H a H Oh O o < OS M H 1899: BUTLER & ALGER NEW HAVEN, CONN. \> Copyrighted. 18M«. by H. L. BARBER. Chicago, 111., U.S.A. The enEravlnKS in this volume were made from original photographs, and are specially protected by copyright: and notice is hereby given, that any person or persons guilty of reproducing or in- fringing upon the copyright in any way will be dealt with accordinf to law. |iiscvit>cd to t[}C f)i5torij JHakcrs of tljc Unitcb States, ^Ije Presibent, tEI?c (Cabinet, tEI?c Congress anb ttje (Officers anb (£nlisteb IlTen of tlje dmcrican CTrniy anb Hary, tOtjose Deebs ©fficiaUy IDritten 3n Ctction (Jre JJecorbeb in ^fjese Pages, (£biteb by tfje autfjor; C5 W O o 55 o TABLE ■ OF CONTENTS. 37 CHAPTER VI. THE TWO SORTS OF SPANIARDS IN CUBA. The Food Supplies in Cuba — Introduction of the Torch by the Insurgents — Garcia's Fine Army with an Engineer Corps — The Double Tax on Sugar-Making — Spanish Methods of Making War — The Policy of Annihilation — A Government in Light Marching Order 176 193. CHAPTER VII. GENERAL LEE'S CONSUL-GENERALSHIP IN CUBA. The Conservative Administrations of Grant, Cleveland and McKinley — A Variety of "American Citizens" in Havana — Judicious Discrimination of Consulate Authorities — A Young Man Who Gave Himself Away — The Brave Stand of the President against Bulling the Market for Bonds Issued on a Basis of Bloody Ashes 194-205 CHAPTER VIII. THE ACTUAL EXPERIENCE AND SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA. Two Parties of Malignants — The Firm Stand of the President at the Beginning of the War — A Study of the Historical Truth of the Situation — The President's Language Contrasted with That of the Fire Bugs — Extreme Views of Senators Davis, Daniel, Foraker, and Others — The Fury of the War Party — Cuban and Spanish Desperadoes — The Massacre of the Maine — The Findings of the Courts — List of the Lost on the Ship 206-22S CHAPTER IX. THE SAN DOMINGO TORCH IN AID OF THE CUBAN REBELLION. The Policy of Maximo Gomez, and the Famine in Cuba — The Reports of American Consuls in Cuba on the Cane Burning and Its Relation to the Starvation of the People — The Agent of the Cubans in Arms Justified Barbarism — The Testimony of Our Consuls that the Gomez Policy was the Cause of the Death of Thousands — Direct Evidence of Blackmail Taxes, and the Anxiety of Cuban People to Be Annexed to the United States — The Desperado Orders by Gomez before Weyler Came to Cuba . . 229-243 CHAPTER X. THE WAY THE WAR BUSINESS WAS HANDLED. The , Declaration of War — The President's Call upon Congress to Take Action — Fit and Few Words — The Constant Scramble in Congress for the Cuban Ghost-Dance Govern- ment — The Official Text of the President's War Proclamations — The Navy Had First to Take Command of the Seas — The Timely Dispatches from the Navy Department — Making Ready for War — Major-General Miles and His 50,000 Cubans .... 244-274 CHAPTER XI. THE STORY OF DEWEV'S SPLENDID VICTORY TOLD BY THOSE WHO WON IT. The Battle of Manila Bay — Confidential Information from Madrid, Showing Spanish Con- fidence in Their Navy — Rapid Exchange of Cables between Dewey and Long — Energetic Inquiry in the Navy Department — Everything Rushed from the Start: — 38 TABLE OF CONTENTS. Dewey's Masterly Movements and Immortal Victory — The Official Reports Full of Stories of the Battle That Will Be News to the People— Details of Uncommon Value — Spanish Official Report Exceedingly Interesting — Admiral Montejo was not Sur- prised, but Fired First— The Celebrated Breakfast Caused by a False Alarm , 277-308 CHAPTER XII. AFTER THE MAY-DAY BATTLE IN MANILA BAY. Dewey's Cables During the Time He Held the Harbor with the City of Manila under His Guns — Dispatches Full of History and Rich in Personal Characteristics — Authentic Information from the Inside — The Official Story — Dewey's Unfavorable Opinion of Cubans — Capture of the City — Trouble with Aguinaldo — Our Ships and Crews . 309-328 CHAPTER XIII. THE OBJECT LESSON OF THE VOYAGE OF THE OREGON. The People Instructed for the Army by the Experience of the Navy— The Run from Washington State to Florida — Splendid Spirit of the Men — The Fearful Storm in the Straits of Magellan — The Threat of Destroying a Spanish Torpedo Boat at Rio — The Finish Alone and in Good Form, and Famous the World Over 329-338 CHAPTER XIV. THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR. Putting the Army into the Combat — The Plans of Campaign— The Proposed Waiting and Equipping Policy of the Major-General Commanding — His Strange Confidence in the Cuban Story of an Army of 50,000 Rebels to Help Us — Reasons Why We Could Not Wait Six Months after Declaring War before Striking Decisively with the Army 341-352 I CHAPTER XV. THE EARLY CORRESPONDENCE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF WAR. Activity in the War Department before the Declaration of War — The Precautionary Policy of the Major-General Commanding — Diiferences of Opinion in High Places about an Early Invasion of Cuba — Importance of Healthful Camps — The Dangers of Water Supplies — The Inside History of a Troubled Time — Shafter's Sagacity as to the Importance of a First Engagement — The Demand for a Competent Army Enforced.353-367 CHAPTER XVI. THE PHANTOM FLEETS OF SPAIN IN CUBAN WATERS. Admiral Cervera Sailed into the Unknown, and Became a Mystery and a Menace— He Appeared and Disappeared, and Was at Last Found at Santiago by Commodore Schley — Imperative Demands for Information Answered — The Orders of General Shafter and Plans of General Miles — Dramatic Scenes at Tampa— Just as the Great Fleet Was Sailing Another Spanish Hoodoo Fleet Was Announced— After All, a Prosperous Voyage and Easy Landing 368-3S3 TABLE OF CONTENTS. 39 CHAPTER XVII. THE SHARP STRAIN OF THE STRUGGLE AT SANTIAGO. General Miles as a Loyal Soldier— Shafter's Fine Voyage and Safe Landing— The First Blood in Battle — Rush of Supplies and Reinforcements to the Army — Alger Wants Shatter to "Get a Good Ready"— Why Siege Guns Were Not Unloaded— Work Cut Out for the Regulars — Parallel with the British Siege of Havana — The Sword Had to Be Swift to Save from Pestilence 3S4-399 • CHAPTER XVIII. THE FIELD FIGHTING FOR SANTIAGO. The Supreme Test of American Valor — The Thin but Steady Regular Line, and the Essential Assistance by the Foremost Volunteers — The Whole Story from the First Skirmish to the Last Assault Told in War Office Dispatches far More Interesting than the Formal Reports of the Officers and More Sensational than the Lurid Chap- ters in the Journals — Their Publication an Admirable Example of the Candor of the Authorities — An AU-Night Watch for News at the White House^Shafter's Memor- able Third and Fourth of July 400-416 CHAPTER XIX. THE STRANGE STORY OF THE SECRET OFFICIAL CIPHER OF SPAIN. The Cables That Passed Between Sagasta, Blanco, Cervera, Correa and Linares During the Crisis of the Spanish War in Cuba — A Diary Telegraphed from Santiago to Havana, Giving the Inside of Spanish Affairs from the Attack to the Surrender — Cer- vera Not Well Fitted Out, Forced to Flight, Protesting that He Was Going to Destruc- tion — The Cables Are a Gallery of Paintings of Spanish Character .... 417-453 CHAPTER XX. THE SANTIAGO SITUATION AFTER THE SPANISH FLEET WAS GONE. Cipher Dispatches — Too Much Publicity — Shatter Demands the Help of the Navy, and is Supported by the War Department — He Heard Firing at Midnight and Hoped it Was Sampson — Garcia's Men Who Were Always Going to Do Something To-morrow — "Terrible Fight" July ist — Reinforcements, Lighters and Tugs Wanted — An Ener- getic Rush to Aid Shaffer, but Not by the Nav}-- Cable Direct to Corbin— The Yellow Fever Appears — Preliminaries to the Capitulation — The President Sticks to It that Spaniards Must Unconditionally Surrender — Fortunate Arrival of Miles in the Blue Rams 454-473 CHAPTER XXI. THE LESSON FOR THE COUNTRY OF THE HILLS OF SANTIAGO. Value of the Reports of the Inspector-General— His Keen Suggestions and Brilliant Sketches with Expert Information — Tribute of Breckenridge to Shaffer — The Volun- teers in Camps— Chickamauga as an Illustiation — The Location of the Wrongs That the Soldiers Suffered Unduly — We Must Build Regiments as We Do Battle.ship.s — The Fault of Poor Preparation Not Personal— Let Congress for the Country Mend It 474-491 4° TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER XXII. THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET. _ The Cape Verde Squadron Smashed, Burned and Sunk, and Admiral Sampson Makes a Present of the Wrecks to the Nation — The Reports of the Admiral and Commodore Schley — Their Difference in Opinions, Methods and Manners — Intensely Interesting Extracts from Reports by Captains and Executive Officers — A Series of Startling Pictures — Admiral Cervera's Official Lamentation — Extracts from the Spanish Diary of Uncommon Value — The Story of Fugitives from the Fleet Who Found Their Way to the Spanish Trenches — Admiral Omits to Improve Opportunity of His Life. . 492-520 CHAPTER XXIII. THE SCENES AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO. The Appearance of General Miles at Santiago — His Moral as well as Military Force — Spanish Obstinacy in the Negotiation for Capitulation— The Iron Hand at Washing- ton — The Practical Question Was How Much Would Victory Cost Us? — -The Spanish Case Was Hopeless — They Sought to Save their Military Honor — The Scenes and Terms of the Surrender — An Inspector-General's Picturesque Story — Telegrams That are Photographs — The President's Proclamation of Principles and Purpose in Cuban Government — Comparative Proportions of Great Surrenders 523-543 CHAPTER XXIV. THE JOINT WORK OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AT MANILA. The Reasons Why Admiral Dewey Remained After Destroying the Spanish Fleet — Why There Was Not a Slaughter at Manila Like That at Santiago— The Old Fort That Was the Key of the City — The American Army Drove the Spaniards and Dusted the Insurgents Out of the Way — A Very Neat Job — We Did Not Make War on the Span- iards for the Sake of the Tagalos 544-567 CHAPTER XXV. THE rORTO RICO CAMPAIGN. The Preliminary Plans and Movements of General Miles — Sharp but Courteous Corre- spondence with General Shatter, Closing Cuban E.xperiences — Place of Landing in Porto Rico Changed at vSea — The Progress of the Campaign Closed by the Peace News — The Constant and Conclusive Success of the American Arms — Some of the Cablegrams that Passed that Remain of Interest 56S-578 CHAPTER XXVL AFTER THE FIGHTING WAS OVER IN CUBA. The Casualties at Santiago — Haste to Ship the Spaniards to Spain and the Americans North — The Parting of the Armies That Met in Bloody Strife — Shatter's Opinion of Immunes — A Curious Proclamation from Spanish Soldiers — 23,726 Spani.sh Soldiers Surrendered — American Volunteers Begging to be Hurried to the Front While the War Lasted, and When It Was Over They Wanted to Go Home 581-599 TABLE OF CONTENTS. 4i CHAPTER XXVII. THE PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. The Marvelous Improvement of the Artillery on Our Ships of War — The Splendid Equip- ment of the Several Vessels — Full Particulars of the Armament of All Our Ships — Vigilance of the Ordnance Bureau to Continue Progress — The Thirteen-Inch Guns to Be Superseded in the New Navy by Twelve-Inch — Important Recommendations — The Way the Navy Was Prepared to Win — Plans for Continued Progress — The Spanish Side as Seen and Described by One of Her Officers — Hopes and Happenings in Bombarded Santiago — Service of Cervera's Fleet — Mystery of the Merrimac — Earth quake-Throwing Vesuvius — German Opinion — Work of the Marines .... 600-629 CHAPTER XXVIII. THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. Its Organization and- Numbers Before and During the War — Strength and Location of the Several Army Corps — The Distribution of the Military Forces and Their Numbers — Casualties During the War, in Cuba, Porto Rico and the Philippines — Deaths in the Camps — The Incidents of Hardship and the Yellow Scandals — Spanish Account of the Valor of Their Troops and Story of the Conflict — Scarcity of Provisions— Cruel Battles of El Caney and San Juan — Suffering in Santiago 630-657 CHAPTER XXIX. THE INSURGENTS OF CUBA AND THE PHILIPPINES IN ARMS. Our Relations With and Responsibilities for Them — The Cuban Soldiers Found on the Pay Roll — A Military Service of Importance and the Only One Performed by Armed Cubans in Our War — The Spanish Account of It — Cubans Kept 3,500 of the Best Toops of Spain Away from El Caney — Testimony Taken at Paris by the Ameri- can Commission of the True Character of the Philippines — General Merritt, General Greene and Major Bell State the Facts 65S-667 CHAPTER XXX. THE TREATY OF PEACE. The Official Terms in Which the Spaniards Sued for Peace and Accepted the Demands of the Peace Protocol of August 12 — "The Demand Strips Us of the Very Last Memory of a- Glorious Past" — The Treaty Commissioners That Met in Paris — Official Text of the Treaty of Peace of December 10 — The Spaniards Contend That the Philippine Insurgents Constantly Change the Status Quo and that the Americans Must Stop Them — Contention that the Transfer of Sovereignty Meant Transfer of Debts — Protracted Debate Over the Cuban Obligations — Claim the Capture of Manila Was Not Lawful — Insinuation that General Merritt Had Heard of the Protocol Before Storming the Town — Spaniards Able and Adroit — Americans Firm but Courteous — The Official History of the Preparation of the Peace Protocol — The Part Taken by the President — His Strong Hand Felt in Paris 66S-731 42 TABLE OF CONTENTS. CHAPTER XXXI. REVIEW OF THE WAR AND THE COMMISSION ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT. Importance of a Day Lost or Gained — The Protocol Was the Treaty — Military Com- missions to Arrange the Spanish Evacuation of Cuba and Porto Rico — Appearance of the Cuban Army — Narrow Margins on Which the War Was Ended so Speedily — Inspiration of Dewey's Victory — Energy in Following It Up — Outbreak of Criticism on the Conduct of the War as Soon as It Was Over — The Commission of Investigation Appointed by the President — Extraordinary Interest in the Action of the Commission and Its Authoritative Report — Weaknesses in Systems and Persons Not Spared — Origin and Extent of the Canned Meat Controversy — Fault Found in High Places — The Army, Regular or Volunteer, of and for the People 732-751 CHAPTER XXXII. THE OCCUPATION OF OUR NEW POSSESSIONS. The Spanish Peninsula Too Narrow to Sustain the Crown System Over Continental Colonies — The Loss of Her Archipelagoes Has Been the Logic of Her Experiences — Comparative Expansion of England and the United States — Our Magnificent Growth Across the Continent the Greatest of National Triumphs — Our Arms Around the World — Our Bugle Call and British Drum-Beats Following the Course of the Sun — The Whispering Wires that Unite the Nations — The Malay Revolt Against Liberty for Tyranny — The Ghastly Demagogy that Meddles with the Army — Pleasing Prospects of Our Possessions Except the Philippines — The Aguinaldo Conspiracy and Tagalo War — The Motives and Malice of It — American Arms Without Stain — Our Soldiers Without Reproach 752-764 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. PAGE Frontispiece — Government Building at Washington, Occupied by the State, War, and Navy Departments. I — President McKinley and His Cabinet 17 2 — Murat Halstead, the Author 18 3— General Nelson A. Miles, Commander of the United States Army 35 4 — The "Iowa," in Command of Fighting Bob Evans 36 5 — Queen Regent and Boy King of Spain 45 6 — Stewart L. Woodford, Minister to Spain When War Was Declared 46 7 — Tablet Commemorating the Execution of the "Virginius" Prisoners. One of the Early Causes of the War with Spain 63 8 — Admiral Dewey under the "Olympia's" Big Guns 64 9 — Admiral Dewey and Staff on the "Olympia" 64 10 — The Cathedral at Santiago ; 81 11 — Kiosk in Main Plaza at Ponce, Porto Rico 82 12 — The Captain-General's Palace in Havana 99 13 — The Plaza in Ponce, Porto Rico 100 14 — Artillery Wagon Park, Porto Rico 100 15 — Church and Palms in Juana, Porto Rico 100 16 — Captain Bethel and General Ernst Reconnoitering in Porto Rico 100 17 — The Military Hospital in Ponce, Porto Rico 105 18 — Battery B, Fourth Artillery, in Action in Porto Rico 106 ig — Fire Department Building, Ponce, Porto Rico 106 20 — -On the Picket Line in Porto Rico 106 43 44 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. PAGE 21 — Catholic Church in Ponce, Porto Rico io6 22 — Leading Cuban Generals Who Commanded Insurgent Forces in Cuba 115 23 — Military Telegraph Office and Barracks at Ponce, Porto Rico 116 24 — Fortifications of San Juan, Porto Rico 121 25 — The Quay, San Juan, Porto Rico 123 26 — General Blanco, Who Commanded Spanish Forces in Cuba 139 27 — La Perla Theatre in Ponce, Porto Rico 140 28 — A Picket Squad of Cuban Soldiers 145 29 — General Castellio and Staff 145 , 30 — Plaza in Santiago, Cuba , 146 31 — Group of Native Women in Ponce, Porto Rico 146 32— Battery F of the Fifth Artillery 155 33 — A Dwelling in Santiago 155 34 — Effect of Torpedo Explosion in "Vizcaya" 155 35 — 5.5-inch Gun and Cartridge on "Vizcaya" 155 36 — The Major, His Adjutant, Orderly, and Wife 156 37 — Partial View of Arsenal, Facing the Bacoor, in Cavite, Philippines 156 38 — Cuadrilleros, or Rural Guards, in the Philippines 161 39 — The Princess Promenade, San Juan, Porto Rico 162 40 — City of San Juan, Porto Rico 179 41 — Street of the Cross, .San Juan, Porto Rico 180 42 — Market Women of Porto Rico 1S5 43 — A Porto Rico Country House 186 44 — Major-General Fitzhugh Lee, Consul at Havana When War Was Declared 195 45 — The Sea Wall of San Juan, Porta Rico '. 196 46 — Horses Loaded with Maloja, in Matanzas, Cuba 201 47 — The Yumuri River at Matanzas, Cuba 202 48_The United States Battleship "Maine" 219 4g — Captain Sigsbee. Who Commanded the lU-Fated "Maine" 220 50 — Funeral of the Victims of the "Maine" Disaster 225 51 — The Court of Inquiry into the Fate of the "Maine," in Session 226 52— Quarter-Deck of the U. S. S. "Brooklyn" 235 53 — Fire-room of the U. S. S. "Brooklyn" 236 54 — A Fruit Vendor in Havana 241 55 — Twelve-Inch Breech-Loading Mortars, Weight 28,980 Pounds Each 242 QUEEN REGENT AND BOY KING OF SPAIN. STEWART L. WOODFORD, MINISTER TO SPAIN WHEN WAR WAS DECLARED. LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 47 PAGE 56 — The Fl^-ing Squadron 259 57 — Admiral Dewey as Chief of the Bureau of Equipment, United States Navy 260 58 — Guns Used by United States Infantry, Breech Closed 265 5g — Guns Used by United States Infantry, Breech Open 265 60— United States Light Artillery at Port Tampa 266 61 — Artillery Practice at Port Tampa 266 62 — Deck View of the U. S. S. "Indiana" 275 63 — Regiment in Heavy Marching Order at Camp Alger 27C) 64 — Admiral Dewey's Fleet That Won the May-day Victory in Manila Bay 2S1 65 — Admiral Dewey, the Hero of Manila 2S2 66 — Admiral Montijo, Commander of the Fleet That Admiral Dewey Sunk 299 67 — Views of the Navy Yard at Cavite, Philippines 300 63 — The Arena, Constructed of Bamboo, in Which Bull Fights Are Given at Manila 305 69 — Views in and around Manila 306 70 — Views in the Philippines, Mostly in and around Manila 315 71 — Views from the Philippines 316 72 — Native Method of Plowing — Scene in the Province of Batangas, Philippines 321 73 — A Country Marriage in the Philippines 322 74 — Captain Clark, of the "Oregon," in His Office 339 75 — The "Oregon," the Bulldog of the Navy 340 76 — Transport "Newport," of the Philippine Expedition, Leaving San Francisco 345 77 — Regiment Breaking Camp at Camp Alger ; 346 78 — United States Volunteer in Full Marching Order -.: 355 79 — Model of Guns Used on Aft Decks 356 80 — Ten-Inch Disappearing Gun Carriage, Model of 1896, Buffington-Ciozier System 356 81 — Daiquiri, Where Our Troops Landed in Cuba 361 82 — The Beach at Daiquiri 361 83 — The Pier at Daiquiri 361 84 — A Part of Daiquiri. Cuba 361 85 — The Way Milk Is Sold and Delivered in Havtrna 362 86 — Chart Showing Daily Positions of the American Fleet in the Campaign Against the Spanish Squadron in Cuban Waters 37g 87 — Daily Positions of the Spanish Squadron in Cuban Waters, Under Admiral Cervera.... 380 88— Third Light Artillery Going into Camp, on Their Way to the Front, Six Miles from Siboney 3S5 48 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. PAGE Sq — Geueral Hawkins, Who Led the Famous Charge of the First Brigade at San Juan, July ist, 1898 3S6 90 — Capron's Battery in Action ^n Their Position in General Lawton's Division 395 gi — Wounded on their Way to Dressing Place at the Battle of San Juan 396 92 — Artillery Men Trying to Locate the Enemy's Batteries While under Fire 401 93 — General Wheeler and General Sumner in the Latter's Headquarters before Santiago 402 94 — The Church at El Caney 419 95 — Scene in a Field Hospital after the Battle of San Juan 420 96 — Bombproofs Thrown Up by Rough Riders to Protect Them from Spanish Shell and Shrapnel 425 97 — Colonel Roosevelt's Men Cooking Their First Dinner at Daiquiri ; Fried Bacon and Hard Tack the Menu 426 gS — Grave of Captain Wetherell, Who Fell in the Famous Charge of San Juan Hill 435 99— "Oquendo," Starboard Side, Showing Exit of Thirteen-Inch Shell 436 100 — "Oquendo," Starboard Side, as Abandoned 436 loi — Views of the Notorious Prison at Santiago 441 102 — Cast Iron Projectiles Used in the Navy 442 103 — Petty Officers of the U. S. S. "New York" 443 104 — Stone Fort at El Caney. Effect of Cannonading 459 105 — Snap Shot of General Shafter in the Field 460 106 — American Troops in Santiago. Relief of the Guard 465 107 — Scene on the Wharf at Santiago de Cuba 46b loS — Crushing-Mill on a Sugar Plantation in Cuba 475 109 — Valley of the Yumuri River, Cuba : 476 no — A Group of Spanish Prisoners before Santiago 481 III — Col. John Jacob Astor, of Astor Battery Fame, near Spanish Trenches 482 112 — The Naval Heroes of Santiago 499 113 — Wreck of "Reina Mercedes," and Estrella Battery, Santiago 500 114 — Admiral Cervera, Who Commanded the Ill-Fated Spanish Fleet at Santiago 505 115 — Side of the "Cristobal Colon" after the Battle 506 116 — Bow of the "Vizcaya." After the Santiago Battle 515 117 — Forecastle of the "Oquendo"; Showing Sinking of Spar Deck 510 118 — "Vizcaya," after the Santiago Battle, Showing.the Results of American Gunners' Marksmanship , 521 iig — "Cristobal Colon" as Finally Abandoned ' 522 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. 49 I'AGE 120 — Santiago de Cuba, North Half, as Seen from the Bay 539 121 — Entrance to Harbor at Santiago de Cuba; "Merrimac" Shown in the Foreground 540 122 — Generals Miles and Shafter on Board Headquarters Boat "Seguranca" 545 123 — Tree Under Which Surrender of Spanish Forces at Santiago Was Made 546 124 — Major-General Thomas M. Anderson and StaflF, in Command of First Division, Eighth Army Corps, at Manila 555 125— Rift in the Jungles that Line the Coast of the Philippines 556 126 — Roadway in Botanical Gardens, Manila 556 127 — The Road to the Cemetery in Tansa, Province of Iloilo 561 128 — Landscape View Showing Beauty and Luxuriance of Vegetation in the Philippines... 562 t2q — United States Transports in the Harbor of Ponce, Porto Rico 579 130 — The Citadel at Ponce, Porto Rico 580 131 — A Corner in the Market of Santiago, Cuba 585 132 — Head of Pack Train Leaving San Luis for Manzanillo 5S6 133 — Sugar Mill. Scene of the San Luis Riot November 4, 1S9S 595 134 — Soidiers in Insurgent Army of Cuba jgj 135 — The Palace of Santiago, Cuba 5g6 136 — Effect of Eight-Inch .Shell through Port Head of "Vizcaya" 601 137 — Starboard Side of "Vizcaya. " After the Battle 601 13S — A Cuban Plowman 602 139 — Sword Ordered by Congress to be Given Admiral Dewey as a Token of the Nation's Gratitude Ciq 140 — Bust of Columbus, Found on "Cristobal Colon." Now in Waj' Department at Washington 620 141 — Department Headquarters of United States Army at Santiago f,37 142 — General W. F. Randolph 5,3 143 — Bob Wrenn and Billy Larned 5.58 144 — Train of Pack Mules ■ 5,8 145 — Sergeant Dan Hewitt, Hero of Caloocan 538 146 — View Inside of the Trenches (,-- 147 — Camp at Port Tamp;i 5,- 148 — Headquarters in the Field gc- 149 — View of the Trenches (^,, 150 — Loading Pack Mules 5,5 151 — A Cuban Villa g.^ so LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. PAGE 152 — Placing Guns into Position : 656 153 — Members of the Ninth Cavah-y, Colored 656 154— The Battlefield of San Juan, July 2, 189S 673 155 — "Maria Teresa," Showing Hole in 5.5-Inch Gun Shield, Inner View 674 156 — The American Peace Commissioners 681 157 — The Spanish Peace Commissioners 684 158 — "To George Dewey, with the Compliments of the President, Cong:-ess and the People of the United States" 691 159 — Major-General Thomas M. Anderson, Commander of Fir.st Division, Eighth Army Corps, at Manila 692 160 — General E. S. Otis and Staff on Porch, Malacanan Palace, Manila 709 161 — Malacanan Palace and Pasig River, Manila 710 162 — General Otis and Staff in Dining Room of Malacanan Palace, Manila 710 163 — Signatures of American and Spanish Peace Commissioners to Treaty of Peace 727 164 — Last Joint Sesision of American and Spanish Peace Commissioners at Paris 728 ^ \ MAPS. CHARTS AND PLANS. PAGE I — Map of Santiago and Vicinity, Showing Intrenchments and Positions of the Fifth Army Corps, U. S. Army, and Those of the Spanish 403 2 — Plan Showing Position of Both Armies before Santiago, July 3, 1898 408 3 — Official Diagram Showing Plan of Naval Battle off Santiago, July 3, 1898 493 4 — Official Sketch Showing External Injuries Sustained by the "Brooklyn" at Santiago, July 3, 1898 ., 495 5 — Official Sketch Showing External Injuries Sustained by the "Iowa" at Santiago, Julys, 189S 495 6 — Official Diagram Showing Where the Spanish Vessels Were Abandoned off Santiago, July 3, 189S 497 7 — Official Sketch Showing Damage Done to Chain Locker by a Spanish Shell, July 3, 8 — Official Plan of "Vizcaya," Showing Approximate Location of Hits and Probable Size of Projectiles 503 9 — Official Plan of "Oquendo, " Showing Approximate Eocation of Hits and Probable Size of Projectiles 503 10 — Official Plan of "Maria Teresa," Showing Approximate Location of. Hits and Probable Size of Projectiles ^ 507 II — Official Plan of "Cristobal Colon," Showing Approximate Location of Hits and Prob- able Size of Projectiles 507 12 — Plan Showing Stations of American Fleet at Santiago before the Battle, July 3 518 13 — Official Map Showing Plan of American and Spanish Trenches before Manila in August, i8g8 , .' 557 51 52 MAPS, CHARTS AND PLANS. PAGE 14— Official Map Showing Country South of the Pasig River and West of the Paranaque River, in Which the Military Operations before Manila Were Conducted in August, 1S9S 559 15— Official Sketch Showing Positions of First Brigade, Second Division, Eighth Corps, in Operations against Manila, August, 1S98 563 16 — Map of Porto Rico, in Colors, from Latest Government Surveys 765 17 — Map of Cuba, in Colors, from Latest Government Surveys 767 iS — Map of Hawaii, in Colors, from Latest Government Surveys 760 ig — Map of the Philippine Islands, in Colors, from Latest Government Surveys 771 :^^S^^'^ CHAPTER I. The Origin of the War Between the United States and Spain. American Good Will for Spain — The Situation in 1S69— The Sickles and Prim Negotiation — Prim Willing to Sell Cuba — "The Honor of Spain"' — Diplomatic Papers that Should be Studied — Spain Sends an AiTny to Cuba — The Valmaseda Proclamation — The Wrongs ot Cuba— We Must Find the Real People of Cuba. More than four centuries after the discovery of the West Indies by Chris- topher Columbus, there was in the celebration of that event in the vanished yet memorable White City at Chicago, a revelation to the nations and people accustomed to regard us as a mass of material rudely fashioned, of the advance of American art and the accomplishments of our higher civilization. There was also manifest, to the students of the progress of mankind, a tre- mendous force of public opinion, and an augmented excellence in character and fervor of expression, of a distinctive national character, clean cut and glowing with public pride and patriotism. One of the features of the celebra- tion was the kindly popular sentiment respecting Spain, and a regard for the people of the peninsula of Europe that enters the Atlantic. One of the treasured and consecrated figures shining in our traditions was Isabella, the friend of Columbus (who offered to pledge her jewels that he might sail west- ward and expand the area of cultivation and Christianity) — Columbus, the first of our heroes, not a Spaniard, but one who gave Spain a new world and his ashes, whose incomparable discoveries became august through the ages by the misfortunes that closed his illustrious life in gloom. The pen of Wash- ington Irving made the Alhambra dear to Americans, and in the mellow splendor of his pages the ancient romantic traditions and tragic histories of the land of Cervantes were enriched in a golden atmosphere like that of the 53 54 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR. masterpieces of Murillo. The descendants of Columbus, coming by way of Havana; the Princess of the royal reigning house of Spain; and the chosen ships of her navy, were welcomed to our shores, homes and harbors, and entertained with a superb hospitality, so profuse that the fault of its pomp was forgiven on account of its sincerity. Almost forgotten were the stories of Spain's cruelties; nearly effaced from American soil the crimson of her foot- steps. The olden grandeur of Spain was for the youth of our country a fascinating story, half history, half romance. So far as we knew how far we were misjudged by Spain, our resentment was softened by remembrance of her fallen fortunes, and compassion for austere vanity and solemn conceit that was content with ignorance. We were even hopeful of Spanish Republican- ism. There was something that Whittier sang, "The north wind told to the pines, the wild duck to the sea." It was that the Lord was .showing signs the slaves should sometime be free. There were many signs that the day was soon coming that Cuba should be free, and few Americans have ever doubted that the freedom of Cuba meant she was to be under the wing of the Great Republic of the North. This was written when the island first grew green in the summer seas, and the Americas emei'ged from chaos. This was not a secret held in the mind of Spain, though an arrow piercing the Spanish heart. Secretary of State Hamilton Fish, whose grandson fell foremost in the charge of the Rough Riders at Santiago, wrote July 29, 1869, to General Sickles at Madrid in terms that equally well described that time and the situa- tion in 1897. The official synopsis of the State papers describes the communi- cation of Mr. Fish in these terms; "The insurrection of Cuba is caiising; great devastation, and will result, if continued, in the destruction of the productive capacity of the island. Reasons why the United States have a peculiar interest in the fortunes and prosperity of the island. Contest one for self-government and freedom. Self-government for every part of the Ameri- can hemisphere and freedom from transatlantic rule a growing sentiment in the United States. This has been recognized by other powers. Spain may, with honor, recognize it and treat for the surrender of her rights in Cuba." Marshal Prim's reply on behalf of Spain was that he recognized the inevitable termination of colonial relations in America, but Spain could not be reconciled to that till hostilities ceased. General Sickles replied that Spain was not asked to treat with insurgents, but with a friendly power and old ally. Prim responded that the United States might be assured of the good THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR. 55 faith of Spain, but that the insurrection had not assumed proportions that could require a government to treat during hostilities. The insurgents held no port or ships, and had no army that offered or accepted battle. The language of Mr. Fish in writing to Mr. Sickles at this juncture was: "It can no longer be a question of national dignity, nor can the proper pride or the just susceptibilities of a great power refuse to consider the question of a voluntary severance of past relations between itself and distant possessions. Spain herself was one of the first of the great European powers to cede volun- tarily its distant colonial possessions, for she transferred Louisiana to France and subsequently ceded Florida to the United States." The Secretary proceeded: "The strife still continues in Cuba. It has already marked its track by devastation and ruin — towns sacked, houses burned, plantations destroyed, and lives lost. On- either side the war has been one of desolation, and, if continued, must result in the entire destruction of a large part of the productive capacity of the island as well as of an immense amount of property and of human life. "It is not impossible that the Cubans may be conquered, if Spain devotes her whole energies to the work; but they can never again be contented, happy, faithful, or quiet subjects of that power. Assuming that Spain may eventually subdue the present insurrection, she will find herself in possession of a devastated and ruined territory, inhabited by a discontented people. The enlightened statesmen of Spain cannot fail to appreciate that the feelings and the affections nf the entire native population of the island are not only ■estranged, but they are deeply hostile to the continuance of Spanish rule. Nor can they fail to recognize the advancing growth of that sentiment which claims for every part of the American hemisphere the right of self-govern- .ment and freedom from transatlantic dependence. "England, bound as she has been to the traditions of the past, tenacious as she has been of her possessions, and conservative of all her rights and interests, has recognized the force of this feeling, and has anticipated events by granting self-government to her North American provinces. Denmark, approving the policy of the separation of colonies from the parent state, is endeavoring to part with her insular possessions." The example of Russia in selling Alaska was pertinently quoted. In a striking picture of recent conditions the fate of Porto Rico was fore- shadowed by Secretary Fish June 29, 1869: "The same causes which have 56 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR. produced the present convulsion in Cuba exist latent in Porto Rico, and may- be fanned into flames hereafter should free government and a system of free labor be brought in immediate contact with that island by establishing them in Cuba. It is not improbable, therefore, that the cabinet of Madrid may think it wise to determine the political condition of both islands at the same time." There is close correspondence between the situations of 1869 and of 1897 in the relations of the United States and Spain, respecting the final disposition of the Cuban question. The ten years of civil war in Cuba had been in prog- ress one year when Secretary Fish sent a special observer and negotiator to Madrid and wrote Minister Sickles to propose to the Spanish government the purchase of Cuba, which was not, it should be well remarked, received as intolerable insolence, but as a business affair to be given the most considerate attention. The Spanish executive authorities were cautious and sensitive, but consoled by the customary diplomatic flatteries, and after shrinking from the attitude of expectant but favorable attention, resumed the use of tentative phrases, suggesting additional offers of compensation, always saying much of the essential requirements of the dignity and honor that must be at all hazards maintained. Marshal Prim, after stating that Spain had lost Cuba practically, and desiring to know how much would be paid for the relinquish- ment of Spanish sovereignty over Cuba and Porto Rico, discovered and declared that his colleagues were less inclined than himself to entertain that form of finding a solution of the making of peace in Cuba by the abandonment of the island. The Spanish statesman knew that Minister Sickles had been a factor in the Ostend Conference, and intimately associated with the influences that made James Buchanan President of. the United States, and that it could hardly be accidental Sickles had been chosen Minister of the United States to Spain, by President Grant, who looked to intervention and the annexation of Cuba, and whose military prestige had so considerably been manifested in our international affairs. Two telegrams from General Sickles to Secretary Fish signify too much to allow omission : "August I, 1869. — Communicated to Prim informally basis of convention. He pressed me to say how much Ctiba and Porto Rico would give. I said I had no instructions, and suggested one hundred and twenty-five millions as probable. Prim said Spain might arrange preliminaries with United States and concede autonomy of Cuba and Porto Rico for satisfactory equivalent as THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR. 57 soon as hostilities ceased. He promised to bring the whole subject before the council to-night." "August 6, 1S69. — Prim says sudden illness of Secretary of State has delayed reply." In conversation with Senor Silvela, a few days after the delay on account of the sudden illness of the Secretary of State, Senor Silvela said to Minister Sickles: "The liberal party in Spain finds itself, to its own infinite regret, forced into a seeming sympathy with the reactionary party in Cuba ; and the liberals of Cuba, who ought to be -its firm friends, are converted, by tlie fatality of the situation, into its bitterest enemies. There is no sentiment dearer to the hearts of the liberal leaders than that of freedom to all men; yet they stand before the world, in this Cuban conflict, as opposed to self-govern- ment and resisting the abolition of slavery." He considered the insurrection as a most deplorable misfortune and mistake, both for Cuba and for Spain, saying: "If a wa)' could be found to settle all these questions in such a manner as to do justice to Cuba, without infringing upon the honor of Spain, the govern- ment would be greatl)' gratified. There is no intention or desire among the liberals of Spaiia ever again to work (exploiter) the island of Cuba on the old selfish system. It has been their constant hope and wish to grant to the Cubans the administration of their own affairs and the full fruits of their own labor, preserving their commercial connections, and some shadow of their political relations." Before the utterance of these somewhat vague but pleasing sentiments, marked with the sonorous cadence of the diplomacy of Spain, with which her decline and fall as a great nation has been accompanied from the beginning of her decadence to the signing of the Treaty of Paris, the Minister evaded with the necessary courtesies the line of business conversation in which Marshal Prim had indulged. On the day after the interview of General Sickles with the Minister of State, who had infinite regrets that the posi- tion of the liberal party was so painfully involved with the Cuban insurrection, the Minister General made a "prescribed visit of ceremony" to Marshal Prim, the President of the Council of the Ministers of Spain, and the Mar.shal, "with much animation and even warmth of manner, protested that Spain would not entertain the suggestion of an armistice with the insurgents, nor consider the question of the independence of Cuba, while the insurgents were 58 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR. in arms against the government; that Spain would grant a full and complete amnesty as soon as the insurgents laid down their arms ; and that being done, the whole subject would be open for consideration ; that he was disposed to meet the question frankly and practically ; that perhaps he was somewhat in advance of the views of his colleagues, but he had no doubt they were unani- mous in the hope that the influence of the United States might be successfully exerted to relieve the question from the embarrassments which now sur- rounded it. " He added that, in regard to emancipation, Spain would prefer to leave that matter to the Cubans themselves, saying, "That is your glory in America, the reward of your philanthrop}', and we do not wish to deprive you of it." The Marshal repelled the idea of a conference in Washington, in which Spain, Cuba and the Cubans should be represented, asserting that Cuba could be heard only through the deputies elected to the Cortes, adding that Spain might deal with the United States but not with Cuba. The next day Marshal Prim notified General Sickles that Spain "accepted the good offices of the United States." This was on impossible conditions, viz., that the Cuban insurgents should lay down their arms, Spain to give amnesty full and com- plete, Cubans by universal suffrage to vote on the question of independence, and if the majority were for it, the Cortes consenting, — Cuba should pay satis- factorily, guaranteed by the United States, safe conduct through Spanish lines to be given when preliminaries were settled. After the good offices of the United States had been accepted by Marshal Prim, President of the Council of Ministers, Senor Silvela, Minister of State, was restored to health, and Gen- eral Sickles says: "I expressed my regret that the Spanish government, by choosing to treat the subject as a purely. legal question to be settled by their own forms of procedure, had apparently closed the door to any arrangement by which the good offices of the United States could be made immediately effective." The reply of the ^Minister of State was with great animation, and he thought the view Minister Sickles took was precisely wrong — for securing simultaneous disarmament and amnesty was "a great step in advance," and then Mr. Silvela "entered upon a very full analysis of Article io8 of the Spanish Constitution." The American Minister did not follow upon that, but pointed otit that a "practical view should be taken," and something should be done speedily, as there would be "complications increasing the difficulties of THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR. 59 reaching an ' accommodation. " Mr. Silvela referred to "the present temper and spirit of the Spanish people," which would not permit haste. This was doubtless true then, and never novel. This is the Section of the Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy — of the transmarine provinces : "Article 108. — The Cortes Constituyentes shall reform the present sys- tem of government in the transmarine provinces when the deputies of Cuba or Porto Rico shall have taken their seats, in order to extend to the same, with the modifications that shall be deemed necessary, the privileges set forth in the Constitution." The memorandum of the conversation between the Spanish Minister of State and Minister Sickles August 10, 1869, was signed by Manuel Silvela and D. E. Sickles, and contained passages reporting the former, whose familiar flavor soon impresses the student of the negotiations that they proceed to "no thoroughfare." We quote them as illustrative of the fine flowing evasions of the literature of Spanish diplomacy: "After the revolution of September had taken place, and conformably to the principles thereby proclaimed, Spain would already have given all constitutional liberties to Cuba if the imfortu- nate insurrection of Yara and the cry of 'Death to Spain,' uttered by some Cubans, had not alienated the sympathies of the nation and obliged the government to accept the impolitic contest to which it was provoked; that a good proof of its desire to settle in a liberal sense the question of the Antilles is shown not only by the election of the deputies of Porto Rico, who are to take their seats in the Cortes Constituyentes at their next session, but also by the 108th Article of the Constitution, in which, notwithstanding the period in which it was adopted, it was provided that the concurrence of the deputies of that province is necessary to fix the future form of government of the island. "In view of these indisputable facts, and taking accoimt of and appreci- ating the traditional pride of the Spanish people, the government considers that it can come to no definite decision in regard to the political situation and future government of the island of Ciiba, until the insurgents lay down their arms and cease the struggle. "This being done, the government is disposed to grant a full and gener- ous amnesty to the insurgents, and when quiet is established, to proceed to the freest election of representatives of Cuba. "The national dignity being thus preserved intact, and it being practi- 6o THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR. cable to comply with the article of the Constitution, the moment will have [irrived for concerting with its representatives the necessary measures in rela- tion to the legal future of the island of Cuba, submitting them to the indis- pensable approbation of the Constituent Cortes. "In conclusion, if the United States, by their natural influence in America, are able to contribute to the cessation of the effusion of blood, in the pacifica- tion of the island of Cuba, and its entrance, by the election of its deprities, into the exercise of its rights, the government of Spain cannot but be grateful for these good offices." Secretary Fish, August i6th, telegraphed General Sickles to "urge accept- ance on basis proposed by the United States." These were: 1. The independence of Cuba to be acknowledged by Spain. 2. Cuba to pa)^ to Spain a sum, within a time and in a manner to be agreed upon by them, as an equivalent for the entire and definite relinquish- ment by Spain of all her rights in that island, including the public property of every description. If Cuba should not be able to pay the whole sum at once in cash, the future payments, by installments, are to be adequately secured by a pledge of the export and the import customs duties under an arrange- ment to be agreed upon for their collection, in trust, for the purpose of secur- ing both the principal and interest of those installments until their fin.il discharge. 3. The abolition of slavery in the island of Cuba. 4. An armistice pending the negotiations for the settlement above referred to. Secretary Fish telegraphed that the Spanish proposition that the insur- gents should lay down their arms as a preliminary was "incapable of attain- ment," and the ascertainment of the Cubans by a vote "impracticable because of the disorganization of society," and the prevalent terrorism, "the violence and insubordination of volunteers." The will of the majority had been "recognized and admitted." On the date of this important di.spatch of Secretary Fish (August 16, 1869), General Sickles wrote to him at length, marking the dispatch "as confi- dential for obviously prudential reasons." He reported General Prim as saying some of his colleagues (;lid not realize as he did "the difficulty of carry- ing on a war in America," and they had great deference for the popular sentiment in Spain, which would sacrifice blood and money for honor. Mr. THE ORIf5lN OF THE WAR. 61 Silvela, a lawyer and leader, inclined to a purely legal view, while as for him- self he would say to the Cubans, "Go, if you will; make good the treasure you have cost us, and let me bring home our army and fleet, and consolidate the liberties of Spain." The Marshal, President of the Council, added, with much animation, that the great difficulty in the way was the defiant attitude of the insurgents; that here was the mistake of the United States, in propos- ing an armistice and asking Spain to treat on the basis of independence with insurgents with arms in their hands; and lie added, emphatically, "I am sure no human power could obtain from the Spanish people the most insignificant concession as long as the rebellion maintains its footing." The reply of General Sickles stated the case with uncommon brevity and force in these words: "No one appreciated more highly than the President," and it shotild be remembered the President was General Grant, "the elevated tone of the Cab- inet of Madrid, and that he would be the last to make any proposal derogatory to the honor of Spain ; that in his view a measure that would stop the indis- criminate sacrifice of life and property in Cuba, pending negotiations for ulterior arrangements, was prompted as well by considerations of humanity as of policy; that Great Britain had recognized the independence of the United States simultaneously with the cessation of hostilities, and that if, as I was glad to be assiired, the future relations of Cuba to the mother country admitted of adjustment hereafter on the basis of the independence of the colony, then surely some means might be devised by which, without offense to Spain, the conflict could be arrested pending the negotiations with the United States, a friendly power offering its good offices to promote a settle- ment. " To this the General added "with emphasis" that there was a "press- ure of events," and President Grant was embarrassed by the delav, and that "unless Spain was prepared to forego whatever advantage might be gained through the mediation of the United States, prompt action was necessary." General Sickles concluded this communication, which substantially summarizes the negotiations of this interesting period of our Cuban solicitudes and con- troversies, with this valuable paragraph of personal side-light : "Observe the duplex form the negotiation receives in the Spanish Cabinet. The reserve of the Minister of State and the frankness of the ■ President of the Council are in striking contrast. The explanation is to be found as well in the solicitude of the IMinister of State to hold a position 62 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR. easily defended in the Cortes, if the negotiation fail, as in the characteristics of the men; one deals with the question as a successful revolutionary leader wielding almost absolute power, the other purely as a jurist and a parliamen- tarian." , The dispatch of General Sickles to Mr. Fish, dated Madrid, August 20, 1869, has unusual historical importance. On that day General Sickles had met General Prim by appointment, who said he was ready to argue upon the basis of an arrangement contemplating the independence of Cuba, but that he could not give to the arrangement the sanctions of a treaty, nor submit the propositions to the Cortes for their ratification while the insurgents were in arms; he said he had no doubt that whatever might be the result of the con- flict, Cuba would eventually be free; that he recognized with hesitation the manifest course of events on the American Continent and the inevitable termination of all colonial relations in their autonomy as soon as they were prepared for independence ; but that no emergency and no consideration would reconcile Spain to such a concession until hostilities ceased. The American Minister reminded the President of the Spanish Council "that Austria had transferred Venice to France, and assented to its imme- diate transfer to Italy, before peace was declared; that the independence of all the American States had been recognized at one time and another during the progress of hostilities; and that in coming to an agreement with the United States on the subject Spain would not treat with the insurgents, but with a friendly power, offering its good offices to an old all}'." To these and like amplifications of the argument the President of the Spanish Council replied with great earnestness and emphasis: "Let the United States be assured of the good faith and the good disposition of Spain, and especially of the frank- ness and sincerity with which the President of the Council has promised to treat with the Cabinet at Washington, on the basis of the independence of Cuba, as soon as it is possible to do so consistently with the dignity and honor of Spain; formidable as the insurrection of Cuba may become, it has not 3^et approached the proportions of any of those conflicts in which governments have found themselves constrained to treat during hostilities. The Cuban insurgents hold no city or fortresses; they have no port, no ships; the)' have no army that presumes to offer or accept battle ; and now, before the period arrives for active operations, when Spain will send the ample reinforcements she holds in readiness, it is only necessary for the Cubans to accept the assur- Bv Comfesv of Fiauk R. Rohersoti. ADMIRAL DEWEY UNDER THE "OLYMPICS" BIG GUNS. By Cou7tesy of Ffank R. Robeisou. ADMIRAL DEWEY AND STAFF ON THE "OLYMPIA," THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR. 65 ance of the United States, given on the faith of Spain, that they may have their independence by laying down their arms, electing their deputies, and declaring their wish to be free by vote of the people." This conversation is able on both sides and sheds a strong light upon the Cuban-Spanish situation for a quarter of a century, reaching from the time since the Treaty of Paris between the United States and Spain ' was signed. In the course of the amplification of the conversation (August 20, 1869, of General Prim and General Sickles), the Spanish General said, "Between the revolutionary movements by which the Republics of the Western Continent gained their independence, and the Cuban insurrection, there was a vast difference." In the examples quoted, "negotiation was resorted to after cam- paigns had been fought, and battles lost and gained; the)' had armies in the held and organized governments supporting them. We see nothing of this in Cuba; only mere roving bands, who fly when they are pursued, and who have never been found in numbers sufficient to give or accept battle. It is very possible that in the lapse of time the insurrection may become more formi- dable; it may raise armies; it may take cities and fortified places; it may demonstrate, what has not yet been in any way demonstrated, that it is sup- ported by the majority of the population. In that case Spain will have some- thing tangible to treat with. But we hope to avoid all this' bloodshed, disaster, and ruin by making some amicable arrangement now. It is impos- sible for us to treat with Cubans now, but the United States, when once convinced of the good intentions and good faith of the Spanish government, can then assure the Cubans that by following the programme I have indi- cated, they can have their liberty without firing another shot." The reply of Mr. Fish by telegram, August 24, was: "Washington, August 24, 1869. — The propositions of Spain are incom- patible with any practicable negotiation. The representatives of the insur- rectionary government are necessary parties to a negotiation. Free communication through the Spanish lines is immediately necessary. "The United States cannot ask the insurgents to lay down their arms unless the volunteers are simultaneously effectually disarmed, and in good faith disbanded. This, if practicable, would require time. We want to arrest the destruction of life and property, and to stop the outrages and annoy- ances to our citizens. An armistice would effect this immediately, and the 66 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR. terms of the compensation to be made to Spain by Ciiba could then be arranged between them under the mediation of the United States. "You may say that we deem an armistice indispensable to the success of any negotiation. Spain may in honor grant this at the request of the United States, and in deference to the wiShes of a friendly power, whose good offices 'she is willing to accept. This being done, negotiations can immediately be opened that will probably result in peace, and her receiving a fair compensa- tion." This dispatch might have closed the negotiation, though there was a great deal more correspondence. There was a resulting difficulty then as later and now in the intangibility of the ostentatious Cuban government. It was unfortunate that there was on both sides a strained sense of the necessity of much formality, and there were far-reaching consequences that could not be measured with exactness and weighed as fixed and determining events for many days. The Spaniards might have recognized as something sufficiently formidable to demand their business as well as distinguished consideration, the bands of guerrillas who were so desperate and tenacious that a treaty was made with their leaders nine years later. Statesmanship in Spain could have saved the desolation of the island and the infliction of frightful calamities upon a million people who were innocent of political crime and of military belligerency. Spain did not close the ten years' war without negotiating with insiirgents who did not put up their arms, and the vain presumption that caused long delay cost her dearly. The words, "honor of Spain," that stood there obstructive, were often imrealities. The Spanish excitement about the rumors that the Cubans would be recognized as belligerents was not called for. They would themselves more than their enemies have been gainers by the acknowledgment of the United States that the Cubans were belligerents. If the claim of the Spanish Premier that there was a vast difference between the Cuban revolt and the revolutions that resulted in the independent .States established in Spanish America was a detail in part true, then there should have been no objec- tion to overlooking it. The grievances of the people of Cuba are the same as those of the Mexicans and the Central and Southern Americans; and there stands the poetic record that "freedom's battle once begun, bequeathed from bleeding sire to son, though baffled oft, is always won." The decision of the United States government, U. S. Grant, President, and Hamilton Fish, THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR. 67 Secretary of- State, pronounced against the concession of belligerency to the Cubans, was on the grounds generally that the Spaniards rested their protest upon. The impossible issue, according to the correspondence, was imaginary. The study of our diplomatic correspondence, however, fails to be convincing that the government of the United States left nothing undone, to deal with Marshal Prim, taking him at his word that for a sum of money not extortionate or extravagant, the Cubans might have had their liberties under the protective possession of the United States without firing a gun after September, 1869. In the twenty-nine years that have passed, Cuba, no matter how made free, would have been Americanized and ours — and the most prosperous island in the world, instead of the most desolate and horror-haunted. Mr. Fish, September isth, telegraphed the Minister of Spain: "Omit- ting the plebiscite, can the President of Council give assurance that if the United States induced the insurgents to lay down arms, and deputies to the Cortes be elected by Cuba, that the Cortes will grant independence? The plebiscite is.impracticable, because in the present circumstances and conditions of the island a popular vote can be no indication of the popular will." There is an abiding embarrassment in Cuba, in the lack of means to record reliably the popular will. The telegram of the isth approached the practical too nearly to be accepted as possible, but on September 2Sth a dispatch from the Minister at Madrid catalogued the following fair promises: "Resume of interview last evening with President of Council: "Plebiscitum not insisted upon. Election of deputies required by consti- tution ; indispensable preliminary to independence. Measures already taken to disarm volunteers simultaneously with cessation of hostilities. Severe and positive order given to stop the scandalous execution of captives and like cruelties. General de Rodas promises to do so at all hazards. "A decree will be promulgated forthwith for the gradual abolition of slavery. Government will proceed with liberal reforms without waiting for termination of war." But at this hopeful opening Spain- insisted that our offer of mediation should be withdrawn, for "the Spanish Cabinet distinguish between mediation and good offices. To prevent recognition of belligerents they seem anxious to hold us to our offer of good offices, while declining mediation as long as there is hope of suppressing insurrection." October i, 1869, the Spanish Cortes met. The United States' offer of 68 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR. "good offices" was withdrawn, and Mr. Silvela wrote to General Sickles that the Spanish government would not have consented to the independence of Cuba, because, even if they had wished it, it was "not within their compe- tence to consent to a dismemberment of the territorj' of this monarchy, with- out the permission and the authorization of the Cortes; but the Cortes, far from permitting and authorizing this, manifested by a unanimous resolution of their permanent commission that they were ready to lend their entire support to the government, in an elevated and dignified policy in the Cuban question, calculated to preserve the integrity of the territory and the national honor." September nth Secretary Fish telegraphed the Minister of the United States to Spain : "We hope there is no truth in the rumor that Spain is about to send additional troops to Cuba. It would exhibit a want of confidence in the pend- ing negotiation that might compel the withdrawal of the offer of this govern- ment to attempt a reconciliation. It might prolong the struggle, and the destruction of life and property, with questionable influence on the result. It certainly would embarrass the negotiations." The Secretary requested to be advised of the sending of additional Span- ish troops to Cuba. The answer to this dispatch was in the form of a news- paper publication as follows, correctly described by Mr. vSickles in transmitting a translation as an "interesting document." (From the Gaceta, December 5, 1869.) "The President of the Council said: 'Last Saturday Senor Navarro y Rodrigo addressed certain inquiries to the minister of war which I could not answer immediately. I said, however, that there had gone to Cuba thirty- thousand men, and to-day I will read a statement of land and sea forces, and of the material which has gone to Cuba since the revolution, because this proves the vitality and energy of the government and of all Spain exercised in the preservation of the island of Cuba. " 'The first forces which went there were 771 volunteers; then 5,400 men of the regular service, afterwards the series of battalions which wei-e asked for by General Dulce* (may he rest in peace!) ; 1,000 went from Baza, 1,000 from Chiclana, 1,000 from San Quintin, and 1,000 from Simancas, who were so thoroughly equipped that they were about to take the field imme- diately on their arrival. Since that the successive departures have reached a * Driven from Cuba by the Volunteers THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR. 69 total of 20,966 of the ai-my of the peninsula; of marines, 2,600; of recruits, I, 371; and of volunteers, 9,563; which gives a total of 34,500 men, according to the accompanying statement. I would call attention to the fact that this immense sum would represent a great effort for any nation whatever. " 'There have gone also 14 ships of war, among them two iron-clad frigates; a complete equipment for a regiment of mountain artillery, with 24 pieces, 24 caissons for artillery of 8 centimeters bore; 20 Krupp steel guns, of 8 centimeters bore; 4,000 projectiles for the same; 5,000 kilograms of powder; 7,400,000 cartridges of i4'< caliber, model of 1857 and 1859; 1,000,- 000 metallic cartridges for needle guns; 10,500,000 caps; 15,000 kilograms of lead; 9,600 carbines, model of 1857; 3,600 muskets, model of 1859; 8,000 Enfield rifles; 3,000 Berdan; 500 short carbines; 1,000 lances; 2,000 sabers. ' " Estimate of the Spanish forces composing the "Army of Cuba," compiled from the statement published in La Iberia of December 26, 1869, and from semi-ofificial sources of information. The strength of battalions, batteries, and squadrons conforms to the regulations of the Spanish service: INFANTRY. . Eight regiments of infantry of the line, two bat- talions of eight hundred each 12,800 Twenty-five battalions of light infantry, one thou- sand each 25,000 Two battalions of the guard — all veterans — one thousand each 2,000 Two battalions of militia (estimated) 1,600 Eleven battalions of infantry, organized in Cuba (estimated to be of the same strength as penin- sular light infantry) 11,000 52,400 ARTILLERY. One regiment, two battalions of four batteries each — eight companies 1,000 One regiment of mountain artillery, two battalions of four batteries each— eight companies . . . 1,000 70 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR. Field artillery being organized, force not stated. CAVALRY. Twenty-five squadrons — fifty companies of one hundred and fifty each (full strength in Spanish army) 7.5oo E.NGINEERS. One battalion — -ten companies of one hundred and fifty each 1,500 MARINES. Four battalions 4,000 67,400 Beside these forces in the field, there are more than forty thousand volunteer troops doing garrison duty . . . 40,000 Grand total 107,400 RECAPITULATION. Infantry, fifty-six battalions 52,000 Artillery, four battalions, sixty-four guns 2,000 Cavalry, twenty-five squadrons 7, 500 Engineers, one battalion 1,500 Marines, four battalions 4,000 Volunteers doing garrison duty 40,000 Total 107,400 Responding to these figures, correctly described as "interesting," Secre- tary Fish, January 26, 1870, made the following very interesting and pertinent statement and suggestion : "The public interest felt in the United States in the Cuban struggle has decreased since the flagrant violations of laws by the agents of the insurgents became known, and alienated the popular sympathy. "Had the Cuban Junta expended their money and energy in sending to the insurgents arms and munitions of war, as they might have done con- sistently with our own statutes and with the law of nations, instead of devoting them to deliberate violation of the laws of the United States; and had they, in lieu of illegally employing persons within the dominion of the United States THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR. li to go in armed bands to Cuba, proceeded thither unarmed themselves to take personal part in the struggle for independence, it is possible that the result would have been different in Cuba, and it is certain that there would have been a more ardent feeling in the United States in favor of their cause, and more respect for their own sincerity and personal courage." But the Secretary, as if foreseeing the emergenc}' that confronted Presi- dent McKinley, twenty-eight years after, remarked over the contention regarding the belligerency demanded, for and against : "Should Spain, after her great and exhaustive effort, fail to restore a state r^/^ ' of peace on the island, the President must reserve to himself a complete liberty of action in that event." The favored Spanish method of putting down rebellion, the knowledge of which, no doubt, caused the inquiries of Secretary Fish about troops from Spain to pacificate Cuba, is found in the following proclamation of evil fame: (From the Diario de la Marina, April 29, 1869 — Translation.) "The Redactor (of St. Jago de Cuba), in its number of 21st instant, pub- lishes the following important proclamation of General Count Valmaseda: "Inhabitants of the country! The reinforcements of troops that I have been waiting for have arrived; with them I shall give protection to the good, and punish promptly those that still remain in rebellion against the govern- ment of the metropolis. "You know that I have pardoned those that have fought us with arms; that your wives, mothers, and sisters have found in me the unexpected pro- tection that you have refused them. You know, also, that many of those I have pardoned have turned against us again. "Before such ingratitude, such villainy, it is not possible for me to be the man that I have been; there is no longer a place for a falsified neutrality; he that is not for me is against me, and that my soldiers may know how to distinguish, you hear the order they carry: " ist. Every man, from the age of fifteen years, upward, found away from his habitation (finca), and does not prove a justified motive therefor, will be shot. "2d. Every habitation unoccupied will be burned by the troops. "3d. Every habitation from which does not float a white flag, as a signal that its occupants desire peace, will be reduced to ashes. "Women that are not living at tlieir own homes, or at the house of their 72 THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR. relatives, will collect in the town of Jiguani, or Bayamo, where maintenance will be provided. Those who do not present themselves will be conducted forcibly. "The foregoing determinations will commence to take effect on the 14th of the present month. El Conde de'Valmaseda. "Bayamo, April 4, 1869." This proclamation offered an ample reason for the objection, which was regarded as somewhat obstinate, of the insurgents to throw down their arms, if promised by Spain "simultaneous amnesty." However "liberal," accord- ing to their views, the Spanish ministers and commanding officers in the army might be, there were many things that displayed the implacable temper of the populace of Spain, and of the Spanish volunteers in Cuba. The spirit of the volunteers was shown in deposing Captain General Dulce June 2, 1869. Mr. Hall, consul at Matansas, reported the governor of that important juris- diction thrown out by the volunteers because he was a friend of Dulce and refused to deliver up to them an insurgent; and it appeared to be a part of their programme to displace every Cuban holding any official position what- ever, as also every "peninsular" Spaniard whose family connections might lead him in any way to sympathize with the natives of Cuba. These incidents identify the character of the Cuban insurrection with the movements in con- tinental colonies. Mr. Plum, Consul at Havana, wrote Mr. Fish, two days after the deposition of Dulce : "On the 2d instant, a captain-general of Cuba was displaced from his command by the resident Spaniards of the island. This event, without precedent here, opens an epoch in the history of this Spanish possession. Some fi fty years ago a similar event occurred in Mexico. An insurrection had been for some time in progress there, and either induced by the course of events at home, or from dissatisfaction at the conduct of the war, the resident Spaniards deposed the viceroy. A new viceroy was sent out, but arrived too late, and no other representative of the mother country ever succeeded to the place. The resident Spaniards there, as soon as they cut loose from entire obedience to the home authorities, turned the scale in favor of independence." The core of the subject was stated by Mr. Plum, describing the business men of the island: "They incline to the idea of taking the management of affairs here, in the name of the mother country, more or less in their own hands. They are residents, identified to a great extent with the prosperity of the THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR. 73 island, having their business and their property here, and as the island has to pay its own expenses, contributing largely, many of them, to the burden of the support of the war, both by their money, and now by their time as volunteers. They desire to see the war ended, and to have the former tran- quillity, upon which their prosperity depends, restored. They may believe, especially as liberal institutions are ur^'cd in Spain, that they have as full right and are as capable to manage the affairs of the island, of which they are the loyal residents, as officials without any local interests or responsibili-" ties, sent out from home to make their fortunes from the public revenues, not in commerce and industry, here. Yet, until now the resident Spaniards in business or having property here have had little more chance than the native Cubans to participate in the government of the island. All the offices, mainly, have been filled by frequently renewed officials, sent out for the purpose from Spain. The consequence has been that the public burdens are felt to be unnecessarily increased, and now the feeling has been engendered that the military operations against the insurrection have not been energetically con- ducted by those who, if they fail here, not having any identification with the island, simply return home to the mother country, leaving the Spanish resi- dents to their fate, or, in some instances, it may be believed that these officials have been too lenient, or have inclined too much in favor of the insurrection, which, if it is successful, would place the control of the island in native Cuban rather than resident Spanish hands." It is in these men, not of the Spanish residents, the volunteers or the professional rural insurgents, that the United States will find the people of Cuba capable of political organization and policy. It should be the popular imder- slanding in this country that there is a distinction between the people of Cuba and the representatives of the New York Junta, a community of Cubans who should not be allowed to monopolize the patriotism of the island or to have exclusive charge of its resources. CHAPTER II. The American Minister to Spain in our Centennial Year Feared War. A Remarkable Correspondence — Suggestive of the Doom of Spanish Rule— The Gradual Approaches of the Spanish War — A Circular Claiming the Cuban Rebellion was Crushed — Gushing as Master of Ceremonies — General Grant's Personality. Mr. dishing attached the greatest importance to the meeting of General Schenck and Lord Derby, even disturbing Secretary Fish with a lurid dream of war, if England did not stand shoulder to shoulder with us. This was a matter evidently in which Mr. Cashing took his intellectual exercises too seriously. He conferred fully with the British Minister to Spain, on the even- ing of December 5, 1875, and the Minister, whose words were expected to be so momentous, was found of the opinion that "the present is a very unfavorable moment for attempting intervention, friendly or other, between Spain and the insurgent Cubans. People in Spain are now animated and hopeful as to both civil wars, in view of the large reinforcements recently sent to Cuba, of the pacification of Valencia and Cataluna, and of the extensive military preparations for moving on the positions of the Vasco-Navarrese. Spain needs, he thinks, to be left to try the experiment of the operations of this winter. They are not likely to sitcceed, at least not in Cuba; and if interfered with now, she will attribute the failure which is to come not to her own weakness or the strength of the insurgents, but to the disturbing action of the United States. But, left to herself, and thus failing, she will then feel discouraged in proportion as she now feels exalted, and will be in the mood to listen to judiciotis counsels, whether coming from the United States or from Great Britain. "These remarks of Mr. Layard could not fail to impress me, and so much the more, in consonance as they were with the views expressed in my note of the 30th of October. "The impression which Lord Derby's observations to General Schenck 74 THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN. 75 make on my mind is that of a disposition on the part of the British govern- ment to aid us in a mediatory form rather than as a cooperator in the exercise of forcible pressure on Spain, "Our advance to Great Britain in the present question insures good offices at least, and may go further. " Nothing turned out precisely as Mr. Gushing feared and prophesied, but there was no effacement of his superb complacency, and no abatement in the course of his admirable confidence. January 4th he wrote in his international capacity to the State Department: "Speculation is active as to the ultimate question of what the United States will do if left alone by other powers — whether the President will inter- vene by force, and if so, whether in armed alliance with Spain, or whether in arms against her and in aid of the insurgents, which it is assumed would be war. Observation of what is going on at the present time in Constantinople respecting Bosnia and Herzegovina, and what occi:rred there formerly in the matter of Greece, leads many persons to anticipate the development of a similar series of incidents at Madrid as respects Cuba." Nothing in the newspapers escaped Mr. Gushing. The journals of Madrid, Paris, London and New York were searched with ceaseless assiduity. One day Mr. Gushing reviewed the London Times, the next the Madrid sheets were scrutinized and annotated. The Galignani Messenger and the Havas Agency were mustered in and reviewed. Even the dispatches from Philadelphia to the London Times could not escape, and at last the Minister appeared as a New York newspaper expert in the pai'agraph annexed: "A letter, purporting to be addressed from Madrid to the New York Herald of the 15th ultimo, puzzles me. Supposing that the pretense of inter- view with Mr. Canovas del Castillo and Mr. Ruiz Gomez, two of the Spanish gentlemen plainly alluded to, is fictitious, yet the fact remains that although the Herald has a correspondent here, yet he did not arrive until after the date of this letter; and no American has been here capable of entering so minutely or intelligently into the question at issue. On the other hand, it is not easy to suppose (although it is possible) that with the aid of some Span- iard of considerable political and juridical experience, such as are continuall}- passing between Spain and Cuba, the letter may have been got up in New York. "On the whole, although the letter contains errors of fact and of language 76 THE AMERICAiS MINISTER TO SPAIN. which a Spaniard of the instruction of Mr. Ruiz Gomez, for instance, would not have committed, still the matter of the letter may have been prepared here by some Spaniard of intelligence desirous of thus making his views known to the people of the United S,tates, and sent to New York to be worked into its present shape in the office." Of course, it is improbable that Mr. Gushing, in the plenitude of his labors, could have dictated the production of the mysterious letter that puzzled him, but it is not impossible. The facilities of journalism are equal to inven- tions even more involved than this presumption. Speedily Mr. Gushing quoted "tlie Epoca ministerial journal," and El Gornista, El Tempo, The Gologne .Gazette, and the Presse of Vienna, took turns of examination along with New York and London papers, and January 8 and lo, 1S76, the annexed papers were produced: (Mr. Gushing to Mr. Fish.) "Legation of the L^nited States, Madrid, January 8, 1876. — Sir: The ministerial journals of last evening continue to rejoice over the tenor of the communique of the Marquis de Molins, reported in my No. 748, of the 4th instant. "They now publish a variation by way of New York and London, as follows : " 'The [American] government admits having sent to the European Powers a circular respecting the atTairs of Guba. " 'It denies having proposed a confederation of Cuba and Porto Rico under a Spanish governor, but it does not publish the text of the circular.' "All this, pursue the journals in question, is nothing but the document so coldly received by the Powers to which it was read by the representatives of the United States. "But, nevertheless, in the very same journals appears the following tele- graphic item, which seems likely to put a new face on things, namely: " 'Berlin, January 7. — It is positively asserted that the German govern- ment shows itself favorable to the American circular relative to Guba, in conse- quence of the injuries which the present situation of the island involves to the commerce of Germany. ' "I hear nothing furthef as to the alleged intentions of Great Britain. "I have, etc., C. GUSHING. "P. S. — -Since the above dispatch was written the London Times has come THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN. 77 to hand, containing a telegram from Vienna, which is annexed. It is con- fused, illogical, and incorrect, like all such telegraphic reports. "If 'Cuba' is a European question, of 'incalculable consequences,' as the telegram asserts, then you had good cause to consult Europe, and Europe has good cause to act in the premises." (Mr. Gushing to Mr. Fish.) "Legation of the United States, Madrid, January 10, 1876. — Sir: I annex translation of an article from the Cronista, a serious ministerial paper, containing a very formal semi-official denial of the alleged concurrence of Germany in the suggestion by the United States of intervention in Cuba. "There is report here of the capture of a German vessel charged with supplying arms to rebels in the Filipinas. Count Hatzfeldt informs me that he has no information respecting the affair, but apprehends it will be the occasion of unpleasant controversy. "I annex translation of an article on the subject from a ministerial jour- nal of respectability, the Tiempo. "I have the honor, etc., C. GUSHING." (Translation of article from El Cronista of January 8, 1876.) "A dispatch of the Agenda Fabra from Berlin, which we published yes- terday, as did our contemporaries, gave news, which would be grave if true, that the German government showed itself favorable toward the American circular referring to Cuba, because of the damage brouo-ht upon German commerce by the condition of the island. "Duly informed, we are able to assert that the statement referred to is not true, and that the Cabinet of Berlin continues to express the greatest sympathies for our country. "The circular of the Government of the United States has not met with a favorable reception from any European power. " (Translation of article from El Tiempo of January 8, 1876.) "We again call the attention of the government toward our possessions in the Philippine Archipelago. We know that the enemies of Spanish integrity rest not, although their affairs in London have recently assumed a bad aspect, and that the English government looks upon them with suspicion. "Upon that immense network of islands of Oceanica belonging to Spain they have fixed their vision. They do not overlook that these offer excellent yS THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN. positions, and they will take advantage of every opportunity to snatch some one of the rich pearls of so precious a jewel. "There, more than anywhere, will they direct their efforts, because else- where they will find immediate opposition from first-class powers. If there be vigilance, more than sufficient is Spanish patriotism against all conspir- acies, native or foreign; and not for a moment do we doubt that there will be such (conspiracies), as is proved by the news which gives rise to these lines." Mr. Cushing's frequent translations from Spanish papers were full of information, and certainly gave the Secretary of State the phases of the public opinion of Madrid, and so clear were they that they lighted up later events. The Epoca of Madrid, January 14, 1876, said of the Cubans: "The only thing we know for certain is that the religion of the insurgents is idolatry, which must be very gratifying for the traitors, who, in order to escape merited chastisement,, go to swell the ranks of the rebels." And here is an editorial article from El Cronista, Madrid, January 14, 1876: "The right which is now the right of Spain in the affairs of Cuba is so clear and so patent that it could not fail to have been recognized, even though shamefacedly and in private circles, by the President of the United States, General Grant. We were right in asserting, as we have repeatedly done, that the parliamentary curvets (excarceos) of the government of the American. Republic with respect to the question of Cuba, obeyed, rather than its own opinions, electoral machina- tions, and the pressure of the filibuster element, so numerous in the United States. "We say this apropos of an important piece of news which we received to-day by the Cuban mail. A Habana paper publishes correspondence from New York, in which it is positively said' that the President of the United States has declared in private circles that he considers the independence of the island of Cuba as impossible, and that its annexation to the United States ■" would cause immense injuries to the country. "The island of Cuba, not being able to govern it.self well as an independ- ent and sovereign State, could still less do so as an autonomic semi-State, and in such circumstances it were in every way impossible for Spain to reserve to herself a protectorate which, without positive benefit to Cuba, would drag the mother country into the most serious complications within and without this territory. "To prove this absolute impossibility so many considerations throng THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN. 79 to the subject that it is no small task to select the prominent ones. In the island of Cuba there exists an immense majority which does not desire separa- tion, which does not desire annexation, which does not desire autonomy, which wishes to keep on in the same conditions as those in which they have lived with respect to the mother country. In the island of Cuba there exists a slender minority which is split up into 'independents,' 'annexationists,' and 'autonomists.' The immense rtmjority_reject autonomy, which would weaken their ties with the mother country. The independents and the annex- ationists 'are not content with autonomy, which does not satisfy their aspira- tions. The autonomists would be the only ones left satisfied, but they are so few in number that they would lack moral and material strength. "The Eco de Cuba, then, is right: the Great Antilla is not fitted to be anything save what it has been hitherto. Thus it is that the right of Spain is supported by every kind of reason based upon expedience. Therefore, in spite of all the efforts of the ambitious ojalateros (sans-culottes) of New York, and in spite of the misdeeds of the criminals of the Managua, the island of Cuba will continue to be a Spanish province." Mr. Cushing had a conversation with the Spanish Minister of State, who said that "the United States could desire nothing in the sense of peace, good government, or liberty in Cuba," that the Spanish government did not want more than we desire. This made an impression upon Mr. Cushing's mind, that may or may not have been intended, nevertheless, it seemed to him that "the inner thought behind the words" was: "If the United States, whether by the use of their naval squadron or by landing troops, intervene by force to prevent Spain from subduing the insurrection in Cuba, that is war, and Spain must, of necessity, fight, at whatever cost and ultimate loss, or cease to hold up her head as an independ- ent nation in Europe or America. "But if the view of the United States is to act by mediation in behalf of the insurgents, to induce them to lay down their arms, to make acceptable terms for them, to secure the execution of these terms, to provide for the introduction of good government and the abolition of slavery in officious concert or in formal treaty with Spain, then Spain is ready to meet the United States half-way in such action, to receive, and even invite, their interposition in the affairs of Cuba. "The impression on my mind to this effect was so strong as to half tempt 8o THE AMERICAN MINISTER TO SPAIN. me to say, 'Will you then accept our mediation?' But I restrained myself, in the doubt whether my present instructions would justify me in thus committing the United States. "I limited myself, therefore, to thanking him cordiall}' for the frankness and friendliness which seemed to inspire what he said, and to assure him that I would lose no time in communicating the same to you, as nearly as possible in his own words, and regretting that no mere written report could do justice to the impressiveness of oral representation. "He then referred briefly to the mere robber character of what there is now in insurrection in Cuba, composed of scattered parties of negroes and mulattoes, without the slightest pretension to any government — directed, so far as they had any general direction, by foreigners, mere desperado adven- turers, without right or stake in the country (I interrupted him here to say there were no citizens of the United States among them, to which he assented, and then continued), engaged in mere plunder and incendiarism, not in war — the worst form of that tendency to guerrilla hostilities in the place of the regular warfare which the Spaniards inherited from their remote Celtiberian progenitors, and which, if one of the glories, was not the less one of the national calamities, of Spain. "But of all this, he said, the President's message showed that we in the United States had a clear conception ; and he added that neither such bad foreigners as Maximo Gomez in the Managua, nor worse Spaniards like Miguel Aldama in New York, could ever make of Cuba any better republic than Hayti; and that appeared to be their only purpose- — to ruin where thev could not rule. "It was impossible for me conscientiously to contradict these apprecia- tions, and therefore, I could but listen attentively, and, when he had con- cluded, take leave, assuring him that he would be informed at once when m)- expected instructions should arrive in Washington. "The concluding remarks of Mr. Calderon y Collantes suggest to me some considerations, which you will permit me to subjoin by way of commentary. "The Spaniards have great qualities, as many a page in their history demonstrates, but they have also the defects of those qualities;' and my dis patches have not been sparing in the exhibition of those defects, such as intolerance of opinion, exaggerated individualism, ill-regulated ambitions. ■^few.' o H a! O Ph ~'t!0KM^miJtigHlitiit''- Z o H H O O Id O w H o n o .-•SHI --^'• '•I'.: I I p s THE TEN YEARS' WAR IN CUBA. 123 the country, not only in industries dependent on war, but in mines and in undeveloped agriculture, to the ultimate advantages of Spain. "The Spaniards are a people preeminently sober in food and drink, economical, and enduring under privations and hardships — as you may infer from the wages of labor, which vary according to the quality from two to three or four pesetas a day, where, in the United States, similar labor would be reckoned at the same number of dollars. Hence, armies are contentedly supported here, and always have been, so cheaply as to constitute a real addi- tion to the relative military resources of Spain. The contrast in this respect between Spanish and English soldiers struck the Duke of Wellington. "I note these facts as being material and important in the present question. That is, we must not confide in a deficiency of financial resources standing in the way if Spain be hard pushed and stirred up to make sacrifices in case of a war with the United States. "And the finances of Spain are not in a much worse condition than they were in the time of Charles V. and his successors of the Austrian dynasty. Great loans were rarer then than now. Spain relied much on wealthy Jews for anticipations, although Jews and Gentiles, in the matter of money lending, incurred hazards quite in proportion to the profits, as illustrated in the hard- ships of the Jews in Spain and the case of Jacques Cosur in France. In truth, the Fuggers of Augsburg are among the few houses of that class which remain to this day. Hence the terrible financial straits which the Philips — II., III., and IV. — were constantly suffering in Spain. Nevertheless, they sustained great wars all over the world. ' "I add that, according to telegrams received from Havana, the mission of Mr. Rubi has already produced important results, so that he is able to make assurance of having equalized the revenue and the expenditures and of under- taking to pay regularly all current obligations after the ist of January. "I have, etc., — C. Cushing." Of this it is now to be remarked that Spain has exhausted all these resources, and if it is the opinion of that country that the honor of the nation is saved, there should be no disputation of that consolation. Mr. Cushing reports his interview with the Spanish Minister of State on November 30th, saying, "A little to my surprise, he took the whole matter very coolly," notwithstanding possible "intervention" was expressly men- tioned. The Minister of State said Spain was not in a hurry to go to war 124 THE TEN YEARS' WAR IN CUBA. with the United States, and was assured the United States was not in a hurry to go to war with Spain. In his remarks to the Spanish Minister of State, Mr. Cushingf said: "In the hope that the contents of the Spanish note may be satisfactory, the President desists from the concrete purpose expressed in the dispatch of the 5th and substitutes a proposition which is merely expect- ant. Meanwhile, I am charged in the first place to explain to you confi- dentially what will be the actual text of the message. The President will discountenance the concession of the recognition of either independence or belligerence to the insurgents of Cuba; he will allude to the injuries inflicted upon the United States and on their citizens by the prolonged struggle in Cuba, and the absence as yet of clear indications of its termination; he will intimate, as an ulterior necessity, intervention, unless positive results be soon reached, but he will abstain from advising it at present. "I am instructed to deliver to you a copy of the said dispatch of the 5th instant, . written before the delivery to me of the Spanish note, and, as is to be supposed, without knowledge of the intention of the government of His Majesty. "This dispatch is not conceived in any minatory sense, but on the con- trary, in a spirit of friendship, as a notice of a pressing necessity, which may force the President in given circumstances from which he desires to save him- self and desires Spain to aid him in escaping them." This is an entertaining example of Mr. Cushing's views for obeying the letter of his instructions, and imparting to his conversation a spirit of concilia- tion in contradiction of the administration of the State Department. He certainly succeeded in conveying the intimation of intervention, and the fact of the impatience of President Grant, in terms so gentle that there was no agitation. Mr. Gushing knew well the current ideas of the Spaniards, their imderstanding that they had a navy superior to ours in the seventies, and the ultimate capacity of the government to find money for war purposes, but there had not been within the range of his observation any experience that would warrant the anticipation of public opinion on the Peninsula for giving up the distant colonies. But with all his versatile astuteness, Mr. Cushing could send this effusive telegram : "Madrid, December 4, 1875. — Brief important interview with Minister of State. He takes office solely in the hope of settlement with us; has carefull)^ read your 266; admits our grievances; is opposed in principle to sequestra- THE TEN YEARS' WAR IN CUBA. i2f tion of property of foreigners; condemns the delays of redress; will take up' and promptly settle each case; will remove all cause of complaint as to treaty; reprobates conduct of local authorities in Cuba as more injurious to Spain than to the United States. Gushing." The filibuster opinion that President Grant and his Cabinet were guilty of a conservation touching closely timidity toward the Spaniards for theii*' misdemeanors in Cuba, has had such free course that it has in some degree- affected the popular intelligence and caused discoloration and distortion of affairs. The truth is President Grant did not respect the style of war-making of the champions of the Cuban cause with whom he came in contact. He understood perfectly that it was the policy of the insurgents in Cuba to cause by any means war between the United States and Spain and repay this country with a supercilious show of gratitude — the leaders in the war out of the island to assume the prerogatives and largely resume the methods of the peninsular Spaniards, so that the difference between the government over- thrown and that established would be the sort of reform the fox referred to when he asked that the old swarm of fleas be allowed to remain, for the fresh ones would be the greater bloodsuckers. The filibuster expeditions were arranged and expected to cause the United States to rush into war. The demand for belligerent rights was expressly to increase the chances of conflict. This story is a generation old. It has been duplicated within recent years, and the game was being played with ever augmenting audacity, when the catastrophe of the Maine influenced public opinion and the hour stnxck for the settlement long deferred. The demand that the Maine should be sent to the harbor of Havana wa^ started by those who hoped something would happen to make trouble, and the Spaniards, infatuated with their own animosities and verbose imbecility, played to the hand of the insurgents, for the lapse of time had taught them folly only; and when some of them were able to comprehend the power of the United States they thought of two things — the very small army of this country, the inefficiency of our military systems for the speedy mustering of our strength in the field, the deficiency of our docks for handling war ships and the slight our demagogues had put upon both army and navy. Our immense reserve of public spirit was not at all comprehended. The Spaniards had deceived themselves as to our character. They really believed we were not a warlike people. They forgot that we had taken grand lessons of war in fighting each other — had kept for four years an unparalleled war '26 THE TEN YEARS' WAR IN CUBA. school. Of course, there were Spaniards not so stupid as to suppose we should be unable to get upon our feet, with old boys enough to teach the young ones — but Spain felt herself after all her experiences of ill-fortune a great Euro- pean power, and had faith that wq would be called to account by the same combination of monarchs that throttled poor Greece, while Turkey reduced the plethora of the Greeks by blood-letting. The difference between life and death in nations was not appreciated by the moribund. The Spaniards read in the modern diplomatic historj' of their country, took courage from the attitude of the great monarchies when President Grant had them sounded as to "intervention" by the United States in the aii'airs of Cuba. Then none were pronounced in our favor, and the whole trend of monarchial opinion was against our policy, which, though well guarded in civil language, meant that the 3-oung American giant was ascertaining his strength, and proposing, per- haps deeply innocent but probabh' after meditation, the disturbance of the old scales in which the balance of power, understood to be the higher law of the military nations, had been adjusted. Onl)'- the very well informed in t+iis country had a realizing sense of the persistent push of the purpose of inter- vention in Cuba if peace was not restored that took place in our centennial year. That was the epoch in which we were incomparabh- engaged in cele- brating ourselves and at the same time the State Department was hard at work, and the courts of Europe incessantly but quieth' advised of our tend- encies to put forth our hands and stop the desolation of the noblest of American islands lying in a commercial and military sense at the mouth of the Mississippi, whose valley is the heart of America. The Spaniards wanted to know whether we would interfere for or against the insurgents, who no more then than now had commanded the admiration of competent witnesses, and deserved a good deal of what Air. Cushing said of them, because they and their peninsular Spaniards had so many faults in common. How very much this article from the Evening Standard of London, January 29, 1876, reads as if it might have appeared tw-o years instead of twenty-two years ago : "The Cuban insurrection is as long-lived as the Carlist revolt. There is no calculating the amount of blood and treasure w^iich have been drawn from the mother countn,- to restore quiet to the island within the past few years. Reinforcements of troops have been sent periodically from Cadiz and San- tander, not a tithe of whom will ever see Spain again; captain-general suc- ceeds captain-general with the regularity of clockwork, and notwithstanding THE TEN YEARS' WAR IN CUBA. 127 the end never is, but always to be. The insurgents are beaten on the average twice a month, yet somehow they always turn up in excellent health and spirits as if they thrived on repeated defeat. It is very difficult to get at the truth about Cuba; but one prediction may be made with safety: As long as Don Carlos parades Navarre and the Vascongadas, the pacification of Cuba will be adjourned. No Spaniard with the spirit of a true hidalgo will allow for a moment in public controversy that his country can part with the island, and yet there is scarcely one traveled and educated Spaniard, we venture to affirm, who will not admit in the intimacy of private conversation that his country can not hold the island." The London Times, of January 26th, said: "In Europe at least there will be a tendency to do injustice to Mr. Fish's indictment of Spain, precisely for the reason which may render it effective among his own countrymen. When American diplomacy states a complaint, it usually makes a large call on those general terms of invective which please half-educated readers, but shock the taste and rouse the suspicions of the more fastidious students. "Critical minds are apt to fancy that the rhetoric has been framed for the purpose of touching the Americans themselves, and when they mentally translate it into scholarly English they tend to cut away much of the truth as well as to improve the style. We speak the more frankly because Mr. Fish seeks to obtain the moral support of European countries in his contest with the Spanish Minister of foreign affairs respecting the civil war in Cuba. He would, we assure him, have been much more effective if he had given specific examples of the wrongs or hardships suffered by his countrymen and left his readers to supply general phrases of indictment. Nevertheless, there need be no doubt that his charges are substantially just, and the truth itself so grave as to need little ornament from rhetoric. "In Cuba Spain owns one of the fairest and most fertile islands in the world, and it has been detestably misgoverned. While we have allowed our colonies to rule themselves in their own way, Spain has persisted in keeping Cuba in the same state of tutelage as when she herself was the greatest power in the world, and when the very idea of colonial rights had scarcely arisen. The island has been dependent on the will of a government changed every few years by a pronunciamiento or a popular revolution. It has been used as a place of honorable banishment for unruly soldiers. The dangerous spirits 128 THE TEN YEARS' WAR IN CUBA. of the army have been sent to Cuba to be kept out of mischief, and they have let loose in the colony the temper which had been found perilous at home. Freed from responsibility, they have often displayed a repetition of that domineering spirit, that contempt of the rights of others, and that cruelty which once added dark chapters to the history of the Spanish conquest. The slaughter of the crew of the Virginius was an act which would have been quite natural three centuries ago, but which, when committed in our time, seems wonderful on account of its folly as well as of its atrocity. If the author of such a deed had been an Englishman, he would assuredly have been hung; yet he is still at liberty, and we believe he has still some kind of command. "We cannot wonder that Mr. Fish, who speaks for a people as proud in their own way as the Spaniards and immeasurably more powerful, should peremptorily demand the trial of General Burriel. America has also many other causes of complaint. Her citizens owned much property in Cuba, and a great deal of it has been confiscated by the Spanish government. Restitu- tion has been promised and evaded. " It is amusing to note the London Times giving lessons in English to tlie Honorable Hamilton Fish. The Times had to say, January, 1876, further: "If the documents just presented to Congress are serious at all, they are most important documents, and we incline, after making every allowance for the necessities and peculiarities of President Grant's position, to believe that they are more serious than is generally imagined. It is perfectly possible that General Grant has decided in his own mind that he will not quit office without inflicting punishment on Spain, and that he has renewed his com- plaints with an intention of making them heard, and that he is now deliber- ately warning Congress, the American people, and the European States that he means to have either redress or war. "He may be trifling with the world, but it is much more probable that he is not; and if he is not he is taking precisely the steps European diplomatists would expect. He is demanding definitely and distinctly a just thing, the trial of General Burriel, which the Spanish government cannot, without risk- ing a collision with the volunteers, concede, except on paper. He is telling Madrid in the plainest words he can use that unless he can obtain redress he shall propose to resort to force. "It seems to us that to imagine President Grant, with a Democratic majority in the House of Representatives, a great Spanish fleet in the harbor THE TEN YEARS' WAR IN CUBA. 129 of Habana, and the Presidential convention almost at hand, is doing all this in order to court a slap in the face from Madrid, a slap which, unresented, would send him on his retirement into a discredited obscurity, is almost absurd ; and if he is in earnest the situation is most serious. It is all ver)' well to talk of the American Constitution and tlie Democratic majority and the absence of material preparations in the United States. The President can order any movement, either of fleet or army, that he pleases. The Spaniards are in no humor to bear interference, and if they defy the Union neither Democrats nor Republicans will remember party squabbles. They might refuse the Presi- dent his third term, and might be ready to hang him, but they would plunge into war with none the less fierceness and carry it on with none the less decision." This is a character sketch not quite friendly, but written after some studies that did not lead to total darkness. Mr. George H. Boker, Minister to Russia, wrote from St. Petersburg, January, 1875, that Prince Gortchakoff was warmly sympathetic with the United States, and seemed surprised at the patience and the forbearance with which our government had acted, not only toward the government of Spain, but toward the more easily approached provincial authorities of Cuba. He said, significantly, that history does not show us that this has been the usual conduct of strong powers toward weaker ones. He commended the reluctance which the government of the United States seemed to feel in proceeding to serious measures with a country in the distraoted_|condition of Spain, and he said that this last act, the laying of the question before the great powers for their consideration and possible action, was a display of candor and of magnanimity on our part that was almost without precedent in international affairs, and the prince was good enough to say it set forever at rest the report that the United States '"had views of territorial extension in the direction of Cuba." And Gortchakoff told Boker that the course of Spain would depend altogether upon the action of the British government, and the representations which might be made by it at the court of Madrid, regarding the unsatisfactory relations between the United States and Spain. He said that the combined influence of all the other powers was not equal to that of Great Britain with the Spanish government. The Hon. George P. Marsh had a full conversation at Rome in December, 1875, with Mr. Viscomti Venosta, and stated that "the editorial 13° THE TEN YEARS' WAR IN CUBA. tone of many journals in the United States, and that of many articles in journals not professedly advocating the annexation, was prompted by fraud- ulently naturalized Cubans, refugees, and other persons interested in severing the connection between Spain and Cuba; that I knew no reason to think that the general population of the United States, still less the more enlightened and patriotic classes, desired the possession of the island. " And Mr. Marsh referred, by way of illustration, to the pretense of French, and to some extent of Italian, journals that the intervention of the Emperor Napoleon III. in Mexico was rendered necessary by the ambitious views of the United States in regard to territorial extension, and pointed out that "after the capture of the City of Mexico by General Scott we were virtually in possession of the whole country, and could have retained it if we had so desired, but that we volun- tarily surrendered it, retaining only California, and some other territory then thought to possess little value, and paying to Mexico a large sum as an indemnity. " The painstaking of Mr. Marsh to free Americans from the charge of wanting more land seems to show that gentleman to have been more amiable in his sentiments than accurate in his observations. CHAPTER V. The Duty of Fair Play to the Spaniards of the Peninsula and of Cuba. Some Testimony That is Not Partial to Cuban Insurgents — Caleb Cushing on Inherent Spanish Character — More Than One Kind of Our Naturalized Citizens — A List of Them and of Claims — Conflicting Testimony as to Cuban Armies — Two Picturesque Witnesses. There is no duty plainer in writing the story of the conflict between the United States and Spain than that of showing fair play to the people who were so signally discomfited, and whose weaknesses have been uncovered by war. The Hon. Caleb dishing had the lawyer's accomplishment of stating a case for friend or foe with little reference to personal judgment, and he always presented the facts that were the frame of his argument with a vivid- ness peculiarly his own. In April, 1876, he took occasion to say, in the course of his correspondence with the State Department, that "all our troubles with Spain have been incidents of the delirium tremens of anarchy and revolution which seized upon her in 1868, involving civil war in Cuba, in the northern provinces, indeed all over the peninsula." Mr. Cushing pro- ceeded to say that all Madrid believed that "faulty as has been the adminis- tration of Spain in Cuba, most of the maladministration has been the logical effect of the factious, ungovernable, and traitorous spirit and conduct of the Cubans themselves, rebellious, as all Spaniards are prone to be, by their hered- itary national character." Beyond this it was alleged that "no repressive measures would ever have been adopted in Cuba but for the frequent rebel- lions or attempted rebellions there in times of complete order, tranquillity, and prosperity, as in 1823, 1829, 1837, and 1854, including the infamous acts of Narciso Lopez in twice recruiting armed foreign adventurers to invade the island, the worst of all forms of treason.' This, however, is not the judicial department of the kind of which Mr. Cushing is speaking, but is the presenta- 131 132 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. tion of one side — that which was bitterly wrong — -by one who was for the moment the passionate advocate of those whose case he was stating. In the next paragraph Mr. Gushing says all Americans bear witness, after seeing both Cubans and Spaniards that "Cubans are Spaniards, with all the faults of Spaniards in aggravated degree; and whereas discontent is the habit in Spain, and violence the ordinary manifestation of discontent — whereas in Spain opposition parties systematically pursue the practice of quarreling with any and all governments, however well-intentioned these may be, and deliber- ately provoking measures of repression in order to have pretext to declaim against oppression and tyranu}' — so the Spaniards say it always has been in ' Cuba." Herein, however, Mr. Cushing loses sight of the teachings of American history. What he says of the excessive faults of the Cubans, would have applicability and would not be quickly and confidently contested, if the Spaniards had not been troubled in other colonies the same as in Cuba. The Cubans are Spaniards as the Mexicans, Peruvians, Chilians, and the rest of the free and independent States of what was once Spanish America were — but it was not the delirium tremens of 1868 that moved Mexico, Bolivia, Argentina, and all the rest of the American Spanish to rise up against the Spaniards of the peninsula. The methods of Cuban rebellions were disagree- able in the extreme, especially when they followed the examples of the ways and means of Spanish repression. We believe it to be true that the Spaniards thought it a justifiable act of war to fire the cane fields of Cubans known to be against the perpetuity of Spanish rule in the island, before Gomez carried the torch through the provinces of Matanzas, Havana and Pinar del Rio. Mr. Cushing drew a picture of the state of Spanish politics in a letter reviewing the debate in the Cortes on the address to the king, saying it mainly con- sisted of easy exhibition of the inconsistencies, the errors and the crimes, the tergiversations, pronunciamientos, treasons, and insurrections of which all parties have heretofore been guilty, as, one after the other, the}' attained the giddy heights of political power, or sank into the depths of angry, impatient, and factious opposition. In these mutual recriminations of parties, in this general settlement of political account between successive governments and administrations — which has only served to show that all of them, as they rose, ascended on the ruins of their country, and, as they fell, left behind a deplor- able deficit of wisdom and usefulness to the debit of each — the home government of Spain passed through all the disorders of the dissolution of DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. i33 ■greedy and corrupt tyranny and in the colonial wars following the Napoleonic occupation. The one binding tie in the peninsula became the oppression of the American Spaniards. Hence, at last, the chaos Gushing sketches, and out of a series of revolutions came an horrible confusion of cruelties. In a general review of the diplomatic situation in Europe, written in March, 1876, Mr. Gushing closed: "I stand behind the players here and see the cards they are playing. It is not our game. We can do much with Spain, but it will have to be done on our own ground. We have no cause, in my belief, to expect aid from the European Powers, not even from Great Britain. The problem rather is to work out our own policy in such way as to avoid obstructions on the part of those powers." It was in 1878 that the Spaniards came to the conclusion, as the insurrec- tion had lasted ten years, and one hundred thousand regular soldiers could not overcome it by force, that the rebels might be heard as to terms of peace with- out giving up their arms, and the result was the peace of Zanjon, negotiated with the insurgent leaders by Martinez Campos. The latest and last of the insurrections against the rule of the Spaniards broke out in February, 1895. In the twenty years before the United States and Spain found themselves at war, there had been in Guba over thirteen years' warfare and less than seven of the comparative reduction of flagrant disorders characterized as peace. Martinez Campos was regarded as the great military chieftain of Spain, and his country- men did not care to inquire too particularly into the preliminaries to the peace of Zanjon. He was commissioned as soon 9,5 the war broke out afresh in Feb- ruary, 1895, to put down the rebellion, and heavy masses of troops were hurried from the peninsula to the island. The old field marshal of Spain began his work with an appearance of confidence and exceptional vigor. It was soon ascertained that the spirit of the insurgents was more implacable than ever — that they had larger forces and better equipments, and were more resolute and desperate than on former occasions — while Campos was in the field there was sharp skirmishing — indeed, some of the fighting was the most severe that ever occurred in the island, until the American army moved upon Santiago. Campos made a strenuous effort to confine the scenes of warfare to the three eastern provinces, as had been the case from 1868 to 1878. but Gomez had a large following, horses were abundant, sugar carts numerous, and there was food in the pastures and fruity forests. 