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 THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER. 
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THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 
 
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THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 
 
 BREVET MAJOR GENERAL N. MARTIN CURTIS, U. S.V. 
 
 General Grant, in the 19th Chapter of the 2d Volume of 
 
 his Personal Memoirs, refers to Fort Fisher in the following 
 
 words : 
 
 " Up to January, 1865, the enemy occupied Fort Fisher, at the mouth of 
 Cape Fear River and below the City of Wilmington. This port was of immense 
 importance to the Confederates, because it formed their principal inlet for block- 
 ade-runners, by means of which they brought in from abroad such supplies and 
 munitions of war as they could not procure at home. It was equally important 
 to us to get possession of it, not only because it was desirable to cut off their 
 supplies so as to ensure a speedy termination of the war, but also because foreign 
 governments, particularly the British government, were constantly threatening 
 that unless ours could maintain the blockade off that coast they should cease to 
 recognize any blockade. For these reasons I determined, with the concurrence 
 of the Navy Department, in December, to send an expedition against Fort Fisher 
 for the purpose of capturing it." 
 
 Thomas E. Taylor, an English merchant, one of the most 
 active and successful blockade-runners during the war, says in 
 his book, " Running the Blockade," page 139: 
 
 " That morning (in Richmond, Va., December, 1864) I had an appointment 
 with the Commissary General, who divulged to me under promise of secrecy that 
 Lee's army was in terrible straits, and had in fact rations for only thirty days. 
 He asked me if I could help him. I said I would do my best, and after some 
 negotiations he undertook to pay me a profit of 350 per cent upon any provisions 
 and meat I could bring in within the next three weeks. . . . Although it was a 
 hard trip it paid well, as we had on board coming out a most magnificent cargo, 
 a great deal of sea island cotton, the profits upon which and the provisions I had 
 taken in amounted to over eighty-five thousand pounds — not bad work for about 
 twenty days." 
 
 January 15th, 1865, the day of the capture of Fort Fisher, 
 he wrote from Nassau to his chiefs in Liverpool, England : 
 (p. 136, same vol.) : 
 
 299 
 
 <k 
 
300 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 " Altogether I think the Confederate government is going to the bad, and if 
 they don't take care the Confederacy will go too. I never saw things look so 
 gloomy, and I think spring will finish them unless they make a change for the 
 better. Georgia is gone, and they say Sherman is going to seize Branchville ; if 
 he does Charleston and Wilmington will be done — and if Wilmington goes Lee 
 has to evacuate Richmond and retire into Tennessee. He told me the other day 
 that if they did not keep Wilmington they could not save Richmond. They nearly 
 had Fort Fisher — they were within sixty yards of it — and had they pushed on 
 as they ought to have done could have taken it. It was a terrific bombardment ; 
 they estimate that about 40,000 shells were sent into it. Colonel Lamb behaved 
 like a brick — splendidly. I got the last of the Whitworths in, and they are now 
 at the fort. They are very hard up for food in the field, but the Banshee has this 
 time 600 barrels of pork and 1 500 boxes of meat — enough to feed Lee's army 
 for a month." 
 
 When Colonel Lamb took command of the fort, July 4th, 
 1 862, he found it a quadrilateral work with six guns, flanked 
 north and south by five detached batteries carrying eleven guns, 
 four of which were casemated. Only one of the seventeen 
 guns was of modern ordnance. He stated that the frigate 
 Minnesota could have destroyed the works and driven them out 
 in a few hours. During his occupation of the fort he made it 
 the largest and best equipped fortification constructed by the 
 Confederates, as shown in his description of it as it stood before 
 the attack. 
 
 At the land-face of Fort Fisher, five miles from the in- 
 trenched camp at Sugar Loaf, the peninsula was about half a 
 mile wide. This face commenced about a hundred feet from 
 the river with a half bastion, and extended with a heavy curtain 
 to a full bastion on the ocean side, where it joined the sea-face, 
 without moat, scarp and counterscarp. The outer slope was 
 twenty feet high from the berm to the top of the parapet, at 
 an angle of 45 °, and was sodded with marsh grass, which grew 
 luxuriantly. The parapet was not less than twenty-five feet 
 thick, with an inclination of only one foot. The revetment was 
 five feet nine inches high from the floor of the gun-chambers, 
 and these were some twelve feet or more from the interior 
 plane. The guns were all mounted in barbette, on Columbiad 
 carriages ; there was not a single casemated gun in the fort. 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 301 
 
 Between the gun-chambers, containing one or two guns each 
 (there were twenty heavy guns on the land-face) there were 
 heavy traverses, exceeding in size any known to engineers, to 
 protect from an enfilading fire. They extended out some 
 twelve feet on the parapet and were twelve feet or more in 
 height above the parapet running back thirty feet or more. 
 The gun-chambers were reached from the rear by steps. In 
 each traverse was an alternate magazine or bomb-proof, the 
 latter ventilated by an air-chamber. Passageways penetrated 
 the traverses in the interior of the work, forming additional 
 bomb-proofs for the reliefs for the guns. 
 
 The sea-face for a hundred yards from the northeast bastion 
 was of the same massive character as the land-face. A crescent 
 battery intended for four guns adjoined this. A series of batter- 
 ies extended for three-quarters of a mile along the sea, connected 
 by an infantry curtain. These batteries had heavy traverses ten 
 or twelve feet high above the top of the parapets. On this line 
 was a bomb-proof electric battery connected with a system of sub- 
 marine torpedoes. Farther along a mound battery sixty feet high 
 was erected, with two heavy guns, which had a plunging fire on the 
 channel ; this was connected with the battery north of it by a 
 light curtain. Following the line of the works it was one mile 
 from the angle of the sea and land faces to the mound, and upon 
 this line twenty-four heavy guns were mounted. From the 
 mound for nearly a mile to the end of the point was a level sand 
 plain scarcely three feet above high tide, and much of it was sub- 
 merged during gales. At this point was Battery Buchanan, of 
 four guns, in the shape of an ellipse, commanding the inlet, its 
 two 1 1 -inch guns covering the approach by land. An advanced 
 redoubt with a 24-pounder was added after the first expedition. 
 A wharf for large steamers was in close proximity to these works. 
 As a defence against infantry there was a system of sub- 
 terra torpedoes extending across the peninsula, five to six hun- 
 dred feet from the land-face, and so disconnected that the explo- 
 sion of one would not affect the others ; inside the torpedoes, 
 
302 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 about fifty feet from the berm of the work, extending from 
 river bank to sea-shore, was a heavy palisade of sharpened 
 logs nine feet high, pierced for musketry. There was a redoubt 
 guarding the sally-port, from which two Napoleons were run out, 
 as occasion required. At the river end of the palisade was a 
 deep and muddy slough, across which was a bridge, over which 
 the river road entered the fort. Commanding this bridge was a 
 Napoleon gun. There were three mortars in rear of the land- 
 face. 
 
