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 THE CAPTURE OP FORT FISHER 
 By Ma^ .-Gen. Adalbert Ames 
 
 Addresses to New York Oommandery, 
 Loyal Legion. 3rd Series. N.Y.1907 
 
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 Personal Recollections of the 
 Rebellion 
 
 THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER, NORTH 
 CAROLINA, JANUARY 15, 1865. 
 
 Read by Brevet Major-General Adelbert Ames, late 
 U. S. Army, February 3, 1897. 
 
 ABOUT the first of December, 1864, when in com- 
 mand of the 2d Division, Twenty-fourth Corps, of 
 the Army of the James, then before Richmond, 
 Va., I was notified I had been selected to lead my division 
 in a movement by sea, against some point of the Con- 
 federacy on the Atlantic coast. 
 
 At that time Wilmington, N. C, was the port through 
 which the Confederacy received a large part of its munitions 
 of war, and whence was shipped to England, in payment 
 therefor, much of its cotton and tobacco.. Wilmington was 
 situated on the east bank of the Cape Fear River, thirty 
 miles from its mouth, which was guarded by Fort Fisher. 
 
 Our Navy was untiring in its efforts to blockade that 
 port, but was not successful. 
 
 The order from General Butler to General Weitzel rela- 
 tive to the expedition December 6th, 1864, was: > 
 
 " The Major-General commanding has entrusted you with the 
 command of the expedition about to embark for -^he North 
 Carolina coast. It will consist of 6500 infantry, two batteries, 
 
 
2 THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 
 
 and fifty cavalry. The effective men of General Ames's division 
 of the Twenty-fourth Corps will furnish the infantry force. Gen- 
 eral Paine is under your orders, and General Ames will be ordered 
 to report to you in person immediately." 
 
 My division, of three brigades, was composed of New 
 Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, and Indiana troops, 
 about 3300 in number. General Paine had a division of 
 colored troops. 
 
 We embarked at Bermuda Hundreds, Va., December 
 8th, and our transports reached the place of rendezvous 
 off New Inlet, N. C, Thursday the 15th. Friday, Saturday, 
 and Sunday, we awaited the coming of the Navy. 
 
 Admiral Porter, commanding our fleet, arrived Sunday 
 evening the 18th. The next day the water was too rough 
 to make a landing on the ocean beach. Towards evening, 
 a northeast gale coming up, the transports were, sent to 
 Beaufort for coal and water, as the ten days' supply had 
 run short, where they were delayed by the weather and the 
 difficulty of getting coal, until Saturday the 24th. 
 
 I did not go to Beaufort, as my ship, on which I had 
 one of my brigades, was well prepared for such an emergency. 
 
 General Butler, followed by his fleet of transports, re- 
 turned to New Inlet on Saturday the 24th of December, 
 between four and five o'clock in the afternoon. 
 
 The powder boat, which played such a notorious part 
 in this expedition, had been exploded at about two o'clock 
 on the morning of the same day. 
 
 The idea of the powder boat was General Butler's, but 
 it was approved of and adopted by the Navy, which fur- 
 nished the vessel and its share of the 215 tons of gunpowder 
 used. The Navy held control of this experiment from 
 first to last. 
 
 The explosion was untimely, and a failure. Commodore 
 Jeffers of the Navy reports: "A part of the programme 
 required that the vessel should be grounded, which appears 
 not to have been the case." 
 
 Commander Rhind writes: "That, owing to the want 
 of confinement and insufficient fusing of the mass, much 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 3 
 
 of the powder was blown away before ignition and its 
 effect lost." 
 
 Admiral Porter reports: "That the powder was finally 
 exploded from the effects of a fire kindled in the forecastle. 
 No results of value were to be expected from this mode. It 
 was proposed only as a final resort, in order to prevent the 
 vessel, in any contingency, from falling into the hands of 
 the enemy." 
 
 Commander James Parker, U. S. Navy, stated to the 
 New York Loyal Legion, October 5, 1892 : " We all believed 
 in it [the powder boat] from the Admiral down, but when 
 it proved so laughable a failure we, of the Navy, laid its 
 paternity upon General Butler." 
 
 Colonel Lamb, in command, describes Fort Fisher as 
 follows : 
 
 " At the land-face of Fort Fisher the peninsula was about half 
 a mile wide, Cape Fear River being on one side and the Atlantic 
 Ocean on the other. This face commenced about a hundred 
 feet from the river with a half bastion, and extended with a 
 heavy curtain to a full bastion on the ocean side, where it joined 
 the sea-face. The work was built to withstand the heaviest 
 artillery fire. The outer slope was twenty feet high from the 
 berm to the top of the parapet, at an angle of forty-five degrees, 
 and was sodded with marsh grass, which grew luxuriantly. 
 The parapet was not less than twenty-five feet thick, with an 
 inclination of only one foot. The revetment was five feet nine 
 inches high, from the floor of the gun chambers, and these were 
 some twelve feet or more from the interior plane. The guns 
 were all mounted in barbette, Columbiad carriages; there was 
 not a single casemated gun in the fort. Between the gun 
 chambers, containing one or two guns each (there were twenty 
 heavy guns on the land-face) , there were (some eighteen) heavy 
 traverses, exceeding in size any known to engineers, to protect from 
 an enfilading fire. They extended out some twelve feet on the 
 parapet, running back thirty feet or more. The gun chambers 
 were reached from the rear by steps. In each traverse was an 
 alternate magazine or bomb-proof, the latter ventilated by an 
 air-chamber. Passageways penetrated the traverses in the 
 interior of the work, forming additional bomb-proofs for the 
 reliefs of the guns. 
 
tf- — ■ 
 
 4 THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 
 
 " The sea-face was a mile long, and for a hundred yards from 
 the northeast bastion was of the same massive character as the 
 land-face. 
 
 "Asa defence against infantry there was a system of subterre 
 torpedoes extending across the peninsula, five to six hundred 
 feet from the land-face and so disconnected that an explosion of 
 one would not affect the others; inside the torpedoes, about fifty 
 feet from the berm of the work, extending from the river bank 
 to the seashore, was a heavy palisade of sharpened logs nine 
 feet high, pierced for musketry, and so laid out as to have an 
 enfilading fire on the centre, where there was a redoubt guarding 
 a sally-port from which two Napoleons were run out as occasion 
 required. At the river end of the palisade was a deep and 
 muddy slough, across which was a bridge, the entrance on the 
 river road into the fort ; commanding this bridge was a Napoleon 
 gun. There were three mortars in rear of the land-face." 
 
 This strong work had, at the time of our first expedition, 
 a garrison of 1400 men, 900 of whom were veterans. 
 
 Colonel Lamb had been incited to the utmost by General 
 Lee, who had sent him word that he "must hold the fort 
 or he could not subsist his army." 
 
 On the morning of the 24th the fleet of Admiral Porter 
 moved in towards New Inlet and opened fire on the fort. 
 The character of this bombardment and the demands made 
 by the Admiral on his ships and sailors I will let him tell. 
 
 ' In his letter to the Secretary of the Navy of the 24th 
 of December, 1864, he says: 
 
 " I have the honor to inform you that I attacked the forts at 
 the mouth of the Cape Fear River to-day at 12.30. . . . After 
 getting the ships in position we silenced it in about an hour and 
 a half, there being no troops here to take possession. I am 
 merely firing now to keep up practice. The forts are nearly 
 demolished, and as soon as troops come we can take possession. 
 We have set them on fire, blown some of them up, and all that is 
 wanted now is troops to land and go into them." 
 
 The Admiral failed to mention, in his letter, the fact 
 that I had offered 1000 men and co-operation, although, 
 in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 5 
 
 the War, he said: "General Ames had a thousand men 
 there, and he sent on board and told me he was ready to 
 land." 
 
 In his letter of the 26th he says, referring to the bom- 
 bardment of the 24th: 
 
 "In an hour and fifteen minutes after the first shot was fired 
 not a shot came from the fort. Finding that the batteries were 
 silenced completely I directed the ships to keep up a moderate 
 fire in hopes of attracting the attention of the transports and 
 bringing them in." 
 
 In this same letter of December 26th Admiral Porter 
 says, speaking of the bombardment of the forts on 
 December 25th: 
 
 " The firing this day was slow, only sufficient to amuse the 
 enemy while the army landed. In the bombardment of the 
 25th the men were engaged firing slowly for seven hours. . . . 
 Everything was coolly done throughout the day, and I witnessed 
 some beautiful practice." 
 
 In a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, December 29th, 
 after the fleet had left and the transports had gone back to 
 Hampton Roads, he writes : 
 
 " At no time did I permit the vessels to open on them with all 
 their batteries, limiting some of them to about two shots a 
 minute, and permitting the large vessels to fight only one division 
 of guns at a time; and the bombardment cost only a certain 
 amount of shells, which I would expend in a month's target 
 practice anyhow." 
 
 Such are the salient features of the reports of Admiral 
 Porter. 
 
 General Whiting, who was in the fort, and who com- 
 manded that military district, says the slight damage done 
 by this cannonading was repaired at night, and that "the 
 garrison was in no instance driven from its guns, the palisade 
 was in perfect order, and the mines the same, the wires not 
 having been cut." 
 
 General Weitzel testified before the Committee on the 
 
6 THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 
 
 Conduct of the War: " I made a reconnoissance of the fort 
 and saw that the work, as a defensive work, was not injured 
 at all, except that one gun about midway of the land-face 
 was dismounted. I did not see a single opening in the row of 
 palisades that was in front of the ditch ; it seemed to be per- 
 fectly intact." All in the fort agree that Admiral Porter 
 was mistaken as to the effects of the cannonading. 
 
 So much as to the condition of the fort. 
 
 On the morning of the 25th all our transports anchored 
 near the shore some two or three miles north of the fort, and 
 the troops immediately began to land. 
 
 I had been selected to storm the fort with my division. 
 
 My report on December 28th is as follows: 
 
 " Brevet Brig. Gen. Curtis and 500 of his brigade were the 
 first to land, and were taken towards the fort by Gen Weitzel 
 for a reconnoissance. ... It was dusk when I reached the 
 front. I then heard that the First Brigade was to remain where 
 it was until further orders, and that if any attack was made the 
 responsibility would rest with the officer in immediate command. 
 At this time I did not know that it had been decided not to 
 attack the fort. Upon the report of Curtis that he could take 
 the fort I sent his brigade forward to make the attempt." 
 
 In his report Curtis says : 
 
 " On my arrival at this point I received orders from Gen. Ames 
 to return and re-establish my lines as they were, and, if possible, 
 to occupy the fort, and I at once ordered my skirmishers forward, 
 etc. . . . The enemy, having cover of the darkness, opened 
 on the skirmishers as they advanced with musketry and canister, 
 but did not prevent their establishing the line in its former 
 position, with the reserves in close proximity." 
 
 Curtis made no further effort to take the fort, as I had 
 ordered him to do, but sent word to me that he was " occupy- 
 ing his former position." Why he failed to assault the 
 fort after I assumed the responsibility and gave the order 
 I have never known. At this time an order reached me 
 to return to our ships, which we did, and the first expedition 
 ended. 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 7 
 
 An incident occurred which had much to do in giving an 
 erroneous idea of the condition of the fort and garrison. 
 
 One of our lieutenants approached the fort and captured 
 its flag, which had been shot away by the Navy, and which 
 had fallen with the flagstaff on the outer slope of the parapet 
 to the ditch. 
 
 On this point General Weitzel testifies : 
 
 " I sent for Lieut. Walling and questioned him about it, and 
 he told me that a shell had knocked the flagstaff outside and on 
 top of the parapet, and the flag hung over into or outside of 
 the ditch. Thinking that probably the rebels had not observed 
 it, he crept up on his hands and knees to the palisading, found 
 a hole in it that one of the shells had made, crept through the 
 hole and up to the flag, and got it and got away with it without 
 being observed." 
 
 Let us see why our expedition terminated thus abruptly. 
 
