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This book must not 
 be taken from the 
 Library building. 
 
 Form No. 471 
 
THE BATTLE OF KINGS MOUNTAIN 
 AND THE BATTLE OF THE COWPENS 
 
Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 
 in 2012 with funding from 
 
 University of North Carolina at Chapel Hil 
 
 http://archive.org/details/historicalstatemOOarmy 
 
70th Congress, 1st Session » « • House Document No. 328 
 
 HISTORICAL STATEMENTS 
 
 CONCERNING 
 
 THE BATTLE OF KINGS MOUNTAIN 
 
 AND 
 
 THE BATTLE OF THE COWPENS 
 
 SOUTH CAROLINA 
 
 UNITED STATES 
 
 GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
 
 WASHINGTON 
 
 1928 
 
HOUSE RESOLUTION No. 230 
 Presented by Mr. Stevenson 
 
 Resolved, That the historical statements concerning the Battle of the Cowpens, 
 South Carolina, of January 17, 1781, and the Battle of Kings Mountain, South 
 Carolina, October 7, 1780, both prepared by the Historical Section of the Army 
 War College, be printed, with illustrations, as a document. 
 
 William Tyler Page, 
 CUr\. 
 
 1 = 1 
 
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL 
 
 War Department, 
 Washington, April 21, 1928. 
 Hon. William F. Stevenson, 
 
 House of Representatives. 
 Dear Mr. Stevenson: In compliance with the request contained in your letter 
 of March 20, 1928, 1 am pleased to inclose herewith a historical statement con- 
 cerning the Battle of the Cowpens, South Carolina, of January 17, 1781, prepared 
 by the Historical Section of the Army War College. 
 
 Very sincerely, 
 
 Dwight L. Davis, 
 
 Secretary of War. 
 
 I nil 
 
 
THE BATTLE OF KINGS MOUNTAIN 
 SOUTH CAROLINA 
 
 October 7, 1780 
 
THE BATTLE OF KINGS MOUNTAIN 
 
 Part I 
 
 THE SUBJUGATION OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
 
 ! HE Battle of Kings Mountain, South Carolina, 
 occurred on the 7th day of October, 1780, and 
 
 T£$£4 resulted in the defeat of Lieutenant Colonel 
 ^Y2 Ferguson, who commanded the royal forces, 
 2#l?( and the loss of his command, not one man 
 escaping from the battle field. The thorough' 
 ness of the disaster, and the death of the 
 brave and highly trusted leader, was by far the most serious blow 
 to which the British forces operating in the Southern Provinces 
 had been subjected. The immediate effect upon Cornwallis was 
 to put an end, for the time being, to the further subjugation 
 of the Province of North Carolina. His contemplated advance 
 from Charlotte Town to Salisbury was menaced by a new and 
 unheard of enemy — the men under Campbell, Shelby, Sevier, and 
 others — who came from the region of the mountains, and the back' 
 waters that flow to the west; from places so remote and unknown 
 to the British leaders as to be almost mythical. This avenging 
 horde made necessary a hasty revision of Cornwallis's plans follow' 
 ing Kings Mountain, which resulted in his immediate withdrawal 
 to the South, and the concentration of his main army, detached 
 posts, and flanking parties, into positions capable of rendering 
 mutual assistance. 
 
 These hardy men of the Blue Ridge and Alleghenies, of deep 
 religious convictions, were accustomed to the hardships and inde' 
 pendence of a pioneer life, and in their mountain homes in the 
 highlands and the backwaters they but seldom were concerned 
 
 111 
 
THE BATTLE OF KIKGS MOUNTAIN 
 
 with affairs beyond their borders or interfered with by Crown or 
 colony. When Ferguson approached their kingdom and threatened 
 to invade their lands and lay waste their country with "fire and 
 sword," and to "hang their leaders," he aroused their indignation 
 and anger to such a degree that they determined to rid the country 
 forever of this enemy, who menaced their independence and the 
 safety of their homes and families. Had Cornwallis and his leaders 
 known more about these mountain and backwater men, they would 
 have carefully avoided all military and punitive measures which 
 might tend to draw them from their mountain fastnesses to enroll 
 amongst the enemies of the King. 
 
 The causes of the Revolution were but little known to many 
 of these pioneers beyond the Blue Ridge. They were concerned in 
 the establishment of their homes, breaking the soil of their new 
 settlements, and wringing a livelihood from it; and with their rifles 
 securing much of their sustenance. They sought the seclusion of 
 the western waters; and in the valleys of the Holston, the Watauga, 
 and the Nolichucky, found freedom in the exercise of their reli' 
 gion. Had the western covering force of Cornwallis's army, as it 
 advanced into the Province of North Carolina, confined its activ' 
 ities to the plains and lowlands east of the Blue Ridge, and had not 
 Ferguson from Gilbert Town uttered his threat of fire and sword 
 and the hangman's noose, these mountain men would probably 
 have remained in their homes, and but few of them would have 
 joined with those who were in rebellion against the King. 
 
 The Battle of Kings Mountain was fought by men on both sides 
 whose bravery should be a matter of pride to all posterity. The 
 troops commanded by Ferguson were Americans, or persons who 
 had come to the Provinces prior to the Revolution. His command 
 consisted of about 125 picked officers and men, taken from several 
 regular battalions raised in New York and New Jersey, and formed 
 into a temporary Provincial Corps. These men were Loyalists, and 
 they gave their services to the Crown with the same high sense of 
 duty which prompted their brothers and neighbors to rebel against 
 
 [21 
 
THE BATTLE OF KIHGS MOUNTAIN 
 
 further domination by Great Britain. Supplementing the Provin' 
 cial Corps was a greater number of Tory militia, enrolled in the 
 Carolinas. Their services were offered for a variety of reasons; 
 some because of their belief that the government of the mother 
 country should continue, others because of expediency so that their 
 lands and possessions might be given the protection of the British 
 flag, still others served as soldiers of fortune under the flag which 
 they believed would be successful, and a small number were influ' 
 enced by a base desire to rob and plunder under the license usually 
 associated with partisan warfare. 
 
 Under the confederated leaders, who commanded at Kings 
 Mountain, were a few refugees from the lowlands, some small 
 groups from the counties east of the mountains, and a large number 
 of mountain and backwater men whose independence was being 
 threatened by an alien invader. In answering the call to embody 
 under their local leaders, there existed the definite understanding 
 among these mountain men that they were going into the lowlands 
 to fight, and that they would not return to their homes until they, 
 or Ferguson, had been defeated. 
 
 At Kings Mountain the defenders used the bayonet and the rifle 
 until their losses made surrender of the survivors inevitable. The 
 attackers faced bullet and bayonet, and responded with an expert 
 use of the rifle, with which they were familiar, due to their fre' 
 quent stalking of game and Indians. The mountain men were not 
 accustomed to the bayonet, but they were expert in taking cover 
 behind rocks and trees. Ferguson was confident that his position 
 rendered him secure against any untrained and unorganized horde 
 which might attack him. His Provincial Corps were trained in the 
 use of the bayonet and were commanded by competent leaders. 
 The militia had received some limited training in the art of war, 
 and were provided with long hunting knives to be attached to their 
 rifles, in lieu of the bayonet. Their marksmanship was not as effec 
 tive as was that of the mountain men, as conditions of life in the 
 lowlands were not such as to make their daily existence dependent 
 
 131 
 
THE BATTLE OF KIHGS MOUHTAIH 
 
 upon accurate use of the rifle. Ferguson was a trained soldier, an 
 able leader, and, together with Tarleton, one of Cornwallis''s most 
 valuable lieutenants. 
 
 In both the Carolinas there was a large number of citizens, 
 and probably a majority, whose sympathies at one time or another 
 in 1780 were with the Royal Government. They believed that a 
 rebellion could not, and should not, succeed. In commenting on the 
 internecine warfare carried on without cessation, General Greene 
 wrote on the 23d of May, 1781, more than five months after he had 
 assumed command of the Southern Department: 
 
 The animosity between the Whigs and Tories of this State renders their 
 situation truly deplorable. There is not a day passes but there are more or less 
 who fall a sacrifice to this savage disposition. The Whigs seem determined to 
 extirpate the Tories and the Tories the Whigs. Some thousands have fallen in 
 this way in this quarter, and the evil rages with more violence than ever. If a 
 slop can not be put to these massacres, the country will be depopulated in a few 
 months more, as neither Whig nor Tory can live. 
 
 The Battle of Kings Mountain was not an isolated action; it was 
 the high spot of 1780 in the South. The surrender of Charleston, 
 the defeat of the American forces at Camden on the 16th of August, 
 of Sumter two days later, the many engagements of lesser impor' 
 tance, all added prestige to the royal cause, resulting in the com' 
 plete subjugation of Georgia and South Carolina. Cornwallis had 
 advanced as far as Charlotte Town in North Carolina and was 
 preparing to move his headquarters to Salisbury, when the unex' 
 peeled blow delivered by the mountain men at Kings Mountain 
 brought to an immediate end the thought of further conquest and 
 made necessary the withdrawal of the British forces into South 
 Carolina and the assumption of a defensive role for several months 
 thereafter. Therefore, to have an intelligent understanding of the 
 Battle of Kings Mountain and its effect upon the southern cam' 
 paign of 1780, it is necessary to know something of the movements 
 of the King's forces from the time Charleston was invested. 
 
 The British land forces in America were commanded by Sir 
 Henry Clinton, whose official title was "General and commander 
 in chief of His Majesty's forces in the several Provinces in America 
 
 141 
 
THE BATTLE OF KIHGS MOUHTAIH 
 
 on the Atlantic, from Nova Scotia to west Florida, inclusive." 
 Vice Admiral Mariot Arbuthnot commanded the fleet, and Lord 
 Cornwallis, who had been designated by Whitehall as second in 
 command to Clinton, held a dormant commission giving him the 
 rank of general in America, only, should an unforeseen accident 
 happen to the commander in chief. 
 
 In the latter part of 1779 the Americans made an unsuccessful 
 attempt to recover Savannah from the British, and following this 
 failure the French fleet, which supported the move, departed for 
 the West Indies. Clinton and Arbuthnot now considered the time 
 propitious to make another attempt against Charleston, with the 
 idea of occupying the Carolinas, giving support to the Tories and 
 popularising the Crown cause. Furthermore, such a move would 
 result in curtailing colony traffic with Europe by way of the 
 Chesapeake. 
 
 Upon completion of their plans, the amphibious expedition 
 under Clinton and Arbuthnot sailed from its base, New York, 
 December 26, 1779. Charleston Harbor was occupied, siege laid to 
 the city, and on the 12th of May General Lincoln surrendered the 
 town and its garrison. 
 
 Upon the capitulation of Charleston, Clinton considered that 
 the major effort in the subjugation of the Province had been accom- 
 plished, and that, with this showing of the power of the Crown, 
 most of the inhabitants would join the loyal cause. It would be 
 necessary, of course, to occupy the country with a considerable 
 land force, and thereby give protection to loyal sympathizers, but 
 it was thought that the British regular force under his command 
 would be largely augmented by Tory militia, who would aid in 
 keeping the revolutionists suppressed. 
 
 Cornwallis commanded in the field, and on May 17 had a force 
 of regulars to the number of 2,542 rank and file, which Clinton 
 believed would be sufficient, when augmented by militia, to sub' 
 jugate South Carolina and continue the campaign into North Care 
 lina. At the same time Cornwallis was advised that in view of the 
 
 151 
 
THE BATTLE OF KIKGS MOUHTAIH 
 
 importance of his mission, troops were not to be sainted, and he 
 was offered, by Clinton, any that he might desire from the garrisons 
 of the several forts. For the initiation of the campaign, his army 
 was to be augmented by the light infantry and the Fortysecond 
 Regiment, with the understanding that they were to be returned 
 to Clinton as soon as they could be spared, as his contemplated 
 operations to the northward would be cramped without them. 
 Corn walks was of the belief that he had sufficient regular forces to 
 eventually control all the territory from the Floridas to Virginia, 
 and on the 18th of May wrote Clinton that he would regret to see 
 left behind any part of the troops destined for use elsewhere, and 
 unless considerable reinforcements of Continentals should come 
 from the northward to join the revolutionists, he would not need 
 more assistance. He suggested that the publication of intelligence 
 by Clinton that he and Arbuthnot were moving to the Chesa' 
 peake would probably stop off, on those waters, any reinforcements 
 intended for the Carolinas. In case Clinton learned before sailing 
 to the north that enemy reinforcements were well on their way, 
 Corn walks asked that his co mm and be increased by some five or six 
 hundred British or Hessians. It will be noted later that at this time 
 Washington and Congress were preparing Maryland and Debt' 
 ware troops, under De Kalb, to march to the South, and that, by 
 resolution of Congress, these two States were transferred to the 
 Southern Department. 
 
 On May 20 the kght infantry and the Fortysecond Regiment, 
 promised to CornwalKs to supplement his forces temporarily, 
 marched to Monks Corner and reported. At this time both the 
 commander in chief and Corn walks were hopeful that South Caro' 
 lina would offer but kttle resistance to complete subjugation, 
 although there was, in Clinton's mind, a measure of doubt, for he 
 knew that the entire success of the campaign would depend upon 
 whether or not "the temper of our friends in those districts is such 
 as it has always been represented to us." 
 
 The time arrived when Clinton and the fleet could no longer 
 delay departure for the north. La Fayette had returned to America 
 
 161 
 
THE BATTLE OF KIHGS M0UH7AIH 
 
 on April 27, with the promise of his Government that a French 
 fleet and army would follow him in a short time. Information of 
 this early augmentation of the enemy forces reached Arbuthnot 
 and Clinton, and they deemed it advisable to assemble the fleet and 
 troops at New York, and for the time being make no move against 
 the Chesapeake. Cornwallis was instructed that after he had fin' 
 ished his southern campaign of subjugation, and by his presence 
 and show of force convinced the people that it was to their best 
 interests to maintain allegiance to the Crown, he was to leave in 
 the South such forces as he might consider necessary to dominate 
 the territory, and send the remainder to the Chesapeake to assist 
 in the operations which were to be undertaken there as soon as 
 Clinton was relieved of the apprehension of a superior fleet and the 
 season was far enough advanced to permit of campaigning in that 
 climate. It was supposed at the time that the move to the Chesa' 
 peake could be undertaken in September or the early part of 
 October. Cornwallis was to command the troops which would be 
 concentrated for this operation. 
 
 From his headquarters in the field, Cornwallis corresponded 
 with loyalists in North Carolina, informing them of his hopes for 
 the prompt subjugation of South Carolina and advising with them 
 as to what immediate militant acts, if any, they should engage in. It 
 was not desired that any partisan of the King should become very 
 active in the field at this time, for fear that the rebels would like' 
 wise become embodied and produce a situation inimical to the 
 success of his army when it approached the border of the Province. 
 However, if the loyalists considered themselves a match for the 
 Whigs, and were determined to rise without further delay, he 
 promised all the assistance in his power, by incursions of light 
 infantry and furnishing ammunition. It soon became evident that 
 this hopeful view of any early conquest was not to be realized, 
 for there were many questions of supply and transportation to be 
 arranged before the army could move far from its base, and matters 
 of civil administration to be adjusted, so that the government of the 
 territory in rear of the royal army would offer safety to the troops. 
 
 171 
 
THE BATTLE OF KIHGS MOUHTAIH 
 
 Cornwallis had established bis headquarters at Camden while 
 Clinton and Arbuthnot were still at Charleston. On their depar- 
 ture, June 5, for New York, the responsibility for the campaign, 
 and the safety of the loyalists and Tories in the occupied territory, 
 rested upon Cornwallis solely. He arranged for the enrollment of 
 militia under the British flag, for the organisation and functioning 
 of civil administration, and modified the proclamations issued at 
 Charleston by Clinton and Arbuthnot June 1, and that of Clinton 
 the 3d, so that greater protection would be given those who were 
 loyal to the Crown and more severe punishment meted out to those 
 in rebellion; and at the same time provided for the needs of his 
 army. His command of 4,000 regular troops and a few Provincials 
 had not only to occupy several important posts widely distant from 
 each other, but from their numbers maintain in the field a force of 
 sufficient strength to withstand local partisans and oppose rein' 
 forcing troops marching from the north. Posts were established 
 from the Peedee to the Savannah to awe the disaffected and encour' 
 age the loyal inhabitants, and measures were taken to raise some 
 Provincial Corps and to establish a militia, as well for the defense 
 as for the internal government of South Carolina. 
 
 In the district of Ninety Six, which was viewed as the most 
 populous and powerful in the Province, Lieutenant Colonel Bal' 
 four, assisted by Major Ferguson, who had been appointed inspec- 
 tor general of militia by Clinton, formed 7 battalions of militia of 
 about 4,000 men, which organizations were so regulated that they 
 could furnish 1,500 men at short notice for the defense of the fron' 
 tier, or for any other home service. In addition to the militia, a 
 Provincial Corps of 500 men was commissioned to be raised under 
 command of Lieutenant Colonel Cunningham. 
 
 Other battalions of militia were formed along the extensive 
 line — Broad River to Cheraws— "but they were in general either 
 weak, or not much to be relied on for their fidelity.'" The refugees, 
 who were now returning to their native country, were organized 
 into the First South Carolina Regiment. 
 
 181 
 
THE BATTLE OF KIJiGS MOUHTAIH 
 
 A Provincial Corps, to consist of 500 men, was put in commission, 
 to be raised between the Peedee and Wateree, under the command 
 of Major Harrison. In order to protect, the raising of this corps, 
 and to awe this large trad; of disaffected country the Seventy 'first 
 Regiment and a troop of dragoons under Major McArthur were 
 posted at Cheraw Hill on the Peedee. 
 
