Chicago, 1894 ^ 
 
 THE EXPEDITIONS AGAINST FORT FISHER 
 AND WILMINGTON. 
 
 By EDSON J. HARKNESS. 
 [Read February 13, 1890.] 
 
 A MONG all the seaports that supplied the Confeder- 
 -*■■*• ates, Wilmington was the one most essential to 
 Richmond. As the crow flies, it is two hundred and 
 twenty miles south of the Virginia capital, one hundred 
 and fifty miles from Charleston, two hundred and twenty- 
 five miles from Savannah, and three hundred and seventy 
 from Atlanta. Here were carried on the principal opera- 
 tions of the blockade-runners. In but little more than a 
 year prior to January 15, 1865, the ventures of Eng- 
 lish capitalists and speculators with Wilmington alone 
 amounted to sixty-six million dollars ; the exports of 
 cotton were sixty-five million dollars ; while three hundred 
 and ninety-seven vessels ran the blockade. For nearly 
 three years one of the largest squadrons afloat, under Act- 
 ing Rear-Admiral Lee, had, amidst great difficulties, held 
 on at all seasons to the bars at the old and new inlets of 
 Cape Fear River, twenty miles south of Wilmington, and 
 succeeded in maintaining the closest blockade ever at- 
 tempted on any coast. They captured or destroyed ves- 
 sels to the value of perhaps ten million dollars. The shores 
 were strewn with wrecks, the captains generally beaching 
 and burning their craft to prevent the Federals from 
 gaining prize-money. But great as were the English losses, 
 for each shipwreck two new vessels were built on an im- 
 proved plan ; for so great were the profits of one successful 
 voyage that the English adventurers, provided with good 
 pilots, readily took all risks, which, in comparison with those 
 incurred by blockaders, amounted practically to nothing. 
 
I46 MILITARY ESSAYS AND RECOLLECTIONS. 
 
 For in these operations the advantages were all on the 
 side of the blockade-runners. Such was the nature of 
 the outlets that they required watching, north and south, 
 for sixty miles. The depth of water at the bar never 
 exceeded ten feet. If our cruisers lay close to, they were 
 in danger of the currents carrying them into breakers and 
 destruction. The average gunboat had too deep draft to 
 follow the blockade-runner, and the slowness of our ships 
 left little chance of catching her. Though sometimes 
 intercepted and driven back to the Bermudas, they suc- 
 ceeded eight times in ten. Toward the last, the English 
 began building those vessels of steel, — long, narrow, and 
 shallow, — which were capable of great speed, and could 
 cross at any hour; for at night, range-lights were kept 
 burning. So regular were their trips that Wilmington 
 counted on their arrival almost as confidently as if they 
 were mail-packets. 
 
 After the appointment of Admiral Porter, September 
 22, 1864, a new system was adopted, which took the con- 
 traband traders by surprise. He furnished every cruiser 
 with a chart, on which were drawn two half-circles close 
 to the bars. Off each outlet ten vessels were ranged in 
 a half-circle. About ten miles southward from Cape Fear 
 extend Frying-Pan Shoals ; here was drawn another half- 
 circle, radiating about twelve miles, and here twenty of 
 the fastest ships took station, averaging five miles apart, 
 and communicating by signal from end to end. A third 
 half-circle, swung from Beaufort (sixty miles north), de- 
 scribed an arc one hundred and thirty miles at sea, and 
 struck Cape Fear. Along this line ships were stationed 
 about eight miles apart. If a blockade-runner came from 
 Wilmington before daylight, she was seen by Circle Two ; 
 and, in case of breaking past, was chased by Circle Three. 
 Should a vessel approach these outermost sentries to run 
 into Wilmington just before daylight, they chased her off; 
 if after dark, and she eluded them, she was caught by the 
 central contingent. As a result, in thirty-seven days six 
 
EXPEDITIONS AGAINST FORT FISHER, ETC. 1 47 
 
 million dollars of property was seized or destroyed, and 
 captured English steamers arrived at Hampton Roads, on 
 an average of nearly one a day. It was, however, hardly 
 feasible to continue such a stringent blockade, — though, 
 if maintained, in three months Wilmington would have 
 been abandoned, — for the Government must have soon 
 put most of the squadron elsewhere, and resumed the 
 former method of investment. 
 
 An occurrence after the fall of Fort Fisher illustrates 
 the difficulty of blockading. Two English boats arrived 
 at night. Their commanders, unaware of the situation, 
 worked their way through all our fleet and came into the 
 river unobserved. They then announced, by signals, their 
 arrival. A captured contraband understood the signals, 
 and informed General Terry what reply would bring them 
 in. The signal was given, and the officers came in, 
 entirely unconscious they were falling among Federal 
 forces. Even after they entered the fort, they enjoyed 
 conversation for some time before suspecting that Union 
 generals were their hosts. They were finally informed 
 that their vessels and cargoes were prizes. 
 
 Whoever held the shore north of New Inlet kept the 
 key of this contraband mart. For more than twenty 
 miles above its mouth, Cape Fear River flows nearly 
 parallel with the coast, forming a peninsula twenty-three 
 miles long, but of varying width. Its southeast end is 
 Federal Point, — the peninsula one mile northward being 
 a mere beach, less than half a mile from sea to river, and 
 entirely open to bombardment. Three miles northward 
 the breadth is one mile, and the east bank is six feet high. 
 At the fourth mile the width becomes one and a half 
 miles. At the north end the peninsula is cleft by Mason- 
 boro Sound, extending sixteen miles south. The area 
 between New Inlet, the river, the sound, and the Atlantic, 
 is sandy ; the ground never rises more than fifteen feet 
 above high water, is heavily timbered in dry regions, and 
 J? abounds in wooded and almost impassable swamps. The 
 
I48 MILITARY ESSAYS AND RECOLLECTIONS. 
 
 beach is bordered by firm land about three hundred yards 
 wide. The river bank forms a natural sheltered way, and 
 on its summit runs the Wilmington road. Not quite 
 seven miles north was Sugar Loaf, a high sand-hill, where 
 there was an intrenched Confederate camp. 
 
 Early in the war unimportant works were erected on 
 this peninsula. A squadron of light-draft gunboats could 
 have passed them and taken possession of the river, then 
 and there enforcing the blockade. What might have 
 been prevented grew into a series of fortifications so 
 formidable as to render most difficult their reduction. 
 
 The first tracings were made by Colonel S. L. Fremont, 
 a native of New Hampshire, a graduate of West Point 
 under the name of Fish, and once an army officer. (He 
 was, in 1875, engineer on the Wilmington & Weldon 
 Railroad.) Under successive engineers, construction 
 continued for many months ; General Whiting, C. S. A., 
 another graduate of the national military academy, and 
 once an officer of United States Engineers, devoting all 
 his labor and skill for two years to the defences of fort 
 and port, until, in 1864, it attained colossal proportions. 
 
 Where the peninsula is seven hundred yards wide, stood 
 a land-face four hundred and eighty yards in length, in- 
 tended to resist attack from the north. Beginning at the 
 river, a stockade, fronted by a shallow ditch and a marsh, 
 ran sixty feet east. Owing to remoteness and shelter, it 
 always remained nearly intact. At its seaward end was 
 a sallyport with a bridge 15 X 10, the Wilmington road 
 entering through this gate. Here the earthwork began. 
 This consisted of a half-bastion on the left, a connecting 
 curtain, with a full bastion at the right. The parapet 
 was twenty-five feet thick, and averaged twenty feet in 
 height. From the interior crest seventeen traverses ran 
 back at right angles for distances varying from thirty to 
 forty feet, overtopping the parapet by ten feet, and having 
 thicknesses of eight or twelve feet. These traverses shel- 
 tered from enfiladement, and were the largest known. In 
 
EXPEDITIONS AGAINST FORT FISHER, ETC. 1 49 
 
 each was an alternating magazine, ventilated by an air- 
 chamber, and passage-ways penetrated the interior bomb- 
 proofs. On the left half-bastion, however, the traverses 
 were only about twenty-five feet long. Between the tra- 
 verses were compartments for gun-platforms and guns at 
 least twelve feet above the interior level, having separate 
 ramps and stairs from a parade-ground inside, mounting 
 each one or two large barbette guns, and holding from two 
 hundred to three hundred infantry. The vast amount of 
 earth 'was partly obtained from a shallow exterior ditch, 
 but mainly from the interior. About fifty feet in front, 
 the palisade extended to the ocean, with loopholes and a 
 banquette ; it had between the river and the left of the 
 parapet a position for guns, and also another between 
 the bastions. The flanking bastion at the right of the 
 land-front was more than a quarter of a mile east from the 
 two compartments nearest the river, and was for that 
 reason practically useless for an enfilading fire when the 
 attack was made on those compartments. The vertical 
 vastness and width of the parapet — five muskets' length 
 — gave a wide space at the foot, below and inside any 
 possible fire from the crest. The fort wall once gained, 
 the bastion would cover assault as truly as defence. 
 
 In the centre of this front, a bomb-proof postern ex- 
 tended through traverse and curtain, its outward opening 
 covered by a small redan for two field-pieces to enfilade 
 palisade and parapet. The traverses were generally bomb- 
 proofed for men or magazines ; the slopes of the curtain, 
 for five feet nine inches above the compartment floorings, 
 either were revetted with marsh-sod or covered with grass, 
 and inclined at an angle of forty-five degrees. This incli- 
 nation was reduced under fire to thirty degrees, while 
 revetments disappeared. The strength of the earthwork, 
 after bombardment, remained about the same as previ- 
 ously. On this front stood twenty-one heavy guns and 
 three mortars. Two hundred yards north of Fort Fisher 
 were three formidable lines of torpedoes, each containing 
 
I50 MILITARY ESSAYS AND RECOLLECTIONS. 
 
 about one hundred pounds of powder, about eighty feet 
 apart, and capable of ploughing a furrow one hundred 
 yards wide. 
 
 From the east end of the land-face ran a wall at right 
 angles, parallel with the beach, and thirteen hundred 
 yards long. It prevented Federal cruisers from entering 
 New Inlet, and troops from gaining Federal Point. This 
 sea-front consisted of a series of batteries mounting 
 twenty-four guns, connected by a strong infantry para- 
 pet, and employing traverses, generally bomb-proofed, 
 though many were not complete. There was neither 
 moat nor palisade, as shifting sands rendered the former 
 impossible. The batteries were fewer and at greater in- 
 tervals. Nearly two-thirds of a mile southwest from the 
 northeast bastion, Mound Battery — or Battery Lamb, as 
 it was named, for its originator — rose sixty feet in height, 
 commanding the channel inside the bar close to the 
 beach. In the terre plein, say fifteen hundred to two 
 thousand feet from the north wall, rifle-pits stretched 
 obliquely across. There was no fortification along the 
 river, but at Federal Point, Battery Buchanan, a small, 
 ellipse-shaped work, garrisoned by marines with four 
 guns, guarded the channel. The floor-space of thirty 
 bomb-proofs, magazines, and passages was fourteen thou- 
 sand five hundred square feet, not including the main 
 magazine, whose dimensions could not be obtained. 
 
