make me disgusted with you ; and God my Creator be my witness that my heart is filled with gall when I see any one of you be- having so villanously. For you cause men to say openly, ' The king, our friend, does us more harm than our enemies.' If you were real Christians you would con* sider what I am doing for you, how I am spending my life in your service. I have given up the treasures of my crown for your sake, and have not had from your German Empire enough to buy myself a bad suit of clothes with." After this strain he went on : " Enter into your hearts," he said, " and think how sad you are making me, so that the tears stand in my eyes. You treat me . . ? S- Com- lll with your evil discipline ; I do not say plains bitterly with your evil fighting, for in that you have . behaved like honourable gentlemen, and for that I am much obliged to you. I am so grieved for you that I am rfjo Victories of Gustavus Adolphns. 1632. vexed that I ever had anything to do with so stiff-necked a nation. Well, then, take my warning to heart ; we will soon show our enemies that we are honest men and honourable gentlemen." One day the king caught a corporal stealing cows. , Punishes " ^ son >" ne sa -id, as he delivered him over plunderers. to the provost marshal, " it is better that I should punish you, than that God should punish not only you, but me and all of us for your sake." Such a state of things could not last long. On Sep- tember 3 Gustavus led his army to the shores of Wallen- stein's entrenchments; but though he made g 10. Fails to ... storm Wallen- some impression, the lines were too skilful- ly drawn, and too well defended, to be bro- ken through. On the other hand, Gustavus was not a Mansfeld, and Wallenstein did not venture, as at the Bridge of Dessau, to follow up his successful defence by an offensive movement. Want of supplies made it impossible for Gustavus to remain longer at Nuremberg. For the first time since he landed in Germany he had failed in securing g n. Is obliged . J . & to march a victory, With drums beating and banners dWd> flying, he marched away past Wallenstein's encampment ; but the wary man was not to be enticed to a combat. As soon as he was gone, Wallenstein broke up his camp. But he knew too well where his opponent's weakness lay to go in pursuit of Gustavus. Throwing himself northwards, he established himself firmly in Saxony, plundering and burning on every side. If only he could work ruin enough, he might hope to detach the Elector from his alliance with the Swedes. I n. Wailen- Gustavus could not choose but follow. tavus in Sax" S ' Wallenstein had hoped to establish himself on Y- as firmly in Saxony as he had established r63 2 - The Battle of Liitzen. 161 himself at Ftirth. He would seize Torgau and Halle, to make himself master of the passages over the Elbe and Saale, whilst Erfurt and Naumburg would complete the strength of his position. Gustavus might dash his head against it as he pleased. Like Wellington at Torres Vedras, or Gustavus himself at Werben, he would meet the attack of the enemy by establishing himself in a carefully selected position of defence. Section VI. — The Battle of Liitzen. Wallenstein had succeeded at Nuremberg, but he was not to succeed in Saxony. Gustavus was upon him be- fore he had gained the positions he needed. » t Gustavus Erfurt was saved from the imperialists, in Saxony. Gustavus entered Naumburg to be adored as a saviour by men flying from Wallenstein's barbarities. As he passed through the streets the poor fugitives bent down to kiss the hem of his garments. He would have resist- ed them if he could. He feared lest God should punish him for receiving honour above that which befitted a mortal man. The Saxon army was at Torgau, and that important post was still guarded. Wallenstein lay at Liitzen. Even there, shorn as he was of his expected , r j 2, Wallen- strength, he threw up entrenchments, and stein believes believed himself safe from attack. It was now November, and he fancied that Gustavus, satisfied with his success, would go, after the fashion of the time, into winter quarters. In Wallenstein's army, Pappenheim's dashing bravery made him the idol of the soldiers, and gave z p apP en- him an almost independent position. He [jF im leaves begged to be allowed to attempt a diversion on the Rhenish bishoprics. Wallenstein gave the re« 1 62 Victories of Gusi ivus Adolphus. 1632. quired permission, ordering him to seize Kalle on the way. It was a serious blunder to divide an army under the eyes of Gustavus. Early on the morning of November 16 the Swedish king was in front of Wallen- of the stein's position at L>>tzen. He knew well Gustavus that, if there was to be a battle at all, he battTe. the must be the assailant. Wallenstein would not stir. Behind ditche - *- and entrenchments, ready armed, his heavy squares lay immovably, waiting for the enemy, like the Russians «** the Alma or the English at Waterloo. A fog lay thick upon the ground. The Swedish army gathered early to their morning prayer, summoned by the sounds of Luther's hymn tune, " God is a strong tower," floating on the heavy air from the brazen lips of a trumpet. The king himself joined in the morning hymn, " Fear not, little flock." Then, as if with forebodings of the coming slaughter, others sung of " Jesus the Saviour, who was the con- queror of death." Gustavus thrust aside the armour which was offered him. Since he had received a wound, not long before, he felt uncomfortable in it. Unpro- tected, he mounted on his horse, and rode about the ranks encouraging the men. At eleven the mist cleared away, and the sun shone out. The king gave his last orders to his generals. Then, looking to heaven, " Now," he said, Y, 5* AttZlCK „ of the " in God s name, Jesus, give us to-day to a *d cs ' fight for the honour of thy holy name." king hofthe Then, waving his sword over his head, he cried out, " Forwards !" The whole line advanced, Gustavus riding at the head of the calvary at the right. After a fierce struggle, the enemy's lines were broken through everywhere. But Wallenstein was nol 1632. i The Battle of Lutzen. 163 yet mastered. Bringing up his reserves, he drove back the Swedish infantry in the centre. Gustavus, when he heard the news, flew to the rescue. In all other affairs of life he knew better than most men how to temper daring with discretion. In the battle-field he flung pru- dence to the winds. The horsemen, whom he had or- dered to follow him, struggled in vain to keep up with the long strides of their master's horse. The fog came down thickly once more, and the king, left almost alone in the darkness, dashed unawares into a regiment of the enemy's cuirassiers. One shot passed through his horse's neck. A second shattered his left arm. Turn- ing round to ask one of those who still followed him to help him out of the fight, a third shot struck him in the back, and he fell heavily to the ground. A youth of eighteen, who alone was left by his side, strove to lift him up and to bear him off. But the wounded man was too heavy for him. The cuirassiers rode up and asked who was there. " I was the King of Sweden," murmured the king, as the young man returned no answer, and the horseman shot him through the head, and put an end to his pain. Bernard of Weimar took up the command. On the other side Pappenheim, having received orders to return, hurried back from Halle. But he brought , , _, . , 2 6. Defeat of only his cavalry with him. It would be Wailenstein. many hours before his foot could retrace their weary steps. The Swedes, when they heard that their beloved king had fallen, burnt with ardour to revenge him. A terrible struggle ensued. Hour after hour the batrie swayed backwards and forwards. In one of the Swedish regiments only one man out of six left the fight unhurt, Pappenheim, the dashing and the brave, whose word was ever for fight, the Bliicher of the seventeenth c.en* 164 Victories of Gustavus AJolphus. 