THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
 
 & 
 
 The Development of 
 United States Policy 
 
 / J 
 
 in the 
 
 v 
 
 Near East, South Asia, and Africa 
 
 During 1953 
 
 by Harry N. Howard 
 
Reprinted from the Department of State Bulletins of February 22 and March 1 and 8, 1954 
 Department of State Publication 5432 • Near and Middle Eastern Series 15 
 
 Released April 1954 
 
 DIVISION OF PUBLICATIONS 
 
 For sale by the Superintendent oj Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office 
 Washington 25, D. C. — Price 15 cents 
 
t 
 
 The Development of United States Policy in the Near East, 
 South Asia, and Africa During 1953: Part I 1 
 
 by Harry N. Howard 
 
 I. SOME OLD PROBLEMS IN A NEW SETTING 
 
 Basic Problems and Considerations 
 
 During the course of the year 1953 the United 
 States continued to be confronted with difficult 
 and complicated problems in the vast area of the 
 Near East, South Asia, and Africa. As in the 
 past, whether directly or within the framework 
 of the United Nations, the problems have ranged 
 from broad and fundamental issues — such as the 
 emergent nationalism of the peoples of this area, 
 with their urge toward self-determination, self- 
 government or independence; the economic de- 
 velopment of underdeveloped territories; and 
 questions of mutual security and assistance — to 
 the special problems involved in North Africa, 
 Anglo-Egyptian and Anglo-Iranian differences, 
 the persistent Israeli- Arab controversies, the ques- 
 tion of Kashmir, and a host of others. In one 
 way or another, the peoples and states of this part 
 of the world continued to be under pressure from 
 the Soviet Union ; the passing of Premier Stalin 
 and the emergence of Premier Malenkov failed 
 to alter the picture in any basic sense, whatever 
 the change in tactics, as indicated in the Malenkov 
 statement of August 8, 1953. 
 
 Although President Eisenhower made no spe- 
 cific reference to problems arising from the Near 
 
 1 For background see Harry N. Howard, "The De- 
 velopment of United States Policy in the Near East, 
 1945-1951," Bulletin of Nov. 19, 1951, p. 809, and Nov. 
 26, 1951, p. 839 (also available as Department of State 
 publication 4446), and "The Development of United 
 States Policy in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa, 
 1951-1952," Bulletin of Dec. 8, 1952, p. 891, and Dec. 
 15, 1952, p. 936 (also available as Department of State 
 publication 4851) ; Henry A. Byroade, "U. S. Foreign 
 Policy in the Middle East," Bulletin of Dec. 15, 1952, 
 p. 931. For a convenient review of various problems 
 in the U. N. Security Council, see U. N. doc. S/3 175, 
 Feb. 8, 1954. 
 
 East, South Asia, and Africa in his inaugural ad- 
 dress of January 20, 1953, he did state : 2 
 
 Conceiving the defense of freedom like freedom itself 
 to be one and indivisible, we hold all continents and 
 peoples in equal regard and honor. We reject any in- 
 sinuation that one race or another, one people or another, 
 is in any sense inferior or expendable. 
 
 There was a similar note in the State of the 
 Union Address of February 2 in which the Presi- 
 dent declared that "the policy we embrace must be 
 a coherent global policy. The freedom we cherish 
 and defend in Europe and in the Americas is no 
 different from the freedom that is imperiled in 
 Asia." 3 Dedicated to the security of the free 
 world, the policy of the United States would "en- 
 vision all peaceful methods and devices — except 
 breaking faith with our friends." Nor would the 
 United States "acquiesce in the enslavement of any 
 people in order to purchase fancied gain for 
 ourselves." 
 
 In his first report to the American people on for- 
 eign policy problems, on January 27, 4 Secretary 
 Dulles touched on the Near East, South Asia, and 
 Africa, pointing out the great strategic and eco- 
 nomic significance of the area and the troublesome 
 issues which had come to the American doorstep 
 and laying stress on the Soviet and Communist 
 threat. 
 
 There were other indications of the American 
 concern, especially with the basic problems in the 
 Near and Middle East. When Prince Faisal, the 
 Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, called on Presi- 
 dent Eisenhower on March 2, 6 the President not 
 
 2 Bulletin of Feb. 2, 1953, p. 169. 
 
 3 IUd., Feb. 9, 1953, p. 207. 
 " IUd., p. 212. 
 
 'IUd., Mar. 23, 1953, p. 440. Prince Faisal called on 
 Secretary Dulles on the same day for a discussion of prob- 
 lems of mutual interest. 
 
 274 
 
 Department of State Bulletin 
 
only expressed his "great pleasure at having the 
 opportunity of receiving so distinguished a rep- 
 resentative of a country with which the United 
 States enjoys especially close relations," but ex- 
 
 Eressed "his concern over some evidence that there 
 ad lately occurred a deterioration in relations be- 
 tween the Arab nations and the United States." 
 He added that "it would be his firm purpose to 
 seek to restore the spirit of confidence and trust 
 which had previously characterized these relations 
 and he hoped that the Arab leaders would be in- 
 spired by the same purpose." President Eisen- 
 hower alluded to "the many strong educational and 
 cultural ties" between the Arab world and the 
 United States and was confident that this was "a 
 foundation of good will on which to build during 
 the coming years to mutual advantage." The 
 President also stressed his personal interest "in the 
 welfare and progress of Saudi Arabia and the 
 other States in the Near East." 
 
 Visit of Secretary Dulles 
 
 President Eisenhower was, indeed, "keenly 
 aware of the importance of the Near East and 
 South Asia." On March 9, Secretary Dulles 
 announced that the President had asked him to 
 go personally to the Near East and South Asia "to 
 show our friendship for the Governments and peo- 
 ples of these areas," and to obtain firsthand im- 
 pressions of their problems. It was the first visit 
 ever paid to the area by a Secretary of State. 
 Accompanied by Mutual Security Director Harold 
 E. Stassen, Assistant Secretary of State Henry 
 A. Byroade, and others, Secretary Dulles visited 
 Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, 
 Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, India, Turkey, Greece, 
 and Libya between May 9 and May 29. 6 
 
 Mr. Dulles reported on his journey to the na- 
 tion on June 1 7 and declared it "high time that 
 the United States Government paid more atten- 
 tion to the Near East and South Asia," indicating 
 that the situation in that area of the world called 
 for "urgent concern." The Secretary had arrived 
 at a number of conclusions. He noted, in the first 
 instance, that most of the peoples of this area 
 were "deeply concerned about political independ- 
 ence for themselves and others." They were sus- 
 picious not only of the "colonial powers" but also 
 of the United States because, it was thought, mem- 
 bership of the United States in Nato required 
 it "to preserve or restore the old colonial interests 
 of our allies." Mr. Dulles was convinced that 
 American policy had become "unnecessarily am- 
 biguous" in this matter, and he stressed that the 
 Western Powers could "gain, rather than lose, 
 from an orderly development of self-govern- 
 ment." 
 
 'IMd., Mar. 23, 1953, p. 431; Apr. 27, 1953, p. 605; 
 May 18, 1953, p. 707. 
 
 ' Ibid., June 15, 1953, p. 831. 
 
 Secondly, Mr. Dulles noted the popular demand 
 for better standards of living, a demand which 
 could no longer be ignored. He believed that the 
 United States could usefully help in finding a 
 solution of this problem "by contributing ad- 
 vanced technical knowledge about transport, com- 
 munication, fertilization, and use of water for 
 irrigation" under the Mutual Security Program. 
 
 Thirdly, Mr. Dulles believed "that the United 
 States should seek to allay the deep resentment 
 against it that has resulted from the creation of 
 Israel." The Arab peoples, he said, were "afraid 
 that the United States will back the new State of 
 Israel in aggressive expansion"; they were "more 
 fearful of Zionism than of communism." Israel, 
 on the other hand, was fearful lest ultimately the 
 Arabs might try to push it into the Mediterranean 
 Sea. 
 
 In this connection, the Secretary made it clear 
 that the United States still stood by the Tripartite 
 Declaration of May 25, 1950, as to violations of 
 frontiers or armistice lines. He also said that the 
 leaders in Israel themselves "agreed with us that 
 United States policies should be impartial so as 
 to win not only the respect and regard of the 
 Israeli but also of the Arab peoples," and that the 
 United States would seek such policies. There 
 was need for peace in the Middle East, achieve- 
 ment of which would require concessions on the 
 part of both Israel and the Arab States, and the 
 Secretary declared that the United States would 
 not "hesitate by every appropriate means to use its 
 influence to promote a step-by-step reduction of 
 tension in the area and the conclusion of ultimate 
 peace." On the other hand, he was now convinced 
 that the establishment of a Middle East Defense 
 Organization was a matter for the future, not an 
 immediate possibility. 
 
 Basic Problems in the United Nations 
 
 As had been the case in previous years, the new 
 Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dag 
 Hammarskjold, in his annual report on the work 
 of the United Nations, made general reference to 
 problems arising from areas like the Near East, 
 South Asia, and Africa. Among other things, 
 for example, he declared : 8 
 
 The efforts of the governments to control and moderate 
 chose conflicts that constitute an immediate danger to 
 world peace — and above all the "East-West" conflict — 
 must command first attention in day-to-day decisions. 
 However, side by side with those conflicts, or underly- 
 ing them, two fundamental trends in human society are 
 apparent which must determine the long-term direction 
 of our efforts. One of the trends is directed towards 
 wider social justice and equality for individuals. The 
 other is directed towards equality and justice between 
 nations, politically but also in the economic and social 
 sense. 
 
 ' U.N. doc. A/2404, xi. xii. 
 
 February 22, 1954 
 
 275 
 
There is the further general recognition of the vital im- 
 portance, for sound development of the world community, 
 of orderly progress of the nations towards a state of full 
 economic development, self-government and independence. 
 And, finally, international co-operation is recognized as 
 an essential instrument for a guided development 
 towards greater social justice within the nations. 
 
 . . . There is a tendency to regard social justice 
 and equality of political and economic rights among 
 nations — or what may be called international equality — 
 as being, on the whole, technical and special problems 
 subordinated to the more urgent one of collective security. 
 This attitude is understandable and correct, but only 
 in a short-term perspective. International equality and 
 justice are prerequisites of the domestic social develop- 
 ment of all the peoples of the world and, together, they 
 are the decisive factors if we are to build a world of peace 
 and freedom. No system of collective security can be 
 built with sufficient strength unless the underlying pres- 
 sures are reduced — and those pressures can be mastered 
 only to the extent that we succeed in meeting the demands 
 for international justice or internal social justice. 
 
 The Secretary-General added that "the efforts of 
 the United Nations to assist under-developed coun- 
 tries and its efforts to promote the observance of 
 human rights should be recognized as contribu- 
 tions to world peace which are just as basic as its 
 efforts in the field of collective security." 
 
 II. SOME SPECIAL PROBLEMS 
 
 The Greek Problem 
 
 The United States was no longer confronted 
 with significant Greek political questions in the 
 General Assembly of the United Nations. Even 
 that of the Greek children, which had been dis- 
 cussed in the spring of 1953, did not arise in the 
 old forms. 9 
 
 In his remarks before the General Assembly on 
 September 21, Ambassador Alexis Kyrou, head 
 of the Greek delegation, touched on the Soviet 
 "peace offensive" and noted the persistent refusal 
 of the Soviet satellites to cooperate with the In- 
 ternational Red Cross in the repatriation either 
 of the Greek children or of other Greek nationals. 
 His comments on the problem of Cyprus were 
 also of interest ; after reviewing the history of the 
 problem, Mr. Kyrou said : 10 
 
 My Government . . . does not at this moment contem- 
 plate bringing the matter before this Organization, since 
 it is convinced that the close relations that, so happily, 
 exist between Greece and the United Kingdom make it in- 
 cumbent upon us not to underestimate either the re- 
 sources of diplomacy or the political foresight of our 
 
 * For details see H. N. Howard, "Greek questions in the 
 Seventh Session of the General Assembly", Bulletin of 
 Aug. 24, 1953, p. 252 ; Aug. 31, 1953, p. 293. At the Eighth 
 Session only $5,000 was set aside for the expenses of the 
 International Committee of the Red Cross and the League 
 of Red Cross Societies in connection with the problem 
 (U.N. doc. A/C.5/553). As part of the Soviet peace of- 
 fensive, the Hungarian Red Cross announced on Oct. 6 
 that it was prepared to repatriate 600 Greek children to 
 
 10 U.N. doc. A/PV. 439, pp. 65-71, especially para- 
 graph 18. 
 
 British friends. My Government definitely prefers the 
 method of friendly bilateral discussion, since that is war- 
 ranted by the very nature of our long-standing cordial re- 
 lations with the United Kingdom and by the felicitous 
 identity of purpose which has always animated the peoples 
 of the two countries. It is our ardent hope that these views 
 are shared by our friends in the United Kingdom and that 
 they, also, consider the task that lies ahead as a worthy 
 object on which to exert their statesmanship. The door 
 will always be open for us to go before a judge, if the 
 ordinary processes of friendly conversations prove to 
 be of no avail. 
 
 The changed situation with respect to Greece was 
 underlined on February 28, 1953, when Greece, 
 Turkey, and Yugoslavia signed a Tripartite Pact 
 providing, among other things, for political and 
 military consultation, economic, technical, and cul- 
 tural collaboration, and pacific settlement of any 
 disputes in accordance with the United Nations 
 Charter. The Soviet "peace offensive" did not 
 seriously impress the members of the new Balkan 
 Entente, despite the later exchanges of ambassa- 
 dors between Greece and Yugoslavia, on the one 
 hand, and the Soviet Union, on the other. As 
 King Paul of Greece indicated during the visit 
 which he and Queen Frederika made to the United 
 States in October-December 1953, Greece was de- 
 termined "that the unity of purpose and under- 
 standing that we are forming in Eastern Europe" 
 should not be "exclusive" but should "become a 
 message of hope and daring possibility to some of 
 our neighbors. 11 
 
 Early in November the three nations established 
 a permanent secretariat to deal with matters of 
 common interest, and on November 20 it was an- 
 nounced that agreement had been achieved among 
 the respective general staffs "on all questions re- 
 lated to the common defense of the three friendly 
 countries in the event of aggression." The United 
 States, of course, welcomed the Entente between 
 its two Nato allies, Greece and Turkey, and 
 Yugoslavia, as a contribution to international 
 peace and security both in Southeastern Europe 
 and in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
 
 Meanwhile, partly on the basis of the Soviet 
 "peace offensive," Bulgaria on June 22 substan- 
 tially accepted the standing Greek proposal that 
 a mixed commission consider Bulgarian-Greek 
 frontier difficulties. 12 A meeting was held on 
 July 10, and by September 17, the dispute with 
 respect to the disputed islets of Alpha, Beta and 
 Gamma in the Evros River appeared to be on the 
 road toward settlement. Arrangements were 
 made for discussions of the resumption of diplo- 
 matic relations between Greece and Bulgaria, fol- 
 lowing a conciliatory statement by Bulgarian Pre- 
 mier Chervenkov on September 8 and the reply 
 
 11 For text of King Paul's remarks of Oct. 29, 1953, see 
 Bulletin of Nov. 16, 1953, p. 671. King Paul also ad- 
 dressed a special plenary session of the General Assem- 
 bly on Nov. 3, 1953. 
 