 Such was the largest of Southern fortifications. On July 
 4, 1862, it had been merely several detached earthworks, 
 with one casemated battery, of palmetto logs and sand, 
 mounting four guns and one heavy gun. The sea-front 
 was constructed first, — the Army of Wilmington having 
 to prevent investment from land, — and the frigate "Minne- 
 sota " could have destroyed it in two hours. In Decem- 
 ber, 1864, it was far from complete. Yet Admiral Porter 
 says : " I have visited Fisher since [its capture], and find 
 its strength greatly beyond what I had conceived. An 
 engineer might be excusable for saying it could be cap- 
 

 ■ jw. Scale of Plan 32ort-ira*h 
 I 1 2P — I r- I T — i — ^ — t— -^* 
 
152 MILITARY ESSAYS AND RECOLLECTIONS. 
 
 tured only by regular siege. The work was really stronger 
 than the Malakoff." In January, 1865, Beauregard pro- 
 nounced Fort Fisher impregnable. 
 
 No commander could demand better and safer oppor- 
 tunities to defend a fort from the outside than Fisher 
 afforded. The river channel, three-quarters of a mile 
 west from the work, allowed an unobstructed view from a 
 ship of both its interior and of enemies. Signal officers 
 at Battery Buchanan and the Mound would be compara- 
 tively free from danger. Water communication from 
 Sugar Loaf to Fort Fisher occupied but thirty minutes. 
 The east bank, from one hundred yards north of Fort 
 Fisher, formed a perfect defence from hostile fleets. 
 From Battery Holland, half a mile north, a series of bat- 
 teries, curtains, and sandhills extended to the south end 
 of Masonboro Sound, protecting infantry against marine 
 bombardment. In the face of a few thousand well-handled 
 and determined troops, moving there unobserved, both 
 nature and art had made landing there impossible. So 
 thought Beauregard, Longstreet, and Whiting. 
 
 The commander of these defences was William Lamb, 
 colonel of the Thirty-sixth North Carolina Infantry, who 
 assumed control July 4, 1862. Before December 10, 1864, 
 the garrison consisted of four companies of infantry, one 
 light battery, and the gun crews, — less than seven hun- 
 dred men in all, with reserve of less than one thousand 
 at Masonboro Sound. Major-General Whiting had been 
 in command at Wilmington until Jan. 13, 1865, when his 
 sense of duty led him to the post of danger. Although 
 ranking Lamb, he declined the proffered precedence, being 
 unwilling to deprive Lamb of the glory that a successful 
 defence might bring, and merely acting as counsellor. The 
 armament comprised fifty-seven smooth-bores and twenty- 
 eight rifles. There were many monster Columbiads, and 
 many superb rifles of heavy calibre. London was repre- 
 sented by a one hundred and fifty pounder Armstrong. It 
 was a piece of magnificent finish, having a carriage of rose- 
 
EXPEDITIONS AGAINST FORT FISHER, ETC. I 53 
 
 wood and mahogany, and on the trunnion its maker's name 
 in full, and the " broad arrow." A post-captain of the Royal 
 Navy managed this gun when the first attack occurred. 
 
 Ever since the winter of 1861-1862, Secretary Welles 
 had endeavored to gain the co-operation of the War 
 Department in a joint attack on Fort Fisher by both 
 navy and army. Owing to shoal water, a purely naval 
 attack against Wilmington could not be undertaken. 
 Had there been water enough for broadside ships of the 
 "Hartford's" class, Wilmington would have shared the 
 fate of New Orleans, Port Royal, and Mobile. In Sep- 
 tember, 1864, Secretary Welles made another appeal to 
 the War Department, and, encouraged by Grant to ex- 
 pect assistance, began to assemble a suitable force. He 
 tendered the command of the North Atlantic blockading 
 squadron to Farragut, and stated to him, on September 5, 
 that Grant thought troops could be spared and moved by 
 October 1. It appears as if the methods actually pursued 
 largely followed Grant's idea. But failing health pre- 
 vented Farragut from accepting, and, on September 22, 
 Rear-Admiral Porter relieved Acting Rear-Admiral Lee. 
 Porter had, on the Mississippi, been daring and efficient, 
 showing a perfect understanding of his profession, and 
 holding that to insure great successes great risks must be 
 taken. He asked for eight thousand soldiers, and ships 
 enough to fire one hundred and fifty guns in broadside. 
 It was then thought that Fort Fisher mounted seventy- 
 five guns, and the proportion of two to one was really 
 small, since the naval fire would occur on surging seas 
 and wooden ships, while the land fire came from heavy 
 and solid earthworks. It was arranged before Septem- 
 ber 1 that the attack should be made October 1, but 
 subsequently it was postponed to October 15. Grant de- 
 cided at once to send the requisite troops as soon as ships 
 were ready. By October 15 about one hundred ships, 
 mounting six hundred and nineteen guns, had assembled, 
 other squadrons being thereby heavily depleted. This 
 
 VOL. II. — IO 
 
154 MILITARY ESSAYS AND RECOLLECTIONS. 
 
 armada could have but one objective point, and hence 
 became matter of common talk. Southern journals dis- 
 cussed the expedition, and Lee sent word that Fort Fisher 
 must be held, or that his supplies would fail. To Lamb 
 he telegraphed (date unknown) : " If Fisher falls, I shall 
 have to evacuate Richmond." Bragg was sent to Wil- 
 mington to prepare for defence. This caused postpone- 
 ment of the attack until the latter part of November. 
 Secretary Welles, on October 28, pleaded urgently with 
 President Lincoln to hasten the military co-operation. 
 The loss of two invaluable weeks since the fleet was able 
 to move, severely tried the patience of both Porter and 
 Welles. The detention of so many vessels from blockade 
 and cruising caused serious injury. The season of severe 
 storms was approaching, when naval operations against 
 Fisher would become impracticable. The country was 
 distressed. But the obstacles preventing immediate mili- 
 tary movement could not be overcome. 
 
 As General Butler then commanded the Army of the 
 James, Beaufort and Fisher were within the geographical 
 limits of his department. He had, therefore, a technical 
 right to equip the expedition, and military courtesy re- 
 quired that orders and instructions should pass through 
 him. It would seem, however, that Grant did not desire 
 to intrust the command to Butler. Porter, in conversa- 
 tion, expressly told Grant he " wanted nothing to do with 
 Butler" (Porter to Welles, January 21, 1865). Grant 
 directed Butler to put General Godfrey Weitzel in com- 
 mand and assigned Butler to movements in support of 
 Meade which he intended should detain him in Bermuda 
 Hundred. But Weitzel afterwards officially informed 
 Grant that he was never aware of the instructions actually 
 forwarded to Butler for him (Weitzel) until he read 
 Butler's report of January 3, 1865, with Grant's official 
 papers accompanying it. Butler signed all orders as 
 " Major-General commanding." 
 
EXPEDITIONS AGAINST FORT FISHER, ETC. I 55 
 
 November 30, Grant learned that Bragg had gone to 
 Georgia, taking most of the forces from about Wilmington. 
 Deeming it of the utmost importance the expedition 
 should reach its destination then, he said to Butler : " It 
 is important Weitzel should get off during his [Bragg's] 
 absence ; if successful in landing, he may by a bold dash 
 capture Wilmington." 
 
 Meanwhile Porter perfected the naval organization. He 
 forged his force into a marine thunderbolt. He syste- 
 matically disciplined it by drill. He divided the fleet into 
 three squadrons, lithographed a plan of attack on a large 
 scale, and assigned to each commander his position in 
 action. 
 
 Butler's course was culpable. He disobeyed orders. 
 He provided inferior transports and inadequate rations. 
 He took no intrenching tools or siege guns. He chose as 
 his rendezvous an offing in sight of the Confederates. 
 Porter repeatedly attempted to obtain some statement of 
 his intention, but without success ; and Weitzel did not 
 seem to know whether he (Weitzel) was commander or 
 orderly. Fleet-Captain Breese one day asked what were 
 Butler's plans, and Weitzel replied he did not believe Butler 
 had any. The general impression was similar. 
 
 Late in November, Butler communicated to Porter a 
 plan for destroying Fort Fisher. From the effect of 
 explosions at Erith and Woolwich, England, he had reason 
 to believe the proper ignition of two hundred and fifteen 
 tons of powder near the walls of the fort would dismount 
 guns, explode magazines, and destroy the garrison. 
 Scientists sanctioned the idea ; and Porter, despite sub- 
 sequent statements to the contrary, must have had confi- 
 dence in the scheme, for he " believed the explosion would 
 destroy Wilmington," and hailed the proposal with delight 
 as an expedient promising to end the delay. Butler 
 declared that if his proposition was consummated he 
 would detail and embark troops as soon as possible. 
 
I56 MILITARY ESSAYS AND RECOLLECTIONS. 
 
 December 6, Grant gave Butler these instructions: — 
 
 " The first object of the expedition under General Weitzel is 
 to close to the enemy the port of Wilmington. If successful 
 in this, the second will be to capture Wilmington itself. There 
 are reasonable grounds to hope for success, if advantage can 
 be taken of the absence of the greater part of the enemy's 
 forces, now looking after Sherman in Georgia. The directions 
 you have given for numbers and equipment are all right, 
 except in the unimportant matter of where they embark and 
 the amount of intrenching tools to be taken. The object will 
 be gained by effecting a landing on the mainland, between 
 Cape Fear River and the Atlantic, north of the North Entrance. 
 Should such landing be effected while the enemy holds Fisher 
 and the batteries guarding the entrance, the troops should 
 intrench, and, by co-operating with the navy, effect the reduc- 
 tion and capture of those places. These in our hands, the 
 navy could enter the harbor, and Wilmington would be sealed. 
 Should Fisher and the Point fall into the hands of our troops 
 immediately on landing, it will be worth the attempt to capture 
 Wilmington by forced march and surprise. If time is consumed 
 in gaining the first object, the second will become a matter of 
 after consideration. The details for execution are intrusted 
 to you and the officer immediately in command. Should the 
 troops under General Weitzel fail to effect a landing, they will 
 without delay be returned to the armies operating against 
 Richmond. 
 
 " U. S. Grant, Lieutenant- General" 
 
 " Major General B. F. Butler." 
 