1632. tury, was struck down. At the battle of the White Hill he had lain long upon the field senseless from his wounds, and had told those who were around him when he awakened that he had come back from Purgatory This time there was no awakening for him. The infantry which in his lifetime he had commanded so gallantly, came up as the winter sun was setting. But they came too late to retrieve the fight. Wallenstein, defeated at last, gave orders for retreat. The hand which alone could gather the results of victory was lying powerless. The work of destruction was practically complete. The Edict of Res- of Gustavus titution was dead, and the Protestant ad- rrepara . ministrators were again ruling in the north- ern bishoprics. The Empire was practically dead, and the princes and people of Germany, if they were looking for order at all, must seek it under other forms than those which had been imposed upon them in conse- quence of the victories of Tilly and Wallenstein. It is in vain to speculate whether Gustavus could have done anything towards the work of reconstruction. Like Cromwell, to whom, in many respects, he bore a close resemblance, he had begun to discover that it was harder to build than to destroy, and that it was easier to keep sheep than to govern men. Perhaps even to him the difficulties would have been insuperable. The centrifugal force was too strong amongst the German princes to make it easy to bind them together. He had experienced this in Saxony. He had experienced it at Nuremberg. To build up a Corpus Evangelicoruvi was like weaving ropes of sand. And Gustavus was not even more than half a German by birth ; politically he was not a German at all. In nis own mind he could not help thinking first of Sweden. In 1632. The Battle of Liitzen. 163 the minds of others the suspicion that he was so thinking was certain to arise. He were his clung firmly to his demand for Pomerania as purpuSf 5 a bulwark for Sweden's interests in the Baltic. Next to that came the Corpus Evangelicorum, the league of German Protestant cities and princes to stand up against the renewal of the overpowering tyranny of the Emperor. If his scheme had been carried out Gustavus would have been a nobler Napoleon, with a confederation, not ot the Rhine, but of the Baltic, around him. For, stranger as he was, he was bound by his religious sympathies to his Protestant brethren in Germany. The words which he spoke at Nuremberg to the princes, telling them how well off he might be at home, were conceived in the very spirit of the Homeric Achilles, when the hardness of the work he had undertaken and the ingratitude of men revealed itself to him. Like Achilles, he dearly loved war, with its excitement and danger, for its own sake. But he desired more than the glory of a con- queror. The establishment of Protestantism in Europe as a power safe from attack by reason of its own strength was the cause for which be found it worth while to live, and for which, besides and beyond the greatness of his own Swedish nation, he was ready to die. It may be that, after all, he was " happy in the opportunity of his death." CHAPTER IX. THE DEATH OF WALLENSTEIN AND THE TREATY OI PRAGUE. Section I. — French Influence in Germany. In Germany, after the death of Gustavus at Liitzen, it was ab it was in Greece after the death of Epaminondas at Mantinea. " There was more disturb- j i. Bemhard ance and more dispute after the battle than ofSaxeWei. before it." In Sweden, Christina, the infant daughter of Gustavus, succeeded peaceably to her father's throne, and authority was exercised with- out contradiction by the Chancellor Oxenstjerna. But, wise and prudent as Oxenstjerna was, it was not in the nature of things that he should be listened to as Gusta- vus had been listened to, The chiefs of the army, no longer held in by a soldier's hand, threatened to assume an almost independent position. Foremost of these was the young Bernhard of Weimar, demanding, like Wal^ lenstein, a place among' the princely houses of Ger- many. In his person he hoped the glories of the elder branch of the Saxon House would revive, and the dis- grace inflicted upon it by Charles V. for its attachment to the Protestant cause would be repaired. He claimed the rewards of victory for those whose swords had gained it, and payment for the soldiers, who during the winter months following the victory at Liitzen had re- ceived little or nothing. His own share was to be a new 1 66 1631. ) French Influence in Germany. 167 duchy of Franconia, formed out of the united bishoprics of Wiirzburg and Bamberg. Oxenstjerna was com- pelled to admit his pretensions, and to confirm him in his duchy. The step was thus taken which Gustavus had un- doubtedly contemplated, but which he had prudently refrained from carrying into action. The , _ . . g a. 1 he seizure of ecclesiastical lands in which the League of , . _, . .. . Heilbrona. population was Catholic was as great a bar- rier to peace on the one side as the seizure of the Pro- testant bishoprics in the north had been on the other. There was, therefore, all the more necessity to be ready for war. If a complete junction of all the Protestant forces was not to be had, something at least was attaina- ble. On April 23, 1633, the League of Heilbronn was signed. The four circles of Svvabia, Franconia, and the Upper and Lower Rhine formed a union with Sweden for mutual support. It is not difficult to explain the defection of the Elec- tor of Saxony. The seizure of a territory by military violence had always been most obnoxious „ ^ r tii 1 • • 2 3- Defec- to him. He had resisted it openly in the tionof case of Frederick in Bohemia. He had re- axon y- sisted it, as far as he dared, in the case of Wallenstein in Mecklenburg. He was not inclined to put up with it in the case of Bernhard in Franconia. Nor could he fail to see that with the prolongation of the war, the chances of French intervention were considerably in- creasing. In 1 63 1 there had been a great effervescence of the French feudal aristocracy against the royal authority. But Richelieu stood firm. In March the 1631. king's brother, Gaston Duke of Orleans, 1 4. French fled from the country. In July his mother, *° mcs ' N 1 68 Wattensteiri 's Deaih : Treaty of Prague. 1632. Mary of Medici, followed his example. But they had no intention of abandoning their position. From their exile in the Spanish Netherlands they formed a close alliance with Spain, and carried on a thousand intrigues with the nobility at home. The Cardinal smote right and left with a heavy hand. Amongst his enemies were the noblest names in France. The Duke of Guise shrank from the conflict and retired to Italy to die far from his native land. The keeper of the seals died in prison. His kinsman, a marshal of France, perished on the scaffold. In the summer of the year 1632, whilst Gusta- vus was conducting his last campaign, there was a great rising in the south of France. Gaston himself came to share in the glory or the disgrace of the rebellion. The Duke of Montmorenci was the real leader of the enter- prise. He was a bold and vigorous commander, the Rupert of the French cavaliers. But his gay horsemen dashed in vain against the serried ranks of the royal in- fantry, and he expiated his fault upon the scaffold. Gaston, helpless and low-minded as he was, could live on, secure under an ignominious pardon. It was not the highest form of political life which Richelieu was establishing. For the free expression of opinion, as a foundation of government, lieu did for France, in that day, was not prepared. But that could be within the limits of possibility, Richelieu's 3 6. 6» oi Westphalia but even so far as the letter of the two the Peace of documents was concerned, this was very far Augsburg. from being the case. The Peace of Augs- burg was full of uncertainties, because the contracting parties were unable to abandon their respective desires. 1648. Co?ulition of Germany. 