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THE HISTORY 
 
 OP THB 
 
 EOMAN BEPTTBLIC. 
 
 \ 
 
 h 
 
THE HISTOKY 
 
 OF THE 
 
 ROMAN REPUBLIC 
 
 ABRIDGED FEOM THE HISTORY BY 
 PROFESSOR MOMMSEN 
 
 // 
 
 BY 
 
 C. BRYANS, 
 
 ABSISTANT-MASTER IN DULWICH COLLEGE, 
 
 F. J. R. HENDY, 
 
 ABSISTANT-MASTEB IN FETTES COLLEGE. 
 
 NEW YORK : 
 
 CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS. 
 
 1911 
 
NORTH CAH.tHiJ.wn 
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 Probably few whose duty it is to teach Roman history in 
 schools will deny that some such work as the present has 
 too long been needed. It is for men thus engaged to judge 
 whether this book meets their need. It would be alike 
 impertinent and superfluous to dilate on the merits of 
 Professor Mommsen's history : those merits have won 
 recognition from all qualified judges, and have long estab- 
 lished his position as the prince of Roman historians. Un- 
 fortunately the size of his history is beyond the compass 
 of ordinary schoolboys; nay, possibly, others besides school- 
 boys have shrunk from attempting so formidable a task. 
 Our abridgment of his history must of necessity give but 
 a feeble and inadequate idea of the original ; but something 
 will have been accomplished if we have given some con- 
 ception, however faint, of that original, and have induced 
 fresh inquirers to read for themselves those pages so 
 bright with wisdom and imagination. There has been no 
 attempt to hold the balance between Professor Mommsen 
 ' and his rival Ihne, nor to answer the criticisms of Pro- 
 fessor Freeman. Such efforts, even if we had the ability 
 to make them, wonld be manifestly out of place in such 
 a work as this. Occasionally, indeed, conflicting views 
 have been indicated in a note; and the authorities have 
 been studied, but our text contains the views of Professor 
 Mommsen. Whatever merits may belong to this work 
 should be ascribed to another; we must be held responsible 
 for its defects. Our object has been to present the salient 
 points clearly, and as far as possible to escape dulness, 
 the Nemesis of the abridger. Consequently we have tried 
 to avoid writing down to a boy's level, a process invariably 
 
 b 
 
vi PREFACE. 
 
 resented by the boy himself. Inverted commas indicate 
 that the passage is directly taken from the original. The 
 requirements of space have necessitated the omission of 
 a special chapter on Literature, Art, Religion, Economy, 
 etc. ; nor have we thought it wise to insert a few maps or 
 illustrations of coins, works of art, etc. An atlas is really 
 indispensable, and one is, we believe, shortly to be pub- 
 lished specially designed to illustrate this period. We have 
 to express our great indebtedness to Professor Dickson for 
 allowing us to make free use of his translation, the merits 
 of which it would be difficult to overpraise. Our gratitude 
 is also due to Mr. Fowler, of Lincoln College, Oxford, and 
 to Mr. Matheson, of New College, Oxford. The former 
 kindly revised the proof sheets of the chapter on Autho- 
 rities, and gave valuable suggestions. The latter was 
 good enough to revise all the proof sheets of the history, 
 in the preparation of which we often found much assist- 
 ance from his very useful " Outline of Roman History." 
 We have also to thank Mr. H. E. Goldschmidt, of 
 Fettes College, Edinburgh, for a careful revision of a 
 large portion of the proofs. 
 
 While our history was in the press the third volume of 
 Professor Mommsen's " Romisches Staatsrecht" appeared. 
 Where possible, we have added references to it m our 
 lists of authorities. 
 
 
 
THE SOURCES OF ROMAN HISTORY. 
 
 At the close of each chapter we have subjoined, where 
 possible, a list of the chief authorities for the statements 
 therein contained, but a few remarks on the character 
 of such authorities will not be out of place. 
 
 Modern criticism has rudely shattered the romantic 
 legends of the origin and regal period of Rome, legends 
 given us in one form or another by all the ancient writers 
 whose works are still preserved. Any reconstruction of 
 the ruined fabric must necessarily rest in the main upon 
 conjecture, and, however great be the probability of such 
 conjecture, absolute certainty is impossible. Not only 
 does' darkness envelop the regal period of Rome, but we 
 have to move with great caution through the confused 
 accounts of the triumphs abroad and conflicts at home 
 which marked Rome's career during the first centuries 
 of the republic. The reason of this is plain : no records 
 except of the most meagre kind were at first preserved 
 by the Romans, and the earliest writer of Roman history 
 did not live until the time of the second Punic war, or 
 five hundred years after the foundation of the city. 
 
 Our inquiry into the sources of Roman history naturally 
 falls into two divisions : firstly, as to what were the 
 authorities of the Roman writers themselves ; secondly, 
 as to what weight must be attached to the writers whose 
 works have come down to us. 
 
 Among the earliest records preserved at Rome were 
 (1) the annales pontificii and the annales pontificum 
 maximi. The first-mentioned, although mainly devoted 
 to the various religious forms and ceremonies, doubtless 
 contained mention of historical events, while the annales 
 
via THE SOURCES OF ROMAN HISTORY. 
 
 maximi contained a bare statement, by the pontifex 
 maximus, of the chief events of the year and the names of 
 the chief magistrates; and this statement was pu'blicly 
 exhibited every year. 
 
 (2) In imitation of the records kept by the priest- 
 colleges, arose at a later time commentarii, or notes, kept 
 by the chief officers of the state, e.g by the consuls and 
 quaestors, and also the tabulae eensoriae or lists of the 
 censors. These were known under the wider term of 
 libri magistratuum, a special division of which is men- 
 tioned by Livy (iv. 13, etc.), under the name of libri 
 lintei, or books written on linen. 
 
 (3) The pontifices also arranged calendars or fasti con- 
 taining the days set apart for the transaction of business 
 (dies fasti), in which were also enumerated the feasts, 
 games, markets, sacrifices, etc., and to which were gradu- 
 ally added the anniversaries of disasters and other brief 
 notices of historical events. 
 
 (4) The name of fasti was subsequently given to lists 
 of years containing (a) the names of the chief magis- 
 trates (fasti consulares), (b) the triumphs held in each 
 year (fasti triumphales), and (c) the names of the priests 
 (fasti sacerdotales). Of these, the first-named, called 
 Fasti Capitolini from the fact that they are now pre- 
 served in the Capitol, are the most important, and con- 
 tain the names of the successive consuls, censors, dic- 
 tators, and magistri equitum. 
 
 (5) In addition to the above-mentioned state documents, 
 which were in the keeping of the magistrates, there 
 existed private memorials and family chronicles of various 
 kinds. Some were in writing, and no doubt contained 
 gross exaggerations in glorification of particular houses. 
 To these belong the imagines or ancestral busts with the 
 attached inscriptions (elogia),the funeral eulogies (lauda- 
 tiones funebres), the songs (neniae) sung during funeral 
 processions or at funeral banquets, and the inscriptions 
 on votive presents, pillars, and tombs. 
 
 (6) The most important legal monument is that of the 
 Twelve Tables, which were graven on iron and set up 
 in the Forum, and were, in Livy's words, "fons omnis 
 publici privatique iuris." The original probably perished 
 in the burning of Rome by the Gauls, but was either 
 
THE SOURCES OF BOM AN HISTORY. ix 
 
 replaced by copies preserved by the pontifices or was 
 restored from memory. We may add to this section the 
 so-called leges regiae, which, though purporting to give 
 decrees and decisions of the kings chiefly on religious 
 matters, were really a collection of old laws, set down 
 in. writing at a period later than the Twelve Tables. 
 
 (7) Another source of information consisted of various 
 treaties of alliance. Dionysius mentions (a) an apocryphal 
 treaty between Romulus and the Veientines (ii. 55), (b) 
 one between Tullus Hostilius and the Sabines (hi. 33), 
 
 (c) one between Servius Tullius and the Latins (iv. 26), 
 
 (d) one between Tarquinius (? Superbus) and Gabii (iv. 
 58). Polybius (iii. 22—26) gives an account of three 
 ancient treaties between Rome and Carthage, Pliny 
 (N. H. xxxiv. 14) mentions the treaty with Porsena, 
 Cicero (pro Balbo, 23) mentions the treaty of alliance 
 with the Latins in 493 B.C., and Livy (iv. 7) mentions the 
 treaty made with Ardea, 410 B.C. To these may be added 
 mention by Festus * (p. 318) of the first tribunician law, 
 493 B.C., and the mention by Livy (iii. 31) and by Dio- 
 nysius (x. 32) of the Italian law De Aventino Publicando 
 in 456 B.C. 
 
 Such, then, were the sources open to the earliest 
 Roman annalists. We may now turn to them. Our first 
 list will give those writers whose works embraced the 
 early history of Rome but which have perished, with the 
 exception of a few fragments. t (1) Q- Fabius Pictor, 
 born about 254 B.C., served in the Celtic war of 22o B.C., 
 and wrote probably in Greek. (2) L. Cincius Aliraentus, 
 praetor 210 B.C., and taken prisoner by Hannibal, wrote 
 
 * Festus' work is merely an abridgment of the lost work of 
 M. Verrius Flaccus, a freedman of the Augustine age 
 
 t For the student of Roman history, Hermann Peter's " Histori- 
 corum Romanorum Fragmenta " is invaluable. On the general 
 question of the sources of Roman history we may refer to Teuffel's 
 " History of Roman Literature," Professor Seeley's " Introduction to 
 the First Book of Livy," and more especially to the " Quellenkunde 
 der Romischen Geschichte," by M. Schmitz, and the instructive 
 criticism by C. Peter, in his " Zur Kritik der Quellen der Aelteren 
 Romischen Geschichte." Cf. also Schwegler, R. G. i., c. 1, 2, 19, of 
 whose work Mr. Fowler writes, " T have always thought it the 
 greatest masterpiece of detailed, clear, and rational criticism I have 
 ever read." 
 
x TEE SOUBCES OF ROMAN EISTORY. 
 
 in Greek. (3) Gaius Acilius, flourished about 155 B.C., 
 a senator, wrote in Greek. (4) Aulus Postumius Albinus, 
 consul 151 B.C., one of the commissioners sent to settle the 
 province of Greece, wrote in Greek. (5) Omitting the 
 poetical description by Gaius Naevius (264-194 B.C.) of 
 the first Punic war, and by Quintus Ennius (239-169 B.C.) 
 of the history of Rome from the earliest times down to 
 172 B.C.), we now come to the first historians who wrote 
 in Latin prose. Marcus Porcius Cato (234-149 B.c), author 
 of the Origines, is the first. (6) Lucius Cassius Hemina, 
 flourished 146 B.C. (7) Lucius Calpurnius Piso, consul 
 in 133 B.C. (8) Gaius Sempronius Tuditanus, consul in 
 129 B.C. (9) Cneius Gellius, flourished about 100 B.C. 
 (10) Quintus Claud as Quadrigarius, flourished about 
 90 B.c ; his history began at the capture of Rome by the 
 Gauls. (11) Valerius Antias, about 70 b.c. (12) Gaius 
 Licinius Macer, tribune in 73 B.C. All these writers 
 preceded Livy, and in most cases are cited by him as 
 authorities. The other historians previous to Livy, such 
 as Gaius Fannius (consul in 122 B.C.), Lucius Coelius 
 Antipater, born in 170 B.C., Lucius Cornelius Sisenna 
 (120-67 B.C.), wrote on special and later periods ; while 
 statesmen, such as M. Aemilius Seaurus (consul, 115-107 
 B.C.), Q. Lutatius Catulus (consul 102 B.C.), and Sulla the 
 dictator, did not disdain to write memoirs in self-defence. 
 We may now give a second list of those writers on the 
 early period of Rome, whose works are in part still extant. 
 Dionysius of Halicarnassus (70-8 B.C.), of whose " Roman 
 Antiquities" we possess nine complete books, and Titus 
 Livius (59-17 B.C.) stand practically alone. Other writers, 
 e.g. M. Velleius Paterculus (born about 19 B.C.), Plutarch 
 (a.d. 46-120), Julius Florus (about a.d. 70-150), Aulus 
 Gellius (a.d. 125-175), Diodorus Siculus, Appian (about 
 a.d. 130), and Dio Cassius (a.d. 155-230), all throw more 
 or less light on the early history ; but practically our in- 
 formation is drawn from the works of Livy and Dionysius.* 
 Unfortunately, the latter's history, written as it was for 
 Greeks, and avowedly written to please the reader rather 
 than inform posterity, is disfigured by contradictions and 
 
 * On the relation of Livy (a) to the Roman annalists, (b) to 
 Dionysius, the student is referred to the remarkably instructive 
 analysis by C. Peter, in his above-mentioned work, pp. 55-82. 
 
THE SOURCES OF ROMAN HISTORY. xi 
 
 rhetorical exaggeration. Difficulties are left unsolved, 
 and the superficial knowledge displayed throughout shows 
 that Dionysius was content with setting down the varying 
 statements of Roman annalists without attempting to 
 reconcile their contradictions. Livy, on the other hand, 
 has the great advantage of being well acquainted with 
 Roman traditions, and is thus able to blend with pictur- 
 esque language the colour of the Roman life and thought. 
 Nor was he wanting in judgment, although incapable of 
 scientific criticism. Yet the narrative of Rome as pre- 
 sented by him in the first decade, cannot be regarded as 
 serious history, built up as it is of the jejune records 
 preserved by the magistrates and of the absurd exaggera- 
 tions and pure fictions preserved in family documents and 
 embellished by family annalists. We do not, in truth, 
 reach real historical ground until the first Punic war, and 
 that we owe to the great work of Polybius. Our know- 
 ledge of the interval between the end of the first decade 
 of Livy and the beginning of the history of Polybius (i.e. 
 293-264 B.C.) is due to passages in Dionysius, Appian, 
 Plutarch, and Dio Cassius, but these extracts are either 
 confused and bare notices, or fabulous anecdotes in illus- 
 tration of the Roman virtues. Polybius (208-127 B.C.) 
 covers the ground extending from 264—146 B.C. Unfortu- 
 nately, we only possess in completeness his books down to 
 216 B.C., but the fragments of the remaining books are 
 many and precious, and the influence he exerted on all suc- 
 ceeding historians was specially valuable in the interests 
 of truth. To quote Professor Mommsen, " Polybius is not 
 an attractive author ; but as truth and truthfulness are 
 of more value tban all ornament and elegance, no other 
 author of antiquity perhaps can be named to whom we 
 are indebted for so much real instruction. His books are 
 like the sun in the field of Roman history ; at the point 
 where they begin the veil of mist which still envelops 
 the Samnite and Pyrrhic war is raised, and at the point 
 where they end a new and, if possible, still more vexatious 
 twilight begins." A comparison of passages describing 
 the same events shows that Livy made free use of the 
 writings of Polybius,* but even where the resemblance is 
 
 * On this point, vide C. Peter, in his above-mentioned work, 
 pp. 82-99. 
 
xii TEE SOURCES OF ROMAN HISTORY. 
 
 closest we can detect signs of other sources used by Livy, 
 and unfortunately his love of rhetorical embellishment 
 and his carelessness as to historical connection often 
 obscured and perverted the more straightforward accounts 
 of Polybius. To Livy we have to turn for a detailed 
 account of Roman history for the years 216-167 B.C., 
 although we can often correct his statement by the copious 
 fragments of Polybius. 
 
 From 167 B.C. onwards we depend upon Appian, 
 Plutarch, and Sallust's Jugurthine war. The books of 
 Appian which have come down to us contain notices of 
 the regal period, a history of Spain and of the second 
 Punic war, a history of Libya down to the destruction of 
 Carthage, a history of Syria and Parthia, the war with 
 Mithradates, and a history of the civil strife from the 
 Gracchi down to the death of Sextus Pompeius in 35 B.C. 
 His carelessness and inaccuracy, his tendency to sacrifice 
 truth to petty jealousy and party spirit, lessen the value 
 of his work.* Sallust, however, had the great advantage 
 over Appian and similar writers of being a Roman and 
 well versed in the politics of his time. He shows a 
 freedom from party prejudice and a sense of historical 
 truth, and his work is not merely instructive with regard 
 to the Jugurthine war, but throws valuable light On the 
 inner circumstances of that period. 
 
 From the beginning of the Social War (91-88 B.C.), the 
 mass of contemporary material which in one form or 
 another must have been available for later writers is con- 
 tinually increasing. For the Sullan period, from the Social 
 War to the death of the dictator (91-78 B.C.), we rely 
 chiefly on Plutarch's Lives of the chief actors on the 
 political stage ; but there are other works of various 
 worth. Of the writers already mentioned, Claudius 
 Quadrigarius treated of Sulla's campaign in Greece; 
 the work of Valerius Antias extended as far as the time 
 of Sulla; that of Sisenna embraced the Social War. They 
 appear to have written at great length, and to have incor- 
 porated speeches and letters in their works. In addition 
 to the sources mentioned above, there were (1) published 
 speeches, political and forensic, such as those of L. Licinius 
 Crassus (consul 95 B.C.), of Q. Scaevola (consul 95 B.C.), 
 
 * Cf . C. Peter, pp. 127-138. 
 
THE SOURCES OF ROMAN HISTORY. xiii 
 
 of C. Julius Caesar Strabo (killed 87 B.C.) ; (2) Memoirs. 
 Sulla (ob. 78 B.C.) wrote an autobiography which was 
 completed after his death by his freedman Epicadus, and 
 which was largely used by Plutarch. Lucius Lucullus 
 (ob. 57 B.C.) wrote a history of the Social War in Greek. 
 C. Piso narrated the war between Sulla and Marius. L. 
 Voltacilius Pilutus, a freedman, wrote an account of the 
 doings of Cn. Pompeius, the triumvir, and of the father of 
 Pompeius, probably during the lifetime of the former. 
 
 Of still extant authorities the following are the most 
 important. (1) Plutarch (lived probably from the reign 
 of Claudius to Trajan or Hadrian). Twenty-three lives 
 of Romans survive, few of which, those of Marius, Sulla, 
 Lucullus, and Sertorius, fall under this period. For later 
 times we have the lives of Crassus, Pompeius, Caesar, 
 Cato minor, Cicero, Antonius, and Brutus. Plutarch 
 writes with good sense and wide knowledge, but his aim 
 is biography, not history : hence important events are 
 often lightly touched, while trivialities characteristic of 
 the men are dwelt upon ; and as a Greek he is often 
 defective in acquaintance with Roman institutions. He 
 used contemporary authorities largely, though his own 
 knowledge of Latin was slight, and he often reveals his 
 sources ; of 250 writers quoted by him 80 are wholly 
 or partially lost. (2) Appian. (3) The epitomes of Livy, 
 attributed to Florus, which survive of all the lost books 
 except 136 and 137, and are valuable for the main points. 
 (4) The compendia of several epitomists of late date have 
 come down to us, based largely, sometimes exclusively, 
 upon Livy. They are careful and accurate, and often 
 contain useful information not found elsewhere, but are 
 marked by a strong Roman bias. Such are the works of 
 (Annaeus ?) Florus (flor. 2nd cent. A.D.), Eutropius and 
 Rufus Festus (4th cent. a.d.). (5) Justinus (date uncer- 
 tain) who made a collection of extracts from the Historiae 
 Philippicae of Trogus Pompeius (flor. 20 B.C.), apparently 
 a sound and solid work, based upon Greek sources ; 
 Justinus is the chief authority for the earlier years of 
 Mithradates. 
 
 For the next eight years (78-70 B.C.), to the overthrow 
 of the Sullan constitution, we rely chiefly upon Plutarch, 
 Appian, the epitomes of Livy, Justinus, Dio Cassius, 
 
xiv TEE SOURCES OF ROMAN HISTORY. 
 
 some valuable fragments of the histories of Sallust dealing 
 with the Sertorian war and the outbreak of Lepidus, and 
 the recently discovered fragments of Granius Licinianus. 
 
 When we come to what may conveniently be called the 
 Ciceronian period (70-40 B.C.) the conditions are changed 
 A, mass of contemporary material — letters, speeches, 
 memoirs — is still extant, though much has perished, 
 and the modern historian is in a position, if not to write 
 history from the original sources, at least to criticise with 
 effect the compositions of ancient writers. At the same 
 time, the spread of culture in Rome and Italy brought 
 with it a facility in composition which resulted in a 
 multitude of historical works ; and if all this mass of 
 literature is the work of partisans, on the other hand we 
 have the advantage of possessing the views of both sides. 
 
 We will now give some account, first of the contempo- 
 rary records whether lost or extant, secondly of the later 
 histories treating of this period, w T hich survive. (1) 
 Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 B c ) is the most voluminous 
 and on the whole the most valuable writer of the period. 
 Advocate and partisan as he was, the naivete and volubility 
 of his character make him peculiarly useful as a historical 
 witness. Of his speeches, private and public, fifty-seven 
 survive, besides fragments of twenty more, and throw light, 
 not only on the political situation in all its constant varia- 
 tions, but on many other points, such as the working of 
 the Sullan laws, and of the numerous changes which fol- 
 lowed rapidly on the death of Sulla, on the social condition 
 of Italy, and the provincial administration. Incomparably 
 more valuable than even the speeches are the letters, 864 
 in number, including ninety addressed to Cicero, and ex- 
 tending from 68 to 43 B.C. It is hardly too much to say 
 that they are an inexhaustible storehouse of contemporary 
 history, such as exists for no other period ancient or modern. 
 A memoir of the year of his consulship is unfortunately 
 lost. His voluminous philosophical and rhetorical writings 
 contain valuable information on a great variety of sub- 
 jects, especially on the Roman law and constitution, for 
 which the De Republica and De Legibus are peculiarly 
 valuable. With Cicero should be mentioned his faithful 
 freedman, friend, and editor, M. Tullius Tiro, who edited 
 the speeches and letters, and wrote a life of his patron, 
 
TEE SOURCES OF ROMAN E1ST0RT. xv 
 
 and also developed a system of stenography (notae 
 Tironianae) . (2) There were also published speeches by 
 Q. Hortensius Hortalus (114-50 B.C.), Pompeius Magnus, 
 C. Scribonius Curio (killed 49 B.C.), M. Coelius Eufus 
 (killed 48 B.C.), M. Junius Brutus (ob. 42 B.C.), C. Licinius 
 Calvus (ob. ante 47 B.C.), and others. (3) Of historical com- 
 positions the most important in the earlier portion of this 
 period, down to 63 B.C., were the annals of T. Pomponius 
 Atticus (109-32 B.C.), a compendium of Boman history 
 from the earliest time, giving special attention to the 
 history of the great Boman families ; he also wrote an 
 account of Cicero's consulship, and a large number of 
 letters. There were also historical compositions by 
 Hortensius the orator, by Lucius Lucceius, a corre- 
 spondent of Cicero's, and by Lucius Tubero, a friend and 
 brother-in-law of Cicero, of which almost nothing is 
 known. (4) In the later half of the Ciceronian period, 
 from 63 B.C. to the outbreak of the civil war, the most 
 important author is C. Julius Caesar (102-44 B.C.). His 
 speeches, letters, and the " Anticato " (a political pamphlet 
 in answer to Cicero's panegyric on Cato Uticensis) are all 
 lost ; but there are extant (a) Commentarii de Bello 
 Gallico in seven books, which is at once a military report, a 
 history, and an apologia. " It is," says Mommsen,* " evi- 
 dently designed to justify as well as possible before the 
 public the formally unconstitutional enterprise of Caesar 
 in conquering a great country, and constantly increasing 
 his army for that object, without instructions from the 
 competent authority." It was published in 51 B.C., when 
 the storm was imminent. The work is very valuable for 
 the condition of Gaul, Germany, and Britain, and also for 
 the Boman military system and camp life. (b) The 
 Bellum Civile, in three books, is a much less careful work; 
 it extends to the beginning of the Alexandrine war in 47 
 B.C., and has equally a political purpose. (5) After 
 Caesar's death the histories of the Gallic and of the civil 
 war were continued by his friends. The eighth book of 
 the Gallic war and the Bellum Alexandrinum are generally 
 ascribed to Aulus Hirtius (killed 43 B.C.); the Bellum 
 Africanum and Bellum Hispanicum are by other and un- 
 known hands. (6) Other friends of Caesar who treated 
 
 * Vol. iv., p. 605. 
 
xvi TEE SOURCES OF ROMAN E1ST0RT. 
 
 of his life were C. Oppius (to whom the continuations of 
 Caesar's Bellum Civile are by some ascribed, and who also 
 wrote lives of Scipio Af rieanus the elder and other famous 
 Romans), and L. Cornelius Balbus of Gades. (7) Cornelius 
 Nepos (circ. 94-24 B.C.), besides other works, wrote lives 
 of Cato the elder and of Cicero, both lost. 
 
 Some of the works already mentioned were written 
 under the influence of the mighty struggle which preceded 
 the extinction of the republic : those which still remain 
 are nearly all directed to political objects, and are strongly 
 affected by the passion and turmoil of the time. (8) 
 Gaius Sallustius Crispus (87-34 B.C.), who has been 
 mentioned above, wrote, besides his Jugui'thine war, an 
 account of the conspiracy of Catiline, to justify the demo- 
 cratic party, " on which in fact the Roman monarchy was 
 based, and to clear Caesar's memory from the blackest 
 stain that rested on it." * His Historiae were written as 
 a continuation of Sisenna, and extended over the twelve 
 years from 78 B.C. onwards: only fragments, together with 
 some letters and speeches extracted from the history, 
 survive. (9) Q. Aelius Tubero (flor. circ. 46 B.C.) wrote 
 a histoi'y of Rome extending to his own time. (10) As 
 evidence of the feeling about Caesar in some literary 
 circles at Rome, and as an example of the warfare of 
 literature which raged alongside of the political struggle, 
 the attacks of the poet Catullus (87-54 B.C.) on Caesar 
 and his friend Mamurra are worth mention. (11) Pam- 
 phlets in prose and verse were continually published on 
 either side ; M. Varro, C. Scribonius Curio, and Aulus 
 Caecina wrote against Caesar. Funeral orations (lauda- 
 tiones) were used for the same purpose. The death of 
 Cato, and even of his daughter, called forth a regular 
 literature of its own ; Cicero and Marcus Brutus were the 
 most famous of his champions, while on the other side 
 Aulus Hirtius, Metellus Scipio, even Caesar himself and, 
 later, Augustus deigned to enter the lists. (12) From 
 59 B.C. onwards the minutes of the senate (acta senatus) 
 and the chief events of the day (acta populi or acta 
 diurna) were regularly published as a sort of official 
 gazette: none of the latter survive. (13) Inscriptions. 
 Only two of great importance belong to this period, con- 
 
 * Mommsen, iv. 184, note# 
 
THE SOURCES OF BOM AN HISTORY. xvii 
 
 taining fragments of the Lex Rubria (Corp. Inscrr. Lat. 
 I. 205) and of the Lex Julia Municipalis (C. I. L. I. 206). 
 For others, on private or local matters, see Corp. Inscrr., 
 especially No. I. 573-626 ; and for one containing a frag- 
 ment of Sulla's law De XX Q (uaestoribus), ib. I. 202.* 
 There are also bullets used in sieges with rude inscrip- 
 tions (ib. I. 644-705), tesserae (ib. I. 717-827), bricks 
 (ib. I. p. 202), epitaphs (ib. 1. 1256). 
 
 Where contemporary material is so abundant later 
 historians are less important, and may be merely enumer- 
 ated. (1) The most valuable is Dio Cassius Cocceianus 
 (circ. a.d. 155-229), whose history extended from Aeneas 
 to a.d. 229, and is extant from the wars of Lucullus to 
 a.d. 10. It is written with great knowledge and judgment ; 
 fragments of the earlier and a compendium of the later 
 portions are extant. (2) C. Suetonius Tranquillus (a.d. 
 75-160) wrote Lives of the Caesars from C. Julius Caesar 
 to Domitian. The work is intelligent, honest, and rich in 
 information, and is based upon valuable contemporary 
 records of all kinds. (3) Tacitus is continually useful for 
 the history of the last generation of the republic, especially 
 on constitutional and legal points. (4) Velleius Pater- 
 culus (19 B.C. to A.D. 31) wrote a compendium of universal 
 history , Memnon (not later than the Antonines), a 
 history of Heraclea in Pontus, which survives in copious 
 extracts by Photius, and is useful for Pontic affairs ; 
 Granius Licinianus (temp, the Antonines), annals, of 
 which fragments relating to 163 B.C. and to 78 B.C. have 
 recently been discovered. (5) Orosius (flor. first half 
 5th cent.), Historiarum adversus Paganos, libb. vii., — a 
 religious polemic of no value when unsupported. 
 
 The following works upon special subjects often throw 
 light incidentally upon history, and may be consulted 
 passim as occasion requires. The order is approximately 
 chronological. 
 
 (1) M. Terentius Varro (116-28 B.C.), De Re Rustica 
 and De Lingua Latina ; unfortunately, all that remain, 
 besides fragments, of the works of the most learned of the 
 Romans ; but his writings, especially the Antiquitatum 
 Libri, were very largely drawn upon by later antiquarians 
 
 * For legal fragments Bruns' Fontes Juris Romani Antiqui 
 may be consulted, as more convenient and accessible than the 
 Coipus iDScriptionum. 
 
xviii THE SOURCES OF ROMAN HISTORY. 
 
 and grammarians, such as those mentioned (12) to (15). 
 In the reign of Augustus, Fenestella, Sinnius Capito, and 
 Verrius Flaccus should be mentioned as antiquarians who 
 wrote under Varro's influence and on similar topics, and 
 who furnished a vast amount of information upon which 
 later writings are based. Flaccus survives in an abridg- 
 ment by Festus. (2) With Varro may be conveniently 
 mentioned two other writers on agriculture ; M. Poreius 
 Cato (234-149 B.C.), the most valuable of the three, and 
 Lucius Junius Moderatus Columella (1st cent. A.D.), 
 De Re Rustica — a work much less valuable than Varro's. 
 (3) Strabo (temp. Augustus and Tiberius), a voluminous 
 work on Universal Geography. (4) Gaius Plinius 
 Secundus (major) (a.d. 23-79), Naturalis Historia — an 
 encyclopedia of the scientific knowledge of his time. (5) 
 Vitruvius Pollio (temp. Augustus), De Architectura. (6) 
 Q. Asconius Pedianus (2 B.C. to a.d. 83), commentaries on 
 some speeches of Cicero — valuable especially for consti- 
 tutional points. (7) Valerius Maximus (temp, the early 
 Caesars), De Factis Dictisque Memorabilibus — contains 
 much unique information. (8) Sex. Julius Frontinus 
 (praetor a.d. 70), Strategematica Libb. iv., on military 
 science with many anecdotes of great commanders ; and De 
 Aqueductibus Urbis Romanae. (9) M. Fabius Quintili- 
 anus (a.d. 40-118), De Institutione Oratoria Libb. xii., 
 including a brief history of Roman literature in book x. 
 (10) Gaius (circ. the Antonines), Institutes, in four books; 
 probably the earliest systematic work on Roman juris- 
 prudence. (11) With Gaius should be mentioned the 
 works executed under the auspices of the Emperor Justi- 
 nian (a.d. 527-565) : (a) the New Code, superseding all 
 previous codes ; (b) Pandecta or Digesta, a compilation of 
 all the valuable matter of preceding jurists ; (c) the 
 Institutes, based chiefly upon Gaius. (12) Aulus Gellius 
 (temp, the Antonines), Noctes Atticae, a miscellany, con- 
 taining information on all manner of subjects and numerous 
 extracts from Roman writers. (13) Nonius Marcellus 
 (between 2nd cent, and 6th, a.d.), a voluminous work on 
 grammar, valuable as a repertory of quotations from lost 
 writers. (14) Servius (5th cent. A.D.), Commentary on 
 Vergil. (15) Macrobius (5th cent, a.d.), Saturnaliorum 
 Conviviorum Libb. vii. — dissertations on mythology, 
 history, etc. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 BOOK FIRST. 
 
 The Period anterior to the Abolition of the Monarchy, 
 Ch. I.-V. 
 
 BOOK SECOND. 
 
 From the Abolition of the Monarchy in Rome to the Union 
 of Italy, Ch. VI.-XI. 
 
 BOOK THIRD. 
 
 From the Union of Italy to the Subjugation of Carthage 
 and the Greek States, Ch. XII.-XVIII. 
 
 BOOK FOURTH. 
 The Revolution, Ch. XIX.-XXVII. 
 
 BOOK FIFTH. 
 
 The Establishment of the Military Monarchy, Ch. 
 XXVIII.-XXXVIII. 
 
HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Ancient history — Geography of Italy — Italian history — Primitive 
 races — Relation of Latins to Umbro-Samnites — Resemblance 
 and distinction between Greeks and Italians. 
 
 The division between ancient and modern history is not 
 one of mere convenience ; it has a reality, in that it marks 
 the distinction in point of time, place, and character 
 between the civilization of the old and new worlds. 
 
 Ancient history is in the main an account of the rise 
 and fall of those peoples whose civilization had a common 
 origin, and presented similar features. In each case, how- 
 ever, the individuality of each nation impressed its own 
 peculiar stamp on the character of that civilization. 
 
 The Mediterranean Sea was the theatre of the growth 
 and decay of the great nations who may be included in 
 the same cycle of civilization, and whose culture found its 
 highest point in Thebes in Egypt, Carthage in Africa, 
 Athens in Greece, Rome in Italy. When their work was 
 finished, new peoples arose, a new cycle of civilization was 
 begun, a new centre was found in the Atlantic Ocean in 
 place of the Mediterranean. The province of the Roman 
 historian is to record the closing scene of the great drama 
 of ancient history as enacted in Italy. 
 
 Geographically, this peninsula is formed by the mountain 
 chain of the Apennines breaking off in a southerly direction 
 from the Western Alps. The Apennines at first run south- 
 
 1 
 
2 HISTORY OF HOME. 
 
 east, and reach their highest point in the Abruzzi. From 
 the Abruzzi the chain runs south, at first unbroken and 
 of considerable height ; but later it splits south-east and 
 south, forming narrow and mountainous peninsulas. It 
 must be specially remembered that the ancient boundary 
 of Italy on the north was not the Alps, but the Apennines ; 
 therefore, the flat country on the north, extending between 
 the Alps and the Apennines as far down as the Abruzzi, 
 does not belong geographically nor historically to the 
 Italy of our history. As the Apennines nowhere rise 
 precipitously, but enclose many valleys and table-lands 
 connected by easy passes, the country is well adapted 
 for human habitation. This is specially the case with 
 the adjacent slopes and coast-districts. On the east coast 
 stretches the plain of Apulia, only broken by the isolated 
 steep of Garganus ; again, on the south coast, well- 
 watered and fertile lowlands adjoin the hill country of 
 the interior ; and on the west coast we find, not merely 
 the extraordinarily rich and irrigated lands of Etruria, 
 Latium, and Campania, but, owing to the action of the 
 sea and of volcanoes, the country is varied with hill and 
 valley, harbour and island. As the Peloponnese is at- 
 tached to Greece, so the island of Sicily is attached to 
 Italy, the Sicilian mountains being but a continuation 
 of the Apennines, interrupted by the narrow "rent" 
 (Pr/ytov) of the straits. Although Italy lacks the island- 
 studded sea which gave the Greeks their seafaring 
 character, and is deficient in bays and harbours, except 
 on the south-west coast, yet it resembles Greece in its 
 temperate climate and wholesome mountain air, while 
 it excels it in rich alluvial plains and grassy mountain 
 slopes. All Italian interests centre in the west ; the 
 reverse is the case with Greece. Thus, the Apulian and 
 Messapian coasts play a subordinate part in Italian, as 
 Epirus and Acarnania did in Greek history. The two 
 peninsulas lie side by side, but turn their backs on each 
 other, and the Italians and Greeks rarely came into 
 contact in the Adriatic Sea. 
 
 The history of Italy falls into two main sections : (1) 
 Its internal history down to its union under the leadership 
 of the Latin stock; (2) The history of its sovereignty 
 over the world. It must be borne in mind that what has 
 
INTRODUCTION. 3 
 
 been called the conquest of Italy by the Romans is really 
 the consolidation and union of the whole Italian stock — 
 a stock of which the Romans were the most powerful 
 branch, but still only a branch. Our attention must now 
 be fixed on the first of the two sections — on the settlement 
 of the Italian stock ; on its external struggles for exist- 
 ence against Greek and Etruscan intruders; on its 
 conquest of these enemies ; finally, on its internal strife ; 
 on the contest between the Latms and Samnites for the 
 leadership of Italy, resulting in the victory of the Latins, 
 at the end of the fourth century before Christ. 
 
 With regard to the earliest migrations into Italy we 
 have no evidence to guide us, not even the uncertain voice 
 of tradition. No monuments of a savage primitive race 
 have ever been unearthed, such as exist in France, Ger- 
 many, and England. But the remains of the Italian 
 languages show that the three primitive stocks were 
 (1) Iapygian, (2) Etruscan, (3) Italian. The last is 
 divided into two main branches : (a) Latin ; (6) TJmbro- 
 Samnite, or more fully that branch to which the dialects 
 of the Umbri, Marsi, Volsci, and Samnites belong. 
 
 As to the Iapygians, owing to the fact that no one has at 
 present been able to decipher the inscriptions in their 
 language, very little is known. Their dialect points to a 
 closer connection with Greek than that of other Italians ; 
 and this supposition is supported by the ease with which 
 they became Hellenized. From the feeble resistance they 
 made to foreign influences, and from their geographical 
 position, it is concluded that they were the oldest immi- 
 grants or historical autochthones of Italy. In the earliest 
 times immigrants came by land, not by sea, and the races 
 pushed furthest south were the oldest inhabitants. 
 
 The centre of Italy was inhabited, from a remote period, 
 by the two divisions of the Italian people. Philological 
 analysis of the Italian tongue shows that they belong 
 to the Indo-Germanic family, and that the Italians are 
 brothers of the Greeks, and cousins of the Celts, Germans, 
 and Slavonians. The same analysis further shows us 
 that the relation of the Latin dialect in the Italian 
 language to the Umbro-Samnite dialect is somewhat 
 similar to the relation of Ionic to Doric Greek ; and the 
 differences between the Oscan (i.e. Samnite) and Umbrian 
 
4 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 dialects may be compared to the differences between the 
 Dorism of Sicily and that of Sparta. Language thus 
 proves to us that, at some unknown period, from the 
 same cradle there issued a stock which included the 
 ancestors of the Greeks and Italians ; that subsequently 
 the Italians branched off ; that the Italians divided into 
 Latin and Umbro-Samnite stocks, and that later the 
 Umbrians parted from the Samnites, or Oscans. 
 
 Language again shows to us what state of civilization 
 had been reached by the Greeks and Italians before they 
 separated. Their words for plough, field, garden, barley, 
 wine, are identical in both languages ; their choice of 
 grain agrees, as also their methods of preparing it. The 
 name of " Wine-land " (OivwTpta) given by Greek voyagers 
 to Italy shows that vine-culture was not introduced 
 by the Greeks. Thus, the two peoples had passed from 
 the pastoral to the agricultural stage, and both nations 
 closely associated agriculture with their religion, laws, 
 and customs. Again, the Greek house, as described by 
 Homer, differs but slightly from the model followed in 
 Italy. In dress, also, the tunica corresponds to the chiton 
 of the Greeks, and the toga is only a fuller himation. 
 In fine, in language, manners, and all the material things 
 of primitive life, the same origin is apparent in both races. 
 
 When we turn to the graver problems of life, to the 
 moral, social, political, and religious development of the 
 Greeks and Italians, the distinction is far more marked ; 
 nay, it is almost difficult to believe that here too there is 
 a common basis. In the Greek world we see the full and 
 free play of individual life, and individual thought, 
 whether in the political arena or that of literature, 
 whether in the games at Olympia or in religious festivals. 
 The whole was sacrificed to its parts, the nation to the 
 township, the township to the citizen. Thus, solemn awe 
 of the gods was lessened and at last extinguished by that 
 freedom of thought, which invested them with human 
 attributes and then denied their existence. The Romans, 
 on the contrary, merged the individual in the state, and 
 regarded the progress and prosperity of the latter as the 
 ideal for which all were bound to labour unceasingly. 
 With them the son was bound to reverence the father, 
 the citizen to reverence the ruler, all to reverence the 
 
INTRODUCTION. 3 
 
 gods. This distinction becomes more evident, when we 
 consider the length to which paternal and marital au- 
 thority was carried by the Romans, and the merciless 
 rigour with which a slave was treated by them. The 
 meagre and meaningless character of individual names 
 among the Romans, when contrasted with the luxuriant 
 and poetic fulness of those among the Greeks, points to 
 the wish of the Romans to reduce all to one uniform level, 
 instead of promoting the development of distinctive 
 personality. But we must not forget that the basis was 
 the same with both nations. In both, the clan arose from 
 the family and the state from the clan ; but, as the rela- 
 tions in a Roman household differed widely from those in 
 a Greek, so the position of a clan, as a separate power, in 
 a Greek, was far higher than in a Roman state. Again, 
 although the fundamental ideas of the Roman constitution 
 — a king, a senate, and an assembly authorized merely to 
 accept or reject proposals submitted to it — are also found 
 in Greek states, as in the earlier constitution of Crete, yet 
 widely different was the development which these ideas 
 received in each nation. So, too, in religion, both nations 
 founded their faith on the same common store of symbolic 
 and allegorical views of nature. But the Greek lost sight 
 of the spiritual abstractions, and gave all the phenomena 
 of nature a concrete and corporeal shape, clothing all 
 with the riches of his poetic fancy. The Roman, casting 
 aside all mythical legends of the gods, sanctified every 
 action of life by assigning a spirit to everything existing — 
 a spirit which came into being with it, and perished with 
 it; and thus the very word Religio, "that which binds," 
 shows what a hold this faith in the unseen and this power 
 of spiritual abstraction had upon the Roman mind. 
 Finally, even in art, where the greatest contrast was 
 developed, the original simple elements are identical. 
 The decorous armed dance, the " leap " (triumpus 6pia.fji.fios 
 St,-dvpa.(ifio<;), the masquerade of the " full people " (crarvpot, 
 satura) who in their sheep or goat-skins wound up the 
 festival with jests ; the pipe, which regulated the solemn 
 or merry dance, were common to both nations. But the 
 Greeks alone felt the power of beauty, and evolved a 
 system of education calculated to train mind and body 
 alike in conformity with that ideal. " Thus the two 
 
6 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 nations, in which the civilization of antiquity culminated, 
 stand side by side, as different in development as they 
 were in origin identical. The points in which the 
 Hellenes excel the Italians are more universally intelli- 
 gible, and reflect a more brilliant lustre; but the deep 
 feeling in each individual, that he was only a part of the 
 community, a rare devotedness and power of self-sacrifice 
 for the common weal, an earnest faith in its own gods, 
 form the rich treasure of the Italian nation. Wherever 
 in Hellas a tendency towards national union appeared, 
 it was based not on elements directly political, but on 
 games and art; the contests at Olympia, the poems of 
 Homer, the tragedies of Euripides, were the only bonds 
 that held Hellas together. Resolutely, on the other hand, 
 the Italian surrendered his own personal will for the sake 
 of freedom, and learned to obey his father that he might 
 know how to obey the state. Amidst this subjection 
 individual development might be marred, and the germs 
 of fairest promise might be arrested in the bud ; the 
 Italian gained in their stead a feeling of fatherland and 
 of patriotism such as the Greek never knew, and, alone 
 among all civilized nations of antiquity, succeeded in 
 working out national unity in connection with a consti- 
 tution based on self-government — a national unity which 
 at last placed in his hands the mastery, not only over the 
 divided Hellenic stock, but over the whole known world." 
 
 AUTHORITIES. 
 
 [N.B. — Reference is made to Mommsen's " Romisches Staatsrecht " 
 as Momms. R. St., and to Marquardt's " Rbmische Staatsver- 
 waltung " as Marq. Stv., and to his " Das Privatleben der Romer" 
 as Marq. P.l. Ramsay's " Manual of Roman Antiquities'' is also of 
 great value to the student, as also the article by Mr. Pelham on 
 Rome, in the "Encyclopaedia Britannica."] 
 
 Geography of Italy.— Strab. 210-288. Polyb. ii. 14-24. 
 lapygians.— Dionys. i. 11, 12, 22, 51. Strab. 279, 282. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 LATIN SETTLEMENTS, AND ORIGIN OF ROME. 
 
 Latin settlements — Latium — Primitive society — Latin league- 
 Origin of Rome — Geographical position — The Palatine city; 
 Hill, or Quirinal Romans. 
 
 We have no data enabling us to accurately determine the 
 migration of the Italians into Italy, but that it took place 
 from the north and by land may be considered certain. 
 The fact that the Umbro-Sabellian stock had to content 
 themselves with the rough mountain districts, proves that 
 the Latins went first and settled on the west coast, in the 
 plains of Latium and Campania. The Italian names 
 Novla or Nola (new town), Campani, Capua, Volturnus, 
 Opsci (labourers), show that an Italian and probably 
 Latin stock, the Ausones, were in possession of Campania 
 before the Samnite and Greek immigrations. The Itali 
 proper, who were the primitive inhabitants of the country 
 subsequently occupied by the Lucani and Bruttii, were 
 probably connected with the Italian, not the Iapygian 
 stock, and possibly with the Latin branch of the Italian ; 
 but Greek influence and Samnite invasions completely 
 obliterated all trace of the Itali. So, too, ancient legends 
 connect the extinct stock of the Siculi with Rome. What- 
 ever the truth of this may be it is not improbable that the 
 Latins in primitive times spread over Latium, Campania, 
 Lucania, and the eastern half of Sicily. But those settled 
 in Sicily, Magna Graecia, and Campania came into con- 
 tact with the Greeks at a time when they were unable 
 to resist so superior a civilization, and were consequently, 
 as in Sicily, completely Helleniaed, or so weakened that 
 
8 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 they fell an easy prey to Sabine hordes. Thus, the Siculi, 
 Itali, and Ausonians play no part in the history of Italy. 
 Ou the other hand, those settled in Latiuui, where no 
 Greek colony was founded, succeeded in maintaining their 
 ground against the Sabines and more northern foes. 
 Latium itself is a plain ti % aversed by the Tiber and Anio, 
 bounded on the east by the mountains of the Sabines 
 and Aequi, which form part of the Apennines ; on the 
 south, by the Volscian range, which is separated from 
 the main chain of the Apennines by the ancient territory 
 of the Hernici ; on the west, by the sea, whose harbours 
 on this part of the coast are few and poor ; on the north, 
 by the broad highlands of Etruria, into which it imper- 
 ceptibly merges. This plain is dotted with isolated hills, 
 such as Soracte in the north-east, the Circeian promontory 
 on the south-west, the lower height of Janiculum ; and 
 the Alban range, free on every side, stands between the 
 Volscian chain and the Tiber. Here were settled the old 
 Latins (Prisci Latini), as they were later on called, to 
 distinguish them from the Latins settled outside Latium. 
 Bat in early times the Tiber formed the northern boundary, 
 and only the centre of the region between the Tiber, the 
 spurs of the Apennines, the Alban mount, and the sea, 
 consisting of some seven hundred square miles, formed 
 Latium proper — the real plain land (7rAarus, flat), as it 
 seems from the height of the Alban mount. This plain 
 is broken by hills of tufa of moderate height, and by deep 
 fissures in the ground. Owing to this uneven character 
 lakes are formed in winter, and as there is no natural 
 outlet for the water, malaria arises from the noxious 
 ' exhalations in summer heat. This malaria the ancient 
 inhabitants avoided by wearing heavy woollen clothing, 
 and by keeping a constant blazing fire, and thus a dense 
 population existed where now no one can support a 
 healthy life. 
 
 The conditions of early society among the settlers in 
 Latium must be a matter of conjecture. The clan,* or 
 gens, served as the link between house, village, and canton. 
 Probably each canton was an aggregate of clan-villages, 
 which villages were an aggregate of clan-houses, united 
 
 * Ihne, i. 113, notes that "clan" does not adequately represent 
 gens, and prefers " house " or " family." 
 
LATIN SETTLEMENTS. 9 
 
 together by locality and clanship ; and every political 
 community (civitas, populus) consisted of an aggregate 
 of cantons. No doubt each canton had its local centre, 
 which served alike as a place of meeting and of refuge : 
 these were called, from their position, mountain-tops 
 (capitolia) or strongholds (arces). In time houses began 
 to cluster round the stronghold, and were surrounded 
 with the " ring " (urbs) ; thus the nucleus of a town was 
 formed. There can be little doubt that the Alban range, 
 from its natural strength and advantages of air and water, 
 was occupied by the first comers. Here, among other 
 ancient canton-centres, stood pre-eminent Alba, the 
 mother-city of all the old Latin settlements. Therefore, 
 when the various cantons, though each independent and 
 governed by its own constitution of prince, elders, and 
 general assembly of warriors, expressed their sense of 
 the ties of blood and language by forming what is known 
 as the Latin League, it was but natural that Alba should 
 be the centre of that league, and therefore president 
 of the thirty cantons which composed it. We have no 
 certain knowledge as to the powers or legal rights this 
 confederacy exercised over the various members. Probably 
 disputes between cantons were settled by the league, wars 
 against foreign foes decided, and a federal commander- 
 in-chief appointed What we do know is that on the 
 annual day of assembly the Latin festival (Latinae feriae) 
 was kept, and an ox sacrificed to the Latin god (Jupiter 
 Latiaris). Each community had to contribute to the 
 sacrificial feast its fixed proportion of cattle, milk, and 
 cheese, and to receive in return a part of the roasted 
 victim. During this festival " a truce of God " was 
 observed throughout all Latium, and safe-conducts were 
 probably granted, even by tribes at feud with one another. 
 It is impossible to define the privileges of Alba, as pre- 
 siding canton. Probably it was a purely honorary position, 
 and had no political signification, certainly none as de- 
 noting any sort of leadership or command of the rest of 
 the Latin cantons. But, vague as the outlines of this 
 early canton life must necessarily be, they show us the 
 one great fact of a common centre, which, while it did 
 not destroy the individual independence of the cantons, 
 kept alive the feeling of national kinship, and thus paved 
 
10 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 the way for that national union which is the goal of 
 every free people's progress. 
 
 In tracing the beginnings of Rome, her original consti- 
 tution, and the first changes it underwent, we are on 
 ground which the uncertain light of ancient tradition 
 and modern theory has made most difficult, if not im- 
 possible to traverse with any certainty. The very name 
 of Romans, with which the settlement on the low hills 
 on the left bank of the Tiber has so long been associated, 
 was originally not Romans, but Ramnes (possibly " bush- 
 men"). Side by side with this Latin settlement of 
 Ramnians two other cantons settled, and from the combi- 
 nation, or synoikismos, of these three arose Rome. It 
 must be specially noted that one of these other two 
 cantons, viz. the Tities, has been unanimously ascribed 
 to a Sabellian, not Latin, stock ; the third canton, viz. 
 the Luceres, was probably, like the Ramnes, a Latin 
 community. From the fact that this Sabellian mixture 
 and absorption in a Latin canton-union has left scarce 
 any trace of Sabellian elements in Roman institutions, 
 we may conclude that, at the remote period at which it 
 occurred, the Sabellian and Latin stocks were far less 
 sharply contrasted in language, manners, and customs 
 than was the case in a later age. A proof of the great 
 antiquity of this triple division is the fact that the 
 Romans regularly used tribuere and tribus in the simple 
 sense of "divide" and "a part." The unfavourable 
 character of the site renders it hard to understand how 
 Rome could so early attain its prominent position in 
 Latium. The soil is unfavourable to the growth of fig 
 or vine, and in addition to the want of good water- 
 springs, swamps are caused by the frequent inundations 
 of the Tiber. Moreover, it was confined in all land 
 directions by powerful cities : on the east, by Antemnae, 
 Fidenae, Caenina, Collatia, and Gabii; on the south, by - 
 Tusculum and Alba ; and on the south-west by Lavinium. 
 But all these disadvantages were more than compensated 
 by the unfettered command it had of both banks of the 
 Tiber down to the month of the river. The fact that 
 the clan of the Romilii was settled on the right bank 
 from time immemorial, and that there lay the grove of 
 the creative goddess (Dea Dia), the primitive seat of the 
 
ORIGIN OF ROME. 11 
 
 Arval festival and Arval brotherhood, proves that the 
 original territory of Rome comprehended Janiculnm and 
 Ostia, which afterwards fell into the hands of the Etrus- 
 cans. Not only did this position on both banks of the 
 Tiber place in Rome's hands all the traffic of Latium, 
 but, as the Tiber was the natural barrier against northern 
 invaders, Rome became the maritime frontier fortress of 
 Latium. Again, this situation acted in two ways. 
 Firstly, it brought Rome into commercial relations with 
 the outer world, cemented her alliance with Caere, and 
 taught her the importance of building bridges. Secondly, 
 it caused the Roman canton to become united in the city 
 itself far earlier than was the case with other Latin 
 communities. And thus, though Latium was a strictly 
 agricultural country, Rome was a centre of commerce ; 
 and this commercial position stamped its peculiar mark 
 on the Roman character, distinguishing them from the 
 rest of the Latins and Italians, as the citizen is dis- 
 tinguished from the rustic. Not, indeed, that the Roman 
 neglected his farm, or ceased to regard it as his home ; 
 but the unwholesome air of the Campagna tended to make 
 him withdraw to the more healthy city hills ; and from 
 early times by the side of the Roman farmer arose a 
 non-agricultural population, composed partly of foreigners 
 and partly of natives, which tended to develop urban 
 bfe. The town originally embraced only the Palatine, 
 or what was later known as " Square Rome " (Roma 
 quadrata), so called from the quadrangular form of the 
 Palatine Hill. The "Festival of the Seven Mounts" 
 (Septimontium) was a memorial of the growth of suburbs 
 and of the gradual extension of the city. Each suburb 
 was surrounded with its own ring-wall, and connected 
 with the original ring-wall of the Palatine. This ancient 
 Palatine city with its seven rings embraced the Palatine, 
 the Palatine slope called Cermalus, the Velia, or ridge 
 connecting the Palatine and the Esquiline, the three 
 peaks of the Esquiline, and the fortress of Subura, which 
 protected the new town. on the Carinae, in the low ground 
 between the Esquiline and the Quirinal. This ancient 
 city of the seven mounts has left no tradition of its 
 history, being completely absorbed in the mightier Rome. 
 That other ground was very early occupied, we may well 
 
12 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 believe, such as the Capitol and Aventine, and the height 
 of the Janiculum ; but as to the distribution of the three 
 component elements, the Ramnes, Tities, and Luceres, 
 we have no knowledge. There is, however, strong evi- 
 dence in favour of the view that, coexistent with the 
 Palatine Romans, was another settlement on the Quirinal, 
 facing the city on the Palatine, and independent of it. 
 The twofold worship of Mars on the Palatine and Quirinal, 
 the duplicate existence in later Rome of his two priest- 
 colleges of Salii and Luperci, representing the original 
 colleges of each priesthood on the two hills, and the fact 
 that the Romans on the Palatine called themselves 
 Montani and those on the Quirinal Collini, all point to 
 the coexistence of two separate and independent commu- 
 nities. That a distinction of race caused the founding 
 of these two cities is unproved. The Palatine Romans 
 soon overshadowed those on the hill, but it was the work 
 of Servius Tullius to comprehend both these small cities, 
 and also the heights of the Aventine and Capitoiine, 
 within a single ring-wall, and thus create the greater 
 Rome of history. 
 
 AUTHORITIES. 
 
 Alba Longa and Latins.— Dionys. i. 66-67 ; iii. 1-34 ; iv. 49. 
 Early society. — Vide Marq. Stv. i. 1-20. 
 
 Triple settlement of Rome. — Liv. i. 13. ' Varro L. L. v. 51, 55, 74. 
 Early city. — Livy i. 44. Dionys. i. 88. Cic. de Rep. ii. 6. Anl. Gell. 
 
 xiii. 14. VaiTo L. L. v. 48, 50, 143. Festus 258, 348. Tac. 
 
 Ann. xii. 24. 
 On all topographical and archaeological questions, ride Middleton'a 
 
 "Ancient Rome " and his article in " Encyclopaedia Britannica." 
 On early Latium and Rome's position, cf. Momms. R. St. iii. 607, 
 
 sqq. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 rome's original constitution. 
 
 Father — Slave — Client — King — Community — Rights and burdens of 
 burgesses — Senate. 
 
 The basis of the Roman constitution was the family, 
 and the constitution of the state was but an expansion of 
 that of the family. The head of the household was of 
 necessity a man, and his authority alike as father or 
 husband was supreme, and in the eye of the law as 
 absolute over wife and child as over slave. Though a 
 woman could acquire property, she was under the absolute 
 dominion of her father, or, if married, under that of her 
 husband, or, if he died, under the guardianship (tutela) of 
 her nearest male relations. This authority of the pater 
 familias was alike irresponsible and unchangeable ; nor 
 could it be dissolved except by death. Although a grown- 
 uvp son might establish a separate household of his own, 
 all his property, however acquired, belonged legally to his 
 father ; and it was easier for a slave to obtain release from 
 his master than for a son to free himself from the control 
 of his father. A daughter, if married, passed out of her 
 father's hand into that of her husband, to whose clan or 
 gens she henceforth belonged. On the father's death the 
 sons still preserved the unity of the family, nor did it 
 become broken till the male stock died out , but, as the 
 connecting links became gradually weaker in succeeding 
 generations, there arose the distinction between members 
 of a family (agnati) and members of a clan (gentiles). 
 The former denoted those male members of a family who 
 could show the successive steps of their descent from a 
 
14 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 common progenitor, the latter, those who could do longer 
 prove their degree of relationship by pointing out the 
 intermediate links of connection with a common ancestor. 
 Slaves belonging to a household were regarded by the law, 
 not as living beings, but as chattels, whose position was 
 not affected by the death of the head of the house. 
 Attached to the Roman household was an intermediate 
 class of person, called clientes (" listeners "), or dependants. 
 These consisted partly of refugees from foreign states; 
 partly of slaves living in a state of practical freedom ; 
 partly of persons who, though not free citizens of any 
 community, lived in a condition of protected freedom. 
 Although these formed with the slaves the familia, or 
 " body of servants," and were dependent on the will of 
 the head of the house or patron (patronus), their position 
 was practically one of considerable freedom ; and in the 
 course of several generations the clients of a household 
 acquired more and more liberty. Every one who was a 
 member of a Roman family, and therefore of one of the 
 gentes, or clanships, whose union formed the state, was a 
 true citizen or burgess of Rome. Every one born of 
 parents united by the ceremony of the sacred salted cake 
 (confarreatio) was also a full citizen ; and therefore the 
 Roman burgesses called themselves "fathers' children" 
 (patricii), as in the eye of the law they alone had a 
 father. Thus the state consisted of gentes, or clans, and 
 the clans of families, and although the relations of the 
 various members of the household were not altered by 
 their incorporation with the state, yet a son outside the 
 household was on a footing of equality with the father in 
 respect of political rights and duties. So, too, the various 
 clients, though not admitted to the rights and duties 
 proper to true burgesses, were not wholly excluded from 
 participation in state festivals and state worship ; and 
 this would be specially true of those who were not clients 
 of special families, but of the community at large. 
 
 Since the family served as the model for the constitution 
 of the state, it was necessary to choose some one who 
 should stand in the same relation to the body-politic as 
 the head of the family did to the household. He who was 
 so chosen rex, or leader, possessed the same absolute power 
 over the state as the house-father had over his household, 
 

 ROME'S ORIGINAL CONSTITUTION. 15 
 
 and, like him, ruled for life : there was no other holder of 
 power beside him. His " command " (imperium) was all- 
 powerful in peace and war, and he was preceded by 
 lictores, or " summoners," armed with axes and rods on all 
 public occasions. He nominated priests and priestesses, 
 and acted as the nation's intercessor with the gods. He 
 held the keys of the public treasury, and alone had the 
 right of publicly addressing the burgesses. He was 
 supreme judge in all private and criminal trials, and had 
 the power of life and death : he called out the people for 
 military service, and commanded the army. Any magis- 
 trates, any religious colleges, any military officers, that he 
 might appoint, derived all their power from him, and only 
 existed during his pleasure. His power only ended with 
 death, and he appointed his successor, thus imparting a 
 sense of permanence to the kingship, despite the personal 
 change of the holders of the sovereign power. But, 
 although the king's authority was so absolute, he never 
 came to be regarded by the Romans as other than mortal, 
 nor, as by divine right, higher and better than his fellow- 
 citizens. This view of the kingship was at once the 
 moral and practical limitation of its power. The king was 
 the people's representative, and derived his power from 
 them, and was accountable to them for its use and abuse. 
 Moreover, the legal limitation to his power lay in the 
 principle that he was entitled only to execute the law, 
 not to alter it. Any deviation from the law had to 
 receive the previous sanction of the assembly of the 
 people and the council of eldei'S. There is no parallel 
 in modern life to the Roman family or Roman state or 
 Roman sovereign. 
 
 The principle on which the division of the burgesses 
 rested was that ten houses formed a clan, ten clans a 
 wardship (curia), ten wardships the community. Each 
 householder furnished a foot-soldier (mil-es, thousand- 
 walker), and each clan a horseman and senator. If com- 
 munities combined, each was a part or tribe (tribus) of 
 the whole community. Originally each household had its 
 own portion of land ; but when households combined into 
 a gens, each clan had its lands, and this system naturally 
 extended to curies and communities, whether single or 
 combined. Thus clan-lands formed in primitive times the 
 
16 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 smallest unit in the division of land. Although this 
 division into ten curies early disappeared in Rome, we 
 find it in later Latin communities, which always had 
 one hundred acting councillors (centumviri), each of 
 whom was "head of ten households" (decurio). This 
 constitutional scheme did not originate in Rome, but was 
 a primitive institution, common to all Latins. What the 
 precise object and value of this division was we cannot 
 now determine ; and it is clear that any attempt to 
 rigidly fix the number of households and clans must, 
 through ordinary human accidents, have failed. The really 
 important unit in the division was the curia, the members 
 of which were bound by religious ties, and had a priest 
 of their own (flamen curialis). Military levies and money 
 valuations were made according to curial divisions, and 
 the burgesses met and voted by curies. Although all full 
 citizens or burgesses were on a footing of absolute equality 
 as regarded one another, the distinction between those 
 who were burgesses and those who were not was most 
 sharply and rigidly defined. If a stranger were adopted 
 into the burgess-body (patronum cooptari or in patricios 
 cooptari, as patronus like patricius merely denoted the 
 "full citizen"), he could not retain his rights as citizen 
 elsewhere. If he did, he merely possessed honorary citizen- 
 ship at Rome, and was entitled to the privileges and 
 protection of a guest (ius hospitii), not to the exercise of 
 full citizen rights. There were no class privileges at 
 Rome. All wore the simple woollen toga in public, 
 although certain officers by virtue of their office were 
 distinguished by dress. As the Latin immigrants had no 
 conquered race to deal with, the nobility of Greece and 
 the caste of India were, unknown to them. The most 
 important duty of the burgesses was military service, as 
 they alone had the right of bearing arms. Hence the 
 name populus (" body of warriors," connected with popular -i, 
 "to lay waste "), called in old litanies pilumnus populus, 
 " spear-armed host ; " hence, too, the name of quirites * 
 (" lance-men "), given them by the king. Other duties in- 
 cumbent on the burgesses were such as the king laid upon 
 them ; among these was the all-important task of building 
 walls, to which the name of moenia ("tasks") was given. 
 * On this word, cf. Momms. R. St. iii. p. 5, note. 
 

 ROME'S ORIGINAL CONSTITUTION. 17 
 
 As there was no state pay for services so rendered, there 
 was no direct state expenditure or state taxation. The 
 very victims for sacrifice were provided by the deposit, or 
 cattle-fine (sacramentum), which the defeated party in a 
 law-suit was bound to pay. In cases of urgent need a 
 direct contribution (tributum) was levied ; but this was 
 regarded as a loan, and repaid when times improved. 
 Although the king managed the state exchequer, the 
 state property, e.g. the land won in war, was not identified 
 with the private property of the king. His exchequer 
 was filled partly by the land-taxes, i.e. the scriptura, or 
 pasture tribute, paid by those w T ho fed cattle on the 
 common pasture, and the vectigalia, or payment in kind in 
 place of rent, by those who were lessees of the state 
 lands; partly by gains in war; partly by harbour-dues 
 levied on the exports and imports of Ostia; partly, 
 perhaps, by the tax which the non-burgesses settled al 
 Rome (aerarii) paid him for protection. In addition 
 to these duties the burgesses had also rights. They 
 were convoked by the king (1) in formal assemblies 
 (comitia curiata) twice a year, or (2) in such meetings 
 (contiones) as the king thought fit to hold. They had no 
 power of speech on such occasions, unless the king saw 
 fit to grant it ; their duty was merely to listen and return 
 simple answers without discussion to the king's questions. 
 As long as the king was executor of existing laws, no 
 intervention was necessary on the part of the citizens ; 
 but where abnormal events arose which necessitated any 
 change of or deviation from existing laws, the co-operation 
 and assent of the burgess body was essential. The king 
 put the question (rogatio), and the people returned 
 answer ; and the lex, or law, which was the outcome of 
 this process, was not in its origin a command of a king 
 but a contract proposed by the king and accepted or 
 refused by his hearers. The citizens alone could allow a 
 man to make such a will as transferred his property on 
 his death to another ; they alone could sanction the 
 adoption of a man into the burgess body, or allow a 
 burgess to surrender his rights as citizen ; they alone 
 could pardon a condemned criminal, whence arose the 
 right of appeal (provocatio), which was only allowed to 
 those who pleaded guilty. " Thus far the assembly of 
 
 2 
 
18 B1ST0HY OF ROME. 
 
 the community, restricted and hampered as it first appears, 
 was yet from antiquity a constituent element of the 
 Roman commonwealth, and was in law superior to, rather 
 than co-ordinate with, the king." 
 
 The origin of the senate can with probability be asci'ibed 
 to that remote period w'len each clan in Latium was 
 under the rule of its own elder. As the clans became 
 amalgamated, the position of such an elder was necessarily 
 subordinated to that of the head or king of the community ; 
 but that the senate was not a mere conclave of trusty coun- 
 cillors called into being by the king, but an institution as 
 old as that of king and burgess-assembly, admits of little 
 doubt. It x'esembled the assembly of pi'inces and rulers, 
 gathered in a circle round the king as described by 
 Homer. The number was fixed at three hundred, corre- 
 sponding to the three hundred clans of which the three 
 primitive communities, forming the whole state, were 
 composed. All senators sat for life ; they were chosen by 
 the king, and it is only natural to suppose that, if originally 
 the senate consisted of the ancient body of clan elders, the 
 king always chose, when a senator died, a man of the same 
 clan to fill his place. The senators were, therefore, so 
 many kings of the whole community, although the chief 
 power, as in the household, was vested in one of their body, 
 namely the king : their insignia, though inferior to those 
 of the king, were of the same character ; the purple border 
 (latus clavus) being substituted for the purple robe of the 
 king, and the red shoes of the senator being lower and less 
 striking than those which the king wore. Should the king 
 die without appointing a successor, one of the senators, 
 chosen by lot as interrex, exercised his authority for fire 
 days, and this interrex appointed the next, thus passing 
 on the five days' sovereign power to one of his own body. 
 Finally, one of these interreges, but never the one first 
 chosen, nominated the king, and his choice was ratified 
 by the whole assembly of the citizens. Thus the senate 
 was the ultimate holder of the ruling power, and was a 
 guarantee of the permanence of the monarchy. Further, 
 it was the guardian of the constitution, examining every 
 new resolution which the king suggested and the burgesses 
 adopted, and having the right of vetoing these resolutions, 
 should they appear to violate existing rights. The senate's 
 
ROME'S ORIGINAL CONSTITUTION. 19 
 
 consent (patrum auctoritas) had also to be obtained before 
 war could be declared. And thus the senate's duty was to 
 guard against any innovation or violation of the constitu- 
 tion, whether coming from king or burgess-assembly. In 
 consequence of, or, at least, in close connection with, this 
 power of the senate, arose the very ancient custom of the 
 king's convoking the senate, and submitting to it the pro- 
 posals he intended to bring before the citizens. By thus 
 ascertaining the opinions of the individual members, the 
 king avoided the possibility of any subsequent opposition 
 from that body. On most questions, involving no breach 
 of the constitution, the senate's part Mas doubtless merely 
 that of compliance with the king's wishes. The senate could 
 not meet unless convoked by the king, and no one might 
 declare his opinion unasked : nor was the consultation of 
 the senate on ordinary matters of state business legally 
 incumbent on the king ; but this consultation soon became 
 usual, and from this usage the subsequent extensive powers 
 of the senate were in great measure developed. To sum 
 up, "the oldest constitution of Rome was in some measure 
 constitutional monarchy inverted. In the Roman con- 
 stitution the community of the people exercised very much 
 the same functions as belong to the king in England. The 
 right of pardon, which in England is the prerogative of 
 the crown, was in Rome the prerogative of the community ; 
 while all government was vested in the president of the 
 state," whose royal power was at once absolute and limited 
 by the laws (imperium legitimum). Further, in the rela- 
 tions of the state to the individual, we find that the family 
 was not sacrificed to the community, but that, though 
 power of imprisonment or death was vested in the statp, 
 no burgess could have his son or his field taken from him, 
 or even taxation imposed on him. In no other community 
 could a citizen live so absolutely secure from encroach- 
 ment, either on the part of his fellows or of the state itself. 
 This constitution was neither manufactured nor borrowed ; 
 it grew and developed with the growth and development 
 of the Roman people, and "as long as there existed a 
 Roman community, in spite of changes of form, it was 
 always held that the magistrate had absolute command, 
 that the council of elders was the highest authority in the 
 state, and that every exceptional resolution required the 
 
20 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 sanction of the sovereign, or, in other words, of the com- 
 munity of the people." 
 
 AUTHORITIES. 
 
 Roman household. — Dionys. ii. 26, 27. Marq. Priv. leb. 1-6. 
 King.— Liv. i. 8, 22, 32, 42 ; iv. 7. Cic. de Legg. iii. 3. Appian 
 
 i. 98. Dionys. 4, 80. Momms. R. St. ii. 3-16. Schwegler R. G. 
 
 i. 646, sq. 
 Burgesses. — Comit. Curiata Dionys. ii. 14; iii. 22. Liv. i. 26. Cic. 
 
 de Rep. ii. 13. A. Gell. v. 19 ; xv. 27. Gaius, ii. 101. Momms. 
 
 R. St. iii. 316-321. 
 Senate.— Liv. i. 8, 17-22, 35, 41, 49. Dionys. ii. 12, 47 ; iii. 67. 
 
 Plut. Rom. 13, 20. Nam. 2. 
 Populus. — Cf. Momms. R. St. iii. 2-8. 
 Gentes and adoption. — Momms. R. St. iii. 9-40. 
 Citizen rights. — Momms. R. St. iii. 40-48. 
 Curies.- Momms. R. St. iii. 89-103. 
 
CHAPTER IV. • 
 
 REFORMS OF SERVIDS TDLLIUS — SUPREMACY OF ROME IN LATIUM. 
 
 Rise of the plebs — Military reforms of Servius Tullius — Political 
 effects — Rise of Rome to supremacy in Latium — Her relation to 
 Latium — Extension of Rome and Roman territory — Treatment 
 of conquered Latins. 
 
 We have already stated that the earliest amalgamation 
 in the history of Rome was that which blended together 
 the Ramnes, Tities, and Luceres. This was followed by the 
 union of the settlement on the Quirinal with that on the 
 Palatine. Traces of this union existed in the duplicate 
 I'eligious institutions retained in Rome, but politically it 
 left little mark. The town on the Quirinal counted as one 
 of the four divisions of the Palatine city, the other three 
 being the Suburan, Palatine, and Esquiline. No new tribe, 
 however, was added to the original three; and the new bur- 
 gesses were distributed among the existing tribes and curies. 
 Henceforth each of the three tribes contained two divisions 
 or ranks, and these ranks were denoted by the names " first " 
 (priores) and " second " (posteriores) . But no increase was 
 made in the number of the senate, the primitive number 
 of three hundred remaining unchanged down to the seventh 
 century of the city's history. So also the magistrates or 
 king's deputies remained the same. If, then, the Quirinal 
 citizens furnished the posterior or " second " gentes of the 
 old tribes, this distinction must not be confused with the 
 subsequent maiores and minores gentes (greater and lesser 
 clans) who figure in history : these probably belonged to 
 those communities which, beginning with Alba, were sub- 
 sequently amalgamated with the Roman people. Thus the 
 
22 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 incorporation of the Quirinal or Hill Romans with the Pala- 
 tine or Mountain Romaus marks an intermediate stage 
 between the earliest synoikismos, which united into one body 
 the Titles, Ramnes, and Luceres, and all subsequent incor- 
 porations. This amalgamation, then, increased the bulk, 
 but did uot change the character of the Roman state. But 
 another process of incorporation, the first steps of which 
 may be traced to this period, and which proceeded very 
 gradually, did profoundly affect the community. We 
 refer to the development of the plebs — a problem most 
 intricate and elusive. In the previous chapter the posi- 
 tion of " clients " was described as twofold : (1) that of 
 those dependent on and protected by the master of the 
 household; (2) that of those dependent on and protected 
 by the state, i.e. by the king. Every fresh amalgamation 
 doubtless brought in an accession of clients, but the 
 principal increase must have been due (1) to the attraction 
 Rome, as a commercial centre, possessed for foreigners, 
 who became metoecs (peToiKoi) , or resident aliens; (2) to 
 the influence of war, which, while it transferred the citizens 
 of conquered towns to Rome, at the same time thinned 
 the ranks of the Roman citizens, who alone had the 
 doubtful privilege of bearing the brunt of such wars. In 
 truth this latter fact was the chief cause in promoting the 
 amalgamation of the clients and the citizens. With the 
 increase of the whole body of clients, and especially of 
 that portion consisting of foreigners, attached as clients to 
 the Roman state, but often retaining the citizenship of 
 other communities, the old restrictions, which were more 
 easily observed in the case of household clients, must have 
 broken down. Many, in fact, must have enjoyed practical 
 freedom, though, of course, not the full rights of Roman 
 citizens. The immemorial principle of Roman law that, 
 when once a master or owner had renounced his ownership 
 (dominium), he could never resume it over the f reed- 
 man or the freedm m's descendants; the liberal concessions, 
 made by Roman law especially to foreignei*s, as regarded 
 marriage and the acquisition of property; the increasing 
 number of manumitted slaves ; the influx alike of traders, 
 and still more of Latins vanquished in war ; the corre- 
 sponding decrease of true Roman patricians ; the constant 
 vexation of the relations between client and patron, — these 
 
REFORMS OF SERYIUS TULLIUS. 23 
 
 and otber causes must have all sufficed to threaten a 
 revolution of the direst consequences to the Roman state. 
 The new name of plebes, or multitude, (from pleo, plenus), 
 by which the clients were now called, was ominous, signi- 
 fying, as it did, that the majority no longer felt so much 
 their special dependence as their want of political rights. 
 The danger was averted by the reform associated with 
 the name of Servius Tullius, although the new consti- 
 tution assigned the plebeians primarily only duties, not 
 rights Military service was now changed from a burden 
 upon birth to a burden on property. All freeholders, 
 from seventeen to sixty years of age, whether burgesses, 
 metoecs, or manumitted slaves, provided only they held 
 land, were bound to serve ; and they were distributed, 
 according to the size of their property, into five classes (lit. 
 " summonings " — classis, from calare). The first class, who 
 were obliged to appear in complete armour, consisted of the 
 possessors of an entire hide of land, and were called classici. 
 The remaining four classes consisted of the respective pos- 
 sessors of three-quarters, half, a quarter, or an eighth of a 
 nominal farm, i.e. of a farm whose size served as the 
 standard by which such divisions were regulated (probably 
 such a farm contained at least twenty jugera). The 
 cavalry was dealt with in the same way : its existing six 
 divisions, which retained their old names, were tripled ; 
 only the richest landholders, whether burgesses or non- 
 burgesses, served as horsemen. All those who held land 
 and were incapable of service, either from sex or age, were 
 bound to provide horses and fodder for special troopers. 
 To facilitate the levying of the infantry, the city was 
 divided into four parts (tribus), (1) the Palatine, com- 
 prising also the Velia ; (2) the Suburan, comprising also 
 the Carinae and Coelian; (3) the Esquiline; (4) the Colline, 
 i.e. the Quirinal and Viminal, Each of these four divi- 
 sions contributed a fourth part, not merely of the force 
 as a whole, but of each of its military subdivisions ; and 
 this arrangement tended to merge all distinctions of clan 
 and place, and also to blend, by its levelling spirit, bur- 
 gesses and metoecs into one people. The army was divided 
 into two levies : the first comprised the juniors, who 
 served in the field from their seventeenth to their forty- 
 sixth year; the second, the seniors, who guarded the walls 
 
24 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 at home. The whole force of infantry consisted of four 
 legions ("musters," legiones), each of 4200 men, or 42 
 centuries, 3000 of whom were heavy armed, and 1200 
 light armed (velites) ; two of these legions were juniors 
 and two seniors. Added to these were 1800 cavalry, thus 
 bringing the whole force to about 20,000 men. The 
 century, or body of one hundred, formed the unit of this 
 military scheme, and by the arrangement above indicated 
 there would be 18 centuries of cavalry and 168 of infantry. 
 To these, other centuries of supernumeraries (adcensi) 
 must be added, who marched with the army unarmed 
 (velati), and took the place of those who fell ill or died in 
 battle. The whole number of centuries amounted to 193 
 or 194; nor was it increased as the population rose. Out 
 of this military organization arose the census or register 
 of landed property, including the slaves, cattle, etc., that 
 each man possessed, and this was strictly revised every 
 fourth year. This reform, though instituted on purely 
 military lines and for military purposes, had important 
 political results. In the first place, every soldier, whether 
 a full citizen or not, would be certain to have it in his 
 power to become a centurion and, further, a military 
 tribune. In the second, those rights which the burgesses 
 had formerly possessed, not as an assembly of citizens in 
 curies, but as a levy of armed burgesses, would now be 
 shared by the whole army of centuries. These rights 
 conferred the power on the military centuries of authoriz- 
 ing soldiers to make wills before battle, and of granting 
 permission to the king to make an aggressive war. In 
 the third place, although the rights of the old burgess 
 assembly were in no way restricted, there thus arose three 
 classes : (1) the full burgesses or citizens ; (2) the clients 
 possessing freeholds, called later, " burgesses without the 
 right of voting " (cives sine suffragio), who shared in the 
 public burdens, i.e. military service, tribute, and task- 
 work, and were, therefore, called municipals (municipes) ; 
 (3) those metoecs who were not included in the tribes, 
 and who paid protection-money, and were non-freeholders 
 (aerarii). The period at which this reform took place must 
 be a matter of conjecture, but it presupposes the existence 
 of the Servian wall, embracing the four regions of the 
 city : and the smallest extent to which the city must have 
 
SUPREMACY OF ROME IN LATIUM. 25 
 
 spread is 420 square miles ; and we must assume that 
 not only the district between the Tiber and the Anio 
 had been acquired, but also the Alban territory. Analogy 
 from Greek states inclines to the view that this reform 
 was modelled on Greek lines, and produced by Greek 
 influence. The adoption of the armour and arrangements 
 of the Greek hoplite system in the legion, the supply 
 of cavalry horses by widows and orphans, point in this 
 direction ; moreover, about this time the Greek states in 
 Lower Italy adopted a modification of the pure clan 
 constitution, and gave the preponderance of power to the 
 landholders. 
 
 The steps by which Rome rose to the proud position 
 of head state iu Latium, the union of the Latin com- 
 munities under her headship, the extension alike of Latin 
 territory and of the city of Rome, the splendour of that 
 regal period which shed a special lustre on the royal 
 house of Tarquin, cannot now be described, save in faint 
 outline. We may, however, briefly summarize the results, 
 the details of which have either been buried in oblivion or 
 falsified by mythical legend. Firstly, those Latin com- 
 munities situated on the Upper Tiber, and between the 
 Tiber and the Anio — Antemnae, Crustumerium, Ficulnea, 
 Medullia, Caenina, Corniculum, Cameria, Collatia, which 
 on the east side sorely hampered Rome — were very early 
 subjugated ; the only one which retained its independence 
 was Nomentum, probably by alliance with Rome. Con- 
 stant war was waged between the Romans and the 
 Etruscan people of Veii for the possession of Fidenae, 
 situate on the left (Latin) bank of the Tiber, about five 
 miles from Rome, but apparently without the Romans 
 becoming permanent masters of this important outpost. 
 Secondly, Alba was conquered and destroyed ; to her 
 position as the recognized political head and sacred 
 metropolis of Latium, Rome succeeded. Rome thus 
 became presideut of the Latin league of thirty cantons, 
 and the seat of the religious ceremonial observed at the 
 Latin festival. An alliance was concluded on equal terms 
 between Rome on the one hand and the Latin confederacy 
 on the other, establishing lasting peace throughout Latium, 
 and a perpetual league for offence and defence. Equality 
 of rights was established between the members of this 
 
26 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 federation, alike as to commerce and intermarriage. No 
 member of the league could exist as a slave within the 
 league's territory, and, though every member only- 
 exercised political rights, as member of the community 
 to which he belonged, he had the private right of living 
 anywhere he liked within the Latin territory ; and, 
 further, although Latin law was not of necessity identical 
 with Roman, the league naturally brought the two into 
 more complete harmony with one another. The difference 
 between the position occupied by Rome and that formerly 
 held by Alba, was that the honorary presidency of the 
 latter was replaced by the real supremacy of the former, 
 Rome was not, as Alba, a mere member of the league, and 
 included within it, but rather existed alongside it ; this 
 is shown by the composition of the federal army, the 
 Roman and Latin force being of equal strength, and the 
 supreme command being held by Rome and Latium 
 alternately. In accordance with this principle, aTl land 
 and other property acquired in war by the league was 
 divided equally between Rome and Latium. Each Latin 
 community retained its own independent constitution and 
 administration, so far as its obligations to the league were 
 not concerned ; and the league of the thirty Latin com- 
 munities retained its independence, and had its own 
 federal council, in contradistinction to the self-government 
 and council of Rone. Thirdly, although Rome failed to 
 master Fidenae, it kept its hold upon Janiculum, and upon 
 both banks at the mouth of the Tiber In the direction 
 of the Sabines and Aequi, Rome advanced her position, 
 and, by the help of an alliance with the Hernici, held in 
 check her eastern neighbours. On the south, constant 
 wars, not without success, were waged against the 
 Volscians and Rutulians ; and in this quarter we first 
 meet with Latin colonies, i.e. communities founded by 
 Rome and Latium on the enemy's soil, which shows that 
 the earliest extension of Latin territory took place in this 
 direction. Lastly, in addition to this enlargement of the 
 Latin borders towards the east and south, the city of 
 Rome, owing to its increase of inhabitants, and com- 
 mercial and political prominence, needed new defences. 
 In consequence the Servian wall was constructed : this, 
 beginning at the river below the Aventine, embraced 
 
SUPREMACY OF ROME IN LATIUM. 27 
 
 that hill, the Coelian, the whole of the Esquiline, Viminal, 
 and Quirinal ; thence it ran to the Capitoline. and abutted 
 on the river above the island in the Tiber.* The Palatine, 
 which had hitherto been the stronghold, was now left 
 open to be built upon, and the stronghold (arx, or capi- 
 tolium) was constructed on the Capitoline, which was 
 free on every side and easily defensible ; it was sometimes 
 called Mons Tarpeius (" the Tarpeian hill"), and its lower 
 summit facing the Tiber was the famous Tarpeian rock, 
 a precipice, in ancient days, of some eighty feet. Here, 
 too, was the enclosed "well-house" (tullianum), the 
 treasury (aerarium), the prison, and the most ancient 
 place of assembling for the burgesses (Area Capitolina). 
 No stone dwelling-houses were allowed to be built on 
 the hill; and trees or shrubs covered the space between 
 the two hill summits, which was afterwards called the 
 Asylum. Thus the Capitol was the true Acropolis of 
 Rome, a castle of refuge when the city itself had fallen. 
 Janiculum, though outside the city limits, was fortified, 
 and embraced by the Servian wall, and connected with 
 the city by the bridge of piles (Pons Sublicins) which ran 
 across to the Tiber island. The great work of draining 
 the marshy valley between the Capitol and the Palatine 
 was undertaken in this regal period, and the assembly- 
 place of the community was transferred from the Area 
 Capitolina to the flat space (comitium) between the 
 Palatine and the Carinae. Not far from here was built 
 the senate-house (Curia Hostilia) ; here stood the tribunal, 
 or judgment-seat platform, and the stage, whence the 
 burgesses were addressed (afterwards called rostra). In 
 the direction of the Velia arose the new market (Forum 
 Romanorum). To the west of the forum, beneath the 
 Palatine, was the temple of Vesta, the common hearth 
 of the city ; and in the valley between the Palatine and 
 Aventine was marked off a racecourse, the circus of later 
 times. Among the numerous temples and sanctuaries on 
 
 * It is necessary to remark that this enlarged Rome was never 
 looked upon as the " city of seven hills," which title was exclusively 
 reserved for the narrower old Rome of the Palatine, described at the 
 end of Chapter II The modern list of the seven hills, as comprising 
 those embraced by the Servian wall, viz. Palatine, Aventine, Coelian, 
 Esquiline, Viminal, Quirinal, Capitoline, is unknown to any ancient 
 author. 
 
28 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 all the summits, were conspicuous the federal sanctuary of 
 Diana ou the Aventine, and the far-seen temple of Jupiter 
 Diovis on the Capitoline. That Greek influences, as in 
 the Servian military organization, can be traced in this 
 remodelling of the Roman state cannot well be doubted ; 
 but how far and in what way they did so cannot now be 
 shown. There may be some truth in the traditions which 
 ascribe to different kings the various improvements and 
 new buildings of Rome, but it is clear that in any case 
 they are to be assigned to the period when Rome re- 
 modelled her army and rose to the hegemony of Latium. 
 
 Reverting for a moment to the first two sections above 
 enumerated, we may briefly touch on the .treatment of 
 the conquered Latins by Rome. The circumstances of 
 each particular case doubtless decided the question, as to 
 whether the inhabitants of a conquered town were forced 
 to migrate to Rome, or allowed to remain in the open 
 villages of their old district. Strongholds in all cases 
 were razed, and the conquered country was included in 
 the Roman territory, and the vanquished farmers were 
 taught to regard Rome as their market-centre and seat of 
 justice. Legally they occupied the position of clients, 
 though in some cases of individuals and clans full burgess- 
 rights were granted ; this was specially the case with 
 Alban clans. The jealousy with which the Latin cantons, 
 and especially the Roman, guarded against the rise of 
 colonies as rival political centres, is well shown in Rome's 
 treatment of Ostia ; the latter city had no political in- 
 dependence, and its citizens were only allowed to retain, 
 if they already possessed, the general burgess-rights of 
 Rome. Thus this centralizing process, which caused the 
 absorption of a number of smaller states in a larger one, 
 though not essentially a Roman nor even Italian idea, was 
 carried out more consistently and perseveringly by the 
 Roman than by any other Italian canton ; and the success 
 of Rome, as of Athens, is doubtless due to the thorough 
 application of this system of centralization. 
 
SUPREMACY OF ROME IN LATIUM. 29 
 
 AUTHORITIES. 
 
 Plebs distinct from clients and populus. — Liv. ii. 35, 56, 64; ill. 14, 
 
 16; vii. 18; xxv. 12. Dionys. vi. 45-47; ix. 41 ; x. 27. Momms. 
 
 R. St. iii. 71-75. 
 Clients. — Liv. ii. 16. Dionys. ii. 10, 46; v. 40 ; ix. 5; x. 14. Marq. 
 
 P.l. i. 196, sq. Momnis. R. St. iii. 54-88. 
 Servian reforms. — Liv. i. 42-43. Dionys. iv. 16, 18. Cio. de Rep. 
 
 ii. 22. Varro L. L. 46-54. Momms. R. St. iii. 240-267, 281- 
 
 288. 
 Rome's extension and relation to Latium. — Liv. i. 35-38, 45, 50-55. 
 
 Dionys. iii. 54. Plinv N. H. 36, 15. Marq. Stv. i. 21, eq. 
 
 Momms. R. St. iii. 609-617. 
 On the tribes, cf. Momms. R. St. iii. 161, sq. 
 
80 HISTORY OF POME. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 THE ETRUSCANS — THE GREEKS IN ITALY. 
 
 The Etrnscans — Origin — Settlements in Italy — Etruria — Relations 
 with Rome — Constitution — Maritime power — Religion — Art — 
 The Greeks in Italy — Date of immigration — League of Achaean 
 cities — Tarentum — Cumae — Relations of Greeks with Latins, 
 Etruscans, and Phoenicians. 
 
 Before proceeding to describe the changes of Republican 
 Rome, it will be well to direct our attention to the other 
 races inhabiting Italy. For convenience, we will omit the 
 movements of the Umbro-Sabellian stocks for the present, 
 and only include in this chapter the two foreign races, 
 whose history is interwoven with our subject : (1) the 
 Etruscans ; (2) the Italian Greeks. A mystery shrouds 
 the first people as to their origin, language, race-classifica- 
 tion, and original home. Their heavy bodily structure, 
 gloomy and fantastic religion, strange manners and customs, 
 and harsh language, point to their original distinctness 
 from all Italian and Greek races. No one has been able 
 either to decipher the numerous remains of their language 
 or to classify with precision the language itself. Its 
 original soft and melodious character was by the weaken- 
 ing of vowels and loss of soft terminations, completely 
 changed. Tarquinius became Tarchnaf ; Minerva, Menrva; 
 Menelaos, Menle ; indistinct pronunciation confused owith 
 v, b with p, c with g, d with t, and the termination al 
 signified " son of" {e.g. Canial = Cainia natus) ; sa denoted 
 "wife of " (e.g. Lecnesa = " wife of Licinius ") ; Hermes 
 became Turms ; Aphrodite, Turan ; Bacchus, Fufluns. All 
 fchijse present not the remotest analogy to the tongues of 
 
TEE ETRUSCANS. 31 
 
 Greece or Italy. But the clan termination enas or cna (e.g. 
 Porsena, Maecenas, Spurinna) corresponds closely to that 
 found in Italian, especially Sabellian, names (compare Vi~ 
 bius, or Vibienus,and Spurius with Vivenna and Spurinna). 
 The Etruscan names of divinities, which at first sight would 
 point to a close connection with the Latin language (e.g. 
 Usil, sun and dawn, connected with ausum, aurum, aurora, 
 sol, Menrva, and Minerva, etc.), probably arose from the 
 subsequent political and religious relations between the 
 Etruscans and Latins. Still, in default of anything more 
 certain, we may conclude that the Etruscans belonged to 
 the Indo-Germanic family, although standing strangely 
 isolated. Many conjectures have been hazarded as to their 
 original home before migrating into Italy — all equally in 
 vain. The fact that their o'dest and most important 
 towns (with the exception of Populonia, which was not one 
 of the old twelve cities) lay far inland, and never on the 
 coast, makes it probable that they migrated by land from 
 the north or west of Italy ; possibly they came over the 
 Raetian Alps, for the Raeti spoke Etruscan down to his- 
 torical times, and their name sounds similar to that of Ras, 
 by which the Etruscans called themselves. The old tradition 
 that they were Lydian emigrants from Asia has nothing 
 to support it, except the accidental resemblance of Tui*s- 
 ennae (which in Greek became Tvpcr-rjvot, Tvpprjvoi ; in 
 Umbrian, Tursci ; and in Latin, Tusci, Etrusci) to the 
 Lydian Topprj/3oi of the town Tvppa. These Torrhebi were 
 sometimes denoted by the word Tyrrhenians ; and, as the 
 Lydian s, and especially the Torrhebians, were noted for 
 piracy, and the Etruscans for commerce by sea, this un- 
 fortunate error easily arose. Whatever, then, was their 
 original home, the fact of the Etruscan dialect being still 
 spoken in Livy's time by the inhabitants of the Raetian Alps, 
 and of Mantua remaining Tuscan to a late period, proves 
 that Etruscans dwelt in the district north of thePo, bounded 
 on the east by the Veneti, and on the west by the Ligu- 
 rians. To the south of the Po, and at its mouths, the Um- 
 brians, who were the older settlers, were mingled with and 
 under the supremacy of the Etruscan immigrants ; and 
 the towns of Hatria and Spina, founded by the Umbrians, 
 and Felsina (Bologna) and Ravenna, founded by the 
 Etruscans, point to this joint settlement; but the irrup- 
 
32 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 tions of the Celts forced the Etruscans early to abandon 
 their position on the left bank of the Po, and later that on 
 the right bank of that river. 
 
 The great settlement of the Tuscans in the land that 
 still bears their name completely effaced all traces of 
 Ligurian or Umbrian predecessors in that country, and 
 maintained its position with great tenacity down to the 
 time of the empire. Etruria proper was bounded on the 
 east by the Apennines, on the north by the Arnus, on 
 the south at first by the Ciminian forest, and later by the 
 Tiber. The land north of the Arnus, as far as the mouth 
 of the Macra and the Apennines, was debatable border 
 territory, held now by Ligurians, now by Etruscans. 
 The land between the Ciminian range and the Tiber, with 
 the towns of Sutrium, Nepete, Falerii, Veii, and Caere, 
 was occupied at a later date, possibly in the second century 
 of Rome; and the Italian population there held its ground, 
 especially in Falerii, though in a state of dependence. 
 When the Tiber became the boundary, the relations 
 between Rome and the Etruscan invader were on the 
 whole peaceful and friendly, especially with the town of 
 Caere. But where an Etruscan town threatened Rome's 
 commercial position on the Tiber, as was the case with 
 Veii, constant war naturally resulted. Any trace of 
 Etruscans to the south of the Tiber must be ascribed 
 to plundering expeditions by sea, never to regular land 
 invasions ; nor is there any reliable evidence of any 
 Etruscan settlement south of the Tiber being planted by 
 settlers who came by land.* The name of " Tuscan quarter " 
 (Tuscus vicus) at the foot of the Palatine, and the un- 
 doubted fact that the last royal house of Rome, the 
 Tarquin, was of Etruscan origin (whether sprung from 
 Tarquinii or Caere), coupled with minor and similar tra- 
 ditions, prove that Tuscan settlements took place in 
 Rome ; but the fact that a house of Etruscan origin held 
 the royal sceptre does not warrant the conclusion that the 
 Etruscans ever were dominant in Rome. There is no 
 evidence that Etruria exercised any essential influence on 
 
 * Others — e.g. O. Miiller and Pelham (" Encyclopaedia Britan- 
 nica") — hold the contrary view, and base it on the evidence for 
 Etruscan rule over Rome and Latium found in Dionys. i. 29, 64, 65; 
 Plut. Q. R. 18 ; Liv. i. 2. 
 
THE ETRUSCANS. 33 
 
 tbe language or customs or political development of Rome. 
 The passive attitude of Etruria towards Rome was prob- 
 ably due to two causes : (1) to their struggles with the 
 Celtic hordes from the North ; (2) to their sea-faring 
 tendency, which is especially shown in their Campanian 
 settlements. 
 
 The commercial instincts of the Etruscans caused them 
 to form cities earlier than any other Italian race. Hence 
 Caere is the first Italian town mentioned in Greek records. 
 This same instinct disposed them less to war, and led 
 them to employ mercenaries at a very early period. They 
 were governed by kings, or lucumones, with powers prob- 
 ably similar to those of Roman kings. They probably had 
 a system of clans not dissimilar from that of the Romans ; 
 the nobles were marked off strictly from the common 
 people. They were formed into loose confederacies, each 
 consisting of twelve communities, with a metropolis and 
 federal head, or high priest of the league. The whole 
 nation was not embraced in one confederation, as the 
 Etruscans in the north and those in Campania had 
 leagues of their own. Volsinii was the metropolis of the 
 league in Etruria proper. Of the rest of the twelve towns 
 we only know for certain Perusia, Vetulonium, Volci, and 
 Tarquinii. The laxity of the league allowed, or rather 
 preferred, that separate communities should carry on 
 ordinary wars ; nor did all the towns join, when, in ex- 
 ceptional cases, a war was resolved on by the confederacy. 
 " The Etruscan confederations appear to have been from 
 the first deficient in a firm and paramount central 
 authority." 
 
 When the tide of Greek invasion swept over Italy, it met 
 a firm but not bitter resistance from the Latins and the 
 inhabitants of the southern part of Etruria. Caere, in fact, 
 attained its early prosperity by its tolerance of, and benefit 
 from, commercial intercourse with the Greeks. But the 
 " wild Tyrrhenians," alike on the banks of the Po and on 
 the west coast, proved a deadly foe to the Greek intruders ; 
 they dislodged them from Aethalia (Ilva, Elba) and Popu- 
 lonia. The depredations of Etruscan privateers were the 
 dread of all Greek merchants, and caused the Greeks to 
 call the western sea of Italy by their name (Tyrrhenum 
 mare). Although the Etruscans failed to effect a settle- 
 
 3 
 
34 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 ment in Latium, or to dislodge the Greeks at Vesuvius, 
 they held sway in Antinm and Surrentum. The Volscians 
 became their clients, and they founded a league of twelve 
 cities in Campania. Their very piracy helped them to 
 develop their commercial instincts; and, though at war 
 with Italian Greeks, they were often on peaceful and 
 intimate relations with Greece proper and Asia Minor 1 . 
 Their position as inhabitants of Northern Italy from sea 
 to sea, and thus commanding the mouths of the Po on the 
 Adriatic and the great free ports on the western sea, as 
 holding the land route from Pisae on the western coast to 
 Spina on the eastern, and as masters in the south of the 
 rich plains of Capua and Nola, gave them exceptional 
 advantages; and the luxury thus speedily introduced was 
 doubtless no small factor in their rapid decline. The part 
 they played, as allies of the Phoenicians, and specially of 
 the Carthaginians, in opposing Hellenic influence, belongs 
 to another chapter ; but the main result at first was to 
 increase their trade and establish their naval power. 
 Corsica, with the towns of Alalia and Nicaea, became 
 subject to them, while Carthage seized the sister island of 
 Sardinia. 
 
 The subsequent decay of the Etruscan power must be 
 treated of elsewhere ; but we may conclude this account 
 with a brief estimate of their religious and artistic de- 
 velopment. Livy's statement that Etruscan culture was 
 in early times the basis of Roman education, as Greek 
 culture was in later days, is due to a false notion preva- 
 lent among ancient and modern scholars touching the 
 intellectual eminence of the Etruscans. The chief cha- 
 racteristics of Etruscan religion were a gloomy mysticism, 
 an insipid play on numbers, a system of fortune-telling, 
 by interpretation of all portents, especially lightning, 
 and by entrail-inspection, and a horrible conception of 
 a future world of torment, ruled over by malignant 
 deities, whose favour was to be appeased by the most 
 cruel worship. Etruscan art exercised very little influence 
 on the development of that of the Italians ; and indeed 
 the Etruscans, except in tomb-painting, mirror- design- 
 ing, and graving on stone, showed but little genius ; and 
 even in these three branches it is probable that the best 
 works of Italian artists were superior. Barbaric extra- 
 
TEE ETBUSCANS. 35 
 
 vasance alike in material and design, an ostentatious love 
 of size and costly eccentricity, and an absence of all origi- 
 nality characterize Etruscan art. The fact that no pro- 
 gress was made by the Etruscans after an early peril id 
 caused people to regard Etruscan art as the mother 
 instead of the stunted daughter of Greek art. A close 
 connection is visible between the Etruscan and oldest 
 Attic art, which arose doubtless from their commercial 
 relations ; and the bronze candlesticks and gold cups 
 decorated by tlie great technical skill of the Tyrrhenian 
 workmen found a market in Attica at an early time. 
 Fresco-painting, copper mirrors, bronze statues of colossal 
 size, and painted vases were also produced in great 
 numbei'S by Etruscan artists. But it is specially to be 
 noticed that it is in South Etruria, in the districts of 
 Caere, Tarquinii, and Volci, where Greek influence was 
 strongly prevalent, and where the population was not 
 purely Etruscan, that the great treasures of so-called 
 Tuscan art have been preserved. What northern Etruria, 
 unassisted by Greek or Latin influence, was able to pro- 
 duce is shown by the copper coins which chiefly belong 
 to it. "Etruscan art is a remarkable evidence of dex- 
 terity mechanically acquired and mechanically retained j 
 but it is as little as the Chinese an evidence even of 
 genial receptivity. As scholars have long since desisted 
 from the attempt to derive Greek art from that of the 
 Etruscans, so they must, with whatever reluctance, make 
 up their minds to transfer the Etruscans from the first to 
 the lowest place in the history of Italian art." 
 
 We now turn to the subject of the second and con- 
 cluding portion of this chapter — the position of the 
 Greeks in Italy. All civilizing influences reached Italy 
 by sea, and not by land; but it is remarkable that the 
 Phoenicians, who established trading stations on almost 
 every coast of the Mediterranean, have left only one trace 
 in Italy. Their factory at Caere, however, was probably 
 no older than the stations established by the Greeks on 
 the same coast ; and the name Poeni, which the Latins 
 gave to the Phoenicians, was borrowed from the Greeks, 
 and points to the probability that the Greeks introduced 
 the Phoenicians to Italian knowledge. The name of the 
 Ionian sea applied to the waters between Epirus and 
 
36 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 Sicily, and that of Ionian gu*f, applied by early Greeks 
 to the Adriatic, prove that seafarers from Ionia first dis- 
 covered the southern and eastern coasts of Italy. Kyme 
 (Cumae), the oldest Greek settlement in Italy, was founded 
 by the town of the same name on the Anatolian coast. 
 The Phocaeans are said to have been the first to explore 
 the western sea ; and doubtless they were soon followed by 
 other Greeks, not only from Asia Minor, but from Greece 
 itself and the larger islands of the Aegean. These, in 
 their new homes in southern Italy or Magna Graecia, 
 as it was called, and in Sicily, recognizing their com- 
 munity of character and interests, became blended to- 
 gether, as in our own time different settlers from the old 
 world have combined in their new home of Northern 
 America. These Greek colonies may be grouped in three 
 divisions : (1) The original Ionian group included in 
 Italy Cumae with the other Greek settlements at Vesuvius 
 and Rhegium, and in Sicily Zankle (later Messana), 
 Naxos, Catana, Leontini, and Himera. (2) The Achaean 
 group embraced Sybaris and most of the cities of Magna 
 Graecia. (3) The Dorian group comprehended Syracuse, 
 Gela, Agrigentum, and most of the Sicilian colonies ; but 
 in Italy it only possessed Tarentum and Heraclea. As to 
 the period at which these several settlements took place, 
 we rely on the fact that, while in Homer's time Sicily 
 and Italy were practically unknown, in Hesiod's poems 
 the outlines of these two lands are more clearly defined ; 
 and in the literature subsequent to Hesiod a general and 
 fairly accurate knowledge appears to have been possessed 
 by the Greeks. That Cumae was the oldest Greek settle- 
 ment in Italy is generally allowed; that between that 
 settlement and the main Greek immigration into Sicily 
 and lower Italy a considerable period elapsed is also 
 probable : but the two first dates in Italian history which 
 can be regarded as fairly accurate are (1) the founding 
 of Sybaris by the Achaeans in 721 B.C., and (2) that of 
 the Dorian Tarentum in 708 B.C. 
 
 It is important to remember that the Italian and Sicilian 
 Greeks always retained the closest connection with their 
 old homes, and that therefore their history is always a 
 history of Greeks, never of true Italians or Sicilians. 
 This is most clearly shown by the league of the Achaean 
 
THE GREEKS IN ITALY. 37 
 
 cities, comprising Siris, Pandosia, Metapontum, Sybaris 
 with its offshoots Posidonia and Laus, Croton, Caulouia, 
 Temesa, Terina, and Pyxus ; which, like the Achaean 
 league in the Peloponnese, preserved its own nationality, 
 distinct alike from the barbarians of Italy and the other 
 Greek colonies. These Achaean Greeks attained a very 
 rapid prosperity, especially in the case of Sybaris, Croton, 
 and Metapontum ; but they did so more from the fertility 
 of their soil, which they compelled the natives to cultivate 
 for them, than from their own efforts in commerce or 
 agriculture. This rapid bloom bore no fruit. Demora- 
 lized by a life of luxury and indolence, these Italian Greeks 
 produced no famous names in Greek art or literature ; and 
 their political constitution, sapped in the first place by 
 the attempt of a few families under the guise of Pytha- 
 gorean philosophy to seize absolute power, and later torn 
 by party feuds, slave insurrections, and the grossest social 
 abuses, completely broke down Thus the Achaeans exer- 
 cised but little influence on the civilization of Italy; and 
 " the bilingual mongrel people, that arose out of the 
 remains of the native Italians and Achaeans and the more 
 recent immigrants of Sabellian descent, never attained 
 any real prosperity." 
 
 The other Greeks settled in Italy had a very different 
 effect on that country. Although, unlike the Achaeans, 
 they founded their cities by the best harbours, and mainly 
 for trading purposes, they did not despise agriculture and 
 the acquisition of territory. The two cities of greatest in- 
 fluence on Italy were the Doric Tarentum and the Ionic 
 Cumae. The first named, from its possession of the only 
 good harbour on the southern coast, from the rich fisheries 
 on its gulf, from the excellence of its wool, and the dyeing 
 of it with the purple juice of the Tarentine murex, rapidly 
 acquired an unrivalled commercial position in the south 
 of Italy. The fact, moreover, that the Greeks planted 
 no colony on the Italian shore of the Adriatic, and only 
 two of importance on the Illyrian coast, viz. Epidamnus 
 and Apollonia, caused Tarentum to have no small share in 
 the Adriatic commerce, carried on by Corinth and Corcyra ; 
 and, as Ancona and Brundisium rose at a far later period, 
 the ports at the mouths of the Po were the only rivals of 
 Tarentum along the whole ea«t coast. Her intercourse 
 
38 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 by land with Apulia sowed the seeds of civilization in 
 the south-east of Italy ; but it is noteworthy that, as a rule, 
 the eastern provinces of Italy acquired the elements of 
 civilization, not from the scanty Greek settlements on the 
 Illyrian and Italian coasts of the Adriatic, but from the 
 more numerous colonies on the west coast of Italy. The 
 people of Cumae, and of the other Greek stations near 
 Vesuvius, attained a more moderate prosperity than either 
 the Achaeans or Tarentines. The district they occupied 
 was small, and they contented themselves with spreading 
 Greek civilization by peaceful commercial intercourse 
 rather than by a policy of conquest and oppression. The 
 sea-port of Dicaearchia (later Puteoli), and the cities of 
 Parthenope and Neapolis were founded by the settlers at 
 Cumae. There is no doubt that in very early times the 
 western coast north of Vesuvius was visited by Greek 
 voyagers ; the adventures of Ulysses himself have been 
 localized in this region. The name and architecture of 
 Pyrgi near Caere, the names of Aethalia (" the fire 
 island," Elba), Telamon in Etruria, and Alsium near 
 Pyrgi, all point to early Greek settlements ; but, as we 
 have already observed, the Latins and Etruscans success- 
 fully resisted the intruders, and north of Vesuvius no 
 independent Greek community existed in historical times. 
 Nay, we may conclude that the danger from Greek depre- 
 dations first turned the attention of the Italians in central 
 Italy to navigation and the founding of towns ; Spina 
 and Hatria at the mouth of the Po, and Ariminum further 
 south, were Italian, not Greek foundations. Although 
 this firm resistance was offered to the Greeks, yet, as far 
 as Latium and southern Etruria were concerned, com- 
 mercial intercourse was welcomed and fostered. Caere, 
 Rome, and the cities at the mouth of the Po, not only 
 prospered commercially by this friendly connection, but, 
 as their earliest traditions show, enjoyed religious inter- 
 course with the Greek oracles of Delphi and Cumae. 
 The different treatment that Greek voyagers met with from 
 the Etruscans proper has been already set forth : how the 
 Etruscans wrested, from their grasp the iron trade of 
 Aethalia, and the silver mines of Populonia, and did 
 not even allow individual traders to enter their waters. 
 This union of the Etruscans with the Phoenicians, and 
 
THE GREEKS IN ITALY. 29 
 
 the sndden rise of Carthage itself, arrested that Greek 
 colonization which had, up to the middle of the second 
 century of Rome, threatened to sweep the Phoenicians 
 out of the Mediterranean. The establishment of Massilia, 
 in 600 B.C., on the Celtic coast marks the limit of Greek 
 enterprise ; an attempt in 579 B.C. to settle at Liljbaeum 
 was frustrated by the natives and the Phoenicians, and a 
 similar fate befell the Phocaeans at Alalia in Corsica, 
 which they evacuated after a naval battle with the com- 
 bined Etruscans and Carthaginians in 537 B.C., pre- 
 ferring to settle at Hyele (Velia) in Lncania. In this 
 struggle between the Greeks and the combined Etruscans 
 and Phoenicians, Latium observed a strict neutrality, 
 being on friendly and commercial relations with Caere 
 and Carthage on the one hand, and Velia and Massilia on 
 the other. Although the Greeks did not give up the 
 struggle, and even founded fresh stations, they no longer 
 gained ground ; and, after the foundation of Agrigentum 
 in 580 B.C., they gained no important additions of terri- 
 tory on the Adriatic or on the western sea, and they 
 remained excluded from the Spanish waters as well as the 
 Atlantic ocean. 
 
 The part played by the Greeks, and in particular the 
 Sicilian Greeks, in revenging themselves at Himera in 
 480 B.C. upon the Etruscans and Carthaginians, must be 
 described when we reach the fall of the Etruscan power; 
 and the decline of the Greek colonies in Italy, and speci- 
 ally the oppression of the Greeks in Campania and 
 southern Italy by the Samnites, must belong to our 
 account of that race. 
 
 AUTHORITIES. 
 
 Etruscans.— Dionys. i. 28-30; iii. 45-66; iv. 27. Liv. i. 2; v. 33. 
 
 For fresh evidence of Etruscan supremacy in Rome, cf. Mod- 
 
 dleton's " Rome," pp. 42, 43. 
 Greeks.— Dionys. ii. 21 ; viii. 22; xix. 1, 6, 14. Polyb. i. 6; ii. 39. 
 
 Liv. vii 25-26. Herod, i. 166. 
 
40 HISTORY OF BOMB. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 CHANGE OF THE CONSTITUTION. 
 
 Triple cause of political agitation — Expulsion of the Tarquins— 
 Powers of the consuls — The dictator — Comitia centuriata — The 
 senate — Chief results of the revolution. 
 
 The close of the regal period, and the causes which led to 
 the subsequent changes in the Roman constitution, render 
 it necessary for us to revert to the internal state of Rome 
 itself. Three distinct movements agitated the community. 
 The first proceeded from the body of full citizens, and 
 was confined to it : its object was to limit and lessen the 
 life-power of the single president or king ; in all such 
 movements at Rome, from the time of the Tarquins to that 
 of the Gracchi, there was no attempt to assert the rights 
 of the individual at the expense of the state, nor to limit 
 the power of the state, but only that of its magistrates. 
 The second was the demand for equality of political privi- 
 leges, and was the cause of bitter struggles between the 
 full burgesses and those, whether plebeians, freedmen, 
 Latins, or Italians, who keenly resented their political 
 inequality. The third movement was an equally prolific 
 source of trouble in Roman history ; it arose from the 
 embittered relations between landholders and those who 
 had either lost possession of their farms, or, as was the 
 case with many small farmers, held possession at the 
 mercy of the capitalist or landlord. These three move- 
 ments must be clearly grasped, as upon them hinges the 
 internal history of Rome. Although often intertwined and 
 confused with one another, they were, nevertheless, essen- 
 tially and fundamentally distinct. The natural outcome 
 
CHANGE OF THE CONSTITUTION. 41 
 
 of the first was the abolition of the monarchy — a result 
 which we find everywhere, alike in Greek and Italian 
 states, and which seems to have been a certain evolution of 
 the form of constitution peculiar to both peoples. What is 
 remarkable in the change at Rome, is that violent measures 
 had to be adopted, and that the Tarquins, both the king 
 and all the members of his clan, had to be forcibly expelled. 
 The romantic details colouring this event do not affect 
 the fact itself, nor are the reasons assigned by tradition 
 undeserving of belief. Tarquin " the proud " is said to 
 have neglected to consult the senate, and fill up the 
 vacancies in it ; to have pronounced sentences of death 
 and confiscation without consulting his counsellors ; to 
 have stored his own granaries, and exacted undue military 
 service and other duties from the citizens. The formal 
 vow registered by each citizen that no king should ever 
 again be tolerated, the blind hatred felt at Rome ever 
 afterwards for the name of king, the enactment that the 
 " king of sacrifice " (rex sacrorum) should never hold any 
 other office, — all these sufficiently testify to the exaspera- 
 tion of the people. There is no proof that foreign nations 
 took part in the struggle which ensued between the royal 
 house and its expel lers, nor can we regard the great war 
 with Etruria in that light, since, although successful, the 
 Etruscans neither restored the monarchy, nor even brought 
 back the family of the Tarquins. The change, violently 
 accomplished as it was, did not abolish the royal power ; 
 the one life-king was simply replaced by two year-kings, 
 called either generals (praetores) or judges (iudices) or, 
 more commonly, colleagues (consules). Although, probably 
 from the first, the consuls divided their functions — the one, 
 for instance, taking charge of the army, the other of the 
 administration of justice — such a partition was not binding, 
 and each possessed and exercised the supreme power as 
 completely as the king had done. In consequence of this 
 each consul could forbid what the other enjoined, and 
 thus the consular commands, being both absolute, would, 
 if they clashed, neutralize one another. It is hard to 
 parallel this system of co-ordinate supreme authorities, 
 which, if not peculiarly Roman, was a peculiarly Latin 
 institution. The object clearly was to preserve the regal 
 power undiminished, but, by doubling the holder of this 
 
42 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 power, to neutralize its effects. The limit of a year, fixed 
 for the duration of the consular office, was reckoned from 
 the day of entry upon office to the day of the solemn 
 laying down of power by the consuls ; and, as the consuls 
 to a certain extent laid down their power of their own 
 free will, and as, even if they overstepped the year's limit, 
 their consular acts were still valid, they were not so much 
 restricted directly by the law, as induced by it to restrict 
 themselves. Still, the effect of this tenure of office for 
 a set term was to abolish the irresponsibility of the king, 
 who, as supreme judge, had been accountable to no tribunal 
 and liable to no punishment. The consul, on the other 
 hand, when his term had expired, and the protection 
 given by his office had been removed, was liable to be 
 called to account just like any other burgess. Together 
 with the abolition of the monarchy, the ancient privilege 
 of the king to have his fields tilled by the burgesses, and 
 the position which the metoecs held as special clients of 
 the king, naturally came to an end. The contrast between 
 the old royal power and the new consular office was brought 
 out more clearly by the following restrictions. (1) The old 
 right of appeal, which the king had granted or not at his 
 pleasure in all criminal procedure, was now established 
 by the Valerian law in 509 B.C. ; the consul was now 
 bound to grant this right to every criminal who was 
 condemned to suffer capital or corporal punishment; 
 unless, indeed, the sentence was pronounced under martial 
 law. In token of this right, which before 451 B.C. was 
 extended to cases of heavy fines, the consular lintors laid 
 aside the axes, which had been the sign of the king's 
 penal jurisdiction. (2) The need of deputies, which had 
 caused, but not compelled, the king to appoint a city- 
 warden (urbi praefectus) to act in his absence, ceased with 
 the substitution of two consuls for one king. If the 
 consul in time of war did entrust the supreme command 
 to a deputy, such a deputy was only adjutant or lieutenant 
 (legatus) of the consul. It is true that, in times of special 
 emergency, the consuls could nominate a third colleague, 
 who, under the name of dictator, revived the old single 
 supremacy of the king, and who for the time was obeyed 
 by the consuls and the whole state ; but such an office 
 was a special creation to meet an exceptional state of 
 
CHANGE OF THE CONSTITUTION. 43 
 
 things. (3) Although in the field a consul could delegate 
 his functions to a deputy, at home he had no free will in 
 the matter. The two quaestors (" trackers of murder"), 
 whose appointment by the king to deal with criminal cases 
 had not been obligatory although usual, became now 
 regular state officers. The consul was obliged to nominate 
 them, and their province was enlarged, so as to include 
 the charge of the state treasure and state archives ; their 
 tenure of office, like that of the consuls, lasted for one 
 year. On the other hand, the chief magistrate in the city 
 had to act in person, or not at all, in those cases in which 
 a delegation of his authority was not expressly incumbent 
 on him. Thus in the home government no deputy acting 
 for a city magistrate (pro magistratu) was possible, while 
 military deputies (pro consule, pro praetore, pro quaestore) 
 were only possible in the field, and had no power to act 
 within the community itself. (4) The consul retained 
 the right, which the king had exercised absolutely, of 
 nominating his successor, but he was bound to follow the 
 expressed wishes of the community in his nomination. 
 He might reject particular candidates, and at first even 
 limit the choice to a list of 'candidates proposed by him- 
 self ; and, what was more important, the candidate, once 
 appointed, could never be deposed by the community. (5) 
 The consuls had not the right, which had belonged to the 
 kings, of appointing the priests ; the colleges of priests 
 now filled up the vacancies in their own body, and the 
 appointment of the vestals and single priests passed into 
 the hands of the president, or Pontifex Maximus, now 
 nominated for the first time by the pontifical college. 
 Thus the supreme authority in religion was separated 
 from the civil power, and the semi-magisterial position 
 of the Pontifex Maximus is a further proof of the wish to 
 impose limits on the consular power. (6) The insignia 
 of the consul were markedly inferior to those which had 
 distinguished the king The lictor's axe was taken away, 
 the purple robe of the king was replaced by the purple 
 border of the consul's toga, the royal chariot was abolished, 
 and the consul was obliged, like every other citizen, to go 
 on foot within the city. 
 
 We have above alluded to the revival of the royal power 
 in the person of the dictator. His other title, " master 
 
44 HISTORY OF SOME. 
 
 of the army " (magister populi), as also that of his chief 
 assistant (magister equitum, "master of the horse"), 
 coupled with what we know about the circumstances and 
 causes of his appointment, prove that the dictatorship was 
 an essentially military institution. No doubt it was 
 designed to obviate the disadvantage of divided power in 
 the field, and its restriction to a maximum limit of six 
 months indicates that the office was not to last longer 
 than the duration of a summer campaign. The dictator 
 was nominated by one of the consuls ; and, as their col- 
 league, he was obliged to lay down his office when they did. 
 All magistrates were subject to him, and no appeal was 
 allowed from his sentence ; the community had no part 
 in his election. The consuls, then, were, with certain 
 restrictions, what the kings had been, the supreme adminis- 
 trators, judges, and generals ; in matters of religion, too, 
 they offered prayers and sacrifices for the community, and 
 with the aid of skilled interpreters ascertained the will 
 of the gods. The very restrictions which hampered the 
 consuls could, in time of need, be broken through by the 
 dictatorship, and Rome could see again, under a new name, 
 the absolute authority of the king. " In this way the 
 problem of legally retaining and practically restricting the 
 regal authority was solved in genuine Roman fashion, 
 with equal acuteness and simplicity, by the nameless 
 statesmen who worked out this revolution." 
 
 A further change of great importance followed the new 
 powers given to the community as a whole. The right of 
 annually electing the consuls, and of deciding, upon appeal 
 from a criminal, the life or death of a citizen, gave the 
 public assembly something more than the passive formal 
 part in state-administration which it had played under the 
 kings. The growth, wealth, and importance of the plebs, 
 and the necessity of their help in making the reform, 
 rendered it impossible for all power to remain in the hands 
 of the smaller body of the patriciate, which by this time 
 had practically become an order of nobility. Therefore 
 the new community was extended, so as to embrace the 
 whole body of plebeians ; all the non-burgesses, who were 
 neither slaves nor citizens of foreign states, living at Rome 
 under the ius hospitii, were admitted into the curies, and 
 the old burgesses, who had hitherto formed the curies, 
 
CHANGE OF THE CONSTITUTION. 45 
 
 Joet the right of meeting and passing resolutions. Further, 
 the curiate assembly (comitia curiata) had thus lost its 
 fundamental character of burgesses belonging to different 
 clans, and included many plebeians, who belonged to no 
 clan, but were legally on an equal footing with the most 
 aristocratic citizens. To obviate the results of such a 
 democratic levelling, all political power was taken away 
 from the comitia curiata, and was transferred to the 
 assembly of the centuries (comitia centuriata) ; that is, to 
 the assembled levy of those bound to military service, who 
 now received the rights, as they had previously borne the 
 burdens, of citizens. This body, originally constituted for 
 pui-ely military purposes, now decided cases of appeal, 
 nominated magistrates, adopted or rejected laws. There 
 was no debate in this assembly, any more than in that of 
 the curies ; but the constitution of the assembly gave the 
 preponderance of power to the possessors of property ; and 
 the peculiar system, by which the decision of an election 
 was often determined by the voting of the first centuries, 
 gave a manifest advantage to the possessors of property, 
 whose centuries had the privilege of giving their votes first. 
 The prerogatives of the senate were increased by the 
 reform of the constitution. In addition to its old rights 
 of appointing the interrex, and of confirming or rejecting 
 the resolutions passed by the community, the senate could 
 now either reject or confirm the appointment of the magis- 
 trates elected by the pub. 1 c assembly. The senate was 
 still composed exclusively of patricians, but on occasions 
 when its advice was asked, side by side with the patres, 
 or true patrician senators, a number of non-patricians 
 were admitted and " added to the senate-roll " (con- 
 script!). These plebeians were not by this admission 
 placed on a footing of equality ; they did not become true 
 senators, and were not invested with the senatorial in- 
 signia ; they had no share in the magisterial prerogatives 
 of the senate (rmctoritas), nor were they allowed to express 
 their opinion on those occasions when the senate met in 
 the chnracter of a state-council, and discussed what advice 
 (consilium) should be tendered the community : they 
 were simply silent voters in the divisions of the house, 
 and called " foot-members " (pedarii) by the proud nobility, 
 or " men who voted with their feet " (pedibus ire in 
 
46 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 sententiam). Still, this admission of plebeians into the 
 senate-house was a most important step, and one fraught 
 with no slight consequences. Among the patres them- 
 selves distinctions of rank arose : those who had been 
 consuls, or were already designated as successors to the 
 outgoing consuls, occupied the first place on the senate- 
 roll, and voted first ; the position of the first of these, or 
 foremost man of the senate (princeps senatus), naturally 
 was much coveted. The consuls in office did not vote, but 
 they selected the new members of the senate, alike the 
 patres and the plebeian conscripti, although they were no 
 doubt more restricted by the opinions of the nobility in 
 their selection than the king had been. Two rules early 
 obtained — (1) that the consulship entailed upon the holder 
 of it admission to the senate for life ; (2) that vacancies 
 in the senate were not filled up at once, but on the oc- 
 casion of the census, taken every fourth year, when the 
 roll of senators was revised and completed. The number 
 of senators remained unchanged, and, from the fact that 
 the conscripti were included in the number, we may infer 
 the diminution of the number of patriciate clans. It is 
 easy to see what an immense preponderance of power 
 the revolution gave the senate. Its right of rejecting the 
 proposals of the comitia centuriata, its position as adviser 
 of the chief magistrate, its tenure of office for life, as 
 contrasted with the annual duration of magistracies, — all 
 tended to place the government in its hands. But what 
 chiefly did so, was the fact that the consul ruled for but a 
 brief space, and was, on the expiry of his office, merely one 
 of the nobility ; and thus, even if a consul were inclined to 
 question the senate's influence, he lacked the first element 
 of political power, viz. time ; while his authority was 
 paralyzed alike by the priestly colleges and his own col- 
 leagues, and, if need be, could be suspended by the dic- 
 tatorship. The result was that the senate became the real 
 governing power, and the consul subsided into a president, 
 acting as its chairman and executing its decrees. The 
 senate also drew into its own hands the management of 
 the state finances, by causing the consul to commit the 
 administration of the public chest to two quaestors, who 
 naturally became dependent on the senate. 
 
 The revolution thus accomplished at Rome was, as we 
 
CHANGE OF THE CONSTITUTION. 47 
 
 have seen, conservative in its character, in that the funda- 
 mental elements of the old constitution were retained. It 
 was, in fact, a compromise between the two state parties — 
 the old burgesses and the plebeians — who, fur the time 
 being sank their party quarrels, and united, under the 
 pressure of the common danger of a despotism. The 
 necessity of their co-operation caused those mutual con- 
 cessions we have described above, and the importance of 
 the revolution lay far more in the indirect effects of those 
 concessions than in the limit of time imposed on the 
 supreme magistracy. The chief of these indirect effects 
 were (1) the rise of the Roman citizens in the later sense 
 of the term. The plebeians had hitherto been little better 
 than aliens or metoecs in the eye of the law. Now they 
 were enrolled in the curies as citizens, they voted in the 
 common assembly and in the senate, and they were pro- 
 tected by the right of appeal. (2) The elevation of the old 
 burgess-body, or patriciate, into an exclusive aristocracy. 
 The very incorporation of the plebeians into the burgess- 
 body caused the patres to close up their ranks, and hold 
 stubbornly to the privileges that remained to them : the 
 admission of new clans into their body, which had not been 
 very rare under the kings, now ceased. Although the 
 plebeians might become military officers and senators, they 
 could hold no public magistracy or priesthood : and the 
 patres still maintained the legal impossibility of marriage 
 between their order and the plebeians. ('6) It further 
 became necessary to define the distinction between the 
 enlarged burgess-body and those who were now the non- 
 burgesses. " To this epoch, therefore, we may trace back 
 — in the views and feelings of the people — both the in- 
 vidiousness of the distinction between the patricians and 
 plebeians, and the strict and haughty line of demarcation 
 between cives Romani and aliens." 
 
 (4) Further, at this period arose the separation between 
 law and edict. The principle of Roman law that every 
 command of a magistrate, even if illegal, was valid during 
 his tenure of office, must, owing to the official life-tenure 
 of a king, have caused the distinction between law and 
 edict to have been lost sight of. But it is obvious that 
 the annual change of consuls led to the two being clearly 
 separated. 
 
48 EISTOBY OF HOME. 
 
 (5) The provinces of civil and military authority were 
 now finally separated. The power of the consul within 
 the city limits was restricted by law, as shown above ; 
 his power as general was absolute. Therefore the general 
 and the army could not in their military capacity enter 
 the city proper, unless allowed to do so. Thus the dis- 
 tinction between quirites and soldiers became deeply rooted 
 in the minds of the people. 
 
 Viewing the revolution as a whole, its immediate effect 
 was to establish an aristocratic government, by making 
 the senate practically supreme. But the germs of a more 
 representative constitution were visible. The enrolment 
 of the plebeians among the burgesses, the admission of 
 certain of them to the senate, were victories of happy 
 augury for the future. Those plebeian families admitted 
 on account of their wealth or position into the senate 
 naturally held aloof from the mass of the plebs. In 
 addition to this distinction in the plebeian body, there 
 arose another oat of the system of voting in the comitia 
 centuriata, which placed the chief power in that class of 
 fanners whose property was in excess of that of the small 
 freeholders, but inferior to that of the great proprietors ; 
 and this arrangement further enabled the seniors, although 
 less numerous, to have as many voting divisions as the 
 juniors. " While in this way the axe was laid to the root 
 of the old burgess-body and their clan-nobility, and the 
 basis of a new burgess-body was laid, the preponderance 
 in the latter rested on the possession of land and on age, 
 and the first beginnings were already visible of a new 
 aristocracy, based primarily on the consideration in which 
 the families were held — the future nobility." 
 
 AUTHORITIES. 
 
 Expulsion of Tar quins. — Liv. i. 58-60. Dionys. i. 75; iv. 41-end ; v. 
 
 1-7, 13-15, 20-23, 31-34, 51-55. 
 Lex Valeria. — Liv. ii. 8 ; iii. 20. Cic. de Rep. ii. 31. 
 Consuls.— Liv. ii. 1, 18, 27 ; iii. 34, 36. Cic. de Rep. ii. 32. Momma. R. 
 
 St. ii. 71-132, 249-279. 
 Quaestors. — Momms. R. St. ii. 511 sq. 
 Pontifex Maximus. — Liv. iii. 32; xxxiii. 44; xl. 42. Dionys. ii. 73, 
 
 Momms. R. St. ii. 17-47. 
 
CHANGE OF TEE CONSTITUTION. 49 
 
 Dictator.— Liv. ii. 18 ; iii. 29 ; viii. 32. Cic. cle Rep. i. 40. Polyb. 
 
 iii. 87. Momms, R. St. ii. 133, sq. 
 Comitia Centuriata. — Dionys. iv. 20. Cic. de Leg. Agr. ii. 2. Prof. 
 
 Seeley, Introd. to Liv. bk. i. Momtns. R. St. iii. 301-368. 
 
 Conscripti Senatores. — Aul. Gell. iii. 18. 
 Senate's power. — Polyb. vi. 13, 16, sqq. 
 
SO HISTORY OF HOME. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 THE TRIBUNATE OF THE PLEBS, AND THE DECEMVIRATE. 
 
 Land-tenure and agriculture — Public land — Evil influence of 
 capitalists — Ruin of small farmers — Secession to the " Sacred 
 Mount" — The tribunes and aediles — Powers of the tribunes — 
 Political value of the tribunate — Further dissensions — Agrarian 
 law of Spurius Cassius — The Decemvirs — Twelve Tables — Fall 
 of the Decemvirs — The Valerio-Horatian laws. 
 
 At the beginning of the last chapter we noted the im- 
 portance of the struggle which was intimately connected 
 with land-occupation. Before proceeding to describe the 
 constitutional changes which arose from this struggle, we 
 must revert for a time to the original laud-tenure among 
 the Romans, and, as far as possible, strive to clearly pre- 
 sent the main features of this most difficult and important 
 question. From the first, agriculture was felt to he the 
 main support and fundamental basis of every Italian 
 commonwealth. The Roman state in particular secured 
 by the plough what it won by the sword; it felt that the 
 strength of man and of the state lay in their hold over 
 the soil; and this feeling caused the state to avoid, if 
 possible, the cession of Roman soil, and caused the fai'mers 
 to cling tenaciously to their fields and homesteads. The 
 main object of war was to increase the number of free- 
 holders ; this object was also evident in the Servian con- 
 stitution, which showed the original preponderance of the 
 agricultural class in the state; and which, by its division 
 of the community into " freeholders " (adsidui) and " pro- 
 ducers of children" (proletarii), without reference to their 
 political position, proved that a large portion of the landed 
 
THE TBIBVNATE OF THE PLEBS. 51 
 
 property had passed into the hands of non-burgesses. 
 This division, by imposing upon the freeholders the duties 
 of citizens, paved the way, as we have seen, to conceding 
 them political rights. In the earliest times no burgess 
 had any special property in land : all arable land was the 
 common possession of the several clans ; each clan tilled 
 its own portion and divided the produce among its con- 
 stituent households. When and how the distribution of 
 laud among the individual burgesses was made, we cannot 
 tell — at any rate it was previous to the Servian constitu- 
 tion ; and that same constitution leads us to conclude that 
 the mass of the land was divided into medium-sized farms 
 of not less than 20 jugera, or 12| acres. Landed estates 
 were successfully guarded against excessive subdivision 
 by custom and the sound sense of the population. Evi- 
 dence is also furnished by the Servian constitution that 
 even in the regal period of Rome there were small 
 cottagers and garden proprietors, with whom the mattock 
 took the place of the plough. In addition to the ordinary 
 farmers, it is clear from the same constitution that large 
 landed proprietors had also come into existence — partlr 
 perhaps from the numerical inequality of the members of 
 the various clans, when the clan-lands were divided 
 among the members ; partly, too, from the great influx of 
 mercantile capital into Rome. But, as we cannot suppose 
 that there were many slaves at this time, by whose labour 
 such large estates were afterwards worked, we must con- 
 clude that a landowner assigned lots to tenants of such 
 portion of his estate as he could not farm in person. 
 Such tenants were composed of decayed farmers, clients, 
 and freedmen, and formed the bulk of the agricultural 
 proletariate. They were often free men, and were then 
 called "tenants on sufferance" (precarii), as their pos- 
 session was only held at the pleasure of the owner. For 
 this usufruct of the soil the tenant did not necessarily pay 
 rent m kind, and, when he did, his position was not quite 
 the same as that of the lessee of later times. The relation 
 between the landlord and his tenants was all the closer, 
 because the landlords did not employ middlemen, but lived 
 themselves on their estates, and took the greatest interest 
 in the welfare of those dependent on them; their lodging 
 in the city was only for business purposes, and for avoid- 
 
52 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 ing, at certain seasons, the unhealthy atmosphere of the 
 country Such slaves as were employed were, as a rule, 
 of Italian race, and must have occupied very different 
 relations towards their masters from those held by Syrians 
 and Celts in later days. It was from these large land- 
 owners, and the system above described, that there sprang 
 up in Rome a landed, and not an urban, nobility; and 
 further, these tenants-on- sufferance were of the greatest 
 service to the state, in furnishing trained and intelligent 
 farmers to carry out the Roman policy of colonization. 
 A sharp line divided arable from pasture land. The 
 latter belonged to the state and not to the clan, and was 
 consequently not subjected to the distribution, which has 
 been described above. The state used such land for its 
 own flocks and herds, which were intended for sacrifices 
 and other purposes, and which were kept up by cattle 
 fines : and such land was also used by individuals who 
 paid a certain tax (scriptura) for the right to graze their 
 cattle on the common pasture. This right was a special 
 privilege of the burgess, and never granted to a plebeian, 
 except under extraordinary circumstances. In the regal 
 period such common pasture land was probably not ex- 
 tensive, and, as a rule, any conquered territory was par- 
 celled out as arable land, originally among the clans, and 
 then among individuals. This description of land-tenure 
 in the earliest period now allows us to resume our history 
 at the point of our digression. 
 
 Although the new government at Rome passed certain 
 measures — such as the reduction of port-dues ; the state- 
 purchase of corn and salt, so as to supply the citizens at 
 reasonable prices ; the addition of a day to the national 
 festival ; the limitation of the magisterial power of fining, — 
 which seemed intended for the good of the more numerous 
 and less wealthy classes, unfortunately such regulations 
 were exceptional The object of the kings had probably 
 been to check the power of capital, and increase the 
 number of farmers. The object of the new aristocratic 
 government was to destroy the middle classes, and espe- 
 cially the smaller independent farmers ; and thus to 
 develop the power of the capitalists, and of large land- 
 owners, and to increase the number of the agricultural 
 proletariate. Out of this action on the part of those in 
 
THE TRIBUNATE OF TEE PLEBS. 53 
 
 power arose the evil influence of the capitalists. The 
 extension of the financial province of the state treasury to 
 such matters as the purchase of grain and salt, caused the 
 state to employ agents, or middlemen, to collect its indirect 
 revenues and more complicated payments. These men 
 pa-id the state a set sum, and farmed the revenues for their 
 own benefit. " Thus there grew up a class of tax-farmers 
 and contractors, who, in the rapid growth of their wealth, 
 in their power over the state, to which they appeared to 
 be servants, and in the absurd and sterile basis of their 
 moneyed dominion, are completely on a parallel with the 
 speculators on the stock-exchange of the present day." 
 
 The mismanagement of the public land (ager publicus) 
 brought out these evils most clearly. The patricians now 
 claimed the sole right of the use of the public pasture and 
 state lands : a right which, as shown above, belonged by 
 law to every burgess. Although the senate made excep- 
 tions in favour of the wealthy plebeian houses, the small 
 farmers and ten ants- on- sufferance, who needed it most, 
 were excluded from the common pasture. Moreover, to 
 oblige men of their own order, the patrician quaestors 
 gradually omitted to collect the pasture-tax (scriptura), 
 and thus diminished the state revenues. And further, in- 
 stead of making fresh assignations of land, acquired by 
 conquest, to the poorer citizens, the ruling class introduced 
 a pernicious system of what was practically permanent 
 occupation, on the condition of the state receiving from 
 the occupier one tenth of corn, or one fifth of oil and wine. 
 Thus the system of " precarium," or tenure-on-sufferance, 
 above described, was now applied to the state lands ; and 
 not only did this tenure become permanent, but it was 
 only allowed to the privileged patricians and their 
 favourites ; nor was the collection of the fifths or tenths 
 enforced with more rigour than that of the pasture-tax. 
 Thus the smaller landholders (1) were deprived of the 
 usufructs which were their right as burgesses ; (2) were 
 more heavily taxed in consequence of the lax collection of 
 the revenues from the use of the pnblic land ; (3) and lost 
 the old outlet for their energies, which had been provided 
 by the assignations of land. Added to these evils was the 
 system of working large estates by slaves, which at this 
 time was introduced, and dispossessed the small agrarian 
 
54 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 clients, or free labourers. Moreover, owing to the enforced 
 absence from his farm in time of war, and the exorbitant 
 taxation and other state-imposed works which war en- 
 tailed, the farmer often lost possession of his farm, and 
 was reduced to the position of bondsman, if not slave, of 
 his creditor. His creditor was often a capitalist, to whom 
 speculation in land offered a new and lucrative field ; if 
 left by his creditor as nominal proprietor, and actual pos- 
 sessor of the farm, he was perhaps saved from utter ruin, 
 but was demoralized by the consciousness that his person 
 and estate really belonged to another, and that he was 
 entirely dependent on his creditor's mercy. The misery 
 and distress caused by these evils thx-eatened to annihilate 
 the middle class of smaller farmers, and matters were not 
 long in coming to a crisis. In 495 B.C. (but this date is 
 probably too early), a levy was called for: owing to the 
 exasperation produced by the strict enforcement of the 
 law of debt, the farmers refused to obey. One of the con- 
 suls, Publius Servilius, induced them to do so, by sus- 
 pending the law and liberating the imprisoned debtors. 
 On their return from the field of victory, the other consul, 
 Appius Claudius, enforced the debtor-laws with merciless 
 rigour. The war was renewed in the following year ; and 
 this time the authority, attaching to the dictatorship, and 
 the personal popularity of the dictator, Manius Valerius, 
 were found necessary to win over the reluctant farmers. 
 Victory again was with the Roman army ; but, on its 
 return, the senate refused to agree to the reforms proposed 
 by the dictator. On the news of this refusal reaching the 
 army, arrayed outside the city gates, the whole force left 
 its general and encampment, and marched to a hill between 
 the Tiber and the Anio, in the district of Crustumeria. 
 This celebrated secession, to what was afterwards called 
 " the sacred mount " (Mons Sacer), was terminated by 
 the mediation of the dictator and the submission of the 
 senate. The consequences of this secession, undertaken 
 by the multitude without a settled leader, and accom- 
 plished without bloodshed, were felt for many centuries. 
 It was the origin of the tribunate of the plebs. The law 
 which created this new office was deposited in a temple, 
 under the charge of two plebeian magistrates specially 
 appointed for the purpose, and called aediles, or " house- 
 
THE TRIBUNATE OF THE PLEBS. 55 
 
 masters." These aedilcs were attached to the tribunes as 
 assistants, and their jurisdiction chiefly concerned such 
 minor cases as were settled by fines. 
 
 The following were the chief characteristics rf the 
 tribunate. (1) The two tribunes were of plebeian rank, and 
 elected by the plebeians assembled in curies. (2) Their 
 power was confined to the city's limits, and thus could not 
 oppose the military imperium of the consul, which was all- 
 powerful outside those limits, nor the authority of the 
 dictator, whether exercised inside or outside the city. 
 (3) Within these limits the tribunes stood on an equal 
 and independent footing with the consuls, and had the 
 right to cancel any command, issued by a magistrate, upon 
 a formal protest from the burgess aggrieved by such a 
 command. This power of intercession made it possible 
 for the tribunes to bring the ordinary administration and 
 execution of the law to a dead-lock while an appeal 
 against the sentence of a judge or decree of the senate 
 was being investigated. (4) Their judicial powers, owing 
 to the vague and ill-defined laws touching offences against 
 order, and crime against the community, were alike exten- 
 sive and arbitrary. They could by their messengers 
 (viatores) summon before them any burgess, even the 
 consul, arrest him on refusal, imprison him, or allow him 
 bail during investigation, and finally sentence him to death 
 or the payment of a fine. An appeal from their sentence 
 was heard, not by the whole body of burgesses, but by 
 the whole plebeian body, and the tribunes defended them- 
 selves before this assembly in case of such an appeal. 
 (5) Out of this risrht of defence sprang the right of 
 holding assemblies of the people, and addressing them on 
 other matters • a right expressly guaranteed to the tri- 
 bunes by the Icilian law (b c. 492), which rendered 
 liable to severe punishment any one who interrupted a 
 tribune while speaking, or who bade the assembly dis- 
 perse. They could take the vote of the people at such 
 meetings, and the "plebiscites" (plebi scita), or resolu- 
 tions thus passed, soon came to have a force and validity 
 which did not properly belong to them. (6) Lastly, the 
 persons of the tribunes were declared inviolable (sacro- 
 sancti), and the man who laid hands on them was counted 
 accursed in the sight of gods and men 
 
56 HISTORY OF HOME. 
 
 This outline of the tribunician power serves to show that 
 it was really a copy of the consular power. In both cases 
 the Roman check of intercession, or veto, plays a prominent 
 part; as one consul could veto his colleague, so one tribune 
 could thwart the other. The special power of vetoing 
 the consul, or any other state magistrate, belonged to the 
 tribune, in virtue of his position as protector and counsel 
 of the plebs. Again, the duration of office was limited to 
 a year in both cases, and in both cases the holder of the 
 office could not be deposed. Further, in their criminal 
 jurisdiction, two aediles were associated with the tribunes, 
 just as two quaestors had been attached to the consuls ; 
 but the consul submitted to the prohibition of the tribune, 
 while the tribune was unrestricted by any such prohibi- 
 tion from the consul. Still, although a copy, tho tribuni- 
 cian power presente 1 a contrast to the consular. It was 
 essentially negative, while that of the consuls was essen- 
 tially positive. The consuls alone were magistrates of the 
 Roman people, as being elected by the whole burgess- 
 body, and not merely by the plebeians. Therefore the 
 consul alone had the outward insignia of office ; the tribune 
 lacked official attendants, the purple border, and had no 
 seat in the senate. " Thus in this remarkable institution 
 absolute prohibition was in the most stern and abrupt 
 fashion opposed to absolute command ; the quarx^el was 
 settled by legally recognizing and regulating the discord 
 between rich and poor." 
 
 It remains for us to consider what was the political 
 value of the tribunate. Springing as it did from the 
 miseries caused by over-taxation, the baleful system of 
 credit, and the pernicious occupation of the state lands, 
 it yet pat no stop to these evils. The reason of this is 
 simply that the wealthy plebeians had as much interest 
 in these abuses as the patricians. The good that the office 
 might do in individual cases of hardship, and in helping 
 plebeians to gain admission to state offices, was more 
 than counterbalanced by the evil of rendering the ad- 
 ministration of criminal law subject to the party passion 
 of politics. For party purposes, too, the tribunes could 
 employ their power of veto, and throw out of gear the 
 machine of state, and thus pave the way for that very 
 tyranny which they were created to render impossible. 
 
TEE TRIBUNATE OF TEE PLEBS. 57 
 
 In the later days of the Republic we shall find that this 
 was the very course they pursued ; and the odium thus 
 incurred found expression in the contemptuous definition 
 of the tribunate as a " pestiferous power, the offspring of 
 sedition, with sedition for its end and aim." The events 
 which followed the institution of the tribunes indicate a 
 state of organized civil war between the two parties of the 
 state. Among minor conflicts stands out the story of 
 Gaius Marcius, surnamed Coriolanus, from the storming 
 of Corioli. Romance has doubtless coloured his bitter 
 opposition to the tribunes in 491 B.C., his expulsion by 
 them from Rome, his return at the head of the Volscian 
 army, his withdrawal on the appeal of his mother, bis 
 death at the hands of the exasperated Yolscians ; but the 
 truth of these disgraceful conflicts between the Roman 
 orders remains unshaken. The surprise of the Capitol by 
 a band of political refugees, led by a Sabine chief, Appius 
 Herdonius, in 460 B.C., the extirpation of the Fabii by the 
 Etruscans at Cremera in 477 B.C., and other events of 
 this period were connected with the same fanatical violence. 
 But the murder of the tribune, Gnaeus Genucius, who had 
 dared to impeach two men of consular rank in 473 B.C., 
 had a more lasting result, giving rise two years later to 
 the Publilian law. The proposer of this law, Volero 
 Publilius, who was tribune in 471 B.C., established in the 
 first place the comitia tributa,* or plebeian assembly of 
 tribes. Hitherto the plebeians had voted by curies, and 
 numbers alone had determined their decision. The clients 
 of patrician families voted in these assemblies, and thus 
 enabled the nobility to exercise no small influence on the 
 result. The new plebeian assembly was composed solely 
 of those who were freeholders, and thus excluded the 
 great majority of freedmen and clients, as well as all 
 the patricians. Owing to this the comitia tributa was 
 practically an assembly of the independent middle class, 
 and was, owing to its exclusion alike of patricians and 
 non-freeholder plebeians, less representative of the bur- 
 gesses than the assembly of curies had been. In the 
 
 * The view here taken is the simplest one held by Schwegler, 
 Pelham, etc., that the comitia tributa was a development of the 
 concilium plebis tributum. Mommsen holds that the Publilian law 
 refers only to the latter. 
 
53 BISTORT OF ROME. 
 
 second place we must ascribe, if not directly to the pro- 
 visions of the Publilian law, at least indirectly to its 
 effects, the fact that the resolutions of theplebs (plebiscita) 
 were recognized as legally binding on the whole commu- 
 nity, and had the same validity as the decrees of the 
 comitia centuriata. Probably, also, the increase of the 
 number of tribunes from two to five was due to this law, and 
 their election was now transferred to the comitia tributa. 
 Previous to this outcome of party triumph and parry 
 legislation, a far wiser and far more serious attempt to 
 deal with the real source of evil was made by Spurius 
 Cassius, a patrician of the patricians, and personally illus- 
 trious by two triumphs. In his third consulate (486 B.C.) 
 he brought forward an agrarian bill, in which lie proposed 
 to have the state land measured, and to lease part of it for 
 the benefit of the public treasury, and to distribute a 
 larger part among the needy citizens. With an unwise 
 generosity he wished to give the Latin confederates a 
 share in this distribution of public land. This proposa.l, 
 aimed as it was at the control of the state lands by the 
 senate, and the selfish system of occupation, drew down on 
 its author the wrath of the nobles and the rich plebeians. 
 The cry of " king " was raised, and the commons, irritated 
 by the proposed association of the Latins in the distribu- 
 tion, and ever ready to believe that royal power was being 
 aimed at, refused to save their champion. Cassius fell, 
 and " his law was buried along with him ; but its spectre 
 thenceforsvard incessantly haunted the eves of the rich, 
 and again and again it rose from the tomb against them, 
 until, amidst the conflicts to which it led, the common- 
 wealth perished." 
 
 Later, in 462 B.C., a further attempt to abolish the 
 tribunate came from one holding that office. Gaius 
 Terentilius Arsa proposed to nominate a commission of 
 five men for the purpose of preparing a legal code which 
 should bind the consuls in the exercise of their judicial 
 powers. Ten years of party strife elapsed before this 
 proposal was carried into effect, and during that strife 
 two concessions were made to induce the plebeians to give 
 up this legal code. (1) In 457 B.C. the tribunes were in- 
 creased from five to ten; (2) in 456 B.C. the Aventine, 
 which had hitherto been sacred ground and uninhabited, 
 
THE DECEMYIRATE. 59 
 
 was distributed among the poorer burgesses, for them to 
 bnild on and occupy. But these concessions did not turn 
 aside the plebs. The legal code was agreed to, and in 
 451 B.C. ten men were elected by the centuries, for the 
 purpose of drawing it up (decemviri consulari imperio 
 legibus scribundis). These decemvirs had frill powers as 
 supreme magistrates in the place of the consuls ; no appeal 
 was allowed in their case ; the tribunate was suspended ; 
 and, what was more important, plebeians, as well as 
 patricians, were eligible for the new office. The first 
 plebeians were elected at the second electiou in 450 B.C., 
 and these were the first non-patrician magistrates of the 
 Roman community. Although the proposal for the insti- 
 tution of the decemvirate was made in 454 B.C., no de- 
 cemvirs were elected for three years ; during that interval 
 an embassy was sent to Greece to collect the more famous 
 Greek laws, and especially those of Solon ; this embassy 
 did not return till 451 B.C. The object of this new creation 
 was to substitute a limitation of the consular powers by 
 written law for the more turbulent veto of the tribunes. 
 The pledge given by the decemvirs not to infringe the 
 liberties of the plebs did not, perhaps, imply the abolition 
 of the tribunate ; but a wise compromise would doubtless 
 have brought this about, had the decemvirs retired when 
 their task was done. In 451 B.C. the law, engraven on 
 ten tables of copper, was affixed in the Forum to the rostra 
 in front of the senate-house. Two more tables were added 
 in the following year, and thus originated the first and 
 only legal code of Rome — the Twelve Tables. The chanees 
 introduced by this code were of a comparatively slight 
 character; the maximum of interest was fixed at ten per 
 cent., and the usurer was rendered liable to heavy penalties. 
 The legal distinction between freeholders and non-free- 
 holders was retained, as also the invalidity of marriage 
 between patricians and plebeians. The chief feature was 
 the denial of appeal to the comitia tributa in capital cases, 
 and the confirmation of it in the case of the comitia 
 centuriata. The political significance of this code lay not 
 so much in the particulars of its legislation, as in the fact 
 that the consuls were now bound to administer justice 
 according to set forms and rules ; while the exhibition of 
 the code in public subjected the administrator to the 
 
60 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 control of the public eye. The downfall of the decemvirs, 
 who under various pretexts refused to abdicate their 
 office, has been ascribed by legend to the tyranny of their 
 chief, Appius Claudius. The murder of Lucius Siccius 
 Dentatus, the bravest soldier in Rome, and a former tri- 
 bune, was laid at the door of the decemvirs ; and the act 
 of the centurion Lucius Verginius, who slew his own 
 daughter to save her from the brutal lust of Appius, 
 caused the storm of popular indignation to break forth. 
 The two armies, which a double war against the Sabines 
 and Volscians had called into the field, on hearing the 
 story from Verginius and Lucius Icilius, the betrothed 
 lover of the dead maiden, straightway left their camps, 
 and once more seceded to the Sacred Mount. They there 
 nominated their tribunes, and, as the decemvirs still re- 
 mained obstinate, returned to the city, and encamped on 
 the Aventine. The decemvirs now gave way, and Appius 
 Claudius and Spurius Oppius put an end to their lives, 
 while the remaining eight went into exile. It is hard to 
 believe that the decemvirate, one of the triumphs of the 
 plebs, was abolished by that body. Possibly the whole 
 story is a myth of the aristocrats. The overthrow of 
 the decemvirate would more naturally have come from the 
 patricians. A subsequent contest may possibly have 
 ensued to force the patricians to restore the tribunate, 
 resulting in the victory of the plebs, and in the com- 
 promise which was confirmed by the Valerio-Horatian 
 laws, the so-called Magna Charta of Rome. 
 
 At any rate the tribunate was restored, and, under 
 the Valerio-Horatian laws, gained the following new 
 powers in 449 B.C. : (1) The consuls were forced to 
 administer justice in accordance with the twelve tables 
 of the decemvirs. (2) To compensate for the loss of 
 right of appeal in capital cases to the comitia tri- 
 buta,* every magistrate, the dictator among the rest, was 
 obliged to allovv the right of appeal. (3) The tribunes 
 could, as before, inflict fines without limitation, and 
 submit their sentences to the comitia tribnta. (4) The 
 management of the military chest was taken from the 
 
 * According to Mommsen it would be better to read in (2) and 
 (3) "'the assembly of the plebs" for "comitia tributa," and to 
 reserve that name for (4). 
 