 Grant adds : " The importance of getting the expedi- 
 tion off, with or without the powder-boat, without delay, 
 had been urged upon Butler. ... I directed him to make 
 all arrangements for the departure of Major-General 
 Weitzel, — designated to command the land forces, — so 
 that the navy might not be detained one moment." Yet 
 Butler now consumed several days in preparing his 
 powder-boat. 
 
 On December 12, Butler informed Grant he was 
 
I58 MILITARY ESSAYS AND RECOLLECTIONS. 
 
 going with the expedition. Grant had had no idea of this, 
 and did not dream but that Weitzel had received all 
 instructions and would command. Nevertheless, he did 
 not forbid Butler, for he supposed he wished to see the 
 explosion of his powder-boat and its effects. Butler, on 
 December 13, sent his transports up the Potomac on a 
 useless parade, and squandered three days of fine weather, 
 during which the enemy was without a force to protect 
 himself. From Confederate sources it is known that this 
 delay enabled the Rebels to reinforce. Had Butler landed 
 during the pleasant weather that prevailed up to the 18th, 
 " he might," according to General Whiting, " with any 
 kind of energy and pluck, have succeeded." 
 
 December 19 brought a heavy gale which detained the 
 transports at Beaufort until the 24th. At one time it was 
 feared that the naval fleet would be obliged to leave the 
 coast, but it rode out the gale in a manner that reflects 
 great credit on the navy. 
 
 Although the Departments of the Navy and of War 
 had determined that a combined attack was necessary, 
 Porter took advantage of the ensuing favorable weather 
 and arranged some independent movements. But he 
 again wrote to Butler that the explosion would now occur 
 December 23. As the army was sixty miles away, the 
 decision was injudicious, for the success of the enterprise 
 demanded the speedy arrival of the land forces, to take 
 advantage of any damage inflicted by the fleet. That 
 night the " Wilderness " towed the " Louisiana," the 
 powder-boat, as near the beach as possible, and the fleet 
 stood twenty-five miles out to sea. At 1.40 a. m., Decem- 
 ber 24, the powder was exploded. There was absolutely 
 no result. The ships scarcely felt the shock, and the 
 Confederates only thought a blockade-runner, loaded with 
 ammunition, had exploded, or a Federal cruiser had burst 
 her boiler. 
 
 At daylight the fleet stood in, and at 11.30 a. m. Porter 
 made signal to engage. His fifty-six ships, carrying 
 
EXPEDITIONS AGAINST FORT FISHER, ETC. I 59 
 
 six hundred guns, took position with almost perfect sea- 
 manship. There were three divisions : the first was 
 opposite Mound Battery, but three-quarters of a mile out ; 
 the second and third lay one mile off the Northeast 
 Bastion, the third slightly separated toward the north. 
 Then began what General Whiting pronounced the 
 most tremendous bombardment of any war. Commodore 
 Ammen, a veteran, declared that it had not been his lot 
 " to witness any operations comparable in force or effect 
 to this." By the time all the large vessels got in play, 
 Fisher ceased to respond energetically. The firing of the 
 monitors was excellent. The shower of shell, one hun- 
 dred and fifteen per minute, drove the garrison into 
 their bomb-proofs. The flag-staff was twice cut away; 
 two magazines blew up ; and in the burning of some 
 barracks, which continued for hours, the garrison lost 
 blankets and overcoats. 
 
 It does not appear by what authority Porter made this 
 purely naval attack of December 24 ; but it demonstrated 
 the weakness of Fisher, while bombarded, to repel land 
 assailants. It was the universal impression of the navy 
 that the right general and the right troops could take it. 
 In a military sense, the work might be but little injured; 
 but the fleet was able to keep the enemy from their guns 
 and in their casemates, to win for the soldiery safe access 
 to the foot of the parapet, to prevent attack from the north, 
 and thus to double the likelihood of successful assault. 
 
 December 25, at 6.30 a. m., all the troop-ships having 
 arrived, Butler sent Weitzel to Porter to arrange a pro- 
 gramme, and urged the Admiral to run into Cape Fear 
 River. Porter did not accede to this suggestion, and his 
 failure to make the attempt has been severely criticised. 
 He had performed feats that to his critics seemed more 
 difficult and dangerous, at Forts Jackson and St. Philip, 
 and at New Orleans. He had with his fleet captured 
 blockade-runners which had crossed this very bar. Gen- 
 eral Whiting affirmed that " a determined enemy could 
 
l6o MILITARY ESSAYS AND RECOLLECTIONS. 
 
 make the passage." Porter, however, sent Commander 
 Guest and Lieutenant Cushing to see if an entrance could 
 be effected, and, upon their report, decided that it was 
 not practicable. There would seem to be but little 
 ground for the criticisms of his conduct. 
 
 At 7 a. m., the fleet took position, and fired for seven 
 hours, while the troops were landing three miles north. 
 
 At 12.40, Commander Howell shelled Flag-Pond Bat- 
 tery (three miles north of Fort Fisher), which made no 
 response, and surrendered about 2 p. m. to another gun- 
 boat's officer. The woods had been raked by the covering 
 squadron, and General Adelbert Ames landed twenty- 
 three hundred men, — the whole of Curtis's brigade and 
 part of Pennypacker's, — without the slightest hostile 
 demonstration occurring during daylight. The troops 
 formed a line across the peninsula ; Curtis threw skir- 
 mishers westward, and pushed his column of twelve hun- 
 dred toward the fort, eighty men going within fifty yards 
 of it. One of them — Captain Walling, of the One Hun- 
 dred and Forty-Second New York — did what two or three 
 could not have done unobserved. Hidden by the angle 
 at the left, he crept through a breach in the stockade 
 and captured a fallen pennon. Ten soldiers were wounded 
 by the bursting of a naval shell. As the skirmishers 
 approached, Lamb withheld his fire till attack should be 
 made in force, when he intended to explode the mines, 
 and deliver a fire of grape and canister which he thinks 
 no troops could survive. Unaware of these facts, how- 
 ever, the gallant Curtis reported to Ames that he could 
 take the fort. Ames gave permission, and strained every 
 nerve to forward Pennypacker's brigade ; but the lateness 
 of its landing, — 3 p. m., — and the impracticability of a 
 three-mile "double-quick " through deep sand, prevented 
 such reinforcement. Curtis alone had any brigade within 
 charging distance of Fisher. He did not take the re- 
 sponsibility of assault, for no northward intrenchments 
 prevented attack from Wilmington. 
 
EXPEDITIONS AGAINST FORT FISHER, ETC. l6l 
 
 Colonel Ames had gone northward and captured Half- 
 Moon Battery with two hundred and twenty-five soldiers. 
 Both these and the Flag-Pond garrison were the North 
 Carolina Junior Reserves, — mere boys. From the com- 
 mander at Half-Moon, Butler learned that Whiting and 
 Bragg had begun calling for reinforcements ; that Gov- 
 ernor Vance was summoning every man who could stand 
 behind parapets and fire muskets to join them ; that 
 Hoke's division, six thousand strong, had been sent from 
 Richmond, December 22 ; and that Kirkland's and Hay- 
 good's brigades, numbering sixteen hundred in all, had 
 arrived at Wilmington the previous night (December 24). 
 Weitzel and Comstock were, with glasses, examining 
 Fisher's land front, a half mile beyond them. They 
 found it in perfect order, with only two guns dismounted, 
 the other seventeen covering the only practicable ap- 
 proach, — a strip not wide enough for more than one 
 thousand men in line. The garrison, though but six hun- 
 dred and seventy-seven men, was active. Confederate 
 forces were assembling at Sugar Loaf. From the contour 
 of the land and the remoteness of the river channel from 
 the naval fire, it was evident the Confederates would have 
 no difficulty in reinforcing or provisioning. The pali- 
 sade, scarcely injured, was alone a formidable obstacle. 
 Weitzel, in spite of personal considerations that would 
 naturally influence him in favor of instant assault, — his 
 professorship for three years at West Point, his experience 
 in assailing, and his desire to have his recent appoint- 
 ment as Major-General confirmed, — announced that "to 
 attack with their force would be murder." Comstock 
 said : " From the information I had, I should have agreed 
 with Weitzel, independent of what Curtis said to me." 
 If Curtis got in, he would have had to fight, and, unsup- 
 ported, would have lost most of his brigade. 
 
 Butler convinced himself that the only alternative was 
 withdrawal. At 4 p. m., he said to Captain Alden, of the 
 " Brooklyn," " It has become necessary to re-embark ; will 
 
I 62 MILITARY ESSAYS AND RECOLLECTIONS. 
 
 you send your boats to assist ? " Alden was surprised, 
 for everything appeared propitious. The bombardment 
 was at its height. Little or no surf was breaking on the 
 beach. Nothing indicated bad weather. He was told 
 that the troops showed much dissatisfaction when in- 
 formed of Butler's decision. It was with difficulty they 
 could be got into the boats. They were loud in their 
 denunciations, saying they had gone there to take the 
 fort, and they were going to do it. Re-embarkation 
 began at 5 p. m., and continued till midnight, when the 
 surf interfered seriously, and seven hundred of Curtis's 
 men, with only one day's rations, were left ashore. As 
 soon as the greater part of the troops were afloat, they 
 made for Hampton Roads, arriving December 28. The 
 abandoned remainder, covered by gunboats, stayed two 
 days, without the enemy molesting them. 
 
 Admiral Porter endeavored to dissuade Butler from 
 abandoning the attempt to assault the fort. He repre- 
 sented that he had sent his largest vessels to Beaufort 
 for ammunition, and that he could by rapid firing keep 
 the enemy from showing themselves until our troops were 
 within twenty yards of the works. But Butler and Weit- 
 zel remained unchangeable; and after the wind which 
 had arisen subsided, Porter took off the seven hundred 
 men of Curtis's brigade and sailed for Beaufort. He 
 immediately sent by a swift steamer a request to send 
 " other troops and another general." 
 
 Grant was greatly disappointed and incensed at Butler's 
 failure. He telegraphed to the President, December 28, 
 indicating in the strongest terms his dissatisfaction. He 
 interviewed some of Butler's subordinates, — General 
 Curtis, Captain Walling, and Lieutenant Simpson, of the 
 One Hundred and Forty-Second New York, — who ex- 
 pressed the opinion that Fisher could have been taken 
 without much loss. Curtis's view had weight in deter- 
 mining Grant to try again ; and, on December 30, he sent 
 a message to Porter as follows : — 
 
EXPEDITIONS AGAINST FORT FISHER, ETC. I 6 
 
 o 
 
 " Dear Admiral, — Hold on a few days, and I will en- 
 deavor to be back with an increased force, and without the 
 former commander." 
 
