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CHATTANOOGA 
 
 AND 
 
 CHICKAMAUG-A 
 
 REPRINT OF 
 
 GEN. H. V.,BOYNTON S LETTERS 
 
 TO THE 
 
 Cincinnati Commercial Gazette, 
 
 AUGUST, 1888. 
 
 Second Edition, with Corrections. 
 
 WASHINGTON. D. C.: 
 
 GEO. R. GRAY, PRINTER. 
 
 1891. 
 
CHATTANOOGA 
 
 AND 
 
 CHICKAMAUG-A. 
 
 REPRIXT OF 
 
 GEN. H. V. BOYNTON S LETTERS 
 
 
 TO THE 
 
 Cincinnati Commercial Gazette, 
 
 AUGUST, 1888. 
 
 Second Edition, with Corrections. 
 
 WASHINGTON, D. C.: 
 GEO. R. GRAY, PRINTER. 
 
 1891. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 Comrades of the Society of the Army of the Cumberland : 
 
 When General H. V. Boynton s letters recently appeared 
 in the Cincinnati Commercial Gazette, so vividly portraying 
 the achievements and heroism of the Army of the Cumber 
 land in its campaign for the possession of Chattanooga, in 
 cluding the inevitable incident thereto, the battle of Chicka- 
 mauga, I thought how agreeable it would be for each member 
 of the society to have a copy for perusal at our approaching 
 reunion on the twenty-fifth anniversary of Chickamauga. 
 
 Accordingly I asked General Boynton s permission to print 
 these letters in pamphlet form, as advance sheets of any 
 volume in which he may determine to put them with other 
 matter. To this he most cheerfully assented in the follow 
 ing letter : 
 
 WASHINGTON, Sept. 1, 1888. 
 
 MY DEAR GENERAL : You are welcome to the Chickamauga 
 letters for any use you choose to make of them. While the 
 salient features of both days battle are easily understood, 
 the details of movements by brigades are in many cases in 
 tricate. For this reason various errors may have been made 
 in the text. If those who observe them will take the trouble 
 to correct them before the public, they would thus assist in 
 establishing the correct history of a battle in which the Army 
 of the Cumberland should take great pride. 
 Very truly yours, 
 
 H. Y. BOYNTON. 
 
 General W. S. ROSECRANS. 
 
 With this explanation, the letters are given in the order 
 of their respective dates. 
 
 W. S. ROSECRANS. 
 
 M144778 
 
WASHINGTON, August 3. [Special.] In two preliminary 
 letters about Chicamauga the attempt was made to describe 
 the field as it appears to-day, and to present some of the 
 scenes of the battle which came rushing back over the plains 
 of memory with a power suggestive of the departed legions 
 that once clothed these farms, forests, and ridges with the 
 terrible magnificence of battle. 
 
 In a sense, to write of Ghicamauga is to try to excite in 
 terest in a subject which far too many regard as worn ; but 
 to the veterans who fought there it will never be a thread 
 bare story. For that generation which has been born and 
 has come to manhood since Chattanooga was won by the 
 Union arms, there is no campaign which can be studied with 
 greater profit, or which will more richly repay the reader. 
 History has not yet done justice to Chickamauga, but its vor- 
 dict is sure. Many of the misconceptions of the days follow 
 ing the battle still exist in the popular mind. It may be 
 years before they are cleared away ; but eventually the 
 Chickamauga campaign will stand in the history of our war 
 as unequaled in its strategy by any other movement of the 
 contest, and as unsurpassed, and probably not equaled, for 
 the stubbornness and deadliness which marked the splendid 
 fighting of Unionist and rebel alike ; and, furthermore, it 
 will stand as a substantial Union victory. 
 
 Just in proportion as the credit due is awarded to those 
 who planned and executed the campaign will well-merited 
 condemnation be meted out to those at Washington who in 
 sisted upon forcing the movement without regard to proper 
 and vital preparation, who withheld re-enforcements, and 
 who, in spite of public and private warnings which it was 
 criminal not to heed, made rebel concentrations against Rose- 
 crans possible from in front of Washington itself, and from 
 Charleston, Mobile, and Mississippi. 
 
 It will be the purpose of a few letters to go over some of 
 the well-known ground of this campaign with a view of 
 enforcing the ideas expressed in general terms above, and 
 attempting to present a clear account of this most involved, 
 and still seriously misunderstood battle. The strategy 
 matchless in our war which compelled Bragg to abandon 
 Chattanooga ; the life and death struggle for concentrating 
 the Union army when Rosecrans, against the protests of 
 Washington authorities that it could not be true, found his 
 widely separated corps confronted with re-enforcements from 
 every part of the Confederacy ; and, lastly, the great battle 
 in the Chickamauga forests for the possession of Chattanooga, 
 
are each most fruitful and interesting themes. The present 
 letter will relate to the first-named subject, the*strategy of 
 the Chickamauga campaign. 
 
 Marching from Murfreesboro on the 23d of June, 1863, 
 General Rosecrans had advanced against Bragg, who was 
 strongly fortified, and whose lines, besides, occupied gaps 
 and ranges of great natural strength. By brilliant strategy, 
 with the loss of only 586 killed and wounded, and thirteen 
 captured or missing, the Army of the Cumberland, with its 
 nine divisions and twenty brigades, operating through six 
 teen days of continuous rain, maneuvred Bragg, with his 
 seven divisions and twenty-three brigades, out of his natural 
 and artificial strongholds, and forced him across the Tennes 
 see. Up to that time there had been no strategic campaign 
 to equal this, and it was soon to be far surpassed, except in 
 the one element of loss, by the campaign to follow it. So 
 brilliant had been the conception and the execution that all 
 the corps commanders, headed by General Thomas, hastened 
 to call on General Rosecrans and offer the warmest congratu 
 lations. 
 
 At the close of the Tullahoma campaign Bragg occupied 
 Chattanooga and the mountain passes above and below it. 
 Rosecrans s army lay along the western base of the Cumber 
 land Mountains, its right above Winchester and its left at 
 McMinnville. Here General Rosecrans at once began the 
 most vigorous preparations for another campaign for the 
 occupation of Chattanooga. Because the necessities of the 
 case compelled secrecy as one of the main elements of success, 
 there was soon at Washington a manifestation of unreasoning 
 impatience over what was criticized as the inaction of the 
 Union commander ; but those who were on the ground know 
 well the unceasing activity and energy with which the work 
 progressed of accumulating sufficient supplies of food, mate 
 rial, and ammunition, preparing the means for crossing the 
 Tennessee and obtaining the necessary knowledge of the 
 mountain passes, roads, and trails by which the army must 
 move. Rosecrans s supplies reached him over a badly equipped 
 line of worn railroad, a hundred and thirteen miles in length, 
 and, as can be readily understood, when the daily wants of 
 a great army preparing for extended movement and battle 
 are considered, the matter of accumulating a surplus of sup 
 plies was not the task of a day or a week. With every effort 
 the railroad was not repaired until July 25, and the forward 
 movement began on the 14th of August. 
 
 A glance at the map will disclose the great natural obsta 
 cles which lay between General Rosecrans and Chattanooga. 
 As his army faced toward the latter point, the Cumberland 
 
Mountains, with a general elevation of 2,200 feet, rose before 
 it. The escarpment was everywhere precipitous, and desti 
 tute of every means of approach except narrow mountain 
 roads and trails, with the one exception that a short railroad 
 ran from Cowan to Tracy City, on the summit of the range. 
 To the eastward this range dropped by like precipitous and 
 difficult slopes into the valley of the Sequatchee River. Be 
 yond that stream rose the equally sharp cliffs of Walden s 
 Ridge, with a general elevation of 1,300 feet. This fell off 
 along the eastern and southern edge of the plateau into the 
 valley of the Tennessee, and overlooked it from the mouth 
 of the Sequatchee River to a point far above Chattanooga. 
 It was fifty miles as the crow flies from the lines of Rose- 
 crans s army across this continuous mountain region to the 
 valley of the Tennessee. This river was broad and deep, 
 and presented in itself the most serious natural obstacle 
 which the Union army had encountered since it left the Ohio 
 River. It was 2,700 feet wide at Bridgeport, and 1,254 feet 
 at Caperton, the points where the bridges were subsequently 
 thrown. 
 
 On the left bank of the river, the stronghold of Chatta 
 nooga lying behind the river, and the great ranges to the 
 westward between Rosecrans s position and his own, might 
 well seem to Bragg impregnable, in fact almost unassailable. 
 First, toward the west, came the Lookout range, rising 
 abruptly from the river to the height of 2,200 feet, and 
 stretching south westwardly far into Georgia and Alabama. 
 Its western piecipices looked down into the narrow valley of 
 Lookout Creek. Beyond the latter rose the equally precipi 
 tous cliffs of the Raccoon Mountains, the latter having the 
 same general elevation as the Lookout range. 
 
 The gorge of the Tennessee where it breaks through these 
 mountain ranges is so narrow and so thoroughly commanded 
 from the heights on both sides as to render it impracticable 
 to so move an army as to attack it from the front or river 
 side. 
 
 With these giant obstacles to the progress of his columns, 
 most serious even if they had been within the Union lines, 
 but almost insuperable when found in an enemy s territory, 
 and while he was bending every energy to complete prepara 
 tions for carrying out a brilliant plan of his own for over 
 coming them, General Rosecrans was astonished at receiving 
 on August 4, only ten days after his railroad had been re 
 paired to the Tennessee River, a dispatch from Halleck say 
 ing : " Your forces must move forward without delay. You 
 will daily report the movement of each corps till you cross 
 the Tennessee River." 
 
8 
 
 To a commander who was building boats, opening mount 
 ain roads, rushing the accumulation of stores, getting out 
 material for four thousand feet of bridges, preparing to leave 
 his base carrying provisions for twenty-five days, and am 
 munition for two battles, and crossing three mountain ranges 
 and a deep and broad river, in an enemy s country, and in 
 the face of an army, this dispatch was not only astounding, 
 but discouraging and exasperating to the last degree. 
 
 It had become a habit at Washington to sneer at the slow 
 ness of General Kosecrans, as it was later to denounce Gen 
 eral Thomas in similar terms at Nashville. There was no 
 more reason or justice in the one case than in the other. The 
 verdict of history has been reached in the case of General 
 Thomas. It is sure to come, and to be the same in this mat 
 ter, for Kosecrans. 
 
 To this dispatch, which can only be excused on the ground 
 of wholly inexcusable ignorance of the active preparations 
 in progress and the natural difficulties of an advance, Gen 
 eral Rosecrans replied with his accustomed clearness and 
 spirit: "Your dispatch ordering me to move forward with 
 out delay, reporting the movements of each corps till I cross 
 the Tennessee, is received. As I have determined to cross 
 the river as soon as practicable, and have been making all 
 preparations and getting such information as may enable me 
 to do so without being driven back, like Hooker, I wish to 
 know if your order is intended to take away my discretion 
 as to the time and manner of moving my troops." To this 
 Halleck responded : u The orders for the advance of your 
 army, and that it be reported daily, are peremptory." Gen 
 eral Rosecrans immediately wrote the following reply, and, 
 calling his corps commanders together, read the dispatches 
 given above. There was no dissent from the proposition that 
 at that stage of their preparations it was impossible to move. 
 He then read his reply as follows, and all approved arid 
 agreed that they should support him : 
 
 " GENERAL HALLECK : % My arrangements for beginning a 
 continuous movement will be completed and the execution 
 begun Monday next. We have information to show that 
 crossing the Tennessee between Bridgeport and Chattanooga 
 is impracticable, but not enough to show whether we had 
 better cross above Chattanooga and strike Cleveland, or below 
 Bridgeport and strike in their rear. The preliminary move 
 ment of troops for the two cases are very different. It is nec 
 essary to have our means of crossing the river completed, and 
 our supplies provided to cross sixty miles of mountains and 
 sustain ourselves during the operations of crossing and fight 
 ing, before we move. To obey your order literally would 
 
9 
 
 be to push our troops into the mountains on narrow and diffi 
 cult roads, destitute of pasture and forage, and short of water, 
 where they would not be able to maneuver as exigencies may 
 demand, and would certainly cause ultimate delay and prob 
 able disaster. If, therefore, the movement which I propose 
 cannot be regarded as obedience to your order, I respectfully 
 request a modification of it or to be relieved from the com 
 mand." 
 
 On the following day Halleck replied as follows : 
 
 "I have communicated to you the wishes of the Govern 
 ment in plain and unequivocal terms. The objective has been 
 stated, and you have been directed to lose no time in reach 
 ing it. The means you are to employ and the roads you are 
 to follow are left to your own discretion. If you wish to 
 promptly carry out the wishes of the Government you will 
 not stop to discuss mere details. In such matters I do not 
 interfere." 
 
 This was answered the same day by General Rosecrans as 
 follows : 
 
 u Your dispatch received. I can only repeat the assurance 
 given before the issuance of the order. This army shall move 
 with all dispatch compatible with the successful execution of 
 our work. We are pressing everything to bring up forage 
 for our animals. The present rolling-stock of the road will 
 barely suffice to keep us day by day here, but I have bought 
 fifty more freight cars, which are arriving. Will advise you 
 daily/ 
 
 This was the last of interference from Washington, but, 
 accustomed as all there were to interfering at will, and direct 
 ing affairs according to the situation as they saw it, they 
 could not brook such manifestly proper independence as was 
 shown by Rosecrans, and from that time forward there was 
 needed only an excuse to insure his removal. 
 
 Had there been a tithe of the attention given to preventing 
 the rebels from concentrating on his front from every part of 
 the Confederacy in fact, bringing Longstreet s veterans 
 from the lines under Halleck s own eyes that there was to 
 the kind ot interference which has been noticed, Bragg would 
 have been destroyed in front of Chattanooga. But this sub 
 ject properly belongs in a succeeding letter. The dispatches 
 given above are well known, but their reproduction will 
 prove a convenience to readers who may not carry their ex 
 act terms in mind. 
 
 Ten clays later, namely, on August 14, the movement to 
 secure Chattanooga began. A glance at the map will reveal 
 its strategy. 
 
10 
 
 Rosecrans had decided to cross the Tennessee in the vicin 
 ity of Bridgeport, and subsequently the Raccoon and Lookout 
 Mountain ranges at points south of Chattanooga, and thus 
 compel Bragg to evacuate the place or to come out of it and 
 fight for his line of communications. It is easily seen that 
 if after crossing the river the enemy, warned in time, should 
 be found in force on the western slopes of these ranges fur 
 ther progress in that direction would have been impossible, 
 and a return to the north bank of the river obligatory. It 
 was, therefore, necessary to wholly deceive Bragg as to the 
 points of crossing. 
 
 Burnside was marching from Kentucky into East Tennes 
 see. Any apparent movement of the Army of the Cumber 
 land in force in that direction would naturally lead Bragg to 
 believe that a junction of the Union forces was contemplated 
 on his right. 
 
