CAVALRY TACTICS 
 
 Illustrated by the War of the Rebellion 
 
 TOGETHER WITH 
 
 MANY INTERESTING FACTS IMPORTANT 
 FOR CAVALRY TO KNOW. 
 
 BY CAPTAIN ALONZO GRAY, 
 
 Fourteenth U. S. Cavalry. 
 
 FART I. 
 
 U. S. CAVALRY ASSOCIATION, 
 FORT LEAVBNWORTH, KANSAS. 
 
 1910. 
 
COPYRIGHT, 1910, 
 BY ALONZO GRAY. 
 
 PRKS3 OF KETCHK80N PRINTING CO. 
 LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 In pursuing the subject of cavalry tactics I found that, 
 while certain principles were accepted as correct, I was not 
 familiar with the battles in which these principles were ap 
 plied. I believe it to be true that there is no modern prin 
 ciple of cavalry tactics, which is accepted today as correct by 
 any first-class military power, which was not fully illustrated 
 during the War of the Rebellion. No war which has occufed 
 
 A 
 
 since that time has, in any respect, added to the cavalry tac 
 tics which were in daily use during that great struggle. 
 
 I give it as my humble opinion that increased range of 
 firearms and the addition of machine guns, increase the 
 sphere of action of, and necessity for, well-organized cavalry ; 
 that bicycles, motorcycles and automobiles will prove to be 
 only valuable auxiliaries to cavalry in transporting informa 
 tion back to the rear, and thus saving an unnecessary expen 
 diture of horse flesh ; and that while flying machines may 
 bring information, by so doing they will widen the sphere 
 of action of good cavalry ; and, more than ever before, as a 
 result of such information, it will be necessary to have good 
 cavalry ready to move on extremely short notice. 
 
 In looking for examples to illustrate the tactical prin 
 ciples of cavalry operations, I have drawn mostly from the 
 Records of the Rebellion (indicated in references by R. R.), 
 but have not endeavored to give exact quotations ; instead I 
 have quoted only so much as is necessary to illustrate the 
 point involved. The illustrations are taken mostly after the 
 opening campaign of 1863, at which time the Federal cavalry 
 
 259819 
 
reached anijj efficient condition. At this time the Confed 
 erate cavalry was at its best. (Life and campaigns of Maj. 
 Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 257.) 
 
 The reason why more Federal than Confederate reports 
 are quoted is because the former are much more numerous. 
 
 Whenever a report states what happens to the enemy 
 or the enemy s losses, be the report Federal or Confederate, 
 that portion of it should be accepted with great caution. 
 
 While the work principally treats of tactics, I have in 
 corporated reports of such facts and expedients as are use 
 ful for every cavalryman to know. 
 
 It is my intention to follow this work, Part I, with a work 
 on "Troop Leading of Cavalry," wherein the decisions are 
 based on the principles herein illustrated. 
 
 This work is undertaken in the hope that the lessons 
 learned during our great war will not be forgotten. 
 
 ALONZO GRAY. 
 Camp Stotsenburg, 
 Pampanga, P. I. 
 March 31, 1910. 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 A OONOI8E HISTORY OF THE ORGANIZATION AND ARMAMENT OF THE 
 UNITED STATES CAVALRY. 
 
 The first mounted force, consisting of one squad- March 5, 1792. 
 ron, was authorized by Act of Congress March 5, 1792. 
 
 The Act of March 2, 1799, authorized three regi- March 2, 1799 
 ments of cavalry, to be composed of five squadrons of March 15,1802. 
 two companies each. They were not all raised, and 
 those which were raised were mustered out March 16, 
 1802. 
 
 The Act of April 12, 1808, authorized a regiment April 12, isos. 
 of light dragoons. 
 
 By Act of January 11, 1812, Congress ordered an- January 11,1812 
 other regiment of light dragoons. 
 
 By Act of March 30, 1814, these light dragoon March so, isu. 
 regiments were consolidated. The consolidated regi 
 ment was composed of eight troops, each consisting of 
 five officers and 116 enlisted men. 
 
 By Act of Congress, June 15, 1815, this regiment June 15, isi5. 
 was disbanded. 
 
 Congress, by Act of March 2, 1833, authorized March 2, im. 
 the raising of the 1st Dragoons. This was the begin 
 ning of our present cavalry organization. The regi 
 ment w^as composed of ten companies to serve on horse 
 or foot as might be directed. 
 
 On May 23, 1836, Congress authorized the raising May 23, isse. 
 of another dragoon regiment which was to be just like 
 the first. It became the 2d Dragoons. 
 
 By an Act known as the "Ten Regiment Bill" Con- Feb. 11, 1347. 
 gress, on February 11, 1847, authorized ten regiments, 
 one of which was the 3d Dragoons and another the 
 Mounted Rifles. Each of these regiments was to have 
 two majors, the others having only one. 
 
1884> At the close of the Mexican War, in the summer 
 
 of 1848, the 3d Dragoons were disbanded and the 
 Mounted Rifles mustered out, but immediately recruited 
 and sent to Oregon. 
 
 March 3, 1865. B y Act of March 3, 1855, Congress authorized 
 
 two regular regiments of cavalry. They became the 
 First and Second Cavalry. 
 
 May 4, i86i. By presidential order, G. O. 16, A. G. O., 1861, 
 
 the 3d Cavalry was added to the regular army. It 
 consisted of three battalions, each composed of two 
 squadrons of two companies each. This order was con 
 firmed by Act of Congress July 29, 1861. 
 
 August 3, i86i. All mounted troops were organized into one arm, 
 
 called cavalry, by Act of August 3, 1861. By this act 
 
 The 1st Dragoons became the 1st Cavalry; 
 
 The 2d Dragoons became the 2d Cavalry; 
 
 The Mounted Rifles became the 3d Cavalry; 
 
 The 1st Cavalry became the 4th Cavalry; 
 
 The 2d Cavalry became the 5th Cavalry; 
 
 The 3d Cavalry became the 6th Cavalry. 
 
 B qua e d fi rSn tioIlof The Act of J^J 29, 1861, defines a squadron as 
 consisting of two troops or companies. 
 
 At the beginning of the war all regiments had ten 
 troops or five squadrons. The 6th Cavalry, formerly 
 the 3d, was, by Act of Congress, to have twelve troops 
 at the time of its organization. (See G .O. 16, A. G. 
 O., May 4, 1861.) 
 
 % Act of Congress July 17, 1862, promulgated 
 in G. O. 91, A. G. O., July 29, 1862, all United States 
 cavalry was organized as follows: Each regiment to 
 have 1 colonel, 1 lieutenant colonel, 3 majors, 1 sur 
 geon, 1 assistant surgeon, 1 regimental adjutant, 1 
 regimental quartermaster, 1 regimental commissary, 1 
 sergeant major, 1 quartermaster sergeant, 1 commis 
 sary sergeant, 2 hospital stewards, 1 saddler sergeant, 
 1 chief trumpeter, 1 chief farrier or blacksmith, 12 
 companies or troops. 
 
 tnent. 
 
Each company or troop to have 1 captain, 1 first 
 lieutenant, 1 second lieutenant, 1 supernumerary second 
 lieutenant, 1 1st sergeant, 1 quartermaster sergeant, 1 
 commissary sergeant, 5 sergeants, 8 corporals, 2 team 
 sters, 2 farriers or blacksmiths, 1 saddler, 1 wagoner, 
 and 78 privates. Total 100 enlisted. 
 
 G. O. No. 7, A. G. O., January 7, 1863, provides 
 that each troop or company of United States cavalry 
 shall have from 60 to 78 privates. 
 
 The volunteer cavalry went out with 10 troops per al unteer < 
 regiment. G. O. No. 126, A. G. O., September 6, 1862, 
 directed that each regiment of volunteer cavalry should 
 have the same organization as that prescribed for the 
 regular service. (See G. O. 91, A. G. O., 1862, above.) 
 This order directed that this organization should be strict 
 ly adhered to by all concerned. 
 
 G. O. No. 110, A. G. O., April 29, 1863, gave the 
 organization of the volunteer cavalry and but slightly 
 changed the above. It provided for 2 trumpeters per 
 troop and fixed the enlisted strength at the minimum of 
 82 and the maximum at 100 per troop. 
 
 By Act of July 28, 1866, Congress provided for the July 88,1866. 
 organization of the 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th regiments of 
 cavalry, and by Act of February 2, 1901, it provided for Feb. 2,1901. 
 the llth, 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th regiments. 
 
 ARMAMENT. 
 
 During the Mexican War the dragoons were armed 
 with musketoons, which were carried on sling belts, ex 
 cept when marching the sling belt was unsnapped. They 
 also carried dragoon sabers of Prussian pattern and 
 horse pistols. 
 
 The Mounted Rifles were armed with percussion 
 rifles and Colt s army revolvers, but no sabers. 
 
 The cavalry regiments were armed with sabers, 
 rifle-carbines and Colt"s navy revolvers. 
 
 (Brackett s History of U. S. Cavalry, p. 160.) 
 
 During the Civil War the U. S. Cavalry was gen- 
 erally armed with rifles or carbines, sabers and revolvers. War 
 
The lance. 
 
 1811. 
 
 1814. 
 
 1826. 
 
 Scott Tactics. 
 
 The rifles carried at the commencement of the war were 
 changed for carbines, and the single loading carbines 
 were, in the latter part of the war, changed for repeat 
 ing ones. See Exts. Nos. 74, 133, 151, 141. 
 
 At the beginning of the war the sabers were the 
 Prussian pattern, with a long straight blade. These 
 were replaced later by the light cavalry saber with a 
 curved blade, which was regarded with much more favor 
 than the Prussian saber. 
 
 The Colt s revolver was generally carried. It was 
 loaded with powder and ball and fired with percussion 
 caps. 
 
 Only one lancer regiment went out, the 6th Penn., 
 and it changed the lance for the saber in April, 1863. 
 
 DRILL REGULATIONS. 
 
 Previous to 1896 Drill Regulations were called Tac 
 tics. 
 
 In 1811 Anthony Finley of Philadelphia published 
 "Colonel Harries Instructions for a Volunteer Corps 
 of Cavalry." 
 
 In 1814 Colonel Wm. Duane, Adjutant General, 
 U. S. Army, published "Hand Book for Cavalry." It 
 was a system of drill regulations. 
 
 In 1826 a Board of Officers was convened to report 
 "A Complete System of Cavalry Tactics." 
 
 Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott was president and 
 Lieut. Col. Z. Taylor was a member of the board 
 These tactics were published in 1834 and were known 
 as the "Scott Tactics." 
 
 The system was a double rank system where two 
 troops, side by side, each in double rank, constituted a 
 squadron, and four squadrons a regiment. The squad 
 ron was commanded by the senior captain. While the 
 drill differs from that of the present time, the principles 
 are essentially the same. Much of the phraseology of 
 our present drill regulations is a repetition of that of the 
 "Scott Tactics." 
 
In 1841 the War Department published what were Poinsett or 4i 
 called the " 41 Tactics," or "Poinsett Tactics." They T 
 differed from the "Scott Tactics " in providing for a regi 
 ment of 10 companies, or 5 squadrons. 
 
 The "History of the U. S. Cavalry," by Brackett, 
 on page 48 states: "The system of cavalry tactics 
 adapted to the organization of the dragoon regiments 
 was authorized by the Hon. J. R. Poinsett, Secretary of 
 War, on the 10th of February, 1841. It is mainly a 
 translation of the tactics of the French service, and has 
 not yet (June 1, 1863) been improved upon, though sev 
 eral attempts have been made, but they have all proved 
 failures. I believe almost every cavalry officer of ex 
 perience considers the tactics of 1841 as far superior to 
 anything which has yet been introduced into our service." 
 
 The 41 tactics were used by the eastern cavalry 
 during the entire war and by the regular cavalry after 
 the war. The western cavalry used the 41 tactics till 
 the fall of 1864, when they began to use the Cooke tac 
 tics, which prescribed a single rank formation. 
 
 Whenever, in a report, the term "squadron" is used, 
 it will mean a unit of two troops; while the term "bat 
 talion" will mean four troops either in single or double 
 rank. 
 
 Because of the almost universal use of the 41 tac 
 tics, it will be necessary to describe some of their im 
 portant features. 
 
 "The squadrons of a regiment in order of battle are Battle order, 
 distinguished by the denominations first, second, third, 
 fourth and. fifth; they are formed on the same line, in 
 order of these numbers, commencing on the right with 
 an interval of 12 paces. This is the primitive and habitual 
 order of the squadrons in regiments. Each squadron is 
 composed of four platoons, distinguished by the denom 
 inations first, second, third and fourth, commencing on 
 the right. The first and second platoons form the first 
 division, the third and fourth form the second division," 
 
10 
 
 The "Column of Squadrons" was a column where 
 each squadron was in line with full distance. In a "Close 
 Column of Squadrons" the squadrons were closed to- 12 
 paces distance. 
 
 poke s Tactics November 1, 1861, the War Department officially 
 adopted the tactics written by Colonel Philip St. George 
 Cooke. They were published in 1862 and known as the 
 "Cooke Tactics." 
 
 While it was ordered that "All additions or de 
 partures from the exercises and maneuvers laid down 
 are positively forbidden," as previously stated, they were 
 not used by the eastern cavalry at all, and not by the 
 western cavalry till 1864. I make this statement on in 
 formation obtained from veterans of the war and believe 
 it to be correct. 
 
 Principles/)! The principles of the Cooke Tactics differ materially 
 from any preceding them. The single rank formation 
 is here introduced. A troop is called a squadron and is 
 composed of four platoons. 
 
 In 1857 the War Department published the report 
 on foreign armies made by Captain Geo. B. McClellan. 
 On p. 278 he recommends that the word company be 
 changed to squadron and that the single rank formation 
 be adopted. 
 
 Cooke acknowledges getting his ideas from conver 
 sations with McClellan. 
 
 The introduction of the Cooke tactics states that 
 the single rank formation was tested by the British in 
 Portugal in 1833 and 1834, and it was found that it 
 greatly simplified all cavalry movements. 
 
 Battle order. The battle order for a regiment of ten troops is four 
 
 troops in line ; four in line of troops in column of platoons 
 at full distance, 300 paces in the rear of the first line; 
 one troop 50 paces behind each flank of the first line, each 
 in column of platoons at full distance. In case the regi 
 ment had only eight troops, the two center troops of the 
 second line were the missing troops. 
 
 An "Open Column" is formed of subdivisions, hav- 
 
11 
 
 ing between them the necessary distance to form line in 
 every way. The "Close Column" is formed of troops 
 with distance of platoon front one from the other. The 
 "Double Column" is formed by advance from the center 
 of the line, by platoons at wheeling distance. 
 
 Other than mentioned, these tactics are much the Double column 
 
 i 1 1 1 i f fours. 
 
 same as the drill regulations of the present time. The 
 double column of fours does not seem to have been used 
 during the Civil War. After his war experience General 
 Cooke rewrote his tactics in 1883. The double column 
 of fours is then introduced. Of this movement General 
 Cooke says : "A new system with two lines and double 
 column of fours as the greatest novelties was devised 
 and was, in fact, approved by a board of experienced 
 officers as early as 1868." (Upton Board.) 
 
 General Wesley Merritt reviewed these tactics and Merritt reviews 
 highly commended these movements as "Valuable C 
 changes in the interest of rapidity of maneuver and 
 celerity of formation, which are so important for the ef 
 fective action of cavalry under the changed conditions 
 for its uses in modern warfare." 
 
 When Cooke, Merritt and Upton agree that the 
 double column of fours is invaluable in the interests of 
 celerity, I conclude that : 
 
 Any organization which will not admit of the ap 
 plication of double column of fours is incorrect. 
 
 Upton s Assimilated Tactics were adopted by G. O. isvs Upton s 
 No. 6, A. G. O., 1873. The cavalry service never took Tactics 
 kindly to the effort to unite them with infantry. 
 
 The Drill Regulations of 1896 seem to be a combina- Drlll Regula . 
 tion of Cooke and Upton. They differ from the Assim- tions 1896 
 ilated Tactics chiefly in that they broke the tie that bound 
 the cavalry to the infantry. 
 
 THE CONFEDERATE CAVALRY. 
 
 The Confederate cavalry under Stuart in the east stuart scav- 
 early obtained a superiority over that of the Federal alry 
 Government. After the Gettysburg campaign the Con 
 federate cavalry began to deteriorate because the fine 
 
12 
 
 quality of horses which they had when the war began 
 could no longer be obtained. Stuart s cavalry was or 
 ganized and armed the same as the cavalry of the Army 
 of the Potomac. 
 
 ^wheeler s cav- i n the western armies of the Confederacy the single 
 rank formation began to be used early in the war. Mor 
 gan began to use it from the start. Forrest soon began 
 to use it, and Wheeler found that it was necessary to the 
 conditions under which they were laboring. 
 
 ^ wheeler s TEC- Wheeler wrote a set of cavalry tactics which were 
 officially adopted by the following order : 
 
 Headquarters Army of the Tennessee, 
 Dalton, Ga. 
 
 February 17, 1864. 
 General Orders 
 
 No. 22. 
 
 The system of cavalry tactics prepared by Major 
 General Joseph W heeler is adopted for the use of the 
 cavalry of the Army of the Tennessee. 
 
 By command of General Johnston. 
 
 K. FALCONER, A.^V. G. 
 
 These tactics were used by Wheeler in 1863. (See 
 Campaigns of Wheeler and His Cavalry, p. 375.) 
 
 mSe e nt er 8 Ar ~ At the battle of Murfreesboro Wheeler s cavalry 
 was armed with the rifle or carbine, sabers and revolvers. 
 (Campaigns of Wheeler and His Cavalry, p. 62.) 
 The following report of an inspection of Wheeler s 
 cavalry is of great importance since it makes statements 
 regarding the use of the saber which cannot be contro 
 verted and which are agreed to by all men who saw that 
 weapon extensively used during the war. 
 
 po\t e wS?eie?B ^ xt< ^ * At ^ east one re ^ ment f eac h brigade 
 cavalry. should be armed with pistols and sabers. This might 
 
 be held in reserve, under ordinary circumstances, as the 
 charging regiment; as at present constituted, this com 
 mand is virtually little else than mounted infantry. A 
 change in this respect is deemed very important, and I 
 
13 
 
 earnestly and respectfully recommend the adoption of 
 this suggestion at the earliest practicable moment. A 
 light carbine might be carried in addition. It is a matter 
 of regret that the saber has been so much overlooked; its 
 moral influence is great. The "fannade, the glitter of 
 the keen blades in the air in the event of a charge, pro 
 duce in themselves a most terrifying effect." In a hand 
 to hand conflict the necessity of the saber is most ap 
 parent. 
 
 (February, 1865, Wheeler and His Cavalry, p. 408.) 
 Wheeler was, without doubt, the ablest Confederate 
 cavalry leader in the west. He was always ready to work 
 in the team and play a subordinate part to his command 
 ing general. 
 
 Ext. No. 2. The carbines and rifles were flashing: Pen picture of 
 
 . . the cavalry flght 
 
 and banging away at times, and scattering- shots, w hen ofshelb y vine. 
 
 ,, * Shelbyville, 
 
 the game was at long range, and then, when a change Tenn., June 27, 
 came on and the work grew hot, the spiteful sharp explo 
 sions swelled into a crackling roar like that of a cane- 
 brake on fire, when, in a single minute, hundreds of 
 boiler-like joints have burst asunder. Add to all the 
 whizzing, angry whirl of countless leaden missiles which 
 split the air about you; the hoarse, unnatural shouts of 
 command for in battle all sounds of the human voice 
 seem out of pitch and tone; the wild, defiant yell and the 
 answering huzzas of the opposing line ; the plunging and 
 rearing of frightened horses; the charges here and there 
 of companies or squadrons which seem to be shot out of 
 the main body as flames shot out of a house on fire; 
 here and there the sharp, quick cry from some unfor 
 tunate trooper who did not hear one leaden messenger 
 for only those are heard which have passed by; the 
 heavy, soggy striking of the helpless body against the 
 ground; the scurrying away of the frightened horse, as 
 often into danger as out of it, whose empty saddle tells 
 the foe that there is one rifle less to fear. All these sights 
 and sounds go to make up the confusing medley of a 
 battle-field. 
 
 (Campaigns of Wheeler and His Cavalry, p. 101.) 
 
14 
 
 ForreBt - Forrest was a very able man, but, like Stonewall 
 
 Jackson, was at his best when operating alone. He could 
 not bear restraint and did not work well to the central 
 idea. 
 
 ? habifS Ext Na 2A. The country, rocky and rugged, was 
 fought on thickly clad with cedars, and difficult, of course, for cav- 
 jJanyHiiijenn, airy movements, so that, for the most part, the fighting 
 was on foot, which, however, was now Forrest s habitual 
 tactics, 
 
 (Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest s Cavalry, p. 
 621. November 29, 1864.) 
 
 COMMENT. 
 
 Forrest always had an escort, but he and his escort 
 always participated in the thickest of the fighting. 
 
 It would seem that if a general does not personally 
 enter the heavy fighting, under the changed conditions 
 of warfare, a large escort would be a nuisance. 
 Armament of Forrest s cavalry generally carried sabers, but sel- 
 
 Forrest s cavalry. J 
 
 dom used them. His cavalry may be considered the high 
 est type of mounted infantry. 
 
 Morgan was essentially a raider; although a hard 
 fighter when the occasion demanded, he preferred a loose 
 sort of warfare to working in conjunction with other 
 troops, 
 
 Morgan s cav y. Ext. No. 3. We were, in fact, not cavalry, but 
 mounted riflemen. A small body of mounted men was 
 usually kept in reserve to act on the flanks, but otherwise 
 we fought very little on horseback except on scouting 
 expeditions. We never used sabers, and long guns were 
 not exactly the weapons for cavalry evolutions. 
 
 Morgan rarely fought with the army; he had to 
 make his command a self-sustaining one. Nearly every 
 man had a pistol and some had two. The pistol pre 
 ferred and usually worn was the Army Colt. 
 
 (Morgan s Cavalry, by Duke.) 
 
 Mosby. Mosby was a partisan and fought whenever every 
 
 thing seemed to be in his favor. His force seldom ex- 
 
15 
 
 ceeded 300 men, mounted on the best horses the state of 
 Virginia could produce. His men were all picked men 
 who knew the country where they were operating. With 
 this class of horses he could always fight on his own 
 terms. When not raiding or harassing trains, they scat 
 tered in the surrounding country and came together again 
 on call. They were armed with the revolver only, ex 
 cept that most men had two, besides carrying extra cylin 
 ders to slip loaded into the weapon when all loads were 
 exhausted. 
 
16 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 ARMS AND THEIR USES REVOLVER vs. SABER. 
 
 EMBRACING A DISCUSSION OF THE RELATIVE MERITS OF THE REVOLVER 
 
 AND SABER AND SHOWING WHEN EACH SHOULD BE USED. 
 
 THE TERM PISTOL, IN ANY REPORT, MEANS REVOLVER. 
 
 Bowie knives. Ext. No. 4. But while a few of the Confederate 
 
 soldiers were efficiently armed, almost every man of them 
 had a bowie knife and revolver. The Arkansas and 
 Texas troops, especially, carried enormous knives, that 
 might have made a Malay s blood run cold, but in the 
 end these huge knives did duty far oftener as cleavers 
 than as bayonets. 
 
 (Morgan s Cavalry, by Duke.) 
 
 u of pistol. Ext. No. 5. Colonel Wickham and a few of his 
 
 June fll^i scaf 1 * men threw themselves into a field on the roadside, and by 
 the fire of their pistols checked further pursuit. 
 
 (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, 
 p. 289.) 
 
 Forrest s men Ext. Nfo. 6. Forrest placed his men dismounted 
 verAlimomited immediately behind a gully. The first Federal charge 
 Feb k 2V64. MiS8 " was checked at 60 yards. The second Federal charge 
 was checked at 40 yards. The third Federal charge was 
 not checked till it reached 20 yards. The fourth Fed 
 eral charge went through. The Confederate rifle am 
 munition was exhausted and they fought with revolvers. 
 (Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest s Cavalry, 
 p. 399.) 
 
 ute of revolver, Ext. No. 7. Two strong lines of Federal infantry 
 Ti^h. min go pressed upon Rucker, Bell and Duff, through an open 
 10, istST" field. Their front line came within 30 paces of the Con 
 federates, who then drew their revolvers and drove the 
 enemy back with great slaughter. 
 
 (Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest s Cavalry, 
 p. 473.) 
 
17 
 
 Ext. No. 8. The 9th Penn. Cavalry had been with- Federal, use 
 drawn from the battery and placed in position by the sidem^nleT 8 dls " 
 of the road, and by close pistol fighting, held the largeTe^Ko.z^ Gs! 
 columns of the enemy in check. 
 
 (Col. E. M. McCook, R. R., Vol. 31, Part I, p. 654.) 
 
 Ext. No. 9. The enemy charged in gallant style, Texan. use re- 
 and were repulsed twice, the second time the Texans v ^ P ooi,Mi SS ., 
 using their six-shooters at 20 paces. Fb.a, i86 
 
 (Maj. Genl. S. D. Lee, C S., R. R., Vol. 32, Part 
 I, p. 365.) 
 
 Ext. No. 10. In one instance the 2d U. S. Cavalry 2d u. s. cavalry 
 
 j ,1 , . use revolver, dis- 
 
 drove the enemy before them with their pistols ( dis- mounted - 
 mounted) after the carbine ammunition had given out. 
 
 Co 
 
 (Brig. Genl. A. T. A. Torbert, R. R., Vol. 36, Part Ml 
 I, p. 805.) 
 
 Ext. No. 11. Anderson advanced in good style, the charge with 
 Confederates with sabers, supported by the 5th Georgia vers r agan.t e cai- 
 
 ... , , J & bines does not 
 
 with pistols. Ihree times these two regiments charged 8UCCeed - 
 
 the 4th Michigan, but each time they were driven back Ga - Jlln a O 1864! 
 
 in confusion. 
 
 (Col. R. H. G. Minty, R. R., Vol. 38, Part II p 
 821.) 
 
 Ext. No. 12. The enemy relied wholly upon the saber against 
 carbine and the pistol; my men preferred the saber. A^e! ve 
 short but closely contested struggle ensued, which re- vaTsept^iSf^l 
 suited in the repulse of the enemy. Many prisoners were 
 taken and quite a number of both sides were left on the 
 field. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. G. A. Custer, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I 
 p. 456.) 
 
 Ext. No. 13. The charge was met by one from the m the me iee 
 enemy and the- command was broken. The men had notf.Vi b iStoS 
 weapons but their carbines, and these were extremely ^sTb^T Gap 
 difficult to load and inefficient in the melee that ensued. Feb> 19) 1865 
 The rebels (Mosby s men) had very few sabers but 
 were well supplied with revolvers and rode up to our men 
 and shot them down without meeting more resistance 
 than men could make with carbines. I ascribe the dis- 
 
18 
 
 aster to * * * fourth, to the men having- neither 
 sabers nor revolvers, and consequently being unable to 
 engage in a melee successfully with an enemy armed with 
 at least two revolvers to the man. 
 
 (Maj. Thos. Gibson, 14th Pa. Cav., R. R., Vol. 46, 
 Parti, p. 465.) 
 
 sabers necea- Ext. No. 14. Lomax s cavalry are armed entirely 
 
 country. 11 n with rifles and have no sabers, and the consequence is 
 
 etSj*i864. HI11 that they cannot fight on horseback, and in this open 
 
 country they cannot successfully fight on foot against 
 
 large bodies of cavalry. 
 
 (Lieut. Genl. Jubal A. Early, C. S., R. R., Vol. 43, 
 Part I, p. 559.) 
 
 Ext. No. 15. I could not stand that; but, drawing 
 
 combat with an . 1 . ,,. 
 
 Indian, revolver my saber, rushed upon the monster and inflicted a severe 
 
 wins against sa 
 
 ber cut. wound on his head. At the same moment he fired his 
 
 Solomon s Fork, .... - .. 
 
 July 29, 1857. last barrel within a foot of me, the ball taking effect in 
 the center of the breast, glancing to the left and lodging 
 near my left nipple. 
 
 (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, 
 p. 21.) 
 
 saber used as a Ext. No. 16. Colonel Munford was dismounted by 
 ^Manassas^Jirty a saber stroke and his horse was killed. 
 
 (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, 
 p. 107.) 
 
 individual Ext. No. 17. Perceiving his danger, Colonel Davis 
 turned upon Allen with a cut of his saber, which Allen 
 
 m Fieetwood,* va., avoided by throwing himself on the side of his horse; at 
 June 9, 1K63. the game moment h e fired and Colonel Davis fell. 
 
 (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, 
 p. 265.) 
 
 Revolver wins Ext. No. 18. Colonel HamptOD, while engaging 1 
 
 against the aber f , . , , . 
 
 one of the enemy with his saber, was shot through the 
 *"^! body by another, and mortally wounded. 
 
 (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, 
 p. 289.) 
 
 *In the reports of Southern Officers the engagement at Brandy Station is given 
 as "Fleetwood" or "Fleetwood Hill." 
 
19 
 Ext. No. 19. Captain Latane and Captain Royall individual 
 
 . , combat, revolver 
 
 met hand to hand, one with the sab er and the other with wins against sa 
 ber. 
 
 the pistol, and Latane received instant death. Royall was chicka hominy 
 severely wounded by Latane s saber and by the men who IBS-/. 
 charged close at Latane s side. 
 
 (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, 
 p. 56.) 
 
 Ext. No. 20. Corporal Caroll and Private Jett f 
 Co. U C," after the hand to hand fight in the field, showed 
 me their sabers cut off close to the hilt, and Caroll s 3 
 forehead was gashed with a saber. 
 
 (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, 
 p. 344, Gettysburg campaign.) 
 
 Ext. No. 21. And the road was soon, and for sev- Forrest s cav- 
 
 . it- airy uses saber as 
 
 eral miles, thickly dotted with the wounded and slam a a cutting weapon 
 number of whom had been cut down by the sabers of Ky" r ifei!*28i 
 
 i & V i 
 
 the untrained but heavy-handed Confederates who fol 
 lowed Forrest that winter afternoon. 
 
 (Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest s Cavalry, 
 p. 52.) 
 
 Ext. No. 22. Forrest was assaulted simultaneous- Pistol wins 
 
 against saber 
 
 ly by two officers with their sabers; but, eluding the f ull ^^ th ?*g ew 
 force of their thrusts by bending his body suddenly for-j^jjjfjg"^ 11 , 1 
 ward, their sword points only touched his shoulder. Car 
 ried a few paces ahead by the impetus of his horse, check 
 ing and drawing which aside in time to shoot one of his 
 opponents as he came up, he thrust his saber point into 
 the other. * * * obliging him to run his saber 
 through one, and disable the other by a blow on the sword 
 arm. 
 
 (Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest s Cavalry, p. 
 53.) 
 
 Ext. No. 23. Private W. H. Terry, while engaged ^officer uses 
 single-handed with a Federal trooper whom he was ham- sacremanto, 
 
 Ky., Dec. Jo, oi. 
 
 mering with his exhausted rifle, was run through the 
 heart by Captain Davis. 
 
 (Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest s Cavalry, p. 
 54.) 
 
20 
 charge in coi- Ext. No. 24. He drew his men up for the work in 
 
 umn of squad- 
 
 r Forrest s cav- an P en space, in a column of squadrons. The order to 
 charge up the ravine was given, with instructions for the 
 first and second companies of the squadrons severally to 
 
 U8 Fort Donison, deploy to the right and left as they advanced. About 
 
 Feb. 15, i86a. the batterv a ^and to fa^ struggle ensued. Sabers, 
 pistols and carbines were lavishly used, with much cost 
 of lives on both sides. 
 
 (Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest s Cavalry, 
 p. 82.) 
 Forrest uses Ext. No. 25. Forrest resolved to charge. At 
 
 shot-guns during 
 
 tje Dearly part of twenty paces the Confederates gave a volley with their 
 shiioh, April 7 shot-guns, a formidable weapon at that distance, and 
 
 1862. 
 
 rushed in with pistols and sabers. 
 
 (Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest s Cavalry, 
 p. 146. Battle of Shiioh.) 
 saber used as Ext. No. 26. Very many charges were made and 
 
 shock weapon. 
 
 Cpp rviiie, Va., the saber used freely. 
 
 (Genl. A. Pleasonton, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 912.) 
 saber used aa Ext. No. 27. There were several charges and the 
 
 shock weapon. 
 Brandy Station, Saber was USed With SUCCCSS. 
 
 (Genl. Buford, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 932.) 
 sturdy men of Ext. No. 28. They outnumbered us three to one, 
 as a cutting e weap but could not withstand the heavy saber blows of the 
 ]y Ford sturdy men of Maine who rode through them and over 
 
 (Genl. Kilpatrick, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 986.) 
 stuart s cav- Ext. No. 29. The charge was spiritedly made and 
 
 ^ooTbfrVug h sabers freel y used > as the heads of m y men wil1 attest 
 
 Md., jV^isSs! ( Lieut< Col Preston, 1st Vt. Cav., R. R., Vol. 27, 
 
 Parti, p. 1015-) 
 
 Kiipa trick s Ext. No. 30. Upwards of 200 left in our hands 
 duXl8 U av e ann b a e h were wounded by the saber alone. 
 Cft way a ne S n borough (General Kilpatrick, Savannah Campaign, R. R., 
 
 Vol. 44, p. 365.) 
 
 stuart s cav- Ext. No. 31. Jones brigade, with drawn sabers, 
 till wfth^lbe^." charged down the turnpike under a fearful artillery fire. 
 
21 
 (General Stuart, C. S., R. R., Vol. 27, Part II, p. 
 
 \ ^" Jily 6, 1868. 
 
 Ext. No. 32. With an abiding faith in the god of 
 battles, and a firm reliance on the saber, your success 
 will continue. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, C. S., R. R., Vol. 27, 
 Part II, p. 720.) 
 
 Ext. No. 33. After driving- the whole cavalry force saber used to 
 
 r ,, 1-1 it 1 i finiah the fight. 
 
 of the enemy steadily all day long, our troops went in seriersviiie, 
 
 about 4 o clock with the saber and a yell and routed them. iseJ . 
 
 (Brig. Genl. S, D. Sturgis, R. R., Vol. 32, Part I, 
 p. 134.) 
 
 Ext. No. 34. This great disaster would have at 
 once been retrieved but for the insufficient armament of 
 the command. Besides the 1st and 2d Md. and a squad 
 ron of the 8th Va., there was not a saber in the com 
 mand. 
 
 In that open country, perfectly level, the only mode C ia 8 a s ld lry because 
 of fighting charging cavalry was by charging, and this ^s. have n 6a ~ 
 
 the men were unable to do. va Ne Iii Cr 4 Ck i 864 
 
 (Brig. Genl. Bradley T. Johnson, C. S., R. R., Vol. 
 43, Part I, p. 6.) 
 
 Ext. No. 35. The cavalry made some handsome Prisoners cap- 
 
 i , . , . , tured with the 
 
 saber charges, in which most of the prisoners were cap- saber - 
 
 fl11 _j Cedarville, Va., 
 
 tUred. Aug. 16, 1864. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, 
 p. 19.) 
 
 Ext. No. 36. Forrest was charged by a Federal ba p t ers r e nal ol c o^ r - 
 officer who lunged at him with his saber ; Forrest parried t w hr n ust ver saber 
 the thrust with his pistol, and, firing, killed his resolute vi ^ a A r la ^ ap r le f 
 adversary. 18(i5 
 
 (Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest s Cavalry, 
 p. 668.) 
 
 The following is another account of the same af 
 fair: 
 
 Ext. No. 37. While charging, Captain Taylor ran Sameasabove 
 up to Forrest and hit him over the head with his saber, 
 
22 
 
 and ordered him to surrender. Forrest then drew his re- 
 cu 8 t oldieru8e * the v l ver an d shot him dead. Another of our boys ran 
 after him, striking at him with his saber as he ran. 
 
 (The Last Campaign, by E. N. Gilpin, published 
 in the Cavalry Journal.) 
 
 in the thick Ext. No. 38. The enemy had used the saber al- 
 
 woods the revol- . . 
 
 ver is superior to most exclusively, torrest and his staff were armed, each 
 
 the saber. 
 
 Near Maples- with two navy revolvers, and the men with Spencer rifles 
 ville, ll..Apr. 1, . 
 
 1865. as well as pistols. It was a contest of sabers with fire 
 
 arms, with the odds of four to one against the Confed 
 erates. Forrest, Lieut. Boon and five of his men only 
 were wounded, while some thirty of the enemy were 
 killed and as many as sixty were left in the hospital, near 
 by, badly wounded. 
 
 (Campaigns of Forest and of Forrest s Cavalry, p. 
 669.) 
 
 saber dis- Ext. No. 39. The 10th Ohio made a most gal- 
 Bear Creek sta . lant saber charge against the enemy posted behind rail 
 VsJi. Ga NoT< 16) barricades ; dismounted, they drove the enemy in con 
 fusion, killing and wounding many with the saber. 
 (Col. Atkins, R. R., Vol. 44, p. 389.) 
 
 saber used an a Ext. No. 40. The captain had command of the ad- 
 ^wiTson s^Bjiidi vance company and did not hear the order to turn off the 
 road, so he charged on past the artillery, cutting right 
 and left among the enemy until shot down by them,. 
 (Col. J. G. Vail, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 455.) 
 
 The following discussion is taken from "Volunteer 
 Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade," written by Captain 
 Frederick Whittaker, 6th N. Y. Cavalry : 
 
 Ext. No. 41. So far as the author s observation 
 goes, he never remembers an instance in which the saber 
 charge, resolutely pushed, failed to drive the pistols. But 
 the individual fancy of the colonel seemed to regulate 
 the matter for his regiment. If he were an enthusiastic 
 swordsman he always managed to infuse the same spirit 
 into his men, and such men depended on their sabers with 
 just confidence. The saber is a weapon that requires 
 
23 
 
 constant practice to keep one s hand in, and our cavalry 
 officers as a class are entirely deficient in the practice. 
 
 In all the instances during the war in which the 
 saber proved ineffective it may be safely asserted that it 
 was owing to two things want of fencing practice and 
 blunt sabers. (Pp. 6 and 7.) 
 
 Now, the moral effect of the charge is tremendous. 
 The fierce charging yell, rising and swelling higher and 
 higher till it overtops the sound of musketry, frightens 
 more men than bullets. Very, very few troops will stand 
 up against a charge unsupported by works; we might 
 say none. One side or the other is sure to give way, not 
 from the force of the weapons, but simply because they 
 are afraid. Anything which encourages men to charge 
 home doubles their morale, and morale is everything. 
 (P. 11. See also Exts. Nos. 1, 2, 480.) 
 
 The true use of the revolver lies in irregular war 
 fare, where single combats and sudden encounters of 
 small parties take place, on horseback, in narrow lanes, 
 among woods and fences, where the saber cannot be used. 
 In such places, and wherever regular order is broken up, 
 the revolver is invaluable. In pursuits, patrols and sur 
 prises it is superior to the saber. In line charges in the 
 field, the latter is always conqueror if it is sharp. But 
 one thing should be impressed upon every man never 
 to try long shots when on horseback. The revolver on 
 the right hip should have a cord fastened to it a yard 
 long. The men should be practiced in firing at a target 
 while passing at speed, and then dropping the pistol on 
 the opposite side, to use the cord while they handle the 
 saber. (P. 14.) 
 
 The men should be taught never to fire before the 
 word. The moral effect of a reserved volley is tremen 
 dous. Irregular firing during an advance is both useless 
 and demoralizing. Thirty or forty feet from the enemy s 
 line is the time to fire, all together aiming low. (P. 15.) 
 
 Ext. No. 42. We overtook about 300 Cheyenne T he saber is 
 warriors drawn up in line of battle, and marching boldly fo ose a orTa e rtisan 
 and steadily towards us. It was my intention and that 
 
24 
 
 Solomon s Fork, of most company commanders to give a carbine volley 
 1857. and then charge with drawn pistols, and use our sabers 
 
 as a dernier ressort; but, much to my surprise, the colonel 
 ordered "Draw sabers, Charge/ We set up a terrific 
 yell, which scattered the Cheyennes in disorderly flight, 
 and we kept up the charge in pursuit. Very few of the 
 company horses were fleet enough after the march to 
 keep up with Indians on fresh ponies. 
 
 (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B Stuart, 
 p. 20.) 
 in the Gettys- Ext. No. 43. Just then Hampton arrived with the 
 
 burgcavalry fight ., , T _, 
 
 both saber and 1st N. C. and the Jeff Davis Legion, and the battle was 
 
 revolver were J 
 
 used in themeiee. renewed back and forth across the plain until all of 
 July 3, 1863. Hampton s brigade except the Cobb Legion, and all of 
 Fitz Lee s brigade except the 4th Va. Cav. were engaged 
 in the fierce hand to hand melee which followed. For 
 many minutes the fight with saber and pistol raged most 
 furiously. 
 
 (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, 
 p. 340. Battle of Gettysburg.) 
 
 wooded coun- Ext. No. 44. There was little chance for mounted 
 
 try not suitable r 1 . . . 
 
 for the use of the fighting in eastern Virginia, the dense woods, the arma- 
 
 saber by large 
 
 bodies of cavalry, ment of both parties, and the practice of barricading 
 making it impracticable to use the saber with anything 
 like a large force; and so, with the exception of Yellow 
 Tavern, the dismounted method prevailed in almost every 
 engagement. 
 
 (Sheridan s Memoirs, Vol. I, p. 424.) 
 
 COMMENTS ON THE SABER AND REVOLVER. 
 
 It will be seen from the next chapter that during the 
 War of the Rebellion, the same as for centuries past, the 
 saber was essentially a weapon for shock action. During 
 the thick of the melee it was still to be preferred ; but 
 . when the melee began to dissolve into individual combats 
 the saber was or should have been exchanged for the re 
 volver. This exchange can be effected by throwing away 
 the saber, returning it to the scabbard or by dropping 
 it and letting it hang attached to the wrist by a sword 
 
25 
 
 knot. The second method of getting rid of it is quite 
 impossible when in motion, while the third will be ac 
 companied by some danger to the trooper if the weapon 
 is as sharp as it should be. Up to the present time, 
 therefore, there is no satisfactory way to exchange the 
 saber for the revolver while in action. 
 
 In the individual combat the revolver will be the 
 winner in almost every case. If the trooper is expert in 
 its use, he has nothing to fear from an individual enemy 
 armed with a saber. (Exts. 15, 17, 18, 19, 22, 36, 37, 
 38, 41.) 
 
 The revolver was, at times, used for collective fire 
 dismounted, but only under exceptional circumstances, 
 such as from behind a stone wall, or for defensive pur 
 poses after the carbine ammunition had become ex 
 hausted. (Exts. 5 to 10 and 90.) 
 
 The revolver should, then, be used whenever regu 
 lar order is broken up. (Ext. 41.) That is, in individ 
 ual combat, charging as foragers on wagon trains or ar 
 tillery (Ext. 24), in the woods (Exts. 38, 44), on patrol 
 duty, when on mounted skirmish line in close country, in 
 irregular or partisan warfare where sudden encounters 
 of small parties are to be expected. (Ext. 41.) 
 
 In the melee the carbine is useless against the re 
 volver. (Ext. 13.) 
 
 As to the type of revolver or pistol needed the con 
 clusions that can be reached are that there is needed for 
 the cavalry a weapon of large caliber or great stopping 
 power, quick firing, and accurate not to exceed fifty 
 yards. Since the change from the saber to the revolver 
 will be made during the fight, it is evident that the 
 trooper should be able to get his weapon into action with 
 the greatest degree of rapidity. Such a contrivance as 
 a holster with a button flap and carrying the butt to the 
 front should be discontinued at the earliest moment. 
 
 All references to the saber as a thrusting weapon, 
 which were observed, have been extracted. (Exts. 22, 
 23, 36, 37.) It will be noticed that it was so used by of 
 ficers, who are presumably better instructed in its use 
 
26 
 
 than are enlisted men. Only a small portion of the ref 
 erences to the saber as a cutting weapon have been ex 
 tracted. (Exts. 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 28, 29, 37, 40, 55, 83.) 
 Not only these references, but conversations with vet 
 erans of the Civil war lead to the conclusion that the en 
 listed man is going to use his saber almost entirely as a 
 cutting weapon. At the close of the war it was no dif 
 ferent than at the beginning. It is believed that the cav 
 alry at the close of the war was as well trained in 
 swordsmanship as any troops that the United States will 
 ever put in the field. If, then, our best trained cavalry 
 is going to use the saber chiefly as a cutting weapon, it 
 is better to give it a weapon adapted to the manner in 
 which it will be used rather than one adapted to the use 
 of a trained fencer. The above statements deal with 
 historical facts and not with abstract theories. It is not 
 to be inferred that the cut is to be preferred to the thrust, 
 since the contrary is the case, but it is reiterated that the 
 cut has been and will be used to the almost entire exclu 
 sion of the thrust. 
 
 There has been a great deal of discussion in the U. 
 S. cavalry service in years past regarding the relative 
 merits of the revolver and saber. Such discussion is time 
 wasted. Each weapon has its distinct and proper uses, 
 and neither can replace the other; neither can either of 
 them be discontinued as a necessary part of modern cav 
 alry armament. 
 
 It is often asserted that the horse is the real weapon 
 in the shock (Ext. 67), and that it makes no difference 
 whether a trooper has a revolver or saber in his hand. 
 (See Exts. 29, 30, 35, 43, and Chapter II.) The moral 
 effect of the flash and glitter of a "three-foot razor " is 
 not to be ignored. 
 
 The 41 tactics prescribed that the charge should be 
 at a "raise saber" and it was so used all through the war. 
 
 Upton, after his war experience as a successful cav 
 alry commander, retained the "raise saber" for the charge 
 in his tactics of 73, probably because he found that his 
 
27 
 
 men used it no matter what was prescribed. Untrained 
 men instinctively use the saber as they would use a club. 
 
 The Cooke tactics of 61 prescribes the "tierce 
 point" as the charging position, and Cooke, after his 
 Civil war experience, still prescribed the "tierce point" 
 in his tactics of 83. 
 
 The "tierce point" was officially adopted as the 
 charging position of the saber in the Cavalry Drill Regu 
 lations of 1896. 
 
 In the effect of the saber previous to and at the in 
 stant of contact is largely a moral one (see Exts. 1, 2, 
 41 ) , then it would seem that this effect may be materially 
 increased by carrying the saber during the charge at a 
 "raise saber" rather than at the position of "charge 
 saber" as now used, since in the former position its flash 
 and glitter, and therefore its moral effect, will be much 
 greater than if carried at the latter. 
 
 THE LANCE. 
 
 At Vionville, Aug. 16, 1870. Bredow s brigade was AB & defensive 
 
 weapon the lance 
 
 composed of two regiments. One was armed with the i^noj>etter than 
 saber and the other with the lance. With equal numbers 
 they charged in the same line under identical conditions 
 and suffered equal losses. This would indicate that as a 
 defensive weapon the lance is not superior to the saber. 
 
 In our service we know very little about the lance. 
 In the Mexican war we had lancers for opponents, as 
 will be seen from the following : 
 
 Ext. No. 45. The cavalry made one most gallant sabers against 
 
 J Mexican lancers. 
 
 charge against the enemy on the 23d of February, and Benna vista, 
 
 cut their way through them; but the Mexican lancers 
 
 were far from, being a contemptible enemy, and many 
 
 of them were admirable horsemen. Our people had the 
 
 advantage of larger horses and heavier men as a general 
 
 thing, but the Mexicans were much more agile, and could 
 
 handle their horses as well as any people on earth, while 
 
 with the lance they were greatly our superiors, and used 
 
 that weapon with great effect both at Buena Vista and 
 
 at San Pascual. 
 
28 
 
 We have yet to make good lancers in the United 
 States, as experiments, even on a small scale, have proved 
 failures among the Americans. 
 
 (History of the U. S. Cavalry, by Brackett, p. 83.) 
 Rush s lancers. The 6th Pennsylvania Cavalry, known as Rush"s 
 Lancers, went out at the beginning of the war with 
 lances which they carried through all the campaigns of 
 the Army of the Potomac till April, 1863. They never 
 used that weapon in any shock action, and after Stone- 
 man s raid in April, 1863, they abandoned it as unsuited 
 to the service, and were thereafter armed with sabers and 
 carbines. At the battle of Beverly Ford we find them 
 charging with sabers, June 9, 1863. 
 
 (See Annals of the 6th Pennsylvania Cavalry, p. 
 167.) 
 
 COMMENTS ON THE LANCE. 
 
 The lance cannot be used to advantage in a close 
 wooded country such as is found everywhere along the 
 Atlantic coast. The greatest use of the lance is in the 
 shock. In the melee the saber possesses a decided ad 
 vantage. In meeting an enemy armed with the lance it 
 would be necessary to first break the continuity of his 
 lines before the saber could gain a superiority. In these 
 extracts there can be found many examples where cav 
 alry charges have been broken by magazine fire by hold 
 ing it till the charging line is within very close range. 
 The traditions of our cavalry and its training are such 
 that we can dismount and fight on foot in a very short 
 time. This dismounted fire should be supported by 
 mounted troops, which should deliver the charge as soon 
 as the lancer line is broken. If it were necessary to meet 
 lancers, whose lines were unbroken by fire action, with 
 shock action of troops armed with the saber, I would 
 endeavor to strike the weakest point of their line with a 
 mass formation of some kind, either by squadrons in 
 column of troops or in line of troops in columns of fours. 
 Thin lines fleeing in front of lancers would soon cause 
 their lines to become so broken that other troops held in 
 reserve could meet them with a fair chance of success. 
 
29 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 SHOCK ACTION AND THE USE OF SABER. 
 
 Ext. No. 46. About 4:00 p. m. the enemy came up 
 and resolutely assailed the right of Roddy s position wi 
 a mounted battalion, with drawn sabers. It was hand- saber used as 
 
 the shock weap- 
 
 somely done, and the Confederates were thrown into a on. 
 
 . . . . -1-j Wilson s Raid, 
 
 great deal of confusion, giving way m disorder. Apr. i, 1865. 
 
 (Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest s Cavalry, 
 p. 666.) 
 
 Ext. No. 47. On came the Federal cavalry with th ^Jf a e r ^ um of 
 their sabers drawn. * * * Such was the momentum Wilson s Raid, 
 
 Apr. 1, 1865. 
 
 of the Federal charge that one of their horses, striking 
 squarely against the wheel of a piece, broke every spoke, 
 and split his own breast open. 
 