THE DECEMVIR ATE. 61 
 
 consuls, and entrusted to two quaestors, who were chosen 
 by the whole body of freeholders, both patrician and 
 plebeian ; the votes of this assembly were taken by dis- 
 tricts, which gave the plebeian farmers far more weight 
 than they possessed in the comitia centuriata. (5) The 
 tribunes were allowed to sit on a bench at the door of the 
 senate-house, and thus have a share in the proceedings of 
 that body. And from this important concession gradually 
 arose the principle, that the tribune could by his veto 
 stop any resolution of the senate or of the public assembly. 
 (6) The persons of the tribunes were pronounced in- 
 violable (sacrosancti), and the most hallowed ordinances 
 of religion were employed to impart sacredness to their 
 office. " No attempt to abolish this magistracy was ever 
 from this time forward made in Rome." 
 
 AUTHORITIES. 
 
 Land.— Appian B. C. 1, 7. Plut. Tib. Gracch. 8. Dionys. ii. 7, 35, 
 
 50, 53. Liv. x. 1 ; xxxvi. 39. Varro de R. R. i. 10. Marq. Stv. 
 
 i. 96-99; ii. 149-159. 
 Publicani.— Cic. ad Q. F. i. 1, 12, 35. Plut. de curios, viii. 60. 
 
 Marq. Stv. ii. 299-301. 
 First secession. — Liv. ii. 23-33 Dionys. vi. 22-96. 
 Tribunate. — Liv. ii. 33, 58; iii. 55 ; iv. 6. Dionys. vii. 17. Varro de 
 
 L. L. 5, 81. Cic. in Corn. p. 75 ; pro Sest. 35, 79. Momms. R. 
 
 St. ii. 261-318. 
 Aediles. — Dionys. vi. 90. Zonar. 7, 15. Valer. Max. 22, 7- Momms. 
 
 R. St. ii. 462, sqq. 
 Struggles between plebs and patres. — Liv. ii. 34—40. Dionys. vii. 
 
 19-47; viii. 1-84 Plutarch G. Marcius (Coriol.). 
 Fabii.— Dionys. ix. 15-27. Liv. ii. 48-50. 
 Appius Herdonius. — Liv. iii. 15-18. Dionys. x. 14, 16, 37. 
 Spurius Cassius. — Liv. ii. 41. Dionys. vi. 95 ; viii. 68-87. Festus. 
 
 p. 241. 
 Lex Publilia. — Liv. ii. 56-60. Dionys. ix. 39-43. 
 Lex Terentilia. — Liv. iii. 9, 32. 
 Decemvirate and Valerio-Horatian laws. — Liv. iii. 33-58. Dionys. x. 
 
 54-60 ; xi. 1-49. 
 Twelve Tables, cf. Schwegler R. G. iii. 1-47 ; Bruns fontes, 147 ; 
 
 Dirksen's Review of the Explanations of XII. Tables, Schmitz 
 
 Qnellen-Kunde, p. 12-14. 
 Comitia Tributa — Mommsen (R. St. iii. 322, sq. ; Romische Forsch- 
 
 ungen, i. 165) holds that Roman writers confused the comitia 
 
 populi tributa with the concilium plebis tributum. Strachan- 
 
 Davidson (Historical Revieiv, p. 209, sq.) suggests a third view, 
 
HISTORY OF flO.lfF. 
 
 CHAPTER Vni. 
 
 EQUALIZATION OF THE ORDERS, AND THE NEW ARISTOCRACY. 
 
 Union of the plebeians — Lex Canuleia, 445 B.C. — Military tribunes 
 with consular powers — Censorship, 435 B.C. — Quaestorship, 
 421 B.C. — Bitter resistance of the nobility — Social distress — 
 Attempted remedies — Licinio-Sextian laws — Death-blows of the 
 old aristocracy — Utility of the Licinio-Sextian laws — New 
 aristocracy and new opposition — Increase of the powers of 
 burgesses — Decreasing importance of the comitia — Subdivision 
 and diminution of the consular power — Changed character of the 
 tribunate — The senate all-powerful. 
 
 The contest between the patricians and plebeians was not 
 yet ended. For two hundred years the bitter strife con- 
 tinued ; each successive struggle wrested from the old 
 aristocracy one or more of their deai'ly loved privileges, 
 until at last not one remained, save that which birth alone 
 gives and nought can take away, the exclusive pride of 
 caste. To present a continuous history of the internal 
 strife of parties, it will be necessary to confine this chapter 
 to a narrative of the inner life of Rome, and to summarize 
 as briefly as possible the events of each blow to the 
 patrician power, and the results of the conflict as a whole. 
 The history of Rome's foreign relations, although they 
 exercised no slight influence on her internal discord, must 
 be reserved for another place. 
 
 Social discontent, rather than political, had given rise 
 to the tribunician movement, a movement viewed with 
 suspicion by wealthy plebeians as well as by patricians. 
 Doubtless some of the leading plebeians had supported 
 their less powerful brethren in the struggle, whether from 
 motives of justice or self-interest. But, now that the 
 
EQUALIZATION OF THE ORDERS. 63 
 
 office of tribune was firmly established, the whole ple- 
 beian body, comprising both those wealthier families who 
 had already become members of the senate, and the 
 general mass of the citizens, became firmly united together, 
 and used the tribunate as a lever to remove the political 
 disabilities of their order. The first blow was dealt by 
 the Canuleian law in 445 B.C. This law (1) legalized the 
 validity of marriage between a patrician and plebeian, 
 giving the children of such a marriage the rank of their 
 father. (2) It further created six military tribunes in 
 the place of consuls, with consular powers and consular 
 duration of office, whose election was intrusted to the 
 centuries. This office was open alike to plebeians and 
 patricians. As the creation of this magistracy was doubt- 
 less a compromise between the claim of the plebeians to 
 be admitted to the consulship and the opposition of the 
 patricians, we must seek for some reason why the patri- 
 cians practically conceded the claim of the plebeians, but 
 changed the form of the consulate to that of a military 
 tribunate. Certain honorary distinctions were associated 
 with the holding of the consular power, such as the honour 
 of a triumph, and the ius imaginum, or right which 
 allowed a consul's descendants to set up their ancestor's 
 image in the family hall, and to exhibit it on certain 
 occasions in public. These honours were not allowed to 
 the military tribunes. Further, a plebeian military tribune 
 did not have the right of speech in the senate, which 
 would of necessity have belonged to plebeian consuls ; 
 since the opinion of all chosen to fill the office of consul, 
 and of all who had filled it, had to be asked before that of 
 the other senators. It must be specially noted that the 
 old patrician consuls were not abolished by this new office ; 
 indeed, every year the struggle was renewed as to whether 
 military tribunes or patrician consuls should be elected. 
 During the period of nearly eighty years, i.e. from 444 B.C. 
 to the throwing open of the consulship to the plebeians by 
 the Licinian law in 367 B.C., we find that the military 
 tribunes were elected fifty times, and the patrician consuls 
 twenty-three times. The miserable shifts by which the 
 patricians thus sought to baffle their opponents found 
 further expression in the creation of the censorship in 
 435 B.C. The two officers, or "valuers" (censores), thus 
 
64 HISTORY OF ROME 
 
 created, were chosen from the patricians, and held office 
 for a period of not more than eighteen months. They had 
 charge of the registration of the whole body of citizens for 
 the purposes of taxation, and the duty of ascertaining the age 
 and property of each man, and of assigning him his proper 
 position on the burgess-roll. This task had hitherto been 
 managed by the consuls every fourth year. The censor- 
 ship, although at this period lacking its rubsequent im- 
 portance and moral supremacy, from its influence in filling 
 up the vacancies in the senate and the equites, and from 
 its power to remove persons from the lists of senators, 
 equites, and burgesses, came to be regarded as the palla- 
 dium of the aristocracy. The second great victory over 
 the patricians was gained in 421 B.C., when the quaestor- 
 ship was thrown open to the plebeians. Hitherto the 
 consuls had nominated the two city quaestors, who had 
 charge of the public money : their election was now trans- 
 ferred to the same body which elected their two colleagues 
 who had charge of the military chest (cf. p. 60). Thus 
 the plebeians became eligible for the first time to one of 
 the ordinary magistracies, although we do not find that 
 they were able to avail themselves of this privilege until 
 409 B.C., when they secured three places out of the four. 
 In their bitter resistance to the plebs the aristocracy had 
 resort to every artifice which could influence elections; 
 the aristocratic colleges of priests, under the guise of 
 religion, seconded the bribery and intimidation freely 
 practised on the electorate. Laws could be arrested, 
 elections made null and void, by the convenient discovery 
 of portentous omens, whether from the flight of birds or 
 other phenomena. The blood of Rome's best and bravest 
 citizens was shed in the vain hope of stemming the tide 
 of plebeian victory. We have already (p. 58) narrated 
 the fall of Cassius ; to the same list of judicial murders 
 must be added the names of Spurius Maelius and Marcus 
 Manlius. The first of these, in a time of great distress 
 (b.c. 439) sold corn at greatly reduced prices for the 
 benefit of the sufferers. This roused the ire of the patri- 
 cian " store-president " (praefectus annonae), Gaius Minu- 
 fius. The old cry of " king" was raised, and Maelius fell 
 by the hand of the master of the hnrse, Gaius Servilius 
 Ahala, because he refused to obey the summons of the 
 
EQUALIZATION OF THE ORDERS. 65 
 
 dictator Lucius Quinctius Cineinnatus. The house of 
 Maelius was pulled down, and the corn from his granaries 
 distributed among the people. The second victim was 
 Marcus Manlius, whose name, as the saviour of the Capitol 
 during the Gallic siege, was specially dear to the Roman 
 people. The same evils which had roused Spurius Cassius 
 now wrung the heart of his ill-fated successor. The 
 mismanagement of the state lands, the evil system of 
 credit, and the misery of the decaying farmers still called 
 loudly for reform. Assignations of conquered territory 
 had, indeed, been made, notably in the case of lands taken 
 from Ardea in 412 B.C., from Labici in 418 B.C., and from 
 Veii in 393 B.C., but the relief thus afforded was by no 
 means adequate. Attempts had been made, moreover, to 
 revive the law of Cassius — as, for instance, the proposal of 
 Spurius Maecilius and Spurius Metilius in 417 B.C. to 
 distribute all the state land ; but all such efforts had met 
 with the same success as that of Spurius Cassius. No 
 better fate befell the patrician Marcus Manlius. His noble 
 generosity in freeing with his own money a brave officer, 
 who was about to be led away to a debtor's prison, and 
 his bold utterance that such iniquities should not occur 
 as long as he had a foot of land to sell, roused against 
 him the hatred of the aristocrats and the blind credulity 
 and fanaticism of the multitude. The brave champion of 
 the oppressed was tried for high treason, and condemned 
 to death by those whom he had vainly tried to free, in 
 384 B.C. ; and thus once more the charge of aiming at 
 royal power exercised its deadly charm. Despite the 
 constant acquisition of fresh territory by successful wars, 
 the social distress among the farmers only deepened ; and 
 the severe war with Veii from 406-396 B.C., when the 
 soldiers remained under arms both summer and winter, 
 coupled with the burning of Rome by the Gauls in 390 
 B.C., added fresh horrors to the widespread misery. 
 
 At last a solution of the troubles arising from political 
 discontent and social wretchedness sprang out of the 
 combination of the chief plebeians with the farmers. 
 This solution was found in the famous proposals brought 
 forward in 377 B.C. by the tribunes Gaius Licinius and 
 Lucius Sextius. Their proposals were, (1) that the 
 military tribunes should be abolished, and that at least 
 
66 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 one of the consuls should be a plebeian ; (2) that plebeians 
 should be admitted to one of the three great priest-colleges, 
 viz. that of the decemviri (hitherto duoviri) sacris faci- 
 undis, or custodians of the oracles ; (3) that no one should 
 keep on the common pasture-land more than a hundred 
 oxen and five hundred sheep, or hold more than five 
 hundred jugera (about three hundred acres) of the state 
 lands left free for occupation ; (4) that every landlord 
 should be obliged to employ in land cultivation a certain 
 number of frue labourers, in proportion to that of his 
 rural slaves ; (5) that debtors should be relieved by the 
 deduction of the intei'est already paid from the capital, 
 and by arranging set terms for the payment of arrears. 
 
 The three watch- words of this great movement were 
 clearly the abolition of privilege, social reform, civil 
 equality. The hereditary distinctions associated with the 
 curule magistracy, the right to speak in the senate-house, 
 (cf. p. 45), the possession of spiritual dignities, were no 
 longer to be the exclusive property of the nobles. Social 
 distress was to be relieved, and the poorest burgess was 
 to have his rightful share in those lands from which the 
 selfishness of the rich had so long excluded him. That 
 the patricians struggled hard to prevent these proposals 
 becoming law is not surprising ; but that they were 
 passed, after a struggle of eleven years, in 367 B.C., proves 
 the strength of the united forces of the farmers and rich 
 plebeians. The passing of these laws was marked by the 
 founding of a temple of concord at the foot of the Capitol % 
 — the last act of the aged warrior and statesman Marcus 
 Furius Camillus, who perhaps trusted that the struggle, 
 too long continued, was now at an end. But the patrician 
 spirit still showed itself in the creation of a third consul, 
 or, as he was usually called, a praetor. However, this 
 office among others was thrown open to the plebeians in 
 337 B.C., having remained in the hands of the aristocracy 
 only twenty-nine years. The last blows which destroyed 
 aristocratic exclusiveness were (1) that by which the 
 dictatorship was thrown open to the plebeians in 356 B.C. ; 
 (2) that which gave the plebeians access to the censorship 
 in 351 B.C.; (3) that dealt by the Publilian law in 339 B.C., 
 which ordained that at least one of the censors must be a 
 plebeian, and which rendered it impossible for the senate 
 
EQUALIZATION OF TEE OBDERS. 67 
 
 to reject a decree of the community. The result of this 
 ■was that the senate had to give their consent before- 
 hand to any measures which might be passed by the 
 comitia tributa. (4) The next blow, aimed at the religious 
 privileges of the patricians, fell later. In 300 B.C., the 
 Ogulnian law increased the number of pontifices from five 
 to eight, and that of the augurs from six to nine, and 
 distributed the stalls in the two colleges between the 
 patricians and plebeians. (5) Lastly, owing to another 
 secession of the plebs, the final blow was given by the law 
 of the dictator Quintus Hortensius, in 287 B.C. This law 
 declared that the decrees of the plebs, passed in their 
 tribal assembly, should have equal force with the decrees 
 of the whole populus, or community. Thus it was brought 
 about that those very burgesses, who had once exclusively 
 possessed the right of voting, no longer had even a vote 
 in that assembly whose resolutions were binding on the 
 whole state. 
 
 The end had at last come to a strife of two hundred 
 years. The clan nobility, as such, was no longer apolitical 
 factor in the Roman Republic; but, although its power and 
 privileges were gone, its exclusive patrician spirit was 
 ever a disturbing element of discontent in the public and 
 private life of Rome. " To understand rightly the history 
 of Rome in the fifth and sixth centuries, we must never 
 overlook this sulking patricianism ; it could, indeed, do 
 little more than irritate itself and others, but this it did 
 to the best of its ability." 
 
 It remains for us to estimate the result of these changes, 
 as to whether they checked social distress and established 
 political equality. 
 
 With regard to the first point, we should first consider 
 what relief was really given by the Licinio-Sextian laws, 
 passed in 367 B.C. No doubt a substantial benefit was 
 conferred upon the small farmer and free labourer by the 
 provisions of these laws, and this benefit was the more 
 felt as long as the regulations touching the maximum of 
 public land held by individuals, and the number of cattle 
 grazing on the public pasture, were strictly enforced. But 
 it is obvious that no legislation could really check the 
 system of large estates, or the employment of slave-labour, 
 without at the same time shaking the foundations of the 
 
68 HISTORY OF HOME. 
 
 civil organization of that time, in a way that would entail 
 far-reaching consequences. Again, the maximum fixed 
 as to occupation of domain-land and the grazing of flocks 
 and herds was a high one, and in effect was a concession 
 to the wealthy, whose tenure, although liable to certain 
 restrictions, acquired a certain legal sanction. Moreover, 
 these laws provided no better means than had previously 
 existed for the collection of the pasture-tax and the tenths 
 or 6fths. No officer was appointed to revise the list of 
 those already holding such land, nor to ensure that, in 
 case of fresh territorial acquisitions, a distribution should 
 at once be made, nor to secure to those who already were 
 in possession, or should be so in future, full ownership. 
 The absence of these provisions, which the necessities of 
 the case demanded, is in itself suspicious. It seems only 
 too probable that the plebeian aristocracy, at whose in- 
 stance these laws were proposed, regarded their own selfish 
 interests rather than those of the poorer citizens. Indeed, 
 Gaius Licinius Stolo, one of the authors of these laws, 
 was among the first to be condemned for having exceeded 
 the maximum of land. Still some real good was done, 
 and other measures followed, of a beneBcial character. In 
 357 B.C., a tax was imposed by the Manlian law on the 
 manumissions of slaves ; this was the first direct tax upon 
 the rich, and its object was to check the undesirable 
 multiplication of freedmen. Moreover, the usury laws 
 established by the Twelve Tables (p. 59) were rendered 
 more stringent, and the maximum of interest, which the 
 law of Duilius Maenius had fixed at ten per cent, in 357 
 B.C., was lowered to five percent, ten years later; and later 
 on, the Genucian law in 342 B.C. forbade the taking of 
 interest altogether. This foolish law, though it remained 
 formally in force, was practically inoperative ; but the 
 maximum of interest at a rate of five or six per cent, 
 would, at this period, represent the usual rate of twelve 
 per cent., which obtained in later times. More important 
 were the restrictions introduced by the Paetelian and 
 Papirian law of 326 B.C. : by this law, no citizen of Rome 
 could be led away to prison for debt until he had been 
 sentenced by jurymen ; and the debtor could, after declar- 
 ing on oath that he was solvent, save his personal freedom 
 by giving up his property. Notwithstanding these measures 
 
THE NEW ARISTOCRACY. 69 
 
 we have clear proof that the distress of the middle class 
 still continued. The appointment of a board to advance 
 money (quinqueviri mensarii) in 352 B.C., the violent in- 
 surrection and secession of the plebs to the Janiculum in 
 287 B.C., and the concessions thereby obtained, all point 
 to the same fact. The real relief came not from legisla- 
 tion, but from the successes of Rome, and the necessity 
 of sending out large colonies to consolidate tie Roman 
 rale in Italy. Added to this, the general increase of 
 prosperity from successful war and commerce, and the 
 flourishing condition of the state finances, must have 
 lightened the burdens, of the farmers, and diffused material 
 well-being among the whole community. 
 
 Again, as to the second point, political equality was now 
 practically attained. In the eye of the law, atr least, all 
 arbitrary distinctions were abolished. The different gra- 
 dations, which age, wisdom, and wealth always produce 
 in society, were lessened by the system that pervaded 
 Roman life. That system aimed rather at a uniform level 
 of ability, than at bringing into prominence those more 
 highly gifted. Rich and poor alike lived frugal lives, 
 avoiding even the luxury of silver plate. From the last 
 war with Veii down to that against Pyrrhus, the farmers 
 played a more important part than the old patriciate: the 
 exploits of a plebeian, like Decins, and of a poor farmer, 
 like Manius Curius, now began to take equal rank with, 
 and even eclipse, those of the noblest aristocrat. But, 
 great as the strides to this republican equality were, the 
 government still remained aristocratic. The mere opening 
 of state magistracies to the humblest and poorest burgess 
 does not remove the difficulties which always hinder the 
 rise of a man from the ranks. Moreover, a new aristocracy, 
 consisting of the wealthy plebeians, had existed from the 
 first, and now developed fresh powers. Their policy had 
 always followed lines distinct from, and often oppos< d to, 
 that of the plebs. This new aristocracy coalesced with 
 the old patriciate, and largely adopted its views, and soon 
 practically took its place. A natural result of this develop- 
 ment was the rise of a new opposition. This new demo- 
 cratic party was formed no longer of plebeians, as such, 
 but of the lower classes and the small farmers. But, 
 fortunately for Rome, her struggles with foreign foes 
 
70 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 caused the leaders of the two new state parties to forego 
 their quarrels in the face of a common danger; and thus 
 we find the patrician Appius Claudius uniting with his 
 personal foe, the farmer Manius Curius, for the purpose 
 of crushing Pyrrhus. " The breach was already formed ; 
 but the adversaries still shook hands across it." 
 
 Finally, let us consider what effect the political abo- 
 lition of the old nobility had upon the relations between 
 the burgesses, the magistrates, and the senate. It has been 
 already pointed out that the Hortensian law in 287 B.C. 
 had given great powers to the comitia tributa ; and 
 that in this assembly all voted ou a footing of equality, 
 without reference to their means, thus differing from 
 the practice in the comitia centuriata. The censor, 
 Appius Claudius, in 312 B.C., even struck a blow at the 
 old freehold basis of suffrage, and allowed landless 
 citizens to be enrolled in the tribes. His action was, 
 however, greatly limited by Quintus Fabius Rullianus, 
 the conqueror of the Samnites, in 304 B.C. He incor- 
 porated all free men who had no land, and also all 
 freedmen whose landed property was under thirty thou- 
 sand sesterces (£300), in the four city tribes. But he 
 reserved the rural tribes, whose number gradually increased 
 from seventeen to thirty-one, for all freeborn freeholders, 
 and for those freedmen whose estate exceeded thirty 
 thousand sesterces in value. Thus he gave a great pre- 
 ponderance of power in the two assemblies of the citizens 
 to the holders of land and wealth, and he placed a check 
 upon the increasing importance of the freedmen. Although 
 the powers of the burgess assemblies were increased in 
 certain directions, chiefly with respect to the number of 
 magistrates nominated by them, they did not as a rule 
 interfere with the administration of government. They 
 kept a firm hold on their right to declare war, and oc- 
 casionally settled disputes between the governing powers, 
 when appealed to by the disputants, and in 390 B.C. they 
 even annulled a decree of the senate. The Hortensian 
 law probably marks the extension of the powers of the 
 comitia tributa, w 7 hich came to be consulted as to the 
 conclusion of peace and alliances. Still, the influence of 
 these assemblies on public affairs towards the close of this 
 period began to wane. This was mainly due to the ex- 
 
THE NEW ARISTOCRACY. 71 
 
 tension of the bounds of Rome, whose burgess-body no 
 longer composed a city, but a state. Thus the interest 
 felt in their proceedings on ordinary occasions was com- 
 paratively slight, inasmuch as only those residing in the 
 capital as a rule attended. Moreover, the magistrate 
 who convoked the assembly could prevent all discussion ; 
 hence the assemblies became mere instruments in his 
 hands, and played a passive part, neither helping nor 
 hindering the administration of the government. 
 
 With regard to the Roman magistrates, a great loss of 
 power was the outcome of party contests. The close of 
 the struggle left the consular power subdivided and 
 weakened. Jurisdiction, city police, election of senators 
 and equites, the census and financial administration, were 
 all transferred to magistrates elected by the community, 
 and occupying a position co-ordinate with, rather than 
 subordinate to, the consuls. Further, although the consul- 
 ship ranked higher than the praetorship, aedileship, and 
 quaestorship, it ranked below the censorship, which office 
 now exercised a wholly arbitrary control over the entire 
 community and every individual burgess. In addition 
 to this creation of collateral standing offices fuch as 
 the praetorship, the senate now annually defined, though 
 it did not directly assign, the different departments (pro- 
 vinciae) of the consuls ; and the senate no longer allowed 
 the consuls to conclude peace, without first receiving in- 
 structions from the assembled senators. Lastly, the senate 
 could in emergencies suspend a consul by creating a 
 dictator ; and, although nominally designated by the 
 consul, the consul elect was, as a rule, really chosen by 
 the senate. Even the dictator's power was no longer 
 regarded as absolute and unlimited. The definition of the 
 functions of the dictator, as of that of the consul and other 
 magistrates, came to be regarded as a constitutional 
 necessity. Thus we find in 363 B.C., and again in 351 
 B.C., a dictator appointed for a special and limited duty, 
 such as the performance of a religious ceremony. More- 
 over, restrictions were imposed in 342 B.C. by plebis- 
 cites, enacting that no one should hold two magistracies 
 in the same year, and that the same man should not 
 hold the same office twice within a period of ten years. 
 Later, again, in 265 b.c, the Marcian law forbade any one 
 
72 EISTOTiY OF HOME. 
 
 holding the censorship twice. Although the rule forbid- 
 ing pluralism, i.e. the holding of two offices at the same 
 time, was strictly observed, we frequently find instances 
 of a relaxation of the other restriction. Thus Quintus 
 Fabius Rullianus was five times consul in eight and twenty 
 years, and Marcns Valerius Corvus (370-271 B.C.) held 
 the consulship six times — the first in his twenty-third, 
 and the last in his seventy-second year. The change, 
 which thus transformed the supreme power of the state 
 into a limited magistracy with definite functions, also 
 affected the tribunate. Now that this office had accom- 
 plished the purpose for which it had been used, by securing 
 the abolition of the legal disabilities of the commons and 
 of the privileges of the old nobility, the original object of 
 the tribunate as counsel and protector of the humblest 
 and weakest was as odious to the new plebeian aristocracy 
 as it had been to the patrician. Therefore, under the new 
 organization the office lost its old character of a weapon of 
 opposition, and became an instrument of government. 
 The tribunes no longer sat on a bench at the door of the 
 senate-house, but took their seats by the side of the other 
 magistrates, and took part in the discussions. Like the 
 other acting magistrates, they did not during their year of 
 office vote in the senate, but they had the right of con- 
 voking it, of consulting it, and of procuring decrees from 
 it. Thus, by becoming magistrates of the state, the tribunes 
 for the time lost their old revolutionary and obstructive 
 character, and paved the way for the steady growth of the 
 power of the new aristocracy ; indeed, the tribunes were, 
 as a rule, members of that body. Yet the preservation 
 and the associations of the name of tribunate, might 
 well forbode danger in the future. " For the moment, 
 however, and for a long time to come, the aristocracy 
 was so absolutely powerful, and so completely possessed 
 control over the tribunate, that no trace is to be met 
 with of a collegiate opposition on the part of the tribunes 
 to the senate." What opposition did arise came from 
 single independent tribunes, and was easily crushed, often 
 by the aid of the tribune-college itself. 
 
 The real governing power became vested in the senate. 
 The Ovinian law, probably passed soon after the Sexto- 
 Licinian laws, regulated the composition of that body. All 
 
THE NEW ARISTOCRACY. 73 
 
 who had been curule aediles, praetors, or consuls became 
 members. The action of the censors was in this way 
 greatly restricted, although it was still their duty to fill 
 up all the vacancies which remained after the above- 
 mentioned officers had been placed on the senatorial roll. 
 Even in making this selection the censors were bound by 
 oath to choose all the best citizens. Moreover, usage, if 
 not law, seemed to have ordained that burgesses, who had 
 filled a non-curule office, or who were eminent for personal 
 valour, or who had saved the life of a fellow-citizen, should 
 be selected for the honour. Those thus chosen by the 
 censor voted, but took no part in debate, and thus were 
 senatores pedarii (cf. p. 45). The main part of the senate, 
 whose election was determined by the Ovinian law, and 
 not by the selection of the censors, and who held the reins 
 of government, were in this way indirectly elected by the 
 people. " The Roman government in this way made some 
 approach to, although it did not reach, the great institu- 
 tion of modern times, representative popular government, 
 while the aggregate of the non-debating senators furnished 
 — what it is so necessary, and yet so difficult to get in 
 governing corporations — a compact mass of members, 
 capable of forming and entitled to pronounce an opinion, 
 but voting in silence." No magistrate submitted a pro- 
 posal to the people without, or in opposition to, the senate's 
 opinion ; if he did so, the senate, by means of the vetoing 
 power of the magistrates and the annulling powers of the 
 priests, easily thwarted him ; and in extreme cases the 
 senate could refuse to execute the decrees of the people. 
 Through the presiding magistrate the senate practically 
 exerted a paramount influence on the elections, and, as 
 was shown above in the case of the consuls, bore no small 
 part in settling what was to be the special sphere of the 
 elected magistrates. Further, the senate acquired the 
 right, which by law belonged only to the community, of 
 extending the term of office to the consul or praetor, acting 
 outside the city's limits ; and the consul or praetor, whose 
 term was thus prolonged, was said to be acting " in a 
 consul's or praetor's stead " (pro consule, pro praetore). 
 From the year 307 B.C. the term of the commander-in- 
 chief was regularly prolonged by a mere decree of the 
 eenate. Finally, as regards administration, war, peace, 
 
74 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 and alliances, the founding of colonies, the assignation of 
 lands, and the whole system of finance, the senate became 
 practically supreme. Great as the powers entrusted to 
 the senate were, the senate proved fully worthy of the 
 trust. Although it is clear that the steps above described 
 arrested the free action of the burgesses, and reduced the 
 magistrates to mere executors of the senate s will, the 
 assembly, by its ability to govern, justified its usurpation 
 of power. Its members owed their position to merit and 
 the people's choice, not to birth ; those unworthy of their 
 high position were liable to removal by the censors every 
 fifth year. Their life-tenure of office freed them from the 
 necessity of trimming their sails to the shifting breeze of 
 public opinion, and gave them a complete control over the 
 executive magistrates, whose office annually changed 
 hands. This continuity of existence rendered possible a 
 firm, unwavering, and patriotic foreign policy; and never 
 was a state more firmly and worthily represented in its 
 external relations than Rome in its best times by its 
 senate. We cannot deny that, in matters of internal ad- 
 ministration, the senate too often favoured the selfish 
 interests of the moneyed and landed aristocracy, which 
 was largely represented in that body. But, when we 
 consider its conduct as a whole, we mnst allow that " the 
 Roman senate was the noblest organ of the nation, and in 
 consistency and political sagacity, in unanimity and pa- 
 triotism, in grasp of power, and unwavering courage, the 
 foremost political corporation of all times — still even now 
 "an assembly of kings," which knew well how to combine 
 despotic energy with republican self-devotion. 
 
 AUTHORITIES. 
 
 Lex Canuleia. — Liv. iv. 1-6. 
 
 Military tribunes cons. pot. — Liv. iv. 7, 12, 55. Dionys. ii. 60-63. 
 
 Momms. R. St. ii. 173-184. 
 Censorship. — Liv. iv. 8. Momms. R. St. ii. 319, sqq. 
 Quaestorship thrown open. — Liv. iv. 43. 
 Spurius Maelius. — Liv. iv. 13, 15. 
 Spurius Maecilius. — Liv. iv. 48. 
 Marcus Manlius. — Liv. vi. 11-20. 
 Veientine war. — Liv. iv. 60-v. 22. 
 
THE NEW ARISTOCRACY. 75 
 
 Licinio-Sextian laws. — Liv. vi. 35-42. Appian B. C. i. 8. Marq. Stv. 
 
 i. 101-104. 
 Praetor. — Liv. vi. 42 ; vii. 1. 
 
 Victories ofplebs.—Liv. vii. 17, 22; viii. 12, 15; ix. 6. Epit. 59. 
 Publilian laiu. — Liv. viii. 12. 
 Ogulnian law. — Liv. x. 6-9. 
 Law of Quintus Hortensius. — Pliny N. H. xvi. 10. Gell. xv. 27. 
 
 Gaius i. 3. 
 Laws of Appius Claudius and Quintus Rullianus. — Liv. ix. 46. 
 Genucian law. — Liv. vii. 42. 
 Papirian laws. — Liv. viii. 28. 
 Quinqueviri mensarii. — Liv. vii. 21. 
 Secession of plebs. — Liv. Epit. 11. 
 Com. tributa. — Liv. ii. 56. Dionys. vii. 59 ; ix. 41. Momms. E. St. 
 
 iii. 340, sqq. 
 Plebiscites limiting number of magistracies. — Liv. vii. 42. 
 Marcian law. — Pint. Coriol. i. Valer. Max. 4, 1. Liv. xxiii. 23. 
 Ovinian law. — Liv. xxiii. 23. Festus, 246. 
 
 Proconsul.— Liv. viii. 23 ; ix. 42 ; x. 22. Momms. R. St. i. 615-622. 
 On the difficulties connected with the Publilian and Hortensian laws, 
 
 cf. Strachan Davidson, Historical Review, p. 210, etc. 
 
7f BISTORT OF HOME. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 FALL OF THE ETRUSCAN POWER — THE CELTS. 
 
 Maritime supremacy of the allied Etruscans and Carthaginians — 
 Etruscan subjugation of and expulsion from Latium. Effects of 
 victories at Salamis and Himera — Rise of maritime power of 
 Tarentum and Syracuse — Wars between Rome and Veii ; 
 between Samnites and Campanian Etruscans — Character of the 
 Celts — Celtic migrations — Fall of Veii, 396 B.C. — Celtic attack 
 and capture of Rome — Effects of Celtic victory — Conquest of 
 South Etruria by Rome — Pacification of North Italy — Decline of 
 Etruria proper. 
 
 The last three chapters have been devoted to the internal 
 struggles of Rome, and their political results : we can 
 now turn to the external history both of Rome and of 
 Italy. Two notable events meet our eyes — firstly, the 
 collapse of the Etruscan power ; secondly, the incursions 
 of the Celts. The history of the rise of the Etruscans has 
 been given in the fifth chapter ; it is here resnmed. About 
 500 B.C. they had reached their zenith of prosperity. Allied 
 with the Carthaginians, who were absolute masters of 
 Sardinia, and had a firm foothold in Sicily, they ruled the 
 Etruscan and Adriatic seas. Although Massilia retained 
 her independence, the seaports of Campania and of the 
 Volscian land, and the island of Corsica, were in the 
 hands of the Etruscans. The possession of Latium, which 
 interposed a firm barrier between Etruria proper and the 
 Tuscan settlements in Campania, was naturally of the 
 ntmost importance ; and, for a short time, the conquest of 
 Rome by Lars Porsena in 507 B.C. seemed to open out a 
 prospect of the realization of Tuscan supremacy in Italy. 
 But the advance of the victorious Etruscans into Latium 
 
FALL OF THE ETRUSCAN POWER. 77 
 
 received a check beneath the walls of Aricia, from the 
 timely succour of the people of Cuma3 in 506 B.C. The 
 end of this war is unknown ; possibly the disgraceful 
 terms of the peace, which Rome had concluded with Lars 
 Porsena the previous year, were somewhat modified ; but, 
 for a time at least, Latium was in imminent danger of being 
 reduced to subjection by Etruscan arms. Fortunately, 
 however, for Rome, the main strength of the Etruscan 
 nation was diverted from Latium, and called to do battle 
 elsewhere ; while Veii and the neighbouring towns grappled 
 with Rome, the rest of the Etruscans were engaged in 
 another cause. 
 
 The arrest of Greek colonization by the combined 
 Etruscans and Carthaginians has been already described ; 
 a more deadly blow, on a far grander scale, if we may 
 believe tradition, threatened the whole Greek world. 
 The simultaneous defeat of the Persians at Salamis 
 and the Carthaginians at Himera by the rulers of Syra- 
 cuse and Agrigentum, Gelon and Theron, in 480 B.C., 
 utterly crushed the great combination of Persians, Cartha- 
 ginians, and Etruscans against liberty and civilization. 
 Six years later, the Cumaeans and Hiero of Syracuse 
 vanquished the Etruscan fleet off Cumae ; and the rise of 
 Syracuse to the chief power in Sicily, and of Tarentum to 
 the leading position in the south of Italy, put an end to 
 the maritime supremacy of both Etruscans and Cartha- 
 ginians. Syracuse in 453 B.C. ravaged the island of Corsica 
 and the Etrurian coast, and occupied Aethalia ; and later, 
 in 415 to 413 B.C., the Athenian expedition against Syracuse. 
 which received support from Etruscan galleys, ended in 
 ignominious failure, and left Syracuse free to turn on her 
 old enemy with redoubled vigour. Dionysius, who reigned 
 from 406 to 367 B.C., founded Syracusan colonies on the 
 Illyrian coast at Lissus and the island of Issa, and on 
 the eastern coast of Italy at the ports of Ancona, Numana, 
 and Hatria ; thus ousting the Etruscans from the Adriatic. 
 In addition to this, he captured, in 358 B.C., Pyrgi, the rich 
 seaport of Caere, a blow from which the Etruscans never 
 recovered. Later, too, when the death of Dionysius and 
 the ensuing political troubles of Syracuse opened the way 
 to Carthaginian arms, we find that the revival of maritime 
 supremacy by Carthage brought no similar revival to their 
 
78 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 old allies the Etruscans. On the contrary, the relations 
 between the two powers had become so strained, that in 
 310 B.C. Tuscan men-of-war assisted Agathocles of Syracuse 
 in his war against Carthage, and the old alliance was thus 
 severed. This rapid collapse of the naval power of the 
 Etruscans was due in great measure to the fact that, at 
 the same time that they were struggling with the Sicilian 
 Greeks by sea, they were assailed on all sides by foes on 
 land. During the period of the combination of Persians, 
 Carthaginians, and Etruscans, above alluded to, a bitter 
 war raged between Rome and Veii from 483 to 474 B.C. 
 This war is memorable for the extermination of the Fabian 
 clan at Cremera in 477 B.C., which clan, doubtless owing 
 to the party struggles, had voluntarily banished itself from 
 Rome, and undertaken the defence of the frontier. The 
 result of this war was so far favourable to Rome that 
 the Etruscans gave up Fidenae, and the district they had 
 won on the right bank of the Tiber Moreover, the 
 Samnites attacked the Etruscan settlements in Campania ; 
 Capua fell in 424 B.C., and the Etruscan population was 
 extirpated or expelled. But in northern Italy a new 
 nation was knocking at the gates of the Alps . it was the 
 Celts ; and the brunt of their inroad fell first upon the 
 Etruscans. 
 
 The character of the Celtic nation, their origin, and the 
 part they played in Italian history at this period, now 
 claim our attention. Nature, though she lavished upon 
 the Celts her most brilliant gifts, had denied them those 
 more solid and enduring qualities which lead to the 
 highest human development, alike in morality and politics. 
 The mainspring of their life and action was a boundless 
 vanity. Whether we regard their chivalrous feats of 
 bravery, their impetuous generosity, and ready acceptance 
 of new impressions, or their want of perseverance, hatred 
 of discipline and order, constant discord, love of ostenta- 
 tion, and extreme instability, — to all these many-sided 
 manifestations of the Celtic temperament egotism supplies 
 the key. They preferred a pastoral life to an agricultural, 
 and had none of that attachment to their native soil 
 which characterized the Italians and the Germans. Their 
 fondness for congregating in towns and villages did not 
 lead them to develop political constitutions. As a nation 
 
TEE CELTS. 79 
 
 they had little sense of unity ; their individual communities 
 were equally deficient in sincere patriotism, consistent 
 purpose, and united effort. Ever ready to rove, they were 
 the true soldiers-of -fortune of antiquity, and possessed 
 all the qualities of good soldiers, hut of bad citizens, — 
 qualities which explain the historical fact that the Celts 
 have shaken all states and founded none. "All their 
 enterprises melted away like snow in spring; and nowhere 
 did they create a great state, or develop a distinctive 
 culture of their own." Sprung from the same cradle as 
 the Hellenic, Italian, and Germanic peoples, the Celts at 
 a very early period settled in modern France ; from there 
 they crossed over to Britain in the north, and in the south 
 passed the Pyrenees, and contested the possession of Spain 
 with the Iberian tribes. Our history is immediately 
 concerned with their movements in the opposite direction, 
 when, leaving their homes in the West, they retraced their 
 steps and poured over the Alps in ceaseless streams. 
 Their hordes, on passing the Graian Alps (the little St. 
 Bernard), first formed the Celtic canton of the Insubres, 
 with Mediolanum (Milan) as its capital. The canton of 
 the Cenomani, with the towns of Brixia (Brescia) and 
 Verona, soon followed. The Ligurians were dislodged, and 
 the possessions of the Etruscans on the left bank of the 
 Po were soon wrested from their grasp ; Melpum fell, and 
 soon the invaders crossed the Po, and assailed the Etruscans 
 and Umbrians in their original home. The Boii, and later 
 the Senones, were the chief assailants in this quarter: 
 the former took the Etruscan town Felsina, and changed 
 its name to Bononia ; the latter settled along the Adriatic 
 coast from Rimini to Ancona. Isolated roving bands no 
 doubt reached the borders of Etruria proper, and about 
 the middle of the fourth century the Tuscan nation were 
 practically restricted to that land, which still bears their 
 name. About the year 426 B.C., the Etruscans were thus 
 engaged in war with three enemies : in the north with the 
 encroaching Celts ; in the south with the Samnites, who 
 had invaded Campania ; and with the Romans. A fresh 
 outbreak of hostilities between Rome and Veii was due to 
 the revolt of the people of Fidenae, who had murdered 
 the Roman envoys and called in the help of Lars Tolum- 
 nius, king of Veii. This king was slain by the corsul 
 
80 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 Aulus Cornelius Cossus, and the war ended favourably to 
 the Romans. After a truce, daring which the position of 
 Etruria grew moi'e and more critical, war broke out again 
 in 406 B.C. between Rome and Veii : the latter received 
 support from Capena and Falerii, but, owing to their 
 struggles with the Celts, and their dislike for the regal 
 form of government in Veii, the Etruscan nation as a 
 whole gave no aid to the hard-pressed Veientines. The 
 city fell in 396 B.C., and was destroyed by the triumphant 
 Romans, to whom the heroism of Marcus Furius Camillus 
 had first opened up the brilliant and perilous career of 
 foreign conquest. Tradition tells us that Melpum and 
 Veii fell on the same day ; whether this be so or not, 
 " the double assault from the north and the south, and 
 the fall of the two frontier strongholds, were the beginning 
 of the end of the great Etruscan nation." For a momeut, 
 however, it seemed as if the folly of Rome was destined 
 to turn aside from the head of the Etruscans the sword of 
 the foreign barbarian. In 391 B.C., Clusium, situated in 
 the heart of Etruria, was hard pressed by the Celtic 
 Senones ; so low was Tuscan pride, that Clusium begged 
 aid from the destroyers of Veii. Rome, however, in place 
 of substantial help, despatched envoys, who attempted to 
 impose on the Celts by haughty language ; when this 
 failed, the envoys violated the law of nations by fighting 
 in the ranks of the men of Clusium. To the demand of 
 the barbarians for the surrender of these envoys the 
 Romans refused to listen. Then the Brennus, or king of 
 the Gallic host, abandoned the siege of Clusium, and turned 
 against Rome. The battle of the Allia in 390 B.C., and 
 the capture and destruction of Rome, taught the Romans 
 a bitter lesson. The horrors of this catastrophe, the 
 burning of the city, the saving of the Capitol by the 
 sacred geese and the brave Marcus Manlius, the scornful 
 throwing down into the scale of the Gallic sword, have 
 left a lasting impression on the imagination of posterity ; 
 but the victory of the Gauls had no permanent conse- 
 quences — nay, it only served to knit more closely the ties 
 of union between Latium and rebuilt Rome. The Gauls 
 often returned to Latium during this century. Camillus, 
 indeed, crowned his great career by defeating them at 
 Alba in 367 B.C. ; the dictator Gaius Sulpicius Peticus 
 
THE CELTS. 81 
 
 routed a Gallic host in 358 B.C., and, eight years later, 
 Lucius Furius Camillus, the son of the celebrated general, 
 dislodged the Gauls from the Alban mount, where they 
 had encamped during the winter. But these plundering 
 incursions only served to make all Italy regard Rome as 
 the bulwark against the barbarians, and thus to further 
 her claim, not only to supremacy in Italy, but also to 
 universal empire. The Etruscans had attempted to recover 
 what they had lost in the Veientine war, while the Celts 
 were assailing Rome. When the barbarians had departed, 
 Rome turned once more on her old enemy. The whole of 
 southern Etruria, as far as the Ciminian range, passed 
 into Roman hands, and the advanced frontier line was 
 secured by the fortresses of Sutrium and Nepete, estab- 
 lished respectively in 383 and 373 B.C. Moreover, four 
 new tribes were formed in the territories of Veii, Capena, 
 and Falerii, in 387 B.C., and the whole country became 
 rapidly Romanized. A revolt of Tarquinii, Falerii, and 
 Caere, about 358 B.C., against Roman aggression was soon 
 crushed; and Caere had to cede half its territory, and 
 withdraw from the Etruscan league. The relation of 
 political subjection in which Caere stood to Rome was 
 called " citizenship without the power of voting" (civitas 
 sine suffragio) ; thus the state lost its freedom, but could 
 still administer its own affairs. This occurred in 351 B.C.; 
 and eight years later Falerii withdrew from the Etruscan 
 league, and became a perpetual ally of Rome. Thus the 
 whole of southern Etruria became subject to Roman 
 supremacy. 
 
 Gradually the conflicts in northern Italy ceased, and 
 the various nations settled side by side within more 
 defined limits. The stream of Celtic immigrations over 
 the Alps flowed back ; whether from the desperate efforts 
 of the Etruscans, and the strong barrier of the Romans, 
 or from some causes operating On the other side of 
 the Alps, we cannot determine. In a general way the 
 Celts now rulel between the Alps and the Apennines, 
 and as far south as the Abruzzi : but their dominion did 
 not sink deep into the land, nor had it the character of 
 exclusive possession. It is certain that the Etruscans 
 still remained in the modern Grisons and Tyrol, the 
 Umbrians in the Apennine valleys, the Veneti in the 
 
 6 
 
82 HISTORY OF BOMS. 
 
 north-eastern valley of the Po, and the Ligurian tribes in 
 the western mountains, dividing Celt-land proper from 
 Etruria. Even in the flat country occupied by the Celts 
 Etruscan settlements still existed. Mantua was a Tuscan 
 city even in the days of the empire, as also was Hatria 
 on the Po , and Etruscan corsairs still rendered the 
 Adriatic unsafe far on into the fifth century. Further, 
 although mere fragments of the former supremacy of the 
 Etruscans were now left in these districts, such civilization 
 as we find among the Celts and Alpine peoples was due to 
 Tuscan influence. To this we must ascribe the fact that 
 the Celts in the plains of Lombardy abandoned their 
 roving warrior-life, and permanently settled in that district. 
 But the Etruscan nation was now hemmed in on all sides. 
 Its possessions in Campania, and in the district north of 
 the Apennines and south of the Ciminian forest, were lost 
 for ever — its day of power had passed away. Socially 
 and politically the whole nation had completely degene- 
 rated. Unbounded luxury and gross immorality had eaten 
 out the heart of the people. Gladiatorial combats first 
 came into vogue among the Etruscans ; sensual indulgence 
 of every sort sapped the nation's vigour. The abolition 
 of royalty, which had been carried out in every city about 
 the time of the siege of Veii, introduced the worst form 
 of aristocratic government. The federal bond had always 
 exercised but little restraint ; now the abuse of power by 
 the nobles caused social revolution and bitter distress. 
 When the aristocrats of Arretium in 301 B.C., and of 
 Volsinii in 266 B.C., called in the Romans to put an end 
 to the disorder, the Romans answered the call-in such a 
 way as to extinguish the lingering sparks of independence. 
 " The energies of the nation were broken from the day of 
 Veii and of Melpum. Earnest attempts were still once or 
 twice made to escape from the Roman supremacy, but in 
 these instances tbe stimulus was communicated to the 
 Etruscans from without — from another Italian stock, the 
 Samnites." 
 
THE CELTS. 
 
 AUTHORITIES. 
 
 Himera.— Plut. Camill. 138. Timol. 23. 
 
 Dionysius and Agathocles. — Polyb. i. 6, 7, 82 ; ii. 39 ; viii. 12 ; ix. 23 ; 
 
 xii. 4, 10, 15 ; xv. 35. 
 Capua taken by Samnites. — Liv. iv. 37. 
 Celts.— Polyb. "ii. 17-22, 32-35; iii. 70, 79. Liv. v. 33-55. Dionys. 
 
 xiii. 6-12. 
 Defeats of Celts.— Liv. vi. 42 ; vii. 12-15, 25-26. 
 Conquest of South Etruria. — Liv. vi. 3-10. Dionys. xii. 10-15. 
 Revolt of Caere. — Liv. vii. 17-20, 38. 
 Arretiwm. — Liv. viii. 3-5. 
 MeVpum.— Pbn. N. H. iii. V, 
 
84 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 ADVANCE OF ROME TO THE SUPREME POWER IN ITALY. 
 
 Encroachment on the rights of the Latins by Rome — Extension of 
 Roman and Latin territory by wars with the Sabines, Aequi, and 
 Volsci — League with the Heinici — Revolt of Latin towns against 
 Rome — Closing of the Latin confederation — Practical subjection 
 ofLatium — Early history of the Umbro-Sabellian migrations— 
 The Samnites — Their political development and conquests in 
 southern Italy — Their relations with the Greeks — The Cam- 
 panian Samnites — Samnium proper — First collision with Rome 
 — Revolt of the Latins and Campanians against Rome — Battle of 
 Trifanum, 340 B.C. — Its effects — Outbreak of thirty-seven years' 
 war between Samnium and Rome — Part played by Tarentum, 
 the Etruscans, central Italy, and the Gauls — Battles of Sentinum 
 and Aquilonia — Complete triumph of Rome. 
 
 We have now reached a turning-point in the fortunes 
 of Rome. In the last chapter it was shown that she had 
 abandoned her old defensive attitude towards Etruria, 
 and had succeeded in annexing the southern portion of 
 that country, and in repelling the restless Celtic hordes. 
 Her next foes are no longer foreign intruders, but men 
 of her own stock, or of Italian race. 
 
 We may briefly summarize the steps by which Rome 
 became mistress of Italy as follows : (1) The subjuga- 
 tion of the Latins and Campanians. (2) The gallant 
 struggles of the Samnites, both on their own behalf and 
 on behalf of the rest of the still independent Italians. (3) 
 The invasion and defeat of Pyrrhus. With regard to the 
 first point, we must for a moment revert to the old posi- 
 tion of Rome in Latium, as exercising a hegemony, based 
 upon complete equality between the Roman state on the 
 
ROMAN ADVANCE IN ITALY. 85 
 
 one hand and the Latin confederacy on the other. That 
 these relations were violently shaken by the abolition of 
 the monarchy at Rome we know from tradition, which 
 has painted in glowing colours the victory at Lake 
 Regillus, gained by the Romans about 499 B.C. More 
 certain proof is afforded by the renewal of the perpetual 
 league between Rome and Latium by Spurius Cassius 
 six years later. At what time the rest of Latium fol- 
 lowed Rome's lead and abolished the regal power we do 
 not know, but probably this took place at an early period. 
 Although we are without definite information on each 
 point, it is easy to understand how the basis of equal 
 rights soon became impracticable ; how Rome not only 
 bore the brunt of most of the wars, but also naturally 
 appropriated the substantial fruits of the victories ; how 
 she not only decided the question of war or peace, but 
 practically appointed from her own body the federal 
 generals and chief officers, and assumed the direction of 
 every campaign, and how in founding colonies she supplied 
 most of the colonists. Although the public rights of the 
 federal Latins were thus encroached upon, their private 
 rights remained the same. To whatever federal town a 
 Latin migrated, he was a passive burgess (municeps), 
 could hold property, marry, make wills ; and, though not 
 eligible for office, he shared in all other political rights 
 and duties, and could vote in the comitia tributa, if not 
 in the other assemblies. Long before the allied Latins 
 dared to penetrate Etruria, they successfully extended 
 their power towards the east and south. The Sabines 
 between the Tiber and Anio offered but a feeble resistance 
 to the confederate arms, possibly owing to the fact that 
 the Sabine hordes were pouring into lower Italy. It was 
 not even found necessary to plant colonies in this Sabine 
 land to keep it in subjection. Their neighbours, the 
 Aequi, on the upper Anio, and the Volscians on the coast, 
 proved far tougher foes. In their constant struggles with 
 these two peoples, the Romans and Latins made it their 
 chief aim to sever the Aequi from the Volsci. This object 
 they partly obtained by planting Latin colonies at Cora, 
 Norba, and Signia, about 495 B.C., and still more by form- 
 ing a league with the Hernici in 486 B.C. ; the accession 
 of this state isolated the Volscians, and formed a bulwark 
 
86 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 against the Sabellian tribes on the south and east. The 
 power of the Aequi was thus broken, but it was not till 
 the system uf fortresses or colonies had been extended 
 throughout the Volscian land that the Volsci ceased to 
 resist. Chief among these colonies were Velitrae, founded 
 in 49 i B.C., Suessa Pometia and Ardea in 442 B.C., Circeii in 
 393 B.C. ; and Bnally, after two great victories, won by the 
 dictator Camillus in 389 B.C., and the dictator Aulus Cor- 
 nelius Cossus in 385 B.C., the Pomptine territory was secured 
 by the founding of the fortresses Satricum in 385 B.C., and 
 Setia in 382 B.C., and the territory itself was distributed 
 into farm allotments and tribes about 383 B.C. These suc- 
 cesses of the league, which now embraced Rome, Latium, 
 and the Hernici, only rendered it more liable to disunion. 
 The allies felt all the more acutely the overshadowing 
 burden of Rome's inci'eased power, and were naturally 
 indignant at her overbearing acts of injustice. A glaring 
 instance of wrong was the appropriation by Rome of a 
 border territory between the lands of the people of Aricia 
 and Ardea, to which both cities laid claim, and had called 
 in Rome to act as arbiter in 446 B.C. Dissensions, owing 
 to this, arose in Ardea between the aristocratic party, 
 which held to Rome, and the popular party, which sided 
 with the Volscians. The chief cause of the disruption 
 of the league was the absence of a common foe. The 
 capture of Rome by the Celts, and the appropriation by 
 Rome of the Pomptine territory caused the most famous 
 Latin towns to break off from their alliance. Separate 
 wars, in consequence, occurred with the revolted towns — 
 with Lanuvium, 383 B.C. ; Praeneste, 382-380 B.C. ; and 
 Tusculum, 381 B.C. The latter was reduced to the posi- 
 tion of a municipality (municipium), and was incor- 
 porated in the Roman state with the full rights of Roman 
 citizenship, retaining certain powers of self-government. 
 This was the first instance of a municipium in its later 
 sense. In addition to these towns, Tibur, in 360 B.C., and 
 some of the colonies planted in Volscian land, such as 
 Velitrae and Circeii and Satricum, all revolted from 
 Rome ; and Tibur even made common cause with the again 
 advancing Celtic hordes, whom the dictator Ahala de- 
 feated in 360 B.C. But, owing to the want of concert 
 between the various Latin cities, Rome subdued each 
 
ROMAN ADVANCE IN ITALY. 87 
 
 separately, and also proved victorious in the later and 
 severer struggle with her allies, the Hernicans, from 362- 
 358 B.C. In the latter year, the treaty between Rome and 
 the Latins and Hernicans was renewed, but the terms were 
 doubtless greatly to Rome's advantage. 
 
 To this period must be referred the closing of the Latin 
 confederation, which took place about 384 B.C. Probably 
 this was in no small degree the cause of the revolt of 
 Latium above described. The league, as now constituted, 
 included thirty towns with full Latin rights, some of 
 which were old Latin towns, viz. Nomentum, between the 
 Tiber and Anio ; Tibur, Gabii, Scaptia, Labici, Pedum 
 and Praeneste, between the Anio and the Alban hills ; 
 Corbio, Tusculum, Bovillae, Aricia, Corioli, and Lanuvium, 
 on the Alban range ; and lastly, Laurentum and Lavinium 
 in the plain by the coast. In addition, there were the 
 colonies founded by Rome and the Latin league, viz. 
 Ardea in the territory of the Rutuli, and Velitrae, Satri- 
 cum, Cora, Norba, Setia, and Circeii in what had been 
 Volscian territory. A second class of seventeen towns, 
 whose names are not known, had no right of voting, but 
 shared in the Latin festival. Such communities as were 
 subsequently founded, e.g. Sutrium, Nepete, Cales, and 
 Tarracina, were not incorporated in the league ; nor were 
 those communities whose independence was afterwards 
 taken away, such as Tusculum and Satricum, erased from 
 the list. The geographical limits of Latium were fixed 
 by the closing o'" the league. Moreover, in the case of all 
 Latin communities subsequently founded, right of com- 
 merce and marriage was granted to them only in relation 
 to Rome ; they could not enjoy the interchange of these 
 privileges with any other Latin community. Further, all 
 special leagues between Latin communities, irrespective 
 of Rome, were for the future prevented, as being dan- 
 gerous to Rome's pre-eminence. Owing also to Rome's 
 influence, aediles were created in the Latin communities, 
 and their constitutions were remodelled on the Roman 
 pattern. After the fall of Veii and the conquest of the 
 Pomptine land, Rome tightened the reins of government 
 over the practically subject Latins ; and the exasperation 
 arising therefrom caused Latin volunteers to join foreign 
 foes in their conflicts with Rome; and, in 349 B.C., the 
 
88 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 Latin league refused the Romans its regular contingent* 
 The defeat of the Aurunci and the capture of Sora 
 in 345 B.C. had advanced Roman arms to the Liris. 
 Thus Rome was brought into contact with the Samnites, 
 and the struggle with this brave people now claims our 
 attention. Before, however, we give the details of this 
 conflict, we must revert to the early movements of the 
 Umbro-Sabellian stocks. 
 
 With regard to the Umbrians and their movements 
 our information is of the most meagre kind. They 
 probably migrated into Italy at a later period than 
 the Latins, and, while moving south, kept in the centre 
 of the peninsula and along the east coast. At a remote 
 period they occupied the greater part of northern Italy; 
 and the Italian names of towns in the valley of the Po, 
 e.g. Hatria and Spina, and of other places in southern 
 Etruria, e.g. Camars, the old name of Clusium, the river 
 Umbro, etc., point to the fact that an Italian population 
 preceded the Etruscan alike in the valleys of the Po 
 and in southern Etruria (cf. p. 31). Inscriptions found 
 in the district of Falerii indicate that an Italian lan- 
 guage long kept its hold in that town — an inference 
 which is supported by the statement of Strabo, and 
 the religious ceremonies of Falerii point in the same 
 direction. The probability that an Umbrian population 
 existed in southern Etruria after the Tuscan conquest is 
 supported by the remarkable rapidity with which that 
 part of Etruria became Latinized (cf. pp. 32 and 81). 
 The pressure exerted on the Umbrians by the victorious 
 Etruscans confined them in the narrow mountainous 
 country between the two arms of the Apennines, which 
 was called by their name, and also drove them south 
 along the mountainous ridges, as the plains were already 
 occupied by the Latins. The absorption of a Sabellian 
 element in the Roman community at an early period 
 (p. 10) marks the fact that during the progress south- 
 ward of the Umbro-Sabellian stocks such mixtnres often 
 took place ; and we infer from this circumstance, and 
 from the ease with which Sabina became Latinized, and 
 from the numerous relations between the Volscians and 
 Latins, that in remote times the Latins and Umbro-Sabel- 
 lians w r ere not markedly distinct in language and customs. 
 
ROMAN ADVANCE IN ITALY. 89 
 
 But the chief branch of the Umhrian stcck turned east- 
 ward from Sabina into the mountains of the Abruzzi and 
 the adjacent hill-country to the south. Owing to external 
 pressure the Sabines are said to have vowed a ver sacrum, 
 which oath bound all the children born in a particular 
 year of war to emigrate as soon as they reached maturity. 
 Owing to this the Safini, or Samnites, went forth from 
 the Sabine land, and settled first on the mountains near 
 the river Sagrus, and later in the plain on the east of the 
 Matese chain, near the sources of the Tifernus. The sign 
 that led them was the Ox of Mars, and in consequence 
 they named both the places of their public assembly 
 Bovianum. The Samnites were followed by other tribes : 
 the Picentes, who occupied the district near Ancona, and 
 the Hirpini, who settled near Beneventum. Smaller tribes 
 also branched off, among wdiom were the Frentani on the 
 Apulian frontier, the Paeligni near the Majella mountains, 
 and the Marsi about lake Fucinus. Their secluded and 
 isolated position in mountain valleys and steep table-lands 
 not only protected these settlers from external assaults, 
 but also rendered all internal intercourse, whether com- 
 mercial or political, very difficult. Thus their communi- 
 ties never formed a single state, nor were their leagues 
 ever closely knit together. Cut off from the rest of Italy 
 and communicating but little with one another, despite 
 their bravery, " they exercised less influence than any 
 other portion of the Italian nation on the development of 
 the history of the peninsula." But the Samnites were an 
 exception to the other Sabellian tribes in their genius for 
 political development. The subsequent strength of the 
 Samnite nation proves that their league was of long 
 standing, though as to its formation we have no know- 
 ledge. No one community preponderated as Rome did in 
 Latium, and no one town served as a centre. The healthy 
 life of the Samnite nation of husbandmen was its strength ; 
 their assembly of representatives appointed in time of need 
 a federal commander-in-chief. The policy they pursued 
 was the exact opposite of that of Rome. They were con- 
 tent with the defence of their territory, and rarely sought 
 to enlarge it ; any new lands gained were the result of 
 adventurous bands who left their homes in search of 
 plunder, and were left to their own resources by their 
 
90 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 native state. Thus their gains were not direct gains to 
 the Samnite nation, while Rome secured every success by 
 a system of colonization. The movements of the Samnites 
 had hitherto been pai'tly checked by the Dannians, whose 
 town of Arpi had attained no small degree of prosperity 
 and power, but still more by the Greeks and Etruscms. 
 The rapid collapse of the Etruscans, and the decline of 
 the Greek colonies from 450-350 B.C., left them free to 
 march west and south. We have already narrated their 
 capture of Capua in 424 B.C. (cf. p. 78) ; four years later 
 they dealt a fatal blow to the Campanian Greeks by taking 
 Cumae. It is about this time that another Samnite stock, 
 called Lucanians, made its appearance in southern Italy. 
 The Lucanians proved too powerful for the demoralized 
 Greeks ; and, despite the united efforts of the chief Achaean 
 cities, who reconstructed their league in 393 B.C., in a very 
 short time but few Greek towns remained. Their speedy 
 downfall was due in great measure to the fact that 
 Dionysius the elder, of Syracuse., sided with the Lucanians 
 against his countrymen. Even Tarentum, powerful and 
 warlike as she was, was forced to turn for aid to her 
 mother country. Thus, at the period when Rome began 
 to advance southward, the Samnites and their kinsfolk 
 the Lucanians and Bruttians had practically swept over 
 the whole of southern Italy. Isolated Greek towns con- 
 tinued to exist, such as Tarentum, Thurii, Croton, Meta- 
 pontum, Heraclea, Rhegium, and Neapolis ; some of these 
 retained their independence. Other Greek cities, such as 
 Cumae, Posidonia, Laus, and Hipponium, were under 
 Samnite rule. In this way mixed populations arose ; this 
 was specially the case with the bilingual Bruttii, and in a 
 lesser degree with the Samnites in Lucaniaand Campania. 
 The very extent of the Samnite conquests, owing to the 
 want of a settled policy, and of some bond by which the 
 Lucanians, Bruttians, and Samnites proper might be 
 closely united, proved a source of weakness rather than 
 strength. The space they occupied was out of proportion 
 to their numbers, and the hold they exercised over their 
 possessions was loose and insecure. Moreover, Greek 
 culture exercised a fatal influence on the Samnite nation. 
 Thus in Campania the Samnite population of Capua, Nola, 
 Nuceria, and Teanum adopted Greek manners, and a 
 
ROMAN ADVANCE IN ITALY. 91 
 
 Greek form (if constitution. Capua became notorious for 
 its wealth and luxury, for its gladiatorial combats, and its 
 warlike, if dissolute, youth ; whose plundering excursions 
 to Sicily and other places had no small effect on the 
 history of Italy. The Campanian Samnites — especially in 
 Capua, where Etruscan influences still lingered — thus com- 
 pletely changed their old habits of life ; and, though they 
 did not lose their love of enterprise and bravery, they were 
 nnable to resist the demoralizing influences with which 
 they were there sm»rounded. The same result in a lesser 
 degree is ebservable in the Lucanians and Bruttians. 
 Treasures of Greek art have been discovered in their 
 tombs, and they abandoned their old national mode of 
 writing for that of the Greeks. The stock inhabiting 
 Samnium proper alone retained its old character, and was 
 free from all the debasing effects of a superior but immoral 
 civilization. The Hellenized Samnites of Campania soon 
 learned to fear their hardier and purer kinsmen in Sam- 
 nium, who, pouring down from their mountain strong- 
 holds, ravaged the rich plains of their weaker brethren. 
 Roman interference sprung from this very cause. The 
 Sidicini in Teanum, and the Campanians in Capua, called 
 in Rome to protect them against the Samnites in 343 B.C. 
 When Rome at first refused, the Campanians offered to 
 submit to Roman supremacy ; this offer was too tempting 
 to be rejected. Rome and Samnium, whether after a 
 campaign or not is doubtful, came to terms ; Capua was 
 left under Roman, and Teanum under Samnite sway, and 
 the upper Liris was left in Volscian hands. Both sides 
 were glad to lay down arms — the Samnites, because 
 Tarentum was threatening her Sabellian neighbours ; the 
 Romans, because a fresh storm was brewing in Latium. 
 The old grievances of the Latin towns were aggravated 
 by the prospect of Roman rule extending to the south of 
 them, and once more they broke into open revolt. All 
 the original Latin communities, except the Laurentes, 
 took up arms against Rome ; but all the Roman colonies 
 in Latium, except Velitrae, remained firm to the Roman 
 side. Capua seized the opportunity to get rid of Roman 
 rule, and other Campanian cities joined the revolted 
 Latins. The Volscians also felt that still another chance 
 was given them of recovering their liberty ; but the 
 
92 EISTOET OF ROME. 
 
 Hernici and the Campanian aristocracy did not unite with 
 the insurgents. The battle of Trifanum in 340 B.C., gained 
 by Titus Manilas Torquatus over the joint forces of the 
 Latins and Campanians, broke the neck of the rebellion. 
 The old Latin league was dissolved in 338 B.C., and was 
 changed from a political federation into a mere association 
 for religious purposes. The Latin communities were 
 isolated from one another by the application to the whole 
 of Latium of the principle which was introduced in the 
 case of those colonies founded after the closing of the 
 Latin league in 384 B.C. (cf. p. 87). Moreover, each com- 
 munity had to form a separate alliance with Rome, as the 
 old confederacy no longer existed. In certain cases harsh 
 measures were adopted. Tibur and Praeneste had to give 
 up part of their territory to Rome. Colonists Avere sent 
 to Antium, the most important and strongest town of the 
 Volscians ; and the town was treated as Tusculum had 
 been in 381 B.C. (cf. p. 86). Lanuvium, Pedum, Aricia, 
 and Nomentum also lost their independence and became 
 Roman municipia. Velitrae lost its walls, and its senate 
 was deported to the interior of South Etruria, while the 
 town was probably treated as Caere had been in 351 B.C. 
 (cf. p. 81). The land thus acquired by Rome was partly 
 distributed among Roman citizens, and two new tribes 
 were instituted in 332 B.C., thus bringing the total up to 
 twenty-nine. The decoration of the orators' platform in 
 the Forum with the beaks of the galleys of Antium by the 
 dictator Gaius Maenius, in 338 B.C., and the erection of a 
 column in the Forum to his honour, attested the Roman 
 sense of the great results achieved by this war. Roman 
 rule was secured in similar fashion in the Volscian and 
 Campanian provinces. A number of towns, among which 
 were Capua, Fundi, Formiae,and Cumae, became dependent 
 on Rome in the same way that Caere was. Privernum, 
 under Vitruvius Vaccus, struck the last blow for Latin 
 freedom ; but in 329 B.C. the town was stormed, and its 
 leader executed. About ten years later, two new tribes 
 were formed out of the numerous settlers planted in the 
 Falernian and Privernate territories. The two strong 
 colonies of Cales, in the middle of the Campanian plain, 
 and Fregellae, commanding the passage of the Liris, finally 
 secured the newly won land. These were founded in 
 
ROMAN ADVANCE IN ITALY. 93 
 
 334 and 328 B.C. respectively. The Romans even estab- 
 lished a garrison in Sora, which properly belonged to 
 Samnite territory. This steady pursuit of a far-reaching 
 policy of colonization secured to Rome what she won on 
 the field of battle, and contrasts strongly with the un- 
 steady violence and loose grasp of the Samnite nation. 
 It is clear that the Samnites must have been alarmed at 
 the advance of the Romans, but with the exception of 
 garrisoning Teanum they did little to prevent it. " The 
 Samnite confederacy allowed the Roman conquest of 
 Campania to be completed, before they in earnest opposed 
 it ; and the reason for their doing so is to be sought partly 
 in the contemporary hostilities between the Samnite nation 
 and the Italian Hellenes, but principally in the remiss and 
 distracted policy which the confederacy pursued." 
 
 While Rome had been securing her hold in the centre 
 of Italy, the Samnite tribes of the Lucanians and Bruttians 
 had been engaged in constant struggles with the Italian 
 Greeks in the south, and especially with Tarentum. So 
 hard pressed was the latter city that she called in the aid 
 of the Spartan king, Archidamus, who was defeated by 
 the Lucanians on the same day as Philip conquered at 
 Chaeronea, in 338 B.C. Alexander, the Molossian, uncle 
 of Alexander the Great, proved far more successful in his 
 championship of the Greek cause in southern Italy. Not 
 only did he capture Consentia, the centre of the Lucanians 
 and their confederates, but he defeated the Samnites who 
 brought aid to the Lucanians, and subdued the Daunians 
 and Messapians who had made common cause with the 
 Sabellian tribes against the Greeks. His successes, how- 
 ever, alarmed the Tarentines, who turned against their 
 commander ; and his scheme of founding a new Hellenic 
 empire in the West was cut short by the hand of an 
 assassin in 332 B.C. His death left the Lucanians and 
 other Sabellian tribes again paramount in the south of 
 Italy, and destroyed all hopes of a combined resistance 
 from the Greek cities. 
 
 We have already shown that war was sooner or later 
 unavoidable between Rome and the Samnites, as the latter 
 were the only power capable of disputing with Rome the 
 supremacy of Italy. Had the Samnites been able to count 
 on the active co-operation of all Sabellian tribes, of the 
 
94 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 Lucanians and Bruttians, as well as of the smaller cantons, 
 such as the Vestini, Frentani and Marrucini, — had they, 
 further, been able to persuade the Greeks of Campania and 
 of southern Italy to sink minor differences in the face of a 
 common danger, — had they been able to rouse at once the 
 Etruscans in the north, and the still chafing and indignant 
 Latins, Volscians, and Hernicans, Rome might no doubt 
 have succumbed. But such combinations belong rather 
 to the imagination of the historian than to the facts of 
 history. The immediate cause of the outbreak of war lay 
 in the two independent Greek cities of Campania, Palaeo- 
 polis and Neapolis. Rome was scheming to obtain posses- 
 sion of these towns, and the Samnites combined with 
 the Tarentines to prevent them. A strong garrison was 
 placed in Palaeopolis by the Samnites. The Romans laid 
 siege to the town ; and thus war began, nominally against 
 the people of Palaeopolis, really against the Samnites, in 
 327 B.C. Palaeopolis, weary alike of the foes without and 
 the Samnite garrison within, got rid of the latter by 
 stratagem, and concluded peace with Rome on the most 
 favourable conditions in the following year. The Cara- 
 panian Greeks generally followed the example of Palaeo- 
 polis, and held to the Roman side ; and Rome still further 
 attained her object of isolating Samnium, by detaching 
 the Sabellian towns to the south of the Volturnus — Nola, 
 Nuceria, Herculaneum, and Pompeii — through the influence 
 of the aristocratic party in those cities. By the same means 
 Rome secured an alliance with the Lucanians, who were 
 the natural allies of the Samnites. This alliance was of 
 great importance, as it left Rome free to turn all her 
 attention to Samnium, while the Samnite ally, Tarentum, 
 was occupied with guarding herself against Lucanian 
 inroads. 
 
 It is not necessary to recount in detail all the events of 
 this war, which lasted seven and thirty years. The isolated 
 position of the Samnites, the disasters that befell them 
 in quick succession, the humble request they made for 
 peace in 322 B.C., the rejection of the same by the Romans; 
 the desperate resistance and brief success of Samnite 
 arms at the Caudine Pass, under the brave Gavius Pontius, 
 in 321 B.C. ; the refusal of the senate to recognize the agree- 
 ment made by the defeated generals, mark the first period 
 
ROMAN ADVANCE IN ITALY. 95 
 
 of the war. When it was renewed, the Samnites occupied 
 Luceria in Apulia, the attempt to relieve which town had 
 caused the Romans the disaster in the pass of Candium ; 
 and they captured Fregellae, aud gained over the Satricans. 
 Lucius Papirius Cursor now was placed in command of 
 the Roman forces, which divided, part marching by Sabina 
 and the Adriatic coast, part proceeding through Samnium. 
 They united again before the walls of Luceria, and took 
 the town in 319 B.C., having received no small assistance 
 from the people of Arpi and other Apulians. Roman 
 successes followed this important capture, and Satricum 
 was recovered and severely punished. For a moment, 
 indeed, fortune deluded the Samnites with hopes of 
 victory. The frontier towns of Nuceria and Nola sided 
 with them. Sora, on the upper Liris, expelled the Roman 
 garrison. The Ausonians on the coast and at the mouth 
 of the Liris threatened to rise, and the Samnite party in 
 Capua began to bestir itself. But the recapture of Sora 
 in 314 B.C., the cruel suppression of the Ausonian revolt, 
 the execution or voluntary death of the leaders of the 
 Saranite party in Capua, the defeat of the Samnite army 
 before the walls of that city, the treaty with Nola which 
 detached that city for ever from the Samnites in 313 B.C., 
 and the fall of Fregellae in the same year, turned the tide 
 of war once more in Rome's favour, and placed Apulia 
 and Campania in her hands. Her position was secured 
 by the usual process of founding new fortresses ; e.g. 
 Luceria in Apulia, Saticula on the frontier of Campania 
 and Samnium, Interamna and Suessa Aurunca on the road 
 from Rome to Capua. Appius Claudius, the censor, com- 
 pleted in 313 B.C. the great military road from Rome to 
 Capua, across the Pomptine marshes. Thus by roads and 
 fortresses Samnium was now cut off, and the ultimate 
 object of the subjugation of Italy was within Rome's 
 grasp. The close of the second period of the war ex- 
 hibits to us an attempt at that coalition which at the 
 outset might have rescued Italy. Tarentum, indeed, 
 practically continued an inactive spectator of the con- 
 test ; with childish arrogance its rulers had. in 320 B.C., 
 ordered the Roman and Samnite armies in Apulia to lay 
 down their arms ; but, when Rome refused, Tarentum 
 lacked the courage and sense of honour to declare war. 
 
96 HISTORY OF ROME 
 
 Towards the close of the war she once more invoked 
 Greek aid against the Lucanians, and the Spartan prince 
 Cleonymus succeeded in compelling the latter to make 
 peace with Tarentum ; but he did not dare to enter 
 on the more perilous course of actively siding with the 
 Samnites against Rome. But in the north and centre of 
 Italy the ignoble example of Tarentum found no imitators. 
 The Etruscans in 311 B.C. made one more fiery effort for 
 freedom, and for two years the Roman frontier-fortress of 
 Sutrinm was hotly besieged. But all was in vain ; in 
 310 B.C. Quintus Fabius Rullianus penetrated for the first 
 time Etruria proper, marching through the Ciminian 
 forest, and at the Vadimonian lake crushed the roused 
 Etruscans. The three most powerful towns, Perusia, 
 Cortona, and Arretium, made peace with Rome ; and two 
 years later, after another defe it, Tarquinii followed their 
 example; and the Etruscans laid down their arms. Mean- 
 while the Samnites abated not their exertions ; but their 
 hopes, based on Etruscan aid, were rudely dashed to the 
 ground by the terrible battle in 309 B.C., in which the 
 very flower of their army — the wearers of striped tunics 
 and golden shields, and the wearers of white tunics and 
 silver shields — was extirpated by Lucius Papirius Cursor. 
 Too late to save them came the allied forces of the Urn- 
 brians, the Marsi, and Paeligni, and, later, the Hernicans, 
 who all rose against Rome, — too late, for the Etruscans 
 had already cowered back into inaction. The first three 
 peoples were soon mastered by Roman arms ; but for a 
 moment the rising of the Hernicans in the rear of the 
 Roman army threatened destruction. But Anagnia, the 
 chief Hernican city, fell ; and two consular armies pene- 
 trated the fastnesses of Samnium, and took the Samnian 
 capital, Bovianum, by storm in 305 B.C. A brief peace, 
 on moderate terms, ensued, not only with Samnium, but 
 with all the Sa,bellian tribes ; and about the same time, 
 owing to the withdrawal of the Spartan Cleonymus to 
 Corcyra, Tarentum, whose part in the contest we have 
 already described, came to formal terms with Rome. 
 
 Rome lost no time in turning her victory to good 
 account. In the first place, she dissolved the Hernican 
 league, and punished those communities which had re- 
 volted, by taking away their autonomy and giving them 
 
ROMAIC ADVANCE IN ITALY. 97 
 
 citizenship without voting power. Those Hernican com- 
 munities which had not joined in the revolt, viz. Aletrium, 
 Verulae, and Ferentinum, remained with their old rights. 
 In carrying out her wise policy of subjugating central 
 Italy, Rome severed the north of Italy from the south, 
 and prevented the inhabitants from being in direct touch 
 ■with one another The old Volscian land was completely 
 subdued and soon Romanized, by planting a legion of 
 four thousand men in Sora on the upper Liris, by making 
 Arpinum subject, and taking away a third of its terri- 
 tory from Frusino. Two military roads ran through the 
 country separating Samnium from Etruria , the northern 
 one, which was afterwards the Flaminian, covered the line 
 of the Tiber, passing through Ocriculum to Nequinum, 
 which was later called Narnia, when the Romans colonized 
 it in 299 B.C. The southern road, afterwards called the 
 Valerian, commanded the Marsian and Aequian land, run- 
 ning along the Fucine lake by way of Carsioli and Alba, 
 in both of which towns colonies were planted. Thus, 
 when we remember the roads and fortresses which already 
 commanded Apulia and Campania, it is easy to see that 
 Samnium was enclosed by a net of Roman strongholds. 
 Such a peace was more ruinous than war, and the proud 
 and heroic Samnites viewed it in that light. We have 
 now reached the third and final period of their brave 
 but ill-fated struggle. This time the Samnites, taught 
 by former experience, brought pressure to bear on the 
 Lucanians, and secured their alliance ; strong hopes were 
 entertained, not only of a rising in central Italy, but 
 of active aid from the Etruscans and from mercenary 
 Gauls. War broke out afresh in 298 B.C., and the first 
 move was the suppression of the Lucanians by Roman 
 arms, and two Samnite defeats in the following year. 
 The superhuman efforts of the Samnite nation put three 
 fresh armies into the field, and their general, Gellius 
 Egnatius, who led an army into Etruria, caused the 
 Etruscans to rise once more and take into their pay 
 numerous Celtic bands. The Romans strained every 
 nerve to meet the threatened danger ; and, by sending 
 part of their forces into Etruria, drew off a large portion 
 of the Etruscan forces which were encamped with the 
 Samnites and Cauls near Sentinum, in Umbria, on the 
 
 7 
 
98 HISTORY OF HOME. 
 
 eastern slope of the Apennines, in 295 B.C. It was here 
 that the two consuls Publius Decius Mus and the aged 
 Quintus Fabius Rullianus encountered the confederate 
 army ; and it was here that the heroic death of Publius 
 Decius rallied the Roman legions when wavering before 
 the Gallic hordes, and at the cost of nine thousand Roman 
 lives gained a victory, which broke the coalition and made 
 Etruria sue for peace. The Samnites, however, met their 
 fate with a spirit unbroken by disaster, and in the follow- 
 ing year gained some successes over the Roman consul, 
 Marcus Atilias; but m 293 B c. the battle of Aquilonia dealt 
 a blow to the Samnites from which they never recovered , 
 and, though in their mountain strongholds they continued 
 the struggle till 230 B.C., deserted by all to whom they 
 looked for aid, decimated and exhausted by a war which 
 had lasted thirty-seven years, they at last concluded an 
 honourable peace with their great antagonist. Rome was 
 too wise to impose disgraceful or ruinous conditions. Her 
 object was to secure for ever what she had already sub- 
 jugated. With this end in view, two fortresses, Minturnae 
 and Sinuessa, were established on the Campanian coast in 
 295 B.C. All the Sabines were forced to become subjects 
 in 290, and the strong fortress of Hatria was established 
 in the Abruzzi, not far from the coast, in 289 B.C. Still 
 more important was the colony of Venusia, founded with 
 twenty thousand colonists in 291 B.C., which, standing on 
 the great road between Tarentum and Samnium, at the 
 borders of Samnium, Apulia, and Lucania, kept in check 
 the neighbouring tribes, and interrupted the communi- 
 cations between Rome's two most powerful enemies in 
 southern Italy. " Thus the compact Roman domain at 
 the close of the Samnite wars extended on the north to 
 the Ciminian forest, on the east to the Abruzzi, on the 
 south to Capua, while the two advanced posts, Luceria 
 and Venusia, established towards the east and south on 
 the lines of communication of their opponents, isolated 
 them on every side. Rome was no longer merely the 
 first, but was already the ruling power in the peninsula 
 when, towards the end of the fifth century of the city, 
 those nations which had been raised to supremacy by the 
 favour of the gods and by their own capacity, began to 
 come into contact in council and on the battle-field ; and 
 
ROMAN ADVANCE IN ITALY. 99 
 
 as at Olympia the preliminary victors girt themselves for 
 a gecond and more serious struggle, so on the larger arena 
 of the nations, Carthage, Macedonia, and Rome now pre- 
 pared for the final and decisive contest." 
 
 AUTHORITIES. 
 
 Rome and Latium. — Liv. ii. 19-20. Dionys. vi. 3-14. Marq. Sfcv. 
 
 i. 21-35. Momnts. R. St. iii. 619, sq. 
 Wars u-itli Aequi and Volsci. — Liv. bks. ii. and iii. 
 League ivith Hernici. — Liv. ii. 41. 
 Ardea and Aricia. — Liv. iii. 71-iv. 11. 
 Wars with Lanuvium, etc. — Liv. vi. 21-29. 
 War with Hernici and closing of league. — Liv. vii. 6-19, 28; viii. 14; 
 
 Dionys. v. 61. 
 Municipia. — Marq. Stv. i. 28. Momms. R. St. iii. 231, sq. 
 Umbrians.— Strab. 214-219, 227, 235, 240, 250, 376. 
 Lucanians, etc. — Strab. 249-251. 
 
 Teanum and Capua, Latin revolt. — Liv. vii. 29-viii. 16. 
 First Samnite war. — Liv. viii. 17, 23-ix. 15. 
 Second war. — Liv. x. 11-end. 
 
100 HISTORY <OF POME. 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 
 WAR WITH PYRRHUS — UNION WITH ITALY. 
 
 Rising of Italians against Rome — Annihilation of the Senones — ■ 
 Outrage of the Tarentines, who invoke aid of Pyrrhus —Early 
 history and character of Pyrrhus — He lands, 280 B.C.— Battle of 
 Heraclea — Negotiations with Rome — Battle of Ausculum, 279 B.C. 
 — League between Rome and Carthage — Pyrrhus master of 
 Sicily — Returns to Italy — Battle of Beneventum, 275 B.C. — 
 Capture of Tarentum — Naval power of Rome — Treatment of the 
 Italians. — New position of Rome. 
 
 The preceding chapter presented the chief features of 
 that career of conquest which left Rome without a rival 
 in Italy. But before her position was firmly and per- 
 manently established, and before the various Italian races 
 were united under her rule, one more step remained, and 
 one more struggle had to be decided. The interest of 
 this final phase in the subjugation of Italy is chiefly due 
 to the romantic charm of the name of Pyrrhus. The 
 personal qualities and adventurous enterprises of Pyrrhus 
 himself cannot but excite our imagination and kindle our 
 sympathies. Of still greater moment is the fact that 
 this was the first occasion on which Roman and Greek 
 influences met in conflict ; that from Pyrrhus date Rome's 
 direct relations with Greece ; that " the struggle between 
 phalanxes and cohorts, between a mercenary army and a 
 militia., between military monarchy and senatorial govern- 
 ment, between individual talent and national vigour, was 
 first fought out in the battles between Pyrrhus and the 
 Roman generals." The victory on this occasion, as on 
 all others, rested with Roman arms, but the victory was 
 
WAR WITH PYRRHUS— UNION WITH ITALY. 101 
 
 of a different character from that over Gauls and Phoeni- 
 cians ; for in the end the subtle charm of Hellenic ideas 
 and Hellenic life amply avenged the physical and political 
 inferiority of the Greek to the Roman. 
 
 For the sake of chronological sequence it will be well 
 to reach the causes which brought Pyrrhus to Italy before 
 we narrate his previous career or estimate his position in 
 history. 
 
 The peace with Samnium had scarce been concluded 
 when the storm broke out afresh, and this time from a 
 new quarter. The Romans had granted the Lucanians, 
 in consideration of their services in the Samnite war, 
 the Greek cities in their territory. In consequence of 
 this, Thurii, among other cities, was attacked by the 
 Lncanians and Bruttians, and reduced to great extremities. 
 Thurii appealed for protection to Rome ; and Rome, feel- 
 ing that the fortress of Venusia enabled her to dispense 
 with the Lucanian alliance, granted the appeal. The Luca- 
 nians and Bruttians, thus foiled by the Romans, proceeded 
 to form a new coalition against their old allies, and at 
 the same time opened the campaign by a fresh attack 
 on Thurii about 285 B.C. This coalition was at once 
 joined by the Etruscans, Gauls, Umbrians, and Sam- 
 nites. The last-named, exhausted and hemmed in on all 
 sides as they were, could render but little assistance. 
 But in the north, under the walls of Arretium, the Roman 
 army, led by the praetor Lucius C^ecilius, was annihi- 
 lated by the Celtic Senones, who were in the pay of the 
 Etruscans. A terrible revenge was executed on the 
 Senones in 283 B.C., by the consul Publius Cornelius 
 Dolabella, who carried fire and sword through their terri- 
 tory, and completely expelled the whole Celtic tribe from 
 Italy. Their Celtic kinsmen and neighbours, the Boii. 
 at once joined the Etruscans, and a mighty combined 
 army marched to wreak vengeance on Rome ; but two 
 battles, one near Lake "Vadimo in 283 B.C., and another 
 near Populonia in the following year, crushed this com- 
 bination, and caused the Boii to conclude a separate peace 
 with Rome. The Romans were now free to prosecute 
 with vigour the war in southern Italy. Thurii was 
 relieved and the Lucanians utterly defeated in 282 B.C. •, 
 the most important places — Locri, Croton, Thurii, and 
 
102 EISTOHY OF ROME. 
 
 Rhegium — were garrisoned. That part of the Adriatic 
 coast which had been occupied by the Senones was secured 
 by a colony planted in the seaport of Sena, the former 
 Senonian capital. A Roman fleet sailed from the Tyrrhene 
 sea to take up its station in the Adriatic, and, on its way, 
 anchored in the harbour of Tarentum. The time had at 
 last arrived for the supine people of Tarentum to shake 
 off their lethargy ; but their awakening came too late. 
 Old treaties had forbidden Roman men-of-war from sailing 
 beyond the promontory of Lacinium. Fiery appeals by 
 mob-orators excited the Tarentine multitude to sucb a 
 degree of senseless passion that it rushed down to the 
 harbour, fell upon the unsuspecting Romans, and seized 
 their ships and crews after a sharp struggle This wanton 
 outrage was followed up by the surprise of Thurii and the 
 severe punishment of its inhabitants. Notwithstanding 
 this violent breach of all civilized law, the Romans dis- 
 played great moderation and forbearance in the terms they 
 offered Tarentum. But all negotiations failed, and the 
 Roman consul, Lucius Aemilius, entered Tarentine territory 
 in 281 B.C. It was clear that Tarentum could not resist 
 Rome single-handed, and the fear of the demagogues as 
 to the vengeanee which Rome would exact drove them to 
 urge the completion of the alliance with Pyrrhus on the 
 terms proposed by the Epirot king. 
 
 At this point we must revert to the previous history 
 of the man whose name has cast a halo of romance upon 
 this war. Born in 320 B.C., Pyrrhus, when but six years 
 old, was by his father's downfall deprived of his hereditary 
 , throne among the Molossians of Epirus, and subjected to 
 the many vicissitudes that befell all those engaged in 
 Macedonian polities. Trained in the campaigns of the 
 veteran Antigonus, one of Alexander's chief generals, 
 universally admired by the Alexandrian court of Ptolemy, 
 whither the battle of Ipsus brought him as a host- 
 age, he was restored to his native land and kingdom 
 of Epirus in 296 B.C., through the influence of Ptolemy, 
 who wished to counteract the growing power of the 
 Macedonian ruler, Demetrius Poliorcetes. Aided by the 
 brave Epirots, whose loyalty and enthusiasm were fired 
 by their young ruler, " the eagle of Epirus," as they styled 
 him, extended his dominions. Wh.n Demetrius was 
 
WAR WITH PYRRHUS— VMON WITH ITALY. 103 
 
 driven from his throne in 287 B.C., Pyrrhus was sum- 
 moned to wear the royal diadem of Philip and of 
 Alexander. No worthier successor could have been found. 
 But Macedonian jealousy, and that national feeling which 
 could not brook a foreign leader, caused him to resign 
 the kingdom after a short reign of seven months. The 
 colourless life of an Epirot king could not satisfy the 
 ambition of such a man as Pyrrhus. Conscious of his 
 great powers as a general, fired with a desire to imitate 
 the great Alexander, Pyrrhus eagerly embraced the oppor- 
 tunity that now offered itself of founding an Hellenic 
 empire in the West. In estimating the possibilities of 
 success, and the historical position of Pyrrhus himself, 
 we cannot but feel that the attempt to draw a comparison 
 between him and Alexander completely fails. Alexander 
 was at the head of a powerful and well-officered Mace- 
 donian army ; he was the foremost general and most 
 gifted statesman of his time ; his own dominions were 
 secured by the powerful army he left behind him ; the 
 foes he went to encounter were such as, long inured to 
 despotism, knew nothing of national independence and 
 national vigour, and regarded with indifference a change 
 of despots. In the case of Pyrrhus none of these advan- 
 tages existed. Despite his noble descent, his strategic 
 ability, his pure and chivalrous nature, he was but a 
 soldier of fortune, a king of mountain-tribes, a man whose 
 chances of success depended on mercenaries and foreign 
 alliances, and on his ability to keep together a coalition of 
 secondary states. Wide-reaching as was his scheme of 
 founding a great Hellenic empire in the West, it was 
 the unreal dream of a romantic adventurer, not the 
 possible and practicable aim of a powerful conqueror and 
 statesman. 
 
 When once Tarentum had signed the treaty with 
 Pyrrhus, the arrival of Cineas, the confidential adviser of 
 Pyrrhus, and of his general, Milo, in 281 B.C., with three 
 thousand Epirots, put an end to all further vacillation. 
 Pyrrhus himself landed early in the following year, with 
 a mixed force of various Greek tribes, amounting in all to 
 about twenty thousand infantry, two thousand archers, 
 five hundred slingers, three thousand cavalry, and twenty 
 elephants. The boasts which the Tarentine envoys had 
 
104 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 made, of the huge confederate army ready to take the field 
 in Italy, were soon proved to be utterly fallacious. In the 
 north, the Etruscans alone were still in arms, but misfor- 
 tune attended every effort they made. The Tarentines, 
 who had hoped that Pyrrhus would take all the blows 
 while they shared the spoil, found their master in the 
 eagle of Epirus. They were called upon to serve ; and 
 the foreign soldiers were quartered in their houses, and 
 foreign guards set over their gates. The strictest military 
 government everywhere prevailed ; and all the clubs, 
 theatres, and amusements of the pleasure-loving Taren- 
 tines were ruthlessly suspended. 
 
 Special exertions were made by Rome to meet the new 
 danger. In 280 B.C., on the banks of the Siris, near 
 Heraclea, the Roman consul, Publius Laevinus, first 
 measured swords with a Greek army under the greatest 
 general of the day. After a stubborn contest, varied by 
 many vicissitudes of fortune, the elephants of Pyrrhus 
 decided the issue. The losses of the Romans, estimated 
 from fifteen to twenty thousand, were almost equalled by 
 those of Pyrrhus. But the value of winning the first 
 battle was at once shown by the fact that the Lucanians, 
 Bruttians, Samnites, and all the Greek cities joined 
 Pyrrhus. The Latins, however, remained firm , and the 
 frontier fortress, Venusia, although completely hemmed in 
 by enemies, refused to desert Rome. Pyrrhus saw that 
 his hopes lay iu securing favourable terms from the 
 Romans, while the impressions of the battle of Heraclea 
 were still vivid. He commissioned Cineas, whose rhetori- 
 cal powers were famous, to go to Rome and demand the 
 freedom of all Greek towns, and the restitution of the 
 territory taken from the Samnites, Daunians, Lucanians, 
 and Bruttians. The leniency and respect shown by 
 Pyrrhus towards his Roman prisoners, and the persuasive 
 arts of Cineas, made the senate waver , but the undaunted 
 energy of the blind and aged Appius Claudius, who had 
 been censor in 312, and consul in 307 and 296 B.C., and 
 who had caused himself to be carried into the senate- 
 house at this critical moment, revived the true Roman 
 spirit in the hearts of his audience. The proud answer 
 was given that Rome could not negotiate with foreign 
 troops as long as they were on Italian soil. This answer, 
 
WAR WITH PYRRHUS-UNION WITH ITALY, 105 
 
 then heard for the first time, passed thenceforth into a 
 maxim of state. 
 
 Pyrrhus now marched upon Rome, hoping by this step 
 to shake the allegiance of her allies and to terrify the 
 capital. Roman courage, however, was proof alike against 
 the flatteries of Cineas, and the armed threats of Pyrrhus. 
 No Latin ally, no Campanian Greek state joined him ; 
 moreover, the Etruscans at this time concluded peace with 
 Rome, and thus set free the army of the consul Tiberius 
 Coruncanius. Three armies, one in his rear under Laevinus, 
 and two in the vicinity of the capital, barred his progress. 
 After surprising Fregellae and reaching Anagnia, the king 
 was forced to retrace his steps without striking a decisive 
 blow. At the approach of winter he returned to his old 
 quarters in Tarentum. In the spring of 279 B.C., Pyrrhus 
 resumed the offensive, and met the Roman army in Apulia 
 near Ausculum. The allied forces of Pyrrhus amounted 
 to about seventy thousand infantry, eight thousand cavalry, 
 and nineteen elephants. The Romans with their con- 
 federates were not inferior in number ; and as a protection 
 against the elephants they had invented a sort of war- 
 chariot, armed with projecting iron poles and movable 
 masts, capable of being lowered, and fitted with an iron 
 spike Pyrrhus also had copied the Roman system of 
 maniples, and placed companies on the wings of the 
 phalanx, with spaces between them, in imitation of the 
 cohorts. For two days the battle raged ; at last the ele- 
 phants, as at Heraclea, forced back the Roman line, and 
 Pyrrhus remained in possession of the field. This defeat 
 cost the Roman forces some six thousand lives ; but 
 Pyrrhus himself was wounded. Nor was the victory 
 decisive enough to break up the Roman confederacy, and 
 thus further the political designs of the Epirot king. 
 Forced by his wound to renounce the campaign and 
 remain inactive in Tarentum, Pyrrhus soon perceived that 
 the losses he had sustained, and the petty quarrels and 
 hatred of discipline which characterized his allies, rendered 
 all chance of ultimate success with his present resources 
 out of the question. The condition of the Sicilian Greeks 
 gave him an opportunity of leaving Italy, and of this he 
 gladly availed himself. 
 
 After the death of Agathocles of Syracuse, in 289 B.C.. 
 
106 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 Carthage had made great strides in the subjugation of 
 Sicily. No resistance could be offered by the smaller 
 Greek cities, whose government, whether under dema- 
 gogues or despots, was always equally incapable. Agri- 
 gentum had fallen, and Syracuse was now hard pressed 
 by the victorious Carthaginians. In the hour of her peril 
 Syracuse acted as Tarentum had done ; she offered the 
 supreme power to Pyrrhus. Thus fortune, by placing in 
 his hands at the same moment Tarentum and Syracuse, 
 seemed to give to Pyrrhus a great opportunity of realizing 
 his mighty schemes. One effect of this union of Italian 
 and Sicilian Greeks under one head was to bring into 
 closer relations Carthage and Rome. An offensive and 
 defensive treaty was concluded between them, in 279 B.C., 
 against Pyrrhus, binding each party to assist the other in 
 case of attack, and binding both states not to conclude a 
 separate peace with Pyrrhus. Messana, which had pre- 
 viously been seized by the Manertines, who were the 
 Campanian mercenaries of Agathocles (cf. p. 78), in fear 
 of the vengeance of Pyrrhus joined the Romans and 
 Carthaginians, and thus secured for them the Sicilian side 
 of the straits. But Rhegium, on the Italian side, which 
 had been wrested from the Romans by a mutiny of the 
 Campanian troops stationed there in 281 B.C., could not 
 be allowed by Rome to follow the example of their 
 Mamertine kinsmen ; and a combined attack of Cartha- 
 ginians and Romans failed to capture the city. A strong 
 Carthaginian fleet proceeded to blockade Syracuse, while 
 at the same time a land army laid siege to it, in 278 B.C. 
 Pyrrhus was therefore forced to desert the Lucanians and 
 Samnites, and content himself with occupying Tarentum 
 by a garrison under Milo, and Locri with a force under 
 his son Alexander. He himself set sail with the rest of 
 his troops for Syracuse in the spring of 278 B.C. During 
 his absence from Italy the Romans, exhausted by their 
 previous struggles, allowed the war to drag on, without 
 being able to completely expel the troops left behind by 
 Pyrrhus. Heraclea, indeed, made peace with Rome in 278, 
 and Locri slaughtered its Epirot garrison in 277 B.C. ; 
 but Milo retained his hold of Tarentum, and made success- 
 ful sorties against the Romans. Ignorance of the art of 
 besieging towns, and the want of a fleet, made the capture 
 
WAR WITH PYRRHUS— UNION WITH ITALY. 107 
 
 of Tarentum almost impossible ; and the Carthaginians, 
 owing to their disasters in Sicily, were unable to render 
 any real assistance. Pyrrhus, on landing at Syracuse, 
 met with complete success. At the hend of the Greek 
 cities he wrested from the Carthaginians almost all that 
 tbey had won. To cope with their powerful fleet and 
 capture the all-important position of Lilybaeum, Pyrrhus 
 built himself a fleet, and in 276 B.C. seemed to have within 
 his grasp the realization of his aims. But his methods of 
 governing Sicily were those which he had seen Ptolemy 
 practise in Egypt: personal favourites, not native Greeks, 
 exercised absolute authority as magistrates and judges in 
 the various cities; his own troeos acted as garrisons, and his 
 own acts were arbitrary and despotic to the last degree. 
 His reign thus became more detested than even the 
 threatened Carthaginian yoke had been, and negotiations 
 were entered into by the principal Greek cities with the 
 Carthaginians. To this error Pyrrhus added a second. 
 Instead of securing his s ule in Sicily, expelling the Cartha- 
 ginians and capturing Lilybaeum, he turned his thoughts 
 once more to Italy. Possibly a sense of honour and the 
 cry of his old allies, the Lucanians and Samnites, moved 
 him to do so ; but the folly of the step was at once 
 apparent. When once it was known that he had set sail 
 for Italy, towards the close of 276 B.C., all the Sicilian 
 cities revolted, and refused to grant him money or troops ; 
 and " thus the enterprise of Pyrrhus was wrecked, and 
 the plan of his life irretrievably ruined, he was thence- 
 forth an adventurer who felt that he had been great, and 
 was so no longer." Foiled in an attack on Rhegium, he 
 surprised Locri, and avenged himself on the treacherous 
 inhabitants. In the spring of 275 B.C. he marched to the 
 aid of the hard-pressed Samnites, and near Beneventum, 
 on the Campus Arusinus, he fought his final battle on 
 Italian soil. The very elephants, which had won his 
 previous victories, proved the cause of his defeat by 
 attacking their own side. Unable any longer to keep the 
 field, or to get reinforcements from abroad, Pyrrhus left 
 Italy, and once more took part in Greek politics. He 
 even succeeded in recovering the whole of his former 
 kingdom, and in paving the way for a return to the throne 
 of Macedonia. But his successes bore no lasting fruit, 
 
108 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 and he perished ingloriously in a street fight at Argos, in 
 272 B.C. 
 
 With the battle of Beneventum and the departure of 
 Pyrrhus the war in Italy came to an end. Milo, who had 
 been left behind in Tarentum, made over that city to the 
 Roman consul Lucius Papirius in 272 B.C., on hearing of 
 his master's death. He thus prevented the citizens from 
 surrendering the town to the Carthaginians, who had 
 entered the harbour with a fleet, and secured for himself 
 and his troops a free departure. The Carthaginians, thus 
 frustrated in their attempt to gain a foothold in Italy, 
 pretended that their presence was merely due to their 
 wish to help the Romans. The gain to Rome from the 
 act of Milo can scarcely be overestimated. In the same 
 year, the Samnites, Lucanians, and Bruttians laid down 
 their arms. Rhegium was at last stormed in 270 B.C., and 
 the remnant of the mutineers who had so long held the 
 town were scourged and executed. Rome was now mis- 
 tress of all Italy. New colonies and new roads held in a 
 firm grip the cunquered territories. Paestum and Cosa 
 in Lucania, Beneventum and Aesernia to command Sam- 
 nium, Ariminum, Firmum in Picenum, and Castrum 
 Novum to hold in check the Gauls, were all established 
 in the ten years from 273-264 B.C. Preparations were 
 made to continue the southern highway to the seaports of 
 Tarentum and Brundisium, to colonize the latter seaport 
 and make it the rival of Tarentum. Wars with small 
 tribes, whose territory was encroached upon, were caused 
 by the construction of these fortresses and roads : w r ith 
 the Picentes in 269-268 B.C., with the Sallentines and the 
 Umbrian Sassinates in 267-266 B.C. Rome's dominion 
 was thus extended from the Apennines to the Ionian sea. 
 Nor did she solely confine her attention to the development 
 of her power by land. At this time Carthage was pirati- 
 cally paramount in the western waters of the Mediter- 
 ranean. Even Syracuse gradually ceased to compete 
 with her ; Tarentum, owing to the Roman occupation, was 
 no longer formidable ; the naval power of Etruria had 
 long been broken, and the Etruscan island of Corsica lay 
 open to the ships of Carthage. The constant struggles 
 by land had caused the Roman fleet to dwindle in neglect, 
 until about 350 B.C. it reached its lowest point of ineffi- 
 
WAR WITH PYRRHUS— UNION WITH ITALY. 109 
 
 ciency. A treaty with Carthage in 348 B.C. bound Roman 
 ships not to sail beyond the Fair Promontory (Cape Bon) 
 on the Libyan coast ; a like stipulation with Tarentum 
 excluded Roman ships from the eastern basin of the 
 Mediterranean. As soon as she was able, Rome made 
 efforts to free herself fro- 1 this humiliating position. 
 The chief towns along the Tyrrhene and Adriatic seas 
 were colonized, and thus protected the coasts from in- 
 vasion and pillage. The Roman navy was in part revived, 
 and the war-ships taken from Antium in 338 B.C. served 
 as a nucleus for this purpose. Such Greek cities as were 
 admitted into a state of dependence on Rome furnished a 
 certain number of vessels as a war contribution. In 311 
 B.C., two masters of the fleet (dnoviri navales) were created 
 by a special resolution of the burgesses, and the Roman 
 fleet lent assistance in the Samnite war at the siege of 
 Nuceria. But the renewal of the treaty with Carthage in 
 306 B.C. shows how little Rome really accomplished. 
 Carthage only allowed the Romans to trade with Sicily and 
 Carthage, but prohibited their navigation of the Atlantic, 
 and thus restricted them to the narrow space of the 
 western Mediterranean. Although obliged to acquiesce in 
 the conditions imposed by Carthage, the Romans continued 
 to improve the state of their navy. Four quaestors of 
 the fleet (quaestores classici) were appointed in 267 B.C., 
 for the purpose of jointly guarding the coasts and creating 
 a navy for their protection. The first was stationed at 
 Ostia, the Roman port ; the second at Cales, the capital 
 of Roman Campania ; the third at Ariminum, to w-atch 
 over the ports on the Adriatic ; the province of the fourth 
 is not known. 
 
 The lukewarm alliance formed with Carthage against 
 Pyrrhus did not lessen the wish of Rome to free herself 
 from the fetters imposed by Carthage on the growth of 
 her maritime power. To further this object she attached 
 herself closely to such Greek maritime states as could 
 counterbalance the Carthaginian ascendency by sea : to 
 Massilia, whose citizens held a position of honour at the 
 Roman games ; to Rhodes, and Apollonia on the Epirot 
 coast ; above all to Syracuse, after the Pyrrhic war was 
 ended. Nature herself favoured the growth of her naval 
 power. Latium supplied the finest timber for ships, and 
 
110 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 the commercial and geographical position of Rome was 
 specially adapted for the development of a war marine. 
 Although, indeed, so far Rome had not availed herself of 
 these advantages, yet at this period signs were not wanting 
 that the old indifference to naval matters was a thing of 
 the past ; " and, considering the great resources of Italy, 
 the Phoenicians might well follow her efforts with anxious 
 eyes." 
 
 It remains for us to consider the political effect of the 
 mighty changes consequent upon the establishment of 
 Roman supremacy in Italy. We do not know with 
 exactness what privileges Rome reserved for herself as 
 sovereign state. It is certain that she alone could make 
 war, conclude treaties, and coin money ; and that, further, 
 any war or treaty resolved upon by the Roman people 
 was legally binding on all Italian communities, and that 
 the silver money of Rome was current everywhere in 
 Italy. 
 
 The relations of the Italians to Rome cannot in all 
 cases be precisely defined, but the main features are as 
 follows. In the first place, the full Roman franchise was 
 extended as far as was compatible with the preservation 
 of the urban character of the Roman community. Those 
 who received this franchise may be divided into three 
 classes : (1) All the occupants of the various allotments 
 of state lands, which now embraced a considerable portion 
 of Etruria and Campania. (2) All the communities 
 which, after the method first adopted in the case of 
 Tusculum, were incorporated and completely merged in 
 the Roman state. As above mentioned (p. 92), this 
 course had been followed in the case of many of the 
 original members of the Latin league : it was now, in 
 268 B.C., pursued with regard to all the Sabine com- 
 munities and many of the Volscian. (3) Further, full 
 Roman citizenship was possessed by the maritime or 
 burgess colonies which had been instituted for the pro- 
 tection of the coast ; the names of these were Pyrgi. Ostia, 
 Antium, Tarracina, Minturnae, Sinuessa, Sena Gallica, 
 and Castrum Novum. In these towns the young men 
 were exempted from service in the legions, and devoted 
 all their attention to guarding the coasts. 
 
 Thus the title of Roman citizen in its fullest sense was 
 
WAR WITH PYRRHUS— UNION WITH IT ALT. Ill 
 
 possessed by men dwelling as far north as Caere,* as far 
 east as the Apennines, and as far south as Formiae. But 
 within these limits isolated communities, such as Tibur, 
 Praeneste, Signia, and Norba, were without the Roman 
 franchise ; while beyond them other communities, such as 
 Sena, possessed it. 
 
 In the next place, we must distinguish the various 
 grades of subjection which marked all the communities 
 not honoured with the full Roman franchise. As in 
 the case of the recipients of full citizenship, so here we 
 may make a threefold division. To the first division 
 belong the Latin towns : these retained their Latin rights ; 
 that is, they were self-governing and stood on an equal 
 footing with Roman citizens as regards the right of trad- 
 ing and inheritance. But it is important to observe that 
 the Latins of the later times of the Republic were no longer 
 for the most part members of the old Latin towns, which 
 had participated in the Alban festival, but were colonists 
 planted in Latium by Rome, who honoured Rome as their 
 capital and parent city, and formed the main supports of 
 Roman rule in Latium. Indeed, the old Latin communities, 
 with the exception of Tibur and Praeneste, had sunk into 
 insignificance. It was but natural that the Latin colonies, 
 issuing as they did from the burgess-body of Rome, should 
 not rest content with mere Latin rights, but should aim 
 at the full rights of Roman citizens. Rome, on the other 
 hand, new that Italy was subjugated, no longer felt her 
 former need of these colonies ; nor did she deem it prudent 
 to extend the full franchise with the same freedom as she 
 hitherto had done. A lin~ was now strictly drawn, and 
 all members of autonomous communities founded after 
 268 B.C. could no longer by settling in Rome become 
 municipes or passive burgesses with the power of voting 
 in the comitia tributa (cf. p. 85). Men of eminence, e.g. 
 public magistrates, in such communities were alone in 
 future eligible to the Roman franchise. By these means 
 the old power of migration to Rome was somewhat 
 restricted, and a jealous guard was set upon the privilege 
 of becoming a full Roman citizen. 
 
 To the second division belong those towns w r hose in- 
 
 * Of course Caere is not meant to be included, but men living 
 uear it had full citizen rights. 
 
112 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 habitants were passive citizens of Rome (cives sine suf- 
 fragio). They were liable to service in the Roman legions, 
 and to taxation, and were included in the Roman census. 
 A deputy or praefect appointed annually by the Roman 
 praetor administered justice according to laws which 
 were subjected to Roman revision. In other respects they 
 retained their old form of government and appointed their 
 own magistrates. Caere (cf. p. 81) was the first town to 
 be placed on this footing; afterwards Capua and other 
 more remote towns were treated in the same way. 
 
 In the third and last division we may include all allied 
 communities which were not Latin states ; the relation of 
 these towns to Rome was defined by separate treaties, and 
 therefore varied in accordance with the terms imposed by 
 such agreements. 
 
 No doubt all national leagues, such as the Samnite and 
 Lucanian, shared the fate which had earlier befallen the 
 Latin and Hernican confederations ; and any movements 
 which might tend to hind one community with another, 
 whether by rights of intermarriage or of acquisition of 
 property or by common council-chambers, were doubtless 
 suppressed by the vigilance of Rome. Further, all the 
 Italian communities were obliged to equip and furnish at 
 their own expense contingents in time of war. Those 
 Latin towns classified above in the first division furnished 
 a definitely fixed number of infantry and cavalry which 
 acted on the wings of the Roman legion and were there- 
 fore named "wings" (alae) and " winged cohorts" (cohortes 
 alariae). The same duty was imposed on most of the 
 allied communities classified in the third division, such as 
 Apulians, Sabellians, and Etruscans. Further, the passive 
 citizens defined in the second division were, as above 
 stated, bound to serve in the ranks of the Roman legions, 
 while the duty of supplying ships of war fell almost 
 entirely on the Greek cities. Such w^ere the leading 
 features of the Roman government of Italy, the details of 
 which can no longer be ascertained. In addition to break- 
 ing up all existing confederacies, and thus splitting up the 
 subject states into a number of smaller communities, Rome 
 fostered schisms and factions among them. In pursuance 
 of the same object the government of all dependent com- 
 
WAR WITH PYIiRHVS— UNION WITH ITALY. 113 
 
 munities was now placed in the hands of the wealthy and 
 leading families, whose interests were naturally opposed 
 to those of the multitude, and who were inclined to favour 
 Roman views. Capua, whose nobles had sided with Rome 
 throughout the war against the revolted Latins and Cam- 
 panians, furnished a notorious instance of this policy. 
 Special privileges and pensions were granted by Rome to 
 the Campanian aristocracy. But the great wisdom and 
 moderation of Rome is shown by the fact that she either 
 extended to these dependent states the Roman franchise, 
 or allowed them to retain a certain amount of self-govern- 
 ment, and gave them a share in the successes of Rome. 
 Thus in Italy, at least, no community of Helots existed, 
 nor, which was equally important, was there any tributary 
 state ; for Rome with a wise magnanimity never assumed 
 that most dangerous of rights, the right of taxing any of 
 her Italian subjects. Rome exercised control and super- 
 vision over the various Italian communities by means of 
 the four quaestors of the fleet, who had a district and resi- 
 dence outside Rome assigned them by law. In addition, the 
 chief magistrate of every community had to take a census 
 of his state every fourth or fifth year ; by this means the 
 Roman senate was kept informed of the resources in men 
 and money of the whole of Italy. 
 
 Politically united under the leadership of Rome, the 
 various tribes inhabiting Italy now began to realize more 
 completely and feel more intensely their unity as a nation. 
 This feeling must have first sprung into existence from 
 the contrast presented by the Greeks, and must have been 
 heightened by the danger with which the Celts threatened 
 all Italians equally. It found expression in two names, 
 which now began to be applied to all the peoples inhabit- 
 ing Italy. The name of Italians, which was originally 
 a Greek term, became current everywhere, and Italia, 
 originally limited to the modern Calabria, was now used 
 of the whole land. The name of Togati, or "men of the 
 toga," was now for the first time used to designate all the 
 Italians, and thus sharply contrasted them with the Celtic 
 "men of the hose" (Braccati). The common use by all 
 of the Latin toga seemed to point to the day when the 
 Latin language would be regarded as the mother-tongue 
 of every Italian : the germs of the Latinization of the whole 
 
 8 
 
114 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 peninsula were already planted ; time alone was needed 
 for their development. 
 
 The recognition of Rome's new position as one of the 
 great powers in the political world was first marked by 
 an embassy sent from Alexandria to Rome in 273 B.C., 
 primarily with a view to settling commercial relations. 
 Egypt was at that time at variance with Carthage touch- 
 ing Cyrene, and with Macedonia touching the predominat- 
 ing influence in Greece ; the complications that were 
 eventually to arise between Rome and Carthage for the 
 possession of Sicily, and between Rome and Macedonia 
 for the sovereignty of the Adriatic coasts, were doubtless 
 foreshadowed even then, and may well have suggested 
 an alliance with Es:ypt. " The new struggles, which were 
 preparing on all sides, could not but influence each other; 
 and Rome, as mistress of Italy, could not fail to be drawn 
 into the wide arena, which the victories and projects of 
 Alexander the Great had marked out as the field of conflict 
 to his successors." 
 
 AUTHORITIES. 
 
 Thurii and Celtic war. — Dionys. xix. 13. Polyb. ii. 19-20. Appian 
 
 Sp. 6; G. 1, 11. Strab. 212, 216. 
 Tarentine mob. — Dionys. xix. 3-10. 
 Pyrrhus. — Dionys. xix. 8-13, 17 ; xx. 1-12. Plut. Pyrrh. and 
 
 Alexand. Appian Sp. 7-12. 
 Tarentum captured. — Zonar. 8, 2. 
 Rhegiwm — Dio. Cass. Fr. 39-40. 
 Picentine war. — Dio. Cas. Fr. 98, 3. 
 Neiv colonies. — Liv. Epit. xi. 14, 16. Veil. i. 14. Marq. Stv. i. 39, 
 
 50-51. 
 Roman fleet. — Liv. viii. 14; ix. 30. 
 Treaty with Carthage.— Polyb. iii. 22-25. 
 
 Quaestores class. — Lydns de Magistr. i. 27. Momms. R. St. ii. 556. 
 Relation of Italians to Rome.— Marq. Stv. i. 21-103. Momms. R. St. 
 
 iii. 645, sq. 
 Cives sine suffragio. — Momms. R. St. iii. 570, 8q. 
 Praefecti. — Momms. R. St. iii. 581. 
 
CHAPTER XII. 
 
 CARTHAGE. 
 
 The Phoenicians — Position of Carthage — Opposition to the Greeks- 
 Empire — Constitution — Financial position — Comparison between 
 Rome and Carthage. 
 
 We now turn our eyes to a race of people widely differing 
 from any in Italy in nature and origin, viz. the Cartha- 
 ginians. Belonging to the great Semitic race, which has 
 ever, as though from some instinctive sense of its wide 
 diversity, kept itself severed from the Indo-Germanic 
 nations, Carthage was one of the numerous settlements 
 of the enterprising Phoenicians. This particular branch 
 of the Semitic stock issued forth from its native land of 
 Canaan or " the plain," and spread further west than any 
 other people of the same race. Utilizing to the full the 
 excellent harbours, and the bountiful supply of timber and 
 metals of their own country, the Phoenicians early attained 
 an unrivalled position in the ancient world as the pioneers 
 of commerce, navigation, manufacture, and colonization. 
 In the most remote times we find them in Cyprus and 
 Egypt, Greece and Sicily, Africa and Spain, and even on 
 the Atlantic Ocean and the North Sea. " The field of 
 their commerce reached from Sierra Leone and Cornwall 
 in the west, eastward to the coast of Malabar." 
 
 But the one-sided character that marks the develop- 
 ment of the great nations of antiquity is specially visible 
 in the case of the Phoenicians. We cannot ascribe to 
 them the credit of having originated any of the intellectual 
 or scientific discoveries which have been the glory of 
 other members of the Semitic family. Their religious 
 
116 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 conceptions were gross and barbarous ; their art was not 
 comparable to that of Italy, still less to that of Greece , 
 their knowledge of astronomy and chronology, of the 
 alphabet, of weights and measures, was derived from 
 Babylon. No doubt, in their commercial dealings, the 
 Phoenicians spread valuable germs of civilization, but 
 rather as a bird dropping grain than a husbandman 
 sowing seed. They never civilized and assimilated to 
 themselves the nations with which they came into con- 
 tact. 
 
 Moreover, politically, the Phoenicians were, like the 
 rest of the Aramaean nations, without the ennobling idea 
 of self-governed freedom. A policy of conquest was never 
 in their eyes to be compared with a policy of commerce. 
 Their colonies were factories. The power to trade with 
 natives was bought too dear if it entailed constant war 
 and the interruption of peaceful barter. Thus they 
 allowed themselves to be supplanted in Egypt, Greece, 
 Italy, and the east of Sicily, almost without resistance , 
 and in the great naval battles at Alalia in 537 B.C., and 
 at Cumae in 474 B.C., for the supremacy of the western 
 Mediterranean, the brunt of the struggle with the Greeks 
 fell upon the Etruscans, and not on the Phoenicians. In 
 the great Sicilian expedition, which ended in their defeat 
 at Himera by Gelo of Syracuse in 480 B.C., the African 
 Phoenicians only took the field as subjects of the Great 
 King, and to avoid being obliged to aid him in the East 
 instead of the West. This was not from want of courage 
 or national spirit ; indeed, the tenacity and obstinacy w r ith 
 which the Aramaeans have ever held to their feelings and 
 prejudices as a nation far exceeds the pertinacity of any 
 I n do -Germanic race: it was rather due to their want of 
 political instinct and of the love of liberty. No Phoenician 
 settlements attained a more rapid and secure prosperity 
 than those established by the cities of Tyre and Sidon on 
 the south coast of Spain and the north coast of Africa. 
 Here they were out of the reach of the great king and of 
 Greek rivals, and held the same l'elation to the natives as 
 the Europeans held to the American Indians. Although 
 not the earliest settlement, by far the most prominent was 
 Karthada, " the new town," or Carthage. Situated near 
 the mouth of the river Bagradas, which flows through the 
 
CARTHAGE. 117 
 
 richest corn district in North Africa, on rising ground 
 which slopes gently towards the plain and ends in a sea- 
 girt promontory, commanding the great roadstead of 
 North Africa, the Gnlf of Tunis, Carthage owed its 
 sudden rise to pre-eminence even more to the natural 
 advantages of its situation than to the character of its 
 inhabitants Even when restored, Carthage at once became 
 the third city in the Roman empire ; and in our day, on 
 a far worse site, and under far less favourable conditions, 
 a city exists in that district, whose inhabitants number 
 one hundred thousand. We need no explanation, then, of 
 the commercial prosperity of ancient Carthage ; but we 
 must answer the question raised by its development of 
 political power, a development never attained by any 
 other Phoenician city. 
 
 At the outset Carthage pursued the usual passive policy 
 of Phoenician cities. She paid a ground-rent for the 
 space occupied by the city to the native Berbers, the tribe 
 of Maxitani or Maxyes ; and she recognized the nominal 
 supremacy of the great king by paying tribute to him on 
 different occasions. It gradually, however, became clear 
 to the Carthaginians that, unless they undertook the task 
 of repelling Greek influences and Greek migrations, the 
 Phoenicians would be supplanted in Africa, as they had 
 already been in Greece, Italy, and Sicily. The colony of 
 Cyrene threatened their very stronghold and imperilled 
 their existence. The Carthaginians, therefore, undertook 
 the task , and by about 500 B.C., after a long and obstinate 
 struggle, they had to a great extent effected their purpose, 
 and set bounds to Greek invasion. These successes changed 
 the character of the city itself ; it no longer aimed at 
 being merely pre-eminent in commerce, but at establishing 
 an empire as mistress of Libya and of part of the Mediter- 
 ranean. 
 
 About the year 450 B.C. the Carthaginians refused 
 any longer to pay rent for the soil they occupied to 
 the natives, and were thus enabled to prosecute agri- 
 culture on a greatly extended scale. Capital thus found 
 a new outlet, and the rich soil of Libya was cultivated on 
 a system similar to that employed by modern planters. 
 Single landowners appear to have employed on their 
 estates no fewer than twenty thousand slaves. Moreover, 
 
118 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 the native Libyan farmers were subdued, and reduced to 
 the position of fellahs, who paid a fourth of the produce 
 of their soil as tribute to their new masters, and served as 
 a recruiting' ground for the Carthaginian armies. The 
 Nomades, or roving pastoral tribes, were driven back into 
 the deserts and mountains, or were compelled to pay- 
 tribute and supply soldiers. The capture of their great 
 town Theveste took place about the time of the first 
 Punic war. These two classes of subjects gave rise to the 
 expression found in Carthaginian state treaties of " towns 
 and tribes of subjects; " the first refers to the dependent 
 Libyan villages, the second to the subject Nomades. 
 Thirdly, the Carthaginian rule embraced the other 
 Phoenician settlements in Africa, or the so-called Liby- 
 Phoenicians. These consisted partly of the older Phoenician 
 colonies, such as Hippo, Hadrumetum, Thapsus, and the 
 Little and Great Leptis ; partly of colonies sent from 
 Carthage itself. These states, with the exception of 
 Utica, the ancient protectress of Carthage, lost their 
 independence, and had to pull down their walls and to 
 contribute a fixed sum of money and a definite number of 
 soldiers. But they did not pay a land-tax, nor were they 
 subject to the recruiting system like the subject Libyans ; 
 and they enjoyed equal legal privileges and right of 
 intermarriage with the Carthaginians. 
 
 Thus Carthage became the capital of a great North 
 African empire, extending from the desert of Tripoli to 
 the Atlantic ocean ; on the west (Morocco and Algiers), 
 indeed, she merely held a belt along the coast, but on the 
 east (Constantine and Tunis) she extended her sway far 
 into the interior. In the words of an ancient writer, the 
 Carthaginians were changed from Tyrians into Libyans. 
 The Phoenician tongue and civilization were, at any rate 
 among the more advanced natives, adopted in Libya. 
 These changes have been associated with the name of 
 Hanno ; but they were no doubt gradual, and cannot, 
 therefore, be assigned to any period with precision. The 
 rise of Carthage was synchronous with a decline of the 
 great cities in the mother-country of Tyre and Sidon ; 
 and from the first-named most of the powerful families 
 emigrated to their prosperous daughter city. 
 
 In addition to the empire in Libya we must bear in 
 
CARTHAGE. 119 
 
 mind tlie parallel growth of the maritime and colonial 
 dominion of Carthage. The early Tyrian settlement at 
 Gades (Cadiz) was the chief Phoenician colony in Spain. 
 By a chain of factories on the west and east of Gades, and 
 by the possession of the silver mines in the interior, the 
 Phoenicians occupied nearly all the modern Andalusia 
 and Granada. Although not strictly under the rule of 
 Carthage, no doubt Gades and the other stations in Spain 
 fell under her hegemony. The island of Ebusus and the 
 Baleares were early occupied by the Carthaginians, partly 
 as fishing-stations, partly as outposts against the Greek 
 colony of Massilia, with which Carthage was ever at war. 
 Moreover, about 500 B.C., the Carthaginians established 
 themselves in Sardinia, the natives of which island retired 
 before them into the mountainous interior, just as the 
 Numidians withdrew to the borders of the African desert. 
 The fertile districts of the Sardinian coast were cultivated 
 by imported Libyans, and colonies were planted at Cavalis 
 (Cagliari) and other points. They also held the west and 
 north-west coast of Sicily, together with the smaller 
 adjacent islands of the Aegates, Melita, Gaulos, Cossyra ; 
 the station at Motya, and later at Liljbaeum, preserved 
 their communication with Africa, as those at Panormus 
 and Soluntum did with Sardinia. For a long period, 
 down to the Athenian expedition to Sicily (415—413 
 B.C.), the Greeks and Carthaginians seem to have agreed 
 to tolerate one another in Sicily. All these posses- 
 sions served not only as commercial centres, but as 
 pillars of the Carthaginian supremacy by sea. The 
 western straits of the Mediterranean were practically 
 closed to other nations, and in the Tyrrhene and Gallic 
 seas alone the Phoenicians had to endure the rivalry of 
 foreign fleets. As long, indeed, as the Etruscan power 
 counterbalanced the Greek in those waters, Carthage 
 could afford to remain passive ; but on the fall of the 
 Etruscans and the rise of the naval power of Syracuse, 
 a great contest ensued between Dionysius of Syracuse 
 (406-865 B.C.) and Carthage, in the course of which all 
 the smaller Greek cities in Sicily were either totally 
 destroyed, e.g. Selinus, Himera, Agrigentum, Gela, and 
 Messana, or reduced to a state of utter prostration. The 
 island was partitioned between the Syracusans and 
 
120 EISTOBY OF HOME. 
 
 Carthaginians, and on several occasions eauli side in turn 
 was on the point of completely expelling its rival from 
 the island. But gradually the balauce inclined iu favour 
 of the Carthaginians, and, after the failure of the attempt 
 of Pyrrhus to restore the Syracusau fleet, the Carthagi- 
 nians commanded Avithont a rival the whole western 
 Mediterranean ; and their efforts to occupy Syracuse, 
 Rhegium, and Tarentum, show the extent of their power, 
 and the objects they had in view. They shrank from no 
 violence in their attempt to monopolize the whole trade 
 of the West ; any foreigner sailing towards Sardinia and 
 Gades, if apprehended, was thrown into the sea , and the 
 treaty of 306 B.C. closed every Phoenician port except that 
 of Carthage against Roman vessels, which forty-two years 
 before had been allowed to trade with the ports in Spain, 
 Sardinia, and Libya. 
 
 The constitution of Carthage was described by Aristotle 
 as having chauged from a monarchy to an aristocracy, or 
 as a democracy inclining towards oligarchy. The conduct 
 of affairs was directly vested in the hands of a council of 
 elders, which consisted, like the Spartan gerusia, of two 
 kings, annually nominated by the citizens, and of twenty- 
 eight elders also annually chosen by the same body. All 
 the chief business of state was transacted by this council, 
 and the general and his chief officers, who were always 
 " elders," were appointed by it. The kings seem to have 
 had compai'atively little power, and acted as supreme 
 judges. The general was much more of an autocrat, and 
 is described by Roman writers as a dictator ; the term of 
 his office was not fixed, but the gerusiasts attached to him 
 as sub-commanders must have restricted his power, and 
 on laying down his office he had to give an official account 
 of his actions. 
 
 But over the gerusia and the magistrates was the body 
 of the Hundred and Four, or the judges, the bulwark of 
 the Carthaginian oligarchy. Its origin was due to the 
 danger that threatened Carthage of all the power being 
 concentrated in the hands of a single family. Public 
 offices could be bought, and, as the supreme board con- 
 sisted originally of only a few members, this result was 
 not only possible, but did actually occur in the case of the 
 Mago family. The aristocratic opposition brought about 
 
CARTHAGE. 121 
 
 a reform and created this body of the judges. Although, 
 there is considerable obscurity as to the mode of their 
 election and the length of their tenure of office, we may 
 infer from the name of senators, given them by the 
 Greeks and Romans, that they practically held office for 
 life, and that they were elected by some method of 
 co-optation. At first intended to act as political jurymen 
 and hear the accounts of, and, if necessary, punish the 
 general, or any of the gerusiasts, the judges gradually 
 came to interfere in all legislation and thus usurp the 
 functions of those gerusiasts whom they controlled. We 
 can thus easily understand how the generals and states- 
 men of Carthage were perpetually hampered in council 
 and action by the fear of this control. 
 
 The body of citizens seems to have exercised very little 
 influence in Carthage. Open corruption prevailed in the 
 election of gerusiasts ; and, although the people were 
 consulted in the election of a general, their opinion was 
 only taken after the general had been nominated by the 
 gerusia. On other questions the people were only con- 
 sulted if the gerusia thought fit to do so. The citizens 
 possessed no assemblies with judicial functions ; they 
 were split up into political coteries or mess associations, 
 like the Spartan pheiditia, and these were probably guilds 
 under oligarchical management. 
 
 Viewing the Carthaginian constitution as a whole, we 
 may conclude that the government was one of capitalists, 
 such as would arise in a city where there was no rich 
 middle class, but merely a city rabble on the one hand 
 and a class of great merchants, planters, and noble 
 governors on the other. Beguiled by the bribes of the 
 rich governing class, the needy nobles did not, for a long 
 time at least, play the part of leaders of a democratic 
 revolution, and thus, up to the time of the first Punic 
 war, no influential party representing a democratic 
 opposition had arisen. At a later time, due in some 
 measure to the defeats sustained by the Carthaginian 
 arms, such a party arose to prominence, and by its 
 rapidly increasing influence broke down the power of the 
 Carthaginian oligarchy. At the close of the second Punic 
 war Hannibal carried a proposal that no member of the 
 Council of a Hundred should hold office for two consecutive 
 
122 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 years ; and thus a complete democracy was introduced ; 
 but, owing to the corruption prevalent at Carthage, and 
 the ungovernable nature of the body of citizens, such 
 revolutions were powerless to effect the good they brought 
 about in other states. 
 
 Regarded from a financial point of view, Carthage 
 stands pre-eminent among the states of antiquity. Poly- 
 bius calls it the wealthiest city in the world, and indeed 
 it rivalled the London of our own times. The high pitch 
 reached by the Carthaginians in the art of husbandry is 
 attested by the agricultural treatise of Mago, the text- 
 book not only of Carthage but of Rome, which was 
 translated into Greek and edited in Latin by the express 
 order of the Roman senate, for the benefit of Italian 
 landholders. The close connection between agriculture 
 and the management of capital was a special feature of 
 their enlightened system ; no one held more' land than he 
 could thoroughly manage. Thus enriched at home by the 
 well-nigh inexhaustible resources of fertile Libya, whose 
 horses, oxen, sheep, and goats excelled those of all other 
 lands, and drawing a huge rental from her subjects, while 
 abroad she held in her hands the trade and manufactures 
 of the interior as well as of the coasts of the western 
 Mediterranean, Carthage occupied a commercial position 
 up to that time unrivalled in the ancient world; and the 
 whole carrying trade between east and west became 
 more and more concentrated in her single harbour. For 
 science and art Carthage was chiefly indebted to Hellenic 
 influences, and rich treasures were carried off to Carthage 
 from Sicilian temples. Native intellect was subservient 
 to the interests of capital : and therefore her literature 
 bore chiefly upon agriculture and geography, and such 
 subjects as advanced commerce. The same utilitarian 
 view of education caused the Carthaginians to pay special 
 attention to the knowledge of foreign languages. In 
 consequence of the huge accumulation of wealth in the 
 city no direct taxation was found necessary ; and after 
 the second Punic war, when the power of Carthage was 
 broken, it was found possible, by a stricter administration 
 of the finances, to meet the current expenses and pay the 
 yearly instalment of £48,000 to Rome without levying 
 any tax. Carthage anticipated the economical principles 
 
CARTHAGE. 123 
 
 of a later epoch in her financial management of loans and 
 currency. " In fact, if government had resolved itself 
 into a mere mercantile speculation, never would any state 
 have solved the problem more brilliantly than Cartliage." 
 Some comparison between the resources of Rome and 
 Carthage will be a fitting close to this chapter. Both 
 cities were purely agricultural and mercantile, art and 
 science in both playing a subordinate and wholly practical 
 part. In Rome the landed interest still preponderated 
 over the moneyed : in Carthage the reverse was the case. 
 In the former the great mass of citizens tilled their own 
 fields, in the latter the agricultural interest was centred 
 in the hands of large landholders and slave-owners. Thus 
 at Rome, ow r ing to the fact that most of the citizens held 
 property, the tone was conservative ; in Carthage the 
 majority held no property, and were therefore moved 
 alike by the bribes of the rich and the reform-cries of the 
 democrats. Rome still prescribed pristine frugal sim- 
 plicity in her mode of life ; Carthage was the victim of 
 opulence and luxury. 
 
 Politically, the constitution of both was aristocratic. 
 The judges of Carthage and the senate of Rome governed 
 on the same system of police-control. In both cities the 
 individual magistrate was subject to the control of the 
 governing board, but the cruel severity and absurd 
 restrictions visible in the Carthaginian system contrast 
 very unfavourably with the milder and more reasonable 
 powers of the Roman council. Moreover, the Roman 
 senate was open to and filled by men of eminent ability, 
 representatives of the nation in the truest and best sense, 
 while the Carthaginian senate exercised a jealous control 
 on the executive, and represented only a few leading 
 families, and was inspired by a sense of mistrust of all 
 above and below it. Hence the steady unwavering policy 
 of Rome, and the confidence and good understanding 
 generally existing between the senate and its magistrates ; 
 while at Carthage a wavering half-hearted policy was 
 pursued, and the best officers were generally at feud with 
 the governing body at home, and were thus forced to join 
 the reform or opposition party. Again, as to their treat- 
 ment of subject states, Rome threw open her citizenship to 
 one district after another, and made it even legally attain- 
 
12A HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 able by the Latin communities : Carthage never allowed 
 such a hope to be entertained, still less to be realized 
 Rome granted a share in the fruits of victory, and sought 
 to create a party in each state favourable to her own 
 interests ; Carthage reserved to herself all the spoils of 
 victory, and took away from all cities the freedom of 
 trade. Rome allowed a shadow of independence even to 
 the lowest grade of her subject states, and imposed a 
 fixed tribute on none ; Carthage enforced a heavy tribute 
 on even the old Phoenician cities (with the exception of 
 Utica), and treated subject tribes as state slaves. Thus 
 every African community (with the above exception) 
 would have profited by the fall of Carthage, whereas 
 every state in Italy would have lost rather than gained 
 by a rebellion against Rome. The strength of the Roman 
 alliance was shown in the war against Pyrrhus; the 
 landing of Agathocles and Regulns in Africa, and the 
 mercenary war, proved the hollow and rotten nature of 
 the Carthaginian confederacy. In Sicily alone Carthage 
 pursued a wiser and milder policy, owing to her inability 
 to take Syracuse, and thus there was always a party 
 there favourable to her interests. 
 
 The state revenues of Carthage were far superior to 
 those of Rome, but the sources of that revenue — tribute 
 and customs — were exhausted far sooner than those of 
 Rome, and the Carthaginian mode of conducting war was 
 far costlier than the Roman. 
 
 Though very different, the military resources of the two 
 rivals were not unequally balanced. Carthage, at the 
 time of her conquest, still numbered 700,000 citizens, and 
 at the close of the fifth century she could put into the 
 field an army of 40,000 hoplites. Rome's advantage lay 
 not so much in the superiority of numbers, as in the 
 superior physique and character of the Roman husband- 
 man. Neither the Carthaginians nor the Libj-Phoenicians 
 were naturally soldiei's ; the flower of the Carthaginian 
 armies consisted of the Libyans, who made good infantry, 
 and were unsurpassed as light cavalry. Aided by the 
 forces of the dependent tribes of Libya and Spain, and by 
 the famous slingers of the Baleares, as well as by merce- 
 nary foreigners, the Carthaginians could raise their armies 
 to almost any strength ; but a long and dangerous interval 
 
CARTHAGE. 125 
 
 must elapse before such hosts could be collected, and, 
 when assembled, they lacked that unity of interests and 
 ties of fatherland which made the Roman army so formid- 
 able. Moreover, the relations between the Carthaginian 
 officers and the mercenary and Libyan troops were 
 marked by a callous indifference on the one hand, and 
 a dangerous and mutinous dissatisfaction on the other. 
 Officers broke their word to the troops, and even betrayed 
 them, — wrongs which were bitterly avenged by Libyan 
 insurrections. Great efforts were always made by the 
 Carthaginian government to remedy the defects of their 
 military system. Not only were the army chests and 
 magazines kept fully stored, but special attention was 
 paid to all machines of war, aud to the use of elephants. 
 As the Carthaginians did not dare to fortify their de- 
 pendent cities, owing to their fear of their subject states, 
 they spared no pains in making Carthage impregnable. 
 Rome, on the other hand, allowed most of the subject 
 towns to retain their walls, and secured her power by a 
 chain of frontier fortresses throughout Italy. The great 
 strength of Carthage lay in her war-marine, composed of 
 ships and sailors unrivalled in the world. Ships with 
 more than three banks of oars were first built at Carthage, 
 and her quinqueremes were better sailers than the Creek 
 ships of war. In this point Rome was no match, and 
 could not at this period venture into the open sea against 
 her rivals. 
 
 To sum up, the resources of the two great powers were 
 at the outset very equally matched ; but the danger of 
 Carthage lay in the want of a land army of her own, 
 and of a confederacy of states resting on a secure and 
 self-supporting basis. It was plain that neither Rome 
 nor Carthage could be seriously attacked except in the 
 home of her power : but, in the one case, almost insu- 
 
 Eerable obstacles met the invader; while, in the other, half 
 is task was accomplished as soon as he had set foot 
 on African soil. 
 
126 
 
 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 AUTHORITIES. 
 
 Phoenicians.— Strab. 756-760. Thuc. i. 8, 13, 16, 100 ; viii. 81, 87. 
 Carthage ; position, etc. — Strab. 832, sqq. Polyb. i. 73-75. Appian, 
 
 Lib. i. sqq. Plat. Timol. 8. 
 Colonies. — Appian Sp. 2-3. 
 
 Constitution. — Polyb. vi. 51, sqq. Aristot. Pol. ii. 11. 
 Resources.— Strab. 833, sqq. Polyb. iii. 39, vi. 52. 
 
CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 THE FIRST PUNIC WAB, 264-241 B.C. — EXTENSION OF 
 ROMAN DOMINION. 
 
 State of Sicily — Cause of rupture between Rome and Carthage- 
 Roman fleet — Naval victories of Mylae, 260 B.C., and Ecnomus, 
 256 B.c. — Regulus in Africa — Siege of Lilybaeum, and Roman 
 defeat off Drepana, 249 B.C. — Despondency at Rome — Victory at 
 Aegusa, 2-A1 B.C. — Terms of peace — Roman administration of the 
 new provinces — Suppression of Illyrian piracy — Conquest of the 
 Italian Celts. 
 
 As was but natural, the first conflict between Rome and 
 Carthage had its origin in the island which lay between 
 Italy and Africa. After Pyrrhus had been driven from 
 Sicily and Italy in 275 B.C., the Carthaginians were left 
 masters of more than half the island, and were in pos- 
 session of the important town of Agrigentum. Syracuse 
 retained nothing but Taui*omenium and the south-east of 
 the island. We have above (p. 91) alluded to the roving 
 and mercenary character of the Catnpanian youth, who, 
 feeling no strong attachment to their native land, had 
 ever been willing to join the forces of Greek adventurers. 
 On the death of Agathocles a band of these mercenaries 
 had, by an act of odious treachery, seized Messana (cf. 
 p. 106), and in a short time these Mamertines, or men of 
 Mars, as they styled themselves, became the third power 
 in Sicilv. Their increasing strength was not unwelcome 
 to the Carthaginians, who gladly saw a new and hostile 
 power established close to Syracuse. Hiero, the new 
 ruler and able general of Syracuse, made great efforts 
 to rest-ore the city to its former eminence, and to unite 
 
128 HISTORY OF R03IE. 
 
 • 
 the Sicilian Greeks. Being at peace for the time with 
 the Carthaginians, he turned his arms against Messana, 
 at the very time that Rome was taking vigorous measures 
 against the Campanian kinsmen of the Mamertines, who 
 had established themselves in Rhegium. Hiero succeeded 
 in shutting up the Mamertines in their city, and was on 
 the point of successfully terminating a siege which had 
 lasted some years, when the Mamertines in their dire 
 strait turned for help to Rome, and offered to deliver 
 their city into her hands. " It was a moment of the 
 deepest significance in the history of the world, when 
 the envoys of the Mamertines appeared in the Roman 
 senate." If the Romans acceded to their request, they 
 would not only do violence to their own feelings of right 
 and wrong, by receiving into alliance a band of adven- 
 turers stained with the worst crimes, whose very kinsmen 
 in Rhegium they had just punished for the same offence, 
 but they would throw aside their views of establishing 
 a mere sovereignty in Italy for the wider and more 
 dangerous policy of interference with the outside world — 
 a policy which could not fail to bring them into compli- 
 cated relations with powers strictly outside their own 
 land. A war with Carthage, serious as it might prove, 
 was not the only result that might follow such a step; 
 no one could calculate the consequences of so bold a leap 
 in the dark. After long deliberation the senate referred 
 the matter to the citizens; and they, fired by a con- 
 sciousness of what they had already achieved, and by a 
 belief in their future destiny, authorized the senate to 
 receive the Mamertines into the Italian confederacy, and 
 to send them aid at once — 265 B.C. 
 
 The question now was, what would be the action of Car- 
 thage and of Hiero, both nominally allies of Rome, when 
 the news came that the Mamertines were under Roman 
 protection, and that therefore Hiero must desist from 
 his siege of Messana. We have already pointed out (p. 
 10S) that the relations between Carthage and Rome had 
 been somewhat strained by the Carthaginian attempt to 
 occupy Tarentum in 272 B.C. Envoys were now sent 
 to Carthage to demand explanations of this act; but the 
 Carthaginians avoided an open rupture, and did not 
 threaten to regard the meditated Roman invasion of Sicily 
 
THE FIRST PUNIC WAR. 129 
 
 as a casus belli. When, however, the Roman fleet, to- 
 gether with the vanguard of the land army under Gaius 
 Claudius, appeared at Rhegiura in the spring of 274 B.C., 
 news came that Hiero and the Mamertines had accepted 
 the mediation of Carthage, that the siege of Messaua was 
 raised, and the town in the hands of Hanno, the Cartha- 
 ginian admiral. The Mamertines, while thanking Rome 
 for her speedy aid, said that they no longer required it. 
 The Roman general, however, refused to acquiesce in this 
 arrangement, and, despite the warnings of the Cartha- 
 ginians, set sail. Although at first foiled by the Car- 
 thaginian fleet, he succeeded in crossing on the second 
 attempt, and seized the town of Messana, which the 
 cowardly Carthaginian admiral evacuated. Carthage 
 declared war 264 B.C., and a strong fleet under Hanno, 
 the son of Hannibal, blockaded Messana. At the same 
 time a Carthaginian land army laid siege to the town 
 on the north side, and Hiero undertook the attack on 
 the south side of the city. But the Roman consul, Appius 
 Claudius Caudex, crossed over from Rhegium, and, uniting 
 his forces with those of Claudius, surprised the enemy, and 
 succeeded in raising the siege. In the following year 
 (263 B.C.) Marcus Valerius Maximus, afterwards called 
 Messalla, "the hero of Messana," defeated the allied 
 armies of Carthage and Syracuse. Upon this Hiero went 
 over to the Roman side, and continued to be the most im- 
 portant and the firmest ally the Romans bad in the island. 
 The desertion of Hiero and the success of Roman arms 
 forced the Carthaginians to take refuge in their fortresses; 
 and the succeeding year (262 B.C.) practically saw the 
 close, for the time being, of the war in Sicily. The siege 
 of Agrigentum, which was held by Hannibal, son of Gisgo, 
 and the flower of the Carthaginian army, was the main 
 episode in this year. Unable to storm so strong a city, 
 the Romans strove to reduce it by famine, but were 
 themselves cut off from provisions by the arrival of a 
 Carthaginian fleet under Hanno. At last a severe battle, 
 in which both sides suffered heavily, gave Rome the 
 coveted town; although the besieged Carthaginians, 
 during the confusion and exhaustion of their conquerors, 
 managed to escape to their fleet at Heraclea. This victory 
 placed the whole island in the hands of the Romans, with 
 
 9 
 
130 ITISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 the exception of the maritime fortresses, held by the firm 
 grip of Hamilcar, and the coast towns, which were awed 
 into obedience by the all-powerful Carthaginian fleet. 
 The real difficulties of the war were at last beginning 
 to be realized by the Romans, and the necessity of a fleet 
 was clearly recognized. Not only was it impossible for 
 them completely to subdue Sicily while Carthage ruled 
 the sea, but their own coast was continually ravaged by 
 Carthaginian privateers, and their commerce was well- 
 nigh ruined. Therefore they resolved to build a fleet 
 of one hundred quinqueremes and twenty triremes. A 
 stranded Carthaginian man-of-war served as a model to 
 the Roman shipbuilders, and in the spring: of 260 B.C. 
 the great task was accomplished, and the fleet launched. 
 We have above shown in what poor estimation the Romans 
 held naval matters (cf. p. 108), and, even now, not only 
 the sailors but also the naval officers were almost ex- 
 clusively drawn from their Italian allies. To compensate 
 for their ignorance of nautical tactics and manoeuvres, 
 the Romans made great use of soldiers ; and by lowering 
 flying-bridges on to the Carthaginian ships, and fastening 
 them with grappling-irons, they reduced the fight to a 
 land conflict, making it possible to board and capture 
 the enemy's ships by assault. The first great trial of 
 strength took place at Mylae, a promontory to the north- 
 west of Messana, where the Roman fleet under Gaius 
 Duilius encountered the Carthaginian fleet under the 
 command of Hannibal. The Carthaginians, despising 
 their awkward-looking opponents, fell upon them in 
 irregular order; but the boarding-bridges gave the 
 Romans a complete victory, the moral effect of which was 
 far greater than the victory itself. " Rome had suddenly 
 become a naval power, and held in her hand the means 
 of energetically terminating a war, which threatened to 
 be endlessly prolonged, and to involve the commerce of 
 Italy in ruin." In the following year (259 B.C.) the 
 consul Lucius Scipio captured the port of Aleria in 
 Corsica ; but no permanent hold was gained in Sardinia, 
 although the coast was plundered. In Sicily, Hamilcar 
 showed great skill and energy in his conduct of the war, 
 and by political proselytism, as well as by force of arms, 
 baffled the Romans in their attempts to completely oust 
 
THE FIRST PUNIC WAR. 131 
 
 the Carthaginiaus. The small towns inland continually 
 returned to their Carthaginian allegiance, while the 
 fortresses on the coast, of which Panormus and Drepana 
 were the chief, were practically impregnable. The war 
 dragged on without any decisive action. At last, weary 
 of this unsatisfactory state of things, the Romans deter- 
 mined to strike at Carthage in her native land. In the 
 spring of 256 B.C. a powerful fleet of 330 ships set sail for 
 Africa ; on the way, it received on board at Himera, on the 
 south coast of Sicily, four legions under the command of 
 the two consuls, Marcus Atilius Regulus and Lucius 
 Manlius Volso. The Carthaginian fleet, consisting of 
 some 350 ships, had taken up its station at Ecnomus to 
 protect its native shores ; thus, when the two fleets met, 
 each side must have numbered little less than one hundred 
 and fifty thousand men. After an obstinate struggle, in 
 which both sides suffered heavily, the Romans gained the 
 day ; and the consuls, having deceived the Carthaginians 
 as to their place of landing, disembarked, without any 
 hindrance from the enemy, on the eastern side of the gulf 
 of Carthage, at the bay of Clupea. An entrenched camp 
 was formed on a hill above the harbour ; and so confident 
 were the Romans rendered by the success of their plan, 
 that half the army and most of the fleet were recalled 
 home by the senate. Regulus remained in Africa with 
 40 ships, 15,000 infantry, and 500 cavalry. The terror- 
 stricken Carthaginians did not dare to face the Romans 
 in the field; the towns everywhere surrendered, and the 
 Numidians rose in revolt against Carthage. Cowed by 
 this accumulation of disasters, the proud Phoenician city 
 sued for peace, but the exorbitant terms proposed by 
 Regulus were little calculated to render such a solution 
 possible. Under the spur of dire necessity, Carthage 
 evinced that energy and enthusiasm which on such 
 occasions often marks Oriental nations. Hamilcar, the 
 hero of the guerilla war in Sicily, appeared on the scene 
 with the flower of his Sicilian troops ; gold purchased 
 the support both of Numidian cavalry and of Greek 
 mercenaries, among whom was the Spartan Xanthippus, 
 famous for his knowledge and skill in the art of war. 
 During the energetic preparations of Carthage, Regulus 
 remained idle at Tunes ; he still pretended to besiege 
 
132 IUSTORT OF ROME. 
 
 Carthage, and did not even take measures to secure his 
 retreat to the naval camp at Clupea. His folly cost him 
 dear. In the spring of 255 B.C. the Carthaginians wen 
 in a position to take the field ; and Regulus accepted 
 battle without waiting for reinforcements. Roman cour- 
 age availed not against the superior tactics of Xanthippus. 
 Outflanked and surrounded by the Numidian horse, crushed 
 and completely broken up by the elephants, the Romans 
 were almost annihilated. The consul was one of the few 
 prisoners ; about two thousand fugitives reached Clupea 
 in safety. On the news of this disaster reaching Rome, 
 a large fleet at once started to save the remnant shut up 
 in Clupea. After defeating the Carthaginians off the. Her- 
 maean promontory, the Roman ships arrived at Clupea, and 
 carried off what remained of the army of Regulus. Content 
 with accomplishing this, they sailed horaewanls, and thus 
 evacuated a most important position, and left their African 
 allies to Carthaginian vengeance. To crown the misfor- 
 tunes of Rome, a terrible storm destroyed three-fourths of 
 their fleet, and only eighty ships reached home iu safety 
 
 Carthage took a stern vengeance on the revolted Nu- 
 midians, and filled her exhausted treasury with the 
 heavy fines in money and cattle Avhich she exacted from 
 her rebellious subjects. Able now to assum3 the offen- 
 sive, she despatched Hasdrubal, so.i of Hanno, to Sicily, 
 with a force especially strong in elephants. He landed 
 at Lilybaeum, and Sicily once more became the theatre of 
 the war. A new Roman fleet of three hundred ships was 
 despatched thither in the incredibly short space of three 
 months ; and the Carthaginian stronghold of Panormus, 
 with many other places of minor importance, fell into the 
 hands of the Romans. But by land no progress was 
 made, and the Romans did not dare to risk a battle in 
 the face of the overwhelming numbers of Carthaginian 
 elephants. The year 254 B.C. passed by ; and the next 
 year, while returning from a plundering expedition to the 
 coast of Africa, the Romans lost 150 vessels in another 
 storm, owing to their obstinate refusal to allow the pilots 
 to take their own course. The senate, utterly downcast 
 by this disaster, reduced their fleet to sixty sail, and 
 limited themselves to the defence of the coast and the 
 convoy of transports. The land war in Sicily was more 
 
THE FIRST FUNIC WAR. 133 
 
 successful. In 252 B.C., Thermae, the last Carthaginian 
 position on the north coast, and the island of Lipara, 
 yielded to Roman arms ; and in the following year the 
 consul Gaius Caecilius Metellus gained a great victory 
 over the Carthaginian army under the walls of Panormus, 
 owing to the disorder of the elephants, which charged 
 their own side. The Carthaginians could no longer take 
 the field, and in a short time they only retained their 
 hold on Drepana and Lilybaeum. The Romans refused 
 the Carthaginian proposals for peace in 249 B.C., and con- 
 centrated all their efforts on the capture of Lilybaeum. 
 This was the first great siege undertaken by Rome; but 
 the greater adroitness of the Carthaginian sailors and the 
 ability of Himilco, the commander of Lilybaeum, parried 
 all the efforts of the Romans both by sea and land. Foiled 
 in their efforts to take the city by assault, they were 
 forced to attempt to reduce it by blockade ; but they 
 were unable to completely prevent Carthaginian ships 
 from running into the harbour with supplies from Drepana, 
 while the light Numidian cavalry made all foraging both 
 difficult and dangerous on land. In addition, disease, 
 arising from the malaria of the district, thinned the ranks 
 of the Roman land army. Weary of the tedious blockade, 
 the new consul, Publius Claudius, attempted to surprise 
 the Carthaginian fleet as it lay at anchor before Drepana. 
 Completely outmanoeuvred by the Phoenician admiral, 
 Atarbas, the Roman consul fell into the trap set for him, 
 and only escaped by prompt flight himself. Ninety-three 
 Roman vessels, with the legions on board, were captured; 
 and the Carthaginians won their first and only great naval 
 victory over the Romans. Lilybaeum was thus set free 
 from the blockade by sea ; in fact, the remains of the 
 Roman fleet were in their turn blockaded by the Car- 
 thaginian vice-admiral, Carthalo. The latter also took 
 advantage of the folly of the second consul, Lucius Junius 
 Pullns, who was in charge of a second Roman fleet, in- 
 tended to convey supplies to the army at Lilybaeum. 
 Carthalo met this fleet off the south coast, sailing in two 
 squadrons at some distance from each other; interposing 
 his own ships between the squadrons, he forced both to 
 run on shore. A violent storm completed the work begun 
 by Carthaginian assaults, and both squadrons were com- 
 
134 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 pletely wrecked, while the Carthaginians easily weathered 
 the storm out on the open sea. 
 
