73S M6- UC-NRLF $B tl 8 Ut to THE PURPOSE OF THE NATION IN THE PRESENT WAR . . THE PURPOSE OF THE NATION IN THE PRESENT WAR AN ESSAY BY WILLIAM H.< MILLS Read before the Chit-Chat Club San Francisco, July, 1898 The Murdock Press THE PURPOSE OF THE NATION IN THE PRESENT WAR. In entering upon an important enterprise the final pur pose of the individual may have complete definition, because the purpose is formed and controlled by an individual will. But national enterprise is the result of compromise between conflicting opinion, antagonistic interests and the contention of elemental forces. The purpose of a nation is always deeper and broader than may be inferred from initial declaration, because it cannot contravene the Revolutionary force which gives law to its motives and direction to its development. The leaders of the Colonial Rebellion, which resulted in the separation of the British colonies in America from their mother country, declared that the armed resistance they were about to begin had no other purpose than the redress of grievances. But the grievances of which they com plained could find perfect redress only in the autonomy of national life. The abuses were offensive to the aspirations of a liberty-loving people. The protest itself was an evi dence that vassalage to the mother country was offensive to the inherent aspiration toward independence and autonomy. However much disclaimed, the real purpose of the Colonial revolt was the achievement of independence, because that end alone could adequately redress the grievances of which our forefathers complained. The Saxon genius for government which arises out of the Saxon love of independence and liberty is the true standard by which the original purpose must be judged. The redress of grievances which appeared to be the full round of initial purpose became merely an incident of the real intention on a natural line of development. The professed purpose, which in the incipient stages of the Revolution was made to appear paramount, became a subordinate incident when the inherent forces in national life had acquired their full and natural momentum. The secession of the slave States left the Federal Govern ment in the control of the free sections of the country. The resistance of the Federal Government to the doctrine of secession had for its first purpose the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of its territorial and political integrity, evolving naturally and inevitably the purpose to extinguish slavery, the one paramount cause of the Rebel lion. In this, as in the former instance, the initial and professed purpose, which was paramount, became a subor dinate incident to the extinguishment of slavery and the establishment of free institutions throughout the borders of the country. In these cases we have historical illustrations of the fact that the real purpose of a nation in any great undertaking can only be understood by observing the political trend from the original impetus in its momentum through current events. A massive rock is sent rolling down a declivity. It is idle to measure the few paces under immediate observa tion and entertain the hope that its momentum will be arrested short of the point where gravity is compensated, at the very extreme of the inclined plane toward which it was given its original impetus. The nation is engaged in a war with Spain. To the superficial observation the current war appears to be an innovation upon our whole history. Its declaration came to the thoughtless as a surprise. It is interesting to note the variety of reasons which have been offered to place it on justifiable grounds, to trace the fact of war to adequate causes, and to give interpretation to the national purpose. An eminent divine of our city, distinguished for careful conservatism of opinion and for grace and elegance of diction, has sought to render the meaning of the war by declaring: 1 The question is, Shall an ancient dynasty perpetuate its expiring tyrannies at our doors ? " A distinguished Jewish Rabbi has said: " This is the expiation of history for centuries of cruelty and barbarism practiced by an Old World monarchy." Another earnest and thoughtful minister has declared that "By this war the responsibility of nations concerning the welfare of the human family in every part of the world receives a higher interpretation, and the pathway of national duty takes a higher plane." Farther down the line of intellectual and moral growth we encounter the revengeful interpretation of " Remember the Maine." The Governmental authorities have offered for popular contemplation the suggestive association of the destruction of the Maine by printing a picture of the ill- fated battle-ship upon the war revenue stamps. This war did not gather on the national horizon in a day. It was not the result of events transpiring in the immediate past. It has its place in the entire historical trend of the nation. It is the legitimate outgrowth of national life and development. Its cause may be traced to vicissitudes in the life of other nations reacting upon our own. It is an event in a logical sequence of events which have transpired in all the history of our country. It has given premonition approach for more than a century. Its approach has been guided on constantly converging lines of national devel opment throughout the world. It is encountered in its appro priate time and at its appropriate place. It has come to us in the irresistible logic of past history and future progress. The political geography of the world has resulted from national conflict. War has been waged to outline national boundaries and to maintain national jurisdiction over the territory acquired. The topography of the country over which national jurisdiction has been extended has played an important part in national defense, and, therefore, in the determination of national boundaries. But, aside from the military or strategic value which attaches to portions of adjacent territory, there are com mercial considerations influencing the desire of the nation for territorial aggrandizement. At the close of the War for Independence the United States had no territory on the Gulf of Mexico, and none west of the Mississippi. The Atlantic seacoast had its southern limit at the mouth of St. Mary s River. Unity of commercial interest, which urges and enforces political annexation, created both a political and commercial necessity for the acquisition of the Missis sippi Valley and the outlet of that great artery of commerce to the Gulf of Mexico. The personal ambitions and pecu niary necessities of Napoleon and the complicated exigencies of European politics had withdrawn the attention of European powers from a country so remote as our own, thus affording a fortuitous opportunity for our territorial expansion in this direction. The United States, in 1803, acquired the province of Louisiana from Napoleon, and by this wise act of statesman ship averted a war for its acquisition. By this purpose the United States acquired the gulf coast line between the Sabine and the west bank of the Mississippi River. This acquisition emphasized the commercial and political neces sity for the further acquisition of East and West Florida. The diplomatic relations between Spain