 (Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest s Cavalry, 
 p. 667.) 
 
 Ext. No. 48. The enemy left some two or three sudden onset 
 
 succeeds "where 
 
 regiments at Sugar Creek, a strong position, to oppose 
 
 my advance; but instead of fighting them at long range, faiL 
 
 as they expected, I ordered a saber charge. The 5th 
 
 Iowa made a most gallant charge, breaking through their sugar creek, 
 
 Tcnn., Oct. 9,1868. 
 
 lines, etc. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. George Crook, R. R., Vol. 30, Part II, 
 p. 687.) 
 
 Ext. No. 49. Our rapid pursuit and vigorous use pursuit should 
 of the saber completely demoralized this force, which caihoun. Te 
 
 , , ,. . , . Dec. 28, 1863. 
 
 was thrown into great confusion, and scattered in every 
 direction, their men throwing away large numbers of 
 arms, accoutrements, etc. 
 
 (Col. Eli Long, Comg. 2d Brig., R. R., Vol. 31, 
 Part I, p. 643.) 
 
30 
 
 m ?n a ts pi re S1 St?n Ext N " 5 Z can onl y account for our small loss 
 ^ ra P idit y of Ollr movements and the consternation 
 
 ing weapon. produced by the saber charges 
 
 Pair Garden, 
 
 . >" 27, (Col. E. M. McCook, R. R., Vol. 32, Part I, p. 141.) 
 
 we?i d conducted "^ xt< ^ ^ ^ w *^ k e observed that we lost but 
 
 !tr b o e y r 8 c the r !ccS?- little ^ which shows that the enemy, by the courageous 
 
 m7esn f re the ene " and cooll y executed saber charge, was so struck and 
 
 okoiona, Miss., taken by surprise that he lost the balance of power to 
 
 Feb. 22, 1864. . n 
 
 give a well-aimed fire, and this explains the many horses 
 shot in the legs and head. 
 
 (Maj. Gust. Heinricks, 4th Mo. Cav., R. R., Vol. 
 32, Parti, p. 280.) 
 
 8hock e wea S pon aS by Ext N S2 ~ TllC 7th Pa and the 4th Mich - each 
 
 western armies mac { e one sa b er charge, and two battalions of the 4th 
 
 JiOonuHy Crp^k, 
 
 G., June 20, 1864. Mich, repulsed three saber charges made by Anderson s 
 brigade of regular cavalry. 
 
 (Col. R. G. H. Minty, R. R., Vol. 38, Part II, p. 
 812.) 
 
 Driving cav- Ext. No. 53. At the same time General Wilson, 
 faSry ^nfs re- with Mclntosh s brigade, dashed up the Winchester pike 
 
 suits in capture , 
 
 re fmenV antry ^ rove ^ e re b^l cavalry at a run, came in contact with 
 Near Berryviiie, Kershaw s division, charged it, and captured the 8th So. 
 Carolina regiment (16 officers and 145 men) and its 
 battle flag, with a loss of only two men killed and two 
 wounded. 
 
 (Maj. Gen. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, 
 p. 24.) 
 
 ^ xt ^ ^ ^ resn columns of the enemy arriv- 
 June d 9 y i863 atlon> * n > unc ^ er ^ le heavy blows of our sabers were driven 
 back. For an hour and a half the contest continued in 
 determined charges. 
 
 (Genl. D. McM. Gregg, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 
 951.) 
 
 infantry may Ext. No. 55. A six-gun battery of the enemy was 
 
 be safely charged , *. 
 
 if struck when playing away rapidly toward our left front. This was 
 
 changing front. 
 
 ordered to be charged, but before the order could be exe 
 cuted it withdrew, and the charge was directed against 
 the enemy s infantry, which was attempting to change 
 
31 
 
 front and meet us; they were in confusion; no time was 
 
 lost; the intrepid Devin, with his gallant brigade, burst ^an n * attacking 
 
 like a storm of case shot in their midst, showering saber ^Q*^^ Creck 
 
 blows on their heads and shoulders, trampling themV*- 8 ^- 19 1864 
 
 under his horses feet, and routing them in droves in 
 
 every direction. The brigade emerged from the fray 
 
 with three stand of colors and over 300 prisoners. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. W. Merritt, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 
 444.) 
 
 Ext. No. 56. On July 3, engagement two or three al u h e a r r s 
 miles to the right of Two Taverns, in which this 
 ment (1st Mich. Cav.) charged in close column 
 Hampton s brigade, using the saber only, and driving 
 the enemy from the field, with a loss to this regiment of 
 6 officers and 80 men. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. G. A. Custer, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, 
 p. 899.) 
 
 Ext. No. 57. A second, third and fourth charge charge should 
 
 t i ,, 1 r 1 1 11 be met by counter 
 
 was made by the enemy, each of which was repulsed or charge. 
 
 met and driven back by counter charges. During all 
 
 enemy s charges the loss of men and horses must have 
 
 been severe. 
 
 (Genl. Jos. Wheeler, C. S., R. R., Vol. 44, p. 410.) 
 
 Ext. No. 58. He occasionally attacked us by charg- charge 
 
 .,, ,. < , , . i , , , ably met by conn 
 
 ing with his cavalry, which was invariably met by coun- ter charge. 
 
 i Waynesboro. 
 
 ter charges. Ga., Dec. 4, 1864. 
 
 (Genl. Jos. Wheeler, C. S., R. R., Vol. 44, p. 410.) 
 Ext. No. 59. I immediately ordered the charge in C obb s Legion 
 
 close columns of squadrons and swept the hill clear of 
 
 . column of squad- 
 
 the enemy. rons. 
 
 (Col. P. M. B. Young, C. S., R. R., Vol. 27, Part 
 II, p. 732.) 
 
 Ext. No. 60. Colonel Owen, with his gallant little g aber iB used 
 regiment, took the center of the road supported by the^ terrible ef 
 2d Va. on his right and the 5th on his left, dashed in with j^ftfSft Va> 
 the most spirited charge of the day, driving the regiment 
 before him:, using the saber with terrible effect, captur 
 ing and killing nearly the whole regiment. 
 
32 
 
 (Genl. Munford, C. S., R. R., Vol. 27, Part II, p. 
 741.) 
 
 saber 86 rvesuse ^ xt No. 61- At the proper moment our reserve 
 Tenn de oot n i is*? c ^ ar " e ^- Thirty-seven of the enemy were killed or 
 wounded and 42 made prisoners. Nearly all the wounds 
 were inflicted with the saber. 
 
 (Col. O. H. LaGrange, R. R., Vol. 30, Part II, p. 
 683.) 
 Revolver is Ext. No. 62. General Smith ordered a charge. Six 
 
 substituted for 
 
 the nature oVthe tro P s roc ^ e forward upon the enemy s lines with drawn 
 ^ sabers - The nature of the ground prevented the ef- 
 f ect i ye use f tne saber, but the pistol was substituted for 
 it and did most excellent service. The enemy was driven 
 from his position and lost fearfully in killed and 
 wounded. 
 
 (Lieut. Col. Thos. M. Browne R. R., Vol. 32, Part 
 I, p. 276.) 
 Regiment Ext. No. 63. In one day six distinct regimental 
 
 makessix J & 
 
 charges in one c h ar g es W ere made besides a number of smaller ones. 
 jn Brandy^ation, (Col. Wyndham, 1st N. J. Cav., R. R., Vol. 27, 
 
 Part I, p. 966:) 
 
 Brigade makes Ext. No. 64. Soon commenced a series of charges 
 Brandy station, and counter charges by the 5th, 6th and 15th Va. Cav 
 alry. There were five distinct charges made at this point, 
 which resulted in leaving us in possession of the railroad 
 and station. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. Lomax, C. S., R. R., Vol. 29, Part I, 
 p. 465.) 
 charges made Ext. No. 65. Thus it will be seen that six distinct 
 
 by a division in . . . 
 
 battle. charges were made by parts of the division after the gen- 
 
 va,. q sept. r lateral advance toward Winchester two by the 2d Brigade 
 and one by the 1st Brigade against the enemy s cavalry, 
 one by the 2d Brigade and one by the reserve against the 
 enemy s infantry and artillery, and one, the final charge, 
 in which all three of the brigades were concerned. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. Wesley Merritt, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, 
 p. 445.) 
 
S3 
 
 Ext. No. 66. Baker was charged by a fresh regi- charges and 
 ment. Then I put in the Cobb Legion and broke the at- C vwmm**v , 
 tacking party. The Cobb Legion was again attacked/" 
 and again with the Jeff Davis Legion- I turned the flank; 
 and this series of charges went on until all my regiments 
 named had charged three times and I had gained ground 
 to the right and front of more than half a mile. 
 
 (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, 
 p. 311, Upperville.) 
 
 Ext. No. 67, -The order was given to charge. The The horse as & 
 most terrific, yet magnificent, charge ever witnessed was W j7 sborou ^ 
 made. The saber and the horses hoofs were about our?^; Augl 19 
 only weapons. 
 
 (Col. E. H. Murray, Comg. Cav. Div., R. R. Vol. 
 38, Part II, p. 864.) 
 
 Ext. No. 68. The order "By fours, right about charge i, very 
 wheel" was heard. The result was most unfortunate, cffbelaugh^ 
 The enemy saw the wheel and instantly ordered the neuvertng * : 
 charge. Colonel Hampton again ordered the "Right cavalry 8 eizes 
 about wheel" and placed himself at the head of his men; 
 
 but it was of no avail. In a moment they were swept to pieetwood mil, 
 
 the side of the road, and the full force of the charge f ell tVn) 
 upon the 4th Virginia. 
 
 (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart 
 p. 289.) 
 
 Ext. No. 69. This charge was gallantly made and TWO brigades 
 gallantly met as any the writer ever witnessed during Jie"hSJe! n a 
 four years of active service on the outposts. Taking into (ifilSg aitlSj; 
 estimation the number of men that crossed sabers in this Va " JuneM8< 
 single charge (being nearly a brigade on each side), it 
 was by far the most important hand-to-hand contest be 
 tween the two armies. 
 
 As the blue and gray riders mixed in the smoke and 
 dust of that eventful charge, minutes seemed to elapse 
 before the effect was determined. At last the inter 
 mingled and disorganized mass began to recede ; we saw 
 that the field was won to the Confederates. 
 
34 
 
 (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, 
 p. 277. Battle of Brandy Station.) 
 
 Ext. No. 70. Observing a small portion of Fed 
 eral cavalry, Lieut. Col. Watts was sent forward with 
 one squadron. His charge developed the fact that he had 
 attacked the advance guard of a brigade, which was ad 
 vancing to battle in column of regiments. Munford 
 formed the second regiment in line and was retiring to 
 gain the advantage of a better position, when he heard 
 the order given to the enemy s column, "Forward, trot, 
 Quick decision march." He instantly wheeled by fours and charged at 
 
 essential to a cav 
 
 alry leader. f u u o-allop. The impetuosity of the charge carried his 
 
 Groveton,Va., b . 
 
 Aag. 29, 186-i regiment entirely through the first line of the enemy, 
 with whom his men were thoroughly intermingled in 
 hand to hand fight. 
 
 (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, 
 p. 106.) 
 smaii losses Ext. No. 71. Nothing but the impetuosity of the 
 
 due to impetuos- . 
 
 ity of the charges, charges, whereby the enemy was not given time to de- 
 
 Mar. i9,-Apr. 21, f end himself, can account for the small list of casualties. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. E. Upton, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 
 
 475.) 
 
 Mounted coi- Ext. No. 72. The fruits of our victories have been 
 
 umns should be 
 
 ready to strike ma tenally increased by having- mounted columns always 
 
 when the enemy J J > J 
 
 breaks. ready to take advantage of opportunities offering. 
 
 Wilson s Raid, J 
 
 Mar. i9-Apr. 2i, ( B v t. Brig. Genl. E. F. Winslow, R. R., Vol. 49, 
 Part I, p. 482.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 It will be noticed that the saber was the only weapon 
 used for shock action except when the ground was un 
 favorable, such as a close or wooded country. Under 
 such conditions the revolver was substituted for the 
 saber. (Ext. 62.) To secure favorable and decisive re 
 sults a cavalry commander must make a quick decision 
 and quickly take the initiative. (Exts. 48, 50, 51, 68, 
 70, 71, 72.) A timid cavalry leader will usually fail 
 where a bold one will succeed. In many cases a bold 
 and sudden attack will result in small losses (Exts. 50, 
 
35 
 
 51), and boldness will take the place of numbers. (Ext. 
 79.) 
 
 The pursuit should be vigorous as long as it is kept 
 up. The time when it should be stopped is discussed un 
 der the head of Pursuit." 
 
 Cavalry in falling back should be careful to move to 
 the flanks of supporting infantry, otherwise their con 
 fusion is communicated to the infantry with serious con 
 sequences to the latter. (Ext. 53 and 471.) 
 
 A charge should always be met by a charge. (Exts. 
 57, 58, 66, 92, 230.) 
 
 A regiment can make as many as six charges in one 
 day. (Exts. 63, 64.) 
 
 Tactical organizations launched in a charge are 
 usually not greater than a regiment at any one time 
 (Exts. 63, 64, 66), but an entire brigade may be charged 
 as such. (Exts. 65, 69.) In one case the charge of an 
 entire division is recorded. (Ext. 65.) 
 
 The charge will be most destructive if the enemy 
 can be caught in the act of maneuvering. (Ext. 68.) 
 
 A mounted column should always be held in readi 
 ness to take the initiative when opportunity is offered. 
 There will at rare intervals be a golden moment, and the 
 commander who would seize it must be found ready. 
 (Exts. 68, 72.) 
 
 Ground scouts should always be sent in advance of 
 attacking troops. (Ext. 68.) 
 
 Reserves should have sabers drawn. (Ext. 61.) 
 
 Care must be exercised that cavalry does not arrive 
 at the charging point in a distressed or blown condition. 
 (Ext. 95, 411, 418.) The distance over which cavalry 
 can travel at an increased gait and still be fit to deliver 
 a shock will depend upon their training. Frederick the 
 Great required that his cavalry should be able to pass 
 over 4,000 yards at a trot, 1,800 yards at a gallop, and 
 still be able to finish 300 to 400 yards at full speed. 
 Modern conditions with long range fire arms, more than 
 ever, make it necessary that cavalry be able to pass over 
 great distances at high speed. 
 
36 
 
 Extract 418 speaks of charging five miles, but it is 
 likely that the language exaggerates to some extent. See 
 also Extracts 411, 418. 
 
 CHARGING ARTILLERY. 
 
 charge battery Ext. No. 73. They made a charge across a deep 
 
 using only the 
 
 *beT. ravine and a creek, up a steep hill, the road rough and 
 
 sept. ^fms. * stony, and through a heavy shell fire, right up to the 
 muzzle of the guns, two of which they brought off with 
 out firing a shot, using nothing but the saber. 
 
 (Col. Davies, R. R., Vol. 29, Part I, p. 120.) 
 
 Attack with Ext. No. 74. The enemy moved a brigade to en- 
 fh^centS 6 and gage the 2d Iowa Cavalry, one regiment dismounted 
 
 dismounted men , . . , i.inir j 
 
 on the flanks. as skirmishers on both flanks of a regiment mounted. 
 
 trauon^badlac- Mounted and dismounted men of the enemy came for 
 
 ward in fine style, the howitzers of the 2d Iowa firing 
 
 Defense holds . , . .. 
 
 their fire. rapidly. The regiment lying on the ground waited until 
 
 y. the enemy s cavalry were within 50 yards (Confederate 
 Federal cav- re port savs 60 yards) , sprang to their feet, and, with 
 
 airy use rapid fire J 
 
 thewa? during cheers, poured in a severe fire from revolving rifles. A 
 Teni lie Mov 1 s ^ ew men reacnec ^ tne g" 11118 tne repulse was thorough. 
 l * (Col. Edward Hatch, R. R., Vol. 31, Part I, p. 245.) 
 
 Attackartiiiery Ext. No. 75. Colonel LeGrange, by a magnificent 
 
 with sabers. . 
 
 Fair Garden, and gallant saber charge upon the Fair Garden road, 
 
 Tenn., Jan. 27, . f M1 1 . 
 
 1084. captured two pieces of artillery, sabered the cannoneers 
 
 and supports and captured a large number of prisoners. 
 
 (Col. E. M. McCook, R. R, Vol. 32, Part I, p. 140.) 
 
 cavalry farm Ext. No. 76. From a personal examination of the 
 
 in column of 1 > 1 
 
 squadrons to ground, I discovered that a successful charge might be 
 
 charge a battery. fe 
 
 Yellow Tavern, made upon the battery of the enemy, keeping well to 
 the right. With this intention, I formed the 1st Mich. 
 Cav. in column of squadrons under cover of the woods. 
 As soon as the 1st Mich, moved from the cover of the 
 woods the enemy divined our intention and opened a 
 brisk fire with shell and canister. Before the battery 
 could be reached there were five fences to be opened and 
 a bridge to cross, over which it was impossible to pass 
 more than three at one time. Yet notwithstanding these 
 obstacles, the 1st Mich, advanced boldly, and when with- 
 
37 
 
 in 200 yards of the battery, charged it with a yell 
 which spread terror before them. Two pieces of can 
 non, two limbers and a large number of prisoners were 
 among the results of this charge. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. G. A. Custer, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, 
 p. 818.) 
 
 Note. During this charge two regiments engaged 
 the attention of the enemy in front while the 1st Mich, 
 executed its charge. 
 
 Ext. No. 77. A part of the 1st N. T. cavalry came Artmery 
 . j out support re- 
 
 thundering down the narrow ridge, striking- McGregor s p l8M cavalry 
 
 charge, using re- 
 
 and Harts unsupported batteries in the flank, and riding volveri - 
 
 .. * Brandy Station, 
 
 through and between guns and caissons from right to va.,junee, ises. 
 
 left, but met by a determined hand-to-hand contest from 
 
 the cannoneers with pistols, sponge staffs and whatever 
 
 else came handy to fight with. The charge was repulsed 
 
 by artillerists alone, not a solitary friendly trooper being 
 
 within reach of us. 
 
 (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, 
 p. 278.) 
 
 Ext. No. 78. "Now, don t express any opinion, There ain t no 
 but answer my question, what s the best way to charge charge a W baJtery! 
 a battery? He looked me squarely in the eye for a 
 few seconds and then said very earnestly, Lieutenant, 
 to tell you the God s truth, thar ain t no good way to 
 charge a battery. " 
 
 (Morgan s Cavalry, by Duke.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 Against artillery the saber was frequently used as 
 the charging weapon (Exts. 73, 75.) The best results 
 will, however, be obtained by using the revolver, since 
 the gunners will take refuge behind their pieces and can 
 do good execution with the revolvers with which they 
 are armed, (Ext. 77.) 
 
 A frontal charge against artillery is not apt to suc 
 ceed unless the distance is very short (Ext. 68) ; the 
 greater the distance charged the less the chance of suc 
 cess. The flank attack offers a fair chance of success 
 
38 
 
 unless the artillery is well supported by foot troops. 
 (Ext. 76.) The frontal attack on artillery with 
 mounted troops in the center and. dismounted troops on 
 the flanks is an example of the poorest kind of tactics. 
 (Ext 74.) 
 
 The best time to strike artillery is when it is in 
 the act of limbering or unlimbering. 
 
 CHARGING FOOT TROOPS. 
 
 charging in- Ext. No. 79. At 4:00 p. m. the enemy pressed 
 nk< warmly along our entire line. The troops on my left 
 gave way and an entire corps of the enemy rushed in 
 pushing in on our rear till they gained our hospitals, and 
 were resting directly upon the only line of retreat of our 
 army. I immediately charged his left flank, feeling cer 
 tain that the boldness and rapidity of a charge was all 
 
 ra B ?dft ness take ( s^ iat cou ^ ^ n an y manne r check a force so vastly our 
 
 toe place of num- SU p er j ors j n num bers. The rangers broke through the 
 
 c Var^ises 8 ^ 116 ^ skirmishers without breaking their impetus and 
 
 pushed on, striking the main line almost at the same time 
 
 with Allen s gallant Alabamians, which threw the entire 
 
 force of the enemy in a most rapid and disorderly retreat. 
 
 (Lieut. Genl. Jos. Wheeler, C. S., R. R., Vol. 47, 
 
 Part I, p. 1131.) 
 
 carairy catches Ext. No. 80. Wilson, with Mclntosh s brigade 
 
 infantry in a 1111 
 
 cafion where it leading, made a gallant charge through the long canon, 
 8uccwsfui r i geB U anc ^ meeting the advance of Ramsen s rebel infantry 
 opeqmm creek, division, drove it back and captured the earthworks at 
 the mouth of the cafion. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 43, Part 
 I, P. 47.) 
 
 Against shaken Ext. No. 81. The charge of the left column was 
 
 charge boot to ordered ; the gallant Custer led it ; boot to boot these 
 
 op eqnon Cre<k, brave horsemen rode in. The enemy s line broke into 
 
 v., *pt. 19, isbi a t h ousanc [ fragments under the shock. The reserve 
 
 brigade followed the blow, and all was lost to the 
 enemy. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. W. Merritt, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, 
 p. 445.) 
 
39 
 
 Ext. No. 82. The enemy now threw a heavy force 
 of infantry across the river on the left of the position, while forming. 
 
 Front Boyal Vs 
 
 The 4th and part of the 6th N. Y. were ordered to Aug. ie, 1864. 
 charge them before they could succeed in forming. This 
 was successfully accomplished. While the 4th and the 
 6th were charging the rebel infantry, the cavalry again 
 advanced to turn our right. As soon as their column 
 was fully exposed, two squadrons of the 6th N. Y. 
 were ordered to charge, and again broke and routed 
 them. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. Thos. C. Devin, R. R., Vol. 43, Part 
 I, p. 474.) 
 
 Ext. No. 83. At this time a line of infantry ed ln wwie y ?n a th g e 
 
 . r~* . act of emerging. 
 
 emerged from the woods in our front. I hey were in from the woods. 
 
 some disorder. General Merritt at once ordered me to 
 
 charge, which I did by changing front obliquely to the 
 
 left, the evolution being splendidly executed by both 
 
 regiments at the gallop, when, like a whirlwind, they ^ cut geems 
 
 dashed on the unfortunate infantry, who were vainly to fa be t grefened 
 
 endeavoring to form. It was a terrible scene. Right on, g* on foot 
 
 over and through the rebel lines, dashed the wild troopers, 
 
 slashing right and left, pistoling those who had again 
 
 seized their guns after surrender and taking prisoners 
 
 by the score. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. Thos. C. Devin, R. R., Vol. 43, Part 
 I, p. 482.) 
 
 Ext. No. 84. The enemy, mounted, three times charge deiiver- 
 
 " ed by successive 
 
 charged our dismounted men in an open field, and were blows - ^^ 
 as often repulsed, but not until, mingling in our ranks, Term., Dec. 24, &s\ 
 some of his men were brought to the ground with 
 clubbed guns. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. W. T. Martin, C. S., R. R., Vol. 31, 
 Part I, p. 547.) 
 
 Ext. No. 85. As we moved up, the whole force (of 
 the enemy) charged down at a gallop, and I am proud 
 to say my men did not disappoint me. Standing firm, take 
 
 they repulsed the grandest cavalry charge I ever wit- 
 nessed. The 2d and 7th Tenn. drove back the advance 
 
40 
 
 line, and as it wheeled in retreat, poured upon them a 
 destructive fire. Each successive line of the enemy shared 
 the same fate, etc. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. N. B. Forrest, C. S., R. R., Vol. 12, 
 Part I, p. 354.) 
 
 Ext. No. 86. The column being attacked in rear, 
 General Kilpatrick ordered me to withdraw my command 
 and form for a charge on the attacking force. I formed 
 my brigade (now reduced to a little over 700 of all 
 
 men h ta e form g in ranks ) in line of re g ental column of fours (three 
 
 umnoffouS 601 " regiments). I sent a few men from each of my columns 
 
 are senTout couts t0 c ^ ar e as f ra g er s, and remove portions of the first 
 
 fence, and moved forward at a trot until I arrived on top 
 
 of the rising ground behind which we had formed, when 
 
 charging cav- we rushed forward at a gallop. One fence still inter- 
 airy knock down 
 
 a fence, and pass vened between us and the rail barricades, from behind 
 
 on to the attack. 
 
 LoTejoy station, which the rebels were firing. The leading horses, in 
 trying to leap the fence, knocked off some of the top 
 rails, and gaps were soon made through which the col 
 umns poured. The rebels held their position until we 
 were within about ten rods, when they broke from their 
 cover and scattered in the wildest confusion. 
 
 (Col. R. H. G. Minty, R. R., Vol. 38, Part II, p. 
 814.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 It is now generally accepted that unshaken infantry 
 cannot be successfully charged in front by cavalry. This 
 is not necessarily true. The infantry of Frederick the 
 Great in solid lines, three deep, delivered a fire of 50- 
 caliber balls as rapidly as our thin lines, with two yards 
 intervals, can now deliver a fire of 30-caliber bullets. 
 Then every ball that hit a horse stopped him. Unless 
 hit in a vital spot by a 30-caliber bullet, a horse with 
 many wounds will now finish the charge and still be able 
 to leave the field. There will be many opportunities 
 offered for a successful charge against infantry other 
 than directly against its front. It can be charged in 
 flank (Ext. 79) ; when changing front (Ext. 55) ; while 
 
41 
 
 forming (Ext. 82) ; while in column emerging from a 
 defile or from the woods (Ext. 83) ; when shaken by 
 fire (Ext. 81) ; in a canon where it cannot deploy (Ext. 
 80). 
 
 If infantry can be surprised by a well executed 
 charge, it is likely that its fire will be very inaccurate. 
 (Ext. 51.) 
 
 It will often be possible to support a mounted charge 
 by dismounted fire or the fire of artillery delivered from 
 a flank position; this will keep down the enemy s fire 
 or divert it from the charging troops. 
 
 When dismounted toops break through a firing line 
 their advance may be checked by a mounted charge. 
 (Exts. 79, 219.) 
 
 CHARGING FIELD WORKS. 
 
 Ext. No. 87. A portion of the 6th Mich. Cav., see- cavalry charge 
 
 earthwork. 
 
 ing that only a portion of the enemy were behind earth 
 works, charged. At a trot they passed up the hill, re 
 ceiving the fire of the whole line, and the next moment 
 rode through and over the earthworks, passed to the h 
 right and left, sabering the rebels along the entire line, ef 
 and returned with a loss of 30 men. 
 
 (Reference omitted.) 
 
 Ext. No. 88. They had constructed barricades and charging rifle 
 rifle pits, which we charged and captured. Todd s javen, 
 
 (Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, p. V> 
 776.) 
 
 Ext. No. 89. Four mounted companies from the Field works 
 
 charged in flank 
 
 same regiment followed in rear of Captain Abraham, and, | d ter bein turn - 
 after crossing the bridge, turned to the right and charged coiumbns, Ga., 
 in flank the works at the lower bridge, capturing (500) 
 prisoners and three guns at that point. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. E. Upton, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 
 475.) 
 
 Ext. No. 90. The enemy s cavalry emerged f rom Bt ^ n e e f y^ * 
 the woods and a hand-to-hand conflict ensued. The gf^JJJ and pis " 
 enemy outnumbering us three to one, we retired behind j^YVeS 1 Va " 
 a stone wall and maintained our position, repulsing the 
 
42 
 
 repeated charges of the enemy by well-directed carbine 
 and pistol firing. 
 
 (Gal. Wm. Gamble, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 933.) 
 Mounted attack Ext. No. 91. Brigadier General Farnsworth moved 
 
 of stone fences 
 
 ?a e n?? y ded by **" with the lst W - Va - and 18th Pa -> followed by the 1st 
 8 Gettysburg, July Vt. and 5th N. Y., and drove the enemy from one position 
 to another until a heavy stone wall was reached, behind 
 which the rebel infantry was gathered in great numbers. 
 The 1st Vt. and the 1st W. Va., led by the gallant 
 Farnsworth, cleared the fence and sabered the rebels in 
 rear, 
 sameasabo. (Kilpatrick, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 993.) 
 
 Anyone not cognizant of the minutiae of this charge 
 upon infantry under cover of heavy timber and stone 
 fences will fail to form a just conception of its mag 
 nitude. 
 
 (Major Capehart, ist W. Va. Cav., R. R., Vol. 
 27, Part I, p. 1019.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 It will be seen that the mounted attack of field works 
 was not unusual. The most persistent was the attack 
 on the right of the Confederate lines at Gettysburg, on 
 July 3d, where the Confederates were behind a succes 
 sion of breast-high stone fences. In these attacks, the 
 gallant Farnsworth lost his life. It is believed that these 
 attacks were the cause of the suspension of the general 
 attack against the Federal left. 
 
 More attention should be given in our service to 
 the matter of jumping obstacles. Unless cavalry can 
 pass ordinary obstacles, it will meet with defeat when 
 otherwise there should be every reason to expect success. 
 
 FORMATION USED IN CHARGING. 
 
 charge in coi- Ext. No. 92. The charge was made in column of 
 
 umn of fours. . -111 
 
 cavalry receiv- * ours an ^ wltn tne saber. It was received by the enemy 
 staSmnlma/ex^ standing in line, drawn up in the road and on either 
 P< Totpo t t0mj ^de f it> an d with an almost harmless discharge of their 
 
 2. Va " June pistols. -jiiad 
 
 (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, 
 p. 56.) 
 
43 
 
 Ext. No. 93. Not 50 yards below, Colonel Percy At the battle 
 Windham was advancing the 1st N. T. Cav. in magnificent Brandy station 
 
 / both sides charge 
 
 order, in column of squadrons, with flags and guidons nn f 
 
 flying, (p. 271 below.) Hampton had formed his four June 9,1868. 
 regiments in column of squadrons, and, with everything 
 in hand for action, was moving forward briskly to 
 attack. 
 
 (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, 
 p. 274.) 
 
 Ext. No. 94. I immediately ordered the charge in same at Brandy 
 
 J Station. 
 
 close columns of squadrons, and swept the hill clear of June 9, ises. 
 the enemy, he being scattered and entirely routed. 
 
 (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, 
 p. 277.) 
 
 Ext. No. 95. At the fight at Cass Station, May 24,, charge over a 
 
 J long distance de- 
 
 1864, Stoneman s cavalry is reported to have charged grog^ C ^ e8i t h n e 
 in line over an open field for about 1,000 yards. Wjheel- JJ^YnSdiS?^ 
 er s cavalry, in two lines, one directly behind the other, M ay S | 5 8t ^64 n G *" 
 supported by other troops in column, waited till the 
 Federals had approached to within 200 yards. The Fed- Troops which 
 
 strike with the 
 
 eral line was by this time disorganized by its long charge. 
 
 At this time Wheeler s cavalry started forward at a ceed - 
 
 walk, then trot and finally sounded the charge when 
 
 about 30 yards from the enemy. ed C at a 3o e yds eliver " 
 
 (Campaigns of Wheeler and His Cavalry, p. 186, 
 reports Wheeler successful.) 
 
 Ext. No. 96. They had rested to feed their ani- U ^ffi s co1 
 mals, and were about to take the road thence to Newport. Cosby creek, 
 
 Tcnn., Jan. 14, 
 
 I immediately charged them in column of fours, routing 1864 - 
 
 their entire command. 
 
 (Col. Wm. J. Palmer, R. R., Vol. 32, Part I, p. 75.) 
 
 Ext. No. 97. Six companies were now ordered up same. 
 
 at a gallop, and charged in column of fours. Ten ! n., 
 
 1864 
 
 (Col. LaGrange, R. R., Vol. 32, Part I, p. 144.) 
 
 Ext. No. 98. The 1st Brigade moved to a position Brigade forms 
 
 . . for charge in col- 
 
 near the front, and, forming in column of squadrons, umn of quad- 
 made ready to give the final stroke to the work of the opequoa creek, 
 
 J Va., Sept. 19,1864. 
 
 day. 
 
44 
 
 (Brig. Genl. W. Merritt, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 
 445.) 
 Brigade attacks Ext. No. 99. The 1st Brigade, in column of regi- 
 
 in column of re- . ,1-1 
 
 giments in line, ments m line, moved forward like an immense wave, 
 
 Hiddle1own,Va., , , r , ,. 
 
 Oct. 19, 1864. slowly at first, but gathering strength and speed as it 
 
 progressed, overwhelmed a battery and its supports, etc. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. W. Merritt, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, 
 
 p. 450.) 
 
 Division form- Ext. No. 100. This division was formed in line of 
 
 ed in three lines , AA , . , . . 1 r , ,. 
 
 of equal strength, battle, with regiments in column ot battalions. 
 o5!w!w^ V * (Brig. Genl. G. A. Custer, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, 
 
 p. 523.) 
 Five brigades Ext. No. 101. At this time five brigades of cavalry 
 
 advance in line . ,, , .. . f n r 1 
 
 of battle, regi-were moving on parallel lines; most, if not all, of the 
 
 merits in col- ... 
 
 umns of squad- brigades moved by brigade front, regiments being in 
 The whole re- P ara ^ e l columns of squadrons. One continuous and 
 ! heavy line of skirmishers covered the advance, using only 
 
 mounted. car ie the carbine, while the line of brigades, as they advanced 
 
 va^ sept n i9 C T8 e 6^ . across the open country, the bands playing the national 
 
 airs, presented in the sunlight one moving mass of glit 
 
 tering sabers. This, combined with the various and 
 
 bright colored banners and battle flags, intermingled here 
 
 and there with the plain blue uniforms of the troops, 
 
 i m p o sin g furnished one of the most inspiring as well as imposing 
 
 scenes on the - . , 
 
 battle field in- scenes of martial grandeur ever witnessed upon a battle 
 
 spire soldiers to 
 perform brave field. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. G. A. Custer, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, 
 p. 456.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 In forming for the charge, almost every formation 
 was used : 
 
 Column of fours (Exts. 92, 96, 97) ; column of 
 squadrons (Exts. 76, 93, 98, 101); close column of 
 squadrons (Exts. 56, 59, 94) ; line of regiments each in 
 column of fours (Ext. 86) ; brigade in column of regi 
 ments each in line, making three lines of equal strength 
 (Ext. 99) ; division formed in line of regiments each in 
 column of battalions, also making three lines of equal 
 
45 
 
 strength (Ext. 100). The formation depended alto 
 gether on the conditions. In a lane a column of fours 
 was all that could be used. When there was room the 
 column of squadrons or close column of squadrons 
 seemed to be preferred. This gave a front of two troops 
 and a depth of six lines. If at full distance the squad 
 rons in rear could be diverted to other objectives, used 
 for a flank attack or held in reserve to fulfill the principle 
 that victory will lie with that side which can put in the 
 last formed reserve. (Exts. 66, 95.) 
 
 As soon as the leading unit has delivered its shock, 
 it should rally in rear of the column (Exts. 52, 54, 57, 
 64, 65, 66, 84, 233). This exercise should be practiced 
 frequently. 
 
 The more solid the mass at the instant of impact, 
 the greater will be the effect of the shock. The charge 
 should, therefore, be made boot-to-boot. (Ext. 81.) Not 
 withstanding this well-known maxim, the tendency is to 
 open out the rank at a time when the troopers greatest 
 safety lies in riding well closed toward the guide. 
 
 If the three line formation is used, the first line 
 should usually be heavier than either the support or the 
 reserve. If time is precious and success depends upon 
 one cast of the die, the first line should be as strong 
 as possible : if the enemy has reserves constantly arriving, 
 then numerous lines should be used. 
 
 The lines should be far enough apart so that, if the 
 advanced line is overthrown, it will not communicate its 
 confusion to the lines in rear. For this reason it is 
 better to hold the troops in rear of the second line in 
 line of columns. The first line should be preceded by 
 mounted skirmishers using mounted rifle fire. (Ext. 
 101, 239.) These same tactics were used by Frederick 
 the Great. The mounted skirmishers amount to the same 
 thing as ground scouts which would be sent out from 
 troops in the front line. 
 
46 
 
 After a line has been launched in a charge, the 
 commander can only influence the fight by the use of 
 troops held in reserve. The commander should not per 
 sonally engage in the fight until after his last reserve is 
 thrown in. The place for regimental bands should be 
 not caring for the wounded, but in the battle, inspiring 
 with stirring martial music those engaged in the combat. 
 (Exts. 101, 223, 469.) 
 
47 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 FIRE ACTION. 
 
 MOUNTED FIRE ACTION CARBINE. 
 
 Ext. No. 102. I ordered my first two squadrons TWO squadrons 
 
 use mounted 
 
 to advance carbine and be ready to receive them. The carbine flre. 
 enemy came dashing down the road. The fire of my JuiKj-ses! 
 regiment being too hot for him, the enemy wheeled and 
 I ordered the charge. 
 
 (Lieut. Col. Doster, 4th Pa. Cav., R. R., Vol. 27, 
 Part I, p. 984.) 
 
 Ext. Nb. 103. Being dismounted, our men were Mounted fire 
 
 has not the pre- 
 
 . . . 
 
 able to fire with much greater rapidity and precision 
 
 the enemy, who were exposed by remaining on horse- f^ men exposes 
 
 back, and fired high above our heads. Roju^Tenn oct s 
 
 (Col. O. H. LaGrange, R. R., Vol. 30, Part II, ^ * 
 p. 683.) 
 
 Ext. No. 104. At this place the saber companies Great havoc 
 
 . . . done with car- 
 
 did great havoc with their carbines (mounted). bine mounted. 
 
 (Maj. D. E. Coon, 2d la. Cav., R. R., Vol. 32, Part re^lrW" 88 1 
 I, p. 300.) 
 
 Ext. No. 105. I soon met the enemy in consider- Mounted kir- 
 
 7 mishers use car- 
 
 able force and skirmished (both mounted and dis- bine - 
 
 Near Knoxville, 
 
 mounted) with him. i3 B<) Feb> 20 
 
 (Lieut. Col. Robert Klein, 3d Ind. Cav., R. R, Vol. 
 32, Part I, p. 410.) 
 
 Ext. No. 106. By immediate order of General charge with. 
 Upton, I sent Co. I to the left in line over the open Wilson s Raid, 
 
 r 1 i 1-11 1 A P r - *> 1866 - 
 
 fields, over which they at once charged, mounted, with 
 carbines, upon the plainly visible lines of the enemy. 
 
 (Col. John W. Noble, 3d la. Cav., R. R., Vol. 49, 
 Part I, p. 491.) 
 
 See also Ext. 101. 
 
48 
 caught Ext. No. 107. When two panels of the fence were 
 
 iSstantfy ta down, the men (enemy) trotted through for 75 yards, 
 
 the aggressive J J J 
 
 and wins a most and gradually came down to a walk and almost halted. 
 
 complete victory. J 
 
 Major Forbes 1 first platoon (mounted and 225 yards from 
 bine fire at 225 the fence) was ordered to fire with carbines. Here was 
 
 yards is not eft ec- . 
 
 tire. the first mistake. It created confusion among the horses, 
 
 Pistol lire at an d the squadron in the rear added to it by firing a few 
 
 ish. yar *" pistol shots. Had the order been given to draw saber 
 and charge, the rebels would never have got their gun 
 off. 
 
 Major Forbes attempted to move the first squadron 
 by the right flank. The rebels saw their chance, gave 
 a yell, and our men, in the confusion of the moment, 
 broke. The two rear squadrons went off in confusion. 
 
 run ro fo? c s a e v ve r n ^ have on ty to re P rt a perfect rout and a chase for five 
 
 zfon to seven miles. More than 100 horses were taken. Men 
 Va " Jaly killed, 12; wounded, 37; taken prisoners by Mo<sby, 44. 
 Mosby had about 200 men with him and used the re 
 volver. 
 
 (Col. C. R. Lowell, 2d Mass. Cav., R. R., Vol. 37, 
 Part I, p. 359.) 
 Mounted hir- Ext. No. 108. I was now ordered to advance and 
 
 mishers advance . . . . . 
 
 at a trot with press the enemy, which I did with success, my skir- 
 
 carbines. 
 
 Near Tom s Run, mishers advancing at the trot. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. Thos. C. Devin, R. R., Vol. 43, Part 
 I, p. 483.) 
 Forrest s men Ext. No. 109. The Confederates, advancing with 
 
 use rifle mounted 
 
 aVwn streets of spirit through the town, mounted, began to fire with their 
 okoiona, Miss., long rifles as they came within 100 vards of the enemy. 
 
 Apr. 22, 1863. 
 
 (Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest s Cavalry, 
 p. 393.) 
 
 moused "skVr- Ext N " HO. This change having been made, a 
 
 Soeo?ao)n e tem- stron g nne f skirmishers displayed by the enemy was 
 
 ^uet^burg^uiy evidence that the enemy s cavalry had gained our right, 
 
 and were about to attack with a view of gaining the rear 
 
 of our line of battle. * * * The First New Jersey 
 
 Cavalry was posted as mounted skirmishers to the right 
 
 and front in a wood. 
 
49 
 
 (Brig. D. McM. Gregg, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, 
 p. 956.) 
 
 Ext. No. 111. In a few minutes the enemy came in g n e n m a y r a d a v d a r c e 
 dashing down the road, when I ordered my first two 
 squadrons to advance carbines to be ready to receive 
 them. The fire of my regiment being too hot for him, June 21) 1863 
 the enemy wheeled, and I ordered the charge. 
 
 (Lieut. Col. W. E. Doster, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, 
 p. 984.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 Mounted carbine fire was often used. Its use was 
 confined mostly to mounted skirmishers which preceded 
 the first line while forming for attack. (Exts. 108, 110, 
 239.) It can be used to advantage to accelerate the 
 retreat of defeated infantry, but should not replace the 
 saber, which is more effective. (157.) The fire of 
 mounted men is very inaccurate, since one hand is always 
 necessary to control the horse. (Ext. 103.) 
 
 Mounted carbine fire is not so accurate as revolver 
 fire provided the force armed with the revolvers comes to 
 close quarters. (Ext. 107.) 
 
 MOUNTED FIRE ACTION REVOLVER. 
 
 Ext. No. 112. From this point General Lee or- charge in coi- 
 clered the Third to charge. The order was executed using revolvers 
 in column of fours. The regiment swept down the line va K , Mar. n. 
 of stone fence which separated them from the enemy 
 in the woods beyond, delivering the fire of their pistols. 
 
 (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, 
 p. 210.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 It seems strange that so little mention is made of 
 mounted revolver fire when used collectively. The in 
 ference is that collective revolver fire was but little used. 
 Captain Whittaker refers to it in Ext. 41. There is 
 numerous mention of the revolver being used individ 
 ually, and it is in this use that its chief value lies. 
 
50 
 
 Badly defeated cavalry, if vigorously pursued with 
 the revolver, will be assembled in the next county. ( Ext. 
 107.) 
 
 DISMOUNTED FIRE ACTION AGAINST CAVALRY. 
 
 va?ueofhoiSiS Ext - No - 113 It may not, however, be amiss to 
 p e r a tat 8 ion f on rfl tbesay that one of the lessons of his operations will be in 
 the demonstration of the great utility in war of horses 
 in the rapid transportation of a body of men to the 
 field of battle or operations, there to be employed as 
 riflemen fighting on foot. 
 
 (Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest s Cavalry, 
 p. 683. The above expression of opinion was written 
 in 1867.) 
 
 snooting at Ext. No. 114. We moved at a brisk trot and so 
 Sore?* do a es g not sudden was the movement that nearly one-half of the 
 
 occasion heavy . . , 
 
 10 Newman Ga 8th Ind> " ot tnrou " n tne lmes without receiving a shot, 
 July so, 1864. an( i although the remainder of the column ran the 
 gauntlet of a heavy fire of musketry, yet, strange to 
 say, but one man was wounded, although the enemy 
 was in some places near enough to almost touch the 
 horses. 
 
 (Lieut. Col. F. A. Jones, R. R., Vol. 38, Part II, 
 p. 877.) 
 
 Ext. No. 115. Throwing down the fence of the 
 
 meadow, some 300 poured into it, formed a long line 
 
 and dashed across with sabers drawn. Four companies 
 
 had by this time dismounted and dropped on their knees 
 
 Fire from be- behind a low f ence. They held their fire until the enemy 
 
 hind a fence gtea- 
 
 dies the men. was w i tn i n 30 yards, when they opened. Then was seen 
 charge fails the effect of the volley from that long, thin line, which 
 seemed so easy to break. Every man had elbow room 
 and took dead aim at an individual foe. Two-thirds of 
 ^ r j c | ers an< j horses seemed to go down. The cavalry 
 was at once broken and recoiled. 
 (Morgan s Cavalry, by Duke.) 
 
51 
 Ext. No. 116. The enemy charged upon my line Dismounted 
 
 i 111- men repulse a 
 
 twice, but were repulsed each time by my carbineers mounted charge. 
 
 with heavy loss. 
 
 (Col. Wyndham, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 966.) 
 
 Ext. No. 117. Three successive charges were re- Same - 
 
 pulsed by dismounted men. niml V 
 
 (Col. Thompson, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 1056.) 
 Ext. No. 118. A part of the 92d dismounted and same. 
 
 attacked the enemy on foot, when the enemy charged Nov^iSeSl 11 6 * 
 
 on horseback. The charge was received and repulsed, 
 
 and the enemy charged in turn. 
 
 (Col. Atkins, R. R., Vol. 44, p. 390.) 
 
 Ext. No. 119. I attribute the loss of the gam to Horse artillery 
 
 needs a support. 
 
 the fact that the enemy could advance under excellent 
 cover to within short rifle range of the position we occu- 
 
 Artillery disa- 
 
 pied, to the killing of the two wheel horses, and the 
 
 want of a regularly designated support. James River, 
 
 Va Julv 29 1864 
 
 (Capt. A. M. Randol, 1st U. S. Art., R. R., Vol. 
 40, Part I, p. 616.) 
 
 Ext. No. 120. The enemy was compelled to retire carbine fire. 
 before the terrific carbine fire. jnne^r/sel Va> 
 
 (Genl. Buford, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 921.) 
 
 Ext. No. 121. Early this morning: the enemv ad- Dismounted 
 
 J cavalry success- 
 
 vanced upon me in a pretty strong force. (Cav., Inf. J^}^ h ^f t J* 
 & Art.) During the first part of the day they pressed combined 
 
 Boonsborough, 
 
 me severely. Towards night I turned the Md - Jul .v s, ises. 
 
 tables upon them and drove them across the Antietam. 
 
 * * * All my fighting had to be on foot. 
 
 (Genl. Buford, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 925.) 
 
 Ext. No. 122. An animated fight ensued, princi- Dismounted 
 
 pally on foot, the ground being entirely too soft f rom b a e v hi r nd g stone 
 
 recent rains to operate successfully with cavalry. The ^nkstown. Md. 
 
 enemy s advance was handsomely repulsed, in which Jaly 10> 186bV 
 
 Witcher s cavalry, on foot behind a stone fence, per 
 
 formed a very gallant part, standing their ground with 
 
 unflinching tenacity. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, C. S., R. R., Vol. 27, 
 
 Part II, p. 704.) 
 
52 
 
 Demounted Ext. No. 123. They had every advantage in se- 
 
 cavalry fight on , . . , . , . , _ 
 
 foot for ninelectmg position, and to drive and dislodge them I was 
 okoiona, Miss., compelled to dismount the most of my command and 
 
 Feb. 22,1864. rill -i r 
 
 fought the last nine miles on foot. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. N. B. Forrest, C. S., R. R., Vol. 32, 
 Part I, p. 353.) 
 
 NO rest for cav- Ext. No. 124. It was nearly daylight, June 3d, 
 before my command, worn and jaded from its exhaust 
 ing labors, bivouacked at Linney s house. At 10:00 
 A. M. I received orders to cross to the west side of the 
 
 Tactical use, to Totopotomy, drive the rebel cavalry from Haw s Shop 
 and then swing to the left again, recross the creek near 
 ^ ts source, an d attack the left of the rebel infantry line 
 
 er.Jnne3.1864. ^ ^ 
 
 (Maj. Genl. J. H. Wilson, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, 
 p. 882.) 
 
 Formation is Ext. No. 125. The Third Brigade, dismounted, 
 gthened C by 8 piao- with one battalion 4th regulars on each flank, charged 
 o^ g thTnanks opfl the rebels on the Lithona road and drove them in con- 
 
 Lithonia, Ga., r 
 July 28, 1864. lUSlOn. 
 
 (Col. R. H. G. Minty, R. R., Vol. 38, Part II, 
 p. 813.) 
 
 Ext. No. 126. We moved forward under a heavy 
 fire of shot and shell until within 600 yards of the top 
 of the hill, where the enemy were posted behind a breast 
 work of rails, and at this period a general charge was 
 ordered, and the skirmish line, being reinforced by 
 Reinforcement the reserve, dashed forward with a shout and a yell, 
 
 by the reserve , 
 
 carries the line carrying everything before them. As we gamed the crest 
 of the hill our ammunition failed and in some parts of 
 
 It is convenient . 
 
 to find stones and the line the enemy were actually driven from their posi- 
 
 clubs handy 
 
 Clubs. 
 
 Hanover c H. (Lieut. Col. G. A. Purington, R. R., Vol. 36, Part 
 
 Va., May oil ioo4. 
 
 I, p. 894.) 
 
 Regiment fires Ext. No. 127. The horses held by the reins, the 
 m?ho n id e inS < h men maintained the position, but finding it impracticable 
 ?e?ns 8e ie to charge the second works, they mounted, and being 
 : relieved by the infantry line, the 92d was withdrawn. 
 
53 
 
 (Col. Eli H. Murray, R. R., Vol. 38, Part II, 
 p. 890.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 The mobility of cavalry renders it extremely val 
 uable as a reinforcement to weak points in the line of 
 battle. (Ext. 113.) 
 
 A rapidly moving target does not suffer heavy 
 losses. (Ext. 114.) 
 
 From behind a fence troops shoot with greater 
 accuracy than when in the open. (Ext. 115.) 
 
 Dismounted men can often stop with their fire a 
 mounted charge, even though it gets as close as 50 yards. 
 (Exts. 115, 116, 117, 118, 120, 121, 122.) 
 
 All references show that a very large part of the 
 cavalry fighting was done on foot. 
 
 A formation for attack is strengthened by placing 
 regular troops on the flanks. (Ext. 125.) 
 
 The time for a skirmish line to go forward is when 
 it receives fresh troops from the reserves. (Ext. 126.) 
 
 Dismounted fire, when each man holds his horse by 
 the reins, is very rare. (Ext. 127.) 
 