 Now, if ever, was the time for Carthage to humble 
 her great antagonist. During a war of fifteen years the 
 Romans had lost four fleets, three with armies on board; 
 and one land army had been destroyed in Libya. This, 
 added to the many minor losses by disease, guerilla war- 
 fare, battles by sea and land, had reduced the burgess- 
 roll, from the years 252-247 B.C. alone, by about forty 
 thousand men, without reckoning the losses of the allies, 
 who bore the whole brunt of the war by sea. The loss of 
 ships and war-material, and the utter paralysis of trade, 
 had inflicted incalculable damage. Moreover, every method 
 and every plan had been tried, and Rome was no nearer 
 the end than she was at the outset of the war. In utter 
 despondency the senate no longer felt equal to the task of 
 subduing Sicily ; the fleet was discarded, and the state 
 ships were placed at the disposal of privateer captains, 
 whose unaided valour might perhaps compensate in some 
 degree for the feebleness of the senate. The miserable 
 indolence and weakness of the Carthaginian government 
 alone saved Rome : relieved of the necessity of self- 
 defence, the Carthaginians imitated the example of their 
 enemy, and confined their operations by land and sea to 
 the petty warfare in and around Sicily 
 
 The next six years of uneventful warfare, from 248-243 
 B.C., reflect little credit on Carthage, and still less on Rome. 
 Hamilcar, named Barak or Barca (i.e. lightning), the 
 Carthaginian commander in Sicily, alone showed proper 
 energy and spirit. Aware that the infantry of Car- 
 thage were no match for the Roman legions, and aware 
 that his mercenaries cared as little for Carthage as for 
 Rome, he proved that personal attachment to a general 
 could compensate in the minds of his soldiers for the 
 want of ties of nation and country. He established 
 himself on mount Ercte (Monte Pellegrino), and later 
 captured the town of Eryx, and from these strong posi- 
 tions he carried on a plundering warfare, and levied con- 
 tributions from the plains, while Phoenician privateers 
 ravaged the Italian coast. The Romans were unable to 
 dislodge him from either of his positions, and every day 
 threatened to bring fresh defeat and disgrace to the 
 
TEE FIRST PUNIC WAR. 135 
 
 Roman arms. No Roman general was a match for Hamil- 
 car, and the Carthaginian mercenary had learnt to look 
 the Roman legionary in the face. This gloomy aspect 
 of affairs was completely changed, not by the energy of 
 the Roman government, but by the noble patriotism of 
 individuals. By private subscription a fleet of two hundred 
 ships, manned by sixty thousand sailors, and fitted out 
 with the greatest care, was raised and presented to the 
 state. This fleet, under the consul Gaius Lutatius Ca- 
 tulus, had no difficulty in occupying the harbours of 
 Drepana and Lilybaeum, and prosecuted the siege of both 
 places with great vigour. Carthage, taken by surprise, 
 despatched a weak fleet with supplies to the beleaguered 
 towns, and hoped to effect a landing without interference 
 from the Romans. They were, however, intercepted and 
 forced to accept battle off the small island of Aegusa, in 
 the spring of 241 B.C. The result was never doubtful, 
 and the Romans gained a complete and decisive victory. 
 " The last effort of the Roman patriots had borne fruit ; 
 it brought victory, and with victory peace." 
 
 Peace was concluded at last on terms not wholly un- 
 favourable to Carthage. Sicily, however, had to Le 
 abandoned, and Hamilcar was forced by the incapacity of 
 others to descend from the positions he had occupied for 
 seven years with such conspicuous success. In addition 
 to Sicily, Carthage ceded all the islands between Sicily 
 and Italy. She was also condemned to pay a war in- 
 demnity of £790,000, a third of which was to be paid 
 down at once, and the remainder in ten annual instal- 
 ments. But Hamilcar refused to accede to certain de- 
 mands of the Roman consul ; and the independence and 
 integrity of the Carthaginian state and territory were 
 expressly guaranteed. Both Rome and Carthage bound 
 themselves not to enter into a separate alliance with any 
 dependency of the other, nor in any way to encroach on 
 the rights which each exercised in her own dominions. 
 The dissatisfaction of the patriotic party at Rome was so 
 great, that at first the public assembly refused to sanction 
 the proposed terms of peace. But a commission was 
 appointed to settle the question on the spot in Sicily ; 
 and practically the proposals of Catulus were adopted, 
 and Hamilcar, the unconquered general of a vanquished 
 
136 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 nation, delivered up to the new masters of Sicily the 
 fortresses which had been in the possession of the Phoeni- 
 cians for at least four hundred years ; and in 241 B.C. the 
 West had peace. 
 
 The severe struggle, which thus ended in the extension 
 of Roman dominion beyond Italy, throws a strong and by 
 no means favourable light on the Roman military and 
 political system. Notwithstanding the noble patriotism 
 and heroic energy often exhibited by the citizens, we 
 cannot fail to mark the miserable vacillation shown by 
 Rome in the conduct of this war. The fact is that the 
 organization of the Roman senate and of the military 
 system were only adapted for a purely Italian policy, and 
 a purely continental war. The wide area of the battle- 
 field, the necessity of a fleet, the siege of maritime 
 fortresses, were all hitherto unknown to the Romans. 
 For the solution of such problems the senate, from its 
 composition and ignorance, was quite unfitted : moreover, 
 the system of choosing a new commander every year, 
 often to reverse the plans of his predecessor, was mani- 
 festly absurd. The noble creation of this war — a Roman 
 fleet — was never truly Roman ; Italian Greeks com- 
 manded, and subjects, nay even slaves and outcasts, 
 composed the crews ; naval service was always held in 
 slight esteem when compared with the honour of the 
 legionary. The general, again, as we see in the case of 
 Regulus, could not change his tactics to suit the exigen- 
 cies of the moment. The old idea that any citizen was 
 fit to be a general wa3 true only in rustic warfare, while 
 the notion that the chief command of the fleet should be 
 regarded as a mere adjunct of the chief command of the 
 land army excites our wonder and ridicule. To the 
 energy of her citizens, and still more to the terrible 
 blunders of her adversaries, Rome owed her victorious 
 issue from the first Punic war. 
 
 In the years that followed this peace Rome gradually 
 extended her dominion to what we may term the natural 
 boundaries of Italy, to the Alps in the north and to Sicily 
 in the south. On the expulsion of the Phoenicians, Rome 
 contented herself with allowing her steadfast ally, Hiero, 
 to retain his independence as ruler of Syracuse, and of the 
 neighbouring districts of Elorus, Neetum, Acrae, Leontini, 
 
EXTENSION OF SOMAN DOMINION. 137 
 
 Megara, and Tauromenium ; the rest of Sicily she per- 
 manently appropriated. Meanwhile Carthage, in con- 
 sequence of her cowardly and miserly attempt to dock 
 the pay of the mercenaries of Hamilcar, was engaged in 
 a deadly conflict with her revolted soldiers and her Libyan 
 dependencies, among whom the revolution spread far and 
 wide. The city of Carthage itself was besieged, and not 
 only in Libya but even in Sardinia the insurgents looked 
 to Rome for aid. Some, although she refused to succour 
 the revolted Libyans, availed herself of the treachery 
 of the Sardinian garrisons, and seized possession of that 
 island in 23S B.C. ; shortly afterwards she added Corsica 
 to her new possessions. Carthage, restored by the genius 
 of Hamilcar to her full sovereignty in Africa, demanded 
 in 237 B.C. the restitution of Sardinia; but she did not 
 dare to take up the gage of battle which was promptly 
 thrown down by Rome; and therefore she had to submit 
 to the cession of Sardinia, and, in addition, to pay 1200 
 talents (£292,000). 
 
 The acquisition of Sicily and Sardinia caused an im- 
 portant change in the Roman method of administration, 
 and one which marked the difference between Italy and 
 the provinces, between the conquests of Rome in her own 
 proper land of Italy and those she made across the sea. The 
 necessity of some special magistrate for these transmarine 
 regions caused the appointment of two provincial praetors, 
 one for Sicily, and one for Sardinia and Corsica ; the coasts 
 of these latter islands alone were occupied, and with the 
 natives of the wild interior perpetual war was waged. 
 The two praetors exercised powers very similar to those of 
 the consuls in early times ; the praetor was commander-in- 
 chief, chief magistrate, and supreme judge. One or more 
 quaestors were assigned to each praetor, to look after 
 the finance-administration. With the exception of this 
 difference in the chief power, the same principles were 
 adhered to as those which Rome had observed in organiz- 
 ing her dependencies in Italy. All independence in 
 external relations was taken away from the provincial 
 communities; every provincial was restricted, as regards 
 the acquisition of property, and, perhaps, the right of 
 marriage, to his own community. But in Sicily, at least, 
 the cities retained their old federal organization, and 
 
138 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 their harmless federal diets : the power of coining money 
 was probably withdrawn. The land, however, was left 
 untouched, and each Sardinian and Sicilian community 
 retained self-administration and some sort of autonomy. 
 A general valuation corresponding to the Roman census 
 was instituted every fifth year, and all democratic con- 
 stitutions were set aside in favour of aristocratic councils. 
 
 Another de facto distinction, of great importance, between 
 the Italian and transmarine communities, was that the 
 latter furnished no fixed contingent to the army or fleet 
 of Rome ; they lost the right of bearing arms, and could 
 only use them in self-defence when called upon by the 
 praetor. In lieu of a contingent they paid a tithe of 
 their produce and a tax of five per cent, on all articles of 
 commerce exported or imported ; these taxes were not 
 new to the Sicilian Greeks, who had paid them to the 
 ruling power, whether the Persian king, Carthage, or 
 Syracuse. Certain communities were no doubt exempted 
 from these imposts ; Messana, for instance, was enrolled 
 in the Roman alliance, and furnished its contingent of 
 ships ; other towns, such as Segesta and Halicyae, Centu- 
 ripa and Alaesa, and Panormus, the future capital of 
 Roman Sicily, though not admitted as confederates of 
 Rome, were exempted from taxation. But on the whole 
 the position of Sicilian and Sardinian communities was 
 one of tributary subjection, not of dependent alliance. 
 
 By the possession of Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica, 
 Rome might now call the Tyrrhene sea her own. On the 
 east coast, the founding of Brundisium in 244 B.C. had 
 from the first established Roman supremacy ; the quarrels 
 of the Greek states prevented any rival power arising in 
 Greece itself. But the Adriatic Sea was a prey to Illyrian 
 pirates, and hordes of these tribes, in their dreaded Libnr- 
 nian galleys, defied all authority and ravaged every coast. 
 They established themselves in Phoenice, the most flourish- 
 ing town in Epirus, and at length took possession of the 
 rich island of Corcyra. Urgent appeals from hard-pressed 
 Greek settlements on the Adriatic coast, and constant 
 complaints from Italian mariners, at last caused Rome 
 to interfere, and to send an embassy to Agron, king of 
 Scodra and Illyria, with demands that he should put the 
 evil down. His refusal was met with an insulting threat 
 
EXTENSION OF ROMAN DOMINION. 139 
 
 from one of the Roman envoys, for which all the ambas- 
 sadors paid with their lives. A Roman fleet, with an 
 army on board, appeared to succour the hard-pressed 
 town of Apollonia in 229 B.C., and the corsairs were 
 completely vanquished and their strongholds razed to the 
 ground. The territory of the sovereigns of Scodra was 
 greatly restricted by the terms imposed by Rome ; and 
 much of the Illyrian and Dalmatian coasts, together with 
 several Greek cities in that quarter, was practically 
 reduced under Roman sway, or attached to Rome under 
 forms of alliance. The Greeks submitted with a good 
 grace to the humility of seeing their countrymen delivered 
 from the scourge of piracy by barbarians from across the 
 sea, and admitted the Romans to the Isthmian games and the 
 Eleusinian mysteries. Macedonia was too weak to protest 
 by aught but words, and that part she disdained to play. 
 
 With the exception of a six-days' war with Falerii in 
 241 B.C., nothing broke the peace of Italy proper. But 
 matters were not so settled in the northern district 
 between the Alps and the Apennines, where strong Celtic 
 races still held their ground. South of the Po were the 
 Boii and Lingones, and other minor tribes ; the Ligurians, 
 mingled with isolated Celtic tribes, occupied the Apen- 
 nines to the west, near the sources of the Po ; while the 
 eastern part of the plain to the north of that river, from 
 Verona to the coast, was held by the Veneti, an Illyrian 
 race. Besides these, were the Cenomani, settled near 
 Cremona and Brescia, and the most important of all the 
 Celtic tribes in Italy, the Insubres, who were established 
 around Milan. It was but natural that Rome should now 
 wrest the gates of the Alps from the grasp of the bar- 
 barian, and make herself mistress, not only of the mighty 
 river, navigable for 230 miles, but of the largest and 
 most fertile plain in the then civilized Europe. The 
 Celts, indeed, had begun to stir in 238 B.C., and two years 
 later the army of the Boii, united with the Transalpine 
 Gauls, encamped before the walls of Ariminum. Fortu- 
 nately for Rome, exhausted as she then was by her 
 struggle with Carthage, the two Celtic hosts turned on 
 one another, and thus freed Rome from the threatened 
 danger. In 232 B.C., the Celts, weary of waiting for the 
 outbreak of that contest for Lombardy, which they per- 
 
140 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 ceived was inevitable, resolved to strike the first blow. 
 All the Italian Celts, except the Cenomani and Veneti, 
 took part in the war against Rome ; advancing to the 
 Apennines in 225 B.C., from which quarter the Romans 
 did not expect an attack, they ravaged Etruria up to the 
 walls of Clusium ; and by a clever strategy almost 
 succeeded in cutting off one Roman army before the 
 other could relieve it. Failing in this attempt, the Celts 
 retreated, bat were intercepted at Telamon by some 
 legions which had crossed from Sardinia and landed at 
 Pisae. The consul Gaius Atilius Regulus commanded 
 this force, and at once made a flank attack with his 
 cavalry ; he fell in the engagement, but his colleague, 
 Papus, at the head of the Italian army, now came into 
 action. Despite their desperate resistance against the 
 double attack, the Celts were utterly defeated; and all 
 the tribes south of the Po submitted in the following 
 year (224; B.C.). The next year saw the struggle renewed 
 on the northern side of the river. The valour of the 
 Roman soldiers redeemed the blunder of their general, 
 Gaius Flaminius, and turned what nearly proved a defeat 
 into a glorious victory over the Insubres. Many conflicts 
 took place in 222 B.C., but the capture of the Insubrian 
 capital, Mediolanum, by Gnaeus Scipio, put an end to 
 their resistance. Thus the Celts of Italy were completely 
 vanquished ; and, though in the most northern and remote 
 districts Celtic cantons were allowed to remain, in all the 
 country south of the Po the Celtic race gradually dis- 
 appeared. By extensive assignations of land in the 
 country between Picenum and Ariminum; by carrying 
 the great northern highway, or " Flaminian road," on 
 from Narnia across the Apennines to Ariminum on the 
 Adriatic coast; by planting fortresses and Roman town- 
 ships, e.g. Placentia and Cremona on the Po itself, in the 
 newly acquired territory, the Romans showed their 
 determination to reap the fruits of their late conquests ; 
 but a sudden event checked them while in the full tide 
 of their prosperity. 
 
 AUTHORITIES. 
 
 First Punic loar. — Polyb. i. 5-end ; ii. 22-35. Appian. Sic. 2, sq.; 
 
 Lib. 3-5. Dio. Cass. Fr. 43, sq. 
 Provincial government. — Marq. Stv. i. 242, sqq. 
 
CHAPTER XIV. 
 
 THE SECOND PUNIC, OR HANNIBALIAN, WAR, 218-202 B.C. 
 
 Hamilcar Barca — Founds kingdom in Spain — Hannibal — Capture of 
 Saguntum — Rome declares war — Hannibal reaches Gaul — 
 Passage of the Alps — Rise of the Italian Celts — Battles on the 
 Ticinus and Trebia— Crossing of the Apennines — Battle at Lake 
 Trasimene — War in Apulia — Battle of Cannae — Its results — 
 State of things in Spain, Africa, Macedonia, and Sicily — Attitude 
 of Rome. 
 
 The most shallow -minded Carthaginian can scarcely 
 have regarded the peace with Rome in 241 B.C. as likely 
 to prove lasting. Carthage had, no doubt, long been 
 divided into two parties, the one eager for political reform, 
 the other striving to retain the close oligarchical con 
 stitution. These two parties were now further rent 
 asunder by the cry for war and the demand for peace. 
 To the latter, or peace-party, belonged the gerusia and 
 Council of a Hundred, under the leadership of Hanno; to 
 this party the timorous and indolent, the worshippers of 
 money and place, naturally attached themselves. The 
 war-party found its chief support in the democratic leaders 
 and military officers, among whom Hasdrubal and Hamil- 
 car were pre-eminent ; the wisest, most far-seeing, and 
 most patriotic Carthaginians lent their aid to this section 
 of the state. The successful conclusion of the war against 
 the revolted Numidians, while it made clear to all the 
 genius of Hamilcar Barca, brought out in odious contrast 
 the miserable incapacity of Hanno, and the utterly corrupt 
 and pernicious character of the ruling oligarchy. Great 
 prominence was thus given to the patriotic party ; and, 
 although political reform was impracticable, while Rome 
 
142 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 was all-povvenul and gave her countenance to the 
 treacherous oligarchs, important changes were effected 
 in the military system of Carthage. Hanno was deposed 
 from his command, and Hamilcar was nominated com- 
 mander-in-chief of all Africa for an indefinite period. He 
 could only be recalled by the vote of the popular assembly, 
 and the choice of a successor was made to depend, not on 
 the magisterial board at home, but on the decision of the 
 officers serving in the army. Apparently Hamilcar wa9 
 invested with these dictatorial powers for the purpose of 
 superintending the border- warfare with the Numidians ; 
 but we shall see what a different view he took of the 
 charge committed to him. 
 
 The task set Hamilcar of saving the state by means 
 of the army was calculated to try to the uttermost the 
 abilities of that great man. Not only had he to con- 
 struct an army out of poor material, and to pay his 
 mercenaries out of an ill-supplied chest, but he had also, 
 as leader of a party, to please and delude in turn the 
 venal multitude at home, whose fickle devotion he knew 
 but too well how to appraise. Although still a young 
 man, Hamilcar possibly foreboded his premature fate; 
 and, ere he left Carthage, he bound his son Hannibal, 
 then nine years of age, by the most solemn oath to swear 
 eternal enmity to Rome, and thus he transmitted to his 
 children his schemes, his genius, and his hatred. At the 
 head of a strong army, and accompanied by a fleet under 
 his son-in-law, Hasdrubal, Hamilcar marched westwards, 
 apparently against the Libyans in that quarter ; suddenly, 
 without any authority from the government, he crossed 
 over into Spain, and there laid the foundations of the 
 Spanish kingdom of the Barcides. Of his personal achieve- 
 ments we have no details, save that Cato the elder, on 
 seeing the still fresh traces of his work, exclaimed that no 
 king was worthy to be named by the side of Hamilcar 
 Barca. After nine years of constant war with the Spanish 
 native tribes, when he was beginning to see the result of 
 all his labours, he fell fighting, in 228 B.C. 
 
 For the next eight years, his son-in-law, Hasdrubal, 
 carried on his plans in the same spirit. The adroit 
 statemanship of Hasdrubal consolidated the Carthaginian 
 kingdom in Spain, which the generalship of Hamilcar had 
 
TEE SECOND PUNIC. OR HANNIBALIAN, WAR. 143 
 
 founded. The fairest regions of Spain, the southern and 
 eastern coasts, became Carthaginian provinces ; towns 
 were founded, chief of which was Cartagena on the only- 
 good harbour on the south coast, whose silver mines, then 
 first discovered, a century later produced a yearly yield of 
 more than £360,000. The revenues of the province not 
 only paid for the maintenance of the army, but enabled 
 Hasdrubal to remit a large sum to Carthage every year. 
 The native chiefs were by every means attached to Car- 
 thage, and all the subject communities served as an 
 excellent recruiting-ground for the Carthaginian army. 
 Constant conflicts with the Iberians and Celtic tribes in 
 Spain greatly improved the character of the Carthaginian 
 infantry. The revival of commerce, which thus recouped 
 in Spain what it had lost in Sicily and Sardinia, w r as in 
 itself a sufficient reason for the non-interference of the 
 home government with the plans of Hamilcar and Has- 
 drubal. 
 
 We must ascribe the inaction of Rome during such a long 
 period of brilliant Carthaginian successes to the ignorance of 
 the Romans, who knew very little of so remote a country as 
 Spain, and who, no doubt, at first regarded with contempt 
 the reports furnished them by their spies in Carthage. 
 In 226 B.C., however, the senate warned Hasdrubal not to 
 pass the Ehro, and received into alliance the two Greek 
 towns on the east coast of Spain. Saguntum and Emporiae ; 
 by fixing this limit to the Carthaginian advance, the 
 Romans intended to secure a basis of operations in the 
 country between the Ebro and the Pyrenees, should 
 occasion arise for their active interference in Spain. The 
 delay of the Romans in beginning the second Punic war 
 was due to many causes, but chiefly to their inability to 
 form a true conception of the great scheme which the 
 family of Barca was pursuing with such success. " The 
 policy of the Romans was always more remarkable for 
 tenacity, cunning, and consistency, than for grandeur of 
 conception or power of rapid organization." 
 
 So far fortune had smiled on the Carthaginians. It was 
 not fated that Hasdrubal should attempt to realize the 
 dream of his great predecessor. In 220 B.C., he fell by an 
 assassin's hand, and his place was filled by Hannibal, the 
 eldest son of Hamilcar, then in his twenty-ninth year. 
 
144 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 Despite his youth, the man thus chosen by his comrades, 
 in-arms, was fully worthy of their confidence. Nature 
 had bestowed upon him gifts both mental and physical, 
 which were no mean qualifications for his mighty task ; 
 education and association had completed nature's work. 
 Brought up from his infancy to cherish thoughts of 
 vengeance on Rome, trained as a soldier in early youth 
 under his father's eye, already highly distinguished, as 
 the commander of the Spanish cavalry, alike for personal 
 bravery and for the higher qualities of a leader, Hannibal 
 was specially fitted to carry out the great projects of his 
 father. Anger, envy, and meanness have written his 
 history, but have not been able to mar the pure and noble 
 image which it presents. Combining in rare perfection 
 discretion and enthusiasm, caution and energy, Hannibal 
 was marked in a peculiar degree by the Phoenician cha- 
 racteristic of inventive craftiness. " Every page of the 
 history of the period attests his genius as a general ; and 
 his gifts as a statesman were, after the peace with Rome, 
 no less conspicuously displayed in the reform of the 
 Carthaginian constitution, and in the unparalleled in- 
 fluence which, as a foreign exile, he exercised in the 
 cabinets of the eastern potentates. The power which he 
 wielded over men is shown by his incomparable control 
 over an army of various nations and many tongues — an 
 army which never, in the worst times, mutinied against 
 him. He was a great man ; wherever he went, he riveted 
 the eyes of all." 
 
 Hannibal resolved at once to begin the war, while the 
 Celts in Italy were still unsubdued, and while a war 
 between Rome and Antigonus Doson, the far-seeing ruler 
 of Macedonia, seemed imminent. Unfortunately the death 
 of the latter reduced Macedonia to silence ; while the death 
 of Hasdrubal had again brought the peace-party in Car- 
 thage to the helm of the state. But Hannibal was not 
 to be deterred by the opposition of the miserable politicians 
 at home. Having in vain tried to provoke the people of 
 Saguntum to break the peace, he attacked the town in 
 219 B.C. on the pretext that the Saguntines were oppress- 
 ing the Torboletes, a native tribe subject to Carthage. 
 The authorities at home, whose sanction Hannibal had 
 purposely refused to wait for, did not dare to oppose the 
 
TEE SECOND PUNIC, OR HANNIBALIAN, WAR. 145 
 
 war thus begun. Owing to the supineness of the Romans, 
 who were engaged in war with the Illyrian brigands, 
 Sascuntum fell after a siege of eight months ; and the rich 
 spoils sent home to Carthage roused the people to such a 
 pitch of enthusiasm that they accepted the challenge of 
 war from the Roman envoys, who had been sent to demand 
 the surrender of Hannibal, in the spring of 218 B.C. 
 
 Hannibal entrusted the safety of Spain to his younger 
 brother, Hasdrubal, and sent home about 20,000 men to 
 defend Africa. The fleet remained in Spain to secure the 
 communications between that country and Africa. Two 
 smaller fleets were despatched, the one to ravage the coast 
 of Italy, the other to attempt to surprise Lilybaeum, and 
 to renew the war in Sicily. Hannibal himself, relying on 
 the enmity of the Celts and Ligurians to Rome, determined 
 to make northern Italy the meeting-place, where all foes 
 of Rome might unite and aid him in the achievement 
 of his great enterprise. It is not clear why he chose 
 the land-route, the old pathway of Celtic hordes, in pre- 
 ference to that by sea ; for neither the maritime supre- 
 macy of the Romans, nor their league with Massilia, 
 could have prevented a landing at Genoa. 
 
 In the spring of 218 B.C., with a force of 90,000 infantry, 
 12,000 cavalry, and 37 elephants, he set out from Cartagena 
 to cross the Ebro ; and he inspired all his soldiers with 
 enthusiasm by pointing out the main plan and object of 
 his undertaking. Distracted by the unexpected nature 
 of the danger which threatened them, the Romans seem 
 to have been but little prepared with a settled plan of 
 war, and to have fatally delayed both in aiding Saguntum 
 and in meeting Hannibal on the Ebro ; the losses inflicted 
 on Hannibal by the native tribes, when he forced the 
 passage of that river, show clearly where the Romans 
 ought to have first opposed him. Part of his troops he 
 left behind to secure the newly won country between the 
 Ebro and the Pyrenees, part he sent home on reaching 
 that chain of mountains ; with the rest, amounting to 
 50,000 infantry and 9000 cavalry, all veterans, he crossed 
 the Pyrenees, nor did he meet with any serious resistance 
 until he reached the Rhone, opposite Avignon ; there a 
 levy of Celts, raised by the consul Publius Cornelius 
 Scipio, but not yet united to the consular army, threatened 
 
 10 
 
146 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 opposition. Hannibal, however, by buying up all the 
 available boats, and constructing rafts with great speed, 
 crossed the Rhone at the same moment that the Celts 
 were taken in the rear by a detachment under Hanno, 
 which had three days previously crossed the Rhone much 
 higher up. Scipio, although warned by the Celts of 
 Hannibal's arrival, had delayed fatally at Massilia ; when 
 at last he did move to Avignon, he found that the Cartha- 
 ginians had passed on into the Celtic territory on the 
 Roman side of the Rhone, and could not now be prevented 
 from reaching the Alps. Hannibal had the choice of 
 three routes in crossing the Alps. The coast-route was, 
 however, out of the question, as it was not only barred by 
 the Romans, but would also have taken him away from, 
 his destination. The remaining two routes at that time 
 consisted of the pass of the Cottian Alps (Mont Genevre), 
 which route, though shorter, passes through a difficult 
 and poor mountain country, and of the pass of the Graian 
 Alps (the little St. Bernard). This, though longer, is far 
 the easiest to traverse ; and the route by this pass leads 
 through the broadest and most fertile of the Alpine 
 valleys ; moreover, the Celts favourable to Hannibal in- 
 habited the country on the Italian side of the little 
 St. Bernard, while the Cottian pass led directly into 
 the territory of the Taurini, a Celtic tribe at feud with the 
 Insubres, who were Hannibal's allies. Thus every cir- 
 cumstance tended to make Hannibal choose the pass of 
 the Graian Alps.* 
 
 The march along the Rhone towards the valley of the 
 upper Isere, through the rich country of the Allobroges, 
 brought the Carthaginian army, after sixteen uneventful 
 days, to the foot of the Alps, and there the first dangers 
 were encountered from some cantons of the Allobroges, 
 who made constant assaults on the army during its ascent 
 of the first Alpine chain, and during the descent of the 
 precipitous path that trends sheer down to the lake of 
 Bourget. A welcome rest in the fertile valley of Cham- 
 
 * The question as to the Alpine route of Hannibal is still open. 
 For an able summary of the various views, see pp. 362-372 of Mr. 
 W. T. Arnold's edition of the third volume of his grandfather's history. 
 Strong arguments are there advanced in favour of the Mont Genevre 
 and of the Col d'Argentiere passes. 
 
TEE SECOND PUNIC, OR EANNIBAL1AN, WAR. 147 
 
 bery gave Hannibal time to repair his losses in beasts 
 of burthen and horses. Marching up the Isere, the army 
 now entered the territory of the Ceutrones, whose cour- 
 teous hospitality did but mask their coming treachery. 
 On reaching the narrow track that led to the summit of 
 the St. Bernard, Hannibal found the pass occupied on both 
 sides, and in the rear, by the perfidious Ceutrones. His 
 forethought in sending forward the baggage and cavalry 
 saved him from the intended robbery of his supplies ; but 
 all along the line of his ascent constant conflicts caused 
 not only loss of men and beasts, but confusion and utter 
 despondency in his soldiers' hearts. At last, however, the 
 summit was reached, and, after a brief rest, the perilous 
 descent began ; here the late season, "with its fresh mantle 
 of September snows, proved more terrible than the 
 treacherous attacks of barbarians. But all difficulties 
 gave way hefore the iron will and unshaken confidence of 
 the great general ; and at last the shattered army enjoyed a 
 nobly earned repose in the plain of Ivrea, quartered in the 
 villages of the friendly Salassi, clients of the Insubres. 
 Fortunately for Hannibal, no Roman troops were stationed 
 so far north to await his arrival. The Alps were crossed, 
 and Hannibal had attained his object; but to this end 
 he had sacrificed more than half his infantry and three 
 thousand cavalry. The military value of this wonderful 
 achievement may well be called in question, but the courage, 
 skill, and masterly execution of the plan by Hannibal 
 himself admit of no doubt. " The grand idea of Hamilcar, 
 that of taking up the conflict with Rome in Italy, was 
 now realized. It was his genius that projected this ex- 
 pedition ; and the unerring tact of historical tradition has 
 always dwelt on the last link in the great chain of pre- 
 paratory steps, the passage of the Alps, with a greater 
 admiration than on the battles of the Trasimene lake 
 and of the plain of Cannae." 
 
 Hannibal's airrival in Italy disconcerted the Roman 
 plans. The army of Publius Scipio had already landed 
 in Spain, under the command of Gnaeus, the brother of 
 Publius. The latter, on being foiled by Hannibal at the 
 passage of the Rhone, had himself returned to Pisae with 
 a few troops, and was now in command of the Roman 
 force in the valley of the Po. A fortunate delay had 
 
148 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 prevented the army of the other consul, Tiberius Semprc- 
 nius, from reaching its destination in Africa. Owing to 
 the futile attempt of the Carthaginian squadron to surprise 
 Lilybaeum, and the threatened attack on the Italian coast, 
 Sempronius had passed the summer in securing the 
 Sicilian and Italian coasts against the possibility of sur- 
 prise by Carthaginian fleets. Urgent orders from the 
 senate now recalled him to the defence of Italy. The 
 Boii and Insubres, who had been driven to revolt before 
 the time agreed upon with Hannibal, by the erection of 
 the Roman fortresses in their country, fully occupied the 
 attention of the hard-pressed colonists and of the two 
 legions sent to their aid. Thus Hannibal bad time both 
 to rest his troops, capture the capital of the Taurini, and 
 bring over to his side all the Ligurian and Celtic commu- 
 nities in the upper basin of the Po, before Publius Scipio 
 encountered him. 
 
 The two armies met in the plain between the Ticino 
 and the Sesia, not far from Vercellae, and Scipio was 
 decisively beaten, owing to the overpowering force of the 
 light Numidian cavalry. Scipio himself was severely 
 wounded, and only saved by the spirited devotion of his 
 son, then a youth of seventeen. Scipio at once wisely 
 recrossed the Po, and broke down the bridge over it. 
 But despite his able precautions Hannibal easily crossed 
 the river higher up on a bridge of boats, and again 
 confronted the Roman army, which had withdrawn from 
 its previous position in the plain before Placentia to 
 a very strong position on the hills behind the Trebia. 
 Scipio, although unable to save Clastidium from being 
 plundered, or to extinguish the torch of insurrection now 
 passed on from Celtic canton to Celtic canton, had by this 
 move completely checked the advance of Hannibal ; more- 
 over, he had thus given an opportunity to the second 
 army, which, under Sempronius, had marched by land 
 from Messana to Ariminum, to unite with his own force 
 at Placentia. The Roman army, thus strengthened and 
 occupying a highly advantageous position, might await 
 with confidence the next move of Hannibal. Fortunately 
 for the latter, Scipio's wound caused the sole command to 
 devolve on Tiberius Sempronius, who was fired with im- 
 patience to avenge the previous defeat on the Ticinus, 
 
TEE SECOND PUNIC, OB HANNIBALIAN, WAR. 149 
 
 and the desolation of the villages of such Celts as still 
 remained loyal to Rome. Drawn on by the simulated 
 flight of the enemy's cavalry, the Romans crossed the 
 Trebia* in hot pursuit, and suddenly found themselves 
 face to face with the whole army of Hannibal drawn up 
 for battle. The Roman cavalry proved no match for their 
 opponents ; but the stubborn courage of the infantry 
 resisted every attack both of foot and horse, until a picked 
 force of two thousand Carthaginians under Mago by an 
 attack in the rear decided the day. Even then the first 
 division of the Roman infantry, ten thousand strong, cut 
 their way through the midst of the enemy and succeeded 
 in reaching the fortress of Placentia. The losses of 
 Hannibal in battle fell chiefly on the Celts ; but many of 
 his veterans and all his elephants, except one, perished 
 afterwards of fatal diseases caused by the cold and wet of 
 that bitter December day. This victory made Hannibal 
 master of northern Italy, and the Celtic insurrection 
 spread far and wide without let or hindrance from Roman 
 arms. Hannibal bivouacked for the winter where he 
 was, and organized the Celtic accessions to his army, 
 which are said to have numbered more than sixty thou- 
 sand infantry and four thousand cavalry. 
 
 Despite this brilliant success Hannibal was probably 
 well aware of his true position in Italy. He knew that 
 his chance of ultimate victory depended rather on political 
 than military achievements, upon the gradual loosening and 
 breaking up of the Italian confederation : as long as that 
 confederation remained united, and confronted him with its 
 vaoily superior resources, he no doubt felt that with his 
 inferior infantry, with his precarious and irregular support 
 from home, with the capricious aid of the fickle Celts, he 
 had no hope of humbling to the dust his proud antagonist. 
 Owing to this conviction, Hannibal's conduct of the war 
 in Italy is marked by a constant change both of the 
 theatre of war and of the plan of operations, and also by 
 an earnest endeavour to turn every success to good 
 account by posing as the liberator of Italian cities from 
 
 * On the geographical questions raised by the battles of Trebia, 
 Trasimene, Cannae, and by the passage of the Apennines and the 
 escape from Fabius, see able notes by Mr. W. T. Arnold in his edition 
 above referred to, pp. 373-399. 
 
150 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 the tyranny of Rome. With this object in view he released 
 all the Italian prisoners without a ransom, and charged 
 them to report that he waged war against Rome, not 
 Italy, whose saviour and restorer of ancient powers and 
 independence he professed himself. The Roman prisoners, 
 on the other hand, he loaded with chains as slaves. 
 
 In the early spring of 2L7 B.C., Hannibal set out from 
 the Po ; aud at a point as far west as possible, while the 
 new consul, Gaius Flaminius, lay idle at Arretium, he 
 crossed the Apennines.* His army suffered terrible hard- 
 ships on the other side of the mountains when struggling 
 through the low-lying and flooded country extending be- 
 tween the Sere hi o and Amo, and Hannibal himself lost 
 the sight of one eye from ophthalmia. However, at last 
 he reached the rich laud at Faesulae, where he encamped, 
 having thus completely baffled the consul Flaminius. 
 
 The latter, raised by the popular party at Rome to a 
 second consulship, did not wait for his colleague, Gnaeus 
 Servilius, to leave his useless post at Ariminum, and join 
 him. Fired by his ambition to justify the good opinion of 
 the democrats, and stung by the sight of the devastation 
 which marked far and wide the line of Hannibal's march 
 through Etruria, Flaminius hastily followed, and overtook 
 Hannibal in the district of Cortona. Here Hannibal 
 had chosen his field of battle — a narrow defile between two 
 steep mountains, closed at its outlet by a high hill, and 
 its entrance by the lake Trasimene.* The outlet was barred 
 by the Libyan infantry, and on both sides the cavalry and 
 light troops of Hannibal were posted in concealment. 
 The unsuspecting Romans in the thick mist advanced into 
 the pass. When they drew near the hill at the outlet, the 
 cavalry of Hannibal, at a given signal, closed the entrance, 
 and the mist rolling away revealed the enemy on all sides. 
 There was no battle ; it was a mere rout. Fifteen thou- 
 sand Romans fell, and among them the consul ; and as 
 many more were captured : while Hannibal's loss was but 
 fifteen hundred. The vanguard of the Romans, six thou- 
 sand strong, proved once more the irresistible might of 
 the legion, and cut its way through the opposing infantry; 
 but they were next day surrounded and made prisoners 
 of war by Maharbal, at the head of a squadron of cavalry. 
 * See note on preceding page. 
 
TEE SECOND FUNIC, OB HANNIBALIAN, WAR. 151 
 
 About the same time the cavalry of the army of Servilius, 
 which had been sent forward to support Flaminius, fell in 
 with the enemy and was cut to pieces. All Etruria was 
 lost ; and the Romans broke down the bridges over the 
 Tiber, and nominated Quintus Fabius Maximus dictator, 
 to make all preparations for the defence of the city, upon 
 which it was supposed Hannibal would at once march. 
 
 Hannibal, however, knew better; suddenly marching 
 through Umbria, he carried fire and sword through the 
 territory of Picenum, and then gave a much-needed rest 
 to his army on the shores of the Adriatic. More than this, 
 he here adopted the marvellously bold experiment of 
 reorganizing his Libyan infantry, after the Roman fashion, 
 and of equipping them with the arms taken from the 
 Roman spoils. From here, too, he sent messages of his 
 victory by sea to Carthage. After a sufficient rest and 
 practice of the new method of warfare, he marched slowly 
 along the coast into southern Italy. His hope that the 
 Italian confederacy would now break up was not fulfilled : 
 not a single community entered into alliance with the 
 Carthaginians. 
 
 A new general of very different tactics now confronted 
 Hannibal, in the person of the dictator Quintus Fabius. 
 Elected to counteract the demagogic spirit, which had 
 given the consulship to Flaminius, he was as opposed 
 in strategy as in policy to his predecessor. Determined 
 to avoid a pitched battle, and to wear out Hannibal 
 by small conflicts and deprivation of provisions, Fabius 
 followed Hannibal, as he marched over the Apennines 
 into the heart of Italy and made a futile attempt on 
 the loyalty of Capua. Bitter indeed must have been 
 the feelings of the Roman soldier as from the heights 
 along which Fabius marched was visible the flaming track 
 of ruin and desolation thi'oughout Samnium and Cam- 
 pania, beneath the devastating blight of the Numidian 
 horsemen. At last, however, the patient policy of Fabius 
 seemed to grasp its reward. When Hannibal, foiled in 
 his attempt on Capua, be<*an to retreat, Fabius inter- 
 cepted his route near Casilinum by strongly garrisoning 
 that town on the left bank of the Volturnus, and occupying 
 the heights commanding the right bank with his main 
 army, while a division blockaded the road along that river. 
 
152 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 •"% 
 All his efforts were, however, baffled by the famous ruse 
 of Hannibal, who caused his light-armed troops to climb 
 the heights immediately above the road, and drive before 
 them a number of oxen with lighted faggots on their 
 horns. The Romans, thinking that they saw the whole 
 Carthaginian army marching off during the night by torch- 
 light, abandoned their blockade of the road, and made for 
 the heights. Hannibal thus gained a free passage for his 
 main army, and on the morrow easily disengaged his light 
 troops ; then marching north-east, and laying all the 
 country under contribution as he marched, he proceeded 
 to entrench himself for the winter in the plains of Apulia 
 at Gerunium. Huge stores of grain and supplies were 
 daily amassed by detachments sent out for that purpose. 
 
 Marcus Minucius, the master of the horse, in the absence 
 of the dictator formed a camp not far off, in the territory 
 of the Larinates ; and by some successful engagements 
 with Carthaginian detachments he caused the storm, which 
 had long been brewing at Rome, to break out against 
 Fabius and his policy. The Roman legions felt that they 
 had borne long enough the passive attitude of vigilant 
 observation, and had too long acquiesced in the sight of 
 all Italy spoiled by the invader without striking a blow 
 in her defence. Indeed, the policy of Fabius not only did 
 not save Rome, but never really hindered Hannibal from 
 carrying into execution any single operation he had 
 planned. The outcry at Rome gave rise to the absurd 
 resolution of the people, by which Minucius was appointed 
 co-dictator with the same powers as Fabius, but with a 
 diametrically opposite policy. Minucius, in his eagerness 
 to give effect to his spirited policy, was soon lured into 
 a foolish attack, and only escaped annihilation by the 
 timely rescue of Fabius. Rome, now thoroughly aroused, 
 haughtily declined the offers of money from Hiero of 
 Syracuse, and from the Greek cities in Italy, and deter- 
 mined to send out such a force as had never before been 
 seen : consisting of eight legions, each raised a fifth above 
 the normal strength, with a corresponding number of allies 
 Weary of the dictatorship, and bitterly distrusting the 
 senate, the people elected, in 216 B.C., as consul, Marcus 
 Terentius Varro, whose sole recommendation was his 
 low origin and hot-headed zeal for the popular cause. His 
 
THE SECOND PUNIC, OR HANNIBALIAN, WAR. 153 
 
 colleague was the able Lucius Aemilius Paullus, whose 
 candidature was supported, and with great difficulty 
 carried, by the senatorial party. 
 
 Hannibal had already resumed the offensive in Apulia, 
 and, marching south from Gerunium, took the citadel 
 of Cannae, which commanded the plain of Canusium. 
 Hither came the two new consuls with a united army 
 of eighty thousand infantry and six thousand cavalry, 
 as compared with the forty thousand infantry and ten 
 thousand cavalry of Hannibal. Paullus saw that the 
 wide, open plain was very favourable to the superior 
 horse of his enemy, and therefore constructed two camps 
 higher up the river, the larger on the right bank, 
 the smaller on the left of the Aufidus, hoping thus to 
 compel Hannibal to retire from his position. But the 
 soldiers and his hot-headed colleague were impatient of 
 camp-work, and longed to measure swords with the hated 
 foe. At early dawn, on one of the days on which Varro 
 held the supreme command, the Romans crossed over the 
 river, then almost dry, and took up position near their 
 smaller camp in the wide plain that stretches westward 
 from Cannae. The Carthaginians followed them, and 
 Hannibal formed his infantry in crescent shape, with the 
 Celtic and Iberian troops in the centre to meet the first 
 shock of the serried ranks of the enemy ; the light 
 Numidian horse occupied the open space in the plain 
 facing the Italian cavalry under Varro ; the heavy cavalry 
 under Hasdrubal occupied the ground near the river on 
 the right, and faced the less numerous Roman horse under 
 Paullus. The Roman legions easily overthrew the Celts 
 and Iberians, and pressed on into the centre to complete 
 their success. On the left wing the cavalry action was 
 undecided, but on the right Hasdrubal completely scattered 
 and cut down the Roman horse. Meanwhile the Roman 
 infantry had become wedged in by their eager efforts to 
 follow up their first success, and were unable to deploy 
 their ranks so as to meet the attacks of the Libyan 
 infantry, who closed in upon all sides. At this crisis, 
 Hasdrubal, who had previously completely routed the 
 horse under Varro and left their pursuit to the light 
 Numidian horse, made a third and final charge on the 
 confused ranks of the Roman infantry. All was lost, and 
 
154 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 the Romans merely stood to be butchered. The army 
 was annihilated: seventy thousand Romans lay on the 
 field, while Hannibal lost but six thousand, two-thirds of 
 whom were Celts. Paullus was among the slain, as also 
 the pro-consul Gnaeus Servilius, who had led the infantry, 
 and eighty men of senatorial rank. Varro was not 
 ashamed to survive the disaster, and, saved by his swift 
 steed, reached Venusia ; and the senators, with a noble, if 
 to us ironical, generosity, met him at the gates of Rome, 
 and thanked him for not having despaired of the safety 
 of the state. In addition to those slain on the field of 
 battle, most of the division guarding the Roman camp 
 were made prisoners ; and, as if to crown the disasters of 
 Rome, a little later a legion sent to Gaul fell into an 
 ambush, and was completely destroyed, together with its 
 general, Lucius Postumius, the consul-designate for the 
 coming year. 
 
 Now at last there seemed good hope of realizing that 
 great political combination for the sake of which Hannibal 
 had invaded Italy ; his army had nobly performed its 
 task, and opened the way for the union of the eastern and 
 western foes of the proud city. In one essential quarter, 
 indeed, all chance of succour had been for the time 
 destroyed. Gnaeus Soipio had met with great success 
 in Spain, and was not only master of the country north 
 of the Ebro, but with the aid of his brother Publius, had 
 in 217 B.C. crossed that river, after inflicting a severe 
 defeat on the Carthaginian fleet it its mouth, and advanced 
 as far as Saguntum. Further, in the following year, almost 
 at the same time as the great victory of Cannae, the two 
 Scipios totally defeated Hasdrubal, when attempting to 
 cross the Ebro and bring a fresh army across the Pyrenees 
 to his brother's aid. As far as Africa was concerned, 
 Hannibal had received all the assistance he could hope for 
 from home, though he was continually pinched for want 
 of money wherewith to pay his soldiers. The news of the 
 victory of Cannae made Carthage resolve to send him 
 reinforcements of money and men, and to prosecute the 
 war with energy both in Italy and Spain. Now, too, 
 Philip of Macedon formed his long-deferred alliance with 
 Carthage, and undertook to land an army on the east 
 coast of Italy, in return for the restoration of the lands in 
 
TEE SECOND FUNIC, OR EANNIBALIAN, WAR. 155 
 
 Epirus, which had been wrested from Macedonia by the 
 Romans. Moreover, Hieronynius, the young and incapable 
 successor of the shrewd fiiero, joined the side of the 
 Carthaginians ; and the ivnited fleet of Syracuse and 
 Carthage at once rendered the position of the Romans at 
 Lilybaeum most critical. But, above all, signs were at 
 last visible that the Italian confederacy was losing its 
 cohesion, and throwing off its allegiance to Rome. Arpi 
 in Apulia, and Uxeutum in Messapia, all the towns of the 
 Brut-tii, must of the Lucanians, the transplanted Picentes 
 near Salernum, the Birpini, the Samnites with the excep- 
 tion of the Pentri, and Capua, the second city in Italy, 
 with the neighbouring towns of Atella and Calatia, passed 
 over to the side of Hannibal. The aristocratic party in 
 all these places vehemently opposed the change of sides, 
 and their bitter opposition, especially in Capua, produced 
 internal conflicts, which greatly lessened the advantage 
 derived by Hannibal from these secessions. On the other 
 hand, the south Italian and Campanian Greeks remained 
 firmly loyal to Rome, despite their perilous position and 
 the attacks of Hannibal ; naturally, too, all the Latin 
 colonies in southern and central Italy presented an un- 
 yielding front to-thc enemy. 
 
 Such were the direct consequences of the day of 
 Cannae, a cruel but just punishment for the grave political 
 errors of the Roman people. The war with Hannibal 
 had revealed, with fatal clearness, the absurdity of the 
 method of electing generals, and the still greater danger 
 of such a method when, as in the case of the two con- 
 suls Flaminius and Varro, it became the tool of party 
 and the two-edged instrument, of deuuagogisin. It was 
 clear that, to work the deliverance of the state, the 
 breach between the senate and the citizens must be 
 healed, and that the government and the governed must 
 unite in the great cause with a trustful confidence in each 
 other. It was clear, too, that the selection of generals 
 must depend upon the one stable element in the state, 
 the senate ; and that their choice, no longer subject to 
 the suspicion of party favouritism, but based upon the 
 necessary qualities of a leader, must be heartily ratified 
 by a united people. The noble and patriotic manner in 
 which the senate performed its task, and healed the party 
 
156 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 quarrels by abstaining from all recriminations, constitutes 
 its glorious and imperishable honour. Quintus Fabius 
 took the lead in all the defensive measures, aud the praetor, 
 Marcus Claudius Marcellus, whose destination previous to 
 the battle of Cannae had been Sicily, was appointed to 
 the chief command of the hastily collected army. Every 
 nerve was strained to gather troops aud supply arms. 
 All those above boyhood were ralWl out, debtor-serfa nnd 
 criminals were armed, and even eight thousand slaves 
 were incorporated in the array. All proposals from 
 Hannibal touching a ransom of captives were contemptu- 
 ously rejected ; no word, no action, was suffered to have 
 even the semblance of a thought of peace, while Hannibal 
 was still in Italy and Cannae unavenged. 
 
 AUTHORITIES. 
 
 Second Punic war — Cannae. — Pol vb. ii. 1, 36 ; iii. 8-21, 29-end ; vi. 
 58. Liv. xxi. xxii. xxiii.-c. 30. Plut. Q. Fabius. Appiaa Sp. 
 3, sqq. ; Harm. 1-28 ; Lib. 0, sqq. 
 
CHAPTER XV. 
 
 FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA. 
 
 Harcei^s — War in Campania and Apulia — Siege of Syracuse — End 
 of war in Sicily —Philip of Macedonia — Spanish war — Defeat 
 and death of the Scipios — Publius Scipio— Capture of New 
 Carthage — Conquest of Spain — War in Italy — Fall of Capua — 
 Weariness of Roman allies — Hasdrubal in Italy — Battle of the 
 Metaurus — Scipio in Africa — Recall of Hannibal — Battle of 
 Zama — Peace — Results of the war in and out of Italy. 
 
 The closing act of the second Punic war shifts the scene 
 of active operations once more to Sicily, where the petty- 
 jealousy of Carthaginian generals was as potent a factor 
 in the final triumph of Rome as the ability of her com- 
 manders and the prowess of her soldiers. From Sicily we 
 turn again to Spain, where the genius and good fortune 
 of Publius Scipio revived the drooping spirits of his 
 countrymen by a series of brilliant successes : finally, with 
 Hannibal, we strain our anxious gaze to the mighty Alpine 
 wall, and await the coming of Hasdrubal to join hands 
 with his great brother, and shake Rome to her foundations 
 in her native land. 
 
 In Italy itself the war flagged. The gradual decline 
 of Hannibal's power dates really from his victory at 
 Cannae. He had gained all that he could hope for by 
 mere force of arms, but the Roman confederation in 
 central Italy still presented an unbroken front to his. 
 invincible army. The support of the Sabellian com- 
 munities was not such a gain to Hannibal as it would 
 have been in earlier days, when the Sabellian youtn was 
 trained to arms and when their land was not over-awcd 
 
158 HISTORY OF HOME. 
 
 by Roman fortresses. The great difficulty of taking 
 fortified towns prevented a single battle from being so 
 decisive as it is in our own days. Further, Rome had 
 grown wiser, and the selection of Marcus Claudius Mar- 
 cellus as commander of the forces in Italy contributed 
 in no small degree to Rome's preservation. Hannibal 
 could no longer hope that Roman armies would remain 
 inactive spectators on mountain heights, while he laid 
 waste the valleys below ; nor that rash and inexperienced 
 generals would leave the protection of their own fortresses 
 and meet him on battle-fields specially chosen by himself. 
 At first, indeed, Hannibal's advance into Campania from 
 the field of Cannae met with conspicuous success. Capua, 
 Nuceria, Acerrae, joined him ; Casilinum, the key of the 
 Volturnus, fell after an obstinate siege in 215 B.C. But 
 the important ports of Neapolis, Cumae, and Nuceria 
 remained faithful to Rome, and Nola was secured in its 
 fidelity by the activity of Marcellus, who repulsed Hannibal 
 with considerable loss in 216 B.C. The winter of this year 
 was passed by Hannibal in Capua, and the luxury of this 
 town had a pernicious effect on his troops, who for three 
 years had not been under a roof. 
 
 In 215 B.C., the Romans took the field with three armies : 
 one, under Marcellus, posted near Nola ; a second, under 
 the veteran Qaintus Fabius Maximus, encamped near 
 Cales ; a third, under Tiberias Sempronius Gracchus, 
 covering the coast and the ports of Neapolis and Cumae. 
 Thus Hannibal was watched on all sides, and the invest- 
 ment of Capua was threatened. An attempt by the Cam- 
 panians to surprise Cumae was completely frustrated by 
 Gracchus, who not only defeated the Campanians, but 
 even worsted Hannibal when he appeared to avenge the 
 defeat of his allies. 
 
 A fourth Roman army meanwhile, under the praetor 
 Marcus Valerius, had taken up its position at Luceria, 
 and in conjunction with the force under Marcellus caused 
 great annoyance to Hannibal's allies in Apulia and Lu- 
 cania. To relieve these, Hannibal again attacked Mar- 
 cellus, and again suffered defeat beneath the walls of 
 Nola. 
 
 This succession of misfortunes obliged Hannibal to 
 evacuate Campania and march to Arpi, where he might 
 
FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA. 159 
 
 in person put a stop to the further progress of the 
 Romans in Apulia. Gracchus followed him, leaving the 
 other two Roman armies to arrange for the attack on 
 Capua in the coming spring. 
 
 It was clear to Hannibal that the offensive was no 
 longer possible, and that the defensive became daily- 
 more difficult. The accomplishment of his great purpose 
 depended on the strenous co-operation of the govern- 
 ment at Carthage, on the success of the Carthaginian 
 generals in Spain, and on the long-promised aid of 
 Philip of Macedon. But the peace party in Carthage, 
 after the first impressions of the victory of Cannae had 
 died away, regained the ascendancy, and, with the ex- 
 ception of a small force of four thousand Africans, no 
 adequate reinforcements reached Hannibal from Carthage. 
 To this miserable short-sightedness and indolence of the 
 Carthaginian citizens the safety of Rome was in no small 
 measure due. Compelled to turn for help from his 
 native land to Spain, Macedonia, and Sicily, Hannibal 
 caused the interest of the war, so far as active operations 
 were concerned, to centre in those countries ; his allies 
 there renewed their exertions to reach out to him the help 
 his own country refused, while the Romans strained every 
 nerve to confine Hannibal's allies to their respective 
 countries and to prevent reinforcements reaching him. 
 Thus, although Italy plays a somewhat passive part in the 
 future events of the war, "all efforts were directed towards, 
 as all interest centred in, the removal or the continuance 
 of Hannibal's isolation in southern Italy." Had Hannibal 
 been able to bring into play the united forces of Carthage, 
 Spain, Sicily, and Macedonia, the overthrow of Rome 
 would have been well-nigh certain ; but in no quarter did 
 matters go well for him. The activity and success of the 
 two Scipios in Spain held Hasdrubal in check ; and the 
 reinforcements sent thither from Carthage failed to produce 
 much effect. An attempt to secure Sardinia was baffled 
 by Titus Manlius Torquatus, who completely destroyed 
 the Carthaginian force in 215 B.C. The assassination of 
 Hieronymus at the close of the same year left the state 
 of Syracuse in great confusion ; and Hippocrates and 
 Epicydes, emissaries of Hannibal, counteracted a tendency 
 on the part of the chief Syracusans to return to their old 
 
ISO HISTORY OF ROME 
 
 alliance with Rome. Marcellus himself was sent over to 
 finish the war in Sicily in 214 B.C. Owing to the dread 
 of Roman vengeance and the passionate enthusiasm for 
 liberty which Hannibal's emissaries had excited in the 
 Syracusan multitude, Marcellus was obliged to lay siege 
 to the city, and after eight months to convert the siege 
 into a blockade. 
 
 The defence of Syracuse was notable alike for the 
 famous ingenuity of the great engineer, Archimedes, 
 and for the efforts made by Carthage in its behalf. A 
 strong army landed under Himilco, and occupied Asrri- 
 gentum ; this army was joined by a force under Hip- 
 pocrates, the able commander of Syracuse. A combined 
 attack on the Roman besieging army failed, and the 
 relieving armies were compelled to encamp on the low, 
 marshy grounds along the Anapus. The deadly pestilence 
 engendered in those districts swept off the troops, while 
 the Romans remained unscathed in their quarters, winch 
 they had transferred to a part of the suburbs, surprised by 
 them not long before during a festival of the Syracusans. 
 The survivors of the Carthaginian and Syracusan armies 
 dispersed into the neighbouring towns, and Epicydes, the 
 successor of Hippocrates as commander of Syracuse, aban- 
 doned the city as lost. Shortly afterwards, Syracuse 
 surrendered, in 212 B.C., and was completely sacked by 
 the soldiers of Marcellus, Archimedes being among the 
 slain. Syracuse was deprived of its freedom and was 
 classed among the communities that paid tribute to Rome. 
 
 All Sicily seemed lost t > the Carthaginians, whose force 
 at Agrigentum, under Hanno and Epicydes, dared not 
 make a move against the triumphant Romans. But 
 Hannibal's influence, and the ability of one of his Libyan 
 cavalry officers, Mutines, whom Hannibal sent from Italy, 
 carried on a guerilla warfare throughout the island with 
 great success. Mutines, at the head of the Nnmidian 
 cavalry, even succeeded in worsting Marcellus himself. 
 Hanno, however, as appointed by the Carthaginian govern- 
 ment, was jealous of the success of one of Hannibal's 
 officers ; insisting upon giving battle to Marcellus against 
 the advice of Mutines, he was utterly beaten. Mutines 
 still gained brilliant successes, which only served to 
 aggravate the stupid jealousy of Hanno ; the latter even 
 
FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA. 161 
 
 deposed him from his command of the cavalry, and gave 
 it to his own son. In indignation at such treatment, 
 Mn tines delivered up Agi'igentum to the Roman general 
 Marcus Valerius Laevinus, and thus put an end to the 
 war in Sicily in 210 B.C. Carthage made no further effort 
 to regain her former position in that island, which was gra- 
 dually reduced to order and tranquillity under Roman rule. 
 Hannibal might with good reason have looked for more 
 substantial aid from Macedonia. In Greece generally 
 there was a strong outburst of national patriotism ; 
 internal discord had been healed and peace established 
 in 217 B.C. between Philip and the Aetolian league. 
 But in Greece, as in Carthage, a national leader was 
 wanting to give effect to the national ardour of the 
 moment. Philip of Macedon lacked that enthusiasm and 
 faith in the Greek nation which alone could have fitted 
 him for such an enterprise. " He knew not how to solve 
 the arduous problem of transforming himself from the 
 oppressor into the champion of Greece." After a futile 
 attempt to take Apollonia in 216 B.C., and after constantly 
 threatening but never daring to carry out his promised 
 descent on the east coast of Italy, he made a useless 
 attack on the Roman possessions in Epirus in 214 B.C. 
 The energetic action of the Romans, who crossed over from 
 Brundisium and stormed his camp, cowed him back into 
 inaction. Nor was he roused out of this inertness until 
 a coalition, headed bv the Aetolians, and joined by the 
 old Greek enemies of Macedonia, and supported by Rome, 
 forced him to bestir himself. In the long and dreary war 
 that followed, Philip repelled the attacks of his foes with 
 vigour and success, but Hannibal soon ceased to look 
 eastward for aid. The war itself bore no fruit, except 
 that it exhausted the Greek states and rendered them the 
 easier prey to Roman oppression. Worn out by useless 
 conflicts, at last Philip made peace with the Aetolians in 
 205 B.C., and then with Rome : a peace favourable, indeed, 
 to Philip, in so far as it left matters in much the same 
 position as they were at the beginning of the war ; but 
 disastrous to him and to the Greek nation as a whole, 
 since by it "the grand and just combination, which 
 Hannibal had projected and all Greece had for a moment 
 joined, was shattered irretrievably." 
 
 11 
 
162 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 In Spain the struggle was sharpest, and was marked by 
 the vicissitudes incidental to the character of the country 
 and habits of the people. Neither Rome nor Carthage had 
 brought into Spain a force sufficiently powerful to termi- 
 nate the contest ; therefore both sides had to have recourse 
 to native help; but the natives regarded neither side with 
 ardent partisanship, and they were never to be depended 
 upon for persistent and united action. For a time, indeed, 
 the two Roman generals, Publins and Gnaeus Scipio, were 
 brilliantly successful. Not only did they firmly secure 
 the barrier of the Pyrenees, but they established a new 
 Rome, as a rival to Nova Carthago, in the city of Tarraco, 
 and penetrated Andalusia in 215 and 214 B.C. In the 
 latter year they almost reached the Pillars of Hercules, 
 and extended the Roman protectorate in southern Spain, and 
 regained and restored the important town of Saguntum ; 
 at the same time they raised up a powerful enemy to 
 Carthage, in the African prince Syphax, who ruled in the 
 modern provinces of Oran and Algiers. A revolt was 
 excited by Syphax among the Libyan dependencies of 
 Carthage, to quell which Hasdrubal Barca took the flower 
 of his Spanish troops in 212 B.C. Syphax was defeated 
 by the brave Massinissa, son of Gala, king of the modern 
 Constantine and ally of Carthage, and was compelled to 
 make peace with Carthage. The Libyan revolt was easily 
 quelled, and Carthage wreaked her usual vengeance on the 
 rebels. 
 
 Hasdrubal proceeded to Spain in 211 B.C., followed 
 by Massinissa, who commanded the Numidian cavalry, 
 and three Carthaginian armies took the field. The two 
 Scipios were thus surprised while plundering the Cartha- 
 ginian territory in Spain. Instead of retreating, they 
 took into their pay 20,000 Celtiberians, and divided their 
 forces so as to face the three armies of the enemy. Has- 
 drubal easily induced the Celtiberians by a sum of money 
 to leave the Romans to their fate. Hemmed in on all 
 sides, while attempting to retreat, the two armies, with their 
 brave commanders, were cut to pieces. The result of this 
 twofold disaster was that Carthage was again paramount 
 in all Spain south of the Ebro. 
 
 In the following year, Rome was enabled, by the fall of 
 Capua, to despatch a force of 12,000 men, under the pro- 
 
FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA 163 
 
 praetor Gaius Claudius Nero, to check the Carthaginian 
 advance in Spain. Nero was not unsuccessful on the field, 
 but his strategic ability was more than counterbalanced by 
 his harshness and inability to deal with the natives. The 
 senate, aware of the great exertions which were being 
 made in Carthage to send Hasdrubal and Massinissa with 
 a powerful army across the Pyrenees to Italy, resolved to 
 send an extraordinary general with a numerous force to 
 Spain. His nomination, if we may credit the story, was left 
 to the people. At first no one in Rome offered himself as a 
 candidate ; but at last Publius Scipio, son of the Publius 
 Scipio who had fallen in Spain, although not properly 
 qualified for the office, came forward. The youth, personal 
 beauty, enthusiasm, military distinctions gained on the 
 fields of Trebia and Cannae, and political eminence of 
 Publius Scipio were of themselves calculated to deeply 
 impress the people of Rome : the thought that a youth of 
 twenty-seven, who had merely held the offices of aedile 
 and miltary tribune, was thus suddenly raised to the 
 highest and proudest office in the state at a time of 
 great peril, and was going forth to avenge a father's death, 
 rendered that impression indelible, and has coloured the 
 story with romantic details. Although lacking the energy, 
 and iron will, and statesmanlike grasp of such men as 
 Caesar and Alexander, Publius Scipio was eminently cal- 
 culated to inspire others with his own enthusiasm. His 
 personal qualities, both of appearance and manner ; his 
 graceful oratory ; his happy union of Hellenic culture and 
 Roman patriotism ; above all, his intense belief in himself 
 as one specially favoured by the gods, served to cast a 
 romantic glamour round his name, and to kindle in men's 
 hearts a fervent belief that a true prophet and divinely 
 inspired saviour had arisen to give victory and peace to 
 his country. 
 
 On being elected general, Scipio proceeded to Spain 
 in 210 B.C., accompanied by the propraetor Marcus Si- 
 lanus, and by his friend Gaius Laelius as admiral, with 
 a strong force and well-filled chest. He at once suc- 
 cessfully executed one of the boldest coups- de-main known 
 in history. All the three Carthaginian generals were at 
 least ten days' march from Nova Carthago. Suddenly, 
 early in the spring of 209 B.C., Scipio appeared before the 
 
164 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 weakly garrisoned town with his whole army and fleet. By 
 engaging the attention of the garrison with an attack from 
 the land side, Seipio had no difficulty in scaling the un- 
 defended walls from the harbour side, where at ebb-tide a 
 land passage was left open to his troops. The capture of 
 the Carthaginian capital, apart from the immense stores 
 thus thrown into the conqueror's hands, completely re- 
 stored Roman prestige in Spain. Scipio's command was 
 indefinitely prolonged, and not only were the passes of 
 the Pyrenees, and all the country north of the Ebro, 
 secured, but incui'sions were successfully made into Anda- 
 lusia. Rendered over-confident by success, Seipio ex- 
 tended his operations over too large an area, and, when 
 in Andalusia, he encountered Hasdrubal Barca at Baecula, 
 in 208 B.C., on his march northward to his brother's aid. 
 Seipio claimed the victory, but Hasdrubal attained his 
 object, and succeeded in crossing the Pyrenees, and taking 
 up his quarters in Gaul for the winter. On Hasdrubal's 
 departure, the two other Carthaginian generals retired to 
 positions of safety, and left all active warfare to the light 
 cavalry of Massinissa. 
 
 Fresh armies were sent from Carthage in 207 and 
 206 B.C. ; but in both years the Romans were successful. 
 In the latter year, Seipio fought a second battle at Baecula 
 against the enemy, who numerically were far superior, 
 and by this battle decided the question as to which 
 power should rule in Spain. Hasdrubal, the son of Gisgo, 
 and Mago, the youngest of Hamilcar's sons, were com- 
 pletely defeated, and escaped to Gades. Mago held the 
 latter place, and for a moment the illness of Seipio 
 and mutiny of one of his corps, owing to arrears of pay, 
 encouraged the hope that a national insurrection would 
 take place in Spain against the Romans, and restore to 
 Carthage her lost supremacy. Seipio, however, speedily 
 recovered, and quelled the tumult ; and Mago, by order of 
 the Carthaginian government, collected what ships and 
 troops he could, and set sail for Italy. Gades, the first 
 and last of Carthaginian possessions in Spain, submitted 
 on favourable terms to the Romans ; and thus Spain, after 
 a struggle of thirteen years, became a Roman province. 
 Seipio resigned his command, and returned to Rome in 
 206 B.C. 
 
FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA. 165 
 
 Meanwhile the great conflict in Italy had been continued 
 without interruption. After Hannibal's departure, the 
 north of Italy had been reoecupied by the Romans, 
 whereas all lower Italy, as far as Mount Garganus and 
 the river Volturnus, with the exception of the fortresses 
 and most of the ports, was in Hannibal's hands. His 
 main army lay at Arpi, and was confronted by four legions, 
 under Tiberius Gracchus ; further south, and as yet 
 opposed by no Roman force, a second Cartbaginian army, 
 under Han no, held possession of all the Bruttian land. 
 The main Roman army, under the two consuls Quintus 
 Fabius and Marcus Marcellus, was occupied with the 
 attack on Capua. An estimate of all the Roman forces 
 employed at this time in Italy, Sicily. Spain, and Sardinia, 
 can scarcely fix the number at less than 200,000 men. 
 The finances of Rone, especially those derived from the 
 land-tax, were terribly embarrassed ; and the culture of 
 the fields, where possible, must have been left to slaves, 
 old men, women, and children. Still, Rome gradually re- 
 covered what she had so rapidly lost ; her forces increased, 
 those of Hannibal diminished ; her commanders were no 
 longer mere citizen -generals, but experienced and able 
 officers of the stern school of Marcellus. 
 
 Hannibal, unable even to protect his Italian allies, had 
 to play the waiting game, until Philip of Macedon or his 
 brothers in Spain should come to his aid. " We hardly 
 recognize in the obstinate defensive system which he now 
 began, the same general who had carried on the offensive 
 with almost unequalled impetuosity and boldness : it is mar- 
 vellous in a psychological, as well as in a military point of 
 view, that the same man should have accomplished the two 
 tasks prescribed to him — tasks so diametrically opposite 
 in their character — with equal completeness." His efforts 
 were at first chiefly directed to preventing the investment 
 of Capua, in which for a time he was successful. But in 
 214 B.C., among other towns, the important position of 
 Casilinum was retaken by the consular army ; and Hanni- 
 bal failed in an attempt to capture Tarentum. In the 
 same year, Tiberius Gracchus gained several successes over 
 Hanno's Bruttian army, and, after a victory near Bene- 
 ventum, he gave liberty and citizenship to the slave- 
 soldiers fighting in the ranks. The following year was 
 
160 HISTOllY OF ROME. 
 
 equally favourable to Rome. Arpi was recovered, and 
 several Bruttian towns passed over to Rome ; even a 
 Spanish division deserted the Carthaginian army and 
 enlisted on the Roman side. In 212 B.C. Rome outraged 
 Greek feeling by putting to death all the hostages of 
 Tarentum and Thurii, who had been induced by Hannibal 
 to attempt to escape. As a result of this senseless revenge, 
 Tarentum opened her gates to Hannibal, though her 
 citadel still remained in possession of the Romans ; and 
 Heraclea, Thurii, and Metapontum, shortly afterwards 
 followed her example. The same year saw the death of 
 Tiberius Gracchus and the dispersion of his army, which 
 had been posted on the Appian Way to prevent Hannibal's 
 approach to Capua. Betrayed by a Lucanian, Gracchus 
 fell, and Hannibal raised the blockade of Capua, which the 
 other two consuls had begun. Various cavalry successes 
 were also gained by the Phoenician horse, and two Roman 
 forces were completely defeated in Apulia and Lucania. 
 
 Despite these successes, as soon as Hannibal left Capua 
 for Apulia, three Roman armies, under Appius Claudius, 
 Quintus Fulvius, and Gaius Claudius Nero, gathered and 
 strongly entrenched themselves round the doomed Capua. 
 Towards the close of the winter 212-211 B.C. provisions 
 were almost exhausted, and urgent messages were sent to 
 Hannibal at Tarentum requesting his immediate succour. 
 Hannibal at once set out and encamped on Mount Tifata, 
 close to Capua ; but the Romans refused to stir from their 
 entrenchments, despite the insulting onset of the Numidian 
 and Campanian cavalry as they dashed against their 
 lines. As a last resource, Hannibal tried to draw off the 
 Roman armies by a rapid march towards Rome. Passing 
 through Samnium, and along the Valerian Way past 
 •Tibur, he crossed the bridge over the Anio, and encamped 
 on the opposite bank, five miles from the city. The two 
 legions in the capital prevented any successful operations 
 against Rome itself. In truth there was no real danger. 
 Hannibal had never hoped to surprise the city, but merely 
 to draw off the legions around Capua, and raise the 
 blockade. But the Roman generals refused to be lured 
 from their Capuan lines. 
 
 The consul Publius Galba followed Hannibal on his 
 retreat from Rome ; suddenly Hannibal turned on him 
 
FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA. 167 
 
 and utterly defeated him, capturing his camp by storm. 
 This was but a poor compensation for the inevitable fall 
 of Capua. This city, after a siege of two years, capitu- 
 lated, and suffered a terrible revenge at the hands of the 
 exasperated Romans. Her chief magistrates were scourged 
 and executed, many citizens were sold into slavery, the 
 property of the rich was confiscated, and the old consti- 
 tution abolished. The fall of Capua gave a tremendous 
 shock to the respect and confidence which Hannibal had 
 enjoyed among the Italian allies, and Roman arms straight- 
 way recovered that ascendancy which the secession of 
 Capua had shown them to have lost. The citadel of 
 Tarentum still held out, and an attempt of Hannibal to 
 surprise Rhegium had previously failed. 
 
 Rome now felt confident as to the issue of the war in 
 Italy, and was for the first time able to reduce the 
 number of her legions, and also to despatch large rein- 
 forcements to Spain. The following year, 210 B.C., 
 saw Rome prosecute the war in Italy with less vigour. 
 Marcellus infused his wonted energy into the struggle in 
 209 B.C., and, after a two-days' battle, gained a costly 
 victory over Hannibal. Tarentum soon after was sur- 
 rendered by the treachery of its garrison to the veteran 
 Quintus Fabius, then consul for the fifth time. The city 
 was pillaged, and the inhabitants sold as slaves. Hannibal 
 arrived too late for its relief, and retired to Metapontum. 
 By the fall of Tarentum, and the loss of all his most im- 
 portant acquisitions, he was gradually hemmed in to the 
 south-western point of the peninsula. 
 
 In the following year, Marcus Marcellus, chosen as 
 consul with Titus Quintius Crispinus, hoped to strike a 
 decisive blow. Fortune, however, willed otherwise, and 
 robbed the aged general of the laurels which he, more 
 than any other Roman, deserved. Surprised during a 
 reconnaissance near Venusia by a strong force of African 
 cavalry, Marcellus fell fighting, and his colleague died 
 afterwards of his wounds. The war had now reached its 
 eleventh year. The material distress of Rome was 
 terrible : the exchequer was utterly impoverished, the 
 lands lay fallow, and starvation was only averted by corn- 
 supplies from Egypt ; the pay of the soldiers was greatly 
 in arrear, and the country villages, no longer smiling 
 
IG8 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 homes of farmers, were nests of beggars and brigands. 
 Still more ominous was the fact that the allies of Rome 
 began to weary of the struggle, and even Latium to waver 
 in her allegiance. In 20D B.c many of the Latin com- 
 munities announced that henceforth they would neither 
 send contingents nor contributions, and that Rome must 
 carry on the struggle single-handed. Fortunately the 
 colonies in Gaul, Picenum, and southern Italy, with 
 Fregellae at their head, refused to adopt so short-sighted 
 a policy. Arretinm gave dangerous signs that the Etrus- 
 cans were preparing to rise once more in aid of Hannibal. 
 
 In the midst of all these difficulties and signs of coming 
 trouble, the news arrived that Hasdrubal had crossed the 
 Pyrenees in the autumn of 208 B.C., and that Rome would 
 have to face, next year, both sons of Ilamilcnr in Italy. 
 Thus, at last, it seemed as if Hannibal was destined to 
 reap the reward of his long and patient waiting Rome 
 once more called out twenty-three legions. Hasdrubal, 
 however, was too quick for them, and, ere the Romans 
 could occupy the outlets of the Alpine passes, news came 
 that he had reached the Po, that the Gauls were flocking 
 to his standard, and that Placentia was invested. Marcus 
 Livius hastened to the northern army : while his colleague 
 Gaius Nero, with the aid of the force at Venusia under 
 Gaius Hostilius Tubulus, barred the advance of Hannibal. 
 The latter marched from the Bruttian territory and fought 
 an indecisive engagement with Nero at Grumentum ; he 
 succeeded, however, in his object, and by a flank march 
 reached Apulia, and encamped at Canusium. Nero 
 followed, and took up his position opposite to him. 
 
 While the two armies remained idly facing one another, 
 Nero had the good fortune to intercept the all-important 
 despatch from Hasdrubal, acquainting Hannibal with his 
 intention to meet him at Narnia. Nero thereupon made 
 his bold and famous march with a picked force of seven 
 thousand men, and joined Marcus Livius in the north at 
 Sena Gallica: he left behind him the bulk of his army 
 strongly entrenched against attack, and, what was more 
 important, he left Hannibal unconscious of his departure 
 and ignorant of Hasdrubal's intention. The two consuls 
 at once marched against Hasdrubal, and found him cross- 
 ing the Metaurus. Hasdrubal tried to avoid a battle, but, 
 
FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA. 169 
 
 being deserted by his guides, made the best provision for 
 the inevitable. A flank attack by Nero decided the hotly 
 contested day. Hasdrubal scorned to survive the disaster, 
 and his army was destroyed. 
 
 The defeat and death of Hasdrubal, in 207 B.C., solved 
 the mighty question of the triumph or humiliation of Rome. 
 After fourteen days' absence, Nero again reached his old 
 station at Canusium, and confronted the unconscious Han- 
 nibal in Apulia. With him, in ghastly fashion, he brought 
 the news of Hasdrubal's defeat, and the overthrow of all 
 Hannibal's plans and hopes. Hannibal retired to the 
 Bruttian territory ; while Rome, overjoyed at the relief 
 from the terrible strain of past years, and conscious that the 
 peril was over, resumed business and even pleasure as in 
 time of peace, and made no great effort to finish the war. 
 
 Thenceforth the w r ar languished in Italy, nor could all 
 the superior force of his opponents compel Hannibal to 
 shut himself up in fortresses or to leave Italian soil. The 
 next few years are marked by the lethargy of Rome, and 
 the gradual retreat of Hannibal into the southernmost 
 corner of Italy. The Carthaginian government, alarmed 
 at the prospect of an African invasion, showed some vigour 
 in 206-205 B.C., and sent reinforcements to Hannibal and 
 an embassy to Philip, and commissioned Mago to revive 
 the war in the north of Italy. Philip, however, had 
 already made peace with Rome. Mago, indeed, prosecuted 
 the war with vigour. Landing at Genoa with the remains 
 of the Spanish army, he sacktd the town, and formed a 
 new army of Gauls and Ligurians. But the exertions of 
 the Carthaginian government and its adoption of the 
 views of Hannibal came too late. 
 
 We have now reached the final scene of this great 
 contest. Publius Scipio, who had returned from Spain 
 in the previous year, was chosen consul in 205 B.C. His 
 popularity with the multitude made him no favourite 
 with the senate, whose members viewed with suspicion 
 his Greek refinement and modern culture, and not un- 
 justly criticized his leniency and indulgence towards his 
 officers and his conduct of the war in Spain. Moreover, 
 the senate was averse from an expedition to Africa as long 
 as Hannibal was in Italy, and was specially disinclined 
 to intrust it to Scipio, who had shown too clearly a 
 
170 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 tendency to slight the constitutional authority of the 
 senate and to rely on his fame and popularity with the 
 masses. At last, however, Scipio was intrusted with 
 the task of building a fleet in Sicily, and raising an army, 
 of which the two legions in Sicily formed the nucleus. 
 The fleet was ready in forty days, and seven thousand 
 volunteers responded to the call of their beloved com- 
 mander. 
 
 In the spring of 204 B.C., Scipio set sail with 30,000 
 men, 40 ships of war, and 400 transports, and landed 
 unopposed at the Fair Promontory near Utica. He was at 
 once joined by his old foe Massinissa, who had been driven 
 from his kingdom by the combined armies of Carthage 
 and Syphax. The latter had embraced the side of 
 Carthage, and, as a reward, had caused Carthage to 
 renounce her old ally Massinissa. The arrival of Syphax 
 with a powerful army, and his junction with the Car- 
 thaginian force stationed to oppose Scipio, caused the 
 Roman general to abandon the siege of Utica, and to 
 entrench himself for the winter on a promontory between 
 Utica and Carthage. Fortune, however, never failed to 
 smile on Scipio, and, under cover of proposals for peace, 
 Scipio succeeded in surprising both camps on the same 
 night, and in utterly routing the two armies. Reinforce- 
 ments at this moment arrived, consisting of a Macedonian 
 corps under Sopater, and of Celtiberian mercenaries. The 
 Carthaginians, thus strengthened, resolved to venture on 
 a pitched battle in the " Great Plains," five days' march 
 from Utica. Scipio was completely successful, and 
 Syphax fell into his hands. 
 
 The peace party at Carthage now tried to reverse the 
 Barcid policy, and sued for peace. The terms proposed by 
 Scipio were so moderate that the peace faction were for 
 accepting them at once. But the patriotic party had not 
 lost hope, and during the negotiations recalled Hannibal 
 and Mago from Italy. The latter, however, after striving 
 for three years to form a coalition in northern Italy 
 against Rome, h^d just been defeated near Milan, and 
 during his voyage home died of a wound received in 
 that battle. Hannibal at once embarked at Croton, and, 
 after an absence of thirty-six years, returned once more 
 to his native land in 203 B.C. " The Roman citizens 
 
FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA. 171 
 
 breathed freely, when the mighty Libyan lion, whose 
 departure no one even now ventured to compel, thus 
 voluntarily turned his back on Italian ground." To 
 mark the occasion, a grass wreath, the highest distinction 
 possible in the Roman state, was presented to the veteran 
 Quintus. Fabius, then nearly ninety, — his last honour, for 
 in the same year he passed away. 
 
 Hannibal's arrival in Africa ignited the torch of war 
 once more. The people of Carthage refused to ratify the 
 peace practically concluded, and the seizure of a ship of 
 war with Roman envoys on board broke the armistice. 
 Scipio, in just wrath, ravaged the valley of the Bagradas, 
 and penetrated the interior, when his course was arrested 
 by Hannibal. After fruitless negotiations both armies 
 prepared for a decisive battle at Zama, in 202 B.C. By 
 a skilful disposition Scipio managed that the elephants 
 of the enemy should pass through his lines without 
 breaking them : forcing their way to the side, these 
 unwieldy creatures threw the cavalry of Hannibal into 
 disorder, and the far more numerous horse of Massi- 
 nissa easily scattered the Carthaginian squadrons. , The 
 infantry battle was most bloody and severe : nor did the 
 veterans of Hannibal ever flinch until the cavalry of 
 Massinissa, returning from pursuit, surrounded them on 
 all sides. The Phoenician army was annihilated and 
 Cannae avenged. Hannibal with a few men escaped to 
 Hadrumetum. 
 
 Peace was now inevitable if Carthage was to be saved 
 from destruction. The terms proposed by Scipio, and sub- 
 sequently ratified by the senate, were: (1) the cession of 
 the Spanish possessions and the islands of the Mediter- 
 ranean ; (2) the transference of the kingdom of Syphax to 
 Massinissa ; (3) the surrender of all ships of war except 
 twenty, and an annual contribution of two hundred talents 
 (£48,000) for the next fifty years ; (4) an engagement not 
 to make war against Rome or her allies, and not to wage 
 war in Africa beyond the Carthaginian boundaries without 
 the permission of Rome. The practical effect of these terms 
 was to render Carthage tributary and to deprive her of 
 her political independence. The terms of this peace have 
 often been considered too light, and they served as a handle 
 to the charge that Scipio, in his eagerness to secure for 
 
172 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 himself the glory of finishing the war, forgot what was 
 due to Rome. A true estimate of the peace aud of its 
 effect on the future position of Carthage inclines rather 
 to the view that these terms were the outcome of the 
 nobleness of the two greatest men of the age, and a recog- 
 nition on the part of Scipio of the crime of blotting out 
 one of the main props of civilization merely to gratify 
 the petty ferocity of his fellow-countrymen. " The noble- 
 mindedness and statesmanlike gifts of the great antagonists 
 are no less apparent in the magnanimous submission of 
 Hannibal to what was inevitable, than in the wise 
 abstinence of Scipio from an extravagant and insulting 
 use of victory." 
 
 It remains for us to sum up the results of this terrible 
 war, which for seventeen years had devastated the lands 
 and islands from the Hellespont to the Pillars of Hercules. 
 Rome was henceforth compelled by the force of circum- 
 stances to assume a position at which she had not directly 
 aimed, and to exercise sovereignty over all the lands of 
 the Mediterranean. Outside Italy, there arose the two new 
 provinces in Spain, where the natives lived in a state of 
 perpetual insurrection : the kingdom of Syracuse was now 
 included in the Roman province of Sicily : a Roman instead 
 of a Carthaginian protectorate was now established over the 
 most important Numidian chiefs : Carthage was changed 
 from a powerful commercial state into a defenceless 
 mercantile town. Thus all the western Mediterranean 
 passed under the supremacy of Rome. In Italy itself, 
 the destruction of the Celts became a mere question of 
 time : the ruling Latin people had been exalted by the 
 struggle to a position of still greater eminence over the 
 heads of the non-Latin or Latinized Italians, such as 
 the Etruscans and Sabellians in lower Italy. A terrible 
 punishment was inflicted on the allies of Hannibal. 
 Capua was reduced from the position of second city to 
 that of first village in Italy : the whole soil, with a few 
 exceptions, was declared to be public domain-land, and 
 was leased out to small occupiers. The same fate befell 
 the Picentes on the Silarus. The Bruttians became in a 
 manner bondsmen to the Romans, and were forbidden to 
 carry arms. All the Greek cities which had supported 
 Hannibal were treated with great severity : and in the 
 
FROM CANNAE TO ZAMA. 178 
 
 case of a number of Apulian, Lucanian, and Samnite 
 communities a loss of territory was inflicted, and new 
 colonies were planted. Throughout Italy the non-Latin 
 allies were made to feel their utter subjection to Rome, 
 and the comedy of the period testifies to the scorn of the 
 victorious Romans. 
 
 It seems probable that not less than three hundred 
 thousand Italians perished in this war, the brunt of which 
 loss fell chiefly on Rome. After the battle of Cannae it 
 was found necessary to fill up the hideous gap in the 
 senate by an extraordinary nomination of 177 senators: 
 the ordinary burgesses suffered hardly less severely. 
 Further, the terrible strain on the resources of the state 
 had shaken the national economy to its very foundations. 
 Four hundred flourishing townships had been utterly 
 ruined. The blows inflicted on the simple morality of the 
 citizens and farmers by a camp-life worked no less mis- 
 chief. Gangs of robbers and desperadoes plundered Italy 
 in dangerous numbers. Home agriculture saw its existence 
 endangered by the proof, first given in this war, that the 
 Roman people could be supported by foreign grain from 
 Sicily and Egypt. Still, at the close and happy issue 
 of so terrible a struggle, Rome might justly point with 
 pride to the past and with confidence to the future. In 
 spite of many errors she had survived all danger, and the 
 only question now was whether she would have the 
 wisdom to make a right use of her victory, to bind still 
 more closely to herself the Latin people, to gradually 
 Latinize all her Italian subjects, and to rule her foreign 
 dependents as subjects, not as slaves, — whether she would 
 reform her constitution and infuse new vigour into the 
 unsound and fast-decaying portion of her state. 
 
 AUTHORITIES. 
 
 Cannae to Zama. — Polyb. vii. 1-4; viii. 1, 3-9, 26-end ; ix. 3-11, 
 21-26, 44; x. 1-20, 32-40; xi. 1-3, 19-33; xiv. 1-10; xv. 1-19. 
 Liv. xxiii. 31-end of xxx. Pint. Marcell. P. Scipio. Appian 
 Sp. 15-38 ; Hann. 28-end ; Lib. 7-67. 
 
174 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 A REVIEW OF THE WEST AND EAST. 
 
 Celtic wars — Roman colonization of North Italy — Treatment of 
 Carthage — Flight of Hannibal — Massinissa — Wars with the 
 Spaniards and government of Spain — Macedonia — Asia — Egypt 
 — Powers of Asia Minor — State of Greece — Philip of Macedon 
 — Causes of Roman interference with and declaration of war 
 against Philip — Events of the war — Battle of Cynoscephalae, 
 197 B.C. — Terms of the peace — Settlement of Greece by Flami- 
 ninas. 
 
 The war with Hannibal had interrupted "Rome in the 
 extension of her dominion to the Alpine boundary of 
 Italy; that task was now resumed. The Celts, aware 
 of the coming vengeance, had again taken up arms in 
 201 B.C. The insurrection spread far and wide, and Celtic 
 and Ligurian bands, under the leadership of the Boii and 
 Insubres, sacked Placentia and invested Cremona in the 
 following year. A great battle before the latter city 
 ended in the overthrow of the Celts ; but the struggle 
 continued, nor was it till the Boii and Insubres quarrelled, 
 and the Cenomani turned traitors on the field of battle 
 and attacked their old allies, that the Insubres submitted 
 in 196 B.C. The Romans, though they excluded them 
 from Roman citizenship for ever, allowed the Cenomani 
 and Insubres to retain their national constitution and 
 cantonal independence, and exempted them from tribute. 
 They intended that these Transpadane Celts should serve 
 as a bulwark against the incursions of northern tribes. 
 It seems that the Celtic nationality in these districts 
 rapidly became submerged in the all-absorbing spread 
 
A REVIEW OF THE WEST AND EAST 175 
 
 of Latin influence. The terror of the Roman name pene- 
 trated even beyond the Alps, and by the founding of 
 Aquileia, about 183 B.C., the Romans showed their deter- 
 mination to close the gates of the Alps for ever against 
 the Celtic nation. 
 
 The resolve of the senate, in 194 B.C., to incorporate 
 the region south of the Po with Italy roused the Boii 
 to a last struggle ; but the bloody battle of Mutina, 
 in the succeeding year, crushed their expiring efforts, 
 and the war became a slave-hunt. Even in the terri- 
 tory still allowed them by the Romans the Boii soon 
 disappeared, and became amalgamated with their con- 
 querors. The old fortresses of Placentia and Cremona 
 w r ere re-established, and new colonies — Potentia and 
 Pisaurum in the old land of the Senones, Mutina and 
 Parma in the lately conquered soil of the Boii — were 
 planted in 184-183 B.C. New means of communication 
 were opened up by the extension of the Flaminian road, 
 under the name of the Aemilian, from Ariminum to Pla- 
 centia, and by the reconstruction of the Cassian Way 
 from Rome to Arretium. The result of these steps was 
 that the Po, and not the Apennines, now divided Celtic 
 from Italian land, and that south of the Po the old name 
 of Ager Celticus, applied to the district between the Po 
 and the Apennines, ceased to have any meaning. 
 
 The same policy was pursued with the Ligurian tribes 
 occupying the hills and valleys in the north-western high- 
 lands of Italy. Some were extirpated, others transplanted, 
 and the mountainous country between the valley of the 
 Po and the Arno was practically cleared. The fortress of 
 Luna was established in 177 B.C., to act as a bulwark 
 against the Ligurians, and as a port for ships sailing to 
 Massilia or Spain. 
 
 With the more western Ligurian tribes in the Genoese 
 Apennines and the Maritime Alps conflicts were incessant, 
 but no permanent results were effected ; possibly they 
 served to keep the coast road from Luna to Emporiae 
 comparatively clear. Wars, too, of a similar character 
 were waged in Corsica and Sardinia, where the natives 
 in the interior were continually hunted down by Roman 
 troops. 
 
 With regard to Carthage, Rome's great aim was to 
 
176 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 keep suspended over her head the fear of a declaration 
 of war. Massinissa was established close at her doors 
 as a most powerful Numidian chief, and Carthaginian 
 territory was constantly exposed to the spoliations 
 of the Libyan and Numidian tribas, who exulted in 
 thus retaliating ou their old tormentors for their former 
 sufferings. Carthage bore every insult with true Phoe- 
 nician patience. Her embassies and complaints to Rome 
 had no effect, save that of making her victor more 
 resolved in this short-sighted policv of humiliation. One 
 man, however, still remained at Carthage, a jnst object 
 of dread to his enemies. Hannibal had already over- 
 thrown the rotten oligarchy and instituted the most 
 beneficial political and financial reforms. By checking 
 the embezzlement of the public moneys it was soon found 
 that the tribute to Rome could be paid without extra- 
 ordinary taxation. Hannibal was doubtless reorganizing 
 Carthage to be ready for the complications which he saw 
 must arise for Rome in the East. We cannot wonder that 
 the Romans at last insisted on the surrender of Hannibal, 
 in 195 B.C., which demand he anticipated by a speedy 
 flight to the East, and thus " left to his ancestral city 
 merely the lesser disgrace of banishing its greatest citizen 
 for ever from his native land, of confiscating his property, 
 and of razing his house. The profound saying, that those 
 are the favourites of the gods on whom tbey lavish 
 infinite joys and infinite sorrows, thus verified itself in 
 full measure in the case of Hannibal." Even after his 
 withdrawal, Rome, still not content, adopted a course of 
 perpetual irritation against Carthage. Jealous of her 
 financial prosperity, which remained unshaken by the loss 
 of political power, Rome was ever the credulous receptacle 
 of every rumour of Carthaginian perfidy and intrigue. 
 
 Unwilling to have any possessions of her own in 
 Africa, Rome established the great Berber chief Massi- 
 nissa in his new Numidian kingdom. This remarkable 
 man was in every way fitted for the post. Thoroughly 
 conversant with Carthage, in which city he had been 
 educated, and with whose armies he had fought both 
 as friend and foe, fired with bitter hatred of the Cartha- 
 ginian oppressor, both as a native African and as a prince 
 personally wronged, gifted with a physique which knew 
 
A REVIEW OF THE WEST AND EAST. 177 
 
 no fatigue, and with a nature that recked not of scruple 
 or honour, Massinissa became the soul of his nation's 
 revival ; and, during ninety years of unimpaired life and 
 sixty years of vigorous reign, was completely successful 
 in consolidating the vast kingdom of which he was the 
 founder. By the addition of the Massaesylian kingdom 
 of Syphax, who died in captivity in Rome, Massinissa 
 extended his sway, not only far into the interior and over 
 the upper valley of the Bagradas, but, by occupying the 
 old Sidonian city of Great Leptis and other districts, he 
 held rule from the Manretanian to the Cyrenaean frontier, 
 and enclosed the Carthaginian territory on all sides ; 
 indeed, he fixed his eyes on Carthage as his future capital. 
 Under his example the Berber became converted from a 
 nomad shepherd into a farmer and settled citizen ; the 
 Numidian hordes of plunderers became trained soldiers, 
 worthy to fight by the side of Boman legions ; Cirta, his 
 capital, became the seat of Phoenician civilization, which 
 the king specially fostered, with a view, perhaps, to the 
 future extension of his power over Carthage. Thus the 
 Libyan language, nationality, and manners, after so many 
 years of degradation, reasserted their position, and made 
 themselves felt even in the old Phoenician cities. 
 
 In Spain the Greek and Phoenician towns along the 
 coastiat once submitted to the Romans, and were absorbed 
 in their civilization. On the other hand, the natives, 
 especially in the west and north and the interior, were a 
 perpetual thorn in the side of the Romans, nor was it 
 even safe for a Roman governor to travel without a strong 
 escort. In the southern and eastern districts, where the 
 natives were more civilized, Roman culture was more 
 readily adopted ; this was specially the case with the 
 unwarlike Turdetani, situated round Seville, who are said 
 to have evinced no small literary development, and to 
 have practised agriculture with great success. But this 
 was never true of the mass of Spain. Bound together by 
 all-powerful laws of chivalry, proud of their military 
 honour, fired with a love of war and change, the barbaric 
 Spaniards were utterly devoid of political instinct, and 
 could neither submit to military discipline nor political 
 combination. Thus in Spain there was no serious war 
 nor real peace. 
 
 12 
 
178 EISTOBY OF ROME. 
 
 The Romans divided the peninsula into two provinces, 
 and while the governor of Hither Spain, the modern 
 Arragon and Catalonia, was ever occupied with quelling 
 Celtiberian revolts, his colleague in Further Spain, 
 which comprised the modern Andalusia, Granada, Murcia, 
 and Valencia, was similarly busy in attempts to hold 
 in check the Lusitanians. Necessity thus compelled the 
 Romans to adopt a new policy — to maintain a standing 
 army of four legions in the country ; hence it was in 
 Spain that the military occupation of the land on a large 
 scale first became continuous, and that the military ser- 
 vice first acquired a permanent character. The obvious 
 danger of withdrawing or even changing every year a 
 large portion of the forces in so remote and tui'bulent a 
 country as Spain forced the Romans to adopt this course 
 Thus service in Spain became very odious to the Roman 
 people, who now learnt that dominion over a foreign 
 nation is a burden not only to the slave but also to the 
 master. 
 
 Wars in Spain lasted during the whole of the second 
 Punic war, and in 197 B.C. a general insurrection broke 
 out, which was only quelled by a complete victory 
 gained by the consul Marcus Cato in 195 B.C. Owing to 
 a false report of his return to Italy the insurgents again 
 rebelled, and this time Cato sold numbers into slavery, 
 disarmed all the natives of Hither Spain, and ordered all 
 the towns in the disturbed districts to pull down their 
 walls. Two more Roman victories, in 189 and 185 B.C., 
 were necessary to reduce the Lusitanians to a state of 
 tranquillity. Reality was first given to the Roman rule 
 in Further Spain by the valour of Quintus Fulvius 
 Flaccus in 181 B.C. ; and, two years later, his successor, 
 Tiberius Gracchus, achieved results of a permanent cha- 
 racter, not merely by force of arms, but by his adroit 
 comprehension of the Spanish character. By inducing 
 Celtiberians to serve in the Roman army, by settling free- 
 booting tribes in towns, by wise and equitable treaties, 
 Gracchus made the Roman name not only feared but 
 liked, and his own memory was ever held dear by the 
 natives. 
 
 The Spanish provinces were governed on principles 
 similar to those which were observed in Sicily and Sar- 
 
A REVIEW OF THE WEST AND EAST. 179 
 
 dinia; but the Romans proceeded with great caution, 
 and often conceded considerable privileges to Spanish 
 towns, such as the right of coining their own money. 
 The old Carthaginian imposts of fixed money payments 
 and other contributions were retained, instead of the 
 tithes and customs paid by Sicilian and Sardinian com- 
 munities. The grave fault of changing the praetors every 
 year was still committed, and that in spite of the Baebian 
 law, which in 192 B.C. specially prolonged the command 
 of Spanish governors for two years. On the whole, Spain, 
 notwithstanding its mines both of iron and silver, was 
 a burden rather than a gain to the Roman state ; but 
 probably the chief reason for its retention as a province 
 was the fear that, if left unoccupied, it might serve 
 another foe as it had served Hannibal, and act as a basis 
 of operations against the sovereignty of Rome. 
 
 We must now turn our eyes eastward, and see how 
 those complications arose which involved Rome in the 
 Macedonian and Asiatic wars. Macedonia, alone of all 
 the Greek states, had preserved that national vigour 
 which made the Greek race so famous in earlier days. 
 Philip V. ruled not only over Macedonia proper, but over 
 all Thessaly, Euboea, Locris, Phocis, and Doris, and held 
 many isolated and important positions in Attica and the 
 Pelopbnnese, of which the chief were Demetrias in Mag- 
 nesia, Chalcis in Euboea, and Corinth, " the three fetters 
 of the Hellenes." His real strength, however, lay in his 
 hereditary kingdom of Macedonia proper. It is true that 
 this land was very sparsely populated, but the national 
 character of its loyal and courageous people, never shaken 
 in their fidelity to their native land and hereditary form 
 of government, places the Macedonians almost on a level 
 with the Romans themselves ; in particular, the regenera- 
 tion of the state after the storm of Celtic invasion was as 
 honourable as it was marvellous. 
 
 The huge unwieldy empire of Asia, pretending to stretch 
 from the Hellespont to the Punjab, was in reality an 
 aggregate of states in different stages of dependence, or 
 rather a conglomeration of insubordinate satrapies and 
 half-free Greek cities. Along the coast the great king 
 vainly endeavoured to expel the Egyptians ; on the eastern 
 frontier he was perpetually harassed by Parthians and 
 
180 HI6T0RY OF ROME. 
 
 Baetrians ; while in Asia Minor the Celtic hordes had 
 settled on the north coast and the eastern interior, and on 
 the west the Greek cities were constantly trying to assert 
 and make good their independence. Indeed, in Asia Minor 
 the king's authority was little more than nominal except 
 in Cilicia, Phrygia, and Lydia, for the powerful kingdom 
 of Pergamus embraced a large portion of the "west, and a 
 number of cities aud native princes practically owned no 
 lord. 
 
 Egypt, on the other hand, presented a marked contrast 
 to the loose organization of Asia. Under the prudent 
 Lagidae, Egypt had been welded into a firmly united and 
 compact state, incapable of revolt or disruption under 
 the worst misrule. The objects of the Ptolemies' policy 
 were not, like the Macedonian or Persian, vague dreams 
 of universal empire, but definite and capable of realiza- 
 tion. The whole traffic between India and the Mediter- 
 ranean was in the hands of the rulers of Egypt, and 
 owing to their excellent geographical position, whether 
 for defence or attack, the Egyptians established them- 
 selves not only in Cyrene, bnt in Cyprus and the Cyclades, 
 on the Phoenician and Syrian coast, on the whole of the 
 south and west coast of Asia Minor, and even in the 
 Thracian Chersonese. The finances of Egypt were most 
 flourishing, and Alexandria, the seat of the Ptolemies, 
 attracted all the learning, whether scientific or literary, 
 of the time. The mutual relation of these three great 
 Eastern powers was naturally one of antagonism and 
 rivalry ; but Egypt, as a maritime power, and the pro- 
 tectress of the Asiatic Greek towns and minor states, was 
 the foe of both Macedonia and Asia, while the two latter 
 powers, though rivals, were ready to combine against 
 Egypt, their common enemy. 
 
 In addition to the various states of the second rank in 
 Asia Minor, such as Atropatene, Armenia, Cappadocia, 
 Pontus, and Bitbynia, there were the three powerful Celtic 
 tribes of the Tolistobogi, Tectosages, and Trocmi, who 
 had settled with their national customs and constitution 
 in the interior. From their barbarous strength and free- 
 booting habits they were the constant terror of the more 
 degenerate Asiatics. It was due to his successful oppo- 
 sition t<-> these hordes that Attalus was raised from the 
 
A REVIEW OF THE WEST AND EAST. 181 
 
 position of a wealthy citizen to that of king of Pergamus. 
 His court was a miniature Alexandria, and, as the patron 
 of art and science, and from his retention, when king, of 
 his simple citizen character, Attalus may not inaptly be 
 styled the Lorenzo de' Medici of antiquity. 
 
 In Greece proper we find a great decay of national energy. 
 The Aetolian league, whose policy was alike hostile to the 
 Achaean confederacy and to Macedonia, would have proved 
 of far more service to the Greek nation had not its 
 members pursued a system of organized robbery, and by 
 their unfortunate policy prevented any union of the whole 
 Hellenic race. In the Peloponnese, the Achaean league 
 had knit together the best elements of Greece, and 
 breathed new life and true patriotism into the nobler 
 portion of the Hellenes. But, owing to the selfish diplo- 
 macy of Aratus and the foolish invocation of Macedonian 
 interference to settle its disputes with Sparta, the league 
 had become entirely subject to Macedonian influence, and 
 had admitted Macedonian garrisons into its chief for- 
 tresses. Sparta alone of the other Peloponnesian states 
 showed any vigour, and under the unscrupulous Nabis 
 daily increased its strength. The commercial prosperity 
 enjoyed by Byzantium, the mistress of the Bosporus, and 
 by Cyzicus, on the Asiatic side of the Propontis, was at 
 this time very considerable ; but they were both eclipsed 
 by Rhodes, which had secured the carrying trade of all 
 the eastern Mediterranean. Aided by her fleet and the 
 courageous temper of her citizens, Rhodes was the cham- 
 pion of all the Greek maritime cities, and, though as a 
 rule pursuing a policy of neutrality and of friendly rela- 
 tionship with the neighbouring powers, she did not shrink, 
 if need be, from adopting sterner measures. The Rho- 
 dians became the leaders of a league of the chief Greek 
 cities scattered along the coasts and. islands of Asia Minor 
 and elsewhere, such as Sinope, Lampsacus, Halicarnassus, 
 Chios, Smyrna, etc. This league upheld with success the 
 cause of freedom against the attacks of neighbouring 
 tyrants, and securely fostered the arts of peace and the 
 old Greek spirit, uncontaminated by the tyranny of a 
 dissolute soldiery or the corrupt atmosphere of an Eastern 
 court. 
 
 Such, then, was the state of things in the East wheD 
 
182 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 Philip of Macedon was induced to break down the wall 
 of political separation, and to interfere in the West. The 
 miserable incompetence he had shown in the first Mace- 
 donian war, 215-205 B.C., and the contemptible indolence 
 which caused him to utterly disappoint Hannibal at a 
 critical period, have been already pointed out. Now, 
 however, though Philip was not the man needed at this 
 juncture, he exhibited none of those faults which had 
 marred his first war with Rome. Philip was a true king 
 in the worst and best sense of the term. Inflated with 
 arrogance and pride, incapable of taking advice or brook- 
 ing opposition, he was utterly callous to the lives and 
 sufferings of those about him ; bound by no sense of moral 
 tie or obligation, the slave of passion, combining in 
 singular fashion sagacity and resolution with supineness 
 and procrastination, he was yet gifted with the valour of 
 a soldier and the eye of a general ; jealous of his honour 
 as a Macedonian king, he could rise to a spirited and 
 dignified public policy ; full of intelligence and wit, he 
 won the hearts of all whom he wished to gain. 
 
 At the present moment Philip directed his attentions 
 to Egypt. About 205 B.C. he had formed an alliance with 
 Antiochus of Asia to break np the Egyptian state, now 
 ruled over by Ptolemy Epiphanes, a child of five years 
 old, and to divide the spoil. In 201 B.C. Philip had begun 
 his task of plunder. By the aid of his ally Prusias, king 
 of Bithynia, Philip crossed to Asia and proceeded to make 
 war upon the Greek cities on the coast. Chalcedon saved 
 itself by submission, but Cius and Thasos were stormed 
 and sacked. Rhodes, at the head of her league, declared 
 war against Philip ; she was joined by Byzantium and 
 Attalus of Pergamus. Several indecisive battles were 
 fought at sea ; towards the close of the year Philip with- 
 drew to Macedonia, where his presence was urgently 
 needed. 
 
 At this point the Romans thought right to interfere. 
 They could not view with indifference the possible 
 extension of Philip's power, the conquest of Rhodes 
 and Egypt, the fall of Cyrene, and the future peril 
 of all the Greek citie9, whose protectors they claimed to 
 be, and they could not honourably refuse aid to Attalus 
 of Pergamus, who had been their staunch ally since the 
 
A REVIEW OF THE WEST AND EAST. 183 
 
 first Macedonian war. The policy of interference in the 
 East was not actuated by greed for further conquest, but 
 was dictated by necessity ; it redounds to the senate's 
 honour that it resolved to prepare for war with Philip at 
 a time when the Roman citizens were thoroughly weary 
 of and exhausted by one transmarine war, and when such 
 a war was sure to rouse a storm of popular disapprobation. 
 
 At first, indeed, the Romans lacked a pretext for war. 
 Their ambassador, sent to Abydus, after the capture of 
 that city by Philip in 200 B.C., was politely reproved by 
 the Macedonian king for attempting to interfere with his 
 designs. The Athenians, however, had at this time put 
 to death two Acarnanians who strayed into their mysteries. 
 The Acarnanians at once invoked Philip's aid, and he 
 proceeded to lay waste Attica. Athens applied for help 
 to Rome, and the popular assembly was at length induced 
 by various concessions to ratify the declaration of war by 
 the senate, in 200 B.C. These concessions were chiefly 
 made at the expense of the allies, who had to supply the 
 garrison service in Gaul, Lower Italy, Sicily, and Sar- 
 dinia: volunteers alone, as was alleged, were enrolled for 
 the Macedonian campaign. Two of the six legions, thus 
 called out, embarked at Brundisium under the leadership 
 of the consul Publius Sulpicius Galba. 
 
 The position of Philip was very critical. Antiochus 
 stood aloof ; Egypt, despite its anxiety to keep a Roman 
 fleet out of Eastern waters, was utterly estranged from 
 Philip by his recent scheme of partition ; the Rhodian 
 confederacy of Greek cities was also, owing to recent 
 events, a pronounced enemy ; while in Greece itself many 
 of the most powerful states were ready to welcome the 
 Romans as deliverers, and the Acarnanians and Boeotians 
 alone remained the steadfast allies of Macedonia. The 
 Achaean league, previously estranged by the murder of 
 Aratus, had, under the able leadership of Philopoemen, 
 revived its military power and freed itself from the 
 oppressive influence of Macedonia. Aware of the danger 
 to Greece of invoking Roman aid, this league attempted 
 in vain to mediate between Philip and Rhodes, and in 
 despair remained neutral, awaiting the coming of the 
 Roman troops with undisguised but inactive dread. Thus 
 Philip, by his cruelty and arrogance, had alienated all 
 
184 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 those Eastern powers which at this critical hour should 
 have proved his staunchest allies in repelling the common 
 danger to Greek freedom and independence. 
 
 The land army under Galba at first effected very little 
 of importance, though a division of the fleet under Cento 
 surprised and captured Chalcis in Euboea, the chief 
 stronghold of Philip in Greece, but from want of troops 
 was unable to retain it. Philip, in revenge, made two 
 futile attempts on Athens, and laid waste Attica. 
 
 In the spring of 109 B.C. a joint invasion of Macedonia 
 was concerted by Galba with the wild races of the 
 Dardani and Illyrians on the north, and the Athamanes 
 and Aetoliaus on the south. Galba with his various allies 
 advanced from the west into Macedonia, and made every 
 effort to draw Philip into a decisive engagement. Aided 
 by his knowledge of the country and his ease in procuring 
 supplies, Philip for a long time avoided an engagement, 
 and continually harassed the Romans. Compelled at last 
 to withdraw, by the news that the barbarians from the 
 north had entered his territory, and that the Aetolians 
 had joined the Athamanes in an incursion into Thessaly, 
 Philip easily evaded the pursuit of Galba, and took up his 
 position in a narrow pass on ground favourable, as he 
 thought, to his troops. But in the battle that followed, 
 Galba was victorious. The result of this victory was not 
 great, as Galba feared to pursue his foe in a difficult 
 and unknown country, and, after laying waste the land 
 and capturing Celetrum, he retreated to Apollonia. 
 
 Philip now turned his arms with great effect against 
 the Aetolians and Athamanes, while his officer Athena- 
 goras chased the Dardani back over the mountains. 
 
 The Roman fleet was scarcely more successful than the 
 land army. 
 
 On the whole, then, the result of the first campaign was 
 favourable to Philip. Elated by his success, and by 
 hopes, never realized, of active assistance from Antiochus, 
 Philip next year encamped in a narrow pass on the Aous, 
 where he was confronted by the Roman army strongly 
 reinforced, and by a much abler officer in the person of 
 the consul Titus Quinctius Flamininus. After much 
 delay, caused both by fruitless negotiations and by the 
 strength of Philip's position, Flamininus was enabled, by 
 
A REVIEW OF TEE WEST AND EAST. 185 
 
 the treachery of some Epirot chiefs, to take the Mace- 
 donians both in front and rear, and rout them with 
 considerable loss. Philip retreated to the pass of Tempe, 
 and, with the exception of certain fortresses in Thessaly, 
 and of the Acarnanian territory, all northern Greece 
 speedily fell into the hands of the Romans. In the south, 
 the strong fortresses of Chalcis and Corinth still kept the 
 Macedonian influence paramount, but the exertions of the 
 allied fleet which threatened Corinth, and the action of 
 the Achaean league in joining the victorious Romans, soon 
 made Philip aware of the desperate nature of his position. 
 
 Negotiations with Flamininus, and afterwards with the 
 Roman senate, ended in the determination of Philip to 
 risk another battle ; and in 197 B.C. he encountered the 
 enemy in the district of Scotussa. The battle takes its 
 name from the steep height of Cynoscephalae, which, 
 lying between the two camps, was the scene of the first 
 encounter between the vanguard of both armies. Owing 
 to the success of the Macedonians at the outset, Philip 
 was encouraged to risk a battle with his whole force, and, 
 after a fierce conflict, in which the phalanx exhibited its 
 ancient prowess, Philip was utterly defeated, and escaped 
 to Larissa. 
 
 At this defeat, even his most staunch allies, the 
 Acarnanians, submitted to Rome ; resistance was no 
 longer possible. The terms imposed do honour to the 
 Romans. They gave no ear to the malignity of the 
 Aetolians, who demanded the annihilation of the Mace- 
 donian kingdom ; for they clearly saw that it alone could 
 serve as a bulwark against the encroaching Celts and 
 Thracians. A commission of ten was appointed, at the 
 head of which was Flamininus, to settle the complicated 
 affairs of Greece. The result of their deliberations was 
 the decision that Philip should give up all his possessions 
 in Asia Minor, Thrace, Greece, and the islands of the 
 Aegean ; that he should pay a contribution of a thousand 
 talents (£244,000) ; that he should conclude no foreign 
 alliances without Rome's consent, and wage no foreign 
 wars ; that he should enter into the Roman alliance, and 
 send a contingent when required ; that the Macedonian 
 army should not exceed five thousand men, nor its fleet 
 five decked ships ; that the territory of Macedonia should 
 
186 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 remain unimpaired, with the exception of some small 
 strips and of the revolted province of Orestis. 
 
 With regard to the disposition of the possessions thus 
 ceded by Philip, Rome, having learnt by experience in 
 Spain the doubtful value of transmarine provinces, kept 
 none of the spoil for herself, and decreed freedom to the 
 Greek states, — a freedom rather in name than deed, when 
 we consider the value of it to a nation devoid ot all 
 union and unity. Athens received the three islands of 
 Paros, Scyros, and Imbros, as a reward for the hardships 
 she had suffered and for the many courtesies she had shown 
 to Rome. All Philip's possessions in the Peloponnese and 
 on the Isthmus were ceded to the Achaean league, which 
 was thus practically made ruler of the Peloponnese : but 
 scant favour was accorded to the boastful and greedy 
 Aetolians, who incorporated Phocis and Locris, but were 
 not suffered to extend their power to Acarnania and 
 Thessaly. 
 
 Nabis of Sparta obstinately refused to give up Argos to 
 the Achaean league, and only yielded to a powerful display 
 of Roman arms ; and, though his banditti were dispersed 
 and Sparta captured, both the city and Nabis himself 
 were left intact, the conquerors only requiring the cession 
 of his foreign possessions and his adherence to the usual 
 stipulations touching the right of waging war and of 
 forming foreign alliances. 
 
 Peace was thus, outwardly at any rate, established 
 among the petty Greek states. Flamininus acted with 
 great fairness and patience throughout, and strove as far 
 as possible to mete out justice to the claims of each Greek 
 state. He showed an especially wise and tolerant mode- 
 ration in his punishment of the rebellious Boeotians, who, 
 in their eagerness to attach themselves again to Mace- 
 donia, did not refrain from putting to death isolated 
 bands of Roman soldiers. 
 
 In 194 B.C. Flamininus, after holding a conference of 
 all the Greek states at Corinth, withdrew his troops 
 from every fortress and departed homeward, thus giving 
 the lie to the Aetolian calumny that Rome had inherited 
 from Philip " the fetters " of Greece. 
 
 We cannot doubt the nobleness and sincerity of the 
 Roman endeavour to set Greece free ; the reason of its 
 
A REVIEW OF THE WEST AND EAST. 187 
 
 failure was the complete demoralization of the Greek 
 nation. In truth, the necessities of the case demanded 
 the permanent presence of a superior power, not the 
 pernicious boon of a fictitious freedom ; the feeble policy 
 of sentiment, with all its apparent humanity, was far 
 more cruel than the sternest occupation. " History has 
 a Nemesis for every sin — for an impotent craving after 
 freedom, as well as for an injudicious generosity." The 
 Nemesis in this case was the war with Antiochus of Asia. 
 
 AUTHORITIES. 
 
 Celtic wars, etc. — Polyb. xxxiv. 10, 11. Liv. xxxi. 10 ; xxxii. 29-31 ; 
 
 xxxiii. 22-23, 36-37; xxxiv. 22, 48-47; xxxv. 3-5, 11, 40; 
 
 xxxvi. 38-40 ; xxxix. 1, 21-23, 54-55 ; xl. 25-28 ; xli. 16, 18, 20. 
 Flight of Hannibal. — Liv. xxxiii. 45-49. 
 Massinissa. — Polyb. xxi. 11, 21; xxxii. 2; xxxvii. 10. Liv. xxx. 44; 
 
 xxxi. 1, 11, 19 ; xxxii. 27 ; xxxiv. 62 ; xxxvi. 4. 
 Spam.— Liv. xxxi. 40 ; xxxiii. 21, 25, 44 ; xxxiv. 10-21 ; xl. 30-34, 
 
 39-40, 44, 47-LO ; xli 6-7. Appian Sp. 39-43. 
 Macedonian ivars. — Polyb. viii. 10-16; ix. 28-41; xv. 20-24; xvi. 
 
 1-12, 24-35 ; xvii. xviii. 1-28, 33-40, 43-48. Liv. xxiii. 33-39 ; 
 
 xxiv. 40 ; xxvii. 29-32 ; xxviii. 5-8 ; xxix. 4, 12 ; xxx. 42 ; xxxi. 
 
 5-8, 14-18, 24-44; xxxii. 4-13, 19-23, 32-38; xxxiii. 3-25. 
 
 Appian. Maced. 1-9 ; Syr. 1. 
 Egypt. — Polyb. iii. 2-3. 
 Greece. — Polyb. iv. and v. Liv. xxxiv. 22-41, 48-52. Diod. xxviii. 
 
 13. Plut. Flamininus and Aratui. 
 
188 HISTORY OF JtOME. 
 
 CHAPTER XVII. 
 
 WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA, AND THE THIRD 
 MACEDONIAN WAR. 
 
 Rupture between Rome and Antiochus — Declaration of war, 192 B.C. 
 — Antiochus in Greece — Scipio in Asia — Battle of Magnesia, 
 190 B.C. — Settlement of Asia and Greece — Deaths of Hannibal 
 and Scipio — Anger of Philip — His successor Perseus — War with 
 Rome, 172 b.c. — Conduct of Perseus and of the Roman generals 
 —Battle of Pydna, 168 B.C. — Roman treatment of Macedonia and 
 the Eastern powers — Position of Rome. 
 
 Antiochus had long fixed his eyes upon the Syrian coast, 
 which had been wrested from Asia bj the Egyptians, and 
 had seized the occasion of Philopator's death, in 205 B.C., 
 to concert measures with Philip for the partition of the 
 kingdom of the Ptolemies. But he lacked the foresight 
 to make common cause with Philip in repelling Roman 
 interference, and had taken advantage of the second 
 Macedonian war to secure Egypt for himself. At first he 
 attacked the Egyptian possessions in Cilicia, Syria, and 
 Palestine, and by a victory gained in 198 B.C., near the 
 sources of the Jordan, he became absolute master of the two 
 latter countries. He then proceeded with a strong fleet 
 to occupy all the districts on the south and west coasts of 
 Asia Minor, which had formerly belonged to Egypt, but 
 had virtually fallen under the dominion of Philip. Rome 
 had, however, bidden Philip to withdraw from these 
 possessions, and to leave them free and untouched, and 
 now Antiochus came forward to take Philip's place as the 
 oppressor of the Greek cities and free kingdoms in those 
 lands. 
 
WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS. 189 
 
 Already, in 198 B.C., Attalus of Pergamus had applied 
 to Rome for aid against Antiochns; and in the follow- 
 ing year the Rhodians openly protected the Carian cities 
 of Halicarnassus, Caunus, Myndus, and the island of 
 Samos against the attacks of the great king. Other 
 cities, such as Smyrna and Lampsacus, took heart to 
 resist Antiochus, and they, one and all, called upon Rome 
 to give effect to her promise that they should be free, and 
 to prove that neither Macedonian tyrant nor Asian despot 
 should be suffered to endanger Greek life and liberty. 
 Rome, however, was slow to answer such a call ; nor did 
 she resort to other measures than those of diplomacy, 
 when Antiochus, in 196 B.C., landed in Europe and invaded 
 the Thracian Chersonese, and took active measures to 
 convert Thrace into a dependent satrapy on the plea that 
 he was merely reasserting his claim to the land conquered 
 by his ancestor Seleucus. 
 
 The delay of the Romans in forcibly opposing Antiochus, 
 who plainly showed his designs not only on Asia Minor 
 but also on Greece, may be ascribed partly to their weariness 
 of war, but chiefly to the vain wish of Flamininus to pose 
 as the liberator of Greece and the extinguisher of the war 
 in the East. Flamininus was thus induced to withdraw 
 all the Roman garrisons from Greece in 194 B.C., and to 
 blind the Romans to the fact that the embers of war still 
 smouldered, soon to be rekindled into a flame by his own 
 vanity and by the senate's culpable negligence. 
 
 In the year previous to the withdrawal of the Roman 
 troops from Greece, Antiochus had accorded an honourable 
 reception to the exiled Hannibal, which in itself was 
 tantamount to a declaration of war; but Flamininus re- 
 fused to regard it as such, and contented himself with 
 addressing mere verbal remonstrances and demands to 
 Antiochus. The latter did not fail to profit by the respite 
 unexpectedly granted him by the Roman evacuation of 
 Greece. He gave one daughter in marriage to the young 
 king of Egypt ; another to Ariarathes, king of Cappadocia ; 
 and offered a third to Eumenes, who had succeeded his 
 father Attalus on the throne of Pergamus, on the condi- 
 tion of his abandoning the Roman alliance : he also adopted 
 conciliatory measures towards the Greek cities in Asia 
 Minor. In Greece itself the Aetolians were eager to join 
 
190 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 him ; a plan was even formed on the suggestion of Han- 
 nibal by which the Western world was to unite with the 
 East, and war to blaze anew throughout Italy, Africa, 
 and Spain, as well as Greece, Egypt, and Asia. To the 
 vanity and impatience of the Aetolians was due the first 
 spark which ignited the train of war. By their attempt 
 to take Sparta and attach it to their league, and by their 
 failure both there and at Chalcis, they caused almost the 
 whole of the Peloponnese to unite against Antiochus — a 
 result diametrically opposite to that which they wished to 
 produce. 
 
 Events had now reached such a pass that a rupture 
 between Rome and Antiochus was inevitable. At length, 
 after some fruitless discussion at Ephesus between the 
 Roman envoys and the great king, war was declared in 
 192 B.C., and in the summer of that year a Roman fleet 
 appeared to secure Greece in its allegiance, while an army 
 under Marcus Baebius landed at Apollonia in the autumn. 
 About the same time, Antiochus crossed over into Greece 
 with such troops as he could at once collect, and occupied 
 Demetrias. All hopes of success depended on the realiza- 
 tion of the coalition planned by Hannibal. But a mean 
 jealousy of the latter's greatness was as fatal in the court 
 of Antiochus as it had been in the councils of Carthage to 
 the execution of his mighty schemes ; and the victor of 
 Cannae was entrusted with subordinate and ill-fitting 
 commissions. 
 
 The attitude of Philip of Macedon, of Eumenes, of the 
 Achaean league, Rhodes, and Egypt, who all sided with 
 Rome, showed at once how futile would be the attempts of 
 Antiochus in Europe. At first, indeed, Antiochus antici- 
 pated the Romans by occupying Euboea, and by an attempt 
 to gain over Thessaly ; but he soon wearied of w r ar, and 
 retired to Chalcis, where he spent his time in writing 
 letters to the Greek states and in idle amusement. In 
 the spring of 191 B.C. the Roman general Manius Acilius 
 Glabrio arrived, accompanied by several noted officers and 
 strong reinforcements ; in all, the Roman force reached 
 about forty thousand men. Antiochus, whose own forces 
 had suffered considerably from sickness and desertion, and 
 who had been grossly deceived by the Aetolians as to 
 the amount of their contingent, foolishly resolved to en- 
 
WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS. 191 
 
 trench himself at Thermopylae, and to await there the 
 arrival of the great army from Asia. Owing to the 
 remissness of the Aetolians posted on the heights, and to 
 their surprise by Marcus Cato, Antiochus was easily 
 routed, and escaped to Chalcis, whence he took ship to 
 Ephesus. At once all the strong fortresses, with the 
 exception of Heraclea and Naupactus, where the Aeto- 
 lians for a while held out, surrendered to the Romans, and 
 all the Greek states tendered their submission. 
 
 Thus ended, for the present, all resistance in Greece ; 
 but the coming war in Asia, owing to the great distance 
 and difficulty of communications, appeared to the Romans 
 far more dangerous. Gaius Livius, the Roman ndmiral, 
 gained a signal victory over the enemy's fleet between 
 Ionia and Chios, and cooped up their ships in the harbour 
 of Ephesus ; but he was obliged, on the approach of 
 winter, to retire to the harbour of Cane, near Pergamus. 
 Tn the winter, Smyrna and many Greek cities in Asia 
 Minor welcomed the Romans, and Antiochus made great 
 exertions to equip two fleets supported by a powerful 
 land army, and thus to prevent the Romans from landing 
 in Asia. 
 
 Early in. the following year, 190 B.C., the Roman 
 admiral proceeded towards the Hellespont, to pave the 
 way for the passage of the land army by the capture of 
 Sestus and Abydus. He had almost effected his pur- 
 pose when he was recalled by the news that the fleet of 
 the Rhodians, his allies, had been destroyed by the 
 enemy ; the latter, however, on the arrival of Livius, shut 
 themselves up in the harbour of Ephesus and refused 
 battle. The Roman fleet now took up its station at 
 Samos, and Livius was replaced by the new admiral 
 Lucius Aemilius Regillus, who for a time effected nothing 
 of importance. The second fleet of Antiochus, led by 
 Hannibal, which had long been detained by unfavourable 
 winds, at last threatened to join the fleet at Ephesus ; 
 but at the mouth of the Eurymedon, off Aspendus in 
 Pamphylia, it was utterly defeated by a squadron of 
 Rhodian ships. It was the first naval battle and the last 
 battle fought by Hannibal against Rome. This victory 
 was followed up by another, at the promontory of Myon- 
 nesus over the Asiatic fleet stationed at Ephesus, in which 
 
192 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 the Romans took or sank forty-two of the enemy's ships, 
 and swept the sea of all opposition to the crossing of the 
 Romau land army. 
 
 The conduct of the war on land had been entrusted to 
 the conqueror of Zama, who practically acted as supreme 
 commander in the place of his brother Lucius Scipio, 
 the nominal commander-in-chief, a man of no ability. On 
 landing in Greece the Scipios had at first been detained 
 by a renewal of hostilities on the part of the Aetohaus, 
 which inconvenient obstacle was only removed by an 
 armistice for six months. As the Aegean was not yet 
 clear of the enemy's ships, Scipio marched by the coast 
 through Macedonia and Thrace, intending to cross the 
 Hellespont. The victory of Myonnesus and the foolish 
 terror of Antiochus proved that Scipio's good fortune 
 had not deserted him. By order of Antiochus the strong 
 fortress of Lysimachia on the Thracian Chersonese was 
 evacuated, and thus no opposition was offered to the 
 crossing of the Hellespont, nor was any preparation made 
 to receive Scipio on the Asiatic coast. Scipio refused to 
 accept the terms of submission proposed by Antiochus, 
 and the Romans met the army of the great king near 
 Magnesia, at the foot of mount Sipylus, not far from 
 Smyrna, in the autumn of 190 B.C. The cumbrous masses 
 of the Asiatic troops proved their own destruction : the 
 flower of their army, drawn up in Macedonian phalanx, 
 was foiled in its efforts to reach the Roman legions by the 
 confusion of their own light troops, and by the absence of 
 the heavy cavalry nnder Antiochus, which had rushed 
 off in pursuit of a small Roman squadron. At last the 
 phalanx was broken up by its own elephants, and the 
 whole army scattered in utter rout. 
 
 The losses of Antiochus have been estimated at fifty 
 thousand, those of the Romans at three hundred foot 
 soldiers and twenty-four horsemen. Peace was concluded 
 on the terms proposed by Scipio before the battle, by 
 which Antiochus was condemned to pay all the costs of 
 the war and to surrender the whole of Asia Minor. Anti- 
 ochus himself was soon after (in 187 B.C.) slain, while 
 plundering a temple of Bel in Elymais, at the head of the 
 Persian Gulf. " With the day of Magnesia Asia was 
 erased from the list of great states ; and never perhaps 
 
WAR WITH ANTIOCLWS. " 193 
 
 did a great power fall so rapidly, so thoroughly, and so 
 ignominiously as the kingdom of the Seleucidae under this 
 Antiochus the Great." 
 
 The Celts of Asia Minor who had supplied mercenaries 
 to Antiochus now met with severe punishment. The new 
 Roman commander, Gnaeus Manlius Yolso, who had suc- 
 ceeded Lucius Scipio in 189 B.C., turned his arms against 
 the two cantons of the Tolistob< gi and the Tectosages. 
 In both cases the mountain heights to which the Celts 
 had retired were scaled, and both cantons were completely 
 broken up and dispersed. 
 
 The final settlement of Asia was determined by a com- 
 mission presided over by Volso. The sum to be paid by 
 Antiochus was fixed at fifteen thousand Euboic talents 
 (£3,600,000) ; all possessions in Europe, and all the 
 country in Asia Minor west of the river Halys and the 
 mountain chain of the Taurus, were now ceded by 
 the great king ; lastly, certain restrictions were imposed 
 upon his rights of waging war and of navigating the sea. 
 Even beyond the boundaries of the Roman protectorate, 
 Ariarathes, king of Cappadocia, though mulcted in a 
 light fine for his alliance with Antiochus, retained his 
 kingdom and was practically independent of Antiochus; 
 moreover, the two satrapies of Armenia now rose under 
 Roman influence into independent kingdoms. Prusias, 
 king of Bithvnia, was allowed to keep his possessions 
 intact; nor were the Celts ousted from their territory, 
 though bound to refrain in the future from sending out 
 armed bands and levying black-mail from the Asiatic 
 Greeks. The Greek cities, which were free and had 
 joined the Romans, were confirmed in their ancient free- 
 dom and exempted from tribute to the various dynasts of 
 Asia Minor ; this exemption was not, however, extended 
 to those which paid tribute to Eumenes. Rhodes obtained 
 Lycia and the greater part of Caria as a reward for her 
 zealous assistance. But the largest share of the spoil fell 
 to the king of Pergarnus. Eumenes received the Thracian 
 Chersonese and the greater part of Asia Minor west of 
 the Halys, the protectorate over and right of receiving 
 tribute from such Greek cities as were not made absolutely 
 free, and a contribution of nearly five hundred talents from 
 Antiochus. Thus he was nobly recompensed for his 
 
194 WSTUHY OF HOME. 
 
 sufferings and devotion to the Roman cause, and thus the 
 kingdom of the Attalids became in Asia what Numidia 
 was in Africa — a powerful state dependent on Rome, 
 capable of acting as a check upon Macedonia and Syria 
 without needing Roman support. Rome thus adhered 
 strictly to its policy of acquiring no transmarine posses 
 sions, and in 188 B.C. the fleet and land army evacuated 
 Asia. 
 
 The war with Antioclms had naturally agitated the 
 ever quarrelsome and excitable states in European Greece. 
 The Aetolians, who had tried to rekindle tbe flame of war 
 by attacks on Philip of Macedon, were soon compelled to 
 utter submission by the combined arms of the Roman 
 consul, Marcus Fulvius Nobilior, and the Macedonians 
 and Achaeans. The possessions taken from the Aetolians 
 were divided among tbe allies of Rome, who reserved for 
 herself nothing but the two islands of Cephallenia aud 
 Zacynthus. Neither Philip nor the Achaeans were satisfied 
 with their share of the spoil. The last-named were foolish 
 enough to attempt to display their independence of Rome, 
 and with a quasi- patriotic zeal to desire an extension of 
 their power ; though indignant at the advice of Flami- 
 ninus to content themselves with the Peloponnese, and at 
 the refusal of Rome to enlarge the territory of their 
 league, they proved their incapacity to govern the Pelo- 
 ponnese by constant quarrels with Sparta and Messene. 
 The senate, after vain attempts to arbitrate, at last grew 
 weary of these petty disputes, and left the Achaeans and 
 the Greek states generally to settle such trifles among 
 themselves. 
 
 After the defeat of Antiochus, Hannibal had taken 
 refuge with Prusias, the king of Bithynia, and had success- 
 fully aided him in his wars with Eumenes. Now he, the 
 only being on earth who was still a source of terror to 
 Rome, was hunted down by his old enemies in a way 
 unworthy of so great a nation, and compelled to take 
 poison, dying in 183 B.C., at the age of sixty-seven 
 
 About the same time died his great rival and lucky 
 victor, Publius Scipio. The favourite of fortune, he had 
 added to the empire of Rome, Spain, Africa, and Asia; and 
 yet he, too, like Hannibal, spent his last years in bitter 
 trouble and disappointment, a voluntary exile from the 
 
TEE TEIRD MACEDONIAN WAR. 195 
 
 city of his fathers, for which lie had spent his life, but in 
 which he had forbidden his own remains to be buried. 
 We do not exactly know A\h;;t drove him from Rome. 
 The charges of peculation brought against him and his 
 brother Lucius were no doubt empty calumnies, but his 
 arrogance and proud belief that he was not as other men 
 had doubtless raised many enemies, while his wish to 
 sacrifice everything to the promotion of his own family 
 caused general distrust of his political aims. "It is, 
 moreover, the distinguishing characteristic of such natures 
 as that of Scipio — strange mixtures of genuine gold and 
 glittering tinsel — that they need the good fortune and 
 the brilliance of youth in order to exercise their charm, 
 and, when this charm begins to fade, it is the charmer 
 himself that is most painfully conscious of the change." 
 
 Thus ended this Asiatic war. A significant indication 
 of the feeble and loose organization of the kingdom of the 
 Seleucidae is the fact that it, alone of all the great states 
 conquered by Rome, never after the first conquest made 
 a second appeal to arms. But Rome had not yet done 
 with her troubles in the East; and her unjust treatment 
 of Philip of Macedon in return for his staunch support 
 during the war with Antiochus soon caused another out- 
 break in that quarter. All the states in Greece now 
 seized the opportunity of damaging their ancient oppressor, 
 and of reviving the anti-Macedonian feeling by constant 
 complaints to the Roman senate ; but the irritation and 
 annoyance thus caused to Philip was as nothing compared 
 with the indignation he felt at the extension of the 
 kingdom of Eumenes. The Attalids had ever been the 
 bitterest foes of Macedonia, and, now that their power 
 was revived and increased under the protecting arm of 
 Rome, Philip's thirst for revenge went beyond all limits 
 of prudence. On hearing of some fresh invectives which 
 had been launched against him in the Thessalian assem- 
 blies he replied with the line of Theocritus: "HSt; yap 
 cf>pdo$ei iravB aXiov a/J-fii SeSikeiv ; ("What! thinkest thou 
 that all my suns are set? ") ; a reply which showed that 
 he had determined once more to put all to the hazard. In 
 these later days, however, Philip displayed a caution and 
 an earnest perseverance in his preparations which at an 
 earlier date might have changed the world's history. He 
 
196 HISTORY OF ROME 
 
 even curbed his proud temper so as to pretend complete 
 submission to Rome, and delayed the breaking out of war 
 by the agency of his son Demetrius, who during his 
 residence as a hostage at Rome had won great popularity 
 with the loading Romans. Perseus, the eldest son, fear- 
 ing that Philip would disinherit him in favour of Deme- 
 trius, persuaded his father to put the latter to death, on 
 the false charge that he was intriguing with Rome against 
 Macedonia. Philip learned too late the plot of the fratri- 
 cide, but died himself, in 1 79 B.C., before he could punish 
 the crime. 
 
 Thus Perseus succeeded to the throne, a man remark- 
 able for his personal prowess and steady perseverance, 
 and incapable of being turned aside, as his father had 
 been, by the vicious allurements of pleasure. He entered 
 on all his father's schemes with resolute determination, 
 and to the outward eye of his countrymen he seemed the 
 man needed for the great work of liberation from the 
 yoke of Rome. But he lacked the genius and elasticity 
 of Philip. He could devise plans and persevere in his 
 preparations for their execution, but when the time came 
 for action he was frightened at his own handiwork. As 
 is the case with all narrow minds, the means became to 
 him the end , when imminent peril demanded the use of 
 the treasures which he had amassed for the war with 
 Rome, Perseus could not find the heart to part with his 
 golden pieces. 
 
 The wise measures of Philip, in founding towns, en- 
 couraging marriage, and in developing the finances of his 
 country during twenty years of peace, had rendered the 
 power of Macedonia at least twice as strong as it had 
 been at the outbreak of the second Macedonian war. 
 Perseus now possessed an army of thirty thousand troops, 
 independent of auxiliaries, a treasury capable of paying 
 both this army and ten thousand mercenaries for ten 
 years, and, above all, a devoted and loyal people. The 
 attempts, however, to raise a coalition against Rome, and 
 thus carry out the schemes of Hannibal, failed. In Greece 
 it is true that the sentiments of every state were gradually 
 veering round to the side of Perseus, whose name was not 
 stained, as that of his father had been, by atrocious and 
 bloodthirsty deeds. Every Greek now saw the true 
 
THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAB. 197 
 
 meaning of the freedom granted by Koine, and that the 
 restoration of Hellenic nationality by a foreign power 
 involved a contradiction in terms. The efforts of Eu- 
 menes, who tried by gifts and favours to conciliate the 
 Greeks in Asia Minor, and to reconcile them to the 
 arrangements made by Rome, were received with every 
 sign of scorn and contempt. 
 
 But tl e support from the Greek cities and states, whether 
 of Greece proper or Asia Minor, was but a broken reed 
 whereon to lean. More important was the success which 
 attended the efforts of Perseus to stir up the barbarian 
 tribes living near the Danube and in Illyria, and the close 
 alliance he formed with the brave Cotys, ruler of the 
 Odrysians and of all eastern Thrace. By public proclama- 
 tion he gained over to his side all the Greeks who, owing 
 to political and other offences, and still more owing to 
 debt, had been exiled. From these and other causes the 
 whole of Greece was once more in a state of ferment. 
 Rome saw that she could delay no longer; and the advent 
 of Eumenes in person, with a long list of grievances and 
 a true account of the state of affairs in Greece, caused the 
 senate to resolve on war in the autumn of 172 B.C. 
 
 Perseus, instead of acting at once and occupying Greece 
 by the aid of the Macedonian party in each state, frittered 
 away his time in discussions with Quintus Marcius Philip- 
 pus, whose aim was to cause Perseus to delay active 
 operations until the Roman legions arrived. This foolish 
 delay on the part of Perseus ruined his chance of support 
 from the Greek states and confederacies. The Aetolian 
 league chose Lyciscus as its new strategus, a thorough 
 partisan of Rome ; and the Boeotian confederacy suddenly 
 collapsed completely on the complaint of a Roman envoy 
 touching two of their cities, Haliartus and Coronea, which 
 had entered into engagements with Perseus. 
 
 In June, 171 B.C., the Roman legions landed, and Perseus, 
 owing to his utter remissness, found himself alone. For- 
 tunately for him, the Roman consul, Publius Licinius 
 Crassus, was grossly incompetent, and, had Perseus 
 followed up his first success, gained near Larisa, by 
 assuming the offensive, no doubt all Greece would have 
 at once followed the example of the Epirots and revolted. 
 Crassus signalized his shameful command by forcing the 
 
198 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 small Boeotian town of Coronea to capitrulate, and by 
 selling its inhabitants into slavery. His successor, Aulus 
 Hostilius, was equally unsuccessful, and was twice easily 
 repulsed in attempting to enter Macedonia ; while his 
 colleague, Appius Claudius, commanding the western 
 army, met with nothing but reverses. Moreover, the 
 Roman name, hitherto distinguished in the East by the 
 honourable probity of its political transactions, was now 
 stained by treacherous and underhand dealing with 
 various Greek states. Two campaigns had served to 
 show the completely demoralized and disorganized con- 
 dition of the Roman army, which was only saved from 
 destruction by the inability of Perseus to change his plan 
 of defensive warfare to one of a vigorous offensive. 
 
 The third campaign was opened in 169 B.C., by the new 
 Roman commander, Quintus Marcius Philippus. He 
 succeeded in entering Macedonia by the pass of Tempe, but 
 was prevented from advancing by the entrenched position 
 which Perseus occupied on the stream of the Elpius , and 
 the Roman army remained idle in the extreme corner of 
 Thessaly. Genthins, king of Illyria, was bribed by Perseus 
 to break with Rome, the bribe, however, the miserly 
 Perseus never paid, nor would he part with his beloved 
 gold to hire twenty thousand Celts who volunteered to 
 serve in his army 
 
 In 168 B c a very different Roman general appeared on 
 the scene, in the person of Lucius Aemilius Paullus, son 
 of the consul who fell at Cannae, — a man full of vigour 
 despite his sixty years, and utterly incorruptible. He 
 soon turned the position of the enemy and forced them to 
 retreat to Pydna. Here the decisive battle was fought, 
 and the Macedonian phalanx, after dispersing the Roman 
 vanguard and endangering the whole army, lost its forma- 
 tion on the uneven ground, and was cut down to a man ; 
 twenty thousand Macedonians fell, and eleven thousand 
 were made prisoners Perseus fled with his cavalry and 
 treasure to Samothrace, and soon after surrendered, weep- 
 ing, to the Romans ; he died a few years later, at Alba on 
 the Fucine lake. 
 
 Thus perished the empire of Alexander the Great, 144 
 years after his death. Macedonia was henceforth abolished, 
 and the united kingdom was broken up into four republi- 
 
THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR. 199 
 
 can leagues, which paid to Rome half the former land-tax ; 
 right of intermarriage between the members of different 
 leagues was forbidden, and every measure was taken to 
 prevent a revival of the ancient monarchy. The Romans 
 gained their object, and from that day to this Macedonia 
 has possessed no history. 
 
 Illyria, whose king Genthius was taken prisoner, and 
 whose capital Scodra was captured by the praetor Lucius 
 Anicius, was treated in the same way as Macedonia had 
 been. It was split up into three free states; its piratical 
 fleet was confiscated, and an end was thus put to the 
 depredations of Illyrian corsairs. 
 
 In the treatment of the rest of the Greek world, 
 Rome now discarded the sentimental policy of Fla- 
 mininus, and determined to reduce all Greek states to 
 the same hnmble level of dependence. It was clear 
 that with the abolition of Macedonia the kingdom of 
 Pergamus, as exercising a check on Macedon, ceased to 
 be a necessity. The Romans therefore proceeded to cir- 
 culate strange, though utterly unfounded, reports as to 
 the loyalty of Eumenes ; they attempted to set his brother 
 Attalus against him by granting Attalus favours and 
 inciting him to establish a rival throne ; they declared 
 Pamphylia independent, and, when the Galatians overran 
 Pergamus, they, after a pretence of mediation, declared 
 them independent also. Eumenes set sail for Italy to 
 remonstrate ; but the senate suddenly decreed that no 
 kings in future were to come to Rome, and sent a quaestor 
 to meet Eumenes at Brundisium. Eumenes, taking the 
 hint, declared that he was satisfied, and returned home ; 
 he clearly saw that all equality of alliance was at an end, 
 and that the time of impotent subjection to Rome had 
 now come for himself as for all other free states. 
 
 The high-spirited Rhodians were the next to suffer. 
 Deluded by the consul Quintus Marcius, who had pre 
 tended to wish for their mediation in the war with Per- 
 seus, they just before the battle of Pydna sent envoys 
 to the Roman camp and the Roman senate, saying that 
 the Macedonian war was injurious to their commercial 
 interests, and that they would declare war against the 
 side which refused at once to make peace. This miserable 
 republican vanity soon changed to humble entreaty, when 
 
200 HISTORY OF HOME. 
 
 the .Romans, after the battle of Pydna, threatened the 
 Rhodians with war. The senate, glad of an excuse to 
 humiliate the haughty merchant city, deprived Rhodes of 
 all her possessions on the maiuland, and, by the erection 
 of a free port at Delos, so damaged Rhodian commerce 
 that the yearly receipts from customs sunk at once from 
 £41,000, to £6000. 
 
 Iu Greece itself severe measures were taken. Seventy 
 towns in Epirus were plundered, and the inhabitants, to 
 the number of 150,000, were sold into slavery. Trials for 
 high treason took place in all parts of Greece, owing to 
 the existence of a Macedonian party in every city. A 
 very large number of suspects from Achaia, Aetolia, 
 Acarnania, and Lesbos were deported to Italy, partly, 
 perhaps, to escape the bloodthirsty zeal of such men as 
 the Aetolian strategus Lyciscus. 
 
 An opportunity had, moreover, been given Rome to 
 interfere once more in the East. During the third Mace- 
 donian war, Antiochus Epiphanes, king of Asia, or, as it 
 was now called, Syria, seized the occasion to carry out 
 the traditional policy of the Seleucidae and to conquer 
 Egypt. When he was on the eve of success, and was 
 lying encamped before Alexandria, a Roman envoy arrived 
 shortly after the battle of Pydna, aud drawing a circle 
 round the king, warned him at once to restore all that he 
 had conquered and to evacuate Egypt. With this warn- 
 ing Antiochus was forced to comply ; and Egypt at once 
 submitted to the Roman protectorate. 
 
 Every state in the world now did homage to Rome, and 
 the most obsequious flattery met the ears of the Roman 
 senate. Nor was the moment ill-chosen ; from the battle 
 of Pydna Polybius dates the full establishment of Rome's 
 universal empire. All subsequent struggles were rebel- 
 lions, or wars with nations beyond the pale of Romano- 
 Greek civilization. The whole civilized world recognized 
 in the Roman senate the supreme tribunal for kings and 
 nations ; to acquire its language and manners foreign 
 princes and noble youths resided in Rome. Only once 
 was a real attempt made to get rid of Roman dominion — 
 by Mithradates, king of Pontus. 
 
 The battle of Pydna marks the last occasion on which 
 the senate still adhered to the state ma?im that Rome 
 
THE TEIED MACEDONIAN WAR. 201 
 
 should, if possible, hold no possessions and maintain no 
 garrisons beyond the Italian seas, but should keep in 
 check the numerous dependent states by a mere political 
 supremacy. The treatment of Macedonia and other states 
 after the battle of Pydna shows that Rome had at last 
 recognized the impracticable nature of this protectorate ; 
 the necessity of her constant intervention had proved to 
 Rome that the effort to preserve vanquished states, even 
 at the cost of faithful allies, was a failure Signs were 
 now forthcoming that by gradual steps these client-states 
 would be reduced to the position of subjects. When we 
 review the extension of Rome's power from the conquest 
 of Sicily to the battle of Pydna, it becomes clear that the 
 universal empire of Rome was a result forced upon the 
 Roman government, without, and even in opposition to 
 its wish ; — certainly it was not a gigantic plan contrived 
 and carried out by a thirst for territorial aggrandizement. 
 All that the Roman government wished for was the sove- 
 reignty of Italy ; and they earnestly opposed the exten- 
 sion of this sovereignty to Africa, Greece, and Asia, from 
 the sound view that they ought not to suffer the kernel 
 of their empire to be crushed by the shell. Their blind 
 hatred of Carthage led them into the error of retaining 
 Spam, and of assuming in some measure the guardianship 
 of Africa ; their still blinder enthusiasm for Greek freedom 
 made them commit the equal blunder of conferring liberty 
 everywhere on the Greeks. 
 
 " The policy of Rome was not projected by a single 
 mighty intellect and bequeathed by tradition from gene- 
 ration to generation , it was the policy of a very able but 
 somewhat narrow-minded deliberative assembly, which 
 had far too little power of grand combination, and far too 
 much of an instinctive desire for the preservation of its 
 own commonwealth, to devise projects in the spirit of a 
 Caesar or Napoleon " 
 
 The universal empire of Rome was, in fact, based on the 
 political development of antiquity in general. In the 
 ancient world, balance of power was unknown, and every 
 nation's aim was to subdue his neighbour or to render 
 him harmless. Though we may sentimentally mourn the 
 extinction of so many richly gifted and highly developed 
 nations by the supremacy of Rome, we must bear in mind 
 
202 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 that that supremacy was not due to a mere superiority of 
 arms, but was a necessary consequence of the international 
 relations of antiquity generally ; and therefore the issue 
 was not one of mere chance, but the fulfilment of an 
 unchangeable and therefore endurable destiny. 
 
 AUTHORITIES. 
 
 War with Antiochus, Asia, etc. — Polyb. xx. 1-12; xxi. ; xxii. 1-14, 
 
 17-18 ; xxiii. ; xxiv.-xxxii. Liv. xxxiii. 19, 35, 38-44, 40 ; xxxv. 
 
 13, 15, 23, 43-47, 51 ; xxxvi. 6-12, 15, 21, 41 ; xxxvii. 3, 8, 19, 
 
 21, 25, 26, 30-31, 34, 37, 39-45, 55 ; xxxviii. 15-27, 38. Appian 
 
 Syr. 2-44. 
 Hannibal, Philip, and Scipio. — Liv. xxxiv. 60-61 ; xxxv. 14, 19 ; 
 
 xxxvii. 23-24 ; xxxviii. 50-56 ; xxxix. 51. 
 Third Macedonian war. — Appian Maced. 11-end. Liv. xxxvi. 4, 8, 13, 
 
 14,25,33; xxxvii. 7; xxxviii. 1-2 ; xxxix. 23-28, 34-35 ; xl.3-8; 
 
 21-24, 50-56: xli. 2, 27-28; xlii. 5-6, 11-18, 36-42, 46, 50-67; 
 
 xliii. 4-5, 20-21 ; xliv. 2, 4, 6, 10, 23-27, 40-46 ; xlv. 6-8, 39, 42. 
 jilyria.— Appian Illyr. 9-10. Liv. xlii. 26 ; xliv 23, 30-32. 
 Eumenes — Liv. xliv. 13, 20, 24-25. 
 
 Rhodes.— Liv. xxxviii. 39; xliv. 14-15, 35; xlv. 10, 20-22 
 Greece.— Liv. xxxvi. 35 ; xliii. 19 ; xlv. 28, 31, 34. 
 Egypt. — Liv. xlv. 11-13. 
 Cf. also Plat. Aem. Paullus and Philopoemen. 
 
