■ STORY OF THE rOWDER-BOAT Lc rWd^r km UaUy tUSss^JT &*L M* xumjL 4+JP d-o 'dU'cJu*,. flu . err&M* ■■■' '-.i&fcfyte : '\%4*r* '/.'Mr Cl)c Hi&rarp of ti)t (Llmtjcrgitp of sftotth Carolina Collection of jRortl) Carolinians Jo STORY OF THE POWDER-BOAT. PROBABLY no episode of the late civil war is really so little understood as that famous attempt to disable the Confederate works near Wilmington, in 1864, known as the "Powder-boat Expedition." Its details have hitherto been known to but few, and the fall of Fort Fisher, the capture of Wilmington, and the other triumphs of 1865, crowding so fast upon each other, naturally distracted the public mind from all preceding unsuccessful experiments. One of the small number to whom the execution of this dangerous experi- ment was intrusted, uttered his last words when he rallied his men at the pali- sades on Federal Point, and shed his blood at the final stronghold of the rebel- lion. Those who survive, and among them is the gallant commander of the ex- pedition, have been content to keep silence, while false tongues spoke ; and, se- cure in the high honor awarded them by their comrades of the navy, they trust to history to tell her "round unvarnished tale" of truth. But the justice of history is tardy, and often does not come until the men who need it have slept for years that quiet sleep which recks so little of the world's renown. In view of the determined silence of those who could best tell the story of this experiment, the writer of this article will essay it. It was not his fortune to be one of those selected as the crew of the powder-boat ; but his opportunities for observing the details of the expedition, from beginning to end, were such as few beyond the actors in the scene enjoyed. He believes the fol- lowing to be a careful and accurate narrative of the conception, preparation and execution of this remarkable project, from which so much was expected and so little realized. Attempts to destroy hostile shipping by means of fire-ships have been com- mon in naval warfare ; but history records but one instance of the use of a powder-boat in such experiments, prior to the Fort Fisher explosion. This single precedent — an attempt gallant but also unsuccessful — is to be found in our own annals. A short narrative of the affair may prove a good introduction to the present article. In 1804, Commodore Preble, commanding the blockading squadron off the harbor of Tripoli, resolved to make the endeavor to destroy the enemy's ship- ping by means of a powder-ship, or "infernal." For this purpose, he prepared the ketch Intrepid, which had been formerly used by Decatur in his attempts on the Philadelphia. A small room was planked up in. her hold, just forward of the main-mast, and in it was stowed one hundred barrels of powder, in bulk. From this a trunk or tube led aft to another room, which was filled with splinters and lightwood. The tube contained a train of powder, which was to be fired by the flames from the fire in the after-room, and which communicated with the fuses leading into the powder. On deck, immediately over the magazine, were stowed fifty thirteen-and-a- half-inch shells, and one hundred nine-inch ; together with loose shot, kent- ledge, and fragments of iron. Captain Richard Somers commanded the Intrepid, and Lieutenant Henry Wadsworth, of the Constitution, was selected to assist him. Mr. Joseph Israel, a midshipman, contrived to smuggle himself into the boats, as they were putting off for the powder-ship. The night of September 4th was chosen for the execution of the project, and ' On* 78 STORY OF THE POWDER-BOAT. [Jan. the Intrepid started into the harbor about eight o'clock. She was watched" as she passed in over the bar by anxious eyes, until within a musket shot of the mole. At this time the enemy's batteries opened, and shortly after the ketch exploded, without reaching her destination. In all probability the premature explosion was caused by the enemy's shot ; but, as none of the gallant men who manned the Intrepid ever returned, save as ghastly and dismembered corpses, to their friends, we are of course limited to conjecture. They had been provided with two fast-pulling boats in which to make their escape. One of these drifted out to the fleet, with a single dead body in it, probably that of the boat-keeper. The other boat was never seen, and the bodies afterward recovered were utterly unrecognizable. The expedition was thus an utter failure, and the damaging of a few gunboats did not compensate for the loss of such men as Somers, Wadswcrth, Israel, and the brave sailors who accompanied them. With this brief account of the loss of the Intrepid, we may proceed to relate the story of its solitary successor. While preparations were making, in 1864, for the attack on Fort Fisher, it occurred to General Butler that if a