CRITICISMS 
 
 UPON SOLUTIONS 
 of MAP PROBLEMS 
 
 GIVEN OUT AT THE ARMY SCHOOL 
 OF THE LINE 
 
Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 
 in 2007 with funding from 
 
 IVIicrosoft Corporation 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/criticismsuponsoOOboydrich 
 
CRITICISMS 
 
 UPON 
 
 Solutions oy Map Problems 
 
 GIVEN OUT AT THE 
 ARMY SCHOOL OF THE LINE 
 
 COMPILED BY 
 
 CHARLES T. BOYD 
 
 Captain, 10th Cavalry/ 
 
 George Banta Pubushing Company 
 Menasha, Wisconsin 
 
W3te 
 
 Copyright 1915 
 
 by 
 
 CHARLES T. BOYD 
 
^ 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 PART I. 
 
 Battalion and Lesser Problems. 
 Patrolling: page 
 Problem 1, Part I, 1911-12. Problem, Solution and 
 Criticisms by Major J. W. Mc Andrew, 8th In- 
 fantry 3 
 
 An Advance Guard: 
 
 Problem 2, Part I, 1911-12. Problem, Solution and 
 
 Criticisms by Captain H. B. Fiske, 28th Infantry. . 25 
 An Outpost: 
 
 Problem 3, Part I, 1911-12. Problem, Solution and 
 
 Criticisms by Captain H. B. Fiske, 28th Infantry. . 40 
 At the River Crossing: 
 
 Problem 4, Part I, 1911-12. Problem, Solution and 
 Criticisms by Lieut. Colonel John F. Morrison, In- 
 fantry. (Problem 7, Part I, in Colonel Morrison's 
 
 "Seventy Problems.") 56 
 
 A Cavalry Combat: 
 
 Problem 5, Part I, 1911-12. Problem, Solution and 
 
 Criticisms by Major Farrand Sayre, 9th Cavalry. . 65 
 A Field Battery: 
 
 Problem 6, Part I, 1911-12. Problem, Solution and 
 Criticisms by Captain R. H. McMaster, 5th Field 
 Artillery 82 
 
 PART II. 
 
 Brigade Problems. 
 
 Covering the March of a Convoy: 
 
 Problem 1, Part II, 1911-12. Problem, Solution and 
 Criticisms by Lieut. Colonel John F. Morrison, In- 
 fantry. (Problem 17, Part III, in Colonel Morri- 
 son's "Seventy Problems.") 93 
 
 A Change in Direction of March: 
 
 Problem 2, Part II, 1911-12. Problem, Solution and 
 Criticisms by Captain Laurence Halstead, 6th In- 
 fantry 107 
 
 333681 
 
An Advance Guard: page 
 
 Problem 3, Part II, 1911-12. Problem, Solution and 
 
 Criticisms by Captain H. B. Fiske, 28th Infantry. . 125 
 A Retreat: 
 
 Problem 4, Part II, 1911-12. Problem, Solution and 
 
 Criticisms by Major Farrand Sayre, 9th Cavalry. . 145 
 On the Flank of the Line of Battle: 
 
 Problem 5, Part II, 1911-12. Problem, Solution and 
 Criticisms by Lieut. Colonel John F. Morrison, In- 
 fantry. (Problem 18, Part III, in Colonel Mor- 
 rison's "Seventy Problems.") 167 
 
 A Defensive Position: 
 
 Problem 6, Part II, 1911-12. Problem, Solution and 
 Criticisms by Major J. W. Mc Andrew, 8th In- 
 fantry 180 
 
 A Position in Readiness: 
 
 Problem 7, Part II, 1911-12. Problem, Solution and 
 Criticisms by Captain R. H. McMaster, 5th Field 
 
 Artillery 195 
 
 An Advance Guard Action: 
 
 Problem 8, Part II, 1911-12. Problem, Solution and 
 
 Criticisms by Captain P. E. Pierce, 13th Infantry. . 212 
 An Outpost: 
 
 Problem 9, Part II, 1911-12. Problem, Solution and 
 
 Criticisms by Captain LeRoy Eltinge, 15th Cavalry, 234 
 An Attack of a River Line: 
 
 Problem 10, Part II, 1911-12. Problem, Solution and 
 
 Criticisms by Captain Oliver Edwards, 5th Infantry, 253 
 
PART I. 
 
 BATTALION AND LESSER PROBLEMS. 
 (See Getty sburg-Antietem Map.) 
 
COURSE IN TACTICS— VART I. 
 
 Map Problem No. 1 — Patrolling. 
 (See Gettysburg and Boneauville sheets, 3" map.) 
 
 Situation : 
 
 Shortly after a declaration of war between states, separated 
 by the Susquehanna river, a Blue invading force, moving by rail 
 from Lancaster upon Gettysburg, finds its advance stopped about 
 five miles east of Hanover by the destruction of the railroad west 
 of that point. The 1st Blue Infantry, under command of Colonel 
 A, is pushed forward to cover the road crossings over the Little 
 Conewago Creek and prevent the destruction of the bridges. This 
 regiment, after a march on the afternoon of September 12th of 
 twelve miles, goes into camp near Brushtown with an outpost line 
 on the hills 606-588-607, and detachments at the bridges west of 
 Conewago and Topper Mill and near 525W. The attitude of the 
 inhabitants is one of intense hostility, and it is impossible for 
 Colonel A's command to get any information from them, or from 
 the newspapers or letters found en route. There are no tele- 
 graph offices in the vicinity, and the telephone service is suspended. 
 The enemy is known to be concentrating a force at Chambers- 
 burg, but so far no Red troops have been heard of east of that 
 town. 
 