CHAPTER XVin. 
 
 THE GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNED. 
 
 New state-parties — Aristocratic character of the senate and equites 
 — The censorship — Usurpation of power by families — Treatment 
 of the Latins — The provinces and their governors — The comitia 
 — Rise of a city rabble — -Cato and his reforms — Demagogism — 
 Management of land and of capital — Decline of the population. 
 
 Amid the din of arms and constant succession of victories, 
 it is difficult to trace the secret and silent growth of those 
 changes which were fraught with such momentous con- 
 sequences to the Roman constitution. The new aris- 
 tocracy, consisting of the old patrician families and of 
 those plebeians who had become united with the old 
 patricians, gradually gathered in its grasp the reins of 
 government The leaders of the plebeian element of the 
 aristocracy were most zealous in maintaining the barrier 
 of caste, and in assigning a political significance to those 
 outward badges, such as the ius imaginum, the laticlave, 
 the gold rings, and the bulla, which had originally merely 
 distinguished the higher from the lower patrician fami- 
 lies. The senate and the equestrian order were no longer 
 organs of the whole state, but organs of the aristocracy. 
 In each case this change was due to the power of the 
 censorship. Every one who had held a curule magistracy 
 had a legal claim to a vote and seat in the senate ; but 
 the censor had the power of summoning men to become 
 members of that body, and of striking off the names of 
 such as were unworthy of so high a position. Inasmuch 
 as the election to a curule office and the choice of censor 
 really lay in the hands of the senate, it was but natural 
 
204 HISTORY OF HOME. 
 
 that curule magistrates and censors were chosen out of 
 the ranks of the nobility, and thus practically gave a 
 strong aristocratic character to the composition of the 
 senate. So, too, the censors selected the members of the 
 equestrian centuries, and no doubt, as a rule, had regard 
 to the birth and position of the members they selected, 
 rather than to their military capacity. Thus the eques- 
 trian order became a stronghold of the aristocracy. The 
 distinction between classes was further rendered more 
 marked by the unwise change introduced by the great 
 Scipio in 19-1 B.C. This change separated the special 
 seats assigned to the senatorial order from those occupied 
 by the mass of the people at the national festivals. 
 
 The office of censor, owing to these changes, became 
 invested with a peculiar glory of its own, as the palladium 
 of the aristocratic order, and great efforts were made to 
 resist attacks on the censorship or judicial prosecution of 
 unpopular censors, and to prevent opponents of the aris- 
 tocracy from holding this office. An important check, 
 moreover, was placed upon the censor himself by the 
 usage which obliged him to specify the grounds on which 
 he erased the name of senator or knight. The nobility, 
 in order to keep the government in their own hands, was 
 naturally averse from appointing more magistrates than 
 the growth of Roman power rendered unavoidable. The 
 appointment, in 243 B.C., of two praetors in the place of 
 one, and the assignation of all lawsuits between Roman 
 citizens to the city praetor (praetor urbanus) and of all 
 law-suits between men who were not Roman citizens to 
 his colleague (praetor peregrinus) was manifestly inade- 
 quate to the growing needs of the state. Further, the 
 attempt to govern the four transmarine provinces bv the 
 appointment of four praetors in 197 B.C., showed a desire 
 to limit the number of magistrates who were outside the 
 immediate control of the senate, rather than a real grasp of 
 the requirements of the new empire. A more serious evil 
 was the election of the twenty-four military tribunes, i.e. 
 of the whole military staff, by the comitia tributa ; thus 
 the choice of officers became subject to the evils of 
 popular election, and every effort was made by the aris- 
 tocracy to secure the position for members of their own 
 order, and to make the military tribunate the stepping- 
 
TEE GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNED. 205 
 
 stone in the political career of young nobles. In serious 
 wars, e.g. in 171 B.C., it was found necessary to suspend 
 this system, and to restore to the general the power of 
 electing his own staff. 
 
 Owing to the aristocratic spirit that pervaded every 
 section of the government, the chief magisterial offices of 
 consul and censor not only centred in the hands of a 
 limited number of gentes, but, what was worse, in the 
 hands of particular families. This was markedly the case 
 in the policy of the Scipios and the Flaminini. Moreover, 
 a serious laxity began to prevail in the management of 
 the public money ; and, although embezzlement was still 
 rare among Roman officials, the corruption prevalent in 
 the provinces could not fail to react with pernicious effect 
 on the praetors and their retinue. The relations of Rome 
 to her allies and dependents, both within and outside 
 Italy, gradually underwent a change. In the first place, 
 such communities as had been passive burgesses of Rome, 
 and had sided with Hannibal, e.g. Capua, lost their Roman 
 citizenship, while other communities which had remained 
 true to Rome acquired the full franchise ; thus, except in 
 isolated cases, the position occupied by passive burgesses 
 ceased to exist. Admission to the Roman franchise be- 
 came more and more difficult ; and the tendency arose on 
 the part of the Roman citizens to separate themselves, not 
 only from the mass of Italians, but even from their old 
 Latin allies, whose staunch support had saved the state 
 in the war with Hannibal. The chief burdens of war, of 
 garrison duty, and of the Spanish service, now fell upon 
 the allies, while the Roman citizens appropriated most of 
 the spoil and of the honours and advantages that accrued 
 from the successes won by the arms of their allies. 
 Indeed, the Latins, though of course far removed from the 
 servile position held by the Bruttians and other com- 
 munities, felt that the distinction between themselves and 
 the mass of the Italian confederacy was being abolished, 
 and that they were fast becoming the subjects, instead of 
 the privileged allies, of Rome. 
 
 A far graver error was the retention of the old consti- 
 tution, which Carthage had established in Sicily, Sardi- 
 nia, and Spain : by retaining the tribute imposed by their 
 predecessors, the Romans renounced their old policy of 
 
206 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 having no tributary subjects ; and by applying this 
 method to Hither Spain, Macedonia, and Illyria, they 
 clearly adopted the dangerous and demoralizing expedient 
 of making money out of their new possessions. It is true 
 that the governors were legally bound to administer their 
 office with honesty and frugality, and it is equally true 
 that many, like Cato in Sardinia, scrupulously observed 
 the legal injunction. But the temptation was too great; 
 the control exercised by the senate over the governors was 
 of necessity very lax, and the complaints of the governed, 
 unless the severity and rapacity of the praetor had ex- 
 ceeded all ordinary limits, met with but scant attention. 
 Moreover, the governor could not be called to account 
 during his term of office, and the charges laid against him 
 "were, as a rule, heard by a jury consisting of men of his 
 own order, and therefore little inclined to visit the offender 
 with severe punishment. We can, then, scarcely doubt 
 that, owing to the feeble control exercised by the senate, 
 and the absolute nature of the governor's provincial office, 
 and, still more, owing to the corrupt servility of those 
 whom he governed, it was a rare thing for governors to 
 return home with clean hands. 
 
 A wholesome corrective to the abuse of the senatorial 
 power, theoretically at least, still existed in the assemblies 
 of the people. But this period exhibits to us the growing 
 unimportance, nay impotence, of the popular comitia. 
 The reason is plain. With the extension of the Roman 
 suffrage, not only throughout Latium, Sabina, and a part 
 of Campania, but to the new colonies founded in Picenum 
 and across the Apennines, the burgess-body no longer con- 
 sisted of farmers living within easy distance of the capital. 
 Thus the decision of the great questions of foreign policy 
 rested with men scattered over Italy, who met together 
 in the capital by mere chance, and who were unable by 
 previous consultation to arrive at some joint course of 
 action and to show an intelligent grasp of the weighty 
 questions submitted to their judgment. As a rule, then, 
 the people played a passive part on such occasions, and 
 ratified without discussion the proposals made to them by 
 the senate. 
 
 Again, out of the old clients of powerful houses now 
 arose a city rabble, whose votes in the comitia were 
 
TEE GOVERNMENT AND TEE GOVERNED. 207 
 
 becoming of even more importance than those of the 
 scattered burgesses, and were employed by the aristocracy 
 to counterbalance the independence of the farmers. 
 Systematic corruption began to be practised upon these 
 clients by the sale of grain at low prices, by an increase 
 of festivals and holidays, and by gladiatorial shows, in 
 order that the aristocratic candidate might secure his 
 election to the offices of state at the expense of his poorer 
 rival. The spoils of war were even employed to corrupt 
 the soldiers, and the stern refusal of Lucius Paullus to 
 turn his victory at Pydna to such base uses almost cost 
 him the honour of a triumph. It was but natural that 
 such corruption should work the decay of the old warlike 
 spirit, and that cowardice should stain the honour of the 
 Koman officers and soldiers. 
 
 Another sign of the universal degeneration was the 
 miserable love for petty distinctions : triumphs were 
 granted to the victor of Ligurian or Corsican robbers ; 
 statues and monuments became so common that it was 
 said to be a distinction to have none ; men received 
 permanent surnames from the victories they had won ; 
 and among the lower orders equal anxiety was manifested 
 to mark their social grade by trifling badges. 
 
 The party of opposition in the state was composed of 
 two elements of widely different character. In the first 
 place, there was the patriotic party, whose cry for reform 
 arose from a genuine distrust and hatred of the prevailing 
 corruption. The moving spirit and typical representative 
 of this party was Marcus Porcius Cato (234-149 B.C.). 
 This rough Sabine farmer had been induced to enter 
 upon a political career by a noble of the old stamp, 
 Lucius Valerius Flaccus. He saw active service through- 
 out the whole of the second Punic war, and in all 
 countries and in every capacity had won equal dis- 
 tinction. " He was the same in the Forum as in the 
 battlefield. His prompt and intrepid address, his rough 
 but pungent rustic wit, his knowledge of Roman law and 
 Roman affairs, his incredible activity and his iron frame, 
 first brought him into notice in the neighbouring towns ; 
 and when at length he made his appearance on the 
 greater arena of the Forum and the senatr-house in the 
 capital, constituted him the most influential pleader aud 
 
208 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 public orator of his time. Thoroughly narrow in his 
 political and moral views, and having the ideal of the good 
 old times always before his eyes and on his lips, he 
 cherished an obstinate contempt for everything new. 
 Deeming himself entitled, by virtue of his own austere 
 life, to manifest an unrelenting severity and harshness 
 towards everything and everybody; upright and honour- 
 able, but without a glimpse of any duty beyond the sphere 
 of police discipline and of mercantile integrity ; an enemy 
 to all villainy and vulgarity as well as to all genius and 
 refinement; and, above all things, a foe to those who were 
 his foes, he never made an attempt to stop evils at their 
 source, but waged war throughout life against mere 
 symptoms, and especially against persons." Not only did 
 he attack the most powerful aristocrats, such as the Scipios 
 and the Flaminini, but he never shrank from abusing his 
 own supporters did he deem they deserved it. Still, so 
 staunch were the farmers in their support, that wheu Cato 
 and his friend and colleague, Lucius Flaccus, stood as 
 candidates for the censorship in 184 B.C., all the exertions 
 of the aristocrats were powerless to prevent their return. 
 
 The reforms introduced by Cato and his party were 
 aimed at arresting the spread of decay and at checking 
 the preponderating influence of the aristocracy in politics. 
 In view of the first object, police regulations were enacted 
 to restrict the luxurious style of living, and to introduce 
 a frugal economy into Roman households. More success- 
 ful and more practical were the efforts made to revive the 
 farmer class by founding Latin colonies in the north, and 
 by large and numerous assignations of the domain land. 
 Although Cato failed to carry his proposal to institute 
 four hundred new equestrian stalls, and thus remedy the 
 decline of the burgess cavalry, the necessities of war had 
 long before compelled the government to reduce the 
 rating, which allowed a man to serve in the army, from 
 £43 to £6, and to abolish the other qualification of free 
 birth. The admission of the poor and of freedmen into the 
 army gave them a new importance in the state, and was 
 one of the chief causes of the changes introduced into the 
 comitia centuriata. These changes, accomplished about 
 241 B.C., at the close of the first Punic war, placed all five 
 classes composing the comitia on an equal footing as 
 
THE GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNED. 209 
 
 regarded number of votes, and took away from the 
 equites their old prioi'ity in voting, and gave the f reed- 
 men the same power as the freeborn. 
 
 This reform was the first victory won by the new 
 democracy over the aristocracy, but its effects were 
 greatly neutralized by the fact that, though priority of 
 votiug was taken away from the equites or aristocratic 
 voters, it was still confined to a division chosen by lot 
 from the first or richest class ; and further, the equaliza- 
 tion of the freedmen with the freeborn was set aside 
 twenty years later, in 220 B.C., by the censor Gaius Flami- 
 nius, and the freedmen were excluded from the centuries. 
 A proof that the reform did not at any rate greatly affect 
 the power of the aristocracy is furnished by the fact that 
 the second consulship and second censorship, although in 
 law open to both patricians and plebeians, were almost 
 invariably filled by patricians ; the second consulship 
 was held by patricians down to 172 B.C., and the second, 
 censorship down to 131 B.C. 
 
 Viewed as a whole, the reforms of Cato and his party, 
 distinguished as they were by great energy and a noble 
 wish to counteract the evident evils of the time, were 
 unfortunately marred by a want of clear insight into the 
 source of those evils, and by the failure to devise, in a 
 large and statesmanlike spirit, some comprehensive plan 
 for their remedy. 
 
 In the second place, the party of opposition contained 
 a far less reputable element, the outcome of the city 
 rabble. The spirit of demagogism was abroad ; men, 
 cursed with a love of empty speechmaking, pretended to 
 be ardent reformers, but in their harangues dwelt only on 
 the excessive powers of the aristocratic government and 
 on the rights of the citizens, not on the urgent need for 
 moral reform in every section of the state. The evils 
 which arose out of this new spirit have already been 
 indicated in the history of the war with Hannibal : the 
 appointment of mere party leaders, such as Flaminius and 
 Varro, to the supreme command ; the absurd decree which 
 made Minucius codictator with Fabius in 217 B.C., and 
 which gave the deathblow to the dictatorship ; the charge 
 of embezzlement laid against Marcellus in 219 B.C., — these 
 and other acts all proceeded from the wanton interference 
 
 14 
 
210 HISTORY OF HOME 
 
 of the demagogues. The citizens were even tempted to 
 interfere with the administration of the finances, the 
 oldest and most important prerogative of the government ; 
 and, in 232 B.C., Gaius Flaminius, owing to the fatal 
 obstinacy of the senate, went to the burgesses with his 
 proposal to distribute the domain- lands in Picenum. Nor 
 was this new system of politics confined to its author, 
 Gaius Flaminius ; aristocrats, such as Scipio, in their 
 efforts to place themselves and their families in a position 
 superior to that of the rest of the senate, condescended 
 to vie with demagogues in their flattery of the city rabble. 
 We have already pointed out the impotence of the comitia ; 
 as a rule, indeed, the burgesses had the good sense and 
 sufficient patriotism to give a hearty support to that 
 senate which had weathered the storm of Hannibal's in- 
 vasion. But appeals to selfishness and avarice could not 
 fail to demoralize the best citizens ; and sudden caprice 
 or violent outbursts of jealousy or hatred from time to 
 time showed that the old foundations of the Republic were 
 being undermined. "To the later generations, who sur- 
 vived the storms of revolution, the period after the 
 Hannibalic war appeared the golden age of Rome, and 
 Cato seemed the model of the Roman statesman. It was 
 in reality the calm before the storm, and the epoch of 
 political mediocrities." The seeming outward stability of 
 the R >man constitution, during the years 266-146 B.C., was 
 a sign, not of health, but of incipient sickness and 
 revolution. 
 
 A review of this period would be incomplete unless it 
 presented a brief notice of the economic troubles produced 
 by the system of farming on a large scale, and by the power 
 of capital. The importation of corn from the provinces, 
 and the sale of it at a merely nominal price for the benefit 
 of the idle proletariat of the capital, naturally ruined the 
 market for the growers of Italian corn. The evil was all 
 the worse and all the more inexcusable in a country like 
 Italy, where there were hardly any manufactures, and, 
 consequently, no large industrial population whose needs, 
 as in England, could not be supplied by home-grown grain. 
 On the contrary, agriculture was the mainstay of the 
 Roman state, and the short-sighted policy of the govern- 
 ment in this matter sacrificed the soundest to the most 
 
THE GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNED 211 
 
 worthless part oi ; the nation. The small farmers were 
 gradually ruined, and their holdings became merged in the 
 large estates of the landlords, who, by cultivating their 
 lands by means of large gangs of slaves, were able to pro- 
 duce at a cheaper rate than the farmer. But even the large 
 landlord was unable to compete with foreign grain, and 
 devoted himself almost entirely to stock-raising and the 
 production of oil and wine : and thus it was that arable land 
 to a great extent was converted into pasture, while, owing 
 to the increased use of slaves, free labour became almost 
 unknown. The power of the capitalist was alike evinced 
 in the speculative management of land, in the increase of 
 money-lenders, and in the enormous extent of all mercantile 
 transactions ; and, as in the end the gains from commercial 
 enterprise flowed into Rome, the result was that Rome, 
 compared w r ith the rest of the world, stoed as superior in 
 point of wealth as in political and military power. In fact, 
 the whole Roman nation btcame possessed with the mer- 
 cantile spirit, and, while money served to create a new 
 social barrier between rich and poor, "that deep-rooted 
 immorality, which is inherent in an economy of pure 
 capital, ate into the heart of society and of the common- 
 wealth, and substituted an absolute selfishness for humanity 
 aud patriotism." 
 
 Moreover, the very population of Italy began to decline, 
 and Cato and Polybius agree in stating that at the end of 
 the sixth century Italy was far weaker in population than 
 at the end of the fifth ; "and although it was, in the fiist 
 instance, the two long wars with Carthage that decimated 
 and ruined both the burgesses and the allies, the Roman 
 capitalists beyond doubt contributed quite as much as 
 Hamilcar and Hannibal to the decline in the vigour and 
 the numbers of the Italian people." 
 
 AUTHORITIES. 
 
 Senate. — Liv. xxii. 7, 34; xxvi. 1; xxxv. 42, 48; xxxvi. 3 ; xxxviii. 
 
 42 ; xlv. 18. Polyb. vi. 13 ; xxvii. 5 ; xxviii. 45. Sail. Jug. 41. 
 
 Momms. R. St. iii. 458, sqq. 
 Equites.— Liv. xxiii. 48, 49; xlii. 61. Polyb. vi. 20. Momms. E. 
 
 St. iii. 458, sqq. 
 Praetors. — Liv Epit. 20, 32. 
 
212 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 Military tribunes. — Liv. ix. 30; xxvii. 36; xliv. 21. Sail. Jug. 63. 
 
 Marq. Stv. ii. 365, sqq. 
 Exclusiveness of Romans. — Liv. xli. 13; xlii. 4. Veil. 2, 15. 
 Bribery.— Cic. in Verr. ii. 3, 7 ; iii. 6, 12. Gains, ii. 7. Liv. Epit. 43. 
 Cato.— Liv. xxix. 25; xxxii. 7, 8, 27; xxxiii. 43; xxxiv. 2, 8-20; 
 
 xxxv. 9 ; xxxvi. 17-21 ; xxxviii. 54 ; xxxix. 40-44 ; xliii. 2 ; xlv. 
 
 25. Plut. Cato. Cato M. 36, 40, 42. Polyb. xxxi. 24 ; xxxv. 6. 
 Sale of imported corn — arable land turned to pasture. — Cic. in Verr. 
 
 ii. 2, 5. Liv. xxvi. 40. Pliny, N. H. xviii. 29. Colum. 6, praef. 
 
 4. Marq. Stv. ii. 112, sqq. 
 
CHAPTER XIX. 
 
 THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES DOWN TO THE GRACCHAN EPOCH. 
 
 Spain — The Lusitanian and Celtiberian wars — Viriathns — Numantia 
 — The protected states — Cause of the third and last war with 
 Carthage — Preparations of Carthage — Scipio Aeniiliaims — 
 Capture and destruction of Carthage — Provinces of Africa and 
 Macedonia — The Achaean war — Destruction of Corinth — State 
 of the East — The Parthian empire — Piracy — General result. 
 
 Before we enter upon the period of change which takes 
 its name from the family of the Gracchi, it is necessary to 
 present a picture of the state of things in the subject 
 countries. Trivial and dreary as the separate conflicts in 
 these remote lands between weakness and power may seem, 
 yet collectively they are of great historical significance •, 
 and the reaction which the provinces exercised on the 
 mother country alone renders intelligible the condition of 
 Italy at this period. 
 
 At first the only two recognized provinces of Rome, if we 
 except what may be regarded as the natural appendages of 
 Italy, i.e. Sicily, Corsica, and Sardinia, were the two Spains ; 
 and they were the scene of many wars and the cause of 
 much trouble to Rome. In 154 B.C. the peaceful state of 
 the Spanish provinces, which had lasted for nearly thirty 
 years, was broken by the successful invasion of the Lusi- 
 tanians. The complete defeat of the praetor Lucius ilum- 
 mius, governor of Further Spain, in 153 B.C., emboldened 
 the Celtiberians to join against the common foe ; and the 
 successes achieved by the powerful tribe of the Arevacae 
 over the consul Quintus Fulvius Nobilior even eclipsed the 
 previous victories of the Lusitanians. But the advent of 
 
214 HISTORY OF HOME. 
 
 Marcus Claudius Marcellus, who combined skilful general* 
 ship with humane treatment, terminated the Celtiberian 
 war in 161 B.C. His peaceful and honourable arrange- 
 ment with the Arevacae did not, however, suit the ideas of 
 the new consul, Lucius Lucullus, who made a sudden and 
 unprovoked assault on the friendly tribe of the Vaccaei, 
 and enslaved or massacred the inhabitants of the unoffend- 
 ing town of Cauca. This new method of warfare found an 
 apt disciple in the praetor Servius Sulpicius Galba, who 
 made a treaty with three Lusitanian tribes under the 
 promise of giving them better settlements, and, having 
 separated them into three divisions, either put to the 
 sword or carried off into slavery seven thousand men. 
 Despite the unequalled perfidy, cruelty, and avarice with 
 which these two generals waged war, they were able to 
 purchase immunity from condemnation on their return to 
 Rome. 
 
 The outbreak of the fourth Macedonian and the third 
 Punic war, in 149 B.C., caused the withdrawal of all special 
 Roman forces from Spain. The Lusitanians at once renewed 
 their invasions of Turdetania, and, when about to capitulate 
 after a defeat by the governor Gaius Vetilius, they were 
 roused to fresh vigour by the eloquence and example of 
 the famous Viriathus. It seemed as if at last Spain had 
 found a champion able to break the fetters of Rome ; 
 general after general, army after army, both in northern 
 and southern Spain, recoiled in utter discomfiture before 
 the ability and enthusiasm of the Spanish leader. For 
 about ten years (148-139 B.C.) Viriathus was the acknow- 
 ledged king of the Lusitanians, though never distinguished 
 by any badge from the meanest soldier ; — a true hero, 
 remarkable alike for his physical and mental qualities. In 
 the end his brilliant and noble career was, as often happened 
 in Spain, cut short by the hand of the assassin, three of 
 his intimate friends having sold the life of their lord to 
 the Roman consul, Quintus Servilius Caepio, in return for 
 their own safety. With the death of Viriathus the war in 
 Lusitania came to an end. But the successes of Viriathus 
 had once more ignited the torch of war in the North, and 
 the Celtiberian Arevacae again revolted, in 144 B.C. The 
 ability of the consul Quintus Caecilius Metellus reduced 
 the northern province to obedience in two years. 
 
THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES. 215 
 
 Far more serious was the struggle with the town of 
 Numantia. The incapable consul, Quintus Pompeius, 
 after several severe defeats, agreed to come to terms with 
 its invincible inhabitants ; but, in fear of the reckoning 
 that awaited him at home for thus concluding peace, he at 
 the last moment took refuge in a base falsehood, and denied 
 the agreement he had made. The matter was referred to 
 the senate, who supported their guilty consul, and ordered 
 his successor Marcus Popilius Laenas to continue the war. 
 The total incompetence of the Roman generals and the 
 demoralized condition of their armies caused the war to 
 drag on, amid disgrace and disaster, from 137-134 B.C. In 
 the latter year Scipio Aemilianus, the first general in Rome, 
 was sent out, and, after reorganizing the Roman army by 
 treatment alike severe and contemptuous, he set about the 
 task of subduing the brave Numantines. After a heroic 
 defence, the city, utterly exhausted by famine and pesti- 
 lence, fell, in the autumn of 133 B.C., and its fall re- 
 established the supremacy of Rome in Hither Spain. A 
 senatorial commission was shortly after sent to Spain, and 
 the provinces were reorganized. Thanks to the efforts of 
 Scipio and other governors Spain gradually became ex- 
 ceedingly prosperous, and, despite the guerilla warfare 
 ever waged by the half-subdued native tribes, it was the 
 most nourishing and best-organized country in the Roman 
 dominions. 
 
 Par more insupportable was the condition — intermediate 
 between formal sovereignty and actual subjection — of the 
 African, Greek, and Asiatic states. These had neither 
 independence nor peace. In Africa there was constant war 
 between Carthage and Numidia ; in Egypt the rulers of that 
 country and Cyrene were ever disputing for the possession 
 of Cyprus; in Asia almost every petty kingdom was torn 
 by intestine struggles, and several were at war with one 
 another. The interference of Rome, constantly invoked, 
 only made matters worse. Rome neither resigned its 
 authority nor displayed sufficient force to bring the ruled 
 into subjection. " It was the epoch of commissions." 
 Commissioners went to and fro, reporting and giving 
 orders, to which the Asiatic states, feeling secure from 
 their very remoteness, as a rule paid no attention. The 
 Roman government conferred neither the blessings of 
 
216 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 freedom nor of order. It was clear that this state of things 
 must be put an end to, and that the only way to do so was 
 by the conversion of the client states into Roman provinces. 
 The only question was whether the Roman senate would 
 perceive the necessity of the task, and would put its hand 
 to the work with the requisite energy. 
 
 In Africa we have to record the last act of the terrible 
 Carthaginian drama. The Romans saw with ill-concealed 
 envy the increasing prosperity of their old rival, though 
 hampered in every way by the encroachments of Massi- 
 nissa. At the head of the second commission, sent from 
 Rome in 161 B.C., to settle points of dispute between the 
 Numidian king and Carthage, was the aged Cato, whose 
 inveterate hatred of Carthage was aroused afresh by the 
 sight of her great commercial prosperity. Opposed 
 though he was by the larger-minded Scipio Nasica, Cato 
 had no difficulty in finding men at home ready to support 
 his view that Rome could know no security until Car- 
 thage was destroyed ; and among his most ardent sup- 
 porters were the bankers and rich capitalists of Rome, 
 who saw that the wealth of Carthage must revert to 
 themselves. 
 
 An opportunity for putting the policy of Cato into 
 effect soon arose. In 154 B.C. Massinissa appealed to 
 Rome to act once more as arbiter between him and Car- 
 thage, and pointed out that the leaders of the patriotic 
 party in Carthage, Hasdrubal and Carthalo, were amass- 
 ing stores and collecting troops in violation of the treaty 
 with Rome. The Carthaginians were ordered to destroy 
 their naval stores and dismiss their troops ; but the spirit 
 of the people was roused, and the demand was rejected 
 and preparations made to wage war against Massinissa. 
 In 152 B.C. hostilities began, and, owing to the miserable 
 incapacity of Hasdrubal, Massinissa gained a complete 
 victory. 
 
 The Romans now conceived that the hour had come to 
 deal the deathblow to their old antagonist. By making 
 war upon Massinissa, an ally of Rome, Carthage had 
 broken one of the stipulations of their treaty, and had 
 thus given Rome a plausible pretext for w T ar, and from 
 the feeble display of arms she had made against Mas- 
 sinissa, Carthage seemed a certain and easy victim. In 
 
THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES. 217 
 
 vain the Carthaginians made every submission to avert 
 the threatened blow, and war was declared in 149 B.C. 
 After dallying with the wretched envoys sent from Car- 
 thage, and after making the severest demands, the Roman 
 consul Lucius Marcius Censorinus, who had landed at 
 Utica, at last revealed the dire purpose of the senate, and 
 bade the envoys tell the Gerusia that Carthage must be 
 evacuated and surrendered to destruction. At this the 
 frenzied enthusiasm of the Phoenician race once more 
 blazed forth. The most marvellous efforts were made to 
 secure the defences of the city, and to repair the blunder 
 which had surrendered all the arms and dismantled the 
 battlements in obedience to the Roman demands. 
 
 Meanwhile, the Roman consuls were deluded by pre- 
 tended embassies, and, though but a few miles distant, 
 had no idea what was happening in the Phoenician capital. 
 The precious respite was turned to good account: day 
 and night the work of forging arms and catapults never 
 flagged. Young and old, women and children, were all 
 fired with the same zeal and the same hatred. With in- 
 credible speed the work was finished, and the city and 
 its inhabitants ready for the struggle. Art had rendered 
 the naturally strong site of Carthage well-nigh impreg- 
 nable ; and the two consuls, Manius Manilius and Lucius 
 Censorinus, on realizing their blunder and attempting to 
 prosecute the siege, soon found out how utterly incom- 
 petent they were for the task. After losses by assaults 
 and disease the Romans were compelled, by the death of 
 Massinissa in 149 B.C., to suspend all offensive operations. 
 The youthful Scipio, who was serving as a military tri- 
 bune, alone retrieved the honour of the Roman name, 
 both by his personal bravery and his politic dealings with 
 the native Numidians ; and to him the aged Cato, who 
 died the same year, applied the Homeric line, olos iriTrvvrat, 
 Tol Se o-Kiai aiaa-ovatv (" He only is a living man, the 
 rest are gliding shades"). 
 
 The following year saw two new commanders, Lucius 
 Piso at the head of the land army, and Lucius Mancinus 
 in charge of the fleet : they achieved even less than their 
 predecessors, and neglected the siege of Carthage for 
 attacks on smaller towns, which as a rule were unsuc- 
 cessful. A Numidian sheik passed over to the Cartha- 
 
218 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 ginian side with eight hundred horse, and negotiations 
 were entered into with the kings of Numidia and Maure- 
 tania. At this juncture the Romans adopted the extra- 
 ordinary measure of giving the command to Scipio 
 Aemilianus, and thus made him consul without his having 
 held the preliminary office of aedile. His arrival, in 
 147 B.C., completely changed the aspect of affairs. Man- 
 cinns was rescued from a position of great danger on an 
 isolated cliff, and the siege of Carthage was once more 
 begun in real earnest. Scipio first constructed a large 
 camp across the isthmus which connected Carthage with 
 the mainland, and then blocked up the entrance to the 
 harbour by a mole of stone ninety-six feet in breadth. 
 This latter operation the Carthaginians neutralized by 
 cutting a new canal, thus gaining a new outlet into the 
 harbour. But Scipio at last succeeded in his object, 
 and completely blockaded the city by land and sea, leaving 
 famine and pestilence to complete what he had be^un. 
 
 In the spring of 146 B.C. the city wall was scaled, and 
 for six days the famished inhabitants continued a terrible 
 but hopeless struggle from house to house and street to 
 street. Even then the steep citadel-rock, held by Has- 
 drubal and the remnant of the garrison, remained ; to 
 clear the approaches, Scipio ordered the city to be set on 
 fire and the ruins to be levelled. The garrison at last 
 capitulated, and life was granted to the survivors, a bare 
 tenth part of the former population. Hasdrubal, to whose 
 gluttony and bragging incapacity the fall of Carthage 
 was in no small measure due, gained the boon of life for 
 which he prayed Scipio on his knees ; but his wife scorned 
 to survive her city's destruction, and plunged with her 
 children into the flames of a burning temple. Despite 
 the protests of Scipio, the senate ordered the consul to 
 raze Carthage to the ground, to pass the plough over its 
 site, and to curse the ground for ever. " Where the 
 industrious Phoenicians had bustled and trafficked for five 
 hundred years, Roman slaves henceforth pastured the 
 herds of their distant masters. Scipio, however, whom 
 nature had destined for a nobler part than that of an 
 executioner, gazed with horror on his own work ; and, 
 instead of the joy of victory, the victor himself was 
 haunted by a presentiment of the retribution that would 
 
THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES. 219 
 
 inevitably follow such, a misdeed." The Carthaginian 
 territory, as possessed by the city in its last days, became 
 a Roman province under the name of Africa, and the 
 boundaries of the enlarged Numidian kingdom were 
 clearly denned. Utica was the capital of the new pro- 
 vince, and thither Roman merchants flocked to turn to 
 account the new acquisition. 
 
 About the same time, Macedonia also experienced the 
 common fate. The four small confederacies, into which 
 Roman wisdom had parcelled out the ancient kingdom, 
 soon showed how impracticable such an arrangement was. 
 A pretender, calling himself Philip the son of Perseus, 
 met with support from Thrace and Byzantium, and was 
 accepted as king by the Macedonian nation. He even 
 extended his rule over Thessaly by a victory over the 
 Roman praetor Juventius in 149 B.C., but in the following 
 year he was crushed by Quintus Caecilius Metellus. Mace- 
 donia was now converted into a Roman province, and this 
 province, including as it did the Roman protectorate over 
 Greece proper, covered much the same area as had 
 formerly been subject to Macedonian sway. One more 
 movement was made by Alexander, another pretended 
 son of Perseus, to break the Roman yoke, but it was 
 easily quelled in 142 B.C. 
 
 In Greece itself all Roman efforts at conciliation failed, 
 and at last, despite the warnings of the Roman envoys, 
 the Achaean league declared war against Sparta about 
 146 B.C. This action, combined with the insulting attitude 
 of the Greeks towards Rome, caused the senate to send 
 Lucius Mummius to crush the pretensions of Critolaus, 
 the Achaean strategus. A battle at Leucopatra was utterly 
 disastrous to the Achaeans, and was followed by the con- 
 version of Greece into the province of Achaia. On the 
 whole, Mummius seems to have acted with justice and 
 moderation in his administration of Greek affairs ; but 
 the Roman senate showed a hideous severity in the 
 destruction of Corinth, the first commercial city in Greece, 
 and the last precious ornament of a land once so rich in 
 cities. Doubtless this barbarous act was due to the 
 political influence of the Roman merchants, who gladly 
 seized the opportunity to rid themselves of a commercial 
 rival. 
 
220 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 In Asia Minor, the bequest of Pergamus to the Romans 
 by the last of the Attalids, in 133 B.C., gave Rome a new 
 province, though she had to vindicate her right by the 
 sword, as Aristonicus, a natural son of one of the former 
 kings of Pergamus, succet-ded for a time in making good 
 his claim to the throne. Most of the small states and 
 cities in western Asia remained unchanged, but both 
 Cappadocia and Pontus received some additional territory 
 on the dissolution of the Attalid kingdom. Roman 
 authority in Syria and Egypt became weaker and weaker, 
 owing to the negligent and spasmodic manner in which 
 the senate attempted to settle the various disputes that 
 arose. Many causes had combined to destroy the once 
 huge empire of Asia : the battle of Magnesia had wrested 
 western Asia from the great king ; the two Cappadocias 
 and the two Armenias had become independent kingdoms ; 
 lastly, Antiochus Epiphanes (175-164 B.C.) had adopted the 
 course, equally foolish and fatal, of introducing Roman 
 and Greek ideas both in manners and religion throughout 
 his dominions. This step, enforced as it was by religious 
 persecution and plundering of temples, drove the Jews to 
 revolt in 167 B.C., and the successful issue of their rebellion 
 was mainly due to the brave and nrudent conduct of the 
 house of the Maccabees. 
 
 A still more important result of the folly of Antiochus 
 was the founding of the Parthian kingdom, the outcome 
 of a reaction on the part of the native religion and 
 manners against Hellenism. Mithradates I. (175-133 B.C.) 
 laid the foundations of this empire by his successes over 
 the Bactrian kingdom, and in all the countries west of the 
 great desert. Aided by the internal dissolution of the 
 kingdom of the Seleucidae, from which Persia, Babylonia, 
 aud Media were for ever severed, this new empire reached 
 from the Oxus and the Hindu Khush to the Tigris and 
 the desert of Arabia. The foundations of its strength rested 
 not merely on the revival of the wild physical forces of the 
 East, on the bow and arrow and the whirlwind rush of 
 the cavalry of the desert, but far more on the revival of the 
 national customs and national religion ; on the old Iranian 
 language, the order of the Magi and the worship of Mithra. 
 From the founding of the Parthian empire dates the ebb 
 of that great Hellenic movement which had reached its 
 
THE SUBJECT COUNTRIES. 221 
 
 height under Alexander the Great. The East once more 
 reasserted itself, and re-entered the world of politics : the 
 world had again two masters. Thus " the Roman senate 
 sacrificed the first essential result of the policy of Alex- 
 ander, and thereby paved the way for that retrograde 
 movement whose last offshoots ended in the Alhambra of 
 Granada and in the great Mosque of Constantinople." 
 
 If we glance at the maritime relations of this period, 
 we find that practically no naval power existed. Rome 
 had no fleet, and her maritime police, once so effective, 
 ceased to control the piracy everywhere prevalent. A 
 check no doubt was kept on the buccaneers of the Adriatic 
 and Tyrrhene seas ; but Crete and Cilicia became the 
 recognized home of organized bands of pirates. The 
 Roman government merely looked on, and the Roman 
 merchants kept up a friendly traffic with the pirate 
 captains, who furnished them with that marketable 
 commodi ty — slaves. 
 
 We have now reviewed Rome's position in and dealings 
 with the outer world. The problem of governing this new 
 empire was not wholly misunderstood, though it was by no 
 means solved. The idea of Cato's time that the state 
 shonld not extend beyond Italy, and that outside that limit 
 a mere protectorate should be exercised, had proved unten- 
 able ; the necessity of substituting a direct sovereignty, that 
 should preserve the liberties of the various communities, 
 was generally recognized. But this policy was not adopted 
 firmly and uniformly : provinces were annexed from time 
 to time, according as convenience, caprice, interest, or 
 chance suggested ; but the majority of dependent states 
 remained in the intolerable uncertainty of their former 
 position, or, as was the case with Syria, even withdrew 
 entirely from Roman influence. Showing themselves often 
 stern masters where leniency was needed, and lenient 
 where sternness was required, the Romans governed from 
 one day to another with feeble and selfish hands, merely 
 transacting the current business of the hour. Senators 
 had learnt to despise the old maxim that office was its 
 own reward, and that such office was a burden and duty 
 rather than a privilege and benefit ; and we find that 
 foreign powers constantly bribed influential senators by 
 enormous gifts. The Roman fleet was allowed to go to 
 
222 HISTORY OF HOME. 
 
 ruin ; the decay of the old military spirit and prestige 
 was no less marked. The better classes had begun to 
 disappear from the army, and officers for the Spanish 
 wars were found with great difficulty. In truth the 
 Roman senate had solved the problem of acquiring the 
 sovereignty of the world, but had broken down under 
 the more difficult task of its government. 
 
 AUTHORITIES. 
 
 Spanish wars. — Polyb. xxxv. Appian Sp. 44-100. Liv. Epit. 53-57, 
 
 59. Dio Cass.'Fr. 73, 75-80. 
 Third Punic war. — Polyb. xxxvi ; xxxvii. 1-2 ; xxxviii. 1-2 ; xxxix. 
 
 3-o. Liv. Epit, 47-51. Appian Lib. 67-135. Strab. 832, sq. 
 Province of Africa. — Sail. Jug. 19. Marq. Stv. i. 464, sqq. 
 Macedonia— Polyb. lxxxvi. 8-9 Liv. xlv. 17-18, 29, 30. Epit. 45, 50. 
 
 Floras, i. 30, 32. Marq. Stv. i. 316, sqq. 
 Achaean war. — Polyb. xxxviii. 7-11; xxxix. 7-17 Liv. Epit. 52. Cic. 
 
 in Verr. i. 21. Marq. Stv. i. 321-333. 
 Miihradates (Arsaces).— Polyb. x. 28-31. Strab. 515, 669. Joseph. 
 
 Antiq. Jew. xii. 5. Mommsen Provinces, ii. 1, sqq. 
 Fleet. — Marq. Stv. ii. 500, sqq. 
 
CHAPTER XX. 
 
 TEE REFORMS OP THE GRACCHI. 
 
 Spread of decay — Attempts at reform — Public elections — Social 
 crisis — Slavery and slave-wars — Italian farmers — Scipio Aemi- 
 lianus — Tiberius Gracchus — Tribune, 134 B.C. — His agrarian 
 law and further plans — His death — Criticism oi: his measures and 
 methods — Suspension of the land commission— Murder of Scipio 
 Aemilianus — The democratic leaders — War with Fregellae — ■ 
 Gaius Gracchus tribune — His measures and objects — The Livian 
 laws — Overthrow and d^athof Gaius Gracchus. 
 
 We have now reached the epoch in Roman history for 
 ever rendered famous by the revolutionary reforms of 
 Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus. It is our duty to trace the 
 causes which called for those reforms, and to form some 
 judgment both of the measures and their authors. In the 
 preceding chapter we have sketched the evils underlying 
 the outward calm which pervaded the whole Roman 
 empire for a full generation after the battle of Pydna. 
 Cato's question as to the future of Rome, when she no 
 longer had a state to fear, had a profound significance now. 
 The younger generation of aristocrats thought no more 
 of foreign foes, but of maintaining and, if possible, of 
 increasing the privileges they had usurped. The various 
 measures of the opposition — e.g. (a) the institution of a 
 standing senatorial commission by Lucius Calpurnius Piso, 
 in 149 B.C., to try the complaints of provincials touching 
 the extortion of Roman governors ; (6) the introduction 
 of the vote by ballot in the burgess assemblies, primarily 
 adopted for the election of magistrates by the Gabinian law 
 in 149 B.C., then applied to the law courts, in 137 B.C., by 
 
224 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 the Cassian law, and finally applied to all 'egisjative pro- 
 posals, in 131 B.C., by the Papirian law ; (c) the exclusion, a 
 little later, of the sena to rs from th e equestrian centuries, — 
 failed entirely to emancipate the electors from aristocratic 
 influence, and to restore to the comitia the power and 
 independence they had once possessed. The Romans 
 lacked what alone compensates for the evils of party life, 
 the free and common movement of the masses to some 
 definite aim. Politics were, as a rule, merely partisanship 
 for individuals, not for great principles, and the people 
 arrayed itself now on the side of this aristocratic coterie, 
 now on the side of that. Hence spr.mg that despicable 
 canvassing of the mob by an aspirant for public office ; 
 hence, too, those demagogic cries for reform and attacks 
 on eminent persons to catch the popular ear ; hence, again, 
 arose the necessity for providing costly popular amuse- 
 ments, the long recognized duty of any candidate for the 
 consulship. A still graver evil was the miserable position 
 which the government, by thus cringing for the favour of 
 the mob, was forced to occupy towards the governed. The 
 burgesses became used to the dangerous idea that they were 
 exempt from all direct taxation, and they were no longer 
 forced to enter the hateful military service across the sea. 
 The two factions, which now became known by the names 
 of Optimates and Populares, fought alike for shadows, 
 being completely destitute of political morality and politi- 
 cal idea?. It would have been better for Rome had the 
 Optimates substituted hereditary rotation for election by 
 the burgesses, or had the Populares developed a real 
 democratic government. 
 
 The crisis with which the Roman revolution opened 
 arose from the old evil, the land question. The warfare 
 which had for centuries been waged between the small 
 farmer and the capitalist had at last produced the most 
 disastrous results ; and as formerly the farmer had been 
 ruined by the chain of debt, so now he was crushed by 
 the competition with trans marine and slave-ffrown corn. 
 The ultimate result was in both cases the same : Italian 
 farms sank in value; small holdings became merged in 
 large estates ; agriculture gave place to stock-raising and 
 the growing of olives and vines ; and, finally, free labour 
 was supplanted in Italy, as in the provinces, by that of 
 
THE REFORMS OF THE GRACCHI. 225 
 
 slaves. The new and huge system of slavery row intro- 
 duced owed its rise to the all-powerful capitalist. In 
 earlier days captives taken in war and the hereditary 
 transmission of slavery had sufficed ; but the demand now 
 exceeded the supply, and, as in America, man was hunted 
 down on a regular system. The "negro-lard " of that period 
 was western Asia, and the Cretan and Cilician corsairs, 
 the professional slave-hunters and slave-dealers, robbed 
 the coasts of Syria and the Greek islands. Their example 
 was imitated by the Roman revenue-farmers, who insti- 
 tuted similar human hunts to such an extent that they 
 well-nigh depopulated certain provinces. At the great 
 slave- market at Delos it is said that as many as ten 
 thousand slaves were disembarked in the morning and 
 sold before the evening of the same day. We have 
 previously shown that eveiy financial arrangement, every 
 speculation, and every trade, were carried on by means 
 of slaves. Pastoral husbandry, now so common, was 
 almost entirelv performed by armed and often mounted 
 slaves. But far worse than any previous form of slavery 
 was the plantation system proper — the cultivation of 
 fields by chained gangs, who v\orked under overseers 
 and were locked up together at night in the common 
 labourers' prison. This system, introduced from Ihe 
 East into Carthage and thence into Sicily, was deve- 
 loped in that island earlier and more fully than in any 
 other part of the Roman dominions. In fact, for the 
 present, Italy was still substantially free from this worst 
 form of slave husbandry, though the Roman government 
 was soon aroused to the danger which the system deve- 
 loped elsewhere. 
 
 It requires but little imagination to picture the hideous 
 sufferings of the slaves themselves, far exceeding the sum 
 of all negro misery. Slave wars and slave insurrections 
 now became frequent, not only in the provinces but in 
 Italy itself, but, as was natural, it was in Sicily that the 
 evil results of slavery were most conspicuous. At Enna, 
 the slaves rose en masse, murdered their masters, and 
 crowned a Syrian juggler as king. His general Achaeus, 
 a Greek slave, traversed the island, and united under his 
 standard both slaves and free labourers. Agrieentum 
 was seized by another band, under Cleon, a Cilician slave; 
 
 15 
 
226 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 and the united forces utterly defeated the praetor Lucius 
 Hypsaeus, and reduced the whole island under their sway. 
 It was not until three successive consuls and armies had 
 been despatched from Rome (134-132 B.C.) that the servile 
 war was ended by the capture of Tauromenium and Euna, 
 the latter stronghold being reduced by famine rather than 
 by Roman arms, after a siege of two years. Such results 
 were due partly to the lax control of the Roman police- 
 system as worked by the senate and its officials in the 
 provinces, partly to the disinclination of the government 
 to disoblige Italian p'anters, to whom revolted slaves were 
 often surrendered for punishment. 
 
 The real remedy for these evils doubtless was to be found, 
 not in the severe repression of such revolts, but in the 
 elevation, by the government, of free labour, a natural con- 
 sequence of which would be the restriction of the slave 
 proletariate. But the difficulty of this measure was 
 beyond the capacity of the senate. In the first social crisis 
 the landholder had been forced by law to employ a number 
 of free labourers in proportion to the number of his slaves. 
 Now the government caused a Punic treatise on agriculture 
 to be translated for the use of Italian speculators, the 
 solitary instance of a literary undertaking suggested by 
 the senate! The same wisdom was shown in the matter of 
 colonization. It was quite clear that the only real remedy 
 against an agricultural proletariate consisted in a compre- 
 hensive and regular system of emigration. Hitherto the 
 constant assignations of land and the establishment of new 
 farm allotments had proved a fairly effective remedy for 
 the evil. But after the founding of Luna in 177 B.C., no 
 further assignations took place for a long time, for the 
 simple reason that no new territory was acquired in Italy, 
 with the exception of the unattractive Ligurian valleys. 
 Therefore there was no other land for distribution except 
 the leased or occupied domain land, with which the aris- 
 tocracy was as loth to part now as it had been three 
 hundred years before. For political reasons it was deemed 
 impossible to distribute the land in the provinces : Italy 
 was to remain the ruling country, and the wall of partition 
 between the Italian masters and the provincial servants 
 was not to be broken down. The result was inevitable — 
 the ruin of the farmer-class in Italy. Even as early as 
 
THE REFORMS OF THE GRACCHI. 227 
 
 134 B.C. not a free farmer existed in Etruria, where the 
 old native aristocracy combined with the Roman capitalist ; 
 and in the very capital one could hear it said that the beasts 
 had their lairs but the burgesses had nothing left but air 
 and sunshine, and that the so-called masters of the world 
 had no longer a clod they could call tbeir own. The 
 census list supplies a sufficient commentary. From the 
 close of the war with Hannibal down to 159 B.C. the- 
 numbers of the burgesses steadily rose, owing to the dis- 
 tributions of the domain land; while from 159 to 131 B.C. 
 they declined from 324,000 to 319,000 — an alarming result 
 for a period of profound peace at home and abroad. 
 
 The urgent need of reform was patent to every eye ; and 
 no one seemed more directly called to the task of reforma- 
 tion than Publius Scipio Aemilianus, the adopted grandson 
 of the great Scipio. He resembled his father Aemilius 
 Paullus in his temperate and healthy mode of life. 
 Passionately devoted to hunting, yet he did not neglect 
 to steep his mind in the highest Greek culture, and his 
 thorough probity and noble simplicity of life contrasted 
 with the mercantile spirit of so many of those around 
 him. His military ability had been proved in his suc- 
 cessful conclusion of the third Punic war, in which, 
 moreover, as an officer he had gained the wreath be- 
 stowed upon those who saved a fellow-countryman's life 
 at the risk of their own. Though no genius, he seemed 
 from his moral worth the man needed for the work of 
 reform ; all the more significant is the fact that he did not 
 attempt it. Nor was this from want of courage ; for he 
 supported Lucius Cassius against the Optimates in carrying 
 his law for the introduction of the ballot into the law- 
 courts, and he showed the greatest severity in restoring the 
 old military discipline before the walls of Carthage and 
 Numantia. But, as to the land question, the remedy, 
 proposed and then withdrawn by his friend Gains Laelius, 
 of distributing the unallotted domain land in Italy among 
 the farmers was in Scipio's opinion worse than the disease ; 
 and so he held a middle course between the two parties of 
 state, and on his death was claimed as champion by both 
 sides. 
 
 When laying down the censorship in 142 B.C., Scipio 
 called on the gods to deign to preserve the state, whereas 
 
228 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 ftll his predecessors had prayed for increased glory to flome. 
 " His whole confession of faith lies in that painful excla- 
 mation." But, where he despaired, Tiberius Sempronius 
 Gracchus, a youth unmarked by any achievement, dared 
 to hope. His father had been the true model of a Roman 
 aristocrat, and had given proof of his noble and generous 
 feelings both as consul and ceisor, but, above all, had by 
 his strict integrity and humane governorship of the pro- 
 vince of the Ebro not only rendered service to his country 
 but also endeared himself to the subject Spaniards. His 
 famous mother, Cornelia, was the daughter of tli j conqueror 
 of Zama, and had been given in marriage to Gracchus in 
 return for his generous intervention on behalf of his politi- 
 cal opponent, Scipio, when a petty and miserable charge 
 had been got up against the Scipionic house. Thus Tiberius, 
 who had taken part in the storming of Carthage under 
 his cousin and brother-in-law Scipio Aemilianus, had been 
 brought up in all the political ideas and social and intel- 
 lectual refinement of the Scipionic circle. Nor were he 
 and his brother Gaius the only members of that circle who 
 regarded the abandonment by Laelius of his scheme of 
 reform as weak rather than judicious. Ap-piu&.JHaudius, 
 consul in 143 B.C. and censor in 136 B.C., the father-in-law 
 of Tiberius, censured the Scipionic circle for their desertion 
 of the state with bitter vehemence ; the pontifex maximus 
 Publius Crassus Mucianus, father-in-law of Gaius Gracchus, 
 the revered warrior Quintus Metellus, and other men of 
 note were known to favour the cause of reform. Tiberius 
 brooded over the lofty ideals of statesmanship which he 
 had imbibed in the atmosphere around him, and public 
 placards often summoned the grandson of Africanus to 
 think of the poor people and of the deliverance of Italy. 
 He was elected tribune in 134 B.C., at a time when one of 
 the consuls had met with disaster in his attempt to quell the 
 rebellion of the Sicilian slaves, and when a small Spanish 
 town had defied for months the efforts of Scipio Aemilianus. 
 Not only had Tiberius the support and counsel of his 
 father-in-law, but he also hoped for the influence of the 
 new consul, Publius Mucins Scaevola, the founder of 
 scientific jurisprudence in Rome, and a man whose absten- 
 tion from party conflict gave his opinion the greater 
 weight. 
 
TEE REFORMS OF TEE GR ACCEL 229 
 
 At the outset Tiberius proposed what was in a certain 
 sense hut the renewal of the Licinio-Sextian law of 307 
 B.C. Under it all the state lands held and enjoyed without 
 remuneration were to be resumed on behalf of the state, 
 with the restriction that each occupier should reserve for 
 himself 500 jugera and for each son 250 (so as, however, 
 not to exceed a total of 1000 jugera) in peimarent and 
 guaranteed possession ; moreover, compensation was to 
 be given to an ejecteel occupier for any improvements 
 executed by him. The domain land thus resumed was to be 
 broken up into lots of o0 jugera, and to be distributed 
 among burgesses and Italian allies on permanent lease at a 
 moderate rent, and th e new holders were bound to use the 
 land for agriculture. A board or "college " of three men, 
 regarded as ordinary state magistrates and annually elected 
 by the people, was intrustfd with the work of confiscation 
 and distribution; and, later, the same board had the difficult 
 and important ta.^k of detei mining what was domain land 
 and what private property. 
 
 This permanent executive, the absence of v.hioh had 
 chiefly caused the Licinian rogations to remain in abeyance, 
 was the special point of difference between the Sempronian 
 and the older proposals. "War was thus declared against 
 the great landholders, whrse organ now, as three centuries 
 ago, was the senate. The old plan was adopted of silencing 
 Tiberius. His colleague JVfarens Octavius interposed his 
 veto when the measure was about to be put to the vote ; 
 Gracchus replied by snsperding all public business and 
 administration of justice. Graechus again brought his law 
 to the vote, Octavius again vetoed it. The senate now 
 induced Gracchus to discuss the matter further in the 
 senate-house, but no fruit came or could come of such 
 discussions. Gracchus, now feeling that all constitutional 
 means were exhausted, began a revolution by proposing to 
 the burgesses that they should vote whether be or Octavius 
 should retire from office. Such deposition v as impossible 
 according to the Roman constitution ; but Gracchus per- 
 severed, and was, of course, backed up by the almost 
 unanimous vote of the assembled multitude. Gracchus 
 then had his opponent removed from the tribunes' bench, 
 and, amid great rejoicing, the law was carried. 
 
 The first three commissioners elected were Tiberius 
 
230 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 Graccli us, his brpy i£ii > _amLhis-iather-in^law-A|4)ius. Such 
 a family Selection only irritated the aristocratic party still 
 more, and the strife was carried into every district where 
 the commissioners' task lay. Gracchus' very life was in 
 danger, and he appeared in public with a retinue of 3000 
 men — a step possibly necessary, but the cause of bitter 
 words from senators as well disposed to him as Metellus. 
 H .; clearly saw that he was a lost man unless he continued 
 indispensable to the people, and that his only course lay in 
 forming fresh plans and introducing still wider reforms. 
 So he proposed that the treasures ofPergamus, which had 
 just been bequeathed to Rome, slfould. be^dTvided among 
 the new landholders for the purchase of the necessary 
 farming implements and stock. What his other proposals 
 were we do not know, but it is certain that he was well 
 aware that re-election to the tribunate could alone secure 
 his safety. At the meeting 01 the tribes to elect tribunes, 
 the aristocratic party opposed its veto with the effect that 
 the assembly broke up on the first and second day without 
 accomplishing its object, though on both occasions the first 
 divisions voted for Gracchus. To attain his object at the 
 second meeting of the tribes Gracchus had resorted to 
 every art, and even employed force to expel his opponents : 
 they, in their turn, spread abroad that he had deposed all 
 the other tribunes and was aiming at sole power. On the 
 assembling of the senate, the consul Scaevola refused the 
 urgent request for the death of Tiberius ; whereupon 
 Pnhli na Spj jno Nasica, at the head of an aristocratic follow- 
 ing armed with legs of benches and clubs, began the civil 
 bloodshed. Tiberius wasstruck^ down on the slope of the 
 /Capitol, and his body, wrthTKeTcorpses of three hundred 
 {adherents, was thrown into the Tiber. Such a day had 
 never before been seen in Rome. The more moderate 
 aristocrats had not only to acquiesce in but even to defend 
 the deed of blood, as was the case with Publius Scaevola 
 and even Scipio Aemilianus ; and official sanction was given 
 to the assertion that Gracchus had aimed at the crown. 
 
 It remains for us to form some judgment touching 
 events so momentous. In the first place,, the appointment 
 of an official commission, though a sign of the unhealthy 
 state of things, was a judicious and necessary step. In the 
 second place, the distribution of the domain lands was not 
 
TEE REFORMS OF TEE GR ACCEL 231 
 
 in itself a question affecting the existing constitution or the 
 government of the aristocracy ; nor, seeing that the state 
 was admitted to be the owner of the occupied land, was it 
 a violation of rights. But, inasmuch as many of these 
 lands had been in private hereditary possession for as long 
 as three centuries, the state's proprietorship in the soil 
 had virtually lost its character of private right and become 
 extinct Therefore, though legally defensible, the resump- 
 tion of these lands by the state was regarded as an ejection 
 of the great landholders for the benefit of the agricultural 
 proletariate. Still, strong as the objections to such a 
 course might be, the fact remains that no other plan 
 seemed capable of checking the extinction of the faimer- 
 class in Italy. But, whatever view wise men took of the 
 aims of Tiberius Gracchus, none could approve of his 
 method. He practically began a revolution with regard 
 to the spirit of the constitution when he submitted his 
 agrarian proposals to the people ; and it was a revolution 
 with regard to the letter, when he destroyed for all time 
 the tribunician veto, by which the senate rid itself of inter- 
 ference with its government, by the unconstitutional deposi- 
 tion of his colleague. Yet even this was not the moral 
 and political mistake of Gracchus; for a revolutionist 
 may be at the same time a sagacious and praiseworthy 
 statesman. The essential defects of the Graechan revolu- 
 tion lay in the nature of the burgess assemblies at that 
 time. The sovereign assembly of Rome was what it would 
 be in England, if, instead of sending representatives, the 
 electors of England were to meet together in Parliament. 
 Not only was the assembly a chance conglomeration of 
 men assembled in the capital, incapable of intelligent 
 action and agitated by every interest and passion, aud, 
 therefore, as a rule, ready to accept and ratify the decree 
 of the proposing magistrate ; but it was also, in no small 
 degree, under the influence of the opinion of the street. 
 Although the contiones, or meetings of the street populace, 
 had legally no power, and consisted of the lowest rabble, of 
 Egyptians, Jews, street boys, and slaves, yet the opinion 
 of the masses, evinced by the loud shouts of approval or 
 disapproval, began to be a power in Rome. It was bad 
 enough that the demoralized and disorganized comitia 
 should be made use of for the elections and legislation ; 
 
232 BISTORT OF ROME. 
 
 but when they were allowed to interfere with the govern- 
 ment, and when the senate lost the instrument to prevent 
 such interferences — when they could decree themselves 
 lands, and when a single person by his influence with the 
 proletariate could thus play the part of ruler and dictate 
 to the senate — then Rome had reached the end of popular 
 freedom, and had arrived, not at democracy, but at mon- 
 archy. For that reason, all such Questions had hitherto 
 been discussed in the senate alone ; and even the very 
 supporters of Gracchus, who afterwards carried out his 
 policy of distribution, abandoned its author to his fate. 
 The very fact that Tiberias Gracchus never harboured the 
 thought of deposing the senate and making himself sole 
 ruler, but was the victim of events which irresistibly urged 
 him into the career of demagogue tyrant, was only a fresh 
 ground of charge against him rather than a justification. 
 The infamous butchery which slew him condemns the 
 aristocratic party, and has cast a halo of martyrdom 
 round his name — a glory undeserved both in the opinion 
 of his mother and of Scipio Aemilinnus, the latter of 
 whom uttered the words of Homei-/fis ut-oXolto kcll aAAos 
 otis ToiauTa ye pepoi. 
 
 Though Tiberius was deid, his two works, the land distri- 
 bution and the revolution, survived their author. Indeed, 
 the moderate party in the senate, headed by Metellus 
 and Scaevola, in combination with the adherents of Scipio, 
 gained the upper hand ; and, in the place of Tiberius 
 Gracchus, Publius Crassus Mucianus, the father-in-law 
 of Gaius Gracchus, was appointed on the commission. 
 In 130 B.C., owing to the death of Appins Claudius and 
 the defeat and death of Mucianus by the Thracian bands 
 of Aristonicus, Gaius Gracchus was left triumvir, with 
 Marcus Flaccus and Gaius Carbo as coadjutors, two of 
 the most active leaders of the reform party. The census 
 furnishes the strongest evidence that the distribution of 
 the domain lands went on very vigorously, an increase of 
 76,000 burgesses being noted in six years (from 131-T25 
 B.C.). No doubt in some cases acts of injustice occurred 
 and private property wns confiscated, but the senate did 
 not interfere, albeit loud complaints arose as to the manner 
 of the distribution. But the commissioners, in their 
 ardour, overreached themselves. They attacked that part 
 
TEE REFORMS OF TEE GR ACCEL £33 
 
 of the lands which had been assigned by decrees to Italian 
 communities, or which had been occupied with or without 
 permission by Latin burgesses. The senate could not dis- 
 regard the complaints of those communities who were 
 already smarting under other wrongs ; and the Latins 
 appealed for protection to the most prominent man in 
 Rome, Scipio Aemilianns. Through his influence the 
 people, in 129 B.C., decreed that the commissioners' juris- 
 diction should be suspended, and that the consuls should 
 decide what were domain lands and what private property. 
 Thus practically the hind distribution ceased, and the 
 reform party were bitterly indignant at Scipio's interven- 
 tion. Shortly afterwards Scipio was found dead in his 
 bed, murdered, no doubt, by some assassin, at the instiga- 
 tion of the Gracchan party. The matter was hushed up 
 as far as possible, both parties in the state being glad to 
 let it rest ; but all men of moderate views were horrified 
 at so atrocious a crime. 
 
 Thus perished a man to whose character Roman history 
 presents no parallel, in the utter absence of political selfish- 
 ness, in generous love of country, and in the tragic part 
 assigned him by destiny. " Comcious of the best inten- 
 tions and of no common abilities, he was doomed to see 
 the ruin of his country carried out before his eyes, and to 
 repress within him every serious attempt to save it, be- 
 cause he clearly perceived that he could only thereby 
 aggravate the evil." Yet due to him, as much as to 
 Tiberius Gracchus, was the increase of nearly 80,000 new 
 farm allotments ; and that he put a stop to the distribu- 
 tion at the right moment is shown by the fact that Gaius 
 Gracchus never attempted to recur, after Scipio's death, 
 to those lands which might have been but were not 
 distributed under his brother's law. 
 
 The revolution still went on under the leadership of the 
 orator Carbo, Flaccus, aud Gaius Gracchus. The first- 
 named nearly carried a proposal that the same person 
 might hold the office of tribune two years in succession ; 
 and this was carried a few years later. The chief object 
 of the revolution party was to revive the allotment com- 
 mission, and to this end they proposed to confer the rights 
 of citizenship on the Italian allies. Marcus Pennus, 
 tribune in 12(3 B.C., and member of the aristocratic party, 
 
234 BISTORT OF ROME. 
 
 carried his proposal that all non- burgesses should leave 
 the city. Flaccus, consul in 125 B.C., made a counter- 
 proposal that every ally should take the vote of the 
 comitia on the subject of his request to be entitled to 
 Roman citizenship. But Carbo had ratted, and joined 
 the aristocratic party ; and Gaius Gracchus was away as 
 quaestor in Sardinia ; so Flaccus' proposal found no sup- 
 port, and he left Rome to take command against the Celts. 
 Still, his action bore fruit in the revolt of Fregellae, at 
 that time the second city in Italy and the mouthpiece of 
 the Latin colonies, situated on the borders of Latium 
 and Campania at the chief passage of the Liris. This 
 was the first instance, for one hundred and fifty years, of 
 a serious insurrection in Italy against Rome, without the 
 instigation of foreign powers. But, before it spread, 
 Fregellae was surprised, owing to the treachery of a 
 native, and was seriously punished by the loss of its walls 
 and all its privileges, in 124 B.C. The democratic party 
 was regarded as implicated in the revolt of Fregellae, and 
 Gaius Gracchus, who had returned from Sardinia, was 
 tried but acquitted. He now threw down the gauntlet, 
 and, by being elected tribune in 123 B.C., declared open 
 war upon the aristocracy. 
 
 Gaius resembled his brother only in his dislike for 
 vulgar pleasures and pursuits, in his culture and personal 
 bravery, but was decidedly his superior in talent, character, 
 and passion. His ability as a statesman was evinced in his 
 clearness and self-possession, in his grasp of details and 
 practical powers. His lovable nature was proved by the 
 devotion of his intimate friends. Disciplined by suffering, 
 he masked the terrible energy of his nature and the bitter 
 indignation he felt against the aristocracy by a compul- 
 sory reserve. At times, indeed, his passion mastered him, 
 and caused his brilliant oratory to become confused and 
 faltering ; but he was one of the greatest speakers Rome 
 ever saw. He had none of the sentimental good-nature 
 of his brother ; fully and firmly resolved, he entered on 
 the career of revolution with vengeance as his goal and 
 aim. To attain this end he counted not too great the 
 price of his own fall and the ruin of the state. His 
 mother's creed, that the country should at all cost be 
 saved, was nobler ; but posterity has been right in 
 
THE REFORMS OF THE GRACCHI. 235 
 
 rather lamenting than blaming the course taken by her 
 son. 
 
 The proposals now mad© by Gracchus were nothing less 
 than a new constitution, the foundation-stone of which 
 rested upon the legal right of the same man to be elected 
 tribune for two or more years in succession. This having 
 been carried, the next object was to attach the multitude 
 of the capital to the holder of the tribunate. This was first 
 of ail effected by distributions of corn. Gaius enacted 
 that every burgess, on personal application, should re- 
 ceive a monthly allowance of five ruodii (1| bushels) 
 at the extremely low rate of three-pence per modius ; 
 this measure would both attract into the capital the 
 whole mass of the burgess proletariate, and would make 
 them dependent on the tribune, and supply him with a 
 body-guard and a firm majority in the comitia. He also 
 changed the method of voting in the comitia centuriata, 
 according to which the five property classes in each tribe 
 voted one after the other, and made the order of voting 
 depend upon lot. Tet, though thus securing his position 
 in Rome, he did not neglect to legislate for the existing 
 social evils. His agrarian law only revived that of his 
 brother, and he did not proceed any further in the distri- 
 bution of domain land. But by establishing colonies at 
 Tarentum and Capua, he rendered that land, which had 
 been let on lease by the state and had been exempt from 
 distribution, liable to be divided; and no doubt he in- 
 tended these colonies to aid in defending the revolution 
 to which they owed their existence. He also opened a 
 new outlet for the Italian proletariate by sending six thou- 
 sand colonists to the site of Carthage — colonists chosen 
 from Italian allies as well as Roman citizens. Moreover, 
 he introduced several modifications of the military system, 
 by reviving the law which enacted that no one should be 
 enlisted before his seventeenth year, and by restricting 
 the number of campaigns requisite for full exemption from 
 military duty : the state also supplied the soldiers, for the 
 future, with their clothing free of charge. Further, 
 Gracchus attempted to restrict capital punishment as far 
 as possible, by withdrawing the cognizance of such crimes 
 as poisoning and murder from the popular assemblies and 
 intrusting it to permanent judicial commissions. These 
 
236 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 tribunals could only sentence a man to exile, and their 
 sentence could not be appealed from, nor could they, like 
 the tribunals of the people, be broken up by the interces- 
 sion of a tribune. 
 
 In order to work the ruin of the aristocracy, Gracchus 
 took advantage of the already existing elements favourable 
 to a rupture in that body. The aristocracy of the rich 
 consisted of two classes : (1) of the governing senatorial 
 families, who bore some resemblance to our peers, and whose 
 capital was invested in land ; (2) of the wealthy merchants 
 and speculators, who conducted all the money transactions 
 of the empire, and who had gradually risen to take their 
 place by the side of the older aristocracy. At the present 
 time this class was generally known as the equestrian 
 order, which title had gradually come to be used of all who 
 possessed an estate of at least 400,000 sesterces, aud, as such 
 were liable to cavalry service. Already senators had been 
 marked off from this body by a law passed in 129 B.C. ; but 
 many members of senatorial families, not yet members of 
 the senate, were included in the equites. The natural 
 antipathy between the aristocrats of blood and those of 
 wealth was adroitly increased by Gracchus, until the 
 equestrian order ranged itself on his side. Partly by con- 
 ferring on them various insignia, but still more by offering 
 them the revenues of Asia and the jui^cjllirts^Gracchus 
 won over the clas&~o£_Jpa ater ial interests. Hitherto the 
 direct taxes of each province had been farmed by the pro- 
 vincials themselves, and thus the Roman publicani had 
 been kept at a distance. . Gracchus now enacted that Asia 
 should be hardened with the heaviest taxes, both direct 
 and indirect, and that these taxes should be put up for 
 auction in Rome ; he thus excluded the provincials from 
 participation, and gave the capitalists ah opening for the 
 farming gf these various taxes, of which they did not fail 
 to avail themselves. 
 
 Having thus opened up a gold-mine for the merchant 
 princes, Gracchus gave them a sphere for public action in 
 the jury courts. Most processes, alike civil and criminal, 
 were up to this time decided by single jurymen or by com- 
 missioners, whether permanent or extraordinary ; and in 
 both cases the members had been exclusively taken from 
 the senate. Gracchus now transferred the functions of 
 
THE REFORMS OF THE GRACCHI. 237 
 
 jurymen, both in strictly civil processes and in the various 
 commissions, to the equestrian order, and directed a new- 
 list of judices to be made out annually from all persons of 
 equestrian rating. The result of these measures was that 
 not only was the moneyed class united into a compact and 
 privileged order on the solid basis of material interests, 
 but that also, as a judicial and controlling power, it was 
 almost on a footing of equality with the ruling- aristocracy. 
 All the old antipathies found expression in the sentences 
 of the new jurymen ; and the senator, on his return from 
 governing a province, had no longer to pass the scrutiny of 
 his brother peers, but of merchants and bankers. 
 
 For the complete overthrow of the senate, Gracchus not 
 only had to deprive it of the substance of its powers by 
 legislative changes, but also to ruin the existing aristocracy 
 by m<;re personal and less permanent measures. He did 
 both. For not only did he deprive the senate of adminis- 
 trative power by settling questions by comitial laws, dictated 
 as a rule by the tribune, but also by taking the business of 
 the state into his own hands. He had meddled with the 
 state finances by his distributions of corn ; with the domain 
 lands by sending out colonies, not at the decree of the 
 senate, but of the people ; with the provincial administration 
 by overturning the provincial constitution of Asia and sub- 
 stituting his own for that of the senate. The marvellous 
 activity Gracchus showed in all his new functions quite 
 threw into the shade the lax administration of the senate, 
 and began to make it clear to the people that one vigorous 
 man cnuld control the business of the state better than a 
 college of effete aristocrats. Still more vigorous was his 
 interference with the jurisdiction of the senate. He forbade 
 their appointing any extraordinary commission of high 
 treason, such as had tried his brother's adherents ; and he 
 even planned to reinforce the senate by three hundred new 
 members, to be elected by the comitia from the equestrian 
 order. 
 
 Such was the political-constitution projected and carried 
 by Gaius Gracchus, as tribune, in 123 and 122 B.C., without 
 any serious resistance or recourse to force. It is clear that 
 he did not -wish to place the Roman Republic on a new 
 democratic basis, but that he wished to abolish it and 
 introduce in its stead an absolute despotism, in the form of 
 
238 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 an unlimited tribuneship for life. Nor can he be blamed 
 for it ; as, though an absolute monarchy is a great mis- 
 fortune for a nation, it is a less misfortune than an 
 absolute oligarchy. Still, it is clear that his whole legis- 
 lation was marred by the fact that it was pervaded by 
 conflicting aims, now seeking the public good, now minis- 
 tering to the personal objects and personal vengeance 
 of its framer. " On the very threshold of his despotism 
 he was confronted by the fatal dilemma, moral and po- 
 litical, that the same man had at one and the same time 
 to hold his ground as a captain of robbers, and to lead 
 the state as its first citizen — a dilemma to which Peri- 
 cles, Caesar, and Napoleon had also to make dangerous 
 sacrifices." Besides this, he was fired with the passion for 
 a speedy vengeance, and was in fact a political incendiary, 
 — the author not only of the one hundred years' revolution, 
 which dates from him, but the founder of that terrible 
 urban proletariate which, utterly demoralized by corn- 
 largesses and the flattery of the classes above it, and at 
 the same time conscious of its power, lay like an incubus 
 for five hundred years on the Roman commonwealth, and 
 only perished with it. 
 
 Many of the fundamental maxims of Roman monarchy 
 may be traced to Gracchus. He first laid down that all 
 the land of subject communi^es_was_-to be regarded as the 
 private property of the state— a maxim first applied to 
 vindicate the right of the state to tax the land and then to 
 send out colonies to it, afterwards established as a funda- 
 mental principle of law under the Empire. He invented 
 the tactics by which his-SncGesaora broke down the govern- 
 ing aristocracy, and substituted strict and judicious ad- 
 ministration for the previous misgovernment. He first 
 opened the way to a reconciliation between Rome and the 
 provinces ; and his attempt to rebuild Carthage and to 
 give an opportunity for Italian emigration to the provinces 
 was the first link in the chain of that beneficial course of 
 action. " Right and wrong, fortune and misfortune, were 
 so inextricably blended in this singular man and in this 
 marvellous political constellation, that it may well beseem 
 history in this case — though it beseems her but seldom — 
 to reserve her judgment." 
 
 Having thus established his new constitution. Gracchus 
 
THE REFORMS OF THE GRACCHI. 239 
 
 turned to the task of enfranchising the Italian allies, which 
 had been proposed and rejected in 125 B.C. But a con- 
 siderable section of the mob, thinking that their own 
 interests would be seriously injured bj a new influx of men 
 to share the profits they were enjoying, combined with the 
 senate in rejecting the proposal, made by Gracchus in 122 
 B.C., that the Latins should receive the full franchise. This 
 encouraged the senate to work his ruin. The method of 
 attack was the clumsy one of offering the proletariate more 
 than Gracchus had done. At the instigation of the senate, 
 Marcus Livius Drusus proposed to release those who 
 received land under the law of Gracchus from their rent, 
 and to declare their allotments free and inalienable pro- 
 perty, and to give relief to the proletariate by planting 
 twelve Italian colonies, each of three thousand men. Prob- 
 ably, owing to the non-existence elsewhere in Italy of 
 domain land to the extent required, this plan would have 
 to be carried out at the expense of the Latins ; and Drusus 
 passed several enactments coufei'rins; privileges on the 
 Latins with the intention of indemnifying them for their 
 losses. Drusus himself refused to be nominated as an 
 executor of his own laws, perhaps knowing well that no 
 such extent of domain land existed, even if those assigned 
 to the Latins were confiscated. But the clumsy bait took. 
 Gracchus was away at the time in Africa, founding the Car- 
 thaginian colony, and the incapacity of his lieutenant, 
 Marcus Flaccus, made all easy for his opponents. The 
 people ratified the Livian laws as readily as they had the 
 Sempronian, and then declined to re-elect Gracchus, when 
 he stood for the third time candidate for the tribunate of 
 
 121 B.C. Lucius Opimius, one of the most pronounced 
 chiefs of the aristocratic party, was also elected consul, 
 and the time had now come when a blow might safely be 
 struck at the democratic despot. On the 10th of December, 
 
 122 B.C., Gracchus ceased to be tribune of the people ; on 
 the 1st of January of the ensuing year Opimius entered on 
 his consular office. 
 
 The first, attack was directed against the most unpopular 
 measure of Gracchus, the restoration of Carthage. National 
 superstition was invoked, and the senate proposed a law to 
 prevent the planting of tho colony of Junonia. Gracchus, 
 attended by an armed crowd of partisans, appeared on the 
 
240 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 day of voting at the Capitol, to procure the rejection of 
 the law. The sight of his armed adherents, and the intense 
 excitement which prevailed, could hardly have failed to 
 result in a collision between the two sides. Quintus An- 
 tullius, the attendant of Lucius Opimius during the usual 
 ceremony of sacrifice, ordered all bad citizens to quit the 
 porch of the Capitoline temple, and seemed even to threaten 
 Gracchus himself ; whereupon a Gracchan cut him down. 
 A fearful tumult arose, and Gracchus, by addressing the 
 people, broke an old statute, which forbade any one to 
 interrupt a tribune while speaking to the people, on pain 
 of the severest penalties. The consul Lucius Opimius 
 took vigorous measures to put down the insurrection by 
 force of arms, and next day was attended by a large armed 
 force, including all the aristocracy, and commanded by 
 Decimus Brutus, an officer trained in Spanish warfare. 
 The senate-house was crowded with senators, and outside 
 its doors lay the corpse of Antullius stretched upon a bier. 
 The Gracchan party, under the command of Flaccus, en- 
 trenched itself upon the Aventine. Gracchus was averse to 
 resistance, but Flaccus hoped to come to a compromise with 
 his foes. But the aristocrats rejected all his proposals, 
 and arrested his son Quintus, who was sent to mediate, 
 and ordered an attack on the Aventine. The defenders of 
 the mount were speedily dispersed, and Flaccus was killed 
 after vainly seeking concealment. Gracchus was persuaded 
 to fly, but sprained his foot in the attempt. The devotion 
 of two of his attendants, who sacrificed their lives to give 
 him time to escape, enabled him and his slave to cross the 
 Tiber; here, in a grove, both he and his slave were found 
 dead. The Gracchan party was hunted down by prosecu- 
 tions, and three thousand are said to have been strangled 
 in prison. The memory of the Gracchi was officially pro- 
 scribed, and Cornelia was forbidden to put on mourning for 
 the death of her son ; but, despite the precautions of the 
 police, the common people continued to pay a religious 
 veneration to the spots where the two leaders of the 
 revolution had perished. 
 
THE REFORMS OF THE GRACCHI. 241 
 
 AUTHORITIES. 
 
 Rome before revolution. — Polyb. iii. 4. 
 
 Calpurnian law. — Cic. Brut. 27; de Offic. ii. 21; in Verr. iii. 84; 
 
 iv. 25. 
 Gabinian and Papirian laws. — Cic. de Legg. iii. 16 ; Lael. 16 ; Brut. 
 
 25, 27 ; pro Sest. 48. 
 Optimates and populares. — Veil. ii. 3. Cic. pro Sest. 48. 
 Slavery.— Appian B. 0. i. 7-10. Cic. de Offic. i. 42. Strab. 608. 
 
 Marq. Stv. i. 164-184. 
 Plantation system. — Colum. i. 6, 9. Cato de r. r. 56. Plin. N. H. xviii. 
 
 21, 36. 
 Slave wars.— Liv. xxxi. 26 ; xxxii. 1; xl. 38. Epit- 46, 56, 58. 
 
 Diod. xxxiv. 23. Strab. 272-273. 
 Land, etc. — Liv. xlii. 1. Marq. Stv. i. 103, sqq. 
 Publius Scipio and Tiberius Gracchus. — Liv. Epit. 54, 58-61, 71. 
 
 Plut. Lives of Gracchi and Aem. Paull. Dio Cass. Fr. 83-85. 
 Gaius Gracchus. — Appian Lib. 136. Veil. ii. 6, 13. Tac. Ann. xii. 
 
 60. Diod. xxxiv. 25. Cic. in Verr. 3, 6. Wordsworth Lat. Inscr. 
 
 424, 441. 
 Equestrian jury-courts. — Appian B. C. ii. 22. Momma. R. St. iii. 
 
 528 sqq. 
 
242 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 CHAPTER XXI. 
 
 THE RULE OF THE RESTORATION. 
 
 Social state of Italy and the provinces — Second slave- war in Sicily—' 
 War of the Numidian succession — Capture of Cirta by Jugurtha — 
 The Jugurthinewar — Its political results — Trausalpine relations 
 of Rome — Conquest of the Arverni and Allobroges — Province of 
 Narbo — Conflicts with tribes in the North- East — The Cimbri — 
 Their movements — Battle of Arausio — Victories of Marius at 
 Aquae Sextiae and Vercellae. 
 
 Gracchus had fallen, and with him the structure he had 
 reared ; nor was there any one left fit to take the lead of 
 the Gracchan party. But, though the aristocracy once 
 more ruled, it was the rule of a restoration, which is 
 always in itself a revolution ; and in this case it was not 
 so much the old government as the old governor that was 
 restored. The senate practically continued to govern 
 with the constitution of the Gracchi, though no doubt 
 resolved to purge it in due time from the elements hostile 
 to its own order. The distributions of grain, the taxation 
 of Asia, and the new arrangements as to jurymen and 
 tribunals remained as before ; nay, the senate exceeded 
 Gracchus in the homage it paid to the mercantile class, 
 and, more especially, to the proletariate. But the noble 
 scheme of Gracchus to introduce legal equality, first 
 between the Roman burgesses and Italy, and then between 
 Italy and the provinces, and also his attempt to solve the 
 social question by a comprehensive system of emigration, 
 were alike disregarded by the aristocrats. They still 
 held fast to the principle that Italy ought to remain the 
 ruling land, and Rome the ruling city in Italy. The 
 
THE RULE OF THE RESTORATION. 243 
 
 colony of Narbo, founded in 118 B.C., was the sole excep- 
 tion to the success of the government in preventing 
 assignations of land outside Italy. So also the Italian 
 colonies of Gracchus were cancelled, and, where already 
 planted, were again broken up ; those who had received 
 domain lands, not by virtue of being members of a colony, 
 retained their possessions. With regard to those domain 
 lands, which were still held by the right of occupation, 
 and from which to a great extent the thirty-six thousand 
 new allotments promised by Drusus were to have been 
 formed, it was resolved to maintain the rights of the 
 present occupier, so as to preclude the possibility of future 
 distribution. 
 
 The allotment commission was abolished in 119 B.C., 
 and a fixed rent imposed on the occupants of the domain 
 land, the proceeds of which went to benefit the populace 
 of the capital. 
 
 The final step was taken in 111 B.C., when the occupied 
 domain land whs converted into the rent-free private 
 property of the former occupants. It was added that in 
 future domain land was not to be occupied at all, but was 
 either to be leased or lie open as public pasture ; thus too 
 late the injurious character of the occupation system was 
 officially recognized, when the state had lost almost all its 
 domain lands. The aristocracy thus converted all the 
 occupied land they still held into private property, and 
 pacified the Italian allies by preserving their rights with 
 resrard to the Latin domain land, though they did not 
 actually confer it upon them. 
 
 But practically the restored government was powerless 
 in the presence of the dread forces evoked by Gracchus. 
 The proletariate of the capital continued to have a recog- 
 nized claim to being kept by largesses of corn ; and the 
 attempt by the consul Quintus Caepio in 106 B.C., to 
 transfer the judicia back again to the senatorial order, 
 resulted in failure. The miserable condition of the senate 
 at this period is only too apparent : its rule rested on the 
 same basis as that of Gracchus, and its strength lay only in 
 its league with the city rabble or with the mercantile order ; 
 confronted with either, it was powerless. " It sat on the 
 vacated throne with an evil conscience and divided hopes, 
 indignant at the institutions of the state which it ruled, 
 
244 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 and yet incapable of even systematically assailing the in, 
 vacillating in all its conduct except where its own ma- 
 terial advantage prompted decision, a picture of faithless- 
 ness towards its own as well as the opposite party, of 
 inward inconsistency, of the most pitiful impotence, of 
 the meanest selfishness — an unsurpassed ideal of misrule." 
 Moral and intellectual decay had fallen upon the whole 
 nation, and especially on the upper classes. The aris- 
 tocracy returned to power with the curse of restoration 
 upon it, and it returned neither wiser nor better. Incom- 
 petency marked alike its leaders in the world of politics 
 and on the field of battle. Social ruin spread apace ; 
 small farm-holders quickly disappeared ; and in 100 B.C. 
 it was said that among the whole burgesses there were 
 scarce two thousand wealthy families. Slave insurrec- 
 tions became almost annual in Italy, the most serious of 
 which was in the territory of Thurii, headed by a Roman 
 knight named Titus Vettius, whom his debts had driven 
 to take this step in 104 B.C. Piracy was practised in the 
 Mediterranean by the magisterial and mercantile classes 
 of Rome as well as by professional freebooters. At last 
 the government was forced to despatch a fleet, in 102 B.C., 
 and occupy stations on the coast of Cilicia, the main seat 
 of the pirates, and this was the first step to the establish- 
 ment of the province of Cilicia ; but piracy flourished in 
 spite of these precautions. 
 
 Throughout the provinces slaves constantly rose in 
 insurrection ; and the most terrible tumults occurred, as 
 usual, in Sicily, wdiich swarmed with slaves brought from 
 Asia Minor to work on the plantations. Practically, 
 too, the free natives were little better than slaves, and 
 many had become enrolled "as such. Publius Nerva, the 
 governor of Sicily, in 104 B.C. was ordered by the senate 
 to hold a court at Syracuse, and to investigate the cases of 
 those who applied for freedom. Numbers were declared 
 free, and, in alarm, the planters succeeded in causing Nerva 
 to suspend the court and to order the rest of the appli- 
 cants to return to their former masters. This set ablaze 
 the smouldering embers of revolt. A band of slaves 
 defeated part of the garrison at Enna, and thus supplied 
 themselves with arms ; they placed a slave at their 
 head with the title of king Tryphon. The open country 
 
THE RULE OF THE RESTORATION. 243 
 
 between Enna and Leontini was overruu by tlieir forces, 
 and they defeated a hastily collected force of militia 
 under the Eoman governor with ridiculous ease. 
 
 On the west coast a still more serious revolt arose 
 under the leadership of Athenion, who had been a robber 
 captain in Cilicia, and was alike versed in military tactics 
 and in the superstitious arts so necessary for gaining a 
 hold on vulgar minds. He avoided jealous quarrels by 
 submitting to king Tryphon, and the two ruled all the 
 flat country in Sicily and laid siege to many towns, Mes- 
 sana itself being all but captured by Athenion. Rome 
 was at that time engaged with the war against the Cimbri, 
 but in 103 B.C. it sent a large force under Lucullus, who 
 gained a victory but did not follow it up. Nor was his 
 successor Servilius any more fortunate ; and, on the death 
 of Tryphon, Athenion, in 102 B.c , stood sole ruler of the 
 greater part of the island. In lOi B.C., Manius Aquillius, 
 who had gained distinction in the war with the Teutones, 
 arrived, and, after two years of hard struggles, quelled 
 the revolt and killed Athenion, thus terminating the war 
 after five years. 
 
 A clear proof of the gross incompetency of the senate 
 is furnished by the origin and conduct of this second 
 Sicilian slave-war. If we turn our eyes to Africa, this is 
 still more clearly proved by the fourteen years' insurrec- 
 tion and usurpation successfully achieved hy Jugurtha. 
 Numidia included the greatest poi'tion of the territory 
 held by Carthage in its days of prosperity, as well as 
 several old-Phoenician cities, and thus embraced the 
 largest and best part of the rich seaboard of northern 
 Africa. The three sons of Massinissa had, by Scipio's 
 arrangement, divided the functions of sovereignty between 
 them. At this time Micipsa, the eldest, reigned alone, a 
 feeble and peaceful old man. As his sons were not grown 
 up, Jugurtha, an illegitimate nephew, practically ruled. 
 Naturally gifted, Jugurtha was, both on the field of battle 
 and in the council chamber, no unworthy grandson of 
 Massinissa. Micipsa arranged that he with his own two 
 sons should govern the kingdom. On Micipsa's death, 
 in 118 B.C., a quarrel arose as to the division. Hiempsal 
 was assassinated by Jngurtha's orders, and a civil war 
 arose between Adherbal, the remaining brother, and 
 
246 HISTORY OF HOME. 
 
 Jugurtha, in which all Numidia took part. Jugurtha 
 was victorious, and seized the whole kingdom, while 
 Adherbal escaped and made his complaints in person at 
 Rome. Jugurtha's envoys, however, bribed the senators, 
 and, notwithstanding the disgust of the leading men in 
 Rome, the senate divided the kingdom equally between 
 the two, and sent Ijftciua_Qpimius to arrange the division. 
 An unfair distribution gave Jugurtha far the best half of 
 the kingdom. But Jugurtha, not content, tried to pro- 
 voke Adherbal to war, and, finding this impossible, made 
 war upon him, and laid siege to Cirta, which was defended 
 more vigorously by the resident Italians than by Adher- 
 bal's troops. In answer to Adherbal's complaints, the 
 senate sent a commission of inexperienced youths, whose 
 demands Jugurtha contemptuously rejected. At last, 
 when matters were getting desperate at Cirta, Rome sent 
 another commission, headed by the chief man of the aris- 
 tocracy, Marcus Aemilius Scaurus ; but the conference 
 at Utica en"cted without any result. In the end, Cirta 
 capitulated, and Jugurtha put air the males, whether 
 Italian or African, to the sword, in 112 B.C. This was too 
 much for the people in Italy ; a storm broke out against 
 the government, headed by Gaius Memmius, tribune 
 designate for the next year, and war was declared against 
 Jugurtha. A Roman army was sent to Africa, and 
 Bocchus, the father-in-law of Jugurtha and king of Mau- 
 retania, took the R >man side, but he neglected to bribe 
 the Roman commanders, and so his alliance fell through. 
 Jugurtha, on the other hand, more wisely made free use 
 of the treasures left by Massinissa, and gained a peace 
 on most favourable terms, being merely condemned to 
 pay a moderate fine and give up his war elephants. On 
 this the storm again broke out in Rome ; all men now 
 knew that even Scaurus, who was serving in Africa, 
 was amenable to bribes, and Gaius Memmius pressed for 
 the appearance of Jugurtha to answer the charges made 
 against him. The senate yielded, and granted a safe-con- 
 duct to Jugurtha ; but his gold was as powerful as ever, 
 and the colleague of Memmius interposed his veto, when 
 the latter addressed his first question to the king. End- 
 less discussions took place in the senate as to the validity 
 of the peace, and Massiva, a grandson of Massinissa, 
 
THE RULE OF TEE RESTORATION. 247 
 
 living in Rome, was induced to claim the throne of Nu- 
 midia. He was at once assassinated by Bomilcar, one 
 of Jugurtha's confidants. This new outrage caused the 
 senate to cancel the peace and dismiss Jugurtha from the 
 city, at the beginning of 110 B.C. War was resumed 
 under the command of the consul Spurius Albinus ; but, 
 owing to the utterly demoralized state of the African 
 army, and, possibly, to the gold of Jugurtha, Albinus 
 could effect nothing. His brother, however, rashly con- 
 ceived the plan of storming the town of Suthul, where 
 Jugurtha kept his treasures. The attack failed, and the 
 Roman general pursued the troops of Jugurtha, who pur- 
 posely decoyed him into the desert. In a night attack 
 the Roman army v\as utterly routed, and the terms dic- 
 tated by Jugurtha were accepted, 109 B.C., which involved 
 the passing of the Romans under the yoke, the evacuation 
 of Numidia, and the renewal of the cnncelled peace. 
 
 On news of this peace, the fury of the popular party, 
 allied for the time with the mercantile classes at Rome, 
 swept away by public prosecutions many of the highest 
 aristocrats. But the chief of sinners, Scaurus, was too 
 powerful and too prudent to be attacked, and was both 
 elected censor and cliosen as one of the presidents of the 
 extraoidinary commission of treason, instituted to try 
 those who were guilty of the disgraceful conduct of the 
 African war. The second treaty of peace was cancelled, 
 and Quintus Metellus, an aristocrat inaccessible to bribes 
 and experienced in war, had the conduct of the campaign 
 in Africa. Gaius Marius accompanied him as one of his 
 lieutenants. 
 
 Metellus speedily reorganized the army in Africa, and 
 in 108 B.C., led it over the Numidian frontier. He returned 
 an evasive answer to Jugurtha's proposals for peace, and 
 tried to end the war by having Jugurtha assassinated. 
 The latter prepared to await the Romans on a ridge of 
 hills, which intersected a plain eighteen miles in breadth 
 extending to the river Muthul. Despite the skilful 
 dispositions of Jugurtha, the Roman infantry utterly 
 scattered the Numidians, and Jugurtha restricted himself 
 to a guerilla warfare. Numidia was occupied by Metellus, 
 but his object was not gained, and the Roman army had 
 to retire into winter quarters. Proposals of peace were 
 
248 HISTOBY OF ROME. 
 
 made and almost agreed to, had it not been for the 
 treachery of Bomilcar, the chief adviser of Jugurtha, who 
 promised to deliver up his king, alive or dead, into the 
 hands of the Romans . this plot and others were dis- 
 covered by Jugurtha, and only leave a stain on the name 
 of Metellus. The capture of Jugurtha was all-important. 
 Vaga, one of the Numidian cities occupied by the Romans, 
 revolted early in 107 B.C., and put to death the whole 
 Roman .garrison ; and, although Metellus surprised the 
 town and gave it over to martial law, such a revolt 
 sufficiently indicated the difficulty of the Roman enter- 
 prise. 
 
 In 107 B.C. the war in the desert went on, but Jugurtha 
 nowhere withstood the Romans ; now here, now there, he 
 was perpetually appearing and then vanishing from the 
 scene. Metellus took Thala, a city situated on the edge 
 of the great desert and only to be reached with great 
 difficulty, where Jugurtha had placed his treasures, 
 children, and the flower of his troops. But Jugurtha 
 escaped with his chest, and, though Numidia was virtually 
 in the hands of the Romans, the war only seemed to 
 extend over a wider area. 
 
 Bocchus seemed again disposed to aid his son-in-law. 
 He received him at his court, and, by his power over 
 Jugurtha's person, held the key of the position. Probably 
 he was undecided whether to play the traitor or side 
 against Rome, but his ambiguous position had its advan- 
 tages. 
 
 Metellus had now to resign the command to his lieu- 
 tenant Marius. The Litter had gained his consulship, in 
 spite of the sneers of Metellus and the whole aristo- 
 cratic party, by appealing to the credulity of the Roman 
 mob and by misleading them with the most unfair and 
 absurd misrepresentations of the conduct by Metellus of 
 the African war. He succeeded Metellus in 106 B.C. In 
 spite of his boast that he would deliver Jugurtha bound 
 hand and foot, he spemed to abandon all hope of his 
 capture, and turned his attention to storming towns and 
 strongholds. Still more aimless was his expedition to the 
 river Molochath, by which, as he almost entered Maure- 
 tanian territory, king Bocchus was roused to give active 
 aid to his son-in-law. Indeed, on his return from that 
 
THE RULE OF TEE RESTORATION. 249 
 
 river, Marius found his army surrounded by immense 
 swarms of cavalry, and, had it not been for the skill and 
 bravery of Lucius Sulla, he might never have reached his 
 winter quarters at Cirta in 105 B.C. Sulla manifested his 
 bravery and adroitness still more conspicuously in the 
 negotiations which followed between Marius and Bocchus, 
 and at last induced the latter to make his choice between 
 the Romans and his son-in-law. By an act of treachery 
 the traitor fell, and Jugurtha was given up to Sulla ; and 
 thus the war which had lasted for seven years came to an 
 end. Jugurtha was brought to Rome on the first of 
 January, 104 B.C., and perished in the old tullianum in the 
 Capitol, which the Numidian king grimly termed the 
 bath of ice. 
 
 There can be little doubt that Marius cuts but a sorry 
 figure, when contrasted with either his predecessor, 
 Metellus, or his still more brilliant officer, Sulla. The 
 fatal consequences produced by the praise lavished on 
 both these men at the expense of Marius bore bitter fruit 
 in succeeding history. 
 
 Contrary to the usual policy, Numidia was not converted 
 into a province, probably because a standing army would 
 have been necessary to protect its frontier. The most 
 westerly district was annexed, and the kingdom of 
 Numidia was handed over to the last surviving grandson 
 of Massinissa, a man feeble alike in mind and body. But 
 politically the results of the Jugurthine war were more 
 important. It had made clear to all, not only the utter 
 baseness and venality of the restored senatorial govern- 
 ment, but also the complete nullity of the opposition. 
 " It was not possible to govern worse than the restoration 
 governed in 117-109 B.C. ; it was not possible to be more 
 defenceless and forlorn than was the senate in 109 B.C. : 
 had there been in Rome a real opposition, that is to say, 
 a party which wished and urged a fundamental alteration 
 of the constitution, it must at least have made an attempt 
 to overturn the restored senate ; but no such attempt 
 took place." The so-cilled popular party, as such, neither 
 could nor would govern, and the only two possible forms 
 of government were a despotism or an oligarchy. The 
 appearance of Marius on the scene indicated clearly the 
 danger which threatened the oligarchy. Probably he was 
 
2.^0 EISTOEY OF ROME. 
 
 unaware of the real significance of his action when he 
 canvassed the people for the supreme command in Africa ; 
 but there was evidently an end of the restored aristocratic 
 government when the comitia began to make generals, or 
 when every popular officer could legally nominate himself 
 as general. As might be expected, the new element 
 introduced into politics was the part played by military 
 men. It could now be foreseen that the new despot would 
 no t be a stateman like O-^'is Gracchus, hut a soldier like 
 Gaius Marius. " The contemporary reorganization of the 
 military system — which Marius introduced when, in form- 
 ing his army destined for Africa., he disregarded the 
 property qualification and allowed even the poorest 
 bm'gess to enter the legion as a volunteer — may have 
 been projected by its author on purely military grounds; 
 but it was none the less a momentous political event, that 
 the army was no longer, as formerly, composed of those 
 who had much, no longer even, as in the most recent 
 times, composed of those who had something, to lose, but 
 became gradually converted into a host of people who 
 had nothing but their arms and what the general bestowe I 
 on them. The aristocracy ruled in 104- B.C. as absolutely 
 as in 134 B.C. ; but the signs of the impending catastrophe 
 had multiplied, and on the political horizon the sword had 
 besfnn to appear by the side of the crown." 
 
 Let us now for a while turn our attention outside 
 Rome and its political crises, and consider what was 
 taking place to the north of Italy. Behind the mighty 
 mountain screen, nations were moving uneasily to and fro, 
 and reminding the Graeco-Roman world that it was not 
 the sole possessor of the earth. In the country between 
 the Alps and Pyrenees Rome found her chief mainstay in 
 the powerful city of Massilia, whose mercantile and 
 political connections extended in all directions. Ligurian 
 tribes were defeated and placed under tribute by the 
 Massiliots in 154 B.C. ; and again a tribe, named the Salassi, 
 was conquered by Appius Claudius in 143 B.C., and forced 
 to surrender the gold mines of Victimulae. But Marcus 
 Fulvius Flaccus, consul in 125 B.C., was the first to 
 systematically and seriously enter on a career of Trans- 
 alpine conquest. At that time the Arverni, under their 
 brilliant and almost civilized ruler, Luerius, had reached 
 
THE RULV OF THE RESTORATION. 251 
 
 a high state of military power and wealth, and between 
 them and the Aedui lay the hegemony of the various 
 Celtic races. At first Flaccus subdued minor Celtic tribes ; 
 and then the Allobroges, who came from the Isere valley 
 to aid these tribes, were drawn into the struggle in 122 B.C. 
 The Arverni at the outset, under Betuitus, son of Luerius, 
 remained spectators of the conflict, but at last sided with 
 the Allobroges, while their rivals, the Aedui, embraced 
 the cause of Rome. Near the confluence of the Isere with 
 the Rhone, in 121 B.C. the Arvernian king was utterly 
 defeated by the consul Quintus Fabius Maximus : and the 
 Allobroges at once submitted. The Arverni once more 
 met the Roman troops under Gnaeus Domitius Ahenobar- 
 bus, and were again discomfited. 
 
 The result of these wars was the creation of the 
 province of Narbo between the Alps and the Pyrenees, 
 Narbo being the seat of the governor of this province, in 
 which several Roman settlements were formed at Aquae 
 Sextiae and elsewhere. The policy which gave rise to 
 this new field for colonization was checked by the death 
 of Gaius Gracchus, but the mercantile class at Rome 
 proved strong enough to protect the colony of Narbo from 
 the narrower policy of the restored optimates. 
 
 A similar problem had to be solved in the north-east of 
 Italy, but there Rome contented herself with taking the 
 strong town of Delmium, and subduing the Dalmatians, 
 in 155 B.C. The conversion of Macedonia into a province 
 in 146 B.C., and the acquisition of the Thracian Cherso- 
 nese in 133 B.C., brought Rome into close relations with 
 the various tribes of the north-east, but also gave her the 
 double basis of the Po valley and the province of Mace- 
 donia, from which she could now advance in earnest 
 towards the Rhine and Danube. Of the various Celtic 
 tribes in these regions, the Helvetii, who occupied both 
 banks of the Upper Rhine, were the most powerful ; near 
 them were the Boii, settled in Bavaria and Bohemia. To 
 the south-east came the Taurisci, next to whom were the 
 Iapydes, partly Ulyrian, partly Celtic ; while in the interior 
 the powerful and cruel Celtic tribe of the Scordisci roamed 
 hither and thither, leaving a path marked by crime and 
 bloodshed. 
 
 Although Roman expeditions against Alpine tribes were 
 
252 HISTORY OF RCfoE. 
 
 frequent, no adequate scheme of conquest was attempted, 
 so as to create a barrier strong enough to ward off the 
 constant inroads of barbarism. Marcus Aemilius Scaurus 
 was the first to cross the eastern Alps, in 115 B.C., and to 
 compel the Taurisci to a friendly alliance with Rome ; the 
 first Roman, general to reach the Danube was Marcus 
 Livius Drusus, in 112 B.C.; and, two years later, Marcus 
 Minucius utterly defeated the Scordisci and reduced 
 them to harmless insignificance. 
 
 But these victories only brought upon the scene a still 
 more terrible foe in the Cimbri, or " champions." Whence 
 this people really came and the causes of their migration, 
 are matters of which we cannot be certain. That they 
 were in the main of German race, as wore their brothers- 
 in-arms the Teutones, is shown (a) by the existence of 
 two small tribes of the same name, left behind, probably, 
 in their primitive seats — the Cimbri in Denmark and the 
 Teutones in the north-east of Germany, near the Baltic ; 
 (b) by the insertion of the Cimbri and Teutones in the 
 list of Germanic peoples among the Ingaevones, by the 
 side of the Chauci ; (c) by the judgment of Caesar, who 
 first showed the difference between Celts and Germans, 
 and who includes the Cimbri among the Germans ; (d) by 
 their names and the account given of their physical 
 appearance and habits. 
 
 No doubt a number of Celts joined these hordes, and 
 thus men of Celtic name directed their armies, and the 
 Celtic tongue was spoken among them. The invasion was 
 not one of mere plunder, but that of a whole nation 
 seeking a new home, with their wives and children drawn 
 along in wagons, which served as house and means of 
 locomotion. Their army was accompanied by priestesses 
 — a truly Germanic custom. They came like lightning, 
 like lightning they vanished ; and in that dull age no 
 observer traced this marvellous meteor. Thus the first 
 Germanic movement that came in contact with civiliza- 
 tion passed away unnoticed till it was too late to have 
 any accurate knowledge of it. Owing to Roman at- 
 tacks on the Danubian Celts the Cimbri broke through 
 the barrier which had prevented their advance, and 
 reached the passes of the Carnian Alps in 113 B.C., where 
 the consul Gnaeus Papirius Carbo was posted to meet 
 
TEE RULE OF THE RESTORATION. 253 
 
 them, not far from Aquileia. He ordered them to evacuate 
 the territory of the Taurisci, and they complied and 
 followed his guides into an ambush. But the betrayed 
 utterly worsted tbe betrayer, and then they turned west- 
 ward, and reached the left bank of the Rhine and passed 
 over the Jura. There, some years after the defeat of 
 Carbo, they again threatened Roman territory. In 109 B.C., 
 Marcus Junius Silanus appeared with an army in southern 
 Gaul, and replied to the Cirabrian request for land to 
 settle in by an attack ; he was completely defeated. 
 
 The Cimbri now occupied themselves with subduing 
 the neighbouring Celtic cantons, and for a time left the 
 Romans unmolested. But, fired by the example of the 
 Cimbri, the Helvetii rose, under their leader Divico, and 
 sought new and more fertile settlements in western Gaul. 
 The consul Longinus with most of his army was decoyed 
 by the Helvetii into an ambush, and fell fighting, in 
 107 B.C. Then for a time all was quiet, but in 105 B.C., 
 under their king Boiorix, the Cimbri again moved on- 
 wards, this time with the serious purpose of invading Italy. 
 
 Their first assault fell on IVlarcus Aurelius Scaurus, 
 whose corps was easily overthrown. Then, owing to the 
 foolish discord between the two Roman commanders, 
 Gnaeus Maximus and the proconsul Caepio, and through 
 the rash haste of the latter, the battle of Arausio (OrangeJ, 
 on the left bank of the Rhone, took place. Both Roman 
 armies were utterly annihilated. Such a calamity materi- 
 ally and morally far surpassed tbe day of Cannae. Allia 
 and. the burning of Rome recurred to men's minds, and 
 every Italian capable of bearing arms was bound by oath 
 not to leave Italy. But, happily for Rome, tbe Cimbri 
 turned upon the Arverni, and then set out to the Pyrenees. 
 
 As after the African defeats, so now, the storm of 
 popular indignation at Rome fell upon individuals, not 
 on the rotten system of senatorial government. Quintus 
 Caepio barely escaped with his life. Gaius Marius was 
 now, in defiance of the law, nominated as consul, and given 
 the chief commaud not merely for one year, but was rein- 
 vested with the consulship for five years in succession 
 (104-100 B.C.). The traces of this unconstitutional step 
 remained vis.ble for all time. 
 
 Owing to the disappearance of the Cimbri from the 
 
254 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 stage, Marias had time to reduce revolted tribes and to 
 reassure the wavering. At last the wave of the Cimbri, 
 having broken itself on the resistance of the brave Celt- 
 iberians, flowed back over the Pyrenees. Near Ron en 
 they received reinforcements from the Helvetii, and were 
 also joined by their kinsmen the Teutones. Having 
 failed to overcome the brave Belgae, they now resolved 
 to invade Italy. But for some reason they broke up 
 again into two hosts, one of which, the Cimbri, was to 
 recross the Rhine and invade Italy by way of the Rhaetian 
 Alps, while the other, the Teutones, together with some 
 of the bravest Cimbrian troops, was to invade Italy by 
 way of Roman Gaul and the western passes of the Alps. 
 
 In 102 B.C., the latter host attacked the camp of Marius 
 at the confluence of the Isere and Rhone, for three days, 
 but in vain ; they then marched onward to Italy, occupy- 
 ing six days in defiling past the Roman camp. Marius 
 followed them to the district of Aquae Sextiae, and defeated 
 the rear-guard. On the third day after this success, 
 Marius drew up his army on a hill ; the barbarians rushed 
 up with hot impatience. For a long while the struggle 
 was terrible, but, owing to the heat of the sun and a false 
 alarm raised in the rear by Roman camp-boys, the bar- 
 barian ranks broke and were utterly cut to pieces. 
 
 The Cimbri, meanwhile, owing to a panic which seized 
 the army of the consul Quintus Lutatius Catulus, had 
 passed the Alps and reached the plain between the Po 
 and the Alps in the summer of 102 B.C., when their 
 brethren were annihilated at Aquae Sextiae. Fortunately 
 for Rome, they remained in the rich land for the winter, 
 and thus gave the Romans time to prepare for the coming 
 struggle. Marius, having refused a triumph for his first 
 victory, returned in the spring and crossed the Po with 
 his army. On the invitation of the Cimbri he named the 
 Raudine plain as the place for battle. There, in a dense 
 morning mist, the Celtic cavalry of the barbarians were 
 driven back on to the infantry ; and thus taken by surprise 
 and thrown into disorder, the whole Cimbrian host fell an 
 easy victim. Thus the battle of Vercellae, in 101 B.C., 
 ended the dreaded invasion of these Germanic peoples. 
 Marius was justly regarded as the conqueror of the Cimbri, 
 although Catulus, a polished art-critic and member of the 
 
THE RULE OF THE RESTORATION. 255 
 
 aristocracy, had overthrown the centre of the Cimbrian 
 hosts and captured thirty-one standards, while Marius took 
 bat two. Bat the victory of Vercellae was only rendered 
 possible by that of Aquae Sextiae. With the victories of 
 Marius were associated hopes of the overthrow of the 
 detested government. Could it be that the rough farmer 
 of Arpinum was destined to be the avenger of Gracchus, 
 and to continue the revolution which he had begun ? 
 
 AUTHORITIES. 
 
 Narbo.—VeYl. i. 15. Eutrop. 4, 23. Cic. Brut. 43. 
 
 Domain land.— Appian B. C. i. 27. Sail. Jug, 32, 33. Marq. Stv. 1. 
 
 108, sqq. 
 Quint us Caepio. Liv. Epit. 70. Tac. Ann. xii. 60. 
 Titus Vetti us.— Diod. Sic. Fr. 30. 
 Cilician fleet. — Liv. Epit. 68. 
 Slave insurrections. — Liv. Epit. 69. Dio Cass. Fr. 93. Diod. Sic. 
 
 36, p. 536, 608. Florus. 3, 19. 
 Jugurthine war. — Appian Numid. Dio Cass. Fr. 89. Plut. Marina, 
 
 Sulla. Liv. Epit. 62, 64, 65, 66. Sail. Jug. 
 Salassi. — Dio Cass. Fr. 74. 
 Arverni. — Liv. Epit. 61. 
 Gallia Narbonensis. — Liv. Epit. 47, 60, 61. Polyb. xxxiii. 5, 7, 8. 
 
 Strab. 185, 191. Marq. Stv. i. 262. 
 Delmium. — Liv. Epit. 62. Appian Illyr. 5. 
 Scordisci. — Liv. Epit. 63, 65. 
 Cimbri and Tent ones.— Liv. Epit. 63-68. Appian Gall. 13 ; Illyr. 4. 
 
 Plut. Marius and Seitorius. Dio Casa. Fr. 90, 91, 94. 
 
255 HISTORY OF ROME 
 
 CHAPTER XXII. 
 
 MARIUS AS REVOLUTIONIST, DRUSCS AS REFORMER. 
 
 Harius — His army reform and its significance — His political position 
 and alliance with Glaucia and Saturninus — The Appuleian laws — 
 Rupture between Marius and his colleagues — Overthrow of 
 Saturninus and his party — Action of the equestrian jury-courta 
 — Reform proposals ot Livius Drusus — His murder. 
 
 Such were the fears and hopes that moved the people in 
 the capital on the nevvs of the final overthrow of the 
 Germanic invaders. These hopes were raised afresh when 
 the saviour of Rome himself returned, late in 101 B.C., by 
 far the first man in Rome, atid yet a mere tyro in politics. 
 Born in 155 B.C., Gaius Marius had, as a poor day-labourer's 
 son, schooled his frame to bear hunger and thirst, cold 
 and heat. His early training had fitted him to rise rapidly 
 from the ranks and to gain distinction, first as a mere 
 soldier, and then as governor of Further Spain. His sub- 
 sequent military career in Africa and Gaul has been 
 already described. Success in speculation had given him 
 wealth, and a union with one of the ancient Julian gens 
 had given him powerful connections. But he never rid 
 himself of the taint of his plebeian origin. No one was 
 ever so popular with the masses, either before or after, 
 both on account of his thorough honesty and disinterested- 
 ness, and of his boorish uncouthness. 
 
 The time had now come to test the power of the rustic 
 soldier to realize the expectations of the people, and to 
 justify the extraragmt joy manifested at his return. 
 The newly organized army might prove a formidable 
 weapon in his hand, though the day was hardly yet come 
 
MAEIUS AS REVOLUTIONIST. 257 
 
 for the sword to achieve what it afterwards did in the 
 world of politics. His military revolution was as fol- 
 lows. Before his time the old Servian constitution had 
 undergone considerable relaxation ; and the minimum 
 census, which bound a man to serve in the army, had been 
 lowered from eleven thousand to four thousand asses 
 (from £43 to £17). The cavalry was still drawn from the 
 wealthiest and the light-armed troops from the poorest 
 citizens, but the arrangement of the infantry of the line 
 was no longer determined by property, but by duration of 
 service in the three divisions of hastati, principes, and 
 triarii. Moreover, the Italian allies had long taken part in 
 the military service. Still, the primitive organization was 
 in the main the basis of the Roman military system, and 
 it was no longer suited to the altered circumstances of the 
 state. The better classes held aloof more and more from 
 service, and the middle class of both Romans and Italians 
 was fast disappearing ; while the allies and subjects out- 
 side Italy, as well as the Italian proletariate, were available 
 to fill up the gaps thus caused. The cavalry formed of 
 the wealthiest burgesses had acted as a guard of honour 
 in the Jugurthine war, and thenceforth it ceases to appear. 
 In ordinary circumstances it was a very difficult task to 
 fill up the legions with properly qualified persons ; in 
 times of emergency, as after the battle of Arausio, it was 
 impossible. Already the cavalry, as a rule, came from 
 Thrace and Africa, while the light Ligurian infantry 
 and Balearic slingers were employed in daily increasing 
 numbers. Moreover, owing to the dearth of properly 
 qualified citizens, non-qnalified and poorer men pressed 
 into the service, nor could it be hard to find plenty of 
 volunteers for so lucrative a profession. Thus it was a 
 necessary result of the social and political changes that 
 the old system of the burgess levy should give place to 
 that of contingents and enlisting, that the cavalry and 
 light troops should mainly consist of subject contingents, 
 and that every free-born citizen should be admitted to 
 the line service, as was, in fact, first allowed by Marius in 
 107 B.C. 
 
 Marius also abolished all the old aristocratic distinctions, 
 whether of definite rank and place or of standards and 
 equipments, which had hitherto obtained among the four 
 
 17 
 
258 DISTORT OF ROME. 
 
 divisions of the army. All were uiiif^mjv^iiaiiied, under 
 the new method of drill devfsed Tly PuBlms Rufus , consul 
 
 in 105 B.C., and hnrrnupd f '•«""•" flip gln.rlia+ojMgl gnTinnla • 
 
 and thus the infantry of the line were reduced to a 
 common level. The thirty maniples, or companies, of the 
 legion were now replaced by ten cohorts, each cohort 
 having its own standard and being formed of six or five 
 sections of one hundred men apiece. The light infantry 
 were suppressed, but the numbers of the legion were raised 
 from 4200 to 6000 men. Although the custom of fighting 
 in three divisions was retained, yet the general could 
 distribute his cohorts in the three lines as he thought 
 fit. The old four standards of the wolf, the ox with a 
 man's head, the horse, the boar, gave place to the new 
 standard of the silver eagle, given by Marius to the legion 
 as a whole. Thus all the old civic and aristocratic dis- 
 tinctions were abolished, and all future distinctions were 
 purely military. The praetorian cohort, or body-guard 
 of the general, owed its existence to a pure accident. 
 In the Nnmanti ne war Scipio Aemilianus had been 
 obliged, owing to the insufficiency and unruly nature of 
 the soldiers with which he was supplied, to form out of 
 volunteers a band of five hundred men, into which he 
 afterwards admitted his ablest soldiers. This cohort had 
 the duty of serving at the praetorium, or headquarters, 
 and was exempt from encamping and entrenching service, 
 and enjoyed higher pay and greater prestige. 
 
 This revolution in the military system probably saved 
 the state, in a military point of view, from destruction, 
 but it involved a complete political revolution, the effects 
 of which time could alone develop. " The republican con- 
 stitution was essentially based on the view that the citizen 
 was also a soldier, and that the soldier was, above all, a 
 citizen; it .was at an end, so soon as a. soldier class was 
 formed." Under the new system of drill, the military ser- 
 vice-became gradually a profession. The admission, though 
 at first restricted, of the proletariate to the service speedily 
 took effect, the more so as the general had a right to 
 reward the successful soldier and give him a share in the 
 spoil. To the burgess in old times the service had always 
 been a burden and duty, but little alleviated by the rewards 
 it might give him. To the proletarian this was far from 
 
MARIUS AS REVOLUTIONIST. 259 
 
 the case. All his hopes, both of pay, rewards, and citizen- 
 ship lay in his success in war and in his general ; thus the 
 camp became his only home and hope. Marios defended 
 his action in giving Roman citizenship to two Italian cohorts 
 on the Raudine plain, by saying that amid the din of battle 
 he could not distinguish the voice of the laws. So, if once 
 the interests of the general and army concurred in pro- 
 ducing unconstitutional demands, it was unlikely that any 
 law would be of much avail amid the clashing cf arms. 
 
 " They had now the standing army, the soldier class, the 
 body-guard : as in the civil constitution, so also in the 
 military, all the pillars of the future monarchy were already 
 in existence ; the monarch alone was wanting. When the 
 twelve eagles circled round the Palatine hill, they ushered 
 in the kings ; the new eagle which Gaius Marias bestowed 
 on the legions proclaimed the advent of the emperors." 
 
 Marios, in the eyes of the populace, who still mourned 
 the death of Gaius Gracchus, was the one man capable alike 
 from his military and. political position of averting the ruin 
 of the state, and of substituting in the place of the effete 
 oligarchy a new and vigorous administration. It remains 
 for us to see how he realized the expectations so confidently 
 formed of him. Two methods of operation were apparently 
 open to him : one, to overthrow the oligarchy by means of 
 the army ; the other, to follow the example of Gracchus 
 and effect his object in a constitutional manner. The first 
 plan, perhaps, he never entertained, relying, maybe, on his 
 immense popularity and on the support of his discharged 
 soldiers, but still more on the weakness of his opponents, 
 whose downfall he probably thought could be more easily 
 compassed than proved to be the case. Moreover, the 
 army was still in a state of transition, and as yet ill adapted 
 for effecting a coup d'etat, and at the beginning of this 
 crisis the use of such an instrument might well have re- 
 coiled upon the user. Having therefore discharged his 
 army, Marios depended for further action upon the leaders 
 of the popular party, which now once more sprang into 
 active existence. This party had much deteriorated during 
 the interval between Gaius Gracchus and Marios ; much 
 of the enthusiasm, faith, and purity of aim had been rubbed 
 off in the years of confusion and turmoil ; and the popular 
 leaders were, for the most part, either political novices, or 
 
260 HISTORY OF ROME- 
 
 men who had nothing - to lose in respect of property, in- 
 fluence, or even honour, and who, from personal motives 
 of malice or a wish to attract notice, busied themselves 
 with inflicting- annoyance and damage on the government. 
 To the first class belonged Gaius Memmius and the noted 
 orator, Lucius Crassus ; to the second, and these were the 
 most notable leaders, belonged Gaius Glaucia, the Roman 
 Hyperbolus, as Cicero called him, and his better and abler 
 colleague, Lucius Appuleiua Saturniuus. The latter, 
 owing to a personal slight at the senate's hands, had 
 joined the ranks of the opposition. As tribune of the 
 people in 103 B.C. he excited popular indignation by his 
 public speeches touching the briberies practised in Rome 
 by the envoys of Mithradates, and also by his invectives 
 against Quintus Metellus, when he was a candidate for 
 the censorship in 102 B c. Moreover, he had canned the 
 election of Marius as consul for 102 B.C. in the teeth of 
 a fierce opposition. His violence and nnscrupulousness 
 marred his very considerable powers both as a politician 
 and orator, but he was the most prominent and dreaded 
 enemy of the senate. He and Glaucia now entered into 
 partnership with Marius, and it was agreed that the 
 latter should become a candidate for his sixth consulship, 
 Satnrninus for a second tribunate, and Glaucia for the 
 praetorship, for the year 100 B.C., in order to carry out 
 the intended revolution. 
 
 Despite all the opposition of the senate, they sncceeded 
 in effecting their object — partly by craft, partly by violence. 
 The laws of Saturninus, known as the Appuleian, revived 
 the chief objects of Gaius Gracchus. Marius was called 
 upon to conduct the assignations of land which had been 
 promised his soldiers, firstly in Africa, and then in all 
 provincial land, and even in that beyond the Alps, which 
 was still occupied by independent Celtic tribes. As the 
 Italian allies were to receive these assignations together 
 with Roman burgesses, this was practically a first step to 
 placing them on an equality with Romans ; and thus not 
 only the extensive schemes of transalpine and transmarine 
 colonization, as sketched by Gaius Gracchus, were revived, 
 but also his project of gradually giving first the Italians 
 and then all Roman subjects the same political privileges. 
 For this work of land distribution it was, doubtless, 
 
MARIUS AS REVOLUTIONIST. 261 
 
 necessary that Marius should have his consulship annually 
 renewed, and thus practically he king of Rome. The main 
 difference between his case and that of Gracchus was that 
 he occupied a military as well as civil position. Following 
 the example of Gracchus, Marius and his confederates 
 made advances to the equites and the proletariate. They 
 extended the powers of the former as jurymen, and gave 
 them greater control over the extortions of provincial 
 magistrates, while to the latter they now sold grain at 
 the merely nominal price of five-sixths of an as, instead 
 of six asses and a half, per modius. Still their real power 
 lay in the discharged Marian soldiers, and this fact lent a 
 strong military colour to their attempt at a revolution. 
 
 In spite of the vehement opposition of the aristocrats, 
 by means of the tribunician veto, the invocation of portents, 
 and the armed interference of the urban quaestor Quintus 
 Caepio, the Appuleian laws were ratified. This was partly 
 due to the firmness of Saturninus, and still more to the 
 appearance of the dreaded soldiers of Marius. Quiutus 
 Metellus, rather than take the oath which bound every 
 senator to observe the new laws, went into exile, but that 
 was only a gain to his opponents. Wl en, however, the 
 plans came to be executed, it was soon clear that a politi- 
 cally incapable general, and a violent street demagogue 
 could not long be allies. In the first place, Marius, from 
 his utter incapacity as a statesman, was unable either to 
 keep his own party in check or to gain over his opponents. 
 The wealthy classes had no liking for Saturninus and his 
 street-riots ; nay, the equites had skirmishes with his aimed 
 bands, and he was only with difficulty elected tribune in 
 100 B.C. Thus this powerful body began to side with the 
 aristocracy, when they saw that Marius was practically the 
 tool of his more violent associates. 
 
 But the attitude of Marius not only alienated those who 
 should have been his most powerful supporters, but, what 
 was more important, caused Saturninus and Glaucia to 
 lose all trust in him. His refusal to go the lengths that 
 they went, his negotiations with his own party and the 
 senate at one and the same time, his reservation when he 
 swore as a senator to observe the Appuleian laws, "so far 
 as they were really valid," soon caused a total rupture 
 between himself and the most violent democrats. But 
 
262 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 Satur£irui$ and Glauciajhad gone too far to recede; they 
 now reSoWed to grasp the sovereignty for themselves. 
 They arranged that the former should again seek the 
 tribuneship, the latter the consulship, for which he was 
 not legally eligible till two years had elapsed. For the 
 latter office Gaius Mem mius was t he gover nment candidate ; 
 he was suddenly murdered. Hereupon the senate called 
 upon the consul Marius to interfere : he complied, and a 
 hasty levy of young men was drawn up in array, while 
 the senators appeared armed in the Forum, led by Marcus 
 Scaurus. The democrats saw their danger, and set free 
 all the slaves in prison; on the 10th of-DeeembeivlOO 
 B.C., a great battle took place in the market-place, the first 
 ever fought within the walls of the capital. It ended in 
 the utter overthrow of the popular party. Saturninus 
 was stoned to death with a number of other prisoners, 
 who were shut up in the senate-house. Glaucia was 
 likewise put to death ; and thus, without sentence or trial, 
 perished on one day four Roman magistrates, a praetor, 
 quaestor, and two tribunes, together with a number of 
 other notable men, in some cases of good family. The 
 victory of the government was complete. Not only were 
 its noisest opponents dead, but the one man who might 
 have proved really dangerous had publicly and completely 
 effaced himself ; and, what was perhaps still more im- 
 portant, the two chief elements of the opposition — the 
 capitalists and the proletariate — emerged from the 
 struggle bitter enemies. 
 
 Thus the force of circumstances, and, still more, the 
 incapacity of Marius, had completely destroyed the fabric 
 reared by Gaius Gracchus. Pitiful, indeed, was the 
 position of the great general ; he retired to the East so as 
 not to witness the return of his rival Metellus. When he 
 came back to Rome his counsel was not sought, and the 
 continuance of profound peace rendered vain his hopes 
 that the time would come when his strong arm would be 
 needed. But his superstitious soul ever kept in mind 
 the oracular promise of seven consulships, and, though in 
 the eyes of all insignificant and harmless, he brooded over 
 his schemes of vengeance, and in moody sullenness bided 
 his time. In addition to this, the current of popular 
 feeling now set in strongly against the remnants of the 
 
MAUI US AS REVOLUTIONIST. 263 
 
 party left behind by Safurninus. The tribunals of the 
 equites condemned with the utmost severity every one 
 who professed the views of the Populares ; nay, they even 
 assailed men on the ground of injuries years old against 
 toe aristocrats. Moreover, abroad the Roman arms were 
 everywhere successful. In Spain, a serious rising of the 
 Lusitanians and Celtiberians was quelled by the consuls, 
 Titus Didius and Publius Crassus, in the years 98-93 B.C. 
 In the East, too, much greater energy was displayed than 
 had been shown for many years. At home the government 
 was more popular and secure thaa it had ever been since 
 the restoration. The l:tws of Saturninus were, of course, 
 cancelled, aud the transmarine colonies of Marius dwindled 
 down to a small settlement in Corsica. When the tribune 
 Sextos Titius reintroduced and carried the Appuleian 
 agrarian law in 99 B.C., the senate annulled it on religious 
 grounds, and the equites punished Titius for bringing it 
 forward . 
 
 In 98 B.C., the two consuls passed a law which made an 
 interval of seven days between the introduction and passing 
 of a bill obligatory, and forbade the combination in a single 
 proposal of several enactments differing in their nature. 
 Thus the government was protected from being taken by 
 surprise by new laws, and some restriction was placed on 
 the initiative power in legislation. 
 
 It was clear that the Gracchan constitution, which had 
 rested on the union of the multitude and the moneyed 
 aristocracy, was on the eve of perishing, and that the hour 
 had come to re-establish the governing oligarchy in undis- 
 puted possession of political power. All depended on the 
 recoverv by the senate of the nomination of jurymen ; for 
 of late the governors of provinces had administered them, 
 not for the senate, but for the order of capitalists and 
 merchants. But the latter fiercely resisted all attempts to 
 wrest their power from them ; and even Quir.tus Mucius 
 Scaevola, one of the most eminent jurists and most noble- 
 minded men of the time, was rewarded for his stern 
 repression of all crime, and for his scrupulous justice in 
 administering the province of Asia., by seeing his legate, 
 Publius Rufus, brought to trial before the equites on the 
 most absurd charge of maladministration. Rufus refused 
 to submit to the moneyed lords, and was condemned and 
 
264 HISTORY OF ROME 
 
 had his property confiscated. He retired to the province 
 which he was accused of plundering, and was there 
 welcomed with every honour by all men, and there spent 
 the rest of his life. Soon after, Marcus Scaurus, seventy 
 years of age, and for twenty years the chief of the senate, 
 was tried for unjust extortions ; and it was evident tbat 
 neither nobility of descent, blamelessness of life, nor age 
 itself were any screen against the wildest charges preferred 
 by men who made a regular profession of reckless accusa- 
 tion. The very commission touching exactions, became the 
 scourge instead of the shield of the provincials ; the vilest 
 scoundrel, provided that he satisfied the claims of his 
 fellow-robbers, went unpunished ; while those who trusted 
 to their innocence, and attempted to do their duty by the 
 provinces they governed, were found guilty by the juries 
 whom they neglected to bribe. 
 
 Marcus Livius Drusus, tribujifi_iifc-2J^£.C., son of the 
 overtBrower ot Gtartns GraccEusV a conservative of the con- 
 servatives, the proudest and noblest of the aristocrats, 
 vehemently earnest, pure of life, and an object of respect 
 to the humblest citizen, felt that the time had come to 
 attack the equestrian jury-courts. He was aided by 
 Marcus Scaurus and Lucius Crassus, the famous orator; 
 but*agaTrTsrhim were not only the consul Lucius Philippus 
 and the reckless Quintus^ Caepio, but also thelnore corrupt 
 and cowardly mass of the aristocracy, who, sooner than 
 lose all chance of plunder, were quite content to share the 
 spoils of the provinces with the equites. Drusus proposed 
 to take away the functions of jurymen from the equestrian 
 order, and to restore them to the senate, and to add three 
 hundred new members to the senate, in order to enable it 
 to meet its increased obligations. Moreover, a special 
 criminal commission was to be appointed to try all jury- 
 men who had been or should be guilty of taking bribes. 
 But he also had a wide and well-considered scheme of 
 reform. He proposed (l}_to_incx£ase the largesses of corn 
 and to cover the increased expense by the permanent issue 
 of copper-plated. by thejhie^f_Jh^silve7^enarii ; (2) to 
 reserve all the still undistributed arable land of Italy, and 
 the best part.pf Sicily, for the settlement of burgess 
 colonists ; (3) lastly, he bound himself to give the Italian 
 allies the Roman franchise. 
 
DRUSUS AS REFORMER. 265 
 
 There is a marked similarity of means and aims in the 
 cases of Drusns and Gains Gracchus ; both relied on the 
 proletariate, and both had practically the same measures 
 of reform in view. The great difference was as to who 
 should be the governing power in the state ; in all other 
 points the best men of both political parties had much in 
 common, widely different as often were the processes of 
 reasoning by which they arrived at such views. 
 
 In order to carry his laws, Drusus wisely kept in the 
 background his proposal touching the Italian franchise, 
 and embodied all his other measures in one law ; thus he 
 caused those interested in largesses of corn and distribu- 
 tions of land to also carry the proposal touching the 
 transference of the jury-courts. He was stoutly opposed, 
 especially by the consul Philippus, whom he caused to be 
 imprisoned. Though the Livian laws were carried, the 
 consul summoned the senate to reject them. On its 
 refusal, Philippus declared he would seek another state 
 council, and seemed to meditate a coup d'etat. Many of 
 the senate now began to waver, and their fears were still 
 further aroused by the sudden death of Lucius Crassus in 
 September, 91 B.C. Gradually the connections of Drusus 
 with the Italians became known, and a furious cry of high 
 treason was raised. The opposition grew more powerful, 
 and the senate at last issued a decree cancelling the Livian 
 laws on the ground of informality. Drusus refused to 
 interpose his veto, and thus the senate once more became 
 subject to the yoke of the capitalists. 
 
 Shortly after, Drusus perished by the hand of an assassin, 
 who escaped undetected ; nor was the crime investigated. 
 Thus the same end which swept away the democratic 
 reformers was the fate of the Gracchus of the aristocracy. 
 The weakness of the aristocracy frustrated reform, even 
 when the attempt came from their own ranks. 
 
 " Drusus had staked his strength and his life in the 
 attempt to overthrow the dominion of the merchants, to 
 organize emigration, to avert the impending civil war ; he 
 himself saw the merchants ruling more absolutely than 
 ever, found all his ideas of reform frustrated, and died with 
 the consciousness that his sudden death would be the 
 signal for the most fearful civil war that ever desolated 
 the fair land of Italy." 
 
263 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 AUTHORITIES. 
 
 Marius's reforms. — Sail. Jug. 86. Pint. Mar. 9. Appian B. C. v. 17. 
 
 Val. Max. 2, 3. Plin. N. H. x. 4. Marq. Stv. ii. 354, 430-442. 
 Political alliances.— Liv. Epit. 69. App. B. C. i. 28-36. Cic. pro 
 
 Balb. 21. 
 Appuleian laics. — Cic. de Orat. ii. 25, 27, 39 ; pro Sest. 16, 47 ; Brut. 
 
 85. Marq. Stv. i. 110. 
 Titian law.— Cic. de Legg. 2, 6, 12. 
 Equestrian jury-courts. — Liv. Epit. 70. Veil. ii. 13. 
 Drusus. — Appian B. C. i. 35. Cic. de Orat. i. 25; de Domo, 50; pro 
 
 Domo, 16. Liv. Epit. 71. Diod. Sic. xxxvii. 10. 
 
CHAPTER XXIII. 
 
 THE SOCIAL OR MARSIC WAR, AND THE SDLPICIAN REVOLUTION. 
 
 91 B.C. Death of Drusus. — 90 B.C. First year of the war — Lex Julia 
 and Lex Plautia Papina. — 89 B.C. Second year of the war — Latin 
 rights conferred on the Transpadani. — 88 B.C. Outbreak of the 
 Mithridatic war — The Sulpician laws — Occupation of Eome by 
 Sulla. — 87 B.C. Departure of Sulla for the East. 
 
 Just as the failure of the previous attempt of Flaccus, 
 in 125 B.C., to confer the citizenship on the Italians was 
 followed by the revolt of Fregellae, so the despair of the 
 subjects of Rome after the death of Drusus broke forth in 
 a revolt of all Italy. 
 
 The Italian allies had two inducements to revolt ; they 
 wished to obtain the enjoyment of certain privileges; they 
 wished also to free themselves from many disabilities and 
 wrongs. The voting power was perhaps the chief, but by 
 no means the only privilege which they sought. There 
 were others, such as immunity from taxation and flogging. 
 On the other hand, they were subject to vexation and 
 oppression in many forms from which Roman citizens 
 were exempt. The rigour of martial law, largely modified 
 for the burgess soldiers, remained unsoftened for them. 
 Italian officers of any rank might be condemned and 
 executed by sentence of court-martial, while the meanest 
 burgess-soldier could appeal to the civil courts at Rome. 
 The contingent furnished by the allies to the army was 
 disproportionate to their number, and the disproportion 
 was increasing. In civil matters the general super- 
 intendence of the Roman government over the dependent 
 
268 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 communities was extended till the allies were at the mercy 
 of the caprice of any Roman magistrate. At Teanum 
 Sidicinum, the chief magistrate had been scourged by 
 order of the Roman consul for supposed remissness in 
 gratifying a whim of the consul's wife. In the Latin 
 colony of Venusia a free peasant was whipped to death 
 for a laugh at the passing litter of a young Roman 
 holding no office. Incidents like these must have been 
 frequent ; and all non-citizens, from Latins downwards, 
 became united by the bond of a common oppression. Since 
 the completion of the Roman conquests the Roman citi- 
 zenship had become the one thing worth having; it alone 
 could give protection from tyranny and a status in the 
 world ; for the Roman empire by this time embraced all 
 civilization, and to be outside the Roman state was to 
 be outside the world. 
 
 The privilege was thus more valuable than it had ever 
 been before ; but it was also becoming more and more 
 difficult to acquire. The tendency of the body of Roman 
 citizens was to close their ranks. The practice of bestow- 
 ing the franchise on whole communities had ceased ; the 
 right of individuals to acquire it by residence at Rome was 
 curtailed ; and in 126 B.C. all non-burgesses were expelled 
 from the city by decree of the senate. 
 
 It might have been thought that the senate and the 
 conservative party objected, not to the demands of the 
 Italians, but to the revolutionary schemes of those by 
 whom these demands were supported ; but in 95 B.C. the 
 deliberate policy of the oligarchy was made clear by a 
 consular law (Lex Licinia-Mucia) which prohibited under 
 penalties any non-burgess from laying claim to the 
 franchise. With Drusus hope arose once more for the 
 Italians; Drusus accomplished nothing but his own 
 destruction, and now no resource was left but an appeal 
 to arms. 
 
 The chief difficulty with which rebellions always have to 
 contend is waut of organization. They have to contend 
 against an established government completely equipped 
 and organized, and to create their own organization during 
 the course of the struggle. The Italian peoples were not 
 entirely unprepared in this respect. In the first place, a 
 secret league had been formed in connection with the 
 
TEE SOCIAL OR MARSIC WAR. 269 
 
 attempt of Drusus, with members in all the most important 
 Italian towns, bound by oath to be faithful to each other 
 and to the common cause. Again, each allied town 
 furnished a contingent to the Roman army, and these 
 trained troops formed a valuable nucleus for the allied 
 army. Thirdly, there were the old Roman confederacies 
 of the various Italian peoples — of the Marsians, Paelig- 
 nians, and others, — which had of course lost all political 
 significance after the conquest by Rome, but which still 
 existed for purposes of common sacrifice. 
 
 The revolt broke out prematurely at Asculum in 
 Picenum, where all the resident Romans were massacred. 
 The flame spread rapidly through all central and southern 
 Italy. The Marsians were the first to declare war, and 
 round them gathered the Paeligni, the Marrucini, the 
 Frentani, and the Vestini, while the Samnites were the 
 centre of the southern group of peoples, from the Liris to 
 Apulia and Calabria. 
 
 On the other hand, the Romans had many adherents 
 where the richer classes were influential. Thus the whole 
 of Umbria and Etruria, where the middle class had entirely 
 disappeared, remained faithful : so also many isolated 
 communities in insurgent districts, such as Pinna in the 
 Vestini. Lastly, many of the most favoured of the allied 
 communities, such as Nola, Nuceria, and Neapolis in Cam- 
 pania, and Rhegium ; and Latin colonies, such as Alba and 
 Aesernia remained steadfastly loyal. The strength of the 
 revolt was in the middle classes and the small farmers ; 
 the moneyed and aristocratic classes held with Rome. 
 
 After the first blood had been shed at Asculum the in- 
 surgents still made an attempt at negotiation : they offered 
 even now to lay down their arms if Rome would grant 
 them the citizenship. Instead of complying, the Roman 
 government instituted a commission (quaestio Varia), on 
 the proposal of the tribune Varius, to investigate the con- 
 spiracy set on foot in connection with the agitation of 
 Drusus. The result was the banishment of many members 
 of the moderate senatorial party who were favourable to 
 compromise, including Gaius Cotta and Marcus Scaurus. 
 Great preparations were made for the struggle. Officers 
 of all parties, including both Sulla and Marius, offered 
 themselves to the government. The largesses of corn 
 
270 HISTORY Oh ROME. 
 
 were curtailed in order to husband supplies ; and all 
 business, except military preparations, was at a standstill. 
 
 The Italians on their side were preparing not merely to 
 secede from Rome, but to crush her and form a new state. 
 Corfinium, a town of the Paeligni, was to be the head of 
 the new government, under the new name of Italica. All 
 burgesses of insurgent communities were declared citizens 
 of Italica. A new forum and senate-house were made ; a 
 senate, consuls, and praetors appointed. The Latin and 
 Samnite languages were placed on an equality as the 
 official tongues ; and the imitation of the Roman constitu- 
 tion was carried out in the minutest details. The most 
 important feature of the new organization is this — that 
 Italica, like Rome, was to remain merely a governing city- 
 state. The Italians, like Rome itself, were unable to rise 
 above the conception of the 7ro\is. No idea occurred to 
 them of any means, such as modern representative insti- 
 tutions, by which a vast population could be welded into 
 a united nation. 
 
 Their plan of campaign was settled for the Romans by 
 the character and extent of the revolt. They had to 
 relieve the many fortresses which held out for them in 
 various parts of the insurgent districts, and they had to 
 combat a numerous enemy at widely distant points. 
 Accordingly, two consular armies were formed, one under 
 Publius Rutilius Lupus, to confront the Italian consul, 
 Quintus Silo, in the northern group of insurgent states ; the 
 other under Lucius Julius Caesar, who commanded against 
 the Samnite, GaiusPapius Mutilus,in the southern districts. 
 Under each consul on both sides were several lieutenant- 
 generals, who were responsible for particular districts. 
 
 The war was begun in the south by the attack of 
 Mutilus on the important Latin fortress of Aesernia in 
 Samnium, which offered the most obstinate resistance. 
 Caesar, after securing Capua, advanced to its relief, but 
 was driven back with severe loss. The town of Venafrum 
 and its garrison was taken by the Italians and the road 
 to Aesernia blocked against the Roman advance. Aesernia 
 accordingly fell by famine at the end of the season. 
 
 In Lucania, Caesar's lieutenant, Publius Crassus, was 
 shut up in the town of Grumentum, which fell after a long 
 siege. 
 
TEE SOCIAL OB MAESIC WAR. 271 
 
 In Campania, Nola and almost all the country except 
 Nuceria fell before Mutilus. The Numidian troops of 
 Caesar deserted to the enemy. An attack npon Caesar's 
 camp was victoriously repelled, but his army was soon 
 after disastrously defeated by Marius Egnatius, and had 
 to retire to Teanum. Acerrae was closely besieged by the 
 Samnite army. 
 
 The war in central Italy was most favourable to the 
 Romans. Their main army, under Lupus, was massed on 
 the Marsian frontier to protect the capital, separated from 
 the enemy by the stream Tolenus. Lupus crossed the 
 stream in two divisions, and was himself destroyed with 
 eight thousand of his troops ; but the other division, under 
 Marius, occupied the enemies' camp, and was able to 
 prevent them from gaining further successes. Quintus 
 Caepio, who was associated with Marius in the command, 
 was drawn into an ambush and cut to pieces. But Marius, 
 now sole commander, gradually pressed the enemy back, 
 and finally defeated them in two important engage- 
 ments. 
 
 In Picenum, a corps under Strabo advanced to threaten 
 Asculum, but was defeated and shut up in Firmum, while 
 a portion of the Italian army entered Apulia, and induced 
 Canusium and Venusia to join the revolt. But another 
 Roman division, under Servius Sulpicius, after defeating 
 the Paeligni advanced to the relief of the Romans The 
 insurgents were taken front and rear, and driven to take re- 
 fuge in Asculum, which was closely besieged by the Romans. 
 
 The course of the war had induced many communities 
 in Umbria and Etruria to declare against Rome, but here 
 the Roman divisions maintained a decided superiority. 
 
 The campaign was, on the whole, adverse to the 
 Romans. They had lost the important towns of Nola 
 and Venusia ; the Umbrians and Etruscans had joined 
 the revolt, and communications with the southern army 
 could only be maintained by a chain of posts from Cumae 
 to Rome, which strained to the utmost the resources of 
 the city. 
 
 The change in popular feeling at Rome was shown in 
 the law of the tribune Marcus Plautius Silvanus with 
 regard to the Varian commission. This body had sent 
 into exile many prominent men of the party favourable to 
 
272 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 concession. The equites of whom it was composed were 
 now dismissed, and a new commission elected by the 
 tribes without class distinction. 
 
 The new commission became a scourge of the extreme 
 non-concession party, and, amongst others, its original 
 author, Quintus Varius, w T ho was charged with the 
 murder of Drusus, was banished. 
 
 About the same time a policy of concession was adopted. 
 The Lex Julia of the consul Lucius Julius Caesar (end of 
 90 B.C.) granted the citizenship to all Italian communities 
 which had not declared against Rome. The Lex Plautia 
 Papiria (December, 90 or beginning of 89 B.C.) granted the 
 citizenship to all allies who presented themselves before a 
 Roman magistrate within sixty days. 
 
 At the same time, the effect of these concessions was 
 largely nullified by the restriction which allowed the new 
 citizens to be enrolled in eight only of the thirty-five 
 tribes. These laws applied to all Italy south of the Po , 
 while the Celts between the Po and the Alps were in- 
 vested with the inferior privileges which had hitherto 
 belonged to Latin towns. The aim of these measures was 
 to secure the loyalty of the allies who had hitherto re- 
 mained faithful, and to draw over deserters from the 
 enemy. But they by no means constituted a complete 
 capitulation ; only " so much of the existing political 
 institutions had been pulled down as seemed necessary to 
 arrest the progress of the conflagration." 
 
 In the second year of the war, Lucius Porcius Cato com- 
 manded against the Marsians, Lucius Sulla in the south, 
 while Gnaeus Strabo retained his command in Picenum. 
 The insurgents began their northern campaign by an 
 attempt to send a body of fifteen thousand men to aid the 
 insurrection in Etruria, but it was totally defeated by 
 Strabo. 
 
 Cato invaded the Marsian territory, but was defeated 
 and slain ; and the whole central command now fell upon 
 Strabo. A great battle was fought at Asculum, where the 
 garrison sallied out to meet a relieving army under Juda- 
 cilius. Victory remained with the Romans, and, after a 
 protracted siege, Asculum was compelled to surrender. 
 The Marrucini, Apulia, the Marsi, were successively sub- 
 dued, and in the next year the Vestini and Paeligni. The 
 
TEE SOCIAL OR MARSIC WAR. 273 
 
 revolt in central Italy was at an end, and Italica once 
 more became the country town of Corfinium. 
 
 In Campania, Stabiae and Herculanenm were captured, 
 and Sulla totally defeated the Samnite general, Cluentius. 
 He then invaded Samnium, surrounded and defeated the 
 Samnite army under Mutilus, and compelled the capital 
 Bovianum to surrender Thus, at the close of the second 
 year, the revolt was on the whole overpowered. Venusia 
 in Apulia and Nola in Campania still held out ; but besides 
 these isolated towns, only the Samnites and Lucaniaus 
 remained unsubdued. The Samnites made great efforts 
 to continue the struggle ; a fresh army was raised with 
 the Marsian Silo in command, and Aesernia became the 
 head-quarters of the final campaign. 
 
 In Apulia, Venusia was captured by Q. Metellus Pius. 
 In Samnium, Bovianum was recaptured by Silo, but he 
 was soon defeated and slain by Mamercus Aemilius. In 
 Campania, Nola was invested and smaller towns cap- 
 tured. In Lucania the Roman general was defeated, and a 
 desultory warfare was still carried on ; the siege of Nola, 
 too, was unfinished : but with these exceptions the war 
 was at an end. 
 
 While the war was progressing favourably to Rome, 
 the internal condition of the city was becoming more 
 and more critical. At the end of 89 B.C. it had become 
 necessary to declare war against Mithradates, and Rome 
 was by no means prepared. The treasury was ex- 
 hausted ; no new army could be raised, but that of 
 Sulla was destined to embark as soon as it could safely 
 be spared ; money was raised by the sale of unoccupied 
 sites within the city In Rome and in Italy all classes 
 were seething with discontent. The Varian prosecutions 
 had embittered the strife between the moderate and the 
 extreme parties. The former was dissatisfied with the con- 
 cessions already made to the Italians, the Italians them- 
 selves were dissatisfied with an enfranchisement which 
 limited their influence to eight tribes — a limitation all 
 the more galling that it found a precedent in the restric- 
 tion of the freedmen to four tribes. The revolted com- 
 munities who had been subdued were in the position of 
 dediticii — that is, in the eye of the law they were as 
 prisoners of war, absolutely at the mercy of their con- 
 
 18 
 
274 BISTORT OF ROMK 
 
 querors ; they were not yet admitted to the citizenship, 
 and they had forfeited their ancient treaties; where these 
 treaties had been restored they had been made revocable at 
 the will of the Roman people. It was desirable to recall the 
 men exiled by the Varian commission, who included many 
 of the best men of the senatorial order ; bnt the cancel- 
 ling of a legal verdict by a decree of the people was seeu to 
 be * most undesirable precedent. Lastly, Marius was thirst- 
 ing tor a fresh command to recover his lost influence, and 
 was ready to go to any length to accomplish his purpose. 
 
 To all these elements of disorder must be added tho 
 decay of military discipline and an economic crisis The 
 social war had necessitated the enrolment of every avail- 
 able man in the army, and had carried party spirit imo 
 the ranks. The result was an appailmg slackness of dis- 
 cipline ; and more than one Rnman division had put its 
 commander to death and escaped all punishment. 
 
 At the same time the old cry of the oppression of capital 
 was heard again. Debtors unable to pay the interest on 
 their loans had applied to the urban praetor Asellio for 
 time to realize their property, and w Te trying to get the 
 obsolete laws against, usury eufo eeJ. Asellio sanctioned 
 actions to recover interest under Qiese laws, and was 
 murdered by the offended creditors under the leader- 
 ship of the tribune Lucius Cassius. The debtors now 
 clamoured for novae tabulae — the cancelling of all ex- 
 isting debts. 
 
 At this critical point the tribune Publius Sulpicius Rufus 
 came forward and proposed three laws : (1) That every 
 senator who owed more than two thousand denarii (c. 
 £S2) should be expelled from the senate. (2) That those 
 who had been exiled by the Varian commission should be 
 recalled. (3) That the new burgesses and the freedmen 
 should be distributed among all the tribes. 
 
 Sulpicius was no revolutionary ; by these laws he 
 attempted simply to carry out the traditional policy of 
 the moderate senatorial party, of the party of Crassus 
 and Drusus. During the early period of his office he had 
 been a supporter of constitutional forms, had opposed the 
 recall of the Varian exiles, and had vehemently resisted an 
 attempt of Gaius Caesar to stand for the consulship before 
 he had been praetor. Nor was the tendency of his pro- 
 
THE SULPICIAV REVOLUTION 275 
 
 posals towards revolution « The first was necessary on 
 account of the venality of the senate and the dependence 
 of the poorer senators upon their richer colleagues. The 
 second was necessary if there was to be a moderate party 
 at all. The third, so far as it concerned the allies, was 
 merely a measure of justice, and necessary to render the 
 Roman concessions a reality ; and the admission of the 
 freedmen into all the tribes would extend the influence 
 of a class largely dependent on the great aristocratic 
 houses. But though the proposals of Sulpicius need not 
 have alarmed the senate, he became exasperated by oppo- 
 sition, kept a hired bodyguard in his pay, and carried on 
 the struggle with great violence. 
 
 The proposals were strongly resisted by the senate ; 
 and the consuls, Sulla and Pompeius Rufus, suspended all 
 popular assemblies on pretence of extraordinary religious 
 observances. Sulpicius replied by a violent tumult. 
 The consuls then yielded, and the proposals became law. 
 But Sulpicius could not yet feel secure ; Sulla had de- 
 parted to the army in Campania, and Sulpicius feared 
 lest he might lead his legions to overthrow the recent 
 laws. Accordingly a fourth Lex Sulpicia was brought 
 forward, and by decree of the people the supreme com- 
 mand against Mithradates was transferred from Sulla to 
 Marius. 
 
 On the arrival of two tribunes from Rome to take over 
 the command of the army, Sulla refused to submit. The 
 command had been conferred upon him legally and con- 
 stitutionally , he knew that he could count upon the 
 devotion of the legions, and he had no scruple about 
 using force against his country. He laid the matter 
 before the troops, and hinted to them that Marius would 
 raise a fresh army for service in the East. The superior 
 officers held aloof, but the common soldiers tore the tri- 
 bunes in pieces, and clamoured to be led to the city. Sulla 
 availed himself of their enthusiasm, and for the first time 
 a Roman army was led against Rome, The city was 
 reached by forced marches, and troops posted at the bridge 
 over the Tiber and at the gates ; the sacred boundary 
 was crossed by two legions in battle array. Stones were 
 thrown from the roofs, but Sulla brandished a blazing 
 torch and threatened to fire the city, and the legions 
 
276 HISTORY OF HOME. 
 
 steadily advanced. The forces of Marius and Sulpicius 
 were overcome ; when they summoned the slaves to arms, 
 not more than three appeai-ed, and in a few hours Sulla 
 was master of Rome. 
 
 Sulla's first step was to declare the Sulpician laws null 
 and void ; his next, to proscribe Sulpicius and twelve of 
 his most strenuous adherents. Sulpioius was captured at 
 Laurentum, and put to death, and his head was exposed in 
 the Forum before the rostra. The adventures of Marius 
 are well known. After escaping successively the cavalry 
 of Sulla, the magistrates of Minturnae, and the treachery 
 of the Numidian king, he found a temporary rest in a 
 small island off the coast of Tnui.3. 
 