134 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. He did the unexpected thing moving west, and succeeded in opening new regions for devastation. Campos, with the utmost use of steamers and rail- ways, and his superior forces, could not check the adventurous rush of the swarm with Gomez, whose right .arm was the indomitable Antonio Maceo. The Spaniards were exasperated by their failures, and furious that the rebels had broken all bounds and records. The flood marks of rebellion were wider and higher than in the ten years ; and then Campos was not killing prisoners in satisfactory numbers. He was attempting to carry on war according to the usages of civilization, and that was not the way the Spaniards desired to make peace. The prestige of the soldier faded rapidly, and there were fierce demands from the volunteers, of whom there were eleven regiments in Havana alone, for more bloodshed, not in battle, but in executions. A change was called for both in Madrid and Havana. Campos was recalled, and General Weyler designated for the vacancy, Ex-Captain-General Marin serving ad interim. The news of Weyler' s appointment filled the Cubans with horror, and at once the steamers for all ports on the Gulf, and for Key West, Savan- nah, Charleston and New York, were crowded with fugitives. Weyler was already a man of terrible reputation. He had been in the ten years' war a lieutenant-colonel in charge of a Spanish column, distinguished for the per- sonal havoc that was committed in its marches. He was boastful of his body- guard of black men, and always ready to receive men of color in camp or in the palace. He was alternatively claimed as and accused of being a Repub- lican! There were many stories of his personal participation in outrages of an incredible nature, not a few of them physically impracticable. It is in this sort of fiendish romance that Spaniards and Cubans revel, as the only ade- quate expression of their astonishing animosities. The evil most keenly anticipated by the Cuban sympathizers in Havana from Weyler was that he would issue decrees ordering and commanding all business men to show their colors — to be explicitly for or against Spain in Cuba, and condone evasions only upon spending their fortunes in bribes rather than awaiting the more summary processes of execution and confiscation. Life and fortune might be preserved for a time by this giving up everything on the installment plan. The Cuban ladies were shocked by the very name of Weyler, saying there was no safety where he was for the innocent. There was a panic, and when Wey- ler was announced at Porto Rico, there was wild haste to get away to Yucatan, Venezuela, Mexico, or the United States. There was reported a DUTY OF FAIR. PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. i3S "blood league among the Cubans, the purpose being the assassination of the new captain-general the moment he set foot on the soil of Cuba. He was duly warned but unmolested, and his safety was accounted for by the repre- sentation that those who had sworn to sacrifice themselves that the monster should die, were convinced that such an act as the murder of a captain- general would be injurious to the Cuban cause, and that the better way was to stand well with sympathetic public sentiment. There was little time lost in the development of General Weyler's policy. It was rigorous and remorseless. He denied for a time the charges of cruelty, protested that he did not approve as many executions as Campos had done. His proceeding did not vary much from the regular course of Spanish suppression of rebellion, but never before had the system of the Spaniards in pacificating colonies been exhibited to the world in so strong a light. As the line was drawn between those true and false to the peninsular Spaniard, it became evident that the people of Cuba were almost unanimously against Spain. On the side of the peninsula were the Spanish army and navy, the swarms of office holders, and their subordinates, the volunteers given the situations that should be occupied by the Cubans, the contractors and all busi- ness men who made money out of the war — the officials of all descriptions, the sycophants of power, and those still striving by complacency to avoid the rugged issues of responsibility. The Spanish army was so numerous that garrisons were in all the considerable towns, and there were thousands of little forts ; and some sugar plantations were paying taxes and assessments to Wey- ler and Gomez alike. The people at large outside the fortified lines were against Spain, with few exceptions. Weyler could not get information about the movements of insurgents, but there was not a Spanish column in motion, that was not signaled. The stones in the road and the trees by the wayside told from day to day of all Spanish activity. There was not a country store, not a magazine for the rebellion — not a swift pony or a fat pig, a drove of cattle or sheep, a tree full of fruit, or a potato patch, that was not contraband of war. The country houses and villages that the insurgents spared were, fired by the Spaniards, and the massacre of domestic animals and destruction of food supplies of all kinds, made way for famine. It was the Spanish policy to make the country untenable by bodies of hostile irregulars. The peasantry were not allowed to till the fields, and this was the answer :to the rebel burning of cane and tobacco. As the Cubans at large gave the 136 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. news of Spaniards moving about, the country people were concentrated under the supervision of the regular garrisons. On both sides the conduct of the war forced this result, and due accountability was not admitted by either. Those who were wild for war between the United States and Spain found fault with the Spaniards alone, and the first material undertaking in the war by our country for humanity was in sending food to those perishing by starvation and medicine to those wasted by the plague of fever. It was plain to all observers that after all the sacrifices the Spaniards had made for Cuba they would conquer the island only by the annihilation of the elements of the prosperity that once had remarkable celebrity. Weyler's greatest military effort was to pen Maceo in the west end, by a fortified line — trocha — twenty- one miles long, the narrowest part of the island. Maceo broke through just before his death, but when he was gone the western province was generally quieted. There were the accustomed bulletins about the achievements of the successors of Maceo, but there were none who answered that description. The sheer weight of the Spanish columns was felt by their antagonists and the strength of the rebellion had largely declined, though holding a great deal of territory. There were symptoms of exhaustion all around, but on "Horror's head horrors" accumulated. That the insurgents took a part in forcing these dreadful isfeues is certain — for the devastation of plantations for five hundred miles was the visible sign of the memorable campaign of Gomez, the Domin- ican Commander-in-Chief. The Spanish government, March ' i, 1897, addressed to the Hon. Hannis Tajdor, the American Minister, a communication of explanation of the arrest of certain alleged citizens of the United States captured and taken to Santiago de Cuba, suspected of being American spies. When released they each claimed damages in the sum of ten thousand dollars. The defense was that the arrest of these people was not for landing in Cuba, but "at the beginning of a formidable insurrection," when "on every point of the coast landed large and small expeditions — arrived from several ports and shores of the Mexican Gulf. Many of those who afterwards took a part in the rebellion as chiefs, rank soldiers, and scouts, came precisely from Haiti, as is well known, using small crafts similar to that of the claimants. In no other manner did the well-known chief, Antonio Maceo, join the insurgent bands, and so great was the number of those who used this means of coming to and going from the island that I do not consider it venturesome to say that at a certain time there was a regular communication. DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 137 by means of small crafts and open boats between Cuba and the Antilles and the nearest keys." One of the most frequent irritations manipulated to increase the strain upon the relations of the United States and Spain was the arrest by Spanish authorities of naturalized American citizens. The Senate of the United States, December 21, 1896, directed a report of all naturalized citizens arrested since the breaking out of the insurrection in Cuba February 24, 1895. There were seventy-four such persons. The Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Olney, in sending the list, said; "Passports, certificates of iiaturalization, registration in the consulates of this government on the island of Cuba, and service on ships sailing under the flag of the United States, having been alike accepted by our consular officers and the Spanish authorities as prima facie evidence of citizenship, establishing the rights of the claimants to the treatment secured to our citizens under our treaties and protocols with Spain, it has been deemed advisable to include in the subjoined list all persons of the classes referred to who have been arrested. "Of the 74 persons arrested, 7 have been tried, namely: Nos. i, 36, 70, 71, 72, 73, and 74. In the cases of 2 of these (Nos. i and 36) appeals have been taken, and in the cases of the other 5, the Competitor prisoners, a new trial has been ordered. "Thirty-six persons arrested have been released after the charges against them had been investigated and found to be baseless. "Eighteen have been expelled from the island, after periods of confine- ment lasting from a few days to nearly a year in the case of Jose Aguirre (No. 2); while 17 cases are still pending. The charges against 14 of the 17 are as follows : "Nos. 31 and 35, sedition and rebellion. "No. 38, rebellion. "Nos. 37, 40, 61, and 62, rebellion with arms in hand. "No. 43,. purchase and concealment of arms and ammunition. "No. 53, disorderly conduct and insults to Spain. "Nos. 70, 71, 72, 73, and 74, landing arms from Competitor for insurgents. "In the remaining three cases (Nos. 35, 47, and 52), the nature of the charges having not yet been ascertained, demand has been made both at Habana and Madrid that they be at once formulated and communicated, or that prisoners be released." 138 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. We present in full the list of American citizens, native and naturalized, arrested and imprisoned in Cuba since February 24, 1895, to date, stating also cause of arrest, charges, place of confinement, whether tried, released, deported, or cases pending: , 1. Julio Sanguily, 49 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1878; arrested February 24, 1895 ; charge of rebellion; tried November 28, 1895 ; found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment; case appealed to supreme court, Madrid. Was also tried on charge of participation in the kidnapping of the sugar planter Fernandez de Castro, in 1894, by the late bandit, Manuel Garcia, and acquitted. Tried for the second time December 21, 1896, for rebellion, the case remanded from Spain, and again sentenced December 28 to life imprison- ment ; an appeal taken. Has been imprisoned in the Cabana fort. 2. Jose Marie Timoteo Aguirre, 52 3'ears; native of Cuba; naturalized 1881; arrested February 24, 1S95 ; charge of rebellion; confined in Cabana fort; acquitted and deported September 6, 1895; went tathe United States. 3. Francisco Peraza, arrested at Sagua, March 2, 1895 ; charge of partici- pation in the robbery of some cattle; released March 4, 1895. 4. Francisco Carrillo, 45 years; native of- Cuba; naturalized 1891 ; arrested at Remedios on February 24, 1895, upon a gubernative order for not having inscribed himself in the register of foreigners in any province of the island; confined in Cabana fort; released and deported to United States May 29, 1895. 5. Juan Roderiguez Valdez, native of Cuba; naturalized 1876; arrested at Puerto Principe April 5, 1895; released April 6. 6. Justo Gener, 68 years; native of Cuba; naturalized; arrested at Matanzas April 6; released April 9, 1S95. 7. Jose Maria Caraballo, 42 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1877; arrested at Matanzas April 6; released April 9, 1885.. 8. Manuel Fuentes, 33 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1889; corre- spondent New York World; arrested at Caimanera April 30, 1S95; released May 4, 1S95, on condition that he return to United States. 9. Manuel Vargas, arrested at Remedios July 3, 1895; released and expelled July 13, 1895; charged with being an agent of the insurgents, etc.; naturalized. 10. Domingo Gonzalez y Alfonso, 42 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1876; arrested at Quivican July 3, 1895; expelled September 3, 1895, for the GENERAL BLANCO, WHO COMMANDED SPANISH FORCES IN CUBA. •■-■.i-s o o o H as o Of o o « H H 05 W ►4 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 141 reason that his presence in the island is a source of danger to the govern- ment. 11. Victoriano Bulit Perez, ^^ years, native of Cuba, of American par- ents; arrested at Sagua July 12, 1895; accused of "proposing treasonable acts"; released November 8, 1895. 12. Joseph Ansley, 56 years; born in Habana, of American parents; arrested at Sagua August 26, 1895; charge, "presence prejudicial to peace of island"; deported to United States September 21, 1895. 13. Aurelio Ansley, 34 years; son of Joseph Ansley. Same as above. 14. Luis Ansley, 30 years; son of Joseph Ansley. Same as above. 15. John A Sowers, 65 years; native of Virginia. Same as above. 16. Carlos M. Garcia y Ruiz, 28 years; born in the United States; arrested at Sagua September 7, 1895 ; accused of attempting to join the insur- rectionists; released October 7, 1895. 17. Jose Martinez Gonzalez, 45 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1873; arrested at Sagua September 12, 1895; charge of riding on railroad without paying fare; no evidence against him; released September 19, 1895. 18. Mariano Rodriguez; Zayas, native of Cuba; arrested Habana Septem- ber 17; released September 19, 1895; naturalized; no charges. 19. Jose Martinez Mesa, 41 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1878; arrested at Habana September 17, 1895; released September 19, 1895; no charges. 20. Eugene Pelletier, 42 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1877; arrested at Cienfuegos December 5, 1895; charged with recruiting for the insurrection; released, under surveillance. May 17, 1896. 21. Joseph J. Trelles, native of Cuba; naturalized; arrested at Matanzas December 24, 1895; released December 26, 1895; no charges. 22. Manuel M. (or W.) Amieva, 39 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1878; arrested at Matanzas December 24, 1895, as a suspect; released Decem- ber 31, 1895; no charges. 23. Solomon, Chas. S., native of the United States, arrested and released. 24. Marcos E. Rodriguez, 57 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1875; arrested January 17, 1896, on board American steamship Olivette; charge, aiding the rebellion, sedition, etc. ; released April 1, 1896. 25. Louis Someillan, Sr. , 58 years; born in Cuba; naturalized Key 142 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. West, 1878; arrested January 17, 1896, at Habana; released April i, 1896; charge, aiding rebellion, sedition, etc. 26. Louis Someillan, Jr., 36 years; born in Habana, son of above; arrested January 17 at Habana; released April i, 1896; charge, aiding rebel- lion, sedition, etc. 27. Ladislao Quintero, born in Key West; made a prisoner of war February 22, 1896, at Guatao, where he had been wounded by Spanish troops; released April 11, 1896. 28. Walter Grant Dygert, 25 years; born in the United States; arrested February 23, 1896; imprisoned at Guines; supposed to be insurgent leader El Inglesito; finally released and sent to United States April 24, 1896. 29. Rev. Albert J. Diaz, native of Cuba; naturalized; arrested at Habana April 16, 1896, charged with forwarding rebel correspondence; con- fined at police headquarters; expelled April 16, 1896; accused of abetting insurrection. 30. Alfred Diaz; brother of above; arrested, same charge; both of the Diazes were released April 22, 1896, on condition of leaving the country; went to Key West. 31. Joseph L. Cepero, native of Cuba; naturalized 1881; arrested prior to January 20, 1896, on board steamer from Cienfuegos to Bata- bano; case now pending before civil court Santa Clara; confined in Santa Clara prison ; charge, sedition, rebellion, etc. 32. Luis Martinez, arrested about March i, 1896; charged with treason- able correspondence; released April 13, 1896, on $400 bail; naturalized 1873. 33. William A. Glean, native of Cuba, of American parents; arrested at Sagua April, 1896; charge, rebellion; military jurisdiction inhibited in favor of civil July 28, 1896; released and returned to the United States. 34. Louis M. Glean, brother of the above ; same as above. 35. Frank J. Larrieu, native of Cuba; naturalized; arrested at Cardenas May 15, 1896; case pending; charges not made known. 36. Louis Someillan, 58 years; native of Cuba; naturalized; arrested July 7, 1896, for second time; charge, aiding rebellion; turned over to civil courts, is confined in city prison; trial held Januarys, 1897; sentenced Jan- uary 13 to imprisonment in chains for life; appeal taken. 37. Manuel Fernandez Chaqueilo, 19 years; native of Key West; cap- tured July 9, 1896; was the companion of Charles Govin; is in Cabana fort; DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. i43 case pending, under military jurisdiction; charge, "rebellion with arms in hand." 38. George W. Aguirre, 25 years; born in the United States; captured by a Spanish gunboat July 10, 1896; case pending before civil court of Jaruco; confined in Cabana fort ; charge of rebellion. 39. Samuel T. Tolon, 45 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1878; arrested on board American steamer Seneca September 3, 1896; incommunicado twenty-two days; charged with being a delegate to the Cuban Junta; released and deported September 30, 1896; went to New York. 40. Oscar Cespedes, 20 years; native of Key West; captured without arms in insurgent hospital near Zapata swamp about September 5, 1896; imprisoned at San Severino fort, Matanzas; question of competency between military and civil jurisdiction decided in favor of military; case pending. 41. Francisco E. Cazanas, arrested as suspect at Matanzas October 14, 1896; released October 16, 1896. 42. Alfredo Hernandez, 44 years; native of Matanzas; naturalized 1876; arrested at his house at Habana September 6, 1896; suspicion of being concerned in the insurrection; expelled September 23, 1896; went to Key West. 43. Antonio Saurez Del Villar, native of Cuba; naturalized; arrested at Cienfuegos September 5, 1896; charged with purchase and concealing of arms and ammunition; case sent to civil jurisdiction December 23, 1896; in prison at Cienfuegos; case pending. 44. Jose Curbino, native of Cuba; naturalized; arrested at Rincon, Sep- tember 18, 1896; surrendered to military authorities without arms; released and is residing at Santiago de las Vegas. 45. Joseph Austin Munoz, native of New Orleans; arrested at Matanzas September 18, 1896; released September 19; claimed that arrest was by mistake. 46. Ramon Rodriguez, native of Cuba; naturalized; arrested September 20, 1896, upon requisition from governor of Matanzas; had been in insurrec- tion ; surrendered and failed to report regularly ; sent to Cardena and released. 47. Esteben Venero, 22 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1895; arrested at Los Palos (Habana province) about September 22, 1896; charges not stated; Captain-General asked for evidence of American citizenship on December 9, which was sent him ; case pending cognizance of military or civil jurisdiction. 144 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 48. Adolfo Torres, native of Cuba; naturalized; arrested October 4, at Sagua; charges not stated; release ordered November 23, 1896, question of competency not established; released November 26, officer remarking, "We have no charges against you." 49. Esteben Cespedes (colored), born in Cuba; naturalized Key West, 1891; arrested October 13, 1896, charged with naniguismo (voodoo); expelled November 7, and went to Key West. 50. Ramon Crucet, 48 years; born in Cuba; naturalized 1873; arrested in Colon November i, 1896; charges, public censure of acts of Spanish government; released December 18, 1896; no grounds of complaint. 51. Louis Lay, 18 years; native of Cuba, of American parents; arrested November 9, 1896, during a raid upon a social club in Regla; confined in Cabana fort; case ordered to be transferred to civil court at Guanabacoa, December 23; charges, aiding rebellion. Released January 15, 1897. 52. Jose Gonzalez, 63 years; native of Bejacal, Cuba; naturalized 1882; arrested at Las Mangas November 10, 1896, taken to prison at Pinar del Rio; charges not yet made known to consulate-general, Habana. 53. Theodore L. Vives, native of Cienfuegos; naturalized 1891; arrested November 19, 1896; charges, first disorderly conduct and then insults to Spain; case pending cognizance of military or civil jurisdiction; is confined in jail. 54. Henry J. Delgado, native of the United States; captured about December 10, 1896, at an insurgent hospital in Pinar del Rio province, after having been ten weeks in a hut sick;, sent to Havana to Cabana fort; removed to hospital December 28, 1896, where, our consul-general reports, he received best medical attention; died in hospital January 19, 1897. 55. Gaspar A. Betancourt, 63 years; native of Cuba; naturalized 1877; arrested December 26, 1896, confined at police headquarters incommunicado, charged with sedition. 56. Fernando Pino Hernandez, 19 years (colored); native of Key West, charged with naniguismo (voodoo) ; ordered to be expelled December 30, 1896; will be sent to Key West. 57. Amado Pino Hernandez, 21 years; brother of the above ; same as above. 58. Jose Antonio Iznaga, native of Cuba; naturalized; expelled in August, 1896; no report. 59. August Bolton, naturalized 1893. A PICKET SQUAD OF CUBAN SOLDIERS. GENERAL CASTELLIO AND STAFF. _: I PLAZA IN SANTIAGO, CUBA. GROUP OF NATIVE WOMEN IN PONCE. PORTO RICO. DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. i47 60. Gustave Richelieu, naturalized 1870; taken in a boat near Santiago de Cuba about February 23, 1896; released from prison about March i, 1896; subsequently rearrested and recommitted for leaving Guantanamo without permission; consul considers second arrest an excuse for detention; release granted shortly after. 61. Frank Agramont, and 62, Thos. Julio Sainz, arrested with arms in their hands, May, 1895; charge, rebellion; to be tried for armed insurrection against the government ; Santiago de Cuba. 63. John D. Ferrer, no evidence against him; released March 23, 1896; naturalized at New York, 1878. 64. Pedro Duarte; 65, Jorge Calvar, and 66, Ramon Romagosa, arrested at Manzanillo for alleged conspiracy in insurrection; expelled August 11, 1896. It will be noted that there was a strong tendency displayed by naturalized citizens, whose names did not themselves declare American ancestry, to par- ticipate in the contested affairs of Cuba. In the case of the men who crossed from Haiti to Cuba in a fishing boat, they obtained able counsel, and we find it stated respecting the Spaniards, by this gentleman in a letter to the State Department: "The euphuistic palaver and the circumambient correspondence of the Spanish authorities thinly veils a deliberate purpose to advisedly disregard these obligations." This language of the counsel of naturalized citizens, it may be observed, while possibly circumambient, is not cast in the circumlocution molds of the curved palaver of stately diplomacy. The claims stacked in the State Department, brought before the Senate in January, 1897, were in the order following: August Bolten, arrest and imprisonment $ 10,000.00 John D. Ferrer, arrest and imprisonment 25,000.00 Mrs. C. J. Diaz de Clarke, property losses 116,335.00 John F. Java, property losses 90,585.00 Jose Ignacio Toscano, property losses 15,000.00 Pedro Plutarco Ortiz, property losses 84,000.00 F. J. Cazanas, property losses 39,843.00 Jose G. and Jose M. Delgado, property losses 178,534.00 Jose Antonio Iznaga, property losses 156,500.00 Ricardo Machado, property losses 64,900.00 148 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. Francisco Seiglie, property losses $778,510.00 Jose Rafael de les Reyes y Garcia and wife, property losses . . 729,161.00 Frederick P. Montes, property losses 160,000.00 George L. Lay, property losses . .' value of horse Andres L. Terry, property losses 334,905.00 John A. Sowers, arrest, imprisonment, and expulsion .... 200,000.00 Perfect© Lacosti, property losses 652,900.00 Wm. A. and Louis M. Glean, imprisonment 150,000.00 Wm. A. Glean, property losses 4,668.00 Louis M. Glean, property losses 7,547.00 Whiting & Co., property losses 60,240.00 Mrs. A. L. Whiting, property losses 17,000.00 J. B. Carillo de Albornoz, property losses 36,000.00 Ignacio Larrondo, property losses 129,472.38 Cristobal N. Madan, property losses and personal injuries . . 88,000.00 Antonio A. Martinez, property losses 35,000.00 Joaquin P. Cruz and wife, property losses 70,000.00 George W. Hyatt, property losses 285,490.54 Manuel A. R. Morales, property losses 275,000.00 Peter Dominguez, expulsion 10,000.00 Teresa Joerg, property losses 2,500.00 James A. Glean, property losses . 28,425.00 Peter S. Rodriguez, property losses 40,796.00 Antonio M. Jimenez, property losses 19,158.45 Pedro C. Casanova, property losses . . • 40,400.00 Pedro C. Casanova, personal injuries 40,000.00 Walter G. Dygert, arrest and imprisonment - 100,000.00 Frederick A. Libbey, property losses '..... 23,166.00 Jose M. Caraballo, property losses 90,470.00 Jose M. Caraballo, arrest, imprisonment, etc 60,000.00 Angel Gronlier, property losses 34,779.00 Albert V. de Goicoiiria, property losses 130,000.00 Rosa A. Maragliano, property losses 30,000.00 Juana M. C. de Maragliano 25,000.00 J. de Armas y Armas, property losses 69,525.00 Maximo M. Diaz, property losses 10,000.00 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. i49 Wm. W. Gay, expulsion $ 25,000.00 Thomas R. Dawley, arrest, imprisonment, etc 100,000.00 George Fortier, property losses 32,450.00 L. F. Marejon y Marquez, property losses 15,000.00 Wm. G. Thome, property losses 25,000.00 M. D. J. Garcia y Pino, executrix, etc., property losses . . . 200,000.00 Manuel Prieto, property losses 58,850.00 Gustave Richelieu, imprisonment a fair indemnity Miguel de la Vega y Gener, property losses 71,683.00 J. Sanchez y Coba, property losses 16,290.00 F. J. Terry y Dorticas, property losses 202,952.50 J. C. de Albornoz O'Farrill, property losses 106,105.49 A. C. de Albornoz O'Farrill, property losses 130,703.12 Heine Safety Boiler Co., property losses 27,316.80 R. M. y de la Cruz, property losses not stated Francisco Rionda (Central Tuinucu Sugar Cane Manufacturing Co.), property losses ' 527,480.20 Charles Rosa, property losses 882,840.00 Rabel & Co. , property losses 75,785.00 Joseph M. Duenos, property losses 15,000.00 P. P. de Leon, property losses 379,000.00 J. F. de Cossio, property losses 20,000.00 Peter E. Rivery, personal injuries suitable indemnity Samuel T. Tolon, personal injuries 50,000.00 Samuel T.Tolon, property losses 100,000.00 Adolphus Torres, imprisonment 25,000.00 A. L. Terry y Dorticos and A. E. Terry, property losses . . . 81,888.00 A. E. Terry, property losses 110,500.00 Frederick L. Craycraft, personal injuries 25,000.00 Thomas E. Rodriguez, property losses, banishment, etc. . . . 61,000.00 Oscar Giguel, property losses 100,000.00 Jose Tur, property losses 251,500.00 Adolfo Santa Maria, property losses 120,803.32 Enrequita Santa Maria, property losses 94,953-3- Joseph M. Fernandez, property losses 61,115.61 George Becket, propert}' losses 75,000.00 15° DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. Manuel F. Lopez, killing of son, S. N. Lopez $100,000.00 Adolfo Torres, arrest and imprisonment 25,000.00 There was a great deal of Cuban investigation by committees of Congress, the object of which seemed to be to persuade the American people that Amer- ican captives were subjected to indignities that must be compensated, and to celebrate the glories of the armies of the rebellion. In truth, there were several kinds of American citizens, and a large assortment of insurgents; and any resinous wood that could be thrown where it would flame for war was welcome and pitched on the fire. The American people need first of all for their own sake, to sift the truth about the Cuban people, and see how many of those who were so rapid to be naturalized citizens before the war are faithful Americans after the war ; and to what extent the Cuban Republic, as it was magnified by the mysteries around it in the war, may claim that they have acquired title to the country, for which they speak with and of authority. As to the number of troops in the field for Cuba, Mr. Frederick W. Lawrence, May 20, 1896, said: "Generals Gomez and Maceo have now under their command in the neighborhood of 100,000 men, whose numbers would be very largely increased if the men who desire to form them could pass through the Spanish lines." The imagination of Mr. Lawrence must have been pro- foundly affected. He said: "General Gomez, with nearly 30,000 men, is marching westward, and has reached a point in Matanzas close enough to the city of Havana to cause great trepidation." This was a dream. Gomez 'never had one-half of 30,000 men, and at this time was not marching west- ward, and there was no trepidation at Havana about him. Mr. Lawrence thought Havana could be taken easily, and added: "In the opinion of mili- tary men whom I have seen, defenses of Habana are totally inadequate to protect the city from an invasion on the land side." The only protection the capital has from an attack by land are a few insignificant stockade forts erected around the outskirts and garrisoned by poorly equipped, undrilled, half starved volunteers, who, during the hours when they are off duty, may be seen in the streets of Habana asking alnl^ of citizens, like ordinary beggars. It seems incredible that such men would succeed in holding Habana against an attack by such fighters as the Cubans under General Gomez have on more than one occasion proven themselves to be." It seems strange that an intel- ligent man could believe these assertions, that would be ridiculous if they had not been a part of the war whoopery that was for a time a leading feature DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 151 with our public men who wanted war in a few minutes. If Gomez had 30,000 men, what happened to them when our 18,000 all told landed and lost 1,500 men, killed, wounded and missing, in carrying Spanish positions near Santiago? Mr. Lawrence was deceived. The 30,000 troops of Gomez, the nearly 100,000 thundering at the gates of Havana, were an array of impostures, the object of which was to subordinate the United .States to Cuba, and play second fiddle to Gomez with the army of the United States. We fortunately escaped from the consequences of the conspiracy of falsification, and we are indebted to the solid sense of the President for the escape. There was good ~~~~fighting done with slender forces in Pinar del Rio by Maceo, but Gomez "Oriented" himself and was hors de combat. Where did he bury his 100,000 heroes, or what otherwise became of them? Mr. Lawrence was good enough to add: "Up in the mountains the leaders of the army of the Republic have estab- lished ranches, where men are engaged in breeding and raising cattle for food purposes. The raising of vegetables is also encouraged by the Cuban commanders, and in addition to this means of subsistence they have the native food plants that grow in wild profusion all over the island. "From this it will be readily understood that no matter how long the war should last, or how much privation they might suffer in other directions, the Republican army will never suffer dangerously from lack of food." They did not seem to be flush of provisions when they first struck our troops in Santiago. We quote again from Mr. Lawrence : "The Cubans have been accused of incendiarism in a criminal sense because they have destroyed sugar cane, tobacco, mills, and plantations. They insist that they should not be regarded as criminals, but that the orders which the commanders issued for the destruction of the island were justifiable war measures. "I have personal knowledge that in a great many cases the plantations have been destroyed with the consent of the owners. In fact, a great number of owners of plantations that have been destroyed informed me personally that they had invited the Cubans to do so because they did not want to grind their cane, and thereby supply revenues to the Spanish government." The cane-burning was barbarian, inflicting immense losses upon the Cubans, destroying the only chance they had of really providing a govern- ment. 152 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. The Rev. A. J. Diaz saw the armies of Maceo and Gomez — great crowds of men, Maceo seven or eight thousand, Gomez ten thousand, and Mr. Aguirre had an army. "Q. Now, what class of people did that army consist of? — A. The best class of young men in Habana, generally. "Q. Do you mean the Province of Habana? — A. No; the city. "Q. Aguirre's command consists mostly of city boys, does it? — A. Yes, sir. "Q. How many were there? — A. He had at that time about 2,000; that was his escort. "Q. He had others? — A. Oh, yes. He had in the province 10,000 or 15,000 men, scattered all over the Province of Habana in different camps. "Q. Now, what kind of people did the army of Maceo appear to be? — A. Very fine people, too; white people; doctors, lawyers, druggists. "Q. Intelligent people? — A. Intelligent people. By Senator Davis: "O. What kind of people were the private soldiers in Maceo's army? — A. Well, they have some colored people, too — many — and they have some of these intelligent people as private soldiers, a great many of them people who do not want any rank; just wanted to be soldiers, just to do that in the democratic line to encourage others." There are fifteen thousand city boys from Havana, eh! What happened to them? What were they doing when Blanco was fortifying th,e city? Senator Morgan wanted to know how many Spanish troops were in Cuba in the May before we attacked .Spain, and Dr. Diaz said: "A. I think they have in Cuba only about 70,000 or So, 000 soldiers. I do not think they have more than that. "Q. How many have come there since this war broke out? — A. Nearly 150,000 to 180,000. "O. W^hat has become of the balance of them? — A. Well, a great many of them have been killed, and many of them have joined the rebels. "Q. Joined the rebels? — A. A great many of them ; j-es, sir. " Dr. Diaz was hard at it to make up a rebel army of about 100,000 men, but having mustered them in he has never been able to find ten per cent of them. The mighty Cuban armies had arms! We quote again from the examination of Dr. Diaz: DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. i53 "Q. Do the Cubans get any arms and ammunition from the villages cr people? — A. Yes; they get them from Habana. "Q. How do they get them? — A. Exactly, I do not know the way they manage it, but I know they get all they need." Mr. William D. Smith was once a soldier in the United States army. He was examined by Senator Morgan June 3, 1897. He joined Gomez, he says, in the midst of a battle. The Cubans lost 68 killed and no wounded. The Cubans dug up 180 dead Spaniards by order of Gomez, and reburied them at once. He wanted to count the dead. Mr. Smith was a gushing talker. He said: "There were 242 engagements I have been in with General Gomez, besides little skirmishes I did not count. It is a dash and a few shots, and get out of the way where they outnumber you. There were 242 engagements where he stood his ground and camped on the ground of the Spaniards, the last engage- ment just a few days before I left,' when General Gomez and General Weyler met for the first time. "Q. Where was that? — A. At La Reforma. "Q. A sugar estate? — A: No, sir; not a sugar estate; it is a cattle range; the most beautiful place, I think, in La Villias. It is General Gomez's favor- ite camping ground, because his son was born there. "Q. How did the last battle wind up? — A. General Weyler withdrew the troops and went to Puerto Principe, and Gomez camped on the ground. "Q. How many troops were engaged? — A. Gomez had 1,500, or pos- sibly 2,000 — I am trying to get this as near right as possible — I do not want to overestimate. The Spanish had 20,000 men — General Weyler had 20,000 troops with him. "Q. 20,000 in bodies within reach of each other?— A. No, sir; 20,000 men right in the fight at one time; not in a mass, in any one body, but he had 20,000 in. columns. The fighting down there requires explanation. It seems ridiculous that 1,500 men would stand and fight 20,000, but the Spaniards always march in a column of ],ooo men and one piece of artillery — one cannon. They came into Reforma in twenty different directions. The trap was being laid by General Weyler to capture General Gomez. The General was cog- nizant of it for two weeks, and waited for them to come. The way he fought those 20,000, he would have 100 men fight one column, and 50 men fight another column, and 100 men fight another, and 75 still another column, and so on, and he stood them off like that. I have known 10 Cubans to hold a 154 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. Spanish column of i,ooo men until General Gomez could get together his; impedimenta and get out — hold them at a dead standstill. I account for it by the reason that the Spaniards thought that there was a trap, an ambuscade, and they would not run into it. Th'at is General Gomez's tactics; he has done it several times. "Q. What is the area of that estate? — A. Between ten and twelve thou- sand acres. "Q. What were the losses in the battle of La Reforma? — A. The last one? "Q. Yes, sir. — A. The Cuban losses were 26, I think, killed, during the two days' fighting. "Q. How many days? — A. Two days. "Q. How many wounded? — A. The wounded it is hard to estimate. We never know the exact number wounded, because so many are wounded who do not pay any attention to it. I saw one man wounded who was shot with a Mauser bullet, which passed right through him, and we never knew anything about it for two days. That seems almost miraculous, but it is true. I sup- pose you have seen that Mauser bullet. The lead is covered by some metal. I can show you a wound that you would have said, if it had happened with any other cartridge, that I would have had to have an amputation. One went right through my ankle, and I was only in the hospital two hours — long enough to have it done up. The bullet does not make any fracture. I have never seen a case of amputation since I have been on the island, and it does not cause septicaemia. There is the wound [exhibiting]. The bullet entered here [pointing to his ankle], and came out there. I was never laid up a min- ute. The doctor in camp simply dressed it with iodoform and a little anti- septic. That is why I say it is almost impossible to give an exact account of the wounded. "Q. About how many? — A. I should say 50 or 75. "Q. What was the loss to the Spaniards? — A. Their loss was 180 or 185 killed, and the wounded we never know, although in getting here after leav- ing camp I ran across a practico — that is, a guide — and he told us he had guided General Weyler's forces across the Rio Sassa, and he got it from the soldiers that they had 300 or 400 wounded. "Q. Weyler was in personal command on the one side and Gomez on the other at that time? — A. Yes, sir; the first time they had ever met. The New York Sun gave an account of it. O w Pi X ■s r r r r THE MAJOR, HIS ADJUTANT, ORDERLY, AND WIFE. PAEL'IAL V1E\Y OF THE ARSENAL, FACING THE BACOOR, IN CAVITE. DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 157 "Q. Where did Gomez's troops camp after that battle? — A. At Reforma, on the battlefield. He has always marched over the battlefield since I have been with him. "Q. General Gomez is commander in chief of the Cuban army? — A. He calls himself the general in chief. The commander in chief is Cisneros Betancourt. "Q. Under whom does he hold his commission? — A. Under the Cuban government. He has a diploma, the same as I have — I have seen it — only, of course, with different names and grades. "Q. Do all the officers hold their commissions from the civil government? — A. Everything above a captain. "Q. Does Gomez make report to the civil government? — A. Daily. They may not get them daily, but there is a daily report made by Gomez to the civil government. He makes them up, and every two or three days they are sent by couriers. Of course, there may be a jump of a. day or two. "Q. Does he report for his own command or entire army? — A. For the entire army. "Q. The army, then, is divided into ? — A. Into six army corps." This old soldier should have been at the head of the literary bureau at Key West. Examined by Senator Morgan, he said: "Every Cuban on the island of Cuba, unless he has run away and got under the protection of the Spanish government, is supposed to have a gun in his hand or be working for those who have a gun ; and they do it with a royal good will. These men work ten hours a day; the pacificos go to the moun- tains and till the soil. I saw in Trinidad, where there were 15 or 20 acres on the slope of the mountains where they have cut the timber down and planted sweet potatoes, and you can kick out sweet potatoes as large as that cuspidor. I have not eaten a meal on the island without having all I wanted, and the finest honey and beef and sweet potatoes. Gomez is husbanding the beef, and I think he has enough to last time immemorial. They are only allowed to kill what is actually consumed. The same can be said of the horses ; all under the control of the Cubans are in depositos. He does not allow a soldier to ride a mare, only geldings ; that is in case the war is prolonged, so that they may have their horses. They systematically propagate horses, mules, and cattle. "Q. From your knowledge of resources of Cuba and its power to produce 158 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. animal life, how long do you think that the Cuban government could sustain an army of fifty or sixty thousand men? — A. Under the plan or system they are working now, I do not know why they should not support it for ages. I know tliat the cattle are apparently just as many as when I went there a year ago, and more vegetables, because they have been accumulating them all the time. The civil government works at that all the time, and there are more of them than a year ago. "Q. How are the women and children provided for? — A. Those in the interior — their husbands, the pacificos — the rule is: The civil government allows one man to provide food for every five women and children. These can be five women, or one woman and four children, but it allows one man to stay away from the' army — or a'portion of the time — one man for five women and children. That is the civil law. And they have their houses in these mountains, and they raise -their pork and vegetables, and a great many of the women work in the shops where they are making clothes for the soldiers. In one portion of this shop there was a great number — I never counted them — daughters of the Cubans in the field and their wives, in there making clothes. I have seen 10,000 suits of clothes at one time, piled out there. That includes a pair of pants, a coat, and shoes. "Q. Is the Cuban army well fed? — A. The best I ever saw in any army. I have not had a meal — and that applies to the army, when I say myself I mean all — I have not had five meals on the island "Q. What? — A. There have not been five nieals on the island when I have not had my coffee and sugar. I say sugar; sometimes we had honey in place of the sugar "Q. Where is the coffee raised? — A. Certain kinds of coffee grow wild in this province of Santa Clara. In these Trinidad hills there is one vast forest of coffee, where I have seen coffee on the ground two inches thick — on the ground rotting. "Q. Is it good coffee? — A. It is fair coffee. It is not the best coffee. Their best coffee is not the very best grade of coffee "Q. It makes a good, wholesome beverage? — A. Yes, sir; it is good enough, so that when the soldiers don't get it they growl considerably. "Q. You would say the army is well fed? — A. Yes, sir; I hardly think that expresses it; they have luxuries. "Q. Take the body of the Cuban army, the white people in it, are they ■ DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 159 as intelligent as the average of people in the rural districts here — what we call backwoods of the United States? — A. Yes, sir. "Q. Are they patriotic? — A. As much so as any class of people I ever saw. So much so that I not only heard General Gomez and the government and the officers, but I have heard private soldiers talk. I will say that there is not a man in the escort or in the Victoria regiment that I have not heard an expression from similar to this: That before they would lay down their arms they would let every Spaniard in Spain walk over their dead bodies, and they would not accept anything but absolute independence. If you want to make them angry, talk autonomy to them. They say they have been caught once, but they will never be the fish to be caught again with the same bait. And I have heard Gomez say that they should be glad to have the United States recognize them, but that they will keep up the war until they secure inde- pendence if it takes twenty years to do it. "Q. Is there any considerable proportion of native Americans in the Cuban army? — A. I do not think there is over 20 in the army." Mr. Smith, once upon a time of Ohio, with a record of over two hundred battles alongside General Gomez — in one of which 20,000 Spaniards under Weyler were defeated by 1,500 Cubans — gave this account under pressure of cross-examination of the escort of the famoiis Dominican chieftain : "I was appointed a captain in Gomez's escort, where they are all officers, appointed over the heads of old Cubans who have been in the service for years — some of them with him in the ten-year war — appointed second in command, jumping over all the others, and there is no jealousy of me. "Q. About what is the strength of that escort? — A. From 70 to 90. "Q. All officers? — A. Yes, sit With the exception of myself, there is no man in it who has got in except through some special act of bravery. They are General Gomez's body-guard. He goes into an engagement, and they are first into the fight and the last to leave, and, by reason of that, I know they have from 10 to 15 or 20 in the hospital, and they have nearly all been wounded more than once. I have never been wounded except the once. "Q. What is the strength of this Victoria regiment? — A. When it came into Las Vegas it was 142 ; when I left there, the other day, they were all, with the exception of 38, in the hospital, wounded." Mr. Smith went so far as to describe Cubitos. The Cuban President, he said, had headquarters at Nahassa— and proceeded: 36o DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. "Q. The same place you call Cubitos? — A. It is in the vicinity. Nahassa is a very level piece of country, a beautiful river running through it, and fine grass for the horses. Cubitos is a little back of it." It will be observed that Cubitos was the only place Mr. Smith did not know all aboiit, and Cubitos is the capital of this land of milk and honey, fat •cattle and sweet potatoes as big as cuspidors. Rut it is a "little back. " Did the Cubans have a coast-guard? Oh, yes — to be sure they had — and Smith told all about it, though he thought his talk might hurt. He said: "There is a continuous guard of armed men around that island, called the •coast-guard. The)^ are fully armed, with plenty of ammunition. "Q. About how many men? — A. I presume in that coast-guard about 5,000 men. They fight if necessary, but it is a complete chain of guards. Now, there are several reasons for that guard. The Cuban government has a perfect line of communication, as I say, all through the island. They also have a perfect line of communication with the United States." Mr. George Bronson Rea, of Brooklyn, was examined June 11, 1897. He was an electrical engineer and newspaper correspondent, and before the war had charge of an electrical light plant. January 18, 1S96, he took the .field with Gomez in Pinar del Rio. After being with Gomez for a month he joined Maceo, was with him six months, and then slipped, through the Span- ish lines, visited New York, and returned in January, 1897, to Cuba, and was with Gomez until the middle of April. Asked how great an army Gomez had, Mr. Rea said: "About 150 under his personal command — the escort and the Victoria regiment — each about 80 men." The grand army of Gomez in the province of Santa Clara was in "two divisions and various regiments." Mr. Rea proceeded to give an intelligible story of Gomez's forces, at the time the oratory of senators was seeking to subordinate the United States to this mili- tary pastmaster. "I can in one minute," said Mr. Rea, "give the total accurately." This was a frightful menace, but it had to go! Mr. Rea said: "This recent campaign of Gomez in the eastern part of La Villas has been •carried out by the first division of what they call the fourth army corps, •divided into three brigades : The brigade of Remedies, about 800 men ; the brigade of Sancti Spiritus, about 600 men ; and the brigade of Trinidad, about 400 men. There are three more brigades, composing the second division: That of Cienfuegos, about 500 men; the brigade of Sagua, about 400 men; and the brigade of Villa Clara, probably 500 more. That is all in that DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 163 province. In the province of Matanzas there are very few insurgents; indeed, I think they could be safely estimated at about 400 or 500 men in the whole province. In the province of Havana, probably at the present time there are 2,000 insurgents. Last November — or October, I meant to say — I was down in the province of Havana about one month or a month and a half, and then there were about that number, and the force has not augmented. Contrary to all stories as to their number, the force has not increased. I left Maceo in Pinar del Rio with 6,000 men. The number of men in the east- ern part of the island is — what I have said already in regard to the western part can be relied on, but in the eastern part of the island I would not like to give any testimony to be depended upon as accurate — as to my opinion as to the number of men, there are, I should judge, probably about 4,000 or 5,000 men in the two eastern provinces. "Q. What provinces? — A. Santiago de Cuba and Camaguey. The total I have not figured, but in my estimation they do not exceed 25,000 armed men on the island. ' ' Of this 25,000 armed Cubans, four thousand were of Maceo's forces, and they dwindled after his death. An effort was made by the examiners to show Mr. Rea was not the friend of the Cubans, but he had simply been telling the truth, and put down the land army of the Cuban commander-in-chief at one hundred and fifty men in hand, the rest scattered so as to scare the Spaniards a little everywhere. We quote the report: "Q. As far as the Spanish were concerned, you were watched? — A. Yes, sir ; I suppose, if caught, I should have suffered the fate of Govin. "Q. What did they do with him? — A. They chopped him up. "Q. Have you any knowledge of that? — A. Yes, sir; no personal knowl- edge. "Q. Whence is your information derived? — A. From two persons who were with him; one Lieutenant-Colonel Mirabal and the other Colonel Gordon — both dead now. They were in a fight between Major Valencia, who had 60 or 80 men, and the Spaniards under General Ochoa from Jaruco. It took place near the sugar estate of Jiquiabo, and, as generally the case in a little fight, the Cubans, after firing a few volleys, got out of the way, and Govin, never having been in a fight before, found himself alone and the Spaniards very close to him. They told me that Govin, when he saw he was to be cap- i64 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. tured, walked forward to meet the Spanish column to surrender, hoping his American citizenship would help him in this case; but it seems that his papers — parties told me who said they were watching and saw it done (but I do not attach much importance to the statement myself, because I never saw a Cuban that would stay near a Spanish column long enough to watch much) — but they said the papers were torn up and thrown in his face, and he was tied to another man and taken to San Mateo and kept there all night, and the next morning as they were led out to march to Jaruco he was untied from the other prisoner and fastened to a tree and chopped up with machetes." Govin was killed, Rea said, because he was an American. Rea added that he did not carry a revolver, for he could get out of the way when the Spaniards came "by keeping up with the Cubans." He once engaged in hostilities to this effect, though a man of peace : "I directed Gomez once how to burn out a locomotive, and that is all. I took no actual hand in it ; I told the old man how they could do it, and men — Cubans — went to work and did it. That is as far as my experience in helping the insurgents has ever gone. "Q. What do you mean by burning out a locomotive — destroying it? — A. Yes, sir. If the water gets low and the fire is kept going, it will burn out the tubes and then it will not stand the pressure. "O. He had captured the locomotive, and wanted to destro)' it? — A. Yes, sir. He asked me how to do it — he knew I was an electrical engineer — and I gave him the benefit of my experience. "Q. Did you give him the benefit of your experience in firing dynamite shells? — A. No, sir. "O. You knew how to do it? — A. Yes, sir. "Q. Did he ever ask for your assistance? — A. Maceo intimated as much to me once or twice, but I thought I was not there to do that; I was there as a neutral, and it was not my business. They have had a few foreigners come there to show them how to blow i;p railroad trains and use dynamite cartridges, and they have treated them badly, in such a way as to disgust them and drive them away. A Frenchman came along and was to show the Cubans how to make dynamite — and there was also a powder maker. Two bombs were prepared, but the Cubans were jealous, as the bomb-maker was going to get some glory, and so only eighteen men were sent to help him. The bombs were exploded, and when the engine went off the track they had a DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 165 couple of hand bombs which they were to throw into the train, but when the engine was derailed and the Spanish soldiers poured out of the cars the Cubans got scared and ran away and left the Frenchman alone. He got away safe, but was disgusted, and left them. '' Evidently the way Mr. Rea talked was not what the investigators wanted, but the cross-examination helped the story of the witness. By Mr. Morgan : "Q. How many fights have you been in, did you say? — A. More or less, about 80 ; not counting little shooting scrapes. "Q. How many?— A. About 80, not counting shooting scrapes. "Q. In how many battles have the Cubans held the ground? — A. I have only seen the Cubans advance twice. "Q. I only speak of holding the ground. — A. They may hold the ground temporarily — for one minute or ten minutes or fifteen. "Q. I mean after the battle is over. — A. They generally come back after the Spaniards give up the pursuit. "Q. After the pursuit? — A. Yes, sir. I was with Antonio Maceo in those fights around Tapia, and we had about a dozen of them, hot and heavy. He would wait until the Spaniards came up, and from one hilltop he would hold them back until they grew too strong for him and then retreat to the next hilltop, going back and back until the Spaniards would give it up after a while and retire, getting tired of the' conflict. "Q. When they got tired, Maceo would come back? — A. Yes, sir. "Q. Who would win the battle? — A. I would call it a draw. There is one strange thing about it; I' rarely saw a Cuban killed." These distasteful accounts of Cubans are like those that came out of the conversation of the private American soldiers who met both Spaniards and Cubans at Santiago. Mr. Rea was asked why the rebels ought to be in the open, as he had said they were hiding themselves too much in Matanzas province, and he answered, "To subsist, ' ' for they had to go to the cultivated zones for vegetables. Asked whether it was not in those zones where people were starving, the witness contumaciously said, "The starvation business has been exaggerated"; and he proceeded to tell how the sweet potato — the boniato — would grow by itself: "Q. Suppose the worst for the Cubans, can not they plant boniatos; and when not assailed by the Spaniards can not they live? — A. Yes, sir; they can. i66 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE vSPANIARDS. and to a certain extent they do, but in the province of La Villas they have shown a wasteful spirit by eating all they have to-day, and never giving a thought of to-morrow. "Q. Maybe they want to prevent We)der from getting it? — A. The Cubans recognize, too, that they must have enough to eat if they want to wait imtil the United States intervenes and recognizes them." Senator Morgan does not seem to have made much headway with this young man. The examination proceeded: "Q. Pinar del Rio — how did you subsist there with 6,000 men [Rea's estimate of Maceo's forces]? — A. I left Pinar del Rio last year, last October. The northern part of the province, from Mariel to a point called La Mulata, cattle had about disappeared. There were a few corralled in the hills by the Cubans. Vegetables had completely disappeared, except those planted around the Spanish forts. The cane fields had been burnt; there was not a stalk of cane standing. It was a devastated country in every sense of the word. This was not done by the Cubans, but by the Spaniards, to take away the fodder for the Cuban cavalry, and the fire spread in all directions ; to the thickets, and palm groves, and everywhere else. Antonio Maceo sent every three nights an armed force of men with the impedimenta (two or three hundred unarmed men) down near Cabanas to bring the boniatos out, or, in lieu of that, they went to the zones of cultivation near the large fortified sugar factories La Linza and Bramales, between Cabanas and Bahia Honda, where there were also a few vegetables. In through the hills, at that time, Antonio Maceo had quite a large number of vegetables planted. He was a very prac- tical man, who saw ahead more than any of the rest, and he took all the impedimenta, probably 1,500 men, and he set them to work planting sweet potatoes, so he must have had quite a sufficient supply to last him that cam- paign in the hills. Along the southern coast, or the part of Pinar del Rio lying south of the Cordillera, there was quite a supply of cattle, and, in fact, all south of the railway was grazing ground, and large cattle ranches were scattered throughout the country, but I should not think there was many cattle left at the present time, because the policy of Weyler, when he found that he could not corner the Cubans, was to destroy their means of subsist- ence ; and all cattle found in the hills and on the plains have been killed. "Q. About how many troops had Weyler? — -A. About 40,000. "Q. And Maceo about 6,000? — A. Yes, sir. DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 167 "Q. It appears the Spaniards, then, were engaged in raising potatoes to feed Maceo's command, principally? — A. Yes, sir; in this case. "Q. Whenever they got out of potatoes they sent out and got them from under the fort? — A. That is right. "Q. If I understood you correctly, there was never a battle-ground that Maceo's command did not return to after the battle was over? — A. No, sir; there were several occasions where he came back, especially in that country of Pinar del Rio, where the hills are. In the open country he never came back. I was with Antonio Maceo when he returned after the first invasion of Pinar del Rio and had so many big fights in Havana province. There was where I joined him, and during the month or more I was with him in this section, there was a constant succession of fights, one after the other, and we could not come back and camp where we were the day before. It was simply one con- tinuous skirmish, day after day, moving from place to place." One thing Mr. Rea did not approve. The insurgents in Matanzas hid themselves in the swamps too much — "could not establish prefectosin Havana or Matanzas provinces." "Q. Why? — A. Because the country is very open. They have a few in the swamps, but in the provinces of Havana and Matanzas it is practically impossible to hold a prefectora. "Q. You say it is open? — A. It is the open country of that i.sland. "Q. Because the Spaniards hold the towns? — A. Because the towns are close together and the Spanish columns are continually on the move, and there are no hills and nooks where they can hide themselves in any force, except along the southern coast in these swamps, which are terrible places to live in. The insurgents cannot hold out in the province of Matanzas a day. "Q. Is it not a fact that they are holding out? — A. Well, if you want to immerse yourself in the swamp and stay there you are holding out, but you are not doing anything. "Q. But they are still there?— A. Yes, sir. "Q. The Spanish have not driven them oiit? — They have driven them off the open country where they ought to be." The judicial examiners stood up for the patriots immersed in the swamps, and would not consent that those fighting by immersion were not conquering heroes, though in hiding until they wanted beef they hooked it from the Spaniards. Maceo was the real great figliting man of the rebellion. Rea i68 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. spoke of the concentration of the Cubans — of their forcing the Spaniards into tlie towns at first. Asked to explain, he said : "When the invasion reached the provinces of Havana and Pinar del Rio (I was in the island from the time the revolution broke out), when the Cubans reached these provinces, they foind a large majority of the people living- there were Spanish storekeepers, clerks, etc., many belonging to the volunteer corps. (All Spaniards coming to Cuba have to belong to the volunteer corps.) If they have not served in Spain, they join the volunteers to free themselves from the enforced military service which all have to suffer in Spain. Also in Pinar del Rio the large bulk of the population are Canary Islanders, not Cubans, and all stanch supporters of the Crown, and belong to the volunteer corps. A large majority of the tobacco planters are also Canary Islanders, as are also many of the sugar planters in Havana and Matanzas. The Cubans commenced their career of — well, they really commenced the atrocities them- selves then. The Spaniards of the volunteer corps were taken and hung, and the trail of Bermudez could be followed by the bodies of those who were hung on the trees. "Q. Did you ever see an instance of that kind? — A. Yes, sir; two of them — three of them. "Q. Where? — A. The first was on the sugar estate of Santa Teresa, in the province of Havana. The second — hold on, he was not a Spaniard, he was a Cuban — I believe, near Rio Bayamos, also in the province of Havana. In the province of Pinar del Rio, while I did not see them, I know of the case where Bermudez hung 21 — everybody spoke of it — 21 to one tree, of these Spanish volunteers. "Q. Who was Bermudez? — A. Bermudez led the vanguard of Maceo's army during the invasion. Bermudez was a bandit before the war, and is called, among the people who lived in the fields, the Weyler of the Cubans. "Q. What has become of him? — A. He is still there, if he did not die of his wound, received just before Maceo crossed the trocha. I do not mean to say that this was approved by Maceo, for when Maceo found that so many people had been killed, he deprived Bermudez of his command. "Q. It was done by a bandit? — A. An ex-bandit; but he was a colonel in the Cuban army. "Q. He was deprived of his command by Maceo? — A. Yes, sir. "Q. Because of these outrages? — A. Yes, sir. Antonio Maceo and all the DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE vSPANIARDS. 169 rest of these Cuban chiefs, when they got this invasion finished, or had carried their revolution to the far western part of the province, started to organize their various zones and appointed local chiefs. One of the first steps of these local chiefs was to eliminate from the country people all those who had Spanish tendencies. All who lived in the country who were in any way suspected of Spanish sympathy and all who belonged to the volunteer corps, were ordered to the towns and their houses were burned over their heads. That started the concentration business. When Weyler began his concentra- tion, there was not a man living in the open fields who was not at least morally, if not openly, a Cuban insurgent. A man to live in the fields has to work for the Cuban government, and plant vegetables for them, and he is, technically, an insurgent, living under the laws of the Cuban prefecto, and he has to acknowledge their authority or go to the town. They give no choice. "Q. They do not kill him, but send him to town? — A. They do not kill them. They have hung several for various little offenses. "Q. What kind of offenses? — A. One fellow in the province of Havana, a Cuban colonel — Col. Raul Arango — invited me once to a double hanging. One man he had ordered to town, and had been seen outside afterwards, and he was going to catch him and hang him "Q. Treat him as a spy? — A. I suppose so. The other man was to be hung because he had taken cattle into town without permission. "Q. Treated him as a spy also? — A. The cattle were his own. If they catch any one who is giving help to the Spaniards they string him up. "Q. The Cubans treat those who are not with them as the enemies of the Republic? — A. Yes, sir. It was only recently, in the province of Villa Clara, that I called Gomez's attention to it, and asked him what he meant, and if it was his policy. Around the small town of Fomento the Spaniards had not operated for a long time. It was about the beginning of Weyler's campaign, in the month of January or February. There were probably 100 families, or 800 individuals, living within a radius of, say, 3 leagues of this town — all little farmers, most of them Cubans and insurgent sympathizers working for the cause. Many were families of the insurgents where the men were out fight- ing. To show that Gomez is bound to force this concentration business him- self, these people were ordered several times to vacate their homes and either go to the towns or to the hills. They did not obey. I believe the order was given twice, and still they did not notice it. Major Herrera — -a Cuban major 170 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. — was given orders by Brigadier Bravo, of Trinidad, to burn the houses of every one and thus force them to move. The orders were carried out, and the houses of these people were looted and burned, and their money and valuables taken away by their own countrymen. These people left destitute, and a great many, enraged at the treatment they received, went to the town and joined the local guerrillas. I reported it to Gomez, and asked if that was his policy, as he was always decrying the Spaniards for employing these methods. He said: 'Those people would not get out of there, and I did it as a humane measure. The humanity consists in forcing them to go away, because if they stay there the Spaniards will come along and kill them. ' The idea is to get the people out of the country. It is just as much to Gomez's ends as to those of the Spaniards not to have too many people around. It is onh^ because he is at present in a country where there are no people, or where there are no pacificos living, that he is able to elude the vigilance of the Spaniards. This policy was not started recently, but long ago, and Weyler has taken the same precaution as Gomez had done previously. "Q. Around what town was this? — A. Fomento. "Q. After they had their houses burnt, they joined the guerrillas? — A. A great many, as they were enraged at the treatment they received at the hands of those they thought their friends. "Q. Do you know — you have had good opportunit)' for observing — have you known any case where Gomez or Maceo, or any other Cuban general, has caused prisoners captured either in battle or out of battle to be shot? — A. I once had occasion to write about the conduct of Lieut. Col. Frederico Nunez, in the province of Pinar del Rio. He captured five Spanish soldiers on the estate »Susi, near Cayajabos, and strung them up. "Q. Did Maceo know of that? — A. No; he was very indignant about it when he heard of it. "Q. What did he do about it? — A. Reprimanded him, I guess. "Q. What was the excuse for doing it? — A. I forget the excuse. There was quite a little talk about it. He had some trouble with General Arolas at the time, and there was something behind it; I could not explain. "Q. Did he do it as an act of retaliation upon some Spanish general? —A. No. "Q. Because they were spies? — A. No. "Q. Well? — A. He might have done it because they were spies. He DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 171 captured them near the trocha, as Cayajabos was the first town outside the trocha. "Q. How did Maceo know about them? — A. Nunez made the report himself. "Q. Made the report that he captured them and hung them? — A. Yes, sir. You asked me did I know anything. I have a copy o£ an official docu- ment of one of these executions, committed by a Cuban sub-chief without the knowledge of his superiors. Here is a letter from Juan Ducasse, commanding the southern brigade of the province of Pinar del Rio. "Q. No, sir. — A. 'I have notice that you have verified some executions in the district under my command without my previous knowledge ' "O. Who was that from? — A. Ducasse to his subordinate. 'I direct this present letter to }'ou so that in the future you will abstain from doing this without filling all the legal requirements that are necessary in such cases. Please acknowledge the receipt of the present letter.' This was, as I say, sent by Ducasse to one of his subalterns (Maj. Thomas Murgado) who had caused a couple of pacificos to be executed. "Q. In every case the act, when it came to the knowledge of the com- mander, was disapproved and rebuked — the. man sometimes deprived of his rank? — A. Yes, sir. In another case I had the confession of a man who did it. Dr. Rojas Sanchez was a commander in Zayas's force. He boasted of having been given eight prisoners to deliver to the Spanish authorities, and openly bragged that only four got there. "Q. Did he say he reported that fact to his commanding officer? — A. No, sir. "Q. He kept that concealed? — A. Yes, sir; to show that Zayas was acting in good faith, when he made a big raid into the town of Esperanza, near vSanta Clara city, this same major openly boasted that he refused to go into the town unless given permission to use his machete on all pacificos, and Zayas would not allow him to go in, but ordered him to stay outside the town. A story comes to my mind "Q. A story I don't care about. — A. It is not a story; it was told to me by two soldiers "Q. I don't care about putting in this record the stories "A. I am perfectly convinced of it." It was a great point that the investigating senators did not care about stories. 172 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. "Q. How do you know any orders were given by any Cuban officer to loot and burn, to machete the men, but respect the women? Do you know that order was ever given? — A. I have heard it at La Palma. I have been at attacks on towns, and I have heard the order to loot and burn the town, but to respect women and children. The reason Maceo suffered such a defeat at Palma was because he put in all his unarmed men to assist in looting, they were so anxious to get clothing. His men were nearly naked. "Q. You went as an electrical engineer when you first went to Cuba? — A. Yes, sir. "Q. How long did you work at that? — A. Until the year after the war began. "Q. Establishing telegraph lines? — A. No, sir; putting up electric light plants." There was much anxiety about Mr. Rea's occupation, but his answers were clear .and to the point, and the more he was examined, the greater amount of truth, as in this case: By Mr. Davis: "Q. Do you not understand that those concentrados are mostly women and children and old men? — A. I do not understand that at all. "Q. Have you ever witnessed one of those places? — A. I saw just as many young men as there were old men. "Q. When? — A. Just before I came home — a few months ago. "Q. Men that liave come in from the country — Cubans? — A. I saw just as many young men as old men. The Cuban who has his country at heart — who was a patriot — went out during the first year. Those who have joined during the last year have been forced out by various circumstances — by lack of food, by persecutions of the Spaniards, etc. All the Cubans who had money when this war broke out came to the United States, and are carrying on the war from here. Leaving out those who rose up against vSpain during the first year of the outbreak, the men carrying on this war in the island are those who could not help themselves or had no money to get away. This insurrection was going on for a year in the provinces of Camaguey and Santa Clara, and those in the west did not have the nerve to take up arms. "Q. Did you ever have any difficulty with Gomez? — A. Yes, sir. "Q. What was it? — A. It is quite a long story. General Gomez and I were very good friends until — I do not say he is a bad friend of mine now, but DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. 173 he treated me very badly. He did not treat me as he had others. He treated Scovil much better. He offered him twenty men to help him get through, and did not offer me any. "Q. What do you mean by impartial manner? — A. He showed partiality to the others. "Q. In what month or in what year did this partiality begin? — A. When I first met the old man. "Q. What other correspondents were in the camp? — A. Sylvester Scovil, correspondent of the World. "Q. He treated him better than you? — A. Yes, sir. "Q. That continued until you ceased all relations with him? — A. Yes, sir. "Q. Now you can go on and make any statement you want to. — A. I had been away from him to Trinidad. I saw things that astonished me — that ought not to have taken place in the Cuban government. I saw many things that would work against them if printed and prove detrimental to their char- acter. Among other things Smith and I witnessed — not exactly witnessed, but we were within half a mile of the town of Paredes. At i o'clock at night the Cubans attacked the town. There were 16 Spanish soldiers in the garri- son — in one fort 5, in another 9, in another 2. They attacked the town and captured two forts, and there were but 5 Spaniards to deal with, when some one raised the cry, 'Here comes the Spaniards,' and they ran out of the town, leaving their dead and wounded. The Cuban commander made a report to Gomez, saying he had gained a big victory, while exactly the opposite was the case. He left his dead and wounded in the streets and ran away. Also, Smith and I had experience with the 'majas' or unarmed men, who live in the hills and steal the food from the pacificos and respect no one's authority. We also had seen several cases on the part of the government prefectos, who would not attend to their business. When I got to Gomez's camp, the old man asked me, very honestly, 'How about your trip?' I said, 'I have not enjoyed it very much;' and I went on to explain what I had seen. I told the old man, for his benefit, what I had seen, and Smith did also, and the old man was quite interested until finally he got mad and walked away; and I talked some with the other officers and made some criticisms on what had passed and that they did not know anything about. Gomez came to me after supper when I was passing through the camp, and said, 'What do you mean, Mr. Rea, by telling me all these things that you saw on that trip?' In the after- 174 DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDS. noon before that he came to me and said, 'You have told me these things, I suppose, because you sympathize with me and want them cor- rected.' Afterwards he called to me and asked what I meant by it, and I told him again what I had said before. He said it was not true, and I told him it was not my habit to lie. "Q. Was Smith in the camp? — A. Yes, sir. "Q. Did you call on him to corroborate you? — A. No, sir; Smith is afraid of the old man. Gomez said, 'What did you mean by saying my brigadier made a false report?' and I said that he did make a false report if he had said that he won a victory, after he had run away and left his dead and wounded. He said, 'What do j'ou think of it, and what are you going to write about it?' I said, 'I am to write the truth,' and he said that I had no business to write the truth. "Q. Did he make any point that you had made the same statements that you made to him to the various men in his command? — A. No, sir; the various men in his command have made these statements to him. He got very mad about it, and said that if I wrote these stories he would shoot me. I looked at him in surprise. I thought perhaps the old man might take it into his head to do it then. I said that it was a pretty serious thing to shoot a man, especially an American, and he answered that as the United States or nobody else had recognized him as a belligerent, and his status was that of a bandit, he would shoot me, and that he could not be held responsible. After awhile he calmed down, and we parted very comfortably. In the morning Gomez, in the front of all his forces, started again on the American Congress, the New York Herald, the American public, Grover Cleveland, and everybody else, and I told him I could not stand it any longer. He said all we cared about it was what we could get out of it or the money'we might make. "O. What did you say aboxit that? — A. I said he was way off — that is not exactly what I said. "O. Give us exactly. — A. I said. 'General Gomez, 3'ou are very unjust. You very well know that if the United States should set its foot down, and cut oiT your chance of getting arms and ammunition, your revolution could not last. ' "Q. Was that between you and Gomez alone? — A. No, sir; the whole armv was there — that is, the whole of the army he had, 150 men and staff. "O. They heard it all? — A. Yes, sir. After it was all over they came to DUTY OF FAIR PLAY TO THE SPANIARDvS. 175 me and tried to smooth it over. I said they could not smooth it over until the old man apologized. Smith was there, and was very mad. He went up to Gomez and told him that he must stop abusing Americans or he would resign. "Q. Did he give a reason for this? — A. Because he had insulted the nation and Americans. "O. Smith did not show he was very much afraid of the old man, then? —A. No, sir. "Q. He didn't like it?— A. Yes, sir. "Q. Did you leave Gomez after this incident? — A. About an hour after- wards. "Q. Did you leave his camp then? — A. About an hour afterwards. "Q. Did you report these facts to your paper? — A. To the paper, yes, sir; I did not publish them. I did not know whether I was right in publish- ing them or not. The old man made these remarks to me, and raised the dickens for no cause whatever. He was quite put out because, I suppose, the old fellow thought we ought to have been arrested and put in prison by the Spanish government, so as to raise an issue between that government and our own. "Q. Did you say anything about the partiality he had shown to other cor- respondents? — A. No, sir; I never said a word about it. He was comparing me with the other correspondents. He said that it would be a very good thing if Scovil or I were arrested, and then the United States government would get into trouble with Spain in regard to it, and he made the same remark that morning, and he made a comparison between Scovil and myself, and I said: 'General, the day I get arrested by the Spaniards, I don't think it will cause a war that will redound to your benefit. ' "Having read and corrected the above statement, I hereby sign the same. GEO. BRONSON REA, "355 Sixth Avenue, Brooklyn, N. Y. " l^'s:^^ < ^itm. CHAPTER VI. The Two Sorts of Spaniards in Cuba. The Food Supplies in Cuba— Introduction of the Torch by the Insurgents— Garcia's Fine Army with an Engineer Corps — The Double Tax on Sugar Making — Spanish Methods of Making War— The Policy of Annihilation— A Government in Light Marching Order. The importance of Mr. Rea's testimony is in the fact that it has been substantially confirmed by the revelations made in the American conquest of Cuba. The insurgents have been found generally as Mr. Rea represented, with the exception, perhaps, that he was occasionally excited by his sense of humor, and as the cue of the Commission was to deal with the Cubans as saints and martyrs, this exuberance was discouraged. However, the efful- gency of Mr. Smith may be accepted as compensation. The Spaniards and the Cubans made war upon the same general principles, with the exception of the treatment of prisoners and wounded. The cruelty of the Spaniards in dealing with those combatants was systematic and rarely allowed an instance of mercy. The Cubans as a rule did not torture helpless enemies, and they seldom "chopped up" prisoners, but the humane purposes of the leaders were often evaded. It was plain policy on the part of the Cubans to deal tenderly with the disabled and spare those who had surrendered, for they hoped to have their hospitals respected. Dr. Diaz states as within his personal knowl- edge that Martinez Campos favored the ministrations of the Red Cross, but Weyler held charitable attention was due Spaniards only. Cubaiis, however, used the torch without hesitation, and at last were mad with the illusion that when property was destroyed the Spaniards were the exclusive sufferers. The Cuban zeal for everlasting war faded perceptibly during the last year of the struggle. Mr. Rea estimated that when Maceo's western army gradually disappeared after the fall of their one magnetic leader, there were not more than twenty thousand Cubans in the army, wliile the whole force of the Span- iards was not less than 135,000 men. Air. Rea was asked the question: 176 THE TWO SORTS OF SPANIARDS IN CUBA. 177 "Q. Have you any way of accounting for the fact that the Cubans — according to your estimate being only 25,000 strong — have been able to pre- vent the 135,000 Spaniards from running over and destroying them? — A. You cannot lick a man if he will not let you, or if he runs away from 3'ou all the time. "O. Cuba is bounded by the sea on every side, and is patrolled by the navy of Spain? — A. There are a great many hills and woods, etc. A body of 1,000 men does not take up much space. That is the reason Gomez has divided his men into bodies of about 150 men, so he can get into the woods. "Q. If his force does not shrink considerably, how long can he protract this struggle? — A. As long as he has anything to eat. "Q. What are his resources for feeding his forces? — A. When I left the province of La Villas, two months ago, the eastern part, where Gomez is, had quite a large number of cattle, owing to the reason that it is a grazing coim- trj', quite the reverse to the western provinces, which are devoted to the culture of cane and tobacco. The eastern provinces of La Villas and Cam- aguey are devoted to cattle and grazing, the eastern part of. La Villas espe- cially. While he had plenty of cattle to last him, economically, for about a 3'ear, he had no potatoes, no vegetables, of any account." In Matanzas there were practically no insurgents. The few existing took refuge in the swamps, and subsisted chiefly on a species of jutia or racoon and crocodile steaks — no vegetables and no cattle, except as they could forage on the Spaniards. There were wild dispatches, however, day by day, about the wonderful war going on in Matanzas. The most unreserved of the admirers of General Gomez is Capt. W. D. Smith, who was also an admirer of Garcia, and gave in his sworn testimony the account of the army of the "Oriente" : "Garcia has the finest equipped army on the island. His chief of staff is General Menocal, a very good engineer, who speaks very good English. He has organized an engineer corps; he .has got a signal corps; he has got his cavalry and his artillery, and his engineer corps is pretty fine, too. It is right up to date. Any one who ever told me before I went down there that the Cubans had a good engineer corps I would have laughed at him, but it is true. ' ' The insurgent troops that came out of the woods at Santiago were there- fore the very flower of the Cuban army. Smith bestowed upon the Cubans, 178 THE TWO SORTS OF SPANIARDS IN CUBA. finding what was wanted, more than 60,000 men, saying, "They can put in the field a little over 60,000 men." As for Gomez personally: "General Gomez called me the morning I left there, and said: 'I want to speak to you. There have been false reports, and some may say to you that I have been sick. ' Gomez is a man over 70 years old. He put his hand on the pommel of his saddle and vaulted right over, and put his other hand on and vaulted right back again. He said to me, 'You do that,' and I told him that I had business elsewhere. 'A sick man cannot do that,' he said." The way Gomez harassed the Spaniards is thus, according to Captain Smith : "Just the moment Gomez gets news that a column has left Sancti Spiritus or any other fort he marches toward that column and they meet. I have never known Gomez to lie idle when there was a Spanish column out ; when they meet there is a fight right off. At night the Spaniards halt, and Gomez retires a mile or so. The Spaniards dare not put out a picket at night ; their only guard is in their camps. Just as quick as dark comes, Gomez details an officer -with 15 or 20 men to keep that camp awake, firing- into them all night, and then at daybreak Gomez attacks the camp, and so on, and they are fighting all day and night, and so on. Whenever they go into camp there are 15 or 20 men more keeping them awake all night, and the result is that the Spanish troops are exhausted, and obliged to return to the town for rations or from fatigue. "Q. The Spanish commanders are obliged to go back for provisions? — A. Yes, sir. "Q. Is the island of Cuba, in the places which were not cultivated, heavily timbered? — A. Yes, sir. "Q. Forests dense? — A. Yes, sir; some of the finest forests the eye ever saw; thousands upon thousands of acres of the finest mahogany, stretching as far as the eye can see. ' ' Mr. Stephen Bonsai, journalist, described the policy of the concentration of the peasantr}^ The orders were issued October, 1896, and, "Every peasant and every person living in the four western provinces outside the garrison towns were driven into stations of concentration, their houses were all burnt, their crops and the palm trees destroyed, all the roots that grew — yams, etc. — were dug up, with the idea, many of the officers told me, to rob insurgent bands in these so-called 'pacified' provinces of the means of subsistence." THE TWO SORTS OF SPANIARDS IN CUBA. i8i In the four western provinces there were twenty sugar estates protected, by regular and irregular Spanish troops, paid by the sugar men. Where there were twenty sugar estates, there had been 200, and: "You go along through the western provinces and you can see the standing chimneys" — all the great machinery burned! There is a close relationship that should be in mind between the sugar estate burning and the concentration abomination. No matter how much the Spaniards were paid to protect the sugar estates, they were burned unless the rebels were paid also. That is, there had to be "two taxes paid to the two governments." Mr. Bonsai says sometimes a man who paid a thousand soldiers would refuse to pay the Gomez tax, and "the crop was always burned." This happened to an American named Stillman. "He was somewhat sluggish and his crop was burned." This was the bottom of the policy of the insurgent commander in chief. He would allow the Spanish to make sugar if the cause of liberty got a share of the blackmail that was impartial as it was infamous. Mr. Bonsai was asked whether the payment of sugar protection was an open bargain, and he said: "It was a bargain. It was arranged at the palace in Havana, and they had to pay extra there. It was a written contract. They had to pay extra to keep the comandante sweet. It cost them a pretty penny to have this garri- son. Every man had to — the way they did this, they woiild have these places declared strategic points. That was the way the Spaniards would excuse the fact that they were having large bodies of troops in places where they were absolutely of no use. So Mr. Atkins or the sugar planters would go to Havana and have breakfast with the Marquis Palmerola, and have a talk, and have their places declared a strategic point, and the Captain General would order a certain number of troops there until further orders, with the understanding that the proprietor would pay so much bounty. I visited one estate where there were a thousand men. By Mr. Davis: "Q. What estate? — A. Azpeztequia, on the southern coast, belonging to the Marquis, now in Madrid, and who belongs to the constitutional or tory party in Cuba. It had eighty forts defending it. "Q. Eighty forts?— A. Fortines. They look like forts in Sebastopol, a game we used to play when I was a boy "By Mr. Morgan: i82 THE TWO SORTS OF SPANIARDS IN CUBA. "O. Did you learn whether this destruction of sugar plantations was the work of one side exclusively or both? — A. I think it was both sides. It is a rather difficult question, because they have each changed their policy. The Spanish idea the first year of the war, the last campaign, as announced over his own signature by Mr. Duguy de Lome, was to make the sugar crop. That was to show that the revolution was merely local and of little impor- tance. This letter was published in the New York Herald, being the ideas of the representative of the Spanish government in the United States, and at that time they took steps to protect the sugar estates to the best of their abil- ity. Azpeztequia was the first man to fortify his estate. As soon as they found out, as they did a year and a half ago, while the first sugar crop was making, that even the most loyal Spaniard, being a business man, was per- fectly willing to pay 50 cents a bag for the sugar he made to the insurgents, or to the Cuban prefecto — when they found out that the people they were pro- tecting were paying taxes into the patriot treasury they concluded it would be a good thing to destroy all the sugar. "By Mr. Davis: "Q. By 'them' you mean the Spanish? — A. Yes, sir. This year they have done nothing for the sugar people, because they knew all the sugar people, whether American, French, German, or the most loyal Spaniard, were paying tribute on their prospective crop to the insm-gent local repre- sentatives. It is so easy to burn cane. One man can burn cane, and 4,000 can not stop it. So the policy of the Spanish government in Cuba on the sugar question changed entirely. Last year it was to make the crop ; this year they think to hurt the Cubans more by destroying it." It should be carefully observed that the cane conflagrations became so fashionable that the Spaniards participated like the others, but few people have reflected that in this war with the torch, the incendiary San Domingo method of destroying all that fire would burn, the worst of the atrocities of the war had their origin — and Weyler and Gomez will be held participants in the crime as far as history enlightens men. Mr. Bonsai said in his evidence about the perishing people crowded around the Spanish garrisons — a horrible example being at Matanzas: "Judge Day asked me two or three days ago, I do not suppose confi- dentially, what would happen if the Spanish government should change its policj' and drive these people back to the places whence they came. I said THE TWO SORTS OF SPANIARDS IN CUBA. 183 that many would die on the way ; that many more would die of starvation after they arrived, "Q. And very few would survive? — A. Yes, sir. "Q. So it is death to stay, and death to go back to their homes? — A. Yes, sir." It does not occur to everj'body, as it certainly should, that this horrible system of warfare never was known in Cuba until General Gomez led his columns five hundred miles through the island, burning plantations; the Cuba Libre journals in New York setting forth in glowing terms that the ruddy skies were the token of the triumphant progress of the liberating army. There was no devastation like this in the ten years' war from 1868 to 1878! That was comparatively civilized. The firebrand was thrown in 1896 in the name of freedom, and the end was blackmail, famine, pestilence, and death. The leaders in this were not the Spanish, but the Cuban officers. The Spaniards did not at first throw fire, but they followed the San Domingo example and became destroyers, as the insurgents were. The very Cubans who began this desperado work, complaining bitterly because their own fashion was imitated, are the foremost and most venomous of the enemies of the United States, insisting that their government of shadows and army of false pretenses must be consoled with money for the horrors they themselves so largely originated. The Spaniards are said to have avowed that they had a policy of extermination. This is in Mr. Bonsai's testimony: "The Spaniards say that the policy of what they call 'kindness' has failed, and that now they have quite made up their minds that the only thing is extermination ; that there will never be peace on the island as long as there are any of these Cubans left, or any considerable number of them. "Q. The policy is then to exterminate? — A. Yes, sir; and they are not at all squeamish about admitting it. "O. They propose to destroy the peasant population? — A. Yes, sir. "Q. And then to repopulate with Spanish? — A. Yes, sir. They have already exterminated one race, and Las Casas tells how they did it. They will probably follow the same methods with the Creole race. "Q. None of the Indians are living? — A. No, sir; within forty years of taking possession by the Spaniards, the Caribbean or Giboney race quite disap- peared, although they had numbered 400,000 or 500,000, in a generation and a half." i84 THE TWO SORTS OF SPANIARDS IN CUBA. But why did the Cubans introduce into this war the lurid features of bar- barism, the firebrand with which the meanest savage can lay in ashes the proudest monuments of civilization — the greater achievements of art, the grandest realizations of the creative forces of industry? "The Cuban Republic" has this question to answer before the people of the United States, who have now to deal not with the peninsular Spaniards, but with Spaniards of the island who are not an improvement on the old stock. We know well how freely the Spaniard has shed blood, how he has for a century stained his colonies with red rivers, how cruel, haughty, revengeful he has been, but what we want to ascertain absolutely now is whether he has precedence as an incendiary and freedom reached by sacrifice of fire? By whom was laid waste the production of one million tons of sugar per annum in Cuban plantations? The peninsular Spaniards did not do that savagery. Mr. Bonsai said: "General Weyler is not unpopular among what you might call the most powerful section of the Spaniards in the island of Cuba. On the contrary, he is quite popular. He is just the man they want. They believe with him in command this policy of extermination will be carried out to its logical con- clusion. I remember, in Santa Clara, in the Club of Merchants, in the town of Santa Clara — it was at the time when it was proposed that Gen. Martinez Campos should come to Cuba — they said to me, these men of influence, unanimously, that 'if Martinez Campos comes to the island of Cuba and makes any proposition of compromise, as he had before, we will shoot him in the streets of Havana. We do not want General Weyler removed, because he is our man. He is bloodthirsty, and he is the man we want.' " Certainly! The tale of bloodthirstiness is the old, old Spanish story, and Weyler was a man of blood. But was he the first of the firebugs in this war? Why deny Gomez the credit of the premier firebrand policy? Dr. F. B. Winn said there were 4, 700 insurgent troops at his time in Havana province, and the concentrados numbered about 80,000 "paisonos — farmers." "Q. What class of people constitute these concentrados? — A. Small farmers, renters, what we would call in this country, I suppose, tenant farmers; a good many storekeepers. Out there they have these small stores scattered all over the country. It is a very old country, and near the sugar plantations or in the thickly settled community they would have five or six of tl^ese small grocery stores to sell groceries, small articles, and drinks, etc. — to sell everything; and those people have been scattered and their stores burned. THE TWO SORTS OF SPANIARDS IN CUBA. 1S7 They are loyal ; but the greater part of the concentrados are little farmers who were unable to get out of the island, and did not care to join the insurgents, and wanted to get to town ; lived in bad houses, which the Spaniards burned. The Spaniards burned all these houses, all the wooden houses. "Q. Was that generally through the province of Havana, the burning of houses of the common people? — A. Complete; all burnt; none left standing. "Q. None at all? — A. None at all; not a house left standing outside of the fortification. ' ' This was the first of the Spanish answers to the sugar plantation firebug crusade. The famine followed. "Q. Are these little palm leaf huts furnished with any furniture or con- veniences for living? — A. No, sir. Some have a chair — you can get a chair pretty near any place in the island. I could camp any place in the province and have a chair to .sit down on in five minutes. The whole island is strewn with chairs, sewing machines, tables, and household articles, etc. "Q. Broken out of the houses? — A. Yes, sir. These concentrados can not come out for them, and they make their chairs and provide the houses pretty well. "Q. By whom has this wreck of the houses been conducted and carried on? — A. The large stone houses, of which there were a good many in that province — the wealthy people's houses — were destroyed by the insurgents, as they regarded them as possible fortifications for the Spanish arm)\ The little wooden houses, the small houses, were destroyed by the Spaniards." Dr. Winn gave a most interesting and important account of the "sur- rendered people," saying: "They are people who came to America, ran away from Cuba to America, and came to the Junta and were a charge on the Junta, and to get them off their hands they sent them back to the insiirgent lines. For the most part they were young men who lived in Havana; dudes, as we would call them here; some bachelors, with a diploma from a college. They would come back to Cuba with their diplomas and call themselves captains, majors, and colo- nels, and they would come up and represent themselves to the men who have been fighting in the field for two years, and they would say: 'We come from the Junta, and you get us a horse and a negro and we want commands in the army,' and the officers would say: 'You get yourself a horse and a negro, if you want them, and get to fighting,' and they would fight for a day or two. i88 THE TWO SORTS OF SPANIARDS IN CUBA. and then slip into the brush and wait their chance to come into the Spanish lines. There is another class of presentados called maja, who are in the woods. They took to the woods when the orders of concentration came. They are supposed to be there to fight when arms are sent to them. When t arms are furnished them, they are ordered to the force to fight. About 40 per cent of them sneak into the first town and surrender. They will not sur- render until they have a gun, but when they have a gun it is a sort of guaranty for them. That is another kind of presentados. " The doctor gave this unquestionable statement of the wa)- a Spanish column searches a thick wood for Cuban hospitals, that they may chop up the wounded with machetes : "I at one time got out of the woods before the soldiers got in, and sat on a hill 300 or 400 yards away and watched them go into the woods. The chief stopped about 300 yards from where they entered the brush, and the infantr}' marched up and all the officers stood back, and the sergeant or lieutenant or small officers ordered the men in. The men marched up to the brush, and then they woiald hesitate, and these officers would draw their canes — they nearly all carry canes — or some of them machetes, and they would whip them in. They would grab a man by the arm and strike him with a cane and drag and push him in. By the time a man got a little ways in he would cry 'Viva Espagnol, ' and then the others would follow, and they would all rush in and set the houses afire, and yell and raise the mischief generally, and those on the outside would run up and try to set the brush afire, try to set the whole army afire, as it looked to me. If it had been dry brush, like American undergrowth, they would have burnt the entire army up. "Q. By brush do you mean trees and bushes that have been cut down? — A. No, sir; it is short growth that has not been cut down." Dr. Danforth, of Milwaukee, for a year physician to Cisneros, President of Cuba, was examined June, 1897, and when asked the favorite question about the mysterious Cuban capital, he said : "They have had no capital until about the ist of February of this year, and then they put up a number of houses at Aguira, about three leagues to west of the city of Wymero, in Puerto Principe, and thej' established that as the seat of government. "Q. Were they not at Cubitos? — A. No, sir. "Q. Have they ever been driven out of their seat of government by the THE TWO SORTS OF SPANIARDS IN CUBA. 1S9 Spaniards? — A. Not up to the time I left; but I will tell you in candor that all the Spaniards have to do, if they want to, is to march 100 men down there and drive the Cubans out. I was there on the 29th of April, and they had but 8 men in the capital. "Q. Is there any regular postal service? — A. Yes, sir. "Q. In what manner is it conducted? — A. On this plan: They have the prefects of these districts, and they act as distributing officers in the postal service, I believe. "Q. They are from 3 to 6 leagues apart? — A. Yes, sir. All the people in their districts are coming and going to and from their place. They usually risit the prefects at least once every week or two to get mail. " "Once every week or two" was the regular mail service of this country with a capital city containing eight men and located for several months where it was the greater part of the time visible only by the all-tearching eye of Omnipotence. Dr. Danforth is a gentleman of large figures. He estimated the Spanish forces in Cuba at 300,000 men — the Cubans about one in ten. As to food: "In Camaguey, where I was, they have boniato, or sweet potatoes. Some- times they will have yucca, sometimes plantains, sometimes cochanchilla, a mixture of honey and hot water. Sometimes they will have coffee, sometimes they will not have anything except, perhaps, meat. "Q. How about their supply of meat? — A. It is ample. "Q. Where is that obtained? — A. Everywhere, anywhere. By the laws of the Cubans, by the law of the land, it is a fact that the Cuban rulers declared, when this war first started, that all horses and all cattle in the island, wherever found, were to be regarded as public property. The result is you can find cattle everywhere in Camaguey. I do not believe I have ever ridden three miles without seeing more or less cattle. The yucca grows without any care at all. They have also a great many bananas, or plantains, as they are termed, growing at Cubitos at the present time. They have a great many of those, and they send over from the rest of the province every once in a while to secure several mule loads of the yucca and plantain, or boniato — the sweet potato. "Q. I do not understand about that plant yucca. Is that a plant which grows in moist soil, like a radish? — A. No, sir; it belongs to the family of 19° THE TWO SORTS OF SPANIARDS IN CUBA. tubers, I believe. It is the root, and the root will increase in size, and will weigh anywhere from 5 to loo pounds. The)'- are very large. "Q. Is it palatable and nutritious? — A. Indeed, it is. It is just about like our Irish potato; just about the same thing. "Q. Do they cook it in the skme way as Irish potatoes? — A. Yes, sir; they cut it up and put it in water and allow it to boil just about as with Irish potatoes. "Q. It comes out mealy? — A. No, sir; it comes out in the original pieces, very nicely done — mealy and nice to the taste. "Q. They eat it with salt, just as you would an Irish potato? — A. Yes, sir. "Q. That food does not require cultivation? — A. No, sir. "Q. Grows indigenous? — A. Yes, sir; wherever you chance to put it. "Q. I have been interested, too, in another thing, and that is, what is the production of hogs in the island of Cuba? — A. They have an immense number. Contrary to the custom in the United States, they allow them to run wild, and they eat whatever they find. I do not know exactly what they do live on, but they live very well. They have what they call hog dogs, and if you want a hog you call the dogs ,and they will take after the hogs, and after chasing them around, the dogs will seize them by the ears and maintain their hold until the man comes up, and then they tie their legs together and sling him across the saddle and take him to the house and kill him. "Q. They are in good condition? — A. Always. "Q. Have the Spanish ever attempted to drive them out of there? — A. Never as yet, up to the time I left Cuba, although one day there was word sent that a Spanish column of 4,000 men was only a league and a half off, and we had orders to get our horses up and saddled, and everything on them, ready to start at a moment's notice. However, it proved to be a false rumor. "Q. And where is the treasury of the government kept? — A. That is somewhat complex. The treasurer of the government is Mr. Pina, and he receives and disburses all moneys, and as fast as he will get on hand any considerable store of money that money is sent, I believe, to New York, in some way or another, to the Junta, and there is used for the purposes that are best calculated to help the revolutionists. "Q. In the meantime, where does he keep his monej' ; where does he have it for safe-keeping? — A. In the chests. THE TWO SORTS OF SPANIARDS IN CUBA. 191 "Q. Carried with the government?— A. Yes, sir; with the President's escort. "Q. Carried along with the archives? — A. Yes, sir. "Q. About what proportion of the Cuban army is negroes? — A. Well, I should say less than 50 per cent. I do not know how much less, but less than 50 per cent. "Q. As a rule, are the negroes under white officers, white Cuban officers? — A. Yes, sir. "Q. Are they good soldiers? — A Yes, sir; very good, indeed; and splendid fighters, too." It is agreeable to hear that the money, gathered, we presume, chiefly through what we may call the supplementary sugar tax, was shipped to the New York Junta. The wars of independence of Spanish colonies were always a competition of Juntas, the original Spaniards holding that they were the divinely appointed ruling class. It was in Cuba only that the insurgents got ahead of the regulars in the use of fire — and this was ominously imder lead of the military chieftain from the east end of Haiti. We have followed the testimony taken by the Senate committee of investi- gation sufficiently to show the character of the war in Cuba, and have endeavored to apportion judicially the measures of the degrees of the respec- tive responsibilities for the peculiar horrors of the conflict between the antagonists. There was an awful accumulation of evidence of unparalleled atrocities. We have to so far acknowledge the rights of the belligerents as to admit the consanguinity of the combatants. We shall quote in addition to the passages that truly set forth the situation of the woeful island during the last year before the American intervention and participation in war, only a few lines from the statement of Mr. C. F. Koop, of Boston, who described fearful brutalities on the cars by Spanish officers : "Q. You can state some of the instances which impressed you as being characteristic of the situation. — A. One of the saddest, if not the saddest sight I saw was the case of a woman who stood in front of a hotel in Santa Clara, and who dropped dead when I handed her a piece of bread. That was the saddest sight I saw on the whole trip. "Q. Did she undertake to eat it? — A. She dropped the baby which she had in her arms, grabbed the piece of bread which I handed her, drove her teeth into it and fell over dead. She had a baby in her arms and two little children hanging on to her skirts. 