large quantity of powder could be confined in the form of a huge torpedo, and ex- ploded close to the works, the effect of that explosion would be the destruction of the fort and garrison and even of the neighboring towns. This idea was sug- gested by the results of two very recent explosions; the one at Erith, in Eng- land, the other at City Point on the James, in the close vicinity of the General's own headquarters. In October, 1S64, on the south bank of the Thames, near Woolwich, two powder-magazines and two barges loaded with powder exploded, killing and wounding a number of persons. There were 840 barrels of powder in the two magazines, and 200 barrels in the barges. The latter were moored at the wharves. The total quantity qf powder exploded was, therefore, about 104,000 pounds, or about 46 tons. The two magazines were 135 feet from each other, on the edge of the river, immediately behind the dike. The barges were alongside the wharves, one of which extended 120, and the other 122 feet into the river. Within a few yards of the magazines were three cottages occupied by the work- men. The magazines and cottages were the only buildings within a mile of the disaster. There were three distinct explosions ; the first on board the barges, which tore asunder the large magazine, and so caused the smaller one to ex- plode. Of these magazines not one stone remained upon another. The barges were split into fragments and hurled into the air. The embankment was de- stroyed, and so were the cottages of the workmen. No damage, other than the breakage of glass and windows, was done outside of the tract of twenty acres on which these buildings were situated. The shock was, however, felt more or less throughout London, distant, at the nearest point, about fifteen miles ; and some of the statements sworn to before the coroner's jury make the distance at which the shock was felt as great as forty or fifty miles. A magazine a quarter of a mile from those blown up was uninjured, although a piece of iron was thrown through the roof, and the workmen inside of the magazine were prostrated by the explosion. Another magazine lay at a distance of a quarter of a mile from this one, and a government magazine one mile, and neither received injury. The explosion at City Point took place on board an ordnance barge moored alongside the wharf at that place. She contained about eight tons of ammuni- tion, a part of it in boxes. A similar boat was moored to her off-shore side. The wharf was built on piles, and had upon it a wooden store-house of one story. 1870.] STORY OF THE POWDER-BOAT. 79 About three hundred feet of the wharf was destroyed, and the store-house was blown down. Yet, although a small boat with several men in it, which was alongside the outer barge, was capsized, none of the men were injured. A loaded railroad train was on the track on the opposite side of the wharf, and the en- gineer was on his engine, but nothing there was injured. Across the railroad, about 165 yards from the exploded barge, were some light wooden buildings, sut- ler's tents, etc. All of these were blown down, or so much injured as to require to be torn down. Several persons were killed in and around these buildings ; and fragments of the boat sufficiently large and having a velocity sufficient to kill a man, were thrown to a distance of five hundred yards. Those persons who were killed, were not killed by the explosion, but by the projectiles which were thrown about by its force. But, though cited by General Delafield as proofs of the insufficiency of the explosive force of powder in large masses to destroy heavy structures at a dis- tance from the explosion, the foregoing facts seemed to General Butler to justify his reliance on the effects of the plan proposed by him. He believed that by it the forts at Federal Point might be destroyed, and the capture of Wilmington, or at least of the two entrances to Cape Fear river, rendered an easy task. In November he communicated this idea to Admiral Porter, then in command of the North Atlantic Squadron. That distinguished officer, with his usual prompt- itude, threw himself heart and soul into the affair. He did not anticipate results as terrible as those looked for by General Butler. He more nearly agreed with General Delafield. But it was, said the Admiral, "an experiment worth trying." If its results should prove as great as were anticipated, it would revolutionize op- erations against harbor defences. The fate of war would thereafter "depend upon which of the combatants possessed the greatest amount of powder." Casting about him for the best means to prosecute the enterprise, the Admiral selected from his fleet an old war-worn propeller of about 250 tons, which had long been employed in the sounds of North Carolina. She was called the Louisiana, and was in many respects