 Colonel Lamb says : 
 
 " Fort Fisher commanded the last gateway between the Confederate States and 
 the outside world. Its capture with the resulting loss of all the Cape Fear River 
 defences, and of Wilmington, the great importing depot of the South, effectually 
 ended all blockade running. Lee sent me word that Fort Fisher must be held or 
 he could not subsist his army." 
 
 General Butler reported at 8 p.m., December 27th, to General 
 Grant, his return to Fortress Monroe, briefly stating the oper- 
 ations of the men under his command, and his reasons for with- 
 drawing his forces. He stated that all but about three hundred 
 were re-embarked before he left the North Carolina coast, and that 
 he had no doubt they were all safely off by that time. He also 
 said that he would go up to see General Grant the next morning. 
 
 The transports returning with the troops (excepting one on 
 which was about one-quarter of Curtis's brigade, which did not 
 return until after the second expedition sailed) passed the capes 
 and anchored in Hampton Roads early in the morning of De- 
 cember 29th, and returned to their camps near the New Mar- 
 ket Road on the 30th of December. 
 
 In the interval between the return of the first expedition 
 and the departure of the second, General Grant was in corre- 
 spondence with the President, the Secretary of War, the Secre- 
 tary of the Navy and Admiral Porter, in reference to the failure 
 of the first expedition, and the preparation going forward to re- 
 new the attack upon Fort Fisher. 
 
 On January 2nd General Grant requested General Butler to 
 send Major General Terry to him at City Point, and the same 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 303 
 
 day issued Special Orders No. 2, Headquarters Armies of the 
 United States, directing eight thousand infantry, two batteries 
 of artillery without horses, with four days' cooked rations in hav- 
 ersacks, to be got in immediate readiness to embark on trans- 
 ports, with orders to report to Major General W. T. Sherman, 
 at Savannah, Ga. ; that the troops and artillery of the late ex- 
 pedition against Wilmington, being experienced in embarking 
 and debarking, should be selected, and to make up the balance 
 of the eight thousand, good and tried soldiers of the Second 
 Brigade, First Division, Twenty-fourth Army Corps, should be 
 taken. Brevet Major General A. H. Terry, U. S. Vols., was 
 assigned to the command of these forces, and directed that every 
 practicable precaution should be observed to prevent information 
 of any movement of troops getting to the enemy. 
 
 On January 2nd General Grant gave General Terry written 
 instructions to renew the attack on Fort Fisher, with details for 
 his co-operation with Admiral Porter. 
 
 On January 4th Lieutenant Colonel C. B. Comstock, Aide- 
 de-camp, was directed to report to General Terry, and accom- 
 pany him as chief engineer of the expedition under his command. 
 
 January 4th, on receipt of a letter from Admiral Porter, 
 General Grant gave General Terry additional instructions gov- 
 erning his action after joining Admiral Porter's fleet. When the 
 troops went down the James River, General Grant accompanied 
 General Terry to Fortress Monroe, and gave such verbal in- 
 structions as he deemed necessary. 
 
 January 4th, 1865, five days after returning from the first 
 expedition, the First Brigade broke camp, marched in a heavy 
 snow-storm to Bermuda Landing; and bivouacked for the night. 
 
 The next morning, General Adelbert Ames, commanding 
 Second Division, Twenty-fourth Army Corps, directed me to 
 embark my brigade on two river steamers, proceed to Hampton 
 Roads, transfer my command to the steamship Atlantic and 
 to reserve rooms on board the ship for himself and staff ; and 
 he especially directed that neither myself nor any member of 
 
304 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 my command should leave the ship after boarding it. The trip 
 down the James River, and the transfer of the troops to the 
 Atlantic were made before sundown. Before dark all the division 
 officers, except General Ames and his aide, Captain Henry C. 
 Lockwood, came on board, and reported that General Ames and 
 Captain Lockwood would soon join us. Two rooms had been 
 reserved for General Ames, and one for each of his staff. 
 
 About nine o'clock in the evening, information reached us 
 that Ames's division, Twenty-fourth Army Corps, Paine's 
 division, Twenty-fifth Corps (Colored), J. C. Abbott's Second 
 Brigade, First Division, Twenty-fourth Army Corps, and two 
 batteries of artillery were on transports in Hampton Roads. 
 
 At five minutes after twelve o'clock that night Captain Alger- 
 non E. Smith, 117th New York, aide to General A. H. Terry, 
 brought to my state-room a sealed envelope addressed " To the 
 Senior Officer on Board the Atlantic" and asked me to take and 
 receipt for it. This I declined to do, informing him that General 
 Ames was the senior officer on board, and the proper person to 
 receive it. He left, but soon returned with one of the division 
 staff, who reported that General Ames was not at that time on 
 board. I then receipted for the despatch, and after reading it to 
 the division staff officer, requested him to acquaint General 
 Ames with its contents as soon as he could do so. The orders 
 addressed "To the Senior Officer on Board the Atlantic" and 
 the sealed orders addressed "To be opened off Cape Henry," 
 read as follows : 
 
 Headquarters Expeditionary Forces, 
 General Orders, ) January 3, 1865. 
 
 No. 2. J 
 
 The vessels containing the troops of this expedition will leave Hampton Roads 
 precisely at 4 a.m. to-morrow. As far as possible the vessels containing the troops 
 of each division will keep together, and the whole fleet will follow the flagship, 
 which will carry red, white, and green lights at the masthead. They will pass out 
 between the capes, and when off Cape Henry the sealed orders which are furnished 
 to the commanding officer on each transport will be opened. The speed of the 
 transports will be as nearly as possible eight knots per hour. 
 
 By order of Bvt. Maj. Gen. A. H. Terry : 
 A. Terry, Captain, and Assistant Adjutant General." 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 305 
 
 Headquarters Expeditionary Forces, 
 January j, 1865. 
 Sealed Orders, 
 
 Commanding Officer of Troops, 
 
 On Board of U. S. Transport Atlantic : 
 Sir: 
 
 The transport fleet will rendezvous twenty-five miles off Beaufort, N.C. 
 You will immediately proceed to that point and report to the senior officer of the 
 expedition present at the time of your arrival. 
 You will then await further orders. 
 
 By order of Bvt. Maj. Gen. A. H. Terry : 
 
 A. Terry, Captain, and Assistant Adjutant General. 
 
 I sent word to Captain Gray, commanding the ship to weigh 
 anchor and be ready to sail at four o'clock in the morning. I 
 went on deck at 3 a.m., and found the men weighing anchor ; 
 but the ship waited for its position in the line until after day- 
 light, and then passed out between the capes. While sailing out 
 breakfast was served to the officers in the cabin. Before taking 
 seats at the table I requested Captain Charles A. Carleton, acting 
 assistant adjutant general on division staff, to invite General Ames 
 to join us. He replied, "General Ames did not come on board 
 until late, and will not breakfast for several hours." Before the 
 officers left the table Captain Gray was called on deck. He soon 
 returned and reported that the ship was off Cape Henry, and 
 asked for further orders. I handed to Captain Carleton the 
 sailing orders, as well as the sealed orders, "To be opened 
 when off Cape Henry," and requested him to give them to 
 General Ames. At first Captain Carleton declined to do so, 
 saying he did not wish to disturb General Ames, and said that I 
 should open the envelope and attend to all matters of detail 
 while on shipboard, as Colonel Bell had done on the first ex- 
 pedition. I replied that I should not assume any of the duties 
 of the division commander until directed by him to do so, and 
 that if he declined to take the orders to General Ames I would 
 send one of my own staff. Thereupon Captain Carleton took the 
 orders to the state-room in which General Ames's baggage had 
 been placed, but soon returned to the cabin and reported that 
 General Ames was not on board the ship. 
 