 The time to inflict severe losses on an enemy is when 
 his attacking line breaks to the rear. (Exts. 85, 170.) 
 
 Dismounted fire action will be resorted to when the 
 ground is unsuited to mounted action. (Ext. 123.) 
 
 DISMOUNTED FIRE ACTION AGAINST INFANTRY. 
 
 Ext. No. 128. As the enemy moved up, he ex- cavalry attacks 
 
 , i n , infantry in flank. 
 
 posed his flank to me. I at once ordered General Lee 
 to attack, which he did with the 9th and 10th Va. regi 
 ments in the handsomest style, leading his men in person. 
 These regiments went in in line of battle, dismounted 
 and reserved their fire until very near the enemy. De- .Firenotopened 
 livering it regularly, they charged, routing the enemy the Inem?. ear 
 completely, capturing 900 prisoners and 10 standards. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. Wade Hampton, C. S., R. R., Vol. 42, 
 Part I, p. 948.) 
 
 Ext. No. 129. Although the main force remained 
 without change of position from September 3 to 19, 
 
NO re*t for cav- still the cavalry was employed every day in harassing 
 
 airy, and they , . ... ..,...- 
 
 should permit no the enemy, its opponents being principally infantry. In 
 shenandoah these skirmishes the cavalry was becoming educated to 
 
 Valley Campaign. . 
 
 attack infantry lines. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 43, Part 
 I, p. 46.) 
 Five brigades of Ext. No. 130.. About a mile from, Leetown a small 
 
 cavalry attack m- 
 
 fm try, demount- cavalry f orce was met in a heavy woods, and from all 
 Leetown^w.va., the information that could be obtained, all went to show 
 that nothing but cavalry was in our front, and disposi 
 tion was immediately made to attack. A brigade was 
 sent on each flank, two to attack in front and one held 
 in reserve. Soon after the attack was commenced, it 
 was found that we were fighting infantry. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. A. T. A. Torbert, R. R., Vol. 43, Part 
 I, p. 425.) 
 opinion that Ext. No. 131. This short but brilliant engagement 
 
 dismounted cav- n .. Al , 
 
 airy is as good as reflected great credit on the regiments engaged, and 
 New Market established the fact that our cavalry can dismount and 
 1864. with their carbines successfully repulse their own front 
 
 of veteran infantry. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. T. C. Devin, R. R., Vol 43, Part I, 
 p. 471.) 
 
 in rough comr ^ xt - ^- 132. It was now almost dark; the cav- 
 alrymen having been fighting all day on foot, owing to 
 
 cavalry fight the roughness of the country, were very much fatigued. 
 
 on foot all day. t J . 
 
 miuborough General Hatch was ordered to bring up nis horses, collect 
 
 Tenn,,Dec. 15, 64.., . . 
 
 his men and bivouac on the Hillsborough pike. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. J. H. Wilson, R. R., Vol. 45, Part I, 
 p. 563.) 
 
 Ext. No. 133. A dispatch was received directing 
 that Cold Harbor be held at all hazards, and I therefore 
 immediately ordered its reoccupation, changed the tem- 
 
 Cavalry con- M 1 1 r 
 
 struct breast- i)orary breastworks so as to make them available for 
 
 works for infan- . . 
 
 try to occupy, our troops, dismounted the cavalry, placing them behind 
 Ammunition these works, and distributing ammunition in boxes along 
 the line. While this was being done the enemy could 
 
 be heard giving commands and making preparations to 
 
55 
 
 attack in the morning. Just after daylight, June 1st, he Magazine fire 
 marched to the attack, and was permitted to come close 
 
 to our little works, when he received the fire of our s no different 1 *! 
 
 , . j , . , short range. 
 
 batteries and our repeating carbines, which were used Cold Harbor, Va., 
 with terrible effect, and he was driven back in confusion. M 
 
 (Maj. Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, 
 p. 794.) 
 
 Ext. No. 134. July 9th, dismounted and waded cavalry con- 
 the Chattahoochee in rear of the Third Brigade; threw 
 up breastworks and held the ground till dark, when 
 General Newton s division of the 4th Corps relieved us. 
 
 (Col. R. H. G. Minty, R. R., Vol. 38, Part II, p. 
 813.) 
 
 Ext. No. 135. During these combats, which were 
 mostly on foot (the enemy s infantry being engaged), 
 there were some telling charges made mounted. * * * 
 The men of the brigade, from long and constant prac- Brigade be- 
 tice, are becoming perfect in the art of foot fighting and foot flgSSS* * 
 skirmishing. They drove infantry from strong posi- ju J iofwS Md< 
 tions. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. W. Merritt, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, 
 p. 944.) 
 
 Ext. No. 136. To check this advance, four regi- Cavalry attack 
 ments were dismounted and moved to the front. This int tT l 
 
 flew nope tn., 
 
 strong line of dismounted cavalry rushed upon the v Kov - 27 > 1868 - 
 enemy, firing volleys from their carbines, and drove the 
 infantry line to the cover of advance woods, and there 
 held it at bay. 
 
 (Genl. D. McM. Gregg, R. R., Vol. 29, Part I, 
 p. 807.) 
 
 Ext. No. 137. (My dismounted men were ordered 
 to charge the Yankee skirmishers, which was done in v P *S5?!!, 
 handsome style, driving them out of their camps and 
 through the woods. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. J. B. Gordon, C. S., R. R., Vol. 29, 
 Part I, p. 903.) 
 
56 
 
 caviry fight ^ xt - No. 138. General Armstrong s division 
 ii a almost entirely on foot, always up and frequently 
 
 
 
 . , sept. 20, 1863. - n ac i vance O f the infantry. 
 
 (Genl. Forrest, Battle of Chickamauga, R. R., Vol. 
 30, Part II, p. 525.) 
 
 cavalry charge Ext. No. 139. The 2d Indiana were dismounted 
 s cross and charged upon the right at double quick. This move- 
 
 ., Oct. 
 
 (Col. E. M. McCook, R. R., Vol. 30, Part II, p. 
 676.) 
 
 Ext. No. 140. At 4:00 P. M. Colonel Campbell s 
 
 8eviersviWe, _ 
 
 Tenn.,Jai.26, 64. brigade charged dismounted. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. S. D. Sturgis, R. R., Vol. 32, Part I, 
 p. 136.) 
 
 cavalry use re- Ext. No. 141. When the enemy s line reached the 
 wSSS f fla?S! crest, a fire from our repeating carbines was opened 
 
 rapid as our mo- . ., & ^e & 
 
 dernarms. U p O n it, whereupon it gave way in disorder. 
 
 This counter attack against the infantry was made by 
 the tide 1 ?! battle, the 1st and 2d cavalry divisions simultaneously, and our 
 
 Darby town. Va.. ,. ,11-11 
 
 July 27, 1864. own line re-established. 
 
 (Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, 
 p. 800.) 
 
 Barricades. Ext. No. 142. During Sherman s march to the sea, 
 
 it was the regular custom for cavalry to protect them 
 selves every night by throwing up log barricades. 
 
 (See all cavalry reports, R. R., Vol. 44, and par 
 ticularly Report 148.) 
 
 cavalry attacks Ext. No. 143. Custer found Early as he (Early) 
 
 bfeast wor b ks hiDd had promised, at Waynesborough, in a well-chosen posi- 
 
 A careful re- tion, with two brigades of infantry and some cavalry 
 
 connaissance -11 i 
 
 JIi i i 11 whii? ie a ti s I Sd Sun ^ er R sser > tne infantry occupying the breastworks. 
 den e auack will Custer, without waiting for the enemy to get up his 
 Attack by courage over the delay of a careful reconnaissance, made 
 ?ig U miu d ntSdhis dispositions for the attack at once. Sending three 
 whue mounted regiments around the left flank of the enemy, he, with 
 
 troops turn the , . < , 
 
 flank. t h e other two brigades, partly mounted and partly dis- 
 
 mounted at a g iven signal, boldly attacked and carried 
 break?. enemy the works, while the 8th N. Y. and 1st Conn., which 
 
57 
 
 were formed in column of fours, charged over the breast- cavalry should 
 
 gather all the 
 
 works and continued the charge through the town. fruits of victory. 
 
 f , -11 <~>r\r\ 1 1 1 Wayniborough. 
 
 He captured 1 1 pieces of artillery, 200 loaded wag- va., Mar. -2, ml. 
 ons with teams, 17 battle flags and 1,600 officers and 
 men. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 46, Part I, 
 p. 476.) 
 
 Ext. No. 144. The most determined effort was cavalry, dis- 
 
 . . , . , 11- -i mounted, in close 
 
 made on both sides and neither would give way until column attacks 
 
 . . infantry. 
 
 late in the evening, when Custer s brigade was dis- Haw s shop.va., 
 mounted, forming in close column of attack, and charged 
 with Gregg s division, when the enemy was driven back, 
 leaving all his dead and his line of temporary works in 
 our possession. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, 
 p. 793.) 
 
 Ext. No. 145. On reaching that place on July 1st, , c ?, v airy selects 
 
 J J battle field and 
 
 General Reynolds found Buford s cavalry warmly en-f^^^^J 
 gaged with the enemy, who had debouched his infantry JgJJi. iUpport 
 through the mountains on the Cashtown road, but was G^J^WP*., 
 
 July 1, lb63. 
 
 being held in check in the most gallant manner by Bu 
 ford s cavalry. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. Meade, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 114.) 
 Ext. No. 146. On arriving within one mile of West Troops should 
 Point. I was ordered to dismount to fight on foot. I Si compelled 1 ?) 
 
 do so. 
 
 dismounted and formed the regiment in line with as west Point, Ga., 
 
 , ., . ,. Apr. in, 1865. 
 
 much alacrity as possible, and was directed to move on 
 rapidly across the fields towards the fort and engage the 
 enemy on the right. While crossing the fields toward 
 the fort the enemy threw shells at my lines in rapid suc 
 cession, the most of which passed over without effect. 
 When we got within fifty yards of the fort I ordered 
 the men to commence firing, which was done with effect. 
 (Maj. A. S. Bloom, 7th Ky. Cav., R. R., Vol. 49, 
 Part I, p. 435.) 
 
58 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 Successful turning movements may be made for the 
 purpose of attacking the flank or rear of an infantry 
 line. (Exts. 124, 128, 153, 171, 180.) 
 
 The fire of an attacking line should not be opened 
 till the enemy s fire compels it. (Exts. 128, 146.) 
 
 Cavalry can attack infantry, and during the war 
 often did, but, if it comes to a hand-to-hand fight, cav 
 alry should at least be supplied with the rod bayonet. 
 (Exts. 130, 131, 135, 136, 137, 141, 144.) 
 
 At times cavalry will be called upon to fight for 
 long periods on foot. (Exts. 123, 129, 132.) 
 
 Breastworks will often be constructed by cavalry 
 with a view of their being occupied later by infantry. 
 (Exts. 133, 134.) 
 
 Ammunition in boxes can be conveniently distrib 
 uted along the line from pack mules before the action 
 begins. (Ext. 133.) 
 
 It will rarely be possible for cavalry to select a 
 battlefield and hold it till occupied by infantry. (Ext. 
 145.) 
 
 It will often be possible for cavalry to hold im 
 portant tactical positions until relieved by infantry. Exts. 
 133, 127, 175, 184.) Under such conditions the com 
 mander should see that the cavalry be not kept to do 
 infantry work, but returned to its own legitimate sphere 
 of usefulness. (Ext. 187.) 
 
 DISMOUNTED FIRE ACTION AGAINST FIELD WORKS. 
 
 Ext. No. 147. Drove Martin s division of cavalry 
 
 Attack of field J 
 
 works. an( j one brigade of infantry from their line of breast- 
 
 Big Shanty, Ga., 
 
 June 9, 1864. works at and near Big Shanty. 
 
 (Col. R. H. G. Minty, R. R., Vol. 38, Part II, p. 
 812.) 
 
 cavalry assault Ext. No. 148. I regard the capture of Selma as 
 S sefma%7a 0rks the most remarkable achievement in the history of mod 
 ern cavalry, the one illustrative of its new powers and 
 tendencies. 
 
59 
 
 The fortifications assaulted and carried consisted of Dimensions of 
 
 . . ,. 1 ^1 -1 1 the bastion line. 
 
 a bastion line on a radius of nearly three miles, extend- seima Ala., 
 ing from the Alabama river below to the same above Apr> 
 the city. The part west of the city is covered by a 
 miry, deep and almost impassable swamp, extending from 
 the river almost to the Summerfield road, and entirely 
 impracticable for mounted men at all times. The profile 
 of that part of the line assaulted is as follows: Height 
 of parapet, 6 to 8 ft. ; depth of ditch, 5 ft. ; width from 
 10 to 15 ft.; height of stockade on glacis, 5 ft.; sunk 
 into the earth, 4 ft. The ground over which the troops 
 advanced is an open field, sloping slightly towards the 
 works, but intersected by one ravine with marshy soil, 
 which both the right and left of Long s line experienced 
 some difficulty in crossing. The distance over which 
 the troops charged, exposed to the enemy s fire of mus 
 ketry and artillery, was 600 yards. Number of men 
 engaged in assault, 1,550 officers and men. The works 
 were manned by Armstrong s brigade, regarded as the 
 best in Forrest s corps, and reported by him at more 
 than 1,500 men. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. J. H. Wilson, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, 
 p. 360. For map see Plate 70, Map 4, Atlas.) 
 
 Loss, 46 killed and 200 wounded. Fifteen per 
 cent of all troops engaged. 
 
 (R. R., Vol. 47, Part I, p. 351.) 
 
 Ext. No. 149. Detachments dismounted and pre- cavalry assault 
 pared to assault Fort Tyler, covering the bridge. Colonel shooting down 
 LaGrange describes it as a remarkably strong: bastioned while bridges are 
 
 made with which 
 
 earth-work, 35 yards square, surrounded by a ditch 1 2 to cross the ditcn - 
 feet wide and 10 feet deep, situated on a commanding 
 eminence, protected by an imperfect abatis mounting two 
 32-pounder guns and two field guns. 
 
 At 1 :30 P. M. the charge was sounded and the brave 
 detachments rushed forward to the assault, drove the 
 rebel skirmishers into the fort and followed under a 
 withering fire of grape and musketry, to the edge of the Ap Y*e, ufe* G * M 
 ditch. This was found impassable, and Col. LaGrange 
 
60 
 
 posted sharpshooters to keep down the enemy s fire and 
 organized parties to gather material for bridges ; as soon 
 as this had been done, he sounded the charge again. The 
 detachments sprang forward again, laid the bridges and 
 rushed forward over the parapet into the work, captur 
 ing the entire garrison of 265 men. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. J. H. Wilson, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, 
 p. 364.) 
 
 cavairycapture Ext. No. 150. Colonel Starr, with the 6th 111. Cav., 
 
 earthworks. . , , , . . , . 
 
 Hnrricane 111 three or four hours severe skirmishing drove the 
 i3, e i864 Mls>> Ang> force in front of him across the creek, and pressing it 
 back on the main force, captured the enemy s earth 
 works. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. Edward Hatch, R. R., Vol. 39, Part 
 I, p. 389.) 
 Attack doesnqt Ext. No. 151. As soon as we uncovered the hill, 
 
 open fire until 
 
 compelled to do about 600 yards from the earthworks, the enemy opened 
 a destructive fire of musketry and artillery on the line, 
 dur- ^ ut we move d steadily forward until wnthin short range, 
 ^^ w h e n a rapid fire was opened by our Spencers, and with a 
 Apr. 2, 1865. cheer the men started for the works on the run. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. Eli Long, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 
 438. Attack on Selma.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 The Civil War furnishes many cases of cavalry at 
 tacking field works. The most noted works were those 
 of Selma, Ala. (Ext. 148), where an assault was made 
 on a bastioned line. Other cases are cited (Exts. 149, 
 150) from which it will appear that it easily can be done 
 if the attackers are able to shoot down the enemy s fire. 
 
61 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 COMBINED ACTION MOUNTED AND DISMOUNTED. 
 
 Ext. No. 152. My command was posted one bat- in combined 
 
 action the r- 
 
 tahon mounted in reserve arid two battalions dismounted serve is kept 
 
 mounted. 
 
 in the center. The enemy charged in column. 
 (Reference omitted.) 
 Ext. No. 153. The enemy had deployed a con- Mounted force 
 
 . . . . turns the enemys 
 
 siderable force in a strong position. I immediately de- 
 
 waver - 
 
 ployed two regiments and commenced skirmishing. Find- 
 ing their position strong, I detached a squadron to turn 
 their right flank. This caused the enemy to waver, when when enemy 
 
 J wavers, the at- 
 
 we charged in line and also in column on the road, driv- 
 ing him in confusion. The enemy attempted to form a 
 
 new line with his reserves, but we met him with such Enemy not 
 
 given time to 
 
 force as to disperse him each time. form line with 
 
 (Maj. Genl. Jos. Wheeler, C. S., R. R., Vol. 30, 
 
 Campaign. 1863. 
 
 Part II, p. 521.) 
 
 Ext. No. 154. We found the enemy in line of ( ; avalry attack 
 battle behind a stone wall and a rail fence which had [SJSS t waif ehlnd 
 been so fixed as to afford good protection to the men. 
 The second brigade was immediately formed in line of 
 battle in a corn field as follows: The 39th Ky., dis- when dismoun- 
 mounted, on the right, with the llth Mich. Cav., IH enemy 1SS 
 
 mounted, on the left. The 39th Kv. succeeded in reach- cavalry charge 
 
 ... . repeatedly. 
 
 ing the enemy s position. As the regiment gamed the cynthiana, Ky.. 
 wall and fence the enemy fled. The llth Mich. Cav. 
 repeatedly charged the rebel lines, driving them in great 
 confusion. 
 
 (Col. David A. Minis, R. R., Vol. 39, Part I, p. 
 37.) 
 
 Ext. No. 155. The dismounted line formed on 
 
 .-I , * c .1 * < 1 Dismounted 
 
 the enemys side of the stream, while a mounted regi- men in the center 
 
 t . , - - . 1 n AT-V mounted men on 
 
 ment filed past their rear, half of it to either flank. The the flanks. 
 line thus formed, dismounted men in the center and va.*oct 6 27 S , ISG"" 
 
62 
 
 mounted men on the flanks, charged up the hill, routed 
 the enemy and captured his works. 
 
 (Col. C. H. Smith, Comg. Brig., R. R., Vol. 42, 
 Part I, p. 648.) 
 
 Mounted men Ext. No. 156. The remainder of the 72d Ind. was 
 
 to charge as soon 
 
 as the enemy s brought forward, dismounted and formed on the left of 
 
 line is broken. 
 
 8eima,Aia.,Apr.the road, and at the sarnie time I directed Colonel Vail, 
 commanding the 17th Ind., to send forward four com 
 panies armed with sabers to charge the enemy as soon 
 as his line was broken. 
 
 (Col. A. O. Miller, Comg. 1st Brig., R. R., Vol. 49, 
 Part I, p. 446.) 
 
 Mounted men Ext. No. 157. I received orders directing: me to 
 
 ready to charge 
 
 with saber as move the command to the led horses and hold it in 
 
 soon RS tnG GD~ 
 
 . re adiness to mount at a moment s notice and charge with 
 
 Selma,Ala..Apr. 
 
 2,1865. the saber as soon as the enemy s line should be broken. 
 
 (Lieut. Col. B. D. Pritchard, Comg. 4th Mich. Cav., 
 R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 464.) 
 Dismounted at- Ext. No. 158. The attack of Selma by Long s 
 
 tack followed by ....... , . . 
 
 mounted charge, division, dismounted, which carried the works, was im- 
 
 Selma.Ala.,Ai)r. ..,..,, . , 
 
 2,1865. mediately followed with a mounted charge into the city 
 
 by a part of Upton s division, which captured many 
 prisoners. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. E. Upton, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 
 473.) 
 combined Ext. No. 159. Captain Abram, having failed to 
 
 mounted and dis- . 
 
 mounted action, receive my order, formed his battalion, dismounted, on 
 
 Mountedaction the right of the Third Battalion, and materially assisted 
 
 emy breaks. ^ u in routing the enemy, though his efforts were not so 
 
 Mar.^rfse?. 11 * effective as they would have been had he received my 
 
 order and been on hand to charge mounted. 
 
 (Lieut. Col. J. H. Peters, 4th la. Cav, R. R., Vol. 
 49, Part I, p. 496.) 
 
 Ext. No. 160. The enemy, behind a stone wall, 
 
 Aldie, Va., Jane 
 
 is, 1863. were attacked by dismounted cavalry, while mounted 
 
 cavalry charged along the main road. The position was 
 carried. 
 
63 
 
 (General J. Irving Gregg, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, 
 p. 975.) 
 
 Ext. No. 161. Dismounted men moved forward to 
 
 ... r , . ,, , Ga., Dec. 4, 1864. 
 
 the attack, while a column of cavalry followed, mounted, 
 on each flank. When the enemy broke, the mounted 
 troops charged. 
 
 (R. R., Vol. 44, p. 392.) 
 
 Ext. No. 162. In this charge we were met by the Mountedattack 
 
 ... , . supported by 
 
 enemy and succeeded in driving him back under cover dismountedmen. 
 of his dismounted sharpshooters, who were posted in then, IMS. 
 woods on each side of the road. 
 
 (Major Breckenridge, R. R., Vol. 27, Part II, 
 p. 742.) 
 
 Ext. No. 163. Four companies were dismounted Dismounte dat- 
 and thrown forward rapidly as skirmishers, a mounted SomuK?n. by 
 company being sent to either flank and the remainder of Cr ^.R \J s s T?nii S 
 the regiment kept sheltered within supporting distance. Oct2 18< 
 
 (Col. O. H. LaGrange, 1st Wis. Cav., R. R., Vol. 
 30, Part II, p. 683.) 
 
 Ext. No. 164. The enemy advanced in three col- Dismounted at- 
 
 , , , . . , tack supported 
 
 umns, one on the road, dismounted, and one on either by mounted men 
 
 on the flanks 
 
 flank, mounted, rendering it almost impossible for my makes it difficult 
 
 J for the enemy to 
 
 dismounted men to regain their horses regain their led 
 
 horses. 
 
 (Col. J. K .Mizner, 1st Brig. Cav. Div., 16th Corps, ^Y^- MiS8 -> 
 R. R., Vol. 31, Part I, p. 580.) 
 
 Ext. No. 165. The 1st and 2d U. S. Cavalry were 
 
 Dismountedat- 
 
 accordingly ordered to make a detour through the woods 
 to our right and turn the enemy s left flank. Nearly 1 00 
 infantry prisoners were taken by these regiments in this Va " May31 - 1864 - 
 movement. In the meantime the 1st N. Y. Dragoons 
 and the 6th Pa. Cavalry were occupying the enemy s 
 attention in front. Here was accomplished a work of 
 which every one connected with the brigade is justly 
 proud a success by cavalry which has no parallel in this 
 war a single brigade contending with and taking from 
 an enemy, at least three times its numbers, one-third in 
 fantry, a naturally strong position, made doubly strong 
 by artificial means. 
 
64 
 
 (Brig. Genl. Wesley Merritt, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, 
 p. 849.) 
 
 Mounted troop. Ext. No. 166. About 200 yards beyond this bar- 
 ope? e wM?e d?* ricade the advance was charged by a large column of 
 Sold 1 the woods cavalry, moving 1 up the plank road, this column having 
 
 on the flanks. . . 
 
 Near Ream s on either flank a line of dismounted men in the woods. 
 static,!,, va., Jui ^.^ Genl ^ M ^ Gregg, R. R., Vol. 40, Part 
 
 I, p. 614.) 
 
 Ext. No. 167. When dismounted men retreat while 
 
 Mounted men 
 
 should always unc [er fire, the retreat is always covered by a mounted 
 
 cover the retreat 
 
 / en dismounted j ine sta tioned behind, whose imposing attitude awes the 
 enemy for a brief space, long enough for the footmen 
 to get away in safety. 
 
 (Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade, p. 18.) 
 Ext. No. 168. Deploying Knipe s division as skir- 
 
 4th U. S. Cav. . , 
 
 charges in col- mighers, dismounted, with Hatch s in close support, 
 
 umn of fours 
 
 breaking the pl en e - General Wilson ordered the 4th U. S. Cavalry, Lieu- 
 
 emies center. tenant Hedges commanding, to charge the enemy. Form 
 
 ing on the pike in column of fours, the gallant little 
 
 command of 200 men charged with sabers drawn, break- 
 
 . 1 *i ~T7~ * ? 1 TT j i ? 
 
 ing the enemy s center, w r mle Knipe s and Hatch s men 
 pressed back the flanks, scattering the whole command 
 and causing them to abandon their artillery. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. Geo. H. Thomas, R. R., Vol. 45> 
 Part I, p. 41.) 
 
 conduct of an Ext. No. 169. The heads of columns met in the 
 by ^f narrow road in a hand-to-hand saber fight. While this 
 
 T * was in progress Captain Irving threw down the fence 
 
 \ Jane 
 
 on the right of the road and, bringing his squadron to 
 
 the front, opened fire on the enemy s left flank. Cap 
 tain Tebbs executed a similar movement on the left 
 of the road, while the sharpshooters were all the time 
 firing into the enemy s rear. Their attack was com 
 pletely broken, and their leading squadron almost de 
 stroyed. 
 
 (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, 
 
 p. 299.) 
 
65 
 
 Ext. No. 170. We met in a lane, both sides of Fences too 
 which were post and rail fences too strong to be broken Stl 
 with an ax. The country is open, the fields small, 
 and all the fences the same character as along the lane. 
 No estimate could be made of the opposing force, but 
 knowing that a vigorous assault must put even a small Vig 9 rous - 
 force on a perfect equality with a large one until a should puH 
 
 i r 1 i 111 small force on an 
 
 larger neld could be prepared, I at once ordered the 7th equality with a 
 
 1 . , large one. 
 
 regiment, which was in front, to charge. Before the Fairfleid,p a ., 
 enemy could be reached he succeeded in throwing car- Jnly 3> 1863 
 bines through the gates right and left, who poured into 
 our flanks a galling fire. The leading men hesitated, the 
 regiment halted and retreated, losing more men than a 
 glorious victory would have cost had the onset been 
 made with boldness and vigor. 
 
 (Brig. Gen. W. E. Jones, C. S., R. R. Vol. 27 
 Part II, p. 752.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 In the combined mounted and dismounted actions, 
 with few exceptions, the dismounted men were in the 
 center and the mounted men on the flanks. (Exts. 152, 
 155, 161, 163, 164, 165.) The exception is where the 
 the most suitable ground for a charge is along a narrow 
 lane, running at right angles and leading to the center 
 of the enemy s line, along which the charge will neces 
 sarily be made in column of fours. (Exts. 153, 160, 
 166, 168.) The reason for the mounted men being on 
 the flanks is that by rapid movements they can attack 
 or threaten the enemy s flanks and rear. If the enemy 
 breaks, it will be difficult for them to regain their led 
 horses, provided that the mounted men are quick to 
 take the aggressive. (Exts. 156, 164.) The reason for 
 the formation with the mounted men in the center is 
 explained in Ext. 168. Dismounted men were pressing 
 back the enemy s flanks, thus presumably weakening their 
 center by drawing troops away from that part of their 
 line. 
 
66 
 
 Mounted troops should always be ready to charge 
 when the enemy s line breaks. (Exts. 153, 156, 157, 
 158, 159, 161.) 
 
 When the enemy is broken, he should not be given 
 time to form new lines with his reserve. (Ext. 153.) 
 
 Dismounted sharpshooters under cover are a good 
 support for a weak or timid mounted force. (Exts. 
 162, 166.) 
 
 If the terrain is not suited to retiring by successive 
 formations, then the retreat of the dismounted men 
 should be covered by mounted troops whose threatening 
 attitude will give the dismounted men time to regain 
 their horses. (Exts. 167, 191.) 
 
 When mounted troops meet in a lane, the head of the 
 column should engage in mounted combat, while those 
 in rear break through the fences to the right and left 
 and endeavor to gain a flank fire on the rear of the 
 enemy s column. (Exts. 169, 170.) 
 
 In a lane from which no deployment can be made, 
 a small force is on an equality with a large one so long 
 as this condition can be maintained. (Ext. 170.) 
 
 COMBINED ACTION CAVALRY AND INFANTRY. 
 
 cavainy, with Ext. No. 171. October 17, just before daylight, the 
 
 SbehSd^makes rebel General Rosser, with one brigade of infantry, rid- 
 
 mi c ies. cu ** ing behind the cavalry, attacked Brigadier General Cus- 
 
 ter s extreme right picket from the rear. He had made 
 
 a circuit of 32 miles to get in rear of our picket line. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. A. T. A. Torbert, R. R. Vol. 43, Part 
 I, p. 432.) 
 
 (For mounting cavalry behind infantry, see also 
 report of Maj. Genl. Jubal A. Early, C. S., R. R., Vol. 
 43, Part I, p. 561.) 
 
 No 172 On Se P tember 22 m y division, with 
 
 ? C rSnem ii? tne exception of McCausland s Brigade, was dismounted 
 
 long> and placed on the left of the line at Fishers Hill and 
 
 directed to throw up works continuous with those of the 
 
 Line to hold infantry. This line was over one mile long and to be 
 
 one man to 1.7 -11 1 .1 r\r\r\ 
 
 yards. occupied by about 1,000 men. 
 
67 
 
 (Maj. Genl. L. L. Lomax, C. S., R. R., Vol. 43, 
 Part I, p. 611.) 
 
 Ext. No. 173. Every available cavalryman was cavalry reiu- 
 
 ,. , , , , . ,. force infantry in 
 
 dismounted and placed in line of battle to strengthen holding a moun 
 
 tain pass. 
 
 the two regiments of infantry under his (Munford s) crampton s Gap, 
 
 J Md., Sept. 14, 62! 
 
 command. 
 
 (Munford s Defense of Crampton s Gap, Life and 
 Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, p. 120.) 
 
 Ext. No. 174. The command took an active part confederate 
 in the skirmishes and battle at and near Chickamausra. SSntry during 
 
 /- i A . ,. i , the battle of Chic- 
 
 hghtmg dismounted, with or on the flanks of the infantry kamauga. 
 
 i ,1 i. .,1 Sept. 19-20. 63. 
 
 during the battles. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. W. T. Martin, C. S., R. R., Vol. 31, 
 Part I, p. 545.) 
 
 (See also 138.) 
 
 Ext. No. 175. At this time, meeting Major Gen- cavalry holds 
 
 1 TTT ,. o, ^ enemy till iu fan- 
 
 era! Warren, commanding the 2d Corps, I was asked by try cau get into 
 him to hold my position until he should be able to sret cedar Run. va.. 
 
 A j -o Oct. 14,1863. 
 
 his corps across Cedar Run. 
 
 (Genl. D. McM. Gregg, Comg. 2d Cav. Corps., 
 R. R., Vol. 29, Part I, p. 357.) 
 
 Ext. No. 176. The enemy in front of Custer now infantry attack 
 
 returned to the attack. He advanced in two lines of in-a?r^ P onthenankI 
 
 fantry skirmishers, supported on the flanks by cavalry. morTvaTo^o, 
 
 (Genl. Kilpatrick, R. R., Vol. 29, Part I, p. 383.) " 
 
 Ext. No. 177. Their cavalry force is about two weak cavalry 
 
 . , . . is followed close 
 
 regiments, and they keep close to infantry supports. by infantry sup- 
 
 (Maj. Genl. S. D. Lee, C. S., R. R., Vol. 31, Part P( 
 I, p. 26.) 
 
 Ext. No. 178. After the fight General Hill di- cavalry 
 rected me to put my command in the trenches to 
 
 j_i ,,1 1 1 < 1 f of infantry. 
 
 the withdrawal of the infantry. Ream s station 
 
 (Maj. Genl. Wade Hampton, C. S., R. R, Vol. 42, Va " Au ^ 25 1864 - 
 Part I, p. 944.) 
 
 Ext. No. 179. Whilst slightly swinging 1 to the left, cavalry assaui- 
 
 , . . P , . ts redoubts de- 
 
 came upon a redoubt containing four guns, which was fended by good 
 splendidly carried by assault at 1 :00 P. M. by a portion Nashville, Tenn. 
 
 * TT j. ti 1- i. Dec. 15, 1864. 
 
 or Match s division, dismounted, and the captured guns 
 
68 
 
 turned upon the enemy. A second redoubt, stronger than 
 the first, was next assailed and carried by the same troops 
 that captured the first position, taking four more guns 
 and about 300 prisoners. 
 
 The infantry of McArthur s division, on the left of 
 the cavalry, participated in both of the assaults; and, 
 indeed, the dismounted cavalry seemed to vie with the 
 infantry to see who should first gain the works; as they 
 reached the position nearly simultaneously, both lay claim 
 to the artillery and prisoners captured. 
 
 (Battle of Nashville, Maj. Genl. G. H. Thomas, 
 R. R., Vol. 45. Part I, p. 38.) 
 
 wwie infantry Ext. No. 180. Wilson s Cavalry, dismounted, at- 
 cavairy, by turn- tacked the enemy simultaneously with Schofield and 
 
 ing movement, 
 
 cuts off the ene- Smith, striking him in reverse and gaining possession 
 Nashville, of the Granny White Pike, cut off his retreat by that 
 
 Teiin.. Dec. 15, 
 
 1864. route. 
 
 (Battle of Nashville, Maj. Genl. G. H. Thomas, 
 R. R., Vol. 45, Part I, p. 40.) 
 
 cavalry assault Ext. No. 181. The firing of the 5th Corps was the 
 
 field works. 1 T\ ^ 1-1 
 
 Five Porks, va., signal to General Merntt to assault, which was promptly 
 
 responded to, and the works of the enemy were soon 
 
 carried at several points by our brave cavalrymen. The 
 
 enemy were driven from their strong line of works and 
 
 completely routed, the 5th Corps doubling up their left 
 
 ment e for e c a avSiy flank in confusion, and the cavalry under General Mer- 
 
 breaksf * ry ritt dashing on the White Oak road, capturing their 
 
 artillery and turning it upon them and riding into their 
 
 broken ranks so demoralized them that they made no 
 
 serious stand after their line was carried, but took flight 
 
 When infantry 
 
 in disorder. Between 5,000 and 6,000 prisoners fell into 
 our hands, and the fugitives were driven westward and 
 were Pursued till long after dark by Merritt s and Mac- 
 
 up a U 8?on b g e as JOB* Kenzie s cavalry for a distance of six miles. 
 
 8ible - (Maj. Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 46, Part I, 
 
 p. 1105.) 
 
69 
 
 Ext. No. 182. Hq. Dept. of the Cumberland, weak cavalry 
 
 Oct. 1, 1863, 2:15 A. M. grMS5?2S 
 Colonel McCook, commanding Division of Cavalry. 
 
 The General commanding- directs that you 
 
 move with all dispatch with the balance of 
 
 your force to Anderson s Cross Roads * * * Three 
 
 regiments of infantry and a section of artillery have been 
 
 ordered there to support you. 
 
 (S*ig.) J. A. GARFIELD, 
 Brigadier General and Chief of Staff. 
 (Campaigns of Wheeler and his Cavalry, p. 120.) 
 Ext. No. 183. Hq. 1st Cavalry Division, 
 
 May 28, 1864. 
 Lieut. D. H. How, 
 
 A. A. A. G. Cavalry Command, 
 
 Department of the Cumberland. 
 * * Privately this thing of covering the flank 
 of infantry seems a one-sided affair; if they are attacked 
 I am to pitch in, while if I am attacked by a superior 
 force I can expect no assistance. These last paragraphs 
 of my letter are unofficial, of course. 
 
 (Sig.) E. M. McCooK, 
 
 Colonel Commanding. 
 Hq. Chief of Cavalry, Dept. of the Cumberland. 
 
 May 28, 1864. 
 Brigadier General E. M. McCook, 
 
 Commanding 1st Division of Cavalry. 
 Don t write unofficial remarks with official ; the lat 
 ter are necessary to have, the former is a pleasure to 
 receive. 
 
 (Sig.) W. L. ELLIOTT, 
 
 Brigadier General, 
 
 Chief of Cavalry. 
 (R. R., Vol. 38, Part IV, p. 336.) 
 
 Ext. No. 184. Rosecrans was determined to make cavalry backed 
 his superior numbers tell, at least in the immediate pSrtwhfch y co S ui P d 
 vicinity of his army. He inaugurated a system about b?gun by ?he fl c g ay- 
 this time which resulted in the decided improvement of &i 
 
70 
 
 his cavalry. He would send out a body of cavalry 
 stronger than anything it was likely to encounter, and 
 that it might never be demoralized by a complete whip 
 ping, he would back it by an infantry force never far 
 in the rear, and always ready to finish the fight the cav 
 alry had begun. This method benefited the latter greatly. 
 (Morgan s Cavalry, by Duke.) 
 
 confederate Ext. No. 185. General Wirt Davis states that at 
 BkPrnSn er e^by Chickamauga the Confederates supported their cavalry 
 skirmish lines by infantry. 
 
 TWO cavalry Ext. No. 186. August 1 to 14 the 1st and 3d 
 a cor a p of infancy Brigades, dismounted, relieved the 23d Corps in the 
 
 in the trenches r 
 
 fortwoweeku. trenches on the extreme left of the army. During this 
 
 Atlanta Cam- . . 
 
 Aug. i-i4, time it did duty as infantry. 
 
 (Col. R. G. H. Minty, R. R., Vol. 38, Part II, p. 
 813.) 
 
 cavalry is kept Ext. No. 187. At the battle of Chickamauga For- 
 "four rest s Cavalry was not relieved from the lines where it 
 
 had been fighting as infantry till it had been in action 
 four days. 
 
 (Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest s Cavalry, 
 p. 353.) 
 
 cavalry go to Ext No - 188 - Seeing our troops retiring, and their 
 j! need of assistance, I immediately rushed Gamble s Bri- 
 g ade to Doubleday s left, and dismounted it in time to 
 render great assistance to our infantry, and to check 
 and break the enemy s line. My troops at this place had 
 partial shelter behind a low stone fence, and were in 
 short carbine range. Their fire w r as perfectly terrific, 
 causing the enemy to break and rally on their second 
 line, which made no further advance toward my position. 
 (Brig. Genl. Jno. Buford, July 1st, Gettysburg, 
 R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 927.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 The tactical action of combined cavalry and in 
 fantry is much the same as that of mounted and dis 
 mounted cavalry. 
 
71 
 
 The case of Early s infantry riding double behind 
 Rosser s Cavalry (Ext. 171) is very rare and of doubt 
 ful utility. 
 
 At Fisher s Hill the cavalry threw up earth works, 
 the same as infantry, to be occupied at the rate of one 
 man to 1.7 yards. (Ext. 172.) This line would seem 
 to be weak. It was not so since the cavalry was armed 
 with repeating carbines at this time. 
 
 Cavalry was often thrown into the battle to 
 strengthen infantry. (Exts. 138, 173, 174, 183, 188.) 
 
 Extract 175 illustrates the case of cavalry holding a 
 position long enough to enable infantry to complete its 
 maneuver. 
 
 It is sometimes thought that the Manchurian war 
 furnished a new method of handling weak cavalry > 
 namely, following it up by light infantry behind which it 
 took refuge when driven back. This use of cavalry was 
 frequently resorted to during the war of the Rebellion. 
 (Exts. 177, 182, 184, 185.) 
 
 In principle the system attributed to Rosecrans (Ext. 
 184) is altogether wrong. Cavalry should not be imbued 
 with the idea that a lot of infantry must follow it around 
 like the tail of a comet. The correct idea is expressed 
 by Sheridan (Ext. 238), namely, that cavalry ought to 
 fight the enemy s cavalry, and infantry the enemy s in 
 fantry. It is true that cavalry, the same as artillery is 
 a subordinate arm, and, under the commanding general, 
 should work to the central idea, and while doing so, can 
 and will fight anything. Good cavalry is, however, too 
 difficult to replace to expend it on foot troops massed 
 behind entrenchments, and its possibilities are likewise 
 too great to kill its mobility by tying it to infantry sup 
 ports. 
 
 Cavalry can often cover the withdrawal of infan 
 try by being placed in trenches, thus enabling the in 
 fantry to get away without molestation or their absence 
 being discovered. Wilson s cavalry screened the move 
 ment of Grant s army across the James River. (See 
 also Exts. 178, 249.) 
 
72 
 
 Extract 180 furnishes a good illustration of the 
 ability of cavalry to make a turning movement and cut 
 off the retreat of defeated troops and thus secure a rich 
 reward in prisoners and trophies. 
 
 It will happen more frequently that cavalry acts as 
 support for infantry than that infantry acts as support 
 for cavalry. However, Colonel E. M. McCook has some 
 ideas of his own on the subject, as expressed in Ext. 
 183. 
 
 The putting of cavalry in trenches for longer than 
 twenty-four hours is very demoralizing to the cavalry 
 (Ext. 186.) The fighting of men in the trenches will 
 not, as a rule, compensate for the damage to their horses 
 resulting from neglect. 
 
 COMBINED ACTION WITH ARTILLERY. 
 
 combined cav- Ext. Nb. 189. Dismounting his men, except about 
 
 !cticm! da lery 200 who were distributed equally on his right and left 
 
 mSS&m^SS. flanks, the Confederate commander disposed them in one 
 
 line of battle with his artillery, occupying three positions, 
 
 Morton s battery in the center and a section of Freeman s 
 
 on each flank, a few paces in advance of the dismounted 
 
 men. 
 
 (Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest s Cavalry, 
 
 p. 211.) 
 
 Stuart s hand- Ext. No. 190. The successful resistance which 
 ar n tfnery hi8 h rse Stuart was enabled to oppose to the Federal advance 
 a "was in great measure due to the skillful handling of his 
 artillery. Stuart s fondness for the use of artillery was 
 almost excessive; Pelham s skill in its management 
 amounted to genius. Stuart and Pelham imparted to 
 the horse artillery an independency of action and celerity 
 of movement which characterized it to the end of the war, 
 and which was nowhere equalled or imitated, except in 
 the same arm of the Federal service. Achievements of 
 the batteries attached to both Federal and Confederate 
 cavalry are worthy of a separate record and the careful 
 attention of military men. 
 
 (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, 
 p. 173.) 
 
73 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 DELAYING ACTIONS AND ATTACK AND DEFENSE 
 OF RIVER CROSSINGS. 
 
 Ext. No. 191. Morgan ordered the command to A charge win 
 
 often disconcert 
 
 retreat on the Augusta road and charged with the mount- 
 ed reserve to cover the withdrawal. 
 
 (Morgan s Cavalry by Duke.) 
 
 Ext. No. 192. The army, the siege of Knoxville Rear of retreat- 
 
 i . . . M1 ing army covered 
 
 being raised, commenced its retreat toward Rogersville. by cavalry. 
 General Morgan s division followed, covering the rear pa ?gn XV Dec e VGS! 
 of General McLaw s division on the south side of the 
 Holston. General Armstrong s division performed the 
 same service on the Knoxville and river roads. 
 
 (Maj. Gen. W. T. Martin, C. S., R. R., Vol. 31, 
 Part I, p. 548.) 
 
 Ext. No. 193. With 973 men the First Brigade 7ooo 3 for e io houS 
 had disputed the advance of 7,000 rebels from 7 o clock vance only five 
 
 miles. 
 
 in the morning until 5 o clock in the evening, and at the chickam-anga 
 end of that time had fallen back only five miles. iff* 1 
 
 (Col. R. H. G. Minty, R. R., Vol. 30, Part I, p. 
 923.) 
 
 Ext. No. 194. For five and a half hours, over onebrigadede- 
 
 lays a large force 
 
 seven miles of country, the unequal contest continued, so that they d 
 
 J vance seven miles 
 
 My gallant brigade was cut to pieces and slaughtered. in five hours. 
 
 (Col. G. B. Hodge, C. S., R. R., Vol. 30, Part II, tat? cS VMM! 
 p. 728.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 When Bragg retreated from Perry ville followed by 
 Rosecrans, Wheeler s cavalry covered his retreat. Ext. 
 261. 
 
 The retreat of Hood s army after the battle of Nash 
 ville was covered by Forrest s cavalry. 
 
74 
 
 Cavalry is particularly fitted for the work of delay 
 ing the advance of a victorious army. Its mobility en 
 ables it to take advantage of the terrain in places where 
 its horses can be kept close up. Under this condition it 
 can delay its retirement with impunity. If horses cannot 
 be kept close up, and owing to unfavorable terrain are 
 sent to the rear, cavalry will still have an advantage over 
 foot troops in that they carry no packs and are stimulated 
 by the assurance of safety upon regaining their horses. 
 
 The further use of cavalry in delaying actions is fully 
 illustrated by the following extracts. 
 
 RETIRING BY SUCCESSIVE FORMATIONS. 
 
 Retire by alter- Ext. No. 195. I received orders to retire behind 
 barricades. I moved back by alternate platoons, at the 
 same time checking the rebel advance till we arrived at 
 the barricades. 
 
 (Capt. Forman, R. R., Vol. 44, p. 376.) 
 
 Ext. No. 196. Their cavalry having turned our 
 
 Retire b sue- J 
 
 positions, flanks, we were compelled to fall back which was done 
 by taking successive positions till we reached the town. 
 
 (Genl. J. Wheeler, R. R., Vol. 44, p. 410.) 
 Brigades sue- Ext. No. 197. I received orders to retire my com- 
 
 mand behind the line of the 2 d Brigade and reform them, 
 
 Hranily Station. 
 
 ; - which was done, and I then held a position under cover 
 of which the 2d Brigade withdrew and again took up a 
 position near the river. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. H. E. Davies, R. R., Vol. 29, Part I, 
 p. 386.) 
 
 when outflank- Ext. No. 198. Upon being repulsed, the enemy 
 and take*upnew commenced extending his flanks which his numerical su- 
 
 positions. . ,,. .... 
 
 , P enorit y enabled him to do, compelling me to form fresh 
 
 Tenn., Oct. 7, i8(>3. j- nes n t | ie ^^ ^^ withdraw those he was enveloping. 
 (Col. G. B. Hodge, C. S., R. R., Vol. 30, Part II, 
 p. 728.) 
 Lmeretires sue- Ext. No. 199. The retreat under a heavy fire of 
 
 cessively by regi- .,, rr . . . 
 
 ment. artillery and small arms, was effected in perfect order, 
 
 tion al Teiin S Dec" the regiments falling back in succession to advantageous 
 
 29, 1863. 
 
75 
 
 points, and then fighting until, having checked the enemy 
 sufficiently, they could gain another point of vantage. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. W. T. Martin, C. S., R. R., Vol. 31, 
 Part I, p. 548.) 
 
 Ext. No. 200. The regiment fell back slowly and Regiment re- 
 
 . tires successively 
 
 in good order for some distance by alternate battalions, by battalions. 
 
 and then resumed its march in column. 
 
 (Lieut. Col. T. M. Browne, R. R., Vol. 32, Part I, 
 p. 276.) 
 
 Ext. No. 201. - 1 Was Ordered tO fall back as SUC- Brigade retires 
 i r j T\ IT successively by 
 
 cessive lines were formed in my rear. My regiment was regiment. 
 
 formed some seven or eight times during the day on the 
 rear and flanks of the brigade. 
 
 (Maj. C. T. Cheek, 5th Ky. Cav., R. R., Vol. 32, 
 Part I, p. 310.) 
 
 Ext. No. 202. Now the fighting became fierce and Regiment 
 desperate, charge after charge received and as often re- 
 pulsed. I found it impossible to hold a given line longer 
 than to deliver a single volley. In this manner we fought 
 our way back five miles. 
 
 (Lieut. Col. J. B. Park, R. R., Vol. 38, Part II, p. 
 828.) 
 
 Ext. No. 203. Each regiment then fell back alter- Regiments fan 
 nately and formed lines for two miles, when we reached two 
 
 Shoal Creek, and I found to my surprise, the 6th 111. pack ^fl C im. AIa> 
 train, artillery and ambulances all safe on the opposite 
 side, and the regiment dismounted to cover the crossing. 
 (Col. D. E. Coon, R. R., Vol. 45, Part I, p. 585.) 
 
 Ext. No. 204. The first position held by Stuart stuart retires 
 was about three miles west of Middleburg. Here he de-f^tloTan^ 
 layed the enemy as long as prudence permitted, and then ^^bur Va 
 retired en echelon of regiments, covered by his artillery. June21 > 1863 - 
 This order of retiring was maintained throughout the en 
 tire day, and at no time was the enemy able to cause any 
 serious disorder in his ranks. 
 
 (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, 
 p. 308.) 
 
76 
 stampede en- Ext. No. 205. The Yankees pressing on my rear 
 
 sues because the ,-, . P 
 
 retirement is not captured 8 men. Such management I never saw before. 
 
 made success- . 
 
 iveiy. Had the batteries retired by echelon, and the cavalry in 
 
 *"the same way, we could have held our position or driven 
 
 back their cavalry by a counter charge from ours. But 
 a retreat was ordered and a disgraceful stampede ensued. 
 (Col. T. T. Munford, C. S., R. R., Vol. 12, Part I, 
 p. 731.) 
 
 Brigades faii Ext. No. 206. I determined to draw off as soon as 
 
 ToineTsTiTie we cou ^ do so successfully, and for this purpose ordered 
 
 Tenn., NOV. s, ss! McCulloch s brigade to dismount and skirmish with the 
 
 enemy until Siemens could be formed in his rear to cover 
 
 his retreat. This was accomplished easily and in good 
 
 order, each brigade forming alternately in rear of the 
 
 other until we were out of reach of the enemy. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. J. R. Chalmers, :. S., R. R., Vol. 31, 
 Part I, p. 248.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 From reading these extracts it is clear that the usual 
 method of withdrawing was by alternate successive for 
 mations. It is possible, at times, to pit the whole fight 
 on one good strong position. In this case, when the 
 smash comes, it will be every m-an for himself (Ext. No. 
 205). No mention has been observed, in any of the re 
 ports, of intentionally using this latter method in a de 
 laying action. 
 
 It will frequently happen that when circumstances, 
 not known to the firing line, render a retirement desira 
 ble, that a successful retirement may be made under cover 
 of the confusion caused by a vigorous attack (Exts. 191, 
 218,440,441). 
 
 In the method of retiring by alternate formations, 
 battalions or regiments seem to be the favorite tactical 
 units (Exts. 199, 200, 201, 203, 204). 
 
 We find in Extract 204 Stuart s cavalry keeping this 
 up for an entire day by first getting back to the new line 
 alternate regiments supported by artillery whose fire cov- 
 
77 
 
 ered the withdrawal of the advanced line. Sometimes the 
 movement was executed alternately by platoons (Ext. 
 195), and sometimes by entire brigades (Exts. 197, 206). 
 