admirably suited for her part in the enter- prise. She was flat-bottomed, and drew only five or six feet of water. She had done good service in the shallow waters where she had hitherto been employed, but was fast becoming worthless, and could be better spared than a better vessel. It was, too, a fitting end for the old war-worn steamer, that she should go from the ranks of the fleet, not into the degrading servitude of some specu- lating contractor, as an old race-horse ends his days in a cart ; nor even into the dull but honorable retirement of a navy-yard hulk ; but into the very fore-front of the battle ; and there gloriously expire in one brilliant flash ; slaying, like Samson of old, more at her death than she had done during her whole life-time. The Louisiana was accordingly ordered to report at Hampton Roads ; and, on the evening of the 30th of November, she arrived in that harbor from New- bern. She was a slow coach, her best speed being about six knots in smooth water. During the trip from Hatteras Inlet to Cape Henry, she was with much ado kept off the beach, the wind drawing partially on it. On her arrival she was immediately ordered to Norfolk, where her officers and crew were transferred to other vessels, and gangs of workmen at once commenced transforming the man- of-war into a torpedo. Her guns and masts were removed, and her stores, am- munition and provisions taken out ; a house was built on her upper deck, ex- tending forward from her smoke-slack (which was just forward of the officers' quarters) almost to her bow, being seventy feet in length. A false smoke-stack, made of hoops and canvas, was placed forward of the real one ; the deck-house 8o STORY OF THE POWDER-BOAT. [JAN. was covered with canvas, painted to prevent leakage; painted canvas screens closed in the sides and side-lights ; and she was then whitewashed all over. Thus, when turned over by the navy-yard authorities to the ordnance officers, she was as fair an imitation of a blockade-runner as could be desired, and one not easily detected at night. And now came the great question while these preparations were making — who should execute this plan, so easy of conception, but so difficult to carry to success ? For obvious reasons, the selection of a commander for the expedition devolved upon Admiral Porter. Having but lately assumed command of the squadron, and being consequently not familiar with all his officers, he first is- sued a general order calling for volunteers for a hazardous duty, stating that the chances were " death, or glory, honor and promotion." He was deluged with ap- plications. Although the nature of the service for which they were required was entirely unknown, volunteers, from commodores to master's-mates, registered their names as candidates for the chance of getting killed. The feeling that the Admiral's brilliant feats in the West had inspired in the hearts of all, and the natural fancy of sailors for anything that was at the same time hazardous and mysterious, made the list a large one. From among so great a number with equa claims, men already famous at Port Royal, New Orleans, Charleston or Mobile how was it possible to select ?- As has been said, while the crude conception of the plan was General But- ler's and while the preparation of the explosive power was the work of the Ord- nance Department, the execution devolved upon the Admiral. He had many brave men in his command : how many had he, who with great bravery com- bined judgment, and with courage coolness ; who would not risk and ruin all for the sake of a dashing attempt ; who would intelligently and fearlessly carry out not only the letter but the spirit of their instructions? Many who fulfilled these conditions, yet, from their age and rank in the service and their positions in the fleet, could not be spared. The admiral's attention'soon fixed itself firmly upon an officer who, for brilliant and judicious conception, and cool and daring execution, had made his name famous among his comrades, and had gained flattering encomiums from a department never too ready to praise. This man was Commander Alexander C. Rhind, of New York, at this time commanding a double-ender, the Agawam. Commander Rhind had already served with great distinction in the South Atlantic Squadron. The writer was a witness to his gallant attack on the forts of the Dawho, in South Carolina, when, in a little tug-boat (the Hale), he engaged the enemy ensconced behind their works, drove them from their guns, and, immediately landing with a boat's crew, destroved the forts, spiked and otherwise disabled the guns, and carried away all their ammunition. Being obliged, owing to his vessel grounding, to wait until night-fall for the rise of the tide, he was subjected, on his return, to a murderous plunging fire of grape and canister from a battery on