192 THE TWO SORTS OF SPANIARDS IN CUBA. "Q. ^V^hat became of the baby she let drop? — A. The baby died that night or the next morning. I found out in the morning that it had died; and the other two children died a day or two afterwards. "Q. Died of starvation? — A. Yes; starvation." Mr. Koop was a man traveling in the tobacco business, and he expressed the opinion that the true purpose of the Spaniards in herding the farmers in the "Zones" of cultivation was to cause them to perish of fevers and starva- tion. We quote: "Q. Do the Spanish treat the Cubans with repugnance? — A. They feel that a Cuban is worse than a dog. "Q. You think, then, that the purpose of the regulation was really to starve these people to death? — A. Yes; the sole purpose. It is well known that 900,000 of those natives were forced in from their homes, and out of that number 500,000 have died already. Therefore, the results have proved the motive. "Q. What was the apparent relation between the soldiers and these reconcentrados, or did the soldiers seem to have^ny sort of human regard for them? — A. Many of the soldiers are low spirited and absolutely incapable of having such resentment, because, in the majority of cases, they were mere boys and in such a condition as to be hardly able to take care of themselves. The repugnance was largely among the officers and the Spanish guards, which is the flower of the army. They are in better condition than the common soldiers. The Home Guard, picked men, are also in better condition. "Q. What is the feeling of this class that are in better condition — what is their feeling towards these poor reconcentrados, as you saw it? — A. There is a sort of a feeling between them that they would eat at one another's table, if they could. If one had anything, they would give it to the other. There was no animosity among the ordinary soldiery of the Spanish army." During the examination of witnesses by Senators to ascertain accurately the state of the island, much attention was given^any one who had ever been in or about the Cuban capital, and anything that supported the view that the Cubans had a civil government somewhere in the woods was dwelt upon and made impressive as possible. This was with a view of putting the Cubans to the front as constituting a Republic. There was found, to the satisfaction of the pro-Cuban part}', that there was an organization camped in a secluded spot, in light marching order, with a President, and a cabinet and all the THE TWO SORTS OF SPANIARDS IN CUBA. 193 formal appurtenances. As the Cubans could not maintain themselves at any particular port, they were given to magnifying 'the formalities and celebrating the functional equipments of their government and to claiming for it a "com- plete" postal system, and also an all-encircling coast guard, but this machine lacked a great deal of perfection, and indeed the uses to which it was applicable were rather in anticipation thafi performance — like the Cuban army in the later months before the United States declared war. The far-sighted organizers remote from the scenes, seeing that they had ready a government to claim the sovereignty to be wrested by our arms from the Spaniards, set up an official ring as the people of Cuba, with power to mortgage the bloody ashes of the island, and assume to rule when their turn came as the Spaniards had done. The history of the island in the future must depend in a compre- hensive way upon the dealing with the professors of official Cubanism, by the government of the United States, whose specific promise to the people of Cuba and the United States and all civilized men, was and remains to estab- lish a "stable government." The immediate necessity is that the possessions with which Spain has parted are to be subordinated to our military forces, under the inviolable guaranties of "the faith and honor of the army of the United States." -^ * H « :lr GENERAL LEE'S CONSUL-GENERALSHIP IN CUBA. 203 the release or speedy trial of all American citizens under arrest, and before the change of the Spanish Cabinet in October last twenty-two prisoners, citizens of the United States, had been given their freedom." Then came the work of charity. The message of the President very seriously recited the develop- ments of the situation leading up to the most grave utterance that ever came from a chief magistrate of this country, touching our international obliga- tions as Americans, and the conservative propriety of our interest in the peace of communities of the neighborhood. The culmination of the message was in this paragraph: "Sure of the right, keeping free from all offense ourselves, actuated only by upright and patriotic considerations, moved neither by passion nor selfishness, the govern- ment will continue its watchful care over the rights and propert)'' of American citizens, and will abate none of its efforts to bring about by peaceful agencies a peace which shall be honorable and enduring. If it shall hereafter appear to be a duty imposed by our obligations to ourselves, to civilization and humanity, to intervene with force, it shall be without fault on our part and only because the necessity for such action will be so clear as to command the support and approval of the civilized world." The remarkable words were " to intervene with force." Spain well knew what the four words signified, but those engaged in shouting war cries in Cuba and this country were not satisfied. They had been screaming for years against General Grant and Grover Cleveland, because they did not accept the New York Junta as a nation, entitled to use the arms of the United States for the faction in Cuba that sought with our aid to supersede the Spaniards. President McKinley offended the filibusters when he declared: "The wise utterances of President Grant in his memorable message of December 7, 1875, are signally relevant to the present situation in Cuba, and it may be whole- some now to recall them. ' ' This, of course, was simple treason to the Republic of Cuba. President Grant said, and President ]\IcKinley quoted with approbation, these words: "A recognition of the independence of Cuba being, in my opinion, impracticable, and indefensible, the question which next pre- sents itself is that of the recognition of belligerent rights in the parties to the contest." More than this. President McKinley said: "In a former message to Congress I had occasion to consider this question, and reached the con- clusion that the conflict in Cuba, dreadful and devastating as were its inci- dents, did not rise to the fearful dignity of war." In a word, the President 204 GENERAL- LEE'S CONSUL-GENERALSHIP IN CUBA. did not propose to use the United States for the pretended Cuban Republic, and that was the very pith of the Cuban war party's position. The President, instead of floundering into war headlong for the Cuban incendiaries, who pre- pared at once to destroy property and issue certificates of bonded indebtedness, made a last sincere and pressing effort to defer war, and so far as was pos- sible interpreted events as helpful for the preservation of peace. He said he regarded the recognition of belligerency of the Cuban insurgents as "now unwise and therefore inadmissible" — and he held that "a hopeful change has supervened in the policy of Spain toward Cuba. A new government has taken office in the mother country. It is pledged in advance to the declaration that all the effort in the world cannot suffice to maintain peace in Cuba by the bayonet; that vague promises of reform after subjugation afford no solution of the insular problem ; that with a substitution of commanders must come a change of the past system of warfare for one in harmony with a new policy." These were the promptings and teachings of a generous heart, and there was behind them the wisdom of expediency, for if we were drifting to war, we would be great gainers by the time occupied. All the American citizen prisoners in Cuba were released. There could be nothing lost save as to the Cuban Republic, and bonds based on the naked chimneys, monumental of ancient and prosperous industry! The President was in position to say: "Not a single American citizen is now in arrest or confinement in Cuba of whom this government has any knowledge. The near future will demonstrate whether the indispensable condition of a righteous peace, just alike to the Cubans and to Spain, as well as equitable to all our interests so intimately involved in the welfare of Cuba, is likely to be attained. If not, the exigency of further and other action by the t^nited States will remain to be taken. When that time comes that action will be determined in the line of indispu- table right and duty. It will be faced, without misgiving or hesitancy, in the light of the obligation this government owes to itself, to the people who have confided to it the protection of their interests and honor, and to humanity." There was behind the President all the powers of the people, and all the dignities of decency and civilization ; and the grim necessity of which he had knowledge exceeding others — for, if war was just ahead, we should not make haste to get into it without preparation. There was an ignorant and inflammatory public opinion — part vanity and part malice — fed by the falsehoods of Spanish Cubans through the convenient GENERAL LEE'S CONSUL-GENERALSHIP IN CUBA. 205 wires, and it was foolishly and wantonly and insolently wrong, as regards the conditions under which we were moving to encounter in Cuba — first, the rainy season; second, the sweltering venom of the yellow fever; third, insufficient water supplies and inadequate facilities for the water transportation even of ollr regular army and the articles requisite to its higher efficiency. Last, but not least, there was not abroad in our country understanding of the fighting abilities of the Spaniards on the defensive, or the fruitfulness of the soil that made starvation outside prisons a tedious task — for we could only blockade the ports. The marvels of the soil and sky of Cuba in providing food remained, and not until the full story of the war is read will the people at large be truly informed of the endowments of the island, golden in all but the yellow metal. The Cuban Spaniards and American filibusters were rank with violence that would have been ludicrous if it had not closly approached criminality, because the President held open to the last hour it was practicable the door that led to the paths of peace. It was Cuban influence that burnt the sugar plantations that did not yield the Republic a special tax, that branded the insurrection with the San Domingo mark, and redoubled outcries for recognizing independence, on preposterous grounds, granting belligerency, and putting firebrands wherever there was fuel for war. CHAPTER VIII. The Actual Experience and Sentiments of the People of Cuba. Two Parties of Malignants — The Firm Stand of the President at the Beginning of the War — A Study of the Historical Truth of the Situation — The President's Language Contrasted with that of the Fire Bugs — Extreme Views of Senators Davis, Daniel, Foraker, and Others — The Fury of the War Party — Cuban and Spanish Desperadoes — The Massacre of the Maine — The Findings of the Courts — List of the Lost on the Ship. The public sentiiaient in Havana did not easily ajDpear to strangers. It was of vital consequence to those who were owners of real estate or engaged in business, surrounded with families, to assume an attitude as far as permissible from partyism — to be moderate in all things, cultivate good will, put out, as a form of consenting to the conditions, the Spanish colors, wear dress suits on occasions of ceremony, welcoming General Weyler, for example. There were those who took the risks of avowed sympathy with the insurgents, but they had reasons for refraining from active service. One of the ways of preventing persecutions was in the susceptibility of many holding Spanish commissions to the acceptance of concessions in cash or its equivalent. The processes of protection in the city were like those that prevented the burning of a few cane fields and mills, and the dispersion of the carts and horses that were an important part of the equipment of plantations — that is, the payment of a double tax. There were those who communicated with the avowed rebels in Key West, New York, and elsewhere, and the Spanish officials were complacent about that. The price of taking a small package of "private" letters to the United States post office was a five dollar Spanish gold piece. Often Spanish or insurgent officers were transported to and fro from Havana — visiting the United States — at regular rates, according to the rank of the travelers. Under this system it was not difficult to account for adventures that were touched up with superficial mystery. What was the need of daring when bribery was .so facile? Heroism was as marketable as Mauser cartridges 206 SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA. 207 at Morro Castle I The men of sincerities ascertained that there were deplor- able disadvantages in persistent integrity. There were two besetting dangers for an honest man. One was to give mortal offense to the important Span- iards by telling the truth of them — and the other was to insult the civilian insurgents by truthfulness respecting them, the capital crime being to doubt the ability of the government in the woods to issue bonds, command armies, and exercise all the supreme functions of a national sovereignty. Those who absorbed this fictitious officialism held that it was treason to question their regularity, and they were sure as possible of everything and in a state of infallibility all the time. It was highly criminal to fail in faith in any false- hood invented in and telegraphed from the Florida bureaus. It was the most wicked way of being treasonable to Cuba Libre to hesitate to believe that the New York Junta and the literary manufactures, carried on outside Cuba with the making of Havana cigars, were not the veritable and the only people of Cuba. One development of scoundrelism in Cuba fostered another. The canker of corruption in the Spanish service was not unknown among the Cubans. There were pecuniary reasons for the protraction of the war. There is a real people of Ciiba behind all this. There is also a real Spanish manhood that is not revealed in this outrageous distemper of dishonesty. If one got the unreserved confidence of true Cubans — those who in spite of mis- government had made the island prosper — the truth would break out about in this way: "We have been taxed regularly and irregularly, by the Spaniards and the rebels — double taxed in custom houses — forced to pay for things done and undone — compelled to pay all sorts of soldiers and loafers to care for us, openly and secretly — have everything offered now as always for money — and are refused justice in any case without it. Now we are exhausted. Our money is gone.* We are not politicians. This is a rich country. There is no end of money to be made here. We only want order — no matter whether un3iF"a monarchy or a republic — anything so that we can do business. We know that if the Spanish conquer the island and rule it again we shall be ruined utterly. We are almost in a condition of beggary now. It will be ■ very little, if any, better for us if these fellows who claim to have a Cuban government should become the masters of the island. They will ruin us just the same as the Spaniards. In either case we are reduced to poverty, and shall be without hope. We have one chance — that we shall sometime soon- very soon, before it is too late for us and our children — become a part of the 2o8 SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA. United States." Notwithstanding the terrible indictment of the Spanish colonial system, of which the last and worst development was in Cuba, by the President in his message of December, 1897, it would have been impossible to have framed a paper more disturbing and alarming to the managers of the Cuban policy than the whole doctfment as it appeared with its plain use of the plain words "intervention with force." The Caban holders of commissions or diplomas, as they say, wanted intervention with force, to be sure, but for them, in their way. The programme was for the United States to make the war and finish it and turn over the island to the Cuban republic. There was a huge speculation in this contrived to be at the expense of the United States, and President McKinley's straightforward course was an interference. One of the Cuban outcries had been stifled. It was that crowds of "American citizens" were imprisoned and not tried. That was at an end. Weyler was gone like a gory scapegoat, and Blanco had arrived, dressed in regimentals that he gave assurance were white robes. He made an impression that there was a real meaning behind his good words. He seemed to be taking himself in earnest. The Spanish language was not exhausted. The President appeared to have hopes that his policy of peace could prevail. It was necessary that there should be something done in Havana to change the current. There was always under Spanish rule a chance for a panic there. The vindictive volunteers were ever ready for the indulgence of resentments. They liated the Blanco style, and opposed it with the same malignity that their extreme opposites — the firebug patriots — denounced the pacific President of the United States. They discovered that the American citizens in Havana were in peril, that they needed ships of war to protect them ! That was one of the cultivated alarms always ready for an emergency. The incendiaries had failed to impress General Lee. There •was a solidity about his composition that gave them sore grief. Lee was fearless and posi- tive as against Spanish misconduct toward American citizens, no matter how defective their title might be. He acted on the face of the papers — but the incandescent Cuban officialism did not appeal to him strongly. He did not submit himself to those people or take them into his confidence. He was an American, not a Cuban, but he could not see, as the United States and Spain were in friendly relations, officially, why there should not be one of our ships of war in the Havana harbor — on the like terms of those of the favored nations. The Cuban theory that our war ships were wanted in the harbor to SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA. 209 protect Americans was unsound. The real want was to use and display our ships of war so as to promote the war conspiracy! It was certain that if we sent ships to Havana waters to rest there as fixtures we would sacrifice many lives to the pestilential influences of that spot where centuries of filthiness have made provision for plagues of fever. It was clear also to any observer that if there were Americans in personal danger, a ship of war more or less could not save them, for the ships would necessarily be out of the way of the resorts of the city, and under the German guns with which the old forts and the new fortifications were armed. It was provided that there should be arranged an exchange of courtesies between Spanish and American ships of war, and two ill-fated cruisers were appointed, the Maine to visit Havana and the Vizcaya to call at New York. The malignants on both sides in Cuba, the extreme peninsular Spaniards, and the extreme Cuban Spaniards, the filibusters and adventurers, were joyful over the massacre of the Maine, and used the awful story to fan the smolder- ing embers of war into a conflagration. They were aided by the Cuban war party in the United States, and a great, irresistible wave of emotion that was deeper than anger, and of indignation that rises like the ocean uplifted by an earthquake and rolls mighty billows upon distant shores. It was the Presi- dent's duty, and he performed it, to be clear headed for the country, to hold the balances of judgment serenely higher than the sphere of the tempests. It is not often in the annals of mankind that a man has had a loftier and broader responsibility to discharge, and the President, awed by the overmastering sense of the destiny upon him, was not disquieted and depressed, but calmed and elevated by the magnitude of events, as became a President of the people, and there were those who would have belittled the da}'s as they passed with sound and fury, and cheapened themselves with hatefulness and fancies that haste and clamor would be thought identical with the expression of serious duties, — and the sensationalists displayed themselves on fire lines and illuminated the distortions of their own insignificance. In proportion as the people of the United States knew war and were of general intelligence, they sustained with their moral sympathy and political force the equipoise of the Executive Department; they commended the request of Captain Sigsbee of the Maine for a suspension of public opinion as to that catastrophe, and the deliberate reserve of the President, accepting the tenders of courtesies of Spanish military and naval civil authorities in the way of regrets and condo- 2IO SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA. lences for the victims of the Havana harbor explosion. In the message of the President May nth, after quoting state papers of Cleveland and Jackson, and reciting once more the hideous situation in Cuba and the elements of danger and disorder, he said these had been "strikingly illustrated by a tragic event which has deeply and justly moVed the American people. I have already transmitted to Congress the report of the naval court of inquiry on the destruction of the battleship Maine in the harbor of Havana during the night of the 15 th of February. The destruction of that noble vessel has filled the national heart with inexpressible horror. Two hundred and fifty-eight brave sailors and marines and two officers of our navy, reposing in the fancied security of a friendly harbor, have been hurled to death, grief and want brought to their homes, and sorrow to the nation. "The naval court of inquiry, which, it is needless to say, commands the unqualified confidence of the government, was unanimous in its conclusion that the destruction of the Maine was caused by an exterior explosion, that of a submarine mine. It did not assume to place the responsibility. That remains to be fixed. "In any event, the destruction of the Maine, by whatever exterior cause, is a patent and im.pressive proof of a state of things in Cuba that is intoler- able. That condition is thus shown to be such that the Spanish government cannot assure safety and security to a vessel of the American navy in the har- bor of Havana on a mission of peace, and rightfully there." Further, dwelling in this connection on recent diplomatic correspondence, "A dispatch from our Minister to Spain, of the 26th ultimo, contained the state- ment that the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs assured hira positively that Spain will do all that the highest honor and justice require in the matter of the Maine. The reply above referred to of the 31st ultimo also contained an expression of the readiness of Spain to submit to an arbitration all the differences which can arise in this matter, which is subsequently explained by the note of the Spanish Minister at Washington of the lotli instant, as follows : , " 'As to the question of fact which springs from the diversity of views between the reports of the American and Spanish boards, Spain proposes that the facts be ascertained by an impartial investigation by experts, whose decision Spain accepts in advance. ' "To this I have made no reply. " Nothing was wanted of Spain's experts. SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA. 211 The date of this message was within ten days of the declaration of war, and the President closed in these words, that will ever reflect honor upon him : "I ask the Congress to authorize and empower the President to take measures to secure a full and final termination of hostilities between the government of Spain and the people of Cuba, and to secure in the island the establishment of a stable government, capable of maintaining order and observing its international obligations, insuring peace and tranquillity and the security of its citizens as well as our own, and to use the military and naval forces of the United States as may be necessary for these purposes. "And in the interest of humanity and to aid in preserving the lives of the starving people of the island I recommend that the distribution of food and supplies be continued, and that an appropriation be made out of the public Treasury to supplement the charity of our citizens. "The issue is now with the Congress. It is a solemn responsibility. I have exhausted every effort to relieve the intolerable condition of affairs which is at our doors. Prepared to execute every obligation imposed upon me by the Constitution and the law, I await your action. "Yesterday, and since the preparation of the foregoing message, official information was received by me that the latest decree of the Queen Regent of Spain directs General Blanco, in order to prepare and facilitate peace, to pro- claim a suspension of hostilities, the duration and details of which have not yet been communicated to me. "This fact, with every other pertinent consideration, will, I am sure, have your just and careful attention in the solemn deliberations upon which you are about to enter. If this measure attains a successful result, then our aspira- tions as a Christian, peace-loving people will be realized. If it fails, it will be only another justification for our contemplated action." It does not seem, now that the war is over, fairly and swiftly won, that there was lacking in this measured language anything becoming the dignity of the United States, the spirit of resolve and sacrifice of the people at large, or any sign of negligence in the discharge of the tremendous functions of the Presidential office. The words "contemplated action" were of deep meaning. There was something of injustice, for a time, in the criticisms of the course of the President, of the steadfast, imperturbable demeanor with which he met the extraordinarily exacting demands upon him, but the people pres- ently knew, not from spoken words or through the pomps of complacency, but 212 SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA. the deeds that were wrought from day to day, that their Chief Magistrate, the Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy, was at the front and never flinched under fire. There appeared in the message, April ii, this passage of solemn caution — then justified — now amply vindicated: "I said in my message of De'cember last, 'It is to be seriously considered whether the Cuban insurrection possesses beyond dispute the attributes of statehood which alone can demand the recognition of belligerency in its favor. The same requirement must certainly be no less seriously considered when the graver issue of recognizing independence is in question ; for no less positive test can be applied to the greater act than to the lesser; while, on the other hand, the influences and consequences of the struggle upon the internal policy of the recognizing State, which form important factors when the recog- nition of belligerency is concerned, are secondary, if not rightly eliminable, factors when the real question is whether the community claiming recognition is or is not independent beyond peradventure. "Nor from the standpoint of expediency do I think it would be wise or prudent for this government to recognize at the present time the independence of the so-called Cuban Republic. Such recognition is not necessary in order to enable the United States to intervene and pacify the island. To commit this country now to the recognition of any particular government in Cuba might subject us to embarrassing conditions of international obligation toward the organization so recognized. In case of intervention our conduct would be subject to the approval or disapproval of such government. We would be required to submit to its direction and to assume to it the mere relation of a friendly ally. "When it shall appear hereafter that there is within the island a govern- ment capable of performing the duties and discharging the functions of a separate nation, and having, as a matter of fact, the proper forms and attributes of nationality, such government can be promptly and readily recog- nized and the relations and interests (5f the United States with such nation adjusted." This excellent medicine was a bitter dose in the bellies of the Cubans who were doing their fighting out of the island whose soil was contested. Among the forces the President was obliged to restrain from misadventure was the report of Mr. Davis, of the Committee on Foreign Relations, who paraded several resolutions of Congress. Mr. Davis said one-third of the people of SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA. 213 Cuba in the eastern end of the island were subordinate to the insurgent gov- ernment and "that third of population pays taxes to them, serves in their armies, and in every way supports and is loyal to them. This situation has existed ever since the first few months of the war. The armies of Spain under Campos, Weyler, and Blanco, successively have been repelled in every invasion that they have attempted of the eastern half of the island. The cause of Spain has continually grown weaker, and that of the insurgents has grown stronger." This was not warranted. It was the acceptance of the exaggerations of the Spanish Cubans, and it was the temporary misfortune of the country that this falsified current history could not be as conclusively exposed as it has been by the accounts of the army and navy of the United States. Throughout the able and ingenious report of Mr. Davis, the injudicial element cropped out, and the absence of the impartial spirit, that gives due weight to all facts, is evi- dent in the omission of the truth that the insurgent forces were the first to use the torch and originated the savage policy of desolation. The President was equal to the firm presentation of the truth: "As I said in my message of last December, it was not civilized warfare ; it was extermination. The only peace it could beget was that of the wilderness and the grave. Meanwhile, the military situation in the island had undergone a noticeable change. The extraordinar)' activity that characterized the second year of the ,war, when the insurgents invaded even the hitherto unharmed fields of Pinar del Rio and carried havoc and destruction up to the walls of the city of Havana itself, had relapsed into a dogged struggle in the central and eastern provinces. The Spanish arms regained a measure of control in Pinar del Rio and parts of Havana, but, under the existing conditions of the rural country, without immediate improvement of their productive situation. Even thus partially restricted, the revolutionists held their own, and their conquest and submission, put forward by Spain as the essential and sole basis of peace, seemed as far distant as at the outset." Here is the exercise of the judicial faculty. Mr. Davis reported : "It is the opinion of this committee that the time to interpose has arrived; that intervention which will stop the war and secure the national independence of Cuba should at once take place. ' ' Even this was not going far enough. The annexed document is an essential part of the record : 214 SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA. "VIEWS OF MINORITY. "The undersigned members of said committee cordially concur in the report made upon th^ Cuban resolutions, but we favor the immediate recogni- tion of the Republic of Cuba, as organized in that island, as a free, independ- ent, and sovereign»power among the nations of the world. "DAVID TURPIE. "R. Q. MILLS. "JNO. W. DANIEL. "J. B. FORAKER." There was for a time a formidable following of this doctrine, which was an effusion of passion and an apotheosis of imposture, and it will claim a fixed place in the popular recollection, to mark the danger escaped, showing that when the Senate tottered on the edge of a precipice, the quality of public safet)' was found in the House. Far beyond all other investigating commit- tees, the army of the United States discovered the whole truth, and there are clouds of witnesses that our recognition of the Cuban "Republic" as an estab- lished government would have been a degradation of ourselves. This does not imply that the Cuban insurgent forces are not largely composed of brave and honest men, and that there is not capacity in them to participate in good government, but all that concerned them was subjected to . competitive deceptions from the peninsular and insular people who had the same habits of both misapprehending and misrepresenting themselves and prevaricating, whether as friends or foemen. The Cuban cause would have been greatlj' benefited if it had been truthfully served, though nothing could have excused or even considerably extenuated the confirmation" of the Spanish accusation of following the precedent of San Domingo, a cause that produced heroes and yet bequeathed to the world a startling lesson of the crimes that may be com- mitted in the name of liberty, the barbarism of which license is productive. However, the greater crimes in the Indies have had their origin in the wrongs inflicted upon labor paid with the lash, and the greed of the strong in consuming the earnings of the weak. The events immediately preceding the blowing up of the Maine are pre- sented in the dispatches passing between Consul-General Lee and Secretary of State Day. January 12, 1898, mobs, led by Spanish officers, attacked the SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA. 215 offices of three newspapers advocating autonomy. The autonomists were rhetoricians, who thought reform could be founded in fine words. Mobs, on the 13th, shouted against Blanco and for Weyler; the palace and consulate were guarded. General Lee thought if Blanco could not control the situation, "or if Americans and their interests are in danger, ships must be sent;" and it was added they must be ready to move promptly. Quiet prevailed for a few days. January 24th Mr. Day telegraphed Mr. Lee : "It is the purpose of this government to resume friendly naval visits at Cuban ports. In that view the Maine will call at the port of Havana in a day or two. Please arrange for a friendly interchange of calls with authorities." Lee telegraphed at once: "Advise visit be postponed six or seven days, to give last excitement more time to disappear. Will see authorities and let you know result. Gov- ernor-General away for two weeks. I should know day and hour visit." Mr. Day responded, 24th: "Maine has been ordered. Will probably arrive at Havana sometime to-morrow. Cannot tell hour; possibly early. Cooperate with authorities for her friendly visit. Keep us advised by frequent telegrams." The next dispatch from Lee was on January 25th, that the "authorities profess to think United States has ulterior purpose in sending ship — would obstruct autonomy, produce excitement, probably demonstration;" and they asked that the Maine should not be sent until instructions could be received from Madrid, and the closing words of the dispatch were that the authorities said, "If for friendly motives, as claimed, delay unimportant." On the same day, "Ship quietly arrived" at eleven in the morning. There was no demon- stration. Spanish commanders called on the commander of the Maine, and salutes were exchanged. If will be observed that the first feeling of the Spaniards was unfriendly to the Maine, and this was succeeded by civility. General Lee, with Captain Sigsbee, and two officers, called on the acting '' aptain-General January 27th, and the following day Lee telegraphed: "Acting Governor-General Parrado and staff went with me this morning to return visit of Sigsbee. Inspected the Maine, were entertained and given the appropriate salute. Expressed pleasure at their reception and admiration for the splendid battleship." On the 4th of February the Secretary of the Nav}' thought it "not prudent for sanitary reasons" to remain long in Havana. If there was another vessel 2i6 SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA. llian the Maine sent, what kind of a ship should it be? Lee replied same day: "Do not think slightest sanitary danger to officers or crew until April or even May. Ship or ships should be kept here all the time now. We should 3 not relinquish position of peaceful control of situation, or conditions would be worse than if vessel had never been sent. Americans would depart with their families in haste if no vessel in harbor, on account of distrust of preser- vation of order by authorities. If another riot occurs, will be against Governor-General and autonomy, but might include anti- American demonstra- tion also. First-class battleship should replace present one if relieved, as object lesson and to counteract Spanish opinion of our Navy, and should have torpedo boat with it to preserve communication with Admiral." _ February nth Lee telegraphed: "Sigsbee attended General Blanco's reception with me last night. This morning paid him and others of govern- ment officials visit. " The next telegram in order was: (General Lee to Mr. Day.) "Havana, February i6, 1898, 12:30 p. m. — Maine blown up and destroyed to-night at 9:40 p. m. Explosion occurred well forward under quarters of crew; consequence many were lost. It is believed all officers saved, but Jenkins and Merritt not yet accounted for. Cause of explosion yet to be investigated. Captain-General and Spanish army and navy officers have I'endered every assistance. Sigsbee and most of his officers on Ward steamer City of Washington. Others on Spanish man-of-war and in city. Am with Sigsbee now, who has telegraphed Navy Department." On the 8th of January General Lee wrote Secretary Day: "I estimate that probably 200,000 of the rural population in the provinces of Pinar del Rio, Havana, Matanzas, and Santa Clara have died of starvation or from resultant causes, and the deaths of whole families almost simultane- ously or within a few days of each other, and of mothers praying for their children to be relieved of their horrible sufferings by death, are not the least of the many pitiable scenes which were ever present. In the provinces of Puerto Principe and Santiago de Cuba, where the 'reconcentrado order' could not be enforced, the great mass of the people are self-sustaining." The following is one of General Lee's inclosures: "Statistics of death rate in Santa Clara (a town of 14,000 inhabitants): SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA, 217 1890 578 1891 720 1892 596 1893 619 1894 687 1895 872 1896 (epidemic of yellow fever among army and Cubans) . 1,417 5,489 1897 (no epidemic) .... 6,981 (1,492 more than in seven previous years.)" After the funeral civilities over the victims of the Maine, the Spanish officials found, through a Naval Board of inquiry, March 22d: "That the character of the proceedings undertaken and respect for the law which establishes the absolute extrg. territoriality of a foreign war vessel have prevented the determination, even by conjecture, of the said internal origin of the disaster, to which also the impossibility of establishing the necessary communication either with the crew of the wrecked vessel or the officials of their government commissioned to investigate the causes of the said event, or with those subsequently intrusted with the issue, has contributed. "Sixth. That the interior and exterior examination of the bottom of the Maine, whenever it is possible, unless the bottom of the ship and that of the place in the bay where it is sunk are altered by the work which is being carried on for the total or partial recovery of the vessel, will prove the correctness of all that is said in this report; but this must not be understood to mean that the accuracy of these present conclusions requires such proof." The United States naval court of inquiry, convened by Rear-Admiral Montgomery Sicard, in pursuance of orders of the Department, found that: "The destruction of the Maine occurred at 9:40 p. m., on the 15th day of February, 1898, in the harbor of Havana, Cuba, she being at the time moored to the same buoy to which she had been taken upon her arrival. There were two explosions of a distinctly different character, with a very short but dis- tinct interval between them, and the forward part of the ship was lifted to a marked degree at the time of the first explosion. The first explosion was more in the nature of a report like that of a gun, while the second explosion was more open, prolonged, and of greater volume. This second explosion was, in the opinion of the court, caused by the partial explosion of two or more of the forward magazines of the Maine. ai8 SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA. "At frame ly.the outer shell of the ship, from a point 113^ feet from the •middle line of the ship, and 6 feet above the keel when in its normal position, has been forced up so as to be now about 4 feet above the surface of the water, therefore about 34 feet above where it would be had the ship sunk uninjured. "The outside bottom plating is bent into a reversed V-shape {/{), the after wing of which, about 15 feet broad and 32 feet in length (from frame 17 to frame 25), is doubled back upon itself against the continuation of the same plating, extending forward. "At frame 18 the vertical keel is broken in two, and the flat keel bent into an angle similar to the angle formed by the outside bottom plating. This break is now about 6 feet below the surface of the water, and about 30 feet above its normal position. "In the opinion of the court this effect could have been produced only by the explosion of a mine situated under the bottom of the ship at about frame 18 and somewhat on the port side of the ship. "The court finds that the loss of the Maine on the occasion named was not in any respect due to fault or negligence on the part of any of the officers •or members' of the crew of said vessel. "In the opinion of the court the Maine was destroyed by the explosion of a submarine mine, which caused the partial explosion of two or more of the forward magazines. "The court has been unable to obtain evidence fixing the responsibility for the destruction of the Maine upon any person or persons." There is no rational question that the condition of the wreck of the Maine • demonstrates the first explosion was exterior, and that exempting the higher Spanish officers from the charge of guilty knowledge, there must have been some concerned who had official information and responsibility. We give the official casualty list on the Maine. It far exceeds in extent of fatalities all the losses of the American navy in all the service of our squadrons in the annihilation of the fleets of Montijo and Cervera at Manila and Santiago, and all the combats with the shore batteries of Cuba and Porto Rico: ""U. S. S. Maine, ist rate, blown up in Havana harbor, February 15, 1898. List of officers, sailors, and marines on board of the U. S. S. Maine, who were killed or drowned when that vessel was wrecked in the harbor of Havana, February 15, 1898, or who subsequently died of their injuries." CAPTAIN SIGSBEE, WHO COMMANDED THE ILL-FATED "MAINE." SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA. 221 (The men marked with an asterisk (*) died subsequently of injuries received when the U. S. S. Maine was destroyed.) OFFICERS. Jenkins, Frederick W., Heutenant. Merritt, Darwin R. , assistant engineer. SAILORS. Adams, John T. , coal passer. Aitken, James P., boatswain's mate, first class. Anderson, John, boatswain's mate, second class. Andersen, Holm A., coal passer. Anderson, Charles, landsman. Anderson, Gustav A., seaman. Anderson, John, seaman. Anderson, Axel C, seaman. Andrews, Frank, ordinary seaman. Anfindsen, Abraham, cockswain. Anglund, Bernhard, blacksmith. Auchenbach, Harry, fireman, second class. Barry, John P., apprentice, first class. Barry, Lewis L., coal passer. Baum, Henry S., landsman. Becker, Jakob, chief machinist. Bell, John R., cabin steward. Blomberg, Fred, landsman. Bookbinder, John, apprentice, second class. Boll, Fritz, bayman. Bonner, Leon, seaman. Brinkman, Heinrich, seaman. Brofeldt, Arthur, chief gunner's mate. Bruns, AdolphC, quartermaster, third class. Burns, Edward, coal passer. Burkhardt, Robert, quartermaster, second class. Butler, Frederick F., machinist, second class. Boyle, James, quartermaster, first class. Clarke, James C, shipwright. Caine, Thomas, blacksmith. Cameron, Walter, seaman. Carr, Herbert M., gunner's mate, second class. Caulfield, William R. B., landsman. Chingi, Suke, mess attendant. Christiansen, Charles A., fireman, first class. Clark, Thomas, coal passer. Cochrane, Michael, fireman, first class. Cole, Thomas M., bayman. Coleman, William, ordinary seaman. Coleman, William, fireman, second class. Conroy, Anthony, coal passer. Cosgrove, William, fireman, second class. Curran, Charles, cockswain. Dahlman, Berger, seaman. Dennig, Charles, seaman. Donoughy, William, ordinary sea- man. Drury, James, fireman, first class. Edler, George, seaman. Eiermann, Charles F. W., gunner's mate, first class. *Erikson, Andrew V., seaman. 222 SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA. SAILORS— Continued. Etts, John P., seaman. Evensen, Karl, seaman. Fadde, Charles F. J., apprentice, first class. Falk, Rudolph, oiler. Faubel, George D., chief machinist. Fewer, William J., boatswain's mate, second class. Finch, Trabie, apprentice, first class. *Fisher, Frank, ordinary seaman. Fisher, Alfred J., oiler. Flaherty, Michael, fireman, first class. Fleishman, Lewis M., seaman. Flynn, Patrick, fireman, second class. Fougere, John, coal passer. Fountain, Hartley, boatswain's mate, first class. Frank, Charles, apprentice, first class. Furlong, James F., coal passer. Gaffney, Patrick, fireman, first class. Gardner, Frank, coal passer. Gardner, Thomas J., chief yeoman. Gorman, William H., ordinary sea- man. Gordon, Joseph F. , fireman, first class. Graham, James A. , chief yeoman. Graham, Edward P., coal passer. Grady, Patrick, coal passer. Greer, William A., apprentice, first class. Griffin, Michael, fireman, second class. Gross, Henry, landsman. Grupp, Reinhardt, coal passer. Hallberg, John A. , oiler. Hamburger, William, landsman. Hamilton, Charles A., apprentice, first class. Hamilton, John, chief carpenter's mate. Hanrahan, William C, cockswain. Harris, Edward, water tender. Harris, Millard F., quartermaster, third class. Harley, Daniel O'C. fireman, second class. Harty, Thomas J., coal passer. Hassell, Charles F., gunner's mate, third class. Hauck, Charles, landsman. Hawkins, Howard B., ordinary sea- man. Hennekes, Albert B., gunner's mate, second class. Herriman, Benjamin H., apprentice, first class. *Holzer, Frederick C, ordinary sea- man. Holm, Gustav, boatswain's mate, second class. ♦Holland, Alfred J., cockswain. Horn, William J., fireman, first class. Hough, William L., landsman. Hughes, Patrick, fireman, first class. Ishida, Otogiro, steerage cook. Johansen, Peter C, seaman. Johnson, Charles, ordinary seaman. Johnson, John W., landsman. Johnsson, Peter, oiler. Johnson, George, coal passer. Jones, Thomas J., coal passer. *Jectson, Harry, seaman. Jencks, Carlton, gunner's mate, third class. Jernee, Fred, coal passer. Just, Charles F., apprentice, first class. Kane, Michael, coal passer. Kay, John A., machinist, first class. Kelly, Hugh, coal passer. SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA. 223 SAILORS— Continued. Kelly, John, coal passer. Lund, William, cockswain. Keskull, Alexander, seaman. Lydon, John T., ordinary seaman. Keys, Harry J., ordinary seaman. Lynch, Matthew, coal passer. Kihlstrom, Fritz, ordinary seaman. Lynch, Bernard, fireman, first class. Kinsey, Frederick E., machinist, Malone, Michael, fireman, second class. second class. Marshall, John E., landsman. Kinsella, Thomas F., machinist, Marsden, Benjamin L., apprentice, second class. first class. Kitagata, Yukichi, warrant officers' Martensson, Johan, gunner's mate, cook. third class. Kniese, Frederick H., macliinist. Mason, James H., landsman. first class. Matiasen, Carl, seaman. *Koebler, George W. , apprentice, first Matza, John, coal passer. class. Meilstrup, Elmer M., ordinary sea- Kranyak, Charles, apprentice, first man. class. Merz, John, landsman. Kruse, Hugo, painter. ■ Mero, Eldon H., chief machinist. Laird, Charles, master-at-arms, third Miller, George, seaman. class. Miller, William S., apprentice, second Lambert, William, Fireman, second class. class. Mobles, George, cockswain. Lancaster, Luther, boatswain's mate, Moore, Edward H., coal passer. second class. Monfort, William, landsman. Lapierre, George, apprentice, first Moss, Gerhard C, machinist, first class. class. Lawler, Edward, coal passer. Moss, John H., landsman. League, James M., chief yeoman. Mudd, Noble T. , seaman. Lee, William J., apprentice, first class. Murphy, Cornelius, oiler. Leene, Daniel, coal passer. McGonigle, Hugh, fireman, second Lees, Samuel, ordinary seaman. class. Leupold, Gustav, fireman, second McManus, John J., fireman, second class. class. Lewis, John B., water tender. McNiece, Francis J., coal passer. Lewis, Daniel, oiler. Nielsen, Sophus, cockswain. Lieber, George, apprentice, first Nielsen, John C, seaman. class. Nolan, Charles M., gunner's mate. Lorenzen, Jorgen J., oiler. third class. Louden, James W., apprentice, second Noble, William, fireman, second class. class. Nagamine, Tomekichi, mess attend- Lowell, Clarence E. , ordinary seaman. ant. 224 SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA. SAILORS— Continued. Ohye, Mas, mess attendant. Ording, Gustav C, carpenter's mate, third class. O'Connor, James, chief boatswain's mate. O'Hagan, Thomas J., apprentice, first class. O'Neill, Patrick, fireman, second class. O'Regan, Henry H., water tender. Paige, Frederick, landsman. Palmgren, John, seaman. Perry, Robert, mess attendant. Phillips, Francis C, apprentice, first class. Pinkney, James, mess attendant. Porter, John, coal passer. Powers, John, oiler. Price, Daniel, fireman, first class. Quigley, Thomas J., plumber and fitter. Quinn, Charles P., oiler. Reilly, Joseph, fireman, first class. Reiger, William A., gunner's mate, first class. Rising, Newell, coal passer. Robinson, William, landsman. Roos, Peter, sailmaker. Rushworth, William, chief machinist. Safford, Clarence E., gunner's mate, first class. Salmin, Michael E., ordinary seaman. Schroeder, August, ordinary seaman. Scott, Charles A., carpenter's mate, second class. Scully, Joseph, boiler maker. Seery, Joseph, fireman, first class. Sellers, Walter S., apothecary. Shea, Patrick J., fireman, first class. Shea, Thomas, landsman. Shea, John J., coal passer. Sheridan, Owen, fireman, second class. Shillington, John H., yeoman, third class. Simmons, Alfred, coal passer. *Smith, Carl A., seaman. Smith, Nicholas J., apprentice, first class. Stevenson, Nicholas, seaman. Sugisaki, Isa, wardroom steward. Sutton, Frank, fireman, second class, Suzuki, Kashitara, mess attendant. Talbot, Frank C, landsman. Tehan, Daniel J., coal passer. Thompson, George, landsman. Tigges, Frank B., coppersmith. Tinsman, William H., landsman. Todoresco, Constantin, fireman, first class. Troy, Thomas, coal passer. Tuohey, Martin, coal passer. . Walsh, Joseph F., cockswain. Wallace, John, ordinary seaman. Warren, John, fireman, second class. White, Charles O., chief master-at- arms. Whiten, George, seaman. White, Robert, mess attendant. Wickstrom, Johan E., seaman. Wilson, Albert, seaman. Wilson, Robert, chief quartermaster. Wilbur, George W., apprentice, first class. Ziegler, John H., coal passer. d w S3 o o s 7. O z 3 a o •7-. H K P O a a H SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA. 227 MARINES. Wagner, Henry, first sergeant. Bennet, John, private. Botting, Vincent H., private. Brosnan, George, private. Burns, James R., private. Brown, James T., sergeant. Dierking, John H., drummer. Downing, Michael J., private. Johnson, Charles E., private. Jordan, William J., private. Kean, Edward F., private. Kelly, Frank, private. Lauriette, George M., private. Losko, Peter A., private. Monahan, Joseph P., private. McDermott, John, private. Newton, C. H., fifer. Newman, F. J., private. Richter, A. H., corporal. Roberts, James H., private. Schoen, Joseph, corporal. Stock, H. E., private. Strongman, James, private. Suman, E. B., private. Timpany, E. B., private. Van Horn, H. A., private. Warren, Asa V. , private. Wills, A. O., private. LIST OF OFFICERS, SAILORS, AND MARINES ON BOARD OF THE U. S. S. MAINE WHO WERE SAVED. Capt. Charles D. Sigsbee, commanding. Lieut. Commander Richard Wainwright. Lieuts. George F. W. Holman, John Hood, and Carl W. Jungen. Lieuts. (Junior Grade) George P. Blow, John J. Blandin. Naval Cadets Jonas H. Holden, Watt T. Cluverius, Amon Bronson, and David F. Boyd, Jr. Surg. Lucien G. Heneberger. Paymaster Charles M. Ray. Chief Engineer Charles P. Howell. Passed Assistant Engineer Frederic C. Bowers. Assistant Engineer John R. Morris. « Naval Cadets (engineer division) Pope Washington and Arthur Crenshaw. Chaplain John P. Chidwick. First Lieut, of Marines Albertus W. Catlin. Boatswain Francis E. Larkin. Gunner Joseph Hill. Carpenter George Helms. Pay Clerk B. McCarty. SAILORS. Allen, James W., mess attendant. Anderson, Oskar, cockswain. Awo, Firsanion, steerage cook. Bergman, Charles, boatswain's mate^. first class. Bloomer, John H., landsman. 228 SENTIMENTS OF THE PEOPLE OF CUBA. SAILORS— Continued. Bullock, Charles H., gunner's mate, second class. Cahill, Francis D., landsman. , Christiansen, Karl, fireman, first class. Cronin, Daniel, landsman. David, George, ordinary seaman. Lohman, Charles A., coal passer. Mack, Thomas, landsman. Matsen, Edward, ordinary seaman. Mattisen, William, ' ordinary seaman. Melville, Thomas, coal passer. Mikkelsen, Peter, seaman. . Moriniere, Loiiis, seaman. Dolan, John, seaman. Dressier, Gustav J., apprentice, first McCann, Harry, seaman. class. McNair, William, ordinary seaman. Durckin, Thomas J., ordinary seaman. Panck, John H., fireman, first class. Flynn, Michael, seaman. Foley, Patrick J., apprentice, first class. Fox, George, landsman. Gartrell, William M., fireman, first class. Hallberg, Alfred, cocfkswain. Ham, Ambrose, apprentice, first class. Harris, Westmore, mess attendant. Heffron, John, ordinary seaman. Herbert, John, landsman. Herness, Alfred B., gunner's mate, third class. Hutchings, Robert, landsman. Johnson, Alfred, seaman. Kane, Joseph H., landsman. Kushida, Katsusaburo, warrant of- ficers' steward. Lanahan, Michael, landsman. Larsen, Peder, seaman. Larsen, Martin, seaman. Load, John B., master-at-arms, third class. Pilcher, Charles F. , ordinary seaman. Rau, Arthur, seaman. Reden, Martin, seaman. Richards, Waller • E. , apprentice, second class. Rowe, James, ship's cook, fourth class. Rusch, Frank, ordinary seaman. Schwartz, George, ship's cook, first class. Shea, Jeremiah, coal passer. Teackle, Harry, seaman. Thompson, William H., landsman. Toppin, Daniel G., wardroom cook. Ttirpin, John H., mess attendant. Waters, Thomas J., landsman. Webber, Martin V., landsman. White, John E., landsman. Williams, James, gunner's mate, third class. Williams, Hfenry, cabin cook. Willis, Alonzo, apprentice, second class. Wilbur, Benjamin R., cockswain. MARINES. Anthony, William, private. Coffey, John, private. Galpin, C. P., private. Germond, C. V., private. Liitz, Joseph, private. Loftus, Paul, private. McDevitt, William, private. McGuinness, William, private. McKay, Edward, private. Meehan, Michael, sergeant. Thompson, T. G., corporal. CHAPTER IX. The San Domingo Torch in Aid of the Cuban Rebellion. The Policy of Maximo Gomez, and the Famine in Cuba— The Reports of American Consuls in Cuba on the Cane Burning and its Relation to the Starvation of the People— The Agent of the Cubans in Arms Justified Barbarism— The Testimony of Our Consuls that the Gomez Policy was the Cause of the Death of Thousands— Direct Evidence of Black Mail Taxes and the Anxiety of Cuban People to be Annexed to the United States.— The Desperado Orders by Gomez Before Weyler Came to Cuba. One of the well remembered circumstances of the agitations that preceded the declaration of war with Spain a few days, was the intensity with which the champions of the freedom and independence of the Republic of Cuba demanded the reports that the American-Cuban consuls had furnished the State De- partment, respecting the Spanish policy of the malicious extermination of the Cuban people, and there was a clamor because it was held to be prudent to revise those papers, or withhold them for a few days, in order that the Span- iards might not find, in the official statements of the consuls, reasons that would seem to demand the slaughter of writers of truth about the island. There were two or three days' waiting, when the consuls were withdrawn from their posts, and preserved, events following so fast that what they had to say about Cuban affairs has never received very much attention. The real character of the documentary evidence will, as a rule, be in the nature of news to those who read this volume. The newspapers having the country in charge and ha,ving undertaken the management of the war, had not much space to give Cuban outrages when once there was assurance that we were going to war with the Spaniards. On the day the Maine was blown up, February 15, 1898, General Lee wrote to President McKinley, enclosing a letter from the insurgent General Maximo Gomez, without date, in which the general said : "The revolution, as absolute master of the country, has never prohibited any citizen, whatever his nationality, from earning his living, and it has hap- 229 230 TORCH IN AID OF THE CUBAN REBELLION. pened that as soon as the barbarous concentration decree was promulgated innumerable families have left and still leave the city for the field, impelled by hunger to wrest from the fruitful Cuban vegetation the means of relieving the X most pressing needs of life. Those unhappy beings ignore the fact that if the Spaniards, by steel and privation, 'have shrouded their hearths in mourning, so also it might be said that the flora of Cuba was in mourning, devastated by the bullet and torch. " It must, of course, have been a solemn occasion when General Gomez referred to the "torch," at the same time claiming that he had done nothing to prevent the gaining of a livelihood by any man. When the Hon. T. Estrada Palma, in 1895, December 7th, wrote to the Secretary of State Rich- ard Olney, he made a statement of points upon which he asked "that the rights of belligerency be accorded them by your government;" and he stated many propositions and elucidated many principles, but gave the greater part of his interesting narrative to the achievements of Gomez, especially the celebration of his campaign against Captain-General Martinez Campos, who was as a fact pretty roughly handled. The strategy of fire by the military Commander-in- Chief was given a good deal of space ; and as far east as Santa Clara Mr. Palma mentions that "a most important work of the forces" under Gomez, "which occupied considerable time and caused many encounters with the enemy, was the destruction of telegraph and telephone communications and railroads, of which there are many lines or branches in this district." Of course, this was just preparing the island to enter upon a superior course of internal improvements, but Gomez had everything his own way, the Spanish not interfering, and we quote Mr. Palma's report: "Early in July he issued the first of the now famous orders relative to the sugar crop, and announced his intention of marching through Santa Clara and into Matanzas in the winter in order to superintend the carrying out of his decrees." This is an official avowal to the Secretary of State of the United States by the authorized agent of the Cubans in arms, of the beginning of the destruction of the greatest industry in the richest island in the world — and as Gomez marched westward the skies over Cuba were flushed with fire, so that the red glow was visible at once from the Atlantic Ocean and the Caribbean Sea. We continue to quote from Mr. Palma — page 8, following the demand of the U. S. Senate commit- tee, that Cuba should at once take her place as a sovereign sister among the nations of the earth. .TORCH IN AID OF THE CUBAN REBELLION. 231 "It was not the intention of General Gomez when he planned his winter campaign to march on and lay siege to the capital, his only object being to prevent the grinding and export of the sugar crop and the consequent flo\^ of treasure into the Spanish cofTers, and to demonstrate to the world that he could control the provinces and enforce his orders. "While this march of the main bodies of troops westward has been carried on, the Cuban forces of the other army corps have also succeeded in carrying out the orders concerning sugar cane and preventing the establishment of Spanish lines of communication." We suppose that it must have been simply the modesty of Gomez that he did not "lay siege" to Havana. That was undoubtedly the way to fire Cuba — or it would have been if it had not been for the regulation of the sugar busi- ness with "the torch." But Gomez wrote to President McKinley on the day of the Maine massacre that he never interfered with a day's work that was to get a living. Mr. Palma describes in his letter to Mr. Olney that the Cuban army con- sisted of five army corps, and says: "The first two corps consist of 26,000 men, mostly infantry; the third, of about 4,000 men, mostly cavalry; the Fourth and Fifth Corps consisted before the late invasion of Gomez of over 20,000 men, both infantry and cavalry, which force has been considerably increased in these last days." Now, here was a magnificent army of liberation of 50,000 men, with more coming, and arms and ammunition pouring in, and a good supply, as Mr. Palma mentions, of artillery. What had become of them when Maximo Gomez was thundering at the gates of Havana two hundred and fifty miles away, with his body-guard and the Victoria regiment, eighty men in each of the august regiments? And where were the first, and second, fourth and fifth army corps of ten thousand men, at least, in each, with 4,000 cavalry to boot, and field pieces galore? Where were those glittering hosts when our small army of 17,000 men landed near Santiago to cooperate with the Cuban cavaliers and legionaries? Why did not Gomez take his swelling ranks, already victorious in setting on fire hundreds of plantations, and set up a republic sure enough? The particular object in gathering the Cuban consuls' reports was to kindle a blaze with them like that of a flaming cane field, so as to fan high the blasts of war with the intelligence, indisputable because official, of the horrors of the camps where the small farmers were passing away with fevers and 232 TORCH IN AID OF THE CUBAN REBELLION. starvation, the grim results of the desolation of the plantations of sugar and tobacco. Now, General Lee believed in the sincerity of Captain-General Blanco, and his chief of staff, Pando — believed they honestly sought to make an end of the famine, and in a let};er from Lee to the Secretary of State, Day, November 23, 1897, we find the perfectly frank and true story of the situation: (..-'First. The insurgents will not accept autonomy. "Second. A large majority of the Spanish subjects who have commer- cial and business interests and own property here, will not accept autonomy, but prefer annexation to the United States rather than an independent repub- lic or genuine autonomy under the Spanish flag. "Third. The Spanish authorities are sincere in doing all in their power to encourage, protect, and promote the grinding of sugar.- The grinding season commences in December. "Fourth. The insurgents' leaders have given instructions to prevent grinding wherever it can be done, because by diminishing the export of sugar the Spanish government revenues are decreased. It will be very difficult for the Spanish authorities to prevent cane burning, because one man at night can start a fire which will burn hundreds of acres, just as a single individual •could ignite a prairie by throwing a match into the dry grass. " Precisely, and just as a fool or a fiend can burn a house or a city. Notice the reference to Spanish subjects wanting to be citizens of the United States. Mr. A. C. Brice was the consul at Matanzas, and wrote, January 17, 1898: "The scenes of misery and distress daily observed are beyond belief. Here is one out of hundreds. In a family of seventeen living in an old lime- kiln, upper part of city limits, all were found dead except three, and they barely alive. ... A few of the strongest of these people have been sent out to sugar plantations, which expect to grind. They get 30 cents per day and board themselves. "A few plantations are grinding cane. In every case they are heavily guarded by Spanish troops, and have paid insurgents for so doing. Was shown a letter from insurgent chief to owner of a large plantation, in which the price demanded for grinding was 2,000 centones ($10,600 United States gold). It was paid. To make crop of sugar this season money, oxen, and laborers must be had. I am, etc., A. C. BRICE, "United States Consul." TORCH IN AID OF THE CUBAN REBELLION. 233 Here we see what was the great principle of "the torch" to which Gomez refers in such a dainty way in his letter through Lee to the President. He was an insurgent chief who wanted $10,000 United States gold for a joerrait to make sugar on one plantation ; and the perishing Cubans of the famine camps could have had work if this blackmail tax had been paid to the Republic of ' Cuba. The torch of liberty was to light the flames of total destruction in a great cane mill that offered employment to the starving — if the machinery moved without a rebel permit ; and yet Gomez would not allow restraint upon working for a livelihood — except in a case where $10,000 American gold was wanted to send to New York for patriotic purposes. Some of our great Statesmen have discovered in Gomez a second George Washington, but closely studied there is to be found some difference between the two men. Mr. Hyatt, U. S. Consul at Santiago de Cuba, writing November 20, 1897, said: "The Spanish residents of the island are becoming very outspoken in favor of closing the war and annexation to the United States. There are numerous inquiries among them of how they can become citizens of our Government. There are also quite a number of Spanish soldiers making the same inquiry. The business Spaniards here declare that they are tired of doing business at a loss, and that peace and prosperity can only come by annexation. Many are greatly disappointed that the United States consul cannot tnake American citizens of them at once. "With highest, etc., PULASKI F. HYATT, "United States Consul." December 5, 1897, Mr. Hyatt wrote: "Mr. Rigney, an American sugar planter near Manzanilla, was preparing to grind during the coming season. A few nights since the insurgents fired seven cannon shots among his build- ings, one ball passing through the roof of his house. Americans were hope- ful that they would be allowed to make their crop, and several are making ready to do so ; but the action of the insurgents toward Mr. Rigney gives the problem a doubtful aspect. It may have been a personal matter against Mr. Rigney. The number of destitute Americans fed by this consulate decreased from 89 to 64, but is again on the increase." It is to be taken into consideration that here is another consuiar report of Spanish residents wanting to become Americans, through "annexation to the United States." We think it entirely probable that these people may soon 234 TORCH IN AID OF THE CUBAN REBELLION. know enough to help govern themselves. Spanish soldiers are making the same inquiry. Here it is mentioned as a matter of business that as insiirgent cannon balls were fired to stop sugar making, the destitution of American citizens was on the increase. The connection between fire and famine is distinctly made. American Consul McGarr, writing from Cienfuegos, January lo, 1898: "Consulate of the United States, Cienfuegos, January 10, 1898. — Sir: All the sugar mills in this consular jurisdiction, 23 in number, have been grind- ing since the first of the month, and at the busy centrales the various indus- tries incident to the gathering of the crop and the manufacture of sugar are in full and steady operation. "Several of the principal estates are owned by American citizens and cor- porations, and most of their skilled employes are brought from t he United States. "The demand for labor on the sugar estates has drawn from the towns a great portion of the unemployed laborers and given employment to the male 'concentrados,' mfnj' of whom were in a state of enforced idleness and destitution. As a consequence, few of them are now seen here, and the labor 'congestion' has been relieved. "Small predatory parties of insurgents make frequent attempts to fire the cane fields, and it requires constant and active vigilance to prevent their destruction. The dry weather and the high winds prevailing at this season render it a simple matter for one person (who can easily conceal himself in the tall cane) to start a conflagration that will, unless promptly extinguished, destroy hundreds of acres in a few hours. "Hence the almost impossibility, with the utmost watchfulness and using every practicable safeguard, to prevent some loss of cane by the fires started, often under cover of darkness, by the stealthy incendiaries familiar with the locality and always on the alert for an opportunity to apply the torch. "The sugar crop is the support of all classes, and especially of the labor- ing class, and should it be in large part destroyed a famine in reality would be inevitable. "I am, etc., OWEN McGARR, "United States Consul," This does not seem to have been exactly what was expected in the consular reports, but it is extremely pertinent and valuable, and it could never H r 2 FIRE ROOM OF THE U. S. S. "BROOKLYN." TORCH IN AID OF THE CUBAN REBELLION. 237 have had a greater opening for usefulness than just now, as the flag of the United States is raised over Cuba. The Consul, Mr. Hyatt, at Santiago de Cuba, writing December 21, 1897, said: "As yet planters are all at sea as to whether they will grind cane or not. It is no secret that they will have to make terms with the insurgents if they do, and I understand that an agreement by which 50 cents per bag, or about 15 cents per loo, will be paid for Cuban hands off. Planters say this will leave them no profit, but leave their plantations in better order for future operations. "The three Rivery brothers, American citizens and owners of coffee, cocoa, and orange groves, are about to return to their places. They are abso- lutely penniless, and say they would have surely starved but for the food issued from this consulate. I shall continue to suppl}' them with food, and issue a month's rations of such food as rice, beans, codfish, crackers, etc., as their homes are over 30 miles away." The letter following, frorh a historic place, is of historical importance : (Mr. Hyatt to Mr. Day.) "Consulate of the United States, Santiago de Cuba, January 12, 1898. — Sir: I deem it a duty to lay before the honorable Department of State the situation here as affecting American interests, and to inclose herewith an order issued by command of General Maximo Gomez, and a translation of the same, forbidding the grinding of the sugar crop for the years 1897 and 1898. "In this part of Cuba, so far as I can learn, all idea of making a sugar crop is entirely abandoned. "I regret to say that the stoppage of industries, from present appearances, will not halt at the sugar crop, but coffee and other agricultural crops fall under the same ban. "I had hoped that, after the reconcentration order was revoked, through the energetic action of the present administration, we would find no trouble in reinstating American industries; but it appears that all of the benefits that ^should have accrued to our citizens are thwarted by the action of the insur- gents, who refuse to allow them to return to their sugar, coffee and other estates. The Pompo Manganese mines, owned by Americans, which would 238 TORCH IN AID OF THE CUBAN REBELLION. at the present time be a very profitable investment if allowed to operate, are also being held up by the same power. "The three Rivery brothers, whom I informed you recently I was about to assist in returning to their coffee and fruit estates, got there only to find they could not go to work until permission was obtained from the insurgent com- mander, which permission seems doubtful, I myself, as I understand ray duty, being inhibited from rendering them any assistance at this point. "These, with several sugar estates within my consular district, are held up and becoming more worthless than before. "It is beyond the power of my pen to describe the situation in eastern Cuba. Squalidity, starvation, sickness, and death meet one in all places. Beggars throng our doors and stop us on the streets. The dead in large num- bers remain over from day to day in the cemeteries unburied. "Very respectfully, PULASKI F. HYATT, "United States Consul." The connection between the blackmail, sugar burning policy of the insur- gents reaffirmed by Gomez, and the "squalidity, starvation, sickness and death" is absolutely established. Mr. Walter B. Barker, writing November 20, 1897: "As to grinding the present crop, I have interviewed most of the largest planters in this consular district, who stated that unless assured of immunity from the insurgent chief — Gomez — they would not jeopardize their property by attempting to grind. " "Consulate of the United States, Sagua la Grande, December 15, 1897. — Sir : Thinking it may interest the Department, I have the honor to transmit herewith clippings from a leading Spanish journal published in Havana, . calling attention to the inability of the mills to grind in the Province of Santiago de Cuba, which is one of the obstacles to grinding in this (Santa Clara) province, where the planters are not able to pay tribtite required by the insurgents. "The grinding season being at hand without preparations having been made dissipates all hope of a beginning. "Not to grind the present crop, small as it must be, will bring distress far greater than can be imagined. "I am, etc., WALTER B. BARKER, "Consul." TORCH IN AID OF THE CUBAN REBELLION. 239 (Mr. Barker to Mr. Day.) "Consulate of the United States, Sagua la Grande, December 28, 1S97. — The suffering and destitution among the concentrados ... is fearful, and must continue to grow worse. "How could the situation be otherwise, since the island is producing absolutely nothing, save some growing cane, and at the same time completely exhausted of all food. Relief alone can be obtained from the outer world in the way of charitable contributions. "This — Santa Clara — province is capable at this season of producing, perhaps, two-thirds of whatever cane might be made in the entire island. "To grind this cane without interruption would be the means of saving the lives of thousands who, without this or outside aid within the next thirty to fifty days, must die of actual hunger. Over a month since, the planters were ofificially advised of Spain's inability to provide protection in order to operate their mills. This leaves the sugar growers entirely in the hands of the Cubans in revolt, as to whether they will be allowed to grind without hindrance or fear of total destruction of their property. I know that strict orders have been given to subordinate commanders imder no circumstances must mills be permitted to grind, under penalty of violation of the order forth destruction of property. "Without contributions of food and medicine from the outer world, and at once, a sacrifice of lives will ensue, the responsibility for which no Chris- tian people can face. "I am, etc., WALT ER B. BARKER, Consul." Here is the . proof in consular repora) that were expected to fill the United States with horror toward the Spaniards, furnishing the proof that the insurgents, carrying on their blackmail war upon industry, refused to save thousands of lives by permitting sugar making. "Consulate of the United States, Sagua la Grande, January 31, 1898. — At my suggestion several families returned to the American-owned 'Central Santa Anna,' the owner having been forced to abandon the property in order to prevent further spoliation of the mill machinery. Although a government guard is stationed on the place, they (former tenants) were ordered to leave. "One sugar mill is running, not without interruption, with chances of making one-fourth of a crop. Another — just started up — was attacked yester- 240 TORCH IN AID OF THE CUBAN REBELLION. day b)' a band of insurgents, killing 14 and wounding 5 of the guerrillas paid by the estate to protect the operatives. Seven laborers were killed, the insurgents leaving two of their dead. "An adjoining estate, the property of the British consul, was also attacked, the growing cane burned. This precludes further attempts to grind, as men cannot be induced to work while the insurgents roam at will over the country. "lam, etc., WALTER B. BARKER, Consul." We do not say that Maximo Gomez meant to inflict famine upon Cuba, for he probably had the barbarian instinct that led him to think that to fling firebrands was a way of announcing liberty. He issiied a proclamation dated at Sancti Spiritus, November 11, 1895, placing the responsibility, as he said, for the great ruin he was about to inflict, upon "passive" people. He added: "This people cannot hesitate between the wealth of Spain and the liberty of Cuba. Its greatest crime would be to stain the land with blood without effecting its purposes because of puerile scruples and fears which do not con- cur with the character of the men who are in the field." July I, 1895, at Najasa Camaguay, Gomez issued an address to the plant- ers and cattle ranchers: "Whereas, all exploitations of any product whatsoever are aids and resources to the Government that we are fighting, it is resolved by the General-in-Chief to issue this general order throughout the island that the introduction of articles of commerce, as well as beef and cattle, into the towns occupied by the enemy, is absolutely prohibited. The sugar plantations will stop their labors, and whosoever shall attempt to grind the crop notwith- standing this order, will have their cane burned and their buildings demol- ished. ' ' Any one disobeying this order was to be considered an enemy and "treated as a traitor." Gomez also issued a peremptory order as follows: "Headquarters of the Army of Liberation, Territory of Sancti Spiritus, November 6, 1895. — Animated by the spirit of unchangeable resolution in defense of the rights of the revolution of redemption of this country of colo- nists, humiliated and despised by Spain, and in harmony with what has been decreed concerning the subject in the circular dated the ist of July, I have ordered the following : "Article I. That all plantations shall be totally destroyed, their cane and oijtbuildings burned, and railroad connections destroyed. TORCH IN AID OF THE CUBAN REBELLION. 243 "Alt. II. All laborers who shall aid the sugar factories — these sources of supplies that we must deprive the euemy of — shall be considered as traitors to their country. "Art. III. All who are caught in the act, or whose violation of Article II. shall be proven, shall be shot. Let all chiefs of operations of the army of liberty comply with this order, determined to unfurl triumphantly, even over ruin and ashes, the flag of the Republic of Cuba. "In regard to the manner of waging the war, follow the private instruc- tions that I have already given. "For the sake of the honor of our arms and your well-known courage and patriotism, it is expected that you will strictly comply with the above orders. "M. GOMEZ, General-in-Chief. "To the chiefs of operations: Circulate this." Here we have the official announcement of the policy of firebugs, as that of liberation, and it is the confirmation of this firebug policy that is now thrust like a torch in the face of the United States, in the name of freedom and independence. 3 j:i ^v^j\^^W-A?y:<" ^>'r:^tfg^^ "-^ ^i'i^:^:iixxi x ;M>l^^"*'l'S-^a «■?^^^-■^&:£■ o a r K H H K O H W B o H O W ADMIRAL DEWEY. HERO OF MANILA BAY. THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. 283 Washington, April 21, 1898. Dewey, Hongkong: The naval force on the North Atlantic Station are blockading Cuba. War has not yet been declared, but may be declared at any moment. I will inform you. Await orders. LONG. Washington, April 24, 1898. Dewey, Hongkong: War has commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at once to Philippine Islands. Commence operations at once, particularly against the Spanish fleet. Yo u must capture vessels o r destroy. Use utmost endeavors. LONG. Hongkong, April 25, 1898. Secretary of Navy, Washington : The squadron will leave for Manila, Philippine Islands, immediately upon the arrival of the United States consul from Manila. DEWEY. Hongkong, April 25, 1898. Secretary of Navy, Washington : In accordance with the request of the governor of Hongkong, the squad- ron leaves to-day for Mirs Bay, China, to await telegraphic instructions. Address, Hongkong. I will communicate by tug. DEWEY. Hongkong, April 27, 1898. Secretary of Navy, Washington: Williams, the United States consul from Manila, has arrived. The squadron will sail immediately for the Philippine Islands. DEWEY. Hongkong, May 7, 1898. (Manila, May i.) Secretary of the Navy, Washington : The squadron arrived at Manila at daybreak this morning. Immediately engaged enemy and destroyed the following Spanish vessels : Reina Christina, Castillia, Don Antonio de Biloa, Don Juan de Austria, Isla de Luzon, Isla de Cuba, General Lezo, Marquis del Duaro, El Curreo, Velasco, one transport, Isla de Mandano, water battery at Cavite. I shall destroy Cavite arsenal dis- pensatory. The squadron is uninjured. Few men were slightly wounded. I > 3 284 THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. request Department will send immediately from San Francisco fast steamer with ammunition. The only means of telegraphing is to the American consul at Hongkong. DEWEY. Washington, May 3, 1898. Dewey (care American consul), Hongkong: I send hearty congratulations to yourself and your officers and men. The President highly appreciates your achievement. I await report from you, on receipt of which further action will be taken and any supplies that you wish will be forwarded. LONG. Hongkong, May 7, 1898. (Cavite, May 4.) Secretary of the Navy, Washington : I have taken possession of the naval station at Cavite, Philippine Islands, and destroyed its fortifications. Have destroyed fortifications bay entrance, paroling garrison. Have cut cable to mainland. I control bay completely^ and can take city at anj' time, but I have not sufficient men to hold. The squadron excellent health and spirits. The Spanish loss not fully known ; very heavy; 150 killed, including captain, on Reina Christina alone. I am assisting and protecting Spanish sick and wounded, 250 in number, in this hospital, within our lines. Will ammunition be sent? I request answer without delay. I can supply squadron coal and provisions for a long period. Much excitement at Manila. Scarcity of provisions on account of not having economized stores. Will protect foreign residents. DEWEY. Washington, May 7, 1898. Dewey (care American consul), Hongkong: The President, in the name of the American people, thanks you and your officers and men for your splendid achievement and overwhelming victory. In recognition he has appointed you acting rear-admiral, and will recommend a vote of thanks to you by Congress as a foundation for further promotion. The Charleston will leave at once with what ammunition she can carry. Pacific Mail Steamship Company's steamer Pekin will follow with ammimition and supplies. Will take troops unless you telegraph otherwise. How many will you require? LONG. THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. 285 Washington, May 7, 1898. Sir: Under the authority of section 1434 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, you have been assigned to the command of the United States naval force on the Asiatic Station, with the rank of rear-admiral. You will hoist the flag of a rear-admiral, will wear the uniform, and will affix that title to your official signature. Respectfully. JOHN D. LONG, Secretary, Commodore George Dewey,- U. S. N., Commander-in-Chief U. S. Naval Force, Asiatic Station, U. S. Flagship Olympia. Hongkong, June 17, 1898. (Cavite, June 12.) Secretary of Navy, Washington: The following is correct list Spanish vessels destroyed May i : Two pro- tected cruisers, Isla de Cuba, Isla de Luzon ; five unprotected cruisers, Reina Christina, Castilla, Don Antonio de Ulloa, Don Juan de Austria, Velasco; two gunboats. General Lezo, Marquis del Duero; one transport, Isla de Mindano; one surveying vessel, Argos, both armed. The following have been captured: One transport, Manila; one gunboat, Callao. DEWEY. Manila, November 26, 1898. Secretary Navy, Washington : Isla de Luzon, Isla de Cuba, and Don Juan de Austria have been raised and docked. My anticipations as to their value fully realized. Will leave shoftly for Hongkong under their own steam. Constructor Capps deserving highest commendation. DEWEY. (Report of engagement of squadron with Spanish forces at Manila Bay.) "(No. 240 D.) U. S. Naval Force on Asiatic Station, Flagship Olympia, Cavite, Philippine Islands, May 4, 1898. — Sir: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the squadron under my command : "The squadron left Mirs Bay on April 27, immediately on the arrival of Mr. O. F. Williams, United States consul at Manila, who brought' important information and who accompanies the squadron. "Arrived off Bolinao on the morning of April 30, and, finding no vessels 286 THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. there, proceeded down the coast and arrived off the entrance to Manila Bay on the same afternoon. "The Boston and Concord were sent to reconnoiter Port Subic, I having been informed that the enemy intended to take position there. A thorough search of the port was made by the Boston and Concord, but the Spanish fleet was not found, although, from a letter afterwards found in the arsenal (inclosed with translation), it appears that it had been their intention to go there. "Entered the Boca Grande, or south channel, at ii 130 p. m., steaming in column at distance at 8 knots. After half the squadron had passed, a battery on the south side of the channel opened fire, none of the shots taking effect. The Boston and McCidloch returned the fire. "The squadron proceeded across the bay at slow speed, and arrived off Manila at daybreak, and was fired upon at 5:15 a. m., by three batteries at Manila and two at Cavite and by the Spanish fleet anchored in an approxi- mately east and west line across the mouth of Bakor Bay, with their left in shoal water in Zanacao Bay. "The squadron then proceeded to the attack, the flagship Olympia, under my personal direction, leading, followed at distance by the Baltimore, Raleigh, Petrel, Concord, and Boston, in the order named, which formation was main- tained throughout the action. The squadron opened fire at 5 141 a. m. While advancing to the attack, two mines were exploded ahead of the flagship, too far to be effective. "The squadron maintained a continuous and precise fire at ranges varying from 5,000 to 2,000 square yards, countermarching in a line approximately parallel to that of the Spanish fleet. The enemy's fire was vigorous, i)ut generally ineffective. "Early in the engagement two launches put out toward the Ol3'mpia with the apparent intention of using torpedoes. One was sunk and the other disabled by our fire and beached before an opportunity occurred to fire tor- pedoes. At 7 a. m. the Spanish flagship Reina Christina made a desperate attempt to leave the line and come out to engage at short range, but was received with such galling fire, the entire batter)^ of the Olympia being con- centrated upon her, that she was barely able to return to the shelter of the point. The fires started in her by our shell at this time were not extinguished until she sank. THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. 287 "At 7:35 a. m., it having been erroneously reported to me that only 15 rounds per gun remained for the 5 -inch rapid fire battery, I ceased firing and withdrew the squadron for consultation and a redistribution of ammunition, if necessary. "The three batteries at Manila had kept up a continuous fire from the beginning of the engagement, which fire was not returned by this squadron. The first of these batteries was situated on the south mole head, at the entrance to the Passig river, the second on the south bastion of the walled city of Manila, and the third at Malate, about one -half mile farther south. At this point I sent a message to the Governor-General to the effect that if the batteries did not cease firing the city would be shelled. This had the effect of silencing them. "At 11:16 a. m., finding that the report of scarcity of ammunition was incorrect, I returned with the squadron to the attack. By this time the flag- ship and almost the entire Spanish fleet were in flames, and at 12 130 p. m. the squadron ceased firing, the batteries being silenced and the ships sunk, burnt and deserted. "At 12:40 p. m. the squadron returned and anchored off Manila, the Petrel being left behind to complete the destruction of the smaller gunboats, which were behind the point of Cavite. This duty was performed by Com- mander E. P. Wood in the most expeditious and complete manner possible. "The Spanish lost the following vessels: "Sunk — Rein a Christina, Castilla, Don Antonio de Ulloa. "Burnt — Don Juan de Austria, Isla de Luzon, Isla de Cuba, General Lezo, Marques del Duero, El Correo, Velasco, and Isla de Mindanao (trans- port). "Captured — Rapido and Hercules (tugs), and several small launches. "I am unable to obtain complete accounts of the enemy's killed and wounded, but believe their loss to be very heavy. The Reina Christina alone had 150 killed, including the captain, and 90 wounded. "I am happy to report that the damage done to the squadron under my command was inconsiderable. There were none killed, and only 7 men in the squadron very slightly wounded. As will be seen by the reports of the com- manding officers which are herewith inclosed, several of the vessels were struck and even penetrated, but the damage was of the slightest, and the squadron is in as good condition now as before the battle. 288 THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. "I beg to state to the Department that I doubt if any commander-in- chief, under similar circumstances, was ever served by more loyal, efficient, and gallant captains than those of the squadron now under my com- mand. Capt. Frank Wildes, commanding the Boston, volunteered to remain in command of his vessel, although his relief arrived before leaving Hongkong. "Asst. Surg. C. P. Kindleberger, of the Olympia, and Gunner J. C. Evans, of the Boston, also volunteered to remain after orders detaching them had arrived. "The conduct of my personal staff was excellent. Commander B. P. Lamberton, chief of staff, was a volunteer for that position, and gave me most efficient aid. Lieut. T. M. Brumby, flag lieutenant, and Ensign W. P. Scott, aid, performed their duties as signal officers in a highly creditable manner. The Olympia being short of officers for the battery, Ensign H. H. Caldwell, flag secretary, volunteered for and was assigned to a subdivision of the 5 -inch battery. "Mr. J. L. Stickney, formerly an officer in the United States Navy, and now correspondent for the New York Herald, volunteered for duty as my aid, and rendered valuable service. "While leaving to the commanding officers to comment on the conduct of the officers and men under their commands, I desire especially to mention the coolness of Lieut. C. G. Calkins, the navigator of the Olympia, who came under my personal observation, being on the bridge with me throughout the entire action, and giving the ranges to the guns with an accuracy that was proven by the excellence of the firing. 'On May 2, the day following the engagement, the squadron again went to Cavite, where it remains. A landing party was sent to destroy the guns and magazines of the batteries there. The first battery, near the end of Sangley Point, was composed of two modern Trubia B. L. rifles of 15 centi- meters caliber. The second was one mile farther down the beach, and con- sisted of a modern Canet 12-centimeter B. L. rifle behind improvised earthworks. "On the 3d, the military forces evacuated the Cavite arsenal, which was taken possession of by a landing party. On the same day the Raleigh and Baltimore secured the surrender of the batteries on Corregidor Island, parol- ing the garrison and destroying the guns. THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. 289 "On the morning of May 4 the transport Manila, which had been aground in Bakor Bay, was towed off and made a prize. "Very respectfully, your obedient servant, "GEORGE DEWEY, "Commodore, U. S. N., "Commanding U. S. Naval Force on Asiatic Station. "The Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C." "U. S. Naval Force on Asiatic Station, Flagship Olympia, Cavite, Philippine Islands, July 9, 1898. — Sir: Referring to section 46355 of the Revised Statutes, I have the honor to forward the following list of the com- plements of the vessels of the enemy destroyed by the squadron under my command in the battle of Manila Bay on May i, 1898, taken from the official list of the Spanish Navy: Ship. Officers, etc. Total complement. Reina Christina 57 352 Castilla 52 349 Don Juan de Austria 28 179 Don Antonio de Ulloa 31 159 Isla de Cuba 31 156 Isla de Luzon 31 156 Marques del Duero 18 96 General Lezo 20 115 Argos 21 87 Velasco 28 147 1,796 "The trans-Atlantic Company's steamer Isla de Mindanao was armed and took part in the battle, and was also destroyed. Her complement is not known, but it is estimated at 120. "From the above it appears that the enemy had more men in this engage- ment than the United States squadron. In this connection I beg to invite the attention of the Department to a letter from the commanding officer of the Petrel, dated June 26, 1898, which has already been forwarded and which 290 THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. gives a statement by one of the crew of the Reina Christina, showing that the crews of the Spanish vessels were largely in excess of the complements given here. "I have the honor to be, very respectfully, "GEORGE DEWEY, "Rear-Admiral, U. S. N., "Commanding U. S. Naval Force on Asiatic Station. "The Secretary of the Navy, "Navy Department, Washington, D. C. " The lamented Captain Gridley's report of working the Olympia in the famous action demands a place in history, and is a most realistic picture of the resources and vicissitudes, the mishaps and the stem work of the flagship: "(No. 6-C.) U. S. Flagship Olympia, Off Manila, Philippine Islands, May 3, 1S98. — Sir: I have the honor to make the following report of this ship's engagement with the enemy on May i : "On April 30 we stood down for the entrance to Manila Bay. At 9:42 p. m. the crew were called to general quarters (the ship having been previ- ously cleared for action), and remained by their guns, ready to return the fire of the batteries if called upon. "About 11:30 p. m. we passed through Boca Grande entrance of Manila Bay. The lights on Corrigidor and Caballo islands and on San Nicolas Banks were extinguished. "After this ship had passed in, the battery on the southern shore of entrance opened fire at the ships astern, and the McCulloch and the Boston returned the fire. "At 4 a. m. of May i coffee was served out to officers and men. At day- break sighted shipping at Manila. Shifted course to southward and stood for Cavite. At 5 :o6 two submarine mines were exploded near, Cavite bearing south-southeast, distant 4 miles. At 5:15 battery on Sangley Point opened fire, but the shell fell short. Other shells passed over us, ranging 7 miles. At 5:41 a. m. we opened fire on Spanish ships with forward 8-inch guns, which were soon followed by the 5-inch battery. A rapid fire was kept up until the close of the action. "The range varied from 5,600 to 2,000 yards. "A torpedo boat ran out and headed for this ship, but was finally driven THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY, -291 back by our secondary battery. She came out a second time and was again, repulsed. This time she had to be beached, as several shot ha'd hit her. "Batteries from Manila fired occasional shots at the ships during the action, but did no damage. "At 6 :20 turned to starboard and headed back in front of the Spanish line. The Olympia led the column three times to the westward and twice to the eastward in front of the Spanish ships and shore batteries. On one occasion the Spanish flagship Reina Christina was hit by an 8-inch shell from our for- ward turret and raked fore and aft. At 7 :35 ceased firing and stood out into , Manila Bay. "The men went to breakfast. ' ' Many of the Spanish ships were seen to be on fire, and when we returned at 11 : 16 to complete the destruction of the vSpanish fleet, only one, the Don Antonio de Ulloa, and the shore batteries returned our fire. The former was sunk and the latter was silenced. "At 12:40 p. m. stood back to Manila Bay and anchored. "Besides making the ordinary preparations of clearing ship for action, the heavy sheet chains were faked up and down over a buffer of awnings against the sides in wake of the 5 -inch ammunition hoists, and afforded a stanch pro- tection, while iron and canvas barricades were placed in various places to cover guns' crews and strengthen moderate defenses. "The vessel was struck or slightly hulled as follows: "i. Plate indented i'^ inches starboard side of superstructure just for- ward of second 5 -inch sponson. "2. Three planks torn up slightly in wake of forward turret on starboard side of forecastle. "3. Port after shrouds of fore and main rigging. "4. Strongback of gig's davits hit and slightly damaged. "5. Hole in frame of ship between frames 65 and 66 on starboard side below main deck rail ; made by a 6-pounder. "6. Lashing of port whaleboat davit carried away by shot. "7. One of the rail stanchions carried away outside of port gangway. "8. Hull of ship indented on starboard side i foot below main-deck rail and 3 feet abaft No 4 coal port. "The forward 8-inch guns fired 23 shells. The ammunition hoist was temporarily out of commission on account of the blowing of the fuse. The 29-' THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. right gun worked well with the electrical batteries. Battery of left gun failed to explode the primer after the first shot; also resistance lamp in dynamo cir- cuit broken. Used percussion primers in this gun with good results after the first shot. "The after turret fired 13 shells. Had three misfires with battery of right gun and two with dynamo circuit, as fuses blew out. In renewing fuses they were immediately blown out; so shifted to percussion primers with good results. In left gun i shell jammed, after which used half-full and half- reduced charge, which fired it. Battery of this gun gave good results. One primer failed to check gas. "The smoke from the 5 -inch battery and from the forward 8-inch guns gave considerable trouble, and in both turrets the object glass of the telescopic sights became covered with a deposit from the powder and had to be wiped off^ frequently. These are, nevertheless, considered good sights for heavy guns ; but it is recommended that bar sights be installed in case of emergency, as there is no provision for sighting other than with the telescopes. "The batteries for the 5 -inch guns found to be unreliable. Used dynamo circuit on 3 guns with good results. Ammunition poor. Many shell became detached from the cases on loading and had to be rammed out from the muzzle. Several cases jammed in loading and in extracting. Guns and gun mounts worked well. Fired about 281 s-inch shell. "The 6-pounder battery worked to perfection, firing 1,000 rounds. Fired 360 rounds of i -pounder and 1,000 roimds of small-arm ammunition. "From 9:42 p. m. of April 30 till 12:40 p. m. May i, two divisions of the engineer's force worked the boilers and engines, keeping up steam and work- ing well, notwithstanding the heat of the fire and engine rooms. The third division worked at their stations in the powder division. "The ship needs no immediate repairs, and is in excellent condition to engage the enemy at any time. "There were no casualties nor wounded on this ship. "Where every officer and man did his whole duty there is only room for general praise. Pay Inspector D. A. Smith, Fleet Pay Clerk Wm. J. Right- mire, and Pay Clerk W. M. Long all volunteered for and performed active service not required by their stations. Ensign H. H. Caldwell, secretary to the commander-in-chief, volunteered for fighting duty and was assigned to the command of a subdivision of the 5-inch battery. Mr. J. L. Stickney, corre- THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. 293 spondent of the New York Herald (and formerly a naval officer of exceptional ability), served as a volunteer aid to the commander-in-chief and rendered valuable assistance in carrying messages and in keeping an accurate account of the battle. One 6-pounder was manned by a crew of marines, and two relief crews for the 5 -inch guns and two for the 6-pounders acted as sharp- shooters under Capt. W. Biddle, U. S. M. C. "The range was obtained by cross bearings from the standard compass, and the distance taken from the chart. "I am, sir, very respectfully, CH. V. GRIDLEY, "Captain U. S. N. , Commanding U. S. Flagship Olympia. "The Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Station." Captain J. B. Coghlan, of the Raleigh, says that at 12:10 a. m., May ist, there was a flash as a signal, and five minutes later a shot was fired from EI Saile Island and returned without effect. At 5 a. m., nearly five hours later, "when the scjuadron was nearly abreast the city of Manila and the flagship was turning to pass down toward Cavite, the Lunetta Battery, of apparently heavy guns, at Manila, opened fire and continued so long as the squadron was in action." This was a dangerous battery of Krupp guns, with a large supply of ammunition. The captain says his vessel was struck but once, "and then by a 6-pounder shell, which passed through both sides of the whaleboat (above her water line), and then glanced along the chase of the starboard 6-pounder on our poop. The gun was not injured, and the whaleboat but .slightly, and she is again ready for service. " In conclusion the captain says to the admiral: "Permit me to congratu- late you upon the very brilliant victory you achieved over a naval force nearly equal to your own, and backed by extensive shore batteries of very heavy guns, and this without the loss of a single life. History points to no greater achievement. ' ' Captain Asa Walker, of the Concord, says: "In passing the city a big gun opened on the fleet, to which I replied with two shots. The Concord held her position in the line until your order to withdraw from action. The Concord was not hit. The following is a list of the ammunition expended: One hun- dred and fifteen 6-inch full charges, sixty-seven 6-inch reduced charges, six shrapnel, one hundred and seventy-six 6-inch common shell, two hundred and twenty 6-pounder cartridges, one hundred and twenty 3-pounder cartridges. 294 THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. and sixty i -pounder cartridges," or seven hundred and sixty-four shots fired. The executive officer of the Concord reports: "Three complete turns were made by our squadron in front of the enemy's line, the ships firing when'ever the guns would bear. "At 7:40 a. m. we ceased firing, in obedience to signal from the com- mander-in-chief, and at 8:10 a. m. the crews went to breakfast. At this time several of the enemy's ships were in flames and explosions took place on board one of them ; some were sinking and others withdrawing for protection behind Canacao and Cavite. "At 12:25 not a Spanish flag was flying in the harbor except from the staff of the sunken cruiser Don Antonio de Ulloa, submerged behind Sangley Point; the Reina Christina was a mass of flames, and sunk near the bastion at Cavite, and the Castilla was burning rapidly in Caiiacao Bay. "At 1 :45 we started to rejoin the squadron, but were ordered to go to the Petrel at Cavite, where she had seen sent to destroy the vessels at the arsenal. She signaled as we anchored, 'Have destroyed eight vessels here." White flags were flying at various points on shore, and there was no longer any resistance." Captain Dyer, of the Baltimore, makes a most interesting report, saying: "At early daylight the fleet had reached a point close up to the shipping off the city of Manila, when the signal was made, 'Prepare for general action.' »Spanish batteries near Old Manila opened fire at long range at about the same time. Flagship leading, with port helm, bore down on the right of Spanish line of vessels, formed in a somewhat irregular crescent at anchor. "Our column passed down the enemy's line, turning with port helm as their left was reached, engaging them with starboard battery on the return. This maneuver was performed three times at distances from the enemy's ships varying from 2,600 to 5,000 yards, when you signaled to 'withdraw from action' at 7 :35. "Upon reaching a convenient distance in the bay, you signaled, 'Let the people go to breakfast' ; and at 8:40, 'Commanding officers repair on board the flagship. ' "While on board the flagship I received an order to intercept a steamer coming up the bay, reported to be flying Spanish colors. "Soon after starting on this duty I discovered the colors of the stranger THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. 295 to be British, and so reported by signal, you having in the meantime made general signal to get under way and follow your motions, this ship being at the time some 2 miles to the south-southwest of the flagship on her way to intercept the supposed Spanish steamer. "At 10:5s you made general signal, 'Designated vessel will lead,' with Baltimore's distinguishing pennant, and in a few minutes signal to 'Attack the enemy's batteries or earthworks' and for fleet to 'close up'; in obedi- ence to which order this ship led in, with starboard helm, to a position off the Caiiacoa and Sangley Point batteries and opened fire with starboard battery at a distance of about 2,800 yards, closing in to 2,200, between which and 2,700 yards our best work was done, slowing the ship dead slow, stopping the engines as range was obtained, delivering a rapid and accurate fire upon the shore batteries and a gunboat just inside of Sangley Point. You signaled, at 1:20, to 'Prepare to anchor,' and at 1:30, 'Anchor at discretion.' "The victory was complete." The executive officer of the Baltimore reports: "The Baltimore was struck five times, with small projectiles, all of which, with one exception, exploded or broke up. The most serious hit, happily attended with no serious injury to any officer or man, came from a 4. 7-inch steel projectile, which entered the ship's side forward .of the starboard gang- way, about a foot above the line of the main deck. It passed through the hammock netting, downward through the deck planks and steel deck, bend- ing and cracking deck beam in wardroom stateroom No. 5, then glanced upward through the after engine room coaming, over against the after cylinder of No. 3 6-inch gun (port), carrying away lug and starting several shield bolts and putting the gun out of commission ; deflected over to the star- board side, striking a ventilator ladder and dropping on deck. In its passage it struck a box of 3-pounder ammunition of the fourth division, exploding several charges, and wounded Lieutenant Kellogg, Ensign Irwin, and 6 men of the gun's crew — none very seriously. A second shot came in about a foot above the berth deck, just forward of the blowers, passed through the 'thwart- ship alleyway, hitting the exhaust pipe of the starboard blower, causdng a slight leak. A third shot struck about 2 feet above the water line on the port side, abreast bunker B-iio, passed into the bunker, cutting blower drain and main air duct, and exploding in bunker. A fourth shot came in about 6 feet above the berth deck, starboard side, abreast the forward end of the forward 296 THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. wash room, and broke up in a clothes locker. A fifth struck the starboard forward ventilator, slightly bending it. "The upper cabin skylight, the after range finder, and the two whaleboats hanging at the davits were all destroyed by the shock of discharge from the 8-inch guns of the second division." Commander E. P. Wood, of the Petrel, reports: "Just as day was break- ing, about 5 o'clock, the shore batteries below Manila began firing. It was scarcely light enough to distinguish signals from this vessel when flagship made signal to 'Prepare for action,' so signal was repeated from the Balti- more. During time column was forming and closing up, the batteries from below Manila were firing. As flagship stood to southward the ships and batteries at Cavite began their firing, and gradually, as we approached, we could make out ships under way in harbor and three guns on shore firing." The Petrel expended in three turns before breakfast: "Ninety-two 6-inch common shells, eighty-two 6-inch full charges, ten reduced charges, and two hundred and fifty-three 3-pounders. Several times during rounds had to cease firing on account of smoke and in order to economize ammunition. "The action of ammunition was exceedingly good. There was expended during action, one hundred and thirteen 6-inch common shells, three 6-inch armor-piercing shells, . eighty-two 6-inch full charges, thirty-four 6-inch reduced charges, and three hundred and thirteen 3-pounder ammunition. Owing to the heat due to firing, the pads swelled and made it very diificult to lock the breech plug. Nothing would remedy this save shifting plugs, replacing hot plug by the one from the other gun which was cool. The wedge of firing lock jammed frequently, due to hot parts. This was remedied by shifting locks. "The percussion primers worked very unsatisfactorily; sometimes four primers would be expended before one woiild act. Primers leaked bajll}', causing excessive deposit in primer seat, hard extraction, and delay in prim- ing of gun and requiring frequent boring of vent. " Lieutenant Hughes reports: "The ship was gradually cleared for action, this work having been begun in Hongkong, when the fore and foretopsails yards, fore trysail gaff, ladders, diving outfit, part of the running rigging, etc., were placed on board the transport Nanshan, and completed the day before the squadron entered Manila Bay. In the operation of preparing the ship for action certain articles and material in the equipment and construction THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. 297 departments were necessarily thrown overboard. Among these may be men- tioned all of the varnishes, inflammable paints and oils, tar, turpentine, etc., lumber, two boats' strong backs, one turpentine chest, one ice chest, one large hammock box, the carpenter's bench." Captain Wilder, of the Boston, brought up the rear, and makes a model report for brevity and prose. He remarks: "Several shots were fired by the batteries in Manila, and two shots were given in reply. At 5:35 (a. m.) action with the enemy commenced, and was continued at varying distances, steaming in a circle, until 7:35 a. m., firing with a fair degree of deliberation and accuracy. At times the smoke was dense, interfering very materially with maneuvering and firing. "The Spanish fleet and shore batteries replied vigorously, and an attempt was made with an improvised torpedo boat, but our fire was overpowering and the enemy received heavy damage and loss. "In obedience to signal, I withdrew from action at 7:35, and gave the crew breakfast and rest. "At 11:10 the action was renewed, and continued until the enemy ceased firing and his ships were all burned, sunk, or withdrawn behind the arsenal of Cavite. "It gives ine pleasure to bear witness to the courage and resolution of the Spanish fleet, and to say that they defended themselves creditably." This report of the working of the guns is interesting: "There being no quick and accurate method of finding the range, it was found that a considerable number of the shots apparently fell short. Had the ship been provided with a range finder the effectiveness of the firing would have been somewhat increased; as it was, the result was generally good. After passing the enemy, a countermarch was made, and fire was opened with the starboard battery. This maneuver was repeated several times, until the enemy seemed to be silenced. During this part of the engagement full charges with common shell were used in all guns of the main battery. The guns generally worked well, but after an hour's fighting it was found that most of the breech plugs of the 6 and 8 inch guns were expanded by the heat, so as to make it a somewhat difficult operation to close the breech. After firing the forward 8-inch for half an hour it was found necessary to put in a new gas-check pad, and the firing was then continued. The wire breechings of No. 2 6-inch gun (starboard) were carried away near the end of the firing. 298 THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. The lock of No. 3 6-inch (port) was disabled, and a spare one substituted. The action was resumed at 11:10 a. m., the starboard battery being fftst engaged. The reply was principally from the forts, but these were soon silenced. Advantage had been taken of the interval to put the battery in order again. The breechings on No. 2 6-inch were replaced by the gunner's mate of the division. The guns were still very hot, and the breech plugs became still harder to work. The forward S-inch gun was put out of com- mission for about twenty minutes from this cause. At 12:20 the ship was turned around and the port battery brought into play. At 12 :4o p. m. 'Cease firing' was sounded, a white flag having been raised at Cavite. " The executive officer, J. A. Howe, says of the officers and men: "Very few, if any of them, had ever been under fire before, but their cool- ,ness was remarkable. They were full of zeal, energy, and enthusiasm, and were untiring. Where the conduct of all was so commendable it would be impossible to single out any individual for special praise. One noteworthy feature was the conduct of the Chinese messmen, who were stationed in the after powder division. While they are usually considered entirely alien in their ideas, and are not regarded as good fighters, yet in this case they dis- played as much zeal, bravery, and energy as any other person. The uninter- rupted ammunition supply in the after part of the ship was largely due to their efforts." In the Spanish official report. Admiral Montijo mentions that he left the Bay of Manila for Subic with his squadron April 25, at 11 p. m., and had one wooden cruiser disabled on the way through leaks and disabled machinery. The admiral found, "with much disgust," of the defense of the western entrance to Subic, that "the guns which should have been mounted on that island were delayed a month and a half. This surprised me, as the shore batteries that the navy had installed (with very little difficulty) at the entrance of the bay of Manila, under the intelligent direction of colonel of naval artil- lery, wSeiior Garces, and Lieutenant Beneavente, were ready to fight twenty- four days after the commencement of the work. "I was also no less disgusted that they confided in the efficacy of the few torpedoes which they had found feasible to put there. "The entrance was not defended by torpedoes nor b)^ the batteries of the island, so that the squadron would have had to bear the attack of the Ameri- cans with its own resources, in 40 meters of Avater, and with little security. ADMIRAL UONTIJO, COMMANDER OF THE FLEET THAT ADMIRAL DEWEY SUNK. VltWS OF THE NAVY YARD AT CAVITE, PHILIPPINES. THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. 301 Our vessels could not only be destroyed, but they could not save their crews. I still held a hope that the Americans would not go to Subic, and give us time for more preparations, but the following day I received from the Spanish consul at Hongkong a telegram which said: 'Enemy's squadron sailed at 2 p. m. from the bay of Mira, and according to reliable accounts they sailed for Subic to destroy our squadron, and then will go to Manila. ' "This telegram demonstrated that the enemy knew where they could find my squadron, and that the port of Subic had no defenses." There was held a council of war, and returned to fight "under less insup- portable conditions" in the bay of Manila, but "not near the City, because far from'defending it, this would provoke the enemy to bombard the plaza, which doubtless would have been demolished on account of its few defenses. It was unanimously decided that we should take position in the bay of Caiiacao, in the least water possible, in order to combine our fire with that of the bat- teries of Point Sangley and Ulloa. "I immediately ordered Del Rio to concentrnte his forces in the most strategic point of the arsenal, taking every disposition to burn the coal and stores before allowing them to fall into the power of the enemy. I sent the Don Juan de Austria to Manila to get a large number of lighters filled with sand to defend the water line of the Castilla (which could not move) against the enemy's shells and torpedoes. At 10 a. m. on the 29th I left Subic with the vessels of my squadron, towing the Castilla by the transport Manila. "In the afternoon of the same day we anchored in the Gulf of Canacao in 8 meters of water. On the following morning we anchored in line of battle, the Christina, Castilla, Don Juan de Austria, Don Juan de Ulloa, Luzon, Cuba, and Marques del Duero, while the transport Manila was sent to the Roads of Bacoor, where the Velasco and Lezo were undergoing repairs. "At 7 p. m. I received a telegram from vSubic announcing that the enemy's squadron had entered the port at 3, reconnoitering, doubtless seeking our ships, and from there they had sailed with course for Manila. "The mail steamer Isla Mindanao arrived in the bay. I advised her cap- tain to save his vessel by going to Singapore, as the enemy could not get into the entrance probably before midnight. As he was not authorized from the trans-Atlantic, he did not do so, and then I told him that he could anchor in shallow water as near as possible to Bacoor. "At midnight gun fire was heard off Corregidor, and at 2 on the morning 302 THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. of the ist of May I received telegraphic advices that the American vessels were throwing their search lights at the batteries of the entrance, with which they had exchanged several shots. I notified the commanding general of the arsenal, Seiaor Sostoa, and the general-governor of the plaza, Capt. Seiior Garcia Pana, that they should prepare themselves. I directed all the artillery to be loaded, and all the sailors and soldiers to go to their stations for battle." Montijo details the tonnage of vessels and the character of guns, to show the odds in favor of the Americans, adding all his vessels had been painted dark gray color, had taken down their masts and yards ; and the boats, to avoid the effects of projectiles and the splinters, had their anchors buoyed and cables ready to slip instantly. At 5:15 the signal to open the fire of the Spanish fleet was made, and the American answer came promptly. Montijo says : "The Americans fired most rapidly. There came upon us numberless projectiles, as the three cruisers at the head of the line devoted themselves almost entirely to fight the Christina, my flagship. A short time after the action commenced one shell exploded in the forecastle and put out of action all those who served the four rapid-fire cannon, making splinters of the for- ward mast, which wounded the helmsman on the bridge, when Lieut. ]os6 Nunez took the wheel with a coolness worthy of the greatest commendation, steering until the end of the fight. In the meanwhile, another shell exploded in the orlop, setting fire to the crews' bags, which they were fortunately able to control. "The enemy shortened the distance between us, and, rectifying his aim, covered us with a rain of rapid-fire projectiles. At 7:30 one shell destroyed completely the steering gear. I ordered to steer by hand while the rudder was out of action. In the meanwhile, another shell exploded on the poop, and put out of action 9 men. Another destroyed the mizzen masthead, bringing down the flag and my ensign, which were replaced immediately. A fresh shell exploded in the officers' cabin, covering the hospital with blood, destroy- ing the wounded who were being treated there. Another exploded in the ammunition room astern, filling the quarters with smoke and preventing the working of the hand steering gear. As it was impossible to control the fire, I had to flood the magazine when the cartridges were beginning to explode. "Amidships several shells of smaller caliber went through the smokestack, and one of the large ones penetrated the fire room, putting out of action i THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. 