 The legislation which Sulla now undertook aimed at 
 relieving the debtors and strength -ning the power of the 
 senate. His chief measures were (1) A lex unciaria, 
 which probably revived the old law fixing the maximum of 
 interest. (2) Schemes for a number of new colonies were 
 set on foot. (3) The reduced numbers of the senate 
 were filled up by the addition of three hundred new 
 members. (4) The old Servian arrangement for voting 
 in the cornitia centuriata was restored, giving nearly one 
 half of the votes to the first class alone, eon,, sting of those 
 who possessed an estate of a hundred thousand sesterces. 
 (5) The full probouleutic power of the senate was restored ; 
 no proposal could henceforth be submitted to the people, 
 unless it had first been approved by the senate. 
 
 Formally these laws of Sulla appeared revolutionary 
 in the extreme. The proscription of Sulpicius and his 
 adherents was a violation of the sacred laws of appeal. 
 The initiative in legislation was taken from the magis- 
 trates and given to the senate, which had legally no 
 privilege but that of giving advice. The old voting 
 arrangements in the centuries, now revolutionized by 
 Sulla, had existed unchanged for a century and a half. 
 But in substance these changes contained little which 
 violated the spirit of the constitution. In occupying 
 Rome and in proscribing the adherents of Sulpicius, 
 Sulla merely accepted actual facts and repelled violence 
 with violence. The extension of the power of the senate 
 was but giving legal sanction to a power which it had 
 always exercised until recent times by means of the tri- 
 
THE SULPICIAN REVOLUTION. 277 
 
 buuician or augural veto ; and the later practice, accord- 
 ing to which any magistrate proposed a law to the tribes 
 without previous deliberation in the senate, was already 
 seen to be fraught with great inconvenience and danger. 
 The measures with regard to interest and colonization 
 show that Sulla was not indifferent to the wrongs of the 
 poorer classes, and they were proposed by him after the 
 victory, and of his own free will. Lastly, it is important 
 to remember not only what he changed, but what he left 
 unchanged. The principal foundations of the Gracchan 
 constitution, the corn largesses and the equestrian jury 
 courts, were left untouched. 
 
 Meanwhile, affairs in the East grew more threatening 
 every day, and Sulla could no longer postpone his depar- 
 ture. He endeavoured to insure the permanence of his 
 measures by procuring the election of consuls favourable 
 to the restored government, and by transferring the armv 
 of the north from the doubtful Strabo to his own devoted 
 friend, Quintus Rufus. 
 
 Bnt one of the new consuls was Cinna, a most deter- 
 mined opponent of Sulla, and Rufus had no sooner taken 
 over his command than he was murdered by the soldiers, 
 and Strabo resumed the leadership. Sulla himself, on the 
 expiration of his consulship, was summoned to appear on 
 his defence before the people. 
 
 Notwithstanding these ominous incidents, Sulla merely 
 exacted an oath from the consuls to maintain the exist- 
 ing constitution, and immediately embarked for the East 
 (beginning of 87 B.C.). 
 
 AUTHORITIES. 
 Social War.— Plut. Sull. 6, 7-10 ; Marins, 32-40. Liv. Epit. 72-77. 
 
 Veil. ii. 15-19. Appian B. C. i. 37-64. Flor. iii. 18. Eutrop. 
 
 v. 3-5. 
 Lex Licinia Mucia. — Cic. de Off. iii. 11. 
 
 Expulsion of Aliens. — Cic. de Off. iii. 11. Festus, s.v. Respublica. 
 Quaestio Varia. — Appian B. C. i. 37. Cic. pro Scaur, i. ; Brut. 56. ; 
 
 pro Corn. fr. 27. Ascon in Scaur, in Corn., p. 79. Val. Max. 
 
 viii. vi. 4. 
 Asellio. — Liv. Ep. 74. Val. Max. ix. vii. 4. 
 Leges Sulpici<ie.— {1) Plut. Sull. 8. (2) Liv. Epit. 77. (3) Appian 
 
 B. C. i. 55. 
 Sulla's laws. — Appian B. C. i. 59. Fest. s.v. Unciaria. 
 
278 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 CHAPTER XXIV. 
 
 THE MITHRADATIC WAR. 
 
 89 B.C. Declaration of war by Rome. — 88 b.c. Occupation of Asia 
 Minor by Mithradates —Massacre of Roman citizens. — 87 B.C. 
 Pontic invasion of Greece — Arrival of Sulla — Siege of Athens 
 and the Piraeeus. — 86 b.c. Battle of Chaeronea. — 85 B.C. Battle 
 of Orchomenus. — 84 B.C. Conclusion of Peace. 
 
 Ever since the beginning of the revolution under Tiberius 
 Gracchus, Rome had been too much occupied with her 
 internal affairs to bestow much attention upon the pro- 
 vinces. During this period important changes had taken 
 place in the East The two kingdoms of Armenia, which 
 dated their existence from the war with Antiochus. had 
 been united under Tigranes, originally king of the north- 
 eastern portion ; and to him the title of Great Kin<; and the 
 titular supremacy of Asia now passed Phrygia became, 
 in the time of Gaius Gracchus, an independent kingdom 
 in connection with the Roman province of Asia ; but other- 
 wise Asia remained unchanged, except for the oppression 
 of the Roman tax-farmers, which was ever growing more 
 merciless and more intolerable. 
 
 The ruler of the kingdom of Pontus was, at that time, 
 Mithradates VI., surnamed Eupator. After the death of 
 his father he became a fugitive and a wanderer for seven 
 years. Eastern legend ascribed to him a stature more 
 than human, strength and swiftness surpassing that of all 
 other men, and a constitution inured alike to any fatigue 
 or excess. He collected Greek and Persian antiquities 
 and works of art, and kept Greek poets and philosophers 
 in his train. 
 
 As a ruler he does not rise beyond the ordinary 
 
TEE M1THBADATIC WAR 279 
 
 Eastern sultan : " of higher elements — desire to advance 
 civilization, earnest leadership of national opposition, 
 special gifts of genius — there is no distinct trace." His 
 government is marked by all the ruthless crime usual to 
 an Eastern despot — by the execution or life-long captivity 
 of mother, brothers, daughters, sons, and of his most 
 confidential servants. "What really distinguishes Mithra- 
 dates is his boundless activity and energy. He extended 
 the limits of his dominions in every direction, founded 
 a new empire on the northern sbores of the Black Sea, 
 and, alone among the princes of the East, was able seri- 
 ously to contend with the Roman power. 
 
 His ancestral dominion was Pontus, or Cappadocia on 
 the Black Sea, between Bithynia on the west and Armenia 
 on the east. It was a iich and fertile country, producing 
 large quantities of grain and fruit, but almost entirely 
 destitute of towns properly so called, though there were 
 numerous fortresses where the peasants might take refuge, 
 and where the king's treasure was deposited. The real 
 basis of his wealth and power lay in the flourishing 
 Greek seaports of Trapezus, Amisus, and Sinope. 
 
 Instead of developing the resources of his dominions, 
 Mithradates devoted himself to extending them. His 
 first conquest was the district of Colchis with the Greek 
 town of Dioscurias, east of Pontus. His next enterprise, 
 which was begun though not completely executed before 
 the first Roman war, was the foundation of the Bosporan 
 kingdom in the region of the modern Crimea. 
 
 The country north of the Caucasus and the Black Sea 
 was inhabited by Scythian and Sarmatian tribes, who led 
 a pastoral life and fought on horseback with sword, lance, 
 and bow, the ancestors of the modern Cossacks. It was 
 the relations of the Greek settlements in the Tauric Cher- 
 sonese with these barbarians which gave Miihradates his 
 opportunity. The most important of the Greek cities 
 were Chersonesus, a free town at the south of the penin- 
 sula, and Panticapaeum on the European side of the 
 Cimmerian Bosporus, which ruled the eastern division of 
 the peninsula, together with Phanagoria and the district 
 of Sindice on the opposite coast. The inhabitants of these 
 cities purchased peace from the barbarians by payment 
 of a tribute, but the exactions and oppressions to which 
 
280 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 they had to submit grew heavier and heavier, and they 
 were glad to be delivered bj the arms of Mithradates, and 
 to acknowledge his supremacy. The new kingdom, based, 
 like Pontus, on a number of Greek cities, was called the 
 Bosporus. It embraced the peninsula and the opposite 
 coast, and paid an annual tribute of two hundred talents 
 (£48,800), besides enormous quantities of grain, to the 
 king. The barbarian tribes acknowledged some sort of 
 dependence upon Mithradates, and supplied a valuable 
 recruiting ground. 
 
 At the same time Lesser Armenia was annexed to 
 Pontus. Mithradates gave his daughter in marriage to 
 Tigranes, king of Greater Armenia, and it was by his help 
 that Tigranes established his supremacy in Asia. 
 
 The king now turned his attention to Paphlagonia and 
 Cappadocia, and it was his conduct with regard to these 
 countries which made Roman interference at length 
 inevitable. 
 
 Paphlagonia was claimed by Mithradates as having 
 been left to his father, Mithradates Euergetes, by will. 
 He gained over the king of Bithynia by allowing him to 
 occupy the western half of the kingdom. Cappadocia had 
 once been united with Pontus, and after the murder of the 
 Cappadocian king Ariarathes, brother-in-law of Mithra- 
 dates, and of his young son, the reunion was practically 
 accomplished. Nominally the country was ruled by a 
 pseudo- Ariarathes, actually by Gordius, a Cappadocian 
 instrument, of Mithradates 
 
 The Roman senate had been entirely passive during all 
 these aggressions. Their first interference was in the 
 wrong direction. In response to an appeal of the Tauric 
 chieftains, they had ordered Mithradates to restore these 
 to their old supremacy over the Greek cities — so far were 
 they from fulfilling their duties to the Hellenic name. 
 The reunion of Cappadocia at last aroused them to energy. 
 Paphlagonia was declared independent, and Mithradates 
 was commanded to evacuate Cappadocia. No army was 
 sent to enforce these decrees, but the energy of Sulla, the 
 governor of Cilicia, compelled Mithradates to submit at 
 all points. The Cappadocian Ariobarzanes was elected 
 king by the people. Sulla marched to the Euphrates, and 
 gained great fame by a conference in which, as repre- 
 
TEE MITEEADATIC WAR. 281 
 
 sentative of Rome, lie arranged the relations between 
 Tigranes and the Parthians. This was the first time that 
 the Romans came into contact with the great nation with 
 which they were destined to dispute the sovereignty of 
 the world. Thus the status quo in the East was restored 
 (b.c. 92). 
 
 But Sulla had no sooner retired than Mithradates' ally 
 Tigranes expelled Ariobarzanes from Cappadocia. This 
 was followed by fresh disturbances in Bithynia. In 
 91 B.C. Nicomedes III. had been recognized as legitimate 
 king by the Romans ; but his younger brother, Socrates, 
 displaced him and assumed the throne. In Paphlagonia 
 the sea-coast was still occupied by Mithradates, and in the 
 Bosporus he even extended his dominions. Again order 
 was restored by the commissioner Manius Aquillius, with 
 the aid of the small Roman force in Asia and the native 
 levies. Mithradates made no resistance, though he did not 
 furnish the contingents of troops required of him (b.c. 90). 
 
 Though the Italian insurrection was at its height, 
 Mithradates did not use the opportunity to make open 
 war on the Romans ; none the less did he prosecute his 
 schemes of territorial conquest. He seems to have fluctu- 
 ated between a sense of his own weakness and a greedy 
 desire of aggrandizement. He gave ample excuse for 
 war to the Romans had they desired it, but yielded at the 
 first show of energy. 
 
 Aquillius was determined to put an end to this unsatis- 
 factory condition of things ; he resolved to make use of 
 Nicomedes of Bithynia to compel his government to 
 declare war. Accordingly Nicomedes was instigated to 
 attack ; he occupied the frontier districts of Pontus, and 
 his ships closed the Bosporus against those of Mithradates. 
 The latter contented himself with appealing to the Romans. 
 He was ordered, in any case, to refrain from war against 
 Nicomedes. Then the king's decision was taken. His 
 son Ariobarzanes was ordered to invade Cappadocia, and 
 envoys were sent to the Roman envoys to demand their 
 ultimatum. War now ensued as a matter of course 
 (B.C. 89). 
 
 Mithradates made the most energetic preparations : he 
 obtained a promise from Tigranes of an auxiliary army ; 
 to the Greeks he presented himself, like Philip of Mace- 
 
282 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 don, as a deliverer from an alien yoke ; and he had hopes 
 of the revolt of Numidia and Syria, of risings in Thrace 
 and Macedonia. The Mediterranean swarmed with Pontic 
 privateers : a foreign corps, composed chiefly of Italian 
 refugees, was formed in Asia, armed and equipped in the 
 Roman fashion. The king's infantry is said to have 
 amounted to 250,000, and his cavalry to 40,000, while his 
 fleet numbered 400 vessels. 
 
 For the Romans the moment was most unfavourable. 
 The Italian insurrection was yet unsubdued, and it was 
 impossible for a Roman army from Italy to arrive, at 
 earliest, till the summer of 88 B.C. Besides the native 
 levies there was but a small Roman force in Asia ; but 
 the Roman officers hoped to protect the Roman province 
 and maintain their present positions. The Bithynian fleet 
 still blockaded the Bosporus. 
 
 The war began in 88 B.C., and the first operations were 
 all in favour of Mithradates. He defeated the Bithynians 
 and captured their military chest. The Roman officers 
 were everywhere worsted, and had to shut themselves up 
 in fortified towns— in Apamea, in the Phrygian Laodicea, 
 and in Pergamus. To conciliate the inhabitants, all Asiatic 
 prisoners were immediately dismissed by the king. The 
 whole country, to the Maeander, was in his hands. The only 
 hope of the Romans was in Sulla, and now news arrived of 
 the Sulpician revolution and of Sulla's march upon Rome. 
 The Asiatics everywhere sided with Mithradates ; the Ro- 
 man officers, Quintus Oppius and Aquillius, were delivered 
 into his hands. In the hour of conquest the savagery of the 
 king broke forth in a stupendous crime. Orders were issued 
 from Ephesus that on one and the same day all Italians, 
 bond and free, should be put to death. Severe penalties 
 were threatened against any who should shelter the pro- 
 scribed, and while one half of their property was to go to 
 the royal treasury, the other half was given over to the 
 murderers. The orders were strictly carried out, and by 
 the smallest computation eighty thousand persons perished 
 in the massacre. The act was one of brutal and impolitic 
 revenge. By striking not merely at Romans but at all 
 Italians the king alienated his most important allies. 
 
 The new conquests were now organized. Pergamus 
 became the new capital, the old Pontus was given over to 
 
THE MITHMADATIC WAR. 283 
 
 the sons of Mithradates, and the other provinces of Asia 
 Minor became Pontic satrapies. All arrears of taxes were 
 forgiven, and exemption from all taxes for five years was 
 promised. Besides the petty ruler of Paphlagonia, the 
 only communities still adhering to Rome were the city 
 leagues of Caria and Lycia and the cities of Rhodes and 
 of Magnesia on the Maeander, which successfully with- 
 stood all attempts to reduce them. 
 
 The king now determined to carry war into Europe and 
 to occupy Hellas. During the last few years there had 
 been several inroads of Thracian tribes into Macedonia, 
 with which Mithradates was probably not unconnected. His 
 son now advanced by land, subduing the country before 
 him, and parcelling it into Pontic satrapies. Abdera and 
 Philippi were made the principal bases for operations, and 
 the whole Aegean was occupied by the Pontic fleet. All 
 the islands were occupied and the mainland was soon 
 attacked. At Athens, Aristion, a philosopher by trade, per- 
 suaded the people to renounce Roman rule ; the Piraeeus 
 became a Pontic harbour ; and the other free states — 
 Achaia, Boeotia, Laconia — followed the example of Athens. 
 
 The position of the Roman government was critical : 
 three armies were required to keep down Rome, Italy, and 
 Asia; only one, that of Sulla, was available. Sulla had 
 to choose between these three tasks. He chose Asia, and in 
 the spring of 87 B.C., he landed in Epirus — but with only 
 thirty thousand men : he was without a single ship and 
 his treasury was empty. But his action was none the 
 less vigorous : as soon as his proposals for peace on the 
 basis of the status quo before the war were rejected, he 
 advanced into Boeotia, defeated the Pontic generals, and 
 quickly possessed himself of the whole of the mainland 
 except Athens and Piraeeus, which he failed to carry by 
 assault. He then established camps at Eleusis and 
 Megara, and proceeded to besiege the city and port of 
 Athens. The siege of Athens was long and tedious. The 
 Pontic relieving army was overthrown under the walls of 
 the city; but abundant supplies arrived at the Piraeeus 
 by sea, and considerable quantities even reached Athens. 
 The winter passed without result : all the Roman assaults 
 on the Piraeeus were repulsed, and the siege was turned 
 into a blockade. Athens at length made overtures of 
 
284 HISTORY OF POME. 
 
 ■surrender; but when there was delay in accepting Sulla's 
 terms, the city was captured by escalade. It was plundered 
 and the ringleaders of the insurrection executed ; but 
 the Athenians were allowed to retain their liberty and their 
 possessions, including Delos, just presented to them by 
 Mithradates. Thus once more was Athens " saved by 
 its illustrious dead" (86 B.C.). 
 
 The Piraeeus still held out, and a fleet became impera- 
 tively necessary to prevent supplies from entering by sea. 
 Lucullus had been despatched to raise ships, but the 
 Egyptian court refused his request for aid. Sulla was 
 compelled to confiscate the temple treasures to supply his 
 needs, and compensated the gods by devoting to them one 
 half of the territory of Thebes. The worst blow was the 
 news of the democratic revolution at Rome, and the trans- 
 ference of the Eastern command from Sulla to Flaccus. 
 
 From these difficulties Sulla was extricated by the rash- 
 ness of Mithradates, who forbade his generals to act on the 
 defensive, and ordered them to crush Sulla at once. An 
 army of over 100,000 men, under Taxiles, arrived at 
 Thermopylae ; Archelaus evacuated the Piraeeus and joined 
 the main army. In the plain of the Cephissus the great 
 battle of Chaeronea was fought. The Pontic forces were 
 three times as numerous as the Roman, and were especially 
 superior in cavalry, so that Sulla had to protect his flank 
 by trenches ; and in front, between his first? and second 
 lines, palisades were erected. 
 
 The battle began with the advance of the Pontic war 
 chariots ; the Roman first line immediately retired behind 
 the palisade, while the Roman slingers and archers poured 
 their missiles on the enemy, and drove them back upon 
 their own line, which was thus broken. Arihtlaus hur- 
 riedly brought up his cavalry from the flanks and made 
 them charge, to give time for the infantry to recover. The 
 Roman line was broken, but still offered stubborn resist- 
 ance. At this moment Sulla, on the right, charged with his 
 cavalry the exposed flank of the enemy ; the confusion 
 into which their infantry were thrown spread to the 
 cavalry, and the Roman infantry seized the moment for a 
 general charge. The rout was complete ; the Pontic camp 
 was captured and the remnant of the army pursued to the 
 Euripus. 
 
 
THE MITHBABATIC WAR. 283 
 
 The effect of the victory was slight — partly for want of 
 a fleet, partly because of the approach of Flaccus, who was 
 now in Thessaly. For some days the two Roman armies 
 were encamped opposite to each other ; but the soldiers of 
 Flaccus began to desert, and he turned northwards, intend- 
 ing to march through Thrace to Asia. Sulla, from what- 
 ever motives, remained at Athens for the winter. 
 
 In the spriug of the next year a second Pontic army 
 reached Boeotia by way of Euboea, where it was joined by 
 the relics of the army of Archelaus ; the latter general 
 was suspected of treason by his master, and the most 
 peremptory orders were given to fight a derisive battle. 
 The armies met in the same plain of the Cephissus — near 
 Orchomenus. The Pontic cavalry caused the Roman line 
 to waver by the fury of its charges ; but Sulla rallied 
 his soldiers in person, — the horse were driven back and the 
 defeat of the infantry was then an easy task. The Pontic 
 camp was stormed on the next day ; the army was almost 
 annihilated. The Boeotian communities were severely 
 punished for their defection, many being almost totally 
 destroyed. The way was now open through Macedonia 
 and Thrace ; Philippi and Abdera were occupied, and the 
 winter, 85-84 B.C., was consumed by Sulla in preparing a 
 fleet for the next year's campaign in Asia. 
 
 During the course of the war in Europe circumstances 
 had greatly changed in Asia Minor. The hopes with 
 which the Asiatic communities had hailed their deliverer 
 were bitterly disappointed : the Roman whips were as 
 nothing to the Pontic scorpions, and even the long suffering 
 Asiatics were driven to revolt. The most anarchical decrees 
 were issued by the new sovereign, giving independence to 
 the revolting communities, full remission of debts to debtors, 
 lands to the poor and liberty to slaves. All manner of 
 outrage and violence was the consequence. The most im- 
 portant mercantile cities, Smyrna, Ephesus, Snrdes, revolted 
 from the king. At Adramyttium the whole of the senate 
 were put to death by his ordei-s. The Chians, suspected of 
 disloyalty, were first heavily fined, and then deported to 
 the coast of Colchis. A massacre of Celtic chiefs in Asia 
 was- planned and carried out, in order to convert Galatia 
 into a Pontic province. But those who escaped raised the 
 powerful Celtic tribes and expelled the Pontic governor. 
 
286 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 At the same time, the king was hard pressed by the 
 Romans by sea and land. Lucullus Lad at length suc- 
 ceeded in raising a considerable fleet, and Lad wrested 
 several islands from the enemy. The army of Ftaccus had 
 reached CLalcedon in 86 B.C., but a mutiny Lad deposed 
 Flaccus and placed Fimbria in command, and tLe new 
 general Lad defeated tLe younger MitLradates and dislodged 
 tLe king himself from Pergamus ; and it was only tLrough 
 tLe refusal of tLe Optimate Lucullus to co-operate witL tLe 
 democrat Fimbria tLat MitLradates was enabled to escape to 
 Mitylene. TLus, by tLe end of 85 B.C., Europe was entirely 
 lost to MitLradates ; and of Asia Minor tLe greater part 
 was in revolt or occupied by the Romans. TLe fleet of 
 Lucullus fougLt two successful engage men ts off tLe 
 Trojan coast, and, wLen joined by tLe fresL vessels 
 equipped by Sulla in Tbessaly, completely commanded tLe 
 Hellespont. 
 
 MitLradates now opened negotiations for peace. He 
 applied to botL Sulla and Fimbria, but Le knew well that 
 it was Sulla with whom Le Lad really to reckon. 
 
 TLe king offered Sulla Lis aid against the democratic 
 party at Rome in return for tLe cession of Asia to himself. 
 But Sulla refused to cede one foot of ground, and would 
 take nothing but the following terms : (1) Restoration of 
 all the king's conquests, both continental and insular. 
 (2) Surrender of prisoners and deserters, and of the Pon- 
 tic fleet. (3) Pay and provisions for the army, and a war 
 indemnity of three tbousand talents (£732,000). ("4) TLe 
 CLians to be restored to tbeir homes, and the Macedonian 
 refugees, friendly to Rome, to be allowed to return. 
 
 Tbese negotiations were carried on at Delium, but 
 Archelaus could not at first persuade his master to agree. 
 Sulla meanwhile proceeded to settle Macedonian affairs, 
 and set out witL fleet and army for tLe Hellespont. At 
 last MitLradates was brougbt to consent. But Sulla's march 
 was still continued ; he crossed the Hellespont, and at 
 Dardanus concluded peace, orally, with MitLradates. At 
 lengtL Le encamped close to Fimbria, at TLyntira, near 
 Pergamus. Fimbria's troops refused to attack tLe Sullan 
 army, and an attempt to assassinate Sulla failed. When 
 Sulla refused a conference, Fimbria gave up all for lost, 
 and fell upon his sword ; the main body of the troops 
 
TEE MITER AD A1IC WAR. 287 
 
 joined Sulla, while those who were most deeply com- 
 promised repaired to Mithradates. 
 
 The settlement of Asia was now proceeded with. Two 
 legions were left under command of Lucius Licinius 
 Murena, and their interference was, in some cases, neces- 
 sary to enforce the Sullan regulations The most impor- 
 tant of these were as follows: (1) The revolutionary 
 decrees of Mithradates were cancelled. (2) The most 
 prominent adherents of the king and the authors of the 
 massacre of the Italians were put to death. (3) The 
 arrears of tithes and customs for the last five years were 
 exacted, together with a war indemnity of twenty thousand 
 talents (£4,880,000) (4) The few faithful communities 
 — Rhodes, the province of Lycia, Magnesia on the Maeander 
 — were rewarded, and compensation was made to the Chians 
 and to the people of Ilium for the exceptional cruelty with 
 which they had been treated. 
 
 During the winter of 84-83 B.C. Sulla allowed his troops 
 to enjoy luxurious winter quarters in Asia, and in the 
 spring transferred them across the Aegean and the Adriatic 
 to Brundisium. 
 
 AUTHORITIES. 
 
 Pint. Sull. 11-27. Lucull. 2-4. Appian Mithr. 1-63. Liv. Epit. 74, 
 
 76-78, 81-83. Flor. iii. 5. Veil. ii. 18. Justin, xxxvii. i. 7-m. ; 
 
 xxxviii. i.-viii. Plin. N. H. xxv. 2. Gell. xvii. 17. Val. Max. 
 
 viii. 7 ; ix. 2. Strab. xii. 545 ; vii. 306, 307, 309-312 ; xi. 499 ; 
 
 xii. 540, 541, 555, 562. Eutrop. v. 5. Memn. v. 5. Dio. fr. 
 
 99-105. Pro L. Manil. 3. Pro Flacc. 24, 25. Tac. Ann. iv. 14. 
 Terms of peace. — Appian Mithr. 55. 
 Settlement of Asia. — Appian Mithr. 61, 62. 
 
HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 CHAPTER XXV. 
 
 THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION AND ITS OVERTHROW BY SCLLA. 
 
 87 B.C. Cinnan revolution — Return of Marius — Reign of terror. — 
 86-84 b.c. Despotism of Cinna — Most of the provinces adhere 
 to the senate. — 83 b.c. Sulla lands at Brundisium — His modera- 
 tion and military successes. — 82 B.C. Further Sullan successes 
 — Battle of the Colline Gate. — 82-80 B.C. Remaining opposition 
 to Sulla crushed in various quarters. 
 
 The departure of Sulla left Italy full of the discontented 
 elements from which revolution might be expected to 
 arise. The Italian revolt still smouldered dangerously in 
 many quarters, and the principal army was in the hands 
 of a general whose loyalty to the senate was doubtful 
 The capitalists had suffered greatly through the severe 
 financial crisis. The insurgents who had laid down their 
 arms since the expiration of the sixty days appointed by 
 the Lex Plautia et Papiria were in the position of dedi- 
 ticii — that is of subjects entirely destitute of rights. The 
 new citizens and the freedmen were exasperated by the 
 cancelling of the Sulpician laws ; while the large class of 
 those who adhered to the men outlawed by Sulla after 
 the revolution of Sulpicius were bent on obtaining the 
 recall of their banished friends. 
 
 So far as the malcontents had a common aim, they were 
 united upon this last point of the recall of the exiles ; but 
 the movement was mainly one of pure discontent, and had 
 no distinct political object. Its aimlessness is shown by 
 the character of the person chosen to lead it — Lucius Cor- 
 nelius Cinna. He was unknown except as an officer in the 
 social war; he had no political aim but that of vulgar 
 
THE CINNAN REVOLUTION. 289 
 
 selfishness, and is said to have been bought over by the 
 party of Marhis merely because the restriction of the 
 power of tribunes made it necessary for the conspirators 
 to have a consul as their instrument. There were abler 
 men in the second rank of the conspiracy — Gnaeus Papirius 
 Carbo, a powerful popular orator, and Quintus Sertorius, 
 a man of the highest ability and integrity. 
 
 Immediately on Sulla's departure (87 B.C.) the conspira- 
 tors took action. Cinna, supported by the majority of the 
 tribunes, proposed two laws : (1) the re-enactment of 
 the Sulpician law permitting the enrolment of the freed- 
 men and the new citizens in any of the tribes : (2) that 
 the Sulpician exiles should be recalled and restored to 
 "their rights. 
 
 On the day of voting both sides appeared in arms. The 
 senatorial tribunes vetoed the new law. When swords 
 were drawn, the bands of the other consul, Octavius, cleared 
 the Forum, and committed the most frightful atrocities on 
 the assembled multitude. Ten thousand persons are said 
 to have been slain. There was no legal means of proceed- 
 ing against the conspirators, but a prophet opportunely 
 gave out that the banishment of Cinna and of six tribunes 
 was necessary for the peace of the country, and a decree of 
 outlawry was accordingly passed by the senate against these 
 persons. Lucius Cornelius Merula was chosen consul in 
 place of Cinna. 
 
 But the senate omitted to expel the new exiles from 
 Italy, and they appeared in Tibur, in Praeneste,and in all the 
 new burgess communities of Latium and Campania, asking 
 money and arms for the common cause. The army besieging 
 ]N"ola, induced partly by their own democratic leanings, 
 partly by the bribes of the exiles, made common cause 
 with Cinna, and furnished a valuable nucleus for the 
 recruits who soon flocked in. Cinna now moved towards 
 Rome, and was soon joined by fresh forces from the north. 
 Marius and the refugees of the previous year had landed 
 in Etruria with a body of five hundred horse. He now 
 ordered the ergastula, or prisons in which the slaves were 
 confined at night, to be broken open ; and soon gathered 
 round him a force of six thousand men ; he also contrived 
 to collect a force of forty ships, with which he intercepted 
 the corn supply of Rome. He placed himself at the 
 
 19 
 
290 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 disposal of Cinna, though the wiser leaders, like Sertorius, 
 saw the imprudence of associating themselves with so 
 dangerous a man. 
 
 The democratic forces gathered round the city, and the 
 senate appealed to Strabo for protection. He pitched his 
 camp at the Coliine Gate, but refrained from battle, and 
 allowed the insurgents to invest the city Cinna was 
 posted on the right bank of the river, opposite the Jani- 
 culum ; Sertorius on the left bank, by the Servian wall. 
 Marius increased his fleet and his army, and gained pos- 
 session of Ostia, which was plundered. Strabo, though he 
 resisted the attack of the insurgents, remained inactive, and 
 demanded the consulship for the next year But this the 
 senate refused, and sought help elsewhere. A decree was 
 passed conferring the franchise on all the Italian allies 
 who had forfeited their old treaties. This was meant to 
 gratify one large and important class of malcontents, but 
 the concession did not produce more than ten thousand 
 men. Negotiations were opened with the Samnites, in 
 order to make the troops of Metellus in that quarter 
 available for the defence of the city ; but the Samnite 
 terms were too humiliating, and when Metellus marched 
 to Rome, leaving behind him a small division, the latter 
 was at once attacked and defeated. Moreover, Cinna and 
 Marius granted all that the Samnites required and were 
 reinforced by a Samnite contingent. 
 
 The insurgents were already in possession of the sea, 
 and the land communications were soon cut off by the 
 capture of Ariminum, which shut off the supplies of food 
 and men expected from the region of the Po ; they also held 
 Antium, Lanuvium, and Aricia, which closed all approaches 
 from the south. At the same time a terrible pestilence 
 broke out among the troops of the city, by which seventeen 
 thousand men perished. The sudden death of Strabo was, 
 no doubt, a relief to the government ; his troops were 
 incorporated with those of Octavius, but their temper was 
 such that the consul dared not fight. The Optimates were 
 at variance with each other : Octavius opposed all con- 
 cession, while Metellus was in favour of compromise. The 
 soldiers first besought Metellus to take over the command, 
 then, on his refusal, deserted in large numbers. At length 
 the government was compelled to think of surrender. 
 
TEE CINNAN REVOLUTION. 291 
 
 Envoys were sent to Cinna, but, while the negotiations 
 dragged on, Cinna moved close up to the city gates, and 
 desertions became so common that the senate was reduced 
 to unconditional surrender. Cinna promised, at the 
 entreaty of the senate, to abstain from bloodshed ; but 
 Marius kept an ominous silence. 
 
 Marius scoffingly refused to set foot in the city till his 
 sentence of exile had been revoked ; and a hurried assembly 
 was held m the Forum, and the necessary decree passed. 
 The old man at length entered, and the work of blood- 
 shed began The gates were closed, and the slaughter 
 was uninterrupted for five days , but, for months after- 
 wards, individuals who had escaped at first were put to 
 death. Gnaeus Octavius was the first victim , others of 
 the illustrious slain were Lucius Caesar, consul in 90 B.C., 
 and the victor of Acerrae ; Marcus Antonius, the first 
 pleader of his time , Lucius Merula, Cinna's successor ; 
 and Quintus Catulus, Marius' colleague in the Cimbiian 
 wars. The fury of Marius amounted to madness ; he could 
 scarce be restrained from hunting out the bitterest of his 
 enemies and slaying them with his own hand ; he forbade 
 the burial of the bodies, and had the corpse of Caius 
 Caesar stabbed afresh at the tomb of Quintus Varius. 
 The man who presented to him, as he sat at table, the head 
 of Antonius was publicly embraced. His own associates 
 were appalled at his frenzy, but rone had the courage or 
 the power to oppose him, and he was even elected consul 
 with Cinna for the following year He lived to enter upon 
 his seventh consulship ; the few remaining days of his 
 life were passed in a delirium which ended in a burning 
 fever He expired on the 13th of January, 86 B.C. " He 
 died in full possession of what he called power and 
 honour, and in his bed , but Nemesis assumes various 
 shapes, and does not always requite blood with blood. 
 Was there no sort of retaliation in the fact that Rome 
 and Italy now breathed more freely on the news of the 
 death of the famous deliverer of the people, than at the 
 tidings of the battle on the Randine plain ? " 
 
 With the death of Marius the massacre ceased ; though 
 there were individual instances of murder. Thus Fimbria 
 attempted to kill the revered pontifex maximus, Quintus 
 Scaevola, whom even Marius had spared ; but Sertorius 
 
292 HISTORY OF ROME, 
 
 secured the public tranquillity by calling together the 
 Marian slaves, to the number of four thousand, and having 
 them cut down by his Celtic troops. 
 
 During the next three years Cinna enjoyed a power as 
 absolute and despotic as any ever exercised by the tyrant 
 of a Greek city. He was consul each year, and nominated 
 himself and his colleague without going through the form 
 of consulting the people. During this period he gave no 
 sign of any definite political plan or aim : no attempt was 
 made to reorganize the constitution and to place the new 
 government on a firm basis. Only the reactionary measures 
 of Sulla were annulled, and a few laws passed as the 
 exigencies of the moment demanded. 
 
 1. The law of Sulpicius, granting to the new burgesses 
 and to the freed men equality with the old citizens, was 
 revived and confirmed by the senate, and censors were 
 appointed to distribute the Italians among the thirty-five 
 tribes. 
 
 2. It was at this time probably that the restrictions on 
 the largesses of corn, introduced on the outbreak of the 
 Social war, were removed. 
 
 3. The old design of Gracchus for the colonization of 
 Capua was carried out. 
 
 4. All debts were reduced to one-fourth of their nominal 
 amount. 
 
 No steps were taken to secure the support of either 
 senate or equites, or to regulate the position of the 
 Samnites, who, though nominally Roman citizens, were 
 really Rome's bitterest enemies, and whose one aim was 
 still their country's independence. The real strength of 
 the government lay in the new citizens, with whose 
 privileges its existence appeared bound up ; while many 
 of the old citizens acquiesced, because they saw that a 
 restoration of the Sullan constitution meant a fresh reign 
 of terror under the opposite party. 
 
 Most of the provinces adhered to the oligarchy. Quintus 
 Metellus and the young Marcus Crassus attempted to hold 
 Africa for the same party," but were compelled to submit 
 to the revolutionary governor. Most of the senatorial 
 refugees fled to Macedonia, which was to some extent in 
 Sulla's power. Sulla, like many of the refugees, was 
 outlawed and deprived of his command ; but the govern- 
 
TEE SELL AN CIVIL WAR. 293 
 
 rnent took no adequate steps to enforce its decrees, so that 
 Sulla was enabled to finish his work: in the East without 
 serious opposition. In 8-4 B.c he addressed a letter to the 
 senate, announcing his return to Italy. He promised to 
 respect the rights of the new burgesses, and that the 
 inevitable punishment, should fall, not on the rank and file, 
 but on the leaders of the revolution. On the arrival of 
 this letter, Cinna hastily set out for Ancora, intending to 
 cross the Adriatic , but his troops mutinied and he 
 himself was killed. His colleague, Carbo, abandoned the 
 idea of carrying war iuto Greece, and went into winter 
 quarters at Ariminum. Meanwhile the moderate party 
 had tried to bring about a compromise, but without 
 success, Sulla's envoys were not admitted into the city, 
 and he was summoned to lay down his arms. For 
 the year 83 B.c consular elections were once more held : 
 the choice fell upon Lucius Scipio and Gains Norbanns — 
 neither of them men of capacity The delay caused by 
 Sulla's crossing into Asia was utilized at Koine in making 
 energetic preparations for war, and 100,000 men are said 
 to have been under arms at Sulla's landing. 
 
 Against this force Sulla had barely forty thousand men, 
 all of them veterans, it is true, and devoted heart and soul 
 to their leader and to him alone. But still Sulla saw that 
 these numbers would be powerless against a united Italy, 
 and he took measures to gain over the strength of the 
 nation — the mass of respectable men who desired nothing 
 but peace and quiet, and the new burgesses who feared for 
 their new privileges. Accordingly he offered unconditional 
 pardon to all who would break off from the revolutionary 
 government; he made the most binding declarations to 
 maintain the privileges of the new citizens, and caused his 
 soldiers to swear singly to welcome all Italians as friends 
 and fellow-citizens. 
 
 In the spring of 83 B.C. Sulla landed at Brundisium with- 
 out opposition ; the town opened its gates to him, and all 
 Apulia followed its example. Many members of the 
 oligarchical party, like Quintus Metellus and Marcus 
 Crassus, and some deserters from the democratic ranks, 
 repaired to Sulla's camp, but brought no appreciable 
 increase to his numbers. 
 
 By far the most important accession was that of the 
 
294 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 young Gnaeus Pompeius, by whose exertions the district of 
 Piceuum was induced to declare for Sulla. Pompeius had 
 made bis peace with the revolution, but the part which 
 his father, Strabo, had played against Cinna was not 
 forgotten : an indictment, charging him to give up the 
 booty said to have been embezzled by his father at 
 Asculum, threatened his ruin, from which he was only 
 saved by the protection of Carbo As soon as Sulla 
 itiuaed in Italy, Pompeius repaired to Picenum, raised 
 the oligarchical standard at Auximum, and gathered 
 ronnd him a force of three legions, with which he 
 skilfully effected a junction with Sulla in Apulia Sulla 
 received him with great honour, and rebuked the slack- 
 ness of the rest of his partisans by greeting the young 
 commander with the title of Imperator 
 
 Thus reinforced, Sulla advanced into Campania ; the 
 army of Norbanus was at Capua, that of Scipio was 
 advancing along the Via Appia from Rome But before its 
 arrival Norbanus had been crushed, and the remnants of 
 his army were blockaded in Capua and Neapolis. Sulla 
 hurried to Teauum, where Scipio was posted, and made 
 proposals for peace; an armistice was concluded, and a 
 personal conference took place between the two generals, 
 while the soldiers of the two armies mingled as they 
 pleased. An agreement was almost concluded, and envoys 
 were sent to procure the opinion of Norbanus at Capua ; 
 but the negotiations, after all, fell through, and Scipio 
 denounced the armistice. Sulla hereupon maintained that 
 the agreement had already been actually concluded The 
 imprudence of allowing the common soldiers to fraternize 
 was now forcibly demonstrated, and Scipio's soldiers passed 
 over to Sulla in a body The consul was required to 
 resign his office, and was escorted to a place of safety. 
 Sulla and Metellns took up winter quarters in Campania, 
 and maintained the blockade of Capua. 
 
 Thus the first campaign had ended in the submission of 
 Apulia, Picennm, and Campania, and the discomfiture of 
 both consular armies. The Italian communities already 
 began to negotiate with Sulla, and had their rights secured 
 to them by separate formal treaties. Sulla boasted that 
 in the next year he would march into Rome, and overthrow 
 the revolutionary government. 
 
TEE SELL AN CIVIL WAli. 2tf5 
 
 The government made the greatest preparations for 
 the next campaign. The consuls were Carbo and the 
 younger Marius ; Sertorius was sent to raise new levies 
 in Etruria ; the gold and silver in the temples was melted 
 down ; new divisions came from Umbria and the Po. But, 
 most important of all, the most strenuous exertions were 
 made in Samnium and Lucania. It was well understood 
 that Sulla would not, like the Cinnan government, 
 acquiesce in the independence of these districts, and they 
 made ready for a renewal of their old struggle against the 
 hated Latin race. 
 
 For the campaign of 82 B.C. the army of the Optimates 
 was divided : Metellus, resting on Picenum, advanced 
 towards Upper Italy , the main body, with Sulla, marched 
 straight upon Rome. Near Signia he came upon the 
 enemy under Marius, who retired to Sacriportus and drew 
 up his line of battle. The icaue was not long doubtful, 
 and was made certain by the desertion of one of the 
 divisions of Marius. By this battle the capital was lost, 
 and Marius sent orders to the praetor Lucius Brutus 
 Damasippus to evacuate it, after putting to death all the 
 notable men of the other party. Among the victims of 
 this latest massacre were the pontifex maximus, Quintus 
 Scaevola, who had so narrowly escaped the vengeance of 
 Fimbria. Sulla left behind Quintus Ofella to blockade 
 Praeneste, into which Marius had thrown himself, and 
 pushed on to Rome, which offered no resistance ; he then 
 hurried on to Etruria. 
 
 This march of Sulla northward altered the position of 
 affairs, and three Sullan armies, from Gaul, Umbria, and 
 Rome, were now advancing upon Carbo in Etruria. On 
 the side of Gaul, Metellus sailed with the fleet to 
 Ravenna, cut off the communications of the enemy with 
 Ariminum, and sent forward a division to Placentia. 
 Pompeius and Crassus penetrated from Picenum into 
 Umbria, and shut up the lieutenant of Carbo at Spole- 
 tium, whence however he subsequently escaped to join 
 Carbo. Lastly, Sulla, advancing from Rome in two divi- 
 sions, fell in with Carbo near Clusium, but was so far 
 unsuccessful that he was unable to continue his advance. 
 
 Meanwhile the democratic party were making every 
 effort to relieve Praeneste, but without success ; help was 
 
296 HISTORY OF HOME. 
 
 sent from Sicily and from Carbo, but did not reach the 
 town. In the south, however, a large force of Samnites 
 and Lueanians, which, with reinforcements from Capua, 
 is said to have amounted to seventy thousand men, 
 could not be prevented from marching to the relief; 
 and Sulla was obliged to hurry from Etruria, and take up 
 a strong position south of Praeneste to intercept them; 
 and in this position both sides for the present remained. 
 
 In the region of the Po the Sullans had -rained great 
 successes. Marcus Lucullus, the lieutenant of Metellus, was 
 at first shut up in Placentia, while Norbanus advanced 
 upon Metellus himself. But Xorbanus was completely 
 defeated, and deserted by his Lueanian troops ; and Lu- 
 cullus was emboldened to make a sally in which he 
 defeated the troops left behind to blockade him. Arinii- 
 n um was occupied by Metellus, and the whole country 
 from the Apennines to the Alps was reduced to sub- 
 mission. 
 
 The troops of Metellus were now available for service 
 in Etruria ; but Carbo, on receiving the news, departed 
 secretly and embarked for Africa. His abandoned troops 
 either dispersed or were destroyed by the enemy ; only a 
 small remnant joined the army of Praeneste. 
 
 The democratic army of Praeneste was now in danger 
 of being caught in a net — by the arrival of Metellus it 
 might be completely surrounded. In his desperation, 
 Pontius of Telesia, the Samnite general, resolved to throw 
 himself upon Rome, which was but one day's march distant. 
 From a military point of view the step was ruinous ; even 
 if successful the democratic army must be crushed at 
 Rome, wedged in between the armies of Sulla and of 
 Metellus. But the measure was dictated, not by policy, 
 but by revenge ; it was the last outbreak of revolutionary 
 fury and of Samnite hatred. 
 
 On the 1st of November, Pontius, with the Lueanian 
 general Lamponius, and the democratic commanders 
 Damasippus and Carrinas, encamped close to the Colline 
 Gate. The force which sallied from the city was scattered 
 like chaff, and the citizens gave way to despair. But 
 before morning a body of horse appeared, which proved 
 to be Sulla's advanced guard under Balbus, and before 
 noon Sulla arrived in person. He had set out imme- 
 
TEE SULLAN CIVIL WAR. 297 
 
 diately on hearing of the departure of the Samnites, and, 
 in spite of his forced march, immediately drew up his 
 army in line, and ordered the attack. The battle lasted 
 the whole night through, and into the following morning. 
 The left wing, under Sulla, was driven back, aud the battle 
 was reported to be lost; but the right wing, under Crassus, 
 routed its opponents and pursued them to Antemnae, and 
 gradually the left wing likewise gained ground. The defec- 
 tion of a division of three thousand of the enemy decided 
 the issue, and Rome was saved. The insurgents were all 
 but extirpated. The three or four thousand prisoners 
 who were taken — including Damasippus, Carrinas, and 
 Pontius — were, on the third day after the battle, massacred 
 by Sulla's orders, in the Campus Martius. 
 
 Praeneste surrendered on the news of this disaster, and 
 the leaders put themselves to death. Of the twelve 
 thousandprisoners, alltheRoman senators, all the Simnites, 
 and most of the Praenestines were slaughtered, and the 
 town was given up to pillage. Capua was voluntarily 
 surrendered, but other towns made the most obstinate 
 resistance. Nola was not evacuated till the year 80 B.C. 
 As to S imnium, Sulla declared that the very name ought 
 to be extirpated; he invaded the country, and made it a 
 waste % as it has remained to this day. In Etruria a long 
 resistance was offered by some towns. Volaterrae stood 
 a siege of nearly three years, and the garrison was mas- 
 sacred after a free departure had been granted to it. 
 
 Of the provinces there still remained Sicily, Spain, and 
 Africa to be subdued. Gnaeus Pompeius was seut to 
 Sicily with six legions, and the island was immediately 
 evacuated by the governor Perpenna (82 B.C.). Pompeius 
 then proceeded to Africa where he defeated the forces 
 of the governor Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus,and Hiarbas 
 the usurping king of Numidia, and captured their camp. 
 Hiempsal was restored to the kingdom of Numidia, and 
 various Gaetulian tribes, hitherto independent, were made 
 subject to him. In forty days the war in Africa was at 
 an end (80 B.C.). 
 
 In Spain, Sertorius was too weak to resist the 
 Sullan officers, and, on his departure, both provinces 
 willingly submitted (81 B.C.). 
 
 At the close of the African campaign Pompeius had 
 
298 HISTORY ROME 
 
 been ordered to break up his army — a command at which 
 both general and soldiers were discontented. Pompeius 
 desired a triumph, though, as an extraordinary officer, 
 he had no legal claim to the honour. Sulla, however, 
 yielded to his wish, and Pompeius could boast of having 
 been the first Roman who had enjoyed a triumph before 
 he was a senator. It was now that Pompeius was saluted 
 by Sulla by the surname of Magnus. 
 
 In the East there had been no cessation of warfare; 
 the carrying out of Sulla's regulations had in many cases 
 to be accomplished by force ; and fresh difficulties had 
 arisen with Mithradates. The king was preparing an 
 expedition into his Bosporan kingdom , and Murena, the 
 governor of Asia, perhaps fearing lest the preparations 
 were really directed against Rome, had crossed the 
 Pontic frontier. Mithradates complained to the Roman 
 government; and Sulla had sent envoys to dissuade the 
 governor, who nevertheless continued his advance Mithra- 
 dates now resolved to repel him by force, and Murena was 
 driven over the frontier with great loss (82 B.C.). 
 
 Peace was now renewed with Mithradates ; and at last 
 the ten years of war and insurrection which had convulsed 
 the whole Roman world were at end. 
 
 AUTHORITIES. 
 
 General.— Liv. Epit. 79, 80, 82-89. Appian B. C. i. 64-96. Licin- 
 
 ianus fragg. Plut. Marius, 40-end ; Sull. 27-32 ; Sertor. 4-7 ; 
 
 Pomp. 5-8. Flor. iii. 21. Veil. ii. 18, 20, 23, 24, 28. Dio, fr. 
 
 102, 106-109. Eutrop. v. 4-9. Cic. Philipp. viii. 2. 
 Cinna's proposed laws. — Appian B. C. i. 63, 64. Dio. fr. 102-108. 
 
 Veil. ii. 20. 
 Civitas conferred on dediticii. — Liv. Epit. 80. Cic. Phil. xii. 11, 27. 
 
 Licinianns, p. 15. 
 Colonization of Capua. — Cic. de Leg. Agr. ii. 33, sqq 
 Reduction of debts. — Veil. ii. 23. 
 Bulla' 8 promise to maintain rights of Italians. — Liv. Epit. 86. 
 
CHAPTER XXVI. 
 
 THE SULLAN CONSTITUTION. 
 
 Solla's office — Measures of punishment and reward — Constitutional 
 changes — The senate — The comitia — The magistrates — Reform 
 of criminal jurisdiction — Reform of the municipal system — 
 Sulla's retirement — His character and career — His work — His 
 death. 
 
 The problem which lay beyond Sulla after his victories 
 was vast beyond conception — it was the reconstruction of 
 a whole state in ruins. " About the time," says Mommsen, 
 " when the first pitched battle was fought between Romans 
 and Romans, in the night of the 6th July, 83 B.C., the 
 venerable temple which had been erected by the kings, 
 dedicated by the youthful republic, and spared by the 
 storms of five hundred years, — the temple of the Roman 
 Jupiter in the Capitol, — perished in the flames. It was no 
 augury ; but it was an image of the state of the Roman 
 Constitution That, too, lay in ruins, and needed reconstruc- 
 tion." The mass of the aristocratic party had no idea of 
 the magnitude of the task. They imagined that now, when 
 the revolution had been suppressed, it would be enough to 
 return to the old lines, taking precautions against similar 
 outbreaks in future. Hence it was that Sulla chose his 
 instruments, with the exception of Quintus Metellus, from 
 the moderate party, or from the deserters from the demo- 
 cratic camp — Lucius Flaccus, Lucius Philippus, Quintus 
 Ofella, Gnaeus Pompeius. Sulla was quite in earnest 
 about restoring the old constitution ; bnt he alone saw the 
 enormous difficulties of restoration. He saw clearly that 
 comprehensive concession and energetic repression were 
 
300 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 alike necessary. He also saw that the senate would 
 mutilate every measure of either kind, and that it was 
 necessary to accomplish the work by his own hand, with- 
 out check or hindrance. At the same time, even Sulla 
 was far from grasping the whole truth about the condition 
 of the empire ; otherwise he must have given up the work 
 in despair. In fact, the constitution was past reconstruc- 
 tion ; the ancient polity had broken down irretrievably; 
 economic causes had corrupted or destroyed every class in 
 the state — aristocracy, middle class, and lower class ; and 
 where no class in the state remained sound, absolute rule 
 by the authority and intelligence of a single man alone 
 remained possible. But not for another generation was 
 this truth to be brought home in all its remorseless 
 fatality. 
 
 The authority with which Sulla was at present provided 
 was the purely military proconsulship. It was necessary 
 that he should be endowed with an office which should 
 preserve as far as possible constitutional forms, and yet be 
 powerful enough to coerce both friends and foes. Sulla 
 accordingly requested the senate to place the regulation of 
 the state in the hands of a single man with unlimited 
 powers, and intimated that he considered himself qualified 
 for the task. The senate directed the interrex Lucius Vale- 
 rius Flaccus to propose a law to the people, conferring upon 
 Sulla the " dictatorship for the making of laws and the 
 regulation of the commonwealth," and approving, retrospec- 
 tively, of all his acts as consul or proconsul. His office 
 was unlimited in point of time, and included absolute 
 power to dispose of the lives and property of the citizens 
 and of the state lands. He might alter the boundaries of 
 the city, of Italy, or of the empire; dissolve or establish 
 communities in Italy ; regulate the provinces and depen- 
 dencies ; confer the imperium on whom he pleased, and 
 nominate proconsuls and propraetors. Lastly, he might 
 regulate the state by new laws. This new office took its 
 name from the old dictatorship, obsolete since the Hanni- 
 balian war. The boundlessness of its power recalled the 
 old decemviri legibus scribundis ; but in reality it was 
 nothing but the monarchy. " The protector of the oli- 
 garchic constitution had himself to come forward as a 
 tyrant, in order to avert the ever-imper.ding tyrannies. 
 
THE SULLAN CONSTITUTION. 301 
 
 There was no little of defeat in this last victory of the 
 oligarchy." 
 
 The work of punishment was first taken in hand. Sulla 
 was not of a vindictive temperament ; — even after his 
 landing in Italy he had shown himself ready to forget and 
 forgive, — but the democrats had used their last moments of 
 power to set on foot fresh massacres, and henceforth Sulla 
 showed no mercy. He immediately outlawed all civil and 
 military officers who had taken part in favour of the revo- 
 lution after the convention with Scipio, and any other 
 citizens who had actively aided the cause. A reward of 
 twelve thousand denarii (£488) was offered to the 
 murderer of any of these outlaws ; sheltering them was 
 forbidden under the severest penalties ; their property was 
 forfeited to the state, their children and grandchildren 
 excluded from a political career; and this confiscation was 
 also extended to the property of those who had fallen 
 during the war. Sulla caused a list of the proscribed to 
 be posted up, and fixed the 1st of Jnne, 81 B.C., as the day 
 for closing it. It was said at last to have amounted to 
 4700 names. 
 
 The fury of the persecution fell primarily upon the 
 Marians. The tomb of Marius himself was broken open, 
 and his ashes scattered. His nephew was executed with 
 torments at the tomb of Catulus. Of the leaders of the first 
 rank few remained ; but other classes suffered severely. 
 Sixteen hundred equites who had speculated in the 
 Marian confiscations were upon the list, and the profes- 
 sional accusers were largely represented. The heads 
 of the slain were publicly piled at the junction of the Vicus 
 Jugarius with the Forum. Bands of soldiers ravaged all 
 Italy to earn the rewards of murder, and many, even of 
 the oligarchy, fell victims to private revenge. 
 
 In the disposal of the confiscated property the greatest 
 abuses prevailed. Sulla himself, and his immediate 
 dependents and connections, bought largely, and bad the 
 purchase-money wholly or partially remitted. If there 
 was any difference between the Marian and the Sullan 
 reign of terror, it was that Marius murdered to satisfy his 
 personal vengeance, while Sulla showed no personal 
 feeling, but regarded the work almost as a political 
 necessity. 
 
802 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 With regard to the new citizens, the general rule was 
 laid down that every citizen of an Italian community was 
 ipso facto a citizen of Rome ; all distinctions between 
 citizens and allies — between citizens old and new — were 
 abolished. Bat the freedmenwere restricted, as before, to 
 their old four tribes. There were, however, exceptions to 
 the general rule ; particular communities were punished, 
 or, less frequently, rewarded. For instance, Brundisium 
 obtained exemption from customs ; but, of the guilty com- 
 munities, many had to pay fines, to raze their walls, or to 
 forfeit a part or the whole of their lands. Praeneste and 
 Spoletium,Florentia, Faesulae, Arretium,Volaterrae,all fell 
 under the last penalty. The dispossessed burgesses were 
 placed in the position of Latins of the lowest class, with 
 the additional hardship that they were attached to no 
 particular community, but were without either home or 
 city. 
 
 The lands thus confiscated were mainly utilized in 
 settling the soldiers of the victorious army, mostly in 
 Etruria, Latium, and Campania ; and in many cases, as 
 in the Gracchan colonies, the settlers were attached to 
 existing communities. The number of allotments is stated 
 at 120,000. This arrangement was made by Sulla with 
 varied objects. Firstly, he redeemed the pledge given to 
 his soldiers ; secondly, he carried out the idea of the 
 moderate conservative party of strengthening the class of 
 small proprietors in Italy — an idea which he had attempted 
 to realize in 88 B.C. To accomplish this object the settlers 
 were forbidden to sell their allotments Lastly, and this 
 was no doubt the strongest reason, the new colonists 
 formed standing garrisons, as it were, for the support of 
 the restored constitution ; and for this reason, where they 
 were attached to an old community, as at Pompeii, the new 
 citizens were not amalgamated with the old, but formed 
 a separate body within the same enclosing wall. Very 
 similar in its aim was the object of another act of Sulla's 
 — the manumission of a body of ten thousand of the 
 slaves of the proscribed, who formed a body-guard in 
 support of the oligarchy, and a garrison for the capital. 
 
 Sulla now destroyed at one blow the constitution so 
 carefully built up by Gaius Gracchus, and restored in all 
 its plenitude the rule of the senate. Gracchus had bribed 
 
TEE SULLAN CONSTITUTION. 303 
 
 the mob of the capital into quiescence by introducing 
 free distributions of corn ; these were now completely 
 abolished. Gracchus had organized the order of equesv 
 trians, and tried to give them a definite place in the con- 
 stitution by introducing the system of farming the taxes 
 of the provinces, by entrusting to them the functions of 
 jurymen, and by assigning them a special place in the 
 theatre at popular festivals. Sulla abolished the farming 
 system, and converted the former taxes into fixed tributes ; 
 the jurymen were now taken from the senatorial order 
 alone , and the equites were deprived of their seats of 
 honour in the theatre, and relegated to the ordinary 
 benches. The senate was henceforth to be the only 
 privileged order. 
 
 In order to fill up the fearfully reduced numbers of the 
 senate, probably also with the intention of permanently 
 increasing the number of its members, three hundred new 
 senators were nominated by the tribes from men of 
 equestrian census — chiefly from the younger men of the 
 senatorial houses, and from Sullan officers whom the late 
 events had brought into prominence. At the same time, 
 the mode of admission to the senate was changed. 
 Hitherto, men had entered the senate either by summons 
 from the censors, or by holding one of the curule magis- 
 tracies — the consulship, the praetorship, or the aedileship : 
 the tribunate and quaestorship gave no right to a seat, but 
 the choice of the censors was generally directed towards 
 men who had held these offices. The censorial functions 
 of appointing to the senate and of deleting from its roll 
 were now set aside ; the senatorial seat was taken from 
 the aediles and given to the quaestors, who were now 
 raised from eight to twenty in number. Several im- 
 portant results followed from these regulations. In the 
 first place, the abolition of the censorial deletion made the 
 senator irremovable. Secondly, the number of members 
 was considerably increased : hitherto the average number 
 had probably been something below three hundred ; in 
 Cicero's time a full meeting consisted of 417 members. 
 Thirdly, as both the new extraordinarily nominated senators 
 and the augmented body of quaestors were nominated by 
 the comitia tributa, the senate was now thoroughly based 
 on popular election. 
 
304 HISTORY OF HOME. 
 
 The comitia tributa remained, as before, formally 
 sovereign ; but the initiative of the senate in all legislation 
 was solemnly enacted. This was sufficient to exclude the 
 people from interference in administration, or in criminal 
 jurisdiction, and the voice of the people was confined 
 practically to giving assent to alterations in the consti- 
 tution. 
 
 The right of the people to elect magistrates in the 
 comitia centuriata was not interfered with by Sulla, nor 
 did he even attempt, as in 88 B.C., to restore the old Servian 
 voting arrangements ; but the election to the priestly 
 offices was entirely taken from the tribes, and the right of 
 co-optation restored to the sacerdotal colleges. At the same 
 time, various restrictions were imposed or confirmed afresh 
 with regard to the qualifications for office. The limit of 
 age for holding each office was strictly enforced ; and the 
 first step in the gradation of offices was in future to be the 
 quaestorship instead of the aedileship, so that the quaestor- 
 ship was now the necessary step to the praetorship, and 
 the praetorship to the consulship. Two years at least must 
 elapse between the holding of any office and of the next 
 above it ; while a ten-years interval was required before 
 re-election to the same office. 
 
 The senate was originally, and was still in theory, a 
 council, from which the magistrates might seek advice ; 
 but it had gradually acquired the right, not merely of 
 advising, but of controlling the magistrates. It was Sulla's 
 aim to consolidate this power, and, accordingly, all magis- 
 tracies emerged from his hands with diminished rights. 
 
 The heaviest blow fell upon the tribunate, an office 
 naturally most independent of the senate. The original 
 right of the tribunes to veto the official acts of magistrates, 
 and the further right to fine and punish all who disregarded 
 their veto, were still left to them ; but the abuse of the 
 right of intercessio was punished by a heavy fine. At 
 the same time the power and influence of these magistrates 
 were heavily fettered by two ordinances, which forbade 
 them to consult the people or submit laws to them without 
 permission from the senate ; and made the holding of the 
 tribunate a bar to the holding of any curule magistracy. 
 
 The power of the consuls and praetors was restricted by 
 the complete separation of their civil and military functions, 
 
THE SULLAN CONSTITUTION. 305 
 
 — an arrangement for which the practice of recent times 
 had formed a precedent. Hitberto there had devolved 
 upon the two chief magistrates, besides the proper consular 
 functions, all official duties for which no special magistrates 
 were appointed. The administration of justice in the 
 capital, aud the government of the four transmarine pro- 
 vinces, Sicily, Sardinia, and the two Spains, was provided 
 for by the six praetorships, and with these functions the 
 consuls had nothing to do. There remained the non- 
 judicial business of the capital, and the military command 
 in the continent of Italy. At times, when these eight 
 magistrates did not suffice, and when there were extra- 
 ordinary commands to be provided for, there were two 
 usual expedients : a particular military command was 
 prolonged after its term had expired, or non-military 
 functions were combined ; as, for instance — the two 
 judicial departments at Rome might be managed by one 
 praetor instead of two, or the duties of the consul in the 
 capital might be performed by the praetor urbanus, and 
 so one magistrate set at liberty for extraordinary duties. 
 But in such cases the senate merely defined the sphere 
 and function of the extraordinary office ; the particular 
 person who was to fill it was left to the magistrates them- 
 selves to decide by agreement or by lot. 
 
 Within the last century six new official departments had 
 been created, — the governorships of the five new provinces 
 Macedonia, Africa, Asia, Narbo, Cilicia, and the pre- 
 sidency of the quaestio de repetundis of Calpurnius ; and 
 yet the number of magistrates had not been increased. 
 The senate preferred to fill up vacancies by prolonging 
 the term of office ; for this prolongation might be granted 
 or refused, and thus the senate kept a hold over the 
 magistrates. Usually those magistrates who during their 
 year of office were confined to the city were appointed for 
 a second year to a transmarine command. 
 
 This expedient of prolongation was seized upon by Sulla 
 as the basis for a complete separation between the political 
 authority of the magistrate over Roman citizens and his 
 military authority over non-citizens. The consulship and 
 praetorship were in future uniformly extended for a second 
 year ; the first year was devoted to civil, the second to 
 military functions. Moreover, as the Roman citizen body 
 
 20 
 
306 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 now embraced all Italy south of the Rubicon, the military 
 jurisdiction of the magistrate did not extend south of that 
 river, and it was a fundamental principle of the constitution 
 that there should ordinarily be no troops and no command- 
 ant within that district. 
 
 The praetors were now increased from six to eight ; 
 and according to the new arrangement the ten chief 
 magistrates devoted themselves in the first year of their 
 office to the business of the capital ; the two consuls to 
 government and administration; two praetors to the admin- 
 istration of civil law — the other six to the administration 
 of the newly organized criminal justice. During the second 
 year, they were invested with the command of the ten chief 
 governorships, Italian Gaul having been added to the list 
 of provinces. 
 
 The effect of these regulations was very largely to 
 increase the power of the senate over the magistrates. In 
 the first place, all offices, whether at home or abroad, were 
 for the future strictly limited to one year , whereas in 
 former times the same man had held the same office for two 
 or even more years. Secondly, by the arrangement as to 
 military commands, no one could in future be, as Marius 
 had been, both commander-in-chief and supreme civil 
 magistrate. Thirdly, the whole military power became, 
 formally at least, dependent on the senate ; the people 
 chose the consuls and praetors, but it was the senate that 
 conferred on them the military authority by prolonging 
 their term of office for a second year as proconsuls or 
 propraetors. 
 
 The censorship was not formally abolished, but its chief 
 functions were taken from it. The new arrangement as 
 to the quaestorship provided for the filling up of the senate, 
 and the register for purposes of taxation and military 
 service was unnecessary now that Italy was tax free, 
 and the army was raised by enlistment ; there remained 
 only the financial functions, which were in future to be 
 performed by the consuls. 
 
 The finances of the state were largely affected by three 
 of Sulla's acts : the first, the con version of the Asiatic taxes 
 into a fixed tribute, certainly produced no gain to the state, 
 though the tax-payers were greatly benefited : but the 
 resumption of the Campanian domain lands to the state, 
 
THE SULLAN CONSTITUTION. 307 
 
 and the abolition of the corn largesses, secured an ample 
 revenue for the future. 
 
 But the most important and enduring part of Sulla's 
 work was the reform of the criminal law. 
 
 As Sulla found it the judicial system was threefold. The 
 whole citizen body formed a court of appeal from sentences 
 of the magistrate affecting the caput of a citizen. Then 
 there was the ordinary procedure for all cases civil or 
 criminal, except crimes directed against the state. In 
 these cases, one of the two praetors investigated the general 
 character of the case, and determined the law under which 
 it was to be tried ; he then nominated a single judex, who 
 decided the case on the lines laid down by the praetor. 
 Thirdly, there was the extraordinary procedure applicable 
 to particular cases or groups of cases of importance, 
 whether civil or criminal. For such cases, not a single 
 judex, but a special body of judices was appointed by a 
 special law. Such were the special tribunals appointed in 
 110 B.C. for the investigation of the alleged treason in 
 connection with Numidian affairs, and in 103 B.C. with 
 regard to the treason of the Roman generals in Gaul, in 105 
 B.C. Such also were the standing commissions for the 
 investigation of special crimes, the earliest of which was 
 the quaestio Calpurnia de repetundis of 149 B.C., and the 
 court of the centumviri, or spear-court (hasta), (so called 
 from the shaft of a spear used as a symbol in processes 
 affecting property, and really consisting of 105 men — three 
 being elected by each of the thirty-five tribes) , for dealing 
 with cases with regard to inheritances. Special provision 
 was made for the presidency of each of these courts, in the 
 law constituting them, — to some a praetor was assigned, to 
 others an ex-aedile or ex-quaestor. 
 
 The reforms introduced by Sulla were also threefold. 
 First, he largely increased the number of standing com- 
 missions or jury-courts. Henceforth there were at least 
 eight of these quaestiones, called respectively, quaestio de 
 repetundis (exaction), de majestate (treason), de vi et 
 injuriis (injuries to person or honour), inter sicarios 
 (murder), de ambitu (bribery at elections), de falsis 
 (fraud), de peculatu (embezzlement), de adulteriis 
 (adultery). By these reforms the judicial power, both of 
 the citizen body and of the ordinary courts, was curtailed, 
 
308 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 since the crime of majestas was withdrawn from the 
 jurisdiction of the former, and many of the most serious 
 crimes from that of the latter. 
 
 Secondly, the presidents of these new courts were six 
 of the praetors and other specially appointed officers. The 
 power to appoint special commissions for special cases of 
 course still remained. 
 
 Thirdly, the jurymen (judices) were in future drawn, 
 not from the equites, but from the senate. The constitu- 
 tion of the spear-court remained unchanged. 
 
 The political aim of these measures was, of course, to 
 exclude the equites from any share in the government ; 
 but they also constituted a most valuable system of legal 
 reform. From this time dates the distinction, hitherto 
 unknown, between civil and criminal causes ; the former 
 were now such as came before a single judex, the latter 
 such as came before a jury. Moreover, Sulla's legislation 
 may be regarded as forming the first Roman code since 
 the Twelve Tables, and the first criminal code which had 
 ever been issued at all. Among other noteworthy results 
 of Sulla's arrangements were these : that capital punish- 
 ment fell into abeyance ; for the whole body of citizens 
 could alone pronounce sentence of death, and the cogni- 
 zance of cases of high treason was now withdrawn from 
 it, and given to a special commission, which could sentence 
 neither to death nor imprisonment : and that the appoint- 
 ment of special commissions for particular cases of high 
 treason, such as the quaestio Varia during the social war, 
 was minimized, now that there was a special court for 
 trying the offence. 
 
 It may be added that new sumptuary laws were enacted, 
 to restrain luxury at funerals and banquets, so that the 
 law now attempted to perform what had formerly been 
 the functions of the censors. 
 
 To the Sullan period, though perhaps not to Sulla, 
 belongs an important development of the municipal system 
 of Italy. Hitherto the government of Italy had been 
 completely centralized in Rome ; but from this period 
 dates a great advance in the direction of local self-govern- 
 ment by each particular community. "Antiquity was 
 certainly as little able to dovetail the city into the state 
 as to develop of itself representative government and 
 
THE SULLAN CONSTITUTION. 309 
 
 other great principles of our modern state life ; but it 
 carried its political development up to those limits at 
 which it outgrows and bursts its assigned dimensions, and 
 this was the case especially with Rome, which in every 
 respect stands on the line of separation between the old 
 and the new intellectual worlds." The social war was 
 a sufficiently striking proof that the old Roman polity 
 was outgrown, and the subsequent arrangements were a 
 great stride in the advance from the city-state to the 
 nation. 
 
 Before the social war the dependent communities 
 were either allowed to keep their municipal constitution 
 by being formally declared sovereign independent states 
 of non-citizens, or, if they obtained the franchise, they 
 were deprived of all local municipal rights, so that even the 
 administration of justice and the charge of building 
 devolved upon the Roman praetors and censors. The 
 utmost concession ever made was that the most urgent law 
 cases might be settled on the spot by a deputy nominated 
 from Rome. After the social war, when all Italy became 
 one civic community by the extension of the franchise, it 
 was necessary to form smaller communities within the 
 larger , it was impossible that the local affairs of all Italy 
 should be settled by the magistrates of the city of Rome. 
 These new communities were formed very much on the 
 model of Rome; there were the same institutions but 
 with different names, and names such as implied In- 
 feriority to the institutions of the capital. There was 
 a citizen-assembly, which passed laws and chose the local 
 magistrates, and a council of one hundred members repre- 
 senting the Roman senate. The duumviri corresponded 
 to the Roman consuls ; two quaestors managed the local 
 funds, and there were the local colleges of pontifices and 
 augurs. 
 
 The imperial authority of Rome, however, existed side 
 by side with the municipal constitution. Taxation might 
 be imposed or public buildings set on foot by the Roman 
 authorities as well as by those of the town ; and in event 
 of collision the town, of course, gave way. It is probable 
 that in judicial matters a formal division of functions was 
 made to avoid the extreme inconvenience of a collision of 
 authority. The more important cases, both civil and 
 
310 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 criminal, would probably be reserved for the Roman 
 authorities, while minor suits, or such as were most 
 urgent, were decided on the spot. 
 
 Such was the constitution which Sulla now presented 
 to the Roman state. He had used the power which he had 
 gained by the sword to introduce really valuable reforms, 
 and to compel all classes in the state, and especially the 
 soldiery, to submit once more to civil authority. The 
 mass of the community, if they did not welcome the 
 Sullan arrangements, at any rate acquiesced in them 
 without open opposition. But not so the military officers. 
 The two most trusted lieutenants of Sulla, Gnaeus Pom- 
 peius and Quintus Ofella, were the first to rebel. The 
 former had resisted the command of the senate to disband 
 his army, and had only been conciliated by the concession 
 of the honour of a triumph. The latter, in defiance of 
 the new ordinance, became a candidate for the consul- 
 ship without passing through the inferior magistracies. 
 In his case no lenience was shown. Sulla had him cut 
 down in the Forum, and then explained to the assembled 
 citizens his reasons for the act. 
 
 On the completion of his work, Sulla abdicated the 
 extraordinary office conferred on him by the Valerian 
 law. Although endowed with absolute power, he had, in 
 the case of many of his enactments, consulted the people 
 or the senate. Consuls had been elected for 81 B.C. ; and 
 for the next year Sulla himself was consul with Quintus 
 Metellus, retaining the regency but without exercising it 
 for the time. For 79 B.C. the elections were left entirely 
 free, and early in that year he resigned the regency, 
 dismissed his lictors, and invited any citizen who wished 
 to call him to account to speak. 
 
 The family to which Sulla belonged had remained for 
 many generations in comparative obscurity, and his 
 character at first gave no promise of an extraordinary 
 career. Personally he was blue-eyed and of a fair com- 
 plexion, with piercing eyes. His tastes made him incline 
 to a life of cultivated luxury, sometimes descending to 
 debauchery. He was a pleasant companion in city or in 
 camp, and even in the days of the regency would unbend 
 after the business of the day. One of the most curious 
 traits in his character was a vein of cynicism, which 
 
THE SULLAN CONSTITUTION. 311 
 
 showed itself in the playful but dangerous irony of many 
 of his acts. Thus he ordered a donation from the spoil of 
 the proscribed to be given to a wretched author, who had 
 written a panegyric upon him, upon condition of never 
 singing his praises again. When he seized the treasures 
 of the Greek temples he declared that the man could never 
 fail whose chest was replenished by the gods themselves. 
 He displayed great vigour both of body and mind ; even 
 in his last years he was devoted to the chase, and, after 
 the conquest of Athens, he could remember to bring with 
 him the writings of Aristotle to Borne. In religion he 
 followed the general tendency of the age towards unbelief 
 and superstition. He nattered himself that he was the 
 chosen favourite of the gods, and believed that he held 
 intercourse with them in dreams and omens. When at 
 the summit of his power, he formally adopted the surname 
 of Felix, and used it from that time forward. 
 
 Sulla's brilliant career seemed to come to him rather by 
 caprice of fortune than by any seeking of his. He passed, 
 like the ordinary aristocrat, through the usual routine of 
 office ; and in 107 B.C. the quaestorship under Marius in 
 Africa fell to his lot. He soon made himself master of 
 the military art, and, after the close of the Jugurthine 
 war, performed the task of organizing supplies for the 
 Roman army in the war with the Cimbri. During his 
 praetorship, in 93 B.C., the first Roman victory over Mithra- 
 dates and the first treaty with the Parthians took place. 
 He took a prominent part in the social war, and, as 
 consul, suppressed the Sulpician revolution with startling 
 energy Wherever Sulla and Marius had come into 
 competition the result had always been loss of renown 
 to the elder general, and increase of reputation to the 
 younger; and the revolution of 88 B.C., which ended in 
 the outlawry and flight of Marius, gave to Sulla the most 
 important position within the empire. Then came the 
 Mithradatic war and the Cinnan revolution, — and it was 
 Sulla who crushed the enemies of Rome abroad, and put 
 down anarchy at home. Now absolute autocrat of the 
 state, he abolished the Gracchan constitution which had 
 fettered the oligarchy for forty years, and compelled all 
 orders and classes to yield a common obedience to the 
 law; he established the oligarchy with all the stability 
 
312 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 tliat laws and constitution can give, and provided it 
 with a body-guard and an army. He was one of the few 
 generals who never lo.st a battle, nor in his political career 
 was he ever compelled to retrace a single step " The 
 capricious goddess of fortune seemed in his case to have 
 exchanged caprice for steadfastness, and to have taken 
 a pleasure in loading her favourite with successes and 
 honours whether he desired them or not. 
 
 There is nothing original in the character of Sulla's con- 
 stitution ; and the reason is to be found in the very nature 
 of his work. His task was to restore, not to create : the 
 germ at least of every one of his institutions existed 
 before ; they had grown up out of the previous regime, 
 and were merely regulated and fixed by Sulla. Even the 
 horrors attaching to his work are but a larger edition of 
 the doings of Nasica, Opimius, Caepio, — the traditional 
 oligarchic mode of getting rid of opponents. Sulla was 
 but the instrument of the oligarchy to which he belonged, 
 and for the Sullan restoration, not Sulla alone, but the 
 body of the Roman aristocracy and its government in 
 the past must be held responsible. When the work was 
 done, Sulla readily gave back the power which had been 
 conferred upon him ; and if his motive was rather ennui 
 than public spirit, he at any rate must be acquitted of 
 the charge of political self-seeking His constitution 
 could not last, because of the worthlessness of the aris- 
 tocracy. Sulla might " erect a fortress," but could not 
 " create a garrison." The gratitude of posterity is due to 
 the man who, in the course of his hopeless task, carried 
 out such admirable isolated reforms as those of the 
 Asiatic revenue system and of criminal justice. 
 
 Sulla's worst fault was the unscrupulous and cynical 
 violence with which his work is defiled. The public posting 
 of the lists of the proseribed ; the exposure of heads in the 
 public streets ; the public auction of confiscated goods, as 
 though of the spoils of an enemy ; the cutting down of a 
 refractory officer in the Forum, — these things surpassed 
 all that previous revolutions had known. Uncertainty 
 and frivolity marked many of his public acts. He could 
 be culpably lenient or brutally severe, as his personal likes 
 or dislikes prompted ; the worst enormities which were 
 perpetrated in his name were permitted through indiffer- 
 
THE SULLAN CONSTITUTION. 313 
 
 ence and carelessness ; he punished with the same non- 
 chalance with which he pardoned. 
 
 The short remainder of his life was passed in the strictest 
 retirement ; in a little more than a year he died, at the age 
 of sixty, in full vigour of body and mind. Immediately 
 after his death, voices were raised in opposition to the pro- 
 posal of a public burial ; but his memory was still too 
 fresh, and he was honoured with, perhaps, the grandest 
 funeral procession Italy had ever seen. 
 
 AUTHORITIES. 
 
 Sulla's character and life. — Plutarch. 
 
 Dictatorship.— Appian B. C. i. 98, 99. Plut. 33. Liv. Epit. 89. Veil. 
 
 ii. 28. Cic. De L. Agr. iii. 2. 
 Proscriptions— Appian B. C. 95, 96, 103. Plut. 31. Val. Max. ix. 2. 
 
 1. Liv. 88, 89. Flor. ii. 9. Veil. ii. 28, 29 ; Cic. pro Rose. Am. 
 
 43, 44. 
 New citizens. — Liv. 86. Cic. pro Dom. 30 ; pro Caecina, 33, 35. Sail. 
 
 frag. i. Or. Lep. 
 Allotments.— Liv. 89. Appian B. C. i. 100, 104. Cic. de L. Agr. i. 8; 
 
 ii. 28, 29 j iii. 2, 3 ; pro Dom. 30. 
 Lex frumentaria. — Sail. Hist. frag. i. Or. Lep. 
 Equites — seats in the theatre; probable because restored by Lex 
 
 Roscia, 67 B.C. 
 Farming system abolished. — Cic. pro Flacc. 14, 32 ; in Verr. i. 35, 89 ; 
 
 ad Q. F. i. 1, 11, 23. Momm. H. of R. iv. c. 5, note. Marq. 
 
 Stv. i. p. 338 and note. 
 Judicia.— Veil. ii. 32. Tac. Ann. xi. 22. 
 Senate increased. — Appian B. C. i. 100. Liv. 89. 
 Comitia Tributa. — Cic. pro Clu. 40. 
 Priestly colleges. — Dio. xxxvii. 37. 
 
 Lex Annalis. — Appian B. C. i. 100, 101. Cic. Phil. xi. 5. 
 Tribunate.— Caes. B. C. i. 7. Appian B. C. i. 100. Liv. 89. Veil. ii. 
 
 30. Cic. de Leg. iii. 4, 9, 19 ; pro. Clu. 40 ; in Verr. i. 60. 
 
 Ascon. in Cor. p. 78. Sail. Hist. fr. i. Or. Lep. Tac. Ann. iii. 27. 
 
 Mom. H. of R. iv. c. 10, note. 
 Provincial governorships. — Cic. ad Fam. i. 9 (Watson, 29) ; iii.6, 8 ; ad. 
 
 Att. vi. 3. 
 Quaestors.— Tac. Ann. xi. 22. Lex. Corn. C. I. L. 1168, n. 202. 
 
 Bruns, pt. i. c. i. 12. 
 Extension of bounds of Italy. — Seneca de Brev. Vit. 14. Dio. xliii, 
 
 50. Momm. H. of R. iv. c. 10, note. 
 Praetors. — Pomponius Dig. i. 2, 32. Suet. Jul. 41. Dio. xlii. 51. 
 Cisalpine Gaul. — Momm. iv. c. 10, note. 
 Censorship. — Schol. ad Cic. Div. in Caec. 3 (Gronov.). 
 
314 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 Criminal law. — Cic. in Verr. Act. i. 13, 16. Lex. Cor. Bruns, pt. i. c. 
 
 iii. 13. 
 Centumviri. — Festus, s.v. Centum viralia. 
 Sumptuary laws. — Gell. ii. 24. Plut. 35. Cic. ad Att. xii. 35, 36. 
 
 Macr. bk. ii. 
 Municipal system. — Cic. De L. Agr. ii. 31; in Pis. c. 23; pro Sest. 
 
 14; Philipp. xiii. 8. Tac. Hist. iii. 34. Caes. B. C. iii. 22. 
 
 Momms. B. St. iii. 797, 815. 
 
CHAPTER XXVII. 
 
 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CONDITION OF THE EMPIRE DURING 
 THE REVOLUTION PERIOD. 
 
 Revenue : from Italy ; from the provinces. — Expenditure : for mili- 
 tary purposes ; for public works. — Agriculture — Trade and 
 commerce — Social life. 
 
 The general tendency and result of the revolution period 
 are evident from the history of the time and from the 
 legislation of Sulla. The financial condition of the empire 
 is worth more particular attention, and will furnish valu- 
 able evidence on many points with regard to the social and 
 political relations of the time. 
 Revenue. 
 
 I. From Italy. The land-tax, with other minor imposts 
 upon Italians, had for some time been in abeyance ; 
 so that from Italy, including Cisalpine Gaul, the Roman 
 exchequer drew nothing but (1) the produce of the state- 
 lands, chiefly those in Campania, and of the gold mines in 
 the north ; (2) customs dues on goods imported for 
 trading purposes ; (3) taxes levied on the manumission 
 of slaves. 
 
 II. From the provinces. 
 
 (i.) State lands. These were either the lands belonging 
 to cities destroyed by martial law, such as Leontini, 
 Carthage, Corinth ; or domain lands which had belonged 
 to former rulers dispossessed by the Romans, such as the 
 lands of the kings of Macedonia, Pergamus, Cyrene, and 
 the mines in Spain. All such property was leased, like 
 the state lands in Italy, by the state to tenants, and the 
 rents formed a large part of the public revenue. 
 
316 UI6T0RY OF ROME. 
 
 • 
 
 (ii.) Taxation. Within the bounds of the empire there 
 were some states, like the kingdoms of Numidia and 
 Cappadocia, which were recognized as fully sovereign and 
 independent ; there were others, like Rhodes, Massilia, 
 Gades, which enjoyed a free and equal alliance by special 
 treaty with Rome, (civitates foederatae). Both classes 
 were exempt from ordinary taxation, and were merely 
 bound to supply ships and men at their own expense in 
 time of war. Besides these there were a few scattered 
 cities, like Narbo, on which the Roman franchise had been 
 specially conferred ; and others such as Centuripa in 
 Sicily (civitates immunes), which were specially exempted 
 from taxation ; but with these four exceptions the whole 
 extent of the empire contributed to the Roman exchequer. 
 
 The taxes fall under three principal heads : — 
 
 1. Decumae and scriptura. The first was a tenth of the 
 produce of arable land; the second, a corresponding tax 
 upon pasture land. Of these kinds were the taxes levied 
 in the fertile islands of Sicily and Sardinia. 
 
 2. Stipendium, or tributum — i.e. a fixed sura paid 
 annually by a community to the Roman exchequer ; 
 amounting, for Macedonia, to about £24,000 of our 
 money ; for Gyaros, a small island near Andros, to about 
 £6 4s. This tax was usually lower than that paid by the 
 community to its former rulers before the Roman con- 
 quest : the amount was fixed by the Roman authorities, 
 while the magistrates of each community were responsible 
 for collecting and paying over the amount to the Roman 
 treasury. 
 
 3. Customs. The Romans recognized the right of each 
 community to levy its own customs at its own ports and 
 frontiers, and made no attempt to set up a general tariff 
 for the whole empire. Dues were levied by the Romans 
 themselves at all the ports of Italy ; most of the subject 
 communities in the same way levied dues on their own 
 frontiers, which would have to be paid even by Roman 
 citizens, unless special exemption was secured by treaty. 
 Bnt in the provinces proper, like Sicily and Asia, where 
 the Roman state was sole ruler and sovereign, the 
 customs, of course, went into the imperial coffers. The 
 amount raised was five per cent, on all imports or 
 exports in Sicily, and two and a half in Asia. The 
 
CONDITION OF THE EMPIRE. 317 
 
 customs, like the decumae and scriptura, were invariably 
 leased to tax-farmers. 
 
 These, with the unimportant item of tolls from roads, 
 bridges, canals, etc., were the only regular taxes imposed 
 upon the provincials by the Roman government. But 
 they are far from representing the full amount of the 
 burdens borne by the provinces. 
 
 In the first place, the expenses of collection were large ; 
 so that the amount paid by the contributors was much 
 greater than that received by the government. Collection 
 hj middlemen is well known to be the most expensive 
 system of all ; and at Rome the lettings were so large that 
 only a few capitalists could undertake them, and con- 
 sequently the competition was small, and the profits of 
 the lessees large. 
 
 Secondly r there were the military requisitions in time 
 of war , frequently, also, in time of peace. Legally, all 
 transport pay and provisions for the soldiers were provided 
 by the Roman government; the provincial communities had 
 only to furnish housing, wood, hay, and such things. But 
 in time of war the governor demanded from them grain, 
 ships, money, or anything he required ; and though such 
 requisitions were considered as advances to be made good 
 by the government, yet practically they became a serious 
 burden. This is proved by frequent laws restricting 
 requisitions, fixing their maximum amount and the rate of 
 compensation. At extraordinary times of course requisi- 
 tions assumed the form of a punishment, as when Sulla com- 
 pelled the subjects of Asia to give forty-fold pay to every 
 common soldier among them, and seventy-five fold to every 
 centurion. 
 
 Thirdly : there were all kinds of extortions, legal or 
 illegal, for which the Roman official had ample opportunity. 
 The right of requisition, the free quartering of soldiers 
 and of the clerks and lictors and innumerable officials in 
 the train of a Roman governor, gave him sufficient pre- 
 text for amassing a princely fortune. The existence of a 
 standing commission for the trial of such offences shows 
 their frequency. 
 
 Lastly, it must be remembered that Rome undertook 
 the military expenses only of her subjects : all other 
 burdens — the maintenance of roads and buildings, the pay 
 
318 BISTORT OF ROME. 
 
 of fleets and of the local contingent to the Roman army — 
 were supported by the subject community, and must have 
 formed a considerable addition to their taxation. For 
 instance, in Judea, the Jews paid a tenth to their native 
 princes in addition to the temple tribute and to their 
 payments to Rome. 
 
 The general conclusion at which we must arrive with 
 regard to provincial taxation is, that, though moderate in 
 theory, it must have been extremely oppressive in practice. 
 
 Expenditure. — I. Military and administrative expenses. 
 The taxation of the Roman empire, like the tribute paid 
 to Athens by her subject allies, was in the main meant 
 to defray the expense of the military system alone. Hence 
 its comparatively small amount, 200,000,000 sesterces 
 (£2,055,000), — only two-thirds of the annual revenue of 
 the King of Egypt. Hence, too, it may be guessed that the 
 surplus revenue after payment of expenses was small, and 
 that provinces like the Spains and Macedonia, which 
 required a large garrison, cost more than they yielded. 
 Still, in the times before the revolution, the surplus was 
 large enough to defray the expenses of public buildings 
 and to form a reserve fund. But the old principle, that 
 the Roman hegemony should not be treated as a privilege 
 from which profit might be derived, was infringed upon in 
 the latter portion of this period in several ways : the 
 customs in conquered territories were appropriated by 
 Rome, and the mode of levying them was oppressive. By 
 Gaius Gracchus Roman citizenship was treated as a 
 privilege conferring a right to a certain amount of corn ; 
 and to provide the money for these largesses the soil of 
 Asia was declared to belong absolutely to the Roman state, 
 and was taxed accordingly. 
 
 II. Public works. The earlier portion of this epoch was 
 an era of vast public undertakings. A new road was made, 
 in 132 B.C., from Capua to the Straits of Sicily — branching 
 from the great road which led from Rome through Capua 
 to Tarentum and Brundisium. The coast road on the east 
 was completed by extension southwards to Brundisium and 
 northwards to Aquileia. About Rome itself, the Mulvian 
 bridge over the Tiber was rebuilt of stone. In North Italy 
 the Via Postumia was constructed in 148 B.C., from Genua 
 to Aquileia through Placentia, Cremona, and Verona, thus 
 
CONDITION OF TEE EMPIRE. 319 
 
 connecting the two seas. Gaius Gracchus provided for the 
 maintenance of the roads by assigning pieces of ground by 
 the side of them to which was attached the duty of keep- 
 ing them in repair. 
 
 To the same period belong the great provincial high- 
 ways : the Via Domitia, connecting Italy with Spain ; the 
 Via Egnatia and the Via Gabinia, connecting the ports of 
 the East coast of the Adriatic with the interior. The 
 draining of the Pomptine marshes was undertaken in 160 
 B.C. The two ancient aqueducts were thoroughly repaired, 
 and two new ones, the Marcia and the Calida, constructed. 
 Not only were these stupendous works carried out, but paid 
 for in cash ; the Marcian aqueduct, which cost two millions 
 of our money, was paid for in three years. Nor did these 
 costly undertakings prevent the accumulation of a reserve, 
 which at the very beginning of the period amounted to 
 £860,000. 
 
 At the same time, it must be said that, even in the early 
 part of this epoch, before the revolution, other duties of 
 the government at least as imperative as these were entirely 
 neglected. Brigands infested the frontier countries, and 
 even the valley of the Po. There was no Roman fleet, and 
 the vessels raised by the provincials were not numerous 
 enough to check piracy, much less to carry on a naval 
 war. The traffic of Rome had still to depend upon the 
 old wooden Janicnlau bridge over the Tiber, and the 
 roadstead of Ostia was allowed to become blocked with 
 Band. 
 
 But from the time of the revolution the picture is far 
 worse. Public works were at a standstill ; either because 
 the corn largesses drained the treasury, or because the 
 oligarchy were bent upon accumulating a large reserve 
 fund in self-defence. (The reserve is said to have reached 
 its highest point in 91 B.C.) The Social war was the first 
 severe strain to which the Roman state had been subjected 
 since the Hannibalic war. During the latter the reserve 
 w r as not touched till the tenth year, when the resources 
 of taxation were exhausted ; the Social war was sup- 
 ported from the first from the reserve, and when this was 
 exhausted the government preferred to sell the public 
 sites in the city to imposing a tax upon the citizens. 
 
 Agriculture. — During this epoch the forces previously at 
 
320 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 work are visible in increased activity, and already produced 
 startling results. The smaller holdings were absorbed by 
 the large estates, " as the sun absorbs the drops of rain." 
 The senatorial government rather favoured than opposed 
 this process, which the opposition constantly endeavoured 
 to counteract. The two Gracchi gave 80,000 new farmers 
 to Italy, and Sulla settled 120,000 of his veterans on the 
 land, but the process still went on ; the small farms were 
 constantly being absorbed, while the creation of new 
 farmers was only intermittent. In the provinces the same 
 evils existed, and not the slightest attempt was made to 
 check them ; w T hile they were attended with this additional 
 disadvantage, that the rents were of course sent out of 
 the country to Italy. 
 
 In Trade and Commerce, there is little but inactivity to 
 record ; the Romans destroyed the industries of Corinth, 
 and created nothing in their place. Building was, perhaps, 
 an exception to the general stagnation, but produced little 
 benefit to the commonwealth, as only slave labour was 
 employed. 
 
 Commerce was exclusively in the hands of the Romans, 
 and the political ascendancy of Rome was unscrupulously 
 used to favour this monopoly. Usury was one of the most 
 lucrative of trades : for instance, the indemnity imposed 
 by Sulla upon the province of Asia was advanced by the 
 Roman capitalists, and swelled in fourteen years to six 
 times the original amount; public buildings, woi'ks of art, 
 even their children, had to be sold by the unfortunate 
 communities to meet their claims. Next in importance to 
 money dealing came the export of wine and oil from Italy 
 to all parts of the Mediterranean, and the import of all 
 kinds of articles of luxury. The importation of slaves was 
 enormous, especially from Syria and Asia Minor. The chief 
 emporia for the reception of imports were Ostia and 
 Puteoli, which traded chiefly with Alexandria and the 
 cities of Syria, in the valuable commodities of the East. 
 
 Thus, side by side with the political oligarchy of sena- 
 torial families, there was a financial oligarchy of capital- 
 ists. These men absorbed the rents of the soil of Italy, 
 and of the richest parts of the provinces ; the usury and 
 the commerce of the whole empire were in their hands, and 
 even of the state revenue itself they drew a considerable 
 
CONDITION OF THE EMPIRE. 321 
 
 share by their profits as lessees. Their influence in the 
 state is clearly seen in the destruction of Corinth and 
 Carthage, the commercial rivals of Rome ; and it is to 
 be remembered that their wealth was based, not upon 
 sound economic principles, but upon the political supre- 
 macy of Rome ; hence every political crisis was attended 
 by a financial crisis. 
 
 Oue important result of the commercial monopoly of 
 Rome was an interchange of population, greatly to the dis- 
 advantage of the Roman state. Everywhere in the pro- 
 vinces there were large numbers of Italians temporarily 
 settled, mostly for commercial reasons. We have seen that 
 80,000 Italians perished in a single day in Asia Minor, and 
 20,000 in Delos. Again, the population of Italy suffered 
 enormous diminution during the Social wars, when 300,000 
 persons are said to have perished. In return for the loss 
 of these citizens Italy received vast numbers of provincials, 
 chiefly oriental Greeks, who acted as physicians, school- 
 masters, and priests, or who came to her ports as traders 
 and mariners ; while the proportion of slaves to freemen was 
 continually increasing. The servile insurrections — the 
 appeals to slaves, in times of disturbance, to take up arms 
 against their masters, are plain enough signs of the times. 
 "If we conceive of England with its lords, its squires, 
 above all its city, but with its freeholders and farmers 
 converted into proletarians and its labourers and sailors 
 converted into slaves, we shall gain an approximate image 
 of the population of the Italian peninsula in those days." 
 
 Social Features. — Socially, no less than politically or 
 financially, the period is one of decadence, and is marked 
 by growing extravagance and frivolity. Enjoyment lost all 
 freshness and spontaneity, and became a laborious and 
 pedantic study. Animal hunts and gladiatorial games 
 became the chief feature in the public festivals. Huge 
 sums were expended at every great funeral on public 
 games — Marcus Aemilius Lepidus left strict injunctions 
 to his children to avoid empty show, and not to spend more 
 at his obsequies than 1,000,000 asses (£10,200). Houses 
 and gardens reached fabulous prices ; gambling and extra- 
 vagance in dress were fashionable foibles ; but the favourite 
 mode of expenditure was on the luxuries of the table. 
 
 Every villa along the coast had its tanks for securing a 
 
 21 
 
322 HlSTOTiY OF ROME. 
 
 constant supply of fish. At the best entertainments, not 
 whole birds, but only the most delicate portions were served 
 up ; and the guests were expected merely to taste of the 
 multitude of dishes presented to them. There were 
 sumptuary laws totally prohibiting certain delicacies, 
 regulating the price <>f meals and the amount of plate, but 
 of all the Roman nobles only three are said to have kept 
 these laws, and that on account of regard for the prin- 
 ciples of Stoic philosophy, not for the law. A century 
 earlier, few houses contained any silver plate beyond the 
 traditional salt dish, but in Sulla's time there were 150 
 silver dishes at Rome of 100 lb. weight. Some of it was 
 of such exquisite workmanship as to be valued at eighteen 
 times its weight of metal, and Lucius Crassus gave 100,000 
 sesterce3 (£1050) for a pair of silver cups. 
 
 Perhaps the most significant mark of the corruption of the 
 a^e is the frequency of divorce and the general aversion to 
 marriage. Even Metellus Macedonicus, censor in 131 B.C., a 
 man renowned for his honourable domestic life, urged the 
 duty of marriage upon his fellow-citizens in the following 
 terms : " If we could, citizens, we should indeed all keep 
 clear of this burden. But as nature has so arranged it that 
 we cannot either live comfortably with wives or live at all 
 without them, it is proper to have regard rather to the 
 permanent weal than to our own brief comfort." These 
 facts are important, for it is only by trying to realize the 
 ignoble private life of the time that we can comprehend 
 the political corruption which prevailed. There were 
 exceptions, especially among the rural towns, but immo- 
 rality was the rule. One of the censors of 92 B.C. publicly 
 reproached his colleague with having shed tears over a pet 
 murena ; the other retaliated on the former that he had 
 buried three wives and shed tears over none of them. 
 
 In 161 B.C., an orator in the Forum gave the following 
 description of the senatorial juryman : — 
 
 " They play hazard, delicately perfumed, surrounded by 
 their mistresses. As the afternoon advances, they summon 
 the servant and bid him make inquiries at the comitium, 
 what has occurred in the Forum, who has spoken in favour 
 of or against the new project of law, what tribes have 
 voted for and what against it. At length they go them- 
 selves to the judgment seat, just early enough not to bring 
 
CONDITION OF THE EMPIRE. 323 
 
 the process down on their own neck. Reluctantly they 
 come to the tribunal and give audience to the parties. 
 Those who are concerned bring forward their cause. The 
 juryman orders the witness to come forward ; he himself 
 goes aside. When he returns, he declares that he has heard 
 everything, and asks for the documents. He looks into the 
 writings — he can hardly keep his eyes open for wine. 
 When he thereupon withdraws to consider his sentence, he 
 says to his boon companions, ' What concern have I with 
 these tiresome people ? Why should we not rather go to 
 drink a cup of mulse mixed with Greek wine, and accom- 
 pany it with a fat fieldfare, and a good fish — a veritable 
 pike from the Tiber island ? ' 
 
 " All this was, no doubt, very ridiculous ; but was it 
 not a very serious matter that such things were subjects of 
 ridicule ? " 
 
 AUTHORITIES. 
 
 Italian Domains. — Cic. de L. Agr. ii. 28 and passim. Liv. xxvi. 16. 
 
 App. B. C. i. 7. 
 Mines.— Pirn. N. H. 33, 34, 37. Liv. xxxiv. 21; xxxix. 24; xlv. 
 
 18, 29. Strab. iii. 146 ; v. 151. 
 Taxation generally.— Mar q. Stv. 182-203, 247-252, 298-301. 
 Manumission tax. — Cic. ad Att. ii. 16. Liv. xxvii. 10. 
 Provincial Domains, civitates foederatae, immunes, liberae : decumae. 
 
 —Cic. in Verr. ii iii. 6, 8, 9, and passim; Caes. de B. Afr. 
 
 cap. ult. 
 Scriptura. — Fest. saltum, scriptuarius. Varro R. R. II. i. Cic. in 
 
 Verr. ii. 2 ; ad Fam. xiii. 65 ; pro L. Manil. 6. Plin. N. H. xix. 
 
 3, 15. 
 Tributum. — Cic. in Verr. ii. 53, 55, sqq. ; ad Att. v. 16 ; ad Fam. 
 
 iii. 8. Appian B. C. v. 4. 
 Portoria. — Cic. in Verr. ii. 75. Plin. N. H. xii. 14. Liv. xxxii. 7; 
 
 xl. 51. Cic. de L. Agr. ii. 29 ; pro L. Manil. 6. 
 Societates. — Tac. Ann. iv. fi. Cic. in Verr. ii. 3, 64, 70; iii. 41: ad 
 
 Att. i. 17 ; xi. 10 : ad Fam. xiii. 9, 65 ; Brans, pt. i. c. v. 6, SC. De 
 
 Oropiis. 
 Requisitions and exactions. — Cic. pro L. Manil. 14. Div. in. Q. C. 
 
 10; in Verr. i. 34, 38; ii. 60; iii. 5, 81, 86, 87; v. 17, 23, 31, 
 
 38, 52 ; pro Flacc. 12, 14 ; Philipp. xi. 12. 
 Amount of revenue. — Pint. Pomp. 45. 
 Public works. — Frontin. de Aqneductibus. Plin. N. H. xxxi. 3, 6; 
 
 xxxvi. 15. Vitrnv. de Aq. vii. ; viii. 6, 7. Plut. C. Grac. 7. 
 
 Aur. Vic. de V. I. Ixxvii. 8. 
 
324 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 Trade and Agriculture. — Rei Rusticae Scriptores (vid. pp. xvii., 
 
 xviii.). Plin. N. H. xvii., xviii. 
 Usury. — In Verr. iii. 70. Hor. Sat. I. ii. 14. 
 Social features. — Cic. ad. Att. ii. 19; xi. 23; xii. 35, 36; ad. Fam. 
 
 viii. 7 ; pro Mur. 18 ; de Orat. 40, 56 ; de Legg. ii. 24 ; de Off. ii. 
 
 16 ; Seneca de Brev. Vit. 20 ; Liv. Epit. 48. Gell. i. 6 ; ii. 24 and 
 
 passim. Macrob. ii. 13 and passim. Plut. Sulla 35. Cic. 41. 
 
 Val. Max. iii. 10, 15 ; ix. 1, and passim. "Suet. Ang. 89. Nero, 2. 
 
 Plin. N. H. x. 50, s. 71 ; xxxvi. 3 ; viii. 16, s. 20; xvii. 1. Aelian. 
 
 Hist. Anim. viii. 4. Cic speeches and letters passim, esp. pro 
 
 Cluent. pro Caul. 
 
CHAPTER XXVIII. 
 
 MARCUS LEPIDDS AND SERTOKIUS. 
 
 Classes which composed the Opposition, and characters of ite 
 leading men, after the death of Sulla. — Insurrection of 
 Lepidus (78-77 B.c.).^Sertorian war (80-72 B.C.). 
 
 Sulla's arrangements had been acquiesced in by all the 
 chief classes in the state, and on his death his constitution 
 had nothing to fear from any organized body of opponents. 
 There was, however, a large but heterogeneous body of 
 malcontents opposed to the present condition of things 
 for widely different reasons. 
 
 1. There were the jurists — men of strict legal training, 
 who detested Sulla's arbitrary mode of procedure, and who 
 even during his life had ventured to disregard several of 
 his laws; for instance, those depriving certain Italian 
 communities of the franchise. 
 
 2. There was the liberal minority in the senate, who 
 had always favoured reform and compromise with the 
 democratic party and the Italians. 
 
 3. The thorough- going democrats, who clung to the 
 traditional watch-words of the party, and whose special 
 aim w T as the restoration of the tribunician power- Besides 
 these, there were many important classes of men, whom 
 Sulla's enactments had either injured or left unsatisfied. 
 
 4. The population who lived between the Po and the 
 Alps (Transpadani), upon whom Latin rights had been 
 conferred, and who were eager for the full Roman franchise. 
 
 5. The freedmen, who swarmed in the capital, and 
 whose political influence had been annihilated by their 
 relegation to the old four city tribes. 
 
326 niSTORY OF ROME. 
 
 6. The capitalists, chiefly of equestrian rank, for whose 
 grievances see p. 303. 
 
 7. The populace, who had been deprived of their free 
 corn. 
 
 8. All that numerous class of burgesses whose property 
 had been curtailed or confiscated to furnish allotments for 
 Sulla's veterans. 
 
 9. The proscribed and their children and connections. 
 It was a point of honour with the friends of these to 
 procure the recall of the living, and the removal, in the case 
 of the dead, of the stigma attaching tc their memory. 
 
 10. To all these classes one more remains to be added — 
 the men of ambition and the men of ruined fortunes. The 
 latter included alike the aristocratic lords, who had lost 
 their patrimony by riotous living, and the Sullan colonists, 
 who refused to settle down to a life of husbandry and were 
 eager for fresh spoil. The former included men, outside 
 the senatorial circle, who were eager to force their way into 
 office by popular favour ; and men of more daring ambition, 
 who might perhaps emulate Gaius Gracchus. 
 
 It is most necessary, for the understanding of the history 
 of the following years, that all these elements of opposition 
 should be fully grasped ; and it may be well here to recall 
 to mind the two great and constant difficulties of the Roman 
 government — the difficulty of controlling its military 
 governors in the provinces ; and the difficulty of managing 
 the masses of slaves and freedmen in the capital, without 
 either police or troops at its disposal. 
 
 It was, perhaps, the greatest misfortune of all that 
 there was everywhere at this period a dearth of political 
 leaders. The management of parties was in the hands of 
 political clubs, or hetaeriae, a system which had existed for 
 centuries at Rome, but which was now seen in its worst 
 and most aggravated form. These clubs were formed 
 among optimates and populares alike; and even the 
 mass of burgesses was formed into societies according to 
 voting districts, under the direction of officers called 
 divisores tribuum. " Everything with these political 
 clubs was bought and sold ; the vote of the electors above 
 all, but also the votes of the senator and the judge ; the 
 fists, too, which produced the street riot, and the ring- 
 leader who directed it. The associations of the upper and 
 
MARCUS LEriDUS AND SERTORIUS. 327 
 
 of the lower classes were distinguished only in the matter 
 of tariff. The hetaeria decided the elections ; the hetaeria 
 decreed the impeachment ; the hetaeria conducted the 
 defence ; it secured the distinguished advocate ; and it 
 coutracted, in case of need, respecting an acquittal with one 
 of the speculators who prosecuted on a great scale the 
 lucrative traffic in judges' votes." One of the most expert 
 wire-pullers of these caucuses was Publius Cethegus. 
 
 Among the Optimates the most notable men were 
 Quintus Metellus Pius, consul in 80 B.C.; Quintus Luta- 
 tius Catulus, son of the victor of Vercellae ; Lucius and 
 Marcus Lucullus, who had shown considerable military 
 talents. But none of these men had any conception of 
 the greatness of the crisis ; their political creed did not go 
 beyond the maintenance of the oligarchy and the sup- 
 pression of demagogism ; their ambition was satisfied by 
 a consulship and a triumph. 
 
 Three men alone are worth a longer consideration. The 
 first is Ghiagas Pompeius. born 106 B.C. He had raised 
 troops and fought for Sulla in the second civil war, and 
 had enjoyed the titles of imperator and triumphator before 
 his age permitted him to stand for any office. Already 
 he began to be known by the title of Magnus. He was 
 an able soldier but no genius ; cautious to timidity, and 
 averse to strike till he had established an immense 
 superiority over his opponent. In culture, as well as in 
 integrity of character, he was at least up to the level of 
 the time ; he was a good neighbour, a good husband and 
 father. His temperament was kind and humane ; and he 
 was the first to depart from the custom of putting to 
 death captive kings and generals after a triumph. Yet 
 he sent a divorce to the wife whom he loved, at the 
 command of Sulla, because she belonged to an outlawed 
 family. For politics he had little aptitude. He was 
 awkward and stiff in public ; easily managed by his 
 freedmen and clients ; eager for power, but affecting to 
 despise it. His relations to the parties of the time was 
 peculiar. Though a Sullan officer he was opposed to Sulla 
 personally. Nor was he in sympathy with the senatorial 
 government ; for his family was not yet fully established 
 among the aristocracy, and Pompeius himself had once 
 been a Cinnan adherent. He had no political sagacity, 
 
328 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 and little political courage. " He might have had a 
 definite and respectable position, had lie contented himself 
 with being the general of the senate — the office for which 
 he was from the beginning destined. With this he was 
 not content, and so he fell into the fatal plight of wishing 
 to be something else than he could be. He was constantly 
 aspiring to a special position in the state, and when it 
 offered itself he could not make up his mind to occupy it. 
 He was deeply indignant when persons and laws did not 
 bend unconditionally before him, and yet he bore himself 
 everywhere with no mere affectation of modesty, as one of 
 many peers, and trembled at the mere thought of under- 
 taking anything unconstitutional. . . Constantly tormented 
 by an ambition which was frightened at its own aims, 
 his deeply agitated life passed joylessly away in a per- 
 petual inward contradiction." 
 
 Marcus Crassus was famed for his boundless activity, 
 especially in the acquisition of wealth : he was contractor, 
 builder, banker, and usurer, and carried on numerous 
 other trades through his freedmen. Unlike Pompeius, he 
 was unscrupulous in the means he employed. He was 
 proved to have committed a forgery in the matter of 
 the Sullan proscription lists; he did not refuse a legacy 
 because the will which gave it him was known to be 
 forged; and he allowed his bailiffs to dislodge the small 
 farmers adjoining his estates by force and by fraud. 
 He soon became the richest man in Rome ; and at his 
 death, after expending enormous sums, he was still worth 
 170,000,000 sesterces (£1,700,000). But his wealth was 
 only a means to the gratification of his ambition ; he 
 extended his connection by every possible means ; he 
 could salute every burgess of the capital by name ; never 
 refused his services as an advocate, and, though without 
 any gift of oratory, overcame all obstacles by his pertina- 
 city in speaking. He advanced money on loan to in- 
 fluential men without distinction of party, and thus 
 acquired a power which none dared to provoke. His 
 ambition knew no bounds ; while he stood alone the 
 crown of Rome was beyond his grasp, but it was not 
 impossible that with the aid of a suitable partner he 
 might attain to supremacy in the state. 
 
 In the ranks of the democrats the revolution had made 
 
MARCUS LEPIDUS AND SERTORIUS. 329 
 
 such havoc that scarcely a man of note survived. Of the 
 rising generation, Gaius Julius Caesar was now only 
 twenty-four years of age, but was already perhaps the 
 third most important man in Rome. His family connec- 
 tions naturally inclined him towards the democratic 
 party ; for his father's sister had been the wife of Marius, / 
 and his own wife was the daughter of Cinna ; while his 
 own early career had so far been one of opposition to the 
 senatorial rule. He had refused to divorce his wife at 
 the bidding of Sulla, and with difficulty escaped pro- 
 scription at the intercession of his relatives. 
 
 But Caesar could only be the hope of the future, and 
 the actual leadership of the democratic party fell into 
 the hands of Marcus Aprpilina TiPpidns J who had been an 
 optimate, but had joined the opposition to escape im- 
 peachment for extortion during his government of Sicily. 
 He was a vehement orator, but had none of the qualities 
 of a leader, whether in the council or in the field. How- 
 ever, he was elected as the democratic leader to the con- 
 sulship of 78 B.C. 
 
 Thus the death of Sulla found the opposition leader in 
 possession of the chief magistracy ; while, by a train of 
 events to be shortly described, the important province of 
 Spain was practically abandoned to the enemies of the 
 senate 
 
 Lepidus resolved to strike an immediate blow. An out- 
 break at the very funeral of the regent was hardly pre- 
 vented by the influence of Pompeius, and by fear of the 
 Sullan veterans ; and preparations were at once begun for 
 a new revolution. The conspirators aimed at the over- 
 throw of Sulla's constitution ; at the revival of the free 
 distributions and of the tribunician power; at the recall of 
 the banished, and the restoration of confiscated lands. 
 The' exiles already began to return. Many noted Marians, 
 such as Graius Perpenna and Lucius Cinna, joined the plot, 
 but Caesar more prudently abstained. All this went on 
 under the very eye of the senate, which was too indolent 
 to take the advice of the other consul, Catulus, and crush 
 the plot at its birth. They allowed a limited corn-law to 
 be enacted, probably permitting a definite number only of 
 poorer citizens to purchase corn at a low rate — a measure 
 which emboldened without satisfying the opposition. 
 
330 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 The war broke out first in Etruria, where the dispos- 
 sessed Faesulans resumed their estates by force, several of 
 the Sullan veterans being slain in the tumult. The senate 
 adopted the worst possible course of sending both consuls 
 to Etruria to raise an army — a proceeding which was 
 scarcely likely to be efficacious when they thought it 
 necessary to bind them over by a solemn oath not to turn 
 their arms against each other. Lepidus, of course, armed 
 for the insurrection, not for the senate, and evaded the 
 efforts of the latter to induce him to return. When at 
 length, in 77 B.C., he was peremptorily ordered to proceed 
 to Rome, he refused, and demanded (1) that the tribuni- 
 cian power should be restored ; (2) that those who had 
 been deprived of their rights of citizenship or of their 
 property should be reinstated ; (3) his own re-election as 
 consul for the current year. 
 
 The senate could rely upon the Sullan veterans and upon 
 the army raised by Catulus ; and the latter was entrusted 
 with the defence of the capital and the conduct of the war in 
 Etruria, while Pompeius was sent to crush the democrats 
 under Marcus Brutus in the valley of the Po. Lepidus 
 meantime advanced upon the capital, and made himself 
 master of the right bank of the Tiber, and was even able 
 to cross the river. A battle followed in the Campus 
 Martius, in which Lepidus was defeated. He retreated to 
 Etruria, while another division of his army shut itself up 
 in Alba. By this time Pompeius had accomplished his 
 work in the north, and was marching southward, so that 
 Lepidus w r as enclosed between two armies. He succeeded 
 in reaching Sardinia with most of his army, but soon 
 afterwards died. The flower of his troops, under Perpenna, 
 joined Sertorius in Spain. 
 
 Spain was now the only province of the empire where 
 opposition to the senate still existed. It only remains to 
 trace the steps by which Sertorius had there established 
 a power which taxed the whole strength of the govern- 
 ment to subdue it. Sertorius was a native of Nursia, in 
 the Sabine land, a man of tender sensitive nature, and at 
 the same time of the most chivalrous courage. Although 
 untrained in speaking, he had considerable oratorical gifts ; 
 and in the revolutionary war his military talent and his 
 genius for organization presented a striking contrast to the 
 
MARCUS LEPIDUS AND SERTORIUS. 331 
 
 incapacity of the other democratic leaders. His Spanish 
 followers called him the New Hannibal, and indeed his 
 adroitness and versatility, in politics and in war, savour 
 far more of the Phoenician than of the Roman genius. On 
 being driven from Spain, he led a life of adventure, chiefly 
 along the African coasts. Among his other exploits he 
 besieged and took Tingis (Tangiers), though the native 
 prince was aided by the Romans. His fame spread abroad, 
 and he was soon invited to Spain by the Lusitanians, who 
 in spite of nominal submission maintained a practical 
 independence. Sertorius was well acquainted with the 
 resources of the country, and accepted the invitation, 
 though he had to fight his way through the Roman 
 squadron which commanded the straits. 
 
 80 B.C. — Upon his arrival, Sertorius found that he had 
 only 2600 men armed in Roman fashion. He immediately 
 raised his force to a full legion by levying four thousand 
 infantry and seven hundred cavalry, and, accompanied by 
 swarms of Lusitanian auxiliaries, gave battle to the Roman 
 governor Lucius Fufidius, who was defeated with the loss 
 of two thousand men on the Baetis. 
 
 79 B.C. — Tn this year Quintus Metellus was sent to relieve 
 Fufidius ; but further misfortunes awaited the Roman 
 arms. Calvinus, governor of the Ebro province, was 
 defeated and slain by Hirtuleius, the lieutenant of Serto- 
 rius ; and Lucius Manlius, governor of Transalpine Gaul, 
 who had crossed the Pyrenees, had to return to his province 
 after suffering a disastrous defeat. Metellus himself in 
 Further Spain penetrated into Lusitanian territory, and 
 besieged Longobriga, near the mouth of the Tagus ; but 
 one of his divisions was lured into an ambush, and the 
 siege had to be raised ; another division was defeated 
 during the retreat, and great damage was inflicted on the 
 main army by the harassing tactics of Sertorius. 
 
 Sertorius had been careful always to act, not as ring- 
 leader of the Lusitanian revolt, but as Roman governor of 
 the province ; and he had already begun to organize the 
 country in the same spirit, though the work was probably 
 carried out chiefly in later years. He formed the chief 
 men of the exiles into a senate to conduct affairs and to 
 nominate magistrates. The officers of the army were 
 exclusively Roman ; to the Spaniards he was the Roman 
 
332 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 governor who levied troops by virtue of his office. At the 
 same time he endeavoured to attach the provincials to 
 Rome and to himself. After the custom of the country, 
 numbers of the noble Spaniards swore to stand by him to 
 the death, and formed the life-guard of the general. Even 
 superstition was enlisted on his side, and he allowed it to 
 be believed that he received counsel from the gods through 
 the medium of a white fawn. The strictest discipline was 
 maintained in the army, and the inhabitants were relieved 
 from all fear of outrage on the part of the soldiers. The 
 tribute of the province was reduced, and the soldiers were 
 made to build winter barracks for themselves, to avoid the 
 necessity of quartering them on the inhabitants. The 
 children of the noble Spaniards were educated in an 
 academy at Osca, where they learned to speak Latin and 
 Greek, and adopted the Roman dress — the first attempt 
 to Romanize the provinces by Romanizing the provincials 
 themselves. 
 
 78 B.C. — By the end of this year Further Spain was 
 completely in the hands of Sertorius, except the places 
 actually occupied by the troops of Metellus. In Hither 
 Spain there was no Roman army, and the agents of Ser- 
 torius roamed through Gaul, urging the communities to 
 revolt. The passes of the Alps became insecure, and the 
 sea was commanded by the insurgents through their 
 alliance with the pirates in the western Mediterranean ; 
 these corsairs had a fixed station on the coast whence 
 they intercepted supplies, and maintained communications 
 with Italy and Asia Minor. 
 
 77 B.C. — After the suppression of the revolt of Lepidus, 
 it was absolutely necessary to send a capable general to 
 Spain. This office Pompeius demanded for himself, and 
 as there was no one else fit for the command, and Pompeius 
 was at the head of an army, the senate resolved to yield. 
 The first task of Pompeius was to quiet the disturbances 
 which had already begun in Gaul, and to lay out a new 
 road over the Alps, in order to secure a shorter communica- 
 tion with Italy. In the autumn he crossed the Pyrenees. 
 Meanwhile Sertorius, leaving Hirtuleius to keep Metellus 
 in check, had been completing the subjection of Hither 
 Spain, and had reduced one after another the towns 
 adhering to the senate. Perpenna, who had hitherto 
 
MARCUS LEPIDUS AND SERTORWS. 333 
 
 maintained his command independently of Sertorius, was 
 forced at the approach of Pompeius to put himself under 
 the orders of his colleague. 
 
 76 B.C. — Perpenna with a strong force stood ready to 
 oppose Pompeius if he should attempt to cross the Ebro, 
 and to march southwards. Herennius was in command 
 of another division to support Perpenna, while Sertorius 
 continued to subdue the districts friendly to Rome. 
 Pompeius, however, forced the passage of the Ebro, 
 defeated Herennius, and took Valentia. Sertorius now 
 appeared on the scene, and besieged Lauro, south of 
 Valentia, which had declared for Pompeius. The latter, 
 at the moment when his efforts to relieve the town seemed 
 on the point of success, was outmanoeuvred by Sertorius, 
 and saw the town captured and the inhabitants carried off 
 before his eyes — an event which confirmed many wavering 
 towns in their adherence to the insurgents. 
 
 Meanwhile, Metellus had defeated Hirtuleius at Italica, 
 near Seville, and driven him into Lusitania. 
 
 75 B.C. — The next year, Metellus marched to join Pom- 
 peius at Valentia, and defeated and killed Hirtuleius, who 
 endeavoured to intercept him. But Pompeius, anxious to 
 wipe out the disgrace of Lauro before Metellus arrived, gave 
 battle on the Sucro to Sertorius. Pompeius was defeated 
 on the right wing, while his lieutenant, Afranius, was 
 victorious on the left. The latter, however, was suddenly 
 attacked by Sertorius while occupied in pillage, and com- 
 pelled to retreat. By the next day, Metellus had over- 
 thrown Perpenna and joined Pompeius, who was now too 
 strong to be attacked. 
 
 For a time the fortune of Sertorius languished, and his 
 army melted away ; but he soon appeared with a new 
 army south of Saguntum, while his privateers prevented 
 supplies from reaching the Romans. There was a long 
 and doubtful battle in the plains of the river Turia 
 (Guadalaviar), the result of which was unfavourable to 
 Sertorius. His army melted away, and Valentia was 
 taken and razed to the ground. The general himself was 
 besieged at Clunia (on the Upper Douro), but escaped, 
 and at the end of the year was once more at the head of 
 an army. 
 
 As the result of the campaign, southern and central 
 
334 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 Spain had been recovered by the Romans, and their con- 
 quests were secured by the occupation of the towns of 
 Segobriga and Bilbilis. But the country was so exhausted 
 that Metellus had even to spend his winter quarters in 
 Gaul. 
 
 74 B.C. — With two fresh legions from Italy, the Romans 
 again took the field ; but Sertorius confined himself 
 entirely to guerilla warfare. Metellus reduced the Ser- 
 torian towns in southern Spain, and carried away the 
 male population with him. 
 
 In the province of the Ebro Pompeius was prevented 
 by Sertorius from taking Pallantia, and was defeated 
 before Calagurris. 
 
 73 B.C. — During this year the warfare was of the same 
 uneventful character ; but Pompeius succeeded in induc- 
 ing many communities to withdraw from the insurrection. 
 
 The war had now continued for eight years. The losses 
 of the state in men and treasure are difficult to estimate : 
 not only were the Spanish revenues lost, but vast suras 
 h;:d annually to be sent for the support, of the army in 
 Spain. The province itself was devastated ; whole com- 
 munities had frequently perished, and the towns which 
 adhered to Rome had countless hardships to endure. 
 Gaul suffered scarcely less from the constant requisitions 
 of men and money, and from the burden of providing 
 winter quarters. Generals and soldiers were alike dis- 
 satisfied ; the former because victory was difficult and of 
 a kind that brought no fame ; the latter because the booty 
 was poor, and even their pay irregular. At the same time 
 the government was contending against its enemies all 
 over the Mediterranean ; on the sea, in Macedonia and 
 in Asia Minor ; while Sertorius was already in open 
 league with the pirates, and was negotiating with Mithra- 
 dates on the basis of mutual assistance. 
 
 But the position of Sertorius was even less enviable. 
 His influence waned as he was compelled more and more 
 to stand on the defensive. The Spanish militia was un- 
 stable as water, melting away at the first disaster; and 
 the Roman emigrants were insubordinate and stubborn. 
 It was difficult to maintain an adequate force of cavalry, 
 the training of which required considerable time. The 
 best of his lieutenants and the flower of his troops had 
 
MARCUS LEPJDUS AND SERTORIUS. 335 
 
 perished in the war, and the most trustworthy communi- 
 ties showed signs of wavering. Like Hannibal. Sertorius 
 knew that one day he must fall, and was always ready to 
 lay down his command, if he might be allowed to live 
 peaceably in Italy. Soon projects were formed against 
 his life, and Sertorius withdrew the custody of his person 
 from Romans and entrusted it to select Spaniards, while 
 the suspected were punished with fearful severity. A 
 second conspiracy was quickly formed among his own 
 staff, and only partially discovered, and the conspirators 
 were induced to hurry on the catastrophe. At the 
 instigation of Perpenna a great victory was announced 
 to the general, and a banquet was held to celebrate it. 
 At the banquet an altercation took place, and a wine-cup 
 was dashed on the floor — the signal for assassination. 
 Sertorius and his faithful attendants were slain (72 B.C.). 
 " History loves not the Coriolani ; nor has she made 
 any exception even in the case of this, the most mag- 
 nanimous, most gifted, most worthy to be regretted of 
 them all." 
 
 Perpenna succeeded to the command, but at the first 
 encounter the despondent ranks of the insurgents were 
 broken, and Perpenna with many other officers captured. 
 The correspondence of Sertorius, which implicated many 
 of the leading men at Rome, was burnt by Pompeius 
 unread. The emigrants dispersed — many to join the 
 pirates ; but soon the Plotian law allowed them to return. 
 The Sertorian towns surrendered or were captured by 
 force, and the two provinces were regulated anew. The 
 tribute of the most guilty communities was increased, 
 and others lost their independence. One band of Ser- 
 torians was settled by Pompeius near Lugdunum as the 
 community of the Convenae. 
 
 At the close of 71 B.C. Metellus and Pompeius returned 
 to Rome. " The good fortune of Sulla seemed still to be 
 with his creation after he had been laid in the grave, and 
 to protect it better than the incapable and negligent 
 watchmen appointed to guard it. The opposition in Italy 
 had broken down owing to the incapacity and precipita- 
 tion of its leader, and that of the emigrants from dissen- 
 sion within their Own ranks. . . . The curule chairs were 
 rendered once more secure." 
 
836 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 AUTHORITIES. 
 
 Lepidus.— Liv. Epit. 90. Plut. Sul!. 34, 38 ; Pomp. 15, 16. Graniua 
 
 Licinianus, fragg. Flor. iii. 23. Sail. Hist. frag. bk. i. Ap. 
 
 pian B. C. i. 105, 107. Tac. Ann. iii. 27. Cic. in Cat. in. 10 
 
 Plin. N. H. vii. 36, 54. 
 Sertorius — Liv. Epit. 90-94, 96 ; frag. bk. 91. Pint. Sertor. 8-end ; 
 
 Pomp. 17-21. Flor. iii. 22. Veil. ii. 29, 30. Eutrop. vi. 1. 
 
 Appian B. C. i. 108-115. Hisp. 101. Orosius v. 10, 23. Frontin. 
 
 I. ii. 13. Caes. B. G. iii. 20. Sail., frag. lib. iii. 
 Disregard of Sulla's la»;s. — Cic. pro Dom. 30; pro Caec. 33-35. 
 Hetaeriae. — Cic. pro Plauc. 15, 18, 23, 37, and passim ; pro Cluent. 
 
 26; ad. Att. i. 16; ad Q. F. ii. 3; Ascon. in Corn. 75 (Bruns, pt. 
 
 iii. 4). 
 
 Note on Caesar's age. — The year of Caesar's birth is usually given 
 as 100 B.C., because Suetonius (Jul. 88), Plutarch (Caes. 69), Appian 
 (B. C. ii. 149) all state that he was at his death (15 Mar. 41 B.C.) in 
 his fifty-sixth year. But this account would make him enter upon 
 the three offices of aedile, praetor, and consul, which he held in 65, 
 62, and 59 B.C. respectively, in his thirty-fifth, fortieth, and forty- 
 third years, that is, in each case, two years before the legal time. 
 The fact that this irregularity is nowhere noticed, suggests that the 
 statements of Suetonius, Plutarch, and Appian are errors derived 
 from a common source, especially as such errors must have been 
 common before the commencement of the acta diurna. The date 
 102 B.C. would agree better than 100 b.c. with the statement of 
 Velleius, that Caesar was appointed Flamen Dialis when paene puer ; 
 since the latter date would make him thirteen years six months old, 
 i.e., not almost, but actually a boy. Further, the number til. on the 
 coins struck by Caesar about the outbreak of the civil war would 
 agree with the years of his life if he was born in 102 B.c. 
 
CHAPTER XXIX. 
 
 RULE OF THE SULLAN RESTORATION. 
 
 I. Subjection of Thrace and Dalmatia. — ii. Rise of Tigranes in the 
 East; third Mithradatic war (74-65 B.C.) ; war with Tigranes; 
 invasion of Armenia. — iii. The pirates : their organization, and 
 the Roman attempts to destroy them. — iv. The Servile war 
 (73-71 B.C.). 
 
 The Sullan constitution had thus survived the dangers 
 which beset it on the death of its author. It remains to 
 be seen how the senate fulfilled the duties of government 
 during its new lease of power. In order to do this it is 
 necessary to go back a little, and to review the condition 
 of other parts of the empire during the last years of Sulla's 
 regency and the first years after his death in 78 B.C. 
 The condition of Spain had thrown all other questions 
 into the shade: but there were other serious dangers 
 threatening — especially from Thrace and Macedonia, from 
 the East, and from the pirates of the Mediterranean. 
 
 In Thrace and the adjacent regions there was warfare 
 for the space of twelve years, the result of which was 
 that the pirates of the Dalmatian coast and the tribes 
 between Macedonia and the Danube were subdued, while 
 Thrace became a portion of the province of Macedonia. 
 
 The most important feature in the history of the East, 
 during the years succeeding the settlement of Sulla, 
 was the rapid increase of the power and territory of 
 Tigranes, king of Armenia, and so-n-in-law of Mithra- 
 dates. The Parthians, who were at this time torn by 
 internal dissensions, were deprived by him of several 
 of their dependent kingdoms — Cordueue, Atropatene, and 
 
 22 
 
338 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 Nineveh: of Mesopotamia the northern half was subject 
 to him. But it was on the west that his proceedings 
 necessarily affected the Romans. He took Melitene from 
 Cappadocia ; and after Sulla's death he advanced into 
 Cappadocia itself, and carried off the inhabitants of the 
 capital and of other towns Even by 83 B.C. he had subdued 
 eastern Cilicia, reduced Upper Syria and the greater part 
 of Phoenicia, and threatened the Jewish state. Antioch 
 became one of the residences of the great king. It was 
 the aim of Tigranes to become supreme monarch of the 
 East ; and it is always as an Oriental sultan, not as a 
 Western ruler, that he appears. His conquests were 
 accomplished by huge heterogeneous hosts gathered from 
 all parts of his dominions. The inhabitants of many of 
 the conquered cities were carried off to found a new great 
 city, Tigranocerta, near the frontier of Mesopotamia, in 
 the most southern province of Armenia. " In other 
 respects, too, the new great king proved faithful to his 
 part. As amidst the perpetual childhood of the East the 
 childlike conception of kings with real crowns on their 
 heads has never disappeared, Tigranes, when he showed 
 himself in public, appeared in the state and costume of a 
 successor of Darius and Xerxes, with the purple caftan, 
 the half-white purple tunic, the long plaited trousers, the 
 high turban, and the royal diadem, — attended, moreover, 
 and served in slavish fashion, wherever he went or stood, 
 by four ' kings.' " 
 
 Mithradates had been careful to give the Romans no 
 provocation, but at the same time he strengthened himself 
 by every means not forbidden by treaty. He greatly 
 extended his dominions in the Black Sea, and devoted 
 himself to arming and training his troops in the Roman 
 fashion, in which he was aided by the Roman emigrants 
 at his court. 
 
 But the Romans were anxious to avoid interference in 
 the East. In 81 B.C., King Alexander II. died, leaving 
 by will his kingdom of Egypt to the Romans ; but Pto- 
 lemy Auletes and Ptolemy the Cyprian were allowed to 
 assume the kingship in Egypt and in Cyprus, though 
 these princes had notoriously no legal claim. Nor did 
 the Romans interfere with the conquests of Tigranes, 
 and if they did not recognize his title, they did nothing 
 
RULE OF TUB SULLAN RESTORATION. 339 
 
 to deprive him of his provinces. There were special 
 reasons why they should not interfere in Egypt, but, in 
 allowing an Asiatic king to establish himself on the 
 Mediterranean, they abandoned the very basis of the 
 Roman power. 
 
 Thus there was no desire for war on either side ; but 
 the third Mithradatic war, like the first, grew out of 
 mutual suspicion and distrust. It was the policy of Rome 
 to pursue every war, not merely to the conquest, but to 
 the annihilation of her opponents ; and the Romans were 
 discontented with the peace of Sulla, as they had been dis- 
 contented with the terms granted by Scipio Africanus to 
 the Carthaginians. It was ominous, too, that the new 
 preparations of Mithradates coincided with a serious civil 
 war, and with difficulties m other parts of the empire. 
 In 77 B c. it was declared in the senate that the king was 
 only waiting his opportunity, and the garrisons of Asia 
 and Cilicia were reinforced 
 
 Mithradates, on his side, felt that a war between the 
 Romans and Tigranes was inevitable, and that he would 
 not be able to remain neutral ; and his suspicions were 
 roused by the fact that he was unable to obtain from the 
 Romans the documentary record of the terms of the last 
 peace. If there was to be war no moment could be more 
 favourable , the Sertorian v ai was at its height, and the 
 king knew that instead of a single-handed struggle against 
 the whole Roman power, he w r ould have the alliance of an 
 important section within it. Just at this time — 75 B.C. — 
 Bithynia was occupied by the Romans, in virtue of the 
 will of King Nicomedes III., who died heirless ; and 
 Cyrene, which had also been bequeathed, was made a 
 Roman province The fears of the king lest the Romans 
 meant henceforth to pursue an aggressive policy turned 
 the scale, and he yielded to the persuasions of the Roman 
 emigrants, and declared war in the winter of 75—74 B.C. 
 
 Tigranes declined the overtures of his father-in-law ; 
 but an alliance was at once concluded w T ith Sertorius and 
 with the pirates. From the former, the king obtained 
 officers for his army; from the latter, a large force of 
 ships ; as for stores, the royal granaries contained two 
 million medimni of grain. 
 
 74 B.C. — The war began with the advance of Diophantus 
 
340 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 into Cappadocia to close the road to Pontus against the 
 Romans, while agents were sent to rouse the Roman 
 province and Phrygia to revolt. The main army of 
 100,000 infantry and 16,000 cavalry advanced along the 
 coast to occupy Paphlagonia and Bithynia. 
 
 On the Roman side, the consul Lucius Lucullus, with 
 thirty thousand infantry and sixteen hundred cavalry, was 
 ordered to invade Pontus : his colleague, with the fleet and 
 a body of troops, was sent to the Propontis, to cover Asia 
 and Bithynia. A general arming of the coast was ordered, 
 and the task of clearing the seas of the pirates was en- 
 trusted to Marcus Antonius, praetor for the year. 
 
 Fortunately for the Roman government the power of 
 Sertorius began from this moment to decline, and it 
 was able to devote itself exclusively to the Asiatic war 
 At first, many cities opened their gates to the officers of 
 Mithradates ; the Roman families in them were massacred , 
 and the Pisidians, Isaurians, and Cilicians took up arms. 
 Something was done by individual energetic men like 
 Gaius Caesar, who hurried from Rhodes and raised volun • 
 teers to oppose the insurgents ; and Deiotarus, tetrarch of 
 the Tolistoboii, fought against them with success ; but 
 still Lucullus was delayed for some time in restoring 
 order in the province before he could advance. 
 
 Meantime Cotta was besieged by Mithradates in Chalce- 
 don, and, anxious to distinguish himself before his col- 
 league could arrive to relieve him, was not only repulsed 
 in a sally which he made by land, but suffered the loss of 
 all his ships, which were burnt in the harbour by the 
 enemy. On the approach of Lucullus, Mithradates moved 
 towards the Hellespont and besieged Cyzicus. The citizens 
 defended themselves with heroic vigour. The town is on 
 an island connected with the mainland by a bridge ; but 
 though the royal army was able to occupy the Dindymene 
 heights on the island itself, all efforts to storm the town 
 were in vain. Meanwhile Lucullus established himself in 
 the rear, and the besieging army was itself blockaded, and 
 could only procure supplies by sea. A storm destroyed 
 a large portion of the siege works, and the scarcity of 
 provisions became intolerable. The greater part of the 
 cavalry, which was sent to convoy some of the beasts 
 of burden, was cut to pieces as it attempted to make its 
 
RULE OF THE SULLAN RESTORATION 341 
 
 way out of the lines, and another body was forced to Teturn 
 to the camp, which suffered fearfully from famine and 
 disease. 
 
 73 B.C. — In the spring the besieged redoubled their exer- 
 tions, and the king could only try to escape and save a 
 portion of his army. He went in person with the fleet to 
 the Hellespont. The land army under Hermaeus and the 
 Roman Marius succeeded in retreating, after considerable 
 losses, to Lampsacus, which was in the hands of the king. 
 Here the arcny and all the citizens embarked and sailed 
 away. 
 
 The enemy had lost 200,000 men, but their fleet still 
 commanded the sea. With it they besieged Perinthus 
 and Byzantium on the European coast, pillaged other 
 towns, and established their head-quarters at Nicomedia. 
 A squadron of fifty sail, with ten thousand men on board, 
 destined, it is said, to effect a landing in Italy, sailed into 
 the Aegean. But Lucullus had by this time collected some 
 new ships, and captured the whole squadron at the island 
 of Neae, between Lemnos and Scyros. At the same time 
 the legates of Lucullus continued the war in Bithynia, 
 and after capturing many towns attacked the king himself 
 at Nicomedia. The king hastily fled by sea and occupied 
 Heraclea, which was betrayed to him ; but a storm sank 
 sixty of his ships and destroyed the rest, and he arrived at 
 Sinope almost alone. 
 
 Lucullus now assumed the offensive. Leaving his 
 lieutenants to blockade the Hellespont and besiege 
 Heraclea, he advanced into Pontus. The king retired 
 in order to draw Lucullus into the interior, but the 
 Romans rapidly followed him, leaving detachments to 
 blockade the towns which they passed. 
 
 72 B.C. — Winter stopped the advance of the army, but 
 not the blockades, which were continued in spite of the 
 murmurs of the soldiery. In the spring, Lucullus im- 
 mediately advanced against Cabira, where a considerable 
 army under Diophantus and Taxiles had assembled. The 
 Romans, with only three legions, were too weak to attack ; 
 and the two armies lay fronting each other, both in great 
 straits to procure supplies. Mithradates had organized a 
 flying column under the two generals mentioned above, to 
 scour the country and intercept the Roman convoys ; but 
 
342 HISTORY OF BOMB. 
 
 the lieutenant of Lucullus, Marcus Fabins Hadrianus, who 
 was escorting a store-train, not only defeated the band 
 which lay in wait for him, but, when reinforced, defeated 
 the whole column. This defeat determined the king to 
 retreat from Cabira ; but on his determination becoming 
 known a panic seized his troops, during which Lucullus 
 attacked and massacred them, as they scarcely offered 
 resistance. Had the legions been less eager for plunder, 
 not a man could have escaped The great king escaped 
 through the mountains, and finding himself pursued, took 
 refuge with his son-in-law in Armenia, where he remained 
 in a sort of honourable captivity 
 
 All the flat country of Pontus and Lesser Armenia was 
 now overrun by the Romans, and the treasure and stores 
 of the king fell into their hands. But the towns, especially 
 those on the coast, offered an obstinate resistance, many 
 of them holding out for two years. Amisus, Sinope, 
 Amastris, and Heraclea, not only defended themselves 
 desperately, but even sent out snips, which did great 
 damage by cutting off Roman supplies ; partly because 
 they were attached to the king, who had protected their 
 free Hellenic constitution, — partly overawed by the pirates, 
 who fought for the king. The reduction of these towns 
 was left to lieutenants, while Lucullus devoted himself 
 to the task of reorganizing the province of Asia. The 
 cause of Mithradates appeared hopeless Tigranes showed 
 no intention of restoring him to his kingdom , the best of 
 the Roman emigrants had fallen, or had made their peace 
 with Lucullus, and were serving in his army ; Sertoriua 
 was killed in the year of the battle of Cabira (72 B.C.) ; 
 the king's ships, as they returned from Crete and Spain, 
 were attacked and destroyed by the Romans , and even his 
 son Machares, governor of his Bosporan kingdom, deserted 
 him and made a separate peace with the Romans. Lucullus 
 applied himself to redressing the grievances of the pro- 
 vincials of Asia, and only awaited the arrival of a commis- 
 sion from the senate to reduce the Pontic kingdom into a 
 province. 
 
 A far more difficult question presented itself in the 
 relations between the kingdom of Armenia and Rome. 
 Lucullus saw clearly that the aggressions of the new 
 great king must be stopped, and the dominion of Rome 
 
-RULE OF THE SULLAN IiESTORATION. 343 
 
 over the Mediterranean re- established. Moreover, as a 
 Philhellene, he felt that, as the heritage of Alexander in the 
 East had at length come to the Romans, so they could not 
 escape the obligation of being, like Alexander, the shield 
 and sword of the Greeks in the East. But he knew that 
 the timid and incapable government at home would not, 
 unless compelled, undertake an expedition so costly and so 
 vast. Antiochus Asiaticus and his brother, the represen- 
 tatives of the Seleucidae, had already implored interference 
 in the affairs of Syria, but without result. If the war was 
 to be undertaken, it must be over the head of the home 
 government. 
 
 There were pretexts enough for a declaration of war ; 
 but, as the mission of Lucullus had reference to Mithra- 
 dates alone, he preferred to take the preliminary step of 
 sending an officer to Tigranes to demand the surrender of 
 Mithradates. The resolution was bold to rashness. In 
 the first place, Lucullus had but thirty thousand men ; and 
 he must leave behind him a large force to hold Pontus, 
 and to secure his communications. Nor, under the circum- 
 stances, could he ask for reinforcements from home ; so that 
 after incorporating in his army some of the Pontic mer- 
 cenaries, he found himself compelled to cross the Euphrates 
 with not more than fifteen thousand men. Secondly, the 
 temper of the soldiers was most dangerous. The general 
 himself was of a haughty aristocratic demeanour, un- 
 popular with the soldiers on account of the strict dis- 
 cipline which he maintained and the tremendous toils 
 which he imposed upon them. Moreover, many of his best 
 troops had served continuously ever since their arrival 
 in the East under Flaccus and Fimbria in the first Mithra- 
 datic war (86 B.C.), and justly demanded their discharge. 
 Thirdly, Lucullus had made himself widely unpopular in 
 the pi-ovince of Asia by the stern justice with which he 
 checked the usury of the Roman capitalists. 
 
 69 B.C. — The demand for the surrender of Mithradates 
 was of course refused, and in the spring of 69 B.C. the 
 Euphrates was crossed. Lucullus marched direct for 
 Tigranocerta, " whither the great king had shortly before 
 returned from Syria, after having temporarily deferred 
 the prosecution of his plans of conquest on the Mediter- 
 ranean on account of the embroilment with the Romans. 
 
3A H1ST0EY OF ROME. 
 
 He was just projecting an inroad into Roman Asia from 
 Cilicia and Lycaonia, and was considering whether the 
 Romans would at once evacuate Asia, or would previously 
 give him battle, possibly at Ephesus, when a messenger 
 interrupted him with the tidiugs of the advance of Lu- 
 cullus. He ordered him to be hanged, but the disagree- 
 able reality remained unaltered ; so he left his capital and 
 resorted to the interior of Armenia to raise a force — which 
 had not yet been done — against the Romans." Lucullus 
 held the newly raised forces of the king in check with a 
 division of his troops, and himself vigorously prosecuted 
 the siege of the city. 
 
 Mancaeus, the governor, held out bravely till Tigranes 
 had raised a huge army of relief from all parts of his 
 empire, with which he advanced to the city. Taxiles, 
 the old general of Mithradates, advised him to avoid battle 
 and starve out the enemy ; but Tigranes, seeing the 
 ridiculously small number of the Romans — not much 
 more than ten thousand men, — resolved to accept the 
 engagement which Lucullus offered him. As the 
 Armenians were forming line, Lucullus noticed that they 
 had omitted to occupy a height which commanded the 
 position of their cavalry. He hastened to occupy it, 
 diverting attention from the movement by a flank attack 
 with his cavalry. As soon as the height was reached, he 
 threw this division of his troops on the rear of the enemy's 
 cavalry. They broke, and were driven upon the infantry, 
 who were not yet formed, and who fled without striking a 
 blow. The bulletin of Lucullus announced that 100,000 
 Armenians and five Romans had fallen , and that the 
 king had thrown away his diadem and galloped off un- 
 recognized. 
 
 Tigranocerta and all the conquests of Tigranes im- 
 mediately passed into the power of the Romans. Envoys 
 arrived even from the Red Sea, Hellenes, Syrians. Jews, 
 Arabs, to do homage to their new sovereigns. But Guras, 
 brother of Tigranes, maintained himself in Mesopotamia. 
 Lucullus restored Antiochus Asiaticus to Syria, and sent 
 back the forced settlers of Tigranocerta to their homes. 
 The immense stores and wealth which were captured de- 
 frayed all the expenses of the war, and furnished a present 
 of 800 denarii (£33) for each soldier. The great king was 
 
RULE OF TEE SULLAN RESTORATION. 345 
 
 completely humbled, and peace would probably have been 
 made but for the influence of Mithradates. To him the 
 continuance of the war was the only hope of safety. He 
 represented to Tigranes that by war he had everything to 
 gain and nothing to lose, and persuaded him to entrust 
 himself with the whole management. Great exertions 
 were made to rouse the whole East against the Romans, 
 and to represent the struggle not merely as national — the 
 East against the West — as it certainly was, but also as 
 religious ; and the Asiatics flocked to the standard to 
 defend their gods against the impious invaders. Mithra- 
 dates spared no pains to make his cavalry irresistible, and 
 in the new army half the force was mounted, while the 
 •infantry were carefully selected and trained by his Pontic 
 officers. Armenia proper was to be the theatre of the 
 war, which was to be entirely defensive. 
 
 68 B.C. — The position of Lucullus became more difficult 
 every day. The senate resented his arbitrary conduct, 
 and appointed two new governors to the provinces of 
 Cilicia and Asia, restricting him to the military com- 
 mand. The capitalists were against him to a man, and did 
 everything to procure his recall ; while discontent grew 
 louder and louder in the camp, and was fostered by several 
 of the general's own officers. But Lucullus, nothing 
 daunted, resolved, like a desperate gambler, to double his 
 stakes, and to march for Artaxata, the capital of Armenia 
 proper, hoping thus to compel the king to fight. The 
 difficulties were tremendous. Troops had to be summoned 
 from Pontus to hold Tigranocerta, and, as the Armenian 
 summer lasted but four months, the whole campaign must 
 be completed in that short period. 
 
 Lucullus set out at midsummer, 68 B.C., crossed the 
 Euphrates, and at length reached the table-land of 
 Armenia, after a march continually harassed by the 
 enemy's cavalry. Winter had set in before Artaxata 
 was reached, and when the troops saw snow and ice 
 around them they mutinied, and compelled Lucullus to 
 retreat. On reaching the plain, where the season still 
 permitted operations, the Romans crossed the Tigris and 
 besieged Nisibis, the capital of Mesopotamia ; the city was 
 stormed, and the array went into winter quarters. 
 
 Meanwhile the weak Roman divisions in Pontus and at 
 
346 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 Tigranocerta had fared hardly. Mithradates once more 
 overran Pontus, and raised the country against the Romans. 
 Hadrianus, the Roman commander, after a battle lasting: 
 two days, was only just able to shut himself up in Cabira, 
 and the other lieutenants of Lucullus met with no better 
 success. 
 
 67 B.C. — These disasters, and the insubordination of his 
 troops, which had increased during the winter, compelled 
 Lucullus to recross the Euphrates ; but he was too late 
 to save the troops in Pontus, which had been defeated 
 and almost annihilated at Ziela. 
 
 At this very time, news arrived from Rome that the 
 people had resolved to grant discharge to those soldiers 
 whose term of service had expired, and to entrust the 
 conduct of the war to Manius Acilius Glabrio, consul for 
 the year. This news dissolved all the bonds of authority 
 just when Lucullus needed them most ; for, at the moment, 
 he was confronted by the Pontic army, while the main 
 army under Tigranes was advancing upon him from 
 Armenia. He tried to procure aid from the new governor 
 of Cilicia, but in vain ; while Glabrio, who had landed in 
 Asia Minor, refused to take over the command. When 
 the soldiers were ordered to advance into Armenia against 
 Tigranes, they took the road to Cappadocia and the pro- 
 vince of Asia instead, and the Fimbrians were with 
 difficulty dissuaded from disbanding at once ; but, when 
 the winter arrived, and no enemy confronted them, they 
 dispersed. 
 
 Thus the eight-years' war left the Romans exactly in 
 the same position as at the beginning. Mithradates 
 regained his old dominions and Tisrranes his conquests. 
 When we consider the means with which Lucullus accom- 
 plished all that he did, his achievements are unsurpassed 
 by those of any Roman general. His retreat from 
 Armenia to Asia Minor excels the celebrated retreat of 
 the Ten Thousand ; and, if the name of Lucullus is less 
 known than the names of other Roman generals, it is 
 probably because in war, more than in any other depart- 
 ment of human action, the judgment is awarded almost 
 solely by the final result ; and because no tolerable narra- 
 tive of his campaigns has come down to us. 
 
 The remissness of the senatorial government is most 
 
RULE 01 TUE SULLAN RESTORATION. 347 
 
 strikingly seen in the extraordinary growth of piracy. 
 The whole Mediterranean was infested with corsairs, so 
 that all traffic by sea was at an end. Th? import of corn 
 into Italy ceased, while the cornfields of the provinces 
 could find no vent for their produce. Romans of rank 
 were carried off for the sake of the ransom paid for their 
 liberation , merchants and even troops put off their 
 voyages till the winter season, preferring the risk of 
 storm and tempest to that of capture. Worst of all 
 were the outrages on the islands and coast towns of Asia 
 Minor, which were either sacked or compelled to purchase 
 safety by the payment of large sums. All the rich 
 temples of this region were plundered, and even towns one 
 or two days' march from the coast were no longer safe. 
 
 The pirates of this day were no longer mere free- 
 booters or slave-catchers, but formed a regular state, with 
 an organization, a home of their own, and at least the germs 
 of a political league. They called themselves Cilicians, 
 but drew their recruits from all sources — discharged merce- 
 naries, citizens of destroyed communities, soldiers from 
 the Sertorian or Fimbrian armies, the refugees of all 
 vanquished parties. The motto of the new state was 
 vengeance upon civil society ; its members were bound 
 together by a strong sense of fellowship — by a determina- 
 tion to be true to each other, and by loyalty to their 
 chosen chiefs. They regarded their plunder as military 
 spoil, and as in case of capture they were sure of the 
 cross, they too claimed the right of executing their 
 prisoners Their ships were small, open, and swift — 
 mostly light " myoparones," and they sailed in squadrons 
 under regularly appointed admirals. Their home was 
 the whole Mediterranean ; but their special haunts, 
 where they kept their plunder and their wives, were 
 Crete and the southern coast of Asia Minor. Here the 
 native leagues were weak, and the Roman station was in- 
 adequate for the guardianship of the whole coast; while 
 the Armenian king troubled himself little about the sea. 
 In the prevailing weakness of the legitimate governments 
 of the time the pirates gained a body of client states 
 among the Greek maritime cities, which made treaties 
 and carried on an extensive trade with them. The town 
 of Side in Pamphylia, for instance, allowed them to 
 
348 niSTOTlY OF ROME. 
 
 build ships on its quays and to sell their captures in it3 
 market. 
 
 This pirate state even formed alliances with Mitbra- 
 dates and with the Roman emigrants; it fought battles 
 with the fleets of Sulla, and some of its princes reigned 
 over many coast towns. 
 
 Evidently the Romans had shamefully neglected all the 
 duties of maritime police. Instead of keeping up a fleet 
 to guard the whole sea, they left each province and each 
 client state to defend itself as it could. Though the 
 provincials paid tribute to the Romans for their defence, 
 there was no Italian fleet. The government depended on 
 ships furnished by the maritime towns at the expense of 
 the provinces, which were even called upon to contribute 
 to the ransom of Roman captives of rank. 
 
 Though no systematic and continuous efforts were made 
 to meet the evil, there were many expeditions, which were 
 more or less successful for the time. Sulla had left in- 
 structions for the raising of a fleet which were never 
 carried out. 
 
 In 79 B.C., one of the consuls, Publius Servilius, defeated 
 the pirate fleet and destroyed the pirate towns on the 
 south coast of Asia Minor, including Olympus and 
 Phaselis, which belonged to the prince Zenicetes. He 
 next led an army over the Taurus, captured Isaura, and 
 subdued the Isaurians in the north-west of rough Cilicia. 
 His campaigns lasted for three years, and were not with- 
 out fruit ; but, naturally, the main body of the pirates 
 simply betook itself to other regions — especially Crete. 
 Nothing but the establishment of a strong maritime 
 police could meet the case ; and this the Romans would 
 not undertake. 
 
