of % llnttwraty of Nnrttj Qlanilitta (Eolterttatt of Nnrtlj (Earoltmana VC34-2..& \TS8o This book must riot be taken from the Library building. - . Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2013 http://archive.org/details/proceedingsdebatnort I c D £ B A T E S ■ I CON V E NTIO N o r .. ; oRTH-CAROLI N T A, C ! i 7 thU The Said CONS T 1 T U T I O 1 \V 1 H,dcc,;.xxxi* XKXX*XX>*XXXXXXXX rut T I T U T I d N O F THE States of America*, * E A M B L E. eople of the United States, in order t# : \ n ore per fe£r, union, eftablifh juftice, in* nquility, provide for the common defence, eral welfare, and fecure the hleffings of its and our pofterity, do ordain and eita- Li , tution for the United States of America* Article I, 4 ft fj S E of REPRESENTATIVES. : I. 4 LL legiflative powers herein granted fhall, be veiled in a Congrefs of the United States, nfift of a Senate and Houfe of Reprefenta- lie Hou&Vf Rcpicf-p stives ftiall be comp rs chofen every fecond yeW by the f ites, and. the electors in each fta( ions reqinTite for ele&orspf t j le of the ft ate Legiuature. " xs i (ha*! fee a Reprefentative wJ the age of twenty-five years, zen of the United States, ac ed, he an inhabitant of that chofen. ;ntatives and dire& taxes fl e feveral ftates which may be i, cording to their refpecliven^ 4?;te;"sr ied by adding to the w^oK fdns, including thofe bound to fervice for a term f year j, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of \[\ other perfons. The a&ual enumeration (hall be mad< withii three years after the firft meeting of the Congtei of the United States, and within every fubfequent term of ten years, in fuch manner as they {hall by law dire£\ The number of Reipreferitatives mall not exceed one fo ever/ thirty thoufand/ but each ftate (hall have at leaft ofc Re- presentative $ and until fuch enumeration (hall be nade, the ftate of New-Hampfhire fhall be entitled to Qoofe three, Maflachufetts eight, Rhode-Ifland and Proviufe (hall keep a journal of its proceedings, and I from time to time publiffi the fame, excepting fuch parts as may in* their judgment require fecrecy — And the yeas . a&d nap of the members of cither tioufe, on any quefr ; tion. fion, thall, at. the cjefire of brte-fifth of thofe prefen** te entered en the journal. Neither Houfe, during the feffion of Congrefs, (hdll, without the confent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any Other place than that in which the two Houfes {hall be iltting. SeB. VI. The Senators and fteprefentatives (hall x& ceive a compenfation for their fervices, to be afcertained by law, and paid out of the treafury Of the United States* They (hall, in all cafes, except treafon, felony and breach of the peace, be privileged from arreft during the'., at- tendance at the feffion of their refpe&ive Houfef, and in going to and returning from the fame ; and for any fpeech or debate in either houfe, the* (hall Rot be iqueih'oned in any other place. No Senator or fee'pretent&ive than*, during the time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office tinder the authority of the United States, which (hall have been created, or the emoluments whereof (hall have been encreafed during fuch time ; and no perfon holding any office under the United States, {hall be a member of el* ther Houfe, during his continuance in office. P O W E R S of CONGRESS. SeB. VII, All bHls for raifing revenue (hall originate in the Houfe of Representatives ; but the Senate may pro- ofe or concur with amendments as on other bills. Every bill which (hall have paifed the Houfe of Repre* mtatives and the Senate, (hall, before it become a law, «! prefented to the Prefident of "the United States : If he irove he (V II fign it, but if not, he (hall returii it, with _.. .Qions, to that Houfe in which it (hall have origi- nated,* who (hall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconfidcr it. If after fuch re- confideration, two-thirds of that Houfe fhall agree to pafs the bill, it (hall be fent, together with the obje&ions, to the other Houfe, by which it (hall likewife be reconfidered, and if approved by two-thirds of that Houfe, it (hall be- come a law. But in all fuch cafes, the votes of both Houfes (hall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the perfons voting for and againft the bill, (hall be entered on the journal of each Houfe refpeCtively. tf #ay bill (hall not be returned by the Prefident within \&% ( 7 > «tay§ (Sundays excepted) after it (hall have been preferred %o him, the fame (hall be a law in like manner as if he had figned it, unlefs the Congrefs, by their adjournment, prevent its return — in which cafe it (hall not be a law. Every order, refolution, or vote, to which the concur* rence of the Senate and Houfe of Reprefentatives may be neceflary, (except on a queftion of adjournment) iliall be prefented to the Prefident of the United States j and be- fore the fame iliall take effect, fhall be approved by him, or, being difapproved by him, iliall be rcpaffed by two- thirds of the Senate and Houfe of Reprefentatives, ac* Cording to the rules and limitations prescribed in the cafe Of a bill. Seft. VIII. The Congrefs (hall have power to lay and solledi taxes, duties, impofts and excifes, to pay the debts and provide for, the common defence and general welfare of the United S.tatea : But all duties, impofts and excifes iliall be uniform throughout the United States— To bor- row money on the credit of the United States — To regu- late commerce with foreign nations, and among the feve- jal flates, and with the Indian tribes — To eftabliih an u- niform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws on the , fubjecl: of bankruptcies throughout the United States — To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the flandard of weights and meafures — To) provide for the punifhment of counterfeiting the fecurities and current coin of the United States — To eftablifti poft- ©ffices and poft-roads —To promote the progrefs of fcience and ufeful arts, by fecuring for limited times to author* and inventors, the exclufive right to their refpe£Hve writ- ings and difcovcries — To conftitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court — To define and punifh piracies and fe- lonies committed on the high feas,and offences againft the law of nations — To declare war, grant letters of marque and xeprifal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water — To raife and fupport armies j but no appropriation of money to that ufe fhall be for a longer term than two years — To provide and maintain a navy — >To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces — To provide for calling forth the militia to exe- cute the laws of the union, fupprefs infiirre&ions and fepel iavafioa^To provide foy organizing, arming and disciplining i • •) tfifciptming the militia, and for governing fuch part cf tnem as may be employed in the fer vice of the United^ States, referving to the ftates refpeclively, the appoint- mentof the officers, and the authority of training the militia, "according to the discipline prefcribed by Gongrefs — To. exercife exclufive legitimation in all cafes whatsoever, over fetch diftri£V, (not exceeding ten miles fquare) as may by ceflion of particular ftates, and the acceptance of Con- grefs, become the feat of the government of the United States ; ami to exercife like authority over all places pur* chafed by the confent of the Legiilature of the ftate in which the fame mall be, for the erection of forts, maga- zines, arfenals, dock-yards., and other needful buildings % ancj to make all laws which (hall be necefTary and proper fo^ carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vefted by this Confutation in the govern- ment of the United States^ or in any department or of* ficer thereof. RESTRICTIONS upon CONGRESS. Seel. IX. The migration or importation of fuch perfona as any of the ftates now exifting ihall think proper to ad- mit, (hall not be prohibited by the Congrefs prior to the year one thoufand eight hundred and eight, but a tax or duty may be impofed on fuch importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each perfon. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus fhall not be fufpended, unlefs when in cafe? of rebellion or invafion the public fafety may require it. No bill of attainder* or expoftfaclo law {hall be pafledf. No capitation or other diredt tax fhall be laid, unlefa in proportion to the cenfus or enumeration herein before; t his death, refignation or inability to difcharge the pow- ers and dut.es af the foid office, the fame fhall devolve om the Vice-Prefident ; and the Congrefs may by law provide for the cafe of removal, death, refignation or inability, ffi fl^f t KMeitt and Vice-Prefident, declaring what officer (hall then al as Prefident, and fuch officer fhall aft Sta£&2& difabilitybe — d > - p - The ( » ) The Prefident fhall, at Rated times, receive for hi* fcr- vices, a compenfation, which fhali neither be encreafed nor diminiffied during the period for which he ftiall have been elected, and he ihail not receive within that period any other emolument from the United States, or any of them. Before he enters on the execution of his office, he (hall fcake the following oath or affirmation : ** I do folemnly fw. ar (or affirm) that I will faithfully " execute the office of Prefident of the United States, and s< will to the belt of my ability, preferve, protect and de- u fend the gonflitution of the United States." Sea. II. The Prefident mall be Commander in Chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the feveral Hates, when called into the actual fervice of the United States ; he may require the opini- on, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the Executive departments, upon any fubjecTt relating to the duties of their refpe£live offices, and he (hall have powec to grant reprieves and pardons for offences againft the United States, except in cafes of impeachment. He (hall have power, by and with the advice and con- fent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided t«ro-third$ of tlae Senators prefent concur : And he (hall nominate* and by and with the advice and content of the S; nate ? fhall appoint AmbalTadors, other public Minilters and Confute, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other of- ficers of the United States, whofe appointments are not herein otherwife provided for, and which (hall be elta- bliffied bylaw. But the Congrefs may by law veil the appointment of fuch inferior officers, as they think pro- per, in the Prefident alone, in the courts of law, 01 in the heads of departments. The Prefident thall have power to fill up alt vacancies that may happen during the recefs of the Senate, by granting commiffions, which (hall expire at the end of their next fefiipn. Se3 III. He (hall from time to time give to the Con- grefs information of the date of the union, and recom- mend to their confideratipn fuch meafures as he (hall judge nectflarv and expedient ; he may, on extraordinary occa- fcoas, CQavene both Houfos, ox tuber of them, and i« mfo ( *2 ) fcafe of disagreement between them, with refpecl fo the tnre of adjournment, he mav adjourn them to fuch time Ss he (hall think proper *, he ihall receive Ambaffadors and other public Minifters; he ftiaii take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and fhali commifFion all the of- ficers of the United States. Sect. IV. The Prefident, Vice-FrelMent and all civil officers of the United States, ihall be removed from of- fice on impeachment for^ and conviction of, treafon, bri- bery, or other high crimes and mifdemeanors. A r t i c L fe III. JUDICI A R y. Seel, I. The judicial power of the United States (hall be veiled in one Supreme Court, and in fuch Inferior Courts as the Congrefs may from time to time ordain and eftnblith. The judges, both of the Supreme and Inferior Courts, (hall hold their offices during good behaviour, and fhail, at dated times, receive for their fervices, a com- j>enfa'tion, which (halt not be diminifhed during their con- tinuance in office. , Seel. II. The Judicial power mall extend to all cafes, in law and equity, arillng under this Conltituticn, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which ill all be made, under their authority — To all cafes affecling Amhaffadors>» other public Ministers and Confuls — To all cafes of admiralty and maritime jurifdiclion — To contro- verfies to which the United States mall be a £arty — To comroverfies between two or more ftates — between a ftate and citizens of another ftate —between citizens of differ- ent ftates — between citizens of the fame ftate claiming lands under crams of different ftates- — and between a ftate, 'or the citizens thereof, and foreign ftates, citizens or fubjecls. In all cafes affe&ing Ambafladors, other public Mini- fters and Confuls, and thofe in which a ftate lhall be a rrtv, the Supreme Court fhall have original jurifdi£tion. *n all the other cafes before mentioned, the Supreme Court ifhall have apnellate jurifdiclion, both as to law and fatl^ xvhh fu ch exceptions, and under fuch regulations, as the Gopgrefs nhall make. The trial of all crimes, except in cafes of impeach- feent, '-fhail be by jury, arj4 fuch trial ihall be held in the fete ( *3 ) fjUte where the fsjid crime {hall have beeii committed ;^* but when not committed within any ftate, the trial (hall be at fuch place or places as the Congrefs may by lavf have directed. Serf. III. Treafon ag?inft the United States (hall confifl only in levying war agaiwft them, or in adhering to thejr enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No perfon fhall be convicted of treafon unlefs on the teftimony of two •witneiTes to the fame overt act, or on confeflion in opea Court. > The Congrefs fhall have.|>Ower to declare the punifh- ment of treafon ; but no attainder of treafon (hall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except during the life ©f the perfon attainted. Article IV. Seel.1. Full faith and credit (hall be given in each (rate lathe public acls, records and judicial proceedings of e- very other ftate : And the Congrefs may, by general laws, prefcribe the manner in which fuch acls,- records and pro- ceedings fhall be proved, and the p.ffe& thereof. Seel. II. The citizens of each ftate '-'{hall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the feveral ftates. A perfon charged in an'y ftate with treafon, felony, or other crime, who mail flee from juftke, and be found m another ftate, fhall, on dlmand of the Executive authori- ty of the ftate from which he fled, be delivered up,- to be' removed to the ftate having jurifdicXion of the crime. No perfon held to fervice or labour in one ftate, under the laws thereof, efcaping into another, dial!, in conf - quence of any law or regulation therein, be difcharged from fuch fervice or labour, but fhall be delivered up, oa claim of the party to whom fuch fervice. or labour may be dug. GENERAL REGULATIONS.. Seel. III. New ftates may be admitted by the Conpref# into this union ; but no new ftate fhall be formed cr erect, ed, within the jurifdiclion of anvother ftate; .n.-.-r any flits be formed by the junction of two or more (lad s or pprtj of ftates, without the confent of the Le?'flature* of the- Hates concerned as well as of the Congrefs, ( M ) The Congrefs mail have power to difpofe of and make a$ lieedtul rulesand regulations refpettmgche territory or other property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this' Conftitution ihail be fo conftrued as to prejudice any •iaims of the United States, or or any particular ftate. Serf. TV. The United otates lhall guarantee to every ftate in this union a republican form or government, and ihail protect each of them againft invaiion-, ana on appli- cation of the l>egiflature, or of the Executive (wncn the- Legiflature cannot be convened) again it domeftie violence^ ARTICLE V. AMENDMENT* PROVIDED FOR. The Congrefs, whenever two- thirds of both Houfe& {hall deem ic necellary, (hall propoie amendments to this Conftitution, or, on the application of the Legiflatures of two-thirds of the ieverai itates, lhall call a Conventi- on for propoiing amendments*, which,' in either cafe, ihall b:- valid to all intents ana 1 purpofes, as part of this Con- ftitution, when ratified by the .Leg ill a cures of three -rourths of the feveral ftates, or by Conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may- be propofed by the Congrefs $ Provided that no amend- ment which may be made prior to the year one thouiand eight hundred and Bight, ihaii in any manner affeU tire firft and fourth claufes in the ninth fpttion of the firit ar- ticle ; and that no itate, without v fts confent, ihail be de- prived of jts equal fuffrage in the Senate, Article VI. ♦ GENERAL REGULATIONS. All debts contracted, and engagements entered into^ before the adoption of this Conftitution, (hall be as valid againft the United States under this Conftitution, as un-» dtr the Confederation. This Conftitution, and the laws of the United States which lhall be made in purfuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which (hall be made, under the authority of the United States, (hall be the fupreme law of the land ; and the Judges in every ftate (hall be bound thereby ; any thing in the Conftitution or laws of any ftate to the con* trary notwithftanding. The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the ^embers of the ieverai itate L^ulatures, and all Executive ( *s ) ©xecutTve and Judicial officers, both of the TTnited State* and of the feveral iiates, fhaii be bound by oath or \ffirw mation, to fupport this Conftitution ; but no religious tcfl (hall ever be required as a qualification to any oiBcc 09 public truft under the United States, Article VH. The ratification of the Conventions of nine dates, (halt be fufficient for the efbblifhment of this Conititution be* tween the dates fo ratifying the fame. DONE in Convention* by the unanimout confent of the Jlates prefent, the Seventeenth day of September, in the year of our Lord one thoufand /even hundred and eighty- feven, and of the Independence of the United States of America the twelfth. In witnefs whereof we have her+> >$nto fubfcribed our names. GEORGE WASHINGTON, Prefident, and Deputy from Vhgime^ New-Hampshire, ^fih^J.angdon, Nicholas Gilman. Massachusetts, Nathaniel Gorham> Rufus King. Connecticut, William Samuel John/on , Roger Shermaak New-York, Alexander Hamilton. New -Jersey, William Livtngfon, David Brearley, William Patter/fo$ Jonathan Daytsn. Pennsylvania, Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Mifflin, Robert Morris, George Ctymer, Thomas Fitzftmons, Jared Ingerfoll, James Wilfon, Gouverneur Morris. Delaware, George Ready Gunning Bedford, jun. John Dickenfoni Richard Baffett, Jacob Broom. Maryland, Jama M< Henry, Daniel of St Thomas Jennifer, Danitf Carrol. Virginia, John Blair, Jamu Madifotty jw No&Tsr- ( I* ) North-Carolina, William Blount, Richard Dobbs Spmgkt, Hugh WilliamJou. South-Carolina, 'John Rutledge, Chales C. Pinckney, Charles Pincbiey y Pierce ■ J Butler. Georgia, William Few, Abraham Baldwin, ' tfttejf. WILLIAM JACKSON, Secret AR¥i In CONVENTION, Monday, September 17, 1787. P R E S E N T, The States of New-Hampfhire, MaflTachufetts, Connecti- cut, Mr. Hamilton from New- York, New-Jerfey, Penn-? fylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North- Caro- lina, South -Carolina, and Georgia. Refofved} THAT the preceding Conftitution be laid before the United States in Congrefs afTemhled, and that it is the opinion of this Convention, that it ihould afterwards be fubmitted to a Convention of Delegates, chofen in each ftate by the people thereof, under the recommendation of its Legiflature, for their affent and ratification; and that: each Convention Renting to, and ratifying the fame, fhould give notice thereof to the United States in Congrefs aflembled. Refolvedy That it is the opinion of this Convention, that as loon as the Conventions of nine ftates (hall have rati- fied this Conftitution, the United States in Congrefs af- fembled fhould fix a day on which Electors ihould be ap- pointed by the ftates which (hall have ratified the fame, and a day on which the Electors fhould affemble to vote for the Prefident, and the time and place for commencing proceedings under this Conftitution. That after fuch publication the Electors fhould be appointed, and the Se- nators and Reprefentatives elected : That {ne Electors fi^U ronton the day fixed for the eleftioa of the Pre? C 37 ; Gdent, and fhould tranfmit their votes certified, figned, fealed and dire£ted, as the Conftitution requires, to the Secretary of the United States in Congrefs affembled : That the Senators and Reprefentatives fhould convene at the time and place affigned : That the Senators and Re- prefentatives fhould appoint a Prefidentof the Senate, foy the iqle purpofe of receiving, opening and counting the votes for Preiident: And, that after he fhall be chofen, the Congrefs, together with the Prefident, (hould without de* 3ay, proceed to execute this Conftitution. By the unanimous order of the Convention, GEORGE WASHINGTON, President, William Jackson, Secretary. In CONVENTION, September 17, 1787, SIR, WE have now the honour to fubmit to the confederation of th$ United States in Congrefs affembled, that conftitution which] has appeared to us the moil advifeable. The friends of our country have long feen and defired, that the pow- er of making war, peace and treaties, that of levying money and re- gulating commerce, and the correfpondent executive and judicial authorities fhould be fully and effectually vefted in the general govern- ment of the union : but the impropriety of delegating fuch extenfiv« tin it to one body of men is evident — hence refults the neceflity of 4 different organization. It is obvionily impracticable in the federal government of the ftates, to fecure all right of independent fovereignty to each, and yet provide for the interelt and fafety of all — Individuals entering into fociety, muft give up a mare of liberty to preferve the reft. The magnitude o£ the facrifice muft depend as well on fituation and circumftance, as or* theobjett to be obtained. It is at all times difficult to draw with pre- cifion the line between thofe rights which muft be furrendered, and thofe which may be referved j and on the prefent occafion this difficul- ty was encreafed by a difference among the feveral ftates as to their fitu- ation, extent, habits, and particular interefts. In all our deliberations on this fubjeft, we kept fteadily in our view, that which appears to us the greateft intereft of every true American, the confolidation of our union, in which is involved our profperity» felicity, fafety, perhaps our national exiftence^. This important con- fideration, ferioufly and 4 ce Pty impreffed on our minds, led each flats C in { » ) in the Convention to be lefs rigid on points of inferior mao-mtud* than might have been otherwife expe&ed ; and thus the Conititution which we now prefent, is the refult of a fpirit of amity, and of that mutual deference and conceflion which the peculiarity of our politi- cal fituatron rendered indifpenfible. That it will meet the full and entire approbation of every ftate is not, perhaps, to be expeaed ; but each will doubtlefs coniider, that had her interefts been alone ccnfulted, the confequences might have been paiticularly difagreeable or injurious to others : That it is liable to as few exceptions as could reafonably have been expected, we hope and believe : That it may promote the lafting welfare of that country fo dear to us all, and fecure her freedom and happinefs, is our moil ardent wifh. With great refpeft, We have the honour to be, Sir, your Excellency's raoft obedient, And humble fervants, GEORGE WASHINGTON, Pre/idem. By the unanimous order of the Convention. fils Excellency the Prejident of Congrefs. A w A «*■* **• •*-*• •*+• •*-*■ «*■*• -t-5- * 4-t* ■*-*» •*-*• <** 4-> *+• 4-J- •4-*- **-> **-> «•*•■*• «*~5r H-> «f~** * *l-i* «*--** <*-** -*-*• «*•* **-^* «*-*• PROCEEDINGS A N Di DEBATE S OF THE CONVENTION' O F NORTH-CAROLINA. AT a Convention, begun and heM at Hillfborough* the 2 1 ft day of July, in the year of our Lord one thoufand feven hundred and eighty-eight, and of the in- dependence of America the thirteenth, in purfuance of a refolution of the laft General Affembly, tor the purpofe of deliberating and determining on the propofed plan of Federal Government — A majority of thofe who were duly elected as Members for this. Convention, being met at the Church,, they pro- ceeded to the election of a Prefident, when bis Excellency Samuel Johnston, Efquire, was unanimoufiy chofen, and conduced to the chair accordingly. The Houfe then elected Mr, John Hunt and Mr. James Tavlor, Clerks to the Convention ; and alfo appointed •Door-Keepers, &c. The Houfe then appointed a felect committee to pre- pare and propofe certain rules and regulations for the go- vernment of the Convention in the difcuffion of the Con* ftitution. The { 26 ) The committee confided of Meflrs. Davie, Perfon, Ire- dell, I. M'Donald, Battle, Spaight, and the Honourable Samuel Spencer, Efquire. The Convention then appointed a committee of three Members from each diftricl;, as a committee of privileges Snd elections, confifting of Meflrs. Spencer, Irwin, Cald- well, Perfon, A. Mebane, Jofeph Taylor, M'Dowall, J. Brown, J. Johnfton, Davie, Peebles, E. Gray, Gregory, Iredell, Cabarrus, I. G. Blount, Keais, B. Williams, T. iBrowrtj Machine, Forfter, Clinton, J. Willis, Grove* J. Stewart, Martin and Tipton. The Convention then adjourned till to-morrow morn- ing. TUESDAY, July 22, 1788. The Convention met according to adjournment. The committee appointed for that purpofe, reported certain rules and regulations for the government of the Convention ; which were twice read, and, with the ex- ception of one article, were agreed to, and are as follow, viz. r. When the Prefident aflumes the chair, the Mem- bers mall take their feats, 2. At the opening of the Convention each day, the minutes of the preceding day {hall be read, and be in the power of the Convention to be corrected, after which any tmfinefs addrefled to the chair may be proceeded upon. 3. No Member fhall be allowed to fpeak but in his place, and after rifing and addreffing htmfelf to the Pre- fident, fhall not proceed until permitted by the Prefident. 4. No Member fpeaking fhall be interrupted but by a rail to order by the Prefident, or by a Member through the Prefident. 5. No perfon fhall pafs between the Prefident and the perfon fpeaking. 6. No perfon fhall be called upon for any words of lieat but on the day on which they were fpoken. 7. No Member to be referred to in debate by name. 8. The Prefident fhall be heard without interruption^ «nd when he rifes, the member up fhall fit down. $>. The Prefident hixofelf ; or by requeft, may call t* order ( ai ) atder any Member who fhall tnnfgrcfs the rules 5 If & fecond time, the Prefident may refer to him by name -, the Convention may. then examine and cenfure the Mem- ber's conduct, he being allowed to extenuate or juftify. 10. When two or more Members are up together, the Prefident mail determine who rofe firft. 11. A motion made and feconded, fhall be repeated by the Prefident. A motion fhall be reduced to writing if the Prefident requires it. A motion may be withdrawn by the Member making itj before any decifion is had upon £t. 12. The name of him who makes, and the name of ,him who feconds, a motion, fhall be entered upon the minutes. 13. No Member mall depart the fervice of the Houfc without leave. 14. Whenever the Houfe fhall be divided upon any iqueflion, two or more Tellers fhall be appointed by the Prefident, to number the Members on each fide. 15. No Member fhall come into the Houfe, or remove from one place to another, with his hat on, except thofc of the Quaker profeflion. *6\ Every Member of a committee fhall attend at the call of his Chairman. 17. The yeas and nays may be called and entered on the minutes, when any two members require it. 18. Every Member actually attending the Convention, {hall be in his place at the time to which the Convention flands adjourned, or within half an hour thereof. Mr. Lenoir moved, and was feconded by Mr. Perfon, that the return for t)obbs county fhould be read ; which was accordingly read : Whereupon Mr. Lenoir prefented. the petition of fundry of the inhabitants of Dobbs county, complaining of an illegaVeleQjpn in the faid county, and praying relief ; which he ig a lfo read, on motion of Mr. Lenoir > feconded by Mr Davie, Refolved, That the faid petition be referred to the committee of elections. Mr. Spaight prefented the depofition of Benjamin Caf- well, Sheriff of Dobbs county, and a copy of the poll of ^n election held in the faid county for members to this Convection j and the depofitions of William Croom, Neil Hopkins, ( 22 ) Hopkins, Robert White, John Hartsfield, Job Smith an . come hither without having determined in his mind a qwef- tion Nvhich mull have been fo long the object of his confl* deration. Mr. Iredell then arofe and addrefTed the Hjrfident thus : Mr. Prefident, I am very much furprifeo^t the motion which has been made by the gentleman from Halifax. I am greatly aftonifhed at a propofal to decide immediately, without the leaft deliberation, a quejtiojri w hich is perhap s thejrreateft that ever wasjubmi tted to ^£ £jojT^pj_iQe»« There is no fnftance of anv Convention upon the conti- nent, in which the fubje<5t has not been fully'debated, ex- cept in thofe dates which adopted the Conftitution una- nimoufly. If it be thought proper to debate at large an act of Afiembly, trivial in its nature, and the operation of which may continue but a few months, are we to de- cide on this great and important queftion without a mo-> ment's confideration ? Are we to give a dead vote upon it ? If fo, I would wifh to know why we are met together 1 If it is to be refolved now by dead votes, it would have been better that every elector, inftead of voting for per-* fons to come here, fhould in their refpeclive counties have voted or balloted for or againft the Conftitution. A deci-? fion by that mode would have been as rational and juft a& by this, and would have been better on economical prin- ciples, as it would have faved the public the expence of our meeting here. This is a fubjecl of great confiderati- on. It is a Conftitution which has been formed after much deliberation. It has had the fanttion of men of the firft characters for their probity and underltanding. It has aU fo had the folemn ratification of ten dates in ihe union. A Conftitution like this, Sir, ought not to be adopted or re-* jecled in a moment. If in confequence of either we fhould involve our country in mifery and diitrefs, what excufc could we make for our conduct ? Is it reconcileable with our duty to our conftituents? Would it be a confcientious dif- charge of that truft which they have fo implicitly repofed in us ? Shall it be faid, Sir, of the Reprefentatiyes of North-Carolina, that near three hundred of them, afiem-» bled for the exprefs purpofe of deliberating upon the mod important queftion that ever came before a people, refufec$ to difcufs it, and difcarded all reafoning as ufelefs ? It is wujqubtedly to be lamented that any addition, fhould fyq *n&# ( *s > made to the public expence, cfpecially at this period when the public funds are fo low ; but if it be ever neceiTary on any occafion, it is neceffary on this, when the queftion p< r- haps involves the fafety or ruin of our country. For my own part I fhould not choofe to determine on any queftion, without mature reflection, and on this occafion my repug-* nance to a hafty decifion is equal to the magnitude of the fubje&. A gentleman has faid, he fhould be forry if any Member had come here without having determined in hisj mind on a fubjecT: he had fo long confuiered. I (hou^d be forry, Sir, that I could be capable of corning to this Houfe predetermined for or againft the Conftitution, I readily confefs my prefent opinion is ftrongly in its favour I have liftened to every objection that I had an opportunity of hearing with attention ; but have not yet heard any that I thought would juftify its rejection, even if it hid not beep adopted by fo many ftates. But notwithftanding this favourable opinion I entertain of it, I have not come here refolved at all events fo vote for its adoption. I have come here for information, and to ]udge,after all that can be faid upon it, whether it really merits my attachment or not, My conftituents did me the honour to eleel: me unanimous- ly, without the leaft folicitation on my part. They pro- bably chofe me becaufe my fentiments were the fame with their own. But highly as I value thi honour, and much as I confefs my ambition prompted e to afpire to it, had I been told that I mould not be elected unlefs I promifed to obey their directions, I fhould have difdained to ferve on fuch difhonourable terms. Sir, I mall vote perfectly independent, and (hall certainly avow a change of my prefent opinion, if I can be convinced it is a wrong one. I (hall not, in fuch a cafe, be reft rained by the univerfal opinion of the part of the country from whicf* I came ; I fhall not be afraid to go back and tell my con- ftituents, « Gentlemen, I have been convinced I was ir* « an error. I found, on confideration, that the opinion « which I had taken up, was ill founded, and have voted a according to my fmcere fentiments at the time, though * c contrary to your withes." I know that the honour and integrity of my conftituents are fuch, that they woulc$ approve of my acting on fuch principles, rather than any v *w ; other. They are the principles, however, I think if m . I. h» "«»»!"« the «>oft mp e ,'?,'° n ' * at we ma y «"'ve every information that can enable us to form a proper judgment. I hope, therefore that we (hall imitate the laudable examph/of the other' ftates, and go into a committee of the whole Houfe, hat the Conft.mt.on may be difouffed elaufe by claufe ' Mr. Willi* Jones-Mr. Prefic'ent, My reafons for pro. pof.nga* immediate decifion were, that I was prepaid tog,vemv vote and believed that others were equally prepared as myfelf. If K enth-men differ from me ?„ , hi pronnety of this motion, I will fubmit. I agTee with he pntieman, that^nomica- confutation, ainot o f e<£ importance with the magnitude of the fubjea. Heto that ,t would hnv, been better at once foAh ekaors to* vote ,n tber refpeflive coumiee than to decide t he e wuhout .bfcuffon. Does he forget that the acTof && DI- points out Tinothcf niode ? the Affcmbly mi&h t as weU have rcquired ^ ^ ^ tors 4§ ( n ) tors mould vote or ballot for or againfl. the Confutation in their refpettive counties, as for the Convention to de- cide it in this precipitate manner. Mr. James Galloivay — Mr. President, I had no fuppo- fition that the gentleman on my right [Mr. Jones] was nfraid of a difcuflion : It is not fo with me, nor do I be- lieve that it is fp with any gentleman here. I do not like fuch reflections, and am furprifed that gentlemen mould make them. Mr. Iredell declared, that he meant not to reflect on any gentleman \ but, for his part, he would by no mea.15 choofe to go home and tell his conftitucnts that he had Voted without any previous consideration. After feme defultory conversation the Convention ad- journed till to-morrow, ten o'clock. THURSDAY, July 24, 1788. The Convention met according to adjournment. On a motion made by Mr. Bloodworth, and feconded by Mr. Madeline^ Rrfolved, That the fpecia! return made by the Sheriff of New-Hanover county^ of the election for Members of this Convention, be referred to the committee of elecli-p ons. On a motion made by Mr. Perfon, and feconded by Mr. Iredell^ Refolvcdy That the return for a Member for the town of Fayetteville, be referred 1 to the committee of elections. Reverend Mr. Caldwell— Mr. Prefideat, The fubj-a before us is of a complicated nature. In order to obviate the difficulty attending its difcuffion, I conceive that it will be neceffary to lay down fuch rules or maxims as ought to be the fundamental principles of every free go- vernment ; and after laying down fuch rules, to compare the Conftitution with them, and fee whether it has at- tended to them : For if it be not founded on fuch princi- ples, it cannot be proper for our adoption. [Here he r^d thofe rules which he faid appeared to him mod pro- per.] Mr. James Galloivay — Mr. Prefulent, I hid the honour yeii$rday of propofing the mode which I thought mod eligibly ( *8 } eligible for out proceeding. I wilh the fubjea tote fairlr cooby, a „d candidly difcuffed , that we may not go Sv' Without knowmg why we came hither. My tLmloni! that we mould enter into a committee of the whole Houfc where we mall be at liberty to difcufs it. Though I Jo rot objea to the proportion of the Honourable Member! as the ground-work of our proceeding, I hope he wil ™hdraw his motion, and I Ln feconu'him in the corn- Mr. CaidueU had no objeaion to that propofition. mini: t ° PP ° fed j he m0tion bf ente "«S into a com- taittee. He conceived it would be an ufelefs wafte of fame a, they would be obliged to reconfide ZllSz Coi.ftitutionin Convention again. Mr. Davie largely expatiated on the neceffity of enter* nf Itir mm ?' ? £ f3id that the Wifl»t«« in vol wg fj large a reprefentat.on, did not mean that they fl lou ld go away without inveftigating the fubjea, but that their cohea.ve information mould be more 'competent to a juft ardour nf P '"J-"! h °' 5cft ™ en He «»«« not know how the Z f Z ., 0f °5 PO u fi,10n I m! S bt °P e »* upon>„, gentlemen, yet he trolled that others bad temper and moderation. He would b C TT" °! l he mSmber frora Rockingham won d be agreed to, and that the Conftitution would be lafd / V hUe ' He then obferved > ** if they laid down a number of original principles, they muft go toTl^w' 6 ,nv < fti S ation ' That it would be necelWy JS thefe °"$» ai P"««ples and compare them with the Conft.tution That it was highly improbable that they fhould agree on theft principle,. That he had a refped for the undemanding of the Honourable Member, and truft! ed he would reflea, that difference in opinion We f'om the nature of things , and that a great deal of time might be taken up to no purpoft, if th*ey ftou.d neither agree Zl,M nC ' P! n ° r u he . ,r a PP' ication - He faid he hoped they would not treat this important bufinefs like a milita" 7v e ZlV*.\ 1 r° CeCd U P° n il like a ^Hberative bo- dy, and that the debates would be conduaed with decen- cy and moderation. oecen- „f Tk C C " n , ven i ion /hen refolved itfelf into a committee 1 of the whole Houfe, Mr. Elijha Haul, in the chair. Mr. 4 » ( 2 9 > Mr. Caldwell — Mr. Chairman, Thofe maxims which I conceive to be the fundamental principles of every fafe and free government, are, ift. A government is a compact be- tween the rulers and the people. 2d. Such a compact ought to be lawful in itfelf. 3d. It ought to be lawfully executed. 4th. Unalienable rights ought not to be given up if not neceffary. 5th. The compact ought to be mutual. And, 6th. It ought to be plain, obvious, and eafily underftood. Now, Sir, if thefe principles be juft, by comparing the Conftitution with them, we (hall be able to judge whether it is fit for our adoption. Mr. Iredell — Mr. Chairman, I concur entirety in the fen- timents lately urged by the gentleman from Halifax, and am convinced we (hall be involved in very great difficul- ties if we adopt the principles offered by the gentleman from Guilford. .To (hew the danger and impolicy of this proceeding, I think I can convince the committee in a mo- ment, that his very nrft principle is erroneous. Tn other countries, where the origin of government is obfeure, and its formation different from ours, government may be decod- ed a contract between the rulers and the people. What is the confequence ? A compact: cannot be annulled but by the confent of both parties ; therefore, unlefs the rulers are guilty of oppreffion, the people, on the principle of a compart, have no right to new mode* their government* This is held to be the principle of fome monarchical go- vernments in Europe. Our government is founded on much nobler principles* The people are known with cer- tainty to have originated it themfelves. Thofe in power are their fervants and agents, and the people without their confent may new model their government whenever they think proper, not merely becaufe it it oppreffively exer- cifed, but becaufe they think another form will be more conducive to their welfare. It is upon the foot- ing of this very principle that we are now met to con- fider of the Conftitution before us. If we attempt to lay down any rules here, it will take us as much time to efta- blifh their validity as to confider the fyftem itfeK. Mr. Caldwell obferve.d,that though this government did not refemble the European governments, it ftill partook of the nature of a compact. That he conceived thofe principles which he propofed to be juft, but was willing. that ( 3° ) iliaf any others which fhould be thought better, mould be fubltituted in their place. Mr.MacIaine-^-Mr. Chairman, The gentleman has taken his principles from fources which cannot hold here. In England the government is a compact between the King a,d the people. I hope it is not fo here. We (hall have no officers in the fltuation of a King. The pcopie here are the origin of all power. Our governors are elected temporarily. We can remove them occafionaiiy, and put others in their (lead. We do not bind ourfelves. We are to confider whether this fyftem will promote our hap pi- ne fs. Mr. Goudv — Mr. Chairman, I wonder that thefe gentle- men learned in the law mould quibble upon words. I care not whether it be called a compact, agreement, cove- nant, bargain or what : Its intent is a conceflion of power on the part of the people to their rulers. We know that private intereft governs mankind generally. Power be- longs originally to the people, but if rulers be not well guarded, that power may be ufurped from them. People ought to be cautious in giving away power. Thefe gen- tlemen fay there is no occafion for general rules. Every one has one for himfclf. Every one has an unalienable right of thinking for himfeJf. There can be no inconve- nience from laying down general rules If we give away more power than we ought, we put ourfelves in the fltuati- on of a man who puts on an iron glove, which he can never take off till he breaks his arm. Let us beware of the iron glove of tyranny. Power is generally taken from the peo- ple by impofmg on their underftanding or by fetters. Let us lay down certain rules to govern our proceedings. It will be highly proper in my opinion, and I very much wonder that gentlemen mould objecl to it. Mr. Iredell — Mr. Chairman, The gentleman who fpoke laft miftook what tht gentleman from Wilmington and myfelf have faid. In my opinion there ought to be a line drawn, as accurately as poflible, between the power which is given and that which is retained. In this fyftem the line is mofl accurately drawn by the pofitive grant of the powers of the general government. But a compact be- tween the rulers and the ruled, which gentlemen compare $iis government withj is certainly not the principle of our government ( 3' ) government. Will any man fay v that if there be a com* pa&, it can be altered without th content of both parries? Thofe who govern, unlefs they grofsly abufe their truft (which is held an implied violation of the corr.pa£t, and therefore a diflblution of it) have a ri^ht to fay they do not choofe the government fliould be changed. But have an) of the officers of our government a right to fay fo if the peo- ple choofe to change it ? Surely they have not. Therefore, as a general principle, it can never ''pply to a government where the people are avowedly the fountain of all power. I have no manner of objection to the mod explicit decla- ration that all power depends upon the people, becaufe, though it will not ftrengthen their rights, it may be a means of fixing them on a plainer foundation. One gen- tleman has faid that we were quibbling upon words. If 1 know my own heart, I am incapable of quibbling on words. I act on as independent principles as any gentle- man upon the floor. If I make ufe of quibbles, there are gentlemen here who can correct me. If my premifes are wrong, let them be attacked If my conclufions be wrong, let me be put right. I am forry that in debating on fo important a fubjec~r, it could be thought that we were difputing about words, I am t willing to apply as much time as is neceffary for our deliberations. I have no ob- jection to any regular way of difcufiing the fubjec"t ; but this way of proceeding will wafte time, and not anfwer any purpofe. Will it not be in the power of any gentle- man in the courfe of the debates, to fay that this plan militates againft thofe principles which the reverend gen- tleman recommends ? Will it not be more proper to urge its incompatibilitv with thofe principles during that dif- cuflion, than to attempt to eftablifh their exclufive validity previous to our entering upon the new plan of govern- ment? By the former mode,thofe rules and the Conftitu- tion may be considered together. By the latter, much time may be wafted to n<-» t>urnofe. T rruft therefore that the reverend gentleman will withdraw his motion. Mr. Rutherford — Mr. Chairman, I conceive thofe max-* ims will be of urili+v. J wifh as much as any one, to have a full and free difcuffion of the fubjec"r. To faci- litate this deferable <""% it feems highly e^nedient that (om.e ground-work (hould be laid, feme line drawn to guide ( 3* ) guide our proceedings : I truft then, that the reverend Jrentleman's propofal will be agreed to. Mr. Sptticer-r-l conceive that it will retard the bufinefs to accede to the propofal of the learned gentleman. The obfervation which has been made in its behalf does not apply to the prefect circumftances. When there is a King or other Governor, there is a compact between him and the people. It is then a covenant ; but in this cafe, in re- gard to the government which it is propofed we fhould adopt, there are no governors or rulers, we being the people who poflefs all power.. It ftrikes me, that when a fociety of free people agree on a plan of government* there are no governors in exiftenee, but thofe who ad* minifter the government are their fervants. Although fe- veral of thefe principles are proper, I hope they will not be part of our difcuffion ; but that every gentleman will confider and difcufs the fubje£t with all the candour, mo- deration, and deliberation which the magnitude and im- portance of the fubje£t requires. Mr. Caldwell obferved, that he would agree that any other word mould be fubftituted to the word compact m % but after all that had been faid, the Conflitution appeared to him to be of the nature of a compact. It could not be fully (o called till adopted and put in execution ; when fo put in execution, there were aclual Governors in ex* iftence. Mr. Davie — Mr. Prefident, What we have already faid, may convince the reverend gentleman what a long time it will take us to difcufs the fubje£t in the mode which he has propofed. Thofe few folitary propofitions which he has put on paper, will make but a fmall part of the prin- ciples of this Conflitution. I wifh the gentleman to re- flet! how dangerous it is to confine us to any particular rules. This fyftem is moft extenfive in its nature, in- volving not only the principles of governments in general, but the complicated principles of federal governments. We ihould not perhaps in a week lay down all the princi- ples eflential to fuch a Conflitution. Any gentleman may, in the courfe of the inveftigation, mention any maxims Jic thinks proper, and compare them with the Conflituti- on. It would take us more time to eftablifh thefe prin- ciples ( 33 ) ciples,thantoconfidertheConftitution itfelf. Itwillbewrong to tie any man's hands. I hope the queftion will be put. Mr. Per/on infilled on the propriety of the principles, and that they ought to be laid on the table with the De- claration of Rights, Conftitution of the flate, and the Confederation. Mr. Lenoir approved of the principles, but difapproved of being bound by any rules. Mr. Machine was of the fame opinion as to the impro* priety of being bound. Mr. James Galloway wifhed to leave the hands of the Members free, but he thought thefe principles were unex- ceptionable. He faw no inconvenience in adopting them, and wifhed they would be agreed to. Mr. Lenoir anfwered, that the matter had been largely debated. He faid, that he thought the previous queftion ought to be put, whether they fhould lay down certain principles to be governed by, or leave every man to judge* as his own breaff fuggefted. After fome little altercation the previous queftion was put — For the principles 90. Againft them 163. Majo- rity againfl them 73. His Excellency Governor Johnjlon then moved to dif-r cufs it by fettions. — This was oppofed becaufe it would take up too much time. After fome altercation about the mode of confidering the Conftitution, Mr. Iredell arofe, and fpoke as follows: Mr. Prefident, Whatever delay may attend it, a difcuf-* fion is indifpenfable. We have been fent hither by the people to confider and decide this important bufinefs for them. This is a facred truft, the honour and importance of which I hope are deeply imprefled on every member here. We ought to difcufs this Conftitution thoroughly in all its parts. It was ufelefs to come hither, and dilho-? nourable unlefs we difcharge that truft faithfully. God forbid that any one of us fhould be determined one way or the other. I prefume that every man thinks it his duty to hold his mind open to conviction, that whatfoever he may have heard, whether againft or for the Conftitution, he will recede from his prefent opinion, if reafons of fuffici- ent validity are offered. The gentleman from Granvilla $ia§ told us, that we had* fince March tg confider it, anc| ~T * " I tbtf ( 34 > that he hoped every member was ready to give his vote, upon it. 'Tis true, we have had fince that time to confi*. der it, and I hope every Member has taken pains to in- form himfelf. I truft they have confcientioufly confi- dered it, that ihey have read on both fides of the quefti- on, and are refolved to vote according to the dictates of their confciences. I can truly fay, that I believe there are few members in this Houfe who have taken more pains to confider it than myfelf. But I am ftiil by no means confi- dent that I am right. I have fcarcely ever converfed on the fubjecT: with any man of underftanding, who has not thrown fome new light upon the fubjecl: which efcaped me before. Thofe gentlemen who are fo felf futficient, that they believe they are never in the wrong, may arrogate in- fallibility to themselves, and conclude deliberation to be ufelefs. For my part, I have often known myfelf to be in the wrong, and have ever wifhed to be corrected. There is nothing dimonourable in changing an opinion. Nothing is more fallible than human judgment. No gentleman will fay that his is not fallible : Mine I am fure has often proved fo. The ferious importance of the fubjecl: merits the utmoft attention. An erroneous decifion may involve truly awful and calamitous confequences. It is incum- bent on us therefore to decide it with the greateft delibe- ration. The Conftitution is at leaft entitled to a regular difcuflion. It has had the fan£tion of many of the beft and greateft men upon the continent ; of thofe very men to whom perhaps we owe the privilege of debating now. It has alfo been adopted by ten dates fince. Is it probable that we are lefs fallible than they are ? Do we fuppofe our knowledge and wifdom to be fupcrior to their aggregate wif- dom and information ? I agree that this queftion ought to be determined on the footing of reafon, and not on that of authority ; and if it be found defective and unwife, I {hall be for rejecting it •, but it is neither decent nor right to refufe it a fair trial. A fyftem fupported by fuch characters merits at leaft a ferious confideration. I hope therefore, that the Conftitution will be taken up paragraph by para- graph. It will then be in the power of any gentleman to offer his opinion on everypart, and by comparing it with other opinions he may obtain ufeful information. If the JpoaftitutiQU be fo defeftive as it is reprefented, then the ___- _ _ enquiry ( 3S ) enquiry will terminate in favour of thofe who oppofe it i But if, as I believe and hope, it be difcovered to be fo formed as to be likely to promote the happinefs of our country, then I hope the decifion will be accordingly in its favour. Is there any gentleman fo indifferent to an union with our fifter itates, as to hazard difunion rafhly without confidering the confequences ? Had my opinion been dif- ferent from what it is, I am fure I fhoukl have hefitated and reflected a long time before I had offered it againft fuch refpeclable authorities. I am forry for the expence which may be incurred, when the community is fo dif- treffedj but this is a trivial confideration compared to the confequences of a rafh proceeding upon this important queftion. Were any member to determine againft it with- out proper confideration, and afterwards upon his return home, on an impartial consideration, to be convinced it was a good fyftem, his reflections on the temerity and pre- cipitation of his conduct might deflroy his peace of mind forever. I doubt not the members in general who con- demn it, do fo from a fincere believe that the fyftem is a bad one : But at the fame time, I believe there are many who are ready to relinquifh that opinion, if they can be convinced it is erroneous, and that the'y fincerely wifh for a fair and full difcufhon of the fubje£t.. For thefe reafons I am of opinion that the motion made by the Honourable Member is proper to be adopted* Mr. Rutherford was furprifed at the arguments ufed by gentlemen, and wifhed to know how they mould vote 5 whether on the paragraphs, and how the report fhould be made when the committee rofe. His Excellency Governor Johnfton — If we reject any t>ne part we rejecl: the whole. We are not to form a con- ftitution, but to fay whether we flaall adopt a conftitution to which ten ftates have already acceded. If we think it a bad government, it is not binding on us; we can reject it. If it be proper for our adoption, we may adopt it. But a rejection of a fingle article, will amount to a rejec- tion of the whole. Mr. Rutherford —The honourable gentleman has mifta- ken me. Sorry I am that it is fo late taken up by North- Carolina, if we are to be influenced and perfuaded in this «aanncr. I am unhappy to hear geutierhea of learning and integrity I 35 ) Integrity preach up the docTxine of adoption by ten ftates* Sir 9 it is my opinion that we ought to decide it as if no {tate had adopted it. Are we to be thus intimidated into a meafure, of which we may difapprove ? The queftion way then put, and carried by a great majo- rity, to difcui's the Conftitution claufe by claufe. The preamble of the Conftitution was then read. Mr. Caldwell — Mr. Chairman, If they mean by We y thi people — the people at large, I conceive the expreflion is Improper. Were not they who framed this Conftitution, the Reprefentatives of the Legiflatures of the different ftates ? In my opinion they had no power from the people st large to ufe their name, or to a£t for them. They were riot delegated for that purpofe. Mr. Maclairte-^-The reverend gentleman has told us> that the expreffions, We, the People, are wrong, becaufe the gentlemen who framed it, were not the Reprefentatives of the people. I readily grant that they were delegated by ftates. But they did not think that they were the people, but intended it for the people at a future day. The fane* tion of the {late Legiflature was in fome degree neceflary. It was to be fubmitted by the Legiflatures to the people^ So that when it is adopted, it is the ael: of the people. When it is the acl: of the people* their name is certainly- proper. This is very obvious and plain to any capacity. Mr Davie — -Mr. Chairman, The obfervation of the reve- rend gentleman is grounded, I fuppofe, on a fuppofition that the federal Convention exceeded their powers. This objec- tion has been induftrioufly circulated ; but I believe, on a candid examination, the prejudice on which thi? error is founded, will be done away. As I had the honour, Sir, to be a member of the Convention, it may be expected I would anfwer an objection perfonal in its nature, and wjhich con- tains rather a reflection on our condudt, than an objection to the merits of the Conftitution. After repeated and de- cifive proofs of the total inefficiency of our general govern- ment, the ftates deputed the Members of the Convention to revife and Jlrengthen it: And permit me to call to your confideration, that whatever form of confederate govern- ment they might devife, or whatever powers they might juopofe to give this new government, no part of it was binding until the whole Conftitution had received the fo* ( » ) lemn aflfent of the people. What was the object of out million ? " To decide upon the moft effectual means of re- moving the defe£ts of our federal union." This is a general, difcretional authority to propofe any alteration they thought proper or neceflary. Were not the ftate Le- giflatures afterwards to review our proceedings ? Is it not immediately through their recommendation that the plan of the Convention is fubmitted to the people ? And this plan muft ftill remain a dead letter, or receive its operation from the fiat of this Convention. Although the federal Convention might recommend the concelTion of the moft extenfive powers, yet they could not put one of them in execution. WJiat have the Convention done that can me- rit this fpecies of cenfure ? They have only recommended a plan of government containing feme additional powers to thofe enjoyed under the prefent feeble fyftem, amend- ments not only neceffary, but which were the exprefs ob- ject of the deputation. When we inveftigate this fyftem candidly and accurately, and compare all its parts with one another, we mail find it abfolutely necefiary to confirm thefe powers, in order to fecure the tranquility of the ftates and the liberty of the people. Perhaps it may be necefTa- ry to form a true judgment of this important queftion, to ftate lome events, and develope fome of thofe defects which gave birth to the late Convention, and which have produced this revolution in our federal government. With the indulgence of the committee I wiil attempt this detail with as much precifion as I am capable of. The general objects of the union, are, i ft. To protect us againft foreign invafion. 2d. To defend us againft internal commotions and infurrections. 