 Other small posts were likewise established in the front and on 
 the left of Camden, at which place the main body of the army was 
 posted, and which was considered a fairly healthy place for the 
 troops. 
 
 Having made the above arrangements, and everything wearing 
 the face of tranquillity and submission, Cornwallis set out on the 
 21st of June for Charleston, leaving the command of the troops on 
 the frontier to Lord Rawdon, who was, after Brigadier General 
 Patterson, the commandant at Charleston, the next in rank in the 
 southern district. 
 
 It was about this time that Cornwallis changed the instructions 
 previously given his friends in the northern Province relative to 
 their rising in aid of the Crown. He now considered it ill advised 
 to march his army through North Carolina before the harvest, and 
 took strong measures to induce impatient partisans not to rise until 
 after the crops had been gathered, and under no conditions to act 
 until he advised them that the time was propitious. 
 
 On June 30 he wrote to Clinton that with the capitulation of 
 Ninety Six, and the dispersion of a party of rebels who had assem' 
 bled at an ironwork on the northwest border of the Province, there 
 was an end to all resistance in South Carolina. He reported the 
 forces of the enemy in North Carolina as about 100 militia under 
 General Caswell, 400 or 500 militia at or near Salisbury under Gen' 
 eral Rutherford, and 300 Virginians in that neighborhood under 
 Porterfield. The force which gave him the most concern, however, 
 was 2,000 Maryland and Delaware troops under Major General 
 Baron De Kalb. 
 
 Now that the strongholds in the northwest part of South Caro' 
 lina were in his possession, Cornwallis thought he could leave this 
 
 191 
 
THE BATTLE OF KIHGS MOUNTAIN 
 
 Province in security, and march about the beginning of September 
 with a body of troops into the back part of North Carolina, "with 
 the greatest probability of reducing that Province to its duty." 
 Having in mind Clinton's instructions that troops which could be 
 spared later would be used at a probable early date on the Chesa' 
 peake, Cornwallis wrote in regard to his contemplated move into 
 North Carolina: 
 
 I am of opinion that (besides the advantage of possessing so valuable a Prov 
 ince) it would prove an effectual barrier for South Carolina and Georgia; and 
 could be kept, with the assistance of our friends there, by as few troops as would 
 be wanted on the borders of this Province, if North Carolina should remain in 
 the hands of our enemies. 
 
 This hopeful view of the situation, based largely upon the success 
 of the royal arms up to this time, was soon to be shattered. While 
 Cornwallis was still at Charleston his intelligence reported that 
 Sumter, with about 1,500 militia, was advancing from the north as 
 far as the Catawba settlement, and that many disaffected South 
 Carolinians from theWaxhaw and other settlements on the frontier, 
 whom Lord Rawdon at Camden had put on parole, were availing 
 themselves of the general release of the 20th of June, and joining 
 Sumter. It was also reported that De Kalb's army was continuing 
 its movement south, followed by 2,500 Virginia militia. Cornwallis 
 informed Clinton of these developments in a letter of July 14, 
 stating: 
 
 The effects of the exertions which the enemy are making in these two Prov- 
 inces will, I make no doubt, be exaggerated to us. But upon the whole there is 
 every reason to believe that their plan is not only to defend North Carolina, but 
 to commence offensive operations immediately; which reduces me to the neces- 
 sity, if I wanted the inclination, of following the plan which I had the honor of 
 transmitting to your excellency in my letter of the 30th of June, as the most 
 effectual means of keeping up the spirits of our friends and securing this Province. 
 
 The plan referred to by Cornwallis was the occupation of North 
 Carolina, and holding it as the frontier of the southern district. 
 
 The work of supplying the base at Camden with salt, rum, 
 regimental stores, arms, and ammunition was under way, so that 
 
 1 101 
 
THE BATTLE OF KIKGS MOUKTAIH 
 
 a further advance of the army beyond that point would be safe 
 guarded. Due to the distance of transportation and the excessive 
 heat of the season, the work was one of infinite labor, requiring con' 
 siderable time. Then, too, the several actions in which his forces 
 had been engaged made Cornwallis more and more doubtful as to 
 the value of his militia. He wrote to Clinton that dependence upon 
 these troops for protecting and holding in South Carolina, in case 
 of an advance of his army into North Carolina, was precarious, as 
 their want of subordination and confidence in themselves would 
 make a considerable regular force always necessary for the defense 
 of the Province, until North Carolina was completely subjugated. 
 
 The plan of campaign of the Crown forces to the north content 
 plated using Ferguson's corps, augmented by militia of the Ninety 
 Six district who were being trained by Ferguson, as a left covering 
 force to advance to the borders of Tryon County, now Rutherford 
 and Lincoln, paying particular attention to the mountain regions in 
 securing protection for the advance of the main body from Cam' 
 den. Lieutenant Colonel Cruger, who commanded at Ninety Six, 
 was to remain there with his corps. Innes, with the remainder of 
 the militia of that district, was to guard the frontier, which would 
 require careful attention, as there were many disaffected, and many 
 constantly in arms. 
 
 The continued advance southward of the American troops pre' 
 viously reported in North Carolina was known to Cornwallis. 
 While still in Charleston, on August 9, he received an express from 
 Camden informing him that General Gates, accompanied by Cas' 
 well and Rutherford, was approaching with every appearance of 
 an intent to attack Lord Rawdon, who had assembled several regi' 
 ments on the west branch of Lynches Creek. These troops were 
 more or less sickly, particularly the Seventy'first Regiment, the two 
 battalions of which had not more than 274 men under arms. On 
 the 6th Sumter had attacked the British post at Hanging Rock, 
 where the infantry of the Legion and Governor Browne's corps 
 were posted. He had been repulsed, but not without difficulty. 
 
 til! 
 
THE BATTLE OF KIHGS MOUHTAIH 
 
 These accounts alarmed Cornwallis, and he proceeded from Charles' 
 ton to join the army in the field. At the same time he wrote to 
 Clinton : 
 
 If we succeed at present, and are able to penetrate into North Carolina, 
 without which it is impossible to hold this province, your Excellency will see the 
 absolute necessity of a diversion in the Chesapeake, and that it musT; be done early. 
 
 Cornwallis reached Camden on the 13th of August. Gates's 
 command had approached very close, and on the morning of the 
 16th the two armies met and fought the Battle of Camden, resulting 
 in the defeat of Gates. Following this victory, Cornwallis deter' 
 mined upon the destruction or dispersion of the corps under Sum' 
 ter, as it might prove a foundation for assembling the routed army, 
 and on the morning of the 17th he detached Lieutenant Colonel 
 Tarleton with the Legion cavalry and infantry, and the corps of 
 light infantry, in all about 350 men, to pursue and attack Sumter. 
 Orders were also sent to Lieutenant Colonel Turnbull and Major 
 Ferguson, on the Little River, to put their corps in motion immedi' 
 ately, and on their side to pursue and attack the same enemy. 
 Tarleton was successful in surprising Sumter on the 18th at Fish' 
 ing Creek, near the Catawba. The latter, with a corps of about 
 800 men, was escorting 250 prisoners and a large quantity of stores, 
 artillery, and ammunition. Sumter himself escaped, though with 
 difficulty, but his whole corps was killed, taken, or dispersed. 
 
 In writing of the Battle of Camden, Cornwallis stated that above 
 1,000 were killed and wounded, and about 800 taken prisoners; that 
 his army captured 7 pieces of brass cannon, all the enemy ammuni' 
 tion, wagons, a great number of arms, and 130 baggage wagons; "in 
 short, there never was a more complete victory.' 11 The British loss 
 was reported as 300 killed and wounded, chiefly of the Thirty 
 third Regiment and the Volunteers of Ireland. Among the Ameri' 
 cans wounded were Major General Baron De Kalb and Brigadier 
 General Rutherford. Baron De Kalb died of his wounds. In a letter 
 to Lord Germain written August 21, Cornwallis said that on arriv- 
 ing in Camden the night of the 13th, he found there Lord Raw' 
 
 1121 
 
THE BATTLE OF KIHGS M0UHTA1K 
 
 don's entire force, except a small detachment under Lieutenant 
 Colonel Turnbull, which fell back from Rocky Mount to Major 
 Ferguson's posts of the militia at Ninety Six, on Little River. 
 
 I had my option to make, either to retire or attack the enemy, for the position 
 at Camden was a bad one to be attacked in, and by General Sumpter's advancing 
 down the Wateree, my supplies must have failed me in a few days. 
 
 These two decisive engagements, following so closely upon each 
 other, brought deep despair to the revolutionists and great elation 
 to the vidtors. In Cornwallis's letter to Lord Germain referred to 
 above and written five days after Camden and three days after the 
 defeat of Sumter, he declared that the rebel forces were dispersed 
 and that internal commotions and insurrections in the Province 
 would now subside. He stated that he had given directions to inflict 
 exemplary punishment on some of the most guilty, in hopes to deter 
 others in future "from tampering with allegiance, with oaths, and 
 with the lenity and generosity of the British Government." The 
 orders of Cornwallis were that all inhabitants of the Province who 
 had submitted, and later took part in the revolt against the King, 
 should be punished with the greatest vigor, imprisoned, and their 
 property taken or destroyed. He ordered in the most positive man' 
 ner that every militiaman who had borne arms under him, and 
 afterwards joined the enemy, should be immediately hanged. Cru' 
 ger, who commanded at Ninety Six, was directed to take the most 
 vigorous measures to extinguish the rebellion in his district, and to 
 obey in the strictest manner the directions given relative to the 
 treatment of the country. It will be seen later how the execution 
 of these instructions in the region of the Blue Ridge and Alle' 
 ghenies resulted in the mountain men swarming from their homes 
 to defend their freedom and independence. 
 
 Now that no further opposition to the advance into North 
 Carolina existed, on the morning of the 17th of September Corn' 
 wallis dispatched messengers into that Province with directions to 
 his friends there to take arms and assemble immediately, and to 
 seizie the most violent people and all the military stores and maga' 
 
 lis! 
 
THE BATTLE OF KIHGS MOUHTAIH 
 
 2jnes belonging to the rebels, and to intercept all stragglers from 
 the routed army. He promised to march without loss of time to 
 their support. Much to Cornwallis's disappointment, however, 
 the people of the northern Province were not as prompt in rising 
 as he had hoped. Their inclinations were held in check due to the 
 large number of revolutionists whom they had observed marching 
 to the south to oppose the royal forces, and they preferred to await 
 the arrival of the British Army in their neighborhood before taking 
 an open stand. Cornwallis was hopeful that Clinton would start, 
 at an early date, the contemplated move to the Chesapeake, thereby 
 relieving the situation on his northern front. He wrote to him that 
 next to the security of New York, the operations in the Chesapeake 
 were one of the most important objects of the war. 
 
 About this time Major Wemyss was sent with a detachment of 
 the Sixty'third Regiment, mounted, some refugees, Provincials, and 
 militia, to disarm in the most rigid manner the country between 
 the Santee and Peedee, and to punish severely all those who sub' 
 mitted or pretended to live peaceably under bis majesty's Govern' 
 ment since the reduction of Charleston, and who had later revolted. 
 Cornwallis himself ordered several militiamen to be executed, who 
 had voluntarily enrolled and borne arms under the British flag and 
 afterwards revolted to the enemy. 
 
 Plans were made to move the first division of the army into 
 North Carolina by way of Charlotte Town and Salisbury, about 
 September 6 or 7- The second division would follow in about 10 
 days with convalescents and stores. A more prompt move follow 
 ing the successes at Camden and Fishing Creek could not be made, 
 due to the number of sick and wounded, and the want of transport. 
 The advance was started on the 8th and Charlotte Town reached 
 the 26th of September. 
 
 During September Ferguson operated in Ninety Six and from 
 there moved into what had been Tryon County, North Carolina, 
 accompanied by about 800 militia collected from the neighborhood 
 of Ninety Six. Protection was to be given to the friends of the 
 
 I Hi 
 
THE BATTLE OF KIHGS M0UHTA1H 
 
 Crown, who were supposed to be numerous in that locality, and it 
 was intended that he should pass the Catawba River and endeavor 
 to preserve tranquillity in the rear and flank of the army. It was 
 while on this duty that the loss of his entire command occurred 
 at Kings Mountain on the 7th of the following month. Without 
 some knowledge of Cornwallis's campaign in South Carolina, and 
 from thence into North Carolina as far as Charlotte Town, the 
 necessity for his immediate retirement from the northern Province, 
 following Kings Mountain, would not be understood. It is now 
 necessary to refer to the group of leaders and the troops which they 
 commanded, who succeeded, so unexpectedly and so decisively, 
 in dealing this staggering blow to Ferguson, and in compelling 
 Cornwallis to place his army on the defensive. 
 
 115! 
 
1161 
 
Part II 
 
 GATHERING OF THE PATRIOTS ~»THE BATTLE 
 
 !T will be recalled that following the defeat 
 of General Gates at Camden on the 16th of 
 August, Cornwallis issued immediate instruc 
 tions to his two flying groups under Tarleton 
 and Ferguson, to pursue Colonel Sumter, who, 
 following the dispersion of Gates's forces, had 
 the only organised corps of patriots in South 
 Carolina. These instructions, together with detailed information 
 of the magnitude of the defeat of the troops under Gates, reached 
 Ferguson on the 19th. Immediate preparations were made to com' 
 ply with the orders, and at 7 in the evening Ferguson put his 
 column in motion. At that moment an express arrived from Colonel 
 Innes, who was on his way from Ninety Six to join Ferguson, 
 informing him that he had been attacked at Musgroves Mills on 
 the Enoree River on the 18th, with severe loss, and asking for sup' 
 port, as his militia had deserted him. Ferguson altered his plans 
 and marched in the direction of Innes, crossing the Broad at sunrise. 
 The troops which had engaged the Loyalists and Tories on the 
 Enoree were commanded by Colonels Williams, Shelby, and Clarke. 
 Following this success, a move against Cruger, commanding at 
 Ninety Six, was contemplated, but just at this time word was 
 received of the defeat of the patriots at Camden two days before, 
 and following a council of the commanders it was decided to rejoin 
 McDowell's corps. Due to the nearness of Ferguson, the march 
 northward, encumbered by prisoners, was one of many difficulties, 
 and it was with great relief that Williams's party rejoined McDow 
 ell's corps in the mountains at Gilbert Town, to which point the 
 latter had retired. Here the seriousness of the cause of the patriots 
 was discussed. It was thought that Ferguson would immediately 
 
 1173 
 
THE BATTLE OF KIKGS MOUHTAIH 
 
 advance to overtake them, and further withdrawal into the momv 
 tains seemed expedient. It was proposed by Shelby and Sevier, 
 who were from the counties of North Carolina where the waters 
 flowed to the westward, and now part of Tennessee, that the 
 troops should disband, and all return to their homes to raise an 
 army of volunteers to defeat Ferguson, or any other leader who 
 might operate along the eastern slopes of the Blue Ridge. This 
 proposition received general support, and Shelby and Sevier, with 
 their followers, departed for their backwater homes, and word was 
 sent to the leaders of Wilkes and Surry Counties to embody their 
 followers and prepare for a rising. 
 
 This was a period of great distress to the patriotic cause through' 
 out the entire State. It was only the mountains that furnished 
 refuge for those who still refused to accept British sovereignty, and 
 a number of refugees, especially those who had borne arms against 
 the King, were seeking protection within their barriers. 
 
 Following the quick withdrawal of Colonel Williams and his 
 confederated command from Musgroves Mills, Ferguson made no 
 effort to pursue him. His marches from day to day were short, and 
 on the 23d of August he left his command to go to Camden to con' 
 fer with Cornwallis, rejoining his troops September 1, with the 
 news that his Provincial Corps were to be separated from the army 
 and act on the frontier with the militia. During the following week 
 he marched to the northward, and on the 7th of September his 
 command crossed into North Carolina, and he, with about 50 of 
 the American volunteers and 300 militia, proceeded to Gilbert 
 Town, to surprise a party of patriots who were reported there. 
 On the following day the remainder of the command moved to the 
 Broad, where on the 10th their commander rejoined them. 
 
 While Ferguson was at Gilbert Town he paroled one of his 
 prisoners and sent him into the mountains with a message to the 
 leaders there, "that if they did not desist from their opposition to 
 the British arms, and take protection under his standard, he would 
 march his army over the mountains, hang their leaders, and lay 
 their country waste with fire and sword." 
 
 1181 
 
THE BATTLE OF KIHGS MOUHTAIH 
 
 The effect of this message was to augment the determination of 
 the mountain leaders to get together their men with all speed pos' 
 sible and march against their hated enemy. The magnitude of their 
 undertaking was fully appreciated, especially as many of these 
 mountain settlements were of but recent creation, and the inhabit' 
 ants not very numerous, and without security from the Cherokees, 
 except such as was furnished by their own trusty rifles. 
 
 As the adjacent territory of Virginia was equally interested in 
 stopping the advance of this hostile invader, cooperation and assis' 
 tance of the Washington County troops was sought. Early in Sep' 
 tember the county lieutenant, Col. Arthur Campbell, was in 
 Richmond, and in an interview with the Governor of Virginia was 
 informed of the measures about to be taken to retrieve the misfor' 
 tunes of the troops under Gates and Sumter. He returned to his 
 western home imbued with the idea of the part his militia should 
 take in the ensuing campaign, and at once showed a willingness 
 and desire to cooperate in the undertaking that Shelby, Sevier, and 
 others were engaged in. 
 