 The Committee on the Conduct of the War thoroughly 
 examined into Butler's conduct in refusing to make the 
 assault, and deliberately " concluded that, from all the 
 testimony before them, his determination seems to have 
 been fully justified by all the facts and circumstances 
 then known or afterwards ascertained." It is needless to 
 say that Butler appeared for himself in that case, and that 
 he displayed greater skill in defence than he had shown 
 himself to possess in assault. While he was gravely- 
 contending before the committee at Washington that to 
 take Fisher by assault was impossible, the booming of 
 cannon announced to a delighted country that Terry had 
 taken it, and by assault. 
 
 In selecting a commander for the second expedition, 
 General Grant was exceedingly fortunate. General A. H. 
 Terry was, as the event proved, most admirably fitted for 
 the duty. He was an officer of great clearness of per- 
 ception, coolness in action, and undoubted bravery. He 
 entered the service as a volunteer, and had won an 
 honorable position by his skill as a commander in many 
 hard-fought battles. Admiral Porter was delighted with 
 General Terry, and pronounced him " the beau-ideal of a 
 soldier and gentleman." Their relations from the first 
 were of the most cordial character, and throughout the 
 expedition their co-operation was perfect. On January 2, 
 1865, Terry was personally appointed by Grant, but with- 
 out receiving the slightest information where he was 
 going or what he should do. " He simply knew he was 
 going to sea, and had with him his orders, which were to 
 be opened there. The object and destination were kept 
 secret from all except a few in the Navy Department, 
 and the army, to whom it was necessary to impart them." 
 He took the same troops and officers that Butler had had, 
 with the addition of Abbott's brigade, numbering fifteen 
 
164 MILITARY ESSAYS AND RECOLLECTIONS. 
 
 hundred, a small siege-train, and his personal staff. 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Comstock, of General Grant's staff, 
 was appointed chief engineer. 
 
 Terry had splendid seconds. Ames was at the first 
 Bull Run as lieutenant of a battery. Refusing to quit it, 
 he suffered severe wounds, and was removed on a gun- 
 caisson. Afterwards colonel of the Twentieth Maine, 
 his services at Gettysburg in command of a brigade made 
 him a brigadier. At Cold Harbor, Petersburg, and Rich- 
 mond, he commanded a division. Curtis, six feet four 
 inches in height, was formed in antique mould. Sanguine 
 of mood, he always asserted that " assault would carry 
 Fisher." He was always ready to fight, always seeking, 
 and usually obtaining, the foremost place. Pennypacker 
 was adored by his men. Six times badly wounded, dis- 
 tinguished in many battles, he had in three years risen 
 from the rank of captain to that of brigadier. Bell, 
 a giant, came from old New Hampshire stock with 
 hereditary ability. He had seen steady service and hard 
 fighting. Paine had especially distinguished himself at 
 Newmarket Heights, September 29, 1864, where his 
 troops had shown good fighting qualities. Abbott's bri- 
 gade was really Hawley's, he being detained in command 
 of the First Division before Richmond. 
 
 Terry's instructions did not differ materially from 
 Butler's. Grant added, however, that it was exceedingly 
 desirable the most complete understanding should exist 
 between him and Porter. Grant said he had served with 
 Porter, and knew Terry could rely on his judgment and 
 nerve to undertake what he proposed. He would, there- 
 fore, defer as much as was consistent with Terry's own 
 responsibilities. Terry needed to look to the practica- 
 bility of receiving supplies, and to defence against supe- 
 rior forces. Grant's own views still were, that the navy 
 ought to run some ships into Cape Fear River, while the 
 remainder operated outside. While the river was in Con- 
 federate hands, land forces could not invest Fort Fisher, 
 
EXPEDITIONS AGAINST FORT FISHER, ETC. I 65 
 
 or cut off supplies and reinforcements. But he ordered 
 neither Terry nor Butler to assault, leaving that entirely 
 to their discretion. 
 
 The navy was doggedly determined to take Fort 
 Fisher, even if it had to do it alone. Though gale after 
 gale swept the coast, the fleet off Beaufort rode out all, 
 till Farragut said : " Porter will lose that fleet ; he is rash 
 to undertake operations when the elements are so 
 opposed." This was fighting the elements as man never 
 fought them before. The officers had been taught that 
 ours is the worst coast in the world, and that a vessel 
 could not stay there at anchor through storms. It was a 
 new school of practice, and benefited them. (In one 
 week, Porter coaled and ammunitioned his fleet of 
 seventy sail !) 
 
 Terry arrived at Fort Monroe the night of January 5, 
 and at once sent out sailing orders. Next morning, the 
 expedition sailed, but violent winds delayed its arrival off 
 Beaufort till the 8th. Here were Porter and part of the 
 North Atlantic squadron. Foul weather detained all till 
 the 1 2th. Though Beaufort was inside the Federal lines, 
 spies escaped, and from the nearest telegraph station sent 
 warning. January 11, at noon, Terry ordered departure; 
 but delivering this order occupied all the afternoon. 
 Next day, eleven hours' sailing took them to 34 10', and 
 they drew to land. The waves, however, swept the 
 shores so heavily, and night was so near, that Porter 
 postponed disembarkment. At daybreak, January 13, 
 preparations were begun for landing at a branch of 
 Masonboro Inlet, i. e., Myrtle Sound, five miles north of 
 Fort Fisher. Before a single boat left the transports, at 
 8 a. m., sixteen gunboats anchored inside, one hun- 
 dred yards from the beach. The Confederate General 
 Hoke had intended to resist the disembarkment, but the 
 naval fire strewed the woods with shell till it seemed a 
 deserted wilderness. By 3 p. M., all the infantry had 
 disembarked, treating the affair as a mere picnic ; they 
 
1 66 MILITARY ESSAYS AND RECOLLECTIONS. 
 
 had forty rounds of ammunition, six days' supply of hard- 
 tack, and three hundred thousand rounds of ammunition 
 for small-arms. 
 
 The first object to be attained after landing was to 
 throw a strong defensive line across the peninsula from 
 the sea to the Cape Fear River. General Terry finally 
 selected a position where the maps showed a large pond 
 occupying about one-third of the width of the peninsula, 
 and about three miles north of the fort. The pond was 
 found to be a sand-flat, partly covered with shallow 
 water. 
 
 The division of General Paine, to which the writer 
 belonged, followed by two of Ames's brigades, made their 
 way through. The night was intensely dark, and our 
 course lay through morass and swamp, through water 
 waist deep in many places. We reached dry and com- 
 paratively open ground, and the river beyond, between 
 8.30 and 9 o'clock in the evening. A force of five hun- 
 dred of the enemy could have captured our entire force in 
 detail as we emerged from that swamp ; but no enemy 
 was found. In this movement we passed through the 
 enemy's cavalry picket-line unobserved. Later in the 
 evening, we found ground to the south better for defensive 
 purposes, about two miles from the fort, and to this we 
 moved and intrenched. The morning of the 14th of 
 January found us with a fairly strong breastwork extend- 
 ing from the river to an almost impenetrable swamp on 
 our right. The writer was in command of the picket-line 
 during the day, and, with the exception of a few shots in 
 the morning, we were not disturbed by the enemy until 
 about four o'clock in the afternoon when Gen. Hoke made 
 a slight demonstration in our front. During the day, 
 Battery E, of the 3d U. S. artillery, came ashore, and six 
 guns were placed in position near the river. 
 
 The troops intended for operation against the fort were 
 in position between the north line and the fort, feeling 
 their way toward it, and waiting the final arrangements 
 for the assault, which were not long delayed. 
 
EXPEDITIONS AGAINST FORT FISHER, ETC. 1 67 
 
 General Terry and Colonel Comstock made a recon- 
 noissance about eleven o'clock, and found Curtis on the 
 river front. His skirmishers had captured Craig's Wharf, 
 nine hundred yards north of Fort Fisher, together with a 
 steamer loaded with ammunition and meal. Curtis now 
 pushed within five hundred yards of the fort, and occupied 
 a small unfinished outwork. Terry and Comstock crept 
 through rushes to within three hundred yards of the fort, 
 unobserved by the enemy, and obtained quite a correct 
 idea of the fort at that point, which was selected as the 
 point of assault. 
 
 In deciding to assault, Terry assumed a grave responsi- 
 bility ; for during the war no fort of comparable strength 
 had yielded to assault. 
 
 Porter had begun naval operations at 7.30 a. m. The 
 disposition of his fleet was different from what it had been 
 before, the vessels being much closer. Four ironclads a 
 half-mile out pounded the Northeast Bastion. Behind 
 them, two-thirds to three-quarters of a mile out, fourteen 
 war-ships formed line Number One, the most northern 
 group, and concentrated on the land face. Southward, 
 one mile out, line Number Two, with twelve ships, devoted 
 itself to the sea front. To the same batteries, line Number 
 Three, with fourteen vessels, one and a quarter miles out, 
 paid assiduous attention. In the rear were reserves. The 
 fire was rapid and severe, continuing unremittingly from 4 
 p. m. till after dark. During the night the " New Iron- 
 sides " and the monitors alone continued the fire. 
 
 During the evening General Terry went to Admiral 
 Porter's flag-ship, when, in an interview lasting until late 
 at night, the plans of attack were agreed upon. On the 
 next morning the navy was to begin early and fire rapidly 
 until 3 p. m. It was Porter's determination that before 
 that hour the guns of Fort Fisher should be silenced. 
 