3d. To promote the commerce, agri- culture and manufactures of America. Thefe objects are requifite to make us a fafe and happy people, and they can- not be attained without a firm and efficient fyftem of union. As to the firft, we cannot obtain any effectual protec- tion from the prefent Confederation. It is indeed univer- fally acknowledged that its inadequacy in this cafe, is one of its greateft defects. Examine its ability to repel invafion. In the late glorious war its weaknefs was une- quivocally experienced: It is well known that Congrefe had a dijeretionary right to raife men and money, but they liad no power to do either. In order to preclude the ne- ceffity of examining the whole progrefs of its imbe- cility, C 3* ) ciHty, permit me to Call to your recollection one Tingle in- fiance. When the laft great ftroke was made which hum- bled the pride of Britain, and put us in pofieflion of peace and independence, fo low were the finances and credit of the United States, that our army could not move from Philadelphia, until the Minifter of his molt Chriftian Ma- jefty was prevailed upon to draw bills to defray the expence of the expedition : Thefe were net obtained on the credit or intereit of Gongrefs, but by the perfonal influence of the Commander in Chief. Had this great project mifcar- Tied, what fatal events might have enfued ? It is a Very mo- derate prefumption, that what has once happened may happen again. The next important confideration which is involved in the external powers of the union, are treaties. Without a power in the federal government to compel the performance of our engagements with foreign nations, we {hall be perpetually involved in deftructive wars. The Con- federation is extremely defective in this point alfo. I mall only mention the Britifh treaty, as a fatisfactory proof of this melancholy fa£h It is well known, that although this treaty was ratified in 1 784, it required the fanction of a law of North-Carolina in 1787 : And that our enemies* prefuming on the weaknefs of our federal government, have refufed to deliver up feverai important pods within the territories of the United Stites> and ftill hold them, to our fhame and difgrace. It is unneceffary to reafon on facts, the perilous confequences of which muft in a moment ftrike every mind capable of reflection. The next head under which the general government may be confidered, is the regulation of commerce. The Uni- ted States (hould be empowered to compel foreign nations into commercial regulations, that were either founded on the principles of juftice or reciprocal advantages. Has the. prefent Confederation effected any of thefe things ? Is not our commerce equally unprotected abroad by arms and negociation ? Nations have refufed to enter into treaties with us. What was the language of the Britifh Court on a proportion of this kind ? Such as wtould infult the pride of any man of feeling and independence — " You can make 4€ engagements, but you cannot compel your citizens to « comply with them ; we derive greater profits from tjie * prefent fituatioa of yoyr comjnerge, than we could expe<5fc « undec ( 39 ) «* under'a treaty ; and you have no kmd of power that caa " compel us to Surrender any advantage to you." This was the language of our enemies *, and while our government remains as feeble as it has been, no nation will form any connexion with us, that will involve the relinquishment of the lead advantage. What has been the confequence ? a general decay of trade, the rife of imported merchan- dife, the fall of produce, and an uncommon decreafe of the value of lands. Foreigners have been reaping the be- nefits and emoluments which our citizens ought to enjoy. An unjuftifiable perverfion of juftice has pervaded almoft all the dates, and every thing prefenting to our view a fpe&acle of public poverty and private wretchednefs. While this is a true reprefentation of our fituation, caa our general government recur to the ordinary expedient o£ loans f During the late war, large fums were advanced to> us by foreign dates and individuals. Congrefs have not been enabled to^r pay even the intereft of thcfe debts with, honour and punctuality. The requifitions made on the dates have been every where unproductive, and fome of them have not paid a diver. Thefe debts are a part of the price of our liberty and independence ; debts which ought to be regarded with gratitude and difcharged with ho- nour. Yet many of the individuals who lent us money in the hour of our didrefs, are now reduced to indigence in confequence of ou| delinquency. So low and hopelefs are the finances of the United States, that the year before lafl: Congrefs were obliged to borrow money even to pay the intercd of the principal which we had borrowed before. This wrethed refource of turning intered into principal, is the mod humiliating and difgraceful meafure that a nation could take, and approximates with rapidity to abfolute ruin : Yet it is the inevitable and certain confequence of fuch a fydem as the exiding Confederation. There are feveral other inftances of imbecility in that fydem. It cannot fecure to us the enjoyment of our own territories, nor even the navigation of our own rivers. The want of power to edablifh an uniform rule of natura- lization through the United States is alfo no fmall defect, as it mud unavoidably be productive of difagreeable con- troverfies with foreign nations. The general government §*J£ht io this, as in every other inftance, to poflefs the meana ( 40 ) means of preferving the peace and tranquility of the union, Aftriking proof of the neceffity of this power lately happen- ed in Rhode-Iiland : A man who had run off with a veflet and cargo, the property of fome merchants in Holland, took fanftuary in that place ; application was made for him as a citizen of the United Netherlands by the Minifter* but as he had taken the oath of allegiance, the ftate refufed to deliver him up, and protected him in his villainy. Had it not been for the peculiar fituation of the dates at that time, fatal confequences might have refulted from fuch a, conduct, and the contemptible Hate of Rhode-Iiland might have involved the whole union in a war. The encroachments of fome ftates on the rights of others, and of all on thofe of the confederacy, are inconteftible proofs of the weaknefs and imperfection of that fyftem. Maryland lately pafled a law granting exclufive privileges to her own veifels, contrary to the articles of the Confe- deration : Congrefs had neither power nor influence to al- ! ter it, all they could do, was to fend a, contrary recom* mendation. It is provided by the 6th article of the Con-, federation, that no compact fhall be made between two or more ftates without the confent of Congrefs ; yet this has been recently violated by Virginia and Maryland, and alfa by Pennfylvania and New-Jerfey. North-Carolina and MafTachufetts have had a considerable body of forces on foot, and thofe in this ftate raifed for iwo years, notwith- standing the exprefs provifion in the Confederation that no forces fliould be kept up by any ftate in time of peace. As to internal tranquility, without dwelling on the un- happy commotions in our own back counties, I will only add, that if the rebellion in Maflaehufttts had been plan- ned and executed with any kind of ability, that ftate mull have been ruined, for Congrefs were not in a fituation to render them any affiftance. Another object of the federal union is, to promote the agriculture and manufactures of the ftates; objecls in which we are fo nearly concerned. Commerce, Sir, is the nurfe of both. The merchant furnifties the planter with fuch articles as he cannot manufacture himfelf, and finds Jiim a market for his produce. Agriculture cannot flourifh if commerce languishes \ they are mutually de-* pendant on each other. Our cornmerce| as. I have befoas QbftrYefore, it would be tottering and inefficient. It became therefore necefisry to bottom it on the people themfelves, by giving; them an immediate inte- relt and agency in the government. There was however, fome real difficulty in conciliating a number of jarring in- ierefts, arifing from the incidental, but unalterable, diffe- rence in the ftates in point of territory, fituation, climate, and rivalfhip in commerce. Some of the ftates are very extenfive, others very limited : Some are manufacturing ftates, others merely agricultural : Some of thefe are ex- porting ftates, while the carrying and navigation bufinefs are in the pofteflion of others. It was not eafy to recon- cile fuch a multiplicity of difcordant and clalhing interefts. Mutual concedions were necefiary to come to any concur- rence, A plan that would promote the exclufive interefts of a few ftates, would be injurious to others. Had each Hate obftinately infifted on the fecurity of its particular lo- cal advantages, we fhould never have come to a conclufion ; each therefore amicably and wifely relinquished its particu- lar views. The federal Convention have told you, that the Conftitution which they formed, " was the refult of a fpirit * f of amity, and of that mutual deference and concefiion, li which the peculiarity of their political fituation rendered «< indifpenfable." I hope the fame laudable fpirit will go- vern this Convention in their decifion on this important queftion. The bufinefs of the Convention was to amend the Con- federation by giving it additional powers. The prefent form of Congrefs being a finglc body, it was thought unfafe to augment its powers, without altering its organization. The act of the Convention is but a mere propofal, fimilar to the production of a private pen. I think it a govern- ment which, if adopted, will cherifii and protect: the hap- pinefs and liberty of America; but I hold my mind open to conviction \ I am ready to recede from my opinion if it be proved to be ill-founded. I truft that every man here is equally ready to change an opinion he may have impro- perly formed. The weaknefs and inefficiency of the old Confederation ( 44 ) Confederation produced the neceffity of calling the Federal Convention: Their plan is nuw before you, and I hope on a deliberate consideration every man will fee the neceflity of fach afyftem. It has been the fubje£t of much jea- loufy and cenfure out of doors. I hope gentlemen will now come forward with their objections, and that they will be thrown out and anfwered with candour and moderation. Mr. Caldwell wifhed to know why the gentlemen who were delegated by the ftates, filled themfelves We, the Peo- ple. He faid that he only wifhed for information. Mr. Iredell anfwered, that it would be eafy to fatisfy the gentleman. That the ftile We, the People, was not to be applied to the Members themfelves, but was to be the Itile of the Conftitution when it {hould be ratified in*their re- fpeflive dates. Mr. Jofeph Taylor — Mr. Chairman, The very wording of this Conftitution feems to carry with it.an aflunied pow- er. We, the People, is furely an afmmed power. Have ihey faid, We, the Delegates of the people ? It feems to me, that when they met in Convention they aiTumed more power than was given them. Did the people give them the power of ufmg their name? This power was in the people : They did not give it up to the Members of the Convention. If therefore they had not this power, they affumed it. It is the intereft of every man who is a friend to liberty, to oppofe the alTumption of power as foon as poflible. I fee no reafon why they affumed this power. Matters may be carried ft ill farther. This is a confolida- tion of all the ftates. Had it faid, We, the States, there would have been a federal intention in it. But, Sir, it is clear that a confolidationis intended. Will any gentleman fay that a confolidated government will anfwer this coun- try ? It is too large. The man who has a large eftate can- not manage it with convenience. I conceive, that in the prefent cafe, a confolidated government can by no means fuit the genius of the people. The gentleman from Ha- lifax [Mr. Davie] mentioned reafons for fuch a government. They have their weight no doubt, but at a more conveni- ent time we can fhew their futility. We fee plainly that tnen who come from New- England, are different from us: ^hey are ignorant of our fituation : They do not know the Hate of our country ; They cannot with fafety legiflate for us. ( 45 ) xls. I am aftonifhcd that the fervants of the Legislature of North-Carolina ihould go to Philadelphia, and inftead of fpeaking of the i'tate of North- Carolina, (hould fpeak of the people. I wifh to (top power as foon as poiTible, f6r they may carry their affumption of power to a more dan- gerous lengtl). I wifh to know where they found the pow- er of faying, We y the People, and of confolidating the ftates. Mr. Machine — Mr. Chairman, I cor.fefs myfelf aito- nifhed to hear objections to the preamble They fay that the Delegates to the federal Convention affumed powers which were not granted" them : That they ought not to have ufed the words, W>, the People. That they were not the Delegates of the people is ur,iv,erfally acknowledged. The Conttitution is only a mere propofaL Had it been binding on us, there might be a reafon for objedling. After they had finifhed the plan, they propofed that it mould be re- commended to the people by the feveral ftate Legiflatures. If the people a'pprove of ir> it becomes their act. Is not this merely a difpute about words, without any meaning whatever ? Suppofe any gentleman of this Convention had drawn up this government, and we thought it a good one ; we might refpe6l his intelligence and integrity, but it would not be binding upon us. We might adopt it, if we thought It a proper fyftem,and then it would be our acl. Suppofe it had been made by our enemies, or had dfopt from the clouds, we might adopt it if we iound it proper for our adoption. By whatever means we found it, it would be our aCt as foon as we adopted it. It is no more than a blank till it be adopted by the people. When that is done here, is it not the people of the (late of North-Ca- rolina that dp it, joined with the people of the other ftates who have adopted it? The exprefiion is then right. But the gentleman has gone further, and fays, that the people of New-England are different from us. This goes againft the union altogether. They are not to legiflate for us ; we are to be reprefented as well as they. Such a futile ob- jection ftrikes at all union. We know that without union, we mould not have been debating now. I hope to hear no more objections of this trifling nature, but that we fhall enter into the fpirit of the fubject at once. Mr. Caldwell obferved, that he only wifhed to knoW why they had aflumed the name of the people. Mr, ( 4<5 ) Mr. yames Galloway —Mr. Chairman, I truft we mall siot take up more time on this point. I fhall juft make a few remarks on what has been faid by the gentleman from Halifax. He has gone through our diftrefTes, and thofe of the other dates. As to the weaknefs of the Confederation, we all know it. A fenfe of this induced the different ftates to fend Delegates to Philadelphia. They had given them certain powers ; we have feen them, they are now upon the table. The refult of their deliberations is now upon the table alfo. As they have gone out of the line which the ftates pointed out to them, we, the people are to take it up and confider it. The gentlemen who framed it, have exceeded their powers, and very far. They" will be able perhaps to give reafons for fo doing. If they can (hew us any reafons, we will no doubt take notice of them. But, on the other hand, if our civil and religious liberties are not fecured, and proper checks provided, we have the pow- er in our own hand to do with it as we think proper. I hope gentlemen will permit us to proceed. The Clerk then read the fir ft feci ion of the fir ft article. Mr. Caldwell — Mr. Chairman, I am forry to be object- ing ; but I apprehend, that all the legiflative powers granted by this Conflitution, are not vefted in a Congrefs confiding of the Senate and the Houfe of Reprefentatives, becaufe the Vice-Prefident has a right to put a check on It. This is known to every gentleman in the Convention. How can all the legiflative powers, granted in that Con- flitution, be vefted in the Congrefs, if the Vice-Prefident is to have a vote in cafe the Senate is equally divided ? I aflc for information, how it came to be exprefled in this manner, when this power is given to the Vice-Prefident ? Mr. Madame declared, that he did not know what the gentleman meant. Mr. Caldwell faid, that the Vice-Prefident is made a part of the legiflative body, although there was an exprefs declaration, that all the legiflative powers were vefted in the Senate and Houfe of Reprefentatives, and that he would be glad to know how thefe things confifted together. Mr. Maclaine exprefled great aftonifhment at the gen- tleman's criticifm. He obferved, that the Vice-Prefident had only a calling vote, in cafe of an equal divifion in the Senate. That a provifioa pf this kind was tg be found in ^: - r - ~ "- - «u I 47 y all deliberative bodies. That it was highly ufeful and ex- pedient. That it was by no means of the nature of a check which impedes or arrefts, but calculated to prevent the operation of the government from being impeded. That if the gentleman could (hew any legiflative power to be given to any but the two Houfes of Congrefs, his objec- tion would be worthy of notice. Some other gentlemen faid they were dhTatisfied with Mr. Machine's explanation. That the Vice-Prefi dent was not a Member of the Senate, but an officer of the United States, and yet had a legiflative power ; and that it ap-' peared to. them inconfiftcnt. That it would have been more proper to have given the calling vote to the Preli- dent. His Excellency Governor Johnfton added to Mr. Mac- Iaine's reafoning, that it appeared to him a very good and proper regulation. That if one of the Senate was to be appointed Vice-Prefident, the flate which he reprefented would either lofe a vote if he was not permitted to vote on every occafion, or if he was he might in fome inftances have two votes. That the Prefldent was already pofTeffed of the power of preventing the paflage of a law by a bare ma- jority : Yet laws were not faid to be made by the Prefi- dent, but by the two Houfes of Congrefs exclufively. Mr. Lenoir — Mr. Chairman, I have a greater objection on this ground, than that which has juft been mentioned. I mean, Sir, the legiflative power given to the Prefldent himfelf. It may be admired by fome, but not by me. — He, Sir, with the Senate, is to make treaties, which are to be the fupreme law of the land. This is a legiflative power given to the Prefldent, and implies a contradiction to that part which fays, that all legiflative power is veiled in the two Houfes. f Mr. Spaight anfwered, that it was thought better to put that power into the hands of the Senators as Reprefen- tatives of the flates ; that thereby the interell of every ftate was equally attended to in the formation of treaties j but that it was not confidered as a legiflative a£l at all. Mr. Iredell — Mr. Chairman, This is an objection againll the inaccuracy of the fentence. I humblv conceive it will appear accurate on a due attention. After a bill is pafled by both Houfes, it if to fee &ewn to the Prefldent. With* ( 48 ) in a certain time he is to return it. If he difapproves of it, he is to date his objections in writing ; and it depends on Congrefs afterwards to fay, whether it (hall be a law or not. Now, Sir, I humbly apprehend, that, whether a law paffes by a bare majority, or by two-thirds, which are required to concurafter he fhall have flared objections, what gives active operation to it is, the will of the Sena- tors and Reprefentatives, The Prefident has no power of legiflation. If he does not object, the law panes by a bare majority ; and if he objects, it paries by two-thirds. His power extends only to caufe it to be reconfidered, which fecures a greater probability of its being good. As to his power with refpetl to treaties, I fhall offer my fentimenta on it when we come properly to it. Mr. Maclaine intimated, that if any gentleman was out of order*, it was the gentleman from Wilkes. [Mr. Le- noir.] That treaties were the fupreme law of the land in all countries, for the mo-ft obvious xeafons. That laws, or legiflative acls, operated upon individuals ; but that trea- ties a£ted upon ftates. That unlefs they were the fupreme. law of the la^nd, they could have no validity at all. That the Prefident did not a£r, in this cafe as a iegiflator, but ra- ther in his executive capacity. Mr. Lenoir replied, that he wifhed to be conformable tc* the rules of the Houfe ; but he ftill thought the Prefident was poiTeffed of legiflative powers, while he could make- . treaties joined with the Senate. Mr. Iredell — Mr. Chairman, I think the gentleman is in- order. When treaties are made, they become as valid as. legiflative at~ts I apprehend, that every a£t, of the go- vernment, legiflative, executive, or judicial, if in purfu^ ance of a conflitutional power, is the law of the land.- — Thefe different atls become the a£ts of the flate by the inftrumentality of its officers. When, for inflance, the Governor of this ftate grants a pardon, it becomes the law of the land, and is valid. Every thing is the law of land, let it come from what power it will, provided it be confident with the Conftitution. Mr. Lenoir anfwered, that that comparison did not hold, M * Something had been faid about order, which was net di&ii&l iteird. »y ( 49 ) . Mr. Iredell continued — If the Governor grants a pardon; it becomes a law of the land. "Why ? Becaufe he has power to grant pardons by the Conftitution. Suppofe this Conftitution is adopted, and a treaty is made — that treaty is the law of the land. Why ? Becaufe the Conftitution grants the power of making treaties. Several Members expreffed difTatisf action at the incon- fiftency (as they conceived it) of the expreffions ; when Mr. James Galloway obferved, that their obfervations would be made more properly when they come to that claufe which gave the calling vote to the Vice-Prefident, and the qualified negative to the Prefident. The firft three claufes of the fecorid fection read, Mr. Machine — Mr. Chairman, As many objections have been made to biennial elections, it will be neceflary to ob- viate them. I beg leave to ftate their fuperiority to annual elections. Our elections have been annual for fome years- People are apt to be attached to old cuftoms. Annual elections may be proper in our ftate governments, but not in the general government. The feat of government is at a confiderable diftance ; and in cafe of a difputed election, it would be fo long before it could be fettled, that the ftate would be totally without reprefentation. There is ano- ther reafon, ftill more cogent, to induce us to prefer bien- nial to annual elections ; the objects of flate legiflation are- narrow and confined, and a fliort time will render a mart fufficiently acquainted with them; but thofe of the gene- ral government are infinitely more extenfive, and require? a much longer time to comprehend them. The Reprc- fentatives to the general government, muft be acquainted not only with the internal fituation and circumftances of the United States, but alio with the ftate of our commerce with foreign nations, and our relative fituation to thofe na- tions. They muft know the relative fituation of thofe na- tions to one another, and be able to judge with which o£ them, and in what manner our commerce mould be regu- lated. Thefe are good reafons to extend the time of elec- tions to two years. I believe you remember, and perhaps every Member here remembers, that this country was very happy under biennial elections. In North-Carolina the Reprefentatives were formerly chofen by ballot biennially. Jt was changed under the royal government, and the mods ( 5° ) pointed out by the King, Notwithstanding the conteft for annual elections, perhaps biennial elections would (till be better for this country. Our laws would certainly be lefs fluctuating. Mr. Shepperd obferved, that he could fee no propriety iii the friends of the new fyftern making objections, when hone were urged by its oppofers. That it was very un- common for a man to make objections and anfwer them himfelf : And that it would take an immenfe time to men- tion every objection which had been mentioned in the country. Mr. Madame— -It is determined |Jready by the Conven- tion, to debate the Conftitution fection by left ion. Are we then to read it only ? Suppofe the whole of it is to be paHed over without faying any thing, will not that amount to a dead vote ? Sir, I am a Member of this Convention, and if objections are made here I will anfwer them to the belt of my ability. If I fee gentlemen pafs by in filence fuch parts as they vehemently decry out of doors, or fuch parts as have been loudly complained of in the country, I (hall anfwer them alfo. After fome defultory converfation, Mr. Willie Jones ob- ferved, that he would eafily put the friends of the Con- ftitution in a way of difcuffing it. Let one of them (faid he) make objections and another anfwer them. Mr. Davie — Mr. Chairman, I hope that reflections of a perfohal nature will be avoided as much as poflible. What is there in this bufinefs fhould make us jealous of each other ? We are all come hither to ferve one common caufc of one country. Let us go about it openly and amicably : There is no neceflity for the employment of underhanded means. Let every objection be made* Let us examine the plan of government fubmitted to us thoroughly. Let us deal with each other with candour. I am forry to fee fo much impatience fo early in the bufinefs. Mr. Shepperd anfwered, that he fpoke only becaufe he was averfe to unnece&ary delays, and that he had no fineffe. or dvrfign at all. Mr. Rutherford wifhed the fyftern to be thoroughly dif- cuffed. He hoped that he fhould be excufed in making a few obfervations in the Convention after the committee rofe, and that he trufted gentlemen wquU make no re flee- panu "~ ~" """ Mr.' ( 5« ) Mr. Bloodworth declared, that every gentleman had a right to make obje&ions in both cafes, and that he was for- ry to hear reflections made. Mr. Goudy — Mr. Chairman, This claufe of taxation will give an advantage to fome dates over the others. It will be oppreftive to the fouthern ftates. Taxes are equal to our reprefentation. To augment our taxes and encreafe our burthens, our negroes are to be represented. If a date has fifty thoufand negroes, (he is to fend one Repre- * Tentative for them. I wifh not to be reprefented with ne r groes, efpecially if it encreafes my burthens. Mr. Davie — Mr. Chairman, I will endeavour to obvi- ate what the gentleman laft up has faid. I wonder to fee gentlemen fo precipitate and hafty on a vubjeCt of fuch aw- ful importance. It ought to be confidered, that fome of m are flow of apprehenfion, not having thofe quick concep- tions, and luminous understandings, of which other gentle- men may be pofleffed. The gentleman c( does not w r ifh to be reprefented wkh negroes." This, Sir, is an unhappy fpecies of population, but we cannot at prefent alter their fituation. The eaftern ftates had great jealoufies on this fubjecl: : They infilled that their cows and horfes were equally entitled to reprefentation ; that the one was pro- perty as well as the other. It became our duty on the other hand, to acquire as much weight as pofliblein the icgiflati- on of the union; and as the northern ftates were more po* pulous in whites, this only could be done by infilling that a certain proportion of our Haves mould make a part of the computed population. It was attempted to form a rule of reprefentation from a compound ratio of wealth and population; but on confederation it was found impractica- ble to determine the comparative value of lands, and other property, in fo extenfive a territory, with any degree of accuracy; and population alone was adopted as the onhg practicable rule or criterion of reprefentation. It was urg- ed by the Deputies of the eaftern ftates, that a reprefenta- tion of two-fifths would be of little utility, and that their entire reprefentation would be unequal and burthenfome ; That in a time of war flaves rendered a country more vul? nerable, while its defence devolved uponjts/w inhabitants. On the other hand, we infilled that in time of peace, they contributed by their labour to the general wealth as well as other ( 5* ) ftthef members of the community : That as rational beihgg they had a right of reprefentation, and in fome inftances inight be highly ufeful in war. On thefe principles the eaftern dates gave the matter up, and confented to the re- gulation as it has been read. I hope thefe reafons will ap- pear fatisfactory. It is the fame rule or principle which •was propofed fome years ago by Congrefs, and afiented to by twelve of the ftates. It may wound the delicacy of the gentleman from Guilford [Mr. Goudy] but I hope he wilt endeavour to accommodate his feelings to the ihtereft and circumftances of his country. Mr. James Galloway faid, that he did hot object to the re- prefentation of negroes, fo much as he did to the fewnefs of the number of Reprefentatnres. He was furprifed how we came to have but five, including thofe intended to re- present negroes : That in his humble opinion North-Caro- lina was entitled to that number independent of the negroes. Mr. Spaight endeavoured to fatisfy him, that the Con- tention had no rule to go by in this Cafe : That they could 2iot proceed upon the ratio mentioned in the Conftitution, till the enumeration of the people was made: That fome ftates had made a return to Congrefs of their numbers, and others had not : That it was mentioned that we had had time, but made no return : That the prefent number was only temporary : That in three years the actual cenfus would be taken, and our number oi Representatives regu- lated accordingly. His Excellency Governor John/Ion was perfectly fatis- fied with the temporary number. He faid that it could not militate againft the people of North-Carolina, becaufe they paid in proportion : That no great inconvenience could happen in three years from their paying lefs than their full proportion: That they were not very flufh of money ; and that he hoped for better times in the courfe of three years. The reft of the fecond fection read. Mr. Jofeph Taylor objected to the provifion made for impeaching. He urged that there could be no fecurity from it, as the perfons accufed were triable by the Senate, who were a part of the Legiflature rhemfelves : That while* irten were fallible, the Senators were liable to errors, efpe- ^jaPy in a cafe *vhere they were concerned themfelves. Mr. Iredtll—hlx^ Chairman^ I was going to obferve that this ( S'i ) this claufe, vetting the power of impeachment in the Houfe of Representatives, is one of the greateft fecurities for a due execucion of all public offices. Every government requires it. Every man ought to be amenable for his con- duct, and there are no perfons fo proper to complain of the public officers as the Representatives of the people at large. The Representatives of the people know the feel- ings of the people at large, and will be ready enough to make complaints. If this power were not provided the confequences might be fatal. It will be not only the meant of punifhing miSconduct, but it will prevent miSconduct. A man in public office who knows that there is no tribunal to punim him, may be ready to deviate from his duty ; but if he knows that there is a tribunal for that purpoSe, although he may be a man of. no principle, the verv terror of .punifhment will perhaps deter him. I beg leave to mention that every man has a right toexprefs his opinion, and point out any part of the Conftitution which he either thinks defective, or has heard reprefented to be fo. What Will be the confequence if they who have objections do not think proper to communicate them, and they are not to be mentioned by others ? Many gentlemen have read many objections, which perhaps have made impreffions on their minds, though they are not communicated to us. I there- fore apprehend that the Member was perfectly regular in mentioning the objections made out of doors. Such ob- jections may operate upon the minds of gentlemen, who, not being uSed to convey their ideas in public, conceal them out of diffidence. Mr. Bloodivorth wifhed to be informed, whether this Sols power of impeachment given to the Houfe of Representa- tives, deprived the ftate of the power of impeaching any of its Members. Mr. Spaight anfwered, that this impeachment extended only to the officers of the United States. That it would be improper if the fame body that impeached, had the pow- er of trying : That therefore the Conftitution had wifely given the power of impeachment to the Houfe of Repre- sentatives, and that of trying impeachments to the Senate* Mr. Jtfeph Taylor — Mr. Chairman, The objection is ve- ry ftrong. If there be but one body to try, where are we ? If any tyranny or oppreffion fhouid ariSe, how are thoS« who ( 54 ) %t?\\o perpetrated fuch oppreffion, to be tried and punifhed? By a tribunal confiiling of the very men who affiit in fuch tyranny. Can any tribunal be found in any community, who will give judgment aga^nft their own aclipns ? Is it the nature of man to decide againft himfelf ? I am obliged to the worthy member from New-Hanover for affifting me with objections. None can impeach but the Representa- tives, and the impeachments are to be determined by the Senators, who are one of the branches x>f power which we dread under this corrftitution- His Excellency Governor Johnflon — Mr. Chairman, The •worthy Member from Granville furprifes me by his objec- tion. It has been explained by another Member, that on- ly officers of the United States were impeachable. J ne- ver knew any inftance of a man being impeached for a le- giflative a£t ; nay, I never heard it fuggefted before* $o Member of the Houfe of Commons in England has ever been impeached before the Lords, nor any Lord for a le- giflative mifdemeanor. A Reprefentative is anfwerable to no power but his conftituents — He is accountable to no ber ing under heaven, but the people who appointed him. Mr. Taylor replied, that it now appeared to fiim in a (till worfe light than before. Mr. Bloodivorth obferved, that as this was a Conftitution for the United States, he fhould not have made the ob- servation' he did, had the fubject not been particularly mentioned. That the words, " fole power of impeach- ment," were fo general, and might admit of fuch a latitude of conftruclion, as to extend to every legiflative Member upon the continent, fo as to preclude the Representatives of the different ftates from impeaching. Mr. Maclmne — Mr. Chairman, If I underrland the gen r tleman rightly, he means, that Congrefs may impeach alj the people or officers of the United States. If the gen- tleman will attend he will fee, that this is a government for confederated ftates ; that consequently it can never in r termeddle where no power is given- I confefs I can fee sio more reafon to fear in this cafe than from our own Ge- neral Affembly. A power is given to our own ftate Senate to try impeachments. Is it not neceflary to point out fome tribunal to try great offences ? Should there not be iome mode of punifhmeat for the offences of the officers of ( 55 ) of the general government ? Is it not neceflary that fuch officers fhould be kept within proper bounds ? The offi- cers of the United States are excluded from offices of ho- nour, truft or profit under the United States, on impeach- ment for, and conviction of, high crimes and mifdemea- nors. This is certainly neceffary. This exclufion from offices is harmlefs in comparifon with the regulation made in fimilar cafes in our own government. Here it is ex- prefsly provided how far the punifhment {hall extend, and that it fhall extend no farther. On the contrary, the limits are not marked in our own Conftitution, and the punifh- ment may be extended too far. I believe it is a certain and known fact:, that Members of the legiflative body are ne- ver, as fuch, liable to impeachment, but are punifhabte by law for crimes and mifdemeanors in their perfonal ca- pacity. For inftance, the Members of Aflembly are not liable to impeachment, but, like other people, are amena- ble to the law for crimes and mifdemeanors committed as individuals. But in Congrefs, a Member of either Houfe can be no officer. Governor Johnjlon — Mr. Chairman, I find that making objections is ufeful. I never thought of the objection made by the Member from New-Hanover. I never thought that impeachments extended to any but officers of theUni- ted States. When you look at the judgment to be given, on impeachments, you will fee, that the punifhment goes no farther than to remove and difqualify civil officers o£ the United States, who (hall, on impeachment, be con- victed of high mifdemeanors. Removal from office is the punifhment — to which is added, future difqualification. How could a man be removed from office who had no of- fice ? An officer of this flare is not liable to the United States. Congrefs could not difqualify an officer of this ftate. No body can difqualify but that body which creates. We have nothing to apprehend from that article. We are perfectly fecure as to this point. I fhould laugh at any judgment they fhould give againfl any officer ^)f our own. Mr. Bloodivortb — From the completion of the para- graph, it appeared to me to be applicable only to officers of the United States 5 but the gentleman's own reafoning convinces me that he is wrong. He fays he would laugh it them. Will the gentleman, laugh when the extentioa of ( $6 ) •f their powers takes place ? It is only by our adoption they can have any power. Mr. Iredell — Mr. Chairman, The argument of the gen- tleman laft up, is founded upon mifapprehenfion. Every article refers to its particular object. We mufl judge of expreffions from the fubjecl-matter concerning which they are ufed. The.fole power of impeachment extends only to objects of the Conftitution, The Senate (hall only try im- peachments ariGng under the Conft itu tron. I n order to con- firm and illuftrate that pofition, the gentleman who fpoke before, explained it in a manner perfectly fatisfactory to my apprehenfion. " Under this Conftitution." — What is the meaning of thefe words ? They fignify, thofe arifing tinder the government of the United States. When this government is adopted, there will be two governments to which we {hall owe obedience.— L To the government of the union, in certain defined cafes— To our own ftate govern- ment, in every other cafe. If the general government were to difqualify me from any office which I held in North- Carolina under its Jaws, I would refer to the Conftitution, arid fay, that they violated it, as it only extended to offi-* cers of the United States. Mr. Bloodivorth -r-The penalty is only removal from of- fice. It does not mention from what office. I do not fee any thing in the expreffion that convinces me that I was mifhken. I ftill confider it in the fame light. Mr. Porter wifhed to be informed if every officer, who was a creature of that Conftitution, was to be tried by the Senate ? Whether fuch officers, and thofe who had com- plaints againft them, were to go from the extreme parts of the continent to the feat of government to adjuft difputes ? Mr. Davie anfwered, that impeachments were confined to cafes under the Conftitution, but did not defcend to petty offices. That if the gentleman meant, that it would be troublefome and inconvenient to recur to the federal courts in cafe of oppreffions by officers, and to carry wit- .neiTes fuch great diftances, that he would fatisfy the gen- tleman, that Congrefs would remove fuch inconveniences, as they had the power of appointing inferior tribunals, where fuch difputes would be tried. Mr. J. Taylor — Mr. Chairman, I conceive that if this ponftitution be adopted, we {hall have a large number of •©cert ( 57 > officers in North-Carolina under the appointment of Con- grefs. We ihall undoubtedly, for inftance, have a great number of tax-gatherers. If any of thefe officers fhall do wrong, when we come to fundamental principles, we find that we have no way to punifh them, but by going to Con- grefsatanimmenfe diilance, whither we muft carry our witnefles. Every gentleman muft fee in thefe cafes that oppreffions will arife. I conceive that they cannot be tried elfewhere. I confider that the Conltitution will be explained by the word " fole." If they did not mean to retain a general power of impeaching, there was no occa- fion for faying the " fole power." I confider therefore that oppreffions will arife. If I am opprefled I muft go to the Houfe of Reprefentatives to complain. I confider that when mankind are about to part with rights, they ought only to part with thofe rights which they can with conve- nience relinquish, and not fuch as muft involve them in diftreifes. 1 In anfwer to Mr. Taylor, Mr. Spaight obferved, that tho* the power of impeachment, was given, yet it did not fay that there was no other manner of giving redrefs. That it was very certain and clear, that if any man was injured by an officer of the United States he could get redrefs by a fuit at law. Mr. Madame — Mr. Chairman, I confefs I never heard before that a tax-gatherer was worthy of impeachment. It is one of the meaneft and leaft offices : Impeachments are only for high crimes and mifdemeanors. If any one is in- jured in his perfon or property, he can get redrefs by a fuit at law. Why does the gentleman talk in this manner i It (hews what wretched fhifts gentlemen are driven to. I never heard in my life of fuch a filly objection. A poor, infignificant, petty officer amenable to impeachment ! Mr. Iredell — Mr. Chairman, The objection would be jight if, there was no other mode of punifhing. But it is? evident that an officer may be tried by a Court of common* law. He may be tried in fuch a court for common law of- fences, whether impeached or not. As it is to be prefumed that inferior tribunals will be conftituted, there will be ncr occafion for going always to the fupreme court, even ia cafe where the federal courts have exclufive jurifdidtion, Wljeje this exclufive cognisance is not given them, redrefs may be Lad in the common law courts in.the ftate ami t have no doubt fuch regulations will be made as will put k out of the power of officers to diftrefs the people with im- punity. r r . . Governor Johifton obferved, that men who were in very high offices could not be come at by the ordinary courfe of juftice, but when called before this high tribunal and con- triacd, they would be topped of their dignity, and reduced to the rank of their fellow-citizens, and then the courts of common iaw might proceed againft them. The committee now rofe-Mr. Prefident refumed the chair, and Mr Battle reported, that the committee had, ac- cording to order, had the propofed conftitution under their confidera^ion, but not having time to go through the fame, had directed him to move the Convention for leave to fit again. , ■ Refolved, That this Convention will to-morrow again re- io 4 yc itfelf into a committee of the_ whole Convention, on the laid propofed plan of government. The Convention then adjourned to ten o'clock to-mor- row morning. F R I D AY, July 25, 1788. The Convention met according to adjournment. . Mr. Gregory from the committee of eledions, delivered ma report; which being read, was agreed to as follows t ^ -ff C ? I ?. mi " ee P roceeded t0 have read the return of the Sheriff of Cumoerland county, for the town of Favetteville m faid county, wherein John Ingram- was returned to re- prefent faid town in the Convention. ' It is the opinion of this committee, that the faid town poflcflcs not the right of reprefentation in this Convention, and that therefore the faid John Ingram hath no right to a feat in the fame. 6 ^ It appearing to this committee, that the votes given for Thomas Devane, fen. Efq. and Thomas Devane, were in- tended and meant for the fame perfon : Refolved therefore, ^hat the faid Thomas Devane, fen. W3. is duly ele&ed to reprefent the county of New-Hano- ISS?! preient Co ~- e?tiQn > * nd that he take his feat ac - lit ( 59 ) The order of tire day, for taking into further confidcra- tion the propofed Conftitution for the future government of the United States, the Convenrion agreeable thereto, re» folved itfelf jnto a committee of the whole Houfe. Mr, Battle in the chair. Firft article of the third fection read. Mr. Cabarrus wifhed to be informed of the reafon why the Senators were to be elected forfcriong a time. Mr. Iredell—* Mr. Chairman, I have waited for fome time in hopes that a gentleman better qualified than myfelf, would explain this part. Every objection to every part of this Conftitution ought to be anfwered as fully as pofiible. " I believe, Sir, it was the general fenfe of all America, with the exception only of one ftate, in forming their own {late Con{titutions,that the legiflative body fhould be divided into two branches.in order that the people might have a dou- ble fecurity. It will often happen that in a fingle body a bare majority will carry exceptionable^and pernicious meafures. The violent faction of a party may often form fuch a ma- jority in a fingle body, and by that means the particular views or interests of a part of the community may be con^ fulted, and thofe of the reft neglected or injured. Is there a fingle gentleman in this Convention, who has been a mem- ber of the kegiflaturc, who has not found the minority in the mod important queftions to he often right f Is there a man here, who has been in either Houfe, who has not at fometimes found the molt folid advantages from the co-ope- ration or oppofition of the other ? If a meafure be righly which has been approved of by one branch, the other will probably confirm it : If it be wrong, it is fortunate that there is another branch to oppofe or amend it. Thefe prin- ciples probably formed one reafon for the inftitution of a Senate in the form of government before us. Another arofe from the peculiar nature of that government, as con- nected with the governments of the particular dates. The general government will 'have the protection and management of the general interefts of the United States. The local and particularMnterefts of the different ftates are left to their respective Legiflatures. All affairs which con- cern this ftate only are to be determined by our Reprefen- tatives coming from all parts of the ftate: All affairs which concern the union at large, are ta be determined by Repre- sentatives ( 6o ) .fentatives coming from all parts of the union. Thus then the general government is to be taken care of, and the ftate governments to be preferved. The former is done by a nu- merous reprefentation of the people of each- ftate, in pro- portion to its importance : The latter is effected by giving each ftate an equal reprefentation in the Senate. The peo- ple will be reprefented in one Houfe : The ftate Legifia- iures in the other. Many are of opinion that the power of the Senate is too great, but I cannot think fo, confidering the great weight which the Houfe of Reprefentatives will have." Several reafons may be affigned for this. The Houfe 6? Reprefen- iatives will be more numerous than the Senate : They will reprefent the immediate interefts of the'people : They will originate all money bills, which is one of the greateft fe- curities in any republican government. The refpecl ability of their conftituents, who are the free citizens of America, 'will add great weight to the Reprefentatives. For a power derived from the people is the fource of all real honour, and a demonftration of confidence which a man of any feel- ing would be more ambitious to pofTefs, than any other ho- nour or any emolument whatever. There is therefore al- ways a danger of fuch a Houfe becoming too powerful, and It is neceflary to counteracl: its influence by giving great •weight and authority to the other. I am warranted by well known fa&s, in my opinion, that the Reprefentatives of the people at large will have more weight, than we (hould be induced to believe from a flight coniideration. The Bri- tish government furnifhes a very remarkable inftance to my prefent purpofe. In that country, Sir, is a King, who is hereditary; a man, who is not chofen for his abilities, but who, though he may be without principle or abilities, is by birth their Sovereign, and may impart the vices of his cha- racter to the government. His influence and power are fo great, that the people would bear : a great deal before they would attempt to refill his authority. He is one complete branch of the Legiflature, may make as many Peers as he pleaies, who are immediately members of another branch; he has the difpofal of almoft all offices in the kingdom, commands the army and navy, is head of the church, and has means of corrupting a large proportion of the Repre- fentatives of the people, who form the third branch of th$ Legiflature 1 , < If ) Legislature. The Houfe of Peers, which forms the focohd branch, is compofed of Members who are here.dit.iry, and except as to money bills (which they are not allowed either to originate or alter) hath equal authority with the other Houfe. The Members of the Huufe of Commons, who are confiderea to reprefent the people, are elected for feven years, and they are chofen by a fmall proportion of the peop!e, v aru» I believe I may fay, a large majority of them by actual corruption. Under thefe circumrtances, one would fuppofe their 'influence, compared to that of the King and Lords, was very inconfiderable. But the fact is, that they "have by degrees increafed their power to an aitoniiliing de- gree, and when they think proper to exert it can command almoft any thing they pleafe. This great power they en- joy, by having the name of Reprefentatives of the people, a'nd the exclufive right of originating money bills. What authority then will our Reprefentatives not pofTefs, who will really reprefent the people, and equally have the right of originating money bills ? The manner in which our Senate is* to be chofen, gives us an additional fecurity. Our Senators will not be chofen by a King, nor tainted by his influence. They are to be chofen by the different Legiflatures in the union. Each is to choofe two. It is to be fuppofed that in the cxercife of this power the utm'oft prudence and circumfpection will be obferved We may prefume that they will felecl two of the moil refpectable men in the flate, two men who had given, the ftrongeft proofs of attachment to the interefts of their country. The Senators are not to hold eftates for life in the Legiflature, nor to tranfmit them to their children. Their families, friends and eflates, will be pledges for their fidelity to their country. Holding no office under the United States, they will be* under no temptation of that kind to forget the interefts of their confliituents. There is every probability that men elected in this manner, will in general do their duty faithfully. It may be expected there- ' fore, that they will co-operate in every laudable acl,but fire- nuoufly refift thofe of a contrary nature. To do this to ef- fect, their ftation muft have fome permanency annexed to it. As the Reprefentatives of the people may probably be more popular, and it may be fometimes necefiary for the -Senate to prevent factious meafures taking place, whick may (62 ) may be highly injurious to the real infereft of the pub- lic, the Senate fhould not be at the mercy of every popu- lar clamour. Men engaged in arduous 'affairs, are often obliged to do things which may for the prefent be difap- proved of, for want of full information of the cafe, which it is not in every man's power immediately to obtain. In the mean time every one is eager, to judge, and many to con- demn ; and thus many an action is for a time unpopular, the true policy and juftice of which afterwards very plain- ly appears. Thefe obfervatjVis apply even to ads of legif- lation concerning domeftic policy ; They apply much more forcibly to thecafe of foreign negociarions, which will form one part of the bufinefs of the Senate. I hope we fhatt not be involved in the labyrinths of foreign politicks. But n is neceffary for us to watch the condud of European pow- ers, that we may be on our defence, and ready in cafe of an attack. All thefe things will require a continued atten- tion :. And in order to know whether they were tranfacted rightly or not, it muft take up a confiderable time. A certain permanency in office' is in my opinion ufefu! for another reafon. Nothing is more unfortunate for a na- tion, than to have its affairs condufted in an irregular man- ner. Confiftency and {lability are neceffary to render the laws of any fociety convenient for the people. If they were to be entirely conduced by men liable to be called away loon, we might be deprived in a great meafure of their utility : Their meafures might be abandoned before they were fully executed, and others of a lefs beneficial tenden- cy fubitituted in their ftead. The public alfo would be de- prived of that experience which adds fo much weight to the greateft abilities. The bufinefs of a Senator will require a great deal of knowledge, and more extenfive information than can be acquired in a ftiort time. This can be made evident by ia£ts well known. I doubt not the gentlemen of this Houfe who have been Members of Congrefs, will acknowledge that they have known feveral inftances of men who were Members of Congrefs, and were there many months before they knew how to aft, for want of information of the real State of the union. The acquifition of full information of this kind, muft employ a great deal of time; fince a gene, wl knowledge of the affairs of gli the ftates, and of the re. lative (' «3 ) lative fituation of foreign nations, would be indifp en fable. Refponfibility alfo would be leffened by a fhort duration ; for many ufeful meafures require a good deal of time, and continued operations, and no man mould be anfwerable for the ill fuccefs of a fcheme which was taken out of his hands by others. For thefe reafons I hope it will appear, that fix years are not too long a duration for the Senate: I hope alfo it will be thought, that fo far from being injurious to the liberties and intereft of the public, it will form an additional, fecurity to both, efpecially when the next claufe is taken up, by which we (hall fee that one third of the Senate is to go out every fecond year, and two-thirds mull concur in the mod im- portant cafes ; fo that if there be only one honefl man among the two-thirds that remain, added to the one-third v which has recently come in, this will be fufficient to pre- vent the rights of the people being facrificed to any unjufl ambition of that body. I was in hopes fome other gentleman would have ex- plained this paragraph, becaufe it introduces an entire change in our fyflem, and every change ought to be found- ed on good reafons, and thofe reafons made plain to the people. Had my abilities been greater I mould have an- fwered the objection better : I have however done it in the beft manner in my power, and I hope the reafons I have afligned will be fatisfactory to the committee. Mr. Machine — Mr. Chairman, A gentleman yefterday made fome objections to the power of the Vice-Prefident, and infifted that he was pofleffed of legiflative powers. That in cafe of equality of voice in the Senate, he had the deciding vote, and that of courfe he, and not the Senate, legiflated. I confefs I was (truck with aftoniihment at fuch an objection, efpeqally as it came from a gentleman o£ character. As far as my underftanding goes, the Vice- Prefident is to have no acting part in the Senate, but a mere calling vote. In every other inftance he is merely to pre- side in the Senate in order to regulate their deliberations. I think there is no danger to be' apprehended from him in particular, as he is to be chofen in the fame manner with the PreGdent, and therefore may be prefumed to pofTefs a great (hare of the confidence of all the dates. He has been flailed an ufelefS officer; I think him very ufeful, and I think the ( 64 ) the oVjetVion very trifling. It (hews the uniform oppefttion gentlemen are determined to make. It is very eafy to ca- vil at the fineft government that ever exifted. Mr. Davie — Mr. Chairman, I will ftate to the committee the reafons upon which this officer was introduced. I had the honour to obferve to the committee before, the caufes of the particular formation of the Senate ; that it was owing with other reafons, to the jealoujy of the ftates, and parti- cularly 'to the extreme jealoufy of the leiTer itates, of the power and influence of the larger members of the confe- deracy. It was in the Senate that the feveral political in- terefts of the ftates were to be preferved, and where all their powers were to be perfectly balanced. The commer- cial jealoufy between the eaftern and fouthern ftates had a principal fhare in this bufinefs. It might happen in im- portant cafes, that the voices would be equally divided. In- decificn might be dangerous or inconvenient to the public. It would then be neceiTary to have fome perfon who mould determine the queltion as impartially aspoilible. Had the Vice-Prefident been taken from the reprefer|tation of any of the dates, the vote of that ftate. would have been dimi- nished in the firft inftance, and he would have been under local influence in the fecond : It is true he mult be chofea from fome ftate ; but from the nature of his election and office, he reprefents no one ftate in particular, but all the ftates. It is impoilible that any officer could be chofen more impartially : He is in confequence of his election, the creature of no particular diftrict or ftate, but the officer and reprefentative of the union. He mutt poffefs the confi- dence of the ftates in a very great degree, and confequent- ly be the mo(t proper perfon to decide in cafes of this kind. Thefe I believe are the principles upon which the Conven- tion formed this officer. Sixth claufe of the third fection read. Mr. James Galloway wifhed gentlemen to offer their ob- jections. That they muft have made objections to it, and that they ought to mention them here. Mr. Jthn Blount faid, that the fole power of impeach- ment had been objected to yefterday, and that it was urged, officers were to be carried from the furtheft parts of the ftates to the feat of government ; $? wifhed to know if gentfemen were'fatUSed, t $ ) Mr. Maclmne — Mr. Chairman, I have no inclination W get up a fecond time, but fome gentlemen think this fub- jeet ought to be taken notice of. I recollect it was men- tioned by one gentleman, that petty officers might be im- peached. It appears to me, Sir, to be the mod horrid igno- rance to fuppofe, that every officer, however trifling his of- fice, is to be impeached for every petty offence; and that every man who fliou'ld be injured by fuch petty officer?, could get no redrefsbut by this mode of impeachment, at the feat of governments at the diftarice of feveral hundred miles, whi- ther he would be obliged to fummort a great number of witnefTes. I hope every gentleman in this committee muft fee plainly, that impeachments cannot extend to inferior of- ficers of the United States. Such a conftruction cannot be fupported without a departure from the ufual and well- known practice both in England and America; But this elaufe empowers the Houfe of Reprefentatives, which is the grand inqueft of the Union at large, to bring great of- fenders to juftice. It will be a kind of ftate trial for high crimes and mifdertieanors. I remember it was objected yeflerday, that the Houfe of Reprefentatives had the fole power of impeachment: The word ** fole," was fuppofed to be fo extenilve as to include impeachable offences again ft particular ftates. Now for my part, I cart fee no impro- priety in the expreilion. The word relates to the gene- ral objects of the union. It can only refer to offences a'gainffc the United -States, nor can it be tortured fo as to havd any other meaning, without a perverfion of the ufual mean- ing of language. The Houfe of Reprefentatives is to have the fole power of impeachment, and the Senate the fole power of trying. And here is a valuable provifion, not ta be found in other governments. In England, the Lords, who try impeachments, declare folemnly upon honour, whe- ther the perfons impeached be guilty or not. But here the Senators are on oath. This is a very happy frcurity. It is further provided, that when the President is tried (for he is alfo liable to be impeached) the Chief-Juftice (hall pre- fide in the Senate : Becaufe it might be fuppofed, that the Vice-PreuMent might be connected, together with the Pre- fident, in the fanie crime, and would therefore be an im- proper perfon to judge him. It would be improper for another reafoa. On the removal of the Prefident from of- I 6-6 ) lice, it devolves on the Vice-Prefiderit. This being the cafe, if the Vice-Prefident fhould be Judge, might he not look at the office of President, and endeavour to influence the Senate unjuftly againft him. This is a moft excellent caution. It has been objected by fome, that the Prefident is in no danger from a trial by the Senate, becaufe he does nothing without its concurrence. It is true, he is exprefT- ly reftricled not to make treaties without the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senators prefent, nor appoint officers without the concurrence of the Senate (not requiring two- thirds). The concurrence of all the Senators however, is not required in either of thofe cafes. They may be all prefent when he is impeached, and other Senators in the meantime introduced. The Chief*Juftice we ought to prefume, would not countenance a collufion. One diflent- ing perfon might divulge their mifbehaviour. Befides he is impeachable for his own mifdemeanors, and as to their concurrence with him, it might be effected by mifre- prefentations of his own, in which cafe they would be in- nocent, though he guilty. I think therefore the Senate a very proper body to try him. Notwithfianding the mode pointed out for impeaching and trying, there is not a fingle officer but may be tried and indicted at common law. For it is provided, that a judgment in cafes of impeachment, fhall not extend further than to removal from office, and difqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honour, truft or profit under the United States ; but the party convicled fhall neverthelefs be liable and fubje£t to indictment, trial, judgment, and puniffiment, according to law. Thus you find that no offender can efcape the danger of puniffiment. Officers however cannot be oppreffed by an unjuft decifion of a bare majority. For it farther provides, that no per- fon fhall be convicted without the concurrence of two- thirds of the members prefent. So that thofe gentlemen *vho formed this government, have been particularly care- ful to diftribute every part of it as equally as poffible. As the government is folely inftituted for the United States, fo the power of impeachment only extends to officers of the United States. The gentleman who is fo much afraid of impeachment by the federal Legiflature, is totally mif- faken in his principles. Mr. J* Tajhr— Mr« Chairman, My apprehe&fion is, that v.: " " r 1 *" ~ "" ' this (• 6 1 ) this claufe is connected with the other which gives the fole power of impeachment, and is very dangerous. "When I was offering an objection to this part, I obferved that it was fuppofed by fome, that no impeachments could be prefer- red but by the Houfe of Representatives. I concluded that perhaps the collectors of the United States, or gatherers of taxes, might impofe on individuals in this country, and that thefe individuals might think it too great a diftance to go to the feat of federal government to get redrefs, and would therefore be injured with impunity. I obferved that there were fome gentlemen whofe abilities are great, who conitrue it in a different manner. They ought to be kind enough to carry their conftru£tion not to the mere letter, but to the meaning. I obferve that when thefe great men are met in Congrefs, in confequ.ence of this power, they will have the power of appointing all the officers of the United States. My experience in life {hews me, that the friends of the Members of the Legiflature will get the offices- Thefe Senators and Members of the Houfe- of Regrefen- tatives, will appoint their friend? to all offices. Thefe of- ficers will be great men, and they will have numerous de- puties under them. The Receiver-General of the taxes of North-Carolina, mult be one of the greateil men in the country. Will he come to me for my taxes ? No. He will fend his deputy, who will have fpecial inftructions to op- prefs me. How am I to be redreffed ? I {hall be told that I muft go to Congrefs to get him impeached. This being the cafe, who am I to impeach ? A friend of the Repre- fsntatives of North-Carolina. For unhappily for us, t thefe men will have too much weight for us; they will have friends in the government who will be inclined againft us, and thus we may be oppreffed with impunity. I was forry yefter- day to hear perfonal obfervations drop from a gentleman in this Houfe. If we are not of equal ability with the gen- tleman, he ought to poffefs charity towards us, and not la- vifli fuch fevere refledtions upon us in fuch a declamatory- manner. Thefe are considerations I offer to the Houfe. Thefe oppreffions may be committed by thefe officers. I can fee no mode of redrefs. If there be any, let it be point- ed out. As to perfonal afperfions with refpecl; to me, I defpife them. Let him convince me by realbnjng, but not fall on detraction or declamation. Mr, ( 6« ) Mr. Madame — Mr. Chairman, If I made ufe of any $fperity to that gentleman yefterday, I conieis I am forry ior it. It was becauie fuch an observation came from a gentleman of his profeffion. Had it come from any other gentleman in this Convention who is not of his profeflion, I (hould not be furprifed. But I was furprifed that it (hould come from a gentleman of the law, who muft know the contrary perfectly well. If his memory had failed him, he might have known by confuting his library. HL books would have told him, that no petty officer was ever im- peachable. When fuch trivial, ill-founded objections were advanced, by perfons who ought to know better, was it not fufficient to irritate thofe who were determined to decide the queftion by a regular and candid difcuffion ? Whether or not there will be a Receiver-General in North-Carolina, jf we adopt the Gonftitution, I cannot take upon myfelf to fay. I cannot fay how Congrefs will collect their money. It will depend upon laws hereafter to be made. Thefe laws ■will extend to other flares as well as us. Should there be a Receiver-General in North-Carolina, he certainly will 3iot be authorifed to opprefs the people, His deputies can have no power that he could not have himfelf. As all col- lectors and other officers will be bound to act according to law, and will in all probability be obliged to give fecurity for their conduct, we may expect they will not dare to op- prefs. The gentleman has thought proper to lay it down ns a principle, that thefe fame Receivers-General will give fpecial orders to their deputies to opprefs the people. The Prefident is the fuperior officer, who is to fee the laws put In execution. He is amenable for any mal-adminiftration an his office. Were it poffible to fuppofe, that the* Prefi- ident fhould give wrong inft ructions to his deputies, where- by the citizens would be diftrefled, they would have redrefs, in the ordinary courts of common law. But fays he, parties injured muft go to the feat of government of the United States, and get redrefs there. I do not think it will be necef- izxv to go to the feat of the general government for that purpofe. No perfons will be obliged to attend there, but on extraordinary oecafions ; for Congrefs will form re- gulations fo as to render it unneceflary for the inhabitants to go thither, but on fuch oecafions. My reafons for this* coaslufion are thefe, I lopfc upon it as the intereft of all the ( «9 ) the people of America, except thofe in the vicinity of the feat of government, to make laws as eafy as poffible for the people, with reipecr. to local attendance. They will not agree to drag their citizens unneorflTarily fix or feven hun-» dred miles from their homes. This would be equally in*, convenient to all except thofe in the vicinity of the feat of government, and therefore will be prevented. But fays the gentleman from Granville, what redrefs have we when we go to that pi tee ? Thefe great officers will be the friends of the Representatives of North-Carolina. It is poffible they may or they may not. They have the power to appoint officers for each ftate from what place they pleafe. It is probable they will appoint them out of the ftate in which they are to act. I will however admit, for the fake of ar- gument, that thofe federal officers who will be guilty of mifdemeanors in this ftate, will be near relations of the Reprefentatives and Senators of North -Carolina. What then? Are they to be tried by t.hem