 In 74 B.C. they did entrust the clearance of the seas 
 to a single admiral in supreme command. But such 
 appointments were managed by the political clubs : and 
 the choice fell upon the praetor Marcus Antonius, who 
 was quite unfit for the post. Moreover, the government 
 did not furnish supplies and money adequate for the 
 purpose, so that the requisitions of the admiral were 
 more burdensome to the provincials than were the pirates 
 themselves. The expedition came to nothing : the Roman 
 fleet was defeated off Cydonia by the pirates and the 
 
RULE OF THE SULLAN RESTORATION. 349 
 
 Cretans combined ; Antonius died in Crete in 71 B.C. ; and 
 the government fell back upon the old system of leaving 
 each state to protect itself. 
 
 The defeat of Cydonia roused even the degenerate 
 Romans of that day from their lethargy ; yet the bribes 
 of the Cretan envoys would probably have bought off 
 Roman vengeance, had not the senate decreed the loans 
 to the envoys from Roman bankers at exorbitant interest 
 not recoverable — thus incapacitating itself for bribery. 
 The most humiliating terms were now offered to the 
 Cretans, and on their rejection Quintus Metellus, the pro- 
 consul, appeared, in 68 B.C., in Cretan waters. A battle 
 was fought under the walls of Cydonia, which the Romans 
 with difficulty won; but the siege of the towns lasted for 
 two years. With the conquest of Crete the last spot of 
 free Greek soil passed under the power of the Romans. 
 " The Cretan communities, as they were the first of all 
 Greek commonwealths to develop the free urban con- 
 stitution and the dominion of the sea, were also to be the 
 last of all the Greek maritime states formerly filling the 
 Mediterranean, to succumb to the Roman continental 
 power " 
 
 Metellus assumed the surname of Creticus, as Servilius 
 had become Isauricus ; but the power of the pirates in the 
 Mediterranean was never higher than now. The coast 
 towns paid taxes for defence to the Roman governor, and 
 blackmail to the pirates at the same time ; the admiral of 
 the Cilician army was carried off, as well as two praetors 
 with all their retinue and insignia; the Roman fleet, 
 equipped to clear the seas, was destroyed by the pirates in 
 the port of Ostia itself : and so things went on, from bad 
 to worse, until Pompeius put an end to the pest in 67 B.C. 
 
 The rule of the restored oligarchy in Macedonia, in the 
 East, and on the sea has already been reviewed ; we have 
 now to see how it fulfilled its duties within the confines 
 of Italy. 
 
 Politically and economically slavery was the curse of all 
 ancient states ; and it is to be remembered that, where this 
 institution exists, the richer and more prosperous the 
 state, the greater the proportion of slaves to the free 
 population becomes. There had already been serious 
 servile wars, and the evil had grown with the growth of 
 
350 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 the plantation system ; but the decade after the death of 
 Sulla was " the golden age of buccaneers " by sea and 
 land. Violence of all kinds was rife in the less populated 
 parts of Italy ; but the crime of abduction both of men 
 and of estates was peculiarly dangerous to the state. For 
 it was frequently perpetrated by the overseers and slaves 
 of great land-owners, who did not disdain to keep what 
 their officious subordinates had thus acquired for them ; 
 and, of course, bands of slaves and proletarians were 
 ready enough to learn their lesson, and to carry on the 
 business of plunder on their own account. Thus Italy 
 was full of inflammable material, and a spark was not 
 long wanting to set it ablaze. 
 
 In 73 B.C., a number of gladiators broke out from one of 
 the training schools of Capua, and took up a position on 
 Mount Vesuvius, under the leadership of two Celtic slaves, 
 Crixus and Oenomaus, and of Spartacus, a Thracian of 
 noble, perhaps even of royal lineage. At first only seventy - 
 four in number, they quickly increased, until aid had to be 
 sought from Rome to repel them. A hastily collected 
 army of three thousand men blockaded the mountain, but 
 when attacked by the robbers it at once fled. This 
 success of course increased the number of the insurgents, 
 and the praetor Varinius found them encamped like a 
 regular army in the plain. 
 
 The Roman militia soon became sorely weakened by 
 disease, and undermined by cowardice and insubordina- 
 tion. The greater number refused to obey the order to 
 attack, and when at length Varinius advanced, the enemy 
 had retreated southwards out of his reach. He followed, but 
 was disastrously defeated in Lucania. The robber band 
 soon rose to the number of forty thousand men; Campania 
 was overrun, and many strong towns were stormed. The 
 slaves naturally showed no more mercy to their captives 
 than was shown to themselves by their masters ; they 
 crucified their prisoners, and, with grim humour, com- 
 pelled them to slaughter each other in gladiatorial combat. 
 
 72 B.C. — For the next year both consuls were sent 
 against the slaves. The Celtic band under Crixus, which 
 had separated from the rest, was destroyed at Mount 
 Garganus in Apulia; but Spartacus won victory after 
 victory in the north, and overcame both consuls and every 
 
RULE OF THE SULLAN RESTORATION. 351 
 
 Roman commander who opposed him. Still the in- 
 surgents remained a mere band of robbers, roaming 
 aimlessly in search of plunder; and all the efforts of 
 Spartacus to restrain the mad orgies of his followers, and 
 to induce them to carry on a systematic war, were in 
 vain. Nor was the band united in itself, but separated 
 into two parts ; the one consisting of half-Greek bar- 
 barians, the other of Celts and Germans. It is said that 
 Spartacus wished after his victories to cross the Alps, and 
 lead his followers to their old homes, but was unable to 
 persuade them ; and that he then turned south to 
 blockade Rome, which again was too arduous an enter- 
 prise to suit the wishes of slaves. 
 
 The supreme command was now entrusted by the 
 Roman government to Marcus Crassus, the praetor. He 
 raised an army of eight legions, and restored discipline by 
 decimating the first division which ran away. Spartacus 
 was defeated and marched south to Rhegium, where he 
 attempted to throw a corps into Sicily, but without 
 success. Crassus followed, and made his troops build a 
 wall across the whole peninsula of Bruttium : but 
 Spartacus broke through, and in 71 B.C. appeared again 
 in Lucania. But their own disunion and arrogance were 
 more fatal to the robbers than the Roman armies. Once 
 more the Celts and Germans broke off from the rest, and 
 though after a narrow escape they once more pitched 
 their camp for safety near that of Spartacus, Crassus 
 managed to compel them to a separate engagement, and 
 slaughtered the whole body. Spartacus even now gained 
 a slight success over the Roman vanguard, but his men 
 compelled him to lead them into Apulia and to fight a 
 decisive battle. Crassus gained a. dearly bought victory ; 
 and, being joined by the troops of Pompeius from Spain, 
 he hunted out the refugees in every part of southern 
 Italy: six thousand crucified slaves lined the road from 
 Capua to Rome. 
 
 If the events of the ten years after the death of Sulla 
 are viewed as a whole, what must be the judgment on the 
 senatorial government ? The most striking fact about all 
 the movements of that period is, that though none of them 
 — neither the insurrection of Lepidus, nor the Sertorian war, 
 nor the wars in Asia and Macedonia — any more than the 
 
352 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 risings of the pirates and of the slaves constituted a really 
 great and serious danger, yet they were allowed to grow 
 by neglect into struggles in which the very existence of the 
 empire was at stake. " It was no credit to Rome that the 
 two most celebrated generals of the government party had, 
 during a struggle of eight years, marked by more defeats 
 than victories, failed to master the insurgent chief Ser- 
 torius and his Spanish guerillas ; and that it was only the 
 dasher of his friends that decided tue Sercorian war in 
 favour of the legitimate government. As to the slaves, 
 it was far less an honour to have conquered them than 
 a disgrace to have been pitted against them in equal 
 strife for years. Spartacus, ton, as well as Hannibal, had 
 traversed Italy with an army from the Po to the Sicilian 
 straits, beaten both consuls, and threatened Rome with 
 blockade. The enterprise which it required the greatest 
 general of antiquity to undertake against the Rome of 
 former days, could be undertaken against the Rome of 
 the present by a daring captain of banditti." 
 
 The external wars produced a result less unsatisfactory, 
 but quite disproportionate to the expenditure of money 
 and men. The Romans were driven from the sea; and in 
 Asia, iu spite of the ganius of Lucullus, the result was 
 tantamount to defeat. And though, to some extent, evpry 
 class in the Roman state is responsible for this deplorable 
 state of affairs, as " every rotten stone in the building 
 helps to bring about the ruin of the whole," yet, in great 
 part, it can be distinctly traced to the mismanagement of 
 the governing body. For instance, the failure of the 
 Asiatic war was due to the remissness of the government io 
 abandoning their client states in the first instance, and to 
 their neglect to support their general after the war had 
 begun ; while the power of the pirates was clue to the 
 culpable reluctance of the government to deal with the 
 evil in the comprehensive manner by which alone it could 
 be met. To sum up : " The material benefits which a 
 state exists to confer — security of frontier, undisturbed 
 peaceful intercourse, legal protection, and regulated ad- 
 ministration — began, all of them, to vani sh for the whole 
 of the nations united in the Roman state ; the gods of 
 blessing seemed all of them to have ascended to Olympus, 
 and to have left the miserable earth at the mercy of official 
 
RULE OF THE SULLAN RESTORATION. 353 
 
 or volunteer plunderers and tormentors. Nor was this 
 decay of the state felt as a public misfortune by such only 
 as had political rights and public spirit ; the insurrection 
 of the proletariate, and the prevalence of brigandage and 
 piracy carried the sense of this decay into the remotest 
 valley and the humblest hut of Italy, and made every one 
 who pursued trade or commerce, or who bought even a 
 bushel of wheat, feel it as a personal calamity." 
 
 AUTHORITIES. 
 
 Thracian and Dalmatian icars. — Liv. Epit. 91, 92, 95, 103. Flor. iii. 4. 
 Eastern war. — Liv. Epit. 93-98. Flor. iii. 5. Veil. ii. 33. Eutrop. 
 
 vi. 8-11. Justin, xxxvii. 2, 3 ; xxxviii. 1-3, 5. Plut. Lucull. 
 
 5-37. Appian Mithr. 67-91. Memn. 37-57. Oros. vi. 2. Strab. 
 
 xii. 546, 547. Sail. Hist. frag. lib. iv., vi. Cic. pro L. Maoil. 
 
 2, 5, 8, 9 ; pro Murena, 15 ; ad Att. xiii. 6. Dio. xxxv. 1-17. 
 Pirates.— Liv. Epit. 90, 93, 98-100. Flor. iii. 6, 7. Veil. ii. 31, 32. 
 
 Eutrop. vi. 12. Appian Mithr. 91-93 ; Sic. 6. Oros. v. 23. 
 
 Strab. xiv. 667, 671. Frontin. in. vii. 1. Val. Max. viii. 5, 6. 
 
 Tac. Ann. xii. 62. Cic. in Verr. ii. 3 ; iii. 91. Plut. Pomp. 24. 
 
 Suet. Jul. 4. Dio. xxxvi. 3-7. 
 Spartacus. — Plut. Pomp. 21. Crass. 8-11. Liv. Epit. 95-97. Appian 
 
 B. C. i. 116-120. Veil. ii. 30; iii. 20. Flor. iii. 19. 
 
 Note on the will of Alexander, king of Egypt. — Mommsen ascribes 
 this document to Alexander II., who died in 81 B.C., not, as most 
 authorities, to Alexander I., ob. 88 B.C. His chief argument is that 
 Alexander II. was the last of the genuine Lagidae, and the similar 
 testaments of the kings of Pergamus, Cyrene and Bithynia were all 
 executed by the last representative of the ruling family. The fact 
 that the treasure bequeathed was deposited at Tyre is accounted 
 for by the fact that Alexander was killed only nineteen days after 
 his arrival in Egypt (Letronne, Inscrr. de l'Egypte, ii. 20) ; and the 
 words of Cicero (De L. Agr. i. 4, 15, 16) are not inconsistent with 
 the assignment of the will to the year 81 B.C. 
 
 23 
 
354 BISTORT OF ROME. 
 
 CHAPTER XXX. 
 
 FALL OF THE OLIGARCHY — RULE OF POMPEIUS. 
 
 Abuses of the senatorial rule : powerlessness of the aristocrats — 
 Coalition of Pompeius and Crassus with the democratic party — 
 Pompeius becomes practically Regent of the Empire by means 
 of the Gabinian and Manilian laws. 
 
 The new government had survived the danger of external 
 war and of insurrection in Italy. We have now to con- 
 sider its relations with parties in Rome during the same 
 decade of years. With characteristic want of energy it 
 had not even completed the half-finished arrangements of 
 Sulla. The lands destined by him for distribution had not 
 been parcelled out ; even domain lands were again occupied 
 in the old arbitrary fashion which prevailed before the 
 Gracchan reforms. Whatever in the new constitution was 
 inconvenient to the optimates was ignored, such as the 
 disfranchisement of particular communities and the pro- 
 hibition against conjoining the new farms. 
 
 Still the Gracchan constitution remained formally 
 abolished, and it was the aim of the democratic party to 
 restore it in its main features , so the old watchwords were 
 heard again — the corn-largesses, the tribunician power, 
 and the reform of the senatorial tribunals. The govern- 
 ment consented, in the year of Sulla's death (78 B.C.), to a 
 limited revival of the corn distributions ; and in 73 B.C. 
 a new corn-law regulated the purchases of Sicilian grain 
 for this purpose. 
 
 The agitation regarding the tribunician power was begun 
 as early as 76 B.C., and continued in later years, though 
 without result. But for the reform of the tribunals the 
 
FALL OF THE OLIGARCHY. 355 
 
 cry was louder and the need more pressing. The crime of 
 extortion had become habitual, and the condemnation of 
 any man of influence could scarcely be obtained. Not 
 only was there a fellow-feeling with the accused on the 
 part of the senatorial jurymen, many of whom had either 
 been guilty or hoped some day to be guilty of a similar 
 offence, but the sale of the votes of the jurymen had 
 become an established custom. A specially flagrant case 
 might provoke an outcry for the time, but, generally 
 speaking, bribery was so universal that "the commission 
 as to extortions might be regarded as an institution for 
 taxing the senators returning from the provinces for the 
 benefit of their colleagues that remained at home." Even 
 Roman citizens in the provinces, unless senators or 
 equites, were no longer safe from the rods and axes of 
 the Roman magistrates. The opposition did not fail to 
 avail itself of this state of things ; for the prosecution 
 of a powerful opponent in the law courts was the only 
 weapon left to it. So Caesar prosecuted Gnaeus Dolabella 
 and Gaius Antonius, and Cicero made himself famous by 
 his indictment of Verres ; while the whole party loudly 
 demanded the restoration of the tribunician power and of 
 the equestrian tribunals, and the renewal of the censorship 
 as the only means of purifying the governing board. 
 
 With all this no progress was made ; the restoration of 
 corn distributions had conciliated the mob of the capital, 
 and the senate could afford to be resolute on the other 
 points. Some slight concession was made with regard 
 to the exiles of the insurrection of Lepidus ; and the in- 
 fluence of Gaius Cotta, leader of the moderate reform 
 party in the senate, abolished the provision which forbade 
 the tribunes of the plebs to stand for other magistracies ; 
 but the other restrictions remained, and neither party was 
 satisfied. 
 
 The present condition of affairs, so happy for the 
 government, was completely changed by the return of 
 Pompeius from Spain in 71 B.C. Pompeius belonged to the 
 optimates, but he was very little at home in his own party. 
 He had ambition above that of the ordinary aristocrat, and 
 could not be content with passing through the regular 
 routine of office, with nothing before him but a luxurious 
 and indolent retirement. Yet this was all that his own 
 
356 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 party could offer. The command in the Mithradatic war, 
 which he ardently desired, he knew the senate would never 
 give him. The interests of the oligarchy could not permit 
 him to add fresh laurels to those he had already gained in 
 Africa and Europe ; they dared not entrust the Eastern 
 command to any but the most approved and stanchest 
 aristocrat. And there were other grounds of dissension 
 It was only with reluctance that the senate had conferred 
 upon him the Spanish command ; while, in return, the 
 general accused the government of neglecting the Spanish 
 armies and endangering the expedition Moreover, he 
 demanded for himself a triumph and the consulship, and 
 for his soldiers assignations of land But Pompeius had 
 never filled any of the subordinate magistracies, and 
 therefore could not legally be consul. Nor could he 
 triumph, for, in spite of his extraordinary commands, he 
 had never been invested with the ordinary supreme power 
 There were but two courses open to him : he could either 
 make his demands openly at the head of his army and in- 
 timidate the senate into compliance, or he could ally him- 
 self with the democrats. The timid nature of Pompeius 
 and his want of political adroitness inclined him to the 
 latter course ; he thus gained for himself able political 
 adjutants like Gaius Caesar, while the forlorn democratic 
 party were only too glad of the alliance — they knew that 
 the government could refuse no demand presented by so 
 formidable a combination. 
 
 There was still one man whose influence, though it might 
 not be able to give victory to either side, was yet consider- 
 able. This was Marcus Crassus, who was at the head of the 
 army with which he had crushed the servile rising, and 
 who, moreover, was the richest man in Rome, and had great 
 influence in the political clubs. He, like Pompeius, was 
 a Sullan, but had personal aims, quite outside the ordinary 
 constitutional routine. He chose the safer course of join- 
 ing the coalition, and was welcomed by the democrats, who 
 were not unpleased to find in him a possible counterpoise 
 to the now all-powerful Pompeius. This, the first coalition, 
 took place in the summer of 71 B.C. The terms were 
 simple. The generals adopted the democratic programme, 
 while they were to have the consulship for the following 
 year. Pompeius, in addition, was to get his triumph and 
 
FALL OF THE OLIGARCHY. 357 
 
 the allotments promised to bis soldiei'S, and Crassus the 
 honour of a solemn entrance into the capital. The seDate 
 had nothing to oppose to the coalition, for Metellus had 
 already disbanded bis troops. They granted the necessary 
 dispensations, and Pompeius gave formal adherence to the 
 democratic proposals in an assembly of the people. 
 
 The Sullan constitution was now speedily abolished. 1. 
 Pompeius himself, as consul, introduced a law restoring to 
 the tribunes all their old prerogatives, especially the right 
 of initiating legislation. 2. The law-courts were reformed 
 by the lex Aurelia of Lucius Cotta, the praetor, and brother 
 of Gaius Cotta (p. 355) ; and this fact, taken together with 
 the provisions of the law itself, seems to show that the 
 moderate senatorial party lent its support to the coalition : 
 for the senators were not altogether excluded from the 
 roll of jurymen, who in future were to be composed one- 
 third of senators, two-thirds of equestrians ; but, of the 
 latter, one-half must have filled the office of tribuni aerarii, 
 or district presidents. As these officers were elected by 
 the tribes, one-third of the jurymen were now indirectly 
 elective. 3. The farming system was reintroduced for the 
 taxes of the Asiatic province ; this, of course, was to con- 
 ciliate the capitalists at the expense of the provincials. 
 4. The censorship was restored — probably without the 
 earlier limitation which restricted the term of office to 
 eighteen months. The two first censors under the new 
 law were two consulars who had been removed by the 
 senate from their commands against Spartacus. They now 
 revenged themselves by expelling eighty-four senators 
 (one-eighth of the whole). 
 
 The constitution of Sulla had been based on a monopoly 
 of power by the senate, and on the political annihilation of 
 every other class in the state ; but under the new arrange- 
 ment the senate was held in check by fear of the censors 
 and of the equestrian jurymen. The tribunes of the people 
 could propose new laws and overturn any existing arrange- 
 ments at will, while the moneyed classes, as farmers of 
 the revenue and as judges of the provincial governors, 
 again raised their heads beside the senate. 
 
 The democrats had further aims, such as the recall of 
 the proscribed and the punishment of the murderers of 
 the Sullan proscriptions ; but the generals had been too 
 
358 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 intimately connected with these events to take any part in 
 such measures, and nothing was done beyond the collection 
 of the outstanding purchase-money for estates confiscated 
 by Sulla. 
 
 Meanwhile the armies of the two generals still lay before 
 the walls of Rome, and the danger was great lest Pompeius 
 should yield to the temptation of making himself absolute 
 master of the city and of the empire. The coalition had 
 only one bond of union — the desire to destroy the Sullan 
 constitution ; that work was now accomplished, and the 
 combination was in reality dissolved. Crassus had through- 
 out played an inferior part, and his terror became so great 
 that he began to make advances to the senate and to 
 attempt to gain over the mob by immense largesses. But 
 Pompeius really lacked the courage to take a decisive 
 step ; he wished to be master of Rome and loyal citizen 
 at the same time. The adroit leaders of the democratic 
 party plied him with flatteries, urged him to surpass his 
 former services to the state by a still greater victory, and 
 to banish the fearful spectre of civil war. Crassus was 
 induced to make the first overtures for disbandment, and at 
 length the great general yielded, and the troops dispersed. 
 The Mithradatic war appeared now at an end (70 B.C.), 
 and as Pompeius would not accept a province he retired 
 at the expiry of his consulship wholly from public affairs. 
 
 During the next few years the condition of parties was 
 very much what it had been before the time of Sulla. The 
 direction of affairs lay with the senate, while the constitu- 
 tion through which it governed was pervaded by a hostile 
 spirit. The democrats were impotent without a leader; 
 and the chief feature of the period is the increase of the 
 influence of the capitalist party, which, though courted by 
 both sides, on the whole drew closer to the senate. Their 
 influence is seen in the law of the year 67 B.C., which restored 
 to them the fourteen special benches in the theatre, and in 
 the fact that the senate withdrew, at their instance, the 
 administration of Asia from Lucius Lucullus. 
 
 But the course of the war in the East soon brought 
 about a change (see p. 346). All the conquests in the East 
 were lost, and the sea was given up to the undisputed 
 sway of the pirates. The democrats eagerly seized the 
 opportunity of settling accounts with the senate, and 
 
FALL OF THE OLIGARCHY. 359 
 
 Pompeius saw once more before him an opportunity of 
 gratifying his ambition. Accordingly, in 67 B.C., two 
 projects of law were introduced in the assembly of the 
 tribes at his instigation. 
 
 1. The first measure decreed the discharge of the soldiers 
 in the East who had served their term ; and the substitution 
 of Glabrio, one of the consuls of the year, for Lucullus in 
 the command. 
 
 2. The second proposed a comprehensive plan for clearing 
 the seas from pirates. The terms of the proposal are 
 extraordinary, and require close attention. 
 
 (a) A generalissimo was to be appointed by the senate 
 from the consulars, to hold supreme command over the 
 whole Mediterranean and over all the coasts for fifty miles 
 inland, concurrently with the ordinary governors, for three 
 years. 
 
 (b) He might select from the men of senatorial rank 
 twenty-five lieutenants with praetorian powers, and two 
 treasurers with quaestorian power. 
 
 (c) He might raise an army of 120,000 infantry and 
 7000 cavalry, and a fleet of 500 ships ; and for this purpose 
 might dispose absolutely of all the resources of the 
 provinces. Besides this, a large sum of money and a con- 
 siderable force of men and ships were at once handed over 
 to him. 
 
 By the introduction of this law the government was 
 practically taken out of the hands of the senate ; it was 
 the final collapse of the oligarchic rule. But it was more 
 than this — it was practically the institution of an unlimited 
 dictatorship. 
 
 1. Like all extraordinary commands, this new office no 
 doubt required the confirmation of the people ; but it was 
 an undoubted prerogative of the senate to define the sphere 
 of every command, and, in fact, to control and limit it in 
 all ways. The people had hitherto interfered only on the 
 proposition of the senate, or at any rate of a magistrate 
 himself qualified for the office of general. Even during 
 the Jugurthan Avar, when the command was transferred to 
 Marius by popular vote, it was only to Marius as consul 
 for the year. But now a private man was to be invested 
 by the tribes with extraordinary authority, and the sphere 
 of his office was defined by themselves. 
 
300 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 2. The new commander was empowered to confer prae- 
 torian powers — that is, the highest military and civil 
 authority — upon adjutants chosen by himself, though 
 hitherto such authority could only be conferred with the 
 co-operation of the burgesses. 
 
 3. The office of general was usually conferred for one 
 year only, with strict limitations as to forces and supplies ; 
 but now the whole resources of the state were committed 
 almost without reserve to one man. 
 
 Thus at one stroke the government was taken out of the 
 hands of the senate, and the fortunes of the empire com- 
 mitted for the next three years to a dictator. The step, 
 no doubt, was in accordance with the wishes of Pompeius, 
 for it would naturally lead in the end to the command 
 against Mithradates, and it gave him an extraordinary 
 position in the state without violating constitutional forms. 
 Still, it was probably due immediately to the instigation 
 of his bold adherents, in particular of Aulus Gabinius, 
 the tribune, who proposed the law, who grasped the 
 situation more completely than Pompeius himself, and took 
 the decision out of his hands. The senate and the moneyed 
 aristocracy alike were furious, while the democrats, though 
 they could not but dislike a bill which threatened to annihi- 
 late all parties, dared not break with their ally ; accord- 
 ingly, Caesar and Lucius Quinctius supported the measure. 
 The scarcity of corn, and the rumours as to the conduct 
 of Lucullus were enough to secure the support of the 
 multitude. 
 
 On the day of the voting, the Forum and even the roofs 
 of the buildings around were covered with men. All the 
 colleagues of Gabinius had promised to veto the measure ; 
 but only one, Lucius Trebellius, had the courage to keep 
 his pledge. Gabinius immediately proposed to deal with 
 him as Tiberius Gracchus had dealt with Octavius, but 
 after seventeen tribes had voted, Trebellius withdrew his 
 veto. All was now lost ; attempts were made to secure 
 the appointment of two generals instead of one, and to 
 make the twenty-five lieutenant-generals eligible by the 
 tribes, but the bill passed without alteration. 
 
 Pompeius and Glabrio immediately set out. The success 
 of Pompeius was rapid and complete ; indeed, such was the 
 confidence in his powers that the price of grain had fallen 
 
FALL OF THE OLIGARCHY. 361 
 
 to the ordinaiy rate as soon as the law was passed. But 
 in Asia the condition of affairs passed from bad to worse ; 
 Glabrio, instead of taking command of the forces, con- 
 tented himself with fomenting the discontent of the soldiers 
 against Lucullus, who, of course, was powerless. It seemed 
 the most natural course to appoint Pompeius to the Asiatic 
 command, which he was known to ardently desire. But 
 no party in the state was willing to increase his already 
 enormous authority. At this juncture, Gaius Manilius, a 
 tribune, who was without influence in either party, wishing 
 to force himself into the favour of the great general, brought 
 forward a proposal to recall Glabrio from Pont us and 
 Bithynia, and Marcius Rex from Cilicia, and to confer both 
 their offices — apparently without limit of time — together 
 with free authority to conclude peace and alliance, upon the 
 proconsul of the seas and coasts. (Early in 66 B.C.) The 
 proposal was repugnant to every party, and jet was passed 
 almost unanimously. The democrats concealed their fears, 
 and openly supported it ; the moderate optirnates declared 
 themselves on the same side ; they saw that resistance was 
 hopeless, and that their best policy was to try to bind 
 Pompeius to the senate. Marcus Cicero made his first 
 political speech in support of it, and the only opposition 
 was from the strict aristocratic party headed by Quintus 
 Catulus. Thus, by the action of an irresponsible dema- 
 gogue, Pompeius, in addition to his former powers, ob- 
 tained command of the most important Eastern provinces, 
 and the conduct of a war of which no man could foresee 
 the end. " Never since Rome stood had such power been 
 united in the hands of a single man." 
 
 The two laws of Gabinius and Manilius terminate the 
 struggle between the senate and the popular party, which 
 was begun sixty-seven years before by Tiberius Gracchus. 
 The first breach in the existing constitution was made 
 when the veto of Octavius was disregarded by Tiberius 
 Gracchus ; and the last bulwark of senatorial rule fell in 
 like manner with the withdrawal of Trebellius. But the 
 struggle, which was begun by men of high ideals and of 
 noble personal character, was brought to a close by venal 
 and intriguing demagogues. And the contrast was but 
 an indication of the change which the whole state had 
 undergone ; everything — law, military discipline, life and 
 
362 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 manners — had changed. A comparison between the Grac- 
 chan ideal and its later realization could only provoke a 
 painful smile. 
 
 But the end of the first struggle was but the beginning 
 of a second — of a new struggle between the allies who bad 
 overthrown their common enemy the senate, between the 
 democratic civil opposition and the military power. The 
 exceptional position of Porapeius was incompatible with a 
 republican constitution : he was not general, but regent 
 of the empire. If, at the close of his Eastern campaign, 
 he sbould stretch forth his arm and seize the crown, 
 who was to prevent him ? " ' Soon,' exclaimed Catulus, 
 ' it would be necessary once more to flee to the rocks of 
 the Capitol, in order to save liberty.' It was not the fault 
 of the prophet that the storm came not, as he expected, 
 from the East, but that, on the contrary, fate, fulfilling his 
 words more literally than he himself anticipated, brought 
 on a destroying tempest a few years later from Gaul." 
 
 AUTHORITIES. 
 
 Liv. Epit. 97-100. Plut. Pomp. 21-23, 25, 36. Crass. 11-12. Cic. 
 
 ad Att. vii. 9, 10; pro L. Manil. pro Cornel, frag. Dio. xxxvi. 
 
 6-20. Appiaa B. C, i. 121 ; Mithr. 97. Ascon. in Corn. U4, 65. 
 
 Veil. ii. 31-33. Sail. Hist. Frag. iii. Letter of Pompeius; 
 
 Speech of Licinius Macer. Licinianns, frag. 
 Restoration of free corn. — Licin. fra?. Cie. in Verr. iii. 70, 136 ; v. 
 
 21, 52. Momms. V. i. note. Sail. Hist. iii. 61. 
 Gains Cotta's concessions. — Cic. fr. pro Cor. 25 (Nobbe) and Ascon. in 
 
 Cor. Sail. H. fr. iii. Or. Lie. Mac. 
 Lex Aurelia Judiciaria. — Liv. Ep. 97. Suet. Jul. 41. 
 Publicani restored. — Marq. Stv. 185. 
 
CHAPTER XXXI. 
 
 POMPEIUS AND THE EAST. 
 
 67 B.C. The Mediterranean cleared of pirates — Command against 
 Mithradates conferred on Pompeius. — 66-64 b.c. War with 
 Mithradates — His death. — 61-62 b.c. Pompeius regulates the 
 affairs of Syria and Asia. — 59 B.C. Ptolemy Auletes acknow- 
 ledged king of Egypt by Rome. — 58 B.C. Annexation of Cyprus. 
 
 Pompeius began the work of subjugating the pirates by 
 dividing the whole field of operations into thirteen 
 districts, each of which was assigned to a lieutenant, who 
 equipped vessels, searched the coast, and captured the 
 ships of the freebooters. He himself, with the best of his 
 6hips, swept the Sicilian, African, and Sardinian waters, 
 while his lieutenants dealt with the coasts of Spain and 
 Gaul. Within forty days the western Mediterranean was 
 free, and the dearth at Rome relieved. The general now 
 repaired, with sixty of his vessels, to Lycia and Cilicia. 
 The pirates everywhere disappeared from the sea on his 
 approach, and many even of the mountain strongholds of 
 Lycia accepted the terms offered to them, and opened their 
 gates. But the Cilicians, after placing their families and 
 their treasures in their strongholds, awaited the Romans, 
 with a large fleet, off the western frontier of Cilicia. 
 Pompeius gained a complete victory ; landed and subdued 
 the strongholds, and in forty-nine days after his first 
 appearance in the eastern seas brought the war to a close. 
 The whole affair was, of course, rather an energetic and 
 skilful police-raid than a victorious war ; but the rapidity of 
 the achievement was astounding, and made a great impres- 
 sion on the public mind. Thirteen hundred pirate vessels 
 
334 HISTORY OF 110MK 
 
 are said to have been destroyed ; ten thousand pirates 
 perished, and more than twenty thousand were captured, 
 while numerous captive Romans, among them Publius 
 Clodius, regained their liberty (67 B.C.). 
 
 An interlude of the pirate war in the island of Crete 
 shows the indescribable weakness and disorganization of 
 the central government at the period. In the year 67 B.C. 
 Quintus Metellus was in Crete, completing the subjugation 
 of the island ; the command of Pompeius extended over 
 the whole island, as it was nowhere more than eighty 
 miles broad (see p. 359). Out of consideration for 
 Metellus, Pompeius did not assign it to any lieutenant ; 
 but the Cretan towns, seeing that Pompeius was acting 
 with the greatest clemency, preferred to make their 
 surrender to him. He accepted their submission, and 
 sent Lucius Octavius to take over the towns. Metellus, 
 however, ignoi*ed these negotiations, and continued the 
 sieges ; and when Octavius summoned troops from Achaia 
 formal conflicts took place, several towns were stormed by 
 Metellus, and in one of them Octavius was taken prisoner, 
 but afterwards released. The island was at last subdued 
 by Metellus, and nothing came of these scandalous pro- 
 ceedings beyond a bitter correspondence between the twc 
 generals ! \+i fact, the new civil war had already begun. 
 
 Meanwhile, Pompeius remained in Cilicia, ostensibly 
 preparing for a Cretan campaign, bat really waiting for a 
 pretext to interfere in the affairs of Asia Minor. At 
 length the Manilian law gave him the desired authority; 
 but in the midst of more important matters the pirates 
 were not iorgotten. Pompeius caused a fleet to be main- 
 tained to protect the Asiatic coasts, and on his return to 
 Rome persuaded the senate to take similar measures for 
 Italy ; and though there were subsequent expeditions in 
 58 B.C. and in 55 B.C., piracy never regained its old pre- 
 dominance in the Mediterranean. 
 
 As soon as Pompeius was invested by the Manilian law 
 with the command he had so long desired, he began 
 strenuously to prepare for his new campaign. At the 
 outset a great piece of good fortune befell him. A son 
 of the great king Tigranes, who bore the same name as 
 his father, rebelled, and took refuge at the Parthian 
 court, and by his influence determined that power to 
 
POMPEIUS AND THE EAST. 365 
 
 adhere to the Roman side and to renew with Pompeius 
 the agreement formed with Lucullus to accept the 
 Euphrates as the boundary of the two empires. At 
 the same time the great king suspected Mithradates of 
 secretly encouraging his rebellious son, and the good 
 understanding between the two monarchs was disturbed. 
 Meanwhile Pompeius completed his preparations, and 
 collected a force of from 40,000 to 50,000 men, many 
 of whom were discharged Fimbrian veterans who had 
 enlisted again as volunteers. 
 
 In the spring of 66 B.C. Pompeius took over the com- 
 mand of the legions from Lucullus, but the meeting of the 
 two generals, from which a reconciliation had been hoped 
 for, ended in bitter recriminations. The Roman army 
 then invaded Pontus, where they were opposed by a force 
 of 30,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry under Mithradates. 
 The king refused to surrender unconditionally, and 
 retreated slowly, seizing every opportunity to inflict 
 damage upon the Romans. At length Pompeius, weary 
 of the pursuit, desisted, and began to subdue the country. 
 He reached the Upper Euphrates, and crossed it, but was 
 intercepted by Mithradates in the Acilisenian province at 
 the castle of Dasteira. Pompeius now retreated into 
 Pontic Armenia, and waited the arrival of the troops 
 expected from Cilicia ; with these he once more took the 
 offensive and blockaded the Pontic army in its camp. 
 When the king escaped secretly by night, Pompeius 
 followed, and finding himself drawn further and further 
 into an unknown country, made a circuit unknown to the 
 enemy, and occupied a defile in front of them, on the southern 
 bank of the river Lycus. At the close of the next day's 
 march, the Pontic army encamped in this very valley, the 
 heights of which were commanded by the Romans. In the 
 silence of the night the terrible battle-cry of the legions 
 broke forth, and missiles were showered on the Asiatic 
 host, scarcely one of which failed to take effect upon the 
 dense mass. A charge of the legions followed, by which 
 the whole army was annihilated. The king escaped with 
 but three attendants to the fortress of Sinoria, whence he 
 hastened, with what stragglers he could bring together, 
 towards Armenia. But the moment was unfavourable. 
 Tigranes had just succeeded in ridding his kingdom of the 
 
S6C HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 Parthian corps which had invaded it and besieged Artaxata, 
 and was negotiating with the Romans for a separate 
 peace. A price of one hundred talents (£24,000) was set 
 upon the head of Mithradates, and the old king had to 
 fly northwards towards his Bosporan kingdom, while 
 Pompeius turned aside to settle matters with Tigranes. 
 The latter was resolved to purchase peace at any price, 
 and hastened to throw himself at Pompeius' feet, and to 
 place in his hands the diadem and tiara in token of un- 
 conditional surrender. He had to pay a fine of six 
 thousand talents (£1,400,000) besides a present of fifty 
 denarii (£1 16s.) to each of the Roman soldiers ; and to 
 cede all his conquests in Syria, Phoenicia, Cilicia, and 
 Cappadocia, besides Sophene and Carduene, east of the 
 Euphrates. He thus became once more merely king of 
 Armenia. In one campaign Pompeius had utterly routed 
 the mighty monarchs of Pont us and Armenia ; and his 
 army wintered on Armenian soil, in the country between 
 the Upper Euphrates and the river Kur. 
 
 During the winter, and before starting to cross the 
 Caucasus in pursuit of Mithradates, Pompeius had to repel 
 the attacks of the Iberians and Albanians — two tribes 
 which had preserved their independence from time 
 immemorial in the country watered by the Kur, at the 
 foot of the Caucasus range, and who fought chiefly with 
 arrows and light javelins, which they often discharged, like 
 the North American Indians, from lurking places in the 
 woods or from behind trees. He then led his army down 
 the Phasis to the Black Sea, where the fleet aw r aited him. 
 But the long march over the mountains, through unknown 
 country peopled by hostile tribes, appeared too dangerous 
 an enterprise to be undertaken on the mere chance of 
 capturing Mithradates ; an insurrection of the Albanians 
 gave a pretext for retreat, and, ordering the fleet to 
 blockade the Bosporus, Pompeius returned to the Alba- 
 nian plain. The force of the Albanians and their allies 
 was said to amount to sixty thousand infantry and twelve 
 thousand cavalry. With this they attacked the Roman 
 cavalry, not knowing that the masses of the infantry were 
 drawn up behind the horsemen ; the legions soon drove 
 the enemy into a wood, which was set on fire. After this 
 engagement the Albanians, Iberians, and other neigh- 
 
POMPEIUS AND THE EAST. 367 
 
 bouring tribes made peace, and thus, for a time at least, 
 were brought into relations of dependence upon Rome. 
 
 In the mean timeMithradates bad reached Panticapaeum, 
 where he drove bis rebellious son Macbares from the 
 tbrone, and forced bim to commit suicide. He knew the 
 deep hatred with which Orientals regarded tbe Roman 
 domination, and was well acquainted with tbe laxity of 
 the senatorial rule ; hence he was not without hopes of 
 establishing some day his old dominion. For the present 
 he sent envoys, asking that his paternal kingdom should 
 be restored to him, and offered to pay tribute as a 
 vassal to Rome. But Pompeius insisted upon personal 
 submission ; and Mithradates immediately began to strain 
 every nerve to raise a new army. He had collected 
 a force of thirty-six thousand men, armed and dis- 
 ciplined after the Roman fashion, and a war fleet. It 
 was rumoured that he intended to march through Thrace, 
 Macedonia, and Pannonia, and, carrying with him the 
 Scythians and the Celts from the Danube, to throw himself 
 like an avalanche upon Italy from the north. But these 
 preparations had caused the severest suffering to his 
 subjects, whose houses had been destroyed and their oxen 
 slaughtered to furnish beams and sinews for the engines 
 of war; moreover Mithradates had never possessed the 
 gift of calling forth the affection and fidelity of his 
 servants ; and, lastly, the Roman emigrants and deserters, 
 for reasons of their own, were extremely disinclined for 
 the rumoured expedition into Italy. Treason was every- 
 where rife, and the standard of insurrection was raised at 
 Phanagoria by Castor, who delivered up the sons of Mith- 
 radates to the Romans. Pharnaces, the favourite son of 
 the king, headed the insurrection, the troops and the fleet 
 joined it, and at last the city of Panticapaeum opened its 
 gates and delivered over the king, shut up in his castle. 
 The latter in vain entreated Pharnaces to spare his life ; 
 he then compelled his wives and daughters and concubines 
 to swallow the poisoned draught, after which he drained it 
 himself, and then, too impatient to wait for death, presented 
 his neck to the stroke of a Celtic mercenary. He was in 
 the sixty-eighth year of his life and tbe fifty-seventh of 
 his reign. For years he had sustained an unequal contest 
 with a superior foe, without success indeed, but yet with 
 
3C3 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 honour : and the Romans regarded his death as a victory, 
 just as Scipio had triumphed even more over Hannibal 
 than over Carthage. 
 
 Pompeius had completed the reduction of Pontus, and 
 in the summer of 64 B.C. set out to regulate the affairs of 
 Syria. The Syrian provinces were now in the hands of 
 three powers — the Bedouins, the Jews, and the Nabataeana. 
 The Bedouins, who were masters of northern Syria, 
 had their home in the desert which stretches from the 
 peninsula of Arabia up to the Euphrates, where they 
 lived under their emirs, the most noted of whom were 
 Abgarus and Sampsiceramus. The Jews, under Jannaeus 
 Alexander, who died in 79 B.C., had extended their dominion 
 south wai-ds to the Egyptian frontier, and northwards to 
 the Lake of Gennesareth, including a considerable stretch 
 of coast. Their further expansion was checked by internal 
 dissension between the Pharisees and the Sadducees. 
 Their fierce religious and political contentions broke out 
 with violence after the death of Jannaeus, and a civil 
 war ensued, in which the Pharisees supported one of his 
 sons, Hyrcanus, and the Sadducees another, Aristobulus, 
 a strong and able prince. These divisions gave an oppor- 
 tunity to the Nabataeans, who were settled in the region 
 of Petra, to obtain a footing in southern Syria. At the 
 invitation of the Pharisees, the Nabataean king Aretas 
 advanced with a large force and besieged Aristobulus in 
 Jerusalem. 
 
 To pnt an end to the anarchy Pompeius resolved to 
 annex Syria, and in the person of Antiochus Asiaticus, 
 who had been acknowledged by the senate and by Lu- 
 cullus, the house of Seleucus was ejected from the throne 
 it had held for two hundred and fifty years. At the same 
 time, Pompeius advanced with his army into the province, 
 and enforced his regulations, where necessary, by arms. 
 The Jews alone refused to obey, and when Aristobulus, after 
 much hesitation, resolved to submit, the more fanatical 
 portion of his army would not comply with his orders, 
 and sustained a siege of three months on the steep temple 
 rock. The Nabataeans still remained. King Aretas 
 retired from Judaea, but retained the city of Damascus, 
 and would not acknowledge the supremacy of Rome. The 
 expedition against him was entrusted to Marcus Scaurus ; 
 
POMrEIUS AND THE EAST. 3G9 
 
 it obtained only trifling successes, but ultimately Aretas 
 was persuaded to purchase for a sum of money a guarantee 
 for all his possessions, includiug Damascus, from the 
 Roman governor. 
 
 Thus the work begun by Lucullus was compleced by 
 Pompeius. The system of protectorate had been exchanged 
 for that of direct sovereignty over the more important 
 dependent territories — Bithynia, Pontus, and Syria; while 
 to the indirect dominion of Rome were added Armenia 
 and the district of the Caucasus, and the kingdom of the 
 Cimmerian Bosporus. The town of Phauagoria was, for 
 its important services declared free. 
 
 In his settlement with the Parthians Pompeius was true 
 to the old Roman policy of favouring the humbled foe at 
 the expense of the powerful ally. The younger Tigranes 
 and his family were arrested and taken to Rome to grace 
 the general's triumph. The province of Corduene, 
 which was claimed by both Phraates and Tigranes, was 
 occupied by Roman troops for tlie latter. What was most 
 serious of all was the fact that the Romans did not respect 
 the agreement by which the Euphrates was fixed as the 
 boundary. Oruros, a point between Nisibis and the 
 Tigris, and 220 miles east of the Euphrates, was fixed as 
 the limit of the Roman dominion. When, in 64 B.C., 
 Phraates declared war upon Tigranes on the question of 
 the frontier, it stemed certain that he had resolved to defy 
 the power of Rome, but he yielded and acquiesced in the 
 Roman award. 
 
 From the new territories four new provinces were 
 formed : Bithynia with Pontus , Cilicia, which was an 
 enlargement of the old province of that name, and which 
 now embraced Pamphylia and Isauria ; Syria ; Crete. The 
 government of the mass of countries now added to the 
 empire probably remained substantially as before, only 
 Rome stepped into the place of the former monarchs ; and 
 the new dominion included a number of kingdoms, prince- 
 doms, and lordships of various kinds, all in different 
 relations of dependence upon Rome. Such were the 
 kingdoms of Cappadocia and Commagene ; the tetrarchies 
 ruled by Deiotarus and Bogodiatarus ; the territories of 
 the high priest of the mother of the gods at Pessinus, and 
 of the two high priests of the goddess Ma in Comana. 
 
 24 
 
370 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 There were also leagues, like that of the twenty-three 
 Lycian cities, whose independence was secured by charter. 
 
 Both Lucullus and Pompeius did every thing in their 
 power to protect and extend the urban communities in 
 the East. They were centres of Romanization, of the 
 civilization of trade and commerce as opposed to the 
 Oriental military despotism. Cyzicus, Heraclea, Sinope, 
 and Amisus, all received a number of new inhabitants and 
 extensions of territory, and everything was done to repair 
 the devastation they had suffered in the late war. Many 
 of the captured pirates were settled in the desolated cities 
 of Plain Cilicia, especially at Soli ; and many new towns 
 were founded in Pontus and Cappadocia ; the most 
 famous of which were Nicopolis in Pontus, Megalopolis 
 on the Cappadocian frontier, and Ziela. In fact nearly 
 the whole of the domain land of these provinces must 
 have been used for these settlemeuts. At the same time, 
 many existing cities obtained an extension of rights : 
 autonomy Avas conferred upon Antioch on the routes, 
 upon Seleucia in Pieria, upon Gaza, Mytilene, and Phaua- 
 goria. 
 
 Pompeius had done good work for Rome, but he had 
 not performed miracles, and had done nothing to call forth 
 the absurd exaggerations of his triumph or the fulsome 
 adulation of his adherents. His triumphal inscriptions 
 enumerated twelve millions of people as subjugated, 1538 
 cities and strongholds taken, while his conquests were 
 made to extend from the Palus Maeotis to the Caspian and 
 to the Red Sea, not one of which he had ever seen. Coins 
 were struck in his honour, exhibiting the globe itself 
 surrounded by triple laurels plucked from three conti- 
 nents, and surmounted by the golden chaplet which was 
 conferred upon him by the citizens. On the other hand, 
 there were voices which affirmed that he had only worn 
 the laurels which another had plucked, and that the 
 honours belonged of right to Lucullus. What really 
 deserves praise in the conduct of Pompeius is his rare 
 self-restraint. The most brilliant undertakings against 
 the Bosporus, or the Parthians, or Egypt, offered them- 
 selves on all sides, but he had resisted all temptations, and 
 had turned to the less glorious task of regulating the 
 territories already acquired. But his conduct towards 
 
POMPEIUS AND THE EAST. 371 
 
 the Parthians deserves grave censure : he might have 
 made war upon them, but when once he had decided 
 against this course he should have loyally observed the 
 agreement to regard the Euphrates as the boundary, in- 
 stead of, by his silly perfidy, sowing seeds of hatred which 
 were to bear bitter fruit for Eome at a later time. 
 
 The financial gain to Eome from the arrangements of 
 Pompeius was immense, and her revenues were raised by 
 one-half. And if the exhaustion of Asia was severe, and 
 if both Pompeius and Lucullus brought home large private 
 fortunes, the blame falls rather upon the government at 
 home and on the system by which the provinces were 
 regularly plundered for the benefit of Rome, than upon 
 the generals themselves. 
 
 After the departure of Pompeius peace was on the whole 
 maintained in the East ; but the governors of Cilicia had 
 constantly to fight against mountain tribes, and those of 
 Syria against the tribes of the desert. There were also 
 dangerous revolts among the Jews which were with diffi- 
 culty suppressed by the able governor of Syria, Aulus 
 Gabimus, and after which the Jews were subjected to a 
 specially heavy taxation. 
 
 Egypt with its dependency of Cyprus now remained 
 the only independent state in the East. It had indeed 
 been formally bequeathed to Eome (pp. 338, 353), but was 
 still governed by its own kings, who were themselves con- 
 trolled by the royal guard which frequently appointed or 
 deposed its rulers The isolation of Egypt, surrounded as it 
 is by the desert and the sea, and its great resources, which 
 gave its rulers a revenue almost equal to that of Eome 
 even after its recent augmentation, made the oligarchy 
 unwilling to entrust the annexation of the kingdom to any 
 one man. Propositions were frequently made at Eome for 
 its incorporation in the empire, particularly by the demo- 
 cratic party, but the Egyptian ruler succeeded always in 
 purchasing a respite by heavy bribes. Cyprus was annexed 
 by decree of the people in 58 B.C., and the measure was 
 carried out by Cato without the interference of an army. 
 But in 59 B.C. Ptolemy Auletes purchased his recognition 
 from the masters of Eome — it is said, for the sum of six thou- 
 sand talents (£1,460,000). On account of the oppression 
 which the payment of this money brought upon the people 
 
372 EIS10SY OF SOME. 
 
 the king was chased from his throne, but after the con- 
 ference of Luca in 56 B.C., and on the promise of a further 
 sum of ten thousand talents (£2,400,000), Aulus Gabmius 
 was ordered to restore him. Victory was secured by a 
 decisive battle on the Nile, and Ptolemaeus once more sat 
 on the throne. The sum promised could not possibly be 
 paid in full, though the last penny was exacted from the 
 miserable inhabitants. At the same time the praetorians 
 were replaced by a force of regular Roman infantry, with 
 Celtic and German cavalry. 
 
 AUTHORITIES. 
 
 Eastern Provinces. — Marqt. i. p. 333. Plut. Pomp. 25-45. Li v. Epit 
 100-103. Flor. iii. 5, 6. Eutrop. 12-14. Veil. ii. 37^0. Ap. 
 pian Mithr. 94-121. Syr. 49, 50, 70. Strab. xi. 496, 497 
 xii. 555. Dio. xxxvi. 28-37; xxxvii. 1-20. Oros. vi. 4, 5. Aur, 
 Vict. De V. I. 76, 77. Val. Max. ix. 2. 
 
 Egypt— Cic. frag, de R. Alex. ; ad Fam. i. 1-7 ; ad Q. Fr. ii. 2, 3 
 de Leg. Agr. i. 1, ii. 16, 17. Plut. Cato Min. 35-38 ; Pomp. 49, 
 Appian Syr. 51. Suet. Julius, 54. 
 
 Note. — Mommsen ascribes the speech of Cicero, de Rege Alexandrino, 
 to 65 B.C., not to 56 B.C., on the grounds (1) that the question dealt 
 with by Cicero is the assertion of Crassus that Egypt had been 
 rendered Roman property by the will of Alexander — a question 
 which had lost significance since the Julian law of 59 B.C. ; (2) that 
 in 56 B.C. the discussion related to the restoration of the king, a 
 transaction in which Crassus took no part; (3) that after the con- 
 ference of Luca, Cicero was not in a position to seriously oppose on© 
 of the triumvirs (Momm. Hist, of R. v. 5, note). 
 
CHAPTER XXXII. 
 
 STRUGGLE OF PARTIES AT ROME DURING THE ABSENCE OP 
 POMPEICS IN THE EAST. 
 
 Isolated successes of the democratic party. — 66 B.C. First Catili- 
 narian conspiracy. — 64 B.C. Servilian rogation. — 63 b.c. Cicero 
 and Antonius consuls — Second Catilinarian conspiracy. — 62 B.C. 
 Defeat and death of Catilina. 
 
 After the departure of Pompeius the optimates remained 
 nominally in possession of the government ; that is, they 
 commanded the elections and the consulate. But the con- 
 sulship was no longer of primary consequence in the face 
 of the new military power ; and the best of the aristocrats 
 — men like Quintus Metellus Pius, and Lucius Lucullus — 
 retired from the lists, and devoted themselves to the 
 elegant luxury of their private life. The younger men 
 either followed their example or turned to court the 
 favour of the new masters of the state. 
 
 There was one exception — Marcus Porcius Cato. Born 
 in 95 B.C., he was now about thirty years of age. He was 
 by nature a man of great courage and firmness, and of the 
 strictest integrity, but dull of intellect, and destitute of 
 imagination or passion. The two influences which 
 moulded his character were Stoicism, the principles of 
 which he adopted with the greatest ardour, and the example 
 of his great-grandfather, the famous censor. Like him he 
 went about the capital rebuking the sins of the times, a 
 living model of the prisca virtus of the good old days — the 
 " Don Quixote of the aristocracy." In a corrupt and 
 cowardly age, his courage and integrity gave him an 
 influence which was warranted by neither his age nor his 
 
374 BISTORT OF ROME. 
 
 capacity, and he soon became the recognized champion of 
 the optimates. He did good work in the region of finance, 
 checking the details of the public bndget, and waging 
 constant war with the farmers of the taxes ; but he had 
 none of the higher qualities of a statesman , he failed com- 
 pletely, if indeed he ever tried, to grasp the political 
 situation. All his policy consisted in steadfastly opposing 
 every one who appeared to deviate from the traditional 
 aristocratic creed. 
 
 During the next few years the activity of the democrats 
 showed itself in two ways : by attacks upon individuals of 
 the senatorial party, and upon the abuses of which the 
 senate was guilty ; and by efforts to complete the realiza- 
 tion of the democratic ideas which had been in the air 
 ever since the time of the Gracchi. 
 
 Various abuses of the senatorial rule were restrained by 
 the following measures. The senate was obliged to give 
 audiences to foreign envoys on fixed days ; before this 
 regulation audiences were frequently postponed in order 
 to extort bribes from the envoys. This kind of bribery 
 was also rendered more difficult by declaring loans to 
 foreign ambassadors at Rome non-actionable (67 B c ) 
 The power of the senate to grant dispensation from the 
 laws in particular cases was restricted in the same year. 
 
 In 63 B.C. restrictions were placed upon the abuse of the 
 fiction by which a Roman noble, wishing to travel, got 
 himself invested with the character and privileges of a 
 public envoy (libera legatio). The penalties for corruption 
 at elections were increased; and the custom by which a 
 Roman praetor bound himself to administer justice accord- 
 ing to the rules which he laid down on entering office was 
 enforced by law (67 B.C.). 
 
 At the same time, individual senators were subjected 
 to prosecutions or insults. Marcus Lucullus was pro- 
 secuted by Gaius Memmius. Lucius Lucullus was com- 
 pelled to wait three years for his triumph outside the 
 city ; Quintus Rex and Quintus Metellus were similarly 
 treated. In 63 B.C. Gaius Caesar defeated two leading 
 aristocrats in the contest for the supreme pontificate; the 
 heirs of Sulla were threatened with an action for the 
 recovery of moneys alleged to have been embezzled by 
 the regent ; and even Cato demanded back their rewards 
 
DURING THE ABSENCE OF POMPEIUS. 375 
 
 from the murderers of the proscribed, as property illegally 
 alienated from the state. Gains Caesar, as president of 
 the commission concerning murder, treated as null and 
 void the ordinance of Sulla which declared the killing 
 of a proscribed person no murder ; and some of the more 
 notorious executioners were condemned. 
 
 At the same time the democratic restoration was pressed 
 on. The election of pontiffs and augurs by the tribes was 
 restored in 63 B.C. An agitation was begun for the com- 
 plete restoration of the corn- laws. The Transpadani were 
 taken under the protection of the populares, and an agitation 
 was set on foot for conferring upon them the full franchise, 
 just as Gracchus had supported the enfranchisement of the 
 Latins. In a quite contrary spirit the democratic leaders 
 discountenanced the movement for allowing the freedmen 
 to be enrolled in all or any of the tribes, and, when a law 
 was passed to this effect, they allowed it to be cancelled 
 by the senate on the same day (Dec. 31, 67 B.C.). Again, 
 all strangers not possessing burgess-rights were expelled 
 from Rome by decree of the people in 65 B.C. It is clear 
 that the policy of the democrats was radically inconsistent. 
 With one hand they aided the political liberation of the 
 distant Transpadani ; with the other they restricted the 
 rights and liberties of the freedmen and foreigners of 
 the capital : in effect they attempted both to maintain and 
 to destroy the system of exclusive rights. 
 
 That ancient palladium of the Roman people, the 
 criminal jurisdiction of the Comitia, was once more 
 restored by the trial of Rabirius. This man was alleged 
 to have slain the tribune Saturninus, thirty-eight years 
 before, and was brought before the people by the tribune 
 Titus Labienus in 63 B.C. This jurisdiction had not been 
 abolished by Sulla, but was practically superseded by 
 the commissions for high treason and murder. No one 
 seriously meant to restore it; the accuser and his 
 supporters were content with their assertion of the 
 ancient right of appeal, and acquiesced when the assembly 
 was dissolved on some pretext by their opponents. 
 
 Lastly, the long proscribed heroes and martyrs of the 
 democracy were rehabilitated in the public memory : 
 Saturninus by the means just described ; Gaius Marius 
 by the audacity of his nephew Gaius Caesar. The latter 
 
JlG HISTORY OF HOME 
 
 had dared to display the features of his uncle in spite of 
 prohibitions at the burial of the widow of Marius in 68 B.C., 
 and now the emblems of victory erected by Marius and 
 thrown down by Sulla were restored to their old places 
 in the Capitol. 
 
 Such were the successes of the democrats, but, after all, 
 they did not amount to much. In their contest with the 
 aristocracy the democrats had conquered, and it was but 
 natural that they should insult the prostrate foe. But 
 they knew that the real reckoning was to come, — not with 
 the vanquished oligarchy, but with the too-powerful ally 
 by whose aid they had conquered. Their schemes were 
 directed ostensibly against the optimates, but really 
 against Pompeius. If direct proofs of this are few it is' 
 because both the present and the succeeding age had 
 an interest in throwing a veil over the events of this 
 period ; but such proofs are not wanting. It is stated by 
 Sail ust (Cat. 39) that the Gabinian and Manilian laws 
 inflicted a grievous blow on the democracy. Again, 
 the Servilian Rogation (see p. 378) was directed against 
 Pompeius, as is clear from the character of the bill itself, 
 and from the statements of Sallust (Cat. 19), and Cicero 
 (De Lege Agr. ii. 17, 46). Finally, the more than suspicious 
 attitude of Caesar and Crassus towards the Catilinarian 
 conspiracies is proof enough in itself. The object of the 
 democratic party during the years 67-63 B.C. was to 
 possess themselves of the reins of government by securing 
 the return of one or more members of the conspiracy for 
 the consulship, and then to entrust one of their leaders 
 with the conquest of Egypt, or some such commission, 
 which would give an opportunity for raising a military 
 power capable of counterbalancing that of Pompeius. 
 
 First Catilinarian Conspiracy, B.C. 66. — The first object 
 of the democratic leaders was the overthrow of the exist- 
 ing government by means of an insurrection in which they 
 would not themselves appear. Materials for such a con- 
 spiracy existed in abundance in the capital. There were 
 the slaves ; there was the herd of free paupers who lived 
 by the corn distributions and who were always ready for 
 any scheme which promised anarchy and license. Again, 
 there were numbers of young men of rank, ruined in 
 fortunes, ruined in body and mind by a life of fashionable 
 
DURING THE ABSENCE OF POMPEIUS. 377 
 
 debauchery, who sighed openly for a return of the times 
 of Cinna and for release from their burden of debt. Among 
 them two men were marked out as leaders by their superior 
 ability — Gnaeus Piso and Lucius Catilina. The latter, 
 in spite of a dissoluteness conspicuous even in that 
 dissolute age, had courage, military talent, and a certain 
 criminal energy which gave him an ascendancy over other 
 men. He had been one of Sulla's executioners, and had 
 hunted down the proscribed at the head of a band of 
 Celts ; but he had now a special quarrel with the aristo- 
 cracy because they had opposed his candidature for the 
 consulship. A secret league was formed, numbering more 
 than four hundred members and including associates in 
 all the urban districts of Italy. 
 
 In December, 66 B.C., the two consuls elect for 65 B.C. 
 were rendered ineligible for office by conviction for 
 electoral bribery. They immediately joined the associa- 
 tion, and it was determined to procure the consulship 
 for them by force. On the 1st of January, 65 B.C., the senate 
 house was to be assailed and the new consuls were to 
 be killed ; Crassus was to be invested with the dictator- 
 ship, Caesar with the mastership of the horse. But the 
 signal w#s never given and the plot was foiled. A similar 
 plan for the 5th of February also failed, and the secret 
 became known. Guards were assigned to the new con- 
 suls, and Piso was got rid of by a mission to Hither 
 Spain with praetorian powers; but farther the govern- 
 ment dared not go.* 
 
 Second Catilinarian Conspiracy, 63 B.C. — For the present 
 no further attempt was made by the conspirators ; but in 
 64 B.C. Pompeius was in Syria, and approaching the 
 conclusion of his task ; and it was therefore resolved to 
 set up as candidates for the consulship of 63 B.C. Catilina 
 and Gaius Antonius — an ex-Sullan and an ex-senator, 
 who was willing to lend himself to the conspiracy. The 
 
 * That this account is true as to the main point — the participation 
 of Caesar and Crassus — is rendered probable by the following facts, 
 which show that they were at any rate heartily in accord with the 
 democratic policy. (1) Crassus, censor in this year, attempted 
 arbitrarily to enrol the Transpadani in the burgess list ; (2) he pre- 
 pared to enrol Egypt and Cyprus in the list of Roman domains ; (3) 
 Caesar, in 65 B.C. or 64 B.C., got a proposal submitted to the burgesses 
 to send him to Egypt to reinstate King Ptolemaeus. 
 
378 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 plan was, to seize the children of Pompeius, and to arm in 
 Italy and in the provinces against him. Piso was to raise 
 troops in Hither Spain; and to securecommuuications with 
 him, negotiations were entered into with the Transpadani 
 and with several Celtic tribes. 
 
 The optimates had no one of their own order who 
 possessed the requisite courage and influence to defeat 
 the democratic candidates ; they therefore supported 
 Marcus Cicero, who as yet belonged properly to no poli- 
 tical party, but was always a supporter of the party of 
 material interests. The result was the election of Cicero 
 and Antonius ; and for the moment the conspiracy was 
 checked. A little before this, Piso had been put to death 
 by his escort in Spain ; and now Cicero gained over 
 Antonius by voluntarily giving up to him the lucrative 
 governorship of Macedonia, instead of insisting on his 
 privilege of having the provinces determined by lot. 
 
 Meanwhile the settlement of Syria proceeded rapidly, 
 and it was more than probable that Pompeius would soon 
 advance into Egypt. Caesar's attempt to get the settle- 
 ment of Egypt entrusted to himself was foiled. A bold 
 stroke was imperatively necessary, and as soon as the 
 new tribunes entered on their office the Servilian rogation 
 was brought forward. 
 
 The nominal object of this bill was the founding of 
 colonies in Italy ; the Campanian domain land was to be 
 parcelled out, and other land was to be acquired by pur- 
 chase. The money necessary for this purpose was to be 
 provided in various ways : (1) by the sale of all the re- 
 maining domain land both in and out of Italy (including 
 the royal domain lands in Macedonia, Bithynia, Pontus, 
 and other provinces : and the territories in Spain, Africa, 
 Sicily, Hellas, and Cilicia belonging to cities which had 
 fallen to Rome by right of conquest). (2) By the sale 
 of all other state property acquired since 88 B.C. — a 
 provision which was aimed at Egypt and Cyprus. (3) 
 All taxable subject communities were to be burdened 
 with heavy taxes and tithes. (4) By the produce of the 
 new provincial revenues opened up by Pompeius, and by 
 the sums found in his hands. 
 
 The execution of this measure was to be entrusted to 
 decemviri armed with special jurisdiction and with the 
 
DURING TEE ABSENCE OF I'OMPEIUS. 379 
 
 imperium, who were to remain in office for five years, and 
 to choose two hundred subordinate officers from the 
 equestrian ranks. All candidates were to announce them- 
 selves personally ; and only seventeen tribes were to vote. 
 
 The real object of the bill was to create a power which 
 might counterbalance that of Pompeius : but it pleased 
 no class ; the mob preferred to subsist on the corn largesses 
 rather than by tilling the soil ; the mass of the democrats 
 were afraid to offend Pompeius, and the measure was with- 
 drawn by its author (January 1, 63 B.C.). 
 
 Catilina now determined to strike a decisive blow. All 
 through the summer prepai'ations for civil war went on. 
 Faesulae was to be the head-quarters of the insurrection — 
 thither arms and money were sent, and troops were raised 
 by Gams Manlius, an old Sullan captain. The Transpadani 
 seemed ready to rise ; bodies of slaves were ready for 
 insurrection in the Bruttian land, on the east coast, and 
 in Capua The plan of the conspirators was to put to 
 death the presiding consul and the rival candidates on 
 the day of the consular elections for 62 B.C. (October 20), 
 and to carry the election of Catilina. 
 
 But on the day fixed Cicero denounced the conspiracy 
 in full senate ; and Catilina did not deny the accusation. 
 On the 21st the senate invested the consuls with the 
 exceptional powers usual in such crises. On the 28th, to 
 which day the elections had been postponed, Cicero 
 appeared in the Campus Martius with an armed body- 
 guard, and the plots of the conspirators again failed. 
 
 But on the 27th, the standard of insurrection had been 
 raised by Manlius at Faesulae, and proclamations had been 
 issued demanding the liberation of debtors from their 
 burdens, and the reform of the law of insolvency, which 
 still, in some cases, permitted the enslavement of the 
 debtor. But the rising was isolated. The government 
 had time to call out the general levy, and to send officers 
 to various regions of Italy in order to suppress the 
 insurrection in detail. Meantime the gladiatorial slaves 
 were ejected from the capital, and patrols were kept in 
 the streets to prevent incendiarism. 
 
 Catilina was now in a difficult position. The outbreak 
 in the city, which should have been simultaneous with 
 the rising at Faesulae, had miscarried. He could hardly 
 
380 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 remain longer in Rome, and yet there was no one among 
 his associates who could be trusted to carry out his design 
 with courage and capacity, or who could command suf- 
 ficient influence to induce the conspirators in the city to 
 strike an effective blow at once. So he remained, brazen- 
 ing out the situation with the most audacious insolence. 
 The spies of the government had made their way into the 
 circle of the conspirators, and kept it informed of every 
 detail of the plot. An attempt to surprise Praeneste 
 failed. On the night of November 6-7 a conference was 
 held, and in accordance with the resolution passed by 
 those who met, an attempt was made early in the morning 
 to murder the consul Cicero. But the men selected found 
 the guard round his house reinforced — the consul was 
 already aware of the result of the conference. 
 
 On the 8th, Cicero convoked the senate and acquainted 
 them with the events of the last few days. Catilina could 
 not obtain a hearing, and departed at ouce for Etruria. 
 
 The government declared Catilina, Manlius, and such of 
 their followers who should not lay down their arms by a 
 certain day, to be outlaws, and called out new levies, 
 which, with incredible folly, were placed under the com- 
 mand of Antonius. 
 
 It had been arranged, before Catilina's departure, that 
 Cethegus should make another attempt to kill Cicero in 
 the night, and that Gabinius and Statilius should set fire 
 to the city in twelve places. Meanwhile Catilina was to 
 advance toward Rome. But now that their leader was 
 gone the conspirators seemed incapable of action, though 
 the government took no measures against them. 
 
 At last the decisive moment came. Lentulus had 
 entered into relations with the deputies of the Allobroges 
 — a Celtic canton, which was deeply in debt — and had given 
 them letters to carry to his associates. On the night 
 of December 2-3 the envoys were seized as they were 
 leaving the city — probably in accordance with a pre- 
 conceived plan ; and from their evidence and from the 
 documents they carried, full details of the plot were 
 furnished to Cicero. Some of the conspirators saved 
 themselves by flight; but Lentulus, Cethegus, Gabinius, 
 and Statilius were arrested. The evidence was laid before 
 the senate; the prisoners and other witnesses were heard; 
 
DURING THE ABSENCE OF FOMPEIUS. 381 
 
 and other proofs, such as deposits of arms in the houses of 
 the conspirators and threatening expressions used by them, 
 were afterwards procured. The most important documents 
 were published, to convince the public of the facts of the 
 plot. 
 
 The plans of the conspirators were now made bare, and 
 their leaders arrested. In a well-ordered commonwealth 
 there would have been an end of the matter. The military 
 and the legal tribunals would have done the rest. But the 
 government of Rome was so disorganized that for the 
 moment the most difficult question for settlement was 
 the custody of the prisoners. These had been given into 
 the keeping of certain eminent private men — two of whom 
 were Caesar and Crassus — who were responsible for their 
 safety. But the freedmen of the prisoners were stirring ; 
 the air was full of rumours of schemes for liberating them 
 by force , Rome was full of desperadoes, and the govern- 
 ment had no efficient force of military or of police at its 
 disposal. Finally, Catilina was near enough to attempt a 
 coup de main. Accordingly the idea was suggested of 
 executing the prisoners at once. By the constitution of 
 Rome, no citizen could be put to death except by sentence 
 of the whole body of citizens , and as such sentences had 
 fallen into disuse, capital punishment was now no longer 
 carried out. Cicero shrank from the step ; he convoked 
 the senate and left to it the decision, although it had even 
 less title to act than the consul, and therefore could not 
 possibly relieve him of the responsibility. All the con- 
 sulars and the great majority of the senate had already 
 declared for the execution, when Caesar, in a speech full of 
 covert threats, violently opposed the proposal : and prob- 
 ably the limits of the law would have been observed had 
 not Cato, by throwing suspicion upon those who were for 
 milder measures, and by throwing the waverers into fresh 
 alarm, secured a majority for the immediate execution of 
 the prisoners. 
 
 On the night of the 5th of December the prisoners 
 were conducted under strong guards to the Tullianum, a 
 dungeon at the foot of the Capitol. No one knew the 
 object of their removal, until the consul, from the door of 
 the prison, proclaimed over the Forum, in his well-known 
 voice, " They are dead." And now the first men of the 
 
382 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 nobility — Cato, and Quintus Catulus — saluted for the first 
 time the author of the deed with the proud title of 
 " father of his country." " Never perhaps had a 
 commonwealth more lamentably declared itself bankrupt 
 than did Rome through this resolution ... to put to 
 death in all haste a few political prisoners, who were no 
 doubt culpable according to the laws, but had not forfeited 
 life ; because, forsooth, the security of prisons was not to 
 be trusted, and there was no sufficient police." 
 
 There still remained the insurrection in Etruria. Cati- 
 lina had now under him nearly ten thousand men, of whom 
 scarcely more than a fourth were armed. On the news of 
 the failure at Rome, the mass of them dispersed, and the 
 remnant of desperate men determined to cut their way 
 through the passes of the Apennines into Gaul. But on 
 their arrival at the foot of the mountains near Pistoria, 
 they were confronted by the troops of Quintus Metellus, 
 who had come up from Ravenna and Ariminum. In their 
 rear was Antonius, and there was nothing left but to 
 throw themselves upon his army. The battle took place 
 in a narrow rocky valley where superiority <>f numbers was 
 of small avail. The forces of Antonius were, for the day, 
 commanded by the veteran Marcus Petreins. The battle 
 was long and bloody ; and quarter was neither given nor 
 received. At length Petreius broke the centre of the 
 enemy, and attacked the two wings from within. The 
 Catilinarians covered with their corpses the ground on 
 which they had fought ; the officers, with their general, had 
 sought death by charging into the thickest of the enemy 
 (early in 62 B.C.). Antonius was " branded " by the senate 
 with the title of imperator, and then thanksgivings were 
 ordered by the senate for this victory over the civil foe. 
 
 The plot was suppressed ; but the blow had fallen, not 
 merely, on the conspirators themselves, but on the whole 
 democratic party. If the complicity of the democratic 
 leaders, Caesar and Crassus, is not an ascertained fact, 
 they are at any rate open to the gravest suspicion. That 
 they were accused of complicity by Catulus, and that 
 Caesar spoke and voted against the judicial murder of the 
 prisoners, is of course no proof ; but there are other facts 
 of greater weight. (1) Crassus and Caesar supported the 
 candidature of Catilina for the consulship. (2) When 
 
DURING THE ABSENCE OF POMPEIUS. 383 
 
 Caesar, in 64 B.C., indicted the Sullan executioners for 
 murder, he allowed Catilina alone to be acquitted. (3) In 
 his revelations to the senate, Cicero did not indeed include 
 the names of Caesar and Crassus ; but it is known that he 
 erased the names of many " innocent persons," and in 
 later years he named Caesar as among the accomplices. 
 (4) The fact that Gabinius and Statilius were intrusted 
 to the custody of Crassus and Caesar, is probably to be 
 explained by the wish of the government to place them in 
 a dilemma. If they allowed the prisoners to escape, they 
 would be regarded as accessories ; if they detained them, 
 they would incur the hatred and vengeance of their fellow- 
 conspirators. (5) After the arrest of Lentulus, a messenger 
 from him to Catilina was arrested and brought before the 
 senate; but when, in his evidence, he mentioned Crassus 
 as having commissioned him, he was interrupted, his 
 whole statement was cancelled at the suggestion of 
 Cicero, and he was committed to prison until he should 
 confess who had suborned him. The senate were clearly 
 afraid to allow the revelations to go beyond a certain 
 limit. The general public were less scrupulous, and 
 Caesar narrowly escaped with his life, when he left the 
 senate on the 5th of December. (6) When Caesar had 
 made himself head of the state, he was in close alliance 
 with Publius Sittius, the only surviving Catilinarian, the 
 leader of Mauretanian banditti. (7) The facts that the 
 government offered no serious hindrance to the conspiracy 
 until the last moment ; that the chief conspirator was 
 allowed to depart unmolested ; that the troops sent against 
 the insurrection were put under the command of Antonius, 
 who had been deeply concerned in the plot, — all point to the 
 suspicion that there were powerful men behind the scenes, 
 who threw their protection over the conspiracy while they 
 kept in the background themselves. 
 
 That the evidence is not more abundant is no matter 
 for surprise. The government were too weak to provoke 
 the democratic party a outrance ; and, after the failure of 
 the plot, the democratic leaders naturally made every 
 effort to conceal their participation in it ; and when Caesar 
 had got the upper hand the veil was only drawn all the 
 more closely over the darker \ ears of his life. 
 
 The close of this period found the democratic party at 
 
384 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 its lowest ebb. By its alliance with anarchists and 
 murderers it had alienated, not only the party of material 
 interests, but even the city mob, who, "although having 
 no objection to a street riot, found it inconvenient to 
 have their houses set on fire over their heads." 
 
 In 63 B.C. the full restoration of the Sempronian corn 
 largesses was carried out by the senate, on the motion of 
 Cato ; the oligarchy were taking advantage of the move- 
 ment to draw over the masses to their side. Worst of all, 
 Pompeius was warned by the course of events, and hia 
 eyes were opened to the folly and weakness of his allies, 
 if not to their treachery and designs against himself : at 
 the present moment the identity of his own interests with 
 those of the optimates was plain. The popular leaders 
 felt the hopelessness of their position. Crassus prepared 
 to carry his family and his riches to a safe refuge in the 
 East ; and even Caesar declared, in 63 B.C., as he left bis 
 home on the morning of the election for the office of 
 pontifex maximus, that, if he failed in this too, he would 
 never cross the threshold again. 
 
 AUTHORITIES. 
 
 Pint. Cat. Min. 22, 23. Cic. 10-23. Caes. 6-8. Crass. 13. Liv. 
 Epit. 101, 102. Dio. xxxvi. 21-27 ; xxxvii. 20-46. Sail. Bell. 
 Cat. Flor. iii. 24. Veil. ii. 35. Eutrop. vi. 15. Appian B. C. 
 ii. 2, 7. Suet. Jul. 7-15, 17. Cic, speeches of those years — pro 
 Leg. Man. (66 B.C.); frag, pro Manil. (65 B.C.); de It. Alex. 
 (65 B.C. ?) ; frag, pro Cornel. (65 B.C.) ; frag, in Tog. Cand. (64 
 B.C.). Speeches of 63 B.C. — de Leg. Agr. ; frag, de Rose. Oth.; 
 pro Rabir. ; frag, de Proscriptorum liberis; in Catilinam ; pro 
 Murena. Of 62 B.C. — frag, contra cone. Met.; pro Corn. Sull. 
 Also In Pisonem, 2; pro Flacc. 40; pro Plane. 37. The most 
 important letters of the time are found in Watson's Selection, 
 pt. i. 1-3. A most useful table of all the letters arranged 
 chronologically will be found in Nobbe's collected edition of 
 Cicero, p. 967. 
 
 Audiences to foreign envoys. — Cic. ad Q. F. ii. 11, 12; ad Fam. i. 4. 
 
 Loans forbidden — dispensing power — praetor's edicts. — Asc. in Cic. pro 
 Cor. Ad. Att. v. 21. 
 
 Libera legatio. — Cic. de Legg. iv. 8; de L. Agr. i. 3; pro Flacc. 34; 
 Phil. i. 2. 
 
 Bribery laws. — Dio. xxxvi. 21 ; xxxvii. 29. Cic. pro Mur. 23. 
 
 Sullan executioners condemned. — Suet. Jul. 11. 
 
 Lex Domitia restored. — Dio. xxxvii. 37. Suet. 13. 
 
 Transpadani — Suet- Jul. 8. Dio. xxxvii. 9. 
 
 Expulsion of foreigner*. — Dio. xxxvii. 9. Cic. de Off. iii. 11 ; pro Balb. 
 23 ; pro Arch. 5 ; de L. Agr. 1, 4 ; ad Att. iv. 16. 
 
CHAPTER XXXIII. 
 
 RETURN OF POMPEIUS — THE SECOND COALITION OF POMPEITJS, 
 CAESAR, AND CRASSDS. 
 
 63 B.C. Quintas Metellus Nepos arrives in Rome as the emissary of 
 Pompeius. — 62 b.c. Pompeius lands at Brundisium and disbands 
 his army. — 60 B.C. Coalition between Pompeins and the demo- 
 crats. — 59 B.C. Consulship of Caesar — Lex Vatinia passed. 
 
 Recent events had fully demonstrated the impotence of 
 both the senate and the democratic party ; neither was 
 strong enough to defeat the other or to govern the state. 
 There was no third party — no class remaining out of 
 which a government might be erected : the only alterna- 
 tive was monarchy — the rule of a single person. Who 
 the monarch would be was still uncertain ; though, at the 
 present moment, Pompeius was clearly the only man in 
 whose power it lay to take up the crown that offered 
 itself. The new regime presented one great advantage, 
 obvious to the dullest perception : no government can rule 
 unless it has military power at its command, and, amidst 
 the disorganization which prevailed, the control of the 
 military was vested absolutely in the general — only to him 
 could the state look tor the maintenance of social order. 
 For the moment the question which agitated all minds 
 was whether Pompeius would accept the gift offered him 
 by fortune, or would retire and leave the throne vacant. 
 It was possible, indeed, that all parties should combine 
 against the general in one last strugle for what they 
 deemed their liberty ; but in face of the victorious legions 
 of Pompeius any combination of parties could be of little 
 avail. 
 
 25 
 
386 HISTORY OF HOME. 
 
 In the autumn of 63 B.C., Quintus Metellus Nepos 
 arrived in the capital from the camp of Pompeius, and got 
 himself elected tribune with the avowed purpose of procur- 
 ing for Pompeius the command against Catilina by special 
 decree, and afterwards the consulship for 61 B.C. Every- 
 thing depended upon the reception which parties at Rome 
 might give to these proposals. It must be remembered 
 that, whatever cause Pompeius might have to be discon- 
 tented with the conduct of Caesar and his partisans, no 
 open rupture had taken place. The coalition of 70 B.C. 
 was still formally in existence. The democracy still 
 treated Pompeius with the greatest outward respect, and 
 this very year had granted him, spontaneously and by 
 special decree, unprecedented honours (see p. 370) At 
 the same time nothing had occurred to bridge over the 
 chasm which the coalition had created between Pompeius 
 and the optimates. The senate had decreed him no 
 exceptional honours, and two of its most influential 
 members, Lucullus and Metellus, were his bitterest 
 personal enemies (see pp. 364—5). Lastly, the aristocracy 
 were at present under the guidance of the uncompromis- 
 ing pedant Cato ; while the democracy were led by " the 
 most supple master of intrigue " — Caesar. Accordingly 
 the aristocracy at once showed their hostility to the 
 proposals of Metellus, and Cato had himself elected 
 tribune expressly for the purpose of thwarting him. 
 But the democrats were more pliant, and it was soon 
 evident that they had come to a cordial understanding 
 with the general's emissary. Metellus and his master 
 both adopted the democratic view of the illegal execu- 
 tions ; and the first act of Caesar's praetorship was to call 
 Catulus to account for the moneys alleged to have been 
 embezzled by him in rebuilding the Capitoline temple, and 
 to transfer the superintendence of the works to Pompeius. 
 By this stroke Caesar brought to light a disgraceful abuse 
 of public money, and threw odium upon the aristo- 
 cracy in the person of one of its most distinguished 
 members ; while Pompeius would be delighted at the 
 prospect of engraving his name upon the proudest spot in 
 the capital of the Roman state. 
 
 On the day of voting, Cato and another of the tribunes 
 put their veto upon the proposals of Metellus, who dis- 
 
RETURN OF POMPEIUS. 387 
 
 regarded it. There were conflicts of the armed bands of 
 both sides, which terminated in favour of the government. 
 The senate followed up the victory by suspending Me- 
 tellus and Caesar from their offices. Metellus immediately 
 departed for the camp of Pompeius ; and when Caesar 
 disregarded the decree of suspension against himself, the 
 senate had ultimately to revoke it. 
 
 Nothing could have been more favourable to the 
 interests of Pompeius than these late events. After the 
 illegal executions of the Catilinarians, and the acts of 
 violence against Metellus, he could appear at once as the 
 defender of the " two palladia of Roman liberty" — the right 
 of appeal, and the inviolability of the tribunate, — and as 
 the champion of the party of order against the Catil'inarian 
 band. But his courage was unequal to the emergency ; 
 he lingered in Asia during the winter of 63-62 B.C., and 
 thus gave the senate time to crush the insurrection in 
 Italy, and deprived himself of a valid pretext for keeping 
 his legions together. In the autumn of 62 B.C. he landed 
 at Brundisium, and, disbanding his army, proceeded to 
 Rome with a small escort. On his arrival in the city in 
 61 B.C. he found himself in a position of complete isola- 
 tion ; he was feared by the democrats, hated by the aris- 
 tocracy, and distrusted by the wealthy class.* 
 
 He at once demanded for himself a second consulship, 
 the confirmation of all his acts in the East, and the ful- 
 filment of the promise he had made to his soldiers to 
 furnish them with lands. But each of these demands 
 was met with the most determined opposition. From the 
 senate, led by Lucullus, Metellus, and Cato, there was no 
 hope of obtaining dispensation from the Sullan law as to 
 re-election (see p. 304). As to the arrangements of Pom- 
 peius in the East, Lucullus carried a resolution that they 
 should be voted upon separately, thus opening a door for 
 endless annoyances and defeats. 
 
 His promise of lands to his soldiers was indeed ratified, 
 but not executed, and no steps were taken to provide the 
 necessary funds and lands. When the general turned 
 from the senate to the people, the democrats, though they 
 
 * Cic. ad Att., i. 14 : " Prima contio Pompei non jucunda miseris 
 (the rabble), inanis improbis (the democrats), beatis (the wealthy), 
 non grata, bonis (the aristocrats) non gravis ; itaque frigebat." 
 
388 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 offered no opposition, did nothing to assist him, and when 
 the proposal for the grant of lands was submitted to the 
 tribes, it was defeated (early in 60 B.C.). To such straits 
 was he reduced, that he bad to court the favour of the 
 multitude by causing a proposal to be introduced for 
 abolishing the Italian tolls ; but he had none of the 
 qualifications of a demagogue, and merely damaged his 
 reputation without gaining his ends. 
 
 From this disagreeable position Pompeius was rescued 
 by the sagacity and address of Caesar, who saw in the 
 necessities of Pompeius the opportunity of the democratic 
 party. Ever since the return of Pompeius, Caesar had 
 grown rapidly in influence and weight. He had been 
 praetor in 62 B.C., and, in 61, governor of Further Spain, 
 where he utilized his position to free himself from his 
 debts, and to lay the foundation of the military position 
 he desired for himself. Returning in 60 B.C., he readily 
 relinquished his claim to a triumph, in order to enter the 
 city in time to stand for the consulship. At last the 
 democracy seemed on the eve of realizing its hopes, and 
 of seeing one of its own leaders invested with the 
 consulship and a province where he might build up a 
 military position strong enough to make it independent 
 of external allies. But it was quite possible that the 
 aristocracy might be strong enough to defeat the can- 
 didature of Caesar, as it had defeated that of Catilina ; 
 and again, the consulship was not enough ; an extra- 
 ordinary command, secured to him for several years, was 
 necessary for the fulfilment of his purpose. Without 
 allies such a command could not be hoped for ; and allies 
 were found where they had been found ten years before, 
 in Pompeius and in Crassus, and in the rich equestrian 
 class. Such a treaty was suicide on the part of Pom- 
 peius, for he owed his strength entirely to his position as 
 the only leader who could rely on a military force ; but 
 he had drifted into a situation so awkward that he was 
 glad to be released from it on any terms. The capitalists 
 were at the moment all the more inclined to join the 
 coalition because of the severity with which they were 
 being treated with regard to their tax leases by the senate, 
 at the instigation of Cato. 
 
 The bargain was struck in the summer of 60 B.C. 
 
RETURN OF POMPEIUS. 389 
 
 Caesar was promised the consulship and a governorship 
 afterwards ; Pompeius, the ratification of his arrange- 
 ments in the East, and land for his soldiers ; Crassus 
 received no definite equivalent, but the capitalists were 
 promised a remission of part of the money they had under- 
 taken to pay for the lease of the Asiatic taxes. The parties 
 to the coalition were the same as in 70 B.C., but their rela- 
 tive positions were entirely changed. Then the democracy 
 was a faction without a head, now it was a strong party 
 with leaders of its own, and could demand for itself, not 
 merely concessions to democratic traditions, such as the 
 restoration of the tribunician power, but office and autho- 
 rity, the consulship and the supreme military command, 
 while it conceded nothing material to its allies. 
 
 Caesar was easily elected consul for 59 B.C. All that 
 the exertions of the senate could do was to give him an 
 aristocratic colleague in Marcus Bibulus. Caesar at once 
 proceeded to fulfil his obligations to Pompeius by pro- 
 posing an agrarian law. All remaining Italian domain 
 laud, which meant practically the territory of Capua, 
 was to be given up to allotments, and other estates in 
 Italy were to be purchased out of the revenues of the new 
 Eastern provinces The allotments were to be small, and 
 to be given to poor burgesses, fathers of three children. 
 The soldiers were simply recommended to the commis- 
 sion, and thus the principle of giving rewards of land for 
 military service was not asserted. The execution of the 
 bill was to be intrusted to a commission of twenty. 
 
 This proposal, together with that for the ratification of 
 Pompeius' arrangements collectively, and the petition of 
 the tax farmers for relief, were first of all laid before the 
 senate, which had now opportunity to reflect on its folly in 
 driving Pompeius and the equites into the arms of Caesar. 
 The agrarian law, moderate and statesmanlike as it was, 
 was rejected without discussion, and also the decree as to 
 the acts of Pompeius. Caesar could now go to the people 
 and ask them to pass these rational and necessary decrees 
 which the senate in its levity had refused. When the 
 aristocracy seemed inclined to push the matter to open 
 violence, Pompeius called upon his veterans to appear on 
 the day for voting with arms under their dress ; and 
 when Bibulus tried to prevent the vote by proclaiming 
 
390 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 that he was observing the heavens, Caesar disregarded 
 him, as he had disregarded the tribunician veto, and Bibulus 
 had to be content with shutting himself np in his own 
 house and intimating by placard that he intended to 
 watch the signs of the sky on all days appropriate for 
 public assemblies throughout the year. At length all 
 these proposals were passed by the assembly, and the 
 commission of twenty, with Pompeius and Crassus at their 
 head, began the execution of the agrarian law. 
 
 Now that the first victory was won, the coalition were 
 able to carry out the rest of its programme without 
 much difficulty. Caesar had loyally fulfilled his obliga- 
 tions to Pompeius, and the most important question now 
 to be considered was his own future position. The senate 
 had already selected for the year of his proconsulship 
 two provinces where nothing but the work of peaceful 
 administration could be expected ; but it was determined 
 by the confederates that Caesar should be invested by 
 decree of the people with a special command resembling 
 that lately held by Pompeius. Accordingly the tribune 
 Vatinius submitted to the tribes a proposal which was 
 at once adopted. By it Caesar obtained the governor- 
 ship of Cisalpine Gaul, and the supreme command of the 
 three legions stationed there, for five years, with the rank 
 of propraetor for his adjutants. His jurisdiction extended 
 southwards as far as the Rubicon, and included Luca and 
 Ravenna. Subsequently the province of Narbo was added 
 by the senate, on the motion of Pompeius. Since no 
 troops could be stationed in Italy, it was evident that such 
 a command as Caesar's dominated both Italy and Rome. 
 The coalition had succeeded; it was master of the state. 
 It kept its adherents in good humour by the most lavish 
 exhibitions of games and shows, and kept the exchequer 
 filled by selling charters and privileges to subject com- 
 munities and princes : for instance, the king of Egypt at 
 last obtained recognition by decree of the people, in return 
 for a large sum. The permanence of the present arrange- 
 ment was assured by securing the return of Aulus Ga- 
 binius and Lucius Piso for the consulship of the ensuing 
 year. Pompeius watched over Italy while he executed the 
 agrarian law, and Caesar's legions in North Italy were a 
 guarantee against all opposition. Caesar and Pompeius 
 
RETURN OF POMPETUS. 391 
 
 were at present, kept united by community of interest, 
 and the personal bonds between them were cemented by 
 the marriage of Pompeius with Julia, the only daughter 
 of Caesar. 
 
 The aristocracy were in despair. " On all sides," wrote 
 one of them, "we are checkmated; we have already, 
 through fear of death or of banishment, despaired of 
 ' freedom ; ' every one sighs, no one ventures to speak." 
 Nevertheless Caesar had hardly laid down his consulship 
 when it was proposed, in the senate, to annul the Julian 
 laws ; there were clearly some among the optimates who 
 would not be content with the policy of sighing and silence. 
 The regents determined to make examples of some of the 
 most determined of their opponents, and to drive them 
 into exile. An infamous attempt was made to involve 
 the heads of the aristocracy in a charge of conspiring to 
 murder Pompeius on the evidence of a worthless informer 
 named Vettius ; but the scheme was too hollow, and the 
 whole matter was allowed to drop. 
 
 Ultimately they were content with a few isolated 
 victims. Cato openly proclaimed his conviction that the 
 Julian laws were null and void, and, to get rid of him, 
 he was entrusted by special decree with the regulation of 
 the municipal affairs of Byzantium, and with the annexa- 
 tion of the kingdom of Cyprus. Cicero was abandoned to 
 the vengeance of the thorough-going democrats, who 
 could not leave unpunished the judicial murder of De- 
 cember 5th. And so the tribune Publius Clodius, his bitter 
 private enemy, proposed to the tribes a resolution de- 
 claring the execution of a citizen without trial a crime 
 punishable with banishment. Both this decree and that 
 relating to Cato were passed without opposition, and, 
 though the majoritr of the senate put on mourning, and 
 Cicero besought. Pompeius on his knees for mercy, he had 
 to go into exile even before the passing of the law. 
 Cato accepted his commission, and set out for the East; 
 and Caesar could now safely leave Italy, to face the heavy 
 task he had imposed on himself in Gaul. 
 
302 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 AUTHORITIES. 
 
 Pint. Pomp. 46-48; Caes. 8-14; Crass. 14; Cic. 23-32. Liv. 103. 
 
 Flor. ii. 8-12. Veil. ii. 40-45. Suet. Jul. 16-23. Dio. xxxvii. 
 
 49-51 ; xxxviii. 1-17, 50. Appian ii. 8-16. Cic. frag, in Clod. 
 
 et Cur. (61 B.C.) ; pro Scip. Nas. (60 B.C.) ; pro Flacc. (59 
 
 B.C.); Watson's Select. Lett. i. 3-end. Lex Julia Agraria: 
 
 Bruns, I. c. iii. 15. 
 Recognition of Ptolemy. — Suet. Jul. 54. 
 Vettius. — Suet. Jul. 17, 20. Dio. xxxvi. 41, xxxviii. 9. Cic. ad Att. 
 
 ii. 24; pro Sest. 63, in Vatin. 10, 11. Appian B. C. ii. 12. Plut. 
 
 Lucnllus, 42. 
 
CHAPTER XXXIV. 
 
 CAESAR IN GAUL. 
 
 Political and social organization of Gaul. — 58 B.C. First campaign- 
 Defeat of the Helvetii and of Ariovistus. — 57 B.C. Second cam- 
 paign — The Belgian League subdued. — 56 B.C. Third campaign 
 — Defeat of the Aremorican cantons ; of the Morini, Menapii, 
 and Aquitani. — 55 B.C. Fourth campaign — Massacre of Usipetes 
 and Tencteri — The Rhine crossed — First expedition to Britain. 
 — 54 B.C. Fifth campaign — Second invasion of Britain — Attacks 
 on Sabinus and Cicero during the winter. — 53 B.C. Sixth cam- 
 paign — General insurrection crushed by defeat of the Nervii, 
 Senones, Carnntes, Treveri, and Menapii — The Rhine again 
 crossed. — 52 B.C. Seventh campaign — Great national rising 
 under Vercingetorix — Sieges of Avaricum, Gergovia, and 
 Alesia. — 51 B.C. Eighth campaign — Remains of the insur- 
 rection stamped out. 
 
 It has been too generally assumed that Caesar regarded 
 Gaul merely as a parade ground on which to exercise 
 himself and his troops for the impending war ; but though 
 the conquest of Gaul was undoubtedly for him a means to 
 an end, yet it was much more — "it is the special privilege 
 of a statesman of genius that his means themselves are 
 ends in their turn. Caesar needed, no doubt, for his party 
 aims a military power, but he did not conquer Gaul as a 
 partisan." It was necessary tbat Italy should be pro- 
 tected by a barrier against the ever- threatening in- 
 vasions of the Germans ; and it was also necessary, now 
 that Italy had become too narrow for its population, that 
 a fresh field of expansion should be provided elsewhere. 
 The Roman state remained a chaotic mass of countries 
 which requii'ed to be thoroughly occupied, and to have 
 their boundaries fixed and defined : the senate had done 
 
394 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 little or nothing to carry out this great work ; it was only 
 when the democracy assumed the reins in 67 B.C. and in fid 
 B.C. that the Roman sovereignty over the Mediterranean 
 was restored, and the dominion in the East consolidated 
 by the annexation of Pontus and Syria. Now that the 
 democracy and its leaders were supreme, another and even 
 more important section of the work was at last taken in 
 hand. 
 
 Something had been accomplished by Caesar towards 
 the subjugation of the West during his governorship in 
 Spain in 61 B.C. : the Lusitanians and Gallaeci were sub- 
 dued, the tribute of the subjects was reduced, and their 
 financial affairs were regulated. 
 
 The term Gallia has been applied, since the age of 
 Augustus, to the country bounded by the Pyrenees, the 
 Rhine, the Atlantic Ocean, and the Mediterranean. The 
 Roman province which had been constituted for sixty 
 years, and which corresponded pretty nearly to the modern 
 Languedoc, Dauphine, and Provence, had seldom been iu 
 a state of peace. Pompeius had had to fight his way 
 through the insurgent tribes in order to reach Spain in 
 77 B.C. ; while the connection of the Allobroges with the 
 Catilinarian conspiracy is but one indication of the per- 
 petual ferment in which the more remote cantons lived. 
 Still the bounds of the province were not extended , 
 Lugdunum Convenarum (the colony of Sertorians), Tolosa, 
 Vienna, and Genava remained the most remote Roman 
 townships towards the west and north 
 
 But the importance of Gallia was continually increasing ; 
 its glorious climate, the fertility of the soil, the commercial 
 routes stretching northwards as far as Britain, the easy 
 communication with Italy, the civilization and luxury 
 which were to be found in the city of Massilia, all com- 
 bined to make Gallia the most attractive of the Roman 
 provinces. Ten years before Caesar's arrival it was swarm- 
 ing with Roman burgesses and merchants, with Roman 
 farmers and graziers, while a large proportion of the land 
 was owned by Roman nobles, who lived in Italy and 
 cultivated their estates by means of stewards. 
 
 This region had for a long time been under the influence 
 of Hellenism, spreading from the great Greek colony of 
 Massilia ; and even in the Roman period Greek physicians 
 
CAESAR IN GAUL. 395 
 
 and rhetoricians were employed in the Gallic cantons : but, 
 as elsewhere, Hellenism was superseded by the mixed 
 Latino-Greek culture. The Celtic and Ligurian popula- 
 tions gradually lost their nationality, were compelled to 
 exchange the sword for the plough, which they were forced 
 to use in the service of a foreign master, and they attested 
 by many insurrections the hardness of the bondage into 
 which they had fallen. But the towns flourished and 
 grew; Aquae Sextiae, Narbo, and, above all, Massilia, might 
 be mentioned in comparison with the most prosperous 
 Italian towns. 
 
 But as soon as the Roman frontier was crossed, Roman 
 influence practically ceased. North of the Cevennes the 
 great Celtic race was found in all its native freedom. 
 The great body of this people had settled in modern 
 France, in the western districts of Germany and Switzer- 
 land, and in the south of England ; but there were Celts 
 in modern Austria and Spain, though cut off from their 
 kinsmen by the barriers of the Alps and the Pyrenees. 
 Little can be known of the development of this great 
 people ; we have to be content with a mere outline of 
 their culture and political condition in the time of Caesar. 
 
 The population of Gaul appears to have been compara- 
 tively dense. From the numbers of the Belgic levy against 
 Caesar it may be computed that in those regions the pro- 
 portion was about 200 persons to the square mile — about 
 the same rate which holds at present for Wales ; in the 
 canton of the Helvetii it was about 245 : hence in the 
 more cultivated districts of the Haedui and Arverni it was 
 probably higher. Agriculture was no doubt known in 
 Gaul, and a kind of beer was made from the barley which 
 was grown there. But the pursuit was despised, and, 
 even in the south, was held unbecoming for a free Celt. 
 Pastoral husbandry was much more esteemed. The 
 Romans availed themselves of the Celtic breed of cattle, 
 and of the skill of Celtic slaves in the rearing of animals ; 
 Gallic oxen and ponies were much used, and in the northern 
 districts the rearing of cattle was almost universal. In 
 the north-east, between the sea and the Rhine, dense 
 woods covered the ground, and on the plains of Flanders 
 and Lorraine, the Menapian and Treverian shepherd fed 
 his half-wild swine in the impenetrable oak forests. In 
 
396 HISTORY OF EOME. 
 
 Britain there was hardly any agriculture, and the culture 
 of the olive and the vine did not extend beyond the 
 Cevennes. 
 
 The Gauls lived mainly in open villages, of which the 
 Helvetii alone had four hundred, besides many single 
 homesteads. But there were also walled towns, of which 
 the walls were an admirable combination of timber and 
 wood, while the buildings were wholly of wood. There 
 were twelve of such towns among the Helvetii, and the 
 same number among the Suessiones. But in the northern 
 parts morasses and forests, and in Britain a sort of wooden 
 abatis, were the only protection in time of war. 
 
 Roads and bridges were numerous, and the number and 
 character of the largest rivers — the Rhone, Garonne, 
 Loire, and Seine — made river intercourse easy and profit- 
 able. In maritime affairs the Gauls had attained no in- 
 considerable skill, and in one respect had surpassed the 
 nations of the Mediterranean. They were the first nation 
 that regularly navigated the Atlantic, and the tribes which 
 bordered on the ocean employed sailing vessels, with 
 leathern sails and iron anchor-chains, not only for com- 
 merce but for war ; while the war vessels of the Phoenicians, 
 Greeks, and Romans, were all, up to this time, propelled by 
 oars, and used the sail only as an occasional aid , their 
 trading vessels alone were sailers properly so-called. In 
 the Channel, the Gauls, still and for long afterwards, em- 
 ployed a sort of leather-covered skiffs. 
 
 There was considerable commercial intercourse between 
 even the most northern Celtic regions and the Roman 
 province. The people of modern Brittany brought tin from 
 the mines of Cornwall, and carried it by river or by land 
 to Narbo and Massilia. Among the tribes at the mouth of 
 the Rhine, fishing and the collection of birds' eggs was an 
 important industry. The tolls levied on rivers and at 
 maritime ports play a large part in the finance of certain 
 cantons. In manufactures, working in metals was the 
 only important known industry : the copper implements 
 even now discovered in tombs, and the gold coins of the 
 Arverni attest the skill of the Gallic workmen ; and they 
 are even said to have taught the Romans the arts of 
 tinning and silvering. Naturally the art of mining went 
 hand in hand with the working of metals. There were 
 
CAESAR IN GAUL. 397 
 
 extensive iron mines on the Loire, and the art of mining 
 "was adapted in those regions to the purposes of war. 
 The Romans believed that Gaul was very rich in gold ; 
 but the idea is negatived by the small amount of gold 
 discovered in tombs, and probably arose from the fables 
 of travellers. Still the streams flowing from the Alps 
 and. Pyrenees may then have yielded sufficient produce 
 to make the search for gold profitable through the 
 employment of slave labour. 
 
 The taste of the Celtic workmen was not equal to their 
 mechanical skill. The ornaments they produced were 
 gaudy and parti-coloured, and their coins invariably 
 imitate two or three Greek dies. But the art of poetry 
 was highly valued, and was intimately connected with 
 religion. Science and philosophy existed, though in 
 subordination to theology. The knowledge of writing 
 was general among the priests. 
 
 Among the Celts "the town had, as in the East, merely 
 mercantile and strategic — not political — importance." The 
 Greeks and Romans had lived, in early times, in cantons, 
 each clan by itself; they had villages in which they 
 bought and sold, and strong places whither they fled for 
 refuge in case of invasion. But very soon the tower of 
 refuge grew into a town, and became the head and centre 
 of the clan, and the seat of law and justice. Among the 
 Celts, however, this development never took place ; they 
 remained a mere collection of clans, and never took the 
 step by which the clan becomes a state with a fixed centre 
 of government. 
 
 The constitution of the clan canton was based upon three 
 elements, the prince, the council of elders, and the body of 
 freemen capable of bearing arms. The supreme authority 
 rested with the general assembly by which, in important 
 matters, the prince was bound. The council was often 
 numerous, sometimes reaching the number of six hundred, 
 but had not more power than the Roman senate in the 
 regal period. In some southern clans — the Arverni, 
 Haedui, Sequani, and Helvetii — a revolution had taken 
 place, before the time of Caesar, which had overthrown 
 the power of the kings and set up that of the senate in its 
 place. In all cases their towns, even when walled, were 
 destitute of political importance. 
 
398 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 The dominant feature in all Celtic commonwealths is the 
 high nobility — a class the existence of which is almost 
 incompatible with that of a flourishing urban life. This 
 nobility consisted for the most part of members of royal, 
 or formerly royal, families. It monopolized all power in 
 the state, financial, warlike, or political. The nobles 
 forced the common freemen to surrender their freedom 
 first as debtors and then as slaves. They maintained large 
 bodies of mounted retainers, ambacti, and by tbeir means 
 defied the government and broke up the commonwealth. 
 These retainers sometimes reached the number of ten 
 thousand, besides tbe bondmen and debtors who were 
 equally dependent. Moreover, the leading families in 
 different states were connected by marriage aud by treaty 
 and were together stronger than any single clan. The 
 community could no uuger maintain peace or protect 
 individuals : only those who were clients of some powerful 
 noble enjoyed security. 
 
 The general assembly lost its importance ; the monarchy 
 usually succumbed to the nobilitv 7 , and the king was super- 
 seded by the vergobretus, or judgment-dealer, who, like 
 the Roman consul, held office for a year. So far as the 
 canton held together it was led by the council, which was 
 governed by the heads of the aristocracy. 
 
 Like the Greeks in the Persian wars, the Transalpine 
 Gauls seem to have become conscious of their unity as a 
 nation only in their wars with Rome. The combination 
 of the whole Celtic nobility was favourable to the develop- 
 ment of the idea, and there were many who were willing to 
 sacrifice the independence of the canton or of the nobility, 
 to purchase the independence of the nation. The universal 
 popularity of the opposition to Caesar is attested by the 
 telegraphic rapidity with which news was carried through- 
 out the length and breadth of Gaul. 
 
 But though politically divided, the Gauls had long been 
 held together by the bond of a close religious union. The 
 corporation of Druids embraced the British islands and all 
 Gaul, perhaps even other Celtic countries. It possessed a 
 special head, elected by the priests themselves ; schools, in 
 which its traditions were transmitted ; special privileges, 
 such as exemption from taxation and military service. 
 Annual councils were held near Chartres; and, above 
 
CAESAR IN GAUL. 399 
 
 all, the blind devotion of the people to their priests was 
 *'in nowise inferior to that of the Irish at the present day." 
 
 Such a priesthood could not but possess considerable 
 political power : in monarchical cantons it conducted the 
 government in case of an interregnum ; it excluded indi- 
 viduals or states from religious and therefore also from civil 
 society , it decided important suits, especially with regard 
 to boundaries and inheritance ; it had an extensive criminal 
 jurisdiction, and even claimed the right of deciding on "war 
 or peace. " The Gauls were not much removed from an 
 ecclesiastical state with its pope and councils, its immuni- 
 ties, inderdicts, and spiritual courts ; only this ecclesiastical 
 state did not, like that of recent times, stand aloof from the 
 nations, but was on the contrary pre-eminently national." 
 
 But though the priests and nobility constituted a certain 
 union of the clans, their class interests were too strong to 
 allow this Union to become really national. The only 
 attempt at political union was the system of hegemony 
 among the cantons ; a stronger clan induced or compelled 
 a weaker to become subordinate to it. The stronger had 
 control of all external relations for both, while the weaker 
 was obliged to render military service, and sometimes to 
 pay tribute. Thus aseries of leagues arose — like that among 
 the Belgae. in the north-east, under the Suessiones ; that, 
 in southern and central Gaul, under the Arverni ; and that 
 of the maritime cantons in the north and west. 
 
 The union in these confederacies was of the loosest kind. 
 The league was represented in peace by the federal diet, and 
 in war by the general. Contests for the hegemony went on 
 in every league, and the rivalry spread into every dependent 
 clan, and into every village and house, just as the rivalry 
 between Athens and Sparta split up every independent 
 community in Greece. 
 
 In a country where knighthood was the predominant 
 social feature, the strength of the army was naturally the 
 cavalry ; war-chariots w r ere also used among the Belgae and 
 in Britain. When the general levy was called out, every 
 man who could keep his seat on horseback took up arms, and, 
 when attacking an enemy w r hom they despised, they swore, 
 man by man, in the true spirit of chivalry, to charge at 
 least twice through the enemy's line. There were also 
 hired free-lances who displayed in its extremest form the 
 
400 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 spirit of Titter indifference to their own lives and to those 
 of others which such a mode of life produces. They would 
 often, we are told, fight for life and death at a banquet, 
 for sport ; and even sell themselves to be killed for a fixed 
 sum of money or a number of casks of wine. 
 
 Besides the mounted force there was the levy en masse 
 of infantry. Their arms were still a large shield and a 
 long thrusting spear. There is no trace of military organi- 
 zation or of tactical subdivisions ; each canton fought en 
 masse, without other arrangement. The baggage was 
 carried in waggons, which were used as a barricade at 
 night. The infantry of certain cantons, such as the Nervii, 
 was more efficient ; but the Nervii had no cavalry, and 
 were, perhaps, an immigrant German tribe. Caesar's 
 estimate of the Celtic infantry is made plain enough by 
 the fact that, after the first battle, he never employed them 
 in conjunction with Roman troops. 
 
 Undoubtedly the Celts of Transalpine Gaul, as they 
 appeared in Caesar's time, had advanced as compared with 
 their kinsmen who had come into contact with the Romans 
 a century and a half previously in the valley of the Po. The 
 militia had been replaced by the cavalry as the preponderat- 
 ing arm. Open villages had been replaced by walled 
 towns. Articles found in the tombs of Lombardy are cer- 
 tainly inferior to those found in northern Gaul. Lastly, 
 the sense of nationality, which scarcely appears in the 
 battles fought south of the Alps, is seen with striking force 
 in the struggle against Caesar. 
 
 Many aspects of Celtic civilization are interesting as 
 approaching nearly to modern culture — its sailing vessels, 
 its knighthood, its ecclesiastical constitution, its attempts 
 to build the nation, not on the city, but on the tribe ; — but 
 a genex*al view of the whole, so far as the materials exist 
 for it, suggests the thought that the Celtic nation had 
 reached its culminating point of development. " It was 
 unable to produce from its own resources either a national 
 art or a national state, and attained at most to a national 
 theology and a peculiar order of nobility." Thus the 
 original simple valour was no more, while the higher 
 military courage, based on morality and organization, 
 appears but in a very stinted form. Again, the coarser 
 features of barbarism were gone : faithful retainers were 
 
CAESAR IN GAUL. 401 
 
 no longer sacrificed at the death of their chief; but human 
 sacrifices remained ; torture, inadmissible in the case of 
 a free man, was still inflicted upon free women or upon 
 slaves. " The Celts had lost the advantages which specially 
 belong to the primitive epoch of nations, but had not 
 acquired those which civilization brings with it when it 
 intimately and thoroughly pervades a people." 
 
 The Celts had long ceased to press on the Iberian tribes, 
 and the country between the Pyrenees and Garonne was 
 occupied by the Aquitani, a number of tribes of Iberian 
 descent. The Roman arms and the Roman culture had 
 already made great inroads upon the Celtic nation. The 
 latter w r as now cut off by the Roman province from Italy, 
 Spain, and the Mediterranean. Trade and commerce had 
 already paved the way for conquest north of the Roman 
 bounds. Wine especially, which the Gauls drank undiluted, 
 was greatly prized , and Italian horses were imported. 
 Roman burgesses already possessed land in cantons north 
 of the frontier, and the Roman language was by no means 
 unknown in free Gaul. 
 
 Bat the strongest pressure came from the Germans on 
 the north and east : "a fresh stock from the cradle of 
 peoples In the east, which made room for itself by the side of 
 its elder brethren with youthful vigour, although also with 
 youthful rudeness." The German tribes nearest the Rhine 
 ■ — the Usipetes, Tencteri, Sugambri, and Ubii — were by 
 this time partly civilized, and inhabited fixed territories ; 
 but in the interior, agriculture was of small importance ; 
 even the names of the various tribes were unknown to the 
 Celts, who called them by the general appellation of Suebi 
 (wanderers), and Marcomanni (border- warriors). Before 
 this period the Celts had been driven over the Rhine ; the 
 Boii, who were once in Bavaria and Bohemia, were harm- 
 less wanderers, and the region of the Black Forest, formerly 
 possessed by the Helvetii, was a desert, or occupied by 
 Germans. Nor had the intruders stopped at the Rhine ; 
 certain tribes, amongst whom were the Adnatuci and the 
 Tnngri, perhaps also the Nervii and the Treveri, had formed 
 settlements west of the river, and exacted hostages and 
 tribute from the neighbouring Gauls. Thus free Gaul was 
 threatened at once by two powerful nations, and was at 
 the same time torn by internal dissensions : " how should 
 
 26 
 
402 . HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 a nation, which could name no day like those of Marathon 
 and Salauiis, of Aricia and the Raudine field,— a nation 
 which, even in its time of vigour, had made no attempt to 
 destroy Massilia by an united effort — now, when evening 
 had come, defend itself against so formidable foes ? '' 
 
 The internal condition of Gaul readily became mixed up 
 with its external relations. The Romans, from their first 
 interference, had availed themselves of the perpetual con- 
 tests for the hegemony, by which every canton was torn 
 asunder; they had supported the Haedui in their rivalry 
 with the Arvemi for predominance in the south, had re- 
 duced to subjection the Allobroges and many of the client 
 cantons of the Arvemi, and got the hegemony transferred 
 from the latter to the Haedui. But the power of Rome was 
 not the only foreign force which might be invoked The 
 Sequani in central Gaul, who were at the head of the 
 anti-Roman faction, had availed themselves of the remiss- 
 ness of the senatorial government, to make an attempt to 
 destroy Roman influence and to humble their rivals, the 
 Haedui. A dispute arose between the two tribes as to tolls 
 on the river Saone, which separated the two cantons ; and 
 about the year 71 B.C. the German prince Ariovistus crossed 
 the Rhine at the head of fifteen thousand men in support 
 of the Sequani. After a long war, the Haedui were re- 
 duced to conclude a most unfavourable peace, by which 
 they became tributary to the Sequani, and swore never to 
 invoke the intervention of Rome (61 B.C.). The Romans 
 talked of assisting the Haedui, and even issued orders to 
 that effect to the governors of Gaul ; but nothing was 
 done, and Ariovistus was even enrolled upon the list of 
 friends of the Roman people. The result of this inaction 
 was that numerous bands of Germans continued to cross 
 the Rhine, and that Ariovistus determined to extend his 
 power over the whole of Gaul. The Celts were treated as 
 a conquered nation : even his friends, the Sequani, were 
 forced to cede a third of their territory to make room for 
 his followers ; and a second third was soon demanded for 
 the tribe of the Harudes. 
 
 But the invasion of Ariovistus was not the only move- 
 ment in progress. The Usipetes and Tencteri, on the 
 right bank of the Rhine, hard pressed by Suebian hordes, 
 had set out to find new settlements lower down the Rhine. 
 
CAESAR IN GAUL. 403 
 
 Suebian bands gathered opposite the canton of the Treveri. 
 Lastly, the Helvetii, the most easterly of the Celtic cantons, 
 in modern Switzerland, formed the desperate resolution of 
 evacuating their own territory, in order to find a more 
 spacious and less exposed habitation west of the Jura 
 mountains, hoping at the same time to acquire the hege- 
 mony of central Gaul. The Rauraci, in southern Alsace, 
 and the remnant of the homeless Boii were induced to 
 make common cause with the Helvetii. If their scheme 
 were carried out, their original settlement would, of course, 
 fall to the German invader. " From the source of the 
 Rhine to the Atlantic Ocean the German tribes were in 
 motion ; the whole line of the Rhine was threatened bv 
 them. It was a moment like that when the Alamanni and 
 the Franks threw themselves on the falling empire of the 
 Caesars ; and even now there seemed on the eve of being 
 carried into effect against the Celts that very movement 
 which was successful, five hundred years afterwards, against 
 the Romans." 
 
 It was at this moment that Caesar entered upon his 
 province (58 B.C.). He was now governor of both the 
 Gauls, including Istriaand Dalmatia; his office was secured 
 to him for five years, and it was extended, in 55 B.C., for 
 five years more ; he had the right of nominating ten lieu- 
 tenants and (at any rate, according to his own interpre- 
 tation of his powers) to fill up his legions or form new 
 ones from the population of his provinces. His army 
 consisted of four veteran legions, the seventh, eighth, 
 ninth, and tenth, in all about 24,000 men, besides auxi- 
 liaries ; he had some Spanish cavalry, and archers and 
 slingers from Numidia, Crete, and the Balearic isles. His 
 staff contained several able officers, such as Publius 
 Cra^sus, son of Caesar's old political ally, and Titus 
 Labienus. " Caesar had not received definite instructions ; 
 to one who was discerning and courageous these were 
 implied in the circumstances with which he had to deal. 
 The negligence of the senate had to be retrieved, and, 
 first of all, the stream of German invasion had to be 
 checked." 
 
 The invasion of the Helvetii had just begun ; they had 
 burned their towns and villages to make return impossible, 
 and had gathered to the number of 380,000 souls at the 
 
404 IIISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 Lacus Lemannus, near Genava. The difficulty of crossing 
 the mountains had determined them to cross the Rhone in 
 a southern direction into the territory of the Allobroges, 
 and to march first south and then west, until they reached 
 the cauton of the Santo nes on the Atlantic, where they had 
 determined to settle. Their route lay though Roman terri- 
 tory, and Caesar was resolved to prevent them from crossing 
 the river. He gained some days by negotiation, and in 
 the mean time hurried up his legions from Aquileia, called 
 out the militia of the province, and broke down the bridge 
 over the Rhone ; he then proceeded to bar the southern 
 bank against the Helvetii by an entrenchment nineteen 
 miles long. Baulked of their scheme, the invaders were 
 obliged to turn to the difficult mountain route, through the 
 passes of the Jura, and a free passage was procured for them 
 from the Sequani by the influence of the anti-Roman party 
 in the central cantons, who hoped to find in the Helvetii a 
 valuable reinforcement. Caesar immediately decided to 
 follow them ; he crossed the Rhone with five legions and 
 the troops stationed at Genava. He overtook the enemy 
 at the Saone, where he destroyed the division which had 
 not yet crossed. His appearance in the territory of the 
 Haedui at once restored the predominance of the Roman 
 party, and thus obviated any difficulty with regard to sup- 
 plies ; but his task still remained formidable. For fifteen 
 days Caesar followed the unwieldy host, which had turned 
 north in the hope that Caesar would not venture to advance 
 far into the interior. No opportunity of fighting a battle 
 under favourable circumstances was given ; the leaders 
 carefully guarded against surprise, and appeared to have 
 accurate intelligence of Caesar's movements. Moreover, 
 the Romans now began to be in want of provisions ; the 
 cavalry had turned out untrustworthy, and were suspected 
 of carrying information into the enemy's camp. Such was 
 the critical state of affairs when the armies were just 
 marching past Bibracte, the capital of the Haedui. Caesar 
 resolved to seize the place before continuing the pursuit — 
 perhaps to establish himself there permanently. But the 
 Helvetii, imagining that the Romans were preparing to 
 fly, attacked them. 
 
 The armies were drawn up on parallel ranges of hills. 
 The Celts charged and broke the Roman cavalry, but had 
 
CAESAR IN GAUL. 405 
 
 to retire before the legions ; and when the Romans 
 charged in turn, the Celts again advanced, while their 
 reserve took the Romans in the flank. But the latter 
 were met by the reserve of the Roman attacking column, 
 and. destroyed ; and now the main body gave way, and. 
 retreated northwards. The Romans were too exhausted 
 for pursuit ; but, in consequence of Caesar's threats, the 
 cantons through which the Helvetii passed refused, them 
 supplies and plundered their baggage, and the whole host 
 were soon reduced to submit without reserve. Caesar 
 treated them with clemency. The Haedui were directed 
 to assign territory to the Boii within their own bounds ; 
 while the survivors of the Rauraci and Helvetii were sent 
 back to their former territory, to defend, under Roman 
 supremacy, the upper Rhine against the Germans. Only 
 the south-western point of the Helvetian territory was 
 occupied by the Romans, and the town of Noviodunum 
 was converted into the fortress of Julia Equestris, or the 
 colony of the horsemen of Caesar. 
 
 By the battle of Bibracte the threatened invasion on the 
 upper Rhine was prevented, and the anti-Roman party in 
 Gaul humbled. But on the middle Rhine Roman inter- 
 ference was even more urgently called for. The yoke of 
 Ariovistus had now become more intolerable than Roman 
 supremacy, and at a diet of the tribes of central Gaul the 
 Roman general was asked to come to the aid of the Celts 
 against the Germans. Caesar consented ; at his suggestion 
 the Haedui refused the customary tribute and demanded 
 the restoration of the hostages. "When Ariovistus pro- 
 ceeded to attack the Roman clients, Caesar sent to demand 
 from him the hostages of the Haedui, and a promise to 
 leave the latter tribe at peace, and to bring no more 
 Germans over the Rhine. Ariovistus rrplied in terms 
 which asserted a claim to equal right and equal power 
 with the Romans. Northern Gaul, he said, had become 
 subject to himself as southern Gaul to the Romans ; he 
 did not hinder the Romans from levying tribute on the 
 Allobroges, and the Romans had no right to prevent him 
 from taxing his own subjects. He also showed that he 
 was acquainted with the political condition of Italy, and 
 offered, to aid Caesar to make himself ruler of Italy, if 
 only Caesar would leave him alone in Gaul. When Caesar 
 
406 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 requested him to appear personally like a client prince in 
 his camp, Ariovistus ref used. 
 
 The Roman troops at once began their march. They 
 occupied Vesontio, the capital of the Sequani, and after an 
 abortive conference between the generals, in which an 
 attempt was made to carry off Caesar, the war languished 
 for a time. At length the Germans established them- 
 selves in Caesar's rear, and cut off his supplies ; but, 
 imitating their own manoeuvre, he sent l-ound two legions 
 which foi-tified themselves beyond the German camp, and 
 repulsed the attempts of the enemy to dislodge them. The 
 whole Roman army was immediately led on, and after a 
 desperate struggle, in which the right wing of each army 
 was victorious, the Roman reserve line under Publius 
 Crassus decided the day in favour of the Romans. The 
 pursuit was continued as far as the Rhine, and only a few 
 besides the king escaped. 
 
 The line of the Rhine was by this battle won. Caesar 
 might have expelled the Germans who had already settled 
 themselves on the left bank ; but preferring, as everywhere, 
 " conquered foes to doubtful friends," he allowed them to 
 remain, and intrusted them with the defence of the Rhine 
 against their countrymen. 
 
 The consequences of this one campaign were great and 
 lasting. It was now finally determined that the whole of 
 Gaul should be under Roman sway, and that the Rhine 
 should be the boundary of the empire against the Germans. 
 " People felt that now another spirit and another arm had 
 begun to guide the destinies of Rome." 
 
 Second campaign, 57 B.C. 
 
 After the first campaign all central Gaul submitted to the 
 Romans, while the middle and upper Rhine were rendered 
 safe from German incursions. But the northern cantons 
 were not affected by the blow ; moreover, close relations 
 subsisted between them and the Germans over the Rhine ; 
 while, at the mouth of the river, Germanic tribes were 
 making ready to cross. Accordingly, in the spring of 
 57 B.C., Caesar set out with eight legions against the 
 Belgic cantons. The confederacy sent the whole first levy 
 of 300,000 men to the southern frontier to receive him. 
 One canton alone, that of Remi, seized the opportunity to 
 shake off the yoke of the Suessiones, and to play the part of 
 
CAESAR IN GAUL. 401 
 
 the Haedui in central Gaul. Caesar entrenched himself on 
 the Aisne and, allowing the enemy no opportunity to attack, 
 waited for their army to dissolve. The Bellovaci, hearing 
 that the Haedui were about to enter their territory, were 
 the first to retire, and soon the whole host broke up, 
 binding themselves by oath to hasten to the assistance of 
 the first canton attacked. Some of the contingents were 
 destroyed by Caesar during their retreat, and the western 
 cantons — the Suessiones, Bellovaci, and Ambiani — at once 
 submitted. 
 
 But in the east the Nervii, aided by the Viromandui, 
 the Atrebates, and the Aduatuci, concluded a second and 
 closer league, and assembled their forces on the upper 
 Sambre. They had accurate knowledge of every move- 
 ment of the Romans while concealing their own. When 
 Caesar's forces arrived at the Sambre, as the legions were 
 pitching the camp on the left bank, while the cavalry 
 explored the right, the latter were suddenly attacked and 
 driven across the river. In a moment the enemy had 
 crossed too, and the legions had scarcely time to take up 
 their arms when they found themselves engaged in a 
 desperate contest without order or connexion, and with 
 no proper command. Labienus, on the left wing, over- 
 threw the Atrebates, while the Roman centre forced the 
 Viromandui down the slope towards the river ; but the 
 right wing was outflanked by the Nervii, and its two 
 legions, each driven separately into a dense mass and 
 assailed on three sides, were on the verge of destruction. 
 Caesar himself seized a shield and induced the wavering 
 ranks to rally, and already connexion between the two 
 legions had been restored when help arrived — partly from 
 the rear-guard which came up — partly from Labienus, 
 who had sent the tenth legion to help the general. The 
 Nervii fell almost to a man where they stood ; and of their 
 six hundred senators only three are said to have survived. 
 
 The eastern cantons now for the most part submitted ; 
 the Aduatuci, who were too late for the battle and who 
 still attempted to hold out, were sold for slaves en masse, 
 and their clients were declared independent. The Remi, 
 of course, became the leading canton of the district, and 
 only the country between the Scheldt and the Rhine 
 remained unsubdued. 
 
408 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 Third campaign, 56 B.C. 
 
 The next year was occupied with the subjection of the 
 Aremorican cantons. Publius Crassus had been sent to 
 them in the autumn of 57 15. c, and had induced the power- 
 ful Veueti to submit. But they soon repented, and during 
 the winter detained as hostages the Roman officers who 
 came to levy grain among them The whole coast from 
 the Rhine to Loire rose against Rome, and the leaders 
 were calculating on the rise of the Belgae and on aid from 
 Britain and from the Germans 
 
 Caesar sent Labienus with the cavalry to the Rhine, and 
 Q. Titurius Sabinus to Normandy, while the main attack 
 was directed against the Veneti by land and sea Decimus 
 Brutus hastily formed a fleet of ships, which he levied 
 from the maritime cantons, or caused to be built on the 
 Loire, while Caesar advanced with the best of his infantry. 
 But the country was poor in supplies : the towns were 
 built on islands close to the shore or on spits of land, 
 and when the Romans had at length reduced any one 
 of them, they had to look on while the enemy transferred 
 their goods and families by sea to another At length 
 the Roman fleet arrived off the coast of Brittany, but 
 their light, vessels were no match for the strong sailing 
 ships of the Veneti, which were too high to be exposed to 
 damage from the Roman missiles, and too strong to be 
 injured by the iron beaks of their ships But the Romans 
 disabled the enemy by cutting the ropes which fastened 
 the sails to the yards with long poles to which sickles 
 were fastened, and then boarded and captured the ship. 
 A calm set in, which prevented the Veneti from gaining 
 the high seas, and the whole immense fleet was nearly 
 destroyed. Thus, as at Mylae two hundred years before 
 this, the earliest naval battle fought on the Atlantic, 
 was decided in favour of the Romans by a lucky 
 invention. The whole coast submitted, and as an ex- 
 ample of severity Caesar caused the whole council of the 
 Veneti to be executed, and the people to be sold to the 
 last man. 
 
 Meanwhile Sabinus had stood on the defensive until he 
 could provoke the army opposed to him to an attack, which 
 he defeated. The Morini and Menapii, who were now 
 threatened by Caesar, retired into the depths of the Ar- 
 
CAESAR IN GAUL. 409 
 
 dennes, and after persevering for some days in his advance, 
 he was obliged to retire without accomplishing anything. 
 
 Communications with Gaul had hitherto Leen carried 
 on by the road over the western Alps, laid out by 
 Pompeius in 77 B.C. Now that central Gaul was open to 
 intercourse with Italy, a shorter route crossing the Alps in 
 a northerly direction was required. Accordingly, in 57 
 B.C. Servius Galba was sent to occupy Octodurum and to 
 subdue the neighbouring tribes, in order to secure the 
 merchant route over the St. Bernard and along the lake 
 of Geneva. In 5G B.C. Publius Crassus was sent into Aqui- 
 tania with the similar object of conquering the Iberian 
 tribes there, and, though opposed by contingents from 
 beyond the Pyrenees led by officers trained in the Ser- 
 torian wars, he succeeded in reducing all the country 
 between the Garonne and the Pyrenees. 
 
 Fourth campaign, 55 B.C. 
 
 The pacification of Gaul, so far as it could be effected 
 by the sword, was now accomplished ; but the work of 
 defending Gaul from the Germans was still unfinished. 
 During the winter the Usipetes and Tencteri had effected 
 a crossing in numbers amounting to 430,000 and were 
 intending to advance into central Gaul. On the approach 
 of the Roman legions the invaders seemed ready to 
 acknowledge the supremacy of Rome; but a suspicion 
 arose in Caesar's mind that they were only negotiating 
 to obtain delay, and, when this was confirmed by an 
 attack upon his vanguard during the de facto suspension of 
 arms, he believed himself absolved from all obligation 
 to observe the principles of international law. When the 
 German princes appeared to apologize for the attack, they 
 were arrested ; and the whole host, thus deprived of its 
 leaders, was attacked and cut to pieces. However deserving 
 of censure Caesar's conduct may have been, the German 
 encroachments were effectually checked. 
 
 Caesar determined to follow up this blow by an expe- 
 dition to the other side of the river, for which the protection 
 afforded by the Sugambri to the fugitives of the Usipetes 
 and Tencteri furnished a sufficient excuse. He accord- 
 ingly crossed into the Ubian territory, and received the 
 submission of several cantons. But the Sugambri with- 
 drew into the interior; the districts adjoining the Ubii 
 
410 HISTORY CF ROME. 
 
 were laid waste, while a large force assembled at a distance. 
 Caesar did not accept the challenge, but recrossed the 
 Rhine after a stay of eighteen days. 
 
 The remainder of the season was occupied with an 
 expedition into Britain, which furnished, if not armed 
 assistance, at any rate a safe asylum to the patriots of the 
 continent. Publius Crassus had already, in 57 B.C., crossed 
 to the Scilly islands, and in the summer of 55 u.C. Caesar 
 himself crossed, in the narrowest part of the Channel, 
 with two legions. The coast was covered with multitudes 
 of the enemy, and the war chariots moved on as fast by 
 land as the Roman galle} T s by sea ; and it was only with 
 great difficulty and under cover of the missiles thrown 
 from the ships of war, that a landing was effected. Some 
 villages submitted, but soon the natives appeared from 
 the interior and threatened the camp ; a storm severely 
 damaged the fleet, and, as soon as the necessary repairs 
 were accomplished, the Romans returned to Gaul. 
 
 Fifth campaign, 54 B.C. 
 
 During the winter a fleet of eight hundred sail was 
 fitted out, and in the spring Caesar sailed a second time, 
 with five legions and two thousand cavalry. The landing 
 was unopposed ; but a second time the fleet was nearly 
 destroyed by the storms, and while the Romans repaired 
 the disaster the British tribes made preparations for 
 defence. The resistance was headed by Cassivellaunus, 
 who ruled in what is now Middlesex and the surrounding 
 counties. He dismissed the general levy, retaining only 
 the war chariots, with which he dogged Caesar's footsteps, 
 threatening his communications and devastating the 
 country through which he was about to pass. The 
 Thames was crossed, and the Trinobantes gave in their 
 submission ; but an attack by the men of Kent upon the 
 fleet warned Caesar of the danger to which he was con- 
 stantly subject, and the storming of a huge abatis where 
 the cattle of the country were collected was an exploit 
 considerable enough to afford an excuse for retreat. 
 Cassivellaunus promised hostages and tribute, probably 
 with no intention of giving either, and Caesar recrossed 
 into Gaul. His immediate object — of " rousing the islanders 
 from their haughty security " seems certainly to have 
 been attained. 
 
CAESAR IN GAUL. 411 
 
 The subjection of Gaul was now complete, while both 
 Britons and Germans had been impressed with a sense of 
 the power of Rome ; but many circumstances combined to 
 make the Celtic nation restive under its yoke. They were 
 ashamed when they had to confess that a nation numbering 
 a million armed men had been subdued by fifty thousand 
 Romans. Central Gaul and the Belgian confederacy had 
 submitted almost without striking a blow ; but the heroic 
 resistance of the Veneti and of the Britons incited the 
 patriotic Celts to make another attempt to recover their 
 freedom. Even in 54 B.C. the Treveri had absented them- 
 selves from the general diet, and Caesar had earned with 
 him into Britain their foremost men as hostages ; and 
 when the Haeduan Dumnorix refused to embark, he was 
 pursued and. cut down by Caesar's orders. His death 
 created a deep impression all through the ranks of the 
 Celtic nobility; every man felt that the fate of Dumnorix 
 might be his own. 
 
 Sixth campaign, 53 B.O. 
 
 In the winter of 54-53 B.C. the main body of the Roman 
 army was quartered in Belgian territory, in six separate 
 divisions for convenience in the matter of supplies. The 
 most easterly division of all, in the territory of the 
 Eburones near Aduatuca, consisting of a legion under 
 Quintus Titurius Sabinus, and some cohorts under Lucius 
 Aurunculeius Cotta, was suddenly surrounded by the 
 general levy of the Eburones, under their kings Ambiorix 
 and Catuvolcus. Provisions were ample, and the attacks 
 of the Eburones were futile against the Roman en- 
 trenchments. But Ambiorix informed Sabinus that all 
 the Roman divisions were being assailed simultaneously, 
 and that all was lost unless they could effect a junction. 
 Out of friendship for the Romans he offered them a free 
 retreat to the nearest camp, two days' march distant. This 
 account was credible enough ; but the immediate duty of 
 Sabinus was undoubtedly to maintain at all costs the post 
 committed to his trust ; but though he was strongly dis- 
 suaded by Cotta and others, the proposal of Ambiorix was 
 accepted. About two miles from the camp the Romans 
 found themselves surrounded in a narrow valley. The 
 Eburones plied them with missiles, but would not enter 
 into a close combat. Escape was impossible, and Sabinus 
 
412 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 demanded an interview with Ambiorix. At the conference 
 he was killed with his principal officers, and the whole 
 Roman division was slain in the attack which followed, 
 except a few who regained the camp, and threw themselves 
 upon their swords in the following night. 
 
 The insurrection now broke out at every point. First 
 the Eburones, reinforced by the Aduatuci, the Menapii, 
 and the Nervii, attacked the division under Quintus 
 Cicero in the last-mentioned canton. The besiegers con- 
 structed ramparts and entrenchments, and showered tire- 
 balls and burning spears against the thatched huts of the 
 Roman camp. The insing was so universal that it was 
 long before the news of this or of the preceding attack 
 upon Sabiuus reached the general. At length a Celtic 
 horseman stole through the enemy from Cicero. Caesar set 
 out with only seven thousand men and four hundred cavalry; 
 but the news of his approach was enough to raise the 
 siege at the critical moment, when not one in ten of Cicero's 
 men remained unwounded. The insurgent army attacked 
 Caesar, but were defeated, and the whole insurrection 
 almost immediately collapsed. The Eastern levies returned 
 to their homes. The Treveri, who had advanced to attack 
 Labienus among the Remi, also desisted for the present. 
 Towards the close of the winter Caesar set out, with his 
 army largely reinforced, to crush the remains of the revolt. 
 The Nervii, Senones, and Carnutes were routed. Even 
 the unconquered Menapii had now to submit. The Treveri 
 were crushed, and the chief power among them reverted 
 to the Roman party. The Germans, who had sent aid to 
 the insurgents, were intimidated by a second crossing of 
 the Rhine. As to the Eburones, Caesar had worn mourn- 
 ing ever since the disaster of Aduatuca, and had sworn 
 not to remove it till he had revenged the treacherous 
 death of his soldiers. Ten Roman legions now advanced 
 into their country, after the cavalry had all but surprised 
 Ambiorix in his house. At the same time the neighbouring 
 tribes were invited to join in the pillage, and even a band 
 of Sugambrian horsemen from beyond the -Rhine accepted 
 the invitation. It was a man-hunt rather than Avar. Many 
 of the Eburones put themselves to death. Some few, 
 including Ambiorix, escaped over the Rhine. Punish- 
 ment now fell upon particular men in the several cantons, 
 
CAESAR IN GAUL. 413 
 
 and the Carnutic knight, Acco, was beheaded by the 
 Roman lictors. At the end of 53 B.C. Caesar crossed the 
 Alps to watch the daily increasing complications of the 
 capital. 
 
 Seventh campaign, 52 B.C. 
 
 But for once Caesar had miscalculated. " The fire was 
 smothered, but not extinguished." The death of Acco 
 again filled the whole Celtic nobility with consternation. 
 The position of affairs was most favourable for revolt. 
 Caesar was at a distance on the other side of the Alps, 
 while his army was encamped on the Seine. The Roman 
 troops might be surrounded and the province overrun 
 before he could appear, even if affairs in Italy did not 
 prevent his return. The signal was given at Cenabum 
 (Orleans), and all the Romans there were massacred. 
 Everywhere the patriots were astir. Even the Arverni, the 
 stanchest supporters of the Romans in all Gaul, were 
 brought to join the insurrection, after a revolution which 
 overthrew the government of the common council and made 
 Vercingetorix, the leader of the Arvernian patriots, king. 
 The latter soon became for the Celts what Cassivellaunus 
 had been for the Britons. It was felt that he, if any man, 
 was to save the nation. The insurrection spread in the 
 west from the Garonne to the Loire, and Vercingetorix 
 was everywhere recognized as commander-in-chief. But 
 in central Gaul the Haedui, on whom the accession of 
 the eastern cantons — the Sequani and Helvetii — de- 
 pended, wavered. The patriotic party was strong among 
 them, but their old antagonism to the Arverni was 
 stronger ; and while they still wavered, Caesar appeared 
 north of the Alps, to the astonishment alike of friend and 
 foe. He quickly provided for the defence of the old 
 province, and sent a force northwards into Arvernian 
 territory ; then, attended by only a few horsemen, he stole 
 through the country of the Haedui, and was again at the 
 head of his troops. 
 
 The presence of Caesar made it impossible for the in- 
 surgents to proceed in the ordinary manner of warfare. 
 Vercingetorix determined to make his cavalry enormously 
 superior to that of the Romans, to lay waste the land 
 far and wide, to burn down the towns, villages, and depots 
 of supplies, and to cut off the enemy's communications. 
 
414 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 The infantry he did not allow to face the Romans, but 
 attempted gradually to impart to them some of the rudi- 
 ments of discipline and training. He persuaded his 
 countrymen to destroy all towns not capable of defence, 
 and to concentrate all their powers upon a few strong 
 fortresses. 
 
 The first operation of the insurgents was an attack upon 
 the Boii, made with the view of annihilating them before 
 Caesar could arrive. The latter started immediately from 
 Agedincum, got together a small force of cavalry formed 
 of German mercenaries mounted on Italian and Spanish 
 horses, and, after causing Cenabum to be burnt, crossed 
 the Loire into the country of the Bituriges. Here the 
 new mode of warfare was tried for the first time. Twenty- 
 four townships of the Bituriges perished on the same day, 
 and the neighbouring cantons were ordered t > follow this 
 example. Avaricum (Bourges), the capital of the Bituriges, 
 was to have met the same fate, but, in compliance with the 
 entreaties of the magistrates of the Bituriges, it was 
 resolved to defend the city. 
 
 The infantry were placed in a position near the town, 
 where they were completely protected by morasses. The 
 cavalry commanded all the roads and obstructed commu- 
 nications. Caesar could not bring on a battle, and all his 
 attacks upon the town were repelled by the courage of 
 the besieged. The difficulty of supplies became daily 
 more serious, and the Roman soldiers were at length 
 reduced to flesh rations. But at the same time the diffi- 
 culties of the besieged increased, until the town could no 
 longer be held. It was determined to evacuate and destroy 
 it, but on the night of departure the wailing of the 
 women betrayed the plan of Vercingetorix to the Romans, 
 and the attempt miscarried : on the following day the 
 walls were scaled, and neither age nor sex was spared. 
 
 Judging by former experience Caesar might have ex- 
 pected that the revolt would now collapse ; so, after 
 making a, demonstration in the country of the Haedui, he 
 sent Labienus with two legions to Agedincum. where were 
 two more guarding the baggage ; while he himself, with 
 six, advanced into the Arvernian mountains. 
 
 Labienus advanced from Agedincum to get possession 
 of Lutetia (Paris), but the town was burned by Camulo- 
 
CAESAR IN GAUL. 415 
 
 genus, the insurgent leader, who refused to give battle, 
 but took up a position where he held the Roman army in 
 check. 
 
 The main army succeeded in baffling the attempts of 
 Vercingetorix to stop it, and arrived before Gergovia, the 
 capital of the Arverni. Here immense stores had been 
 collected, and the insurgent troops were encamped in a 
 strong position under the walls of the town, which was 
 on a hill, and were protected by strong ramparts. Caesar 
 was not strong enough either to besiege the town or to 
 blockade it, but remained inactive, facing his antagonist. 
 Such a check was almost equivalent to a defeat ; the 
 Haedui prepared to join the revolt in earnest, and a body 
 of Haeduan troops, on the march to join Caesar, was induced 
 by its officers to declare against him, and was only recalled 
 to nominal obedience by the presence of Caesar, who had 
 hurried to meet it with two-thirds of his army. But 
 during his absence Vercingetorix had attacked the Roman 
 camp and very nearly stormed it, and it was plain that 
 the Haeduan troops could scarcely be relied on. He 
 determined therefore to withdraw from Gergovia, and to 
 march at once into the canton of the Haedui, but first to 
 make one more attempt to capture the town. While the 
 majority of the garrison were entrenching one side of 
 the ramparts, Caesar attacked the other ; the walls of the 
 camp were scaled, but the whole garrison took the alarm, 
 and Caesar dared not attack the city wall. He gave the 
 signal for retreat, but the foremost legions were carried 
 away by the fervour of victory, and pushed on — some 
 even into the city. They were met by masses upon masses 
 of the garrison, who gradually forced them back, and at 
 last chased them down the hill, where the troops stationed 
 in the plain received them into safety. Seven hundred 
 men, including forty-six centurions, had fallen ; Gergovia 
 remained untaken, and the halo of victory that had sur- 
 rounded Caesar in Gaul began to fade away. 
 
 The Haedui at once arose, their contingent deserted 
 from Caesar, and carried off with it the Roman depots on 
 the Loire. The Belgae began to stir, the Bellovaci marched 
 to attack Labienus in the rear, and, with the exception of 
 the Remi and the cantons immediately depending upon 
 them, " the whole Celtic nation, from the Pyrenees to the 
 
416 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 Rhine, was now for the first and last time in arms for 
 freedom and nationality." 
 
 It was a grave crisis, and many voices were raised in 
 favour of a retreat over the Cevennes into the old province. 
 But Caesar rejected these timid counsels, called out the 
 general levy of the province, and set out for Agedincum, 
 whither Labienus was ordered immediately to retreat. 
 Labienus crossed the Seine under the eyes of the enemy, 
 fought a battle in which Camulogenus was defeated and 
 slain, and succeeded in effecting a junction with Caesar. 
 
 The insurgents adhered to the same plan of campaign. 
 A national assemhly confirmed Vercingetorix in the 
 supreme command, and adopted his plans without altera- 
 tion. A new position was selected at Alesia (Alise Sainte 
 Reine in the Cotf; d'Or), and another camp constructed. 
 The army was ordered thither, and the cavalry raised to 
 fifteen thousand. Caesar marched southwards to protect the 
 province, and repulsed, with his newly levied German squad- 
 rons, the Celtic cavalry which attacked him on the route. 
 Vercingetorix shut himself up in Alesia, and Caesar had 
 no alternative but to besiege him there or to abandon the 
 offensive altogether. But the whole of the Roman troops 
 were now united, and the cavalry of Caesar were successful 
 in every encounter : the communications of the* Celtic 
 army were cut, and the supplies of the town would soon 
 be exhausted by the enormous army (80,000 foot and 
 15,000 horse) and the numerous inhabitants. At the 
 moment when the Roman lines were on the point of 
 completion, Vercingetorix dismissed all his cavalry with 
 orders to rouse the whole nation for the relief of Alesia. 
 The miserable inhabitants were turned out of the town, 
 and perished of hunger between the lines on either side. 
 At last the huge host of the relieving army appeared — 
 in number amounting to 250,000 infantry and 8,000 
 cavalry. But Caesar had prepared himself to be besieged, 
 and his rear was protected by a strong line of entrench- 
 ments. A determined assault was made upon the Romans 
 from without and from within ; and on the second day the 
 Celts succeeded, at a point where the lines ran over the 
 slope of a hill, in filling up the trenches and hurling 
 the defenders from the ramparts. Labienus threw him- 
 self with four legions upon the enemy. It was the crisis 
 
CAESAR IN GAUL. 417 
 
 of the struggle, and the assailants were gradually forced 
 back, while squadrons of cavalry assailed them in the rear 
 and completed the rout. 
 
 The fate of Alesia and of the Celtic nation was decided. 
 The army dispersed, and the king was, by his own consent, 
 delivered up to the Romans for punishment, in order to 
 avei't as far as possible destruction from the nation, by 
 bringing it upon his own head. " Mounted on his steed 
 and in full armour the king of the Arvernians appeared 
 before the Roman proconsul, and rode round his tribunal ; 
 then he surrendered his horse and arms, and sat down in 
 silence on the steps at Caesar's feet." Five years after- 
 wards he was led in Caesar's triumph, and beheaded at the 
 foot of the Capitol. " As after a day of gloom the sun 
 breaks through the clouds at its setting, so destiny bestows 
 on nations that are going down a last great man. Thus 
 Hannibal stands at the close of the Phoenician history, and 
 Vercingetorix at the close of the Celtic. They were not 
 able to save the nations to which they belonged from a 
 foreign yoke, but they spared them the last remaining 
 disgrace, an inglorious fall. . , . The whole ancient world 
 presents no more genuine knight (than Vercingetorix), 
 whether as regards his essential character or his outward 
 appearance. But man ought not to be a mere knight, and 
 least of all the statesman. It was the knight, not the hero, 
 who disdained to escape from Alesia, when he alone was of 
 more consequence to the nation than a hundred thousand 
 ordinary brave men. It was the knight, not the hero, who 
 gave himself up as a sacrifice, when the only thing gained 
 by that sacrifice was that the nation publicly dishonoured 
 itself, and with equal cowardice and absurdity employed 
 its last breath in proclaiming that its great historical 
 death-struggle was a crime against its oppressor. How 
 very different was the conduct of Hannibal in similar 
 positions ! It is impossible to part from the noble king 
 of the Arverni without a feeling of historical and human 
 sympathy ; but it is characteristic of the Celtic nation, 
 that its greatest man was after all merely a knight." 
 
 After the fall of Alesia no united effort was made to 
 continue the insurrection ; the league fell to pieces, and 
 every clan made what terms it could with the conqueror. 
 Caesar was anxious for many reasons to bring the war to 
 
 27 
 
418 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 a close, and the easy temperament of the Gauls met him 
 halfway. Where there was a strong Roman party, as 
 among the Haedui and Arverni, the cantons obtained 
 a complete restoration of their former relations with Rome, 
 and their captives were released without ransom, while 
 those of the other clans became the slaves of the legion- 
 aries. But not a few cantons refused to make submission, 
 until the Roman troops appeared within their borders. 
 Such expeditions were undertaken in the winter aud in 
 the following summer against the Bituriges and Carnutes, 
 the Bellovaci and other Belgic cantons. The Bellovacian 
 king Correus offered a brave resistance, but was at last 
 slain in a skirmish. On the Loire considerable bands 
 assembled, and required a considerable Roman force to 
 defeat them. The last remnant of opposition was at Ux- 
 ellodunum on the Lot, where Drappes and Lucterius, the 
 brave adjutant of Vercingetorix, shut themselves up in the 
 last resort. The town was taken only after Caesar had 
 appeared in person, and the spring from which the garrison 
 derived water had been diverted. The whole garrison 
 were dismissed to their homes after their hands had been 
 cut off. 
 
 Thus Gaul was finally subdued after eight years' war. 
 Hardly a year later the Roman troops had to be with- 
 drawn, owing to the outbreak of civil war; yet the Celts 
 did not rise against the foreign yoke, and Gaul was the only 
 pai't of the Roman empire where there was no fighting 
 against Caesar. Later disturbances, like the rising of the 
 Bellovaci in 46 B.C., were easily dealt with by the local 
 governors. This state of peace was, it is true, purchased 
 to a large extent by allowing the more distant districts to 
 withdraw themselves de facto from the Roman allegiance; 
 but however unfinished the building of Caesar may have 
 been, its foundations remained firm and unshaken. 
 
 For the present the newly acquired provinces were 
 united with the province of Narbo, but when Caesar gave 
 up this governorship, in 46 B.C., two new governorships, 
 of Gaul proper and Belgica, were formed. The individual 
 cantons of course lost their independence, and paid to 
 Rome a fixed tribute which they levied themselves. The 
 total was £400,000 ; but masses of gold from the treasures 
 of temples and of rich men also flowed to Rome, to such 
 
CAESAR IN GAUL. 419 
 
 an extent that, as compared with silver, gold fell twenty- 
 five per cent. 
 
 Existing arrangements were everywhere allowed to 
 remain as far as possible : the hereditary kingships, the 
 feudal oligarchies, even the system of clientship by which 
 one canton was dependent on another still existed. Caesar's 
 sole object was to arrange matters in the interest of Rome, 
 and to bring into power the men favourably disposed to 
 Roman rule. Cantons where the Roman party was strong 
 and trustworthy, such as the Renii, the Lingones, and the 
 Haedui, received the right of alliance which gave them 
 much greater communal freedom, and were invested with 
 the hegemony over other cantons. The national worship 
 and its priests were preserved as much as possible. 
 
 At the same time, Caesar did what he could to stimulate 
 the Romanization of Gaul. A number of Celts of rank 
 were admitted into the Roman citizenship — perhaps into 
 the Roman senate ; Latin was made the official language in 
 several cantons ; and while smaller money might be coined 
 by the local authorities for local circulation, this might only 
 be done in conformity with the Roman standard, and the 
 coinage of gold and of denarii was reserved for the Roman 
 magistrates alone.* Hereafter the organization of the 
 cantons approached more nearly to the Italian urban con- 
 stitution, and both the common councils and the chief 
 towns became of far greater importance than hitherto. If 
 Caesar did little in the way of founding colonies — only two 
 settlements can be traced to him, that of Noviodunum 
 and that of the Boii — it was because circumstances did not 
 allow him to exchange the sword for the plough. No one 
 probably saw more clearly than himself the military and 
 political advantages of establishing a series of Transalpine 
 colonies as bases of support for the new centre of civiliza- 
 tion. 
 
 Gaul as a nation had ceased to exist ; it was absorbed in 
 a politically superior nationality. The course of the war 
 was significant enough of the character of the nation : at 
 the outset only single districts, and those German or half 
 German, offered energetic resistance ; and when foreign 
 
 * The followiBg inscription occurs on a semis struck by a vergo- 
 brete of the Lexovii : " Cisiambos Cattos vercobreto; Simissos 
 publicos Lixovio." The writing and stamping are as bad as the Latin. 
 
420 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 rule was established, the attempts to shake it off were either 
 without plan or were the work of certain prominent nobles, 
 and with the death or capture of an Indutiomarus or a 
 Vercingetorix the struggle was at an end. In the severe 
 words of a Roman, " The Celts boldly challenge danger 
 in the future, but lose their courage before its presence." 
 All accounts of the ancient Celts bring out a strik- 
 ing similarity between them and the modern Irish. 
 " Every feature reappears : the laziness in the culture of 
 the fields : the delight in tippling and brawling ; the osten- 
 tation — we may recall that sword of Caesar hung up 
 in the sacred grove of the Arvernians after the victory of 
 Gergovia, which its alleged former owner viewed with 
 a smile at the consecrated spot, and which he ordered 
 to be carefully preserved ; — the language full of com- 
 parisons and hyperboles, of allusions and quaint turns ; 
 the droll humour — an excellent example of which was 
 the rule, that if any one interrupted a person speaking in 
 public, a substantial and very visible hole should be cut, 
 as a measure of police, in the coat of the disturber of the 
 peace ; . . the curiosity, . . the extravagant credulity, . . 
 the childlike piety, . . the unsurpassed fervour of national 
 feeling, . . . the incapacity to preserve a self-reliant 
 courage equally remote from presumption and from pusil- 
 lanimity. ... It is, and remains, at all times and places 
 the same indolent and poetical, irresolute and fervid, 
 inquisitive, credulous, amiable, clever, but — in a political 
 point of view — thoroughly useless nation ; and therefore its 
 fate has been always and everywhere the same." 
 