and the United States began in 1792, during the administration of Presi dent Washington and resulted in the treaty of 1795. The leading feature of the treaty related to the responsibility of Spain for the conduct of the Indians within the territory claimed and owned by that nation. These treaty obligations were not observed, and an equal disregard was shown by Spain for her treaty obligations relating to the Gulf piracy practiced by the Buccaneers who found shelter, notably in the harbor of Cardenas, on the northwest coast of Cuba. From 1793 to 1823 the relations of the two countries was strained to the verge of war. The citizens of the United States had sustained injuries entitling them to indemnity in the amount of $5,000,000, and the purchase price for East and West Florida was paid on the part of the United States by assuming these liabili ties. Thus the purchase price of the Floridas was paid to citizens of the United States. A retrospect of these events with the map of the country before us justifies the theory that contiguous territory is sometimes indispensable to the territorial and political integrity of a nation. The commercial and industrial expansion of the United States demanded the acquisition of the Mississippi Valley and the Florida peninsula; and the commercial and industrial considerations were strongly reinforced by the military and strategic necessities of the situation. The reasons which were deemed sufficient for the acquisition of Louisiana and the Floridas were equally applicable to the Republic of Texas and prevailed in the annexation of that Republic, by which the Government of the United States acquired 500,000 square miles. The same commercial, industrial, and political considerations which enforced these territorial acquisitions, became in their turn applicable to the territory acquired in 1848 by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, comprising 600,000 square miles and embraced within the States of California, Nevada, Utah, about one third of the Territory of New Mexico, and portions of the States of Colorado and Wyoming. Topographical considerations, however, accounted for the Gadsden purchase of 50,000 square miles in 1853. This purchase had reference to the construction of lines of rail way connecting the Gulf and Pacific ports on American soil. The original intention, however, of the negotiation was the acquirement of the outlet of the Colorado River into the Gulf of California. When the treaty was signed, it was the prevalent belief that this intention had been ful filled, but when the territory described in the treaty was delineated on the map, it was discovered that the Mexican diplomats and negotiators had used their superior knowl edge of the geography of the territory subject to negotia tion to excellent advantage. The fortuitous circumstances which enabled us to acquire the province of Louisiana without the expense of war have already been referred to, but we acquired the Floridas at the narrow hazard of conflict, and acquired Texas and the Pacific States and territories as the actual result of war. Up to this point in our history, the policy underlying each instance of territorial acquisition appears to have run on parallel lines. Each of these acquisitions related to con tiguous territory and extended by natural expansion the national domain. The desirability of these acquisitions was concurred in by all the leading statesmen in every period of our history. The policy of territorial expansion was regarded not only as justifiable but indispensable to the territorial and political integrity of the country. The acquisition of the Hawaiian Islands, embracing 31,000 square miles, is an event of yesterday. It follows the precedent of annexing non-contiguous territory established in the purchase of Alaska, but is unprecedented in the feature of absorbing distant islands, acquired mainly for their strategic value and future possible commercial import ance. By this latest acquisition we have annexed territory within the tropics, so that the range of production of things useful to man within the national domain embraces every object of culture in all latitudes from the equator to the North Pole. This last acquisition proceeds upon the defensible theory that political and commercial reasons for territorial incorporation into the national system are not limited solely to continental and contiguous territory. From a very early period, however, and after the acquisi tion of the Mississippi Valley and the entire northern coast of the Gulf of Mexico from Cape Sabine to the mouth of the Rio Grande, the Island of Cuba had been regarded by leading statesmen in this country as a natural-geographical and political part of the territory of the United States. From the earliest period in our history, the position of Cuba, commanding as it did the commerce of the Gulf of Mexico, and liable to pass from the possession of Spain to the hands of a more powerful commercial rival, was the subject of apprehension in the minds of American states men and a prolific source of irritation and annoyance, as well as a constant menace of armed conflict. The view that Cuba is territorially a part of the United States; that its possession by a foreign power is inimical to our interests and a menace to our safety; that its acquisition by the United States is demanded by every commercial and mili tary consideration, has been entertained by all the leading statesmen in every period of our history; When Great Britain proposed a defensive alliance between herself and the United States against the designs of the Holy Alliance concerning the restoration of Spanish authority in America, by which the United States would have been forever debarred from acquiring any portion of the Spanish col onies for themselves, the subject was submitted by President Monroe to Thos. Jefferson, who replied, under date of October 24, 1823, as follows: " But we have first to ask ourselves the question, Do we wish to acquire to our own confederacy any one or more of the Spanish provinces ? I candidly confess that I have ever looked upon Cuba as the most interesting addition which could ever be made to our system of States. The control which, with Florida point, this island would give us over the Gulf of Mexico and the countries and isthmus border ing upon it, as well as all those whose waters flow into it, would fill up the measure of our political well being." The alliance proposed by Great Britain in this instance was opposed by Mr. Adams, Secretary of State. He declared that we should make our declaration independ ently of Great Britain. Accordingly, on December 2, 1823, the message of President Monroe was submitted to Congress. This message, which embodies the historical Monroe doctrine, vouchsafes no assurance to the world that the United States would forego the acquisition of addi tional territory upon this continent as suggested by Great Britain. It was a simple declaration that the United States would not look with indifference upon any attempt on the part of European governments to restore the authority of Spain over her lately revolted colonies, and a further pro test against extending the political systems of Europe to any portion of the American continents, coupled