217 In the Peace of Westphalia all was definite. Evasion or misinterpretation was no longer possible. If the letter of the two treaties was entirely different, it was because the spirit in which they were conceived was also entirely different. In 1555 Protes- , „ _ 3 "^ \%. General tantism was on the rise. The peace of 1555 desire for the , i>ii continuance of was a vain attempt to shut out the tide by peace, artificial dykes and barriers. In 1648 the tide had re- ceded. The line which divided the Protestant from the Catholic princes formed almost an exact division be- tween the Protestant and Catholic populations. The desire for making proselytes, once so strong on both sides, had been altogether extinguished by the numbing agony of the war. All Germany longed for peace with an inexpressible longing. The mutual distrust of Catholic and Protestant had grown exceedingly dull. The only feeling yet alive was hatred of the tyranny and exactions of the soldiers. Section III. — Condition of Germany. What a peace it was when it really came at last! Whatever life there was under that deadly blast of war had been attracted to the camps. The strong man who had lost his all turned soldier that he might be able to rob others in turn. The young girl, who in better times would have passed on to a life of 'the war. of honourable wedlock with some youth who had been the companion of her childhood in the sports around the village fountain, had turned aside, foi very starvation, to a life of shame in the train of one or other of the armies by which her home had been made desolate. In the later years of the war it was known that a body of 40,000 fighting men drew along with it a loathsome following of no less than 140,000 men, women, ai8 The End of the War. 1648. and children, contributing nothing to the efficiency of the army, and all of them living at the expense of the miserable peasants who still contrived to hold on to their ruined fields. If these were to live, they must steal what yet remained to be stolen ; they must devour, with the insatiable hunger of locusts, what yet remained to be devoured. And then, if sickness came, or wounds — and sickness was no infrequent visitor in those camps— wliat remained but misery or death ? Nor was it much better with the soldiers themselves. No careful surgeons passed over the battle-field to save life or limb. No hospitals received the wounded to the tender nursing of loving, gentle hands. Recruits were to be bought cheaply, and it cost less to enrol a new soldier than to cure an old one. The losses of the civil population were almost incre- dible. In a certain district of Thuringia which was pro- bably better off than the greater part of \ 2. Decrease ° * of the Germany, there were, before the war cloud popuation. burst, i,7i7 houses standing in nineteen villages. In 1649, only 627 houses were left. And even of the houses which remained many were untenanted. The 1,717 houses had been inhabited by 1,773 families. Only 316 families could be found to occupy the 627 houses. Property fared still worse. In the same dis- trict 244 oxen alone remained of 1,402. Of 4,616 sheep, not one was left. Two centuries later the losses thus suffered were scarcely recovered. And, as is always the case, the physical decline of the population was accompanied by moral decadence. Men who had been accustomed to live by the decadence. strong arm, and men who had been accus- tomed to suffer all tilings from those who were strong, met one another, even in the days of peace, 1648. Condition of Germany. 219 without that mutual respect which forms the basis of well- ordered life. Courts were crowded with feather-brained soldiers whose highest ambition was to bedeck them- selves in a splendid uniform and to copy the latest fashion or folly which was in vogue at Paris or Versailles. In the country district a narrow-minded gentry, without knowledge or culture, domineered over all around, and strove to exact the uttermost farthing from the peasant in order to keep up the outward appearance of rank. The peasant whose father had been bullied by maraud- ing soldiers dared not lift up his head against the ex- actions of the squire. The burden of the general impoverishment fell heavily upon his shoulders. The very pattern of the chairs on which he sat, of the vessels out of which he ate and drank, assumed a ruder appear- ance than they had borne before the war. In all ranks life was meaner, poorer, harder than it had been at the beginning of the century. If much of all this was the result of the war, something was owing to causes antecedently at work. „,, „ , • 1 , . . r , 2 4- Intellec- The German people in the beginning of the tual decline seventeenth century was plainly inferior to thenar ° re the German people in the beginning of the sixteenth century. During the whole course of the war Maximilian of Bavaria was the only man of German birth who rose to eminence, and even he did not attain the first rank. The destinies of the land of Luther and Gothe, of Frederick II. and Stein were decided by a few men of foreign birth. Wallenstein was a Slavonian, Tilly a Walloon, Gustavus a Swede, Richelieu a French- man. The penalty borne by a race which was unable to control individual vigour within the limits of a large and fruitful national life was that individual vigour itself died out. »2o The End of the War. 1648. We may well leave to those who like such tasks the work of piling up articles of accusation against this man or that, of discovering that the war was all ties inherited" tae &u\t of Ferdinand, or all the fault of times early Frederick, as party feeling may lead them. Probably the most lenient judgment is also the truest one. With national and territorial institutions the mere chaos which they were, an amount of political intelligence was needed to set them right which would be rare in any country or in any age. As far as national institutions were concerned the Thirty Years' War made a clean sweep in Germany. Nominally, it is true, Emperor and Empire disintegration still remained. Ferdinand III. was still ac- ermany. CO rding to his titles head of all Christendom, if not of the whole human race. The Diet still gathered to discuss the affairs of the Empire. The imperial court, re-established on the principle of equality between the two religions, still met to dispense justice between the estates of the Empire. But from these high-sounding names all reality had fled. The rule over German men had passed for many a long day into the hands of the princes. It was for the princes to strive with one another in peace or war under the protection of foreign alliances ; and by and by, half consciously, half uncon- sciously, to compete for the leadership of Germany by the intelligence and discipline which they were able to fos- ter under their sway. When the days of this competition arrived it was of inestimable advantage to Germany that, whatever else had been lost, Protestantism had been ant'ism saved", saved. Wherever Protestantism had firmly rooted itself there sprang up in course of ti-me a mighty race of intellectual giants. Gdthe and 1648. War between France and Spain. 221 Schiller, Lessing and Kant, Stein and Humboldt, with thousands more of names which have made German in- tellect a household word in the whole civilized world, sprung from Protestant Germany. When Bavaria, scarcely more than two generations ago, awoke to the consciousness that she had not more than the merest ru- diments of education to give to her children, she had to apply to the Protestant north for teachers. For Germany in 1648 the worst was over. Physically, at least she had no more to suffer. One „ m § 8. The page of her history was closed and another worst over for had not yet been opened. She lay for a etma °y- time in the insensibility of exhaustion. Section IV, — Continuance of the War between France and Spain. For France T64S is hardly a date at all. She was rid of the war in Germany. But her war with Spain was not browght to an end. And if Spain would . „ *» r . I s. Peace no longer have the support of the imperial- between Spa™ • ^ j- j-* t- t. *.i aiKl the .Dutch. ists of Germany, France was at the same time deprived of the support of a far more vigorous ally. Spain at last lowered its haughty neck to accept condi- tions of peace on terra&s of equality from the Dutch re- public. The eighty years' war of the Netherlands was brought to a conclusion simultaneously with the thirty years' war of Germany. Spain could mow send