 Ferguson's withdrawal southward from Gilbert Town on the 
 10th of September was for the purpose of rejoining the main part 
 of his command, which had taken a stand on the Broad to keep a 
 lookout for a reputed body of Georgians who were approaching. 
 The following morning he put his assembled command in motion, 
 and on the 12th led a small party to the head of Cane Creek in 
 Burke County, in pursuit of McDowell and his refugee followers, 
 who were on their way over the mountains to seek shelter pending 
 the assembly of the various county regiments that were to move 
 against Ferguson. A slight skirmish resulted, but McDowell's 
 force was able to extricate itself and continue its retirement with 
 but few losses. The pursuit was continued on the 15th and 16th 
 to the banks of the Catawba, where, at Quaker Meadows, was the 
 home of the McDowells, but the pursuers arrived too late, as 
 the refugees were well on their way into the mountains. 
 
 In the ensuing week Ferguson campaigned from the Catawba to 
 the Second Broad, and on the 23d entered Gilbert Town for the 
 
THE BATTLE OF KIHGS MOUJiTAIK 
 
 second time. The following day was busily occupied in receiving 
 500 of the inhabitants of the contiguous territory, who came in to 
 profess their allegiance to the King. It was on this day that intelli- 
 gence was received from Colonel Cruger of an adtion which had 
 just occurred at Augusta, and to which reference will be made, as 
 it had a decided bearing upon Ferguson's future plans. 
 
 Early in September Colonel Clarke assembled a body of troops 
 and marched to attack the British post at Augusta. He reached his 
 destination on the 14th, and found that the commanding officer, 
 Lieutenant Colonel Browne, with the assistance of some friendly 
 Indians, had taken a position in a fort about 3 miles from Augusta. 
 Clarke invested the position for five days, when he retired upon 
 the approach of Cruger, who had hastened with assistance from 
 Ninety Six, upon learning of the danger to this frontier post. It is 
 known that Cruger's message to Ferguson informing him of these 
 events reached the latter at Gilbert Town on the 24th, five days 
 after Clarke withdrew from the vicinity of Augusta to fall back 
 upon the protection of the mountains. This retirement placed him 
 between Cruger and Ferguson, and Cruger asked the latter to coop' 
 erate with him in cutting Clarke off before he could reach a retreat 
 in the mountains. With this plan in view, Ferguson left Gilbert 
 Town on the 27th and moved to the Broad, and then to the Green 
 River to await in the vicinity of their junction further intelligence 
 of Clarke. By the 30th, however, Ferguson knew that his efforts 
 to intercept Clarke on his return to the mountains were unsuccess' 
 ful, as the latter had taken another route. In the meanwhile Cruger 
 found that the pursuit of Clarke would carry him too far from 
 Ninety Six, and as he was responsible for its safety, he returned to 
 that post. At this time Ferguson was in possession of the definite 
 information of the advance of the army of mountain men, who had 
 started their march from Watauga on the 26th. 
 
 Reference has been made to the retirement of Col. Charles 
 McDowell from his home, with his band of soldiers and refugees. 
 He reached the shelter of the backwaters with a force of 160 men 
 
 1201 
 
THE BATTLE OF KIHGS MOUHTAIH 
 
 from Burke and Rutherford Counties. To this rendezvous on the 
 Sycamore Flats, bordering the Watauga, about 2}4 miles south' 
 west of the present town of Elizabethton, Col. Arthur Campbell 
 sent his brother 'in'law, Col. William Campbell, with 200 militia 
 from Washington County, Va. Later on he led to the same place 
 an additional force of 200 men who joined the first group. It 
 was necessary for Col. Arthur Campbell to return to the county 
 under his jurisdiction and take measures to protect it from the 
 invasion of hostile Indians. Shelby, at the head of 240 men from 
 Sullivan County, and Sevier, with an equal number from Wash' 
 ington County, N. C, joined at the designated meeting point 
 on the Watauga on the 25th of September. 
 
 David Ramsey, in his history of South Carolina, written in 1808, 
 said that "hitherto these mountaineers had only heard of war at a 
 distance, and had been in peaceable possession of that independ' 
 ence for which their countrymen on the seacoast were contending." 
 They embodied to check the invader of their own volition, "with' 
 out any requisition from the Governments of America or the officers 
 of the Continental Army." Each man set out with a knapsack, 
 blanket, and gun. All who could obtain horses were mounted; the 
 remainder afoot. There is a tradition that before starting out on 
 the journey from which many would never return, the Scotch' Irish 
 Presbyterian clergyman of the settlement invoked a blessing and 
 besought divine protection and guidance for the army. 
 
 The highway of their great adventure followed the only roadway 
 connecting the backwater country with the eastern slopes of the 
 Blue Ridge in North Carolina. Leaving Sycamore Flats, the column 
 marched up Gap Creek to its headwaters in Gap Creek Mountain, 
 and there turned eastward and then south, following around the 
 base of Fork Mountain to Toe River, and on up that stream to one 
 of its tributaries. Here the route continued in a southerly direction 
 until the top of the mountain was reached, between Roan High 
 Knob and Big Yellow Mountain. From the mountain top, descent 
 was made along Roaring Creek to the North Toe River. It is stated 
 
 1211 
 
THE BATTLE OF K1HGS MOUH^AIH 
 
 in the diary of Ensign Robert Campbell that the mountains were 
 crossed and descent to the other side was smarted before camp was 
 made for the night. Snow was encountered in the highlands, for 
 an elevation of 5,500 feet was reached in this march. On the top of 
 the mountain there was found a hundred acres of beautiful table' 
 land, and the troops were paraded, doubtless for the purpose of 
 seeing how they were standing the march, which was about 26 
 miles to this point. Campbell's diary spates that the second night — 
 that of the 27th — they rested at Cathey's plantation. This is placed 
 by Draper at the junction of Grassy Creek and North Toe River. 
 The diary does not mention the camping place of the 28th. On 
 this day McDowell, who had previously left the column to go to 
 his home in Rutherford County, returned with such information 
 as he had been able to secure relative to the movements of Ferguson. 
 The night of the 28th a council of officers was held, at which it was 
 agreed that an experienced officer was needed to take command of 
 all separate county units. It was decided that Colonel McDowell 
 should convey a message to General Gates, asking that General 
 Morgan or General Davidson be sent to them to take over the 
 command. 
 
 Tradition has it that on reaching Gillespie Gap the troops divided, 
 one group, including Campbell's men, moving south to Turkey 
 Cove, the others going easterly to the North Cove on the North 
 Fork of the Catawba. Ensign Campbell's diary gives the informa' 
 tion that the fourth night, the 29th, Campbell's men rested at a 
 rich "Tory's," and this place has been identified as being in Turkey 
 Cove. 
 
 The following day the men who had camped at North Cove 
 marched southeast down Paddy Creek, while those from Turkey 
 Cove marched southerly down the North Fork and then easterly 
 down the Catawba. The two forces joined on the banks of the 
 Catawba near the mouth of Paddy Creek, and continued down the 
 Catawba to Quaker Meadows, the home of the McDowells, where 
 camp was made, after a march of about 27 miles for the southern 
 
 1221 
 
THE BATTLE OF KIHGS MOUNTAIN 
 
 column and about 23 for the northern. During the five days which 
 had elapsed since leaving Sycamore Flats, about 80 miles had been 
 covered. 
 
 Here the marching column of 1,040 men was joined by Colonel 
 Cleveland with the men from Wilkes and Major Winston with the 
 men from Surry, 350 in all, making a combined strength of 1,390. 
 The time was now opportune for Colonel McDowell to depart 
 for General Gates's headquarters, with the request of the several 
 colonels that a general officer be designated for the command, 
 and after turning his regiment over to his brother, Maj. Joseph 
 McDowell, he departed on this mission the 1st of October. 
 
 We left Ferguson on September 30, at which time he had given 
 up hopes of cutting off Clarke's force. His camp was at Step's plan' 
 ration, 12 miles from Denards Ford of the Broad River. Being 
 aware that the gathering hordes of the enemy were either at a con' 
 centration point east of the Blue Ridge or approaching it, Ferguson 
 wrote to Cruger on the 30th informing him of this new threat, and 
 suggested that it would be well if the district of Ninety Six called 
 out more of its militia. 
 
 The following day Ferguson began his withdrawal from the 
 vicinity of the mountains. He marched to Denards Ford, where 
 he camped, and issued his last appeal to the inhabitants of the 
 region to join the militia serving under the King. As it is typical of 
 the inflammatory proclamations put forth by both Whig and Tory 
 during this period of violent passions it is here given: 
 
 Denards Ford, Broad River, 
 Tryon County, October 1, 1780. 
 Gentlemen : Unless you wish to be eat up by an inundation of barbarians, who 
 have begun by murdering an unarmed son before the aged father, and afterwards 
 lopped off his arms, and who by their shocking cruelties and irregularities, give 
 the best proof of their cowardice and want of discipline; I say, if you wish to be 
 pinioned, robbed, and murdered, and see your wives and daughters, in four days, 
 abused by the dregs of mankind — in short, if you wish or deserve to live and 
 bear the name of men, grasp your arms in a moment and run to camp. 
 
 K23J 
 
THE BATTLE OF KIHGS MOUNTAIN 
 
 The backwater men have crossed the mountains; McDowell, Hampton, 
 Shelby, and Cleveland are at their head, so that you know what you have to 
 depend upon. If you choose to be degraded forever and ever by a set of mongrels, 
 say so at once, and let your women turn their backs upon you, and look out for 
 real men to protect them. p AT Ferguson> 
 
 Major, Seventy firM: Regiment. 
 
 Ferguson continued his march at 4 o'clock in the afternoon of 
 the 2d, proceeding 4 miles, then forming line of adtion and lying 
 on his arms all night. The following morning he got under way at 
 an early hour, and after a long march down the Broad, halted for 
 the night at Tate's plantation, 1 mile after crossing Buffalo Creek. 
 These three marches brought Ferguson's command 38 miles nearer 
 Charlotte Town and Corn walks than was his camp of September 
 29 and 30. From Tate's plantation, where he remained until 4 
 o'clock the morning of the 6th, to Charlotte Town was 50 miles. 
 In this position he could feel sufficiently close to the main army to 
 be reinforced from it should the necessity arise. At the same time 
 further intelligence would be received of the route taken by the 
 mountain men, and their probable intentions; and a reply to his 
 letter of September 30 could be awaited. Cruger's reply, which 
 was dated October 3, was probably received at Tate's plantation, 
 and doubtless prompted Ferguson to leave that camp and take up 
 a position from which to offer battle. This letter was found on 
 Ferguson's body, and as it was somewhat mutilated, its complete 
 contents is not known. Nothing in the letter indicated that Cruger 
 was going to take any immediate adtion. He said: 
 
 I don't see how you can possibly ([defendj the country and its neighborhood 
 that you fare} now in. The game from the mountains is just what I expected. 
 Am glad to find you so capitally supported by the friends to government in 
 North Carolina. I flattered myself they would have been equal to the mountain 
 lads, and that no further call for the defensive would have been fmadej on this 
 part of the Province. I begin to think our views for the present rather large. 
 
 Cruger evidently believed that Ferguson had a difficult situation 
 to face, but that he was equal to the emergency, and, without 
 
 1241 
 
THE BATTLE OF KIHGS MOUKTAIH 
 
 doubt, this was Ferguson's opinion also. At this time he knew the 
 mountain men were in the vicinity of his camp site of September 30, 
 28 miles away, and that a day's march of those who were mounted 
 would bring the enemy upon him, so in going to "Little King Moun' 
 tain," as Allaire designates the place, on the 6th, and taking up 
 a position which was most favorable for defense, and remaining 
 there for 24 hours before the enemy came in sight, Ferguson acted 
 with deliberation and with full intent to engage in battle, did the 
 enemy take the initiative. The "Little King Mountain" position 
 was about 36 miles from Charlotte Town, and had Ferguson desired 
 to avoid battle with the mountain men, he could have marched on 
 the morning of the 7th halfway to army headquarters. 
 
 The letter which Ferguson wrote to Cornwallis October 6, in 
 which he said, "I am on my march towards you, by a road leading 
 from Cherokee Ford, north of Kings Mountain. Three or four 
 hundred good soldiers, part dragoons, would finish the business. 
 Something must be done soon. This is their last push in this quar' 
 ter," is indicative of the subordinate commander whose duty it is 
 to keep his superior informed of the forces opposed to him, and, 
 when the enemy is in such strength as to be a serious menace, to 
 suggest that reinforcement would insure a more certain success. 
 In this letter Ferguson mentioned that "they are since joined by 
 Clarke and Sumpter." Ferguson had the mistaken idea that Clarke, 
 on his withdrawal northward from Augusta to the mountains, had 
 joined the mountain men. Some of the men of Sumter's command, 
 under Colonel Williams, did join about this time, as will be noted 
 later. 
 
 When the mountain men left their rendezvous on the Catawba 
 October 1, they marched to the southward, up Silver Creek, past 
 Pilot Mountain, and from thence down Cane Creek in the direc- 
 tion of Gilbert Town. Although the several organization command' 
 ers had sent to Gates for an officer to command, it was considered 
 unwise to continue further without coordinated leadership, and on 
 this day a conference was held which resulted in the selection of 
 
 1251 
 
THE BATTLE OF KI?iGS MOUNTAIN 
 
 Colonel Campbell to command all the groups, until a general officer 
 should arrive. The command was intrusted to the colonel of the 
 Virginia regiment to prevent dispute were an attempt made to 
 name a leader from the North Carolina colonels. 
 
 On the 2d the march was continued toward Gilbert Town, from 
 which Ferguson had departed five days previous. Continuing on 
 to the south, the Cowpens were reached on the 6th, the march 
 being directed toward Ninety Six, as it was thought Ferguson was 
 falling back in the direction of Cruger. At the Cowpens Col. James 
 Williams, of South Carolina, with 400 men, joined. This new party 
 was made up largely of groups of Sumter's men from South Caro- 
 lina, under Colonels Hill and Lacey, of men from Lincoln County 
 under Graham, Hambright, and Chronicle, and a small number 
 embodied by Colonel Williams in North Carolina. On the 2d of 
 October Williams had written to General Gates that with a force of 
 450 horsemen he was in pursuit of Ferguson, and that he expected 
 to join the mountain men in the accomplishment of this purpose. 
 
 Colonel Campbell was informed by the new arrivals that the 
 enemy lay encamped somewhere near the Cherokee Ford of the 
 Broad River, and plans were made for immediate pursuit. A coun' 
 cil of the principal officers was held, and it was decided to select 
 900 of the best horsemen and leave the weak horses and footmen 
 to follow as fast as possible. 
 
 Time was pressing, and the necessity for immediate action great, 
 for if Ferguson continued his withdrawal in the direction of Char' 
 lotte Town another day's march, he would be so near the main 
 army that to engage him would be a most ha2ardous enterprise. As 
 soon, therefore, as the selected group was formed, the command 
 mounted, and at 8 o'clock started on its long night ride, which the 
 next day was to terminate in the encounter so eagerly sought. 
 
 Cherokee Ford of the Broad was crossed early in the morning, 
 and the march continued along the northeast road topping the ridge 
 between Buffalo and Kings Creeks. Information was received from 
 several people as to Ferguson's line of march the day before, and 
 
 1261 
 
THE BATTLE OF KI^GS MOUTiTAIK 
 
 finally as to the mountain top on which his camp was established. 
 This camp site could best be reached by way of the main highway 
 running from North Carolina in a southeast direction to Yorkville, 
 S. C, so the eager patriots hastened their march to gain this road, 
 passing Antioch Church and Ponders Branch, and stopping on the 
 way only long enough to gain additional information. When the 
 highway was reached, the column turned southeast, and after cross' 
 ing Kings Creek began the gradual ascent of the rugged hills which 
 lay between the creek and the enemy's position. An uncomfort' 
 able rain had added to the weariness of the sleepless marchers, but 
 about noon the weather cleared, the sun shone with grateful 
 warmth, and the nearness of the quarry added ?est to the chase. 
 
 About a mile from Kings Creek the road passed between two 
 slight knobs, and as the patriots emerged from the bottom of the 
 ravine between these knolls, they found themselves upon a small 
 plateau, overlooking to the southeast a sharp ravine, the far side of 
 which terminated in a ridge, part of which was a hundred feet 
 higher than the plateau, and on which Ferguson stood and offered 
 battle. The broadside silhouette of the ridge was visible about 
 700 yards away, but the tree'covered slopes hid its occupants from 
 view. 
 
 Continuing along the highway to the southeast for several hwv 
 dred yards, to a point where the plateau terminates and the road 
 begins its descent into the ravine, a better view of Ferguson's posi- 
 tion was obtained. Beyond this point the column could not proceed 
 until definite plans for the attack had been determined upon. The 
 characteristics of the mountain on which Ferguson was making his 
 stand were known to several of Campbell's command, and this 
 information imparted to his leaders. While halted in the position 
 which they had now reached, with the mountain occupied by the 
 enemy in sight, the plan of battle was finally agreed upon. They 
 could see a ridge about 600 yards long, the general direction of 
 which extended north 52° east. The highest point of the ridge was 
 near its southwest end, from which point, toward the southwest, 
 
 1271 
 
THE BATTLE OF KIHGS MOUNTAIN 
 
 there was a gradual dropping off of 20 feet to a very narrow hog' 
 back, then a widening out of the terrain into a gently sloping, 
 narrow plateau, which extended due north to the place where the 
 column had debouched from the ravine between the two knobs. 
 
 From the highest point of the ridge, along its crest to the north' 
 east, there was a gradual descent for 400 yards, then a very sharp 
 drop to the highway. The northern face of the ridge descended to 
 a stream which flows into Clarks Fork. The south face of the moun' 
 tain was unknown to the leaders, except as described by those 
 familiar with its features. From them it was learned that another 
 stream led from the south of the mountain, and that several slight 
 spurs projected from the ridge to the east and southeast, which 
 gradually flattened out into comparatively level ground. 
 