 Bat the ruin of the Celtic nation was not the most 
 important result of Caesar's wars. Nothing but the insight 
 and energy of Caesar prevented Gaul from being overrun 
 by the Germans, in whom the Roman statesman saw the 
 rivals and antagonists of the Romano-Greek world. By his 
 conquests and organization he gained time for the West to 
 acquire that culture which the East had already assumed : 
 but for him the great " migration of peoples " which took 
 place four hundred years later under the Gothic Theodoric 
 would have taken place under Ariovistns ; and if the Roman 
 empire had escaped destruction, the Western world at any 
 rate would have been cut off from it. 
 
 While Caesar was creating' for Rome a scientific frontier 
 
CAESAR IN GAUL. 421 
 
 in the West, the whole northern frontier had been dis- 
 turbed from time to time. In north-east Italy, in Illyria, 
 in Macedonia, and in Thrace there had been resistance to 
 the Roman rule, which had been usually met in a temporary 
 and partial manner by the senatorial governors. In one 
 quarter only, among the Dacians, north of the Danube, a 
 new power had arisen. Among this people there had been 
 in primeval times a holy man called Zamolxis, associated 
 with the king. This divine personage, after years of travel 
 in foreign lands and after studying the wisdom of the 
 Egyptian priests and of the Greek Pythagoreans, had 
 returned to his native country to end his life as a hermit. 
 He was accessible only to the king and to his servants, and 
 gave forth through the king oracles with reference to all 
 important undertakings. By the nation he was regarded 
 first as priest of the supreme god, then as god himself : and 
 this peculiar combination of monarchy and theocracy had 
 become a permanent institution, and probably gave to 
 the kings of the Getae a position something similar to that 
 of the caliphs. About this time a marvellous reform of 
 the nation was carried out by Boerebistas, king of the Getae, 
 and the god Dekaeneos. The people were metamorphosed 
 from unexampled drunkenness to temperance and valour, 
 and the king used their puritanic enthusiasm to found a 
 mighty kingdom, which extended along both banks of the 
 Danube and stretched southward into Thrace, Illyria and 
 Nbricum. No direct contact with the Romans had yet 
 taken place, " but this much it needed no prophetic gift 
 to foretell, that proconsuls like Antonius and Piso were 
 nowise fitted to contend with gods." 
 
 AUTHORITIES. 
 
 Plat. Caes. 16-27. Caes. de Bell. Gall. Liv. Epit, 103-108. Veil. 
 ii. 46, 47. Flor. iii. 10. Appian Celt. 15-end. Hisp. 102. 
 Dio. xxxvii. 52, 53 ; xxxviii. 31-50 ; xxxix. 1-5, 40-53 ; xl. 1-11, 
 31-43. Snet. Jul. 24, 25. Tac. German, esp. 28. Strab. iv., 
 vii. Varro R. R. i. 7, 8 ; ii. 5-9 ; ii. 10, 4. Plin. N. H. ii. 67, 
 170 ; iii. 4 ; iv. 17-19 ; xvii. 6, 42. Cic. ad. Att. iv. 16. Pomponius 
 Mela, ii. 7 ; iii. 2. 
 
 Most of the above writers touch upon Gaul incidentally, as well as 
 in the particular passages mentioned. For identification of 
 localities, see notes to Momms. Hist, of R. v. ch. vii. Of. also 
 Momms. Hist, of R. bk. viii. " The Provinces from Caesar to 
 Diocletian," passim, especially ch. 1, 3, 4, 5. 
 
422 EISTOBT OF HOME 
 
 CHAPTER XXXV. 
 
 THE JOINT RULE OF POMPEIUS AND CAESAR. 
 
 58-56 B.C. Growing opposition to the regents — Pompeius fails tc 
 control the capital. — 56 b.c. Conference at Luca. — 55 b.c. Pom- 
 peiuB and Crassus consuls. — 53 B.C. Murder of Clodius. — 52 B.C. 
 Pompeius dictator. 
 
 Of the three joint rulers Pompeius was undoubtedly 
 the foremost in the eyes of the Roman world. Nor is this 
 surprising, for Pompeius was undoubtedly the first general 
 of his time, while Caesar, so far as he was known, was only 
 a dexterous party leader. In the eyes of the multitude he 
 was to Pompeius what Flavius and Afranius had been — a 
 useful instrument for political purposes. And if the position 
 of Pompeius under the Gal in an law was compared with 
 that of Caesar under the Yatmian, the comparison was to 
 the advantage of the former ; for Pompeius had almost the 
 whole resources of the state under his control, and ruled 
 nearly the whole empire, while Caesar had only certain 
 fixed sums and four legions, and ruled two provinces. 
 Caesar, again, was to resign his command after five years, 
 while Pompeius had fixed his own time for retirement. 
 
 But Pompeius attempted a task beyond his powers when 
 he undertook to rule the capital — a problem always in- 
 finitely difficult, because there was no armed force at the 
 disposal of the government, whatever it might be. The 
 result was complete anarchy: "after Caesar's departure 
 the coalition still ruled doubtless the destinies of the world, 
 but not the streets of the capital." The senate felt its 
 impotence, and attempted no show of authority ; Pompeius 
 shut himself up and sulked in silence ; the sound portion 
 
JOINT RULE OF POMPEIUS AND CAESAR. 423 
 
 of the citizens, who had at heart freedom and order, kept 
 rigorously aloof from politics. But for the rabble of all 
 sorts, high and low, it was a time of carnival ; " deruagogism 
 became quite a trade, which accordingly did not lack its 
 professional insignia — the threadbare mantle, the shaggy 
 beard, the long streaming hair, the deep bass voice." 
 
 Greeks and Jews, freedmen and slaves, were the most 
 regular attendants at the popular assemblies, and often 
 only a minority of those voting consisted of burgesses 
 legally constituted. The real rulers of Eome were the 
 armed bands, raised by adventurers out of gladiatorial 
 slaves and blackguards of all sorts. These bands had 
 hitherto been usually under the control of the popular 
 leaders, but now all discipline was at an end, and the leaders 
 of the bands fought either for the democracy, for the senate, 
 or for Crassus : Clodius had fought at different times for 
 all three. 
 
 The most noted of these street leaders was Publius 
 Clodius, whom the regents had already made use of against 
 Cato and Cicero. During his tribunate he had exerted all 
 his great talent, energy, and influence to promote an ultra- 
 democratic policy : he gave the citizens corn gratis ; pro- 
 hibited the obstruction of the comitia by religious 
 formalities ; re-established the street-clubs (collegia com pi - 
 talicia), which constituted a complete organization of the 
 whole proletariate of the city according to streets ; and set 
 the seal of Divine favour upon his doings by erecting a 
 grand temple of Liberty on the Palatine. 
 
 The position of Pompeius was soon seriously compro- 
 mised : Clodius opposed him in a trifling matter about the 
 sending back of a captive Armenian prince, and the quarrel 
 became a serious feud. Pompeius revenged himself by 
 allowing the return of Cicero, the bitter enemy of Clodius. 
 But the real battle-ground was in the streets ; and here, 
 though Pompeius had his own hired gangs, Clodius was 
 usually victorious. To complete the spectacle, both parties 
 in the quarrel courted the favour of the senate ; Pompeius 
 pleased it by recalling Cicero, Clodius by declaring the 
 Julian laws null and void. Naturally no positive result 
 came from this " political witches' revel " — it was quite 
 aimless ; demagogism was a mere makeshift in the inter- 
 regnum between republic and monarchy. It had not even 
 
424 BISTORT OF ROME. 
 
 the effect of kindling the desire for a strong government 
 based on military power; for those citizens likely to be 
 affected in this way lived mostly away from Rome, and 
 were not touched by the anarchy which prevailed there; 
 and besides, they had already been thoroughly convei'ted to 
 the cause of authority by the Catilinarian attempts. The 
 only important result of all this confusion was the painful 
 position of Pompeius, which must have had considerable 
 influence upon his future conduct. 
 
 Far more important than the change in the relations of 
 Pompeius with Clodius was his altered position with regard 
 to Caesar. While Pompeius had failed to fulfil the func- 
 tions assigned to him, Caesar had been brilliantly success- 
 ful : he had crushed the threatening Cimbrian invasion, and 
 in two years had carried the Roman arms to the Rhine and 
 the Channel. Already, in 57 B.C., the senate had voted him 
 the usual honours in far richer measure than had ever been 
 accorded to Pompeius. Caesar was now the hero of the day, 
 master of the most powerful Roman army , while Pompeius 
 was merely an ex-general who had once been famous No 
 rupture had taken place, but it was evident that the 
 alliance must be at an end when the relative position of 
 the parties was reversed. At any rate Pompeius found it 
 necessary to abandon his attitude of haughty reserve, and 
 to come forward and attempt to gain for himself a com- 
 mand which would again put him on equal terms with 
 Caesar. To do this he must be able to control the machinery 
 of government : but by his awkward quarrel with Clodius 
 he had lost command of the streets, and therefore could 
 not count on carrying his point in the popular assembly ; 
 and, at the same time, it was doubtful whether after his 
 long inaction, even the senate was sufficiently under his 
 influence to grant what he wished. 
 
 The opposition to the regents had been growing in 
 strength and importance, and they were powerless to check 
 it : in consequence, a change occurred in the position of the 
 senate, which found itself largely increased in importance. 
 The marriage alliance of Caesar and Pompeius, and the 
 banishments of Cato and of Cicero suggested unpleasantly 
 to the public mind the decrees and alliances of monarchs, 
 and men began to perceive that it was no modification of 
 the republican constitution which was at stake, but the 
 
JOINT RULE OF POMPEWS AND CAESAR. 425 
 
 existence of the republic itself. Many of the best men 
 who had hitherto belonged to the popular party now- 
 passed over to the other side. The " three dynasts," the 
 u three-headed monster," were phrases in everybody's 
 mouth. Even the masses began to waver : Caesar's con- 
 sular orations were listened to without a sound ; at the 
 theatre no applause greeted his entrance, and his tools 
 and associates were publicly hissed. The rulers hinted to 
 the equites that their opposition might cost them their new 
 special seats in the theatre, and that the commons might 
 lose their free corn. Caesar's wealth was employed in 
 every direction to gain adherents ; no one, unless hopelessly 
 lost, was refused assistance in distress, and the enormous 
 buildings set on foot by Caesar and Pompeius brought 
 gain to great numbers of men in every position. But 
 corruption could only touch a comparatively small number, 
 and every day brought proofs of the strong attachment of 
 the people to the existing constitution and of their hatred 
 of monarchy. Under representative institutions the 
 popular discontent would have found an outlet at the 
 elections, but under the existing circumstances the only 
 course left for the supporters of the republic was to 
 range themselves under the banner of the senate. Thus, 
 for the moment, the senate rested on a firmer support than 
 it had enjoyed for years ; it began to bestir itself again. 
 With the approval and support of the senate, a proposal 
 was submitted to the people, permitting the return of 
 Cicero. An unusual number of good citizens, especially 
 from the country towns, attended on the day of voting 
 (Aug. 4, 57 B.C.), and the journey of the orator from 
 Brundisium to Rome was made the occasion of a brilliant 
 demonstration in favour of the senate and the constitution. 
 Pompeius was helpless, and his helplessness disarmed the 
 party in the senate favourable to the regents. Had the 
 senate possessed a leader their cause might even yet have 
 won ; they might have cancelled the extraordinary powers 
 as unconstitutional, and summoned all the republicans of 
 Italy to arm against the tyrants. But the necessary 
 leader was wanting, and the aristrcracy were too indolent 
 to take so simple and bold a resolution. They preferred 
 to side with Pompeius against Caesar, in the hope that a 
 rupture between the two was inevitable ; and to settle 
 
426 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 matters with Pompeius, after victory, might be expected 
 to be no very difficult matter. 
 
 It seemed natural that an alliance between Pompeius 
 and the republicans should be formed, but the matter was 
 brought to a test when, in the autumn of 57 B.C., Pom- 
 peius came before the senate with a proposal to entrust 
 him with extraordinary official power. His proposal was 
 based upon the price of corn in the capital, which had 
 again reached an oppressive height, owing to the con- 
 tinuance of piracy and the negligence of the government 
 in supervising the supply. He wished to be entrusted 
 with the superintendence of all matters relating to corn 
 supply throughout the whole empire, and for this purpose 
 to be invested with unlimited control over the state 
 treasure, with an army and fleet, and with powers superior 
 to those of the ordinary governor in every province ; and 
 to this command he hoped that the conduct of the 
 impending Egyptian war would naturally be added. The 
 senate accepted the proposal in principle with outward ob- 
 sequiousness, but made alterations which seriously curtailed 
 the general's authority. Pompeius obtained no unlimited 
 power, but merely certain large sums and fifteen adjutants 
 for the purpose of organizing due supplies for the capital, 
 arid, in all matters relating to grain supply only, full 
 proconsular power throughout the empire for five years. 
 The decree of the senate was ratified by the people. The 
 regent had missed his object, but he had obtained definite 
 employment and an excuse for leaving the capital, and the 
 supply of corn was soon in a more satisfactory condition. 
 Still, without troops his proconsular authority was only a 
 shadow, and he got a second proposal made in the senate, 
 conferring upon him the charge of restoring- the expelled 
 king of Egypt, if necessary by force of arms. But the 
 senate grew less and less compliant ; it was discovered in 
 the Sibylline books that it was impious to send a Roman 
 army to Egypt. Pompeius was ready to accept the mission 
 even without an army, but the senate refused to risk so 
 valuable a life, and ultimately resolved not to interfere at 
 all (Jan., 56 b.c). 
 
 These rebuffs of Pompeius were, of course, regarded as 
 defeats of the regents generally ; and the tide of opposition 
 rose hisrher and higher. The elections for 56 B.C. had 
 
JOINT RULE OF POMPEIUS AND CAESAR. 427 
 
 gone only very partially according to the wishes of the 
 triumvirate, and for the consulship of 55 B.C. Lucius 
 Domitius Ahenobarbus announced himself as a candidate 
 with the avowed object of actively opposing them. The 
 senate solemnly deliberated over an opinion which was 
 furnished by certain Etruscan soothsayers of repute, that 
 the whole power over the army and treasure threatened 
 to pass to one ruler, and that the state would lose its 
 freedom. But they soon went on to a more practical 
 declaration of war. As early as December, 57 B.C., the 
 opinion had been expressed in the senate that the laws of 
 Caesar's consulship, especially the law about the domain 
 land of Capua, must be cancelled ; and in April, 56 B.C., 
 Cicero moved that the Capuan law should be taken into 
 consideration on May the 1st. Domitius soon afterwards 
 declared that he intended as consul to propose to the 
 burgesses the immediate recall of Caesar ; and in this 
 manner the nobility threw down the gauntlet to the 
 regents. 
 
 The triumvirs had no time to lose. Crassus im- 
 mediately started north to confer with Caesar, whom he 
 found at Ravenna ; at Lucathey were joined by Pompeius, 
 who had left Rome ostensibly on business connected with 
 the supply of grain. The most noted adherents of the 
 rulers, such as Metellus Nepos, proconsul of Hither Spain, 
 and Appius Claudius, propraetor of Sardinia, followed 
 them. A hundred and twenty lictors and two hundred 
 senators were counted at the conference ; it was almost a 
 rival senate of the monarchy as opposed to the other 
 senate of the republic. The decisive voice lay with 
 Caesar, and he used it to re-establish the joint rule on a 
 firmer basis, with a more equal distribution of power. 
 The most important governorships after Gaul, namely 
 the two Spains and Syria, were assigned, the former to 
 Pompeius, the latter to Crassus, and were to be secured by 
 decree of the people for five years. Caesar was to have 
 his own office prolonged for another five years, from 54 
 B.C. to the close of 49 B.C. ; and to be allowed to increase 
 his legions to ten, and to charge the pay of his arbitrarily 
 levied troops on the state chest. Pompeius and Crassus 
 were to hold the consulship for 55 B.C., before departing 
 for their provinces, and Caesar was to be consul in 48 B.C., 
 
428 HISTORY OF EOME. 
 
 after the termination of his command. The military- 
 support necessary for the regulation of the capital was to 
 be supplied by raising legions for the Spanish and Syrian 
 armies, and keeping them in Italy as long as should seem 
 convenient. Minor details were easily settled by Caesar's 
 magic influence; Pompeius and Crassus were reconciled 
 to each other, and even Clodius was induced to give no 
 further annoyance to Pompeius. 
 
 The reasons which induced Caesar to concede to his rival 
 so powerful a position — a position which he had refused 
 him in 60 B.C., when the league was formed — can only be 
 conjectured. It was not that necessity compelled him, for 
 Pompeius was a powerless suppliant at Caesar's feet ; and 
 even if, in case of a rupture, he had joined the optimates, the 
 alliance would not have been so formidable as to demand 
 so heavy a price to prevent it. Probably Caesar was not 
 yet prepared for civil war; but in any case the decision of 
 peace or war rested, not with Pompeius, but with the oppo- 
 sition. Possibly purely personal motives may have contri- 
 buted ; Caesar was not the man to be disloyal to his allies, 
 and he may have hesitated to break the heart of his 
 beloved daughter, who was sincerely attached to her 
 husband : — " in his soul there was room for much besides 
 the statesman." But the main reason was undoubtedly 
 the consideration of Gaul. If Caesar's object was to 
 become king of Rome as soon as possible, it was a grave 
 blunder to give up his present enormous superiority over 
 his rivals, and especially to put Pompeius in a position to 
 settle matters independently with the senate. But Caesar's 
 was no vulgar ambition ; the conquest of Gaul was an 
 enterprise on which depended the external security and 
 internal reorganization of the empire ; it was necessary 
 for the repression of German invasions, and necessary to 
 furnish new soil for Italian civilization. But Caesar's 
 Gallic couquests hindered far more than they helped him 
 on the way to the throne, and it yielded him bitter fruit 
 that he postponed the revolution from 56 to 48 B.C. 
 
 The aristocracy did not make good its gage : " they had 
 taken up arms only to lay them down as soon as the adver- 
 sary merely put his hand to the sheath." Nothing more 
 was heard about discussion of the Julian laws in the 
 senate ; the legions raised by Caesar were charged on the 
 
JOINT RULE OF POMPEIUS AND CAESAR. 429 
 
 public chest, and the attempts to take from him one or both 
 of his provinces decisively failed (May, 56 B.C.). Cicero was 
 among the first to repent, and applied to himself " epithets 
 more appropriate than flattering." * The troops for Syria 
 did indeed depart, but the legions for Spain were dismissed 
 on furlough, and Potnpeius remained with them in Italy. 
 At the same time the regents acted deliberately in such 
 a manner as to withdraw from the senate what had 
 hitherto been its especial function — the management of 
 military matters and of foreign affairs. The arrangements 
 made at Luca with regard to the provinces of Gaul, Spain, 
 and Syria were submitted to and approved by the people. 
 The regents lent and borrowed troops from each other 
 without authority. The Transpadani were apparently 
 treated by Caesar as full burgesses of Rome, though they 
 had legally only Latin rights. Caesar organized his con- 
 quests and founded colonies, such as Novum Comum, 
 without the consent of the senate. The Thracian, Egyptian, 
 and Parthian wars were conducted by the generals in com- 
 mand without consulting or even reporting to the senate. 
 The majority of the senate submitted humbly enough to 
 necessity. Cicero was now completely in the service of 
 the regents. His brother was an officer in Caesar's army, 
 in some measure as a hostage. Cicero himself was com- 
 pelled to accept an office under Pompeius, on pretence of 
 which he might be banished at any moment; and he sub- 
 mitted to be relieved from his pecuniary embarrassments 
 by loans from Caesar and by an appointment to the joint 
 overseership of the vast building operations in the capital. 
 Many prominent members of the nobility were kept sub- 
 servient by similar methods ; but there remained a certain 
 section which could be neither intimidated nor cajoled. 
 The foremost of these was Cato, who ceaselessly, at the 
 peril of his life, offered the most determined opposition in 
 senate-house and Forum. The regents did not molest him 
 and his followers ; strong measures would have made them 
 martyrs, and, after all, their activity was unavailing. But 
 though destitute of important results, their action fostered 
 and gave the watchword to the widespread discontent 
 which fermented in secret : and they were often able to 
 draw the majority in the senate, which secretly sympathized 
 * "Me asinum germanura fuisse " (Ad Att., iv. 5. 3). 
 
430 HISTORY OF HOME. 
 
 with them, into isolated decrees against its masters and 
 their adherents. Thus Gabinius was refused a public 
 thanksgiving in 56 B.C.; Piso was recalled from his province; 
 and the senate wore mourning when the tribune Gaius Cato 
 hindered the elections of 55 B.C. as long as the republican 
 consul Marcellinus remained in office. But the great fact 
 was unaltered — the regents were supreme. " No one," 
 says a contemporary writer, "is of the slightest account 
 except the three ; the regents are all powerful, and they 
 take care that no one shall remain in doubt about it ; the 
 whole state is virtually transformed, and obeys the 
 dictators." 
 
 The opposition, powerless in the field of government, 
 could not nevertheless be dislodged from certain depart- 
 ments of state which had considerable political influence — 
 the elections of magistrates, and the jury-courts. The 
 former, which belong properly to the government of the 
 state, were, under the present regime, when the govern- 
 ment was really wielded by extraordinary magistrates, 
 unimportant ; the ordinary magistrates themselves were 
 ciphers, and the elections sank into mere demonstrations. 
 The regents spared no pains to gain the victory even here : 
 the lists of candidates for some years was settled at Luca ; 
 large sums were expended upon elections, and numbers of 
 soldiers were sent on furlough from the armies of Caesar 
 and Pompeius to vote at Borne. But the result was only 
 partial success. For 55 B.C. Potnpeius and Crassus were 
 elected only by open violence and after the most scanda- 
 lous scenes. For 54 B.C. Domitius was elected consul, and 
 Cato praetor ; while the candidates for the regents were 
 convicted of the most shameful corruption in the elections 
 for 53 B.C., and were abandoned by their principals. These 
 defeats may be accounted for partly by the wide discontent 
 at the rule of the triumvirate ; mainly by the elaborately 
 organized system of political clubs which were entirely 
 controlled by the nobility. 
 
 The jury-courts gave even greater trouble and annoy- 
 ance. As at present composed (see p. 357) the sena- 
 torial party was influential in them, but the middle 
 class was predominant ; and the fact that in 55 B.C. 
 Pompeius proposed a high-rated census for jurymen, 
 shows that the strength of the opposition was in the 
 
JOINT RULE OF P0MPE1US AND CAESAR. 431 
 
 middle clasp, and that the capitalists were more easy to 
 manage. A constant warfare of prosecution was waged 
 against the adherents of the rulers, the accusers being 
 generally the younger and more fiery members of the 
 nobility. Still, even here, where the regents chose to 
 insist, the courts dared not refuse to comply. Vatinius, 
 the best hated of all Caesar's personal adherents, was 
 acquitted in all the processes against him. But Pom- 
 peius did not know so well how to protect his clients, and 
 Gabinius was sent into banishment in 54 B.C., for extor- 
 tions in the provinces ; and even where unsuccessful, 
 impeachments by such masters of sarcasm and dialectics 
 as Gaius Licinius Calvus and Gaius Asinius Pollio did 
 not miss their mark. i 
 
 Still less controllable was the power of literature, which 
 throughout these years is pervaded by a tone of the 
 bitterest opposition. The orations of the accusers in the 
 law-courts were regularly published as political pam- 
 phlets ; the youth of the aristocracy and of the middle 
 class in the country towns kept up a constant fire of 
 pamphlets and epigrams ; and the senator's son, Gaius 
 Licinius Calvus, fought side by side with Marcus Furius 
 Bibaculus of Cremona, and Quintus Valerius Catillus of 
 Verona. The literature of the time is full of s;;rca>ras 
 against the " great Caesar," " the unique gem ra 1," the 
 affectionate father-in-law and son-in-law who ransack the 
 globe to enrich them dissolute favourites. Caesar saw 
 that such opposition could not be checked by word of 
 command ; he tried rather to gain over by his personal 
 influence the more eminent authors. Cicero was treated 
 respectfully, out of regard for his literary reputation ; and 
 Catullus, in spite of his sarcasms, was treated with the 
 most flattering distinction. The commentaries on the 
 Gallic wars were intended partly to meet the enemy on 
 their own ground, and to set forth to the public the 
 necessity and constitutional propriety of Caesar's opera- 
 tions. " But it is freedom alone that is absolutely and 
 exclusively poetical and creative; it and it alone is able, 
 even in its most wretched caricature, even with its latest 
 breath, to inspire fresh enthusiasm . . . Practical politics 
 were not more absolutely controlled by the regents than 
 literature by the republicans." 
 
432 BISTORT OF ROME. 
 
 The opposition became more and more troublesome, 
 and the regents at length determined to take stronger 
 measures. It was resolved to introduce a temporary dic- 
 tatorship. At the close of 54 B.C. the dictatorship was 
 demanded in the senate ; but Pompeius himself still 
 shrank from openly asking it. Even when the elections 
 for 53 B.C. led to the most scandalous scenes, and had to 
 be postponed for a full year beyond the time fixed, he 
 still hesitated to speak the decisive word, and might long 
 have hesitated but for circumstances which forced his 
 hand. For the consulship of 52 B.C. Titus Annius Milo 
 came forward in opposition to the candidate of the re- 
 gents, who were both personally connected with Pompeius. 
 Milo was the great rival of Clodius in the game of the 
 streets, the Hector to the Achilles of Clodius. As Clodius 
 was on the side of the regents, Milo was of course for the 
 republic ; and Cato and his friends supported his can- 
 didature in return. In a chance skirmish between the 
 rival bands on the Appian Way, not far from the capital, 
 Clodius was wounded and carried into a neighbouring 
 house, from which he was afterwards dragged to be mur- 
 dered by Milo's orders. The adherents of the triumvirs 
 saw here an opportunity for thwarting the candidature 
 of Milo, and carrying the dictatorship of Pompeius. The 
 bloody corpse was exposed in the Forum, ispeeches were 
 made, and a riot broke forth. The mob set fire to the 
 senate-house, and then besieged the residence of Milo till 
 they were repulsed by his band. They then saluted 
 Pompeius as dictator and his candidates as consuls ; and 
 when the interrex, Marcus Lepidus, refused to hold the 
 elections at once, he was blockaded in his house for five 
 days. Pompeius certainly desired the dictatorship, but 
 he would not take it at the hands of a mob. He brought 
 up troops to put down the anarchy in the city, and then 
 demanded the dictatorship from the senate. To escape 
 the name of dictator, the senate, on the motion of Cato and 
 Bibulus, perpetrated a double absurdity, and appointed 
 the proconsul Pompeius " consul without colleague " * 
 (25th intercalary f month, 52 B.C.). 
 
 * " Consul means colleague, and a consul who is at the same time 
 a proconsul is at once an actual consul and a consul's substitute." 
 t Between February and March. 
 
JOINT RULE OF rOMPEIUS AND CAESAR. 433 
 
 Pompeius at once proceeded energetically to use his 
 powers against the republican party in their strongholds, 
 the electioneering clubs and the jury-courts. 
 
 1. The existing election laws were repeated and en- 
 forced ; and a special law, which prescribed increased 
 penalties for electioneering intrigues, was endowed with 
 retrospective force as far back as 70 B.C. 
 
 2. The governorships were to be conferred on the con- 
 suls and praetors, not as heretofore, immediately on their 
 retirement from office, but after an interval of five years. 
 The years which must elapse before this arrangement 
 could be brought into action were to be provided for by 
 special decrees of the senate from time to time — a course 
 which put the provinces for the next few years at the 
 disposal of the person or persons whose influence might 
 be supreme in the senate. 
 
 3. The liberty of the law-courts was curtailed by 
 limiting the number of advocates and the time of speak- 
 ing allowed to each ; and the custom of bringing for- 
 ward laudatores as witnesses to character was prohibited. 
 
 4. The senate decreed that the country was in danger, 
 owing to the disturbances connected with the affair on 
 the Appian Way, and accordingly a commission was ap- 
 pointed by a special law to inquire into all offences con- 
 nected with the affray, the members being nominated by 
 Pompeius. 
 
 At the same time, all the men capable of service in 
 Italy were called to arms, and made to swear allegiance to 
 Pompeius ; troops were stationed at the Capitol, and the 
 place where the trial respecting the murder of Clodius 
 was going on was surrounded by soldiers. 
 
 By these measures opposition was checked, but not, of 
 course, destroyed. The reins were drawn tighter and the 
 republican party was humbled. Milo was condemned by 
 the jurymen, and Cato's candidature for the consulship 
 frustrated. But many mischances occurred through the 
 maladroitness of Pompeius ; he was attempting an im- 
 possible task — to play at once the parts of impartial 
 restorer of law and order, and of party chief. Thus he 
 allowed many subordinate persons belonging to the re- 
 publican party to be acquitted by the commission, and 
 looked on in silence while every man who had taken part 
 
 28 
 
434 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 for Clodius — that is for the regents — in the late riots 
 was condemned. At the same time he violated his own 
 laws by appearing as a laudator for his friend Plancus, 
 and by protecting from condemnation several persons 
 specially connected with himself, such as Metellus Scipio. 
 Still, the regents were on the whole satisfied, and the 
 public acquiesced, even to celebrating the recovery of 
 Pompeius from a serious illness with demonstrations of 
 joy. On the 1st of August, 52 B.C., Pompeius, laid down 
 his special command and chose Metellus Scipio as his 
 colleague. 
 
 AUTHORITIES. 
 
 Flut. Pomp. 49-55 ; Caes. 28 ; Crass. 14, 15 ; Cato, 41-52. Appian 
 B. C. ii. 16-25. Cic. post Red. in sen. (Sept. 57); ad Quir. (Sept. 
 57) ; pro Dotn. sua (Sept. 57) ; de Har. Resp. (56 B.C.) ; pro 
 Sext. and in Vatin. (Mar. 56) ; pro Cael. Ruf. (~>6 B.C.) ; de Prov. 
 Consul. (56 B.C.) ; in Pisonem, in Aul. Gab., and pro Cn. Plane, 
 frag. (55 B.C.) ; pro Rabir., pro Vatin. frag., and pro Aem. 
 Scauro (54 B.C.) ; de Ae. A. Mil. (53 B.C.) ; pro MiloDe (52 B.C.). 
 Watson's Select. Lett. ii. 1-30. Liv. Epit. 104-109. Veil. ii. 
 46-49. Suet. Jul. 26, 27. Dio. tribunate of Clodius, xxxviii. 13 ; 
 return of Cicero, xxxviii. 30 and xxxix. 6-8; 9-39; 56-59 
 (Egyptian war) ; 62-65 ; xl. 44-56 (Dictatorship of Pompeius, 
 52-56). 
 
 Transpadani. — That Caesar treated them as full burgesses not 
 directly stated. Mommsen infers that he followed the tradi- 
 tions of his party by so treating them, from Cic. ad Att. v. 2, 
 3; ad Fam. viii. 1, 2. B. G. viii. 24. Suet. Jul. 28. Strabo, v. 
 i. p. 213. Pint. Caes. 29. Cic. ad Att. v. 11. 2. See note 
 Momras. Hist, of R. bk. v. c. 8. 
 
 Lex Pompeia Judiciaria, 55 B.C. — Ascon. in Pison. § 94. Bruns, ill. iv. 
 
CHAPTER XXXVL 
 
 DEATH OF CRASSUS — RUPTURE BETWEEN POMPEIUS AND CAESAR, 
 
 54 B.C. Crassus arrives in Syria. — 53 B.C. Battle of Carrhae — Death 
 of Crassus. — 51 and 50 B.CT Attempts of the republicans to 
 deprive Caesar prematurely of his command — Alliance of the 
 extreme republicans and Pompeius — War declared. — 49 B.C. 
 Caesar's ultimatum rejected by the senate — He crosses the 
 Rubicon. "^ 
 
 For years Marcus Crassus had been reckoned one of the 
 regents of Rome without any claim to be so considered. 
 But after the conference at Luca his position was changed : 
 Caesar had allowed the consulship and the governorship of 
 Syria to be assigned to him, m order to counterbalance the 
 great concessions he found it advisable to make to Pom- 
 peius , and at the close of his consulship Crassus had an 
 opportunity, as governor of Syria, of attaining, through the 
 Parthian war, the position acquired by Caesar in Gaul. 
 Avarice and ambition combined to inspire him, at the age 
 of sixty, with all the ardour of youth. He arrived in 
 Syria early in 54 B.C., having left Rome even before the 
 close of his consulship, eager to add the riches of the East 
 to those of the West, and to achieve military glory " as 
 rapidly as Caesar and with as little trouble as Pompeius." 
 The Parthian war had already begun. Pompeius had not 
 respected his engagements with regard to the frontier (pp. 
 365, 369), and had wrested provinces from the empire to 
 confer them upon Armenia. Accordingly, after the death 
 of king Phraates, his son Mithradates declared war upon 
 Armenia. This was, of course, a declaration of war 
 against Rome, and Gabinius, the governor of Syria, soon 
 
436 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 led his troops across the Euphrates. But meantime Mithra- 
 dates had been dethroned by the grandees of the empire 
 with the vizier at their head, and Orodes now reigned in 
 his stead. Mithradates took refuge with the Romans ; but 
 at this juncture Grbinius was ordered by the regents to 
 restore the king of Egypt to Alexandria by force of arms, 
 and he had to give up the Parthian war for the present. 
 But he induced Mithradates to make war on his own 
 account, and the prince was supported by the cities of 
 Seleucia and Babylon. Soon afterwards, however, Seleucia 
 was captured by storm, Babylon was reduced to surrender, 
 and Mithradates was captured and put to death. Gabi- 
 nius, who had finished the Egyptian campaign, was on 
 the eve of resuming operations against the Parthians, when 
 Crassus arrived in Syria and relieved him of the command. 
 
 Crassus spent the summer of 54 B.C. in levying troops 
 and contributions, and in making an extensive reconnais- 
 sance. The Euphrates was crossed and a victory won at 
 Ichnae ; garrisons were placed in several of the neighbour- 
 ing towns, and then the troops returned to Syria. This 
 reconnaissance determined the Romans to march against 
 the Parthians straight across the Mesopotamian desert, 
 rather than by the circuitous route through Armenia, for 
 the numerous Greek and half -Greek towns in the region 
 of the Tigris and Euphrates were found ready at once to 
 shake off the Parthian yoke. 
 
 Next year (53 B.C.) the Euphrates was again crossed, 
 and after some deliberation it was decided to march acros9 
 the desert to the Tigris rather than down the Euphrates 
 to Seleucia, where the two rivers are but a few miles 
 apart. The Roman army consisted of seven legions, four 
 thousand cavalry, and four thousand slingers and archers. 
 For many days they marched, and no enemy appeared. At 
 length, not far from the river Balissus, some horsemen of 
 the enemy were descried in the distance. The Arab prince 
 Abgarus of Edessa, who had been loud in his protesta- 
 tions of loyalty, and who had been mainly instrumental in 
 determining Crassus to adopt the desert route, was sent 
 out to reconnoitre. The enemy disappeared, followed by 
 Abgarus and his men ; and after a long interval it was 
 resolved to advance, in the hope of coming upon the 
 enemy. The river was crossed and the army was led 
 
THE RUPTURE. 437 
 
 rapidly forward, when suddenly the drums of the Par- 
 thians were heard, their silken gold-embroidered banners 
 were seen waving and their helmets and coats of mails 
 blazing in the sun; and by the side of the Parthian 
 vizier stood Abgarus and his Bedouins. 
 
 The Romans saw at once the net in which they were 
 ensnared. The whole Parthian army consisted of cavalry ; 
 the vizier had seen that no Oriental infantry could cope 
 with that of Rome, and had dispensed with the arm 
 altogether. The mass of his troops were mounted archers, 
 while the line was formed of heavy cavalry, armed with 
 long thrusting lances, and protected — man and horse — by 
 armour formed of leather or of metal plates. The Roman 
 infantry were quite unable to bring such an enemy to a 
 close engagement, and, even if they had been able, these 
 ironclad hosts would probably have been more than a 
 match for them. In the desert every advantage was on 
 the side of the enemy and none on that of the Romans. 
 The strength of the Roman system of warfare lay in the 
 close order in which the legions fought, and in the custom 
 of forming entrenched camps, which made every encamp- 
 ment a fortification. But the close order now only served 
 to make them an easier mark for their enemies' missiles, 
 and in the desert ditches and ramparts could often hardly 
 be formed. It is curious that the irresistible superiority of 
 the Roman infantry led the enemies of Rome at about the 
 same time, in widely different parts of the world, to meet 
 it, and meet it successfully, by the same means — by the 
 use of cavalry and missiles. The Parthian vizier was 
 only carrying out on a larger scale, and under infinitely 
 more favourable conditions, what had been completely 
 successful under Cassivellaunus in Britain, and partially 
 successful under Vercingetorix in Gaul. 
 
 Under such conditions the first battle between Romans 
 and Parthians was fought in the desert, about thirty miles 
 south of Carrhae. The Roman archers, who began the 
 attack, were driven back; the legions, which were in their 
 usual close order, were soon outflanked and overwhelmed 
 by the archers of the enemy. In order that they might 
 not be completely surrounded, Publius Crassus, the same 
 who had served with such distinction under Caesar in 
 Gaul, advanced with a select corps of cavalry, archers, and 
 
438 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 infantry. The Parthians retreated, hotly pursued ; but 
 when completely out of sight of the main army of the 
 Romans, the heavy cavalry made a stand aud soon com- 
 pletely surrounded the band of Crassus. All the valour 
 of the Romans and of their leader was in vain ; they were 
 driven to a slight eminence, where their destruction was 
 completed. Crassus and many of his officers put them- 
 selves to death ; out of the whole number of six thousand 
 only five hundred were taken prisoners, not one was able 
 to escape. Meanwhile the main army was left compara- 
 tively unmolested, but when it advanced to discover the 
 fate of the detached corps, the head of the young Crassus 
 was displayed on a pole before his father's eyes, and the 
 terrible onslaught was at the same time renewed. Night 
 alone put an end to the slaughter Fortunately the 
 Parthians retired from the field to bivouac ; and the 
 Romans seized the opportunity to retreat to Carrhae, 
 They left the wounded and the stragglers — said to have 
 been four thousand in number — on the 6eld , and as the 
 Parthians stayed to massacre these, and the inhabitants 
 of Carrhae marched forth in haste to succour the fugitives^ 
 the remnant of the army was saved from destruction 
 But the Romans, either from want of provisions or from 
 the precipitation of Crassus, soon set out from Carrhae 
 and marched towards the Armenian mountains. March- 
 ing by night and resting by day the main body arrived at 
 Sinnaca, within a day's march of safety There the vizier 
 came to offer peace and friendship, and to propose a con- 
 ference between the two generals. The offer was accepted 
 and terms were discussed ; a richly caparisoned horse was 
 produced — a present from the king to Crassus; and as 
 the servants of the vizier crowded to assist the Roman 
 general to mount, the suspicion arose among the Roman 
 officers that it was a design to seize the person of their 
 leader. Octavius snatched a sword from a Parthian and 
 stabbed the groom. In the tumult which followed 
 all the Roman officers were killed , Crassus refused to 
 survive as a prisoner, and the whole Roman force left 
 behind in the camp was either captured or dispersed. 
 Only one small body, which had broken off from the main 
 force, and some straggling bands found their way back 
 to Syria. Ten thousand Roman prisoners were settled 
 
THE RUPTURE. 439 
 
 in the oasis of Merv; one half of the whole force had 
 perished. 
 
 This disaster to the Roman arms seemed likely to shake 
 the very foundations of the Eoman power in the East. 
 Armenia became completely dependent upon Parthia, and 
 the Hellenic cities were again enslaved. More than this, 
 the Parthians prepared to cross the Euphrates and to 
 dislodge the Romans from Syria. But, fortunately for 
 Rome, the leaders on each side had changed. The vizier 
 was executed by the Sultan Orodes, and the command of 
 the invading army given to the young prince Pacorus ; 
 while the ad interim command of Syria was assumed by 
 the able quaestor Gaius Cassius. For two years the 
 Parthians sent only flying bands, which were easily re- 
 pulsed. Owing to the negligence of the Roman govern- 
 ment the great Parthian invasion, which came at last in 
 51 B.C., found nothing to oppose it but two weak legions 
 which Cassius had formed from the remains of the army 
 of Crassus, and which could, of course, do nothing to 
 oppose the advance. However, under an ordinary general 
 the Parthians were no more formidable than any other 
 Oriental army ; and though the Syrian command soon 
 devolved upon the incapable Bibulus, nothing was effected 
 by the invaders, and Pacorus soon came to an agree- 
 ment with the Roman commander, and turned his arms 
 against his father Orodes instead. 
 
 It is an ominous sign of the times that the national 
 disasters of Carrhae and Sinnaca attracted almost less 
 attention at Rome than the pitiful brawl upon the Appian 
 Way. But it is hardly wonderful ; the breach between the 
 regents was now becoming imminent. " Like the boat of 
 the ancient Greek mariners' tale, the vessel of the Roman 
 community now found itself, as it were, between two rocks 
 swimming towards each other ; expecting every moment 
 the crash of collision, those whom it was bearing tortured 
 by nameless anguish into the eddying surge that rose 
 higher and higher, were benumbed ; and while every 
 slightest movement there attracted a thousand eyes, not 
 one ventured to give a glance to the right or left." 
 
 After the conference at Luca, it seemed that the division 
 of power was made on a basis sufficiently firm to ensure 
 its endurance, provided that both parties were disposed to 
 
440 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 act in good faith. This was the case with Caesar, at any 
 rate daring the internal necessary for the completion of hia 
 Gallic conquests ; but probably Ponipeius was never even 
 provisionally in earnest about the collegiate scheme. Still, 
 though he never meant to acknowledge Caesar's equality 
 with himself, the idea of breaking with him formed it- 
 self but slowly in his mind. In 54 B.C. the death of 
 Julia, followed closely by that of her child, destroyed the 
 personal bond between the rivals ; and when Pompeius 
 refused Caesar's overtures for fresh marriage connections, 
 and himself married the daughter of Quintus Metellus 
 Scipio, the breach had unmistakably begun. Still the 
 political alliance remained, and Pompeius, after the disaster 
 of Aduatuca in 54 B.C., lent Caesar one of his Italian legions, 
 while Caesar gave his consent and support to the dictator- 
 ship of Pompeius. But as soon as the latter found himself 
 in a position completely outweighing in influence that of 
 Caesar, and when all the men of military age in Italy had 
 tendered their military oath to himself personally, it became 
 clear that he had made up his mind to a rupture. The 
 proceedings of the dictatorship told largely against the 
 partisans of Caesar. This might have been accident; 
 but when Pompeius selected for his colleague in office his 
 dependent Metellus Scipio instead of Caesar, still more 
 when he got his governorship of the two Spains prolonged 
 for five years more, and a large sum of money assigned to 
 him for the payment of troops, without procuring similar 
 arrangements for Caesar, it was impossible to mistake his 
 intention. Lastly, the new regulations as to the holding 
 of governorships had the ulterior object of procuring 
 Caesar's premature recall. No moment could have been 
 more unfavourable to Caesar. In June, 53 B.C., the death 
 of Crassus occurred — and Crassus had always been the 
 closest ally of Caesnr, and a bitter personal enemy of Pom- 
 peius. A few months later the Gallic insurrection broke 
 out with renewed violence, and for the first time Caesar had 
 to encounter an equal opponent in Vercingetorix. Pom- 
 peius was dictator of Rome and master of the senate ; what 
 might have occurred if, instead of intriguing obscurely 
 against Caesar, he had boldly recalled him from Gaul ? 
 
 The impending struggle was, of course, not between re- 
 public and monarchy, but between Pompeius and Caesar 
 
TEE RUPTURE. 441 
 
 for the crown of Rome. Nevertheless, each of the rivals 
 found it convenient to adopt one of the old party battle- 
 cries ; neither dared to alienate from himself the mass of 
 respectable conservative citizens, who desired the continu- 
 ance of the republic, by openly aiming at monarchy. 
 Caesar, of course, inscribed upon his banner, " The people 
 and democratic progress." He had been from the outset 
 an earnest democrat, and the monarchy meant to him some- 
 thing which differed in little but name from the Gracchan 
 government of the people. To Caesar this subterfuge 
 brought little advantage, except that he thus escaped 
 the necessity of directly employing the name of King. 
 But Pompeius, who, of course, proclaimed himself the 
 champion of the aristocracy and of the legitimate consti- 
 tution, gained besides a large and influential body of allies. 
 In the first place, he rallied round him the whole republican 
 party, and the majority, or, at any rate, the soundest part 
 of the burgesses of Italy. Secondly, what was no mean 
 advantage for so awkward a politician, it relieved him of 
 the difficulty of finding a plausible pretext for provoking 
 the war. His new allies would be willing enough to pro- 
 voke a conflict with Caesar, and to entrust the conduct of 
 the war to Pompeius, who would then come forward, in 
 obedience to the general wish, as the protector of the con- 
 stitution against the designs of anarchists and monarchists, 
 — as the regularly appointed general of the senate against 
 the imperator of the streets. 
 
 Thus the republican party became once more a factor in 
 the politics of Rome, owing to the rupture between the 
 rulers. The heart and core of the republican opposition was 
 the small circle of the followers of Cato, who were resolved 
 to enter on the struggle against monarchy under any cir- 
 cumstances. The mass of the aristocracy, though averse 
 to monarchy, desired, above all things, peace, and could 
 not be counted on for decisive action. Hence Cato's only 
 hope lay in a coalition with one of the regents. In alliance 
 with Pompeius he might compel the timid majority to 
 declare war ; and though Pompeius was not in earnest in 
 his fidelity to the constitution, yet the war would train a 
 really republican army and republican generals, and it 
 would be, at any rate, easier to settle matters with Pom- 
 peius after victory than with Caesar. The rapprochement 
 
442 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 between the general and the senate was made easy by the 
 events of the dictatorship. Pompeius had refused to accept 
 the office except from the senate ; he had shown unrelenting 
 severity against disorder of every kind, and surprising 
 indulgence towards Cato and his followers ; while, on the 
 other hand, it was directly from the hands of Cato and 
 Bibulus that Pompeius received the undivided consulship. 
 An outward and visible sign that the alliance was already 
 practically concluded was given, when, for the consulship 
 of 51 B.C., one of Cato's pronounced adherents, Claudius 
 Marcellus, was elected, evidently with the concurrence of 
 the regent. 
 
 Caesar was kept constantly informed of all that happened 
 at Rome, and formed his plans accordingly. He had doubt- 
 less long determined to take for himself, if necessary by 
 force of arms, the supreme power after the conclusion of 
 his Gallic wars ; but he wished earnestly to avoid the deep 
 disorganization which civil war must produce in a state ; 
 and even if civil war could not be avoided, no time could 
 be more unfavourable for it than the present, when the in- 
 surrection in Gaul was at its height, and when the consti- 
 tutional party was dominant in Italy. If he became, 
 according to the arrangement at Luca, consul for the year 
 48 B.C., he might confidently reckon on out-manoeuvring 
 his awkward and vacillating rival, and, with the compliant 
 majority in the senate at his disposal, might either reor- 
 ganize the state by peaceful means, or at least enter upon 
 the war with far greater prospects of success. Meanwhile 
 he armed, certainly, and raised his legions during the winter 
 of 52-51 B.C., to the number of eleven. But, at the same 
 time, he publicly approved of all Pompeius' acts as dictator, 
 and took no steps when he saw the alliance gradually 
 formed between his rival and the aristocracy ; only adher- 
 ing immovably to the one demand, that the consulship 
 for 48 B.C. should be granted him according to the agree- 
 ment. 
 
 It was upon this demand that the diplomatic war between 
 Caesar and the senate began, and it is important to grasp 
 fully and accurately the exact point in dispute. 
 
 If there should be any interval between the day on which 
 Caesar resigned his Gallic command and the day on which 
 he entered upon his consulship, he would be liable during 
 
TEE RUPTURE. 443 
 
 that interval to criminal impeachment, which, according 
 to Roman law, was allowable only against a man not in 
 office ; and in that case it was extremely probable that he 
 would meet the same fate as Milo, and be compelled to go 
 into exile. Was it necessary that there should be such an 
 interval ? According to the usual mode of reckoning, a pro- 
 vincial command began in theory on March 1st, of the 
 magistrate's year of office in Rome, so that Caesar's Gallic 
 command theoretically began on March 1st, 59 B.C., the 
 year of his consulship, and the ten years for which it was 
 secured to him would expire on the last day of February, 
 49 B.C. Accordingly there would be an interval) of ten 
 months between the end of the Gallic command and the 
 beginning of the consulship. Caesar's opponents aimed, 
 both directly and indirectly, at preventing him from 
 retaining his provinces during this interval. 
 
 Firstly, directly. According to the old custom, Caesar's 
 successor would have been appointed from among the 
 magistrates for the year 49 B.C., and could not, therefore, 
 have taken over the command until the beginning of 48 
 B ; and by the same old custom Caesar would have had 
 the right to the command for the remaining ten months of 
 the year 49 B.C., pending the arrival of his successor. But 
 by the new regulation, made specially for this purpose 
 during the dictatorship of Pompeius in 52 B.C. (see p. 433), 
 the senate might immediately fill up any legally vacant 
 governorship, and Caesar might therefore be relieved of 
 his command on March 1st, 49 B.C. 
 
 Secondly, indirectly. Even without this special regu- 
 lation passed for the purpose, the senate had a very simple 
 means of compelling Caesar to leave his command before 
 entering upon his consulship. The law required every 
 candidate for the consulship to appear in person before the 
 
 {residing magistrate, and to enter his name upon the official 
 ist before the election ; that is, about half a year before 
 entering on office. It was probably assumed at Luca that 
 Caesar should be exempted from this regulation, as was 
 often done with regard to particular candidates. At any 
 rate, during the dictatorship of Pompeius in 52 B.C., Caesar's 
 appearance in person was dispensed with by a tribunician 
 law ; but when the new election ordinance (p. 433) was 
 passed, the obligation to appear in person was repeated in 
 
444 EISTOEY OF LOME, 
 
 general terms, and no exemption in Caesar's case was men- 
 tioned. Caesar complained, and an exempting clause was 
 interpolated by Pompeius, but not confirmed by the people, 
 and was therefore legally of no effect. The whole matter is 
 a good example of Pompeius' tortuous methods. " Where 
 he might have simply kept by the law, he had preferred 
 first to make a spontaneous concession, then to recall it, 
 and lastly to palliate this recall in a manner most illegal."' 
 
 The remaining events to the outbreak of the civil war 
 may be viewed in three separate stages. 
 
 I. The discussion at the beginning of 51 B.C. 
 
 In accordance with custom, the governorships of the year 
 49 B.C., which were to be filled by consuls, would be delibe- 
 rated upon in the beginning of 51 B.C. On this occasion the 
 consul Marcus Marcellus proposed that the two provinces 
 of Caesar should be banded over on March 1,49 B.C., to 
 the two consuls who were to hold governorships for that 
 year. The long repressed torrent of indignation against 
 Caesar burst forth. The followers of Cato demanded that 
 the exemption of Caesar from appearing to announce his 
 name in person should be held invalid ; that the soldiers of 
 his legions who had served their time should be at once 
 discharged ; and that the bestowal by him of burgess- 
 rights and the establishment of colonies in upper Italy 
 should be considered null and void. Marcellus, in ac- 
 cordance with this last proposal, caused a senator of the 
 Caesarian colony of Comum to be scourged as a non-burgess. 
 
 On the other side, the supporters of Caesar affirmed that 
 both equity and the condition of affairs in Gaul required 
 that Caesar should be allowed to hold his command and 
 his consulship simultaneously ; they pointed out that 
 Pompeius had in time past combined the Spanish pro- 
 vinces and the consulship, and was even now in possession 
 of proconsular power for the purpose of the supply of 
 grain, of the Spanish governorships, and of the supreme 
 command in Italy. The timid majority in the senate 
 prevented any resolution being taken for months. Pom- 
 peius at last declared on the whole in favour of the 
 proposal of Marcellus, while hinting at certain concessions 
 which might perhaps be made to Caesar ; and ultimately 
 (September 29, 51 B.C.) the nomination of successors was 
 postponed to the last day of February, 50 B.C. 
 
THE RUPTURE. 445 
 
 Meanwhile the republicans tried to break up Caesar's array 
 by inducing the veterans to apply for their discharge ; and 
 the elections for the next year were thoroughly unfavour- 
 able to Caesar. The latter had at length quelled the in- 
 surrection in Gaul, and had moved one of his legions to 
 North Italy. War was clearly inevitable, but even now he 
 was willing to make great sacrifices ; it was still advisable 
 to keep the legions for some time in Gaul, and he had still 
 perhaps some hope in the strong desire for peace which the 
 majority of the senate entertained. When the senate, at the 
 suggestion of Pompeius, requested each general to furnish 
 a legion for the Parthian war, and when Pompeius at the 
 same time demanded from Caesar the legion lent him some 
 years before, Caesar complied, and the two legions from his 
 army were kept by the government at Capua. For the 
 discussions of 50 B.C. Caesar had succeeded in buying the 
 services of one consul, Lucius Aemilius Paullus, and, above 
 all, one of the tribunes, Gaius Curio, a man of brilliant 
 talents but of the most profligate character.* Caesar paid 
 his debts, amounting to £575,000 of our money, and thence- 
 forth his great gifts of eloquence and energy were exerted 
 for, instead of against, the enemy of the senate. 
 
 II. The discussions of the year 50 B.C. 
 
 In March, 50 B.C., when the question of Caesar's successors 
 arose, Curio approved of the decree of the year before 
 superseding Caesar on March 1, 49 B.C., but demanded that 
 it should be extended to Pompeius ; he argued that the con- 
 stitution could be rendered safe only by the removal of all 
 exceptional positions ; and at the same time, declared that 
 he would prevent any one-sided action against Caesar by 
 his tribimician veto. Caesar at once declared his consent 
 to Curio's proposal ; but Pompeius would only reply that 
 Caesar must resign, and that he himself meant soon to do so, 
 though he mentioned no definite term. The decision was 
 delayed for months, but at last Curio's proposal was 
 adopted by 370 votes against 20 — all that the extreme 
 republican party could muster. All good citizens rejoiced, 
 and the party of Cato was in despair. The latter had 
 undertaken to force the senate to a declaration of war, and 
 they were bitterly reproached for their failure by Pompeius. 
 As matters stood, Pompeius and Caesar were both recalled 
 * " Homo ingeniosissime nequam" (Vellei. ii. 48).' 
 
44G HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 by the senate ; and while Caesar was ready to comply, 
 Pompeius refused — the champion of the constitution and 
 the aristocracy treated the constitutional decisions of the 
 senate as null ! But the extreme republicans were deter- 
 mined to bring matters to a crisis. A rumour arose that 
 Caesar had moved four legions across the Alps, and stationed 
 them at Placentia. This was an act quite within his 
 prerogative, and the rumour 'was shown to be groundless, 
 and yet the consul Gaius Marcellus proposed, on the 
 strength of it, to give Pompeius orders to march against 
 Caesar. When the senate rejected the proposal, Marcellus, 
 in concert with the two consuls designate for 49 B.C., who 
 were also Catonians, proceeded to Pompeius and requested 
 him, on their own authority, to put himself at the head of 
 the legions at Capua, and to summon the Italian militia to 
 arms. No more informal authorization for the commence- 
 ment of civil war could be imagined, but it was enough 
 for Pompeius, and he left Rome in December, 50 B.C. 
 
 III. Caesar's ultimatum. 
 
 Caesar had fully attained his object of throwing upon his 
 opponents the onus of declaring war; and while himself 
 keeping on legal ground, he had compelled Pompeius to 
 begin the struggle as the general of a revolutionary 
 minority of the senate which overawed tho majority. It 
 was now his interest to strike a blow as soon as possible ; 
 his opponents were only just beginning to make prepara- 
 tions, and it might be possible to surprise the city un- 
 defended, or even to seize all Italy and shut them off from 
 their best resources. Curio represented these considera- 
 tions strongly to his chief, and Caesar at once sent to hurry 
 on the nearest legion to Ravenna. Meanwhile he sent an 
 ultimatum to Rome, in which he dropped all counter- 
 demands, offered to resign Transalpine Gaul and dismiss 
 eight of his ten legions, if only the senate would allow him 
 either Cisalpine Gaul and Illyria with one legion, or Cis- 
 alpine Gaul alone with two — and that not up to his in- 
 vestiture with the consulship, but only till the close of the 
 consular elections for 48 B.C. It may almost be doubted 
 whether Caesar can possibly have been sincere in these 
 proposals ; but it is probable that he committed the fault 
 of playing too bold a game, and that if his ultimatum had 
 been accepted he would have made good his word. Curio 
 
TEE RUPTURE 447 
 
 undertook once more to enter the lion's den. On the 1st of 
 January, 49 B.C., he delivered his master's letter in a full 
 meeting of the senate. " The grave words of Caesar, in 
 which he set forth the imminence of civil war, the general 
 wish for peace, the arrogance of Pompeius, and his own 
 yielding disposition with all the irresistible force of truth ; 
 the proposals for a compromise, of a moderation which 
 doubtless surprised his own partisans ; the distinct declara- 
 tion that this was the last time that he should offer his hand 
 for peace, made the deepest impression." The sentiment 
 of the majority was so doubtful that the consuls would 
 not allow a vote to be taken, even on the proposal of Marcus 
 Marcellus, to defer the determination till the Italian levy 
 could be under arms to protect the senate. The consul 
 Lentulus said openly that he would act on his own authority 
 whatever the senate might decree, and Pompeius let it be 
 known that he would take up the cause of the senate 
 now or never. Thus overawed, the senate decreed that 
 Caesar should, at no distant day, give up Transalpine Gaul 
 to Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus, and Cisalpine Gaul to 
 Marcus Servilius Novianus, and should dismiss his army, 
 failing which he should be esteemed a traitor. The 
 Caesarian tribunes who tried to veto the decree were 
 menaced with death in the senate-house, and had to fly 
 in Slaves' clothing from the capital. The senate declared 
 the country in danger, called all citizens to arms, and all 
 magistrates, faithful to the constitution, to place them- 
 selves at their head (January 7th, 49 B.C.). 
 
 Hesitation was now no longer possible for Caesar. He 
 called together the soldiers of the thirteenth legion, which 
 had now arrived at Ravenna, and set before them them the 
 whole circumstances. He spoke not to the dregs of the 
 city, but to young men from the towns and villages of 
 northern Italy who were capable of real enthusiasm for 
 liberty, who had received from Caesar the burgess rights 
 which the government had refused them, and whom 
 Caesar's fall would leave once more at the mercy of the 
 fasces (see p. 444). He set before them the thanks which 
 the nobility were preparing for the general and the army 
 which had conquered Gaul, the overawing of the senate 
 by the extreme minority, and the last violation of the 
 tribunate of the people, wrested the hundred years ago 
 
448 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 by their fathers from the nobility. And when he sum- 
 moned them, as the general of the popular party, to follow 
 him in the last inevitable struggle against the despised 
 perfidious aristocracy, not an officer or soldier held back. 
 At the head of his vanguard Caesar crossed the Rubicon, 
 the narrow brook which separated his province from Italy, 
 and which it was forbidden, by the constitution, to the 
 proconsul of Gaul to pass. 
 
 AUTHORITIES. 
 
 Egypt — Dio. xxxix. 55-59. 
 
 Parthian war— Plut. Anton. 5 ; Crass. 16-end. Appian Syr. 51. 
 
 Dio. xl. 12-30. Liv. 105, 106, 108. Flor. iii. 11 ; iv. 2. Veil. 
 
 ii. 46. Strab. xi. Justin, xlii. 4. 
 Rupture with Caesar— Plut. Caee. 29-32; Pomp. 56-60; Cic. 35. 
 
 Appian B. C. 25-33. Caes. Bell. Civ. init. Suet. Jul. 26-32. 
 
 Liv. 107-109. Flor. iv. ii. 13-17. Dio. xl. 56-66; xli. 1-3. 
 
 Cic. Watson, ii. 31-45, especially 33 and 34 (ad Fani. viii. 4, 8). 
 
 For the whole of the letters of this period see Nobbe's list, p. 967. 
 
CHAPTER XXXVII. 
 
 THE CIVIL WAR. 
 
 49 R.c. Resources of either side — Caesar occupies Rome — The 
 Pompeians depart for Epirus — Spanish campaign — Siege of 
 Ilerda — Surrender of Pompeians — Siege of Massilia — Conquest 
 of Sardinia, Corsica, and Sicily — Death of Curio in Africa. — 
 48 B.C. Caesar crosses to Epirus — Compelled to retreat towards 
 Thessaly — Battle of Pharsalus — Flight and death of Pompeiua. 
 — 4-7 B.C. Caesar besieged in Alexandria during the winter — 
 Relieved by Mithradates of Pergamus — Affairs of Asia Minor 
 — Battle of Ziela. — i6 B.C. War in Africa — Battle of Thapsus — 
 Death of Cato. 
 
 Before describing the course of the struggle between the 
 two aspirants to the crown of Rome, it will be well to 
 examine the resources at the disposal of each. 
 
 Caesar's authority was wholly unlimited within his own 
 party ; in all matters, military and political, the decision 
 lay with him. He had no confederates, only adjutants, 
 who, as a rule, were soldiers trained to obey uncondition- 
 ally. So, on the outbreak of war, one officer alone, and he 
 the foremost of all, refused him obedience. Titus Labienus 
 had shared with Caesar all his political and military 
 vicissitudes of defeat and victory. In Gaul he had always 
 held an independent command, and had frequently led 
 half the army. As late as the year 50 B.o., Caesar had 
 given to him supreme command in Cisalpine Gaul ; but 
 from this very position he entered into a treaty with the 
 other side, and on the outbreak of hostilities went at once 
 to the camp of Pompeius. It was the one great dis- 
 advantage on Caesar's side that he had no officers to 
 whom he could entrust a separate command, but this was 
 
 29 
 
450 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 quite outbalanced by the unity of the supreme leadership 
 — the indispensable condition of success. 
 
 The army numbered nine legions — at mo*t fifty thou- 
 sand men, two-thirds of whom had served in all the 
 campaigns against the Celts. The cavalry consisted of 
 mercenaries from Germany and Noricum, and had been 
 well tried in the war against Vercingetorix. The physical 
 condition of the soldiers was beyond all praise ; by the 
 careful selection of recruits and by training they had been 
 brought to a perfection never perhaps surpassed in march- 
 ing power and in readiness for immediate departure at any 
 moment. Their courage and their esprit de corps had been 
 equally developed by Caesar's system of rewards and 
 punishments — a system so perfectly carried out that the 
 pre-eminence of particular soldiers or divisions was acqui- 
 esced in even by their less favoured comrades. Their 
 discipline was strict but not harassing ; and while main- 
 tained with unrelenting rigour in the presence of the 
 enemy, was relaxed at other times, especially after victory, 
 when even irregularities and outrages of a very question- 
 able kind went unpunished. Mutiny was never pardoned, 
 in either the ringleaders or their dupes. Caesar took care 
 that victory should be associated in the minds of both 
 officers and soldiers with hopes of personal gain ; every 
 one had his share of the spoil, and the most lavish gifts 
 were promised at the triumph. At the same time that 
 unquestioning obedience was exacted from all, yet all were 
 allowed some glimpse at the general's aims and springs 
 of action, so that each might feel that he was doing his 
 part towards the attainment of the common object, and no 
 one could complain that he was treated as a mere instru- 
 ment. During the long years of warfare a sense of 
 comradeship grew up between soldiers and leader. They 
 were his clients, whose services he was bound to requite, 
 and whose wrongs he was bound to revenge. The result 
 was that Caesar's soldiers were, and knew themselves to 
 be, a match for ten times their number, and that their 
 fidelity to him was unchangeable and unparalleled. With 
 one exception, no Roman soldier or officer ref used to follow 
 him into the civil war, and the legionaries even determined 
 to give credit for the double pay which Caesar promised 
 them from the beginning of the war, while every sub- 
 
THE CIVIL WAR. 451 
 
 altera officer equipped and paid a trooper out of his own 
 purse. 
 
 Thus Caesar had two requisites for success — unlimited 
 authority and a magnificent and trustworthy army. But 
 his power extended over a very limited space. It was 
 based essentially on the province of Upper Italy, which 
 was indeed devoted to him and furnished an ample supply 
 of recruits. But in Italy the mass of the burgesses were 
 all for his opponents, and expected from Caesar only a 
 renewal of the Marian and Cinnan atrocities. His only 
 friends in Italy were the rabble and the ruined of all classes 
 — friends infinitely more dangerous than foes. The newly 
 conquered territory in Gaul could not, of course, be relied on, 
 and in Narbo the constitutional party had many adherents. 
 Among the independent princes Caesar had tried to effect 
 something by gifts and promises, but without important 
 result except in the case of Voctio, king of Noricum, from 
 whom cavalry recruits were obtained. 
 
 Caesar thus began the war without other resources 
 than efficient adjutants, a faithful army, and a devoted 
 province. Pompeius, on the other hand, was chief of the 
 Bx>man commonwealth and master of all the resources at 
 the disposal of the legitimate government of the empire. 
 But unity of leadership was inconsistent with the nature 
 of a coalition ; and though Pompeius was nominated by 
 the senate sole generalissimo by land and sea, he could not 
 prevent the senate itself from exercising the political su- 
 premacy, or from occasionally interfering even in military 
 matters. Twenty years of antagonism made it impossible 
 for either party of the coalition to place complete con- 
 fidence in the other. 
 
 In resources Caesar's opponents had an overwhelming 
 superiority. They had exclusive command of the sea, and 
 the disposal of all ports, ships, and naval material. The 
 two Spains were specially devoted to Pompeius, and the 
 other provinces had during recent years been put into safe 
 hands. The client states were all for Pompeius ; many of 
 them had been brought into close personal relations with 
 him at different times. He had been the companion in 
 arms of the kings of Numidia and of Mauretania ; he had 
 re-established the kingdoms of Bosporus, Armenia, and 
 Cappadocia, and created that of Deiotarus. He had caused 
 
452 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 the rale of the Lagidae to be re-established in Egypt, and 
 even Massilia was indebted to him for an extension of 
 territory. Moreover, the democratic policy handed down 
 from Gains Gracchus of uniting the dependent states and of 
 setting up provincial colonies was dreaded by the dependent 
 princes, more especially by Juba, king of Numidia, whose 
 kingdom Curio had lately proposed to annex. Even the 
 Pai'thians by the convention between Pacorus and Bibulus 
 (p. 439) were practically in alliance with the aristocracy. 
 
 In Italy, not only the aristocracy but the capitalists 
 were bitterly opposed to Caesar, together with the small 
 capitalists and landowners, and generally all classes who 
 had anything to lose. 
 
 The army of Pompeius consisted chiefly of the seven 
 Spanish legions —troops in every way trustworthy, — and 
 of scattered divisions in Syria, Asia, Macedonia, Africa, 
 and Sicily. In Italy there were the two legions lately 
 given over by* Caesar — not more than seven thousand 
 men, and, of course, of doubtful trustworthiness. There 
 were also three legions remaining from the levies of 54 B.C. 
 (p. 428), and the Italian levy, which had been sworn to 
 allegiance and then dismissed on furlough. Altogether the 
 Italian troops w r hich might, within a very short time, be 
 made available, amounted to about sixty thousand men. 
 Cavalry there was none ; but a nucleus of three hundred 
 men was soon formed by Pompeius, out of the mounted 
 herdsmen of Apulia. 
 
 Under such circumstances the war began, early in 
 January, 49 B.C. Caesar had only one legion — five 
 thousand men and three hundred cavalry — at Ravenna, 
 distant by road about 240 miles from Rome. Pompeius 
 had two weak legions — seven thousand infantry and a 
 small force of cavalry — at Luceria, about equally distant 
 from Rome. The remainder of Caesar's troops were either 
 on the Saone and Loire or in Belgica, while Pompeius's 
 reserves were already arriving at their rendezvous. Never- 
 theless Caesar resolved to assume the offensive : in the 
 spring Pompeius would be able to act with the Spanish 
 troops in Transalpine and with his Italian troops in Cis- 
 alpine Gaul ; but at the moment he might be disconcerted 
 by the suddenness of the attack. 
 
 Accordingly Marcus Antonius pushed forward across 
 
THE CIVIL WAR. 453 
 
 the Apennines to Arretinm, while Caesar advanced along 
 the coast. The recruiting officers of Pompeius and their 
 recruits fled at the news of his approach ; several small 
 successes were gained, and Caesar resolved to advance 
 upon Rome itself, rather than upon the army of Luceria. 
 A panic seized the city when the news arrived ; Pompeius 
 decided not to defend it, and the senators and consuls 
 hurried to leave, not even delaying to secure the state 
 treasure. At Teanum Sidicinum fresh proposals of Caesar 
 were considered, in which he again offered to dismiss his 
 army and hand over his provinces if Pompeius would 
 depart to Spain and if Italy were disarmed. The reply 
 was that if Caesar would at once return to his province 
 the senate would bind itself to procure the fulfilment 
 of his demands. As to the war, Pompeius was ordered to 
 advance with the legions from Luceria into Picenum, and 
 personally to call together tbe levy of that district, and 
 try to stop the invader. 
 
 But Caesar was already in Picenum. Auximum, Came- 
 rinum, and Asculum fell into his hands ; and such of the 
 recruits as were not dispersed left the district and repaired 
 to Corfinium, where tbe Marsian and Paelignian levies 
 were to assemble. Here Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus was 
 in command ; and instead of conducting the recruits, 
 who now amounted to fifteen thousand men, to Luceria 
 according to the instructions of Pompeius, he remained 
 where he was, expecting Pompeius to come to his relief. 
 Instead of Pompeius Caesar arrived, now at the head of 
 forty thousand men. Domitius had not the courage to hold 
 the place ; neither did he resolve to surrender it, but rather 
 to escape during the night with his aristocratic officers. 
 But his dastardly plan was betrayed ; the troops mutinied, 
 arrested their staff, and handed over the town to Caesar. 
 Thereupon the forces in Alba and in Tarracina laid down 
 their arms; a third division, of 3500 men, in Sulmo had 
 previously surrendered. 
 
 As soon as Picenum wis lost, Pompeius had determined 
 to abandon Italy and had set out at once for Brundisium. 
 Here all the available troops were assembled, to the number 
 of twenty-five thousand ; part of them were at once con- 
 veyed across in the ships ; the remaining ten thousand 
 were besieged by Caesar in Brundisium, but were skil- 
 
454 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 fully withdrawn by Pompeius before Caesar could close the 
 harbour. 
 
 In two months Caesar had broken up an army of ten 
 legions, and made himself master of the state chest, of the 
 capital, and of the whole peninsula of Italy. But though his 
 resources were thus largely increased, the military difficul- 
 ties of the situation were proportionally complicated. He 
 had now to leave behind a large garrison in Italy, and to 
 guard against the closing of the seas and the cutting off of 
 grain supplies by his opponents. Financial difficulties, too, 
 soon arose, now that Caesar had to feed the population of 
 the capital while the revenues of the East were still in the 
 enemy's hands. 
 
 The general expectation was that confiscations and pro- 
 scriptions would be resorted to. Friends and foes saw in 
 Caesar a second Catilina; and it must be allowed that 
 neither his own antecedents nor the character of the men 
 who now surrounded him — men of broken reputation and 
 ruined fortunes like Quintus Hortensius, Curio, and Marcus 
 Antonius — were reassuring But both friends and foes were 
 soon undeceived ; from the beginning of hostilities the 
 common soldiers were forbidden to enter a town armed, 
 and the people were everywhere protcctei from injury. 
 When Corfininm was surrendered late at night, Caesar 
 postponed the occupation of the town until the next day, 
 to prevent confusion and outrage in the darkness. Every- 
 where the officers captured were allowed to carry off 
 their private property, and in his worst financial straits 
 Caesar preferred borrowing from his friends to levying 
 exactions from his foes. The aristocrats indeed, far from 
 being appeased by Caesar's moderation, were only goaded 
 to more frantic hatred ; but the mass of quiet people, in 
 whose eyes material interests were more important than 
 politics, were completely gained over. Even the senators 
 who had ventured to remain behind acquiesced in Caesar's 
 rule. His object was fully attained: anarchy, and even 
 the alarm of anarchy, had been kept under, — an incalculable 
 gain with regard to the future reorganization of the state. 
 The anarchists, of course, were bitterly disappointed, and 
 showed a spirit which might be expected at some future 
 time to give trouble. The republicans of all shades were 
 neither converted nor disarmed. In their eyes their duty 
 
THE CIVIL WAR. 455 
 
 to the constitution absolved them from every other con- 
 sideration. The less decided members of the party who 
 accepted peace and protection from the monarch, were none 
 the more friendly to him in their hearts, and the con- 
 sciences of the more honourable among them smote them 
 when they thought of other members of the party who 
 had gone into exile rather than compromise their prin- 
 ciples. Besides, emigration had become fashionable ; it 
 was plebeian to remain and perhaps take a seat in the 
 Caesarian senate of nobodies, instead of emigrating with 
 the Domitii and the Metelli. 
 
 Caesar had begun the war as the protector of the over- 
 awed senate against the violent minority ; but the same 
 inertness which had made it possible for Caesar to prevent 
 strong action on the part of his opponent, prevented him 
 from obtaining aid from the senate himself. The first 
 meeting was on April 1st;" but Caesar could not procure 
 approval of his acts or power to continue the war ; he 
 then tried in vain to be named dictator. When he sent 
 men to take possession of the treasure, the tribune Lucius 
 Metellus attempted to protect the state chest with his 
 person, and had to be removed by force. And at length 
 Caesar was obliged to tell the senate that, since it 
 refused him its assistance, he would proceed without it. 
 He appointed Marcus Aemilius Lepidus prefect of the city, 
 and hastened to resume the war. 
 
 Pompeius, for whatever reason, had preferred to remain 
 in Greece rather than to go to Spain, where he had able 
 lieutenants, a strong army, and provinces devoted to him. 
 Accordingly Caesar had the option of directing his first 
 attack against Pompeius himself in the East, or against 
 the strong Spanish army under his lieutenant. He had 
 already collected on the lower Rhone nine of his best 
 legions and six thousand cavalry ; but his enemies had 
 been active in the same region. Lucius Domitius had 
 induced Massilia to declare against him and to refuse a 
 passage to his troops ; and the five best Spanish legions, 
 together with forty thousand Spanish infantry and five 
 thousand cavalry, were on their way, under the com- 
 mand of Afranius and Petreius, to close the passes of 
 the Pyrpnees. But Caesar anticipated them, and the line 
 of the Pyrenees was lost to the Pompeians. The latter 
 
456 E1ST0UY OF ROME. 
 
 now established themselves at Ilerda on the right bank of 
 the Sicoris, about twenty miles north of its junction with 
 the Ebro. To the south of the town, the mountains 
 approach pretty close to the river; to the north stretches 
 a plain commanded by the town. Connection with the 
 left bank of the Sicoris was maintained by means of a 
 single solid bridge close to the town. The Caesarians were 
 stationed above Ilerda, between the river Sicoris and its 
 tributary the Cinga, which joins it below the town ; but 
 they could not make good their ground betw r een the Pom- 
 peian camp and the town, which would have given them 
 command of the stone bridge, and consequently they 
 depended for their communications upon two temporary 
 bridges twenty miles higher up the river. These were 
 swept away by the floods, and the whole army was now 
 cooped up in the narrow space between the two streams. 
 Famine and disease appeared. A body of reinforcements 
 from Gaul, together with foraging parties on their way back 
 to the camp, to the number of six thousand, were attacked 
 and dispersed under the eyes of the Caesarians on the other 
 side of the river. Had the river been adequately guarded 
 the Pompeians could hardly have failed of success : but the 
 further bank was observed to be unoccupied ; Caesar suc- 
 ceeded in restoring the bridges without much difficulty, and 
 provisions again entered the camp in abundance. Soon 
 his superior cavalry scoured the country far and wide, and 
 the most important Spanish communities to the north, some 
 even to the south, of the Ebro passed over to him, while 
 the Pompeians began to feel the want of supplies. They 
 determined to retreat south of the Ebro, but it was neces- 
 sary first to build a bridge of boats over that river. This 
 was done at a point below the mouth of the Sicoris. Caesar 
 sought by all means to detain the enemy, but was unable 
 to do so as long as he had not control of the bridge of Ilerda, 
 since there was no ford. His soldiers worked night and day 
 to draw off the river by canals, so that infantry might wade 
 it; but the Pompeians had finish d the'r bridge over the 
 Ebro before Caesar had completed his canals, and he could 
 only order his cavalry to follow them and harass their rear. 
 But when the legions saw the enemy retreating they called 
 upon the general to lead them on ; they entered the river, 
 and though the water reached their shoulders it was crossed 
 
THE CIVIL WAR. 457 
 
 in safety. The Pompeians were now within five miles of 
 the mountains which lined the north bank of the Ebro, and 
 wonld soon be in safety. But, harassed by the enemy's 
 attacks and exhausted with marching, they pitched their 
 camp in the plain ; here Caesar's troops overtook them and 
 encamped opposite, and in this position both armies re- 
 mained for the next day. On tbe morning of the third 
 day Caesar's infantry set out to turn the position of the 
 Pompeians and bar the way to the Ebro, and, in spite of 
 all the latter could do, they found themselves anticipated. 
 They were now strategically lost, and, in spite of ample 
 opportunity, Caesar refrained from attacking them. The 
 soldiers of the two armies began to fraternize and to dis- 
 cuss terms of surrender, but Petreius cut short the negotia- 
 tions and began to retreat towards Uerda, where were 
 a garrison and magazines. Shut in between the Sicoris 
 and the enemy, their difficulties increased at every step : 
 Caesar's cavalry occupied the opposite bank and prevented 
 them from crossing the river to gain the fortress, and at 
 last the inevitable capitulation took place (August 2, 49 
 B.C.). Caesar granted to soldiers and officers life, liberty, 
 and property, and did not, as in Italy, compulsorily enrol 
 the captives in his army. The native Spaniards at once 
 returned to their homes, and the Italians were disbanded 
 at the borders of Transalpine and Cisalpine Gaul. 
 
 In Further Spain, Varro determined to shut himself up 
 in Gades ; but when this town, together with all the most 
 notable places in the province, gave itself up to Caesar, 
 and when even Italica closed its gates against the 
 Pompeian general, he himself resolved to capitulate. 
 
 About the same time Massilia surrendered. By sea, 
 Caesar's lieutenant, Decimus Brutus — the same who had 
 conquered the Veneti (p. 408), — had defeated with his im- 
 provised fleet the far stronger force of the Massiliots. 
 He gained a second victory not long afterwards, when a 
 small squadron of Pompeians under Lucius Nasidius had 
 arrived to reinforce, and completely shut the besieged from 
 the sea. On land Gaius Trebonius pressed forward the 
 siege with energy ; the works were pushed up to the very 
 walls of the city, when the besieged promised to desist 
 from the defence if Trebonins would suspend operations 
 until Caesar arrived. The armistice was granted, but was 
 
458 HISTORY OF HOME. 
 
 tised by the Massiliots to make a treacherous sally ; the 
 struggle was renewed, aud the city once more invested. 
 On Caesar's arrival it was reduced to surrender on any 
 terms. Domitius stole away in a boat. The garrison aud 
 inhabitants were protected by Caesar from the fury of his 
 legions, but the city, while it retained its freedom and 
 nationality, lost a portion of its territory and privileges. 
 
 While Caesar was occupied in Spain his lieutenants 
 had been at work to prevent the other great danger which 
 was imminent, namely, the starvation of Italy. The 
 Pompeians commanded the sea and the corn provinces, 
 Sardinia and Corsica through Marcus Cotta, Sicily through 
 Cato, Africa through Varus and Juba, king of Numidia. 
 Sardinia was quickly recovered for Caesar, by Quintus 
 Valerius ; the conquest of Sicily and Africa was entrusted 
 to Curio. He occupied Sicily without a blow, and, leaving 
 two legions in the island, he embarked with the remaining 
 two and with five hundred horse for Africa. He effected 
 a landing, and pitched his camp near Utica : his legions 
 were for the most part composed of men taken over from 
 the enemy, but he knew well how to gain their affections, 
 and at the same time showed himself a capable officer. 
 He was successful in several minor engagements, and at 
 length put to flight the whole forces of Varus, and pro- 
 ceeded to lay siege to Utica. But there came news that 
 king Juba was advancing with all his forces to its relief, 
 and Curio raised the siege and returned to his former 
 camp to wait for reinforcements. Soon afterwards came 
 a second report, that the king had turned back, and was 
 sending on only a moderate corps under Saburra. Curio 
 immediately sent forward his cavalry, which surprised and 
 inflicted much damage upon this body ; he then hastened 
 himself to complete their defeat, and succeeded in putting 
 them to flight. But Saburra was not destitute of support. 
 Only five miles distant was the Numidian main force, 
 which was now seen rapidly approaching. The Roman 
 cavalry were by this time dispersed in pursuit, all but a 
 band of two hundred, who with the infantry were com- 
 pletely surrounded in the plain. In vain Curio attempted 
 to cut his way through : the infantry were cut down to a 
 man ; only a few of the cavalry escaped. Curio, unable to 
 bear the shame of defeat, fell sword in hand, and on the 
 
THE CIVIL WAR 459 
 
 following day the force in camp near Utica surrendered 
 on receiving news of the disaster. 
 
 The expedition had been successful in relieving the 
 most urgent wants of the capital by the occupation of 
 Sicily, but the loss of Curio was irreparable. He was 
 the only one of Caesar's subordinates who had a touch of 
 genius and a certain magnetic power over the minds of 
 men. 
 
 It is uncertain what had been Pompeius's plan of cam- 
 paign for the year 49 B.C. Probably the Spanish army 
 was meant to stand on the defensive until the Macedonian 
 army was ready to march ; a junction would then have 
 been effected between the two armies, and a combined 
 attempt made by land and sea to recover Italy. In 
 pursuance probably of some such plan, the admirals of 
 Pompeius in the Adriatic, Marcus Octavius and Lucius 
 Scribonius Libo, attacked Caesar's fleet under Dolabella, 
 destroyed his ships, and shut up Gaius Antonius with 
 two legions in the island of Curicta. All attempts to 
 rescue the latter failed, and the majority had to lay down 
 their arms and were incorporated in the Pompeian army. 
 Octavius proceeded to reduce Illyria; most of the towns 
 gave themselves up to him, but the Caesarians maintained 
 themselves obstinately in Salonae and Lissus. 
 
 This, the only result obtained by the Pompeian fleet 
 in the year 49 B.C., is miserably small considering the 
 superiority of the party by sea. and suggests an appalling 
 picture of the discord and mismanagement which prevailed 
 in the ranks of the coalition. The general result of the 
 campaign had been complete success for the Caesarians 
 in one quarter and partial success in another, while the 
 plan of Pompeius had been completely frustrated by the 
 destruction of the Spanish army. 
 
 But though nothing was done to obstruct Caesar in the 
 West, no effort was spared to consolidate the power of 
 the republican party in Macedonia. Hither flocked the 
 emigrants from Brundisium, and the refugees from the 
 "West : Marcus Cato from Sicily, Lucius Domitius from 
 Massilia, Afranius and Varro from Spain. The senate of 
 the emigration which met at Thessalonica counted nearly 
 two hundred members, including almost all the consulars. 
 Out of scrupulous regard to formal law they called them- 
 
460 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 selves — not the senate, for that could not exist beyond 
 the sacred soil of the city — but "the three hundred," the 
 ancient normal number of senators. The majority indeed 
 were lukewarm, and only obstructed the energy of others 
 by their querulousness and sluggishness : but the violent 
 minority showed no want of activity. With them the in- 
 dispensable preliminary of any negotiations for peace was 
 the bringing over of Caesar's head; bis partisans were 
 held to have forfeited life and property, and it was even 
 proposed to punish every senator who had remained neutral 
 in the struggle or had emigrated without entering the 
 army. Bibulus and Labienus caused all soldiers and officers 
 of Caesar who fell into their bands to be executed, and 
 probably the main reason why no counter-revolution broke 
 out in Italy during Caesar's absence was the fear of the 
 unbridled fury of the extreme section of the aristocracy. 
 Cato alone had the force and the courage to check such 
 proceedings : he got the senate to prohibit the pillage of 
 subject towns and the putting to death of burgesses other- 
 wise than in battle, and confessed that he feared the 
 victory of his own party even more than their defeat. 
 
 The position of Pompeius became more and more dis- 
 agreeable after the events of the year 49 B.C. All the 
 failures of his lieutenants were visited upon himself, 
 while the newly formed senate took up its abode almost 
 in his head-quarters, and impeded his action at every step. 
 There was no man of sufficient mark to put a stop to these 
 preposterous doings ; Cato, who alone might have effected 
 something, was jealously kept in the background by Pom- 
 peius, and Pompeius himself had not the necessary intellect 
 or decision. 
 
 The flower of the troops were the legions brought from 
 Italy, out of which, with recruits, five legions were formed. 
 Two others were on their way from Syria and one from 
 Cilicia, and three more were formed from Romans settled 
 in Crete, Macedonia, and Asia Minor. Finally, there were 
 two thousand volunteers, and the contingents of the 
 subjects. The militia of Epirus, Aetolia, and Thrace were 
 called out to guard the coast, and a body of archers and 
 slingers was drawn from Greece and Asia Minor. Of cavalry 
 there was a considerable body formed from the young 
 aristocracy of Rome and from the Apulian slave herdsmen ; 
 
THE CIVIL WAR. 461 
 
 the rest consisted of contingents from the subjects and 
 clients — Celts from the garrison of Alexandria (p. 372) 
 and from the princes of Galatia, Thracians, Cappadocians, 
 mounted archers from Commagene, Armenians, and 
 Numidians : amounting in all to seven thousand. 
 
 The fleet numbered five hundred sail ; one fifth of which 
 were Roman vessels, and the rest from the Greek and 
 Asiatic maritime states. Immense stores of corn and war 
 material were collected at Dyrrachium, and for money the 
 whole Roman and non-Roman population within reach, 
 subjects, senators, and tax-farmers, were laid under contri- 
 bution. The temper of the soldiers was good, but a great 
 part of the army consisted of newly raised troops, and 
 required time for training and discipline. 
 
 The design of the commander was to unite his whole 
 force, naval and military, during the winter along the 
 coast of Epirus. The land army moved slowly from its 
 winter quarters at Berrhoea towards Dyrrachium ; the 
 Syrian legions were not expected until the spring. The 
 admiral Bibulus was already at Corcyra with 110 ships. 
 
 The Pompeians were taking their time, but Caesar was 
 not slow to act. On the conclusion of the Western cam- 
 paign he had ordered the best of his troops to set out 
 immediately for Brundisium, where ships of war and trans- 
 ports were already collected. These unparalleled exertions 
 thinned the ranks of the legions more than their conflicts, 
 and the mutiny of the ninth legion at Placentia showed 
 the dangerous temper of the soldiers ; it was mastered by 
 the personal authority of Caesar, and at present the evil 
 spread no farther. But at Brundisium only twelve ships of 
 war were found, and the transports were scarcely sufficient 
 to convey a third of the army, which numbered twelve 
 legions and ten thousand cavalry, while the enemy com- 
 manded the Adriatic and all the islands and harbours of 
 the opposite coast. However, on the 4th of January, 48 
 B.C., Caesar, with a temerity which is not justified by the 
 success of the immediate enterprise, set sail with six 
 legions and six hundred horse. The Pompeians were not 
 ready to attack, and the first freight was landed in the 
 middle of the Acroceraunian cliffs. The vessels returned 
 to bring over the remainder of the army. Caesar at once 
 began to disperse the Epirote militia, and succeeded in 
 
462 HISlOli Oh ROME. 
 
 taking Oricum and Apollonia, while Dyrrachium, the arsenal 
 of Pompeius, was in the greatest danger. 
 
 But the further course of the campaign did not fulfil 
 the promise of this brilliant beginning. Thirty of Caesar's 
 transports were captured by Bibulus, and destroyed with 
 every living thing on board. The whole coast, from the 
 island of Sason to Corcyra, was closely watched, and for a 
 time even Brundisium was blockaded. Nor was Dyrrachium 
 captured, for Pompeius had hastened his march and 
 secured it in time. Thus Caesar was wedged in among the 
 rocks of Epirus, between the immense fleet of the enemy 
 and a land army twice as strong as hi9 own. Pompeius 
 was in no hurry to attack, but established himself on the 
 right bank of the river Apsus, between Dyrrachium and 
 Apollonia, facing Caesar on the left bank, and awaited the 
 arrival of the Syrian legions which had wintered at Per- 
 gamus. 
 
 Caesar was rescued from this perilous position by the 
 energy of Marcus Antonius, the commandant of Italy. 
 Again the transport fleet set sail, with four legions and 
 eight hundred horse. The wind fortunately carried it 
 past the galleys of Libo, the Pompeian admiral ; but the 
 same wind carried it northward, past the camps of Caesar 
 and Pompeius to Lissus, which still adhered to Caesar, 
 where it was enabled to land only by the most marvellous 
 good fortune. At the moment when the enemy's squadron 
 overtook the ships of Antonius, at the mouth of the har- 
 bour, the wind veered and drove them back into the open 
 sea. Pompeius was unable to prevent the junction of 
 Caesar's forces, and now took up a new position on the 
 Genusus, between the river Apsus and Dyrrachium. When 
 he refused to give battle, Caesar succeeded in throwing 
 himself with his best marching troops between the enemy's 
 camp and the town of Dyrrachium, on which it rested ; 
 and Pompeius again changed his position, and encamped 
 upon a small plain enclosed between the fork formed by 
 the main chain of the Balkans, which ends at Dyrrachium, 
 and a lateral branch which runs to the sea in a south- 
 westerly direction. His communication with the town 
 was secured by the fleet, and there was therefore no diffi- 
 culty about supplies, while to Caesar's camp provisions 
 were brought at intervals only by strong detachments 
 
THE CIVIL WAR. 463 
 
 sent into the interior, and flesh, barley, and even roots had 
 to be eaten by the legions instead of \\ heat. 
 
 Under these circumstances inaction meant destruction 
 to the Caesaria s, and they proceeded to occupy the heights 
 commanding the plain on which Pumpeius lay. They 
 invested his army with a chain of posts sixteen miles long, 
 and cut off the rivulets which flowed into the plain, thus 
 hoping to compel him either to fight or to embark. At 
 the same time, as at Alesia (p. 416), Caesar caused a second, 
 outer, line of entrenchments to be formed, to protect him- 
 self against attacks from Dyrrachium or from attempts to 
 turn his position. The works advanced amid incessant 
 conflicts, in which the tried valour of the Caesarians had 
 usually the advantage. At one point, for instance, a 
 single cohort maintained itself against four legions for 
 several hours until help arrived. At length the want of 
 fodder and water began to be so severely felt by the Pom- 
 peians, that it was absolutely necessary for them to strike 
 a decisive blow. The general was informed by some Celtic 
 deserters that the enemy had neglected to secure the beach 
 between his two lines of entrenchments, six hundred feet 
 distant from each other. Pompeius could thus attack from 
 three sides at once. While the inner line was attacked 
 from the camp and the outer line by light- armed troops, 
 conveyed in vessels and landed beyond it, a third division 
 landed in the space between the two lines and attacked in 
 the rear the defenders who were already sufficiently occu- 
 pied. The entrenchment next the sea was taken, and the 
 second was with difficulty held by Antonius against the 
 advance of the enemy. Soon afterwards Caesar eagerly 
 seized an opportunity of attacking a Pompeian legion, 
 which had become isolated, with the bulk of his infantry ; 
 but a valiant resistance was made, and as the ground had 
 been already used for the encampment of several suc- 
 cessive divisions, it was much intersected by mounds and 
 ditches. Caesar's right wing and cavalry missed their way ; 
 Pompeius, advancing with five legions to the aid of his 
 troops, found the two wings of the enemy separated and 
 one of them isolated. A panic seized the Caesarians ; a 
 disorderly flight ensued, and the matter ended with the 
 loss to Caesar of one thousand of his best soldiers. But 
 the results of the day's fighting were more serious than 
 
464 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 this. Caesar's lines were broken. The cavalry of Pompeius 
 now ranged at will over the adjacent country, and ren- 
 dered it almost impossible for him to obtain provisions. 
 Gnaeus Pompeius the younger had destroyed his few ships 
 of war which lay at Oricum, and soon afterwards burnt 
 the transports at Lissus. Caesar was thus cut off from 
 the sea more than ever, and, in fact, was completely at the 
 mercy of Pompeius. 
 
 It was now open to Pompeius to attack or to blockade 
 his enemy, or to cross in person to Italy with the main 
 army and try to recover the peninsula. But he left his 
 opponent to make the first move, and Caesar had no 
 choice. He began immediately to retreat to Apollonia, 
 followed by the enemy, who, however, after four days, 
 had to give up the pursuit. Many voices now advised 
 Pompeius to cross to Italy ; but this plan would necessitate 
 the abandonment of the Syrian legions, now in Macedonia 
 under Metellus Scipio ; and, besides, he hoped to capture 
 the corps of Calvinus, whom Caesar had detached to en- 
 counter Metellus. Calvinus was now on the Via Egnatia 
 at Heraclea Lyncestis, and only learned the condition of 
 things just in time to escape destruction by a quick 
 departure in the direction of Thessaly. Caesar, who had 
 arrived at Apollonia, and had deposited his wounded there, 
 now set out for Thessaly, in order to get beyond the 
 reach of the enemy's fleet. He crossed the mountain chain 
 between Epirus and Thessaly, effected a junction with 
 Calvinus at Aeginium, near the source of the Peneus, and, 
 after storming and pillaging Gornphi, the first Thessalian 
 town before which he appeared, quickly received the sub- 
 mission of the others. 
 
 Thus the victories of Dyrrachium had borne little fruit 
 to the victors. Caesar and Calvinus had escaped pursuit, 
 and stood united and in full security in Thessaly. But 
 the former caution of the Pompeians was succeeded by 
 the most boundless confidence. They regarded the victory 
 as already won, and were resolved at any price to fight 
 with Caesar and crush him at the first opportunity. Cato 
 was left in command at Dyrrachium and in Corcyra. 
 Pompeius and Scipio marched southward and met at 
 Larissa. 
 
 Caesar was encamped near Pharsalus, on the left bank 
 
THE CIVIL WAB. 465 
 
 01 the river Enipeus, which intersects the plain stretching 
 southward from Larissa. Pompeius pitched Ids camp on 
 the right hank, along the slope of Cynoscephalae. His 
 entire army was assembled, and he had now eleven legions 
 numbering 47,000 men and 7000 horse, while Caesar was 
 still expecting two legions from Aetolia and Thessaly, and 
 two which were arriving by way of Illyria from Italy ; 
 his eight legions did not number more than twenty-two 
 thousand men and his cavalry but one thousand troopers. 
 All military reasons urged Pompeius to fight soon, and the 
 impatience of the emigrants had doubtless more weight 
 than these reasons. The senators considered their triumph 
 secure. Already there was strife about filling up Caesar's 
 pontificate, and houses were hired in the Forum for the 
 next elections. Great indignation was excited when Pom- 
 peius hesitated to cross the rivulet which separated the 
 camps. He was only delaying the battle, they alleged, in 
 order to perpetuate his part of Agamemnon and to rule the 
 longer over so many noble lords. The general yielded, and 
 prepared to attack. The battle-field was almost the same 
 on which, a hundred and fifty years ago, the Romans had 
 laid the foundation of their Eastern dominion. The right 
 of the Pompeians rested on the Enipeus, Caesar's left upon 
 the broken ground in front of the river. The other wings 
 were both out in the plain, and each was covered by cavalry 
 and light troops. The plan of Pompeius was to scatter 
 with his cavalry the weak band of horsemen opposite to 
 him, and then to take Caesar's right wing in the rear. 
 But Caesar, foreseeing the rout of his cavalry, had stationed 
 behind his right flank about two thousand of his best 
 legionaries. As the enemy's cavalry galloped round the 
 line, driving Caesar's horsemen before them, they were met 
 and thrown into confusion by this unexpected infantry 
 attack, and galloped from the field of battle.* This un- 
 expected repulse of the cavalry raised the courage of the 
 
 * It was in this attack that the well-known direction of Caesar to 
 his troops to strike at the faces of the enemy's horsemen was given. 
 The infantry, acting in an irregular way against cavalry, were not to 
 throw their pila, but to use them as spears, and, to be more effective, 
 were to thrust at the faces of the troopers. It was probably the 
 rough wit of the camp which suggested the idea that the Pompeian 
 cavalry fled for fear of scars on their faces. 
 
 30 
 
4C6 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 Caesarians. Their third division, which had been held in 
 reserve, advanced all along the line. Pompeius, who had 
 never trusted his infantry, rode at once from the field to 
 the camp. His legions began to waver and to retire over 
 the brook, an operation which was attended with much loss. 
 The day was lost, but the army was substantially intact. 
 Nevertheless Pompeius lost all hope, and when he saw the 
 troops recrossing the brook he threw from him his general's 
 scarf and rode off by the nearest route to the sea. The 
 army, discouraged and leaderless, found no rest within 
 the camp. They were driven from its shelter, and with- 
 drew to the heights of Crannon and Scotussa. As they 
 attempted to march along the hills and regain Larissa 
 Caesar's troops intercepted their route, and at nightfall 
 cut them off from the only rivulet in the neighbourhood. 
 Fifteen thousand of the enemy lay dead or wounded upon 
 the field, while the Caesarians had only two hundred men 
 missing. The next morning twenty thousand men laid 
 down their arms, and of the eleven eagles of the enemy 
 nine were handed over to Caesar. Caesar had on that very 
 day reminded his men that they should not forget the 
 fellow-citizen in the foe ; but he found it necessary to use 
 some severity. The common soldiers were incorporated 
 in the army, fines and confiscations were inflicted upon the 
 men of better rank, and the senators and equites of note 
 were with few exceptions beheaded. 
 
 The immediate results of this day, the 9th of August, 
 48 B.C., were soon seen. All who were not willing or not 
 obliged to fight for a lost cause now passed over to Caesar's 
 side. The client communities and princes recalled their 
 contingents. Pharnaces, king of the Bosporus, went so 
 far as to take possession of Phanagoria, which had been 
 declared free by Pompeius, and of Little Armenia, which 
 had been conferred upon Deiotarus. So also many luke- 
 warm membei'S of the aristocracy made their peace with 
 the conqueror. But the flower of the defeated party made 
 no compromise ; aristocrats could not come to terms with 
 monarchy. " Into whatever abyss of degeneracy the 
 aristocratic rule had now sunk, it had once been a great 
 political system ; the sacred fire, by which Italy had been 
 conquered and Hannibal had been vanquished, continued 
 to glow — although somewhat dim and dull — in the Roman 
 
 
TEE CIVIL WAR. 467 
 
 nobility as long as that nobility existed, and rendered a 
 cordial understanding between the men of the old regime 
 and the new monarch impossible." Many submitted out- 
 wardly, and retired into private life. Marcus Marcel! us, 
 •who had brought about the rupture with Caesar, retired 
 into voluntary banishment at Lesbos ; but in the majority 
 passion overwhelmed reflection. No one grasped the hope- 
 lessness of the situation more clearly than Marcus Cato. 
 Convinced from this moment that monarchy was inevit- 
 able, he doubted whether the constitutional party ought 
 to continue the struggle. But when he resolved still to 
 fight — not for victory, but for a more honourable fall — he 
 suught to draw no one into the struggle who chose to 
 make his peace. It was, in his eyes, merely senseless and 
 cruel to compel the individual to share the ruin of the 
 republic. 
 
 Most of the leading men who escaped from Pharsalus 
 made their way to Corcyra, where a council of war was 
 held, at which Cato, Metellus Scipio, Titus Labienus, 
 Lucius Afranius, and Gnaeus Pompeius the younger were 
 present. But the absence of the commander-in-chief and 
 the internal dissensions pi'evented the adoption of any 
 common resolution , and it was indeed difficult to say 
 what ought to be done. Macedonia and Greece, Italy and 
 the East, were lost to the coalition. In Egypt there was 
 indeed a large army, but it was soon evident that the 
 court of Alexandria was not to be relied on. In Spain 
 Pompeian sympathies were very strong, especially in the 
 army, so much so that the Caesarians had to give up the 
 idea of invading Africa from that quarter ; in Africa, 
 again, the coalition, or rather king Juba, had been arming 
 unmolested for more than a year : so that in two regions 
 it was still possible for the constitutionalists to prolong 
 the struggle in honourable warfare for some time to 
 come. By sea, too, their power was still considerable, even 
 after the recall of the subject contingents, while Caesar 
 was still almost without a fleet. And there was yet another 
 possibility — that of a Parthian alliance, and of procuring 
 the restoration of the republic at the hands of the common 
 foe. 
 
 Meanwhile, Caesar was in hot pursuit of Pompeius. The 
 latter had gone first to Lesbos, where he joined his wife 
 
468 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 and his younger son Sextus ; thence he proceeded to 
 Cilicia and to Cyprus. Fear of the reception he might 
 meet with from his aristocratic allies appears to have 
 decided him to take refuge with the Parthian king, rather 
 than to fly to Corcyra. He was in Cyprus, collecting 
 money and arming a band of slaves, when he heard that 
 Antioch had declared for Caesar and that the Parthian 
 route was no longer open , he thereupon hastened to 
 Egypt, from the resources of which he might hope to 
 reorganize the war. 
 
 After the death of Ptolemy Auletes in 51 B.C., his two 
 children — Cleopatra, aged about sixteen, and Ptolemaeus 
 Dionysius, a boy of ten — had ascended the throne, accord- 
 ing to their father's will, as consorts. But the brother, 
 with his guardian Pothinus, had driven Cleopatra from the 
 kingdom, and was lying with the whole Egyptian army 
 at Pelusium, to protect the eastern frontier against her, 
 when Pompeius anchored at the promontory of Casius, 
 and asked permission to land. His request was about to be 
 refused when the king's tutor, Theodotus, pointed out that, 
 if rejected, Pompeius would probably use his connections 
 in Egypt to instigate rebellion in the army, and that it 
 would be better to make away with him. Accordingly 
 Achillas, the royal general, and some of the old soldiers of 
 Pompeius went off in a barge to Pompeius, whom they 
 invited to come on board in order to be conveyed to land. 
 As he was stepping on shore the military tribune, Lucius 
 Septimius, stabbed him in the back, under the eyes of his 
 wife and son, who had to watch the murder from the deck 
 of their vessel (Sept. 28. 48 B.C.). It was the same day 
 of the same month on which, thirteen years ago, he had 
 entered the capital in triumph over Mithradates He was 
 " a good officer, but otherwise a man of mediocre gifts of 
 intellect and of heart. . . . Barely once in a thousand years 
 does there arise among the people a man who is a king not 
 merely in name but in reality. If this disproportion be- 
 tween semblance and reality has never perhaps been so 
 strongly marked as in Pompeius, the fact may w T ell excite 
 grave reflection that it was precisely he who in a certain 
 sense opened the series of Roman monarchs." When Caesar 
 arrived in Alexandria all was over. He turned away in 
 deep agitation when the murderer brought the head of his 
 
1LLE CIVIL WAB. 469 
 
 rival to his ship. How Caesar would have dealt with 
 Pompeius had he been captured alive it is impossible to 
 say. But interest as well as humanity would probably 
 have counselled clemency. " The death of Pompeius did 
 not break up the Pompeians, but gave them, ... in his sons 
 Gnaeus and Sextus, two leaders, both of whom were young 
 and active, and the second a man of decided capacity. To 
 the newly founded hereditaiy monarchy, the hereditary 
 pretendership attached itself at once like a parasite, and 
 it was very doubtful whether by this change of persons 
 Caesar did not lose more than he gained." 
 
 Caesar's immediate object was accomplished : but he 
 landed and proceeded at once to settle matters in Egypt. 
 He was accompanied by 3,200 men and 800 cavalry, and, 
 taking up his abode in the royal palace, he began collecting 
 the money he urgently needed, and regulating the Egyptian 
 succession. No war contribution was imposed, and the 
 arrears of the sum stipulated for in 59 B.C. (p. 372) were 
 commuted for a final payment of ten million denarii 
 (£400,000). The brother and sister were ordered to 
 suspend hostilities, and it was decided that they should 
 rule jointly, in accordance with their father's will. The 
 kingdom of Cyprus was given — as the appanage of the 
 second-born of Egypt — to the younger children of A uletes, 
 Arsiuoe and Ptoleuiaeus the younger. 
 
 But a storm was brewing. Alexandria was a cosmo- 
 politan city, hardly inferior to Rome in the number of 
 its population, and far superior in stirring commercial 
 spirit. In the citizens there was a lively national self- 
 importance, which can hardly be called patriotism, — a 
 turbulent vein which made them indulge in street riots as 
 heartily as the Parisians of to-day. Pothinus and the 
 boy-king were much discontented with Caesar's arrange- 
 ments, and ostentatiously sent the treasures of the temple 
 and the royal plate to be melted at the mint. Both the 
 piety and the national feeling of the populace were 
 shocked. The Roman army of occupation had become 
 denationalized by its long sojourn in Egypt and by inter- 
 marriage with the women of the country ; they were 
 indignant at being obliged to suspend their action on the 
 frontier at the bidding of Caesar and his handful of 
 legionaries, and numerous assassinations of his soldiers in 
 
470 U 1 STORY OF HOME. 
 
 the city revealed to Caesar the danger in which he was 
 placed. He contented himself with ordering up rein- 
 forcements from Asia, and meantime prosecuted the 
 business in hand. It was a time of rest after toil, and 
 never was there greater gaiety in the camp. " It was a 
 merry prelude to a grave drama." The Roman army of 
 occupation suddenly appeared in Alexandria, under the 
 leadership of Achillas, and the citizens at once made 
 common cause Avith the newly arrived soldiers. 
 
 Caesar hastily collected his scattered troops, seized the 
 king and his minister, and entrenched himself in the 
 palace and theatre. The war fleet, as there was no time 
 to place it in safety, was burned ; and the lighthouse island 
 of Pharos was occupied by means of boats. Thus the 
 way was kept open for reinforcements. Orders were at 
 once issued to the commandant of Asia Minor and to the 
 nearest subject countries to send troops and ships in all 
 haste. In the streets the insurrection had free course : 
 fighting went on from day to day; but Caesar could not 
 break through to the freshwater lake of Marea, nor could 
 the Alexandrians master the becieged or deprive them of 
 water. The canals from the Nile were spoiled by in- 
 troducing saltwater, but wells dug on the beach furnished 
 a sufficient supply. The besiegers then directed their 
 attention to the sea. The island of Pharos and the mole 
 which connected it with the mainland divided the harbour 
 into a western and an eastern port. The latter with the 
 island were in Caesar's power ; the former, with the mole, 
 in that of the Alexandrians. The fleet of the latter had 
 been burnt, but they equipped a small squadron and 
 attempted, though in vain, to prevent the entrance of 
 transports conveying a legion from Asia Minor But 
 when, soon after, the besiegers captured the island and 
 compelled Caesar's ships to lie in the open roadstead, his 
 position was indeed perilous. His fleet was compelled to 
 fight repeatedly, and if it should once be defeated he would 
 be completely hemmed in and probably lost. Accordingly 
 he determined to attempt to recover the island. The 
 double attack from the sea and from the harbour was 
 successful, and both the island and the part of the mole 
 nearest it were captured, and henceforward remained in 
 Caesar's hands. 
 
TEE CIVIL WAR. 471 
 
 But relief was at hand : Mithradates of Pergamus, who 
 claimed to be a natural son of the old enemy of Rome, 
 arrived with a motley army gathered from all the communi- 
 ties of Cilicia and Syria. He occupied Pelusium, and then 
 marched towards Memphis to avoid the intersected ground 
 of the Delta. At the same time, Caesar conveyed part of his 
 troops in ships to the western end of lake Marea, and 
 marched round the lake and along the river to join Mithra- 
 dates. The junction was effected ; and the combined 
 army marched into the Delta, where the young king (who 
 had been released by Caesar in the hope of allaying the 
 insurrection) was posted on rising ground between the 
 Nile and some marshy swamps Caesar attacked from three 
 sides at once, the camp was taken, and the insurgents were 
 either put to the sword or drowned ; among the latter was 
 the young king. The inhabitants met Caesar on his entry 
 in mourning, and with the images of their gods in their 
 hands implored mercy. The conqueror contented himself 
 with granting to the Jews settled in Alexandria the same 
 rights as the Greek population enjoyed, and with sub- 
 stituting for the army of occupation, which nominally 
 obeyed the Egyptian king, a regular Roman garrison of 
 three legions, under a commander nominated by himself, 
 whose birth made it impossible for him to abuse his 
 position,— Rufio, the son of a freedman. Cleopatra and 
 her younger brother Ptolemaeus received the crown, under 
 the supremacy of Rome ; the princess Arsinoe was carried 
 off to Italy. Cyprus was again added to the Roman 
 province of Cilicia. 
 
 The Alexandrian insurrection is unimportant in itself, 
 but it compelled the man on whom the whole empire now 
 depended to leave his proper task for nearly six months. 
 In the meantime, accident or the ability of individual 
 officers decided matters everywhere. 
 
 In Asia Minor, Calvinus had been ordered, on Caesar's 
 departure, to compel Pharnaces to evacuate the territories 
 he had occupied, especially lesser Armenia (p. 466). But 
 Calvinus was obliged to despatch to Egypt two out of his 
 three legions, and was defeated by Pharnaces at Nicopolis. 
 When Caesar himself arrived, Phnrnaces promised sub- 
 mission, but took no steps to relinquish his conquests, in 
 the hope that Caesar would soon depart. But Caesar 
 
472 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 broke off negotiations, and advanced against the king's 
 camp at Ziela. A complete victory was gained, and the 
 campaign was over in five days. The Bosporan kingdom 
 was bestowed upon Mithiadates of Pergamus. Caesar's 
 own allies in Syria and Asia Minor were richly rewarded ; 
 those of Pornpeius dismissed, as a rule, with fines and 
 reprimands. Bat Deiotarus was confined to his hereditary 
 domain, and lesser Armenia was given to Ariobarzanes, 
 king of Cappadocia. 
 
 In Illyria there had been warlike operations of some 
 importance while Caesar was in Egypt. The interior 
 swarmed with dispersed Pompeians, and the Dalmatian 
 coast was bitterly hostile to Caesar But the Caesarian 
 lieutenant, Quintus Cornificius, was able not only to main- 
 tain himself but to defeat Marcus Octavius, the conqueror 
 of Curicta (p. 459), in several engagements. During the 
 winter Aulus Gabinius arrived to take over the command 
 of Illyria, and soon began a bold expedition into the 
 interior. But his army was swept away ; he suffered a 
 disgraceful defeat during his retreat, and soon afterwards 
 died at Salonae. Finally Vatinius, the governor of Brun- 
 disium, defeated the fleet of Octavius with a force ex- 
 temporized out of ordinary ships provided with beaks, 
 and compelled him to quit those waters. 
 
 But the condition of things was most serious in Africa, 
 where the most eminent of the Pompeians had gathered 
 after the defeat of Pharsalu3, and had had ample time to 
 reorganize the war on a large scale. The fanaticism of 
 the emigrants had, if possible, increased ; they continued 
 to murder their prisoners, and even the officers of Caesar 
 under a flag of truce. King Juba, in whom was com- 
 bined all the fury of a barbarian and of a partisan, 
 wished even to extirpate the citizens of every community 
 suspected of sympathizing with the enemy, and it was 
 only by the intervention of Cato that Utica itself was 
 saved. It had been no easy task to fill the vacant post 
 of commander-in-chief. Juba, Metellus Scipio, Varus, the 
 governor of the province, all laid claim to it, while the 
 army desired Cato, who was indeed the only man who 
 had the necessary devotion, energy, and authority. But 
 through Cato's own influence the decision fell upon Scipio, 
 as the officer of highest standing ; nevertheless it was Cato 
 
TEE CIVIL WAR. 473 
 
 alone who confronted the insolent claims of king Juba, 
 and made him feel that the Roman nobility came to him, 
 not as suppliants to a protector, but as to a subject from 
 whom they were entitled to demand assistance. With 
 Scipio the king carried bis point, that the pay of his 
 troops should be charged on the Roman treasury, and 
 that the province of Africa should be ceded to him in 
 the event of victory. 
 
 The senate of the " three hundred " again appeared, 
 and filled up their ranks from the best or wealthiest of 
 the equites. Warlike preparations went forward with 
 great activity. Every man capable of bearing arms was 
 enrolled, and the land was stripped of its cultivators. 
 The infantry numbered fourteen legions, of which four 
 were legions of King Juba armed in the Roman manner. 
 The heavy cavalry, consisting of Celts and Germans who 
 arrived with Labienus, was sixteen hundred strong, to 
 whom must be added Juba's squadron, equipped in the 
 Roman style. The light troops were mostly Numidians, 
 and very numerous, javelin men, and archers mounted 
 or on foot. Lastly there were 120 elephants, and the fleet 
 of fifty-five sail under Varus and Octavius. Money was 
 provided by the self-taxation of the senate, which included 
 many very wealthy men ; huge stores were accumulated 
 in the fortresses, while the open towns were denuded of 
 provisions. 
 
 An evil star seemed to preside over the African expe- 
 dition of Caesar. Not only was it delayed by his long 
 absence in Egypt, but the preparatory measures which he 
 set on foot before leaving for Egypt miscarried. Erom 
 Spain, Quintus Cassius Longinus had been ordered to 
 cross into Africa with four legions, and to advance 
 against Numidia in conjunction with Bogud, king of 
 western Mauretania. But in this army were many native 
 Spaniards, and two of the legions had formerly been 
 Pompeian. Difficulties arose, which were only aggravated 
 by the unwise and tyrannical conduct of the governor. A 
 formal revolt broke out, and was only repressed on the dis- 
 avowal of Longinus by the respectable Caesarians and on 
 the interference of the governor of the northern province. 
 Gaius Trebonius, who arrived in the autumn of 47 B.C. to 
 supersede Longinus, everywhere received obedience ; but 
 
474 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 meanwhile nothing had been done to hinder the enemy's 
 organizations in Africa. 
 
 Still more serions difficulties occurred among the 
 troops collected in southern Italy for the African cam- 
 paign. The majority of these consisted of the old legions 
 which had "founded Caesar's throne in Gaul, Spain, and 
 Thessaly." They were spoiled by victory and disorganized 
 by their long repose in Italy. The tremendous demands 
 made on them by their general had thinned their ranks to 
 a fearful extent, and had left in the minds of the sur- 
 vivors a secret rancour which only wanted an opportunity 
 to break forth. The only man who had any influence 
 over them had been absent, almost unheard of, for a year; 
 and when orders to embark for Sicily arrived the storm 
 burst. The men refused to obey unless the promised 
 presents were paid to them, and threw stones at the 
 officers sent by Caesar. The mutineers set out in bodies 
 to extort fulfilment of the promises from the general in 
 the capital. Caesar ordered the few soldiers in the city to 
 occupy the gates, and suddeuly appeared among the 
 furious bands demanding to know what they wanted. 
 They exclaimed, "Discharge." Their request was im- 
 mediately granted. As to the presents promised on the 
 day of triumph, as well as the lands destined for them, 
 though not promised, Caesar added, they might apply to 
 him on the day when he and the other soldiers should 
 triumph ; in the triumph itself they could not of course 
 participate, as having been previously discharged. The 
 men were not prepared for this turn of affairs. They 
 had demanded discharge in order to annex their own con- 
 ditions to their service if refused. They were ashamed, 
 too, at the fidelity with which the imperator kept his 
 word, even after they had forgotten their allegiance, and 
 at the generosity with which he granted more than he had 
 promised. When they realized that they must appear as 
 mere spectators at the triumph of their comrades, when 
 their general addressed them no longer as " comrades," 
 but as " burgessess " (quirites)— a name which destroyed, 
 as it were, at one blow the whole pride of their past 
 soldierly career, — when they felt once more the spell of 
 the man whose presence had for them an irresistible 
 power, they stood for a while mute and undecided, till 
 
TEE CIVIL WAR. 475 
 
 from all sides a cry arose that the general should once 
 more receive them into favour, and again permit them to 
 be called Caesar's soldiers. After a sufficient amount of 
 entreaty Caesar yielded ; but the ringleaders had a third 
 cut off from their triumphal presents. " History knows 
 no greater psychological masterpiece, and none that was 
 more completely successful." 
 
 Thus again the African campaign was delayed. When 
 Caesar arrived at Lilybaeum the ten legions destined for 
 embarkation had not nearly arrived, and the experi- 
 enced troops were the farthest distant. However, Caesar 
 sailed on the 25th of December, 47 B.C., with six legions, 
 five of which were newly raised. Storms prevented the 
 enemy's fleet from obstructing their passage, but the 
 same storms scattered Caesar's fleet, and he could not dis- 
 embark near Hadrumetum more than 3,000 men and 150 
 horsemen. He got possession of the two seaports of 
 Ruspina and Little Leptis, and kept his troops within en- 
 trenchments, and ready at a moment's notice to re-embark 
 if attacked by a superior force. But the remaining ships 
 arrived soon afterwards, and on the following day Caesar 
 made an expedition with three legions into the interior 
 to procure supplies. He was attacked by Labienus, who 
 had nothing but light troops ; and the legions were soon 
 surrounded. By deploying his whole line, and by a 
 series of spirited charges, Caesar saved the honour of his 
 arms and made good his retreat ; but had not Ruspina 
 been close at hand, the Moorish javelin might have accom- 
 plished the same result as the Parthian bow at Carrhae. 
 
 Caesar would not again expose his soldiers to snch an 
 attack, and remained inactive till his veteran legions 
 should arrive. In the interval he tried to organize some 
 force to counterbalance the enormous superiority of the 
 enemy in light-armed troops. He equipped light horse- 
 men and archers from the fleet, and succeeded in raising 
 against Jnba the Gaetnlian tribes. The Mauretanian 
 kings, Bogud and Bocchus, were Juba's natural rivals, 
 and there still roamed in those regions a band of Cati- 
 linarians under Publius Sittius of Nuceria, who had 
 eighteen years ago become converted from a bankrupt 
 Italian merchant into a leader of free bands. Bocchus 
 and Sittius fell upon Numidia, occupied Cirta, and com- 
 
476 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 pelled Julia to semi a portion of his troops to his southern 
 and western frontiers. Still Caesar's position was un- 
 pleasant enough : his array was crowded together within 
 a space of six square miles ; corn was supplied by the 
 fleet, but there was great dearth of forage. If Scipio 
 retired and abandoned the coast towns, he might at least 
 endlessly protract the war ; this plan was advised by 
 Cato, who offered at the same time to cross into Italy and 
 call the republicans to arms. But the decision lay with 
 Scipio, who resolved to continue the war on the coast. 
 This blunder was all the more serious because the army 
 which they opposed to Cresar was in a troublesome 
 temper, and the strictness of the levy, the exhaustion of 
 the country, and the devastation of many of the smaller 
 townships had produced a feeling of exaspei*ation in the 
 region to which the war was transfeiTed. The African 
 towns declared, wherever they could, for Caesar, and de- 
 sertion increased continually in the army. But Scipio 
 marched with all his force from Utica, appeared before 
 the towns occupied by Caesar, and repeatedly offered him 
 battle. Caesar refused until all his veteran legions had 
 arrived, when Scipio on his part grew afraid, and nearly 
 two mouths passed away in skirmishes and in efforts to 
 procure supplies. 
 
 When Caesar's last reinforcements had arrived he made 
 a lateral movement towards the town of Thapsus, strongly 
 garrisoned by the enemy. Scipio now committed the 
 unpardonable blunder of risking a battle to save the town, 
 on ground which placed the decision in the hands of the 
 infantry of the line. He advanced to a position imme- 
 diately opposite Caesar's camp on the shore, and, at the 
 same time, the garrison of Thapsus prepared for a sally. 
 Caesar's camp-guard sufficed to repulse the latter ; and 
 his legions, forming a correct estimate of the enemy from 
 their want of precision and from their ill-closed ranks, 
 compelled a trumpeter to sound for the attack even before 
 the general gave the signal. The right wing, in advance 
 of the rest of the line, turned the elephants opposed to 
 them back upon the ranks of the enemy ; they then broke 
 the left wing of their opponents, and overthrew the whole 
 line. The old camp of the enemy was at a distance, and 
 the new one was not yet ready, so that the defeated arruy 
 
THE CIVIL WAR. 477 
 
 was almost annihilated. The legionaries refused all 
 quarter ; they were tired of being hurried from one con- 
 tinent to another in pursuit of an enemy who, though 
 always defeated, was never destroyed. Fifty thousand 
 corpses covered the field of Thapsus, among which were 
 those of several Caesarian officers suspected by the soldiers 
 of sympathy with the enemy. The victorious army 
 numbered no more than fifty dead (April 6, 46 B.C.). 
 
 The struggle was over in Africa : Cato convoked the 
 senate at Utica, and asked them to decide whether they 
 would yield or continue their defence. At first the more 
 courageous view seemed likely to prevail, but ultimately 
 it was resolved to yield. Faustus Sulla, and Lucius 
 Afranius soon arrived with a body of cavalry and wished 
 to defend the city after slaughtering en masse the un- 
 trustworthy citizens. Cato indignantly refused ; and after 
 checking, as far as he could, by his authority and by 
 largesses, the fury of the soldiery, and after providing 
 the means of flight for those who feared to trust them- 
 selves to the mercy of Caesar, he at last held himself 
 released from his command, and, retiring to his chamber, 
 plunged his sword into his breast. 
 
 Few of the fugitive leaders escaped : Afranius and 
 Faustus were delivered up to Caesar, and when he did not 
 order their immediate execution were cut down by the 
 soldiers. Metellus Scipio was captured by the cruisers of 
 Sittius, and stabbed himself. King Juba, half expecting 
 the issue, had caused a huge funeral pile to be prepared 
 in the market-place of Zaraa, upon which he proposed to 
 consume himself with all his treasures and the dead 
 bodies of all the citizens. But the latter had no desire 
 to adorn the funeral rites of " the African Sardanapalus ; " 
 and closed their gates when he appeared in company with 
 Marcus Petreius. The king, " one of those natures that 
 become savage amidst a life of dazzling and insolent 
 enjoyment, and prepare for themselves even out of death 
 an intoxicating feast " — resorted with Petreius to one of 
 his country houses, where, after a copious banquet, he 
 challenged Petreius to fight him in single combat. The 
 conqueror of Catilina fell by the hand of the king ; and 
 the latter caused himself to be stabbed by one of his 
 slaves. Labienus and Sextus Pompeius fled to Spain, 
 
478 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 and betook themselves to a piratical warfare by land 
 and sea. 
 
 The kingdom of Massinissa was now broken up. The 
 eastern portion was united with the kingdom of Bocchns, 
 and king Bogud was rewarded with considerable gifts. 
 Cirta was handed over to Publius Sittius as a settlement for 
 his half- Roman bands ; but this same district, as well as 
 the largest and most fertde part of Numidia, was united 
 as " New Africa " with the older province of Africa. 
 
 The struggle, which had lasted for four years, thus 
 terminated in the complete victory of the new monarch. 
 The monarchy might no doubt be dated from the moment 
 when Pompeius and Caesar had established their joint 
 rule, and overthrown the aristocratic constitution. But 
 it was only the battle-fields of Pharsalus and Thapsus that 
 set aside the joint rule, and conferred fixity and formal 
 recognition on the new monarch. Pretenders and con- 
 spiracies, even revolutions and restorations, might ensue, 
 but the continuity of the free republic, uninterrupted 
 during five hundred years, was broken through, and 
 monarchy was established as an accomplished fact. 
 
 That the constitutional struggle was at an end was 
 proclaimed by Cato when he fell upon his sword at Utica. 
 The republic was dead, the treasure was carried off, — why 
 should the sentinels remain ? " There was more nobility, 
 and, above all, more judgment in the death of Cato than 
 there had been in his life." He was not a great man ; 
 he was the ideal of unreflecting republicanism, and this 
 has made him the favourite of all who make it their 
 hobby ; but he was " the only man who honourably and 
 courageously defended in the last struggle the great 
 system doomed to destruction. Just because the shrewdest 
 lie feels itself inwardly annihilated before the simple 
 truth, and because all the dignity and glory of human 
 nature ultimately depend not on shrewdness but on 
 honesty, Cato has played a greater part in history than 
 many men far superior to him in intellect. ... It was 
 a fearfully striking protest of the republic p gainst the 
 monarchy, that the last republican went as the first 
 monarch came, — a protest which tore asunder like gos- 
 samer all that so-called constitutional character with 
 which Caesar invested his monarchy, and exposed in 
 
TEE CIVIL WAR. 479 
 
 all its hypocritical falsehood the shibboleth of the recon- 
 ciliation of all parties, under the aegis of which despotism 
 grew up. . . . The unrelenting warfare which the 
 ghost of the legitimate republic waged for centuries — 
 from Cassius and Brutus down to Thrasea and Tacitus, 
 nay even far later — a warfare of plots and literature, was 
 the legacy which the dying Cato bequeathed to his 
 enemies." Immediately after his death the man was 
 revered as a saint by the party of which in his life he was 
 often the laughing-stock and the scandal. " But the 
 greatest of these marks of respect was the involuntary 
 homage which Caesar rendered to him when he made an 
 exception to the contemptuous clemency with which he 
 was wont to treat his opponents, Pompeians as well as 
 republicans, in the case of Cato alone, and pursued him 
 even beyond the grave with that energetic hatred which 
 practical statesmen are wont to feel towards antagonists 
 who oppose them in a domaiu of ideas, which is as danger- 
 ous in their view as it lies beyond their reach." 
 
 AUTHORITIES. 
 
 Caes. Bell. Civ., especially 1-7 ; Bell. Alex. ; and Bell. Afric. Plufc. 
 Caes. 33-56 ; Pomp. 61-end ; Cato, 52-end ; Cic. 37, 38 ; Brat 
 4-6. Ant. 5. Liv. 109-116. Veil. ii. 49-55. Flor. iv. 2. 
 Eutrop. vi. 19-25. Suet. Julius, 32-37. Dio. xli. xlii. xliii. 1-4," 
 Appian B. C. 34-100. Cic, Watson's Sel. Let. pt. iii. and iT. 
 79-88 ; pro Maroello (47 b.c.) ; pro Ligario (46 B.C.). 
 
480 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 CHAPTER XXXVin. 
 
 THE OLD REPUBLIC AND THE NEW MONARCHY. 
 
 Caesar's lineage and character — His attempts to unite the state, to 
 satisfy his own extreme partisans and conciliate his opponents 
 — Principles of the popular party and of Caesar — Caesarianism 
 — Caesar's offices — Title of Imperator — Monarchical insignia and 
 prerogatives — 'Legislation — The royal edict — The senate — The 
 executive — The subject territories — The magistrates — Religion 
 — Legal administration — Military reorganization — Financial 
 reforms — Increase of soldiers' pay — Condition of the capital — 
 Measures of reform and police — Condition of Italy — Agriculture 
 — Money-dealing — The middle class — Rich and poor — Immo- 
 rality — Influence of women — Depopulation — Caesar's measures 
 — Relief of debtors — Law of insolvency — Restrictions on money- 
 dealing — Encouragement of agriculture — Regulation of the 
 municipal system — The provinces — Tyranny of the Roman 
 magistrates and capitalists — Measures of relief and protection 
 — Nationalities of the empire — The Greek and the Jew pro- 
 tected — Latinization of the provinces — Distinctions between 
 Italy and the provinces levelled — Elements of administrative 
 unity — Survey of the empire — Fusion of religions — Condition 
 of the criminal and civil law — Weights and measures — The 
 Calendar. 
 
 Caesar, was in his fifty-sixth year (horn July 12, 102 B.C. ?) 
 when the battle of Thapsus made him sole monarch of 
 Rome. He was sprung from one of the oldest noble 
 families of Latium, and traced his lineage back to the 
 heroes of the Iliad and to the kings of Rome ; and he 
 spent the years of his boyhood like any other noble youth 
 of the period, in playing with literature and verse-making, 
 in love intrigues and the arts of the toilette, together with 
 another art much studied at that period, that of always 
 
THE OLD REPUBLIC AND THE NEW MONARCHY. 481 
 
 borrowing and never paying. But manhood found his 
 vigour both of mind and body unimpaired ; in fencing 
 and riding he was a match for any of his soldiers, and 
 the incredible rapidity of his journeys astonished both 
 friend and foe. His power of intuition was remarkable, 
 and displayed itself in the practicability and precision of 
 his orders, even when he had not seen with his own eyes, 
 while his memory never failed him. " Although a gentle- 
 man, a man of genius, and a monarch, he had still a 
 heart." His love for his mother was deep and lasting, 
 while he was sincerely devoted to his wives, and, above 
 all, to his daughter Julia. His fidelity to his associates 
 was unwavering, and several of them, such as Aulus 
 Hirtius and Gaius Matius, showed their attachment to him 
 after his death. But, above all, Caesar was a realist and 
 a man of sense , his passion was never stronger than ho 
 could control. Literature and verse-making occupied him 
 at times, but in his sleepless hours he chose to meditate 
 upon the inflections of Latin nouns and verbs. After the 
 revels of his youth he avoided wine entirely, and though 
 he enjoyed, even when a monarch, the society of women, 
 he allowed them no influence over him. He prided himself 
 upon his personal appearance, and covered the baldness of 
 his later years with the laurel chaplet which he wore in 
 public. It was the result of this cool realism that Caesar 
 possessed the power of living keenly in the present 
 moment, undisturbed by memory or expectation ; that he 
 could at any moment apply his whole genius to the most 
 incidental enterprise. To this he owed his " marvellous 
 serenity," his independence of control by favourite or 
 friend. He never deceived himself as to the power of 
 fate and the ability of man ; he felt that in all things 
 fortune — accident — must bestow success, and this perhaps 
 is the reason why he often chose to play so desperate 
 a game. 
 
 Caesar was from the beginning of his political career 
 emphatically a statesman : his aim was the regeneration, 
 political, military, intellectual and moral, of his own and 
 of the Hellenic nation. He was a brilliant and masculine 
 orator, an author of an inimitable purity and simplicity of 
 style ; as a general he disregarded routine and tradition, 
 and conducted each campaign with regard to its own 
 
 31 
 
482 HISTORY OF HOME. 
 
 requirements. Like William of Orange, he stood always 
 ready for battle after defeat, and in the rapid movement 
 of masses of men — the highest and most difficult element 
 of warfare — he was unrivalled. But he was all these 
 things only secondarily, and merely because he was a 
 statesman : they were but the means to an end. His 
 original plan had been to compass his aim, like Pericles, 
 without force of arms, and it w r as not till the age of forty 
 that he found himself at the head of an army. This 
 improvised generalship is seen in the temerity with w r hich, 
 in many instances, notably when he landed in Epirus, he 
 set aside, without absolute necessity, the best- founded 
 principles of war. But, though a master of the art of 
 war, he did his utmost to avert civil strife, and, after the 
 struggle, he allowed no hierarchy of marshals or govern- 
 ment of praetorians to arise. He had every quality which 
 makes the statesman. He was a born ruler, and compelled 
 men of all natures to work in his service. His talent for 
 organization was unsurpassed, and is seen in the creation 
 and management of his political alliances and of his army. 
 He never made the blunder, which so many others have 
 made, of carrying into politics the tone of military 
 command : he was a monarch, but never a tyrant. In his 
 life there were doubtless many mistakes, but there was no 
 false step of passion for him to regret ; nothing to be 
 compared with the murder of Kleitos or the burning of 
 Persepolis, in the life of Alexander. Whatever his task, 
 he always recognized its natural limits ; where he recog- 
 nized that fate had spoken, he always obeyed. Alexander 
 on the Hyphasis, Napoleon at Moscow, turned back 
 because they were compelled : Caesar turned back volun- 
 tarily on the Thames, and on the Rhine; and on the 
 Danube and the Euphrates he thought, not of unbounded 
 conquests, but of well-considered frontiers. 
 
 Such was the man — so easy and yet so difficult to 
 describe. Tradition has handed down copious and vivid 
 information regarding him, and yet no man is more difficult 
 to reproduce to the life. The secret lies in his perfection ; 
 the artist can paint anything except only consummate 
 beauty. " Normality admits, doubtless, of being expressed, 
 but it gives us only the negative notion of the absence of 
 defect." In the character of Caesar, the great contrasts of 
 
THE OLD REPUBLIC AND THE NEW MONARCHY. 483 
 
 existence meet and balance each other. He was of the 
 mightiest creative power, and yet of the most penetrating 
 judgment ; of the highest energy of will and the highest 
 capacity of execution ; filled with republican ideals, and at 
 the same time born to be king, He was " the entire and 
 perfect man ; " and he w r as this because he was the entire 
 and perfect Roman ; he was in the full current of his time, 
 and possessed in perfection the special gift of his nation — 
 practical aptitude as a citizen. 
 
 In the work of regenerating the state, Caesar started at 
 once from the principle of the reconciliation of parties — 
 so far as antagonistic principles can be reconciled at all. 
 The statues of Sulla, overthrown by the mob in the capital 
 after Pharsalus, were ordered to be set up again ; the men 
 who had been banished in the Cinnan and Sertorian times 
 were recalled, and the children of those outlawed by Sulla 
 (p. 301) were restored to their full rights. In the same 
 way, all who had suffered loss of rights in the early stages 
 of the recent struggle, especially through the impeach- 
 ments of 52 B.C. (p. 433), received full restitution. The 
 only exceptions were made in the case of those who had 
 put to death the proscribed for money, and of Milo, the 
 condottiere of the senatorial party. 
 
 These steps were easy ; but it was much more difficult 
 to deal with the parties, which even now, after the war, 
 confronted each other with undiminished hatred. Caesar's 
 own adherents were among the most dissatisfied with the 
 results of the struggle. The Roman popular party expected 
 Caesar to accomplish for them what Catilina had at- 
 tempted ; and lond was their outcry when it became plain 
 that the most which debtors could expect from him was 
 some alleviations of payment and modifications of pro- 
 cedure. They began even to coquet with the Pompeians, 
 and during Caesar's long absence from Italy, in 48 and 
 47 B.C., to instigate a second civil war. 
 
 Just before the battle of Pharsalus the praetor Marcus 
 Caelius Rufus proposed to the people laws granting to 
 debtors a respite of six years free of interest, and cancel- 
 ling all claims from loans or house-rents. When deposed 
 by the Caesarian senate he entered into negotiations with 
 Milo for a rising in Italy. Milo raised his standard in the 
 region of Thurii, and Rufus formed a plan, which was 
 
484 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 frustrated, to seize Capua. The fall of the two leaders put 
 an end to the incident (48 B.C.); but in the following year 
 Publius Dolabella revived the laws of Rufus, and dis- 
 turbances took place, which had to be put down by Marcus 
 Antonius, the commandant of Italy, by military force. 
 
 At the same time that Caesar repressed with a strong 
 hand the ebullitions of his own left wing, he tried to pave 
 the way for the gradual extinction of the republican party 
 by a policy of combined repression and conciliation. He 
 refused to triumph on the ground of victories won over 
 his fellov\ -countrymen. The statue of Pompeius was re- 
 stored to its former distinguished place in the senate- 
 house, and political prosecutions of his opponents were 
 confined within the narrowest limits. The papers found 
 in the enemy's head-quarters after Pharsalus and Thapsus 
 were burnt unread ; all the common soldiers, except those 
 burgesses who had enlisted under king Juba, escaped with 
 impunity. Even the officers obtained free pardon until 
 the close of the Spanish campaign of 49 B.C. ; after that 
 date all who served as officers in the enemy's army, or who 
 sat in the opposition senate, forfeited property and political 
 rights, and were banished from Italy for life. Any who 
 had fought once more after accepting pardon forfeited 
 life at once. But these rules were applied in the mildest 
 possible manner ; the punishment of death was rarely in- 
 flicted ; many were pardoned or escaped with fines, and in 
 fact almost all were pardoned who could bring themselves 
 to ask favour of Caesar. Ultimately, in 44 B.C., a general 
 amnesty was issued. 
 
 But the opposition was none the more reconciled. Open 
 resistance there was none, but secret agitations and, above 
 all, the literature of opposition gave expression to the 
 seething republican discontent. The praise of Cato was 
 the favourite theme of opposition pamphlets, which were 
 replied to by Caesar and his confidants. " The republican 
 and Caesarian scribes fought round the dead hero of Utica 
 like the Trojans and Hellenes round the dead body of 
 Patroclus." But, naturally, the Caesarians had the worst 
 of it with a republican public. Hence literary men, like 
 Publius Nigidius Figulus, and Aulus Caecina, found more 
 difficulty than any other class in obtaining permission to 
 return to Italy ; and in Italy itself they were subjected to 
 
TEE OLD REPUBLIC AND THE NEW MONARCHY. 485 
 
 a practical censorship whose punishments were purely 
 arbitrary. But though risings of republicans and Pom- 
 peians were perpetually preparing in every part of the 
 empire, and conspiracies were formed even in the capital 
 itself, Caesar was not induced to surround himself by a 
 body-guard, but contented himself with making known 
 the plots, when detected, by public placards. His clemency 
 and his indifference were not the fruit of sentiment, but 
 of the statesmanly conviction that vanquished parties are 
 absorbed within the state more rapidly than they can be 
 exterminated by proscription. Besides, he needed for his 
 own high objects all the talent, culture, and distinction 
 which the aristocratic party embraced ; for here, in spite 
 of all, was still to be found all that remained of a free and 
 national spirit among the Roman burgesses. Like Henry 
 TV. of France and William of Orange, Caesar found that 
 his difficulties only began with victory. For the moment 
 all parties united against their chief, and against his own 
 great ideal. But what Caesar lost the state gained ; volun- 
 tarily or compulsorily, men of all parties worked at the 
 erection of the new mighty edifice ; and if the reconcilia- 
 tion was but external, no one knew better than Caesar that 
 antagonisms lose their keenness when brought into out- 
 ward union, and that only in this way can the statesman 
 anticipate the work of time. 
 
 In attempting to give a detailed account of the mode in 
 which the transition was effected from the old to the new, 
 it must be remembered that Caesar came not to begin but 
 to complete. The principles of the popular party, which 
 Caesar had from the beginning adopted to the full, were 
 the principles of Gaius Gracchus, and had, since his time, 
 been the essential principles of the democracy. They were 
 — the alleviation of the burdens of debtors ; transmarine 
 colonization ; equalization of the differences of rights exist- 
 ing between the classes in the state ; emancipation of the 
 executive from the senate. And these remained the 
 principles of Caesar as monarch ; for his monarchy was 
 like the monarchy of Pericles and of Cromwell, " the 
 representation of the nation by the man in whom it 
 puts supreme and unlimited confidence." 
 
 With regard to the judgment to be passed upon Caesar, 
 too much care cannot be taken to avoid the common 
 
486 HISTORY OF ROME 
 
 blunder of using historical praise and historical censure, 
 applied to particular circumstances, as phrases of general 
 application ; and, in the present instances, of construing 
 praise of Caesar as praise of what is called " Caesarianisin." 
 History is instructive with respect to the present only as 
 she reveals the necessary organic conditions of civilization — 
 "the fundamental forces everywhere alike, and the manner 
 of their combination everywhere different," — the knowledge 
 of which leads men, not to slavish imitation, but to inde- 
 pendent reproduction. The history of Roman imperialism 
 is in reality the bitterest censure of modern autocracy 
 which could be written by the hand of man " Every con- 
 stitution which gives play to the free self-determination 
 of a majority of citizens infinitely surpasses the most 
 brilliant and humane absolutism," just as the smallest 
 organism is superior to the most artistic machine ; the 
 former is living and capable of development, but the latter 
 cannot develop, and is therefore dead. Caesar's work 
 could bring no blessing in itself, but was necessary and 
 salutary because the ancient political organization, based 
 upon slavery and ignorant of representative government, 
 ended logically in military monarchy as the least of evils. 
 " When once the slave-holding aristocracy in Virginia and 
 the Carolinas shall have carried matters as far as their 
 congeners in the Sullan Rome, Caesarianism will there too 
 be legitimized in the view of the spirit of history ; where 
 it appears under other conditions of development, it is at 
 once a caricature and a usurpation." * History too " is a 
 Bible, and if she cannot any more than the Bible hinder the 
 fool from misunderstanding, and the devil from quoting her, 
 she too will be able to bear with and requite them both." 
 
 Formally the position of the new monarch assumed a 
 singular shape. 
 
 1. He was invested with the dictatorship, at first tempo- 
 rarily, after his return from Spain in 49 B.C. ; again for an 
 indefinite time after Pharsalus ; finally from the 1st of 
 
 * la later editions the following note is appended by Professor 
 Mommsen : " When this was written, in the year 1857, no one could 
 foresee how soon the mightiest struggle and most glorious victory as 
 yet recorded in human annals would save the United States from 
 this fearful trial, and secure the future existence of an absolute self- 
 governing freedom not to be permanently kept in check by any local 
 Caesarianism." 
 
TEE OLD REPUBLIC AND TEE NEW MONARCHY. 487 
 
 January, 45 B.C., as an annual office, which was in 44 B.C. 
 conferred on him for life. 
 
 2. He held the consulship for 48 B.C. — the office which 
 immediately occasioned the civil war; afterwards he was 
 appointed for five and finally for ten years — once with- 
 out colleague. 
 
 3. He was invested with tribunician power for life, in 
 48 b.c. 
 
 4. With the first place and the leading vote in the 
 senate. 
 
 5. With the title of imperator for life. 
 
 6. He was already pontifex inaximus (p. 374), but be- 
 came a member of the college of augurs. 
 
 7. Numerous decrees of the senate entrusted him with 
 the right of deciding on war and peace, the disposal of 
 armies and treasure, the nomination of provincial governors, 
 and many other privileges ; together with such empty 
 honours as the title of pater patriae, and the designation 
 of the month in which he was born by the name of Julius. 
 
 It is difficult in this confused union of offices to deter- 
 mine by what formal shape Caesar chose to express the 
 new absolute power, but the new name of imperator is iu 
 every respect its appropriate formal expression, jnst be- 
 cause it is new, and no outward occasion for its introduc- 
 tion is apparent. It expresses concisely all the functions 
 of the chief of the stute — the concentration of official 
 power in the hands of a popular chief independent of the 
 senate. The title prevails on Caesar's coins, especially 
 those of the last period, by the side of the dictatorship; 
 in his law as to political crimes the monarch is designated 
 by this name ; and, what is most decisive, the authority 
 of imperator was given to Caesar for his bodily or adopted 
 descendants. The new monarchy was to be hereditary. 
 The new office was based on the position which consuls or 
 proconsuls occupied outside the pomerium, and included 
 not only the military but the supreme administrative and 
 judicial power. Moreover, the imperator, unlike the 
 consul, had never been checked by the right of provo- 
 catio or been obliged to respect the advice of the senate. 
 
 In fact the new office of imperator was nothing else than 
 the regal office re-established ; as the consulship was only 
 the kingship with certain restrictions imposed, so for the 
 
488 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 new office these restrictions were once more removed. 
 Almost every feature of the old monarchy reappears in 
 the new : the union of supreme military, judicial, and 
 administrative power in the hands of the prince ; the 
 religious presidency over the commonwealth ; the right 
 of issuing binding ordinances ; the reduction of the senate 
 to a council of state, the revival of the patriciate and of 
 the praefecture of the city ; the power of the prince to 
 nominate his successor under the form of adoption. Again, 
 as the old kings of Kome had been the protectors of the 
 commons against the nobility, so Caesar came " not to 
 destroy liberty but to fulfil it." Nor had the idea of the 
 regal office ever become obsolete at Rome , at various 
 times, in the republican dictatorship, in the decemviral 
 power, in the Sullan regency — there had been a practical 
 recurrence to it. And as mankind " have infinite difficulty 
 in reaching new creations, and therefore cherish the once 
 developed forms as sacred heirlooms," it was natural for 
 Caesar to connect himself with Servius Tullius, as Charle- 
 magne connected himself with Caesar, and as Napoleon 
 attempted to connect himself with Charlemagne. Accord- 
 ingly, beside the statues of the traditional seven kings on 
 the Capitol, Caesar ordered his own to be erected as the 
 eighth. He appeared in public in the costume of the old 
 kings of Alba ; in the formula for political oaths the 
 genius of the imperator was added to the Jovis and the 
 Penates of the Roman people , from the year 44 B.C. 
 the head of Caesar appears on the coins — the recognized 
 outward badge of monarchy. There could be no doubt 
 as to Caesar's view of his position ; it is even possible that 
 he wished to assume the title of king; certainly he was 
 often pressed by his adherents to assume it — most strikingly 
 when Marcus Antonius, as consul, offered him the diadem 
 before all the people. But it is probable that Caesar was 
 resolved to avoid the name as tainted with a curse, and 
 as familiar to the Romans of his day chiefly as applied to 
 the despots of the East, and the scene with Antonius may 
 have been designed to put an end once and for all to 
 rumours on the subject. 
 
 Whatever the title, the sovereign was there, and all the 
 due accompaniments of royalty at once made their appear- 
 ance. Caesar appeared in public, not in the consular robe 
 
TEE OLD REFUBLIC AND TEE NEW MONARCEY. 489 
 
 with purple stripes, but in the robe wholly of purple, and 
 received without rising from his chair the procession of 
 the senate. Rents rose in the quarter of the city where 
 he lived ; personal interviews became so difficult that 
 Caesar was often obliged to communicate in writing even 
 with his nearest friends. A new monarchical aristocracy 
 arose to replace the old patriciate, which still existed but 
 had dwindled away until not more than fifteen or sixteen 
 genuine patrician families remained. Caesar had the 
 right of creating new patrician gentes conferred on him 
 by popular decree, and thus established a new nobility 
 entirely dependent on himself. 
 
 Thus the regal tradition was completely renewed ; the 
 burgess assembly remained by the side of the king as the 
 ultimate expression of the sovereign will of the people ; 
 the senate was reduced to its old function of giving advice 
 to the ruler when requested ; aud the whole magisterial 
 authority of the state was concentrated in the monarch. 
 
 In legislation the primitive maxim of Roman law was 
 reverted to, that the assembly in concert with the king 
 can alone alter the law of the state ; and Caesar regularly 
 had his enactments confirmed by the people. Though 
 the authority of the comitia w r as only a shadow, yet their 
 existence was a standing acknowledgment of the principle 
 of the sovereignty of the people, and an energetic protest 
 against sultanism. 
 
 But at the same time the other maxim of state law was 
 revived, that the command of the supreme magistrate is 
 binding at least as long as he remains in office ; and hence 
 the royal edict now obtained the force of law. 
 
 On the other hand, while Caesar formally acknowledged 
 the sovereignty of the people, it was no part of his plan to 
 divide his authority with the senate. He made use of it 
 as a council to advise him with regard to new laws, and for 
 issuing important administrative regulations. The latter 
 were usually issued formally in the name of the senate, 
 and there are instances of such decrees of which none of 
 the senators recited as present had any knowledge. In 
 order to make it i*epresentative as far as possible of all 
 classes, and also in order to take from it its character as 
 head-quarters of the opposition, it was raised at once 
 to the number of nine hundred; ami, to maintain this 
 
490 BISTORT OF ROME 
 
 increase, the number of quaestors — all of whom became 
 annually members of the senate — was raised from twenty 
 to forty. Of these, twenty were nonuhated by the im- 
 perator, who had also the privilege of conferring the 
 honorary rights of the quaestorship on whomsoever he 
 pleased. The immediate extraordinary increase was carried 
 ont solely by Caesar's nomination, and the new members 
 included many non-Italians and persons of humble or 
 dubious origin. 
 
 At the same time, the whole executive was concentrated 
 in the hands of the monarch. Every question of any 
 moment was decided by the imperator in person ; and 
 Caesar was able to carry personal government to a height 
 which seems incredible to men of modern times. The 
 Roman house was a machine, and the intellectual powers 
 of slaves and freedmen were as much at the disposal of 
 the master as their manual labour. So, whenever circum- 
 stances permitted, Caesar 6 lied up any post demanding 
 special confidence with slaves, freedmen, or clients of 
 humble birth. " It was the beau-ideal of bureaucratic 
 centralization." 
 
 In matters strictly political Caesar of course avoided, 
 whenever possible, any delegation of his functions ; when 
 this was inevitable, as when he was compelled to be absent 
 from Rome, his representative was usually no political 
 personage, but his banker, the Phoenician Lucius Cornelius 
 Balbus, without regular official jurisdiction. In finance, 
 the private means of the monarch were kept strictly 
 separate from the property of the state ; but the whole 
 financial management, the levying of the provincial re- 
 venues and the coinage — were entrusted to the slaves and 
 freedmen of the imperator. The provincial governors, 
 now that they were relieved of all financial business by 
 the new imperial tax receivers, became little more than 
 military commanders. Egypt, on account of its great 
 resources, and its geographical isolation, which rendered it 
 peculiarly liable to be broken off from the central power 
 under an able leader, was entrusted to a man little likely 
 to abuse his position (p. 471). The more important 
 of the other provinces were given to those who had 
 been consuls, the others to those who had been praetors, 
 and the distribution of provinces among qualified candi- 
 
TEE OLD REPUBLIC AND TEE NEW MONARCHY. 491 
 
 dates was vested in the imperator. The consuls for the 
 year were often induced to abdicate to make room for 
 other men (consules suffecti) ; moreover the number of 
 praetors was raised from eight to sixteen, and the nomina- 
 tion of them entrusted to the imperator ; finally, the prince 
 could nominate titular praetors or quaestors, and by these 
 various means could always count upon a sufficient 
 number of candidates favourable to himself. As a rule the 
 consular governor remained not more than two years, the 
 praetorian not more than one in his province. The Roman 
 magistrates — consuls, praetors, aediles, tribunes, and quaes- 
 tors — retained substantially their former powers; but 
 their position was radically changed. Formerly they had 
 been magistrates of the empire, now they were magistrates 
 of the city of Rome, and the consulship became little but 
 a titular post, important only as implying the reversion 
 of a Lngher governorship. The election of consuls, tribunes, 
 and plebeian aediles was free from restriction ; but half of 
 the praetors, curule aediles, and quaestors were nominated 
 by the monarch. The tribunician power was left in the 
 main untouched, but a refractory tribune would of course 
 be summarily dealt with. 
 
 Thus, for all general and important questions, the im- 
 perator was his own minister; he controlled the finance 
 by his servants and the army by his adjutants ; the old 
 state-magistracies were again converted into magistracies 
 of the city of Rome ; and, in addition to all this, he acquired 
 the ri^ht of nominating his successor. The autocracy 
 was indeed complete. 
 
 In spiritual matters Caesar made little alteration, except 
 to attach the supreme pontificate and the augurship to the 
 person of the monarch. Such support as religion could 
 give to the state was now transferred to the monarchy, but 
 it can scarcely have been worth having. 
 