 At 6 p. m., Sept. 12th, Colonel A receives the following message 
 from the commanding officer of the Blue troops near Hanover: 
 
 War Department advises that Red troops left Chambersburg 
 yesterday, the 11th, moving eastward. Keep the country as far 
 as Gettysburg under observation and report promptly the appear- 
 ance of any Red troops therein. The command will be ready to 
 resume its advance westward on Thursday, the 14th. 
 Required — 1st Part: 
 
 A. Colonel A's plan for complying with the orders received. 
 
 B. If patrols are sent out, the number, and the strength and 
 composition of each ; and the instructions given the patrol leaders. 
 2d Part. (Continuation of the situation) 
 
 You are leader of a patrol made up of the sergeant and six 
 privates of the mounted scouts with orders to move out at daylight, 
 
[4] 
 
 September 13th, to reconnoiter along the Square Corner — Boneau- 
 ville road towards Gettysburg. A second officers' patrol has 
 been sent to the northwest to reconnoiter along the York Turn- 
 pike, and a third to the southwest to reconnoiter along the Balti- 
 more Turnpike. 
 Required : 
 
 C. The measures you take before - starting out to prepare 
 yourself and your patrol for the mission assigned to you. 
 
 D. Marching formation of the patrol and its conduct until 
 Boneauville is passed, assuming that nothing has been seen or 
 heard of the enemy up to that time. 
 
 3d Part. (Continuation of the situation) 
 
 As the patrol passes the Mt. Vernon S.H., the point, then at 
 the crest of the hill about 200 yards east of 530, signals "Enemy 
 in sight". After halting the patrol and riding forward to the 
 point you see a Red detachment of ten mounted men moving east- 
 ward along the road near J. Spangler's, and taking up a road 
 space of about 300 yards. The Reds are evidently unaware of 
 the presence of your patrol. 
 Required : 
 
 E. The action you take as patrol leader; the messages, if any, 
 that you send back, and the manner of sending them. 
 
 4th Part. (Continuation of the situation) 
 
 The hostile detachment passes by without discovering your 
 patrol and you resume your march. As your point reaches the 
 crest in the road, about 350 yards west of 546, it signals "Enemy 
 in force", and one of the point comes back at a gallop and reports 
 to you that a strong body of infantry is marching eastward on 
 the Hanover road, its leading troops at that time not more than 
 300 yards west of the crest. 
 Required : 
 
 F. Your action upon receipt of this information. 
 
 G. Your further intentions and your plans for rejoining your 
 command, assuming that you have been able to ascertain the 
 strength of the Red column which you find to be two regiments 
 of infantry and a battery of artillery. 
 
[5] 
 
 STUDENTS' ERRORS AND INSTRUCTOR'S CRITICISMS. 
 
 (A) 
 1st Solution. 
 To send patrols observing enemy's advance from Gettysburg 
 along either York Turnpike, Hanover Road, or Baltimore Turn- 
 pike. 
 
 Comment: "Indefinite. Would you send them on any one of 
 the three roads mentioned, or if not, what would decide your 
 choice?" 
 
 5th Solution. 
 To send two patrols, each of an officer and 8 mounted scouts, 
 toward Gettysburg on the morning of the 13th. 
 
 Comment: "Three patrols would cover the country better be- 
 cause of the 3 highways that lead to Gettysburg from the east." 
 
 6th Solution. 
 
 To send forward at daylight on the 13th inst., three officer's 
 patrols, two mounted and one dismounted, the latter to go via 
 601-Square Corner-Boneauville-Hanover Road toward Gettys- 
 burg. 
 
 Comment: "Too great a distance for a dismounted patrol." 
 
 9th Solution. 
 
 'Col. A * * * * will be ready to move toward Gettys- 
 burg at 6:30 on the morning of the 13th to secure a position 
 nearer the town * *.' 
 
 Comment: "This, however, would de departing from his mis- 
 sion to cover the road crossings over the Little Conewago." 
 
 11th Solution. 
 
 'Col. A would send out three patrols, one to hill 618 on York 
 Turnpike, one to Wolf Hill and one to Round Top.' 
 
 Comment: "Good, but would not direct them on any point 
 other than Gettysburg. Round Top is a long distance away, but 
 your patrol leader on the Baltimore pike would go there if con- 
 ditions warranted. Better leave that to him to decide." 
 
[6] 
 
 (B) 
 
 1st Solution. 
 
 Three patrols sent out. 
 
 Lieut. A, Sgt. A and 4 privates to cover road Boneauville-M. 
 Fink-intersection with York Turnpike and vicinity, carefully ob- 
 serving York Turnpike. 
 
 Lieut. B, Sgt. B and 4 privates to cover Hanover road between 
 Gettysburg and Boneauville, and vicinity of that road. 
 
 Lieut. C, Sgt. C and 4 privates to cover road Boneauville-M. 
 Rudish, to intersection with Baltimore Turnpike, and vicinity of 
 that road. 
 
 Comment : "You evidently use dismounted patrols as shown by 
 their composition; the number and size are all right, but distance 
 is too great for dismounted patrols. 
 