306 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 During the second day after the arrival of the division at the 
 rendezvous off Beaufort, N. C, General Ames and his personal 
 aide, Captain Lockwood, came on board the Atlantic from a 
 hospital ship which had sailed from Fortress Monroe the day- 
 following the departure of the expedition. General Ames then 
 charged General Curtis with " sailing with his division for the 
 purpose of commanding it," and used offensive words, which 
 were promptly resented and their retraction demanded. Follow- 
 ing this unhappy and uncalled for incident the intercourse 
 between these officers was limited to the strictest requirements 
 of official duty. 
 
 After the sailing of the troops above mentioned, Brevet 
 Brigadier General H. L. Abbott sailed from Fortress Monroe, 
 on the 7th of January, with a siege train of twenty 30-pounder 
 and four 100-pounder Parrott guns, twenty Coehorn mortars, 
 three companies of the 1st Connecticut Heavy Artillery, and 
 two companies of the 15th New York Engineers. This addi- 
 tional force joined us at the rendezvous one day before the 
 landing. 
 
 Early on the morning of Friday, January 13th, the vessels 
 of Admiral Porter's squadron moved into position before Fort 
 Fisher and opened a vigorous bombardment of the fort, which con- 
 tinued without cessation until its capture. About eight o'clock 
 a.m. a division of light draught naval vessels was detached from 
 the squadron to cover the landing of the troops, which was com- 
 pleted at three o'clock in the afternoon, together with extra 
 rations, ammunition and intrenching tools. The landing was 
 made through a heavy surf in which officers, men, provisions in 
 haversacks, and ammunition in boxes were thoroughly soaked. 
 
 A line established across the peninsula in the early morning 
 was soon abandoned for a second line, a mile farther south, on 
 which breastworks extending from the beach to the Cape Fear 
 River were thrown up during the night and completed at eight 
 o'clock the next morning, when the troops of General Ames's 
 division were withdrawn from the line. General Paine's divis- 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 307 
 
 ion and Abbott's brigade (under command of General Paine) 
 were left to defend it if attacked by the enemy, then in large 
 force at Sugar Loaf, two and a half miles north. The maintain- 
 ing of this line was of vital importance — a failure to do so 
 would have caused the withdrawal of troops from before the 
 fort, to reinforce the line. General Terry was justified, in view 
 of the past services of the troops under Generals Paine and 
 Abbott, in leaving it in their charge. The regiments of 
 Abbott's brigade were first organized under General Terry, and 
 he always fondly referred to it as " his old brigade." They were 
 prepared to make a stubborn defence, but the mildness of 
 General Bragg's demonstrations did not rise to the dignity of an 
 attack at any time. Not only did he not, throughout the 
 day, force back the line ; his fire did not wound a single Union 
 soldier. 
 
 For the third time since he rejoined the expedition, General 
 Ames now requested General Terry to promise that he would 
 not designate General Curtis for any special duty, and, failing 
 to obtain assurance that his request would be complied with, 
 stated to General Terry that he would not be responsible for 
 the success of any movement with which General Curtis was 
 charged. Thereupon General Terry answered : " I have known 
 General Curtis for nearly two years, and have perfect confidence 
 in his ability and fidelity. I will relieve him from your com- 
 mand, and direct him to report to me for orders." Immediately 
 after this General Terry informed me that from that time I 
 should receive all orders from him direct. A brief statement 
 of this incident is made to give a better understanding of 
 subsequent events. 
 
 Soon after being relieved from General Ames's command my 
 brigade accompanied General Terry and Colonel Comstock, 
 Aide to General Grant, to Battery Holland, below Craig's Land- 
 ing, where a small steamer, loaded with forage and ammunition, 
 was captured. While marching down a shell from the rebel 
 gunboat Chickamauga, lying in the Cape Fear River, ex- 
 
308 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 ploded near the head of the column, seriously wounding Captain 
 J. H. Reeve, commanding the 3rd New York, and three men 
 of the brigade. 
 
 A skirmish line was sent forward from Battery Holland, 
 under cover of which General Terry, Colonel Comstock and 
 myself went along the sand dunes near the river to within six 
 hundred yards of the fort. After completing his observations 
 General Terry asked, "Do you think the fort can be successfully 
 assaulted with the force I can spare from the line established 
 last night, the holding of which is of the first importance ? " I 
 replied that I believed the three brigades already withdrawn 
 from the line could carry the fort by an assault if the disposi- 
 tions were properly made, and if the Navy should support the 
 troops from start to finish. He said, " It has been definitely 
 determined that in case an assault is made you will make it. 
 I will see Admiral Porter this evening, and we will then decide 
 what course to pursue." 
 
 General Terry directed me to remain near the fort if I could 
 do so safely, or to retire to the reserves near the breastworks 
 thrown up the night before, where he could be found to receive 
 reports of any incidents which I might think it important for 
 him to know. He then returned, with Colonel Comstock, to 
 the reserves. 
 
 From a sand dune on the right of my skirmish line I took a 
 survey of the ground in front of the parapet, and determined to 
 throw up breastworks to protect the assaulting party. On 
 account of the conformation I decided to construct these lines 
 at an angle to the curtain, the left flanks to be fifty yards nearer 
 the fort than the right flanks. There was marshy ground in 
 front of the west half of the parapet, but I preferred to march 
 through it rather than go to the eastward over dry ground, 
 although the west end of the parapet was higher than the east 
 end, as the low ground in front made it easier to get under the 
 plane of fire than at the east end, where the surface was higher, 
 and served as a natural glacis. Because of this, when the 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 309 
 
 assault finally came to be made, the naval column was kept 
 under fire longer than were the troops assaulting on the left 
 end of the parapet. 
 