 12 The Albanian Government proposed a mixed com- 
 mission in a communication of November 12 to the Sec- 
 retary-General of the United Nations. Like Bulgaria, 
 it had rejected similar proposals in 1949. 
 
 276 
 
 Department of State Bulletin 
 
of the Greek Government on September 21. The 
 situation along the northern frontiers had become 
 normalized to such an extent that, on November 
 26, Ambassador Kyrou requested the Secretary- 
 General of the United Nations to consider reduc- 
 ing the number of United Nations observers in 
 Greece from six to three and to continue their 
 services through July 31, 1954; the budget re- 
 quirement was estimated at $49,000. 13 
 
 On October 12 the United States and Greece 
 signed an agreement providing for joint use 
 of Greek air and naval bases within the frame- 
 work of the North Atlantic Treaty. 14 Two weeks 
 later, on October 26, the Soviet Union protested 
 to the Greek Government, charging it with partici- 
 pation in the alleged Nato plans for the prepa- 
 ration "of a new war" by making Greece "a 
 foreign military base, contrary to the interests 
 of maintaining peace and international security." 
 The Soviet Government therefore, could not — 
 
 but draw the attention of the Greek Government to the 
 fact that the conversion of the territory of Greece into 
 a base for the armed forces of the aggressive North At- 
 lantic Bloc creates a threat to peace and security in the 
 Balkans, and the Greek Government thereby assumes 
 grave responsibility for this step leading to an aggrava- 
 tion of the international situation. 
 
 The Bulgarian Government filed a similar protest 
 on October 29, and the Albanian Government sent 
 one to the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
 on October 31. The Greek Government replied to 
 the Soviet note on November 12 indicating that 
 the Soviet position was quite unfounded, since the 
 agreement with the United States did not change 
 the situation in the Balkan region and was merely 
 a supplement to the North Atlantic Treaty, which 
 was Dased on the principles of collective security 
 enshrined in the charter of the United Nations. 
 The Greek note also stated that Greece, which was 
 devoted to the ideal of peace and international 
 cooperation, had learned through experience that 
 constant vigilance was imperative and did not per- 
 mit any slackening of defensive measures. 
 
 The Problem of the Turkish Straits in 1953 
 
 During his visit to Turkey on May 25-26, 1953, 
 Secretary Dulles noted that the United States con- 
 sidered Turkey one of its "staunchest allies" and 
 appreciated "the share of the Turkish people in 
 measures to defend their great democracy." The 
 American Congress and people, he said, were 
 aware of Turkish efforts "to strengthen a free and 
 independent Middle East," and admired the "he- 
 roic performance" of the Turkish Brigade in 
 Korea. Turkish membership in Nato, like that of 
 Greece, was welcomed, and the United States was 
 
 B U. N. docs. A/CN. 7/SC. 1/52 and A/C. 5/570; see 
 the Seventh Periodic Report of the United Nations Mili- 
 tary Observers in Greece, dated Oct. 1, 1953 (U.N. doc. 
 A/CN. 7/SC. 1/51). 
 
 " For text see Bulletin of Dec. 21, 1953, p. 863. 
 
 "happy to have this association with a nation 
 which has the courage and discipline required to 
 strengthen our common cause and act as a bulwark 
 in the defense against communism." 
 
 The problem of the Turkish Straits, which had 
 been dormant since the end of the "great debate" 
 of October 1946, 15 was raised once more with the 
 Turkish Government by the Soviet Union on May 
 30, although there was nothing essentially new in 
 the Soviet proposals. It was only a few days after 
 the visit of Secretary Dulles that Foreign Minister 
 Molotov handed the Turkish Ambassador in Mos- 
 cow a formal communication concerning the 
 Straits, indicating that the Soviet Government had 
 been considering its relations with neighboring 
 states and, among other matters, the status of 
 Soviet-Turkish relations. 
 
 The Soviet note referred to the denunciation 
 of the Soviet-Turkish treaty of December 17, 
 1925, and to the ensuing discussions, during which, 
 on June 7, 1945, as a price for a new treaty of 
 "friendship" similar to those being made with 
 the states of Eastern and Southeastern Europe, 
 the Soviet Union had asked for retrocession of the 
 Kars-Ardahan district in eastern Anatolia. The 
 note also pointed out that at that time the Soviet 
 Union, in the interest of the "elimination of any 
 threat to the security of the Soviet Union which 
 might come from the direction of the Straits of 
 the Bosphorus," had raised the problem of the 
 Turkish Straits. The demands at the time had 
 included (1) bases in the Straits, (2) the elabora- 
 tion of a new convention of the Straits by the 
 Black Sea Powers and (3) joint defense of the 
 Straits by Turkey and the Soviet Union. 
 
 The Soviet Government now felt, however, that 
 the Turkish Government had "been unduly 
 grieved" in these matters, with consequent dele- 
 terious effects on Soviet-Turkish relations. 16 As 
 the Soviet note went on to say, the Armenian and 
 Georgian S.S.R.s in the interests of preserving 
 good neighborly relations and strengthening peace 
 and security in the region, had now found it pos- 
 sible to renounce their claims on Turkish terri- 
 tory. Moreover, the Soviet Government had 
 reviewed its policy as to the problem of the Turk- 
 ish Straits and "deemed it possible to ensure the 
 security of the Soviet Union in the area of the 
 Straits under conditions which would be equally 
 acceptable both to the Soviet Union and to Tur- 
 key." Consequently the Soviet Union now had 
 "no territorial claims against Turkey." 
 
 The Turkish Government did not reply to the 
 Soviet note until July 18, since it desired to give 
 appropriate study to the problem. After repeat- 
 
 " For background see H. N. Howard, The Problem of the 
 Turkish Straits, Department of State publication 2752, 
 pp. 36-45, 47-68. 
 
 10 The Soviet position in 1945-46 bore a close resem- 
 blance to that taken in the Hitler-Ribbentrop-Molotov 
 discussions of Nov. 12-13, 1940 ; see H. N. Howard, "Ger- 
 many, the Soviet Union and Turkey during World War 
 II," Bulletin of July 18, 1948, p. 63. 
 
 February 22, 7954 
 
 277 
 
ing the text of the Soviet note, the Turkish reply 
 acknowledged 
 
 with satisfaction the statement in which the Ussr Gov- 
 ernment states that the Ussr has no territorial claims 
 on Turkey. The Turkish Government states that the 
 interest in preserving good neighborly relations and 
 strengthening peace and security to which the above 
 statement refers, fully corresponds with interests which 
 always have been shown and will continue to be shown 
 by Turkey. The Turkish Government considers it 
 necessary to underline, in connection with the above, 
 that the question of the Black Sea Straits, as is known 
 to the Soviet Government, is regulated by the provisions 
 of the Montreux Convention. 
 
 Two days later on July 20, the Soviet Govern- 
 ment presented another note on the Straits to Am- 
 bassador Hozar in order, evidently, to keep the 
 subject alive. The new note had a special bear- 
 ing on Turkish-American and Anglo-Turkish 
 relations : 17 
 
 The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has informed 
 the Soviet Embassy in Ankara that between July 22-27, 
 United States naval units, consisting of ten ships, includ- 
 ing two cruisers, three destroyers, four minesweepers, and 
 one landing craft, will visit the port of Istanbul. 
 
 Following this the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 informed the Soviet Embassy that between July 27 and 
 August 3, British naval vessels, consisting of 22 units, 
 including three cruisers, four destroyers, six minesweep- 
 ers and four landing vessels will visit the port of Istanbul. 
 
 In connection with this report of the Turkish Ministry 
 of Foreign Affairs one cannot but draw attention to the 
 fact that recently entry into ports in the Black Sea 
 Straits by units of foreign navies, including large naval 
 vessels, has become more frequent, and that the above- 
 mentioned visits to the port of Istanbul by 10 American 
 naval vessels and 22 British naval vessels can be con- 
 sidered as a kind of military demonstration. 
 
 The Soviet Government, therefore, hoped "to re- 
 ceive additional information" from Turkey with 
 regard to the visit of these warships to Istanbul. 
 
 The Turkish Government replied to the Soviet 
 note on July 24, merely stating that, under articles 
 14 and 17 of the Montreux Convention, there was 
 full freedom for courtesy visits of warships, both 
 as to tonnage and composition, and that it was 
 "impossible to interpret the frequency of these 
 visits as anything other than an auspicious mani- 
 festation of the bonds of friendship that exist be- 
 tween Turkey and the states whose naval units are 
 invited to make the visits in question." This being 
 the situation, and in view of the fact that, in ac- 
 cordance with the Montreux Convention, the So- 
 viet Union had been notified of the visits, the 
 Turkish Government was "astonished" that the 
 Soviet Government had "found it necessary to re- 
 quest supplementary information of a nature that 
 could be construed to be a sort of interference in 
 a matter which international custom leaves to the 
 discretion of the states concerned." 
 
 " Under article 17 of the Montreux Convention a naval 
 force of any tonnage or composition may pay a courtesy 
 visit of limited duration to a port in the Straits at the in- 
 vitation of the Turkish Government, but must leave by 
 the same route by which it entered, unless it fulfills the 
 conditions for passage laid down in articles 10, 14, and 18. 
 
 On July 31 the Soviet Government presented 
 another note to Turkey, reiterating its communi- 
 cation of July 20 and reviewing the Turkish reply. 
 In addition, the Soviet Government summarized 
 the data as to the visits of foreign warships in 
 the Straits since 1945, as follows: 18 
 
 1950 33 warships, 197,000 tons displacement 
 
 1951 49 warships, 378,800 tons displacement 
 
 1952 69 warships, 587,727 tons displacement 
 
 During the first seven months of 1953, it was 
 stated, sixty warships, of more than 300,000 tons, 
 had visited in the region of the Straits. Thus, 
 the Soviet Government indicated that in recent 
 years the visits of "large formations of foreign 
 warships to the Black Sea Straits" had considera- 
 bly increased. These visits had reached such a 
 high level that the Soviet Government felt its re- 
 quest for additional information from the Turk- 
 ish Government could not be regarded as "unusual 
 or unexpected." But the Turkish Government, 
 in view of its July 24 note, did not consider a 
 reply necessary. 
 
 Premier Malenkov's address before the Su- 
 preme Soviet of the Soviet Union on August 8 
 which touched, among other things, on problems 
 of the Near and Middle East generally and on 
 Soviet-Turkish relations in particular, is of in- 
 terest in the light of the Soviet-Turkish exchange 
 with respect to the Straits and of the Soviet "peace 
 offensive." Premier Malenkov said: 
 
 In everybody's memory is the statement made by the 
 Soviet Government to the Government of Turkey. This 
 statement establishes essential prerequisites for the de- 
 velopment of good-neighborly relations if, of course, the 
 Turkish side is to show in its turn due efforts in this 
 direction. The improvement of relations between Tur- 
 key and the Soviet Union would undoubtedly serve the 
 interests of both sides and make an important contribu- 
 tion to the strengthening of security in the Black Sea 
 area. 
 
 Premier Malenkov also noted the Soviet initia- 
 tive in proposing the exchange of envoys, "after 
 a long interval," with Yugoslavia and Greece, 
 and expressed the hope that this would "lead to 
 appropriate normalization of relations with both 
 countries" and "produce useful results." 
 
 The Turkish Government, however, sensed that 
 behind the Soviet moves was a desire to weaken 
 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and, in 
 effect, to isolate the United States from its allies. 19 
 
 18 For detailed figures concerning both commercial and 
 war vessels see Republique Turque. Ministere des Af- 
 faires Etrangeres. Rapports Annuels sur le Mouvement 
 des Navires a Travers les D6troits, 1940, ff. 
 
 ™ It is worthy of note that, in his address of Septem- 
 ber 21 in the U. N. General Assembly, Mr. Vyshinsky re- 
 peated all the familiar charges against "the aggressive 
 North Atlantic bloc," and then stated : "The whole course 
 of its policy from its earliest days proves that the Soviet 
 Union seeks to strengthen good-neighbourly relations with 
 other countries and that it has no territorial claims on 
 any State, including its neighbors" (U. N. doc. A/PV.438, 
 pp. 51-61, especially paragraph 25). 
 
 Turkey was elected to the Security Council on October 
 5, to succeed Greece. 
 
 278 
 
 Department of State Bulletin 
 
On October 20 the American-constructed naval 
 supply and repair base at the Mediterranean port 
 of Iskenderon (Alexandretta), which had been 
 constructed with funds from the Mutual Security 
 Agency, was turned over to the Turkish 
 Government. As President Bayar, of Turkey, 
 who was to visit the United States in January 
 1954, 20 told the Grand National Assembly on No- 
 vember 1, 1953, Turkey was "working earnestly to 
 make the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
 more effective," and hoped that the United Na- 
 tions would be "freed from the obstacles which 
 presently impede it." He added that "the close and 
 cordial relations between Turkey and the United 
 States" grew "stronger with each day that passes." 
 Turkey was receiving "valuable aid from this pow- 
 erful country, and great understanding in every 
 field." 
 
 The Problem of Iran 
 
 The United States was also concerned during 
 1953 with the problems of Iran, involving (1) 
 the country's difficult economic and financial po- 
 sition, (2) the normalization of Anglo-Iranian re- 
 lations, following the break in October 1952, and 
 (3) the oil controversy. 
 