 Everything being ready, Crittenden opened the campaign 
 with the Twenty-first Corps. Leaving his camps at Hills- 
 boro , Manchester, and McMinnville on the 16th of August, 
 he crossed the Cumberland Mountains and occupied the 
 Sequacliee Valley from a point between Jasper and Dunlap 
 to Pik ville. Van Cleve held the latter place, Palmer was 
 established at Dunlap, and Wood at Anderson, between 
 Dunlap and Jasper. All built extensive camp fires and 
 moved about in such ways as to convey to observers from the 
 heights the impression that the whole army was moving. 
 Meantime Minty s active cavalry had moved through Sparta 
 and driven Dibrell s cavalry eastward through Crossville, on 
 to the Tennessee, and over it, and Dibrell, having come to 
 reconnoiter and see what was going on, naturally got the idea 
 that Rosecrans s army was coming. The crossing of the 
 Cumberland was but the first step of the imposing diversion. 
 Though the mountain roads were few and very difficult, 
 Crittenden s movements over them had been completed ex 
 actly on time. The advance over Walden s Ridge, equally 
 difficult, though it was not quite as high as the main range, 
 was immediately undertaken. Minty, on the extreme left, 
 appeared on the Tennessee more than thirty miles above 
 Blythe s Ferry, where he made most energetic commotion. 
 Hazen reached the river in the vicinity of Dallas. Two 
 brigades were strung out along the edge of the cliffs on the 
 top of Walden s Ridge, where they overlooked Blythe s Ferry, 
 and could be seen from the other side of the river. Minty 
 with his troopers, swept down the valley of the Tennessee to 
 near Chattanooga* Wilder and Wagner also appeared in the 
 valley. While a show of building boats was made in the 
 small streams about Blythe s Ferry, Wilder from the heights 
 
11 
 
 of Waldcn s Ridge, opposite Chattanooga, opened fire on the 
 town with artillery. Bragg was thoroughly deceived. For 
 rest was ordered far up the Tennessee to Kingston to watch 
 for the expected crossing. Buckner was ordered from East 
 Tennessee toward Blythe s Ferry. 
 
 As may be supposed, Wilder s cannonading produced the 
 wildest excitement in Chattanooga. The rollipg-stock of 
 the railroads was hastened out of reach. The depots of sup 
 plies were moved out of the range of the unexpected bom 
 bardment. D. H. Hill s corps was hurried oft to guard the 
 river above, and other heavy forces were moved in the same 
 direction. Everything done by Bragg was based upon the 
 idea that Rosecrans was moving in iorce to points on the 
 river above the city. 
 
 Meantime the real movement was going on quietly sixty 
 to eighty miles in the opposite direction, in the vicinity of 
 Bridgeport and IStevenson. A force of cavalry for the pur 
 poses of observation, and to convey ihe idea by quick move 
 ments that Rosecrans was feigning below, while really ex 
 pecting to cross above the city, was sent as far westward as 
 Decatur. Thus Rosecrans was operating along the river 
 through a bin dred miles of mountain region and fifty miles 
 of low country beyond, and in spite of the natural difficul 
 ties every part of the plan was working with precision. 
 
 Thomas and McCook on the right moved at the same time 
 with* Crittenden. Reynolds, of Thomas s corps, had marched 
 in advance and repaired the roads by way of University, and 
 down the eastern slope of the mountain to Jasper. Brannan 
 iollowed him, and both were at first kept well out of sight 
 of the river. Baird and Negley came down nearer to Bridge 
 port, and McCook descended back of Stevenson. With the 
 exception of Sheridan, at Bridgeport, all were kept well out 
 of sight from the enemy s cavaliy on the left bank. 
 
 Sheridan alone made a show of his presence arid openly 
 began the construction of a trestle through the shoal water, 
 in order to lessen the length of the floating bridge. As 
 this was without a decided show of strength it deepened 
 the impression that the movements on this wing were the 
 feint and those toward the upper river the real move. In 
 fact, after watching Sheridan s trestle building for a while 
 from the other side of the river, Anderson s brigade of 
 infantry, the only infantry force available to oppose 
 a passage of the river, was withdrawn and sent to Chatta 
 nooga. 
 
 The bridge for Caperton s Ferry was brought down on a 
 train, which was halted out of sight, and a road cut for its 
 transportation through the woods to a point near its desti- 
 
12 
 
 nation, where the troops which were to lay it were drilled in 
 their work. 
 
 Early on the 29th fifty boats, each carrying fifty men, 
 were brought out of the woods near Caperton s, rushed 
 across an open field, launched, and quickly rowed to the op 
 posite shore. The Confederate cavalry pickets were driven 
 off and twenty-five hundred men held the south bank. The 
 bridge was promptly laid. Davis was soon over, and then 
 McCook s entire corps, with cavalry, started promptly for 
 Valley Head, forty miles down the Lookout range. Rey 
 nolds collected boats at Shellmonnd, Brannan had built 
 rafts and cut out canoes at the mouth of Battle Creek. The 
 long bridge was successfully laid at Bridgeport, and before 
 Bragg had recovered from his surprise, in fact before he had 
 comprehended the extent of the movement, Rosecrans, with 
 two corps, was over the river and moving on his communi 
 cations. 
 
 As soon as the crossing was assured, Crittenden marched 
 with celerity by way of the Sequatchee Valley towards the 
 bridges and was soon across with the main body and advanc 
 ing on the left of it directly towards Chattanooga. 
 
 This crossing of the Tennessee was a great feat. The 
 bridges were not sufficient for the army. Reynolds gathered 
 small boats and improvised his own means of crossing. Bran- 
 nan s men had cut out canoes from immense poplars and 
 launched them in Battle Creek out of sight. Some of -them 
 would hold fifty men. They also built rafts, one of them 
 large enough to carry artillery. These, with an abandoned 
 rebel pontoon boat, constituted Brannan s flotilla. When 
 the signal was given the whole swept out from behind the 
 bushes which concealed the mouth of Battle Creek and made 
 for the opposite shore. The rebel pickets withdrew and the 
 crossing was secured. Then all his men who could swim, 
 piling their guns, clothing, and accouterments on a few fence 
 rails, pushed these before them and thus gained the opposite 
 bank. Later, Wilder swan his mounted brigade across the 
 river and joined Crittenden south of Chattanooga. Halleck 
 must have had this ability for crossing a river in the pres 
 ence of an enemy in mind when he telegraphed Rosecrans, a 
 few weeks before, to move at once and keep moving. 
 
 But this crossing, and the grand diversion which made it 
 possible, were only the preliminary, and by no means the 
 formidable parts of the movement. To complete it, Rose 
 crans was to cut loose from his base, carry twenty-five 
 day s supplies and sufficient ammunition for two battles, 
 cross two precipitous and difficult mountain ranges wholly 
 within the enemy s territory, and their passes presumably 
 
13 
 
 strengthened and defended, and, after crossing the last range 
 at widely separated points, to descend into the valley in the 
 rear of that enemy s stronghold, prepared for battle or any 
 other contingencies which might arise on this distant and 
 isolated theater of action. 
 
 When Bragg discovered the real point of crossing and the 
 lines of actual movement it was too late to recall the forces 
 dispatched up the Tennessee or to post columns of sufficient 
 strength on the slopes before Rosecrans to impede his ad 
 vance in force. How strong the positions thus turned by 
 the Union forces were will appear from the statement that 
 so precipitious and otherwise difficult were the roads over 
 these ranges that at several of them it required a day and a 
 night for a division with its artillery and reduced trains to 
 make the ascent. 
 
 The Union commander had delayed his movement until 
 the corn was ripe in order that it might not be necessary to 
 carry grain for his animals, which would have largely in 
 creased his trains so careful, thoughtful, and wise was he in 
 every detail of preparation. 
 
 Bragg s failure to resit in the vicinity of Rosecrans s cross 
 ings and at the crossings bf Raccoon Mountains was due in 
 part to the tact that even after he knew that the heads of 
 columns were over the river he was still inclined to look 
 upon their movements as a feint, and to regard the real point 
 of danger to lie above the city. Rosecrans, even after cross 
 ing, sought successfully to strengthen such impressions in 
 Bragg s mind. He directed Wagner s, Wilder s, and Minty s 
 brigades to report to Hazeri, and with this force, some 7,000 
 strong, the latter was ordered to make a conspicuous show 
 of crossing the river far above Chattanooga. This active and 
 efficient officer admirably executed his orders. By extended 
 fires, by marchings and countermarchings, by moving his 
 artillery continuously across openings in sight from the oppo 
 site bank, by buglers at widely separated points, and other 
 similiar devices, he easily created the belief that an army was 
 encamped on the right bank intending to cross. 
 
 With the exception of this force, all of Rosecrans s army 
 was south of the river on September 4, and on the move. 
 The right was already well on its way. On the 6th his army 
 had descended from Raccoon Mountain and occupied the 
 valley between that range and the western slope of Lookoot 
 from a point seven miles from Chattanooga to Valley Head, 
 forty-two miles from the city. The next day McCook arid 
 Thomas began to ascend Lookout at points respectively forty- 
 two and twenty-six miles from Chattanooga. On the 8th 
 McCook s troops were in motion down the eastern slope of 
 
14 
 
 the mountain toward Alpine, and Thomas was descending 
 from Steven s and Frick s Gap, both of which were near 
 where the road from Trenton, after running southwardly, is 
 represented as leading over Lookout. Crittenden had pushed 
 small portions of his command up mere mountain trails, and 
 on the 9th these gained position where they could look down 
 upon Chattanooga. They saw no flags, and soon discovered 
 that Bragg had evacuated. The day before Wagner, still 
 watching from the north bank of the river, had reported to 
 Rosecrans that the enemy was leaving. The news came in 
 the night, and Rosecrans ordered Crittenden to ascertain the 
 situation. His detachments on the mountain had already 
 discovered that the city was deserted. Crittenden was at 
 once ordered to march around the north point of Lookout, 
 and follow Bragg toward Ringgold. At night on the 9th 
 Palmer and Van Cleve s divisions were established at Ross- 
 ville, five miles south of Chattanooga. 
 
 Thus, in three weeks from the time his diversion towards 
 Bragg s right began, and in five days from the time his army 
 was over the river, Rosecrans had repeated the Tullahoma 
 campaign on a far greater scale, and in the face of much 
 more formidable obstacles, and absolutely without fighting, 
 except as Minty had been slightly engaged with Dibrell near 
 Sparta in the outset of the movement, had driven Bragg from 
 the mountain stronghold of Chattanooga, the objective of 
 the campaign. It was well said later by General Meigs, who 
 came from Washington to Chattanooga after its final occupa 
 tion by the Union army, and spent some days in studying 
 the movements by which it had been secured : "It is not 
 only the greatest operation in our war, but a great thing 
 when compared with any war." 
 
 But the occupation of Chattanooga, in a military sense, 
 was not accomplished by sending Crittenden s two divisions 
 beyond it and one brigade into it. Bragg had only with 
 drawn to save his communications and supplies, and to await 
 the re-enforcements he knew to be hastening from Virginia, 
 from Mobile, and from Mississippi. The battle for Chatta 
 nooga was yet to be fought. Bragg had retired with delib 
 eration . He established his headquarters at Lafayette, behind 
 Pigeon Mountains, but his rear guard never passed beyond 
 Lee and Gordon s Mills. 
 
 The news that Rosecrans troops were in Chattanooga, and 
 that he had pushed out after the retreating Bragg, made a 
 tremendous impression upon the North. It was accepted as 
 a capture, and a military occupation of that long-coveted 
 stronghold. It is true it was occupied, but not in a military 
 sense, since the Union army had not been brought into it, 
 or concentrated between it and the enemy. 
 
15 
 
 Hence arose that misconception, which is widespread still, 
 that the Array of the Curaherland had occupied Chattanooga, 
 and thence marching out to attack Bragg, had been defeated 
 by the latter at Chickamauga, and driven back in disorder 
 into Chattanooga. 
 
 But, instead, Chickamauga was the battle for Chattanooga, 
 fought by Rosecrans while on the way to take military pos 
 session of it, and while he was concentrating his army be 
 tween Bragg and that city, the objective of the Union cam 
 paign. The battle was not for the Chickamauga woods, but 
 for the passes behind them which controlled the way to Chat 
 tanooga. These were secured as the immediate result of the 
 battle, and the successful occupation of Chattanooga in the 
 military sense followed an occupation which lasted till the 
 close of the war. 
 
 In connection with the fact of Crittenden s unopposed 
 movement into Chattanooga another point of general misap 
 prehension arose, which, through the years, has formed the 
 basis of unfair and unthinking, if not ignorant criticism of 
 General Rosecrans brilliant strategy. Why did not Rose- 
 crans face Thomas and McCook about in the valley west of 
 Lookout, where their movements would have been concealed, 
 and hurry them after Crittenden into Chattanooga? It was 
 simply because with McCook s advance nearly fifty miles 
 from Chattanooga by the roads west of Lookout, and Thomas s 
 head of column already down and over Missionary Ridge, 
 full thirty miles away, to withdraw and send them in succes 
 sion after Crittenden *vould have been to have invited attack 
 in detail from Bragg upon each head of column as it followed 
 Crittenden, with all the chances in favor of Bragg s success. 
 Besides, the shortest and surest, in fact the only practicable 
 line of concentration looking to the safety of the widely- 
 separated corps was through a movement to the left along 
 the eastern basis of Lookout and Missionary Ridge. It was 
 this movement of Rosecrans for concentrating on Crittenden s 
 position south of Rossville that led to the battle of Chicka 
 mauga. Bragg, having been heavily re-enforced, started at 
 the same time from Lafayette to interpose between Rosecrans 
 and Chattanooga, the Union objective of the whole campaign. 
 
 Subsequent letters will follow this exciting concentration, 
 and the desperate contests of each army for position, and 
 the bloody battles which ensued, and by which Chattanooga 
 was finally won. 
 
 H. V. B. 
 
WASHINGTON, August 7. [Special.] In the movements of 
 the Union armies none, from first to last, presented such 
 brilliant strategy as the two which brought General Rosecrans 
 from Murfreesboro , to the rear of Chattanooga. Almost 
 equally wonderful was the successful concentration of his 
 widely scattered corps. This was accomplished in the face 
 of an enemy that had been heavily re-enforced with veteran 
 troops, and largely outnumbered General Rosecrans. The 
 concentration, moreover, united the Army of the Cumber 
 land for battle between this confident enemy and the city 
 which was the objective of the Union forces. 
 
 The story is crowded with brilliant and successful opera 
 tions of detached corps against greatly superior forces and of 
 minor strategy, which blend harmoniously with the more 
 striking features of the great campaign. It covers a period 
 of intense anxiety for General Rosecrans and his subordinate 
 commanders, of most skillful action, and continued danger to 
 destruction in detail. It culimnated in the delivery of a bat 
 tle, which, through still widely misunderstood, unquestiona 
 bly ranks for the stubbornness and effectiveness of its fighting 
 and the importance of its results with the most notable bat 
 tles of the war. 
 
 A previous letter left the Army of the Cumberland where 
 its strategy had thrown it across three mountain ranges and 
 the Tennessee River, and brought it without loss to the rear 
 of Chattanooga, at the foot of the eastern base of the Lookout 
 Mountains. This had compelled Bragg to withdraw toward 
 Lafayette. The left of the Union army, under General Crit- 
 tenden, had passed around the north end of Lookout, marched 
 through Chattanooga after Bragg, and occupied Rossville 
 Gap. General McCook, forty-two miles to the right, had 
 descended to Alpine, while the center, under General 
 Thomas, was at Steven s Gap, directly opposite Bragg s 
 center, at Lafayette. 
 
 Finding that the enemy had withdrawn behind Pigeon 
 Mountains, General Rosecrans having been assured from 
 Washington that no re-enforcements had been sent from Lee s 
 army, determined to push Bragg vigorously at all points for 
 the purpose of gaining every advantage which a retreat pre 
 sented, and of inflicting all the damage possible. Beyond 
 question, this put his army in serious peril, since Bragg had 
 only retired to meet re-enforcements promised and actually 
 arriving from all quarters, and was even then concentrated 
 and ready to strike. McCook, on the right, pushed in from 
 Alpine and Summerville with Stanley s cavalry to within 
 
16a 
 
17 
 
 seven miles of Lafayette without finding any signs of retreat. 
 He therefore wisely kept his trains and main force near the 
 mountain. 
 