rein- forcements to Flanders by sea without fearing the over- whelming superiority of the Dutch marirae, and could defend the southern frontier of the obedient provinces without having to provide against an attack in the rear. In the long run, a duel between France and Spain could be of no doubtful issue. It was a contest between the old system of immobility and intolerance and the 222 TJie End of the War. 1652. new system of intelligence and tolerance ; between 4 1 2. France government which despised industry and and Spam. commerce, and a government which fostered them. But however excellent might be the aims which the French government kept in view, it was still in it? nature an absolute government. No free discussion en' lightened its judgment. No popular intervention kept in check its caprices. It was apt to strike roughly and ignorantly, to wound many feelings and to impose griev- ous burdens upon the poor and the weak whose lamen- tations never reached the height of the throne. Suddenly, when Mazarin's government appeared most firmly rooted, there was an explosion which threatened i 3. The t0 change the whole face of France. An Fronde. outcry arose for placing restrictions upon rights of the crown, for establishing constitutional and individual liberties. The Fronde, as the party which uttered the cry was called, did its best to imitate the English Long Parliament whose deeds were then ringing through the world. But there were no elements in France upon which to establish constitutional government. The Parliament of Paris, which wished itself to be considered the chief organ of that government, was a close corpora- tion of lawyers, who had bought or inherited judicial places ; and of all governments, a government in the hands of a close corporation of lawyers is likely, in the long run, to be the most narrow-minded and unprogres- sive of all possible combinations; for it is the business of a lawyer to administer the law as it exists, not to modify it in accordance with the new facts which rise constantly to the surface of social and political life. Nor were the lawyers of the parliament fortunate in their supporters. The Paris mob, combined with a knot of intriguing courtiers, could form no firm basis for a healthy revolu* i657- War between France and Spain. 223 tion. It was still worse when Conde, quarrelling on a personal question with Mazarin, raised the standard of aristocratic revolt, and threw himself into the arms of the Spanish invader. Mazarin and the young king repre- sented the nation against aristocratic selfishness and in- trigue ; and when they obtained the services of Turenne, the issue was hardly doubtful. In 1652 Louis XIV. entered Paris in triumph. In 1653 Conde, in conjunction with a Spanish army, invaded France, and pushed on hopefully for Paris. But Turenne was there with a handful of troops ; and if Conde was the successor of Gustavus in the art of fighting battles, Turenne was Wallenstein's successor in the art of strategy. Conde could neither fight nor advance with effect. The siege and reduction of Rocroy was the only result of a campaign which had been commenced in the expectation of reducing France to submission. In 1654 Conde and the Spaniards laid siege to Arras, whilst the French were besieging Stenay. Stenay was taken; Arras was relieved. In 1655 further g 4 The war progress was made by the French on the with s P ain - frontier of the Netherlands ; but in 1656 they failed in the siege of Valenciennes. With the check thus inflicted, a new danger appeared above the horizon. In England there had arisen, under Cromwell, a new and power- Cromwell, and ful military state upon the ruins of the mon- pain ' archy of the Stuarts. To Cromwell Spain addressed itself with the most tempting offers. The old English jealousy of France, and the political advantage of resisting its growing strength, were urged in favour of a Spanish alli- ance. Cromwell might renew the old glories of the Plan- tagenets, and might gather round him the forces of the Hu- guenots of the south. If Charles I. had failed at Rochelle, Cromwell might establish himself firmly at Eordeaux. 224 The End of tfie War. 1660. For a moment Cromwell was shaken. Then he made two demands of the Spanish ambassador. He must have, he said freedom for Englishmen to rcfiises 3 " 1 trade in the Indies, and permission for Eng- te r rms WeU ' S lishmen carrying on commercial inter- course with Spain to profess their religion openly without interference. " To give you this," was the Spaniard's cool reply, " would be to give you my master's two eyes." To beat down religious exclusiveness and commercial exclusiveness was the work to which Cromwell girded himself. An alliance with France was between' 3 " quickly made. The arrogant intolerance of England" 1 " 1 Spain was to perish through its refusal to admit the new principle of toleration. The politic tolerance of France was to rise to still higher fortunes by the admission of the principle on which all its successes had been based since Richelieu's accession to power. In 1657, six thousand of Cromwell's Ironsides landed to take part in continental warfare. The union of Turenne's strategy with the valour and discipline which had broken down opposition at Naseby and Wor- cester was irresistible. That autumn the small Flemish port of Mardyke surrendered. In 1658 Dunkirk was taken, and given over, according to compact, to the English auxiliaries. But France, too, reaped an ample harvest. Gravelines, Oudenarde, Ypres saw the white flag of France flying from their ramparts. Spain was reduced to seek for peace. In 1660 the Treaty of the Pyrenees, a supplement as it were to the Treaty of Westphalia, put an end to the Treaty of the long war. The advantages of the peace were all on the side of France. Roussillon and Artois, with Thionville, Landrecies, and Avesnes, i66o. War between France and Spain. 225 were incorporated with France. Another condition was pregnant with future evil. Lewis XIV. gave his hand to the sister of Philip IV. of Spain, the next heiress to the Spanish monarchy after the sickly infant who became afterwards the imbecile and childish Charles II. At her marriage she abandoned all right to the great in- heritance ; but even at the time there were not wanting Frenchmen of authority to point to circumstances which rendered the renunciation null and void. Richelieu's power had been based upon tolerance at home and moderation abroad. Was it likely that his successors would always imitate his exam- 1 The pie? What guarantee could be given that greatness of the French monarchy would not turn its on its tolerance, back upon the principles from which its strength had been derived ? In a land of free discussion, every gain is a permanent one. When Protestantism, or toleration, or freedom of the press, or freedom of trade had been once accepted in England, they were never abandoned; they became articles of popular belief, on which no hesi- tation, except by scattered individuals, was possible. Multitudes who would find it difficult to give a good reason why they thought one thing to be true and another untrue, had yet a hazy confidence in the result of the battle of reason which had taken place, much in the same way as there are millions of people in the world who believe implicitly that the earth goes round the sun, without being able to give a reason for their belief. In France it was hard for anything of the kind to take place. Tolerance was admitted there by the mere will of the government in the seventeenth century, just as free trade was admitted by the mere appended 'on will of the government in the nineteenth ^ e wiU of tne century. The hand that gave could also 236 The End of the War. 1660. take away ; and it depended on the young king to decide whether he would walk in the steps of the great minister who had cleared the way before him, or whether he would wander into devious paths of his own seeking. At first everything promised well. A great statesman, Colbert, filled the early part of the manhood of Lewis XIV. with a series of domestic reforms, the tolerance of least of which would have