 Even before President Eisenhower's inaugu- 
 ration, Prime Minister Mossadegh wrote to him, 
 on January 9, 1953, asserting that, despite its 
 friendship for Iran, the United States had pur- 
 sued what appeared "to be a policy of supporting 
 the British Government" and the Anglo- Iranian 
 Oil Company. U. S. assistance had been given to 
 the United Kingdom but withheld from Iran, and 
 it seemed that the United States had given "at 
 least some degree of support to the endeavors of 
 the British to strangle Iran with a financial and 
 economic blockade." Dr. Mossadegh then sum- 
 marized the familiar Iranian position in the oil 
 controversy and expressed the hope that the new 
 administration would "give most careful consider- 
 ation to the Iranian case so that Iran would be able 
 to attain its just aspirations in a manner which 
 will strengthen the cause of world peace and will 
 renew confidence in the determination of the 
 United States to support with all its power and 
 prestige the principles of the charter of the United 
 Nations." President-Elect Eisenhower responded 
 the next day, indicating that his own impartiality 
 had not been compromised in any way and that he 
 hoped Iranian-American relations would not only 
 be "completely free of any suspicion" but "char- 
 acterized by confidence and trust inspired by 
 frankness and friendliness." 
 
 Dr. Mossadegh communicated with President 
 Eisenhower again on May 28, once more expressing 
 his views cn the controversy with the United King- 
 dom, and complaining that no change seemed "thus 
 
 * For text of his address to Congress, see Bulletin of 
 Feb. 15, 1954, p. 247. ■ 
 
 far to have taken place in the position of the 
 American Government." Among other things, he 
 recalled that the Iranian Government had been 
 prepared to pay compensation to the Anglo- 
 Iranian Oil Company for its properties in Iran, 
 in such amount as might be determined by the 
 International Court of Justice, although he also 
 noted that Iran had certain claims against the 
 Company. The Prime Minister added that, as a 
 result of actions taken both by the United King- 
 dom and by the Company, Iran was "now facing 
 great economic and political difficulties," and de- 
 clared that if the situation continued there might 
 be serious consequences. Although Iran was grate- 
 ful for American assistance, it had not been suf- 
 ficient to solve Iranian problems and insure world 
 peace, "which is the aim and ideal of the noble 
 people and of the Government of the United 
 States.'/ 
 
 President Eisenhower, who replied on June 29, 
 reiterated American friendship for Iran and ex- 
 pressed his hope that Iran would be able to main- 
 tain its independence and that the Iranian people 
 would be "successful in realizing their national 
 aspirations and in developing a contented and free 
 nation which will contribute to world prosperity 
 and peace." It was essentially because of that 
 hope that the United States had made earnest ef- 
 forts to assist in eliminating the Anglo-Iranian 
 differences which had developed in the oil contro- 
 versy. But the failure of Iran and the United 
 Kingdom to reach agreement as to compensation 
 had handicapped the United States in its efforts 
 to help Iran. As President Eisenhower stated, 
 there was — ■ 
 
 a strong feeling in the United States, even among Ameri- 
 can citizens most sympathetic to Iran and friendly to the 
 Iranian people, that it would not be fair to the American 
 taxpayers for the United States Government to extend any 
 considerable amount of economic aid to Iran so long as 
 Iran could have access to funds derived from the sale of 
 its oil and oil products if a reasonable agreement were 
 reached with regard to compensation whereby the large- 
 scale marketing of Iranian oil would be resumed. Simi- 
 larly, many American citizens would be deeply opposed to 
 the purchase by the United States Government of Iranian 
 oil in the absence of an oil settlement. 
 
 The President also indicated that there was con- 
 siderable American sentiment to the effect that 
 mere compensation for losses of the physical assets 
 of a firm which had been nationalized would not 
 constitute a "reasonable settlement." Many be- 
 lieved that "the most practicable and the fairest 
 means of settling the question of compensation" 
 would be to refer it "to some neutral international 
 body which could consider on the basis of merit 
 all claims and counter-claims." The President was 
 not attempting to advise the Iranian Government 
 as to its best interests but was trying to explain 
 why the United States was not "in a position to 
 extend more aid to Iran or to purchase Iranian 
 oil." But if Iran so desired, the United States 
 hoped to be able "to continue to extend technical 
 
 February 22, 1954 
 
 279 
 
assistance and military aid on a basis comparable 
 to that given during the past year," and the Presi- 
 dent hoped that the Iranian Government would 
 take such steps as were in its power "to prevent a 
 further deterioration" of the dangerous situation 
 in Iran. 21 
 
 The situation did, in fact, become worse, and 
 on July 28 Secretary Dulles indicated that the 
 growing activities of the illegal Communist 
 (Tudeh) Party in Iran, and their toleration by 
 the Government, had caused the United States 
 "great concern." These developments, he said, 
 made it "more difficult for the United States to 
 grant assistance to Iran." 22 Dramatic events 
 took place within a few weeks. The period of 
 August 15-22 witnessed the Shah's decision to dis- 
 miss Dr. Mossadegh and appoint General 
 Fazlollah Zahedi as Prime Minister ; Mossadegh's 
 coup d'etat to counter this move ; and the Shah's 
 flight and triumphant return on August 22, after 
 popular demonstrations and action by loyal troops 
 established Zahedi in power and led to the arrest 
 and subsequent trial of Mossadegh. 
 
 Prime Minister Zahedi appealed to President 
 Eisenhower for assistance on August 26. After 
 expressing gratitude for the assistance which the 
 United States was already extending to his coun- 
 try, he pointed out that the treasury was empty, 
 foreign exchange exhausted, and the national 
 economy deteriorating. General Zahedi declared 
 the intention of his Government not only to 
 strengthen Iran internally but also to improve its 
 international position. President Eisenhower on 
 August 27 felicitated the Shah and expressed 
 "continuing good wishes" for every success in his 
 efforts to "promote the prosperity of your peo- 
 ple and to preserve the independence of Iran." 
 In a letter to General Zahedi, the President ad- 
 vised the Prime Minister of the continued Ameri- 
 can interest in the independence of Iran and the 
 welfare of its people, noting that he had author- 
 ized U. S. Ambassador Loy Henderson to con- 
 sult with regard to American aid programs in 
 Iran. On September 1, Ambassador Henderson 
 informed the Iranian Government that the United 
 States was prepared to make available $23,400,000 
 for technical and economic aid during the current 
 fiscal year, and General Zahedi promised that 
 Iran would "expedite the fulfillment of programs 
 designed to advance the welfare of the people of 
 Iran." 23 
 
 A few days later, on September 5, President 
 Eisenhower made available $45 million on an 
 emergency basis, to be used for immediate eco- 
 nomic assistance to Iran, in addition to existing 
 American technical assistance and military pro- 
 
 a For texts of these exchanges, see ibid., July 20, 1953, 
 p. 74. 
 
 * Ibid., Aug. 10, 1953, p. 178. 
 
 "For texts of these exchanges, see ibid., of Sept. 14, 
 1953, p. 349 ff. 
 
 280 
 
 grams in Iran. According to the White House 
 announcement : 24 
 
 There is great need for Immediate assistance to re- 
 store a measure of stability and establish a foundation 
 for greater economic development and improvement in 
 the living standards for all of the people of Iran. It is 
 hoped that, with our assistance, there will be an increase 
 in the internal stability of Iran which will allow the 
 development of a healthy economy to which an early 
 effective use of Iran's rich resources will contribute. 
 
 But it was also evident that Iran's economy, 
 which depended to a large extent on the rehabil- 
 itation of the oil industry, had to be put in order. 
 At the request of Secretary Dulles, Herbert 
 Hoover, Jr., who had recently been appointed an 
 adviser to the Secretary on worldwide petroleum 
 affairs, left for Iran on October 15 to study the 
 country's oil problems, in the interest of facil- 
 itating a solution of the Anglo-Iranian oil 
 controversy. 25 
 
 When Secretary Dulles, on October 22, . wel- 
 comed Nazrollah Entezam, who had been once 
 more designated as the Ambassador of Iran to the 
 United States, he noted that, under the leader- 
 ship of the Shah and Premier Zahedi, Iran was 26 — 
 
 recovering from the effects of the recent Communist- 
 abetted disorders and is striving to overcome serious eco- 
 nomic dislocations which have come about during the past 
 2 years. The United States, as a means of helping Iran 
 carry out urgent measures to stabilize her economy, has 
 extended $45 million in emergency aid, in addition to that 
 previously granted under the technical-cooperation 
 program. 
 
 These measures constituted concrete evidence of 
 American concern and friendship for Iran and 
 of the desire of the United States that "Iran pros- 
 per as an independent country and a respected 
 member of the family of free nations." 
 
 Meanwhile, the United Kingdom and Iran 
 since October had been moving toward resuming 
 diplomatic relations, and by December 5 the re- 
 sumption of relations was in process. It was also 
 indicated that negotiations would soon begin, with 
 a view to reaching a solution of "the differences 
 concerning oil which had recently caused the 
 darkening of relations between them, and thus 
 restore and strengthen their old friendship." In 
 his address to the House of Commons on Decem- 
 ber 17, Prime Minister Churchill declared that 
 "old friends" like Iran and the United Kingdom 
 sometimes had "estrangements," but that it was 
 "not right that these should last any longer than 
 need be." 
 
 The Anglo-Egyptian Controversy 
 
 The United States, as in the recent past, was 
 concerned with issues pertaining to Egypt during 
 
 ** IUd., p. 350. 
 
 a Ibid., Oct. 26, 1953, p. 553. 
 w Ibid., Nov. 2, 1953, p. 590. 
 
 Department of State Bulletin 
 
1953, particularly with the problems involving 
 the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and the Suez Base. 
 Secretary Dulles, in his survey of the problems of 
 foreign policy on January 27, made particular 
 note of the importance of the Suez Canal as a sea- 
 way "which made it possible for Europe to be in 
 communication with Asia" and referred to the 
 difficulties between the United Kingdom and 
 Egypt concerning its control and defense. 27 
 
 After long negotiations, the United Kingdom 
 and Egypt, on February 12, 1953, reached an 
 agreement concerning self-determination and self- 
 government for the Sudan. 28 The agreement pro- 
 vided: (1) an early election for an all-Sudanese 
 Parliament, supervised by a Mixed Electoral Com- 
 mission composed of seven members (three Suda- 
 nese, one British, one Egyptian, one American, 
 and, as Chairman, an Indian) ; (2) a transitional 
 period of full self-government of not more than 
 3 years, in order to enable the Sudanese people 
 to exercise their self-determination in a free and 
 neutral atmosphere; (3) a special committee to 
 complete the "Sudanization" of the Administra- 
 tion, the Police, the Sudan Defense Force, etc., 
 within the three-year period; (4) election of a 
 Constituent Assembly to decide the future status 
 of the Sudan and to prepare a constitution; (5) 
 a decision on the future of the Sudan (a) by the 
 Constituent Assembly choosing to link the Sudan 
 with Egypt in any form or (b) by the Constituent 
 Assembly choosing complete independence. 
 
 Secretary Dulles congratulated Foreign Secre- 
 tary Eden and Foreign Minister Mahmoud Fawzi 
 on February 14 concerning the agreement as to 
 the Sudan. 29 He believed that the settlement was 
 one which the British, the Egyptian and the 
 Sudanese peoples could view "with equal satis- 
 faction as appropriate to their respective inter- 
 ests, and as providing a solid foundation for 
 friendly, mutually beneficial future relationships." 
 
 * IMd., Feb. 9, 1953, p. 214. 
 
 M For text, see British Information Service, The Sudan, 
 1899-1958 (I. D. 1179, New York, 1953), 54-57. 
 
 *° Bulletin of Feb. 23, 1953, p. 305. Warwick Perkins 
 was designated to serve as the U.S. representative on 
 the Mixed Electoral Commission for the Anglo-Egyptian 
 Sudan and departed for Ms post on Mar. 19, 1953 (ibid., 
 Apr. 6, 1953, p. 493). 
 
 Moreo ver, the Secretary thought the accord might 
 well be "the first step toward the establishment 
 of more fruitful associations in an area of critical 
 importance to the security of the free world." 
 In Mr. Dulles' view, the resolution of this difficult 
 problem went far toward creating "an atmosphere 
 of mutual understanding and trust in the Near 
 East" which could "only result in great benefits 
 for all the nations of the free world. ' 
 
 Foreign Secretary Eden declared on Febru- 
 ary 17 that "complete independence" included 
 the right of the Sudanese to choose any form of 
 association with any other state "on achieving 
 self-determination." It may be noted that the 
 elections, which were held in November 1953, gave 
 a majority in the bicameral Sudanese Parliament 
 to the pro-Egyptian National Unionist Party. 
 
 No solution was reached, however, in the Suez 
 Base negotiations, which were renewed in April 
 1953, although the area of controversy appeared 
 to be narrowed by the end of the year. Prime 
 Minister Churchill, in a statement in the House 
 of Commons on December 17, noted that formal 
 negotiations with Egypt had ceased, although in- 
 formal discussions had not. Among other things, 
 he said : 
 
 Naturally, we do not wish to keep indefinitely 80,000 
 men, at a cost of perhaps over £50,000,000 [$140,000,000] 
 a year, discharging a duty which has largely fallen on us 
 and us alone of safeguarding the interests of the free na- 
 tions in the Middle East and preserving the international 
 waterway, the Suez Canal. . . . 
 
 We remain convinced that it is in our interest, military 
 and financial, to procure the redeployment of our forces 
 in North Africa and the Middle East. 
 
 Our action will be based on a careful study of the 
 merits of the problem and the solution will not be dictated 
 either by the violence of our foreign enemies or the pres- 
 sure of some of our best friends. 
 
 Meanwhile, on July 23, the first anniversary of 
 Egypt's Liberation Day, President Eisenhower 
 sent a message to President Naguib, in which he 
 expressed the view that Egypt now had "the op- 
 portunity of fulfilling its destiny of strengthening 
 the peace and stability of the Middle East and 
 thereby contributing to the welfare of mankind." 30 
 
 IMd., Aug. 10, 1953, p. 178. 
 
 February 22, 7954 
 
 281 
 
The Development of United States Policy in the Near East, 
 South Asia, and Africa During 1953: Part II 
 
 by Harry N. Howard 
 
 The Problems of Palestine 
 
 The United States was faced with a number of 
 problems from Palestine during the course of 
 1953, problems which had been well characterized 
 by Secretary Dulles in his address of June 1, 
 following his visit to the Middle East. In general, 
 four specific problems arose, some of them of long 
 standing: (1) the problem of Jerusalem; (2) the 
 Arab refugees; (3) the Qibiya incident; and (4) 
 the dispute over the Israel hydroelectric project 
 in the Israel-Syrian Demilitarized Zone. 
 
