\ Iflln AND.*:' I ^^^f^%^^. ^^Mi m piro 1^ ^^^M l^^l m^.^l f ^n!9'" 'i ^ Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2007 with funding from IVIicrosoft Corporation http://www.archive.org/details/brieftextbookoflOOcopprich A Brief Text-Book OK LOGIC -^' MENTAL PHILOmy By REV. CHARLES COPPENS, S. J. $ 1 , 2 O • (Discount is allowed to Schools.) Philadelphia, Jan. 14, 1893. My Dear Father Coppens : I received from your publisher your admirable work on "Log^cand Mental Philosophy " It is just the work needed at the present time, and I earnestly recommend its use in our colleges. t P. J. Ryan, Archbishop of Philadelphia. Catholic Publication Society Co.: I received your note kindly sending to my address the precious work *' lyOgic and Mental Philosophy " I read the work and I consider it most use- ful for our colleges as a text-book, and of great advantage for those who have finished their studies, as well as for Catholics in general. t F. Mora, Bishop of Monterey and Los Angeles. Father Coppens, we think, has produced a book which will meet all the requirements of the English student of philosophy. It embodies a thorough course of Logic and Metaphysics, expressed in clear, concise language, and is printed with a care for those details — division of questions, diversity of type, accentuation of paragraphs, etc.- -which go to maice up a text-book, and cannot fail to arrest and fix the attention of the reader. Needless to say, the Encyclical of the Holy Father has been the inspiration of the learned author, and the philosophy of St. Thomas permeates the whole work. We feel assured it will meet with a hearty welcome in all our schools and colleges.— /Iw Maria. If we were to characterize the present work of Father Coppens in a sen- tence, we would call it Philosophy Simplified ; for in treatment, style and terminology, the technical is eschewed as far as possible ; and we are indebted to Father Coppens for some English equivalents to philosophical Latin which cannot fail to prove of great service to the reader of metaphysical principles in every day discussions. But praise is superfluous. Father Coppens' work supplies the need, and this not only in the class-room for advanced stu- dents, but for the general reader who has stepped over the threshold of jfraduation.— CAwrcA Progress. LOGIC AND MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. .... Father Coppens' book will be a safe, a very safe guide, and a very easy one, considering the subject matter, for young students of philosophy. Theit I^tin text-books will be better understood and appreciated for this help, of which we urge everyone who may begin the study of philosophy to avail himself at once. Indeed, we have not the slightest misgiving that the small manual will prove a most valuable aid both to those who pursue the two years' course, and much more to others who can devote only one year to it, or who, having failed in the thorough mastery of a system of philosophy heretofore, are anxious to supply the loss at the least possible cost of time and severe a.-p^\ica.i\on.— American Ecclesiastical Review. It is almost impossible to read newspapers or magazines without encoun- tering articles on topics not to be understood without a knowledge of these subjects, and it is well that the young student should be prepared to detect their fallacies. This book will give him the necessary knowledge, and will also increase his pleasure in reading really able arguments.— 7%^ IHlot. Those who are acquainted with Father Coppens' text-books of " Rhetoric " and "Oratorical Composition," will be prepared to find in this new work of his a model of order and thoroughness, combined with an attractive style, and they will not be disappointed. The treatment of logic in its dialectic side is the best brief statement for school use that we have yet seen in English. The critical side of the logic is compendious, but by no means dry. The latter two-thirds of the work is devoted to mental philosophy. The views of the Stonyhurst Manuals are reflected in this book, only that the American Jesuit has systematized the matter in a way to make all teachers grateful to him. The work is printed and set out with the usual elegance that has characterized the press-work of the Catholic Publication Society Company. — Catholic Review. Father Coppens has fully carried out his aim to give "a brief outline of sound philosophy." The only fault we might point out is that, in parts, it would seem a little too brief. Apart from this the teaching is clear, orderly, and exact ; and, what is of great consequence, thoroughly loyal to the scholastic ^ocirinc.— Dublin Review. The aim of this little volume, in the modest words of the author, is simply "to present to pupils unfamiliar with L,atin a brief outline of a sound philoso- phy conformable to the teachings of the schoolmen." It is chiefly meant for "class use in academies and similar institutions" ; and we will add, for use in our Catholic reading circles, to which we take great pleasure in heartily recommending it. We conceive that, in the hands of a good director, it would soon make logic and mental philosophy extremely popular with our young men and •wora^n.