303 master gunner and 12 men serving the guns. Another rendered useless the starboard bow gun ; while the fire astern increased, fire was started forward by another shell, which went through the hull and exploded on the deck. "The broadside guns, being undamaged, continued firing until there were only one gunner and one seaman remaining unhurt for firing them, as the guns' crews had been frequently called upon to substitute those charged with steering, all of whom were out of action. "The ship being out of control, the hull, smoke pipe, and mast riddled with shot, or confused with the cries of the wounded ; half of her crew out of action, among whom were 7 officers, I gave the order to sink and abandon the ship before the magazines should explode, making signal at the same time to the Cuba and Luzon to assist in saving the rest of the crew, which they did, aided by others from the Duero and the arsenal. "I abandoned the Christina, directing beforehand to secure her flag, and accompanied by my staff", and with great sorrow, I hoisted my flag on the cruiser Isla de Cuba. "After having saved many men from the unfortunate vessel, one shell destroying her heroic commander, Don Luis Cadarso, who was directing the rescue. "The UUoa, which also defended herself firmly, using the only two guns which were available, was sunk by a shell which entered the water line, put- ting out of action her commander and half of her remaining crew, those which were only remaining for the service of the two guns stated. "The Castilla, which fought heroically, remained with her artillery use- less, except one stern gun, with which they fought spiritedly, was riddled with shot and set on fire by the enemy's shells, then sunk, and was abandoned by her crew in good order, which was directed by her commander, Don Alonzo Algado. The casualties on this ship were 23 killed and 80 wounded. "The Austria, very much damaged and on fire, went to the aid of the Castilla. The Luzon had three guns dismounted, and was slightly damaged in the hull. The Duero remained with one of her engines useless, the bow gun of 12 centimeters and one of the redoubts. "At 8 o'clock in the morning, the enemy's squadron having suspended its fire, I ordered the ships that remained to ns to take positions in the bottom of the Roads at Bacoor, and there to resist to the last moment, and that they should be sunk before they surrendered. 304 THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. "At 10:30 the enemy returned, forming a circle to destroy the arsenal and the ships which remained to me, opening upon them a horrible fire, which we answered as far as we could with the few cannon which we still had mounted. "There remained the last recourse, to sink our vessels, and we accom- plished this operation, taking care to save the flag, the distinguishing pennant, the money in the safe, the portable arms, the breech plugs of the guns, and the signal codes. "After which I went with my staff to the Convent of Santo Domingo de Cavite, to be cured of a wound received in the left leg, and to telegraph a brief report of the action, with preliminaries and results. "It remains only to say that all the chiefs, officers, engineers, quarter- masters, gunners, sailors, and soldiers rivaled one another in sustaining with honor the good name of the navy on this sad day. "The inefficiency of the vessels which composed my little squadron, the lack of all classes of the personnel, especially master gunners and seamen gunners ; the inaptitude of some of the provisional machinists, the scarcity of rapid-fire cannon, the strong crews of the enemy, and the tmprotected char- acter of the greater part of our vessels, all contributed to make more decided the sacrifice which we made for our coiintry and to prevent the possibility of the horrors of the bombardment of the city of Manila, with the conviction that with the scarcity of our force against the superior enemy we were going to certain death and could expect a loss of all our ships. "Our casualties, including those of the arsenal, amounted to 381 men killed and wounded." There is a surprising amount of information in the official reports of Admiral Dewey's famous victory that will be of the nature of novelty to people at large. The fact becomes prominent that a great_dealof credit is due the Navy Department for its foresight, vigilance, incessant industry in supplying to the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic fleet the news of the day, cautioning him not to spare expense where there was anything in reach or sight to aid the fighting ships when the decisive hours came. The conversa- tion between the Navy Department and the Asiatic command was right to the point. Nothing seemed to escape, or to be misunderstood. The movements on behalf of the United States were characterized by confidence, certainty of purpose, promptitude and precision of execution. The Spaniards were hesi- 41. Street in the Suburb of La Ermita. 42. Rosario Street iu La Ermitn. 43. Luneta Square in Manila. 44 Hospital of Sau Juan de Dios. 4.5. Manila Cathedral. 46. Royal Street in Malate. 47. Royal Street in S.Tula Ana. 48. Monument t)f Don Simon do Anda y Salazar in the Malecon Square. VIEWS IN AND AROUND MANILA. THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. 3°? tant, uncertain, confused, and the doom that was upon them was announced plainly — the one redeeming^feature for them being in the personal bravery of the officers and men. The rottenness of the government of Spain provided the elements of defeat. The preparations by the Spaniards for the battle con- trast effectively with those of the Americans. Admiral Montijo was "disgusted" to find nothing done at the vital point for the defense of Subic, and warned that the Americans were on the way, made haste to Manila Bay, where he planned his line of defense so as to be flanked by shore batteries, and yet to spare the city — a strategy afterward sharply resented by Admiral Dewey when he sent his compliments to the authorities in Manila with the message that another gun fired at an American ship and the city would be destroyed. The flanking batteries were of powerful German guns, several of them firing heavier metal than any in the American squadron, and they were well located to do hurt to our .ships. Montijo's line had been formed with reference to them, and he had contrived to be in part protected by shal- lows. He had towed a ship that he calls a floating battery, from Subig, and sought to protect this machine with other vessels. The Americans stripped for the battle, their ships and themselves, throwing overboard all that was inflammable, sparing nothing that would splinter or burn. The Spaniards were much encumbered with fuel, and the fires kindled by our shells were inextinguishable. There have been doubts whether the Spaniards were sur- prised by the American visit. They certainly were not. Admiral Montijo had two days' warning, heard the guns at the mouth of the harbor at mid- night, and made full preparation for the shock that he knew was approaching. He gave the signal for the firing to commence, and the Americans were received by two shore batteries and a floating one and the entire Spanish squadron. The American reply was immediate, and the hour was that of daybreak. The victory of our ships was so thorough, and the loss on our side so insignificant, that our countrymen have hardly ascertained how many things there were to think about, and with what efficacy the hard work was done, or through what strife with tribulations it was accomplished. The gunners foimd out in battle much they had not been familiar with, in handling their tools. The dreadful and beautiful machines they used were fashioned delicately as telescopes, and might in several particulars be mistaken for instruments of science of refined construction and nice adjustments. One of the words of caution to the men that the Commander-in-Chief made 3o8 THE STORY OF DEWEY'S SPLENDID VICTORY. impressive was that ammunition was not to be wasted. They were far from home, and in a protracted engagement might disarm themselves. It was an erroneous report that only fifteen rounds remained of the ammunition for the four-inch rapid fire battery tht^t caused the remarkable intermission in the battle — and the celebrated recess. The boys, it will be remembered, wanted to finish the job before they had coffee, but the Commander-in- Chief insisted on breakfast all around, and not a minute was lost. First the smoke of the firing and the burning ships covered the scene of action, though the American ships were kept in motion. Second, the guns were so hot it was hard to work them. Third, the heat was excessive — May is the hottest month of the year at Manila. The rest was refreshing and reassuring to the Americans. They saw their victory, and poured in what Admiral Montijo calls "a horrible fire" that soon closed the conflict with the annihilation of the Asiatic squadron of Spain. At 12:40 the flagship signaled "Cease firing. " The resistance of the Spaniards had ended. There were only the slain and wounded, the wrecks and ships on fire, the swarms of prisoners and fugitives, the burning houses at Cavite, the silenced batteries — a battle won whose proud story shall never fade, the American arms with freshly-wrought splendors on the seas, the flag of the Great Republic with brightened stars and stripes, the sound of Ameri- can guns ringing around the globe, great news on the streets of the capitals of all nations, another radiant chapter in our inheritance of glory. CHAPTER XII. After the May Day Battle in Manila Bay. Dewey's Cables during the Time He Held the Harbor with the City of Manila under His Guns — Dispatches Full of History and Rich in Personal Characteristics — Authentic Information from the Inside — The Official Story — Dewey's Unfavorable Opinion of Cubans — Capture of the City — Trouble with Aguinaldo — Our Ships and Crews. Dtiring the days Admiral Dewey was on the way from Mirs Bay to that of Manila, the news got into circulation that something was to be expected from our Asiatic squadron. Our ships of war in time of war could not remain in neutral ports, and those on the coast of China had been ordered to assume the offensive in the Philippines, especially, it was the early public understanding, to "remove" the Spanish fleet, so that our commerce on the seas of Asia might not be assailed or obstructed. We had a very vigilant consul at Hong- kong, who had been at pains to inform himself as to affairs in the Spanish archipelago, and was favorably impressed by the Filipino insurgents, and when Admiral Dewey departed on his important errand, his line of cominuni- cations was "by tug" through the consulate. The first account of the action in Manila Bay was from the defeated Spaniards, and in the course of explain- ing their misfortunes they confessed to disaster that at length included all the ships in that part of the world flying the flag of Spain, with the exception of a few gunboats scattered so far among the islands that they disappeared from all scenes of action. The immediate impression made by the loss of cable connection with Manila while it was relating the story that the navy of Spain had vanished in the Orient, so valiantly defended that the Americans were *' compelled to maneuver repeatedly, " was that the Spaniards had cut the wires so as to keep the extent of their broken fortunes to themselves. The cable was cut by order of Admiral Dewey, who selected a suitable place, took out a section of the cable, coiled it away and buoyed both ends. He first pro- posed to preser\'e the line for the use of both parties, but the offer was 309 3IO AFTER THE MAY DAY BATTLE IN MANILA. BAY. quickly rejected. After a few hours the minds of the authorities of Spain were changed, and they sent an acceptance of the conservation of the privilege of talking to Madrid in exchange for admitting the American Admiral to equal rights, but it was too late. There was a weary wait for news from Dewey, and the full orbed intelligence had to travel by dispatch boat to Hong- kong. When the city of Manila fell into our possession the cable was soon spliced, and money poured into the company at the rate of four dollars a word. The dispatches by Admiral Dewey through the combination of tugs and cables, during the intermission in through wire service, and his cable- grams afterward, are so many thunderbolts of history, and the journals gener- ally have been so busily magnifying current matters that this treasury of solid knowledge has not been attractively displayed, until, thanks to the Navy Department, it appears in these pages: • '' Hongkong, May 12, 1898. Secretary of Navy, Washington: There is liltle change in the situation since my last telegram. I am transferring to transports steel breech-loading rifles from sunken Spanish men-of-war; also stores from arsenal in my possession. I am maintaining strict blockade. Add Argos to the list of destroyed vessels. El Correo prob- ably El Cano. I send this telegram to Hongkong. ... It has been reported at Manila that Pelayo and another vessel are en route to Philippine Islands. DEWEY. Hongkong, May 15, 1898. (Cavite, May 12.) Secretary of the Navy, Washington: I thank the President for my promotion. Forcibly recommend that Com- mander Lamberton, chief of staff; Captains Wildes, the commander of the Boston ; Coghlan, the commander of the Raleigh ; Gridley, the commander of the Olympia; Dyer, the commander of the Baltimore; Walker, the commander of the Concord; Wood, the commander of the Petrel — without whose aid I could have done nothing, each to be advanced ten numbers. DEWEY. Hongkong, May 15, 1898. (Cavite, May 13.) Secretary of the Navy, Washington : The squadron thanks the President for his message in your telegram of May 7. I am maintaining strict blockade of Manila by sea, and believe rebels AFTER THE MAY DAY BATTLE IN MANILA BAY. 311 are hemming in by land, although they are inactive and making no demon- strations. Great scarcity of provisions in the city. I believe the Spanish Governor-General will be obliged to surrender soon. I can take Manila at any moment. To retain possession and thus control Philippine Islands would require, in my best judgment, well-equipped force of 5,000 men, although United States troops sent by Pekin will be very useful to relieve the Olympia of guarding Cavite. United States troops should make provision for extremely hot, moist climate. Spanish force is estimated 10,000 men. The rebels are reported 30,000 men. I should suggest the Charleston or Pekin bring a few officers and about 100 men, partly Engineers' Department, to man transport Manila and captured vessels. I am loading Manila with ordnance from the Spanish man-of-war. I propose to assign Lieutenant-Commander Singer to command. Captured on May 12 the Spanish gun vessel Callao attempting to run blockade; released on parole officers and men. I have plenty of coal for the present and can purchase more in Chinese ports. Will hold frequent com- munication with Hongkong. One British, one French, two German, one Japanese men-of-war here observing. Baltimore requires immediately one Mark IV mount for one 6-inch B. L. R. , a supply of extractors for Hotchkiss 3-pounders and for Hotchkiss 6-pounders; also locks most recent design for main battery. , DEWEY. Hongkong, May 24, 1898. (Cavite, May 20.) Secretary of Navy, Washington : Situation unchanged. Strict blockade is continued. Great scarcity pre- vails at Manila. Foreign subjects fear an outbreak of the Spanish soldiers. Arrangements have been made for them to be transferred to Cavite by the foreign men-of-war, if necessary. Aguinaldo, the rebel commander-in-chief, was brought down by the McCulloch. Organizing forces near Cavite, and may render assistance that will be valuable. I do not consider submarine mines practicable here, on account of great depth and width of bay and entrance. If attacked by superior force, the squadron will endeavor to give good account of itself. The American bark Saranac was captured off Iloilo, Philippine Islands. Upon the arrival of the Charleston with ammunition, I propose to recapture and to clear the island of small Spanish gun vessels. When is Charleston expected to arrive? I request you will send to the Asiatic Station the Bennington and the Yorktown, if possible. Will be more useful 312 AFTER THE MAY DAY BATTLE IN MANILA BAY, than the Philadelphia. How many troops coming here Pekin? When expected to arrive? I request send provisions for the squadron — 2,000 men for three months. Also small stores. DEWEY. Hongkong, May 27, 1898. (Cavite, May 29.) Secretary of Navy, Washington : No change in the situation of the blockade. Is effective. It is impossible for the people in Manila to buy provisions, except rice. The French men- of-war must go to Saigon for provisions. It is important that I should know as early as possible whereabouts and strength of the possible Spanish expedi- tion to the Philippines, and, if possible, that the squadron should be reinforced with a battleship or armored cruiser. The captain of the Olympia (Gridley) condemned by medical survey; is ordered home; leave by Occidental and Oriental Steamship Company's steamer from Hongkong on May 28. Com- mander Lamberton has been appointed to the command of the Olympia. Steamer has just arrived from Amoy with 3,000 Mauser rifles and great amount ammunition for Aguinaldo, whose force is increasing constantly. . . . Bark Saranac is sailing under the British flag; is loading with sugar at Iloilo for New York. DEWEY. Hongkong, May 30, 1898. Secretary of Navy, Washington : Aguinaldo, revolutionary leader, visited the Olympia yesterday. He expects to make general attack on May 31. Doubt ability to succeed. Situa- tion remains unchanged, DEWEY. Hongkong, June 6, 1898. Secretary of Navy, Washington : The following telegram has been received, addressed United States consul, Hongkong: "Direct Captain Hodgson, McCulloch, turn over command Foley; return home. * CRIDLER." I request to be informed is this official? DEWEY. (The reply, through Allen, Acting Secretary, was "official.") AFTER THE MAY DAY BATTLE IN MANILA BAY. 313 U. S. Naval Force on Asiatic Station, Flagship Olympia, Cavite, Philippine Islands, June 12, 1898. Sir: I take pleasure in bringing to the attention of the Department the zeal and efficiency of Capt. Daniel B. Hodgson, R. C. S., commanding the McCulloch, while serving in the squadron under my command. The McCulloch steamed from Hongkong to Manila Bay in the squadron formation, and ran the batteries at the entrance with the squadron, and while not in the line of battle at the battle of Manila Bay, was kept near by and in readiness to assist any vessel that might be disabled. Since joining my command, and up to the time of his detachment, Cap- tain Hodgson has kept the McCulloch in a high state ef efficiency, and ready to move at a moment's notice, and has made her a valuable auxiliary to the squadron. I request that the Department will communicate this report to the hon- orable Secretary of the Treasury. I have the honor to be, very respectfully, GEORGE DEWEY, Rear-Admiral, U. S. N., Commanding U. S. Naval Force on Asiatic Station. The Secretary of the Navy Washington, D. C. Hongkong, June 6, 1898. (Cavite, June 3.) Secretary of Navy, Washington : Receipt of telegram of May 26 is acknowledged, and I thank the Depart- ment for the expression of confidence. Have acted according to the spirit of Department's instructions therein from the beginning, and I have entered into no alliance with the insurgents or with any faction. This squadron can reduce the defenses of Manila at any moment, but it is considered useless until the arrival of sufficient United States forces to retain possession. DEWEY. Hongkong, June 6, 1898. Secretary of Navy, Washington : There are no guns of recent design available to mount upon shore, being without breech mechanism, mounts, or ammunition. There is no telegraphic communication Bolinao to Hongkong. Have just received 4,500 tons of coal; I have sufificient coal for two months. Insurgents have been engaged 314 AFTER THE MAY DAY BATTLE IN MANILA BAY. actively within the province of Cavite during last week; they have won several small victories, taking prisoners about i,8oo men, 50 officers; Spanish troops, not native. I am preparing arsenal and Cavite for the occupation United States troops, and will have vessel of Cape Engano to meet United States transports. DEWEY. Hongkong, June 27, 1S98. Secretary of Navy, Washington : Receipt of telegram of June 14 is acknowledged. Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, with thirteen of his staff, arrived May 19, by permission, on Nanshan. Established self Cavite, outside arsenal, under the protection of our guns, and organized his army. I have had several conferences with him, generally of a personal nature. Consistently I have refrained from assisting him in any way with the force under m.y command, and on several occasions I have declined requests that I should do so, telling him the squadron could not act until the arrival of the United States troops. At the same time I have given him to understand that I consider insurgents as friends, being opposed to a common enemy. He has gone to attend a meeting of insurgent leaders for the purpose of forming a civil government. Aguinaldo has acted independently of the "squadron, but has kept me advised of his progress, which has been wonderful. I have allowed to pass by water rectuits, arms, and ammunition, and to take such Spanish arms and ammunition from the arsenal as he needed. Have advised frequently to conduct the war humanely, which he has done invari- ably. My relations with him are cordial, but I am not in his confidence. The United States has not been bound in any way to assist insurgents by any act or promises, and he is not, to my knowledge, committed to assist us. I believe he expects to capture Manila without my assistance, but doubt ability, they not yet having many guns. Ln my opinioxL,.Ji£se-^eople arejar superior in their intelligence and more capable of self-government than the natives of Cuba, and I am familiar with both races. DEWEY. Hongkong, June 17, 1898. (Cavite, June 12.) Secretary of Navy, Washington : Insurgents continue hostilities and have practically surrounded Manila. They have taken 2,500 Spanish prisoners, whom they treat most humanely. They do not intend to attack city proper until the arrival of United States .troops thither; I have advised. Twelve merchant vessels are anchored in the 33. In the Valleys of Carabao. 34. Street in the District of Pacu, Manila. 35. Aristocratic Residences in the Suburbs of San Juan S ' d 3 ^^^^^^^^^^ ^ ^ 1^- t3 % n ^^^^^^^E- I^B*^" 2! ^K^^' IS B 1 'B^-. O Hi 1 Hk I z B^ 1 •fwy^' o ^Hfi r J =1 HK r w wK^" L _ ?- Lr-f3 ^J 2 S) 1-3 O ■I] d o d CO ^^ ■ 1 B ■i ' ^^^K I^^^^^^HK^^^ikt^ tfivr^ — a-tiii ■(^^ *- \. ■] > a z Q H 03 H P Q z Q O •) The Adjutant-General U. S. A., Washington, D. C. : Recommend brigades to consist of three regiments of infantr}^, three brigades to a division. Regular regiments to be brigaded together, adding two volunteer regiments tothe sixteen regular regiments already here to form first and second divisions of Fifth Army Corps, the other corps to be formed in like manner from volunteer regiments. General officers in order of rank of respective corps to command divisions as fast as organized ; others to com- mand brigades. Staff officers recently appointed to be assigned as far as practicable with the volunteers, in order to give brigade commanders the benefit of their experience. The five cavalry regiments here now to be formed into two brigades of three and two regiments respectively. Should cavalry volunteer regiments be assigned here, brigades then to be formed with two regiments each. The number of regiments for each brigade as I 366 THE EARLY CORRESPONDENCE OF THE WAR. have indicated is approved by General Wheeler. Other general officers whom I have consulted agree with me as to the number of regiments to constitute a brigade. Recommend placing all the regular regiments in one corps, so that they may be taken first for service in Cuba. If this is not satisfactorj', half of the regulars can he assigned to each corps, and in event of an ad- vance on Cuba the regulars in each corps formed for the advance. I think, however, that it would be better to have all regulars in one corps. The light artillery should (remain), as at present, all together under charge of Colonel Randolph. They should accompany the advance, and then be assigned one battery to each division and one to cavalry corps, the remainder to constitute the reserve. If this project is approved, I request early order, and I will immediately proceed to complete the organization. I have been led to make the recommendations in view of an early advance, and from the fact that I believe the first battle will be the decisive one and that the best troops should bear the brunt, supported as strongly as possible by the volunteers. SHAFTER, Major-General, Commanding. This dispatch is a model of executive statement and the last sentence not only contains the outlines of the Santiago campaign, but is marked by the sagacity that solved the situation — "the first battle will be the decisive one, and the best troops should bear the brunt." It was sound military sense in Shafter to discern six weeks ahead of the fact that the decisive battle would be the first one, and he wanted no mistake about that. General Shafter thus emerged from the moonshine of distant speculation, and ptit himself in the place of the critical command and mapped the event, v^dthout knowing where on the island the fateful field was located. In the wars that may hereafter come upon us, this is an example to be quoted. It is a line of sunlight to be distinguished in the morning, followed to the noon of victory. The importance of the increase of the regular army is tremendously increased by the truth, plain now and to be more and more made known to the comprehensive assimilation of the intelligence gathered by prescient observation, that the decisive battles will be the first ones, or at least that the losers of the opening engagements will find the cost of the restoration of fallen fortunes intolerably augmented by the education of sufficient armies, after the wars are on. In the campaigns of modern warfare there is no instance but that in our war of States in the United States in which the winners of the first serious combat were not those who gained the THE EARLY CORRESPONDENCE OF THE WAR. 367 closing triumph; and it was a terrible road to travel from Manassas to Appomattox. In the Crimean war the allies held the field of battle of Alma. In the Franco- Austrian war Marshal McMahon was the victor at Magenta, and it was followed by Solferino. The Prussians won the first events in the advance into Silesia in the combat with Austria, and Sadowa was the finish. In the Franco-German war the French lost the skirmishes on the frontier, the battles of Woerth and Saarbriick, and the end was Gravelotte, Sedan, and the capitulation of Paris. The same fatality was visible in the English invasion of Egypt, the Chilean assault upon Peru, the Japanese advance into China, the Turkish humiliation of the Greeks. These oljject lessons all tell the same story. They mean the necessity that is imj30sed. upon a nation of great resources — a fine place for looting, as Blucher said of London — to have a competent army; first for the insurance of pea ce wit h dignity and honor, second to guard against the misfortune of insufficiency at the start when the red flame of war bursts through the roofs and the walls of the world, and one disaster makes way for another — following fast and following faster — all modern improvements hastening and extending the original impulse to ruin. Every decent sentiment of national duty demands of the people of the United States that they shall be an armed nation. It turned out at Santiago as Shafter said it would somewhere, that the decision would be made where the armies of the belligerents first met in battle array. It was the foresight that put the regulars to the front where the swords crossed, that enabled us to close the campaign with a clap of thunder and a blaze of glory, JJIIK! CHAPTER XVI. The Phantom Fleets of Spain in Cuban Waters. Admiral Cervera Sailed into the Unknown and Became a Mj^stery and a Menace— He Appeared and Disappeared and Was at Last Found at Santiago by Commodore Schley — Imperative Demands for Information Answered — The Orders of General Shafter and Plans of General Miles — Dramatic Scenes at Tampa — Just as the Great Fleet was Sailing Another Spanish Hoodoo Fleet was Announced — After All a Pros- perous Voyage, and Easy Landing. The fleet of Admiral Cervera sailed from the Cape Verde Islands April 29th, four armored cruisers, and three torpedo gunboats. The destination cottld only be conjectured. The surface indications were that the Spaniards had done the best they could, but the Cadiz squadron was not in form for fighting. The Cervera fleet was obviously unequal to raising the blockade of Cuba, and must have for its objective an appearance on our North Atlantic coast, with the view of exciting an alarm that would be a diversion, or to maneuver in the West Indies, to disturb the disposition of those destined to invade Cuba. The Spanish cruisers had a high reputation for speed, and were tmdoubt- edly swifter than the fleet of Admiral Sampson, which was limited in move- ment to the rate at which the monitors could be towed, and for a time it was held by those who gave time to conjecture that the real object of the Spaniards was to capttire the Oregon, whose voyage from the Pacific to the Atlantic was "of universal knowledge, and the interest in it constant and keen. There was a hawk in the sky, and it might strike anywhere. May 7th Admiral Sampson was informed at Cape Haitien that the Spanish sqtiadron was reported at St. Thomas. May 14th the roving cruisers of Spain were off Curacoa. The bombardment of San Juan, Porto Rico, by Admiral Sampson's fleet, took place on the loth of May. On the 22d was received a dispatch from Key West that Cervera's fleet was in the Santiago harbor. The Naval Department had information that — we quote the Secretary of the Navy — the 368 PHANTOi^-pLEETS OF SPAIN IN CUBAN WATERS. 369 "Spanish fleet had munitions of war destined for the defense of Havana, and was under imperative orders to reach Havana, Cienfuegos, or a port connected with Havana by rail; and that as Cienfuegos appeared to be the only port ful- filling the conditions, the Flying Squadron would be instructed upon arrival at Key West to proceed to Cienfuegos. Instructions were at the same time given to Admiral Sampson to increase the Flying Squadron by such armored ships as he might deem desirable." It turned out that for a time Cervera's fleet, which had taken refuge at Santiago, because short of coal and provisions, occupied the attention of both our superior squadrons, and detained the army that was going to Cuba. May 27th, the Secretary of the Navy wrote the Secretary of War: "If the Span- ish fleet is in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, I expect absolute information to that effect from our naval commanding officer at any moment. On receipt of that information, the movement to Santiago should be made without a moment's delay, day or night," and of this he had advised Admiral Sampson and Commodore Schley. The Secretary telegraphed Sampson: "If Cervera's division is proved to be in Santiago, it is intended to make immediately a descent upon that port with 10,000 troops, landing about eight miles east of port. You will be expected to convoy the transports, probably fifteen or twenty, going in person and taking with you New York, Indiana, Oregon, and as many smaller vessels with good batteries as can possibly be gathered." This was partly in apprehension of the torpedo vessels. The bl ockade of Havana was to be provided for_by_the monitors and gunboats. The Secretary's telegram to Commodore Schley was: "The most absolutely urgent thing now is to know positively whether Cervera's division is in Santiago harbor, as, if so, an immediate movement against him and the town will be made by the navy and a division of about 10,000 of our troops, which are all ready to embark. Your difficulties regard- ing coaling must be surmoimted by your own ingenuity and perseverance. This is a crucial time, 'and the Department relies upon you to give quickly Information as to Cervera's presence, and to be all ready for concerted action with the army. Two colliers have been ordered to St. Nicolas Mole." The coast line of Cuba is almost as long as that of our country on the Atlantic. The island is neai'ly eighteen hundred miles from east to west, and there are many islands and reefs. Blockading vessels looking for a hostile 370 PHANTOM FLEETS OF SPAIN IN CUBAN WATERS. fleet are surprising consumers of coal, and battleships are, as a rule, hard to coal unless in comfortable quarters. Commodore Schley was not convinced as quickly as others that the Cape Verde fleet was at Santiago, and hesitated whether to go to Key West for coal. He knew that if Cervera was to give relief to the city of Havana, he must do it from Cienfuegos, within easy reach of the capital by rail, and that if he was aggressive. But Cervera, instead of seeking enemies, was striving to elude them, and secure coal and provisions for his men, do what was possible in the way of clearing his ships to restore their much declined speed. The Commodore, however, concluded after he had sent out dispatches that he was going to Key West, that his first duty was to find certainly that Cervera was or was not at Santiago, and wisely turned his ships about and drove them east. May 28th he cabled from Kingston : "Have been unable absolutely to coal the Texas, Marblehead, Vixen, Brooklyn from collier, all owing to very rough sea. Bad weather since leav- ing Key West. The Brooklyn alone has more than sufficient coal to proceed to Key West ; cannot remain off Santiago present state squadron coal account. Impossible to coal leeward Cape Cruz in the summer, all owing to south- westerly winds. Harvard reports coal sufficient for Jamaica; leaves to-day for Kingston; reports only small vessels could coal at Gonaives or Mole. Minne- apolis only coaled for Key West; also Yale, which tows Merrimac. Much to be regretted, can not obey orders of Department. Have striven earnestly; forced to proceed for coal to Key West by way of Yucatan passage. Cannot ascertain anything respecting enemy positive. Obliged to send Eagle — admitted no delay — to Port Antonio, Jamaica; had only 25 tons of coal. Will leave St. Paul off Santiago de Cuba. Will require 10,000 tons of coal at Key West. Very difficult to tow collier to get cable to hold." On the same day Long telegraphed : Washington, May 28, 1898. Harvard, care American Consul, Kingston, Jamaica: Following must be delivered to Schley as soon as possible; utmost urgency. Unless it is unsafe, your squadron Department wishes you to remain off Santiago, so can not you take possession of Guantanamo, occupy as a coaling station? If you must leave, are authorized to sink collier in the mouth of harbor if you can obstruct thereby, but if not so used and not necessary to you, it would be desirable to leave her Nicholas Mole or vicinity. PHANTOM FLEETS OF SPAIN IN CUBAN WATERS. 37i You must not leave the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba unless it is unsafe your squadron, or unless Spanish division is not there. LONG. Sampson to Long, Key West, May 28: "He has sufficient coal aboard, undoubtedly, to keep sea for some time, as all except Iowa left here full. The importance of absolutely preventing departure of Spanish squadron of paramount importance, and demands the most prompt and efficient use of every means. " May 29, Sampson to Long: "The failure of Schley to continue blockade must be remedied at once if possible. There can be no doubt of presence of Spanish division at Santiago." Long to Schley, May 29: "Schley, Mole Haiti. (Also sent to Port Antonio and to Kingston, Jamaica). — It is your duty to ascertain immediately if the Spanish fleet is in Santiago and report. Would be discreditable to the navy if that fact were not ascertained immediately. All military and naval movements depend upon that point." Schley to Long: "Off Santiago de Cuba, May 29, 10 a. m.— Enemy in port. Recognized Cristobal Colon, Infanta Maria Teresa, and two torpedo-boat destroyers moored inside Morro, behind point. Doubtless the others are here. I have not sufficient coal." Long to Sampson, 29 : "Schley has seen the Spanish fleet at Santiago." Washington, May 29, 1898. Cotton, U. S. S. Harvard, Kingston, Jamaica: Return to Schley with this message. Hold on at all hazards. New York, Oregon, and New Orleans are on the way. St. Louis and Yankee just leaving New York for Santiago, via Nicholas Mole. Two more colliers en route. LONG. , ^^. T • Washington, May 30, 1898. Harvard, Kmgston, Jamaica: Deliver Schley' following: Where are the other two armored cruisers, Spanish fleet? When discovered, please report promptly. Commander-in- Chief North Atlantic Station has started to join you. LONG. Commodore Schley made for Santiago in good time. The tone of the Sampson and the Long dispatches was not that of approval of the Commo- dore's disability from lack of coal. The Secretary asked, on the 30th of May, 372 PHANTOM FLEETS OF SPAIN IN CUBAN WATERS. where the two armored cruisers of Spain Schley had not seen were. Schley had seen two of the four cruisers, and the two torpedo boats — and reporting them by name, added, "Doubtless the others are here." Of course, that was according to the probabilities, but it was necessary to be sure of all the Span- iards, — and so the energetic Secretary cautioned: Washington, May 31, 1898. Sampson, care Cable Office, Mole St. Nicholas, Haiti: It is essential to know if all of four Spanish armored cruisers in Santiago, as our military expedition must wait for this information. Report as soon as possible. LONG. Schley's answer. May 31st, mentioned that he needed more picket boats "very badly, and he added: "Have seen one more vessel of the Vizcaya class in port." The Commodore would not, however, swear it was the Vizcaya. On the 2 9tli Sampson had come around to this: "Telegram just received from Schley shows that he is to-day blockading Santiago de Cuba, and will continue to do so until coal supply has been reduced to safe limit for large ships." Two days later Schley was telegraphing from in front of Santiago. "Smooth sea here now." The waves were not running so high, but Schley had not seen all the Spanish cruisers, and it would not do to let any of them get out when our transports were on the wing. The Secretary of the Navy had a slight attack of Cuban stories delivered in this official form : Washington, May 30, 1898. Harvard, Kingston, Jamaica: Deliver following to Schley: Sagua, 25 miles east of Santiago, is reported a good place for landing, and that the insui-gents have entire possession of this vicinity, and some horses of their cavalry are kept about a mile inland. From thence it has been reported easy to reach the heights in the rear of Santiago, commanding view of the whole harbor, without any probability of meeting with the Spanish forces. For miles the road is mountainous, and after this very fair. LONG. The subsequent proceedings at Santiago did not show that the reports to the Secretary that he sent on to Schley were strictly accurate. The Cuban cavalry of the coast guard did not muster in force when wanted, and the heights in the rear of Santiago were not "easy to reach" without meeting PHANTOM FLEETS OF SPAIN IN CUBAN WATERS. 373 » several Spaniards, and right in the neighborhood the Cubans to sacrifice their lives for their Republic were not reported as numerous, and never were found by burial parties. But Admiral Sampson proceeded to Santiago waters, on this dispatch from Long dated May 29th: "Department thinks it very desirable that you carry out recommendation to go yourself with two ships to Santiago de Cuba;" and the Commander-in-Chief of the North Atlantic squadron certified to "a reliable Cuban" as follows: Mole Haiti, June 4, 1898. Secretary of the Navy, Washington : Off Santiago, June 3. — Some observations made to-day by a reliable Cuban, in accordance with my instructions, made four armored vessels and two torpedo destroyers at Santiago. At that time repairs and more coal needed by them. SAMPSON. This made up the full list of the Spanish fleet seen in the harbor of Santiago. The Secretary of the Navy, on May 31st, wanted to know from the War Department, as there seemed to be a movement of the army at hand, "what means are to be employed by the War Department for landing the troops, artillery, horses, siege guns, mortars, and other heavy objects, when the pending military expedition arrives on the Cuban coast near Santiago." It was pointed out that the crews of the armored ships "ought not to be fatigued by the work incident to landing troops, stores, etc." They were going to have to remove Spanish mines and to meet the Spanish fleet in action, and so must not be overworked. The boys were eventually able to help themselves ashore, bitt the transfer from the ships to the land was not accompanied with facilities of the most modern sort. We were a shade deficient in that line, but the men were shifty and glad to swim ashore when boats were scarce, but they left their supplies. It seemed that the time for action had arrived, and that the personal tele- grams of General Corbin and the cipher dispatch to General Shatter following made the start of the embarked army definite and certain: Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, May 30, 1898 — 11:30 p. m. Major-General Shatter, Tampa, Fla. : My telegram just now said important telegram would reach you in a few minutes. It may be an hour before I can have it ready, but no more. H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General. 374 PHANTOM FLEETS OF SPAIN IN CUBAN WATERS. War Department, Washington, May 30, 1898. (Sent in cipher May 31, 1898, 2:30 a. m.) Maj. Gen. William R. Shafter,.Tampa, Fla. : With the approval of the Secretary of War, you are directed to take your command on transports, proceed under convoy of the Navy to the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba, land your force at such place east or west of thai point as your judgment may dictate, under the protection of the Navy, and move it onto the high ground and bluffs, overlooking the harbor, or into the interior, as shall best enable you to capture or destroy the garrison there ; and cover the navy as it sends its men in small boats to remove torpedoes, or with the aid of the navy capture or destroy the Spanish fleet now reported to be in Santiago Harbor. You will use the utmost energy to accomplish this enterprise, and the govern- ment relies upon your good judgment as to the most judicious use of your command, but desires to impress upon you the importance of accomplishing this object with the least possible delay. You can call to your assistance any of the insurgent forces in that vicinity, and make use of such of them as you think advisable to assist you, especially as scouts, guides, etc. You are cautioned against putting too much confidence in any persons outside of your troops. You will take every precaution against ambuscades or 'surprises or positions that may have been mined or are commanded by the Spanish forces. You will cooperate most earnestly with the naval forces in every way, agree- ing beforehand upon a code of signals. Communicate your instructions to Admiral Sampson and Commodore Schley. On completion of this enterprise, unless you receive other orders or deem it advisable to remain in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, reembark your troops and proceed to the harbor of Port de Banes, reporting by the most favorable means for further orders and future important service. This with the understanding that your command has not sustained serious loss and that the above harbor is safe for your transports and convo)'. When will you sail? By command of Major-General Miles: H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General. Tampa Bay Hotel, Tampa, Fla., May 31, 1898 — ^11:58 a. m. Gen. H. C. Corbiri, Washington, D. C. : Telegram received 3:45 this morning now being deciphered. Your boy will go with me, and I shall take same care of him I would my own. Much love. SHAFTER, Major-General, Commanding. PHANTOM FLEETS OF SPAIN IN CUBAN WATERS. 375 On the 27th of May General Miles had addressed a letter to the Secretary of War, saying he thought it would be advisable to "land transports with a strong force," and so on, and with army and navy together capture the harbor, garrison and fleet at Santiago. If this happened prematurely, the General argued," We will be able to land a superior force, and I believe that a combined effort will result in capturing the island, with its garrison, provided it is done before it can be reinforced from Spain. The distance from Key West to Porto Rico is 1,040 miles, and from Cadiz, Spain, to Porto Rico, it is about 4,000 miles. The possession of Porto Rico would be of very great advantage to the military, as it would cripple the forces of Spain, giving us several thou- sand prisoners. It could be well fortified, the harbor mined, and would be a most excellent port for our navy, which could be speedily relieved from any responsibility in the charge of that port, as we could leave a sufficient garrison to hold it against any force that might be sent against it." After this there was to be "a movement toward the west," and a base found at Nue vitas along the Puerto Principe railroad — insurgents to be supplied with the usual "abundance of arms and munitions of war," our people acting in conjtinction "with the forces of Lieutenant-General Garcia, and General Gomez" — and the general gave this cheerful reassur- ance: "These movements, in my judgment, can all be accomplished during the rainy season, through a country comparatively free from yellow fever, well stocked with cattle, and having grass sufficient for our animals. While this is being accomplished our volunteer army will be prepared to land in the vicinity of Mariel, Havana, or Matanzas in sufficient force to complete the capture or destruction of the Spanish forces upon the island of Cuba. The advantage of this movement will be that the army and navy will act in concert and close unison." Another recommendation was that this would not divide the navy, and the General adds: "I believe that the entrance to the port of Cienfuegos can be obstructed or blockaded by one or two monitors to better advantage than to send the army there, where it would have to meet a strong garrison, which is already there." The only detail neglected is as to the two monitors. The General does not say whether they should be allowed to float — if they may be said to float — or sunk altogether; and the General does not say whether the "close unison" 376 PHANTOM FLEETS OF SPAIN IN CUBAN WATERS. of the army and navy could be best secured by himself or Admiral Sampson becoming Commander-in-Chief of both Army and Navy. Of course, the only real objection to this happy adjustment would be that the Constitution of the United States is an instrument th,at reserves the command in chief of the sail- ors and soldiers, afloat and ashore, to the President alone. In the instructions sent by General Miles to General Shafter from Washington, May 31, 2:30 a. m., Shafter was told to move his army as his judgment might dictate, "onto the high ground and bluffs overlooking the harbor or into the interior." Shafter being thus instructed^ the Major-General left for Tampa at once, arriving June ist. The first bulletin from the Major-General commanding. General Miles, after his arrival at Tampa was that men were working night and day, and there was an important and gratifying telegram to the effect that "Dorst, Captain," had at Port Banes, northern coast, directly opposite Santiago, "landed over 400 armed and equipped Cubans; 1,300,000 rounds ammimi- tion, Springfield and Remington; 7,500 Springfield rifles; 20,000 rations, besides large quantities equipment and clothing; 24 horses; 74 mules." As for Spanish troops there were 40,000 in the province of Santiago, and "nearly 1,000 insurgent troops" had arrived at Banes, a favorite resort, no doubt, of the Cuban navy! General Miles reported favorably June 2d as to work going on, saying: "The working force at Tampa has been divided into three reliefs, each working eight hours during the twenty-four, nine ships being loaded at one time." Rear Admiral Sicard recommended that to secure secrecy as to army movements, "the commanding officer of the army in Tampa and of the navy at Key West be directed to seize and detain all press boats, of whatever character, in those ports, and to prevent their following the expedition, plac- ing, if necessary, a file of soldiers or marines on board to enforce obedience; and likewise that the commanding naval officer of the convoy be directed, in case a press boat joins the fleet, to take charge of her and compel her to remain until he reaches the Commander-in-Chief, who shall also detain her so long as he thinks expedient to do so. ' ' Orders were issued accordingly. Shafter telegraphed that the difficulties in loading could not be appreciated. General Miles illustrated the embarrass- ments: "Fifteen cars loaded with uniforms were sidetracked 25 miles away from Tampa, and remained there for weeks while the troops were suffering PHANTOM FLEETS OF SPAIN IN CUBAN WATERS. 37? for clothing. Five thousand rifles, which were discovered j'esterday, were needed by several regiments. Also, the different parts of the siege train and ammunition for same, which will be required immediately on landing." It was the next day that Admiral Sampson cabled that the Merrimac was in the channel, and Cervera "safely bottled up." The Secretary of the Navy says in his report that when Sampson arrived off Santiago he found "Schley's squadron in column to the westward of the mouth of the harbor, ' ' and " on June 3rd an attempt was made to close the harbor by sinking across its entrance the collier Merrimac. This attempt, though unsuccessful in its object, was dar- ingly executed. It is now one of the well-known historic marvels of naval adventure and enterprise, in which Naval Constructor Hobson and his men won undying fame." The President became impatient and wanted to know why there was so much delay in getting off. Shaffer replied, June 5th, 6:32 a. m., that "delays occur that cannot be prevented or foreseen" — and, "Siege guns have only been assembled late this evening. They will be loaded on cars to-night and sent to transports early in the morning, and the loading rushed. Will begin putting men on to-morrow p. m,, if possible, and be ready to start Monday night or Tuesday morning. The last of the troops from Chickamauga are expected to-night. Officers engaged in loading transports have worked night and day. The main cause for delay has been the fact that great quantities of stores have been rushed in promiscuously, and with no facilities to handle or store them. The last 10 miles before reaching the wharf is a single track, and very narrow place in which to work. The capacity of this place has been greatly exceeded. Could have put the troops on and rushed them off, but not properly equipped as I know the President wishes them. I will not delay a minute longer than is absolutely necessary to get my command in condition and start the earliest moment possible." June 5th General Miles telegraphed that the delay had been caused "through no fault of any one connected with it," and contained the principal part of the army, "which for intelligence and efficiency was exceeded by no body of troops on earth." The General requested "ample protection" for this command from the navy while at sea — and he added: "This enterprise is so important that I desire to go with this army corps, or to immediately organize another and go with it to join this, and capture position No. 2." 378 PHANTOM FLEETS OF SPAIN IN CUBAN WATERS. General Miles telegraphed the day following that there should be "a few regiments well equipped at Camp Alger." The words "few" and "well" here are not of military precision — but the general proposition stands good. , Admiral Sampson had, on June yth, "silenced works quickly without injury of any kind." The general opinion is after the war that this sentence should have read, "without injury of any kind to the works." The Admiral also remarked: "If 10,000 men were here, city and fleet would be ours within forty-eight hours. Every consideration demands immediate army movement. If delayed, city will be defended more strongly by guns taken from the fleet." This observation was not confirmed by Shaffer's experience with 18,000 men. Santiago was a hard, hot nut to crack. The night of June 7th the Secretary of War telegraphed Shaffer: "The President directs you to sail at once with what force you have ready," and Shaffer's reply was worthy the occasion: Tampa, Fla., June 7, 1898 — 9 p. m. Secretary of War, Washington : I will sail to-morrow morning. Steam cannot be gotten up earlier. There is loaded to-night one division of infantry (9 regiments), 16 companies of dismounted cavalry, 4 light batteries, 2 siege batteries artillery, 2 companies of engineers, and the troops from Mobile. I will try and get on the rest of the cavalry and another division of regular infantry by morning. I will sail then with whatever I have on board. SHAFTER, Major-General. Executive Mansion, Washington, June 7, 1898. •General Shaffer, Tampa, Fla. : About how many men will you have ready by morning? CORBIN, Adjutant-General. Port Tampa, Fla. (direct), June 7, 1898 — 10:15 :p. m. Adjutant-General Corbin : I expect to have 834 officers, 16,154 men on transports by daylight, and will sail at that hour. SHAFTER. General Miles telegraphed that the last of the troops from Chickamauga "arrived this morning and hurried to the steamers. " ■^^ t i M 4 ^= \-it-#-\ "^WllM' TZEzirr: -:%% Hi ill f If "1? 5 "3 ■ s5 s PHANTOM FLEETS OF SPAIN IN CUBAN WATERS. 381 This was a remarkable situation, and the next thing was a startling shift of scenery: War Department, Washington, D. C, June 8, 1898. Major-General Shafter, Tampa, Fla. : Wait until you get further orders before you sail. Answer quick. R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War. Port Tampa, Fla., June 8, 1898 — 4:06 p. m. R. A. Alger, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. : Message received. Vessels are in the stream, but will be able to stop them before reaching the Gulf. SHAFTER, Major-General. War Department, Washington, June 8, 1898. Major-General Miles, Tampa, Fla. : The reason for countermanding order you will find in the following. - The order was given at the request of the Navy Department by direction of the President: "Key West, June 8. — Spanish armor cruiser, second class, and Spanish torpedo-boat destroyer seen by Eagle, Nicholas Channel, Cuba. — Remey. " "Key West, June 8. — Last cipher just came by Resolute, just arrived; was pursued by two vessels, Nicholas Channel, Cuba, last night. Shall I order Indiana and all available cruisers to coast of Cuba? More detail to follow. — Reme)'." Tampa, Fla., June 8, 1898 — 11:42 p. m. Hon. Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. : If that report is true, those Spanish vessels could be within six hours of the loaded transports now, and there to-morrow. Have ample measures been taken by the navy to insure their safety? MILES, Commanding. General Miles took advantage of the interval to submit several questions, suggestions and plans of campaign. He rattled the Secretary of War. June 9th, 6:50 p. m. : "Think it would be well to announce that the army got on board transports and started, as they did yesterday. Say nothing about its being recalled, but let our naval vessels go over the course that our transports would have gone over, with the hope of finding those Spanish ships." Now, the General wanted to know .whether the presence of Spanish war 382 PHANTOM FLEETS OF SPAIN IN CUBAN WATERS. vessels didn't render it extremely hazardous to send troops on transports until the Spaniards were "captured, destroyed or driven away." The General wanted to know whether he should go on with the organization of Expedition No. 2. The reply of the President was : War Department, June 9, 1898. Major-General Miles, Tampa, Fla. : The President directs me to say that no change of plan will be made ; that Expedition No. 2 must be organized as rapidly as possible. We are looking for transports, and are satisfied the navy will take care of that problem. Give nothing out. R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War. General Miles at once had another plan — not a change in the plan, but a new one, right from the mint. It took hold heartily of the navy, and awak- ened its drowsy consciousness thus: Tampa, Fla., June 9, 1898 — 2:45 ?• ^n- Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. : It seems that it is a naval problem yet unsolved, and it might be advis- able for the command now on board transports to have the protection of the entire navy to convoy it to number i, number 2, or Nuevitas, or, if this is considered too hazardous, then keep the troops in healthful camps, as they are now, and assist the navy to destroy the Spanish fleet. There are here 25 good steamers that could be used to carry water, coal, and supplies, guns, revolving cannon, and mortars, etc., and they could be added to the force of the navy. It seems strange to be suggesting that the army assist the navy in this way, but I am sure we would receive most loyal support when the waters are safe for crossing with the army. MILES, Major-General, Commanding Army. There was talk of disembarking the troops, but Shaffer said it was not practicable. They could not be encamped comfortably, but were taken off in detachments to exercise. June 17th it was stated that the expedition should get under way and meet convoy at Rebecca Shoal. Port Tampa, Fla., June 10, 1898 — 9:30 p. m. Adjutant-General of the Army, Washington, D. C. : Practically all the transports have been in canal, where men have had free access to shore, and they have been off the greater part of two days. This afternoon all but eleven of the transports have been drawn a short dis- PHANTOM FLEETS OF SPAIN IN CUBAN WATERS. 383 tance into the stream, where the men are much more comfortable than in the canal, with excellent facilities for swimming and keeping clean. The com- mand is being increased only by recruits, of which there are several hundred, the exact number of which will be telegraphed you in the morning, and by one troop of cavalry mounts. The transports now here are practically filled, though it might be possible to get one more regiment of volunteer infantry on. Will be able to tell to-morrow, when a rearrangement of some of the troops will be made. If I find it possible to take another regiment I prefer the Thirty-second Michigan. SHAFTER, Major-General, United States Volunteers, Commanding. June 12th, 7:18 p. m. , Shaffer telegraphed Corbin: "Have consulted with senior naval officer present, who says we must have daylight to get down to lower bay. Will start the transports at daylight to-morrow, and with good luck will meet convoy from Key West before Wednesday noon." Port Tampa, Fla., June 13, 1898 — 1:10 p. m. Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. : Steamers are moving out to sea and should be away by i o'clock. MILES, Major-General. Playa del Este, via Haiti. (Received at Washington June 22, 1898, 6:22 p. m.) Secretary of War, Washington, D. C. : Off Daiquiri, Cuba, June 22, 1898. — Landing at Daiquiri this morning successful. Very little, if any, resistance. SHAFTER. CHAPTER XVII. The Sharp Strain of the Struggle at Santiago. General Miles as a Loyal Soldier — Shafter's Fine Voyage and Safe Landing — The First Blood in Battle — Rush of Supplies and Reenforcements to the Army — Alger Wants Shafter to "Get a Good Ready" — Why Siege Guns were not Unloaded — Work Cut Out for the Regulars — Parallel with the British Siege of Havana — The Sword Had to be Swift to Save from the Pestilence. The credit is due General Miles of pulling steadily in the harness. When one of his suggestions did not take root, he was soon ready with another. If one of his campaigns on paper was blown away in the morning, he was as fertile as ever in the evening. He saw, after the Santiago expedition was under way, that it was the primary enterprise, and would in all ways take precedence, and he was ready and willing to go on with number two. If he was not to command in Cuba, he was persevering for Porto Rico. His plans might be subjected to all trials except that of being tried, but his loyalty as a soldier was never impeachable. In all aspects of his versatility he was facing to the front. If he thought it wise to wait, he said so at large and in particular, but when the word was to go, he was up and doing at the tap of the drum, buttoned and buckled, alert and stepping out to the music. In his contentions with the critics he can always say that his faults were in words, and the facility with which they are flashed about the world, but his feet were rather jubilant than laggard, and the toes of his boots pointed to the enemy. When Shafter's fleet sailed down the bay. General Miles telegraphed the War Department the hour and the minute — June 14, 1898, 10:30 a. m. — when "the last one was out of sight," and he mentioned an auxiliary cruiser, that would go in six hours, and for a wonder the Major- General commanding did not know the destination of the boat. This was signed simply, "Miles, Commanding," but his command at the moment was "out of sight" so far as the regular army was concerned. Major-General 384 H 5 3 to 5 a H r r w po z 55 ■h- Z H O o »- E o z H w H sa o H tE m w c z H cr. P g r ft c a c z H GENL. HAWKINS WHO LLU THE FAMOUS CHARUE OF THE 1ST BRIGADE AT SAN JUAN, JULY 1ST, 1898. SHARP STRAIN OF STRUGGLE AT SANTIAGO. 3^7 Brooke telegraphed the Adjutant-General of the army July 14th that he was "directed to fully equip 15,000 men for duty elsewhere, " and he wanted to know whether "the ordnance equipment for 23 regiments" was on the way to the Chickamauga Park, or likely to arrive soon. This was to the point. Miles, commanding, telegraphed the Secretary of War June 14th, 9:50 p. m., that he thought their "telegrams crossed in transit," not at all an improbable conjecture — though what happened when they collided has not yet been the subject of an investigation. But the fact Miles wanted to get through was that one-half the "troops for No. 2" — the army for Porto Rico — were at Tampa, "fully equipped and drilling every day as artillery. Siege trains, balloons, heavy ammunition, commissary and quartermaster's stores" were also there. Balloons and everything all ready, Shatter was sailing on the blue sea under the indigo sk}' of the subtropics. There had been a change at Tampa, — there were 21 feet of water, and nine ships could load at a time. Just at this hour Inspector-General Breckenridge made a call for officers in these terms, addressing himself to the Secretary of War: "Regular officers are sadly needed among volunteers, but regular organi- zations are also already suffering from paucity of officers^ Regular organiza- tions furnish a remarkably fine training school for officers and all that can be so trained are already needed. Can not regular service be immediately supplied with all the junior officers the law allows, especially as the good of the service evidently demands it? Then additional second lieutenants can increase the numbers now so greatly needed. It must be evident to all now that we need a larger perfectly trained and equipped force, especially officers, and the best place for quick training is among the regulars. It would be well if we had several hundred more regular officers immediately." On the 15th of June the Secretary of War concluded he must see Major- General-Commanding Miles speedily and telegraphed "Important business requires your presence here; report at once," and at 5:23 p. m. General Miles was able to say over the wire, "I leave by the first train, 7:20 this evening," and the telegrams, which are of the kinetoscope order, show that he was in three days transacting business from the Washington army headquarters in the usual way. Telegrams show vigorous work in the camps preparing the volunteer troops. General Coppinger, June 26th, telegraphed that cars were being as rapidly unloaded as delivered by railroads. Some days 70 were 388 SHARP STRAIN OF STRUGGLE AT SANTIAGO. unloaded, then only 13, because they could not be placed. There were in cor- rals 1,811 unassigned mules, and there were 1,791 assigned draft mule and 15 Red Cross ambulances. Shatter, Major-General Volunteers, commanding, telegraphed: "Playa del Este, via Haiti, June 25th, 2:45 P- i^- — Daiquiri, 23. — Had very fine voyage, lost less than 50 animals, 6 or 8 to-day; lost more putting them through the surf to land than on transports. Command as healthy as when we left. Eighty men sick. Only deaths 2 men drowned in landing. Landings difficult. Coast quite similar to that in vicinity of San Francisco, and covered with dense growth of bushes. Landing at Daiquiri unopposed. All points occupied by vSpanish troops; heavily bombarded by navy to clear them out. Sent troops toward Santiago and occupied Juragua City, a natur- ally strong place, this morning. Spanish troops retreating as soon as our advance was known. Had not mounted troops or could have captured them — about 600 all told. Railroad from there in. Have cars and engine in pos- session. With assistance of navy disembarked 6,000 men yesterday and as many more to-day. Will get all troops off to-morrow, including light artillery and greater portion of pack train, probably all of it, with some of the wagons; animals have to be jumped to the water and towed ashore. Had consultations with Generals Garcia, Rader, and Castillo, i p. m. of 20th, 20 miles west of Santiago. These officers were unanimously of the opinion that landing should be made east of Santiago. I had come to the same conclusion. General Garcia promises to join me at Juragua City to-morrow with between 3,000 and 4,000 men, who will be brought from west of Santiago by ships of the navy to Juragua City and there disembarked; this will give me between 4,000 and 5, 000 Cubans, and leave 1,000 under General Rabi to threaten Santi- ago from the west. General Kent's division is being disembarked this after- noon at Juragua City, and will be continued during the night. The assistance of the navy has been of the greatest benefit, and enthusiastically given. Without them I could not have landed in ten days, and perhaps not at all, as I believe I should have lost so many boats in the surf. At present want nothing. Weather has been good. No rain on land, and prospects for fair weather." There is not a sentence lost in this dispatch. It is not long, and tells all. If General Garcia came with between three and four thousand Cubans, he would have between four and five thousand of them. So there must have been SHARP STRAIN OF STRUGGLE AT SANTIAGO. 389 about 1,000 already in the neighborhood ready for rations. A few of the Cubans had a skirmish with the Spaniards — no casualties reported. The first fighting was when General Young, with 964 officers and men, one squadron of the First cavalry, one of the Tenth cavalry and two of the First U. S. Volun- teer cavalry, on the morning of the 24th, became engaged with Spaniards entrenched in a strong position at La Guasimo, three miles from Siboney on the Santiago road. General Shafter says in his official report: "The enemy made an obstinate resistance, but were driven from the field with considerable loss. Our own loss was i officer and 15 men killed; 6 officers and 46 men wounded. The reported losses of the Spaniards were 9 killed and 27 wounded. The engagement had an inspiriting effect upon our • men, and doubtless correspondingly depressed the enemy, as it was now plainly demonstrated to them that they had a foe to meet who would advance upon them under a heavy fire delivered from entrenchments. General Wheeler, division commander, was present during the engagement, and reports our troops, officers and men, fought with the greatest gallantry. This engagement gave us a well-watered country farther to the front, on which to encamp our troops. ' ' In his telegram to the Adjutant-General about this affair. General Shafter said: "The Spaniards occupied a very strong, intrenched position on a high hill. The firing lasted about an hour, and the enemy was driven from his position, which is now occupied by our troops, about a mile and a half from Sevilla. The enemy has retired toward Santiago." One sees in the telegrams following the opening fight that there was intense interest and exertion in the War Department. The army was com- mitted irrevocably to the Santiago stroke, arid it was seen that there was to be the fight of the war. Coppinger wires, June 25th, 6:35 P- i^^-, in answer to inquiries as to what cotild be done to reinforce Shafter: "If transports and ammunition are provided, I can ship 629 officers and 12,860 men from Tampa. No transports have reported to me. I understand there are five transports and two ocean tramps at Port Tampa." Corbin telegraphs Coppinger to know "whether in the transports at Port Tampa there are two or three lighters that can be sent at once to General Shafter. Having lost one going over, the tug he has is not sufficient to meet demands of the service. Time is essence of situation, and an immediate answer is desired. " 39° SHARP STRAIN OF STRUGGLE AT SANTIAGO. There is evidence here that the War Department was alive to the fact that Shafter might need help. As to the ships at Tampa, there were seven, "capac- ity about s,ooo men, if loaded and shipped at once. This will, however, be increased when the boats are fitted up. At present there are but two boats which are in proper condition to load and ship and get maximum results. ' The Secretary of War made a memorandum June 25th, that 15,000 men were to be taken from Chickamauga, and 12,000, if so many were fit, from Coppinger's command, Snyder's division to embark at once to go as soon as convoy could be had, to reinforce Shafter at Santiago. Orders were issued to establish telegraphic communication between Shaffer's headquarters and cable stations. Corbin telegraphed Shafter, June 28th: "From Mobile the large steam tug Nimrod and light draft lighters Ben, Ora, and Tourat, have been ordered to get out of Mobile just as soon to-day as possible, going with all dispatch, taking into consideration the safety of the lighters. The depot quartermaster at Tampa has been ordered to send the Bessie to report to you. The Bessie is a steam lighter, and sister to the Laura. General Duffield will arrive on the Yale to-morrow morning with 1,300 men. Balance of his brigade left Fort Monroe this morning. Orders have been given to have a division sent you from Tampa this week. The wagon transportation will leave to-morrow." There were anxious inquiries already about the remains of our dead and questions raised whether bodies could be embalmed, which was not possible. The Secretary of War telegraphed that the parents of Hamilton Fish and others were "very desirous of recovering the bodies of their boys." June 27th Alger telegraphed Shafter: "Have you landed the siege guns?" and the order on this telegram was "rush." Two light batteries, Lemly's and Macomb's of the Seventh Artillery, at Fort Mayer, Va., were ordered to Tampa — and the six light batteries at Tampa were ordered on fastest steamers immediately, but this was subject to "when convoy arrives" — as there might be Spanish gunboats hiding in the many shady places looking for an unarmed transport. Alger had telegraphed Shafter that he hoped he would "take time to get a good ready." Shafter's reply was from Siboney, June 27th: "Will not act hastily, though I believe I can take the place within forty-eight hours, but I fear at considerable loss of life. There is no necessity for haste, as we are growing stronger and they weaker every day. The health of the command is reported to me by the surgeon as remarkable. Outside of the wounded there SHARP STRAIN OF STRUGGLE AT SANTIAGO. 39' are to-day less than 150 men sick. So far no wounded have died, and but two men of disease since leaving Tampa. Am very glad to know that tugs and lighters are on the way. Hospital steamer Relief is all that we need at present." The roads were dusty, and a position was taken within three miles of Santiago, and in plain view of the town! June 28th the convoy was ready at Key West, and Corbin asked Coppinger what he had ready to go next day, and the answer was, "Six batteries, 800 recruits for Shaffer's infantry, and the First Illinois." Incidentally these telegrams passed: Playa del Este, June 28, 1898 — 4:15 p. m. Adjutant-General U. S. A., Washington: Daiquiri, Cuba, June 27. I have just been shown a telegram from Greely to Major Greene, of my staff, requesting daily confidential reports of operations of my command. I have ordered him never to send any report relating to my command that is not first submitted to me. I do not under- stand by what authority General Greely presumes to ask confidential informa- tion from a member of my staff. SHAFTER, Major-General. Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, June 28, 1898. Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba: Your telegram of this date concerning giving of information by staff officers has been read by the Secretary of War, and your action therein is approved by him, without any reservation whatever. H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General. The inference is that General Greely, who was censor of the press dis- patches, wanted points to make his duties of suppression clear, and was not guarded as to the form of stating the desire. The rush and urgent telegrams were now flying day and night. The form of "Acknowledge receipt and report execution" appears frequently. Shafter wanted, June 28th, "Thirty-six sides Lutigo leather ; 36 sides har- ness leather; 50 pounds copper rivets, one-half inch; 5,000 pounds mule shoes, Nos. 2 and 3; 500 pounds nails, horseshoe No. 6; 6 shoeing hammers; 24 rasps, farriers'; 12 coils five-sixths rope; 12 coils three-eighths rope ; 12 hand punches, saddlers'; 1,200 yards canvas, 72-inch, heavy; 1,200 yards canvas, 22 inch; 2 small field forges for pack train; 2 small anvils for pack 392 SHARP STRAIN OF STRUGGLE AT SANTIAGO. train; 35 dozen snaps, i^-inch, with guard. The 22-inch canvas is to make oversacks for carrying forage." Here is one of the Commanding General's telegrams: "Siboney, Cuba, June 28, 5 pr m. Have just learned 8,000 Spaniards are en route here from Manzanillo with pack train and beef cattle on the hoof; probably 54 miles from here to-day; advancing at the rate of 12 miles per day." This was probably from a "reliable Cuban" who wanted reinfcfrcements and rations. Corbin telegraphed June 29th from Washington: "Six transports will leave Port Tampa this evening for Santiago. Specialist and Unionist carrying artillery horses and artillery guard. The Comanche will carry artillerj'men, the Hudson infantry recruits for your com- mand. The City of Macon and Gate City will take First Illinois and such cavalry recruits and signal corps as can be loaded." Coppinger telegraphed the Adjutant-General June 29th, 12:15, replying to telegram that deducting troops about leaving on transports there were at Tampa — "infantry, 12,661; cavalry, 4,693; cavalry horses, 5,000; heavy artil- lery, 917; horses, 378; signal corps, 147; also about 160 men awaiting dis- charge and unequipped recruits belonging to General Shaffer's command, and about 150 tons of regimental and company property, and tentage left by General Shafter with the cavalry, being about i,ooc tons of prop- erty of all kinds. Quartermasters estimate 4,300 mules, 840 cavalry and artillery horses, 921 Cuban horses, 1,000 tons hay, 500 tons oats, and 12,000 tons coal; about 1,000 tons miscellaneous quartermaster's property, ordnance material, and forage with siege train; 1,200 tons commissary stores and prop- erty; about 4,000 tons ordnance." There was great inquiry as to Shatter's slowness in getting the siege artillery to the front, and he cabled the Secretary of War: "I have not yet unloaded the siege guns, but will do so as soon as I can. I do not intend to take them to the front until we are stopped or need them. It is going to be a very difficult undertaking to get them up, and if attempted now would block the road. I have four light batteries at the front, and they are heavy enough to overcome anything the Spaniards have. If we have to besiege the town I will get the guns up. The advance picket is now within 2)^ miles of Santiago. Officers making reconnoissances were within lyi miles to-day, and met with no opposition." SHARP STRAIN OF STRUGGLE AT SANTIAGO. 393 There was a necessity as imperious as can arise in the affairs of a great nation in days of destiny, that the blow the United States had to strike Spain when declaring war upon her, must be delivered as soon after the declaration as was mechanically practicable. Owing to national inattention and the con- servatism of Congress, the army in hand that was efficient was small. Under the circumstances, it was a success that in the end proved to be the assurance of speedy and complete victory and honorable and triumphant peace, to get together and embark in time, when the actual beginning of the war was in May, so considerable an army as that which sailed and made a prosperous voyage under Shafter. The mobilization of this force and its embarkation and disembarkation would have been wholly impracticable if it had not been for the construction just in time of our battleships that gave us the unequivocal superiority over Spain at sea, and the improved character of the regular army. Thorough as the confidence of the country has been in our volunteer military system, the people' are educated by the vSpanish war as never before, not to depend upon it to the exclusion of an army prepared to meet emergencies that may strike us by cablegrams, through orders flying in the twinkling of an eye by tele- graph. We ha d not _th. e fo rce to attack Havana at the time the Santiago army scrambled through the Cuban surf to remove Spain from the Americas. If we had landed in the west instead of the east end of the island, as was at first proposed, we could undoubtedly have made the landing and held the ground, though there would have been hard fighting to do that, and our regular army could not have marched straight to Havana. The Santiago campaign demon- strates that. Blanco would have opposed us with from fifty to sixty thousand men, and 150 guns, and on several fortified lines. It would have been neces- sary to hasten the embarkation of all the volunteers, fairly armed, in all the Southern camps, to aid the regulars in advance, and we would have had seventy thousand men attacking Havana in the rain and the yellow fever. We could have produced in and about the city of Havana the horrors of the besieged Jerusalem as described by Josephus, and repeated in our camps the awful experiences of the English, the New Englanders, and the New Yorkers and New Jersey men who conquered Cuba by taking Havana in August, 1762. The change of the point of attack from Havana to Santiago saved tens of thousands of our fellow citizens from Cuban graves, but it was the cost of the -war and not its eventual substantial fortunes, changed by the determination 394 SHARP STRAIN OF STRUGGLE AT SANTIAGO. that hung upon the will of the President, who had the genius of good sense to choose the better way. The change made the sea voyage i,ooo miles instead of 200, and a fearful augmentation of difficulties that forced delays, forcing upon Shaffer's army the deadly demand of storming the lines of the enemy instead of crushing them with siege artillery. To those who have not ascertained this vital point the story of the cam- paign is a nightmare dream of bloody blundering. Given the understanding that interprets the circumstances, the conquest of Santiago, while an enter- prise that was hazardous, was a deed of the highest military accomplishment. The exertions of the government through its respective departments to pro- vide for the army of the invasion of Cuba were something gigantic. To go from Tampa to the west end of Cuba was like a voyage from New York to Norfolk, but from Tampa to Santiago, the excursion was equal to the journey from Philadelphia to Havana. Aware of the certainty of wounds and sick- ness, the steamer John Engliss was purchased for $450,000, and fitted up as a hospital ship at a cost of $136,851.11, and named the Relief. She was pro- vided with every appliance, as the Quartermaster-General comprehensively as well as particularly states, "for the ease, comfort and treatment of the sick and wounded. The interior was remodeled; electric plant for light and purifying, sterilizing and laundry plants, and two steam launches were pro- vided. " The launches were like cradles, to carry the helpless men from the shore to the ship. After the first of July there were chartered on the Atlantic coast the steamers Wanderer, La Grande Duchesse, Tarpan and Ute, for the transpor- tation of troops and supplies to Cuba and Porto Rico, and with these the tonnage was 111,000 tons, the carrying capacity 250,000 men. The Quartermaster-General reports: "The carrying capacity of the chartered steamships employed in connec- tion with General Shafter's army for the invasion of Cuba was not found adequate to promptly transport the number of troops, in addition to that army, required for Cuba and Porto Rico, and it therefore became necessary to- increase the number of transport vessels with larger carrying capacity for men and animals, with bilge keels to prevent rolling, and thus make the ships more comfortable for stock. "Congress being averse to admitting foreign ships to American registry, the Secretary of War decided to direct the purchase of vessels, and have them WOUNDED ON THEIR WAY TO DRESSING PLACE AT BATTLE OF SAN JUAN. SHARP STRAIN OF STRUGGLE AT SANTIAGO. 397 fitted up to meet the needs of the army for the safe and comfortable transpor- tation of men and animals and the transportation of army supplies. Fourteen large steamships were purchased and fitted up for carrying men, animals, freight, etc. The following is a list of these vessels: Name of Vessel Panama No. i Port Victor, No. 2 Rita, No. 3 Mohawk, No. 20 Mobile, No. 21 Massachusetts, No. 22. Manitoba, No. 23 Minnewaska, No. 24... Mississippi, No. 25 Michigan, No. 26 Roumanian, No. 27 Obdam, No. 30 Berlin, No. 31 Chester, No. 32 Total. Tonnage 2,085 2, 792 2,194 5,658 5,7So 5.673 5.673 5,796 3.732 3.722 4,126 3.656 5,641 4,770 61,29s Cost Class $ 41,000 175,000 125,000 660,000 660,000 660,000 660,000 660,000 350,000 350,000 240,000 250,000 400,000 200,000 5,431,000 ....Freighter do do ..Combination . do do do do do do do ...Troop ship..., do do Carrying Capacity- Officers Men Animals 10 25 15 80 80 80 80 100 40 40 45 50 75 400 400 700 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,200 800 Soo 1,100 1,300 2,000 720 12,700 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 Soo 800 50 100 6,750 "Eight of these vessels were provided with refrigerators for the transpor- tation of fresh meat, seven of them having a capacity of 1,000 tons each. Two, the Panama and the Rita, were captured by the navy, and were pur- chased by this Department after having been cpndemned as prizes by the proper courts and offered for sale. "All of these were merchant vessels and were temporarily fitted up as army transports to meet the urgent demands of the service for which purpose an expenditure of $178,018.37 was made. "The fleet of transport ships which was concentrated at Port Tampa, Fla. , in June last for the transportation of the army of General Shafter to Cuba, consisting of 38 vessels, including 2 water boats, 3 steam lighters, 1 collier, and I tug-, had been fitted out for a voyage to the vicinity of Havana, distant about 400 miles; 2 decked barges were also provided by the Engineer Depart- ment. One of the steam lighters, the tug, and a decked barge failed to reach Cuba. "Upon embarkation of the troops it was found that the vessels would not safely and comfortably carry more than about 16,000 men with their 2,295 animals, equipments, ammunition, subsistence, and medical supplies, on a voyage of 1,000 miles." 398 SHARP STRAIN OF STRUGGLE AT SANTIAGO. To relieve the fighting soldiers and the seamen from the heavy task of landing supplies — the very line of labor that exhausted and sickened the British when they were besieging Havana — the Quartermaster's Department entered "into contract with the firm of D. Van Aken & Co., of New York City, to fit out an expedition with a large force of mechanics of various trades, and laborers, with machinery, such as pile drivers, implements for construc- tion of docks and railways, with the necessary materials — iron and lumber — for building docks, lighters, repairing railroads and engines. The company was furnished the steamship Panama and two fine ocean tugs, the Gladisfen, which was chartered, and the Gypsum King, which was purchased." This outfit afforded great aid and relief. The English expedition which assailed and captured Havana in 1762 was not as large as Shafter's army. The force of Lord Albemarle was only 11,351 men. The vessels of the squadron numbered 203, including "six ships with the baggage of general officers," 93 transports and 43 ships of the line; and 1,000 negroes were purchased to relieve the troops of drudgery, and with the provincials and the sailors saved the enterprise from failure. Colonel Humphrey, Chief Quartermaster, worked hard at Tampa and Santiago, and says of the transports that began to arrive early in May at Tampa, that they were as fast as reported, "fully coaled and watered and policed, and later fitted with bunks and stalls for the comfort of men and animals. The loading of the transports began at once, and was carried on speedily and systematically. This was, at best, difificult, owing to the limited wharf facilities. The place affords, in all particulars, most insufficient facili- ties for fitting out the many ships and embarking so large a force. The load- ing of all classes of stores was completed at 11 a.m of June 6th, and by 9 p. m., June 8th, the troops were all on board and the expedition was fully embarked. The departure, however, was delayed until Jiine 14th, by reason of a report made by the naval authorities that the Spanish war vessels were seen in Nicholas Channel. The transports when sailing were in good order, but not in so prime condition as when the troops and animals were embarked." No effort was spared, no cost counted in any department, or nook, or corner of the government of the United States, to assist the plain purpose of the Shaffer expedition. The General recited the facts of the bitter fight of the 24th, in which out of 964 our loss was 16 killed and 52 wounded in an hour. The loss of the enemy reported 9 killed and 27 wounded; that the engagement SHARP STRAIN OF STRUGGLE AT SANTIAGO. 399- had "inspirited the men. " They were hardy men who believed that they had' tried the tether of the enemy under circumstances that were and would be characteristic of the campaign, and. that they could win out, but the effect at Washington — and it is well that it was so — was to hurry telegrams that all get ready instantly to reinforce the army at Santiago. That the fighting right at hand would be of the severest nature, with the fearful climate and the dread- ful ambuscades to contend with, was already clear. Moreover, the certainties were that the few Cubans who had emerged from their mysteries could not be relied upon for hot work, and that the Spaniards were well armed and abun- dantly supplied with ammunition, that their Mauser rifles and smokeless powder were haunting as a superstition, and that they would in shelter do things to truly save the military character of their country from contempt. There was also a deep conviction of danger that Shafter needed more men, and that the quicker they could reach him the surer the result for us, and the smaller the expenditure of the blood of the heroic few. The United States is a mighty nation, and there was that in the air more fiery than "the rocket's red glare" in the song of the banner, but while the people waited with anxiety and the trains rumbled, and there were busy scenes at the ports, and the volunteers were massed and rushed to the rescue, while steamers blackened the sky and whitened the waters, as they throbbed through the waves to the scene of the conflict, the brunt of the battle was to be borne by the thin lines already in the sultry forests and on the steep hillsides where the boys stood in disciplined devotion, the siege guns not ashore, incredible toil the only way to get forward to those ready to famish the necessaries of life. Then arose the specter of the ghastliest fever that blights the strong, and so the breasts of the boys and the steel they bore must be driven home by stormy rushes, that the sword might win the salvation it was vain to hope for when the pestilence surely on the wing would swoop down upon the bivouacs of the brave. ^r xf nMtk, 4^ j} ".A CHAPTER XVIII. The Field Fighting for Santiago. The Supreme Test of American Valor — The Thin but Steady Regular Line, and the Es- sential Assistance by the Foremost Volunteers — The Whole Story from the First Skirmish to the Last Assault Told in War Office Dispatches Far More Interesting than the Formal Reports of the Officers and More Sensational than the Lurid Chap- ters in the Journals — Their Publication an Admirable Example of the Candor of the Authorities — An All-Night Watch for News at the White House — Shatter's Memorable Third and Fourth of July. The President sent thanks to General Shafter and his army for "the gal- lant action" of the 24th June. On the 26th the Secretary of War communi- cated to General Miles that with the least possible delay an expedition would be organized under the immediate command of Major-General Brooke, "composed of three divisions taken from the troops best equipped in the First and Third Army Corps, and two divisions from the Fourth Army Corps, for movement and operation against the enemy in Cuba and Porto Rico. Tiie command under Major-General Shafter, or such part thereof as can be spared from the work now in hand, will join the foregoing expedition," and the whole was to be commanded in person by General Miles, who was to place himself "in close touch with the senior ofScers of the navy in those waters, with the view to harmonious and forceful action." This telegram was sent on the day of the assignment of General Miles to the Porto Rico occupation: Washington, June 26, 1898. Maj. Gen. W. R. Shafter, Commanding United States forces in Cuba: In burying the dead, be sure and detail a competent officer to have a map made giving resting place of each, so that friends can find the remains of their loved ones. R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War. There have been serious perplexities about the graves. It is true that they were sometimes shallow, because the men detailed to dig them were so weak from the heat and affected by exposure to the sun and rain that they 400 Z OS o a u CO « -J! & a a CD bj H H O w 31 a a; '■A •J S3 S3 w C3 THE FIELD FIGHTING FOR SANTIAGO. 403 ft Jl v::?:; 404 THE FIELD FIGHTING FOR SANTIAGO. could not wield the grave-digger's tools more than a very few minutes at a time. Another reason exists for some of the lost graves, which were identified by bottles tightly corked, containing the name, organization and home of the deceased, and buried close by the remains. There was also an external identification — strong stakes driven at the head of the graves and marked so as to be intelligible. Some of the stakes were removed by Santiago refugees and Cubans who professed to be soldiers, because it was convenient to make use of them to cook coffee. This was resented by our soldiers to the point of shooting several of the miscreants informally, but the mischief was done. On the 29th the advance pickets were within a mile and a half of Santi- ago, and Shaffer was expecting to put a division on the Caney road between that place and Santiago on the ist of July, also "advance on the Sevilla road to the San Juan road, and possibly beyond," and Garcia with 3,000 men was to "take the railroad north of Santiago and prevent Pando reaching the city. " The figures of Garcia's force show that the "scatterment" he reported of his fol- lowers when the time came to show them up had not been reformed alto- gether. Still his army greatly outnumbered that of the Commander-in-Chief Gomez, who for strategic reasons kept only 150 men about his person,' holding the others in reserve in the recesses of the wilderness, where no human eye beheld them when the cane burning orgies were over. June 30th the First Illinois, 1,200 men, sailed from Tampa, also Shaffer's regular recruits, some hundreds, and two hundred thousand rations. Certainly the government was doing all that could be done. The advance of the 1st of July developed the enemy and Shaffer tele- graphed 9:34 a. m: "Action going on, but firing only light and desultory — began on the right near Caney — Lawton's division." The movement was on the northeast of Santiago. But the light' firing deepened, and then its desul- tory character changed. July ist was a bloody day. The first dispatch from the field to the 'War Office was: Siboney. — Had a very heavy engagement to-day, which lasted from 8 a. m. till sundown. We have carried their outer works and are now in possession of them. There is now about three-quarters of a mile of open country between my lines and city. By morning troops will be intrenched and con- siderable augmentation of forces will be there. General Lawton's division and General Bates's brigade, which have been engaged all day in carrying El Caney, which was accomplished at 4 p. m., will be in line and in front of THE FIELD FIGHTING FOR SANTIAGO. 405 Santiago during the night. I regret to say that our casualties will be a-bove 400. Of these not many are killed. W. R. SHAFTER, Major-General. The second dispatch added significance to the story of the fight "from 8 a. m. till sundown" : Playa del Este, via Haiti. (Received at Washington July 2, 1898 — 1:12 a. m.) Adjutant-General, Washington: , Headquarters near Santiago de Cuba, i. — I fear I have underestimated to-day's casualties. A large and thoroughly equipped hospital ship should be sent here at once. Chief surgeon says he has use for 40 more medical officers. Ship must bring launch and boat for conveying wounded. W. R. SHAFTER, Major-General, Fifth Corps. The response from Washington was that the hospital ship and medical officers would be sent "as soon as possible," and was confident of "ultimate complete success." The Secretary of War suggested the navy could "help" in the care of the wounded. July ist, the President disapproved of a "plan" by General Miles to at once capture the Isle of Pines. The Major-General commanding had thought that subject all over, and concluded that it would be the very thing to take the celebrated retreat of the pirates in the Pines, as: "It is said to have the most delightful climate in the Wes£ Indies, being entirely free from yellow fever. It can be made extremely useful for the establishment of a hospital and a camp of prisoners, and, also, eventually, as a base for supplying the Cubans, and possibly for the cavalry operations on the main island of Cuba. "I think the one steamer now at Tampa can, with a battery of artillery, and one regiment of infantry, take the island, land from two to six months' supplies, and return to Tampa inside of ten days, when the steamer would be ready to be used for any future military purpose." This was one episode of the day. Another was, Brooke telegraphed from Chickamauga he was "pressing the whole corps for movement. " The return of as many transports as possible from Santiago was ordered "at once. " July 3d, at 5:25 p. m., there was a telegram from Tampa to the Adjutant-General: "General Randolph and six light batteries on the Comanche and two English 9-knot transports, and the First District of Columbia infantry, on the Catania, have sailed for Key West to-day." 4o6 THE FIELD FIGHTING FOR SANTIAGO. At 7:55 p. m., Coppinger telegraphed from U. S. Camp, Florida: "Specialist, with 225 horses, and Unionist, with 300 horses and 2 mules, both carrying artillery material and 75 men each, sailed at 8:35 this morning. The Comanche, with General Randolph and balance of men of the six light batteries and 50 horses, left at 11:40. The first two are 9-knot freight- ers; the Comanche is a i6-knot boat. The Catania, with the First District Volunteers, less Captain Looker's company, remaining here as provisional engineers, left at 12:30 p. m." The Adjutant-General was advised: "Depot quartermaster has conferred with us as to movement Tampa to Savannah. Both Florida railroads have sent to Chickamauga their passenger equipment, which is being held in readi- ness for movement from there. We can get together equipment for the rough riders, but it would simplify matters if you could order Chickamauga move- ment to begin at once, and we could use that equipm.ent to carry the 5,000 troops to Savannah. " The first of July, 1898, was Friday. On Sunday morning the Secretary of War sent a telegram to the general commanding the army assailing Santi- ago that shows as distinctly as a tremor of the earth is recorded by a seis- mometer, the strain of the critical hours: "Executive Mansion, Washington, July 3, 1S98 — 1:56 a. m. Major-General Shaffer, Playa del Este: (To be forwarded at once to headquarters in the field.) The following is just received — midnight — from sources unofficial: "Cervera has been ordered to shell the town (Santiago) when Americans get possession. All foreign consuls have been notified to retire at that time to places of safety outside of city." This information majj- or may not be correct, but is sent for your consideration. We are awaiting with intense anxiety tidings of to-day. R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War. The President was up all night. There was no news, and it was hard to have faith that it was good to hear nothing. This is the Secretary's telegram, of the up-all-night-after-the-battle vigil at the White House : War Department, July 3, 1898. Major-General Shaffer, Commanding United States Forces, Cuba: I waited with the President until 4 o'clock this morning for news from you relative to Saturday's battle. Not a word was received, nor has there been THE FIELD FIGHTING FOR SANTIAGO. 407 up to this hour, 11 a. m. , except an account of the battle of Friday, upon which I congratulate you most heartily. I wish hereafter that you would interrupt all messages that are being sent to the Associated Press and others, and make report at the close of each day, or during the day if there is anything of special importance, at once. The Relief left New York yesterday. She has 17 surgeons aboard, and will come to you as quickly as possible. R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War. The Relief was the scientifically provided hospital ship, purchased and fitted out in anticipation for such an emergency, but too late to go with the expedition. Playa del Este, via Haiti. (Received Washington, July 4, 1898 — 12:15 a. m.) General Alger, Washington : Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, Cuba, 3. — Did not telegraph, as I was too busy looking after things that had to be attended to at once, and did not wish to send any news that was not fnlly confirmed; besides, I was too much excited myself. The Spanish fleet left the harbor this morning and is reported practically destroyed. I demanded surrender of the city at 10 o'clock to-day. At this hour, 4:30 p. m., no reply has been received; perfect quiet along the line ; situation has been precarious on account of difficulties of supplying command with food, and tremendous fighting capabilities shown by the enemy from his almost impregnable position. SHAFTER, Major-General. This dispatch tells the story that Shaffer had been sorely tried. The forceful candor of his way of putting things is well illustrated here, but he had suffered from illness, and despondency, and in the darkest hour he sent this dispatch, which is a remarkable contribution to the full story of historical events: Playa del Este, July 3, 1898. (Received Washington, 11:44 a. m.) The Secretary of War, Washington: Camp near Sevilla, Cuba, 3. We have the town well invested on the north and east, but with a very thin line. Upon approaching it we find it of such a character and the defenses so strong it will be impossible to carry it by storm with my present force, and I am seriously considering withdrawing about 5 miles and taking up a new position on the high ground between the San Juan River and Siboney, with our left at Sardinero, so as to get our sup- 4o8 THE FIELD FIGHTING FOR SANTIAGO. SKETCH Of the: position - of both armies on JULY 3. Ezplanahon& I .Soco/ix! Sa/f^ry ^. Jtarm Cizj/t^ a ^armSa/icTi' ■f. P^i.iAz ^arJ^'SaJHiy! 7.. ...Ce/nf/irt/ 3. . .J^AUerfTiy-i a. . . ^/KU7is^ TTvjK^as h £42^03 a ^r^ X- ^i7fer/ca77 7ye/?cfies REDUCED FROM OFFICIAL PLAN PREPARED BY WAR DEPARTMENT. THE FIELD FIGHTING FOR SANTIAGO. 409 plies, to a large extent, by means of the railroad, which we can use, having engines and cars at Siboney. Our losses up to date will aggregate 1,000, but list has not yet been made. Exit little sickness outside of exhaustion from intense heat and exertion of the battle of the day before yesterday and the almost constant fire which is kept up on the trenches. Wagon road to the rear is kept up with some difficulty on account of rains, but I will be able to use it for the present. General Wheeler is seriously ill, and will probably have to go to the rear to-day. General Young also very ill ; confined to his bed. General Hawkins slightly wounded in foot during sortie enemy made last night, which was handsomely repulsed. The behavior of the regular troops was magnificent. I am urging Admiral Sampson to attempt to force the entrance of the harbor, and will have consultation with him this morning. He is coming to the front to see me. I have been unable to be out during the heat of the day for four days, but am retaining the command. General Garcia reported he holds the railroad from Santiago to San Luis, and has burned a bridge and removed some rails ; also that General Pando has arrived at Palma, and that the French consul with about 400 French citizens came into his lines yesterday from Santiago. Have directed him to treat them with every courtesy possible. SHAFTER, Major-General. The dismal lines in this telegram are relating to the serious consideration of retirement — "withdrawing about five miles." A five mile retreat could not have changed American destiny, but it would have smashed a great deal of highly wrought red, white and blue china. The Secretary of War struck the right keynote when he finally got the news in his dispatch — firm, quiet, strong words that will be long held in honorable remembrance : War Department, Washington, July 3, 1898 — 12:10 p. m. Major-General Shaffer, Playa del Este, Cuba: Your first dispatch received. Of course, you can judge the situation better than we can at this end of the line. If, however, you could hold your present position, especially San Juan heights, the effect upon the country would be much better than falling back. However, we leave all that matter to you. This is only a suggestion. We shall send you reinforcements at once. R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War. On this memorable July 3d, Alger requested that the transports returned should be ordered by the commander of the fleet, "directing that the fastest vessels sail with all possible speed to Port Tampa, in order that they may get i^^JJ^ 4IO THE FIELD FIGHTING FOR SANTIAGO. a supply of coal and water, and commence loading before the others arrive, thus saving time." This was "pushing things" — to use two of Phil. Sheridan's words as he put them. At two o'clock in the afternoon of July 3d, Shaffer telegraphed : "Camp near Santiago, 3. — Large quantities of underclothing and shoes, enough for entire army, are badly needed." The response the next day was : St. Paul leaves New York Wednesday direct for Santiago with Eighth Ohio, and underclothing, shoes, stockings, and duck suits for your whole army. How are you, Wheeler, Young, and others? R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War. But to go back a day: Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, July 3, 1898 — 5 p. m. Major-General Shaffer, Playa del Este, Cuba: You can have whatever reinforcements you want. Wire what additional troops you desire, and they will be sent as rapidly as transports can be secured. In addition to the 2,700 troops now en route from Tampa, the St. Paul and Duchess will leave Newport News not later than Wednesday, with 3,000 troops of Garretson's brigade; the St. Louis, Yale, and Columbia will sail probably from Charleston, carrying 4,000 more, and others will be sent from Tampa as j^ou may request. H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General. War Department, Washington, July 3, 1898. General Shaffer, Commanding United States Forces, Cuba: We are forwarding reinforcements to you this week. How is your health? Do you think that some one should come to relieve )'ou? Are you going to be able to stand through? What do you think? Be very careful of yourself. R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War. This was a delicate but decided suggestion that Shaffer's resignation was the thought of the War Department and the country. Early in the morning of the 4th of July there was this good news in the war office, in reply to the "suggestion" of Alger to Shaffer that he had better not yield any ground, but hold what he had got: THE FIELD FIGHTING FOR SANTIAGO. 4" Playa del Este, via Haiti. (Received Washington, July 4, 1898 — 1:16 a. m.) The Honorable Secretary of War, Washington : Headquarters Fifth Corps, 3. — I shall hold my present position. SHAFTER, Major-General. Holding his present position meant two things. A little later Shafter felt better, as this witnesses: Playa, July 4, 1898. (Received Washington July 4, 1898 — 9:30 a. m.) The Adjutant-General's Office, U. S. Army, Washington: Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, near Santiago. — Your telegram inquir- ing about my health just received. I am still very much exhausted. Eating a little this p. m. for the first time in four days. The good news has inspired everybody. When the news of the disaster of the Spanish fleet reached the front, which was during the period of truce, a regimental band that had managed to keep its instruments on the line, played "The Star-Spangled Banner" and "There will be a hot time in the old town to-night," men cheer- ing from one end of the line to the other. Officers and men, without even shelter tents, have been soaking for five days in the aftefnoon rains, but all are happy. SHAFTER, Major-General, U. S. A. The American eagle has a fashion of flying high on the 4th of July, and this was no exception. There are two dispatches from General Shafter that should be printed together — the following: Playa del Este, via Haiti. (Received Washington July 3, 1898 — 7 p. m.) Secretary War, Washington: Camp near Santiago, 3. — Lieutenant Allen, Second Cavalry, is just in from my extreme right, which is on the railroad running north from Santiago and which overlooks the entire bay. Lieutenant Allen states that Cervera's fleet was in full view until nearly 10 o'clock this morning, when it proceeded down the bay, and shortly afterwards heavy firing was heard. Duffield, at Siboney, has just telephoned me that Captain Cotton, of the Harvard, just sent him word that Admiral Sampson had signaled Cervera had come out and had escaped, and that he was in pursuit. The Harvard immediately left. The French consul informed General Garcia, into whose lines he went yesterday, that Admiral Cervera had stated that he would run out at 10 o'clock this 412 THE FIELD FIGHTING FOR SANTIAGO. a. m., and that was the hour Allen witnessed his departure. Cervera told such consul it was better to die fighting than blow up ships in harbor. SHAFTER, Commanding. Playa del Este, via Haiti. (Received Washington July 3, 1898 — 7:31 p. m.) Adjutant-General United States Army, Washington: Camp near Santiago, Cuba 3. — Early this morning I sent in a demand for immediate surrender of Santiago, threatening bombardment to-morrow. Perfect quiet on lines for one hour. From news just received of escape of fleet am satisfied place will be surrendered. SHAFTER, Commanding. It was very good of the French consul to inform General Garcia when Cervera was to go out, and Shaffer was quick and hair-triggered in his rebound, demanding the surrender of Santiago within the same day that he had considered a fall-back of five miles. The following is the text of the demand: Headquarters United States Forces, Near San Juan River, Cuba, July 3, 1898 — 8:30 a. m. To the Commanding General of the Spanish Forces, Santiago de Cuba: Sir: I shall be obliged unless you surrender to shell Santiago de Cuba. Please inform the citizens of foreign countries and all women and children that they should leave the city before 10 o'clock to-morrow morning. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, W. R. SHAFTER, Major-General, U. S. Army. The reply of Jos6 Toral, the Spanish commander at Santiago, was: "I advise the foreigners and women and children that they must leave the city before 10 o'clock to-morrow morning. It is my duty to say to you that this city will not surrender, and that I will inform the foreign consuls and inhabitants of the contents of your message." The British, Portuguese, Chinese, and Norwegian consuls came to Gen- eral Shaffer's lines and asked if non-combatants could occupy the town of Caney and railroad points, and wanted until 10 o'clock of the 5th instant before the city was fired on. "They claim" — we quote Shaffer — "that there are between 15,000 and 20,000 people, many of them old, who will leave. They ask if I can supply them with food, which I cannot do for want of transportation to Caney, which is 15 miles from my landing." THE FIELD FIGHTING FOR SANTIAGO. 413 Shafter concluded that solely in the interest of the poor women and chil- dren he would delay the bombardment until noon of the 5th, if in the interval no demonstration was made on the American lines, and added in com- municating this to the Secretary of War: "I do not know that these extreme measures which I had threatened be justifiable under the circumstances, and I submit the matter for the action of the President. The little town of Caney will not hold one thousand people, and great suffering will be occasioned to our friends, as we must regard the peo- ple referred to; and it is now filled with dead and wounded, the dead still unburied. The consuls tell Dorst that there are not to exceed 5,000 troops in the city. I can hold my present line and starve them out, letting the non- combatants come out leisurely as they run out of food, and will probably be able to give such as are forced out by hunger food to keep them alive. I await your orders. ' ' The Secretary of War responded, early in the morning of the 4th: "While you would be justified in beginning to shell Santiago at expira- tion of time limit set by you, still under the conditions named in your dispatch and for humanity's sake the postponement of the bombardment to noon of July 5th is approved." And later the Secretary continued to Shafter: "You are the best judge of the situation, and all the country has every faith in your wisdom. How are you physically, anyway?" The dispatch from Shafter, showing depression so deep he was consider- ing retirement to a line abandoning five miles of lands and territory, continued to disturb, if not dismay, the War Office, as this telegram perfectly expresses; Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, July 4, 1898. Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba: After conference with the President and the Secretary of War, I am directed to say j'our continued illness brings sorrow and anxiety. In case you are disabled. General Wheeler would, of course, succeed to command. His illness, which we also regret, is feared to be so serious as to prevent his assuming command. You must determine whether your condition Is such as to require you to relinquish command. If so, and General Wheeler is dis- abled, you will order the next general oflficer in rank for duty to succeed you and to take up the work in hand. It is not expected that our forces will make assault until they are ready. H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General. 