 With regard to the problem of Jerusalem, Secre- 
 tary Dulles stated on June 1 : 31 
 
 Jerusalem is divided into armed camps split between 
 Israel and the Arab nation of Jordan. The atmosphere 
 is heavy with hate. As I gazed on the Mount of Olives, 
 I felt anew that Jerusalem is, above all, the holy place 
 of the Christian, Moslem, and Jewish faiths. This has 
 been repeatedly emphasized by the United Nations. This 
 does not necessarily exclude some political status in Jeru- 
 salem for Israel and Jordan. But the world religious 
 community has claims in Jerusalem which take prece- 
 dence over the political claims of any particular nation. 
 
 Editor's Note. For part I of this article, see Bulletin 
 of February 22, page 274. Part III, dealing with Mutual 
 Security and assistance programs, will appear in a sub- 
 sequent issue. 
 
 31 Bulletin of June 15, 1953, p. 832. 
 
 Nevertheless, on July 10 the Israel Government 
 announced that the Foreign Ministry, as long 
 planned, was henceforth to be in Jerusalem rather 
 than Tel Aviv, despite the resolutions of the Gen- 
 eral Assembly of November 29, 1947, December 
 11, 1948, and December 9, 1949. 32 The original 
 intent to move the capital to Jerusalem had been 
 announced as early as February 1, 1949. In spite 
 of a request for explanations by the Palestine Con- 
 ciliation Commission on September 20, 1949 and a 
 protest by the Trusteeship Council on December 
 20, 1949, government offices had been moved piece- 
 meal to that city. Reiterating the position which 
 it had announced on July 9, 1952, the Department 
 of State declared on July 11, 1953 : 33 
 
 The Department was informed on July 10 by the Israeli 
 Government that it intends to transfer its Foreign Min- 
 istry from Tel Aviv, to Jerusalem as of July 12, 1953. 
 
 The United States does not plan to transfer its Embassy 
 from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. It is felt that this would 
 be inconsistent with the U.N. resolutions dealing with the 
 international nature of Jerusalem and that it would not 
 observe the solution regarding Jerusalem which was set 
 forth in the Secretary of State's address of June 1, 1953. 
 
 32 See U.N. Resolutions 181 (II), 194 (III), 303 (IV). 
 
 33 Bulletin of July 20, 1953, p. 82. 
 
 328 
 
 Department of State Bulletin 
 
The Israel Government stressed both the "prac- 
 tical" character of the transfer and the historical 
 tradition of Jerusalem. On July 16, all the Arab 
 States sent identical letters of protest to the Sec- 
 retary-General of the United Nations. Secretary 
 Dulles dealt with the problem in his press confer- 
 ence on July 28, noting that the United States had 
 made its' feelings known to the Israel Government 
 on two prior occasions, in July 1952 and March 
 1953, when Israel was requested not to transfer the 
 Foreign Ministry to Jerusalem. He added : 34 
 
 . . . We believe that it would embarrass the United 
 Nations, which has a primary responsibility for deter- 
 mining the future status of Jerusalem. You may recall 
 that the presently standing U.N. resolution about Jeru- 
 salem contemplates that it should be to a large extent at 
 least an international city rather than a purely national 
 city. Also, we feel that this particular action by the Gov- 
 ernment of Israel at this particular time is inopportune 
 in relation to the tensions which exist in the Near East, 
 tensions which are rather extreme, and that this will add 
 to rather than relax any of these tensions. 
 
 The Secretary also indicated that these views were 
 shared by a considerable number of other govern- 
 ments which were concerned with the development 
 of an atmosphere of peace and good will in the 
 Near East. 35 
 
 On September 2, 1953, in response to a letter of 
 July 16 from the Israel Foreign Ministry, the 
 United Nations Conciliation Commission for 
 Palestine drew the attention of the Israel Govern- 
 ment to the position which it had "adopted in the 
 past on the question of the transfer of ministries 
 of the Israel Government to Jerusalem, in the 
 light of the special status accorded that city by the 
 relevant decisions of the General Assembly." 
 Among other things, the Conciliation Commission 
 noted its' letter of March 30, 1949, in which it had 
 advised the Israel Government that transfer of 
 certain ministries and departments to Jerusalem 
 "would be incompatible with paragraph 8 of the 
 General Assembly Resolution of 11 December 1948 
 which resolved that the Jerusalem area should be 
 accorded special and separate treatment from the 
 rest of Palestine and should be placed under effec- 
 tive United Nations control." 
 
 Another problem which developed in the fall 
 of 1953, and for which it proved difficult to find a 
 solution at the time, involved a hydroelectric proj- 
 ect on the Jordan River at Banat Ya'qub, in the 
 Israel-Syrian Demilitarized Zone. Sponsored by 
 the Israel Government Water Planning Authority, 
 
 " Ibid., Aug. 10, 1953, p. 177. 
 
 85 On Aug. 4, representatives of Arab States with the 
 exception of the Minister of Jordan, protested both to the 
 Foreign Office in London and to the Department of State 
 in the United States. The Israel Embassy at Washington 
 on Aug. 5 issued a long statement defending the transfer. 
 There was some speculation as to what the Soviet Union 
 would do when, according to an agreement reached in 
 July, it resumed diplomatic relations with Israel ; it is 
 interesting to note that the Soviet envoy paid a visit to 
 Foreign Minister Sharett in Jerusalem on December 2, 
 1953. 
 
 the project was based on a concession granted to 
 the Palestine Electric Corporation on March 5, 
 1926 ; work was begun on September 2, 1953. The 
 Syrian Government on September 21 asked the 
 Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission to 
 halt the work, charging that the project would dry 
 up some 12,000 acres of Syrian land by diverting 
 the Jordan waters. 36 As Chief of Staff of the 
 United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, 
 Gen. Vagn Bennike called for a cessation of work 
 on the project on September 23, as long as an agree- 
 ment was not arranged. 37 Foreign Minister 
 Moshe Sharett of Israel contested the Bennike 
 view on September 24 and declared that "in the 
 specific circumstances of the present case no issues 
 exist which call for such agreement, and conse- 
 quently the continuation of the work cannot be 
 made conditional thereon." 38 In a reply of Oc- 
 tober 20, General Bennike repeated his views as 
 to both the economic and the military consequences 
 of the project and noted his authority in the mat- 
 ter under article VII of the General Armistice 
 Agreement. 39 
 
 While this problem was developing, there oc- 
 curred the raid of Israel forces on the Jordan 
 village of Qibiya on October 14-15, in which some 
 250 soldiers were involved, according to the Mixed 
 Armistice Commission, and in which some 53 
 Arab men, women, and children were killed. On 
 October 18 the Department of State announced : 40 
 
 The U.S. Government has the deepest sympathy for the 
 families of those who lost their lives in and near Qibya 
 during the recent attack by Israeli forces. The shocking 
 reports which have reached the Department of State of the 
 loss of lives and property involved in this incident con- 
 vince us that those who are responsible should be brought 
 to account and that effective measures should be taken 
 to prevent such incidents in the future. 
 
 The U.S. Government has been increasingly concerned 
 at the mounting tension along the frontier between Israel 
 and the neighboring Arab States. It is for this reason 
 that it initiated the recommendation and subsequently, in 
 concert with the British and French Governments, decided 
 to request the Security Council to consider, at the earliest 
 possible date, the situation on the frontiers, to include a 
 direct report by Gen. Vagn Bennike, Chief of Staff of the 
 United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. 
 
 Secretary Dulles, Foreign Secretary Eden, and 
 Foreign Minister Bidault considered the Qibiya 
 incident at their London meeting of October 16- 
 18; their final communique included the follow- 
 ing : 41 
 
 The Foreign Ministers noted with grave concern the 
 recent incidents culminating in Israeli armed action of 
 October 14 in Qibya, which, according to their informa- 
 tion, resulted in serious loss of life and property inside 
 Jordan. 
 
 38 U.N. doc. S/3093. 
 31 U.N. doc. S/3122. 
 38 U.N. doc. S/3122, Annex II. 
 
 "* Ibid., annex III. For the Israel-Syrian Armistice of 
 July 20, 1949, see U.N. doc. S/1353/Rev. 1. 
 
 40 Bulletin of Oct. 26, 1953, p. 552. 
 
 41 Ibid., p. 546. For the request to the Security Council, 
 see U.N. docs. S/3109, 3110. 3111. 
 
 March 7, 7954 
 
 329 
 
They recalled the tripartite declaration of May 25, 1950, 
 affirming the determination of their Governments im- 
 mediately to take action, within and outside the United 
 Nations, to prevent any violation of frontiers or armistice 
 lines. 
 
 They have therefore jointly requested an urgent meet- 
 ing of the Security Council to consider the tension between 
 Israel and the neighboring Arab States, with particular 
 reference to recent acts of violence and to compliance with 
 and enforcement of the general armistice agreements. 
 
 Two days later, in an address before the New 
 York Herald-Tribune Forum on October 20, Sec- 
 retary Dulles noted the action taken and, recalling 
 that the United States had "played an essential 
 part in creating the State of Israel," declared that 
 "this was clearly an occasion to invoke the concept 
 of decent respect for the opinion of mankind as 
 represented by the United Nations." 42 The Jordan 
 Government had already appealed to the Security 
 Council on October 16, noting that the Mixed 
 Armistice Commission had condemned the attack 
 and had called on Israel to take immediate steps 
 to prevent a recurrence. 43 
 
 But there were now other aspects of the problem. 
 On October 20 Secretary Dulles announced at his 
 
 ress conference that the United States, since 
 
 eptember 25, had been withholding an allocation 
 of Mutual Security funds to Israel because Israel 
 was acting in defiance of the United Nations by 
 trying to divert water from the Jordan; he de- 
 clared that this decision was not based on acts such 
 as the attack on Qibiya. Mr. Dulles indicated that 
 the action taken would not affect technical co- 
 operation funds and stated that of some $33 mil- 
 lion in military assistance, set aside for the coun- 
 tries of the Near East, no allocations had yet been 
 made. On October 23 Mr. Dulles explained that 
 assistance to Israel had been deferred — 44 
 
 because it seemed to us that the State of Israel should 
 respect General Bennike's decision, and that as long as the 
 State of Israel was acting in defiance of that decision, it 
 was questionable at least as to whether we should make 
 the allocation. I might add we recognize that there was 
 a right of appeal from General Bennike's decision to the 
 Security Council, but we felt that pending the exercise of 
 that appeal it would have been better that the work be 
 suspended unless General Bennike agreed that it could 
 go on without prejudice to the interests which he thought 
 were jeopardized on the part of Syria. 
 
 On October 27, however, Ambassador Abba 
 Eban announced in the Security Council that Is- 
 rael was agreeing to a temporary suspension of 
 work in the demilitarized zone. 45 The next day, 
 October 28, Secretary Dulles recommended to 
 President Eisenhower that a grant of $26,250,000 
 
 43 Bulletin of Nov. 2, 1953, p. 588. 
 
 a U.N.doc. S/3113. The Security Council actually met 
 on Oct. 19-20 to consider the problems of Palestine, but 
 became involved in a procedural wrangle concerning 
 Trieste and did not get to the Palestine issue until Oct. 27. 
 See U.N. docs. S/PV. 626-628 ; S/3116, 3118, 3119. 
 
 44 Bulletin of Nov. 2, 1953, p. 589. See also the Secre- 
 tary's comment of Oct. 27 (Bulletin of Nov. 16, 1953, 
 p. 674, footnote 1). 
 
 * U.N. doc. S/PV. 631, pp. 2-3. 
 
 in economic aid to Israel be made for the first 6 
 months of the current fiscal year, on the ground 
 that the policy of the United States to support the 
 United Nations Truce Supervision Organization 
 in this matter had been realized "and the impedi- 
 ment to the present grant of economic aid to 
 Israel" had been removed. 46 
 
 By this time the Security Council was giving 
 serious consideration both to the Qibiya incident 
 and to the problem of the Israel-Syrian Demili- 
 tarized Zone. General Bennike presented a 
 thorough report on the Qibiya incident to the 
 Security Council on October 27, together with 
 detailed written responses to questions, which 
 were submitted formally on November 3, 1953. 
 The Bennike report estimated that between 250 
 and 300 well-trained Israel soldiers carried out 
 this operation with small arms, automatics, in- 
 cendiary and demolition bombs, and Bangalore 
 torpedoes, among other types of equipment. His 
 statements made it clear that, although the Qibiya 
 incident was not to be isolated from others in 
 which both Israelis and Jordanians had been in- 
 volved in the past, nevertheless, because of the 
 size of the forces employed and the loss of life 
 and damage involved, it was of outstanding and 
 major significance. Up to the middle of October, 
 the Mixed Armistice Commission had found Israel 
 guilty of 21 violations of the Armistice Agreement 
 during 1953, and Jordan of 20 violations. Israel 
 and Jordan representatives had submitted figures 
 to the Armistice Commission to the effect that some 
 108 Israelis had been killed and 108 wounded, with 
 243 Jordanians killed and 147 wounded since 1949 ; 
 the Commission, however, was able to verify only 
 31 Israelis killed and 31 wounded, and 79 Jordan- 
 ians killed and 59 wounded, between 1949 and mid- 
 October 1953. 47 
 
 There appeared to be little question as to the 
 facts in the case, despite the Israel Government's 
 denial on October 19 that Israel armed forces had 
 taken part in the raid. Discussion in the Security 
 Council got under way on November 9. 48 Ambas- 
 sador Eban reviewed the problem on November 12, 
 
 *• Bulletin of Nov. 16, 1953, p. 674. See also the Pres- 
 ident's statement at his news conference on Oct. 28, 1953. 
 
 47 For General Bennike's report, see U.N. doc. S/PV. 630, 
 pp. 3-22 ; for his responses to questions, see U.N. doc. 
 S/PV. 635, annex, pp. 1-55. The Israel representative had 
 charged before the Commission that 89 Israelis and 68 
 Jordanians had been killed on Israel soil since 1949, and 
 101 Israelis and 18 Jordanians wounded. The Jordan 
 representative had charged that 19 Israelis and 175 Jor- 
 danians had been killed on Jordanian territory during this 
 period, and 7 Israelis and 129 Jordanians wounded. Am- 
 bassador Eban, among other things, charged that 421 
 Israelis had been killed and wounded between May 1950 
 and August 1953 (see U.N. doc. S/PV. 637, pp. 2-48, 54-78, 
 Nov. 12, 1953). 
 