with the statement that the extension of such system would endanger our peace and happiness. Mr. Adams views concerning Cuba were expressed at a date prior to the expression of Mr. Jefferson already quoted. In a letter to Mr. Nelson, dated April 20, 1823, and prior to the receipt of the proposition by President Monroe of the proposed defensive alliance with Great Britain, Mr. Adams, speaking of Porto Rico and Cuba, said: "These islands, from their local position, are natural appendages of the North American continent, and one of them (Cuba), almost in sight of our shores, from a multi tude of considerations has become an object of transcend- ant importance to the commercial and political interests of our Union. Its commanding position with reference to the Gulf of Mexico and the West India seas; the character of its population; its situation midway between our southern coast and the Island of San Domingo; its safe and capa cious harbor of the Havana, fronting a long line of our shores destitute of the same advantage; the nature of its productions and of its wants, furnishing the supplies and needing the returns of a commerce immensely profitable and mutually beneficial, give it an importance in the sum of our national interests with which that of no other foreign territory can be compared, and little inferior to that which binds the different members of this Union together." At this date Spain was at war with France and had made overtures to Great Britain for assistance. Apprehending the danger to the perpetuity of Spanish authority in Cuba by reason of an alliance with Great Britain, Mr. Adams voiced a note of warning. He declared that a guarantee of the island to Spain might be among the stipulations of an alliance with Great Britain, but that in the event either of a threatened attack upon the island by France, or attempts on the part of the inhabitants of Cuba to assume their independence, the temporary occupation of Havana by the British might be among the probable expedients. The danger to the United States of this temporary occupation was pointed out by Mr. Adams, as follows: "It is not necessary to point out the numerous contin gencies by which the transition from a temporary and a fiduciary occupation to a permanent and proprietary posses sion may be effected. The transfer of Cuba to Great Britain would be an event unpropitious to the interests of this Union." In the same letter, Mr. Adams declares a law of territorial integrity and gravity so clearly and forcibly that it cannot be omitted He said: " But there are laws of political as well as of physical gravitation; and if an apple, severed by the tempest from its native tree, cannot choose but fall to the ground, Cuba, forcibly disjointed from its own unnatural connection with Spain, and incapable of self-support, can gravitate only toward the North American Union, which, by the same law of nature, cannot cast her off from its bosom." This declaration of the existence of a law of political as well as physical gravitation, as applied to Cuba, permeates the literature of American diplomacy in all periods of our his tory. But Mr. Adams went further than to declare merely a law of political gravitation, and said: In looking forward to the probable course of events for the short period of half a century, it is scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the annexation of Cuba to our Federal Republic will be indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the Union itself." The expressions of opinion already quoted may be said to belong to the earliest period of American statesmanship. They clearly disclose the national belief that Cuba is territorially a part of the Union; that its acquisition is indispensable to the safety of the country, from a strategic point of view as well as highly important in its industrial and commercial aspect. They also disclose the fact that to the minds of these statesmen territorial acquisition in defense of national integrity is both expedient and right, and they declare in terms that while the relation between Cuba and the United States is natural, the relation between Cuba and Spain is forced and unnatural. In consonance with the opinions already quoted, like expressions continue in a straight line down the course of the diplomatic history of the country. Their full presentation wonld be beyond the compass of this paper, but brief extracts are indispensable to an adequate understanding of the subject. Mr. Van Buren, Secretary of State, writing to Mr. Van Ness, October 2, 1829, said: "The Government has always looked with the deepest interest upon the fate of those islands, but particularly of Cuba. Its geographical position, which places it almost in sight of our southern shores, and as it were, gives it the command of the Gulf of Mexico and the West Indian Seas, its safe and capacious harbors, its rich productions, the exchange of which for our surplus agricultural products and manufactures constitutes one of the most extensive and val uable branches of our foreign trade, render it of the utmost importance to the United States that no change should take place in its condition which might injuriously affect our political and commercial standing in that quarter." Daniel Webster, under date of January 14, 1843, sa ^: "Intrenched at Havana and San Antonio, ports as impregnable as the rock of Gibraltar (Great Britain), she will be able to close the two entrances to the Gulf of Mexico, and even to prevent the free passage of the commerce of the United States over the Bahama Banks and through the Florida Channel. * * * Spain has repeatedly been told that the United States never would permit the occupation of that island by British agents or forces upon any pretext whatever. Mr. Forsythe, Secretary of State, under date of July 15, 1840, said: The United States will resist at every hazard any attempt of any foreign power to wrest Cuba from Spain." Mr. Buchanan, Secretary of State, under date of June 13, 1847, said: 4 s The United States will not tolerate any invasions of uba by citizens of neutral States." Mr. Daniel Webster, October 4, 1851, said: " Mr. J. Quincy Adams often said that, if necessary, we ought to make war with England sooner than to acquiesce in her acquisition of Cuba. It is, indeed, obvious enough what danger there would be to us if a great naval power were to possess this key to the Gulf of Mexico and the Carribean Sea." Mr. Crittenden, Acting Secretary of State, under date of October 22, 1851, said: "The geographical position of the Island of Cuba, in the Gulf of Mexico, lying at no great distance from the mouth of the River Mississippi, and in the line of the greatest cur rent of the commerce of the United States, would become, in the hands of any powerful European nation, an object of just jealousy and apprehension to the people of this country. A due regard for their own safety and interest must, there fore, make it a matter of importance to them who shall possess and hold dominion over that island. The Govern ment of France and those of other European nations were long since officially apprized by this Government that the United States could not see without concern that island transferred by Spain to any other European State." Mr. Everett, Secretary