 ATTACK AND DEFENSE OF A RIVER CROSSING FORDS. 
 
 Ext. No. 207. I advanced rapidly to the creek, but Dismounted 
 
 men ford and at- 
 
 findingf it impossible from abrupt and miry banks to cross tack a battery. 
 
 Culpeper, C. H., 
 
 with horses, I dismounted 100 men with carbines, who, Va., Sept. is, i86. 
 wading and swimming the stream, charged rapidly up the 
 hill towards the battery. 
 
 (Col. Mann, R. R., Vol. 29, Part I, p. 127.) 
 
 Ext. No. 208. The reserve brigade was ordered to Dismounted 
 
 ~ . ,-, r men attack the 
 
 effect a crossing at Servers Ford; this was done in fine ford supported 
 
 by mounted men. 
 
 style by Col. Lowell, who threw over dismounted men, opequau creek, 
 closely supported by the 5th U. S. Cavalry and part of 
 the 2d Mass. Cav. mounted. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. W. Merrittt, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 
 443.) 
 
 Ext. No. 209. The enemy, about 300 strong, oc ~ ar [^v C ca V va r i?v 
 cupied a well chosen position behind earthworks upon the | a ^* rough 
 opposite side, commanding the bridge. The bridge was Swor^? take 
 already on fire, but the 9th Ohio Cav., 92d 111. Mtd. Inf. g Hear jjanrjgi, 
 (Dismounted) gallantly dashed through the swamp, the 
 men wading in the water up to their arm pits, crossed the 
 stream on trees felled by our pioneers, and under cover 
 of a rapid fire of artillery, gallantly carried the works, 
 driving the enemy in confusion toward the town of Barn- 
 well. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. J. Kilpatrick, R. R., Vol. 47, Part I, 
 p. 858.) 
 
 Ext. No. 210. They made another attempt some Enemy allowed 
 distance leftward, and were suffered to get well into the the stream before 
 
 firing on them. 
 
 stream without molestation, when Captain Forrest at 
 tacked with vigor, and repulsed them with loss. 
 
 (Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest"s Cavalry, 
 p. 239.) 
 
 Ext. No. 211. The Federals were forced to retire d ^J va a r c y r Ss 1 ^ 1 J 
 to their fortifications, eastward of the stream, which is shallow ford, and 
 
78 
 dismount on the some 250 yards broad at this point, but shallow, and with 
 
 other side to at- " 
 
 tack field works, an excellent ford, across which, under cover, secured by 
 eight pieces of artillery that had been previously placed 
 in a favorable position, the Confederates dashed boldly 
 in the face of the Federals. Dismounting his men as 
 soon as they reached the other bank, they were formed 
 as infantry, and pushed up with the loss of eight or ten 
 men killed or wounded before the Federals abandoned 
 their position. 
 
 (Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest s Cavalry, 
 p. 355.) 
 TO recross art- Ext. No. 212. I determined to recross the river. 
 
 illery is sent with 
 
 the c?os r 8in OCOver ^ s ^ le enem y began a brisk attack on my skirmishers, I 
 Morton s Ford, directed them to stand firm and at once sent my main 
 
 Va., Nov. 27, 1863. 
 
 body across the ford, having my guns in position and 
 placing a battalion in the houses at the ford, I ordered 
 the skirmishers in at the gallop. They retired, followed 
 closely by the enemy s cavalry which were checked by the 
 guns and the men posted at the ford and the whole com 
 mand crossed the river without losing a man. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. H. E. Davies, Jr. R.R., Vol.29, Parti, 
 p. 815.) 
 
 BRIDGES. 
 
 cavalry crones Ext. No. 213. Another battalion of the same regi- 
 
 bri dge under 
 
 cover of artillery. m en t was dismounted and placed as near the bridge as 
 N.c.,ApJfl 17/65! shelter could be found. The second shot from our artil 
 lery dismounted the rebel gun, a few more discharges 
 drove them from their rifle pits, when the dismounted 
 battalion charged across the bridge on the sleepers and 
 drove the rebels from the ford. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. A. C. Gillem, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, 
 p. 335.) 
 cavalry crosses Ext. No. 214. The enemy occupied a strong posi- 
 
 b ridge under J 
 
 cover of carbine tion on the opposite side of Broad Run which could only 
 Position fire, be crossed at a bridge and a ford one mile below. After 
 
 oct. r i% d i863 D) Va " a determined effort of over two hours, General Custer 
 had succeeded in pushing his command up to the bridge 
 and on the hills to the right of the road overlooking the 
 
79 
 
 enemy s position. I ordered General Custer to charge the 
 bridge. The charge was successfully made, the buildings 
 on the opposite side were gained and held by our sharp 
 shooters and in a few minutes General Custer s entire 
 brigade had crossed. 
 
 (Genl. Kilpatrick, R. R., Vol. 29, Part I, p. 382.) 
 Ext. No. 215. Lieut. Col. Pritchard commanding 
 the 3d Ohio Cav. had orders to push forward and save ^SThaV been 
 
 the double bridges over the Flint River. He carried out 
 
 his orders faithfully and energetically and saved t 
 bridges, although every preparation had been made to Al 
 burn them, and captured the battalion which had been left 
 to destroy them. Captain Hudson led his battalion at the 
 gallop over these unknown bridges, dashed into the rebel 
 battalions with sabers, and captured the entire force. 
 
 (Col. R. H. G. Minty, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 
 445.) 
 
 Ext. No. 216. From there a charge was ordered, cha v rge s ? u d c 
 and was executed with such precipitancy that the guard Sv 
 at the bridge, consisting of a force of fifty men, was com- ai p | intRiverneai , 
 pletely surprised, receiving no knowledge of our approach Aji. u ii865: Ga " 
 until the head of the column struck the bridge at the gal 
 lop, which was swept like a hurricane, not allowing the 
 enemy time to fire a volley. A few scattering shots were 
 fired, but to no effect. The whole force then broke and 
 fled. 
 
 (Lieut. Col. B. D. Pritchard, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, 
 p. 465.) 
 
 Ext. No. 217. I again moved forward at a f ast 
 trot in order to be on time to save the bridge over the 
 Tabesofkee Creek. Here we found the enemy in line, 
 about 300 strong, and attacked them. The advance 
 charged, mounted, over the burning bridge until stopped 
 by the plank being torn up. They then dismounted, as 
 did also the two advance companies, and I double quicked 
 them across the bridge, and after a sharp fight of about 
 five minutes, drove the enemy off in confusion. In the 
 meantime I had part of the companies at work extinguish- 
 
80 
 
 ing the fire on the bridge, the men carrying water in their 
 hats, caps, and everything else available. The fire was 
 sufficiently suppressed in about fifteen minutes to admit 
 of horsemen crossing, and, leaving men still at work 
 against the flames, I crossed the command and pushed on. 
 (Lieut. Col. F. White, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 
 458.) 
 
 Retiring across Ext. No. 218. At 2:00 p. m. Wheeler had his 
 
 wagon trains and horses carried to the south side of the 
 
 o e atteck vi fnd r i yer - H C tnen charged the enemy s line and before they 
 
 cover r o1it under could recover from their consternation, he had, by a rapid 
 
 , movement, reached the river with his dismounted men 
 
 Led horses and 
 
 are sent anc l hurried them across the pontoons, cut loose the bridge 
 and swung it around to the south side of the river just 
 as the enemy in force reached the other bank. 
 
 (Campaigns of Wheeler and His Cavalry, p. 196.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 In the attack of a ford or bridge, the whole trick con 
 sists in keeping down the enemy s fire till the crossing 
 can be effected and a deployment made on the opposite 
 side. This may be done by rifle fire (Ext. 214), artillery 
 fire (Exts. 209, 213), or by both combined (Ext. 212). 
 The method of employing it will depend upon the ground. 
 If high banks overlook the crossing, position fire (Ext. 
 214) is desirable. Often a bold clash will turn the trick 
 (Exts. 211, 215, 216, 217). This method is particularly 
 applicable where the defenders can be surprised (Ext. 
 216). 
 
 Extract 212 furnishes a good illustration of with 
 drawing from the firing line and crossing while under 
 fire. Under these circumstances, horses and trains should 
 be sent ahead (Ext. 218). 
 
 The method here used by General Wheeler will often 
 be possible, namely, deliver a vigorous attack and cross 
 under cover of the confusion caused to the enemy s ranks. 
 
 The cutting loose of one end of a pontoon bridge 
 was also resorted to by Lee s army when- crossing the 
 Potomac after the battle of Gettysburg. 
 
81 
 
 Usually some method can be found by which the 
 crossing can be turned. The mobility of cavalry will en 
 able it to reconnoitre, in a short time, a considerable 
 distance to both flanks of the crossing, while other troops 
 are engaging the enemy s attention in front. If a cross 
 ing can be found, it will be cheaper to turn the position 
 than to force it. 
 
 When the defense is sufficiently strong, the enemy 
 will suffer more by permitting his column to get well into 
 the stream (Ext. 210). 
 
82 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 MISCELLANEOUS TACTICS. 
 
 THE BATTLE OF BOONEVILLE. 
 
 This battle is described in Sheridan s Memoirs, Vol. 
 I, p. 156. It is well worth the study of every cavalry 
 officer. As it was the first fight where Sheridan com 
 manded independent cavalry, and is so full of good cav 
 alry tactics that it is here quoted in full. 
 
 Sheridan at this time showed a fine conception of 
 the correct use of cavalry. The details of the battle were 
 well known to General Grant, and probably had a mater 
 ial influence on the latter when he recommended Sheri 
 dan for the command of the cavalry of the Army of the 
 Potomac. 
 
 It resulted in Sheridan s immediate promotion, gave 
 him the command of an infantry division, brought his 
 sterling qualities to the attention of higher commanders, 
 and who shall say that it did not, in this indirect manner, 
 have an important bearing on the destiny of the nation, 
 cavalry out- Ext. No. 219. On the morning of July 1, 1862, a 
 cavalry command of between five and six thousand men, 
 under the Confederate General James R. Chalmers, ad 
 vanced on two roads converging near Booneville. The 
 head of the enemy s column on the Blackland and Boone 
 ville road came in contact with my pickets three miles 
 and a half west of Booneville. These pickets, under 
 Lieutenant Leonidas S. Scranton, of the Second Michi 
 gan Cavalry, fell back slowly, taking advantage of every 
 tree or other cover to fire from till they arrived at the 
 ubbornl ?n P oint where the converging roads joined. At this junc- 
 W tion there was a stron " P osition in tne Protecting timber, 
 and here Scranton made a firm stand, being reinforced 
 presently by a few men he had out as pickets on the road 
 
 out. 
 
83 
 
 to his left, a second company I had sent him from camp, 
 and subsequently by three companies more, all now com 
 manded by Captain Campbell. This force was dismount 
 ed and formed in line, and soon developed that the enemy 
 was present in large numbers. Up to this time Chalmers Advance, by 
 had shown only the heads of his columns, and we had ^not^pio^d 
 
 11, < . till compelled to 
 
 doubts as to his purpose, but now that our resistance do 80 b ? fire - 
 forced him to deploy two regiments on the right and left 
 of the road, it became apparent that he meant business, 
 and that there was no time to lose in preparing to repel 
 his attack. 
 
 Battle of BooneYille 
 Julj / s . e J86?, 
 
 JJHilt 
 
 to 
 
 Full information of the situation was immediately 
 
 J -frompt report 
 
 sent me, and I directed Campbell to hold fast, if possible, 
 till I could support him, but if compelled to retire he was 
 authorized to do so slowly, taking advantage of every 
 means that fell in his way to prolong: the nVhtinsr. Be- 
 
 ,, T . , . Stubborn reiiet- 
 
 tore this I had stationed one battalion of the Second Iowa ance b > r advance 
 
 -r, .., troops enables 
 
 m Booneville, but Colonel Edward Hatch, command ing StJ melt r the 
 
 that regiment, was now directed to leave one company attack- 
 
 for the protection of our camp a little to the north of 
 
 the station, and take the balance of the Second Iowa, 
 
 with the battalion in Booneville except two saber com- Digmounte d 
 
 panics, and form the whole in rear of Captain Campbell, poTtSd bymou U n P t- 
 
84 
 ed troops which to protect his flanks and support him by a charge should 
 
 are ordered to . 
 
 eharge if the en- ^ ene mv break his dismounted line. 
 
 emy breaks the J 
 
 dismounted line. While these preparations were being made, the Con 
 federates attempted to drive Campbell from his position 
 Fire is reserved by a direct attack through an open field. In this they 
 
 till the enemy J - . ~ ,. 
 
 gets within thirty failed, however, for our men, reserving their fire until 
 the enemy came within about thirty yards, then opened 
 on him with such a shower of bullets from our Colt s 
 rifles that it soon became too hot for him and he was 
 repulsed with considerable loss. Foiled in this move, 
 Chalmers hesitated to attack again in front, but began 
 overlapping both flanks of Campbell s line by force of 
 numbers, compelling Campbell to retire toward a strong 
 position I had selected in his rear for a line on which to 
 make our main resistance. 
 
 As soon as the enemy saw this withdrawing he again 
 charged in front, but was again as gallantly repelled as 
 in the first assault, although the encounter was for a 
 short time so desperate as to have the character of a 
 hand to hand conflict, several groups of friend and foe 
 using on each other the butts of their guns. At this 
 juncture the timely arrival of Colonel Hatch with the 
 Second Iowa gave a breathing spell to Campbell, and 
 made the Confederates so chary of direct attacks that he 
 was enabled to retire ; and at the same time 1 found op 
 portunity to make disposition of the reinforcement to the 
 best advantage possible, placing the Second Iowa on the 
 left of the new line and strengthening Campbell on its 
 right with all the men available. 
 
 In view of his numbers, the enemy soon regained 
 confidence in his ability to overcome us, and in a little 
 while again began his flanking movements, his right pass 
 ing around my left flank some distance, and approaching 
 our camp and transportation, which I had forbidden to 
 be moved out to the rear. Fearing that the enemy would 
 envelop and capture the camp and transportation, I de 
 termined to take the offensive, 
 commander Remembering- a circuitous wood road that I had 
 
 makes thorough . t r 
 
 " become familiar with while making the map heretofore 
 
85 
 
 Forlorn hope. 
 
 mentioned, I concluded that the most effective plan would rounding his 
 be to pass a small column around the enemy s left, by kn^wiedgew^ich 
 
 fit" 11-11- isof immense 
 
 way of this road, and strike his rear by a mounted charge advantage to him 
 
 J & when hia camp te 
 
 simultaneously with an advance of our main line on his attacked - 
 front. I knew that the attack in rear would be a most ed^mSan^us- 
 hazardous undertaking, but in face of such odds as the rear? 1 
 enemy had the condition of affairs was most critical, and 
 could be relieved only by a bold and radical change in our Sheridan stakes 
 tactics; so I at once selected four saber companies, two*^^S?o?one 
 from the Second Michigan and two from the Second w Ins - S * 
 Iowa, and placing Captain Alger, of the former regiment, 
 in command of them, I informed him that I expected of 
 them the quick and desperate work that is usually im 
 posed on a forlorn hope. 
 
 To carry out the purpose now in view, I instructed 
 Captain Alger to follow the wood road as it led around 
 the left of the enemy s advancing forces, to a point where 
 it joined the Blackland road, about three miles from 
 Booneville, and directed him, upon reaching the Black- 
 land road, to turn up it immediately, and charge the rear 
 of the enemy s line. Under no circumstances was he to 
 deploy the battalion, but charge in column right through 
 whatever he came upon, and report to me in front of 
 Booneville, if at all possible for him to get there. If he 
 failed to break through the enemy s line, he was to 
 go ahead as far as he could, and then if any of his men 
 were left, and he was able to retreat, he was to do so 
 by the same route he had taken on his way out. To con 
 duct him on this perilous service I sent along a thin, Useofgui(3e - 
 sallow, tawny-haired Mississippian named Beene, whom 
 I had employed as a guide and scout a few days before, 
 on account of his intimate knowledge of the roads, from 
 the public thoroughfares down to the insignificant by 
 paths of the neighboring swamps. With such guidance 
 I felt sure that the column would get to the desired point 
 without delay, for there was no danger of its being lost 
 or misled by taking any of the many by-roads which 
 traversed the dense forests through which it would be 
 
86 
 
 obliged to pass. I also informed Alger that I should 
 take the reserve and join the main line in front of Boone- 
 ville for the purpose of making an advance of my whole 
 force, and that as a signal he must have his men cheer 
 loudly when he struck the enemy s rear, in order that 
 my attack might be simultaneous with his. 
 
 A commander I gave him one hour to go around and come back 
 w?h 3 <?ra^?ng through the enemy, and when he started I moved to the 
 helms put ail of front with the balance of the reserve, to put every thing I 
 
 his reserves into 
 
 the firing line, had into the fight. This meant an inestimable advantage 
 to the enemy in case of our defeat, but our own safety 
 demanded the hazard. All along the attenuated line 
 
 Prearranged , ~ . . ,. 
 
 signal for simui- the fighting was now sharp, and the enemy s tiring md i- 
 
 taneous attack J 
 
 canno^ usually catec i sucn numerical strength that fear of disaster to 
 Alger increased my anxiety terribly as the time set for 
 
 the cheering 1 arrived and no sound of it was heard. Re- 
 Time agree- , 
 ment better than lying- however, on the fact that Beene s knowledge of the 
 
 a sound signal. > 
 
 roads would prevent his being led astray, and confident 
 of Alger s determination to accomplish the purpose for 
 which he set out, as soon as the hour was up I ordered 
 my whole line forward. Fortunately, just at this mo 
 ment a locomotive and two cars loaded with grain for 
 my horses ran into Booneville from Corinth. I say for 
 tunately, because it was well known throughout the com 
 mand that in the morning, when I first discovered the 
 large numbers of the enemy, I had called for assistance; 
 and my troops, now thinking that reinforcements had 
 courage of arrived by rail from Rienzi, where a division of infantry 
 ae?ief e that p a* was encamped, and inspired bv this belief, advanced with 
 
 siBtance had ar- T , , 
 
 rived. renewed confidence and wild cheering. Meantime 
 
 the engineer of the locomotive blow his whistle loudly, 
 so that the enemy might also learn that a train had come; 
 and from the fact that in a few moments he began to 
 give way before our small force, I thought that this 
 stratagem had some effect. Soon his men broke, and ran 
 in the utmost disorder over the country in every direc 
 tion. I found later, however, that his precipitous retreat 
 was due to the pressure on his left from the Second Iowa, 
 
87 
 
 in concert with the front attack of the Second Michigan, 
 and the demoralization wrought in his rear by Alger, 
 who had almost entirely accomplished the purpose of his 
 expedition, though he had failed to come through, or so 
 near that I could hear the signal agreed upon before 
 leaving Booneville. 
 
 After Alger had reached and turned up the Black- 
 land road, the first thing he came across was the Con 
 federate headquarters; the officers and orderlies about 
 which he captured and sent back some distance to a farm 
 house. Continuing at a gallop, he soon struck the rear 
 of the enemy s line, but was unable to get through, nor 
 did he get near enough for me to hear his cheering; but 
 as he had made the distance he was to travel in the time 
 allotted, his attack and mine were almost coincident, and 
 the enemy, stampeded by the charges in front and rear, 
 fled toward Blackland, with little or no attempt to cap 
 ture Alger s command which might readily have bee** 
 done. Alger s troops soon rejoined me at Booneville, Good cavalry 
 minus many hats, having returned by their original route. Si^to^lSF i5 
 They had sustained little loss except a few men wounded way out 
 and a few temporarily missing. Among these was Alger 
 himself, who was dragged from his saddle by the limb 
 of a tree that, in the excitement of the charge, he was 
 unable to flank. The missing had been dismounted in 
 one way or another, and run over by the enemy in his 
 flight ; but they all turned up later, none the worse except 
 for a few scratches and bruises. My effective strength 
 in this fight was 827 all told, and Alger s command com 
 prised ninety officers and men. Chalmers was composed 
 of six regiments and two battalions, and though I have 
 been unable to find any returns from which to verify his 
 actual numbers, yet, from the statements of prisoners and 
 from information obtained from citizens along his line 
 of march, it is safe to say that he had in action not less 
 than five thousand men. Our casualties were not many 
 forty-one in all. His loss in killed and wounded was 
 considerable, his most severely wounded forty men 
 
88 
 
 falling into our hands, having been left at farm houses 
 in the vicinity of the battle field. 
 Sheridan dis- The victory in face of such odds was most gratify- 
 
 obeys orders, but . ..,. . . 
 
 on account of his jng- anc i as it justified my disinclination in fact, refusal 
 
 complete victory J 
 
 "stifled 8 ^Had to ret i re from Booneville without fighting (for the pur- 
 whippfitm^hit P ose f saving my transportation, as directed by superior 
 lr a e v nt mltter diff " authority when I applied in the morning for reinforce 
 ments), it was to me particularly grateful. It was also 
 very valuable in view of the fact that it increased the 
 confidence between the officers and men of my brigade 
 A victory in- and me, and gave us the balance of the month not only 
 ence between fi of- comparative rest, but entire immunity from the dangers 
 of a renewed effort to gobble my isolated outpost. In 
 addition to all this, recommendation from my immediate 
 superiors was promptly tendered through oral and writ 
 ten congratulations ; and their satisfaction at the result of 
 the battle took definite form a few days later, in an ap 
 plication for my promotion. 
 
 (Sheridan s Memoirs, pp. 156 to 165 inclusive.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 General Sheridan here displayed the same character 
 istics which he afterwards displayed in the valley. He 
 loved a fight and disobeyed orders to withdraw in order 
 to save his transportation. He here used the same tac 
 tics which were so popular with Forrest, viz: Holding 
 the enemy in front while a turning movement attacked 
 him simultaneously in rear. He had made a thorough 
 reconnaissance of the surrounding country and mapped 
 it. He personally knew every road and trail in the vicin 
 ity of his camp and utilized them to the best advantage. 
 His outposts were well out and resisted stubbornly till 
 the main body could form for defense. 
 
 In our drill it is often thought that if the attack can 
 get to within two hundred yards, a charge will be prac 
 ticable. Such will seldom ever be the case. We here 
 find Sheridan s men holding their fire till the enemy gets 
 within thirty yards. They were armed with revolving 
 
89 
 
 carbines and could deliver a rapid fire as fast as with our 
 present rifle. 
 
 It will be noticed often in these extracts that fire is 
 held till the enemy gets to within very short range. 
 
 It will be noted that prearranged signals which de 
 pend on sound are not to be relied upon. Sound signals 
 failed in the battles of Seven Pines, Malvern Hill, Gettys 
 burg, and many others during the rebellion. A time sig 
 nal is better if the conditions are known to the com 
 mander. In case a time signal is agreed upon, care should 
 be exercised to see that watches agree. 
 
 We here see the commander playing with the cour 
 age of his men, and keeping up their spirits by making 
 them believe in conditions which did not exist. 
 
 In this fight Sheridan staked his whole reputation 
 on the result. The people of the United States seem to 
 lay great stress on a commander gaining a victory in his 
 first fight. All through the war we see many careers 
 ruined because the commander was unfortunate in his 
 first fight, while those who were fortunate were greeted 
 as heroes and were permitted to continue with their 
 former experience to support them in future operations. 
 
 A commander is not justified in withdrawing from a 
 fight till he has put all his reserves into the firing line. 
 
 CAVALRY SHOULD NOT SURRENDER. 
 
 Ext. No. 220. Forrest declared that he would lead Forrest s cav- 
 forth all who desired to accompany him, and then in-of ry Fon a Donei- 
 
 , . son when 17,000 
 
 quired how many would make the attempt. The answer troops surrender 
 was unanimous that they would follow him to the last. 
 Orders were issued accordingly for an immediate move 
 ment. About 4 o clock a. m. Forrest was ready and took 
 
 Cavalry should 
 
 the road through Dover. About 500 officers and men not surrender, 
 formed the column. * * * Thus assured, Forrest Tenn., Feb. 15, 62! 
 returned to his command, that meanwhile had continued 
 on the road to the crossing of the creek eastward of 
 Dover. The creek expanded by backwater to a breadth 
 of about 100 yards, lined with ice, it was supposed to be 
 "swimming." Forrest dashed through the ice as their 
 
90 
 
 pioneer just as he had but lately been their scout. Pass 
 ing entirely across, the water proved not deeper than to 
 the saddle skirts. The whole command now moved over 
 and took up the march for Cumberland City. 
 
 (Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest s Cavalry, 
 p. 91.) 
 
 cavalry of the Ext. No. 221. Upon hearing that the Army of 
 er^virginia^do Northern Virginia had surrendered, the men generally 
 
 not at first sur- . ,,-.,., , . 
 
 render at Appo- dispersed and rode off to their homes, subject to reassem- 
 
 mattox. 
 
 Appomattox,v blingf for a continuation of the struggle. I rode out in 
 
 Aprlf9,1865. , . . 
 
 person with a portion of W. H. F. Lee s division, the 
 nearest to me at the time, and previous to the negotia 
 tions between the commanders of the two armies. It will 
 be recalled that my action was in accordance with the 
 views I had expressed in the council the night before 
 that if a surrender was compelled the next day, I would 
 try to extricate the cavalry, provided it could be done 
 without compromising the action of the commanding 
 general. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. Fitzhugh Lee, C. S,, R. R., Vol. 46, 
 Parti, p. 1303.) 
 
 Escape of the Ext. No. 222. At the capture of Harper s Ferry, 
 
 SSSr? Harp " 1862, Colonel B. F. Davis, 8th N. Y. Cavalry marched 
 
 sept. 14, 1862. ou j. at t j ie i ieac | of 1,500 horsemen and not only escaped 
 
 surrender, but inflicted serious loss on the Confederates 
 
 by capturing Longstreet s ordnance train. 
 
 (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, 
 p. 122.) 
 
 Ext. No. 223. Heavy masses of rebel cavalry were 
 
 Cutter cuts way . . . r t 
 
 out, when sur- seen covennsr the heipfhts in front ot mv advance; my 
 
 rounded, with J 
 
 saber. rear guard was hotly engaged with a superior force and 
 
 Brandy Station. 1 1 n 1 
 
 Va.. oct, 11, 1863. a heavy column was enveloping each flank. Leaving 
 the 6th and 7th Michigan Cavalry to hold the force in 
 rear in check, I formed the 5th Michigan Cavalry on my 
 right in column of battalions ; on my left I formed the 
 1st Michigan Cavalry in column of squadrons. After 
 ordering them to draw their sabers I informed them that 
 we were surrounded, and all we had to do was to open 
 
91 
 
 a way with our sabers. They gave three hearty cheers 
 and the band struck up Yankee Doodle which excited the 
 enthusiasm of the command to the highest pitch. Simul-| 1 i ^ le Yankee 
 taneously both regiments moved forward to the attack. 
 After a series of brilliant charges we succeeded in reach 
 ing the river which we crossed in good order. 
 
 (Genl. G. A. Custer, R. R., Vol. 29, Part I, p. 390.) 
 
 Ext. No. 224. I was finally completely surround- cutting way 
 ed and compelled to abandon everything that would im- Kear Lovejoy 
 pede me in order to cut my way through. I took Colonel 29, A i864. 
 Jones with me and got through 1,200 men by a charge in 
 column, and crossed the river below Franklin. 
 
 Brig. Genl. E. M. McCook, R. R., Vol. 38, Part II, 
 p. 762.) 
 
 Ext. No. 225. General Van Dorn attacked and cavalry refuse 
 
 to surrender. 
 
 captured the town of Holly Springs, Mississippi, on the Holly springs, 
 20th of December. The attack was sudden and over 
 powering, and the garrison was speedily captured. Six 
 companies of the 6th Illinois Cavalry under the brave 
 Major Mudd, refused to surrender and cut their way 
 through the ranks of the enemy and escaped. 
 
 (History of the U. S. Cavalry, Brackett, p. 266.) 
 
 Ext. No. 226. At 5 :00 p. m. my patrols and pick- 
 
 ets reported the enemy in force in my rear. I formed 
 
 the 5th Iowa in charging column on the pike. The 1 6th 
 
 Illinois, dismounted, on the right and the 8th Michigan, The formation 
 
 L WftS n * ^ r an 
 
 dismounted, on the left of the pike; led horses of both attack but to cut 
 
 . a way out when 
 
 regiments to follow at safe distance in their respective surrounded. 
 
 rears; the 14th Illinois was placed in column of fours to 
 
 the left and rear of the 8th Michigan and parallel to the 
 
 5th Iowa. As soon as the enemy s fire was drawn, the 
 
 dismounted men were to immediately fall back, mount 
 
 and follow out the 5th Iowa which was to go through 
 
 with sabers. In fifteen minutes we struck the enemy in 
 
 line barricaded and posted in out houses and buildings. 
 
 The movement was entirely successful. 
 
 Out of 1,500 brought out safe not more than 30 opinion that 
 were missing. Permit me to add the fact of growing lot%? captured" 
 
92 
 
93 
 
 confidence amongst our troops that good cavalry can Duck River 
 
 , , Tenn., Nov. 28, 64! 
 
 never be captured. 
 
 (Maj. J. M. Young, R. R., Vol. 45, Part I, p. 604. 
 
 IMPROPER USE OF CAVALRY. 
 
 Ext. No. 227. The officers and men were in pretty of 
 good condition, so far as health and equipment were con-gjJ*JJ 
 cerned, but their horses were thin and very much worn 
 out by excessive, and, it seemed to me, unnecessary 
 picket duty, the picket line almost encircling the infantry 
 and artillery camps of the army, covering a distance, if 
 stretched out on a continuous line, of nearly 60 miles. 
 
 The enemy, more wise, had been husbanding the During winter 
 
 horses should be 
 
 strength and efficiency of his horses by sending them to J| t r ^% e ra t ey 
 the rear, in order to bring- them out in the spring in good Rapidan to the 
 
 Jamet, Apr. 1864 
 
 condition for the impending campaign. 
 
 (Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, p. 
 787.) 
 
 Ext. No. 228. As it was difficult to overcome the cavalry should 
 
 , ,. , ... . . not be wasted for 
 
 established custom of wasting cavalry for the protection the protection of 
 of trains, and for the establishment of cordons around a Rapidan to the 
 
 . ... , . , . James, Apr. 1864. 
 
 sleeping infantry force, we had to bide our time. 
 
 (Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, p. 
 787.) 
 
 Ext. No. 229. The enemy here again made an Cannot oppose 
 error in tactics by sending a large force to attack my g e fo?ce C bya 
 rear, thus weakening his force in front, enabling me to rear with a\arge 
 throw all my strength on that which opposed my front, Yei iow Tavern 
 
 j /- 1 *. 1 r vi 11 j Va.. May 11, 1884. 
 
 and fight this force with a small rear guard. 
 
 (Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, p. 
 790.) 
 
 Ext. No. 230. -Ouster s charge, with Chapman on Cavalry should 
 his flank, was brilliantly executed; first at a walk, then 
 at a trot, then dashing at the enemy s line and battery, 
 capturing the guns and gunners and breaking the line, 
 which was simple enough to receive the charge in a 
 stationary position. In this assault General J. E. B. 
 Stuart, commanding the enemy s cavalry, was mortally 
 wounded. 
 
94 
 
 (Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, p. 
 790.) 
 Marching cav- Ext. No. 231. On the morning- of the 23d I was 
 
 airy in rear of in- 
 
 ra?ns tr to n cav- e to P roceec ^ via New Castle, in rear of the train 
 alr y- and in rear of the rest of the army. From that time till 
 
 Lynchbnrg Cam 
 paign, June, 1864. the arrival of my division at Loup Creek it was marched 
 
 in the rear. No opportunity has been offered to obtain 
 forage or subsistence for the men, everything having 
 been taken by the troops marching in my front. As a 
 consequence many of the men of my command have 
 perished by the roadside from hunger and fatigue, whilst 
 their horses fell bv the way from the same cause. I 
 
 Night march- J J 
 
 iefy p bad e forca b v e . would respectfully call attention to the fact that my 
 
 marching has been done principally during the night 
 
 time, thus affording little opportunity for rest or sleep. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. A. N. Duffle, R. R., Vol. 37, Part I, p. 
 
 144.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 When Sheridan took command of the cavalry of 
 the Army of the Potomac he found the conditions as 
 stated in Extract 227. The horses had been worn out 
 in doing picket duty around an infantry camp on a line 
 of nearly sixty miles ; while the Confederates habitually 
 sent their horses to the rear in winter to recuperate. The 
 use of cavalry for train guards is not to be encouraged. 
 It is a great waste of cavalry and besides the duty can be 
 better done by infantry. In case of an attack the in 
 fantryman from the ground can do much more effective 
 shooting than can a man on a horse. The rate of speed 
 of a train being much slower than the rate of march, of 
 cavalry, it is very wearing on horses to hold them down 
 to the rate of travel of the train. 
 
 The marching of cavalry in rear of infantry trains 
 means that there will be nothing left for the cavalry to 
 eat, and when this condition is combined with night 
 marching the situation could not be worse for a cavalry 
 command (Ext. 231). 
 
95 
 
 Extract 229 illustrates an error in the use of cavalry 
 where Stuart tried to bring Sheridan to a fight by attack 
 ing his rear. Sheridan fought to the rear with a small 
 rear guard and kept on his Richmond raid without seri 
 ous opposition. 
 
 STREET FIGHTING. 
 
 Ext. No. 232. A fierce fight at once began. I street fighting. 
 made the men force their way into the houses whence The offensive 
 they were fired upon. Details were posted in the middle septf?! 1862 . 
 of the street in front of every house, to fire on the in 
 mates when they showed themselves and prevent them 
 from maintaining an accurate and effective fire. Other 
 details were made to break doors of the houses and enter 
 them. Artillery was brought into the town and turned 
 upon the houses in which the most stubborn resistance 
 was kept up. 
 
 (Morgan s Cavalry, by Duke.) 
 
 Ext. No. 233. The street through which he neces- Formation for 
 
 street fighting is 
 
 sarily passed was so narrow that his regiment could only column of fours. 
 be operated in column of fours. A sufficient interval 
 
 was, however, preserved between his squadrons, which Attack by suc- 
 were employed successively in charging the head of the ea e ch S forming in 
 
 , rear after deliv- 
 
 enemy s advancing column. As one squadron retired ering its wow. 
 
 r ji 1 r r Booiisboi 0, Md., 
 
 irom the charge, to torm again in rear ot the regiment, Sept. 15, 1862. 
 the one in front took up the battle. By a rapid series of 
 \vell executed attacks the 9th regiment thus covered the 
 retreat of the remainder of the brigade and gave it time 
 to take position w 7 est of Boonsboro. 
 
 (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. ]. E. B. Stuart, 
 p. 125.) 
 
 Ext. No. 234. I had pressed up to within 500 Dismounted 
 
 troops clear the 
 
 yards when the enemy retired precipitately through the \ 
 
 town. I charged half way through the main street, an 
 
 on the left, but a hot fire from the enclosures and gardens Va>) Sept - 24) 1864> 
 
 forced me back. I now dismounted five squadrons of the 
 
 1st N. Y., cleared the town, and charged through with 
 
 the rest of my command. 
 
96 
 
 (Brig. Genl. T. C. Devin, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p 
 476.) 
 
 NIGHT OPEBATIONS. 
 
 This is a fine Ext No. 235. On October 28, 1863, a part of the 
 
 illustration of o , -p,- r , . , 
 
 - Ulvision * the 12th Corps under Brig. Genl. Geary, 
 
 ?tudy xtensivecami>ecl at Wauhatchie two and one-half miles from the 
 
 Wauhatchie, llth Corps. 
 Tenn., Oct. 28, 29, 
 
 Between 12 midnight and 1 :00 a. m. on a bright 
 moonlight night, his camp was attacked and the attack 
 repulsed. 
 
 When the attack began, General Hooker immediate 
 ly ordered General Carl Schurz to double quick his di 
 vision to the aid of Geary, and at the same time sent 
 word to General Howard, who was in immediate com 
 mand of both divisions, that such orders had been given. 
 
 General Schurz started promptly with three brigades, 
 marching at their head. Each brigade had orders to fol 
 low the one in front of it. Schurz, while en route, re 
 ceived orders to occupy a neighboring hill. The brigade 
 ordered there got off the road and into a boggy thicket 
 where it was obliged to halt ; but it eventually succeeded 
 in reaching the hill. The second brigade did not follow 
 the first and halted without orders. The third brigade, 
 not having orders to halt, marched past the second. Then 
 an aide of General Howard began to give orders in the 
 name of his general, and the two brigades were formed 
 in line of battle with no enemy near. At about this time 
 a few prisoners were brought in and an order was issued 
 to escort them to Chattanooga ; one entire brigade started 
 off with them. 
 
 General Hooker came up and found everything be 
 ing done except relieving General Geary s small com 
 mand ; lie thereupon got mad and made remarks, 
 
 Finally one brigade reached Geary at 5 :30 a. m. 
 followed by another at 7 :00 a. m. 
 
 Schurz asked for a court of inquiry and was held 
 blameless. The court found that "It was right and 
 
97 
 
 proper that he (Hooker) should give expression to his 
 righteous indignation in his official report." 
 
 The whole operation is a fine illustration of night 
 maneuvers, when undertaken after dark in an unknown 
 country. It is believed that all the points are covered by 
 this concrete example. 
 
 (See the report of the Court of Inquiry, R. R., Vol. 
 31, Parti, p. 206.) 
 
 Ext. No. 236. Remaining in possession of the pike Friendly troops 
 for half an hour we withdrew upon the approach of sev- 
 eral bodies of infantry, which, coming up in opposite 
 directions, by mistake got to shooting into each other 30 18 
 and fired several volleys before finding out their error. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. L. S. Ross, C. S., R. R., Vol. 45, Part 
 I, p. 770.) 
 
 Ext. No. 237. I reached the head of Winslow s Formation for 
 
 
 brigade at 4 o clock and found the troops marching- to before dart 8 
 
 ,1 .. . the attack made 
 
 the position assigned them by General Upton WinslowJ U8t after dark . 
 
 ,. . . over a short dis- 
 
 dici not arrive till after dark, but General Upton pro- tance - succeeds - 
 
 posed to make the assault in the night, and coinciding Apr.^isS. 
 with him in judgment, I ordered the attack. Three hun 
 dred men of the 3d Iowa were dismounted and moved 
 forward and forced across the road under a heavy fire 
 of artillery. At 8 :00 p. m. the troops were ready. Gen 
 erals Upton and W r inslow directed the movement in per 
 son. The troops dashed forward ; during the attack the 
 rebel guns threw out perfect storm of canister and grape. 
 General Upton swept away all opposition and took pos 
 session of the foot and railway bridges. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. J. H. Wilson, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, 
 p. 363.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 A very poor opinion is held of night operations. 
 Their chief use will be limited to an attack over a short 
 space of ground directly to the front after the troops 
 have worked into position by daylight as illustrated in 
 Ext. 237. 
 
98 
 
 Another application will be where the troops can 
 work into position under the cover of darkness and make 
 the attack at daybreak (Ext. 275). 
 
 correct use to Ext. Njo. 238. During the period of my immedi- 
 afr^corps* a v " ate control of the Corps, I tried to carry into effect, as 
 far as possible, the view I had advanced before and dur 
 ing the opening of the Wilderness campaign, i. e., "that 
 our cavalry ought to fight the enemy s cavalry, and our 
 infantry the enemy s infantry" ; for there was great 
 danger of breaking the spirit of the Corps if it was to 
 be pitted against the enemy s compact masses of foot 
 troops posted behind intrenchments, and unless there was 
 some adequate tactical or strategical advantage to be 
 gained, such a use of it would not be justified. 
 
 (Sheridan s Memoirs, p. 453, Vol. I.) 
 Battle tactics Ext. No. 239. Our line of battle in corps front 
 
 of a corps, three .. . , . 
 
 lines. was always formed in one way. Each brigade detached 
 
 front one of its regiments to cover its whole front, often half 
 
 one-half mile. 
 
 2d line have a m ^ e l n w ^^ a chain of skirmishers. Two more 
 
 drawn labers. re giments followed behind each wing at about 200 yards 
 
 apart, in line, with sabers drawn. The rest of the 
 
 8d line in col- L 
 
 umn of fours. brigade formed a third line in column of fours. 
 
 (Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade, p. 18.) 
 
 For the offen- -^ xt - ^ ^40. The only principle to establish for 
 
 SSt a be d aSan? tn employment of a body of cavalry as considerable as 
 
 and n for a ^nutuai the division is the division of this mass of troops into 
 
 many lines arranged for mutual support. T he disposing 
 
 lines in echelons should be considered as most favorable 
 
 for safe offensive. 
 
 (Cooke s New 7 Cavalry Tactics, p. 266.) 
 
 A straight line Ext. No. 241. The enemy was dismounted behind 
 
 the crest of a hill. Their formation was defective in that 
 
 instead of forming a straight, uniform line, they were 
 
 formed in the shape of a "V," perhaps to meet my move- 
 
 A sharp salient ment to ^ an ^ them. When we charged over the hill, al- 
 
 ?iine eak part f though the enemy had some advantage in firing upwards, 
 
 it was more than counterbalanced by the fact that the men 
 
 upon their flanks could not fire at us at all, while our 
 
99 
 
 whole line could fire without difficulty upon any portion 
 of their formation. After a short, but hot fight, they 
 gave way. 
 
 (Morgan s Cavalry, by Duke.) 
 
 Ext. No. 242. This movement was made at a Marching a 
 walk, with three divisions on the same (plank) road cavalry corps> 
 making a column of about 13 miles in length march 
 ing by the flank of the enemy. I preferred this, however, t^n^^S 
 to the combinations arising from separate roads, com- meS ! s n g imm e i- 
 binations rarely working as expected, and generally fail- n R^wan to the 
 ing, unless subordinate commanders are prompt and fully JaB 
 understand the situation; besides, an engagement was 
 imminent, and it was necessary that the force be well to 
 gether. 
 
 (Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, p. 
 789.) 
 
 Ext. No. 243. There was no lack of courage, but Evils of a di- 
 
 111 ,. . e vided command. 
 
 clearly an absence of concert and of sustained movement Yazoo city, Miss., 
 in this operation; and, worst of all, a divided command, Mar> 5> 18< 
 for though General Richardson claimed to be the senior, 
 he waived the chief command in deference to the fact 
 that General Ross had a superior knowledge of the the 
 atre of operations. It would appear, therefore, that each 
 brigade was handled in the attack as a separate force, 
 with little regard to the movements or purposes of the 
 other an incongruity in war utterly hostile to success. 
 (Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest s Cavalry, 
 p. 405.) 
 
100 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 SECUEITY AND INFORMATION. 
 
 ADVANCE GUARD. 
 
 Advance guard Ext. No. 244. Captain Rup-er, who took and 
 
 preceded by . . 
 
 guides. maintained his position at the head of the advance guard, 
 
 in charge of the guides, and who conducted the column, 
 and whose services were almost indispensable to me. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. L. H. Rousseau, R. R., Vol. 38, Part II, 
 p. 909.) 
 
 HOW to enter a Ext. No. 245. On arriving at Woodstock the 
 scouts dashed through the town followed by the advance 
 guard. 
 
 (Maj. C. C. Brown, 22d N. Y. Cav., R. R., Vol. 46, 
 Part I, p. 532.) 
 
 Morgan has a Ext. No. 246. Morgan appreciated the necessity 
 
 permanent a d- 
 
 vance guard. of having an advance guard which could be thoroughly 
 relied on, and disinclined to trust to details changed every 
 day for that duty, had organized a body of twenty-five 
 selected men. men selected with great care from the entire force under 
 his command, to constitute a continuous advance guard 
 for the expedition. So well did this body perform its 
 duty that it became an honor eagerly sought and a reward 
 
 Selection a re- , J 
 ward for bravery, for gallantry. 
 
 This guard habitually marched at a distance of 400 
 order of march, yards in front of the column. Three videttes were, as 
 connecting files, placed between it and the column with 
 distances of 100 yards. Their duties were to transmit in 
 formation and orders between the column and the ad 
 vance guard, and to regulate the gait of the former so 
 that it would not press too closely on the latter. Six 
 videttes were thrown out in front of the guard; 125 
 yards in front of the main body of the advance guard 
 
101 
 
 was a group of four riding in pairs with a distance of 50 
 yards between each pair, and 125 yards in front of them 
 was the other pair. It was found best to keep the same 
 men always on the same duty. The advance videttes 
 were required to carefully examine on all sides and re- investigating 
 port. When they came to cross roads one or both gal 
 loped down them as the case might require for 200 or Places of such 
 300 yards and remained till men were sent from the head SSrs IS? tol 
 of the column to relieve them, when they returned to 
 their posts. As soon as they notified the commander of 
 the advance guard that they were about to leave their 
 posts, he took measures to supply their places. The two 
 videttes next to them in the chain galloped to the front, 
 and the other two moved up respectively fifty yards. 
 Two men were sent from the guard to fill the places of 
 the last. 
 
 (Morgan s Cavalry, by Duke.) 
 
 Ext. No. 247. The size of an advance guard for a Formation of 
 corps should be one brigade. In the point should be a advance guard * 
 sergeant and two men, connecting files should extend 
 back for a mile 100 yards apart, then about 30 men with 
 connecting files for another mile, total 70 men; then the 
 leading brigade with a battery. In this way signals can 
 be transmitted back two miles in two minutes. At each 
 side road the leading man rides out one quarter 
 mile or more and all the connecting files move up. When 
 the last file goes past the lookout takes his place in rear. 
 The employment of flankers and skirmishers, unless the 
 enemy is known to be near, hardly pays for the con 
 sumption of horse flesh occasioned by constantly riding 
 over broken ground. The flanking should be done by 
 scouts who travel light. 
 
 (Volunteer Cavalry, The Lessons of a Decade, p. 
 90.) 
 
102 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 Attention is invited to the system of advance guard 
 as used by Morgan (Ext. 246). 
 
 Captain Whittaker also highly recommends this sys 
 tem (Ext. 247). 
 
 The system prescribed in the cavalry drill regulations 
 will find little application. In a close country the flank 
 ing groups cannot be used, and in an open country a 
 more open formation will be used. 
 
 SCBEENING. 
 
 screening the Ext. No. 248. During Sherman s march to the sea 
 
 march of an in- !* 
 
 lantry column, his cavalry was commanded by Kilpatnck. 
 
 The infantry marched in four strong columns. The 
 cavalry repeatedly attacked barricades both mounted and 
 dismounted. The enemy was not able to touch a train 
 or annoy the flanks. 
 
 The cavalry crossed the entire front of the army 
 three times, and marched 541 miles in 33 days. 
 
 (General Kilpatrick, R. R., Vol. 44, p. 366; also, 
 General Sherman, R. R., Vol. 44, p. 368.) 
 screens the Ext. No. 249. From the evening of June 12th till 
 
 withdrawal of in- 
 
 fantry from the 2 a. m. of the 14th Mclntosh s brigade covered the rear 
 
 battle line. 
 
 of the army, crossed the Chickahominy at Long s bridge 
 and on the afternoon of the 14th reached Charles City 
 court house. On the 15th and 16th both brigades were 
 kept unceasingly active in making demonstrations from 
 Philip s house and St. Mary s church upon the enemy be 
 tween White Oak Swamp and Malvern Hill. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. J. H. Wilson, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, 
 p. 884. Covering of Grant s army while crossing the 
 James.) 
 
 screening the Ext No - 250. So skillfully was this movement 
 
 Suitrj?* oftar screened by the disposition which Stuart made of his 
 
 from^wiSchwrter! cavalry that General Patterson does not appear to have 
 
 Va> July 18 186L been aware of it until the 21st of July, on which day 
 
 Johnston s forces were actively engaged at Bull Run. 
 
 (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, 
 p. 34.) 
 
103 
 Ext. No. 251. To conceal my movements as far as cavalry screens 
 
 . . 1 , , the movements 
 
 possible from the enemy, Brig. Genl. Ashby, who has re- of infantry, 
 mained in front of Banks during the march against Mil- ^jfaj i? a i862. 1 " 
 roy, was directed to continue to hold that position till 
 the following day, when he was to join the main body, 
 leaving, however, a covering force sufficient to prevent 
 information of our movements crossing our lines. 
 
 (Lieut. Genl. T. J. Jackson, C. S., R. R., Vol. 12, 
 Part I, p. 701.) 
 
 Ext No. 252. May 7, 1864, crossed Taylor s ^ch^cterMie 
 Ridge, through Nickajack Trace, forced back the rebel corps befoi* and 
 cavalry, covering and masking the movements of the ^e^a^, e*., 
 20th Corps. 
 
 May 8, moved to Villanow and opened communica 
 tion with the Army of the Tennessee. Led the advance 
 of the Army of the Tennessee on Resaca, drove the 
 enemy s cavalry and infantry skirmish line back behind 
 his works, masking the movements of our infantry un 
 til the force of the enemy was too great to contend with 
 longer, when I was relieved by the infantry and the com 
 mand took post on the right of our army then in line of 
 battle before Resaca. 
 
 (Genl. J. Kilpatrick, R. R., Vol. 38, Part II, p. 857.) 
 
 Ext. No. 253. You may depend upon it, we can Enemy s inteu- 
 
 r . . tions cannot be 
 
 never discover the whereabouts of the enemy, or divine discovered as 
 
 J long as he fills 
 
 his intentions, so long as he fills the country with a cloud 
 of cavalry. We must break through that and find him. alry * 
 
 (Maj. Genl. J. Hooker, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 
 45.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 The subjects of security and information are dis 
 tinctly different. Security embraces advance, rear and 
 flank guards, outposts and screening; while information 
 embraces all kinds of reconnaissance, the employment of 
 a spy and scout system, and the strategic use of cavalry. 
 
 Security will usually find troops on the defensive 
 (Ext 250), while reconnaissance and the strategic use of 
 
104 
 
 cavalry will usually involve them in combat. (Ext. 252.) 
 See Strategic Use of Cavalry. 
 
 The defeat of the enemy s cavalry may prevent it 
 from gaining information of the main body that is fol 
 lowing. (Ext. 252.) 
 
 The offensive screen will naturally result from a 
 cavalry fight just preceding a battle, and not far from 
 the main body. (Ext. 252.) (299.) 
 
 The defensive screen is well illustrated in extract 
 253. 
 