— American Catholic Quarterly Review. a. Ok. ©. (5. A BRIEF TEXT-BOOK LOGIC Mental Philosophy. REV. CHARLES COPPENS, SJ., Author of "A Practical Introduction to English Rhetoric'^ and " The Art Oratorical Composition.'^ "Christ is the Restorer of the Sciences/' LEO. XIII. UNIVERSITY Of NEW YORK SCHWAETZ, KIRWIN" ure, if the judgments are analytic judgments; empiric, if they are synthetic, and mixed, if one premise is analytic and the other synthetic. Reasoning ex- pressed in words is called argumentation. Article I. The Categorical Syllogism. 23. All argumentation may be reduced to the categorical syllogism. A syllogism is an argument consisting of three propositions so connected that from the first two the third follows. If all the propositions are categorical, the syllogism is categorical. It will be remembered that a proposition is called categorical if it affirms or denies absolutely the agree- ment of a subject with a predicate. (No. 21.) "All virtues are desirable ; but sobriety is a virtue ; therefore sobriety is Reasoning. 23 desirable," is a categorical syllogism. This conclusion, " So- briety is desirable," is implicitly contained in the first or major premise, " All virtue is desirable " ; and the second or minor premise, " Sobriety is a virtue," points out the fact that it is therein contained. Such reasoning is, therefore, perfectly valid. § I. Constructing Syllogisms, 24. To prove a thesis by a syllogism we begin by finding a proposition which really involves the truth of the thesis, and in a second proposition we state that it does so. Thus, if I am to prove that every one must honor his father and mother, I may start with the premise, " Every one must do what God commands " ; I add the minor premise, " But God commands to honor father and mother." Hence I legitimately draw the conclusion, " Therefore every one must honor his father and mother." 25. We must next examine in what ways premises may contain conclusions. If the major is a universal proposition, it may contain the conclusion in four different ways : 1. The proposition being universal, the subject is dis- tributed or taken in its widest extension ; thus, " Every stone is matter," means that the predicate * matter ' appUes to everything that is a * stone.' If, therefore, the minor states that something, say * marble,' is a stone, the conclusion will follow that marble is mat- ter. Thus the major affirms thai a predicate belongs to a whole class ; the minor affirms that a certain thing is of that class ; the conclusion affirms that the same predicate belongs to that certain thing. 2. Similarly, if the major is negative, as, " A stone is not a spirit," and the minor declares that " Marble is a stone of some kind," the conclusion will be that "Marble is not a spirit." That is: the major 24 Dialectics. denies a predicate of a whole class ; the fnifior affirms that a certain being is of that class ; the conclusion denies that same predicate of that same being. . A third form reasons thus : The major denies a predi- cate of a whole class ; the minor affirms that a certain being has that predicate; the conclusion denies that said being is of said class ; for if it were of that class, it would not have that predicate. Thus, '' A stone is not a spirit ; but an Angel is a spirit ; there- fore an Angel is not a stone." In the three cases just explained the minor is affirm- ative. A fourth form of syllogism arises if the major affirms some predicate of a whole class, and the minor denies that ^ certain being has that predicate ; the con- clusion will then be that said being does not belong to said class ; since all the individuals of that class have been affirmed to possess that predicate. " Every stone is matter; an Angel is not matter j therefore an Angel is not a stone." In these four forms the major is a universal propo- sition, and the reasoning is founded upon the wide extension of the subject. The major need not be universal in the fifth form, which derives its validity from the full comprehension of the predicate. , The fifth form reasons thus : The major affirms that a being has a certain predicate, i. , parallel reasoning) is an argu- ment by which we conclude that a certain line of reasoning will hold in one case because it is known to hold in a similar case. Thus, because we see that the actions of brutes are to a great extent similar to those of men, and in men they are prompted by certain feelings, we conclude, with very strong probability, that in brutes also they are prompted by similar feelings. Reasoning, 37 51. The principles underlying analogical reasonings are such as these : " Similar causes are apt to produce similar effects/' "Similar properties suggest similar essences,'' '^Things similarly constructed appear to be governed by similar laws," etc. Sometimes the probability thus obtained is very strong ; at other times the argument is deceptive, be- cause, though alike in many other ways, the two cases may differ on the very point in question. Such are many of the analogies urged in support of the Evolution of Species. " The vile grub is evolved into a beautiful butterfly ; why may not a hawk be developed into an eagle ? " asks the popular scien- tist. But from the egg of the butterfly comes the vile grub again, and the species remains ever the same. Varieties of type within the same species of animals are numberless, but no single case of an evolution from one species into another has ever been scientifically established. 