 The general plan of the assault prepared by General 
 Terry was that the army should attack the western half 
 of the land face of the fort, and that a column of sailors 
 
1 68 MILITARY ESSAYS AND RECOLLECTIONS. 
 
 and marines should assault at the Northeast Bastion. At 
 eight o'clock on the morning of the 15th, all the vessels, 
 except a division left to aid in the defence of our northern 
 line, should it be attacked, moved into position, and, to 
 use General Terry's expression, a fire magnificent alike 
 for its power and accuracy was opened. General Ames's 
 division had been selected for the assault. As before 
 indicated, General Paine was placed in command of the 
 defensive line, having with him Abbott's brigade in addi- 
 tion to his own division. Ames's First Brigade, com- 
 manded by Curtis, was already at the outwork above 
 mentioned, and in the trenches close around it. The 
 other two brigades, Pennypacker's and Bell's, were moved 
 to within supporting distance of him. The preparations 
 for the assault were begun at two o'clock in the after- 
 noon. Sixty sharpshooters from the Thirteenth Indiana 
 Volunteers, armed with the Spencer repeating-carbine, 
 and forty others, volunteers from Curtis's brigade, the 
 whole under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Zent, of the 
 Thirteenth Indiana, were thrown forward at a run to 
 within one hundred and fifty yards of the work. They 
 were provided with shovels, and soon dug pits for shelter, 
 and began firing at the parapet. As soon as the firing 
 opened, the parapet of the fort was manned, and the 
 enemy's fire, both musketry and artillery, began. When 
 the sharpshooters reached their position, Curtis's brigade 
 moved forward at double-quick into line, about four hun- 
 dred and seventy-five yards from the work, and there lay 
 down. This was accomplished under a sharp fire from 
 the enemy, from which, however, the men soon sheltered 
 themselves by digging shallow trenches, each man con- 
 structing his own earthwork. Pennypacker's brigade 
 took the place of Curtis's in the outwork, and Bell's was 
 brought into line two hundred yards in his rear. Curtis 
 again moved forward, on the reverse slope of a crest 
 fifty yards in the rear of the sharpshooters, and again 
 intrenched ; Pennypacker following and occupying the 
 
EXPEDITIONS AGAINST FORT FISHER, ETC. 1 69 
 
 ground vacated by Curtis, bringing Bell's brigade to the 
 outwork. It was found that the fire of the navy had 
 been so effective during the preceding night and morning 
 that many openings had been made in the palisade, 
 which, with the aid of a few axe-men, were soon made 
 large enough for our men to pass through. At 3.25 p. m., 
 preparations being completed, the order to move forward 
 was given to Ames, and Terry signalled Admiral Porter 
 to change the direction of his fire. Curtis's brigade 
 sprang from the trenches and dashed forward in line. Its 
 left was exposed to a severe enfilading fire, and it obliqued 
 to the right, so as to envelop the left of the land front. 
 The ground over which it moved was difficult to cover, 
 being marshy ; but it soon reached the palisades, passed 
 through them, and effected a lodgment on the parapet. 
 At the same time the column of sailors and marines, 
 under Fleet-Captain Breese, advanced up the beach in 
 the most gallant manner, and attacked the Northeast 
 Bastion. Their great force gave the Confederates the 
 impression that this was the main attack, and they made 
 their dispositions accordingly. Colonel Lamb, command- 
 ing the fort, was at that bastion, and personally directed 
 operations there. This column was exposed to a murder- 
 ous fire, and was unable to get up the parapet. After a 
 severe struggle, with large losses of valuable officers and 
 men, they were withdrawn, and retired up the beach, leav- 
 ing about one hundred and sixty killed and wounded. 
 
 Lieutenant-Commander Harris, of this commandery, 
 who was with the navy during both of these expeditions, 
 and who participated in this assault, has, at my request, 
 given some of his personal recollections of these days in 
 a letter to me, which I will here read : — 
 
 Chicago, Thursday, February 13, 1890. 
 Major E. J. Harkness : 
 
 My dear Major, — As you requested me last night, I have 
 
 been trying to think this morning of Fort Fisher, and to recall 
 
 enough of the naval side of the story to supply your want. If 
 
 vol. 11. — II 
 
170 MILITARY ESSAYS AND RECOLLECTIONS. 
 
 your business had allowed us to go over your notes together, 1 
 might have been of more assistance. My recollection of the 
 events is vivid enough, but what I recall is so largely personal 
 history that it is fit only to tell my children. These are the 
 general facts which I think you want : — 
 
 In regard to the powder-boat : Like more than half the offi- 
 cers of the squadron, I volunteered for duty in it, and up to 
 the last moment hoped to be detailed for a special post in her. 
 Who is to blame for the failure I cannot say. The reason she 
 failed so completely was because the powder was not confined 
 as it should have been, and because the boat did not take the 
 ground. The destruction of the Duke of Alva's bridge, below 
 Antwerp, by the first powder-boat, might have taught whoever 
 did plan the attempt the necessity of those two conditions. 
 The first explosion threw the most of the powder out of the 
 hull, and it then exploded on the surface of the water. About 
 the first expedition : No one can reconcile the stories of Gen- 
 eral Butler and Admiral Porter. I know that the entire fleet, 
 men and officers, believed that it was jealousy only which pre- 
 vented the entry of the army. We expected to see it march in 
 and take possession without resistance. As you know, there 
 was no flag flying when the landing was made ; and so far as 
 we could see, the men in the Flag-Pond and Half-Moon batteries 
 were quite willing to surrender. We could see from our decks 
 small bodies of soldiers walking about the fort, close to it, and 
 unmolested. I cannot vouch for more than I saw ; but as Gen- 
 eral Butler said himself that an officer carried off the flag, which 
 had been shot down, and no one interfered with him, and as 
 the reports of all the division commanders agree, I must believe 
 that the re-embarkation was wrong. Men like Commodores 
 Schenk and Redford do not state what they are not sure of. 
 It certainly is strange that the seven hundred men, deserted 
 on the beach, remained there two days unmolested, when the 
 weather was so bad that we could not bring them off to the 
 ships. I do not doubt that if Admiral Porter could have 
 known of the General's intentions, he would have landed us, 
 and might have taken the fort. 
 
 The feeling of the navy against General Butler was bitter, 
 and seemed to be shared by some of the army. On the second 
 
EXPEDITIONS AGAINST FORT FISHER, ETC. I J I 
 
 expedition I landed four or five boat-loads of a colored regi- 
 ment, including the field officers. The smell of the men was 
 a trifle "loud," and, making inquiry, I was told that they had 
 been three weeks without their knapsacks, which had been left 
 behind in camp by General Butler's order. I asked one of the 
 officers why, and was answered that the General was spiteful 
 because Grant would not let him command this (second) expe- 
 dition. They certainly had no knapsacks, and the language of 
 the officers was as strong as the smell of the men. 
 
 The gale which the fleet rode out, off Beaufort, was an 
 incident which would not be appreciated by your audience 
 to-night. 
 
 Of the second bombardment and landing, you know all that 
 I can tell you. 
 
 Of the movement of the army after landing, I know nothing, 
 except what I have read and heard. 
 
 Like the Rebel army in the fort, the officers (except the 
 leading ones) and the men of the fleet supposed that General 
 Terry had gone up the peninsula to meet General Hoke ; and 
 when, on the morning of January 15, sixteen hundred of us 
 landed, we saw no sign of soldiers, and supposed that we were 
 to assault the fort without any support. After we were landed, 
 we were organized into three regiments. The men from each 
 ship formed a company. The senior officer from our ship 
 (Lieutenant Bache) became major of the centre regiment, 
 leaving me in command of the " Powhatan's " men, with Ensign 
 (now Commander) Evans as lieutenant. We were the right- 
 centre company of the centre regiment. We were drilled a 
 little after forming, and then lay down in a long line on the 
 beach, while for several hours the fleet fired over us into the 
 fort. This was a very trying ordeal. The shells from fifty- 
 eight men-of-war made a horrible screeching, and one eleven- 
 inch gun (said to be the after pivot-gun of the " Vanderbilt ") 
 fired several shells into our column. The wounded had to be 
 carried through our ranks, and it seemed to discourage the men 
 somewhat. It was about three o'clock when the fleet suddenly 
 ceased its fire, and we rose to our feet and formed a line across 
 the field. It was intended that the marines should occupy 
 some rifle-pits (thrown up by the sailors under Lieutenant 
 
172 MILITARY ESSAYS AND RECOLLECTIONS. 
 
 Preston), about six hundred rods from the fort. They were 
 about four hundred strong, and armed with Springfield rifles ; 
 while only one company of the blue-jackets was armed with 
 anything except cutlasses and revolvers. But, for some reason, 
 the marines were halted in a line nearly out of range, and the 
 sailors prepared to " board the fort in a seaman-like manner." 
 In the mean time some field-pieces opened on us, but did n't 
 do much harm; and, after the shell-fire we had been under, the 
 sailors were more amused than frightened by the little balls 
 that came ricocheting over the sand. After the marines were 
 halted, our line was faced to the left, and Fleet-Captain Breese 
 gave the order, " Head of column, right," which sent us down the 
 beach in a column of fours. The marines of our ship, the 
 " Powhatan," happened to be on the left of the marine line, 
 which opened to let us through, and they deserted their officer 
 (who had lately joined the ship), and fell in with our company. 
 We commenced to " double-quick " nearly a mile from the pali- 
 sades, and many were very faint from so long a run in the sand. 
 Of the heavy guns in the fort, all except two were disabled. 
 One of these two — an elegant one-hundred-and-fifty-pounder, 
 with the broad-arrow of her Majesty, and mounted on a polished 
 mahogany carriage — had been presented by the City of Lon- 
 don, and was so placed that it could hardly be reached by the 
 guns of the ships. A discharge of grape from this gun struck 
 our men just in front of where I was running. One ball knocked 
 my sword into the water. Many men were struck down, and the 
 unhurt, falling over the bodies, left me for an instant quite alone. 
 On reaching the palisades, the first regiment turned to the right, 
 and, running along the line, got into shot-holes. Our comman- 
 der, with about thirty others, had to remain in a hole, made by 
 the explosion of a fifteen-inch shell, until night. Our regiment 
 broke through the palisade, and lay down on the glacis of the 
 fort. The third regiment lay on the beach as close up as it 
 could get to the fort. From where I lay on the glacis, we could 
 see the four rows of soldiers in the fort, two ranks firing, and two 
 loading, and hear their taunts to " come on." No sailor reached 
 the parapet. Ensign George C. Davis (now Commander) 
 reached a hole in the face of the parapet. No one went fur- 
 ther. At this time there was no distinct sound of the bullets, but 
 only a steady rush, and the water close to the beach was lashed 
 
EXPEDITIONS AGAINST FORT FISHER, ETC. I 73 
 
 to foam. I would not have supposed men could fire so fast. 
 We only lay a few minutes under this fire before the troops got 
 in on your side, and nearly all the enemy were withdrawn to 
 meet you. 
 
 Much has been said of W. B. Cushing. I saw him half-way 
 back to the rifle-pits. He had seen his friend Porter shot 
 down, and had taken his sword. He was crying and swear- 
 ing at a few men he had gathered together, and who were being 
 called away by their wounded friends lying near. I spoke to 
 him, and at once he controlled himself perfectly, and told me 
 that an orderly had come from General Terry, saying that he 
 had seven traverses, and could take no more unless the sailors 
 would make another demonstration against the sea-side of the 
 fort. If the sailors could not be brought up again, he said he 
 would dig a ditch between the traverses, and hold what he had 
 till morning. Three or four of us stayed with Cushing till we 
 saw it was useless. The loss of the navy was great. Admiral 
 Porter reports twenty-one officers and three hundred and nine 
 men lost from twenty-nine ships. There were twenty-nine more 
 ships ; and from the " Wabash " only twelve were reported 
 wounded, instead of about thirty. As the marines of our ship 
 joined the blue-jackets, I don't know how many we had ; but 
 all but eighteen were hit. The reported loss was twenty-nine. 
 All the officers were wounded. We went ashore in three boats, 
 and returned in one. I say this to show that the probable loss 
 was over four hundred out of the sixteen hundred who landed. 
 After the repulse, the sailors who could, went to the upper line 
 of the intrenchments, near Terry's headquarters ; but I know 
 nothing of that. 
 