 Negley, of Thomas, marched out from Steven s Gap beyond 
 the Chickamauga and his skirmishers deployed in front of 
 Dug Gap. This advanced position he held during the 10th, 
 and early next morning was supported in it by Baird s di 
 vision. Here Bragg attempted his initiative, and developed 
 his preparations for advance. Two corps of infantry, Hill s 
 and Walker s, a division from Folk s command, and a di 
 vision of cavalry, were in the gaps of Pigeon Mountains, or the 
 woods behind them, under orders to advance on Negley. By 
 a fortanate delay their combinations for attack were not com 
 pleted until Baird had arrived. The bold front displayed by 
 both of these officers still further held back those overwhelm 
 ing forces of Bragg. When the latter were ready to move, 
 the skill, sharp fighting, and able maneuvering under fire 
 enabled these Union officers to bring their troops back to the 
 shelter of the mountain with comparatively little loss. It 
 was a thrilling and difficult situation, and the day a most 
 anxious one for Generals Rosecrans and Thomas. 
 
 The disappointment was great to Bragg when he learned 
 that his heavy converging columns from Catlett s Gap on his 
 right, Dug Gap in the center, and Blue Bird Gap on his left 
 had met on the ground held by Negley and Baird, only to find 
 them retiring with such show of strength and with such well 
 ordered lines as enabled them to elude even serious attack. 
 Both these officers deserve far greater credit than they have 
 ever received for their courage, coolness, and ability. At 
 night they were supported by the arrival of Brannan and 
 Reynolds from the west side of the mountain, and the position 
 of Thomas at Steven s Gap was secure. 
 
 Rosecran s anxiety and Bragg s attention were instantly 
 turned to the Union left. The discovery on the 1 1th that the 
 rebel rear guard under Cheatham had not moved south of 
 Lee & Gordon s showed Rosecrans that whatever Bragg s 
 intention may have been, he was then concentrating for battle. 
 As General Rosecrans himself declares in his official report, 
 the concentration of the Army of the Cumberland became a 
 matter of life and death. 
 
 Crittenden, from the 9th to the 12th, had carried on most 
 vigorous operations. Palmer and Van Cleve had advanced 
 to Ringgold. Wood was close at hand. Hazen, Minty, and 
 Wilder, fresh from their part in the brilliant feint north of 
 the river, had joined Crittenden, and some lively minor bat 
 tles were the result. The discovery that the rebel rear guard 
 was still at Lee & Gordon s suddenly stopped these opera- 
 
18 
 
 tions, and on the 12th, under an order to concentrate with 
 the utmost celerity north of the Chickamauga, Crittenden 
 established himself along that river near and above Lee & 
 Gordon s. 
 
 On the 13th Bragg had ordered an attack upon him by 
 Polk with two corps and the promise of the support of a third, 
 hoping to overthrow this wing, in continuance of his plan of 
 defeating the Union corps in detail, before the center or right 
 could afford relief. In the face of such threatening, with 
 McCook over fifty miles away, and Thomas unable to move 
 from the center till McCook should be within supporting dis 
 tance, Rosecrans undertook the concentration of his army. 
 
 At this point, that justice may be done, it is well to contrast 
 the attitude which the governments at Washington and Rich 
 mond had assumed toward this movement on the rebel center. 
 
 For weeks before General Rosecrans had moved forward 
 he had tried to impress upon the authorities at Washington 
 the importance of giving him strong support. Promising 
 offers to raise veteran mounted troops from several Eastern 
 governors were laid before the War Department and refused 
 with insulting warmth. Two weeks later came the order from 
 Halleck to move at once and keep moving, which is treated 
 of at length in a former letter. 
 
 This gross ignorance at Washington of the gigantic diffi 
 culties of the situation was equaled, if not surpassed, by a 
 telegram of September 11, the very day that Bragg s re-en 
 forced army was moving against Rosecrans center and or 
 ganizing for an attack on his left, and while Rosecrans and 
 Thomas and McCook were straining every nerve in a life and 
 death effort to concentrate their army. Said Halleck, by 
 telegraph of this date : 
 
 "After holding the mountain passes on the west and 
 Dal ton, or some point on the railroad, to prevent the return 
 of Bragg s army, it will be decided whether your army shall 
 move further South into Georgia and Alabama. It is re 
 ported here that a part of Bragg s army is re-enforcing Lee. 
 It is important that the truth of this should be ascertained 
 as early as possible." 
 
 This showed that Halleck shared the general and ignorant 
 belief that Rosecrans had occupied Chattanooga in a military 
 sense. 
 
 At this time Longstreet s advance had been gone a week 
 from under Halleck s eyes near Washington, and two divis 
 ions of Johnston s troops from Mississippi, and Buckner, 
 from East Tennessee, had already joined Bragg, and others 
 were on the way. 
 
19 
 
 The failure to give Rosecrans effective flanking supports 
 was inexcusable. The only explanation for it is found in the 
 irritation and dislike which his straightforward and independ 
 ent dealings had aroused in Washington, and a failure to 
 understand the natural obstacles of the position and the con 
 templated advance. Meade was in a state of enforced inactivity 
 before Lee. Grant s army was doing nothing to occupy John 
 ston in Mississippi, and there was no such Union activity in 
 front of Mobile and Charleston as prevented troops being 
 spared to Bragg from those points. And so, while the 
 Washington authorities were finding fault with Rosecrans 
 while he was pushing some of the most brilliant and effec 
 tual moves of the war, and were not even lifting a finger to 
 encourage or even to protect him, the Richmond government 
 was neglecting no means to strengthen Bragg to the extent 
 of its powers. As a result, in one week from the date of 
 Halleck s telegram inquiring whether Bragg was re enforcing 
 Lee, Longstreet and Johnston and Walker and Buckner 
 had reached Bragg from the extremes of the Confederacy, 
 and he had moved to attack Rosecrans with TO, 000 men. 
 
 In this criminal neglect of Rosecrans the authorities were 
 without excuse. No friend of Stanton s or Halleck s have 
 even yet attempted to explain, much less defend it. These 
 and other high officers, at one time or another, arraigned 
 General Rosecrans as solely responsible for what they chose 
 to designate as the disaster and defeat of Chicamauga. It 
 was* the shortest way for some of them to divert attention 
 from the terrible neglect and responsibility which rested on 
 their heads. But even if the favorable chances for the con 
 centration of Confederate forces against Rosecrans had escaped 
 unwilling observation at Washington, the authorities there 
 were without excuse, since the case was very pointedly placed 
 before them in an editorial of the Cincinnati Commercial, 
 which excited so much attention that the editor was officially 
 notified that such articles were highly indiscreet. This was 
 as early as September 1. In view of what occurred a few 
 weeks later, and of the evidence it gives of ample warning, 
 it is interesting to reproduce this editorial of Mr. Halstead, 
 printed on the date named, under a title, a " Point of Dan 
 ger." Said the editor : 
 
 tf Jeff Davis and his generals are as well informed as we are 
 of the presence of a considerable part of the army of the Po 
 tomac in New York City to enforce the draft, and that con 
 sequently an advance on Richmond need not be apprehended 
 for some weeks. They have also heard of the presence of 
 Admiral Farragut in New York, and infer from the circum 
 stance that there is no immediate danger of an attack on 
 
20 
 
 Mobile. They know the situation at Charleston, and are not 
 mistaken in the opinion that the advance upon that city 
 must be slow, by process of engineering, digging, and heavy 
 cannonading. They do not need large bodies of troops to 
 make the defense ; negro laborers, engineer officers and gun 
 ners being all that are required. General Grant s army, as 
 is well known, is, for the most part, resting from its labors 
 in undisputed possession of an enormous territory. The real 
 aggressive movement of the Federal forces is upon the rebel 
 center ; that is to say, East Tennessee, and it is extremely 
 unlikely that the rebels are deficient in information as to the 
 strength and intentions of Generals Rosecrans and Burnside. 
 
 " The important question is whether they will improve the 
 opportunity by concentrating upon their center. The reports 
 that General Joe Johnston has joined his forces to those re 
 cently under Bragg, and has thus gathered a force almost if 
 not quite equal numerically to those in the hands of General 
 Rosecrans, have in addition the immense advantages of the 
 occupation of mountain passes, and that are to be found in 
 pursuing a defensive system of warfare. General Lee is re 
 ported to have sent troops to East Tennessee, and it is prob 
 able that he has done so, as, thanks to the New York riots, he 
 has some divisions temporarily to spare from Virginia. If 
 the rebels do give up East Tenessee and Northern Georgia 
 without a struggte, that is to say, if Generals Rosecrans and 
 Burnside complete the operations in which they are engaged 
 without meeting serious resistance, it may he taken as con 
 clusive evidence of the exhaustion of the rebellion." 
 
 Several subsequent editorials enforced these ideas, and 
 were even so definite as to point out Johston, Longstreet, 
 and Buckner as the commands which were likely to re-en 
 force Bragg. 
 
 General Rosecrans had had these general points of danger 
 in mind, and made them known to the Government nearly 
 a month before he crossed the Tennessee. But his request 
 for more men and flanking supports was refused at the War 
 Department with much warmth and most inconsiderate em 
 phasis. This Commercial editorial, therefore, startled him, 
 and his records show that he sent Mr. Halstead a sharp let 
 ter intimating that such an editorial was little better than 
 a call to the Jeff Davis government to fall on him. It was, 
 however, the clear common sense of the situation ; and if the 
 Washington authorities had heeded it, instead as was their 
 custom, sneering at " newspaper generals" and newspaper 
 ways of carrying on the war, many lives would have been 
 saved at Chickamauga which were lost because of the un 
 equal contest, and there would never have been any question 
 ing, of that costly, but no less decided victory. 
 
21 
 
 It is further true that General Peck, stationed in North 
 Carolina, sent word to General Kosecrans, under date of 
 September 6, that Longstreet s corps was passing southward 
 over the railroads. Colonel Jacques, of the Seventy-third 
 Illinois, who had come up from the South, tried in vain for 
 ten days to gain admittance in Washington, to communicate 
 this fact of Longstreet s movement to Halleck and Stanton, 
 and then, without accomplishing it, started West, and 
 reached his command in time to fight with the regiment at 
 Cbickamauga, There had been time enough, after General 
 Rosecrans s explanations of his proposed plan, to force Burn- 
 side, with twenty thousand men, down from East Tennessee, 
 and to have brought all needed strength for the other flank 
 from the Array of the Tennessee on the Mississippi. Even 
 when ordered up, after the battle, this latter loitered to a 
 degree that its commander will never be able to satisfactorily 
 explain. 
 
 To return from this digression, Bragg on the 13th had 
 ordered an attack by three corps on Crittenden. The latter, 
 by his great activity and by the bold operations of Van Cleve, 
 Wood, Palmer, and the brigades of Hazen, Minty, and 
 Wilder, had created the impression of much greater strength 
 than they really had, and Polk moved cautiously. Finally, 
 just as he was ready to attack, his column on the Lafayette 
 road encountered Van Cleve moving on him with a single 
 brigade of infantry. So vigorously did this officer attack 
 that he forced Folk s advance back for three miles, and cre 
 ated the impression of a general Union advance. This dis 
 concerted Polk, and instead of ordering his forces forward, 
 he halted, took up a defensive position, and sent to Bragg 
 for re-enforcements. Thus Negley and Baird, by their pluck 
 and skill in front of overwhelming forces, and Palmer and 
 Crittenden s active divisions and attached brigades on the 
 left, by their unhesitating attacks wherever they developed 
 the enemy, and by this last one delivered in the face of an 
 advance of three full corps on one, had made the concentra 
 tion of the army possible, and had saved it. The next day 
 Steedman, that lion of battle, had reached Rossville, in im 
 mediate support of Crittenden, with two brigades of his own 
 command and two regiments and two batteries temporarily 
 attached, having marched from Bridgeport, a distance of forty 
 miles, in twenty-eight hours. 
 
 The appearance and wonderful activity of Hazen, Wilder, 
 and Minty s brigades on the left of Crittenden s, and Steed- 
 man s forces of the reserve corps at Rossville, with the iact 
 that McCook was nearing Thomas, and that the latter had 
 extended his left to within near supporting distance of Critten- 
 
22 
 
 den, seem to have restrained Bragg from attack in any 
 direction after the failure of his orders to Polk to attack on 
 the 13th until his orders of the night of the 17th for an attack 
 the next day upon Crittenden s left and rear. 
 
 During this period of comparative inaction against the 
 Union front, Rosecrans insured the concentration of his 
 army in time for hattle. McCook, not understanding the 
 roads along the top of the mountain, and not deeming it 
 prudent to consume the time necessary to explore them, had 
 crossed Lookout twice, at the cost of more than a full day, 
 and appeared with his head of column at General Thomas s 
 camps during the 16th. On the 17th the latter closed the 
 heads of his columns toward Crittenden. 
 
 The days of concentration had been a period of the most 
 intense anxiety, of unceasing watchfulness, of unbending 
 determination, of brilliant minor affairs, of unflinching cour 
 age, and, withal, of cool calculation and precise execution 
 for every part of the army. 
 
 While, on the morning of the 18th, the three corps of the 
 Union army and its reserve were in position where each 
 could support the other if attacked, its supreme effort for 
 position was to come. Bragg s order for battle contem 
 plated crossing the Chicamauga some miles below Lee and 
 Gordon s and driving the Union left under Crittenden back on 
 the center and right under Thomas and McCook, and thus, 
 by thrusting his columns between Rosecrans and Chatta 
 nooga, recover that place and force the Union army back into 
 the mountains, from which position it is doubtful if it could 
 have extricated itself. 
 
 Bragg s order for attack on the 18th could not be executed. 
 His army was concentrated between Lee and Gordon s and 
 Lafayette. He moved with five Infantry and two cavalry 
 corps. Narrow roads, small bridges, difficult fords, and 
 dense forests delayed operations, so that at nightfall of the 
 18th his troops were not in position to attack. In fact, he 
 was scarcely ready to deliver battle under his plan on the 
 morning of the 19th, when Thomas s unexpected attack, far 
 on the rebel right, deranged Braggs s plan, and forced him 
 to battle several miles from the point where he was about 
 to open it on Crittenden, who he supposed still constituted 
 the L^nion left. 
 
 It was nothing less than the inversion of the Union army 
 under cover of a night that had thus disconcerted Bragg and 
 enabled Rosecrans to array himself for battle between Bragf 
 and Chattanooga, and across the roads and in front of the 
 passes which led to that city. It was this night march of 
 two corps which constituted the supreme movement of the 
 
THE CONCENTRATION. 
 
23 
 
 concentration, and which at the same time defeated Bragg s 
 purpose to fight with the back of his own army to Chatta 
 nooga with a view to its recovery. 
 
 The map given below will make this inversion and final 
 concentration clear, and show the position of the two armies 
 at daylight on the 19th, when the battle began. 
 
 On the 17th General Thomas s corps was in the vicinity of 
 Pond Spring, Negley on the left, and so nearest to a junction 
 with Crittenden at Lee & Gordon s, Baird next to the right, 
 and Brannan next. Reynolds was thrown to the front. The 
 left of McCook had closed on Thomas at Pond Spring. 
 