 As soon as it was dark a skirmish line was deployed at five 
 paces, the front rank carrying muskets, the rear shovels, and 
 advanced to the place selected for the first line. Here the men 
 in the rear line proceeded to throw up enough sand to protect a 
 man lying on his face, while the line with muskets advanced 
 twenty paces beyond the men with shovels. In the drift sand 
 the work was quickly done. Then the man with the shovel 
 went forward and gave it to the picket, from whom he took his 
 musket and marched forward twenty paces, while the former 
 picket threw up the sand where he stood ; and so the lines 
 went forward, each man exchanging gun for shovel. In this 
 manner four lines of breastworks were laid out, the last being 
 under the plane of fire. Details were made to connect these 
 " Gopher Holes," as the men called them, thus making con- 
 tinuous lines. About one hundred and seventy-five yards from 
 the parapet a higher and heavier breastwork was thrown up to 
 protect a party of sharpshooters ; and forty men, selected on 
 account of their skill as marksmen, were immediately sent to 
 occupy it. They had orders to remain until the next night, or 
 until an assault should be made, in which case they were 
 instructed to join the first line and go to the fort. In the 
 meantime they were to prevent the loading of the Columbiads 
 on the parapet. The work was completed before dawn, and 
 the tired troops of the First Brigade turned in for a well-earned 
 rest. Many of those who slept on the sands of Federal Point 
 the night preceding the battle of January 15th, friends and 
 foes alike, will, from causes incident to the service, remember 
 that night, with all its disagreeable features, as one which 
 afforded them sweeter and more restful slumber than they have 
 since obtained on the softest couch. 
 
 On the morning of the 15 th General Terry, with Colonel 
 Comstock, came to Battery Holland, and informed me that it 
 
310 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 had been agreed between Admiral Porter and himself that the 
 three brigades of the Second Division should attack the west 
 end of the parapet, while sixteen hundred sailors and four 
 hundred marines would attack the east end at three o'clock in 
 the afternoon. He then asked, " What have you done or dis- 
 covered during the night ? " He was told about the rifle pits 
 and their use when advancing on the fort, and the stationing of 
 men under the plane of fire to keep the cannoneers from loading 
 the Columbiads when the assaulting forces should take position 
 preliminary to the final rush. He approved the work, and later 
 sent forward sixty men of the 13th Indiana (Third Brigade) 
 with repeating rifles, to join the sharpshooters. They went 
 under command of Lieutenant Colonel Samuel M. Zent, and 
 they performed most valuable service. 
 
 General Terry said to me, " You stated yesterday that an 
 assault would be successful ' if the dispositions were properly 
 made.' Your brigade is to lead, and I should like to know 
 your views as to the formation." I replied that I wished to 
 charge in line, brigade front, make successive advances from one 
 rifle pit to the next, the final rush not to be made until we were 
 as near the fort as we could get without drawing the infantry 
 fire, and that our movements in this particular would be gov- 
 erned by the action of the enemy in coming to the parapet ; that 
 when his infantry came up we would wait behind our newly made 
 rifle pits until the Navy pounded them down ; when they were 
 down we would go forward to the next line ; when they came to 
 the parapet again we would again lie down until they were 
 driven back ; and when they should refuse to leave the parapet 
 we would make the final rush and get under the plane of fire 
 before the enemy could deliver a second volley. 
 
 General Terry said, " Don't you want to strike them in 
 column with a hammer-head?" I replied, "After I get under 
 the plane of fire I will ; but before that the thinner the line 
 the better. The troops will be in column when they get to the 
 parapet. The right regiment will go straight to the right of the 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 3 1 1 
 
 left salient, the three other regiments will oblique to the right 
 and strike the fort at the same place, and so reduce the front to 
 one-third of what it will be at the start. We will pass the 
 stockade and mount the parapet, and if we cannot get in, send 
 a brigade to push us in." The subject was fully discussed, and 
 after Colonel Comstock had given the plan his approval General 
 Terry accepted it. He thus became responsible for the plan, 
 and ordered its execution. 
 
 I said, " General Terry, the final rush will be made when 
 you see me rise in the middle of the line and hear me call aloud. 
 Soon after you will see the First Brigade go through the stock- 
 ade and up the parapet ; then send Pennypacker's brigade." He 
 replied, " With the men of your brigade on the parapet I shall 
 feel certain of success. A lodgment there assures victory." 
 
 About noon General Ames came to the front with Bell's 
 and Pennypacker's brigades, and halted, them in rear of my 
 brigade. 
 
 A little time before advancing to the line from which the 
 start was to be made, a naval officer, Lieutenant Porter, I 
 think, came to me and said, " General Terry informs me that 
 your brigade is to lead in the assault, and I desire to be informed 
 of your plans, so that the sailors and marines on the beach may 
 move at the same time you do." I told him of the plans for a 
 gradual approach, and that the final rush would be made when 
 the garrison remained on the parapet, at which time the column 
 on the beach should also start ; that I did not approve of the 
 formation the Navy seemed inclined to make, and feared the 
 result would not be satisfactory. He replied, " I am sorry 
 Army officers find so much fault with the Navy. We are try- 
 ing to help them on their own ground, and they ought to be 
 satisfied." I answered, " You misunderstand me. We want 
 you very much, both your guns on the ships and your men on 
 the shore. I speak as a landsman about operations on land — 
 I would not criticise nautical matters. Your men are too com- 
 pactly formed — your front is too narrow for the depth of your 
 
312 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 column. To go into action as your men are now formed places 
 you under a great disadvantage. You should hold back your 
 main body until your advanced line gets a foothold on the fort. 
 If you go forward as you are you will be fearfully punished, and 
 the only good your column will do us will be to receive the fire 
 which otherwise would come to our lines. I fully understand 
 the great advantage the troops will derive from this movement 
 of the Navy, but hesitate to commend it when I think of the 
 heavy loss they must sustain in making it in the formation you 
 have adopted." The officer left, assuring me that the Navy 
 would do its part and merit approval whether the Army gave it 
 or not. 
 
 Two thousand men from the Navy, from sixty ships, unac- 
 quainted one with another or with the service they were to 
 undertake, were brought together on the beach to perform a 
 most hazardous work. The number of officers was small — 
 entirely too few for the number of men engaged. As before 
 stated, the force was too compact. The first line should have 
 been longer and thinner, and the main body kept out of the fire 
 until the first line had reached the fort. Such a plan requires 
 good men — veterans ; it is, however, the way to assault fortifi- 
 cations with the least loss of life, almost the only plan by which 
 to achieve success. 
 
 Before advancing to the first line every officer and man had 
 been instructed as to his movements and the order in which 
 they would take place, and that the point of attack would be 
 between the first and second traverses. 
 
 Just before the preliminary movements were begun Captain 
 A. G. Lawrence, of General Ames's staff, came to me and asked 
 if he could go with my brigade. I replied that he could if he 
 would not interfere with its movements, and sent him to Lieu- 
 tenant Colonel F. X. Meyer, commanding the 1 1 7th New York, 
 at the right of the line. Captain Lawrence understood that I 
 was not under the command of his chief, and that he could not 
 accompany my brigade without my permission. He did not go 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 313 
 
 as the representative of another, nor did he make the slightest 
 attempt to direct the movements of the men. He fell at the 
 stockade, seriously wounded, the victim of a valor which he con- 
 spicuously exhibited in every battle in which he participated. 
 
 The preliminary advances were made in a succession of thin 
 lines, number one of the first line going forward to a rifle pit, 
 followed by number two ; the rear rank advancing in the same 
 manner. By this method only one-fourth of the line was ex- 
 posed to the enemy's fire. 
 