 Where is your authority for saying, 'The enemy is at Gettys- 
 burg' .^^ you don't know that yet. All you know is that a Red force 
 left Chambersburg on the 11th. 
 
 You might cover the country better by starting one patrol to 
 the northwest to get on the York Turnpike, and another to the 
 southwest to get on the Baltimore Turnpike. Your disposition 
 does not cover the country well. Suppose the enemy is going 
 through Germantown, or is at Cedar Ridge when your patrols 
 start out. If they follow the road you assign them you will miss 
 them altogether. * * * * Remember that a foot patrol 
 should never be sent far from supporting troops. It is at the 
 mercy of any hostile cavalry it may encounter." 
 
 2nd Solution. 
 
 Two patrols sent out. 
 
 Lieut. B and 11 mounted scouts to proceed along the Hanover 
 Road to Rock Creek, * * * * turn north on the west side 
 of Rock Creek and pass around the north side of Gettysburg to 
 the ridge about 1/^ mile west. 
 
 Lieut. C and 10 mounted scouts to proceed along the Hanover 
 Road to 536, just east of White Run, south to the Baltimore 
 Turnpike, to McAllister Hill and Cemetery Hill, then west to 
 Seminary Ridge. 
 
 Comment : "Better send three patrols and over different roads. 
 Lieut. C will observe no more than Lieut. B, since both go over the 
 
[7] 
 
 same road. You hamper your leaders by giving them too detailed 
 instructions. They may never get as far as Rock Creek, and if 
 they do, they must be the judges as to how they can best proceed 
 from that point. Better send them out at daylight; and tell 
 them to be back within the outpost line by dark or to go prepared 
 to stay out over night." 
 
 3rd Solution. 
 
 Sends out patrols to go until darkness overtakes them, then to 
 return and report to Col. A at A. Rifle's. 
 
 Comment: "The Colonel would probably be in camp with the 
 main body, near Brushtown, and not at Rifle's." 
 
 4th Solution. 
 
 Three patrols, each of 1 officer mounted and 7 mounted scouts, 
 sent out. These patrols were to report mounted to Col. A at 
 5:30 A. M., the 13th inst. for instructions. 
 
 A part of the instructions to the patrol leaders was to keep 
 up communication with each other and continued: 
 
 "Should you encounter the enemy you will at once report that 
 fact and endeavor to locate his position or route of march." 
 
 Comment on latter part: "Unnecessary, as this should be 
 done as a matter of course by any patrol leader who understands 
 his mission." 
 
 Further comments: "Better to give the patrol leaders their 
 instructions on the evening of the 12th. This enables them to 
 better prepare themselves for their task. 
 
 I would tell them how long they were expected to remain out. 
 Patrols, especially of this strength, should not be required to keep 
 up communication with each other. It hampers their movements 
 and necessitates at times wide dispersion of the patrol. Every 
 man of each patrol should know of the whereabouts of the other 
 patrols in a general way in order that he will not be surprised 
 if he encounters them. But to keep up communication between 
 patrols is to delay and hamper the work of the reconnaissance.'^ 
 
 5th Solution. 
 Patrols instructed. «* * * * Stay out unless forced 
 back, until you get word from me * * * */' 
 
[8] 
 
 Comment : "It may be difficult for you to get word to your 
 patrols later on." 
 
 7th Solution. 
 
 Sends out two officer's mounted patrols, Lieut. B with eight 
 men, Lieut. C with thirteen men. 
 
 Instructs Lieut. C to proceed along Hanover Road, sending a 
 patrol as far north as the York Turnpike, Lieut. C to go as far 
 as Benner's Hill * * * * and to open communication with 
 Lieut. B near Cemetery Hill. 
 
 Comment: "Better send this patrol out from the camp, and 
 not sub-divide Lieut. C's patrol." 
 
 Comment relative to communication : "This may prove impos- 
 sible. Better not hamper your patrols by such instructions. 
 Lieuts. B and C will communicate with each other if favorable 
 opportunity arises." 
 
 Solution states: "I (Col. A) shall remain in camp here tomor- 
 row and continue my advance along the Hanover Road early in 
 the morning of the 14th." 
 
 Comment: "Whether you do or not will depend on the orders 
 of your Blue Comd'g. Gen'l." 
 
 8th Solution. 
 
 Three cavalry patrols sent out at 6:10 P. M. One of these is 
 to observe enemy west of Gettysburg. 
 
 Comment: "Why go west of Gettysburg.'* The instructions 
 say 'as far as Gettysburg.' Don't try to do too much." 
 
 Further comments: "It is not clear just what troops you in- 
 tend to use for patrolling. You say cavalry, from which the 
 inference is drawn that you realize your patrols must be mounted. 
 Only mounted scouts are available. There are only 21 of these, 
 and your three patrols call for 25 men." 
 
 9th Solution. 
 
 Sends patrol of Lieut. A and 2 men out at 6 :30 P. M. on Han- 
 over Road toward Boneauville to ascertain if any of enemy's 
 cavalry has pushed forward or does push forward during the 
 night, — to locate any night march of the enemy on the Hanover , 
 Road. 
 
 Comment: "This, while not considered an error, would prob- 
 ably lead to no results. Reconnaissance at night in an unknown 
 
[9] 
 
 country and with the inhabitants intensely hostile cannot ac- 
 complish much." 
 