 During the day Bragg, strongly threatening Crittenden at 
 Lee & Gordon s with two divisions, held him fast, and started 
 the rest of his army down the Chickamauga to cross and 
 sweep in on Crittenden s left and rear, expecting to find him 
 still constituting the left of the Union army, and to double 
 this left back on Thomas and McCook. 
 
 Bushrod Johnson had crossed at Reed s Bridge, driven 
 Wilder nearly to the State road at Vineyard s, and bivou 
 acked a mile and a half from Crittenden s left. Walker had 
 also crossed at Lambert s Ford with three divisions and For 
 rest s cavalry division, and halted for the night about a mile 
 in the rear of Hood. For the most part Bragg s army had 
 the full night for rest. 
 
 On the other hand, the Union columns were alive with 
 motion. That night was to cover the inversion of an army. 
 About 4 o clock Thomas started his whole corps from Pond 
 Spring toward Crittenden, McCook following him. This was 
 doubtless interpreted by Bragg as a closing in on Crittenden. 
 But it was far more than that. 
 
 As soon as night shut the columns in they were pressed 
 rapidly to the left. Negley, as he drew near to Crittenden, 
 was moved to the Chickamauga in front of Crawfish Springs. 
 This prevented a night attempt to cut the column by occupy 
 ing the roads intersecting at that point. Meantime Thomas, 
 with his other three divisions, pushed on. It was a long, 
 weary night. Heavy trains of supplies and ammunition 
 occupied the road. The troops moved mostly through the 
 adjacent fields, both for celerity of marching and as guards 
 to the trains. Heavy flanking forces streamed along parallel 
 to the road, and well out toward the river. There were 
 constant interruptions to continuous movement, causing fre 
 quent halts of the infantry. The night was cool, and, as 
 the commands stopped, the men warmed themselves by start 
 ing fires in the fences. The result was that toward midnight 
 the trains were everywhere driving between two continuous 
 lines of fires, and the men on either side, or in the road, had 
 
24 
 
 constant facilities for warming themselves. It was a tedious 
 and most fatiguing night, but at daylight the vitally im 
 portant task was done. Thomas s head of column, Baird in 
 advance, reached the Kelly farm at daylight, with Brannan 
 well closed up and Reynolds a short distance in the rear. 
 Brannan was on the State or Lafayette road, near the inter 
 section of the road leading into it from Reed s bridge. McCook 
 had reached a point to the right and rear of Crittenden, near 
 Crawfish Springs. And so at sunrise the Union right, in 
 stead of resting far up the Chickamauga from Crittenden s 
 position, as Bragg expected to find it, had become the left of 
 Rosecrans army and Crittenden was the right. More than 
 this, Rosecrans had established his lines two miles beyond 
 Bragg s right, and between it and Chattanooga. The victory 
 of concentration had been followed by the equally important 
 success of inverting the army and thus thrusting its columns 
 between the enemy and the objective of the campaign. These 
 second stages of the movement deserve to take rank with the 
 matchless strategy with which it was inaugurated. 
 
 But the battle for the firm and final possession of Chatta 
 nooga was still to come. It opened suddenly for both sides, 
 and for Bragg in a wholly unexpected quarter. The weary 
 Union troops had scarcely time to cook their coffee after the 
 night march, and some of them no time at all, before the 
 storm broke and the army was summoned to the battle which 
 Thomas had opened. 
 
 H. V. B. 
 
WASHINGTON, August 14. [Special.] The last letter in 
 this series left the Army of the Cumberland on the morning 
 of the 19th of September, concentrated for battle on the field 
 of Chickamauga. By an energetic night march the army 
 had been thrown forward on its left by inversion into line, 
 and thrust between the enemy and Chattanooga, the objective 
 of the campaign. It was a difficult and dangerous move 
 ment, where two armies, intent on battle, were only separated 
 by such a stream as the Chickamauga, which was everywhere 
 easily fordable above Lee & Gordon s. But General Thomas, 
 who led this column, is the one commander of a great army 
 of whom it can be said with accuracy that from the first of 
 the war to the close no movement of his miscarried. At day 
 light of the 19th he held the Lafayette and Chattanooga road 
 at the Kelly farm. 
 
 Bragg s army, though re-enforced from all parts of the 
 Confederacy, and though it had been well concentrated be 
 tween Lafayette and Gordon s mills for several preceding 
 days, had been skillfully foiled by General Kosecrans in the 
 efforts to strike his isolated corps. During the 18th it had 
 been pressed by Bragg down the winding and thickly- 
 wooded valley of the Chickamauga in execution of an order 
 for battle. This order was based upon the idea that Critten- 
 den s corps at Lee & Gordon s was the left of the Union 
 army. While he was to be held there by strong force threat 
 ening attack from the other side of the stream, the bulk of 
 Bragg s army was to cross at the various fords and bridges 
 below, and, turning up stream, was then to join in sweeping 
 Crittenden back on Thomas and McCook, whom Bragg sup 
 posed still to constitute the Union center and right. In exe 
 cution of this plan Bushrod Johnson had crossed at Heed s 
 bridge, and pushed up to within a mile and a half of Lee & 
 Gordon s, and westward to within a mile of the Lafayette 
 road, where night overtook him. Walker s corps had crossed 
 below Alexander s Bridge, and bivouacked alter a short ad 
 vance toward Crittenden. Minty and Wilder, with their 
 mounted men, and Dan McCook, with his brigade, had 
 stoutly resisted and greatly delayed these columns. The most 
 of Bragg s army had rested through the night. Two corps 
 of Kosecrans s forces had marched continuously since four 
 o clock the preceding afternoon. They were about to move 
 into battle without time for breakfast or further rest. Bragg, 
 upon Longstree*t s arrival, would have 70,000 men available 
 for the fight. Rosecrans s strength for battle was not over 
 56,000. 
 
26 
 
 At daylight all of Bragg s army, wholly concealed by the 
 forests, was in motion. A considerable portion of it was still 
 crossing the river at the various fords and bridges from Tel- 
 ford s to Reed s bridge, and deploying on the other side to 
 ward Crittenden , who was still supposed to hold the Union left. 
 
 Suddenly, about 9 o clock, there came to Bragg s ears the 
 sounds of heavy and unexpected battle far down the Chicka- 
 rnauga and well toward Rossville. Thomas, whose head of 
 column rested at the Kelly farm, for the double purpose of 
 exploring the forests in his front and to test the truth of a 
 report that an isolated brigade of the enemy was on the west 
 side of the river near Reed s bridge, moved Brannan ^and 
 Baird directly into the forest on the road towards Reed s. At 
 this time two-thirds of Bragg s army, concealed by the for 
 ests, had crossed the Chickamauga and was directing its col 
 umns up that stream toward Crittenden. Just at the time 
 when Bragg expected that his right would have swung 
 across the Lafayette road, and that his center divisions would 
 have opened on Crittenden s position at Lee & Gordon s, 
 these portentous sounds of battle from Thomas s line aston 
 ished and perplexed him. After vainly waiting for them 
 to cease, under the first impression that the affair was a move 
 ment of his forces in reconnoissance, and that some Union 
 cavalry had been encountered, he found it so serious as to de 
 range his whole plan of battle, and force him to meet an 
 enemy who had turned his right. To do this he was obliged 
 to move a portion of his troops that had not crossed the river 
 down stream to Reed s. By the circuitous roads which they 
 were obliged to travel, it required a march of six miles to 
 reach the left of Thomas. 
 
 This destruction of the rebel plan was due to Thomas 
 opening the battle with the divisions of Brannan and Baird 
 in the vicinity of Reed s bridge. At 6.30 o clock Brannan left 
 Kelly s, and moving north, turned in from the Lafayette 
 road at McDaniel s toward Reed s. A quarter of a mile from 
 McDaniel s he deployed his division. Van Derveer was on 
 the left, and thus became the left of the Union army. Cou 
 ncil s brigade was in the center, and Croxton on the right. 
 In like manner Baird advanced with a front line of two bri 
 gades. King, with the regulars, was on the left, next to 
 Brannan, and Scribner on the right of King, while Stark 
 weather marched by the flank behind Scribner s right. 
 
 The last disposition was promptly made by Baird upon his 
 discovering that the enemy was in strong force to his right. 
 
 Thus while neither army was aware that the other was in 
 heavy force in the woods which surrounded them, and while 
 Bragg s forces were forming to move up the Chickamauga, and 
 
ROSSVILLE GAP 
 
 W ^ 
 
 I 
 
 i 
 
 STEEDMJN 
 
 VIDITOE 
 
 KELLEY I / 
 
 as/on | j 
 
 
 CHAW FISH 
 
 xEED BRIDGE 
 
 MAP OF FIRST DAY S BATTLE. 
 
 26a 
 
27 
 
 so away from Thomas s line of march , both Brannan and Baird 
 came in force on Bragg s right, in front of Reed s bridge, at 
 a point near Jay s Mills, and opened the battle of Chicka- 
 mauga. Croxton struck first with a vigorous attack on For 
 rest, who, with the two divisions of his corps, was guarding 
 the Confederate right. The cavalrymen were forced back to 
 the sawmill, where they rallied, dismounted, and began to 
 fight as infantry. Croxton held his own, and even ad 
 vanced slightly. Forrest sent for infantry, and Wilson s 
 brigade of Walker s division hurried from Alexander s and 
 rushed into the fight. 
 
 Meantime re-enforcements were turning from all portions 
 of Bragg s line toward the sound of furious battle. Shortly 
 the advance toward Crittenden ceased, so vigorous had 
 Thomas s battle become, Connell and Van Derveer at first 
 meeting no enemy on their fronts pressed toward the vortex 
 of Croxton s fighting. Forrest, relieved by Walker s infan 
 try, met this advance of Brannan s left with his whole force 
 and fought for the most part on foot. Croxton, out of am 
 munition, was obliged to retire somewhat before Walker, 
 when Baird pushed King in to support him, while Van Der 
 veer and Connell moved in first on Forrest and next on 
 Ector s brigade of Walker s reserve. The battle became 
 terrific. Forrest hurried in person after infantry supports, 
 and for portions of his own command left near Alexander s. 
 
 At 11 o clock Bragg had become convinced that Rosecrans 
 had forced battle upon him on the extreme rebel right. 
 With such vigor did Thomas s two divisions fight that 
 Walker was ordered at that hour to go to Forrest with all 
 his force, and Cheatham, of Folk s corps, who had the 
 strongest division of the army, consisting of five brigades, 
 then stationed as the reserve of Bragg s left. Hardly had 
 Cheatham started before Stewart, of Buckner s corps, which 
 was near Tedford s Ford, ready to move toward Crittenden, 
 was also dispatched in haste to the Confederate right, and 
 at 1 o clock Cleburne, of Hill s corps, posted near the ex 
 treme left of the Confederate line, was ordered to the scene 
 of action before Brannan and Baird. These movements 
 show how Bragg s plan of battle had been wholly over 
 turned, and how fierce the fighting of these two divisions 
 of Thomas must have been to decide Bragg to send four 
 infantry divisions to the assistance of Forrest s corps of two 
 divisions. 
 
 Meantime Walker had moved Govan s brigade obliquely 
 on the right flank of Scribner and forced him back. Simul 
 taneously Walthall s brigade struck King in flank and drove 
 him in disorder over Van Derveer s brigade. Guenther s 
 
28 
 
 regular battery, one of the best and most efficient in tbe 
 service, was captured. We shall see how it was shortly after 
 retaken by the splendid Ninth Ohio. 
 
 Thus, while Baird s lines were shaken by the overwhelm 
 ing concentration against them, and Brannan was facing 
 and fighting superior numbers, matters were hot for Thomas, 
 who was slowly moving to and fro along his divisions and 
 closely watching them. Baird was restoring his lines under 
 fire and in the face of a flank attack Croxton s men, with 
 fresh ammunition, were holding their place. Council s bri 
 gade was immovable, and poured its fire into the very faces 
 of the enemy. Van Derveer, on the left, was busily maneu 
 vering to meet flank attacks, and fighting desperately, but 
 with unvarying success. 
 
 At this moment, when Baird was scarcely able to maintain 
 position, and must have soon yielded to numbers, Johnson, 
 of McCook s corps, came on the field from Crawfish Springs, 
 and was led by Thomas to the right of Baird. Here, with 
 the brigades of Willich and Baldwin on the front and 
 Dodge in reserve, Johnson, by heavy fighting, relieved the 
 pressure on Baird, restored the line, and checked Bragg s 
 new center. 
 
 Following came Palmer, most opportunely ordered for 
 ward by Crittenden from Lee & Gordon s, who saw plainly 
 from the development of furious battle on the Union left that 
 troops would surely be wanted there. Palmer followed 
 Johnson into line, and under the personal direction of 
 Rosecransthe brigades of Hazen,Cruft, and Grose were formed 
 in echelon and ordered forward, immediately encountering 
 Cheatham s men and becoming fiercely engaged. Hazeu on 
 the left fell with great vigor on Walker s left and relieved 
 Starkweather, of Baird, from precarious position. At the 
 same time Van Derveer was thrown by Brannan on the right 
 of Walker and by terrific fighting crushed Walthall s line 
 and drove it well back into the forests. 
 
 It was here that the Ninth Ohio, the German Turner reg 
 iment of Bob McCook both regiment and commander of 
 glorious memory recaptured the regular battery and 
 brought it into the Union lines. The regiment had been 
 with the trains during the night march and it was chafing 
 far in the rear when Van Derveer sent for it. Sore was his 
 need. The repeated attacks of the enemy on his front and 
 flank in the attempt to crush the Union left and reach the 
 Lafayette road in its rear were becoming so frequent and 
 heavy that, in spite of the fact that every man under him 
 was fighting where he stood and yielding no inch of ground, 
 it seemed as if the limit of human endurance even for iron 
 
29 
 
 veterans must soon be reached. Then from the near distance 
 came the well-known hurrah of the Ninth advancing from 
 the right. As all waited to welcome the head of its column, 
 its charging shout was heard to the front of its line of ad 
 vance, followed at once by rapid musketry, and then their 
 great "hurrah" of victory. The story is brief. Colonel 
 Kammerling at the head of his regiment, coming on at dou 
 ble-quick, saw to his right and front the captured artillery of 
 the regulars, just taken by Grovan. Without order s he 
 halted his line, fronted it, and with the command " Links 
 Schwengket," swung it to the left, faced toward the hill 
 where the battery stood in the hands of its captors, and 
 with a sweeping charge drove the rebels back, bayoneting 
 some among the guns, and rushed with guns and many pris 
 oners back to the Union line. A few minutes after he came 
 in on the run to Van Derveer, just in time to take part in 
 the last and supreme effort of the enemy to crush that un 
 yielding left. Forrest s men had passed beyond Van Der- 
 veer s left and formed for assault on his front, and also di 
 rectly on his flank. But the vigilant skirmishers and pris 
 oners taken by them made known the movement. The left 
 was thrown back in time, and the line presenoed an obtuse 
 angle opening toward the enemy. Into this, and heavily 
 against the left of it, Forrest hurled his columns, four deep. 
 On came these men in gray in magnificent lines, which 
 showed clearly through the open forest bending their faces 
 before the sleet of the storm, and firing hotly as they ad 
 vanced. As they came within the range of the oblique fire 
 from Van Derveer s right they halted within forty yards 
 of his left and for a few moments poured in a destructive 
 fire. A wheel of Smith s regular battery, and of a section 
 of Church s guns which had reported, brought themw here they 
 poured a nearly enfilading fire of cannister down those long 
 lines, standing bravely there and fighting almost under the 
 mouths ot the guns. Thomas and Brannan and Van Der 
 veer were looking on and encouraging the line. It had 
 seemed almost beyond the probabilities to hold it till those 
 well served batteries opened. An instant later it seemed as 
 if the lines of gray had sunk into the earth. When the 
 smoke lifted from the third round the front was clear of every 
 thing but the heaps of dead and wounded, and the work of 
 the day at that point of the Union left was done. 
 