only i Will they be the near friends of the Senators and Reprefentatives of the other ftates ? If not, his objection goes for nothing, I do not understand what he fays about detraction and declama- tion. My character is well known. I am no declaimer, but when I fee a gentleman ever fo refpe&able, betraying his truft to the public, I will publifh it loudly ; and I fay this is not detraction or declamation. Governor Johnfton — Mr. Chairman, Impeachment is ve- ry different in its nature from what the learned gentleman from Granville fuppofes it to be. If an officer commits an offence againft an individual, he is amenable to the courts or law. If he commits t crimes againft the ftate, he may be indicted and punifhed. Impeachment only extends to high crimes and mifdemeanors in a public office. It is a mode of trial pointed out for great mifdemeanors againft' the public; But I think neither that gentleman or any other perfon need be afraid that officers who commit op- preffions, will pafs with impunity. It is not to be appre- hended, that fuch officers will be tried by their coufins and friends. Such cannot be on the jury at the trial of the caufe; it being a principle of law, that no perfon intereft- ed in a caufe, or who is a relation of the party, can be a juror in it. This is the light in which it ftrikes me. Therefore the objection of the gentleman from GranviHr, |r*nft neceflarily fall to the ground on that principle. Mr, ( 7° ) Mr. Machine — Mr. Chairman, I muft obviate fome ob- jections which have been made. It was faid by way of ar- gument, that they could impeach and remove any officer, whether of the United States, or any particular ftate. This was fuggefted by the gentleman from New Hanover. No- thing appears to me more unnatural than fuch a conftruc- tion. The Conftitution fays in one place, that the Houfe of Reprefentatives (hall have the fole power of impeach- ment. In the claufes under debate ifprovides, that the Se- nate (hali have the fole power to try all impeachments, and then fuhjoins, that judgment in cafes of impeachment, mall not extend further than to removal from office, and dif- -qualification to hold and enjoy any office of honour, truft or profit under the United States. And in the fourth fee- tion of the fecond article, it fays, that the President, Vice- Prefident and all civil officers of the United States, fhali be removed from office on impeachment for, and convic- tion of, treafon, bribery, or other high crimes and rwifde- meanors. Now, Sir, what can be more clear and obvious than this ? The fe eral claufes relate to the fame fubjecl:, and ought to be confidered together. If confidered feparately and unconneeledly, the meaning is dill clear. They relate to the government of the union altogether* Judgment on im- peachment only extends to removal from office, and future difqualification to hold offices wider the United States. Can thole be removed from offices, and difqualified to hold of- fices under the United States, who actually held no of- fice under the United States ? The fourth fe£Hon of the fecond article provides exprefsly for the removal of the Pre- sident, Vice-Prefident and all civil officers of the United States, on impeachment and conviction. Does not this clearly prove, that none but officers of the United States are impeachable. Had any other been impeachable, why was not provifion made for the cafe of their conviction ? Why not point out the punifhment in one cafe as well as in others ? I beg leave to obfervc, that this is a Con- stitution which is not made with any reference to the go- vernment of any particular ftate, or to officers of particu- lar ftates, but to the government of the United States at large. We muft fuppofe, that every officer here fpoken of, muft be an officer of the United States. The words dis- cover the meaning as plainly as poflible. The fentence which ( 7' . ) which provides, that "judgment in cafes of impeachment, fliall not extend further than to removal from otfice," is joined by a conjunction copulative to the other fentcnce, f* and dlfqualification to hold and enjoy any office of ho- nour, trull or profit under the United States" which incon- trovertibly proves, that officers of the United States are only referred to. No other grammatical conftruction can I be put upon it. But there is no neceflity to refer to gram- matical conitruclions, fince the whole plainly refers to the government of the United States at large. The general government cannot intermeddle with the internal affairs of the ftate governments. They are in no danger from it. It has been urged, that it has a tendency to a confolidation. On the contrary it appears, that the ftate Legiflatures mufl exift in full force, otherwife the general government can- not exift itfelf. A confolidated government would never fecure the happinefs of the people of this country. It would be the intereft of the people of the United States, to keep the general and individual governments as feparate and diftincl: as poffible. Mr. Bloodworih —Mr. Chairman, I confefs I am obliged to the honourable gentleman for his conftruclion. Were he to go to Congrefs he might put that conftru&ion on the Conftitution. But no one can fay what conftru£tion Congrefs will put upon it. I do not diftruft him, but I diftruft them. I wifh to leave no dangerous latitude of conllruction. The firft claufe of the fourth fe£lion read. Mr. Spencer — Mr. Chairman, It appears to me that this claufe, giving this controul over the time, place and man- ner of holding elections, to Congrefs, does away the right of the people to choofe the Reprefentatives every fecond year, and impairs the right of the ftate Legiflatures to choofe the Senators. I wifh this matter to be explained. Governor Johnfton — Mr. Chairman, I confefs that I am a very great admirer of the new Conftitution, but Icannot com- prehend the reafon of this part. The reafon urged is, that every government ought to have the power of continuing itfelf, and that if the general government had not this pow- er, the ftate Legiflatures might neglect to regulate elections, ^whereby the government might be difcontinued. As long #s tbe ftate Legiflatures have it in &eir pQwer uot to choofe th© v 72 ; the Senators, this power in Congrefs appears to me altoge- ther ufdefs ; becaufe they can put an end to the general go- vernment by refufmg to choofe Senators, But I do not con- fi' vote for the ftate Representatives. If the ftate government vanifhes, the general government muft vanifti alSo. This is the foundation on which this government was raifed, and without which it cannot poflibly exift. The nextdepartment is the Senate. How is it formed ? By the ftateV themfelves. Do they not choofe them ? Are they not created by them ? And will they not have the in- tereft of the ftates particularly at heart? The ftates, Sir, can put a final period to the government, as was obferyed by a gentleman who thought this power over elections un- fteceiTary. If the ftate Legiflatures think proper, they may refufe ( 8° ) refufe to choofc Senators, and the government muft be de- ftroyed. Is not this government a ncrvelefs mafs, a dead carcafs, without the Executive power ? Let your Repre- fentatives be the moft vicious demons that ever exifted, let them plot againft the liberties of America, let them con- fpire againft its happinefs — all their machinations will not avail if not put in execution. By whom are their laws and projects to be executed ? By the Prefident. How is hecre- ated ? By Electors appointed by the people under the direc- tion of the Legiflatures— -by an union of the intereft of the people and the ftate governments. The ftate governments can put a veto, at any time, on the general government, by ceafing to continue the Executive power. Admitting the Reprefentatives or Senators could make corrupt laws ; they can neither execute them themfelves, nor appoint the Exe- cutive. Now, Sir, I think it muft be clear to every candid mind, that no part of this government can be continued after the- ftate governments lofe their exiftence, or even their prefent forms. It may alfo be eafily proved, that all federal governments poffefs an inherent weaknefs which continually tends to their deftru&ion. It is to be lamented that all governments of a federal nature have been fhort- lived. Such was the fate of the Achaean league, the Am- phytliomc council, and other ancient confederacies ; and this opinion is confirmed by the uniform teftimony of all hiftory. There are initances in Europe of confederacies fubfifting a conGderable time, but their duration muft be attributed to circumftances exterior to. their, government. The Germanic confederacy would not exift a moment, were it not for the fear of the furrounding powers, and the in- tereft of the Emperor. The" hiftory of this confederacy- is but a feries of factions, diflention:, bloodihed and civil war. The confederacies of the Swifs and United Nether- lands, would long ago have been deftroyed from their im- becility, had it not been for the fear, and even the policy* of the bordering nations. It is impoflible to conftru£t fuch a government in fuch a manner as to give it any probable longevity. But, Sir, there is an excellent principle in this jDropofed plan of federal government, which none of thefe confederacies had, and to the want of which in a great, meafure their imperfections may be juftly attributed. J. mean the principle of reprefentatipjj. I hope that by the agency I 91 > Agency of this principle, if it be not immortal, it will at leait be Jong-lived. I thought it necefTary to fay this much to detect the futility of that unwarrantable fuggeftion, that we are to be fwallowed up by a great confolidated govern- ment. Every part of this federal government is dependent On the continuation of the ftate Lcgillatures for its evidence. The whole, Sir, can never fwallow up its parts. The gen- tleman from Edenton [Mr. Iredell] has pointed out tha rcafo'ns of giving this controul over elections to Congrefs, the principal of which was, to prevent a dhTolution of the government by defigning ftates. If all the (tares were equal- ly poffeffed of abfolute power over their elections, without any controul of Congrefs, danger might be juftly appre- hended where one ftate pofierTes as much territory as four or five others;, and fome of them being thinly peopled nowj will daily become more numerous and formidable. . With- out this controul in Congrefs, thofe large ftates might fuc- cefsfully combine to deftroy the general government. It was therefore necefiary to controul any combination of this' kind. Another principal reafon was, that it would operate in favour of the people againft the ambitious defignsof the fede- ral Senate. I will illuftrate this by matter of fact. The hiftory of the little ftate of Rhode-Iftand is well known. An aban- doned faction have felzed on the reins of government, and frequently refufed to have any reprefentation in Congrefs. Jf Congrefs had the power of making the law of elections operate throughout the United States, no ftate could with- draw itfelf from the national councils, without the confenfc of a majority of the Members of Congrefs. Had this been the cafe, that trifling ftate would not have with-held its re- prefentation, _ What once happened may happen again, and it was neceffary to give Congrefs this power to keep the go- vernment in full operation. This being a federal govern- ment,- and involving the interefts of feveral ftates ; and fome acts requiring the afientof more than a majority, they Qught to be able to keep their reprefentation full. It would have been a folecifm, to r have a government without any means of felf-prefervation*. The Confederation is the only inftance of a government without fuch means, and is a nervelefs fyftem, as inadequate to every purpofe of go^ ternment as it is to the fecurity of the liberties of the peo- ( 82 ) pie of America. When the councils of America have this power over elections, they can, in fpite of any faction in any particular ftate, give the people a reprefentation. Uni- formity in matters of election is alfo of the greateft con- fequence. They ought all to be judged by the fame law and the fame principles, and not be different in one ftate from what they are in another. At prefent the manner of electing is different in different dates. Some elect by bal- lot and others viva voce. It will be more convenient to have the manner uniform in all the ftate3. I fhall now anfwer fome obfervations made by the gentlemanfromMecklinburg. He has ftated, that this power over elections, gave to Con- grefs power to lengthen the time for which they were elect- ed. Let us read this claufe coolly, all prejudice afide, and determine whether this conftruction be warrantable. The claufe runs thus : (< The times, places and manner of hold- ing elections for Senators and Reprefentatives, fhall be pre- fcribed in each ftate by the Legiflature thereof; but the Congrcfs may, at any time, by law, make or alter fuch re- gulations, except as to the place of choofing Senators. 1 * I take it as a fundamental principle, which is beyond the reach of the general or individual governments to alter, that the Reprefentatives (hall be chofen every fecond year, and that the tenure of their offices fhall be for two years — that Senators fhall be chofen every fixth year, and that the te- nure of their offices fhall be for fix years. I take it alfo as a principle, that the electors of^the molt numerous branch of the ftate Legiflatures, are to elect the federal Reprefen- tatives. Congrefs has ultimately no power over elections, but what is primarily given to the ftate Legiflatures. If Congrefs have the power of prolonging the time, &c. as gentlemen obferve, the fame powers muft be completely vefted in the ftate Legiflatures. I call upon every gentle- man candidly to declare, whether the ftate Legiflatures have the power of altering the time of elections for Reprefen- fentatives from two to four years, or Senators from fix to twelve ; and whether they have the power to require any ether qualifications than thofe of the moft numerous branch of the ftate Legiflatures, and alfo whether they have any other power over the manner of elections any more than the mere mode of the act of choofing, or whether they fhall be held by Sheriffs as sontradiftinguifhed to any other of* ( 8 3 ) ficer, or whether they fhall be by votes as contradiflin- guiihed from ballots or any other way. If gentlemenwill pay attention they will find, that in the latter part of this claufe, Congrefs has no power but what was given to the dates in the firfl part of the fame claufe. They may alter the manner pf holding the election, but cannot alter the tenure of their oiHce. They cannot alter the nature of the elections, for it is eftablifhed as fundamental principles, that the electors of the moft numerous branch of the ftate Legiflature (hall elect the federal Reprefentatives, and that the tenure of their office (hall be for two years •, and likewife, that the Senators (hall be elected by the Legislatures, and that the tenure of their office (hall be for fix years. When gentlemen view the claufe accurately, and fee that Congrefs have only the fame power which was in the ftate Legifla- ture, they will not be alarmed. The learned Doctor on my right [Mr. Spencer] has alfo faid, that Congrefs might lengthen the time of elections. I am willing to appeal to grammatical conttruction and punctuation. Let me read this as it ftands on paper. {Here he reads the clauje different %uays t exprejjtng the fame fenfe.] Here in the firft part of the claufe, this power over elections is given to the ftates, and in the latter part the fame power is given to Congrefs, and extending only to the time of holding, the place of holding, and the manner of holding the elections. Is this not the plain, literal and grammatical conftruction of the claufe ? Is it poflible to put any other conftruction on it, without departing from the natural order, and without de^ viaHng from the general meaning of the words and every rule of grammatical conftruction? Twift it, torture it as you may, Sir, it is irnpoffible to fix a different fenfe up- on it. The worthy gentleman from New-Hanover, whofe ardour for the liberty of his country I wifli never to be damped, has infmuated, that high characters might in- fluence the Members on this occafion. I declare for my own part, I wifh every man to be guided by their own con- science and underftanding, and by nothing elfe. Every man has not been bred a politician nor ftudied the fcience of go- vernment; yet when a Subject is explained, if the mind js unwarped by prejudice and not in the leading- firings of other people, gentlemen will do what is right. Were this the cafe I would riik my Salvation on a right decifion. Mr, ( «4 5 Mr. Caldwell — Mr. Chairman, Thofc things which cam be, may be. We know that in the Britifh government, the Members of Parliament were eligible only for three years. They determined they might be chofen for feven years. If Congrefs can alter the time, manner and place, I think it will enable them to do what the Britifh Parlia- ment once did. They have declared, that the elections of Senators are for fix years, and of Reprcfentatives for two years. But they have faid there was 'an exception to this general declaration, viz* that Congrefs can alter them. If the Convention only meant that they mould alter them in fuch a manner as to prevent a difcontinuation of the go- vernment, why have they not faid fo ? It mufl appear to every gentleman in this Convention^ that they can alter the elections to what time they pleafe : And if the Britifh Parliament did once give themfelves the power of fitting four years longer than they had a right to do, Congrefs^ having a (landing army, and the command of the militia, may, with the fame propriety, make an aft to continue the Members for twenty years, or even for their natural lives. This conftruttion appears perfectly rational to me. I fhall therefore think that this Convention will never fwal- }ow fuch a government, without fecuring us againft danger. Mr. Machine — Mr. Chairman, The reverend gentleman from Guilford, has made an objection which aftonifhes me more than any thing I have heard. He feems to be acquainted with the hiftory of England, but he ought to confider whether his hiftorical references apply to this coun- try. He tells us of triennial elections being changed to ieptennial elections. This is a hiftorical fact we well know, and the occafion on which it happened, is equally well known. They talk as loudly of conftitutional rights and privileges in England, as we do here, but they have no written conftitution. They have a common law, which has been altered from year to year, for a very long period- — Magna Charta, and Bill of Rights. Thefe they lpok upon as their conftitution. Yet this is fuch a conftitution as it as univerfally confidered Parliament can change. Black- Hone, in his admirable Commentaries, tells us, that the power of the Parliament is tranfeendent and abfolute, and tan do and undo every thing that is not naturally impofli- fcle. The a&, therefore^ to which the reverend gentlemau alludes, ( «s ) ft-Hudes, was not unconstitutional. Has any man faid that the Legiflature can deviate from this Conftitution ? The Legiflature is to be guided by the Conftitution. They can- riot travel beyond its bounds. The reverend gentleman fays, that though the Reprefentatives are to be elected for two years, they may pafs an act prolonging their appoint- ment for twenty years, or for natural life, without any vi- olation of the Conftitution. Is it poffrble for any com- mon understanding or fenfe, to put this conftru&ion upon it ? Such an acl, Sir, would be a palpable violation of the Conftitution. Were they to attempt it, Sir, the country would rife againil them. After fuch an unwarrantable fuggeftion as this, any objection may be made to this Con- ftitution. It is neceffary to give power to the government. I would afk that gentleman who is fo afraid it will deftroy our liberties, why he is not as much afraid of our ftate Legiflature ? For they have much more power than we are now propoling to give this general government. They have an unlimited controul over the p&rfe and fword — yet no complaints are made. Why is he net afraid that our Legiflature will call out the militia to deftroy our li- berties ? Will the militia be called out by the general go- vernment to enflave the people — to enflave their friends, their families, themfelves ? The idea of the militia being made ufe of as an inftrument to deftroy our liberties, is ?lmoft too abfurd to merit a refutation. It cannot be fup- pofed that the Reprefentatives of our general government will be worfe men than the Members of our ftate govern- ment. Will we be fuch fools as to fend our greateft rafcala to the general government ? Wc mu'ft be both fools as well as villains to do fo. Governor Johnjtoti — Mr. Chairman, I (hall offer fome observations on what the gentleman faid. A parallel has been drawn between the Britifh Parliament and Congrefs. The powers of Congrefs are all circumfcribed, defined, and clearly laid down. So far they may go, but no farther. But, Sir, what are the powers of the Britifh Parliament ? They have no written Conftitution in Britain. They have certain fundamental principles and legiflative acts, fecuring the liberty of the people : But thefe may be altered by ti\eir Reprefentatives, without violating their Conftitution, jii fuch manner as they may think proper. Their Legif- lature ( 86 ) lature exifted long before the fcience of government wat well underftood. From very early periods you find their Parliament in full force. What is their Magna Charta ? It is only an a£r, of Parliament,. Their Parliament can at any time, alter the whole, or any part of it. In fhort, it is no more binding on the people than any orher act which has pafled. The power of the Parliament is, therefore* unbounded. But, Sir, can Congrefs alter the Conftituti- on ? They have no fuch power. ' They are bound to a£fc by the Conftitution. They dare not recede from it. At the moment that the time for which they are elected ex<- pires, they may be removed. If they make bad laws, they mntt be removed, for they will be no longer worthy of con^ fidcncc. The Britifli Parliament can do every thing they pleafe. Their Bill of Rights is only an acl: of Parliament, which may be at my time altered or modified, without a violation of the Conftitution. The people of Great-Bri- tain have no Conftitution to controul their Legislature. — - The King, Lords and Commons can do what they, pleafet Mr. Caldiutll obferved, that whatever nominal powers the Britiih Parliament might poflefs, yet they had infring- ed the liberty of the people in the molt flagrant manner, by giving themfelves power to continue four years in Parl- iament longer than they had been elected for . That though they were only chofen for three years by their con- ftituents, yet they pafled an a£l,'that Reprefentatives fhould, for the future, be chofen for feven years — That this Con* Citation would have a dangerous tendency— That this claufe would enable them to prolong their continuance in ©See as long as they pleafed — And that if a Conftitution was not agreeable to the people, its operation could not be iiappy- Governor JohnJIon replied, that the a£r. to which allufi- on was made by the gentleman, was not unconstitutional : But that if Congrefs were to pafs an acl, prolonging the terms of elections of Senators or Reprefentatives, it would he clearly unconstitutional. Mr. Maclaine obferved, that the a£fc of Parliament re- ferred to was pafled on urge it neceflity, when George I. afcended the throne, to prevent the Papifts from getting in- to Parliament ; for parties ran fo high at that time, that FapifU enough might have got in to deftroy the a£t of fet- tlement § ( «7 ) dement, which excluded the Roman Catholics from the fucceffion to the throne. Mr. Spencer — The gentleman from Halifax faid, that the -'reafon of this claufe was, that fome ftates might be re- fractory. I profefs, that, in my opinion, the circumftances of Rhode-Ifland do not appear to apply. I cannot con- ceive the particular caufe why Rhode-Ifland fhould not fend Reprefentatives to Congrefs. If they were united in one government, is it prefumed that they would wave the right of reprefentation ? I have not the leaft reafon to doubt they would make ufe of the privilege. With re- fpe£l to the conftru&ion that the worthy Member put up- on the claufe, were that conftruclion eftablifhed, I would be fatisfied ; but it is fufceptible of a different explanation. They may alter the mode of election fo as to deprive the people of the right of choofing. I wifh to have it exprefled in a more explicit manner. Mr. Davie— Mr. Chairman, The gentleman has cer- tainly mifconeeived the matter, when he fays, " that the circumftances of Rhode-Ifland do not apply." It is a fa£fc well known, of which perhaps he may not be poflefled, that the ftate of Rhode-Ifland has not been regularly re- prefented for feveral years, owing to the character and par- ticular views of the prevailing party. By the influence o£ this faction, who are in pofTeffion of the ftate government, the people have been frequently deprived of the benefit of a reprefentation in the union, and Congrefs often embaraf- fed by their abfence. The fame evil may again refult from, the fame caufe ; and Congrefs ought therefore to poffefs conftitutional power to give the people an opportunity of elecling Reprefentatives, if the ftates neglect or refufe to do it. The gentleman from Anfon has faid, « that this claufe is fufceptible of an explanation different from the conftru£Hon I put upon it." I have a high refpecl: for his opinion % but that alone, on this important occafion, is not fatisfactory : We muft have fome reafons from him to fup- port and fan£tion this opinion. He is a profeffional man, and has held an office many years — the nature and duties of which would enable him to put a different conftru&ion on this claufe, if it is capable of it. This claufe, Sir, has been the occafion of much ground- lefs alarm, and has fceea the favourite theme of declama- tion ( «» J tidn out of doors. I now call upon the gentlemen of thfc oppofition to fhew that it contains the mifchiefs with which' they have alarmed and agitated the public mind, and I de- fy them to fupport the conftruction they have put upon it by one fingle plaufible reafon. The gentleman from New- Hanover has faid in objection to this claufe, " That Con- grefs may appoint the mod inconvenient place in the mod inconvenient diftrict, and make the manner of election fa oppreffive, as entirely to deftroy reprefentation." IS this is' confidered as poflible, he fhould alfo reflect that the ftate Legiflatures may do the fame thing. But this can never happen, Sir, until the whole mafs of the people become corrupt, when all parchment fecurities will be of little fer- vice. Does that gentleman, or any other gentleman who J has the fmalleft acquaintance with human nature or the fpi- rit of America, fuppofe that the people will pafiively re- linquifh privileges, or fufFer the ufurpation of powers un* warranted by the Conftitution ? Does not the right of elect- ing Reprefentatives revert to the people every fecond year ? There is nothing in this clause that can impede or deftroy this reverfion ; and although the particular time of year,- the particular place in a county or a diftrict, or the parti- cular mode in which elections are to be held, as whether by vote or ballot, be left to Congrefs to direct ; yet this* can never deprive the people of the right or privilege of election. He has alfo added, that the " democratical branch; was in danger from this claufe •," and with fome other gen- tlemen took it for granted, that an ariftocracy mull arife out of the general government. This, I take it, from thie- very nature of the thing, can never happen. Ariftocracies grow out of the combination of a few powerful families,' where the country or people upon which they are to operate are immediately under their influence ; whereas the intereft and influence of this government are too weak, and too much diffufed ever to bring about fuch an event. The con- fidence of the people, acquired by a wife and virtuous con- duct, is the only influence the members of the federal go- vernment can ever have. When ariftocracies are formed, they will arife within the individual ftates ; it is therefore absolutely neceffary that Congrefs fhould have a conftituti- onal power to give the people at large a reprefentation in tfis government, in order to break and controul fuch dan- gerous ( *9 ) gerous combinations. Let gentlemen (hew when and how this ariftocracy they talk of, is to arife out of this Confti- tution. Are the firft members to perpetuate themfelves 2 Is the Conftitution to be attacked by fuch abfurd aflertions as thefe, and charged with defects with which it has no poflible connection i Mr. Bloodworth —Mr. Chairman, The gentleman has miftaken me. When we examine the gentleman's argu- ments, they have no weight. He tells us, that it is not pro- bable " that an ariftocracy can arife." I did not fay that it would. Various arguments are brought forward in fup- port of this article, They are vague and trifling. There is nothing that can be offered to my mind, which will re- concile me to it, while this evil exifts — while Congrefs have this controul over elections. It was eafy for them to mention, that this controul fhould be only exerted when the ftate would neglect or refufe, or be unable in cafe o£ invafion, to regulate elections— If fo, why did they not mention it exprefsly ? It appears to me, that fome of their general obfervations imply a contradiction. Do they not tell us, that there is no danger of a confolidation ? That Congrefs can exift no longer than the ftates — the mafly pillars on which it is faid to be raifed ? Do they not alfo tell us, that the ftate governments are to fecute us againft Congrefs ? At another time they tell us, that it was neceffary to fecure our liber- ty by giving them power to prevent the ftate governments from opprefling us. We know that there is a corruptioa in human nature. Without circumfpection and careful- nefs we (hall throw away our liberties. Why is this gene- ral expreflion ufed on this great occafion ? Why not ufe* expreffions that were clear and unequivocal ? If I truft my property with a man I take fecurity, (hall I then barter awa^ my rights ? Mr. Spencer- — Mr. Chairman, This claufe may operate in fuch a manner as will abridge the liberty of the people It is well known that men in power are apt to abufe it, andt extend it if poflible. From the ambiguity of this expreflion* they may put fuch conftruction on it as may fuit them. 5 would not have it in fuch a manner as to endanger the rights q£ the people. But it has been faid, that this power is ne- fejTary to preferve their exiftence. Jtee i§ not the leaft ( 9* ) power had not means to defend itfelf againft the encroach- ment of the others. The Britifh Conftitution, the theory of which is much admired, but which, however, is in fact liable to many objections, has divided the government into three branches. The King, who is hereditary, forms one branch, the Lords and Commons the two others ; and no bill paffes into a law without the King's confent. This a great conftitu- tional fupport of his authority. By the propofed Condi- tution> the Prefident is of a very different nature from a Monarch. He is to be chofen by Electors appointed by the, people — to be taken from among the people— to hold his office only for the (hort period of four years — and to be perfonally refponfible for any abufe of the great truft re- pofed in him. - In a republican government it would be extremely dan* gerous to place it in the power of one man to put an abfo- lute negative on a bill propofed by two houfes, one of which reprefented the people, the other the dates of Ame- rica. It therefore became an object of confideration, how the Executive could defend itfelf without being a compo- nent part of the Legiflature. This difficulty was happily remedied by the claufe now under our confideration. The Executive is net entirely at the mercy of the Legiflature m t nor is it put in the power of the Executive entirely to defeat the acts of thofe two important branches. As it is pro- vided in this claufe, if a bare majority of both Houfes fliould pafs a bill which the Prefident thought injurious to his country, it is in his power — to do what ? Not to fay in an arbitrary, haughty manner, that he does not approve of it ; but, if he thinks it a bad bill, refpectfully to offer his reafons to both Houfes ; by whom, in that cafe, it is to be reconfidered, and not to become a law unlefs two-thirds of both Houfes (hall concur \ which they ftill may, not- withftanding the Prefident's objection. It cannot be pre- fumed that he would venture to oppofe a bill under fuch circumftances, without very ftrong reafons. Unlefs he was fure of a powerful fupport in the Legiflature, his op- pofition would be of no effect ; and as his reafons are to be put on record, his fame is committed both to the pre- fent times and to pofterity. The exercife of this power in a time of violent faction^ might be pffiWy hazardous 9 ( 91 ) to hlmfelf, but he can have no ill motive to exert it in the face of a violent opposition. Regard to his duty alone could induce him to oppofe when, it was probable two- thirds would at all events over-rule him. This power may be ufefully exercifed, even when no ill intention prevails in the Legiftature. It might frequently happen, that where a bare majority had carried a pernicious bill, if there was an authority to fufpend it, upon a cool ftatement of rea- fons many of that majority, on a reconsideration, might be convinced, and voce differently. I therefore think the method propofed, is a happy medium between the pofTefTioni ^of an abfolute negative, and the Executive having no con- troul whatever, on a£fcs of legiflation : And at the fame time that it ferves to protect the Executive from ill defigns in the Legiftature, it may alfo anfwer the purpofe of pre- venting many laws paffing which w<7uld be immediately injurious to the people at large. It is a ftrong guard againft abufes in all, that the President's reafons are to be entered at large on the journals, and if the bill paffes notwithstand- ing, that the yeas and nays are alfo to be entered. The public therefore can judge fairly between them. # The firfl: claufe of the eighth fe£tion read. Mr. Spencer — Mr. Chairman, I conceive this power to be too extenfive, as it embraces all poffible powers of taxation, and gives up to Congrefs every poffible article of taxation that can ever happen. By means of this, there will be no way for the ftates of receiving or collecting taxes at all, but what may interfere with the collections of Congrefs. Every power is given over our money, to thofe over whom we have no immediate controul. I would give them pow-. ers to fupport the government, but would not agree to an- nihilate the ftate governments in an article which is raoft efiential to their exiftence. I would give them power of laying impofls; and I would give them power to lay and collect excifes. I confefs that this is a kind of tax fo odi- ous to a free people, that I would with great reluctance agree to its exercife. But it is obvious, that unlefs fuch excifes were admitted, the public burthen will be all borne by thofe parts of the community which do not manufacture for themfelves. So manifeft an inequality would juftify a, {esurrerjce to this fpecies of taxe§, - N How ( 9« ) How are direct taxes to be" laid ? By a poll-tax, autf& ments on land or other property ? Inconvenience and op- prelfton will arife from any of them. I would not be un- deritood that I would not wifti to have an efficient govern- ment for the United States. I am fcnfible that laws ope- rating on individuals, cannot be carried on againft ftates ; becaufe if they do not comply with the general laws of the union, there is noway to compel a. compliance but force. There mull be an army to compel them. Some ftates may have fome excufe for non-compliance. Others will feign excufes. Several ftates may perhaps be in the fame predi- cament. If force be ufed to compel them, they will pro- bably call for foreign aid, and the very means of defence • will operate to the difTolution of the fyftem, and to the destruction of the ftates. I would not therefore deny that Congrefs ought to have the power of taking out of the pockets of the individuals at large, if the ftates fail to pay thofe taxes in convenient time. If requifitions were to be made on the feveral ftates, proportionate to their abilities, the feveral ftate Legifiatures, knowing the circumftances of their conftituents, and that they would ultimately be compelled to pay, would lay the tax in a convenient man- ner, and would be able to pay their quotas at the end of the year. They are better acquainted with the mode in which taxes can be raifed, than the general government can pof- fibiy be. It may happen, for inftance, that if ready money can- not be immediately received from the pockets of individu- als for their taxes, their eftates, confiding of lands, negroes, flock, and furniture, muft be fet up and fold at vendue. We can eafily fee, from the great fcarcity of money at this day, that great diftrefles muft happen. There is no hard money in the country. It muft come from fome other parts of the wSrld. Such property would fell for one tenth part of its value. Such a mode as this would, in a few years, deprive the people of their eftates. But on the contrary, if fuch articles as are proper for exportation, were either fpecifically taken for their taxes immediately by the ftate Legiflaturej or if the collection fhould be deferred till they had difpofed of fuch articles, no oppreflion or in- convenience would happen. There is no perfon fo poor fcut who can raife {omsxhwz to dtfpofe of. For a great "* " "' "" - ~** K«t ( pp ) part of the United Suites, thofe articles whicli are proper for exportation would anfwer the purpofe. I would have a tax laid on eftates where fitch articles could not be had, and fuch a tax to be by'inftallments for two or more years, I would admit that if the quotas were not punctually paid at the end of the time, that Congrefs might collect taxes, becaufe this power is abfolutely neceifary for the fupport of the general government. But I would not give It in the firft inftance, for nothing would be more oppref- five, as in a fhort time people would be compelled to part with their property. In the other cafe they would part with none but in fuch a manner as to encourage their in- duftry. On the other hand if requifitions, in cafes of emer- gency, were propofed to the ftate AfTemblies, it would be a meafure of convenience to the people, and would be a means of keeping up the importance of the ftate Legisla- tures, and would conciliate their affections; and their knowledge of the ultimate right of Congrefs to colled: taxes, would ftimulate their exertions to raife money. But if the power of taxation be given in the firft inftance^ to Congrefs, the itate Legillatures will be liable to be coun- teracted by the general government, in all their operations, Thefe are my reafons for objecting to this article, Governor Johnjion — Mr. Chairman, This claufe is ob» jedted to, and it is propofed to alter it in fuch a manner that the general government fhall not have power to lay- taxes in the firft inftance, but fhall apply to, the Mates, and in cafe of refufal, that direCl taxation fhall take place. That is to fay, that the general government fhould pafs an ac~fc ta levy money on the United States, and if the dates did not within a limited time pay their refpeclive proportions, the officers of the United States fhould proceed to levy money on the inhabitants of the different flates. This queftion has been agitated by the Conventions of different ft ates, and fome very refpeeTable ftates have propofed that there fhould be an amendment in the manner which the worthy Mem- ber laft up has propofed. But, Sir, although I pay very great refpecl: to the opinions and decifions of the gentle- men who compofed thofe Conventions, and although they were wife in many inftances, I cannot concur with them in. this particular. It appears to me that it will be attended with many inconveniences^. It feems to me probable, that the ( 100 ) (he money arifjng from duties and excifes, will be in gene- ral fufficient to anfwer all the ordinary purpofes of govern- ment ; but in cafes of emergency it will be neceffary to lay direct taxes. In cafes of emergency it will be neceffary that thefe taxes fhould be a refponfible and eftablifhed fund to fupport the credit of the United States : For it cannot be fuppofed that from the ordinary fources of revenue, mo- ney can be brought into our treafufy in fuch a manner as to anfwer preffing dangers ; nor can it be fuppofed that our (credit will enable us to procure any loans, if our govern- ment is limited in the means of procuring money. But if the government have it in their power to lay thofe taxes, it will give them credit to borrow money on that fecurity, and for that reafon it will not be neceffary to lay fo heavy a tax; for if the tax is fufficiently productive to pay the intereft, money may always be had in confequence of that fecurity. If the date Legiflatures mufi: be applied to 9 they mud lay a tax fufficient for the full fum wanting. This wi]l be much more oppreffive than a tax laid by Congrefs; for I prefume that no ftate Legiilature will have as much credit individually, as the United States conjointly ; there- fore viewing it in this light, a tax laid by Congrefs will be much eafier than a tax laid by the ftates. Another incon- venience which will attend this propofed amendment is, that thefe emergencies may happen a confiderable time be- fore the meeting of fome ftate Legiflatures, and previous to their meeting the fchemes of the government may be de- feated by this delay. A confiderable time will elapfe be- fore the ftate can lay the tax, and a confiderable time before it be collected, and perhaps it cannot be collected at all. — One reafon which the worthy Member has offered in favour of the amendment was, that the general Legiilature can- not lay a tax without interfering with the taxation of the ftate Legiilature. It may happen, that the taxes of both may be laid on the fame article ; but I hope and believe that the taxes to be laid on by the general Legiilature, will be fo very light, that it will be no inconvenience to the people to pay them ; and if you attend to the probable amount of the impoft, you mufl conclude that the fmall addition to the taxes will not make them fo high as they are at this time. Another reafon offered by the worthy Member in fupport of the amendment, is, that the ftate Legiilature may ( "I ) j&ay direct taxes to be paid in fpecinc articles. We had full experience of this in the late war. I call on the Houfe t& fay, whether it was not the moft oppreffive, and lead pro- ductive tax ever known in the ftate. Many articles were loft, and many could not be difpofed of fo as to be of any fervice to the people. Moft articles are perifhable, and cannot therefore anfwer. Others are difficult to tranfport, expenfive to keep, and very difficult to difpofe of. A tar payable in tobacco would anfwer very well in fome parts of the country, and perhaps would be more productive than any other ; yet we fee that great loffes have been fuftained )by the public on this article. A tax payable in any kind of grain would anfwer very little purpofe — grain being perifh- able. A tax payable in pitch and tar would not anlwer. A mode of this kind would not be at all eligible in this Mate: The great lofs on the fpecific articles, and inconvenience in difpofi.ng of them, would render- them productive of very Jittle. He fays, that this would be a means of keeping up the importance of the (late Legiflatures. I am afraid it would have a different effect:. If requifitions mould not be com- plied with at the time fixed, the officers of Congrefs would then immediately proceed to make their collections. We know that feveral caufes would inevitably produce a failure. The dates would not, or could not comply. In that cafe, the ftate Legiilature would be difgraced* After having done every thing for the fupport of their credit and import- ance without fuccefs, would they not be degraded in the eyes of the United States ? Would it not caufe heart-burn- ings between particular ftates and the United States ? The inhabitants would oppofe the tax-gatherers. They would fay, " We are taxed by our own ftate Legiilature for the proportionate quota of our ftate, we will not pay you alfo." This would produce infurrections and confufion in the country. Thefe are the reafons which induce me to fup- port this claufe. It is perhaps particularly favourable to this ftate. We are not an importing country — very little is here raifed by impofts. Other ftates who have adopted fche Conftitution import for us. Maffachufetts > South-Caro- lina, Maryland and Virginia, are great importing ftates. From them we procure foreign goods, and by that means^ fhey are generally benefitec}, For it is agreed upon by all writers, > ( K» ) Witers, that the confumer pays the impoft. Do we net then pay a tax in fupport of their revenue in proportion to our confumption of foreign articles ? Do we not know that this, in our prefent fituation, is without any benefit to us ? Do we not pay a fecond duty when thefe goods are import- ed into this ftate ? We now pay double duties. It is not to be fuppofed that the merchant will pay the duty without wifhing to get intereft and profit on the money he lays out. It is not to be prefumed that he will not add to the price a fum fufficient to indemnify himfelf for the inconvenience of parting with the money he pays as a duty. We there- fore now pay a much higher price for European manufac- tures than the people do in the great importing dates. Is it not laying heavy burthens on the people of this country, not only to compel them to pay duties for the fupport of the importing ftates, but to pay a fecond duty on the im- portation into this ftate by our own merchants ? By adop- tion we fhall participate in the amounts of the impofts. — Upon the whole, I hope this article will meet with the ap- probation of this committee, when they confider the ne- cefhty of fupporting the general government, and the ma- ny inconveniences, and probable if not certain inefficacy, of requisitions. Mr. Spencer — Mr. Chairman, I cannot, notwithftanding what the gentleman has advanced, agree to this claufe un- conditionally. The moft certain criterion of happinefs that any people can have, is, to be taxed by their own immedi- ate Representatives — By thofe Reprefentatives who inter- mix with them, and know their circumftances — not by thofe who cannot know their fituation. Our federal Re- prefentatives cannot fufficiently know our fituation and circumftances. The worthy gentleman faid, that it would be. necefTary for the general government to have the power of laying taxes, in order to have credit to borrow money. But I cannot think, however plaufible it may appear, that his argument is conclufive. If fuch emergency happens as will render it necefTary for them to borrow money, it will be necefTary for them to borrow before they proceed to lay the tax. I conceive the government will have credit fuffi- cient to borrow money in the one cafe as well as the other. If requifitionsbe pun&uality complied with, no doubt they can borrow, and if not punctually complied with, Congrefs •can ultimately lay the tax. I ( I0 3 ) I wilh to have the mod eafy way for the people to pa/ their taxes. The itate Legiflature will know every method and expedient by which the people can pay, and they will recur to the moft convenient. This will be agreeable to the people, and will not create infurredtions or diflentiona in the country. The taxes might be laid on the moil pro- ductive articles : I wifh not, for my part, to lay them or* perishable articles. There are a number of other articles befides thofe which the worthy gentleman enumerated. There are befides tobacco, hemp, indigo, and cotton. la the northern dates, where they have manufactures, a con- trary fyftem from ours would be necefTary. There the* principal attention is paid to the giving their children trades. They have few articles for exportation. By railing the tax in this manner, it will introduce fuch a fpirit of in- duftry as cannot fail of producing happy confequences to pofterity. He objects to. the mode of paying taxes infpe- cific articles : May it not be fuppofed that we mail gain fomething by experience, and avoid thofe fchemes and me- thods which ihall be found inconvenient and difadvantage- ous ? If expences mould be incurred in keeping and dif- pofing of fuch articles, could not thofe expences be reim- burfed by a judicious fale ? Cannot the Legiflature be cir- cumfpe£t as to the choice and qualities of the objects to be feledted for raifmg the taxes due to the continental trea- fury ? The worthy gentleman has mentioned, that if the people fhould not comply to raife the taxes in this way B that then if they were fubje£t to the law of Congrcfs, it would throw them into confufion* I would afk every one here, if there be not more reafon to induce us to believe that they would be thrown into confufion in cafe the power of Congrefs was exercifed by Congrefs in the firft initance, than in the other cafe. After having fo long a time to raife- the taxes, it appears to me that there could be no kind o£ doubt of a punctual compliance. The right of Congrefs to lay taxes ultimately, in cafe of non-compliance with re- quifitions, would operate as a penalty, and would ftimulate ■ the dates to difcharge their quotas faithfully. Between thefe two modes there is animmenfe difference. The one will produce the happinefs, eafe, and profperity of the people j the other will deftroy them, and produce infur- p&ion. ( *ft > - Mr. Spaig£t~—Mr. Chairman, It was thought abfolutely necefTary for the fupport of the general government, to give it power to raife taxes. Government cannot exift without certain and adequate funds. R.equifitions cannot be depended upon. For my part, I think it indifferent whether I pay the tax to the officers of the continent, or to thofe of the ftate. I would prefer paying to the conti- nental officers, becaufe it will be lefs expenfive. The gentleman laft up, has objected to the propriety of the tax being laid by Congrefs, becaufe they could not know the circumftances of the people. The ftate Legiflature will have no fource or opportunity of information which the Members of the general government may not have* They can avail themfelves of the experience of the ftate Legiflatures. The gentleman acknowledges the inefficacy of requifitions, and yet recommends them. He has allow- ed that laws cannot operate upon political bodies without the agency of force. His expedient of applying to the ftates in the firft inftance, will be productive of delay, and w*ll certainly terminate in a disappointment to Congrefs- But the gentleman has faid that we had no hard money, and that the taxes might be paid in ipecific articles. It is well known that if taxes are not raifed in medium, the ftate lofes by it. If the government wifhes to raife orte thou- fa-nd pounds, they mult calculate on a difappointment by fpecific articles, and will therefore impofe taxes more in proportion to the expected difappointment. An individual can fell his commodities much better than the public at large. A tax payable in any produce would be lefs pro- ductive, and more oppreffive to the people, as it would en- hance the public burthens by its inefficiency. As to abufes by the continental officers, I apprehend the ftate officers will more probably commit abufes than they. Their con- duct will be more narrowly watched, and mifconducl: more feverely punifl ed. They will be therefore more cautious. Mr. Spencer, in anfwer to Mr. Spaight, obferved, that in cafe of war, he was not oppofed to this article, becaufe if the ftates refufed to comply with requifitions, there was no way to compel them but military coercion, which would induce refractory ftates to call for foreign aid, which might terminate in a difmemberment of the empire. But he faid that he would not give the power of 4i?e& taxation ttf Congrefs ( *°s ) Congrefs in the firft inftance, as he thought the ftatcs would lay the taxes in a lefs oppreflive manner. Mr. Whitmill Hill— Mr. Chairman, The fubjeft now before us is of the higheft importance. The object of all government is the protection, fecurity, and happinefs of the people. To produce this end, government mud be poflefled of the neceflary means. Every government muft be empowered to raife a fuf- flcient revenue; but I believe it will be allowed on all hands, that Congrefs has been hitherto altogether deftitute of that power fo eiTential to every government. I believe alfo that it is generally wiflied that Congrefs mould be pcflefTed of power to raife fuch fums as are requifite for the fupport of the union, though gentlemen may differ with regard to the mode of railing them. Our paft experience (hews us, that it is in vain to expect any poffible efficacy from requisitions Gentlemen recom* mend thefe as if their inutility had not been experienced. But do we not all know what effecTs they have produced ? Is it not to them that we muft impute the lofs of our cre- dit and refpedt-abiiity ? It is neceflary, therefore, that go- vernment have recourfe to fome other mode of raifing a revenue. Had, indeed, every ftate complied with requi- fitions, the old Confederation would not have been com- plained of; but as the feveral flates have already discovered fuch a repugnancy to comply with federal engagements, it muft appear absolutely neceflary to free the general go- vernment from fuch a ftate of dependence. The debility of the old fyftem, and the neceffity of fub- ftituting another in its room, are the caufes of calling this Convention. I conceive, Sir, that the power given by that claufe, is abfolutely neceflary to the,exiftence of the government* Gentlemen fay that we are in fuch a Situation that we can- not pay taxes. This, Sir, is not a fair reprefentation in my opinion. The honefl: people of this country acknow- ledge themfelves fufficiently able and willing to pay them. Were it a private contract they would find means to pay them. The honeft part of the community complain of the a£ts of the Legislature. They complain that the s Le- giflature makes laws, not to fuit their conftituents, but them/elves. The Legislature, Sir, never means to pay a O juft ( i people difcontented. I believe this would be the cafe. The dates, by acting dimonedly, would appear in the mod odious light •, and the people would be irritated at fuch an application, after a rejection by their own Legiflaf ure. But if the taxes were to be raifed of individuals, I believe they could, without any difficulty, be paid in due time. But,Sir,theUnitedStates wifii to be eftablifhed and known among other nations. This will be a matter of great util* ity to them. We might then form advantageous, connec- tions. When it is once known among foreign nations, that our general government and our finances are upon a refpe&able footing, fhould emergencies happen, we can borrow money of them without any difadvantage. The lender would be fure of being reimbursed in time. This matter is of the highed confequence to the United States. Loans mud be recurred to fometim.es. In cafe of war they would be neceffary. All 'nations borrow money on pref- fmg occasions. The gentleman who was lad up,, mentioned many fpe- cific articles which could be paid by the people in difcharge of their taxes. He has, I think, been fully anfwered. He mud fee the futility of fuch a mode. When our wants would be greated, thefe articles would be lead pro*- du£Uve — I mean in time of war. But we dill Jiave means — fuch means as honed and affiduous men will find. He fays, that Congrefs cannot lay the tax to fuit us. He has forgot that Congrefs are acquainted with us — go from us — ( io8 ) tig— are (ituated like ourfelves. I will be bold to fay, that it will be moil their own intereft to behave with propriety and moderation. Their own intereft will prompt them to lay taxes moderately ; and nothing but the laft neceflity will urge them to recur to that expedient. This is a moft effential claufe. Without money govern- ment will anfwer no purpofe. Gentlemen compare this to a foreign tax. It is by no means the cafe. It is laid by ourfelves. Our own Representatives will lay it, and •will, no doubt, ufe the mcft eafy means of raifing it pofli- ble. Why not truft our own Reprefentatives ? We might no doubt have confidence in them on this occafion, as well as every other. If the continental treafury is to depend on the ftates as ufual, it will be always poor. But gen- tlemen are jealous, and unwilling to truft government, though they are their own Reprefentatives. Their max- im is, truft them with no power. This holds againft all government. Anarchy will enfue, if government be not trufted. I think that I know the fentiments of the honeft, induftrious part of the community, as well as any gentle- man in this houfe. They wifh to difcharge thefe debts, and are able. If they can raife the intereft of the public debt, it is fuflicient. They will not be called upon for more than the intereft, till fuch time as the country be rich and populous. The principal can then be paid with eafe. The intereft can now be paid with great facility. We can borrow money with eafe, and on advantageous terms, when it (hall be known, that Congrefs will have that power which all governments ought to have. Con- grefs will not pay their debts in paper money. I am will- ing to truft this article to Congrefs, becaufe I have :io rea- fon to think that our government will be better than it has been. Perhaps I have fpoken too liberally of the Legisla- ture before ; but I do not expect that they will ever, •without a radical change of men and meafures, wifh to put the general government on a better footing. It is not the poor man who oppofes the payment of thofe juft debts to which we owe our independence and political exiftence — but the rich mifer. Not the poor, but the rich, fhudder at the idea of taxes. I have no dread that Congrefs will diftrefs us ; nor have I any fear that the tax will be em- bezzled by officers. Induftry and economy will be pro- moted, ( m ) moted, and money will be eafier got than ever it has been yet. The taxes will be paid by the people when called upon. I truft, that all honeft, induttrious people will think with me, that Congrefs owght to be poiTefled of the power of applying immediately to the people for its fup- port, without the interpofition of the ftate Legiflatures. I have no confidence in the Legiflature — The people do not fuppofe them to be honeft men. Mr. Steele was decidedly in favour of the claufe. A government without revenue, he compared to a poor, for* lorn, dependent individual, and faid, that the one would be as helpiefs and contemptible as the other. He wifhed the government of the union to be on a refpe£iable foot- ing. Congrefs, he faid, (hewed no difpofition to tax us; That it was well known, that a poll-tax of eighteen pence per poll, and fix pence per hundred acres of land, were appropriated and offered by the Legiflature to Congrefs : That Congrefs was folicited to fend the officers to collect thofe taxes, but they refufed : That if this power was not given to Congrefs, the people mud: be oppreffed, efpecial- lyin time of war : That during the I a ft war. provifions, horfes, &c. had been taken from the people by force, to fupply the wants of government : That a refpedtable go- vernment would not be under the neceflity of recurring to fuch unwarrantable means : That fuch a method was un- equal and oppreffive to the laft degree. The citizens, whofe property was prefied from them, paid all the taxes — the reft efcaped. The prefs-m afters went often to the pooreft, and not to the richeft citizens, and took their horfes, &c. This difabled them from making a crop next year. , It would be better, he faid, to lay the public bur- thens equally upon the people. Without this power, the other powers of Congrefs would be nugatory. He added, that it would, in his opinion, give ftrength and refpecta- bility to the United States in time of war — would promote induftry and frugality — and would enable the government to protect and extend commerce, and confequently increafe the riches and population of the country. Mr. Jofeph M'Dowall— Mr. Chairman, This is a pow- er I will never agree to give up from the hands of the peo- ple of this country. We know that the amount of the impofts will be trifling, and that the expences of this go- vernment ( «o ) vernment will be very great *, confequently the taxes will be very high. The tax-gatherers will be fent, and our pro- perty will be wrefted out of our hands The Senate is moil dangeroufly constructed. Our only fecurity is the Houfe or Reprefentatives. They may be continued at Congrefs eight or ten years. At fuch a diftance from their homes, and for fo long a lime, they will have no feeling for, nor any knowledge of, the fituation of the people. If elected from the fea-ports, they will not know the weftern part of the country, and vice verfa. Two co operative powers cannot exilt together. One mud fumbit. The in- ferior muft give up to the fuperior. While I am up, I will fay lomething to what has been foid by the gentleman to ridicule the General AlTembly. He reprelents the Le- gislature in a very approbious light. It is ,very aftonifhing that the people mould choofe men of fuch characters to reprefent them. If the people be virtuous, why fhould they put confidence in men of a contrary difpofition. As to paper money, it was the refult of neceffity. We were involved in a great war. What money had been in the country, was fent to other parts of the world. What would have been the confequence if paper money had not been made ? We muft have been undone. Our political cxiftence muft have been deftroyed. The extreme fcarcity of fpecie, with other good caufes, 'particularly the fe- licitation of the officers to receive it at its nominal va- lue, for their pay, produced fubfequent emiflions. HI tells us that all the people wifh this power to be giv- en—that the mode of payment need Only be pointed out, and that they will willingly pay. How are they to raife the money ? Have they it in their chefts ? Suppofe, for inftance, there be a tax of two (hilling per hundred laid .on land— where is the money to pay it ? We have it not. I am acquainted with the people. I know their fituation. They have no money. Requifitions may yet be complied with. Induftry and frugality may enable the people to pay moderate taxes, if laid by thofe who have a knowledge of their fituation, and a feeling for them. If the tax-gather- ers come upon us, they will, like the locufts of old, de- ft.ro v us. They will have pretty high falaries, and will ex- ert themfelves to opprefs us. When we confider thefe .things, we fhould be cautious. They will be weighed, I truft, ( "I ) truft, by the Houfe. Nothing faid by the gentlemen o% the other fide, has obviated my obje&ionf. Governor JohnJIon — Mr. Chairman, The gentleman who was lad up, ftill infrfts on the great utility which would refult from that mode which has been hitherto found in- effectual. It is amazing that pall: experience will not in- ftrudl: him. When a merchant follows a fimilar mode — when he purchafes dear and fells cheap, he is called a fwindler, and muft foon become a bankrupt. This ftate deferves that moft difgraceful epithet. We are fwindlers — we gave three pounds per hundred weight for tobacco, and fold it at three dollars per hundred weight, after hav- ing paid very confiderable expences for tranfporting and keeping