 Weitzel had been ordered by Butler to land and make a 
 reconnoissance. In his testimony before the Committee 
 on the Conduct of the War he gave his experience during 
 the war in charging and defending field works, and con- 
 tinuing, said: 
 
 " After that experience, with the information I had obtained 
 from reading and study — for before this war I was an instructor 
 at the Military Academy for three years under Professor Mahan, 
 on those very subjects — remembering well the remarks of the 
 Lieutenant- General commanding, that it was his intention I 
 should command that expedition, because another officer se- 
 lected by the War Department had once shown timidity, and in 
 face of the fact that I had been appointed a Major- General only 
 twenty days before, and needed confirmation; notwithstanding 
 all this, I went back to Gen. Butler, and told him I considered it 
 would be murder to order an attack on that work with that force." 
 
 Colonel Lamb says, in reference to the loss of his flag : 
 
 " I had no fear of an assault, and because, during a bombard- 
 ment which rendered an assault impossible, I covered my men, 
 and a few straggling skirmishers, too few to attract attention, 
 got near the fort, and some gallant officers thought they could 
 
<r 
 
 8 THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 
 
 have carried the work, it does not follow that they would not 
 have paid dearly for their temerity if they had made the attempt." 
 
 General Whiting speaks to the same effect. 
 
 Now, who is to say that Weitzel, Whiting, and Lamb 
 were mistaken as to the situation that day ? Is it the brave 
 soldier, who crept unseen through a hole in the palisade to 
 the parapet and took a flag from a staff which had been 
 shot away? 
 
 Is it Admiral Porter, who wrote to the Secretary o" the. 
 Navy January 17, 1865 : 
 
 " I have since visited Fort Fisher and the adjoining works, 
 and find their strength greatly beyond what I had conceived. 
 An engineer might be excusable in saying they could not be 
 captured except by regular siege. I wonder, even now, how it 
 was done. The work, as I said before, is really stronger than the 
 Malakoff tower, which defied so long the combined power of 
 France and England." 
 
 In a letter of the 16th of January to the Secretary of 
 the Navy, he says: "I was in Fort Malakoff a few days 
 after it surrendered to the French and English; the com- 
 bined armies oc the two nations were many months capturing 
 that stronghold, and it won't compare, either in size or 
 strength, to Fort Fisher." 
 
 I have no hesitancy in saying that they were not mis- 
 taken, though it is true that without personal knowledge 
 of the character of the fort, and, for the time, believing 
 Curtis, I ordered him to take it on his assertion that he could 
 do so. 
 
 What was not possible December 25th, was made 
 possible January 15th, through an efficient bombardment 
 on the part of the Navy and the co-operation of 2000 sailors 
 and marines and an additional force of 1400 infantry. 
 
 January 1, 1865, Grant wrote to Secretary Stanton: 
 "The fact is, there are but two ways of taking Fort Fisher, 
 operating from the water: one to surprise them whilst there 
 is but a small garrison defending the place; the other is 
 for the Navy to send a portion of their fleet into Cape Fear 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 9 
 
 River. . . ." He continues: "In the three days of 
 good weather which elapsed after the Army had reached 
 the scene of action, before the Navy appeared, our troops had 
 the chance of capturing Fort Fisher whilst it had an insuffi- 
 cient garrison to hold it. The delay gave the enemy time to 
 accumulate a force, . . . The failure before was the 
 result of delays by the Navy." 
 
 So, of Grant's two ways of taking the fort, one, by sur- 
 prise, failed, as he said, because of the delay of the Navy, 
 and as to the other, Colonel Comstock reports to Grant, 
 January 9th: "There is no hope, at least at present, of the 
 Admiral's trying to run by Fort Fisher." 
 
 Grant ordered and intended that Weitzel should have 
 command of the expedition. North Carolina was in Butler's 
 military department. His order retained Weitzel as his 
 subordinate. 
 
 Though Grant may have intended and ordered certain 
 action on the part of our expedition in December, 1864, 
 on the first of January, 1865, he wrote the Secretary of War, 
 as just quoted, that there were but two ways to take 
 the fort — by surprise or by the occupancy of the river by 
 the Navy. There was no surprise, the Navy was not in the 
 river, the bombardment of the fort was ineffectual, Weitzel 
 decided against an assault, Butler acquiesced and ordered 
 the expedition back to Virginia, saying to Weitzel at the 
 same time that he, Butler, would assume all responsibility, 
 as he could stand the blame better than could Weitzel, the 
 professional soldier. 
 
 The Committee on the Conduct of the War was composed 
 of the leading men in Congress at that time. Much experi- 
 ence in the investigation of military affairs had made them, 
 to say the least, fairly capable judges. They could command 
 any witness, they were critical and severe in their examina- 
 tions, and their conclusions were reached without fear or 
 favor. Honest Ben Wade was their Chairman. This is 
 their decision : 
 
 "In conclusion, your Committee would say, from all 
 the testimony before them, that the determination of 
 
IO THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 
 
 General Butler not to assault the fort seems to have been 
 fully justified by all facts and circumstances then known or 
 afterwards ascertained . ' ' 
 
 Few can comprehend the penalty General Butler had to 
 pay for his action on this occasion. The war was within a 
 few months of its end, and he had hoped for a share of 
 the honors conferred on those who served faithfully and 
 well, but he was sent home, and the whole nation condemned 
 him for the failure. General Weitzel, one of the best of 
 men, and one of our ablest generals, was humbled in spirit 
 before the storm of censure and ridicule. But all that 
 came after the capture of the fort on our second expedition. 
 
 The second expedition was started without delay. 
 January 2, 1865, Gen. A. H. Terry was put in command. 
 On the 3d we left camp, began re-embarkation on the 4th, 
 and completed it on the 5th. 
 
 I had 3300 picked men in my division. General Paine 
 had the same number in his. There were added a brigade 
 of 1400 men under Col. J. G. Abbott and two batteries of 
 light artillery of three and six guns each. Colonel Corn- 
 stock, who represented Grant on our first expedition, 
 returned with us on the second. 
 
 The transports put to sea on the morning of the 6th. 
 A severe storm drove them into Beaufort. 
 
 The troops were landed on the 13th, some two miles north 
 of the fort. 
 
 Upon landing, the first work on hand was to establish 
 a line of breastworks from the ocean beach to the river to 
 keep the enemy in the direction of Wilmington from inter- 
 fering with our operations. 
 
 A reconnoissance was made. Terry reports: 
 
 " As a result of this reconnoissance, and in view of the extreme 
 difficulty which might be expected in landing supplies and the 
 materials for a siege on the often tempestuous beach, it was 
 decided to attempt an assault the next day, provided that, in 
 the mean time, the fire of the Navy should so far destroy the 
 palisades as to make one practicable. This decision was com- 
 municated to Admiral Porter, who at once placed a division of 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER II 
 
 his vessels in a position to accomplish this last-named object, 
 It was arranged, in consultation with him, that a heavy bom- 
 bardment from all the vessels should commence early in the 
 morning and continue up to the moment of the assault, and that 
 even then it should not cease, but should be diverted from the 
 points of attack to the other parts of the work. It was decided 
 that the assault should be made at 3 p.m., that the army should 
 attack on the western half of the land-face, and that a column 
 of sailors and marines should assault the northeast bastion. 
 The fire of the Navy continued during the night. At 8 a.m. of 
 the 13th all of the vessels, except a division left to aid in the 
 defence of our northern line, moved into position, and a fire, 
 magnificent alike for its power and accuracy, was opened," 
 
 and continued all day Saturday, Saturday night, and Sunday, 
 till 3.30 p. m. "Ames's division had been selected for the 
 assault. . . . At 3.25 p. m. all the preparations were 
 completed, the order to move forward was given to Ames, 
 and a concerted signal was made to Admiral Porter to change 
 the direction of his fire." 
 
 The situation at this time was as follows: Some two 
 miles north of the fort General Paine had established a 
 line of breastworks, from ocean to river, facing north, 
 with his own division on the left and Colonel Abbott's 
 brigade on the right. On the sea beach, about half a mile 
 from the fort, were 2000 sailors and marines under command 
 of Fleet Capt. K. R. Breese. On the east were sixty-four 
 ships of war, under Admiral Porter, cannonading the fort. 
 My three brigades were in line, one behind the other, ranging 
 from three to five hundred yards from the fort; the left 
 of each line nearly opposite the middle of the land-face 
 of the fort, the right near the river. A body of sharp- 
 shooters were pushed forward, and the whole division was 
 covered from the fire of the enemy, as far as possible, by 
 the inequalities of the ground and slight pits formed by 
 throwing up the sand. 
 
 Terry, Comstock, and I were in a small advanced outwork 
 about half a mile from the fort. My able and gallant 
 Adjutant-General, Gen. Chas. A. Carleton, has made the 
 following record: "General Terry turned to General Ames 
 
12 THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 
 
 and said: 'General Ames, the signal agreed upon for the 
 assault has been given.' General Ames asked : 'Have you 
 any special orders to give?' General Terry replied: 'No, 
 you understand the situation and what is desired to be 
 accomplished. I leave everything to your discretion.'" 
 Thus was given me the unrestricted command of the fighting 
 forces. 
 
 At once I directed Captain Lawrence of my staff to 
 order Curtis, commanding the First Brigade, to charge, 
 striking the parapet at the end nearest the river. The 
 palisade had been sufficiently broken and shot away by 
 the fire of the Navy to permit the passage of the troops. 
 As I approached the fort I watched with anxious eyes the 
 charge of the First Brigade. 
 
 Captain Lawrence heroically led the charge of that part 
 of the brigade which advanced at this time. He was 
 the first through the palisade, and while reaching for a 
 guidon to plant on the first traverse, his hand was shot 
 away and he was dangerously wounded in the neck, but 
 with this lodgment on the first traverse, the force of the 
 charge was spent. I quickly ordered Colonel Pennypacker's 
 brigade, which was close at hand, to charge and sweep down 
 the parapet to the ocean. 
 
 I will not attempt a description of the battle. It was a 
 charge of my brigades, one after the other, followed by 
 desperate fighting at close quarters over the parapet and 
 traverses and in and through the covered ways. All the 
 time we were exposed to the musketry and artillery of the 
 enemy, while our own Navy was thundering away, occa- 
 sionally making us the victims of its fire. 
 
 The official reports of my officers give no adequate idea 
 of their gallant deeds, but they must supply the form and 
 coloring of the warlike scenes of that eventful Sunday. 
 
 Colonel Daggett, in command of the First Brigade, 
 January 17th, reports: 
 
 "At about 3 p.m., General Curtis having received orders to 
 that effect from Gen. Ames, through Capt. Lawrence, the brigade 
 advanced to the charge, so as to strike the sally-port, that having 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 1 3 
 
 been deemed the only vulnerable point of the work, and, after 
 a desperate struggle, the advance of the brigade reached the 
 parapet of the fort and scaled it to the first traverse, where the 
 guidon of the 117th New York was planted — the first colors 
 on the fort." 
 
 Major 0. P. Harding, who came out of the fight in 
 command of the Second Brigade, reports : 
 
 ' ' The brigade was ordered to assault the fort, which was done in 
 a gallant manner and under a heavy fire of grape and musketry, 
 and entered the fort through a sally-port near the river. The 
 203d Pennsylvania, commanded by Col. J. W. Moore, was the 
 first to enter the fort, closely followed by the 97th Pennsylvania, 
 commanded by First Lieutenant John Wainwright. The colors 
 of each of those regiments reached the parapet about the same 
 time, those of the 97th borne by Col. Pennypacker, and of the 
 203d by Col. Moore. Col. Pennypacker was seriously wounded 
 while planting his colors on the third traverse, and Col. Moore 
 fell dead while passing the second traverse, waving his colors and 
 commanding his men to follow. After entering the fort the 
 brigade became somewhat broken up; nevertheless, both officers 
 and men behaved gallantly until its capture. 
 
 " After the fall of Lieut. Col. Lyman, 203d Pennsylvania, who 
 fell on the sixth traverse, I commanded the regiment until about 
 5 p.m., when ordered by General Ames to take command of the 
 brigade, which I immediately organized." 
 
 Capt. H. B. Essington, commanding 203d Pennsylvania, 
 reports : 
 
 " The regiment charged on the right of the Second Brigade, 
 and was the first regiment of the brigade to enter the fort, going 
 in with the First (Curtis's) Brigade. After having assisted in 
 capturing the first two mounds, a portion of the regiment went 
 to the right and stationed themselves behind a bank in the open 
 field south of the fort. The latter portion then charged across 
 the plain, by order of the commanding general (Gen. Ames), 
 until opposite the seventh or eighth traverse, where they threw 
 up an embankment with their tin plates and shovels, which they 
 held until the fort surrendered, keeping up a steady fire on the 
 enemy." 
 