 Very sincerely yours, Ira Harris. 
 
 When Curtis moved forward, Pennypacker was directed 
 to .take position in rear of the sharpshooters, and Bell was 
 brought to Pennypacker's last position. As soon as Curtis 
 got a foothold on the parapet, Pennypacker was sent to 
 his support. He advanced, swung around Curtis's right, 
 and drove the enemy from the palisades, which extended 
 from the west end of the land face to the river, capturing 
 a considerable number of prisoners. 
 
174 MILITARY ESSAYS AND RECOLLECTIONS. 
 
 Nothing could surpass the magnificent manner in which 
 Pennypacker and his men made this charge. They swept 
 the enemy westward and opened the sally-port from the 
 inside, and the two brigades together drove the enemy 
 from about one-fourth of their land face. Ames brought 
 up Bell's brigade, and moved it between the fort and the 
 river. On this side there was no parapet, but an abund- 
 ance of cover was afforded to the enemy by cavities from 
 which sand had been taken for traverses, behind which 
 they stubbornly resisted the advance of Pennypacker and 
 Curtis. Much band-to-hand fighting of a desperate char- 
 acter ensued upon these huge traverses. Our men would 
 make a charge to the summit of a traverse, to be met by 
 the Confederates coming from the other side, where these 
 hand-to-hand struggles occurred. One or two of these 
 traverses were retaken, and held for a short time by the 
 Confederates, but they were soon driven out for the last 
 time. 
 
 By this time Terry had concluded that reinforcements 
 were necessary, and sent an order for Abbott's brigade 
 to move down from the north line, also directing General 
 Paine to send one of the strongest regiments of his 
 division. About dusk these troops arrived, and reported 
 to General Ames. At six o'clock, Abbott's brigade went 
 into the fort, and a regiment from Paine's division — 
 the Twenty-Seventh United States Colored troops, com- 
 manded by Brevet Brigadier-General A. M. Blackman — 
 was brought up to the rear of the fort, where it remained 
 under fire for some time. The fire of the navy up to this 
 time had been directed to that portion of the work not 
 occupied by us. After that time it was directed to the 
 beach, to prevent reinforcements being sent from the 
 other side of the river to Battery Buchanan. This hand- 
 to-hand fight over these traverses continued till nine 
 o'clock in the evening, when two more of them were 
 carried. Abbott's brigade then drove the Confederates 
 from their last defences, and the occupation of the work 
 was complete. 
 
EXPEDITIONS AGAINST FORT FISHER, ETC. I 75 
 
 Abbott's brigade and Blackman's regiment immedi- 
 ately pushed down the point to Battery Buchanan, whither 
 many of the garrison had fled, hoping to find means 
 of escape across the river to Smithville. But this work 
 had been abandoned early in the evening ; the boats were 
 gone, guns were spiked, and when Abbott and Blackman 
 reached the place no defence was made, and all the 
 remaining garrison were made prisoners. Major-General 
 Whiting surrendered his sword to General Blackman, and 
 Colonel Lamb was also taken prisoner. Both these 
 gallant officers were severely wounded, General Whiting 
 dying of his wounds in March following, in the North. 
 About four o'clock in the afternoon, General Hoke made 
 a demonstration against our north line, with the apparent 
 design of attacking it. But if this was his intention, he 
 abandoned it after a skirmish with our pickets. This, 
 with the slight skirmish on the morning of the 14th, was 
 the only demonstration made by Hoke and Bragg, with 
 six thousand men, against our northern line. Captain 
 Edgerly, of the Third New Hampshire, brought General 
 Terry the flag of Fort Fisher. Among other effects, fifty 
 scraggy ponies were found at Battery Buchanan. These 
 animals became intensely interesting to our wearied staff 
 officers, and were rapidly secured and made use of. In 
 the action, one hundred and ten of our men were killed, 
 and five hundred and thirty-six wounded, and of the navy 
 about three hundred were killed and wounded ; while the 
 Confederates lost over seven hundred. 
 
 The next morning, as Bell's brigade were bivouacking 
 around the main magazine, it exploded with a tremendous 
 shock. A mountain of earth shot into the air, rolled to 
 the right and left, and fell back in a mass twenty feet 
 deep. About one hundred Federals and thirty Confed- 
 erates instantly suffered death and burial at once. Fort 
 Fisher was their monument and grave. It was first 
 charged that the Confederates exploded this magazine by 
 an electric current from the other side of the river. But 
 
176 MILITARY ESSAYS AND RECOLLECTIONS. 
 
 a board of officers, appointed to investigate, found that 
 it was the result of an accident attributable to our own 
 men. 
 
 It is needless to say that the rejoicing in the army and 
 navy at the successful termination of this great military 
 and naval enterprise was exuberant and tumultuous. 
 From ten o'clock at night, when the firing ceased, until 
 the morning dawned, the army echoed back the shouts 
 of the navy, while the sky was filled with rockets, which 
 could be seen for miles around. The combined efforts 
 of the army and navy thus secured one of the most 
 important successes of the war. This was Grant's opin- 
 ion. And undoubtedly the fall of Fort Fisher and the 
 closing of the port of Wilmington precipitated the col- 
 lapse of the Confederacy at Richmond. Even the British 
 Government, which had till that time held out hopes to 
 the Confederacy's emissaries, now sent word to them 
 through Washington, rebuking the Rebels for their 
 stubbornness. 
 
 If Porter had his Butler, Lamb and Whiting had their 
 Bragg. The responsibility for the failure to hold Fort 
 Fisher must rest with him. In speaking of this disaster 
 to the Confederate cause, General Whiting, lying wounded 
 at Fort Fisher, on January 18, wrote to General Lee, 
 saying : — 
 
 " I think that the result might have been avoided, and Fort 
 Fisher still held, if the commanding general had done his duty. 
 I charge him with this loss, — with neglect of duty in this, that 
 he either refused or neglected to carry out every suggestion made 
 to him in official communications by me for the distribution of 
 the troops, and especially that he failed to appreciate the lesson 
 to be derived from the previous attempt of Butler. Instead of 
 keeping his troops in position to attack the enemy on his 
 appearance, he moves them twenty miles from the point of 
 landing, in spite of repeated warnings. He might have learned 
 that his failure to interrupt either the landing or the embark- 
 ing of Butler for two days with his troops, though disgraceful 
 
EXPEDITIONS AGAINST FORT FISHER, ETC. I J J 
 
 enough, would indicate to the enemy that he would have the 
 same security for any future expedition. The previous failure 
 was due to the strength of Fort Fisher alone, and not to any of 
 the supporting troops. I charge him further with making no 
 effort whatever to create a diversion in favor of the beleaguered 
 garrison during the three days' battle, by attacking the enemy, 
 though that was to be expected, since his delay and false dis- 
 positions allowed the enemy to secure his rear by works, but 
 works of no strength. I desire that a full investigation be had 
 of this matter, and these charges which I make. They will be 
 fully borne out by the official records." 
 
 Colonel Lamb, who was in immediate command of the 
 force in the fort, is even more severe in his criticism of 
 Bragg. General Bragg, at one o'clock on the 16th of 
 January, telegraphed to Richmond in these words : " I 
 am mortified at having to report the unexpected capture 
 of Fort Fisher, with most of its garrison, about ten o'clock 
 the night of the 15th. Particulars not yet known." He 
 also made a report of his operations to President Davis, 
 January, 1865, in which he endeavors to excuse his con- 
 duct in not attacking our north line and in not reinforcing 
 Fort Fisher by the river, during the night of the 14th, by 
 saying that his command could not have been divided 
 with safety, and that an attack upon our intrenchments 
 would have been undoubtedly repulsed with great loss to 
 himself. 
 
 It is difficult to understand why General Hoke, with 
 his splendid record as a fighting Confederate, and with 
 the magnificent troops which he brought with him from 
 Richmond, should have allowed himself to remain at 
 Sugarloaf, seven miles above Fisher, without making any 
 attempt to relieve Whiting or to attack Paine's defensive 
 line. General Hoke was a special favorite of President 
 Davis, and had been selected by Davis and Lee for some 
 of the most difficult and dangerous work connected with 
 the defence of Richmond. By direction of Davis and 
 Lee, with his command, he made the celebrated charge 
 
178 MILITARY ESSAYS AND RECOLLECTIONS. 
 
 on Fort Harrison, on the north side of the James River, 
 for the purpose of recapturing it, in November, 1864, — 
 one of the most gallant charges ever made in that or any 
 other war. At Petersburgh, on the 15th of June, and at 
 Drury's Bluff, he was the most conspicuous character on 
 the Confederate side. In conversing with General Hoke 
 about three years since, I introduced this subject, and 
 was unable to secure from him any explanation with 
 respect to this Fort Fisher affair. I gathered, however, 
 from some intimations, that upon Bragg the whole respon- 
 sibility of his supine policy should rest. There has never 
 been any question in my mind, either from the reports 
 made of these operations, or from my own observation, 
 that the landing of our forces at Masonborough Sound, 
 or, at any rate, the establishment of a line across the 
 peninsula from ocean to river, could have been pre- 
 vented by a resolute and determined enemy. Neither 
 has there been any doubt that after the line was estab- 
 lished, an attack by Hoke upon the north line would have 
 been so serious a diversion as to have withdrawn a large 
 portion of the assaulting force from Fort Fisher, and ren- 
 dered that assault impracticable. But the Confederates 
 were everywhere discouraged and dispirited ; and possibly 
 to this despondency, as much as anything, can be attrib- 
 uted the course pursued by Bragg with relation to the 
 relief of Fort Fisher. 
 
 No estimate of the forces which brought about the 
 reduction of Fort Fisher would be correct which did not 
 accord to the navy the larger share of the credit. But 
 for the fact that nearly every gun in Fort Fisher was 
 rendered useless by the fire of the navy, no successful 
 assault could have been made by the land forces. Secre- 
 tary Stanton, who was at Fort Fisher about a week after 
 its capture, met Terry and Porter upon Porter's flag-ship, 
 and, in his report to the President, speaks of the fact 
 that " Admiral Porter and General Terry vied in their 
 commendations each of the other. Each seemed more 
 
EXPEDITIONS AGAINST FORT FISHER, ETC. I 79 
 
 anxious to do justice to the other than to claim anything 
 for himself, and they united in the highest commendation 
 of the naval and military officers and the forces engaged. 
 To this harmony of feeling and the confident spirit 
 inspired, may perhaps be attributed in some degree the 
 success of an attack, with nearly equal numbers, against 
 a resolute enemy, in a work unsurpassed, if ever equalled, 
 in strength, and which General Beauregard a few days 
 before pronounced impregnable." 
 