of State, December i, 1852, said: The Island of Cuba lies at our doors. It commands the approach to the Gulf of Mexico, which washes the shores of five of our States. It bars the entrance of that great river which drains half the North American Continent, and, with its tributaries, forms the largest system of internal water communication in the world. It keeps watch at the door way of our intercourse with California by the Isthmus route. If an island like Cuba, belonging to the Spanish Crown, guarded the entrance to the Thames and the Seine, and the United States should propose a convention like this to France and England, those powers would assuredly feel that the disability assumed by ourselves was far less serious than that which we asked them to assume." Mr. Marcy, Secretary of State, July 2, 1853, referring to the proposition of France and Great Britain to intervene in the affairs of Cuba, addressed Mr. Reeves, Minister to France, calling attention to the proposition of France and England to enter into a tripartite convention with this coun try, guaranteeing Spanish dominion over Cuba, said: " For many reasons the United States feel deeply inter ested in the destiny of Cuba. They will never consent to its transfer to either of the intervening nations or to any foreign State." Referring to the same subject, Mr. Marcy addressed Mr. Soule, under date of July 23, 1853, and said: While the United States would resist at every hazard the transference of Cuba to any European nation, they would exceedingly regret to see Spain resorting to any power for assistance to uphold her rule over it. Such a dependence on foreign aid would, in effect, invest the auxil iary with the character of a protector, and give it a pretext to interfere in our affairs and also generally in those of the North American Continent." These quotations bring the record of opinion entertained by the leading statesmen of the various periods, to which their dates relate, to 1854, the year in which the Ostend Manifesto was promulgated. A due regard for the high significance of this important link in the history of American diplomacy concerning Cuba, and the influence it has exerted upon subsequent history, demand somewhat greater elabo ration. 16 In the expression of opinion by statesmen, party plat forms, and messages of Presidents, there has been an accompanying thread of mild, self-accusing protest against the charge of desiring to acquire the Island of Cuba. The strength of the utterances on the one hand and the feeble ness of this protest on the other bear testimony to the deter mined sincerity of one and the diplomatic prudence of the other. France and England jointly determined to test American sincerity upon this point. Accordingly, in 1852, France and England proposed a treaty with the United States, guaranteeing in perpetuity the sovereignty of Spain over the island. The body of the convention proposed to us by Great Britain and France was as follows: "The high contracting parties hereby severally and col lectively disclaim, both now and for hereafter, all intention to obtain possession of the Island of Cuba, and they respect ively bind themselves to discountenance all attempts to that effect on the part of any power or individual whatever. The high contracting parties declare that they will not obtain or maintain for themselves, or for any one of themselves, any exclusive control over said island, nor assume nor exercise any dominion over the same." Mr. Everett, as Secretary of State for Mr. Fillmore, rejected the overtures. Mr. Greeley, in his Review of the American Conflict," says that Mr. Everett answered this in a smart dispatch, disclaiming, pro forma, any desire or intention on the part of the United States to acquire Cuba, but that the dispatch itself afforded the strongest evidence of a contrary disposition. Mr. Everett assumed from the outset that the Senate would inevitably refuse its consent to the treaty proposed, and adds: 17 " Its certain rejection by that body would leave the question of Cuba in a more unsettled condition than it is now." Mr. Everett further said: "The President does not covet the acquisition of Cuba for the United States. At the same time he considers the acquisition of Cuba as mainly an American question. The proposed convention proceeds on a different principle. It assumes that the United States have no other or greater interest in the question than France or England; whereas, it is necessary only to cast one s eye on the map to see how remote are the relations of Europe, and how intimate those of the United States, with this island." It is obvious from this that Mr. Everett stood in line with the other great statesmen quoted in entertaining the opinion that the Island of Cuba was a territorial integer of the United States. In 1848, during the administration of President James K. Polk, an offer of $100,000,000 was made for the island by the United States, but was spurned by the Spanish monarchy as " a national indignity. This offer had not been withdrawn when, in 1854, President Pierce requested the American Ministers to France, England, and Spain "to meet and compare opinions and to adopt measures for per fect concert of action in aid of the negotiations at Madrid." The commission was composed of James Buchanan, Minister to England, J. Y. Mason, Minister to France, and Pierre Soule, Minister to Spain. These representatives of the United States met in conference, first at Ostend, in Belgium, on the gth, loth, and nth of October, and later at Aix la Chapelle, in Prussia, on the I2th and to the i8th of Octo- ber, 1854, the date of the Manifesto. Their conclusions were arranged under two heads: 1. "The United States ought, if practicable, to pur chase Cuba with as little delay as possible." 2. " The probability is great that the government and cortes of Spain will prove willing to sell it, because this would essentially promote the highest and best interests of the Spanish people." The Manifesto then proceeds to traverse the entire ques- ion of the relation of Cuba to the United States; its geographical, commercial, and political importance to the United States, but declared in unmistakable terms, as fol lows: " Indeed the Union can never enjoy repose, nor possess reliable security, as long as Cuba is not embraced within its boundaries. * * Cuba has thus become to us an unceasing danger and a permanent cause of anxiety and alarm." The Manifesto then proceeds to argue the case on behalf of Spain, and insists that the large sum of money the United States would be willing to pay for Cuba would greatly enhance the prosperity of Spain. It was suggested that France had constructed continuous lines of railways from Havre, Marseilles, Valenciennes, and Strasbourg, via Paris to the Spanish frontier, and that Spain would do well to take the money offered by the United States to continue these roads through to Madrid, Seville, Cadiz, Malaga, and the frontiers of Portugal. It called attention to the fact that the wretched financial condition of Spain quoted her bonds upon her own bourse at only one third of their par value; that Cuba had been an 19 expense and not a profit to the mother country. It indulged in prophecy which to-day is finding fulfillment. It said: "It is