it. The United States are bankrupts. They are confidered fuch in every part of the world. They borrow money, and promife to pay — they have it not in their pow- er, and they are obliged to afk of the people to whom they owe, to lend them money to pay the very intereft. This is difgraceful and humiliating. By thefe means we are paying compound intereft. No private fortune, however great — -no (late, however affluent, can (land this moft de- structive mode. This has proceeded from the inefficacy of requifitions. Shall we continue the fame practice ? Shall we not rather ftruggle to get over our misfortunes ■? »I hope we fhall. Another Member on the fame fide, fays, that it is im- proper to take the power of "taxation out of the hands of the people. I deny that it is taken out of their hands by this fyftem. Their immediate Reprefentatives lay thefe taxes. Taxes are neceflary for every government. Can there be any danger when thefe taxes are laid by the Re- prefentatives of the people ? If there be, where can po- litical fafety be found ? But it is faid that we have a fmall proportion of that reprefentation. Our proportion is equal to the proportion of money we fhall have to pay. It is therefore a full proportion, and unlefs we fuppofe that all the Members of Congrefs (hall combine to ruin their con- flituents, we have no reafon to fear. It is faid (I know not from what principle) that our Reprefentatives will be taken from the fea-coaft, and will not know in what man- ner to lay the tax to fuit the citizens of the weftern part #f the country. I know not whence that idea arofe. The gentlemen ( ** ) gentlemen from the weftward are not precluded from voting for Reprefentativee. They have it therefore in their power to fend them from the weftward, or the middle parts of the date. They are more numerous, and can fend them or the greater part of them. I do not doubt but they will fend the moft proper, and men in whom they can put confidence, and will give them, from time to time, inftruclions to enlighten their minds. Something has been faid with regard to paper money. I think very little can be faid in favour of it *, much may be»faid, very juftly, againft it. Every man of property — every man of confiderable tranfa&ions — whether a merchant, planter, mechanic, or of any other condition, muft have felt the baneful influ- ence of that currency. It gave us relief for a moment. It affifted us in the profecution of a bloody war. It is de- ftruttive however, in general, in the end. It was ftruck in the laft inftance, for the purpofe of paying the officers and foldiers." The motive was laudable. I then thought, and ftill do, that thofe gentlemen might have had more adv -.ntage by not receiving that kind of payment. It would have been better for them and for the country, had it not been emitted. We have involved ourfelves in a debt of f .2o#,ooo. We have not, with this fura, honeftly and fairly paid /\ 5 0,000. Was this right ? But, fay they, there was no circulating medium. This^want wats necef- fary to be fupplied. It is a doubt with me whether the circulating medium be increafed by an emiffion of paper currency. Before the emiffion of the paper money, there was a great deal of hard money among us. For thirty years paft I had not known fo much fpecie in circulation as we had at the emiffion of paper money, in 1783. That medium was increafing daily. People from abroad bring fpecie, for, thank God, our country produces articles which are every where in demand. There is more fpecie in the country than is generally imagined, but the pro- prietors keep it locked up. No man will part with his fpecie. It lies in his cheft. It is alked, why not lend it out ? The anfwer is obvious : That fhould he once let it get out of his power, he never can recover the whole of it. If he bring fuit, he will obtain a verdidt for one half of it. This is the reafon. of our poverty. The fcarcity of money ( Ut ) *noriey muft be in fome degree owing to this, and the fpe* cie which is now in this country, might as well be in any other part of the world. If our trade was once on a re- fpectable footing, we ihouid iind means of paying that enormous debt. Another obfervation was made, which has not yet beer! anfwered, viz. that the demands of the Unfted States will be fmaller than thofe of the dates, for this reafen — th£ United States will only make a demand of the intereft o£ the public debts *, the dates muft dena and both principal and intereft : For I prefume no (late can on an emergency produce, without the aid of individuals, a fum fufficient for that purpofe ; but the United States can borrow ori the credit of their funefs, arifing from their power of lay- ing taxes, fuch funis as will be equal to the emergency. There will be always credit given where there is a good fecurity. No man who is not a mifer, will hefitate to truft where there is a refpeclable fecurity ; but credulity itfelf would not truft where there was no kind of fecurity, but an abfolute certainty of lo.Gng. Mankind wi(h to make their money productive ; they will therefore lend it where there is a fecurity and certainty of recovering it, and no' longer keep it hoarded in ftrong boxes. This power is eflential to the very exifterice of the go- vernment. Requisitions' afe fruitlefs and idle.. Every expedient propofed as an alternative, or to qualify this power, is replete with inconvenience. It appears to me therefore, upon the whole, that this article ftands much better as it is, than in any other manner. Mr. Iredell — Mr. Chairman, I do not prefume td rife to difcufs tills" claufe, after the very able, and, in my opi- nion, unanswerable arguments which have been urged iri favour of it j- ,but merely to correct an error which fell from a very rcfpe£tab!e Member [Mr. M'Dowall] on the other fide. It was, that Congrefs, by interfering with* the mode of elections, might continue themfelves in of- fice. I thought that this was fufficientty explained yefter- but in a matter of this magnitude, which con- cerns the intereil of millions yet unborn, fufpicion is a. very noble virtue. Let us fee, therefore, how far we give power, for when It is once given, we cannot take it away. It is faid that thofe who formed this Conftitution, wera great and good men. "We do not difpute it. We alfo ad- mit that great and learned people have adopted it. But I have a judgment of my own, and though not fo well in- formed always as others, yet I will exert it when manifeft danger prefents itfelf. When the power of the purfe and the fword are given up, we dare not think for ourfelves. la cafe of war, the lait man and the laft penny would be extorted ( Mi ) lexlorted from us. That the Conftitution has a tendency to tleftroy the itate governments, muft be clear to every man of common underftanding. Gentlemen, by their learned arguments, endeavour to conceal the danger from us. I have no notion of this method of evading argu- ments, and of clouding them over with rhetoric, arid I mud fay, fophiitry too. $ut I hope no man will be led aftray with them. Governor Johnjlon obferved, that if any fophiftieal ar- guments had been made ufe of, they ought to be pointed but •, and no body could doubt that it was in the power of ta learned divine [alluding to Mr. Caldwell] to (hew their fophiftry. Governor Johnjlon being informed of his miftake in taking Mr. Gaudy for Mr. Caldwell, apologized for it. Mr. Porter — Mr. Chairman, I mull fay that I think the gentleman laft up was wrong, for the ether gentleman was, in my opinion, right. This is a money claufe. \ would fain know whence this power originates. I have heard it faid that the Legiilature were villains, and that this power was to be exercifed by the Reprefentatives of the people. When a building is raifed, it fhuuld be on folid ground — Every gentleman muft agree that we fhould not build a fu per ft rupture on a foundation of villains. Gentlemen fay that the mafs of the people are honeft — I hope gentlemen will confider that we fhould build the jftru&ure on the people, and not on the Reprefentatives of the people. Agreeably to the gentleman's argument [Mr. Hill] our Reprefentatives will be mere villains. I ex peel: that very learned arguments, and powerful oratory will be difplayed on this occasion. I expecl: that the great cannon from Halifax [meaning Mr. Davie] will difcharge iire balls among us, but large batteries are often taken by fmall arms. Mr. Blood-worth wiflied that gentlemen would defift from making perfonal reflections. He was of opinion that it was wrong to do fo, and incompatible with their duty to their conftftuents. That every man had a right to dis- play his abilities, and he hoped they would no longer re- ilecl: upon one another. From the fecond to the eight claufe read without any obfervation. ( "7 ) Mi nth claufe read. Several Members wifhed to hear an explanation of this ) raifing two hundred and one men for two years, for the defence of Davidfon county. I do not deny that the in- tention might have been good, and that the Affembly really thought the fituation of that part of the couritrj required fuch a defence. But this makes the argument ftill itroiv^er agamit the impolicy of fuch a reftri6tion, fmce our own experience points out the danger rtfulting from it: For I take it for granted, that we could not at that time be faid to be in a ftate of war. Dreadful might the condition or* this country be, without this power. We muft truft our friends or truft our enemies. There is one reftritTtion on this power, which I believe is the only one that ou^ht to be put upon it. Though Congrefs are to4iave the power of raifing and fupporting armies, yet they cannot appro* priate money for that purpofe>for a longer time than two years. Now we will fuppofe that the majority of the two Houfes fhouid be capable of making a bad ufe of this pow- er, and fhouid appropriate more money to ra-ife an army than is n-'-cefTary. The appropriation we have teen cannot be conftitutional for more than two years : Within that time it might command obedience. But at the end of the iecond year from the firft choice, the whole Houfe of Re- presentatives muft be re-chefen, and alfo one-third of the Senate. . The people being inflamed with the abufe of power of the old Members, would turn them out with indignation. Upon their return home they would meet the univerfal execrations of their fellow- citizens — Inftead of the grateful plaudits of their county, fo dear to every feeling mind, they would be treated with the utmoft re- fentment and contempt: — Their names would be held in everlafting infamy ; and their meafures would be inftantly reprobated and changed by the new Members. In two years, a fyftem of tyranny certainly could not fucceed in the face of the whole people ; and the appropriation could not be with any fafety for lefs than that period. If it de-* pended on an annual vote, the confequence might be, that at a critical period, when military operations were neceflary, the troops would not know whether they were entitled to pay or not, and could not fafely aft till they knew that the annual vote had pafTed. To refufe this power to the go- vernment, would be to invite infults and attacks from other nations. Let us not, for God's fake, be guilty of fuch in* % difcretio$f ( til ) iifcretlon as to truft to our enemies mefcy, but give*, as l§ our duty, a fufficient power to government f o protect their country, guarding at the fame time againft abuies as well f as we can. We well know what tin's country fuffcred by the ravages of the Britifti army daring the war. How could we have been faved but by an army ? Without that refource we mould foon have felt the miserable confequen- ces j and this day, in Head of having the honour, the great- eft any people ever enjoyed, to chocfe a government which our reafon recommends, we mould have been groaning under the moll intolerable tyranny that was ever felt. We ou^ht not to think thefe dangers are entirely over. The Britifli government is not friendly to us : They dread the rifing glory of America: Ther tremble for the Weft-In- dies, and their colonies to the north of us : They have counteracted us on every occafion fince the peace. Inftead of a liberal and reciprocal commerce, they have attempt- ed to confine us to a moft narrow and ignominious one* Thsir pride is ftill irritated with the difappointment o£ their endeavours to enflave us. They know that on the record of hiftory their conduct towards us muft appear in the moft dif^racefu: light. Let it alfo appear on the record of hiftory, that America was equally wife and fortunate ia peace as well as in war. Let it be faid, that with a tem- per and unanimity unexampled, tiiey corrected the vices? of an imperfect government, and framed a new one ort the baiis of juftice and liberty : That though all did not concur in approving the particular ftru£lure of this govern- ment, yet that the minority peaceably and refpecHully fufo- mitted to the decifion of the greater number. This is $ fpe£lacle fo great, that if it mould fucceed, this muft b« confidered the greateft country under Heaven ; for ther© is no inftance of any fuch deliberate change of govern- ment in any other nation that ever exilted. But howf would it gratify the pride of our enemy to fay : « Ws u could not conquer you, but you have ruined yourfelves. " You have fooliftily quarrelled about trifles. You are un- *.? fit for any government whatever. You have feparated "from us, when you were unable to govern yourfelves* *< and you now defervedly feel all the horrors of anarchy.** I beg pardon for faying fo much. I did not intend it when I began, But the consideration of one of the moft im- Q^ gpjrunt ( m ) jiortant parts of the plan excited all my feelings on the fuD* jeel:. I fpeak without any affectation in exprefling my ap- prehension of foreign dangers — the belief of them is ftrongly imprefied on my mind. I hope therefore the gen- tlemen of the committee will excufe the warmth with which I have fpoken. I mall now take leave of the fub- jeel;. I flatter myfelf that gentlemen will fee that this pow- er is absolutely neceflary, and muft be veiled fomewhere 5 that it can be veiled no where fo well as in the general go- vernment, and that it is guarded by the only reftri&ioa which the nature of the thing will admit of. Mr. Hardiman defired to know, if the people were at- tacked or harrafled in any part of the (late, if on the fron- tiers for inftance, whether they muft not apply to the ftate Legislature for affiftance ? Mr. Iredell replied, that he admitted that applicatioa might be immediately made to the ftate Legiflature, but that by the plan under confideration, the ftrength of the union was to be exerted to repel invafions of foreign ene- mies and fupprefs domeftic infurre&ions ; and that the pof- fibility of an inftantaneous and unexpected attack in time of profound peace, iUuftrated the danger of reftricting the power of raifing and fupporting armies. The reft of the eighth Section read without any obfervation, Firft claufe of the ninth Section read. Mr. J. M^Dowall wiihed to hear the reafons of this re- striction. Mr. Spaight anfwered, that there was a conteft between the northern and fouthern ftates : That the fouthern ftates, whofe principal fupport depended on the labour of Slaves, would not confent to the defire of the northern ftates to exclude the importation of Slaves absolutely : That South- Carolina and Georgia infilled on this claufe as they were now in want of hands to cultivate their lands : That in the courfe of twenty years they would be fully Supplied : That the trade would be abolished then, and that in the mean time fome t*x or duty might be laid on. Mr. M'Doivall replied, that the explanation was juft fuch as he expected, and by no means Satisfactory to him, and that he looked upon it as a very objectionable part of the fyftem. Mr. Ir*dell-~Mr. Chairman, I rife to exprefs Sentiment* finulat ( 1*3 ) #milar to thofe of the gentleman from Craven. For my part, were it practicable to put an end to the importation of flaves immediately, it would give me the greateft plea* fure, for it certainly is a trade utterly inconfiftent with tho rights of humanity, and under which great cruelties have been exercifed. When the entire abolition ot flavery takes place, it will be an event which muft be pleafing to every generous mind, and every friend of human nature; but we often wifh for things which are not attainable. It was the wifti of a great majority of the Convention to put an end to the trade immediately, but the ftates of South-Carolina 2nd Georgia would not agree to it. Confider then what would be the difference between oar prefent fituation in this refpecl, if we do not agree to the Conftitution, and what it will be if we do agree to it. If we do not agree to it, do we remedy the evil ? No, Sir, we do not. For if the Conftitution be not adopted, it will be in the power of every ftate to continue it forever. They may or may not abolifh it at their discretion, But if we adopt the Con- ftitution the trade muft ceafe after twenty years if Con- grefs declare fo, whether particular ftates pleafefoor not; furely then we gain by it, This was the utmoft that could be obtained, I heartily wifh more could have been done. But as it is, this government is nobly diftinguiftied above others by that very provifion. Where is there another country jn which fuch a reftri£tion prevails ? We there- fore, Sir, fet an example of humanity, by providing for the abolition of this inhuman traffic, though at a diftant period. I hope therefore that this part of the Conftituti* on will not be condemned, becaufc it has not ftipulated for what was impracticable to obtain, Mr. Spmght further explained the claufe. That the \U snitation of this trade to the term of twenty years, was a compromise between the eaftern ftates and the fouthera ilates. South-Carolina and Georgia wiftied to extend the term. The eaftern ftates infilled on the entire abolition of the trade. That the ftate of North-Carolina had not thought proper to pafs any law prohibiting the importa- tion of flaves, and therefore its Delegates in the Conven- tion did not think themfelves authorised to contend for an immediate prohibition of it. Mr. Iredell added to what he had iaid before. That the ftate* < "4 ) ftates of Georgia and South-Carolina, had loft a great many flaves during the war, and that they wifhed to iup- p\y the lofs. Mr. Galloway— Mr, Chairman, The explanation give* to this ciauie, does not fatisfy my mind. I wifn to fee this abominable trade pnt an end to. But in cafe it be thought proper to continue this abominable traffic for twenty years, yet I do not wifli to fee the tax on the im- portation extended to all perfons whntfoever. Our fitua- tion is different from the people to the north. We want citizens. They do not. Inftead of laying a ta:r> we ought to give a bounty, to encourage foreigners to come among us. With refpeS to the abolition of flavery, it require* the utmoft confides 'don. The property of the fouthern ftates confids princely of flaves. If they mean to do away flavery altogether, this property will be deftroyed. I apprehend it means to bring forward manumiffion. If we manurmt oiir flaves, what country (hall we fend them to? It is irripoffible for us to be happy, if after manu- miiTion they are to nv$ among us. ♦ Mr. 7r^//-Mr. Chairman, The worthy gentleman, I believe, h?& mifunderftoc-d this claufe, which' runs in the following words, " The migration or importation of fuch perfons as zny of the dates now exifting, fhall think pro- per to admit, O^li not be prohibited by the Cdngrefs, prior to the year iSo3, but a tax or duty may be impofed om fuch importation^ hot exceeding t$n dollars for ench pcr- ibn." Now, Sir, obferve that the eaftern ftates, who- Jong ago hav- tf&oltfhed flavery, did not approve ©f the exprefSon -flaws, they therefore ufed another that anfwer- ed the fame purpofe. The Committee will obferve the diftindtion. between the two words migration and importa- tion. The flrft part of the claufc will extend to perfons who come into the country as free people or are brought as flaves. But the latt part extends to 'flaves only. The word migration refers to free perfons ; but the word importa- tion refers to flaves, becaufe free people cannot be faid to be imported. The tax therefore is only to be laid on flaves who are imported, and not on free perfons who migrate. I further beg leave to fry, that the gentleman is miftaken in another thing. He feems to fay that this extends to the abolition of flavery. Ig there any thing in this Conftitu. tioa ( «s ) ikon which fays that CongTefs {hall have it in their powas? to aboliih the flavery of thofe flaves who are now in the country ? Is it not the plain meaning of it, that after twenty years they may prevent the future importation of* ilaves ? It does noi extend to thofe now in the country. There is another cirtumflancc to be obferved. There is no authority veiled in Congrefs to re (train the ftates in the interval of twenty years, from doing what they pleafe. If they wifli to inhibit fuch importation, they may do fo. Our next Ailembly may put an entire end to the importa- tion of flaves. The reft of the ninth fedlion read without any obfer- vatiom Article fecond, feclion firft. Mr. Davie — Mr Chairman.* I muft exprefs my aftonifh- ment at the precipitancy with which we go through tnis bufinefs. Is it not highly improper to pafs over in filence any part of this Conftitution, which has been loudly ob- jected to ? We go into a committee to have a freer dif- cuffion. - I am forry to fee gentlemen hurrying us through and fupprefling their objections, in order to bring them forward at an unfeafonable hour. We are aflembled here to deliberate for our own common welfare, and to decide mpon a question of infinite importance to our country. What i* the caufe of this filence and gloomy jealoufy in gentlemen of the oppofition ? Thic department has been iiiiiverfaliy objected to by them. The m@ft virulent in- vectives, the moft opprobrious epithets, and the mod in- decent fcurrility, have been ufed and appl^d againfh this part of tke Conftitution. It has been reprefenterf. as in- compatible with any degree of freedom. V^fty, therefore, do not gentlemen oder their o'»jc£Hons now, tltat we may examine their force, if they have any ? The claufc meets rny entire approbation. I only rife to (hew the principle ©rt which it was formed. The principle is, the reparation of the executive from the legiflative~a principle which pervades all free governments. A difpute arofe in the Convention, concerning the re-eligibility of the Prefident, , It Was the opinion of the deputation from this ftate, that he fhould be elected for five or feven years, and be after- wards ineligible. It was urged, in fupport of this opini- #fy that the return of public officers into the common nuft imafs of &e people, where they would feel the tone they had given to the adminiftration of the laws, was the beft fecurity the public had for their good behaviour : That it would operate as a limitation to his ambition, at the fame time that it rendered him more independent : That when once in poffeflion of that office, he would move Heaven and earth to fecure his re-ele&ion, and perhaps become the cringing dependent of influential men. That our opinion was fupported by fome experience of the effects of this principle in feveral of the dates. A large and very re* fpettable majority were of the contrary opinion. It was faid, that fuch an exclufion would be improper for many reafons ; that if an enlightened, upright man, had dif* charged the duties of the office ably and faithfully, it would be depriving the people of the benefit of his ability and experience, though they highly approved of him. That it would render the Prefident lefs ardent in his endeavours to acquire the efteem and approbation of his country, if he knew that he would be abfolutely excluded after a given period. And that it would be depriving a man of fingu-r lar merit, even of the rights of eHizenfhip. It was aifa faid, that the day might come, when the confidence of America would be put in one man, and that it might be dangerous to exclude fuch a man from the fervicc of his country. It was urged likewife, that no undue influence could take place in his elc&jon. That as he was to be elected on the fame day throughout the United States, no, man could fay to himfelf, / am to be the man. Under thefe confiderations, a large, refpe&able majority voted for it as it now {lands* With refpeft to the unity of the Execu^ tive, the fuperior energy and fecrecy wherewith one per- fon can aft, was one of the principles on which the Con- vention went : But a more predominant principle was^ the more obvious refpoiffibility of one perfon. It was ob- ferved, that if there were a plurality of perfons, and a crime mould be committed, when their conduct came to be examined, it would be impoffible to fix the fact on any one of them : But that the public were never at a lofs, when there was but one man. For thefe reafons, a great majority concurred in the unity, and re-elegibility aU fo, of the Executive. I thought proper to (hew the ^irit of the ieputatioa from this Hate, However, I ~ "?■."■" " '' hewtily r «*7 ) . tieartily concur in it as it now (lands, as the mode of liis election precludes every poflibility of corruption or im- proper influence of any kind. Mr. Jojeph Taylor thought it improper to object on every trivial cafe. That this claufe had been argued on in fome degree before, and that it would be an ufelefs wafte of time to dwell any longer upon it. That if they had the power of amending the Conftitution, that every part need not be difcufled, as fome were not objectionable. And that for his own part, he would object when any eflentiai defect came before the Houfe. Second, third and fourth claufes read. Mr. J. Taylor objected to the power of Congrefs to de- termine the time of choofmg the Electors, and to deter- mine the time of electing the Prefident, and urged that it was improper to have the election on the fame day through- out the United States. That Congrefs, not fatisfied with their power over the time, place and manner of elections of Reprefentatives, and over the time and manner of electi- ons of Senators, aftid their power of railing an army, wifti* ed likewife to controul the election of the Electors of the Prefident. That by their army, and the election being on, the fame day in all the ftates, they might compel the elec«* tors to vote as they pleafe. Mr. Spaight anfwered, that the time of choofing the Electors was to be determined by Congrefs, for the fake of regularity and uniformity. That if the ftate9 were to determine it, one might appoint it at one day, and ano- ther at another, &c, and that the election being on the fame day in all the ftates would prevent a combination between the Electors. Mr. Iredell — Mr. Chairman, It gives me great aftonifh* ment to hear this objection, becaufe I thought this to be % moft excellent claufe. Nothing is more neceflary than to pre- vent every dangerof influence. Had the time of election been different in different ftates, the Electors chofen in one ftate might have gone from ftate to ftate and conferred with the other Electors, and the election might have been thus carried on under undue influence. But by this provifion^ the Elec- tors muft meet in the different ftates on the fame day, and cannot confer together. They may not even know who are fhe Ekctors in, the other ftates. There can be therefore no fcm4 ( «28 ) fetid of combination. It is probable, that the man who It the object of the choice of thirteen different ftates, the Electors in each voting unconne&edly with the reft, mult be a perfon who poffefiTes in a high degree the confidence and refpe£t- of his country. Governor . Johnjlon exprefled doubts with refpedt to the perfons by whom the Electors were to be appointed. Some, he faid, were of opinion that the people at large were to choofe them, and others thought the ftate Legiflatures were to appoint them. Mr. Iredell was of opinion, that it could not be done with propriety by the ftate Legiflatures, becaufe as they Were to direct the manner of appointing, a law would look very awkward, which fhould fay " They gave the power of (f fuch appointments to themfelves." Mr. Maclaine thought the ftate Legiflatures might di- rect the Electors to be chofen in what manner they thought proper, and they might direct it to be done by the people at large. ^ Mr. Davie was of opinion, that it was left to the wif- dom of the Legiflatures to direct their election in what- ever maimer they thought proper. Mr. Tayhr (till thought the power improper with re- fpect to the time of cliooGng the Electors. This power appeared to him to belong properly to the ftate Legiflatures, nor could he fee any purpofe it could anfwer but that of an augmentation of the Congreffional powers, which he faid were too great already. That by this power they might piolong the elections to feven years, and that though this would be direct oppofition to another part of the Conftitution,foph!ft'y would enable them to reconcile them, Mr. Spaight replied, that he was furprifed that the gen- tleman objected to the power of Congrefs to determine the time of choofing the Electors, and not to that of fixing the day of the election of the Prefident. That the power in the one cafe could not poflibly anfwer the purpofe of uni- formity without having it in the other. That the power m both cafes could be exercifed properly only by one general fuperintending power. That if Congrefs had not this pow- 1 er, there would be no uniformity at all, and that a great deal of time would be taken up iu Qrdes to. agree upon th* lime. ( 12$ ) The committee now rofe. Mr. Prefident refumed the chair, and Mr. Kennion reported, that the committee had* according order, again had the faid propofed Conftitution under their confideration, and had made a further progrefe therein, but not having time to go through the fame* had directed him to move for leave to lit again. Refilvedj That this Convention will on Monday next, again refolve itfelf into a Committee of the whole Conven- tion on the faid propofed plan of government. The Convention then adjourned until Monday next, nine o'clock. MONDAY, July 28, 1788. The Convention met according to adjournment, and immediately refolved itfelf into a committee of the whole Convention, to take into further confideratios the propofed Conftitution of government for the United States. The fecond fe£tion of the fecond article read. Mr. Iredell-^Ax. Chairman, This part of the Conftitu* tion has been much objected to. The oiBce of fuperin- tending the execution of the laws of the union, is an of- fice of the utmoft importance. It is of the greateft con* fequence to the happinefs of the people of America, that the perfon to whom this great truft is delegated fliould be worthy of it. It would require a man of abilities and ex- perience : It would alfo require a man who porTcrTed in a high degree the confidence of his country. This being the cafe, it would be a great defect in forming a Conftitution for the United States, if it was fo conftrudled that by any accident an improper perfon could have a chance to obtain that office. The Committee will recollect, that the Prefi- dent is to be ele&ed by Electors appointed by each ftate, according to the number of Senators and Reprefentatives to which the ftate may be entitled in the Congrefs : That they are to meet on the fame day throughout all the ftatesj and vote by ballot for two perfons, one of whom (hall not be an inhabitant of the fame ftate with rhemfelves. Thefe votes are afterwards to be tranfmitted under feal to the feat of the general government. The perfon who has the greateft number of votes, if it be a majority of the whole, will be the Prefident. If more than one have a majority, and equal votes, the Houfe of Reprefentatives are to & choofe ( n* ) £hoofe one of them. If none Rave a majority of votes, then the Houfe of Representatives are to choofe which of the perfons they think proper, out of the five higheft on the lift. The perfon having the next greateft number of votes is to be the Vice-Prefident, unlefs two or more fhould have equal votes, in which cafe the Senate is to choofe one of them for Vice-Prefident. If I recollect right, thefe are the principal chara&eriftrcs. Thus, Sir, two men will be in office at the fame time. The Prefident, who poflefles in the higheft degree the confidence of his country ; and the Vice-Prefident, who is thought to be the siext perfon in the union moft fit to perform this truft. Here, Sir, every contingency is provided for. No fac- tion or combination can bring about the election. It is probable, that the choice will always fall upon a man of experienced abilities and fidelity. In all human probabili- ty, no better mode of election could have been devifed* The reft of the firft fection read without any obfervation^ Second fection read. Mr. Iredell — Mr- Chairman, I was hi hopes that fome Other gentleman would have fpoken to this claufe. It conveys very important powers, and ought not to be paus- ed by. I beg leave in as few words as poffible to fpeafe my fentiments upon it. I believe moft of the Governors of the different ftates, have powers fimilar to thofe of the Prefident. In aJmoil every country the Executive has the, command of the military forces. From the nature of the thing, the command of armies ought to be delegated to one perfon only. The fecrecy, difpatch and decifion which are neceflary in military operations, can only be expected from one perfon. The Prefident therefore is to command the military forces of the United States, and this power I think a proper one ; at the fame time it will be found to be fuflkiently guarded. A very material difference may be obferved between this power, and the authority of the King of Great-Britain under fimilar circumftances. The King of Great-Britain is not only the Commander in Chief of the land and naval forces, but has power in time of war to raife fleets and armies. He has alfo authority to declare war. The Prefident has not the power of declaring war by his own authority, nor that of raifing fleets and armie?* Th$fe powers are veiled in other hands. The power de* daring ( 13' ) glaring war is exprefsly given to Congrefs, that is, to thv two branches of the Legiflature, tike Senate compofed of Reprefentatiyes of the (late Legiflaturcs, the Houfe of Re- prefentatives deputed by the people at large. They have alfo exprefsly delegated to them, the powers of raifing and fupporting armies, and of providing and maintaining $ navy. With regard to the militia, it mud be obferved, that though he has the command of them when called into the ecltual fervice of the United States, yet he has not the power of calling them out. The power of calling them out, is veiled in Congrefs, for the purpofe of executing the,laws of the union. When the militia are called out for any purpofe, fome perfon muft command them ; and who fo proper as that perfon who has the beft evidence of his poffefling the general confidence of the people $ I truft therefore, that the power of commanding the mili- tia when called forth into the aclual fervice of the United States, will not be objected to. The next part which fays, " That he may require the. opinion in writing of the principal officers," is in fome degree fubflituted for a Council. He is only to confulj; them if he thinks proper. Their opinion is to be given: him in writing. By this means he will be aided by their intelligence, and the neceffity of their opinions being in- writing, will render them more cautious in giving them, and make them refponfible fliould they give advice mani- Jfeftly improper. This does not diminifh the refponfibili- ty of the Prefident himfelf. They might otherwife have colluded, and opinions have been given too much under his influence. It has been the opinion of many gentlemen, that the President mould have a Council. This opinion probably has been derived from the example in England. It would be very proper for every gentleman to confider attentively, whether that example ought to be imitated by us. Altho* it be a refpe&able example, yet in my opinion very fatis- factory reafons can be affigned for a departure from it in this Conftitution. It was very difficult, immediately on our feparation frort| Great-Britain, to difengage ourfelves entirely from ideas of government we had been ufed to. We had been accuf- tomecl ( n* ) tamed to a Council under the old government, and took it for granted we ought to have one under the new. But examples ought not to be implicitly followed •, and the rea- sons which prevail in Great-Britain for a Council, do not apply equally to us. In that country the executive autho- rity is vefted in a magiflrate who holds it by birth-right. He has great powers and prerogatives 5 and it is a coniti- tutional maxim, that he can do no wrong. We have expe- rienced that he can do wrong, yet no man can fay fo ia his own country. There are no courts to try him for any crimes 1 nor is there any conftitutional method of depriv- ing him. of his throne. If he lofes it, it mult be by. a ge- neral refiftance of his people contrary to forms of law, aa at the revolution which took place about a hundred years ago. It is therefore of the utmoft moment in that coun- try, that, whoever is the imtrument of any ac~l of govern- ment (hou-ld be perfonally refponfible for it, finee the King is not ; and for the fame reafon, that no acl: of govern* sjient (hou.ld be exercifed but by the inflrumentality of" fome perfon, who cair be accountable for it. Every thing; therefore that the King does mull be by fome advice, audi the advifer of courfe anfwerabie. Under our Conftituti- on we are much happier* No. man lias an authority to ir&- Jure another with impunity. No man is better than- hiis fellow-citizens, nor can pretend to any fuperiority over the meaneft man. in. the country. If the Prefident does a fin* gle a£t, by which the people are prejudiced,., he is, punifh^ sible himfelf, and no other man merely to fcreen him. lit be commits any mifciemeanor in office, he is impeachable,, removable fjrom, office, and incapacitated to hold any of- £ce of honour, trull or profit. If he commits any crime*, he is punilhable by the laws of his country, and in capital cafes may be deprived of his life.. This being the cafe >( there is not. the fame reafon here for having a Council,, which exifts in England. It is, however, much to be de- fired, that a man who has fuch extennve and important buunefs to perform, fhould have the means of fome affift- ance to enable him to difcharge his arduous employment. The advice of the principal executive officers, which he can at all times command, will in my opinion anfwer this* valuable purpofe. He can at no time want advice, if he dfcfir.es it, as the principal officers will always be on the %Oti £pot, Thofe officers from their abilities and experience will probably be able to give as good, if not better advice* than any Counfellors would do ; and the folemnity of the advice in writing, which mud be preserved, would be a great check upon them. Bcfides thefe considerations,, it was difficult for the Con- vention to prepare a Council that would be unexceptionable, That jealoufy which naturally exids between the different dates, enhanced this difficulty. If a few Counfellors were to be chofen from the northern, fourhern or middle dates, or from a few dates only, undue preference might be giv- en to thofe particular dates from which they fliould come. If to avoid this difficulty, one Counfellor fhould be fent from each date, this would require great expence, which is a confederation at this time of much moment, efpecially .as it is probable, that by the method propofed, the Prefi- dent may be equally well advifed without any expence at all. We ought alfo to confider, that had he a Council, by whofe -advice he was bound to a£t, his refponfibility in all fuch cafes mud be deftroyed. You furely would not oblige him to follow their advice, and punifh him for obeying it. If Called upon on any occafion of diflike, it would be natural for him to fay, « You know my Council are men of in- '*" tegrity and ability : I could not act againd their opinio <® ( ons, though I confefs my own was contrary to theirs." JThis, Sir, would be pernicious. In fuch a fituation, he anight eafily combine with his Council, and it might be im- ||)offible to fix a fa& upon him. It would be difficult often *to know, whether the Prefident or Counfellors were mod no blame. A thoufand plaufible excufes might be made, which would efcape detection. But the method propofed fin the Conditution creates no fuch embarraflment. It is vplain and open. And the Prefident wilt perfonally have the credit of good, or the cenfure of bad meafures; fincc, though he may afk advice, he is to ufe his own judg- ment in following or rejecting it. For all thefe reafons I am.clearly of opinion, that the claufe is better as it dands "than if the Prefident were to have a Council. I think eve- ry good that can be derived from the inftitution of a Coun- cil, may be expected from the advice of thefe officers,, without its being liable to the difadvantages to which it ap- pears, to me the inditution of .a Council would be. .Another { '34 ) Another power that he has is to grant pardons, except In cafes of impeachment. I believe it is the Tenfe of a great part of America, that this power mould be exercifed. by their Governors. It is in fevera! dates on the fame footing that it is here. It is the genius of a republican government, that the laws mould he rigidly executed with- out the influence of favour or ill-will ; That when a man commits a crime, however powerful he or his friends may be, yet he mould be punifhed for it ; and on the other hand, though he {hould be univerfally hated by his coun- try, his real guilt alone as to the particular charge is to Operate againft him. This ftri£t and fcrupulous obfer r vance of juftice is proper in all governments, but it is par- ticularly iiidifpenfable in a republican one 5 becaufe in fuch a government, the law is fuperior to every man, and no man is fuperior to another. But though this general prin- ciple be unqueftionable, furely there is no gentleman in the committee, who is not aware that there ought to be exceptions to it y becaufe there may be many inftances, where though a man offends againft the Utter of the law, yet peculiar circumflances in his cafe may entitle him to mercy. It is impofhble for any general law to forefee and provide for all poffible cafes that may arife, and therefore an inflexible adherence to it in every inftance, might fre- quently be the caufe of very great injuftice. For this rea-* fon, fuch a power ought to exift fomewhere ; and where could it be more properly vefted, than in a man who had received fuch ftrong proofs of his poiTefiing the higheft conr iidence of the people ? This power however only refers to offences againft the United States, and not againft parti- cular ftateg. Another reafon for the Prefident poiTeffing this authority, is this : It is often neceflary to convict, a man by means of his accomplices: We have fufficient experience of that in this countrv. A criminal would of- ten go unpunifhed, were not this method to be purfued againft him. In my opinion, till an accomplice^ own dan- ger h removed, his evidence ought to be regarded with great diffidence. If in civil caufes of property, a witnefs muft be entirely difinterefted, how much more proper is it he mould be fo in cafes of life and death ! This power is naturally vefted in the Prefident, becaufe it is his duty to patch pver the public fafety, and as that may frequently require ( m \ require the evidence of accomplices to bring great offend- ers to juftice, he ought to be entrufted with the moft ef- fectual means of procuring it. I beg leave farther to obfevve, that for another reafon I think there is a propriety in leaving this power to the ge- neral discretion of the executive magiftrate, rather than to fetter it in any manner which has been propefed. It may happen, that many men, upon plaufible pretences, may be feduced into very dangerous meafures againft their country* They may aim by an infurreclion to redrefs imaginary grievances, at the fame time believing, upon falfe fuggef- tions, that their exertions are neceiTary to fave their coun- try from deltruclion. Upon cool reflection however, they poffibly are convinced of their error, and clearly fee thro' the treachery and villainy of their leaders. In this fitua- tion, if the Prefident poffefled the power of pardoning, they probably would immediately throw themfelves on the equity of the government, and the whole body be peace- ably broke up. Thus, at a critical moment, the Prefident might prevent perhaps a civil war. But if there was no authority to pardon, in that delicate exigency, what would be the confequence ? The principle of felf-prefer- vation would prevent their parting. Would it not be na- tural for them to fay, " We (hall be puniftied if we dif- •' band. Were ■ we Aire of mercy we would peaceably " part. But v/e know not that there is any chance of this. u We may as well meet one kind of death as another. " We may as well die in the field as at the gallows." I therefore fubmit to the committee, if this power be no£ highly neceiTary for fuch a purpofe. V/e have feen a. happy inftance of the good effecT; of fuch an exercife of mercy in the ftate of Maffachufetts, where very lately there* was fo formidable an infurre&ion. I believe a great majo- rity of the infurgents were drawn into it by falfe artifices. They at length faw their error, and were willing to difband. Government, by a wife exercife of lenity, after having fhewn its power, generally granted a pardon ; and the whole party were difperfed. There is now as much peace in that country as in any ftate in the union. A particular inftance v*hich occurs to me, (hews th$ utility of this power very ftrongly. Suppofe we were in- volved in war. It would be then neceiTary to know the defigns tfefigns of the enemy. This kind of knowledge cannot al- ways be procured but bymeansof#>7V.f,afet of wretches whom all nations defpifc, but whom all employ, and as they would affuredly be ufed againfl us, a principle of felf defence would urge and juftify the ufe of them on our part. Sup- pofe therefore the Prefident could prevail upon a man of fome importance to go over to the enemy, in order to give him fecret information of his meafures. He goes off pri- vately to the enemy. He feigns refentment againfl his country for fome ill ufnge, either real or pretended, and* is received poffibly into favour and confidence. The peo- ple would not know the purpofe for which he was employ- ed. In the mean time he fecretly informs the Prefident of the enemy's defigns, and by this means, perhaps thofe defigns are counteracted, and the country faved from de- ftruclion. After his bufinefs is executed, he returns into his own country, where the people, not knowing he had rendered them any fervice, are naturally exafperated againfl him for his fuppofed treafon. I would a(k any gentleman whether the Prefident ought not to have the power of par- doning this man. Suppofe the concurrence of the Senate, or any ether body was necerTary, would this obnoxious perfon be properly fare ? We know in every country there is a ftrong prejudice againfl the executive authority. If a prejudice of this kind, on fuch an occafion, prevailed againfl the Prefident, the Prefident might be fufpe£led of being influenced by corrupt motives, and the application, in favour of this man be rejected Such a thing might very pofhbly happen when the prejudices of party were ftrong, and therefore no man fo clearly entitled as in the cafe I have fuppofed, ought to have his life expofed to fo hazardous a contingency. The power of impeachment is given by this Conflitu- tion, to bring great offenders to punifhment. It is calcu- lated to bring them to punifhment for crimes which it is not eafy to defcribe, but which every one mufl be con- vinced is a high crime and mifdemeanor againfl the go- vernment. This power is lodged in thofe who reprefent the great body of the people, becaufe the occafion for its exercife will arife from a£ls of great injury to the commu- nity, and the objects of it may be fuch as cannot beeafily reached by an ordinary tribunal. The trial belongs to the, Senate, ( i37 > Senate, left an inferior tribunal fhould be too mucli awed fey (o powerful an accufer. After a trial thus folemnly conduced, it is not probable that it would happen once in a thoufand times, that a man actually convicted, would be entitled to merry ; aid if the Prefident had the power of pardoning in fuch a cafe, this gr&at check upon high officers of {fate would lefe much of its influence. It feems therefore proper, that the general power of pardoning fhould be abridged in this particular inflnnce. The pu- nlihmenc annexed to conviction on impeachment, can only be removal from office, and disqualification to hold ai y pi.ice of honour, truft or profit. But the peifon convicted is further liable to a trial at common law, and may receive fuch common law punifhment as belongs to a defcriptibri pf fuch offences, if it be ore puniihable by that law. I •hope, for the reafons I have dated, that the whole of this ;claufe will be approved by the committee. r l he regula- tions altogether, in my opinion, areas wifely contrived as they could be. It is impoflible for imperfect beings to> form a perfect fyftem. If the prefent one may be pro- ductive of pofiible inconveniences, we are not to reject it for that reafoilj but inquire whether any other fyftem coulcl be devifed which would be attended with fewer inconve- niences, in proportion to the advantages refulting. But we ought to be exceedingly attentive in examining, and flill more cautious in deciding, left we fhould condemn what may be worthy of applaufe, or approve of what may be exceptionable. I hope, that in the explanation of this claufe, I have not improperly taken up the time of the* committee. Mr. Miller acknowledged, that the explanatiori of this claufe by the Member from Edenton, had obviated fome objections which he had had to it : But (till he could not -entirely approve of it. He could not fee the neceffitv of Veiling this power in the Prefident. He thought that his influence would be too great in the country, and particu-. larly over the military, by being the Commander in Chief of the army, navy and militia. He thought he could too ea- fily abufe fuch lexcenfiye powers *, and was of opinion^ that Congrefs ought to have power to direct the motions fcf the army. He confidered it as a defect in the Confti- S twit ion* ( '3* ) fution, that it wa9 not exprefsly provided that Congrefg fhould have rhe direction of the motions of the army. Mr. S-paight anfwered, that it was true that the com- mand of the army and navy was given to the Prefident : But that CongrefSj who had the powf-r pf raifing armies,' could certainly prevent any abufe of that authority in the Prefident. That they alone had the means of fupporting armies, and that the Prefident was impeachable if he in any manner abufed his truft. Hfe was furprifed that any objection fhould be made to giving the command of the army to one man ; That it was well known, that the di- rection of an army could not be properly exercifed by £ numerous body of men : That Congrefs had in the lair, war given the exclufive command of the army to the Com- mander in Chief ; and that if they had not done fo, per- haps the independence of America would not have been eftablifhed. Mr. Porter — Mr. Chairman, There is a power veiled; in the Senate and Prefident to make treaties, which thai! be the fupreme law of the land. Which among us can Call them to account ? I always thought that there could no proper exercife of power, without the fuflfrage of the; people : Yet the Houfe of Reprefentatives has no power to intermeddle with treaties The Prefident and feveit Senators, as nearly as I can remember, can make a treaty which will be of great advantage to the northern dates, and equal injury to the fouthern, fhites. They might give up the rivers and territory of the fouthern ftates : Yet in the preamble of the Conftitution, they fay, all the Peoplr have done i I mould be glad, to know what power there/ is of calling the P* efident and Senate to account. Mr. Spaight .anfwered, that under the Confederation, two-thirds of the ftates might make treaties. That if the Se- nators from all the ftates attended when a treaty was about to be made, two-thirds of the ftates would have a voice in its formation. He added, that he would be glad to afk th« gentleman, what mode there was of calling the pre- fent Congrefs to account. Mr. Porter repeated his objection. He hoped that gen* tlemen would not impofe on the Houfe. That the Prefix dent could make treaties with two-thirds of the Senate ? Taat the P* efideot in that cafe, voted rather in si legifla- tivfc five, than in an executive capacity, which he thought ini* politic. 5 Governor Johnflon — TSfir. Chairman, In my opinion, i{ |here be any difference between this Conftitution and the Confederation, with refpeft to treaties, the Conftitution is more fafe than the Confederation. We know that two Members from each (late, have a right by the Confedera- tion to give the vote of that (late, and two- thirds of the ftates have a right alfo to make treaties'. By this Conftituti- on two-thirds of the Senators cannot make treaties without the concurrence of the Prefident. Here is then an addi- tional guard. The calculation that feven or eight Senators, with the Prefident, can make treaties, is totally erroneous. Fourteen is a quorum. Two-thirds of which are ten. It is upon the improbable fuppofition that they will not at- tend, that the objection is founded, that ten men with the prefident can make treaties. Can it be reafonably fup- pofed that they will not attend when the moft important bufinefs is agitated 5 when the interefts of their refpec- tive ftates are moft immediately affe£ted. Mr. Machine obferved, that the gentleman was out of order with his objection. That they had not yet come to $he claufe which enables the Senate and Prefident to make treaties. The fecond claufe of the fecond fetlion read. Mr. Spencer — Mr. Chairman, I rife to declare my dif- japprobation of this likewife. It is an elTential article in <©ur Conftitution, that the legislative, the executive and the lupreme judicial powers of government, ought to be forever feparate and diftin£t from each other. The Seriate in the propofed government of the United States, are pofiefled of the legiflative authority in conjun&ion with the Houfe of Representatives. They are likewife poffefTed of the fole power of trying all impeachments, which not being re- strained to the officers of the United States, may be in- tended to include all the officers of the feveral ftates in the union. And by this claufe they poflefs the chief of the executive power — they are in effecT; to form treaties, which are to be the law of the land, and they have obvioufly in effeft the appointment of all the officers of the United States •, the Prefident may nominate, but they have a ne- gative upon his nomination, till he has exhaufted the num- ber ( Mo ) hex of thofe he wifhes to be appointed : He will be oblig- ed finally to acquiefce in the appointment of thofe which the Senate (hall nominate, or elfe no appointment will take place. Hence it is eafy to perceive, that the Prefident, in order to do any bu.fi nefs, or to anfw.er any purpcfe in iiis department of his office, and to keep himfelf out of perpetual hot water, will be under a necefnty to. form a. connection with that powerful body, and be contented to, put himfelf at the head of the leading members who corn- pole it, I do not expect at this day, that the outline and organization of this propofed government will be ma- terially altered. But I cannot but be of opinion, that the government would have been infinitely better and more iecure,if the Prefident had been provided with a {landing Council, cooipofcd of one Member from each of the dates, the duration of whofe office might have been the fame as. that of the Prefident's office, or for any other period that: jrnight have been thought more proper. For it can hardly be. ^uppofed, that if two Senators can be fent from each (late, who are fit to give counfel to the Prefident, that one fuch cannot be found in each date, qualified for that purpofe. Upon this plan, one half the expence cf the Senate, as a, Handing Council to the Prefident in the recefs of Con.-. grefs, would, evidently be faved ; each date would have, equal weight in this Council, as it has now in the Senate i And what renders this plan the more eligible is, that twet \ery important confequences would refult from it, which, cannot refult from the prefent plan. The fird is, that the. \vhoIe executive department, being feparate and didincl; from that of the kgiflative and judicial, would be amena- ble to the judice of the land— the Prefident and his Coun- cil, or either or any of them, might be Impeached, tried and condemned for any mifdemeanor in office. Whereas on the prefent plan propofed, the Senate who are to advife the Prefident, and who in effect: are poflefled of the chief executive power, let their conduct: be what it will, are not amenable to the public judice of their country -, if they. j>iav be impeached, there is no tribunal inveded with juris- diction to try them. It is true that the propofed Cohdi- tution provides, that when the Prefident is tried the Chief- judice fhall prefide. But I take this to be very little more. than a farce. What can the Seaate try him for ? For do* ing ( MI ) lag that which they have advifed him to do, and whicii without their advice he would not have done. Except what he may do in a military capacity, when I prefume he will be entitled to be tried by a court-martial of General officers, he can do nothing in the executive department without the advice of the Senate, unlefs it be to grant pardons, and adjourn the two Houfcs of Congrefsto fome day to which they cannot agree to adjourn themfeives, pro- bably to focne term that may be convenient to the leading Members of the Senate. I cannot conceive therefore, that the Prefident can ever be tried by the. Senate with any ef- fect, or to any purpofe, for any mifdemeanor in his office, linlefs it mould extend to high treafon, or unlefs they (houla wifh to fix the odium of any meafure on him, in order to exculpate* themfeives ; the latter of which I cannot fup- pofe will ever happen. Another important confe.quence of the plan I wifh had taken place, is, that the office of the Prefident being there- by uncon ne£ted with that of the legiflative, as well as the Judicial, he would enjoy that independence which is ne- ceffary to form the intended check upon the a£h patted by £he Legislature before they obtain the fan&ion of laws, put on the prefent plan, from the ncceffary connection of ithe Prefident's office with that of the Senate, I have little ground to hope, that his firmnefs will long prevail againfl: the overbearing power and influence of the Senate, fo far as to anfwer the purpofe of any confiderable check upon the a&s they may think proper to pafs in conju&ion with the Houfeof Reprefentatives. For he will foon find, that un- lefs he inclines to compound with them, they can eafily fiinder and controul him in the principal articles of his of- iice. But if nothing elfe could be faid in favour of the plan of a (landing Council to the Prefident, independent of £he Senate, the dividing the power of the latter would be Sufficient to recommend it ; it being of the utmoft impor r .tance toward the fecurity of the government, and the li- berties of the citizens under it. For I think it muft be ^obvious to every unprejudiced mind, that the combining in the Senate, the power of legiflation with a controulirtg fhare in the appointment of all the officers of the United States, except thofe chofen by the people, and the power of trying all impeachmen^ that may bs fount} againfl: fucfy officers^ ( Ml ) officers, invefts the Senate at once with fuch an enormity oT power, and with fuch an overbearing and uncontroulabie influence, as is incompatible with every; idea of fafety to the liberties of a free country, arid is calculated to (wallow tip all other powers, and to render that body a cjefpotic ariftocracy. ■■' '• Mr. Porter recommended the molt ferious confixleratioa when they were about to give away power- That they were not only about to give away power to legiflate of make laws of a fupreme nature, and to mske treaties, which might facrifice the moil valuable interefts of the commu- nity; bat to give a power to the general government to drag the inhabitants to any part : of the world as long as they pleafed. That they eugh£ not to put it in the power of any man or any fet of men to' do fo j and tliat the re- prefentation was defective, being not a fubftantial imme- diate repfeferitation," He obfefved that as treaties were the fupreme law of the land, the Houfe of Repr» fentativts ought to have a vote in making them, as well as in parting them. '• > • ' Mr. J. M'B.Giva H—Mr. Chairman, Permit me, Sir, to make a few observations, to (hew how improper it is to* place fo much power in fo few men, without any refpon- fibility whatever. Let us confider what number of them* Xs necefTary to tranfacl: the mod important bufinefs. Two- thirds of, the members prefenr, with the Prefident, can snake a treaty. Fourteen of them are a quorum, twqJ thirds of which are ten. Thefe ten may make treaties and alliances. They may involve usi.n any difficulties, and dif- pofe of us in any manner they pleafe. Nay eight is a ma- jority of a quorum, and can ^o every thing but make treaties. How unfafe are we, when we have no power of bringing thofe to an account. It is abfurd to try them before their own body. Qur lives and property are in the hands of eight or nine men. Will thefe gentlemen entruft their tights in this manner? „ Mr. Davie—* Mr. Chairman, Altho'.treaties are mere con- ventional acls between the contracting parties, yet by the law ©f nations th-ey are thefupremelawof the land to their refpec* tive citizens or fubje&s. All civilized nations have concurred in confid^ring them as paramount to an ordinary acl: of le- gation. This concurrence is founded on the reciprocal con- !¥ ■ - " -. venience yeriience and foltd: advantages arifing from It. A due obfe?