 The fight still raged bitterly, however, along the lines of 
 Johnson, and of Palmer to the right of him. Brannan and 
 Baird were withdrawn from the front which they had held, 
 the former being sent toward the center to provideagainstcon- 
 tiugencies there, and the latter posted to prevent any move- 
 
30 
 
 ment toward the Layfayette road at McDaniel s. Forrest and 
 Cheathara s brigades of infantry next attacked Johnson (of 
 McCook), who then held the advanced portion of the Union 
 left. Here the contest soon became furious again, partly on 
 the ground of Baird s morning battle. Maney s splendid bri 
 gade rushed to a hand-to-hand fight, but was borne back. 
 Wright, Strahl, Jackson, and Smith, with their brigades, 
 all under Cheatham, each delivered bold and most cour 
 ageous attacks_, but without carrying the Union line. Rose- 
 crans s army, under the successive hammering of the Con 
 federate onslaughts, was fast being solidly formed from left 
 to right. Willich, Baldwin, and Dodge, of Johnson, and 
 Hazen, Cruft, and Grose, of Palmer, were fairly aligned, 
 having fought themselves forward into good positions. 
 
 The battle next fell heavily on the right of Palmer, as 
 Bragg at last had his whole army in rapid motion toward 
 his right. As Palmer s ammunition began to fail, Reynolds 
 moved up to his right and rear, arid made most excellent 
 dispositions just east of the Lafayette road. Upon call, he 
 pushed Willich and Edward King in on Palmer s right, and 
 at once became hotly engaged. Crittenden sent Van Cleve 
 with Samuel Beatty s and Dick s brigades to the right of 
 Reynold s, leaving Barnes s brigade with General Wood at 
 Lee & Gordon s. 
 
 As fast as the Union line could be extended to the left it 
 became sorely pressed by Bragg s troops, then well massed 
 west of the Chickamauga. General Davis, from McCook, 
 pressed rapidly to the left and was sent in near Vineyard s. 
 At 3 o clock Wood was ordered from Lee & Gordon s to the 
 field of the growing fight. As Bragg still had some forces 
 opposite this point. General Lytle s brigade, of Sheridan s 
 division, was directed to relieve Wood and hold the crossing. 
 Thus in six hours from the time Bragg was directing his 
 army on Crittenden at Lee & Gordon s, a single brigade, 
 posted there only from prudence, served for all demands 
 against Confederate movement from that direction. This in 
 dicates how completely Bragg had been driven from his plan. 
 
 Wood and Davis had not been dispatched a moment too 
 soon. Van Cleve, Davis, and Wood were confronted with 
 solid masses of Bragg s concentrated troops, and the scenes 
 arid splendid fighting of the morning at the left were re 
 peated hereby these divisions. Stewart, Johnson, and Pres 
 ton, of Buckner s corps, and Hindmau, of Longstreet s 
 advance, were assaulting these lines. Davis had been 
 ordered to wheel in on the enemy s left flank, and this 
 movement led to one of the bravest and bloodiest contests 
 of the day in front of Vineyard s- Wood advanced -his 
 
31 
 
 lines into the vortex just when David was hardest pressed, 
 and, when all seemed about to he compelled to yield, Sheri 
 dan appeared on the flank, and Wilder s mounted brigade 
 came up in the rear. Every division of the Union army was 
 in line except the reserve under Granger, which was some 
 miles away toward Ringgold, with orders to hold Red House 
 bridge. 
 
 The battle along Rosecrans s center and right waxed hotter 
 and fiercer. He seemed everywhere present and he was 
 everywhere alert. Van Cleve encountered the left of Stewart 
 marching to relieve Cheatham, and a fight muzzle to muzzle 
 took place between Clayton of Stewart s and the two brigades 
 of Van Cleve, Sam Beatty and Dick. 
 
 Reynolds, by magnificent generalship and fighting, re 
 stored the broken line in his front, and firmly established 
 himself there. His brigades, under Turchin and Edward 
 King, covered themselves with laurels as they swayed back 
 and forth on the tides of battles which rushed and swirled 
 over all that portion of the field. 
 
 Davis, with the brigades of Carlin and Heg, delivered their 
 fire at short range, and stood their ground long and well, 
 till borne back by overwhelming forces. It was just as this 
 slow retrograde movement began that Wood had appeared, 
 having marched rapidly from Lee and Gordon s with Bark- 
 ex s and Buell s brigade of his own-division and Barnes s of 
 Van Cleve s. They swept in on the right, and bj splendid 
 fighting checked the rebel line and held it on their front in 
 spite of its vigorous and splendid fighting. 
 
 At this point two exactly opposite movements were in 
 progress along the lines of the armies. Bragg, who seemed 
 determined to push his right between the Union left and 
 Chattanooga, ordered Cleburne from Tedford s Ford to the 
 extreme right, the scene of the morning fighting. At the 
 same time General Thomas, convinced that no perilous attack 
 could be delivered at that hour from that extreme point, was 
 bringing Brannan from the left to the support of Reynolds 
 just as the latter was fighting to push the enemy from the 
 Lafayette road. Brannan arrived in time to help, and with 
 Croxton s assistance Reynolds restored the lines on his front 
 and flank, and regained possession of the road. Negley also 
 arrived opportunely from the right and took active part at 
 this point. Wood repulsed Bush rod Johnson s division, 
 though at great cost. Trigg, of Preston s division, entirely 
 Iresh, moved in with splendid pluck and movement to restore 
 the line, but Sheridan-, from McCook, with Bradley and 
 Laiboldt s brigades, met and checked this advance, and with 
 its recoil the heat of battle on the Union right began to subside. 
 
32 
 
 About 5 o clock the field on both sides was still. But 
 Cleburne and Walker were moving again far on the rebel 
 right, in obedience to Bragg s order to again attack the Union 
 left. The Confederate march was over the field of the morn 
 ing, where the dead of Walker were thickly strewed. It 
 wa8 a depressing advance. Still those veterans formed and 
 moved on without a sign of shrinking, and about six o clock 
 the hour of silence was broken by a terrifie attack in the 
 gathering dusk upon Johnson, near the ground occupied by 
 Baird in the morning. The assault fell also upon Baird fur 
 ther to the left. Cleburne, with a front of a mile, filled by 
 three brigades, had suddenly burst upon Thomas s left. 
 Cleburne had three brigades Polk, Wood, and Deshler. 
 Walthall and Govan, of Liddell s division, and three brigades 
 of Cleburne Strahl, Johnson, and Preston Smith supported 
 him. The assault was tremendous. Night was falling, and 
 the aim of each side was directed by the flashes of the guns. 
 
 Willich, Dodge and Baldwin, of Johnson, fought their 
 brigades with undaunted pluck and endurance. Baldwin fell 
 on his line. Baird, with Scribner, King, and Starkweathar, 
 held their ground, though vigorously attacked. Preston 
 Smith, on the Confederate side, was killed here. Darkness 
 put an end to the movement and the fighting, and each 
 army sought rest. 
 
 For the commanders of all grades it was a busy night. 
 While the Union line was continuous and measurably com 
 pact between the enemy and practicable roads to Chatta 
 nooga, there was much realignment to be done to better the 
 position for the morrow. The Union troops obtained only 
 snatches of rest on ground white with frost. No fires were 
 lighted, lest the direction of the lines might be revealed. 
 This made supper a dry meal. But the fact that for most 
 there had been no time for breakfast and none at all for 
 dinner, gave excellent relish even to a dry supper. 
 
 Rosecrans s purpose of establishing his lines between the 
 enemy and Chattanooga had been accomplished. Bragg s 
 plan of thrusting his army between the Union advance and 
 the city had been defeated. At the close of this first day 
 victory rested with Rosecrans. He had found himself largely 
 outnumbered, and had thrown every available man into the 
 fight. 
 
 Bragg had many brigades which were not engaged, and 
 Longstreet, with the greater part of his force, was yet to ar 
 rive. The spirit of the Union army had risen to a high pitch 
 under the splendid and most effective fighting which it had 
 done, and it looked forward to the morrow with a confidence 
 born of the consciousness of fighting and staying powers. 
 
33 
 
 But hard as the work of the day had been, and stubborn 
 and bitter as was the fighting in each army, the coming 
 Sunday was to witness a battle eclipsing this and surpassing 
 all the war for its pluck and tleadliness. While the weary 
 commanders were preparing for this day, and tired sentinels 
 kept faithful watch, the wounded suffered and the armies 
 slept. 
 
 H. V. B. 
 
WASHINGTON, August 17. [Special.] The second and final 
 fight for the possession of Chattanooga opened on Sunday, 
 September 20. We have seen how through the preceding 
 day, in the white heat of battle, the Union lines had estab 
 lished themselves on thje field of Chickamauga, and that at 
 nightfall they were still between Bragg and the city for which 
 they were fighting. 
 
 It was a cool and beautiful morning, though heavy fog 
 hung over the lower parts of the field, greatly impeding the 
 preparations of each commander. For an hour or two after 
 daylight there were few indications of the terrific scenes which 
 were to be crowded into that Sabbath day. 
 
 Both sides had improved the night to rectify and strengthen 
 the alignment. Bragg had received important re-enforce 
 ments. General Longstreet arrived in the night and was 
 placed in command of the left wing. Polk was assigned to 
 the right wing. With Longstreet came the bulk of his two 
 divisions from Virginia, Hood and McLaws. Three brigades 
 only of the former had taken part with Hood in the first day s 
 fight. Gist s brigade of Walker s corps also arrived from 
 Meridian. The Army of the Tennessee, with all the warn 
 ings and requests of Rosecrans to the authorities at Wash 
 ington, had done nothing to prevent a general .exodus of 
 rebel forces from Mississippi. Even a portion of Pemberton s 
 paroled men came, and two brigades, relieved by paroled 
 prisoners, were in time for the first day s battle. Bragg re 
 adjusted his lines during the night. The most important 
 change was to bring Breckinridge from his extreme left, east 
 of the Chickamauga, to the extreme right. Cleburne and 
 Cheatham were both moved close to Breckinridge. Forrest, 
 with two divisions, one to fight on foot, was placed still to 
 the right of Breckrinridge, to observe the Lafayette road. 
 With this heavy force, strengthened on its extreme left with 
 Stewart, he intended to attack the Union left at daylight. 
 
 Rosecrans, on the other hand, had no re-enforcements with 
 which to relieve or help his lines, and most of his army had 
 marched a night and fought a day without rest and with little 
 food, and every available man had been engaged. Burnside 
 had been for weeks where he could easily have formed a junc 
 tion. In fact, slowly as he had moved, his infantry had 
 reached Kingston about the time Rosecrans had finished con 
 centrating his army. It was the duty and the business of 
 Halleck and others at Washington to have had it on the field 
 for the first day s battle. 
 
 It was grim business for this contracted line of Union 
 heroes to face the eleven divisions of infantry and two of 
 
CHICKAMAUGA SECOND DAY S BATTLE. 
 
35 
 
 cavalry, one of the latter fighting as infantry, which Bragg 
 had before them. Their only advantage was in their shorter 
 lines and the fact that it was necessary for Bragg to attack, 
 while for the most part they could remain on the defensive. 
 They were besides in excellent spirits and confident of their 
 powers. 
 
 A glance at the map will show the rearrangement of the 
 Union line. Beginning on the left, which covered Bragg s 
 objective namely, the control of the Lafayette road to Chat 
 tanooga -Baird, Johnson, Palmer, and Reynolds were with 
 drawn slightly from the ground on which they had fought 
 the day before, and placed in strong position in the edge of 
 the woods which skirted the Kelly farm. Brannan remained 
 near the position to which he had been called to support Rey 
 nolds the night before. The divisions of Negley, Wood, 
 Davis, and Sheridan arid the brigade of Wilder had all been 
 drawn back of the Lafayette road, their lines being slightly 
 advanced from the road, leading from Crawfish Springs to 
 the Layfayette road at Kelly s farm. 
 
 The order of the Confederate line from its right to a point 
 in front of Brannan s has already been stated. Here Stewart, 
 of Buckner s corps, formed the right of Longstreet, who com 
 manded the left wing, and, counting toward the enemy s 
 left, the succeeding divisions were Bushrod Johnson, with 
 Law and Kershaw in reserve, Hindman and Preston Buck 
 ner s corps was present with this wing by the courtesy of 
 Burnside and the Washington authorities, while the latter 
 alone were responsible for the inaction at the East which 
 allowed Longstreets corps to be present. By the same court 
 esy Walker s division from Mississippi was present with 
 Hill s corps, and was to fight again, splendidly but unsuccess 
 fully, on Bragg s right, as it had all the day before. 
 
 Under cover the tog in the shelter of the woods, and in 
 the plainful quiet of that Sabbath morning, the two armies 
 had brought their lines face to face. At 9 o clock there was 
 scarcely any point the length of a tiger s spring between 
 them. 
 
 Bragg had 212 regiments, organized into 42 brigades, and 
 these in 7 divisions. There were in all 173 infantry regi 
 ments and 11 of cavalry, which were dismounted and fought 
 as infantry, 28 cavalry regiments and 50 batteries. Rose- 
 crans had 158 regiments, 33 brigades, 14 divisions, and 5 
 corps. There were 141 regiments of infantry and 18 of cav 
 alry and 36 batteries. 
 
 Of Bragg s corps two were cavalry Wheeler and Forrest. 
 One division of Forrest s fought as infantry. Rosecrans had 
 one cavalry corps of two divisions. This tremendous array 
 
36 
 
 was pushed close against a Union front of only two miles and 
 a half. 
 
 At 9 o clock that Sabbath service of all the gods of war 
 began. It broke full-toned with its infernal music over the 
 Union left, and that morning service continued there till 
 noon. 
 
 Let us look a moment at the Union line. John Beatty s 
 brigade had been stretched as a thin line from Baird s left 
 to the Lafayette road and across it. King s regulars formed 
 the left of Baird, Scribner his center, and Starkweather his 
 right. He had no reserve. Johnston s division was on the 
 right of Baird; Dodge and Baldwin, of his brigades, on the 
 front, and Willich in reserve. Next was Palmer, with Cruft 
 and Hazen on the line, and Grose in reserve. Reynolds, on 
 Palmer s right, reached the Lafayette road again. He had 
 Turchin in line and King in reserve. The Union line was 
 protected by log barricades. It thus ran around the Kelley 
 farm and was established from fifty to a hundred yards within 
 the woods which skirted the great open space in their 
 rear. This field, which lay along the State road for half a 
 mile and was a quarter of a mile wide, became the scene of 
 almost continuous and ever brilliant fighting. Beside the 
 great battle along the main lines surrounding it, there were 
 during the day five distinct brigade charges over it, one of 
 Stanley, one of Van Deveer. one of Grose, a fourth by Wil 
 lich, and a fifth by Turchin. 
 
 Bragg s orders were to attack successively by divisions, 
 from right to left. Breckenridge struck first. He came on 
 in single line, swinging around towards the State road to 
 gain Baird s rear. Adams was on his right, Stovall in the 
 center, and Helm on the left. This latter brigade struck 
 Scribner s breastworks, and was instantly shattered there. 
 Helm rode bravely among his troops, enthusiastically urging 
 them forward, and fell dead while thus engaged. Two of 
 his colonels were killed, and two were wounded. 
 