414 THE FIELD FIGHTING FOR SANTIAGO. The reply was not thoroughly reassuring, but raised the pressure of severe anxiety that might take the form of duty to order the resignation of the officer who was ill. , Playa del Este, via Haiti. (Received Washington, July 6, 1898 — 5:40 a. m.) Adjutant-General, Washington : Camp near Santiago, Cuba, 5. — I am not at present so much ill as exhausted from the intense strain that has been on me for last twoj^ months. I am also suffering from an attack of gout, which prevents me from moving about. I have, however, the whole business in my hand, and am managing it through able staff officers. When I do have to give up I will of course follow your order, but I hope to be better soon. SHAFTER. This day, July 6th, the Commanding General at Santiago was notified that "Hobson and men" were to be exchanged, and the next day Shaffer had the pleasure of telegraphing: "Lieutenant Hobson and all his men have just been received safely in exchange for Spanish officer and prisoners taken by us. All are in good health except two seamen, convalescent from remittent fever." The apprehensions of General Shafter as to the safety of his position when he considered falling back were in some degree accountable by the state of his health. He was seriously sick. He is a man of uncommon bulk, and the climate was to him unexpectedly trying. He could not endure the full power of the sun, and suffering from an attack of gout was an additional burden. The line the American troops occupied on the Friday night when there was such an oppression in the atmosphere was, as General Shafter described it, "very thin." So exhausting had been the experiences of the day, so many men had been killed and wounded, and so many had been overcome by heat, or fatigued into disability, and the carrying of the wounded to the rear had been a grievous labor, demanding many bearers, that in the judgment of most competent officers not more than three thousand of our men were in a defensive position. The question was whether the Spaniards would advance, and there was concern on that subject. General Joseph Wheeler, instead of yielding to his illness, managed to shake it off, and was on the thin line encouraging the men, and expanding his conviction to them that they were safe from an attack by the Spaniards they had driven before them ; that the Spaniards would not dare to fling themselves against our position, and must THE. FIELD FIGHTING FOR SANTIAGO. 415 get the worst of it if they did. But the line, considering its great extent, was thin, but good as the "thin red line" the British held against the solid Russian masses, good stuff as they were, at Balaklava and Inkerman. The four dis- patches following display the exact lines of the conditions: Playa del Este, via Haiti. (Received at Washington July 5, 1898 — 7 a. m.) Adjutant-General U. S. Army, Washington : I :o7 p. m. Headquarters United States forces near San Juan River, Cuba, 4. — I regard as necessary that the navy force an entrance into the har- bor Santiago not later than 6th instant, and assist in the capture of the place. If they do, I believe the place will surrender without further sacrifice of life. SHAFTER, Major-General, U. S. Volunteers. Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, July 5, 1898 — 11:20 a. m. Major-General Shaffer, Playa del Este, Cuba: Secretary of War instructs me to say that the President directs that you confer with Admiral Sampson at once for cooperation in taking Santiago. After the fullest exchange of views, you will agree upon the time and manner of attack. By command Major-General Miles: H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General. Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, July 5, 1898 — 3:10 p. m. Major-General Shaffer, Playa del Este, Cuba: Your telegram this date has been submitted to the President. After con- sideration, the Secretary of War directs me to say that it is evident from your several reports that you do not consider your force strong enough to make a successful assault upon the Spanish army entrenched in Santiago. This being the case, it is the part of wisdom to await reinforcements, the embarka- tion of which you have already been advised. As you have already been advised, you must be judge of the time and manner of assault. The Presi- dent has directed that you and Admiral Sampson have a conference and determine a course of cooperation best calculated to secure desired results with least sacrifice. By command Major-General Miles: H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General. 4i6 ■ THE FIELD FIGHTING FOR SANTIAGO. Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, July 6, 1898 — 2:30 p. m. Maj. Gen. W. R. Shatter, Playa del Este, Cuba: The Secretary of War is anxious to know what prospect there is of breaking through the mines. He would be very glad, even with a delay, to have coopera- tion of the navy, thus saving mjiny lives. The St. Paul, sailing from New York to-day, has nearly everything you asked for. The lighters, sent a long time since, ought to be with you by this time. We are trying to make arrangements for light-draft steam vessels for carrying orders, etc., to be sent you as quickly as possible. Can you not procure from the navy steam launches to aid you in landing supplies and carrying dispatches while we are getting crafts of our own for that object. It is expected you will communi- cate freely, setting forth any assistance that can be given you in the way of suoplies of any kind. By command Major-General Miles: H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General. General Shatter, when his Santiago Fouth of July was but fifteen minutes old — 12:15 a. m. — had accounted for being too busy to telegraph the current intelligence to the President and Secretary of War, who waited in vain until four in the morning, that he did not want to be sending what might not be confirmed, and there was a further embarrassment in "the tremendous fighting capabilities shown by the enemy." The words that followed — "from his almost impregnable position" — did not take away the great compliment which ought to be useful to Spain in her home rule, for the good positions, though they may be defended by fighting men instinctively, are not found marked out and made almost impregnable accidentally. CHAPTER XIX. The Strange Story of the Secret Official Cipher of Spain. The Cables that Passed Between Sagasta, Blanco, Cervera, Correa and Linares During the Crisis of the Spanish War in Cuba — A Diary Telegraphed from Santiago to Havana, Giving the Inside of Spanish Affairs from the Attack to the Surrender — Cervera not Well Fitted out. Forced to Flight, Protesting that he was Going to Destruction — The Cables Are a Gallery of Paintings of Spanish Character. In association with the official history of the war between the United States and Spain, as recorded in our departments of War and the Navy, and published officially for the information of all nations and people, we are indebted to the journalistic investments in the news of the day — the libera} purchase of intelligence in the market — for the unquestionably authentii cable and wire dispatches of the Spanish Cabinet, the Premier and Ministers of War and Navy ; General Blanco, iVrust Build Regiments as We do Battleships — The Fault of Poor Preparation not Personal — Let Congress for the Country Mend it. There is extraordinary value, professional and literary, in the official papers of Major General of Volunteers, Inspector General J. C. Breckenridge. His military intelligence is constantly manifested in what he says, and his vigor of expression presents information clear-cut and in a strong light, the outlines sharp, the color vivid. He said of the earliest military expedition out of this country, that to Santiago, that it was composed of "the flower of the American army" — and writing as it was getting under way, he said: "Despite the newspaper freedom of assertion, its purpose is said to be definitely known to but few, but it is doubtless worthy of its high quality. America has no fighting force of equal size, worthy to represent her, if this is not. Every general and line officer has come up through the different grades in her military service, and is as ripe as any we have for their respective com- mands; and many of the staff officers have had broad experience perhaps even in their present particular positions. The adaptability of Americans is illus- trated by the admirable work being done by many officers outside their own legitimate field. Officers of the line are doing every kind of staff duty in a manner it is impossible to too highly appreciate. The elasticity and adven- turousness of youthful vigor may occasionally be somewhat lacking, and the siege artillery material may lack preliminary adjustment and practice in expeditions seaward, or even in the ordinary experience in the practical maneuvers of large bodies of men, and under a questionable policy is partic- ularly deficient in military transportations. An immobile army is ridiculous. 474 tr o > w •c o I CO p o « W H O- < THE LESSON OF THE HILLS OF SANTIAGO. 477 "Many foreign countries are also studying every detail and the varying phases of this expedition with most critical care, for few are exempt from similar possibilities. The Fifth Corps is not alone in need of all the benefits that can be gleaned from such experience; the whole army should derive full advantage from it. The difficulties have been immense, and have been over- come with remarkable energy. Only the ultimate result can fully approve how well or how ill every possible contingency has been provided for and met. The careful, painstaking preparation and study of every detail of the problem to be met, and the persistent exertion to fully meet it to the utmost limit of the powers of a great department of the government, and with the combined provision and united effort of every bureau, which was so admirably illustrated in the naval expedition to the Philippines, is, of course, also to be expected in this." One of the lessons of the war of the sections and states was sharply applied by General Breckenridge to this: "It is believed that special attention should be called to the general absence of intrenching tools as a regular part of the equipment of the troops. Hardly any intrenching tools, save the usual small number of picks and shovels for public purposes, accompany this expedition ; though this nation, in the war of the rebellion, brought the use of hasty intrenchments into such prominence as to materially affect the tactics and strategy of its armies. If the use of the bayonet or other makeshifts for this purpose was formerly inadequate, it is no longer so. The modern shelter trench for skirmishers is normally 2^^^ feet in thickness, for protection against the penetration of modern small arms, and this would seem to require the use of a tool specially adapted for the purpose required. So patent has this need become that one young company com- mander is said to have purchased masons' trowels at Tampa, for the use of his company in Cuba." In regard to the volunteers. General Breckenridge refers to their "zeal, rare intelligence and adaptability and the having of many of them in some of the more excellent schools of the National Guard," and remarks that these qualities are evident all along the line, and that "every advantage should be taken of all the military instruction which our military system affords, and perhaps full use is not being made of the graduates of our hundred of military colleges, nor of the army itself as a training school for young officers. Doubtless we could promptly commission several hundred bright young citi- 478 THE LESSON OF THE HILLS OF SANTIAGO. zens in our regular regiments, and put them into thorough training immedi- ately, and so release and utilize more of the superbly trained regular officers, and have them serve with, and perhaps command, volunteer regiments and brigades — men of the age of Sheridan and Custer when they won their fame — and we could attract many more graduates of our military colleges into places of command; so the whole situation might be benefited and much less discomfort be felt and quicker efficiency for battle be attained. Already there is progress everywhere. The work is devolving upon the better officers, and a general insight as to how and when it is to be done and the best way to do it is spreading rapidly. ' ' This was especially applicable to the first stage of preparation in . the camps, and meant for the encouragement of those bearing the burdens of those preliminaries. The General struck a common experience in this state of things at Chickamauga Park in May: "The worst from some States are better equipped than the best from others, and they are apt to know how to continue to get things. The struggle and delay in supplies is still apparent, and the more inexperienced suffer." In one division were two regiments without arms, and "some other regiments have none for 30 to 40 per cent of men, and gfuards walk posts with wands. Many rifles, especially older models, even if not already unserviceable, can hardly be expected to last through a campaign. An issuing arsenal and repair shop seem needed." On the way to Tampa the General wrote that "brigade and division com- manders, rather under than over 45 (alert, vigorous, and experienced, but not Stale), are especially needed for instruction and leading an improvised army to promptly and successfully meet the requirements of the modern battle lines, and well-instructed staff officers for these subordinate commands, even if not so young, are also needed. There are almost none with the brigades." General Breckenridge urged striking Spain a blow at home in order to make an impression on her where she lives, "and if possible the solar plexus blow, now that the pace is set." July 25th the General wrote: "Daiquiri having been selected, the landing could not have been effected with less loss, and the movements of the troops thereafter were merely limited by the speed •with which supplies could be gotten from the vessels, even with the advan- tage of Siboney also, both of which were little more than indentations on an open coast without landing facilities. And it was seldom, indeed, that the supplies were brought up to the fighting lines in any great excess of their THE LESSON OF THE HILLS OF SANTIAGO. 479 immediate needs, and the entire absence of the usual comforts and conven- iences of even the simplest army life during the whole of this expedition, and sometimes medical essentials, even in the hour of utmost need, was one of the most marked features of the landing." In a few sentences the General gives the story of the fighting on land for Santiago: "The remarkable marksmanship of our trained soldiers was hardly more exploited than the gross ignorance of our recruits. The books say that it ought not to be possible to successfully assault in front unshaken, still more, well-fortified infantry, under modern conditions. But in this instance dis- mounted cavalry, as well as its confrere of the infantry arm, did, without bayonets, successfully assault infantry posted on commanding ground, behind water, well intrenched, valiant and unshaken, and the severity of the task is indicated by the list of casualties, as compared with the actual numbers the immediately opposing trenches will hold. And when the fight was over, though successful everywhere, we had no reserves. "Doubtless, through telegrams and otherwise, there have been sufificient indications of the intense strain in the whole military situation on the field of operations which led to the consultation at the El Poso house on the night of July 2d, and to some of the general oiificers favoring a retrograde movement during the day or two prior to our intrenchments taking shape and the armistice being agreed upon, which latter remained almost unbroken until the surrender. Probably it is now evident to all that it was far better to stand steadfast, and perhaps quite possible to advance rather than retreat, so near the 4th of July; and certainly we have demonstrated our ability to hold our own. Indeed, the fighting of this army came up to the highest expectations, and accomplished results beyond what it is usual to expect of a force so constituted." General Breckenridge has been quoted without authority as having given personal encouragement to General Shaffer in moments of doubt as to the demands of the hour, and to have been steadily urgent to stand firm until the word could be given to advance, and some of the language quoted above may be taken to refer to his exertions and confirm in part the general statement of his timely tenacity. His accounts of the fighting days contain this reference to the action of Las Guasimas : "The First and Tenth regiments 'of regular cavalry (dismounted) 48o THE LESSON OF THE HILLS OF SANTIAGO. deployed, and charged up the hill in front; the First Volunteer Cavalry- deployed upon the other or ridge road from Siboney, which forks at this point with the valley road, and charged in flank on the left, driving the enemy from his position, but not until we had sustained severe losses in both killed and wounded. Our forces pushed on, and at nightfall occupied a line a mile or more in advance of the position occupied by the enemy in the morning. The conduct of the troops, both white and colored, regular and volunteer, was most gallant and soldierly, and General Young's dispositions, plan, and execu- tion were skillful, dashing, and successful." The soil of the portion of Cuba containing the battlefields, he says, "is rich and supports a luxuriant growth of trees, brush, and vines, making a chaparral rather noticeably thorny and poisonous, that is often impossible to penetrate unaided by the machete. The streams in this vicinity are for the most part readily fordable, except for a few hours immediately after heavy and long-continued rains. The roads become then almost impassable, but dry up very quickly." The movements of the troops were between the fighting days favored by the moon, and many hours of the night were useful for changes that could not have been possible in darkness. In the preliminaries to the battle of El Caney, "General Ludlow's brigade took up a position west of the village, in order to cut off the retreat of the Spaniards when they should be driven out and attempt to retreat to the city of Santiago. But with soldierly instinct and admirable effect, he closed in upon the defenses of the village, and his white sailor hat became a target for the enemy during the hours he hugged the blockhouses on his flank of the well-defended village." The artillery was on this occasion served with great effect. The division commander, between one and two, directed the battery "to concentrate its fire upon the stone fort, or blockhouses, situated on the highest point in the village on the northern side, and which was the key point to the village. This fort was built of brick, with walls about a foot thick, about 45 by 35 feet, with semicircular bastions diagonally opposite each other. The practice of the artillery against this was very effective, knocking great holes into the fort and rendering it untenable." At about 6:30, after the El Caney fight, "General Lawton went forward with his staff to find and definitely locate the position which his troops were to occupy, and continued along the road to within about a mile of the city, when iy^ COL. JOHN JAl'UH AsrOR, OF ASTOR BATTERY FAME, NEAR SPANISH TRENCHES. THE LESSON OF THE HILLS OF SANTIAGO. 483 he was fired into by the Spanish pickets. He then returned and sent forward a strong patrol of Cubans to find out the condition of affairs. He then reported the matter to corps headquarters and waited until about 2:30 a. m., and not receiving any report from the Cubans, or any further direction from headquarters, he started forward again, and was ordered to take a position on the right." Nothing was heard from the Cubans after they were directed to do some- thing. General Breckenridge says: "Firing was kept up during the whole of the 2d of July by both sides, our troops having thrown up hasty intrenchments in many positions the night previous. During the 2d of July there were a great many casualties, result- ing not entirely from aimed fire, but from bullets clearing the crest of our intrenchments and going far beyond, striking men as they were coming up to gather into position, or as they were going back and forth, bringing water, caring for the wounded, and so on. Many casualties also resulted from the fire of sharpshooters, stationed in trees with such thick foliage that the sharp- shooters could not be seen. It seemed incredible that men should be so reckless as to remain within our lines and continue firing, and it was believed by many that what was reported to be fire from sharpshooters was simply spent bullets that came over the crest of our works. But I and the members of my staff can testify to the fact that, in many places along the road leading up to the center of our lines, the sharp crack of the Mauser rifle could be heard very close to the road ; and there were all the usual indications of the near and selected aim against individuals. Scouting parties were sent out from time to time to get hold of these fellows, and a number of them were captured or shot. It was not until a day or two afterwards, however, that they were all cleared out. "On the morning of the 2d, three batteries of artillery went into action near San Juan, right behind the infantry intrenchments, and about 600 yards from the enemy's intrenchments. Firing black powder, instead of smokeless, they, of course, instantly drew all fire in that vicinity, and being unable to work the guns, were obliged to withdraw. The question as to smokeless powder, intrenchments, and batteries of both light and siege artillery, were matters of the highest moment to the men inost nearly exposed to the steady fire from the intrenched lines, so admirably laid out and stoutly defended as in this fight. During the night of the 2d our troops 484 THE LESSON OF THE HILLS OF SANTIAGO. continued intrenching on a crest from 500 to 1,500 yards distant from the crest occupied by the Spanish intrenchments, and in more cases having liigher command. The Spaniards made an attack on the night of the 2d upon our lines, which was repulsed with very little loss to ourselves." These are remarkable accounts of Spaniards, who not only remained within our lines to do sharp-shooting from tree tops, but ventured upon a night attack. General Breckenridge says the bravery of the Spanish soldier fighting on the defensive is beyond doubt, and the Mauser rifle "an excellent and rapid weapon," while the smokeless cartridge adds to its special efficacy. It is loaded with five cartridges at a time, held in a clip "detached from the belt and placed in the rifle in one motion." The account General Breckenridge gives of the Cubans is discriminating and judicial, and we quote the words herewith : "In the beginning the Cuban soldiers were largely used as outposts on our front and flanks. There has been a great deal of discussion among officers of this expedition concerning the Cuban soldiers and the aid they have rendered. They seem to have very little organization or discipline, and they do not, of course, fight in the battle line with our troops. "Yet in every skirmish or fight where they are present they seem to have a fair proportion of killed and wounded. They were of undoubted assistance in our first landing, and in our scouting our front and flanks. It is not safe, however, to rely upon their fully performing any specific duty, according to our expectation and understanding, unless they are under the constant super- vision and direction of one of our own officers, as our methods and views are . so different, and misunderstanding or failure so easy." The General says; "We were told when we entered upon this campaign that it was necessary above all things not to sleep on the ground, and hammocks were recommended to secure this end. Some were seen in the original bales on the transports, and it is doubtful whether the soldiers could have carried hammocks in addition to what they already had to carry. Even such heavy intrenching tools as were on hand were felt to be a burden. The Kahki quickly loses its shape and dandy color, and is not strong enough to withstand thorns. There were many lost packs, and apparently the Cubans and the sick found some comfort from the owners' loss. Bayonets were found useless in this war except to dig with. "It has certainly been clearly demonstrated that smokeless powder is an THE LESSON OF THE HILLS OF SANTIAGO. 485^ absolute necessity for both small arms and field guns. Often we fought for hours against an invisible enemy who was firing fatally upon us all the time. The volunteers, as soon as the Springfields were fired, at once revealed their position and drew the fire of the enemy, besides hiding the enemy from their view. They found it difficult to contend with an invisible enemy, pouring in an effective fire from a position impossible to determine. "The Spanish blockhouse is ubiquitous and a more elaborate structure than we had been led to expect. It has the air of an evolution during a course of years for dominating an inimical and insurgent country at every high point and crossroad. It is usually placed upon a commanding position and affords a lookout, the lower part built of stones and earth, and two tiers of fire, and the upper part of wood, the top of the parapet being the top of the -stone wall, so that up to the height of the breast there is complete protection against small-arms fire. "Around the blockhouses and . connected with it by intrenchments are sometimes several successive lines of field intrenchments. These intrench- ments are very narrow in profile, and instead of earth being thrown to the front it is more often thrown to the rear, to one side, so that the protection in front of the trench is natural solid earth. The soil is of such a nature that it will stand almost vertical in its natural condition, so that the slope of the trench is very slight. "Such a trench as this is extremely difficult to injure, even in artillery fire, and it is extremely difficult to reach men in the intrenchments, as they are thoroughly protected, even from artillery fire, by crouching. The trenches are usually very short, so that there is not much chance of bringing an enfilading fire upon them. "The old Springfield seemed a begrimed and suicidal blunderbuss upon the battlefield. Of course it can still administer death to enemies, like the obsolete cannon in the enemy's trenches did to us, as a pitiful makeshift. "Among the telling features frequently remarked upon by those present were the conspicuous gallantry of the gray-haired officers (General Hawkins at San Juan and Captain Haskell at the Caney blockhouse), when they led their commands to the final assaults, and the courage and conduct of the colored troops and First United States Volunteers seemed always up to the best. The admiration certain other organizations also elicited from their comrades was noticeable where all were such good soldiers." 486 THE LESSON OF THE HILLS OF SANTIAGO. The concluding lines of the report of the battles of Santiago by the Inspector General are personal. General Lawton is referred to as in "every exigency of campaign and battle capable of adequately performing more than was ever assigned to him, though some of the severest military tasks and duties were performed by him. This judgment still stands well established, though the command of a division of regulars and the front and swinging right wing of an invading and assaulting army has been intrusted confidently to his command. The reserve force and quiet self-control with which every step in action was conducted equaled his proverbial energy, endurance, courage, and tenacity." General Shafter is characterized as of phenomenal force and activity, and, "if permitted me, it seems due that I should bear willing testimony to the rentarkable energy, decision, and self-reliance which characterized General Shaffer's course during this distinguished military adventure throughout its arduous course to its most honorable conclusion. At every stage of this proceeding General Shafter was the dominant spirit at the scene of action. "Oppressed with sickness and overweighted with responsibilities and care, he carried the fate of his army to a successful and glorious issue. And any precedent is rare where, amidst such natural obstacles and dangers and limited means and opposing defenses, a more numerous, well disciplined, and gallant force capitulated to invaders who had upon their fighting line a smaller force than that surrendered. The glory of this belongs to General Shafter and his army and the administration sustaining it. And whatever influence was felt from this army toward the driving out and destruction of the Spanish fleet may also go to its credit." That the volunteers who got to the front at Santiago were of the same sort that have established themselves in the public confidence and the favor- able opinion of the masters and leaders of armies, goes without saying. They were, as a rule, under the direction of men who 'knew something of the busi- ness of war, but suffered from inexperience. They were hurried from camps that had not been found particularly healthful, because the sorrows of embarrassing troubles that could not be provided against, were encountered everywhere the men were gathered for the instruction of discipline and the accouterments of army life. They in the flush of enthusiasm chose officers who could not draw requisitions or give the convenient tips for the ameliora- tion of hardships or even the preparation of rations for consumption. The THE LESSON OF THE HILLS OF SANTIAGO. 487 average thought of the average citizen of the United States was, when Chick- amauga Park became a camp for volunteers and regulars too, it was an ideal selection for the schooling into soldiership of an army of the people. It was the battle-ground that in a higher* degree than any other— all points included — had illusti-ated the devoted spirit and desperate endurance of American manhood on the fields smitten under the stress of the grim game of war. There were higher percentages of losses of both sides at Chickamauga, on those terrible and glorious Sep'-'>mber days, that all then and now living in this country remember so well, and that those born since, here and else- where, must know all about if they would comprehend the perseverance of valor, and the capacities of sacrifice, that is in the nerve of the men of the nation, and it seemed that our young men assembled there from the States north and south, whose regiments lost most heavily by the stream that the Creeks called "the river of death" (Chickamaiiga), would find in the atmos- phere an inheritance of the inspiration of heroism. In the order of recommendations was the presence a few miles to the north of the splendid River Tennessee, and on the spot was the Cherokee Spring, pouring forth an imfailing pure broad stream, that managed with knowledge and energ}' and guarded with vigilance would water an army greate'r than that of Xerxes. There was also the mountain air of Georgia, and the farmers' fields and the breezy woods, and great spaces where army corps could be mustered and put through their evolutions. Even into this paradise of soldiers' schools came plagues of flies and other plagues, and with the Chickamauga River and the Crawfish Spring and wells by the score, each yielding inexhaustible supplies of the better beverage of man, there were bitter complaints of the water as v/ell as of the insects. There was, counting all the circumstances of the crisis, no quick and certain help for these things. They must all be considered in the argument for a real army, not necessarily for a monstrous host, but a sufficient force to prevent the awfiil expensiveness of tlie profligate system of accepting challenges to war, or galloping into it, as the unthinking horse goes to battle, headlong and squandering in a few summer weeks, and then with disappointing results, the substance of the people, the gain of laborious and thrifty years and the lives of the youth just grown up into usefulness. In those profuse outlays that the zeal of patriotism and the pride of manliness and the gracious sympathies of womanliness call for irresistibly 488 THE LESSON OF THE HILLS OF SANTIAGO. and without stint, there cannot be full compensation found. Lost time is irrecoverable, and we have put off for the mystical to-morrows those pro- visions for bad weather that must come to us as to all others, and that the story of every age foreshadows. If we had been as presciently thoughtful for the army as on behalf of the navy we would not have depended in the days big with destiny in July, 1898, upon the thin lines of indomitable sufferers, who stormed and held the hills beyond Santiago and were a great salvation. If we had been really ready for entrance upon such a campaign, as all other nations of thirty per cent of our ability, with the exception of China, are, we would have sent troop ships with lighters and tugs, laborers, and all the well known wants of such an enter- prise and the requirements of life in southern Cuba. We would have had shipped a narrow-gauge railroad, rails, cars, locomotives, engineers, all but conductors, with expert railroad builders to put it down, and our soldiers could have been and would have been supplied with full rations and medicines, their packs delivered on the firing lines with all their shelter tents, blankets, tobacco, arid all the other little comforts, the sum of which is so great, and along with these full advanced, swiftly placed, and provided long range and rapid fire guns to sweep away the Spanish blockhouses and score and search the ridges, thickets and ditches with an intolerable flight of iron hail. But such things cannot be extemporized at Tampa, Camp Alger, Chicka- mauga, or anywhere else. What artillery might have done may be seen in what one battery did at El Caney. It was only with extreme exertion that the fateful battery that prepared the victory was placed where it wiped away the Spaniards with their smokeless Mausers, that scourged our lines as if with swarms of hornets, flying from invisible nests with stings of death. Our shells smashed their blockhouses, killing the defenders, or the decisive charge could not have been made. Our Congress, and it is another way of saying our public opinion, seeing our ocean and gulf coasts exposed to modern squadrons, and apprised of the nature and power of the armaments of the great powers abroad, made the navy more than the army a non-partisan and non-sectional matter, and appro- priations were, after due discussion, given for battleships, a fact that stands out and shines forth in honor of the States that are far from salt water, t)r the mountains where the rivers run to the great river, the Father of floods and the greater ocean of the globe. The national American spirit was abroad in THE LESSON OF THE HILLS OF SANTIAGO. 489 them, and they began in time the mag-nificent machines of steel, that are fit for ocean service, bearing enormous burdens, endowed with prodigious forces, equipped with thunderbolts as volcanoes are — such marvels of mechanism as the Oregon, her voyages no less renowned than her fights, and her speed sends her where her artillery smashes the foe that stands or flees. Gigantic embodiments like this could not be built and sent booming forward and back, around Cape Horn, from Washington to Florida, and New York to Manila, unless for years the furnaces flamed and the hammers rang. Now, if Congress will come to the realizing sense that it takes as long to make out of our matchless material of men a battle regiment, as it does to delve in the mines for iron and coal and build a battleship, and construct a navy, we shall no more be grieved over the privations of the camps, as well as the perils of those who form the fire line. When the thunders of hostile guns deliver the messengers of death and immortality in the ranks of our heroes, we shall not again mourn that precious lives were lost, that might have been saved by the aggregate will and wisdom of the people at large, whose government we have and whose army is their own — their flesh and blood, as the navy is bone of their bone. Regular regiments must be enlisted, officered, drilled and altogether uplifted to competency, and live to the straight line and the broad precept of faith and glory of the fathers — as the steel broadsides from which the far-flashing guns send their armor-piercing bolts, and the crackling shells that light the stormy gloom of battle. There was a great wrong in that our army at Santiago was so small and so poorly furnished when they stood between the nation and humiliation, and it is to be hoped the war has educated us so that we have surely located the fault and seriously mean to find and apply the remedy that experience has once more revealed. Was it the negligence, the indifference, the incompe- tency, the ruthless selfishness, the ambition that would deal destruction, hoping to harvest lucrative reputation and forward private ends, of the Secretary of War, the Major-General who commanded the army of the United States, the Adjutant-General of the army, the Major-General Commanding at Santiago, or the Adjutant-General or some commissary or quartermaster? Those who answer yes belittle the great and grave facts. It is due the dignity of the country that the tirade of personalities, in and outside journal- ism, the screeching demagogues, in and out of public life, the chatter of speculators in unwholesome exciting agitations should cease. There are 49° THE LESSON OF THE HILLS OF SANTIAGO. before us volumes of reports of investigation, all of which must be useful, and yet all could have been spared, but for the fact that there was a popular demand for fair and full information as to the grievances of all who had stepped forward to serve the country whether they reached the fire line or not. The "clamor for investigation" was one of the forms of- the appearance of public opinion that the records of the war demanded "army reform." Unquestionably that is true judgment, and the concrete mass of it, hammered down to a solid proposition, is that the regular army should be enlarged, and that the improvements of recent years having such excellent and admirable results in the army already, shall be extended and continued. Concerning the innumerable incidents of a disagreeable, distressing and Exasperating nature that have aroused indignation, and provoked unseemly differences and recriminations, there is to say that the (Santiago expedition was, with the exception of the invasion of Mexico, the first .eY£r_undertaken by our military organizations in a tropical country, and that Vera Cruz was not so distant or difficult a point to disembark and meet the enemy as Santi- ago. More than this, the pressure of time was not so acute in Mexico as in Cuba, nor was the race with the yellow fever so close. It was not the Spaniards in front that shook the fortitude of General Shafter, but the precarious nature of the landing. He realized the peril of bad weather in the obliteration of inadequate roads, the exhaustion of those who were handling the supplies, the certainty that the army would melt away if a regular siege was attempted ; that it was unable to dig trenches, stewed in the heat by day, or soaked by rains and chilled at night. Sleeping on the ground because the hammocks could not be carried, the soldiers knew that they were being saturated with poison. Unable to charge through the sultry air and thorny thickets upon the Spanish intrenchments and entanglements, bearing packs and tools, blankets and tents, for the ways were steep and the heat horrible, our boys stripped for the fighting, and were nearly naked, and yet must sleep in the mud. It was hard to say which was the worst trial — the burning sun or the pouring rain by day, or the chill earth and the heavy dew by night. It is no wonder the Commanding General, himself ill, viewed with dismay the prospect of the total failure of the wretched roads, and thought seriously of falling back, or letting the Spaniards go on easy terms. The surroundings justified apprehension, and the wires at Washington THE LESSON OF THE HILLS OF SANTIAGO. 491 sent only firm words, and spurred fainting resolution, while the countiy was in a frenzy of wrath that war was a horror and glory so dearly won, that the machinery that made up and moved armies was broken here and there under the stress of unaccustomed emergencies. The victory was won at last, and the teachings of its costliness will have a value beyond price if there is consent that the truth is true, and the remedy easily in the hands of Congress; and if there is a victim demanded, let the sacrifice be the folly that has found favor with many, that we are not as other people, amenable to the laws of progress and of destiny, and to the domestic and international obligations, to be armed that we may defend ourselves, by taking care that we are ready for war if a foeman seeks us or we have to go beyond the seas to find him, for the field is the world in war for warriors as well as for the preachers of peace. The sword has its missions divine. CHAPTER XXII. . The Day of Doom for Cervera's Fleet. The Cape Verde Squadron Smashed, Burned and . Sunk and Admiral Sampson Makes a Present of the Wrecks to the Nation — The Reports of the Admiral and Commodore Schley — Their Diilerence in Opinions, Jlethods and Manners — Intensely Interesting Extracts from Reports by Captains and Executive Officers — A Series of Startling Pictures —Admiral Cer\'era's Official Lamentation — Extracts from the Spanish Diary of Uncommon Value — The Story of Fugitives from the Fleet Who Found Their Way to the Spanish Trenches — Admiral Omits to Improve Opportunity of His Life. Admiral Sampson announced the destruction of Cervera's fleet in the following message: July 3, 1898. Secretary of the Navy, Washington : The fleet under my command offers the nation as a Fourth of July present the whole of Cervera's fleet. It attempted to escape at 9:30 this morning. At 2 the last ship, the Cristobal Colon, had run ashore 75 miles west of Santiago and hauled down her colors. The Infanta Maria Teresa, Oquendo, and Vizcaya were forced ashore, burned, and blown up within 20 miles of Santiago. The Furor and Pluton were destroyed within four miles of the port. SAMPSON. The President and Secretary of War responded in these telegrams: Executive Mansion, Washington, July 4, 1898. You have the gratitude and congratulation of the whole American people. Convey to noble officers and crews, through whose valor new honors have been added to the American Navy, the grateful thanks and appreciation of the Nation. WILLIAM McKINLEY. Navy Department, Washington, July 4, 1898. The Secretary of the Navy sends you and every officer and man of your fleet, remembering equally your dead comrade, grateful acknowledgment of 492 THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET. 493 w M O a o H o 1^ w o o s w B W > w H O w K O w •13 H s ^ Cf m o -n r (p C/i Si X o> < JuL.y 3 /9fS> / 494 THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET. your heroism and skill. All honor to the brave. You have maintained the glory of the American Navy. JOHN D. LONG. On the second day of July Admiral Sampson had arranged to meet Gen- eral Shaffer to consult about the cooperation of the army and navy, and was on his flagship New York, four miles east of his usual position, three miles east of the harbor entrance, going on that errand. Commodore Schley, on his flagship Brooklyn, was two miles west of the harbor and the flight of the Spaniards' fleet was his way. Admiral Sampson says the speed of the Spanish vessels was from eight to ten knots as they came out "shrouded in the smoke from their guns," and "turned to the westward in column, increasing their speed to the full power of their engines," firing vigorously upon the block- ading vessels. The American crews were at Sunday quarters for inspection and "cheered as they sprang to their guns," those in range opening fire in eight minutes. The Admiral relates that the New York toward the end of the chase made sixteen and one-half knots, but "was not, at any time, within the range of the heavy Spanish ships, and her only part in the firing was to receive the undivided fire from the forts in passing the harbor entrance, and to fire a few shots at one of the destroyers, thought at the moment to be attempting to escape from the Gloucester." "It was," the Admiral says, "the heavy vessels that speedily over- whelmed and silenced the Spanish fire. " The Brooklyn and Texas "had at the start the advantage of position," and "the Brooklyn maintained this lead ;" the Oregon, however, "steaming with amazing speed from the commencement of the action, took first place. The skillful handling and gallant fighting of the Gloucester excited the admiration of every one who witnessed it," says Admiral Sampson, and her fire upon the destroyer was "accurate, deadly and of great volume. " At 11:15 the Vizcaya was on fire, "turned in shore and was beached at Assenderos, fifteen miles from Santiago, burning fiercely and with her reserves of ammunition on deck already beginning to explode." The Admiral says the rescue of prisoners, including wounded, "from the burning Spanish vessels was the occasion of some of the most daring and gallant con- duct of the day. The ships were burning fore and aft, their guns and reserve ammunition were exploding, and it was not known at what moment the fire •would reach the main magazines. In addition to this a heavy surf was running just inside of the Spanish ships. But no risk deterred our officers and men iintil their work of humanity was complete." THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET. 495 -=^ n z a a H Ph W a >< > 35 o M M CS a, fa O a o « En o w a 496 THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET. The Cristobal Colon is called by the Admiral "the best and fastest vessel" of the Spaniards. The Brooklyn and Oregon, overhauling her slowly, opened fire at 12:50 and an Oregon shell struck beyond her, and at 1:20 she, the last survivor of the fleet, hauled down her colors and ran ashore forty- eight miles from Santiago. This fine ship, not injured by shots or fire, was treacherously sunk by the opening and breaking of her sea valves and Sampson says: "When it became evident that she could not be kept afloat, she was pushed by the New York bodily up on the beach, the New York's stem being placed against her for this purpose — the ship being handled by Captain Chad wick with admirable judgment." It is the opinion of the Admiral that the blockade had been made so "stringent and effective during the night that the enemy was deterred from making the attempt to escape at night, and deliberately elected to make the attempt in daylight. That this was the case I was informed by the com- manding officer of the Cristobal Colon." The special feature of the blockade was the search light, and of it the Admiral says: "To the battleships was assigned the duty, in turn, of lighting the channel. Moving up to the port, at a distance of from one to two miles from the Morro — dependent upon the condition of the atmosphere — they threw a search light beam directly up the channel, and held it steadily there. This lighted up the entire breadth of the channel, for half a mile inside of the entrance, so brilliantly that the movement of small boats could be detected. Why the batteries never opened fire upon the search light ship was always a matter of surprise to me ; but they never did. Stationed close to the entrance of the port were three picket launches and, at a little distance farther out, three small picket vessels — usually converted yachts — and, when they were available, one or two of our torpedo boats. With this arrangement there was at least a certainty that nothing could get out of the harbor undetected. "After the arrival of the army, when the situation forced upon the Spanish admiral a decision, our vigilance increased. The night blockading distance was reduced to two miles for all vessels, and a battleship was placed alongside the search light ship, with her broadside trained upon the channel in readiness to fire the instant a Spanish ship should appear. The com- manding officers merit the greatest praise for the perfect manner in which they entered into this plan and put it into execution. The Massachusetts, THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET. 497 n if \i \ \ i \^ \ "^ V 2 \ \ \ \ i 1 \ / ^k f? < V M.. ^^ y^-^u "VT '£p tfifX'Vjv '^*'V p H H to t» O H M H tn o t-t o a H M w •H IS o m o a PL, « H -s w cs Eu o z ^-» z e> o o Q D o o w h4 E- CO --• w M O THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET. SH were out of action, he prepared to beach the ship, first giving orders to discharge all the torpedoes in order to prevent the enemy from approaching. Driven to the last extreme, and after consulting with all the officers present, he ordered the flag to be hauled down. The second and third commanders and three lieutenants had already been killed, and while Mr. Lazaga was directing the rescue of the crew he gave his own life for his country. The men of the Oquendo witnessed calmly and without becoming terrified, the constant explosions on board, determined above all things that the enemy should not set foot on the ship." The secret cipher official telegrams of the Spanish premier, Sagasta, the Captain General of Cuba, Blanco, the Minister of the Navy of Spain, and the military commander of Santiago, given in the chapter of this book relating to them, should be read in connection with the extracts from our own official papers, touching the Santiago expeditions and the battles on land and sea. The two collections of the papers that are of absolute sincerity, verity and inwardness, perfect the accounts of the episode that was demonstrative that the fortunes of the war were all against Spain. This was so certain, that it would have been irrational not to surrender. The secret ciphers of the Spanish officers complete the explanation of the almost incredible inferiority of the ships of Spain as against ours. Admiral Cervera was not duped by vanity on this subject and did not condescend to boastfulness, or conceal the truth from those higher than himself in authority, yet he confessed after the annihilation of his squadron that he would not have believed the ships he commanded could have been knocked in pieces so rapidly. The fire of the American fleet was overwhelming — battleships, protected cruisers, gunboats, heavy and light, participating with equal vigor, efficiency and immunity from harm. The identification of the Spanish ships of war in the harbor of Santi- ago de Cuba as Admiral Cervera's fleet was reported by Commodore Schley. The War Department was able to inform General Miles, then at Tampa, of it, on the 2nd of June, one month and one day before the day of the doom of the squadron. The movements of the Spanish cruisers and torpedo boats commanded by Cervera, had been managed with such skill to prevent their precise location that they had an extraordinary degree of the public attention and there was the gravest concern that they might be located and that no pains should be spared to put them out of the possibility of action. 5i8 THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET. The campaign plans in Cuba were disturbed by the existence of Spanish war ships in West India waters. One swift and heavil)' armed cruiser could sink an army of unprotected transports. The news that the flitting squadron of Spain had become fugitives and taken refuge in Santiago Bay was of the t greatest consequence. The next thing was to assemble off Santiago an over- whelming blockading fleet, and this done, the organization was in two squadrons: First squadron (under the personal command of Admiral Sampson) : New York, Iowa, Oregon, New Orleans, Mayflower, Porter. Second squadron (Commodore Schley) : Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Texas, Marblehead, Vixen. Morro. \ \ Marblehead . , ^^Brooklyn. \ A 7 / % Mayflower. \\ \ Ne» Or/eant. I ' Porfe^s. |/ New York. %/ • The order was: "The vessels will blockade Santiago de Cuba closely, keep- ing about six miles from the Morro in the daytime, and closing in at night, the lighter vessels well in shore. The first squadron will blockade on the east side of the port, and the second squadron on the west side. If the enemy tries to escape, the ships must close and engage as soon as possible, and endeavor to sink his vessels or force them to run ashore in the channel." One thing that contributed greatly to the success of the blockade was the use of search lights held steadily on the mouth of the harbor. The diagram THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET. 519 annexed was drawn to accompany the order of battle, dated June 2nd, and shows the method of the formation. The Spanish Office of Naval Intelligence has published the diary of Lieutenant Jos6 Muller y Tejeiro, second in command of Naval forces of the province of Santiago de Cuba. We quote the opening passages: "On the 1 8th of May the first hostile ships were sighted from the Morro of Santiago de Cuba and the first gunshots were heard, which since that date, for the space of two months, have hardly ceased for a single day. "On the following day, the 19th, the Spanish fleet, commanded by Rear Admiral Cervera, entered with very little coal, which it was absolutely necessary to replenish. "From that time on I have kept an exact diary * * * of everything I saw, or that came to my notice, or that passed through my hands in my official capacity, or that I knew to be accurate and trustworthy." A part of the entry, under the date of July the 4th, has special significance: "July 4. — Opposite the mouth of the harbor, the New York, Brooklyn, ^ Indiana, Massachusetts, Minneapolis, Vesuvius, i yacht, and 17 mercliant vessels. At 8 p. m. the cruiser Reina Mercedes started up. "As the interior of the harbor did no longer have the safeguard of the feet, as the Bustaniente torpedoes (six of them) had been taken up so that the feet could go out and had not yet been replaeed, and as, finally, t lie first line if mines no longer existed, the commander of marine decided — General Toral also being of his opinion — to sink the Mercedes (the only ship that was suitable for that purpose) in the narrow part of the channel ; consequently the commander of the cruiser received orders to do so. Hurriedly, for time was pressing, the wounded and sick from the lost fleet were transferred to the steamer Mejico, which had been converted into a hospital, and hoisted the flag of the Red Cross. Important papers that had been saved, memoranda, portable arms, beds, and the most necessary things, were taken off the Mercedes, and at 8 p. m., with her commander. Ensign Nardiz, a few engineers, the necessary sailors, and Pilots Apolonio Nunez and Miguel Lopez, started toward the entrance, with her bow anchor and stern spring on the cable ready." The ship was sunk imder a heavy fire by the American fleet, but the Spanish diary we quote says: "Unfortunately, the ship did not come to lie across the channel, because it seems a projectile cut the spring on the cable; the sacrifice was useless and the harbor was not obstructed. Yet it was not 520 THE DAY OF DOOM FOR CERVERA'S FLEET. entirely useless, since the enemy could not take possession of her, as she is all riddled by bullets which she received that night, and I do not believe she can ever again be used. " One thing that is of the utmost importance and that has escaped critical notice, is the fact that when Admiral Sampson ordered the Indiana to turn back to protect our transports, he missed the opportunity of his life. He was alarmed quite unnecessarily by the fancy that there was danger more Spanish war ships would come out and avenge the loss of Cervera's squadron. That was not, after the experiences of the day, possible. The Admiral was right to turn the Indiana back from the pursuit, but wrong in not discon- tinuing the long chase after the Brooklyn and Oregon, then steadily overhaul- ing the Colon. There was no business demand for the Admiral to be a per- sonal spectator of the surrender of the Colon, and to hold a reception for the prisoners. It is plain now, and ought to have been then, that the Indiana should have gone in where the Spaniards came out. There were no torpedoes to fear. The batteries were not alarming — would not have been to Farragut or Dewey or Lord Nelson. The torpedoes had not been replaced, the mines no longer existed. Oivr_fleet^jvyas not dargaged The Indiana and New York should have gone at full speed for the open door, signaling the battleships to follow, and the Fourth of July would have seen the harbor and city in pos- session of the fleet, and t he Spa nish army's surrender must have been immediate and unconditional, There was a gate of glory open, unseen. ^ A CHAPTER XXIII. The Scenes and Significance of the Surrender of Santiago. • The Appearance of General Miles at Santiago— His Moral as well as Military Force — Spanish Obstinacy in tTie Negotiation for Capitulation — The Iron Hand at Washing- ton — The Practical Question was, How Much Would Victory Cost Us? — The Spanish Case was Hopeless— They Sought to Save their Military Honor — The Scenes and Terms of the Surrender— An Inspector General's Picturesque Story— Telegrams that are Photographs— The President's Proclamation of Principles and Purpose in Cuban Government — Comparative Proportions of Great Surrenders. It was July 7th that the Major-General commanding the army of the United States left Washington City for the seat of war in Cuba, and with the aid of a fast train to Columbia, South Carolina, and a "special" for Charles- ton, took the "Yale," having 1,500 troops aboard, and arrived at Santiago on the morning of the nth, finding Admiral Sampson bombarding the Spaniards at the mouth of the harbor, but not forcing his way in, as Shafter desired. The General was en route four nights and three days. There had been a good deal of conjecture whether the real intention of the war office in hastening the transit of the head of the army from the national capital to the scene of action, might not to be to supersede Shafter, who was a sick man, sorely perplexed ; and within the horizon of the poptilar observation there were heavy clouds, though the navy of the Spaniards was no longer considered. The purpose of General Miles — his plan presumably— was to assist in the capture of Santiago and press on to Porto Rico, precisely that which he did. Santiago was to him a spectacular episode. The General commanding the United States army and the Admiral com- manding the North Atlantic squadron soon got together. General Miles desired to land troops west of Santiago, and make a diversion in that quarter, the Cubans not getting up in our fashion of fighting. In his note to Samp- son, Miles did not take into view that a force comprising the greater part of fifty or sixty thousand Cubans ought to be, according to his original plan, C "> '^ 524 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO. somewhere in the neighborhood to storm the Spaniards out of Santiago. Shafter had cabled Miles July 4th: "I am delighted to know that you are coming that you may see for yourself the obstacles which this army had to ov^ercome. My only regret is the great number of gallant souls who have given their lives for our country's cause." A telegram of congratulation sent by General Miles July 3d was read at the head of each of the regiments that had been engaged. Miles told Samp- soil that he desired the cooperation of the navy in the west end movement, and Sampson cordially acquiesced, offering every assistance of his fleet to cover the debarkation of the troops and also to enfil3de the Spanish position with the guns of the ships. It will be noted that it was the plan of Miles, and not the plan of Shafter, in which Sampson so cordially acquiesced. There was one thing about which the Admiral held positive opinion, and that was, as the Spaniards had done what the gallant Hobson had not, blockaded the mouth of the harbor, he did not mean to risk the sinking of a battleship in attempting a "no thorough- fare. " After meeting Sampson, Miles went on shore and communicated with Shafter, who said he had troops enough to hold his position, and Miles gave the orders for the movement on the west. The next morning, July 12th, Miles rode to Shafter's headquarters, and the news of the arrival of the Major-General commanding was sent the Spanish General, also the fact that large reinforcements had arrived, and that others were on the way, and that Shafter and Miles desired to meet him between the lines at any time agreeable to him. The Spanish General courteously rep'.ied that he would see the American generals at 12 o'clock on the following day. On that day Shafter announced "nervousness" in the army on account of the yellow fever, "which is among us certainly, twenty-nine new cases yesterday and probably one hundred and hdy all told. " General Toral had been seen and "a good impression made on him," and Shafter supplemented that information with these words; "I will open on him at twelve noon to-morrow with every gun I have and the assistance of the navy with thirteen-inch shells." The Spanish General agreed to surrender on .the basis of being returned to Spain — the proposal including all eastern Cuba. There were about 12,000 Spanish troops in Santiago, and as many at other points. The Spaniards were eagerly urgent to be allowed to have their arms shipped with them. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO. 525 July i6th the Spaniards surrendered, the main point with them being that they were to go home with their side arms and that they were to take with their military archives, the arms they had so valiantly defended. General Shafter did not seem to think it an essential matter whether the old Spanish guns went to Spain or not, but Secretary Alger insisted that it was not possible to concede that the arms should go. The letter of. General Toral notifying Shafter of Blanco's acceptance of the terms that had been definitely agreed upon, was wired to the Adjutant-General of the United States at "Washington by the American General commanding in the field, who added: "I have stood the delay, as I believe it will come out all right, and a fight which we can have at any time will cost a lot of men." The letter was as follows : Santiago, Cuba, 14. General in Chief of the American Forces. Honored Sir: His excellency the general in chief of the army of the island of Cuba telegraphs from Havana yesterday at 7 p. m. the following: "Believ- ing that business of such importance as the capitulation of that place should be known and decided upon by the government of His Majesty, I give you notice that I have sent the conditions of your telegrarti, asking immediate answer, and enabling yau also to show this to the general of the American army to see if he will agree to await the answer of the government, which can not be as soon as the time which he has decided, as communication by way of Bermuda is more slow than Key West. In the meanvi-hile your honor and the general of the American army may agree upon capitulation on the basis of returning to Spain." I have the honor to transmit this to you that in case you may find the foregoing satisfactory he may designate persons representa- tive of himself, who, with those in my name, may agree to the clauses of capitulation upon the basis of return to Spain, accepted already in the begin- ning by the general in chief of this army. Awaiting a reply, I am, Very respectfully, your ser-fant, JOSE TORAL, Commanding, Chief of the Fourth Army Corps. July 14th, 3:24 p. m.., General Miles telegraphed Toral had formally surren- dered on the understanding that his troops should be returned to Spain. The General pronounced that this was "very gratifying" — and "General Shafter and the officers and men of this command are entitled to great credit for their sincerity, fortitude, and in overcoming almost insuperable obstacles 526 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO. which they encountered. A portion of the army has been infected with yellow fever." Then came to the Santiago army headquarters this important dispatch from the White House : Executive Mansion, Washington, July 15, 1898 — 12:35 p. m. Major-General Shafter, Camp before Santiago, Cuba: Have you received the absolute surrender of the enemy? We are await- ing the conditions with impatience. R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War. Shafter announced that the discussion as to terms lasted until ten o'clock the night of the 14th, and was to be settled on the evening of the isth at 9:30, and that the great point of the vSpaniards was to have their arms "shipped to them. " It was not possible for them to fail to complete arrangements. The following telegrams complete the links of the chain of events : Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, July 15, 1898 — 4:45 p. m. Major-General Shafter, Playa del Este: Secretary of War suggests, is it not possible that Toral is gaining time to get reinforcements that may be on the way to assist him? H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General. Playa del Este, via Hayti. (Received at Washington July 15, 1898 — 9 p. m.) Adjutant-General United States Army, Washington : Headquarters near Santiago, Cuba, 15, — I do not believe that Toral is trying to gain time in hopes of getting reinforcements. Cubans have forces in vicinity of all Spanish troops. Toral asked to-day to send messages to Guantanamo and to Palmas to notify Spanish troops of condition. Wheeler, Lawton, and Miley are thoroughly convinced that they are earnest, and they have been in consultation with the Spaniards twenty-four hours. Am told by reliable persons Santiago the Spanish officers are greatly pleased at the thought of going home, but generals are afraid of the consequences with themselves unless terms of surrender are sanctioned by the Madrid govern- ment. SHAFTER, Major-General. Executive Mansion, Washington, July 15, 1898 — 5:59 p. m. Major-General Shafter, Camp near Santiago, Playa : Is it not possible that you are entertaining the proposition of permitting the Spanish to- carry away their arms? Such a suggestion should be rejected THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO. 527 instantly. You have been instructed the terms of surrender acceptable to the President, and they must be concluded on these lines. R. A. ALGER, Secretary of War. Playa del Este, via Hayti. (Received Washington July 15, 1898 — 11:20 p. m.) Adjutant-General U. S. Army, Washington : Headquarters near Santiago, 15. — I do not entertain the proposition for the Spanish to retain their arms. They are to surrender them absolutely immediately after articles of capitulation are signed, but they beg, as an act of consideration to them, that I will intercede with my government that they be shipped with them to Spain. I regard this as a small matter that in no way binds the government, but is one I would not let stand between clearing 20,000 Spanish soldiers out of Cuba, or leaving thera there to be captured later, and probably with much loss to ourselves. SHAFTER, Major-General. The text of the terms agreed upon is as follows: Terms of the military convention for the capitulation of the Spanish forces occupying the territory which constitutes the division of Santiago de Cuba, and described as follows : All that portion of the island of Cuba east of a line passing through Aserradero, Dos Palmas, Cauto Abajo, Escondida, Tanamo, and Agaidora, said troops being in command of Gen. Jose Toral, agreed upon by the undersigned commissioners: Brig. -Gen. Don Federico Escario, lieuten- ant-colonel of staff; Don Ventura Fontan, and, as interpreter, Mr. Robert Mason, of the city of Santiago de Cuba, appointed by General Toral, com- manding the Spanish forces on behalf of the kingdom of Spain, and Maj.-Gen. Joseph Wheeler, U. S. V.; Maj.-Gen. H. W. Lawton, U. S. V.; and First Lieut. J. D. Miley, Second Artillery, A. D. C. , appointed by General Shafter, commanding the American forces, on behalf of the United States : 1. That all hostilities between American and Spanish forces in this dis- trict absolutely and unequivocally cease. 2. That this capitulation includes all the forces and war material in said territory. 3. That the United States agrees with as little delay as possible to trans- port all the Spanish troops in said district to the kingdom of Spain, the troops being embarked, as far as possible, at the port nearest the garrisons they now occupy. 528 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO. 4. That the officers of the Spanish army be permitted to retain their side arms and both officers and private soldiers their personal property. 5. That the Spanish authorities agree to remove, or assist the American navy in removing, all mines or other obstructions to navigation now in the harbor of Santiago and its mouth. 6. That the commanders of the Spanish forces deliver, without delay, a complete inventory of all arms and munitions of war of the Spanish forces in above-described district to the commander of the American forces ; also a roster of said forces now in said district. 7. That the commander of the Spanish forces, in leaving said district, is authorized to carry with him all military archives and records pertaining to the Spanish army now in said district. 8. That all that portion of the Spanish forces known as volunteers, mov- ilizadoes, and guerrillas who wish to remain in the island of Cuba are permitted to do so upon condition of delivering up their arms and taking a parole not to bear arms against the United States during the continuance of the present war between Spain and the United States. 9. That the Spanish forces will march out of Santiago de Cuba with honors of war, depositing their arms thereafter at a point mutually agreed upon, to await their disposition by the United States government, it being understood that the United States commissioners will recommend that the Spanish soldier return to Spain with the arms he so bravely defended. 10. That the provisions of the foregoing instrument become operative immediately upon its being signed. Entered into this i6th day of July, 1898, by the undersigned commission- ers, acting under instructions from their respective commanding generals and with the approbation of their respective governments. JOSEPH WHEELER, Major-General, United States Volunteers. H. W, LAWTON, Major-General, United States Volunteers. J. D. MILEY, First Lieutenant, Second Artillery, A. D. C. to General Shatter. FEDERICO ESCARIO. VENTURA FONTAN. ROBERT MASON. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO. 5^9 The President sent this eloquent message of congratulation: Washington, D. C, July i6, 1898. General Shafter, Commanding, Front near Santiago, Playa: The President of the United States sends to you and your brave army the profoimd thanks of the American people for the brilliant achievements at Santiago, resulting in the surrender of the city and all of the Spanish troops and territory under General Toral. Your splendid command has endured not only the hardships and sacrifices incident to campaign and battle, but in stress of heat and weather has triumphed over obstacles which would have overcome men less brave and determined. One and all have displayed the most con- spicuous gallantry and earned the gratitude of the nation. The hearts of the people turn with tender sympathy to the sick and wounded. May the Father of Mercies protect and comfort them. WILLIAM McKINLEY. Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, July 17, 1898 — 9:55 a. m. General Shafter, Playa del Este, Cuba; Your telegram saying that our flag would be hoisted in Santiago at 9 this morning was received by the President and Secretary of War and members of the Cabinet with a sense of profound satisfaction. This feeling is general with all the people. I hope you are well. H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General. Shafter telegraphed Corbin : "Upon coming into the city I discovered a perfect entanglement of defenses. Fighting as the Spaniards did the first day, it would have cost 5,000 lives to have taken it." Major and Inspector-General Reade reported : "Fighting famine. and fever extorted from even such a man as Col. Theo- dore Roosevelt the statement: 'Twenty-five per cent of my Rough Riders can't carry a pail of water from the creek to the trenches. No man can decry me or my regiments, but we must accede to the next proposition from the enemy.' One characteristic of our soldiers is their unwillingness to go upon the sick report. The regulars do duty when really not fit to perform it, but they do duty all the same. Regiments have a pride in maintaining on paper a small percentage of sick." 530 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO. General Reade wrote this most interesting account of the raising of the flag of the United States over the Governor's Palace of the ancient capital of Cuba. It was 9 o'clock in the morning of July 17th. Within a few feet of Gen- erals Shafter, Wheeler and Kent '*were three officers wearing Panama hats, dressed in cotton, having narrow stripes of blue and white ; their hats had rosettes on the side, and they wore either top boots of black leather or white canvas slippers," and "a fine looking man with a gray moustache was General Toral, who saluted General Shafter like a graceful, dignified soldier." "Just then Lieutenant Miley, Fifth Artillery, aid-de-camp to General Shafter, dashed to the rear, shouting to an orderly to 'Bring up the sword.' After some delay, a sword, having the belt and slings twisted around the hilt, was handed to General Shafter. It was then by him turned over to General Toral. Our trumpets then sounded, after which, by Captain Brett's order, the hundred cavalry executed left front into line, forming in single rank, on our left, facing some dismounted Spanish infantry soldiers, "armed with Mauser rifles. The lines were not fifty yards apart. " 'Present sabers!' by our cavalry was immediately followed by a like com- pliment by the Spanish. It was then 9:25 o'clock. General Toral shouted out something in Spanish. The Spanish trumpets then sounded a march. We were then told by Mr. A. C. Nunez that the tune was played only for the King of Spain or the Captain-General of Cuba. We were also told that the soldiers facing our cavalry comprised the bodyguard of General Toral. A little later the Spanish infantry forged down the road, eastward, without their rifles, to the point where the Thirteenth Regiment, United States Infantry, received them as prisoners of war. I counted them. Their number was 330. "As they filed along I wheeled my horse and noted trifling things. They had to step over the vulture-picked carcass of a horse Ij'ing in the road. Across the tall Guinea-Panama grass came the warbling trill of a mocking bird, imitating the 'Plant! plant' chut, chut-a-dee!' so familiar to the New England ears. A few hundred feet to the westward, hiding Campo de Marte from sight, the crest was lined with the now empty trenches, from which thousands of guns had belched torrents of lead at the United States lines, after the First Division had assaulted, captured and held Fort San Juan, the principal Spanish stronghold, during the seventeen days of battle and siege, which had cost us, in killed and wounded, nearly 2,000 officers and men. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO. S3i ''All of the Americans were silent for perhaps two or three minutes. After General Toral's surrendered bodyguard had passed us our generals led the way through a gap that had been made in the wire-fence, and we filed out into the road leading to Santiago. In order to get there, distance about two miles, we had to pass through the outlying military suburb called Campo de Marte. It is made up entirely of barracks, military storehouses, and hospitals. "These latter are very large buildings, and throughout the siege numerous white flags, each having the red cross, sacred to neutrals, had fluttered prom- inently from the roof of every hospital. No doubt the charge will be made that during the siege our forces did not respect, but fired upon and into the buildings displaying the Geneva flag. "Thousands of us can testify to two facts: First, that the most damaging battery of artillery of the enemy, one shell from which put eleven men of the Sixteenth United States Infantry out of action, was so located that our return fire imperiled the hospital buildings ; second, that the trenches of the enemy were, in part, directly between these hospital buildings and our own trenches, so that the direct return fire of our infantr)' brought the hospitals, Geneva flags and all, into line. "Moreover, in the course of our triumphal entry from the field of surren- der to Santiago, through Campo de Marte, we noted that the hospitals had- trenches about them, close in, and the street barricades of tierces filled with earth; also the barbed-wire entanglements were constructed with evident defensive purposes by the enemy if driven from their outer intrenchments. The structures were carefully scanned to see if their plastered surfaces showed any bullet marks. Few indications were observable of bullet impact or pene- tration. "The cavalcade of army officers passed Spanish refugees who were wend- ing their way back into town. Most were afoot. A few carretas, two- wheeled vehicles, drawn by a single mule or Cuban pony in shafts, were passed. Some had as many as ten children huddled in one ; only one four-wheeled carriage, a sort of barouche, hauled by a pair of imdersized Cuban ponies, contained one or two adults and eight or ten juveniles. The streets are mostly paved and quite narrow, not wide enough for a field battery of artillery. "Santiago is built upon a siding. Some of the houses were built of brick, then plastered; some were built of adobe, or sun-dried brick, and then plas- tered; some were mud-and-stick houses. Many had blue fronts. The front 532 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO. doors were of double or triple layers of wood studded with nails and of great strength. Many resembled a jail entrance, because supplemented with iron doors. Barred windows were common. Nearly every residence showed both door and window gratings, from behind which many women and children peered at us; a few men also peered. Shops were numerous, but the major- ity were closed on July 17. "Here and there floated the flag of a foreign consulate. The Spanish flag was not anywhere seen. Soldiers were numerous. At the principal street corners armed sentinels with Mauser rifles were posted. They appeared to be doing police patrol duty. All of the Spanish privates were what we term undersized men. We passed sad-eyed women, scowling-eyed women, arid coquettish-eyed women. Many of these latter smiled at the procession of American officers from second-story balconies. As a rule, the women were thin, uncomely, and slatternly; only a few had their hair neatly arranged ; less than five per cent wore mantillas; their faces were more wan than handsome. "Absolutely naked children stood in doorways, on the balconies, in win- dows, or in the streets. A general paucity existed of decent clothes or necessities. Numerous starveling cats and kittens were visible. On the ground porch of one house a burro was lariated to the front door. More negroes, I should call them, than Spaniards were seen. Lines of refugee Cubans, carrying bundles, pails, furniture, even trunks, upon their heads were seen. All appeared to be entering the city, none departing. Perhaps they were of the 15,000 non-combatants who fled from Santiago to avoid the perils of the bombardment. A few, a very few, led or drove poor-looking milch cows. "We were impressed by the marked physical contrast between the under- sized, wiry, cotton-clad Spanish soldiers and our men. Nobody braced up, so far as I noticed. I was surprised to see so many well-stocked stores, although the warehouses of the pawnbrokers were more abundantly filled with furniture and other household belongings than any. Santiago has several stores whose shelves display what good judges say are $10,000 worth of general merchandise on sale. There is a hardware store in Santiago de Cuba carrying a $20,000 stock of goods. One warehouse had 500,000 pounds of rice in 200-pound sacks. Great quantities of olive oil, mostly in tin cans, are on hand. "We had heard such touching tales of the general destitution'prevailing in THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO. 533 Santiago, as, for instance, that the Spanish soldiers were subsisting on hors,e meat to avoid starving, that the evidences of sale goods were especially noted. Capt. E. F. Taggart, commissary of subsistence, United States Vol- unteers, also called my attention to a kind of parched barley put up in metal- lined cans. "But to resume. Reaching a plaza, the generals dismounted, we of the staff following suit. All in order of rank entered a large building. For a few minutes we wandered about without let or hindrance. This is what I saw: Tiled floors, marble freshly wet. The floors of the halls and the rooms that I visited were not all alike. Some had black and white tiles alternating. Some of the rooms had planked floors. All of the windows had Venetian shutters. All of the rooms were cool. The windows had lambrequins. There were also portieres, and an abundance of chairs — arm-chairs, cane-seated, and cane-backed. "In the great reception room was a life-sized oil painting, probably of some Spanish Queen. Quantities of bamboo furniture, iron-barred windows, glass chandeliers, crystal pendants of the old style, something like mother's can- delabra, marble-topped tables, green-topped tables, irresistibly suggestive of poker, several cheval glasses six feet high outside the frame, and perhaps four feet six inside, were conspicuous. Strolling back, I passed into bedrooms. There were no closed doors. The beds all had canopies. Decorated china toilet sets, eau de quinine, puff boxes, 'Roger Gallet' French soap. "Servants were engaged in setting a table for ten. It had a floral center- piece, cut-glass decanters, three sizes of wine-glasses, and tHe usual china and cutlery appointments of civilization. Later our ranking generals lunched there. An electric push button hung on the wall of the hall." This is official, and more, a bit of color, and an admirable pencil painting. A little before noon the generals and their respective staffs massed in the Plaza facing the governor's palace. On the roof of the palace were three officers — Lieutenant Miley held the halyards attached to our national flag. It was about the size of the recruiting or storm flag, only shorter. General Chambers McKibben was with a military band behind, and gave the command "Present arms," and the command was repeated by General Breet just as twelve o'clock chimed out of the cathedral clock — the flag, our flag, was raised to the top of the staff, the band played "The Star-Spangled Banner." Three cheers called for by a soldier were given General Shafter. 534 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO. The Inspector-General Reade, from whom we have quoted, writes a shock- ing account of the sick army after its movement when the city surrendered, to get out of the infected camps: "The change of camping ground demonstrated sadly the enfeebled condi- tion of our men. They straggled along the roads ; some fell out and pros- trated themselves anywhere where shade could be obtained. Some of General Ames's men, Thirteenth Infantry, completed the march and then dropped unconscious or went crazy. He has a wall tent as his headquarters and for personal occupancy. In that tent he sheltered and cared for several exhausted or delirious privates. He said that during his entire military experience and command, 1861 and succeeding years, he never saw as heavy a percentage of used-up men. Unless more food and a greater variety of food is furnished these soldiers their condition will become pitiable indeed. They also need to be relieved of the necessity of having to travel a mile and a half for a canteen full of water. "They have no camp kettles; all were left aboard the transports 25th of last month, and have remained at Siboney, twelve miles from here, ever since. Ditto as to extra clothing. They need better shelter than shelter tents. All canvas beyond what could be carried upon the person was ordered left behind when the army of invasion left the transports. That was June 24th and 25th. The tents are still on the vessels, and it is much to be hoped that they will be landed at Santiago, together with other supplies. Major McLaughlin, com- manding Sixteenth United States Infantry, says that his men can no longer stomach canned bacon. "According to the statement, soldiers vomit at the sight of a label having printed on it the name of Libby or Armour. They lived on it during a sea voyage of eighteen days; have lived on it since, and now want some nourish- ing food that their stomachs can retain. Major McLaughlin says that he would like vinegar and tobacco for his regiment. Regarding vinegar, Colonel Miner, commanding Sixth United States Infantry, says: 'My men drank what vinegar was issued them like hungry wolves. ' The officer last named says that what is issued as canned beef is refuse from which all nour- ishment has been extracted. Dr. Calhoun says that it is not possible for officers to buy pure lime juice at twenty-seven cents per large bottle. He believes that the article sold by the Subsistence Department as such is injurious. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO. 535 "Asst.-Sm-g. W. D. McCaw, Medical Department, on duty with the Sixth United States Infantry, reports that symptoms of scurvy are showing them- selves in certain fever cases, and asks that issue be made of vinegar, onions, potatoes, tomatoes, etc. Dr. McCaw states that he has not shelter or canvas enough for his sick. Wants cans of beef extract. He predicts that a startling increase in the sick list will occur, due to lack of the essentials, food and rest, and proper clothing. All of the indications sustain this prediction, and the sooner the sick are placed aboard transports, the better." Such was the sad state of United States troops after the Spaniards, made hopeless by the loss of their fleet and overawed by the arrival of our reinforce- ments, surrendered. The exchange of observations between General Shafter and Admiral Sampson put a strain on their courtesies as the siege of Santiago was about to terminate. The Secretary of the Navy cabled Sampson that the Commanding General of the army and the Secretary of War requested "that navy force harbor." The matter was left to the discretion of the Admiral, "except that the United States armored vessels must not be risked. — Long." Sampson cabled that published telegrams of General Shafter reflected on the navy, and added: "I wish the Department and the President to understand that the first requisite to opening harbor of Santiago de Cuba is the occupa- tion of forts and intrenchments at its entrance guarding mine fields, and that the general has never made a move to do this, although before his army landed he stated that such was the primary object of his operations." The next thing was the capitulation. Sampson, informed of articles about to be agreed upon, wanted the stipulation added that the Spaniards should remove -all torpedoes from the harbor entrance and the harbor itself. Miles had Sampson signal that he should send ashore an officer to represent him "during negotiations for evacuation." The use of the word "evacuation" is an indication that Miles did not think unconditional surrender could be exacted. Sampson wished to know when his representative was wanted and where he could get a horse. The next signal from shore to flagship was that Santiago had been surren- dered, and then Shafter signaled, "Hitch in negotiations. We may have to fight them yet." July loth Shafter telegraphed "Surrendered," and asked whether a navy representative would be sent, and Miles telegraphed that there was "a little delay," but the Spaniards had surrendered "in a formal. 536 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO. positive manner." A copy of the agreement was sent Sampson, who, quoting the Commanding General's communication, says: "The foregoing certainly shows clearly the most absolute joint action, and I took for granted that we should be joint signatories of any capitulations, as is customary in all services in such circumstances." The Admiral's representative. Captain Chadwick, "arrived at the front at the earliest hour it was possible for him to do so, and informed General Shafter of my expectanc)'^ in the matter, but General Shafter peremptorily refused. The convention had already been signed, and he stated as one reason that nothing had been said of the army in my report of the fleet action of July 3d. There would have been as much reason for mentioning the navy in the report of the land action of July ist, when assault was made by our army on the Spanish lines. "No mention was made of the shipping in the capitulations, and Captain Chadwick informed General Shafter that all Spanish ships would be regarded by us as property to be turned over to the navy. He said he would refer such a matter to the Secretary of War, but that, of course, could have no bearing upon what I considered my duty in the matter, particularly in the view of our late experience of Spanish perfidy in regard to injury of ships, which, in my opinion, made it necessary to look after their safety at once. I thus, after the hauling down of the Spanish flag, sent prize crews on board the gunboat Alvarado and to the five merchant steamers in the harbor. An officer of the army was found on board the Alvarado, who stated he had been sent to take charge of her, whereupon I addressed the following letter to General Shafter: " 'U. S. Flagship New York, July 17, 1898. " 'Sir: Upon sending in an officer to take charge of the captured Spanish gunboat, the Alvarado, it was found that one of your officers was on board, evidently with the expectation of taking charge of her. It should hardly be necessary to remind you that in all joint operations of the character of those which have resulted in the fall of Santiago all floating material is turned over to the navy, as all forts, etc., go to the army. I have been lying within 500 yards of the Morro, from which the Spanish flag was hauled down at 9 o'clock and upon which the United States flag has not yet, at 2 p. m., been hoisted. Although my forces have frequently engaged these forts and yours have not exchanged a shot with them, I await the arrival of a detachment of your THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO. 537 troops to take possession, as they must eventually occupy them. I expect the same consideration. " 'I request that you will relieve Lieutenant Caruthers of the duty given him, as I have directed Lieutenant Marble to assume command of the Alvarado. Very respectfully, etc. ' "Early on the morning of the i8th I received from the senior naval officer in the harbor a paper sent him, of which the following is a copy: " 'Santiago, July 17, 1898. " 'Lieutenant Doyle can keep his men on the ships for the night, and in the morning one of the tugs will get up steam and transfer him with his officers and men to their respective ships. C. McKIBBINS, " 'Brigadier-General, Commanding.' " The Admiral quoted this, and remarked: "I will not enter into any expression of surprise at the reception of such a paper. "No mention of the shipping was made in the articles of capitulation, though I specially requested that it be included by my message to you of July 13th. "Our operations leading to the fall of Santiago have been joint, so directed by the President and so confirmed by their character. All proprietj' and usage surrenders the floating material in such cases to the naval force, and I have taken possession of it. "I am unable to recognize the authority of the Secretary of War over my actions. I have telegraphed to the Secretary of the Navy and await his instructions. "In the event of a difference of opinion between the departments, the question will, of course, be decided by the President of the United States; until then my prize crews must remain in charge, and I have so directed. "Very respectfully, "W. T. SAMPSON, Rear Admiral U. S. N. "Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station. "Maj.-Gen. W. R. Shaffer, U. S. V., "Commanding Fifth Army Corps." Shafter's explanation of his refusal to allow a naval officer's signature on the capitulation agreement is this: 538 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO. "Santiago, August i, 1S98. "I do not acknowledge the authority of the Secretary of the Navy in the matter in which you wire me. The surrender of Santiago was made to me by General Toral in person, in surrendering verbally all the prisoners and public property of Spain in the district commanded by him, and I accepting the same in the presence of troops representing all the respective armies. The details for carrying this into effect were arranged by three commissioners on each side. These articles were signed by the respective commissioners in 'duplicate, one copy of handed to General Toral and the other was sent b)"^ me to the Secretary of War. Neither General Toral nor myself signed them. Certainly could not and would not permit these articles to any officer for signature, my own not being affixed, and I shall protest to the Secretary of War against your signature to that document. I respectfully invite your attention to the fact that no claim for any credit for the capture of Cervera and his fleet has been made by the army, although it is a fact the Spanish fleet did not leave the harbor imtil the investment of the city was practically completed, and Cervera had sufficient losses on land on July i and 2, notably among them his chief of staff. W. R. SH AFTER, Major-General." The President's proclamation of the i8th of July was of a character that gives it permanent interest. It is the foundation of the policy of the government of the United States with respect to Cuba, which is by the treaty of peace with Spain our military possession. President McKinley's declaration is as follows: "Adjutant-General's Office, "Washington, July 18, 1898 — 6:30 p. m. "General Shaffer, Santiago, Cuba: "The following is sent you for your information and guidance. It will be published in such manner in both English and Spanish as will give it the •widest circulation in the territory under your control: " 'To the Secretary of War: " 'Sir: The capitulation of the Spanish forces in Santiago de Cuba and in the eastern part of the province of Santiago, and the occupation of the territory by the forces of the United States, render it necessary to instruct the military commander of the United States as to the conduct which he is to observe during the military occupation. " 'The first effect of the military occupation of the enemy's territory is o « a OS p H 5^ O a 2 a » a o 54 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO. 541 the severance of the former political relations of the inhabitants and the estab- lishment of a new political power. Under this changed condition of things, the inhabitants, so long as they perform their duties, are entitled to security in their pei^sons and property, and in all their private rights and relations. It is my desire that the inhabitants of Cuba should be acquainted with the purpose of the United States to discharge to the fullest extent its obligations in this regard. It will therefore be the duty of the commander of the army of occupa- tion to announce and proclaim in the most public manner that we come, not to make war upon the inhabitants of Cuba, nor upon any party or faction among them, but to protect them in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal and religious rights. All persons who, either by active aid or by honest submission, cooperate with the United States in its efforts to give effect to this beneficent purpose will receive the reward of its support and protection. Our occupation should be as free from severity as possible. " 'Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights of person and property, and provide for the punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and in practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force, and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion. The judges and the other officials connected with the administration of justice may, if they accept the supremacy of the United States, continue to administer the ordinary law of the land, as between man and man, under the supervision of the American commander- in-chief. The native constabulary will, so far as may be practicable, be pre- served. The freedom of the people to pursue their accustomed occupations will be abridged only when it may be necessary to do so. " 'While the rule of conduct of the American commander-in-chief will be such as has just been defined, it will be his duty to adopt measures of a different kind, if, unfortunately, the course of the people should render such measures indispensable to the maintenance of law and order. He will then possess the power to replace or expel the native officials in part or altogether, to substitute new courts of his own constitution for those that now exist, or to 542 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO. create such new or supplementary tribunals as may be necessary. In the exercise of these high powers the commander must be guided by his judg- ment and his experience and a high sense of justice. " 'One of the most important and most practical problems with which it t will be necessary to deal is that of the treatment of property and the collection and administration of the revenues. It is conceded that all public funds and securities belonging to the government of the country in its own right, and all arms and supplies and other movable property of such government, may be seized by the military occupant and converted to his own use. The real property of the State he may hold and administer, at the same time enjoying the revenues thereof, but he is not to destroy it save in the case of military necessity. All public means of transportation, such as telegraph lines, cables, railways, and boats belonging to the State may be, appropriated to his use, but unless in case of militaiy necessity they are not to be destroyed. All churches and buildings devoted to religious worship and to the arts and sciences, all school houses, are, as far as possible, to be protected, and all destruction or intentional defacement of such places, of historical monuments, or of archives, or of works of science or art, is prohibited, save when required by urgent military necessity. " 'Private property, whether belonging to individuals or corporations, is to be respected, and can be confiscated only for cause. Means of transportation, such as telegraph lines and cables, railways and boats, may, although they belong to private individuals or corporations, be seized by the military occupant, but, unless destroyed iinder military necessity, are not to be retained. " 'While it is held to be the right of the conqueror to levy contributions ■upon the enemy in their seaports, towns, or provinces which may be in his military possession by conquest, and to apply the proceeds to defray the expense of the war, this right is to be exercised within such limitations that it may not savor of confiscation. As the result of military occupation the taxes and duties payable by the inhabitants to the former government become payable to the military occupant, unless he sees fit to substitute for them other rates or modes of contribution to the expenses of the government. The moneys so collected are to be used for the purpose of paying the expenses of government under the military occupation, such as the salaries of the judges and the police, and for the payment of the expenses of the army. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SURRENDER OF SANTIAGO. 543 " 'Private property taken for the use of the army is to be paid for, when possible, in cash at a fair valuation; and when payment in cash is not possible receipts are to be given. " 'All ports and places in Cuba which may be in the actual possession of our land and naval forces will be opened to the commerce of all neutral nations, as well as our own, in articles not contraband of war, iipon payment of the prescribed rates of duty which may be in force at the time of importation. '"WILLIAM McKINLEY.' "By order Secretary of War: "H. C. CORBIN, Adjutant-General." The Spanish soldiers surrendered at Santiago by General Toral with the approval of Captain-General Blanco and the Spanish government outnumbered two to one the combined armies of Burgoyne and Cornwallis surrendered at Saratoga and Yorktown, and were a larger force than was engaged on either side in our two wars with England, and forty per cent greater than the armies of Taylor that crossed the Rio Grande and won at Monterey and Buena Vista; and of Scott, the conqueror of the city of Mexico, who unfurled over the "Halls of the Montezumas" the flag that now floats at Havana. 1 CHAPTER XXIV. The Joint Work of the Army and Navy at Manila. The Reasons Why Admiral Dewey Remained After Destroying the Spanish Fleet — Why there Was Not a Slaughter at Manila Like that at Santiago — The Old Fort that Was the Key of the City— The American Army Drove the Spaniards and Dusted the Insurgents Out of the Way— A Very Neat Job — W e Di d Not M akeJH ar on the Spani ards for the Sake of the Tagalos. We have seen in the official communications by cable between the Secretary of the Navy of the United States and the Commander of the American fleet on the Asiatic station, that before the declaration of war there were forceful and particular preparations to strike a blow at the Spaniards in the East Indies as soon as the war hurricane broke in the West Indies. The great possessions of Spain in Asian waters seemed almost literally at the end of the world, and were little known. The duty confided to Admiral George Dewey was first the protection of American commerce with China and Japan from the Spanish squadron known to be maintained at Manila, and in the channels and harbors of the Philippines, and it was strongly expressed over the wires from Washington to the squadron of U. S. cruisers at anchor in Hongkong harbor that the way to defend our commerce on the other side of the globe, was to destroy the Spanish war ships. There was extraordinary energy in the Navy Department. Mr. Long, the Secretary, is a man of high attainments and forecasting intellect. He had for Assistant Secretary, Governor Theodore Roosevelt of New York, who was a grizzly-bear killer before he was a Rough Rider; and indeed the strong, keen and brilliant character that was a dominant factor in the admin- istration of the Navy, itself a high school of heroes. Admiral Dewey was Substantially instructed to clear for action and strike the squadron of Spain before the declaration of war. "Fill up with coal — the best to be had," was the first order issued that had the ring of battle 544 CI tfl z w w p r V- H ft E C H tr C TREE UNDER WHICH SURRENDER OF SPANISH FORCES AT SANTIAGO WAS MADE. WORK OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AT MANILA. 547 thunder in it. Coal is even more essential in providing a war ship for active service, than gunpowder. There is no more inert mass of matter than a battleship without steam. With coal steam can be raised, and the ponderous structure of iron becomes a thing of life that parts the waters with enormous power, and drives through stormy seas, an engine of wrath and violence, crushing whatever floats in its way, but the utmost accurate range of a rifle is half a dozen miles. "Fill up with coal — the best to be had" is a good phrase, the very thing for a beginning. It was followed up and the Spanish Asiatic fleet in a fe\T days passed away. It will be a welcome task for Americans to tell the story of the glory of the battle of the Bay of Manila, for the gallant Dewey and , his captains bold, and sailors and gunners, and all the officers and crews, the Chinese waiters included, who waited on the boys at the flaming guns with ammunition as cheerfully as they served the tables at one time — but we have to recite another story now. When Admiral Dewey left Hongkong he had no home for his ships nearer than vSan Francisco. He had no boarding house, no tavern in which he could take his time and his ease. He found himself on the evening of the first of May destroyer of a fleet, the conqueror of a broad bay with heavy batteries still frowning upon him from the shores, a great city held by an array of thirteen thousand men amply armed imder his guns, a litter of wrecks where the fleet of his enemies had been, his own command less numerous than the crews of the ships he had annihilated and his ammunition seriously reduced by hours of rapid firing, it being one of the characteristics of war ships that they consume stores of powder, shells and bolts at a rate never in old times thought possible. What should he do? Run to Singapore and be permitted to take coal enoiigh to move him to the next port and so on home, getting into American waters in two months, leaving a lot of Spanish gunboats known to be hidden about the islands to go out and prey upon our commerce? Or would it be the better way to hold the Bay of Manila, make it a place of shelter for his fleet and a base of operations, implying as the situation did, that we had gained command of a group of islands extensive as New York, Pennsylvania and New Jersey, one of them more spacious than the State of Ohio, the group rich as our Gulf States? The Admiral of course remained, and announc- ing that he would lay waste the city if again fired on, established a con- 548 WORK OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AT MANILA. dition that was satisfactory until the re-enforcements, the ships, provisions, coal and fixed ammunition cabled for after the Spanish fleet was removed, arrived. The alternative to go away and allow the Spanish gunboats to do us a great mischief was not chosen. The Admiral could have proceeded to Singapore and cabled for further orders, but it was cheaper and stronger to stay, hold Cavite, use the insurgents to employ the Spaniards, protect our interests as a nation, and "possess" what his artillery dominated. The Administration did not order him to sail away from islands equal in soil, climate, minerals, fruits and agricultural productions to all the West Indies. The Admiral saw no departure from duty in the service of a Republican government, in a conquest. As for the government of the people by a majority of the heads or hands shown we cannot profess to do that indiscriminately, and never have done so. We depend upon votes, but it is desirable to mix votes with brains before casting them, and to measure the rights of the people by the American standard, and base the qualifications of statehood in an indissoluble union, upon American manhood. The Admiral had to stay at Manila, and he was glad to stay. He could not in honor get away, either to leave the Spaniards in possession, or to turn over the civilized communities to the insurgents, whose first idea was to avenge in a few months the wrongs that had been endured for centuries. The United States is like the Admiral. It has a duty to preserve order until there appears a people capable of caring for themselves and governing themselves. Those who have that capacity will not begin the redemption of their race by acts of barbarism — neither of robber)', nor brutal destructiveness. The same class of people who were always distressed' by more territory, terrified because they were so much superior to others that the country ought to be small and select for their special use and fashioned according to their personal peculiarities, which were not of generous proportions, grieved over Dewey's protection of his own and the national honor. We have a territorial system that will serve excellently as a colonial system, for the assimilation of elements from regions remote, and we can govern them through our executive and legislative departments with such measure of military force as may be necessary to preserve peace and promote tendencies to civilization. There is no hurry about more states. Indeed it would be a sound conservation to refuse henceforth to organize WORK OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AT MANILA. 549 \territories into states, unless they are so Americanized as to come into our Union so naturally that opposition would be to antagonize ourselves and assail the precedents that are behind-our laws and customs. The President of the United States has sustained Admiral Dewey and honored him at every step, from the first day of the war when they made their acquaintance intimate over the cable, but he reserved one decision until he was able to consult public opinion. That was what we should do with the Philippines when the time came to make the treaty that must follow the war with Spain. All questions were settled in the Protocol but that of the Spanish East Indies. That was absolutely but not expressly referred to the matured judgment of the citizens of the United States and the result was the decision that we should hold the islands. There are but few against the verdict. If there had been a popular vote on it the majority would have been ten millions to keep the prize so gallantly won. Those opposed to raising the objections are, the survivals of the antique ideas of the delightful symmetry of small countries and the delicious refinement of little things, and in addition there are those who think that they can gain something by the vulgarity of figuring on the twenty millions of indemnity to Spain, the expense of three weeks of war ; and there is the soft, flabby demagogy of suffering for the sake of the people we have relieved from the Spanish yoke. The line that we draw is that we are quite prepared to consent to the government of Cuba by Cubans and of the Philippines by the Filipinos, but we hold they would improve rapidly in the art of government by the experience of liberty under our guidance. We shall not fight them as against self-government, but they must not fall prey to a class of Spaniards inferior to those who fought for Spain, and of Malay chiefs, whose vanity, inflamed by possible prosperity and modified by material aid, is conspicuous with gilt and titles of distinction. We want to find the real people of the islands of Cuba and Luzon, and others, and we have not evidence that Aguinaldo and Gomez are men of the people. They are powerful in letters and proclamations that have the tropical features of literature, so floridly tinctured that it needs, to assume a wholesome aspect, to be tingecl with the tones and strengthened with the American air of the North Temperate Zone. We are content that the islanders in question shall have the government that pleases them, as soon as they show that they have a people whose policy has not been that of firebugs, and ravenous seekers of spoil. There 55° WORK OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AT MANILA. are people in Cuba and Luzon; let them step to the front. Distinction in superstition or accomplishment in assassination are not sufficient to constrain the United States to set up mutual administration and speculation societies of insurgents as a ruling class who shall govern over us as well as the Cubans and the Filipinos. This insufficiency is not held in favor by those who studied the art of government in swamps and the thorny underbrush of the wilderness. Those both in Cuba and Luzon who are threatening us with guerrilla warfare, if we do not submit to their presumption, appear, as the war manifested, to have voracity for the official privileges the Spaniards enjoyed, and would be willing, in consideration of our war of humanity, to aid us in a zealous and lucrative manner to carry on the government of the United States. The elementary principles of the policy of expansipn,_are to improve the opportunities that occur for the appropriation of more land for the people, our people — we the people of the United States. George Dewey held the prize he won and William McKinley has sustained him handsomely for the sake of the people, and the people will stand with them while there is land for labor and power for guns. Admiral Dewey knew General Merritt was coming. He had helped Aguinaldo against the Spaniards, but had ignored or opposed his fantastic pretensions. Then the insurgent chief was pleased to be, in the language of the Admiral, "threatening" toward Americans. The chief is surrounded by a queer assortment of fanatics, some of whom hold that he has a "charm" that makes him proof against bullets and poison, but he has to obtain the consent of certain persons before he can do anything. The great grievance against the Americans by the insurgents was, after the Spaniards surrendered Manila, that they were not allowed to enter the town in triumph and indulge the passions of revenge and looting. They had been boasting that they could take Manila, but that was not in their power. It was the fleet of the United States in the bay that allowed the insurgents to blockade the city. It was the fleet too, that by drawing the line between the city and Forte Malate, preserving the former and crushing the latter, broke the Spanish line of defense without such loss of life as occurred at Santiago. We were the master of Manila with a loss small compared with the experience of carrying trenches in Cuba, because the navy forced the mouth of the harbor and made an end of the fleet in the bay with- WORK OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AT MANILA. 