~ vance of treaties makes nations more friendly to e.ich other* arid is the only meansof renderinglefs frequent thofe mutual hostilities, which tend to depopulate and ruin contending nations. It extends and facilitates that commercial inter- Courfe, which founded on the univerfal protection of pri- vate property, has in a meafure made.the World, one nation. The power of making treaties has in all countries and governments been placed in the executive departments. This has not only been grounded on the necefiity and rea- jfon arifing from that degree ' of fecrecy, defign and difc? patch, which are always neceffary in negociations betweea liations, but to prevent their being impeded, or carried in** to effect, by the violence, animofity and heat of parties, v^hich roo often infecl numerous bodies, v 'Both - of thefe reafons preponderated in the foundation of this part of thei fyftem. It is true, Sir, that the late treaty between tiie United States and Great-Britairi, has not, in fome of the ft'ates, been held as the fupreme law of the land. Even in this ftate an a£l of AiTembly pafled to declare its vali- dity. But no doubt that treaty was the fupreme law of the land without the fanclion of the AfTembly - f becaufe, fry the Confederation, Congrefs hjtd power to make trea- ties. It was one of thofe original rights of fovereignty which were veiled in them ; and it was not the. deficiency of constitutional authority in Congrefs to make treaties, that produced the necefiity of a law to. declare their vali«* dity \ but it was owing to the intire imbecility of the Con- federation. On the principle of the propriety of veiling this power in the executive department, it would feero. that the whole power of making treaties ought to be left to the Prefident, whc% bemg elected by the people o£ the United States at large, will have their general intereft at heart* But that jealoufy of executive power which has fhewn itfelf fo ftrongly in all the American governments* \voiild not admit this improvement. Intereft, Sir, has a moft powerful influence over the human mind, and is the. bafis on which all the tranfa£Hons of mankind are* built* It was mentioned before, that the extreme jealoufy of true little ftates, and between the commercial dates and the non-importing dates, produced the nee effity of giving an equality of fuffrage to the fenate. The fame caufes made ( M4 ) h indi f penfable to give to the Senators, as Rpprefentatives of dates, the power of making, or rather ratifying, trea- ties. Although it militates againft every idea of ju(t pro- portion,that the little (late of Rhorfe-Iilmd mould have the fame fuffrage with Virgina, or the great commonwealth Of Maffachufetts ; yet the fmall ftates would not eonfent to confederate, without an equal voice in the formation of treaties. Without the equality, they apprehended that their intereft would be neglected or facrificed in negocia- tions. This difficulty could not be got over. It arofe from the unalterable nature of things. Every man was convinced of the inflexibility of the little ftates in this point : It therefore became neceffary to give them an ab- folute equality in making treaties. The learned gentleman on my right [Mr. Spencer] after faying that this was an enormous power, and that blend- ing the different branches of government was dangerous, faid, that fuch accumulated powers were inadmimbJe and contrary to all the maxims of writers. It is true, the great Montefquieu and fevcral other writers, have laid it down; as a maxim not to be departed from, that thi legiflative, executive and judicial powers, mould be feparate and di£- tincl:. But the idea thatthefe gentlemen had in view, has' been mifconceived or mifreprefented. An abfolute and complete feparation is not meant by them. It is impofTi- ble to form a government upon t'hefe principles. Thofe' ftates who had made an abfolute feparation of thefe three powers their leading principle, have been obliged to de- part from it. It is a principle in facl:, which is not to be found in any of the ftate governments. In the govern- ment of New- York, the Executive and Judiciary have a negative fimilar to that of the President of the United States. This is a junction of all the three powers, and has been attended with the mod happy effects. In this ftate and mod of the others, the executive and judicial powers are dependent on the Legiflature. Has not the Legiflature of this ftate the power of appointing the Judg-* es ? Is*it not in their power alfo to fix their compenfation ? "What independence can there be in perfons who are obli- ged to be obfequious and crtriging for their office and fa- lary ? Are not our Judges dependent on the Legiflature for ©very morfel they eat ? It is not difficult to difcern what effe& ( '45 ) effect this may have on human nature. The meaning of* this maxim I take to be this, that the whole legiflative, executive, and judicial powers, mould not be exclufively blended in any one particular inltance. The Senate try impeachments. This is their only judicial cognizance. As to the ordinary objects of a judiciary, fuch as the decifion of controverfies, the trial of criminals, &c the judiciary- is perfectly feparate and diftinct from the legiflative and executive branches. The Houfe of Lords in England, have great judicial powers, yet this is not confidered as a blemilh in their Conftitution. Why ? Becaufe they have not the whole legiflative power. Montefquieu, at the fame time that he laid down this maxim, was writing in praife of the Rritifh government. At the very time he recom- mended this diftinction of powers, he pafled the higheft eulogium on a Conftitution wherein they were all partially blended. So that the meaning of the maxim, as laid down by him and other writers, mud clearly be, that thefe three branches muft not be entirely blended in one body. And this fyftem before you, comes up to the maxim more completely than the favourite government of Montefquieu. The gentleman from Anfon has faid, that the Senate de~ ftroys the independence of the Prefident, becaufe they muft confirm the nomination of officers. The neceflity of their interfering in the appointment of officers, refulted from the fame reafon which produced the equality of fuf- frage. In other countries, the Executive or Chief Ma- gistrate alone nominates and appoints officers. The fmall ftates would not agree that the Houfe of Reprefentatives fhould have a voice in the appointment to offices ; and the extreme jealoufy of all the ftates, would not give it to the Prefident alone. In my opinion, it is more proper as it is than it would be in either of thofe cafes. The intereft of each ftate will be equally attended to in appointments, and the choice will be more judicious by the junction of the Senate to the Prefident. Except in the appointments of officers, and making of treaties, he is not joined with them in any inftance. He is perfectly independent of them in his election. It is impoffible for human ingenuity to devife any mode of election better calculated to exclude undue influence. He is chofen by Electors appointed by ♦the people. He is elected on the fame day in every (late, T f» ( *4<5 ) fo that there can be no poffible combination between the Electors. The afFe&ions of the people can be the only influence to procure his election. If he make a judicious nomination, is it to be p relumed that the Senate will not concur in it ? Is it to be fuppofed the Legiflatures will choofe the moft depraved men in the Hates to reprefent them in Congrefs ? Should he nominate unworthy charac- ters, can it be reasonably concluded that they will confirm it ? He then fays, that the Senators will have influence to get themfelves re-elected, nay, that they will be perpetu- ally elected. I have very little apprehenfion on this ground. I take it for granted, that the man who is once a Senator, will very probably be out for the next fix years. Legifla- tive influence changes — Other perfons rife, who hare par- ticular connections to advance them to office. If the Se- nators ftay fix years out of the ftate governments, their influence will be greatly diminifhed. It will be impoffible for the moft influential character to get himfelf re-elected after being out of the country fo long. There will be an entire change in fix years. Such futile objections I fear proceed from an aver (ion to any general fyftem. The fame learned gentleman fays, that it would be better, were a Council confiding cf one from every ftate, fubftiruted to the Senate. Another gentleman has objected to the fmalinefs of this number. This (hews the impoflibility of fatisfying all mens minds. I beg this committee to place thefe two objections together, and fee their glaring incon- fiftency. If there were thirteen Counfellors, in the man- ner he propofes, it would deftroy the refponfibility of the Prefident. He muft have acted alfo with a majority of them. A majority of them is feven, which would be a quorum — a majority of thefe would be four, and every avia~ ted. Mr. Bloochuorth defired to be informed whether treaties were not to be fubmittedto the Parliament in Great-Britain fcefore they were valid. Mr. Iredell — Mr. Chairman, The objections to this claufe •deferve great confideration. I believe it will be eafy to ob- viate the objections againd it, and that it will be found t© ■have been necefiary, for the reafons dated by the gentle- man from Halifax, to ved this power in fome body compof- cd of Re;prefentat?ives of dates, where -their voices fhould be equal : For in this cafe the fovereignty of the dates is .particularly concerned ; and the great caution of giving the dates an equality of fufFrage in making treaties, was for the exprefs purpofe of taking care of that fovereignty,, and attending to their intereds, as political bodies, in foreign ^negotiations. It is objected to as improper, becaufeif the *Frefident or Senate mould abufe their truft, there is not ■fufficient refponfibiiity, fince he can only be tried by the 'Senate, by who'fe advice he acted -, and the Senate cannot *be tried at all. 1 beg leave to obferve, that when any man as impeached, it mud be for an error of the heart, and not ♦of the head. God forbid, that a man in any country ia 'the world, fhould be liable to be punifhed for want of judg- ement. This is not the cafe here. As to errors of the lieart there is fufficient Refponfibiiity. Should thefe be •committed, there is a ready way to bring him to punifhment. This is a refponfibiHty which anfwers every purpofe that could be defired by a people jealous of their liberty. I pre- sume that if the Prefident, with the advice of the Senate* ihould make a treaty with a foreign power, and that trea- ty fhould be deemed unwife, or againd the intered of the country, yet if nothing could be objected againd it but the 'difference of opinion between them and their condituents, they could not judly be obnoxious to punifhment. If they were punifhable for exercifing their own judgment, and not that of their condituents, no man who regarded hh reputation would accept the office cither of a Senator or Prefident. Whatever midake a man may make, he ought not to be punifhed for it, nor his poderity rendered infa- mous. But if a man be a villain, and wilfully abufes hi* trud, he is to be held up as a public offender, and ignomi- SiGufly punifhed. Jl> t «5? ) A public officer ought not to aft from a principle of fear. Were he punifhable for want of judgment, he would be continually in dread. But when he knows that nothing but real guilt can difgrace him, he may do his duty firmly if he be an honed man, and if he be not, a juft fear of difgrace, may perhaps, as to the public, have nearly the eiTeA of an intrinfic principle of virtue. Ac- Cording to thefe principles, I fuppofe the only inftances in which the Prefident would be liable to impeachment, would be where he had received a bribe, or had acted from fome corrupt motive or other. If the Prefident had received a bribe without the privity or knowledge of the Senate, from a foreign power, and had, under the influence of that biibe, had addrefs enough with the Senate, by artifices and mifreprefentations, to feduce their con fen t to a per- nicious treaty — if it appeared afterwards that this was the cafe, would not that Senate be as competent to try him as anv other perfons whatsoever ? Would they not exclaim againft his villainy ? Would they not feel a particular re- 'fentrsent againft him for their being made the inflrumcnt of his treacherous purpofes ? In this fituation, if any ob- jection could be made againft the Senate as a proper tri- bunal, it might more properly be made by the Prefident himfelf, left their refentment {hould operate too ftronglv, rather than by the public, on the ground of a fuppofed partiality. The Prefident miift certainly be punifliuble for giving falfe information to the Senate. He is to regulate all intercourfe with foreign powers, and it is his duty to impart to the Senate every material intelligence he receives. If it fiiould appear that he has not given them full in- formation, but has concealed important intelligence which he ought to have communicated, and by that means induc- ed them to enter into mjfures injurious to their country, znd whicli they would irot have confented to had the true ilate of things been difclofed to them — In this cafe, I afk •whether, upon an impeachment for a mifdemeanor upon fuch an account, the Senate would probably favour him ? With refpccl to the impeachability of the Senate, that is a matter of doubt. There have been no inftances of im- peachment for legiflative mifdemeanors : And we mail ^ind, upon examination, that the inconveniences rcfulting from iuch impeachments, would more than preponderate the ( 'JI ) the advantages. There is no greater honour in the worM, than being the reprefentative of a free people — There id no truft on which the happinefs of the people has a greater dependence. Yet, whoever heard of impeachiug a Mem- ber of the Legiflature for any legiflative mifcondu£l ? Ic would be a great check on the public bufmefs, if a Mem- ber of the Aflembly was liable to punifhment for his con- duct, as fuch. Unfortunately it is the cafe, not only in other countries but even in this, that divifions and differ- ences in opinion will continually arife. On many quef- tions, there will be two or more parties. Thefe often judge with little charity of each other, and attribute every opposition to their own fyftem to an ill motive. We know this very well from experience ; but, in my opinion, this condant fufpicion is frequently unjuft. I believe in gene- ral, both parties really think themfelves right, and that the majority of each commonly a£t. with equal innocence of intention. But, with the ufual want of charity in thefe cafes, how dangerous would it be to make a Member of the Legiflature liable to impeachment ( A mere difference of opinion might be interpreted by the malignity of party, into a deliberate, wicked aelicn. It, therefore, appears to me at lead very doubtful, whether it would be proper to render the Senate impeachable at all ; efpecially as in the branches of executive government, where their concur- rence is required, the Prefident is the primary agent, and plainly refponfible \ and they in fact are but a Council to validate proper, or reftrain improper, conduct in him. — i But if a Senator is impeachable, it could only be for cor- ruption, or fome other wicked motive •, in which cafe, furely thofe Senators who had acTedifrom upright motives, would be competent to try him, Suppofe there had been fuch.a Council as was propofed, confiding of thirteen, one from each ftate, to afiift the Prefident in making treaties, &c. more general alarm would have been excited, and flronger oppofition made to this Conflitution, than even at prefent — The power of the Prefident would have ap- peared more formidable, and the dates would have loft one half of their fecurity ; fince, inftead of two Reprefenta- tives, which each has now for thofe purpofes, they would have had but one. A gentleman from New-Hanover has afked^ whether it is not the practice in Great-Britain to fubrais ( '52 ) £ubmit treaties to Parliament, before they are efteemed va« lid. The King has the fole 'authority, by the laws of tha$ Country, to make treaties. After treaties 'are made, they are frequently difcuffed in the two Houfes of Parliament ; where, of late years, the mod important meafures of go- vernment have been narrowly examined. It is ufual to move for an addrefs of approbation ; and fuch has been the complaifance of Parliament for a long time, that this feldom hath been with-held. Sometimes they pafs an aft in conformity to the treaty made : But this I believe is not for the mere purpofe of confirmation, but to make altera- tions in a particular fyftem, which the change of circttm- ftances requires. The constitutional power of making treaties is veiled in the crown •, and the power with whom a treaty is made, confiders it as binding without any a£t of Parliament, unlefs an alteration by fuch is provided for in the treaty itfelf, which I believe is fometimes the cafe. When the treaty of peace was made in 1763, it con- tained ftipulations for the furrender of fome iflands to the French. The iflands were given up, I believe, without any acl: of Parliament. The power of making treaties is very important, and muft be veiled fomewhere, in order to coun- teract the dangerous defigns of other countries, and to be able to terminate a war when it is begun. Were it known that our government was weak, two or more European powers might combine againfl us. Would it not be politic to have fome power in this country, to obviate this danger by a treaty ? If this power was injudicioully limited, the* nations where the power was poffefled without reftri&ion, would have greatly the advantage of us in negociation ; and every one muft know, according to modern policy, of what moment an advantage in negociation is. The honourable Member from Anfon faid, that the accumulation of all the different branches of power in the Senate, would be dan- gerous. The experience of other countries fhews that thi* fear is without foundation. What is the Senate of Great- Britain oppofed to the Houfe of Commons, although it be compofed of an hereditary nobility, of vaft fortunes, and entirely independent of the people ? Their weight is far inferior to that of the Commons. Here is a ftrong inftanee of the accumulation of powers of the different branches •f government without producing any inconvenience. That Senate, ( >53 ) Senate, Sir, is a feparate branch of the Legiflature, is the great conftitutional Council of the Crown, and decides oft lives and fortur ,s in impeachments, befides being the ul- timate tribunal for trying controversies refpecling private rights. Would it not appear that all thefe things mould render them more formidable than the other Hcufe ? Yet the Commons have generally been able to carry every thing before them. The circumitance of their reprefenting the great body of the people, alone gives them great weight. This weight has great authority added to it, by their pol- fefling the right (a right given to the people's Reprefenta- tives in Congrefs) of exclusively originating money bills. The authority over money will do every thing. A govern- ment cannot be fupported without money. Our Repre- fentativ,es may at any time compel the Senate to agree to areafonable meafure,by with-holding fupplies till 'the mea- fure is confented to. There was a great debate in the Con- vention, whether the Senate (hould have an equal power of originating money bills. It was ftrongly infilled by fome that they mould ; but at length a majority thought it unadvifeable, and the claufe was palled «*s it now ftands. I have reafon to believe our own Reprefentatives had a great {hare in eftablilhing this excellent regulation, and in my opinion they deferve the public thanks for it. It has been objected, that this power mud neceflarily injure the people, inafmuch as a bare majority of the Senate might alone be affembled, and eight would be fufEcient for a de- cifion. This is on a fuppofition that many of the Sena- tors would neglect, attending. It is to be hoped that the gentlemen who will be honored with feats in Congrefs* will faithfully execute their truft, as well in attending as in every other part of their duty. An objection of this fort, will go againft all government whatever. Pofliblc abufe and neglect of attendance, are objections which may be urged againft any government which the wifdom of man is able to conftruffc. When it is known of how much importance attendance is, no Senator would dare to incur the univerfal refentment of his fellow-citizens, by grofsly abfenting himfelf from his duty. Do gentlemen mean that it ought to have been provided by the Conttitution, that the whole body fhould attend before particular bufi- »efs was done ? Then it would be in the power of a fevr U men* ( *S4 1 men, by negletling to attend, to obftru£l the publfc bti- finefs, and podibly bring on the deftru&ion of their coun- try. If this power be improperly veiled, it is incum- bent on gentlemen to tell us in what body it could be more fafcly and properly lodged. I believe, On a ferious confi- deration, it will be found that it was neceffary, for the reafons mentioned by the gentleman fro'm Halifax, to velt the power in the Senate or in fome other body reprefenting equally the fovereignty of the ftates, and that the power,- as given in the Constitution, is not likely to be .attended with the evils which fome gentlemen apprehend. The only real ftcurity of liberty in any country, is the iealoufy and cifcumfpettion of the people themfelves. Let theni be watchful over their rulers. Should they find a combi- nation aga"«nft their liberties, and all other methods appear infufficient to preferve them, thev have, thank God, an ultimate remedy. That pbweif which created the govern- ment, can deftrOy it. Should the government, on trial, be found to want amendments', thofe amendments can be iriade in a regular method, in a mode prefcribed by the Conftitution itfelf. Maffachufetts, South Carolina, New- Harapfhire, and Virginia, have all propofed amendments 5 but they all concurred in the neceftity of an immediate N adoption* A conftitutional mode of altering the Confti- tution itfelf, is perhaps, what has never been linown among mankind before. We have this fecurity, in addition to the natural watchfulnefs of the people, which I hope will never be found wanting. The objections I have anfwered, deferved all pofftble attention, and for my part I fhall aU ways refpeil that iealoufy which aiifes from the love of public liberty. Mr. Spencer — Mr. Chairman, I think that no argument to the decifion of which the ftate judiciaries might be fully competent, nor with fuch controverfies as muft carry the? people a great way from home. With refpect to the ju- arifdiction of cafes arifing under the Conftitution, when we reflect on the very extenfive objects of the plan of go- vernment — the manner in which they may arife — and the multiplicity of laws that may be made with refpect to them, the objection againft it will appear to be well found- ed. If we confider nothing but the articles of taxation, duties, and excifes, and the laws that might be made with refpect to thefe, the cafes will be almoft infinite. If we confider that it is in coatemplation that a ftamp duty (hall take place throughout the continent ; that all contracts ihall be on ftamp paper ; that no contracts mould be of validity but what would be thus ftamped ^ thefe cafes will be fo many that the confequences would be dreadful. It would be neceffary to appoint Judges to the Federal Su- preme Court, and other inferior departments, and fuch a number of inferior courts in every diftrict and county, with a correfpondent number of officers, that it would coft an immenfe expence without any apparent neceffity 5 which muft operate to the diftrefs of the inhabitants. — There will be, without any manner of doubt, clafhings and animofities between the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts and of the ftate courts, fo that they will keep the country in hot water. It has been faid that the impro- priety of this was mentioned by fome in the Convention. ( i6i ) 1 cannot fee the reafons of giving the Federal Courts jll- rifdiction in thefe cafes, but I am fure it will occafion great expence unnecefTarily. The ftate judiciaries will have very little to do. It will be almoft ufelefs to keep them up. As all officers are to take an oath to fupporc the general government, it will carry every thing before it. This will produce that consolidation through the United States which is apprehended. I am fure that I do not fee that it is poffible to avoid k. I can fee no power that can keep up the little remains of the power of the dates. Our rights are not guarded. There is no decla- ration of rights, to fecure to every member of the fociety thofe unalienable rights which ought not to be given up to any government. Such a bill of rights would be a check upon men in power. Inftead of fuch a bill of rights, this Constitution has a claufe, which may warrant en- croachments on the power of the refpe£tive ftate Legifla- tures. I know it is faid that what is not given up to the United States will be retained by the individual dates. I know it ought to be fo, and mould be fo underftood; but, Sir, it is not declared to be fo. In the confederation it is exprefsly declared that all rights and powers, of any kind whatever, of the feveral ftates, which are not given lip to the United States, are exprefsly and abfolutely retained to be enjoyed by the ftates. There ought to be a bill o£ rights, in order that thofe in power may not ftep over the boundary between the powers of government and the rights of the people, which they may do, when there is nothing to prevent them. They may do fo without a bill of rights •, notice will not be readily taken of the encroach- ments of ruleis, and they may go a great length, before the people are alarmed. Oppreffions may therefore take place by degrees, but if there were exprefs terms and bounds laid down, when thefe were pafled by, the people would take notice of them, and oppreffions would not be carried on to fuch a length. . I look upon it therefore that there ought to be fomething to confine the power of this government within its proper boundaries. I know thac feveral writers have faid that a bill of rights is not necef- fary in this country ; that fome ftates had them not, and that others had. To thefe I anfwer, that thofe ftates that ^are then} not sis bills of right, ftrjftjy fo galled, hav« X them ( tffl ) them in the frame of their conftitution, which is nearly the fame. There has been a comparifon made of our (ituation with Great-Britain. We have no crown or prerogative of a King like the Britim Conftitution. I take it, that the fubje<3 has been mifunderftood. In Great- Britain, when the King attempts to ufurp the rights of the people, the declaration and bill of rights are a guard againft him. A bill of rights would be neceffary here to guard againft our rulers. I wifh to have a bill of rights, to fecure thofe un- alienable rights, which are called by fome refpeclable wtU ters the rejiduum of human rights, which are never to be given up. At the fame time that it would give feeurity to Individuals, it would add to the general ftrength. It might not be fo neceffary to have a bill of rights in the govern- ment of the United States, if fuch means had not been made ufe of, as endanger a consolidation of all the ftates y but at any event it would be proper to have one, beeatrfe though it might not be of any other fervice, it would at lead fatisfy the minds of the people. It would keep the ftates from being fwal lowed up by a confolidated govern- ment. For the reafons I before gave, I think that the ju- rifdi&ion of the Federal Court, with refpecl to all cafes in law and equity, and the laws of Congrefs, and the ap- peals in all cafes between citizens of different ftates, &c* is inadmiffible. I do not fee the neceflaty that it fhould be vefted with the cognizance of all thefe matters. I am de- firous, and have no objection to their having one Supreme Federal Court for general matters ; but if the Federal Courts have cognizance of thofe fubje&s which I mention- ed, very great oppreffions may arife. Nothing can be more ©ppreflive than the cognizance with refpecl: to controver- sies between citizens of different ftates. In all cafes of appeal, thofe perfons who are able to pay, had better pay down in the firft inftance, though k be unjuft, than be at fuch a dreadful expence, by going fuch a diftance to the Supreme Federal Court, Some of the moft refpe&able ftates have propofed by way of amendment, to ftrikc out a great part of thefe two claufes. If they be admit- ted as they are, it will render the country entirely un- happy. On the contrary, I fee no inconvenience from r«- iating the power «ti has been propof«4. I am of opinion { $) ) that it is inconfiftent with the happinefs of the psople t# admit thefe two claufes. The ftate Courts are fu Indent to decide the common controversies of the people, with- out diftrefling them by carrying them to fuch far diftanfc tribunals. If I did not confider thefe two claufes to be dangerous, I mould not object to them. I mean not to object to any thing that is not abfolutely neceflary. J wi£J| to be candid, and not be prejudiced or warped. Mr. Spaight — Mr. Chairman, The gentleman infinuate* that differences exifted in the Federal Convention refpect- ing the claufes which he objects to. "Whoever told him fo was wrong, for I declare, that in that Convention, the unanimous defire of all, was to keep feparate and diftinct the objects of the jurifdiction of the federal from that of the ftate judiciary. They wiihed to feparate them as ju- dicioufly as poflibte, and to confult the eafe and conveni- ence of the people, The gentleman objects to the cog- nizance of all cafes in law and equity arifing under th^ Constitution and the laws of the United States. This oh? Jection is very aftoniftiing. When any government is cftablifhed, it ought to have power to enforce its laws, or dfe it might as well have no power. What but that is the aife of a Judiciary ? The gentleman, from his profeflion^ mud know that no government can exift without a Judi- ciary to enforce its laws, by diftinguiftring the difobedient from the reft of the people, and impofing Sanctions for lecuring the execution of the laws. As to the inconveni- ence of diftant attendance, Congrefs has power of efta- blifhing inferior tribunals in each ftate, fo as to accommo- elate every citizen. As Congrefs have it in their power will they not do it f Are we to elect men who will wan? jtonly and unneceiTarily betray us ? Mr. Machine — Mr. Chairman, I hoped that fome gen- tleman more capable than myfelf, would have obviated the objections to this part. The objections offered by the gentleman, appear to me totally without foundation. He told us that thefe claufes tended to a consolidation of the flates. I cannot fee how the ftates are to be confolidatei by eftablifhing thefe two claufes. He enumerated a num- ber of cafes which would be involved within the cogni- zance of the Federal Courts; cuftoms, excifes, duties,, Samp 4utiqs, a ftamp on every article, on every contract^ ( I«4 ) in order to bring all perfons into the Federal Court ; and iaid that there would be neceffarily courts in every diftri£t and county, which would be attended with enormous and needlefs expence, for that the ftate courts could do every thing. He went on further, and faid that there would be a neceffity of having fheriffs and other officers in thefe in- ferior departments. A wonderful picture indeed, drawn up in a wonderful manner ! I will venture to fay that the gentleman's fuggeftions are not warranted by any reason- able conftruction of the Conftitution. The laws can, in> general, be executed by the officers of the ftates; State courts and ftate officers will, for the rnoft part, probably anfwer the purpofe of Gongrefs as well as any other. But the gentleman fays that the ftate courts will be fwallowed up by the Federal Courts. This is only a general aftertion, unfupported by any probable reafons or arguments. The objects of each are feparate and diftincT:. I fuppofe that whatever courts there may be, they will be eftablifhed ac- cording to the convenience of the people; This we muft fuppofe from the mode of electing and appointing the Members of the government. State officers will as much as poffible be employed, for one very confiderable reafon^, I mean to leffien the expence. But he imagines that the oath to be taken by officers, will tend to the fubverfion o£ our ftate governments and of our liberty; Can any go- vernment exift without fidelity in its officers I Ought not the officers of every government to give fome fecurity for the faithful difcharge of their truft ? The officers are only;- to be fworn to fupport the Conftitution, and therefore will! only be bound by their oath fo far as it {hall be ftricl:lp purfued. No officer will be bound by his oath to fupport any a£t that would violate the principles of the Con ft w tution. The gentleman has wandered out of his way, to tell us what has fo often been faid out of doors ; that there is no declaration of rights, that confequently all our rights are ta- ken away. It would be very extraordinary to have a bill of rights, becaufe the powers of Gongrefs are exprefsly de- fined, and the very definition of them is as valid and ef- ficacious a check as a bill of rights could be, without the dangerous implication of a bill of rights. The powers of Congrefs are limited and enumerated. We fay we have give* ( i«S ) given them thofe powers, but we do not fay we have giyen them more. We retain all thofe rights which we have not given away to the general government. The gentleman is a profeffional man. If a gentleman had made his laft will and teftament, and devifed or bequeathed to a particu- lar perfon the fixth part of his property, or any particular fpecific legacy, could it be faid that that perfon fhould have the whole eftate ? If they can afiume powers not enu- merated, there was no occafion for enumerating any pow- ers. The gentleman is learned : Without recurring to his learning, he may only appeal to common fen fe, it will in- form him, that if we had all power before, and give away but a part, we ftill retain the reft. It is as plain a thing as pofiibly can be, that Congrefs can have no power but what we exprefsly give them. There is an exprefs claufe,, which, however difingenuoufly it has been perverted from its 4rue meaning, clearly demonftrates that they are confined to thofe powers which are given them. This claufe enables ?them to make all laws which ihall be neceffary and proper ibr carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all aother powers veiled by this Conftitutionin the government of the United States, ^©r any department or officers there- of. This claufe fpecifies that they (hall make laws to car- ary into execution, all the powers vejled by this Conftittt- j&ion, confequently they can make no laws to execute any <*ather power. This claufe gives no new power, but de- clares that thofe already given are to be executed by pro- sper laws. I hope this will fatisfy gentlemen. Governor Johnjlon — Mr. Chairman, The learned mem- ifeer from Anfon fays, that the Federal Courts have exclu- ifive jurifdiction of all cafes in law and equity arifing un>- *der the Conftitution and the laws of the United States. The opinion .which 1 have always entertained is, that they •will in thefe cafes, as well as in feveral others, have con- current jurifdiclion with the ftate Courts, and not exclu- sive jurifdi&ion. I fee nothing in this Conftitution which hinders a man from bringing fuit wherever he thinks he can have juftice done him. The jurifdi&ion of thefe courts is eftablifhed for fome purpofes with which the ftate courts have nothing to do, and the Conftitution takes no power from the ftate courts which they now have. They ^iUliave the fame bufmefs which they have now, and if 4b* ( «<55 ) fo, they will have enough to employ their timer We know that the gentlemen who prefide in our Superior Courts, have more bufinefs than they can determine. Their complicated jurifdi&ion, and the great extent o£ country, occafions them a vaft deal of bufinefs. The ad- dition of the bufinefs of the United States would be no manner of advantage to them. It is obvious to every one,, that there ought to be one Supreme Court for national pur- pofes. But the gentleman fays that a bill of rights was ne- ceffary. It appears to me, Sir, that k would have been the higheft abfurdity to undertake to define what rights the people of the United States were entitled to : For that would be as much as to fay, they were entitled to nothing elfe. A bill of rights may be neceffary in a monarchical government, whofe powers are undefined. Were we in the fituation of a monarchical country ?■ No, Sir. E- very right could not be enumerated, and the omitted rights, would be facrificed, if feeurity arofe from an enumeration.. The Congrefs cannot aflume any other powers than thofe exprefsly given them, without a palpable violation of the^ Conftitution. Such objections as this, I hope will have no effect on the minds of any Members in this Houfe^ When, gentlemen obje6t generally, that it tends to confo- lidate the ftates. and dejroy the ftate Judiciaries, thep ©ught to be explicit, and explain their meaning. They* make ufe of contradictory arguments. The Senate repre-* fents the ftates, and can alone prevent this dreaded con- solidation : Yet the powers of the Senate are objected to.. The rights of the people, in my opinion, cannot be affect- ed by the Federal Courts. I do not know how inferior courts will be regulated. Some fuppofe the ftate court* will have this bufinefs. Others have imagined that the continent would be divided into a number of diftricvts, where courts would be held fo as to fuit the convenience «f the people. Whether this or fome other mode will be appointed by Congrefs, I know not, but this I am fure of, that the ftate judiciaries are not diverted of their prefent judicial cognizance, and that we have every feeurity that our eafe and convenience will be confulted. Unlefs Con- grefs had this power, their iaws could not be carried into *KecutioR> Mr. ( i*7 ) Mr. Bloodworth — Mr. Chairman, The worthy gentle- man up laft, has given me information on the fubjecl:, which I had never heard before. Hearing fo many opi- nions, I did not know which was right. The honorable gentleman has faid that the (late courts and the Courts o£ the United States, would have concurrent jurifdi&ion. I beg the committee to reflect what would be the confe- quences of fuch meafures. It has ever been confidered that the trial by jury was one of the greateft rights of the peo- ple. I afk whether, if fuch caufes go into the Federal Court, the trial by jury is not cut off, and whether there is any fecurity that we (hall have juftice done us. I afk i£ there be any fecurity that we (hall have juries in civil caufes. In criminal cafes there are to be juries, but there is no provifion made for having civil caufes tried by jury. This concurrent juridiclion is inconfiftent with the fecu- rity of that great right. If it be not, I would wifii to hear how it is fecured. I have liftened with attention to what the learned gentlemen have faid, and have endea- voured to fee whether their arguments had any weiglft, but I found none in them. Many words have been fpoken, and long time taken up, but with me they have gone in at one ear and out at the other. It would give me much pleafure to hear that the trial by jury was fecured. Mr. J, M'Dowall—Mx. Chairman, The objections to this part of the Conftitution have not been anfwered to my fatisf action yet. We know that the trial by a jury of the vicinage, is one of the greateft fecurities for property. I£ caufes are to be decided at fuch a great diftance, the poor will be opprefled 5 in land affairs particularly, the wealthy fuitor will prevail. A poor man, who has a juft claim or* a piece of land, has not fubftance to {land it. Can it be fuppofed that any man, of common circumftances, can (land the expence and trouble of going from Georgia to Philadelphia, there to have a fuit tried ? And can it be juft- ly determined without the benefit of a trial by jury ? Thefe are things which have juftly alarmed the people. What made the people revolt from Great-Britain ? The trial by jury, that great fafeguard of liberty, was taken away, and a ftamp duty was laid upon them. This alarmed thera, and led them to fear that greater oppreflions would take |la9«i W« th^j r«fcfUeen the prin- cipal flurce of tyranny in all ages. As to the claufe refpe£Hhg cafes arifing tinder the Con* ftitution and the laws of the union, which the honourable Member objected to, it muft be obferved, that laws are ufe- lefs unlefs they are executed* At prefeht Congrefs have powers which they cannot execute. After making laws which affect the deareft intefefts of the people, in the con- stitutional mode, they have no way of enforcing them. The fituation of thofe gentlemen who have lately ferved in Congrefs muft have been very difagreeable. Congrefs have power to enter into negociations with foreign nations^ but cannot compel the obfervance of treaties that they make. They have been muchdiftreffed by their inability ta pay the preffing demands of the public creditors. They have been reduced fo low as to borrow principal to pay intereft.' Such are rhe unfortunate conferences of this unhappy, fituation! Thefe are the effecls of the pernicious mode of requifitions. Has any ftate fully paid its quota ? 1 believe not, Sir. Yet I am far from thinking that this has beeni owing altogether to an uriwillingriefs to pay the debts. It may have been in fome inftances the cafe, but I believe not in all. Our ftate Legiflature has no way of raifing any eonfiderable fiim but by laying dire£t taxes. Other ftates' have imports of confequence. Thefe may afford them a confiderable relief, but our ftate perhaps could not have raifed its full quota by direcl taxes, without impofing bur- thens too heavy for the people to tear. Suppofe in this fituation, Congrefs had proceeded to enforce their requifi- tions, by fending an army to collect them ; what would nave been the confequence ? Civil war ; in which the in- nocent muft have fuffered with the guilty. Thofe who were willing to pay, would have been equally diftreffed with thofe who were unwilling. Requifitions thus having failed of their purpofe, it is propofed by this Cohftitution, that inftead of collecting taxes by the (word, application Ihall be made by the government to the individual citizens. If any individual difobeys, the courts of juftice can giv£ immediate relief. This is the only natural and effectual method of enforcing laws. As to the danger of concur-* ient jurifdiclions, has any inconvenience refulted from the concurrent ( *7i ) concurrent jurifdi£tfons, in fundry cafes, of the fuperioc. and county cpurts of this ftate ? The inconvenience of at* tending at a great diftance, which has been fo much ob- jected to, is one which would be fo general, that there is ho doubt but that a majority would always feel themfelves and their conftitueuts perfonally interefted in preventing it. I have no doubt, therefore, that proper care will be taken to leffen this evil as much as pollible, and i. n particular, that an appeal %q the Supreme pourt will not be allowed, but in cafes of great importance, where ^he object may be adequate to the expence. The Supreme Court may pofiibly be directed to fit alternately in different parts o£ the union. The propriety of having a Supreme Court in every go- vernment, muft be obvious to every man of reflection. There can be no other way of fecuring the ad minift ration, of juftice uniformly in, the feveral ftates. There might be otherwife as many different adjudications on the fame fub> ject, as there are ftates. It is to be hoped, that if this government be eftablifhed, connexions ftili more intimate than the prefent, will fubfift between the different ftates. The fame meafure of juftice therefore, as to the objecl^ of their common concern, ought to prevail in all. A man in North-Carolina for inftance, i| he owed £.100 here, and was compellable to pay it in good money, ought tO ( have the means of recovering the fame fum, if due to him, in Rhode-Ifland, and not merely the nominal fum, at about an eighth or tenth part of its intrinfic value.To obviate fuch a grievance as this, the Conftitution has provided a tribunal to adminifter equal juftice to all. ' *-' A gentleman has (aid, that the ftamp-a£t, and the tak- ing away of the trial by jury, were the principal caufes of refiftance to Great-Britain, and feemed to infer, that oppo- fition would therefore be juftified to this part of the fyftem. The ftamp-aft was much earlier than the immediate caufe of our independence. But what was the great ground of oppofition to the ftamp-a£t, ? Surely it was, becaufe the acl: was not paued by our own Representatives, but by thofe of Great-Britain. Under this Conftitution, taxes are to be impofedjjy our own Reprefentatives in the General Congrefs. The fewnefs of their number will be compen^ fated by the weight and importance of their characters. Our < ft* ) Our Representatives will be in proportion to thofe of the other ftates. This cafe is certainly not like that of taxa- tion by a foreign Legiflature. In refpeft to the trial by ju- ry, its being taken away in certain cafes, was to be fure one of the caufes afligned in the declaration of indepen- dence. But that was done by a foreign Legiflature, which might continue it fo forever, and therefore jealoufy was juftly excited. But this Conftitution has not taken it away, and it is left to the difcretion of our own Legiflature, to aft in this refpeft, as their wifdom fhall direft. In Great- Britain, the people fpeak of the trial by jury with admira- tion. No Monarch or Minifter, however arbitrary in his principles, would dare to attack that noble palladium of liberty. The enthufiafna of the people in its favour would in fuch a cafe produce general refiftance. That trial re- mains unimpaired there, although they have a confiderable {landing army, and their Parliament has authority to abo- li{h it if they pleafe. But woe be to thofe who fhould at- tempt it ! If it be fecure in that country, under thefe cir- cumftances, can we believe that Congrefs either would or could take it away in this ? Were they to attempt it, their authority would be inftantly refilled. They would draw down on themfelves the refentment and deteftation of the people. They and their families, fo long as any remained in being, would be held in eternal infamy, and the attempt prove as unfuccefsful as it was wicked. "With regard to a bill of rights, this is a notion origin- ating in England, where no written Conflitution is to be found, and the authority of their government is derived from the moft remote antiquity. Magna Charta itfelf is no Conftitution, but a folemn inftrument afcertaining cer- tain rights of individuals, by the Legiflature for the time being, and every article of which the Legiflature may at any time alter. This, and a bill of rights alfo, the inven- tion of later times, were occafioned by great ufurpations of the crown, contrary, as was conceived, to the prin- ciples of their government, about which there was a va- riety of opinions. But neither that inftrument or any other inftrument ever attempted to abridge the authority of Parliament, which is fuppofed to be without any limit- ation whatever. Had their Conftitution been fixed and eertajnj 4 bill of rights would have been ufelefs, for the Conftitution ( *73 ) Conftifatibn would have (hewn plainly the extent of tha&. authority which they were difputing about. Of what ufe therefore can a bill of rights be in this Constitution, where the people exprefsly declare how much power they do give, and confequenjtly retain all they do not ? It is ^ declaration of particular powers by the people to their Re- prefentatives for particular purpofes. It may be consider- ed as a great power of attorney, under which no power can be exercifcd but what is exprefsly given. Did any man ; ever hear before that at the end of a power of attorney it- was faid, that the Attorney mould not exercife more^pow- er than was there given him ? Suppofe for inftance a man had lands in the counties of Anfon and Cafwell, and he, fhould give another a power of attorney to fell his lands in, Anfon •, would the other have any authority to fell the lands in Cafwell ? or could he without abfurdity fay, " 'Tis true. f* you have not exprefsly authorifed me to fell the lands in, " Cafwell, but as you had lands there, and did not fay I; * c fhoujd not, I thought I might as well fell thofe lands as_ " the other." A bill of rights, as I* conceive, would not only be incongruous, but dangerous. No man, let his in- genuity be what it will, could enumerate all the individu- al rights not relinquished by this Conftitutiom Suppofe therefore an enumeration of a great many, but an omiflioi\, of fome, and that long after all traces of our prefent difputes were at an end, any of the omitted rights (hould be inva^ ded, and the invafion be complained of ; what would be, the plaufible anfwer of the government to fuch a complaints- Would they not naturally fay, " We live at a great diftance u from the time when this Conftitution was eftablifhed. u We can judge of it much better by the ideas of it en-. " tertained at the time, than by any ideas of our own., " The bill of rights pafled at that time, (hewed that the. ill of rights would not only have been proper, but necef- fary ; and it wouM have then operated as ari exception to the legiflative authority in fuch particulars. It has this ef- iecl: in refpecT: to fome of the American Conftitutions, where the powers of legiflation are general. But where they are powers of a particular nature, and exprefsly de- fined, as in the cafe of the Conftitution before us, I think, for the reafons j have given, a bill of rights is not on\f unneceffary, but would be abfurd and dangerous. Mr. J. M i Dpwali-—lAx. Chairman, The learned gen- tleman made ufe of feveral arguments to induce us to be- lieve r that the trial by jury in civile cafes was not in dan- ger, and obferyed, that in criminal cafes it is provided, that the trial is to be in the (late where the crime was com- mitted. Suppofe a crime is committed at the Miffifippi — the man may be tried at Edenton. They ou ; ght to be tried by the people of the vicinage ; for when the trial is at fuch an immenfe diftance, the principal privilege attending the trial by jury is taken away : Therefore the trialought to be limited to a diftric"t, or certain part of the ftate. It has been laid by the gentleman from Edenton, that our Represen- tatives will have virtue and wifdom to regulate all thefe things. But it would give me much fatisfa&ion, in a mat- ter of this importance, to fee it absolutely fecured. The depravity of mankind militates againft fuch a degree of confidence. \ wifti to fee every thing fixed. Governor JohnJIon— Mr. Chairman, The obfervations of the gentleman laft up, confirm what the other gentleman faid. I mean, that as there are diflimilar modes with re- fpecT: to the trial by jury in different dates, there could be no general rule fixed to accommodate all. He fays that this claufe is defective, becaufe the trial if not to be by a jury of the vicinage. Let us look at the ftate of Vir- ginia, where, as long as I have known it, the laws have been executed fo as to fatisfy the inhabitants, and I believe as well as in any part of the union. In that country ju- ries are fummoned every day from the by-ftanders. We may expe£r. lefs partiality, when the trial is by ftrangers ; and were I to be tried for my property or life, I would ra- ther be tried by difinterefted men, who -were not biafled, e£an by men wfco were perhaps intimate friends of my op- ponent. ( '75 ) ponent. Our mode is different from theirs, but. whether theirs be better than ours or not, is not the queftion. It would be improper for our Delegates^to impoie our mode upon them, or for theirs to imipofe their mode upon us. The trial will probably be in each ftate as it has been hi- therto ufed in fuch ftate, or otherwife regulated as conve- niently as poffible for the people. The Delegates who are to meet in Congrefs will, I hope, be men of virtue ancl wifdbm. If not, it will be our own fault. They will have it in their power to make neceflary regulations to ac- commodate the inhabitants of each ftate. In the Confti- tution, the general principles only are laid down. It will be the object of the future legitimation of Congrefs, to make fuch laws as will be moft convenient for the people. With regard to a bill of rights fo much f£oken of, what the gen- tleman from Edenton has faid, I hope will obviate the ob- jections againft the want of it. In a monarchy, all power may be fuppofed to be vefted in the Monarch, except what may be referved by a bill of rights. In England, in eve- ry inftance where the rights of the people are not declared, the prerogative of the King is fuppofed to extend. But in this country we fay, that what rights we do riot give away remain with us. •-,.,. Mr. Bldodivorth — Mr. Chairman, The footing on which! the trial by jury is in the Conftitution, does not fatisfy me. Perhaps I am miftaken, but if I underftand the thing right,* the trial by jury is taken away. If the Supreme Federal Court has jurifdi£tion both as to law and fadt, it appears io me to be taken away. The honourable gentleman who Was in the Convention, told us, that the claufe, as it now (lands, refulted from the difficulty of fixing the mode of trial. I think it. was eafy to have put it on a fecurtf footing. But if the genius of the people of the United States is fo diffimilar, that our liberties cannot be fecured, ; we can never hang long together. Intereft is the band of focial union, and when this is taken aWay, the union itfelf muft difTolve. Mr. Machine — Mr. Chairman, I do not take the fciter- £fts of the dates to be fo diffimilar ; I take them to be all nearly alike, and inseparably connected. It is impoffiblef to' lay down any constitutional rule for the government o£ all the different ftates in each particular. , But it will be e*fy ( I# ) te trie 'eafy For the Legiflature to make laws to accommodate people in every part of the union, as circumftances may arife. Jury trial is not taken away in fuch cafes where it may be found neceflary. Altho' the Supreme Court has cognizance of the appeal, it does not follow but that the trial by jury may be had in the court below, and the tefti- mony tranfmitted to the Supreme Court, who will then finally determine on a review of all the circumftances. This is well known to be the practice in fome of the ftates. In our own ftate indeed, when a caufe is inftituted in the county court, and afterwards there is an appeal upon it, a new trial is had in the fuperior court, as if no trial had been had before. In other countries hoWever, when a tri- al is had in an inferior court, and an appeal is taken, no teftimony can be given in the court above, but the court determines upon the circumftances appearing upon the re- cord. If I am right, the plain inference is, that there may be a trial m the inferior courts, and that the record including the teftimony may be fent to the Supreme Court* But if there is a neceffity for a jury in the Supreme Court, ft will be a very eafy matter to empanel a jury at the bar of the Supreme Court, which may fave great expence and be very convenient to the people. It is impoffible to make every regulation at once. Congrefs, who are our own ^.eprefentatives, will undoubtedly make fuch regulations as will Xuit the convenience and fecure the liberty of the people. Mr. Iredell declared it as his opinion, that there might be juries in the fuperior court as well as in the inferior courts, and that it was in the power of Congrefs to regu- late it fo. Mr. Prefident now refumed the Chair, and Mr. Ken- nion reported, That the committee had, according to the order of the day, again had the propofed Conftitution un- der confideration, and had made further progrefs therein, but not having time to go through the fame, had defired him. to move to the Convention for leave to fit again, Refolvedy That this Convention will to-morrow again difiblve itfelf into a committe of the whole Houfe, to take into further confideration the propofed plan of govern- ment. The Convention then adjourned until to-morrow morn- ing, nine oclock, TUESDAY,, j ( m 3 [Ji TUESDAY, July 29, 1788. The Convention met according to adjournment, and re* folved itfelf into a committee of the whole Convention,' to take into further confederation the propofed plan of go- Ternment. Mr. Kennion in the Chair. Mr. Spencer— Mr. Chairman, I hope to be excufed for making fome obfervations on what was faid yefterday, by gentlemen in favour of thefe two daufes. The motion which was made that the committee mould rife, precluded me from (peaking then. The gentlemen have (hewed much • moderation and candour in conducting this buiiriefs : But I dill think that my obfervations are well founded, and that fome amendments are neceflary. The gentlemen faid all matters not given up by this form of government, were retained by the refpedtive dates. I know that it ought to be fo ; it is the general doctrine, but it is neceflary that it fhould be exprefsly declared in the Conftitution, and not left to mere conftru&iori and opinion. I am autho- rifed to fay it Was heretofore thought neceflary. The Confederation fays exprefsly, that all that was not given up by the United States, was retained by the refpeclive ftates. If fuch a claufe had been inferted in this Con^ ftitution, it would have fuperceded the neceflity of a bill of rights. But that not being the cafe, it was neceflary that a bill of rights, or fomething of that kind, (hould be a part of the Conftitution. It was ©bferved, that as the Conftitution is to be a delegation of power from the feve- ral ftates to the United States, a bill of rights was un* neceflary. But it will be noticed that this is a different, Cafe. The ftates do not a£t in their political capacities, but the government is propofed for individuals. The very* caption of the Conftitution (hews that this is the cafe. The expreflion, "We the people of the United States/* Ihews that this government is intended for individuals.; there ought therefore to be a bill of rights. Tarn ready to acknowledge that the Congrefs ought to have the power of executing its laws. Heretofore, becaufe all the laws of the Confederation were binding on the ftates in their political Capacities, courts had nothing to do with them ; but now the thing is entirely different. The laws of Con- grefs will be binding on individuals, and tftofe things Z which. t il* 1 which concern individuals will be brought properly before the courts. In the next place, all the officers are to take an oath to carry into execution this general government, and are bound to fupport every act of the government, of whatever nature it may be. This is a fourth reafon for fecuring the rights of individuals. It was alfo obferved, that the Federal Judiciary and the courts of the nates tinder the federal authority, would have concurrent jurif- diction with refpeft to any fubjecl: that might arife under the Conftitution. I am ready to fay that I mod heartily wifh that whenever this government takes place, the two jurifdictions and the two governments, that Is, the gene- ral and the feveral ftate governments, may go hand in hand, and that there may be no interference, but that every thing may he rightly conducted. But I will sever concede that it is proper to divide the bufinefs between the two differ- ent courts. I have no doubt but there is wifdom enough in this ftate to decide the bufinefs in a proper manner^ without the neceflity of federal afliftance to do our bufi- nefs. ' The worthy gentleman from Ederiton, dwelt a con- siderable time on' the obfervations on a bill of rights, con- tending that they were proper only in monarchies, which were founded on different principles from thofe of our government ; and therefore, though they might be necef- fary for others, yet they were not neceffary for us. I ftilj think that a bill of r rghts is neceffary. This neceflity arifes from the nature of human focieties. When individuals enter into fociety, they give up fome. rights to fecure the reft. There are certain human rights' that ought not to be given up, and which ought in fome manner to be fecured. With refpecl: to thefe great effential rights, no latitude ought to be left. They are the moft ineftimable gifts of the great Creator, and therefore ought not be deftroyed^ tut ought to be fecured. They ought to be fecured to in- dividuals in confederation of the other rights which they* give up to fupport fociety. The trial by jury has been alfo fpoken of. Every per- fon who is acquainted with the nature of liberty, need not be informed of the importance of this trial. Juries are tailed the bulwarks of our rights and liberty ; and na country can ever be enflaved as long as thofe cafes which a^ec^ fcbejx lives a$d pronerty, ars to be decided in a : grea^ { »79 ) great meafure, by the confent of twelve honeft, difintefct tefted men, / taken from the refpectable body of yeomanry. .'It is highly improper that any claufe which regards the Security of the trial by jury mould be any way doubtful. In the claufe that has been read, it is .ascertained that cri- minal cafes are to be tried by jury, in the ftates wherein they are committed. It has been objected to that claufe, that it is not Sufficiently explicit. I think that it is not ■ It was obferved, that one may be taken at a great diftance. One reafon of the refiftance to the Britifli government was, becaufe they required that we mould be carried to 4 the country of Great-Britain, to be tried by juries of that country, Put we infilled on being tried by juries of the" vicinage in our own country. I think it therefore proper, that Something explicit ftiould be Said with reSpect to the; vicinage. With regard to that part that the Supreme Court (hall have appelfate jurisdiction both as to law and fact, it has been obferved, that though the FederarCourt might decide without a juryj yet the court below, which tried it, might have a jury. I alk the gentleman what benefit would be received in the Suit by having a jury trial in the court be- low, when the verdict: is fet afide in the Supreme Court. It was intended by this claufe that the trial by jury mould he fupprefled in the Superior and inferior courts. It has 'been faid in defence of the omiffion concerning the trial By jury in civil cafes, that one general regulation could mot be .made — that in Several cafes the Constitution of fe- deral ftates did not require a trial by jury ; for inftance, in cafes of equity and admiralty, whereas in others it did %. and that therefore it was proper to leave this Subject at large. I am fure that for the fecurity of liberty they ought to have been at the pains of drawing Some line. I think that the reSpectable body Who formed the Conftitution, HioulcMiave gone So far as to put matters on fuch a footing as that there fhould be no danger. They might have pro- vided that all thofe cafes which are now triable by a jury, fliould be tried in each (late by a jury, according to the' mode ufually practised in fuch ftate. This would have been eafily done if they had been at the trouble of writing live or fix lines. Had it been done, we mould have beer^ faffed to fay that our rights and liberties were not en{ dangerecy? ^angered. If we adopt this claufe as it is, I think, not- y.'ithftanding what gentlemen have faid, that there will be danger. There ought to be fome amendments to it, to put this matter on a fure footing. There does not appear to ine to be any kind of neceiTity that the Federal Court {hould have jurifdi£lion in the body of the country. I am .ready to give up that in the cafes exprefsly enumerated, aa appellate jurifdi ought to be binding upon us the moment they are made- They involve in their nature, not only our own rights but thofe of foreigners. If the rights of foreigners were left to be decided ultimately by thirteen diflincl: judiciaries, there would neceflarily be unjuft and contradictory de- ci(ion§. If our courts of juftice did not decide in favour of foreign citizens and fubjecls when they ought, it mighc. involve the whole union in a war. There ought, there- fore, to be a paramount tribunal, which mould have am- ple power to carry them into effecT:. To the decifion of all caufes which might involve the peace of the union, may be referred alfo, that of controverfies between the fcitiaens or fubje&s of foreign ftates and the citizens of the Uaiteti ( m ) United States. It has been laid down by all writers, that the denial of juftice is one of the juft eaufes of war. If thefe controverfies were left to the decifion of particular ftates, it would be in their power at any time, to involve the whole continent in a war, ufually the greateft of all national calamities. It is certainly clear, that where the peace of the union is affected, the general Judiciary ought to decide. It has generally been given up, that all cafes of admiralty and maritime jurifdiclion {hould alfb be de- termined by them. It has been equally ceded by the ftrongeft oppofers