 Stovall pushed in with dauntless pluck against the regu 
 lars on the left of Scribner, but King s men fought splen 
 didly. The rebels assaulted bravely but uselessly. Adams 
 had swept in on John Beatty s thin line, and broken it. 
 Still itfought with undaunted courage, yielding doggedly, and 
 by the inch, and finally Adams, retarded by the disaster on 
 his left, was at bay. At this juncture came Stanley s brigade, 
 from Negley, near the center, with deployed lines, and the 
 sun on its banners. It swept over the Kelly field, from 
 near the house, and plunged into the woods in the rear of 
 Beatty. Well might those who were witnessing that threat 
 ening move toward the Union rear hold their breaths as 
 
37 
 
 Stanley disappeared, and thus wait for his volleys and their 
 effect. In a moment they came, then his rattling line fire, 
 then the cheer of a charge. The first attack of Breckenridge 
 had ended in a sore defeat. 
 
 But Clehurne had in turn advanced. He, like Breckin- 
 ridge, came in single line. Polk, of Cleburne, assaulted 
 Starkweather s front, while Wood of the same command ex 
 tended the attack as far as the right of Baldwin. The rem 
 nants of Helm, under Colonel Lewis, still assisted against 
 Scribner, hut soon Cleburne s division was repelled at every 
 point with terrible loss. The Confederate officers engaged 
 describe the effect of the Union artillery throughout this at 
 tack as the most destructive in their experience. Thus 
 Bragg s first attack had wholly failed. The Union forces 
 were exultant, and so strong were their skirmish demonstra 
 tions that Hill, who was under orders to organize a second 
 and much stronger attack, paused to first prepare his own 
 lines against assault. 
 
 Walker s reserve corps of two divisions was brought up, 
 and its five brigades distributed along the shattered points 
 of Breckenridge s and Cleburne s lines. The organizations 
 of rebel divisions being thus destroyed, the attack became 
 largely one of brigades acting independently, each rushing 
 at the Union works. There were ten rebel brigades engaged 
 in the movement from the Union left to Palmer s position, 
 and beyond this point Stewart s division co-operated by as 
 saulting Reynold s narrow front and Brannan s lines. 
 Wood, of Cleburne, who had previously stormed the angle 
 of the Union works on Johnson s right and been repulsed, 
 assisted by Deshler, of the same division, thinking this angle 
 the flank of the barricades, again struck obliquely and with 
 fury with the idea of turning them. Instead, these dashing 
 Confederates went to pieces on Baldwin s brigade, of Johnson, 
 and on Palmer s front. Walthall assaulted the corresponding 
 angle at Scribner s position, and though he carried his men 
 within pistol range of the crests, he wa^ beaten back with 
 heavy loss. Gist, acting with Helm s (now Lewis ) broken 
 line, attacked with power, but in turn was driven back. Col- 
 quitt, still further to the right, came upon the regular brig 
 ade of King. But his line had missed direction, and was at 
 onceexposed to a withering flank fire, and overwhelmed. Col- 
 quitt fell. Several of his most prominent officers were killed. 
 Ector and Wilson, of Walker s second division (Liddell s), 
 advanced to help, but without effect. Govan, however, of this 
 same division , was successful , and by hot fightin g and the weight 
 of numbers, he bore back John Beatty s weakened line^and 
 the situation on the Union left became at once most serious. 
 
38 
 
 Everything but this along the line of the second attack hy 
 Bragg s right had failed. It began to look as if rebel victory 
 was dawning here, and that the triumph of Bragg s plan of 
 turning the Union left had come. 
 
 For Breckinridge, in the second advance, had swung his 
 lines much farther to his right, and by a wide left wheel had 
 brought his right across the State road, and so between the 
 Union left and Rossville His left reached and slightly over 
 lapped Beatty s left. Thus formed with lines perpendicular 
 to the State road, he began a march directly toward the 
 Kelly house and the rear of Reynolds, just beyond it. 
 While the remnants of the left, so badly broken, first under 
 Helm and then under his successor, were entangled with 
 Beatty and Stanley, his two other brigades, Adams on the 
 right and Stoval to the left, burst out of the woods on the 
 noth side of the Kelly field, quickly rectified their lines, 
 threw out a heavy skirmish force, and bore rapidly down 
 toward Reynolds. It was half a mile to his position over 
 smooth and open ground. From the start the skirmishers 
 could throw their bullets into Reynolds rear. It was a 
 movement threatening dire disaster. The moment it devel 
 oped in the rear of Baird, Walker s corps and Cleburne s 
 brigades reopened their fire on the front of the barricades, 
 while Stewart advanced on Reynolds and Brannau. Thus, 
 taken on flank, front, and full in the rear, and outnumbered 
 at every point, it seemed as if there was no salvation for the 
 Union left. But it came, and at that point where Confed 
 erate victory seemed sure, full defeat fell suddenly upon 
 them. Thomas watching the progress of Breckinridge s 
 flank attack, had sent to Rosecrans for Brannan. At that 
 moment the battle had not extended to the latter. But just 
 as Rosecrans order to go to Thomas reached Brannan signs 
 of heavy and immediate attack on his front became apparent 
 He well used his discretion, and remained on the line until 
 he could report the situation to Rosecrans. But in the 
 mean time, in partial compliance with the order, he sent 
 Fred Van Derveer s brigade, which constituted his reserve, 
 to the help of the left. This brigade deployed, marched 
 rapidly, in to line toward the Kelly house, and came into 
 the field less than two hundred yards in advance of Breckin- 
 ridge s line. Though presenting its flank to the enemy 
 when he was first discovered, it changed front in the open 
 ground under fire, charged the rebel line, broke it, following 
 it back into the woods, and after an hours fighting drove 
 these two brigades with their artillery entirely clear of the 
 Union left. It then returned to a point near the Kelly 
 house. 
 
39 
 
 Govan, of Walker, next on the left of Breckinridge, had, 
 however, gained a lodgment on the line which Beatty had 
 so stubbornly held. Then came another Union charge over 
 the Kelly field. Palmer, under Thomas s orders, sent 
 Grose with his reserve brigade to clear Baird s immediate 
 left. Moving from the edge of the woods back into the open 
 field, Grose formed in double lines, moved at double-quick 
 across the rear of Johnson and Baird, and rushed with 
 cheers into the woods on the north side of the field. In a 
 few moments his volleys were pouring into the face of Govan. 
 The latter s troops fought desperately, but their supports on 
 each flank had been previously broken, and soon, after bit 
 ter loss, gave way. The Union left was then further 
 strengthened by placing Barries, of Van Cleve, on the left of 
 Beatty. It was then noon. So badly shattered was Bragg s 
 right that it was nearly 5 o clock before another attack 
 could be organized on this ground. Thenceforth the Union 
 left was safe. 
 
 Simultaneously with the appearance of Breckinridge in 
 the Kelly field events were hastening to an appalling con 
 summation on the Union center. Stewart, the right of 
 Longstreet s wing, moved to the assault in Reynold s front. 
 With three brigades he rushed upon Turchin, who formed 
 Reynold s advance, and Hazen, of Palmer, next on the left, 
 while his left also involved Brannan s left. On his right he 
 also had the co-operation of Wood s and Deshlers brigades, 
 of Cleburne. Deshler was killed as the movement began, 
 and Roger Q. Mills, of Texas, succeeded him. 
 
 As this was the opening of the memorable attack which 
 led to the break in the Union center it is worthy of close at 
 tention. General Stewart, in his report, thus describes it : 
 
 " For several hundred yards both lines pressed on under 
 the most terrific fire it has ever been my fortune to witness. 
 The enemy retired, and our men, though mowed down at 
 every step, rushed on at double-quick, until at length the 
 brigade on the right of Brown broke in confusion, exposing 
 him to an enfilading fire. He continued on, however, some 
 fifty to seventy-five yards further, when his two right regi 
 ments gave way in disorder and retired to their original po 
 sition. His center and left, however, followed by the gal 
 lant Clayton and indomitable Bate, pressed on, passing the 
 cornfield in front of the burnt house, and to a distance of 
 two hundred to three hundred yards beyond the Chattanooga 
 road, driving the enemy within his line of intrenchments 
 and passing a battery of four guns, which were afterward 
 taken possession of by a regiment from another division. 
 Here new batteries being opened by the enemy on our front 
 
40 
 
 and flank, heavily supported by infantry, it became necessary 
 to retire, the command reforming on the ground occupied be 
 fore the advance." 
 
 All this was going on in the front of Reynolds and Palmer, 
 while Brechinridge, as already described, was entering the 
 open field from the north in plain sight from their rear. Yet 
 not a single Union soldier left the- line. Standing steadfast, 
 they first resisted, as Stewart describes, and then were in 
 cited to still greater action by the brilliant fighting of Van 
 Derveer in their rear, which so unexpectly brought them the 
 much-needed relief. 
 
 Here the story reaches the event of the break in the Union 
 lines, which is widely misunderstood, and has been most un 
 justly used to throw discredit on General Kosecrans. Just 
 as Longstreet s attack was developing upon Wood s front, 
 the latter received an order from General Rosecrans to 
 11 close upon Reynolds as fast as possible and support him." 
 As Brannan was between himself and Reynolds, Wood saw 
 no other way of executing the order, which he deemed im 
 perative, except to withdraw from line, and pass to the rear 
 of Brannan. This he did, although the attack was just 
 bursting on his front. 
 
 It has been persistently claimed, to General Rosecrans s 
 detrimeat, that in the excitement of the height of battle he 
 had issued a blundering order. Nothing could be more un 
 just. The explanation is perfectly simple. General Thomas 
 had sent for Brannan to meet Breckinridge s flank attack. 
 Stewart s attack had struck Reynolds with force and was 
 rapidly developing on Brannan s front. The latter hastily 
 consulted with Reynolds as to the propriety of withdrawing, 
 and both being clear that to obey the order would open the 
 line to the enemy, Brannan dispatched Van Derveer, his re 
 serve, to the left, in partial compliance with its terms, and 
 then reported to Rosecrans that he had deemed it vitally im 
 portant to maintain his line till the commanding officer 
 could be advised of the situation. He instantly approved 
 Brannan s action. But just before his message arrived, 
 upon the supposition that he had obeyed the order and gone 
 to Thomas, the noted order to Wood to close to the left on 
 Reynolds had been dispatched. When it reached Wood, the 
 attack, rolling along Branran s front, had reached his own. 
 Had he exercised the same discretion which Brannan had so 
 wisely displayed, all would have been well, and that nearly 
 fatal break in the Union lines would not have occured. But 
 instantly on reading it, Wood rapidly withdrew his division 
 and started in the rear of Brannan toward Reynolds. Long- 
 street, who had waited most impatiently till 11 o clock be- 
 
41 
 
 fore be could move a man to the attack, had solidified his 
 lines before the Union center and left, and the moment 
 Wood left this wide gap for him, Longstreet thrust into it 
 the eight brigades of his central column of attack. They 
 were formed in three lines, and advancing rapidly they 
 opened on Brannan s right and rear and Davis left, and 
 greatly widened the gap. Brannan threw back his right, 
 losing something from Council s brigade on that flank, but, 
 stubbornly resisting Longstreet s advance as he retired that 
 wing of his division, he soon re-established it on Horseshoe 
 Ridge, near the Snodgrass House, on a line nearly perpen 
 dicular to the one he had occupied when Longstreet pushed 
 through the gap left by wood. The latter had passed rap 
 idly to the rear of Brannan, and though subjected to heavy 
 attack after passing Brannan s left, he was able to. establish 
 his line on a lower ridge in the prolongation of Brannan s 
 new position, and reaching in the direction of Reynolds. 
 The latter officer soon retired his right slightly, and the line 
 was again continuous, except a break between Wood and Rey 
 nolds, from Brannan s right to Barnes on Baird s left. 
 Into this vacant space Hazen moved later under orders from 
 Thomas, and then the line on that part of the field was 
 firmly established. 
 
 All to the right of Brannan had gone. Negley, with one 
 brigade of his division, which was caught in the gap, had 
 drifted toward Brannan. Here, gathering up much artillery, 
 which he was ordered by Thomas to post on the crest over 
 looking the field in front of Baird s left, he took it instead to 
 Brannan s right, and soon, without waiting to be attacked 
 in his strong position, and although he had promised Bran- 
 nan to hold it, abandoned it, and retired in haste toward Ross- 
 ville, ordering all the artillery to follow him. 
 
 Davis had moved rapidly into the breastworks which Neg 
 ley had occupied, and there placed his weak force of two 
 brigades across Longstreet s advance. But after his terrific 
 fighting of the day before he ha,d only twelve hundred men for 
 action, and though Carlin. and Heg s men under Martin, 
 fought with desperation, they could do nothing but yield. 
 They were driven in disorder to the right and rear. 
 
 At the same time Van Cleve, with his two remaining 
 brigades in motion towards Thomas, was thrown into great 
 disorder, through a considerable portion of them rallied with 
 Wood. 
 
 As Davis was borne back, McCook, of the Twentieth Corps, 
 in person led Laibolt s brigade, of Sheridan s division, 
 against Longstreets advancing columns. The attack was 
 delivered with spirit and power, but it failed in the face of 
 
42 
 
 overwhelming numbers, and the brigade was utterly routed. 
 McCook was carried to the rear with it. 
 
 Next came Sheridan, with his two remaining brigades un 
 der Lytle and Bradley. The former, with splendid bearing 
 and courage, rallied his columns, and though they were taken 
 at every disadvantage, under the inspiration which he im 
 parted they faced the resistless advance with desperate valor. 
 Lytle fell where death was thickest for his comrades. His 
 brigade, and that of Bradley, with Wilder, who had also 
 fought to the extremity to assist, were all borne to the rear 
 and forced to join the fugitive columns falling off from the 
 Union right toward Rossville. General Rosecrans had just 
 ridden the lines from the left, and had passed in the rear of 
 McCook s position, when the line was severed. Finding the 
 roads in rear of the right filled with retreating columns rep 
 resenting all corps of the army, for Negley was there from 
 Thomas, he deemed it prudent to ride to Chattanooga and 
 decide upon a new position in front of the place. General 
 Crittenden s whole command, that is, three divisions, having 
 been ordered in succession to Thomas before the break, Crit- 
 tenden himself, being without command, rode into Chatta 
 nooga after Rosecrans, as did also McCook. Sheridan s divis 
 ion was in good order by the time it reached Rossville, and 
 most of the troops which left the field were about that place 
 and McFarland s Gap in fighting condition throughout the 
 afternoon. Their numbers at 2 o clock were from seven to 
 ten thousand. They could easily have been led to Baird s 
 left or Brannan s right, as the way to either flank was open. 
 This was proved by the fact that General Garfield, Colonel 
 Gates Thurston, and Surgeons Gross and Perkins, the medi 
 cal directors of the Fourteenth and Twentieth Corps, rode 
 back and joined General Thomas. It is one of the myths of 
 current Chickamauga history that Sheridan marched with his 
 division back to the fighting line, but this is an error. He 
 received a request at McFarland s Gap from Gen. Thomas 
 to return to the field, but decided instead to retire to Ross 
 ville. Upon reaching the latter point he moved out on the 
 Lafayette road toward Gen. Thomas, but did not form a 
 junction with him. He reached the Cloud House at 7 p. m. 
 and soon after withdrew to Rossville. 
 