an overhanging bluff. But so well had he protected his men by hammocks and bags, that, though his decks were badly scarred, he rejoined his little fleet without having a man injured. Where others might have ordered an attack, he was wont to lead it ; and he there- by inspired his officers and men with such enthusiasm that the Edisto river, long a stronghold of the rebels, became, after his occupation of its waters, altogether too hot for them. The sight of his vessel (and an old rattle-trap she was) com- ing up the river, was enough, at any time, to scatter the foe, and to render the banks of the Edisto safe from its mouth as far up as there was water enough for his vessel to float in. For his gallantry at the Dawho, he received the written thanks of the Navy Department. 1870.] STORY OF THE POWDER-BOAT. 81 The Agawam was now undergoing extensive repairs at Norfolk, and would not be ready for sea in time to share in the proposed bombardment of Fort Fish- er. It was proposed to her commander to take command of the Louisiana and the powder-party. He accepted at once, and set about his preparations. Ad- miral Porter having desired that Commander Rhind should select his own offi- cers and crew, he chose Lieutenant Samuel W. Preston, Second Assistant Engin- eer A. T. E. Mullan, and Master's Mate Paul Rj der as officers of the party, and the following enlisted men he selected as his crew : Frank Lucas, coxswain ; William Garvin, captain of the forecastle, Charles J. Bibber, gunner's mate ; John Neil, quarter gunner ; Robert Montgomery, captain of afterguard ; James Roberts, sea- man ; Charles Hawkins, seaman; Dennis Conlan, seaman: James Sullivan, or- dinary seaman ; William Hinnegan, second-class fireman ; and Charles Rice, coal-heaver. The crew were all volunteers from the Agawam. Mr. Boyden was one of the Louisiana while she was in service, and volunteered, as he expressed it, " to see the last of the old thing." Mr. Mullan was one of the Agawam's engineers, and also a volunteer. Mr. Preston had but just returned from a rebel prison, having been captured in the unfortunate assault on Fort Sumter. The Louisiana was to have as consort a fast steamer, which was to tow the vessel in, if found necessary, pilot her to her destination and bring off her offi- cers and crew. The charge of this vessel and her movement, under his direc- tions, was committed by Commander Rhind to Lieutenant Roswell H. Lamson, commanding the Gettysburg, and Sub-Assistant J. S. Bradford, of the Coast Survey, hydrogiapher on the Admiral's staff. While the officers detailed from the Ordnance Office were engaged in load- ing and preparing this monstrous torpedo, Admiral Porter, after studying the charts of the vicinity of New Inlet, with a view to ascertain how near the works the vessel could be taken without grounding, concluded to send in a party in a small boat, to find and trace the line of six feet at low water along the beach. This duty was entrusted to Mr. Bradford, who proceeded, with a boat and crew furnished by the steamer Wilderness, to New Inlet ; but, owing to the very stormy weather, repeated attempts failed, and it was not until the night of the 17th of December that he succeeded in getting a line of soundings in to the de- sired point. On a W. by S.^S. course, he struck six feet at an estimated dis- tance of 150 yards from the beach. Returning to Beaufort (now the rendezvous of the fleet), he reported his success on the morning of the 18th December, to the Admiral at the council of officers convened on board the flag-ship. At the same time he received his own orders to be prepared to guide the powder- vessel in. For the Louisiana was now "ready for action." The stowage of the powder and the arrangement of the means for exploding it had been committed to the charge of Major Rodman, of the Ordnance Corps of the Army, and Lieut.-Com- mander Jeffers, of the Navy. The vessel was taken down to Craney Island, at the mouth of the Elizabeth river, and there received on board one hundred and eighty- five tons of powder, which was stowed under the superintendence of those offi- cers. The accompanying plan shows a longitudinal section of the powder ves- sel, and the manner of stowing the powder. The powder was first stowed in the berth-deck in 5o)b. bags, filling the deck up even with the hatches. Abaft the berth deck, between it and the boiler, was an after hold or coal-bunker, which was also filled. To guard against damage by leakage, the bunker was stowed, first, with two tiers of full barrels, having their heads knocked out, and the bags were piled on top of these to the level 82 STORY OF THE POWDER-BOAT. [Jan. of the spar deck. The IS sh: ffl nz ^S balance of the powder was stowed in the deck-house, beginning against the after bulk-head, and occupying about one-fifth of the available space. To the