 I have neglected to mention that in this assault Colonel 
 Bell, commanding the Third Brigade of General Ames's 
 division, was killed while gallantly leading the charge at 
 the west end of the land face. Colonel Penny packer re- 
 ceived a severe wound, from which for months it was not 
 expected he would recover, and which has rendered him an 
 invalid for life. General Curtis was also severely wounded, 
 his wound resulting in the loss of the sight of one of his 
 eyes. The losses in detail, with other data, will be shown 
 by a statement attached to this paper. 
 
 Within twenty-four hours after the fall of Fort Fisher, 
 the formidable chain of works around the two mouths of 
 the Cape Fear River fell into Porter's hands. Our light- 
 draft gunboats crossed the bar, and felt their way care- 
 fully through the channel of the river, removing torpedoes, 
 with which the river was filled at that point. Lieutenant 
 dishing made a reconnoissance on January 17, and found 
 Forts Caswell and Shaw blown up, and Bald Head and 
 Campbell destroyed. The fortifications at Smithville 
 were also abandoned. Three of these forts had been 
 built to keep out any force, and were wonderful speci- 
 mens of engineering. They mounted eighty-three guns, 
 nine-inch, ten-inch, and one-hundred-and-fifty-pound Arm- 
 strongs, completely commanding the channel of the river, 
 and were nearly out of the reach of projectiles from 
 seaward. 
 
 January 18, Colonel Ames, commanding the Third Bri- 
 gade of Paine's division, reconnoitred toward Wilmington, 
 
l8o MILITARY ESSAYS AND RECOLLECTIONS. 
 
 and found the Confederates in force at Sugarloaf. Hoke 
 was strongly intrenched at Sugarloaf, and occupied Fort 
 Anderson, upon the opposite side of the river, with a col- 
 lateral line running to a large swamp three-quarters of a 
 mile distant. It was a strong position, and could only be 
 taken by crossing the Sound above Hoke's left, or passing 
 around the swamp on his right. On February n, Gen- 
 eral Terry pushed forward Paine's division in the direc- 
 tion of Sugarloaf, and drove in the Rebel pickets, and 
 established a line directly under and about five hundred 
 yards distant from the Confederate main line on Sugarloaf 
 Hill. General Schofield then attempted to send a fleet 
 of navy-boats and pontoons above the enemy's position ; 
 and a force, composed of General Coxe's and General 
 Ames's divisions, was to march along the beach in the 
 night to the point where the boats were to land, haul 
 them across the beach into the Sound, and cross the Sound 
 to the mainland in rear of Hoke's position. The weather 
 was so stormy as to render the execution of this plan 
 impossible. It was again attempted on the night of 
 February 14; but the unusually high tide caused by the 
 heavy sea wind defeated the plan again. General Scho- 
 field then directed his attention to the enemy's right, and 
 sent General Coxe and General Ames over to Smithville, 
 where they advanced along the Wilmington road until 
 they encountered the enemy's position at Fort Anderson. 
 These two brigades intrenched to occupy the enemy, 
 while General Coxe, with his other two brigades and 
 General Ames's division, moved around the swamp, 
 covering the enemy's right, to strike the Wilmington road 
 in the rear of Fort Anderson. The enemy, warned by 
 his cavalry of General Coxe's movement, abandoned his 
 works on both sides of the river during the night of 
 February 19, and fell back behind Town Creek on the 
 west side, and to a corresponding position covered by 
 swamps on the east side. Here was another gain of ten 
 pieces of heavy ordnance, and the possession of the main 
 
EXPEDITIONS AGAINST FORT FISHER, ETC. l8l 
 
 defences of Cape Fear River and Wilmington by our 
 troops, with comparatively trifling loss. General Coxe, 
 on the 20th, pursued the enemy to Town Creek, behind 
 which he was found intrenched, having destroyed the 
 only bridge across the creek. General Terry also 
 encountered the enemy in position on the other side of 
 the river, in forces superior to his. General Ames re- 
 crossed the river and joined General Terry on the night 
 of the 19th. On the 20th, General Coxe crossed Town 
 Creek by the use of a single flat-boat found in the 
 stream, and by wading swamps reached the enemy's flank 
 and rear, attacked and routed him, capturing two pieces 
 of artillery and three hundred and seventy-five prisoners, 
 and dispersing the remainder of his force. During the 
 night General Coxe rebuilt the bridge, crossed his artil- 
 lery, and the next morning pushed on toward Wilming- 
 ton without opposition. General Terry, although unable 
 to make further advance, occupied the attention of all 
 Hoke's force, so that none could be sent to replace that 
 which Coxe had destroyed. On the 21st, General Coxe 
 secured a portion of the enemy's pontoon bridge across 
 Brunswick River, which he had attempted to destroy, put 
 a portion of his troops upon Eagle Island, and threatened 
 to cross the Cape Fear River above Wilmington. The 
 enemy at once set fire to his steamers, cotton, and military 
 and naval stores, and abandoned the town. Our troops 
 entered without opposition early on the morning of 
 February 22, and General Paine's division pursued the 
 enemy across the Northeast River. The total loss in 
 the operations from February 11, when the first advance 
 was made from Fort Fisher, to the capture of Wilming- 
 ton, was about two hundred officers and men killed and 
 wounded ; while that of the enemy was not less than one 
 thousand killed, wounded, and made prisoners. Fifty-one 
 pieces of heavy ordnance, fifteen light pieces, and a large 
 amount of ammunition fell into our hands. 
 
 In no campaign of the war did such great achievements 
 
1 82 MILITARY ESSAYS AND RECOLLECTIONS. 
 
 upon land result from the operations of so small a force 
 of men. Up to the time that General Schofield joined 
 the forces, many days after the taking of Fort Fisher, less 
 than ten thousand Federal soldiers had been upon the 
 peninsula. Six thousand Confederates, under the imme- 
 diate command of General Hoke, were to the north of 
 them, and between them and Wilmington ; and Fort 
 Fisher, with its garrison of twenty-four hundred men, to 
 the south. Yet this small Federal force, co-operating 
 with the navy, assaulted and captured one of the strongest 
 defensive works erected in these modern times, after a 
 seven hours' fight. 
 
 In view of such an achievement, well may all loyal 
 American citizens exclaim, in the language of the old 
 song, — 
 
 " The Army and Navy forever ! " 
 
 APPENDIX I. 
 
 THE FORCES. 
 A. THE UNION ARMY. 
 
 Major-General A. H. Terry. 
 
 Second Division, Twenty-Fourth Army Corps, Brigadier-General 
 Adelbert Ames. 
 
 First Brigade. Col. N. Martin Curtis : — 3d New York, Capt. 
 J. H. Reeves, Lt. E. A. Behan; 112th New York, Col. J. F. 
 Smith ; 117th New York, Lt.-Col. F. X. Meyer; I42d New 
 York, Lt.-Col. A. M. Barney. 
 
 Second Brigade. Col. Galusha Pennypacker, Major O. P. Hard- 
 ing:— 47th New York, Capt. J. M. McDonald; 48th New 
 York, Lt.-Col. W. B. Coan, Major N. A. Elfuring ; 76th 
 Pennsylvania, Col. J. S. Little, Major Knerr ; 97th Pennsyl- 
 
EXPEDITIONS AGAINST FORT FISHER, ETC. 1 83 
 
 vania, Lt. Wainwright ; 203d Pennsylvania, Col. Moore, 
 Lt.-Col. Lyman, Major Harding, Capt. Essington. 
 
 Third Brigade. Col. Louis Bell, Col. Alonzo Alden : — 13th 
 Indiana, Lt.-Col. S. M. Zent; 4th New Hampshire, Capt. 
 Roberts; 115th New York, Lt.-Col. Johnson; 169th New 
 York, Col. Alden, Lt.-Col. Colvin. 
 
 Second Brigade. Division One, Col. Abbott (temporarily at- 
 tached to Div. 2) : — 6th Connecticut, Col. Rockwell ; 7th 
 Connecticut, Capts. Thompson and Marble ; 3d New Hamp- 
 shire, Capt. Trickey ; 7th New Hampshire, Lt.-Col. Rol- 
 lins; 16th New York (Heavy Artillery, detachment), Lt. 
 Huntington. 
 
 Third Division, Twenty-Fifth Army Corps (colored), Brig.-Gen. 
 C. J. Paine. 
 
 Second Brigade. Col. John W. Ames: — 4th U. S., Lt.-Col. 
 Rogers ; 6th U. S., Major A. S. Boernstein ; 30th U. S., 
 Lt.-Col. Oakman ; 39th U. S., Lt.-Col. Stearns. 
 
 Third Brigade. Gol. Elias Wright. — 1st U. S., Lt.-Col. Rich ; 
 5th U. S., Major Brazie ; 10th U. S., Lt.-Col. Powell; 27th 
 U. S., Col. Blackman ; 37th U. S., Lt.-Col. Nathan Goff, Jr. 
 
 Artillery Companies. B, G, and L, 1st Connecticut Heavy, Capt. 
 Pride ; 16th New York Battery, Capt. Lee ; E, 3d U. S., Lt. 
 Myrick. 
 
 Chief of Engineers. Lt.-Col. O. B. Comstock; A and I, 15th 
 New York, Lt. O'Keefe. 
 
 Casualties : — 
 
 Killed 184 
 
 Wounded 749 
 
 Missing 22 
 
 Total 955 
 
 Casualties of explosion : — 
 
 Killed 25 
 
 Wounded 66 
 
 Total 91 
 
 Net total 1046 
 
184 MILITARY ESSAYS AND RECOLLECTIONS. 
 
 B. THE CONFEDERATE ARMY. 
 
 Defences. Mouth of Cape Fear River, Brig.-Gen. Louis Hebert. 
 Department Commander, Gen. Braxton Bragg. 
 
 Garrison of Fort Fisher. 
 Col. Lamb ; Major Stevenson (too ill for duty), Major Reilly : — 
 10th North Carolina (1st Artillery), Major Reilly, — Co. F, 
 Capt. Walsh ; Co. K, Capt. Shaw. 36th North Carolina 
 (2d Artillery), Major Stevenson, — Co. A, Capt. Murphy ; 
 Co. B, Capt. Munn; Co. C, Capt. Braddy ; Co. D, Capt. 
 Dudley ; Co. E, Capt. Powell ; Co. F, Lt. Hunter ; Co. G, 
 Capt. Swain ; Co. H, Capt. Patterson ; Co. I, Capt. Melvin; 
 Co. K, Capt. Brooks. 40th North Carolina, Co. D, Capt. 
 Lane, — Co. E, Capt. McBryde ; Co. G, Capt. Buchan ; Co. K, 
 Capt. Clarke. Co. D, 1st North Carolina, Capt. McCormick. 
 Co. C, 3d North Carolina, Capt. Sutton. Co. D, 13th North 
 Carolina, Capt. Adams. 
 