 Six Confederate divisions under Longstreet had taken part in 
 breaking the Union center and sweeping its right off the field. 
 These were Stewart, Bushrod Johnson, and Preston, of 
 Buckner s corps : Hood and McLaws, of Longstreet s Vir 
 ginia troops, and Hindman s division of Polk s corps. Eight 
 brigades of this force had first entered the gap left by Wood, 
 and from that time till Rosecrans, McCook, Crittenden, and 
 
>/ x x \SNODG-R AS$ 
 
 42a 
 
 KELLEY S FARM-HORSESHOE RIDGE. 
 
43 
 
 Sheridan had gone, and Brannan had established himself on 
 Horseshoe Ridge, each of these six divisions had advanced 
 and fought with vigor. Finally Hindman, finding no re 
 sistance on his left, wheeled to the right to assist Longstreet s 
 center and right, which had been checked by Brannan and 
 Wood. This brought Longstreet s six divisions together in 
 the vicinity of Horseshoe ridge. 
 
 Shortly after 2 o clock Longstreet ordered a general as 
 sault by his wing. It was delivered with confidence and 
 tremendous power. To meet these six divisions Brannan on 
 the right had Croxton s brigade and part of Council s ; Wood, 
 on the left, had Harker s brigade. With these organized 
 commands were a part of John Beatty s, a good part of Stan 
 ley s and the Twenty-first Ohio, of Sirwell s, all of Negley ; 
 parts of the Ninth and the Seventeenth Kentucky ; Forty- 
 fourth Indiana and Thirteenth Ohio, of Van Cleve s divis 
 ion, with the Fifty-eighth Indiana, of Buell s brigade in 
 all about 4,000 men. 
 
 Against this line, hastily formed and without reserves, 
 Longstreet launched his solid columns. They came on mag 
 nificently, wave behind wave. They met sheeted fire from 
 the summits, and yet pressed on to hand encounters, but from 
 these they soon recoiled. The whole line retired from the 
 foot of the slopes, and covered by the forests organized for a 
 second attack. It was delivered soon after 3 o clock. Like 
 the first, it fell on the fronts of Wood and Brannan. But 
 while Hindman assaulted the latter in front he also sent 
 a brigade through the gap to Brannan s right to scale 
 the ridge and gain his rear. Negley, who had held this 
 point with abundant artillery and infantry supports, and 
 who had promised to stay there, had promptly fled before 
 any attack had reached him and was even then in Rossville. 
 There was absolutely nothing to send against Hindman s 
 left, towering there with its fringe of bayonets on the com 
 manding ridge, and forming to sweep down on Brannan s 
 right and rear. Longstreet and all his general officers were 
 exultant, and though their second attack had failed every 
 where, except as this lodgment was obtained on the ridge 
 beyond Brannan, they rapidly arranged their lines for what 
 they believed would be a final assanlt leading to sure victory. 
 
 But not a Union soldier moved from his place. The men 
 clutched their guns tighter. Officers everywhere moved 
 closer to the lines to encourage and steady them. The color- 
 bearers set their flags firmer. And then, as if to repay such 
 courage, help came as unexpectedly as if the hand of the 
 Lord had been visibly extended to save. Suddenly a Union 
 column appeared, moving with speed across the fields from 
 
44 
 
 the direction of the McDaniel house. It was Granger, of the 
 reserve, with two brigades of Steedman s division. Being 
 stationed four miles away toward Ringgold, Granger, agree 
 ing with Steedman that they must be sorely needed on the 
 field, had started without orders, and though shelled by 
 Forrest on his flank for two miles of the way, had not al 
 lowed his columns to be greatly delayed. And now Steed 
 man was sweeping up to the foot of the hill below the Snod- 
 grass House. As he reported to Thomas, coming in from 
 toward the Kelly farm was another well-ordered column. 
 It proved to be Van Derveer returning from the charge upon 
 Breckenridge in the Kelly field. The map shows how he 
 had left Brannan s line just before the break and hastened 
 with deployed lines toward the left ; how thus deployed he 
 had marched from the woods to be enfiladed from Breckin- 
 ridge s front as the latter emerged from the woods and burst 
 upon the Union rear. Here, under this fire, he whirled his 
 brigade to the left, delivered a full volley at pistol range 
 into the enemy s faces, charged into their lines on a run, 
 drore them back on their batteries, and pursued both infantry 
 and artillery to a point beyond the Union left, where Grose, 
 coming from the rear of Palmer, completed the work. The 
 dotted line shows Van Derveer s return. He, too, had moved 
 without orders to the sound of tremendous firing about the 
 Snodgrass house. Just as Steedman had hastily formed and 
 assaulted Hindman s forces beyond the right of Brannan, Van 
 Derveer joined his brigade to Steedman s left and moved also 
 to the assault. Steedman seized a regimental flag and rode 
 with it in his hands to the top. His command was the bri 
 gades of those splendid soldiers, John G. Mitchell and 
 Walter C. Whittaker. 
 
 One (Whittaker s) plunged into the gorge through which 
 Hindman s left was pouring, the rest of the line, with Van 
 Derveer on its left, charged for the ridge. In twenty minutes 
 it was carried and all of Hindman s forces were driven from 
 it and out of the ravine. Whittaker had been wounded and 
 four of his five staff officers either killed or mortally wounded. 
 One-fifth of Steedman s force had been disabled in the charge. 
 Van Derveer" s loss was considerable, but less in proportion, 
 as he was not fairly in front of Hindman, as Steedman was. 
 Twice Hindman turned his recoiling troops to recapture the 
 position, but finally abandoned the effort and relinquished 
 the ridge to Steedman. The center and right of Longstreet 8 
 third assault was in like manner repelled. In this move 
 ment the Fourth Kentucky, Col. R. M. Kelley, joined Van 
 Derveer and fought with him till night. 
 
45 
 
 The coming of Steedman was more than an inspiration. It 
 was more than the holdingof the right. He brought 100,000 
 rounds of cartridges and artillery ammunition far more 
 welcome than diamonds. Regiments in the line had been 
 fighting, even at thatearly hour, with the bayonet and clubbed 
 muskets. Now, wben Longstreet s right came on in aid of 
 the attempt of Hindman to bold bis position on the west 
 they were received with terrific and continuing fire, and as 
 the lines of gray, with desperate valor, neared the summit 
 Wood s men and Brannan s rushed, at them with the bayonet 
 and broke their ranks, rolled them down the slopes, and on 
 WoocP s front, with help of a direct fire from Aleshire s 
 battery on the left and a terrible enfilading fire from Battery 
 I, Fourth Regular Artillery, on Brannan s left, under those 
 splendid young soldiers, Lieutenants Frank Gr. Smith and 
 George B. Rodney, drove them in disorder beyond their 
 artillery. 
 
 At this time both Confederate wings were calling for re- 
 enforcements. Bragg s reply to Longstreet was that the 
 right was so badly shattered that it could not help him. 
 
 When Steedman s coming with four thousand men had so 
 changed the whole current of the battle, what if the seven 
 thousand men under Sheridan and Negley about McFarland s 
 and Rossville, much nearer than Steedman was, had been 
 brought up ? How the officers who were there could stay 
 themselves, or manage to keep the men, is a mystery sick 
 ening to think about. 
 
 Hindman thus tells of the attack by which he carried the 
 ridge to the right of Brannan, before Steedman arrived : 
 
 "In a few minutes a terrific contest ensued, which con 
 tinued, at close quarters, without any intermission, over four 
 hours. Our troops attacked again and again with a courage 
 worthy of their past achievements. The enemy fought with 
 determined obstinacy and repeatedly repulsed us, but only to 
 be again assailed. As showing the fierceness of the fight, 
 the fact is mentioned that* on our extreme left the bayonet 
 was used and men were also killed and wounded with clubbed 
 muskets." 
 
 Of the attack of Steedman s men in the ravine, where they 
 rushed on the Confederate line with the bayonet, pushed in 
 among the guns and killed gunners at their posts, Hindman 
 further says : "I have never known Federal troops to fight 
 so well. It is just to say, also, that I never saw Confederate 
 soldiers fight better." Of the second attack upon Brannan s 
 position, which was repulsed, Kershaw, commanding in 
 Longstreet s troops from Virginia, said: " This was one of 
 the heaviest attacks of the war on a single point." 
 
46 
 
 Up to the time of Steedman s arrival there had been a 
 break between Reynolds and Wood, but the flank of the 
 former in advance of the latter somewhat covered it. Upon 
 this point Longstreet now organized a heavy attack. But 
 the lull on the left, arising from the rebels there having been, 
 as Bragg expressed it, " so badly beaten back" that they 
 could be of no service on his left, made it practicable to 
 strengthen the Union center. Hazen was found to have am 
 munition, and was moved with celerity into the gap, and 
 Grose, Johnson s reserve,- replaced him. Hazen arrived none 
 too soon. His lines were hardly established before Long- 
 street s right was upon him. lapping over upon Reynold s 
 front, and then, from Reynolds to Steedman, there was one 
 continuing hell of battle. Garfield, who had come up with 
 an escort, having ridden from Rossville, after reporting to 
 Thomas, moved along the ranks of his old brigade (Harker, 
 of Wood), encouraging the men, and giving evidence against 
 all loiterers at the gaps in the rear that every officer and 
 man of them could easily have reached the field. 
 
 Longstreet s columns assault at every point, as rapidly as 
 his lines rolled back from the crest could be reformed. He 
 had ten brigades in front of Brannan and Steedman, while 
 these officers had only four unbroken in organization, and 
 fragments of two others. One brigade of Preston, which 
 assaulted Wood and Hazen s line, had over 2,000 men in the 
 movement. The successive movements, rather the tremen 
 dous dashes of these lines against the hill, was like the ad 
 vance of breakers with which ocean storms attack the shore. 
 But, as surely, each wave with its crest of steel, its spray of 
 smoke, and its glitter of fire broke and swept back with dead 
 and wounded in its terrible undertow. It was treason, but 
 magnificent. Such was the scene which these soldiers of 
 Thomas saw on the Snodgrass Hill throughout the afternoon 
 till dusk. 
 
 To relieve the left Polk was ordered at 3 o clock, to attack 
 in force with the whole right wing. But it required much 
 time to organize those battered lines for assault, but when 
 done, it was, indeed, formidable. The second map will make 
 it plain. Cleburne, with four brigades, was deployed before* 
 Palmer and Johnson. Jackson and Polk s brigades lapped 
 over Baird. Cheatham was in a second line. The map gives 
 his position wrongly, though it is taken from the original 
 official map in the War Department. Ranged further to the 
 right, and crossing the State and Lafayette road at Mc- 
 Daniel s, and thus massed against the Union left, were the 
 divisions of Breckinridge and Liddell, Armstrong s dis 
 mounted cavalry division of Forrest, and Forrest s artillery. 
 
47 
 
 While Grose, of Preston, was assaulting Hazen and Wood 
 this attack on the Union leit began. But, as before, the 
 brigades that moved up to the log breastworks were speedily 
 shattered, though this time they took their artillery through 
 the thickets with them, pushing it by hand. 
 
 Once more, as the assault was made on Baird s left, there 
 came a Union charge across the Kelly field, the fourth for 
 the day. This time it was Willich, the reserve of Johnson. 
 Withdrawing from lineand facmgnorth, hesweptalong on the 
 run and with cheers. His lines dashed into the woods at the 
 point where Stanley and Grose had charged before, and with 
 out a halt sprang into the faces of the advancing Confederates. 
 King s regulars and Barnes gave brave help, and once more 
 the immediate left was cleared. The force on the road by the 
 McDaniel house, though unbroken, was not advanced. Later, 
 an assault on Reynolds and Palmer was ordered, but, naturally, 
 it was feeble after so many repulses at the breastworks. At 
 half-past 5 there was quiet again along the Union left. 
 Longstreet, however, in front of the right, was active for 
 another hour, though at every point unsuccessful. 
 
 At half-after 5 General Thomas, having full discretion, 
 decided to withdraw to occupy the passes in his rear at Mc- 
 Farland and Kossville, which controlled the roads to Chat 
 tanooga. His line was solid at every point. Both wings of 
 the Confederates were at bay. Their right was too much broken 
 to successfully assault the Union left. The Union right, though 
 its ammunition ran low, and its officers were constantly 
 searching the boxes of the killed and wounded for cartridges, 
 was becoming practiced in the use of the bayonet against as 
 saulting lines, and in spite of the persistence of Longstreet s 
 men, had begun to feel comfortable in its position. The 
 whole line could have been held until night. But daylight 
 was wanted to set the army in orderly motion toward the 
 gaps which controlled the city. After that was accomplished 
 the darkness afforded the needed cover to complete the move 
 ment. It was because Chattanooga, and not the Chicka- 
 mauga woods, was the objective of the campaign that the 
 army withdrew to Bossville. It was in no sense a military 
 retreat. 
 
 If Thomas had not occupied these passes in the night, 
 Bragg could have done so, and the object he had in view 
 would then have been accomplished. Had Thomas allowed 
 it, Bragg would have been only too glad to have withdrawn 
 from the field and "retreated" on Rossville. Thomas did 
 not permit it, but went there first, and Chattanooga was won. 
 
 The withdrawal involved some fighting. The movement 
 began on the right of Reynolds. Palmer, Johnson, and 
 
48 
 
 Baird were to follow in succession, all leaving their skirmish 
 ers in their works. 
 
 Reynolds formed his brigades by the flank on each side of 
 the Lafayette road, King on the right and Turchin on the 
 left. Thus he advanced northward along tjie Kelly field 
 toward Rossville. General Thomas followed at the head of 
 the column. As they passed a short distance beyond the 
 south line of the field they encountered the advancing troops 
 which had taken part in the last rebel attack. Instantly 
 Thomas ordered Reynolds to cause Turchin to file to the 
 left, and after thus changing front to "charge and clear 
 them out." The line of Turchin s charge is shown on the 
 map. Filing into the wood to the left at double-quick, he 
 faced to the front while thus moving, and his lines darted at 
 a run into the faces of the enemy. It was one of the bravest 
 and most brilliant, most important and effective charges of 
 the day the fifth over those Kelly fields. At the same 
 moment King, forcing his way along the road, fell on the 
 flank of Liddell s division and broke it. Dan McCook, who 
 had been active during the day on the flank of Forrest, ad 
 vanced and opened with his artillery on the rebel rear, and 
 after short but sharp fighting the formidable array was 
 driven back and the way to Rossville was open. 
 
 Turchin and King moved by the roads to McFarland s Gap. 
 Baird, Johnson, and Palmer followed over the same roads. 
 They were attacked as they left their works and crossed the 
 Kelly field, but order in their columns was restored as soon 
 as they gained the shelter of the woods on the west of the 
 road. Hazen and Wood then followed without molestation. 
 Steedman withdrew at six o clock from the extreme right, 
 and Brannan was left alone on Horseshoe Ridge. The sun 
 was down. The shadows were thickening in the woods be 
 fore him, and yet Longstreet s men remained on the slopes, 
 and several times appeared in detachments close along his 
 lines. Suddenly a line of Hindman s men were found on 
 the slope where Steedman had been. By some strange over 
 sight Brannan had not been notified that his right was un 
 protected. A hasty examination in the gathering dusk 
 showed another rebel line on the slope directly in the rear, 
 and which had come round through the gap where Steed- 
 man s right had been, and was evidently forming for an 
 assault. The Thirty- fifth Ohio, of Van Derveer s brigade, 
 was thrown back to face both these lines. Fragments of 
 five regiments more, which had opportunely arrived, were 
 given to the commander of the Thirty-fifth. His own regi 
 ment had one round and one in the guns. This was placed 
 in front. The others, with fixed bayonets, were formed in 
 
49 
 
 the rear. Just before dark a rebel officer rode in on the 
 line and asked what troops were here. He was shot by the 
 near outposts. 
 