 The plan of attack decided upon was to surround the mountain 
 and trap its defenders in a band of fire, constantly decreasing in 
 diameter as the mountain sides were scaled. To accomplish this 
 maneuver, the command was divided into four parts, which were to 
 be led in four columns abreast to the place from which the separate 
 columns would proceed to their respective positions. The interior 
 columns were composed of the men from Virginia and from Sulli' 
 van County, Campbell leading his men in the right column and 
 Shelby his men in the left. The right flank column was made up of 
 men from Surry, the Nolichucky, and Burke; Major Winston being 
 at the head of the column, followed by Colonel Sevier. The detach' 
 ment commanded by Major McDowell was joined to Sevier's com' 
 mand. The left flank column was composed of the men from Wilkes 
 and those who joined the preceding day from the two Carolinas 
 under Colonel Williams. Major Chronicle was at the head of this 
 column, followed by Colonel Cleveland. The senior officer who 
 accompanied the Lincoln County men into action was Lieutenant 
 Colonel Hambright, but he waived his right to command in favor 
 of Major Chronicle. The right and left flank columns were about 
 the same strength, and each equaled that of the two regiments 
 constituting the interior columns. 
 
 1281 
 
THE BATTLE OF KIHGS MOUJiTAIH 
 
 In this order the several columns proceeded from the plateau 
 into the bottom of the ravine north of the mountain. Here the 
 right and the two interior columns halted, dismounted, tied their 
 horses to trees and bushes, and left a small group of men in charge. 
 The left column continued its march around the east point of the 
 mountain, thence southwestwardly, to its position. 
 
 Shelby's men were deployed in the vicinity of the highway, 
 from which position they were to attack the eastern extremity of 
 the ridge. Campbell was on Shelby's right, along the bed of the 
 stream. These two regiments were first in position, and had the 
 most difficult terrain on their front, due to the sharpness of the 
 slope and the height of the crest. Beyond Campbell, on his right, 
 was McDowell, and then Sevier. The deployment of the latter 
 was along the stream line leading up to the narrow hogback just 
 southwest of the highest elevation of the ridge. 
 
 When the units in the left column reached their positions south 
 of the mountain, they dismounted and formed line, with Winston, 
 at the head of the column, connecting with the right of Sevier at 
 the hogback. On the right of Winston was Chronicle, then Clevc 
 land, with Williams between Cleveland and Shelby. All of the 
 commanders cautioned their men to hold their fire until near the 
 enemy, and to reform their ranks, if broken, and renew the fight. 
 Appeal was made to their patriotism and love of liberty, although 
 this was not necessary, as every man went into battle resolved to 
 fight as long as life lasted. 
 
 Ferguson's Provincials and militia were formed on the summit 
 of the ridge, which varied in width from 30 to 60 yards. His camp 
 and wagon train were established here also. The crest was com' 
 paratively level within the narrow confines indicated, and free from 
 trees. Rock outcroppings provided a limited amount of cover for 
 firing positions. Pickets had been placed in the direction of approach 
 of the enemy, to give warning of his presence. 
 
 The attack started at 3 o'clock, with the driving in of the cover- 
 ing forces. The center of the patriot army, under Campbell and 
 
 1291 
 
THE BATTLE OF KIHGS MOUKTAIH 
 
 Shelby, was the first to engage the enemy. The Virginia and Sulli' 
 van County men advanced up the steep slopes, taking cover behind 
 rocks and trees, with a fair field of fire, as the underbrush was not 
 thick. Their attack was sustained for about 15 minutes while the 
 flank groups proceeded to their several positions, when the fire 
 became general around the entire mountain. The groups then closed 
 in, and Campbell's and Shelby's men almost reached the enemy 
 lines, but here they were met by Ferguson's Provincial Corps, and 
 at the point of the bayonet driven down the mountain. Their offi' 
 cers bravely rallied them, however, and under cover of rocks and 
 trees the enemy fire was returned. The Provincials now in turn 
 fell back before the sure marksmanship of the mountain men, and 
 were pursued to the top of the crest, where a second time they 
 resorted to the bayonet, and again forced the retirement of Camp' 
 bell's and Shelby's men, but only to the point where, from behind 
 cover, they had time to reload their rifles, and by their deadly fire 
 stop the onrush of the enemy and compel their return once more 
 to the ridge top. 
 
 When pressure of the right and left wings began to be felt by 
 Ferguson, new dispositions had to be made of his forces to meet 
 the situation. The parts of the encircling band composed of the 
 men of McDowell and Sevier on the north, and of Williams, Clevc 
 land, Chronicle, and Winston to the south of the mountain, closed 
 in toward the crest of the ridge, and on its southwest extremity the 
 enemy was cleared from the summit, and forced in a northeasterly 
 direction into a huddled group. 
 
 About this time Campbell's and Shelby's men succeeded in gain' 
 ing the portion of the ridge on their front, driving all before them, 
 back into the group that the closing of the wings was compressing. 
 The defenders of the mountain were now in sore straits. The losses 
 among the Provincial Corps were heavy. These troops had fought 
 with great heroism, but their numbers were too few to win alone. 
 The Tory militia endured the contest as long as was to be expected 
 of them. Ferguson's survivors were surrounded by an enemy 
 fiercely determined to fight for complete victory. 
 
 1301 
 
THE BATTLE OF KIKGS MOUHTAITi 
 
 It was evident that nothing could be done to better the situa- 
 tion and snatch victory from defeat, and Ferguson determined to 
 cut his way through the band of fire and escape. He, with several 
 of his officers, made this desperate move, but was shot from his 
 horse and killed instantly. Captain De Peyster, the second in com' 
 mand, bravely continued the fight for a brief time, but the confusion 
 was so great, and his compadt group of followers such a vulnerable 
 target, that further resistance was suicidal, and a white flag was 
 shown. 
 
 It was some time before the firing could be stopped. Units had 
 become disorganized and intermingled during the fierce conflict, and 
 all firing did not cease at the time De Peyster surrendered his com' 
 mand. Then, too, there were some who refused quarter to many of 
 the Tories who asked for it, in retaliation for the treatment which 
 they heard had been accorded Buford's command at the Waxhaw 
 on May 29. To the cry, "Buford's play," many of the wounded 
 were hurried into oblivion. The total number of Tories killed and 
 wounded in this action was 334, and of this number 206 were 
 reported killed. 
 
 The battle lasted an hour and five minutes. The report of this 
 engagement, prepared by Colonels Campbell, Shelby, and Cleve' 
 land, and submitted to General Gates between three and four weeks 
 after the battle, stated that the official provision returns for the 7th 
 of October, found in camp, gave an enemy strength of 1,125 men. 
 The losses given in the report for the Provincial Corps were 19 
 killed, 35 wounded, 68 prisoners; total, 122. The Tory losses were 
 206 killed, 128 wounded, 648 prisoners; total, 982. The combined 
 totals give a strength on the battle field at the time of the action 
 of 1,104, as no one escaped. In addition to Colonel Ferguson, the 
 Provincial Corps had one captain killed; and among the Tories, 
 two colonels and three captains lost their lives, and one major was 
 wounded. The losses in the patriot army, as given in the report, 
 were 28 killed and 62 wounded, a total of 90. The Virginia regi- 
 ment suffered the heaviest losses. Campbell's command had 13 
 
 1311 
 
THE BATTLE OF KIHGS MOUHTAIH 
 
 officers killed or mortally wounded. The Lincoln County men 
 lost their leader, Major Chronicle, and Colonel Williams received 
 wounds from which he died the following day. The booty captured 
 included 17 baggage wagons and 1,200 stand of arms. 
 
 A defeat so overwhelming as that suffered by Ferguson's com' 
 mand is rare in warfare. His position on Kings Mountain was 
 selected after mature deliberation. The top of the mountain was just 
 large enough to serve as a battle ground for his command and to 
 provide space for his camp and wagon train. Water was near and 
 plentiful. The advance of the attackers would be impeded by the 
 slopes of the mountain. When attacked he could expect that retreat 
 would be rendered hazardous by flanking or encircling detach' 
 ments, a condition he desired, as his militia would be put to the 
 necessity of fighting instead of fleeing. A better position on which 
 to make a stand and fight could not have been found. 
 
 That he underestimated the valor of the mountain men is unques' 
 tionable. Their reputed superiority in numbers did not deter him 
 from offering battle, otherwise he would have continued his march 
 on the 7th in the direction of Charlotte Town. But had he known 
 that these crusaders from the mountains would stand and fight 
 with a fierceness heretofore unexperienced in his southern cam' 
 paign, he would have been more discreet and less valorous. His 
 epitaph, written by his brother officers and published in the New 
 York Gazette of February 14, 1781, rings with affectionate praise 
 and admiration for his many admirable qualities as a man and soldier. 
 
 The leaders of the patriots, and the men whom they commanded, 
 were honored with the thanks of their several legislatures; and 
 the thanks of Congress were given in a resolution of the 13th of 
 November, as follows: 
 
 Resolved, That Congress entertain a high sense of the spirited and mili tary 
 conduct of Colonel Campbell, and the officers and privates of the militia under 
 his command, displayed in action of the 7 of October, in which a compleat victory 
 was obtained over superior numbers of the enemy, advantageously posted on 
 King's Mountain, in the state of North Carolina; and that this resolution be 
 published by the commanding officer of the southern army, in general orders. 
 
 1321 
 
Part III 
 
 CORNWALLIS ON THE DEFENSIVE ~ INACTIVITY 
 IN THE NORTH™ CONCLUSIONS 
 
 SHE day following the battle the victors and 
 their prisoners withdrew in the direction of 
 
 Tg&g2 the mountains. On the 13th of October they 
 /Ijvyj reached BickerstafPs plantation, about 15 miles 
 £$3^ northeast, of Gilbert Town. It was here that a 
 number of the prisoners were tried by a court 
 of officers, and 30 found guilty of "breaking 
 open houses, killing the men, and turning the women and children 
 out of doors and burning the houses." On the 14th nine of the 
 convicted men were hanged. 
 
 Following this event the march was resumed in the direction of 
 Virginia, in consequence of instructions sent by Gates on the 12th 
 that the prisoners were to be escorted under proper guard to Fin' 
 castle Court House, Va. By the time the Catawba was reached, like 
 all partisan groups, these men thought their mission being accom- 
 plished they could return to their homes, and at this time there 
 were no more troops than prisoners. 
 
 On reaching Bethabara a halt was made, and on the 26th Camp- 
 bell turned the command over to Cleveland, and he and Shelby 
 repaired to Gates's headquarters in Hillsborough to arrange for the 
 disposition of the prisoners. The official report of the battle was 
 prepared some time subsequent to the departure from the com- 
 mand of Sevier and Lacey at Quaker Meadows, and was delivered 
 to General Gates by Colonel Campbell October 31, or the day 
 following. 
 
 Rumors of the disaster which Ferguson's army suffered probably 
 reached the patriots in and around Charlotte Town late the follow- 
 ing day or morning of the 9th. By the 10th Cornwallis's headquar- 
 
 I33J 
 
THE BATTLE OF KIKCS MOUKTAIH 
 
 ters had received sufficient intelligence to cause great fear that a 
 disaster of some nature had occurred, and Tarleton's command was 
 ordered to proceed immediately to reinforce Ferguson wherever he 
 could be found, "and to draw his corps to the Catawba, if after the 
 junction, advantage could not be obtained over the mountaineers; 
 or, upon the certainty of his defeat, at all events to oppose the 
 entrance of the victorious Americans into South Carolina." Tarle' 
 ton proceeded to the Catawba, where he received certain informa' 
 tion of the melancholy fate of Ferguson. Upon crossing this river, 
 to "give protection to the fugitives, and to attend the operations of 
 the enemy," he realized the complete disaster to the royal cause in 
 the surrounding country. In his book description of the campaign 
 of 1780 and 1781 , published in 1787, he said : 
 
 The destruction of Ferguson and his corps marked the period and the extent 
 of the first expedition into North Carolina. Added to the depression and fear it 
 communicated to the loyalists upon the borders, and to the southward, the effect 
 of such an important event was sensibly felt by Earl Comwallis at Charlotte 
 town. The weakness of his army, the extent and poverty of North Carolina, the 
 want of knowledge of his enemy's designs, and the total ruin of his militia, 
 presented a gloomy prospect at the commencement of the campaign. A farther 
 progress by the route which he had undertaken could not possibly remove, but 
 would undoubtedly encrease his difficulties; he therefore formed a sudden deter' 
 mination to quit Charlotte town, and pass the Catawba river. The army was 
 ordered to move, and expresses were dispatched to recal Lieutenant-colonel 
 Tarleton. 
 
 Cornwallis , s army left Charlotte Town on October 14, marching 
 southwest to the Catawba, and from thence in a direction to cover 
 both Camden and Ninety Six. Following the defeat of Ferguson, 
 Cruger sent information to Cornwallis from Ninety Six that the 
 whole district had determined to submit as soon as those in revolt 
 against the King should enter it, and Cornwallis decided that in 
 withdrawing it should be in a direction that would permit of con' 
 tact with both Camden and Ninety Six. On the 29th of October 
 Lord Rawdon, who was in temporary command of the British Army 
 owing to the illness of Cornwallis, wrote to Sir Henry Clinton: 
 
 I34J 
 
THE BATTLE OF KIHGS MOUHTAIH 
 
 Lord Cornwallis foresees all the difficulties of a defensive war, yet his lord' 
 ship thinks they can not be weighed against the dangers which must have 
 attended an obstinate adherence to his former plan. 
 
 Withdrawal from North Carolina was continued for more than 
 60 miles from Charlotte Town, before the army halted and went 
 into camp at Wynnesborough. 
 
 On the 3d of December Cornwallis, who had recovered from his 
 illness, wrote to the commander in chief from Wynnesborough of 
 the various causes which prevented his penetration into North 
 Carolina. Regarding Ferguson's mission toward the mountains he 
 said: 
 
 The event proved unfortunate, without any fault of Major Ferguson's. A 
 numerous and unexpected enemy came from the mountains; as they had good 
 horses their movements were rapid. 
 
 Regarding his position at Wynnesborough, he advised that it 
 was well situated to protedt the greatest part of the frontier, and to 
 assist Camden and Ninety Six. He determined to remain at this 
 place until he learned of the intentions of General Leslie's com' 
 mand, on which his plan for the winter was to depend; meanwhile 
 using every possible means of putting the Province into a state of 
 defense, which he considered necessary, whether his future cam' 
 paign was offensive or defensive. The extent of his disappointment 
 and discouragement over conditions in the southern district are 
 expressed in a sentence near the close of the above'mentioned letter, 
 which reads : 
 
 After everything that has happened I will not presume to make your excellency 
 any sanguine promises. 
 
 Campaigning in the South during 1780 consisted almost entirely 
 of partisan warfare, wherein detachments of the Army, militia, 
 and irregular groups fought over wide areas. The main armies 
 were engaged but twice — at Charleston and Camden — both Brit' 
 ish victories. The territory involved, from Charlotte Town south, 
 constituted a large portion of the colonial area, but the more impor' 
 tant part, from the standpoint of wealth and density of population, 
 
 I35J 
 
THE BATTLE OF KIKGS MOUHTAIH 
 
 was in the north. The seat of government was at Philadelphia; 
 Washington's headquarters during the first of the year at Morris' 
 town; and the commercial center in New York, held, at the time, by 
 the British. What concern was felt by Washington and Congress 
 over conditions in the Carolinas was largely due to the uncer' 
 tainty as to the strategy which Clinton would use in the North. 
 The year 1780, like those which had gone before, brought to 
 Washington many problems of vital import to the American cause. 
 The calm, dispassionate manner in which he planned for the Army 
 and advised with Congress indicates a grandeur of character and a 
 capacity for work too little understood. His faith in the justice of 
 the cause and its ultimate success was unbounded, despite the fad; 
 that at times his optimism faltered and he felt that "we are totter' 
 ing on the brink of a precipice. 11 But this temporary despair is 
 explained by his overwhelming surprise over the treason of Arnold. 
 Matters of more casual concern, such as difficulties in connection 
 with the draft, depreciated currency, lack of supplies, intermittently 
 starving Army, general disaffection amongst the troops; all these 
 had been his problems for a long time; they had been solved some' 
 how or other, and he had faith in their solution for the future. He 
 wrote to Baron von Steuben on April 2: 
 
 My sentiments concerning public affairs correspond too much with yours. 
 The prospect, my dear Baron, is gloomy, and the storm threatens. But I hope we 
 shall extricate ourselves, and bring everything to a prosperous issue. I have been 
 so inured to difficulties in the course of this contest, that I have learned to look 
 upon them with more tranquillity than formerly. 
 
 England was complete mistress of the Atlantic seaboard. Her 
 fleet held the harbors of Halifax, Penobscot, New York, Charleston, 
 and Savannah, and that the Colonies, as a consequence, had not 
 suffered more than they had, Washington ascribed to the "feeble 
 and injudicious manner in which the enemy have applied the means 
 in their hands during this war." He realized that a fleet was essen- 
 tial to the success of the American cause, and only from France 
 could this succor come. La Fayette had returned to Europe the pre 
 
 1361 
 
THE BATTLE OF KIHGS MOUHTAIH 
 
 ceding year to use his tremendous enthusiasm for the American 
 cause as a lever to pry from the King and his ministers a fleet and an 
 army that would make of France an effective ally of America. His 
 return to the Colonies on the 27th of April, 1780, with the joyous 
 tidings that a fleet and army were soon to follow, heartened 
 Washington and Congress beyond measure. 
 
 The British Army in the North was quiet during the first half 
 of 1780, due to the detachment of a considerable part of the fleet 
 and army for operations in the South. The American Army was 
 quiet, as tidings from France were awaited, and when the French 
 fleet and army finally did arrive, Washington abandoned his winter 
 quarters early in June and prepared for operations to secure the 
 reduction of the city and garrison of New York. He estimated that 
 he would have a force of from 30,000 to 40,000 men, after the 
 militia joined. 
 