gladdened the heart of Richelieu. Taxation was reduced, the tolls taken upon the passage of goods from one pro- vince to another were diminished in number, trade and industry were encouraged, the administration of justice was improved ; all, in short, that it was possible to do within the circle of one man's activity was done to make France a prosperous and contented land. But the happy time was not of long duration. The war fever took pos- session of Lewis ; the lust of absolute domination entered into his heart. He became the tyrant and bully of Eu- rope ; and as abroad he preferred to be feared rather than to be loved, at home he would be content with nothing else than the absolute mastery over the con- sciences as well as over the hearts of his subjects. The Edict of Nantes, issued by Henry IV. and confirmed by the policy of Richelieu, was revoked, and intolerance and persecution became the law of the French monarchy, as it had been the law of the Spanish monarchy. It was not for this that Henry IV. and Rl- l 12. Fate chelieu had laboured. The tree that bears no French f rint must be cut down to the ground, or it will monarchy perish by its own inherent rottenness. As the Empire had fallen, as the Spanish monarchy had fallen, the French monarchy, shaken by the thunders of La Hogue and Blenheim, fell at last, when, amidstthe corrup* tion of Versailles, it ceased to do any useful work for man. INDEX. AUS AACHEN (Aix-la-Chaj>elle) place of coronation, 2. Administrators. See Bishoprics. Aix la-Chapelle. See Aachen. Aldringer, offers to assist Wallen- stein, 175 ; declares against him, 177 ; tries to seize him, 177. Alsace, Mansfeld in, 50 ; his designs there, 56 ; Mansfeld returns, to, 60 ; pioposed march of Mansfeld to 75 ; its possession of importance to France, 191 ; comes into French possession, 197. Anhalt. Prince of. See character of Anhalt. Anne of Austria, Regent of France, 205. Anspach, the Margrave of, hopes for a revolution, 135. Anstruther, Sir Robert, his mission to the King of Denmark, 84. Arnim, ordered by Wallenstein to besiege Stralsund, 108 ; commands the Saxons at Breitenfeld, 139 ; his conference with Wallenstein, 153 ; is expected to meet Wallenstein at Eger, 179. Arras, besieged by Conde, 223. Augsburg, city of, swears obedience to Gustavus, 150 ; besieged by the imperialists, 187; resists Turenne, 212. Augsburg, Peace of, 9 ; questions arising out of \\, 10 ; evaded by the Protestants, 11. Austria, Lower, estates of, attempt to wring concessions from Ferdi- nand, 36. Austria, Upper, surrenders to Maxi- milian, 42 ; pledged to Maximilian, 46; restored to Ferdinand, 119. BET Austria, the House of; territories governed by it, 9 ; its branches, 24. Avesnes incorporated with France, 225. BAUTZEN, besieged by John George, 42. Bergen-op-zoom, siege of, 63. Bernhard of Weimar, joins the King of Denmark, 101 ; joins Gustavus, 138; takes the command of the Swedes at Liitzen, 163; his expec- tations after the death of Gustavus, 166 ; his duchy of Franconia. 167; takes Ratisbon, 173 ; is invited to assist Wallenstein, 179; prepares to march to Eger, 179; is defeated at Nbnilingen, 183; loses his duchy of Franconia, 183 ; his alliance with France, 190 ; defeats the imperial- ists at Rheinfelden and takes kheinfelden. F'eiburg, and Brei- sach, 195 ; his death, 196. Bachararch, misery at, 187. Baden-Durlach, Margrave of, joins Frederick, 54 ; defeated at Wimp- fen, 57; abandons his allies, 60; aids the King of Denmark, 101. Bamberg and Wiirzburg, Bishop of, attacked by Mansfeld, 49. Baner, defeats the Imperialists at Wittstock, 194; is driven back to the coast of the Baliic, 195; fights in different parts of Germany, 196. B&rwalde, treaty of, 132. Bethlen Gabor, P'ince of Transylva- nia, attacks Austria, 40 ; prepares to aid Frederick, 44 ; defeats Buc- quoi, 49 ; threatens Austria, 88, 94; is joined by Mansfeld, 97; withdraws from the contest, 101. 227 228 Index. BRE Bishoprics, question connected with them left unsettled at the Peace of Augsburg, 10 ; in the north they mainly fall under Protestant ad ministrators, 12 ; forcible recon- version of the population where this is not the case, 14; Protestant administrators not acknowledged by the Diet, 14 ; attempt to brin.^ over Cologne and Strasburg to Protestantism, 14 ; questions relat- ing to them settled for a time at Miihlhausen, 41; reopened after the battle of Stadtlohn, 67 ; names of those reclaimed in the Edict of Restitution, 121 ; arrangement for them at the treaty of Prague, 184. Boguslav, Duke of Pomerania, com- f)elled to accept a garrison by Wal- enstein, 108 ; supports Wallenstein in the siege of Stralsund no ; com- plains of Wallenstein's soldiers, 127 ; submits to Gustavus, 130. Bohemia, the Royal Charter granted in, 25; its infringement, 27; ac- knowledgment of Ferdinand as its king, 28 ; revolution in 29 ; direc- tors appointed. 32 ; war begins in, 32 ; political incapacity of the re- volutionary government, 32 ; it make^ application to foreign powers, 35 ; election of Frederick as king, 38 ; suppression of the Revolution, 45 ; occupied by John George, 151.; the Saxons driven out of, 155 ; Tor- stenson's occupation of, 209. Bohemia King of, h s functions as an Elector, 1. See also Rudolph If., Matthias, Frederic* V., and Ferdinand II. Bohemian Brethren expelled from Bohemia, 46. Brande burg, bishopric of, named in the Edict of Restitution, 131. Brandenburg, Elector of, 1. See also John Sigismund, and George William. Biaunau, Protestant church at, 27. Breda, siege of, 76 Breisach, taken by Bernhard, 195. Bieisgan, taken possession of by the French, 195. Breitenfeld, battle of, 141. Bremen, archbishopric of, connexion of. with Christian IV., 78; named in the Edict of Restitution, 120; given up to Sweden, 214. CHE Bridge of Dessau, battle of, 96. Brunn, besieged by Torstenson, 209, Brunswick, peace negotiations at, 93. Brussels, conferences for peace at, 52. 57. 6°/ Bucquoi, commands the army in- vad" lg Bohemia, 32 ; defeats Mans- fcld, 3- ; joined by Maximilian, 43 ; advises to delay a battle, 44 ; is killed, 49. Buckingham, Duke of, his expedition to Rhe, 114; intends to raise the siege of Rochelle, 115 ; is mur- dered, 115. Budweis, attacked by the Bohemians, 32. Burgundy, Eastern. See Franche Comte. Butler, receives orders to capture Wallenstein, 180 : consults on the murder with Leslie and Gordon, CALVINISM in Germany, 18. _ Camin, bishopric of, named in the Edict of Restitution, 121. Casale, sieges of, 1.-2, 123. Catalonia, insurrection of, 199. Charles I., King of England, lorms an alliance with Christian IV., 86 ; is unable to fulfil his engagement, 95 ; sends Sir C. Morgan to aid Chris- tian IV., 101 ; quarrels with France, xii ; attempts to succour Rochelle, 113; his arrangements about the Spanish fleet in the Downs, 198. Charles V., his strength external to the empire, 8; his meeting with Luiher, 9 ; forced to yield to lh« Protestants, 9. Charles Emanuel, Duke of Savoy, helps the Bohemians, 33 ; plans Kir his advancement in Germany, 35 ; attacks Genoa, 76; reduced to sub- mission by Richelieu, 122. Charles L wis. Elector Palatine, claims his father's dominion, 198; rect lves the Lower Palatinate, 214. Charles, Prince of Wales proposed marriage with an Infanta, 51 ; treaty with Spain broken off, 70 ; proposed marriage with Henrietta Maria. 74. See shades 1., King of England. Charles the Great (Charlemagne) nature of his authority, 2. Cherasco, tieaty of, 135. Index. 