 After the first advance Captain Keeler, of the division staff, 
 who was near the right of my line, called out, " General Ames 
 says the time for the assault has come." I replied, " I shall 
 obey the orders of General Terry, who understands that the 
 advance depends upon the fire of the Navy and its effect upon 
 the garrison." 
 
 Three short advances were made. During each the garrison 
 came to the parapet ; when the line halted it returned to the 
 bomb-proofs, each time remaining longer on the parapet and 
 suffering greater damage from the naval fire. When the enemy 
 seemed determined to remain on the parapet the final rush 
 was made. I arose from the middle of the line and called 
 out "Forward," advancing as I arose from the ground. Each 
 officer and man had been instructed to advance as he got up, 
 and to go forward in silence. Cheering was positively for- 
 bidden, the object being to keep the men from expending their 
 wind needlessly, as it was all important to save it for the final 
 rush up the parapet. We were fifteen paces to the front before 
 we reached the usual height of a running man, which is about 
 one-third less than the height when standing. The result of 
 this movement was to cause the first volley to pass over our 
 heads, doing but little damage. Had the order been given, 
 " Attention, first battalion, guide right, second, third and fourth 
 battalions oblique to the right," many in the line would have 
 been shot down before a start was made. 
 
 The naval fire had made many openings in the stockade, but 
 
314 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 not enough to allow speedy passage through it. One hundred 
 axes which had been distributed in the brigade were vigorously- 
 used, under a galling fire, in making openings for the men. 
 The first forty or fifty through the stockade climbed up the 
 parapet and met the enemy between the first and second trav- 
 erses. In this space there were two Columbiads, one disabled, 
 the enemy loading the other. The charge had been sent home, 
 but the ramrod not withdrawn, when we overpowered the gun- 
 ners. The man at the breech put out his hand with a primer 
 to discharge the piece, after his surrender had been demanded. 
 A sharp blow from a sabre on his outstretched hand quickly dis- 
 suaded him, and the charge remained until the captors had 
 leisure to withdraw it. 
 
 The first battle-flag to come up was a marker of the 1 1 7th 
 New York, which was promptly placed on the second traverse. 
 Its right to remain there was tested in a hand to hand contest 
 with swords and bayonets, in which the Yankees' won. 
 
 We then went down to the floor of the fort and secured the 
 men serving a Napoleon gun at the gate, and a number of in- 
 fantry posted at the stockade west of the gate. These men 
 were sent to the rear without escort. Their capture removed 
 the chief obstacle to an approach by the road. At this time 
 the 'Second Brigade entered the fort, some through the gate, 
 and others over the parapet. Just before returning to the para- 
 pet I saw General Ames advancing from the gate, through which 
 he had apparently entered the fort. He requested Adjutant 
 Roys, 117th New York, to take a number of prisoners then 
 coming out of the left bomb-proof, to General Terry, with his 
 compliments. I directed Adjutant Roys to return to the para- 
 pet, where he could be better employed than in escorting pris- 
 oners to the rear. He obeyed my order, and rendered most 
 efficient service in the front line throughout the day. Upon 
 reaching the parapet I found that a large number of my brigade 
 had succeeded in getting through the stockade, and were advan- 
 cing to the place first gotten possession of, where they were 
 being rapidly joined by men of the Second Brigade. 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 315 
 
 At the time we made the grand rush for the left of the para- 
 pet, the naval column moved in mass upon the sea bastion. 
 The enemy, believing this to be the main attack, turned upon 
 them all the guns which could sweep the beach, and massed 
 more than half of his infantry behind the right of the parapet 
 to repel the attack. Colonel Lamb conducted this defence of 
 the sea bastion in person. The enemy's fire upon the naval 
 column was terribly effective, spreading death and disorder. 
 Except a few, who reached the stockade, those not disabled soon 
 retired. 
 
 General Whiting at this time occupied a position on the 
 parapet midway between the sea bastion and the sally-port. 
 The repulse of the naval column caused the troops under 
 Colonel Lamb and General Whiting to cheer vigorously, the 
 cheers being heard above the roar of the cannon ; but their 
 exultation was short, for, upon looking to the west, they saw 
 two U. S. flags on the left of the parapet, — their comrades 
 unable to remove them. General Whiting hurried with the 
 troops near him to the left of the line, and joined in the contest 
 which we made for the third traverse. While in this hand to 
 hand conflict he received a mortal wound, and was carried to a 
 bomb-proof, whence he encouraged his men to continue the de- 
 fence. Colonel Pennypacker, commanding the Second Brigade, 
 was severely wounded while placing the colors of his regiment 
 on this traverse, and Colonel Moore, 203rd Pennsylvania, was 
 killed while advancing with the colors of his regiment to the 
 same position. Lieut. Colonel Burney and Major Jones, 142nd 
 New York, were wounded here, but soon after re-entered the 
 contest. Here Captain Thomas, 117th New York, was killed. 
 Lieut. Colonel Meyer and Major Bagg, 117th New York, al- 
 though each wounded, and many officers of the Second Brigade 
 whose names I cannot give, came to the front and joined in the 
 contest until our possession of the traverse was undisputed. 
 Our killed and wounded on the parapet impeded our advance to 
 the fourth traverse so that we were scarcely able to go forward 
 
316 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 without treading upon them. Colonel Lamb came forward with 
 troops to meet us at the fourth traverse, bringing into action a 
 larger number than we had met at the third. Our numbers 
 were also increased by those who joined us as rapidly as they 
 came into the fort. The struggle for this traverse was the 
 hottest and most prolonged single contest of the day. The loss 
 of life was great on both sides. The killed and wounded were 
 set aside to make room for comrades who came impetuously for- 
 ward to support their respective sides. In this contest Colonel 
 Lamb was seriously wounded, and taken to the same bomb r proof 
 occupied by General Whiting, from which place he directed his 
 subordinates to make every resistance to our advance ; but our 
 success in this fearful struggle had turned the tide, their 
 defence became less spirited and effective, and each succeeding 
 traverse was taken with less difficulty. 
 
 The naval fire throughout the day had been delivered with 
 singular accuracy, at the rate of two or three shells per second, 
 in front of the assaulting forces ; but at the fifth traverse a shot 
 went wide of its mark and killed or disabled all but four men in 
 our front line. Fearing that a slackening of our fire would in- 
 vite a countercharge, I myself discharged the guns of the killed 
 and disabled men until reinforcements were brought forward. 
 A sudden emergency compelled this action. It was not done to 
 encourage the soldiers • — no theatrical efforts were needed to 
 quicken their zeal. Men unable to stand and fire their pieces 
 handed up the guns of their dead and helpless comrades, and 
 when given back reloaded them again and again, exhibiting a 
 frenzied zeal and unselfish devotion, that, seemingly, nothing but 
 death could chill. 
 