 Patrol leader is instructed to locate the enemy and find out if 
 he is pushing forward during the night. 
 
 Comment: "A big commission under the conditions given." 
 
 Three patrols are sent out at 6:00 A. M. 
 
 Comment: "Better at daylight." 
 
 The solution continues : "The regiment will move at 6 :30 A. M. 
 toward Boneauville." 
 
 Comment: "It is considered an error for Col. A to move his 
 regiment towards Boneauville unless ordered to do so by higher 
 authority. If he finds out the approach of an enemy weaker than 
 he is, he will have no difficulty in holding his present position. If 
 enemy is stronger, he endangers the safety of his command by 
 pushing it forward farther away from supporting troops." 
 
 10th Solution. 
 
 Sends out three officer's patrols mounted: 
 
 1st composed of a lieutenant and 5 men. 
 
 2nd composed of a lieutenant and 3 men. 
 
 3rd composed of a lieutenant and 3 men. 
 
 Comment: "Too small, as messages will, no doubt, have to be 
 sent back." 
 
 11th Solution. 
 
 Sends out three patrols at once, prepared to stay out all night 
 and adds: "Each of you send me in a report here by 10:30 P. M. 
 tonight." 
 
 Comments : "May have nothing to report at that time." 
 
 "Better wait until morning. It will be dark before your patrols 
 get far away from the outpost line. The inhabitants will give 
 them no information ; they can see nothing at night ; and they are 
 in an unknoAvn country. Under such conditions they cannot hope 
 to get any information of value, and you expose them to danger 
 of capture." 
 
 12th Solution. 
 
 Lieut. C and 6 mounted scouts were to observe the network of 
 roads between Hanover Road and Baltimore Turnpike. 
 
 Lieut. A and 6 scouts go via Hanover Road toward Gettysburg. 
 Lieut. B and 6 scouts go via Baltimore Turnpike. 
 
[10] 
 
 Patrol leaders were told: "Avoid fighting. Do not trust to 
 guides." 
 
 Comments: "It would be better to send Lieut. C's patrol to 
 the south of Hanover road. The network of roads between the 
 Hanover road and Baltimore Turnpike can be covered quite well 
 by Lieut. A's and Lieut. B's patrols." 
 
 "Instructions to patrol leaders are *too detailed. Much of it 
 they should know as a matter of course if they are efficient 
 officers." 
 
 15th Solution. 
 
 Sends out at once three officer's patrols, one officer and 4 scouts 
 each, to go to store % mile north of Breashner's, Square Corner, 
 and Whitehall respectively, and to remain out until dark. 
 
 Comment : "Your instructions to your patrols show you realize 
 how little can be done by them before dark. The chances are they 
 would not even get a start before dark. The security patrols from 
 the outposts will undoubtedly cover the country as far as the 
 582-606 road. Your patrols can do no more. At night, in an 
 unknown country, they would be helpless. Better wait until next 
 day. 
 
 You provide in your instructions for observing country as far 
 west as the Whitehall-Square Corner line only. How about observ- 
 ing country as far west as Gettysburg as directed.''" 
 
 (C) 
 3rd Solution. 
 
 To the patrol: "The enemy is moving in this direction from 
 Chambersburg * * * *," 
 
 Comment : "You don't know that such is the case. You know 
 only that the enemy left Chambersburg on the 11th, moving east- 
 ward. He may, since that time, have turned north or south, or 
 turned back." 
 
 6th Solution 
 
 To the patrol: "A force of the enemy is reported at Gettys- 
 burg moving eastward * * * *." 
 
 Comment: "Where did you get this information.? Who re- 
 ported the enemy at Gettysburg moving eastward.''" 
 
[11] 
 
 11th Solution. 
 
 States: "We will keep concealed and take cover wherever we 
 can do so." 
 
 Comment: "Only when necessary as your patrol must not be 
 unduly delayed." 
 
 12th Solution. 
 
 States: "Our force near Hanover will be here Thursday 
 night. * * * *." 
 
 Comment: "You don't know this. It may be in Boneauville 
 or elsewhere." 
 
 Orders patrol to carry two days grain. 
 
 Comment: "No necessity for so much." 
 
 (D) 
 
 1st Solution. 
 Formation — Point — Lieut., Sgt., and 1 Pvt. 
 Comment : "Why so strong a point, and why both 1st and 2nd 
 in command in most exposed place?" 
 
 2nd Solution. 
 
 Formation — 1 private, 200 yards, sergeant and 4 privates, 200 
 yards, 1 private. 
 
 The sergeant and 4 privates alternate on the sides of the road, 
 about 25 yards apart. Trot to cross roads 601. Halt there and 
 send two privates by the 602-573-547-598 road to Boneauville, 
 and two others by the 606-604-641 road to Boneauville. 
 
 Comment : "Your patrol takes up about 500 yards road space, 
 rather large for so few men. 
 
 You disperse your patrol rather widely after leaving 601. 
 Better keep it intact, sending men out on crossroads and to good 
 points of observation, but all to return just as soon as they have 
 observed the country around them. In that way, you can keep 
 all parts of your patrol under your observation nearly all the 
 time." 
 
 5th Solution. 
 
 * * * * "Halt detachment under cover near 617. Send 
 Sergeant forward with 3 men to examine Boneauville." 
 