52. The argument of analogy is more useial to the orator than to the philosopher. It supplies the former with the topics of Simihtude and Example. It suggests much effect- ive reasoning a majori^ a minori, and a pari. In scientific investigations analogy is often suggestive of solutions, which may afterwards be proved demonstratively to be correct ; till they are so proved, they are called hypotheses. 53. II. Apt hypothesis {yTt6^E6i^, a supposition) is a prop- osition provisionally assumed as if true, because it accounts plausibly for many facts. For instance, it was formerly sup- posed that light consisted of particles emitted by luminous bodies ; the present hypothesis explains the phenomena of ^ Hght more plausibly by the vibrations or undulations of ether. When an hypothesis is so far confirmed by experience that it leaves no reasonable doubt as to its correctness, it ceases to be an hypothesis a id becomes a thesis. That an hypothesis may be probable and truly scientifiCi 38 Dialectics. it is necessary: i. That it explain a considerable portion of the facts in question. 2. That it do not certainly contradict any well-established truth ; for, as two contradictories cannot both be true, whatever hypothesis contravenes a well-estab- Hshed truth is thereby known to be false. Numerous impor- tant discoveries have been made, especially in the Physical Sciences, by means of ingenious hypotheses. On the other hand, science has often been much retarded by false hypotheses, which led investigations into wrong directions. To point out such false assumptions is to render most important services to the cause of progress. For one Copernican theory retarded a while till supported by stronger proofs, numerous wild vaga- ries have been discountenanced by the Roman tribunals, and the energies of the learned diverted from wasting themselves in the pursuit of idle fancies. Article V. Indirect Reasoning. 54. Reasoning, whether demonstrative or probable, is styled indirect when, instead of proving the thesis, it simply aims at clearing away objections against it, or at establishing some other proposition from which the truth of the thesis may be* inferred. Indirect reasoning may assume various forms : 1. The self-contradiction, or reductio ad absurdum, is a form of argument showing that the denial of the theses leads to absurd consequences ; thus we argue the necessity of admitting certainty from the fact that the denial of all certainty leads a man to stultify him- self. 2. The negative argument points out the absence of all proof from an opponent's assertions. " Mere as- sertions go for nothing," " Quod gratis asseritur gratis negatur^^ are received axioms of discussion. nt,. The instance or example adduces a test case in Reasoning. 39 which the assertion or the reasoning of an opponent is shown to be at fault. Thus, if one asserted that all history is unreliable, we might instance our Declara- tion of Independence as an undeniable fact of history. 4. An argumentTiin ad hominem draws from an oppo- nent's principles, true or false, a conclusion against him; e. g., when a Fatalist philosopher was about to flog his slave for the crime of theft, the latter argued that he could not be justly punished for a crime which he -wa.^ fated to commit. 5. A retort turns an adversary's argument or some por- tion of it against himself; as when the same philoso- pher answered that he likewise was fated to flog the slave. 6. We evade an argument when, without discussing his proofs, we call on an adversary to explain what he is unwilling or unable to explain ; thus many a spe- cious theorizer is silenced by summoning him to explain the consequences of his theories. 7. The argument ad ignorantiam shows that an oppo- nent is unable to prov^e his point or answer our objec- tions. 8. The argument ad invidiam makes an adversary's thesis or his proofs odious or ridiculous. 55. In answering objections we should attend with spe- cial care to distinguish what is true from what is false in the arguments of our opponents. Most objections contain some element of truth ; for falsity, as such, is not plausible : it is the truth blended with falsity that gives plausibility to an objection. To separate the one from the other, by drawing clear lines of demarcation, is the keenest test of logical skill, and the direct road to complete victory. To facilitate for the student this task of neatly dis- 40 Dialectics, tinguishing the true from the false, we shall now point out the chief forms which fallacious arguments are apt to assume. Article VI. Sophisms or Fallacies. 