 48 See especially the remarks of Sir Gladwyn Jebb, Henri 
 Hoppenot, and Ambassador Lodge in U.N. doc. S/PV. 635, 
 pp. 17-24, 25, 26. For text of Ambassador Lodge's state- 
 ment, see also Bulletin of Nov. 9, 1953, p. 648. The dis- 
 cussion as a whole may be followed in U.N. docs. S/PV. 
 635, 637, 638, 640, 642, 643. 
 
 330 
 
 Department of State Bulletin 
 
stressing Arab hostility toward Israel, emphasiz- 
 ing the constant problem of Arab infiltration 
 across the Jordan-Israel armistice line, and detail- 
 ing the loss of life and property as a result thereof, 
 from the Israel point of view. While regretting 
 the loss of life at Qibiya, he was "astonished at 
 our people's general record of patience under un- 
 paralleled tension," and denied that Israel armed 
 forces had been involved. Mr. Eban believed that 
 the Security Council should devote its attention to 
 what he deemed the basic causes of the problem 
 and should attempt to bring about peace. 49 Am- 
 bassador Charles Malik, of Lebanon, who fol- 
 lowed, contested the entire Israel point of view, 
 declared that it was not at all supported by the 
 Bennike report, and urged the Council to take 
 strong action to prevent a repetition of such inci- 
 dents. 50 Dr. Yusuf Haikal, the representative of 
 Jordan, adopted a similar tone on November 16." 
 
 On November 18 the United States, the United 
 Kingdom, and France circulated a draft resolution 
 with regard to the Qibiya incident, 52 which re- 
 called previous resolutions of the Security Council 
 of July 15, 1948, August 11, 1949, and May 18, 
 1951, and found that the "retaliatory action at 
 Qibiya taken by armed forces of Israel on 14-15 
 October 1953 and all such actions" constituted a 
 violation of the cease-fire provisions of the Secu- 
 rity Council resolution of July 15, 1948, and were 
 "inconsistent with the Parties' obligations under 
 the General Armistice Agreement and the Char- 
 ter." The draft resolution also expressed "the 
 strongest censure" of the Israel action, which 
 could "only prejudice the chances of that peaceful 
 settlement which both Parties" were "bound to 
 seek," and called upon Israel "to take effective 
 measures to prevent all such actions in the future." 
 Note was also taken of the problem of infiltration 
 into Israel from Jordan, and the latter was re- 
 quested "to continue and strengthen the measures" 
 already being taken to prevent "such crossings." 
 Moreover, the draft recalled the obligations of 
 Israel and Jordan, under the resolutions of the 
 Security Council and the General Armistice 
 Agreement, to prevent acts of violence. Em- 
 phasis was placed on their obligation to cooperate 
 fully with the Chief of Staff of the Truce Super- 
 vision Organization, who was requested to con- 
 sider the best ways of strengthening the Organiza- 
 tion and to report, within 3 months, with appro- 
 priate recommendations "on compliance with and 
 enforcement of the General Armistice Agree- 
 ments with particular reference to the provisions 
 of this resolution." 
 
 There was considerable criticism of the resolu- 
 tion after its presentation on November 20 by the 
 
 " U.N. doc. S/PV. 637, pp. 2^8, 54-78. 
 
 °°IMd., pp. 78-111. 
 
 61 U.N. doc. S/PV. 638, pp. 2-37. 
 
 53 U.N. doc. S/3139. 
 
 sponsoring powers. 53 The Arabs were critical, 
 largely because the resolution contained no specific 
 provision for compensation or for punishment of 
 the perpetrators. Sir Zafrulla Khan of Pakistan 
 had no doubt that Israel had been guilty of grave 
 violations, and he felt it the duty of both Israel 
 and Jordan to live up to their obligations under 
 the armistice agreements. 
 
 Ambassador Eban on November 24 expressed 
 grave misgivings concerning the draft resolution, 54 
 charging the authors thereof with unfairness to 
 Israel, repeating the Israel thesis as to the inac- 
 curacy of the Bennike report on the Qibiya inci- 
 dent, and regretting the alleged abandonment of 
 the "invariable policy" of the Security Council of 
 calling upon the Governments concerned "to nego- 
 tiate a final settlement of all questions outstanding 
 between them." Mr. Eban noted that, on Novem- 
 ber 23, he had invoked article XII of the Israel- 
 Jordan Armistice Agreement and asked Secretary- 
 General Dag Hammarskjold to call a meeting of 
 Israel and Jordan representatives at the United 
 Nations for direct and immediate negotiations to 
 prevent a further impairment of peace and security 
 in the Near East. Ambassador Eban's remarks 
 "produced a painful impression" on M. Hoppenot, 
 of France, because they cast a reflection on the 
 motives of the sponsors of the resolution. 
 
 However, partially to meet the Israel position, 
 the resolution was modified by the addition of a 
 final paragraph ; in this form it was approved on 
 November 24 by a vote of 9-0-2 (Lebanon, 
 U. S. S. B.). The new paragraph requested the 
 Chief of Staff to report to the Security Council 
 within 3 months with appropriate recommenda- 
 tions as to compliance with an enforcement of the 
 General Armistice Agreements, taking into ac- 
 count any agreement reached in pursuance of the 
 Israel request under article XII of the Israel- 
 Jordan Armistice Agreement. 55 Notwithstanding 
 his views on the resolution as a whole, Ambassa- 
 dor Eban expressed his pleasure at this addition 
 when he spoke on November 25. 
 
 Ambassador Malik of Lebanon, who spoke in 
 explanation of his abstention, gave his own analy- 
 sis of the problem and, among other things, indi- 
 cated that from the Arab point of view, there 
 could be peace negotiations if (1) Israel respected 
 the Armistice Agreements; (2) the resolutions of 
 the United Nations with respect to Palestine were 
 implemented ; and (3) the Arabs were so strength- 
 
 " U.N. doc. S/PV. 640. Sir Gladwyn Jebb indicated in 
 his statement that he was "quite unable to accept the ac- 
 count that Mr. Eban gave us of this problem," and M. 
 Hoppenot expressed agreement. For text of Ambassador 
 Wadsworth's statement, see Bulletin of Dec. 14, 1953, 
 p. 839. 
 
 54 U.N. docs. S/PV. 642, pp. 2-24 ; S/3140. 
 M U.N. doc. S/3139/Rev. 2; for text, see Bulletin of 
 Dec. 14, 1953, p. 840. 
 
 March J, 7954 
 
 331 
 
■ened that they would not feel that they were "at 
 the mercy of Israel." 58 
 
 As for the Israel hydroelectric project in the 
 Israel-Syrian Demilitarized Zone, the Security 
 Council was unable to agree on a resolution before 
 the end of 1953. 57 During the course of the dis- 
 cussion Ambassador Eban took the position that 
 the project was a constructive one, did not injure 
 Syrian interests in any way, would fit into more 
 general projects for water utilization, and was 
 within the framework of the Israel-Syrian Armis- 
 tice Agreement. Ambassador Farid Zeineddine 
 of Syria on the other hand, with support from 
 Sir Zafrulla Khan and Ambassador Malik, con- 
 tended that the rights of Syria, both in an eco- 
 nomic and in a military sense, were infringed, that 
 Israel had no "sovereignty" in the demilitarized 
 zone under the Armistice Agreement, that work 
 could not be carried on without Syrian agreement, 
 and that General Bennike's authority in the matter 
 should be explicitly upheld. A draft resolution 
 noting the situation, upholding the authority of 
 the Chief of Staff, and requesting and authorizing 
 bim "to explore possibilities of reconciling the 
 interests" involved, was presented by the United 
 States, the United Kingdom, and France, on De- 
 cember 21, 1953. But it was clear that it did not 
 command a substantial majority and was threat- 
 ened with a veto on the part of the Soviet repre- 
 sentative, Andrei Vyshinsky, now fishing in the 
 troubled waters of the Jordan. Nor was the 
 Council able to reach a decision later in December 
 or in January 1954, despite modifications in the 
 draft resolution. When the vote came on January 
 22, there were seven in favor, two against (Leba- 
 non and the U. S. S. R.), and two abstentions 
 (Brazil and China), the Soviet representative 
 having cast his country's 57th veto. 68 
 
 On the other hand, the General Assembly ap- 
 proved (52-0-5) a resolution on November 27, 
 1953, which extended the United Nations Relief 
 and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the 
 Near East and maintained the projects fund pre- 
 viously authorized at $200 million, the total pro- 
 
 "U.N. doc. S/PV. 643, pp. 7-12, 13-20, 43-63. For an 
 additional Arab complaint concerning an incident of De- 
 cember 18, 1953, see U.N. doc. S/3157. 
 
 It may be observed that the Soviet representative made 
 no statement at all concerning the Qibiya incident. 
 
 " The discussion as a whole may be followed in U.N. 
 docs. S/PV.629, 631, 633, 636, 639, 645, 646, 649-656. For 
 statements by Ambassador Lodge and text of the three- 
 power draft resolution, see Bulletin of Jan. 11, 1954, 
 p. 58; for a statement by Ambassador Wadsworth, see 
 ibid., Feb. 22, 1954, p. 297. 
 
 18 On Jan. 28, 1954, the Israel representative requested 
 urgent consideration by the Security Council of the Israel 
 complaint against Egypt concerning (a) enforcement by 
 Egypt of restrictions on the passage of ships trading with 
 Israel through the Suez Canal; and (b) interference by 
 Egypt with shipping proceeding to the Israeli port of 
 Elath on the Gulf of Aqaba, in violation of the Security 
 Council's resolution of Sept. 1, 1951 and of the Egyptian- 
 Israel General Armistice Agreement of February 24, 1949. 
 See U.N. docs. S/3168 and Add. 1. 
 
 gram being established at $292,800,000. The Ad- 
 visory Committee, at the same time, was authorized 
 to increase its membership by two. 59 Moreover, 
 the Conciliation Commission for Palestine was 
 able to report some progress during 1953 with 
 respect to the problem of blocked refugees' ac- 
 counts in Israel, noting that there had been some 
 3,200 applications, that some 1,590 had been ap- 
 proved for payment, and estimating that, when 
 all applications had been processed, the total value 
 of payments would amount to about £750,000. 60 
 
 The Problems of Morocco and Tunisia 
 
 Other difficult problems which came before the 
 Eighth Session of the General Assembly, and 
 which involved U.S. relations both with France 
 and with the States of the Arab world, were those 
 of Morocco and Tunisia. 61 Although the United 
 States was unable to support the draft resolutions 
 submitted on these questions by certain Arab- 
 Asian states (neither draft obtained the necessary 
 two-thirds majority in the General Assembly), its 
 attitude was explained in Committee I. 
 
 Thus, on October 13, 1953, Ambassador Lodge 
 noted that the "aspirations of peoples who are not 
 now independent toward self-government always 
 evoke sympathy and support from Americans," in 
 view of their "basic traditions." But he did not 
 consider that the Moroccan issue was one which 
 
 19 U.N. doc. A/2558. For the Report of the Director of 
 the United Nations Belief and Works Agency for Palestine 
 Refugees in the Near East and the Special Report of the 
 Director and the Advisory Commission see U.N. docs. 
 A/2470, A/2470/Add. 1. For the American position con- 
 cerning the Arab Refugee Program see (1) Palestine 
 Refugee Program. Hearings before the Subcommittee on 
 the Near East and Africa of the Committee on Foreign 
 Relations, United States Senate, 83d Cong., 1st sess., May 
 .20, 21, and 25, 1953; (2) statement by Acting Secretary 
 Smith, May 20, 1953, Bulletin of June 8, 1953, p. 822 ; (3) 
 statement by Representative James P. Richards in the Ad 
 Hoe Political Committee of the General Assembly on Nov. 
 4, 1953, Bulletin of Nov. 30, 1953, p. 759 ; (4) Palestine 
 Refugee Problem. Report of the Sub-Committee on the 
 Near East and Africa, Foreign Relations Committee on 
 The Problem of Arab Refugees from Palestine, July 24, 
 1953 (Committee print) ; (5) Palestine Refugee Program, 
 Background Information for Study of the Palestine Ref- 
 ugee Program. Staff Memorandum for Subcommittee on 
 Near East and Africa (Committee print) ; (6) Interim 
 Report of the Special Near East Refugee Survey Com- 
 mission, Dec. 11, 1953, Bulletin of Jan. 18, 1954, p. 95. 
 
 M U.N. doc. A/2629: U.N. Conciliation Commission for 
 Palestine. 13th Progress Report (for period from 28 Nov. 
 1952 to 31 Dec. 1953), pars. 2-14. 
 
 "Bulletin of Nov. 2, 1953, p. 610. For background, 
 see H. N. Howard, "The Problems of Tunisia and Morocco 
 in the Seventh Session of the General Assembly," Bulle- 
 tin of Mar. 9, 1953, p. 359, and Henry A. Byroade, "The 
 World's Colonies and Ex-Colonies : A Challenge to Amer- 
 ica," ibid., Nov. 16, 1953, p. 655; see also Ambassador 
 Lodge's statement of Aug. 27, 1953, when the United States 
 opposed inscription of the problem on the agenda of the 
 Security Council (Bulletin of Sept. 7, 1953, p. 325). See 
 also U.N. docs. A/2405, 2406, 2526, 2530. For Maurice 
 Schumann's statement, see U.N. doc. A/PV. 445, pp. 153- 
 157. 
 