 However, with the blockade of the French fleet in the port of 
 Rhode Island, the projected campaign to conquer New York had 
 to be abandoned, and a season of comparative inactivity on the part 
 of his army drew to a close in October. The following month 
 arrangements were made to go into winter quarters again. 
 
 With both Congress and Washington, their principal concern 
 was the main army under his command. What occurred south of the 
 Chesapeake were collateral issues to which only a limited amount 
 of thought, energy, and assistance could be given. While Charles' 
 ton was undergoing its siege, Washington wrote to Philip Schuyler, 
 who was in Congress: 
 
 What to do for the Southern States, without involving consequences equally 
 alarming in this quarter, I know not. 
 
 Upon his recommendation, Congress detached the Maryland 
 division to reinforce the South, and it fought with great credit at 
 Camden. Later Congress added Delaware and Maryland to the 
 Southern Department. It was felt in the North that Charleston 
 would probably fall, in which case, Washington wrote on April 15, 
 "there is much reason to believe the Southern States will become 
 the principal theater of war." 
 
 P71 
 
THE BATTLE OF KIHGS MOUHTAIH 
 
 After the defeat at Camden, Washington wrote to Count de 
 Rochambeau on the 8th of September that "this event must have 
 the worst effect upon the affairs of the Southern States. Nor is it 
 easy to say how far its influence may extend." But it was expected 
 that if the inhabitants of the Carolinas were vitally concerned in 
 independence, they would rise in sufficient numbers to acquire it, 
 at least within their own boundaries, and affairs in the North still 
 continued to monopolize the attention of both Congress and Wash' 
 ington. However, there was sufficient concern to prompt action 
 which resulted in sending to the Southern Department late in the 
 year a competent commander, General Nathanael Greene. Receipt 
 of the news as to how the mountain men overcame Ferguson thrilled 
 the entire country, and Congress showed its appreciation of this 
 magnificent feat in the manner already referred to, but beyond this 
 it was but an incident of the southern campaign. Following Cam' 
 den, Arnold's treason, and the inactive campaign of his army, on 
 the day after Washington wrote that "we are tottering on the brink 
 of a precipice," he said in a letter to General Cadwalader, "our 
 case is not desperate, if virtue exists in the people, and there is 
 wisdom among our rulers." 
 
 In considering the effect of the Battle of Kings Mountain upon 
 the situation in the South, it was only this epic tragedy to FergU' 
 son's army that halted Cornwallis in his subjugation of North 
 Carolina. Without this, or a similar calamity, he would have 
 reached the northern borders of the Province in December, and 
 with the Chesapeake occupied by the British fleet, Virginia would 
 have suffered the same fate. What the outcome of such a situation 
 in the winter of 1780-81 would have been is problematic. In a letter 
 to Count de Vergennes from M. de la Luzerne, the latter declared 
 that the intention of the British was to sever the Carolinas and 
 Georgia from the North. After the fall of Charleston, a gazette 
 was published in that town in which the conquerors circulated 
 insinuations that the Northern States had abandoned the South, 
 and were about to make arrangements with England which would 
 exclude the Carolinas and Georgia. The letter adds: 
 
 1381 
 
THE BATTLE OF KITiGS MOUNTAIN 
 
 These attempts had an effect. The Members of Congress are divided as to 
 their interests and objects. Some are for using all efforts for rescuing the South. 
 Others think the people there have shown too little zeal and activity in the cause, 
 and that it is not expedient to put in jeopardy the safety of the North by rendering 
 extraordinary aid to people who are so indifferent about their own independence. 
 * * * It is possible that the British will make a proposition to the 10 North- 
 ern States tending to assure their independence; and their scheme will be to form 
 into a new government the two Carolinas, Georgia, east Florida, and the Bahama 
 Islands, which together would make a respectable possession. 
 
 That there was some foundation for the impressions above com' 
 municated is confirmed in a letter from Mr. Duane, in Congress, to 
 General Schuyler, written the 21sT: of May. Said he: 
 
 That the reinforcements ordered to the southward should be halted is obvious 
 for the reasons you assign. But do you expect such a proposition from a northern 
 Member, deeply interested in Strengthening the main army? It is a question of 
 the utmost delicacy and even danger; for, however groundlessly, an opinion has 
 been propagated, that Congress means to sacrifice the two southernmost States, 
 and it has been productive of the greatest animosity and discontent. We have 
 privately stated the subject to some of the southern gentlemen, who, though I 
 believe convinced of the propriety of the measure, did not choose, after great 
 deliberation, to have it adopted, much less to propose it. There is but one person 
 from whom it can originate with any prospect of success. If we had undertaken 
 it, nothing would have resulted but disappointment and the loss of personal 
 confidence. 
 
 The Battle of Kings Mountain was the outstanding victory of 
 the Americans in 1780. Following it, Cornwallis was compelled to 
 abandon North Carolina, and for a time assume the defensive. It 
 put an end to the possibility of an eventual peace with England 
 under such terms as might have resulted in the retention of the 
 southern Provinces under British rule. It is an exemplification of 
 American aspirations for self'government and a display of romantic 
 hardihood and bravery well worthy the careful study of American 
 youth. 
 
 K39J 
 
140! 
 
Part IV 
 
 THE BATTLE GROUND OF KINGS MOUNTAIN 
 IN SOUTH CAROLINA 
 
 jHERE never has been any uncertainty as to 
 the actual location of the ground on which 
 
 TS&p^ the Battle of Kings Mountain was fought, but 
 /st^n due to the defects and limitations in early 
 §?f§j) maps, the battle has frequently been described 
 as occurring in North Carolina. Many of the 
 early maps show "King Mountain" north of 
 the boundary line, with none of the mountain symbols extending 
 into South Carolina. As a result the battle was accredited to North 
 Carolina. 
 
 In 1772 a portion of the boundary between the two Carolinas 
 was surveyed from the Catawba River westwardly. The origin of 
 this portion of the boundary was the center of the junction of the 
 Catawba and the South Fork of the Catawba. From this junction 
 the line was to run due west to the mountains and there connect 
 with the boundary of the Cherokee Nation. 
 
 The Price and Strother map, engraved in 1808, which purports 
 to be "The First Actual Survey of the State of North Carolina," 
 shows the 1772 line crossing the Broad River 1^4 miles south of the 
 east and west line through the junction of the Broad and the First 
 Broad. This corresponds with the distance on the Gaffhey quad' 
 rangle of the United States Geological Survey. By other checks of 
 the 1772 line where it crosses streams, with the United States 
 Geological Survey of the line, it is evident that both lines are one 
 and the same. 
 
 On the Price and Strother map, and on all other maps subsequent 
 to 1772 for many years, the boundary line from the junction of the 
 branches of the Catawba is shown as running due west. It was 
 
 141 1 
 
THE BATTLE OF KIKGS MOUHTAITi 
 
 later discovered that due to magnetic errors the line was run north 
 of west. The United States Geological Survey maps show that this 
 deviation is about 2}4°. The 1772 line has been resurveyed and 
 confirmed, but never has it been changed between the Catawba 
 and the mountains, 68 miles west. The latitude of the 1772 line 
 near its initial point is 35° 09' 01.5". An inspection of the Kings 
 Mountain quadrangle will show that the battle ground is much far' 
 ther south, hence had the line been run due west, as was intended, 
 the battle ground would nevertheless He within the borders of 
 South Carolina. 
 
 C42J 
 
THE BATTLE OF KIHGS MOUJ^TAIH 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 SOURCE MATERIAL ANALYZED 
 
 Sparks, 1835: The Writings of George Washington. 
 
 Ford, 1891: The Writings of George Washington. 
 
 1780-81 : Journals of the Continental Congress. 
 
 Sparks, 1853: Correspondence of the American Revolution. Letters to Washington. 
 
 Stevens, 1888: Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy Growing out of the Campaign in Virginia. A 
 reprint of six pamphlets, with other matter added. 
 
 Cornwaixis, 1783 : An answer by Cornwallis to certain parts of Narrative by Clinton. 
 
 Clinton, 1783 : Observations by Clinton on certain parts of Cornwallis's Answer. 
 
 Ross, 1859: Correspondence of Cornwallis. 
 
 Tarleton, 1787: History of the Campaign of 1780 and 1781, in the Southern Provinces of North 
 America. 
 
 Mackenzie, 1787: Strictures on Tarleton's History. 
 
 Almon, 1780-81: The Remembrancer. 
 
 Houghed, 1867: The Siege of Charleston by the British Fleet and Army. 
 
 Draper, 1881 : King's Mountain and its Heroes. The appendix publishes the following source 
 material: Allaire's Diary; letters from officers of the Provincial Corps; letter, Williams to Gates; 
 letter, Davidson to Sumner; letter, Gates to Jefferson; letter, Shelby to Shelby; letter, Shelby to 
 Arthur Campbell; letter, Campbell to Campbell; letter, Shelby to Sevier; official report; Wash- 
 ington's general order; Campbell's general orders; vote of thanks, Virginia Legislature; vote of 
 thanks, Virginia Senate; Diary of Ensign Robert Campbell; account of battle by Ensign Robert 
 Campbell; Shelby's statements to Hardin in 1815-1819; Shelby's 1823 statement. 
 
 Vance, narrative: Pamphlets on the Revolutionary War. 
 
 Maps: United States Geological Survey — Kings Mountain quadrangle; Gaffney quadrangle; Roan 
 Mountain quadrangle; Mount Mitchell quadrangle; Morganton quadrangle; State of Tennessee; 
 State of North Carolina; State of South Carolina. Price and Strother — North Carolina, 1808. 
 Mills Atlas, 1825. 
 
 BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS READ 
 
 Draper, 1881: Kings Mountain and Its Heroes. Collection of material for this history covered a 
 
 period of 40 years. The book contains much source material of varying worth. 
 Losslng, 1860: Pictorial Field Book of the Revolution. 
 Carrington, 1876: Battles of the American Revolution. 
 Landrum, 1897: Colonial and Revolutionary History of Upper South Carolina. 
 Ramsay, 1789: The History of the American Revolution. 
 Ramsay, 1809: The History of South Carolina. 
 Ramsey, 1853: Annals of Tennessee. 
 
 Stedman, 1794: The History of the Origin, Progress, and Termination of the American War. 
 Simms, 1860: The History of South Carolina. 
 Wilkin, 1914: Some British Soldiers in America. 
 
 1431 
 
THE BATTLE OF KIHGS MOUHTAIJi 
 
 Warren, 1805: History of the Rise, Progress, and Termination of the American Revolution. 
 
 Hunter, 1877: Sketches of Western North Carolina. 
 
 Wheeler, 1861 : History of North Carolina. 
 
 Johnson, 1822: Sketches of the Life and Correspondence of Nathanael Greene. 
 
 Roosevelt, 1889: The Winning of the West. 
 
 Graham, 1913: Address by Major Graham on General Davidson, in North Carolina Booklet. 
 
 Boyd, 1909: The Battle of Kings Mountain, in North Carolina Booklet. 
 
 Channtng, 188S: The War in the Southern Department. 
 
 Graham, 1904: General Joseph Graham and His Papers on North Carolina Revolutionary History. 
 
 De Peyster, 1880: The Affair of King's Mountain. 
 
 De Peyster, 1881 : The Battle or Affair of King's Mountain. 
 
 Greene, 1871 : The Life of Nathanael Greene. 
 
 McCrady, 1901 : The History of South Carolina in the Revolution. 
 
 Sohenck, 1889: North Carolina, 1780-81. 
 
 Lee, 1869: Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States by Lieut. CoL 
 
 Henry Lee. 
 Johnson, 1822: Sketches of the Life and Correspondence of Nathanael Greene. 
 Sablne, 1864: Loyalists of the American Revolution. 
 
 [44J 
 
LZ COL. H.L. LANDERS, F.A. 
 HISTORICAL SECTION, ARMY WAR COLUCC 
 

Contour intervals- 10 feet. 
 
 ? ? 1 S6TS9 looo-dj. 
 
 A.- Old monument. 
 B.-New monument. 
 C- Ferguson killed here. 
 Dl- Ferguson's qrave. 
 E.- Monument. 
 
 Battle, of Kings Mountain 
 
 OCTOBER 7, 17 80 
 
 Sketch made in April I9Z5 
 by Lt.CoI. H. L. Landers, F.A. 
 
 
 \ 
 
 108368°— 28. (Face p. 44.) No. 2 
 
THE BATTLE OF THE COWPENS 
 SOUTH CAROLINA 
 
 January 17, 1781 
 
f46! 
 
THE BATTLE OF THE COWPENS 
 Part I 
 
 BRITISH PLANS 
 TARLETON SENT AFTER MORGAN 
 
 >HE Battle of the Cowpens was the second 
 serious disaster which occurred to the Brit' 
 
 T|ssj|j ish Army, operating in the Southern States, 
 /l^g during the 1780-81 campaign. Following the 
 ^^ capitulation of Charleston on May 12, 1780, 
 all of South Carolina was in a condition of 
 subjugation within a few months, and in Sep' 
 tember British headquarters were moved to Charlotte Town, N. C. 
 Prior to this Lieutenant Colonel Ferguson had been detached, with 
 a small force of Provincials, to organise the militia and operate on 
 CornwalUVs flank. On the 7th of October his entire command was 
 lost at Kings Mountain. Following this disaster the British field 
 army was withdrawn more than 60 miles to Wynnesborough, and 
 there remained on the defensive while awaiting information relative 
 to the rehabilitation of Gates's army, now commanded by Greene; 
 and in coordinating plans with the commander in chief, General 
 Clinton, particularly with reference to the use of the troops under 
 General Leslie, which were sent from New York to Virginia. 
 
 Lieutenant Colonel Tarleton, the only officer remaining after 
 Ferguson's death used by Cornwallis for the command of roving 
 troops, was sent into the district north of Ninety Six to oppose 
 General Morgan, and somewhat later Cornwallis resumed his march 
 northward. Tarleton and Morgan met at the Cowpens, on the 17th 
 of January, and in a battle noted for the unusual tactics adopted by 
 the Americans, the British were defeated, with heavy losses, by 
 a force inferior in numbers, a considerable portion of which was 
 militia. 
 
 1471 
 
THE BATTLE OF THE COWPEHS 
 
 The relation of the Cowpens to the southern campaign in 1780-81 
 can be understood only through a knowledge of the purposes of the 
 two army commanders, Greene and Cornwallis, during the period 
 following Kings Mountain. After General Clinton's departure from 
 Charleston for New York on June 5, 1780, he conducted corre' 
 spondence with Cornwallis relative to operations contemplated in 
 the Chesapeake. In October General Leslie was given command of 
 about 2,000 regulars, and sailed from New York to establish posts 
 on the western tributaries of the Chesapeake, near its mouth. The 
 letter of instructions from Clinton, given him before his departure, 
 directed him to proceed to those waters and make a diversion in 
 favor of Cornwallis, who, it was expected, would be, at the time 
 of his arrival, in central and western North Carolina. The instruc 
 tions suggested that he proceed up the James River and destroy 
 enemy magazines at Petersburg, Richmond, and elsewhere, and 
 finally establish a post on the Eksabeth River at Portsmouth, but 
 that under any conditions he was to communicate as soon as possible 
 with Cornwallis and act under his orders. 
 
 A copy of the instructions under which Leslie was to act was 
 received by Cornwallis about the 24th of October, at which time 
 he was withdrawing from Charlotte Town, and the possibility of 
 carrying out at this time any plan of joint action in Virginia was 
 very remote. Lord Rawdon, who commanded, due to the illness of 
 Cornwallis, immediately dispatched a letter to Leslie, advising him 
 of the defeat of Ferguson, with its consequent augmentation of 
 defection in both the Carolinas, and of the necessity of the British 
 Army remaining within supporting distance of Ninety Six and Cam' 
 den until a more favorable moment arrived for the resumption of 
 the offensive. From the circumstances related in his letter, Lord 
 Rawdon expressed the fear that the two armies were too far apart 
 to render Leslie's cooperation very effectual. 
 
 Although the British commander in chief had signified to Corn' 
 wallis that he was at liberty to give Leslie any direction for further 
 cooperation which might appear to him expedient, Cornwallis was 
 
 I48J 
 
THE BATTLE OF THE COWPEHS 
 
 loath at this time to instruct the latter to bring his troops to South 
 Carolina. He feared that should he withdraw this force from the 
 Chesapeake, he might interfere with other purposes, unknown to 
 him, to which Clinton had destined these troops. Rawdon there 
 fore informed Leslie in October that "Lord Cornwallis thinks him- 
 self obliged to leave you at liberty to pursue whatsoever measures 
 may appear to your judgment best for his majesty's service and 
 most consonant with the wishes of the commander in chief." In 
 conclusion Rawdon informed Leslie that should his knowledge of 
 Clinton's desires prompt him to make a trial upon North Carolina, 
 a movement up Cape Fear River to Cross Creek was the most 
 likely, at this time, to prove effectual. The general situation in the 
 South was similarly described by Rawdon in a letter to Clinton of 
 the 29th of October, wherein was stated the intention of not defi' 
 nitely ordering Leslie to the Cape Fear, as Clinton might have other 
 plans with which such a move would interfere. 
 
 When Leslie learned of General Cornwallis's desire that he quit 
 the Chesapeake and move up the Cape Fear to Cross Creek, know 
 ing that Clinton had no ulterior purpose in keeping him in Virginia, 
 he immediately planned to make this change and sent dispatches 
 to Clinton on the 7th of November informing him of the new 
 arrangement. This met with the entire approval of the commander 
 in chief. A second letter from Lord Rawdon, written on the 31st 
 of October, wherein he reiterated in a more urgent manner the 
 wishes of Cornwallis in the matter, was probably the deciding 
 factor in prompting compliance by Leslie. 
 