14 THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 
 
 Let me say, in passing, that Colonel Pennypacker's 
 conduct in leading his brigade with the colors of his own 
 regiment placed him second to none for gallantry that 
 day. It would be difficult to overestimate the value of 
 his example to his brigade. 
 
 Entering the fort and passing to the rear of the parapet 
 at the west end, I made an examination of it from that 
 position, and decided to use my third brigade, Colonel Bell's, 
 with its left by the parapet, right extended south and 
 west inside the fort, and charge into the angle formed by 
 the land- and sea-faces. I ordered Bell forward with his 
 brigade to report to me. Lieutenant -Colonel Johnson, 
 commanding the Third Brigade, January 19th, reports: 
 "Colonel Bell was ordered by General Ames to remain near 
 him for the purpose of receiving orders." Unfortunately 
 Colonel Bell was killed in the advance, gallantly leading his 
 brigade. The part of his brigade which reached me was 
 in a somewhat disorganized condition. I formed it as 
 best I could for the charge. Owing to the obstructions 
 of the demolished quarters of the garrison and the fire of 
 the enemy from the front (the angle had been partially 
 filled in and was protected by a curtain) and from the 
 right, as well as the fire of our Navy, the advance was 
 checked. The men were in a very exposed position, and 
 as no advantage could be gained there I ordered them to 
 join the other troops in pushing seaward on the land-face 
 of the fort. Lieutenant-Colonel Johnson further reports: 
 "The brigade entered the fort conjointly with a portion of 
 the First (Curtis's) Brigade, at the left bastion, a portion 
 moving along the terre-plain and a portion on the ramparts, 
 parapets, and slopes, some of the officers and men in the 
 advance with officers and men of other brigades, all vying 
 with each other." 
 
 Owing to the contracted space in which the fighting was 
 done, brigade and regimental formations were impossible. 
 What was accomplished was through the heroic efforts of 
 small bodies of officers and men. 
 
 From time to time I sent to Terry, who was in the earth- 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 1 5 
 
 work half a mile away, reports of the progress I was 
 making. 
 
 I had previously learned that the sailors and marines 
 who had made an attack on the sea angle had been quickly 
 repulsed. 
 
 As the sun sank to the horizon, the ardor of the assault 
 abated. Our advance was but slow. Ten of my officers 
 had been killed, forty-seven wounded, and about 500 men 
 were killed and wounded. Among the killed was one 
 brigade commander, the other two were wounded and 
 disabled. I now requested Terry to join me in the fort. 
 It was dark before he and Comstock arrived. I explained 
 the situation. 
 
 Colonel Abbott's brigade, which had been relieved from 
 its position in the line facing Wilmington, by the defeated 
 sailors and marines, had been ordered to report to me. 
 
 I decided to make my chief effort with the re-enforce- 
 ments by moving the troops by the flank between the 
 palisade and the foot of the fort until the head of the 
 column should reach the northeast angle by the ocean, 
 then face to the right and rush the men up and over the 
 parapet; and at the same time continue the struggle for 
 the traverses. Col. J. C. Abbott, commanding Second 
 Brigade, 1st Division, in his report of January 15th, says: 
 
 " Reaching the fort about dark I reported to Gen. Ames. By 
 order of Gen. Ames I first threw the 3d New Hampshire Volun- 
 teers, Capt. Trickey commanding, along the portion of the north 
 face of the work already occupied by his troops and relieved 
 them ; also by Gen. Ames's order, I threw out the 7th Connecticut 
 Volunteers, Capt. Marble commanding, as a picket in rear of 
 the work, the right of the line resting on Cape Fear River. Dur- 
 ing this time the enemy occupied all the eastern and about one- 
 third the northern face of the work. At about 9 o'clock, by order 
 of Gen. Ames, I then proceeded to dislodge the enemy from the 
 remainder of the fort. I then advanced the 7th New Hamp- 
 shire, Lieut. Col. Rollins commanding. They at once and 
 gallantly charged up the slope enveloping the sea angle of the 
 work, meeting a sharp fire from the enemy, who were stationed 
 behind the parapets, and in rear of the main work." 
 
1 6 THE CAPTURE OP FORT FISHER 
 
 Captain William H. Trickey, commanding 3d New 
 Hampshire Regiment, reports January 18th: 
 
 " I was directed by Col. Abbott, commanding Brigade, to 
 move my regiment to the extreme advance held by the second 
 division and open fire upon the enemy; was thus engaged for 
 nearly an hour, having, to a great extent, silenced the enemy's fire, 
 was then directed by Col. Abbott to take and hold, with twenty 
 men, the next traverse in front, the remainder of my command 
 being left in several traverses to keep up the fire upon the enemy. 
 We took the traverse, as directed, driving the enemy out. 
 Thinking we could go farther, we charged and took the next two, 
 with a like result. After taking the third traverse, having met 
 with considerable resistance, I did not deem it prudent to go 
 farther with so few men, and opened a vigorous fire upon the 
 enemy, who was rallying for the recapture of the traverses; 
 we held the enemy in check until the arrival of the 7 th New 
 Hampshire and 6th Connecticut, who charged and took the 
 remainder of the work." 
 
 Lieutenant Colonel Rollins reports : 
 
 "At 10 p.m. moved my regiment inside the fort, and was ordered 
 by Gen. Ames to take two traverses, and three, if possible, the 
 number not then taken. I moved over the third traverse of the 
 fort, and advanced rapidly inside the stockade until I reached 
 the battery on the northeast angle of the fort, where I formed 
 the right wing of the regiment, leaving the left in support. I 
 then ordered a charge and captured the three remaining traverses 
 and batteries, then pushed on by the right flank, and by so 
 doing cut off the angle of the fort, moved to the right, and, by a 
 rapid and determined advance, captured the remaining traverses 
 and batteries of the fort proper." 
 
 Thus, after some seven hours' fighting, more than five 
 of which were after dark, the land-face of the fort was 
 occupied and all resistance ceased. The enemy tied to 
 the shelter of Battery Buchanan, at the end of the point, 
 two miles away. Terry took Abbott and a part of his 
 brigade and marched to Battery Buchanan. Abbott 
 reports: "I was met by the Adjutant-General of the Gen- 
 eral commanding the enemy's forces, who tendered the 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 1 7 
 
 surrender of the battery, upon which I referred to General 
 Terry, who would soon arrive. . . . General Terry 
 having arrived, received the surrender of the work and the 
 force." 
 
 Colonel Abbott was mistaken. Terry was too late. 
 Captain Lockwood of my staff had already received the 
 surrender. 
 
 It was after ten o'clock. The task set for us at half- 
 past three was finished. Our work was done. 
 
 The statement of their achievement is the highest eulogy 
 that can be passed upon our soldiers. 
 
 A grievous accident occurred early the next morning, 
 which killed and wounded one hundred and thirty of our 
 gallant heroes. It was the explosion of the magazine of 
 the fort. A board of enquiry was organized and found 
 
 " that the following are the main facts, viz. : i, immediately after 
 the capture of the fort, Gen. Ames gave orders to Lieut. Col. 
 Samuel M. Zent to place guards on all the magazines and bomb- 
 proofs. 2, Lieut. Col. Zent commenced on the northwest corner 
 of the fort, next the river, following the traverses round, and 
 placed guards on thirty-one entrances under the traverses. The 
 main magazine, which afterwards exploded, being in the rear 
 of the traverses, escaped his notice, and, consequently, had no 
 guards from his regiment or any other." 
 
 General Bragg reports that the defenders of the fort 
 numbered, all told, about no commissioned officers and 
 2500 men — their casualties being over 400. A few escaped 
 across the river, in boats, under cover of the darkness; the 
 rest became our prisoners. 
 
 Mr. Stanton, the Secretary of War, had been visiting 
 Sherman at Savannah after his march through Georgia, 
 and on his way north called at Fort Fisher, where he had 
 an interview with Terry. 
 
 LTpon Stanton's arrival at Fortress Monroe, Va., he 
 sent a dispatch to President Lincoln marked "official," 
 dated Tuesday, ioa.m., January 17, 1865. In this dispatch 
 Stanton mentions Terry, my brigade commanders, and some 
 
15 THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 
 
 regimental commanders, but omits my name altogether. 
 Among other things he says: "The assault on the other 
 and most difficult side of the fort was made by a column 
 of 3000 troops of the old Tenth Corps, led by Colonel Curtis, 
 under the immediate supervision of General Terry." 
 
 This is not true, as the official reports show, in any other 
 sense than that Curtis's brigade first reached the fort under 
 my immediate orders, with Terry half a mile away. An 
 earlier attempt to make public these facts has been imprac- 
 ticable, as the volume of the War Records covering this 
 event was not published till 1894. 
 
 With this as a preface I will add to the extracts of the 
 reports of some of my subordinate officers already given, 
 the report of General Terry, who was my only superior 
 officer. He says: "Of General Ames I have already 
 spoken in a letter recommending his promotion. He 
 commanded all the troops engaged and was constantly 
 under fire. His great coolness, good judgment, and skill 
 were never more conspicuous than in this assault." 
 
 These official reports show, as Terry says, that I "com- 
 manded all the troops engaged" from the first act, when 
 my aide, Capt. A. G. Lawrence, led the first brigade into 
 the fort, to the last act, when the garrison surrendered to 
 my aide, Capt. H. C. Lockwood. 
 
 The sailors and marines w T ho assaulted in column the 
 northeast angle of the fort along the sea beach were a body 
 of 2000 men, made up of detachments from different ships. 
 Naturally enough, Captain Breese found it, as has been 
 stated, an unwieldy mass. The 1600 sailors were armed 
 only with pistols and cutlasses. They were quickly repulsed. 
 Few reached the parapet. Once checked, they turned and 
 fled, losing 300 in killed and wounded. Admiral Porter 
 testified: "I suppose the whole thing was over in fifteen 
 minutes, as far as the sailors were concerned, for they were 
 cut down like sheep." 
 
 Later, this force was sent to the line of entrenchments 
 facing Wilmington, relieving Colonel Abbott's brigade, 
 which reported to me. Of course Admiral Porter expected 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 19 
 
 his sailors to carry the fort, but, alas! he had been deceived 
 as to its defensive capabilities, which deception resulted 
 in the apparently needless sacrifice of his gallant sailors. 
 
 Our Navy, in its ships and armament, was the most 
 powerful that ever existed up to that time. In officers and 
 men it never had its equal, and never will till an equally 
 enlightened, powerful, and liberty-loving people again rise, 
 in their might, in a struggle for self-preservation. 
 
 As to the effect on the fort of the second bombardment, 
 Colonel Lamb writes : 
 
 " The land armament, with palisades and torpedoes, had been 
 destroyed. For the first time in the history of sieges the land 
 defences of the works were destroyed, not by the act of the 
 besieging army, but by the concentrated fire, direct and enfilad- 
 ing, of an immense fleet, poured upon them without intermission, 
 until torpedo wires were cut, palisades breached so that they 
 actually afforded cover for assailants, and the slopes of the work 
 were rendered practicable for assault." 
 
 Why the first expedition was a failure and the second 
 a success has never been rightly understood. The military 
 situations have been obscured by the contention between 
 General Butler and Admiral Porter, though the most 
 amicable relations existed between the Army and Navy. 
 
 It has been believed that the fort was in the same condi- 
 tion on both occasions, and that it was but poorly garrisoned 
 on the first. Those who so held were in error in both 
 particulars. 
 
 According to Badeau, Grant's historian: "Curtis 
 declared that the fort could have been carried on the first 
 expedition, and that at the moment when they were recalled 
 they virtually had possession." This declaration has been 
 accepted as the truth. 
 
 We can examine the facts, now that the official reports 
 have been published, and form our own opinions on this 
 point, which has been the pivot of the whole controversy. 
 
 It appears from Curtis's report that he had " pushed the 
 right of his skirmishers to within 75 paces of the fort and 
 had sent back to his reserves for 200 men with which to 
 
20 THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 
 
 possess the fort, but his messenger was there informed 
 that orders from the department commander bade him 
 retire," which he did. 
 
 Let us see what these 200 men would have had to do to 
 make what Curtis calls a "virtual," an actual possession 
 of the fort. 
 