to this government, that the Federal Courts mould have cognizance of controverfies between two or more ftates ; between a ftate and the citizens of another ftate, and between the citizens of the fame 'ftate claiming lands under the grant of different ftates. Its ju- rifdiclion in thefe cafes *• neceffary, to fecure impartiality in decifions, and preferve tranquility among the ftates. It is impoflibie that there (hould be impartiality when a party arretted is to be Judge. The fecurity of impartiality is the principal reafon for giving up the ultimate decifion of controverfies between citizens of different ftates. It is effential to "the intereft of agriculture and commerce, that the hands of the ftates (hould be bound from making paper money, inftalment laws, or pine-barren aBs. By fuch iniquitous laws the merchant or farmer may be defrauded of a confiderable part of his juft claims. But in the federal court real money will be recovered with that fpeed which is neceffa- ry to accommodate the circumftances of individuals. The tedious deiays of judicial proceedings at prefent in fome ftates, are ruinous to creditors. In Virginia many fuits are twenty or thirty years fpun out by legal ingenuity, and the defective conftruclion of their judiciary. A citizen of Maffachufetts or this country might be ruined before he could recover a debt in that ftate. It is neceffary therefore in order to obtain juftice, that we recur to the Judiciary of the United States, where juftice muft be equally admi- niftered, and where a debt may be recovered from the ci- tizen of one ftate as foon as from the citizen of another. As to a bill of rights, which has been brought forward £n a manner I cannot account for, it is unneceffary to fay 'any thing. The learned gentleman has faidy that by a con- current . { i«5 ) current jurifdi&ion the laws of the United States muft iieccffarily clafh with the laws of the individual dates, in confequence of which the laws of the Hates will be ob- structed, and the (late governments abforbed. This can- not be the cafe. There is not one inftance of a power given to the United States, whereby the internal policy or adminiftration oi the ftates is affected. There is no in- ftance that can be pointed out,' wherein the internal policy of the ftate can be affected by the Judiciary of the United States. He mentioned impoft laws. It has been given up on all hands, that if there was a neceffity of a Federal Court, it was on this account. Money is difficult to be got into the treafury. The power of the Judiciary to en- force the federal laws is necefTary to facilitate the collec- tion of the public revenues. It is well known in this ftate with what reluctance and backward nefs Collectors pay up the public monies. . We have been making laws after laws to remedy this evil and ftill find them ineffectual. Is it not therefore necefTary to enable the general government to compel the delinquent receivers to be punctual ? The honourable gentleman admits that the general government ought to legiflate upon, individuals inftead of ftates. Its laws will otherwife be ineffectual, but particularly with refpect to treaties. .We have feen with what little cere- mony the ftates violated the peace with Great- Britain. Congrefs had no power to enforce its observance. The fame caufe will produce the fame effect. We need not flatter ourfelves that fimilar violations will always meet with equal impunity. I think he muft be of opinion up- on more reflection, that the jurifdiction of the federal Ju- diciary could not have been conftructed otherwife with fafety or propriety. It is necefTary that the Conftitution fiiould be carried into effect, that the laws mould be exe- cuted, juftice equally done to all the community, and trea- ties obferved. Thefe ends can only be accomplifhed by a general paramount Judiciary. Thefe are my fentiments, and if the honourable gentleman will prove them errone- ous, I (hall readily adopt his opinions. Mr. Maclaine — Mr, Chairman, I beg leave to make a few obfervations. One of the gentleman's objections to the Conftitution now under consideration is, that it is not the act of the ftates but of the people > but that it ought A a t# ( M J to be the act of the dates, and he inftances the delegation of power by the ftates to the Confederation at the com- mencement of the war as a proof of this pofnion. I hope, Sir, that all power i? in the people and not in the ftate governments. If he will not deny the authority of the people to delegate power to agents, and to devife fuch a government as a majority of them thinks will promote their happinefs, he will withdraw his objection. The peo- ple, Sir, are the only proper authority to form a govern- ment. They, Sir, have formed their ftate governments, and can alter them at pleafure, Their tranfeendent pow- er is competent to fornv this or any other government which they think promotive of their happinefs. But the gentleman contends that there ought to be a bill of rights, or fomething of that kind — fomething declaring expreff- ly, that all power not exprefsly given to the Conftitution^ ought to be retained by the ftates, and he produces the Confederation as an authority for its neceffity. When the Confederation was made, we were by no means fo well ac- quainted with the principles of government as we are now. We were then jealous of the power of our rulers, and had an idea of the Britilh government when we entertain- ed that jealoufy. There is no people on earth fo well ac- quainted with the nature of government as the people of America generally are. We know now, that it is agreed upon by mod writers, and men of judgment and reflec- tion, that all power is in the people and immediately de- rived from them. The gentleman furely muft know, that if there be certain rights which never can nor ought to be given up ; thefe rights cannot be faid to be given away, merely becaufe we have omitted to fay that we have not given them up. Can any fecurity arife from declaring that we have a right to what belongs to us ? Where is the ne- ceffity of fuch a declaration ? If we have this inherent, this unalienable, this indefeafible title to thofe rights, if they are not given up, are they not retained ? If Congrefs fhould make a law beyond the powers and the fpirit of the Conftitution, fhould we not fay to Congrefs, w You have " no authority to make this law. There are limits beyond ** which you cannot go. You cannot exceed the power ** prescribed by the ConfUtutiorit You are amenable t« ( ««7 ) i «* us for your conduct. This act is unconftitutional. We \ || will disregard it, and punifh you for the attempt." | But the gentleman feems to be moft tenacious of the ju- I dicial power of the ftates. The honourable gentleman ] muft know, that the doctrine of reservation of power not i relinquimed, clearly demonftrates that the judicial power : of the ftates is not impaired. He afks, with refpect to the trial by jury, when the caufe has gone up to the Su- perior Court, and the verdict is fet afide, what benefit ,; arifes from having had a jury trial in the inferior Court I | i would a(k the gentleman, what is the reafon, that on a fpecial verdict or cafe agreed, the decifion is left to the court ? There are a raumber of cafes where juries cannot decide. When a jury finds the fact fpecially, or when it is agreed upon by the parties, the decifion is referred tot i the court. If the law be againil the party, the court de» cides againft him \ if the law be for him, the court judges^ accordingly. He as well as every gentleman here muft I know, that under the Confederation Congrefs fet afide ju- ries. There was an appeal given to Congrefs, did Con- grefs determine by a jury ? Every party carried his teftt- mony in writing to the Judges of Appeal, and Congrefs determined upon it. The diftin&ion between matters of law and of fact, ha$ not been fufficiently underftood, or has been intentionally mifreprefented. On a demurrer in law, in which the facts are agreed upon by the parties, the law arifing there- upon is referred to the court. An inferior court may give an erroneous judgment ; an appeal may be had from this court to the Supreme Federal Court, and a right decifion. had. This is an inftance wherein it can have cognizance •f matter of law folely. In cafe§ where the exiftenee o£ facts has been firft difputed by one of the parties, and af- terwards eftabliftied as in a fpecial verdict, the confederation, of thefe facts, blendid with the law, is left to the court. In fuch cafes Inferior Courts may decide contrary to juf- tice and law, and appeals may be had to the Supreme Court. This is an inftance wherein it may be faid they have jurifdiction both as to law and fact. But where facts on- ly are difputed, and where they are once eftabliftied by a verdict, the opinion of the judges of the Supreme Cour$ cannot* • ( »8* ) cannot, I conceive, fet afide thefe facts, for I do not think they have power fo to do by this conftruction . The Federal Court has jurifdiction only in fome in- ftances. There are many inftances in which no court but the date courts can have any jurifdiction whatfo- ever, except where parties claim land under the grant of different ftates, or the fubject of difpute arifes under the Conftitution itfelf. The ftate courts have exclufive jurif- diction over every other poflible controverfy that can arife between the inhabitants of their own ftates; nor can the Federal Courts intermeddle with fuch difputes either ori- ginally or by appeal. There is a number of other inftances where though jurifdiction is given to the Federal Courts, it is not taken away from the ftate courts. If a man in South-Carolina owes me money, I can bring fuit in the courts of that (late, as well as in any inferior Federal Court. I think gentlemen cannot but fee the propriety of leaving to the general government the regulation of the in- ferior federal tribunals. This is a power which our own ftate Legiflature has. We may truft Congrefsas well as them. Mr. Spencer anfwered, That the gentleman laft up had mifunderftood him. He did not object to the caption of the Conftitution, but he inftanced it to (hew that the United States were not, merely as ftate9, the objects of the Conftitution *, but that the laws of Congrefs were to operate upon individuals arid not upon ftates. He then continued— I do not mean to contend, that the laws of the general government ihould not operate upon individu- als. I before obferved that this was necefTary, as laws could not be put in execution againft ftates, without the agency of the fword, which initead of anfwering the ends of government would deftroy it. —I endeavoured to {hew, that as the government was not to operate againft ftates but againft individuals, the rights of individuals ought to be properly fecured. In order to conftitute this fecurity, it appears to me there ought to be fuch a claufe in the Conftitution as there was in the Confederation, exprefsly declaring, that every power, jurifdiction and right, which are not given up by it, remain in the ftates. Such a claufe would render a bill of rights unneceflary. But as there is no fuch claufe I contend, that there ihould be a bill of ?4ghts, ascertaining and fecuring the great rights of the ftates ( 18? ) ftates and people. Befidcs my objection to the revifion o£ facts by the Federal Court, and the insecurity of jury trial, I confider the concurrent junfditHon of thofe courts with the (late courts, as extremely dangerous. It muft be ob-. vious to every one, that if they have fuch a concurrent jurifdit"tion, they mult in tinae takeaway the bufinefs from the ftate courts entirely. I do not deny the propriety of having Federal Courts ; but they fhould be confined to federal bufinefs, and ought not to interfere in thofe cafes where the ftate courts are fully competent to decide. The ftate courts can do their bufinefs without federal afiiftance, I do not know how far any gentleman may fuppofe, that I may from my office be biaffed in favour of the ftate ju-> rifdi£Hon. I am no more interefted than any other indi- vidual. I do not think it will affect the refpe&able office which I hold. Thofe courts will not take place immedi- ately, and even when they do, it will be a long time be- fore their concurrent jurifdi&ion will materially affect the ftate judiciaries — I therefore confider myfelf as difintereft- cd. I only wifh to have the government fo conftructed as to promote the happinefs, harmony and liberty of eve- ry individual at home, and render us refpectable as a nati- on abroad. I wifh the queftion to be decided coolly and calmly, with moderation, candour and deliberation, Mr. Machine replied, That the gentleman's objections to the want of a bill of rights, had been fufficiently an- fwered. That the federal jurisdiction was well guarded* and that the Federal Courts had not, in his opinion, cog- nizance in any one cafe where, it could be alone veiled in the ftate judiciaries with propriety or Safety. The gen- tleman, he faid, had acknowledged that the laws of the union could not be executed under the exifting govern-* ment, and yet he objected to the Federal Judiciary's hav- ing cognizance of fuch laws, though it was the only pro- bable means whereby they could be enforced. The treaty of peace with GreaNBritain was the Supreme law of the land, yet it was disregarded for want of a Federal Judici- ary. The ftate judiciaries did not enforce an observance of it. The ftate courts were highly improper to be en* trufted with the execution of the federal laws, as they were bound to judge according to the ftate laws, which •light be repugnant to thofe of the union. Mr, ( *9° ) Mr. IredeI!-~Mr. Chairman, I beg leave to make a few observations on fome remarks that have been made on this part of the Constitution. The honourable gentleman faid that it was very extraordinary that the Convention mould rot have taken the trouble to make an addition of five or (ix lines, to fecure the trial by jury in civil cafes. Sir, if by the addition, not only of five or fix lines, but of five or fix hundred lines, this invaluable object could have been fecured, I fhould have thought the Convention cri- minal in omitting it; and inftead of meriting the thanks of their country, as I think they do now, they might juftly have met with its refentment and indignation. I am per- fuaded that the omifiion arofe from the real difficulty ( of the cafe. The gentleman fays that a mode might have been provided, whereby the trial by jury might have been fecured Satisfactorily to all the ftates. I call on him to (hew that mode — I know of none — nor do I think jt poflible for any man to devife one to which fome dates would not have objected. It is faid indeed, that it might have been provided that it fhould be as it had been heretofore. Had this been the cafe, furely it would have been highly incongruous. The trial by jury is different in different ftates. It is regulated in one way in the ftate of North-Carolina, and in ano- ther way in the .ftate of Virginia. It is eftablifhed in a different way from either in feveral other ftates. Had it then been inferted in the Conftitution, that, the trial by jury (hould be as it had been heretofore, there would have been an example, for the firft time in the world, of a Ju- diciary belonging to the fame government being different in different parts of the fame country. "What would you think of an a£t of Aflembly which inould require the tri- al by jirry to be had in one mode in the county of Orange, 3» another mode in Granville, and in a manner different from both in Chatham ? Such an acl: of Aflembly, fo ma- nifeftly injudicious, impolitic and unjuft, would be re- pealed next year. But what would you fay of our Confti- tution, if it authorised fuch an abfurdity ? The mifchief then could not be removed without altering the Conftitu- tion itfelf. It muft be evident therefore, that the addition contended for would not have anfwered the purpofe. If the method of any particular ftate had been eftablifhed^ it would ( '9« ) Would have been objected to by others, becaufe whatever inconveniences it might have been attended with, nothing but a change in the Constitution itfelf could have removed them j whereas, as it is now, if any mode eftablilhed by Congrefs is found inconvenient, it can eafily be altered by a fingle act of legifiation. Let any gentleman confider the difficulties in which the Convention was placed. An uni- on was abfolutely neceflary. Every thing could be agreed upon except the regulation of the trial by jury in civil cafes. They were all anxious to eftabliffi it on the beft footing, but found they could fix upon no permanent rule that was not liable to great objections and difficulties. If they could not agree among themfelves, they had ftill lefs reafon to believe that all the ftates would have unanimouf- ly agreed to anv one plan that could be propofed. They therefore thought it better to leave all fuch regulations to the Legiilature itfelf, conceiving there could be no real danger in this cafe from a body compofed of our own Re- prefentatives, who could have no temptation to undermine this excellent mode of trial in civil cafes, and who would have indeed a perfonal intereft in common with others, in making the adminiftratioa of juftice between man anc^ man fecure and eafy. In criminal cafes, however, no la- titude ought to be allowed. In thefe the greateft danger from any government fubfifts, and accordingly it is pro- vided, that there (hall be a trial by jury in all fuch cafes in the ftate wherein the offence is committed. I thought the objection again ft the want of a bill of rights had been ob- viated unanfwerably. It appears to me moft extraordina- ry. Shall we give up any thing but what is positively granted by that inftrument ? It would be the greateft ab- surdity for any man to pretend, that when a Legiilature is formed for a particular purpofe, it can have any authority but what is fo exprefsly given to it, any more than a man acting under a power of attorney could depart from the authority it conveyed to him, according to an inftance which I ftated when fpeaking on the fubject before. As for example — If I had three tracts of land, one in Orange, another in Cafwell, and another in Chatham, and I gave a power of attorney to a man to fell the two tracts in O- range and Cafwell, and he mould attempt to fell my land m Chatham; would any man of common fenfe fuppofe he had { «9* ) jh^d authority to do fo ? In like manner, I {ay, the future Congrefs can have no right to exercife any power but what is contained in that paper. Negative words, in my opini- on, could make the matter no plainer than it was before* The gentleman fays that unalienable rights ought not to be given up. Thofe rights which are unalienable are not alienated. They ftill remain with the great body of the people. If any right be given up that ought not to be, let it be fhewn. Say it is a thing which affecls your coun- try, and that it ought not to be furrendered— this would be reafonable. But When it is evident that the exercife of any power not given up would be an ufurpation, it would be not only ufelefs but dangerous to enumerate a number of rights which are not intended to be given up; becaufe it would be implying in the ftrongeft manner, that every right not included in the exception might be impaired by the government without ufurpation, and it would be rim* poflible to enumerate every one. Let any one make what collection or enumeration of rights he pleafes, I will im- mediately mention twenty or thirty more rights not con- tained in it. v . Mr B/oodwortb—Mv. Chairman, 1 have liftened with attention to the gentleman's arguments, but, whether it be for want of fuihcient attention, or from the groiTnefs of mv ideas, I cannot be fatisfied with his defence of the omiflion with refpecl to the trial by jury. He fays that it would be impoflible to fall on any fatisfa&ory mode of re- gulating the trial by jury, becaufe there are various cus- toms relative to it in the different dates. Is this a fatif- fa&ory caufe for the omifhon ? Why did it not provide that the trial by jury mould be preferved in civil cafes ? It has faid that the trial mould be by jury in criminal cafes, and yet this trial is different in it* manner in criminal cafes in the different ftates. If it has been poflible to fecure it in criminal cafes, notwithstanding the diverfity con- cerning it, why has it not been poflible to fecure it in civil cafes ? I wifh this to be cleared up. By its not being provided for, it is exprefsly provided againft. I ftill fee the necf ffity of a bill of rights. Gentlemen ufe contra- dictory arguments on this fubje&, if I recollect right* Without the moft exprefs reftri&ions, Congrefs may tram- ple on your rights. Every poflible precaution ftiould be taken { m ) taken when we grant powers. P.ulers are always difpofed to abufe them. I beg leave to call gentlemens re collection to what happened uflder our Confederation. By it nine ftates are required to make a treaty, yet feven dates faid that they couid, with propriety, repeal part of the inflruc- tions givsn our fecretary for foreign affairs, which pro- hibited him from making a treaty to give up the Mifiifippi to Spain, by which repeal the reft of his inftructions en- abled him to make fuch treaty : Seven ftates actually did repeal the prohibitory part of thefe inilructions, and they infifted it was legal and proper. This was in fact a vio- lation of the Confederation. If gentlemen thus put what conftruction they pleafe upon words, how (hall we be re- drefTed if Congrefs (hall fay that all that is not exprefled is given up, and they aflume a power which is exprefsly inconfiilent with the rights of mankind. Where is the power to pretend to deny its legality ? This has occurred to me, and I wifh it to be explained. Mr. Spencer — 'Mr. Chairman, The gentleman exprefies admiration as to what we object with refpedt to a bill o£ rights, and infills that what is not given up in the Con- ftitution, is retained. He mult recollect I faid yefterday, that we could not guard with too much care, thofe effen- tial rjghts and liberties which ought never to be given up. There is no exprefs negative — no fence againft their being trampled upon. They might exceed the proper boundary without being taken notice of. When there is no rule but a vague doctrine, they might make great ftrides and get into poffeffion of fo much power, that a general infurrec- tion of the people would be neceltary to bring an alter- ation about. But if a boundary were fet up, when th© boundary is paffed, the people would take notice of it immediately. Thefe .are the obfervations which I made, and I have no doubt that when he coolly reflects, he will acknowledge the neceflity of it. I acknowledge, however, that the doctrine is right. But if that Conftitution is not fatisfactory to the people, I would have a bill of rights, or fomething of that kind, to fatisfy them. Mr. Locke — Mr. Chairman, I wifli to throw fome parti- cular light upon the fubject according to my conceptions. I think the Conftitution neither iafe nor beneficial, as it grants powers unbounded, without; reftrictions. One B b gentfemaa C m > gentleman has faid, that it was neceflary to give cogni- zance of caufes to the Federal Court, becaufe there was partiality in the Judges of the dates ; that the ftate Judges could not be depended upon in caufes arifing under the. Gonftitution and laws of the union. I agree that impar- tiality in Judges is indifpenfable. But I think this altera- tion will not produce more impartiality than there is now in our courts, whatever evils it may bring forth. Mult there not be Judges in the Federal Courts — and thofe Judges taken from fome of the ftates ? The fame partiality therefore may be in them. For my part 1 think it dero- gatory to the honour of this ftate to give this Jurifdi&ior* to the Federal Courts. It muft be fuppofed that the fame paflions, difpofitions, and failings of humanity which at- tend the ftate Judges, will be equally the lot of the Fede- ral Judges. To juftify giving this cognizance to thofe courts, it muft be fuppofed that all juftice and equity are given up at once in the ftares. Such reafoning is very ft/range to me.. I fear greatly for this ftate and other ftates. I find there has a confiderable ftrefs been laid upon the. injuftice of laws made heretofore. Great reflections are thrown on South-Carolina for paffing pine-barren and in» Jtalmetit laws, and on this ftate for making paper money^ I wilh thofe gentlemen who made thofe obfervations, would confider the neceflity which compelled us in a great mea- fure to make fuch money. I never thought the law which authorifed it, a good law. If the evil could have been avoided, it would have been a very bad jaw. But ne- ceflity, Sir, juftified it in fome degree. I believe I have gained as little by it as any in this houfe. If we are to Judge of the future by what we have feen, we fhall find as much or more injuftice in Congrefs than in our Legiflature. Neceflity compelled them to pafs the law in order to fave vaft numbers of people from ruin. I hope to be excufed in obferving, that it would have been hard for our late continental army to law down their arms, with which they had valiantly and fuccefsfully fought for their country, without receiving or being promifed and affiired of fome compenfation for their paft fervices. What a fi- tuation would this country have been in, if they had had the power over the purfe and/word ? If they had had the. powers given up by this Conftitution, what a wretched fituatioa ^situation would this country have been in ? Congrefs waf iinable to pay them, but paiTed many refolutions and law* in their favour, particularly one, that each (late fhould inake up the depreciation of the pay of the continental line, who were diftrefled for the want of an adequate compensation for 'their fervices. This ftate could' not pay her proportion in fpecie. To have laid a tax for that pur- pofe, would have been oppreflive. What was to be done I The only expedient was to paut this incurred much expence. This fubjecl: has for rnany years embroiled the ftate. But the fituation of the Country is fuch, and the diftrefles of the people fo great, that the public meafures muft be' accommodated to their circumftances with peculiar delicacy and caution, or ano- ther infurrection may be the confequen^el As to what the gentleman faid of the trial by jury— it furprifes me imuch to hear gen tie men of fuch great abilities, fpeak fucH. Slanguage. It is clearly infecure, nor can ingenuity and fubtle arguments prove the contrary. I truft this country is toofenfible of the value of liberty, and her citizens have bought it too dearly to give it up haftily. Mr. Iredell— Mr. Chairman, I hope that fome other gentleman will anfwer what has been faid by the gentle- men who have fpoken laft. I only rife to anfwer the queilion of the MermSer from New-Hanover, which was; If there was fuch a difficulty in eftabliihing the trial by jury in civil cafes, that the Convention could not concur in any mode, why the difficulty did not extend to criminal cafes ? J beg leave to fay r that the difficul- ty in this cafe does not depend fo much on the mode o£ proceeding, as on the difference of the fubjeds of contro- Verfy, and the laws relative to them. In fome ftates there are no juries in admiralty and equity cafes. In other ftates there are juries in fuch cafes. In fome ftates there are no ctiftinft courts of equity, though in moft ftates there are. II believe, that if an uniform rule had been fixed by the Conftitution, it would have tfifpleafed fome ftates fo fat that ; ( i0 ) that they would have rejected the Conflitution altogether. Had it been declared generally, as the gentleman menti- oned, it would have included equity and maritime cafes, and created a neceflity of deciding them in a manner dif- ferent from' that in which they have been decided hereto- fore in many of the flates ; which would very probably have met with the difapprobation of thofe dates. We have been told, and I believe this was the real reafon why they could not concur in any general rule. I have great refpeil for the characters of thofe gentlemen who formed the Convention, and I believe they were not capable of overlooking the importance of the trial by jury, much lefs of defignedly plotting againfl it. But I fully believe that the real difficulty of the thing was the caufe of the omif- fion. I truft fufficient reafons have been offered, to (hew that it is in no danger. As to criminal cafes, I mult ob- ferve, that the great inftrument of arbitrary power is cri- minal profecutions. B^ the privilege of the habeas corpus no man can be confined without enquiry, and if it fhould appear he has «been Committed contrary to law, he rauft be discharged. That diverfity which is to be found in ci- vil controverfies, does not fubfifl in criminal cafes. That diverfity which contributes to the fecurity of property in civil cafes, would have pernicious effects in criminal ones. There is no other fafe mode to try thefe but by a jury. If any man had the means of trying another his own way ; or were it left to the controul of arbitrary Judges, no man ■would have that fecurity for Hfe and liberty which every freeman ought to have. I prefume that in no ftate on the continent is a man tried on a criminal accufation but by a jury. It was neceflary therefore that it fhould be fixed in the Conflitution, that the trial fhould be by jury in cri- minal cafes, and fuch difficulties did not occur in this a? in the other cafe. The worthy gentleman fays, that by not be- ing provided for in civil cafes it is exprefsly provided againfl, and that what is not expreffed is given up. Were it fo, :no man would be more againfl this Conflitution than my- felf. I fhould deteft and oppofe it as much as any man. But, Sir, this cannot be the cafe. I beg leave to fay that that conflru£lion appears to me abfurd and unnatural. As jt could not be fixed either on the principles of uniformi- ty or diverfity, it mufl be left to Congrefs to modify it. ( '97 ) If they eftablifh it in any manner by law, and find it in- convenient, they can alter it. But I am convinced that a majority of the Representatives of the people, will never attempt to eftablift a mode opprefhve to their conftituents* as it will be their own intereft to take care of this right. But it is obferved that there ought to be a fence provided againft future encroachments of power. If there be not fuch a fence it is a caufe of objection. I readily agree there ought to be fuch a fence. The inftrument ought to contain fuch a definition of authority as would leave no doubt, and if there be any ambiguitv it ought not to be admitted. He fays this conftruction is not agreeable to the people, though he acknowledges it is a right one. Ira my opinion there is no man of any reafon at all, but muft be Satisfied with fo clear and plain a definition. If the Con- grefs mould claim any power not given them, it would be as- bare an ufurpation as making a King in America. If thi& Conftitution be adopted, it muft be prefumed the inftru- ment will be in the hands of every man in America, to fee whether authority be ufurped ; and any perfon by infpe£t- ing it may fee if the power claimed be enumerated. If it. be not, he will know it to be an ufurpation. Mr. Maclaine-~Mr. Chairman, A gentlemen lately up* [Mr. Locke] has informed us of his doubts and fears re- fpecling the Federal Courts. Me is afraid for this flat® and other ftates. He fuppofes that the idea of giving cog- nizance of the laws of the union to Federal Courts, muft have arifen from fufpicions of partiality and want of com- mon integrity in our ftate Judges. The worthy gentle- man is miftaken in his conftru&ion of what I faid. I did not perfonally reflect on the members of our ftate judicia- ry. Nor did I impute the impropriety of veiling the ftate judiciaries with exelufive jurifdi£Hon over the laws of the union, and cafes arifing under the Conftitutior*, to any want of probity in the Judges. But if they be Judges of the local or ftate laws, and receive emoluments for a£lin£ in that capacity, they will be improper perfons-.to judge of the laws of the union. A federal Judge ought to be fole- ly governed by the laws of the United States, and receive his falary from the treafury of the United States. It is impoffible for any Judges, receiving pay from a fingle ftate, to be impartial in cafes where the local laws or inter* Sfttf i $f ) tils of that ft ate clafh with the laws of the union, or the general interefts of America. We have inftances here which prove this partiality in fuch cafes. It is alfo fo in other ftates. The gentleman has thrown out fomething very uncommon. He likens the powers given by this Con- ilitution to giving the late army the purfe and the (word. I am rhuch aftonifhed that fuch an idea ihould be thrown out by that gentlemen, becaufe his refpecl ability is well known. If he confiders but a moment, he muft fee that his obfervation is bad, and that the comparifon is extreme- ly abfurd and improper. The purfe and the fword muft be given to every government. The fword is given to the Executive Magiftra'te'; but the purfe remains by this Con- stitution in the Reprefentatives of the people. We know very well that they cannot raife one milling but by the confent of the Reprefentatives of the people. Money bills do not even originate in the Senate; they originate folelyiri the other houfe. Every appropriation muft be by law. We know therefore that no Executive Magiftrate or officer, can appropriate a fhilling but as he is authorifed by law. With refpecT: to paper motley, the gentleman has acted and fpoken with great candour. He* was againft paper money front the firft emiffion. There was no other way tofatisfy the late army but by paper money, there be- ing not a fhilling of fpecie in the ftate. There were other modes adopted by other ftates, which did not produce fuch inconveniences. There was however a considerable ma- jority of that Aflembly who adopted the idea, that not one fhilling more, paper money, fhould be made, becaufe of the evil confequences that muft neceflarily follow. The experience of this country for many years has proved that fuch emiffions involve us in debts and diftrefTes, deftroy bur credit and produce no good confequence ; yet contra- ry to all good policy the evil was repeated. With refpecl: to our public fecurity and paper money, the apprehehfions of gentlemen are groundlefs. I believe this Conftitufion cannot affect them at all. In the 10th fe&ion of the firft article, it is provided among other re- ftri&ions, " that no ftate (hall emit bills of credit, make •• any thing but gold or filver.coin a tender inpayment of ** debts, or pafs any law impairing the obligation of 'con- I I tra&s." Now, Sir, this has no retrofpe&ive view. It looks C *99 ) Ipoks to futurity. — It is conceiyed by many people, that the moment this new Conftitution is adopted, our prefent paper money will fink to nothing, for my part, I believe $hat inftead of finking it will appreciate. If we adopt, it will rife in value, fo that twenty {hillings of it will be equal to two Spanifh milled dollars and an half* Paper money is as good as gold and filver where there are proper funds to redeem it, and no danger of its being encreafed* Before the late war our paper money fluctuated in .value. Thirty- fix years ago, when I came into the country, our paper money was at feven {hillings id the dollar. A few/ years before the late War, the merchants of Great-Britairi remonftrated to the Miniftry of that country, that they loft much of their debts by paper money lofing its value. This caufed an order to be made through aJl the dates not to pafs any money bilLs whatever. The effect of this wasi that our money appreciated. At the commencement o£ the war, our paper money in circulation was equal to gold or filver. But it is faid that on adoption, all debts con- tracted heretofore, muft then be paid in gold or filver coin. I believe that if any gentleman .will attend to the claufe above recited, he will find^that it has no retrofpec- tive but a profpective view. It does not look back but forward. It does not deftroy the paper money which is now actually made, but prevents us from making any more. This is much in our favour, becaufe we may pay in thq money we contracted for (or fuch as is ecjual in value to> it) and the very reftri£Uoh againft an increafe of it will add to its value. It is in the power of the Legiflature to c.ftablifh a fcale of depreciation to fix the value of it ; There is nothing againft this in the Conftitution ; on the contrary it favours it. I fhould be much injured if it was really to be the cafe that the paper money fhould fink. 4-fter the Conftitution was adopted, I fhould think my- felf, as a holder of our paper money, pofTefted of conti- nental fecurity. . I am convinced our money will be good: money, and if I was to fpeculate in any thing, I would, in paper money, though I never did fpeculate. I fhould l?e fatisfied that I fhould make a profit. Why fay that the ftate fecurity will be paid in gold and filver after all thefe things arc confidered ? Every real, actual debt of the ftate* , ( 400 > ftate, ought to be discharged in real, and not nominal value, whether the Conftitution be adopted or not. Mr. Baft took a general view of the original and appel- late jurifdi&ion of the Federal Court. He confidered the Conftitution neither necefTary nor proper. He declared that the lail part of the firft paragraph of the fecond Sec- tion, appeared to him totally inexplicable. He feared that dreadful oppreffion would be committed by carrying peo- ple too great a diftance to decide trivial caufes. He ob- served that gentlemen of the law and men of learning did not concur in the explanation or meaning of this Confti- tution. For his part, he Said, he could not underftand it, although he took great pains to find out its meaning, and although he flattered him Self with the pofleffion of com- mon fenfe and reafon. He always thought that there ought to be a compact between the governors and governed ; Some called this a compact, others faid it was not. From the contrariety of opinions, he thought the thing was ei- ther uncommonly difficult, or absolutely unintelligible. He wifhed to reflect on no gentleman, and apologized for his ignorance, by obferving that he never went to School, and had been born blind j but he wifhed for information, and fuppofed that every gentleman would confider his defire as laudable. Mr- Maclaine firft, and then Mr. Iredell, endeavoured to Satisfy the gentleman by a particular explanation of the whole paragraph. It was obferved, that if there lhould be a controversy between this ft ate and the I£ing,s of France or Spain, it muft be decided in the Federal Court. Or if there fhould arife a controverSy between the French King or any other foreign power, or one of their Subjects or citfc- aens,and one of our citizens, it muft be decided there alfo* The diftinction between the words citizen an&fubjecJ was ex- plained — that the former related to individuals of popular governments ; the latter to thofe of monarchies. As for in- ftance, a difpute between this ftate or a citizen of it, and a perfonjin Holland. The word foreign citizen would proper- ly refer to Such perfon. If the difpute was between this ftate and a perfon in France or Spain, the word foreign Subject would apply to this — and all fuch controverfies might be de- cided in the Federal Court — That the words citizens or fuh- jecls in that part of the claufe, could only apply to foreign sitizctw ( ioi ) citizens or foreign fubjeBs, and another part of the Conftitu> tion made this plain, by confining difputes in general be* tween citizens of the fame ftate, to the fingle cafe o£ their claiming lands under grants of different ftates. The laft claufe of the fecond feclion under confidera- tion. Mr. Madame — Mr. Chairman, An objection was made yefterday by a gentleman againft this claufe, becaufe it confined the trial to the ftate ; and he obferved, that a per- fon oh the Miffifippi might be tried in Edenton. Gentle- men ought to confider that it was impoflible for the Con- vention, when devifing a general rule for all the ftates, to defcend to particular diftritla. The trial byjury is fecur- cd generally, by providing that the trial mall be in the ftate where the crime was committed. It is left to Congrefs to make fuch regulations by law, as will fuit the circumftan- ces of each itate. It would have been impolitic to fix the mode of proceeding, becaufe it would alter the prefent , mode of proceeding in fuch cafes, in this ftate or in feve* ral others. For there is fuch a diilimilarity in the proceed- ings of different ftates, that it would be impoflible to make a general law which would be fatisfa&ory to the whole. But as the trial is to be in the ftate, there is no doubt bu£ Jt will be in the ufual and common mode pradtifed in the ftate. Third fe£tion read without any obfervation. Article fourth. The firft fe£Hon, and two firft claufes ©f the fecond fe£Uon, read without any obfervation. The laft claufe read. Mr. Iredell t begged leave to explain the reafon of this claufe. In fome of the northern ftates they have emanci- pated all their Haves. If any of our Haves, faid he, go there and remain there a certain time, they would by the prefent laws, be entitled to their freedom •» fo that their mafters could not get them again. This would be extremely pre- judicial to the inhabitants of the fouthern ftates, and to prevent it, this claufe is inferted in the Conftitution — Though the word Jlave be not mentioned, this is the mean- ing of it. The northern Delegates, owing to their parti- cular fcruples on the fubjecl: of llavery, did not choofe the word Jlave to be mentioned. The reft q£ the fourth article read without any obferva* fi9D» Q € Artick ( iot ) Article fifth. Mr. Iredell— Wit. Chairman, This is a very important claufe. In every other conftitutiori of government that I have ever heard or read of, no provifion is made for neceffary amendments. The misfortune attending mod conftitutions which have been deliberately formed, has. been, that thofe who formed them thought their wif°* dom equal to all poflible contingencies, and that there could be no error in what they did. The gentlemen who framed this Coriftitution thought with much more diffidence of their own capacities ; and undoubtedly with- out a provrfion for amendment it would have been more juftly liable to objection, and the characters of its fra- mers would have appeared much lefs meritorious. TlnY indeed is one of the greateft beauties of the fyftem, and fhould ftrcngly recommend it to every candid mind. The Conftitution pf anjr government which can not be regu- larly amended when its defects are experienced reduces this people to this dilemma — they muft either fubmit to its op- preffions, or bring about amendments more or lefs by a civil war. Happy this, the country we live in ! The Con-' ftitution before us, if it be adopted, can be altered with as much regularity and as little confufion, as any a£t of Aflembly — net indeed quite fo eafily, which would be extremely impolitic ; but if is a moft happy cifcumftanceV that there is a remedy in the fyftem itfelf for ks own fal-" libility, fo that alterations can without difficulty be made ag'reea&] ) e to the general - fenfe of the people. Let us attend to the manner in which amendments may be made:' The proportion for amendments may arife- from Con- grefs itfelf, when two-thirds of both Houfes fhall deem it neceffary. If they fhould not, aind yet amendments be generally wifhed for by the people, two-thirds of the Le-' giflatures of the different ftates may require a general Convention for the purpofe, in which cafe Congrefs are under the neceflity of convening one. Any amendments which either Congrefs fhall propofe, or which fhall be pro- pofed by fuch General Convention, are afterwards to be fubmitted to the Legiflatures of the different ftates, or Conventions called for that purpofe, as Congrefs fhall think proper j and upon the ratification of three-fourths of the $ates, wiU become a part of the Coaftitutioru By refer-' rin$ ( *°3 ) pfng this bufinefs to the Legiflatures, expencc would f*e fav^d ; and in general it may be prefumed, they would fpeik the genuine SenSe of the people. It may, however, on Some occafions, be better to confult an immediate dele^ gation for that Special purpofe. This is therefore left dis- cretionary. It is highly probable that amendments agreed to in' either of theSe methods, would be conducive to the public welfare, when So large a majority of the ftates con- sented to them. And in one of thefe modes, amendment* that are now wifhed for, may in a fhort time jbe made to ihis Constitution by the ftates adopting it. It is however to be obServed, that the firft and fourth claufes in the ninth Section of the firft article, are protect- ed from, any alteration till the year 1808, And in order ,that no confolidation fhould take place, it is provided, that no date mail, by any amendment or alteration, be ever deprived of an equal Suffrage in the $enate with- out its own conSent* The two firft prohibitions are with reSpecT: to the cenfus, according to which direel tax- es are impofed, and with reSpecl: to the importation o£ flaves. As to the firft, it muft be obferved, that there is a material difference between the northern and Southern, ftates. The northern ftates have been much longer fettled, and are much fuller of people lhan the Southern, but have not land in equal proportion nor Scarcely any flaves. The fubjeel: of this article was regulated with great difficulty, and by a Spirit of conceflion which it would not be pru- dent to difturb for a good many years. In twenty years there will probably be a great alteration, and then the Sub- ject may be reconfidered with leSs difficulty, and greater coolneSs. In the mean time the compromise was upon the beft footing that could be obtained. A compromifq likewiSe took place in regard to the importation of flaves. It is probable that all the members reprobated this inhu- man traffic, but thoSe of South-Carolina and Georgia would not confent to an immediate prohibition of it; onet s;eafon of which was, that during the laft war they loft * vaft number of negroes, which lofs they wifh to fupply. In the mean time it is left to the ftates to admit or prohi- bit the importation, and Congrefs may impofe a limited duty upon it, Bfr, { **4 ) Mr. Baft obferved, that it was plain, that the intlrocluc- tion of amendments depended altogether on Congrefs. Mr. Iredell replied, that it was very evident that it did Jiot depend on the will of Congrefs ; For that the Legifla* tures of three fourths of the dates were authorised to make application for calling a Convention to propofe amendments, and on fuch application, it is provided that Congrekjhall call fuch Convention, fo that they will have no option. Article ilxth. Firft claufe read without any obfervation. Second claufe read. Mr. Iredell — This claufe is fuppofed to give \po much power, when in fact it only provides for the execution of thofe powers which are already given in the foregoing ar- ticles. What does it fay ? That " this Constitution, and *< the laws of the United States which {hall be made in u purfuance thereof, and all treaties made or vhich (hall *< be made under the authority of the United States, fhall €f be the fupreme law of the land ; and the Judges in eve- «< ry Hate (hall be bound thereby, any thing in the confti* •* tution of laws of any Hate to the contrary notwithftand* « c ing." What is the meaning of this, but that as we have given power we will fupport the execution of it ? We fhould atl: like children to give power and deny the legality of exe- cuting it. It is faying no more than that when We adopt the government we will maintain and obey it ; in the fame manner as if the Conftitution of this {late had faid f that when a law is pafled in conformity to it we mult obey that lavv". Would this be objected to ? Then when the Congrefs paJTes a law confident with the Con- ftitution, it is to be binding on the people. If Congrefs under pretence of executing one power, fliould in facl; ufurp another, thev will violate the Conftitution. I pre- fume therefore that this explanation, which appears to me the plaineft in the world, will be entirely fatisfa&ory to the committee. Mr- Bloodnvorth ^-Mr. Chairman, I cortfefs his explana- tion is not fatisfa&ory to me — I wifh the gentleman had gone further. I readily agree, that it is giving them no more power than to execute their laws. But how far does this go ? It appears to me to fweep off all the Con- ftitutipns pf the {iates. It is a total repeal of every acT: and ( *®J ) a«d Conftitution of the dates. The Judges are fworft td Uphold it. It will produce an abolition of the itate govern- ments. Its fovereigaty abfolutelv annihilates them. Mr, Iredell — Mr. Chairman, Every power delegated td Congrefs, is to be executed by laws made for that purpofe. It is neceifary to particular fe the powers intended to be given in the Conftitution, as having no exigence before. But after having enumerated what we give up, it follows of courfe, that whatever is done by virtue of that autho- rity, is legal without any new authority or power. The queftion then under this claufe. will a' ways be— whether Congrefs has exceeded its authority ? If it has not exceed- sd it we muft obey, othtrwife not. This Conftitution when adopted will become a part of our ftate Conitii ution, and the latter muft yield to the former only in thofe cafes where power is given by it. It is not to yield to it in any other cafe whatever. For inftance v there is nothing in thtf Conftitution of this ftate eftabliming the authority of a Federal Court. Yet the Federal Court when eftablifhed, will be as constitutional as the Superior Court is now un- der our Conftitution.^-It appears to me merely a general claufe, the amount of which is, that when they pafs an a&, if it be in the execution of a power given by the Con* ftitution, it fhall be binding on the people, otherwife not» As to the fufficiency or extent of the power, that is ano<* ther confederation, and has been difcufled before. Mr. Bloodivorthy This claufe will be the deftru&ion o£ every law which will come in competition with the laws of the United State?. Thofe laws and regulations which have been or (hall be made in this ftate, muft be deftroyed by it if they come in competition with the powers of Con- grefs. Is it not neceflary to define the extent of its ope- ration ? Is not the force of our tender laws deftroyed by it ? The worthy gentleman from Wilmington has endea- voured to obviate the objection as to the Conftitution's de- ftroying the credit of our paper money and paying debts in coin, but unfatisfattorily to me. A man afTigns by le- gal fiction a bond to a man in another ftate — Could that bond be paid by money ? I know it is very eafy to be wrong. I am confeious of being frequently fo. I endea- vour t» be open to conviction. This claufe feems to m$ too ( tO$ ) r tsp general, and I think its extent ought to be limited an# if- , r ° uW fu PP° fe every rcafonable man would think fonae amendment to it was necefiary. ^ Mr. Machine— Mr. Chairman, That it will deftroy the ilate fovereignty is a Very popular argument. I beg leave to have the attention of the committee. Government is formed for the happinefs and prosperity of the people at iarge. The powers given it are for their own good. We iave found by feveral years experience, that government * a *j5 n . b ? lt ^ f nominally, without adequate power, is not luthciertt to promote their profperity. Sufficient powers muft be g,ven to it. The powers to be given the general government, are propofed to be withdrawn from the au- thority of the ftate governments, in order to proteft and iecure the anion at large. This propofal is made to the people. No man will deny their authority to delegate powers and recall them, in all free countries. But, fays the gentleman laft up, the conftruclion of the Mnititution is in the power of Congrefs, and it will de- - aJ r- f 0y ? rd $ nt y of the ft * te governments. It may be juftly faid, that it diminifhes the power of the ftate Legif- latoreg,- and the diminution is' necefiary to the fatetv and profperity of the people. But it may be fairly faid/ that the members of the general government, the Prefident, Senators and Reprefcntatives whom we fend thither by our tree fuffrasres to confult our common intereft, will not wiih to deftroy the ftate governments, becaufe the exiftence ot the general government will depend on that of the ftate .governments. But what is the fovereignty, and who is Congrefs? One branch— the people at 'large, and the other branch the ftates by their Reprefentativesi Do people fear the delegation of power to themfelves— to their own Re- prefentatives ? But he objefts, that the laws of the union are to be the fupreme laws of the land. Is it not proper that their laws mould be the law of the land, and para- mount to thofe of any particular ftate? Or is it proper that the laws of any particular ftate mould controul the Jaws of the United States? Shall a part controul the whole ? To permit the local laws of any ftate to controul the laws of the union, would be to give the general govern- ment no powers at all. If the Judges are not to be bound *>y *t, the powers of Congrefs will be nugatory. This is felf-evidejg; ( 2°7 - ) {elf-evident and plain. Bring it home to . every under-, ftanding ; it is fo clear it will force itfelf upon it. The worthy gentleman fays, in contradiction to what I have obferved, that the claufe which reftrains the ftates from emitting paper money, «§cc. will operate, upon the prefent circulating paper money, and that gold and filver muft pay paper contradict , Tlie claufe cannot poflibly have a retro- spective view. It cannot affect the exitting currency in any manner, except to enhance its value by the prohibition of future emiffions. It is contrary to the univerfalpiinn ciples of jurifprudence^, t that a law or Conftitution mould have a retrofpe&ive operation, unlefs it be exprefsly provided that it mail. Does he deny the power of th*. Le- giflature to fix a fcale of depreciation as a criterion to re- gulate cbntra&s made for depreciated money ? As to the queftion he has put of an afligned; bond, I anfwer that it jpan be paid with paper money. For this reafon — the af- fignee can be in no better fituation than the affignor. . I£ at be regularly transferred, it will appear what perfon had ithe bond originally, and the prefent pofleffbr can recoveP inothing but what the original holder of it could.. Another reafon which may be urged is, that the Federal Courts* could have no cognizance of fuch a fuit. Thofe courts have no jurifdi£lion in cafes of debt between the citizens Qf the fame ftate.^ The afftgnor being a citizen of the fame ftate with the debtor, and afiigning it to a citizen of another ftate to avofd the intent of the Conftitution, the affignee can derive no advantage from the aflignment, ex- cept what the affignOr had a right to, and consequently the gentleman's objection falls to the ground. t , • Every gentleman muft fee the neceffity for the laws of the union to be paramount to thofe of the feparate ftates ;' and that the powers given by this Conftitution muft be ex- ecuted. What, (hall we ratify a government and then fay it ftiall not operate ? This would be the fame as not to ratify. As to amendments^ the be ft characters in the coun- try, and thofe whom fmoft highly efteem, wifti for amend r tments. Some parts of it are not organized to my wifti. But I apprehend no danger from the ftructure of the go- vernment. One gentleman [Mr. Bafs] faid he thought it neither neceflary nor proper. For my part, I think it ef- Jential to our very exiitexice as a nationy and our happinef§ ( 26* ) and profperity as a free people. The men who compofed jt were men of great abilities and various minds. They carried their knowledge with {hem, It is the refult, not only of great wifdom and mutual refle&ion, but of " mu- «< tual deference and concefliom** It has trifling faults, but they are not dangerous. Yet at the fame time I de- clare, that if gentlemen propofe amendments, if they be not fuch as would deftroy the government entirely, there Is not a fingle Member here more willing to agree to them than myfelf Mr. Davie^Mr. Chairman, Permit me, Sir, to make a few obfervations on the operation of the claufe fo often mentioned, This Conftitution, as to the powers therein granted, is conftantly to be the fupreme law of the land. $£very power ceded by it muft be executed, without being counteracted by the laws or Conititutions of the individual ftates. Gentlemen fhould diftinguiih that it is not to be the fupreme law in the exercife of a power not granted. It can be fupreme only in cafes confiftent with the power© fffecifically granted, and not in usurpations. If you grant any power to the federal government, the laws made inj pu*uance of that power, muft be fupreme and uncon- trouled in their operation. This confequence is involved in the very nature and neceflity^ of the thing. The only rational enquiry is, whether thofe powers are neceffary, and whether they are properly granted. To fay that you have vefted the federal government with power to legiflate for the union, andjhen deny the fupremacy o the laws, is a folccifm in terms. With refpecl: to its operation on our own paper money, I believe that a little confideration will fatisfy every man that it cannot have the effe£t affert- ed by the gentleman from New-Hanover. The Federal Convention knew that feveral (bates had large fums of pam- per money in circulation, and that it was an interefting property, and they were fenfible that thofe ftates would never content to its immediate deftruclion, or ratify any fyftem that would have that operation. The mifchief al- ready done could not be repaired •, all that could be done was to form fome limitation to this great political evik As the paper money had become private property, and th© pbje^ of numberlefs contracts, it could not be deftroye<# $r intermeddled witfc ia that fituatioa* although its banc* t S09 ) fill tendency was obvious and undeniable ; it was, however, effecting an important object to put bounds to this grow* ing mifchief. If the ilates had been compelled to fink the paper money inftantly, the remedy might have been worfe than the difeafe. As we could not put an immedi- ate end to it, we were content with prohibiting its future i increafe, looking forward to its entire extinguifhment when, 1 the ftates that had an emiflion circulating, ihould be able to call it in by a gradual redemption. In Pennfylvania, their paper money was not a tender in difcharge of private con- tracts ; in South-Carolina their bills became eventually a tender ; and in RhodeTfland, New-York, New-Jerfey, and North-Carolina the paper money was made a legal tender in all cafes whatfoever. The other dates were fen- (ible that the dedrucYion of the circulating paper, would be a violation of the rights of private property, and that fuch a meafure would render the acceflion of thofe dates to the fydem abfolutely impracticable. The injudice and pernicious tendency of this difgraceful policy were viewed with great indignation by the dates which adhered to the principles of judice. In Rhode-Iiland the paper money had depreciated to eight for one, and a hundred per cent, with us. The people of Maffachufetts and Connecticut had been great fufferers by the difhonedy of Rhode-Ifland, and (imilar complaints exided againd this date. This claufe, becaufe in fome meafure a preliminary with the ^a* gentlemen who reprefented the other dates, " Youhave/fgff (aid they, " by your iniquitous laws and paper emiflions^r i fhamefully defrauded our citizens. The Confederation " prevented our compelling you to do them judice, but " before we confederate with you again, you mud not ** only agree to be honed, but put it out of your power « to be otherwife." Sir, a Member from Rhode-Ifland itfelf, could not have fet his face againd fuch language. The claufe was, I believe, unanimoufly atTented to ; it has only a future afpe£t, and can by no means have a re- trofpe£Uve operation. And I trud the principles upon which the Convention proceeded, will meet the approba-* tion of every honed man. ^ Mr. Cabarrus — Mr. Chairman, I contend that the claufe which prohibits the dates from emitting bills of credit, will not affett our prefent paper money. The claufe has ( 2i6 ) iao retrofpe£Hve view. This Conftitution declares in the molt pofitive terms, that no ex pojl fafto law (hall be paffed by the general government. Were this claufe to operate yetrofpe&ively, it would clearly be ex poft fa5lo % and re- pugnant to the exprefs provision of the Conftitution. How* then in the name of God, can the Conftitution take our paper money away ? If we have contracted for a fum of money we ought to pay according to the nature of our contract: . Every honeft man will pay in fpecie who engag- ed to pay it. But if we have contracted for a fum of paper money, it muft be clear to every man in this committee* that we fliall pay in paper money. This is a Conftitution for the future government of the United States. It does not look back. Every gentleman muft be fatisfied on the lead reflection, that our paper money will not be deftroy- td. To fay that it will be deftroyed, is a popular argu- ment, but not founded in fact in my opinion. I had my doubts, but on confideration I am fatisfied. Mr. Bloodworth —Mr. Chairman, I beg leave to afk, if the payment of fums now due be expojt fafto ? Will it be an ex poftfaBo law, to compel the payment of money now due in filver coin ? If fuit be brought in the Federal Court againft one of our citizens for a fum of money, will paper money be received to fatisfy the judgment ? I enquire for information — ray mind is not yet fatisfied. It has been faid that we are to fend our own gentlemen to reprefent us, and that there is not the leaft doubt they will puf that con* ftrutlion on it which will be moft agreeable to the peo- ple they reprefent. But it behoves us to cotifider, whether they can do fo if they would when they mix with the bo- dy of Congrefs. The northern fta'tes are much more po- pulous than the fouthern ones. To the north of the Suf- quehannah there are thirty-fix Representatives, and to the fouth of it only twenty-nine ; they will always out-vote us. Sir, we ought to be particular in adopting a Confti- tution which may deftroy our currency, when it is to be the fupreme law of the land, and prohibits the emifliori of paper money. I am not, for my own part, for giving an indefinite power. Gentlemen of the bed abilities dif* fer in the conftru&ion of the Conftitution. The Mem* bers of Congrefs will differ too. Human nature is fallible. . 