 The formations used by cavalry on screening duty 
 will necessarily be different from those used when seek 
 ing information. In screening cavalry may be disposed 
 as indicated in extract 253. In this case, if the enemy 
 approaches, the screen, in falling back, gathers strength 
 as it retires ; while the cavalry seeking the information 
 will try and break the screen and locate the enemy s main 
 body. In order to do this, officer s patrols may be sent 
 out which will endeavor to locate the weak points in the 
 screen. The aggressors can then concentrate their forces 
 in an effort to break the screen (Ext. 253) (299) at the 
 weak point, leaving the duty of screening their own 
 forces to the divisional cavalry. 
 
 Screening means separation, while the penetration 
 of an enemy s screen means concentration. 
 
 OUTPOSTS. 
 
 pickets should Ext. No. 254. On October 31, 1863, the 4th Ind. 
 pSfll. be sup " Cav. went into Fayetteville and put out unsupported 
 pickets at the principal exits of the town. At about 8 
 p. m. twenty men appeared from the town and in answer 
 to the challenge said, "Friends to relieve the pickets." 
 They advanced and shot down the pickets and passed on 
 and fired on the videttes. 
 
 (Maj. J. P. Leslie, R. R., Vol. 31, Part I, p. 236.) 
 Ext No 255. My pickets were attacked at 10 
 
 Reserve found 
 
 useful. o clock this morning by a small scouting party. I im 
 
 mediately pursued them with the reserve, capturing six, 
 etc. 
 
105 
 
 (Col. Wm. J. Palmer, R. R., Vol. 31, Part I, p. 
 440.) 
 
 Ext. No. 256. The division marched to Auburn; I Division picket* 
 established my headquarters about a mile from Auburn, 
 throwing out my picket a distance of ^4 mile beyond. 
 
 (M. H. Avery, 10th N. Y. Cav., R. R., Vol. 29, 
 Part I, p. 368.) 
 
 Ext. No. 257. On Nov. 28, about noon, the pickets outpost givet 
 
 r , ,, . . notice of the 
 
 gave notice of the enemy s advance at various fords and enemy s advance 
 
 at several points 
 
 in such force as to leave no doubt of his intention. at the same time. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. J. H. Wilson, R. R., Vol. 45, Part 
 p. 550.) 
 
 Ext. No. 258. In May, 1862, Morgan s squadron 
 went into Lebanon, Tenn., and quartered three companies lead8 to disaster. 
 in buildings, and put horses in stables; the night was 
 rainy and bleak and the pickets sought shelter in a neigh 
 boring house. The next mornig the Federal cavalry sur 
 prised the picket and then the town and captured nearly 
 all of Morgan s command and all of his horses. 
 
 (Morgan s Cavalry, by Duke.) 
 
 Ext. No. 259. Morgan s death occurred because of unguarded by- 
 
 roads should not 
 
 quartering in towns and also because of improper out- be left in rear of 
 post duty. The picket was posted beyond a by-road 
 through which the enemy entered. "The town, had the 
 instructions been obeyed and the pickets correctly posted, 
 would have been perfectly protected. The enemy gained 
 admittance, unchallenged, through an unaccountable error 
 in the picketing the roads on the left." 
 
 (Morgan s Cavalry, by Duke.) 
 
 Ext. No. 260. Orders issued by General Bragg 
 May 29th, 1862, for retreat from Corinth, direct: 
 
 3d. At 10:00 p. m. retrograde movement to com 
 mence as already indicated. 
 
 4th. At 12 :00 p. m. rear guard to follow the move 
 ment. 
 
 5th. Outposts will be called in at 9:00 p. m., their outposts re- 
 
 1 placed by cav- 
 
 places supplied by cavalry. fry y retre e at infan " 
 
106 
 
 camp fires kept 6th. Three rockets at 3 :00 a. m. to be sent up by 
 the cavalry ; camp fires will be kept up. 
 
 The above orders were sent to Col. Joseph Wheeler, 
 who entirely misled the Federal forces as to what was 
 confronting them the next day. 
 
 (Campaigns of Wheeler and His Cavalry, p. 7.) 
 cavalry covers Ext. No. 261. During Bragg s retreat from Perry- 
 
 the retreat of an .,,,. -, , ,, r i 
 
 army. ville, Wheeler s cavalry covered the retreat of his army. 
 
 From Bryantville General Bragg wrote Wheeler: "Your 
 services have been most valuable and brilliant. No cav 
 alry force was ever more handsomely handled and no 
 army better covered." While covering Bragg s army 
 Wheeler s cavalry was engaged in thirty engagements 
 and innumerable skirmishes. 
 
 (Campaigns of Wheeler and His Cavalry, p. 25.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 . Outposts should be well out and so arranged that 
 the advance troops can be promptly supported as illus 
 trated by the battle of Booneville. (Ext. 219.) 
 
 The evils resulting from the absence of supports are 
 illustrated by extracts 254, 258; while the advantages of 
 supports are likewise illustrated by extracts 255 and 257. 
 
 The % mile from the main body of a division out 
 post (Ext. 256) is regarded as altogether too little. If 
 the outpost is well out, care should be exercised that by 
 roads do not enter behind the outpost. (Ext. 259.) 
 
 Divisional cavalry remains on outpost till the in 
 fantry outposts are posted. It should then be brought 
 in behind the infantry lines. If this is not done, the 
 horses will all be rendered unserviceable by excessive 
 work in a very short time. Only enough should be left 
 out to do the patrolling in front of the infantry outpost 
 The divisional cavalry may be sent out again early in the 
 morning to take up the duties of the infantry while the 
 latter is withdrawn. (Ext. 260.) 
 
107 
 
 FLA.NK GUARD. 
 
 Ext. No. 262. The 22d N. Y. Mounted Rifles were Flank guard of 
 
 infantry column. 
 
 nanry coumn. 
 
 detailed to guard the flank of the infantry and were re- Brpeditio* 
 tained on duty with the infantry till the expedition re- R -> Dec - 7 - 12 1864 
 turned. 
 
 (Bvt. Brig. Gen. C. H. Smith, R. R., Vol. 42, Part 
 I, p. 649.) 
 
 Ext. No. 263. During this movement his rear and cavalry acts as 
 flanks were covered by Stuart s cavalry, and he received ?SSd a to d Jack- 
 correct information concerning the Federal forces, which ^MMMBM, Aug. 
 were now rapidly concentrating upon him. 
 
 (Jackson s retirement from, Manassas Aug. 2d, 
 1862. Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, 
 p. 103.) 
 
 Ext. No. 264. During the engagement, Colonel cavalry P ro- 
 
 A 11 ,i e i tects the flank of 
 
 Asnby, with a portion of his command, including Chew s infantry during 
 battery, which rendered valuable service, remained on Kerartowi, Y*., 
 our right, and not only protected our rear in the vicinity 
 of the Valley turnpike, but also served to threaten the 
 enemy s front and left. Colonel Ashby fully sustained 
 his deservedly high reputation by the able manner in 
 which he discharged the important trust confided to him. 
 (Maj. Genl. T. J. Jackson, C. S., R. R., Vol. 12, 
 Parti, p. 383.) 
 
 Ext. No. 265. In countries infected with guer- Flftnk 
 rillas and bushwhackers, flankers will have to be used to buthwnacktr 8 up 
 scour the country and beat them up on the flank. 
 
 (Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of a Decade, p. 91.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 The use of cavalry as a flank guard for other troops 
 will most frequently ocur while on the march. (Exts. 
 262, 263, 273.) 
 
 In battle, cavalry will frequently be found on the 
 flank of infantry either as a support or as a part of the 
 firing line. (Exts. 264, 272.) 
 
108 
 
 CONVOYING RAILROAD TRAINS. 
 
 Guarding the Ext. No. 266. Trains are run to and from the 
 
 rear of Sherman s . 
 
 army against tront in sections under convoy. One follows another as 
 airy. close as may be, so as to be able to assist each other in 
 
 case of attack. Each train or section has a strong guard ; 
 when forces are combined quite an army can be organ 
 ized on the roadside for the defense of the cars. At any 
 rate, no mere guerrilla force can capture a train. All 
 the bridges are stockaded and the towns fortified, so that 
 a run of a few miles brings a train into a place of com 
 parative safety. 
 
 (Campaigns of Wheeler and His Cavalry, p. 265.) 
 
 position of the Ext. No. 267. Again, at the time and place of 
 
 commaader dur- j . , , . 
 
 ing an advance, danger btuart was always present. He habitually rode 
 with his advance guard and was ever ready to seize and 
 improve an opportunity. 
 
 (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, 
 p. 164.) 
 
 Active cavalry Ext. No. 268. February 2, 1863, 
 
 plays the mis- r^. -..-.. -r-^ 
 
 chief with the The Honorable E. M. Stanton. * * * 
 
 communications 
 
 One rebel cavalryman takes on an average three of 
 our infantry to watch our communications, while our 
 progress is made slow and cautious, and we command 
 the forage of the country only by sending large train 
 guards. * * * 
 
 (Sig.) W. S. ROSECRANS, Maj. Gen. 
 
 (Campaigns of Wheeler and His Cavalry, p. 78.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 The annoyance caused by cavalry to a line of com 
 munications is illustrated in extract 268, where Rose- 
 crans states that one cavalryman takes three infantrymen 
 to watch his line of communications. Extract 266 also 
 verifies this statement. If the total number of men who 
 were watching Sherman s line of communications while 
 at Atlanta were known it would probable be more than 
 three infantrymen to each cavalryman. 
 
109 
 
 WEAKNESS OF A FLANK. 
 
 Ext. No. 269. At the court house Wickham s brig- fla ^ akncss of a 
 ade was struck in the flank by a gallant charge and scat- 
 tered in all directions. s,i864. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. J. H. Wilson, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, 
 p. 878.) 
 
 Ext. Nb. 270. The attack on the enemy was made ue of caval 
 about 3 :00 p. m. by a left half wheel of the whole line, 
 
 with a division of cavalry turning each flank of the cedarCreek,va., 
 enemy, the whole line advancing. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 43, Part 
 I, p. 33. Battle of Winchester or Cedar Creek.) 
 
 Ext. No. 271. In the affair at Fisher s Hill the a weakness of 
 
 flank causes a 
 
 cavalry ^ave way, but it was flanked. This could have P anic - 
 
 Fisher s Hill, 
 
 been remedied if the troops had remained steady, but a va., sept. 2-2, 1864. 
 panic seized them at the idea of being flanked, and with 
 out being defeated, they broke, many of them fleeing 
 shamefully. 
 
 (Lieut. Genl. Jubal A. Early, C. S., R. R., Vol. 43, 
 Part I, p. 558.) 
 
 Ext. No. 272. As soon as General Gregg was A t Gettysburg 
 aware of Stuart s presence he wisely assumed the ag- 
 gressive, and forced upon Stuart a battle in which he 
 had nothing to gain but the glory of fighting; while July ^ 1863< 
 Gregg himself had performed the paramount duty of 
 protecting the right flank of the Federal army. 
 
 (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, 
 p. 341, Gettysburg campaign.) 
 
 Ext. No. 273. During the campaigns of the Caro- campaign of 
 linas, 1865, Sherman used his cavalry to protect his leftc^r^piote^s 
 flank and trains against the Confederate cavalry under shlrman??rmy f 
 Wheeler and Hampton. 
 
 (R. R., Vol. 57, Part I.) 
 
 Ext. No. 274. This change having been made, a stuart threat- 
 
 strong line of skirmishers displayed by the enemy was right* at 
 evidence that the enemy s cavalry had gained our right, Gettysburg, Pa., 
 and were about to attack, with a view of gaining the rear Jn 
 of our line of battle. The importance of successfully 
 
110 
 
 resisting an attack at this point, which, if succeeded in by 
 the enemy, would have been productive of the most 
 serious consequences, determined me to retain the brigade 
 of the Third Division until the enemy were driven back. 
 (Brig. Genl. D. McM. Gregg, R. R., Vol. 27, Part 
 I, p. 956.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 The great advantages in having cavalry on the flanks 
 is here further illustrated. Its great mobility enables it 
 to acomplish the results reported in extracts 270 and 271; 
 while its presence on the flanks will check a turning 
 movement of the hostile cavalry. (Exts. 272, 274.) 
 
 SURPRISE. 
 
 surprise. Ext. No. 275. The enemy during the night, under 
 
 Wade Hampton, taking advantage of the darkness of the 
 night and the inclemency of the weather, it being quite 
 rainy, moved heavy columns of cavalry through the 
 open pine woods to the vicinity of our camp, preparatory 
 
 improper out- to attacking the camp at daylight on the following morn- 
 posts. 
 
 ing. 
 
 At early dawn we were awakened from our slum 
 bers by the deadly missile and fiendish shouts of the rebel 
 cavalry charging into our camp in three different places, 
 rear and both flanks. 
 
 individual It was individual bravery that saved the day on this 
 kjuJuw g cross occasion ; men fighting, not in organized bodies, but be- 
 fo! a i865 S C " Mar< hind trees, stumps, and anything that could afford pro 
 tection. Many of the men fought almost in a state of 
 nudity, not having had time to dress themselves before 
 the rebels were upon them. 
 
 (Maj. C. T. Cheek, 5th Ky. Cav., R. R., Vol. 47, 
 Parti, p. 899.) 
 
 Avoid encios- Ext. No. 276. Captain Thornton sent his men in- 
 ^lar Ft. Brown, side a corral to feed their horses and soon followed him- 
 Texae,A P r.2V46 . gelf He f oun( j fa s command suddenly surrounded and 
 
 the entire command was killed or captured. 
 
 (History of U. S. Cavalry, Brackett, p. 55.) 
 
Ill 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 It is an old military maxim that a surprise is inex 
 cusable. 
 
 INFORMATION. 
 
 Ext. No. 277. The cavalry that crossed at Seneca information 
 Ford have passed on up through Westminster and Han- 
 over some 6,000 to 8,000 strong. The people are all so 
 frightened that accurate information is not to be ob- 
 tained. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. G. G. Meade, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, 
 p. 69.) 
 
 Ext. NO. 278. A model report 
 
 Gettysburg, June 30 10:40 p. m. c^mander 
 I have the honor to state the following facts: A. campaign 8 b Jaie g 
 
 PT T * 1 1 1 1863. 
 
 . Mills corps, composed of Anderson, Heth and Pen- 
 der, is massed back of Cashtown, 9 miles from this pace. 
 His pickets, composed of infantry and artillery, are in 
 sight of mine. There is a road from Cashtown running 
 through Mummasburg and Hunterstown on to York 
 pike at Oxford, which is terribly infested with roving 
 cavalry detachments. Rumor says Ewell is coming over 
 the mountains from Carlisle. One of his escort was cap 
 tured today near Heidlersburg. He says Rodes, com 
 manding a division of Swell s, has already crossed the 
 mountains from Carlisle. When will the reserve be re 
 lieved, and where are my wagons? I have no need of 
 them, as I can find no forage. I have kept General 
 Reynolds informed of all that has transpired. The in 
 closed is in reply to my last dispatch. 
 
 I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 JNO. BUFORD, 
 
 Brigadier-General of Volunteers. 
 To General Alfred Pleasonton. 
 
 (R. R., Vol. 27, Parti, p. 924.) 
 
 T? 4- AT 0*7 o A T Truthful but 
 
 r^xi. JNO. Z/5A. 1 entered this place at 11 a. m. to- inexperienced 
 
 4 - ^ HI 6 G GXftggGrfttG 
 
 day. Found everybody in a terrible state of excitement fnemTwh^n 
 on account of the enemy s advance upon this place. HeSSSmSSt" f 
 had approached within half a mile of the town when 
 
112 
 
 the head of my column entered. His force was terribly 
 exaggerated by reasonable and truthful but inexperienced 
 men. On pushing him back toward Cashtown, I learned 
 from reliable men that Anderson s division was march 
 ing from Chambersburg, by Mummasburg, Abbottstown, 
 on toward York. 
 
 (Genl. Jno. Buford, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 923.) 
 
 Keeping touch. Ext. No. 279. About 1 :30 p. m. today I discovered 
 oet B 28!i863? Ala tne en eniy retiring. My command is following closely. 
 (Maj. Genl. S. D. Lee, C. S., R. R., Vol. 31, Part 
 I, p. 29.) 
 
 Absence of Ext. Nfo. 280. No report had been received that 
 
 Stuart s cavalry 
 
 S??*? General ^ ie Federal Army had crossed the Potomac, and the ab- 
 e sence of the cavalry rendered it impossible to obtain ac- 
 curate information. * * * By the route he pursued, 
 
 concenTration. f the Federal Army was interposed between his command 
 campaign, 8 b janl, and our main body, preventing any communication with 
 him until his arrival at Carlisle. The march toward 
 Gettysburg was conducted more slowly than it would 
 have been had the movements of the Federal Army been 
 known. 
 
 (General R. E. Lee, R. R., Vol. 27, Part II, p. 307.) 
 
 SPIES. 
 
 Execution of a Ext. No. 281. A spy from the enemy, who came 
 into my camp soon after my arrival, was killed by my 
 order. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. Wm. W. Averell, R. R., Vol. 37, Part 
 I, p. 147.) 
 
 uee of false ^ xt ^ ^^* Sheridan suspected two of his spies 
 spies. O f playing double. He had them shadowed and found his 
 
 suspicions to be correct. Instead of letting them know 1 
 that he was aware of their treachery he utilized their 
 services to give false information to the enemy. 
 (See Sheridan s Memoirs, Vol. 11, p. 109.) 
 
113 
 
 SCOUTS. 
 
 Ext. No. 283. Scouts should go in pairs, well scout organiza 
 tion necessary, 
 mounted, leave saber and packs with baggage train, and 
 
 live off the country. A well organized scout organization 
 should be kept at headquarters. They should not dress 
 in the enemy s uniform, (p. 85.) Horses should be 
 shod with rubber pad shoes. 
 
 (Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of a Decade, p. 86.) 
 
 Ext. No. 284. 
 To General Garfield. 
 
 General Crittenden wishes to know if you intend to couriers or re 
 establish a line of couriers between department head 
 quarters and his own at Shellmound. * * * 
 
 (Sig.) J. J. McCooK, Aide de Camp. 
 
 (R. R., Vol. 30, Part III, p. 348.) 
 
 Ext. No. 285. I at once prepared to establish a line Line of cour- 
 of couriers to Loudon and Kingston, and the 5th Ohio ie: 
 Cavalry was assigned to that duty. 
 
 (General Eli Long, Comg. 2d Brig., R. R., Vol. 31, 
 Part II, p. 563.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 This shows that the use of relay posts is not entirely 
 a German idea, but was used in our Civil War. 
 
 Ext. No. 286. At this moment (4:00 p. m.) I re- strength of 
 ceived information from Colonel Garrard that the enemy ^TmelaSto 
 was crossing infantry at Fain s Island Ford and that an point. & given 
 officer of his command had watched them wading the Pain s island 
 
 r Ford, Tenn., Jan. 
 
 stream for more than an hour, estimating the force at 28 1864 - 
 three brigades. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. S. D. Sturgis, R. R., Vol. 32, Part I, 
 P- 1370 
 
 Ext. No. 287. 
 
 Headquarters Army of the Potomac. 
 
 June 28, 18634:45 p.m. 
 Maj. Genl. H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief. 
 
 The following statement has been furnished me. It 
 is confirmed by information gathered from various other 
 sources regarded as reliable. 
 
114 
 
 I propose to move this army tomorrow in the di 
 rection of York. 
 
 GEO. G. MEADE, Major General. 
 
 illustrates the Thomas McCammon, blacksmith, a good man, from 
 
 amount of valu- 
 
 that ^STe 1 0^- Hagerstown, left there on horseback at 11 a. m. today. 
 
 zln n s e( if the/Ko Rebel cavalry came first a week ago last Monday. Gen- 
 eral Jenkins having 1,200 mounted infantry, said to be 
 ^ked from Jackson s men, and 300 or 400 cavalry of 
 
 i863 paign June< m s own. The cavalry went back and forth, out of Penn 
 sylvania, driving horses and cattle, and the first infantry 
 came yesterday a week ago General Ewell s men. He 
 came personally last Saturday, and was at the Catholic 
 church Sunday, with General Rodes and two other gen 
 erals. On Monday he left in the direction of Green- 
 castle, in the afternoon, Rodes having left the same 
 morning. Rebel troops have passed every day, more or 
 less, since ; some days three or four regiments or a brig 
 ade, and some days, yesterday, for instance, all of Long- 
 street s command passed through excepting two brigades. 
 Saw Longstreet yesterday. He and Lee had their head 
 quarters at Mr. Grove s, just beyond the town limits, 
 toward Greencastle, last night, and left there this a. m. 
 at 8 o clock. Think A. P. Hill went through last Tues 
 day. Heard from J. D. Roman, prominent lawyer and 
 leading Confederate sympathizer, who was talking in 
 the clerk s office last night; said that their officers re 
 ported their whole army, 100,000 strong, now in Mary 
 land or Pennsylvania, excepting the cavalry. Mr. Logan, 
 register of wills, and Mr. Protzman, very fine men in 
 Hagerstown, have taken pains to count the rebels, and 
 could not make them over 80,000. They counted the ar 
 tillery; made it 275 guns. Some of the regiments have 
 only 175 men two that I saw, 150. Largest regiment 
 that I saw was a Maryland regiment, and that was about 
 700. Don t think their regiments would range 400. Great 
 amount of transportation; great many wagons captured 
 at Winchester. Horses in good condition. Ewell rides 
 in a wagon. 2,000 comprise the mounted infantry and 
 
115 
 
 cavalry. Saw Wilcox s brigade wagons yesterday or day 
 before. Saw Kershaw s wagons in town yesterday. 
 Kershaw s brigade is in McLaw s division, Longstreet s 
 corps. Know Hood and Armistead. Have passed 
 through Hood s division and Armistead s brigade. Pick- 
 ett s division is in Longstreet s corps. The Union men 
 in Hagerstown would count them, and meet tonight. Of 
 ficers and men in good condition; say they are going to 
 Philadelphia. Lots of Confederate money; carry it in 
 flour barrels, and give $5 for cleaning a horse; $5 for 
 two shoes on a horse, rather than 50 cents United States 
 money. 
 
 (R. R, Vol. 27, Part I, p. 65.) 
 
 Ext. No. 288. Stuart s march was not, however, March of 
 
 1 i >~ T 1 1 i -MI /- Stuart s column 
 
 unobserved. Captain Logan, 12th 111. Cav., who had observed for 
 
 1 three and one- 
 
 charge of the pickets in the vicinity, was apprised bv a halfhours - 
 
 Chambersburg 
 
 citizen as early as half past 5 o clock that the enemy was Raid. Oct. 1862. 
 crossing at McCoy s Ferry, and he immediately moved 
 out his reserve to support of his interior pickets, who had 
 been attacked but not surprised. He remained in ob 
 servation of Stuart s column until 9 o clock a. m. 
 
 (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, 
 p. 139.) 
 
 Ext. No. 289. Climbing a tree, about 7 p. m., For- important 
 rest sought to satisfy himself of the situation, and dis- 
 covered the enemy in a disordered retreat into Chatta 
 nooga, which lay in full view beneath him, a scene of wild 
 chaos and tumult. This state of affairs was immediately Reportmade to 
 communicated, in written dispatches, both to Generals P Tr?o ff ?s e at the 
 Bragg and Polk. -^ n a r y 
 
 (Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest s Cavalry, p.f 8 63. ge Sept 21> 
 351.) 
 
 Ext. No. 290. Marching by roads unfrequently information of 
 traversed and bridle paths, he would have kept his mo- 
 
 , r .1 ,. ,. . . by the blowing of 
 
 tions perfectly secret but for a system of communicating horns. 
 intelligence adopted about this time by the Home Guards 
 of southern Kentucky. Conch shells and horns were 
 blown along his route by these fellows, the sound of 
 
116 
 
 which, transmitted a long distance, traveled faster than 
 his column. 
 
 (Morgan s Cavalry, by Duke.) 
 
 Ext - No - 291. I learned that it was his intention 
 wthout a i> C e? t ng to withdraw from the enemy s front, and this, too, on 
 T Fi ih er 8 Hiii, tne indefinite report of a signal officer that a "brigade or 
 ?-, sept. 22, is*: division" of Confederates was turning his right flank, 
 and that he had not seriously attempted to verify the in 
 formation. 
 
 (Sheridan s Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 43.) 
 Boldness of Ext. Nb. 292. During the evening and night of 
 
 scouting parties 
 
 ence ca o1 ^firge ^ ^^ boldness of the enemy s scouting parties, 
 
 w j t ] 1 which we had been coming in collision more or less 
 
 Movement to the 
 
 James, June, 1864. every day, perceptibly increased, thus indicating the pres 
 ence of a large force, and thus evidencing that his shorter 
 line of march had enabled him to bring to my front a 
 strong body of cavalry. 
 
 (Sheridan s Memoirs, Vol. I, p. 419.) 
 
 ca D i 8 t p S 8 red n di p s - On April 4, 1865, Sheridan captured a dispatch. 
 signed by Lee s Commissary General, which he forwarded 
 to its destination. As a result of this dispatch several 
 trains of rations were sent as ordered and captured by 
 Sheridan, who was on the lookout for them. The fol 
 lowing is the dispatch with Sheridan s comments : 
 Ration return Ext. No. 293. "The Army is at Amelia Court 
 
 a basis for an 
 
 ?ney s e st?ength House, short of provisions. Send 300,000 rations quick- 
 Pursuit after l y to Burkville Junction. 1 
 
 D a t T i e oi five * 
 
 rorks, Apr. i, 65. There was thus revealed not only the important fact 
 that Lee was concentrating at Amelia Court House, but 
 also a trustworthy basis for estimating his troops. 
 
 (Sheridan s Memoirs, Vol. 2, p. 175.) 
 
 important dis- Ext. No. 294. It was of the utmost importance 
 Ee sent 8 in dupii- that General Grant should receive these dispatches with- 
 
 cate. 
 
 After battle of out chance of failure, in order that I might depend abso- 
 
 Waynesboro, Va., . 
 
 Mar. 2, 1865. lutely on securing supplies at the White House ; there 
 fore I sent the message in duplicate, one copy overland 
 direct to City Point by two scouts, and the other down 
 the James River in a small boat. 
 
 (Sheridan s Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 120.) 
 
117 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 The information obtained from independent cavalry 
 by strategic reconnaissance is much more accurate and 
 valuable than that obtained from civilians. The former 
 will be trained military observers (Ext. 278), while the 
 latter, under stress of excitement, will either not know or 
 terribly exaggerate. (Exts. 277, 278A.) Occasionally 
 intelligent citizens will be found who, in a systematic 
 way, go about the matter of observing an enemy passing 
 through a town and succeed in getting a report to the 
 general of their own forces. (Ext. 287.) This extract 
 is a fine illustration as to what may be accomplished by 
 intelligent civilians. It will be noted, however, that Gen 
 eral Meade was careful to verify it from, other sources. 
 
 The information obtained from spies will be more 
 or less valuable, depending upon the reliability of the spy, 
 his intelligence and opportunity for observation. Even 
 a spy that plays double may be utilized. (Ext. 282.) 
 
 A well organized scout system should be maintained 
 in every army. (Ext. 283.) All officers should be 
 trained in the matter of estimating the number of troops 
 seen. (Exts. 286, 288.) Autumn maneuvers furnish an 
 excellent opportunity to make application of this valuable 
 accomplishment. A number of officers should be detailed 
 daily to observe and report on the number of troops seen. 
 
 It is desirable to send important duplicate reports 
 to different superiors. Each report should mention the 
 fact that a duplicate one has been sent to the other su 
 perior. (Exts. 289, 294.) 
 
 A novel method of communicating information is 
 illustrated in extract 290. 
 
 A commander who hastily acts on information with 
 out seeking to verify it will usually make a mistake. 
 (Ext. 291.) 
 
 It will always be necessary to have at headquarters 
 a bureau of information, where different reports can be 
 compared and conclusions drawn from the multitude of 
 reports received. (Exts. 287, 292, 293.) 
 
118 
 
 The absence of information is as much of a handi 
 cap to a commander as the possession of it is an advan 
 tage. (Ext. 280.) Had Stuart s cavalry been present 
 at Gettysburg to furnish Lee with information, the field 
 would have been in Lee s possession instead of in 
 Meade s. (Ext. 280.) Lee then could have fought a de 
 fensive battle, which he was never known to lose. 
 
 When contact is gained the cavalry should not again 
 lose it. (Ext. 279.) 
 
 STRATEGIC USE OF CAVALRY. 
 
 stuart keepa Ext. No. 295. My command has been fighting al- 
 most constantly for four days. * * * General Bu- 
 
 days, of r movl ford sent a party to the top of the Blue Ridge, that saw 
 
 ment of Lee s , , , 
 
 army. a rebel camp about two miles long on the Shenanaoan, 
 
 a n s d tr 8cre e e g ni c ng. se J ust below Ashb y s Ga P- The atmosphere was so hazy 
 
 Gettysburg th a t they could not make out anything more beyond. 
 " (General A. Pleasonton, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 
 
 913.) 
 
 strategic use. Ext. No. 296. During the entire movement ( Sher- 
 
 P ?gi a i8M h Cam " man s march to the sea) I kept my superiors fully in 
 formed of the strength and all the movements of the 
 enemy. 
 
 (General J. Wheeler, C. S., R. R., Vol. 44, p. 411.) 
 Ext. No. 297. Regarding his dispositions at Bev- 
 
 How to defend _ - IT n^.u 
 
 a river line. An erlev Ford, Brandy Station, or Fleetwood, June ytn, 
 
 example of good * , 1, 
 
 strategy. 1353 General Stuart says: "On a field geographically 
 
 Fleetwood. Va., , . , , 
 
 June 9, 1863. so extensive, and much of it wooded, presenting to the 
 enemy so many avenues of approach, I deemed it inju 
 dicious to separate my command into detachments to 
 guard all the approaches, as in such case the enemy could 
 concentrate upon any one and, overwhelming it, take the 
 others in detail. * * * I conceived it to be my policy 
 to keep my command concentrated, except sufficient to 
 watch and delay the enemy as to his real move, and then 
 strike him with my whole force." 
 
 (General J. E. B. Stuart, C. S., R. R., Vol. 27, 
 Part II, p. 681.) 
 
119 
 
 Ext. No. 298. About midnight I received a com- strategic ob- 
 munication asking that I obtain early information of the 3e JJ,** tetj Va 
 enemy s movements in the direction of Sperryville. Agree- i 8 a 6 paign Oct> 
 ably to my orders, Colonel Gregg, commanding 2d Brig 
 ade, sent one regiment to obtain the required informa 
 tion. I directed the 2d Brigade to move to the east side 
 of the Rappahannock, leaving one regiment on the west 
 side to be in a position to support the 1st Maine should 
 it be compelled to return. 
 
 (D. McM. Gregg, R. R., Vol. 29, Part I, p. 356.) 
 
 Ext. No. 299. Believing- this attack of the enemy, A fine illustra 
 tion of strategic 
 
 who had shown only cavalry and artillery, was but a ue of cavalry. 
 
 f . f , T 1 1 ^ James City, Va., 
 
 cover of the movement of other troops, I ordered Gen- Oct. 10, ises. 
 eral Davis to make an attack from his right and discover, 
 if possible, the movements of the enemy. The attack 
 was made and the enemy s cavalry was driven back three 
 miles and a heavy column of infantry and a large wagon 
 train discovered to be moving in the direction of Wood- 
 ville. 
 
 (Kilpatrick, R. R., Vol. 29, Part I, p. 381.) 
 
 Ext. No. 300. By great activity, watchfulness and successful 
 
 J strategic use. 
 
 good judgment on the part of General Hatch, every Florence A i a ., 
 movement of the enemy and indication of his intention 
 were promptly reported to Generals Stanley, Schofield 
 and Thomas. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. J. H. Wilson, R. R., Vol. 45, Part I, 
 p. 556.) 
 
 Ext. No. 301. Colonel Coon s brigade made a . Reconnaissance 
 
 in force disclose* 
 
 forced reconnaissance, met the enemy s cavalry in force, fJn tr e y nemy>8 in ~ 
 and after a severe engagement, discovering the march of A1 h 5j C iJ e is^ 
 the rebel infantry, was compelled to join the main force 
 on the east side of the creek. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. J. H. Wilson, R. R., Vol. 45, Part I, 
 p. 557.) 
 
 Ext. No. 302. The question then arose in my mind cavalry fights 
 whether I should pursue my course on to Lynchburg, m 
 leaving General Early in my rear, or to go out and fight n ^ Cleave *arle 
 him with my cavalry against his infantry and what cav- ** 
 
120 
 
 Expedition to a ^ r y he could collect, defeat him, and open a way through 
 
 M*ri865? Va> Rock Fish Gap, and have everything in my own hands 
 
 for the accomplishment of that portion of my instruc 
 
 tions which directed the destruction of the Central Rail 
 
 road and the James River Canal. 
 
 I decided upon the latter course. 
 (Maj. Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 46, Part 
 I, p. 476.) 
 
 Stuart s chick- Ext. No. 303. June 11, 1862, General J. E. B. 
 strateg?/ success. Stuart was ordered to take only such men and horses 
 as could stand the expedition and make a "scout move 
 ment" to the rear of McClellan s army with a view of 
 - intelligence of his operations, communications, 
 
 Successful raid , , . - ., ... 
 
 increases conn- etc., and to return as soon as the object of the expedition 
 
 dence in com- /~n 1 i 
 
 mander, and was accomplished. This was known as the Chickahominy 
 
 morale of nis 
 
 command. Raid. The results following were increased morale of 
 
 the Confederate cavalry; loss in confidence in McClellan; 
 
 Has a depress- accurate information as to the location of the Federal 
 
 ing effect on the 
 
 enemy. army, and incidentally the capture of 165 prisoners, 260 
 
 Chickahominy _ 
 
 Raid, jaoe i2-i5, horses, destruction of two schooners and seventy-five 
 wagons. 
 
 (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, 
 p. 52.) 
 strategic use of Ext. No. 304. General Lee reports: The cavalry 
 
 Confederate cav 
 
 alry. of the army, at the time of these operations, was much 
 
 Chancellorsville , i , j 
 
 campaign, April, reduced. To its vigilance and energy we were indebted 
 for timely information of the enemy s movements before 
 the battle, and for impeding his march to Chancellors 
 ville." 
 
 (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, 
 p. 228.) 
 
 same as above. Ext. No. 305. Hidden in the woods, Stuart re 
 
 mained in observation of the enemy for a long time. 
 
 staff officer Satisfied that he was witnessing the movement of a large 
 
 sent to make re- part Q Meade > s armv , S tuart sent Major Vcnable, of his 
 
 6 sb junf sta ^ to conve y tm s information to General Lee. 
 
 (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, 
 p. 392.) 
 
121 
 
 Ext. No. 306. Cavalry that sticks close to the Theoretical 
 Army loses half its strength. It must be employed on 81 
 distant expeditions to cut the enemy s lines, to be worth 
 its cost in strategic combinations. For its full strategical 
 effect cavalry is obliged to live on the country after the 
 first three days. 
 
 (Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade, p. 63.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 Cavalry operating strategically will be on the offen 
 sive and a considerable distance from its main body, 
 while the opposing cavalry will be defensively screening 
 its own forces. Extract 295 well illustrates this matter, 
 in which it appears that Pleasonton s cavalry fought 
 Stuart s for four days and then only succeeded in slipping 
 a small strategic patrol through, which observed and re 
 ported the Confederate camp. 
 
 Cavalry operating strategically will endeavor to 
 break through the enemy s screen and observe the num 
 bers and dispositions of the enemy and what they are 
 doing. 
 
 Cavalry can be screening defensively, and, while 
 using good strategy, will not be strategically used. ( Ext. 
 297.) Cavalry performing a defensive role may take the 
 offensive and thus be used strategically. (Ext. 299.) A 
 forced reconnaissance amounts to a strategic use. (Ext. 
 301.) 
 
 The strategic use will require great activity, watch 
 fulness and good judgment on the part of the command 
 er. (Exts. 296, 300.) 
 
 Tactical use may also involve the use of strategy. 
 (Ext. 302.) Here Sheridan concluded to fight the 
 enemy s infantry rather than leave it in his rear. 
 
 A successful raid may be merged with strategic use 
 depending upon the object of the raid. (Ext. 303.) In 
 the reference quoted, other important results followed 
 which were unforeseen; such as the effect on the enemy, 
 increased morale of the raiders, etc. 
 
 While cavalry strategically used may not get all the 
 
122 
 
 information desired, it may assist the commander s plans 
 so as to produce great tactical results. (Ext. 304.) 
 
 When cavalry, on a strategic mission, obtains val 
 uable information, a staff officer should be sent with it to 
 the commanding general. The messenger will then be 
 able to answer questions and make explanations, thus 
 elucidating matters which would otherwise remain ob 
 scure to the commanding general. (Ext. 205.) 
 
 For its full strategic effect, cavalry will be employed 
 on distant expeditions and be obliged to live on the coun 
 try. (Ext. 306.) When war is declared it should there 
 fore be well organized at its war strength and ready to 
 move on very short notice. Skeleton organization or 
 war inflation will deprive cavalry of its mobility and 
 therefore its strategical importance at a time when it is 
 most needed. 
 
123 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 MISCELLANEOUS USE OF CAVALRY. 
 
 BRIDGES CONSTRUCTION OF. 
 
 Ext. No. 307. General Forrest learned that it improvised 
 
 would be necessary to bridge Hickahala Creek, a deep from tel 
 
 poles and the 
 
 stream running 60 feet broad, with full banks. He floor of neigh 
 
 boring mills. 
 
 spread detachments about to collect lumber from the cot- Bridge 60 feet 
 
 . long made^in 60 
 
 ton-gm floors, which they carried four miles on their minutes. 
 
 shoulders. At the creek they found a narrow flatboat Memphis, Aug.* 
 
 about 20 feet long. Out of grapevines a strong twisted 
 
 cable was made and fastened to a tree on each side of 
 
 the river. They cut down dry cedar telegraph poles and 
 
 fastened them together with grapevines for floating 
 
 piers. These were attached to the grapevine cable with 
 
 grapevines and the flatboat was attached likewise in the 
 
 center as a pontoon. Telegraph poles were used for 
 
 balks and on these the flooring from the gin mills was 
 
 placed. The bridge was completed in sixty minutes. The 
 
 command began crossing at once in column of twos, the 
 
 men leading their horses, and the artillery, unlimbered, 
 
 was taken over by hand. Six miles beyond, Cold Water 
 
 River, twice as wide, was crossed in the same way. The 
 
 bridge over the latter stream was constructed in less than 
 
 three hours. 
 
 (Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest s Cavalry, 
 p. 535.) 
 
 Ext. No. 308. It was found on examination that Mountedtroo . 
 the railroad bridge at the White House had been but Cards iom su?- 
 partially burned, and could be repaired, and General Her- t?y n Sf Sake 
 
 j, ^1 1 j 1- 1 railway bridge 
 
 ntt was at once put on this duty. By sending mounted passable for cav- 
 parties through the surrounding country, each man bring- Rapidan to the 
 ing back a board, it was made passable in one day. S<3. es Apr " Augl 
 
124 
 
 (Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, p. 
 792.) 
 
 improvised Ext. No. 309. Today we built a novel bridge over 
 one of the creeks. Our artillery had mired down and 
 
 and fence rails. . . 1iri . r i r^ 1 T T j. 
 
 it was impossible for the column to ford. General Upton 
 ordered every trooper to carry a fence rail on his shoul 
 der, and when we came to the crossing we found a couple 
 of caissons in midstream, for a foundation, and on them 
 rested two forked pine trees for piers, across which ran 
 saplings for stringers; every man threw his fence rail 
 for a flooring, and, swaying and swinging, the command 
 crossed the rude bridge. 
 
 (The Last Campaign, by E. N. Gilpin, published in 
 the Cavalry Journal.) 
 
 Bridge bunt of Ext. No. 310. We crossed Mud River that night 
 on a bridge constructed of three flat bottom boats laid 
 endwise, tightly bound together and propped, where the 
 water was deep, by beams passing under the bottom of 
 each one and resting on the end of the next; each re 
 ceiving this sort of support, they mutually braced each 
 other. Planks were placed across the intervals between 
 the boats and the horses, wagons and artillery were 
 crossed without trouble. The bridge was built in about 
 two hours. 
 
 (Morgan s Cavalry, by Duke.) 
 
 cavalry are Ext. No. 311. I immediately made a heavy detail 
 
 their own pion- . . , , . , , 
 
 eers. f rom the 2d Iowa Cavalry to finish a bridge across the 
 
 Aia.??cF. iJ$L ln Hatchie, which the 7th 111. Cav. had been sent in advance 
 to construct. 
 
 (Col. D. E. Coon, 2d la. Cav., R. R., Vol. 45, Part 
 I, p. 580.) 
 
 At night cav- Ext. 312. Col. Chapman reached the Chickahominy 
 fiTaceoTflre^d just after dark, expecting to find the bridges ready for 
 &de d wEi!e 8 ii>n e him to cross. The officer in charge of the pontoons 
 
 toneers construct . . _, - , Tr .. 
 
 abridge. seemed somewhat timid. General Warren, commanding 
 
 ^, the 5th Corps, would give him no assistance. Colonel 
 Chapman was therefore compelled to take the matter in 
 hand. The stream at this place divided into two branches, 
 
 
125 
 
 leaving a small island in the center, and was unford- 
 able. Colonel Chapman dismounted the 22d N. Y. and 
 3d Ind. The former pushed along the stream to a point 
 about 50 yards above the site of the old bridge, and by 
 means of fallen trees and overhanging limbs succeeded in 
 getting across. The 3d Ind., launching a pontoon, 
 pushed across in the face of a sharp fire from the enemy, 
 posted on the south bank of the stream in a line of rifle 
 pits hastily formed, and dashed at the rebels, driving 
 them in confusion from the works. Nothing could have 
 been more steady and dashing than the conduct of these 
 two regiments. The night was very dark, the difficulties 
 to be overcome by no means trifling, and the enemy s 
 strength entirely uncertain. The whole affair did not re 
 quire over half an hour ; the bridge was soon constructed, 
 and by midnight the entire brigade had crossed. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. J. H. Wilson, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, 
 p. 883.) 
 
 Ext. No. 313. I was ordered to bridge the river Bridge bunt 
 
 r from scows and 
 
 if possible. This I effected by means of scows or ferry- piank. 
 boats, lashed together, anchored, and covered with lum- May a 3, ig&. 
 ber procured by tearing down the store-houses of the 
 ferry. The bridge was amply sufficient to cross the 
 corps. 
 
 (Col. T. C. Devin, 6th N. Y. Cav., R. R., Vol. 36, 
 Parti, p. 836.) 
 
 Ext. No. 314. The 17th Cavalry was detached to cavalry force 
 
 and hold cross- 
 make a demonstration as if we intended to cross at ing while en- 
 
 gineers construct 
 
 Jones Perry. Iwo canvas pontoon boats were put upp ntoon - 
 
 . , Rapidan to the 
 
 beyond the range of the enemy s guns, and then taken to James, Apr., 1864. 
 the river banks by the engineers, preceded by a regiment 
 of Custer s brigade, who drove the enemy from the op 
 posite bank, while the boats were put in the river and 
 two squadrons dismounted ferried over at once and held 
 the opposite bank till the pontoon bridge was laid. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. A. T. A. Torbert, R. R., Vol. 36, Part 
 I, p. 804.) 
 
126 
 
 cavalry make Ext. No. 315. Selma was taken April 2d, 1865. 
 ?ong ge ove 7 r Aia- April 3d pontoons were ordered to be constructed in the 
 
 bama River, . , _ _. . 
 
 without assist- city shops. April 6th canvas pontoon tram under Major 
 
 ance of engineers . 
 
 Hubbard arrived. Major Hubbard was ordered to begin 
 
 the construction of a bridge over the Alabama River. 
 
 pieted in 6 three April 8th the bridge was completed. It consisted of 
 
 30 canvas pontoons, 16 wooden pontoons made in the 
 
 city shops, and 3 barges. General Wilson states that the 
 
 bridge was 870 feet long. Major Hubbard states that 
 
 the bridge was 700 feet long. Forty-nine boats would 
 
 bridge 50 bays, which at 17J/2 feet each would make a 
 
 bridge 875 feet long. By reason of strong current the 
 
 cro 7 88 00 with val a r i y i bridge was broken twice while being crossed. It was 
 
 ?8ai p threeVays repaired and on April 10th the three cavalry divisions, 
 
 while the bridge . . 
 
 d consisting of I/, 000 men, and all equippage had crossed 
 d* ancl the bridge was dismantled. The bridge was con- 
 A Wilson s Raid, structed by cavalry. 
 
 (Major Hubbard, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 412, 
 and Maj. Genl. J. H. Wilson, p. 362.) 
 
 Rate of cross- Ext. No. 316. April 8th, at 4:10 p. m., I com 
 ing pontoon 27 i-k 1 
 
 men per minute nienced crossing: the Alabama River on the pontoon 
 
 or two miles per 
 
 hour. bridge (870 feet loner) which had that moment been 
 
 Wilson s Raid, , . oc . 
 
 Apr.,i865. completed, and had the entire division across by 7 :Z5 
 p. m., notwithstanding the fact that the crossing had to 
 be stopped three times in consequence of damage done 
 to the bridge by driftwood. The division consisted of 
 about 5,500 men. The rate of crossing was 27 or 28 
 men per minute, or about two miles per hour. 
 
 (Col. R. H. G. Minty, Com d. Div., R. R., Vol. 49, 
 Parti, p. 442.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 In these extracts we see how resourceful cavalry 
 must be. We find them bridging wide streams and other 
 wise doing their own pioneer work. The pioneer work 
 naturally belongs to cavalry. To be sure, engineers can 
 do it, but they are seldom in the right place at the right 
 time for cavalry. If this work is going to fall to the 
 cavalry, as it did, then cavalry should have men regu- 
 
127 
 
 larly trained and organized to do it. In the volunteer 
 cavalry will be found men who can be collected into an 
 improvised pioneer detachment, as was Wilson s in 1865. 
 (Ext. 315.) The Engineer Corps has a mounted detach 
 ment for the purpose of accompanying cavalry troops. 
 They are numerically so small, and in time of war their 
 services would be in such demand for other duties, that 
 the pioneer work would again, just as it did during the 
 War of the Rebellion, fall to the cavalry service. The 
 pioneer organization, then, ought to be in the cavalry and 
 not in the engineers. 
 
 USE OF CAVALRY TO STOP ROUTED INFANTRY. 
 
 Ext. No. 317. The 5th U. S. Cavalry, attached to Cavalry used to 
 
 ,. , , , i j stop routed in- 
 
 division headquarters, was immediately deployed across fantry. 
 
 the fields, and, together with the officers and orderlies of (ceda?cre S ek% r ct: 
 
 19 1864 
 
 the division staff, did much to prevent the infantry go 
 ing to the rear, and forced everyone to stop and form 
 line. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. W. Merritt, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, 
 p. 449.) 
 
 Ext. No. 318. I found large numbers of the in- Routed troops 
 
 j j checked by use 
 
 fantry retiring by regiments, companies, squads and of the saber and 
 stragglers. With some difficulty I checked the rout at cedar creek, va. 
 
 . Oct. 19,1864. 
 
 this point, it being necessary in several instances to fire 
 on the crowds retiring and to use the saber frequently. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. Thos. C. Devin, R. R., Vol. 43, Part 
 I, p. 478.) 
 
 Ext. No. 31-9. On the 8th instant a Federal cav- cavalry used as 
 airy force, from 300 to 400 strong, landed at Greenville, i nd ian Bayon, 
 
 -- n^t t- r f c ici j Miss.. June 8, 1864. 
 
 Miss. This force consisted of four companies of land 
 cavalry" sent up from Vicksburg, the rest were cavalry 
 of the marine boats, and the raid was under General 
 Ellet of the Marines. 
 
 (Captain Perry Evans, 9th Tex. Cav., R. R., Vol. 
 39, Part I, p. 232.) 
 
 Ext. No. 320. The nature of the battle was such cry 
 that cavalry could not be used in front; I therefore 
 formed ours into line in rear to stop stragglers of 
 
128 
 
 Tenn., whom there were many. When there would be enough 
 of them to make a show, and after they had recovered 
 from their fright, they would be sent to reinforce some 
 part of the line which needed support, without regard to 
 their companies, regiments or brigades. 
 
 (Memoirs of General U. S. Grant, Vol. I, p. 344.) 
 
 SWIMMING STREAMS. 
 
 Regiment Ext. No. 321. The larger portion of my regiment 
 
 swims Tennesee J 
 
 River. swam their horses, and lost several horses, some arms, 
 
 Meridian Expe 
 dition, Jan., 1864. but no men. 
 
 (Col. J. P. C. Shanks, 7th Ind. Cav., across the 
 Tennessee River, Jan. 25, 1864, R. R., Vol. 32, Part I, 
 p. 272.) 
 
 Naked men Ext. No. 322. Brownlow performed one of his 
 only 8 r guns and characteristic feats today. I ordered a detachment to 
 
 ammunition. 
 
 jane 9, 1864. cross at Cochran s Ford. It was deep, and he took them 
 over naked ; nothing but guns, cartridge boxes and hats. 
 They drove the enemy out of their rifle pits, captured a 
 non-commissioned officer and three men, and the two 
 boats on the other side. They would have got more, but 
 the rebels had the advantage in running through the 
 bushes with clothes on. It was certainly one of the fun 
 niest sights of the war, and a very successful raid for 
 naked men to make. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. E. M. McCook, R. R., Vol. 38, Part 
 II, p. 761.) 
 
 riye a r Va af y ni C gTt Ext - No - 323. The river being very deep and 
 P a iTnt"n muddy, they had to swim the horses. It being very dark, 
 01 ** it could only be done by the aid of boats or canoes; 
 three of the latter were found on the opposite shore. 
 The canoes were laden with arms and equipments and 
 three men placed in each, who guided the horses across. 
 Daylight the next morning found them (283 men) com 
 paratively safe upon the north bank of the river. 
 
 (Lieut. Col. H. P. Lampson, R. R., Vol. 38, Part 
 II, p. 784.) 
 
129 
 
 Ext. No. 324. Two of Capehart s (regiments) TWO regiments 
 swam the river above the bridge, charged Rosser and 8 ^ e " v a e n d oah 
 
 routed him. River, Mar. 1,1865. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 46, Part I, 
 p. 475.) 
 
 Ext. No. 325. The dismounted men and prisoners Dismounted 
 
 f , , . .. . men cross swift 
 
 forded the stream in groups of fifty or sixty, holding: stream m groups 
 
 r J J & by locking arms 
 
 each other by the arm. It was impossible for a single 
 
 footman to ford, the water being breast high, with a 
 rapid current. 
 