 Colonel Lamb had a force of 1400 men, 900 of whom 
 were veterans. Whiting, Lamb, and other officers commend 
 the discipline, skill, and gallantry of the garrison. I will 
 not take time to quote from their reports. They all show 
 that the officers of the fort were keenly alive to our move- 
 ments. Colonel Lamb states that he intentionally kept 
 his men hidden from view. He was perfectly familiar 
 with the surroundings, both within and without the fort. 
 
 Now, the one question to decide is, could those 200 
 men, sent for by Curtis, have taken possession of that pali- 
 saded Malakoff fortress, with its garrison of 1400 men? 
 
 Lieutenant Colonel Barney, who commanded our forces 
 behind the picket line, nowhere intimates that we had any 
 kind of possession of the fort. 
 
 Even Curtis reports, officially, that his skirmishers were 
 met with musketry and canister, and that he retired under 
 a heavy fire. 
 
 In making a decision, Lamb's report must not be over- 
 looked. He reports: 
 
 " That it was dark at 5.30, when the fleet ceased firing. No 
 assault could be made while the fleet was firing. When the 
 firing ceased, the parapets (which were 20 feet high) were at 
 once manned and half of the garrison (700 men) were stationed 
 outside the work behind the palisade, which was 9 feet high and 
 pierced for musketry." 
 
 What soldier will say we had "virtual" possession of 
 the fort under such circumstances? 
 
 The second expedition took this question from the realm 
 of speculation. 
 
 Three weeks after the first attempt we were back again 
 before the fort, which, because of the efficient bombardment 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 21 
 
 of the Navy, was far less capable of resistance. A column 
 of 2000 sailors and marines were to make a gallant assault 
 on the sea angle simultaneously with ours, thereby to create 
 a diversion greatly to our advantage. 
 
 Curtis had in his brigade, now forming the first line, more 
 than twice as many men as he had before the fort on the 
 first expedition. Again I gave him the order to take the 
 fort. Did he take it? No. His brigade, led by Captain 
 Lawrence, made a lodgment on one corner of it — a lodgment 
 so uncertain that I immediately ordered up Colonel Penny- 
 packer's brigade, which, inspired and led by him and 
 Colonel Moore, reached the third traverse and made our 
 foothold secure. Such are the official records of the battle. 
 
 I wish to touch one other point. Badeau writes in this 
 same history : 
 
 " The fighting was continued from traverse to traverse, until 
 at 9 o'clock the troops had nearly reached the bastion. Bell had 
 been killed and Pennypacker wounded, and Curtis now sent back 
 for re-enforcements. The advance party was in imminent peril, 
 for the guns from both bastions and the mound batteries were 
 turned upon them. At this crisis a staff officer brought orders 
 from Terry to stop fighting and begin intrenching. Curtis was 
 inflamed with the magnificent rage of battle, and fairly roared 
 at this command: "Then we shall lose whatever we have gained. 
 The enemy will drive us from here in the morning. " While he 
 spoke he was struck by a shell, and fell senseless to the earth. 
 The hero of Fort Fisher had fallen, and the fort was not yet 
 carried. Ames, who was near him, sent an officer to Terry to 
 report that Curtis was killed, and that his dying request was 
 that the fighting might go on. It was also Ames's opinion that 
 the battle should proceed. Terry caught the contagion, and 
 determined to continue the assault, even if it became necessary 
 to abandon the line of defence towards Wilmington. Abbott's 
 re-enforcements were at once ordered forward, and as they en- 
 tered the fort the rebels on the bastion gave way and Fort Fisher 
 was carried." 
 
 It is due to Badeau to state that he says in a note that 
 he. "obtained the account of this assault from a paper 
 written by an aide-de-camp to General Curtis." 
 
2 2 THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 
 
 This remarkable statement deserves a moment's con- 
 sideration. If it be true, then all the chief honors must 
 fall on one head. But it is not true. If Terry gave orders 
 to stop fighting and begin intrenching, who can believe 
 that it was through the "contagion caught" by him from 
 Curtis that the fight continued, or that he would " abandon 
 the line towards Wilmington" to try uncertainties at the 
 fort? 
 
 Terry reports : 
 
 " When Bell's brigade was ordered into action I foresaw that 
 more troops would probably be needed, and sent an order for 
 Abbott's brigade to move down from the north line, at the same 
 time requesting Captain Breese to replace them with his sailors 
 and marines. I also directed General Paine to send me one of 
 the strongest regiments of his own division; these troops arrived 
 at dusk and reported to General Ames." 
 
 This treatment of Terry and the ignoring of division, 
 brigade, and regimental commanders find no justification 
 in the facts. Terry is entitled to every honor due his 
 position. Pennypacker and Bell can not be swept aside 
 so lightly, nor the regimental commanders, whose names 
 I need not give here. 
 
 I would say specifically to that reference to myself, 
 that I did not send any request, "dying" or other, from 
 Curtis to Terry that the fighting might go on. 
 
 If Terry intended my division to stop fighting and begin 
 intrenching he did not send the order to Curtis, one of my 
 brigade commanders, nor would Terry send re-enforcements 
 to Curtis over my head. 
 
 According to this aide, Curtis was wounded at 9 o'clock 
 while criticising Terry's order to stop fighting and begin 
 intrenching. I say in my report that Curtis was wounded 
 " a short time before dark" on that brief winter's day. 
 
 I saw him in, and emerge from, a covered way at the 
 west end of the parapet. He approached me and began 
 to speak; almost at the same time a shot struck him down. 
 Colonel Daggett, who succeeded to the command of Curtis's 
 brigade, reports two days after: "Curtis was seriously 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 23 
 
 wounded about 4.30." General Carleton, who was with 
 me at the time, and picked up his sword as he fell, says 
 Curtis was shot at about 4.30. 
 
 And yet Badeau would have us believe that Curtis was 
 wounded while criticising Terry's order to stop fighting 
 and begin intrenching, at 9 o'clock, some four hours after 
 Curtis fell senseless at my feet. 
 
 In fact, he was wounded before dark, about an hour and 
 a half after the battle began, and some four hours before 
 the fort was taken. The exact minute is of no importance. 
 Participants in a battle are poor judges of passing time. 
 
 In this instance it is fixed accurately enough in the 
 official reports of Daggett, Abbott, and myself, as well as 
 Carleton's statement of his recollections. 
 
 General Terry says in his official report of the battle: 
 
 " Brigadier General Curtis and Colonels Pennypacker, Bell, 
 and Abbott, the brigade commanders, led them with the utmost 
 gallantry. Curtis was wounded after fighting in the front rank, 
 rifle in hand; Pennypacker, while carrying the standard of one 
 of his regiments, the first man in a charge over a traverse; Bell 
 was mortally wounded near the palisade." 
 
 This is all, literally all, Terry says of exceptional services 
 by Curtis. "Fighting in the front rank, rifle in hand," 
 is most commendable under the circumstances, but it does 
 not in itself justify claims for exceptional honors. 
 
 My report says : 
 
 "The conduct of the officers and men of this division was 
 most gallant. . . . Where the name of every officer and man 
 engaged in this desperate conflict should be submitted, I shall 
 at present only be able to give a few of those most conspicuous. 
 It is hoped all may be properly rewarded. 
 
 " Brevet Brig.-Gen. N. M. Curtis, commanding First Brigade, 
 was prominent throughout the day for his bravery, coolness, and 
 judgment. His services can not be overestimated. He fell 
 a short time before dark, seriously wounded in the head by a 
 canister shot. 
 
 " Colonel Pennypacker, commanding the Second Brigade, was 
 seriously wounded while planting his colors on the third traverse 
 
24 THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 
 
 of the work. This officer was surpassed by none, and his ab- 
 sence during the day was most deeply felt and seriously regretted. 
 
 " Col. L. Bell, commanding Third Brigade, was mortally 
 wounded while crossing the bridge in advance of the palisading. 
 He was an able and efficient officer ; one not easily replaced. 
 
 " Col. J. W. Moore, 203d Pennsylvania Volunteers, behaved 
 with the most distinguished gallantry. He was killed while 
 passing the second traverse of the fort, in advance of his regiment, 
 waving his colors. Few equalled, none surpassed, this brave 
 officer." 
 
 My report on Curtis is not less generous than Terry's ; but 
 it was not intended to, and I doubt if it does, sustain his 
 pretensions of this day. 
 
 The official records, written thirty-two years ago, must 
 be the foundation for all claims of honor and distinction. 
 Nothing can now be added to them or taken from them. 
 By them we all must be judged. 
 
 Misrepresentations greatly injured General Butler, and 
 deeply humiliated General Weitzel. Truth has been out- 
 raged — truth overslow in the pursuit of falsehood, not 
 always the most agreeable company. 
 
 In this paper I have attempted to right a wrong. I have 
 given few opinions of my own. I have called up the actors 
 themselves, and have let them speak in their own words — 
 sometimes under oath — always under a sense of grave 
 responsibility. 
 
 Authorities. 
 
 Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, vol. ii., Fort 
 Fisher Expedition. War of the Rebellion Records, vol. xlii., part 1. 
 War Records, vol. xlvi., part 1. War Records, vol. xlvi., part 2. The 
 Century Company's War Books, vol. iv. Letter of Col. Wm. Lamb, dated 
 Norfolk, Va. 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER. 
 
 Read before the Commandery by 
 Brevet Major-General Newton Martin Curtis, U. S. V., 
 
 May 5, 1897. 
 
 description of the fort. 
 
 COLONEL LAMB took command of the fort, July 4, 
 1862; he found it a quadrilateral work with six 
 guns, flanked north and south by five detached 
 batteries carrying eleven guns, four of which were casemated. 
 Only one of the seventeen guns was of modern ordnance. 
 He stated that the frigate Minnesota could have destroyed 
 the works and driven them out in a few hours. During 
 his occupation of the fort he made it the largest and best 
 equipped fortification constructed by the Confederates, 
 as shown in his description of it as it stood before the 
 attack. 
 
 "At the land-face of Fort Fisher, five miles from the 
 intrenched camp at Sugar Loaf, the peninsula was about 
 half a mile wide. This face commenced about a hundred 
 feet from the river with a half bastion, and extended with 
 a heavy curtain to a full bastion on the ocean side, where it 
 joined the sea-face without moat, scarp, or counterscarp. 
 The outer slope was twenty feet high from the berm to 
 the top of the parapet, at an angle of 45 °, and was sodded 
 with marsh grass which grew luxuriantly. The parapet 
 was twenty-five feet thick, with an inclination of only one 
 foot. The revetment was five feet nine inches from the 
 floor of the gun-chambers, and these were some twelve feet 
 or more from the interior plane. The guns were all mounted 
 en barbette on Columbiad carriages; there was not a single 
 casemated gun in the fort. Between the gun-chambers, 
 
 25 
 
2 6 THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 
 
 containing one or two guns each (there were twenty heavy- 
 guns on the land-face), were heavy traverses, exceeding in 
 size any known to engineers, to protect from an enfilading 
 fire. They extended twelve feet on the parapet and were 
 twelve feet in height above the parapet, running back thirty 
 feet. The gun-chambers were reached from the rear by 
 steps. In each traverse was an alternate magazine or 
 bomb-proof, the latter ventilated by an air-chamber. 
 Passageways penetrated the traverses in the interior of 
 the work, forming additional bomb-proofs for the reliefs 
 for the guns. 
 
 " The sea-face for a hundred yards from the northeast 
 bastion was of the same massive character as the land-face. 
 A crescent battery intended for four guns adjoined this. 
 A series of batteries extended for three-quarters of a mile 
 along the sea, connected by an infantry curtain. These 
 batteries had heavy traverses ten or twelve feet high above 
 the top of the parapets. On this line was a bomb-proof 
 electric battery connected with a system of submarine tor- 
 pedoes. Farther along a mound battery sixty feet high 
 was erected, with two heavy guns which had a plunging 
 fire on the channel; this was connected with the battery 
 north of it by a light curtain. Following the line of the 
 works it was one mile from the angle of the sea- and land- 
 faces to the mound, and upon this line twenty-four heavy 
 guns were mounted. From the mound for nearly a mile 
 to the end of the point was a level sand plain scarcely three 
 feet above high tide, and much of it was submerged during 
 gales. At the point Battery Buchanan, four guns, in the 
 the shape of an ellipse, commanded the inlet, its two n-inch 
 guns covering the approach by land. An advanced redoubt 
 with a 24-pounder was added after the first expedition. A 
 wharf for large steamers was in close proximity to these 
 works. As a defence against infantry there was a system 
 of subterra torpedoes extending across the peninsula, five to 
 six hundred feet from the land-face, and so disconnected 
 that the explosion of one would not affect the others ; inside 
 the torpedoes, about fifty feet from the berm of the work, 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 27 
 
 extending from river bank to sea-shore, was a heavy pali- 
 sade of sharpened logs nine feet high, pierced for musketry. 
 There was a redoubt guarding the sally-port, from which 
 two Napoleons were run out, as occasion required. At the 
 river end of the palisade was a deep and muddy slough, 
 across which was a bridge over which the river road entered 
 the fort. Commanding this bridge was a Napoleon gun. 
 There were three mortars in rear of the land-face." 
 