 Cornwallis established his camp at Wynnesborough in Novem- 
 ber. It was evident from the correspondence conducted with Leslie 
 that he could make no move until he knew where the latter would 
 establish himself, as his plans for the winter would depend upon 
 this knowledge. The success of the Americans at Kings Mountain 
 had done much to overcome the depression in the South, following 
 the defeat at Camden, and partisan forces were active on both flanks 
 of the British Army. Colonel Marion operated between the Santee 
 
 1491 
 
THE BATTLE OF THE COWPEHS 
 
 and Peedee, and from this locality threatened communications and 
 supplies for the post at Camden, and the army at Wynnesborough. 
 Sumter and his subordinate leaders were active west of the Broad, 
 threatening Ninety Six. Furthermore, the British had intelligence 
 that General Morgan, with Washington's cavalry and a body of 
 Continental infantry, was advancing toward Lynches Creek, with 
 Camden as their objective. 
 
 Early in November Tarleton had been sent east of the Wateree, 
 and on his arrival at Camden, finding no reason to expect an attack 
 upon that place by General Morgan, proceeded down the east bank 
 of the river against Marion. The two forces met on the 10th, but 
 Marion, realising he was outnumbered, retreated. During the pur' 
 suit an express arrived from General Cornwallis, sent from Wynnes' 
 borough the preceding day, directing Tarleton to lose no time in 
 returning, as Cornwallis was "under the greatest anxiety for Ninety 
 Six." The circumstance which occasioned this unexpected order 
 was the predicament into which Major Wemyss, at the head of 40 
 of Tarleton's dragoons, and the mounted Sixty'third, had gotten. 
 He was operating along the Broad, and learning that Sumter with 
 about 300 men was near by, undertook to surprise him by a 
 night attack. The British entered Sumter's camp by surprise, but 
 instead of dismounting and securing the enemy arms, they remained 
 mounted. Sumter's men recovered from their surprise, got their 
 arms, engaged the enemy, wounded Wemyss, and as the second in 
 command did not know his plans, the British withdrew. 
 
 Cornwallis's letter of recall to Tarleton written on the 9th was 
 followed by another on the 10th, and a third on the 11th of Novem- 
 ber, so urgent was he that Tarleton appear in the territory of the 
 Broad to retrieve the situation, and fearful that the other letters 
 might not have gotten through. In the letter of the 11th he said: 
 
 I wish you would get three legions, and divide yourself into three parts. We 
 can do no good without you. I trust to your coming immediately, unless you see 
 something more materially pressing. 
 
 Tarleton hastened his return to army headquarters at Wynnes' 
 borough, and from thence continued southwestwardly across the 
 
 1501 
 
THE BATTLE OF THE COWPEKS 
 
 Broad, to locate and engage Sumter, who was approaching Ninety 
 Six. There followed the fight at Blackstocks on the 20th of Novem' 
 ber, wherein General Sumter was wounded. Following this action 
 Tarleton withdrew to Brierlys Ferry on the Broad. It was with 
 much gratification that Cornwallis learned of Sumter's wound, 
 for he wrote, "he certainly has been our greatest plague in this 
 country." 
 
 The recovery of Cornwallis from his illness during the with' 
 drawal from Charlotte Town, and the successes attendant upon 
 Tarleton's efforts in the field, stimulated a desire to renew offen' 
 sive warfare, and in November he decided to bring Leslie's force 
 to Charleston, as cooperation with him even at the distance of the 
 Cape Fear River would be attended with many difficulties. Leslie 
 arrived in Charleston on the 13th of December, where orders 
 awaited him to march up country with 1,530 men, to ioin Corn' 
 wallis as soon as possible. 
 
 The British plan of campaign for the winter of 1780-81 was for 
 the main army to penetrate into North Carolina, leaving South 
 Carolina in security against any probable attack. Offensive opera' 
 tions were to be started about the middle of January. The line of 
 march was to be by the upper, or western, roads in preference to 
 lowland routes, because fords were more frequent above the forks 
 of the rivers, and the passage of the army could be less easily 
 obstructed. Furthermore, General Greene being on the Peedee, and 
 there being few fords in any of the great rivers of this country 
 below their forks, especially in the rainy season, a penetration north, 
 by way of Salisbury, would probably meet with much resistance by 
 Greene's army. 
 
 Cornwallis was the more induced to prefer the western route, as 
 he hoped to destroy or drive out of South Carolina the corps com' 
 manded by General Morgan, which, it will be noted later, was sent 
 into the region of the Broad and Pacolet, during the latter part of 
 December, to threaten the valuable district of Ninety Six. There 
 was hope, also, that by rapid marches the British main army would 
 
 I51J 
 
THE BATTLE OF THE COWPEKS 
 
 get between Greene and Virginia, and by that means force the 
 Americans to fight without receiving any reinforcements from that 
 State, or, failing in this, to oblige Greene to quit North Carolina 
 with precipitation, and thereby encourage the friends of the Crown 
 to make good their promises of a general rising to assist the British 
 commander in reestablishing the Royal Government. 
 
 While Tarleton lay on the Broad, following the fight at Black' 
 stocks, it became known to the British that General Morgan and 
 Colonel Washington had been detached from Charlotte Town on 
 December 20th and had proceeded across the Broad in the direction 
 of Ninety Six, which post was viewed by Cornwallis as the most 
 sensitive of all under his command. On the 30th of December Corn' 
 wallis advised Tarleton of this threat, and on the 1st of the follow 
 ing month sent his aide with orders that Tarleton should cross the 
 Broad with his corps of Cavalry and Infantry of 550 men, the First 
 Battalion of the Seventy-first, consisting of 200 men, and one 
 3'pounder, to counteract the designs of General Morgan, by pro' 
 tecting the country and compelling him to repass the Broad. The 
 danger of Morgan's presence west of the Broad was felt so acutely 
 by Cornwallis that the day after he dispatched his aide with this 
 message to Tarleton, he wrote an additional admonition: 
 
 If Morgan is still at Williams's, or anywhere within your reach, I should wish 
 you to push him to the utmost; I have not heard, except from Mc Arthur, of his 
 having cannon; nor would I believe it, unless he has it from very good authority; 
 it is, however, possible, and Ninety Six is of so much consequence, that no time 
 is to be lost. 
 
 Let me know, if you think that the moving the whole, or any part of my corps, 
 can be of use. 
 
 On the receipt of this letter Tarleton immediately directed his 
 course to the westward, leaving his baggage behind, but he had not 
 proceeded more than 20 miles from Brierleys Ferry before he was 
 satisfied that Morgan was nowhere near Fort Williams and that 
 for the time being Ninety Six was not threatened. He therefore 
 decided to camp, bring up his baggage, and make certain recom' 
 mendations to Cornwallis relative to the ensuing campaign, as was 
 
 1521 
 
THE BATTLE OF THE COWPETiS 
 
 called for in the latter 's letter of the 2d. Tarleton wrote on the 4th 
 asking that his baggage be forwarded under escort of the Seven' 
 teenth Light Dragoons, the Yagers, and the Seventh Regiment. 
 "When I advance, I must either destroy Morgan's corps," he said, 
 "or push it before me over Broad River, toward Kings Mountain. 
 The advance of the army should commence (when your lordship 
 orders this corps to move) onward for Kings Mountain. Frequent 
 communication by letter can pass the Broad River." It is to be 
 noted that at this time Tarleton and Cornwallis occupied interior 
 positions, separated less than 24 hours in messenger service, while 
 Morgan and Greene lay beyond them in opposite directions, and 
 from 5 to 10 days apart by messenger. 
 
 On the 5th of January Cornwallis approved the suggestions 
 relative to combined action as mentioned in Tarleton's letter of the 
 day before, and informed him that the Seventh Regiment was 
 escorting his baggage to Brierleys Ferry, and that he, Cornwallis, 
 proposed marching on January 7. Two hundred men of the Seventh 
 Regiment, who were mostly recruits and designed for the garrison 
 at Ninety Six, 50 dragoons of the Seventeenth Regiment, and a 
 3-pounder, brought the wagons from Brierleys Ferry to camp. Upon 
 the arrival of the baggage and reinforcing troops, Tarleton crossed 
 Indian and Duncan Creeks, and on his advance received accounts 
 of the increase of Morgan's corps, which induced him to halt his 
 march and request permission of Cornwallis to retain the Seventh 
 Regiment. This request having been granted, on the 12th he con' 
 tinued his course to the westward in order to discover the most 
 practicable fords, and the Enoree and Tiger were passed on the 
 14th, above the Cherokee Road. That evening Tarleton obtained 
 information that Morgan was on the Pacolet, guarding all the fords. 
 In the meanwhile Cornwallis's march northward had not been 
 made in accordance with his plans, as the junction of Leslie's com' 
 mand had been much retarded by high waters, and it was not until 
 the 14th that "Leslie is at last out of the swamps," at which time 
 Cornwallis was at Bull Run. 
 
 1531 
 
THE BATTLE OF THE COWPEJiS 
 
 On the 15th Tarleton made a reconnaissance of Morgan's dispo- 
 sitions covering the fords of the Pacolet, and that evening a feint 
 was made to cross high up the river. The morning of the 16th this 
 course was altered, as it was now known that Morgan had with' 
 drawn from the Pacolet, and a passage was secured within 6 miles 
 of the hostile camp. The British continued their march for several 
 miles, and halted in some log huts to resT; and reconnoiter Morgan's 
 whereabouts. Tarleton intended to post his troops behind the 
 huts in case Morgan showed an inclination to attack him in this 
 position. In his narrative he says that the camp afforded a plentiful 
 supply of half-cooked provisions, left by the Americans that day. 
 Patrols and spies were dispatched to observe the Americans dur- 
 ing the night, and dragoons followed until dark, when they were 
 ordered back to the main body. Early in the night the patrols 
 reported that Morgan had withdrawn to Thicketty Creek, and 
 that several groups of partisans were en route to join him. Tarleton 
 determined to push ahead promptly for the purpose of engaging 
 Morgan before he could effedt a passage of the Broad, and before 
 his numbers were too greatly augmented. Accordingly at 3 o'clock 
 on the morning of the 17th the pursuit was resumed. The wagons 
 and baggage of his train were left in camp under the protection of a 
 small detachment from each corps. 
 
 154: 
 
Part II 
 
 AMERICAN PLANS 
 MORGAN SENT WEST OF THE CATAWBA 
 
 ! HE disaster which befell the American Army 
 at Camden on the 16th of August resulted 
 
 TS$p^ in Congress passing a resolution on the 5th 
 !§jH of October ordering General Washington to 
 g^j|j direct a court of inquiry to be held on the con' 
 dud: of Major General Gates, as commander of 
 the southern army, and to appoint his succes- 
 sor. Washington designated Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene, second 
 in command in the main army, and an officer whose ability, loyalty, 
 and capacity for command were fully appreciated by the commander 
 in chief. On the receipt of instructions from General Washington 
 and Congress, Greene proceeded south, stopping in Philadelphia to 
 confer with Congress, and in the several States on his way, which 
 were immediately concerned in furnishing men and supplies for the 
 Southern Department. He desired to acquire a knowledge of the 
 military situation therein, and plan for the regular support and sub- 
 sistence of his command in provisions, forage, and transportation. 
 Before leaving Philadelphia he wrote to Washington that his first 
 object would be to equip a flying army of 800 horses and 1,000 
 Infantry. Greene held the services of Cavalry and mounted Infan- 
 try in high regard, the contrary view being entertained by the 
 officer whom he was to relieve. Lieut. Col. Henry Lee was one of 
 the officers whom he desired to conduct partisan warfare, which he 
 knew would constitute an important factor in his campaigns. 
 
 General Greene reached Charlotte Town, where Gates's head- 
 quarters were now established, on the 2d of December, and on the 
 following day the latter issued his final order to the troops, turning 
 the command over to General Greene. While traversing Maryland, 
 
 1551 
 
THE BATTLE OF THE COWPEHS 
 
 Virginia, and North Carolina, wise and energetic measures had 
 been taken by Greene, in consultation with the State authorities, 
 to insure that cooperation and assistance would be forthcoming. 
 A survey of his troops at once confirmed his previous knowledge 
 of their needs for food, clothing, transportation, and shelter, as 
 learned from Gates's reports on these matters, and his attention to 
 the correction of these deficiencies was incessant and laborious. 
 His ability as a quartermaster was in no wise inferior to his worth 
 as a commander in the field, and the detailed manner in which he 
 directed the betterment of conditions is a high tribute to his general 
 efficiency. The logistics of supply were carefully covered in his 
 many instructions for the surveys of all possible water routes, the 
 construction of bateaux, the listing of animals and wagons for trans' 
 portation, and for the operation of mills, ironworks, and other 
 utilities. 
 
 Pending improvement in his numbers, and augmentation in the 
 necessary supplies, the army was to remain inactive. The country 
 around Charlotte Town had been depleted so thoroughly of food 
 and forage, that on the 8th of December Greene wrote to Colonel 
 Kosciusko to examine the country along the Peedee for a distance 
 of 20 or 30 miles south of Little River, for a good position for the 
 army. 
 
 During this enforced period of combat inaction and rehabilita' 
 tion, intelligence of the enemy was most essential, particularly in 
 view of the many rumors that Cornwallis was to be reinforced by 
 way of the Cape Fear, or through Charleston. For this work troops 
 that were well mounted and extremely mobile were necessary, due 
 to the great distance covered, and Marion, who operated in the 
 eastern part of South Carolina, was selected for this duty. On the 
 4th of December a letter of instructions was sent to this officer by 
 Greene directing him to continue partisan warfare, thereby harass* 
 ing the enemy and preserving the tide of sentiment among the 
 people as much as possible in favor of the patriotic cause. Upon 
 Marion he would depend for early information of reinforcements 
 
 1561 
 
THE BATTLE OF THE COWPEHS 
 
 arriving in Charleston, or departing therefrom to join Cornwallis. 
 To secure this information, and other that might be necessary, 
 Marion was to employ spies and organise an intelligence service. 
 The unhappy condition of the southern army is pictured in a 
 letter written to Washington on the 7th of December, wherein 
 Greene says : 
 
 Nothing can be more wretched and distressing than the condition of the 
 troops, starving, with cold and hunger, without tents and camp equipage. Those 
 of the Virginia line are literally naked, and a great part totally unfit for any kind 
 of duty, and musT: remain so until clothing can be had from the northward. 
 
 The magnitude of the work confronting Greene in his responsi' 
 bility for the retention of the Southern States in the Confederation, 
 and the earnestness with which he engaged in his labors, will be 
 understood by reading the seven lengthy letters written by him on 
 the 6th and 7th of December to Baron von Steuben, who was in 
 Virginia under his command, General Washington, General Knox, 
 the President of Congress, the Board of War, Governor Nash, and 
 Governor Jefferson. 
 
 After two weeks of arduous attention to a multitude of details, 
 report having been received in the meanwhile from Kosciusko of a 
 favorable site for the army on the Peedee, the troops were put 
 under marching orders on the 16th, but due to heavy rains the 
 march was postponed until the 20th. The route followed was by 
 way of Wadesborough to Haleys Ferry, thence to the position 
 selected on the east bank of the Peedee, opposite to Cheraw Hill, 
 which was reached on the 26th. General Greene called his new 
 location a "camp of repose," adding in this connection, in a letter 
 to Washington written on the 28th of December, "no army ever 
 wanted one more, the troops having totally lost their discipline." 
 
 General Greene was fortunate in his selection of officers to sur' 
 round him, and part of his success in the South must be attributed 
 to these capable leaders and administrators. There were Von Steu- 
 ben, Lee and his legion, which joined on the Peedee early in January, 
 Williams, Morgan, William Washington, Howard, Carrington, 
 
 1571 
 
THE BATTLE OF THE COWPEHS 
 
 Davie, and the partisan leaders, Sumter, Marion, Pickens, and 
 others, all highly reputed as leaders in their several lines of activities, 
 imbued with a spirit of loyalty for their commander, and possessed 
 of an unquenchable determination to attain the independence of 
 their country. 
 
 Before departing from Charlotte Town, General Greene arranged 
 to send General Morgan with an independent command to operate 
 along the tributaries of the Broad and Pacolet, threatening the Brit' 
 ish post at Ninety Six and the left of Cornwallis's army. During 
 the great depression which existed in the South after the defeat of 
 Gates at Camden, and while the British were triumphantly advanc 
 ing to Charlotte Town, Morgan had returned to active duty in the 
 Army and joined Gates at Hillsborough in September. Congress 
 appointed him a brigadier general on the 13th of October. 
 
 The duty to be performed by Morgan's command was so far 
 removed from Greene's headquarters, with the British Army 
 between, that detailed instructions were prepared for his guidance: 
 
 Camp Charlotte, December 16, 1780. 
 
 You are appointed to the command of a corps of light infantry of 320 men 
 detached from the Maryland line, a detachment of Virginia militia of 200 men, 
 and Colonel Washington's regiment of light horse, amounting to from sixty to a 
 hundred men. With these troops you will proceed to the west, side of the Catawba 
 River, where you will be joined by a body of volunteer militia under command 
 of General Davidson of this State, and by the militia lately under command of 
 General Sumter. This force and such others as may join you from Georgia, you 
 will employ against, the enemy on the west, side of the Catawba, either Offensively 
 or defensively, as your own prudence and discretion may dired: — ading with 
 caution and avoiding surprises by every possible precaution. For the present, I 
 give you the entire command in that quarter, and do hereby require all officers 
 and soldiers engaged in the American cause to be subject- to your orders and 
 commands. 
 