 (Col. J. L. Thompson, N. H. Cav., R. R., Vol. 46, 
 Part I, p. 529.) 
 
 Ext. No. 326. We reached Johnson s Ferry at sun- cavalry brigade 
 
 J J crosses large river 
 
 down. I ordered the 8th Iowa to begin crossing at ona 
 and at sundown the next day the whole command (65 
 officers and 1,734 men) was west of the Black Warrior 
 River, the men with their equipments crossing in a single 
 flatboat and the horses swimming, losing only two or 
 three. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. J. T. Croxton, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, 
 p. 421.) 
 
 Ext. No. 327. April 15th began crossing Sipsey cavalry bri- 
 
 T? i r* 11 t 1 -r Sade crosses in 
 
 rork at Calloway s and Lindsays Ferries, having no two da y s at two 
 
 . & crossings with 
 
 means of crossing men and equipments but in canoes and 
 
 the horses by swimming. April 1 7th all were over ( 65 in 
 
 ty. 1 i T>A \ Wilson s Raid, 
 
 officers and 1,734 men). A P r.i5,i865. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. J. T. Croxton, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, 
 p. 423.) 
 
 Ext. No. 328. Enough debris of the old bridge re- cavalry cross 
 mained to facilitate the construction of another. As^mmingTjy 
 
 , , their side. 
 
 large, abandoned warehouse was at hand, and the party ckickahominy 
 was at once set to work to tear down this house and con- fseT June 14 
 vey the timbers to the bridge. In a wonderfully short 
 time a footway was constructed, over which the cavalry 
 men at once commenced to pass, holding the bridles of 
 their horses as they swam by their side. 
 
 (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, 
 p. 64.) 
 
130 
 
 cavalry crosses Ext. No. 329. Meanwhile, the animals, detached 
 byTw^m m ! n e g from the vehicles and artillery, were being- driven into 
 
 animals and fer 
 rying guni and the river and made to swim across, as also the horses of 
 
 wagons. 
 
 Dec., 1862. the cavalry. Quite as many as 1,000 animals were at 
 one time in the river, which was about 600 yards broad 
 with favorable banks. The ferriage of the artillery and 
 wagons was very much slower. Loaded upon the old 
 flatboat, it was poled up stream a distance of nearly half 
 a mile, and, pushed out into the stream, was caught and 
 carried by the current gradually to the other bank. On 
 its return trip the process was reversed. By this means 
 about 1,000 cavalry, 5 pieces of artillery with caissons, 
 60 wagons and 4 ambulances crossed the Tennessee River 
 from 12 :00 m. till 8:00 p. m. with one flat bottom boat. 
 (Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest s Cavalry, 
 p. 220.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 It is not believed that large organizations did much 
 swimming with the troopers on their horses. Rivers of 
 any magnitude must be crossed either by bridging or by 
 ferrying the men and equipments and swimming the 
 animals. (Ext. 239.) 
 
 Streams necessitating a swim of from fifty to sixty 
 feet may be crossed by large commands, but those neces 
 sitating a longer swim should only be tried by organiza 
 tions that have been previously trained. Untrained 
 horses quickly lose their heads, paw the air and finally 
 go over backwards. Even if the trooper is floating by 
 the horse, he will be compelled to let go with grave 
 danger to himself, though he may be a good swimmer. 
 Under such circumstances a line of lariats with empty 
 canteens for floats should be stretched across the stream 
 on the down-stream side. Men who lose their horses 
 can quickly gain the line marked by the floating canteens 
 and reach the shore with no difficulty. The line should 
 be held by men on shore, who can move it up or down 
 stream. If possible, a row boat should be kept manned 
 and ready to take out men who lose their horses. A large 
 
131 
 
 blanket roll will furnish buoyancy till the blanket gets 
 wet through. It is better to leave the rifle in the scab 
 bard. Then it will surely go ashore with the horse. If 
 held in the hand, and the horse goes over, it is sure to 
 be lost. 
 
 PLUNDER PILLAGE. 
 
 Ext. No. 330. The commanding general directs Pillage . Brand . 
 that any person found guilty of such disgraceful conduct ing 
 be stripped of his uniform, his head shaved, then branded 
 on his left cheek with the letter T as a Thief, and 
 drummed out of the service. 
 
 (G. O. No. 11, Hq. Army of the Ohio, Aug. 31, 
 1863. R. R., Vol. 30, Part IV, p. 262.) 
 
 Ext. No. 331. Every crime in the catalogue of in- Effect of P m- 
 
 r i i 1 T i 1 a S e on troops. 
 
 tamy has been committed, I believe, except rapine and Moorefieid, w. 
 murder. Pillage and sack of private dwellings took Va " Ang> ? w 
 place hourly. I believe a higher tone of morals and dis 
 cipline may be infused in any soldier. Had there been 
 less plunder there would have been more fighting at 
 Moorefieid on Sunday. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. Bradley T. Johnson, C. S., R. R., Vol. 
 43, Parti, p. 8.) 
 
 Ext. No. 332. .General Wheeler s command was plunder de- 
 much demoralized by plunder, and officers and men be-2Sff"" 
 haved unbecomingly on this trip, thinking more of their 
 plunder than of fighting the enemy. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. S. D. Lee, C. S., R. R., Vol. 31, Part 
 I, p. 25.) 
 
 Ext. No. 333. Word was sent to Gordon and Ker- victory incom- 
 shaw to swing around and advance with their divisions, 
 but they stated in reply that a heavy force of cavalry 
 had got in their front, and that their ranks were so de- 
 pleted by the number of men who had stopped in the 
 camps to plunder that they could not advance them. 
 
 (Lieut. Genl. J. A. Early, C. S., R. R., Vol. 43, 
 Part I, p. 562.) 
 
132 
 
 By stopping to Ext. No. 334. The enemy, eager to plunder, failed 
 
 plunder, victory irn TTT 1 1 
 
 fs turned to de- to promptly follow us up. We rallied and at once ad 
 vanced upon him. We retook the cavalry camp, and, en 
 couraged by our success, charged the enemy, who was 
 endeavoring to harness up the battery horses, and plun 
 dering my headquarters, not twenty steps distant, and 
 finally forced him out of the camp with great slaugh 
 ter. We re-established our line and for an hour and a 
 half foiled every attempt of the enemy to retake it. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. J. Kilpatrick, R. R., Vol. 47, Part I, 
 p. 861.) " 
 
 After captur- Ext. No. 335. The cavalry corps commanded by 
 *5e n bt General J. H. Wilson, which captured Selma, Ala., April 
 
 - 2, 1865, was composed of well organized and disciplined 
 t d ent. to x " troops. Lieut. Col. E. Kitchell, 98th 111., says : "I kept 
 
 Apr 6 2*1865 A k my men together till after we went into camp, and did 
 not permit them to straggle or go in search of plunder 
 or captured property in the city, although quite a num 
 ber of them, following the general example, did find their 
 way there during the night time." 
 
 (R. R., Vol. 49, Parti, p. 452.) 
 
 pursuit discon- Ext. No. 336. I am now to record the fact that so 
 advance troops many of Ashby s command, both cavalry and infantry, 
 
 stop to pillage. . , . , ,. 
 
 Winchester, forgetful of their high trust as the advance of a pursuing 
 army, deserted their colors, and abandoned themselves 
 to pillage to such an extent as to make it necessary for 
 that gallant officer to discontinue further pursuit. 
 
 (Lieut. Genl. T. J. Jackson, C. S., R. R., Vol. 12, 
 Parti, p. 704.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 The branding of men as ordered in extract 330 
 would not now be permitted. (A. W. 38, 98.) The 
 Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual punishments, 
 and since branding would be so classed, it was not legal 
 at the time of the order quoted. Pillage is a serious 
 military offense and calls for drastic punishment. The 
 deplorable condition of discipline resulting from pillage 
 is described in extracts 331, 332. The offense is so grave 
 
133 
 
 that A. W. 42 authorizes the death penalty. In time of 
 victory, men who stop to plunder will neutralize the ad 
 vantages gained (Exts, 333, 336) and sometimes con 
 vert a victory into a defeat. (Ext. 334.) Plundering 
 is very difficult to stop, even among well disciplined 
 troops. (Ext. 335.) 
 
 PURSUIT. 
 
 Ext. No. 337. The next day I received orders from R0 uted enemy 
 Maj. Genl. Sheridan to start out at daylight and whip 282* 
 the rebel cavalry or get whipped myself. * * * v a S ii h ey "Smp^l^ 
 
 After a spirited engagement for about two hours, 18 
 the enemy, seeing that they were being flanked and se 
 verely pressed in front, gave way in great confusion, 
 which was immediately taken advantage of by both di 
 vision commanders. 
 
 The enemy endeavored to rally several times, but 
 were unable to stand the desperate charges made by our 
 men, and they were driven in a perfect rout for twenty 
 miles. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. A. T. A. Torbert, R. R., Vol. 43, Part 
 I, p. 431.) 
 
 Ext. No. 338. His retreat was so rapid that pur- pursuit by dis- 
 suit by dismounted men was impossible, and the 1 st iSipos?ibie d n 
 Mich., supported by two regiments of the reserve brig- jaS^V^ 6 
 ade, were sent forward and drove the enemy for two 
 miles, returning with many prisoners. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. G. A. Custer, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, 
 p. 819.) 
 
 Ext. No. 339. It now became apparent that the Bear pursuit 
 enemy, in following up our rear, had made a great mis- S 8 ^ u i t 
 take, and he began to see it, for, when we leisurely took 
 the Negro Foot road to Richmond, a doubt arose in his James May 1864t 
 mind as to whether his tactics were good, whereat he 
 immediately hauled off from the rear, and urged his 
 horses to the death so as to get in between Richmond 
 and our column. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, 
 p. 790.) 
 
134 
 
 Parallel pur- Ext. 340. Having notified the commanding general 
 SU Rlpida C n ee ?o 8 the on the morning of June 8th that Sheridan, with a heavy 
 1864 es Jnne 8 force of cavalry and artillery, had crossed the Pamunkey, 
 I was ordered to take one division in addition to my own 
 and follow him. Supposing that he would strike at Gur- 
 donsville and Charlottsville, I moved rapidly with my 
 division so as to interpose my command between him 
 and the places named above, at the same time directing 
 Maj. Genl. Fitzhugh Lee to follow as speedily as pos 
 sible. In two 1 days march I accomplished the object in 
 view that of placing myself ini front of the enemy. 
 
 (Maj. Gen. Wade Hampton, C. S., R. R., Vol. 36, 
 Parti, p. 1095.) 
 
 Rear pursuit. Ext. No. 341. The enemy, after being charged by 
 
 valley o?t n 8 d i864 our " a ^ ant cavalry, were broken, and ran; they were fol 
 lowed by our men on the jump twenty-six miles. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. P. H. S heridan, R. R., Vol. 43, Part 
 I, p. 31.) 
 
 Ext. No. 342. The pursuit was immediately con- 
 Method of 
 
 fSi^ur g suit uccess ~ ti nue( t Knipe and Hatch moving in parallel columns 
 Franklin, Tenn., alone the Columbia pike, Johnson down the Carter s 
 
 Dec. 17, 1864. 
 
 Creek pike, and Croxton on the Lewisburg pike. The 
 flanking columns were directed to push rapidly forward 
 and endeavor to pass around the flanks of the enemy s 
 rear guard, composed almost entirely of infantry, while 
 a strong force of skirmishers across the pike should press 
 it continuously and compel it to form line as frequently 
 as possible. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. J. H. Wilson, R. R., Vol. 45, Part I, 
 p. 565.) 
 
 Pursuit not Ext - N - 343. Hoping the cavalry would soon 
 come up, the artillery, followed by the infantry, was 
 pressed forward for two hours, for the purpose of pre- 
 > venting, by artillery fire, a reforming of the enemy, but 
 as nothing was heard of the cavalry, and as but little or 
 nothing could be accomplished without it in the ex 
 hausted condition of the infantry, between which and the 
 
 x " 
 
135 
 
 enemy the distance was constantly increasing, I ordered 
 the halt. 
 
 (Lieut. Genl. T. J. Jackson, C. S., R. R., Vol. 12, 
 Part I, p. 7QC ) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 It is desiiable to have a well organized mounted 
 force ready to take up the pursuit in case of victory. 
 (Ext. 338.) The approved method of making a pursuit 
 is described in extract 342, namely, flanking columns 
 should take up the pursuit on parallel roads, endeavoring 
 to cut in on the enemy s column (Sheridan at Appomat- 
 tox), while troops following in rear endeavor to compel 
 the enemy to deploy as frequently as possible. Only the 
 parallel pursuit can meet with great results when cavalry 
 is pursuing cavalry. (Exts. 339, 340.) 
 
 Fresh infantry can pursue defeated infantry, but 
 exhausted infantry cannot. In this case cavalry is neces 
 sary. (Ext. 343.) 
 
 The distance that a pursuit should be kept up will 
 depend upon the progress of the general engagement. If 
 cavalry defeats cavalry at the beginning of a battle, they 
 should not pursue to the extent of becoming disorgan 
 ized, but should rally and be kept in readiness to con 
 tribute to the general result. A decisive cavalry victory 
 would amount to nothing if the general engagement was 
 lost. If an enemy is defeated in a general engagement, 
 then there should be no limit to the pursuit. In that 
 case, push it as far and as long as possible. (Exts. 337, 
 341.) 
 
 RAIDS. 
 
 Ext. No. 344. Should a raid be contemplated, a conditions 
 strong diversion should be made in its favor by an at-SJS ble to a 
 tack on the enemy in force, or a demonstration to his bn ?g{ d V a?, Set 25, 
 opposite flank. No raid could succeed if attacked and 1863 
 compelled to fight at its outset. To prepare and start 
 a raiding party after a general action has commenced, 
 and when the enemy s attention is diverted, would be 
 much more favorable for its success. 
 
136 
 
 (General Alfred Pleasonton, R. R., Vol. 29, Part 
 II, p. 383.) 
 Sheridan s Ext. No. 345. In May, 1864, General Sheridan 
 
 Richmond raid. 
 
 made a raid on Richmond, Va. He was gone 16 days; 
 average march, 18 miles; longest march, 30 miles. Horses 
 that failed were shot by the rear guard. 
 
 (See Sheridan s report, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, p. 
 792.) 
 
 method of* >n- Ext - Na ^46. His fav o rit e strategy on his impor- 
 ductingaraid. tant expeditions or "raids" was to place himself by long 
 and swift marches moving sometimes for days and 
 nights without halt except to feed horses in the very 
 heart of the territory where were the objects of his en 
 terprise. He relied on this method to confuse, if not to 
 surprise, his enemy, and prevent a concentration of his 
 forces. He would then strike right and left. He rarely 
 declined to fight advancing, but after commencing his 
 retreat he would use every effort and stratagem to avoid 
 battle. 
 
 (Morgan s Cavalry, by Duke.) 
 
 successful raid Ex ^ ^o. 347. Grierson continued his movement 
 
 fw?y vs fro r mthewith about 1,000 men, breaking the New Orleans and 
 
 "bto^ibdd, Jackson railroad, arriving at Baton Rouge May 2d. This 
 
 Apr.-May, i ra ^ was Q f g- reat importance, for Grierson had attracted 
 
 the attention of the enemy from the main movement 
 
 against Vicksburg. 
 
 (Memoirs of General U. S. Grant, Vol. I, p. 489.) 
 if raiding party Ext. No. 348. The close of a raid is the point 
 of greatest danger. If a commander cannot join his 
 
 pay for the loss r , , , . 1,1 T r 
 
 of men and army in safety all his work may be thrown away. If 
 
 horses. J J , 
 
 he has to cut his way through, the losses in men and 
 horses will more than counterbalance the gains of the 
 raid. (P. 93.) 
 
 Duties of the A cavalry general on a raid must be always awake, 
 or at least take as little sleep as nature will permit. He 
 must surround himself with pickets that stretch for miles 
 and keep his corps encamped in as small a space as pos- 
 
 woods the best sible. Woods are best for this purpose, on many ac- 
 
137 
 
 counts. They hide the number of troops, furnish fuel 
 for fires, and hitching posts for horses. They are easily 
 defensible in case of surprise or attack, and by pushing 
 out pickets to the edge of the open ground the grand 
 requirements of a perfect camp ground are fulfilled, viz., 
 wood, water and security. Water is almost invariably 
 to be found in or near the woods. Security against at 
 tack is gained by felling a few trees on the flanks of the 
 camp to entangle an enemy in. In the summer, by tak 
 ing the precaution to camp early, and put out the fires 
 after dark, a whole corps of cavalry may be buried in 
 the woods without giving a sign of its presence. 
 
 (Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of a Decade, p. 95.) 
 
 Ext. No. 349. Kilpatrick started on the night of Any damage 
 
 done to a rail- 
 
 the 18th of August to reach the Macon road about road by any cav 
 
 alry expedition 
 
 Tonesboro. He succeeded in doing so, and passed en- is soon repaired. 
 
 J Kilpatrick s 
 
 tirely around the Confederate lines of Atlanta, and was R g aw, Aug. 18-22, 
 
 back again in his former position on our left by the 22d. 
 
 These little affairs contributed, however, but very little 
 
 to the grand result. They annoyed, it is true, but any 
 
 damage thus done to a railroad by any cavalry expedi 
 
 tion is soon repaired. 
 
 (Memoirs of General U. S. Grant, Vol. II, p. 172.) 
 
 Ext. No. 350. As many of my cavalry are still un- Raid leaves 
 
 J J J cavalry unservic- 
 
 serviceable from the effects of Stoneman s raid, I am !J^.a^ th f e be- 
 
 too weak to cope with the numbers of the enemy if as ^gjf burs cam " 
 
 large as represented. 
 
 (Genl. Jos. Hooker, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 33.) 
 Ext. No. 351. Upon the suggestion of the former 
 
 officer (Stuart) that he could damage the enemy and de-stuart s cavalry 
 
 . . - 1 1 during Gettys- 
 
 lay his passage of the river by getting in his rear, he was 
 
 authorized to do so, and it was left to his discretion q^a^e ?nforma- 
 whether to enter Maryland east or west of the 
 Ridge; but he was instructed to lose no time in placing 
 
 his command on the right of our column as soon as he it also fe 
 
 . . cavalry much re- 
 
 could perceive the enemy moving northward. be\?and n m n b m ~ 
 
 It was expected that as soon as the Federal Army should condition - 
 cross the Potomac, General Stuart would give notice of campaign, ises. 
 
138 
 
 its movements, and nothing having been heard from him 
 since our entrance into Maryland, it was inferred that 
 the enemy had not left Virginia. * * * The move 
 ments of the army preceding the battle of Gettysburg had 
 been much embarrassed by the absence of the cavalry. 
 * * * The ranks of the cavalry were much reduced 
 by its long and arduous march, repeated conflicts, and in 
 sufficient supplies of food and forage. 
 
 (General R. E. Lee, R. R., Vol. 27, Part II, pp. 316, 
 321, 322.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 A raid, to be successful, will have to be started 
 without much preparation. If suspected by the enemy, 
 it will not succeed. A strong diversion should be made 
 in its favor, as stated in extract 344. 
 
 The most successful raider the war produced was 
 Morgan. His method is described in extract 346. 
 
 Raids are seldom worth their cost in horse flesh, 
 and the damage done to the cavalry will operate later to 
 the detriment of the raiders, as illustrated by Stoneman s 
 raid (Ext. 350), which left the Federal cavalry weak at 
 the beginning of the Gettysburg campaign, and Stuart s 
 raid (Ext. 351), which left his ranks reduced after his 
 long march, and left General Lee without the informa 
 tion he had a right to expect, and further much em 
 barrassed him in the movements of his army preceding 
 the battle of Gettysburg. 
 
 It may well be doubted if Sheridan s Richmond raid 
 was worth its cost. He accomplished no lasting results 
 except the death of Stuart, while he left Grant s army 
 without its eyes, while Lee, by use of his cavalry, was 
 enabled to ascertain Grant s movements and successfully 
 interpose his army between the Federal army and Rich 
 mond at the North Anna. 
 
 If the raiders cannot rejoin in safety, the raid may 
 be counted as a failure. 
 
139 
 
 The most successful raid during the war was Grier- 
 son s (Ext. 347), which drew a large number of troops 
 away from opposing Grant"s army when it was ma 
 neuvering Pemberton into Vicksburg. Since Grierson 
 marched with only 1,000 men, he did not greatly deplete 
 the Federal forces. 
 
 The results of a raid will necessarily be temporary 
 and the damage soon repaired; and, as stated by Grant, 
 they "contribute very little to the grand result." (Ext. 
 349.) 
 
 Successful raids will generally be made in a friendly 
 country, or at least in a country where many sympa 
 thizers are found to give information. 
 
 As long as Morgan stayed in Kentucky and Ten 
 nessee he was completely successful; but as soon as he 
 crossed the Ohio River, where he could no longer obtain 
 the information necessary to enable him to elude his pur 
 suers, his raid was a most complete failure. 
 
 CAPTURE OF STEAMBOATS. 
 
 Ext. No. 352. During the same month a party of 
 cavalry from the 10th 111. and the 1st Ark. cavalry, un- 
 der Lieut. Col. Stewart, captured a steamboat near Van 
 Buren, Arkansas, and about 300 prisoners. 
 
 (History of the U. S. Cavalry, by Brackett, p. 277.) 
 
 Ext. No. 353. On April 13 Major John F. Wes- 
 ton captured and brought to Montgomery three steam- 
 boats loaded with cotton, bacon, salt and corn, 
 
 (Col. W. Cooper, 4th Ky. Cav., R. R., Vol. 49, Part 
 I, p. 433.) 
 
 Ext. No. 354. Dispatch to N. Y. Herald: Nash- 
 
 M1 T ., A , TT1 , 
 
 ville, Jan. 14. Wheeler s rebel cavalrv, with a batterv 
 
 f ... J} J 
 
 of artillery, attacked three or four boats at Harpeth 
 Shoals yesterday. One or two hundred sick and wounded 
 were captured and the men paroled. One gunboat sur 
 rendered. Her guns were thrown overboard and the 
 boat burned. The others also taken were burned. 
 
 (Campaigns of Wheeler and His Cavalry, p. 64.) 
 
 capture of 
 by 
 
 Jan " 1863< 
 
 cavalry cap 
 
 ture three steam- 
 
 boats. 
 
 cavairycap- 
 
 ture gunboat and 
 
 other boats load 
 
 ed with wound- 
 
 ed - 
 
140 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 TRAINS, TRANSPORTATION AND SUPPLIES. 
 
 TRAINS WHERE MARCHED; ATTACK AND DEFENSE. 
 
 cavalry field Ext. No. 355. In the Savannah campaign the cav- 
 
 t rain s, where . . . 
 
 marched. a lry field trains marched with the trains of the infantry 
 
 Savannah Cam 
 paign, 1864. columns, while the cavalry did the screening and pro 
 tected the flanks. 
 
 (Col. Heath, R. R., Vol. 44, p. 400.) 
 
 Supplytrainan Ext. No. 356. The Supply train Was a heavy en- 
 
 encumbrance to 
 
 n cumbrance during the whole march; it caused a week s 
 
 enemy s country. W1 
 
 Meridian 
 dition, Jan 
 
 Meridian Expe- delay, while it was little use to the main column, which 
 lived off the country nearly all the time and could have 
 done so entirely. 
 
 (Col. G. E. Waring, Jr., Comg. Brig., R. R., Vol. 
 32, Part I, p. 264.) 
 
 Disposition of Ext. No. 357. With all his camp equipage ex- 
 
 field trains when ~. ., . , . ... 
 
 battle is expect- cept two tent flies packed in wagons and in readiness 
 Fieetwood, Va., for an early start, Stuart himself bivouacked on the night 
 of the 8th on Fieetwood Hill. * * * Every scrap 
 of camp was removed toward Culpeper Court House, 
 and there remained nothing upon the hill except the ad 
 jutant and his couriers. 
 
 (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, 
 pp. 263, 269.) 
 
 Cavalry trains Ext. No. 358. 
 
 are an encum- 
 
 brance to cavalry Kingston, Mav 23, 1864. 
 
 column. 
 
 Cam " Colonel Long, Commanding Cavalry Brigade. 
 
 Cavalry with a train is worse than useless. Let 
 your train fall in with the infantry when your cavalry 
 can act effectively on the south flank of Blair s column. 
 * * * (Sig.) W. T. SHERMAN, 
 
 Maj. Genl., Cmdg. 
 (R. R., Vol. 38, Part IV, p. 296.) 
 
141 
 
 Ext. No. 359. The train was strongly guarded by Guard in front 
 
 , and rear of a 
 
 a corps front and rear, but the flanks were exposed, long train is not 
 
 sufficient. 
 
 While the 12th and /th regiments kept up a brisk skir- Near Ely Ford, 
 
 , . Va, Nov. 27, 1863 . 
 
 mish with the corps that was marching in rear, I suc 
 ceeded in destroying 35 or 40 wagons, brought 8 loaded 
 with ordnance stores, 7 ambulances, 230 mules and 
 horses, and 95 prisoners with the loss of 2 men killed 
 and 3 wounded. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. T. L. Rosser, C. S., R. R., Vol. 29, 
 Parti, p. 904.) 
 
 Ext. No. 360. General Wheeler, with 1,500 rebel cavalry useful 
 
 . , , . as support to in- 
 
 cavalry and some artillery, attacked a wagon tram mov- fantry escort, 
 ing from Knoxville to Chattanooga, and escorted by in- paign, X Deo. 6 28 *es! 
 fantry, convalescents, etc. Colonel Long at once mounted 
 a small portion of his command and charged the enemy, 
 whose ranks had been broken by the infantry escort, 
 scattering them in every direction. 
 
 (Colonel Long, R. R., Vol. 31, Part I, p. 435.) 
 
 Ext. No. 361. I have the honor to report the ar- Train suocess . 
 rival at this place with all the brigade train but about ^f ig tt acked at 
 eight or ten wagons. We were attacked at daylight 
 yesterday morning, and a disgraceful panic ensued, re 
 sulting in the entire destruction of the Reserve Brigade 
 train and a portion of ours, with battery forges, etc., the 
 running off of all the mules, the capture of a large 
 number of prisoners, etc. 
 
 (Maj. W. E. Beardsley, 6th N. Y. Cav., R. R., Vol. 
 43, Parti, p. 484.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 These extracts go to show clearly that a cavalry 
 column, when operating against an enemy, has little use 
 for trains. Cavalry must have trains, but, when oper 
 ating against an enemy, the trains must march with the 
 infantry column. To quote General Sherman (Ext. 
 358) : "Cavalry with a train is worse than useless." 
 This will necessitate cavalry often camping without its 
 baggage. It must then be prepared to live on saddle bag 
 or emergency rations. (Exts. 355, 356, 358.) The best 
 
142 
 
 system will be for each troop to have a led horse or 
 mule with a pack saddle. The Moore cross-tree saddle 
 is a good type for this purpose. On one side of the sad 
 dle should be carried a water can, inside of which should 
 be a nest of camp kettles and other necessities for cook 
 ing; on the other side should be a similar water can 
 carrying one day s rations for the troop; carried as a 
 top pack should be a picket rope with iron pins. This 
 will avoid individual cooking, keep the horses from get 
 ting burned on small lariat ropes, and enable the com 
 mand to always have a supply of boiled water, which is 
 considered so indispensable to modern warfare. The 
 command will then have one day s field rations, two sad 
 dle bag or haversack rations and one emergency ration, 
 so that if the baggage wagons connect with it only once 
 in three days no great harm will be done. 
 
 When a battle is expected, the trains must be sent to 
 the rear. (Ext. 357.) 
 
 The most suitable escort for trains is infantry, dis 
 mounted cavalry, or convalescents. (Ext. 360.) Es 
 cort duty is very trying on cavalry, and, besides, a horse 
 man cannot fire as rapidly or with as much precision as a 
 man on foot. 
 
 Trains should have a flank guard if possible. (Ext. 
 359.) 
 
 The best time to attack a train is at daybreak. (Ext. 
 361.) 
 
 TRANSPORTATION. 
 
 Allowance of Ext. No. 362. 
 
 transportation. 
 
 Headquarters Army, Adjutant General s Office, 
 
 War Department. 
 
 General Orders Washington, D. C., 
 
 No. 160. October 18, 1862. 
 
 The following regulations are established for Army 
 Trains and Baggage : 
 
143 
 
 ment 20 wagons. 
 
 1. There will be allowed wagons to 
 Headquarters Army Corps 4 
 
 Div. or Brig 3 
 
 Full regiment of Infantry 6 
 
 Light battery or Squadron of Cavalry 3 cavalry regi- 
 
 In no case will this allowance be exceeded, but al 
 ways proportionately reduced according to the number 
 of officers and men actually present. 
 
 2. The wagons allowed to a regiment, battery or 
 squadron must carry nothing but forage for the teams, 
 cooking utensils and rations for the troops, hospital 
 stores, and officers baggage. One wagon to each regi 
 ment will transport exclusively hospital supplies, under 
 the direction of the regimental surgeon; the one for 
 regimental headquarters will carry the grain for the 
 officers horses, and the three allowed for each battery 
 or squadron will be at least half loaded with grain for 
 their own teams. Stores in bulk and ammunition will 
 be carried in the regular or special supply trains. 
 
 4. Officers baggage will be limited to blankets, one 
 small valise or carpet bag, and a moderate mess kit. allowance - 
 The men will carry their own blankets or shelter tents, 
 and reduce the contents of their knapsacks as much as 
 possible. 
 
 Ext. No. 362. 
 
 Officers baggage 
 
 ALLOWANCE OF WAGONS. 
 
 
 00" 
 
 li 
 
 <r 
 
 
 
 3 
 
 "* 
 
 5 MS 
 
 
 ^^ 
 
 fl* 
 
 g 
 
 Hq. Army Corps 
 Hq. Division 
 Hq. Brigade 
 
 4 
 3 
 3 
 1 
 
 2 
 3 
 2 
 1 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 4 
 2 
 
 3 
 
 2 
 
 1 
 1 
 
 Hq. Regiment . 
 
 Hq. Battalion, 12 officers 
 
 Regiment of Inf., 12 Cos. 
 
 6 
 
 6 
 
 
 6 
 
 12 
 
 Reg. of Cav. 12 Troops . . 
 Battery 
 
 20 
 3 
 
 6 
 3 
 
 
 6 
 
 34 
 
 3 
 
 Supply Trains 
 
 
 / 1000 men, 
 I Div. 
 
 7 
 75 
 
 
 Div. 63 
 
 
 
 Ammunition Trains .... 
 
 
 1000 men, 
 
 5 
 
 
 1000 men, 3 
 
 Hospital Supply Train. . 
 Wagons for intren. tools. 
 
 
 / 1500 men, 
 I Div. 
 Corps, 
 
 3 
 30 
 6 
 
 
 
 Div. 40 
 
 Allowance o f 
 wagons. 
 
144 
 
 wheeler has no Ext No. 364. Wheeler s cavalry, while opposing 
 Atlanta Cam- Sherman s march to the sea, had no wagons for five 
 paign 1864 months. 
 
 (Lieut. Genl. J. Wheeler, R. R., Vol. 44, p. 412.) 
 Gettysburg Ext. No. 365. Stuart s cavalry, while marching 
 1863. around the Federal army during the Gettysburg cam 
 
 paign, had no wagons or vehicles excepting six pieces 
 of artillery with caissons, and a few ambulances. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, R. R., Vol. 27, Part 
 II, p. 692.) 
 
 Sheridan s Ext. No. 366. From February 27 to March 28, 
 domi ry to S lowest 1865, Sheridan marched the 1st and 3d Cavalry Divis- 
 
 limit. 
 
 ions, 10,000 officers and men, from Winchester to Peters 
 burg. Division headquarters had one wagon. 
 
 The command had 8 ambulances, ammunition train, 
 16 wagons, a pontoon train of 8 boats. The fifteen 
 days rations of coffee, sugar and salt only took 60 
 wagons. 
 
 Each regimental headquarters had two pack mules. 
 Each squadran had one pack mule. 
 
 (R. R., Vol. 46, Part I, pp. 475 and 485.) 
 Load carried Ext. No. 367. Division commanders were directed 
 
 by trooper. -11 , 1 r- 1 > 
 
 to see that every trooper was provided with five days 
 light rations in haversacks, 24 pounds of grain, 100 
 rounds of ammunition and one pair of extra shoes for 
 
 Load carried his horse ; that the pack animals were loaded with five 
 days hard bread, ten days sugar, coffee and salt, and 
 
 Load carried the wagons with 45 days coffee, 20 sugar, 15 salt and 
 
 on wagons. 
 
 80 rounds of ammunition. These calculations were made 
 
 180 rounds per 
 
 Se n raid ken for on a basis of sixty days campaign, under the supposition 
 that the command would be able to supply itself from 
 the enemy s country with everything else in abundance. 
 Only enough hard bread was taken to last through the 
 sterile region of north Alabama. 
 
 Bridge train One % nt canvas pontoon train of 30 boats, with 
 
 fixtures complete, transported by 50 six-mule wagons in 
 
 b/JTnmoun^ld charge of a battalion of cavalry was got ready to ac- 
 
 intobattaHon Z s ed company the expedition. The entire train, in charge of 
 
145 
 
 the Chief Quartermaster, numbered not far from 250 
 wagons, escorted by 1,500 dismounted men of the three 
 divisions. These men were organized into battalions and 
 commanded by majors, 
 
 (Maj. Genl. J. H. Wilson, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, 
 p. 356.) 
 
 Wilson s raid, known also as the Selma raid, started 
 March 15, 1865. It was composed of three divisions 
 and numbered about 17,000 men, 1,500 of which were 
 without mounts. 
 
 If we deduct the 50 bridge train wagons, we have 
 only 200 left for supplies and equipage of 17,000 men 
 and horses. Some of these wagons might have been 
 hauling artillery supplies or might have been ambulances, 
 but assuming that they were not so occupied, we have 
 left about 12 wagons per 1,000 men for a sixty days a r j 
 campaign. This large number of wagons was taken ^ g do " 
 along to assist the command in crossing the Alabama 
 river, after which 30 wagons were destroyed. 
 
 Ext. No. 368. The following should be allowed: The amount of 
 One wagon to each corps and division headquarters; oneSSSylifoiad 
 two-wheeled vehicle to each brigade and regimental head- have- 
 quarters. 
 
 Every officer should carry his kit and grain for 
 both horses on his second horse, and a suitable pack 
 saddle should be provided for that purpose. 
 
 Each troop should have one pack mule for cooking 
 purposes, 
 
 (Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade, p. 76.) 
 
 Ext. No. 369. In regard to the carriage of rations, Haversackisno 
 the experience of a single campaign is sufficient to decide * 
 a thing that the haversack, as used in the United States 
 army, while very good perhaps for infantry, is a poor 
 thing for cavalry. 
 
 (Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade, p. 35.) 
 
 Ext. No. 370. To carry three days rations on the How to carry 
 saddle, have a long bag slit in the middle, put grain in 
 both ends and throw it across the saddle and sit on it. 
 
146 
 
 Tie the ends to the cincha rings. Distribute the grain 
 to equalize the pack. 
 
 (Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade, p. 35.) 
 -^ xt ^o. 371. There are just three things which 
 i4,S)o r me C n 0rp8 f are loaded in cavalry trains, viz., food, ammunition and 
 baggage. The provision and forage part of the train 
 should not be taken on raids. Great bulk and weight are 
 necessary, and such cannot be moved rapidly. Ammu 
 nition must be carried, so must a small quantity of bag 
 gage, the less of this the better. The problem becomes, 
 then, to carry the ammunition and baggage in the small 
 est space and safest and most expeditious manner. Pack 
 trains take an immense number of animals and make a 
 long and tedious train. Since cavalry must be always 
 accompanied by artillery, wherever a gun can go a wagon 
 should follow. One wagon with six mules will carry 
 as much as twenty-four pack mules. 
 
 The following is an estimate of transportation for 
 a cavalry corps of three divisions, each of three brigades 
 of four regiments with an average strength of 400 men, 
 total strength of corps, 14,000 men. (Wilson s Corps 
 in 1865 numbered 17,000) : Forty rounds per man for 
 each battle, three battles during raid ; ammunition for 
 these three battles on wagons makes 120 rounds per 
 man on wagons, total, 1,680,000 rounds. Besides this 
 each man should carry enough on his person for two 
 battles. 
 
 (Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade, p. 72.) 
 Note. In 1910 forty wagons each carrying 3,500 
 pounds would be necessary to carry this ammunition. 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 The orders affecting the allowance of wagons are 
 quoted for all arms, but the comments will be confined 
 to the cavalry service. 
 
 G. O. 160, 1862, allowed 3 wagons per squadron 
 of two troops each, one for regimental headquarters and 
 one for hospital supplies, making a total of 20 for each 
 
147 
 
 regiment of cavalry. G. O. 83, Army of the Potomac, 
 August 21, 1863, allowed 6 wagons to each regiment of 
 cavalry, and G. O. 100, Army of the Potomac, Novem 
 ber 5, 1863, still retained that allowance. G. O. 95, 
 W. D. 1908, allows each regiment of cavalry 34 wagons. 
 The two orders of 1863, allowing 6 wagons per regiment 
 of cavalry, were issued after the Gettysburg campaign, 
 and were based on war experience. 
 
 The allowance of 34 wagons is simply and flatly 
 absurd. The maximum allowance of wagons per regi 
 ment of cavalry should be one to each troop, one to regi 
 mental headquarters and band, and one ammunition 
 wagon to each squadron of four troops, total of 16 
 wagons. Supplies will be carried on supply trains and 
 issued as needed; but supply trains are no part of a regi 
 mental equipment. (Ext. 362.) 
 
 Wheeler s cavalry, opposing Sherman s march to the 
 sea, had no wagons for five months. (Ext. 364.) 
 
 Stuart s cavalry, on the Gettysburg campaign, had 
 no wagons and only a few ambulances. (Ext. 365.) 
 
 Sheridan marched 10,000 cavalry for a month at 
 the rate of one wagon to 130 men. (Ext. 366.) 
 
 Wilson s Selma raid started with 17,000 cavalry for 
 a two months campaign with one wagon to 84 men. 
 (Ext. 367.) 
 
 On the Trevillian raid Sheridan had wagons for 
 ammunition only. (Ext. 377.) 
 
 The recommendation contained in Extract 368, that 
 each officer should carry his baggage on his extra horse, 
 is a good one, and sometimes practiced in the regular 
 service. 
 
 A single-track railroad will supply an army of 
 60,000 to 70,000 men. (Ext. 373.) 
 
 SUPPLIES. 
 
 Ext. No. 372. I employed a brigade once a week 
 
 . How to gather 
 
 in the duty of collecting and bringing in forage, sending f t ?f e a g u tr * h 8 
 out sometimes as many as 150 wagons to haul the grain useof B cout. 
 which my scouts had previously located. In nearly every 
 
148 
 
 one of these expeditions the enemy was encountered, and 
 the wagons were usually loaded while the skirmishers 
 kept up a running fire. 
 
 (Sheridan s Memoirs, p. 253.) 
 
 capacity of a Ext. No. 373. A single-track railroad can supply 
 road. an army of 60,000 or 70,000 men with the usual num 
 
 ber of cavalry and artillery, but beyond that number or 
 with a large mounted force the difficulty of supply is 
 very great. 
 
 (Halleck to Grant, R. R., Vol. 31, Part I, p. 668.) 
 
 in hostile coun- Ext. No. 374. They will help themselves to corn, 
 
 receipts^regfy p eD meat and what they need, and take all good horses, giv- 
 
 for supplies. , . . , -, . , r ., 
 
 taken. ing simple receipts to be settled at the end of the war 
 
 or according to circumstances. 
 
 (Genl. W. T. Sherman, R. R., Vol. 31, Part I, 
 p. 719.) 
 
 cavalry can Ext. No. 375. I will avail myself of this occasion 
 H to call the attention of the commanding general to the 
 s ^ act tnat $ or nearly two months my command has been 
 ridge,Tenn!!jant almost daily engaged with the enemy and compelled to 
 live mainly on parched corn, most of which has been 
 gathered at a distance of from six to fifteen miles. The 
 weather at times has been intensely cold and the suffer 
 ing very great, most of them being without shelter of 
 any kind. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. S. D. Sturgis, R. R., Vol. 32, Part I, 
 p. 138.) 
 curing two Ext. No. 376. In addition, the animals were, for 
 
 days fight horses . . . , , .,, , f 
 
 get nothing to two entire days, in which we were engaged, without for- 
 Eapidan to the age, the surrounding country affording nothing but graz- 
 ing of a very inferior quality, and generally at such points 
 as were inaccessible to us. 
 
 (Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, 
 p. 785.) 
 
 Number of Ext. No. 377. On his Trevillian raid Sheridan 
 ried 8 on a ra S id. ar ~ started with two divisions carrying three days rations 
 ax ow fo r iage are * n naversac ks, to last for five days, and carrying two 
 days grain on the pommel of the saddle. 
 
149 
 They carried 100 rounds of ammunition per man, Amount of am- 
 
 Af\ r 1 1 ,1 x-^ munition carried 
 
 40 of which was on the person and the other 60 m on a raid, 
 wagons. 
 
 The only other wagons were one medical wagon, 
 eight ambulances and one wagon for each brigade and idan to the 
 division headquarters. James, Jane, isw. 
 
 (See Sheridan s report, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, 
 p. 795.) 
 
 Ext. No. 378. I made application for and obtained cavalry gather 
 
 . . wheat and grind 
 
 permission to gather up corn and wheat and take it to " at a mil }- 
 a mill five miles distant, where I supplied my command NO. Alabama and 
 
 Tennessee, Oct. 64. 
 
 scantily for the next four days. 
 
 (Col. D. E. Coon, 2d Iowa Cav., R. R., Vol. 45, 
 Part I, p. 581.) 
 
 Ext. No. 379. Two divisions of cavalry marched customary to 
 on the morning of the 29th, the men, as usual, carrying tS, fi 3o e ?ound a s ~ 
 
 , , , r , , , . . - of forage and 40 
 
 on their horses rive days rations, thirty pounds ot forage rounds of ammu- 
 
 - r , . . nition on horse. 
 
 and forty rounds of ammunition. Appomattox 
 
 (Maj. Genl. Wesley Merritt, R. R., Vol. 46, Part29 a fe aign>Mi 
 I, p. 1116.) 
 
 Ext. No. 380. Sheridan, on his march from Win- Rations. 
 Chester to Petersburg, February 27 to March 28, 1865, Forage, 
 started with five days rations in haversacks, and on each Transportation, 
 horse 30 pounds of forage; he carried in wagons fifteen Ammunition, 
 days rations of sugar, salt and coffee. The wagons also 
 carried 100 rounds of ammunition, while each man car 
 ried 75 rounds on his horse. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 46, Part I, 
 p. 475; also report of Maj. Genl. W. Merritt, p. 485.) 
 
 Ext. No. 381. I had often seen bread baked upon improvised 
 
 n . . method of bak- 
 
 a flat rock or board, or by twisting it around a ramrod ing bread, 
 or stick and holding it to the fire, but one method of 
 baking corn bread was practiced successfully on this 
 march which I had never witnessed before. The men 
 would take meal dough and fit it into a corn shuck, tying 
 the shucks tightly. It would then be placed on the hot 
 embers and in a short time would come out beautifully 
 
150 
 
 browned. The dough was worked up in an oil cloth or 
 a half pumpkin, thoroughly scooped out. 
 
 (Morgan s Cavalry, by Duke.) 
 
 Living off of a Ext. No. 382. I can get no forage or rations; am 
 cau?eBs y traggiin r | ou t o f both. The people give and sell the men something 
 
 ; to eat, but I can t stand that way of subsisting; it causes 
 
 1863* 
 
 dreadful straggling. 
 
 (Genl. Buford, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 324.) 
 cavalry sub- Ext. No. 383. During the campaign my brigade 
 t s jy t80nthecoun " marched 520 miles, having subsisted ourselves principally 
 paigM^. Cam on the country. 
 
 (Col. Atkins, R. R., Vol. 44, p. 393.) 
 
 wheeler s cav- Ext. No. 384. During the last five months my 
 
 ?ranIpo?taTfon n command has been without wagons or cooking utensils, 
 
 subsist upon w ith orders to subsist upon the country. The food has 
 
 country. , 
 
 been limited to bread baked upon boards and stones and 
 
 meat broiled on sticks. It has not been paid in twelve 
 on sticks. months. During five months it has averaged in direct 
 
 twelve mSitLf n marching 16 miles per day, and having no wagons, has 
 
 Average 16 been obliged to pack all forage and rations to camp on 
 five e mon r th y *** horseback. Our camps could not be designated before 
 
 supper at mid- n io-ht fall Details had then to be sent to procure forage 
 
 night, march at . . . 
 
 daylight. an( } rations, frequently making it midnight before sup- 
 
 in r to rag c e a m a p ck onper could be prepared for my men, and then they were 
 
 im- 
 
 p. 412. ) 
 
 stuart 8 cav- Ext. No. 385. Stuart s raid around Federal army 
 ?hree car dafs rl- during the Gettysburg campaign carried only three days 
 when going on a rations on the horse and with no transportation except 
 
 No transporta- ambulances. 
 
 ttt^urgoa,. (Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, C. S, R. R, Vol. 27, 
 
 paign,Jane, 3. 
 
 compelled to be in the saddle before daylight. 
 
 Savannah Cam- __ , 
 
 P aign,i864. (Maj. Genl. Joseph Wheeler, C. S., R. R., Vol. 44, 
 
 when cavalry Ext. No. 386. Merritt, commanding reserve bri- 
 
 gade at Brist e Station October 17 1863 reported: 
 The command is hard up for something to eat. They 
 have not a thing to feed on; cannot rations be sent 
 
 immediately? 
 
151 
 
 Reply : General Meade directs that you make the 
 necessary arrangements to have rations sent out by 
 cars. * * * 
 
 (R. R., Vol. 29, Part I, p. 352.) 
 
 Ext. No. 387. A whole division has been twenty- NO wonder the 
 
 . Army of the Po- 
 
 one days without hay. No horses, however good, and toma c lost horses. 
 bought at whatever price, can stand this kind of treat- Fora s e - 
 ment in a region where but little, if any, grass can be 
 procured. 
 
 (Brig. Gen. Stoneman, R. R. Vol. 29, Part. II., p. 
 4I9-) 
 
 Ext. No. 388. G. O. 100, Army of the Potomac, a JS?^ or % 
 fall of 63, prescribes maximum forage for horses, lO^S. 01 the Po ~ 
 pounds hay and 14 pounds grain; mules 10 pounds hay 
 and 11 pounds grain. When short forage (no hay) 
 only can be procured, horses, 18 pounds grain; mules, 
 15 pounds grain. When the army is on the march the 
 above allowance will not apply. Marching ration, 10 
 pounds average per animal per day. Increased allow 
 ance of grain intended to be fed only when animals are 
 at rest, after long marches, to recuperate them and when 
 hay cannot be procured. 
 
 (R. R., Vol. 29, Part II, p. 420.) 
 
 Ext. No. 389. My command was kept on the battle Forrest s horses 
 
 r . . _ kept on the bat- 
 
 field during the night of the 20th, and men and horses e 
 
 gerrt 
 
 suffered greatly for want of water. The men were with- Jy^ food and " 
 out rations, and the horses had only received a partial 
 
 ... Ga., Sept. 20, 1863. 
 
 feed once during the two days engagement. 
 
 (General Forrest, C. S., Battle of Chickamauga, 
 R. R., Vol. 30, Part II, p. 525.) 
 
 Ext. No. 390. Having but three days rations in soldiers remain 
 
 , , , cheerful under 
 
 twenty days, and many of them nearly naked and several ad verse condi- 
 
 J . tions, without 
 
 times exposed to a cold, drenching ram, yet they never regular rations. 
 
 complained, but were always cheerful and ever ready to 
 
 , 11 j r 1 Oct., 1863. 
 
 perform all duties required of them. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. George Crook, R. R., Vol. 30, Part II, 
 p. 688.) 
 
152 
 
 confederate Ext. No. 391. A very large proportion of my men, 
 
 cavalry find it , ~~ 
 
 effective without ^ ^ V&n officers, are ragged and barefooted, without 
 ciotwng or pay. blankets or overcoats. We have drawn no clothing for 
 
 Knoxville Cam- r 11 A ^1 ^ 
 
 paign Deo., 1863. fall or winter. The men have received no pay for six 
 months. The extremely cold weather has made it almost 
 impossible for me to move. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. W. T. Martin, C. S., Jan. 8th, 1864, 
 R. R., Vol. 31, Part I, p. 549.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 Forage: Cavalry must expect to live on the coun 
 try. The way to obtain forage is to locate it by scouts 
 and then either send wagons for it or impress wagons 
 from the inhabitants and make them haul it. Usually, 
 however, the inhabitants of a hostile country will have 
 disappeared; the forage will then have to be brought in 
 by troops. (See also Ext. 453. Ext. 372.) Receipts 
 should be given, to be paid or not at the end of the war, 
 depending upon the policy of the government. (Ext. 
 374.) 
 
 In going on raids each horse carried 30 pounds of 
 grain. (Exts. 377, 379, 380.) Cavalry was expected to 
 gather forage from the surrounding country when the 
 30 pounds were exhausted. Wheeler s cavalry, for five 
 months, had to pack all forage into camp on horseback. 
 (Ext. 384.) 
 
 The forage allowance of the Army of the Potomac, 
 G. O. 100, 1863, was a maximum of 10 pounds of hay 
 and 14 pounds of grain. When no hay could be obtained, 
 18 pounds of grain were allowed when animals were 
 at rest recuperating; when marching only 10 pounds 
 were allowed. (Ext. 388.) 
 
 Rations : The best single diet known is Indian corn. 
 Men can live on it by parching it. (Ext. 375.) Corn 
 and wheat should be gathered and ground in neighboring 
 mills. (Ext. 378.) 
 
 Foraging in a friendly country causes straggling. 
 (Ext. 382.) 
 
153 
 
 During a battle soldiers can expect little except what 
 is carried on their persons or horses. (Exts. 376, 389.) 
 
 Cavalry started on raids with from three (Exts. 
 377, 385) to five days rations on the horse. (Exts. 379, 
 380.) The best way to carry rations is described in 
 extract 370. 
 
 Emergency rations were unsuccessfully tried during 
 the war. (Ext. 395.) 
 