 While we were capturing the traverses, others on the floor 
 of the fort fought the enemy in bomb-proofs and behind obstruc- 
 tions near the parapet, keeping pace with us. Lieut. Colonel 
 Lyman, 203rd Pennsylvania, was killed while actively urging this 
 line forward. Several company officers were in this detachment, 
 and vigorously conducted these operations after his death, among 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 317 
 
 them Captain William H. Walling, 142nd New York Volunteers, 
 who, on the first expedition, had captured the garrison flag of 
 Fort Fisher. Captain R. D. Morehouse, 142nd New York 
 Volunteers, in charge of a party, captured a large number of 
 Confederates in the sally-port, from which they had energetically 
 opposed the advance of our forces on the floor of the fort ; but 
 our progress on the parapet rendered their position untenable, 
 and, by a skilful movement, he captured them before they could 
 retire to other defences. His skill and bravery were as con- 
 spicuous then as his modest dignity is noticeable among his com- 
 panions of the Legion. This capture was considered by the 
 Confederates a dishonorable surrender. They did not know 
 then that these men had been compelled to surrender, and had 
 only put up a white flag when retreat was impossible. Major 
 William J. Sanders reports this incident in the following language: 
 " General Whiting, although wounded, was still directing, as far 
 as possible, the movements of his small force, when Major Riley 
 rushed in and reported the astonishing fact that an officer, hav- 
 ing put his handkerchief on a ramrod whilst he was temporarily 
 in another portion of his command, had surrendered three 
 hundred of his men and admitted a regiment into the galleries 
 of the sally-port on the land-face." 
 
 Progress was more easily and steadily made until we gained 
 possession of the seventh traverse at 4.45 p.m., where it was 
 found that our best marksmen could drive the gunners from 
 the Columbiad on the sea bastion, with which gun the enemy 
 had enfiladed the ditch and given the assailants more trouble 
 than with any other piece in the fort. When it was discovered 
 that this gun could be silenced, the project of marching up the 
 ditch and capturing the sea bastion was decided upon, and men 
 at the west end of the fort were summoned to undertake it. I 
 sent Corporal Jones, of the color guard of the 1 17th New York, 
 to the west end of the fort to bring men forward. He came 
 back, and stated that General Ames directed him to return and 
 say that men could not be sent, but spades to fortify would be 
 
318 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 furnished. My orderly, A. D. Knight, was next sent to obtain 
 men, and directed to state the object of the movement to be 
 made. He soon returned, and stated that General Ames had 
 ordered him to say that the men were exhausted, and no further 
 advance would be attempted until reinforcements arrived in 
 the morning ; that we should hold the ground occupied, if 
 possible, and that intrenching tools would be sent to us. I 
 directed Orderly Knight to go back and request officers under 
 my rank to collect men and bring them forward, so that the 
 attack could be made before dark ; to say that the resistance of 
 the enemy was less than at the beginning of the battle, and that 
 the capture of the bastion would compel an early surrender. 
 Knight soon returned with an armful of spades which General 
 Ames had ordered him to carry to me that I might fortify and 
 hold our position until fresh troops came into the fort. I threw 
 the spades over the traverse to the Confederates. Being con- 
 vinced that General Ames intended to suspend operations until 
 reinforcements came in, I directed Silas W. Kempton, Mate 
 U. S. Navy, who reported to me early in the engagement and 
 volunteered to serve in whatever capacity he might be useful, 
 to go, for the second time, to General Terry, to urge him to 
 have the troops then engaged in throwing up fortifications in 
 rear of the left end of the parapet to join in a general advance, 
 and take possession of the fort before reinforcements could be 
 sent in to the enemy. I instructed him to state that the enemy 
 were offering slight resistance, and that a bold push would 
 secure a victory already substantially won. This young sailor 
 had been previously sent to General Terry, after we had won 
 possession of the fourth traverse, to ask him to have the naval 
 fire in front of our advancing lines increased, if possible, and to 
 have the fuses cut shorter, so as to cause the explosion of 
 the shells nearer the parapet. Many passed beyond the fort, 
 and were lost by exploding in the marsh and river. The zeal 
 and intelligence of Mr. Kempton commanded my warmest 
 admiration. 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 319 
 
 I then directed Captain David B. Magill, 117th New York, 
 to take the next traverse with the first men who should come 
 up, and went to the west end of the parapet and to the floor of 
 the fort in rear of it, to obtain men to march up the ditch to 
 the sea bastion. While collecting them on the floor of the fort 
 in rear of the first and second traverses, General Ames addressed 
 me, for the first time since the movement on the fort had 
 begun, and said, " I have two or three times sent you word to 
 fortify your position and hold it until reinforcements can be 
 sent to aid us ; the men are exhausted, and I will not order 
 them to go forward." I directed his attention to two steam- 
 boats in the Cape Fear River, loaded with Confederate troops, 
 waiting for darkness to enable them to land, which they could 
 not do while it was light, because of the naval fire, and said, 
 " Should they succeed in landing they may be able to drive us 
 out ; therefore, the fort should be captured before fresh troops 
 come to the enemy." I informed him that the garrison was 
 resisting with less spirit than earlier in the day, and asserted 
 that complete victory was within our grasp if we aroused our- 
 selves and pushed the advantage we surely had, and that I 
 intended to conduct the movement up the ditch to the sea 
 bastion if I could get but fifty men. Several said, " We will 
 go." At this time the sun was just disappearing, at 5.1 5^ p.m., 
 — as stated by the Navy Department, two hours and five 
 minutes from the opening of the battle. 
 
 While the volunteers were assembling I went further into 
 the fort and had ascended a magazine or sand dune for the 
 purpose of looking into the angle of the bastion I intended to 
 attack, when I was struck and disabled by two fragments of a 
 shell, one destroying the left eye, and the other carrying away 
 a portion of the bone at the base of the brain. I was uncon- 
 scious for several hours. 
 
 From official and other trustworthy sources it is shown that 
 after sundown no special efforts were made to advance our 
 lines, except the capture of an additional traverse by the troops 
 
320 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 left under command of Captain Magill when I started out to 
 collect men to go up the ditch. About 8 o'clock a regiment 
 of colored troops from General Paine's line was sent to General 
 Ames to assist in taking possession of the fort. He directed 
 them to stack arms outside the fort and join the men in the 
 rear of the left end of the parapet in throwing up breastworks 
 to protect the assailants from a counter-charge by the garrison. 
 Late in the afternoon the sailors and marines were withdrawn 
 from the beach and sent to relieve Abbott's brigade, which was 
 immediately sent down to the fort. The 3rd New Hampshire 
 was placed on the right of Abbott's brigade, and when Captain 
 Trickey, in command of it, was directed by General Abbott to 
 take the traverse on that part of the parapet where the greatest 
 resistance was expected to be made, the captain called his 
 attention to the fact that he had less than eighty men in his 
 command, and that a greater number might be needed to carry 
 the traverses. General Abbott informed him he' would be 
 supported, and that his regiment was specially named to him by 
 General Terry for that duty. The fact that the regiment was 
 armed with repeating rifles may have influenced General Terry 
 in making the selection. The order for the placing of the 
 3rd New Hampshire in Abbott's brigade, as stated to me by its 
 commander, shows that General Terry kept in close touch with 
 the several brigades, and gave personal attention to their move- 
 ments throughout the battle. When Abbott's brigade reached 
 the unoccupied portion of the parapet the enemy received it 
 with a volley, but not heavy enough to check its progress. It 
 marched over the parapet, across the floor of the fort, parallel 
 to the sea-face, and southward to Battery Buchanan, where the 
 garrison of Fort Fisher was found, unarmed and demoralized. 
 These operations of Abbott's brigade were successfully carried 
 out with the loss of four men killed and twenty-three wounded. 
 As soon as it was dark General Whiting and Colonel Lamb 
 had been carried to Battery Buchanan, the former mortally and 
 the latter seriously wounded. It was proposed to send them 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 321 
 
 across the river in small boats, as many had been, but they de- 
 termined to remain and share the fate of the garrison. 
 