 With regard to the administration of the law, Caesar 
 revived the ancient regal right of bringing both capital 
 cases and private suits before himself for sole and final 
 decision. He often sat, like the ancient kings, in the Forum 
 to try burgesses in cases of high treason ; client princes 
 accused of the same offence were tried in Caesar's house : 
 so that the only privilege of burgesses in this respect was 
 that of publicity. But for all ordinary cases the former 
 
492 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 republican procedure was retained. Criminal causes went 
 before the several jury-commissions appointed to deal 
 with them : civil cases came either before the centum- 
 viri, as the court of inheritance was called, or were re- 
 ferred to single judices. The general superintendence of 
 judicial proceedings was conducted in the capital chiefly 
 by the praetor : in the provinces by the governors. 
 Political crimes were still referred to a special commis- 
 sion ; the law on this subject was laid down with great 
 precision, and excluded all prosecution of opinions, while 
 it fixed as the penalty, not death, but exile. The question 
 of the selection of jurymen was left, as before, according 
 to the law of Cotta (p. 357) except that the tribuni aerarii 
 were set aside, and the rating of jurymen fixed at 400,000 
 sesterces (£4000.) 
 
 The old republican jurisdiction and that of the king 
 were on the whole co-ordinate, and any case once decided 
 upon before either bar was regarded as closed. But by 
 his tribunician power the king might interfere with any 
 sentence (unless where the law specially forebade the veto 
 of the tribunes) so as to cancel it, and might then, by 
 virtue of his judicial supremacy, order the case to be tided 
 anew before himself. This was the germ of the system of 
 appeal to a higher court, a thing unknown to earlier 
 procedure.* 
 
 But these innovations — which cannot with certainty be 
 pronounced improvements in themselves — could not cure 
 the evils from which the Roman administration of justice 
 was suffering. In the first place, criminal procedure 
 could never be sound in a slave state. For the duty of 
 proceeding against a slave must be left, de facto at any 
 rate, to the master, who will punish crime in a slave only 
 so far as it impairs his value : slave criminals at Rome 
 were sold to the fighting booth, just as an ox given to 
 goring was sent to the butchers ; but punishment for crime 
 as crime could scarcely exist for slaves. Again, during 
 the long course of political disturbance criminal prosecu- 
 tions, even against freemen, had become mere faction fights, 
 to be fought out by means of favour, money, and violence. 
 All classes bear the blame of this demoralization, but the 
 class of advocates must take the lion's share. Among 
 
 * This cannot be proved to have existed anterior to Augustus. 
 
THE OLD REPUBLIC AND THE NEW MONARCHY. 493 
 
 all the numerous pleadings in criminal causes which have 
 come down to us from this epoch, scarcely one makes a 
 serious attempt to fix the crime and to put the proof or 
 counterproof into proper shape.* Civil procedure suffered 
 in the same way, though, from the nature of the case, of 
 course in a minor degree. Caesar retained and even made 
 more severe the curb imposed on forensic eloquence by 
 Pompeius (p. 433), and, under his rule, of course open 
 corruption and intimidation of the courts came to an end. 
 But he could not pluck up the roots of the evil, or repro- 
 duce in the minds of the people the sacred sense of right 
 and reverence for law which alone can insure the purity 
 of judicial administration. 
 
 Nowhere was the general decay of the state more con- 
 spicuously exemplified than in the condition of the military 
 system. This was now in much the same condition as that 
 of the Carthaginians in the time of Hannibal. The govern- 
 ing classes furnished the officers: the subjects, plebeians 
 and provincials, the rank and tile. The general was left 
 practically to himself, and to the resources of his province. 
 All civic or national spirit had deserted the army ; esprit 
 de corps alone held it together; it had ceased to be the 
 instrument of the commonwealth, and had become that 
 of the general who commanded it. Under the ordinary 
 wretched commanders it became a rabble; but in the hands 
 of a capable leader it attained a perfection of which the 
 burgess army was incapable. The higher ranks in the 
 state became more and more averse to arms ; so that 
 the military tribuneship, once so keenly competed for, 
 was open to any man of equestrian rank who chose to 
 serve. The staff of officers usually gave the signal for 
 mutiny and desertion. Caesar himself has described the 
 scene at his own head-quarters when orders were given to 
 advance aorninst Ariovistus — the cursing and weeping, 
 the making of wills, the requests for furlough. The levy 
 was held with great unfairness ; and soldiers once levied 
 were kept thirty years under the standards. The burgess 
 
 * " Plura enim multo," says Cicero, De Orat. (ii. 42. 178), primarily 
 with reference to criminal trials, " homines judicant odio aut amore 
 aut cupiditate, aut iracundia aut dolore, aut laetitia, aut spe, aut 
 timore, aut errore, aut aliqua permotione mentis, quam veritate, aut 
 praescripto, aut juris norma aliqua, aut judicii formula aut legibus." 
 
494 HISTOBT OF ROME. 
 
 cavalry had degenerated into an ornamental guard ; the 
 " burgess " infantry was a troop of mercenaries collected 
 from the lowest dregs of the populace. The subjects 
 furnished the whole of the cavalry and light-armed troops, 
 and began to be employed extensively in the infantry. 
 The post of centurion went by favour, or was even sold to 
 the highest bidder : the payment of the soldiers was most 
 defective and irregular. Of the decay of the navy enough 
 has been said before ; here too, as elsewhere, everything 
 that could be ruined had been reduced to ruin under the 
 oligarchic government. 
 
 Caesar's military reorganization was limited substantially 
 to the tightening and strengthening of the reins of disci- 
 pline. The system itself he did not attempt — perhaps 
 he did not wish — to reform. He did indeed enact that, in 
 order to hold a municipal magistracy or sit on a municipal 
 council before the thirtieth year, a man must serve, either 
 three years as an officer, or six years in the ranks ; and 
 thus attempted to attract the better classes into the army. 
 But he dared not associate the holding of an honorary 
 office unconditionally with the fulfilment of the time of 
 service. The levy was better arranged, and the time of 
 service shortened ; for the rest, the infantry continued to 
 be raised chiefly from the lower orders of burgesses, the 
 cavalry and light infantry from the other subjects. Two 
 innovations must be placed to Caesar's account : one 
 the use of mercenaries in the cavalry, to which he was 
 driven by the untrustworthiness of the subject cavalry ; 
 the other the appointment of adjutants of the legion 
 with praetorian powers (legati legionis pro praetore). 
 Hitherto the legion had been led by its military tribunes, 
 who were appointed partly by the burgesses, partly by 
 the general, and who, as a rule, commanded the legion 
 in succession. But henceforward colonels or adjutants of 
 the whole legion were nominated by the imperator in 
 Rome, and were meant chiefly as a counterpoise to the 
 governor's authority. The most important change in 
 the military system was, of course, the new supreme 
 command ; for the first time the armies of the state 
 were under the real and energetic control of the supreme 
 government. In all probability the governor would 
 still retain the supreme military authority in his own 
 
TEE OLD REPUBLIC AND TEE NEW MONARCHY. 495 
 
 province, but subject to the authority of the imperator, 
 who might take it from him at any moment and assume 
 it for himself or his delegates. There was no longer any 
 fear, either that the armies might become utterly dis- 
 organized, or that they might forget that they belonged to 
 the commonwealth in their devotion to their leaders. 
 
 Perhaps it was the sole illusion which Caesar allowed 
 himself to cherish, that the monarchy he had founded could 
 be otherwise than military. That a standing army was 
 necessary he saw of course, but only because the nature of 
 the empire required permanent frontier garrisons ; and to 
 the regulation of the frontier his military plans were 
 substantially limited. He had already taken measures 
 for the tranquillization of Spain, and ha'd provided for the 
 defence of the Gallic and the African boundaries ; he had 
 similar plans for the countries bordering on the Euphrates 
 and the Danube. Above all, he was determined to avenge 
 the day of Carrhae, and to set bounds to the power of Boere- 
 bistas, king of the Getae (p. 421), who was extending his 
 dominions on both sides of the Danube. Fabulous schemes 
 of world-wide" conquest are ascribed to Caesar, but on no 
 respectable authority, and his conduct in Gaul and Britain 
 gives little countenance to such traditions. At any rate 
 it is certain that he did not intend to rest his monarchy 
 primarily on the army, or to set the military power above 
 the civil. The magnificent Gallic legions were dissolved 
 as incompatible with a civic commonwealth ; only their 
 glorious names were perpetuated by newly founded 
 colonies. The soldiers who obtained allotments were not 
 settled together to form military colonies, but scattered 
 throughout Italy, except where, as in Campania, aggrega- 
 tion could not be avoided. Caesar attempted in every way 
 to keep the soldiers within the sphere of civil life : by 
 allowing them to serve their term, not continuously, but 
 by instalments ; by shortening the term of service ; by 
 settling the emeriti as agricultural colonists ; by keeping 
 the army aloof from Italy, on the distant frontiers. No 
 corps of guards — the true criterion of a military state — w y as 
 ever formed by him ; even as general he dropped the body- 
 guard which had long been usual ; and, though constantly 
 beset by assassins in the capital, he contented himself 
 with the usual escort of lictors. But this noble ideal, of a 
 
496 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 kingship based only on the confidence of the people, 
 could but be an illusion ; amidst the deep disorganization 
 of the nation it was impossible for the eighth king of 
 Rome to reign merely by virtue of law and justice. Just 
 as little could the army which had placed him on the 
 throne be really absorbed agaiu into the state. The Cam- 
 panian mutiny and the battle-field of Thapsus showed how 
 the legionaries had learned their lesson. Thousands of 
 swords still flew at Caesar's signal from their scabbards, 
 but they no longer returned to their scabbards at his 
 signal. Caesar's creation could not but be a military 
 monarchy ; he had overthrown the regime of the aristo- 
 crats and bankers, only to put a military regime in its 
 place. Nevertheless, it was important that at the outset 
 Caesar laboured, however uselessly, to avoid military rule ; 
 and it is owing to his exertions that for centuries the 
 emperors of Rome used the army in the main, not against 
 the citizen, but against the foe. 
 
 The financial embarrassment in which the state found 
 itself during recent years was not caused by deficiency of 
 revenue, which had lately been increased by £850,000 since 
 the formation of the provincas of Bithynia-Pontus, and 
 Syria. The taxation of foreign luxuries, too, yielded a con- 
 stantly increasing revenue ; and immense sums had been 
 brought into the state chest by Lucullus, Metellus, Pom- 
 peius, Cato, and others. But expenditure had likewise in- 
 creased, and the whole department had been mismanaged. 
 The corn distribution had gradually come to absorb one- 
 fifth of the revenue ; the military budget had risen with the 
 addition of Cilicia, Syria, and Gaul to the list of provinces. 
 Again, special warlike preparations had swallowed up 
 enormous sums. Still, boundless as were the resources of 
 the empire, the exchequer might have met all these claims 
 upon it but for mismanagement and corruption. 
 
 Apart from these last two causes there were two insti- 
 tutions, both introduced by Gaius Gracchus, which " ate 
 like a gangrene into the Roman financial system," — the 
 corn distributions and the leasing system. The latter was 
 retained for the indirect taxes ; but the direct taxes were 
 in future either paid in kind, like the contributions of 
 corn and oil from Sardinia and Africa, or converted into 
 fixed money payments, the collection being entrusted to 
 
THE OLD REPUBLIC AND THE NEW MONARCHY. 497 
 
 the communities themselves. The corn distributions 
 could hardly be abolished ; but in their present form 
 they were an assertion of the principle that the ruling 
 community had a right to be supported by its subjects. 
 Caesar reduced the number of persons relieved from 
 320,000 to 150,000, which number was fixed as a maxi- 
 mum, and he excluded from the list all but the most 
 needy, thus converting the institution from a political 
 privilege into a provision for the poor. 
 
 A thorough revision of income and expenditure was 
 carried out. The ordinary items of revenue were fixed 
 anew. On many communities and districts total exemp- 
 tion from taxation was conferred, either directly or by 
 bestowal of the franchise. Many others had their tribute 
 lowered : that of Asia was reduced by one-third ; in the 
 newly conquered districts of Illyria and in Gaul the 
 tribute was fixed at a low rate ; all Gaul paid but forty 
 million sesterces (£400,000). On the other hand, 
 some communities, as Little Leptis in Africa, had their 
 tribute raised , the recently abolished Italian harbour 
 dues (p. 388) were reimposed : and to these ordinary 
 sources of income were to be added great sums raised 
 from booty, temple treasures, forced loans and fines 
 imposed on subject communities or on individuals ; above 
 all, from the proceeds of the estates of the defeated party. 
 The fine of the African capitalists who sat in the senate 
 at Utica amounted to a hundred million sesterces 
 (£1,000,000), and the property of Pompeius sold for 
 £700,000. These confiscations were necessary, because 
 the strength of the aristocrats lay in their colossal wealth ; 
 but the proceeds were scrupulously devoted to state 
 purposes, and the purchase money was always rigidly 
 exacted, even from Caesar's closest adherents, such as 
 Marcus Antonius. 
 
 The expenditure was largely diminished by the restric- 
 tion of the corn distributions ; and these, together with 
 supply of oil for the baths, were now provided for by 
 contributions in kind from Sardinia and Africa, and thus 
 kept separate from the exchequer. But the military 
 expenditure was increased, both by the augmentation of 
 the standing army and by the raising of the pay from 480 
 sesterces (£5) to 900 (£9) annually. Both steps were 
 
 32 
 
498 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 necessary: the first owing t> the w.mt of any efficient 
 defence of the frontiers ; the second because the former 
 pay of 1^ sesterces (3^(2. ) per day had been fixed at a 
 time when money had an entirely different value, and 
 when the soldier entered the army, not for pay, but for 
 the irregular gains which he made at the expense of the 
 provincials. The new scale was fixed at 2+ sesterces 
 (6W.) per day, the ordinary day's wages at the same 
 period being 3 sesterces (7hd.). Caesar's extraordinary 
 expenses during and after the civil wars were enormous. 
 The war had cost immense sums ; every common soldier 
 in Caesar's army received twenty thousand sesterces 
 (£200) at its close ; every neutral burgess in the capital, 
 three hundred (£3). Buildings undertaken in the capital 
 cost in all 160,000,000 sesterces (£1,600,000). Yet, in 
 spite of these immense disbursements, in March, 44 B.C., 
 there was in the public treasury a sum of seven hundred 
 million sesterces, in that of Caesar one hundred millions 
 (in all £8,000,000) — tenfold the amount which the treasury 
 had held in the most flourishing times of the republic. 
 
 But the task of breaking up the old parties, and furnish- 
 ing the state with a suitable constitution, an efficient 
 army, and well-ordered finances, was not the most difficult 
 part of Caesar's work. It remained to regenerate the 
 Italian nation, to reorganize Rome, Italy, and the 
 provinces. 
 
 As to Rome itself, nothing could be more deplorable 
 than the condition into which it had fallen. In it, as in 
 all capitals, were congregated the upper classes, who 
 regarded their homes in town as mere lodging places, the 
 foreign settlers, the fluctuating population of travellers 
 on business or pleasure, the mass of indolent, criminal, 
 bankrupt, and abandoned rabble. All real communal 
 life had ceased in Rome : it was a centre to which people 
 flocked from the whole extent of the empire for specu- 
 lation, debauchery, intrigue, or crime. All the evils in- 
 inseparable from great capitals were found intensified at 
 Rome, and there were others peculiar to itself. No city, 
 perhaps, was ever s© completely without free industry of 
 any kind, which was rendered impossible by the importa- 
 tion of foreign commodities and by the extensive employ- 
 ment of slaves in domestic manufacture. Nowhere, again, 
 
THE OLD REPUBLIC AND THE NEW MONARCHY. 499 
 
 were such masses of slaves congregated ; nowhere were 
 the slaves of so many different nationalities — Syrians, 
 Phrygians, half-Hellenes, Libyans, Moors, Getae, Iberians, 
 and, of late years, Celts and Germans in daily increasing 
 numbers. Still w r orse were the masses of freedmen — often 
 free only de facto — a mixture of beggars and of rich 
 parvenus, no longer slaves but not yet burgesses, econo- 
 mically and even legally dependent on their masters. 
 Retail trade and minor handicrafts were almost entirely 
 in their hands, and in riots and at elections their influence 
 was supreme. The oligarchical government had done 
 nothing to mend these evils. The law prohibiting persons 
 condemned for capital offences from living in the capital 
 was not enforced ; the police supervision over clubs and 
 associations was first neglected and then forbidden by 
 law (p. 423). Popular festivals had been allowed to in- 
 crease so largely that the seven principal celebrations 
 alone occupied sixty-two days. The grain supply was 
 managed with the greatest remissness, and the fluctuations 
 in prices were fabulous and incalculable. Lastly, the free 
 distributions were a standing invitation to all destitute 
 and indolent burgesses to come and take up their abode 
 in the capital. Out of all this neglect sprang the system 
 of clubs and bands, the worship of Isis and other religious 
 extravagances. Dearth and famine were ordinary inci- 
 dents ; life was nowhere more insecure than at Rome. 
 The condition of the buildings and streets was equally 
 disgraceful , nothing was done to prevent the constant 
 overflows of the river, and the city was still content with 
 one bridge over the Tiber. The streets were narrow and 
 steep, the footpaths small and ill-paved Ordinary bouses 
 were wretchedly built, and of a giddy height, while the 
 palaces of the rich formed a striking contrast to the decay- 
 ing temples of the gods, with their images still carved for 
 the most part in wood. " If we try to conceive to ourselves 
 a London with the slave population of New Orleans, with 
 the police of Constantinople, with the non-industrial 
 character of the modern Rome, and agitated by politics 
 after the fashion of the Paris of 1848, we shall acquire an 
 approximate idea of the republican glory, the departure 
 of which Cicero and his associates in their sulky letters 
 deplore." 
 
500 HISTORY OF HONE. 
 
 Caesar could not, of course, alter the essential character 
 of the city, nor would this have suited his plan. To be 
 the head of the Roman empire it must remain what it was, 
 the denationalized capital of many nations, situated at the 
 meeting-point of East and West; and for this reason Caesar 
 tolerated the new Egyptian worship, and even the strange 
 rites of the Jews, alongside of those of Father Jovis ; 
 while at his popular festivals he caused dramas to be 
 performed, not only in Latin and Greek, but in Phoenician, 
 Hebrew, Syrian, and Spanish. The primary evils could 
 not be eradicated ; Caesar could not abolish slavery or 
 conjure into existence a free industry in the capital. But 
 by his extensive building operations he at any rate gave 
 to the willing an opportunity of honourable employment, 
 while the limitation of the distributions must have stopped 
 the influx of the destitute into Rome. The existing pro- 
 letariate was reduced by measures of police and by compre- 
 hensive transmarine colonization. Eighty thousand settlers 
 were sent abroad during the few years of Caesar's govern- 
 ment. The grain supply was placed upon a regular and 
 efficient basis, and entrusted to the two newly appointed 
 corn-aediles. The club system was checked by laws, and 
 came to an end of itself as the elections ceased to be of 
 practical importance. In future, with some few excep- 
 tions, the right of forming associations depended upon 
 the permission of the monarch and the senate. At the 
 same time, the laws regarding violence w T ere rendered more 
 severe, and the right of the convicted criminal to with- 
 draw himself from part of the penalty by self-banishment 
 was set aside. The repair of the streets and footpaths 
 was laid as a burden upon house proprietors, and the 
 whole regulation of the streets was entrusted to the four 
 aediles, who each superintended a distinct police district. 
 Building in the capital received a stimulus which put to 
 shame everything that had been accomplished in former 
 days. And the new buildings were not merely monuments 
 of splendour, but contributed largely to the public con- 
 venience. The crowded Forum was relieved by the 
 construction of a new comitium in the Campus Martins, 
 and of a new place of judicature, the Forum Julium. In 
 the same spirit, oil was supplied to the baths free of cost, 
 as a measure of sanitation. Other and more brilliant 
 
TEE OLE FErUBLIC ANE TEE NEW MONARCEY. 501 
 
 projects, suck as the alteration of the whole lower course 
 of the Tiber, so as to provide more space for public 
 edifices, to drain the Pomptine marshes, and to provide 
 the capital with a safe sea-port, were cat short by the 
 death of Caesar. 
 
 But when all was done, Rome, just because it was 
 incapable of a real municipal life, was essentially inferior 
 to other municipalities of the period. " The republican 
 Rome was a den of robbers, but it was at the same time 
 the state : the Rome of the monarchy, although it began 
 to embellish itself with all the glories of the three conti- 
 nents, and to glitter in gold and marble, was yet nothing in 
 the state but a royal residence in connection with a poor- 
 house, or, in other words, a necessary evil." 
 
 The reorganization of the police of Rome was, of course, 
 a small task compared with the social reorganization of 
 Italy. The plague-spot in the condition of Italy was, as 
 it had long been, the disappearance of the agricultural 
 and the unnatural increase of the mercantile population. 
 In spite of numerous attempts to foster the system of 
 small holdings, f.irm husbandry was scarcely anywhere 
 predominant in Italy. In the districts of Tibur and 
 Tusculum, on the shores of Tarracina and Baiae, where 
 the Italian farmer had once sowed and reaped, there was 
 now to be seen only the barren splendour of the villas of 
 the nobles, with all the appurtenances of gardens and 
 fish-ponds salt and fresh, nurseries of snails and slugs, 
 game preserves, and aviaries. The stock of a pigeon- 
 house was valued at £1000 , the fishes left behind by 
 Lucius Lucullus brought £400. Accordingly the supply 
 of such luxuries developed into a trade which, if intelli- 
 gently prosecuted, brought large profits. Gardening, the 
 production of vegetables, fruit, and flowers, especially 
 roses and violets, in Latium and Campania, and of 
 honey, were the most profitable. The management of 
 estates on the planter system gave results which, from 
 an economic point of view, far surpassed anything which 
 the old system of small cultivators could have given, 
 especially in central Italy, the district of the Fucine lake, 
 of the Liris and Volturnus. Even some branches of 
 industry, such as were suitable accompaniments of a 
 slave estate, were taken up by intelligent landlords, and 
 
502 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 i'ins, weaving factoiues, brickworks, were conducted on 
 the demesne. Pastoral husbandry, which was always 
 spreading, especially in the south and south-east, was 
 indeed in every respect a retrograde movement, but it 
 too participated in the general progress, and accomplished 
 much in the way of improvement of breeds 
 
 The dimensions which money-dealing assumed by the 
 side of this unnaturally prosperous estate husbandry, and 
 the extent to which capital flowed to Rome, is shown by 
 the singular fact that at Rome the ordinary rate of interest 
 was six per cent. ; that is, one-half the average rate else- 
 where in ancient times. 
 
 The result of this economic system, based upon masses 
 of capital, was the most fearful disproportion in the dis- 
 tribution of wealth. Nowhere is the phrase "a common- 
 wealth composed of millionaires and beggars " so applicable 
 as at Rome in the last stages of the republic ; nowhere has 
 the essential maxim of the slave state, that the rich man who 
 lives by the exertion of his slaves is respectable, and the 
 poor man who lives by the labour of his hands is necessarily 
 vulgar, been so widely recognized. A real middle class 
 there can never be in any fully developed slave state ; the 
 nearest approach to it in the Roman commonwealth was 
 composed of men who were either too cultivated or too 
 uncultivated to go beyond their own sphere of activity, 
 and to take any share in public life. Of the former class, 
 Cicero's friend, Titus Pomponius Atticus, is a typical 
 example. He acquired a large fortune by estate farming 
 and by extensive money transactions ; but he was never 
 seduced into soliciting office, or even into money transac- 
 tions with the state , his table was ample, but moderate, 
 and was maintained at a cost of one hundred sesterces 
 (£1) per day ; he was content with an easy existence, 
 which included all the charms of a country and a city life, 
 together with intercourse with the best society of Rome 
 and Greece, and all the enjoyments of literature and art. 
 Of the less cultivated rural gentleman (pater-familias 
 rusticanus) an example is furnished by Sextus Roscius, 
 who was murdered in 81 B.C. He manages his thirteen 
 estates in person, and comes seldom to the capital, where 
 his clownish manners contrast strongly with those of the 
 polished senator. In such men and in their country 
 
THE OLD REPUBLIC AND THE NEW MONARCHY. 503 
 
 towns the discipline, manners, and language of their 
 fathers were best preserved. Traces of such a class appear 
 wherever a national movement arises in politics, and from 
 it sprung Varro, Lucretius, Catullus, and all the freshest 
 literature of the time. An excellent picture of this simple 
 landlord life may be found in the graceful introduction to 
 the second book of Cicero's treatise " De Legibus." 
 
 But the vigorous class of landlords is completely out- 
 balanced by the two predominant classes in the state, the 
 mass of beggars, and the world of quality. The relative 
 proportions of poor and rich we have no means of accurately 
 knowing. But fifty years earlier the number of families 
 of established wealth did not amount to two thousand ; 
 and the disproportion had probably increased. The 
 growth of poverty is shown by tho crowding into the army, 
 and into the city for the corn- largesses ; that of wealth, 
 by the fact that an author of this generation describes 
 an estate of two million sesterces (£20,000), of the Marian 
 period, as " riches, according to the circumstances of that 
 day," and by the enormous fortunes possessed by indi- 
 viduals. The estate of Pompeius amounted to 70,000,000 
 sesterces (£700,000) ; Crassus, who began with a fortune 
 of 7,000,000 (£70,000), died, after lavishing enormous 
 sums on the people, worth 170,000,000 (£1,700,000.) The 
 result was, on both sides, economic and moral dis- 
 organization. The Roman plebeian became a lazy mendi- 
 cant, fonder of gazing in the theatre than of working. 
 The gladiatorial games flourished as never before ; freedom 
 had so fallen in value that freemen often sold themselves 
 for board and wages as gladiatorial slaves. In the world 
 of quality essentially the same features occur. As the 
 plebeian lounged on the pavement, the aristocrat lay in 
 bed till late in the day ; unbounded and tasteless luxury 
 everywhere prevailed ; huge sums were lavished on politics 
 and on the theatre, to the corruption of both. In 54 B.C., 
 the first voting division alone was paid £100,000, and all 
 intelligent interest in the drama vanished amidst the 
 insane extravagance of decoration. Rents in Rome were 
 four times as high as in the country ; the house of Marcus 
 Lepidus, at the time of Sulla's death the finest in Rome, 
 was, a generation later, not the hundreth on the list of 
 Roman palaces. A palatial sepulchre was a necessity to 
 
50-1 HISTORY OF ROMR 
 
 every noble who wished to die a^s became his rank , horses, 
 dogs, furniture, dress, plate, all cost outrageous sums. 
 But it was the luxury of the table, the coarsest luxury 
 of all, which flourished most bravely. There were dining- 
 rooms for winter and summer ; sometimes the meal was 
 served on a platform in the deer-park, and the guests were 
 entertained by a theatrical Orpheus, at whose notes trained 
 roes and wild boars gathered round. Italian delicacies had 
 become vulgar, and even at popular festivals three sorts of 
 foreign wine, Sicilian, Lesbian, and Chian were distributed. 
 Emetics were commonly taken to avoid the consequences 
 of a meal. Debauchery of every sort had become a pro- 
 fession, by which instructors in the theory and practice 
 of vice could gain a living. Of course no fortune could 
 bear the ravages of such expenditure. Tue canvass for 
 the consulship was the usual high-road to ruin. The 
 princely wealth of the period is far surpassed by the more 
 than princely liabilities. Caesar in 62 B.C. owed £250,000 
 more than his assets. Marcus Antonius owed at the age 
 of twenty-four, £60,000, fourteen years later £400,000, 
 Curio owed £600,000 ; Milo £700,000. The borrowing of 
 the competitors for the consulship once suddenly raised the 
 rate of interest from four to eight per cent. Insolvency 
 was usually prolonged by the debtor as long as possible, and 
 when the final crash came the creditors perhaps got — as 
 in the case of Milo — four per cent, of their lendings The 
 only man who profited by such a condition of things was, 
 of course, the cool banker. The debtors were either in 
 servile subjection to their creditors, or ready to get rid of 
 them by couspiracy and civil war. Hence the cry of 
 "clear sheets" (novae tabulae), the motto of Cinna and 
 Catilina, of Caelius and Dolabella. 
 
 Under such circumstances morality and family life had 
 become antiquated things ; poverty was the only disgrace, 
 the only crime ; the state, honour, freedom were alike sold 
 for money. Men had forgotten what honesty was, and a 
 man who refused a bribe was regarded as a personal foe. 
 The criminal calendars of all ages and countries could 
 scarcely furnish a tale of crime so horrible, so varied, and 
 so unnatural as the trial of Aulus Cluentius reveals in the 
 bosom of a respectable family in an Italian country town. 
 Nevertheless, the surface of life was overspread with a 
 
THE OLD REPUBLIC AND THE NEW MONARCHY. £05 
 
 veneer of polish and professions of universal friendship. 
 All the world exchanged visits. At houses of quality the 
 crowds of visitors were admitted in a fixed order, the more 
 notable one by one, the others in groups, or in a body at 
 the close. Invitations to dinner and the customary 
 domestic festivals became almost public ceremonials, and 
 even at his death the Roman was expected to provide each 
 of his countless friends with a keepsake. Instead of the 
 genuine intimacy of family ties there was a spectral shadow 
 of " friendship," not the least of the evil spirits which 
 brooded over the horrors of the age. 
 
 Another equally characteristic feature was the emanci- 
 pation of women — not merely the economic emancipation 
 from father or husband — which had long ago been 
 accomplished, but a freedom which allowed them to 
 interfere in every department of life. The ballet dancers 
 (mimae) and all their tribe pollute even the pages of 
 history ; liaisons in even the best circles were so common 
 that only a very extraordinary scandal could excite com- 
 ment. The intrusion of Publius Clodius at the women's 
 festival of the Bona Dea, a scandal hitherto unparalleled, 
 passed almost without investigation. The carnival time 
 for license of this sort was the watering-place season (in 
 April), at Baiae and Puteoli ; but the women were not 
 content with their own domain. They invaded the realm 
 of politics, attended political conferences, and took their 
 part in all the coterie intrigues of the time. The lightness 
 with which divorce was regarded may be inferred from the 
 conduct of the stern moralist Cato, who did not hesitate to 
 divorce his wife for a friend who wished to marry her, or 
 to marry her again after the death of his friend. Celibacy 
 and childlessness became increasingly common, especially 
 in the upper classes ; even with Cato and his circle the 
 same maxim was now current to which Polybins had traced 
 the decay of Hellas, that it is the duty of a citizen to 
 keep great wealth together, and therefore not to beget 
 too many children. 
 
 During all this period the population of Italy was grow- 
 ing steadily smaller. The amount of talent and working 
 power necessary for the government of the empire was no 
 longer forthcoming from the peninsula, especially as a 
 large part of its best material was continually being lost 
 
505 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 for ever to the nation. The aristocracy lost the habit oi 
 looking on Italy as their home. Of the men enlisted for 
 service, large numbers perished in the numerous wars, and 
 many more were wholly estranged from their native 
 land by the long period of service. Speculation kept 
 many of the land-holders and merchants away from their 
 country, and their itinerant habits estranged them from 
 civic and family life. In return for these sound elements 
 Italy received a rabble of slaves and f reedmen, handicrafts- 
 men and tradesmen from Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt, 
 who moreover flourished chiefly in the seaports and in 
 the capital ; in many parts of Italy there was not even 
 this compensation, and the population visibly declined. 
 The pastoral districts, such as Apulia and the region round 
 Rome, became every year more desolate : many towns, such 
 as Labici and Gabii, could hardly find representatives for 
 the Latin festival ; Tusculum consisted almost solely of 
 families of rank who lived at Rome but retained their 
 Tusculan franchise. In some portions of Italy, especially 
 Campania, things were not so bad ; but in general, as 
 Varro complains, " the once populous cities of Italy stood 
 desnUte." 
 
 " It is a terrible picture, but not one peculiar to Italy ; 
 wherever the government in a slave-state has fully de- 
 veloped itself, it has desolated God's fair world in th3 
 same way. . . . As in the Hellas of Polybius, and the 
 Carthage of Hannibal's time, . . . the all-powerful rule of 
 capital ruined the middle class, raised trade and estate- 
 farming to the highest prosperity, and ultimately led to 
 a . . . moral and political corruption of the nation. . . . 
 Not until the dragon-seed of North America ripens, will 
 the world have again similar fruits to reap."* 
 
 The evils of Italy were in their deepest essence irremedi- 
 able ; the wisest government cannot give freshness to the 
 corrupt juices of the organism, or do more in such a case 
 than remove obstructions in the way of the remedial power 
 of nature. The worst excrescences vanished under the 
 new rule, such as the pampering of the proletariate, the 
 impunity of crimes, the purchasing of offices. But Caesar 
 was not one of those overwise men who refuse to embank 
 the sea because no dyke will keep out a sudden influx of 
 * Written in 1857. See note on p. 486. 
 
TEE OLD REPUBLIC AND TEE NEW MONARCEY. 507 
 
 the tide. Though no one knew better than himself the 
 limits of his power, he applied all his energies to bring 
 back tbe nation to home and family life, and to reform the 
 national economy by law and decree. 
 
 In order to check the absence of Italians from Italy the 
 term of military service was shortened, and men of senatorial 
 rank were prohibited from living out of Italy except on pub- 
 lic business. Other Italians, of marriageable age, were for- 
 bidden to be absent for more than three consecutive years. 
 In his first consulship Caesar had especially favoured 
 fathers who had several children, in founding his colony 
 of Capua. As imperator he offered rewards to fathers of 
 numerous families, and treated divorce and adultery with 
 great rigour. In order to repress some of the worst forms 
 of luxury, extravagance in sepulchral monuments was cut 
 down by law, the use of purple robes and of pearls was 
 restricted, and a maximum was fixed for the expenditure 
 of the table. Even the semblance of propriety enforced by 
 these police measures was, under the circumstances, not 
 to be despised. The laws designed to meet the existing 
 monetary crisis, and for the better regulation of monetary 
 dealings in future, were more serious and promised better 
 results. The law which was produced by the outcry 
 against locked-up capital, and which provided that no one 
 should have on hand more than sixty thousand sesterces 
 (£600) in gold and silver, was probably only meant to 
 allay the public indignation, and can hardly have been 
 enforced. The treatment of pending claims was a more 
 serious matter. Two important concessions were made to 
 debtors in 49 B.C. First, the interest in arrear was struck 
 off, and that already paid was deducted from the capital. 
 Secondly, the creditor had to accept as payment the pro- 
 perty of the debtor at its estimated value before the general 
 depreciation caused by the civil war ; which of course was 
 only fair, inasmuch as it compelled the creditor to bear his 
 share of the general fall in values. But the first provision, 
 which in practice compelled the creditor to lose, besides 
 the interest, an average of twenty- five per cent, of his 
 capital, amounted to a partial concession to the cry for a 
 total cancelling of debts. But the democratic party had 
 always taken their stand upon the illegality of all interest : 
 interest was, in fact, forbidden by the lex Genucia, which 
 
508 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 was extorted by the plebeians in 342 B.C., and which was 
 still formally valid ; in the confusion of the Marian period 
 it had even been enforced for a time. And though Caesar 
 can hardly have shared the crude views of his party, 
 he could not entirely repudiate its traditional maxims ; 
 especially as he had to decide this question, not as the 
 conqueror of Pharsalus, but even before his departure 
 for Epirus. 
 
 Besides assisting the debtor of the moment, Caesar did 
 what he could permanently to repress the fearful omni- 
 potence of capital. According to Roman law the insolvent 
 debtor became the slave of his creditor ; and though 
 modified in secondary points, the principle had remained 
 unaltered for five hundred years. It was Caesar who first 
 gave to an insolvent the right of saving his personal freedom 
 though with diminished political rights ; of ceding his 
 property to his creditors, and beginning a new financial 
 existence. Claims arising from the earlier period could be 
 enforced against him only if he could meet them without 
 renewed financial ruin. At the same time, Caesar did not 
 disown the antipathy of his party to usury. In Italy, for 
 the future, no single capitalist was allowed to lend sums 
 amounting to more than a fixed proportion (perhaps one 
 half) of the value of his landed estate. In consequence of 
 this law every money-lender was compelled to be also a 
 landowner, and the class of capitalists subsisting wholly 
 on their interest would disappear from Italy. It was also 
 forbidden to take a higher interest than one per cent, per 
 month ; or to take interest on arrears of interest, or to 
 claim interest to a greater amount than the capital — pro- 
 visions which were probably first introduced by Lucius 
 Lucullus in Asia Minor, and which were extended to all 
 the provinces by decree of the senate in the year 50 B.C. 
 
 For the improvement of agriculture the first necessity 
 was the improvement of the adminstration of law and 
 justice. Hitherto neither movable nor immovable 
 property had been secure. The leaders of armed bands, 
 when their services were not required in the capital, had 
 applied themselves to rounding off the country estates of 
 their masters by violently expelling the rightful owners. 
 Such proceedings were now at an end. A high road was 
 made from Borne through the passes of the Apennines to 
 
THE OLD REPUBLIC AND THE NEW MONARCHY 50D 
 
 the Adriatic, and the level of the Fucine lake was lowered 
 for the benefit of the Marsian farmers. In order to check 
 brigandage and encourage free labour, Italian graziers were 
 required to take at least a third of their herdsmen from 
 free-born adults. In the encouragement of small holdings 
 Caesar showed himself scrupulously observant of every 
 legitimate title, whether derived from Gracchus or Sulla; 
 but the commission of twenty was revived to revise 
 all Italian titles ; and the whole of the actual domain 
 land of Italy which was suitable for agriculture was 
 destined for distribution. In the selection of farmers the 
 veterans were first considered ; and thus Caesar restored 
 to his country as a farmer the proletarian whom he had 
 levied as a recruit. Desolate Latin communities, such as 
 Veii and Capena, were provided with new colonists. The 
 new owners were forbidden to alienate their lands for 
 twenty years. 
 
 The newly organized municipal system, which had been 
 developed out of the crisis of the social war (p. 309), was 
 regulated by Caesar in two ordinances of 49 B.C. and 45 B.C., 
 the former of which applied to Cisalpine Gaul only, while 
 the latter remained the fundamental law for all succeeding 
 time. It proceeded on the line of purifying the urban 
 corporations from all immoral elements, and of restricting 
 centralization to the utmost. The communities were still 
 allowed to elect their own magistrates, and to exercise a 
 limited civil and criminal jurisdiction. 
 
 Such were Caesar's regulations for the reform of the 
 social economy of Italy. It would be easy to show that 
 they were insufficient, and that they acted in some 
 respects injuriously, — still easier to show that the evils 
 of Italian economy were incurable. But Caesar did not 
 hope or expect from them the regeneration of Italy. This 
 he attempted to attain in a very different way, for the 
 understanding of which it is necessary to review the con- 
 dition of the provinces as Caesar found them. 
 
 The provinces in existence at this time were fourteen 
 in number : seven European — Further Spain, Hither 
 Spain, Transalpine Gaul, Italian Gaul with Ulyricum, 
 Macedonia with Greece, Sicily, Sardinia with Corsica; 
 five Asiatic — Asia, Bithynia with Pontus, Cilicia with 
 Cyprus, Syria, Crete ; two African — Cyrene, Africa. To 
 
510 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 these Ceesar added three more — Lugdunese Gaul, Belgica, 
 and Illyria, which was now erected into a separate pro- 
 vince. 
 
 Under the oligarchy the provinces were reduced to a 
 condition of hopeless misery which it seems impossible 
 for any government ever to surpass. It is true that, before 
 the Romans had their day, the rule of Greeks, Phoenicians, 
 or Asiatics had almost everywhere driven from the nations 
 all sense of right and liberty. The Roman provincial, 
 when accused, was obliged to appear personally at Rome ; 
 the Roman governor interfered at pleasure in every detail 
 of administration ; the Roman administrators and their 
 train were bound by no rule of morality and justice, and 
 outrages, rapes, murders with or without the form of law, 
 were of daily occurrence. But these things had gone on 
 from time immemorial under Carthaginian overseers and 
 Syrian satraps, and the well-being of the provincials was 
 far less disturbed by them than by the financial exactions, 
 in which the Romans outran all former tyrants. The 
 ordinary taxes were rendered doubly oppressive by the 
 mode of levying them. As to the quartering of troops, 
 Roman statesmen themselves confessed that a town suffered 
 nearly as much from it as when stormed by an enemy. 
 The taxation was properly an indemnification for the burden 
 of military defence undertaken by Rome, and the com- 
 munities taxed had a ri^ht to be exempt at any rate from 
 the ordinary service. But garrison duty was still for the 
 most part imposed upon the provincials, as well as the 
 whole burden of cavalry service ; and the extraordinary 
 contributions for the supply of grain to the capital, the 
 costly naval armaments and coast defences against the 
 pirates, the military requisitions in time of war, were 
 frequent and oppressive in the extreme. In Sicily the 
 number of farms decreased fifty-nine per cent, during 
 three years of the administration of Gaius Verres , and 
 the ruined cultivators were not small farmers, but con- 
 siderable planters and Roman burgesses ! In the client 
 states the burdens were, if possible, heavier. In addition 
 to the Roman exactions came those of the native courts ; 
 farmer and king were alike bankrupt. And to these, 
 to some extent regular exactions, are to be added the 
 plunderings of the governor and of all his friends each 
 
THE OLD REPUBLIC AND TEE NEW MONARCHY. 511 
 
 of whom expected to retirrn to Rome a made man. The 
 advocates and jurymen at home expected to share the 
 spoil; so that the more the governor stole, the greater 
 his security. And these were the successors of the men 
 who had brought nothing home from the provinces but 
 the thanks of the subjects and the approval of their 
 countrymen ! 
 
 Nor is this all. The tyranny of the Italian men of 
 business was even worse than that of the governors. 
 Much of the landed property and most of the commerce 
 and finance of the provinces were in their hands. Usury 
 flourished as never before. The small landowners managed 
 their estates as the debtor-slaves of their creditors. Com- 
 munities had sometimes to pay four per cent, per month 
 for loans. Frequently a man of business got the title of 
 envoy (libera legatio) conferred on him, and sometimes 
 had men put at his disposal for the more effective pro- 
 secution of his affairs. On one occasio. , i banker, who had 
 a claim on the town of Salamis in Cyprus, kept its council 
 blockaded in the town-house until five members died of 
 hunger. And still to all these miseries and oppressions 
 there remain to be added general calamities, for some of 
 which, such as war, brigandage, and piracy, the inefficiency 
 of the Roman government was responsible. The general 
 result, even in the comparatively prosperous provinces of 
 Spain and Narbonese Gaul, was total ruin. Towns like 
 Samos and Halicarnassus stood empty; even the patient 
 Asiatic was weary of life. The statesmen of Rome allowed 
 that the Roman name was unutterably hateful throughout 
 Greece and Asia; and when the men of Heraclea, in 
 Pontus, put to death the whole of the Roman tax-collectors, 
 " the only matter for regret was that such things did not 
 occur oftener." 
 
 The wounds inflicted could only be healed by time ; but 
 Caesar took care that there should be no new inflictions. 
 The new governors were the servants of a stern master, 
 and were practically appointed by him (p. 491). Their 
 functions were largely restricted by the new supreme 
 command in Rome and by the new adjutants associated 
 with them (p. 494). The raising of the taxes, too, was 
 probably already committed to imperial officials, so that 
 the governor was now surrounded by an independent 
 
512 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 staff, directly responsible to tbe imperator. The law 
 against exactions had been made more stringent by Caesar 
 in his first consulate, and was applied with inexorable 
 severity. At the same time, the extraordinary burdens 
 were limited to the necessary requirements, and the ordi- 
 nary burdens materially lessened. Exemptions from tribute 
 were liberally granted, the direct taxes lowered, the system 
 of decumae (p. 316) confined to Africa and Sardinia, and 
 the system of middlemen in the collection was set aside. 
 That Caesar,- like Sertorius, tried to free the subjects from 
 the burden of quartering troops cannot be proved, but 
 it was in this spirit that the heirs of his policy created 
 military camps, and converted them into towns which 
 formed rallying-points in the barbarian frontier districts. 
 
 To deliver the provincials from the tyranny of Roman 
 capital was a far more difficult task. Its power could not 
 be directly broken, and a radical cure could only be hoped 
 for from the gradual revival of prosperity. Isolated abuses, 
 such as the custom of libera legatio, were abolished, and 
 palpable acts of violence or flagrant wrong were sharply 
 punished ; but this was all. Caesar had, as governor of 
 Further Spain in 60 B.C., assigned to the creditors two- 
 thirds of the income of their debtors in order to pay 
 themselves ; and Lucius Lucullus had in Asia cancelled a 
 portion of the arrears of interest, and assigned to the cre- 
 ditors a fourth part of the produce of the lands of their 
 debtors. It is probable that similar liquidations were in- 
 stituted in the provinces generally after the civil wars. 
 As to the remaining evils of piracy and brigandage, these 
 might be expected to disappear through the fresh vigour 
 of the new regime. At any rate, with Caesar hope dawned 
 afresh, and the first intelligent and humane government 
 which had appeared for centuries began to rule. " Well 
 might the subject*, in particular mourn along with the best 
 Romans by the bier of the great liberator." 
 
 We have now surveyed in outline the principal measures 
 by which Caesar attempted to reorganize existing institu- 
 tions, to get rid of abuses, and to reform the whole system 
 of government. But this was, on the whole, but the 
 negative part of his task. For the regeneration, it might 
 almost be said the re-creation, of the state he tried to lay 
 a firm foundation, upon which might be realized that con- 
 
THE OLD REPUBLIC AND THE NEW MONARCHY. 513 
 
 ception which had first been grasped by Gaius Gracchus, 
 and which was. afterwards taken up by Sertorius in 
 Spain. Like those great statesmen, Caesar looked for- 
 ward to the time when the provinces, as such, would 
 disappear, and when a new Helleno-Italic nation should 
 arise in a new and wider home, with a fresher, broader, 
 grander national life, which would of itself be the ex- 
 tinction of the sorrows and wrongs of the nation for 
 which there could be no redress in old Italy. The emi- 
 gration of Italians to the provinces had been going on for 
 centuries. Gaius Gracchus was the first to guide the 
 Italians systematically to settle beyond tlie bounds of Italy 
 by his colonization of Carthage and Narbo. Sertorius 
 had done his best to Latinize the Spaniards of rank, and 
 to introduce Italian culture into Spain, and by Caesar's time 
 there was a large Italian population ready to his hand in 
 nearly every province of the empire. On the other hand, 
 the interpenet ration of the Latin and the Hellenic character 
 was as old almost as Rome. The Roman legionary was 
 followed everywhere by the Greek schoolmaster, and the 
 Latin higher culture was nothing but Hellenism pro- 
 claimed in the Latin tongue. Everywhere it was felt that 
 Rome was the protector and avenger of Hellenism. The 
 idea of a new Italo- Hellenic empire was not new, but 
 Caesar was the first to grasp it, and systematically to carry 
 it out. The first conditions for the realization of this idea 
 were the extension and preservation of the two nations 
 which were destined jointly to rule, and the absorption of 
 the barbarian races. There was, indeed, a third nationality 
 — the Hebrews — which might almost have claimed a place 
 by the side of the other two. The Jews were numerous and 
 powerful in the city of Rome, and influential everywhere 
 as traders ; but the Jewish nation is denied the gift of 
 political aptitude. The Jew stands in a relation of in- 
 difference to the state, clothes himself readi.y with any 
 nationality, and is unfit to be a member of a governing 
 hierarchy. But for this very reason he seemed made for 
 the purposes of this new state, which was to be built upon 
 the ruins of a hundred different nationalities, and accord- 
 ingly Judaism was everywhere protected by Caesar as 
 " an effective leaven of cosmopolitanism and of national 
 decomposition." 
 
 33 
 
514 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 The Greek nationality was protected wherever it ex- 
 isted, notably at Massilia and Alexandria, but the Italian 
 none the less remained everywhere in the ascendant. 
 Hellenism was too dangerous by its intellectual supe- 
 riority, by its wide extension, and by the firm hold which 
 it had obtained in Italy, to make it desirable for the 
 government to extend it by direct action. The rule oi 
 the Greek lackeys had already begun with Theophanes, the 
 confidential servant of Pompeius, and his influence w T as at 
 once a sign of the times and a warning full of ill omen 
 for the future. But the Roman element was everywhere 
 promoted by the government, both by means of colonies 
 and by Latinizing the provincials, and, to further this 
 object, the principle that all the land in the provinces not 
 ceded by special act of the government to communities or 
 private persons was the property of the state, was retained 
 by Caesar, and raised from a democratic party-theory 
 to a fundamental maxim of law Cisalpine Gaul now 
 (in 49 B.C.) of course received de jure the full citizenship 
 which it had already enjoyed de facto for forty years, and 
 remained for centuries the head-quarters of Italian man- 
 ners and culture. Transalpine Gaul henceforth occupied 
 the place of the old sister province, and became more and 
 more an Italian land. Four new colonies were founded 
 in it, at Baeterrae (Beziers), Arelate (Aries), Arausio 
 (Orange), and Forum Julii (Frejus), with which were 
 connected the names of the most famous of the Gallic 
 legions. Other communities, such as Nemausus (Mmes), 
 received Latin rights. In other non-Greek and non- 
 Latin regions centres of Italian civilization were estab- 
 lished : in northern Gaul, Noviodunum (Nyon) arose on 
 the Leman Lake ; in Spain, Emporiae was founded ; and 
 the ancient city of Gades was admitted to full rights (49 
 B.C.). A few years later (45 B.C.) other communities were 
 similarly favoured, and others received Latin rights. In 
 Africa, the project of Gaius Gracchus was renew r ed, and a 
 Roman Carthage arose on the old site ; Utica had ap- 
 parently already received Latin rights, and Cirta was 
 constituted as a Roman military colony. In Greece, the 
 restoration of Corinth was energetically carried out, and 
 a plan formed for cutting through the Isthmus. In the 
 remote East, Heraclea and Sinope were reinforced by 
 
THE OLD REPUBLIC AND THE NEW MONARCHY. 515 
 
 bodies of Roman colonists ; Berytus in Syria received an 
 Italian constitution, and even in Egypt a Roman station 
 was established on the island of Pharos. 
 
 Through these arrangements the Italian municipal 
 system was carried into the provinces in a manner far 
 more comprehensive than ever before. The fully enfran- 
 chised communities of the provinces were on an equality 
 with those of Italy in two respects ; namely, that they ad- 
 ministered their own affairs and exercised a limited legal 
 jurisdiction, while the more important processes of law 
 came before the Roman authority, usually the governor of 
 the province. The autonomous Latin communities had 
 probably unlimited jurisdiction, as well as administrative 
 freedom, though the governor could of course interfere in 
 virtue of his general power of control. There was now for 
 the first time a whole province, that of Cisalpine Gaul, con- 
 sisting entirely of Roman burgesses ; and this fact marked 
 the disappearence of the first great difference between 
 Rome and the provinces. The second began soon to dis- 
 appear, at any rate in practice It is true that the legal 
 distinction between Italy as the sphere of civil law and of 
 the consuls and praetors, and the provinces as the sphere 
 of martial law and of the proconsuls and propraetors, re- 
 mained ; but the procedure of martial and of civil law had 
 for long been practically the same : what had been the 
 true and vital point of distinction vanished when legions 
 ceased to be stationed ordinarily in the provinces, and 
 were kept only where there was a frontier to be guarded. 
 " The rule of the urban community of Rome over the 
 shores of the Mediterranean was at an end , in its stead 
 came the new Mediterranean state : " and the restoration 
 of Carthage and Corinth showed clearly that the old 
 regime of political tyranny which had destroyed those two 
 famous centres of commerce was over, and that a new era 
 of national and political equality had begun. 
 
 The new united empire was, of course, rather an in- 
 animate product of art than a vigorous growth of nature ; 
 it needed unity of institutions as well as unity of govern- 
 ment ; unity in constitution and administration, in re- 
 ligion and jurisprudence, in money, weights, and measures 
 In all these departments Caesar did little but lay the 
 foundations ; only here and there the lines which he drew 
 can still be traced. 
 
516 HISTORY OF ROME. 
 
 As to administration, the three most important elements 
 of unity have already been noticed : the transition of the 
 sovereignty from the municipal council of Rome to the 
 sole master of the Mediterranean monarchy ; the con- 
 version of that council into a supreme imperial council 
 representing Italy and the provinces ; above all, the 
 transference, which was now begun, of the Roman and 
 Italian municipal organization to the provinces. One other 
 important work in this department was undertaken by 
 Caesar — an improved census of Italy, which was to be 
 taken in future, not at Rome, but simultaneously in each 
 Italian community ; and a survey of the whole empire, 
 which was ordei'ed, suggests that Caesar intended to make 
 arrangements for a similar census in the provinces. It 
 was of the first importance to the new empire that the 
 government should have at its disposal a comprehensive 
 view of the resources in men and taxation at its command. 
 
 In religion, men had for long been busied in forging 
 together the Italian and Hellenic worships, a task which 
 was rendered easier by the abstract formless character of 
 the Roman gods. At the same time, local faiths were 
 tolerated and protected. 
 
 In the field of law, the criminal department, in which 
 the government must always interfere directly to a large 
 extent, was easily made uniform by judicial enactment 
 throughout the empire. In civil law, commercial inter- 
 course had long ago developed naturally the code which 
 the united empire required. Roman urban law was still 
 based formally upon the Twelve Tables. But commercial 
 intercourse between Romans and non-Romans had long 
 ago developed an international private law (jus gen- 
 tium), a body of maxims relating chiefly to commercial 
 matters, according to which Roman judges gave judg- 
 ment when from the nature of the case they were com- 
 pelled to revert to the common notions of right under- 
 lying all commercial dealings. This body of law arose 
 originally out of proceedings between Romans and non- 
 Romans ; but, in practice, dealings between Romans and 
 Romans, particularly commercial matters, had come to be 
 judged by the standard of what was substantially a com- 
 promise between this new law and the old Twelve Tables. 
 Secondly, this new law was to a certain extent in use 
 
THE OLD REPUBLIC AND THE NEW MONARCHY. 517 
 
 throughout the whole extent of the empire as subsidiary 
 law; the various local statutes were retained for transac- 
 tions between members of the same legal district, while 
 those between members of different districts were regulated 
 according to the principles of the new law as expressed in 
 the praetor's edict. Caesar's design for a new code was 
 never carried out; but it is easy to guess what must have 
 been his intentions. It was most necessary, first, that the 
 new urban law should be extended as subsidiary law to 
 the provinces where it had properly no application; and, 
 secondly, that the old law of the Twelve Tables with its 
 accretions, which still formally outweighed the later code, 
 should be set aside in favour of this newer and spon- 
 taneous growth. 
 
 In respect of money, measures and weights, and kin- 
 dred matters the Roman standard was alone used in all 
 official intercourse ; and the non-Roman systems were 
 restricted to local currency, and placed in a fixed ratio to 
 the Roman. Under the republic the coinage had been 
 exclusively silver, gold being given and taken by weight. 
 But from Caesar's time gold obtained the first place ; the 
 new Caesarian gold piece (worth about 20s. 7d.) was 
 coined to an enormous extent. In a single treasure, 
 buried only a few years after his death, eighty thousand 
 of them were found. The mint of Massilia was closed, 
 but the coining of small silver and copper money was 
 permitted to many western communities. Later the ar- 
 rangement found in existence is this ; that the denarius 
 has everywhere legal currency, while local coins are in 
 circulation at a tariff unfavourable to them as compared 
 with the denarius. 
 
 The calendar, like every other institution, had become 
 hopelessly confused under the oligarchical government, 
 and had come to anticipate the solar time by sixty-seven 
 days, so that, e.g., the festival of Flora was celebrated on 
 July 11th, instead of on April 28th. This evil was finally 
 removed by Caesar, and the Italian farmer's year was 
 introduced, tog-ether with a rational system of intercalation, 
 into religious and official use. At the same time, the 
 beginning of the year was altered from the 1st of March 
 to the 1st of January, the date which had already been 
 long predominant in civil life owing to the fact that the 
 
518 niSTORT OF HOME. 
 
 supreme magistrates entered upon office on that day. 
 The new Julian calendar, which is still in the main the 
 standard of the civilized world, came into use on January 
 1, 45 B.C. 
 
 Such was the manner in which Caesar attempted to lay 
 the foundations for the regeneration of the Roman state. 
 " There was doubtless much corruption in this regenera- 
 tion ; as the unity of Italy was accomplished over the ruins 
 of Samnite and Etruscan nations, so the Mediterranean 
 monarchy built itself on the ruins of countless states and 
 tribes once living and vigorous ; but it was a corruption 
 out of which sprang a rich growth, part of which remains 
 green to the present day." Caesar ruled as king of Rome 
 for about five years and a half; the intervals of seven 
 great campaigns, which altogether gave him but fifteen 
 months in the capital, were all the time allowed him to 
 regulate the destinies of the world. This very rapidity 
 proves that the plan had long been meditated and its 
 parts settled in detail. The ontlines were laid down, the 
 future alone could complete the structure ; and, indeed, 
 Caesar was heard himself to say, that he had lived long 
 enough. 
 
 AUTHORITIES. 
 
 [The references include the arrangements of Augustus, where these 
 
 interpret or carry out the plans of Caesar.] 
 General authorities. — Suet. Jul. Pint. Caes. Cic, Watson, S. L., pts. 
 
 iv. and v., passim, espec. iv. 89-92, 103 ; v. 114. Philippics, 
 
 espec. i. ii. Liv. Ep. Ill, 113, 115, 116. Appian B. C. ii. 10, 
 
 eeqq. Dio. xlii. seqq. Veil. ii. 56-58. Flor. vi. 25. Momms. 
 
 Monumentum Ancyranum. 
 Tribunicia potestas. — Tac. Ann. ii. 1; iii. 56, 57. Hist. i. 42. Gaius 
 
 Constit. i. 5; Mon. Anc. p. 71. 
 Title of imperator — Suet. Jul. 76; Dio. xliii. 44; lii. 41 ; liii. 7; lvii. 
 
 8. Momms. notes to Bk. v. c. 11. Princeps. Mon. Anc. p. 98. 
 
 Tac. Ann. i. 1, 6, 9. Journal of Philology, vol. viii. 323. Momms. 
 
 B. St. ii., pt. 2. 
 Election of magistrates. — Tac. Ann. i. 14; ii. 36. 
 Jus edicendi. — Gaius i. 5. 
 New nobility. — Tac. Ann. xi. 25. 
 
 Increase of magistrates. — Tac. Ann. i. 14 ; ii. 32 ; iii. 29 ; iv. 6. 8. 
 Lex Julia de provinciis and lex judiciaria. — Cic. Phil. i. 8. 
 Allotments.— Cie., Watson, S.L. iv. 89, 102, 103. 
 
THE OLD REPUBLIC AND THE NEW MONARCHY. 519 
 
 Regulation of Rome. — Lex Julia Munic. Bruns. pt. I. c. iii. 18; C. I. 
 L. i. 206. 
 
 Regulations for crime and for social and economical evils. — Lex de vi. 
 Cic. Phil. i. 9. Just. Dig. xlviii. ±, 6, 7 ; de Bonis ced. and de 
 Foeuore Caes. B. C. iii. 1. Suet. Jul. 42. Tac. Ann. vi. 16. Dio. 
 lviii. 21. Lex Jul. et P. et P. Bruns. i. c. iii. 23. Lex Sump- 
 tuaria Dio. xliii. 25, de Adult. Bruns. pt. I. c. iii. 21. 
 
 The provinces. — Lex Rubria, Lex Julia Municipal's, Lex Ursonensis, 
 Lex Salpensana, Lex Malacitana, Bruns. pt. I. c. iii. 16, 18 ; c. iv. 
 1, 2, 3, besides the literary authorities and Momms. Hist, of R., 
 Bk. v. ii., notes, and Bk. viii. " The Provinces fiom Caesar to 
 Diocletian " passim. Cf., also, authorities for ch. xxvii. 
 
 Colonies— Cic. de Off. ii. 7, 27. Phil. xiii. 15, 31, 32. Caes. B. C. i. 
 35. Dio. xlii- 25. Flor. ii. 13. Oros. vi. 15. 
 
 £The references are to the fifth edition of Bruns.] 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Abgarns, 368, 436 
 
 Abydns, 183, 191 
 
 Acarnania and the Acarnanians, 183, 
 
 185, 186, 200 
 Acco, 413 
 Aoerrae, 158 
 Achaean colonies in Italy and Sicily, 
 
 36 , league of cities, 37 ; decay, 37 
 league, 183, 186, 190; war 
 
 against it, 219 
 Aohaeans, 37, 38, 194 
 Aohaia, province of, 219 
 Achillas, 468 
 Acilius Glabrio M\, 190 
 
 M'. Glabrio (consul 67 B.C.), 346 
 
 Aorae, 136 
 Adcensi velati, 24 
 Adherbal, 245, 246 
 Adoption, 16 
 Adsidni, 50 
 Adnatnca, 401, 411 
 Aediles, plebis, 54, 55, 56 
 
 in the municipia, 87 
 
 ceriales, 500 
 
 Aegates Insulae, battle at the, 135 
 Aemilius Lepidus Marcus, 329, 330 
 
 (city prefect), 455 
 
 Aemilius Papus L., 140 
 Aemilius Paullus L., 153, 154 
 
 , 198 
 
 Aemilius Scaurus M., 246, 247, 252, 
 
 262, 264, 269 
 
 (adjutant of Pompeius), 368 
 
 Aequi, 26, 85, 86 
 Aerarii, 17, 42 
 
 Aerarium, 27, under the control of 
 the quaestors, 46 
 
 Aesernia colonized, 108, 269, 270, 
 273 
 
 Aethalia, 33, 38 
 
 Aetolians, side with Rome against 
 Philip, 161, 181, 184, 186; side 
 with Antiochus against Rome, 189, 
 190, 194, side with Rome against 
 Perseus, 197; treatment of, by 
 Rome, 20^ 
 
 Afranins, 333, 422, 455, 477 
 
 Africa, before the Gracchan period, 
 215, 216, made a province, 219; 
 after Pharsalus, 467, 473-479 
 
 Agathocles, 78, 105 
 
 Agedincnm, 414 
 
 Ager publicus. See Domains. 
 
 Agnati, 13 
 
 Agriculture, known to Greeks and 
 Italians, 4 ; basis of the Italian 
 economy, 11, 50; distress and 
 diminution of the farmers, 54, 65 ; 
 relief of, 69 , destruction of, 167, 
 173, 210, 211; Carthaginian sys- 
 tem, 117, 118, 122; condition of 
 before and at the time of the 
 Gracchi, 224-227, 319, 501, 502, 
 506-508 
 
 Agrigentum founded, 39 ; taken by 
 Carthage, 106, 119, 127, 160; 
 besieged by the Romans, 129; 
 given up to them, 161 
 
 Agron, 138 
 
 Alae sociorum, 112 
 
522 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Alaesa, 138 
 
 Alalia, 34, 39, 116 
 
 Alba, 9, 25 
 
 — — , on the Fucine lake, colonized, 
 97, 198 
 
 Albanians in the Caucasus, 866 
 
 Aleria, 130 
 
 Alesia, 416, 417 
 
 Aletrium. 97 
 
 Alexander Jannaeus, 368 
 
 Alexander, pretended son of Perseus, 
 219 
 
 Alexander the Great, 102, 103, 221, 
 482 
 
 Alexander the Molossian, 93 
 
 Alexander II. of Egypt, 338, 353 
 
 Alexandria, 180, 181, 468-471 
 
 AUia, battle on the, 80 
 
 Allies, Italian, bound to furnish 
 naval or military contingents, 112 ; 
 in the second Punic war, 168; 
 diminution of rights and increas- 
 ing oppression, 183, 205 , relations 
 to Rome in time of Gracchi, 238, 
 239 , grievances and war with 
 Rome, 267, seqq., 289, 290, seqq., 
 321, 501, 505-507 
 
 Allobroges, 146, 251, 380, 394, 402 
 
 Alphabet, 116 
 
 Alps, Graian, 79 , passage by Hannibal 
 146, 147 and n., expeditions against 
 Alpine peoples, 251, 252, civiliza- 
 tion of, due to Etruscans, 82 ; new 
 roads over, 332, 409 
 
 Ambaoti, 398 
 
 Ambiorix, 411, 412 
 
 Amisus, 342, 370 
 
 Anagnia, 96, 105 
 
 Ancona, 77 
 
 Anioius, L., 199 
 
 Annius Milo T., 432, 483, 505 
 
 Antigonas, 102 
 
 Antigonus Doson, 144 
 
 Antiooh in Syria, 338 
 
 Antiochus Asiaticus, 343 ; restored 
 by Lucullus, 344 , ejected by 
 Pompeius, 368 
 
 Antiochus III. the Great, allies with 
 Philip against Egypt, 182, fonduct 
 during second Macedonian war. 
 183, 187 ; war with Rome. 188- 
 194 
 
 Antioohus IV. Epiphanes, of Syria, 
 
 200, 220 
 Antium, 34, 92, 109, 110 
 Antonins C, 355, 377, 380, 382 
 
 , lieutenant of Caesar, 459 
 
 Antonins M., expedition against the 
 
 pirates, 340, 348 
 , the Triumvir, 462, 484. 497, 
 
 504 
 Aons, the river, 184 
 Apennines, 1, 2, 8, 150, 175 
 Apollonia, 139, 161, 184, fouuded 
 
 37; allied with Rome, 109 
 Appeal (provocatio), 17, 44, 45, 55, 
 
 235, 267, 375, 391 
 Appellate jurisdiction of the Impe- 
 
 rator, 492 
 Appnleins Saturninus L, 260-262, 
 
 375 
 Apulia, 38, 95, 173 
 Aquae Sextiae, 251, 254, 255, 395 
 Aqueducts, 319 
 Aqnileia, founded 175 
 Aquillius M\, 245, 281, 282 
 Aquitani, 409 
 Aratus, 181, 183 
 Arausio, 253 
 Archelaus, 284-288 
 Archidamus, 93 
 Archimedes, 160 
 Ardea, 65, 86, 87 
 Area Capitolma, 27 
 Aretas, 368 
 Arevacae, 213, 214 
 Argos, 108, 18b 
 Ariarathes IV., king of Cappadocia, 
 
 189, 193 
 Ariarathes VI., assassinated, 280 
 Aricia, 86, 87 ; battle at, 77 ; becomes 
 
 a municipium, 92 
 Anminnm, colonized, 108; fleet- 
 station, 109 ; bulwark against the 
 
 Celts, 139, 140 
 Ariobarzanes, 280, 281, 472 
 Ariovistus, 402, 405, 406 
 Aristion, 283 
 Aiistobnlus, 368 
 Aristonicns, 220 
 Aristotle, 120 
 Armenia, 180, 193, 220 
 
 Lesser, 280 
 
 Army, earliest organization, 15, 16, 
 
INDEX. 
 
 52b 
 
 Servian arrangements, 23, 24, 25 
 service of aHies, 111, 112; begin 
 nings of a standing army, 178 
 decay, 198, 204, 205, 208, 214, 
 215, 217, 222, 274, 493; reor 
 ganized by Marius, 257-259 ; by 
 Caesar, 494, 497 
 
 Arno, the, 175 
 
 Arpi, resists Samnites, 90, 95 ; joins 
 Hannibal, 155, 158 ; recovered by 
 Rome, 166 
 
 Arretium, invokes Roman aid, 82 ; 
 makes peace with Rome, 9H ; 
 conduct in the second Punic wa>, 
 168 
 
 Vrtaxata, 345 
 
 Arverni, 250, 251, 253, 395-398, 
 402, 413, 417 
 
 Arx, 9, 27 
 
 Asoulum, 269, 271, 272 
 
 Asia (Syria), extent, 179, 180 : posi 
 tion after the war with Antiochus, 
 192, 193 (cf. Antiochus) 
 
 Asia Minor, 180, 181, 220, 278, 285- 
 287 ; farming of taxes abolished, 
 303 ; restored, 357, 358, 364 ; 
 settlement by Pompeius, 369, 471, 
 497, 508 
 
 Asinius Pollio, 431 
 
 Atarbas, 133 
 
 Atella, 155 
 
 Athamanes, 184 
 
 AthenagoraB, 184 
 
 Athenians, commercial connection 
 with Etruscans, 35 ; expedition 
 against Syracuse, 77 ; during war 
 with Philip, 183, 184, 186 
 
 Athenion, 245 
 
 Athens, 283-285 
 
 Atilius M., 131, 132 
 
 Atilius Regulus C, 140 
 
 Atropatene. See Media. 
 
 Attalidae, 195, 220 
 
 Attains, 180-182,189 
 
 Attains, brother of Kumenes, 199 
 
 Attins Varus P., 473 
 
 Anctoritas Senatus, 45 
 
 Augurs, 67, 304 
 
 Aurelius Cotta C, friend of Drusus, 
 268, 355 ; brother of L. Cotta, 357 
 
 Aurelius M., 340 
 
 Aurelius Scaurus M., 253 
 
 Aurunci, 88 
 
 Auruncnleins Cotta L., 411 
 Ausoulum, 105 
 Ausones, 8, 95 
 Avaricum, 414 
 
 Bactrians, 180, 220 
 
 Baebius M., 190 
 
 Baecula, 164 
 
 Balearic Isles, 119, 124 
 
 Bankruptcy, 507 
 
 Belgae, 254, 399, 406, 411, 415, 418 
 
 Bellovaci, 407, 415, 418 
 
 Beneventum, 107, 108, 165 
 
 Betuitus, 251 
 
 Bibracte, 404 
 
 Bithynia, 180, 193, 194; a Roman 
 province, 339-341, 369 
 
 Boarding-bridges, 130 
 
 Bocchus. See Mauretania. 
 
 Boeotians, 183, 186, 197 
 
 Boii, Italian, 79, 101, 139, 174, 175 
 
 , in Germany, 251, 401-403, 405, 
 
 414 
 
 Boiorix, 253 
 
 Bomilcar, 247 
 
 Bononia, 79 
 
 Bosporan kingdom, 279, seqq., 364, 
 seqq. 
 
 Bovianum, 89, 96 
 
 Boviilae, 87 
 
 Brennus, 80 
 
 Bridge building, 11 
 
 , Milvian, 318 
 
 , Sublician, 27 
 
 Brigandage, 168, 173 
 
 Britain, 396, 399, 408, 410 
 
 Brittany, 396, 408 
 
 Brixia, 79 
 
 Brundisium, 37, 108, 138, 183, 199, 
 293, 302, 453, 461, seqq, 
 
 Bruttians, 90, 91, 93, 94, 104, 108, 
 155,165, 166 168, 169, 172 
 
 Building in Rome, 318, 319, 425, 
 500 
 
 Bulla, 203 
 
 Burgess-body, its primitive con- 
 ditions, 15, 16; duties and rights, 
 17; extension, 206; clients and city 
 rabble, 207 ; incipient corruption, 
 207, 231 
 
 — — cavalry. See Army. 
 
524 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Burgess colony. See Colony. 
 
 rights. See Civitas. 
 
 Byzantium, 181, 182 
 
 Cabira, 341, 346 
 
 Caecilius Macedonicus Q., 214, 219, 
 228, 232, 247-249, 261, 262 
 
 Caecilius Metellus G., 133 
 
 Caecilius Metellus Nepos Q., 386, 
 387 
 
 Caecilius Metellus Pius Q., Creticus, 
 273,290, 293, 295, 327, 331,seqq., 
 349, 357, 364, 373 
 
 Caecilius Metellus Scipio Q. (consul 
 52 B.C.), 440, 464, 467, 472, 476, 
 477 
 
 Caecina A., 485 
 
 Caelius Rufus M., 483 
 
 Caenina, 10, 25 
 
 Calatia, 155 
 
 Calendar, 517 
 
 Cales, 92, 158; naval station, 109 
 
 Calpurnius Bibulus M., 389, 432, 
 460-462 
 
 Calpurnius Piso Cn. (the Catilina- 
 rian), 377, 378 
 
 Calpurnius Piso L., 217, 223 
 
 , father-in-law of Caesar, 390 
 
 Camars = Clusium, 88 
 
 Cameria, 25 
 
 Campanians in Sicily, 127. See 
 Capua. 
 
 Canaan, 115 
 
 Cannae, 153-156 
 
 Cantonal constitution in Gaul, 397 
 
 Canusium, 153, 168 
 
 Capena, 80, 81 
 
 Capitolium, 9, 27 
 
 Cappadooia, 180, 189, 193, 220, 279- 
 281, 338, 366, 369, 370, 472 
 
 Capua, taken from the Etruscans, 78, 
 90 ; under Greek influence, 90, 91 ; 
 seeks Roman aid, and revolts, 91 ; 
 recovered, 92, 95, 98; receives 
 Caerite rights, 112 ; its nobles 
 receive privileges, 113; resists 
 Hannibal, 151 ; joins him, 155; he 
 winters there, 158 ; siege and 
 capture, 158-167 ; its ruin, 167, 
 172, 205 ; colonized, 235, 292, 294, 
 297 ; its lands resumed bv Sulla, 
 306, 378, 389 
 
 Caria, 193 
 
 Carinae, 11 
 
 Canutes, 412 
 
 Carrhae, 437, seqq. 
 
 Carsioli, 97 
 
 Carthage and Carthaginians in con« 
 nexiuD with Etruscans and Greeks, 
 34, 39, 76, 77, 78 ; in Sicily, and 
 her early relations with Rome, 1U6- 
 109 ; at variance with Egypt, 114, 
 origin, position, empire, constitu- 
 tion, wealth, compared with Rome, 
 115-125; first Punic wary 127- 
 135 ; peace, 135, 136 ; mercenary 
 war, 137 ; causes of second Punic 
 war, 141-144; war, 145-173, 
 Roman policy towards Carthage, 
 175-177; war with Massinis-a, 
 215-217; third Punic war, 217- 
 219; colony sent by C Gracchus, 
 235, 238, 239 , restored, 515 
 
 Carthage, New or Spanish (Carta- 
 gena), 143, 162, 163 
 
 Carthalo, (1) Carthaginian admiral. 
 133 ; (2) leader of the patriot party, 
 216 
 
 Carthalo, lieutenant of Crassus, 439 
 
 Carthalo L., 224 
 
 Carthalo Longinus L., 253 
 
 Carthalo Longinus Q., 473 
 
 Carthalo Sp., 58, 64, 65 
 
 Casilinum, 151, 158, 165 
 
 Cassivellaunus. 410 
 
 Castrum Novum, 108, 110 
 
 Catena, 36 
 
 Cato. See Porcius. 
 
 Cattle, 52 ; increase of stock-raising. 
 211, 224 
 
 Caudine Forks, 94, 95 
 
 Caulonia, 37 
 
 Caunus, 189 
 
 Ceietrum, 184 
 
 Celtiberians, 162, 178, 213, 214,263 
 
 Celts, character and migrations and 
 invasion of Italy, capture of Rome, 
 subsequent incursions, result of 
 migrations, 78-82 ; take part in 
 the Samnite war, 97-102; subdued 
 by Rome, 139 140, 174 175; join 
 Carthage in second Punic War, 
 147-149, 168, 169 ; different tribes 
 of. 250-252 
 
INDEX. 
 
 51% 
 
 Celts, of Asia, 180, 199; war with, 193 
 
 , Transalpine, 139, advance iDto 
 
 Italy checked, 174-175 
 
 Cenomani, 79, 139, 140, 174 
 
 Censorship instituted, 63 ; impor- 
 tance, 64, 204 ; plebeians eligible, 
 66 ; under Sulla, 303, 306 ; restored 
 by Pompeius, 357 ; reorganized by 
 Caesar, 516 
 
 Census, origin, 24 ; every fourth year, 
 46 , extended to Sicily, 138 
 
 Centumviral court, 307, 308, 492 
 
 Centumviri, a Latin senate, 16 
 
 Cephallenia, 194 
 
 Cermalus, 11 
 
 Centrones, 147 
 
 Chaeronea, 284 
 
 Chalcedon, 182, 340 
 
 Chalcis, 179, 184, 185, 190, 191 
 
 Chersonese, Tauric, 27a 
 
 Chersonese, Thracian, 180, 193, 251 
 
 Chios, 181, 191, 285- 287 
 
 Cilicia, 180, 188 ; seat of piracy, 221, 
 244, 338, 340, 347-349, 363, 364, 
 369, 371 
 
 Cimbri, 252-255 
 
 Cincinnatus. See Quinctius. 
 
 Cineas, 103, 104, 105 
 
 Circeii, 86, 87 
 
 Circus, 27 
 
 Cirta, 177, 246, 475, 478 
 
 Cius, 182 
 
 Cives sine suffragio, protected bur- 
 gesses, 24 ; burgesses without right. 
 of electing or being elected, 81 ; 
 their position, 96, 97, 111, 112; 
 disappearance of this class, 205 
 
 Civic communitv as opposed to a 
 state, 308, 309*, 491, 499 
 
 Civitas (citizenship), originally coin- 
 cident with patriciate, 14 ; could 
 not be lost within the state or 
 Latin League, 26 ; sparingly con- 
 ferred in early timps, 22, 23 ; given 
 to the Alban clans, 28 ; later civitas 
 of the plebeians, 47 ; burgess rights, 
 formerly forced upon the holders, 
 now coveted and conferred as a 
 favour, 111 ; rarely conferred after 
 conquest of Italy, 268 ; bestowed 
 on Italians, 272, 274, 276, 289, 292, 
 293, 302, 375, 444, 514 
 
 Civitates foederatae, 31* 
 
 immunes, 316 
 
 Clans, form the community, 14 15; 
 clan-villages, 8 ; gentes maiorei efc 
 minores, 21 ; in Gaul, 397 
 
 Classes, 23 
 
 Classici, 23 
 
 Clastidium, 148 
 
 Claudius Ap., 59, 60 
 
 , 198 
 
 , 228, 230, 232 
 
 Claudius C, 129 
 
 Claudius Caecus Ap., 70, 104 
 
 Claudius Caudex Ap., 129 
 
 Claudius Cento C, 184 
 
 Claudius Marcellus C. (consul 50 
 B.C.), 446, seqq. 
 
 Claudius Marcellus M., 156, 158, lflO s 
 165, 167 
 
 , 214 
 
 (consul 51 B.C.), 442, 444, 447 
 
 Claudius Nero C, 163, 166, 168, 169 
 
 Claudius Pulcher Ap., 166 
 
 Claudius Pulcher P., 133 
 
 Clavus, 203 
 
 Cleonymus, 96 
 
 Cleopatra, daughter of Ptolemy 
 Auletes, 468 
 
 Clientship, 14, 22, 23, 24, 42, 57 
 
 Clodius P., 391, 423, 424, 428, 432 
 
 Cluentius A., 504 
 
 Clupea, 131, 132 
 
 Clusium, 88, 140 
 
 Cohorts. See Legion. 
 
 Collatia, 10, 25 
 
 Collegia (clubs), 326, 423, 499, 500 
 
 Colline Gate, battle at, 296 
 
 Collini, 12 
 
 Coloniae civium Romanorum, at first 
 on the sea-coast, 109, 110 
 
 Latinae, earliest 26 ; Romans 
 
 predominate, 85 
 
 Colonies, salutary effect, 69, 208; 
 stoppage of, 226 ; those of C. 
 Gracchus, 233 ; of Drusus, 264 ; 
 of Sulla, 276, 302, 326; of Lex 
 Servilia, 378. Cf. Capua. 
 
 , non-Italian, 235, 243: pro- 
 posals of Saturninus, 260 ; of 
 Caesar, 419, 429, 513, 514 
 
 Comana, high-priest of, 369 
 
 Comitia centuriata, 24, 44, 45 ; re* 
 
526 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 formed, 208, 209, 235; treatment 
 by Sulla, 276, 304 
 
 Comitia, composition and powers, 70, 
 204; nullity, 206; condition in 
 time of Gracchi, 224, 231, 232; of 
 Sulla, 304 ; of Caesar, 489 ; in re- 
 lation to Lex Gabiuia, 359 ; cor- 
 ruption of, 326, 503 
 
 cunata, summoned by the king, 
 
 17 ; plebeians admitted, 44, 45 ; 
 plebeian curiate assembly, 55, 57 
 
 tributa, 57 and n., 61 ; treat- 
 ment by Sulla, 303, 304 
 
 Comitium, 27 
 
 Commercial interests, effect on poli- 
 tics, 216, 219, 320, 321, 506 
 
 Commercium, denied to Italian com- 
 munities, 112 ; to Sicilian, 137 
 
 Comnm, 4i:9 
 
 Concilium, denied to Italian commu- 
 nities, 112 
 
 plebis, 57 n., 61 n. 
 
 Concord, temple of, 66 
 
 Confarreatio, 14 
 
 Confiscations, by Sulla, 301, 302 ; by 
 Caesar, 497 
 
 Consentia, 93 
 
 Consuls, origin and powers, 41-44 ; 
 position in reference to senate, 46 ; 
 restrictions and suspension, 55, 56, 
 59, 60, 63, 64 ; plebeians admitted, 
 66 ; exclusion of the poorer citi- 
 zens, 205; re-election of, 304; 
 regulation of powers by Sulla, 305 ; 
 decay, 491 
 
 Conubium, between Romans and 
 Latins, 26 ; forbidden to Italian 
 communities, 112 ; to provincial, 
 137 
 
 Cora, 85, 87 
 
 Corbio, 87 
 
 Corcyra, 37, 96, 138 
 
 Corduene, 337, 366, 369 
 
 Corfinium, 268, 270. 273, 453 
 
 Corinth, 37, 179, 185, 186, 219 ; re- 
 stored, 514 
 
 Corioli, 87 
 
 Corn, distribution of, 235, 242, 261, 
 264; restricted, 269; renewed, 
 292 ; abolished, 303 ; restored, 
 329, 354, 384 ; restricted by Caesar, 
 497 
 
 Cornelia, 228, 232, 240 
 Cornelii, Sulla's freedmen, 302 
 Cornelius Balbus L., 490 
 Cornelius Cethegus P., 327 
 Cornelius Cinna L., 277, 288, seqq 
 
 , son of the preceding, 329 
 
 Cornelius, Cossus A., 80 
 Cornelius Dolabella P., 101 
 
 , admiral of Caesar, 459, 484 
 
 Cornelius Lentulus Crus L., 447 
 Cornelius Lentulus Sura P., 380 
 Cornelius Merula L., 289, 291 
 Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Afri- 
 canus P., takes Carthage, 217 ; 
 Numant-ia, 215; chaiacter, 227, 
 228, 230 ; death, 233 
 Cornelius Scipio Africanus P., saves 
 his father, 148 ; character and 
 Spanish campaigns, 163, 164 ; 
 African expedition, 169-172; op- 
 posed to Antiochus, 192; separates 
 the orders in the theatre, 204, op- 
 ponent of Cato, 208 ; courts the 
 rabble, 210; death, 194, 195 
 Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus L., 192, 
 
 193 
 Cornelius Scipio Calvus Cn., 140, 
 
 154, 162 
 Cornelius Scipio L., 130 
 Cornelius Scipio L., 293, 294 
 Cornelius Scipio Nasica P., 216, 230 
 Cornelius Scipio P., 147, 148, 154, 
 
 162 
 Cornelius Sulla L., in Jugurthine war, 
 249 ; in Social war, 269, 272, 273 ; 
 consul 88 B.C., appointed to Eastern 
 command, 273 ; marches on Rome, 
 275; first legislation, 276, de- 
 parted for the East, 277 ; war with 
 Mithradates, 278-287; in civil 
 war, 292-298; dictatorship, 300; 
 proscriptions, 301 ; reconstitu- 
 tion of Roman state, 302-310 ; his 
 character and career, 310-313; 
 political results of his death, 329 
 Cornificius L., 472 
 Corona civica, 171 
 Coronea, 197, 198 
 
 Corsica, Etruscan, 34, 77 ; Carthagi- 
 nian, 108 ; Roman, 130, 137, 138 ; 
 war with, 175 ; Marian colony in, 
 263 
 
INDEX. 
 
 527 
 
 Cortona, 96 
 
 Coruncanius Tib., 105 
 
 Cosa, 108 
 
 Cossyra, 119 
 
 Cotta. See Aurelius. 
 
 Cottian Alps, 146, 332 
 
 Cotys, 197 
 
 Cremona, 140, 175 
 
 Crete, seat of piracv, 221, 347-349, 
 364, 369 
 
 Criminal procedure under G. Grac- 
 chus, 235, 236 ; under Sulla, 307, 
 seqq., 375 ; under Caesar, 491, 492 
 
 Critolaus, 219 
 
 Croton, 37, 90 ; occupied by Rome, 
 101 ; by Hannibal, 170 
 
 Crustnmerium, 25, 54 
 
 Cumae, oldest Greek settlement, 36, 
 38 ; checks Etruscan advance, 77, 
 116 ; conquered by Sabellians, 90 ; 
 obtains Caerite rights, 92 
 
 Cnria, 15, 16 
 
 Cnrius Dentatus M.', 69, 70 
 
 Cursor. See Papirius. 
 
 Curnle magistracies, 203, 204 
 
 Customs, Sicilian, 138 ; in the empire, 
 316,317 
 
 Cyclades, the, 180 
 
 Cynoscephalae, 185 
 
 Cyprus, 115, 180; annexed by Rome, 
 338, 371, 391,468,471 
 
 Cyrene, 114, 117, 180, 182 ; a Roman 
 province, 339 
 
 Cyzicus, 181; besieged by Mithra- 
 dates, 340, 341 ; enlarged by Pom- 
 peius, 370 
 
 Dacian kingdom founded, 421 
 
 Dalmatia. See Illyricum 
 
 Damascus, 368 
 
 Dardani, 184 
 
 Dea Dia, 10 
 
 Debt, 54, 65, 66, 68, 274 ; reduced 
 to one-t'ourth, 292; Cataline's pro- 
 jects, 377, 504. Cf. Coehus Rufus, 
 Cornelius Dolabella P. (2), and 
 Bankruptcy. 
 
 Decemvirs, 58-60; decemviri sacris 
 faciundis, 66 
 
 Decius Mus. P., 98 
 
 Decurio, 16 
 
 Dediticii, name given to Bruttian 
 
 and Cisalpine Celtic communities, 
 172, 205; applies to allies after 
 Social war, 274 
 
 Deiotarus, 3-40, 369 
 
 Delium, peace negotiations at, 286 
 
 Delmium, 251 
 
 Delos, 200, 225, 284 
 
 Delphic oracle, 38 
 
 Demetrias, 179, 190 
 
 Demetrius Poliorcetes, 102 
 
 Demetrius, son of Philip of Mace- 
 donia, 196 
 
 Diana, temple of, on the Aventme, 28 
 
 Dictator, 42^4; has to allow appeals, 
 60 ; plebeians eligible, 66 ; office 
 set aside, 152, 209; Sulla's dicta- 
 torship, 300 ; Caesar's, 486 
 
 Dionysius of Syracuse, 77, 90, 1 19 
 
 Divisores tribuum, 326 
 
 Dolabella. See Cornelius. 
 
 Domains, property of the state, 17 ; 
 treatment of, in early times, 52 ; 
 mismanagement of, 53 ; attempt 
 of Cassius, 58; increased distress, 
 65 : new regulation by the Licinio- 
 Sextian laws, 66-68 ; large assig- 
 nation of 208, 210; occupation of 
 Italian domains, 226, 229, 231, 232, 
 233; under Sulla, 302, 306; in 
 provinces, 315; Lex Servilia, 378; 
 under Caesar, 509. See Capua. 
 
 Domitius Ahenobarbus C, 251 
 
 — — , governor of Africa 81 B.C., 
 297 
 
 Domitius Ahenobarbus L. (consul 54 
 B.C.), 430, 453, 455, 458 
 
 Domitius Calvinus Cn., 464 
 
 Doric colonies, 36, 37 
 
 Drepana, 131, 133 
 
 Druids, 398 
 
 Duilius, C, 130 
 
 Dumnorix, 411 
 
 Duoviri navales, 109 ; sacris faciun- 
 dis, 66 
 
 Dyrrhachium, 461-464. See Epi- 
 damnus. 
 
 Eagle introduced as a standard, 258 
 
 Eburones, 411, 412 
 
 Ecnomus, 131 
 
 Edessa. See Osroene. 
 
 Edictum praetoris urbani, 374, 517 
 
528 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Egesta. See Segesta. 
 
 Egnatius Gellius, 97 
 
 Egypt, character of the kiDgdom, 
 180 ; first contact with Italy, 
 114; supplies Rome, lt37 ; before 
 the time of the Gracchi, 215, 220 ; 
 revenue, 318 ; bequeathed to Rome, 
 338, 371, 372 n., 376, 378, 426, 
 436, 468-471, 490 
 
 Elephants, use of, in battle, 103, 104, 
 105, 107 ; Carthaginian, 132, 133, 
 145, 149, 171 
 
 Eleusinian mysteries, 139 
 
 Elymais, 192 
 
 Emigrants, Roman, in Spain, 330, 
 332, 334, 3:>5 ; with Mithradates, 
 338, 367 ; with the pirates, 347 
 
 Emporiae, 143, 175 
 
 Ephesus, 190, 191 
 
 Epioydes, 160 
 
 Epidamnus, 37 
 
 Epirus and the Epirots, 35, 102, 
 103, 107, 138, 185 
 
 Equestrian centuries, 204 ; proposed 
 increase of, 208 
 
 order, 204 ; raised by C. Grac- 
 chus, 236, 237 ; restricted by Sulla, 
 303. See Jury Courts. 
 
 Ercte, 134 
 
 Eryx, 134 
 
 Etruria, boundaries of, 32 ; southern 
 part conquered by Rome, 81 
 
 Etruscans, origin, etc., 30-35; early 
 relations with Romans and Phoeni- 
 cians, 38, 41 ; fall of power, 76- 
 82 ; in the Samnite wars, 96, 97, 
 101, 104 , after the war with 
 Pyrrhus, 112 ; in the second Punic 
 war, 168 ; in Social war, 269-272 ; 
 struggles against Sulla, 295, 302 ; 
 insurrection of Lepidus, 330 ; cf. 
 Catilina, 379-380 
 
 Euboea, 179 
 
 Eumenes, 189, 190, 193, 194, 197, 
 199 
 
 Eurymedon, 191 
 
 Exports, Italian, 320 
 
 Fabii, 57 
 
 Fabius Hadrianus M., 342, 346 
 Fabius Maximus Q., 151, 152, 156, 
 158, 165, 167, 171, 209 
 
 Fabius, Maximus Allobrogicus Q., 251 
 
 Fabius, Rullianus Q., 70, 72, 96, 98 
 
 Faesulae, 379, 380 
 
 Falerii, 32, 80, 81, 88 
 
 Family, among the Romans, 13, 14, 
 
 504, 507 
 Felsina=Bononia, 79 
 Ferentinum, 97 
 Feriae Latinae, 9 
 Ficulnea, 25 
 
 Fidenae, 10, 25, 26 ; Roman, 78, 79 
 Financial position during second 
 Punic war, 165, 167 ; in seventh 
 century, 306, 315-319: under 
 Caesar, 490, 491, 496-498 
 Firmum, 108 
 Fish-ponds, 321, 501 
 Flamininus. See Quinctius. 
 Flaminius C, 140, 150, 151, 155, 
 
 209, 210 
 Flavius Fimbria C, 286, 287 
 Fleet. See Maritime affairs. 
 Formiae, 92 
 Forum Romanorum, 2 
 Fregellae, 92, 95, 105, 168; de- 
 stroyed, 234 
 Freedmen, confined to four tribes, 
 273 ; under Lex Sulpicia, 274 ; 
 under Cinna, 289 ; under Sulla's 
 constitution, 324, 375 ; position at 
 Rome, 423, 499 
 Frentani, 89 
 Frusino, 97 
 Fulvius Flaccus M, 232, 233, 234, 
 
 239, 240, 250 
 Fulvius Flaccus Q., 166 
 
 , 178 
 
 Fulvius Nobilior M , 194 
 Fulvius Nobilior Q., 213 
 Functions, defined, 71 
 Fundi, 92 
 
 Furius, Bibaculus M., 431 
 Furius Camilluj L., 81 
 Furius Camillus M., 66 , conquart 
 Veii, 80 
 
 Gabii, 10, 87 
 
 Gabinius A., 359-361, 371,372, 390 
 
 430, 431, 435, 436 
 Gades, 119, 164, 457, 514 
 Gala, 162 
 Galba. Sea Sulpicius. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 529 
 
 Gallaeci, subdued by Caesar, 394 
 Gaul, south coast (Narbonensis), 
 2 r i0, 251 ; in Sertonian war, 332, 
 334 ; Caesar's views concerning, 
 393, 394, 403, 418, 419, 428; 
 boundaries, 394 ; relations to 
 Rome, 394, 395, 402 ; to the 
 Germans and others, 401, 403 ; 
 population, 395 ; urban life, 396, 
 397 ; agriculture, 395 ; commerce, 
 396 ; mining, art, science, 397 ; 
 political organization, 397-399 ; 
 religion, 398, 399; army, 399, 
 400 ; civilization, 400 ; wars with 
 Caesar, 403-418; taxation, 418, 
 497; Latinization, 419 ; colonies, 
 419, 514. Cf. Julius Caesar. 
 
 Gela, 36, 119 
 
 Gelo, 77 
 
 Gens. See Clan. 
 
 Genthius, 198, 199 
 
 Gentiles. See Agnati. 
 
 Genucius Cn., 57 
 
 Gergovia, 415 
 
 Germans, first appearance in Roman 
 history, 252 ; relations to Celts, 
 401, 4o2 ; to Romans, 402, 405, 406 
 
 Geranium, 152, 153 
 
 Glabrio. See Acilius. 
 
 Gladiatorial war, 349-351 
 
 games, first in Etruria, 82 ; 
 
 Capuan, 91 ; at Rome, 321, 503 
 
 Gold mines, 250, 315, 397 
 
 Gracchus. See Sempronius. 
 
 Graeco-Italian culture, religion, art, 
 etc., 4-6 
 
 Grain, sale at low prices, 207, 210. 
 See Agriculture. 
 
 Greece, relations with Macedonia, 
 179, 181, 183; declared free, 186; 
 patriot party, 196, 197 ; treatment, 
 200 
 
 Greeks, iu Italy and Sicily, 35-39; 
 struggles with Etruscans, 77, 78 ; 
 with the Sabellian races, 90, 91 ; 
 adhere to Rome in the Hannibalian 
 war, 155 
 
 Grumentum, 168, 270 
 
 Hadrumetum, 118, 171 
 Haedui, 251, 395, 397, 402, 404, 
 405,411, 413, 415,418,419 
 
 Ealiartus,197 
 
 Halicarnassus, 181, 189 
 
 Halicyae, 139 
 
 Halys, 193 
 
 Hamilcar Barca, war in Sicily, 130, 
 131, 134, 135 ; mercenary war, 
 137 ; political position and ex- 
 ploits in Spain, 141, 142, 147 
 
 Hamilcar, Carthaginian general, 130 
 
 Hannibal, character and capture of 
 Saguntum, 143-145 ; march from 
 Spain to Italy, 145-147, first 
 campaign, 147-149 ; second cam- 
 paign, 150-152; third campaign, 
 152-156; fourth campaign, 157, 
 158; his isolation, 159, 161; 
 gradual retreat, 165 ; fresh suc- 
 cesses and march on Rome, 166 ; 
 retreats after death of Hasdrubal, 
 168, 169; returns to Africa, 170; 
 defeated at Zama, 171; reforms 
 the Carthaginian constitution, 176 ; 
 goes into exile, 176; received by 
 Antiochus, whom he aids, 189- 
 191 ; death, 194 
 
 Hannibal, son of Gisgo, 129, 130 
 Hanno, (1) son of Hannibal, 129; 
 
 (2) a Carthaginian general, 129 ; 
 
 (3) commands the Bruttian army, 
 165 ; (4) Carthaginian general in 
 Sicily, 160; (5) son of Bomilcar, 
 146 ; (6) the Great, 141, 142 
 
 Hasdrubal, (1) 141 ; (2) son of Gisgo, 
 164; (3) brother of Hannibal, 145, 
 154, 159, 162-164; reaches Italy, 
 168, 169 ; (4) brother-in-law of 
 Hannibal, 142, 143; (5) son of 
 Hanno, 132; (6) leader of the 
 patriots in Carthage, and general, 
 216; (7) commander of the citadel, 
 218 
 
 Hatria, on the Po, 38, 77, 82, 88 
 
 in the Abruzzi, 98 
 
 Helvetii, 251, 253, 254; population 
 of, 395, 397 ; in Black Forest, 401 ; 
 migration, 403-405, 413 
 
 Heraclea in Italy, 36, 90 ; battle of, 
 104, 105 ; makes peace with Rome, 
 156 ; joins Hannibal, 166 
 
 in Trachinia, 191 
 
 on tha Euxine, 341, 342, 370, 
 
 511, 514 
 
 34 
 
530 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Herculaneum, 94 
 
 Herdonius A pp., 57 
 
 Hormaean promontory, battle at, 
 132 
 
 Heruioi, allied with Rome, 26 ; join 
 the Romano- Latin league, 85 ; rise 
 against Rome, 87; refuse to join a 
 revolt, 92, 94 ; join the Samnites, 
 96 ; punishment, 96, 97 ; relation 
 to Rome, 112 
 
 Hesiod, 36 
 
 Hiempsal, 245 
 
 Hiero I., 77 
 
 Hiero II., war against the Mamer- 
 tines, 127-1"20; allies with Rome, 
 129 , position after the first Punic 
 war, 136, 137 ; conduct in the 
 second Funic war, 152, 155 
 
 Hierinymus, 155, 159 
 
 Himera (Thermae), 36, 119, 133; 
 batt e at, 77, 116 
 
 Himilco, (1) 133; (2) 160 
 
 Hippo Reg us, 118 
 
 Hippocrates, 159, 160 
 
 Hipponium, 90 
 
 Hirpini, 89, 155 
 
 Hirtuleius L., 331-333 
 
 Homor, 36 
 
 Hon >rary surnames, 207 
 
 Hostilius Manciuus A., 198 
 
 Hosti-ias Tubulus C, 168 
 
 Hon^e-i'ather, 13, 14 
 
 Human sacrifices in Gaul, 401 
 
 Hyrcanns, 368 
 
 Iapydes, 251 
 
 Iapygians, 3 
 
 Iberians in Georgia, 366 
 
 Ilerda, 455-457 
 
 Illyrians, piracy, 138, 139, 145. See 
 Genthius. 
 
 niyricuin, subjugation of the Dal- 
 matians in, 251, 421, 497 
 
 Ilva, 33 
 
 Imbros, 186 
 
 Imperator, 487, 488 
 
 Imperium, 15 
 
 Imports, Italian, 320 
 
 Indo-Ceonans, 3 
 
 Insubres, 79, 139, 140, 147, 148, 
 174 
 
 Interamna, 95 
 
 Intarest, 59, 68, 274, 276, 483, 507, 
 508 
 
 Interrex, 18 
 
 Ionian Sea, 35, 36 
 
 Isanrians, 348 
 
 Issa, 77 
 
 Isthmian games, Romans admitted 
 to, 139 
 
 Itali, 7-8 
 
 Italia (Corfinium), 270, 273 
 
 Italians, two divisions of, 3 ; distinc- 
 tion from and resemblance to the 
 Greeks, 4-6 ; migrations of, 7-8 
 
 Italy, physical character, 1, 2 ; union 
 of, 3, 113, 114 ; natural boundaries 
 of, 136 ; political boundary the 
 Rubicon, 306 , North Italy = Gallia 
 Cisalpina or Italian Gaul, 306, 514, 
 515 
 
 Janicnlum, 8, 10, 11, 26, 27 
 
 Jannaeus, 368 
 
 Jews, 368 , in Alexandria, 471, 513 
 
 Jnba, 452, 458, 467, 472, 475-477 
 
 Judaea, 220, 338, 368, 371 ; position 
 in Caesar's state, 513 
 
 Judges, Carthaginian, 120, 121 
 
 Judices = consuls, 41 
 
 Jngnrtha, 245-249 
 
 Julia, Caesar's daughter, 391,440, 481 
 
 Julius Caesar C, opposed by Sulpi- 
 cius, 275, 291 
 
 ■ , family and connections, 329, 
 480; character, 329, 4*0-483; 
 year of birth, 336 n. , abstains from 
 Lepidan rising, 329 ; against Mith- 
 radates, 340 ; prosecutes Sullan 
 partisans, 355 , supports Lex Gabi- 
 nia, 360 , Pontifex Maximus, 374, 
 384 ; relations with Catilinarian 
 conspiracy, 376, 377, 382, 383; 
 democratic zeal, 375, 376, 386 , 
 praetorship, 386, 387; his rapid 
 rise, 38* ; governor of Spain, 388, 
 394; alliance with Pompeius and 
 Crassus, 389; consul 389-391; 
 governor of two Gauls, 390, 451 , 
 wars with Gauls and Germans, 
 403-418 ; crosses Rhine, 409, 412 , 
 invades Britain, 410; settlement 
 of Gaol, 418, 419; at Luca 427, 
 428 ; rupture with Pompeius, 440- 
 
nwEx. 
 
 531 
 
 448; recalled, 444 , bis ultimatum, 
 446 ; crosses Rubicon, 448 •, Civil 
 war, 449-479 ; regulation of Italy, 
 454, 455 ; Egypt, 471 , attitude to- 
 wards the old parties, 483-485 ; 
 Caesarianism, 486 ; regulates the 
 new monarchy, 486-489 , the state, 
 489-493; the army, 493-496; 
 finance, 496-498 ; Rome and Italy, 
 498-509 ; the provinces, 509-512 , 
 attitude towards Jews and Greeks, 
 512-515 ; census, 516; law of the 
 empire, 516, 517 ; coinage, 517 , 
 calendar, 517, 518 , length of his 
 reign, 518 
 
 Julius Caesar L., 269, seqq. 
 
 Junius Brutus Damasippus L., 297- 
 299 
 
 Junius Brutus Dec, 240 
 
 , 408, 457 
 
 Junius Pennus M., 233 
 
 Junius Pullus L., 132 
 
 Junius Silanus M., 163 
 
 , 253 
 
 Jupiter Capitolinus, 28 
 
 Jupiter Latiaris, 9 
 
 Jury courts, transferred by C Grac- 
 chus from the senate to the equites, 
 236, 237, 263, 264 ; Drusus' pro- 
 posal x 264, 265 ; Lex Plautia, 271 ; 
 under Sulla, 303, 354, 355 , Lei 
 Aurelia, 357 , regulations of 
 Pompeius, 433 ; of Caesar, 492 
 
 Jus, imaginum, 63, 203 
 
 Jus separated from mdicium, 42—43 
 
 Juventius, 219 
 
 King, position, powers, etc., 14-19 ; 
 abolished, 40-43, 85 ; powers re- 
 vived under the name of dictator, 
 43—44 ; compared with monarchy 
 of Caesar, 486-489 
 
 lAbeo. See Fabius. 
 
 Lablci, 65, 87 
 
 Labienus T., 375 ; with Caesar in 
 Gaul, 403, 407,408, 412,414-416, 
 449 , in Civil war, 449, 460, 467, 
 473, 477 
 
 Lae'ius C, 163 
 
 Sapiens C, 227, 228 
 
 Laevinus. See Valerius. 
 
 Lampsacus, 181, 189 
 
 Laud, division of, at the time of Ser- 
 vius, 23 ; distribution of, by T. 
 Gracchus, 229-232; by Sulla, 302, 
 354 ; by Pompeius, 356, 357, 387, 
 389, 390; by Caesar, 495, 509 
 
 Language, Latin. See Latinizing. 
 
 Lanuvium, 86, 87 
 
 Larissa on the Peneius, 185 
 
 Latin communities, as regards the 
 domain question, 233; right of mi- 
 gration curtailed, 268 ; in Social 
 War, 270 , in Cisalpine Gaul, 272 ; 
 Latin rights given to insurgent 
 communities, 302 -, Jus Latinum to 
 Cisalpine Gaul, 272 ; in Transalpine 
 Gaul, 514 
 
 Latin league of thirty cantons under 
 Alba, 9 ; new position under Rome, 
 25, 26, 28 ; war with Rome, and 
 renewal of league and loss of power, 
 85 , revolt against Rome, 86 ; clos- 
 ing of the league, and list of the 
 towns included, 87 ; new restric- 
 tions by Rome, 87 ; anger of the 
 Latins, 87, 88 , fresh revolt, 91 ; 
 dissolution of league, politically, 
 92 , treaties between Rome and 
 each community, 92 ; refuse to join 
 Pyrrhus, 105 , position after the 
 war with Pyrihus, 111; increased 
 oppression, 205 
 
 Latinizing, of Italy, 113, 173 ; of the 
 land between the Alps and the Po, 
 174, 175; of Spain, 331, 332; of 
 Gaul, 394, 401, 419, 514; of the 
 empire by Caesar, 513-517 
 
 Latins, first immigrants and extent 
 of migration and settlements, 7, 8; 
 relation to Umbro-Samnitcs, 88 
 
 Latium, physical character, 8 ; limits 
 fixed, 87 
 
 Laurentum, 87 
 
 Laus, 37, 90 
 
 Lavinium, 10. 87 
 
 Law, Roman and Latin, harmonized, 
 26 ; administration of, in muni- 
 cipia and colonies, 112, 309, 310, 
 515, 516 ; codification projected, 
 517 ; appeals, 492 ; regal jurisdic- 
 tion restored, 491, 492. Cf. Jury 
 courts . Q.uaestion««. 
 
532 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Legati legionis pro praetore, 494 
 Legatus, 42 
 Leges : — 
 Appuleia agraria, 260, 263 
 
 frumentaria, 261, 354 
 
 Amelia, 357 
 Baebia, 179 
 Caecilia, abolition of Italian tolls, 
 
 388 
 Canuleia, 63 
 Cassia agraria, 58, 65 
 
 fcabellaria, 223, 224, 227 
 
 Corneliae. See Cornelius Sulla. 
 Domitia de sacerdotiia abolished by 
 
 Sulla, 304 
 Fabia de plagiariis, abduction, 350 
 Flaminia agraria, 210 
 Fulviade civitate sociis danda, 233 
 Gabinia, 223, 359-361 
 Genucia, 68 
 Hortensia, 67, 70 
 I cilia, 55 
 Julia, 272 
 
 agraria, 389, 390 
 
 Juliae. See Julius Caesar C. 
 
 Junia de peregrinis, 233 
 Labiena restoring Lex Domitia, 
 
 375 
 Lioiniae Sextiae, 65-68 
 Liviae (of the elder Drusus), 230 
 (of the vounger Drusus), 264, 
 
 265 
 Maecilia agraria, 65 
 Maenia, 68 
 Manilia. 361 
 Manlia, 68 
 
 Mucia de civitate, 268 
 Ogulnia, 67 
 Plautia iudiciaria, 272 
 
 Papiria de civitate, 272 
 
 Plotia, 335 
 Poetelia, 68 
 
 Pompeia de iudiciis, 430 
 Publilia(of471 B.C.), 57 
 
 (of 339 B.C.), 66 
 
 Sacratae, as to the appointment of 
 
 plebeian tribunes and aediles, 54 
 Semproniae, 229, 231, 232. See 
 
 Sempronius Gracchus. 
 Servilia, 378 
 Sulpiciae, 274, 289 
 Sumptuariae, 308, 507 
 
 Leges (continued) : — 
 
 Tabellariae (Gabinia, Cassia, Papi« 
 
 ria), 222, 223 
 Terentilia, 58 
 Titia agraria, 263 
 Valeria de provocatione, 42 
 
 on Sulla's dictatorship, 300 
 
 Valeriae Horatiae, 60, 61 
 
 Legion, copied by Pyrrhus. 105; 
 divided into cohorts, 258 
 
 Legislation, by decree of the com- 
 munity, 17; acquired practically 
 by the senate, 73 
 
 Lentulus. See Cornelius. 
 
 Leontini, 36 
 
 Lepidus. See Aemilius. 
 
 Leptis Magna, 118, 177; Minor, 118 
 
 Leucopatra, 219 
 
 Lex, primarily agreement, 17 ; dis- 
 tinct from edict, 47 ; interval 
 between the introduction and pass- 
 ing of, 263 
 
 Liburnae, 138 
 
 Libyans, 118, 124, 125, 177 
 
 Libyphoenicians, 118, 124 
 
 Licinius Calvus C., 431 
 
 Lioinius Crassus L., 260, 264, 265 
 
 Licinius Crassus M., character, 328 ; 
 in Sullan war, 292, 293; in 
 Servile war, 351 ; coalition with 
 Pompeius, 356-358 ; relation to 
 Catilinariau conspiracy, 376, 377, 
 381-383 ; in triumvirate, 388, 389 , 
 at Luca, 427 ; second consulship, 
 430; in Syria, 435-438; death, 
 438 ; his wealth, 503 
 
 Licinius Crassus Mucianus P., 228, 
 232 
 
 Licinius Crassus P., 197 
 
 ■ , 263 
 
 , Caesar's lieutenant, 403, 406, 
 
 408, 409, 410, 437, 438 
 
 Lioinius Lucullus L., 214 
 
 , character, 343, 345 ; lieutenant 
 
 of Sulla, 284, 286; war against 
 Mithradates and Tigranes, 340- 
 346 ; estimate of his generalship, 
 346; his aims in Asia, 342, 343, 
 370 ; superseded by Pompeius, 
 365 ; opposes Pompeius, 387 ; 
 humiliated by Caesar, retires from 
 political life, 373, 374 
 
INDEX. 
 
 533 
 
 Licinius Lucullus M., in Sullan war, 
 
 296, 327, 373 
 Licinius Nerva P., 244 
 Licinius Stolo C, 65 
 Lietores, 15, 42 
 Ligurians, 32, 79, 82, 139, 145, 148, 
 
 169, 174, 175 
 Lilybatum, 33, 107, 119, 132, 133, 
 
 135, 145, 148 
 Lingones, 139 ; in Gaul, 419 
 Lissus, 77 
 Livius C, 191 
 Livius Drusus M., 239 
 
 264, 265 
 
 Livius Salinator M., 168 
 
 Locri, occupied by the Romans, 101 ; 
 
 its fate in the Pyrrhic war, 106, 
 
 107 
 Locris, 179, 186 
 Luca, conference at, 427 
 Lucanians, 90, 91, 93, 94, 96, 97, 
 
 98, 101, 104, 107, 108, 112, 155, 
 
 166, 173, 270, 273 
 Luceres, 10, 12, 21 
 Luceria, 95, 158 
 Lucretius Ofella Q., in Sullan war, 
 
 295, 299, 310 
 Luna, 175 
 
 Lugdunum Convenarum, 335, 394 
 Luperci, 12 
 Lusioanians, 178; war with Rome, 
 
 213, 214; revolt, 263; subdued, 
 
 394 
 LutatiuS Catulus C, 135 
 Lutatius Catulus Q., 254, 291 
 , consul 78 B.C. ; 327, 330, 361, 
 
 362, 382, 386 
 Lycia, 193 
 Lydia, 180 
 Lysimacbia, 192 
 
 Maccabees. See Judaea. 
 
 Macedonia, land and people, 179 ; 
 power in Greece, 181; relations 
 with Rome, 139, 144, (see Philip); 
 at the beginning of the third war 
 with Rome, 196 ; broken up into 
 four confederacies, 198, 199; be- 
 comes a province, 219, 251 ; in 
 Sertorian times, 334, 337 ; in 
 Caesar's, 421. Cf. Perseus, Philip- 
 pus. 
 
 Machares, 342, 367 
 Maelius Sp., 64, 65 
 Maenius C, 92 
 Magister equiturn, 44 
 
 Magister populi, 44 
 
 Magistrates, deputies only military, 
 43 ; relation to the senate, 45, 73 ; 
 edicts of, valid during office, 4.' ; 
 order of succession, etc., prescribed, 
 71 ; unimpeachable during tenure 
 of office, 206 ; distinction between 
 military and civil authority, 48 ; 
 Sulla's regulations, 304-306; 
 Caesar's, 490, 491 ; provincial 
 governorships, 359-361, 433, 443, 
 490 
 
 Magnesia, 192 
 
 Mago, Hannibal's brother, 149 ; in 
 Spain, 164 ; in Italy, 169, 170 
 
 Mallius Maximus C. 253 
 
 Mamertines. See Messana. 
 
 Manilius C, 361 
 
 Manilius M., 217 
 
 Manlius C, 379, seqq. 
 
 Manlius Capitolinus M., 64, 65, 80 
 
 Manlius Imperiosus Torquatus T., 92 
 
 Manlius Torquatus T , 159 
 
 Manlius Volso Cn., 193 
 
 Manlius Vol>o L., 131 
 
 Manumission, tax on, 68, 315; 
 freedmen restricted to the four 
 city tribes, 70 ; share in military 
 service and in the suffrage, 208 ; 
 this equality removed, 209 
 
 Mantua, 31, 82 
 
 Marcellus. See Claudius. 
 
 Marcius Censonnus L., 217 
 
 Maroius Coriolanus C, 57 
 
 Marcius PhiJippus L., 264, 265, 299 
 
 Marcius Philippus Q., 197-199 
 
 Marcomanni, 401 
 
 Maritime affairs, Rome's original 
 position in, 11; piracy and efforts 
 to improve position, 108-110, 125; 
 building of fleets, 130, 132, 134- 
 136; neglect of, 221, 348,349; 
 reorganized, 363 
 
 Marius C, character and career, 256 ; 
 in the Jugurthine war, 247-249 ; 
 in the Teutonic and Cimbnc wars, 
 253-255 ; military reforms and 
 their significance, 249, 250, 257- 
 
534 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 259 ; political position and failure 
 of projects, 259-263 ; in social 
 war, 269, seqq ; desires Eastern 
 command, 274 ; appointed to it, 
 275 ; exiled, 276 ; returns to Italy 
 and Rome. 2 <9-291 ; seventh con 
 sulship and death, 291 ; his 
 memory rehabilitated, 376 
 
 Marias, 0., son of the preceding, 294, 
 295 
 
 Mariu3 Gratidianus M., nephew of 
 C. Marias (1>, 301 
 
 Marriage, 14; marital powei, 13, 
 between patricians and plebeians 
 null, 47 ; made valid, 63 ; in revo- 
 lution period, 322 , in Caesar's 
 time, 504, 505, 507 
 
 Marruoini, 94, 273 
 
 Mars, worship of, 12 
 
 Marsians, offshoots of the Umbrians, 
 3, 89 ; join the Samnites, 96 , in 
 the Social war, 269, seqq 
 
 Massaesylians, 177 
 
 Massilia, 39 ; allied with Home, 109 ; 
 conflicts with Carthage, 119, in 
 second Punic war, 145, 146, 175, 
 power, 250 , position in Gaul, 394, 
 395 ; trade, 396 ; in Civil war, 455, 
 457, 458 , treatment by Caesar, 514 
 
 Massinissa, character of, 17.^-177 ; 
 part in second Punic war, 162, 164, 
 170, 171 ; after the war, 176, 177, 
 216, 217, 245, 249 
 
 Massiva, 246 
 
 Maaretania, 177, 246, 248, 473, 475 
 
 Maxitani, 117 
 
 Media, 220 
 
 Atropatene, 180 
 
 Mediolaaam, 79, 140 
 
 Mediterranean, 1 
 
 Meduliia, 25 
 
 Megalopolis, founded by Pompeius, 
 370 
 
 Melita, 119 
 
 Melpam, 79, 80, 82 
 
 Memmius C, 246, 260 
 
 Menapii, 395, 408, 412 
 
 Mesopotamia, 338, 345 
 
 Messana, 36, 119; seized by Mamer- 
 tines, 106 , war with Hiero, 128 ; 
 cause of the first Punic war, 128, 
 129, 148 
 
 Metapontum, 37, 90, 166 
 
 Met auras, 168 
 
 Metelius. See Caeoilias. 
 
 Mioipsa, 245 
 
 Military service, length of, 233, 343, 
 495 
 
 Milo, 103 
 
 Mines, Spanish, 179 ; gold in Pied- 
 mont, 250, 315; in Gaul, 396, 397 
 
 Mintornae, 98, 110, 276 
 
 Minucius Rufus M., 152 
 
 Mithra, 220 
 
 Mithradates I., 228 
 
 Mithradates, king of Parthia, 435, 
 436 
 
 Mithradates of Pergamus, 471 
 
 Mithradates VI., Eupator, character, 
 
 278, 279, conquests and alliances, 
 
 279, 280, 339 ; comes into contact 
 with Rome, 280, 281; first war 
 with Rome, massacre of Italians, 
 281-286 , terms- M peace, 286, 287 ; 
 second war with Rome, 298 ; third 
 war with Rome, 338-342, 364- 
 368; takes refuge with Tigranes, 
 343 ; entrusted by Tigranes with 
 the command, 345 ; regains his 
 kingdom, 346 , defeated by Pom- 
 peius, 365, vevolt of his Bospcran 
 subjects, 367 , death, 367 
 
 Money, gold, 517 , Celtic, 397 ; 
 coinage in Gaul, 419, of Pom- 
 peius, 370 money dealing, -320, 
 507 
 
 Mons Sacei, 54, bC 
 
 Montani, 12 
 
 Motya, 119 
 
 Mucios Scaevola P., 228, 230, 232 
 
 Mucios Scaevola Q., son of the above, 
 263, 295 
 
 Mulvius pons, 3i 
 
 Municeps, passive burgess, 24 
 
 Municipal constitution, Latin, re- 
 modelled, 85, 87 
 
 system, 86, 205 ; developed in 
 
 Italy, 308-310; regulated by 
 Cae*ar, 509 , extended to provinces, 
 515 
 
 Muthol, battle on the, 247 
 
 Matiaa, 175 
 
 Mutines, 160, 161 
 
 Mylae, battle of, 130 
 
INDEX. 
 
 535 
 
 Myndus, 189 
 Myonnesus, 191 
 
 Nabataean state, 338, 368 
 
 Nabis, 181, 186, 
 
 Narbo, 243, 251 
 
 Narnia, 97, 169 
 
 Nasioa. See Cornelias. 
 
 Naupactus, 191 
 
 Naval warfare, 130 
 
 Navigation of the Gauls, 396, 400, 
 408 
 
 Naxos, 36 
 
 Neapolis, 38; relations with the 
 Samnites, 90, 94; laithful to 
 Rome, 158 
 
 Neetum, 136 
 
 Nemausus (Nimes), 514 
 
 Nepete, 32, 87 
 
 Nervii, 400, 401,407, 412 
 
 Nicomedes II., king of Bithynia, 280 
 
 Nicomedes III., Philopator, 281 ; be- 
 queaths his kingdom to Rome, 339 
 
 Nicopolis, 370, 471 
 
 Nigidius Figulus P., 484 
 
 Nobility, development of, 48, 69, 
 203 ; in possession of the senate 
 ami equestrian centuries, 203, 204; 
 need of money for office, 207 ; new 
 nobility of Caesar, 489 
 
 Nola, 7 ; under Etruscans, 34 ; under 
 Samnites becomes Greek, 90; in 
 the Samnite wars, 94, 95 ; in the 
 second Punic war, 158 ; in Social 
 war, 269, seqq., 289 
 
 Nomentum, long independent, 25; 
 member of Latin league, 87 ; bur- 
 gess-town, 92 
 
 Norba, 85, 87 
 
 Norbanus C., 293, 294, 296 
 
 Noviodunum (Julia Equestris), 405, 
 514 
 
 Nuceria, under Greek influence, 90 ; 
 in Samnite wars, 94, 95 
 
 Numana, Syracusan, 77 
 
 Numantia, 215 
 
 Numidia, 245-249 
 
 Numidians (or Berbers), 176, 177 
 
 Ocriculum, 97 
 
 Ootavius Cn., 289, 290, 291 
 
 Octavius L., 364 
 
 Ootavius ML, 229 
 
 , admiral of Pompeius, 459, 472, 
 
 473 
 Odrysians, 197 
 Odysseus (Ulysses), 38 
 Opimius L., 239, 240 
 Oppius Q., 282 
 Opsoi, 7 
 
 Optimates and Populares, 224 
 Orehomenus, battle at, 285 
 Orestis, 186 
 Ostia, 11, 17; position towards 
 
 Rome, 28 ; naval quaestor at, 109 ; 
 
 roadstead silted up, 319 ; post for 
 
 Eastern imports, 320 
 Oxus, 220 
 
 Paelignians, 89; join the Samnites, 
 96 ; 269, seqq. 
 
 Paestum. 108 
 
 Palaeopolis, 94 
 
 Palatine, 11, 12, 23,27 
 
 Pamphylia, 199, 348 
 
 Pandosia, 37 
 
 Panormus, 119, 131, 133 
 
 Panticapaeum, 279, 367 
 
 Paphlagonia, 280, 281 
 
 Papirius Carbo C., 232-234, 252, 253 
 
 Papirius Carbo Cn., 289, 293-296 
 
 Papirius Cursor L., 95, 96 
 
 Papius Mutilus C, 270, seqq. 
 
 Parma, 175 
 
 Paros, 186 
 
 Parthenope, 38 
 
 Parthia, foundation of, 220 ; contact 
 with Romans, 281 ; encroached on 
 by Tigranes, 337, 338 ; agreement 
 with Lucullus, 365 ; alliance with 
 Pompeius, 365 ; agreement with 
 Pompeius, 369 ; war with Rome, 
 435-439 ; agreement with Bibulus, 
 452 ; mode of warfare, 437 
 
 Parthians, 179 
 
 Pastoral husbandry, 225, 502 
 
 Paternal authority, 13, 14 
 
 Patres conscripti, 45 
 
 Patricians, the Roman burgesses, 14, 
 16 ; decrease of, 22 ; become a 
 privileged and governing nobility, 
 47, 48; lose their privileges, 67} 
 new patriciate of Caesar, 489 
 
 Fatronus, 16. See Clientship. 
 
536 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Paullus. See Aemilius. 
 
 Pedarii, 45 
 
 Pedum, 87 ; becomes a municipium, 
 92 
 
 Pentri, 155 
 
 Pergamus, 181, 182, 189, 191, 193, 
 220, 282, 283, 286 
 
 Perpenna C, 270 
 
 Perpenaa M., 297, 332, 333, 335 
 
 Perseus, 196-199^ 
 
 Persians, 77 
 
 Perusia, 33, 96 
 
 Pessinus, high priest of, 369 
 
 Petreius M., 382, 455, 457, 477 
 
 Phanagoria, 279, 367, 369, 466 
 
 Pharisees, 369 
 
 Pharnaces, sou of Mithradates, 367, 
 466, 471 
 
 Pharos, 470 
 
 Pharsalus, battle at, 464-466 
 
 Phasis, 366 
 
 PhiUnaus V., of Macedonia, character 
 of," 182; ally of Hannibal, 154, 
 161; first war with Rome, 161, 
 \<>b, 169; his power, 179; invades 
 Asia Minor, 182; second war with 
 Rome, 183-185; results, 185, 186 ; 
 attitude during war with Anti- 
 ochus, 190; dissatisfaction and 
 preparations for a third war, 194- 
 196 
 
 Philippus, the Pseudo, 219 
 
 Philopoemen, 183 
 
 Phooaeans, 36, 39 
 
 Phocis, 179 
 
 Phoenice in Epirus, 138 
 
 Phoenicians, home of, character, etc., 
 115, 116; in Italy. 35; contest 
 with the Greeks, 39. See Car- 
 thage. 
 
 Phraates, 369, 435 
 
 Phrygia, ISO; attached to province 
 of Asia, 278, 282 
 
 Piceutes, 89 ; war with Rome, 108 ; 
 in the second Punic war, 168 ; 
 Campaniau, 155, 172 
 
 Pilumnus populus, 16 
 
 Piracy, 138, 1 39, 221 ; used by Mithra- 
 dates, 282, 348; unchecked by 
 Romans, 319, 347 ; in concert with 
 Sertorius, 332, 334, 348; their 
 organization, 347, 348 ; expeditions 
 
 of Servilius, Antonius, and Metel- 
 lus, .548, 349, 364; Gabinian law, 
 359, 360; suppressed by Pom- 
 peius, 363, 3^4 ; recrudescence 
 after Civil war, 478 
 
 Pisaurum, 175 
 
 Piso. See Calpurnius. 
 
 Pistoria, 382 
 
 Placentia, 140, 148, 149, 168, 175 
 
 Plautius Hypsaeus L., 226 
 
 Plebeians, origin, etc., 22, 23; eligible 
 f>r military commands, 24; ad- 
 mitted to the curiae and senate, 
 44-46 ; acquire burgess-rights, 
 47, 48. Cf. Patricii, and Tribuni 
 plebis. 
 
 Plebiscitum, 55, 57, 67 
 
 Plurality of offices, 71, 72 
 
 Poeni. See Phoenicians. 
 
 Pompaedius Silo, 270, seqq. 
 
 Pompeii, 94 ; colony of Sulla, 302 
 
 Pompeius Cn.. character, 327, 328, 
 355, 370, 371, 440; Sullan parti- 
 san and lieutenant in Sullan war, 
 294, 299 ; propraetor in Sicily, 
 297: saluted "Magnus," 29S ; 
 opposes Pompeius. 310; attitude 
 to Lepidus, 329, 330 ; command 
 against Sertorius, 332-335 ; coali- 
 tion with democrats and Crassus, 
 355-361 ; war with pirates, 363, 
 364; with Mithradates, 364-366; 
 peace with Tigranes, 366 ; conquers 
 Caucasian tribes, 366 ; settlement 
 of Parthia, 369 ; of conquered 
 territories, 369, 370; of Syrian 
 affairs, 368 ; triumph, 370 ; posi- 
 tion on return to Rome, 385-388 ; 
 coalition with Caesar and Crassus, 
 388-391 ; management at Rome 
 during Caesar's absence, 422-434; 
 of corn supplies, 426 ; dictatorship, 
 432-434; rupture with Caesar, 
 439-448 ; in the Civil war, 449- 
 466; flight and death, 466, 468; 
 his wealth, 503 
 
 Pompeius Cn., son of above, 469 
 
 Pompeius Q., 215 
 
 Pompeius Rufus Q., 275, 277 
 
 Pompeius Sext., 469, 477 
 
 Pompeius Strabo Cn., in Social war, 
 271 seqq., 277, 290 
 
INDEX. 
 
 537 
 
 Pomponius Atticus, 502 
 
 Pomptine Marshes, 95, 319 
 
 Pontifex Maxim us, 43 
 
 Pontifices, increase of, 67 ; in muni- 
 cipia, 309 
 
 Pontius of Telesia, Samnite leader, 
 296, 297 
 
 Pontus, 180, 220 ; under Mithradates 
 VI., 279, 280 ; occupied by Romans, 
 341 ; made a Roman province, 369. 
 See Mithradates. 
 
 Popilius Laenas M., 215 
 
 Population, of the oldest Roman terri- 
 tory, 11 ; at the time of Servius 
 Tullius, 24; decrease of, 173, 211. 
 Cf. Census. 
 
 Populonia, 33, 38 
 
 Populus, 16 
 
 Porcius Cato M., character, etc., 207, 
 208 ; in Spanish war, 178; in war 
 with Antiochus, 191 ; as governor, 
 206 ; his reforms, 208, 209 ; esti- 
 mate by posterity, 210; commis- 
 sioner to Carthage, 216; death, 
 217; his estimate of Hamilcar, 142 
 
 Porcius Cato Uticensis M., character, 
 373, 374,478, 479; in Catilinarian 
 conspiracy, 381, 382 ; opposes Pom- 
 peius, 386, 387, 429, 432 ; mission 
 to Cyprus, 391 : opposes the 
 regents, 441, 444, 445 ; in Civil 
 war, 458-460, 464, 467, 472, 476, 
 477-479 
 
 Porsena, 76-77 
 
 Port dues, 17 ; abolished, 388 ; re- 
 established, 497 
 
 Posidonia, 37, 90 
 
 Postumius Albinus A., brother of 
 Spurius, 247 
 
 Postumius Albinus Sp., 247 
 
 Postumius L., 154 
 
 Potentia, 175 
 
 Praefecti annonae, 64 ; urbi, 42 
 
 Praeneste, war with Rome, 86 ; a 
 member of the Latin league, 87 ; 
 cedes territory, 92 ; later position, 
 111 ; siege of, 295-297 
 
 Praetores, name of consuls, 41 ; a 
 third consul, 66 ; governors of 
 provinces, 137 ; in Spain, 179 ; 
 inadequate, 204; under Sulla, 304, 
 305, 306 ; under Caesar, 491 
 
 Praetor peregrinus, 204 
 
 Praetoriani, 258 
 
 Precarii, 51 ; precarium, 53 
 
 Priests, nominated by the king, 15; 
 not by the consuls, 43; power in 
 politics, 64; chosen by co-optation, 
 304 ; by the tribes, 375 
 
 Prineeps senatus, 46 
 
 Prisci Latini, 8 
 
 Privernum, 92 
 
 Proletarii, 50 ; admitted by Marius 
 to enlistment, 258 
 
 Proscriptions of Sulla, 276, 301, 326, 
 357, 375, 483 
 
 Provinciae originally the departments 
 of the consuls, 71 ; provincial con- 
 stitution, 137, 138, 205, 206 ; 
 Spain, 179 ; acquisition of, 221 ; 
 fundamental distinction of, 515; 
 distribution by senate, .105 ; num- 
 ber, in Sulla's time, 305; in 
 Caesar's, 509 
 
 Prusias, 182, 193, 194 
 
 Ptolemaeus Epiphanes, 182 
 
 Ptolemaeus Philopator, 188 
 
 Ptolemaeus, son of Lagus, 102, 180 
 
 Ptolemaeus the Cyprian, 338 
 
 Ptolemaeus XI., Auletes, 338 ; recog- 
 nized by Romans, 371 ; expelled 
 and restored, 372 ; Egypt after his 
 death, 468 
 
 Publicani, origin of, 53 ; 236 
 
 Funic wars : first, 127-136 ; — second, 
 causes of, 141-145 ; march of Han- 
 nibal from Spain to Italy, 145-147 ; 
 battles of Ticinus, Trebia, Trasi- 
 mene, 148-151 ; events to b:ittleof 
 Cannae, 151-156; events in Italy, 
 157-159 ; war in Sicily, 159-161 ; 
 war in Macedonia, 161 ; in Spain, 
 162-164; in Italy, and fall of 
 Capua, 165-167 ; Hasdrubal and 
 battle of Sena, 168-169 ; Scipio's 
 expedition to Africa and end of 
 war, 169-173 ;— third, 216-219 
 
 Puteoli, 38 ; Eastern trade, 320 
 
 Pydna, 198, 200 
 
 Pyrgi, 38 ; stormed by Dionysius, 77 ; 
 burgess-colony, 110 
 
 Pyrrhus, character, early history, and 
 historical position of, 102, 103; 
 interest of, 100, 101 ; lands at 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Tarentum, 1^3, 104; war with 
 Rome, 104, 105 ; Sicilian expedi- 
 tion, 105-107 ; battle of Beneven- 
 tum, 107 ; death, 108 
 Pyxus, 37 
 
 Quaestiones perpetuae, repetunda- 
 rum, 223 ; extended by Sulla, 307, 
 308 ; under^ Caesar, 492 
 
 Quaestors, under the republic, 43 ; 
 two new ones to manage the 
 military chest, 60 ; four quaestores 
 classici, 109; provincial, 137; 
 increased to twenty, 303 ; to 
 forty, 490 
 
 Quartering troops in the provinces, 
 avoided by Sertorius, 332, 510, 512 
 
 Quinctius Cineinnatus L., 65 
 
 Quinotius Flamininus T., 184-187, 
 189 ; nepotism, 205 
 
 Quinctius L, 360 
 
 Quinctius Pennus Capitolinus T., 167 
 
 Quirinal city, 12, 21 
 
 Quirites, 16 
 
 Eabirius C, trial, 375 
 
 Raeti, 31 
 
 Ramncs, 10, 12, 21, 22 
 
 Rasennae, 31 
 
 Baudiue plain, 254 
 
 Ravenna, 31 
 
 Recruiting, system of Marius, 257, 
 
 258 
 Regillus, lake, 85 
 Regulus. See Atilius. 
 Religion, Etruscan, 34 ; Italian and 
 
 Roman, 4—6 
 Remi, 406, 407, 412, 415, 419 
 Bepresentative institutions unknown 
 
 to antiquity, 231 ; approached to 
 
 at Rome, 303, 308, 309 
 Bex sacrorum, 41 
 Rhegium, 36, 90 ; occupied by Rome, 
 
 102 ; mutinies and repulses Roman 
 
 attacks, 106 ; refuses to admit 
 
 Pyrrhus, 107 ; is stormed by 
 
 Romans, 108 
 Rhine, boundary of Gaul, 394, 401- 
 
 403, 405, 406 ; crossed by Caesar, 
 
 409, 412 
 Rhodes, ally o e Rome, 109; after the 
 
 6econd Punic war, 181 ; war with 
 
 Philip, 182, 183; opposes Antiochus, 
 
 189-191 ; reward, 193 ; humiliated, 
 
 199, 200 ; resists Mithradates, 283; 
 
 rewarded, 287 
 Rhone, Hannibal's passage of, 145, 
 
 146 ; Helvetii prevented from 
 
 crossing, 404 
 Boad. See Via. 
 Roma quadrata, 11 
 Rome, site, character, rise, etc., 10- 
 
 12 ; amalgamation of Palatine and 
 
 Quirinal, 21 ; division, 23 ; Servian 
 
 wall and the seven hills, 26-28 ; 
 
 burnt by the Gauls, 80 ; condition 
 
 in Caesar's time, 498-501 
 Rostra, 27 ; decorated with the 
 
 beaks of the Antiate galleys, 92 
 Rubicon, boundary of Italy, 306 ; 
 
 crossed by Caesar, 448 
 Rufinus. See Cornelius. 
 Ruspina, battle at, 475 
 Rutili, 26 
 Rutilius Lupus P., 270, srqq. 
 
 Sabellians, 7, 10, 93, 94 
 
 Sabines, 8 ; contact with Rome, 26 ; 
 conquered, 85, 98 
 
 Saddueees, 368 
 
 Saguntum, allied with Rome, 143 ; 
 attacked and taken by Hannibal, 
 144, 145, 154; recaptured by Rome, 
 162 
 
 Salassi, 147 
 
 Salii, 12 
 
 Sallentini, 108 
 
 Sallustius Crispus C, 376 
 
 Samnites, a branch of the Umbrians, 
 3, 4 ; movements, 7, 88, 89 ; loose 
 fedemtion and character of con- 
 quests, 90-93 ; wars with Rome, 
 93-98 ; join the Lucanians, 101 ; 
 join Pyrrhus, 104, 107 ; make 
 peace, 108; league dissolved, 112; 
 in the second Punic war, 151. 155; 
 lose territory, 173 ; in Social war, 
 269, seqq. ; courted by Sullans and 
 Cinnans, 290; march on Rome, 
 battle, 296, 297 punishment, 297 
 
 Samos, 189, 191 
 
 Samothraoe. 198 
 
 Sardinia, Carthaginian, 34, 76, 119; 
 attacked and occupied by Rome, 
 
INDEX. 
 
 539 
 
 130, 137 ; Carthage attempts to 
 recover, 159; wars in. 175; occu- 
 pied by Lepidus, 330; by Q. 
 Valerius, 458 
 
 Sassiuates, 108 
 
 Satioula, 95 
 
 Satricum, 86, 87 ; revolts, 95 
 
 Scaptia, 87 
 
 Scipio. See Cornelius. 
 
 Scodra, 138, 139 
 
 Scordisci, 251, 252 
 
 Scotussa, 185 
 
 Scribonius Curio C, bought by 
 Caesar, 445 ; manages his interests 
 at Rome, 445-448 ; recovers Sicily, 
 458; killed in Africa, 458, 459 ; 
 his debts, 504 
 
 Scribonius Libo C, 459 
 
 Scriptura, 17. 52, 53, 317 
 
 Scyros, 186 
 
 Scythia, 279 
 
 Secession. See Sacred Mount. 
 
 Segesta, 138 
 
 Selinus, 119 
 
 Sempronius Asellio A., 274 
 
 8empronius Gracchus C, character, 
 234 ; on the land commission, 230 ; 
 232, 233 , quaestor, 234 ; tribune 
 and measures, death, 234-240; 
 improves Italian roads, 319; after 
 his fall, 242, 243, 259, 262 
 
 Sempronius Gracchus Ti., 158, 159, 
 165, 166 
 
 — — (father of the two Gracchi) in 
 Spain, 178, 228 
 
 , character, proposals, and 
 death. 228-232 
 
 Sempronius Longus Ti., 148 
 
 Sena Gallica, colony, 102 ; battle 
 near, 168 
 
 Senate, origin, powers, etc., in regal 
 times, 18, 19; increased power, 
 
 45, 46 ; plebeians admitted, 45, 
 
 46, 48; tribunes admitted, 72; 
 real power vested in the senate, 
 72-74 ; contrasted with the judges 
 of Carthage, 123; conduct of the 
 first Punic war, 132, 134, 136; 
 patriotism in the second War, 155, 
 156 : estimate of its foreign policy, 
 201 ; becomes purely aristocratic, 
 203-205 ; lax control of praetors, 
 
 206 ; mismanagement of land, 
 210,211; senatorial commissions, 
 215; decline and corruption of, 
 221, 222, 224; attacked by C. 
 Gracchus, 236, 237 ; its subsequent 
 rule, 243, 244; under Sulla, 303, 
 304, 306, 357 ; dispensing power 
 curtailed, 374 ; abuses corrected, 
 374 ; foreign affair^ after its re- 
 storation by Sulla, 337, seqq. ; 
 under Caesar, 489, 490 ; opposition 
 senate of Italians, 269 ; of Ser- 
 torius, 331 ; of the regents, 427 ; 
 in Macedonia, 459 ; in Africa, 473. 
 Senatorial jurymen. See Jury 
 Courts. 
 
 Senones, 79, 80; expelled from Italy, 
 101,412 
 
 Sentinum, 97, 98 
 
 Septimius L., 468 
 
 Septimontium, 11 
 
 Sequani, 402, 404, 413 
 
 Sergius Catilina L., character, 377; 
 conspiracies, 377-382 ; death, 382 
 
 Sertorius Q., character, 330, 331 ; 
 iu Marian war, 289-291, 295, 297 ; 
 in Mauretania, 331 ; returns to 
 Spain, 331 ; struggle with the 
 Roman government, 331-335; or- 
 ganization of Spain, 331-332; to 
 eat with Mithradates, 339 
 
 Servian, wall, 26, 27 ; constitution, 
 23-25 ; voting arrangements re- 
 stored, 278 
 
 Servilius Ahala C, 64 
 
 Servilius C, 245 
 
 ,269 
 
 Servilius Caeplo Q., 214 
 
 , 243, 253 
 
 , 261, 264 
 
 Servilius Rullus P., 378 
 
 Servilius Vatia Isauricus P., 348 
 
 Sestus, 191 
 
 Setia, 86, 87 
 
 Sertius Lateranus L, 65 
 
 Sibylline oracles, 426 
 
 Siccius Dentatus L., 60 
 
 Sicily, position, 2 ; earlv immigrants, 
 7 ; Greeks in, 36, 39, 77 ; con- 
 dition after the death of Aga- 
 thocles, 105, 106 ; Pyrrhus in, 
 107; Phoenicians in, 116; Car- 
 
540 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 thaginian rule in, 119, 120, 122, 
 124; condition of, before first 
 Punic war, 127, 128 ; surrendered 
 to Rome, 135-138; attempts to 
 recover it by Carthage, 145, 155, 
 159-161; slavery in, 225, 226; 
 occupied sfor Caesar, 458. Cf, 
 Slaves. 
 
 Sidon, 116, 118 
 
 Signia, 85, 111 
 
 Silver plate at Rome, 322 
 
 Sinnaca, 438 
 
 Sinope, 181, 279, 341, 342; ex- 
 tended, 370, 514 
 
 Sinuessa, 98, 110 
 
 Sins, 37 
 
 Sittius P., 381, 475, 477, 478 
 
 Slaves, 14; work on estates, 53, 66, 
 225, 226 ; employed in rural labour, 
 51, 52, 211 ; carry on trades, 225 ; 
 system of, 225 ; insurrections of, in 
 Italy and Sicily, 225, 226, 244, 245; 
 increase of, 320, 321, 498, 499, 501, 
 502, 503 ; checked by Caesar, 509 ; 
 gladiatorial war, 349-351 , m 
 Sicily, 351 
 
 Smyrna, 189, 191 
 
 Solon, 59 
 
 So Inn turn, 119 
 
 Sora, 88, 95, 97 
 
 Soracte, 8 
 
 Spain, Phoenicians in, 115, 119, under 
 Hamilcar, 142, 143 ; a Roman pro- 
 vince, 164; after second Punic 
 war, 177 ; constant warfare in, 
 178, 179, 213-215, 263; Sertorius 
 in 330 335 ; Caesar in, 394, 455- 
 457 ; Caesari.in lieutenants in, 473 
 
 Sparta, 181, 186, 219 
 
 Spartacns, 350, 351 
 
 Spina, 34, 88 
 
 Stabiae, 271 
 
 Stoicism at Rome, 322, 373 
 
 Subnra, 11, 23 
 
 Suburra, 458 
 
 Suebi, 401, 403 
 
 Snessa Aurnnca, 95 
 
 Suessa Pometia, 86 
 
 Snessiones, 399, 406, 407 
 
 Sugambri, 401, 409 
 
 Sulpicius Galba P., 166, 183, 184 
 
 Snlpicius Galba Serv., 214 
 
 Sulpicius Peticus C, 80, 81 
 
 Sulpicius Rufus P., 274-27 v 
 
 Surrentum, 34 
 
 Sutrium, 81, 96 
 
 SybariB, 36, 37 
 
 Syphax, 162, 170, 171 
 
 Syracuse, 36 , head of the Sicilian 
 Greeks, 77, 78, 119, 120; calls in 
 Pyrrhus, 105-107 ; in the Punic 
 wars, 127, 129, 136, 137, 159, 160 
 
 Syria, 200, 220, 221, 282, 338, 343, 
 344, 366, 368, 369, 371 ; Cras>us 
 appointed governor, 427, 435, 436, 
 439, 471, 472 
 
 Tactics, Roman and Parthian, 437 , 
 Celtic, 399, 400 ; of Vercingetorix, 
 413-416; of Britons, 410 
 
 Tarentum, 36 ; commerce of, 37 ; rise, 
 77 ; attacked by Samnites, 90, 91, 
 93, 94; conduct in Samnite wars 
 with Rome, 95, 96 ; mob attacks 
 Roman fleet, 102 ; calls in Pyrrhus, 
 103-105 ; held by Milo, 106, 107 ; 
 surrendered to Rome, 108, 128 ; in 
 the second Punic war, 166-167 
 
 Tarpeian Hill, 27 
 
 Tarquinii, home of the, 32 ; expelled 
 from Rome, 41 
 
 Tarquinii, one of the twelve Etruscan 
 towns, 32, 33 ; war with Rome, 81 
 
 Tarracina, 87 
 
 Tarraco, 162 
 
 Task- work, 16 
 
 Taurini, 146,148 
 
 Taurisci, 251-253 
 
 Tanromenium, 127 
 
 Taxation, direct, unknown, 17 ; Ita- 
 lian, 315; Provincial, 315; 496- 
 498, 510-512 
 
 Taxiles, 284, 341 
 
 Teanum Sidicinum, under Greek in- 
 fluence, 90; calls in Rome, 91 j 
 garrisoned bv the Sammtes, 93 
 
 Tectosages, 180, 193 
 
 Telamon, 38, 140 
 
 Temesa, 37 
 
 Tempe, pass of, 185 
 
 Tencteri, 401,. 402, 409 
 
 Tenths, 138, 316 
 
 Terentius Varro M., 152-155 
 
 , 457, 459 
 
INDEX. 
 
 541 
 
 Terina, 37 
 
 Territory of Rome, original, 10, 11 ; 
 
 increased, 25, 26 ; lessened, 76, 77 ; 
 
 conquest of Veii, 80 ; south Etruria 
 
 conquered, 81 ; extension south 
 
 and east, 85, 86 ; at end of Samnite 
 
 wars, 98 ; at end of Pyrrhic war, 
 
 110, 111 ; extends to the Po, 175 
 Teutones, 252, 254 
 Thala, 248 
 
 Thapsus, 118; battle of, 476-477 
 Thasos, 182 
 Theatre, seats of the equites in, 303, 
 
 358 
 Thermae. See Himera. 
 Thermopylae, 191 
 Thessaly, 179, 184, 185, 190, 198 
 Theveste, 118 
 Thrace, 185, 189, 192, 197; Thra- 
 
 cians invade Macedonia and Epirus, 
 
 251 ; wars in 282, 337, 421 
 Thurii, 90 ; apply to Rome, 101 ; 
 
 captured by the Tarentines, 102 ; 
 
 in the second Punic war, 166 
 Tiber, 8, 10, 11, 26, 27 ; stone bridge, 
 
 318; neglect of, 319; Caesar's 
 
 project, 501 
 Tibur, revolts from Rome, 86 ; in the 
 
 Latin league, 87 ; cedes territory, 
 
 92 ; position, 111, 501 
 Ticinus, 148 
 Tifata, Mount, 166 
 Tigranes, ally of Mithradates, 280- 
 
 282 ; increase of his power, 337, 
 
 338 ; in third Mithradatic war, 
 
 339; war with Rome, 343-346, 
 
 364-366. 367 
 Tigranocerta, 338, 343, 344 
 Tingis, 331 
 Tities, 10, 12, 21, 22 
 Titurius Sabinus, 408, 411, 412 
 Toga, 16 ; togati, 113 
 Tolistobogi, 180, 193 
 Tolumnius Lars, 79 
 Torboletes, 144 
 Torrhebi, 31 
 Trades at Rome, 320, 321, 328, 499, 
 
 500 
 Transpadani, 306 ; claim the civitas, 
 
 325, 375; Caesar governor, 390, 
 
 403, 447, 514, 515 
 Trasimene lake, 150-151 
 
 Trebellius, 360, 361 
 
 Trebia, 149 
 
 Trebonius, 457, 458 
 
 Treviri, 395, 401, 411, 412 
 
 Tribes of the clans, 10, 21, 22; 
 Servian levy-districts, 23 ; their 
 voting, 57 , four added, 81 ; more 
 additions, 92 ; in all thirty-five, 70 
 
 Tribunal, 27 
 
 Tribuni militum, elected by the 
 comitia, 204, 205, 493 
 
 militum consulari potestate, 63 
 
 plebis, origin, 54 ; powers, etc., 
 
 55 ; compared with consuls, 56 , 
 value, 56, 57 ; suspended during 
 the decemvirate, 58-60 ; restored 
 with new powers, 60,61; change 
 of character, 72; eligible for re- 
 election, 233 ; power restricted bv 
 Sulla, 304, 324, 354; restored", 
 357 ; under Caesar, 491 
 
 Tributum, 17 
 
 Trifanum, 92 
 
 Triumph, meaning of, 5 , becomes 
 common, 207 
 
 Trocmi, 180 
 
 Triumvirate, first, 356 ; second, 388, 
 389 
 
 Tryphon, in Sicily, 245 
 
 Tullianum, 27, 249, 381 
 
 Tullius Cicero M., accuses Verres, 355, 
 supports Lex Manilla, 361 , consul, 
 378 ; opposes Lex Servilia, 378 , 
 during Catilinarian conspiracy, 
 378-383 ; banished, 391 ; recalled, 
 423-425 ; threatens opposition to 
 regents, 427 ; submits, 429, 431 
 
 Tullius Cicero Q., 412 
 
 Tunes, 131 
 
 Turdetani, 177 
 
 Tuscan Sea, 33 
 
 Tusculum, 10 ; revolts, 86 ; member 
 of Latin league, 87 ; treatment of, 
 86,87 
 
 Tutela, 13 
 
 Twelve tables, origin, 59 
 
 Tyre, 116, 118 
 
 Ubii, 401, 409 
 Ulysses, 38 
 
 Umbrians, branch of the Italians, 3 ; 
 language, 3, 4 ; migrations, 7 ; 
 
542 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 evidence of movements, 88 ; in the 
 Samnite war, 96, 97 ; in Social 
 war, 269, seqq. 
 
 Urbs, 9 . 
 
 Usipetes, 401, 402, 409 
 
 Usury, 59, 68, 320, 483, 507, 508 
 
 Utioa, relations with Carthage, 118, 
 124; Scipio's conflicts at, 170; in 
 third Punic war, 217, 219; in 
 Civil war, 458, 472, 477, 478 
 
 Uxentum, 155 
 
 Vaocaei, 214 
 Vadimonian Lake, 96 
 Vaga, 248 
 
 Valerias Catullus Q., 431 
 Valerius Corvus L., 207, 208 
 
 , 284, 285, 286, 299 
 
 Valerius Corvus M., 72 
 
 Valerius Laevinus M., 158, 161 
 
 Valerius Laevinus P., 104, 105 
 
 Valerius Maximus M., 54 
 
 Valerius Maximus Messalla M., 129 
 
 Valerius Poplicola L , 60 
 
 Varius Q., 270, 273, 274, 291 
 
 Varro. See Terentius. 
 
 Vatinius P., 390, 431, 472 
 
 Vectigalia, 17 
 
 Veil, 25, 32 ; assignment of terri- 
 
 torv, 65 ; captured, 80, 82 
 Veliai 11, 27 
 Velites, 24 
 
 Velitrae, 86, 87; revolts, 91. 92 
 Veneti, 31, 81, 82, 139, 140; Gallic, 
 
 408 
 Venusia, 98 ; in Pyrrhic war, 104 ; 
 
 in second Punic war, 154, 167 , in 
 
 Social war, 271, 273 
 Vercellae, 254, 255 
 Vercingetorix, 413-418 
 Verres C, 355, 510 
 Verona, 79 
 Verulae, 97 
 Vesta, 27 
 Vestini, 94 
 Veterans of Marius, lands allotted to, 
 
 260 ; of Sulla 302, 329, 330 ; of 
 
 Pompeius, 357, 387, 389; of 
 
 Caesar, 495, 509 
 
 Vetulonium, 33 
 Vetilius C, 214 
 Vettius T., 244 
 
 , informer, 391 
 
 Via Aemilia, from Ariminum to Pla» 
 
 centia, 175 
 Appia, to Capua, 95 ; to Venusia, 
 
 98 ; to the Ionian sea, 108 
 Aurelia, coast road from Rome 
 
 to Luna, perhaps at the same time 
 
 as the Aemilian, 175 
 
 Cassia, 175 
 
 Domitia, from the Rhone to the 
 
 Pyrenees, 251, 320 
 Egnatia, to protect the Mace- 
 donian frontier, from Apollonia 
 
 and Dyrrhachium to the Hebrus, 
 
 219,319 
 
 Flaminia, 97, 175 
 
 Gabinia, connecting Adriatic 
 
 ports with interior, 319 
 Postumia, from Genua to Aqui- 
 
 leia, 318 
 
 Valeria, 97 
 
 Vicus Tuscus, 32 
 
 Vine-culture in Italy, 4, increase of, 
 
 211 
 Viriathus, 214 
 Vitruvius Vaccus, 92 
 Volaterrae, 275, 302 
 Volci, 33 
 Volsci, wars with Rome, 26 : cltents 
 
 of the Etruscans, 34 ; subdued by 
 
 Rome, 85, 86 ; revolt, 91, 94, 97 
 Volsinii, 33 , its aristocrats call ra 
 
 Rome, 82 
 Vote by ballot, 223. 224 
 
 War chariots In Britain, 410 
 Women, 505 
 
 Xanthippus, 131, 1S2 
 
 Zaoynthus, 194 
 Zama regia, 171 
 Zamolxis, 421 
 Zanole. See Messana. 
 Ziela, 472 
 
 b