 Comment : "Boneauville should be carefully reconnoitred from 
 a distance before entering, if entered at all." 
 
[12] 
 
 8th Solution. 
 Comment: "How about conduct of the patrol? iTow ao you 
 reconnoitre cross roads? How Square Corner and Boneauville? 
 What use do you make of 627 hill, for instance?" 
 
 9th Solution. 
 Point 200 yards ahead of rest of patrol. 
 Comment: "Better make this not more than 100 yards." 
 
 10th Solution. 
 Point 150 yards ahead of rest of the patrol. 
 Comment: "This is a little too much distance. 50 to 100 
 yards is correct." 
 
 14th Solution. 
 
 Comment on marching formation : "Road space excessive. 300 
 yards from first man to last is maximum." 
 
 15th Solution. 
 Marching formation: Lieutenant and 2 men, rest of party 
 about 300 yards in rear. 
 
 Comment: "Formation of patrol faulty." 
 
 (E) 
 2nd Solution. 
 
 Retreats at gallop via 484 W to bend in road 550 yards north- 
 east of Trostle's. 
 
 Comment: "You do well to keep to the road as long as pos- 
 sible, and the place of concealment you are making for is well 
 selected. But I think I would endeavor to get there via the wooded 
 ravine west of the road, so as to escape observation. * * * * 
 The fact that your solution to Z) leaves you, with only one man, 
 in this serious predicament, shows the wisdom of keeping your 
 patrol intact." 
 
 5th Solution. 
 
 "Dismount my detachment. Leave the horses — one man as 
 horseholder — at foot of hill, occupy crest of hill with remainder 
 of detachment. Let the leading 1 or 2 men come to crest of hill. 
 Capture or kill them. Open upon rest of hostile detachment and 
 drive them back. Mount up promptly and follow. Send back one 
 man with appended message, and prisoner if any." 
 
[13] 
 
 Comment: "You assume everything will go your way in the 
 encounter with the hostile patrol. You do not give the Red patrol 
 leader credit for knowing his business. 
 
 Are you out to fight or to get information.'^ If Col. A wanted 
 you to fight every hostile patrol you met, don't you think he 
 would have given you a stronger force.'' 
 
 Would you send one man back through an intensely hostile 
 country and the enemy about.? And would you ask him, besides, 
 to take back prisoners.? In only the unusual case would your 
 prisoner, or prisoners, still retain their mounts. If dismounted, 
 what are you going to do with them.? Prisoners, just now, serve 
 only to embarrass you." 
 
 8th Solution. 
 
 * * * * 'Pq send message by two privates * * * * 
 west to M. Fink's, thence by main road southeast to Boneauville, 
 Square Corner — 601 to outpost 558. 
 
 Comment : "Better for your messengers to keep off main road." 
 
 11th Solution. 
 
 Sends one man back with message. 
 
 Comment : "Better send 2 men. You have just seen the enemy ; 
 there may be other Red patrols out, and moreover, the country 
 is intensely hostile." 
 
 12th Solution. 
 
 Conceals himself and two men at 5 :30, and conceals the rest of 
 the patrol along the Hanover Road ; assumes the Red patrol may 
 not find them. 
 
 Comments: "You must always assume that the enemy will 
 act with good judgment. So why play his game for him.?" 
 
 "If patrol moves up the wooded ravine northward from Mt, 
 Vernon S. H. they can undoubtedly escape observation, and even 
 if seen can probably get away. Some point along the 486 — 
 Trostle road will give good observation of the enemy, and hill 571 
 can be readily gained. If you move forward to crest near 530 to 
 write your message, you are walking right into the hands of the 
 enemy." 
 
 13th Solution. 
 
 Proceeds rapidly to wooded ravine running south from Mt. 
 Vernon S. H., thence south along ravine, turning into ravine 
 
[14] 
 
 running southeast to road bend about 1150 yards east of 535 on 
 the 535-587 road, and observes from there. Then sends message. 
 Comment: "If you examine map carefully, I think you will 
 agree that your best chances for observation, for concealment, and 
 for a quick get-away lie north of the road. However, this could 
 be definitely determined only on the ground." 
 
 14th Solution. 
 Sends back a message. Then ambushes the Red detachment. 
 Comment : "You are sent out to gain information, not to fight. 
 What good can you accomplish by fighting the Red patrol? 
 
 ^ ^ ^ 7|C 
 
 Conceal your patrol where it can get away if discovered, and 
 observe the Reds as they go by. Send back message by 2 men and, 
 when the Red patrols pass by, continue on your mission which you 
 are yet far from accomplishing, and which you run the danger of 
 putting it out of your power to accomplish if you attack ten men 
 with five only four of whom have rifles." 
 
 15th Solution. 
 
 Sends word back to patrol by one of point to go north up creek 
 bottom and join patrol leader in trees north side of hill 571. 
 Tells this man to wait at Mt. Vernon S. H. for another member 
 of point who will join him with a message and both return to 
 camp. 
 
 Comment : "It will be 5 or 10 minutes before your messenger 
 can start. In that time the enemy may reach Mt. Vernon S. H." 
 
 16th Solution. 
 Sends message addressed: "C. O., 1st Infantry, Brushtown." 
 Comment: "If your message falls into enemy's hands, it will 
 give him clearly the information that the 1st Inf. is at Brush- 
 town." 
 
 Message contains two names of places in small letters. 
 Comment: "CAPS." 
 