 ITS IMPORTANCE TO THE CONFEDERACY. 
 
 Thomas E. Taylor, an English merchant, one of the 
 most active and successful blockade-runners during the 
 war, says in his book, Running the Blockade, page 139 : 
 
 " That morning (in Richmond, Va., December, 1864) I had 
 an appointment with the Commissary General, who divulged to 
 me under promise of secrecy that Lee's army was in terrible 
 straits, and had in fact rations for only thirty days. He asked 
 me if I could help him. I said I would do my best, and after 
 some negotiations he undertook to pay me a profit of 350 per 
 cent, upon any provisions and meat I could bring in within the 
 next three weeks. . . . Although it was a hard trip it paid 
 well, as we had on board coming out a most magnificent cargo, 
 a great deal of sea-island cotton, the profits upon which and the 
 provisions I had taken in amounted to over eighty-five thousand 
 pounds — not bad work for about twenty days." 
 
 January 15, 1865, the day of the capture of Fort Fisher, 
 Mr. Taylor wrote from Nassau to his partners in Liverpool, 
 England : 
 
 " General Lee told me the other day that if they did not keep 
 Wilmington they could not save Richmond. They nearly 
 had Fort Fisher — they were within sixty yards of it, and had 
 they pushed on as they ought to have done could have taken it. 
 It was a terrific bombardment; they estimated that about 
 40,000 shells were sent into it. Colonel Lamb behaved like a 
 brick — splendidly. I got the last of the Whitworths in, and 
 they are now at the fort. They are very hard up for food in the 
 field, but the Banshee has this time 600 barrels of pork and 
 1500 boxes of meat — enough to feed Lee's army for a month." 
 
28 THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 
 
 Alexander H. Stephens said of the capture of Fort 
 Fisher in his book, The War between the States, vol. ii., 
 page 619: 
 
 " The fall of this fort was one of the greatest disasters which 
 had befallen our cause from the beginning of the war — not 
 excepting the loss of Vicksburg or Atlanta. Forts Fisher and 
 Caswell guarded the entrance to the Cape Fear River, and 
 prevented the complete blockade of the port of Wilmington, 
 through which a limited foreign commerce had been carried on 
 during the whole time. It was by means of what cotton could 
 thus be carried out, that we had been enabled to get along 
 financially as well as we had ; and at this point also a considerable 
 number of arms and various munitions of war, as well as large 
 supplies of subsistence, had been introduced. All other ports, 
 except Wilmington, had long since been closed by naval siege." 
 
 General Grant, in the 61st chapter of the 2d volume 
 of his Personal Memoirs, refers to Fort Fisher in the follow- 
 ing words: 
 
 "Up to January, 1865, the enemy occupied Fort Fisher, at 
 the mouth of Cape Fear River and below the city of Wilmington. 
 This port was of immense importance to the Confederates, 
 because it formed their principal inlet for blockade-runners, by 
 means of which they brought in from abroad such supplies and 
 munitions of war as they could not procure at home. It was 
 equally important to us to get possession of it, not only because, 
 it was desirable to cut off their supplies so as to insure a speedy 
 termination of the war, but also because foreign governments 
 particularly the British Government, were constantly threaten- 
 ing that unless ours could maintain the blockade off that coast 
 they should cease to recognize any blockade. For these reasons 
 I determined, with the concurrence of the Navy Department, in 
 December, to send an expedition against Fort Fisher for the 
 purpose of capturing it." 
 
 THE FIRST JOINT EXPEDITION. 
 
 On the 6th of December, 1864, General Grant issued 
 written instructions to General Butler specifying that 
 
 " the object of the expedition under General Weitzel is to 
 close to the enemy the port of Wilmington. . . . This will 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 29 
 
 be gained by effecting a landing on the mainland between the 
 Cape Fear River and the Atlantic north of the north entrance 
 to the river. Should this landing be effected whilst the 
 enemy still hold Fort Fisher and the batteries guarding the 
 entrance to the river, then the troops should entrench them- 
 selves, and by co-operating with the Navy effect the reduction 
 and capture of those places." 
 
 The 2d Division of the Twenty-fourth Corps, under the 
 command of Brigadier-General Adelbert Ames, and the ist 
 Division of the Twenty-fifth Corps, under the command of 
 Brigadier-General C. J. Paine, came to Hampton Roads on 
 the 8th of December, 1864, and were transferred to ocean 
 transports; on the 13th the transports sailed, and on the 
 15th rendezvoused off Masonborough Inlet, North Carolina. 
 The steamer Louisiana, loaded with 215 tons of powder, had 
 been sent forward under convoy of the Navy. On the 24th 
 of December the Louisiana was sent inshore to a point 850 
 yards north of the fort and exploded by Commander Rhind 
 250 yards from the shore at 1.30 A. m. The only effect of 
 the explosion was the awakening of a part of the garrison. 
 Admiral Porter kept the fort under a continuous fire from 
 his fleet from the morning of December 24th until the even- 
 ing of December 25th, only slackening the fire from dark to 
 daylight. At 1 o'clock p. m. on the 25th the troops began 
 landing under the protection of the naval division com- 
 manded by Captain O. S. Glisson. Five hundred of my 
 brigade were put into row-boats, furnished by the trans- 
 ports and the Navy, and in a single line moved to the shore. 
 I preceded the line in Captain Glisson 's gig, in charge of 
 Lieutenant Farquhar, and on landing carried the Captain's 
 flag and raised it on a sand dune to indicate where the 
 troops should land. Before the men reached the shore 
 General Weitzel landed and directed me to at once form 
 my troops in line as they came from the boats and marched 
 down the beach, throwing out flankers as we proceeded. 
 A company of Confederates in a small earthwork, half a mile 
 south, raised a white flag; the Navy sent boats ashore and 
 took off as prisoners two officers and sixty-five men. Con- 
 
3<D THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 
 
 tinuing the march south we halted at a small earthwork, 
 which General Weitzel thought was 800 yards north of Fort 
 Fisher, but later measurements showed it to have been 
 2200 yards. Here an examination of the fort was made 
 by a field-glass and it appeared to have sustained no injury 
 from the naval fire beyond the displacing of a single gun 
 and the breaking of a few piles of the stockade. General 
 Weitzel left me at this point to return to General Butler, 
 directing me to take command of the troops as they arrived 
 but not to bring on an engagement, and to report to General 
 Butler any matters of importance, stating that he would 
 leave a signal sergeant to transmit any reports I might 
 wish to make. The sergeant did not appear. About 
 half of the men first landed had been sent out as flankers. 
 I sent forward forty men toward the left salient of 
 the fort, leaving the remainder with orders to retain at 
 that point all troops that might come forward. , I followed 
 the skirmish line, and when we were within fifty yards of 
 the parapet the staff carrying the garrison flag was shot 
 away by the Navy, and Capt. W. H. Walling, i42d N. Y., 
 went through the ditch and stockade and up the parapet 
 and brought it away at 4.20 p. m. About the same time 
 Lieutenant George Simpson, i42d N. Y., of my staff climbed 
 a telegraph pole and cut the wire, breaking telegraphic 
 connection between the fort and Wilmington. Having no 
 means of promptly communicating with headquarters, I 
 went to the beach with two men carrying the captured 
 flag and exhibited it at a point about 150 yards north of 
 the east salient of the fort. Before starting to carry the 
 flag to the beach, I had sent an order to Lieutenant Colonel 
 Barney, i42d N. Y., to bring forward to Battery Holland, 
 an earthwork half a mile north of the west salient of the 
 fort, all the troops which had arrived at the reserve. No 
 movement of the troops had been made when I reached 
 the beach, and I walked up the beach to ascertain why my 
 order to advance had not been obeyed, and on arriving 
 at the reserve learned that a short time before the receipt 
 of my order to go forward, General Butler had ordered the 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 3 1 
 
 troops to retire from the front of the fort. Feeling confident 
 that General Butler had issued his order without knowing 
 the condition of the fort, I sent an officer with this message : 
 
 " Your order to retire is held in abeyance that you may know 
 of the true condition of the fort: the garrison has offered no 
 resistance; the flagstaff of the fort was cut by a naval shot and 
 one of my officers brought from the parapet the garrison flag; 
 another officer cut the telegraph wire connecting the fort with 
 Wilmington; my skirmishers are now at the parapet." 
 
 I marched all the troops which had come forward to 
 Battery Holland, and sent the 117th N. Y. to advance 
 along the river and establish pickets north of Craig's 
 Landing and extend them from the river to the beach. 
 In this movement a Confederate major surrendered a 
 battalion of Junior Reserves of North Carolina to an officer 
 and two men. About thirty escaped, but 227 were brought 
 in and carried north on the return of the expedition. A 
 second order was brought me to retire, which I answered 
 as before, adding my later operations. I did this under 
 the impression that my former report had not been received, 
 which I learned later was the case. 
 
 Soon after sending my second report, Colonels Corn- 
 stock and Jackson came to Battery Holland, closely followed 
 by General Ames. To these officers I fully explained 
 the condition of the garrison and my captures, and informed 
 them that the Navy was able to keep the garrison in the 
 bomb-proofs, and that after an hour's cannonading the 
 fort could be successfully assaulted, and urged them to 
 communicate this information to General Butler. But 
 they did not regard the proposed attack as feasible, and 
 moreover did not wish to assume any responsibility for 
 my disobedience of orders. They left, and soon after I 
 received the third order to retire, with the information that 
 all the troops had re-embarked except those at the front. 
 I then drew in my pickets and marched up the beach to 
 the point of landing with my prisoners and sent the cap- 
 tured officers to General Butler's ship, after which the 
 
32 THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 
 
 surf prevented the further re-embarkation of troops. With 
 between 6co and 700 men of my brigade and 220 prisoners 
 we remained on the beach without fresh water, provisions, 
 or blankets in a sleet storm until Tuesday afternoon, the 
 27th. We were finally taken off through a heavy surf by 
 a life-boat, which passed between a transport and the 
 beach by means of a rope extending from the transport 
 to a stake on shore. When the last load had entered the 
 boat I cut the line near the stake and taking hold of the 
 end was dragged through the breakers and aboard the 
 transport; then all vessels carrying troops turned their 
 prows to the north and steamed for Hampton Roads. 
 While at breakfast in the restaurant at Fort Monroe, 
 on the morning of the 29th, Colonel Babcock brought me 
 word that General Grant desired to see me on his boat then 
 at the wharf. 
 
 In reply to the General's questions I related all that 
 had been done on the expedition and what I had seen. 
 Our interview was interrupted by the arrival of an officer 
 from General Sherman, and I was informed that I would 
 be questioned later. The same day I received a telegram 
 from General Weitzel ordering me to City Point, and there 
 I related to him all I had learned about Fort Fisher, and 
 repeated my opinion that it might have been captured 
 had an attempt been made. My statement and those of 
 three officers and three men of my brigade who had been 
 on or at the base of the parapet of the fort were taken down 
 by a staff -officer and sent to Colonel Comstock of General 
 Grant's staff, and were forwarded by him to the Secretary 
 of War to be filed with General Butler's report. 
 
 When General Butler gave the order for the troops to 
 re-embark he had received no report from the troops at 
 the front, and fully three- fourths of his command were 
 then on the beach. It required more time to re-embark 
 the troops on the beach than it would have required to 
 have landed those still on the transports with a full supply 
 of provisions and ammunition. 
 