 The object of this detachment is to give prote dtion to that part of the country 
 and spirit up the people — to annoy the enemy in that quarter — to collect the 
 provision and forage out of their way — which you will have formed into a num' 
 ber of small magazines in the rear of the position you may think proper to take. 
 You will prevent plundering as much as possible and be as careful of your 
 provisions and forage as may be, giving receipts for whatever you take to all such 
 as are friends to the independence of America. 
 
 H58J 
 
THE BATTLE OF THE COWPEHS 
 
 Should the enemy move in force toward the Pee Dee, where the army will take 
 a position, you will move in such a direction as to enable you to join me if neces' 
 sary, or fall upon the flank, or into the rear of the enemy, as occasion may require. 
 You will spare no pains to get good intelligence of the enemy's situation and keep 
 me constantly advised of both your and their movements. You will appoint, for 
 the time being, a commissary, quartermaster, and forage master, who will follow 
 your instructions in their respective lines. Confiding in your abilities and activity, 
 I entrust you with this command, being persuaded you will do everything in your 
 power to distress the enemy and afford protection to the country. 
 
 Given under my hand at Charlotte this 16th December, 1780. 
 
 To Brig. Gen. Morgan. Nath - Greene - 
 
 Morgan's command of approximately 600 men left Charlotte 
 Town on the 21st of December, reaching the Catawba that evening, 
 and the following morning crossed the river at Biggers Ferry. From 
 thence the march led to Cane Creek, and the following day, the 
 24th, the Broad was crossed, and on the 25th camp was made on 
 the north bank of the Pacolet, at Grindalls Ford. Here Morgan 
 was joined, a few days later, by a party of mounted militia under 
 Colonel Pickens and Major McCall. 
 
 Early in December General Greene had given orders to General 
 Davidson, of North Carolina, to join Morgan with militia gathered 
 from that State, when the latter had crossed the river; but the 
 British authorities incited the Cherokee Indians to ravage the west- 
 ern settlements, and the men of Burke, Rutherford, Washington, 
 and Sullivan Counties were engaged in safeguarding their homes. 
 Davidson did arrive in Morgan's camp on the Pacolet toward the 
 end of December with 120 men, but returned at once to North 
 Carolina for the drafts that had been ordered to assemble in the 
 district of Salisbury. 
 
 On the 27th of December Morgan received intelligence that a 
 body of Georgia Tories, about 250 in number, had advanced as far 
 as Fair Forest, and were committing depredations in that region. 
 For the purpose of routing them he sent Washington's dragoons, 
 and 200 mounted militia under Major McCall, on the 29th. The 
 hostile force was about 20 miles from Grindalls Ford, in the direction 
 
 I59J 
 
THE BATTLE OF THE COWPEHS 
 
 of Ninety Six. The enemy withdrew on the approach of Wash' 
 ington's command, but after a hard march of 40 miles they were 
 encountered the next day at Hammonds Storehouse, and dispersed 
 with great loss. Although at considerable distance from support' 
 ing troops, and within range of Ninety Six and Wynnesborough, 
 Washington proceeded to march against a British post called Fort 
 Williams, on the road from Wynnesborough to Ninety Six, and 
 about 15 miles northeast of the latter place. General Cunningham, 
 who was in charge of the Tory militia in this region, evacuated the 
 fort, and Washington perceived the wisdom of retracing his steps 
 to the Pacolet. In the meanwhile Morgan detached 200 men to 
 cover the withdrawal of Washington's command, to guard against 
 any misfortune that might occur to it. 
 
 At the time of reporting the success at Hammonds Storehouse, 
 Morgan wrote to Greene on the 31st that the mili tia were coming 
 in fast, and suggested that when he had collected his force he 
 desired to march into Georgia, if the main army could, at the time, 
 make a diversion against Cornwallis. To expedite this movement, 
 should it meet with the approval of General Greene, he had sent 
 for 100 swords, which he intended putting into the hands of expert 
 riflemen, to be mounted and incorporated with Washington's corps. 
 He said, "It is incompatible with the nature of light troops to be 
 encumbered with baggage," and called for 100 packsaddles to 
 replace wagon transportation, where necessary or desirable. 
 
 Morgan remained on the Pacolet to await a reply to his letter 
 of the 31st of December covering the foregoing suggestion, but 
 developments were now so rapid that it became impossible to give 
 further serious thought to a march on Georgia. Greene knew that 
 Leslie was advancing on Camden, at which place a strong post had 
 been established under Lord Rawdon, and in replying on the 8th 
 of January to Morgan's letter which reached him the 7th, he 
 did not think an expedition into Georgia was "warrantable in the 
 critical situation our Army is in." "Should you go into Georgia, 
 and the enemy push this way, your whole force will be useless." 
 
 1601 
 
THE BATTLE OF THE COWPEKS 
 
 Greene intimated to Morgan that by remaining where he was he 
 was favorably situated to interrupt communications with Ninety 
 Six and Augusta, and to harass the enemy rear should Cornwallis 
 attempt to push forward. He was cautioned to attempt no major 
 enterprise, unless by surprise, "for you will only beat your heads 
 against the wall without success." As a further warning, Greene 
 added: "I must repeat my caution to you to guard against a 
 surprise." 
 
 Before receiving from General Greene a reply to his letter of 
 December 31, Morgan wrote the former again on January 4, as to 
 the difficulties of obtaining forage and provisions in the vicinity of 
 his camp, and declared the necessity either to move into Georgia or 
 retreat. He had spies watching the enemy and did not consider 
 himself in danger of being surprised. Greene replied to this com' 
 munication on the 13th with the advice that Morgan hold his pres' 
 ent ground, as a retreat would discourage the militia, and informed 
 him that "Colonel Tarleton is said to be on his way to pay you a 
 visit." This letter did not reach its destination before the action at 
 the Cowpens. 
 
 On the 14th of January Morgan learned that Tarleton had 
 crossed the Tiger at Musgroves Mill, and he prepared to change 
 his position in the direction of the Broad. Leaving detachments to 
 observe the fords over the Pacolet, the army was put in motion on 
 the 15th, and that evening camped at Burrs Mills on Thicketty 
 Creek. It was on this same day that Tarleton reached the Pacolet 
 and reconnoitered the crossings. His strength was estimated by 
 Morgan to be from 1,100 to 1,200 men. 
 
 Continuing his retirement on the 16th, the Cowpens were 
 reached, where small parties joined during the night, and the spirit 
 of the camp was strong for fight. Morgan doubtless viewed this 
 augmentation of strength and the high spirits of the men as a favor' 
 able omen, and determined to offer battle the following day. The 
 proposed plan of deployment was explained to the several leaders, 
 particular attention being given to the part the militia, whom 
 
 1611 
 
THE BATTLE OF THE COWPEHS 
 
 Pickens was to command, would take in the battle. For the purpose 
 of strengthening Washington's Cavalry, 45 militia were selected 
 for their ability as horsemen and rifle shots, armed with sabers, 
 provided with suitable mounts, and attached to the dragoons. 
 
 H62J 
 
Part III 
 
 DEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS "-THE BATTLE 
 
 iHE place where General Morgan established 
 his camp the night of the 16th was near the 
 
 T2&p2 intersection of the Mill Gap Road and the 
 £jdCn road from the present city of Spartanburg 
 :~M& running northeast into North Carolina, and 
 crossing the Broad River at Island Ford, 
 Many roads of more recent construction now 
 traverse this territory, but during the Revolutionary period they 
 were few in number. The Mill Gap Road crossed the Broad at 
 Cherokee Ford and ran northwestwardly through the present town 
 of Gaffney, into the mountains far to the west. Its course followed 
 generally the tops of ridges, thereby avoiding the crossing of 
 creeks and rivers. The road from Spartanburg to North Carolina 
 now runs through Chesnee, but in olden days it crossed the Mill 
 Gap Road about 3 miles southeast of Chesnee. Morgan made camp 
 in a wooded ravine having a stream of water running through it, 
 which lay north of the Mill Gap Road, and about a thousand yards 
 northwest of the cabin of Robert Scruggs, which was visited by 
 Lossing in 1849. 
 
 The position selected for the action lay on both sides of the Mill 
 Gap Road, just south of the camp. The ground is slightly undulat' 
 ing, and at the time was covered with scattered trees of red oak, 
 hickory, and pine. Being used for the gracing of cattle, there was 
 but little, if any, underbrush. Two very slight elevations top the 
 ridge along which the Mill Gap Road runs, and these were selected 
 as the lines of deployment for the American troops. 
 
 The main position was on the elevation just south of the ravine, 
 in which camp was established. To its front for 300 yards there is 
 a scarcely perceptible slope downward; beyond this the slope is 
 
 631 
 
THE BATTLE OF THE COWPEKS 
 
 greater, dropping off into a shallow ravine 700 yards from the main 
 position. To the rear of the main position, and just west of the 
 camp site, is an elevation slightly higher than that of the main posi' 
 tion. This ridge continues across the road in a south and southwest 
 direction, but at a slightly less elevation. From either ridge the 
 terrain between the two was visible under and through the trees. 
 The ground offered no cover for either the attack or the defense, 
 except such as was furnished by the trees. The flanks of both 
 armies were exposed, as the terrain was favorable in all directions 
 for the operation of mounted troops. The ravine in which Morgan 
 camped and one on the opposite side of the road offered but little 
 interference with the movement of foot or mounted troops. 
 
 Morgan's plan of battle was to use the Maryland Continentals 
 and the Virginia Militia (of worth equal to the Continentals, as 
 many had served in previous campaigns) in his main position on the 
 summit of the southernmost ridge and astride the Mill Gap Road. 
 Washington's dragoons to the number of 80, augmented by the 45 
 militia under McCall, were the main reserve, posted in rear of the 
 northernmost ridge, where ground cover was sufficient to protect 
 them from hostile observation and fire and sufficiently near "as to 
 be able to charge the enemy, should they be broken." The militia 
 were to form an interrupted line on the flanks in front, which posi' 
 tion was to be held only temporarily, when they were to withdraw 
 and reform on the flanks of the main position after reorgani2ation 
 had been effected and lend what assistance they could as an 
 additional reserve. 
 
 At this time Howard's Maryland and Delaware Continentals 
 consisted of 237 men. They were placed on the left of the line, 
 astride the Mill Gap Road. To their right were Captain Beatie's 
 and Major Triplett's companies of Virginia Militia, under the 
 command of the latter, and totaling about 100 men. Captains Tate 
 and Buchanan, with about 100 of the Augusta riflemen of Vir' 
 ginia, supported the right of the line. In the advanced position, 
 which was to be abandoned early in the fight, were about 308 
 militia from North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, under 
 
 I64J 
 
THE BATTLE OF THE COWPEHS 
 
 Colonel Pickens. These troops were situated to guard the flanks. 
 Major McDowell, of the North Carolina Volunteers, was posted 
 on the right flank, 150 yards in front of Howard's line. Major Cun- 
 ningham, of the Georgia Volunteers, was on the left flank, at the 
 same distance in front of Howard's line. To the right of Major 
 McDowell were posted the South Carolina Volunteers under 
 Colonels Brannon and Thomas. To the left of Major Cunningham 
 was posted the remainder of the South Carolina Militia, under 
 Colonel Hays and Major Hammond. The latter commanded Major 
 McCall's regiment, he being with Colonel Washington. 
 
 From Pickens's line of militia small parties of riflemen were 
 sent 150 yards farther to the front to skirmish with the enemy. 
 McDowell commanded those in the right sector of the skirmish 
 line and Cunningham those in the left sector. Patrols covered the 
 front and flanks to give warning of Tarleton's approach. 
 
 Tarleton broke camp at 3 o'clock in the morning, determined to 
 engage the Americans before they could cross the Broad, or in case 
 they made an early march and continued their withdrawal, to strike 
 them when astride the. river. The baggage and wagons were to 
 remain in camp, under protection of a detachment from each corps, 
 until daybreak. The advance guard consisted of three companies 
 of light infantry, supported by the legion infantry. The main body 
 comprised the Seventh Regiment, the two 3'pounders, and the 
 First Battalion of the Seventy'first Infantry. The cavalry and 
 mounted infantry brought up the rear. The march was slow, due 
 to the ground being broken by creeks and ravines, and the necessity 
 for careful reconnaissance on the front and flanks. Before dawn a 
 screen of cavalry was placed on the front, soon after which contact 
 was made with the American patrols, when Tarleton ordered two 
 troops of dragoons to reinforce the advance guard and harass the 
 rear of the enemy. 
 
 In due course of time the advance guard reported that the Amer- 
 icans were forming, and the native guides with Tarleton described 
 their position as in an open woods, free from swamps, with the 
 Broad parallel to their rear. 
 
 1651 
 
THE BATTLE OF THE COWPEHS 
 
 Tarleton viewed the enemy's situation as one vulnerable to 
 attack, particularly in view of his superiority in cavalry, and the 
 inability of a defeated force to escape beyond the Broad. Further' 
 more, the supposed nearness of Cornwallis and the assumed supe' 
 riority of his regulars over the large percentage of militia with 
 Morgan made it seem apparent that success should be attended 
 with no great loss to his command. His total strength, including 
 the detachment left to guard the baggage, was about 1,000. 
 
 The dragoons in the advance guard drove in the hostile covering 
 forces along the Mill Gap Road, thereby enabling Tarleton to pre 
 ceed far enough to inspect the deployment of Morgan's army. It 
 is probable that his estimate of the strength of the opposing forces 
 was considerably less than the total of 1,920 mentioned later in his 
 narrative. Even though he believed that he was opposed by about 
 500 Continentals, 120 cavalry, 1,000 militia, and 300 backwoods' 
 men, he probably ignored the two latter groups, and considered 
 himself superior in quality to the American Continentals and 
 cavalry, who made a force much smaller than his regulars. 
 
 Prior to deploying the infantry were directed to discard all 
 surplus equipment and retain only their rifles and ammunition. 
 The light infantry then filed to the right, into a position opposite 
 to Morgan's militia, with their right flank extending as far as the 
 left of the militia. The legion infantry were added to the left of the 
 light infantry, and a 3'pounder placed in the line between the two 
 commands. This force was instructed to advance within 300 yards 
 of the enemy. When this position was reached, the Seventh Regi' 
 ment formed upon the left of the legion infantry, and the other 
 3'pounder was given to the right division of the Seventh. A captain, 
 with 50 dragoons, was placed on each flank of the line, to protect 
 its flanks and threaten those of the enemy. The First Battalion of 
 the Seventy'first Regiment formed 150 yards in rear of the left 
 flank of the Seventh, and constituted, together with about 200 
 legion cavalry, the reserve. 
 
 The British deployment being completed at about 8 o'clock, 
 Tarleton ordered his troops to attack. The whole line moved with 
 
 166! 
 
THE BATTLE OF THE GOWPEHS 
 
 the greatest impetuosity, shouting as they advanced. The Ameri' 
 cans responded with Indian war cries of equal intensity, and held 
 their fire until the enemy closed to effective rifle range, when the 
 front'line skirmishers under Cunningham and McDowell gave them 
 a "heavy and galling fire, and retreated to the regiments intended 
 for their support." Tarleton's infantry suffered but little from this 
 fire and continued their approach to Pickens's line, which "kept up 
 a fire by regiments, retreating agreeably to their orders." Still the 
 British line suffered but little, and now it approached the Conti- 
 nentals and the Virginians under Howard. Here, according to 
 Morgan, they received a " well'directed and incessant fire." Tarle- 
 ton says "the fire on both sides was well supported, and produced 
 much slaughter." The British advance was temporarily checked. 
 
 At this time Tarleton sent the troop of dragoons on the right of 
 the line to harass that portion of the militia which had fallen back 
 to the left of Pickens's line, and at the same time ordered forward 
 his reserve. The First Battalion of the Seventy-first was directed to 
 pass the left of the Seventh before delivering its fire. The reserve 
 cavalry and the troop on the left of the line were ordered to incline 
 to the left and form a line which would embrace the whole of the 
 American right flank. When the battalion of the Seventy 'first was 
 in position, the entire British line moved forward. Tarleton now 
 had about 750 infantry in line, supported by two guns, and was 
 opposed by less than 450 infantry in Howard's line. Whether or 
 not the militia, which had withdrawn to the two flanks of Howard's 
 line, could be later assembled and used in the fight could not at this 
 time be determined. Those who had withdrawn to the left rear of 
 the main position were charged by the troop of dragoons from the 
 right of Tarleton's line and were being cut down, when Washing' 
 ton countercharged with his cavalry, supported by some infantry 
 fire, and relieved the situation in that quarter. 
 
 It was evident to Howard that with the enemy reserve brought 
 into action his right flank was exposed, and he ordered the flank 
 company to change front to the right. In doing this some confusion 
 
 167! 
 
THE BATTLE OF THE COWPEHS 
 
 ensued, and first a part and then the whole of the company com' 
 menced a retreat. The officers along Howard's line seeing this, and 
 supposing that orders had been given for a retreat, faced their men 
 about and moved off. Morgan, at this time, was engaged in reform' 
 ing the militia, and was surprised to observe the Maryland and 
 Delaware Continentals, who had fought so valiantly at Camden, in 
 apparent retreat. He quickly rode over to Howard to inquire into 
 the situation and his apprehensions were quieted when Howard, 
 pointing to the line, observed that "men were not beaten who 
 retreated in that order." Morgan then ordered Howard to continue 
 retiring his line until the rising ground to the rear was reached, and 
 rode back to select the position on which the line was to halt and 
 face about. 
 
 The halt and change of front was effected without mishap, and 
 although this retreat resulted from misunderstanding, it was very 
 fortunate, as Howard's units were thereby extricated from a posi' 
 tion wherein they doubtless would have been defeated with heavy 
 losses. 
 