1 am not for throwing ourfelves out of the union. Buc ( 21* ) we ought to be cautious by propofing amendments. Th#. majority in feveral great adopting ftates was very trifling,. Several of them have propofed amendments, but not in the mode moft fatisfa&ory to my mind. I hope this Convene tion never will adopt it till the amendments are a&ually obtained. Mr. Iredell — Mr. Chairman, With refpe& to this claufe, it cannot have the operation contended for. There is no- thing in the Conftitution which afFecls our prefent paper money. It prohibits for the future the emitting of any» but it does not interfere with the paper money no^v actu- ally in circulation in feveral ftates. There is an exprefs claufe which protects it. It provides that there fhall be no fx poji fatlo law. This would be expoft faBo^ if the construc- tion contended for were right, as has been obferved by ano- ther gentleman. If a fuit were brought againft a man in) the Federal Court, and execution (hould go againft hi$ property, I apprehend, he would, under this Conftitution| have a right to pay our paper money, there being nothing in the Conftitution taking away the validity of it. Every individual in the United States, will keep his eye watch- fully over thofe who adminifter the general government and no ijfurpation of power will be acquiefced in. The pof- fibility of ufurping powers ought not to be objected againft it. Abufe may happen in any government. The only refource againft ufarpation, is the inherent right of the people to prevent its exercife. This is the cafe in all free governments in the world. The people will refill if the government ufurp powers not delegated to it. We muft jrun the rifle of abufe. We muft take care to give no more power than is necelTary, but having given that we muft fubmit to the poflible dangers arifing from it. With re- fpeQ: to the great weight of the northern ftates, it will not, on a candid examination, appear fo great as the gen- tleman fuppofes. At prefent the regulation of our repre- sentation is merely temporary. Whether greater or lefs it ■will hereafter depend on a£tual population. The extent of this ftate is very great, almoft equal to that of any ftate in the union. And our population will probably be in proportion. To the north of Pennfylvania there are twen- ty-feven votes. To the fouth of Pennfylvania there are thirty votes, leaving Pennfylvania out. Pennfylvania has eight ( 212 ) tight votes. Tn the divifion of what is called the norther* and fouthern interefts, Pennfylvania does not appear to be' .decidedly in either fcale. Though there may be a com- bination of the northern ftates, it is not certain that the intereft of Pennfylvania will coincide with theirs. If at any time fhe join us, we (hall have thirty-eight againft twenty-feven. Should (he be againft us, they will have only thirty-five to thirty. There are two ftates to the northward who have, in fome refpe£l, a fimilarity of in- terefts with ourfelves. What is the fituation of New- Jerfey ? It is in one refpeft Hmilar to ours. Moft of the goods which they ufe come through New-York, and they pay for the benefit of New- York, as we pay for that of Virginia. It is fo with Connecticut, fo that in every queftion between importing and non-importing ftates, we may expecl that two of the northern ftates would proba- bly join with North-Carolina. It is impoffible, perhaps, to deftroy altogether this idea of feparate interefts. But the difference between the ftates does not appear to me fo great as the gentleman imagines ; and I beg leave to fay, that in proportion to the increafe of population, the fouth- ern ftates will have greater weight than the northern, as they have fuchJarge quantities of land ftill uncultivated, which is not fo much the cafe to the north. If we fhould fufFer a frhall temporary inconvenience, we ftiall be com- penfated for it by having the weight of population in out favour in future. Mr. Bloodivorth—Mt. Chairman, When I was in Con- grefs, the fouthern and northern interefts divided at Su£- quehanna. I believe it is fo now. The advantage to be gained by future population is^no argument at all. Do we gain any thing when the other ftates have an equality of Members i» the Senate, notwithstanding the increafe of Members in the Houfe of Representatives ? This is no> confequence at all. I am forrv to mention it, but I cart produce an ihftance which will prove the facility of mif- conftruclion. [Here Mr. Bloodivorth cited an inftance which took place in Congrefs with refpecl to the Indian trade, which not having been diftinelly heard is omitted.} They mav trample on the rights of the people of North- Cirolina if there be not fufficient guards and checks. I ©uly mentioned this to fhew that there may be mifconftruc- tionsj ( **3 ) flons, and that in fo important a cafe as a Confutation, every thing ought to be clear and intelligible, and no ground left for difputes. Mr. Caldwell — Mr. Chairman, It is very evident that there is a great neceflity for perfpicuity. In the fweeping elaufe there are words which are not plain and evident. It fays, that " this Constitution and the laws of the Unit* * c ed States which {hall be made in purfuance thereof, &c. ** mail be the fupreme law of the land/' The word pur* fuanee is equivocal and ambiguous ; a plainer word woul4 be better. They may purfue bad as well as ^ood meafures, and therefore the word is improper — it authorifes bad mea- fures. Another thing is remarkable, that gentlemen as an anfwer to every improper part of it, tell us that every thing is to be done by our own Reprefentatives, who are to be good men. There is no fecurity that they will be Co, or continue to be fo. Should they be virtuous when elected, the laws of Congrefs will be unalterable. Thefe laws nusft be annihilated by the fame body which made them. It appears to me that the laws which they make, cannot be altered without calling a Convention. [Mr. Caldwell added fome reafons far this opini©n # but fpoke too low to be heard.] 'Governor Johnfton — Mr Chairman, I knew that manv gentlemen in this Convention were not perfectly fatisfied tuc ( ?I4 ) fue of their conftitutional authority, it will be an a8uai Jaw. I do not know a more expreflive or a better way of reprefenting the idea by words. Every law confident with the Conftitution, will have been made in purfuance of the powers granted by it. Every ufurpation or law repugnant to it, cannot have been made in purfuance of its powers^ The lattter will be nugatory and void. I am at a lofs to know what he means, by faying the laws of the union will he unalterable. Are laws as immutable as Conftitutions ? Can any thing be more abfurd than aflimiiating the one to the other ? The idea is not warranted by the Conftitution, nor confluent with reafon. Mr. J. M'Dotvall wifhed to know how the taxes are to be paid which Congrefs were to lay in this (late. He afkecr if paper money would difcharge them. He calcu- lated that the taxes would be higher, and did not know how they could be difcharged. For fays he, every man is to pay fo much more, and the poor man has not the money locked up in his cheft. He was of opinion that our laws could be repealed entirely by thofe of Congrefs. Mr, Maciaine — Mr. Chairman, Taxes mud be paid in gold or filver coin, and not in imaginary money. As to the fubjecT: of taxation, it has been the opinion of many intelligent men that there will be no taxes laid immediate? ly, or if any, that they will be very inconfiderable. There will be rto occafion for it, as proper regulations will raife very large funis of money. We know that Congrefs will have fufficient power to make fuch regulations. The mo- ment that the Conftitution is eftabliftied, Congrefs will have credit with foreign nations. Our fituation being known they can borrow any fum. It will be better for them to raife any money they want at prefent by borrow- ing than by taxation. It is well known that in this coun- try gold and filver vanifh when paper money is made. When w r e adopt, if ever, gold and filver will again appear in circulation. People will let their hard money go, ber caufe they know that paper money cannot repay it. After the war we had more money in gold and filver in circular tion, than we have nominal paper money now. Suppofe Congrefs wifhed to raife a million of money more than the |mpofts : Suppofe they borrow it. They can eafily borrow |t in Europe at four per cent. The intereft of that fum will ( 215 ) will be but 40,000!. So that the people inftead of having the whole i,ooo,oool. to pay, will have but 40,0001. to pay, which will hardly be felt. The proportion of 40,0001. for this ftate, would be a trifle. In feven years time the people would be able, by only being obliged to pay the in- terelt annually, to fave money, and pay the whole principal perhaps afterwards without much difficulty. Gongrefs will not lay a firtgle tax when it is not to the advantage of the people at large. The weftern lands will alfo be a confiderable fund. The fale of them will aid the revenue greatly, and we have reafon to believe the import will be productive. Mr. J. M^Dowall—Mx. Chaimian, Inftead of reasons and authorities to convince me, aflertions are made. Many refpeclable gentlemen are fatisfied that the taxes will be higher. By what authority does the gentleman fay that the impoft will be productive, when our trade is come to nothing ? Sir, borrowing money is detrimental and ruin- ous to nations. The intereft is loft money. We have been 6bliged to borrow money to pay intereft ! We have no way of paying additional and extraordinary fums. The people cannot ftand them. I mould be extremely forry to' live under a government which the people could not un- derftand, and which it would require the greateft abilities to underftand. It ought to be plain and eafy to the mean- eft capacity. What would be the confequence of ambi- guity ? It may raife animofity and revolutions, and involve fcs in bloodmed. — Jt becomes us to be extremely cautious. Mr. Maclalne — Mr. Chairman, I would afk the gentle- man what is the ftate of our trade ? I do not pretend to a very great knowledge in trade, but I know fomething of it. If our trade be in a low fituation, it muft be the ef- fect of our prefent weak government. I really believe that Congref? will be able to raife almoft what fums they Jsleafe by the impoft. I know it will, though the gentle- man may call it affertiori. I am not unacquainted with the territory or refources of this country. The fefources,* tinder proper regulations, are very great. In the courfe of a few years we can raife money without borrowing 3 fingle (hilling. It is not difgraceful to borrow money. The richeft nations have recurred to loans on fome emer- gencies. I believe, as much as I do in my e^iftence, that Congrsfc Congrefs will have It in their power to borrow money if our government be fuch as people can depend upon. They have been able to borrow now under the prefent feeble fyftem : If fo, can there be any doubt of their being able to do it under a refpedlable government ? Mr. M' Do wall replied, that our trade was on a con- temptible footing— That it was come almoft to nothing — and lower in North-Carolina than any where — That there- fore little could be expected from the impoft. Mr. J. Galloway — Mr. Chairman, I fhould make no objection to this claufe were the powers granted by the Conftitution fufficiently defined : For I am clearly of opi- nion that it is absolutely necefTary for every government, and efpecially for a general government, that its laws fhould be the fupreme law of the land. But I hope the gentlemen of the committee will advert to the 10th fec- tion of the firft article. This is a negative which the Con- ftitution of our own flare does not impofe upon us. I wifh the committee to attend to that part of it which pro- vides that no flate fhall pafs any law which will impair the obligation of contracts. Our public Securities are at a low ebb, and have been fo for many years. We well know that this country has taken thofe fecurities as fpetie. This hangs over our heads as a contract. There is a million and a half in circulation at lead. That claufe of the Confti- tution may compel us to make good the nominal value of thefe fecurities. I trufl; this country never will leave it to the hands of the general government to redeem the fecurities which they have already given. Should this be the cafe, the confequence will be, that they will be pur- chafed by fpeculators, when the citizens will part with them perhaps for a very trifling confideration. Thofe fpe- culators will look at the Conftitution, and fee that they will be paid in gold and filver. They wijl buy them at a half crown in the pound, and get the full nominal value for them in gold and filver. I therefore wifh the commit- tee to confider whether North- Carolina can redeem thofe fecurities in«the manner mod agreeable to her citizens, and juftifiable to the world, if this Conftitution be adopted. Mr. Davie — Mr. Chairman, I believe neither*he tenth fe&ion cited by the gentleman, nor any other part of the Conftitution has vetted the general government with pow« : "" ~" ' ' er CI* to interfere with the public fecurities of any ftare. I will venture to fay, that the laft thing which the general government will attempt to do, will be this. They have nothing to do with it. The claufe refers merely to con- tracts between individuals. That fe&ion is the befl in the Conftitution.. It is founded on the ftrongeft principles o£ juftice. It is a fecTion in fhort, which I thought would have endeared the Conftitution to this country. When the worthy gentleman comes to confider, he will find that the general government cannot poffibly interfere with fuch fecurities. How can it ? It has no negative claufe to that effect:. Where is there a negative claufe, operating nega- tively on the ftates themfelves ? It cannot operate retro- fpectively, for this would be repugnant to its own exprefs provifions. It will be left to ourfehes to redeem them as we pleafe. We wifhed we could put it on the fhoulders o£ Congrefs, but could not. Securities may be higher, but never lefs. I conceive, Sir, that this is a very plain cafe* and that it mull appear perfectly clear to the committee,, that the gentleman's alarms are groundlefs* The committee now rofe, Mr. Ryefident refumed th& chair, and Mr. Kenan reported, that the committee had, according to order, again had the faid propofed Conftitu- tion under their confideration, but not having had time to> go through the fame, had directed him to move for leaver to fit again to-morrow. Refohed, That this Convention will again to-morrow* refolve itfelf into a committee of the whole Convention^ on the faid propofed Conftitution. The Convention then adjourned until to-morrow mora* ing nine o'clock. WEDNESDAY, July 30, 1788. The Convention met according to adjournment, ancl then refolved into a committee of the whole Convention, to take into further confideration the faid propofed Confti* tution. — Mr. Kenan in the chair. The laft claufe of the fixth article read. Mr. Henry Abbot, after a ihort exordium which was riot cUftinctly heard, proceeded thus — Some are afraid, Mr* Chairman, that (hould the Conftitution be received, they E e would ( Itl ) fc/ould be deprived of the privilege of worfhipping <3od -according to their consciences ; which would be taking from them a benefit they enjoy under the prefent Conftitu- tlon. They wifh to know if their religious and civil liber- ties be fecured under this fyftem, or whether the general government may not make laws infringing their religious liberties. The worthy member from Edenton mentioned fundry political reafons why treaties mould be the fupreme law of the land. It is feared by fome people, that by the power of making treaties, they might make a treaty en- gaging with foreign powers to adopt the Roman catholic religion in the United States, which would prevent the people from worfhipping God according to their own con- fciences. The worthy member from Halifax has in fome rneafure fatisfied my mind on this fubject. But others may be diffatisfied. Many wifh to know what religion fhall be eftablifhed. I believe a majority of the community are Prefby terians. I am for my part againft any exclufi ve efta- bliftiment, but if there were any, I would prefer the Epif- copaL The exclufion of religious tefts is by many thought dangerous and impolitic. They fuppofe that if there be no religious teft required, Pagans, Deifts and Mahometans' might obtain offices among us, and that the Senate and Reprefentatives might ail be Pagans. Every perfon em- ployed by the general and date governments is to take an oath to fupport the former. Some are defirous to know' how, and by whom they are to fvvear, fince no religious teds are required' — whether they are to fwear by Jupiter,' Juno, Minerva, Proferpine or Pluto. We ought to be ftripici'ou's of our liberties. We have felt the effects of op- preffive meafures, and know the happy confequences of being jealous of our rights* I would be glad fome gentle- man would endeavour to obviate thefe objections, in order to fatisfy the religious part of the fociety. Could I be convinced that the objections were well founded, I would then declare my opinion againft the Conftitution. [Mr. Abbot added fevcral other obfervations, but fpoke too low' to be heard.] Mr. Iredell — Mr. Chairman, Nothing is more defireable than to remove the fcruples of any gentleman on this in- ierefting fubject : Thofe concerning feli'gion are entitled' to. particular refpect. I did &ot expect any objection to tbift ( m ) this particular regulation, which in my opinion, is calcuv Jate he Iho^ldhayc kififccj the .book. A. very ( 224 ) remarkable inftance alfo happened in England about forty years ago, of a perfon who was admitted to take an oath according to the rights of his own country, though he was an Heathen. He was an Eaft-Indian, who had a great fuit in Chancery, and his anfwer upon oath to a bill filed againft him, was absolutely neceflary. Not believing either in the Old or New Teftament, he could not be fworn in the accuftomed manner, but was fworn according to the form of the Gentoo religion, which he profefled, by touching the foot of a Prieft. It appeared, that ac- cording to the tenets of this religion, its members believed in a Supreme Being, and in a future ftate of rewards and punifhments. It was accordingly held by the Judges, upon great eonfideration, that the oath ought to be re- ceived ; they confidering that it was probable thofe of that religion were equally bound in conference by an oath ac- cording to their form of fwearing, as they themfelves were by one of theirs*, and that it would be a reproach to the juftice of the country, if a man, merely becaufe he •was of a different religion from their own, mould be de- nied redrefs of an injury he had fuftained. Ever fince this* great cafe, it has been univerfally confidered, that in ad- miniftering an oath, it is only necefFafy to enquire if the perfon who is to take it, believes in a Supreme Being, and in a future ftate of rewards and punifhments. If he does, the oath is to be adminiftered according to that form which it is fuppofed will bind his confeience mod. It is, however, neceffary that fuch a belief fhould be entertained, becaufe otherwife there would be nothing to bind his con- feience that could be relied on, fince there are many cafes where the terror of punifhment in this world for perjury, could not be dreaded. I have thus endeavoured to fatisfy, the committee. We may, I think, very fafely leave re- ligion to itfelf ; and as to the* form of the oath, I think this may well he trufted to the general government, to be applied on the principles I have mentioned. Governor Johnjlon expreiTed great aftonimment that the people were alarmed on the fubject of religion. This, he faid, muft have arifen from the great pains which had been taken to prejudice mens minds againft the Conftitution. He begged leave to add the following few obfervations to what had been fo ably faid by the gentleman laft up. 1 read the Constitution over and over, but could not fc& one caufe of apprehenfion or jealoufy on this fubjecf. When I heard there were apprehenfions that the Pope of Rome could be the Prefident of the United States, I wa» greatly ailonifhed. It might as well be faid that the King of England or France, or the Grand Turk could be chofen fo that office. It would have been as good an argument. It appears to me that it would have been dangerous, if Gongrefs could intermeddle with the fubjecT; of religion. True religion is, derived from a much higher fource than human laws. When any attempt is made by any govern- ment to reftrain mens confidences, no good consequence can poffibly follow. It is apprehended that Jews, Maho-< metans, Pagans, &c. may be elected to high offices undetf the government of the United States. Thofe who are; Mahometans, or any others, who are not profeffors oi the Chriftian religion, can never be elected to the office of Prefident or other high office but in one of two cafes. Firft, if the people of America lay afide the Chriftian re- ligion altogether, it may happen. Should this unfortu- nately take place, the people will chufe fuch men as thinfo as they do tbemfelves. Another cafe is, if any perfonS? of fuch a description, mould, notwithftanding their re* ligion, acquire the confidence and efteem of the peopl® of America by their good conduct and practice of virtue* they may be chofen. I leave it to gentlemens candour ta judge what probability there is of the people's chufing men? of different fentiments from themfelves. But great apprehenfions have been raifed as to the influ- ence of the eaftern ftates. When you attend to circum» ftances, this will have no weight. I know but two o£ three itates where there is the leaft chance of eftabiifliing any particular religion. The people of Maflachufetts and vj Connecticut are moftly Prefbyterians. In every other; ftate, the people are divided into a great number of fee~rs» In Rhode-Iffand the tenets of the Baptifts I believe pre- vail. In New- York they are divided very much : the mod numerous are the Episcopalians and the Baptifts. In New*' Jerfey they are as much divided as we are. In Pennfyl* vania, if any fe£fc prevails more than another it is that of the Quakers. In Maryland the Epifcopalians are moft nu- merous, though there are other fe&s. In Virginia ther* ( t$6 ) arc many fe£b ; you all know what their ^religious fentk ments are. So in all the fouthern dates they differ ; as alfo in New-Hampffiire. I hope therefore that gentlemen will fee there is no caufe of fear that any one religion (hall be exclufively edabliftied. Mr. Caldwell thought that fome danger might arife. He imagined it might be objected to in a political as well as in a religious view. In the nrd place, he faid there was an invitation for Jews, and Pagans of every kind, to come among us. At fome future period, faid he, this might endanger the charader of the United States. Moreover, even thofe who do not regard religion, acknowledge that the Chridian religion is bed calculated of all religions to make good members of fociety, on account of its morali- ty. I think then, added he, that in a political view, thofe gentlemen who formed this Conftitution, mould not have given this invitation to Jews and Heathens. All thofe who have any religion are againd the emigration of thofe people from the eadern hemifphere. Mr. Spenser was an advocate for fecuring every unalien- able right, and that of worfliipping God according to the didates of confcienee in particular. He therefore thought that no one particular religion mould be eftablimed. Re- ligious teds, faid he, have been the foundation of perfe- ctions in all countries. Perfons who are confcientious will not take the oath required by religious tefts, and will therefore be excluded from offices, though equally capa- ble of difcharging them as any member of the fociety. It is feared, continued he, that perfons of bad principles, Deids, Atheifts, &c. may come into this country, and there is nothing to redrain them from being eligible to of- fices. He afked if it was reafonable to fuppofe that the people would chufe men without regarding their charac- ters. Mr. Spencer then continued thus — Gentlemen urge that the want of a ted admits the mod vicious characters to offices. I defire to know what ted could bind them. If they were of fuch principles, it would not keep them from enjoying thofe offices. On the other hand, it would exclude from offices confcientious and truly religious peo- ple, though equally capable as others. Confcientious per- fons would not take fuch an oath, and would be therefore excluded. This would be a great gaufe of objeaion to a — i religious ( 227 ) religions tctl. But in this cafe as there is not a religion* teft required, it leaves religion on the folid foundation of its own inherent validity, without any connexion with temporal authority, and no kind of oppreflion can take place. I confefs it ftrikes me fo. I am forry to differ from the worthy gentleman. I cannot objedt to this part of the Conftitution. I wifti every other part was as good and proper, • Governor Johnjlm approved of the worthy member's candour. He admitted a poffibility of Jews, Pagans, &c, emigrating to the United States ; yct^ he fait}, they could not be in proportion to the emigrations of Chriftians who ihould come from other countries % that in all probability the children even of fuch people would be Chriftians $ and that this, with the rapid population of the United States, their zeal for religion ahd love of liberty, would* he trufted, add to the progrefs of the Chxiilian religion among us. The feventh article read without any objection againft it* Governor Johnjlon, after a fhort fpeech which was not cUftinclly heard, made a motion to the following effecl: : That this committee having fully deliberated on the Conftitution propofed for the future government of the United States of America, by the Federal Convention late~ ly' held at Philadelphia, on the 17th day of September laft, and having taken into their ferious and folemn confidera-- tion the prefent critical fituation of America, which in*- tfkiccs them to be of opinion, that thoaigh certain amend- ments to the faid Conftitution may be wilhed for, yet that thofe amendments mould be propofed fubfequent to the ratification on the part of this ftate, and not previous to it : They therefore recommend that the Convention do ratify the Conftitution, and at the fame time propofe amendments, to take place in one of the modes prescribed by the Conftitution. Mr. Lenoir— Mx, Chairman, I conceive that I fliall net be out of order to make fome observations on this laft part of thefyftem, and take fome retrofpeclive view of fome other parts of it. I think it not proper for our adoption, as I confider that it endangers our liberties. When we confider this fyftem collectively, we muft be furprifed to think, that any fet of men who were delegated to amend thf ( **ft ) <|?ie Confederation, mould propofc to annihilate it. For that and this fyftem are utterly different, and cannot exift together, ft has been faid that the fulleft confidence mould be put in thofe characters who formed thjs Conftitution, We will admit them in private and public transactions to be good characters. But, Sir, it appears to me and every other tyjember of this committee, that they exceeded their powers. Thofe gentlemen had no fort of power to form a new Conftitution altogether, neither had the citizens of this country fuch an idea in their view. I cannot under- take to fay what principles actuated them. I muft con- ceive they were miftaken in their politics, and that this, fyftem does not fecure the unalienable rights of freemen. It has fpme ariftocratical and fome monarchical features, ;ind perhaps fome of them intended the eftablifhment of pne of thefe governments- Whatever might be their in- tent, according to my views, it will lead to the moft dan- gerous ariftocracy that ever was thought of. An arifto- cracy eftablifhed on a constitutional bottom ! — I conceive (and I believe moft of this committee will likewife) that this is fo dangerous, that I mould like as well to have no 'Constitution at all. Their powers are almoft unlimited. A Conftjtution ought to be underftood by every one, The moft humble and trifling characters in the country have a right to know, what foundation they ftand upon. I confefs \ dq not fee the end of the powers here pro* pofed, nor the reafons for granting them. The principal end of a Conftitution is to fet forth what muft be given up for the common benefit of the community at large, and to fecure thofe rights which ought never to be infrin- ged. The propofed plan fecures no right, or if it does, it is in fo vague and undeterminate a manner, that we do jiot underftand it. My conftituents inftru£ted me to op-> pofe the adoption of this Conftitution. The principal reafons are as follow. The right of reprefentation is not* fairly and explicitly preferved to the people j it being eafy to evade that privilege as provided in this fyftem, and the terms of election being too long, If our General AfTem- fely be corrupt, at the end of the year we can make new men of them by fending others, in their itead. It is not fa $iere. If there be any reafon to think that human nature I* corrupt, and that there is a difpofition in men to afpire ( 2*p ) to power, they may, embrace an opportunity during theif long continuance in office, by means of their powers, to take away the rights of the people. The Senators are chofen for fix years, and two-thirds of them with the Pre- fident have mod extenfive powers. They may enter into a. dangerous combination. And they may be continually re-eleCted. The Prefident may be as good a man as any in exiftence, but he is but a man. He may be corrupt, fie has an opportunity of forming plans dangerous to the Community at large. J (hall not enter into the minutiae of this fyftem, but I conceive that whatever may have been the intention of its framers, that it leads to a moft dan- gerous ariftocracy. It appears to me that inftead of fe* curing the fovereignty of the dates, it is calculated to melt them down into one foljd empire. If the citizens of this (late like a confolidated government, I hope they will have, virtue enough to fecure their rights. I am forry to make ufe of the exprefjion, but it appears to me to be a fchem« to reduce this government to an ariftocracy. It guaran*. tees a republican form of government to the ftates ; wheii all thefe powers are in Congrefs it will only be a form. It will be paft recovery when Congrefs has the power of th« purfe and the fword. The power of the fword is in ex- plicit terms given to it. The power of dire£t. taxation gives the purfe. They may prohibit the trial by jury, which is a moft {acred and valuable right. There is no- thing contained in this Copftitution to bar them from it. The Federal Courts have alfo appellate cognizance of law and fa£t ; the fole caufe of which is to deprive the people of that trial, which it is optional in them to grant or not. We find no provifion againft infringement on the right* pf conference. Ecclefiaftical courts may be cftabliftied, which will be deftru&ive to our citizens. They may make, any eftablilhment they think proper. They have alfo am exclufive legiflation in their ten miles fquare, to which may be added their power over the militia, who may be carried thither and kept there for . life. Should any one- grumble at their acts, he would be deemed a traitor, an(J perhaps taken up and carried to the exclufive legiflation, and there tried without a jury. We are told there is no caufe to fear. When we confider the great powers of Congrefs, there is great caufe of alarm, They can difarn* the ( 2 3 o ) *he militia. If they were armed, they would be a refourcc againft great oppreflions. The laws of a- great empire are difficult to be executed. If the laws of the union were opprelfive they could not carry them into efFe£t, if the people were pofleiTed of proper means of defence. It was cried out that we were in a mod defperate fitua- tion, and that Congrefs could not difcharge any of their mod facred contracts. I believe it to be the cafe. But why give more power than is neceffary ? The men who went to the Federal Convention, went for the exprefspur- poie of amending the government, by giving it fuch addi- tional powers as were neceffary. If we mould accede to this fyftem, it may be thought proper by a few defigning perfons to dedroy it in a future age in the fame manner that the old fyftem is laid afide. The Confederation was binding on all the ftates. It could not be dedroyed but with the confent of all the dates. There was an exprefs article to that purpofe, The men who were deputed to the Convention, indead of amending the old, as they were folely empowered and directed to do, propofed a new fyf- tem. If the belt characters departed fo far from their- autherity, what may not be apprehended from others who may be agents in the new government, It is natural for men to afpire to power. It is the na- ture of mankind to be tyrannical, therefore it is neceffary for us to fecure our rights and liberties as far as we can. But it is alked why we fhould fufpeft men who are to be chofen by ourfelves, while it is their intered to act judly, and while men have felf-intered at heart ? I thir/k the rea~ ions which J have given are fufficient to anfwer that quef- tion. We ought to confider the depravity of human na- ture ; the predominant third of power which is in the bread of every one ; the temptations our rulers may have, and the unlimited confidence placed in them by this fyf- tem. Thefe are the foundation of my fears. They would be fo long in the general government that they would for- get the grievances of the people of the date. But it is faid we (hall be ruined if feparated from the other dates, which will be the cafe if we do not adopt. Jf fo, I would put lefs confidence in thofe dates. The #ate$ are all bound together by the Confederation, and the reft ( *3< ) reft cannot break from us, without violating the moft fo- lemn compact. If they break that, they will this. But it is urged that we ought to adopt becaufe fo many other ftates have. In thofe ftates which have patronized; and ratified it, many great men have oppofed it. The motives of thofe ftates I know not. It ig the goodnefs of the Conftitution we are to examine. We are to exercife our own judgments, and aft independently. And as t conceive we are not out of the union, I hope this Confti- tution will not be adopted till amendments are made. Amendments are wifhed for by the other ftates. It was urged here, that the Prefident fhould have power to grant reprieves and pardons. This power is neceiTary with pro- per reftriaions. But the Prefident may be at the head of a combination againft the rights of the people, and may reprieve or pardon the whole. It is anfwered to this that he cannot pardon in cafes of impeachment. What is the punifhment in fuch cafes ? Only removal from office and future difqualification. It does not touch life or pro- perty. He has power to do away punifhment in every other cafe. It is too unlimited in my opinion. It may be exercifed to the public good, but may alfo be perverted to a different purpofe. Should we get thofe who win attend to ourintereft, we ftiould be fafe under any Conftitution,, or without any. If we fend men of a different difpofition we fhall be in danger. Let us give them only fuch pow- ers as are neceiTary for the good of the community. The Prefident has other great powers. He has the no- mination of all officers and a qualified negative on the laws. He may delay the wheels of government. He may drive the Senate to concur with his propofal. He has other ex- tenfive powers. There is no affurance of the liberty o£ the prefs. They may make it treafon to write againft the moft arbitrary proceedings. They have power to ccntroul our eleftions as much as they pleafe. It may be very op- ' preflive on this ftate, and all the fouthern ftates. Much has been faid of taxation, and the inequality o£ it on the ftates. But nothing has been faid of the mode of furniihing men. In what proportion are the ftates to furnifh men > Is it in proportion to the whites and blacks ? I prefume it is. This ftate has 100,000 blacks. By this Conftitution co negroes are equal to 30 whites. This ftate ( *3* ) flate therefore, befides the proportion fhe muft raife for ner white people, mult furnifh an additional number for her blacks, in proportion as 30 is to 50. Snppofe there be a ftate to the northward that has 60,000 perfons, this (late muft furnifh as many men for the blacks as that whole ftate, exclufive of thofe (he mull furnifh for her whites. Slaves inftead of (lengthening, weaken this ftate— the regulation will therefore greatly injure it and the other fouthcrn dates. There is another claufe which I do not perhaps well underftand. The power of taxation feems* to me not to extend to the lands of the people of the Uni- ted States, for the rule of taxation is, the number of whites and three-fifths of the blacks. Should it be the cafe that they have no power of taxing this object, muft not direct taxation be hard on the greater part of this ftate ? I am not confident that it is fo, but it appears to me that they can Jay taxes on this objecl:. This will opprefs the poor people who have large families of whites, and no flaves to affift them in cultivating the foil, although the taxes are to be laid in" proportion of three-fifths of ^the negroes and all the whites. Another disadvantage to this ftate will arife from it. This ftate has made a contract with its citizens* The public Securities and certificates I allude to. Thefe tnay be negotiated to men who live in other ftates. Should that be the cafe, thefe gentlemen will have demands againft this ftate on that account. The Constitution points out the mode of recovery — it muft be in the Federal Court only, becaufe controverfies between a ftate and the citi- zens of another ftate are cognizable only in the Federal Courts. They cannot be paid but in gold and filver. Ac- tual fpecie will be recovered in that court. This would fee an intolerable grievance without remedy. I wifh not to be fo underftood as to be fo averfe to this fyftem, as that I fhould objec\,$© all parts of it, or attempt to reflect on the reputation of thofe gentlemen who form* cd it j though it appears to me that I would not have agreed to any propofal but the amendment of the Confederation. If there were any fecurity for the liberty of the people, I would for my own part agree to it. But in this cafe, as millions yet unborn are concerned, and deeply interefted in our decifion, I would have the moil pofitive and poinC- #d fecurity. I {hall therefore hope that before this Houfe ( *33 ) will proceed to adopt this Conftitution, they will propofe fuch amendments to it, as will make it complete •, and when amendments are adopted, perhaps I wili be as ready- to accede to it as any man.— One thing will make it arif- tocratical. Its powers are very indefinite. There was a very necefiary claufe in the Confederation, which is omit- ted in this fyftem. That was a claufe declaring that every power, &c 4 not given to Congrefs, was referved to the ftates. The omiffion of this claufe makes the power fo much greater. Men will naturally put the fulleft con- ftrutlion on the power given them. Therefore lay ail re- flraint on them, and form a plan to be underftood by every gentleman of this committee, and every individual of the community. Mr> Spaight — Mr. Chairman, I am one of thofe who formed this Conftitution. The gentleman fays we exceed- ed our powers. I deny the charge. We were fent with a full power to amend the exifting fyftem. This involved every power to make every alteration neceflary to melio- rate and render it perfect. It cannot be faid that We ar- rogated powers altogether inconfiftent with the objecT: of our delegation. There is a claufe which exprefsly provides for future amendments, and it is ftill in your power. "Wlia£ , the Convention has done is a mere propofal. It was found impoflible to improve the old fyftem, without changing its very form. For by that fyftem the three great branches of government are blended together. AH will agree that the conceflion of power to a government fo conftru£tedj is dangerous. The propofing anf w fyftem to be eftabliuSed by the afTent and ratification of nine ftates, arofe from the neceflity of the cafe. It was thought extremely hard tha£ one ftate, or even three or four ftates, ftiould be able to prevent neceflary alterations. The very refractory conduct of Rhode-Ifland in uniformly oppofing every wife and ju- dicious meafure, taught us how impolitic it would be, to put the general welfare in the power of a few members of the union. It was therefore thought by the Convention, that if fo great a majority as nine ftates mould adopt it, it would be right to eftablifh it. It was recommended by Congrefs to the ftate Legiflatures to refer it to the people of their different ftates. Our AfTembly has confirmee^ what they have done, by propofing it to the confideratioi* G g e£ ( 234 ) of the people. It was there and not here that the objec- tion fhould have been made. This Convention is there- fore to confider the Conftitution, and whether it be pro- per for the government of the people of America ; and had it been propofed by any one individual, under thefe circumftances, it would be^, right to confider whether it be good or bad. The gentleman has infinuated, that this Conftitution, inftead of feeuring our liberties, is a feheme to enflave us. He has produced no proof, but refts it on his bare affertion— an affertion which I am aftonifhed to hear, after the ability with which every objection has-been fully and clearly refuted in the courfe of our debates. \ am for my part confcious of having had nothing in view but the liberty and happinefs of my country, and I believe every member of that Convention was acluated by motives equally fincere and patriotic. He fays that it will tend to ariftocracy. Where is the arif- tocratical part of it ? It is ideal. I always thought that an ariftocracy was that government where the few govern- ed the many, or where the rulers were hereditary. This is a very different government from that. I never read of fuch an ariftocracy. The firft branch are Reprefentative* chofen freely by the people at large. This muft be allow- ed upon all hands to be democratical. The next is the Se- nate, chofen by the people in a fecondary manner through the medium of their delegates in the Legjftature. This cannot be ariftocratical. They are chofen for fix years, but one third of them go out every fecond year, and are refponfible to the ftate Legislatures. The Prefident is elected for four years. By whom ? By thofe who are elect- ed in fuch manner as the ftate Legislatures think proper. I hope the gentleman will not pretend to call this an arif- tocratical feature. The privilege of reprefentation is fecur- ed in the moft pofitive and unequivocal terms, and cannot be evaded. The gentleman has again brought on the trial by jury. The Federal Convention, Sir, had no wifh to deftroy the trial by jury. It was three or four days before them. There were a variety of objections to any one mode. It was thought impoflible to fall upon any pne mode, but what would produce fome inconveniences. I cannot now recollect all the reafons given, Moft of them |ave been, amply detailed by other gentlemen here. I < *35 ) fhould fuppofe, that if the Reprefentatives of twelve ftate^ with many able lawyers among them, could not form any unexceptionable mode, this Convention could hardly be able to do it. As to the fubjeel: of religion, I thought what has been faid would fully fatisfy that gentleman and every other. No power is given to «*the general govern* ment to interfere with it at all,. Any a& of Congrefs on this fubjeel: would be an ufurpation. No feci is preferred to another. Every man has a right to worfhip the Supreme Being in the manner he thinks proper. No teft is required. All men of equal capacity and integrity, are equally eligi* h\e to offices. „ Temporal violence might make mankind wicked, but never religious. A teft would enable the prevailing feci to perfecute the reft. I do not fuppofe an Infidel, or any fuch perfon, will ever be chofen to any of- fice unlefs the people themfelves be of the fame opinion*, He fays that Congrefs may eftablifh ecclcfiaftical courts. I do not know what part of the Conftitution warrants that aflertion. It is impoffible. No fuch power is given them. The gentleman^adyifes fuch amendments as would fatisfy fiim, and propofes a mode of amending before ratifying, If we do not adopt firft, we are no more a part of the tmion than any foreign power. It will be alio throwing sway the influence of our ftate to propofe amendments as £he condition of our ratification. If we adopt firft, our Ileprefentatrves will have a proportionable weight in bringing about amendments, which will not be the cafe if =we do not adopt. It is adopted by tenftates already. The queftion then is, not whether the Conftitution be good, but whether we will or will not confederate with the other ftates. The gentleman fuppofes that the liberty of the prefs is not fecured. The Conftitution does not take it away. It fays nothing of it, and can do nothing to injure it. But it is fecured by the Conftitution of every ftate iij the union in the moft ample manner. He objects to giving the government exclufive legiflati* on in a diftricl- not exceeding ten miles fquare, although the previous confent and ceflion of the ftate within which it may be, is required. Is it to be fuppofed, that the Re- prefentatives of the people will make regulations therein dangerous to liberty ? Is there the leaft colour or pretext for faying, that t,he rnijitia will be carried and kept there - ( *# J for life ? Where is there any power o 1 o this ? The power of calling forth the militia is given for the common defence, and can we fuppofe that our own Representatives, chofen for fo (hort a period, will dare to pervert a power, given for the general protection, to an abfolute oppreffion. But the gentleman has gone further, and fays, that any man who will complain of their oppreflions, or write agamd their ufurpations, may be deemed a traitor, -and tried as fuch in the ten miles fquare, without a jury. What an aftonifh- Sng mifreprefentation ! Why did not the gentleman look at the Cqnftitutidh, and fee their powers ? Treafon is then?, defined. It fays exprefsly, that treafon againft the United States (hall coniift only in levying war againft them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. Complaining therefore, or writing, cannot be treafon. [Here Mr. Lenoir rofe, and faid that he meant mifprifion of treafon.] The fame reafons hold againfl that too. The liberty of the prefs being fecured, creates an additional fecurity. Perfons accufed cannot be tried without a jury y for the fame article provides, that " the trial of all crimes {hall be by jury." They cannot be carried to the ten miles fquare ; for the fame claufe adds, « and fuch- trial mail he « held in the ftate where the faid crimes ftiall have been « c committed.** He has made another objeaion, that lane* might not be taxed, and the other taxes would fall heavily on the poor people. Congrefs has a power to lay taxes, and no article is exempted or excluded. The proportion of each ftate may be raifed in the mod convenient man* ner. The cenfus or enumeration provided, is meant for the falvation and benefit of the fouthern ftates. It was mentioned that land ought to be the only object of taxa- tion. As an acre of land in the northern flates, is worth many acres in the fouthern ftates, this would have greatly opprefled the latter. It was then judged that the number of people, as therein provided, was the beft criterion for fixing the proportion of each ftate, 3tid that proportion in each ftate to be raifed in the moft eafy manner for the peo- ple. But he has darted another objection, which I never heard before \ that Congrefs may call for men in propor- tion to the number of negroes. The article with refpeel: to requifitions of men is entirely done away. Men are to fee raifed by bounty. Suppofe it had not been done away. The < 237 ) The eaftern dates could not impofe on us a man for every black. It was not the cafe during the war, nor ever could be. But quotas of men are entirely done away. Another objection which he makes, is, that the Federal Courts will fiave cognisance of contradts between this Hate and citizens of .another {late, and that public fecuri- iies, negociated by our citizens to thofe of other ftates will be recoverable in fpecie in thofe courts againft this ftate. They cannot be uegociated. What do thtfe certi- ficates fay ? Merely that the perfon therein named, {hall for a particular fervice, receive fo much money. They are not negotiable. The money mud be demanded for them in the name of thofe therein mentioned. No other per- fon has a right. There can be no danger therefore in this refpect. The gentlemen has made feveral other objections, .but they have been fo fully an f were d and clearly refuted by feveral gentlemen in the courfe of the debates, that I lhall pafs them by unnoticed. I cannot however conclude, without obferving, that I am amazed he mould call the powers of the general government indefinite. It is the j£rft time I heard the objection. I will venture to fay they pre better defined than the powers of any government he Hiver heard of. Mr. J. M'DovmII— Mr. Chairman, I was in hopes -ftliat amendments would have been brought forward to the fConftitution, before the idea of adapting it had been thought of or propofed. From the belt information, there is a great proportion of the people in the adopting ftates >&verfe to it as it ftands. 1 collect my information from •srefpectabje authority. I icnow the necefiity of a federal government, I therefore wifh this was one in which our -liberties and privileges were fecured. For I confider the union as the rock of our political falvation. I am for the flrongeit federal government. A bill of rights ought to to have been inferted to afcertain out molt valuable ancj. ^inalienable rights. The fourth lection of the firfl claufe gives the Congreff ^in unlimited power over elections. This matter was not cleared up to my fatisfaction. They have full power to alter it from one time of the year to another, fo as that it (hall be impoflible for the people to attend. They J»ay fix the time in winter, and the place at Edenton, ivheij. { * 3 8 ) when the weather will be fo bad that the people cann&fc attend. The ftate governments will be mere boards of elec- tion. The claufe of elections gives the Congrefs power ever the time and manner of chufing the Senate. I wifh to know why refervation was made of the place and time of chufing Senators, and not alfo of electing Reprefenta- tives. It points to the time when the ftates fhall be all confolidated into one empire. Trial by jury is not fecured. The objections againft this want of fecurity have not been cleared up in a fatisfa&ory manner. It is neither fecured in civil nor criminal cafes. The federal appellate cogni- zance of law and fa£t, puts it in the power of the wealthy to recover unjuftly of the poor man, who is not able to attend at fuch extreme diftance, and bear fuch enormous expence as it muft produce. It ought to be limited fo as to prevent fuch oppreffions. I fay the trial by jury is not fufficicntly fecured in crimi- nal cafes. The very intention of the trial by jury is, that the accufed may be tried by perfons who come from the vicinage or neighbourhood, who may be acquainted with his character. The fubftance^therefore of this privilege is taken away-. By the power of taxation every article capable of being taxed, may be fo heavily taxed that the people cannot bear* the taxes neceiTary to be raifed for the fupport of their itate governments^ Whatever law we may make, may be repealed by their laws. All thefe things, with others^ tend to make us one general empire. Such a government cannot be well regulated. When we are connected with the northern ftates, who have a majority in their favour, Jaws may be made which will anfwer their convenience, but will be oppreflive to the laft degree upon the fouthern ftates. They differ in climate, foil, cuftoms, manners, &c. A large majority of the people of this country are againft this Conftitution, becaufe they think it replete with dan- gerous defecls. They ought to be fatisfied with it before it is adopted, otherwise it cannot operate happily. With- out the affections of the people it will not have fufficient energy. To enforce its execution recourfe muft be had to arms and bloodftied. How much better would it be if the people were fatisfied with it ? From all thefe confiderati- ons I now rife to oppofe its adoption ; for I never will agree to a government that fepds to the ,dcftru£Uon of the liberty of the people, Jjjjr. ( 2 3 * ) Mr. Wilfon wifhed that the Conftitution had excluded Po* pifh Priefts from offices. As there was no tell required, and nothing to govern them but honour, he faid, that when their intereit clamed with their honour, the latter would fly before the former. Mr. Lancafter — Mr. Chairman, It is of the utmoft im- portance to decide this great queftion with candour and deliberation. Every part of this Conftitution has been elucidated. It has been afterted by feveral worthy gentle- men, that it is the mod excellent Conftitution that ever was formed. I could wifh to be of that opinion if it were fo. The powers veiled therein are very extenfive. I am apprehenfive that the power of taxation is unlimited. It exprefsly fays, that Congrefs (hall have the power to lay taxes, &c. It is obvious to me that the power is unbound- ed, and I am apprehenfive that they may lay taxes too heavily on our lands, in order to render them more pro- ductive. The amount of the taxes may be more than our lands will fell for. It is obvious that the lands in the northern ftates, which gentlemen fuppofe to be more po- pulous than this country, are more valuable and better cul- tivated than ours : 'Yet their lands will be taxed no higher than our lands. A rich man there, from reports, does not pofTefs fo large a body of land as a poor man to the fouthward. If fo, a common poor man here, will have much more to pay for poor land, than the rich man there for land of the beft quality. This power, being necefla- lily unequal and oppreffive, ought not to be given up. I mall endeavour to be as concife as poffible. We find thafi the ratification of nine ftates (hall be fufficient for its efta- bliftiment between the ftates fo ratifying the fame. This, as has been already taken. notice of, is a violation of the Confederation. We find that by that fyftem, no altera- tion was to take place, except it was ratified by every ftatc in the union. Now by comparing this laft article of the Conftitution to that part of the Confederation, we find a mod flagrant violation. The articles of Confederation were fent out with all folemnity on fo folemn an occafion, and were to be always bindmg on the ftates ; but, to our aftoniftiment, we fee that nine ftates may do away the force of the whole. I think, without exaggeration, that it will be looked upon by foreign nations, as a ferious and alarming change* Hew ( *4« ) l£ow cfo we know that if we propofe amendments fney Ihail be obtained after actual ratification ? May not thefe amendments be propofed with equal propriety, and more fafety, as the condition of our adoption ? If they violate the thirteenth article of the Confederation in this manner, may they not with equal propriety refufe to adopt amend- ments, although agreed to and wifhed for by two-thirds of' the dates? This violation of the old fyftem is a precedent- for fuvh proceedings as thefe. That would he a violation d$ fir uctive to our felicity. We are now determining 3 queftion deeply affecting the happinefs of millions yet un- born. It is the policy of freemen to guard their privileges* Let us then as far as we can exclude the poffibility of ty- ranny. The Prefident is chofen for four years. The Se- nators for fix years. Where is our remedy for the moflt flagrant abufes ? It is thought that North-Carolina is to have an opportunity of ehufing one-third of their fenato--* rial Members, and all their Representatives, once in two- years. This would be the cafe as to the Senators, if they ftould be of the firft clafs : but at any rate, it is to be af- ter fix years. But if they deviate from their duty, they cannot be excluded and changed the firft year, as the Mem- bers of Congrefs can now by the Confederation. How can it be faid to be fafe to truft fo much power in the hands of fuchmen, who are not refponfible or amenable for mif- conduct ? As it has been the policy' of every flate in the union to guard elections, we ought to be more punctual in this* cafe. The Members of Congrefs now may be recalled. But in this Constitution they cannot be recalled. The continuance of the Prefident and Senate is too long» It will be objected by fome gentlemen, that if they are good, why not continue them ? But I would afk, how are we to find out whether they be good or bad I The indivi- duals who aflented to any bad law are not eafily discrimi- nated from others. They will, if individually enquired ' of, deny that they gave it their approbation ; and it is ire their power to conceal their tranfactions as long as they pleafe, There is alfo the Prefident's conditional negative on the laws. After a bill is prefented to him and he difapproves of it, it is to be tent back to that Houfe where it origin- ~ ' ' " ~ " " ated. ated, for their confi deration. Let u$ confider the effe&l of this for a few moments. Suppofe it originates in thb Senate, and paffes there by a large majority : Suppofe it pafles in the Houfe of Reprefentatives unanimoufly — it mull be tranfmitted to the Prefident. If he objects, it is fcnt back to the Senate •, if two-thirds do not agree to ife in the Senate, what is the confequence ? Does the Houfe of Reprefentatives ever hear of it afterwards? No, it drops, becaufe it mud be palled by two thirds of both Houfes, and as only a majority of the Senate agreed to it it cannot become a law. This is giving a power to the Prefident to over- rule fifteen Members of the Senate and every Member in the Houfe of Reprefentatives. Thefe are my objections. I look upon it to be unfafe to drag each other from the mod remote parts in the ftate, to the Su- preme Federal Court, which has appellate jurifdiction o£ caufes arifing under the Conftitution, and of controvert! es between citizens of different flates. I grant that if it be a contract between a citizen of Virginia and a citizen of North- Carolina, the fuit muft be brought here; but may they not appeal to the Supreme Court, which has cogni- zance of law and fact ? They may be carried to Philadel- phia. They ought to have limited the fum on which ap- peal mould lie. They may appeal on a fuit for only ten pounds. Such a trifling fum as this, would be paid by a man who thought he did not owe it, rather than go fuch; a diftance. It would be prudence in him fo to do. This would be very oppreflive. I doubt my own judgment — experience has taught me tc* be diffident — but I hope to be excufed and pui right if I be miftaken. The power of raifing armies is alfo very exceptionable.' I am not well acquainted with the government of other* countries, J>ut a man of any information knows that the King of Great-Britain cannot raife and fupport armies- 1 He may call for and raife men, but he has no money to> fupport them. But Congrefs is to have power to raife and fupport armies. Forty thoufand men from North-Caroli- na could not be refufed without violating the Conftitution. 