 332 
 
 Department of State Bulletin 
 
endangered international peace and security, nor 
 that the General Assembly was "equipped to act 
 as a court, to adjudicate the various claims which 
 have been made by various parties concerning 
 events in Morocco." But it could be hoped that 
 France and Morocco would "move continually 
 closer together in achieving self-government for 
 the people of Morocco." Moreover, Ambassador 
 Lodge was encouraged by the statement of Maurice 
 Schumann to the General Assembly on September 
 25, in which he described the French proposals for 
 reform in Morocco as to elected representative 
 assemblies, independence of the judiciary, protec- 
 tion of the rights of the individual, and legal free- 
 dom for labor unions. Ambassador Lodge hoped 
 that any action in the General Assembly would 
 "promote an atmosphere" in which France and 
 Morocco would "move continually closer in effec- 
 tuating self-government for the people of 
 Morocco." 61 
 
 Similarly, in connection with the Tunisian prob- 
 lem, David W. Wainhouse explained in Commit- 
 tee I on October 26 62 that the United States looked 
 forward "to increasing self-government for Tu- 
 nisia" and was convinced "that this objective 
 should be attained through harmonious' agreement 
 between France and Tunisia." In the American 
 view, however, the proposed resolution was "not 
 likely to advance this objective." As Ambassador 
 Lodge explained in the plenary session of the Gen- 
 eral Assembly on November ll, 63 the United States 
 favored "the ideal of self-government," and be- 
 lieved that "negotiations between the French and 
 Tunisians" were "the best approach to the solution 
 of this question." The General Assembly, he ar- 
 gued, should encourage, not discourage, such nego- 
 tiations, and resolutions which exacerbated "the 
 relations between the French and the Tunisians" 
 were "not calculated to further the objective of 
 
 M Bulletin of Nov. 23, 1953, p. 730. 
 
 63 Ibid. See also the statement by Representative Fran- 
 ces P. Bolton in Committee IV on Oct. 19, on "Educational 
 Needs in Non-Self-Governing Territories," Bulletin of 
 Nov. 16, 1953, p. 686, for broader aspects of the problem. 
 
 bilateral negotiations and therefore in our view 
 tend to defeat their proper purpose." 
 
 The Kashmir Problem 
 
 Although the United States was not directly 
 involved with the problem of Kashmir, between 
 India and Pakistan, it was much interested in an 
 equitable solution of this issue, which had troubled 
 the relations of these two countries since 1947, M 
 The problem was the subject of direct negotiations 
 during the course of 1953 ; the discussions of Indo- 
 Pakistan expert committees, according to a com- 
 munique of December 29, centered on the follow- 
 ing questions : 
 
 1. Numbers and character of armed forces to be 
 maintained in the State ; 
 
 2. Local authorities in charge of administration 
 in the area west and north of the cease-fire line ; 
 
 3. Safeguarding of rights in the State according 
 to the resolution of the U.N. Commission for India 
 and Pakistan of August 13, 1948 ; 
 
 4. Mechanism for certifying that tribesmen and 
 Pakistani nationals have been withdrawn from the 
 State in accordance with the Uncip resolution ; 
 
 5. Creation and maintenance of a peaceful at- 
 mosphere before and during the plebiscite. 
 
 " See especially Bulletin of Jan. 12, 1953, p. 73 ; Dec. 
 29, 1952, p. 1028 ; Apr. 13, 1953, p. 523. See also the Fifth 
 Report by the U.N. representative for India and Pakistan, 
 U.N. doc. S/2967, excerpts of which are reprinted in 
 Bulletin of May 11, 1953, p. 694. In general see also 
 Report of Special Study Mission to Pakistan, India, Thai- 
 land, and Indochina. Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
 House of Representatives. May 6, 1953. 83d Cong., 1st 
 spss.. Committee print ; Pakistan: Faith Builds a New 
 Force in Asia (Department of State publication 4977) ; 
 India: A Pattern for Democracy in Asia (Department of 
 State publication 5095). 
 
 It may be noted that on February 19, 1954, Turkey and 
 Pakistan announced a mutual agreement to promote 
 closer political, economic and cultural ties, in which they 
 undertook to strengthen "peace and security in their own 
 interest, as also in that of all peace-loving nations." On 
 February 22, Prime Minister Mohammed Ali announced 
 that Pakistan had requested American military aid under 
 terms of the American mutual assistance legislation. 
 
 March T, 1954 
 
 333 
 
The Development of United States Policy in the Near East, 
 South Asia, and Africa During 1953: Part III 
 
 by Harry N. Howurd 
 
 MUTUAL SECURITY 
 
 AND ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 
 
 The Problem of Mutual Security in the 
 Near and Middle East 
 
 That the United States continued its funda- 
 mental interest in the security of the Near and 
 Middle East during 1953 was clear from the early 
 addresses of Secretary Dulles on foreign policy. 
 Although the signing of the Tripartite Pact 
 among Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia, on Feb- 
 ruary 28, 1953, represented a contribution to the 
 security of the Balkan region and of the Eastern 
 Mediterranean, as did the October 12 agreement 
 between the United States and Greece concerning 
 base facilities, there was no progress with respect 
 to the development of a Middle East Defense Or- 
 ganization, the outlines and principles of which 
 were elaborated in October-November 1951. 
 
 In his report of June 1, 1953, concerning the 
 Near East, Secretary Dulles expressed the view 
 that the establishment of a Middle East Defense 
 Organization was "a future rather than an imme- 
 diate possibility," since "many of the Arab League 
 countries are so engrossed with their quarrels with 
 Israel or with Great Britain or France that they 
 pay little heed to the menace of Soviet commu- 
 nism." Where the Soviet Union was near, there 
 was more concern, however, and, in general, "the 
 northern tier of nations" demonstrated "awareness 
 of the danger." There was "a vague desire to have 
 
 Editor's Note. For Parts I and II of this article, deal- 
 ing primarily with political problems, see Bulletin of 
 February 22, page 274, and March 1, page 328. 
 
 a collective security system," but it could not be 
 imposed from without, and "should be designed 
 and grow from within out of a sense of common 
 destiny and common danger." Secretary Dulles 
 believed that, while awaiting the formal creation 
 of a "security association," the United States could 
 "usefully help strengthen the interrelated defense 
 of those countries which want strength, not as 
 against each other or the West, but to resist the 
 common threat to all free peoples." 65 
 
 The Mutual Security Program for Fiscal Year 
 1954 showed a basic awareness of the problems 
 in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa, 60 noting 
 that in the Near East, "political instability, eco- 
 nomic weakness and an almost total lack of mili- 
 tary strength" presented "an open invitation to 
 subversive forces from within and hostile political 
 and military pressures from without." Moreover, 
 "the prestige of the western Democracies, includ- 
 ing the United States in the Moslem States" had 
 "progressively deteriorated in the postwar era" 
 and required "the most urgent and decisive re- 
 medial measures." The objectives of the United 
 States in the Near East and Africa were described 
 as follows: 
 
 (a) Promotion of stable governments and peaceful 
 relations within the region ; 
 
 (6) Expansion of economic development and trade, 
 including the removal of discriminations and restrictions 
 impeding trade with and among the individual states; 
 
 (c) Development toward self-sustaining economies; 
 
 (d) Promotion of friendly relations between the region 
 and the West, looking to a fuller participation of its 
 
 05 Bulletin of June 15, 1953, p. 835. 
 
 66 See The Mutual Security Program for Fiscal Year 
 1954. Basic Data Supplied by the Executive Branch, 
 83d Cong., 1st sess. (Committee print). See especially 
 pp. 22-27, 34-36. 
 
 March 8, 1954 
 
 365 
 
people in the structure of the free world and to a climate 
 in which plans for the region's defense can mature ; 
 
 (e) Active and effective cooperation of the countries 
 of the region in the event of general war. 
 
 In South Asia, where there were grave threats to 
 freedom and independence, "the preservation of 
 free governments and institutions and the con- 
 tinued adherence of this area to the free world" 
 were "of critical importance to the security of the 
 United States." 
 
 As submitted to the Congress on May 5, 1953, 
 President Eisenhower's requested authorization 
 was for some $4,024,523,000, of which $425,812,637 
 was to go to the Near East and Africa, $397,412,- 
 637 for military material and training, and the 
 major portion to Greece and Turkey. In an ac- 
 companying message to the Congress 67 President 
 Eisenhower stated "certain clear conclusions" with 
 respect to the problem as a whole, among others, 
 that "we must help the free nations to help them- 
 selves in eradicating conditions which corrode and 
 destroy the will for freedom and democracy from 
 within." In the end, the Mutual Security Act, 
 which was signed on July 16, 1953, authorized 
 $396,250,000 to provide military assistance to 
 Greece, Turkey, and Iran, and $50,000,000 for 
 military assistance for the general area of the Near 
 East and Africa. It also authorized some $50,- 
 000,000 for economic and technical assistance in 
 the Near East and Africa, $50,000,000 for the Arab 
 refugees from Palestine and refugees coming into 
 Israel, and $194,000,000 for special economic as- 
 sistance in the area as a whole. The sum of $94,- 
 400,000 was authorized for assistance to India and 
 Pakistan. The Mutual Security Appropriation 
 Act, signed on August 7, 1953, however, designated 
 $270,000,000 in military assistance, mostly for 
 Greece and Turkey, and $33,792,500 for technical 
 and economic assistance in the Near East and 
 Africa, special economic assistance being reduced 
 to $147,000,000, the Palestine refugee program to 
 $44,063,250, and assistance to India and Pakistan 
 to $75,000,000. Moreover, the U.S. contribution 
 to multilateral technical cooperation (largely 
 under the United Nations) was reduced to $9,500,- 
 000 and that to Unicef to $9,500,000. 68 
 
 "Ibid., ix-x. See also the statements by Mr. Dulles on 
 May 5, 1953 (Bulletin of May 25, 1953, p. 736) and July 9 
 (Bulletin of July 20, 1953, p. 88) and by Harold E. Stas- 
 sen on May 5, 1953 (Bulletin of May 25, 1953, p. 740). 
 
 68 See Public Laws 118, 218, 83d Cong. See also Mutual 
 Security Legislation and Related Documents -with Ex- 
 planatory Notes, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of 
 Representatives, December 1953 (Committee Print). 
 
 In the President's budget message of January 21, 1954, 
 net expenditures for economic and technical development 
 in fiscal year 1955 were estimated at $1,028,000,000, which 
 reflected proportionately greater emphasis on programs 
 in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. With respect to the 
 Near East, the budget provided assistance to the Arab 
 refugees through the United Nations and for technical 
 assistance and supplementary development in the Arab 
 States, Israel, and Iran. (See Bulletin of Feb. 1, 1954, 
 p. 147.) 
 
 These figures, however, should be set in the 
 perspective of the total of American foreign aid 
 since 1941, in general, and more particularly since 
 the end of the war. Thus, between 1941 and fiscal 
 year 1953, the gross foreign aid of the United 
 States reached no less than $84,348,000,000 in 
 grants and credits, the net being $82,276,000,000, 
 while the total between July 1, 1945, and the end 
 of fiscal year 1953 reached $45,124,000,000 gross, 
 or $41,348,000,000 net. For the Near East, South 
 Asia, and Africa the total between 1941 and the 
 end of fiscal year 1953 was approximately $3,353,- 
 000,000 gross, or $2,922,000,000 net, distributed 
 generally as shown in the chart. 69 
 
 U.S. Technical and Economic Assistance Programs 
 
 Most of the basic agreements for technical co- 
 operation between the United States and the coun- 
 tries of the Near East, South Asia, and Africa were 
 concluded during 1950-1951, although there have 
 been many specific agreements since that time. 70 
 A few examples may be taken from this manifold 
 program of assistance to illustrate the kinds of 
 projects which are being carried out. 
 
 Greece, Turkey, and Iran — Greece and Turkey 
 have been the subject of special programs of as- 
 sistance, designed to strengthen their defensive 
 positions with a view to preserving their inde- 
 pendence in a highly important area of the world. 
 Both have received large-scale economic benefits 
 from American assistance, of which village recon- 
 struction in Greece and road construction in 
 Turkey may be taken as particular illustrations. 71 
 Iran has been the recipient of technical assistance, 
 on the other hand, in addition to the emergency 
 assistance extended in the summer of 1953, of 
 which note has already been made. 72 
 
 89 In general see Foreign Aid by the United States Gov- 
 ernment, 1940-1951. A Supplement to the Survey of Cur- 
 rent Business. United States Department of Commerce, 
 Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Office of Busi- 
 ness Economics ; Cora E. Shepler, "Foreign Aid in Fiscal 
 Year 1952," Survey of Current Business of October 1952, 
 p. 6 ; E. S. Kerber, "United States Foreign Aid in the 
 Fiscal Year 1953, ibid., October 1953, pp. 15-20. In addi- 
 tion, $581,000,000 gross and $550,000,000 net in assistance 
 went to undesignated areas in Asia and the Pacific be- 
 tween 1945 and fiscal 1953. 
 
 70 See especially Greece: Sti-ong Defense at a Strategic 
 Crossroad (Department of State publication 5040) ; George 
 A. Spear, "Rebuilding 2,100 Greek Villages," Field Re- 
 porter of March-April 1953 (Department of State publica- 
 tion 4972), p. 28; Blythe Ellen Foote, "Turkey Likes U. S. 
 Libraries," ibid., July-August 1953 (Department of State 
 publication 5106), p. 31. 
 
 71 For background see Jonathan R. Bingham, "Under- 
 standing Point Four," Bulletin of Dec. 29, 1952, p. 1016 ; 
 Stanley Andrews, "The United States and the Under- 
 developed Areas," ibid., Feb. 23, 1953, p. 306; Stephen 
 P. Dorsey, "How Shall a Christian Look at Point Four?," 
 ibid., Feb. 23, 1953, p. 311 ; Arthur Z. Gardiner, "Problems 
 of Trade with the Middle East," ibid., Mar. 23, 1953, 
 p. 432. 
 
 72 Jean Dupont Miller, "Rural Development in Iran," 
 Field Reporter, January-February 1953 (Department of 
 State publication 4874), p. 13. 
 