 The Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the 
 
THE CAPTURE OP FORT FISHER 33 
 
 War made an exhaustive investigation of subjects not 
 covered by General Butler's orders and approved his con- 
 duct in regard to speculative matters not mentioned in 
 his orders. The findings of the committee did not show- 
 that the failure of the expedition was wholly due to the 
 fact that General Grant's specific instructions had been 
 disregarded. 
 
 THE SECOND EXPEDITION TO FORT FISHER AND ITS CAPTURE. 
 
 The second expedition was composed of the troops 
 which had returned from the first expedition not dis- 
 abled, and Colonel J. C. Abbott's brigade of the ist Division 
 of the Twenty-fourth Corps. Before the landing of troops 
 General Henry L. Abbot joined the force with Companies 
 A, B, G, and L of the ist Connecticut Artillery, Myrick's 
 Battery E, 3d U. S. Artillery, Capt. R. H. Lee's 16th 
 New York Light Battery, Major F. W. Prince's battalion, 
 1 6th New York Heavy Artillery, and Companies A 
 and I of the 15th New York Engineers. General Ames 
 joined the expedition at the same time from a hos- 
 pital boat which left Hampton Roads one day after the 
 expedition sailed. On coming on board the Atlantic 
 he addressed me with bitter and insulting words, alleging 
 that I had been guilty of a " shabby trick " in sailing from 
 Hampton Roads without him. He apparently failed 
 to consider that he had not been on the ship during the 
 ten hours when my troops and all his staff had been on 
 board, that his staff were informed of the sailing orders 
 as soon as they came into my hands, fully seven hours 
 before the ship moved out of the Roads, and that his entire 
 staff believed, at the hour of going to breakfast as the 
 ship was passing the Capes, that he was on board. His 
 words were resented and their withdrawal demanded, 
 which was done within the next hour, but his subsequent 
 conduct compelled me from that time to refuse all inter- 
 course with him not required by the strictest official duties. 
 
 On Friday morning, January 13th, the transports moved 
 up to the place w T here our previous landing had been effected, 
 
34 THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 
 
 4 
 
 and under cover of the naval vessels the troops began to dis- 
 embark; although in a heavy surf all were landed, together 
 with extra rations, ammunition, and intrenching tools, 
 at 3 o'clock. The troops were at once put to work con- 
 structing a line of breastworks from the beach to the Cape 
 Fear River, which was completed before daylight on the 
 morning of the 14th. General Ames's division was then 
 " withdrawn from the works and General Paine was directed 
 to hold the line with his division and Abbott's brigade. 
 
 Then for the third time since General Ames had rejoined 
 his command after his unexplained absence he requested 
 General Terry to promise him that he would not detail any 
 officer or organization of his division by name to perform 
 any special duty. When this request was denied he set 
 forth his grievances, stating that " General Curtis had ig- 
 nored him in consulting Generals Grant and Weitzel, had 
 not communicated to him the orders for sailing, and so 
 thoroughly did he distrust General Curtis and his brigade 
 that he would not be held responsible for anything they 
 might be directed to do." General Terry replied "that 
 he would direct General Curtis to report to him and there- 
 after he would receive from him all instructions until 
 the work in hand was disposed of." These facts were 
 given to me by General Terry in Richmond, Virginia, when 
 I was serving as his chief of staff in the Department of 
 Virginia. 
 
 In notifying me that I should report to him until further 
 orders, General Terry directed me to accompany him and 
 Colonel Comstock with my brigade down the peninsula 
 that he might examine the enemy's fortifications. While 
 we were marching down, the Confederate gunboat Chicka- 
 mauga, lying in the Cape Fear River, fired on us and one 
 shell seriously wounded Capt. James H. Reeves and three 
 men of his regiment, the 3d New York. 
 
 After General Terry had completed his examination 
 of the fort and its approaches he asked: "Do you still 
 believe the fort can be carried by an assault with such force 
 as I can spare from the line established last night, the 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 35 
 
 holding of which is of the first importance?" I replied 
 that I believed the three brigades already withdrawn from 
 the line could capture the fort by an assault if the dispo- 
 sitions were properly made, and if the Navy should support 
 the troops from start to finish. He said: "It has already 
 been decided that in case an assault is ordered you will 
 make it. I will see Admiral Porter this evening and we 
 will determine what course to pursue." 
 
 General Terry and Colonel Comstock then left for the 
 reserve, having directed me to report any incidents I 
 might think it important for him to know. 
 
 The ground in front of the west third of the parapet 
 was swampy, in parts of it water was tw T o or more feet 
 deep, and opposite the gate, at the west end, was a bridge 
 from which the enemy had removed the floor, leaving only 
 the stringers. At the eastern third the ground was much 
 higher and served as a natural glacis so that an assaulting 
 force would be kept under fire from its start until it reached 
 the parapet, but an attacking force approaching the left 
 end of the parapet would pass under the plane of fire at 
 some distance from the parapet. As soon as it was dark 
 I deployed two lines of skirmishers, one with guns and the 
 other with shovels, at a distance of five paces. The line 
 with muskets advanced twenty paces before the line with 
 shovels and stood on guard, while the men with shovels 
 threw up breastworks high enough to protect a man lying 
 on his face ; then the rear line advanced, exchanging shovels 
 for muskets as it passed the front line, which threw up 
 breastworks in turn while the former shovellers stood guard 
 in their front. In this manner the troops advanced close 
 to the wet ground, having constructed four parallel lines 
 of breastworks, which were later strengthened by fatigue 
 parties. In advance of the last line of the newly constructed 
 breastworks and to the left, where the ground was higher 
 and dry, a much higher and heavier breastwork was built, 
 in which forty men selected on account of their skill as 
 marksmen were stationed. They were to remain in this 
 position until the next night or until an assault should 
 
36 THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 
 
 be made. In the event of an assault they were to join in 
 it, and before the advance ^should be made they were to 
 prevent the loading of the eight- and ten-inch Columbiads 
 which pointed toward our line of approach. This work 
 was completed before dawn and my men, except a small 
 guard, slept upon their arms. 
 
 Before noon of the 15th, General Terry with Colonel 
 Comstock came to Battery Holland and informed me that 
 it had been agreed between Admiral Porter and himself 
 that an assault upon the fort should be made at 3 o'clock; 
 that 1600 sailors and 400 marines should attack the east 
 end of the parapet and that my brigade should attack 
 the left and be followed by the brigades of Pennypacker 
 and Bell. He approved the work I had performed during 
 the night, and sent sixty men of the 13th Indiana to join the 
 forty from my brigade left in advance, placing them under 
 the command of Lieut. S. M. Zent. Up to the advance 
 of the attacking party these men performed important 
 service and they joined in with the first line going to the 
 parapet. 
 
 General Terry said to me: "You stated yesterday that 
 you thought an assault would be successful 'if the dispo- 
 sitions were properly made.' Your brigade is to lead, 
 and I would like to know your views as to the formation." 
 I replied that I wished to advance in line, brigade front, 
 to make advances from one rifle-pit to the next, all lying 
 down at each, every movement to be governed by the 
 action of the enemy in coming to the parapet, and the final 
 rush to be made when the enemy showed an intention to 
 remain on the parapet. As I advanced, the enemy's 
 infantry would doubtless mount the parapet. We would 
 then lie down while the Navy drove them back; then we 
 would advance to the next rifle-pit and so repeat until the 
 enemy's infantry refused to leave the parapet, when we 
 would make the final rush and get under the plane of fire 
 before a second volley could be fired upon us. General 
 Terry said: "Do you not wish to strike them in column 
 with a hammer-head ? " I replied :" A single line can advance 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 37 
 
 with little loss, but a column would be severely punished 
 from the start; my right regiment will go straight to the 
 left salient, and the three other regiments will oblique to 
 the right and at the parapet will be in column for about 
 one-third of the advancing line." The subject was dis- 
 cussed with Colonel Comstock, who approved my plan, 
 which General Terry then accepted and ordered its exe- 
 cution. I then said to General Terry: "The final rush 
 will be made when you see me rise in the middle of my line 
 and hear me call aloud; soon after the brigade will pass 
 through the stockade up the parapet, and when I raise 
 my hat send Pennypacker's brigade." He replied: "With 
 your brigade on the parapet I shall feel certain of success; 
 a lodgment there assures victory." About noon Penny- 
 packer's and Bell's brigades, under command of General 
 Ames, came to the front and halted in rear of my command. 
 A short time before advancing to the place from which 
 the real movement was to be made, a naval officer, Lieu- 
 tenant Porter I believe, came to me and said: "General 
 Terry informs me that you lead in the assault, and I desire 
 to learn your plans that the sailors and marines on the 
 beach may move at the same time you do." I explained 
 the plan already stated, and concluded with expressing 
 my regret that the Navy forces were not differently formed ; 
 they were then closely massed. He replied: "I am sorry 
 Army officers find fault with the Navy. We are trying 
 to help them on their own ground and they ought to be 
 satisfied." I stated: 
 
 " We want your help very much, both your guns on the ships 
 and your men on shore; but your formation is bad, your front 
 is too narrow for the depth of your column, and going into 
 action as your men are now formed you will get fearfully pun- 
 ished and no good will be rendered except that much of the 
 fire directed to your forces will be saved from my line. I con- 
 demn your formation as a landsman; I would not criticise 
 nautical matters." 
 
 Two thousand men from the Navy, from sixty ships, 
 unacquainted with one another or with the service they 
 
38 THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 
 
 were to undertake, were brought together on the beach 
 to perform a most hazardous work. The number of officers 
 was small — entirely too few for the number of men engaged. 
 As before stated, the force was too compact. Their first 
 line should have been longer and thinner, and their main 
 body kept out of the fire until the first line had reached 
 the fort. Such a plan requires good men — veterans; it is, 
 however, the way to assault fortifications with the least 
 loss of life, almost the only plan by which to achieve success. 
 
 Before advancing to the first line every officer and man 
 had been instructed as to his movements and the order 
 in which they would take place, and that the point of 
 attack would be between the first and the second traverses. 
 
 Just before the preliminary movements were begun 
 Capt. A. G. Lawrence, of General Ames's staff, came to me 
 and asked if he could go with my brigade. I replied that 
 he could if he would not interfere with its movements, 
 and sent him to Lieut. -Col. F. X. Meyer, commanding 
 the 117th New York, at the right of the line. Captain 
 Lawrence understood that I was not under the command of 
 his chief, and that he could not accompany my brigade 
 without my permission. He did not go as the represen- 
 tative of another, nor did he make the slightest attempt 
 to direct the movements of the men. He fell at the 
 stockade, seriously wounded, the victim of a valor which 
 he conspicuously exhibited in every battle in which he 
 participated. 
 
 The preliminary advances were made in a succession 
 of thin lines, number one of the first line going forward 
 to a rifle-pit, followed by number two; the rear rank 
 advancing in the same manner. By this method only 
 one-fourth of the line was exposed to the enemy's fire. 
 
 Three short advances were made. During each the 
 garrison came to the parapet; when the line halted the 
 garrison returned to the bomb-proofs, each time remaining 
 longer on the parapet and suffering greater damage from 
 the naval fire. When the enemy seemeti determined to 
 remain on the parapet the final rush was made. I arose 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 39 
 
 from the middle of the line and called out "Forward," 
 advancing as I arose from the ground. Each officer and 
 man had been instructed to run as he got up, and to go 
 forward in silence. Cheering was positively forbidden, 
 the object being to keep the men from expending their 
 breath needlessly, and it was all-important to save it for 
 the final rush up the parapet. We were fifteen paces to 
 the front before we reached the usual height of a running 
 man. which is about one-third less than his height when 
 standing. The result of this movement was to cause the 
 first volley to pass over our heads with but little damage. 
 Had the order been given, "Attention; first battalion, 
 guide right; second, third, and fourth battalions, oblique 
 to the right," many in the line would have been shot down 
 before a start was made. 
 
 The naval fire had made many openings in the stockade, 
 but not enough to allow speedy passage through it. One 
 hundred axes which had been distributed in the brigade 
 were vigorously used, under a galling fire, in making open- 
 ings for the men. The first forty or fifty through the 
 stockade climbed up the parapet and met the enemy 
 between the first and the second traverses. In this space 
 were two Columbiads, one disabled, the enemy loading 
 the other. The charge had been sent home, but the ramrod 
 not withdrawn, when we overpowered the gunners. The 
 man at the breech put out his hand with a primer to dis- 
 charge the piece, after his surrender had been demanded. 
 A sharp blow from my sabre on his outstretched hand 
 quickly dissuaded him, and the charge remained until 
 the captors had leisure to withdraw it. 
 