 The troops entered the fort without hesitation, and vied one 
 with another, officers and men alike, for possession of the work. 
 The loss in the early part of the engagement of Colonel Bell, 
 commanding Third Brigade, and Colonel Smith, 112th New 
 York, both mortally wounded before reaching the work, and of 
 Colonel Moore, killed soon after mounting the parapet, was 
 sorely felt throughout the day. They were soldiers of marked 
 ability, veterans who had won distinction in every campaign in 
 which the army to which they belonged had been engaged. 
 Colonel Pennypacker, commanding Second Brigade, was seri- 
 ously wounded while placing the colors of his regiment on the 
 third traverse. This distinguished officer had put his brigade 
 into position and given it an impulse which continued through- 
 out the day. The loss of no officer could have been greater. 
 At the end of the first hour few officers could have been found 
 not disabled or bearing wounds that would have justified their 
 retirement from an ordinary engagement, and a suspension of 
 hostilities would have followed had not the troops been of the 
 highest grade. Nine-tenths of them were veterans who had 
 served in the campaigns in Virginia and the Carolinas, and had 
 fought in every battle from Cold Harbor to the last battle in the 
 campaign before Petersburg and Richmond. There was not an 
 officer or man in the division who did not merit the highest 
 commendation for unyielding persistency, courage, and devotion. 
 
 While the First and Second Brigades were the first to enter 
 the fort, and contended together without distinction for posses- 
 sion of the parapet, it is not the intention to claim that one 
 brigade was superior. Circumstances to a large degree, no 
 doubt, influenced the selection as to the order in which the 
 troops attacked the fort. The First Brigade had been near it 
 on the first expedition, had taken its flag and a battalion of 
 prisoners, and thoroughly believed that it could have been 
 captured then. The knowledge of this fact undoubtedly had 
 
322 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 much weight in influencing the commanding general to select 
 that brigade to lead the assaulting forces. Each brigade took 
 the position assigned to it, and performed its duties in a most 
 courageous and efficient manner. 
 
 The crisis was passed soon after four o'clock, and success 
 assured when the First and Second Brigades had mounted the 
 parapet and demonstrated their ability not only to hold their 
 ground, but to make steady progress from traverse to traverse. 
 Had Ames and Curtis both been killed or disabled at the time 
 Pennypacker was wounded, the battle would have proceeded 
 successfully under the command of field and company officers. 
 When the battle was well begun skill and generalship consisted in 
 physical blows, and to every one who struck them honor is due. 
 
 Admiral Porter wanted success no less than General Terry, 
 and was ready to take any steps in the line of his profession to 
 win it. He knew, as all did, that a naval column would divert 
 the garrison, and asked the navy to furnish men to' form it. 
 In pursuit of victory desperate chances are often taken. Never 
 did men undertake a more difficult or hazardous task, and never 
 did men offer themselves in their country's service with more 
 zeal, courage or unselfish devotion than did the officers and men 
 of the Navy, and the Marines, on the beach at Fort Fisher. 
 Their action contributed to the progress of the army — whether 
 the gain justified the losses we shall never know. The naval 
 column was important as a diversion, but its value was slight in 
 comparison with the fire of the six hundred guns trained on the 
 fort. The fleet maintained an uninterrupted fire for two days, 
 exceeding in effectiveness any bombardment recorded in the 
 annals of war. To Admiral Porter's fleet the army was in- 
 debted for an uncontested landing, for an uninterrupted approach 
 to within charging distance of the fort, and to its well directed 
 fire in front of the assaulting forces, for a success which, with- 
 out the Navy's aid, would have been impossible. 
 
 It will not be out of place to refer to the enemy and their 
 defence of the fort. 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 323 
 
 The constant fire of the Navy for two days deprived the 
 garrison of opportunity to rest or prepare food. While they 
 suffered but little from this fire until brought out of their bomb- 
 proofs to contest the advance of the assaulting forces, they then 
 came under the hottest fire men ever encountered. Colonel 
 Lamb skillfully conducted the defence, aided by General Whit- 
 ing, who had volunteered his services on entering the fort. 
 They protected their men until the decisive moment, and then 
 led them with conspicuous gallantry. 
 
 The left of the parapet was in charge of a junior officer 
 whose mistake, that of a moment only, was in failing to mount 
 the parapet and contest our advance from the ditch. The men 
 serving the piece of artillery covering the road, west of the para- 
 pet, were so intent in performing their duty that they were un- 
 conscious of our approach until ordered to surrender by men of 
 the 1 1 7th New York, who went down from the parapet after 
 capturing the second traverse. 
 
 General Bragg, in his report on the capture of the fort, says 
 of our assaulting line : 
 
 " His army column, preceded by a single regiment, ap- 
 proached along the river and entered the work on that flank 
 almost unopposed." 
 
 This does a great injustice to the men guarding the road. 
 In fact they made it fatal to approach by the road ; and not 
 until their capture, in active defence of the work, was the road 
 made a safer line of approach than over the parapet. The Con- 
 federate garrison of Fort Fisher might well resent this asper- 
 sion on their most stubborn defence, and justly complain of the 
 indifference of General Bragg, who had six thousand men within 
 striking distance of our defensive line — more than twice the 
 number of men holding the line — in not vigorously attacking 
 it. General Bragg reported to General Lee "That at 4 p.m., 
 when the enemy's infantry advanced to the assault, our troops 
 were making a heavy demonstration against the enemy's rear." 
 Although he expended a large amount of ammunition in making 
 
324 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 this so-called "heavy demonstration," nevertheless General 
 Paine's line was maintained without the loss or injury of a single 
 Union soldier. 
 
 I have said that the enemy plainly showed signs of weaken- 
 ing before 5 p.m., and that full possession of the fort only 
 awaited the advance of the Federal troops. This statement is 
 supported by the reports of Confederate officers. 
 
 In his report General Whiting says : 
 
 " The fall both of the general and the colonel commanding 
 the fort, one about 4 and the other about 4.30 p.m., had a per- 
 ceptible effect upon the men, and no doubt hastened greatly the 
 result ; but we were overpowered, and no skill or gallantry could 
 have saved the place, after he effected a lodgment, except attack 
 in the rear." 
 
 General Colquitt, who had been ordered, late in the after- 
 noon, to take command of the fort, reported to General Bragg 
 the condition of affairs he found on landing on Federal Point 
 between 9 and 10 p.m. 
 