56. A sophism or fallacy is an argument which, under the specious appearance of truth, leads to a false conclusion. The deception is caused either by some ambiguity in the ex- pression, or by some confusion in the thoughts expressed. 57. I. The fallacies arising from ambiguity in the expres- sion are chiefly two : 1. The equivocation, or ambiguous middle, uses a mid- dle term in two different meanings; e, g., " The soul is immortal ; but a brute animal has a soul ; therefore a brute animal has something immortal." We answer by distinguishing the two meanings of the word * soul.' In the major it denotes the human soul, in the minor the principle of life in any animal : there are four terms. 2. The fallacy of composition and division confounds what holds of things separate with what holds of them united ; e. g., " It is absolutely impossible that the dead should live " is true in the sense that they cannot live and be dead at the same time, i. e., in the sense of composition ; but it is not true in the sense of divi- sion: those now dead can, by the power of God, be made to live again. 58. II. Fallacies result from confusion of thought in six ways, chiefly : I. The fallacy of the accident confounds an essential with an accidental property; e. g., " We buy raw meat, and we eat what we buy ; therefore we eat raw meat." Reasoning, 41 What we eat has the same essence as what we buy, but not the same accident of rawness. 2. What is true in the proper sense of the word, ^simplici- ter^ is often confounded with what is true in a qualified sense or under a certain respect {secundum quid) ; €, g.^ " A sea-captain who willingly throws his cargo overboard ought to indemnify the owner ; but A did so; hence A ought to indemnify the owner." The major would be true, if the captain were absolutely willing to destroy the cargo entrusted to him ; but not • if he is willing in a way only, /. e., as a necessary means to save vessel and crew. 3. An irrelevant conclusion, ignoratio elenchi^ or missing the point, proves what is not in question, refutes what is not objected ; as when Evolutionists prove elabo- rately that the body of man resembles in various ways the bodies of brutes — a fact which no sensible man denies. 4. The petitio principii, or begging the question, con- sists in taking for granted the point which is to be proved ; when this very point is used as a premise in the reasoning, the fallacy is called a vicious circle. 5. The fallacy of the false consequence, often called a non-sequitur, or want of sequence, is used when a con- clusion is drawn which is not contained in the prem- ises; e. g.y " There exists a wonderful gradation in the perfection of plants and animals; therefore the more perfect are evolved firom the less perfect." 6. The undue assumption, or false cause, non causa pro causa, assumes as a cause what is not a cause ; as when the Reformation is assumed to be the cause of scientific progress. This fallacy often arises fi-om 42 •^ Dialectics. the fact that mere priority in time is mistaken for causality ; post hoc ; ergo propter hoc* Article VII. Method in Reasoning. 59. Order is a proper arrangement of parts for any purpose whatever, theoretical or practical ; method is a suitable arrange- ment of parts with a view to a practical end. In reasoning, the end is the acquisition or the communication of knowledge. 60. All reasoning must begin with undoubted premises, which themselves need not to be supported by reasoning : no science is expected to prove its first principles. Thus, Geom- etry starts out with a number of axioms, from which the whole science is derived by logical reasoning. Such axioms are not blindly or arbitrarily taken for granted; but they are self- evident, they need no proof. Thus, too, in Philosophy the first principles are self-evident and need no proof. 61. As the mind must, of course, apprehend the premises before it draws conclusions fi-om them, we say that in the logical order, i. e., in the order of thought, the premises are always prior to the conclusions. But in the ontological order, /. e., in the order of being, a truth stated in the premises may be really posterior to the truth expressed in the conclusion. Such is the case whenever we reason from an effect to its * Exercise. Point out the fallacies contained in the following arguments: 1. " Liberty is desirable; but the laws restrict liberty; therefore the laws restrict what is desirable." 2. "The liberty of the press is a blessing; but blessings should not be restricted; therefore the liberty of the press should not be restricted." 3. "The Inquisition was the cause of much cruelty; but the Popes approved the Inquisition ; therefore the Popes approved the cause of much cruelty." 4. " The Spanish Inquisitors were often cruel ; but St. Peter Arbues was a Spanish Inquisitor; therefore the Saints are often cruel." 5. " Galileo was condemned by a Roman tribunal ; therefoie the Pope is not in- fallible." 6. "The Supreme Court of the United States is a fallible tribunal ; therefore its decisions are not to be regarded." Reasoning, 43 cause, say from a beautiful picture to the skill of the painter; for the effect is posterior to the cause, is dependent on the cause. 