 The first battle-flag to come up was a marker of the 
 1 1 7th New York, which was promptly placed on the second 
 traverse. Its right to remain there was tested in a hand- 
 to-hand contest with swords and bayonets, in which the 
 Yankees won. 
 
 We then went down to the floor of the fort and secured 
 the men serving a Napoleon gun at the gate and a number 
 of infantry posted at the stockade west of the gate. These 
 
40 THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 
 
 men were sent to the rear without escort. Their capture 
 removed the chief obstacle to an approach by the road. 
 At this time the Second Brigade began to enter the fort, 
 some through the gate and others over the parapet. Upon 
 returning to the parapet I found that a large number of 
 my brigade had succeeded in getting through the stockade, 
 and were advancing to the place first captured, where they 
 were being rapidly joined by men of the Second Brigade. 
 
 At the time we made the grand rush for the left of the 
 parapet, the naval column moved in mass upon the sea 
 bastion. The enemy believing this to be the main attack 
 turned upon them all the guns which could sweep the 
 beach, and massed more than half of his infantry behind 
 the right of the parapet to repel the attack. Colonel 
 Lamb conducted this defence of the sea bastion in person. 
 The enemy's fire upon the naval column was terribly 
 effective, spreading death and disorder. Except a few 
 who reached the stockade those not disabled soon retired. 
 
 General Whiting occupied a position on the parapet 
 midway between the sea bastion and the sally-port. The 
 repulse of the naval column caused the troops under Colonel 
 Lamb and General Whiting to cheer vigorously, the cheers 
 being heard above the roar of the cannon ; but their exulta- 
 tion was short, for upon looking to the west they saw 
 two United States flags on the left of the parapet — their 
 comrades unable to remove them. General Whiting hurried 
 with the troops near him to the left of the line, and joined 
 in the contest which we were making for the third traverse. 
 In this hand-to-hand conflict he received a mortal wound 
 and was carried to a bomb-proof. Colonel Pennypacker, 
 commanding the Second Brigade, was severely wounded 
 while placing the colors of his regiment on this traverse, 
 and Colonel Moore, 203d Pennsylvania, was killed while 
 advancing with the colors of his regiment to the same 
 position. Lieutenant-Colonel Barney and Major Jones, 
 i42d New York, were wounded here, but soon after re-entered 
 the contest. Here Captain Thomas, 117th New York, 
 was killed. Lieutenant-Colonel Meyer and Major Bagg, 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 4 1 
 
 117th New York, both wounded, and many officers of the 
 Second Brigade, whose names I cannot give, came to 
 the front and joined in the contest until our possession of 
 the traverse was undisputed. Our killed and wounded on 
 the parapet impeded our advance to the fourth traverse so 
 that we were scarcely able to go forward without treading 
 upon them. Colonel Lamb then came up with troops 
 to meet us at the fourth traverse, bringing into action 
 a larger number than we had met at the third. Our numbers 
 were also increased by those who joined us as they came 
 upon the parapet. The struggle for the fourth traverse 
 was the hottest and most prolonged single contest of the 
 day. The loss of life was great on both sides. The killed 
 and wounded were set aside to make room for their com- 
 rades who came impetuously forward to support the respec- 
 tive sides. In this contest Colonel Lamb was seriously 
 wounded and was taken to the same bomb-proof occupied 
 by General Whiting. Our success in this fearful struggle 
 turned the tide, the enemy's defence became less spirited 
 and effective, and each succeeding traverse was taken with 
 less difficulty. 
 
 The naval fire throughout the day had been delivered 
 with singular accuracy, at the rate of two or three shells 
 per second, in front of the assaulting forces; but at the fifth 
 traverse a shot went wide of its mark and killed or disabled 
 all but four men in our front line. Fearing that a slackening 
 of our fire would invite a countercharge, I myself discharged 
 the guns of the killed and disabled men until reinforcements 
 were brought forward. A sudden emergency compelled 
 this action. It was not done to encourage the soldiers — no 
 such efforts were needed to quicken their zeal. Men unable 
 to stand and fire their pieces handed up the guns of their 
 dead and helpless comrades, and when given back reloaded 
 them again and again, exhibiting a frenzied zeal and 
 unselfish devotion that seemingly nothing but death 
 could chill. Within twenty minutes I found wounded men 
 dead who had thus handed me their guns. 
 
 While we were capturing these traverses, others on the 
 
42 THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 
 
 floor of the fort fought the enemy in bomb-proofs and 
 behind obstructions near the parapet, keeping pace with 
 us. Lieutenant-Colonel Lyman, 203d Pennsylvania, was 
 killed while actively urging this line forward. Several 
 company officers were in this detachment, and vigorously 
 conducted these operations after his death, among them 
 Captain William H. Walling, 1426. New York Volunteers, 
 who on the first expedition had captured the garrison 
 flag of the fort. Captain R. D. Morehouse, 1426. New 
 York Volunteers, in charge of a party captured a large 
 number of Confederates in the sally-port, from which they 
 had energetically opposed the advance of our forces on 
 the floor of the fort ; but our progress on the parapet rendered 
 their position untenable, and by a skilful movement he 
 captured them before they could retire to other defences. 
 His skill and bravery were as conspicuous then as his 
 modest dignity is noticeable among his companions of 
 the Loyal Legion. This capture was considered by the 
 Confederates a dishonorable surrender. They did not know 
 then that their men had been compelled to surrender only 
 when retreat was impossible. 
 
 Progress was more easily and steadily made until we 
 gained possession of the seventh traverse at 4.45 p. m., 
 where it was found that our best marksmen could drive 
 the gunners from the Columbiad on the sea bastion, with 
 which the enemy had enfiladed the ditch and given the 
 assailants more trouble than with any other piece in the 
 fort. When it was discovered that this gun could be 
 silenced, the project of marching up the ditch and capturing 
 the sea bastion was decided upon, and men at the west 
 end of the fort were summoned to undertake it. I sent 
 Corporal Jones, of the color-guard of the 117th New York, 
 to the west end of the fort to bring these men forward. 
 He came back, and stated that General Ames had directed 
 him to return and say that men could not be sent, but 
 spades to fortify would be furnished. My orderly A. D. 
 Knight was next sent to obtain men, and directed to state 
 the object of the movement to be made. He soon returned 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 43 
 
 and stated that General Ames had ordered him to say 
 that the men were exhausted and no further advance would 
 be attempted until reinforcements arrived in the morning ; 
 that we should hold the ground occupied, if possible, and 
 that intrenching tools would be sent to us. I directed 
 Orderly Knight to go back and request officers under my 
 rank to collect men and bring them forward, so that the 
 attack could be made before dark ; to say that the resistance 
 of the enemy was less than at the beginning of the battle, 
 and that the capture of the bastion would compel an early 
 surrender. Knight soon returned with an armful of spades 
 which General Ames had ordered him to carry to me that 
 I might fortify and hold our position until fresh troops came 
 into the fort. I threw the spades over the traverse to the 
 Confederates. Being convinced that General Ames intended 
 to suspend operations until reinforcements came in, I 
 directed Silas W. Kempton, Mate U. S. Navy, who had 
 reported to me early in the engagement and volunteered 
 to serve in whatever capacity he might be useful, to go 
 for the second time to General Terry, now to urge him to 
 have the troops then engaged in throwing up fortifications 
 in rear of the left end of the parapet to join in a general 
 advance, and take possession of the fort before reinforce- 
 ments could be sent in by the enemy. I instructed Kemp- 
 ton to state that the enemy were offering slight resistance, 
 and that a bold push would secure a victory already substan- 
 tially won. This young sailor had previously been sent to 
 General Terry, after we had won possession of the fourth 
 traverse, to ask him to have the naval fire in front of our 
 advancing lines increased, if possible, and to have the 
 fuses cut shorter, so as to cause the explosion of the shells 
 nearer the parapet. Many had passed beyond the fort 
 and were lost by exploding in the marsh and river. The 
 zeal and intelligence of Mr. Kempton commanded my 
 warmest admiration. 
 
 I then directed Capt. David B. Magill, 117th New 
 York, to take the next traverse with the first men who 
 should come up, and went to the west end of the parapet 
 
44 THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 
 
 and. to the floor of the fort in rear of it, to obtain men to 
 march up the ditch to the sea bastion. While collecting 
 them on the floor of the fort in rear of the first and second 
 traverses, General Ames addressed me, for the first time 
 since the movement on the fort had begun, and said: ''I 
 have two or three times sent you word to fortify your 
 position and hold it until reinforcements can be sent to 
 aid us; the men are exhausted, and I will not order them 
 to go forward." I directed his attention to two steamboats 
 in the Cape Fear River loaded with Confederate troops 
 waiting for darkness to enable them to land, which they 
 could not do while it was light because of the naval fire, 
 and said: "Should they succeed in landing they may be 
 able to drive us out; therefore, the fort should be captured 
 before fresh troops come to the enemy." I informed him 
 that the garrison was resisting with less spirit than earlier 
 in the day, and asserted that complete victory was within 
 our grasp if we aroused ourselves and pushed the advantage 
 we surely had, and that I intended to conduct the move- 
 ment up the ditch to the sea bastion if I could get but fifty 
 men. Several said, ''We will go." At this time the sun 
 was just disappearing, at 5.15 p.m., — as stated by the Navy 
 Department, two hours and five minutes after the opening 
 of the battle. 
 
 While the volunteers were assembling I went farther 
 into the fort, and had ascended a magazine or sand dune 
 for the purpose of looking into the angle of the bastion I 
 intended to attack, when I was struck and disabled by two 
 fragments of a shell, one destroying the left eye and the 
 other carrying away a portion of the frontal bone. I was 
 unconscious for several hours. 
 
 From official and other trustworthy sources it is learned 
 that after sundown no efforts were made to advance our 
 lines, except the capture of an additional traverse by the 
 troops left under command of Captain Magill when I 
 started out to collect men to go up the ditch. About 8 
 o'clock a regiment of colored troops from General Paine's 
 line was sent to General Ames to assist in taking possession 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 45 
 
 of the fort. He directed them to stack arms outside the 
 fort and join the men in the rear of the left end of the 
 parapet in throwing up breastworks to protect the assail- 
 ants from a countercharge by the garrison. Late in the 
 afternoon the sailors and marines had been withdrawn from 
 the beach and sent to relieve Abbott's brigade which was 
 brought down to the fort. The 3d New Hampshire was 
 placed on the right of Abbott's brigade, and when Major 
 Trickey in command of it was directed by General Abbott 
 to take the traverse on that part of the parapet where the 
 greatest resistance was expected to be made, the Major 
 called his attention to the fact that he had less than eighty 
 men in his command, and that a greater number might be 
 needed to carry the traverses. General Abbott informed 
 him he would be supported and that his regiment was 
 specially named by General Terry for that duty. The fact 
 that the regiment was armed with repeating rifles may 
 have influenced General Terry in making the selection. 
 The order for the placing of the 3d New Hampshire as 
 stated by General Abbott shows that General Terry kept 
 in close touch with the several brigades, and gave personal 
 attention to their movements throughout the battle. When 
 Abbott's brigade reached the unoccupied portion of the 
 parapet the enemy received it with a volley, but not heavy 
 enough to check its progress. It marched over the parapet, 
 across the floor of the fort, parallel to the sea-face, and 
 southward to Battery Buchanan, where the garrison of 
 Fort Fisher was found unarmed and demoralized. These 
 operations of Abbott's brigade were successfully carried 
 out with the loss of four men killed and twenty-three 
 wounded. At dark General Whiting and Colonel Lamb 
 were carried to Battery Buchanan, the former mortally 
 and the latter seriously wounded. It was proposed to send 
 them across the river in small boats, as many had been, 
 but they determined to remain and share the fate of the 
 garrison. 
 