 States : "Caution my patrol to keep out of sight of the enemy." 
 Comment: "You are leader. What orders would you give to 
 conceal your patrol.?" 
 
[16] 
 
 (F) 
 1st Solution. 
 Moves by ravine from 546 to the orchard about 1100 yards a 
 little east of south of 546. Takes position in orchard to observe 
 column passing along Hanover Road. 
 
 Comment: "It would probably be impossible to observe the 
 
 Hanover road from anywhere near the orchard you speak of. 
 
 * * * * j> 
 
 2nd Solution. 
 
 'I would turn north to some point near Storrick's orchard, from 
 which I could observe the road and ascertain the size and composi- 
 tion of the command. If I could not find an observation point 
 there, * * * * i would cut across country to a point in 
 the Cavalry Field where I could conceal my patrol and observe 
 the Red force. 
 
 After ascertaining the strength and composition of the Red 
 force, I would return to Brushtown via 572-606-Mt. Rocks S. H.- 
 537 road. 
 
 -Before starting back, I would make a note of the strength of 
 the Red column, the time it passed the point at which I observed 
 it, and the location of this point.' 
 
 Comment: "This (determining the strength) may take a long 
 time. So far as you now know the Red column may be miles in 
 length." 
 
 'It is difficult to get good points of observation north of Han- 
 over Road, and you would lose time going to Cavalry Field and 
 waiting for the Red column to again come under observation. 
 Better turn south in wooded ravine south of 546, and make for 
 Hill 567, or, if necessary, Wolf Hill. 
 
 After definitely determining the Red strength and composition, 
 send back a message by two of your men. It is best for you not 
 to lose sight of the Red column until it is approaching the Blue 
 outpost lines. It may turn in any direction, even going back to 
 Gettysburg, or may go into camp. This would oblige Col. A to 
 later send out another patrol to complete your work.' 
 
 3rd Solution. 
 'I move the patrol with all possible speed into the wooded ravine 
 south of 546, down this ravine under cover of woods to White 
 
[16] 
 
 Run and up road 473-516 to the orchard. From the shoulder 
 N. W. of the orchard I can get a good view of the road east of the 
 ridge 350 yards west of 546, where I remain in observation of the 
 column and estimate its strength and composition. If not dis- 
 turbed I wait to see if more troops are following.' 
 
 Comment : "None of the Hanover Road west of 530 can be seen 
 from the position you select. It will b'e 40 mins. before the leading 
 Red element reaches 530. It will take 40 mins. more for the Red 
 column to pass. Thus it will be 80 mins. before you have ascer- 
 tained definitely the Red strength." 
 
 6th Solution. 
 
 "The Lieutenant conducts his patrol rapidly to the rear and by 
 the north branch road by Storrick to the bunch of trees on the 
 north slope of hill 565, 900 yards beyond Storricks." 
 
 Comment: "None of the Hanover road west of 546 can be 
 seen from the position you select, and it is uncertain how much of 
 the road east of 546 you can see." 
 
 8th Solution. 
 * * * * Moves off the road to hill 606 northwest of Stor- 
 
 "p-i /^ IT" ^ ^ ^ ^ 
 
 Comment : "Difficult to see Hanover road from anywhere near 
 606. * * * * » 
 
 States :«**** Remain in observation and concealment 
 until I have determined the strength of the column ****,' 
 
 Comment: "This takes too much time. So far as you know, 
 the column may be miles long. Better go where you can see more 
 of Hanover road." 
 
 11th Solution. 
 
 Conceals patrol in woods along creek south of 546 and takes 
 one man, and from nose of ridge southwest of 546 calculates the 
 enemy's strength by watching it pass a given point in a certain 
 time. 
 
 Comments: "This takes a long time if the enemy is in force." 
 
 "You are rather too near the road for safety. Remember the 
 Red advance guard will cover quite a distance north and south of 
 the road." 
 
[17] 
 
 12th Solution. 
 
 Sends two men back at once with orders to report enemy in 
 force. Patrol leader then verifies report, returns to the patrol 
 concealed in little creek south of 546 and works up toward Wolf 
 Hill. He sends two men with following verbal message : "Enemy 
 in force at 54<6 at 10 A. M. Am continuing to observe toward 
 Hanover Road from Wolf Hill." 
 
 Comment: "Why send back 2 more men with this message 
 since it gives no more information than what you already sent by 
 2 others.?" 
 
 "No word should be sent back until some definite information 
 is obtained as to enemy's strength and composition. Then a mes- 
 sage should be written out and sent back by two men at urgent 
 gait." 
 
 13th Solution. 
 
 Retires at full gallop to 546 thence to high ground just east of 
 Reynolds. 
 
 Comment: "Difficult to see road from anywhere near Rey- 
 nolds." 
 
 15th Solution. 
 
 Gallops to crest and verifies and estimates force. 
 
 Comment: "How can you do this.? You can see not more than 
 600 yds. of road from the crest. It will be 40 minutes before 
 all the Red column comes in sight. So far as you know it may 
 be hours. In the meantime what will happen to you if you remain 
 on the 'crest'.?" 
 
 16th Solution. 
 
 States : "Conceal my patrol and put myself in a position 
 where I could observe the enemy without being seen * * * *." 
 
 Comment: "Where? This is indefinite. Your map shows you 
 what cover you can make use of in getting away, and also the best 
 points of observation." 
 