 Naval Detachment. Capt. Van Benthuysen. 
 Battery Buchanan. Capt. Chapman, C. S. N. 
 
 Hoke's Division. Major-General Robert F. Hoke. 
 
 Clingman's Brigade, 8th, 31st, 57th, and 61st North Carolina; 
 Colquitt's Brigade, 6th, 19th, 23d, 27th, and 28th Georgia; 
 Hagood's Brigade, nth, 21st, 25th, and 27th South Caro- 
 lina ; 7th South Carolina Battalion ; Kirkland's Brigade, 
 17th, 42d, 50th, and 66th North Carolina. 
 
 [Regimental Officers cannot be ascertained.] 
 
 Cavalry. 2d South Carolina, Col. Lipscomb. 
 Chief Engineer. Major-General W. H. C. Whiting. 
 
 [Only two companies of the garrison ever came from outside 
 North Carolina, and they stayed but temporarily.] 
 
 C. THE NAVY. 
 
 Rear-Admiral David D. Porter, commanding North Atlantic 
 Squadron ; Lt.-Commander K. R. Breese, Fleet-Captain. 
 ship. officer. 
 
 Colorado Commander Thatcher 
 
 Minnesota " Lanman 
 
 Powhatan " Schenck 
 
 Susquehanna " Godon 
 
EXPEDITIONS AGAINST FORT FISHER, ETC. 
 
 SHIP. OFFICER. 
 
 New Ironsides Commander Radford 
 
 Santiago de Cuba Captain Glisson 
 
 Vanderbilt " Pickering 
 
 Juniata . " Taylor 
 
 Fort Jackson " Sands 
 
 Shenandoah " Ridgely 
 
 Ticonderoga " Steedman 
 
 Brooklyn . " Alden 
 
 Tuscarora Commander Frailey 
 
 Monadnock " Parrott 
 
 Rhode Island " Trenchard 
 
 Nereus " Howell 
 
 Mohican " Ammen 
 
 Iosco " Guest 
 
 v Osceola " Clitz 
 
 « Pawtucket " Spotts 
 
 Mackinaw " Beaumont 
 
 Cuyler " Caldwell 
 
 Saugus " Calhoun 
 
 * Pontoosuc Lieutenant-Commander Temple 
 
 *Vance " " Upshur 
 
 Yantic " " Harris 
 
 i Sassacus " " Davis 
 
 Tacony " " Truxtun 
 
 Kansas " " Watmough 
 
 * Maratanza " " Young 
 
 Maumee " " Chander 
 
 ' Pequot " " Braine 
 
 * Nyack " " Newman 
 
 Canonicus " " Belknap 
 
 Vicksburg " " Baker 
 
 ' Chippewa " " Potter 
 
 •* Unadilla " " Ramsey 
 
 Mahopac " " Weaver 
 
 v Huron " " Self ridge 
 
 / Seneca " " Sicard 
 
 Monticello " " Cushing 
 
 *Gettysburg " " Lamson 
 
 Malvern (Flag-ship) Lieutenant Porter 
 
 Alabama .... Acting Volunteer " Langthorn 
 
 Montgomery ..." " " Dunn 
 
 Fort Donelson Acting Master Frost 
 
 ♦Governor Buckingham Acting Volunteer Lieutenant Macdearmid 
 
 VOL. II. — 12 
 
i86 
 
 MILITARY ESSAYS AND RECOLLECTIOAS. 
 
 SHIP. OFFICER. 
 
 Aries Acting Volunteer Lieutenant Wells 
 
 *Lilian " " " Harris 
 
 *Britannia .... " " " Sheldon 
 
 *Eolus Acting Master Keyser 
 
 *Nansemond " " Porter 
 
 V Little Ada " " Crafts 
 
 Republic " Ensign Bennett 
 
 *Howquah .... Acting Volunteer Lieutenant Balch 
 
 *Wilderness Acting Master Arey 
 
 *Cherokee .... Acting Volunteer Lieutenant Dennison 
 
 *Moccasin Acting Ensign Brown 
 
 *Emma Acting Volunteer Lieutenant Williams 
 
 *Tristram Shandy . " " " Green 
 
 Total 60 
 
 Of these ships, 56 were engaged in the first bombardment, 58 in the 
 second. Those marked with a star formed the reserves. 
 
 APPENDIX II. 
 
 THE ARMAMENT OF FORT FISHER. 
 
 
 
 
 INCHES 
 
 
 
 
 
 INCHES 
 
 I Columbiad . . . . 10 
 
 19 
 
 Rifle 6f 
 
 2 Rifle . . . 
 
 
 
 
 20 
 
 Columbiad 
 
 
 
 IO 
 
 3 Smooth-bore . 
 
 
 
 8 
 
 21 
 
 Smooth-bore . 
 
 
 
 8 
 
 4 " " . 
 
 
 
 8 
 
 22 
 
 Rifle (Blakely) . 
 
 
 
 8i 
 
 5 Columbiad . 
 
 
 
 8 
 
 23 
 
 Columbiad . . 
 
 
 
 10 
 
 6 Rifle (Parrott) 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 24 
 
 Rifle . . . 
 
 
 
 °8 
 
 7 Smooth-bore . 
 
 
 
 6f 
 
 25 
 
 Columbiad 
 
 
 
 IO 
 
 8 
 
 
 
 51 
 
 26 
 
 u 
 
 
 
 IO 
 
 9 " " . 
 
 
 
 6^ 
 
 27 
 
 a 
 
 
 
 8 
 
 10 " " . 
 
 
 
 6f 
 
 28 
 
 a 
 
 
 
 8 
 
 11 " " . 
 
 
 
 6i 
 
 29 
 
 (i 
 
 
 
 8 
 
 12 " " . 
 
 
 
 8 
 
 3° 
 
 it 
 
 
 
 8 
 
 13 " " • 
 
 
 
 6f 
 
 31 
 
 Rifle (Brooks) . 
 
 
 
 7 
 
 14 " " . 
 
 
 
 6f 
 
 32 
 
 Columbiad 
 
 
 
 8 
 
 15 " " . 
 
 
 
 H 
 
 33 
 
 Rifle . . . 
 
 
 
 u 8 
 
 16 Rifle . . . 
 
 
 
 6f 
 
 34 
 
 (i 
 
 
 
 6£ 
 
 17 " (Brooks) 
 
 
 
 7 
 
 35 
 
 " 
 
 
 
 8 
 
 18 " .... 
 
 
 
 6& 
 
 36 
 
 Columbiad 
 
 
 
 10 
 
EXPEDITIONS AGAINST FORT FISHER, ETC. I 87 
 
 
 
 INCHES 
 
 
 
 INCHES 
 
 37 
 
 Columbiad . . 
 
 . . IO 
 
 4i 
 
 Columbiad . . 
 
 . . IO 
 
 3S 
 
 Rifle (Brooks) . 
 
 • • 7 
 
 42 
 
 " . . 
 
 . . 10 
 
 39 
 
 
 6& 
 
 43 
 
 Rifle . . . . 
 
 • • 6f 
 
 40 
 
 Columbiad 
 
 . . 10 
 
 
 
 
 (The above is the order of guns from the left salient to Battery 
 Lamb.) 
 
 Within the curtain, behind the land face, were two mortars of 5^ 
 inches ; at the north-east bastion was one mortar of 8 inches ; behind 
 the sea-front was one 150-pounder Armstrong. 
 
 Another enumeration is by Colonel Towle, U. S. A. : — 
 
 SMOOTH-BORES. 
 
 2 1 1 -in. double-banded Brooks 
 15 10-in. Columbiads 
 12 8-in. " 
 
 7 iron 32-pounders 
 
 2 " 24-pounders 
 
 2 bronze 12-pounder howitzers 
 6 32-pounder carronades 
 
 3 12-pounders (bronze) 
 
 1 6-pounder (iron) 
 
 2 6-pounders (bronze) 
 
 1 10-in. sea-coast mortar 
 
 2 Coehorn iron mortars 
 1 i^-in. smooth-bore 
 
 1 volley gun (Robinson & Cot- 
 tum, makers) 
 57 Total 
 
 RIFLED GUNS. 
 
 i 8-in. 150-pounder Armstrong 
 
 3 7-in. double-banded Brooks 
 1 8-in. three-grooved 
 
 4 5f-in. non-banded 
 
 6 6f-in. single-banded 
 
 4 6|-in. double-banded Brookes 
 
 1 100-pounder Parrott, U. S. 
 
 1 5^-in. non-banded 
 
 1 4|-in. three-grooved 
 
 1 4 f in. 
 
 1 30-pounder Parrott, U. S. 
 
 1 3-in. Whitworth 
 
 2 3-in. banded Richmonds 
 
 1 2^-in. muzzle-loading Whit- 
 worth 
 28 Total 
 
 Net total, 85. (This includes Battery Buchanan and others.) 
 
 Forty-six (46) smooth-bores and 21 rifles remained in good con- 
 dition after January 15; of the former 11, and of the latter 7, were 
 disabled. 
 
MILITARY ESSAYS AND RECOLLECTIONS. 
 
 APPENDIX III. 
 
 AUTHORITIES AND SOURCES. 
 
 Copies of Official Reports furnished by the War Department ; 
 Report of Committee on Conduct of the War; " Personal Memoirs of 
 U. S. Grant;" "Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman;" "Battles 
 and Leaders of the Civil War ; " " Naval History of the Civil War ; " 
 "The Failure at Fort Fisher;" "Naval Battles off Fisher;" 
 " Terry's Fort Fisher Expedition ; " " The Powder Boat Experi- 
 ment;" '"New Ironsides' at Fort Fisher;" "Under Fire." 
 
 CASUALTIES IN FIRST BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION, 
 TWENTY-FOURTH ARMY CORPS. 
 
 January 15, 1865. 
 
 
 KILLED. 
 
 WOUNDED. 
 
 MISSING. 
 
 TOTAL. 
 
 OFF. 
 
 MEN. 
 
 OFF. 
 
 MEN. 
 
 OFF. 
 
 MEN. 
 
 OFF. 
 
 MEN. 
 
 i42d N. Y. V. . . 
 117th " . . 
 112th " . . 
 3d 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
 5 
 
 15 
 10 
 
 5 
 
 4 
 10 
 
 2 
 2 
 
 65 
 62 
 29 
 IO 
 
 — 
 
 3 
 
 4 
 
 2 
 
 5 
 
 11 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 73 
 81 
 
 39 
 17 
 
 
 2 
 
 35 
 
 18 
 
 166 
 
 — 
 
 9 
 
 20 
 
 210 
 
 Brigade staff : Bvt. Brig:. Gen. N. M. Curtis wounded. 
 
 R. Daggett, 
 Colonel Commanding Brigade.