62. Reasoning thus from effect to cause is reasoning a posteriori, and, vice versa, reasoning from cause to effect is called a priori, since causes are ontologically prior to their effects. 63. It will be noticed that the terms a priori and a posteriori have not exactly the same meaning when applied to reasoning and when apphed to judgments. A judgment a priori, as explained above (No. 17), is one formed independently of experience, while a reasoning a priori is one proceeding from a cause to its effect. 64. While in a priori and a posteriori reasonings we con- sider relations between two things, one of which is ontologi- cally prior to the other, in analytical and synthetical reason- ings we consider only one thing, studying the relations between the whole being and its parts, between a substance and its qualities. If we are first acquainted with the whole being and from the study of it strive to discover its parts, we are said to analyze the subject {dvaXvaa^ I take apart) : we then proceed analytically. But if we know the parts first, and put them together to find the whole, we proceed syn- thetically {6vvHE6Lescartes, who, under the Latinized name of Cartesius, wrote in the middle of the sev- enteenth century. He was not a Sceptic ; but he traced out a false system of studying the existence of certainty : destroy- ing the solid basis of Philosophy, he substituted for it a weak fabric of his own invention, and left Httle in the minds of his followers but ruin and confusion. He maintained, {a) That every philosopher should begin his speculations by doubt- ing of everything, {b) Next, the philosopher will find that he cannot help granting the fact of his own thought, and he will conclude from it his own existence : Cogifo, ergo sum — " I think, therefore I am." [c) Hence the would-be phi- losopher will infer the general rule that whatever is clearly perceived is true, {d) Then finding that he clearly perceives the idea of God, he thence concludes to the existence of God. (e) From the veracity of God he infers the reliability of his own faculties. (/) Thence, at last, he reasons to the certainty of his knowledge. 96. Thesis IV. Descartes' Methodic Doubt is absurd. Proof. That is absurd which affirms and denies the same thing ; but 6o Critical Logic, the doubt in question does so. For in it the philosopher begins by denying the reliabiHty of reason, and at once im- plicitly affirms its reliability by using it to prove his own existence : " I think, therefore I am." He pretends to doubt all his faculties, and still he treats the guidance of those same faculties as reliable. Besides, Descartes moves in a vicious circle : he proves the rehability of our faculties by the veracity of God, and the veracity of God by the reliability of our faculties, etc. 97. The error of Sceptics arises from their false supposition that nothing is certain which is not demonstrated by discursive reasoning. Now, the science of Mathematics begins by the admission of axioms which are self-evident; e. g., that " the whole is greater than a part," that " two things equal to a third are equal to each other," etc. The science of Philoso- phy must follow a similar process : it must draw its first con- clusions fi-om premises which are evident without proof. Be- sides, like Mathematics and all other sciences, it must admit without proof the reliability of the reasoning process. If the first premises and the reliabiHty of reason required proof, man could never make the first start in scientific studies ; in fact, he would be incapable of reasoning at all : he would not be a rational being. 98. Every philosopher, therefore, must, on entering the field of science, affirm with certainty : i. His own existence; called the first fact. 2. The principle of contradiction, viz., that a thing cannot * be and not be ' at the same time ; called the first principle. 3. The power of the intellect to know truth ; called the first condition. These truths are not blindly admitted: they are seen to be objectively evident. There is no alternative between admitting them and admitting the self-contradiction of universal Scepticism. 99. Tp refute partial Scepticism, we must prove the reli- The Existence of Certainty, 6i ability of the various means by which certainty may be attained, as we shall do in the following chapter. Still, the arguments which we shall adduce will, in many cases, be rather scientific explanations than strict proof s : scientific explanations, because they will show distinctly what causes or reasons we have for firm adhesion to the truths \ not strict proofs, because the reliability of the means in question is in several cases proved while taking their reliability for granted, as having no need of demonstration. CHAPTER III. MEANS OF ATTAINING CERTAINTY. 100. The means at our disposal to attain certainty are, directly, our own cognoscive powers or faculties, viz., intellect and sensation, and, indirectly, the authority of other men. To explain these clearly we must treat: i. Oi our cognoscive pow- ers in general j 2. Of Intellect in paxt[cvila.r ; ^. Of sensation y 4. Of authority. To all this we shall add a chapter on common sense, which, though proceeding from the intellect, requires for the discussion of its certainty the previous understanding of the reliability of intellect, sensation, and authority. Article I. A Sketch of our Cognoscive Powers. 