certain that should the Cubans themselves organ ize an insurrection against the Spanish Government and should other independent nations come to the aid of Spain in the contest, no human power could, in our opinion, pre vent the people and government of the United States from taking part in such a civil war in support of their neighbors and friends." But the most striking feature of this Manifesto remains to be noted. It is perhaps by far the most open, candid, dip lomatic declaration in all the literature of diplomacy. Its strong declarations follow: il But if Spain, dead to the voice of her own interest, and actuated by stubborn pride and a false sense of honor, should refuse to sell Cuba to the United States, then the question will arise, What ought to be the course of the American Government under such circumstances ? Self- preservation is the first law of nature with States as well as individuals. All nations have, at different periods, acted upon this maxim. Although it has been made the pretext for committing flagrant injustice, as in the partition of Poland and other similar cases which history records, yet the principle itself, though often abused, has always been recognized. "After we shall have offered Spain a price for Cuba, far beyond its present value, and this shall have been refused, it will then be time to consider the question, Does Cuba, in the possession of Spain, seriously endanger our internal peace and the existence of our cherished Union ? "Should this question be answered in the affirmative, then, by every law, human and divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain if we possess the power; and this, upon the very same principle that would justify an individ ual in tearing down the burning- house of his neighbor if there were no other means of preventing the flames from destroying his own home." The question naturally arises, Did these statements appropriately express the opinions of the people of the United States ? The appropriate historical setting of the Ostend Manifesto will determine this question. That Man ifesto was the answer of the United States to the overtures of England and France for a tripartite agreement, guaran teeing Spanish sovereignty in perpetuity over the Island of Cuba. It had been declined two years previously by Edward Everett, Secretary of State, with the bold declara tion that the Senate of the United States would never con sent to become a party to such a treaty. The transcendent candor of these statements must be read in the light of the circumstances which called them forth, and so read, they must be received as the unmistabable, though not directly authorized, expression of American opinion. But the political history of the country affords additional evidence that the Ostend Manifesto voiced the opinions of the people of this country. James Buchanan was the author of the Manifesto. Two years after its promulgation, he was nominated for President on a platform which referred to our geographical and political position with reference to the other States of the continent and to the great necessity for the construction of a canal through the Isthmus of Darien; and then referring to Cuba pledged itself to a policy out lined as follows: That the Democratic party will expect of the next administration that every proper effort be made to assure our ascendency in the Gulf of Mexico and to maintain per manent protection to the great outlets through which are emptied into its waters products raised out of the soil and the commodities created by the industry of the people of our western valleys and of the Union at large." The opposing Republican platform of the same campaign placed the Cuban question and the Ostend Manifesto in issue by declaring: "The highwayman s plea that might makes right, embodied in the Ostend circular, was in every respect un worthy of American diplomacy, and would bring shame and dishonor upon any government or people that gave it their sanction." With the issue thus joined the parties went to the country, and the hand that wrote the Ostend Manifesto was placed at the helm of State. When James Buchnan s relations with the Ostend Manifesto and the platform declarations of the two parties are considered, the popular majority in favor of Buchanan can be regarded in no other light than as a national approval of the doctrines of the Ostend Manifesto. The records of opinion of American statesmen in line with those already quoted would expand into a volume. Suffice it to say, that they are in complete alignment with those already quoted. Therefore, but one further quotation will be made from them. A period distant in point of time will be selected. Hamilton Fish, Secretary of State to General Grant, on February 16, 1874, in a letter to Mr. Gushing, Minister to Spain, said: " In fine, Cuba, like the former continental colonies of Spain in America, ought to belong to the great family of American Republics, with political forms and public policy of their own, and attached to Europe by no ties save those of international amity, and of intellectual, commercial, and social intercourse. The desire of independence on the part of the Cubans is a natural and legitimate aspiration of theirs, because they are Americans. And while such independence is the manifest exigency of the political interests of the Cubans themselves, it is equally so that the rest of America, including that of the United States." 1 True it is that now, when war has been waged for more than five years, there is no material change in the military situation. The Cubans continue to occupy, unsubdued, the eastern and central parts of the island, with exception of the larger cities or towns, and of fortified points held by the Government, but their capacity of resistance appears to be undiminished, and with no abatement of their resolution to persevere to the end in repelling the domination of Spain." "You will understand, therefore, that the policy of the United States in reference to Cuba at the present time is one of expectancy, but with positive and fixed convictions as to the duty of the United States when the time or emer gency of action shall arrive." Passing from the opinions of leading statesmen, brief extracts from the messages of Presidents of the United States, referring to the relations between Cuba and this country, will be presented. In his first annual message, December 2, 1817, President Monroe, referring to the inability of Spain to govern and control her colonies, said: " Her territory ought not to be made instrumental, through her inability to defend it, to purposes so injurious to the United States. To a country over which she fails to main tain her authority, and which she permits to be converted to the annoyance of her neighbors, her jurisdiction for the time necessarily ceases to exist." This quotation from President Monroe is the beginning of a line of declarations, maintained down to the present time, that when a Government claiming sovereignty over a province, district, island, or colony, fails to maintain a stable government there, its authority has, in fact, ceased to exist, and its right of sovereignty has been forfeited. This declaration finds echo in the message of President McKinley, dated April n, 1898, less