 Improvised methods of baking were frequently 
 used, viz : on a flat rock or by twisting it on the ramrod ; 
 tied in corn shucks and baked in hot embers (Ext. 381) ; 
 on boards and stones. (Ext. 384.) 
 
 Amount of ammunition carried : The amount de 
 pended upon the length of the expedition. 
 
 In the Selma raid the ammunition carried per man 
 for 60 clays was 100 rounds on the horse and 80 in 
 wagons. (Ext. 367.) 
 
 Extract 371 recommends 80 rounds on the man and 
 120 rounds per man in the wagons as enough for five 
 battles, allowing 40 rounds per man per battle. 
 
 On the Trevillian raid each man carried 40 rounds 
 on the horse and 60 per man in wagons (Ext. 377), but 
 the Federal troops ran out of ammunition and Sheridan 
 gives that as the reason why he retreated. (Memoirs, 
 Vol. I, p. 425.) 
 
 During Sheridan s march from Winchester to 
 Petersburg the ammunition carried per man was 75 on 
 the horse and 100 in the wagons. (Ext. 380.) 
 
 During the war, then, cavalry carried from 100 to 
 180 rounds per man. 
 
 Our cavalry can now carry 80 rounds of rifle 
 ammunition on the trooper, depending on the type of 
 cartridge belt used. If each squadron of four troops has 
 one ammunition wagon carrying 2,800 pounds, or 700 
 pounds per troop, each troop will have 8,400 rounds, or 
 84 per man, in the squadron wagon. It will be impos 
 sible to carry more in the saddle pockets unless some 
 thing else is thrown out. There is already carried one 
 day s emergency rations, one day s field rations, two 
 
154 
 
 haversack rations, extra grain in the nose bag, extra 
 horseshoes and other necessary articles. More ammuni 
 tion can be carried on the person in bandoliers. If each 
 trooper carries one, he will have on the person 140 
 rounds and in the wagon 84 rounds, making a total of 
 224 rounds, which should be ample for at least two mod 
 ern battles. 
 
 AMMUNITION SUPPLY TO THE FIRING LINE. 
 
 Ammunition Ext. No. 392. And here let me call your attention 
 
 supply to the fir- , , . t 
 
 ing line. to the necessity of having some organized system of ord- 
 
 Janfe p 9 ld May*i864. e nance sergeants, or men detailed whose duty it shall be 
 to keep cavalry commands well supplied with ammu 
 nition during engagements. Men armed with the breech- 
 loading weapon will necessarily fire a greater number 
 of rounds than those armed with a muzzle-loading piece, 
 and it is utterly impossible for a cavalryman to carry 
 more than from 60 to 80 rounds upon his person, and 
 when dismounted and away from his horse this supply 
 can easily be exhausted in a few hours firing. 
 
 At daylight details were sent to the train. Captain 
 Weeks, in command of detail, immediately started for 
 our own train, some nine miles distant, making the trip 
 back to Hanover Court House, thence to Ashland, twen 
 ty-seven miles, each man loaded with 85 pounds of 
 ammunition, in less than one-half day and even then 
 hardly arrived in time, as three boxes were captured 
 by the enemy before we could issue it to the men. 
 
 (Lieut. Col. G. A. Purington, 2d Ohio Cav., R. R., 
 Vol. 36, Part I, p. 895.) 
 
 Mounted de- Ext. No. 393. Through the kindness of Major 
 
 tails distribute 
 
 ammunition to Dana, who furnished me with a mounted detail, I suc- 
 
 the firing line 
 
 regaled eavily cee ded in procuring a supply of ammunition, which was 
 Five Forks, Va., delivered and distributed to the men on the line of 
 
 Apr. 1, 1865. 
 
 battle while heavily engaged. 
 
 (Col. A. C. M. Pennington, 3d N, J. Cav., R. R., 
 Vol. 46, Part I, p. 1136.) 
 
155 
 Ext, No. 394. Forty rounds of ammunition ought Amount of am- 
 
 , . . , c -i r- 1 .L munition necee- 
 
 to be enough for any cavalry skirmisher if he rights sary for a cavalry 
 
 . .skirmisher to last 
 
 from daylight to dark, and a regiment announcing itseli an day. 
 "out of ammunition " in the thick of a fight ought to be tJnTva. 1 , 1 June 8 ii- 
 severely censured in brigade, division and corps orders. 
 But these "out of ammunition" fellows have often got 
 better men into grave peril by falling back, and thus 
 leaving a gap for the enemy to occupy. I have seen the 
 whole of a brigade forced into a retreat and the loss of 
 many prisoners from the failure of a single regiment in 
 this manner. It was at Trevillian Station, near Gordons- 
 ville, Va., we were fighting on foot, and before we were 
 aware of it a force of the enemy was in our rear and 
 firing into the led horses. Only the approach of dark 
 ness saved many of us, myself in the number, from cap 
 ture, and I lost my horse and had to foot it till I cap 
 tured another. 
 
 (Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade, p. 21.) 
 
 Sheridan claims that he had to withdraw from Tre 
 villian Station because his ammunition had given out. 
 (Sheridan s Memoirs, Vol. I, p. 425.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 A soldier should carry enough ammunition on his 
 person to fight at least one battle. A cavalryman may 
 have ammunition on his horse, which ammunition, under 
 most circumstances, will be available. It will seldom be 
 possible to bring ammunition from the squadron wagons 
 to the firing line, but where horsemen can approach 
 the firing line from the rear under cover, ammunition 
 can be so supplied. (Ext. 393.) 
 
 Pack mules will usually be available to bring am 
 munition from the wagons to some sheltered place, where 
 the boxes can be broken open and the bandoliers dis 
 tributed. If an organization is well controlled in fire 
 discipline, the 80 rounds in the belt and one bandolier on 
 the person, together with what can be obtained from 
 the dead and wounded, should enable it to fight at least 
 one pitched battle. (Ext. 394.) 
 
156 
 
 EMERGENCY RATIONS. 
 
 Emergency ra- Ext No. 395. They have also sent us compressed 
 cakes which Lun, our mess cook, calls "desecrated vege 
 tables." We have boiled, baked, fried, stewed, pickled, 
 sweetened, salted it, and tried it in puddings, cakes and 
 pies, but it sets all modes of cooking at defiance, so the 
 boys break it up and smoke it in their pipes. They say 
 the Dutch of the "Fourst Missouri" know how to cook 
 it, but we are too proud to learn. 
 
 (The Last Campaign, by E. N. Gilpin, 3d la. Cav., 
 published in the Journal of the U. S. Cavalry Associa 
 tion.) 
 
157 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 Spnt Ont 
 
 (Genl. D. S. Stanley, R. R., Vol. 30, Part II, p. 
 
 ANIMALS ENDURANCE, CARE AND DISEASE. 
 
 ENDURANCE. 
 
 Ext. No. 396. From September 26 to October 9, ^ivfcio^ mar- 
 1863, Crook s division, composed of Minty s and Long s s* x days 
 brigades, marched and fought 247 miles in six days. 
 
 668.) 
 
 Ext. No. 397. The First Maine Cavalry marched chiflTm 
 
 nrv .. . , without rest. 
 
 90 miles without rest. Bristoe (Va.) 
 
 (J. Irvin Gregg, R. R., Vol. 29, Part I, p. 366.) campaign, Oct., 
 
 Ext. No. 398. Mitchell s Cavalry Division marched Division mar 
 
 ches 52 miles in 
 
 52 miles in 24 hours. ^ hours. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. R. B. Mitchell, R. R., Vol. 30, Part R J?dey s e 5aTd d 
 
 TT *(\\ Oct., 1863. 
 
 II, p. 669.) 
 
 Ext. No. 399. In the pursuit of Wheeler s cavalry, six days forced 
 October 4th to 9th, 1863, there was scarcely an hour dur-ah-y out of busi- 
 ing the whole pursuit that the horses were unsaddled, wheeierand 
 
 T- j 1 1 A ,1,1 ,1 1 11 Roddey s raid 
 
 For days and nights together the men were in the saddle, Oct., ises. 
 almost constantly on the march, and some days making 
 as high as 53 and 57 miles. A greater part of the time 
 the troops were out of rations, our hasty movements giv 
 ing them no time to forage on the country; the nights 
 were very cold and the men without overcoats. It is 
 positively necessary that a large number of horses be 
 had before the command can be in working condition 
 again. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. R. B. Mitchell, R. R., Vol. 30, Part II, 
 p. 672.) 
 
 Ext. No. 400. First Brigade Michigan cavalry Brigade mar- 
 marched 350 miles in 14 days. miles in 
 
158 
 wheeler and (Col. A. P. Campbell, R. R., Vol. 30, Part II, p. 
 
 Roddey s raid ,- x 
 Oct., 1863. 678. ) 
 
 ch^fef^ieTTn Ext - No - 401. The 9th Perm. Cav. marched 61 
 22^ hours. mil f 2 ;30 October 2d, to 1 :00 p. M., October 
 
 Wheeler and 
 Roddey s raid, ^A 1 S^S 
 
 Oct., 1863. OQ > 1C)00 - 
 
 (Lieut. Col. R. M. Russell, R. R., Vol. 30, Part 
 II, p. 679.) 
 wheeler and E x t. No. 402. First Term. Cav. marched 750 miles 
 
 Roddeys raid, 
 
 Oct., 1863. m two mO nths. 
 
 (Lieut. Col. J. P. Brownlow, R. R., Vol. 30, Part 
 II, p. 681.) 
 
 Ext. No. 403. I had marched 41 miles that day. 
 n wh ay i ( Bri "- Genl. George Crook, 2d Cav. Div., R. R., 
 
 WaSSf -Vol. 30, Part II, p. 686.) 
 Brigade mar- Ext. No. 404. Although my horses and men were 
 
 ches 30 miles per 
 
 weeks 01 * eightweai ~i e d with marches, which for eight weeks had aver- 
 w heeler and aged 30 miles a day, I obeyed the order. 
 
 sept d o e cCi863 id (Col. G. B. Hodge, C. S., Comg. Brig., R. R., Vol. 
 
 30, Part II, p. 726.) 
 Division mar- Ext No. 405. My command having- marched 52 
 
 ches 52 miles in 
 
 24 hours. miles in 24 hours. 
 
 oct h , a i8 m 63 er>s raid (Col. Edward Hatch, Comg. Cav. Div., R. R., Vol. 
 
 30, Part II, p. 741.) 
 Brigade mar- Ext. No. 406. After making a march of 50 miles 
 
 ches 50 miles in . . r 
 
 15 hours. m 15 hours. 
 
 (Col. J. J. Morrison, Comg. Cav. Brig., R. R., Vol. 
 31, Parti, p. 12.) 
 Division mar- Ext. No. 407. We marched 30 to 40 miles daily 
 
 ches 30 to 40 mile* . . 1 1 r 1 j 
 
 daily for six days, for six days, during which a great deal of ram had 
 mond^May! ife?" fallen, and the roads in some places very heavy. Con 
 sidering the work done, comparatively few of the horses 
 failed. We captured as many horses as we lost. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. A. V. Kautz, Comg. Cav. Div., R. R., 
 Vol. 36, Part II, p. 174.) 
 
 TWO divisions Ext No - 408. During the Trevillian raid Sheri- 
 Sive h days consec " dan s two divisions marched fifty-six consecutive days. 
 
 jatfA^rr ( R - R -> VoL 36 > Part J > 
 
 1864. 
 
159 
 
 Ext. No. 409. If such is their expectation, it is Division mar- 
 impossible that they can know that this command has Sis day* " 
 marched 1,400 miles since the 1st of May, without a Va s n h e B c *J 
 remount, and without a halt sufficiently long to set the ^- Jnl ^ 1864 - 
 shoes on my horses. 
 
 (Report of Brig. Genl. Wm. W. Averill, Comg. 2d 
 Cav. Div., dated Aug. 3d, 1864, R. R., Vol. 37, Part 
 I, p. 330.) 
 
 Ext. No. 410. Both men and horses of my division Division stay 
 
 in the saddle 18 
 
 need rest. They have been in the saddle from eighteen 
 
 to twenty hours each day since the 2cl of this month. Atlanta eam- 
 
 J paign May, 1864. 
 
 (Col. E. M. McCook, May 20, 1864, R. R., Vol. 38, 
 Part II, p. 752.) 
 
 Ext. No. 411. I received orders to move to Gil- Brigade gallops 
 
 5 miles and ren- 
 
 lem s Bridge (five miles) at a gallop and to hold the 
 
 bridge at all hazards. This five-mile gallop rendered Kingston, Ga., 
 
 May 19, 1864. 
 
 about 300 horses unserviceable. 
 
 (Col. Robt. H. G. Minty, Comg. Brig., R. R., 
 Vol. 38, Part II, p. 811.) 
 
 Ext. No. 412. My command up to this time had cavalry com- 
 traveled about seventy miles without having halted. S & mn e T without 
 
 (Maj. Genl. Jos. Wheeler, C. S., R. R., Vol. 38, Quanta cam- 
 Part III, p. 955.) 
 
 Ext. No. 413. The march of 470 miles from Cyn- cavalry march 
 thia to the Cumberland river and back to Lexington inaay 1 ?, a B nd n i20 
 
 . , miles in less than 
 
 eleven days is, perhaps, the most rapid and trying known 60 hours. 
 during the war, especially that from Irvine to the Cum-intoifenta r cVy, 
 berland, a distance of 120 miles, in less than sixty hours, 
 with stock the most of which had already traveled nearly 
 a thousand miles. 
 
 (Col. Chas. S. Hanson, R. R., Vol. 39, Part I, 
 P- 42.) 
 
 Ext. No. 414. The forces under Generals Burn- Morgan con 
 
 cedes that enemy 
 
 bridge and Hobson, who were at Pound Gap and Mud 
 
 Creek, finding that the state was invaded, immediately. Morgan s raid 
 
 . J into Kentucky 
 
 gave up their intended expedition into Virginia and June > 1864 - 
 pursued my command. They reached Mount Sterling 
 
160 
 
 at daylight on the 9th, having marched 90 miles in 
 twenty-four hours. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. J. H. Morgan, C. S., R. R., Vol. 39, 
 Part I, p. 68.) 
 
 ^xt. No. ^^ During this interval of eighty-one 
 ucho d f hours the command rested from marching and fighting 
 Cam- not to excee d six hours. During these eighty-one hours 
 June, 1864. the Division marched 135 miles. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. J. H. Wilson, R. R., Vol. 40, Part I, p. 
 624.) 
 
 Curing Grierson s raid, April, 1863, 
 
 uand 
 
 16 days. two regiments of 111. Cav. marched 600 miles in less than 
 
 Grierson s raid, 
 
 Apr., 1863. 16 days. The last 76 miles was marched in 28 hours. 
 
 This command was enabled to replace broken-down 
 horses from the country passed through. 
 (R. R., Vol. 24, Parti, p. 528.) 
 
 ENDURANCE IN THE CHARGE. 
 
 charge unsuc- Ext. No. 417. We charged up to the enemy over 
 
 cessful with - 1 < t c 
 
 blown horses, a long stretch of marshy ground, intersected by a dif- 
 
 JuteHse! . Va "ficult ditch and terminating in a hill of plowed ground. 
 
 The charge was unsuccessful, the most of the horses 
 
 being so blown that it was impossible to bring or keep 
 
 them for such a distance at a charging pace. 
 
 (Capt. Cram, 6th U. S. Cav., R. R., Vol. 27, Part 
 I, p. 947.) 
 Regiment Ext. No. 418. The 2d Kentucky, with Colonel 
 
 charges for 5 r 
 
 miles and breaks Long- at their head, made a most gallant charge of some 
 
 through enemy s ^ ~ 
 
 line - five miles, breaking through his lines, etc. 
 
 Tenn cM oc B t n 4, v i863: (Brig. Genl. George Crook, R. R., Vol. 30, Part II, 
 
 p. 685.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 These extracts speak for themselves. There is little 
 to be said on the subject of endurance of cavalry on the 
 march, except that all recent marches, for the purpose 
 of determining what can be done, serve no purpose other 
 than breaking down, unnecessarily, horses which are very 
 difficult to replace. The war of the Rebellion sufficiently 
 
161 
 
 tried out the subject, and if anybody is not satisfied with 
 the above reports, the Rebellion records furnish many 
 more. 
 
 OARE. 
 
 Ext:. No. 419. Here we drew five pounds of for- cavalry 
 
 t get no care or for 
 
 age and removed our saddles for the first time in six a e e - 
 
 days, during which period we had marched from the ba d f or 
 Rappahannock to Chancellorsville, doing duty both day 3 Sr S 8e g 8 reat 
 and night, and had been under the command of rAae 
 different officers. 
 
 (Lieut. Col. G. A. Purington, 2d Ohio Cav., R. R., 
 Vol. 36, Part I, p. 893.) 
 
 Ext. No. 420. The thirteen days we lay at this FUII forage can- 
 place is the only time during the whole campaign that during e a 
 we had full forage for our horses. P& At u n t a 
 
 ( Atlanta Campaign, Col. R. H. G. Minty, R. R., paign ] 
 Vol. 38, Part II, p. 815.) 
 
 Ext. No. 421. The men have taken excellent care veteran 
 of their horses and have uncomplainingly marched on 
 foot a considerable portion of each day s march in order 
 to save them. 
 
 (Lieut. Col. J. H. Peters, 4th la. Cav., R. R., Vol. 
 49, Part I, p. 499. Wilson s Selma raid.) 
 
 Ext. No. 422. The horses subsisted almost entirely use of green 
 
 , . corn as forage. 
 
 upon green corn during our absence, but returned in Grierson s raid 
 fair condition. Apr " May 1868 
 
 (Brig. Genl. B. H. Grierson, R. R., Vol. 39, Part I, 
 p. 388.) 
 
 Ext. No. 423. My horses are much worn down, Green com 
 
 having been fed for the last ten days on green corn. 
 
 Many of them are foundered by the injudicious manner Ap G ^ 
 in which they are fed. 
 
 (Col. Joseph Karge, Comdg. Cav. Div., R. R., Vol. 
 39, Part I, p. 392.) 
 
 Ext. No. 424. The horses of the battery have suf- Green 
 fered most, as the toil they have had to undergo 
 been greater than animals can stand with no other forage AP^ 
 than green corn at this season. 
 
162 
 
 (Col. J. W. Noble, R. R., Vol. 39, Part I, p. 396.) 
 
 The following is a summary of a report well worth 
 reading : 
 
 Ext. No. 425. The 7th Pa. Cav. started April 30, 
 
 1864 with 919 horses fresh from the corral at Nashville; 
 rl u su e its depl rable the y were unused to military duty and the majority were 
 young. 
 
 Of the enlisted men 300 were raw recruits; some 
 had never been on a horse before. The regiment traveled 
 48 consecutive hours and during that time the horses 
 were without food. Then we received 23 pounds of corn 
 for three days" feed, and carried it and five days rations 
 on the horses. 
 
 Out of 72 hours the horses were under the saddle 
 60 hours. May 22d the loss of 76 horses reported as died 
 of starvation. May 26th to June 2d the horses were 
 without feed and actually starved. 
 
 One battalion lost in action trying to procure for 
 age, 33 horses, and 101 starved to death. 
 
 A detail traveled 30 miles after forage and returned 
 without any. Another detail traveled 26 miles and re 
 turned with one quart per horse. 
 
 June 13th to 18th, received half forage. 
 
 June 19th to 22d, received no forage. 
 
 June 23d to July 17th, received half forage. 
 
 sore backs J u ty 27th to 30th, foraged on the country for twen- 
 ing 8 forageon a fhe ty miles around Stone Mountain. All was packed upon 
 much 6 harm as the withers of the horses, doing as much harm as the 
 
 the forage does . ... , . . 
 
 good. feed did good, causing sore backs, 
 
 cavalry in August 1st to 15th the command was in the trenches 
 
 trenches means . , c .,11 
 
 gross neglect of and separated from the horses. 
 
 August 15th and 16th, received one quart per head. 
 August 17th and 18th, received one pint of feed. 
 August 19th to 24th, marched 120 miles, feeding 
 but once upon green corn. 
 
 August 24th to September 9th, half rations. 
 September 9th to llth, no feed and no grazing. 
 Stock received no salt or hay during the campaign. 
 
163 
 
 Recapitulation : 
 
 Horses 
 
 Started with 919 
 
 Captured 42 
 
 961 
 Loss : 
 
 Abandoned and died 230 
 
 Killed and captured 171 
 
 401 
 
 Present September 13 560 
 
 Marched 902 miles, not including picket duty and 
 company scouting. 
 
 The horses were without food 26 days and scant March from 
 food 27 days; they were 7 consecutive days without f ood to ^SA^ 
 of any kind. g& A p - to AH ^ : 
 
 The majority of horses that died and were aban 
 doned were literally starved. 
 
 (Maj. Wm. Jennings, 7th Pa. Cav., R. R., Vol. 38 
 Part II, p. 832.) 
 
 Ext. No. 426. The men are in good health and Nea ri y half of 
 spirits, but want clothing badly. I have sent back toSWgffiSK 
 endeavor to procure a supply of both, and also horse- of e hoJ s e e f 8 ho5 aat 
 shoes,^for want of which nearly half our cavalry is ,&$?}" iffi! 
 unserviceable. As soon as these necessary articles are 
 obtained, we shall be prepared to resume operations. 
 
 (General R. E. Lee, R. R., Vol. 27, Part II, p, 302.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 The frequent change of commanders is highly det 
 rimental to any organization. (Ext. 419.) 
 
 Constant night picket duty will soon render cavalry 
 unserviceable. (Ext. 419.) 
 
 Full forage can seldom be expected during a cam 
 paign. (Ext. 420.) 
 
 Veteran cavalry will frequently walk on foot to 
 save their horses. (Ext. 421.) 
 
 Green corn is a very unsatisfactory forage. (Exts. 
 423, 424.) 
 
164 
 
 Deplorable results can be expected from recruits 
 mounted on young, untrained and unseasoned horses 
 which receive scant forage. (Ext. 425.) 
 
 Sore backs caused from packing forage on the 
 horse does cavalry as much harm as the forage does 
 good. (Ext. 425.) 
 
 The placing of cavalry in trenches means gross 
 neglect of their horses. (Ext. 425.) 
 
 The want of horseshoes will render cavalry tem 
 porarily unserviceable. (Ext. 426.) 
 
 FIELD DISEASES. 
 
 Hoof-rot. 
 
 Hoof-rot Ext - N - 427. - * haVC Sent t0 the Q uartermaster S 
 
 Bristoe (Va.) Department in Washington City 471 disabled horses. 
 
 ampaign Oct 63 
 
 There are at least 100 more in the command. The 
 frightful loss among horses owing to a disease which 
 resembles tetter (called in the army hoof rot) from the 
 effects of which the finest appearing horses in the com 
 mand become disabled in a few days march. The dis 
 ease seems to have been contracted in the quartermas 
 ter s corrals in Washington. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. Wesley Merritt, R. R., Vol. 29, Part 
 I, p. 353.) 
 
 Ext. No. 428. My cavalry was much reduced by 
 recent active operations, and particularly by the appear 
 ance with the last few days of hoof disease, which is 
 now spreading rapidly. 
 
 (Genl. Meade, R. R., Vol. 29, Part II, p. 376.) 
 
 Ext. No. 429. His horses are not fit for hard 
 service, and the disease called "rotten-hoof" has made 
 its appearance in that division with great virulence. 
 
 (Genl. Pleasanton, R. R., Vol. 29, Part II, p. 382.) 
 
 Hoof-rot and Ext. No - 430. Within the last three days I have 
 swelled tongue. been ^({^ to send into the dismounted camp 265 men 
 and horses, the horses having been affected with hoof 
 disease and swelled tongue. 
 
 (Genl. Kilpatrick, R. R., Vol. 29, Part II, p. 401.) 
 
 Hoof-rot. 
 
165 
 
 Ext. No. 431. The remedy used at the depot is 
 chloride of antimony for sore feet, and a decoction of 
 white oak bark for the mouth. 
 
 Another is borax and alum, half and half, pulver- Another remedy, 
 ized and mixed with sweet oil and applied with a swab 
 to the tongue; and still another, common salt crisped 
 on a hot shovel and applied to the feet and mouth. 
 
 Prevention : Give the horses all the salt they can Prevention, 
 eat. 
 
 (R. R., Vol. 29, Part II, p. 419.) 
 
 From February 27th to March 28th, 1865, Sheri 
 dan, with two divisions of cavalry, marched from Win 
 chester to Petersburg. He says : "There perhaps never 
 was a march where nature offered such impediments and 
 shrouded herself in so much gloom as upon this; inces 
 sant rain, deep and almost impassable streams, swamps 
 and mud were overcome. 
 
 "Our loss in horses was considerable almost en- LOSS from hoof- 
 tirely from hoof-rot." 
 
 Ext. No. 432. A troublesome disease, known as Grease-heei. 
 "grease heel," had prevailed among the horses, and the 
 number of men for duty in this brigade had been re 
 duced to less than 1,000. 
 
 (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, 
 p. 169.) 
 
 Ext. No. 433. The hardships of the expedition had 
 been so extreme and prolonged that it had perceptibly 
 affected them, leaving them jaded and footsore. Many 
 also were now taken with the "scours" and "cramp," scours, 
 which proved so fatal in a few moments that of the 550 CrampB - 
 with which the command reached Rome, not more than 
 250 remained. 
 
 (Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest s Cavalry, 
 p. 279.) 
 
 Ext. No. 434. A slip of old blanket made into a HOW to keep 
 
 , . < 11 horses from get- 
 
 bandage, carefully and closely rolled around the legs, ting scratches. 
 
 beginning at the pastern, will save every horse s heels 
 from scratches. Four such strips, warmed and dried at 
 
166 
 
 the fire, will put such comfort into the animal as to 
 enable him to go through a mud raid unharmed. The 
 heels and pasterns should be hand rubbed after cleansing, 
 and a little grease rubbed in now and then. Such a plan 
 will save the whole force from scratches if the use of 
 bandages is combined therewith. (P. 39.) 
 
 Dry quarters will save your horses from scratches. 
 
 (Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade, p. 54.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 The disease called hoof-rot amounted, at times, to 
 an epidemic. It comes from constantly standing in the 
 mud. It was common in the cavalry camp at Huntsville, 
 Ala., in 1898. The prevention is to stand the horse in 
 a dry place and bandage their pasterns with flannel ban 
 dages. (Ext. 434.) The cure is very difficult. 
 
 The scours and cramps which proved so fatal to 
 Forrest s horses seemed to be very rare. (Ext. 433.) 
 
 LED HORSES. 
 
 Led horses Ext. No. 435. The confusion occasioned by get- 
 
 causes confusion , . < i r 1 1 1 1^-111 
 
 to troops in rear, ting a large number of led horses hastily back on one 
 
 road was communicated to the men and caused the men 
 to break badly. 
 
 (Col. G. H. Chapman, Comg. 2d Brig., R. R., Vol. 
 36, Part I, p. 897.) 
 
 in an assault ^ xt> ^ To> ^^ Lieut. Col. Briggs deserves great 
 man 7 shoui^be cre dit f or his efforts to bring every man possible into 
 Fngiine the fir " action, leaving only one man in eight with horses. 
 Apises/ 1 *" ( Col A - - Miller, Comg. Brig., R. R., Vol. 49, 
 Part I, p. 448.) 
 
 This extract refers to the assault of Selma, Ala., 
 by dismounted cavalry. 
 
 Led horses ^ xt> ^ ^ ^ n t ^ ie attac ^ on Selma, Ala., April 
 
 fmen d t edbyareg ~ 2d > 1865 > the led horses and pack mules of General 
 
 2 S i86? a Ala Apr Long s division were guarded by a regiment, the 3d 
 
 Ohio. They were found necessary to keep off the Con 
 
 federate cavalry, which was attacking them in rear. 
 
 (Col. Robt. Minty, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 461.) 
 
167 
 
 (Brig. Genl. Eli Long, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 
 438.) 
 
 Ext. No. 438. So closely did the enemy press my when dis- 
 
 j r ,1 . mounted cavalry 
 
 command many of the men were unable to mount their br eats, press 
 
 . . them closely. 
 
 horses; the enemy, capturing and mounting- the horses, stoneman s raid 
 
 j, i . July 27,-Ang. 6, 
 
 repeatedly charged my rear as I continued to retreat. 186 4- 
 (Col. H. Capron, R. R., Vol. 38, Part II, p, 927.) 
 Ext. No. 439. Gregg decided to retreat when he in a retreat the 
 
 got all his led horses fairly on the way, and such of sent aSSS with 
 
 , , , , , . the wounded. 
 
 the wounded as could be transported, he retired by his A11 wounded 
 right flank in some confusion, it is true, but stubbornly S5??d e B hSuid bl 
 resisting to Hopewell Church, where Hampton ceased TaiC^c ross 
 to press him. ?2 0a i d 8 S k Va " Jnne 
 
 (Sheridan s Memoirs, p. 435, Vol. I.) 
 
 Ext. 440. The rebel brigade came at double quick when mount- 
 up the hollow, colors in front, and in another instant a n %avy e fire fil ?s 
 was in line of battle. Three hundred Spencers from the the command 
 
 mounted under 
 
 zd Iowa drove them back in confusion ; but a moment, fSSS^SSd 00 " 
 however, intervened when the rebels rallied. Major Hor- On e battalion 
 ton in the meantime retired and mounted, by battalions, &* "hi TthSrs 
 under fire, leaving one officer and five men wounded on withdrawal* 1 
 
 the field Campbellsville, 
 
 me neia. Tenn Nov 24> , 64 ; 
 
 (Col. D. E. Coon, R. R., Vol. 45, Part I, p. 588.) 
 Ext. No. 441. Wheeling with his escort (about 75 A sudden dash 
 
 . into a battery 
 
 men) and a detachment of some 50 strong, the Conf ed- f a j e 8 
 erate commander now made one of his characteristic 
 
 dashes at their pieces, dispersed their gunners and threw Ro p ^ r s k ^ n s n 
 their infanty support into such confusion as to materially 30> 1862 
 aid his command at the moment to regain and mount 
 their horses. 
 
 (Campaigns of Forrest and of Forrest s Cavalry, 
 p. 214.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 If a large number of led horses go back on one 
 road, much confusion will result. (Ext. 435.) It will 
 often happen that there is no other road over which they 
 can travel. If possible, led horses should be in rear of 
 
168 
 
 the units to which they belong and maintain that relative 
 position. 
 
 When horses do not need to be moved, they can be 
 tied in a circle, and thus bring more men into the fight. 
 (Ext. 436.) 
 
 A guard should always be left with the led horses. 
 (Ext. 437.) 
 
 Extract 438 cites a case of led horses being cap 
 tured, mounted and used to charge their former riders. 
 
 When a retreat is decided upon, the led horses may 
 be sent to the rear with the wounded. (Ext. 439.) 
 
 Dismounted troops may regain their led horses 
 under cover of a vigorous attack. (Exts. 440, 441.) 
 
 value of being Ext. No. 442.* * * through which flows a 
 ]umpfng e horse. a little stream whose steep banks form a ditch from ten to 
 jun?8o!i863. Pa fifteen feet wide and from three to four feet deep. 
 Stuart, with his staff and couriers, occupied this field 
 on the side next the enemy. The position soon became 
 one of extreme peril to Stuart, whose retreat by the 
 road was cut off. Nothing remained but to leap the 
 ditch. Splendidly mounted on his favorite mare, Vir 
 ginia, Stuart took the ditch at a running leap and landed 
 safely on the other side with several feet to spare. Some 
 of the party made the leap with equal success, but a few 
 failed and landed their riders in the shallow water, 
 w r hence by energetic scrambling they reached the safe 
 side of the stream. 
 
 (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, 
 p. 328.) 
 
 pact trains Ext. No. 443. I directed McCook to strengthen 
 roE the battalion previously ordered to Centerville by a regi- 
 
 therefore ma- , , . , . 
 
 chine guns on me nt and to follow at once with LaGrange s entire bn- 
 
 packs cannot i i 
 
 cavli?y u making acle > leaving all pack trains and wagons with the main 
 a forced march co i umn so t hat he could march with the utmost celerity. 
 
 Wilson s Raid, T 
 
 Mar,A P r.,i865. (Mzj. Genl j H Wilson, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, 
 
 p. 358.) 
 
169 
 
 Ext. No. 444. I found it necessary to retreat. I Mules as 
 immediately gave the command : " fours, right about, m JonTsborongii 
 gallop, march." This movement, owing to the narrow- Ga Augl 81 1864> 
 ness of the lane and the many obstinate mules on which 
 one-fourth of the men were mounted, was executed with 
 some confusion. 
 
 (Capt. M. Choumee, Comg. 5th la. Cav., R. R., 
 Vol. 38., Part II, p. 873.) 
 
170 
 
 CHAPTER XL 
 
 MISCELLANEOUS INTERESTING FACTS. 
 
 Artillery team Ext. No. 445. Seeing our force so small, a bat- 
 
 disabled by 
 
 K>?6e! ng wheel tanon f tne enemy formed and advanced to retake the 
 Te McNutt s Bridge, guns. A horse in each wheel team was shot to hinder 
 his moving them. 
 
 (Col. O. H. LaGrange, R. R., Vol. 32, Part I, p. 
 144.) 
 
 See also Ext. 119. 
 Killing of lead Ext. No. 446. Before the guns could be moved, the 
 
 and swing horses , . , , r 1 1 1 
 
 does not prevent drivers and horses of the lead and swing teams were 
 
 the gun from be- . 
 
 ing moved. killed or wounded, and Ryan, the driver of the wheel 
 
 May e, 1864. team, had his arm shattered by a bullet. Breathed 
 
 jumped from his horse, cut loose the teams that were 
 
 struggling on the ground, mounted a wheel horse, and 
 
 brought off the gun almost as by a miracle. 
 
 (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, 
 p. 408.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 The foregoing extracts go to show that the best 
 way to stop an artillery team is to kill a wheel horse. 
 Model canton- Ext. No. 447. The plan of that constructed by 
 bison s Raid General Hammond and afterwards occupied by Upton s 
 Mar.-Apr., 1865. di v j s i on j regard the best arrangement of a cavalry can 
 tonment yet devised. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. J. H. Wilson, R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, 
 p. 355.) " 
 
171 
 
172 
 
 astt Yards 
 
 } oa DO oa oa DO o 
 a DO DO oa oa DO D 
 
 sO DO DO-,Da DO DO D 
 ^Q DO DO DO DO DO D 
 
 -a DO DO DO Da DO D 
 43 DO DO oa DO oa D 
 
 a oa oa DO 
 
 a D-D DO DO 
 
 a oa Da^oa 
 
 a oa DaDa 
 
 a DO DO oa 
 
 a DO DO DO 
 
 DO oa D 
 DO oa D 
 DO oa o 
 DO DO D 
 DO oa D 
 
 OO DO D 
 
 to oo oo oo oo oo o o oo oo QQ oo oo o 
 
 H ? 
 
 Waterloo and CrieallvaTn s Ferry Road 
 
 O DO DC DO DO DO O 
 
 a oa DO Da oa oa o 
 
 o DO DO-DO oa oa o 
 
 CD DO oa^oa oa DO o 
 
 a oa DO DO DO DO D 
 
 a DQ DO DO DO oa o 
 
 a oo oo oo oo oo o 
 
 a 
 
 Plan of the Cantonment of the 1st Brigade, 7th Division, Cavalry Corps, Military Divi 
 sion of the Mississippi, at Gravelly Springs, Ala., in January and February, 1865. Accom 
 panying report of Bvt. Maj. Gen. J. H. "Wilson, U. S. A., June 29, 1865. 
 
 NOTE : 
 
 A. End Elevation of Stables. 
 
 B. Side Elevation of Stables. 
 
 C. Side Elevation of Cabins. 
 
 D. Front Elevation of Cabins. 
 
 E. Plan of Cabins. 
 
 F. Stables. 
 
 G. Men s Quarters. 
 
 H. Regimental Headquarters. 
 
 I. Brigade Headquarters. 
 
 NOTE : 
 
 a. Table. 
 
 b. Bunks. 
 
 c. Chimnej and Fireplace. 
 
 d. Door. 
 
 e. Vacant place to sit. 
 
 Figures denote the dimensions in feet 
 and inches. 
 
 Treatment of Ext. No. 448. The enemy made a forced march 
 
 civilians when . 
 
 secrecy is desired. o f 35 miles on the 3d instant, and picked up on their 
 way all persons who might give information of their 
 approach. An important scout was captured twelve miles 
 from the post, and the enemy avoided my infantry pick 
 ets near the town and in advance of the bridge by dis 
 mounting and moving through the fields with negro 
 Poor outpost guides. Their sudden and unexpected appearance at 
 capture of TUS- the bridge and overwhelming numbers dispersed the 
 
 caloosa, Ala., Apr. . . . 
 
 4,1865. militia guard after but a faint show of resistance. 
 
 (Capt. A. B. Hardcastle, C. S., R. R., Vol. 49, Part 
 I, p. 505.) 
 
173 
 
 OOLOB8. 
 
 Ext. No 449. We missed the colors, taken to> the colors neces 
 sary to rally reg- 
 
 states by the men discharged, to rally the regiment on, iment on. 
 
 Cedar Creek,Va., 
 
 more in this engagement than at any other time since NOV. 12, ISM. 
 on account of the small number of officers present. 
 
 (Maj. W. G. Cummings, 1st Vt. Cav., R. R., Vol. 
 43, Parti, p. 549.) 
 
 (See also "A Summer Night s Dream.") 
 
 Ext. No. 450. In our own cavalry sets, at the com- u?e of lariats 
 mencement of the war lariat ropes were issued with iron 
 picket pins. These were soon disused. Their intention 
 was to confine the horse at night and permit him to 
 graze while tethered. In practice it was found that the 
 horses were certain to get entangled in the ropes and 
 cut their hind pasterns very dangerously. 
 
 (Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade, p. 66.) 
 
 AN EXPLOIT. 
 
 Ext. No. 451. At about 3:00 A. M. February 21, Lieut. McNeil 
 1865, Lieutenant McNeill, Confederate cavalry, with Federal generals 
 
 J without firing a 
 
 thirty men, entered Cumberland, Maryland. They cap- a n 0t a ? a r rm reating 
 tured the picket and rode quietly to the headquarters Cumberland, 
 
 Md., Fed. 21, 1865. 
 
 of Generals Crook and Kelley, overpowered the guards, 
 and without disturbing the occupants of the adjoining 
 rooms, compelled the generals to dress and mount led 
 horses waiting at the door and made off at a rapid rate, 
 making good the capture and escape without firing a 
 shot. The alarm was not given for ten minutes and it 
 was an hour before a pursuing party could be started. 
 
 (R. R., Vol. 46, Part I, pp. 469 and 470.) 
 
 Ext. No. 452. About thirteen miles from Macon I Treatment of 
 was met by a flag of truce under the rebel general, Rob- Wilson s Raid, 
 
 -PU j *i n r Apr. 20, 1865. 
 
 ertson. Ihe force we were pursuing passed the flag of 
 truce and thus saved themselves. The flag of truce de 
 tained us about half an hour. I then received orders to 
 give them five minutes to get out of the way, and then 
 to drive everything before me. After going about two 
 miles he came in sight of the flag of truce party covering 
 the rear of about 250 men. They were moving very 
 
174 
 
 slowly and evidently trying to delay us. Seeing this, 
 the adjutant charged them, causing the flag of truce to 
 run into the woods, capturing three of the officers that 
 were with it and driving the rebels pell-mell along the 
 road. 
 
 (Lieut. Col. F. White, 17th Ind. Mtd. Inf., R. R., 
 Vol. 49, Part I, p. 458.) 
 
 FOBAGING HOW DONE. 
 
 HOW to collect Ext. No. 453. The only proper people to attend 
 
 and distribute J L 
 
 forage. to foraging parties are officers of the quartermaster s 
 
 department. They ought to be made to attend to it the 
 same as regular issues, the corps quartermaster mapping 
 out the ground for his division quartermasters, who, 
 in turn, assign to each brigade its foraging ground. All 
 forage should be collected and issued by the brigade and 
 regimental quartermasters proportionately and justly. 
 The best way is to impress wheeled vehicles of the 
 country into the service and forbid the carriage of grain 
 on the horses. The quartermasters can then keep the 
 grain more easily under their own control, and six or 
 seven times as much can be brought in for distribu 
 tion without any distress to the horses. 
 
 (See also Forage under heading of "Supplies.") 
 (Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade, p. 65.) 
 safeguards. Ext. No. 454. Safeguards should in all cases be 
 
 left at houses that have supplied the troops to protect 
 them from future pillage. 
 
 (Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade, p. 65.) 
 
 Marching cav- Ext - No - 455. Next morning I was ordered to 
 Sov? ve n r f y an e r x y move my division dismounted, and did so, marching the 
 
 ftmOttw to men about two miles > and as there was S0me chan g e in 
 l5S?i8w. iss " Jttly the orders about our position after we came upon the 
 field, there was consequently marching and counter 
 marching, which proved very exhausting to men unac 
 customed to marching on foot. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. J. R. Chalmers, C. S., of Forrest s 
 cavalry, R. R., Vol. 39, Part I, p. 326. 
 
175 
 
 Ext. No. 456. And so at last our cavalry was Advantages of 
 gathered together from its places of contempt and banded organized into*! 
 together in one corps, as it should be. Its progress 
 from that moment was positively marvelous. Not a dis 
 aster befel the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac from 
 the day it was first drawn into the cavalry corps. It 
 went on from victory to victory. 
 
 (Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade, p. 24.) 
 
 Ext. No. 457. Any scheme of military service cavalry should 
 
 not be at a peace 
 
 . 
 
 which requires long drilling and costly preparation i 
 eminently unfitted for the United States. \? s a11 the 
 
 (Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade, p. 27.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 The extracts referring to organization are very few, 
 but very important. The lessons illustrated should not 
 be forgotten. At the time Sheridan took charge of the 
 cavalry of the Army of the Potomac, it was picketing 
 an infantry camp on a line of 60 miles and guarding 
 wagon trains. Although the Confederate cavalry had 
 been an object lesson for three years, not much was 
 learned from the lesson till Sheridan, with Grant s sup 
 port, was enabled to break away from the established 
 custom of using cavalry as above described. 
 
 Extract 457 is very short, but Captain Whittaker 
 might have written a book and not have said more. 
 In substance it means that a peace organization which 
 is to be increased in time of war is to be condemned. 
 No system could be more vicious. It was tried out in 
 the Spanish war, and conclusively demonstrated that cav 
 alry in time of peace should be at its war strength. Any 
 inflation except by trained men will operate as a complete 
 block to its effectiveness. At the beginning cavalry will 
 be needed badly or not at all. The principle is supported 
 by such eminent authority as Von Bernhardi and others. 
 
 Ext. No. 458. The transfer of Torbert to the po- cavalry need. 
 sition of Chief of Cavalry left Merritt in command of 1<3S C * 
 the First Cavalry Division. He had been tried in the 
 
176 
 
 place before, and from the day he was selected as one 
 of the young men to be appointed general officers, with 
 the object of giving life to the cavalry corps, he filled 
 the measure of expectation. 
 
 (Sheridan s Memoirs, p. 474, Vol. I.) 
 
 PRISONERS. 
 
 strength of a Ext. No. 459. March 3d to 8th, 1865, Sheridan 
 
 guard of convoy 
 
 ni 8 p tiie c n o e untr n a sent P risoners captured at Waynesborough, under con- 
 
 shenandoah voy commanded by Col. John L. Thompson, N. H. Cav., 
 
 i865. ey to Winchester, number of prisoners l,3oo. The escort 
 
 consisted of dismounted men and those with poor horses 
 
 from all the cavalry, about 600 men, together with seven 
 
 small organizations numbering 600 men in all ranks. 
 
 The march was through a hostile country infested 
 by Rosser s and Mosby s men. 
 
 The strength of the guard was about one soldier 
 to one prisoner. 
 
 (Col. J. L. Thompson, R. R., Vol. 46, Part I, p. 
 528.) 
 
 Advance troopi Ext. No. 460. We had no men to spare to guard 
 
 leave prisoners to . , 
 
 be gathered up prisoners, and they were ordered to the rear as fast as 
 
 by other troops 
 
 in rear. captured, and were gathered up bv parties of our own 
 
 Selma, Ala., , ^ 
 
 Apr. 2, 1865. and other commands. 
 
 (Col. J. G. Vail, 17th Ind., R. R, Vol. 49, Part I, 
 p. 450.) 
 
 command not Ext. No. 461. I moved forward as fast as possible 
 
 prisoners. toward the city, passing squads of the enemy who had 
 
 Apr. 2, 1865. thrown away their arms, and whom I ordered to the rear, 
 
 but on account of the paucity of my command I could 
 
 not spare men to guard them. 
 
 (Lieut. Col. E. Kitchell, 98th 111., R. R., Vol. 49, 
 Part I, p. 452.) 
 victorious Ext. No. 462. Here the column turned to the right 
 
 troops pay no at 
 tention to prison- and at the double-quick moved down the line of entrench- 
 
 Columbus, Ga., ments on the principal fort, running over scores of the 
 
 Apr. 16, 1865. 
 
 enemy and paying no attention to prisoners. (Lieut. Col. 
 J. H. Peters, 4th la. Cav., R. R., Vol. 49, Part I, p. 
 498.) 
 
177 
 
 Ext. No. 463. The capture of prisoners was com- prisoners ignor- 
 pletely ignored in the eagerness of the men to press Inem? stniihoJS 
 forward so long as there was an enemy still showing re- EbeneezeTchnrch 
 sistance. Aia., Apr. i, 1865. 
 
 (Col. J. Morris Young, 5th la. Cav., R. R., Vol. 49, 
 Parti, p. 503.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 Where there is little danger of prisoners becoming 
 organized to offer effective resistance, no attention should 
 be paid to them by advanced troops. 
 
 It is true that troops in rear will gather them; up 
 and claim the honors, but advanced troops will have to 
 suffer the injustice rather than fail to administer a de 
 cisive defeat to the enemy. To deplete the advanced 
 victorious troops of men to guard prisoners would be to 
 relinquish the fruits of victory. (Exts. 460, 461, 462.) 
 The advanced troops should press forward as long as 
 there is an enemy still to show resistance. (Ext 463.) 
 
 Ext. No. 464. I attempted to fall back upon the Recruits are 
 
 . f not to be depend- 
 
 support above referred to, but finding this in full retreat, ed on - 
 
 the regiment was swept to the lines of the First Brigade, naee, n va.! a oct a 7", 
 
 nearly two miles, without being able to offer any effectual 
 
 resistance. It will be borne in mind that I had 150 
 
 recruits in ranks that never before had drilled a day 
 
 or heard a shot in earnest. 
 
 (Lieut. Col. J. W. Bennett, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, 
 p. 545.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 The commander who depends on recruits will lean 
 on a broken reed. They are useful only at their own 
 fireside, which they will fight to defend. Even then 
 they are useful only on the defensive. 
 
 Ext. No. 465. In sending re-enforcements into the 
 field Heaven grant that they may not be organized into 
 fresh regiments, as they were at ruinous and suicidal 
 costs in 1864. Sent as recruits to fill up gaps of the 
 veterans, such men pick up their duty in a very short 
 time under the teaching s of their comrades. 
 
178 
 
 (Volunteer Cavalry, Lessons of the Decade, p. 32.) 
 Recall gives Ext. No. 466. Col. La Grange, rinding the enemy 
 
 notice to the 
 
 of a re - massing heavily upon him, ordered the recall sounded. 
 Ma ta 9~ ^ e enem y becoming aware of our situation, rushed for- 
 1864> ward in overwhelming numbers, capturing many of the 
 
 dismounted skirmishers and driving the remainder in 
 confusion to the woods. 
 
 (Lieut. Col. H. P. Lamson, R. R., Vol. 38, Part 
 II, p. 781.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 Trumpet calls in the presence of the enemy only 
 serve to give them notice of intended movements. The 
 value of trumpet calls may well be questioned. If they 
 cannot be used in the presence of the enemy, of what 
 good are they in time of peace? There are a few that 
 it will make no difference whether the enemy knows or 
 does not know, such as the charge. The enemy can see 
 the charge, and it will make no difference if he does 
 hear the call. Such calls, however, as the recall, to the 
 rear, assemble, by the flank, etc., might as well be dis 
 pensed with. 
 
 RUSE OK STRATAGEM. 
 
 A ruse. Ext. No. 467. In order to deceive the enemy still 
 
 Jam?s! jSA K more, I sent during the night one of my divisions to the 
 opposite side of the James, first covering the bridge with 
 moss and grass to prevent the tramp of the horses being 
 heard, and at daylight marched it back again on foot 
 in full view of the enemy, creating the impression that a 
 large and continuous movement to the north side was 
 still going on. 
 
 (Maj. Gen. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, 
 p. 800.) 
 
 Aruse Ext. No. 468. During Grierson s raid, Captain 
 
 Grierson s Raid, Forbes with Co. C, 1st 111. Cav., was detached. He 
 
 Apr. 17,-May 2, bo. , 
 
 later reached Enterprise in an effort to rejoin Gnerson s 
 command. Here he found 2,000 rebels just getting off 
 the cars. He promptly raised a flag of truce and rode 
 boldly forward and demanded the surrender of the place 
 
179 
 
 to Colonel Grierson. The rebel officer, Colonel Good 
 win, asked one hour to consider the proposition, which 
 was granted. Captain Forbes then moved out of sight 
 and then moved off after Colonel Grierson with all pos 
 sible speed. 
 
 (History of U. S. Cavalry, Brackett, p. 296.) 
 
 Ext. No. 469. Fortunately Young had with him A ruse, 
 a regimental band ; this he moved rapidly from point to pafg", Vet e i863 m " 
 point in rear, and by its music tended to exaggerate in 
 the enemy s estimation the force at his disposition. 
 
 (Life and Campaigns of Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, 
 p. 384.) 
 
 BOUT PANIC. 
 
 Ext. No. 470. The enemy s retreat finally became Rout. Panic, 
 a rout; led horses, mounted men and artillery all fled gre \T l Scutio e n 
 together in the wildest confusion. Williston, with hisE > r n 00 r ps. treatiIlg 
 battery, took position near by and did elegant practice tJn*va" a juneii , 
 with his guns, planting shells in the midst of the con- 181 
 fused mass of the retreating enemy. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. Wesley Merritt, R. R., Vol. 36, Part 
 I, p. 850.) 
 