551 out harming the city In storming the Spanish lines after the naval bombard- ment had cleared the entrance by the shore, the American forces were about one-third the Spaniards and Filipinos counted together. With two divisions of our troops engaged, one drove the Spanish and the other held back the insurgents. It was a divided duty and a double job, and an altogether artistic and effective piece of work. This event took place, it will be remembered, after the Protocol negotiated by the French Minister had been signed, but before knowledge of peace had reached the Oriental seat of war. One of the dangers in sending an American army across the Pacific was that there were loose Spanish gunboats, that might attack transports that were -without convoys or effective batteries and crowded with troops. When the peril was realized, there were in several instances rifled cannon mounted on deck and men trained to handle the guns. General Greene pre- pared the China in her voyage out to Manila with rifles that it was believed would stand off a gunboat, and the same provision was made on the boat that carried Major General Otis, who had an artillery company of regulars on board, but the steamers with the soldiers, while stanch in encountering bad weather, were frail vehicles to be extemporized for ships of war. The voyages were according to orders on lines easily followed. This cable will explain the method: Washington, June 27, 1898. Dewey (care American consul), Hongkong: The Monadnock sailed June 25 from San Francisco, accoinpanied by collier Nero. Was ordered to proceed at utmost speed safely possible, and stops as short as possible, and to make the best of way to a point 600 nautical miles east true from Cape Engano, and thence to run to the west true until np to Cape Engano. If then she has not received from you a message to the contrary, she will proceed at once to Manila. This enables you to meet the Monadnock or to send a message to her within 600 nautical miles of Cape Engano, if you desire to do so. Furthermore, General Merritt's third division of transports will leave about June 27 from San Francisco with about 4,000 men and not convoyed, but he has been advised to make and to sail the 600 knots east and west line as described for the Monadnock. LONG. The Spaniards were not enterprising, and there was no danger visibly 552 WORK OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AT MANILA. threatened. Admiral Dewey was kept well advised of the movement of reenforcements. The Secretary of the Navy cabled him June i8th: "Second division of the army expedition, about 3,500 men, in four steamers, sailed from San Francisco [at] noon on June 15. The army estimates they wiU make average speed 10 knots p'er hour, and touch two days at Honolulu. Sustained sea speed seems doubtful." June 25th the Secretary cabled Dewey via Hongkong: "Second army division. Gen. F. V. Greene commanding, left San Francisco to touch at Honolulu and Guam. Estimated to arrive at Guam July 10 and expects to meet convoying vessel from you at Guam. If practicable, send one. If you cannot do, then charter vessel and send naval officer Guam. Inform com- manding officer expedition to come to Engano or Manila without convoy. The War Department states Greene would not touch Guam, but now announces he will touch there." The Secretary of the Navy cabled: "The Spanish fleet from Cadiz passed Cape Bon, going to the east, June 22, 3 p. m. Expected to go to Manila. Comprise Pelayo, Emperor Carlos v., three torpedo-boat destroyers, three auxiliary armed steamers, and seven transports. In all 15 sail. "Monterey and the collier sailed [for] Manila from San Diego on June 11. The Monadnock and the collier will follow June 20 if possible. Could not you have a vessel at Hongkong to receive notice concerning Spanish fleet passing Suez?" June 29th Long wired to Dewey as follows: "The different re- enforcements sent to you are as follows: First army detachment and the Charleston sailed May 21 from San Francisco via Honolulu and Guam. Estimated sea speed, 10 knots. The Monterey sailed June 11 from San Diego, Cal., via Honolulu and Guam, probably estimated sea speed, 10 knots per hour. The Monadnock sailed June 25 from San Francisco for Honolulu and then direct. Estimated sea speed, 6 knots per hour, perhaps more. Third army detachment sailed June 27 from San Francisco; was recommended to go direct. Squadron under Watson, the Iowa and Oregon, the Yankee and the Dixie, the Newark and the Yosemite, and four colliers preparing with all possible dispatch to start for Spanish coast. The Spaniards know this." Twenty thousand tons of coal were reported to be aboard supply vessels for the war boats announced to Dewey June 27th in the.se terms: WORK OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AT MANILA. 553 *'Camara's fleet arrived off Port Said June 26, and is reported by our agent there as follows: Pelayo, Carlos V., Audaz, Osada, Proserpina, Patriota, 12 guns, and three unarmed transports, Colon, Covadonga, and San Francisco. They will coal immediately— to be supplied by Cory Brothers, whose agents are Savon Bazui. ' ' There was according to all appearances a serious line of business in this movement, but it evaporated. Dewey's purpose was to evacuate the harbor at Manila if the Spanish fleet, too strong to fight without getting the worst of it, should pass into the China iSea and reach the Babujan Islands north of Luzon. Long's cable to Dewey July ist is proof of this. General Merritt, Commander-in-Chief of the Philippine expedition, sailed from San Francisco June 2gth and arrived at Cavite, Manila Bay, July 25th. General Thomas M. Anderson was in command of the United States troops up to that time, his headquarters being in Cavite. General F. V. Greene with his brigade was encamped along the bay near the village of Paranague, "about five miles by water and twenty-five miles by the roads from Cavite, •and a strip as described by General Merritt, "of sandy land running parallel to the shore of the bay and not far distant from the beach, but owing to the great difficulties of landing supplies, the greater portion of the force had shelter tents only and were suffering many discomforts, the camp being situated in a low, flat place, without shelter from the heat of the tropical sun or adequate protection during the terrific downpours of rain so frequent at this season. " General Merritt was "at once struck by the exemplary spirit of patient, even cheerful, endurance shown by the officers and men under such circiim- stances, and this feeling of admiration for the manner in which the American soldiers, volunteer and regular alike, accept the necessary hardships of the work they have undertaken to do, has grown and increased with every phase of the difficult and trying campaign which the troops of the Philippine expedition have brought to such a brilliant and successful conclusion." The General found that the left or north flank of Greene's command "extended to a point on the 'Calle Real,' about 3,200 yards from the outer line of Spanish defenses of the city of Manila. This Spanish line began at the powder magazine, or old Fort San Antonio, within a hundred yards of the beach and just south of the Malate suburb of Manila, and stretched away to the Spanish left in more or less detached works, eastward, through 554 WORK OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AT MANILA. swamps and rice fields, covering all the avenues of approach to the town and encircling the city completely." This fact was the key of the defensive position of the Spaniards and their lines were formidable. There were marshes, rice fields and trenches, and mud barricades, and the advance would have to be over open ground, covered completely by the Spanish rifle fire. The position of the Spaniards was stronger than that of Santiago, for here they were well protected and storming columns could not be sheltered in the least, but the old fort by the seaside was not tenable under the fire of the American fleet. As to General Aguinaldo, whose forces had surrounded the city with irregular skirmish lines, and who was publishing proclamations of independence and belief that he was about to capture Manila, he seems to have thought it was General Mer- ritt's object in coming to place the United States army at the disposition of the insurgent Junta. General IMerritt says in his official report that at the time of his arrival "the entire edifice of executive and legislative department and subdivision of territory for administrative purposes had been accomplished at least on paper, and the Filipinos held military possession of many points in the islands other than those in the vicinity of Manila. "As General Aguinaldo did not visit me on my arrival nor offer his services as subordinate military leader, and as my instructions from the President fully contemplated the occupation of the islands by the American land forces, and state that 'the powers of the militarj' occupant are absolute' and sitpreme and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, ' I did not consider it wise to hold any direct communication with the insurgent leader until I should be in possession of the city of Manila, especially as I would not until then be in position to issue a proclamation and enforce my authority, in tlie event that his pretensions should clash with my designs. "For these reasons the preparations for the attack on the city were pressed and military operations conducted without reference to the situation of the insurgent forces. The wisdom of this course was subsequently fully established by the fact that when the troops of my command carried the Spanish intrenchments, extending from the sea to the Pasay road, on the ex- treme Spanish right, we were under no obligations, by prearranged plans of mutual attack, to turn to the right and clear the front still held by the insur- gents, but were able to move forward at once and occupy the city and suburbs." EIFT IN THE JUNGLES THAT LINE THE COAST OF THE PHILIPPINES. ROADWAY IN BOTANU;aL GARDENS, MANILA. WORK OF THE ARMY AND NAVY AT MANILA. 557 tf-Oi-est ^ ~~, ■- jgyr -ij --=--_-~--«^.< M ^ O u z <; I— I » P D Q z < X D C9 ■J O s -n Id a ;L ./T'^ V BUST OF COLUMliUS, FOUND ON 'CRISTOBAL COLON. ' NOW I\ WAR DEPARTMENT AT WASHlN(;TON. PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. 621 due, in the first place, to the cruiser Reina Mercedes, under the command of Captain Rafael Micon, and in the second place, to our fleet anchored in the bay, and which the enemy would have had to fight after forcing the harbor, provided they had succeeded in doing so, but they do not appear to have thought of it." Further information will show the gallant Spaniard that it was not for the lack of thinking of it that it was not attempted. The Mercedes was detained at Santiago by bad boilers, when on the way to Havana. The Lieutenant remarks of Spanish belief in their fleets before the trial by battle : "When the war between Spain and the United States became a fact, it is bard to tell how much was said and written about the Spanish fleet, or rather, fleets; everybody knows of the thousands of items which appeared in the newspapers concerning the purchase of ships, to such an extent that, if all could have been believed, our navy would have been vastly superior to that of the United States, in number and quality. And this is so true that the least optimistic, the most reasonable people, those whom we considered best informed as belonging to the profession, and who knew to a certain extent what we could expect, counted on not less than eight battleships leaving the Peninsula." When Cervera ran into Santiago May 19, famishing for coal, and hoped to get it and get away, it was "one of those beautiful mornings that are so frequent in tropical countries; not the slightest breeze rippled the surface of the water, not the least cloud was to be seen in the deep blue sky, and still, notwith- standing all that the local papers have said, very few were the people who came down to witness the arrival of the ships. With the exception of the official element and a small number of Peninsulars, the arrival of our warships inspired no interest, nor even curiosity." The Peninsulars alone were enthusiasts. Coaling facilities were such that the fleet was detained until blockaded. The troops required 360,000 rations a month, enough with economy for half a month. This would seem to mean that there were 24,000 troops, but this must be a miscalculat on. As to the business men, this example is sufficient : "The man who had the contract of furnishing water at the bay, relying on the letter of his contract, tried to charge the ships of the fleet for the water which they were getting at Las Cruces pier, this water being the property of the American company of the Jurngua mines, for which the 622 PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. Spanish government could therefore not contract, and was conveyed on board by means of the water pipes, which are there for that purpose, the pump being kept going night and day by the soldiers of Colonel Borry's column. Nearly all the ships took over 500 pipes of water each, which, at 4 pesetas a pipe, amounts to several thousand dollars. The contractor in question, whose name I do not wish to remember, is from the Peninsula, a captain of volunteers, and, as he says himself, 'a better Spaniard than Pelayo.' " Before the siege was over this writer says there was famine in Santiago, and many persons starved to death. He saw a man at the entrance to the Brook House who "died because he had nothing to eat," and "horses, dogs and other animals were dying from hunger in the streets and public places, and the worst thing was that their carcasses were not removed. I also saw — this is significant on account of the fatal consequences that might follow — I saw, I repeat, a dog throw himself upon a smaller one and kill and devour him. The water from the aqueduct had been cut off, and the city was exposed to the danger of the dogs going mad." The Lieutenant continues: "We who belonged to the captaincy of the port finally dined, breakfasted and slept there — or rather, did not sleep there, for there never was a night when it was not necessary to transmit to the Admiral two or three urgent papers, orders, or other cablegrams, at all hours, and the telephone did not stop a minute and did not give us any rest." Of what service to Spain was the Spanish fleet in Santiago? This ques- tion Lieutenant Muller answers: "Compelling the enemy to sustain with superior forces the blockade of Santiago de Cuba, with all its difficulties and dangers. While our ships were in port, safe from the ordinary dangers of the sea, using hardly any coal, not exhausting their engines, and waiting for a favorable opportunity to maneuver, when and as best they could, the hostile fleet was obliged to cruise on the coast day and night, using a great deal of coal, constantly doing sea service, which is always laborious, especially in time of war, exhausting their engines, and exposed to the danger of having to abandon the blockade in case of a storm from the south or east, still more if the season of cyclones should come." And, "If it had been possible for us, besides the ships that were at Santiago, to have two at Cienfuegos, for instance, and two more at Nuevitas, which ports are well suited for placing lines of torpedoes, owing to their nar- row entiances, there is no doubt but that the Americans, who, outside of the PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. 623 ships they had in the Philippines, had sent their whole fleet to the island of Cuba, would have had to blockade those three ports with forces superior to ours and to keep watch at Ke}' West if they did not want to expose themselves to a serious disaster, or would have had to force one of the ports, thereby exposing themselves to a hecatomb; and we only need think of the number of their ships to understand that the}^ could not successfully threaten so many points ; though they only had Lo deal with Santiago and had almost all the ships of the fleet in front of it, they would have found it necessary to desist from taking the offensive. " The Americans^_the Spaniards thought, never before Santiago lacked se cret in formation, and the sinking of the Merrimac was a mystery to the ■ Spaniards. The Spanish writer visited Hobson to take his deposition, and Hobson wanted to know why the British Consul was not present, as he had charge of the American Consulate, and also, "by whose authority he was being examined; and he stated that, since he had been taken prisoner by Admiral Cervera himself in his own boat (as was true), it was his understand- ing that he could and should answer only Admiral Cervera, or some one delegated by him. And although all this was said in the very best form and with a thousand protestations of his respect and deference for me, it did not prevent our positions from being reversed, and far from my asking the pris- oner questions, it was he, on the contrary, who asked them of me. "I told him so, asking him through the interpi-eter to state categorically whether he was disposed to answer. He replied he w^as ready to answer the questions which he thought he ought to answer, but not those which he deemed untimely. Therefore, and in order not to lose time, I at once asked him one question which I knew beforehand he would refuse to answer, namely, by whose order and for what purpose he entered the harbor; he replied: 'By order of Admiral Sampson; the second part I cannot answer.' I then deemed my mission at an end." Having finished with Hobson, the Spanish officer stood on the esplanade in front of the Morro and admired the American fleet. It was a beautiful evening, and seventeen American ships were in sight. June 6th the Ameri- can fleet opened fire, and "it was so intense and the shots followed each other in such quick succession that it might have seemed like a fusillade if the mighty thunder of guns can be compared with the crackling of small arms. "By 9 o'clock it became somewhat slower, shortly after reaching again the 624 PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. same intensity, then decreasing once more at 10:15, and again becoming terribly intense. "At 2 p. m. there arrived at the royal pier a boat from the Reina Mer- cedes, towed by her steam launch, with Lieutenant Ozamiz, bringing three seriously wounded sailors, who were taken to the military hospital. This officer reported the death of Commander Emilio de Acosta y Eyermann, second in command of the cruiser, and of five sailors; also, that Ensign Molins, one boatswain, and several other sailors had been wounded." Again, the writer says, "the fire resembled one prolonged thunder," and he "had no idea that any firing could be as terrific as that of those ten ships," and he "does not believe the bombardment of Sebastopol and Alexandria could be as terrible as that suffered at Santiago." It was computed that the Americans fired eight thousand projectiles. The belief of the writer was that the insurgents had located everything, and he was sure when he saw the aim of the Americans, who fired so close to the Maria Teresa and Vizcaya, that it was a miracle they were not hit. The Mercedes, though protected by a hill, was hit thirty-five times. "Commander Emilio de Acosta y Eyermann was directing the extinguish- ing of the fire in the forecastle, when a large shell cut off his right leg at the hip and also his right hand, mutilating him horribly. But he lived for half an hour after that, and kept on looking after the fire, as I was told by Mr. Ozamiz, who was close to him in those critical moments. I do not like to think of it; he had been a fellow-student of mine at college, and our old friendship had always remained the same. As there was no safe place in the ship, his body was placed on a cot and taken to the Socapa coast ; five soldiers who had been killed the same day were also carried there, and all of them were covered with the flag which they had been defending and for which they had died. "The large projectiles shot through the space across the bay, causing a tremendous noise which only those who heard it can understand ; some fell on the opposite coast (to the westward), raising, as they exploded, clouds of dust and smoke ; others could not be seen falling, which proves that they must have dropped in the hills at a great distance. This explains that they did not only reach the city, but went thousands of meters beyond. "The inhabitants of Cay Smith had to take refuge in the northern part, which is very abrupt, and many were in the water up to the waist; if they had not gone there, most of them would have been killed, for nearly all the PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. 625 dwellings which were located in the southern part suffered from the effects of the shells. The following day the Cay was abandoned." June 2ist it was found out that forty-two ships had during the day before sailed and proceeded eastward. They were the transports bearing Shafter's army, on June 23. "Opposite the Morro entrance, and at a distance of about six miles from it, 8 battleships, 2 destroyers, the Vesuvius, and 8 merchant vessels. The rest, as many as 63, continued the landing on the coast, protected by some of the war ships. "Every night, with great regularity (between 11 and 2), the Vesuvius threw her three dynamite bombs on the batteries at the mouth of the harbor, with the greatest humanity possible, for it will be remembered that such was the pretext of this war. For that purpose she would come close to the coast, accompanied by another ship, usually a battleship — for the mission of the Vesuvius is only the offensive, she has no defensive qualities — and as soon as she was within convenient distance she would discharge three tubes at regular intervals. If the projectiles dropped close to a battery its ruin was certain, for one must see the effects of one of these projectiles to under- stand them. "This ship is the only one of her class; her projectiles and the apparatus throwing them are not known, and she has made her debut here. One of the projectiles which fell on the northern slope of the Socapa tore up trees right and left for a distance of about 20 meters. From a certain distance, as I could see the day I went to the Mercedes, it looked as though a road had been opened across the mountain. "Another, which fell a short distance from the one just referred to, made an excavation, not very deep, but very wide ; I was told that it would hold twenty horses." The sound of the battle in which Cervera's fleet perished is thus related : "A terrific cannonade commenced, such as I have never heard, nor will prob- ably ever hear again, a cannonade more intense than that of June 6, a thing which I believed impossible, shaking the building, thundering through the air. I could not think coherently. I kept looking at Mr. Bustamente like an imbecile, and he looked at me and didn't say a word. I felt something that commenced at my feet and went up to my head, and my hair must have stood on end. Then suddenly, without taking leave, I went out, got on my horse 626 PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. and rode down the hill at breakneck speed, and I hardly understand how it was that I did not break my neck. I arrived at the captaincy of the port, where I found them all, from the commander of marine to the last clerk, with emotion painted on every face, and, all looking in the direction of the mouth of the harbor. The noise caused by the gunshots, which the mountains and valleys echoed, was truly infernal and comparable to nothing." The pilot who took out the Spanish flagship tells of his personal experi- ence. His name is Miguel Lopez, and he says: "I was in the forward tower by the side of Admiral Cervera, who was as calm as though he had been at anchor in his own cabin, and was observing the channel and the hostile ships, and only said these words: " 'Pilot, when can we shift the helm?' He had reference to turning to starboard, which could only be done after we had passed Diamante Bank. After a few seconds he said; " Pilot, advise me when we can shift the helm.' " 'I will advise you, Admiral,' I answered. "A few moments later I said: 'Admiral, the helm may be shifted now.' "In a moment the Admiral, without shouting, without becoming excited, as calm as usual, said: 'To starboard,' and the next minute, 'Fire!' At the same moment, simultaneously, the two guns of the turret and those of the port battery fired on a ship which seemed to me to be the Indiana. I thought the ship was sinking. I cannot tell you, Don Jose, all that passed. By this time there were already many dead and wounded in the battery, and I believe that in spite of the water that was in the ship she was already on fire then. The Admiral said to me : " 'Good-by, pilot; go now; go, and be sure you let them pay you, because you have earned it well.' And he continued to give orders." It was for eight hours believed in Santiago that Cervera's fleet had escaped. There was at first four great clouds of smoke. The mountains, as the ships passed westward, presented a view of the sea except from a few points, and no ship was burned or disabled within the range of vision. The Spanish officers confirmed the view taken by Admiral Sampson of the value of the incessant use at night of the searchlights. The effect of the cannonades by the fleet was more serious when we read the Spanish story than in the American accounts. The reason Cervera ran into Santiago harbor was lack of coal, and the reason he did not get out at first PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. 627 was because he could not fill the bunkers in time. There was scarcity of baskets to handle coal, for one thing. The American fleet came in force to Santiago because the Spanish fleet was there, and our army arrived because the fleets were there. Hence the fame forever of Santiago. Rear Admiral Pluddeman, of the German navy, has published critical "comments" on the main features of the command in Spain, and we have a translation from the November number of the Marine Rundschau. The Admiral opens with the rem.ark that there is nothing in the events of the war which might lead to a radical revolution of present ideas, but while the war has "enriched former experiences," no essentially new appliances have been made use of. The torpedo and ram have not been used, but they have no doubt been found less formidable in fact than in imagination. Torpedoes have been tried and found wanting, and it appears that in the state of efficiency of artillery the use of the ram has become, like cavalry charges upon steady infantry with magazine long-range rifles, impracticable. The supremacy of the battleship, with a few heavy guns and a greater array of secondary batteries, is hardly disputed. The Oregon would have great chances to destroy all the torpedo boats and torpedo boat destroyers that could be launched against her. There is a general conviction that our thirteen-inch guns are too big, that eight and ten inch guns to the same amount of weight are better, and that the smaller rapid-fire guns are weapons that have a way of doing a greater share of execution than the huge steel tubes that shiver and shatter their own foundations. It is said by the Admiral that many of our shells did not explode, and our Navy Department is already making provision for more sensitive shells. Our monitors are slightingly spoken of, and Admiral Sampson thought he found them a nuisance, holding back his fleet, yet the Monterey and the Monadnock crossed the Pacific Ocean, and Admiral Dewey was extremely glad to add them to his squadron, for they gave him the ability to smash batteries that had caused him uneasiness, and if Camara's fleet had appeared in the waters of Asia, he proposed to wait for the monitors on the way before undertaking the sinking of a second Spanish squadron. The Colonel Commandant of the United States Marine Corps states: "During the war 57 vessels had marine guards, varying in strength from So down to 6 men, making a total of 2,055 enlisted men at sea. There were •623 in the battalion and 50 at Key West, making a total of 2,728." 628 PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. A battalion of marines saw very active service at Guantanamo. Land- ing on the loth of June at Guantanamo Bay, they were on the nth attacked by a superior force of Spaniards, and a constant fire was kept up for three days. The bay was important, as it was the only one where the vessels could take shelter in the hurricane season. The necessity for the marines to hold their position is stated in the official report of the commander: "Owing to the dense undergrowth, affording safe shelter to the Spanish sharpshooters, it would have been impossible for the vessels, by shelling the shore, to keep the enemy from harassing those on board the ships with their Mauser rifles to such an extent as to make it dangerous for them to remain there." Admiral Pluddeman has written critically on the matters of interest in , our naval experience, and says of Guantanamo: "In the entrance of Guanta- namo Bay the Americans found quite a number of mines. These might have caused considerable damage if they had operated, for the Americans entered the bay without any precautionary measures, and the screws of the Marble- head tore two of the mines loose from their anchorages so that they rose to the surface of the water. Then the whole bay was systematically searched for mines. This was done on June 2 1 by the boats of the Marblehead and Newark. Four steam launches, tinder the fire of Spanish infantry hiding on the shore, fished up thirteen mines on the first day with light chains they were towing. The ships, of course, fired on the hostile position, which was soon abandoned. "During the next few days thirty-five more mines were found and taken ashore. These proved to be charged with 120 pounds of guncotton each. Many of them showed evidences of having been in contact with ships' bottoms or screws, but the firing mechanism was not capable of operating. The fuses showed such grave defects that it was quite evident that the work of constructing them had not been done under the supervision of a superior. "The mines raised in vSantiago Harbor after the surrender of the place proved on the whole to be in better condition. vStill, the outer row contain- ing contact mines was of doubtful value. One mine was found, for instance, in which half of the guncotton had been burned, leaving no doubt that it had been in contact with some object — probably the Merrimac — and that the fuse had acted, but that the guncotton charge had become spoiled. "The second row of mines (electric) was in pretty good condition, and might easily have destroyed one or more ships if an attempt had been made PUBLIC OPINION THAT ADVANCED THE NAVY. 629 to force the entrance. These latter mines contained a charge of 200 pounds of guncotton each. All the mines in Guantanamo as well as Santiago Bay were thickly overgrown with barnacles and seaweeds." This covers a point of some delicacy, owing to the controversy over the management of the fleet off Santiago in confining the assaults at the mouth of the harbor to cannonading. A study of the whole matter of the reports from both sides leads to the conclusion that Admiral Sampson was right in his objection to Shafter's chatige of plans after arrival, the weak point of the defense being at the mouth of the harbor, which could have been forced easily if troops had been landed to drive the Spaniards from their lower batteries, those of the old guns on the castle not being serious in modern war- fare. It appears, however, that the dangers of driving into the mouth of the harbor were not as great as imagined. All experiences with vSpanish tor- pedoes and mines discredit them, and plainl)', if after Cervera's fleet had dis- appeared during the hours the harbor was open, the only grave peril was in the navigation of the difficult channel. However, it was Secretary Long's order that a battleship should not be "risked," but he evidently did not mean a literal interpretation of the caution. It is ungracious to find fault systematically, and to award praise in stinted measure of either Sampson or Shaffer, when the closing scenes were the annihilation of the fleet of Spain and the surrender of her army and of the ancient capital of Cuba; however, the distinguished Admiral and General are responsible for the rather fierce exchange of letters that so grounded and inflamed controversy that the grounds upon which it was established and the temper with which it was conducted cannot be neglected. The abundance of glory is insufficient to establish harmony. CHAPTER XXVIII. The Army of the United States. Its Organization and Numbers Before and During the War — The Strength and Location of the Several Army Corps — The Distribution of the Mihtary Forces and their Num- bers — Casualties During the War, in Cuba, Porto Rico and the Philippines — Deaths in the Camps — The Incidents of Hardship and the Yellow Scandals — Spanish Account of the Valor of their Troops and Story of the Conflict — Scarcity of Provisions— Cruel Battles at El Caney and San Juan — Suffering in Santiago. The regular army of the United States at the beginning of the war with Spain was composed of 2,143 officers and 26,040 enlisted men. Of general officers and staff corps there were 532, with 2,026 enlisted men; cavalry, 437 officers, 6,047 enlisted men; artillery, 288 officers, 4,486 enlisted men; infantry, 886 officers, enlisted men 12,828. The army was increased in March and April, 1898. In the four months following the declaration of war with Spain, the enlisted men in the regular army numbered, in May, 41, 934; June, 49,513; July, 53,93i; August, 56,365. These figures include 5,365 men of the hospital corps. The regular officers were 2,191 in May, and 2,323 in August. The enlistments in the regular army were, in May, 9,569; June, 9,311; July, 6,586; August, 3,400. There ■were 387 regular officers appointed in the volunteer army. There were 15 major-generals, 45 brigadier-generals, 86 officers of volunteer regiments. The enlisted men in the infantry of the volunteer army were, in May, 118,580; June, 153, 355; July, 203,461; August, 188,947. The searching care taken in filling the ranks of the regular arm)' appears in a strong light in the remarkable figures of this paragraph from the Ad- jutant-General's report: Of the 29,521 accepted applicants, 24,490 were native born and 5,031 of foreign birth; 27,140 were white, 2,345 colored, and 36 Indians (scouts). The enlistments numbered 24,248, and the reenlistments, 5,273. Excluding reenlistments, the percentage of native-born applicants for original enlistment "was 87, the balance being naturalized citizens. The reports show that the 630 THE ARMV OF THE UNITED STATES. 631 recruiting officers making the 29,207 enlistments embraced in the first two items of the foregoing list rejected 98,277 applicants — a little over 77 percent of the number seeking enlistment — as lacking in legal, mental, and moral- or physical qualifications; 5,209 of these were rejected as aliens, and 4,788 for illiteracy. The aggregate strength of the regular and of the volunteer armies foi each of the months of May, June, July and August was as follows: Officers. Enlisted men. Grand total. 44,125 May — Regular army Volunteer army 2,191 6,224 41,934 1 18,580 124,804 Aggregate , . June — Regular army . . Volunteer army . • 8,415 • 2,198 • 7,169 160,5 14 49,513 153,355 168,929 51,711 160,524 Aggregate . July- Regular army Volunteer army . • 9,367 • 2,327 • 8,633 202,868 53.931 203,461 212,235 56,258 212,094 Aggregate . August — Regular army . . Volunteer army . . . 10,960 • 2,323 . 8,785 " 257,392 56,365 207,244 268,352 58,688 216,029 Aggregate 11,108 263,609 274,717 The Adjutant-General's report states that May 31, a month and tei\ Jays after the declaration of war, nearly 125,000 volunteers were mustered into service, and "the suspension of hostilities, resulting from the short but bril- liant operations of the army against Santiago, Cuba, leading to its capture and of that of the Spanish forces defending the city, the surrender of Spanish troops in Porto Rico, no less than the successful operations of oiir troops in the Philippines, led to the determination to muster out 100,000 men, nearly one-half of the entire volunteer force, and the first order looking to that end was issued on the i8th of August." The Adjutant-General speaks of the delicate duty of selecting the organi- sations to be mustered out, it being impossible "to preserve the absolutely correct arithmetical proportion, in the first instance, to the State quotas, and, in the second, to the actual number of troops from the several states," and he 632 THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. adds: "Since the signing of the Protocol the officers and men of the volunteer regiments have remained at their posts of duty, in most cases at great per- sonal sacrifice. That they have done this cheerfully and without complaint makes it all the'more desirable that a speedy increase of the regular army be provided for in order that the volunteers may be released from further service and be allowed to return to their peaceful vocations." Relating to staff organization, the Adjutant-General remarks: "If, as recommended, additional officers are given the line of the army, so as to give plenty of trained officers for staff duty in time of war, the main objection will have been met ; and it is doubtful if, under all the conditions peculiar to this government, a general reorganization of the staff, or the adoption of new systems, will be found to be desirable; certainly nothing radical should be entered upon. "Under the present system. Grant, Sherman, and Sheridan conducted great and successful campaigns; it has worked well in our Indian wars, and it is confidently asserted that, when the work of the staff departments in this war is more fully understood, it will receive the approval' of militarj' men and of the people generally. That there can be improvements in many ways there is no doubt; that this should be done as the result of experience is also true." The regiments of the regular army, with few exceptions, got their orders to proceed to southern "points April isth, and considering the situation of the army, the extent of territory over which the posts were scattered in small detachments, the movements of concentration were executed with remarkable swiftness, order and ease. It was an excellent lesson of mobilization, and the complete success of this initial step made practicable the stroke at Santiago which proved fatal .to Spanish pretension, preventing a lingering schooling of volunteers in the several camps for a greater enterprise under the Major- General Commanding, to resemble the important instruction imparted when for many months of "masterly inactivity" under McClelland all was "quiet on the Potomac." The infantry regiments' changes were made in the general shifting in this order: First United States Infantry, California, to New Orleans. Second United States Infantry, Montana and North Dakota, to Chicka- mauga Park, Ga. Third United States Infantry, Minnesota, to Mobile, Ala. THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 633 Fourth United States Infantry, Illinois, to Tampa, Fla. Fifth United States Infantry, Georgia, to Tampa, Fla. Sixth United States Infantry, Kentucky, to Tampa, Fla. Seventh United States Infantry, Colorado, to Chickamauga Park, Ga. Eighth United States Infantry, Wyoming, to Chickamauga Park, Ga. Ninth United States Infantry, New York, to Tampa, Fla. Tenth United States Infantry, Oklahoma, to Tampa, Fla. Eleventh United States Infantry, Missouri and Arkansas, Mobile, Ala. Twelfth United States Infantry, Nebraska, to Chickamauga Park, Ga. Thirteenth United States Infantry, New York, to Tampa, Fla. Sixteenth United States Infantry, Idaho and Washington, to Chicka- mauga Park, Ga. Seventeenth United States Infantry, Ohio, to Tampa, Fla. Eighteenth United States Infantry, Texas, to New Orlean-s. La. Nineteenth United States Infantry, Michigan, to Mobile, Ala. Twentieth United States Infantry, Kansas, to Mobile, Ala. Twenty-first United States Infantry, New York, to Tampa, Fla. Twenty-second United States Infantry, Nebraska, to Tampa, Fla. Twenty-third United States Infantry, Texas, to New Orleans, La. Twenty-fourth United States Infantry, Utah, to Chickamauga Park, Ga. Twenty-fifth United States Infantry, Montana, to Chickamauga Park, Ga. Company E, Engineers, West Point, to Tampa, Fla. Seven army corps were formed by order of the President, May 7th, com- bining both regulars and volunteers, and the Philippine expeditionary force was June 21st the Eighth Corps. The First and Third corps were organized at Camp Thomas, Ga. , Major-General John R. Brooke commanding the First, and Major-General James F. Wade the Third. The combined strength of these corps, on the last day of the month of April, May, June, July and August, was: _„ •!-> ,■ , , Officers. Enlisted men. April 383 6,328 May 2,191 42,036 June . .' 2,004 56,544 July 1,563 42,260 August 436 12,725 In July the First Division of the First Corps, under General Wilson, was detailed for duty in Porto Rico, and August 22 the Second and Third divisions of that corps were sent to Lexington, Ky., and Knoxville, Tenn., respectively. The Third Army Corps was transferred early in September to the camp established at Anniston, Ala., and by the end of the month but a small detachment remained at Camp Thomas, Ga. 634 THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. The Second Corps, Major-General William M. Graham commanding^ was organized at Camp Alger, Virginia, and removed when that camp was discontinued in July to Camp Meade, Middletown, Pa. The Strength of the Corps was: , Officers. Enlisted men. May 903 17,406 June ... 887 22,624 July 802 21,373 August 768 20,686 The headquarters of the Fourth Corps, Major-General John J. Coppinger commanding, were at Mobile, and the strength present was: ' Officers. Enlisted men. May 343 7,456 June 763 20,053 July 548 13,485 August 413 9,933 The Fifth Army Corps, Major-General William R. Shaffer commanding, was organized June 7th at Tampa, and embarked for Santiago June 14th. The strength of this corps for the months indicated was as follows: Officers. Enlisted men. May 769 15.657 June 791 14,945 July 840 18,619 August 518 14,347 This corps, seventy days after embarking from Tampa, was returned to the United States, owing to the prevalence of sickness. They had in the meantime received the surrender of nearly double their number of Spaniards at Santiago. The Sixth Corps was not organized. General Wilson, who was to have commanded it, was assigned to the first division of the first corps. The Seventh Corps was commanded by Major-General Fitzhugh Lee. Its strength was: Officers. Enlisted men. May 496 8,847 June 781 i8,37s July 909 23,193 August 1,025 27,817 The Eighth (Philippine Corps), Major-General Wesley Merritt command- ing, sailed from San Francisco for Manila in seven expeditions, the first, under General Thomas Anderson, 115 officers and 2,386 enlisted men. They THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 635 sailed May 25th and arrived June 30th. The second expedition, General F. V. Green, 158 officers and 3,428 men, sailed June 15th and arrived July lylh. The third expedition. General Merritt, 197 officers and 4,650 enlisted men, sailed June 27th and 29th, and arrived July 2Sth and 31st. The fourth, Gen- eral E. S. Otis, 42 officers and 1,640 enlisted men, sailed July 15th and arrived August 2ist. The fifth expedition. Colonel H. C. Kessler, 54 officeis and 1,294 men, sailed July 19th and arrived August 24th. The sixth expedition. General H. G. Otis, sailed July 23d and arrived August 24th, 50 officers and 846 men. The seventh expedition, Lieutenant- Colonel Lee Stover, 25 officers and 814 enlisted men, sailed July 29th and arrived August 31st. The total of the seven expeditions was 641 officers and i5,c58 enlisted men. Since that date, October 19, 27, 28 and 30, the troops that sailed for Manila were 99 officers and 2,565 men. The grand total of United States officers and enlisted men who have made the voyage from San Francisco to Manila is 17,363. The subjoined table exhibit^ the strength and distribution of the Army of the United States through the Spanish war: RESUME OF STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION OF TROOPS. Command. May. o c E June. O c B w July. o August. O Department of California Department of Colorado Department of Columbia Department of Dakota Department of the East Department of the Gulf Department of the Lakes Department of the Missouri.... First and Third Corps Second Corps Fourth Corps Fifth Corps Seventh Corps Eighth Coi-ps (Dept. of Pacific) Porto Rico Department of Santiago At State Camps, en route, at recruiting stations, on fur- lough, etc 98 45 21 2-1 53" 230 18 23 2,191 903 342 769 496 636 2,176 956 431 662 12,093 4,921 221 757 42,036 17,406 7,456 15,657 8,847 13,179 S7 39 38 16 586 232 31 20 2,004 867 763 791 7S1 865 1,716 1,250 997 722 15,576 5,792 597 591 56,544 22,624 20,058 14,945 iS,375 22,124 70 41 41 67 577 249 28 20 1,563 802 548 890 909 917 377 1,745 1,329 1,256 2,056 17,240 7,228 646 598 42,260 21,378 13,485 18,619 23,193 22,536 9,084 2,089 33,716 2,227 20,957 3,861 74,739 40 43 32 804 280 20 19 438 768 413 5.18 1,025 899 641 299 4,771 2,390 I>5l6 1,416 955 23,248 7,262 185 522 12,725 20,688 9.933 14,347 27,817 22,046 16,332 6,7-18 95.479 Grand total.. 8,415 160,514 9,367 202,868 10,960 257,93: 263,609 636 THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. Casualties. — The following is a statement of the several actions in which United States troops were engaged during the war with Spain, and of the losses sustained by them from April 21 to August 13, 1S98: Operations in Cuba.— May 2 : Point Arbolitos, Companies E and G, First Infantry, under Capt. J.H. Dorst, Fourth Cavalry. No casualties. Siege and Surrender of Santiago, June 22 to July 17. (Maj. -Gen. Wil- liam R. Shaffer, commanding Fifth Army Corps) : June 24. — La Quasina: Cavalry division, Maj. -Gen. Joseph Wheeler, commanding. Second Cavalry Brigade, Brig. -Gen. S. B. M. Young. Present for duty, June 20, 74 officers and 1,067 enlisted men. Killed, one officer and 15 enlisted men; wounded, 6 officers and 44 enlisted men. Officers killed and wounded, 7. Killed: Capt. A. K. Capron, First United States Volunteer Cavalry. Wounded: Majs. J. M. Bell, First Cavalry, and A. O. Brodie, First United States Volunteer Cavalry; Capts. T. T. Knox, First Cavalry, and J. H. McClintock, First United States Volunteer Cavalry; First Lieuts. G. L. Byram, First Cavalry, and J. R. Thomas, Jr., First United States Volunteer Cavalry. July 1-12. — Operations against Santiago, embracing the actions at San Juan, El Caney, and Aguadores, July 1-3, and actions around Santiago, July 10-12. Present for duty, June 30, 858 officers and 17,358 enlisted men. Killed: 22 officers and 222 enlisted men; wounded, 93 officers and 1,288 enlisted men. Officers killed and wounded, 122. Killed: Col. C. A. Wikoff, Twenty- second Infantry; Lieut. -Col. J. M. Hamilton, Ninth Cavalry; Maj. A. G. Forse, First Cavalry; Capts. C. W. Rowell, Second Infantry; A. M. Wetherill, Sixth Infantry; John Drum, Tenth Infantry; T. W. Morrison, Sixteenth Irifantry, and William O'Neill, First United States Volunteer Cavalry; First Lieuts. W. E. Shipp and W. H. Smith, Tenth Cavalry; J. G. Ord, Sixth Infantry; G. H. Field, Second Massachusetts Infantry; Second Lieuts. J. J. Bernard, Fourth Infantry; E. N. Benchley, Sixth Infantry; T. A. Wansboro, Seventh Infantry; L. H. Lewis, Ninth Infantry; W. A. Safer, Thirteenth Infantry; D. M. Michie, Seventeenth Infantry; J. A. Guerney and J. N. Augustin, Twenty-fourth Infantry; H. L. McCorkle, Twenty-fifth Infantry, and Acting Assistant Surgeon H. W. Danforth, who was on duty with Ninth Cavalry. GENERAL W. F. RANDOLPH. BOB WRENN AND BILLY LARNED. TRAIN OF PACK MULES. SERGEANT TAN HEWITT. THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 639 Wounded: Brig.-Gen. H. S. Hawkins. Lieut. -Cols. Henry Carroll, Ninth Cavalry; H. C. Egbert, Sixth Infantry; W. S. Worth, Thirteenth Infantry; J. T. Haskell, Seventeenth Infantry ; E. H. Liscum, Twenty-fourth Infantry; J. H. Patterson, Twenty-second Infantry. Majs. H. W. Wessells, Third Cavalry; T. J. Wint, Tenth Cavalry; J. H. Smith, Second Infantry; A. W. Corliss, Seventh Infantry; S. H. Lincoln and R. I. Eskridge, Tenth Infantry; P. H. Ellis, Thirteenth Infantry, and W. C. Hayes, First Ohio Cavalry. Capts. H. L. Mills, A. A. G. Volunteers (first lieutenant, First Cavalry); G. K. Hunter and G. A. Dodd, Third Cavalry; J. B. Kerr and A. P. Blocksom, Sixth Cavalry; C. W. Taylor, Ninth Cavalry; John Bigelow, Jr., Tenth Cavalry; C. D. Parkhurst, Second Artillery; W. J. Turner, Second Infantry; Z. W. Torrey and G. B. Walker, Sixth Infantry; J. B. Jackson, Seventh Infantry; R. C. Van' Vliet, Tenth Infantry; James Fornance, J. B. Guthrie, and H. G. Cavanaugh, Thirteenth Infantry; William Lassiter, W. C. McFarland, and T. C. Woodbury, Sixteenth Infantry; H. B. Moon and J. B. Rodman, Twentieth Infantry; F. B. Jones, J. J. Crittenden, and Theodore Mosher, Twenty-second Infantry; A. C. Ducat and J. J. Brereton, Twenty-fourth Infantry; W. S. Warrener, Second Massachusetts Infantry, and Capt. M. J. Henry, commissary of subsistence volunteers. First Lieuts. Arthur Thayer, A. C. Merrillat, and O. B. Meyer, Third Cavalry; W. S. Wood, Ninth Cavalry; R. L. Livermore, E. D. Anderson, and M. H. Barnum, Tenth Cavalry; W. C. Neary, Fourth Infantry; J. S. Grissard, Seventh Infantry; J. R. Seyburn, Eighth Infantry; Carl Koops, Tenth Infantry; A. B. Scott, Thirteenth Infantry; S. W. Dunning, Sixteenth Infantry; W. M. Dickinson, Seventeenth Infantry; G. J. Godfrey, Twenty- second Infantry; H. G. Lyon and J. E. Brett, Twenty-fourth Infantry; R. C. Day and J. A. Carr, First United States Volunteer Cavalry. Second Lieuts. W. C. Short, Sixth Cavalry; F. R. McCoy, T. A. Roberts, H. C. Whitehead, and H. O. Williard, Tenth Cavalry; B. H. Wells and W. J. Lutz, Second Infantry; J. H. Hughes, Fourth Infantry; L. H. Gross, C. N. Purdy, John Robertson, R. S. Turman, and W. H. Simons, Sixth Infantry; H. A. Lafferty, Seventh Infantry; M. C. Saville, Tenth Infantry; W. E. Dove and Clark Churchman, Twelfth Infantry; L. S. Sorley and R. E. Spence, Sixteenth Infantry; B. F. Hardaway, Seventeenth Infantry; F. R. Meade, Twenty-first Infantry; W. H. Wassell, Twenty-second Infantry; Albert Laws, Twenty-fourth Infantry; J. S. Murdock and H. L. Kinnison, 640 THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. Twenty-fifth Infantry; D. J. Moynehan and C. D. Hapgood, Second Massa- chusetts Infantry; W. E. Trull, Seventy-first New York Infantry; D. J. Leahy and H. K. Devereaux, First United States Volunteer Cavalry, and Acting Second Lieut, (cadet M. A.) Ernest A. Haskell, First United States Volunteer Cavalry. Operations in Porto Rico, July 25 to August 13 (Maj.-Gen. Nelson A. Miles, commanding) : July 25. — Guanica road: i officer and 3 enlisted men wounded. August 5. — Guayamo: 4 enlisted men wounded. August 8. — Four miles north of Guayamo: 5 enlisted men wounded. August 9. — Near Coamo: 6 enlisted men wounded. August 10. — Hormigueros: i enlisted man killed; i officer and 15 enlisted men wounded. Officer wounded: First Lieut. J. C. Byron, Eighth Cavalry, A. D. C. to General Schwan. August 12. — Pass near Arbonito: 2 enlisted men killed; 2 officers and 3 enlisted men wounded. Officers wounded: Capt. F. T. Lee, Third Wisconsin Infantry, and Lieut. J. P. Hains, Third Artillery. August 13. — At crossing of the Rio Prieto, near Las Marias: No casualties. The total casualties in Porto Rico were 3 enlisted men killed and 4 officers and 36 enlisted men wounded. Operations in Manila, Philippines, July 30 to August 13 (Maj.-Gen. Wesley Merritt, commanding) : July 30 - August 5. — In the trenches before Manila: Thirteen enlisted men killed; 7 officers and 57 enlisted men wounded. Officers wounded: Capts. C. V. Hobbs, Third Artillery, Reinhold Richter, First California Infantry, and J. A. Loar, Tenth Pennsylvania Infantry; First Lieuts. E. F. Davis, First California Infantry, and R. D. Laird, Tenth Pennsylvania Infantry; Second Lieuts. A. J. Buttermore and G. L. Gordon, Tenth Pennsylvania Infantry. August 13. — Assault on Manila: 4 enlisted men killed; 3 officers and 39 enlisted men wounded. Officers ^rounded: Capts. Oscar Seabach, A. W. Bjomstad, and First Lieut. C. G. Bunker, Thirteenth Minnesota Infantry. The total casualties in Manila were: 17 enlisted men killed, 10 officers and 96 men wounded. THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 641 Grand total of casualties in killed and wounded during the war witll Spain: , Killed V , Wounded ^ Enlisted Enlisted Where— Officers. men. Officers. men. Cuba 23 237 99 1,332 Porto Rico ...... 3 4 36 Manila . . 17 10 96 Total 23 257 113 1,464 The number of deaths from all causes, between May i and September 30 inclusive, as reported to the Adjutant-General's office up to October 3, were: Killed, 23 officers and 257 enlisted men; died of wounds, 4 officers and 61 enlisted men; died of disease, 80 officers and 2,485 enlisted men. Total, 107 officers and 2,803 enlisted men, being an aggregate of 2,910 out of a total force of 274,717 officers and men, or a percentage of lyfj^. Statement showing the embarkation of Spanish- prisoners, officers, and enlisted men, and the wives of officers and their children over 5 years of age, priests, monks, and sisters of charity, from Cuba to Spain, as reported to the Quartermaster-General's office by Mr. Solon F. Massey, agent, Quarter- master's Department: Name of vessel. Where embarked. +j '7*' o Number of persons. "rt E O oi ir' -a c . m o a- J= O Alicante Isle de Luzon Covadonga Villaverde Isla de Panay P. de .Satrustegui.. Montevideo Cheribon Colon Colon Leo XIII San Ignacio Leonora Ciudad de Cadiz... San Augustin San Francisco Santiago Santiago Santiago Santiago Santiago Santiago Santiago Santiago Sant iago Guantanamo Guantanamo Guantanamo Guantanamo Guantanamo Guantanamo Guantanamo Aug. 9 Aug. 14 Aug. 16 Aug, 19 Aug. 19 Aug. 22 Aug. 25 Aug. 27 Aug. 2S Aug. 30 Sept. I Sept. 3 Sept. 6 Sept. 12 Sept. 17 Sept. 17 38 137 109 5 99 12S 136 18 100 23 113 59 15 53 65 iS 1,069 2,056 2,148 565 1.599 2,359 2,108 905 1,316 726 2,209 1,40s 1,118 800 58S 1,107 2,193 2,257 617 1,698 2,487 2,244 923 1,416 749 1,467 1. 133 53 865 606 I 16 34 18 19 31 53 12 36 3 51 10 5 24 45 16 7 37 69 25 23 57 10 14 24 9 13 1,124 2,237 2,336 651 1.729 2,555 2,368 960 1.475 754 2,430 1,499 1,133 86 910 617 Total.. 1,163 20,974|22,i37 331 348 27 2; ,864 642 THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. Principal camps of United States troops, dates of estabHshment, and number of deaths by disease, accidents, etc., at each to September 30, as reported to the Adjutant-General's Office: « Date of Camps — establishment. Deaths. Camp Thomas, Chickamauga Park, Ga. . . Apr. 14 425 Camp Cuba Libre, Jacksonville, Fla. . . May 26 246 Tampa, Fla May 2 56 Cuba (not including killed or died of wounds) June 22 427 At sea, en route from Cuba to Montauk Point Aug. and Sept. 87 Camp Wikoff, Montauk Point, N. Y. . . Aug. 7 257 Manila, Philippine Islands June 30 63 Porto Rico July 25 137 Camp Alger, near Falls Church and vicinity May 18 107 Camps in San Francisco May 7 139 Camp Poland, Knoxville, Tenn Aug. 21 23 Camp Shipp, Anniston, Ala Sept. 3 12 Camp Meade, near Middletown, Pa. . . . Aug. 24 64 Camp Hamilton, Lexington, Ky. . . . Aug. 23 29 Camp Wheeler, Huntsville, Ala Aug. 17 35 At posts, minor camps, etc 37S Total 2,485 « The report of the Quartermaster-General, M. J. Ludington, gives an idea ■of the magnitude of the problem of supplying an army of 275,000 men with the machinery and stores provided for an army of 25,000. The General says: "This Department set upon this task without a moment's delay; every known expedient was at once resorted to with a view to obtaining the neces- sary quartermaster supplies. Many difficulties were in the waj'. Contracts were promptly entered into for all the articles of clothing and camp equipage for which there would be an early demand, great care being taken to prevent the supply of articles of inferior quality. The kerseys and flannels of stand- ard quality used for making army blouses and trousers were not to be had in the market, and it was necessary to have them manufactured. In the mean- time, the Department, as far as possible, endeavored to procure articles con- forming as nearly as practicable to existing standards, but had to resort, at first, to some extent, to the purchase of dark-blue trousers, so that the men might be quickly supplied. ' ' THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 643 The peace and war figures of the principal articles purchased or con- tracted for are instructive when the two periods are contrasted : July 1, 1897, to Apr. .SO, 189S. 10 months peace period. May I, ISiW, to Aug. 15. 1898, 3',i months war period. 22,000 546,338 274,232 77,000 230,000 31,601 31,590 50,000 43,340 1,056,990 153,169 18,040 476,705 I 1,000 588,800 129,000 32,9-^5 325,385 548,634 76,093 27,950 782,303 1,996,699 40,006 150,942 Blankets, wool Blouses Caps, forage Canvas, fatigue coats . Canvas fatigue trousers, pairs Drawers, canton flannel, pairs Drawers, summer, pairs . Field and summer uniforms Hats, campaign .... Leggins Overcoats Ponchos, rubber .... Shirts, dark blue flannel Shoes, barrack, pairs Shoes, calfskin, pairs . Stockings, cotton, pairs Stockings, woolen, pairs It is not surprising to learn that "the shoes procured at the outbreak of hostilities, and which were found to be essential for the immediate equipment of the organizations then being rapidly mustered into service, did not conform altogether to the newly adopted army shoe." This does not look like inattention: "The clothing of part of the troops returning from Cuba was ordered to be destroyed to prevent contagion, and the issue to each of the men, free of charge, of another suit in lieu of the one destroyed was authorized. Similar issue was also made to the men in hos- pitals whose clothing was destroyed for the same reason." There is much said in few words in this paragraph : "Fourteen ships were chartered to June 30, 1898, on the Pacific coast, having a total tonnage of 41,152 and carrying capacity of 629 officers and 13,059 men, with their complete outfit of camp and garrison equipage, arms, ammu- nition, medical and subsistence stores for a voyage of over 7,000 miles. " And . this was without a serious accident. The movements of troops up to Septem- ber 15 was: to Cuba, 28,195; to Porto Rico, 17,460; to Manila, 16,405; to 644 THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. Honolulu, 629; returned from Cuba, 21,686; returned from Porto Rico, 5,541; civilian employes transported, 2,920; the total being 92,863. A resume of the work done by the Quartermaster's Department at Tampa in the short space of four mpnths is as follows: Army corps equipped, 2; freight cars handled (loaded or unloaded), 13,239; officers and men trans- ported, 66,478; horses and mules transported, 15,309; horses and mules received, 11,389; horses and mules issued, 9,919; \vagons "set up," 604; teams "broken out" (6 mules), 141; teams "broken out" (4 mules), 520; pack trains equipped, 21; wagons and ambulances repaired, 699; transports fitted out, 33; transports cleared, 78. The Quartermaster in his general summary observes : "Practically every- thing needed for the largely increased army had to be purchased or manu- factured and then transported to the numerous camps." During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1898, transportation was furnished for 709,617 persons, 60,632 animals, and 1,529,585 tons of war material. f~One of the public complaints, widespread and bitter, of the disadvantages to which our soldiers were exposed when facing the enemy at Santiago and Manila, was that the Spaniards had the advantage of us in smokeless powder, and that their rifle, the Mauser, was an excellent long-range gun. General D. W. Flagler, Chief of Ordnance, gives in his report to the Secretary of War this interesting information: "The especial advantage of the magazine rifle is its reserve of five cartridges in the magazine, the very important advantage of its flatter tra- jectory, and the lighter weight of its ammunition, which enables the soldier to carry more cartridges. The most serious defect of the Springfield rifle during the war was the fact that at the origin nothing but charcoal powder could be furnished for it. As rapidly as possible this defect was overcome, and the manufacture of smokeless ammunition for the caliber .45 rifle was carried on extensively. The large reserve of Springfield rifles on hand will be supplied with smokeless-powder cartridges should their use become neces- sary in the future, a use which is not now anticipated. The arms, however, are being cleaned and repaired and made fit for service as rapidly as turned in. ''^ "Reports of o^fficers who were in the Santiago campaign, as received by a special board which proceeded to Montauk Point to investigate the subject, confirm the excellence of the magazine rifle, caliber .30, in all respects. THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 645 Notwithstanding rough usage, unusual exposure in a bad climate, which pi'e- vented the exercise of the usual care in preserving the arm, the breech mechanism is reported to have worked smoothly and well." The American magazine rifle has had fastened upon it the name Krag- Jorgensen. General Flagler says: "At Springfield Arsenal there were manufactured up to June 30, 1898,- some 30,000 magazine rifles, 12,000 magazine carbines, an output of about 1 1,000 more than during the last fiscal year, but this does not show the large increase incident to the war. The maximum was not reached until August 13, when about 370 per day, or over 100,000 per year, were being manufac- tured. The average daily output before March 15 was about 120. This out- put was gradually increased to the maximum by working double shifts of men and putting them on as rapidly as was practicable. The utmost output at Springfield with the present plant would not exceed about 500 per day. In February the manufacturers were given orders to work on smokeless powder to their full capacity. Under these orders, with the charcoal powder obtained, the amount on hand brought the supply up to a reasonably safe point. The first issues of powder for field and siege guns were made from charcoal powder on hand; but before the end of May the supply of smokeless powder was ready, and this was issued thereafter." The Secretary of War remarks: "The supply of powder was a most troublesome question at the outbreak of the war. There are only two establishments in this country which manu- facture smokeless powder, and they own patents upon the process. These, however, like all other companies called to aid the government, responded with alacrity, ran their works day and night, and produced in a short time an ample supply. The same can be said for all manufacturers of tents, cloth- ing, all kinds of guns, cartridges, and other war material, and but for their most energetic exertions we would have been sadly deficient." The Secretary recommends that there should be 500,000 magazine rifles in our arsenals. General Greeley, in his report on the Signal .Service, says the work of the corps "affords a beautiful example of the rapidity and efficiency with which electrical communications can be established and main- tained between military posts and advancing armies when the commanding general of such armies takes proper equipments," and instances: "The peace protocol reached the outposts of Generals Brooke, Wilson, and Henry within 646 THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. thirty-three minutes of the time it was received at Ponce, and thus prevented battles at two points where the troops were moving out." One hundred and seventy miles of line were operated -in Porto Rico when the end of the war came. General Greeley says : "Cables had to be manufactured to order, steamer chartered, cable gear obtained, and the Chief Signal Officer opened negotiations with commercial telegraph companies whereby the whole system would be harmonious. As a result of two months' labor, the Signal Corps opened a station at Cainanera, Guantanamo Bay, June 20, a day in advance of the landing of General Shaffer's army, and within five minutes telegraphically of the Executive Mansion and War Department." The pages of this volume given to telegrams prove that this marvelous connection between the President and headquarters in the field did not, as has been the rule in wars, cripple the armies, taking the initiative out of the gen- erals commanding and confronting the enemy, but, on the contrary, energized them, and constantly facilitated rather than retarded the decisive movements. Next to the belated and scandalous disturbance about fresh meat, there was the most disheartening palaver and clamorous outcry relating to water in the camps, and the spot selected to overwhelm this storm was the camp at Chickamauga Park. And yet twenty-seven wells were drilled through the solid rock underlying the park, though springs abounded. Genei'al H. V. Boynton, of the Park Commission, says: "By casing and surrounding the wells at the surface with masonry set in hydraulic cement, surface contamination was rendered impossible. While this work was in progress an emergency pipe line, designed primarily to pro- vide water for cooking, for the large number of animals, and for washing, was recommended and authorized by the Secretary of War, and constructed by the engineer of the park. The intake was established on Chickamauga Creek at the farthest point of park ownership of the stream, and above any possible wash from the camps, in spite of all that has been asserted to the contrary. This stream is fed entirely from mountain springs, and the valley it flows through is exceptionally clean and wholesome. Ten miles of mains and laterals were expeditiously laid, furnishing abundant water to nearly all the camps, and shower baths for all who cared to arrange them. "All the springs and wells on the park, and the water of the pipe line, were analyzed by competent chemical autliority as soon as any question was THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 647 raised as to the purity of the water supply, and all in use by troops pro- nounced fit for domestic use, except two wells, which at first were regarded as doubtful, and their use stopped, but which were found by more thorough analyses to be good. The pipe-line water was twice analyzed chemically, and once bacteriologically by Dr. C. F. Craig of the army, a recognized aruthority, and pronounced good. While the water supply of the park was abundant and wholesome, the outcry against it, though not based on analyses, became so general as to lead to much hauling of spring water for considerable distances, to the great inconvenience of the troops and the hospitals, and the unneces- sary disturbance of the countr)'. " There is no doubt that a good deal of bad stuff called "beef" was sent to the army, and it has been decorated with the descriptive word "embalmed,'* while it is asserted that "chemicals" were used, and frightful fluids injected — something different from the common chemistry of salt, we infer. The magnificent energies of the modern journalism were largely bestowed upon this chemical terror, and after a war into which the Administration of the Government was forced when there was a plentiful lack of preparation and through which the Nation passed triumphantly, there was a sensation that rivaled the Dreyfus scandal in France, but fortunately Americans are less excitable and fantastic in expression than Frenchmen. The motive forces of the emotion seemed to spring from the soil where there was a failure to cultivate the primary opportunities in the season when the seed was sown for the harvest of events. The personalities that figured in the unseemly proceedings need not be noticed. They were embodiments of vanities and other weaknesses of ostentation that lacks substantiality. The pose of passion that was full of tears and has a tendency to tatters may be forgiven sooner than the pride that stooped to folly and fancies cloudy campaigns. Napoleon and Wellington had tormenting troubles with the providers of provisions, meats in particular, for their armies, and prescribed the shooting of the commissaries; and Patrick Henry heaped an immortality of ridicule upon a contractor who had sold beef to the old Continentals, filling the air with cries of "Beef, beef!" Some of the journals that in their majestic pre- sumption not only conducted the war, but claimed the honor of causing it, and indulged in the tropical luxuriance of their imagination, sounded the brasses, and blowed the wind about their luxuriant theme. There was enough shown of carelessness, experimental or speculative, or 648 THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. of alack of executive intelligence in discrimination, to .warrant anger, but the exaggeration of details that offend, distort and magnify until wrath is wasted in weariness, and there is a stage set with strange scenery, reminding one of the poetry of a lunatic describing a wilderness in which his mind was lost: ■ "Yonder indigenous endogen wave Banner-like blades from a mystical bole, And with a vigor perennial, brave Boreal blasts from the Alien pole." Fresh meat is hard to manage in hot countries in good form, whatever may be the experimental chemistry of speculation. The ship anchored near- est the flagship of Admiral Dewey in Manila Bay was a Belgian cold-storage iron steamer from Australia, filled with frozen beef and mutton. A boat-load of it was conveyed to the deck of the Olympia every day, placed on and cov- ered by a sail, that it might slowly thaw. If the flesh is released from the ice suddenly, if cooked before the process of thawing is complete, it turns black and cannot be eaten, loses flavor and acts like something "embalmed." Let the thaw occur gradually, and the beef and mutton become — it is the Admiral's word — "delicious." The fact as to the embalmed beef is that, as it was known the meat of steers became ill-flavored in from twelve to sixteen hours, there was offered an experiment in fresh meat alleged to have been prepared so that it would remain good seventy hours. It was referred to General Young, who reported against the experiment. Then permission was. asked to put some of it on two transports for trial. That was granted. The experiment failed, and the stuff was thrown overboard. Lieutenant Jose MuUer is the Spanish officer who called on Lieutenant Hobson in Morro Castle and insisted upon asking him questions with an air of severity, but was questioned himself, and it finally developed that he had been playing a part of intimidation, he and Hobson separating as good friends in pleasant fellowship. His account of the battles and capitulation of Santiago de Cuba is valuable, and we quote from his work passages of interest to the American army and all students of its history. He says of the situation of the city in the middle of June: "One of the first articles that gave out was flour, and no bread could be baked. Hardtack (galleta) was used instead, but only a few people could pay for it ; there was no milk to be had, indispensable for the sick and for babies. THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 649 The soldiers commenced to eat bread made of rice and rice boiled in water, which weakened them very much; and though they were not suffering actual hunger, everybody knew that calamity was not far off and was inevitable, for no provisions could be expected, either by land or sea." It was the scarcity of provisions, Lieutenant Mailer says, that "compelled General Linares to defend the line, which, beginning at Ermitailo and pass- ing through El Caney, San Miguel de Lajas, Quintero Hill and the hills of La Caridad and Veguita, would protect the railway to Sabanilla and Mordn and the aqueduct. If the troops could have maintained this line, they would not have suffered for lack of water, as they did in some positions, nor would the food, as long as we remained in possession of the cultivated region, have been reduced to rice bread and rice boiled in water, which the soldiers could not stand and which made them unfit for active operations. There was nothing left in Santiago except rice, and only 500,000 extra cartridges outside of the regular supply of the soldiers, namely, 150 each; for althotigh there were many more included in the surrender of the Park, they are of the Remington, Argentine Mauser, and other types, and of calibers differing from those of the Spanish Mauser, which is the weapon carried by almost all of our forces. Of course, 150 cartridges are used up ver}' rapidly. "If El Caney and the San Juan position had not been taken we should not have lost our communications with the cultivated region, nor would the aqueduct have been cut, and it is easy enough to understand how much these two things had to do with later events. "The ships would no doubt have reduced the city to ashes and ruin, but there would have been water and more provisions, and the army would have been able to maintain itself and fight, at least until the last cartridge was gone. " Here the lamentation comes in that the insurgent Cubans had held back Escario's column, with which it is assumed that the long line could have been maintained on the 27th of June. "The Vesuvius had di.scharged two bombs the preceding night, one com- pletely destroying the house of the lighthouse keeper, the other seriously damaging the fortress, wounding three sailors of the Mercedes, and a soldier of the garrison." And yet the German Admiral who has been writing of the lessons of America for the benefit of our countrymen pronounces the dyna- Siite boat as without value. The Spaniards by watching the transport ships Vere able to tell approximately the number of the Americans on hand. 650 THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. This account is gi^jen of the numbers and organization of the defenders of Santiago : "The advance post of Caney (a league and a half — about 6 miles — from the city), in command of General Vara del Rey, was defended by three com- panies of the battalion 'Constitucidn' (the 29th), one company of guerrillas on foot, in all 430 men. 40 soldiers of the Santiago regiment, and 50 of the mobilized troops, being a total of 520 men. "The line of J;he precinct (9 kilometers), extending from Dos Caminos del Cobre, west of the city, to the fort of Punta Blanca, to the east, on the sea- shore, was defended by the following forces: Corps of sailors from the fleet (four second companies) . . . 458 Four companies of the Provisional Battalion of Puerto Rico . 450 Talavera Battalion, No. 4 (Peninsular) 850 Four companies of the San Fernando Battalion, No. it . . 440 Total, army 2,198 Three companies of mobilized troops 330 Volunteers 440 Total 2,968 "Also a small number of gunners, for there was not a sufficient number to serve the guns installed. It may therefore be said that there were, in round numbers, 3,000 men. This was the fighting force." There was also the cavalry, the firemen and 970 men at the mouth of the harbor. The Spanish story of the battles of El Caney and San Juan is intensely interesting. General Vara del Rey had 520 men, with two Plasincia guns, and the position of San Juan was occupied by 250 men. They claimed that General Wheeler had 12,000 men, a remarkable exaggeration. Another statement is that Wheeler's command was 3,500 men, supported by another brigade, "while Colonel Chaffee, with 2,000 men, attacked the hill and fort of San Juan." Lieutenant MuUer says: "The Americans, it must be acknowledged, fought that day with truly admirable courage and spirit. The houses of El Caney, which General Vara with his 520 men converted into as many fortresses, threw forth a hail of pro- jectiles upon the enemy, while one company after another, without any pro- tection, rushed with veritable fury upon the city. The first company having been decimated, another appeared, then a third, and still another, and those THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 651 soldiers resembled moving statues (if I may be permitted that expression for want of a better) rather than men ; but they met heroes, and although the houses had been riddled with bullets by the artillery and musketry, and although the streets were obstructed with dead and wounded. El Caney had been converted into a veritable volcano, vomiting forth lava and making it impossible to go near it. "Both sides being short of forces and out of breath, almost without having stirred from their relative positions, the battle ceased for some time, and General Vara del Re)' took advantage of this circumstance to have his sol- diers re-form the lines and again get ready for the battle. 'General Linares, who was repulsing the attacks at the position of San Juan, upon learning the result of these assaults, warmly congratulated the handful of lions in these words: 'When the American army attacked El Caney they had not counted on a general of Vara del Rey's stamp and on troops as fiery and inured to warfare as those he had under his command.' "The fighting commenced once more, and the enemy attacked again and again, being always repulsed, but as we had no reserve forces, and the Americans, on the contrary, had a great many, the battle was no longer pos- sible under these circumstances. The General was wounded almost simul- taneously in both legs by two musket balls, and as he was being carried away on a stretcher, the bullets falling around him like hail, he was killed by a third one, at the same moment as two of the men who were carrying him. "The greater part of the commanders and officers (among them two rela- tives of the General) were dead or wounded, as also the majority of the sol- diers. Finally, at 7 p. m., the commander being dead and those 520 men having been reduced to less than 100, and most of these slightl}' wounded and bruised, that handful of heroes, for want of forces and a commander, retreated from the site, which for ten hours they had been defending without being able to get any reinforcements, for there were jjone to be had, and the enemy occupied the position in which he in his turn had made such a bold attack." Only eighty of the 520 Spaniards who fought at El Caney returned. The Spaniards organized and entrenched at San Juan, and "the Americans attacked about noon with cannon, machine gun and musket fire. The Spanish position became critical," as "one half of the officers had fallen under the action of the lead that was pouring down upon the line. The enemy was advancing in large and compact masses, firmly resolved to take the positions, 652 THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. but Baqiiero, the brave soldier who had distinguished himself so highly in the campaign, was there, keeping up by his example the spirit of the troops, almost annihilated by hunger and fatigue, and decimated by the clouds of bul- lets and grapeshot. "At this critical moment the cavalry was ordered to advance rapidly in order to protect the retreat of Colonel Baquero's forces and save the artillery if possible. Lieutenant-Colonel Sierra hastened to carry out the order, as Commander Arraiz had done before him at San Juan. " "The line which General Linares commanded personally now formed the vanguard. With his assistance the General's aids and his chief of staff had to organize the remnants of the first line. "It was necessary to maintain that position at any cost, for its loss would give the enemy free entrance into the city. The brave men of the first line were retreating. Colonel Baquero had disappeared, killed, no doubt, when he led that retreat under the hail of grapeshot and lead. The enemy was advancing in compact masses, and rushing upon what was now the first line. Fortunately, the fire of our infantry, accurately aimed, compelled the Ameri- cans to recede, and they retreated behind the positions of San Juan. At that moment General Linares and the brave commander of infantry, Arraiz, fell wounded; the latter officer, who had already shed his blood at Cacarajicara, was one of the most beautiful examples of the army. "The San Juan forces tried once more to recover themselves. Others came to their assistance, among them the company of marines which had been stationed at the Plaza de Toros with Captain Bustamente ; but the enemy was already strongly occupying the position, our forces were scant, and success was impossible." The Spanish writer speaks of "the cruel battles of El Caney and San Juan." At 3:30, at the Plaza de Dolores, he met General Linares. He was on a stretcher being carried to his house. The battle was at an end, and "many commanders and officers were arriving all tired out and almost d)'ing from thirst." The Spanish hospital was near the trenches, and "musket balls were falling in great quantities in the court and on the roof. Later on shells were flying in all directions." The loss of El Caney was the loss of both provisions and water by the Spaniards, and the writer we are quoting gave up the ghost of a chance in these words: "We had to confine ourselves to the defense of the precinct, knowing full I THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 653 well that, though the sad end might be held off for a day or two longer, there was no possibility of avoiding it." He claims that the Americans were inspired by the fighting of the Span- iards with respectful admiration; and says the Americans did not after the ist of July expose themselves as on that day, but "entrenched themselves and set up their artillery as fast as they received it, and did not again come out from behind their fortifications." And "it was difficult to convince them that only 520 men had been defending El Caney for ten hours. When doubt was no longer possible,. their admiration had no limits. When they entered Santiago de Cuba the American soldiers and ours looked upon each other without any prejudice or jealousy, perhaps because they knew that both had fought like brave men, and whenever the Americans saw one of our men of the Twenty- ninth (the number of the battalion 'Constitucidn,' which had defended the city, and has been referred to so many times) they would call him, look at him, and treat him with great admiration, wondering, perhaps, how so simple a soldier could do such great things. "The men of the Twenty-ninth, known to have done something worth doing, were loved and feasted by every one and spent whole hours with the Americans, who did not understand them, but applauded everything they said, on the assumption, perhaps, that he who is brave must also be bright. "Incidents like these 1 saw, not once, but a hundred times, and they have made me believe and say what I have stated. I may be mistaken, but I do not believe it, because I have also noticed that the Yankees treat the insur- gents, although they are their allies, very differently." According to their own list, the casualties of the Spaniards were: Killed: Brigadier-General Joaquin Vara del Rey, 3 commanders, 12 officers, and 78 men. Missing: Colonel of Infantry Jose Baquero, 4 officers, and 116 men. The Colonel was probably killed, but this could not be verified. Prisoners: Two officers. Wounded: Lieutenant-General Arsenio Linares Pombo, 6 commanders, 30 officers, and 339 men. (Among the wounded officers was Colonel of Engineers Caula and Colonel of Artillery Ordotlez). Total, 595. The Spanish story of the siege is that the Americans opened fire by land and sea. "Each hour that elapsed fortified the circle that enclosed us," and 6S4 THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. in the night the Americans "kept up most incessantly a violent musket and terrific gun fire," bombarded the city, dismounted one of the two effective guns on the Socapa, and on the 2d of July the companies of the fleet embarked, and "a pilot was sent to each one of the ships, which latter took in their boats and steam launches and loosened the spring on their cables, and the gunboat Alvarado, which had come out of the slip and was afloat, raised at night the six Bustamente torpedoes that were obstructing the channel to the west. Everything indicated, without leaving room for doubt, that the fleet was about to go out; but when and how?" That question was answered the next morning. Even that night the Spaniards believed there was a fleet coming from Spain to the rescue of Santiago. On the next day after the destruction of Cervera's fleet, July 4th, Lieutenant Muller says, the Jlercedes was sunk to obstruct the harbor channel. "As the interior of the harbor did no longer have the safeguard of the fleet, as the Bustamente torpedoes (six of them) had been taken up so that the fleet could go ont, and had not yet been replaced, and as, finally, the first line of mines no longer existed, the commander of marine decided — General Toral also being of his opinion — to sink the Mercedes." This took place about noon, the harbor having been open twenty-four hours for our victorious and unharmed squadron, and one of the two guns that fought our fleet at the mouth of the harbor was dismounted. If advantage had been taken of the situation, the controversy between Shaffer and Sampson, representing the army and the navy, might have been avoided. After the departure of Cervera's fleet from the harbor, and from life, the streets of Santiago were "dark as wolves' dens," and infested by robbers. General Toral issued a decree that, "All soldiers who shall destroy or set on fire buildings or property, or commit any acts of violence on persons, shall be punished by confinement in the penitentiary for life, after previous degrada- tion, in conformity with Article 239 of the Code of Military Justice. The penalty of death shall be imposed upon the instigators, or persons employing soldiers for this purpose." This was dated July 16. On the loth the Americans opened a lively fire from their trenches, and the fleet also. The Spanish loss was 7 killed and 47 wounded. A single shell from the fleet completely ruined a house in the city Twenty-three projectiles fell within a small space. On the 12th of July m •X 3 PI H a B H W w •X w c w H Z n o THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES. 657 General Linares, wounded and in his bed, telegraphed the Commander-in-Chief and Minister of War: "The situation is fatal; surrender inevitable; we are only prolonging the agony; the sacrifice is useless; the enemy knows it, fully realizing our situa- tion. Their circle being well established, they will exhaust our forces without exposing theirs as they did yesterday, bombarding on land by elevation with- out our being able to see their batteries, and from the sea by the fleet, which has full advices, and is bombarding the city in sections with mathematical accuracy. "There is a limit to the honor of arms, and I appeal to the judgment of the government and the whole nation; for these long-suffering troops have saved that honor many times since the iSth day of May, when they sustained the first bombardment. "If it should be necessary to consummate the sacrifice for reasons which I ignore, or if there is need of some one to assume the responsibility of the denouement anticipated and announced by me in several cablegrams, I offer myself loyally on the altar of my country for the one purpose or the other, and I will take it upon myself to perform the act of signing the surrender." The vaunted volunteers fought well in the first battle, but became dis- couraged, and many of them put away their uniforms and guns and retired. The Spanish historian says of the scenes after the surrender: "When a Yankee officer of artillery and another of engineers took possession of the Morro, they inquired about the defenses and artillery of the fort. 'There they are,' said the governor, pointing to the land batteries and old guns. The American officers did not believe him ; personally they went all over the place in search of guns and more important works of fortification. And when they had convinced themselves that they had been told the truth, they exclaimed: 'That fleet' (pointing to Admiral Sampson's) 'has no excuse for not having gained possession of the harbor and defeated the city and its defenses in so many days.' " It is perfectly apparent by the vSpanish accounts that the sufferings, the exposures and privations of the defenders of Santiago were even greater than those of the assailants, and the situation, regarded after the battle of El Caney and the flight of the fleet, as not containing a chance of success. On each side there was surprise and apprehension at the proven fighting qualities of the other. n^l J .4'/. ' ■ - ¥^._e .^3,^211=*===^'^ CHAPTER XXIX. The Insurgents in Arms of Cuba and the Philippines. Our Relations with and Responsibilities for Them — The Cuban Soldiers Found on the Pay Roll — A Military Service of Importance and the Only One Performed by Armed Cubans in Our War — The Spanish Account of It — Cubans Kept 3,500 of the Best Troops of Spain Away from El Caney — Testimony Taken at Paris by the American Commission of the True Character of the Philippines— General Merritt, General Greene and Major Bell State the Facts. All the Spaniards in Cuba during the dreary wars that culminated in the decisive struggle between the United States and Spain, were not engaged in the cause of the Peninsulars. The insular Spaniards were not in many respects unlike their oppressors and antagonists. Though in conflict about government, their idea about systems of governing were kindred. The hope of better days in Cuba is in the people of the island, not in either wing of the Spaniards. The supporters of the Junta closely resemble in views of adminis- tration the representatives of the regency. The destroyers of the industries of Cuba, that were prosperous under misgovernment, are themselves the vic- tims of false education, and are incapable of organizing reformation. Liberty with order, fair play for all, and integrity in official life, is not within the comprehension of those who burned the cane and trampled the tobacco. Those golden productions were transferred from Hayti to Cuba, while the horrors of barbarism ruined the former island, when the abolition of slavery established anarchy; and in the latter and greater island the inherit- ance of the torch has perished by the torch in the hands of the Dominican chieftain, Maximo Gomez. It is the repeatedly expressed opinion of Admiral Dewey that the Fili- pinos are more capable of self-government than the Cubans, and they might be that if we confounded the Cuban name with the Key West and New York syndicates, gotten up in the old Jtmta form, and employed with the facility of 658 INSURGENTS OF CUBA AND THE PHILIPPINES. 659 experience, in the accomplishments of the pomps and vanities of the Spanish language, including the fables of history and the follies of freedom. Gomez had two objects in firing the fields from which the wealth of the island he invaded from Dominica comes — one was to destroy property, because it was an expression of civilization, and the other to destroy labor, because he wanted men to abandon the productive occupations to become destroyers. General Miles expected 50,000 Cubans to line up with his grand army for the siege of Havana, but there would not have been as many of them there as appeared at Santiago. They have, however, materialized in regard to the ipay-roU, and Gomez and his bodyguard and recruits after the war assume that they are a people and that the object of the United States in conquering the island was to give it up to them to rule after the manner of the Spaniards. The difference between one class of Spaniards and another, in the cultivation of the art of government, does not matter much to the cultivators of the soil and the managers in the ways of enterprise that are conducted according to the methods of civilization and yield fruitful harvests to the labor that gains bread in the sweat of the face. No doubt it was the judgment of Gomez of Dominica that the way to free fertile land was to burn the crops, and that one savagery must be met by another, one victim of an outrage compensated by another victim. The Cubans burned the fine houses and the Spaniards the cottages, and both sides plied the chopping-knife to massacre domestic animals. This was the broad road of bloody ashes to famine.* In the Philippines we do not have as many Spaniards of any sort as in Cuba, but the Malay makes iip for any lack of the elements of mischief; and the Tagalo rivals the Cuban Spaniard as an adventurer to claim what the sword of America has conquered. He wanted joint occupation of Manila, and tickled himself that he was about to make reprisals in days of the accumulated wrongs of centuries. If he had been logical in action he would have applied the torch to the city instead of firing the country, and the property of Eng- lish, Germans, and Chinese would have been burned in the name of liberty, after the capacity of the insurgents for booty had been determined by the occurrence of physical exhaustion. There is a notable difference in the racial questions between the isles of Cuba and Luzon. There is no negro blood in the Philippines. The Spanish monarch for whom they were named did not permit African slavery in his 66o INSURGENTS OF CUBA AND THE PHILIPPINES. Indian possession, but Spanish officialism is the same in the East Indies as in the West. Incidents in the cities of Manila and Santiago, under military government, will indicate the likeness. Some of the men of afTairs of Manila were importing goods upon which there were duties, and they were so accustomed to paying their respects to the officers who consented to the importations, in pecuniary compliments, that they did not know any other style of transacting business. They gathered a few hundred new Mexican dollars, and for several days carried it around in bags to find "the right man," to whom was to be confided the little testimonial of their respectful confidence, and they asked many tentative questions, and began to feel at last that their modesty must have become offensive. When, at last, they referred in plain terms to the custom of the country, and their desire to conform to it, and were told they would be forgiven just once but never more, there was amazement. The deputation of gentlemen tottered away bearing bright silver dollars refused, and then they wondered whether they did not make a mistake in not having their silver converted into gold. In Santiago there was a little dinner party in which the representative of the American Republic was entertained, and his guests had arranged for him a pleasant surprise. They wanted to do certain things in which they judged money was to be made, and they were provided with thousands, when the Manila people had but hundreds, and when the time for talking came, they offered their visible means according to the ancient Cuban custom, and heard the incredible response that the Americans did not do public business in that way, that the request they made was proper and there was no reason why they should pay a dollar for the privilege, for it was already their right, and they must not allow such a mistake to occur again, for if it did they would be held to have committed a misdemeanor. The Cuban army on the pay-rolls, hearing that money was rolling in at the custom houses, had no notion of going home to work, and of course they held that the Americans were shoveling the cash into their own pockets. They no doubt believed they were entitled to pay for several years' picnics, and would go back to the Ten Years' War rather than have nothing to be so unhappy about, as to take away their appetite for employment. These are examples of Asiatic and African sentimentalities and of the thrift of the mixed races, as developed under Spanish instruction for a dozen generations. INSURGENTS OF CUBA AND THE PHILIPPINES. 66i In a Spanish pamphlet translated and issued by the office of Naval Intel- ligence, Lieut. Jose MuUery Tejrio, the writer on the battles and capitulations of Santiago de Cuba, there is evidence of the usefulness of the Cubans in the neighborhood of Santiago. It is stated by the Spanish officers that the insurgents firing from ambush on Escario's column, "succeeded in delaying its march long enough so that it could not arrive before the first of July. Fate is not always just." It is important in fairness to the Cuban soldiery to give what the Spanish reinforcements on the way to Santiago have to say of the opposition they met. The Spaniards' column, commanded by Escario, arrived in Santiago July 3d after marching fifty-two leagues; the troops nearly all the way "had to march in single file, opening the way with machetas." Their starting place was Man Janillo, and the column comprised a total of 3,752 men. On the Yara River and camping at dark, the Spanish diary, the one we quote, says: "The column had been harassed all day, especially while preparing to encamp, when the enemy opened a steady, lively fire, which lasted ten minutes, killing one man and wounding three." The next day the column had one man killed and one wounded. Bayamo, the stronghold of the insurgents, was taken with a rush and without loss, and "we learned afterward that the enemy had ten killed and nine wounded." On the 28th, "the rebels appeared again, "and near the town of Baire they "opened a galling musket fire. Colonel Ruiz, the second in com- mand of the column, was wounded and his horse killed under him, four soldiers killed and'five wounded." On the 29th the column rested and had three more wounded. On the 30th there was hot skirmishing, the rebels numerous. The Spanish losses during the day were five killed and ten wounded, among the latter the captain. July ist there was a sharp fight at Aguacate. The Spanish diar)' says: "The enemy did not wait to be surprised, but opened fire at once from Aguacate hill, the station of our heliograph, and adjoining hills to the right and left in an extensive intrenched line. Our soldiers -maneuvered as though on drill, and advancing steadily, two-thirds of the column entered the battle, and that hail of lead which strewed death in its path was not sufficient to make them retreat or even check them. Calmly, with fearless heroism, they advanced, protected by the frequent and sure fire of the artillery, and skill- fully guided by their chiefs, and wilh the cry, 'Long live Spain!' and charging with bayonets, they simultaneously took those heights which were so difficult 662 INSURGENTS IN CUBA AND THE PHILIPPINES. and dangerous to scale, beating the enemy into precipitate retreat, so that they could not gather up their dead and wounded. "Seventeen dead were left on the field, also ammunition of various mod- ern types. There were moments, during that battle when the tenacity of the enemy and the order with which they fought gave the impression that they belonged to our own column. This report spread rapidly and reached Colonel Escario's ears, who, fearing that this might really be the case, gave orders to suspend the fire, and tried to make himself known by bugle signals. But this precaution was useless, and the commander, becoming convinced that he was fighting rebel forces, ordered the attack to be renewed and the hostile posi- tions to be taken. "To do the enemy justice, it must be stated that they defended these well-chosen positions with persistency and in good order, and that they rose to unusual heights that day, making this the fiercest battle which we sustained on the march from Manzanillo to Santiago, and one of the most remarkable ones of the present campaign. Our casualties consisted of 7 dead, and i lieutenant and 42 privates wounded. . Large pools of blood on the battlefield showed the severe chastisement the enemy suffered." The 3d of July the troops started at 2 a. m. and got to Santiago with "slight skirmishes," and "here it was learned that on the same day our fleet had gone out in search of death;" and the column "had arrived at the post of honor after a supreme effort and after victoriously crossing the Alps of Cuba. It is not to be wondered at that, when they came in sight of the^city, they took off their hats, and with tears in their eyes opened their lips in a unani- mous shout of 'Long live Spain!' which rose spontaneously from those noble hearts. "The casualties during the whole march were i colonel, 2 officers, and 68 privates wounded and 27 killed. Twenty-eight thousand six hundred and seventy Mauser cartridges had been used, and 38 rounds of artillery fired." The insurgent troops in this case were of Garcia's command, and the Spanish column of less than four thousand men had forced their way through the most rebellious part of the island and arrived just when the fighting was over. Garcia's estimate of his forces opposed to Escario has been counted as five thousand men. There were not so many, but they made a resistance that kept Escario from being on the Spanish lines at El Caney, Santiago. The Spanish pamphlet says: "When 520 men maintained themselves at INSURGENTS IN CUBA AND THE PHILIPPINES. 663 El Caney for ten hours, and 250 at San Juan for four hours, if Escario could have been there that day, so that there had been 3,000 men more in our lines, neither El Caney nor San Juan would have been lost, though attacked by almost the whole hostile army." The detention of Escario was the best work done for us during the war by the Cubans, and indeed the only impor- tant diversion they made, and justice demands full credit shall be awarded. The statements made before the American Commission at Paris may be classed as the most striking presentation of the attitude of the Philippine insurgents that has been given. General Merritt was before the Commission August 4th, and was first asked about General Frank V. Greene, of whom he said: "He was out on the lines all the time, and took a great deal of interest in investigating with the citizens and soldiers. He knew some of the ranking officers, although he did not know Aguinaldo nor have anything to do with him. It was part of my policy that we should keep ourselves aloof from Aguinaldo as much as possible, because we knew trouble would occur from his wanting to go to Manila at the time of its surrender." General Merritt said further he would greatly rely on General Greene's judgment, who "wrote the best and most authentic — the best received — book on the Russian-Turkish war published yet. He is a man who reads a great deal, quite a student, a very bright man." General Greene's memorandum, made August 27th, and handed General Merritt, opened with these trenchant statements: "If the United States evacuate these islands, anarchy and civil war will immediately ensue and lead to foreign intervention. The insurgents were furnished arms and the moral support of the navy prior to our arrival, and we cannot ignore obligations, either to the insurgents or to foreign nations, which our own acts have imposed upon us. The Spanish government is completely demoralized, and Spanish power is dead beyond possibility of resurrection. Spain would be unable to govern these islands if we surrendered them. Spaniards individually stand in great fear of the insurgents. The Spanish government is disorganized and their treasury bankrupt, with a large floating debt. The loss of property has been great. On the other hand, the Filipinos cannot govern the country without the support of some strong nation. They acknowledge this themselves, and say their desire is for independence under American protection ; but they have only vague ideas as to what our relative 664 INSURGENTS IN CUBA AND THE PHILIPPINES. positions would be — what part we should take in collecting and expending the revenue and administering the government. "The hatred between the Spanish and natives is very intense, and cannot be eradicated. The natives are all Roman Catholics and devoted to the church, but have bitter hatred for monastic orders — Dominican, Franciscan, and Recollects. They insist that these be sent out of the country or the)' will murder them. These friars own the greater part of the land, and have grown rich by oppressing the native husbandmen." General Merritt said the Philippines would have to be educated up to self-government, and he added: "They want a protectorate, but they do not exactly understand what that means. Their idea is that they should collect the revenues and keep them in their treasury, and that we should be at the expense of maintaining an army and a navy there for their protection, which is the kind of a protectorate they would like very much." Major Frank Barnes stated: "The masses of the people will accept our government as soon as they understand the form of government that we would offer. The people are for the most part easily controlled by proper methods, the essence of which can be expressed in two words — justice and firmness. I have definite information also that at least three or four of the leading men of the provinces to the north and east of Manila are not at all in harmony with those in authority around Manila." It was the opinion of the Major that if a few of the ambitious chieftains were disposed of, those who controlled the insurgent army, "the masses of the people could be handled without difficulty. At the present it is my opin- ion that these chieftains find themselves in a difficult position on account of the promises made to their followers in regard to looting Manila, said promises being so far unfulfilled. Their troops have been serving up to the present time almost without remuneration, promises being made that their reward would come when Manila capitulated. I have availed myself of every oppor- tunity to talk with natives and half-castes, both in the insurgent territory and in Manila. I find that many of them would be perfectly willing to accept an American government, and many of them are very anxious that we should take full possession of the islands. Many others hold to the desire of the insurgent chiefs for a Philippine government under the protection of the United States. " Major J. F. Bell, of the Bureau of Information, reported to General Mer- INSURGENTS IN CUBA AND THE PHILIPPINES. 665 ritt in Manila Bay, that Aguinaldo had about $200,000, and in Baccoar $220,000 in public funds. Major Bell catalogues and describes the leaders among Aguinaldo's following in this highly interesting way: "Aguinaldo. — Honest, sincere, and poor, not well educated, but a natural leader of men, with considerable shrewdness and abilit}'; has the power of creating among the people confidence in himself, and is undoubtedly a verv popular man, highly respected by all; but there are many better educated and richer natives who do not think he has sufficient education or experience to be a suitable president. He was a 'little governor' of a small town in one of the provinces. It is also said that he was a school teacher, but I have been unable to verify this assertion. "There is no Secretary of State, the place being kept open for one Caye- tano S. Arellano, a prominent native citizen who is said to be the best lawyer and best man among the native prominent men. He is now in Pagsanjan, and has been repeatedly sent for, but does not return, stating as an excuse that he cannot get through Santa Cruz, which is held by the Spanish. He is an avowed annexationist, and does not believe the Filipino people sufficiently advanced in the arts and laws of civilization to govern themselves. "Baldomero Aguinaldo, a first cousin of Don Emilio, is Secretary of War, and is a swelled dunce, and was once a schoolmaster. "Mariano Trias, an educated, honest man, of mediocre capacit)-, is Secre- tary of the Treasury. He was the Vice-President of a former revolution, and of all the insurgent leaders, he stands next to Aguinaldo in popularity with the people. "Leandro Y. Barra, a lawyer and good, honest man, is Secretary of the Interior. "One Estefan de la Rama, a rich and educated man, who speaks English, is commandante de marina, or commander-in-chief of the navy. He is reported honest and capable. "Aguinaldo's interpreter and secretary is one Escamilla, a good linguist, speaking Latin, French, Spanish, and English — Spanish fluently and English well, to my personal knowledge. He was a teacher of the piano in Hong- kong, and is one of the best interpreters I have ever seen. "One Malabini, a student of law and notary public, honest, but not espe- cially talented, is one of his councilors. There is a prominent and wealthy citizen of this city who is also a councilor, but I prefer not to mention his 666 INSURGENTS IN CUBA AND THE PHILIPPINES. name. He is an avowed annexationist, and sincerely hopes the Americans may remain here. "Don Felipe Agoncillo is a highly respected lawyer, and has for some time been the Filipino agent in .Hongkong. I understand it is he who has been designated by Aguinaldo to go to Paris and America to represent the insurgent cause. "C. Sandico, a skilled and well-educated machinist, who speaks English quite well, is a prominent man, and coadjutor of Aguinaldo. His present commission is to appear on behalf of political prisoners before the officer charged with investigating such cases. He has been generally useful to Aguinaldo as a delegate and negotiator with Americans. "Lieut. -Gen. Emiliano Riego De Dios, the military governor of Cavite, is said to be an honest man, but with little education. "Major-General Ricati, in command of operations along the southern zone of trenches, appears and is said to be a well-meaning, honest man, with a fair education. "Maj.-Gen. Pantelon Garcia, in command of operations along the north- ern zone, is not educated very well, but is an able, honest, polite, and agree- able man, who has been a schoolmaster of the primary grade. "Brig. -Gen. Pio Del Pilar, a vicious, uneducated ignoramus and highway robber. "General Estrella, commanding the military forces in Cavite, has the credit of being an honest man with little education. "Brigadier-General Mascardo, fairly educated and honest, but possesses little ability. "Gen. Gregorio Del Pilar is young, well educated, and honest, but with little experience. He belongs to a wealthy family of Nueva Ecija. "General Noriel, an honest, fairly educated, well-meaning, reasonable, and agreeable fellow, who has done good service and gained the reputation of a good soldier. "Colonel Montenegro, a very conciliatory fellow to meet. Young, small, and well educated. Speaks French, English, and Spanish, the latter fluently; the others very well. He is a considerg,ble of a 'talk a heap. ' Is 'kinder' hon- est and was a clerk in Lalla's hotel, where he received his lessons in honesty. "There are other leaders of lesser grade whom it is hardly necessary to mention here. Aguinaldo has many adjutants, most of whom are young. INSURGENTS IN CUBA AND THE PHILIPPINES. 667 smart, and well educated. In fact, nearly all of the adjutants of all the generals belong to the jeunesse doree Filipino, in whom insurrectionary ideas seem to breed spontaneously. They are all bright, ambitious, active, and well educated. Among them is one Captain Arevela, Noriel's adjutant, who is a dentist, having learned his profession from an American, who also taught him very good English. He has always possessed great partiality for Americans. ' ' Note. — It appears, however, that Maximo Gomez, the old soldier of fortune, has in the schools of misfortune been taught the lessons of sorrow, and when throwing o£E his reserve after the war was over he knew the light of reason when he saw it, and was not disposed to join in playing a bunco game upon the people of the United States. He may yet exploit his ambition to found a confederacy of the West Indies, but he has shown great dignity and com- mands respect by his qualities of statesmanship. CHAPTER XXX. The Treaty of Peace. The Official Terms in Which the Spaniards Sued for Peace and Accepted the Demands of the Peace Protocol of August 12 — "The Demand Strips Us of the Very Last Memory of a Glorious Past" — The Treaty Commissioners that Met in Paris — Official Text of the Treaty of Peace of December 10 — The Spaniards Contend that the Philippine Insurgents Constantly Change the Status Quo and that Americans Must Stop Them — Contention that the Transfer of Sovereignty Meant Transfer of Debts — Protracted Debate over the Cuban Obligations — Claim the Capture of Manila was not Lawful — Insinuation that General Merritt had Heard of the Protocol Before Storming the Town — Spaniards Able and Adroit — Americans Firm but Courteous — The Official History of the Preparation of the Peace Protocol — The Part Taken by the President — His Strong Hand Felt in Paris. The government of Spain, on July 22, 189S, submitted through the Ambassador of France a message to the President, saying Spain wished to show again that in this war, as well as in the one she carried on against the Cuban insurgents, she had but one object, "the vindication of her prestige, her honor, and her name." She had desired to "spare the great island from the dangers of premature independence," and her sentiments were rather inspired by ties of blood than by her interests. "Spain, " the message con- tinued, "is prepared to spare Cuba from the continuation of the horrors of war if the United States is likewise disposed." This paper was signed by the Spanish Minister of State, the Duke of Almodovar del Rio. In reply Secretary Day wrote, July 30th: "The President witnessed with profound disappointment the frustration of his peaceful efforts by events which forced upon the people of the United States the unalterable conviction that nothing short of the relinquishment by Spain of a claim of sovereignty over Cuba which she was unable to enforce would relieve a situation that had become unendurable. "For years the government of the United States, out of regard for the susceptibilities of Spain, had by the exercise of its power and the expenditure of its treasure preserved the obligations of neutrality. But a point was at length reached at which, as Spain had often been forewarned, this' attitude 668 THE TREATY OF PEACE. 669 could no longer be maintained. The spectacle at our very doors of a fertile territory wasted by fire and sword, and given over to desolation and famine, was one to which our people could not be indifferent. Yielding, therefore, to the demands of humanity, they determined to remove the causes in the effects of which they had become so deeply involved." Secretary Day proceeded to state substantially the points of the Protocol that was the basis of the treaty of peace. The reply from Madrid, August 7th, by the Minister of State, was: "The necessity of withdrawing from the territory of Cuba being impera- tive, the nation assuming Spain's place must, as long as this territory shall not have fully reached the conditions required to take rank among other sovereign powers, provide for rules which will insure order and protect against all risks the Spanish residents, as well as the Cuban natives still loyal to the mother country. "In the name of the nation the Spanish government hereby relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over or title to Cuba, and engages to the irremeable evacuation of the island, subject to the approval of the Cortes — a reserve which we likewise make with regard to the other proffered terms — just as these terms will have to be ultimately approved by the Senate of the United States. "The United States require, as an indemnity for or an equivalent to the sacrifices they have borne during this short war, the cession of Porto Rico and of the other islands now under the sovereignty of Spain in the West Indies, and also the cession of an island in the Ladrones, to be selected by the Federal government. "This demand strips us of the very last memory of a glorious past, and expels us at once from the prosperous island of Porto Rico and from the Western Hemisphere, which became peopled and civilized through the proud deeds of our ancestors. It might, perhaps, have been possible to compensate by some other cession for the injuries sustained by the United States. How- ever, the inflexibility of the demand obliges us to cede, and we shall cede, the island of Porto Rico and the other islands belonging to the Crown of Spain in the West Indies, together with one of the islands of the archipelago of the Ladrones, to be selected by the American government. "The terms relating to the Philippines seem, to our understanding, to be quite indefinite." 670 THE TREATY OF PEACE. Secretary Day put the case of the United States in these simple and effective terms to the Spanish Minister of State, before the submission of the terms, referred to with such pathetic dignity in the letter of submission by the Duke of Almodovar del Rio : , "As the result of the patriotic exertions of the people of the United States, the strife has, as your excellency observes, proved unequal, inclines the President to offer a brave adversary generous terms of peace. "The President, therefore, responding to your excellency's request, will state the terms of peace which will be accepted by him at the present time, subject to the approval of the Senate of the Uhited States hereafter. "Your excellency in discussing the question of Cuba intimates that Spain has desired to spare the island the dangers of premature independence. The government of the United States has not shared the apprehensions of Spain in this regard, but it recognizes the fact that in the distracted and prostrate condition of the island, aid and guidance will be necessary, and these it is pre- pared to give." Secretary Day was precise in drawing the Protocol, and yet the Spaniards persuaded themselves that they could find much in it, especially in the clause about the Philippines, susceptible of construction remote from the purpose of the President. August 12th the French Ambassador addressed these lines to the American Secretary of State : "Mr. Secretary of State: I have the honor to inform you that I have just received, through the intermediation of the Department of Foreign Affairs at Paris, a telegram, dated Madrid, August 11, in which the Duke of Almodovar del Rio announces to me that, by order of Her Majesty the Queen Regent, the Spanish government confers upon me full powers in order that I may sign, without other formality and without delay, the Protocol whereof the terms have been drawn up by common accord between you and me." The instrument that made this authorization regular was the following: DON ALFONSO XHI., BY THE GRACE OF GOD AND THE CONSTITUTION, KING OF SPAIN, AND IN HIS NAME AND DURING HIS MINORITY, DONA MARIA CRISTINA, QUEEN REGENT OF THE KINGDOM. Whereas it has become necessary to negotiate and sign at Washington a Protocol in which the preliminaries of peace between Spain and the United THE TREATY OF PEACE. 