amount in the deck-house, the naval authorities afterward added thirty tons, in Beaufort ; but even then two thirds of the house remained unfilled. This, as will be hereafter shown, was a very grave error, but the vessel could not carry more with safety than the two hundred and fifteen tons now in her. The fault lay in the calculations of the projectors of the en- terprise, that a vessel of two hundred and fifty tons could carry three hundred tons of powder." The d«ck-house either should not have been built upon her at all, or should have been made very much smaller. To explode this mass of powder several appliances were adopted. By the ordnance officers the movements of three ordinary marine clocks were used. First re- moving the faces and hands, a cylinder, having four pins set in its circumference equidistant, was secured to the arbor of the minute-hand. As these four pins were at equal distances, it is easy to see that the space between any two was equal to fifteen minutes. The clocks were each fastened to a board by the side of a copper tube at the bottom.of which was fitted a common musket-tube (or a shell-plunger) capped with a percussion cap. One end of a piece of catgut was attached to a grape-shot of two pounds weight, which latter, when the clocks were set, was placed at the top of the tube. The catgut was then led through an eye on the board just above the tube, and then, by means of a loop in its other end, was hooked over one of the pins in the clock cylinder. Of course, as the revolution of the cylinder brought this pin down- ward, the loop would drop off, the shot would fall, and so explode the cap. With this cap on each of the clocks was connected an end of the fuse leading through the powder. These fuses, according to the plans of the ordnance office, were laid only in the upper and outer layers of bags in the deck-house. Holes were bored in the deck to enable the fire to communicate with the powder below. Lieutenant-Commander Jeffers desired, at first, that large hatches might be cut in the spar deck ; but, for some reason unknown to the writer, was induced to abandon the idea, and bore holes instead. The fact that the fuses were not led through the powder in the coal-bunker and berth-deck, seems to an impartial observer sufficient to account for the non- explosion of the vast mass of powder in those rooms. Mr. Jeffers, however, in his testimony (Fort Fisher Ex- pedition, page 255) says that "the theory adopted was, that by igniting it from the top and sides the lateral i8 7 o.] STORY OF THE POWDER-BOAT. 83 effect would be increased." The question, as it appears to us, is, Was it ignited at all ? The fuses would certainly have secured the certainty of ignition. The accompanying sketch shows the arrangement of the clocks. There were also six slow matches, provided by Major Rodman with as many wooden tubes, lined with lead or zinc, in and through which they were to be laid. The slow matches were placed in different parts of the vessel, and connected with the powder by Gomez fuses. The tubes, however, proved useless, as the matches would not burn in them, and the latter were, therefore, laid without them. Besides these means, adopted by the ord- nance officers, Commander Rhind added a third. A board, slung at its four corners by cords, was suspended in the cook-house; and in it were set five pieces of candle, cut, by experiment, to burn one hour and three- quarters. Into the bottom of each candle was inserted a Gomez fuse-end, and these fuses passed out into the powder-room for- ward of the cook-house, being spliced or married into every line of fuse which they crossed. Finally, to make the explosion a cer- tainty, and prevent the vessel falling into the hands of the enemy in case of the above means to explode her failing, a fire was laid in the stern, composed of tallow, turpentine, cotton waste and pine wood. This was to be lighted at the last moment, and was to be so arranged that the flames might not reach the powder until the clocks and chandelier should have had ample time to aet. Lieutenant-Commander Jeffers asserts in his report (see Fort Fisher Expedition, page 250) that it was proposed to use Beardslee's electro-magnetic machines and wires to explode the powder ; but that that proposition ''was not favorably considered by those charged with the execution of the plan." In regard to this assertion, we can only say, that the first hint of the contem- plation of any such plan was received by Commander Rhind on reading Mr. Jeffers's statement to that effect in the report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War. Does it not, in the face of this fact, seem extraordinary that Mr. Jeffers should say "those charged with the execution of the plan" were opposed to the use of electricity ? The subject of electricity was never broached to any of the