 So certain were the British that victory was at hand that they 
 pushed forward to close in on the retreating force with the bayonet, 
 and an order was dispatched to the cavalry on the right to charge. 
 Not more than 30 yards separated them from the Americans, when 
 the latter unexpectedly halted and changed front, and again con' 
 fronted them with a deadly volley, which stopped the British in 
 their tracks and threw them into great confusion. 
 
 Lieutenant Colonel Howard observing this, gave orders for the line to charge 
 bayonets, which was done with such address, that they fled with the utmost 
 precipitation, leaving their field pieces in our possession. 
 
 Some of the militia which had withdrawn to Howard's right 
 were reformed and participated in the rout. 
 
 Further exertions to make the British infantry advance were use' 
 less. Nor could Tarleton's cavalry strike, for it was at the moment 
 when they were prepared to charge the retreating line that Howard 
 halted and faced his command about, and the panic which seised 
 
 1681 
 
THE BATTLE OF THE COWPEHS 
 
 the British infantry extended to the cavalry also, and a general 
 flight ensued. Tarleton sent directions to his cavalry to form about 
 400 yards to the right of the enemy, whilst he endeavored to rally 
 the infantry to protect the guns. 
 
 The cavalry did not comply with the order, and the effort to collect the infantry 
 was ineffectual; neither promises nor threats could gain their attention; they suf 
 rendered or dispersed, and abandoned the guns to the artillerymen, who defended 
 them for some time with exemplary resolution. 
 
 In this last; stage of defeat, Tarleton in his narrative says that he 
 made a final struggle to bring his cavalry to the charge, but all 
 attempts to restore order proved fruitless. 
 
 Above 200 dragoons forsook their leader and left the field of battle. 
 
 He was able to rally a group of 14 officers and about 40 horse' 
 men, and with these engaged the cavalry of Washington, who in 
 the latter stage of the fight were adding to the general confusion of 
 the enemy by passing around Howard's right and charging into the 
 broken ranks of the enemy. The contest between the two mounted 
 groups was short lived, and Tarleton fled from the field, the action 
 having lasted about 50 minutes. He directed his course to the south' 
 east in order to reach Hamilton Ford, near the mouth of Bullock 
 Creek, where he might communicate with Cornwallis, who had 
 not advanced beyond Turkey Creek. A part of Washington's com' 
 mand pursued scattered groups of the enemy cavalry for some 
 distance, returning to camp late that night. 
 
 The British losses, as reported by General Morgan in a letter 
 dated the 19th of January, were 10 officers and 100 noncommis' 
 sioned officers and privates killed; 200 rank and file wounded; 502 
 noncommissioned officers and privates prisoners, independent of 
 the wounded, and 29 commissioned officers prisoners. This totals 
 approximately 841, and is somewhat in excess of the entire British 
 infantry and artillery personnel in the battle. The losses in the 
 legion cavalry were not heavy, and that night and the next day 200 
 of their scattered numbers rejoined Tarleton. The spoils of war 
 
 1691 
 
THE BATTLE OF THE COWPEHS 
 
 included 2 standards, 2 field pieces, 800 stand of arms, 100 dragoon 
 horses, and 35 wagons. The baggage which had been left in camp 
 was in a great measure destroyed by its guard before they fled. 
 
 Cornwallis 1 s return of troops shows the following changes in 
 the organizations under Tarleton's command : 
 
 
 Jan. 15 
 
 Feb. 1 
 
 
 167 
 
 249 
 69 
 
 451 
 
 
 Seventy 'firft Regiment: 
 
 FirSt Battalion 
 
 
 
 
 
 174 
 
 
 
 
 936 
 
 174 
 
 In addition to the foregoing, Tarleton had about 40 men of the 
 Seventeenth Dragoons and a detachment of artillery to man the 
 two 3'pounders. The American losses were inconsiderable, there 
 not having been more than 12 killed and about 60 wounded. 
 
 Tarleton attributed his defeat to — 
 
 the bravery or good conduit of the Americans; to the loose manner of forming 
 which had always been practiced by the King's troops in America; or to some 
 unforeseen event, which may throw terror into the most disciplined soldiers or 
 counteract the best-concerted designs. 
 
 He held the opinion that commanding officers in the Army, who 
 were unfortunate in action, should be subject to the same rules 
 which governed the Navy, to the effect that a court-martial would 
 inquire into the merits of the case. Influenced by this thought, 
 some days after the action Tarleton "required Earl Cornwallis's 
 approbation of his proceedings, or his leave to retire till inquiry 
 could be instituted to investigate his conduct." To this demand 
 Cornwallis replied in a letter of the 30th of January : 
 
 You have forfeited no part of my esteem as an officer by the unfortunate event 
 of the action of the 17th. The means you used to bring the enemy to action were 
 able and masterly, and must ever do you honor. Your disposition was unexcep- 
 tionable; the total misbehavior of the troops could alone have deprived you of 
 the glory which was so justly your due. 
 
 170! 
 
Part IV 
 
 COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 ! T is difficult to understand General Morgan's 
 reasons for accepting battle at the Cowpens, 
 unless his personal characteristics for bravery 
 and daring and his superior qualities as a leader 
 of militia explain the matter. The instructions 
 which he received before leaving Charlotte 
 Town were that he was to act offensively or 
 defensively, as his prudence and discretion might direct, but that 
 he was to conduct operations with caution and avoid surprises. 
 When he effected his withdrawal from the Pacolet in the face of 
 Tarleton's approach he halted for the night of the 15th at Burrs 
 Mills, on Thicketty Creek, and sent to Greene the last letter writ' 
 ten prior to the battle. At this time he had no thought of an early 
 encounter. He reported that Tarleton had crossed the Tiger at 
 Musgroves Mill with a force of 1,100 or 1,200, and that his com' 
 mand was probably Tarleton's objective. He suggested to General 
 Greene that his detachment be recalled and that General David' 
 son and Colonel Pickens be left with the militia to check the dis' 
 affected in that region. He realized that, due to his distance from 
 the main Army, Cornwallis might detach a force against him so 
 superior as to render it essential to his safety to avoid an engage' 
 ment. He wrote : 
 
 Upon a full and mature deliberation, I am confirmed in the opinion that nothing 
 can be effected by my detachment in this country which will balance the risks I 
 will be subjected to by remaining here. 
 
 General Greene replied to this letter on the 19th of January, at 
 which time he was unaware that an engagement had occurred, to 
 the effect that it was of great importance to keep a force in that 
 
 1711 
 
THE BATTLE OF THE COWPEHS 
 
 quarter, for which duty the militia alone would not answer. He 
 realised that the movements of Cornwallis and Tarleton had the 
 appearance of being directed against Morgan, and told him: 
 
 I do not wish you should come to action unless you have a manifest superiority, 
 and a moral certainty of succeeding. Put nothing to the hazard. A retreat may be 
 disagreeable, but not disgraceful. Regard not the opinions of the day. It is not 
 our business to risk too much. Our affairs are in too critical a situation, and 
 require time and nursing to give them a better tone. ■ 
 
 Upon his further withdrawal to the Cowpens on the 16th, where 
 additional militia joined, and with the knowledge that Tarleton 
 was closely pursuing and was now but one short march away, Mor' 
 gan decided that evening to stand and fight. The decision once 
 made, however much its wisdom may be questioned, there can be 
 no doubt about the enthusiasm and thoroughness with which he 
 prepared for the coming day. A plan of action was determined 
 upon, and his commanders informed. The role for the militia was 
 such that under a slight baptism of fire, it was hoped much of their 
 fear would be dissipated, and that they would remain on the battle 
 field for later participation in the contest. Appeal was made to 
 their loyalty, their manhood, and their prowess with the rifle. There 
 was no question but what Washington's dragoons, Howard's Con' 
 tinentals, and Triplett's Virginians would do their full duty. The 
 men were able to rest during the night, and after the morning meal 
 leisurely took up their designated positions. 
 
 Not much praise can be given for the position selected, except 
 that the slope in front of Pickens impeded, to some extent the 
 advance of Tarleton's weary ranks, and the hill in rear offered cover 
 for the cavalry reserve. In all directions the terrain was open to 
 attack from both infantry and cavalry, and Morgan doubtless knew 
 that the cavalry of Tarleton's legion far outnumbered Washington's 
 dragoons. 
 
 What superiority he believed to be possessed by the troops under 
 Howard over the infantry of Tarleton can not be explained other 
 than on the grounds that he hoped his own courage great enough 
 
 172! 
 
THE BATTLE OF THE COWPEKS 
 
 to cause his men to do the seemingly impossible. In planning for 
 the militia under Pickens to hold their line for but a brief time, and 
 then retire, it would be with the assumption that the British would 
 not have lost heavily by the time they reached the main line. On 
 this line the fate of the day would be determined, and Howard's 
 strength was less than 450 men. Tarleton's strength at this stage 
 of the action would probably be 750 infantry, outnumbering 
 Howard about 2 to 1. 
 
 It appeared to the British, when Howard's line fell back, that 
 victory was at hand, and so it would have been, had the line been 
 composed of men less inured to battle than were the Continentals 
 of Maryland and Delaware. There was no delay or hesitation when 
 the order to halt, face the enemy, and fire, was given, and there 
 then occurred in a moment a scene of dumbfounded surprise, con' 
 fusion, and panic seldom witnessed in battle. The outcome resulted 
 in one of the most gloriously unexpected victories of the Revolu' 
 tionary War. The heroes of the Cowpens could worthily stand 
 shoulder to shoulder with those of Kings Mountain. 
 
 Under a resolution of Congress passed March 9, 1781, the thanks 
 of the United States were given to Brigadier General Morgan, and 
 the officers and men under his command, "for their fortitude and 
 good conduct, displayed in the action at the Cowpens." The resc 
 lution further provided that a gold medal be presented to General 
 Morgan, silver medals to Lieutenant Colonels Washington and 
 Howard, and a sword to Colonel Pickens. 
 
 In writing to the President of Congress on the 17th of February, 
 General Washington said: 
 
 General Morgan's signal victory over Colonel Tarleton with the flower of the 
 British Army reflects the highest honor upon our arms, and I hope at least be 
 attended with this advantage, that it will check the offensive operations of the 
 enemy until General Greene shall have collected a much more respectable force 
 than he had under his command by the last accounts from him. I am apprehensive 
 that the Southern States will look upon this victory as much more decisive in its 
 consequences than it really is, and will relax in their exertions. It is to be wished 
 that the gentlemen of Congress who have interests in those States would remove 
 
 1731 
 
THE BATTLE OF THE COWPEHS 
 
 such ideas, if any such should be found to exisr., and rather stimulate them to 
 redouble their efforts to crush an enemy, pretty severely shaken by the two 
 successful strokes upon Ferguson and Tarleton. 
 
 Cornwallis employed the day following the battle in effecting a 
 junction with Leslie's command and in collecting the remains of 
 Tarleton's corps, and on the 19th hastened in pursuit of Morgan, 
 hoping to be able to engage him and recover the prisoners before 
 Morgan and Greene could effect a jundtion. A part of the army, 
 without baggage, made great exertions to come up with Morgan, 
 but the celerity of his movements and the swelling of numberless 
 creeks rendered their efforts useless, and he reached the Catawba 
 on the 23d of January. 
 
 Cornwallis therefore assembled his army on the 25th of January 
 at Ramseur 1 s mill, on the South Fork of the Catawba, and as the 
 loss of his light troops could only be remedied by the activity of 
 the whole corps, he employed two days in collecting flour, and in 
 destroying superfluous baggage and wagons, and then resumed the 
 pursuit. 
 
 In writing to Lord Germain on the 17th of March, Cornwallis 
 said that — 
 
 The unfortunate affair of the 17th of January was a very unexpected and severe 
 blow; for, besides reputation, our loss did not fall short of 600 men. However, 
 being thoroughly sensible that defensive measures would be certain ruin to the 
 affairs of Britain in the Southern Colonies, this event did not deter me from 
 prosecuting the original plan. 
 
 Tarleton in his narrative, commenting on the two disasters which 
 the British suffered in South Carolina, said that the fall of Ferguson 
 at Kings Mountain was a catastrophe which put an end to the first 
 expedition into North Carolina, and that the Battle of the Cow 
 pens overshadowed the commencement of the second expedition. 
 This comment taken in conjunction with the above-mentioned 
 apprehension of General Washington, "that the Southern States 
 will look upon this victory as much more decisive in its consc 
 quences than it really is," briefly summarises the result of the Battle 
 
 1741 
 
THE BATTLE OF THE COWPEHS 
 
 of the Cowpens. The effect at the time was to hearten greatly the 
 patriotic cause and to distress the British Army and their Tory 
 sympathizers beyond measure. It was the second link in the chain 
 of events, soon to be followed by others, which finally led to the 
 surrender of Cornwallis's army at Yorktown. 
 
 I75J 
 
1761 
 
THE BATTLE OF THE COWPEKS 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 SOURCE MATERIAL ANALYZED 
 
 Sparks, 1835: The Writings of George Washington. 
 
 Sparks, 1853: Letters to Washington. 
 
 Ford, 1891: The Writings of George Washington. 
 
 1781 : Journals of the Continental Congress. 
 
 Stevens, 1888 : Clinton-Corn wallis Controversy. 
 
 Cornwaixis, 1783 : An Answer by Cornwallis to certain parts of Narrative by Clinton. 
 
 Clinton, 1783 : Observations by Clinton on certain parts of Cornwallis's Answer. 
 
 Ross, 1859: Correspondence of Cornwallis. 
 
 Tarleton, 1787: History of the Campaign in 1780 and 1781 in the Southern Provinces of North 
 
 America. 
 Mackenzie, 1787: Strictures on Tarleton's History. 
 
 Hanger, 1789: An Address to the Army in reply to Strictures by McKenzie. 
 Marquis de Chastellux, 1787: Travels in North America in 1780, 1781, and 1782. 
 Gibbes, 1853: Documentary History of the American Revolution. 
 Seymour: A Journal of the Southern Expedition, published in the Pennsylvania Magazine of 
 
 History and Biography, 1883. 
 Howard's statement: Published in Magazine of American History, October, 1881. 
 Maps: United States Geological Survey— North Carolina, 1 : 500,000; South Carolina, 1 : 500,000. 
 
 Price and Strother, North Carolina, 1808. South Carolina, 1822. Mills Atlas, 1825. Map in 
 
 Tarleton's Narrative. 
 
 BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS READ 
 
 Johnson, 1822: Sketches of the Life and Correspondence of Nathanael Greene. 
 
 F. V. Greene, 1893 : General Greene. 
 
 Graham, 1856: The Life of General Daniel Morgan. 
 
 G. W. Greene, 1871 : The Life of Nathanael Greene. 
 Lossing, 1860: Pictorial Field Book of the Revolution. 
 Carrlmgton, 1876: Battles of the American Revolution. 
 
 Landrum, 1897: Colonial and Revolutionary History of Upper South Carolina. 
 
 Ramsay, 1789: The History of the American Revolution. 
 
 Ramsay, 1809: The History of South Carolina. 
 
 Stedman, 1794: The History of the Origin, Progress, and Termination of the American War. 
 
 Wilkin, 1914: Some British Soldiers in America. 
 
 Peixotto, 1917: A Revolutionary Pilgrimage. 
 
 Lodge, 1898: The Story of the Revolution. 
 
 Marshall, 1805: The Life of George Washington. 
 
 Garden, 1828: Anecdotes of the American Revolution. 
 
 James, 1821 : Sketches of the Life of Brigadier General Francis Marion. 
 
 McConkey, 1885: The Hero of Cowpens. 
 
 1771 
 
THE BATTLE OF THE COWPENS 
 
 rW 1^1869: Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department of the United States Third 
 
 Fiske, 1891: The American Revolution. 
 
 Alman, 1781: Remembrancer. 
 
 Bancroft, 1874: History of the United States. 
 
 Dawson, 1858: Battles of the United States by Sea and Land 
 
 Shacomon, 1893 : Hannah's Cowpens, A Battle Field of the Revolution 
 
 Kied, 1847: Life and Correspondence of Joseph Reed. 
 
 Avery, 1909: A History of the United States. 
 
 1881 : Cowpens Centennial 
 
Contour Intervals sn«. 
 T" inches = 1 mile. 
 
 Battle of The Oowpens 
 
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 Monument erected in 1856 by the Washington Light Infantry of Charleston, S. C. 
 
 There is no other monument or marker on the battle field of the Cowpens. 
 
 Howard's line ran very close to where this monument is located. 
 
 The Martin house in the background 
 
 (April, 1928) 
 
 Battle ground of the Cowpens. Howard's line was in the woods. Tarleton advanced over this 
 
 ground after driving Pickens back. Picture taken from the Blackwell house. 
 
 The monument is in the woods in the center of the picture 
 
 (April, 1928) 
 
Battle ground of the Cowpens. In the background are the woods in which Howard's line was 
 
 formed. Pickens's line and skirmishers were in front of Howard's line. Tarleton attacked 
 
 over this ground. The highway shown passes through the battle ground. 
 
 It is an excellent roadway. Blackwell's house to the left 
 
 (April, 1928) 
 
 Thicketty Mountain in the middle background. Picture taken from a position northwest of 
 Thicketty. From the direction of Gaffney and Grindall Shoals Thicketty appears more 
 extensive and is more of a landmark than when viewed from the northwest 
 (April, 1928) 
 
Home of George Blackwell, on the battle field of the Cowpens 
 (April, 1928) 
 
 Robert Scruggs's house, where Lossing stopped in 1849. A log cabin of one room was con- 
 structed over one hundred years ago adjacent to the chimney shown in the picture. The 
 cabin has since been weather boarded, and extensions added. The present occupant 
 is Mrs. Black Scruggs, widow of the youngest son of Robert Scruggs 
 (April, 1928)