 Ext. No. 471. In this attack the enemy was driven cavalry when 
 
 . .. . defeated in front 
 
 in confusion from his position and simultaneous with of infantry, com- 
 
 mn n i cat ea its 
 
 it, Merritt and Averill, under Torbert, could be distinctly ggjgjj" to the 
 seen sweeping up the Martinsburg pike, driving the en ~ V{ J >pe s q e u t"^^ 
 emy s cavalry before them in a confused mass through 
 the broken infantry. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, 
 p. 47.) 
 
 Ext. No. 472. I found it impossible to rally the Defeated troops 
 
 ~, ,. seized with a 
 
 troops. They would not listen to entreaties, threats orgerat terror of 
 
 the enemy s cav- 
 
 appeals of any kind. A terror of the enemy s cavalry alr y. 
 
 , ,. ^ Cedar Creek, 
 
 had seized them and there was no holding them. They va.,oct, 19,1864. 
 fled in the greatest confusion. 
 
 (Lieut. Genl. J. A. Early, C. S., R. R., Vol. 43, 
 Part I, p. 562.) 
 
180 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 The psychology of the battle field is a subject which 
 is receiving much consideration. The commander who 
 can utilize it to its fullest extent will have a great ad 
 vantage over one who cannot. 
 
 In time of panic cavalry will certainly fill a defeated 
 enemy with terror. (Ext. 472.) Then will be the time 
 to reap the reward in trophies and prisoners. (Ext. 
 471.) 
 
 Macademized Ext. No. 473. The roads macadamized and the 
 SpMvairy witn- cavalry unprovided with horseshoes, and being compelled 
 
 out shoes. J 1 1 T r J 
 
 Shenandoahto subsist mostly on young grass without salt, 1 found 
 May-7une\ m ffl gn my -command in a most deplorable condition. Our 
 work had been eternal, day and night. We were under 
 fire twenty-six days out of thirty. 
 
 (Col. T. T. Munford, C. S., R. R., Vol. 12, Part I, 
 p. 733.) 
 soldiers sleep Ext. No. 474. I allowed the men to sleep on their 
 
 on the ground . . 
 
 holding bridles, arms, which for our arm of the service means to he 
 
 - upon the ground, holding the bridle, and keeping in 
 readiness to leap into the saddle at a moment s notice. 
 (Col. E. B. Sawyer, 1st Vt. Cav., R. R., Vol. 29, 
 Part I, p. 393.) 
 
 stragglers get Ext. No. 475. A party of foragers sent out from 
 Expedition to the 1st Miss, lost two of their men who straggled from 
 
 Oxford, Miss., 
 
 Aug. 6,1864. the column. 
 
 (Lieut. Col. J. C. Hess, R. R., Vol. 39, Part I, p. 
 393-) 
 Guerillas pre- Ext. No. 476. During this campaign I was at times 
 
 Ind\e s e?!mlnl annoyed by guerrilla bands; the most formidable was 
 under a partisan chief named Mosby, who made his 
 headquarters east of the Blue Ridge, in the section of 
 the country about Upperville. I had constantly refused 
 to operate against these bands, believing them to be, sub 
 stantially, a benefit to me, as they prevented straggling 
 and kept my trains well closed up, and discharged such 
 other duties as would have required a provost guard of 
 at least two regiments of cavalry. 
 
181 
 
 (Maj. Gen. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I 
 p. 55.) 
 
 Ext. No. 477. July 9, Colonel N. P. Richmond 
 was relieved of the command of the brigade, and the 
 regiment, by order, went to Frederick City, Md., for 
 the purpose of doing provost duty and arresting all 
 stragglers, and to form a stragglers camp. 
 
 (Maj. C. E. Capehart, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 
 1020, After the Battle of Gettysburg.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 Some patriotic Americans think that we are so 
 brave that straggling as an item can be ignored. The 
 records show just the contrary. After the battle of 
 Gettysburg a stragglers camp had to be established to 
 collect the skulkers. (Ext. 477.) 
 
 MOBALE. 
 
 Ext. No. 478. I was ordered to support Custer s 
 brigade. * * * As soon as the enemy opened his guns 
 upon General Custer, the latter charged with his brigade, * Yell w 
 mostly mounted. In pursuance to my instructions, Chap 
 man with his brigade charged at the same time. * * * 
 The charge was entirely successful. * * * It was in 
 this charge and the melee which followed that the rebel 
 cavalry leader, J. E. B. Stuart, was killed, and from it 
 may be dated the permanent superiority of the national 
 cavalry over that of the rebels. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. J. H. Wilson, R. R., Vol. 36, Part I, 
 p. 879. Yellow Tavern, May 11, 1864.) 
 
 Ext. No. 479. Under gallant leaders your cavalry Fe derai 
 has become the efficient arm in this war that it has proved Gob* e 6 a S er d 
 in other countries, and is winning by its exploits the^e 
 admiration of the government and the country. i 8 a 6 4 ley 
 
 (Stanton to Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, p. 62.) 
 
 Ext. No. 480. Officers and men, as they saw the Military spirit 
 sun appear bright and glorious above the horizon, felt ex ^ mplified ; 
 
 upeqiion trpen. 
 
 a consciousness of renewed strength, a presentiment of Va -> Sept - 19 - 1864 - 
 fresh glory to be added that day to their already unfad- 
 
 cav- 
 er d s 
 
182 
 
 ing laurels. They felt like men who were willing to do 
 and die; that they were not deceived the history of the 
 day proves. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. Wesley Merritt, R. R., Vol. 43, Part 
 I, p. 443.) 
 
 superiority in Ext. No. 481. In this fight I had already defeated 
 
 tuILTh^scr" 16 the enemy s infantry, and could have continued to do so, 
 
 va pe sep? i9 r i864 but the enemy s great superiority in cavalry and the conv 
 
 parative inefficiency of ours turned the scale against us. 
 
 (Lieut. Genl. Jubal A. Early, C. S., R. R., Vol. 
 
 43, Parti, p. 555.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 Morale plays a very important part in the winning 
 or losing of a battle. Troops that feel conscious of their 
 superiority are difficult to defeat, while those that feel 
 their inferiority are half defeated at the beginning. This 
 feeling of inferiority may be in the arms, morale, artil 
 lery, leadership or cavalry. (Ext. 481.) The effect of 
 leadership is shown in extracts 478 and 479. Troops 
 conscious of their superiority are mentioned in Extract 
 480. ! 
 
 UNMOUNTED CAVALRY. 
 
 mounted cavalry. Ext. No. 482. In obedience to orders, I took com- 
 
 mand of the dismounted (unmounted) men of this 
 division, designated as the Fourth Brigade Cavalry. I 
 organized the command into three regiments, the men 
 of each brigade forming a regiment, and numbered after 
 their respective brigades as the First, Second and Third 
 Regiments. Each regiment was formed into companies 
 of fifty men each, with one commissioned officer and the 
 proper number of non-commissioned officers to each 
 company. 
 
 (Lieut. Col. Wm. B. Way, 9th Mich. Cav., R. R., 
 Vol. 47, Part I, p. 902.) 
 MX . 8Bald (See also Vol. 49, Part I, p. 356.) 
 
183 
 
 Ext. No. 483. All dismounted cavalry belonging Unmou nted 
 to the army of the Potomac, and the dismounted cav- JJd - 2a?8r82 
 airy belonging to the Middle Military Division not re- pofnt. 6 c 
 quired for guarding property belonging to their arm of 
 the service will report to Brigadier General Benham to 
 be used in the defenses of City Point. 
 
 (Sheridan s Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 128.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 Unmounted cavalry may be used to guard wagon 
 trains, convoy prisoners (Ext. 459), to defend important 
 points, as infantry, to guard property belonging to their 
 arm of the service (Ext. 483), or, better yet, as Forrest 
 used them, namely, take them along and capture mounts 
 for them. 
 
 FRUITS OF VICTORY. 
 
 Ext. No. 484. We sent to the War Department Fruits of vic- 
 from May 5, 1864, to April 9, 1865, 205 battle flags tory> Trophies 
 captured in the open field, and captured between 160 
 and 170 pieces of artillery. 
 
 In all the operations the percentage of cavalry cas- Percentage of 
 
 1 J cavalry losses. 
 
 ualties was as great as that of infantry, and the ques 
 tion which had existed, "Who ever saw a dead cavalry 
 man?" was set at rest. 
 
 (Genl. P. H. Sheridan, Report of Cavalry Opera 
 tions of the Army of the Potomac.) 
 
 Ext. No. 485. The part that I expected the cav- cavalry fails to 
 
 i .. , -,-,. . -r-T 11 f M secure the fruits 
 
 airy to accomplish at P isher s Hill was a complete failure, of victory. 
 
 I have relieved Averill from his command. Instead of val ley "campaign, 
 
 following the enemy when he was broken at Fisher s 
 
 Hill so that there was not a cavalry organization left, 
 
 he went into camp and left me to pursue the enemy for 
 
 a distance of fifteen miles with infantry during the 
 
 night. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R, Vol. 43, Part I, 
 p. 29.) 
 
 Ext. No. 486. When I attacked the enemy, Mer- Pursuitweii 
 ritt and Custer, under the direction of Torbert, fiercely of e victo?y gather- 
 attacked the enemy s flanks and when he broke, closed 
 
184 
 
 cedar creek,va., in after dark and secured the artillery, trains, etc. 
 
 The cavalry pursuit was kept up to a point between 
 Edenburg and Mount Jackson. We captured fourteen 
 battle flags, 50 pieces of artillery, 1,600 prisoners, ambu 
 lances, wagons in large numbers, etc. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. P. H. Sheridan, R. R., Vol. 43, Part I, 
 p. 33. Battle of Cedar Creek or Winchester.) 
 Trophies of Ext. No. 487. During and after the Battle of 
 a6hviiie,Teim. N&shville. Stannary: Captured by Hatch s Division, 
 2 redoubts, 17 guns, 2 battle flags, 2 droves of beef cat 
 tle, 35 wagons (including the headquarters train of Chal 
 mers Division), one brigadier general and 701 pris 
 oners; Knipe s Division 5 battle flags, 350 prisoners, 1 
 piece of artillery and 2 caissons; Johnston s Division 
 56 prisoners; Croxton brigade, 184 prisoners; 4th U. S. 
 cavalry 1 gun and 25 prisoners. In addition, John 
 ston s and Knipe s Divisions should be credited with the 
 wounded taken in hospitals at Franklin, 2,000 men. 
 
 Total, 2 redoubts, 19 guns, 7 battle flags and 3,316 
 prisoners. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. J. H. Wilson, R. R., Vol. 45, Part I, 
 p. 554.) 
 
 of a Ext. No. 488. Results of Wilson s Selma raid: 
 eima Twenty-two colors, 210 pieces of artillery, 34,500 
 1*1866^ 22> Apr< stand of small arms, 18 locomotives, 563 coal, flat and 
 box cars, 6,820 prisoners, 255,000 bales of cotton de 
 stroyed, military uniforms and supplies too numerous to 
 mention. 
 
 (Provost Marshal C. L. Greeno, R. R., Vol. 49, 
 Part I, p. 413.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 The possibility of cavalry at the time of a general 
 victory is here well illustrated. A dead cavalryman was 
 at last discovered, and the percentage of cavalry losses 
 was as great as that of infantry. (Ext. 484.) 
 
 The cavalry commander who puts his cavalry in 
 camp at time of a general victory should be given an 
 other job, as was Averill. (Ext. 485.) 
 
185 
 
 There will be times when cavalry will secure a great 
 number of trophies as a result of their own prowess. In 
 many cases, however, they reap the reward of a victory 
 brought about by other troops. (Ext. 487.) 
 
 WOUNDED. 
 
 Ext. No. 489. Morgan always made it a point to wounded 
 
 . ., 1 1 1 r 1 t should not be 
 
 carry off every wounded man who could be safely moved, abandoned to the 
 In this way he prevented much of the demoralization 
 attending the men felt of falling, when wounded, into 
 the hands of the enemy. 
 
 (Morgan s Cavalry, by Duke.) 
 
 Ext. No. 490. It was very soon evident that the wounded 
 
 should always be 
 
 force of the enemy was superior to ours, and that they removed if possi- 
 were supported by infantry. * * * It became evi- st. Mary s 
 
 . Church, Va., June 
 
 dent that the contest was too unequal to maintain it 24 > 186 *- 
 longer. The led horses, and wounded for whom there 
 was transportation, and caissons were started on the 
 road leading to Charles City Court House, 8 miles dis 
 tance. These fairly under way, our division began to re 
 tire by the right. Our men continued fighting on foot, 
 but were mounted from time to time. The movement 
 was made without confusion or disorder. 
 
 (Brig. Genl. D. McM. Gregg, R. R., Vol. 36, Part 
 I, p. 856.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 Wounded should not be abandoned to the enemy 
 when it is possible to remove them. Not only does the 
 abandonment seriously affect the morale, but such of the 
 wounded as get well are subject to exchange as prisoners 
 of war. In the end, then, it amounts to surrendering 
 fighting troops. It is usually the case that wounded can 
 not be removed from the firing line, but, as the line passes 
 on, the wounded should be removed by a special organ 
 ization as soon as it is safe to do so. The fighting men 
 should, under no circumstances, be allowed to leave the 
 firing line to assist or carry wounded to the rear. 
 
186 
 
 Qualities need- Ext - ^ 491 - Jt was in one of tnese brilliant en- 
 commaude a r valry gagements that the noble and gallant Farnsworth fell, 
 jiSy"?i8&3 glP *" heroically leading a charge of his brigade against the 
 rebel infantry. Gifted in a high degree with a quick 
 perception and correct judgment, and remarkable for 
 his daring and coolness, his comprehensive grasp of the 
 situation on the field of battle and the rapidity of his 
 actions had already distinguished General Farnsworth 
 among his comrades in arms. In his death was closed a 
 career that must have won the highest honors of his 
 profession. 
 
 (Genl. A. Pleasonton, R. R., Vol. 27, Part I, p. 
 916.) 
 
 what to do Ext - No - 492. During the night of July 3, the con> 
 * 8 manding general withdrew the main body to the ridges 
 Pft " west of Gettysburg and sent word to me to that effect, 
 but the messenger missed me. I repaired to his head 
 quarters during the latter part of the night and received 
 instructions as to the new line. 
 
 (Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, R. R., Vol. 27, Part II, p. 
 699.) 
 
 sleeping in the Ext. Nto. 493. After a series of exciting combats 
 d ttysi>urgCam. and night marches, it was a severe tax on their endur- 
 ain, Jane, 1873. ance . whole regiments slept j n t h e saddle; their faithful 
 
 animals keeping the road unguided. In some instances 
 they fell from their horses, overcome with physical fa 
 tigue and sleepiness. 
 
 (Maj. Genl. J. E. B. Stuart, C. S., R. R., Vol. 27, 
 Part II, p. 696.) 
 
 Ext. No. 494. Five days and nights of constant 
 
 JVl^n. sleep in. 
 
 fm hoSel ^ duty in the saddle, added to fourteen days rapid march- 
 is m > would shake even the most robust constitution. Men 
 fell from their horses, and the most persistent efforts 
 of their officers could not keep them awake. 
 
 (Lieut. Col. F. A. Jones, 8th Ind. Cav., R. R., Vol. 
 38, Part II, p. 875.) 
 
187 
 
 Ext. No. 495. The 6th Regiment was in the rear Men who ride 
 and our men were completely worn down and most of u uve hr dayswif 
 them sleeping on their horses. * * * Many of the fn Uestddie. p M 
 men were nearly exhausted from hunger and loss of Va S ifey 
 sleep. We had been in the saddle and had no regular 1862 
 rations for three days. 
 
 (Col. T. T. Munford, C. S., R. R., Vol. 12, Part I, 
 p. 730.) 
 
 COMMENTS. 
 
 It is evident from the foregoing that cavalry, un 
 der exceptional conditions, is going to sleep in the saddle. 
 A saddle for this purpose must have a high cantle. In 
 the combat the trooper will have to jump ditches, fences 
 and other obstacles. The saddle with a high cantle is 
 not adapted to this use. The McClellan tree is adapted 
 to the former rather than to the latter purpose. It should 
 be modified so as to fulfill all the conditions of combat, 
 rather than those of sleep, which are to be regarded as 
 exceptional. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 ADVANCE 
 GUARD. 
 
 AMBULANCES 
 AMMUNITION 
 
 ARMAMENT 
 
 ARTILLERY 
 
 ATTACK 
 
 BANDS 
 
 BARRICADES 
 BATTLE 
 BATTLEFIELD 
 BOLDNESS 
 
 In general, Exts. 244 to 247, p. 100. 
 Comments on, p. 102. 
 Formation of, Ext. 247, p. 101. 
 Morgan s system of, Ext. 246, p. 100. 
 Exts. 305, 366, p. 144; 385, p. 150. 
 
 Amount carried on the horse, Exts. 367, p. 144 ; 371, p. 146 ; 377, p. 148 ; 
 379, p. 149; 3SO, p. 149. 
 
 Amount carried on wagons, Exts. 367, p. 144; 362, p. 142; 366, p. 144; 
 367, p. 144; 371, p. 146; 377, p. 148; 380, p. 149. 
 
 Comments on the amount carried, p. 153. 
 
 Amount necessary, Ext. 371, p. 146.J 
 
 Supplied to the firing line, Exts. 133, p. 54; 392 to 394, p. 154. 
 
 Supplied to the firing line, comments on, p. 155. 
 
 Of Confederate Cavalry, See Introduction, pp. 12 and 16. 
 
 Of Forrest s Cavalry, Ext. 6, p. 16; Introduction, p. 14. 
 
 Of U. S. Cavalry, Introduction, p. 7. 
 
 Comments on, p. 37. 
 
 Charged by Cavalry, Exts. 73 to 76, p. 36. 
 
 How to charge, Ext. 78, p. 37. 
 
 How to disable horses of, Exts. 119 p. 51 ; 445, 446, p. 170. 
 
 Use revolvers, Ext. 77, p. 37. 
 
 Of Cavalry from the rear, Ext. 229 p. 93. 
 
 Of river crossing, Exts. 207 to 211, p. 77. 
 
 Should play during the battle, Exts. 101, p. 44; 223, p. 90; 469, 
 p. 179. 
 
 Exts. 142, p. 56; 154, p. 61. 
 
 Of Booneville, p. 82. 
 
 Selection of by Cavalry, Ext. 145, p. 57. 
 
 Eesults in small losses, Exts. 50, 51, p. 30. 
 
 Takes the place of numbers, Ext. 79, p. 38. 
 
Will often succeed when timidity will fail, Ext. 143, p. 56. 
 BOWIE KNIVES Use of, Ext. 4, p. 16. 
 BRANDING For pillage, Ext. 330, p. 131. 
 BREAD How made, Exts. 381, p. 149; 384, p. 150. 
 
 BREASTWORKS Attack of, Exts. 143, p. 56; 147, p. 58; 154, p. 61. 
 
 Made for Infantry, Exts. 133, 134, pp. 54 and 55. 
 BRIDGES Attack and defense of, Exts 213 to 218, pp. 78-80. 
 
 Attack and defense of, comments on, p. 126. 
 
 Construction and repair of, Exts. 307 to 316, pp. 123-126. 
 
 Pontoon, Exts. 312, 314, 315, p. 124; 366, 367, p. 144. 
 
 Rate of crossing, Ext. 316, p. 126. 
 
 CALLS Trumpet, Ext. 466, p. 178; comments on, p. 178. 
 
 CANTONMENT Model, Ext. 447, p. 170. 
 
 CARBINE Use of dismounted, Exts. 1, p. 12; 12, p. 17; 74, p. 36; 90, p. 41 
 
 113 to 151, pp. 50 60. 
 
 Use of mounted, Exts. 13, p. 17; 24, p. 20; 101 to 111, pp. 44-49. 
 CARE Of horses, Exts. 419 to 426, pp. 161-163; comments on, p. 163. 
 
 CAVALRY Confederate, Stuart s, Introduction, p. 11. 
 
 Wheeler s, Introduction, p. 12. 
 
 Forrest s, Introduction, p. 14. 
 
 Morgan s, Introduction, p. 14; Ext. 3, p. 14. 
 
 Mosby s, Introduction, p. 14. 
 
 Driven through Infantry lines, Exts. 53, p. 30; 471, p. 179. 
 Fight, picture of, Ext. 2, p. 13. 
 Improper use of, Exts. 227 to 231, pp. 93, 94. 
 Needs young officers, Ext. 456, p. 175. 
 Strategic use of, Exts. 295 to 306, pp. 118-121. 
 Unmounted, how used, Exts 482, p. 182; 483, p. 183; 459, p. 176. 
 CHARGE Against Artillery, Exts. 73, p. 36 ; 75, p. 36 ; 76, p. 36. 
 
 Against bridges, Exts. 215 to 217, p. 79. 
 Against field works, Exts. 87 to 91, pp. 41-42. 
 Against Infantry, Exts. 55, 56, p. 30-31 ; 79 to 83, p. 38-39. 
 As foragers, Ext. 24, p. 20. 
 Boot to boot, Ext. 81, p. 38. 
 By brigade, Exts. 65, p. 32; 69, p. 33. 
 By division, Ext. 65, p. 32. 
 
By regiments, Exts. 63, p. 32; 64, p. 32; 66, p. 33. 
 Comments on the charge, p. 34. 
 
 Distance over which charge can be made, Exts. 411, p. 159; 418, 
 p. 160; 95, p. 43. 
 
 Impetuosity of the, Exts. 48, p. 29; 50, p. 30; 51, p. 30; 60, p. 31; 216, 
 p. 79. 
 
 In column of fours, Exts. 86, p. 40 ; 92, p. 42 ; 96, p. 43 ; 97, p. 43 ; 
 112, p. 49; 143, p. 56; 168, p. 64. 
 
 In column of squadrons, Exts. 24, p. 20; 76, p. 36; 93, p. 43; 98, p. 
 43; 101, p. 44. 
 
 In column of close column of squadrons, Ext. 56, p. 31 ; 59, p. 31 ; 
 94, p. 43. 
 
 In column of regiments, Exts. 99, p. 44; 100, p. 44. 
 In flank, Ext. 79, p. 38. 
 
 Met by charge, Exts. 34, p. 21; 57, p. 31; 58, p. 31; 66, p. 33; 92, 
 p. 42 ; 230, p. 93. 
 
 Number of made, Exts. 63 to 66, pp. 32-33. 
 Ready to, Exts. 68, p. 33 ; 72, p. 34. 
 Repulse of, Ext. 95, p. 43. 
 
 Time to, Exts. 48, p. 29; 50, p. 30; 51, p. 30; 55, p. 30; 57, p. 31; 
 58, p. 31; 68, p. 33; 70, p. 34; 72, p. 34; 79, p. 38; 80 to 83, 
 
 pp. 38-39; 107, p. 48; 143, p. 59; 153 to 159, pp. 61-62; 181, p. 68. 
 With blown horses, Ext. 417, p. 160. 
 
 CIVILIANS HOW treated, Ext. 448, p. 172. 
 
 CLUBBED GUNS Ext . 84, p. 39. 
 
 COLORS Uge in battle> Ext 449> p> 173 
 
 COMBINED Mounted and dismounted, Exts. 152 to 170, pp. 61-65; 219, p. 82. 
 
 ACTION 
 
 With Artillery, Exts. 189, p. 72; 190, p. 72. 
 
 Infantry, Exts. 171 to 186, pp. 66-70. 
 COMMAND Divided, Ext. 243, p. 99. 
 COMMANDER Duties of, Ext. 348, p. 136. 
 
 Position of, Ext. 267, p. 108. 
 
 Qualities needed, Ext. 491, p. 186. 
 
 COMMUNICA-Ext. 268, p. 108. 
 TIONS, 
 
 CONFUSION Caused to Infantry by defeated Cavalry. Exts. 53, p. 30; 471, p. 179, 
 CONVOY Of prisoners, Ext. 459, p. 176. 
 
 Railroad trains, Ext. 266, p. 108. 
 CORN Green as forage, Exts. 422 to 424, p. 161. 
 
Parched as food, Ext. 375, p. 148. 
 CORPS Cavalry organized into a, Ext. 156, p. 1 75. 
 
 Correct use of, Exts. 238 to 240, p. 98. 
 
 How marched, Ext. 242, p. 99. 
 COURA GE How kept u p, Ext. 1 ] 3, p. 50. 
 COURIERS Exts. 284, 285, p. 113. 
 
 CUTTING WAY Exts. 220 to 226, pp. 89-91. 
 
 COVERING Rear of retreating army, Exts. 192, p. 73; 260, p. 105; 261, p. 106. 
 Comments on, p. 73. 
 
 Quick one essential, Exts. 48, p. 29; 50, p. 30; 51, p. 30; 68, p. 33; 
 70, p. 34; 71, p. 34; 72, p. 34; 107, p. 48; 156, p. 62; 164, p. 63; 
 216, p. 70. 
 
 DEC MKNT M * Exts - 55 P- - s ; 68, p. 33; 70, p. 34; 72, p. 34; 82, p. 39; 83, p. 39; 
 107, p. 48 ; 153, p. 61 ; 156 to 161 , pp. 62 63 ; 181, p. 68. 
 
 Cavalry driven through Infantry lines, Exts. 53, p. 30; 471, p. 179. 
 
 Troops have fear of Cavalry, Ext. 472, p. 179. 
 
 Of river crossing, Exts. 210 to 214, pp. 77-78; 297, p. 118. 
 
 DEI T 1oNl G AC " Exts " 191 to 206 > PP- 73 - 7 6. 
 
 DEPLOYMENT Not made till enemy s fire compels it, Ext. 219, p. 82. 
 
 DISEAS - S OF Exts. 427 to 434, pp. 164-165. 
 THK HORSE 
 
 Comments on, p. 166. 
 
 DISPATCHES Captured, Ext. 293, p. 116. 
 
 Sent in duplicate, Ext. 294, p. 116. 
 ENDURANCE Qn the march, Exts. 396 to 418, pp. 157-160. 
 
 Comments on, p. 160. 
 EXPLOIT Ext. 451, p. 173. 
 
 FENCE As a barricade, Exts. 115, p. 50; 122, p. 51. 
 
 FIELD WORKS Assault of, Exts. 148, p. 58; 149, p. 59; 179, p. 67; 181, p. 68. 
 
 Charging, Exts. 87 to 91, p. 41; 148, p. 58; 150, p. 60; 211, p. 77. 
 
 Constructing, Exts. 133, p. 54; 134, p. 55; 172, p. 66. 
 
 Holding of by cavalry, Exts. 178, p. 67; 186, p. 70; 249, p. 102. 
 
 Number of men necessary to man, Ext. 172, p. 66. 
 
 FIGHTING ON Exts. 2A, p. 14; 6, p. 16; 113 to 151, pp. 50-KO. 
 FOOT 
 
 Time consumed by, Exts. 123, p, 62; 129, p. 53; 132, p. 54. 
 FIRE ACTION Chapter III, p. 47. 
 
 With carbine mounted, Exts. 101 to 111, pp. 44-49; 219, p. 82. 
 With carbine mounted, comments on, p. 49. 
 
With carbine dismounted against Cavalry, Exts. 113 to 127, pp. 50-52. 
 
 With carbine dismounted against Cavalry, comments on, p. 53. 
 
 With carbine dismounted against field works, Exts. 147 to 151, pp. 58-60. 
 
 With carbine dismounted against field works, comments on, p. 60. 
 
 With carbine dismounted against Infantry, Exts. 128 to 146,pp. 53-57. 
 
 With carbine dismounted against Infantry, comments on, p. 58. 
 
 With revolver, Ext. 112, p. 49. 
 
 With revolver, comments on, p. 49. 
 FIRE Discipline, Ext. 394, p. 155. 
 
 Position, Ext. 214, p. 78. 
 
 Shoot down the enemy s, Exts. 149, p. 59; 209 to 214, pp. 77-78. 
 
 When opened, Exts. 128, p. 53; 146, p. 57; 151, p. 60; 219, p. 82. 
 FLAG Of truce, how treated, Ext. 452, p. 173. 
 
 FLANK Attack of, Exts. 128, p. 53; 176, p. 67 ; 272, p. 109. 
 
 Enveloping, Ext. 270, p. 109. 
 
 Protection of by Cavalry, Exts. 272, 273, p. 109. 
 
 Turning, Exts. 124, p. 52; 143, p. 56; 153, p. 61 ; 165, p. 63; 180, p. 68; 
 198, p. 74; 219, p. 82. 
 
 Strengthening by regular troops, Ext. 125, p. 52. 
 FLANK GUARD Cavalry used as, Exts. 262 to 265, p. 107. 
 
 Comments on, p. 107. 
 FORAGE Allowance of, Ext. 388, p. 151 ; comments on, p. 152. 
 
 Green corn as, Exts. 422 to 424, p. 161. 
 
 How carried, Exts. 377, p. 148; 379, p. 149; 380, p. 149; 384, p. 150. 
 
 How gathered in hostile country, Exts. 372, p. 147; 384, p. 150; 
 453, p. 174. 
 
 In wagons carried, Exte. 362, p, 142; 377, p. 148; 380, p. 149. 
 Packed on horses make sore backs, Ext. 425, p. 162. 
 
 Want of, Exts. 376, p. 148; 382, p. 150; 384, p. 150; 385, p. 150; 387, 
 p. 151 ; 389, p. 151 ; 419, p. 161 ; 420, p. 161 ; 425, p. 162. 
 
 FORAGERS Ext. 86, p. 40. 
 
 FORDING Swift streams, Ext. 325, p. 129. 
 
 FORMATION Comments on, p. 44. 
 
 For attack, Exts. 152, p. 61 ; 155, p. 61 ; 161 to 166, pp. 63-64 ; 226, p. 91. 
 
 Successive, Exts. 191 to 206, pp. 73-76. 
 
 Used in the charge, Exts. 74, p. 36; 76, p. 36; 86, p. 40; 92 to 101 > 
 pp. 42-44 ; 143, p f 56 ; 144, p. 57, 
 
6 
 
 GR UND 
 
 SC< UTS 
 GUERRILLAS 
 
 GUIDES 
 HISTORY 
 HOOF-ROT 
 HORSE 
 
 INFANTRY 
 INFORMATION 
 
 JUMPING 
 HORSE 
 
 LANE 
 LANCE 
 
 LANCERS 
 LARIATS 
 
 Exts. 68, p. 33; 86, p. 40; 101, p. 44. 
 
 Ext. 476, p. 180. 
 
 Use of, Exts. 219, p. 82; 244, p. 100. 
 
 Of U. S. Cavalry, See Introduction. 
 
 Exts. 427 to 432, pp. 164-165. 
 
 As a weapon, Ext. 67, p. 33. 
 
 Arriving, blown at charging point, Ext. 95, p. 43. 
 
 Captured, Ext. 374, p. 148. 
 
 Care of, Exts. 387, p. 151; 419 to 426, pp. 161-163; comments on, 
 p. 163. 
 
 Diseases of, Ext. 427 to 434, pp. 164-165; comments on, p. 166. 
 
 Each man fires holding his own by the reins, Ext. 127, p. 52. 
 
 Led horses, Exts. 218, p. 80; 435 to 441, pp. 166-167. 
 
 Marines, Ext. 319, p. 127. 
 
 As means of transportation on the battle field, Ext. 113, p. 50. 
 
 Recuperating of the, Ext. 227, p. 93. 
 
 Ridden by recruits, Ext. 425, p. 162. 
 
 Unserviceable for want of shoes, Ext. 426, p. 163. 
 
 Veteran troopers walk to save, Ext. 421, p. 161. 
 
 Use of Cavalry to stop routed, Exts. 317, p. 127 ; 318, p. 127 ; 320, p. 127. 
 
 Chapter VII, Exts. 277 to 294, pp. 111-116. 
 
 Absence of, Exts. 280, p. 112; 351, p. 137. 
 
 By blowing horns, Ext. 290, p. 115. 
 
 Should be verified, Ext. 291 p. 116. 
 
 Comments on, p. 117. 
 
 Received from country people, Exts. 277, p. Ill; 278A, p. Ill; 28", 
 p. 113. 
 
 Received from strategic use of Cavalry, Exts. 295 to 306, pp. 118-121. 
 
 Value of, Ext. 442, p. 168. 
 
 Attack in, Exts. 153, p. 61 ; 160, p. 62; 166, p. 64; 168, p. 64; 169, p. 64; 
 
 170, p. 65. 
 
 As defensive weapon, p. 27. 
 Comments on use, p. 28. 
 Use in Mexican war, Ext. 45, p. 27 ; p. 8. 
 Use in U. S., Ext. 45, p. 27. 
 Reg. of, 6th Penn. Vol. Cav., pp. 8, 28, 
 Ext. 450, p. 173. 
 
LKADER Good, needed, Ext. 479, p. 181. 
 
 Timid will fail, Exts. 50, p. 30; 51, p. 31. 
 LED HORSES Capture of, Ext. 438, p. 167. 
 
 Cause confusion to troops in rear, Ext. 435, p. 166. 
 
 Comments on, p. 167. 
 
 Guard for, Ext. 437, p. 166. 
 
 How mounted, Exts. 440, p. 167 ; 441, p. 167. 
 
 In general, Exts. 218, p. 80; 435 to 441, pp. 166-167. 
 
 Sent ahead when retreating, Ext. 439, p. 167. 
 LINES Of battle, straight, Ext. 241, p. 98. 
 
 Successive, Exts. 239, 240, p. 98. 
 LOSSES Of moving target, Ext. 114, p. 50. 
 
 Per centage of, Ext. 484, p. 183. 
 
 Of retreating troops, Exts. 85, p. 39; 470, p. 179. 
 MARCHING Of Cavalry, Exts. 231, p. 94; 242, p. 99; 396 to 418, pp. 157-160. 
 
 Comments on, p. 160. 
 
 Dismounted proves exhausting to, Ext. 455, p. 174. 
 
 Distance marched, Exts. 396 to 418, pp. 157-160. 
 
 Forced march, Ext. 399, p. 157. 
 
 Rate of, Exts. 396 to 418, p. 157-160. 
 
 MARINE CAV- Ext. 319, p. 127. 
 ALRY 
 
 MELEE Carbine vs. Revolver, Exts. 13, p. 17; 478, p. 181. 
 
 MOMENTUM Qf the charge, Exts. 47, p. 29 ; 86 p. 40. 
 
 MORALE Of the saber in charging, Exts. 1, p. 12 ; 2, p. 13 ; 41, p. 22 ; 480, p. 181, 
 
 MULES 
 
 Of troops, Exts. 478 to 481, pp. 181-182. 
 As mounts, Ext. 444, p. 169. 
 
 NIGHT OPERA- Ext. 235 to 237, pp. 96-97. 
 
 TIONS 
 
 Comments on, p. 97. 
 OBJECTIVE Strategic, Ext. 298, p. 119. 
 ORGANIZATION Of U. 8. Cavalry, See Introduction, p. 6. 
 
 Vol. Cavalry, See Introduction, p. 7. 
 
 Comments on p. 175. 
 
 Into corps, Ext. 456, p. 175. 
 
 Peace and war, Ext. 457, p. 175. 
 
 ORDERS What to do when none are received, Ext. 492, p. 186. 
 
 OUTPOSTS In general, Exts. 254 to 261, pp. 104-106; 275, p. 110. 
 
8 
 
 Comments on, p. 106. 
 
 Evading the, Ext. 448, p. 172. 
 
 Far out, Exts. 219, p. 82; 256, p. 105. 
 
 Resistance required by, Ext. 219, p. 82. 
 
 Support of, Exts. 254 to 258, pp. 104-105. 
 
 PACK TRAINS E xts. 366> p H4; 3^ p 144; 37^ p UQ . 443> p m 
 
 PARTISAN T?xt 42 n oo 
 
 WARFARE J 
 
 PANIC Exts. 27], p. 109; 470 to 472, p. 179. 
 
 PAY Exts. 384, p. 150; 391, p. 152. 
 
 PICKETS Resistance required of, Ext. 219, p. 82. 
 
 Use of, Exts. 254 to 259, pp. 104-105. 
 PICKETING Infantry camp, Ext. 227, p. 93. 
 
 PICKET DUTY xt 419> p 161> 
 
 PIL PLUNDER In General, Exts. 330 to 336, pp. 131-132. 
 
 Comments on, p. 132. 
 
 Effect on discipline, Exts. 331, p. 131 ; 332, p. 131. 
 
 Stops pursuit, Ext. 336, p. 132. 
 
 Turns victory into defeat, Ext. 334, p. 132. 
 
 Victory neutralized by, Ext, 333, p. 131. 
 
 PIONEERS Cavalry do the woik of, Exts. 307 to 316, pp. 121-126. 
 PISTOL In general, Exts. 3 to 11, pp. 14-17; 112, p. 49. 
 
 Comments on use, Exts. 41, p. 22; p. 24. 
 
 Collective fire of, Exts. 5, p. 16; 6, p. 16; 112, p. 49. 
 
 In individual combat, Exts. 13 to 19, pp. 17-19; 22, p. 19; 36, p. 21. 
 
 Used by Artillery, Ext. 77, p. 37. 
 
 Use dismounted, Exts. 7 to 10, pp. 16-17. 
 
 Use in the woods, Ext. 38, p. 22. 
 
 PONTOONS Exts. S12, p. 124; 314, p. 125; 315, p. 126; 366, p. 144; 367, p. 144. 
 PONTONIERS Ext. 312, p. 124. 
 
 POSITION FIRE Ext. 214, p. 78. 
 
 POSITIONS Selected by Cavalry, Exts. 127, p. 52; 133,p.54; 175,p.67; 184,p.69. 
 PRISONERS In general, Exts. 459 to 463, pp. 176-177. 
 
 Comments on, p. 177. 
 
 How captured, Exts. 460 to 463, pp. 176-177. 
 
 Strength of guard for, Ext. 459, p. 176. 
 PURSUIT In general, Exts. 337 to 343, pp. 133-134. 
 
RAIDS 
 
 Comments on, p. 135. 
 
 By dismounted men, Exts. 338, p. 133; 343, p. 134. 
 How far kept up, Exts. 107, p. 48; 123, p. 52; 181, p. 68; 337, p. 133; 
 486, p. 183. 
 
 Parallel, Exts. 339, p. 133; 340, p. 134; 342, p. 184. 
 
 Rear, Exts. 339, p. 133; 341, p. 134. 
 
 Stopped by plundering, Ext. 336, p. 132. 
 
 Vigorous, Ext. 49, p. 29. 
 
 In general, Exts. 344 to 351, pp. 135-137. 
 
 Comments on, p. 138. 
 
 Conditions favorable to, Ext. 344, p. 135. 
 
 Damage of to railroads temporarily, Ext. 349, p. 137. 
 
 Leave Cavalry unserviceable, Exts. 350, p. 137; 351, p. 137. 
 
 Morgan s method, Ext. 346, p. 136. 
 
 Object of, Ext. 347, p. 136. 
 
 Strategic, Exts. 303, p. 120; 347, p. 13rt. 
 
 Successful, must rejoin in safety, Ext. 548, p. 186. 
 
 Capacity of, P^xt. 373, p. 148. 
 
 How guarded, Ext. 266, p. 108. 
 
 Carbines, Exts. 74, p. 36; 133, p. 54; 141, p. 56; 151, p. 60. 
 
 Comments on, p. 152. 
 
 Amount carried, Exts. 366, 367, pp. 144; 377, p. 148; 379, p. 149; 
 380, p. 149; 385, p. 150. 
 
 Carried on the trooper, Exts. 367, p. 144; 370, p. 145; 369, p. 145; 
 377, p. 148; 379, p. 149; 380, 385, pp. 149-150. 
 
 Carried on wagons, Exts. 366, 367, p. 144; 371, p. 146; 377, p. 148; 
 380, p. 150. 
 
 Emergency, Ext. 395, p. 156. 
 
 How obtained, Ext. 374, 375, p. 148 ; 378, p. 149 ; 381 to 383, pp. 149-160. 
 
 Given for supplies, Ext. 374, p. 148. 
 
 Bad for horses, Ext. 425, p. 162. 
 
 Not to be depended upon, Ext. 464, p. 177. 
 
 Ext. 465, p. 177. 
 
 In force, Ext. 301, p. 119. 
 
 Made by the commander, Ext. 219, p. 82. 
 R ECU PER AT- Of horses, Ext. 227, p. 93. 
 REINFORCING Of Infantry by Cavalry, Exts. 173, 174, p. 67. ( See Combined Action.) 
 
 RAILROADS 
 
 RAPID FIRE 
 RATIONS 
 
 RECEIPTS 
 RECRUITS 
 
 RECRUITING 
 
 RECONN A is- 
 
1(1 
 
 REPORT 
 
 RESERVES 
 
 RETIRING 
 
 RETREAT 
 
 REVOLVERS 
 
 REVOLVING 
 
 RIFLES 
 
 RIVER CROSS 
 ING 
 ROADS 
 
 ROUT 
 RUSE 
 SABER 
 
 By staff officer, Ext. 305, p. 120. 
 
 Made in duplicate, Exts. 289, p. 115; 294, p. 116. 
 
 Model, Ext. 278, p. 111. 
 
 Carry forward the firing line, Ext. 126, p. 52. 
 
 Last formed, Exts. 66, p. 33; 95, p. 43. 
 
 Kept mounted, Ext. 152, p. 61. 
 
 No time to form on, Ext. 153, p. 61. 
 
 Across a bridge, Ext. 218, p. 80. 
 
 By successive formations, Exts. 191 to 206, pp. 73-76. 
 
 Troops stopped by Cavalry, Exts. 317, 318, 320, p. 127. 
 
 Under the cover of a vigorous attack, Exts. 191, p. 73; 218, p. 80; 
 440, p. 167; 441, p. 167. 
 
 Costly, Exts. 170, p. 65. 
 
 Covered by mounted men, Exts. 167, p. 64; 191, p. 73. 
 
 See pistol. 
 
 Ext. 74, p. 37; (See rapid fire carbines.) 
 
 Attack and defense of, Exts. 207 to 218, pp. 77-80. 
 
 Macadamized cut up Cavalry without shoes, Ext. 473, p. 180. 
 
 Exts. 470 to 472, p. 179. 
 
 Exts. 467 to 469, pp. 178-179. 
 
 Against Artillery, Exts. 73, 75, p. 36. 
 
 Against foot troops, Ext. 83, p. 39. 
 
 Against revolver, Exts. 12, p. 17; 17 to 23, pp. 18-19; 38, p. 22. 
 
 As cutting weapon, Exts. 16, p. 18; 20, p. 19; 21, p. 19; 28, p. 20; 
 29, p. 20; 37, p. 21 ; 40, p. 22 ; 55, p. 30; 83, p. 39. 
 
 As final weapon, Ext. 33, p. 21. 
 
 As shock weapon, Exts. 26, p. 20; 27, p. 20; 31, p. 20; 46 to 51, 
 pp. 29-30; 60, p. 31 ; 168, p, 64. 
 
 AH thrusting weapon, Exts. 22, 23, p. 19. 
 Capture of prisoners with, Ext. 35, p. 21. 
 Comments on use of, p. 24, Ext. 41, p. 22. 
 Dismounted, Ext. 39, p. 22. 
 Individual combat, Exts. 15, p. 18; 36, p. 21. 
 In open country, Ext. 14, p. 18. 
 In partisan warfare, Ext. 42, p. 23. 
 In pursuit, Ext. 49, p. 29. 
 
11 
 
 SAFE GUARDS 
 SCOUTS 
 
 SCREENING 
 
 SECURITY 
 SHOCK ACTION 
 
 SHOT GUNS 
 SIGNALS 
 SKIRMISHERS 
 SLEEPING 
 
 SPIES 
 
 SQUADRON 
 STEAMBOATS 
 STONE WALLS 
 STRAGGLERS 
 
 STRATEGIC 
 
 STRATEGY 
 STRATEGEM 
 
 Need of, Exts. 13, p. 17; 34, p. 21. 
 
 Opinion of by Stuart, Ext. 32, p. 21, 
 
 Use in woods, Exts. 38, p. 22 ; 44, p. 24. 
 
 Use by reserves, Ext. 61, p. 32. 
 
 Ext. 454, p. 174. 
 
 Ground, Exts. 68, p. 33; 86, p. 40; 101, p. 44. 
 
 Organization, Ext. 283, p. 113. 
 
 Scouting parties, Exts. 292, p. 116; 372, p. 147. 
 
 Of main body, Exts. 248 to 253, pp. 102-103; 295, p. 118. 
 
 Comments on, p. 137. 
 
 Breaking of screen, Exts. 253, p. 103 ; 299, p. 119. 
 
 Formation of screen, Ext. 253, p. 103. 
 
 Chapter VII, p. 100. 
 
 Chapter II, p. 29. 
 
 Against artillery, comments on, p. 37. 
 
 Against Cavalry, comments on, p. 34. 
 
 Against field works, comments on, p. 42. 
 
 Against Infantry, comments on, p. 40. 
 
 By successive blows, Exts. 52, p. 30 ; 54, p. 30 ; 57, p. 31 ; 64, p. 32 
 65, D. 32; 66, p. 33; 84, p. 39; 233, p. 95. 
 
 Ext. 25, p. 20. 
 
 Prearranged, p. 86. 
 
 Exts. 101, p. 44 ; 110, p. 48 ; ( See Fire Action Mounted ). 
 
 On the ground holding the reins, Ext. 474, p. 180. 
 
 In the saddle, Exts. 493 to 495, pp. 186-187. 
 
 Exts. 281, 282, p. 112. 
 
 Definition of, p. 5. 
 
 Capture of by cavalry, Exts. 352 to 354, p. 139. 
 
 Exts. 86, p. 40; 90, p. 41 ; 91, p. 42; 122, p. 51 ; 154, p. 61. 
 
 Exts. 320, p. 127; 382, p. 150; 475 to 477, pp. 180-181. 
 
 How prevented, Ext. 476, p. 180. 
 
 Camp for, Ext. 477, p. 181. 
 
 Use of, Exts. 295 to 306, pp. 118-121. 
 
 Comments on, p. 121. 
 
 Exts. 297, p. 118; 302, p. 119. 
 
 Exts. 467 to 469, pp. 178-179. 
 
12 
 
 STREET FIGHT 
 ING 
 STRENGTH 
 
 SUBSISTENCE 
 SUCCESSIVE 
 
 SUPPLIES 
 
 SUPPORTS 
 
 SURPRISE 
 
 SURRENDER 
 
 SWIMMING 
 
 TACTICS 
 
 TARGETS 
 
 TOWNS 
 TRAINS 
 
 Exts. 109, p. 48; 232 to 234, p. 95. 
 
 Of enemy, how determined, Exts. 286, 287, p. 113; 288, p. 115; 293, 
 p. 116. 
 
 In general, Exts. 374 to 384, pp. 148-150. 
 On the country, 372 to 384, pp. 147-150. 
 Formations, Exts. 191 to 206, pp. 73-76. 
 Blows in charging, Ext. 233, p. 95. 
 In general, Exts. 372 to 395, pp. 147-156. 
 
 Of dismounted by mounted troops, Exts. 152 to 170, pp. 61-65; 219 
 p. 82. 
 
 Of Infantry by Cavalry, Exts. 138, p. 56; 173, p. 67; 174, p. 67; 183, 
 p. 69 ; 188, p. 70. 
 
 Of Infantry follow weak Cavalry, Exts. 177, p. 67; 182, p. 69; 184 
 p. 69 ; 185, p. 70. 
 
 Exts. 216, p. 79; 275, 276, p. 110. 
 
 Good Cavalry should not, Exts. 220 to 226, pp. 89-91. 
 
 Streams, Exts. 321 to 329, pp. 128-130. 
 
 Comments on, p. 130. 
 
 By men, Ext. 322, p. 128. 
 
 By animals, Exts. 321 to 329, pp. 128 to 130. 
 
 Of Cooke, 1862, p. 10. 
 
 Of Poinsett, 1841, p. 9. 
 
 Of Upton, 1873, p. 11. 
 
 Of Scott, 1826, p. 8. 
 
 Of Wheeler, 1863, p. 12. 
 
 Moving, Ext. 114, p. 50. 
 
 Exts. 109, p. 48; 232 to 234, p. 95; 245, p. 100; 335, p. 132. 
 
 In general, 355 to 361, pp. 140-141 ; 384, p. 150. 
 
 Comments on, p. 141. 
 
 An incumbrance to Cavalry, Exts. 356, p. 140; 358, p. 140; 384, p. 150, 
 
 Disposition of during battle, Ext. 357, p. 140. 
 
 How guarded, Exts. 359, p. 141 ; 367, p. 144. 
 
 Marching Cavalry in rear of, Ext. 231, p. 94. 
 
 Pontoon, Exts. 366, 367, pp. 144. 
 
 Sent ahead when retiring, Ext. 218, p. 80. 
 
 Should not be guarded by Cavalry, Exts. 228, p. 93; 360, p. 141. 
 
 When to attack, Ext. 361, p. 141. 
 
13 
 
 Where marched, Ext. 355, p. 140. 
 TOUCH Keeping, Ext. 279, p. 112. 
 
 TRENCHES Occupied by Cavalry, Exts. 425, p. 162; 483, p. 183. 
 TRANSPORTA- In General, Exts. 362 to 371, pp. 142-146. 
 
 TION 
 
 Comments on, p. 146. 
 
 Allowance of, Exts. 362, 363, p. 143; 366 to 368, pp. 144-145; 371, 
 p. 146; 377, p. 148. 
 
 Cavalry with no, Exts. 364, 365, p. 144. 
 
 Of officers baggage, Exts. 362, p. 142 ; 368, p. 145. 
 
 TROPHIES Exts - 484 to 488 > PP- 183-184. 
 
 TRUMPET Calls, Ext. 466, p. 178. 
 
 Comments on p. 178. 
 
 TURNING Movements Exts. 124, p. 52; 128, p. 63; 153, p. 61; 171, p. 66; 180, p. 68. 
 
 VICTORY In general, Exts. 484 to 488. pp. 183-184. 
 
 Comments on p. 184. 
 
 Causes increased confidence in leaders, Ext. 1 15, p. 50. 
 
 Fruits of, gathered by Cavalry, Exts. 143, p. 66; 181, p. 68. 
 
 Fruits of failing to secure, Ext. 485, p. 183. 
 WOODS Cavalry in, Exts. 38, p. 22; 44, p. 24; 83, p. 39; 16(5, p. 64. 
 
 For camp grounds, Ext. 348, p. 1H(>. 
 WOUNDED In general, Exts. 489, 490, p. 185. 
 
 Comments on p. 185. 
 
 Sent ahead when retiring, Ext. 439, p. 167. 
 
 Should not be abandoned, Ext. 489, p. 185. 
 
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