 The troops entered the fort without hesitation and vied 
 one with another, officers and men alike, for possession of 
 
46 THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 
 
 the work. The loss in the early part of the engagement of 
 Colonel Bell, commanding Third Brigade, and Colonel 
 Smith, 1 1 2th New York, both mortally wounded before 
 reaching the work, and of Colonel Moore, killed soon after 
 mounting the parapet, was sorely felt throughout the day. 
 They were soldiers of marked ability, veterans who had 
 won distinction in every campaign in which the army 
 to which they belonged had been engaged. Colonel Penny- 
 packer, commanding Second Brigade, was seriously wounded 
 early in the engagement. This distinguished officer had put 
 his brigade into position and given it an impulse which con- 
 tinued throughout the day. The loss of no officer could 
 have been greater. At the end of the first hour several 
 officers and men were disabled or bearing wounds that 
 would have justified their retirement from an ordinary 
 engagement, and a suspension of hostilities would have 
 followed had not the troops been of the highest grade. 
 Nine-tenths of them were veterans who had served in the 
 campaigns in Virginia and the Carolinas, and had fought in 
 every battle from Drury's Farm and Cold Harbor to the 
 last battle in the campaign before Petersburg and Rich- 
 mond. There was not an officer or man in the four brigades 
 who did not merit the highest commendation for unyielding 
 persistency, courage, and devotion. While the First and 
 the Second Brigades were the first to enter the fort and 
 contended together without distinction for possession of the 
 parapet, it is not my intention to claim that either brigade 
 was superior. Circumstances to a large degree, no doubt, 
 influenced the selection as to the order in which the troops 
 attacked the fort. My brigade had been near it on the first 
 expedition, had taken its flag and a battalion of prisoners, 
 and all its members believed that it could have been 
 captured then. The knowledge of this fact undoubtedly 
 had much weight in influencing the commanding general to 
 select that brigade to lead the assaulting forces. Each 
 brigade took the position assigned to it, and performed its 
 duties in a most courageous and efficient manner. 
 
 The crisis was passed soon after four o'clock, and 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 47 
 
 success was assured when the First and Second Brigades 
 had mounted the parapet and demonstrated their ability 
 not only to hold their ground but to make steady progress 
 from traverse to traverse. It was a soldiers' fight, and 
 had Ames and Curtis both been killed or disabled at the 
 time Pennypacker was wounded, the battle would have 
 proceeded successfully under the command of field and 
 company officers. When the battle was well begun, skill 
 and generalship consisted in physical blows, and to every 
 one who struck them honor is due. 
 
 Admiral Porter wanted success no less than General 
 Terry, and was ready to take any steps in the line of his 
 profession to win it. He knew, as all did, that a naval 
 column would divert the garrison, and asked the Navy to 
 furnish men to form it. In pursuit of victory desperate 
 chances were often taken. Never did men undertake a 
 more difficult or hazardous task, and never did men offer 
 themselves in their country's service with more zeal, courage, 
 or unselfish devotion than did the officers and men of the 
 Navy and the Marines on the beach at Fort Fisher. Their 
 action contributed to the progress of the Army — whether 
 the gain justified the losses we shall never know. The 
 naval column was important as a diversion, but its value 
 was slight in comparison with the fire of the six hundred 
 guns of the ships trained on the fort. The fleet maintained 
 an uninterrupted fire for two days, exceeding in effective- 
 ness any bombardment recorded in the annals of war. To 
 Admiral Porter's fleet the army was indebted for its un- 
 contested landing, its uninterrupted approach to within 
 charging distance of the fort, and the well directed fire in 
 front of the assaulting forces without which success would 
 have been impossible. 
 
 It will not be out of place to refer to the enemy and 
 their defence of the fort. The constant fire of the Navy 
 for two days deprived the garrison of opportunity to rest or 
 prepare food. They suffered but little from this bombard- 
 ment until brought out of their bomb-proofs to contest 
 the advance of the assaulting forces ; then they came under 
 
48 THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 
 
 the hottest fire men ever encountered. Colonel Lamb 
 skillfully conducted, the defence, aided by General Whiting, 
 who had volunteered his services on entering the fort. 
 They protected their men until the decisive moment and then 
 led them with conspicuous gallantry. 
 
 The left of the parapet was in charge of a junior officer 
 whose mistake, that of a moment only, was in failing to 
 mount the parapet and contest our advance from the ditch. 
 The men serving the piece of artillery covering the road 
 west of the parapet were so intent in performing their 
 duty that they were unconscious of our approach until 
 ordered to surrender by men of the 117th New York, who 
 went down from the paarpet after capturing the second 
 traverse. 
 
 General Bragg, in his report of the capture of the fort, 
 says of our assaulting line: "His army column, preceded by 
 a single regiment, approached along the river and entered 
 the work on that flank almost unopposed." This does a 
 great injustice to the men guarding the left, who made it 
 fatal to approach by the road; and not until their capture, 
 in active defence of the work, was the road made a safer 
 line of approach than over the parapet. The Confederate 
 garrison of Fort Fisher might well resent this aspersion of 
 their most stubborn defence and justly complain of the 
 indifference of General Bragg, who had six thousand men 
 within striking distance of our defensive line — more than 
 twice the number of men holding that line, — in not vigor- 
 ously attacking it. General Bragg reported to General 
 Lee that "at 4 p.m., when the enemy's infantry advanced 
 to the assault, our troops were making a heavy demonstra- 
 tion against the enemy's rear." Although General Bragg 
 expended a large amount of ammunition in making this 
 so-called "heavy demonstration," General Paine's line was 
 maintained without the loss or injury of a single Union 
 soldier. 
 
 I have said that the enemy plainly showed signs of 
 weakening before 5 p.m., and that full possession of the 
 fort only awaited the advance of the Federal troops. This 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 49 
 
 statement is supported by the report of General Whiting, 
 who says: 
 
 "The fall both of the general and the colonel command- 
 ing the fort, one about 4 and the other about 4.30 p.m., 
 had a perceptible effect upon the men, and no doubt hastened 
 greatly the result, but we were overpowered, and no skill 
 or gallantry could have saved the place, after he effected a 
 lodgment, except attack in the rear." 
 
 "The Abstract from Return of the Expeditionary 
 Forces, Bvet. Maj.-Gen. Alfred H. Terry, U. S. Army, 
 Commanding, for January 10, 1865," states the aggregate 
 of the four brigades engaged in reducing the fort, five days 
 before the assault, to have been two hundred and fifty- 
 seven officers and five thousand one hundred and seventy- 
 two men. Of this number probably thirty-seven hundred 
 took part in the assault, and at 9 o'clock p.m. thirteen 
 hundred men under Abbott and three hundred colored 
 troops entered the fort substantially unopposed, to secure 
 a victory actually won four hours before. There are no 
 records in the War Department giving the number of 
 officers and men in the brigades commanded respectively 
 by Curtis, Penny packer, and Bell, or the number of men 
 taken into action. It is estimated that the First (Curtis's) 
 Brigade numbered nine hundred officers and men; the 
 Second (Pennypacker's), seventeen hundred officers and 
 men; the Third (Bell's), eleven hundred officers and men; 
 Abbott's brigade, thirteen hundred officers and men. 
 
 The return of the casualties indicates the actual resistance 
 met by the several brigades, which I give in the order they 
 respectively entered the fort. Curtis's brigade, two officers 
 and thirty -seven men killed; eighteen officers and one 
 hundred and sixty-six men wounded; five missing: 25.33 
 per cent. Pennypacker's brigade, six officers and forty- 
 five men killed; six officers and two hundred and eleven 
 men wounded; two missing: 16.47 per cent. Bell's brigade, 
 two officers and fourteen men killed ; six officers and ninety- 
 one men wounded; two missing: 10.04 per cent. Abbott's 
 brigade, four men killed; two officers and twenty-one men 
 
50 THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 
 
 wounded; four missing: 2.33 per cent. The missing in- 
 cludes those injured beyond recognition and those buried 
 in the sand by the explosion of a magazine after the capture. 
 
 In bestowing honors for the victory at Fort Fisher we 
 should prominently mention the Secretary of the Navy, and 
 the officers and men of the North Atlantic blockading 
 squadron, who for three years had continually urged the 
 sending of an army force to join the navy in an expedition 
 to reduce the defences at the mouth of the Cape Fear River. 
 Nor should we neglect prominently to associate General 
 Grant with its capture. He organized the military force, 
 and in spite of the first failure adhered to his purpose with 
 unyielding persistency until the end was accomplished- 
 The skill and labors of Admiral Porter and General Terry 
 were fully acknowledged by the Administration and Con- 
 gress, which all serving under them heartily approve. 
 
 Whatever may be the opinion of military men, as to the 
 wisdom of employing troops in throwing up breastworks 
 inside the fort, using a greater number of men than were 
 engaged with the enemy in close action on the parapet and 
 the floor of the fort near the parapet — instead of sending 
 them across the floor of the fort to the sea-face, which move- 
 ment would have ended the contest in half an hour, certain 
 it is all will acknowledge that General Ames, under whose 
 directions these engineering operations were carried on, bore 
 himself with coolness and courage. 
 
 The services of the gentleman who went on both ex- 
 peditions in an advisory capacity, although on the first 
 the most important action — the withdrawal of the troops 
 from the beach — was determined upon without his opinion 
 being asked, were briefly stated by General Terry: 
 
 "To Bvt. Brig.-Gen. C. B. Comstock, Aide-de-Camp 
 on the staff of the Lieutenant General, I am under the 
 deepest obligations. At every step of our progress I 
 received from him the most valuable assistance. For the 
 final success of our part of the operations the country is 
 more indebted to him than to me." 
 
 It would be unjust, as it would be ungenerous, to with- 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 5 1 
 
 hold from the field and company officers the warmest 
 praise for their watchfulness in detecting every advantage 
 afforded by the enemy and for their irresistible impetuosity 
 and valor, which overcame obstacles as great as human 
 skill and stubborn devotion could create, or to fail grate- 
 fully to acknowledge the services of the men in the ranks. 
 Their steadiness, fortitude, and bravery were surpassed by 
 no one exercising command over them. Certainly our 
 great commander did not neglect to commend every member 
 of the military force composing the expedition, irrespective 
 of rank or grade, in one of the most extraordinary docu- 
 ments ever filed with the archives of the War Department, 
 wherein he recommended their commander for a high po- 
 sition in the regular army, based solely on their services, 
 and independent of the promotions given to Terry, Ames, 
 Pennypacker, and Curtis in acknowledgment of their personal 
 services. 
 
 City Point, Va., January 17, 1865. 
 Hon. E. M. Stanton, 
 
 Secretary of War. 
 As a substantial recognition of the bravery of both officers 
 and men in the capture of Fort Fisher, and the important service 
 thereby rendered to their country, I do most respectfully 
 recommend Bvt. Maj. Alfred H. Terry, U. S. Volunteers, their 
 commanding officer, for appointment as Brigadier General in 
 the Regular Army. 
 
 U. S. Grant, 
 
 Lieutenant- General . 
 
A BOY AT SHILOH. 
 
 Read by Captain Charles Morton, U. S. Army, 
 October 6, 1897. 
 
 THE battle of Shiloh was not only the first great battle 
 in the late great war but one of the greatest in our 
 history, and it stands second to none in modern 
 history for its fierceness and persistent determination. It 
 was fought without generals and, it may be said, almost 
 without soldiers. It was armed Americans against Amer- 
 icans, terribly in earnest and full of fight, enfuriated by a 
 hatred that had grown out of fifty years of bitter political 
 strife that was to be settled by a physical contest with arms. 
 Both sides believed that upon the turn of this battle, in 
 great measure, hung the general final result. And who, 
 to-day, can doubt that there would have been a more 
 speedy termination of the war, on much different terms, had 
 our army met on this occasion total defeat, or had its victory 
 been promptly and vigorously followed up? Though the 
 passion and hatred that then obtained, gradually, and 
 before the end of the war almost entirely disappeared, the 
 battle has been fought over and over again since, in not 
 always entirely dispassionate and harmless ink. Indeed, 
 it has been written up from so many different standpoints, 
 that it seems there is nothing left untold; and in such 
 masterly ways, that any account by me would prove weak 
 and insipid. Yet there are a few facts relating to the battle, 
 that came under my personal observation or to my know- 
 ledge at the time, that have been barely touched upon, or 
 not at all, in any of the numerous descriptions I have read. 
 They seem to me all-important facts for truthful history and 
 a better understanding of the battle. 
 
 The proper limits of a paper to be read here preclude the 
 
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