1 01. I. The outer senses. Our first step in the acquisition of knowledge is the perception of material objects by means of material instruments which are parts of ourselves, and are called the organs of sense. 102. An organ is a part of a living body peculiarly con- structed by the Creator for the purpose of exercising a func- tion of life. Living bodies are made up of such organs. In man, and in the higher animals generally, five of these organs are intended for the perception of exterior bodily objects; these are called the organs of the five outer or exterior senses, viz., of the sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch* * Physiologists now split up the touch into two senses, the tactual or skin sense and the muscular sense; the former perceives heat and cold, roughness and smoothness, etc. ; the latter perceives resistance, exteriority, and extension. President McCosh 62 Means of Attaining Certainty, 63 103. II. The inner sense. There is, besides, an internal or inner sense, whose organ is some portion at least of the nerv- ous system ; it perceives interior modifications of the animal body, such as cause the feelings of hunger, thirst, fatigue, pain, comfort, etc. It also perceives the actions and affections of the various external senses ; for an animal not only sees, hears, tastes, etc., but it dXso feels that it sees, hears, tastes, etc This inner sense, in as far as it takes cognizance of what is done by the outer senses, is often called the common sense, and its organ is styled the common sensory ; but the term common sense, without the definite article * the,' stands for a very differ- ent idea, viz., for the common judgment of men on matters of universal importance to mankind. 104. The inner sense does not perceive the causes of the affections which it perceives, but only the fact that those affections exist. As both the objects of sensation and its organs are material, the action of all sensation is material, organic, and is common to man and brute. But the organ is, of course, not dead but living matter ; it is one substance with the soul, /. e., with the principle of life ; hence the actions of any sense are actions of the living compound soul and body. 105. III. The imagination. When an animal perceives describes it thus, quoting Wundt's Beitrage zur Theorie der Sinttesivahmek- mung: "When we move our members we come upon external resistances. We observe that these resistances sometimes give way before our pressure; but we find at the same time that this takes place with very different degrees of facility, and that, in order to put different bodies in motion, we must apply very different degrees of muscular force ; but to every single degree of the contraction-force there corresponds a determined degree in intensity of the muscular sensations. With these muscular sensations, the sensations of the skin which cover our members of touch so continually mingle, that the intensity of these touch-sensations goes parallel to the intensity of the accompanying muscular sensations. We succeed in this way in connecting the degree of intensity of the muscular sensations in a necessary manner with the nature of the resistances which set themselves against our movement" (Defence of Fundamental Truth, p. 173). 64 Critical Logic, material objects, it forms and retains of them material images or representations, called phantasms. The organ used for these purposes is the brain. The imagination is the power of forming and retaining those images, of recalling them on occasions, and of combining them in wonderful varieties, thus forming new phantasms which in turn may be recorded and retained, etc. We should not suppose those images to be pictures, for we can have no picture of taste, smell, etc.; they are modifications of some kind. 1 06. IV. The sensile memory. This name denotes that portion of the imaginative power which retains and recalls the phantasms, but it adds a further function, viz., that of recognizing, not intellectually however, present sense-percep- tions and present phantasms as identical with former phan- tasms and former sense-perceptions. By this faculty " The ox knoweth his owner, and the ass his master's crib," as Holy Writ expresses it. The inner sense, the common sense, the imagination, and the sensile memory need not be considered as distinct faculties, but rather as various functions of the same faculty, which may be generally designated as the inner sense. 