 (G) 
 4th Solution. 
 
 Message: "Two Regiments of Infantry and Battery F. A. 
 passing here * * * *." 
 
 Comment: "This column is probably nearly 2% miles long. 
 It is important for Col. A to know just where the head of the 
 column is." 
 
[18] 
 
 5th Solution. 
 
 Patrol leader decides to return at once to Brushtown. * * 
 * * Directs Sergeant to take 3 men and move to York Turn- 
 pike and return, after reaching pike, by most practicable route. 
 
 Leader moves to 590 with other 3 men, to 588-618-across 
 country to 574 and in * * * *. 
 
 Comment: "Why disperse your patrol, if you all are going 
 back? Can you be certain of what the enemy will do- after he 
 gets out of your sight?" 
 
 7th Solution. 
 
 Returns to ridge near J. Spangler's and remains in observation 
 
 * * * * falling back. 
 
 Comment : "By going back to the ridge at Spangler's you ex- 
 pose yourself to danger. Remember 2 regs. inf. and a battery 
 or artillery, marching with advance guard take up nearly 2% 
 miles road space. So the point will have passed your place of 
 observation near Spangler's long before the tail of the column 
 comes in sight or you are able to determine the enemy's strength. 
 Better take a position well off to the flank." 
 
 8th Solution. 
 
 "You decide therefore that you have accomplished your mis- 
 sion." 
 
 Comment: "Have you? Suppose the enemy goes into camp, 
 or goes back to Gettysburg. What excuse would you give your 
 Colonel for not finding that out?" » 
 
 9th Solution. 
 
 Sends a message indicating presence of large force of infantry, 
 and after ascertaining full strength of enemy rejoins his com- 
 mand. 
 
 Comment : "Better not send message until you have something 
 definite to report as to enemy's strength and composition. When 
 you have ascertained this, send the message as you suggest. After 
 that, plan to keep the enemy under observation while returning to 
 your command. You cannot yet be sure that he intends to go 
 to Brushtown." 
 
 10th Solution. 
 
 Rejoins command. States: "My mission would have been ac- 
 complished and my patrol would be needed by the Colonel." 
 
[19] 
 
 Comment: "The best use the Colonel could make of your 
 patrol would be in finding out just what the enemy does for the 
 next two hours." 
 
 11th Solution. 
 
 "I must now carry back the information I have acquired about 
 the enemy. * * * *." 
 
 Comment: "Better send back a message, and hang on to the 
 enemy as long as there is anything to be learned about him." 
 
 14th Solution. 
 
 Comment : "You should not lose all touch with the enemy, now 
 that you have him in sight. You cannot be sure of his actions 
 for the next few hours." 
 
 15th Solution. 
 
 Sends two messages (duplicates) each by two men. Then with 
 Sergeant makes his own way back. 
 
 Comment: "You are justified in sending back the message by 
 two parties, each of 2 men, if you feel the occasion warrants it. 
 But you and the Sergeant would better continue to keep the Red 
 column under observation." 
 
 16th Solution. 
 "I conclude that the force I have seen is the Advance Guard 
 of a Division. I consider my mission is accomplished, * * 
 
 Comment: "If you conclude that the force you have seen is 
 the advance guard of a division, then your mission is certainly not 
 accomplished. Do you know this a fact, or is it a mere guess. ^^ 
 If you have an idea a large force is following, it is manifestly 
 your duty to make sure of that fact. Would you go back and 
 report to your Colonel that a division was approaching? 
 
 If so what excuse would you make when later on he found out 
 there were no more than 2 regts. inf. and a battery of artillery? 
 Or would you report 'I saw 2 regts. inf. and a battery of artillery, 
 and I think (or conclude) there is a division in all, but I didn't 
 wait to ascertain definitely'? 
 
 Two men with a message stand even a better chance of getting 
 back safely to Brushtown than does your entire patrol. You, 
 yourself, better remain with the other three men of the patrol 
 and keep the enemy under observation." 
 
[20] 
 
 AN APPROVED SOLUTION. 
 
 A. To send out at daybreak on September 13th officers' pa- 
 trols, made up of the mounted scouts, to reconnoiter the country 
 as far as Gettysburg. 
 
 B. Three patrols are sent out, each composed of an officer and 
 seven of the mounted scouts. 
 
 Upon receipt of the message given,' Colonel A assembles Lieu- 
 tenants A, B and C, whom he has selected as patrol leaders, and 
 also Lieutenant D, in charge of mounted scouts, and after each is 
 supplied with the proper maps, gives them the following instruc- 
 tions : 
 
 "I have just received the following message from the com- 
 manding general (reads message). This regiment will remain in 
 its present position until further orders. Outpost line is — (points 
 out Blue outpost position on map). 
 
 "Lieutenants A, B and C, each with seven of the mounted 
 scouts, will start at daybreak tomorrow to reconnoiter the country 
 westward as far as Gettysburg. 
 
 "Lieutenant A, you will move via Centennial in the direction of 
 Cedar Ridge and the York Turnpike, and thence towards Gettys- 
 burg. 
 
 "Lieutenant B, you will move in the direction of the Square 
 Corner — Boneauville (Hanover) road. 
 
 "Lieutenant C, you will move via Whitehall and Germantown, 
 and thence by the Baltimore Turnpike towards Gettysburg. 
 