229 COR Chichester, Lord, his embassy to the Palatinate, 59. Christian IV., King of Denmark; his connection with Germany, 78 ; his views on the course of the war, 79 ; his offers to England to make war, 84 ; his offer accepted, 85 ; at- tacked by Tilly, 94 ; defeated at Luiter, 96 ; refuses Wallenstein's terms of peace, 101 ; sends agents to Stralsund, 109 ; makes peace at Liibeck, 117. Christian of Anhalt, leader of the German Calvinists, 38; his cha- racter and policy, 18 ; his part in the foundation of the Union, 21 ; his intrigues in Austria, 26; his plan for supporting the Bohemians, 34 ; commands the Bohemian army, 44. Christian of Brunswick, administra- tor of Halberstadt, his instalment in the cathedral, 54; resolves to take part in the war, 55 ; invades the diocese of Paderborn, 55 ; de- feated at Hochst, 59 ; retreats to Alsace, 60; marches through Lor- raine, 63 ; loses his arm at Fleurus, 64 ; threatens the Lower Saxon Circle, 65 ; negotiates with the Em- peror, 6f ; is defeated at Stadtlohn, and resigns the See of Halberstadt, 67 ; joins Christian IV., 95 ; dies, 96. Christina, Queen cf Sweden, 166. Christina, Regent of Savoy, assisted by the French, 197. Church lands secularized, 10, 11 ; legal decision about them against the Protestants, 14. Cities, free imperial, their part in the Diet, 6. Cleves, war of succession in, 21. Coblentz, fired at by the French in Ehrenbreitstein, 187. Colbert, his reforms, 226. Cclogne, Elector of, 1 ; failure of an attempt by him to bring over the electorate to Protestantism, 14. Conde, Prince of, takes part with Spain, 223. Convention of Passau. See Pas- sau. Corbie, taken by the Spaniards, and retaken by the French, 193. Cordova, Gonzales de, commands the Spaniards in the Lower Palati- nate, 50; takes Hurt in the battle EMP ofWimpfen, 57; joins in defeating Christian of Brunswick at K6chst c 59 ; c mmands at Fleurus, 63. Corneille, writes " The Cid," 169. Cromwell, courted by France and Spain, 223; decides to help France, 334. DANHOLM, seized by Wallen. stein's soldiers, 109. Darmstadt, entered by Mansfeld, 58. Descartes, his first work published, 169. Dessau, the Bridge of, battle of, 96. Devereux, murders Wallenstein, 180. Diet of the Empire, 1 ; its reform in the J5th century, 5; its constitu- tion, 5 ; how far opposed to Pro- testantism, 8 ; its meeting in 1608, 21. Directors of Bohemia appointed, 31. Donauworth, occupation of, 20 ; en- tered by Gustavus, 149; surren- ders to Turenne 212. Downs, the Spanish fleet takes refuge in the, 198. Dunkirk, surrender of, 224. EAST FRIESLAND, invaded by Mansfeld, 64. Ecclesiastical reservation, the. See Bishoprics. Edict of Restitution, issued, 120. Eger, Wallenstein summons his colo- nels to, 179. Eggenberg confers with Wallenstein, 99 ; favours Wallenstein's restora- tion, 151 ; joins Onate against Wal- lenstein, 176. Ehrenbreitstein, receives a French garrison, 170; fires on Coblentz, 187. Elector Palatine, 1. See also Frede- rick IV., and Frederick V. Electors, functions of, 1 ; their part in the Diet, 6 ; their quarrel with Wallenstein, 103, 124 ; demand Wallenstein's dismissal, T27. Eliot, Sir John, his satisfaction at the victories of Gustavus, 142. Elizabeth, Electress Palatine, en- courages her husband to accept the crown of Bohemia, 39. Emperor, functions of, 1 ; he is prac- tically scarcely more than a Ger- man king, 2. 2JO Index. FER Enghien, Duke of (afterwards Prince of Conde), defeats the Spaniards at Rocroy, 206 ; commands at the battle of Freiburg and Nordlingen, 208. See Conde, Prince of. England. See James I., Chaides I., l. harles, Prince of Wales. English ambassador (the Earl of Ar- undel >, notes of his journey through Germany, 187. Erfurt, Gustavus at, 147. FABRIC1US, thrown out of win- dow, 30. Felton, murders Buckingham. 115, Ferdinand, the Archduke, afterwards the Emperor Ferdinand I., repre- sents Charles V., at Augsburg, 10. Ferdinand, Archduke (afterwards the Emperor Ferdinand II.) rules Sty- ria, Carinthia, and Carniola, 24 ; puts down Protestantism there, 24 ; acknowledged as Ki g of Bohemia, 28 ; his character, 28 ; swears to the Royal Charter, 29 ; elected Kingof Hungary, 32 ; receives help from Spain, 33 ; promises to re- spect the Royal Charter, 36; be- sieged by Mansfeld, 37 ; elected .h-mperor, 38 ; comes to terms with Maximilian, 40 ; puts Frederick to the ban, 46 ; refuses to go beyond the agreement of MUhlhausen, 68 ; accepts Wallenstein's offer to raise an army, 89 ; grants Mecklenburg to Wallenstei.i, 105, 118 ; oppresses the Protestants, 120 ; recovers Up- per Austria, 119 ; takes part in the Mantuau war, 121 ; carries out the Edict of Restitution, 126; despises Gustavus, 134; refuses to aband 11 the Edict, 137 ; looks to Spain for help, 15c; hesitates what to do about Wallenstein, 174; decides against him, 176 ; consents to the Peace of Prague, 184 • his death, . '94- »"erdinand, King of Hungary (after- wards the Emperor Ferdinand III.); his marriage, 174 ; com- mands the army after Wallens'ein's death, 182 ; becomes Emperor, 194; reluctance to surrender Al- sace to the French, 210. Ferdinand, tha Cardinal-infant ; pro- FRE posed command of, resisted by Wallenstein, 171 ; joins the King of Hungary before the battle of Nordlingen, 182 ; proceeds to Brus- sels, 183; invades France, 192. Fleurus, battle of, 63. France, takes precautions against Mansfeld, 63 ; its internal dissen- sions, 77, 112 ; at war with Eng- land, 113; intervenes in Italy and makes peace with England, 122 ; supremacy of Richelieu in, 168 ; places itself at the head of a Ger- man alliance, 189 ; declares war openly against Spain, 192 ; con- tinues the war with Spain, 197 ; its victories over Spain, 205 ; its vic- tories in Germany, 307; its gains by the Peace of Westphalia, 214 ; continuance of its war with Spain, 221 ; successes of, in Flanders, 224 ; its gains by the treaty of the Pyrenees , 224 ; its condition under Lewis XIV , 226. Franche t_omte, included in the Em- pire, 2. Franconia, duchy of, assigned to Bernhard, 167 ; taken from him, „ [8 3- Frankenthal, garrisoned by Vere's troops, 57 ; given up to the Span- iards, 60. Frankfort-on-the Main, place of coro- nation, 2. Frankfort-on-the-Oder, taken by Gustavus, 134. Frederick III., the Emperor, words used to him. 2. Frederick IV., Elector Palatine, nominal leader of the Calvinists, 18 ; his death, 31. Frederick V., Elector Palatine, his marriage, 31 ; encourages the Bohe- mians, 31 ; proposal that he shall mediate in Bohemia, 34 ; is elected King of Bohemia, 38 ; becomes un- popular at Prague, 43 ; his defeat at the White Hill, 45 ; takes refuge at the Hague, 45 ; put to the ban, 46 ; maintains his claims to Bo- hemia, 48 ; proposal that his eldest son shall be educated at Vienna, 52 ; his prospects in 1O22, 53 ; joins Mansfeld in Alsace, 57 ; seizes the Landgrave of Darmstadt, 58 ; driven back to Mannheim 59; re- turns to the Hague, ou ; enters Index. 231 GUS Munich with Gustavus, 150; his dea.h, 171. Freiburg (in the Breisgau\ surrenders to Berahard, 195 ; retaken, 208 ; battle of; 208. Friedland, Prince and Duke of. See Wallenstein. Friesiand. See East FriesLand. Fronde, the, 217. Fuentes, Count of, killed at Rocroy, 207. Fiirth, Wallenstein's entrenchments at, 158. GALLAS, offers to assist Wallen- stein, 175. Gassion advises the French to give battle at Rocroy, 206. Gaston, Duke of Orleans, leaves France, 167 ; takes part in a re- bellion, 168. George of Ltineburg, a Lutheran in ' Wallenstein's service, 98 : sent into Silesia, roi. George William, Elector of Branden- burg, consents to his sister's mar- riage with Gustavus, 81 ; refuses to join Gustavus, 131 ; compelled to submit to him, 135. Germany, its political institutions, 1-7 ; what it included, 2 ; divided into circles, 6 ; its miserable condi- tion, 186 ; its condition after the Peace of Westphalia. 217. Gliickstadt, fortified by Christian IV., 78 ; siege of, 117. Gordon, his part in Wallenstein's murder, 180. Gravelines surrenders to the French, 224. Guebriant, defeats the Imperialists at Wolfenbiittel and Kempten, 201. Guise, the Dukeof, leaves France, r68. Guiton, Mayor of Rochelle, 115. Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden, his character, 79; early struggles, 80; visits Germany, 81 ; hostile to the growth of the Empire, 82 ; views on religion and politics, 83 ; projects a general league against the House of Austria, 84; refuses to taice part in it on the terms of- fered, and attacks Poland, 86 ; sends help to Stralsund, 104 ; makes peac^ with Poland, 124 ; negotiates with France, 224 ; lands in Pomerania, HEN 127 ; gains possession of the lands on the Baltic coast, 131 ; negotiates with France, 131 ; signs the treaty of Birwalde, 132; compels the Elector of Brandenburg to join him, 135 ; fails to relieve Magdeburg, 136 ; entrenches himself at Wer- ben, 138 ; allies himself with Saxony, 139 ; his skill as a commander, 140 ; defeats Tilly at Breitenfeld, 141 ; receives overtures from Wallenstein, 143 ; his political plans, 144 ; de- termines to march to the Rhine, 145 ; keeps Christmas at Mentz, 147; his reception at Nuremberg, 148; enters Donauwarth, and de- feats Tilly at the Lech, 149 ; occu- pies Munich, 1 50 ; lays down terms of peace, 1 56 ; proposes a league of the cities, 157 ; rebukes his officers, 159 ; fails in storming Wallenstein's entrenchments, 160 ; follows Wal- lenstein into Saxony, 161 ; attacks Wallenstein at Lotzen, 162 ; his death, 163 ; his future plans, 165. IT AGENAU, seized by Mansfeld, Hague, the, Frederick takes refuge there, 45 ; returns after his cam- paign in Germany, 60. Halberstadt, diocese of, Christian of Brunswick Bishop of it, 54 ; for- feited by his treason, 65 ; occupied by Wallenstein, 92 ; named in the Edict of Restitution, 120; execu- tion of the Edict at, 125 ; not re- covered by the Protestants at the treaty of Prague, 184; restored at the peace of Westphalia, 214. Halle, Pappenheim's march to, 162. Hamburg, its commerce, 78 ; refuses to submit to Wallenstein, no. Hanse Towns, offers made them by the Emperor, 106. Havelberg,bishopricof, named in the Edict of Restitution, 121. Heidelberg, garrisoned by Vere, 57 ; taken by Tilly, 61 ; treatment of Protectants at, 119. Heilbronn, the league of, 167 ; its leading members excepted from the amnesty of the treaty of Prague, 184. Heiligenhafen, combat of, 102. Henry IV., King of France, plans in- tervention in Germany, 22. 23 a Index. JOH Henry the Fowler, notan emperor, 2. Hesse Cassel, L.ndgrave of. See Maurice, and William. Hesse Darmstadt. See Lewis. Hochst, battle of, 59. Horn, commands a Swedish force in Mecklenburg, 134 ; is defeated at Niirdiingen, 18.3. Huguenots, nature of toleration granted to, 173; insurrection of 77, 112; tolerated by Richelieu, 116. Hungary, political divisions of, 40. IMPERIAL Council {Reichsho- frath) intervenes in the case of Donauworth, 20. Imperial Court (Re-ichskammerge- richt), institution, 6 ; out of work- ing order, 19. Ingolstadt, Tilly's death at, 149. Italy, kingdom of, 3., 122. JAMES I., K ng of England, offers to mediate In Bohemia and Ger- many, 35, 47 ; proposes to pay Mansfeld, 51 ; his negotiations with Spain, 51, jo ; desires aid from France, 71 ; supports Mansfeld, 75 ; orders him not to relieve Breda, 76 ; agreement with Christian IV., 85 ; death of, 86 Jankow, battle of, 209. Jesuits, the, appear in Germany, 13. John Ernest, Duke of Saxe- Weimar, ideas of religious liberty, 94; sup- ports Mansield, 96; dies., 101. John George, Elector of Saxony, at the head of the Lutheran and neu- tral party, 15, 22 ; wishes to pacify Bohemia, 31 : his. share in Ferdi- nand's election to the Empire, 38; is gained over by Maximilian 41 ; his vacillations in 1622, 62 ; refuses to join in the Danish war, 87 ; his son elected administrator of Mag- deburg, 126 ; attempts to mediate between Gustavus and the Em- peror, 133, 134 ; joins Gustavus, 139 ; failure of his army at Breiten- feld, 141 ; despatched into Bohe- mia, 151 ; enters Prague, 151 ; is driven out of Bohemia, 155; pro- poses terms of peace to Gustavus, 156; refuses to join the league of Heilbruun, 167; negotiates, with LOR Wallenstein, 170 ; hopes for peace, 184 ; agrees to the Peace of Prague, 185; his troops defeated at Witt- stock, 194. John Sigismund, Elector of Branden- burg his claim to the duchy oi Cleves, 21 ; turns l.alvinist, 22. Joseph Father, employed as Riche- lieu's agent, 128. KEMPTEN, battle of, 201. Klostergrab, Protestant church at, 27. Kiiln. See Cologne. LA FORCE, commands at Paris, *93- Lamonnain, Father. Ferdinand's confessor, declares against peace, Landrecies incorporated with France, 224. League, the Catholic, its formation, 21 ; agrees to the treaty ef Ulni, 42. See Maximilian, Duke of Ba- varia. Lebus. bishopric of, 121. Lech, battle at the passage of the, 149. Leipzig, assembly at, 133. Leipzig, batde of. See Breitenfeld. Leslie, his part in Wallenstein's mur- der, 180. Leuchtenberg, Landgrave of, taken prisoner by Mansfeld, 40. Lewis XIII., King of France, hit character, 72 ; his jealousy of Spain, 73 ; summons Richelieu to his council, 74 ; takes part against Spain, 75 ; his policy towards the Huguenots, 112 ; at war with Eng- land, 113 ; invades Italy, 122 ; dis- likes the success of Gustavus, 148 ; takes the field against Spain, 193 ; dies, 205. Lewis X1Y., King of France, acces- sion of, 205. Lewis, Landgrave of Hesse Darm- stadt, ta en prisoner, 58. Lombardy, the iron crown of, 3. Lorraine (Lothringen), included in the Empire. 2 ; Mansfeld and Chris- tian of Brunswick, in, 63. Lorraine, Duke of, joins the Span- iards against Gustavus, 158; is re- duced to subjection by France, 170. Index. 233 MAN Lower Saxony, Circle of, threatened by Christian of Brunswick and Tilly, 64 ; refuses to support Chris- tian, 65 ; disunion amongst its members, 68 ; attacked by Tilly, 87. Llibeck, bishopric of named in the Edict of Restitution, 121. Liibeck, Peace of, 117. Lusatia, invaded by the Saxons, 42. Luther, his meeting with Charles V.,9. Lutherans, 17; their estrangements from Frederick in Bohemia, 43 ; still remain in Paderborn, 55. Lutter, battle of, 96. Liitzen, battle of, 161. MAGDEBURG, city of, refuses to admit Wallenstein's troops, 105, 126 ; declares for Gustavus, 134 ; stormed and sacked, 136. Mag eburg, diocese of, occupied by WalleLStein, 92 ; included in the ' Edict of Restitution, 120 ; execu- tion of the Edict at, 126. M.igdeburg, Protest .nt administra- tor of, not acknowledged as Arch- bishop by the Diet, 14. Maintz. See Mentz. Majest'dtsbrief. See Royal Charter. Manheim, garrisoned by Vere, 57 ; retreat of Frederick and Mansfeld to, 59 ; taken by Tilly, 60. MansLld, C unt Ernest of, takes service with the Bohemians and besieges Pilsen, 33; tikes the field against Bucquoi, 36 ; is defea ed by him, 37 ; character of his army, 48 ; occupies the Upper Palatinate, 49 ; marches into Alsace, 50 ; aims at becoming master of part of it, 56 ; invades the Lower Palatinate, 57; seizes the La ndgrav of Darm- stadt, 58 ; state of his army, 59 ; retreats to Alsace, 60 ; occupies Lorraine, 63 ; cuts his way through the Spanish, Netherlands, relieves Bergen-op-zoom, and invades East Friesland, 64 ; returns to the Neth- erlands, 69 ; assisted by France, 74 ; proposed march into Alsace, 75 ; fails to relieve Breda 76 ; sent to help the King of Denmark, 86 ; joins Christian IV., 94 ,- defea ed at the Bridge of l3c:r.au, 96 ; marches through Silesia into Hun- gary, 96 ; dies, 97. MER Mantua and Montferrat, war of suc- cession .n, 121. Mardyke, surrender of, 224. Martinitz, one of the Regents of Bo- hemia, thrown out ot window, 30. Mary of Medici, opposes Richelieu, 132 ; obliged to leave France, 160. Matthias, Archduke, rises against Rudolph II., 25 ; succeeeds as Em eror, 26. See Matthias, Em- peror. Matthias, Emperor, his election, 26 ; his attempts to brea't the Royal Charter, 27 ; his death, 36. Maurice-, Landgrave of Hesse Cassel, submits to Spinola, 47. Maximilian, Archduke, governs Ty- rol, 24. Maximilian, Duke of Bavaria, his character and policy, 15 ; his part in the formation of the League 21 ; prepares tu attack Bohemia, 39 ; proposed transference of the Pa- latinate Electorate to, 40 ; gains over the North German princes, 41; attaches Austria and Bohemia, 42 ; receives Upper Austria in pledge, 46 ; receives the Electorate, 6t ; his policy after the peace of LUbeck, 118 ; makes an iffort against the French, 207; is ready to surrender Alsace to the French, 211 ; but refuses to surrender the Upper Palatinate, 211 ; makes a truce, which does not last long, 213. Mayence. See Mentz Mazarin, Cardinal, Minister of Anne cf Austria, 205. Mecklenburg, Dukes of their land pledged to Wallenstein, 105 ; for- mally given to Wallenstein, 118. Meissen. See Misnia. Melancthon, his protect against theo- logical disputation, 13. Mentz, entered by Spinola, 42 ; treaty for the dissolution of the Union signed at, 47. Mentz, Archbishop of, one of the Electors, 6 ; lays claim to lands in North Germany, 98. Mentz, city of, Gustavus at, 147 ; given over to Oxenstjerna, 148 ; misery at, 187. Mercy, prudence of, 208 ; is killed, 208 ; Merseburg, bishopric of, named in the Edict of Restitution, 121. 