 366 
 
 Department of State Bulletin 
 
Summary of Foreign Aid (Grants and Credits) in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa, 1941-1945, 1945-1953" 
 
 
 1941-1945 
 
 1946-1953 
 
 _ 
 
 Otoss 
 $79, 000, 000 
 90, 000, 000 
 34, 000, 000 
 
 iV el 
 
 $79, 000, 000 
 90, 000, 000 
 24, 000, 000 
 
 $1, 639, r 000, 000 
 431, 000, 000 
 oy, uuu, uuu 
 252, 000, 000 
 269, 000, 000 
 108, 000, 000 
 
 Net 
 
 $1, 543, 000, 000 
 388, 000; 000 
 oy, uuu, uuu 
 244, 000, 000 
 236, 000, 000 
 101, 000, 000 
 
 
 
 India - - 
 
 742, 000, 000 
 121, 000, 000 
 
 160, 000, 000 
 86, 000, 000 
 
 Near East and Africa (unspecified) - 
 
 Total 
 
 $1, 066, 000, 000 
 
 $439, 000, 000 
 
 $2, 758, 000, 000 
 
 $2, 551, 000, 000 
 
 The Near and Middle East— With the exception 
 of Syria and Yemen, all states of the Near and 
 Middle East had signed general agreements for 
 technical cooperation by 1953, and some progress 
 had been made as to a number of programs. Thus 
 it was announced on January 13, 1953, that 
 Thomas D. Cabot, a prominent business executive, 
 had arrived in Egypt to advise and assist in devel- 
 oping Egyptian industries under a technical co- 
 operation program. The purpose was to stimulate 
 actual development, including the location of spe- 
 cific opportunities, recommendation of action 
 necessary to attract investment in particular fields 
 and sites for industrial development, and the de- 
 velopment of general plans for advancing in- 
 dustrialization in consonance with the aims of 
 Egypt's general economic and social development 
 program. 73 
 
 Moreover, on March 19 a large-scale program 
 was announced in which the United States would 
 assist Egypt in reclaiming wastelands and re- 
 settling farmers. The United States was to con- 
 tribute $10,000,000 to a joint fund, with the Egyp- 
 tian Government contributing the equivalent of 
 $15,700,000 in Egyptian pounds; an Egyptian- 
 American Rural Improvement Service would be 
 established to administer the fund. According to 
 preliminary estimates, some 20,000 acres in the 
 Baheira area and 60,000 acres in the Fayoun were 
 to be reclaimed by drainage and other measures, 
 and some 1 6,000 families were to be resettled. This 
 program represented a major expansion of Amer- 
 ican assistance to Egypt, and was to be developed 
 around villages, the accepted pattern of Egyptian 
 rural life. The project also included assistance 
 in the organization and operation of cooperatives, 
 demonstrations of improved water conservation 
 and management practices, training of agricul- 
 tural extension and other rural-service workers, 
 and advice to farmers in management and im- 
 proved methods. 74 
 
 Under a technical cooperation agreement, the 
 Government of Saudi Arabia has been assisted 
 in revising and modernizing its entire tariff and 
 customs system, as a part of a broader undertaking 
 for systematizing the entire fiscal and monetary 
 structure of the Government. A monetary agency 
 
 " Bulletin of Feb. 9, 1953, p. 223. 
 "Ibid., Apr. 6, 1953, p. 498. 
 
 was established, a system of Government control 
 over expenditures and receipts was inaugurated, 
 a new currency law adopted, ground-water sur- 
 veying and water-well construction continued and 
 expanded, surveys completed for the Riyadh- 
 Jidda railway, the first commercial school started, 
 and preliminary work completed on a cooperative 
 community-development program, which is to be 
 a large-scale effort on the part of the Saudi 
 Arabian Government to improve the economic 
 and social conditions of villagers. 75 
 
 On April 7, 1953, the U.S. Technical Coopera- 
 tion Mission in Baghdad signed an agreement with 
 Iraq to provide technical assistance in carrying 
 out the vast Miri Sirf (state-owned lands) land 
 development and resettlement program, ultimately 
 involving some 19,000,000 acres, about two-thirds 
 of which are considered capable of some develop- 
 ment. Three projects are now in operation, in- 
 volving some 200,000 acres and 1,600 families, 
 while other projects, in various stages of develop- 
 ment, involve more than 1,000,000 acres and 10,000 
 families. The Miri Sirf project is one of the 
 largest and most significant efforts of its kind 
 in the Near East, to which a considerable amount 
 of Iraq's oil reserves are being devoted. The proj- 
 ect involves enormous problems, such as the sur- 
 veying and classification of lands according to 
 their agricultural capabilities, planning and con- 
 struction, assistance in farm planning and man- 
 agement, credit facilities, establishment of schools 
 and provision of teachers, development of health 
 clinics, and guidance in the formation and opera- 
 tion of cooperatives. A major difficulty is the 
 general lack of teclmicians in Iraq. While the 
 agreement provides for no additional allocation 
 of funds or personnel, the Technical Cooperation 
 Administration (now the Foreign Operations 
 Administration) is to assist in planning the pro- 
 gram and supplying technical advice, train Iraqi 
 technicians, aid in research and survey work, and 
 provide some demonstrational equipment and sup- 
 plies necessary to teach improved methods. 76 
 
 In response to an urgent request from Jordan 
 for assistance when the spring rains were small 
 and late and a disastrous crop failure resulted, the 
 United States provided grant aid of up to 10,000 
 
 ™IMd., Jan. 12, 1953, p. 56. 
 n IUd., Apr. 27, 1953, p. 610. 
 
 March 8, 1954 
 
 367 
 
tons of wheat to combat famine conditions among 
 the people of that country, the agreements being 
 signed in exchanges of October 14-21, 1953." 
 
 Israel also has been the recipient not only of 
 large-scale grants and credits but of significant 
 technical assistance. As an example, during 1953 
 Israel sent 50 trainees to the United States under 
 Tca grants, and plans were developed for making 
 some 200 technical experts available over a 2-year 
 period in the fields of agriculture, fisheries and 
 forestry, education, public health and sanitation, 
 natural resources, industry and commerce, and 
 public administration. 78 
 
 But the United States was also interested in the 
 broader development of the Near East, since it 
 believed "that the interests of world peace" called 
 for "every possible effort to create conditions of 
 greater calm and stability in the Near East." In 
 this interest, President Eisenhower announced on 
 October 16, 1953, that Eric Johnston was being 
 sent to the Near East as his personal representa- 
 tive, with the rank of Ambassador, "to explore 
 with the governments of the countries of that 
 region certain steps which might be expected to 
 contribute to an improvement of the general situa- 
 tion in the region." 79 Note was made of the prob- 
 lem of the Arab refugees as one of the major 
 causes of disquiet in the Near East, and of the fact 
 that, during a period of 4 years, the United States 
 had contributed $153,513,000 to aid these refugees. 
 One of Mr. Johnston's major purposes, it was 
 stated, would be "to undertake discussions with 
 certain of the Arab States and Israel, looking to 
 the mutual development of the water resources 
 of the Jordan River Valley on a regional basis for 
 the benefit of all the people of the area." Mr. 
 Johnston was to make known the concern of the 
 United States regarding "the continuation of Near 
 Eastern tensions" and to express its willingness 
 "to assist in every practicable way in reducing the 
 areas of controversy." He was also to indicate 
 "the importance which the United States Govern- 
 ment attaches to a regional approach to the devel- 
 opment of natural resources" which "held a 
 promise of extensive economic improvement in the 
 countries concerned through the development of 
 much needed irrigation and hydroelectric power 
 and through the creation of an economic base on 
 the land for a substantial proportion of the Arab 
 refugees." The President was convinced that 
 acceptance of such a comprehensive program 
 "would contribute greatly to stability in the Near 
 
 " Ibid., Jan. 11, 1954, p. 55. 
 
 ™ See Bruce McDaniel, "Israel and U.S. Aid," Depart- 
 ment of State Field Reporter, July-August 1953 (De- 
 partment of State publication 5106), p. 6. On July 27, 
 1953, it was announced that Israel had joined the Mutual 
 Security Agency's Contact Clearing House Service, which 
 provides for a two-way exchange of investment oppor- 
 tunities ( Bulletin of Aug. 17, 1953, p. 211). 
 
 " Bulletin of Oct. 26, 1952, p. 553. 
 
 East and to general economic progress of the 
 region." 80 
 
 Mr. Johnston, who reported to the President 
 and Secretary Dulles following his return from 
 the Near East on November 17, indicated that he 
 had not expected or asked for decisions at this 
 time from the various governments concerned. 
 He stated that the attitude which he had encoun- 
 tered, nevertheless, gave him reason to believe 
 that, after serious scrutiny, the Jordan Valley 
 project would commend itself to the states con- 
 cerned as a sound and constructive approach to 
 some of the most critical issues contributing to 
 present tensions in the area. He felt that — 
 
 acceptance of the proposals by the Jordan Valley states 
 would not only go far toward resolving the highly con- 
 troversial question of rights to the vital water of the River 
 Jordan, but clear the way for the construction of irrigation 
 and hydroelectric installations to provide an economic 
 base in the Jordan Valley for upward of 300,000 people. 
 This would offer an opportunity to settle a substantial 
 number of the Arab refugees now living on international 
 relief rolls in the Arab countries of the region. 
 
 Mr. Johnston thought the United Nations could 
 be trusted with the effective execution of such a 
 project, noting that each country could undertake 
 "unilateral commitments to the coordinating 
 agency, which could serve as a clearinghouse and 
 a catalytic agent." 81 
 
 South Asia — There have also been significant 
 aid programs in South Asia, such as, for example, 
 the emergency Export-Import Bank loan of 
 $1,500,000 to Afghanistan, announced on January 
 8, 1953, for the purchase of wheat in the United 
 States, to be distributed by the Afghan Govern- 
 ment in certain critical areas. 82 
 
 In the case of India, the International Bank for 
 Reconstruction and Development made a loan of 
 $31,500,000 on December 18, 1952, to the Indian 
 Iron and Steel Company in West Bengal, under 
 the guarantee of the Indian Government, to assist 
 the company in carrying out a 5-year project for 
 increasing blast furnace capacity from 640,000 to 
 1,400,000 tons of iron and for raising its steel 
 capacity from 350,000 to 700,000 tons per year. 83 
 Moreover, on December 30, 1952, it was announced 
 that a Tca agreement had been signed to provide 
 for an American contribution of $5,200,000, to be 
 matched by an Indian equivalent of $3,129,000 for 
 malaria control. 84 Contracts were signed in New 
 
 M Ibid., Nov. 30, 1953, p. 749. See also Eric John- 
 ston, "Jordan River Valley Development," ibid., Dec. 28, 
 1953, p. 891. 
 
 81 For details of the contemplated project see The 
 Unified Development of the Water Resources of the 
 Jordan Valley Region. Prepared at the request of the 
 United Nations under direction of Tennessee Valley Au- 
 thority by Chas. T. Main, Inc., Boston (1953), 78 pp. 
 
 M Bulletin of Jan. 19, 1953, p. 103. 
 
 83 Ibid., Jan. 12, 1953, p. 54. 
 
 "Ibid., Jan. 12, 1953, p. 55. The funds were to be 
 used for supply of 4,000 tons of wettable DDT, 2,250 
 Hudson sprayers, 4,500 stirrup pumps, 75 motor-driven 
 sprayer units, 75 microscopes, 300 trucks, 75 jeeps, and 
 9 station wagons. 
 
 368 
 
 Department of State Bulletin 
 
Delhi and Lucknow on February 6, 1953, with 
 Harold T. Smith, Inc., of Washington, D. C., for 
 drilling 300 tube wells in the state of Pepsu, 255 in 
 Punjab, and 200 in Uttar Pradesh, as part of the 
 2,000 wells involved in the Indo-American Pro- 
 gram. The tube well program, for which $13,- 
 700,000 of United States funds and the Indian 
 equivalent of $9,300,000, was designed to achieve 
 an increase in India's food production and to help 
 overcome its food deficit. 85 
 
 On December 28 the Foreign Operations Ad- 
 ministration announced another agreement with 
 India calling for expenditures of $20 million and 
 the Indian equivalent of $6,730,000 for the pur- 
 chase of 100 new locomotives and 5,000 new freight 
 cars, in the interest of improving India's railroad 
 system. On January 20, 1954, the Foa announced 
 that, under an Indo-American project, India's 
 farm-equipment manufacturers, railways, and con- 
 struction industry would be the principal con- 
 sumers of 200,000 tons of steel being provided 
 during 1954. The agreement provided for $25,- 
 500.000 in U.S. funds to finance purchase of steel 
 from free-world markets outside India. 85 * 
 
 The United States and Pakistan, as a supple- 
 ment to the agreement of February 2, 1952, signed 
 an agreement on April 1, 1953, providing for an 
 American allotment of some $12,254,000, with an 
 equivalent from Pakistan. At the same time proj- 
 ects were approved for the utilization of $8,437,- 
 500 of these funds for (1) the continuation of the 
 Village Agricultural and Industrial Development 
 Program, (2) importation of fertilizer, (3) con- 
 struction of a water development laboratory at 
 Karachi, (4) construction of a fertilizer factory at 
 Karachi, (5) construction of an irrigation and 
 reclamation dam across the Bolan River at Sibi 
 (Baluchistan), and (6) assistance in the develop- 
 ment of modern fishing facilities at Karachi. 86 
 
 In view of the serious wheat problem, a number 
 of steps were taken to assist Pakistan, including 
 the sending of Dean Harry Reed of the College of 
 Agriculture at Purdue University to survey the 
 situation. Following an intensive study, Dean 
 Reed reported late in May 1953 that the most 
 urgent problem was that of assuring food during 
 the next year. 87 To help meet this critical situa- 
 tion, President Eisenhower advised Congress on 
 June 10, 1953, that the people of Pakistan were 
 faced with famine and urged that 1,000,000 tons 
 of wheat be sent on an emergency basis, out of 
 stocks held by the Commodity Credit Corporation. 
 Congress acted with dispatch and the legislation 
 was signed on June 25, 1953. The first wheat ship- 
 ments reached Karachi less than a month later, and 
 by November 25 some 350 tons had reached 
 Pakistan. 88 
 
 83 Hid., Feb. 16, 1953, p. 266. 
 
 ** 1 Ibid., Jan. 18, 1954, p. 88 ; Feb. 1, 1954, p. 156. 
 K Ibid., Apr. 13, 1952, p. 531. 
 
 87 Ibid., May 18, 1953, p. 723 ; June 8, 1953, p. 818. 
 
 88 Ibid., .Tune 22, 1953, p. 889 ; July 6, 1953, p. 15 ; Dec. 14, 
 1953, p. S22 ; S. Doc. 2112 ; Cong. Rec, June 16, p. 6831. 
 