107. V. The intellect, understanding, or mind, in the proper meaning of this term, is an entirely different faculty; it does not confine its perceptions to the material qualities of objects, as all sense-action does, but it penetrates into the very essences of things material and immaterial {intus legit, it reads within), and it forms concepts or ideas representing essences, e. g.j of * plant,' ' tree,' * spirit,' etc. Even when it considers mere accidents, e. g., * color,' * shape,' * size,' it need not simply consider this individual color, shape, or size, as material faculties must do, but it can consider the essence of color, shape, and size ; so that, by a power peculiar to itself^ ft forms ideas representing qualities as abstract — /. tive, negative, 28 ; parts of, 29 ; valid, 30 ; rules of, 31, 32 ; hypo- thetical, 34 to 37. Synthetic, judgment, I. V]\ reason- ing, 64 to 66. i86 Alphabetical Index, Term, T. lo, i6, 29, 31, 32. Thomas, St., I. 91; II. 41, 108, no, 118, 127. Time, IL 50, 70, 71. Traditionalism, II. 179. Transcen dentals, II. 9. Transient action, II. 65. Transubstantiation, II. 99. Trinity, the Holy, II. 74, 237. True, beauty, II. 47; good, 44. Truth, I. 72 to ^^\ II. 36, 42. Tyndall, II. 155. Ultimate, criterion of certainty, I. 165 to 170 ; particles of matter, II. 127. Undue assumption, I. 58. Unity, II. 36; kinds of, 37; of God, 240, 241. Universal, ideas, I. 12, 13, 122, 224; direct, reflex, II. 183, etc. ; proposi- tion, I. 20 ; major, 25 ; cause, II. 84. yniverse, II. 100; see "World." Univocal terms, I. 16. Valid, syllogism, I. 30; induction, 48. Vegetable life, II. 139, Virtual cause, II. 84. Vital, principle, II. 127, 129, 139 to 148; acts, 59. Voluntary, II. 193. When, II. 63, 70. Whole, II. 91. Will, II. 181, 192 ; antecedent, con* sequent, 116 ; of man is free, 198, 199 ; of God, 254 to 258. Wisdom of God, II. 253. World, II. 100: origin of the, loi to no; age of the, in; perfection of the, 117 ; purpose of the, 112 to 115. A PRACTICAL INTRODUCTION TO English Rhetoric: Precepts and Exercises. By Rev. Charles Coppens, S.J. $1.25. (Discount is allowed U Schools.) Speaking of the " Rhetoric", Very Rev. Rudolph Meyer, SJ., said : "The best thing I ever did for education was to urge Father Coppens to publish that book." " We have taken some of the most popular and approved text-books in use in our best schools and compared them with this new Introduction to English Rhetoric. The result is in every way— and in some parts to an exceptional degree — favorable to the latter. — Ahterican Catholic Quarterly Review. We are happy to add another to the list of text-books for Catholic Schools of which one can write only iu terms of unqualified praise. Its author, the Rev. Charles Coppens, S.J., is already well-known through his admirable "Art of Oratorical Composition." His two books, taken together, contain the entire course of rhetoric as studied in colleges and universities. But The Prac- tical Introduction to English Rhetoric, taken alone, must have a far wider sphere of usefulness, being perfectly adapted for the higher departments of academies for girls, and for the use of the teachers themselves in the lower departments of schools for either sex, or in schools where so extended a course of rhetoric does not enter into the plan of study.— /^7o/. The book is the result of thirty years of work as a professor of rhetoric in various colleges conducted by the Jesuit Fathers in this country. It is a class- book, but it would make a useful and interesting book in the library of any man who admires and loves to cultivate good English. From the examination we have given the work we feel justified in pronouncing it the best English book on rhetoric that has yet been -pvLbWshtA.— Michigan Catholic. Thk Art ok ORATORICAL COMFOSITIOfi: Based on the Precepts and Models of the Great Masters. By REV. Charles Coppens, S.J. $ 1 ,25. {Discount is allowed to Schools.) "It is a clear, didactic exposition, with such illustrations from modern sources as will make it practical under our circumstances. But it is also a text-book, which is saying something apart from its general merits, as teachers will understand I,east of all has Father Coppens reason to guard himself against distrust, for he simply proves his strength by the grasp he has of the masters in his profession For seminaries, we find here the entire course from preparatory school to the class of sacred eloquence in theology.'^— American Catholic Quarterly Review. Father Coppens has been, over twenty-five years, a Professor of Oratory in the United States, so that he brings to this book not only the full equipment of a master of the art, but all the invaluable skill in imparting his knowledge to be acquired only, and after long trial, in the rostrum of the teacher. Father Coppens' is perhaps the most practical class-book on the speaker's art yet offered to American schools. . . . Father Coppens, wherever it is practicable, lets the acknowledged masters of oratorical composition speak for themselves, so that his pupil is made familiar, and in their own words, with the leading precepts of the great writers on oratory among both the ancients and modems.— Ca/Ao//c World. 14 DAY USE RETURN TO DESK FROM WHICH BORROWED LOAN DEPT. This book is due on the last date stamped below, or on the date to which renewed. Renewed books are subjea to immediate recall. 8Nov'56?W REC'D LD OCT .Si 1956 18Nov'57HM REC'D LD NOV 4 1957 '■■■" ^"-°o^^"° .-P^ ^■'^iB^"^^ >r YB 23104 .^^^