than three months since, when, referring to the destruction of the Maine, he said: "That condition is shown to be such that the Spanish Government cannot insure safety and security to a vessel of the American Navy in the harbor of Havana on a mission of peace and rightfully there." On November 16, 1818, in his second annual message, President Monroe said: " Spain is not maintaining her authority in Florida. The country is becoming the theater of every species of lawless adventure. The embarassments of Spain have prevented her from making indemnity to our citizens for their losses by spoilation and otherwise, but it has always been in her power to provide it by the cession of the territory." Proceeding in the same message, President Monroe says: " The right of self-defense ceases. It is among the most 24 sacred, and alike necessary to nations and to individuals, and whether the attack be made by Spain herself, or by those who abuse her power, its obligation is not the less strong." This doctrine of the right of self-defense as being inherent in nations and analogous to the same right in individuals, was imported by unmistakable declarations into the Ostend Manifesto. In his eighth annual message, dated December 7, 1824, President Monroe calls attention to the piracy in Cuban waters, criticises the relaxed and enfeebled state of local government in Cuba, and submits to the Congress of the United States the question as to whether the local authorities alone may be held accountable. April 27, 1825, Henry Clay, Secretary of State to Presi dent Adams in a letter to the American Minister to Spain, declares that if the war should continue between Spain and the new Spanish- American Republics, and Cuba and Porto Rico should become the ob!ect and theater of it, the for tunes of these islands have such connection with the people of these United States that they could not be indifferent spectators, and that contingencies might bring upon the Gov ernment of the United States duties and obligations the per formance of which, however painful they should be, they might not be at liberty to decline." Between the date of the messages of John Quincy Adams and William McKinley there is a concensus of expression, all looking to the same direction, to-wit: Cuba is an integral portion of the territory of the United States. The sover eignty of Spain over the island is strained and unnatural. The commercial, industrial, and political interests of the United States demand that the unnatural relation should be broken and that the natural relation should be assumed. Avoiding comment for the conservation of space, a few quotations, having general applicability to matters under con sideration, will be presented. President Pierce, in his first annual message, December 5, 1853, referring to filibustering expeditions to the coast of Spain, said: 11 Independent of our available trade with Spain, we have important political relations with her growing out of our neighborhood to the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico. Con sidering the proximity of that island to our shores, lying, as it does, in the track of trade between some of our principal cities, and the suspicious vigilance with which foreign inter course, particularly that with the United States, is guarded, a repetition of such occurrence may well be apprehended. " The territorial expansion of the United States was dis cussed and commended by President Pierce, as follows: The United States have continued gradually and stead ily to expand through acquisitions of territory, which, how much soever some of them may have been questioned, are now universally seen and admitted to have been wise in policy, just in character, and a great element in the advance ment of our country, and, with it, of the human race, in free dom, in prosperity, and in happiness." President Pierce s message, of March 15, 1854, refers to the seizure of the " Black Warrior, " and declares, concern ing that transaction, that: " It presents so clear a case of wrong that it would be reasonable to expect full indemnity therefor." The offending party is at our doors with large powets for aggression, but none, it is alleged, for reparation." In the same message, President Pierce declares: 26 " In view of the position of the Island of Cuba, its prox imity to our coast, the relations which it must ever bear to our commercial and other interests, it is vain to expect that a series of unfriendly acts, infringing our commercial rights and the adoption of a policy threatening the honor and security of these States can long coexist with peaceful relations. The relations with Spain were so strained at this date that President Pierce suggested to Congress the propriety of adopting such provisional means of defense for any exi gency which might arise, and declared that he would not hesitate to use the authority and means which Congress might grant to insure the prevalence of the rights of the people of the United States." On December 4, 1854, President Pierce, in a message to Congress, referred again to the territorial expansion of the United States, as follows : " Some European powers have regarded with disquieting concern the territorial expansion of the United States. This rapid growth has resulted from the legitimate exercise of sovereign rights belonging alike to all nations, and by many liberally exercised. Under such circumstances, it could hardly have been expected that those among them which have within a comparatively recent period subdued and absorbed ancient kingdoms, planted their standards on every continent, and now possess or claim the control of the islands of every ocean as their appropriate domain, would look with unfriendly sentiment upon the acquisitions of this country, in every instance honorably obtained." On December 6, 1858, in his second annual message, President Buchanan said: "Spanish officials under the direct control of the Cap tain-General of Cuba have insulted our national flag and in repeated instances have, from time to time, inflicted injury on the persons and property of our citizens." Continuing, the President said: It has been made known to the world by my predeces sors that the United States have on several occasions endeavored to acquire Cuba from Spain by honorable negotiation. If this were accomplished, the last relic of the African slave trade would instantly disappear." President Buchanan referred to the acquisition of terri tory from France, the annexation of Texas and the further acquisition of territory from Mexico by purchase, and said: " This course we shall ever pursue unless circumstances should occur, which we do not now anticipate, rendering a departure from it clearly justifiable under the imperative and overruling law of self-preservation." "Our relations with Spain which ought to be of the most friendly character must always be placed in jeopardy while the existing colonial government over the island shall remain in its present condition." Abraham Lincoln, in his third annual message, dated December 8, 1863, said: "An important question, involving the extent of the maritime jurisdiction of Spain in the waters which surround the Island of Cuba, has been debated without reaching an agreement, and it is proposed in an