 Africa — Both Liberia and Ethiopia have re- 
 ceived important technical cooperation assistance 
 from the United States; the Liberian program 
 dates back to the war years. Under the general 
 agreement of 1950 a Joint Liberian-United States 
 Commission for Economic Development was estab- 
 lished, to which the Liberian Government assigns 
 approximately 20 percent of its total annual reve- 
 nue. Airfield and harbor construction have been 
 carried out and economic and health missions have 
 assisted the country. 89 
 
 On May 22, 1953, an agreement was signed with 
 Ethiopia whereby the United States was to pro- 
 vide equipment and training for the Ethiopian 
 armed forces, composed of some 20,000 men. 
 Moreover, by 1953, the United States had con- 
 tributed some $2,000,000 in technical and economic 
 assistance to Ethiopia, the local contribution being 
 some $500,000, with the American staff totaling 
 some 67 people. Primarily technical assistance 
 in agriculture has been involved, one agricultural 
 secondary school having been opened and another 
 planned. The Ethiopian Government plans to 
 spend $5,000,000 on an agricultural and mechani- 
 cal college. 
 
 Export- Import Bank Loans 
 
 Even before the inauguration of the programs 
 for technical and economic assistance, the Export- 
 Import Bank of Washington had authorized a 
 number of loans in the Near East, South Asia, 
 and Africa for the economic development of coun- 
 tries in that general area. By July 1953, these 
 loans were substantially as shown in the table on 
 p. 370. 90 
 
 U. S. Support for U. N. Programs 
 
 As in the past, the United States also continued 
 its support to the United Nations programs for 
 technical and economic assistance during 1953. 
 Ambassador Lodge, 91 in addressing the United Na- 
 
 89 See Department of State Field Reporter of May-June 
 1953 (Department of State publication 5028), p. 21. See 
 also Point 4 and Liberia (Department of State publication 
 4899). Note may also be made of an Export-Import 
 Bank loan of $17,000,000 to Portugal for railway con- 
 struction from Rhodesias to the port of Lourenco Marques 
 in Mozambique (Bulletin of Feb. 9, 1953, p. 223). See 
 also in general Point 4 Profiles (Department of State 
 publication 4859). 
 
 00 See Export-Import Bank of Washington. Sixteenth 
 Semiannual Report to Congress for the Period January- 
 June 1953. Appendix C. It may be noted that loans in 
 Africa as a whole totaled $151,576,000 and in Asia $529,- 
 209,000. 
 
 M Bulletin of Mar. 9, 1953, p. 384. For brief reviews 
 of the U.N. Programs see U.N. docs. A/2404, Annual 
 Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Or- 
 ganization, 1 July 1952-30 June 1953, p. 97, and passim; 
 A/2430, Report of the Economic and Social Council Cover- 
 ing the Period from 2 August 195.2 to 5 August 1953, p. 62; 
 E/2353/Add/l ( ST/ECA/,9/Add/l, Review of Economic 
 Conditions in the Middle East 1951-52, p. 145: E/TAC/28, 
 Technical Assistance Activities under the Expanded Pro- 
 gramme. Status Report as at SO November 1953, 69 pp. 
 
 March 8, 1954 
 
 369 
 
Export-Import Bank Loans in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa 1945-1953 
 
 Country 
 
 Greece.. 
 
 Turkey. 
 
 Iran 
 
 Israel. _. 
 
 Egypt 
 
 Saudi Arabia. 
 
 Afghanistan. . 
 
 Pakistan 
 
 Ethiopia 
 
 Liberia 
 
 Totai 
 
 Date 
 
 1/9/46 
 
 9/11/45 
 11/26/47 
 10/6/50 
 1/19/49 
 10/26/49 
 
 7/16/47 
 
 1/3/46 
 7/20/50 
 1/22/49 
 
 9/17/52 
 6/10/46 
 6/22/50 
 4/27/49 
 6/14/51 
 
 $25, 000, 000 
 
 32, 094, 281 
 
 25, 000, 000 
 135, 000, 000 
 
 7, 250, 000 
 
 40, 000, 000 
 
 21. 000, 000 
 
 15, 000, 000 
 3, 000, 000 
 
 10, 350, 000 
 
 $313, 094. 281 
 
 Purpose 
 
 U. S. products and services. Some $10,436,000 of loan cancelled or 
 
 expired; about $13,689,000 outstanding. 
 Various types of industrial, electrical railway, port, and shipping 
 
 equipment. Some $672,425 cancelled or expired. 
 Cancelled or expired. 
 
 Loans for agricultural equipment, transportation, housing, tele- 
 communications, port and industrial equipment. About $122,- 
 000,000 outstanding. 
 
 Equipment for fertilizer and chemical industries. $6,525,000, 
 outstan ding. 
 
 Products and services, cement plant construction, materials and 
 equipment. Some $25,000,000 cancelled or expired. 
 
 U. S. equipment, materials and services for canal and dam construc- 
 tion. About $17,500,000 outstanding. 
 
 Wheat purchases in United States. 
 
 Aircraft and spare parts, communications equipment, and indus- 
 trial machinery. About $613,900 outstanding. 
 
 Iron ore production, highway improvement and construction, 
 water supply, and sewage system. About $300,000,000 out- 
 standing. 
 
 tions Technical Assistance Pledging Conference 
 on February 26, 1953, stated that the program 
 could be "a powerful force for the development of 
 latent resources, both human and physical," and 
 noted that, in contrast to certain governments 
 which spoke loudly of their interest in under- 
 developed countries, but did nothing about it, the 
 United States for some 25 years had participated 
 in bilateral programs of assistance and had con- 
 tributed to the United Nations program from its 
 inception. Approximately 1,000 experts from the 
 United Nations were now at work, and the pro- 
 gram was already producing results, as in locust 
 control in the Near East, and in Asia, Africa, and 
 Latin America, where animal diseases had de- 
 prived millions of people of necessary nutrition. 
 Ambassador Lodge also noted that "in the great 
 arid and semiarid areas of the world, exploration 
 and technical operations" were "bringing water 
 to the surface for the livelihood of countless men, 
 women, and children." In other areas, "swamps, 
 and lowlands" were "being drained and con- 
 trolled — with a resulting drop in malaria and a 
 rise in food production." Moreover, "extension 
 programs" were "bringing the findings of agricul- 
 tural science to the individual farmer and showing 
 him how to put them to work." 
 
 In concluding his remarks, Ambassador Lodge, 
 on behalf of the United States pledged — 
 
 a maximum of $14,708,750 to the Expanded Program of 
 Technical Assistance for the calendar year 1953 provided 
 that the United States pledge does not exceed 60 percent 
 of the total pledges made by all governments for this 
 period. 
 
 In the end 63 Governments pledged $20,863,575 
 toward the goal of $25,000,000, and, at 60 percent 
 of the total pledges at the Third Technical As- 
 
 sistance Conference, the American contribution 
 would total $12,518,145. 92 
 
 Henry Ford II expressed similar sentiments in 
 the General Assembly on October 2, 1953, 93 when 
 he reaffirmed the American belief in the United 
 Nations program, and indicated that the United 
 States had carried "a major share of the burden, 
 about eight times more than the next largest con- 
 tributor." As Mr. Ford stated, the United States 
 was "not interested in exploiting anybody," but 
 was "interested in the mutual advantages which 
 flow from an unfettered exchange of skills, goods, 
 and ideas with other peoples. This is neither al- 
 truism nor imperialism — it is simply enlightened 
 self-interest." He believed that the program's 
 funds should be concentrated so that whatever jobs 
 were undertaken would be done well, and he looked 
 forward to the day when the "concept of technical 
 assistance" could "have a program more adequate 
 to its needs," for "technical assistance" was "a 
 solid bridge between the miseries of the past and 
 the hopes for the future." 
 
 The United States also contributed heavily to 
 the capital of the International Bank for Recon- 
 struction and Development, which has assisted in 
 financing a large number of development projects. 
 By June 30, 1953, out of an authorized capital of 
 $10,000,000,000, the subscribed capital totaled 
 $9,036,500,000. The total paid-in subscription of 
 the United States totaled $635,000,000 and was 
 available to the Bank for lending purposes. By 
 
 02 Bulletin of Mar. 1G, 1953, p. 422. See also U.N. doc. 
 E/TAC/31, Financial Arrangements for the Expanded 
 Programme of Technical Assistance. 
 
 8:1 Ibid., Oct. 19, 1953, p. 531 ; U.N. doc. A/C/2/SR.252, 
 p. 28. 
 
 370 
 
 Department of State Bulletin 
 
September 4, 1953, the Bank had made 85 loans, loans in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa 
 totaling $1,633,618,464, in 29 countries. Among were the following: 94 
 
 Country 
 
 Date 
 
 Amount 
 
 Purpose 
 
 £jtniopi& _ 
 
 13/9/50 
 
 $5, 000, 000 
 
 Highway rehabilitation 
 
 
 io/y/ou 
 
 o nnn Ann 
 A UUU, UUU 
 
 Foreign exchange for Development Bank 
 
 
 
 1, oUU, UUU 
 
 Telephone and telegraph systems 
 
 T J- 
 
 India _ _ 
 
 
 OA nnn nnn 
 
 o% UUU, UUU 
 
 Railway rehabilitation 
 
 
 OQ/GMQ 
 
 zy/y/4y — 
 
 i n nnn nnn 
 
 IU, UUU, UUU 
 
 Agricultural development 
 
 
 J.5/4/DU 
 
 i q ^nn nnn 
 lo, oUU, UUU 
 
 Electric power development 
 
 
 OQ/1 |KQ 
 ZO/ LJOO- . - 
 
 i q K.nn nnn 
 iy, ouu, uuu 
 
 Electric power, flood control, irrigation 
 
 India (Guarantor) . . 
 
 Iraq . _ 
 
 15/6/50— 
 
 12, 800, 000 
 
 Construction of flood control project 
 
 Pakistan . 
 
 27/3/52—. 
 
 27, 200, 000 
 
 Railway rehabilitation 
 
 
 13/6/52 
 
 3, 250, 000 
 
 Agricultural development 
 
 Turkey _ . _ 
 
 7/7/50 
 
 3, 900i 000 
 
 Constructor of grain storage facilities 
 
 7/7/50 — 
 
 12, 500, 000 
 
 Port construction and development 
 
 Turkey (Guarantor).-. 
 
 19/10/50- 
 
 9, 000, 000 
 
 Foreign exchange for development of private industry 
 
 Total 
 
 
 $190, 150, 000 
 
 
 
 
 But the United States has also contributed in 
 major proportion to other agencies of the United 
 Nations which have rendered assistance to under- 
 developed areas, such as the Fao, Who, and 
 Unesco. 95 This was also true of Unicef, which 
 by 1951-1952 had shifted its emphasis from Eu- 
 rope to underdeveloped areas to such an extent 
 that 88.4 percent of its funds went to Africa, Asia, 
 the Eastern Mediterranean, and Latin America. 
 Congress appropriated $9,814,333 to Unicef in 
 1953, by which time the United States had already 
 contributed some $87,416,667 to its humanitarian 
 work. The United States joined with other 
 United Nations members on October 6, 1953 in 
 placing Unicef on a permanent basis. 98 
 
 Some Summary Observations 
 
 Such were the broad and complex, as well as the 
 very specific, problems confronting the United 
 States from the Near East, South Asia, and 
 Africa, and the policies developed to meet them. 
 That they could not be met by arms alone, nor 
 merely by political alliances, was clear from Secre- 
 tary Dulles' statement that "we must recognize 
 the equal dignity of all men and find a way to 
 provide opportunity that extends from the most 
 
 ** See International Bank for Reconstruction and De- 
 velopment, Eighth Annual Report, 1952-1953 (Washing- 
 ton, 1953), 68 pp.; Supplement to the Eighth Annual 
 Report: A Summary of Developments in the Bank from 
 July 1 to September i, 1953 (Washington 1953), 4 pp. 
 Bulletin of Jan. 12, 1953, p. 54. 
 
 85 For Unesco assistance programs, see Unesco Official 
 Bulletin Vol. V, No. 5 (November 1953), 182. 
 
 "•Martha M. Eliot, "The United Nations Children's 
 Fund," Bulletin of Aug. 31, 1953, p. 288; see also Mrs. 
 Oswald B. Lord's statement of Oct. 5, 1953, in support of 
 continuation of Unicef on a permanent basis, ibid., Oct. 
 19, 1953, p. 553. The 1953 budgets for eight of the special- 
 ized agencies were as follows: Ilo, $6,223,368; Fao, 
 $5,250,000; Unesco, $8,528,482; Icao, $2,817,167; Who, 
 $8,485,095 ; Upu, $390,300 ; Itu, $1,304,319 ; Wmo, $359,881. 
 The net budgets of these agencies totaled $33,358,612. For 
 an excellent summary review of their work see United 
 Nations Bulletin of Jan. 15, 1954, p. 72. 
 
 fortunate to the least fortunate among us." 97 Vice 
 President Nixon expressed the same fundamental 
 when, following his extensive visit to the Far East, 
 South Asia, and the Middle East in the fall of 
 1953, he indicated that the peoples of Asia wanted 
 independence, economic progress, and peace, along 
 with freedom of choice as to their culture, religion 
 and economic systems — in other words, a "funda- 
 mental recognition of their equal dignity as 
 human beings." Mr. Nixon thought it essential 
 that, "by deed and word and thought," the Ameri- 
 can people prove that their ideals of tolerance, 
 liberty, and equal rights were a living reality, 
 noting that every American citizen could con- 
 tribute toward "creating a better understanding of 
 American ideals abroad by practicing and think- 
 ing tolerance and respect for human rights every 
 day of the year." 98 In his State of the Union 
 message to the Congress on January 7, 1954, 
 President Eisenhower sketched out a broad and 
 balanced policy for South Asia and the Middle 
 East, in which he bespoke the necessity of main- 
 taining technical assistance and declared : 99 
 
 "In South Asia, profound changes are taking 
 place in free nations which are demonstrating 
 their ability to progress through democratic meth- 
 ods. They provide an inspiring contrast to the 
 dictatorial methods and backward course of events 
 in Communist China. In these continuing efforts, 
 the free peoples of South Asia can be assured of 
 the support of the United States. 
 
 "In the Middle East, where tensions and serious 
 problems exist, we will show sympathetic and im- 
 partial friendship." 
 
 • Mr. Howard, author of the above article, is 
 United Nations Adviser for the Bureau of Near 
 East, South Asian, and African Affairs. 
 
 Address of Nov. 18, 1953, before the Congress of Indus- 
 trial Organizations, Cleveland, Ohio (Bulletin of Nov. 
 30, 1953, p. 742). 
 
 " Ibid., Jan. 4, 1954, p. 13. 
 
 "Ibid., Jan. 18, 1954, p. 76. 
 
 March 8, J 954 
 
 <rU. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1954 O - 295733 
 
4t