1 wife amendments to thefe parts. I agree it is not our bufinefs to enquire whether the continent be invaded or Hot. The General Legiilature ought to fuperintend the H h riutf { *4* > fare of this. Treaties are to be the fupreme law of th£ land. This has been fufriciently difcufled — it muft be amended fome way or the other. If the ConftitutiOn be adopted, it ought to be the fupreme law of the land, and a perpetual rule for the governors and governed. But if treaties are to be the fupreme law of the land, it may re- peal the laws of different ftates, and render nugatory our bill of rights. As to a religious teft, had the article which excludes it, provided that none (hould be required, but what had been required in the ftates heretofore, I would not have objected to it. It would fecure religion. Reli- gious liberty ought to be provided for. I acquiefce with the gentleman who fpoke on this point my fentiments bet- ter than I could have done myfelf. For my patt, in re- viewing the qualifications neceflary for a Prefident, I did not fuppofe that the Pope could occupy the Prcfident's chair. But let us remember that we form a government for millions not yet in exiftence. I have not the art of divination. In the courfe of four or five hundred years^ I do not know how it will work. This is mod certain, that Papifts may oecupy that chair, and Mahometans may take it. I fee nothing againft it. There is a difqualifica- tion I believe in every flate in the union — it ought to be fo in this fyftem. It is faid that all power Hot given is retained. I find they thought proper to infert nega- tive cl a ufes in the Conflitution, retraining the general government from the exercife of certain powers. Thefe were unneceffary if the doctrine be true, that every thing not given is retained. From the infertion of thefe we may conclude the do£lrine to be fallacious. Mr. Lancafter then obferved, that he would difapprove of the Conflitu- tion as it then flood. His own feelings and his duty to his conftituents induced him to do fo. Some people, he faid, thought a Delegate might a£l independently of the people. He thought otherwise, and that every Delegate •was bound by their inflruclions, and if he did any thing re- pugnant to their wifhes he betrayed his truft. He thought xiimfelf bound by the voice of the people, whatever other gentlemen might think, He would cheerfully agree to adopt if he thought it would be of general utility, but as he thought it would have a contrary ertecl:,and as he believed a great majority of the people were againit it, he w«uhi •ppofe \i% adoption. * * Mr. ( 143 ) Mr. Willie Jones Was againft ratifying in the manne* propofed. He had attended, he faid, with great patience? to the debates of the fpeakers on both fides of the queftion.. One party faid the Conftitution was all perfection. The other party faid it wanted a great deal of perfeetien. For his part, he thought fo. He treated the dangers which were held forth in cafe of non adoption, as merely ide- al and fanciful. After adding other remarks, he mo- ved that the previous queftion might be put, with an in* tention, as he faid, if that was carried, to introduce a re- solution which he had in his hand, and which he was then willing to read if gentlemen thought proper, ftipulating for certain amendments to be made previous to the adop- tion by this ftate. Governor John/Ion begged gentlemen to recollect, that the propofed amendments could not be laid before the? other ftrttes unlefs we adopted and became part of the union, Mr. Taylor wifhed that the previous queftion might; be, put as it would fave much time. He feared the motU on firft made was a manoeuvre or contrivance to impofe a Conftitution on the people, which a majority difaproved of, Mr. Iredell wifhed the previous queftion fhould be with-*, drawn, and that they might debate the firft queition. The great importance of the fubjecl:, and the refpeciability of* the gentleman who made the motion, claimed more defe- rence and attention than to decide it in the very moment it was introduced by getting rid of it by the previous ques- tion. A decifion was now prefented in a new form by a, gentleman of great influence in the Houfe, and gentle- men ought to have time to confi.der before they voted pre- cipitately upon it. A defultory converfation now arofe. Mr. J. Galloway winded the queftion to be poftponed till to-morrow morn- ing. Mr. J. M K Dowall was for immediately putting the queftion. — Several gentlemen expatiated on the evident ne- ceflity of amendments. Governor Johnfton declared, that he difdained all ma- noeuvres and contrivance ; that an intention of impofing an improper fyftem on the people, contrary to their wifh- es> was unworthy of any man. He wifhed the motion ta fce fairly and fully argued and inveftigated. He obferved that ( *44 ) that the very motion before them propofed amendments t* be made. That they were propofed as they had been in ether dates. He wi(hed therefore that the motion for th$ previous queftion fhould be withdrawn. Mr. Willie Jones could not withdraw his motion. Gen- tlemens arguments, he faid, had been liftened to attentive- Sy^ but he believed no perfon had changed his opiniafti. It Tvas unneceifaryj:hen to argue it again. His motion was not conclufive. He only wimed to know what ground they itood on, whether they mould ratify it unconditionally or JlOt. Mr. Spencer wiftied to hear the arguments and reafons for and againft the motion. Although he was convinced the Houfe wanted amendments, and that all had near- ly determined the queftion in their own minds, he was for hearing the queftion argued, and had no objection to the poftponemerit of it till to-morrow. Mr. Iredell urged the great importance of confederation. That the confequence of the previous queftion, if carried, would be an exclufion of this ftate out of the union. He contended that the Houfe had no right to make a conditi- onal ratification, and if excluded from the union, they could not be affured of an eafy admiflion at a future day, though the impoffibility of exifting out of the union muft be obvious to every thinking man. The gentleman from Halifax had faid, that his motion would not be conclufive. For his part, he was certain it would be tantamount to an immediate decifion. He trufted gentlemen would confi- «der the propriety of debating the firft motion at large. Mr. Perfon obferved, that the previous queftion would produte no inconvenience. The other party, he faid, had all the debating to themfelves, and would probably have it again, if they infilled on further argument. He faw no propriety in putting it off till to-morrow, as it was not cuftomary for a committee to adjourn with two queftrons before them. Mr. Shepherd declared, that though he had made up his mind, and believed other gentlemen had done fo, yet he had no objection to giving gentlemen an opportunity of fdifplaying their abilities, and convincing the reft of their error if they could. He was for putting it off till to- morrow, m ( M5 ) Mr. Dank took notice that the gentleman from Grftle yille had frequently ufed ungenerous infinuations,and had taken much pains out of doors to irritate the minds of hi& countrymen againft the Conftitution. He callled upon gentlemen to act openly and above board, adding that a, contrary conduct on this occafion, was extremely defpica- ble. He came thither, he faid, for the common caufe of his country, and knew no party, but wjfhed the bufinefs to be conducted with candour and moderation;. The pre- vious queftion he thought irregular, and that it ought not to be put till the other queftion was called for* That it was evidently intended to preclude all further debate, and, to precipitate the committee upon the refolution which it had been fuggefted was immediately to follow, which they were not then ready to enter upon. That he had not ful- ly confidered the eonfequences of a conditional ratification, but at prefent they appeared to him alarmingly dangerous* and perhaps equal to thofe of an abfolute rejection. Mr. Willie Jonec obferved, that he had not intended to take the Houfe by furprife : That though he had his moti- on ready, and had heard of the motion which was in- tended for ratification, he waited till that motion mould be made, and had afterwards waited for fome time, in ex- pectation that the gentleman from Halifax, and the gen- tleman from Edenton, would both fpeak to it. He had no. objection to adjourning, but his motion would be ftill be- fore the Houfe. Here there was a great cry for the queftion. Mr. Iredell, [The cry for the queftion ftili continuing^ Mr. Chairman, I defire to be heard, notwithstanding the cry of U. the queftion, the queftion." Gentlemen have no right; to prevent any Member from fpeaking to it if he thinks fit {The Houfe fubfided into order.] Unimportant as I rr/ be myfelf, my conftituents are as refpectable as thofe any Member in the Houfe. It has indeed, Sir, been my misfortune to be under the neceffity of troubling the Houfe much oftener than I wifhed, owing to a circumftance which J have greatly regretted, that fo few gentlemen take a {hare in our debates, though many are capable of doing fo with propriety. I fhould have fpoken to the queftion at large before, if I had not fully depended on fome other gentle- J$an doing it, and therefore I did not prepare myfelf bj. ( *4* ) taking notes of what was faid. However, I beg leave now to make a few observations. I think this Constitution fafe, 1 have not heard a fingle objection which in my opinion {hewed that it was dangerous- Some particular parts have been objected to, and amendments pointed out. Though I think ife perfectly fafe, yet with refpecl: to any amend- ments which do not deftroy the fubftarice of the Confti- tution, but will tend to give greater fatisfaction, I fhould approve of them, beeaufe I {hould prefer that fyftem which would mod tend to conciliate all parties. On thefe principles I am of opinion, that fome amendments (howld be propofed. The general ground of the objections feems to be, that the powers propofed to the general government, may be abufed. If we give no power but fuch as may not be abufed, we (hall give none 4 , for all delegated powers may be abufed. There are two extremes equally dangerous to liberty. Thefe are tyranny and anarchy. The medium be- tween thefe two is the true government to protect the peo- ple. In my opinion, this Constitution is well calculated to guard againft both thefe extremes. The poftibility of genera! abufes ought not to be urged, but particular ones pointed oat. A gentleman who fpoke fome time ago [Mr. Lenoir] obferved that the government might make it treafon to write againft the moft arbitrary proceedings. He corrected himfelf afterwards, by faying he meant tnifprijion of treafon. But in the correction he committed as great a miftake as he did at firft. Where is the power given to them to do this ? They have power to define and punim piracies and felonies committed on the high feas, mnd offences againft the law of nations. They have no tower to define any other crime whatever. This will W how apt gentlemen are to commit miftakes. I am convinced on the part of the worthy Member, it was not de%ned, but arofe merely from inattention. Mr. Lenoir arofe and declared, that he meant that thofe punifhments might be inflicted by them within the ten miles fquare, where they would have exclufive powers pf legislation. Mr. Iredell continued — They are to have exclufive pow- er of legiflation ; but how ? Wherever they may have this diftrjcl, they mult pofiefs it from the authority of the itete ( *47 5 ftate within which it lies : And that ftate may ftipulate thfc conditions of the cefiion. Will not fuch ftate take car© of the liberties of its own people. What would be the coniequence if the feat of the government of the United States, with all the archives of America, was in the power of any one particular ftate ? Would not this be moft un- fafe and humiliating ? Do we not all remember that in the year 1783^ a band of foldiers went and infulted Congrefs ? The fovereignty of the United States was treated with in- dignity. They applied for protection to the ftate they re- fided in, but could obtain none. It is to be hoped fuch a difgraceful fcene will never happen again, but that for the future the national government will be able to protect it- felf. The powers of the government are particularly enu- merated and defined: they can claim no others but fuch. as are fo enumerated. In my opinion they are excluded as much from the exercife of any other authority as they could be by the ftrongeft negative claufe that could be framed. A gentleman has alked, what would be the con- fequence if they had the power of the purfe and fword ? I afk, in what government under Heaven are thefe not giv- en up to fome authority or other ? There is a neceffity o£ giving "both the purfe and the fword to every government * or elfe it cannot protect the people. But have we not fuf- ficient fecurity that thofe powers (hall notbeabufed ? The immediate power of the purfe is in the immediate Repre- fentatives of the people, chofen every two years, who can lay no tax on their conftituents but what they ars fubjecfc to at the fame time themfelves. The power of taxation muft be veiled fomewhere. Do the committee wifh it to b*> as it has been ? Then they muft fuffer the evils which they have done. Requifitions will be of no avail. No money Will be collected but by means of military force. Under the new government taxes will probably be much lighter than they can be under our prefent one. The impoft will afford vaft advantages, and greatly relieve the people from direct taxation. In time of peace it is fuppofed by ma-* iiy the impofts may be alone fufficient : But in time of war, it cannot be expected they will. Our expences would be much greater, and our ports might be blocked up by the enemy's fleet. Think then of the advantage of a na« iional government jJSfieffeil of energy and credit. Could government ( 24« ) government borrow money to any advantage without the power of taxation ? If they could fecure funds, and want- ed immediately for inllance ioo,©ooL thsy might borrow this fum, and immediately raife only money to pay the in- tereft of it. If they could not, the 100,000 1. muft be anftantly raifed however diftreffing to the people, or our country perhaps over-run by the enemy. Do not gentle- men fee an immenfe difference between the two cafes ? It is faid that there ought to be jealoufy in mankind. I ad- mit it as far as is confiftent with prudence. But unlimited jealoufy is very pernicious. We muft be contented if pow- ers be as well guarded as the nature of them will permit; In regard to amending before of after adoption, the diffe- rence is very great. I beg leave to ftate my idea of that difference. I mentioned one day before, the adoption by ten flares. When I did fo, it was not to influence any per* fon with refpeel: to the merits of the Conftitution, but as a reafon for coolnefs and deliberation. In my opinion, when fo great a majority of the American people have adopted it, it is a ftrong evidence in itg favour : For it is not probable that ten dates would have, agreed to a bad Conftitution. If we do not adopt, we are no longer in the union with the other flates. We ought to confider ferioufly before we determine our connection with Jthenn The fafety and happinefs of this ft.atc depend upon it. Without that union what would have been our condition' iiow? A finking iriftance will point out this very clearly: At the beginning of the late war with Great-Britain, the Par- liament thought proper to flop all commercial intercourfe with die American provinces. They paffed a general pro- hibitory a£t, from which New- York and North-Carolina were at firft excepted. Why were they excepted ? They Iiad been as active in oppofition as the other ftates ; but this was an expedient to divide the northern from the middle ftates, and to break the heart of the fouthern. Had New- York and North-Carolina been weak enough to fall into this fnare, we probably mould not now have been an independent people. [Mr. Per/on called to order, and intimated that the gentleman meant to refletl: on the op-* pofers of the Conftitution, as if they were friendly to the Britiih intereft. Mr. Iredell warmly refented the interrup- tion, declaring he was perfectly in order, that it was di£- orderfy ( *49 ) orderly to interrupt him, and in refpecl: to Mr. Pfrfortb ia- finuation as to his intention, he declared in the mod fo- lemn manner he had no fuch, being weil aflured the op- pofers of the Condituti'on were equally friendly to the in- dependence of America, as its fupporters.. He then pro- ceeded.] I fay, they endeavoured to divide us. North- Carolina and New-York had too much fenfe to be taken in by their. artifices Union enabled us then to defeat all their endeavours : tTnion will enable us to defeat all the machinations of our enemies hereafter. The friends of their country mud lament our prefent unhappy divifions. Mod free countries have loft their liberties, by means of diflentions, among themfelves. They united in war and danger: When peace and apparent fecurity came, they fplit into factions and parties, and thereby became a prey to foreign iavaders. 4 This fhews the neceflity of union* In urging, the danger of difunipn fo drongly, I beg leave again to fay, that I mean not to reflecl: on any. gentleman Miatfoever* as if his wifjies were directed to. fo wicked a purpofe. I am fure fifch an infinuation as, the gentleman from Granville fuppofed I intended, would" be utterly un- j.uft, as I know fom'e of the warm eft oppofers of Great- Britain, are now among the warmed opponents of the pro- pofed Conditution.; Such afuggettion never Entered into my head, and I can fay with truth,- that warmly as I arVi attached to this Constitution, and though I am convinced that the falvaticn of our country depends upon the adop- tion of it, I would not procure it fuocefs by. one unworthy action or one ungenerous word. A gentleman has faiA ifhat we ought to determine in the fame manner as if no' date had adopted the Conditution. The general princi- ple is right, but we ought toconfider ,our peculiar fituati- «*n'. We cannot exift by ourfelves. If we imitate the ex- amples of fome refpe&able dates that have propofecl amendments fubfequent to their ratification, we (hall add our weight to have thefe amendments carried, as our Re-* prefentatives wiil be in Congrefs to enforce them. Gen* tlemen entertain a jealoufy of the.eadern dates. To with- draw ourfelves from the fouthern dates, will be «n~ creafing the northern influence. The lofs of one. date may be attended with particular prejudice. It will be a good while' before amendments of any kind can take pla<*.£en done, In, the other Qiates) or to, propofe amendment*, and be out of the union till all thefe be agreed to by the Other, ftates. The confequences of either refolution I beg leave to date. By adopting we fha,ll be in. the union with our fifter itatesj, which is the only foundation of our prof« perity and fafcty, We fhall avoid the.danger. of a fepara- tion, a danger of which the. latent effects are unknown. $p far am I convinced of the neceflity of the union, that I would give up many things againft my own opinion to. obtain it. If we facrifice it, by ajeje£tion of the Confti- tution, or, a refufal to, adopt (which amounts, I, think, npar^ l,y to the fame thing) the very circumdance of difunioa may occafion animohty between us and the inhabitants of the other ftates, which may be a means of fevering us for- ever. We fhall lofe the benefit which njuft accrue to the other dates from the new government. Their trade wilL flourifh: Goods will fell cheap: Their commodities will rife in value, and their didrefies occafioned by the war will gradually be removed. Qurs, for want of thefe advanta- ges, will continue. Another, very material confequenca will refult from.it: We fhall lofe our fhare of the impofta ^n all the dates, which under this Conftitution are to go in-, to the federal treafury. It is the particular local intereft of this date to adopt on this account, more perhaps than, that of. any other member, of the union. At prefent sill thefe impofts go into the refpeclive treafury of each date, anid we well know our.own are of little confequence compared to thofe of the other dates in general. The gentleman from Halifax [Mr. Jones'] has offered an expe- dient to prevent, the lofs of our fhare of the impod. In my opinion that expedient will not anfv/er the pwrpofe. The amount of duties on. poods imported into tjiis date it very little, and if thefe resolutions are agreed to it will ba lefs. I. afk. any gentleman, whether the United Si:atei would receive from ; the duties of this date fo much as would be our, proportion, under the Conftitution, of the duties on goods, imported in all the dates. Our duties would be no manner of compenfation. for fuch proportion. What would be the lajigvjage of- Congrefs on our holding forth fuch an offer? " 1/ you. are willing to enjoy the be- « c nefits of the un:on, you. mud be fubje£i to all the law$ «,l of it. We wili make no partial agreement with vou » this ( 2<5o ) This would probably be their language. I have no doubt ;dl America would wifh North-Carolina to be a member of fhe union. It is of importance to tfyem. But we ought to confider whether ten dates can do longer without one, or one without ten ? On a competition^ which will give Way , ? The adopting ftates will fay, " Other dates had ob- f je&ions as well as* you, but rather than feparate they €i agreed to come into the union, truding to the judice " of the other dates for the adoption of proper amend- (t ments afterwards. One mod refpe&able date, Virgi- *< nia, has purfuedthis meafure, though apparently averfe f to the fydem as it now dands. But you have laid down " the condition on which alone you will come into the * c union. We mud accede to your particular propofitions, *< or be difunited from you altogether. Is it fit that c < North-Carolina (hall dictate to the whole union I We f c may be convinced by your reafon, but our conduct will f * certainly not be altered by your refidance-" I beg leave Jo fay, if Virginia thought it right to adopt and propofe amendments, under the circumdances of the Conditution at that time, furely it is much more fo for us in our pre r fent fituation. That date, as was judly obferved, is a mod powerful and refpeftable one. Had (he held out, i*; would have been a fubjeel of mod ferious alarm. But ihe thought the rifk of lofing the uniqn altogether too dange- rous to be incurred. She did not then know of the rati- fication by New-Hampftiire. Jf fhe thought it necefTary to adopt, when only e^ght dates had ratified, is it not much more neceflary for us after the ratification by ten I I do not fay that we ought fervilely to imitate any example, TBut I may fay, that the examples of wife men, and intel- ligent nations, are worthy of refpecl ; and that in general we may be much fafer in following than in departing from them. In my opinion, as many of the amendments pro r pofcH, are fimilar to amendments recommended not only by Virginia, but by other dates, there is a great probabili- ty of their being obtained. All the amendments propofed undoubtedly will not be, nor I think ought to be, but fuch as tend to fecure more effectually the liberties of the peo- ple, ajzainft an abufe of the powers granted, in all human probability, will •, for in fuch amendments all the dates are equally intereftcd. The ptofcbility of fuch amendments. being ( m ) feeing obtained is extremely great, for though three ftates ratified the Conftitution unanimoufly, there has been a confideratye oppofition in the other dates. In New-Hamp- ftiire the majority was fmall. In Maflachufetts there was a ftrong oppofition. In Connecticut the oppofition was about v one third j fo it was in Pennfylvania. In Maryland the minority was fmalj, but very refpeclable. In Virgi- nia they had little more than a bare majority. There was a powerful minority in South-Carolina. Can any man pretend to fay, that thus circumftanced, the ftates would difapprove of amendments calculated to give fatisfactjon to the people at large ? There is a very great probability, if not an abfolute certainty, that amendments will be obtain- ed. The intereft of North-Carolina would add greatly to ' the fcale in their favour. If we do not accede we may injure the ftates who wifti for amendments, by withdrawing our- felves from their afliftance. "We are not at any event in a condition to ftand alone. God forbid we mould be a moment feparated from our fifter ftates. If we are, wc ftiali be in great danger of a feparation forever. I truft eve- ry gentleman will paufe before he contributes to fo awful an event. "We have been happy in our connexion with the other ftates. Our freedom, independence, every thing dear to us, has been derived from that union we are now going raftily to difiblve. Jf we are to be feparated ; let every gentleman well weigh the ground he Hands on before he votes for the feparation. Let him not have to reproach himfelf hereafter that he vofed without due confideration, for a meafure that proved the deftruction of his country. Mr. Iredell then obferved, that there were infinuations thrown out againft thofe who favoured the Conftftution — that they had a view of getting offices and emoluments. He faid, he 1 , hoped no man thought him fo wicked, as to facrifice the intereft of his country to private views. He declared in the moft folemn manner, the infinuation was unjuft and ill-founded as to himfelf. He believed it was fo with refpe® to the reft. The intereft and happinefs of his country fplely governed him on that occafion. He could appeal to fome Members in the Houfe, and particu- larly to thofe who knew him in the lower part of the coun- try, that his difpofition had never been pecuniary, and that he had never afpired Jo offices. At the beginning of the revolution, ( *«* ) ^evolution, he faid, he held one of the bed offices in the. ftate under the crown— an office on which he dependent for his fupport. His relations were in Great- Britain \ yefc v though thus circufrnftanced, fo far was he from being in- fluenced by pecuniary motives, or emoluments of office, that as foon as his fixation, would admit of it, he did not hefitate a moment to join $ie oppofijion to Qrea^-Britain, nor would the richeft office in America have tempted him, to adhere in that unjuft caufe to the I^nti/h government. He. apologifed for taking up the time of the committee, but he obferved |hat reflections of that Ifind were confidered, as having applied, unlefs {hey w^re taken notice of. He- attributed rio unworthy motives to any gentleman in the. Houfe. He believed rnoft of them wifhed to purfue. the intereft of thejr country according to their own ideas of; it. He hoped other gentlemen would be equally liberal. Mr. Willie Jonei obferved, that he affigned unworthy, motives to no o,ne. He thought a gentleman had infinua- ted, that the oppofition all acted ifrom bafp motives. He. was well aflured that their motives were as good as thofe. of the other party, and he thought he had a right to re-, tort by ihewing that felfifti views might influence as well, on one fide as the other. I^e intended however no partir, cular reflections on thofe two gentlemen, who had appli- ed the obfervatitm to themfelves, fpr whom he faid he ha4 the higheft refpeel, and was forry l>e had made the obser- vation as it hac^ given them pain. But if they were con- scious that the pbfervation did not apply to them, they ought not to be offended at it. He then explained the nature of the refolutions he propofed ; and the plair^ jqueftion was, whether they fhould adopt them or not.—. He was not afraid that North-Carolina would, not be ad* mitted at any time hereafter. Maryland, he obferved, had not confederated for many years with the, other dates ' A yet (he was confidered, in the mean time as a member of the union, was allowed as fuch to fend her proportion of men and money, and was at length admitte4 into the con- federacy in 1781. This he faid (hewed how the adopting ftates would acl on the prefent occafion. North-Carolina might come into, the union wfien (lie pjeafed. Governor Johnjlon made fome observations as to the par? ticular cafe of Maryland, but in too low a voice to be difr $in&ly heard. JVfr, ( at$ 3 > Mr. Blood-worth obferved, that the firft Convention Which met to confult on the necefiary alterations of the Confederation, fo as to make it efficient, and put the com* merce of the United States on a better footing, not con- Ming of a fufficient number from the different ftates* fo as to authorize them to proceed, returned without ef- fecting any thing j but propofed that another Convention mould be called, to have more extenfive powers, to alter and amend the Confederation. This proportion of that Convention was warmly oppofed in Congrefs.—Mr. King, from Mafiachufetts, infifttd on the impropriety of the meafure, and that the exifthig fyftem ought to ftand as it was., His arguments, he faid, were, that it might deftroy the Confederation to propofe alterations; that the unani- mous confent of all the ftates was neceflary to introduce thofe alterations, which could not poflibly be obtained ; and that it would therefore be in vain to attempt it. He wondered how gentlemen came to entertain different opi- nions now. He declared he had liftencd with attention, to the arguments of the gentlemen on the other fide, and had endeavoured to remove every kind of bias from his mind, yet he had heard nothing of fufficient weight to induce him to alter his opinion. He was forry that there was any divifion on that important occafion, and wiflied they could all go hand in hand. As to the difadvantages of a temporary exclufion from! the union, he thought them trifling. He afked if a few political advantages could be put in competition with our liberties. Gentlemen faid that amendments would pro- bably be obtained. He thought their arguments and rea* fons were not fo fure a method to obtain them as with- holding their confent would be. He could not conceive that the adopting ftates would take any meafures to keep this ftate out of the union. If a right view were taken of the fubjeft, he faid they could not be blamed in flaying out of the union till amendments were obtained. The compact betwen the ftates was violated by the other ftates and not by North- Carolina. Would the violating party blame the upright party ? This determination would cor- refpond with the opinion of the gentleman who had writ- ten from France on the fubjecl. He would lay ftrefs on no man's opinion, but the opinion of that gentleman wa» very refpt ftable* Mr, ( m ) Mr. Davie — Mr. Chairman, It is faid that there is si fcreat majority againft the Conftitution and in faveur of the gentleman's propofitidn. The objc& of a majority, 1 I fuppofe, is to purfue the mod probable method of ob- taining amendments. The honourable gentleman from Halifax has faid this is the moft eligible method of obtain- ing them. My opinion is the very reverfe j let us weigh the probability of both modes propofed, and determine with Candour which is the fafeft arid furcft method of obtaining the wiihed for alterations. The honourable gentleman from Anfon, has faid that our conduct in adhering tothefe refolutions, would be modeft. What is his idea or defini- tion of modefty ? The term muft be very equivocal \ fo far from being modeft, it appears to me to be no lefs than an arrogant dictatorial propofal of a Conftitutiofr, to the United States of America. We (hall be no part of that confederacy, and yet attempt to dictate to one of the mod powerful confederacies in the world. It is alfo faid to be inoft agreeable to prudence ; if our real object be amend- ments, every man muft agree that the moft likely means Of them are the moft prudent. Four of the moft fefpecl> able ftates have adopted the Conftitution, and recommended amendments, New- York (if fhe refufes to adopf) Rhode- Ifland, and North- Carolina, will be the only ftates out of the union. But if thefe three were added, they would compofe a majority in favour of amendments, and might by various means, compel the other ftates into the meafure. It muft be granted that there is ho way of obtaining a- mendments but the mode prefciibed in the Conftitution % two thirds of the Legiflatures of the ftates in the confede* racy, may require Congrefs to call a Convention to propofe amendments, or the fame proportion of both Houies may propofe them. It will then be of no confequence that we Hand out and propofe amendments ; without adoption we are not a member of the confederacy, and pofleffing no federal rights, can neither make any pf opofition nor require Congrefs to call a Convention. Is it not clear* however ftrange it may be, that we are with-holding our weight from thofe ftates who are of our Own opinion, and by » $erverfe obftiaacy obftru&ing the very meafure we wi(fr to promote. If two thirds of both Houfes arc nccefiary to fend forwatd amendments to the ftates, would it not be prudent ( j«S ) prudent wc that (hould be there and add our vote to the num* ber of thofe ftates who are of the fame fentiment ? The ho- nourable Member from Anfon has likened this bufinefs to a copartnerfhip, comparing fmall things to great. The eomparifon is only juft in one refpecT: — the dictatorial pro- fcofal of North*Carplina to the American confederacy, is like a beggarly bankrupt addre fling an opulent company of mer- chants, and arrogantly telling them, " I wifh to be in copart- nerfhip with you, but «5 the terms muft be fuch as Ipleafe" "What has North-Carolina to put into the flock with the o- ther ftates ? Have we not felt our poverty ? What was the language of Congreis on their laft requifition, on this (late ? Surety gentlemen .muft remember the painful terms in which our delinquency was treated. That gentleman has alfo faid* ". that we mail ftill be a part of the union, and if we b$ €l feparated it is, not our fault." This is an obvious fo.lecifm... It is our own faulty Sir,, and the direcl confe- rence of tne means we are now purfuing. Nprth-Caro- 'lina.ftands foremoft in point of delinquency, and has re- peatedly violated the Confederation. The conduct of this; ftate .has been among the principal caufes which produce^ this revolution in our federal government. The honoura- ble gentleman has alfo added, that it was a rule in law, *' that the fame folemnities were neceiTary to annul which « were necefiary to create or cftablifh a compacl, and that ** as thirteen ftates, created, fq thirteen ftates muft concut *« in the diffolutipn of the Confederation." This may be talking like a lawyer or a judge, but it is very unlike a po- litician ; a majority is the rule of republican decifiqns. It was the voice of a majority of the people of America that gave that fy;ftem validity, and the fame authority can and will annul it at anytime. Every man of common fen fe, tnowi, that political power is political right. Lawyers ma jr. cavil and quibble about the neceflity of unanimity, but the true principle is otherwife. In every republican commu- nity the majority binds the minority, and whether confe- derated or feparated the principle will equally apply. We have a right to come into the union, until we exercif* the right of deciding on the queftion referred to us. Adop- tion places us in the union-r-reje&ion extinguishes the right, forever. The fcheme propofed by thefe gentlemen will certainly be cohered as an. abfolutt rejection; it may fcr amufe ( i&6 ) amufe the people and anfwer a purpofe here, but wilt Hot anfwer any purpofe there. The honourable gentlemaii from Halifax affirm, " we may come in when we pleafe." The gentleman from New-Hanover, on the fame fule of the queftion, endeavoured to alarm and frighten us about the dangerous influence of the eaftern ftates *, if he de- ferves say credit, can we expect they will let us into the union, until they have accomplifhed their particular views, and then but on the moft difadvantageous terms? Com- mercial regulations will be one of the great objects of the rirft fefiion of Congrefs, in which our interefts will be totally negle&ed. Every man muft be convinced of the Importance of the firft acls and regulations \ as they will probably give a tone to the policy of ages yet to come, and this fcheme will add greatly to the influence of the eaftern ftates, aiid proportion ably diminifh the power and inte- refts of the fouthern ftates. The gentleman fays he has a project in his pocket, which he rifks his life will induce the other ftates to give us a fhare of the general impoft. 1 am fully fatisfied, Sir, this project will not anfwer the purpofe, and the forfeiture of his life will be no compenfation for irretrievable public lofs. Every man who knows the refources of our commerce, and ©ur fituation, will be clearly convinced that the project can r not fucceed — the whole produce of our duties,both by land and water is very trifling. For feveral years paft it has not exceeded 10,000 1. of our own paper money. It will not be more, probably lefs, if we are out of the union. The whole proportion of this ftate of the public debts, ex- cept this mere pittance, muft be railed from the people by direct and immediate taxation. But the fact is, Sir, it cannot be raifed, becaufe it cannot be paid; and with- out fharing in the general impoft we fhall never difcharge our quota of the federal debt. What docs he offer the ©ther ftates? The poor pittance I have mentioned. Can we fuppofe Congrefs fo loft to every fenfe of duty, intereft and juftice ? — Would their conftituents permit them to put their hands into their pockets to pay our debts ? We have no equivalent to give them for it. As feveral powerful ftates have propofed amendments, they will no doubt b« Supported with zeal and perfevcrance, fo that it is not pro- vable that the objeft of amendments will be loft. Wt .... r .... ma j ( 2«7 ) may ftruggle on for a few years and render ourfeTves wretched and contemptible, but we mud at laft come into the union on their terms however humiliating they may be. The project on the table is little better than an abfoiute rejection, and is neither rational or politic as it cannot promote the end propofed. Mr. Lock, in reply to Mr. Davit, expreffed fome appre- fienfions that the Gonltitution, if adopted as it then flood, would render the people poor and miserable. He thought -k-^wolild be very produ&ive of expences. The advantage* of the ftnpoft he considered as of little confequ.ence, as he thought all the money raifed that way, and more, would be fwept away by courtly parade — the emoluments of the Prefident,, and other members of the government, the Supreme Court, &c. Thefe expences would double the impod in, his opinion. They would render the dates bank- rapt. The impofts, he imagined, would be inconiiderable. The people of America began to import lefs foreign frip- pery. Every wife planter was fond of home manufac- ture. The northern dates- manufactured confiderably, and he 'thought manufactures would* encrenfe daily. K«5 thought a previous ratification dangerous. The word that could happen would be, that we IhouJd' be thrown out of the union. He would rather that fliould be the cafe, than embrace a tyrannical goverment, and give away our rights and privileges. He was therefore determin- ed to, vote for the nefolutions of the genjlenaan from Ha r lifax. Mr* Spencer obferved^ that if the conduct of North- Ca^ rolina would be immoded and dictatorial, in propofing amendments, and if it was propofing a conditution to the other dates, he was fure the other dates who hacf^ropofed the fame amendments, were equally guilty of immodedy and dictating a conditution to the other date?. The only difference being* that this date does not adopt previoufly. The gentleman had objections to his legal maxims, and* faid they were not politic He would be extremely forry, he faid, if the maxims of juftice mould not take place in politics* Were this to be the cafe, there could be no faith put in any compact. He thought the comparifon of the date to a beggar was a degradation of it, and infided on the propriety of his own comparifon ; which he thought obvious. obvious to any one. He acknowledged that an exclufion from the union would be a mod unhappy circumdahce] fcut he had no idea that it would be the cafe. As this mod* of proceeding would haden the amendments, he could not but Vote for it.' Mr. Jones defined the word modejly by contrafting it with its antagonid impudence. The gentleman found fault with the dbfervation, that this was the mod decent and bed way of obtaining amendments. If gentlemen would propofe a more eligible method, he would confeht to that. He "faid the gentleman had reviled the date by his compa- rison, and mud have hurt the feelings of every gentleman |n the Houfe. He had no apprehenfions that the other ftates would refufe to admit them into the union, when they thought proper to come in. It was their intered to admit them. He afked if a beggar would refufe a boon though it were but a (hilling, or if twelve men ftruggling under a heavy load would refufe the aflidance of a thir- teenth man ? '■ ■ : ,« -.. - . >< ; A defultory converfation now took place. Mr. Davie hoped they would not take up the whole col- lectively, but that the propofed amendments would be' con- fidered one by one. Some other gentlemen exprefled the* fame defire. Many other gentlemen thought the refolution very pro- per as it dood. ; The quedion being put, the refolution was agreed to by a great majority of the committee. " It was then refolved that the committee ftiould rife, Mr. Prefident refumed the chair, and Mr. Kenan re- ported from the commjttee of the whole Convention, that the committee had again had the Cohditution propofed for the future government of the United States undet confederation, and had come to "a retolution thereupon; Which 'he read in his place, and afterward* delivered in at the Clerk's table. 1 Ordered, That the faid report lie on the table until to- morrow morning nine o'clock : To which time the Houfe adjourned. FRIDAY, ( *** } FRIDAY, August i, 1788. The Convention met according to adjournment. Mr. Iredell— Mr. Prefident, I believe, Sir, all debate it now at ah end. It is ufelefs to contend any longer againft a majority that is irrefiftible. We fubmit, with the de- ference that becomes us, to the decifibn of the majority j but my friends and myfelf are anxious that fomething may appear on the journal to (hew our fentimcnts on the fub- je£t. I have therefore a refolution in my hand to offer, hot with a view of creating any debate, (for I know it Will be inftantly rejected) but merely that it may be enter* ed 6n the 'journaV'with the yeas and nays taken upon it, jn order that our coriftituents and the world may know What our opinions really were on this important occafion. We prefer this to the exceptionable mode of a proteft, which might increafe the fpirit of party, and raife ani- inofity among the people of this" country, which is an event we wifti to prevent, if poflible. I therefore, Sir, have the honour of moving, ! «< That* the confideration of the report of the committee <« be poftooned, in order to take up the consideration of << the following refolution.'* Mr. Iredell, then read the refolution in his place, and afterwards delivered it in at the Qlerk's table, arid his mo- tion was feconded by Mr. John Skinner. ! Mr. Jofeph M'Dpivall and feveral other gentlemen, mod ftro'ngly objeclied againft the propriety of this motion. They thought it improper, unprecedented, and a great #ontempft of the voice of the majority. Mr. Iredell replied that he thought it perfectly regular, and by no means a contempt of the majority. The fole intention of it was, to (hew the opinion of the minority, which' could not, in any other manner, be fo properly done. They wifhed to juftify themfelves to their confti- tuents, and the people at large would judge between the merit of the two propofitions. They wilhed aifo to avoid, if poflible, the difagreeable alternative of a proteft. This being the firft time he ever had the honour of being a Member of a reprefentative body, he did not folely con- fide in his own judgment as to the proper manner of bring- ing his refolution forward, but had confulted a very re- fpe&able arid experienced Member of that Houfe, who ?■ ' '••" r - > , - » •• - • had ( 270 ) had recommended this method to him ; and he well knew it was conformable to a frequent practice in Congrefs, as he had obferved by their journals. Each Member had an equal right to make a motion, and if feconded, a vote ought to be taktn upon it, and he trufted the majority would not be fo arbitrary as to prevent them from taking this method to deliver their fentinients to the world. He was fupported by Mr. Machine and Mr. Spaight. Mr. Willie Jottes, and Mr. Spencer infifted on its being irregular^-and faid they might proteft. Mr* Jones faid, there never was an example of the kind before *, that fuch a practice did not prevail in Congrefs when he was a Mem- ber of it, and he well knew no fuch practice had' ever pre- vailed in the AiTembly. Mr. Davie faid, he wasforry that gentlemen mould not deal fairly and liberally with one another. He declared it was perfe&ly Parliamentary, and the u#s for all injuries and. wrongs he may receive in his perfon, property or character j heought to obtain right and juftice freely with- out fale, completely and withqut denial,, promptly and without delay,, and that all eftablimments or regulations contravening thefe rights, are oppreffive and unjuftJ ..-.<•, 1 3th. That exceflive bail ought not to be required, nor exceflive fines impofed, nor cruel and unufual punifliments inflicted. 14th. That every freeman has a right to be fecure from all unrea- fonable fearches and.feizures of his perfon, his papers and property ; all warrants therefore to fearch fufpected places, or to apprehend any; fufpected perfon without fpecially naming or .defcribing the place or jperfon, are dangerous and ought not to be granted. . 15th. That the people have a. right peaceably tp alTemble together to. confult for the common good, or to inftruft their representatives j and that every freeman has a right to petition or apply to the legiftature for redrefs of grievances,* 1 1 6th. That the people have a right to freedom of fpeech,and of •writing and pubiifhing their fentiments ; that the freedom of the prefs Is one of the greateft bulwarks of liberty, and ought not to be violated. 17th. That the people have a right to keep and bear arms ; that a well 1 regulated militia, compofed of the body of the people, trained to arms, is the, proper, natural and fafe defence of a free (tare. That (landing, armies in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, and, therefore ought to be avoided, as far as the circumftances and protection of the commu- »ity.wiil admit , and that in all cafes, the military (hould be under irict fubordination to, and governed by, the .civil power. 18th. That no foldier in time of peace ought to be quartered in any. fioufe without the confent of the owner, and in time of war in fuch manner only as the laws direct.. X9th. That any perfon religioully fcrupulous of bearing arms ought to be exempted, upon payment of an equivalent to employ another to bear arms in his ftead. aoth. That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of difcharging it, can be directed only .by reafon and con- viction, not by force or violence, and therefore all men have an equal, natural and unalienable right to the free exercife of religion, according to the dictates of confeience j and that no particular religious feet or fo- eiety ought to be favoured or eftabliihed by law in, preference toothers* ' JMEND MEN? S to the CONSTITUTION. , I. That each (tare in the union (hall refpectively retain every power, jurifdiction and right, which is not by this conftitution delegated t» the Congreft of the Unittd States, or to the department* of the fede> ral government, II. ( *7J )' * v Y ' • - . , II. That there fhall be one reprefentative for every 30,000^ according to the enumeration or cenfus mentioned in the constitution, until fhe whole number of reprefentatives amounts to two hundred ; after which that number fhall be continued or encreafed as Congrefs fhall direct, upon the principles fixed in the constitution, by apportioning the re- prefentatives of each ftate to fome greater number of people, from! time to time, as population encreafes. III. When Congrefs (li all lay direct taxes or excifes, they fhall imme- diately inform the executive power of each ftate, of the quota of fuch! ftate, according to the cenfus herein directed, which; is propofed to be thereby faifed : And if the legislature of any ftate fh'all pafs a )aw,whichi fhall be effectual for raifing fuch quota at the time required by Congrefs^ the taxes and excifes laid by Congrefs (hall not be collected in fuch ftate*. IV. That the members of taftfift^te .and; noufe of reprefentatives (hall be ineligible to, and incafmble of, holding any civi.l office under the authority of the United States, during the time for which they fhall refpectively be elected. V. That the journals of the proceedings of the fenate and houfe of reprefentatives fhall be publifhed at leaft once in every year, except fuel* parts thereof relating to treaties, alliances, or military operations, as in their judgment require fecreCy. VI. That a regular ftatemcnt and account of receipts and expendi- tures of all public monies fhall be publifhed at leaft once in every year.. VII. That ho commercial treaty fhall be ratified without the concur- rence of two-thirds of the whole number of the members of tile fenate 5 And no treaty, ceding, contracting, reftraining or fufperiding the terri- torial rights or claims of, the United' States, or any of them, or their, cr any of their rights, or claims to fifhing in the American feas, or navi- gating the American rivers, fhall be made, but in cafes of the mod ur- gent and extreme neeeffity j nor fhall any fuch treaty be ratified with- out the concurrence of three-fourths-of the whole number of the mem- bers of both houfes refpectively. VIII. That no navigation law, or law regulating commerce, fhalt be paffed without the confent' of two-thirds of the members prefent in both houfes. IX. That no (landing army or regular troops fhall be raifed or kept tip in lime of peace, without the confent of two-thirds of the members prefent in both houfes. X. Tf'hat no foldier fhall be enlifted for any longer term than four years, except in time of war, and then for no longer terra than the continuance of the war. XI. That each ftate refpectively fhall have the power to provide for organizing, arming and difciplining its own militia whehfoever Congrefs fhall omit or neglect to provide for the fame. That the militia fhall noe be fubject to martial law, exeeptjwhen in actual fervice in time of war;, iyivafion or rebellion : And when not in the actual fervice of the United States, fhall be fubject only to fuch fines,' penalties and punifhmentsaa Jhall be directed of inflicted by the laws of its own ftate. XII. That Congrefs fhall not declare any ftate to be in rebellion. Without the confent of at leaft two-thirds of all the members prefent ©f both houfes. XII t. That the exclufive power of legiflation given to Congrefs or?* M n* the- I -74 ) Mie federal tewn and its adjacent difttia, and other places purchafecti •r to be purchaied by Congrefs of any of the Kates, (hall extend onlf *°™ r £f " lat,ons as 'efpea the police and good government thereof. XIV. 1 hat no perion (hall be capable of being preiident of theUnited States for more than eight years in any term of hxteen years. XV. That the judicial power of the United States mall be vefted 1ft •one fupreme court, and in fuch courts of admiralty as Congrefs may from time to tunc ordain and eftablim in any of the different rtates. The judici- al power /hall extend to all cafes in law and equity, arifing under treaties made, or winch Thai] behiSdc Under the authority of thellnited States* to all cafes affecting ambafladors, other "foreign miniffers and confuU to all caies of admiralty, and maritime jurifdiaion ; to controverfies to which the Umted States mall be a party j to controverfies between two or more (fates, and between partiesjiriming lands under the grants of different ftates j hi all cafes affeainMbafladors, other foreign mini Iters and confuls, a*d thofe in which a Tate (hall be a party : the fupreme court (hall have original jurifdiaion in all other caTe's before mentioned • the fupreme court (hall have appellate jurifliaioh' as to matters of lav* only, except in cafes of equity, and of admiralty and maritime jurifdiai- on, in which the fupreme court (hall have appellate jurifdiaion both as to la* and faa with fuch exceptions and under fuch regulations as the Congrefs mail make : But the judicial power of the United States (hall extend to no C^Ct where theScaufe of aaion fliall have o. iginated before the ratification of this cbnftitution, except in difputes between ftates about their territory $ difputes between perfons claiming lands under th« gr ™\ ^ • nt ftat ' S ' a ," d fuits for debts Jue t0 the U ^ted States. XVI. That in criminal profecutions, no man (hall be regained in theexerc.feof the ufual and accultomed right of challenging or ex- cepting to the jury. & XV I h That Congrefs (hall not alter, modify, or interfere in the times, places, or manner of holding eieclidhs for fcnators and reprefen- tatives, or either of them except when the legislature of any Mate (hall »egle6 refufe or be d.fabled by invafion or rebel lion, to prefcribe the fame. XVIII. That thofe claufes which declare that Congrefs (hall not ex- crc.fe certain powers, be not interpreted in any manner whatfoever t* ..xtend the powers of Congrefs ; but that they be conftrued either as making exceptions to the fpecified powers where this mall be the cafe or xrtherwife, as inferted merely for greater caution. XIX. That the laws afcertaining the corapenfatlon of Tehators and representatives, for their fervices, be poftponed in their operation until after the eleaion of reprefentatives immediately fucceeding the pafcW the ™f> $ zt «cepted which (hall firft be pafled on lhe*' fftg laws of the United States in Congrefs affembled (hall be valid* \m?. tU fuch laws fliall.be repealed, or made conformable to fuch treaty ; no* fhall any treaty be valid which is contradictory to the ccnitituiion of the United States. XXl V. That the latter part of the 5th paragraph of the 9th feclion of the rirft article be altered to' read thus— 'Nor ftiall veflels bound to a par* ticular (late fye obliged to enter or pay duties in any other; nor when. bound from any one of the ltates be obliged to clear in another. XXV. That Congrefs Jhall not dire&ly or indirectly, either by them- felves or through the judiciary, interfere with any one of the ltates in th« redemption of paper money already emitted and now in circulation, or m liquidating and,difchargirig the public fecuritiesof.any oneof the ltates, but each and every ftate fhail have the ex.clufive right of, making fuclv, laws and regulations for the above puipofes as they mail think proper. XXVI. That Con greis mall, not introduce foreign troops into the United States without the confent of two-thirds, of the members pre- ient of both.houfes. Mr. Spencer then, moved, that the rep.prt of; the commit- tee be concurred with, and was,feconded by Mr. Jofeph, Mr. Ire fall moved^ " That the consideration of that. «5 motion be poftponed, in order to take into confiderati- |tf on the following refolutipn." (Which refolution was the fame he introduced before, and which he afterwards, in fubftance, moved by way of; amendment^) This gave rife to.a very warm, altercation on both (ides* during wnich the Houfe was in great confufion. Many gentlemen, in tfie majority (particularly Mr. Willie Jones) itrongly contended, againft the. propriety of the motion. Several; gentlemen in the minority refented in ftrong terms the arbitrary attempt of the majority (as they termed it) to fupprefs thetr fentiments ; and Mr* Spaight y in,parti- ticular, took notice, with great indignation, o£ the motion ma?le. to, concur with the committee, when the gentleman from Edenton appeared* in fomc meafure to have had the faith of the Houfe, that he fhould have an opportunity to renew his motion t which he had withdrawn at the requeft of fome of the majority* themfelves, Mr. Whitmill Hill fpoke with great warmth, and declared that in his opinion, if the majority perfevered in their tyrannical attempt, the minority fhoiild fecede. Mr. Willie Jones, ilill contended that the motion was al- together irregular and improper, and made a motion cal- culated to (hew that fuch a motion, made and feconded un-; der the circumftances in which it had been introduced^ Vfis not en^titied c to be entered oa the journal. His motion ( 2 7 6 ) being feconded, was carried by a great majority. Thp yeas and nays were moved for, and were taking, when Mr. Iredell arofe, and faid, he was fenfible of the irregularity fie was guilty of, and b°ped he mould be excufed for it^ J)ut it arofe from his defire of faving the Houfe trouble. That Mr. Jones (he begged pardonfor naming'him) had pro r pofed an expedient to riim, with which he fhould be per- |e£Uy fatisfied, if the Houfe approved of it, as it was in- different to jiim what was the mode, if his objeel: in fub- itance was obtained. The method propofed was, that the motion for concurrence mould be Withdrawn, and his re- solution fhould be moved by way of amendment. If the Houfe therefore approved of this method, and the gentle- men who had moved and feconded the motion would agree to withdraw it, he hoped it would be deemed unneceflary to proceed with the yeas and nays. Mr. Nathan B^ryan faid, the gentleman treated the ma- jority with contempt. Mr. Iredell declared he had no fuch, intention, but as the yeas and nays were taken on a diffe- rence between both fides of the Houfe, which he hoped might be accommodated, he thought he might be excufe4 for the liberty he had taken. Mr. Spencer and Mr. M'Pqwall, after fome observations riot diftin&Iy heard, accordingly withdrew their motion ; and it was agreed that the yeas and nays fhoujd not be tak- en, nor the motion which occafioned them entered or* the journal. Mr. Iredelh then moved as follows, viz. That the report of the committee be amended, by ftrik? ing out all the words of the-faid report except the two firft, viz. ail refpe&ively retain every power, ju- rifdiction and right, which is not by this Conftitution delegated to the jCongrefs of the United States, or to the departments of the general go- vernment j rjor /hall the faid Congrefs, or any department of the faid go- vernment, exercife any act of authority over any individual in any of the faid ftatcs, bijt fuch as can be juftified under fome power, particularly given in this conftitution j but the faid conftitution fliali be confidered at ail times a ibjemn inftrument defining the extent of their authority, and the limits of which they cannot rightfully in any inftance exceed. II. There (hall be one reprefentative for every thirty thoufand, accord- ing to the enumeration or cenfus, mentioned in the conftitution, until th« whole number of representatives ^mounts to two hundred } after which that number (hall be continued or encreafed as Congrefs (hall di- rect, upon the principles fixed in the conftitution, by apportioning the representatives qf each Itate to fome greater number of people, from time to time, as population encreafes, III. Each ftate refpectively mall have the power to provide for or- ganising, arming and difciplining its own mU^tia, whenfoever Congrefs fyall omit or neglect to provide for the fame. The militia (hall not be fubject to martial law, except when in a&ual fervice in tjm e °f wa *"> inva- sion or rebellipn j and when they are not in the. actual fervice of the - Uniffed States, they (hall he fubject only to fuch fines, penalties andpu- liifhments as (hall be directed or inflicted by the laws of its own ftate. IV. The Congrefs (h,all not alter, modify* or interfere in the times, places, or manner of holding elections for fenators and reprefeatatives, or either of them, except when the legiflature of any ftate (hall neglect, refufe or be difabled by invafion, or rebellion,*, to prefcribe the fame. V. The laws afcertaining the compenfation of fenators and reprefen- tatives for their fervices, (hall bepoftponed in their operation, until af- ter the election of representatives immediately facceeding the paffinj* thereof.; that excepted, which (hall firft be parted on the fubject. $vT. Inftead of the following words in the oth fection of the ift ar- ticle, viz,. " Nor (hall veflels bound to or from one ftate, be obliged to enter, clear or pay duties in another :" [The meaning of which is by many deemed not fu f fickn tW explici t : ] It is propofed that the follow* ing mail be fubftituted : "No veflel bound to onfe ftate (hall be oblig- ed to enter or pay duties to which fuch veflel may be liable at any port of entry, in any other ft&te than that to which fuch veflel is bound s- Nor (hail anyveflel bound from one ftate, be obliged to clear or pay du- ties to which fuch veflel may be liable at any port of clearance, in any other ftate than that from which fuch veflel is bound." lie was fecondecLby Mr. John Skinner, The queftion was then put, " Will the Convention adopt that amendment or not ?" And it was negatived : Where- upon Mr. Iredell moved that the yeas and nays mould be taken, and he wa,s feconded by Mr. Steele, They were accordingly taken, and were as follow : YEAS— His Excellency Samuel Johnfton, Efq. Prefident, MeflTrs. lames Iredell, Archibald Machine, Nathan Kcais, Iohn G. Blount, Thomas Aldeifon, John Johnfton, Andrew Oliver, <5oodwin Ellifton, Charles ( *7* I #harles M'Dowall, Richard D. Spaight, Willianj I. Dawfon, lames IPorterfield, William Barry Grove, George Elliott, Wallis Styron, William Shepperd, Carteret, lames Philips, Iohn Humphries, Mi- chael Payne, Charles J ohnfon, Stephen Cabarrus, Edmund Biount, Chowan, Henry Abbot, Iiaac Gregory, Peter Dauge, Charles Grandy, Enoch Sawyer, George Lucas, Iohn Willis, Iohn Cade, EJias Barnes, Neil Brown, Iame§ Winchefter, William Stokes, Thomas Stewart, Jofiah Collins^ Thomas Hines, Nathaniel Jones, Iohn Steele, Wil- liam R. Davie, Jofeph Reddick, lames Gregory, Thomas Hunter, Gates, Thomas Wynsi Abraham Jones, Iohn Eborne, lames Jafper, Caleb Foreman, Seth Hovey, Iohn Sloan, Iohn Moore, William Maclaine, Nathan Mayo', William S.la4e, William M'Kenate, Ro- bert Irwin, John Lane, Thomas Reading, Edward Everagain, Enoch Relfe, Devotion Davis, William Skinner, jofhua Skinner, Thomas Hervey, Iohn Skinner, SamnelJiarrel, JofepH Leech, Wm. Bridges, William Burden, Edmund Blount, *Tyrrek Simeon Spruil, David Tanner, Whitmill Hill, Benjamin Smith, Iohn Sitgreaves, Natha- niel Allen, Thomas Owen, George Wyns, David, Perkins, Jofeph, Jperebee, William Ferebee, William Baker, and Abner ; Neate.— 84. NAY§-—MeiTrs. Willie Jones, Samuel Spencer, Lewis Lanier, Thomas Wade, Daniel Gould, lames Bonner, Alexius' M. Fofter^ Lewis Dupree^ X" 011138 Brown, lames Greenlee, Joleph M'Dowall,' Robert Miller, Benjamin Williams, Richard Nixon, Thomas AJfm- ftrong, Alexander M'Allifter, Robert Dkkins, George Roberts, Iohn- Womack, Ambrpfe Ramfey, lames Anderfon, Jos, Stewart^ WiU" liam Veftal, Thomas Evans, Thomas Hardlman, Robert Weakley, William Donnelfon, William Dobins, Robert Diggs, Bythel Bell," Elifha Rattle, William Fort, Etheld. Gray, William Lancafter, Tho- 1 mas Sherrod, ^chn Norwood, Sterling Dupree, Robert Williams, Richard Moye, Arthur Forbes, David Caldwell, William Goudy, Daniel Gillefpie, Iohn Anderfon, Iohn Hamilton, Thomas Perfon,' Jofeph Taylor, Thornton Yancey, Howell Lewis, jun. E* Mitchell, George Moore, George Ledbetter, William Porter, Zebedee Wood, Edmund Waddeil, Xames Galloway, Iohn Regan, Jofeph Winftonj" James Gains, Charles M'Annelly, Abfalom Boftick, Iohn Scott,' Iohn Dunkin, David 9 0c ^> Curtis Ivev^^e^is^ Holmes, Richard' Clinton, Hardy Holmes, Robert Alifpn, lames Stewart, Iohn Tip- ton, Iohn Macon, Thomas Chriftmaijj, Henry Montfort, William Taylor, Iamea Hanl^y, Britain Saupdert, William Lenoir, Richard^ Allen, Iohn Brown, jof. Herndon, lames Fletcher, Lemuel Burkit, William Little, Thomas Kang, Nathan Bryan, Iohn H f %y*n, Ed- ward Whitty, Robert Alexander, lames Johnfon, Iohn Cox, Iohn Carrsl, Corn. Doud, Thomas Tyfon, WilUam Martin, Thomas Hunter, Martin, Iohn Graham, William fopfc"» William Kindal, Thomas UlTery, Thomas Butler, Iehn BemrWd, lames Vaughan, Robert Peebles, lames Vinfon, William S. Marnes, Howell Ellin,' Redman Bunn, Iohn Bonds, David Pridgen, Daniel Yates, Thomas' Johnfton, Iohn Spicer, A.Tatom, Alexander Mebane, William Me- bane, William M'Cauley, William. Shepperd, Orange, Jonathan JLinley, Wyatt Hawkins, lames Payne, Iohn Graves, Iohn Blair, Jofeph Tipton, William Bethel), Abraham Phillips, Iohn May* Charles Galloway, lames Bofwell, Iohn M'Alliftcr, David Looney, ' v John ( 279 ) Iohn Sharpe, Jofeph Gaitier, Iohn A. Campbell, Iohn PugH Wil- liams, William Marshall, Charles Robertfon, lames Gillefpie, Charles Ward, William Randal, Frederick Hargel, Richard M'Kinnie, Iohn Cains, Jacob Leonard, Thomas Carfon, Richard Singleton, lames Whitfide, Caleb Phifer, Zachias Wilfon, Jofeph Douglas, T homas Dougan, lames Kenan, Iohn Jones, Egbert Hay ^ood, Wil- liam Wootten, Iohn Branch, Henry Hill, Andrew Bafs, Jofeph Boon, William Farmer, John Bryan, Edward Williams, Francis Oli- ver, Matthew Brooks, Griffith Rutherford, George H. Barringer, Timothy Bloodworth, Everet Pearce, Afahel Rawlins, lames Wrl- Ton,, lames Roddy, Samuel Cain, Benj. Covington, Jofeph M'Dowall jun. Durham Hall, lames Bloodworth, Joel Lane, lames Hinton, Thomas Devane, lames Brandon, William Dickfon, Burwell Moor- ing, Matthew Lock, and Stokely Donelfon.— 184. Ordered, That the further coafideration of the report of the committee of the whole Convention be poftponed un- til to-morrow. After proceeding on another bufinefs which had been afligned them, (fixing on a feat of government) the Con- vention adjourned till to-morrow morning fix o'clock. SATURDAY, August 2, 1788. The Convention met according to adjournment. The report of the committee of the whole Convention, Recording to order, was taken up and read in the fame words as on yefterday ; when it was moved by Mr. Perfon t and feconded by Mr. Maeon, that the Convention do con- cur therewith, which was objected to by Mr, A, Machine. The queftion being put, " Will the Convention concur, with the report of the committee of the whole Convention or not V* It was carried, in the affirmative. Whereupon Mr. Davie moved for the yeas and yeas, and was feconded by Mr. ; Cabarrus. They were accordingly taken : And thofe who voted yefterday againft the amendment, voted for concurring with the report of the committee — thofe who voted in favour of the amendment now voted againft a concurrence with tta report. [See their names page 278. J On motion by MWWillie Jones, and feconded by Mr. James Galloway, the following refolution was adopted by a large majority, viz. Whereas this Convention has thought proper neither to ratify nor reject the Conftitution propofed for the go* vernment of the United States ; and as Congrefswill pro- ceed to aft under the faid Conftitution, ten ftates having ratified ratified the fame, and probably lay ah impoft on g$S&$ imported into the faid ratifying ftate6 : Refblved, That it be recommended to the Legiflature of this ftate, that whenever Gongrefs (hall pafs a law for collecting an impoft in the ftates aforefaid, this ftate enact a law for collecting a ftmilar impoft on goods im- ported into this ftate, and appropriate the money arifing therefrom, to the ufe of Congrefs. .i On a motion made by Mr. Wlllk Jones, and fecorided l)y Mr. James Galloway, Refohed unnnimoujly, That it be recommended to the General Afiem.bly to take effe&tfal meafures for the re- demption of the paper currency, as fpeedily as may be, confiftent with the fituation and circumftances of the peo- ple of this ftate. On a motion made by Mr. Willie Jones y and fecondecf by Mr. Jarnes Galloway, . Refohed unanimoujly, That the Honourable the Prefix dent be requefted to tranfmit to Congrefs, and to the Ex- ecutive of New-Hampftiire, Maffachufetrs, Connecticut/ Jfchode-Ifland, New- York, New-Jcrfey, Pennfylvania, De- laware, Maryland, Virginia, SoUth-Carolina, and Georgia, a copy of the fefblution of the committee of the whol? Convention oh the fubjecl: of the Confutation propofec| for the government of the united States, concurred witlr by this Convention, together with a copy of this refolu- tions on the fubjeel: of impoft and paper money. The Convention afterwards proceeded to the bufinefs of fixing the feat of government, and on Monday, Auguft 4, adjourned Ji fie die* | 8^ 'the per/on ivho took the debates, having %ad a very inconvenient feat in the gallery and hawing been frequently mtilcjled by the wife made . in the gallery and below, is afraid that there may be fame inaccuracies and omijjions in them. But he can truly affure the gentlemen vohofpohe in Con- vention in particular, and the public in general, that he paid thefiricleji mndmofl inviolable regard tojujiice and impartiality , nor