amicable spirit to refer it to the arbitrament of a friendly power." Andrew Johnson, in his third annual message, dated December 3, 1867, said: 28 I agree with our early statesmen that the West Indies naturally gravitate to, and may be expected ultimately to be absorbed by, the continental States. I agree with them also that it is wise to leave the question of such absorption to this process of natural political gravitation." Andrew Johnson, in his fourth annual message, dated December 9, 1868, said: "A comprehensive national policy would seem to sanc tion the acquisition and incorporation into our federal union of the several adjacent continental and insular com munities as speedily as it can be done, peacefully, lawfully, and without any violation of national justice, faith, or honor. Foreign possession or control of those communi ties has heretofore hindered the growth and impaired the influence of the United States." President U. S. Grant, in his first annual message, dated December 6, 1869, said: " The United States have no disposition to interfere with the existing relations of Spain to her colonial possessions on this continent. They believe that in due time Spain and other European powers will find their interests in terminat ing those relations and establishing their present dependen cies as independent powers." President Grant s special message of May 21, 1871, sub mitted for ratification an additional article to the treaty of November 29, 1870, concerning the annexation of the San Domingo Republic, and presents the standard arguments, depended upon by all statesmen and used by all Presidents in their messages, in favor of acquiring a strong position in the West Indies in the interest of the construction of the Nicaragua Canal and American commerce in the Gulf of Mexico. President Grant s fifth annual message of December i, 1873, gives the history of the seizure of the Virginius. " " On October 3ist, and while sailing under the flag of the United States, on the high seas, she was forcibly seized by the Spanish gunboat "Tornado" and carried to the port of Santiago, where fifty-three of her passengers and crew were inhumanly and without due process of law put to death." 1 Pending negotiations between the United States and the Government oi Spain on the subject of this capture, I have authorized the Secretary of the Navy to put our navy on a war footing. In his sixth annual message, dated December 7, 74, President Grant referred to the deplorable strife in Cuba, continued without any marked change, and said: Six years of strife give to the insurrection a significance which cannot be denied. Its duration and the tenacity of its adherence, together with the absence of manifested power of suppression on the part of Spain, cannot be con troverted, and may make some positive steps on the part of other powers a matter of self-necessity/ President Grant s seventh annual message of December 7, 1875, calls attention to the disregard of the laws of civil ized warfare on the part of Spain in her attempt to subdue the insurgents, and continued: "Desolation, ruin, and pillage are pervading the rich fields of one of the most fertile and productive regions of the earth, and the incendiary torch, firing plantations and valuable factories and buildings, is the agent making the alternate advance or retreat of contending parties." 30 He declared that: " This protracted conflict seriously affects the interests of all commercial nations, and those of the United States more than others." President Hayes, in his fourth annual message, dated December 6, 1880, reports to Congress the fact that during the summer several American merchant vessels, sailing in neutral waters of the West Indies, had been fired at, bom barded, and searched by a Spanish armed cruiser, and said : The circumstances as reported involve not only a pri vate injury to the persons concerned, but also seemed too little observant of the friendly relations existing for a cen tury between this country and Spain." Omitting further extracts from these messages, let the plat form expressions of the great national parties be con sidered. The declaration of the platform of the Democratic national party in 1856 has already been quoted; also that of the Republican platform of the same year and campaign. In 1860, the Douglas Democratic Convention declared: The Democratic party are in favor of the acquisition of the Island of Cuba on such terms as shall be honorable to ourselves and just to Spain." In the same year the Breckinridge Democratic Conven tion declared that: "The Democratic party are in favor of the acquisition of the Island of Cuba, on such terms as shall be honorable to ourselves and just to Spain, at the earliest practicable moment." In 1864, the Republican Convention, which nominated Lincoln and Johnson for President and Vice- President, declared that: 1 We approve the position taken by the Government that the people of the United States can never regard with indifference the attempt of any European power to over throw by force, or to supplant by fraud, the institutions of any republican government on the western continent, and that they will view with extreme jealousy as menacing to the peace and independence of their own country the efforts of any such power to obtain new footholds for mon archical governments, sustained by a foreign military force in near proximity to the United States." In 1884, the National Democratic Convention which nominated Cleveland and Hendricks, declared: This country has never had a well denned and executed foreign policy, save under the Democratic administration. That policy has ever been in regard to foreign nations, so long as they do not act detrimental to the interests of the country or hurtful to our citizens, to let them alone; that as a result of this policy we recall the acquisition of Louisiana, Florida, California, and of the adjacent Mexican territory by purchase alone, and contrast these grand acquisitions of Democratic statesmanship with the purchase of Alaska, the sole fruit of Republican administration for nearly a quarter of a century." This is a declaration that the right of territorial expansion is a cardinal doctrine of the American people, and the indictment is brought against the Republican party that during an administration of twenty-five years it had annexed only about 1,500,000 square miles of territory to the national domain. In 1888, the Republican Convention which nominated Harrison and Morton, declared: " The conduct of foreign affairs by the present adminis tration has been distinguished by its inefficiency and cow ardice. Having withdrawn from the Senate all pending treaties effected by Republican administrations for the removal of foreign burdens and restrictions upon our com merce and for its extension into better markets, it has neither effected nor proposed any others in their stead. Professing adherence to the Monroe doctrine, it has seen with idle complacency the extension of foreign influence in Central America and of foreign trade everywhere among our neighbors." The Republican Convention of 1892 declared: " We reaffirm our approval of the Monroe doctrine and believe in the achievement of the manifest destiny of the Republic in its broadest sense. Reaching current history, we find the Democratic, Free Silver National Convention, held in Chicago, July 9, 1896, declaring: We extend our sympathy to the people of Cuba in their heroic struggle for liberty and independence." In the same year the National Republican Convention, held at St. Louis, declared: " From the hour of achieving their own independence the people of the United States have regarded with sympathy the struggle of other American people to free themselves from European dominion. We watch with deep and abiding interest the heroic battle of the Cuban patriots against cruelty and oppression, and our best hopes go out for the full success of their determined contest for liberty." 