 Then came a scattering fire from the flank of the rebel line 
 along the ridge, next a volley from the Thirty-fifth, and a 
 silent awaiting results behind its line of bayonets. The vol 
 ley had scattered the enemy on the ridge, and the force in the 
 rear had withdrawn. These were the last shots on the right. 
 Following them there was absolute quiet everywhere on the 
 field. The stillness was painful and awful. Brannan s officers 
 and men, peering down into the dim and smoking ravine, 
 saw long lines of fire creeping over the leaves, and in and out 
 among the wounded and the dead. It was a sight far more 
 horrible than any of the pictured presentations of Dante s 
 Inferno. From this scene, with the low wailings of the suf 
 ferers in their ears, they turned in triumph and exultant to 
 form the rear guard of Thomas s advance to Rossville. Tur- 
 chin and Willich fought last on the left and formed the rear 
 guard there ; Van Derveer covered the right. And thus the 
 Army of the Cumberland at midnight occupied the passes 
 which made the possession of Chattanooga secure. 
 
 There had been no such disordered rush of the broken por 
 tions of the army on Chattanooga as the panic-stricken cor 
 respondent of an Eastern paper depicted, who gave visions 
 of his own early flight to the country as news. Only a small 
 part of the broken wing drifted to Chattanooga,. From 7,000 
 to 10,000 stopped at Kossville, and were fairly organized 
 there. When Thomas s forces arrived the whole army was 
 placed in position on Missionary Ridge, and in front of it, and 
 remained in line of battle throughout the whole of the 21st. 
 
 At nightfall the army advanced to Chattanooga advanced 
 is the word ; the term " retreated," so persistently used in 
 regard to this movement has no place in the truthful history 
 of this campaign. The Army of the Cumberland was on its 
 way to Chattanooga, the city it set out to capture. It had 
 halted at Chickamauga, on its line of advance, to fight for its 
 objective. On the night of the 21st it began its last march 
 for the city. Every foot of it was a march in advance, and 
 not retreat. At sunrise of the 22d Brannan s division, which 
 was the rear guard, reached the city, and the campaign for 
 Chattanooga was at an end. Until that morning broke the 
 great bulk of the Army of the Cumberland had never seen 
 the place. 
 
 Thus, crowned with success, though won at terrible cost, 
 closed the last campaign of General Rosecrans. It was 
 matchless in its strategy, unequaled in the skill and energy 
 with which his outnumbered army was concentrated for bat- 
 
50 
 
 tie. Its stubborn, desperate, and heroic fighting throughout 
 the two days battle was not surpassed, and, judged by its 
 returns of dead and wounded, not equaled in any one of the 
 great battles of the war. It secured the city which it marched 
 to capture. The loss was no greater than the country would 
 have expected at any time in attaining that result. If Rose- 
 crans had crossed the river in front of the city and captured 
 it with even greater loss, the country would have gone wild 
 with enthusiasm. Had he been properly supported from 
 Washington he would have entered it without a battle, since, 
 if there had been even a show of activity elsewhere, Bragg s 
 army would not have been nearly doubled with re-enforce 
 ments and thus enabled to march back on Chattanooga after 
 its retreat from the city; The reverse on the field on Sunday 
 was not the disaster which at the time it was declared to be, 
 and which it has ever since suited several writers of military 
 fiction to persistently represent. The account herewith pre 
 sented shows that after General Thomas consolidated his lines 
 at 1 o clock on Sunday not a single position was carried and 
 held by the enemy. The withdrawal, which begun soon after 
 5 o clock, was not in any sense forced. There is not an offi 
 cer or soldier who fought on those lines but knows that they 
 could have been held throughout till dark. 
 
 The accepted version of Sunday s break on Rosecrans s 
 right is that the two corps of Crittenden and McCook were 
 swept off the field ; but only five brigades of McCook s 
 entire corps left the field, and the fragments which went from 
 Crittenden would not exceed two brigades. Palmer s and 
 Johnson s divisions, which fought splendidly to the end 
 under Thomas on the left, were respectively from Critten- 
 den s and McCook s corps. Wood belonged to Crittenden. 
 Barnes s brigade, which fought on the extreme left, and part 
 of Dick s and Samuel Beatty s were all of Van Cleve s divi 
 sion of Crittenden s corps. In other words, the large part 
 of Crittenden s force fought to the last. Four regiments of 
 Wilder s brigade of Reynolds s division were detached and 
 cut off with the right, and a considerable part of Negley s 
 division of Thomas went to the rear, chiefly through the bad 
 conduct of its commander. We have seen, however, how 
 persistently and effectively Stanley s and John Beatty s 
 brigades of that division fought, and Beatty and General 
 Charles Grosvenor and Sirweli and Stoughton, of these 
 brigades, were all found fighting like private soldiers on the 
 hill with Wood and Brannan to the last. The battle of 
 Sunday was, then, not the fight of any one corps, but of the 
 Army of the Cumberland. There was no disorderly retreat 
 of the army on Chattanooga, and nothing approaching it. 
 
51 
 
 The greater portion of the right wing, which was cut off and 
 certainly thrown into much confusion, was reorganized at 
 Rossville, and occupied its place in line at that point through 
 out the next day and until the army moved on in the night 
 to occupy Chattanooga. The battle was desperate from the 
 moment it opened till its close. For the most part the lines 
 fought at close range and, in the countless assaults, often 
 hand to hand. On the first day there were no field works of 
 any kind. On the second Thomas was protected by such rude 
 log works as could be hastily thrown together. Brannan and 
 Steedman were without a semblance of works. Thebattle in the 
 main, on both sides, was dogged, stand-up fighting far within 
 the limit of point blank range. For the second day, on the 
 Confederate side, the contest was one continued series of 
 brave and magnificent assaults. 
 
 General Rosecrans had crossed the Tennessee with an 
 effective force of all arms equipped for duty of a few hundred 
 more than 60,000. Of this number Wagner s brigade, with 
 2,061 effectives, held Chattanooga, leaving the Union force 
 in front of Bragg slightly less than 58,000. It was several 
 thousand less at the battle, Post s brigade of Davis division 
 and three regiments of infantry and one battery being en 
 gaged in guarding supply trains. 
 
 In a letter from General Lee to President Davis, dated 
 September 14, 1863, the following figures of Bragg s actual 
 and prospective strength are thus stated : 
 
 "If the report sent to me by General Cooper since my 
 return from Richmond is correct, General Bragg had, on the 
 20th of August last, 51,101 effective men ; General Buckner, 
 16,118. He was to receive from General Johnson 9,000. 
 His total force will, therefore, be 76,219, as large a number 
 as I presume he can operate with. This is independent of 
 the local troops, which, you may recollect, he reported as 
 exceeding his expectations." 
 
 It will be well to remember, in connection with these offi 
 cial figures, that Bragg, after the battle, reported Long- 
 street s force, which was not included by Lee, at 5,000. 
 This, according to the figures furnished General Lee, gave 
 Bragg 81,219. According to General Johnson s corre 
 spondence, after he had sent 9,000 to Bragg, he subse 
 quently dispatched him two small brigades, and these, later, 
 reached him the day before the battle. 
 
 A reference to the losses on each side will show that there 
 has been no exaggeration in the description of the fighting. 
 Rosecrans s loss was 16,179. This included 4,774 missing, 
 of which a large number were killed or wounded. Bragg s 
 losses, as compiled and estimated at the War Records Office, 
 
52 
 
 were 17,804. Thus the entire loss for each army was over 
 twenty-five per cent, of the entire force of each. Hill s 
 corps of the Confederate right wing lost 2,990 out of a total 
 8,884. Of the 22,885 in Longstreet s left wing the loss was 
 7,856, with one brigade heavily engaged not reported. 
 Longstreet s loss on Sunday afternoon was thirty-six per 
 cent, of those engaged. 
 
 The casualties in Jackson s brigade of Cleburne s division, 
 which assaulted on Baird s front,, was 35 per cent., while the 
 Fifth Georgia, of that brigade, lost 55 per cent., and the 
 First Confederate Regulars 43 per cent. Gregg s brigade, 
 of Buckner s corps, lost 652 out of 1,425. Helm s Ken 
 tucky brigade, on the Union left, lost 75 per cent, of its 
 strength. Bate s brigade lost 7 officers killed and 61 officers 
 wounded, and the total casualties were 607 out of 1,316. 
 All his field officers except three were killed or wounded. 
 The losses in Govan s brigade, of Walker s corps, exceeded 
 50 per cent. Deas, who fought in front of Steedman s as 
 sault, lost 745 out of 1,942. Walthall, of Walker, lost 705 
 out of 1,727. On the Union side Steedman in four hours lost 
 1,787 out of 3,700, and all were killed and wounded but one. 
 Brannan s division had 5,998 engaged. Its casualties were 
 2,174, or 38 per cent. The loss in Van Derveer s brigade, 
 of this division, in four regiments and one battery, was 840 
 out of 1,788 engaged, or 49 per cent. Croxton s brigade, of 
 the same division, made up of five regiments, lost 938. Of 
 Van Derveer s regiments the Ninth Ohio lost 50 per cent. ; 
 the Thirty-fifth Ohio, a small fraction less than 50 per cent. ; 
 the Second Minnesota 192, or exactly 50 per cent., and the 
 Eighty-seventh Indiana about half of its number. General 
 Wood lost 1,070 in two brigades. 
 
 These figures become the more significant when compared 
 with the statement of losses in the world s noted battles. 
 General Wheeler, the distinguished Confederate cavalry com 
 mander, thus vividly presented this question at the gathering 
 of the Society of the Army of the Cumberland and Confeder 
 ates, at Chattanooga, in 1881 : 
 
 " Waterloo was one of the most desperate and bloody fields 
 chronicled in European history and yet Wellington s casual 
 ties were less than 12 per cent., his losses being 2,432 
 killed and 9,528 wounded out of 90,000 men, while at Shiloh, 
 the first great battle in which General Grant was engaged, 
 one side lost in killed and wounded 9, 740 out of 34,000, while 
 their opponents reported their killed and wounded at 9,616, 
 making the casualties about 30 per cent. At the great battle 
 of Wagram Napoleon lost but about 5 per cent. At Wurz- 
 burg the French lost but 3^ per cent., and yet the army gave 
 
53 
 
 up the field and retreated to the Rhine. At Racour Marshal 
 Saxe lost but 2J per cent. At Zurich Massena lost but 8 
 per cent. At Lagriz Frederick lost but 6^ per cent. At 
 Malplaqnet Marlborough lost but 10 per cent., and at Ra- 
 millies the same intrepid commander lost but 6 per cent. At 
 Contras Henry of Navarra was reported as cut to pieces, yet 
 his loss was less than 10 per cent. At Lodi Napoleon lost 
 1^ per cent. At Valmy Frederick lost but 3 per cent., and 
 at the great battles of Marengo and Austerlitz, sanguinary 
 as they were, Napoleon lost an average of less than 14J per 
 cent. At Magenta and Solferino, in 1859, the average loss 
 of both armies was less than 9 per cent. At Konigrattz, in 
 1866, it was 6 per cent. At Werth, Specheran, Mars la Tour, 
 Gravelotte, and Sedan, in 1870, the average loss was 12 per 
 cent. At Linden General Moreau lost but 4 per cent., and 
 the Archduke John lost but 7 per cent, in killed and wounded. 
 Americans can scarcely call this a lively skirmish. 
 
 " At Perry ville, Murfreesboro, Chickamauga, Atlanta, 
 Gettysburg, Mission Ridge, the Wilderness, and Spottsyl- 
 vania the loss frequently reached and sometimes exceeded 
 forty per cent., and the average of killed and wounded on 
 one side or the other was over thirty per cent." 
 
 Those who remained at Chickamauga and fought till the 
 night of Sunday came, when, for many regiments, every 
 other comrade was dead or wounded, were satisfied with the 
 result, and have always maintained that Chickamauga was 
 fought for Chattanooga, and have so regarded it as a great 
 and notable victory. General D. H. Hill in a recent Century 
 article thus sums up the result for the Confederate side : " A 
 breathing space was allowed him ; the panic among his 
 troops subsided, and Chattanooga the objective point of the 
 campaign was held. There was no more splendid fighting 
 in 61, when the flower of the Southern youth was in the 
 field, than was displayed in those bloody days of September, 
 63. But it seems to me that the elan of the Southern 
 soldier was never seen after Chickamauga that brilliant 
 dash which had distinguished him on a hundred fields was 
 gone forever. He was too intelligent not to know that the 
 cutting in two of Georgia meant death to all his hopes. He 
 knew that Longstreet s absence was imperiling Lee s safety, 
 and that what had to be done must be done quickly. The 
 delay to strike was exasperating to him ; the failure to strike 
 after the success was crushing to all his longings for an in 
 dependent South. He fought stoutly to the last, but after 
 Chickamauga, with the sullenness of despair and without the 
 enthusiam of hope. That < barren victory sealed the fate 
 of the Southern Confederacy." 
 
54 
 
 The authorities at Washington, to cover their own short 
 comings and inexcusable neglect, chose to deepen the erro 
 neous impression that the Army of the Cumberland had been 
 routed and driven back to Chattanooga in confusion. The 
 removal of General Rosecrans was determined upon. In fact, 
 it had been only a question of opportunity since the cam 
 paign opened. There was only needed the misrepresenta 
 tions about Chickamauga to furnish this. 
 
 In the mean time General Rosecrans thoroughly fortified 
 Chattanooga and was actually engaged in preparations to 
 open the river for supplies, exactly as it was afterwards done, 
 when he was removed. In fact, his plan was partially per 
 fected before he crossed the river, as is shown by the fact that 
 he made written contracts with Northern firms to have bridges 
 completed by October 1 for the Tennessee at Bridgeport, and 
 the Running Water at Wauhatchie. He had ordered the 
 thorough reconnoitering of the river bank opposite the north 
 end of Missionary Ridge where Sherman afterward crossed 
 with a view of a flank attack there. It was, therefore, al 
 together fitting and proper that the order for his relief should 
 arrive while he was absent making a personal examination of 
 the vicinity of Brown s Ferry, where he intended to throw a 
 bridge to unite with Hooker from Bridgeport and open the 
 river exactly as was afterward done. He had even notified 
 Harker of the plan three days before and ordered him to be 
 ready to execute his part of it. General Thomas, at first, 
 insisted that he would resign rather than appear to acquiesce 
 in Rosecrans s removal by accepting the command. It was 
 at Rosecrans s earnest solicitation that he reconsidered this 
 determination. But he did not hesitate to say that the order 
 was cruelly unjust. When General Garfield left for Wash 
 ington soon after the battle he immediately charged him to 
 do all he could to have Rosecrans righted. These will be 
 new statements to most, but they are true. 
 
 The survivors of the Army of the Cumberland should awake 
 to great pride in this notable field of Chickamauga. Why 
 should it not, as well as Eastern fields, be marked by monu 
 ments, and its lines accurately preserved for history? There 
 was no more magnificent fighting during the war than both 
 armies did there. Both sides might well unite in preserving 
 the field where both, in a military sense, won such renown. 
 
 H. V. B. 
 
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