 "We landed, therefore, four hundred or five hundred yards 
 from Battery Buchanan, between the Battery and Fort Fisher. 
 I was not hailed, and did not see a sentinel or picket. A short 
 distance from the point of landing I saw a shanty with several 
 negroes and one or two white men in it. They reported that 
 Fisher was taken, which, as I distrusted, I required one of them 
 to come out and go with me as guide. I was about starting 
 when an officer, representing himself as Captain Munn, with a 
 dozen or fifteen men, without arms, came up. These I took for 
 a fatigue detail, until the captain informed me the fort was 
 evacuated ; that he had just come from it, and that General 
 Whiting and Colonel Lamb were already at Battery Buchanan. 
 . . . Meeting an officer, he said he would carry me to Colonel 
 Lamb, who was wounded. I found the colonel prostrate with 
 a wound, which he thought, however, was not severe. In an- 
 swer to my inquiry whether anything more could be done, he 
 replied that a fresh brigade might then retake the fort. I told 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 325 
 
 him there was no brigade with me, and wished to know of him 
 the condition of the men who had escaped. He said that when 
 he was wounded everything broke up in consternation and was 
 utterly disorganized, and that no further efforts could effect 
 anything with the resources available." 
 
 Lieutenant Hugh H. Colquitt, who accompanied General 
 Colquitt to Battery Buchanan, in his report says : 
 
 " I asked an officer, the coolest man I saw, at what hour the 
 enemy got into the fort. He replied, about two hours by the 
 sun. ' What in the world have you been doing since ? ' This 
 he answered by stating that he had been fighting in the fort 
 ever since, until dark, when the garrison commenced leaving, 
 and he presumed all had left by that time. . . . All our men 
 were in a state of panic and demoralization ; no organization, 
 no guns, nothing but confusion and dismay." 
 
 "The Abstract From Return of the Expeditionary Forces, 
 Bvet. Maj. Gen. Alfred H. Terry, U. S. Army, commanding, 
 for January 10, 1865," gives the aggregate of the four brigades 
 engaged in reducing the fort, five days before the assault, 
 to have been two hundred and fifty-seven officers and five thou- 
 sand one hundred and seventy-two men. Of this number prob- 
 ably thirty-seven hundred took part in the assault, and at 9 
 o'clock p.m. thirteen hundred men under Abbott and three 
 hundred colored troops entered the fort substantially unopposed, 
 to secure a victory actually won four hours before. There are 
 no records in the War Department giving the number of officers 
 and men in the brigades commanded respectively by Curtis, 
 Pennypacker and Bell, or the number of men taken into action. 
 It is estimated that the First (Curtis') Brigade numbered nine 
 hundred officers and men ; the Second ( Pennypacker' s), seven- 
 teen hundred officers and men ; the Third (Bell's), eleven hun- 
 dred officers and men ; Abbott's Second Brigade, thirteen 
 hundred officers and men. 
 
 The return of the casualties indicates the actual resistance 
 met by the several brigades, which I give in the order they re- 
 
326 CIVIL WAR PAPERS 
 
 spectively entered the fort. Curtis' brigade, two officers and 
 thirty-seven men killed ; eighteen officers and one hundred and 
 sixty-six men wounded ; five missing. 25.33 per cent. Penny- 
 packer's brigade, six officers and forty-five men killed ; six offi- 
 cers and two hundred and eleven men wounded ; two missing. 
 16.47 P er cent. Bell's brigade, two officers and fourteen men 
 killed ; six officers and ninety-one men wounded ; two missing. 
 10.04 P er cent. Abbott's brigade, four men killed ; two officers 
 and twenty-one men wounded ; four missing. 2.33 per cent. 
 The missing includes those injured beyond recognition, and 
 those buried in the sand by the explosion of a magazine after 
 the capture. 
 
 In bestowing honors for the victory at Fort Fisher we 
 should prominently mention the Secretary of the Navy, and the 
 officers and men of the North Atlantic blockading squadron, 
 who, for three years, had continually urged the sending of an 
 army force to join the navy in an expedition to reduce the de- 
 fences at the mouth of the Cape Fear River. Nor should we 
 neglect prominently to associate General Grant with its capture. 
 He organized the military force, and in spite of the first failure 
 adhered to his purpose with unyielding persistency until the 
 end was accomplished. The skill and labors of Admiral Porter 
 and General Terry were fully acknowledged by the Administra- 
 tion and Congress, which all serving under them heartily approve. 
 
 Whatever may be the opinion of military men as to the 
 wisdom of employing troops in throwing up breastworks in- 
 side the fort — a greater number of men than were engaged 
 with the enemy in close action on the parapet and the floor of 
 the fort near the parapet — instead of sending them across the 
 floor of the fort to the sea-face, which movement would have 
 ended the contest an hour before sunset, certain it is all will 
 acknowledge that General Ames, under whose directions these 
 engineering operations were carried on, bore himself with cool- 
 ness and courage, as he did in his first battle, when he won a 
 Congressional Medal of Honor for personal bravery. 
 
THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER 327 
 
 The services of the gentlemen who went on both expeditions 
 in an advisory capacity, although on the first the most impor- 
 tant action — the withdrawal of the troops from the beach — 
 was determined upon without his opinion being asked, were 
 briefly stated by General Terry : 
 
 " To Bvt. Brig. Gen. C. B. Comstock, Aide-de-Camp on the staff of the 
 Lieutenant General, I am under the deepest obligations. At every step of our 
 progress I received from him the most valuable assistance. For the final success 
 of our part of the operations the country is more indebted to him than to me." 
 
 It would be unjust, as it would be ungenerous, to withhold 
 from the field and company officers the warmest praise for their 
 watchfulness in detecting every advantage afforded by the 
 enemy, for their irresistible impetuosity and valor, which over- 
 came obstacles as great as human skill and stubborn devotion 
 could create, or to fail to gratefully acknowledge the services of 
 the men in the ranks. Their steadiness, fortitude and bravery 
 were surpassed by no one exercising command over them. 
 Certainly our great commander did not neglect to commend 
 every member of the military force composing the expedition, 
 irrespective of rank or grade, in one of the most extraordinary 
 documents ever filed with the archives of the War Department, 
 wherein he recommended their commander for a high position 
 in the regular army, based solely on their services, and inde- 
 pendent of the promotions given to Terry, Ames, Pennypacker 
 and Curtis in acknowledgment of their personal services. 
 
 City Point, VA.,/anua?y 17, 1865. 
 Hon. E. M. Stanton, 
 
 Secretary of War. 
 As a substantial recognition of the bravery of both officers and men in the 
 capture of Fort Fisher, and the important service thereby rendered to their 
 country, I do most respectfully recommend Bvt. Maj. Gen. Alfred H. Terry, U. S. 
 Volunteers, their commanding officer, for appointment as Brigadier General in the 
 Regular Army. 
 
 U. S. Grant, 
 
 Lieutenant General. 
 
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