671 States of America shall be settled, and as it is necessary for me to empower for that purpose a person possessing the _ requisite qualifications: Therefore, I have decided to select, after procuring the consent of His Excellency the President of the French Republic, you, Don Julio Cambon, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the French Republic in the United States of America, as I do, by these presents, select and appoint you to pro- ceed, invested with the character of my plenipotentiary, to negotiate and sign with the plenipotentiary whom His Excellency the President of the United States of America may designate for that purpose the aforesaid Protocol. And I declare, from the present moment, all that you may agree upon, negotiate, and sign in the execution of this commission acceptable and valid, and I will observe it and execute it, and will cause it to be observed and executed as if it had been done by myself, for v/hich I give you my whole full powers in the most ample form required by law. In witness whereof I have caused these presents to be issued, signed by my hand, duly sealed and countersigned by the undersigned, my Minister of State. Given in the palace at Madrid, August 11, 1898. (L. S.) MARIA CRISTINA. JUAN MANUEL SANCHEZ Y GUTIERREZ DE CASTRO, Minister of State. The city of Manila fell into our hands two days after the suspension of hostilities, and during the discussion of the Commissioners at Paris the Spaniards made a plea that as Admiral Dewey cut the cable, the failure to get the news at Manila before the Americans possessed the town was an American fault. The report of the French Ambassador of his interviews with the President was much quoted by the Spanish Commissioners, but the American Commissioners were inflexible from the first for the plain mean- ing of the treaty. OFFICIAL TEXT OF THE TREATY OF PEACE WITH SPAIN, SIGNED DECEMBER 12, 1898: The United States of America and Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain, in the name of her august son Don Alfonso XIII., desiring to end a state of war now existing between the two countries, have for that purpose appointed as plenipotentiaries: The President of the United States, 672 THE TREATY OF PEACE. William R. Day, Cushman K. Davis, William P. Frye, George Gray, and Whitelaw Reid, citizens of the United States; And Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain, Don Eiigenio Montero Rios, J'resident of the Senate ; Don Buenaventura de Abarzuza, Senator of the Kingdom and ex-Minister of the Crown; Don ]ps6 de Garnica, deputy to the Cortes, and Associate Justice of the Supreme Court; Don Wenceslao Ramirez de Villa-Urrutia, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Brussels, and Don Rafael Cerero, General of Division; Who, having assembled in Paris, and having exchanged their full powers, which were found to be in due and proper form, have, after discussion of the matters before them, agreed upon the following articles: Article I. Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba. And as the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the United States, the United States will, so long as such occupation shall last, assume and discharge the obligations that may under international law result from the fact of its occupation, for the protection of life and property. Article H. Spain cedes to the United States the island of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and the island of Guam in the Marianas or Ladrones. Article HI. Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands, and comprehending the islands lying within the following line : A line running from west to east along or near the twentieth parallel of north latitude, and through the middle of the navigable channel of Bachi, from the one hundred and eighteenth (iiSth) to the one hundred and twenty- seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence along the one hundred and twenty-seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the parallel of four degrees and forty-five minutes (4° 45') north latitude, thence along the parallel of four degrees and forty- five minutes (4° 45') north latitude to its intersection with the meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and thirty-five minutes (119° 35') east of Greenwich, thence along the meridian of longitude one hundred and > Z a J H S P a Q ►J o M z *^ g: O M w as W H Bj THE TREATY OF PEACE. 675 nineteen degrees and thirty-five minutes (119° 35') east of Greenwich to the parallel of latitude seven degrees and forty minutes (7° 40') north, thence along the parallel of latitude of seven degrees and forty minutes (7° 40') north to its intersection with the one hundred and sixteenth (i i6th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence by a direct line to the inter- section of the tenth (loth) degree parallel of north latitude with the one hun- dred and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, and thence along the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the point of beginning. The United States will pay to Spain the sum of twenty million dollars ($20,000,000) within three months after the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty. Article IV. The United States will, for the term of ten years from the date of the / exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, admit Spanish ships and '-, merchandise to the ports of the Philippine Islands on the same terms as ships , and merchandise of the United States. Article V. The United States will, upon the signature of the present treaty, send back to Spain, at its own cost, the Spanish soldiers taken as prisoners of war on the capture of Manila by the American forces. The arms of the soldiers in question shall be restored to them. Spain will, upon the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, proceed to evacuate the Philippines, as well as the island of Guam, on terms similar to those agreed upon by the Commissioners appointed to arrange for the evacuation of Porto Rico and other islands in the West Indies, under the Protocol of August 12, 1898, which is to continue in force till its provisions are completely executed. The time within which the evacuation of the Philippine Islands and Guam shall be completed shall be fixed by the two governments. vStands of colors, uncaptured war vessels, small arms, guns of all calibers, with their carriages and accessories, powder, ammunition, livestock, and materials and supplies of all kinds, belonging to the land and naval forces of Spain in the Philippines and Guam, remain the property of Spain. Pieces of heavy ordnance, exclu- sive of field artillery, in the fortifications and coast defenses, shall remain in their emplacements for the term of six months, to be reckoned from the 676 THE TREATY OF PEACE. exchange of ratifications of the treaty; and the United States may, in the meantime, purchase such material from Spain, if a satisfactory agreement between the two governments on the subject shall be reached. Article VI. - Spain will, upon the signature of the present treaty, release all prisoners of war, and all persons detained or imprisoned for political offenses, in con- nection with the insurrections in Cuba and the Philippines and the war with the United States. Reciprocally, the United States will release all persons made prisoners of war by the American forces, and will undertake to obtain the release of all Spanish prisoners in the hands of the insurgents in Cuba and the Philippines. The government of the United States will at its own cost return to Spain and the government of Spain will at its own cost return to the United States, Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines, according to the situation of their respective homes, prisoners released or caused to be released by them, respectively, under this article. Article VII. The United States and Spain mutually relinquish all claims for indemnity, national and individual, of every kind, of either government, or of its citizens or subjects, against the other government, that may have arisen since the beginning of the late insurrection in Cuba and prior to the exchange of ratifi- cations of the present treaty, including all claims for indemnity for the cost of the war. The United States will adjudicate and settle the claims of its citizens against Spain relinquished in this article. , Article VIII. In conformity with the provisions of Articles I, II, and III, of this treat}', Spain relinquishes in Cuba, and cedes in Porto Rico and other islands in the West Indies, in the island of Guam, and in the Philippine Archipelago, all the buildings, wharves, barracks, forts, structures, public highways and other immovable property which, in conformity with law, belong to the public domain, and as such belong to the Crown of Spain. And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, to which the preceding paragraph refers, cannot in any respect impair the property or rights which by law belong to the peaceful possession THE TREATY OF PEACE. 677 of property of all kinds, of provinces, municipalities, public or private estab- lishments, ecclesiastical or civic bodies, or any other associations having legal capacity to acquire and possess property in the aforesaid territories renounced or ceded, or of private individuals, of whatsoever nationality such individuals may be. The aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, includes all documents exclusively referring to the sovereignty relinquished or ceded that may exist in the archives of the Peninsula. Where any document in such archives only in part relates to said sovereignty, a copy of such part will be furnished whenever it shall be requested. Like rules shall be reciprocally observed in favor of Spain in respect of documents in the archives of the islands above referred to. In the aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, are also included such rights as the Crown of Spain and its authorities possess in respect of the official archives and records, executive as well as judicial, in the islands above referred to, which relate to said islands or the rights and prop- erty of their inhabitants. Such archives and records shall be carefully pre- served, and private persons shall without distinction have the right to require, in accordance with law, authenticated copies of the contracts, wills and other instruments forming part of notarial protocols or files, or which may be contained in the executive or judicial archives, be the latter in Spain or in the islands aforesaid. Article IX. Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the present treaty, relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty, may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce and professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to other foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they may reside. 678 THE TREATY OF PEACE. The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the terri- tories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress. Article X. The inhabitants of the territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be secured in the free exercise of their religion. Article XI. The Spaniards residing in the territories over which Spain by this treaty cedes or relinquishes her sovereignty shall be subject in matters civil as well as criminal to the jurisdiction of the courts of the country wherein they reside, pursuant to the ordinary laws governing the same; and they shall have the right to appear before such courts, and to pursue the same course as citizens of the country to which the courts belong. Article XII. Judicial proceedings pending at the time of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty in the territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be determined according to the following rules: 1. Judgments rendered either in civil suits between private individuals, or in criminal matters, before the date mentioned, and with respect to which there is no recourse or right of review under the Spanish law, shall be deemed to be final, and shall be executed in due form b)' competent authority in the territory within which such judgments should be carried out. 2. Civil suits between private individuals which ma}^ on the date men- tioned be undetermined shall be prosecuted to judgment before the court in which they may then be pending or in the court that may be substituted therefor. 3. Criminal actions pending on the date mentioned before the Supreme Court of Spain against citizens of the territory which by this treaty ceases to be Spanish shall continue under its jurisdiction until final judgment; but, such judgment having been rendered, the execution thereof shall be com- mitted to the competent authority of the place in which the case arose. Article XIII. The rights of property secured by copyrights and patents acquired by Spaniards in the island of Cuba and in Porto Rico, the Philippines and other ceded territories, at the time of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty. THE TREATY OF PEACE. 679 shall continue to be respected. Spanish scientific, literary, and artistic works, not subversive of public order in the territories in question, shall continue to be admitted free of duty into such territories, for the period of ten years, to be reckoned from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty. Article XIV. Spain will have the power to establish consular officers in the ports and places of the territories, the sovereignty over which has been either relin- quished or ceded by the present treaty. Article XV. The government of each country will, for the term of ten years, accord to the merchant vessels of the other country the same treatment in respect of all port charges, including entrance and clearance dues, light dues, and ton- nage duties, as it accords to its own merchant vessels, not engaged in the coastwise trade. This article may at any time be terminated on six months' notice given by either government to the other. Article XVI. It is understood that any obligations assumed in this treaty by the United States with respect to Cuba are limited to the time of its occupancy thereof; but it will upon the termination of such occupancy, advise any government established in the island to assume the same obligations. Article XVII. The present treaty shall be ratified by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, and by Her Majesty the Queen regent of Spain; and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Wash- ington within six months from the date hereof, or earlier if possible. In faith whereof, we, the respective Plenipotentiaries, have signed this treaty and have hereunto affixed our seals. Done in duplicate at Paris, the tenth day of December, in the year of Our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight. ' [Seal] WILLIAM R. DAY. [Seal] EUGENIO MONTERO RIOS. [Seal] CUSHMAN K. DAVIS. [Seal] B. DE ABARZUZA. [Seal] WILLIAM P. FRYE. [Seal] J. DE GARNICA. [Seal] GEO. GRAY. [Seal] W R DE VILLA URRUTIA. [Seal] WHITELAW REID. [Seal] RAFAEL CERERO. 68o THE TREATY OF PEACE. When the conference met at Paris, October ist, the President of the Spanish Commission stated he was charged by his government to la)^ before the American Commission a proposition of a pressing nature. It was that the status quo was altered and contiiiued to be with daily increasing gravity "to the prejudice of Spain, by the Tagalo rebels who formed an auxiliary force to the regular American troops, and the Spanish Commission demanded of the American Commissioners that the American forces in the Philippines must proceed fully and absolutely to restore the said status quo, and must abstain from preventing by any means, direct or indirect, the restoration thereof by the Spanish authorities and forces in the territory not occupied by those of the United States." The commissions of American Plenipotentiaries were in these terms: William McKinley, President of the United States of America, to all who shall see these presents. Greeting: Know ye, that reposing special trust and confidence in the integrity and ability of William R. Day, of Ohio, I do appoint him a Commissioner Plenipotentiary of the United States, under the Protocol signed at Washington of the 12th daj!- of August, 1898, to negotiate and conclude a Treaty of Peace between the United States and Spain, and do authorize and empower him to execute and fulfill the duties of this Commis- sion, with all the powers, privileges, and emoluments thereunto of right appertaining, during the pleasure of the President of the United States. In testimony whereof, I have caused these letters to be made patent, and the seal of the United States to be hereunto affixed. Given under my hand at the city of Washington the 13th day of Septem- ber in the year of Our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight, and the 123rd year of the Independence of the United States of America. Signed: WILLIAM McKINLEY. By the President : Signed: J. B. MOORE, Acting Secretary of State. The Commissions of the other American Plenipotentiaries were in the same form, their names being as follows : Cushman K. Davis, of Minnesota. William P. Frye, of Maine. George Gray, of Delaware, and Whitelaw Reid, of New York. THE TREATY OF PEACE. 681 |i a o o /n//'///!// 1,-:^/,/^/!/,/ /f/u'//'r>v. //^//A/A.//y .^/i.cvu/f ^/y/^//}/ti'// ,^r///'M ///>//, f/i, -y/f// ft //.>»//f »/''/> ry>'^^^^ ,„./■ '/U/f,., ,/ m.f \M JPf G^f 9 y/,,/ „. -„,„„■/„/',„.//,/ „,„/„,//, //„ ,„/,v„ ,y,/ .,/u//f/,Aj<'fr//.ifM ii{^tltiVrtl ■ /"'//"'■' f',Airlif r/w/A//r/r.,t/r/i l''///f>.i,//i' ./, ,,./„ i/i/i/y „t,/ii //!/// //I'.- >■////> /"/'t/i^jnsaiSxiBusxTf///" ///////r/ //////./,. / //.f ■ /r ///, '-,.;. A,. "A __. '^«J Y^*//'//\ //f A, /yA T /// . AA/ /f.//f//uA//y/A/ /4ttje/f/ ne^tf- /,„, A,vA'/',„.AA, ;.//,/A,„/A, /^-?"^' ^/f ///A ///r ^z^,, '/A/////f/.yA///.j. *. Xl. "^U^i-' A "TO GEORGE DEWEY, WITH THE COMPLIMENTS OF THE PRESIDENT, CONGRESS AND THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES." THE TREATY OF PEACE. 693 with a permanent deficit, as was the case in the island of Cuba, the nearest sister-colony came to its rescue. The vice-royalty of Mexico, from 1766 to 1806, annually assisted the island of Cuba with heavy sums for its govern- mental needs and the development of its natural resources, at the time unex- ploited, which expenses it could not, at such time, meet from its ovv-n revenues. Not less that 108 millions of pesos came into Cuba from Mexico during that period, this assistance being known in the Spanish colonial admin- istration under the name of 'Situado de Mexico.' " The Spanish Commission proceeded to state that grave errors were fallen into "owing to the Spanish colonial system being unknown." The Spanish Commission at this point paid this tribute to the Spanish- American peoples: "What has been said up to this point regarding the nature of the colonial obligations and those bound thereby, has never been disregarded (to their honor be it said) by the Spanish-American peoples. They achieved their independence through their Own efforts, and the majority of them, before Spain had recognized it, had by prior and solemn act of their legislatures, declared as their own and as having preference those debts which the Crown of Spain had contracted during the continuance of its sovereignty for the service of such territories, and which debts were recorded in their respective treasury books. "Very few of the Spanish-American republics delayed so honorable a declaration until the mother country had recognized their independence, as was said by the Argentine Republic in the treaty concluded with Spain on September 21, 1863, and by Uruguay, in that concluded on July 19, 1870: 'Just as they acquired the rights and privileges belonging to the Crown of Spain, they also assume all its duties and obligations.' "Note that the Spanish-American republics without exception recognized and assumed as their own these debts of every kind whatsoever, specifying them in the treaty of peace with Bolivia of July 21, 1847, wherein it is stated that they 'include all debts for pensions, salaries, supplies, advances, trans- portation, forced loans, deposits, contracts, and any other debt incurred during war times or prior thereto, chargeable to said treasuries; provided they were contracted by direct orders of the Spanish government or its constituted authorities in said territories. ' "Spain did not recognize the independence of any American state which had previously been her colony save upon this condition, which those states 694 THE TREATY OF PEACE. spontaneously incorporated in their respective treaties, as of right they should. "Her right and her dignity will not permit her to recognize — without this condition, which now more than .ever if possible is still just and proper — the independence of the Cuban and Porto Rican peoples, which they have not been able to achieve by their own unaided efforts." The Spanish Commission desired a modification of the sentence in the American Commissioners' Protocol No. 4, that the Spanish Article was a proposition not to relinquish sovereignty, but to "transfer to the United States a mass of Spanish charges and obligations, ' ' and modification was desired "on the ground that it might be thought to imply that they were not acting in good faith. " Out of deference to the Spahish Commissioners this was changed, though the sentence did not sustain the Spanish construction, to- read, "a mass of charges and obligations which, in the opinion of the Ameri- can Commissioners, properly belong to Spain." October 14th the American Commission replied to the Spanish Commission as to the distinction between relinquishment and abandonment, the contention being based upon the fact that "in the various documents referred to the United States required Spain to 'relinquish' her sovereignty, but did not demand that she 'abandon' it. "A distinction is thus made between a 'relinquishment' and an 'aban- donment'; and it is argued that while 'abandoned territories' become derelict, so that they may be acquired by the first occupant, 'relinquished territories' necessarily pass to him to whom relinquishment is made. "The American Commissioners are unable to admit that such a distinc- tion between the words in question exists either in law or in common use. "The word 'relinquish,' as defined in the English dictionaries, means 'to give up the possession or occupancy of; withdraw from; leave; abandon; quit.' Again: 'to renounce a claim to; resign; as, to relinquish a debt. ' "On the other hand, we find in that great monument of Spanish learning, the law dictionary of Escriche (Diccionario de Legislacion y Jurisprudencia), under the word 'renunciar, ' which the Spanish memorandum declares to be the equivalent of the French word 'renoncer' (used in Spain's version of the Protocol) and of the English word 'relinquish,' the following definition: 'The voluntary giving up of a right exercised or expected to be exercised, or of a thing held or possessed or expected to be held or possessed.' " Commenting upon this definition, Escriche says: "The relinquishment THE TREATY OF PEACE. 695 differs from the cession in that the latter requires for its completion the con- currence of the wills of the grantor and the grantee and a just cause for the transfer, while the former is perfect with only the will of the relinquisher. The effect of the relinquishment is confined to the abdication or dropping of the right or thing relinquished. The effect of the cession is the conveyance of the right to the grantee." The American Commissioners noted the declaration in the Spanish memorandum that there was no purpose now to transfer with the sovereignty of Cuba and Porto Rico a proportional part of the national debt of Spain, but "only the obligations and charges attaching individually to the islands," which obligations and charges it likens to the local debts which pass with ceded ter- ritory; but it appears, however, by the explanation given in the memorandum of the origin of these charges and obligations, and of the manner in which they were contracted, that they included the whole of what is commonly called the Cuban debt. And it was shown that this debt did not exist prior to 186 1, and the American memorandum concluded with the statement that the government of the United States had at a great sacrifice of life and treasure prosecuted a conflict to cause the relinquishment b}' Spain of sover- eignty over Cuba, and one of the results was the unconditional agreement embodied in the first article of the Peace Protocol that Spain "will relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba," and "upon the simple fulfill- ment of that stipulation the American Commissioners are obliged to insist." The formation of the Cuban debt was thus related by the Commissioners: "The revenues of the island were, as a rule, far more than sufficient to pay the expenses of its government, and produced in each year a surplus. This surplus was not expended for the benefit of the island, but was sent to Madrid. The surpluses thus disposed of amounted, from 1856 to 1861 in- clusive, to upwards of $20,000,000. "In 1864, in order to meet the national expenses of the attempt to 'rein- corporate' San Domingo into the Spanish dominions, and of the 'expedition to Mexico,' the Spanish authorities issued bonds to the amount of $3,000,000. Subsequently new loans were made, so that the so-called Cuban debt had swollen by 1868 to $18,000,000. "In that year the ten years' war for Cuban independence broke out, a war produced by causes so generally conceded to be just as to need no exposition on this occasion. All the expenses of this war were imposed upon Cuba, so 696 THE TREATY OF PEACE. that in 1880, according to a statement made at Madrid in that year by a Span- ish Secretary for the Colonies, the so-called Cuban debt amounted to upwards of $170,000,000. "Subsequently the Spanish government undertook to consolidate these debts, and to this end created in 1886 the so-called Billetes hipotecarios de la Isla de Cuba, to the amount of 620,000,000 pesetas, or $124,000,000. The Spanish government undertook to pay these bonds and the interest thereon out of the revenues of Cuba, but the national character of the debt was shown by the fact that, upon the face of the bonds, 'the Spanish nation' (la Nacidn Espanola) guarantee their payment. The annual charge for interest and sinking fund on account of this debt amounted to the sum of 39,191,000 pesetas, or $7,838,200, which was disbursed through a Spanish financial insti- tution, called the Banco Hispano-Colonial, which is said to have collected daily from the custom house at Havana, through an agency there established, the sum of $33,339.. "In 1890 a new issue of bonds was authorized by the Spanish government to the amount, as it is understood, of 875,000,000 pesetas, or $175,000,000, with the same guarantee as before, apparently with a view to refund the prior debt, as well as to cover any new debts contracted between 1886 and 1890. It seems, however, that only a small number of these bonds had been disposed of when, in February, 1895, the last insurrection and movement for independence broke out. "The government of Spain then proceeded to issue these new bonds for the purpose of raising funds with which to suppress the uprising, so that those outstanding on January i, 1898, amounted, according to published reports, to 858,550,000 pesetas, or $171,710,000. In addition to these a further loan, known as the 'Cuban War Emergency Loan,' was, as the American Commissioners are advised, floated to the amount of 800,000,000 pesetas, or $160,000,000, represented by what are called 'five per cent peseta bonds.' "Although it does not appear that any mention is made in these bonds of the revenues of Cuba, it is understood that they are regarded in Spain ai properly constituting a part of the 'Cuban debt,' together with various unliqui- dated debts, large in amount, incurred by the Spanish authorities in opposing by arms the independence of Cuba. "From no point of view can the debts above described be considered as local debts of Cuba or as debts incurred for the benefit of Cuba. In no sense are they obligations properly chargeable to that island. They are debts THE TREATY OF PEACE. 697 created by the government of Spain, for its own purposes and through its own agents, in whose creation Cuba had no voice." In reply to this the Spanish Commission asserted that, "as a general rule, the island of Cuba has not since its discovery covered its own expenses. "As long as Spain kept the American colonies the island was sustained by the pecuniary aid of her sisters and specially by that of the Vice-Royalty of Mexico. In this century, for a very few years, she had a surplus, thanks to the development of her natural resources, at last obtained through this assistance, and it is true that this surplus was turned over to the treasury of the Peninsula. But with this exception it is patent that the general accounts of the Spanish state from 1896-1897 show that the treasury of the Peninsula advanced to Cuba, in the years preceding that recent period, a sum amounting to 429,602,013.08 pesetas. There also appears an advance to Porto Rico of 3,220,488.67 pesetas, and to Santo Domingo 1,397,161.69 pesetas. "The prosperity of Cuba was of short duration; for the greater part of the time frorn the days of Columbus, by reason either of the scarcity of its inhabitants or of the slavery of the black race, which formed the majority, or lastly because Spaniards preferred to colonize other parts of America, the island was unable to develop its natural resources; and it was nevertheless constantly necessary to expend in the island the large sums which were required for the establishment of reform and the creation of the institutions which are the essential conditions of modern life." The Spanish Commission protested against an assertion in the American memorandum that the insurrections in Cuba were the outcome of just griev- ances, and regretted that such an assertion should have been made. The American Commission "would surely, and with good reason, regret that the Spanish Commission should say anything here without an imperative necessity of the justice of the rebellions of the natives of the immense American territory which the United States had so often to suppress with an iron hand, and if it should also say anything of the right by which the Southern States attempted to break the federal bond by the force of arms." It was "very natural," the Spaniards proceeded, "that the American Commissioners should not have such accurate knowledge as is requisite for precise judgment of the acts of the Spanish administration in the Peninsula or in its colonies. "And we find a confirmation of this in the facts. 698 THE TREATY OF PEACE. "In regard to the argument against the recognition of a certain part of the Cuban debt, on the ground that the rebellion of a minority of the Cuban people to obtain their independence was just, we have only to make the fol- lowing remark : , "The insurgent minority, it is true, rose up in arms to secure the inde- pendence of the island. The United States erroneously believed that their cause was just, and by force of arms caused it to prevail against Spain. But now the facts have shown that Spain was right, as the United States them- selves have had to recognize that the Cuban people are not as yet in such con- ditions as are necessary to entitle them to the enjoyment of full liberty and sovereignty. It is upon this ground that the United States have decided to withhold from that people the said privileges and to hold them under Ameri- can control, until they become able to enjoy that liberty prematurely demanded by them." In order to define the debts the Americans should assume the Spaniards presented an article, providing: "All pecuniary charges and obligations outstanding upon the ratification of this treaty of peace which, after a minute examination into their origin, purpose and the conditions of their creation, should be held, pursuant to strict law and undeniable equity, to be distinct from such as are properly and peculiarly chargeable to the treasury of the Peninsula, and to have been always properly and peculiarly Cuban. "To make the strict examination provided for in the foregoing paragraph, the two High Contracting Parties shall name a Commission of competent and impartial persons in the manner to be determined in the proper article of this treaty." As to the powers of the Commissioners, the Spanish Commission quoted the .Secretary of State and the President, as follows: "After the three conditions which the Secretary of State at Washington, replying on July 30 last to the message of the government of Her Catholic Majesty of the 22d of the said month, proposed to Spain for the termination of the war, he said: 'If the terms hereby offered are accepted in their entirety commissioners will be named by the United States to meet similarly author- ized commissioners on the part of Spain for the purpose of settling the details of the treaty of peace and signing and delivering it under the terms above indicated. ' These details do not appear to be circumscribed to the archipelago. THE TREATY OF PEACE. 699 "The very President of the American Republic in the conference he held on August 10 with the Ambassador of France, representing Spain for the time' being, made an absolute distinction between the Protocol and the treaty of peace, stating that the former should only be a mere preliminary document which should have no object or effect other than to record without any delay the agreement of the two governments upon the principles themselves of the peace, and that, therefore, it would not be necessary to reserve therein either the rights of the Cortes or those of the Federal Senate, who were charged only with the ratification of the final treaty. "The President, it is true, spoke of the Philippine question to state that it was reserved for the Paris conference; but he never said, or even intimated, that this subject should be the only one to be treated by this conference " This was followed up with these interesting observations : "The American Commission, in order to sustain its inadmissible opinion regarding the abandonment by Spain of the island of Cuba, relies on the difference which appears in the Protocol itself. They say that Spain agreed to cede only Porto Rico to the United States, while she bound herself to relin- quish the island of Cuba. From this they deduce that the effects of the obli- gation of Spain with respect to one are broader than with respect to the other. We have already proved by the very text of the draft of articles presented by the said gentlemen that when they drew it up they did not even perceive this difference in the effects with respect to Spain. The difference, nevertheless, is well understood under another aspect. The United States made a demand on Spain and afterwards declared war on her that Cuba might become free and independent. And it is clear that having conquered they could not demand that the island be ceded to them, ignoring the liberty and independence thereof, as this would give cause to the world to believe that such liberty and independence had not been the true cause of the conflict. They did not make the same demand regarding Porto Rico, and did subse- quently claim the sovereignty of the latter island and of the others surround- ing Cuba (which will render impossible its independence without the will and gracious consent of the United States, which will always have it at their mercy owing to their control over the islands surrounding it like a band of iron) in the way of indemnity for the expenses of the war and of the damages which they said American citizens had ' suffered during the colonial Insurrection. This is the natural explanation of why in the Protocol the 700 THE TREATY OF PEACE. sovereignty of one island appears as relinquished and that of the others as ceded. " The Spaniards proceeded to state the fact that we had repeatedly paid for land, citing the cases of Louisiana, Texas, New Mexico and Alaska, and now we were demanding from Spain, in the way of war indemnity, not only the cession of islands but additional!)' that the burdens which encumbered them, "as well as their sister Cuba, be thrown upon the mother country, who with her own hands introduced them into the life of the civilized world." In concluding their very lengthy and able memorandum the Spanish Commission remarked, with eloquent impressiveness, it is only fair to say : "It results, in recapitulation, that the only question up to now in existence between the two Commissions and awaiting their decision is a question of money, which as far as one of the High Contracting Parties is concerned is relatively of secondary importance. That question is the one which relates to the colonial debt. "The Spanish Commissioners understand that a question of such a nature as this cannot fail to be solved satisfactorily between two parties, one of which is the greatest nation of the new world, immensely rich and prosperous, blessed with inexhaustible resources, whether due to nature or to the prodigious activity of its inhabitants, which on the other hand acquires by this treaty territories of great importance, and thereb}' fulfills an aspiration of its policy in America, while the other party is a great and noble nation of the old world, a cordial friend of her late antagonist in days for her more prosperous, but now impoverished through the misfortunes heaped upon her during the century which is about to terminate; whose treasury is overburdened by obligations, and for whom the present treaty will mean the solemn confirma- tion of the loss of the last remnants of her American empire, although through her discovery of the new world she was instrumental in the very existence of the Great American Republic, and to the enrichment of the modern nations, perhaps at the expense of her own welfare and to the detriment of the full development of the great elements of wealth accumulated in her own bosom but neglected through her desire preferentially to attend to her colonies, creatures who like others in the order of nature enlist the utmost solicitude on the part of their mother, who feeds and supports them at the sacrifice of her own welfare." In replying to this remarkable manifesto in a memorandum, which is THE TREATY OF PEACE. 701 marked by the passionate dignity of an uncommon and transcendent sorrow, the American Commission said that in offering the precise stipulations of the Protocol they "sought to put aside the controversy- raised by the Spanish proposals as to the relinquishment of sovereignty and the assumption of the Cuban debt, and to afford the Spanish Commissioners an opportunity to meet them on the common ground of what the two governments had unmistakably agreed to. It was and is now apparent that on the composite subject, as the Spanish Commissioners consider it to be, of the relinquishment of sovereignty over Cuba and the assumption of the Cuban debt, the views expressed on the one side and on the other are irreconcilable, and that, imless some common ground is found, the conference is at an end. In this crisis the American Commissioners conceived that both sides might, without any compromise of principle or of opinion, agree that, instead of amplifying the words of the Protocol, or substituting for them argumentative stipulations, they would execute the promise in the words in which it was made. They regret that the Spanish Commissioners rejected this conciliatory proposition. "The Spanish Commissioners, in the memorandum now itnder considera- tion, recur to the distinction which they have sought to make between the words 'abandon' and 'relinquish.' On this verbal question, which was raised by the Spanish Commissioners in their memorandum of the nth of October, the American Commissioners find no occasion to add anything to what they have already said ; but they feel called upon to repel the imputa- tion that they have sought either to leave Cuba in a derelict condition or to evade any responsibility to which their government is by its declarations or its course of conduct committed. " Touching the Spanish claims that they had made recent "advances" to Cuba, the American Commission observed : "It is to be regretted that details were not given. But, by the very term 'advances' it is evident that the Spanish memorandum does not refer to gifts, but to expenditures for the reimbursement of which Cuba was expected ulti- mately to provide; and the American Commissioners do not doubt that these expenditures were made for the carrying on of the war, or the payment of war expenses, in Cuba. "When the American Commissioners, in their memorandum of the 14th instant, referred to the Cuban insurrection of 1868 as the product of just grievances, it was not their intention to offend the sensibilities of the Spanish 702 THE TREATY OF PEACE. Commissioners, but to state a fact which they supposed to be generally admitted. They might, if they saw fit to do so, cite the authority of man) eminent Spanish statesmen in the support of their remark. "The American Commissioners have read without offense the reference in the Spanish memorandum to the Indian rebellions which it has been necessary for the United States to suppress, for they are unable to see any parallel between the uprisings of those barbarous and often savage tribes, which have disappeared before the march of civilization because they were unable to submit to it, and the insurrections against Spanish rule in Cuba, insurrections in which many of the noblest men of Spanish blood in the island have participated. "Nor are the American Commissioners offended by the reference of the Spanish memorandum to the attempt of the Southern States to secede. The Spanish Commissioners evidently misconceive the nature and the object of that movement. The war of secession was fought and concluded upon a question of constitutional principle, asserted by one party to the conflict and denied by the other. It was a conflict in no respect to be likened to the uprisings against Spanish rule in Cuba. "The American Commissioners are unaware of the ground on which it is asserted in the Spanish memorandum that the United States has been com- pelled to admit that the Cuban people are as yet unfit for the enjoyment of full liberty and sovereignty. It is true that an intimation of such unfitness was made in the note of the Spanish government on the 2 2d of July last. The government of the United States, in its reply of the 30th of July, declared that it did not share the apprehensions of Spain in this regard, but that it recognized that in the present distracted and prostrate condition of the island, brought about by the wars that had waged there, aid and guidance would be necessary." The Spaniards had said publicists had declared that the thirteen original colonies of the United States had paid Great Britain ^15,000,000. The Amer- icans replied: "The American Commissioners are not acquainted with the works of the publicists who maintain that the thirteen original United States paid to Great Britain ^/^ 15, 000, 000 sterling, presumably for the extinguishment of colonial debts. The American Commissioners, however, feel no interest in the matter, since the statement is entirely erroneous. The preliminary and THE TREATY OF PEACE. 703 definitive treaties of peace between the United States and Great Britain of 1782 and 1783 were published soon after their conclusion, and have since been republished in many forms. They are the only treaties made between the two countries as to American independence, and they contain no stipulation of the kind referred to." The American memorandum closes with these simple sentences: "If it could be admitted, as is argued in the memorandum submitted by the Spanish Commissioners, that the United States in this relation stands as the agent of the Cuban people, the duty to resist the assumption of these heavy obligations would be equally imperative. The decrees of the Spanish government itself show that these debts were incurred in the fruitless endeavors of that Government to suppress the aspirations of the Cuban people for greater liberty and freer government." The next move of the Spaniards was to assume and assert a policy in the cases of the Philippines and the West Indian islands. The reply of the American Commission was: "The American Commissioners are not disturbed by this charge of incon- sistency, since they deem it obviously groundless. They based their demands in regard to Cuba and Porto Rico upon the precise terms of the Protocol, because it was in those very terms that the United States had made its demands and Spain had conceded them, by promising to 'relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba,' and to 'cede' to the United States Porto Rico and certain other islands. The United States, in insisting upon the words of the Protocol on these subjects, merely asked that the precise con- cessions of Spain be made good. "In the case of the Philippines, the United States, except as to the bay, city, and harbor of Manila, confined itself to demanding that the subject should be left in the widest and fullest sense for future negotiatiSns. While it did not, with the exception referred to, demand specific concessions, it reserved and secured the right to demand them. Its position, therefore, is, not that its present demands in respect of the Philippines were specifically set out in the Protocol, but that they are justified by and included in the right which it therein expressly reserved and secured to make demands in the future." The Spanish Commission had been sensitive from the first meeting of the Commissioners about the fate of the Philippines, and protested October 17th against the sending of American reinforcements to Manila, the president of 704 THE TREATY OF PEACE. the Spanish Committee stating "that he had received from his government a telegram referring to reports to the effect that two American men-of-war were about to leave American ports with reinforcements of troops for the gar- rison at Manila, and that Spanish, prisoners in the possession of the Tagalos are ill-treated." But the telegram was not read. There is a curious passage in one of the memorandums, charging that General Merritt, "after the Protocol was signed, contrary to what had been agreed upon, forcibly took possession of Manila," and in the terms of the capitulation the words occurred "or when the American army evacuates," and the Spanish memorandum goes on to say : "In the conference held on August 4 last, between Mr. Cambon, Ambassador from France, and President McKinley, in the presence of the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Cambon made some remarks as to the session of Porto Rico in compensation for the expenses of the war, and the President, showing himself inflexible upon that point, repeated his assertion that the Philippine question was the only one not finally settled in his mind. It was then that Mr. Cambon asked for an explanation about the meaning of the above cited phrases in Article III. of the Protocol, relating to the Philip- pine Archipelago, as the language of said Article might lend itself to inspire fear in Spain in regard to her sovereignty over these islands. President McKinley answered him, verbatim, as follows: " 'I do not want any ambiguity to be allowed to remain on this point. The negotiators of both countries are the ones who shall resolve upon the permanent advantages (notice that he said "advantages," and not "rights") which we shall ask in the archipelago, and decide upon the intervention (con- trole), disposition and government of the Philippine Islands.' "He further said: 'The Madrid government can rest assured that up to now nothing is decided a priori, in my own mind, against Spain, nor do I consider anything decided by it against the United vStates. ' "Is it therefore doubtful that on the 12th of August, when the Secretary of State of the United States signed the Protocol, the President of the United States had no idea of demanding from Spain the cession to the United States of her sovereignty over the archipelago?" There was further comment upon the President's open-mindedness as to the Pliilippines, and this gave rise to the most interesting episode of the arduous and contentious negotiations, which, stated by the American Com- THE TREATY OF PEACE. 70S mission, in constant communication by the cable with the President himself, has every authenticity of authority, and is official history. The Spanish Com- mission had gone so far as to say that on the 13th of August, "General Mer- ritt, commander of the American forces in Manila, and the Admiral of the fleet in that bay, demanded the surrender of the place, and as its authorities did not agree thereto, the said forces opened fire on the San Antonio Abad powder magazine and on the trenches which defended the city on the land side, unnecessarily causing a considerable number of losses to the Spanish forces, who would have peacefully delivered, the city over to the Americans in obedience to the third basis of the Protocol that they might hold it as a guaranty pending the conclusion of the treaty of peace. "General Merritt entered Manila by force, he made prisoners of war of its garrison made up of eight or nine thousand men, he took possession of the public funds and the collection of taxes, including customs receipts, he named as Intendant General and Administrator of the Public Treasury, and Tax Collector, the officers of his army he saw fit, thereby displacing the Spanish officials. He relieved the Spanish Commander of the civil guard charged with the maintenance of public order; he constituted military courts; he opened the port of Manila and all the other ports of the Philippines in the possession of his land and naval forces to the commerce of his nation and of neutral nations, conditioned on the payment of the dues in force at the time of his arrival, which were collected by his officials. All of this is recorded in the preliminary minute of the capitulation of August 13, in the capitulation of the 14th itself, in the proclamation of General Merritt of like date, in his orders of the 22d and 23d of the same month, and in the others dictated by the Ameri- can authorities and officials in Manila. "The Spanish government remonstrated to that of Washington through the French Embassy against everything that occurred there on August 29 and the 3d and nth of September last, repeating such remonstrances since and down to the present time, signally insisting upon the immediate release of the garrison held prisoners in Manila and upon the return of their arms, since, on the one hand, it could not send reinforcements from the Peninsula to the archipelago, nor would the United States look favorably upon such an action, and, on the other hand, it needed those forces to liberate the thou- sands of Spanish prisoners of the Tagalo insurgents, victims of their ill-treat- ment, and to combat and dominate that insurrection of its own subjects. The 7o6 THE TREATY OF PEACE. remonstrances of the Spanish government have been up to the present fruit- less. These acts are daily assuming a worse phase. On September 21 Captain W. P. Moffatt, appointed by the American Provost Marshal in charge of the Bilibid prisons, with authority to regulate the enti'ance and release of all kinds of prisoners, released two, named Silvestre Lacoy and Marcos Alarcon, charged with the offense of highway robbery ; two others charged with desertion; six charged with contempt of authority; another charged with assault and robbery, and three others charged with homicide. As is seen, all these prisoners were in jail for common crimes. This unheard-of act was communicated to the government of Her Catholic Majesty by the 'Commandant General's Office of the station of Manila." The American Commission says of this: "The American Commissioners are loth to assume that the Spanish 'proposition' employs these words for the purpose of intimating that General Merritt could at the time of the capture of Manila have had knowledge of the Protocol. It is a fact doubtless well known to the Spanish government that on the i6th of August last, four days after the signature of the protocol, and four days before the receipt at Wash- ington of the news of the capture and capitulation of Manila, the Depart- ment of State addressed to the French Ambassador a note soliciting the consent of the Spanish government to the restoration of cable communica- tion between Manila and Hongkong, in order that continuous telegraphic connection with the Philippines might be reestablished." The Spaniards descended from their pose of dignity in this instance. The President of the United States could just as well have forced the cession of the Philippines as of Porto Rico, but deemed it his duty to refer the question of our permanency in the archipelago to the people of the United States. The raid of the Spanish Commission upon the facts as to the Philippines exhibits a weakness that takes away sympathy from the Commissioners when representing the misfortunes of their country ; they were from the beginning conscious that however adroit their ability, or vigorous their protests, the inevitable end was Spain's surrender. There is compensation for the general reader in the narration the Ameri- canXommissioners give of the part of the President in the preparation of the Peace Protocol. The President on the 26th of July received a note asking him to name the terms on which peace might be obtained. This note was presented to the THE TREATY OF PEACE. 7C7 President of the United States on the 26th day of July, 1898, by Mr. Cambon, Ambassador of the French Republic at Washington, authorized to make the application, and represent the Spanish government in the subsequent negotia- tions which led up to the execution of the Protocol. At that meeting, the President received the note of July 22 from the Spanish government, and advised Mr. Cambon that after consultation with his Cabinet he would pre- pare an answer which could be transmitted to the Spanish government. On July 30, following, the terms of peace having been carefully considered and agreed upon by the President and his Cabinet, the President received Mr. Cambon at the Executive Mansion in Washington, at which meeting were also present Mr. Thiebault, Secretary of the French Embassy in Washington, and the then Secretary of State of the United States. The answer of the President to the communication of the Spanish government, dated July 30, 1898, was then read to Mr. Cambon. This note was in the exact form in which it was afterwards signed and delivered to Mr. Cambon to be sent to the Spanish government, with a single exception. After some discussion of the terms of the note as to Cuba, and Porto Rico, and other West Indian islands, Mr. Cambon said he did not know what the Spanish government would desire as to the Philippines, and no matter what the note might say as to the Com- mission, the Spanish government would regard the purpose of the United States as being fixed to acquire not only Cuba and Porto Rico, but the Philip- pines as well. The President said that as to the Philippines the note expressed the purposes of this government, and their final disposition would depend upon the treaty to be negotiated by the Commissioners and ratified by the interested governments. After further discussion, in which the President reiterated that the treaty must determine the fate of the Philippines, and the note of the Presi- dent on that subject reading then as now with the single exception that the word "possession" was then in Article III., so that it read "control, possession and government of the Philippines," where it now reads "control, disj^osition and government of the Philippines," Mr. Cambon said that the word "pos- session" translated into Spanish in such a way as to be regarded as of a severe and threatening nature, and suggested a change in that word. He suggested the word "condition." The President declined to change the word except for a word of similar import or meaning. The word "disposition" being suggested, after considerable talk the President consented that that 7o8 - THE TREATY OF PEACE. word, not changing the meaning, being indeed a broader one and including possession, might be substituted. Thereupon the note at the close of the interview of July 30, in exactly the form it was originally cast with the single change of the word "disposition" for "possession," was delivered to Mr. Cambon to be communicated to the Spanish government. On Wednesday, August 3, in the afternoon, Mr. Cambon having inti- mated a desire for a further interview with the President, another meeting between the same persons was held at the Executive Mansion. Mr. Cambon said the Spanish government had received the answer of the President, and that it was regarded by Spain as very severe. After asking a modification as to Porto Rico, to which the President promptly answered that he could not consent, Mr. Cambon said there was a disposition to believe in Spain that the United States intended to take the Philippine group; that the Spanish govern- ment appreciated that reforms were necessary in the government; that Amer- ican privileges should be granted ; but that Spanish sovereignty should not be interfered with was a matter which Spain would insist upon. The President answered that the question of Cuba, Porto Rico and other West India islands, and the Ladrones, admitted of no negotiation; that the disposition of the Philippine Islands, as he had already said to Mr. Cambon, must depend upon the treaty which might be negotiated, and that he could not make any change in the terms theretofore submitted. Mr. Cambon called attention to the wording of the note as to the possession of the city, bay and harbor of Manila to be retained during the pendency of the treaty, and asked what was to be done with them afterwards. The President said that must depend upon the terms of the treaty. This is the same interview alluded to in the memorandum of the Span- ish Commissioners as having occurred on the 4th of August. It in fact occurred on the afternoon of August 3, the difference in date arising from the fact, no doubt, that it was reported on the 4th of August. This could make but little difference, as there was but one interview at that time. In reporting the conversations, and comparing the memoranda made by Mr. Cambon with those made by the representative of the American govern- ment then present, it must be borne in mind that Mr. Cambon did not speak or understand English, but communicated with the President through the medium of an interpreter, his Secretary, and that neither of the American representatives understood or spoke the French language. Making this allow- MALACANAN PALACE AND PASIG RIVER, MANILA. GENERAL OTIS AND STAFF. DINING ROOM. MALACANAN PALACE. MANILA. THE TREATY OF PEACE. 7" ance, it is perfectly apparent that the American President, even in the version reported and transcribed in the memorandum of the Spanish Commission, at all times maintained that the treaty of peace should determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines The President did say that the Philippine question was the only one left open for negotiation and settle- ment in the treaty. It is undoubtedly true that it was not then fully settled in his own mind as to what disposition should be made of the Philippines. Had it been, there would have been nothing to leave to negotiation and settlement in the treaty. It was the purpose of the President in everything written and spoken of to leave to the negotiators of the treaty the most ample freedom with reference to the Philippines, and to settle, if their negotiations should result in an agreement, the control, disposition and government of those islands in the treaty of peace. When Mr. Cambon spoke of Spain's purpose to retain sovereignty over those islands, the President did say he wanted it clearly understood that no ambiguity should remain upon that point, but that the whole matter should be decided as set forth in the treaty of peace, which should determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippine Islands. He certainly did not use the word "intervention," nor limit the subject of negotiation to "advantages" in the Philippines; nor could it be claimed that any report was made to the Spanish government of the precise English words used by the President. In the same paragraph quoted in the memorandum of the Spanish Commission in which it is said he used the words above quoted, it is added that the President also said the negotiators should decide upon the "intervention" (controle), disposition and government of the Philippine Islands. Even this version of the conversation is ample proof that the President showed no uncertainty as to the scope and meaning of the terms used. He did say in substance, in reply to the inquiry of Mr. Cambon as to whether the United States had prejudged the matter of the Philippine Islands and the rights to be acquired therein by the United States, that the case had not been prejudged either as to the United States or as to Spain. The whole matter would be left to the Commission for negotiation, and to be settled by the treaty of peace. In the meantime, the United States would insist upon holding Manila as laid down in the note, and its disposition thereafter would depend upon the terms of the treaty. This is reported in the quotation in the Spanish note as the utterance of the President that "the Madrid government can rest assured that up to now nothing is decided a 712 THE TREATY OF PEACE. priori in my own mind against Spain, nor do I consider anything decided by it against the United States." This may not be an unfair interpretation, though not the exact words used by the President. It shows clearly that he did not regard the United States as^limited to 'advantages in the Philippines,' but the whole matter, being undecided in the President's mind, was left open in accordance with the terms of the note. The case was not decided in advance in any of its aspects either for or against either government. Great stress was laid in the Spanish memorandum upon the allegation that the President had not then determined to take the Philippine group, and indeed did not intend to do so. It is utterly immaterial to inquire as to. what either government would then have insisted upon. There was a mutual agreement that the question should not then be decided. Opportunity for full investigation was reserved, the final conclusion to be arrived at as the result of the negotiations then in progress, in the treaty of peace to be con- cluded. Further conversation as to the number of Commissioners, the place of meeting, et cetera, terminated the interview. On the afternoon of August 9, Mr. Cambon, having received the note of August 7 sent by the Duke of Almodovar, called by appointment at the Executive Mansion in Washington, at which interview were present the same parties as at the last meeting. The part of that note which relates to the Philippines, in the exact terms in which it was then presented in English text by the French Ambassador to the President of the United States, is as follows : "The terms relating to the Philippines seem, to our understanding, to be quite indefinite. On the one hand, the ground on which the United States believe themselves entitled to occupy the bay, the harbor and the city of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, cannot be that of con- quest, since in spite of the blockade maintained on sea by the American fleet, in spite of the siege established on land by a native supported and provided for by the American Admiral, Manila still holds its own, and the Spanish standard still waves over the city. On the other hand, the whole Archipelago of the Philippines is in the power and under the sovereignty of Spain. Therefore, the government of Spain thinks that the temporary occupation of Manila should constitute a guaranty. It is stated that the treaty of peace shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines; THE TREATY OF PEACE. 713 but as the intentions of the Federal government by regression remain veiled, therefore the Spanish government must declare that, while accepting the third condition, they do not a priori renounce the sovereignty of Spain over the Archipelago, leaving it to the negotiators to agree as to such reforms as the condition of these possessions and the level of culture of their natives may render desirable. "The government of Her Majesty accepts the third condition, with the above mentioned declarations. "Such are the statements and observations which the Spanish govern- ment has the honor to submit in reply to your Excellency's communication. The}' accept the proffered terms, subject to the approval of the Cortes of the Kingdom, as required by their constitutional duties. "The agreement between the two governments implies the irremeable suspension of hostilities and the designation of Commissioners for the purpose of settling the details of the treaty of peace and of signing it, under the terms above indicated. " ' It is translated in the memorandum of the Spanish Commissioners in language differing somewhat from the terms of the note as presented to the President. In the translation in the memorandum it is said that the treaty shall determine "the intervention, disposition and government of the Philip- pine Islands." In the note as presented to the President it reads, "It is stated that the treaty of peace shall determine the control, disposition and govern- ment of the Philippines." The word "entire" precedes "sovereignty" in the translation embodied in the Spanish note. It is true that, taking these words of the Duke of Almodovar either as they were conveyed to the President of the United States, or as they were quoted in the Spanish proposition, it may be argued that they did no more than reserve to Spain the right to maintain that she did not in advance of the negotiations for peace renounce her sovereignty over the Archipelago. She did this, by her own declaration, for the reason that the intentions of the United States were "veiled"; clearly perceiving that by the terms of the demand the United States would have the right, if it saw fit to exercise it, to ask that she yield her sovereignty over the group, and that her sovereignty was thus put in jeopardy, she took the precaution to say that she did not intend, in assuming the chance of such a demand, to concede it in advance. The American Commissioners did not deny that this might be a fair con- 714 THE TREATY OF PEACE. struction of this particular paragraph of the Duke's note. The representa- tives of the United States were not willing, however, to leave anything to construction. When, therefore, the Duke's answer was read to the President it was immediately objected to by.him and the Secretary of State, in that it was vague and indefinite, purporting to accept the terms laid down in the note of the United States, while requiring some modification. In referring to the Philippines, while in one paragraph it stated the acceptance of the terms, in another it seemed to retain the full right of sovereignty, with such reforms, etc., as that government might see fit to grant. The unsatisfactory character of this answer is more clearly shown when in the subsequent part of the same note, not quoted in the memorandum of the Spanish Commissioners, it was said without qualification that they (the Spanish government) accepted the proffered terms, subject to the approval of the Cortes of the Kingdom, as required by their constitutional duties; In the part of the note referred to above it is said 'the Spanish government must declare that, while accepting the said condition, they do not a priori renounce the sovereignty of Spain over the archipelago, leaving it to the negotiators, etc. ' These contradictory statements were called to the attention of Mr. Cambon, and made the note, as was said to him, unsatisfactory to the United States. It is to be observed, as has already in effect been pointed out, that even the terms of this note were inconsistent with the claim later put forward that Spanish sovereignty should not be interfered with, for the length to which the statement went in the note is that the Spanish government does not a priori relinquish entire sovereignty over the Philippine Archipelago, thus leaving it clearly to be inferred that the Spanish government recognized that the negotiations resulting in a treaty might require a relinquishment of Spanish sovereignty consequent upon such negotiations. Mr. Cambon, having heard the objections raised by the American representatives to the note, asserted that allowance must be made for different translations which the note had undergone in course of transmission, and to the desire of the Spanish government to express regret at the loss of its colonies; and he was very confident that it was the intention to accept the terms of the United States. It was then suggested by the American repre- sentatives that if this was true, and the note was to be regarded as a full acceptance, the best way to settle the matter was to put the terms in the shape of a definite Protocol, which the President would authorize the Secre THE TREATY OF PEACE. 7i5 tary of State to sign for the United States, Mr. Cambon to submit to the Spanish government the exact terms of the Protocol, to which an answer Yes or No coiild be had; and if the Spanish government accepted the Protocol, that would end the controversy. Mr. Cambon concurred in this view, and said if the Protocol was drawn up in proper form he would submit it to the Spanish government, and if authorized would execute it on its part. On that evening, August 9, the Protocol was prepared in the State Department at Washington, and taken to the Executive Mansion, where it was submitted to the President and members of the Cabinet there present. On the morning of August 10 Mr. Cambon called at the State Department at Washington, a draft of the Protocol was submitted to and approved by him, and put into French by Mr. Thidbault, Secretary of the French Embassy at Washington, and experts in the State Department. It was carefully com- pared with the English text, and then telegraphed by Mr. Cambon to the Spanish government. On the same day, August 10, the note' of the Secre- tary of State enclosing the Protocol was sent to Mr. Cambon in Washington. This note, it is said, contained the admission of the Secretary of State of the United States that the note of the Duke of Almodovar of August 7 "contained in its spirit the acceptance by Spain of the conditions proposed by the United States." The best answer to this obvious misconstruction of the terms of the note of the Secretary of State is in the text of the note itself, which is as follows : "Department of State, Washington, August 10, 1898. "Excellency: Although it is your understanding that the note of the Duke of Almodovar, which you left with the President on yesterday after- noon, is intended to convey an acceptance by the Spanish government of the terms set forth in my note of the 30th ultimo as the basis on which the Presi- dent would appoint Commissioners to negotiate and conclude with Com- missioners on the part of Spain a treaty of peace, I understand that we concur in the opinion that the Duke's note, doubtless owing to the various transfor- mations which it has undergone in the course of its circuitous transmission by telegraph and in cipher, is not, in the form in which it has reached the hands of the President, entirely explicit. "Under these circumstances, it is thought that the most direct and certain way of avoiding misunderstanding is to embody in a Protocol to be signed by us as the representatives, respectively, of the United States and Spain, the terms on which the negotiations for peace are to be undertaken. 7i6 THE TREATY OF PEACE. "I therefore enclose herewith a draft of such a Protocol, in which you will find that I have embodied the precise terms tendered to Spain in my note of the 30th ultimo, together with appropriate stipulations for the appointment of Commissioners to arrange the details of the immediate evacuation of Cuba, Porto Rico, and other islands under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, as well as for the appointment of Commissioners to treat of peace. "Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration. "(Signed) WILLIAM R. DAY. "His Excellency, M. Jules Cambon, etc." In this note, so far from saying that the Secretarj- of State of the United States understood that the note of the Spanish government of August 7 accepted the American terms, it is distinctly said: "Although it is your (Mr. Cambon's) understanding that the note of the Duke of Almodovar is intended to convey the acceptance by the Spanish government of the terms set forth in my note of the 30th ultimo, ... I understand that we concur in the opinion that the Duke's note, doubtless owing to the various transformations which it has undergone in the course of its circuitous transmission by tele- graph and in cipher, is not, in the form in which it reached the hands of the President, entirely explicit." Here it is distinctly stated that the Secretary of State and Mr. Cambon concurred that the note was not entirely explicit. Was it then to be expected after all this careful negotiation that a note which the American representatives contended did not accept the terms of the United States, and which both negotiators agreed was not explicit, was, to be received as a satisfactory answer to the American demand? Not so. "Under these circumstances it was thought that the most direct and cer- tain way of avoiding misunderstanding was to embody in a Protocol, to be signed by the representatives, respectively, of the United States and Spain, the terms on which the negotiations for peace were to be undertaken." This is a most emphatic and definite declaration that the note of August 7 was not satisfactory, and that it was the purpose of the United States to leave nothing open to misunderstanding, but to embody, in a contract so plain that dispute would be forever foreclosed, the exact terms upon which negotia- tions for peace would be undertaken. The note goes on to say: "I therefore enclose herewith a draft of such a Protocol, in which you will find that I have THE TREATY OF PEACE. 717 embodied the precise terms tendered to Spain in my note of the 30th ultimOj together with appropriate stipulations for the appointment of Commissioners, etc." What does this note mean? Does it admit the construction chat the proposal was intended to embody the acceptance of August 7, reserving Span- ish sovereignty? It is definitely settled, as a perusal of the document will show, that the Protocol embodied, not the imcertain and equivocal terms of the note of August 7, but the precise terms stated in the note of the American government of July 30. This note to Mr. Cambon enclosed the Protocol just as it was written and just as it was signed by the parties. It would seem, if ever an attempt was fairly made to have a clear understanding, if ever all precautions were taken which could leave no room for misunderstanding, such was the course pursued in this case. It is thus seen how utterly groundless was the declaration in the Spanish "proposition" that, in order to determine the meaning of the Protocol, it is necessary to "bear in mind . . . the negotiations carried on between the two parties which culminated in this agreement, and in which the interpreta- tion of the latter had been given beforehand and officially!" In the corre- spondence thus invoked by the Spanish Commissioners as an interpretation of the Protocol, the two governments did not contemplate the execution of such an instrument; and if the response of the Spanish government to the Ameri- can demands had taken the form of a simple acceptance, no Protocol would have been made. The first suggestion of such an instrument was that made in the interview in which the Spanish response was declared to be unsatisfac- tory. It was because the Spanish response was unacceptable that the United States demanded a Protocol. And it was upon this rejected response that the Spanish argument for the limitation of the clear scope and meaning of the Protocol was built. If further proof of the soundness of the position of the United States were needed, it would be found in a most convincing form in the telegram sent by Mr. Cambon to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs. See the French 'Yellow Book' referred to in the Spanish memorandum, telegram number 9, Mr. Cambon to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs. "No. 9. — M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador of the French Republic at Washington, to M. Delcasse, Minister for Foreign Affairs. "Washington, August 10, 1898. "The Federal government has decided to state precisely (pr^ciser), in a 7i8 THE TREATY OF PEACE. Protocol, the bases upon which the peace negotiations must, in its judgment, be entered upon. "I send you herewith this document, which I shall thank you to transmit to the Spanish government. , (Signed) J. CAMBON." In this telegram, which was immediately communicated to the Spanish government, and which led to the telegram to Mr. Cambon authorizing him to sign the Protocol, followed by full power from the Queen Regent to Mr. Cambon to that effect, Mr. Cambon distinctly says, not that the American government had accepted the note of August 7, or in any wise agreed to such reservations as were contained therein, but that "the Federal government has decided to state precisely (precise r), in a Protocol, the bases upon which the peace negotiations must, in its judgment, be entered upon." It thus clearly appears that the bases of peace negotiations were to be determined by the instrument which was enclosed, and which it was under- stood put in definite terms the ultimate agreement of the parties. It was because the answer made in the note of August 7 was rejected by the United States, and for this reason alone, that hostilities were not upon the receipt of that note declared to be suspended; and it remained for the Spanish Commissioners in their "proposition" to advance for the first .time in behalf of their government the suggestion that such a declaration should then have been made. It was not so made because that note was not received as an acceptance of the American demands. Hostilities were declared to be sus- pended only upon the signature of the Protocol. The correspondence quoted in the French "Yellow Book," no less than the subsequent communications from Mr. Cambon to the American govern- ment, shows distinctly that with the exact terms of this Protocol before it, the Spanish Government, on the nth instant, and subsequently by full power of the Queen Regent, authorized Mr. Cambon to execute. the Protocol in behalf of Spain. Observe the language of the note of Mr. Cambon to the American Secretary of State of August 12, 1898: "Embassy of the French Republic in the United States, "Washington, August 12, 1898. "Mr. Secretary of State: I have the honor to inform you that I have just received, through the intermediation of the Department of Foreign Affairs at Paris, a telegram, dated Madrid, August 11, in which the Duke of Almodovar THE TREATY OF PEACE. 719 del Rio announces to me that, by order of Her Majesty the Queen Regent, the Spanish government confers upon me full powers in order that I may sign, without other formality and without delay, the Protocol whereof the terms have been drawn up by common accord between you and me. The instrument destined to make regular the powers which are thus given to me by telegraph will be subsequently addressed to me by the post. "His Excellency the Minister of State adds that in accepting this Protocol, and by reason of the suspension of hostilities which will be the immediate consequence of that acceptance, the Spanish government has pleas- ure in hoping that the government of the United States will take the neces- sary measures with a view to restrain (empecher) all aggression on the part of the Cuban separatist forces. "The government of the Republic having, on the other hand, authorized me to accept the powers which are conferred upon me by the Spanish govern- ment, I shall hold myself at your disposition to sign the Protocol at the hour you may be pleased to designate. "Congratulating myself upon thus cooperating with you toward the restoration of peace between the two nations, both friends of France, I beg you to accept, Mr. Secretary of State, the fresh assurances of my very high consideration. (Signed) JULES CAMBON." In the light of these facts, it appears there was absolutely no foundation for the claim that the American government accepted the Spanish reservations so far as they are contained in the note of the Duke of Almodovar of August 7. Had that note been only a distinct and unqualified acceptance of the terms as contained in the American note of August 30, it would have been unnecessary to require that all uncertainty and doubt would be removed by reducing into few and simple terms, which it was believed could never be misunderstood, the final agreement of the parties. So far from remaining unanswered, the note of August 7 was declared unsatisfactory when pre- sented to the President. Thus ended the attempt to come to an agreement by correspondence ; and it was decided that a Protocol should embody the ultimate terms. The Spanish government telegraphed the amplest authority to Mr. Cambon to execute it. We were then remitted to the terms of the Protocol itself. 720 THE TREATY OF PEACE. The American government was at a loss to know how stronger terms could have been used to evidence the purpose of the President to keep open the most full and absolute right to deal with and determine the dominion over the Philippine Islands. This was the .purpose of inserting the third article of the Protocol, which embodied the terms of the third demand of the . United States, as set forth in the note of July 30 of the American government to the Duke of Almodovar, wherein it is said: "Third. On similar grounds the United States is entitled to occupy and hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the con- trol, disposition and government of the Philippines." What are these similar grounds? They are to be found in the next preceding paragraph of the note of July 30, in which the President says that, though not then making any demand for pecuniary indemnity, nevertheless he could not be insensible to the losses and expenses of the United States inci- dent to the war, or to the claims of our citizens for injuries to their persons and property during the late insurrection in Cuba. He must, therefore, require the cession to the United States, and the immediate evacuation by Spain, of the Island of Porto Rico, etc. On similar grounds, to wit, among others the right of the United States to have indemnity for its losses, the United States would hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila pending the con- clusion of a treaty of peace, which should determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines. How could the United States receive indemnity in whole or in part from the control, disposition and government of the Philippines, if Spanish sovereignty was not to be touched? It is difficult to conceive what terms could^have been used which would more clearly have evidenced the purpose of the parties to afford the fullest latitude in dealing with the Philippine ques- tion. The treaty was to determine not alone the control, disposition and government, but at the same time had full power to determine all that is implied in control, disposition and government. Certainly the word "control" was not used here in the sense of "register" or "inspection," but in its broader sense of "authority or command; authority over; power over; the regulation or rule of. ' ' What word could be broader than "disposition, "which has practically the same meaning in both the French and English languages? "The disposal of; distribution of; alienation of; definite settlement of; ultimate destination." THE TREATY OF PEACE. 721 We have in these two words, then, authority over, dominion of, final and ■ultimate destination of the subject matter. What is "government" but the right of administration, or exercising sovereignty, the direction, the. political management of a state? Either of these terms implies power of interfering with sovereignty. Taken together, they give the fullest scope in dealing with all power, governmental, territorial and administrative. It is not argued in the Spanish "proposition" that these words should have a narrow meaning so far as disposition and government are concerned, but transcribed into the French language it is sought to give a narrower meaning to the word "control." It must be construed in the connection in which -it is found in the Protocol, in its broader sense of power or dominion. "Noscitur a sociis" is a legal maxim which applies to the discussion or determination of the meaning of phrases. "Control" associated with disposi- tion and government of territory might have a very different significance when used in another relation in its less familiar meaning of "inspection or register." The word "disposition" used in another association might have an entirely different meaning, and a meaning which, in connection with govern- ment and control, would deprive it of all sense. The American government, then, felt itself amply supported in its right to demand the cession of the Philippines with or without concessions, relying upon either the exact terms of the Protocol, or those terms interpreted in the light of negotiations, oral and written, which led to its execution. The Commissioners of the United States noticed with regret that an attempt had been made in the memorandum of the Spanish Commissioners to invoke the high authority of the French Minister for Foreign Affairs in the interpretation of the Protocol, so as to exclude therefrom all mention of the right of the treaty to deal with the control, disposition and government of the Philippines. In the French "Yellow Book" cited by the Spanish Com- missioners, it is apparent that as early as the loth of August the French government was in possession of the exact terms of the Protocol, transmitted in the note of that date of its Ambassador, Mr. Cambon. Would anybody believe that in summing up this note the Minister would intentionally omit one of the most essential parts of the Protocol? The note No. 19, referred to, is no part of the negotiations; its purpose was merely to advise the Ambassadors of the French Republic at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, etc., of the result of the action of the repre- 722 THE TREATY OF PEACE. sentative of France in bringing about a suspension of hostilities, and the preliminary agreement as to peace, between two nations toward which the French government was actuated by feelings of humanity and mutual friend- ship. In this note it is said that 'the points upon which both parties had reached an agreement were set forth in a Protocol. In stating the contents of that instrument, doubtless through inadvertence, it was not stated that the treaty should determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines. The attention of the Minister being called to this matter by the Ameri- can Ambassador in Paris, he very promptly corrected any misapprehension which might exist as to his despatch. This appears in the following-letter from the American Ambassador, which was received by the American Com- missioners: "Ambassade des Etats-Unis, i8. Avenue Kl^ber, "Paris, November 5, 1898. "Dear Sir: I beg to inform yoi: that I saw the French Minister of For- eign Affairs in regard to that portion of the reply of the Spanish Peace Com- missioners in which they refer to a letter sent by him to the French Ambassadors dated August 15, 1898, which appears in the French 'Yellow Book, ' and attempt to construe the language used therein as an interpretation of the French Minister of the meaning of the Protocol, and speak of the unquestionable moral weight of the testimony therein given by him regard- ing that instrument. He assured me emphatically and unreservedly that the letter jreferred to was intended to be simply a brief resume of the general features of the preliminary peace negotiations carried on between the two belligerents, and that he did not attempt to cpiote the precise language of the Protocol. He disclaimed any intention of giving any views of his own regarding it, having no authority for so doing, and declared that the brief mention contained in his letter could in no wise be construed as an interpre- tation. b)^ him of the terms or meaning of that instrument. He promised that he would at once send to the French Ambassadors the full text of the Protocol in order that they might be informed of its conditions in extenso, and that there might be no ground for misapprehension as to its terms. "The Minister repeated what he had said several times before, and which I know to be true, that he and his government had all along observed a strict and impartial neutrality between the two powers which were negotiat- THE TREATY OF PEACE. 723 ing, being equally friendly to both, and that he intended to continue the observance of such neutrality. Very truly yours, "(Signed) HORACE PORTER. "Hon. William R. Day, "President of the American Peace Commission, Paris." It was stated that the occupation of Manila was to be only temporary. The Protocol, so far as it relates to the Philippines, is itself provisional. It expressly provides for the doing of certain things pending the conclusion of a treaty which is in this particular to supersede it. Had it provided for the iDermanent occupation of Manila by the United States, it would have withdrawn the Philippines to that extent from the sphere of future negotia- tion. The most presentable and seemly of the pleas of the Spanish commission for shouldering the Cuban debts upon the United States as an obligation of the transferred sovereignty, to be handed over to the Cubans if they became a nation, was this: "In the memorandum which we are now answering, the singular affirma- tion is made that the mortgage created by the two issues above named can be called more properly a subsidiary guarantee, and that the party principally bound to pay is the Spanish nation. Undoubtedly tlie American Commission in making this affirmation had not before its eyes Article II. of the Royal Decree of May 10, 1886, authorizing the issue of 1,240,000 hypothecary bonds of the Island of Cuba, or the 2d paragraph of Article II. of the Royal Decree of September 27, 1890, authorizing the issue of 1,750,000 hypothecary bonds of the same island. Both texts read literally the same thing, and it will be sufficient for us to transcribe one of them. Their language is as follows: 'The new bonds shall have the direct (especial) guarantee of the customs revenue, stamp revenue of the island of Cuba, direct and indirect taxes now levied or to be levied there in the future, and the subsidiary (general) guar- antee of the Spanish nation. They shall be exempt from all ordinary and ex- traordinary taxes, etc' " Unquestionably, from the accustomed foundations for the building of nations, in material facts, it would have been simpler and stronger for the President to have demanded the cession of Cuba as of Porto Rico, but the effu- sion of Congress when it rushed to war had made difficulty in that direction and the President had deftly and sturdily resisted the torrent that was driving 724 THE TREATY OF PEACE. him upon the rock of the recognition of the national character of the Cuban faction that had monopolized the functions of the ancient Spanish Junta system, and the notorious Key West bureau of misinformation. The President was greatly wise in this, and in referring the Philippine question to the sober second thought of the people of the United States. He did not exert to the utmost the expression of his tremendous power, for that might have been mistaken for imperialism. He followed the high and holy traditions of our form of republicanism, and has been the faithful embodiment of the will of the people; and more than that, he has sought to know their will. He had faith in the people of Cuba, taught in schools of sorrow to take their part in a system of self-government, but he has not confounded the Cubans in the United States engaged in finance with credit based upon the ashes of the conflagration kindled by Gomez with the people of Cuba, who would restore the opulent industries of the island. A people of Cuba exist, and they are not entirely or principally those who have appeared in the phan- tom armies that ambuscaded and terrorized the Spanish columns with agility and mystery. The people of Cuba are not those who, after applying the torch to the cane fields and the tobacco leaves, that come visible wealth from the red and black soil and the indigo sky of the island, have mustered under the banner of the torch of San Domingo, ready for the American pay-roll, and also to make war for the poor plunder the island affords after the visitation of fire, that impoverished Cuba rather than the Peninsula of Spain. It is true that the deliberation of the President and people of the United States and the characteristic delays associated with the dignities of the Senate, allowed the Tagalos of Luzon to strike for a rule despotic and superstitious dictatorship of their own under a man who may be a soldier but is not a statesman ; and this is in harmony with the stated courses of the methods of the people who do govern themselves. It would have been happy if the Senate had ratified at once the splendid treaty with Spain, the fitting crown of a war of triumphs, but time is needed for obtaining the consensus of a multitude of wills trained in the individu- alities of free politics under popular dominion. The delay was mischievous, but the recompense is in the greater strength that comes at last, indicating one of the primary and grander truths of republicanism, that it is stronger than the imperialism that rests upon despots and dynasties that are degenerate. THE TREATY OF PEACE. 725 The country is indebted no less to the military energy of General Mer- ritt than to the brilliant ability and tenacity of Admiral Dewey, for the victories in which but little of the blood of the victors was spilled, for our possession of the capital of the Philippine Archipelago. General Merritt forced the fight, and Admiral Dewey smashed the defense by the seaside of Manila so that the storming of the town became a spectacle rather than a combat, and he was just in time. Neither the Spanish nor the American Commission seemed to have been perfectly informed or quite ingenuous in their information and use of the cable, the disability of which at one time caused delay, and at another hastened conclusion. The cable was cut by Dewey after the Spaniards had refused to neutralize its service, and a piece was taken out of it, the operators were scattered and the instruments gone, so that if both sides had been agreed some time must have elapsed before resumption of business. And things that might readily have happened would have vastly changed the Philippine situation — if Dewey had departed after destroying the Spanish fleet, and if Merritt had not rushed the American army, the smaller of the three forces in and about the city, so that he had the Spanish army captives in the walled city, and the Filipino forces relegated to the country, before the peace Protocol was announced. The Spanish Commissioners' solemn sentences became grotesque touching this phase of the subject, and the American people took their time and way to find their sovereign will and pleasure, as to the disposition of the Philippines, and their commandments will henceforth be executed both in the East and the West Indies. CEREMONIES CONCLUDING THE WAR WITH SPAIN. Actually, the war with Spain that began with the battle of the bay of Manila, May i, concluded August 13, with the capitulation of the city of Manila, the Protocol of Peace having been signed in Washington two days before, the fact, in the broken condition of the cable, not being known in the Philippines until transmitted in dispatch boat from Hongkong. The declara- .tion of war by the United States was on the 21st of April. The official close of the war was on April 11, the period of a legal state of hostilities lacking ten days of a year. The importance of fixing the date is in the eifect the formal end of the war has upon the terms of enlistment of our volunteers. The ceremony of the restoration of a state of peace imder the law was the 726 THE TREATY OF PEACE. exchange of ratifications in the reception room of the White House. The exact time was April ii, 3 p. m. Among the witnesses attracted by the his- toric character of the event were many members of the Cabinet and officials prominent in the Administrati9n gathered at the White House. These included Secretaries Hay, Wilson and Hitchcock; Senator Davis, one of the Peace Commissioners who negotiated the treaty; Assistant Secretaries Hill, Adee and Cridler, of the State Department; Acting-Secretary of War Meikel- john, Adjutant-General Corbin, Solicitor-General Richards, Hon. Wayne MacVeagh, and Mr. Sidney Smith, Chief of the Bureau of Diplomatic Cor- respondence, State Department, who had prepared the American copy of the treaty. A few minutes in advance the French Ambassador, M. Cambon, arrived, in company with M. Thiebaut, the First Secretary of the Embassy, the latter bearing the Spanish copy of the peace treaty. Mr. McKinley cordially greeted the Ambassador, and, after a brief exchange of well-wishes, the formal ceremony began. The President stood back of the large desk presented to the government by Queen Victoria, while Secretary Hay and Ambassador Cambon occupied places at the desk. Around this central group were ranged the Cabinet officers and others, and officials of the household. The powers of M. Cambon and Secretary Hay were examined, a protocol con- cerning the day's ceremony signed, and other formalities concluded. These preliminaries took some time, so that it was nearly 3:30 before the actual exchange began. The signing of the protocol of exchange occurred at 3: 28 p. m., Ambassador Cambon signing for Spain, and Secretary Hay for the United States. The protocol was in French, and briefly recited the circum- stances leading up to the exchange. This cleared the way for the exchange itself, constituting the final act. The President took from the desk the American copy of the treaty, handsomely engrossed, bound in dark blue morocco, and encased in a black morocco portfolio, and handed it to M. Cambon. At the same time M. Cambon handed to the President the Spanish copy of the treaty, also engrossed, bound in morocco and encased in a maroon- colored morocco box. There were deferential bows as each received from the other this final pledge of peace. This exchange of ratifications occurred at 3: 35 p. m. The President was the first to speak. "Mr. Ambassador," said he, "I will issue my proclamation at once." M. Cambon thanked the President for the promptness with which the proclamation followed. This ended the ceremony, and after brief felicitations '^§^-^^i;r^^ •t SIGNATURES OF AMERICAN AND SPANISH PEACE COMMISSIONERS TO TREATY OF PEACE. Reproduced from Photograph Taken by Signal Service Officers Expressly for This History, by Permission of State Department at Washington. THE TREATY OF PEACE. 7^9 the Ambassador and other officials withdrew. Secretary Hay took with him the Spanish copy of the treaty and deposited it in the archives of the State Department. M. Cambon cabled the Spanish government of the final restora- tion of peace, and made known that the American copy of the treaty would be forwarded through the French Foreign Office. PRESIDENT'S PROCLAMATION. . After the ceremony connected with the exchange of the ratification of the peace treaty, President McKinley issued the following proclamation : Whereas, A treaty of peace between the United States of America and Her Majesty, the Queen Regent of Spain, in the name of her august son, Don Alfonso XIII, was concluded and signed by their respective plenipotentiaries at Paris on December lo, 1898, the original of which is in the Spanish lan- guage, is word for word as follows: (Here full text of treaty is included.) And, whereas. The said convention has been duly ratified on both parts, and the ratifications of the two governments were exchanged in the city of Washington on April 11, 1899; now, therefore. Be it known, That I, William McKinley, President of the United States of America, have caused the said convention to be made public, to the end that the same and ever}- article and clause thereof may be observed and ful- filled with good faith by the United States and the citizens thereof. In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed. Done at the city of Washington, April 11, in the year of our Lord 1899, and of the independence of the United States 123. WILLIAM McKINLEY. By the President: JOHN HAY, Secretary of State. There is something in the documents exchanged that is characteristic of the two countries. The Spanish copy now in our possession is handsomely engrossed on parchment in old English script, with wide double columns, one in Spanish and the other in English. Its binding is of red morocco, heavily embossed in gold, which gives the effect of the yellow and red colors of Spain. The United States copy held by Spain is neat and simple, the text in parallel columns, the left in English and the right in Spanish, surrounded by 730 THE TREATY OF PEACE. a narrow border of the national colors. The document is enclosed in a cover of dark blue morocco, with the great seal of the United States upon the face and a decorative design in gilt. The Official Gazette of Madrid of April i6 contains a royal decree appointing the Duke de Arcos to be Spanish Envoy Extraordinary and Min- ister Plenipotentiary to the United States. The decree also creates consulates at Havana, Manila, Iloilo, San Juan de Porto Rico, and Cienfuegos. Senor Larrea, now Spanish Consul at Antwerp, is transferred to Havana; Senor Bouila, now at Shanghai, is appointed to Manila, and Senor Uriarte goes to Antwerp. The Hon. Bellamy Storer, Minister of the United States, has been chosen to represent the United States at the Spanish court. General orders of th^ date of April 12 look to the disbandment of the volunteer forces. The War Department makes this announcement : "To be continued in service or appointed under Section 13 of the Act of March 2, 1899, which authorizes the President to appoint or continue in serv- ice Brigadier-Generals not exceeding one for every 4,000 enlisted men actually in service and Major-Generals not exceeding one for every 12,000 enlisted men: "General officers of Volunteers — Maj.-Gen. William R. vShafter, Maj.- Gen. Elwell S. Otis. "Brigadier Generals — James H. Wilson, Fitzhugh Lee, Joseph Wheeler, John C. Bates, Samuel B. M. Young, H. W. Lawton, Adna R. Chaffee, Wil- liam Ludlow, Leonard Wood, George W. Davis, Theodore Schwan, Robert H. Hall, Loyd Wheaton, Frederick D. Grant. "To be continued in service under the clause of Section 15 of the act of March 2, 1899, which authorizes the President to enlist temporarily in service for absolutely necessary purposes in the Philippine Islands volunteers, officers and men, individually or by organizations, now in those islands : "General Officers of Volunteers — Maj.-Gen. H. W. Lawton, Maj.-Gen. Arthur MacArthur, Brig. -Gen. Charles King, Brig.-Gen. Robert P. Hughes Brig. -Gen. Samuel Ovenshine, Brig.-Gen. Irving Hale." It would be, now that peace is declared, a great saving to the government and relieve the Department of the necessity of sending more troops to the Philippines if the volunteers there could be largely retained. Under the law the service of the volunteer organization terminated with the declaration of peace, but the act of Congress provided that volunteer organizations might THE. TREATY OF PEACE. 731 remain in the volunteer service six months thereafter if they so desired. At the end of that time, however, they were to be mustered out whether they so desired or not. The volunteers now in the Philippines have gained so much experience in the field and have become so well adapted to the service required against the insurgents that it has been thought important to induce them to reenlist in the regular service, either at the present time by demand- ing their discharge from the volunteer army, or to do so at the expiration of the six months after the declaration of peace. Volunteer organizations enlisted in the regular army as organizations would therefore bring with them their officers as now assigned. As an inducement to the volunteers to reenter the service of the government, it has been proposed to pay to all reenlisting their full travel allowance for land and sea travel from place of discharge to place of previous enlistment. The adjournment of Congress by limitation on the 4th of March pre- vented the accomplishment of an adequate establishment of the army. If it had not been for this incompetency there would have been no anxiety to extend the terms of volunteer enlistments. Fighting men enough, however, will be found to take care of the property and the honor of the country, naval and military. pMi^i"<'[ . . . » i ~' • ^ mmmm CHAPTER XXXI. Review of the War and the Commission on the Conduct of the War Department. Importance of a Day Lost or Gained — The Protocol Was the Treaty — JliHtary Commissions to Arrange the Spanish Evacuation of Cuba and Porto Rico — Appearance of the Cuban Army — Narrow Margins on Which the War Was Ended so Speedily — Inspiration of Dewey's Victory — Energy in Following It Up — Outbreak of Criticism on the Conduct of the War as Soon as it Was Over — The Commission of Investigation Appointed by the President — Extraordinary Interest in the Action of the Commission and Its Authoritative Report — Weaknesses in Systems and Persons not Spared — Origin and Extent of the Canned Meat Controversy — Fault Found in High Places — The Army, Regular or Volun- teer, of and for the People. One loses a day on the way from Washington City to Manila. The line on which going westward we must correct the almanac, by dropping a day, is the i8oth meridian. When it is midnight in London it is noon of the same day on longitude 180 degrees west, or half-way around the world. Whatever time the magic 180th degree is struck going west, the next day is sponged off. If you get there Tuesday, there is no Wednesday that week. And going east there are two of the days on which the mysterious meridian is encountered. The point of this in association with the war is that if we count time to China as we find it coming east, the order of Admiral Dewey to destroy the Spanish fleet was just a little too sharp on time for the actual declaration of war, but if we count on the westward course, the declaration was in time to fairly cover the direction to sink the Spaniards. Either way we go, there was no time lost. It was 103 days from the naval battle before Manila to the signing of the Protocol August 12. Our war with Spain was for 100 days, with a margin of two days, counted as the sun keeps time. It was hard to realize for a while that the Protocol was truly the Treaty of Peace — that the rest was debate on details, and painstaking to weigh and measure and adjust points of difference and formulate the settlement. When Santiago surrendered, Spain was van- quished. Her fate was declared the day it was determined that she could not 732 REVIEW OF THE WAR. 733 contest with us the command of the sea. It was impossible to defend Porto Rico and Cuba if the Spanish armies in those islands were isolated, for the power to overcome them was in the United States, and would be employed. As to the signing of the treaty at Paris, or its ratification at Washington and Madrid, those formalities were needful to legalize action taken. The Protocol was actual peace, but there was a legal continuation of a state of war; and in the first hundred and ten days of this situation there had been mustered out and discharged from the military service an average of one thousand men per day. The order to muster out one hundred thousand men was issued on the i8th of August, less than a week after the proclamation announcing the pro- tocol and suspending hostilities. The administration was as prompt to take advantage of peace, when the war was over, as it had been swift to execute the mandate of war at the beginning. Military committees to superintend the evacuation of Cuba, Porto Rico and the adjacent islands were forthwith appointed; for Cuba, Major-General James F. Wade, Rear- Admiral William T. Sampson, Major-General Matthew C. Butler; for Porto Rico, Major-Gen- eral John C. Brooke, Rear-Admiral Winfield S. Schley, Brigadier-General W. Gordon — who soon afterwards met the Spanish commissioners at Havana and San Juan respectively. Porto Rico was evacuated and the American flag was vip on August 18th. The task of evacuating Cuba proceeded slowly. The American flag was raised on Morro Castle and the Go\'ernor General's palace, January ist, at which time twenty-two thousand Spanish troops remained in the vicinity of Cienfuegos. While the war was on there was general solicitude that the freedom of speech and facility of the press should not be abused to harm the cause of the country. There was a great deal of eccentricity in the press, but it consisted in excessive military energy,, with the accustomed "instructions" to the com- manders of the active fleets and armies. There was a steady flight of accusa- tions of favoritism, those whose chosen ones were not favored opening fire on the others who were at the front, as a personal favor, it was said. The harm done was not considerable. The journal that might have reported the pres- ence of Cervera's fleet in Santiago Harbor, when he could only go there to be bottled up, would have been forgiven, even by admirals on the look-out, for audacity of pushing in and pointing to the enemy. The usually season- able vehemence of partisans skirmishing for position in future civil campaigns was reduced to inoffensiveness while the fighting was going on, and the Presi- 734 REVIEW OF THE WAR. dent's cares were lessened by the loyal moderation of the great mass of his countrymen who had not lined up with him in national affairs until the bugles called for the blue and the gray to put on the uniform of the country and keep step to the national music. The naval victories without loss of life, and the undervaluation of Spanish soldiers as fighting men, on a defensive line, caused the casualty lists of our troops engaged in the Santiago battles to be a surprise that shocked the country, and the illness of General Shatter was charged to his stoutness, and the frank statements he made of his depressions and misgivings were so distressing to the people that the great results attained were not regarded as compensation for loss, though the extraordinary success gained will have a permanent place in the records of decisive battles. The sweeping naval victories of the Americans from Cavite to Santiago, ninety- five days, were so uniform i-n character, there was a feeling that the Spaniards were unworthy to be considered stead)' enough to furnish a test of our high quality, and soon there was much said by the perverse about the feebleness of the foe. It is, however, the established truth that the Americans were well commanded, fought in the highest form on all occasions, and in addition to good conduct were attended by good fortune. If the regular army had not been massed at Tampa to strike the southern coast of Cuba, in spite of the rainy and fever seasons, the volunteers must have been held in camps of instruction until there was frost on the cotton fields, or suffered from the Cuban soil and climate immense losses; and military operations against Havana on a very large scale would have been frightfully costly. When, however, the volunteers were engaged, they would have been so prepared and disciplined that they could have closed the campaign quickly. One of the reasons why Admiral Schley was strongly of the opinion that Cervera would put into Cienfuegos was because he knew that port was less than two hundi-ed miles from Havana, and that with the railroad all the available troops of the west end might be rapidly gathered to meet invaders. If Cervera had been in Cienfuegos instead of Santiago the regular army of the United States would have been unable to do the work they accomplished at Santiago, wliich was isolated, and yet we had no strength to spare in forcing the sur- render. One Spanish column of less than three thousand had a sharp struggle in getting to Santiago just too late to hold lines the loss of which was irretriev- able. At Cienfuegos, the concentration of forces on both sides must have amounted to fifty thousand men on each side, and the war would have been REVIEW OF THE WAR. 735 protracted. It was one of the things carrying conviction in the first place that Cervera, at liberty to make choice, would prefer Cienfuegos to Santiago, unless he might have believed the very assurance of preference could make the latter port for the Spanish service dangerous, as any American commander would naturally be on the watch at that place. Sampson and Schley were agreed about this for a time, and it is possible Cervera gave himself the bene- fit of the idea. The retreat of Cervera into Santiago was an admission of the naval incapacity of Spain, unless we can believe that he ran for coal where he thought Americans were unlikely to look for him, and when he was located the American forces followed. Frequently in the congressional debates, ban- quet and platform speeches, and comments of the press, the idea is advanced that the military lesson of the war is that the regular army should be rigor- ously reduced to a scanty force, as the fact of efficiency of volunteers devel- oped in a few months proves their reliability. No American who knew enough of his country to warrant him in views of her resources in war ever disparaged voliinteers. The truth is we must depend upon them in great wars, but we require enough regulars to handle a sharp sword promptly, to avoid the necessity for hurried and therefore exceedingly exhaustive prepara- tions. We happened to have regulars enough, such was the ease with which men were assembled from remote posts, to deliver a blow that ended the war before the mustering corps of volunteers could be provided with that which they must have to fortify themselves to take the field, and it will always be to the credit of the volunteers that the surrender at Santiago was not so much the result of what had occurred as the visible evidence that the winners of San Juan and El Caney were but the advanced guard of the grand armyof the United States. There was no doubt of the ultimate result. Loss of time was loss of life. The army that did the fighting was almost disbanded in the moment of victory. As there were but five hundred and twenty defenders of El Caney, it is clear that if Escario's column of nearly three thousand effec- tives had arrived three days earlier the army of Shaffer could not have carried the hills that were so stoutly held. That would have meant waiting for rein- forcements, and by every hour of detention the sacrifice of scores of brave men. The plan of campaign that was to deal the crushing blow with the regular armj^ without waiting for the thorough equipment of the volunteers in great force, could not have succeeded if Spanish reinforcements had got in, until the Americans were also strengthened, and the failure to give the 736 REVIEW OF THE WAR. decisive stroke then would have made certain the loss of thousands of our men where hundreds sufficed. Each week's delay implied disaster for us. On the critical night of the Santiago campaign, when General Wheeler was on the long, thin line held by not more fhan three thousand men, all extremely weary, needing precisely the encouragement the game old confederate gave them, that the Spaniards were whipped and dared not assume the aggressive, for their losses were greater in proportion than ours, and their exhaustion and privation equal — if the Spaniards could then have had Escario's column massed and sent it forward, the chances were largely in favor of driving us, and regaining the water supply of the city and access to the. country for food supplies to supplement rations exclusively of rice. It is a close question whether the continued presence of Cervera's fleet might not alone have post- poned the surrender of the city and province of Santiago for an additional month and greatly reduced the moral effect of the final victory of our arms — the deadly climate and the pestilential fevers sweeping away our heroes by thousands. We then should have won Santiago as the British did Havana in 1762, and with like losses. More than half the British and Provincial army perished. After the loss of two fleets and two armies by the Spaniards — it was as clear to all Europe as to ourselves that the Spanish army in Manila could not escape, but must be captives. After the fleet that was essential to its support was annihilated and our troops on the way arrived, the continu- ance of the war under those misfortunes was impossible for Spain; and she sued for peace, accepting subsequently the terms of unconditional sur- render. The debates at Paris were able, but not essential. The policy of the Protocol was after the fall of Santiago. That depended upon the conclusive triumph with the regular army. The event trembled in the balance. We refer to the regulars especially and distinctively, for the military policy of the President turned upon the blow that might be delivered by them. Only three volunteer regiments were at the front at Santiago. The transportation was limited, and the movement on the ragged edge of critical circumstance. The volunteers were eager for the fray, but none knew better than themselves that they needed time to be educated up to the requirements of the high standard they hold in history. The Aguinaldo war around Manila has but repeated the experiences that give confidence in the volunteer system, but the objection to it is that it can never be ready to meet the grave and sudden emergencies. Time is the most REVIEW OF THE WAR. 737 expensive item in war and the appropriation of money and manhood for the regular army making it equal to abrupt occasions would be economical. There was good fortune as to the time and place of the decision of the war in Cuba. If Cervera had been able to fill his coal bunkers within a few days after an-iving in West India waters he might have entered Havana Harbor, and that would have forced us to attack the city, a work too extensive for the regulars — indeed, involving several corps of volunteers. It was the inspiration of the May-day victory of Admiral Dewey that caused the inauguration of the Santiago campaign, and in this relation the beginning and end of the war are closely linked. The President said, in hisannual message, of Dewey's battle; "The effect of this remarkable victory upon the spirit of our people and upon the fortunes of the war was instant. A prestige of invincibility thereby attached to our arms, which continued throughout the struggle. Reinforce, ments were hurried to Manila under the command of Major-General Merritt, and firmly established within sight of the capital, which lay helpless before our guns." The "prestige of invincibility" was the thing, and the glory of Dewey is not so much in the fact that when he came within range of the Spanish fleet he destroyed it, because he took all the chances of torpedoes and mines, land batteries and of the disabilities that might be inflicted upon his ships, seven thousand miles from a home port. He found the torpedoes harmless. Fortune favored the brave. If a torpedo had blown up the Olym- pia or one or two of the cruisers, the result of the day might not have been so influential. If several vessels had been disabled, the situation of the admiral could not have been described by any softer term than precarious. The dis- tinguishing points of the war stand out like mountains. It is easy to trace the impulses behind the actions closing in successes that ended the combat. The reinforcements for Dewey were sent with energetic celerity, and the fall of Manila two days after the Spanish surrendered in the Protocol, an event unknown to the combatants, was due to the animation with which the War Department pressed all advantages. The official statement of the President, giving the facts of supporting the navy by the army at the most remote scene of the warfare, is in these terms: "On the 7th day of May the government was advised officially of the vic- tory at Manila, and at once inquired of the commander of our fleet what troops would be required. The information was received on the 15th of May, 738 REVIEW OF THE WAR. and the first army expedition sailed May 25 and arrived off Manila June 30. Other expeditions soon followed." When the war was over, the good management, vigilance, precision and strong grasp upon affairs first in order became first in the minds and hearts of the people, and of moment to every fireside, but extensively held to be the commonplace consequence of the lavish use of the resources of the country; and there followed a flood of turbid accusation. The banners bright with victory were clouded with fogs. The origin of these was our unprepared state and the confusion was unavoidable. There was also, owing to impera- tive haste, a great deal of waste, — and 5'et the official history of the war can never be read by a citizen of intelligence and temper of justice without sur- prise that in all departments so much was done so well. There never was a war more speedily conducted to a successful and satis- factory end than that of the United States with Spain; and yet when it was done there was an epidemic of complaint, and the President answered the clamor, which was loud and long enough to show a serious public interest, by appointing a commission. General Dodge was chosen president. The follow- ing were the members : General Grenville M. Dodge, Iowa, President; Col. James A. Sexton, Illinois; Col. Charles Denby, Indiana; Capt. Evan P. Howell, Georgia; Ex-Governor Urban A. Woodbury, Vermont; Brig-Gen. John M. Wilson, Chief of Engineers, U. S. A.; Gen. James A. Beaver, Pennsylvania; Maj.