33 " The Government of Spain having lost control of Cuba, and being unable to protect the property or lives of resi dent American citizens, or to comply with its treaty obliga tions, we believe that the Government of the United States should actively use its influence and good offices to restore peace and give independence to the island." In the same year the People s party adopted a platform at St. Louis, from which the following extract is taken: " We tender to the patriotic people of Cuba our deepest sympathy in their heroic struggle for political freedom and independence, and we believe the time has come when the United States, the great Republic of the world, should recognize that Cuba is, and of right ought to be, a free and independent State." The words of the People s party platform were incorpor ated in the Declarations of War, and thus a platform declaration became the basis of national action. At last the Cuban question assumed a moral aspect. When a national question becomes a moral issue, its solu tion cannot be postponed. For more than one hundred years the relations of Spain with her American colonies has demonstrated her inability to maintain government over them. According to the doctrine enunciated by the greatest and wisest Presidents of the United States, that when a nation is not strong enough to maintain her sovereignty over distant territorial possessions, that sovereignty ceases, and the independence of the people over whom that sover eignty is sought to be extended is established, and such people are and of right ought to be free. Spain has adopted measures for the suppression of a rebellion in Cuba which has existed for a period of more than fifty years. Of that method, the President of the United States has said : The only peace it could beget was that of the wilderness and the grave." As if conscious that the government and authority which she was feebly endeavoring to maintain over distant insular possessions were in their expiring throes, Spain resorted to a policy the most barbarous and cruel in all the annals of a history, every page of which is dark with the record of tyranny and cruelty. If she could not govern, she could at least destroy. The condition was intolerable. Every humane instinct of the nation was aroused. The logical decree of all our history was about to be invoked, and on April 23, 1898, the Congress of the United States declared: That the people of the island are and of right ought to be free and independent. " That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the Island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters. That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States and to call into actual service of the United States the militia of the several States to the extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect." And, on April 25th, Congress declared that "War be and the same is hereby declared to exist, and that war has existed since the 2ist of April, 1898." Thus was ushered in the current historical era. It has 35 brought us to a time which is the legitimate birth of all former time. The war with Spain crystallizes into action the declaration emanating from the statesmen of all periods of our history; from the messages of Presidents to the Congress of the nation; from the platform declarations of the great national parties; from acts of Congress, and interpreted by accom plished facts of history, unmistakably discloses the purpose of the nation. The evolutionary force to which the trend of our history has responded, and must respond, is the racial aspiration to be a great nation, in all the attributes of greatness. In obedience to this force, we have declared the right and exercised the power of acquisition of territory allied to us by commercial affinity and by geographical position necessary to the national defense and to our growth and expansion. We have in all time maintained that by virtue of her geographical position, the incorporation of Cuba into our territorial system was natural and right, and even indispensable to our safety. Any sovereignty other than that of the United States, whether claimed and exercised by an Old World monarchy or established by the people of the island themselves, will in all essentials be at issue with the inherent evolutionary force of our development, and if national opinion, of which there is ample record, may be trusted, a foe to our safety and an obstacle to our progress. The independence of Cuba is, therefore, an historical absurdity. The irritating jealousy concerning her relations with other powers will, from the first, force her into the debas ing expediency and enfeebled vassalage of an American pro tectorate, a relation prolific of international complications, and attended with the perpetual menace of foreign war. The 36 independence of Cuba may be a step in the direction of incorporating her into our industrial, commercial, and political system; but nothing short of her complete incor poration into our territorial system will allay the menace of her geographical position, or remove the obstacle her aliena tion opposes to the defense of our country and to our national expansion and commerce. In the current war we are witnessing the drama of history and the tragedy of progress. " Individual wrongs become historic rights," and we will retain sovereignty over every foot of territory conquered by our army. This is decreed by the trend of all our history. Hereafter this great Republic is to be a factor in the meaningful movements of nations. The purpose of the nation cannot be in terpreted by the vanity of oratory, the hypocrisy of eloquence, or the bigotry of mere sentimental patriot ism; elemental forces over which man does not appear to exercise control, are broadening and deepening the current of national life as the channels of rivers are broadened in their onward flow. And when the fruits of victory, ennobling the sacrifice of blood and compensating the tears of sorrow, shall lay at the feet of liberty new empires and crown our country with a higher mission and a broader responsibility among the nations of the earth, the purpose of the nation will stand revealed in the possession of nobler aspirations, augmented possibilities, and the achievement of a higher place in the upward and onward pathway of destiny. 57 RETURN CIRCULATION DEPARTMENT TO* 202 Main Library LOAN PERIOD 1 HOME USE 2 3 4 5 6 ALL BOOKS MAY BE RECALLED AFTER 7 DAYS Renewals and Recharges may be made 4 days prior to the due date. 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