234 Index. NUR Merseburg, city of, taken by Pap- penheim, 139. Metz, annexed by France. 215. Minden, bishopric of, named in the Edict of Restitution , lai. Misnia, bishopric of, named in the Edict of Restitution, 121. Montmorenci, Duke of, his rebellion, 168. Morgan, Sir Charles, commands an English force sent in aid of Den- mark, 101. M'uhlhau- en (in Thuringia), agree- ment of, 41 ; meeting of the Electors at, 103. Munich, occupied by G istavus, 150. Miinster, meeiing of diplomatists at, 210. Miinster, diocese of, threatened by Mansfeld, 64. NANCY taken possession of by the French, 180. Nantes, Edict of, 71 ; its revocation, 226. Naumburg, bishopric of, named in the Edict of Restitution, 121. Naurnburg, city of, entered by Gus- tavus, 161. Netherlands, the, included in the Kmpire, 2. Netherlands, the Spanish, defended against a French attack, 191. Netherlands, United States of the, end of their truce with Spain, 51 ; acknowledgment of their indepen- dence, 221 Neuberg, Wolfgang Wilhelm, Count Palatine of, lays claim to the duchy of Cleves, 22 ; has his ears boxed, 22. Neustadt, misery at, 188. Nevers, Duke of, his claims to the succession in Mantua, 122. New Brandenburg, taken by Tilly, J 34- Nienburg, holds out for Christian IV., 101. Nordheim, holds out for Christian IV., 101. N<*r lingen. treatment of the Pro- test nts at, 120 ; battle of, 183 ; second battle of, 208 ; surrenders to Turenne, 213. Nureiiibi-rg joins the Union, 20, 21 ; meeting of the Union at, 41 ; de- PIL serts the Union, 47 ; welcomes Gustavus, 148 ; despatches Gustav- us against Wallenstein, 158; suffer- ings of, 158. ONATE, opposes Wallenstein, 175; proposes to kill Wallen- stein, 177. Oppenheim, stormed by Gustavus, M7- Os. abriick, election of a Catholic Bishop of, 67 ; meeting of diploma- tists ai, 217. Otto the Great, becomes Emperor, 2. Oudenarde, surrender to the French, 224. Oxenstjerna, his view of Gustavus' march upon the Rhine, 145 ; re- ceives the government of Mentz. 148 ; his position after the dea'.h of Gustavus, 166 ; an, 12 ; contrast be- tween it in the north and the south, Pyrenees, treaty of the, 224. RATISBON, diets held at, 61, 127; taken by Bernhard, 173. | Ratseburg, bishopric of, named in 1 the Edict of Restitution, 121. Regensburg. See Ratisb m. ! Reichshofrath. See Imperial Council. Reichskammergericht. See Imperial C >urt. Rhe, Isle of, Buckingham's expedi- tion to, 114. Rheinfelden, battli of, 195. Richelieu, bee imcs a minister of Louis XIII., 74 ; recovers the Val- telline 75 ; his plans frustrated by the insurrection of the Huguenots, 77; wishe. to make peace with them, 112 ; causes of his success, 116; his policy of toleration, 116; takes part in the Mantuan War, 122 ; negotiates wiih Swede ', 124; is startled by the victories of Gus- tavus, 148: defends himself against the French aristocracy, 167 ; na- ture of the government esta lished SPA by him, 168 ; his aims in Europe. 169 ; intervenes more decidedly in Germany, 184, 190 ; aims at the conquest of Alsace, 191 ; obtains conirol ov r for resses in Alsace, 192 ; failure of his a'tack upon the S anish Netherlands, 192 ; suc- cessfully resists a Spanish invasion, 193 ; continues the struggle with Spain, 197 ; his successes, 197, 201 ; his deithan 1 policy, 201. Rochelle, insurrection of, 77, 112 ; siege of, 114; surrender of, 115; subsequent treatment of, 116. Rocroy, attacked by the Spaniards, 206 ; battle of, 207. Rohan, Duke of, insurrection of, 123. Rostock, its harbour blocked up by Wauenstein, 108. Roussitlon, conquered by France, 200, 201 ; annexed to France, 224. Royal Charter, the ( Majest'dtsbrief), granted by Rudolph II., 25 , its for- feiture declared, 45 Riidesheim, misery at, 187. Rudolph II., Emperor, his part in the Austrian territjries, 24; grants the Royal Charter of Bohr-mia, 5 ; tries to withdraw it 26; dies, 26; fate of his art-treasures, 43. Rupert, Prince, his birth at Prague, 43- SALUCES, siezed by Richelieu, 124. Salzburg, persecution of Protestants of, 216. Saxony, Elector of, 1. See also John George. Savoy, Duke of. See Charles Emanuel. Schorndorf, surrenders to Turenne, 212. Sigismund, King of Poland, a claim- ant to the crown o 1 Sweden, 81. Sigismund, the Emperor, anecdote of, 2. Slawata, one of the Regents ■ f Bohe- mia, 30 ; thrown out of window 30. Soissons, Count of, rebels in France, 200. Soubise, Duke of, rebels, 77. Spain, intervenes in the war, 42 ; anxious for peace, 43 ; military position of in 1624, 74 ; loses tie Valtelline, 75 ; takes part in the Mantua war, 121 ; supports Wal- 236 Index. TIL lenstein, 151 ; takes part in the war on the Rhino, is8; turns against Wallenstein, 171 ; at war with France, 192 ; invades France, 193 ; naval inferiority of, 197, 198 ; rebellion of the Catalans, 199 ; loss of Portugal, 200 ; continues the war with France after the Peace of We tphalia, 221; continues the war with Fi ance, 221 ; agrees to the Peace of the Pyrenees, 224. Spens, Sir James, his mission to Sweden, 84. Spinola, attacks the Palatinate, 42 ; returns to Brussels, 50; besieges Bergen-op-znom, 63 ; besieges Bre- da, 75 ; besieg"S Casale, 123. Spires, Bishop of, attacked by Vere, So. Stade, taken by Tilly, 117. Stadtlohn. battle of, 66. Stenay, besieged by Conde, 223. Stralsund, siege of, 108. Strasburg, Bishopric of, failure of an attempt to place it in Protestant hands, 14. Strasburg, city of joins the Union, 20, 21 ; deserts it, 47. Sweden, her gains at the Peace of Westphalia, 214. Switzerland included in the Empire, TABOR, occupied by Mansfeld, 48. Thionville, besieged by the French, 207 ; annexed to France, 224. Thirty Years' War, the disputes which led to it, 14 ; commencement of, 30 ; end of, 213. Thurn, ('ount He.i y of, his part in the Bohemian Revolution, 30; his operations against Bucquot, 33; besieges Vienna, 36; aids Chris- tian IV., 101. Tilly, commands the army of the League, 42 ; his part in the con- quest of fiohem a, 44; his army, 48 ; conquers the Upper Palati- nate, 50 ; invade* the Lower Pa- latinate, 51 ; his prospects in 1622, 55 ; defeats the Margrave of Baden at Wimpfen, 57 ; defeats 1 hristian of Brunswick at H; subdues Silesia, rot ; conq-iers SchJ swig and Jutland, Ivj2 ; cotipiajnts of the Electors against him, 103 ; his fresh levies, it 4 ; Mt-cldeaburt; pledged to him, 105 ; named Admiral of the Baltic, 108 ; attempts to burn the Swedish fleet, 108 ; besieges Stralsund, 108 ; assists in the siege of Gluckstadt, 117; his inves'iture with the Due >y of MeckSenburg, 118; his bre ch with the Electors, 124; talks njf sacking Rome, .127 ; his depriva- tion denaanded, 127 ; his dismis- sal, i'9 ; mafces overtures to Gus- tavus, 142 ; feTcaks off his imrer- course with G .stavus, 15; ; is ire- instated in command written by authors selected by the editor on account of some especial qualifications for a portrayal of the period they respectively describe. The volumes form an excellent collection, especially adapted to the wants of a general reader." The Publishers will supply these volumes to teachers at SPECIAL NE T RA TES, and would solicit correspondence concerning terms for examination and introduction copies. CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, Publishers 597-599 Fifth Avenue, New York. THE GREAT SUCCESS THE SERIES OF is the best proof of its general popularity, and the excellence of the various volumes is further attested by their having been adopted as text-books in many of our leading educational institu- tions. The publishers beg to call attention to the following list comprising some of the most prominent institutions using volumes of the series : Smith College, Northampton, Mass, Univ. of Vermont, Burlington, Vt. Yale Univ., New Haven, Conn. Harvard Univ., Cambridge, Mass. Bellewood Sem., Anchorage, Ky. Vanderbilt Univ., Nashville, Tenn. State Univ., Minneapolis, Minn. Christian Coll., Columbia, Mo. Adelphi Acad., Brooklyn, N. Y. 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