- Gen. Alexander McD. McCook, U. S. A.; Dr. Phineas S. Conner, Ohio; Richard Weightman, Secretary; Lieut. -Col. F. B. Jones, Chief Quartermaster of Volunteers, Disbursing Officer; Maj. Stephen C. Mills, Recorder. The specific duty of this body was "to investigate the conduct of the War Department in the war with Spain." A great mass of testimony was taken, and there were many precautions to get witnesses who would give all the information they possessed, and to find those who could speak from personal knowledge. Three press associations were represented in the reporters pres- ent during the proceedings. The Secretary of War, the Adjutant-General, the Quartermaster-General, and the Surgeon-General were requested to transmit all the complaints received by them touching the administration of their respective departments. This was promptly done. Public invitation was given September 27th to all persons "having knowledge or belief of any official wrong or dereliction" — a most sweeping call — to submit their state- REVIEW OF THE WAR. 739 ments in writing, accompanied by such collateral proof or information as might be at their disposal. This call met with a remarkable response. Hundreds of affidavits, letters, newspaper clippings, editorial articles, and sermons were received, all of which were thoroughly and laboriously exam- ined. The strong purpose of the commission to get all the facts appears in the determination that in the examination of witnesses the strict rules of evi- dence as applied in legal proceedings should not be adhered to, but consider- able latitude allowed. The way investigation of the whitewashing fashion is conducted is by rigid adherence to the rules of evidence, the question perpetu- ally pressed being: What do you know of your own knowledge? That is a tight stopper upon anj' expression that is excellent in suggestion but not in legal form. There were nearly five hundred witnesses examined. The report of the commission has disposed of the frivolous fad for a time prev- alent of challenging the good faith of the members. The commission finds that there was too much "red tape" in the departments, too much "paper work," and recommends that there should be more preparation for future wars by Congress, and also suggests retired officers might be utilized. Sum- ming up the results of the war, the commission gives the official figures of 23 officers and 250 men killed, and 113 officers and 1,464 men wounded in the field, while the deaths from all causes from May 1 to September 30, a period of five months, were 107 officers and 2,803 rnen. The total strength of the army was 274,717, so that the death rate was a fraction over i per cent. The commission says in the official report of its labors and findings: "No nian or woman who has stated to us that he or she had any material matter touching the subject of our inquiry to communicate has been refused a hearing, and there has been no evidence before us that any one in or connected with the War Department has dishonestly received a dollar. "We have made persistent efforts to secure the attendance of persons to whose names rumor has attached an allegation that they knew of corruption of officials in the War Department, but these men have either denied the statements attributed to them, or have maintained silence when invited to tell what they know. ' ' This criticism and recommendation are important: "The routine work in the departments, in our opinion, is far beyond what is necessarj-, and each year seems to increase it. The methods employed make it almost impossible 740 REVIEW OF THE WAR. to transact business promptl}^ The heads of all departments, officers of large depots, chiefs of staff departments, corps and divisions have necessarily been obliged to give attention to details which should have been given to matters of larger moment. No v^rell-regjilated concern or corporation could transact business satisfactorily under such regulations as govern the staff departments, and the fact that every officer of each of the staff departments holding a responsible position has been forced to ignore routine demonstrates the neces- sity of a new form." A significant utterance is the following: "For many years the divided authority and responsibility of the War Department has produced friction, for which, in the interest of the service, a remedy, if possible, should be applied. The constitution makes the President commander-in-chief of the army, and he cannot transfer that authority to any other person. The President selects the secretary of war, who has his confidence and is his confidential adviser. The commanding general is assigned to duty as such by the President, and under the miltary laws of the United States his duties are defined as follows: • "The command exercised by the commanding general of the army, not having been made the subject of statutory regulation, is determined by the order of assignment. It has been habitually composed of the aggregate of the several territorial commands that have been or may be created by the President. The military establishment is under orders of the commanding general of the army in that which pertains to its discipline and military con- trol. The fiscal affairs of the army are conducted by the secretary of war through the several staff departments. (Par. 187, A. R. , 1895.) "All orders and instructions from the President or secretary of war relat- ing to military operations or affecting the military control and discipline of the army will be promulgated through the commanding general. (Par. 188, A. R., 1895.)" Lieutenant-General Schofield, who has probably had as much experience and given the question as much thought as any one in our country, says in substance: "Recent experience has served to confirm all the results of my lifelong study and large experiences that the proper position for the senior officer of the army on duty at Washington is not that of the commanding general, a position which is practically impossible, but that of commander-in-chief, which means, in fact, chief of staff to the President. The title of general-in- REVIEW OF THE WAR. 741 chief was a permanent one during the entire history of the country up to the time when General Grant became lieutenant-general. "When I became commanding general I addressed to the President a letter in which I pointed out to him what had been the result of my study and experience, and saying that the only way was to abandon entirely — which I did during my seven years of service — all pretenses of being the commanding general, and to content myself with acting as the chief of staff of the army imder the secretary of war and the President. The result was that perfect harmony prevailed during my time, and I did exercise a legitimate influence in command of the army, this because I did- not claim to exercise anything that the law did not give me. "The President must have the same power of selection of his general- in-chief as he has of his secretary of war. Without this there can be no guaranty that he will give, or that the secretary of war will place in the general-in-chief that confidence which is necessary to perfect harmony. "Neither the President nor the secretary of war should have in the command of the army an officer who is not working in harmony with him." The work of General Corbin attracts the attention of the commissioners. His services were of the greatest importance. He was the engineer of order, the fireman who kept the furnace roaring, raised steam power, and strove with a giant's strength to subjugate chaos. The report says of him: "The adjutant-general testifies that there had not been a deficiency of one dollar reported on the part of a volunteer staff officer, and that he wished to make it a matter of record that in the distribution of many millions of dollars during this war there was yet to be made the first charge of defalcation against an army officer, regular or volunteer." The remarks upon the War Department, referring directly to the Secre- tary of War, are : "The records of the War Department, which have been laid before us, show that the Secretary of War extended to all chiefs of bureaus cordial and full support, and promptly responded to every proper demand made upon him by commanding officers. "No testimony has been presented showing intentional neglect of duty or any attempt to serve personal interests. "The charges made that the Secretary of War was pecuniarily interested 742 REVIEW OF THE WAR. in contracts, purchases and other transactions of the War Department have been thoroughly investigated and found baseless. "In the judgment of the commission there was lacking in the general administration of the War Department during the continuance of the war with Spain that complete grasp of the situation which was .essential to the highest efficiency and discipline of the arm}'. "The commission has refrained from criticising certain of the heads of bureaus for not having acted with foresight in preparing their various depart- ments for active war before war was declared, because it has appeared that the national defense fund provided by the act of March 9, 1898, was not made available for use except for the navy and for coast defenses and the expendi- tures incident thereto until after the declaration of war." The commission has not spared the weak places in the War Department, beginning with paper work, asking for the strengthening of the administra- tion by the employment of retired officers, many of whom are among the most capable in the country and as well fitted in the sixties for the higher responsi- bilities and performance of the tasks of elucidation and the removal of entanglements as the active service officers between forty and sixty years of age. The sudden multiplication of the numerical force of the army by ten, and the requisition for supplies in the same proportion, the material to be discovered if not created, necessarily involved occasional gorges in the chan- nels, such as occur in rivers that are choked with ice or timber. One of the worst was the gorge at Tampa, and with all the high rank and gilded talent gathered there, the man to clear the way was not found, and we hear from the commanding general of the army, himself present, that his remedy for improper rations of meat was to have droves of cattle shipped to the seat of war. If this had been done it would have been necessary to have sent the steers to Cuba and left the soldiers in Florida to overcome by perfect rest on the sand the waste of physical force by the debilitating atmosphere of the floral peninsula. The commission spares not the lack of transportation, the nerveless slump into a bottomless pit of disorder that prevented prompt- ness in embarkation, reduced dangerously the strength of Shaffer's army, notified the Spaniards of our plans and incapacities, and nearly spoiled the expedition, upon which depended the grave decision whether we would have to wait for winter or force the fighting. The commissioners say with a moderation of language that stings where epithets would be found totally REVIEW OF THE WAR. 743 insufficient, that "the condition of the railroad congestion during the early- portion of the time Tatnpa was occupied by troops seems unparalleled, show- ing an almost inexcusable lack of executive ability on the part of those charged with the loading, unloading and handling of the trains." It is the judgment of the commissioners that ships should have been "seized," because when the transports had been assembled, supposed to be equal to carrying 25,000 men, it was found that their capacity had been largely overrated, and it was impossible to carry on them, without great discomfort and danger, more than 16,000 men, with their equipments, artillery, ammuni- tion, subsistence, medical supplies, and 2,295 animals, for a voyage of 1,000 miles. It is not, however, even hinted by the commission that a fleet ought to have been impressed to bear burdens of living beef to be cast ashore as wanted by the army! The following from the commissioners' report is full of phrases that imply more than they express : "In spite of the efforts of the quartermaster's department, many of these vessels were poorly equipped with speeding accommodations; the sinks in many instances were inconvenient and insufficient, and some of the vessels were badly ventilated and filled with disagreeable odors. It has been stated that had the fleet encountered a severe storm while en route for Cuba the dis- comfort would have been intense, and there might have been loss of life. "The quartermaster's department ought to have been able to more thoroughly equip these vessels, and surely it should have been more certain of their carrying capacity. "It has been noticed that the ships were not loaded systematically, as for example, a battery with its guns and horses would be placed on one vessel, and its ammunition on another. The Second, Seventh and Seventeenth Regular Infantry were each divided up, and portions in each case sent on three different vessels." The expedition was detained until, if we had been opposed by a keen and enterprising enemy, we could hardly have escaped the misfortunes so con- spicuously invited. The horrible bungling extended to the handling of the medical supplies, and yet in that department, in spite of manifest omissions, "a vast deal of good work was done by medical officers, high and low, regular and volunteer, and there were unusually few deaths among the wounded and sick." At last Shafter sailed, got away from the sphere of false and foolish rumor, Spanish war ships flitting like the Flying Dutchman, and the steam 744 .REVIEW OF THE WAR. launches and lighters to land the troops and stores, frightfully deficient at the start, lost by the way. The commission points to the facts at the bottom of the muddy pool in this trenchant paragraph : "That the shortcomings in administration and operation may justly be attributed, in large measure, to the hurry and confusion incident to the assembling of an army of untrained officers and men, ten times larger than before, for which no preparation in advance had been or could be made, because of existing rules and regulations." If Captain-General Blanco had been a man of aptitudes and initiative equal to decisions in a few hours, and to stimulating the disturbance of the sullen lethargy of his countr)^men, and had possessed the quality of illu- mination from. his own brain, he would have acted upon the safe presump- tion that Santiago was the objective point of the American army. The move- ment of our war ships had revealed that to the observant, and he should have hurried his best troops to the rescue, and seen to it that the landing of Shaffer's army was resisted to the last extremity of the defenders. That was the Spaniards' chance. Such a policy would have given the army tumbled upon unfit vessels infinite trouble, and made the advance upon the land defenses of Santiago for some time impossible. We owe a great debt to the stolidity that amounts often to stupidity in the Spanish commanders. The quality of Spaniards who wait to be attacked, if there are officers who stay with the men when the fire storms beat upon them, is, as our troops found on the Santiago hills, as good as that the infantry of Spain celebrated in the middle ages. The march of Escario's column that reached Santiago a few hours too late makes known that if the young Spaniards are bravely led they will go far, clearing their way through ambuscades swarming with sharp- shooters. The manifestations of the manliness of the Peninsulars mean that there is still hope for Spain in her people. As soon as we have a congress elevated to the understanding of the economy in the efficiency of the army as well as of the navy, and the necessity of preparation for war in time of peace, it will appear in the halls of national legislation that the work of the commission of investigation of the conduct of the War Department during the war is a document of extraordinary nature, full of information that should be the basis of reforms that will amount to reconstruction. The time will certainly come when this will be done, and the longer the delay the greater price we must pay for the indispensable reforma- REVIEW OF THE WAR. 745 tion. In one matter the commission does not seem to have been as incisive, critical and certain in its work, or as comprehensive and accurate in its sug- gestions as in general. We refer to the "embalmed beef." There must have been present in the minds of the commissioners on that subject a con- sciousness of the prejudiced motives and questionable methods of the accusers, in regard to the "roast beef" thrown upon the army and thrown into the sea, that imparted a certain reluctance to say anything that would palliate the impropriety apparent in the noisy aggressiveness that sought to inflict per- sonal injuries and promoted reckless exaggerations, detrimental to the public service and hostile to a great American industry, thereby giving aid and com- fort to factions at home that cannot be respected as animated by sincerities, and enemies abroad of our export commerce, or those careless of hurting business reputation. The cautiousness of this temperament of care in the commission is to be accepted as far as it goes, but the expression following does not cover the case : "Many samples of refrigerated beef furnished to the army have been sent by the commission to the chemists of the Agricultural and Interior depart- ments for careful chemical examination. The result of the analysis has been reported to us in twenty-nine cases, and in no specimen examined has either boric or salicylic acid or other deleterious chemicals been found. In view of the facts set forth, the commission is of the opinion that no refrigerated beef furnished by contractors and issued to the troops during the war with Spain was subjected to or treated with any chemicals by the contractors or those in their employ." The veracity of this statement is not to be questioned, for it has obviously limitations of applications, but that it is misleading is shown in the headline under which it appears in a reputable journal — this: "WAR COMMISSION HOLDS ARMY REFRIGERATED BEEF TO BE PURE." The word "pure" should be more carefully guarded, and held too precious for doubtful employment. The commission says of the canned beef: "Occasionally an inferior article was found. But the records of the array prove that canned beef has been used for many years. " The commissioners attempted to confine them- selves in the public regard to their actual and not constructive findings in these terms: "In considering questions concerning canned meats it is not the 746 REVIEW OF THE WAR. duty of the commission to inquire into the character, kind or condition of the canned meats that may be in use in this country. Our specific duty is to give an opinion as to the quality of those furnished the soldiers during the recent war with Spain." Delicacies of distinction are not, however, a notice- able feature in the work of the press, exploited with the headlining that adver- tises news highly seasoned, and presented in a style believed to be alluring, and certainly for sale. A letter is presented showing that the boiled or roast canned meat question was not up in the army during the Spanish war for the first time. The date is October i8, 1897, and the document as follows: War Department, Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, D. C, Oct. 19, 1897. W. Clarke Marshall, Produce Exchange, 6646 Wentworth Ave. , Chicago. Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 19th ultimo to the Secretary of War, giving information regarding the proper food to be taken to the sufferers in Alaska, and also for the subsistence of the troops there, and ascribing the sickness in that locality to the use of salt meats, and in reply thereto the Secretary of War desires me to call atten- tion to the following remarks of the Medical Department of the army, in which the major-general commanding the army concurs: "Canned meats put up by reputable firms are wholesome and have the full nutritive value of the meat contents, and in the absence of fresh meat are to be preferred to any of the three substitutes suggested by the writer. Meat, •when salted, loses a certain proportion of its albuminoids and extractives, but what remains is valuable as food, and has no specific influence in the produc- tion of scurvy. With hard bread, bacon, pea meal, and an occasional issue of fresh beef, or in its absence canned meat, a dietary of a satisfactory force value can be provided. To these there should be added for the prevention of scurvy occasional issues of potatoes, onions or canned vegetables, or in their unavoidable absence, dessicated vegetables and dried fruit." Very respectfully, W. H. CARTER, Assistant Adjutant-General. All the above in quotation is the indorsement upon the letter of Mr. Marshall, signed by C. Smart, deputy surgeon-general, U. S. A. The indorsement of the major-general commanding is in the following words: REVIEW OF THE WAR. 747 Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D. C, Oct., 18, 1897. The major-general commanding concurs in the remarks of the deputy surgeon-general, fourth indorsement. J. C. GILMORE, Assistant Adjutant-General. The "major-general commanding" here referred to is Major-General Nelson A. Miles. The commission reports: "On the 2 1 St day of December last Major-General Nelson A. Miles, upon the written request of the president of this commission, appeared before it. He refused to be sworn, as all other witnesses had been except one, who affirmed, stating that he would make his statements without being sworn and was responsible for what he said. He proceeded, and for the first time in the history of this investigation the allegation was made that refrigerated beef issued to the troops had been chemically treated. "In the statement, revised by himself. General Miles said: " 'There was sent to Porto-Rico 337 tons of what is known as so-called refrigerated beef, which you might call embalmed beef.' "He proceeded to read a communication from Dr. W. H. Daly, major and chief surgeon, United States volunteers, on his staff, bearing date of Septem- ber 21, 1898, wherein Dr. Daly stated that: " 'In several inspections I made in the various camps and troopships at Tampa, Jacksonville, Chickamauga and Porto Rico, I found the fresh beef to be apparentl}' preserved with secret chemicals, which destroy its natural flavor, and which I also believe to be detrimental to the health of the troops. ' "Although Dr. Daly swears that he informed General Miles about the ist of August, 1898, that he suspected that the refrigerated beef was chemically treated, it does not appear that the general informed the War Department that an officer of his staff had made this discovery, nor does it appear that he at the time ordered any of the officers imder his command to probe to the bottom an allegation which, if true, concerned the health of 275,000 soldiers of the United States. It appears from the report of Dr. Daly, which he handed to General Miles October 21 last, that he then specifically stated that the refriger- ated beef furnished to the troops was 'apparently chemically treated.' "It does not appear that when this charge was made, October 21, it hav- ing been already made to him in August, 1898, that General Miles communi- 74^ REVIEW OF THE WAR. cated to you or the Secretary of War or to the commissary general the belief or suspicion entertained by him that refrigerated meat, dangerous to health, was issued every day to the troops, in failure to do which there was dereliction of duty. It is true that on September 20 he had directed that an order should be issued asking for reports relative to meats issued, but the order specifically mentions 'canned fresh roast beef,' and nothing else, and it was the reports received in answer to this that were presented in abstract by the general at the time of his appearance before the commission and since. "In his report Dr. Daly does not make the all-important statement that he had already chemically analyzed any meat, although he suggests that such analysis should be made. He does state that in the several inspections made by him at Tampa, Jacksonville, Chickamauga and Porto Rico he 'found the fresh beef to be apparently preserved with secret chemicals. ' He said that at Ponce the beef he examined 'was also of the same character, being appar- ently preserved by injected chemicals.' "For months, as it appears, Dr. Daly concealed the commission of a crime affecting men under his charge, whom, as an officer and a physician, he was bound to protect." After setting forth in full force the miscellany of mistakes and the genius displayed for blunders so gross as to add an additional sense of misery to the lot of mankind, in the embarkation of the Shafter expedition, the commission states the result that closed the scenes of that decisive movement, with this paragraph : "The result of the Santiago campaign was the complete realization of the several objects contemplated — the capture of the city with its fortifications and munitions of war, together with immense supplies of foodstuffs and ammuni- tion, (the former estimated by General Wood at 1,200,000 rations) ; the sur- render of the entire province of Santiago de Cuba, with all the troops garrisoning the same, amounting, as already stated, to between 23,000 and 24,000; the destruction of the navy of Admiral Cervera's fleet after its'*' departure from the harbor, and general demoralization of the Spanish forces and the discomfiture of the Spanish government and people, leading almost immediately to overtures for peace by Spain." There is nothing in the splendid story of American soldiers that exceeds this, telling how the valor and fortitude, the patience under privation and hardihood of endurance, tenacious of duty, overcomes even that solid but diversified stupidity REVIEW OF THE WAR. 749 against which, it is a saying of ancient acceptance, even the gods fight in vain. The commission reports in closing that "notwithstanding the haste with which the nation entered upon the war with Spain, the resulting and almost inevitable confusion in bureau and camp, the many difficulties of ai^ming, assembling and transporting large bodies of hitherto untrained men, the carrying on of active operations in two hemispheres, the people of the United States should ever be proud of their soldiers, who, cooperating with their sailors, in less than three months put an end to Spanish colonial power enfranchised oppressed peoples, and taught the world at large the strength and nobility of the republic. " There was taken in the investigation of the varieties of beef prepared with a view of preservation, statements that increased the public feeling about the wrong done soldiers in supplying them with food that was unwholesome. In handling the subject there were introduced remarks supposed to be humor- ous, to the effect that the regular soldiers were so accustomed to imperfec- tions in rations that their stomachs were prepared for anything, and there were jocose imputations that the volunteers would, as they became veterans, cease to strive against the diet demanded by the "paper work" that is obstruc- tive and establishes conditions of famine in a land of plenty and the midst of abundance. The complaints of soldiers that were not fairly dealt with were very often put in this effective way: "We know that Uncle Sam pays for the things we ought to have, but that there is a way of getting the freight cars on the side track as at Tampa, and sailing away without the necessaries of life." There will sometime be traced to the investigation of the conduct of the War Department in war, and the report of the commission, the existence of laws and regulations promoting the welfare of our citizens who bear arms for the country. The commission does not state along with the notice of the use of canned beef in Alaska, commended on the authority of General Miles, notice of the decisive distinction between the arctic and the tropical climates. It is to be remembered there is no great care necessary for the preservation of meat in Alaska. There is no trouble about refrigeration. The northern end of the earth is extremely frozen. It is different in the Indies. It has come to pass that the word "experiment" as applied to keeping meat fresh is a terror. What "experiment" with the meat of the boys in blue, white or yellow! One might as well "experiment with the bread and butter 75° REVIEW OF THE WAR. of the people!" However, experiments relate closely to experience, and the lamps by which wise men find the paths of safety and keep in them are those that have been tried, that is, experimented with. The canned meats that were good in Old England and'New England, excellent on the European continent, were "unfit" in our new possessions of the tropics. The fresh meat in Porto Rico — the island abounds in cattle — was complained of because it was "too fresh. " It had to be eaten almost as soon as the life was out of the carcasses, or not at all, for there was no way of cooling it. General Miles could not take refrigerator cars along with him. In a few hours after the butcher had pursued his profession the fresh meat was spoiled. The way the flies pitched upon it to deposit their eggs was something surprising. There were "experiments with beef" — awful as it appears in the newspapers, the fact is substantially undeniable — to cure it so that it would be "fit" for seventy hours. That was all claimed for the stuff that at the end of twenty-four hours had to be turned into the sea. The War Department did not order it. General Egan reported against it. If General Miles got a whiff of it the fact is with- out official celebration, or any sort of good and regular standing. It is not surprising that there was general confidence in the canned meat of well-known brands, but that failed fast tmder the tropical test. The notorious investiga- tions into the processes in this country of canning meats will ultimately have a favorable influence in marketing them, for there will be no experiments of preservation untried, and American manufacturers will rise to the occasion in the canning of meats and vegetables good in all climates. The people of the tropics have the advantage over us in their habits of nourishing themselves. They are but light consumers of meat, and a portion of rice, well set up with garlic and pepper, and a banana, is a satisfactory ration. The Cubans and Filipinos want "hot stuff" rather than "heavy" stuff, and do not find out that there is a kind of both hot and heavy food. Americans in the tropics have much to learn in the accommodation of themselves to the conditions of the country so as to be comfortable. The thing is not to abandon the use of meat, but to reduce the quantity of it consumed. One reason for this is the trouble in preservation of fresh meat. If there is ever found a deep and healthful solution of the problem it must be done by Americans. The beef scandals and conundrums, and the whole long list of our recorded trials that were made sore by grievous errors that otight to have been avoidable, and pro- voking incapacities — putting our armies into the field and failing to provide for REVIEW OF THE WAR. 751 them before going or to help them there, as should have been done on behalf of a great, liberal and loving people — surely that which has been revealed will have the respectful attention of the people and of the Congress, and sub- stantially that which is demanded by the distinguished commission will be done. The army, regular or volunteer, is of the blood, brain and bone of the people, and is for the people. CHAPTER XXXII. The Occupation of Our New Possessions. The Spanish Peninsula too Narrow to Sustain the Crown System Over Continental Colonies — The Loss of Her Archipelagoes Has Been the Logic of Her Experiences — Comparative Expansion of England and the United States — Our Magnificent Growth across the Con- tinent the Greatest of National Triumphs — Our Arms Around the World — Our Bugle Call and British Drum-Beats, Following the Course of the Sun — The Whispering Wires that Unite the Nations — The Malay Revolt Against Liberty for Tyranny — The Ghastly Demagogy that Meddles with the Army — Pleasing Prospects of Our Possessions Except the Philippines — The Aguinaldo Conspiracy and Tagalo War — The Motives and Malice of It — American Arms without Stain — Our Soldiers without Reproach. The logic of the war with Spain was that we should possess her American colonies and, of course, occupy them. She had ceased for a generation to hold continental land, outside the western peninsula of Europe, so long con" tested by the great tribes of adventurous nations, of the earliest periods of which there are histories. The Carthaginians, Romans, Goths, and Moors successively were masters of the extraordinary resources of the country, with a charming climate and fertile valleys, mountains rich in minerals, rivers romantic in story and name, that became the home of one of the most enter- prising and dominating races of men. The tragedies of Spain for two thou- sand years have exceeded even those of Italy. There came to her through Columbus the greatest of new possessions that ever were grasped by any people, the immeasurably endowed Americas. Columbus died neglected and poor, for the greed of the crown of Spain, through the viceroys and their rapacious followers, did not spare the illustrious discoverer or the inoffensive races that were to have been converted to Christianity, but were slattghtered by taskmasters. The American colonies poured wealth into the Peninsula, but the system of governing by the Crown, so that neither the people of Spain nor the natives of the new land they occupied, had rights that were respected, gave up the priceless fortunes conquered or inherited, to favorites of the administrators of the affairs of the kingdom, and their cruelty and profligacy 752 THE OCCUPATION OF OUR NEW POSSESSIONS. 753 prepared the wav for the horrible wars that established the independence of the Spanish American vStates; and Spain ultimately gave far more in g-old and blood for the lands she ruled beyond her borders than she gained by her mastery of the most opulent portions of the earth. Before we of the United States became greatly interested in the decline of Spain and began to feel that we had duties and destinies involved in the final break-up of her pretensions of dominion and power, the American continents were freed from her rule, and her only hold upon the mainland beyond her boundaries between the Pyrenees and the Atlantic was a penal colony upon the African shore, near Gibraltar. She still held several archipelagoes, the Balearic, Canary, Philippine, Caroline and Ladrone islands, Cuba and Porto Rico. If the war had lasted another hundred days, the Americans would have taken all the Spanish islands, those European and African as well as Ameri- can and Asiatic. The beautiful groups in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, off the coast of Africa, would have been possessions for our people, stripping Spain down to the bones of the old Peninsula. The fate of the Spanish colo. nies is not quotable as an example for nations holding lands abroad, for it is not to be assumed that any of them, the United States least of all, would in a system of administration exclude the people, both at home and abroad, from all rights the officials of the government and their classified assistants need regard. Spain of old was too narrow a basis, both in land and people, to sup- port a colonial expansion that included continents. The wonder is that this pyramid on its apex stood so long. If we had confined our republic to the Atlantic tide-water region, from South Carolina to Massachusetts, and had undertaken to colonize Africa and Australia, the popular contention might well have been that we were attempting a task beyond our strength. We have done a greater work of expansion that any other nation has accomplished — in our increase from the original thirteen colonies of England to the repub- lic that does what no other power can boast — occupies the whole breadth of the American continent between the greater oceans of the globe. If there are exceptions, we name Mexico and Canada, and they hardly, extensive and respectable as they are, can be classed with us. We have also the entire northern line of the central sea of the Americas ; and the further we have moved west, the more rapid our growth has been north and south. There has for some years been a feeling among our people who believe themselves conservative that we were hasty in the admission of territories as states, 754 THE OCCUPATION OF OUR NEW POSSESSIONS. because we gave some thinly inhabited regions disproportionate power in the national Senate. The specifications of evil anticipated, however, passed away, and the fact that our states are continuous across the continent must be hailed as auspicious because the majestic Jinks of statehood make an incomparable bond of imion. There is another bond that has been in full view since we assumed the responsibility devolved upon us by the victory of our arms in Asiatic waters — the sentiment that accords with a gigantic nationality has been developed on both the ocean boundaries of the republic where we find our- selves one of the influences that shall shape the future of Asia. That the ages to come will find Asiatic commerce an increasing factor in the progress of the world there is reason to believe. We cross the Pacific on errands to our new possessions, in less time than our grandfathers occupied in Atlantic voyages between America and Europe ; and while our troops on the way to Manila are reviewed on parade at Malta, our warships homeward bound through the Mediterranean exchange salutes with the remnants of the Spanish navy, where the thunder of the guns of Trafalgar was heard. The Pacific coast will take on a new growth, and the influence of the states on the Pacific, whatever the transitory aberrations of miscalculating men may be — the Pacific influence will be for the expansion of the foundations of our power in Asia. No European nation, not even England or Russia, is so marked out for domination, according to our wisdom of the appropriation of opportunity, as ourselves. We have three Pacific states, the immense territory of Alaska, the Aleutian Archipelago, that stretches westward far along the Siberian coast, many of the islands most valuable; and no\v, beyond all question, the Hawaiian group, a splendid acquisition, a part of the Ladrones, and the Philippines, equal alone to all the West Indies. We have in these possessions the potentiality of American civilization in contact with that of ancient Asia. Marco Polo will be famous forever for his stories of the glories of Japan, and the fancy of Columbus, one of the rare adventurers whose imagination became executive, was inflamed by him to sail westward in search of the Indies. Yet he missed in his estimation of the bulk of the world the con- tinents and islands of America. The West Indies were found by ships whose sails were filled with trade winds westward blowing. The Indies west are eastward, not westward, to us. The East Indies were named in the same way, for it was known in the huge vagueness that wrapped the known and the unknown in the same clouds that south and east of Asia were the THE OCCUPATION OF OUR NEW POSSESSIONS. 755 Indies. The caravans carried Indian stories, superstitions and merchandise across the Arabian deserts. Palmyra was a green island in a sea of sand, and sprung from trade that found a channel from the further east. The northern Italian cities grew from this golden seed grain, and flourished when the prom- ise of the Cape of Good Hope became a gorgeous realization, and then faded because the oceans were spread not to divide but to unite the great divisions of land. London and Lisbon profited. England took unto herself the empire of India, and bearing "the white man's burden," became sovereign of the mighty waters, master of colossal shores and countless millions, feeding her grandeur with a colonial system that made her capital the greatest of cities, and her trade the despair of the nations. She was enriched by the expansion that made Spain poor. The English speaking races have gained the gift of colonization that the Latin nations lost. The United States waited long to take herself consciously, — and conspicuously before all spectators, the world the stage, humanity the audience, — her own high place among the powers of the world-wide affairs, not in a way that was ostentatious, but with the simple directness that is fitting for strength, the clear purpose power warrants, the majestical graciousness that an open, honorable purpose yields and wields. An order was cabled two-thirds of the way around the world, facing the sun from Washington, to destroy a fleet that menaced our commerce, and in a week the order was obeyed ; and that was literally firing guns around the world. Since that day we have sent our regiments east and west, steaming into the morning skies from New York, and into the sunsets from San Fran- cisco. Our troopships, going opposite ways, have met in Manila. Those that departed eastward will sail on until they come home from the west! This far exceeds the British drumbeat that follows the sun. The American bugles have been heard morning and evening on the Atlantic and Pacific, the Medi- terranean, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Sea of China. The boys are upholding the faith and honor of the army and the navy, carrying the flag of America, keeping step to her lofty music, extending the beneficence of Americanism, their field that of the apostles, — the world. The campaign for suitable legislation in Congress to meet the changed rela- tions of the country to the armed nations, was like that at Santiago in the fact it was necessary to do a great deal of arduous work within strict limitations of time or make costly sacrifices. Success at Santiago — and there was a meas- ure of it there, striking in proportion, for there were many chances of failure 75^ THE OCCUPATION OF OUR NEW POSSESSIONS. — the American victory at the critical point and certain crisis of the war, depended upon the things that must be done in sharply defined hours, or disastrous expenditure of life and treasure would have been demanded, in addition to that which sufficed. Congress expired on the 4th of March. It was important not to have that body convened in extra session. A fashion of extra sessions is to be deprecated, because the industrially productive people need intervals of repose from heated terms of politics, when the National cap- ital should be the scene rather of executive labor than legislative agitation. The President was bound by his convictions of what the public prosperity de- manded, to call an extra session, a fortnight after his inauguration, of the Con- gress, whose house was elected on the same day with his own popular election. There were decisive reasons why it was undesirable to follow the precedent with the second Congress of his term. The protracted debates on the ratifica- tion by the Senate of the treaty with Spain were injurious in the mere matter of time lost, and )'et more unfortunate because the nature of the discussion raised doubts even among enlightened peoples, as to the stability of the pur- pose of the government of the United States in regard to the new posses- sions, while the Tagalo conspirators were encouraged to believe that if they made war upon our troops we would be persuaded that the government of the Philippines should be turned over from the Spaniards to the martial law of Tagalo tyrants, burning to be more desperate and destructive, avaricious and violently oppressive, than the Spaniards. The world is a neighborhood of nations, and a whispering gallery over wires. Dr. Rizal, the ablest and most cultivated of Filipino writers, prepared in the form of a short story a tale of the telephone, the leading idea of which was that long-distance telephonic commtmication was established between Madrid and Manila and so perfected that the priests in the two cities talked with facility, and the Spanish priests at home were wretched to find that the friars in Luzon were so unworthy, and it was decided by the priests of Spain they should fast and pray for their brethren at the other end of the wire that carried their voices on wings of fire. The representatives of the Tagalos were free, while in Paris in attendance on the treaty commission, to cable by way of Hongkong whatever representations they saw fit of the attitude of the Americans. There have been for several years centers of Philippine hostility to Spain in Paris and Hongkong, and some of those finding employment in planning revolution had a good deal of money, were liberally educated, and employed the cables. When the Treaty THE OCCUPATION OF OUR NEW POSSESSIONS. 757 of Peace was signed at Paris the Filipino commissioner appeared in Wash- ington, and of course was still using cables to inform Aguinaldo by way of private Hongkong messages ; and if the matter sent was not too flagrant and vicious it passed direct through Manila to the eastward station where the committee that they call an assembly met. That Agoncillo overestimated the influence of the Americans opposed to our ratification of the Spanish treaty, and regarded their utterances as an appeal to the Filipino army to take the offensive, and destroy the steadfastness of the American people, so that con- gressional and other incendiary talk fanned the embers into a flame to be quenched in blood, is an unexaggerated statement of indisputable fact. The most serious and incurable difficulty that besets us when we are anxious to make peace with the swarming Tagalos is that they have no comprehension of our solicitude for pacification, other than that we are preparing the way for our submission to them. That is precisely the way the paths to peace are obstructed. The very proclamations that the President meant to give assur- ances of the purpose of our government to deal liberally and generously with the Philippines, and the orders issued by General Otis pursuant to the advices he received of the eminently pacific disposition of the American government, excited the Tagalos, and influenced them, just because the President announced his sense of responsibility, and thereby presumed to question the dictatorship of Aguinaldo. Further, the Filipinos were persuaded that they had only to strike a blow at our army to disturb the peace of this country. The President had shown anxiety to avoid bloodshed, and while the insurgents were intrenching themselves and mounting guns to enfilade our lines, our sentinels were subjected to the grossest insults and taunted night and day. This aggressive effrontery continued until the attack was made in force, and then the Tagalos got a lesson that was a surprise to them. They had been accustomed when they thought they were besieging Manila, to open fire for a few hours, and then to rest, regarding the proceeding heroic and to be resumed at pleasure. The Americans rushed for them, and put them to flight and slaughter. The result of the effervescence of factions in our Congress and country after the war was over except in a legal sense, was to furnish fire for the fuel accumulated with false pretenses by the Tagalos, and substitute a war with the Filipinos for that with the Spaniards, and at the same time cut down and put aside the army bills, thus encouraging Indian disorders, and other manifestations of hatred and contempt for the authorities. It was possible, 758 THE OCCUPATION OF OUR NEW POSSESSIONS. however, to save for a time the regular army as it is and give to the discretion of the President power to raise troops enough, as appeared to Congress, to aot on the defensive, until the law-making power should come together in regular session or be called by the President, if that seemed the lesser evil. Congress was good enough to provide for an ad interim army. The President was not commanded — that is, not yet — to throw away the weapons the constitution placed in his hands. There is hardly enough of the army to take care of the military property accumulated in the fortifications and camps, seaside and other, and thinly occupy our vast possessions so that the peace and dignity of the United States may not be imfavorably affected. Fortunately the military arm of the nation does not need to be strongly displayed in Porto Rico and Hawaii, and it is a coincidence that the absence of insurgents is in precisely those places in which our authority is not limited as to time. Porto Rico has been ceded to us, the schools opening under the American flag, the people shouting in joyous response to the salutes with which the flag was received, and the band played the Star Spangled Banner. We annexed Hawaii in spite of the outcries of those who had profited by the occupation of the monarchy that was surrounded by as many rings as Jupiter has moons. A ship of war or two and a few companies of regulars are enough to keep order there. The people accept it as a fact, as it is, that the annexation is irrevocable. The way to cause disturbance is to question that fact, but it will not be questioned any more until the army submits to the mob. It will be the duty of Congress to make liberal appropriations for the equipment of the old forts at the prin- cipal ports of Porto Rico, with modern artillery, — and as the naval officers agree that the eight and ten inch guns are great enough for battleships, and that the five-inch and small rapid-fire artillery are the most serviceable afloat, we will have and to spare a splendid assortment of our eleven, twelve and thirteen inch thunderers to mount ashore. Porto Rico, the Pacific coast and Hawaii should absorb them. In Cuba we were fortunate not to open the war with Spain by accepting as fact the Key West fiction about the repub- lic of Cuba. That wonderful oganization was apparently gotten up expressly for the issue of bonds and postage stamps. There was a coast-guard and postal system, also a capital city, and an army, accounts of which reminded one of that described in the alliteration, "An Austrian army awfully arrayed. " The American statesmen who have used Cuba as a live coal on their brains, thought it important to have the republic recognized to assist in placing loans, THE OCCUPATION OF OUR NEW POSSESSIONS. 759 take command of our armies, and accept rations from our hands. The Cuban Assembly was like that in the Isle of Luzon, representative of a clique, a faction, a gang, not at all of the people. Both gangs, that of Cuba and that of Luzon, are representative only of Spanish misgovernment and the deform- ities of an administration by royal favorites for immigrant stipendiaries. In the character they asserted for themselves, that of representatives of the people, they were self-evident impostors. It was held to be high public policy to disclaim ambition to annex Cuba to the United States, and it seems prob- able the precaution of that profession was wise, for it does much to smooth the way for the final complete absorption of Cuba in the United States. In no other way than by pursuing the path of American reserve, and respect for the orderly expression of the Cuban people when they emerged from the chaos of war and made themselves felt, could the Assembly have been so dis- credited as it is by its own acts. That body was so wild with folly as to take issue with the one man whose power of character, will and fame crush them when they charge him with their own faults. They are shattered by the col- lision, while their animosity inflicted no scratch or stain on the Cuban chief. The intelligence and high-toned public spirit of Martinez Gomez has redeerned the faults of his campaigning, which was that of fighting Spaniards with their own weapons, and burning the fairer places of the island to free it from woes greater than poverty, of hopeless strife with corrupt and venomous oppression. The stand of Gomez for the freedom of the people from false debts was full of the dignity of heroic devotion, sympathy with those really liberated and their true liberators, and scorn for all who would convert the cause of the country into a source of profitableness for pretenders. The future of Cuba too largely depends upon this one-man power, for Gomez is old and worn. The people of the island have acclaimed him one of them- selves, though a Dominican, and his leadership is one he cannot abdicate, for there is no hand but his to guide the sorely-stricken Cubans to the peace of a stable government that the people may voice their aspirations with authen- ticit)^ and efficacy. There was, in the Congressional debate on the army bill in association with the current events of the Filipino war, many things said by the opposi- tion that would be entirely deplorable if the standard of intelligence was that of the Tagalos, who must be convinced that Americans are, in view of the •warfare that engages their attention around Manila, about to engage in a civil 76o THE OCCUPATION OF OUR NEW POSSESSIONS. war at home. One member said war with Aguinaldo could have been avoided if .the President had stated he was not going to subjugate them, and this congressman had "mused much" upon the "embattled farmers" who "fired the shot heard round the world, "and "wondered if there was anywhere out along the firing line around Manila a spot that looked like Concord Bridge." This is a direct instigation of the assassination of American soldiers doing their duty at Manila. This incident occurred when the President cabled within three weeks of the naval battle of Manila that it would be the duty of the commander of the American expedition to "publish a proclamation declaring that we came not to make war upon the people of the Philippines," but to "protect them in their homes, their employments and in their personal and religious rights." The proof is perfect that Aguinaldo was false and malicious, a conspirator, hostile all the while to Americans, seeking to deceive and make use of them, to help him with his followers to take the place of the Spaniards as robbers of the people, and tyrants irresponsible and unappeas- able. Mr. Wildman, consul at Hongkong, wrote the State Department that Aguinaldo arrived in that city on the day after Dewey's Ma}--day victory, and added: "It was May loth before I could obtain permission from Admiral Dewey to allow Aguinaldo to go by the U. S. steamer McCulloch. " It was three weeks after the battle when Aguinaldo arrived at Cavite. Just at this time a proclamation was issued at Hongkong by the Philippine insurgents saying: "Where you see the American flag flying, assemble. They are our redeemers!" May 20, Williams, consul, wrote; "General Aguinaldo told me to-day that his friends all hoped that the Philippines would be held as a colony of the United States of America." While Aguinaldo was at Hong- kong his "compatriots" there busied themselves getting up statements tender- ing their allegiance to the United States. Here is an example : To the President of the United States of America: Claudio Lopez, merchant and proprietor and vice-consul of Portugal at Iloilo, native of the Philippine Islands, emigrant to this colony of Hongkong for political causes, exposes with great consideration: Having known the histor)' and constitution of the noblest liberal and rightful nation of the United States of America, he, for the present, adheres to the Government in annexing his country, and considers that it will be for him a great honor to join his country as an additional star to the always vie- THE OCCUPATION OF OUR NEW POSSESSIONS. 761 torious flag- of the United States of America and to count him as one of its citizens. Hongkong^, 9th May, 1898. (Signed) CLAUDIO LOPEZ. This was prepared a week after Aguinaldo's arrival at Hongkong, when the news of Dewey's victory had been received, and a week before he gave permission for the Malay tribesman, who had accepted Spanish money to accept a Spanish peace for his people, to take passage in a United States ship, return to the country he had left for his country's good, as the sequel shows. There was a struggle without intermission to get the State Depart- ment and Admiral Dewey to consent to an alliance with Aguinaldo and his "government." This was persistently the policy of our consuls at Hong- kong, Manila and Singapore, who were active in the presumed management of the man who had been deported, cash in hand, as the Spanish prom- ised to reform if he would take his share of the country and go away. He knew as well then the nature of the reforms of Spain as he does now. He was, until the American admiral allowed him to appear at Cavite, a professor of Americanism. What he secured through the intervention of our consuls was to advertise himself under the auspices of the United States forces, and the Tagalos presumed he was running the United States. Very soon he became of the opinion that it was his mission to permit and direct the operation of our fleet and army, and he has ever since been violent as an "ally" of the United States, whose "dictatorship" was of such a nature he was called upon to "order and command" all manner of men. The State Department of the United States several times by cable and mailed letters ordered the consuls to omit negotiations. This was before the war. When it was in the air after the war, they were "cordial" with Aguinaldo that they might "influence him for good. " He was playing upon them a sinister game. Mr. Wildman, however, had written February 22, 1898, that the Spanish cap- tain-general at Manila was asserting he had pacified the islands, so that he could return to Spain with that to his credit, when the truth was "certain rebel leaders were given a cash bribe of $1,650,000 to consent to public depor- tation to China. This bribe and deportation only multiplied claimants, and fanned the fires of discontent." It was Aguinaldo who got the money. The sort of peace he secured was described by his friend, Consul Williams, in these words; "On Friday morning, March 25, a meeting of natives was being 762 THE OCCUPATION OF OUR NEW POSSESSIONS. held near my consulate in Manila, the natives being unarmed. The building was surrounded bj^ police and military, the meeting broken up, twelve natives wantonly shot to death, several wounded, and sixty-two taken prisoners. Saturday morning, March 26, the sixty-two prisoners were marched in a body to the cemetery and shot to death, although it was shown that several were chance passers-by or employes in ships adjoining, not being in attendance at the meeting." We quote again from Mr. Williams: "I was in Hongkong September, 1897, when Aguinaldo and his leaders arrived under contract with the Spanish government. They waited until the ist of November for the pay- ment of the promised money and the fulfillment of the promised reforms. Only $400,000, Mexican, was ever placed to their credit in the banks." It was on the 3d of November Mr. E. Agoncillo, "late minister of foreign affairs in Aguinaldo's cabinet," tried to make a secret bargain with the United States for arms, and was willing the United States should make some money. "There has been a systematic attempt to blacken the name of Aguinaldo and his cabinet," Mr. Williams wrote later, "on account of the questionable terms of their surrender to Spanish forces a year ago this month." Mr. Wil- liams proceeded to argue that Aguinaldo had not sold himself. This was a part of the "diplomatic dealing" with the conspirator who was at work to use the Americans, civil and military, to further his plan for setting up a dictator- ship. Aguinaldo was like the frozen reptile in the fable, found by a wood- man, and warmed before the fire, stung his benefactor. This preposterous Tagalo serpent began to show his fangs at an early date. The first United States troops, under General Thomas Anderson, arrived at Manila to rein- force Dewey June 30th, and the second expedition, under General Green, July 22d. July 28th Aguinaldo wrote Anderson: "I consider it my duty to advise )'ou of the undesirability of disembarking North American troops in the places conquered by the Filipinos from the Spanish, without previous notice to this government, because, as no formal agreement yet exists between the two nations, the Philippine people might consider the occupation of its territories by North American troops as a viola- tion of its rights. "I comprehend that without the destruction of the Spanish squadron the Philippine revolution would not have advanced so rapidly. Because of this I take the liberty of indicating to your excellency the necessity that, before dis- embarking, you should communicate in writing to this government the places THE OCCUPATION OF OUR NEW POSSESSIONS. 763 that are to be occupied and also the object of the occupation, that the people may be advised in due form and [thus] prevent the commission of any trans- gression against friendship." There could not have been anything more insolent than this imagined, - but Aguinaldo was soon able to surpass it, expressing astonishment that Americans wanted wood, horses and cattle, and meant to take them if not sold at a fair price. Presently the snaky conspirator, who sought to absorb all the offices of tyranny, claimed it as a virtue that he had "permitted" the Ameri- cans in Manila to obtain pure water, and he began his openly aggressive course that culminated in the war he forced. It was, he held, a condescension to say that the Americans had hastened the revolution by destroying the Spanish fleet! As for himself, he and his 14,000 men, which he represented as 37,000, did nothing toward taking Manila. The American fleet silenced the fort by the seashore that was the key of the city, and the American col- umns, the line of defense broken, entered with slight loss. Then because the Tagalos were not allowed to jointly occupy the place they had not contributed to conquer, there was the claim that we had ill-treated our "ally." The President telegraphed Admiral Dewey, May 26: "You must exercise discre- tion most fully in a)l matters, and be governed according to circumstances which you know and we can not know. You have our confidence entirely. It is desirable, as far as possible and consistent for your success and safety, not to have political alliances with the insurgents or any faction in the islands that would incur liability to maintain their cause in the future. " This was the product, of course, of the consular correspondence which had gone far in sympathy and flattery. The Admiral replied: "I thank the Department for the expression of confidence. Have acted according to the spirit of the Department's instructions therein from begin- ning, and I have entered into no alliance with the insurgents or with any fac- tion. This squadron can reduce the defenses of Manila at any moment, but it is considered useless until the arrival of sufficient United States forces to retain possession. DEWEY." August isth Consul Wildman telegraphed State Department: "The Spanish consul received dispatch Sunday ordering the surrender of' Manila. Shall I offer to deliver personally and save more delay? Believe can be of service to Dewey, should Aguinaldo make trouble. WILDMAN." 764 THE OCCUPATION OF OUR NEW POSSEvSSIONS. This telegram from Wildman was thus answered by the Secr^tarj- : "Spanish consul should deliver dispatch in his own waj'. Take no action respecting Agiiinaldo without specific directions from this Department." Mr. Wildman finally discovered that Agninaldo, with whom he had labored hard and long, was treacherous, and wanted to take possession of the. country and be the reigning tyrant vice the Spaniards, and at last in ignorance and vanity mistaking the character of the American army and people, made war with the swarm of deluded men of his tribe, not for liberty, but to set up a personal despotism. We have to liberate the people of the Philippines twice, from the Spaniards and from the Tagalos. The American arms have not been tarnished in either conflict, but brightened and glorified in the same good cause, keeping clear and shining on high, the faith and honor of the army and navy of the United States and the absolute integrity of the national government. It was not possible to avoid the war with a tribe of Malays who answered generosity with resentment, charity with malice, and forbearance with vindictiveness. They are not fighting for personal or public riglits, but for a savage sovereignty, that they may spoil and slay for the sake of robbery and revenge. No reproach rests upon Americans for their conduct at Manila. Under difficult circumstances they have been admirable. There has not been a day since May i, 1898, when they could have left the Philippines with honor, for they could not provide for peace except by force. The degradation of submissiveness suggested — the abandonment of duty and decency — it is impossible to conceive of our countrymen. M#fe3C' INDEX. PAGE Abarzuza, Don Buenaventura 683 '■Abondanar"'and "Renunciar" quibble over terms 689 Almodovar, Duke of 713 Ambiguity avoided in preparing Peace Protocol • Jii American plenipotentiaries; their powers 6S2 American Commissioners not offended by Spanish memorandum regarding Indian rebel- lions and seceding Southern States 702 American Commissioners uphold Merritt 706 American Government accepted no Spanish reservations 719 American Secretary of State's correspondence with Marshal Prim 55 American Proposal to purchase Cuba s6 American Minister to Spain 74 American appeal to European Powers proves inadequate go Americans not believed warlike by Spaniards 125 Americans arrested and charges 137 American citizens of two kinds in Cuba 19S American prisoners in Cuba released 204 American eagle flew high on the Fourth of July 411 American troops had a line "which was very thin" 414 American army receives grateful letter from defeated Spaniards 584 American army at Santiago small and poorly furnished 4S9 Americans' handsome behavior according to Cervera 514 Americans' occupy Jamaica and Ponce 570 American fire from fleet "one prolonged thunder" 624 After the Mayday battle in Manila Bay 309 After the fighting was over in Cuba 581 Alleged American citizens 137 Administrations, conservative, of Grant, Cleveland and McKinley 194 Advance of the first of July 404 Agoncillo, Don Felipe 665 Aguinaldo calls on Dewey 312 773 774 INDEX. lAGE Aguinaldo organizes army under protection of Dewey's guns 314 Aguinaldo, according to Dewey, unable to capture Manila 314 Aguinaldo proclaims himself President 31S Aguinaldo becomes aggressive 319 Aguinaldo and General Jlerritt 554 Aguinaldo described by Major Bell 665 Aguinaldo, Baldamero, Secretary of War 665 Aguinaldo's treacherj- 761 Aguira, seat of Cuban Government*. 188 Aguirri, General, at Cienfuegos, is ordered by Blanco to congratulate Cen-era on his victory 446 Aguacate Hill, where Cubans made a va'iant stand 661 Alger, R. A., Secretar}- of \Yar, directs that graves be properly and surely marked 440 Alger, General, urges Shaffer to hold his own 409 Alger urges joint action of Army and Navy 417 Alger, Secretary, thanked by Clara Barton 583 Arevella, Captain, dentist, soldier 667 Annexation of Cuba the correct policy no Anxiety for latest news from Shafter's headquarters 454 Army of the United States should have most approved arms 329 Arm\- seizes prizes in harbor claimed by Navy 536 Army of the United States 630 Army corps, officers and men ■. 633 Army rifle, Krag-Jorgensen, its excellence 644 Arellano, Cayetano S., avowed annexationist 665 Art in handling modern rifle 329 Artillery and its great effect 480 Assaults believed to have been impossible under modern conditions 479 Authorization of the Spanish Peace Commissioners 682 Azpeztequia fortifies his estate 182 Bombardment of American ports suggested 103 Brice, A. C, Consul at Matanzas, writes of starvation 232 Barker, Walter B., Consul of Sagua la Grande, tells of inability to grind sugar crop 238 Baranger, General, sure of .Spain's success 277 Brumby, T. M., Lieutenant, commended b\- Dewey 288 Bombardment of San Juan, Porto Rico 368 Blanco says withdrawal of Cervera's fleet would mean loss of Cuba 434 Blanco orders Cervera to land marines 437 Blanco asks authority over Cervera 437 Blanco advises Cervera when to escape 437 Blanco orders Cervera out of harbor 439 INDEX. 775 PAGE Blanco postpones fleet's "departure" 443 Blanco orders Cervera to leave 444 Blanco advised by Cervera withdrawal of his sailors would mean loss of Santiago 445 Blanco gives Cervera twelve hours to leave Santiago 445 Blanco advised of Cervera's departure and loss of two torpedo boats 445 Blanco orders General Guirri at Cienfuegos prepare to receive Cervera and con- gratulate him on his "distinguished victory" 446 Blanco tells Madrid fate of Cervera's squadron 447 Blanco receives report of Cervera of his capture 447 Blanco tries to shift blame for Cervera's defeat 447 Blanco advises Madrid to hold out against Americans 44S Blanco's tribute of admiration to Cervera 448 Blanco appealed to by Sagasta for help towards peace 449 Blanco has Madrid's position explained to him by Correa 449 Blanco demands of Sagasta continuation of the war 451 Blanco cables Cervera can't fight 429 Blanco advises Correa army still wants to fight 451 Brecken ridge on need of regular officers among volunteers 387 Breckenridge, General J. C, his military intelligence 474 Breckenridge, and what should be done with the volunteers 477 Breckenridge tells of landing, Daiquiri 478 Breckenridge's story of the fighting at Santiago 479 Breckenridge's account of El Caney 483 Breckenridge's account of Cubans 484 Burss, Fireman J., wounded on Brooklyn in fight with Cervera 504 Brooklyn hit many times 504 Brooklj-n most dreaded by Spaniards 513 Black powder and its dangers 483 Bravery of the Spaniards ; 484 Baltimore struck five times 295 Biddle, Captain W., U. S. M. C, performed valuable services 2S3 Belief in her navy accounts for Spain's determination to fight 27S Boker. Geo. H., Minister to Russia, writes of sympathy there 129 Burning of houses 187 Bureau of Ordnance — additional guns O08 Bureau of Construction and Repair, report of O14 Bombardment by Sampson according to Santiago Spaniards 628 Belief in Santiago that Cervera had escaped 626 Battleship, its supremacy (,27 Boynton, General H. V., on water supply at Chickamauga Park 646 Beef supplied army, and scandal (147 776 INDEX. . PAGE Beef and the truth about it 647 Banquero, Colonel, his bravery 652 Bustemente, Captain, fights valo'rously for Spain 652 Bell, Major J. F., catalogues Philippine leaders 664 Centennial Exhibition and relations between the two Governments 54 Cushing, Caleb, as a newspaper reader 75 Cushing's indictment of Spain and Spp.niards 94 Cushing, Caleb, studies of Spanish character explained 108 Cushing's, Caleb, state papers and their importance ? 114 Cushing's, Caleb, views as to obeying the letter of his instructions 124 Cushing, Caleb, put diplomatic facts with a lawyer's impartiality 131 Carlist war made Europe slow to intervene in Cuba loi Campos, Martinez, negotiates Peace of Zanjon 133 Campos, Martinez, attempts to quell outbreak of hostilities in 1895 133 Campos, Martinez, replaced by General Weyler 134 Claims stacked in State Department and damages asked 147 Conduct of Cuban troops as witnessed by G. B. Rea 165 Concentration of peasantry described by Stephen Bonsai, journalist 17S Camaguey filled with cattle iSg Consulate at Havana igS Caldwell, Ensign H. H., volunteer, commended by Dewey 28S Calkins, Lieutenant C. G., navigator of Olympia, stood on bridge with Dewey. Highly commended by him 28S Cogh'an, Captain J. B., of the Raleigh, on Manila victory 293 Cubans inferior to Filipinos, according to Dewey 314 Cuban Government at Key West 657 Cuban Government at New York 657 Cuban army on the pay-roll 660 Cuban question thrashed over during Ten Years' War log Cuban Republic at Key West and New York affair no Cubans according to General Breckenridge 484 Cuban cavalry on the coast guard did not muster in force 372 Cuba's one great aid 661 Cuba and her expenses 696 Cuba is freed 672 Cuba should have been ceded as Porto Rico was 723 Cuban debt related by commissioners 695 "Cuban War Emergency Loan" 696 Clark, Captain C. E., assumes command of Oregon 334 Clark, Captain of the Oregon, warned of Cape de Verde fleet 336 Clark, Captain, cables could beat off and cripple Spanish fleet 336 INDEX. 777 Captain Clark at Rio de Janeiro warns Captain in command of the Brazilian flagship that he would blow up Spanish torpedo boat in the harbor if she approached the Oregon ... 337 Captain Clark acknowledges congratulations received by crew with "enthusiasm and spontaneous cheers" 337 Captain Clark of the Oregon tells of his ship in action 509 Correspondence of the Department of War 353 Camps in Florida 359 Cervera reported at Santiago 368 Cervera reported ordered to shell Santiago when Americans got possession 406 Cervera's position at Santiago is understood by the Spanish Government 431 Cervera warned against being bottled up 433 Cervera's marines ordered to land 437 Correa advises chance for Cervera's escape 438 Cervera told of a good time to escape .■ 437 Cervera says attempt to escape would mean loss of squadron and men 43S Cervera advises Blanco he is under his orders 438 Cervera tells of bad condition of his ships , 439 Cervera ordered out of harbor by Blanco 439 Cervera's pathetic telegram requesting positive orders from Blanco before le;iving Santiago 440 Cervera pressed by Madrid to escape 443 Cer\-era's departure postponed by Blanco 443 Cer\'era accepts his doom 444 Cervera ordered to leave by Blanco 444 Cervera seeks delay 444 Cervera advises Blanco virithdrawal of sailors would mean loss of Santiago 444 Cervera given twelve hours to leave 445 Cervera reports to Blanco his capture 447 Cervera paid tribute of admiration by Blanco 448 Cervera's report of his defeat 513 Cervera sails from Cape Verde Islands , 368 Cervei"a famished for coal 621 Cervera's fleet as seen in Spanish eyes before the disaster of Santiago 278 Cervera reports his arrival at Santiago 429 Cervera at crucial moment 626 Corbin, Adjutant-General, telegraphs re-inforcements are coming 410 Corbin, H. C, sends remarkable telegram to Shafter about entering harbor with transport armored wnth baled hay 456 Chancom tran.sported and installed torpedoes in Cuba ' 277 Corruption in Spanish army and navy 112 Correspondence of the Department of War 357 778 INDEX. PAGE Cambon, Ambassador from France, his conversations with President 704 Cambon, Don Julio, French Ambassador, negotiates peace for Alphonso XIII 66S Cambon and Day concurred in believing note explicit 716 Cambon's instrument of authorization .'. 670 Cadiz fleet starts for Manila 323 Captain Cook of the Brooklyn tells story of the naval battle 508 Capitulation 527 Casualties in the army operating against Spaniards in Manila 565 Casualties at Santiago 581 Clara Barton thanks Secretary Alger 583 Cabellra, Lieutenant, tells of the destroyer's destruction 512 Canovas del Castillo shipped torpedoes to Cuba 277 Correa explains to Blanco Madrid's unfortunate position 449 Conference interrupted by Cervera's departure 461 Cavalry dismounted and its work 479 Chaparral about Santiago 4S0 Cable cut by Dewey gave us Philippine archipelago 725 Carter, Assistant Adjutant-General, Letter from 746 Corruption of Spanish contractor (,21 Casualties 636 Casualties in Santiago 636 Casualties in Porto Rico 640 Casualties in Manila 640 Camps of United States troops 642 Chickamauga Park and water supply 646 Craig, Dr. C. P., analyzes Chickamauga water (,47 Constitution, twenty-ninth Spanish regulars crack fighters 653 Conclusion 725 Congressional effusions make great trouble 723 Country's debt to General Merritt 725 Country indebted to Admiral Dewey 725 Ceremonies Concluding the War with Spain 725 Commission to Investigate the Conduct of the War Department 738 Derby, Lord, and Gen. Schenes meet 74 Death of Marti log Death of colonial system of Spain 113 Duty of fair play to the Spaniards of the Peninsula and Cuba 131 Diaz, Don JoseGarnica y 683 Diaz, Rev. A. J., tells of immense armies of Gomez and Maceo 152 Death to those helping Spaniards 169 Defeat called victory by Cubans 173 INDEX. 779 PAGE Dr. Danforth describes Cuban capital ^ iSS Death in Cuba 211 Different character in explosions of the Maine 217 Day, Secretary, telegraphs Consul-General Lee 215 Declaration of War, President places issue with Congress 245 Day, Secretary, splendidly replies in the name of the President 66S Day to Woodford 248 Day states substantially points of protocol 66S Day to Woodford, Telegram in Cipher 249 Day Lost or Gained, Importance of in Closing the War 732 Dewey's splendid victory 277 Dewey charters British steamer 280 Dewey purchases British steamer Zafiro 280 Dewey announces departure for Manila 283 Dewey threatened with Cervera's squadron 308 Dewey's simple announcement of his victory over Spanish fleet 283 Dewey congratulated by President and Secretary of the Navy 284 Dewey announces securing naval station at Cavite 284 Dewey congratulated in the name of American people 284 Dewey made Rear-Admiral 285 Dewey sends correct list of Spanish vessels destroyed 285 Dewey announces raising and docking three Spanish vessels 285 Dewey's official report of the engagement of his squadron with the Spanish fleet 285 Dewey happy to report none killed — squadron but slightly damaged 2S7 Dewey's praise of officers and men 2S8 Dewey doubts if any Commander-in-Chief was ever served by more loyal and gallant captains 2S8 Dyer, Captain, of the Baltimore, makes a most interesting report 294 Defeated Spaniards give first account of action in Manila Bay 309 Dewey cuts cable, after first proposing to preserve the line for the use of both Americans and Spaniards, which was rejected by the enemy 309 Dewey thanks President for promotion, and recommends advancement on list of his commanding officer 310 Dewey's estimate of troops necessary to control Philippine Islands 311 Dewey sends warning troops should be provided for extremely hot, moist cliinate 311 Dewey cabled if attacked by superior force squadron would endeavor to give good account of itself 311 Dewey asks for whereabouts and strength of possible Spanish expedition against him 312 Dewey receives call from Aguinaldo ^12 Dewey's high commendation of Captain Daniel B. Hodgson 313 Dewey allows Aguinaldo to organize his army under the protection of his guns 314 78o INDEX. PAGE Dewey doubts Aguinaldo's ability to capture Manila 314 Dewey believes Filipinos more capable of self-government than Cubans 314 Dewey's anxiety for arrival of monitors 318 Dewey announces arrival of United States troops 318 Dewey's duty at Manila 547 Dewey sustained by the President 5 06 Dewey feared by Spaniards i,-,8 Dewey's trust in monitors 627 Dewey announces arrival of General Merritt .• 310 Dewey announces Aguinaldo is becoming aggressive 319 Dewey receives announcement of Peace Protocol ._ 320 Dewey's dispatches are characteristic and historical 320 Dewey entered into no alliance with Philippine insurgents 323 Dewey believed could beat Cervera with addition of two monitors 323 Dewey in few words tells President all about Philippines 325 Dewey, his country's indebtedness to him 725 Difficulty in loading transports for Santiago 376 Daiquiri landing unopposed 388 Difficulties in the Santiago campaign 3gq Departure of American fleet told to Blanco 430 Destroyers destroyed at Santiago 512 Destruction of the Maine 210 Diminutive forces of Cuba according to G. B. Rea '. 160 Daiquiri and the landing there 478 Day of doom for Cervera's fleet 483 De la Rama, One Estefan, described 6O5 Dedios, Lieut.-Gen. Emiliano, Military Governor Cavite 666 Del Pilar, Brigadier-General _ 666 Destruction of Cervera's fleet as seen from shore 625 Deference to Spanish Commissioners 694 Dictionary and interpretation of Peace Protocol 694 "Disposition" and "possession," President's change of wording 707 Duke de Arcos appointed Spain's Minister to the United States ; 730 European press comment on Cuban-Spanish-American situation in 1S76 98 European powers hold off during war of 1898 113 European monarchies relied on by Spain 126 Exodus Cubans through dread of Weyler 134 Experience and sentiments of the people of Cuba 206 Events immediately preceding the blowing up of the Maine 214 Extra territoriality of foreign war vessel prevented Spaniards investigating Maine disaster 217 El Caney and General Ludlow .;8o INDEX. 781 El Caney according to Breckenridge 483 European powers addressed by American Government regarding intervention 76 Evans, J. C, brave conduct at Manila 288 Evans, Captain Bob, on the Iowa's performance 5" Ellis, Chief Yeoman G. H., killed on Brooklyn in fight with Cervera 504 Eaton, Commodore, of the Resolute, on the naval fight 510 Exterior explosion the verdict 210 Eyermann, Emilio de Acosta y, killed on Mercedes 624 Embalmed beef •• f'48 Eighth (Philippine) corps ^'34 Expeditions to Philippines ('35 E.scario's column delayed by Cubans (161 Escario's desperate advance to gain Santiago (J6i Escario's delay, according to Spaniards, lost Santiago 663 Escamillo, Aguinaldo's secretary 665 Estrella, General f>66 Exact terms of note relating to Philippines 712 Evacuation of Porto Rico 733 Evacuation of Cuba 733 Fish, Secretary- of State Hamilton, on former Cuban insurrection 54 Filibuster expeditions intended to rush United States into war 125 Fish, Hamilton, instructed in English b'y London Times 12S Fish, Hamilton 194 Firebrand and Freedom 1S3 Five-dollar Spanish gold piece sent private letter to United States 206 Florida Literary Bureau : 207 Field Fighting for Santiago , 407 Foreign countries closely studied vSantiago expedition 477 Fifth Army Corps and its lesson to the whole army 477 "Fill up wfth coal — the best to be had" 544 Fleet and army cooperate at Manila 446 Filipinos more capable of self-government than Cubans, according to Dewey 314 Filipino Commission in Washington 757 Filibusters accused of responsibility for Cuban insurrection S5 Famme in Santiago fi22 Flagler, Gen. D. W., Chief of Ordnance, on magazine rifle (44 Fight at El Caney and Spanish version 640 Fight at .San Juan and Spanish version fi49 Fourth Corps (134 Fifth (.Santiago) Corps 634 Free exercise of religion 678 782 INDEX. PAGE Former colonies of Spain and their independence in relation to the treaty 693 Great Britain's attitude in the Ten Years' War 74 Guerrilla tactics and length of Cuban War..' 89 General Grant was conservative 97 Grant's third term desire alleged to cause America's proposed intervention 102 Gomez.'Gen. Maximo, his annihilation of Cuban industries 104 Gomez and the torch no Gomez's two objects in firing fields 659 Gomez attacks American Government, press and President 174 Gomez's letter to Gen. Lee claiming insurgents kept no one from earning a living 229 Gomez's address to planters and cattle ranchers 367 Gridley, Captain, his report of the Olympia 290 General Greely on Signal Service 645 Guantanamo and splendid behavior of the Marines 628 Guantanamo Bay filled with mines 628 Grant's poor opinion of Cuban war-making 125 Greene, Gen. Frank V., wins Merritt's highest praise 663 Greene's fear of anarchy in the Philippines 663 Garcia, Pantelon, Major-General 666 Garcia, Gen., his troops do good work in retarding Spaniards : 662 "Honor" of Spain stood in the way of peace during Ten Years' War 66 Helping Spaniards meant death 169 Hogs easy to catch in Cuba 190 Hyatt, Pulaski F., Consul at Santiago, writes regarding annexation 233 Hyatt, Consul, writes of distress due to Gomez's order forbidding grinding of sugar crop ... 237 Hou.se of Representatives resolves for immediate intervention 245 Hughes, Lieutenant, reports Battle of Manila 288 Howe, J. A., praises officers and men in naval engagement at Manila 29S Hodgson, Capt. Daniel B., highly commended by Dewey 313 Humanity in withholding bombardment of Santiago 413 Hobson, Lieutenant, and men exchanged ~. 414 Humphrey, Colonel, Chief Quartermaster at Tampa, on the Santiago transports 398 History of the war in a few words 342 "History points to no greater achievement" 293 Intervention of European Powers 76 Investigation by Congressional Committees 150 Isle of Pines and General Miles' plan of capture 405 Intrenching tools should be regular part of equipment of troops 477 Intervention 203 Insurgents of Cuba and the Philippines in arms 658 Indemnity claims mutually relinquished by United States and Spain 676 INDEX. 783 I'AGE Interview between President and Ambassador Cambon 70S Junta's divinely appointed ruling class igi Joint work of Army and Navy at Manila 544 Joint resolution demanding that Spain relinquish its authority in Cuba 250 Jurisdiction of the courts 67S Koop, C. F., of Boston, describes brutality of Spanish officers 191 Killed wounded Cubans 1S8 Kindelberger, C. P. , assistant surgeon of the Olympia, volunteered, was attached, com- mended 414 Key West and shortness of water 360 Key West Bureau of Misinformation 724 "Keep full of coal" 270 London Times claims United States departed from political traditions loi London Times dares to give lessons in English to Hamilton Fish 12S Lawrence, Frederic W., on number of insurgent troops 150 List of officers, sailors and marines killed in the Maine disaster 221 Logan, Gen., his division carries El Caney 257 Linare's impression of Cervera's fleet,. 430 Linares telegraphs Blanco can't give up Cervera's help 429 Linares, General, defense of his line 649 Lesson for the country of the hills of Santiago 4-4 Lessons of the War j3 5 Las Guasimas and the fighting there as told by Gen. Breckenridge 479 Ludlow's Brigade at El Caney 4S0 Lawton highly commended b\' Breckenridge 4S6 Long's telegrams to naval officers scattered about the world 268 Long, Wm., Pay Clerk, performed active service, commended 268 Long, Secretary, cables Dewey 279 Long notifies Dewey war has begun 283 Long telegraphs Oregon to get ready ; 332 Long to Schley 3^1 Long anxious to know if all Cervera's fleet are at Santiago 372 Lamberton, Commander Chief of Staff B. P., volunteered and praised by Dewey..." 28S Luneta battery, Manila, use Krupp guns 293 List of the sick and dead of the American fleet at Manila 32S Lee, Con.sul-General, telegraphed by Day 215 Lee's Consul-Generalship i,, . Lee's eminent fitness i„,, Lee's letter to Secretary Day regarding situation 232 Las Guasimos Spaniards make desperate resistance 263 Long's high attainments c_i. 784 INDEX. PACE Lopez, Miguel, Cervera's pilot, tells of departure from harbor C2f> Ludington, Quartermaster-General M. J., shows magnitude of problem supplying big army , 642 Limit to the honor of arms 657 Logic of the War with Spain 752 Maceo's death and the truth 107 Marti 's death '. 109 Maceo breaks through trocha 136 Maceo's death according to Cubans and Spaniards 136 Money of Cuban treasury sent to New York 190 Manner of forcing Spanish soldiers into the brush 1S8 Malignance on both sides in Cuba 209 Maine destruction ..co 210 Maine sent to Havana 216 Maine disaster, those killed 221 McGarr, Owen, Counsel at Cienfuegos, writes of cane grinding and attempts to fire fields 234 Message from the President transmitting correspondence between Spain and the LTnited States 24^) Montijo. Admiral, reports his defeat 298 Manila falls 325 Manila fleet resumes regular target practice in captured bay '. 328 Mahan, Captain, taught English significance of "sea power" ■ 331 McCormick, Capt. D. J., condemned by Medical Survey, relieved of command of Oregon 333 Miles, Major-General Nelson A., reports on work done by bureaus and officers 268 Miles and his ideal campaign 342 Miles believed in a big Cuban army 344 Miles" unfortunate reference to Bull Run 352 Miles plans to capture Santiago 375 Miles pulls steadily in the harness and is ready with suggestions 384 Miles telegraphs Spanish General to surrender 471 Miles appears at Santiago 523 Miles and Shaffer get together 523 Miles believed in Cuban Army which failed to materialize 523 Miles arrives at Shaffer's headquarters 524 Miles' coming impresses Spaniards 524 Miles'*plans and movements in Porto Rico campaign 551 Miles sails for Porto Rico 569 Miles desires cooperation of navy at San Juan, Porto Rico 570 Miles changes his plans at sea owing to leak of information 573 Miles' completeness of information 573 Miles' sonorous proclamation to Porto Ricans 574 INDEX. 7S5 PAG K Miles' idea of Cuban aid '^'5'> Miley, Lieutenant, raises flag over Santiago 532 Merritfs, General, fight after protocol was signed TM Merritt upheld by American Commission T^'> Merritt, country indebted to him 725 Merritt decides time to strike 5f>o Merritt and Aguinaldo 554 Merritfs proclamation to Filipinos i^'^ Merrimac follows up Cervera 253 Merrimac did not obstruct -channel 457 Merrimac, her sinking a mystery to Spaniards ^23 Mauser rifle ''-'-' Monitors slightingly spoken of by Puddeman (J27 Marietta ordered to join Oregon 333 Marine Corps and its work <''27 Mines that did not explode ^'2* Marksmanship of trained soldiers compared to that of the volunteers 479 Map of positions of vessels on blockade duty S'S Malay as a factor in the Philippines dSO Malabani, Counsellor, described f)(i5 Montenegro, Colonel f)66 Manterola 421 Madrid presses Cervera to escape 443 Madrid's "Great Joy," believing Cervera's escape 448 Madrid hears of Santiago's fall 457 Merchant vessels of both countries receive same treatment f)75 Moore, John Bassett, Secretary to the Commission " 685 Jlilitary Committees to Superintend the Evacuation of Cuba and Porto Rico 733 Minister to Spain Appointed 730 Newspaper correspondents at Havana 1 98 Naval Court of Inquiry reports on Maine disaster 217 No effort spared by the Government 399 Naval officers, their vigilance and studious observation 554 Nunez, Lieutenant-Col. Frederico, hangs fire Spanish captives 170 Nunez reproved by Maceo 171 Noriel, General 666 Origin of the war between the United States and Spain 53 Old, old stor)- of Spain qg Olney, Secretary ir)4 Oregon, object lesson of voyage ^29 Oregon, telegraphed to get ready 332 786 INDEX. BAGE Oregon commanded by Capt. C. E. Clark 353 Oregon leaves San Francisco 333 Oregon's coal contracted for at Callao 333 Oregon reaches Callao '. 334 Oregon warned of Spanish torpedo-boat Temerrario 334 Oregon meets a storm 335 Oregon reaches Port Tamar 335 Oregon learns war declared at Rio Janeiro 336 Oregon delayed by Marietta Nictheroy 336 Oregon at Rio Janeiro, Brazilians become vigilant 337 Oregon arrives at Jupiter Inlet, Fla 337 Oregon Congratulated by Secretary Long 337 One American killed in naval battle of Santiago 504 Overcrowding transport Mobile 583 Oregon's splendid performance at Santiago 594 Organization and numbers of United States army 630 Officers killed and wounded 636 Officers continued in service 730 One of the Ladrones ceded 669 Our Pacific Possessions 754 Prim, Marshal, foresaw end of Spain's colonial possessions 54 Prim's correspondence with American Secretary of State 55 Prim and Sickles confer 59 Pall Mall Gazette claims United States proposed intervention due to General Grant's desire for third term 102 Peace of Zanjon 133 Peace conference meets at Paris 6S0 President Cleveland and state papers of Secretary Olney 194 President Grant, Secretary Fish, Daniel Sickles and Caleb Cushing 194 President McKinley, Gen. Fitzhugh Lee 194 President's Message to the 45th Congress 200 President's message asking powers to terminate hostilities between Spain and Cuba 211 Pesident's proclamation regarding Maritime law 261 President's proclamation calling for volunteers 262 President's proclamation extending blockade 263 President asked information from Dewey as to the value of the Philippine Islands 324 President approves war resolution of Senate and House 246 President's proclamation blockading Cuban ports 254 President praises army for work of July ist 468 President thanks General Shafter and his army 274 President offers brave adversary "generous terms of peace" 670 INDEX. 787 PAGE President's commissions to Peace Commissioners 680 President misrepresented by Spanisli Commissioners Cgg President's words with Ambassador Cambon 704 President's openmindedness as to Pliilippines 704 President's part in preparation of Peace Protocol 706 President and cabinet meet French Ambassador 715 President was greatly wise 724 President instructs Shafter to accept nothing but unconditional surrender 338 President congratulates Sampson and navy at Santiago 494 President's proclamation of July iS showing policy of Government toward Cuba 53S President sustains Dewey 549 President's Message on Dewey's battle 737 Preparations to strike Spaniards in East Indies 544 Policy o'" expansion 550 Philippines and their boasting 550 Porto Rico campaign 568 Porto Rico ceded 669 Porto Rico is ceded to the United States 672 proclamations of the President relating to war with Spain ; 257 Plot to smash Dewey 434 Passport handed Spanish minister 252 Philippine insurgents demand joint occupation of Manila 326 Phantom fleets of Spain in Cuban waters 244 Palma, T. Estrada, asks for rights of belligerents 230 Palma on Gomez' orders relative to sugar crop 230 "People of the island of Cuba of right ought to be free and independent" 245 Pluddeman, Rear Admiral German Navy, comments on naval battle at Santiago 627 Powder and its supply 645 Philippine idea of "fixing" custom house officers O60 Philippines' hatred of monastic orders ." 664 Philippine Islands are ceded to the United States 672 Philippines and the Commissioners .' 703 Passionate dignity of Spaniards 701 Porter, Horace, his note to American Commissioners 722 Prisoners are released by United States and Spain 676 Property rights.. 67 8 Proclamation of Peace by the President 729 Quartermaster-General's report on steamships that carried Shafter's army of in- vasion 394 Quartermaster's department at Tampa, its work 644 Reforms for Cuba proposed in 1869 59 788 INDEX. PAGE Risk of war to United States through bombardment of American sea-ports pointed out by British critics '03 Recruits, Cuban, came in small crafts from Ilayti 136 Rea, George Bronson, examined , 160 Rea's difficulties with Gomez 172 Resources of Cubans I77 Real Cubans would join United States 207 Report of Mr. Davis' committee on foreign relations 212 Recognition of Republic of Cuba 214 Rigney, American sugar planter, assaulted by Cubans and estate damaged 233 Recognition of independence of Republic of Cuba defeated 245 Regular officers needed among volunteers 387 Reports of Sampson and Schley and their contrast 508 Rough Riders sick : 529 Reed, Inspector General, writes of sick soldiers 534 Remarkable letter from Spanish soldiers about to sail for Spain 5S4 Rightmire, W. J., Fleet Pay Clerk, performed active service, commended 292 Roosevelt, Col. Theodore, his famous dispatch to Dewey 270 Roosevelt, Theodore, his brilliant record as assi.stant Secretary 544 Read, Gen., describes raising of flag over Governor's palace 530 Reina Mercedes' creditable work 621 Regular regiments and their stations 633 Relations and responsibilities for insurgents 65S Ruiz, Colonel, wounded by Cubans 661 Real people of Cuba 724 Ratifications of the Treaty of Peace Exchanged at Washington 726 Report of Commission to Investigate the Conduct of the War Department 739 Report on Beef by Investigating Commission 745 Sampson says Schley had suflBcient coal 371 Sampson's army delayed by phantom fleets 3S1 Sampson arrives at Daiquiri 383 Sampson partially explains refusal to force Santiago harbor '. 455 Sampson explains relations with Shaffer 457 Sampson and Shafter were to consult when Cervera's departure interrupted 461 Sampson's plans for Shafter to take forts at harbor entrance 462 Sampson announces destruction of Cerveta's fleet 492 Sampson congratulated by President and Secretary of Navy 492 Sampson's absence on duty during the destruction of Cervera's fleet 494 Sampson's preparations in event of attempt to escape 49S Sampson gives reasons for ordering Indiana to turn back 510 Sampson failed to see an open gate to glory 520 INDEX, 789 PAGE Sampson agreed with Miles rather than Shafter 524 Sampson did not sign articles of capitulation 535 Santiago a hard nut to crack 378 Santiago's fall reported by Blanco 439 Santiago's situation after Spanish fleet was gone 454 Santiago Harbor open to Sampson for twenty-four hours 654 Santiago plan of pacifying American custom-house officers 660 Sandico, C, coadjutor of Aguinaldo 666 Sanitary report of Santiago 581 San Domingo torch in aid of Cuban rebellion 229 San Juan de Porto Rico key to the situation 570 Scoundrelism in Cuba 207 Scott, Ensign W. P., commended by Dewey 2S8 Schley telegraphed to locate Cervera 371 Schley disobeys orders 370 Schley ordered to remain off" Santiago 370 Schley reports to Long that enemy is at Santiago 371 Schley's departure cabled from Canada to Madrid and Cuba 431 Secretary of War's report 341 Seventy-first New York with men who had never fired a gun 365 Searchlight special feature of blockade 496 Service of Spanish fleet at Santiago 622 Second corps G34 Seventh corps 634 Shafter directed to seize and hold Mariel 357 Shafter directed to assume troops at Tampa 360 Shafter recommends army formation by brigades 365 Shaffer's executive statements and sagacity — "First battle will be the decisive one" 367 Shafter ordered to proceed to Santiago , 37^^ Shafter in need of help ,01 Shafter and his army thanked by the President 400 Shafter reports casualties ,oj Shafter urges Sampson to force the entrance of the harbor 409 Shafter suggests a retreat ^gg Shaffer's resignation suggested ,io Shafter improves in health ,jj Shafter demands surrender of Santiago 412 Shafter insists navy enter harbor ..v Shafter explains relations with Sampson ___ .57 Shafter announces to Sampson he will attack Santiago, and wishes fleet to aid attacking Aquadores ..g 790 INDEX. PAGE Shafter's compliments to Sampson 453 Shafter advises Sampson of terrific fighting and wants his aid 458 Shafter's idea Sampson must force harbor .' 462 Shafter's Fourth of July greeting to Sampson 462 Shafter notifies Washington of scarcity of medicines 467 Shafter notifies Government of the appearance of yellow fever 469 Spanish officers to surrender Santiago 471 Shafter's serious position before Santiago 472 Shafter reports on Cuban and Immune regiments 533 Shafter displeased with Immunes 533 Shafter at Camp Wycoff 5S7 Shafter's change of plans in relation to his difficulties with Sampson 6:9 Sherman to Woodford 247 Sherman to Woodford 249 Sherman to Spanish Minister 250 Sherman to Spanish Minister 251 Sherman to Woodford announcing Spanish Minister given passport 252 Schenck, Gen., and Lord Derby meet 74 Sharp strain of the struggle at Santiago 3S4 Shafter characterized by Breckenridge 4S6 Schley's report of victory 502 Shafter's explanation of his refusal to allow a naval officer's signature on capitulation agreement 538 Scandal about beef 647 Sagasta appeals to Blanco to help towards peace 449 Shafter wants to know why navy cannot work under fire like army 45S Shafter cheered by his soldiers 533 Shells not sensitive enough ,. 629 Ships chartered on Pacific coast 643 Shower of telegrams soliciting chance to serve in war 5SS Sickles and Prim confer 59 Sickles, Daniel 194 Sicard, Rear Admiral, seeks for secrecy as to army movements 376 Siboney, the heavy engagement there 404 Signal service 645 Smith, D. A., Pay-Inspector, active service, commended 41S Spain would not confer until Ten-year-war-Cubans laid down arms 58 Spain sends more troops to Cuba 69 Spain explains that length of war is due to the guerilla tactics of Cubans 8g Spain's losses in Cuba 109 Spain's fear of a second San Domingo 109 INDEX. 791 PAGE Spain longed for foreign war during Carlist conquest iiQ Spain's belief in her navy during Ten Years' War iiO Spain's finances in 1875 120 Spain confident of triumph with her naval force 404 Spain's character impaired by injustice to her colonies ■. 452 Spain pleads for peace through France C68 Spain would spare Cuba 6C8 Spain gives up Cuba f'&9 Spain cedes Porto Rico (169 Spain stripped of "last memory of a glorious past" 669 Spain is paid twenty million dollars 675 Spain cedes Porto Rico to the United States 672 Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over, and title to Cuba 672 Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago of the Philippine Islands 672 Spain's commercial rights in Philippine Islands 675 Spain releases prisoners 676 Spain wished United States to pay her debts 687 Spain's claim that United States erred in. believing Cuban cause just 698 Spain's pitiful plea 700 Spain's Minister to the United States appointed 730 Spain too weak to maintain a Colonial .System 752 Spaniards did not believe Americans warlike people 125 Spaniards relied upon European monarchies 126 Spaniards at Manila signaled approach of American fleet shortly after midnight 293 Spaniards surrender at Manila 211 Spaniards testify to valor of American troops 650 Spanish volunteers hung by Cubans 16S Spanish manner of seeking hospitals to kill wounded 1S8 Spanish wish to investigate Maine wreck 217 Spanish claim electoral machinations make United States hostile 78 Spanish inaliility to conquer Cuba explained by Gushing loS Spanish Minister to Sherman 251 Spanish squadron defeated at Manila, officers and men 290 Spanish fleet and its mystery 353 Spanish phantom fleet reported to General Miles 364 Spanish cruisers reputation for speed 368 Spanish war secrets revealed through secret cablegrams 417 Spanish general agreed to surrender 524 Spanish shaipshooters and their bravery 484 Spanish defenders of Santiago (J50 Spani-h block houses 485 792 INDEX. PAGR , Spanish story of EI Caney and San Juan 649 Spanish trenches 485 Spanish casualties 653 Spanish claim President had not determined to take Philippines 712 Spanish Commission protest's 697 Spanish plenipotentiaries; their names and titles 6S3 Spaniards attempted to divert object of commission..'. 6S5 Spaniards objected to General Merritt 705 Spanish soldiers sent back to Spain through Treaty of Peace 675 Spaniards in conquered territorj- may preserve allegiance to crown of Spain 677 Springfield arsenal 645 Straightforwardness of three administrations '. 194 Statistics of death-rate at Santa Clara 217 Starvation due to burning policy 23S Story of Santiago as cabled from Dedemonte to Admiral Ventura Mantelora 421 Strain on courtesies between Shaffer and Sampson 535 Stars and Stripes popular in Porto Rico 576 Staff organization 632 Strange story of the official secret cipher of Spain 417 Strength of regular and volunteer armies 631 Stars and Stripes over Santiago •. 530 Stickney, J. L., Correspondent New York Herald, rendered "valuable service to Dewey" 388 Sugar producers paid tribute to Cubans and Spaniards 181 Superior accuracy of fire won naval battle of Santiago 498 Smallness of American army at Santiago 4S9 San Juan according to General Breckenridge 4S3 Sampson refuses to enter Santiago harbor until mines are removed 45S Santiago and its supplies during siege 649 Status quo bothered Spaniards 6S5 Senate created trouble through .slowness to ratify .~ 724 Storer, Bellamy, appointed Minister to Spain 730 Torch, and its awful cost to Cuba in Ten Years' War in Cuba 112 Two sorts of Spaniards in Cuba 177 Treatment of alleged American citizens in Havana Consulate 198 "To intervene with force" 203 Transportation of Spanish or insurgent officers at regular rates according to rank 206 Telegrams that made necessary sending of Maine to Havana 216 Target practice at Manila 331 Transports, their cost of purchase, tonnage and carrying capacity of officers and men 397 Toral, Gen. Jose, sends foreigners out of the city 412 INDEX. 793 PAGE Telegraph operators in Cuba opposed to Spanish cause 4i8 Toral advises Blanco of capture of Cervera's squadron, and loss of two torpedo boats 445 Toral sends Blanco first news of Cervera's squadron's destruction 446 Toral ready to surrender if army allowed to go out of city with arms and baggage 470 Texas hit by big shells S'^9 Tejeiro, Lieutenant Jose Muller y, tells of removal of mines from Santiago harbor 519 Taggart, Capt. E. F., tells of sustenance Spaniards had 533 Table giving assignment of secondary batteries C108 Tejeiro, Lieutenant Jose Muller y, on Spanish artillery 618 Tejeiro on Spanish belief in their fleets (Jsi Tejeiro attempts to interview Hobson 623 Tejeiro tells of terrible Vesuvius 625 Tejeiro gives example of Cuban usefulness to United States 661 Table giving grand total of casualties f4i Table showing sending home of Spanish prisoners f^i Table showing peace and war figures on army goods 643 Table showing strength of regular and volunteer armies 631 Table giving strength and distribution of troops 635 Transportation furnished soldiers 644 Telegrams connecting President and armies in the field 646 Trias Mariano described 665 Terms relating to Philippines indefinite, according to Spaniards 669 Text of the Treaty of Peace with Spain tv^ 671 Twenty-ninth Spanish regiment, its valor 653 Treaty of Peace 668 Treaty of Peace: Articles L H, III 672 Treaty of Peace: Articles IV, V 675 Treaty of Peace: Articles VI, VII, VIII 676 Treaty of Peace: Article IX 677 Treaty of Peace: Articles X, XI, XII, XIII 678 Treaty of Peace; Articles XIV, XV, XVI, XVII 679 United States to send back Spanish soldiers 675 United States gives Spain commercial rights in Philippine Islands 675 United States pays Spain twenty million dollars 675 United States releases prisoners 676 United States did not pay Great Britain to extinguish colonial debts 702 Valmaseda's brutal proclamation 71 Virginius case 117 Volunteers force out Campos 134 Volunteers praised by General Breckenridge 349 Vegetable food of Cubans 189 794 INDEX. PAGE Views of minority asking immediate recognition of Republic of Cuba 214 Valparaiso authorities careful in their treatment of American ships 335 Vessels and the assignment of secondary batteries 60S Vesuvius dynamite shells terrified Spaniards 625 Valor of American troops testified by Spaniards 650 Vara del Rey, General G51 Vara, Leandro y, described 665 Villa, de — Urrutia, Don Wencesnao Ramirez 6S3 Volunteer System, The 736 Way the war business was handled 243 Woodford's reply to Day . 249 Woodford to Sherman, announcing that he had asked for passport 253 Woodford to Sherman, giving official note from Spanish Minister of State 253 Woodford to Sherman, text of official note from Spanish Minister of State, and Woodford's instruction to United States consular representatives to turn over consulates to British consuls 254 "Where every officer and man did his whole duty there is only room for general praise"... 292 Wakler, Capt. Asa, of the Concord, tells of the Manila fight 293 Wood, Commander E. P., of Petrel, reports 293 Wilder, Captain, of the Boston, makes a model report for brevity. and prose 297 What it would have cost to have attacked Blanco at Havana 393 Wheeler, General, praises gallantry of the troops 389 Wheeler seriously ill 409 Wheeler to succeed in command if Shatter continued sick 413 Wheeler shakes off his illness 414 Weyler, General, succeeds Campos 134 Weyler's reputation 134 Weyler's remorseless policy 135 Weyler's attempt to pen Maceo 136 Winn, Dr. F. B., tells of insurgents and concentrados 1S4 Williams, Raymon O., Consul General at Havana 19S Wilson, Major-General, arrives in Porto Rico 574 Wounded G39 Yellow fever at Siboney 469 Yellow fever prevalent 5S1 Young commanders needed 478 Yara River, fight there 661 /r University of California Library Los Angeles This book is DUE on the last date stamped below. rse r 825-9188 HI MAY 1 9 2000 % m k^iV^'SaM^^l^ Form L9-Se \JX-^J .1. V I^WW 4^ 3 1158' 66282 3499 •<4