 "All the patrols should be back within our outpost line by 
 nightfall. The outpost commander will be notified of the hour 
 of your departure and of your mission. 
 
 "Lieutenant D will make the necessary details of the mounted 
 scouts, and will have them report to you at the time and place 
 you designate. You will confer with him as to further details. 
 The quartermaster has been directed to supply you with a suit- 
 able mount, if you have not such already. 
 
 "Messages will reach me at Brushtown." 
 
 C. You confer with Lieutenant D as to your detail, the time 
 the men are to be awakened in the morning, the hour of breakfast, 
 the equipment they are to carry, rations, forage, etc., and get 
 from him what information he can give you as to the men of your 
 detail and their mounts. You ask him to have your detail report 
 
[21] 
 
 to you, equipped as directed, at the bridge west of Brushtown 
 at 5 :10 in the morning. 
 
 You study your map so as to become familiar, as far as is pos- 
 sible, with the route you are to cover, the topography of the 
 country, particularly the hills, ravines, woods, side roads, towns 
 and villages, and the routes of the other patrols in relation to 
 your own. You see that your watch, compass, field glasses, mes- 
 sage pad and pencils are at hand and available for your use. 
 
 In the morning, you inspect your patrol carefully to see that 
 your men and horses are in fit condition for the task before them, 
 and that they have the necessary equipment. Before starting out 
 you explain to them, as far as is possible, your mission and your 
 plans for carrying it out, the position of your own troops, the 
 routes to be taken by the other patrols, and tell them what is 
 known of the enemy. You impress on them that the purpose of 
 the patrol is to get information, and that it can best do so by 
 avoiding conflict with the enemy; that firing will be resorted to 
 only when absolutely unavoidable, and that concealment from any 
 Red troops that may be encountered is of the utmost importance. 
 
 D. The patrol marches in column of twos, at a walk, until 
 hill 588 is reached. Here you halt long enough to point out the 
 position of the Blue outposts, the direction the other patrols have 
 taken, and the prominent features of the country in your front. 
 You get from the outguard of this section any information it 
 may have as to the enemy, and the road you are to march over. 
 
 You then move out in the following formation: The sergeant 
 and one private as point, marching on opposite sides of the road 
 and about 25 yards apart, the sergeant in the lead; 100 yards in 
 rear of the private, yourself and three privates marching about 
 15 yards apart; 100 yards in rear of the last of these is the first 
 of the remaining two privates who are marching on opposite sides 
 of the road and about 25 yards apart. No flankers are kept out, 
 but men are sent to the flanks to all places that appear to be 
 good points for observation, and to woods or other features that 
 might aff'ord concealment for the enemy. Crests in the road are 
 approached cautiously, the patrol moving up such only at a sig- 
 nal from the point. Farm houses and enclosures are approached 
 with caution, and are not entered unless there appears some un- 
 usual reason for so doing. At crossroads men are sent along 
 
[22] 
 
 such roads to the nearest crest from which the new road can be 
 seen for some distance, or to the next intersecting road; but care 
 is taken that none of the patrol be out of sight of the leader for 
 any considerable time. The patrol should, where it is at all pos- 
 sible, be kept intact. Square Corner is carefully reconnoitered 
 from a distance before the patrol passes through it. Boneauville 
 and the surrounding country should be carefully reconnoitered 
 from near Sweet Home, S. H., 616, and hill 627 before the village 
 is entered, if the leader decides to enter it. But as reconnaissance 
 in the neighborhood, and careful observation from the outside, 
 probably will give as much information as it is possible to get by 
 entering, both Square Corner and Boneauville may be avoided by 
 the patrol. 
 
 The patrol moves at a trot wherever possible, and makes as 
 rapid progress as is consistent with the obtaining of information 
 and its own safety. While in a patrol of this size the usual place 
 of the leader is near the center, he unhesitatingly goes to the 
 front, flanks or rear if he deems it necessary to secure information 
 or for the better leading of his patrol. 
 
 You note as you go along any errors or discrepancies in the 
 map furnished you, and mark thereon any features of the terrain 
 that may be of military value, but which are not shown on the map. 
 
 E. With the point you return at a gallop to your patrol, and 
 lead it up the wooded ravine running north from Mt. Vernon S. H. 
 to a point about 600 yards N. W. of Trostle where you turn 
 south in the draw leading to hill 571, watching carefully for in- 
 dications of the enemy on the 530 — 548 road, and leaving one man 
 at some point in the ravine which will enable him, while keeping 
 concealed, to note the passing of the Red detachment by 484. You 
 halt the patrol within the south edge of the woods on 571 hill 
 and, dismounted, with one man move through the corn to a point 
 from which you can see the Hanover road. After assuring your- 
 self that the Red detachment has passed by, and that it is not 
 followed immediately by other troops, you write the following 
 message, select two privates as messengers, tell them of the con- 
 tents of the message before giving it to them, and direct them to 
 go at a "rapid" rate of speed via the Trostle-Fink road, and the 
 roads north of and generally parallel to the Hanover road, to the 
 
[23] 
 
 Blue outpost line, and to lose no time in delivering their message 
 to Colonel A : 
 
 No. 1. Lieut. B's Patrol, 
 
 Hill 571, N. W., Mt. Vernon S. H. 
 Colonel A : September 13 — 7 :45 a. m. 
 
 Red detachment, 10 mounted men, just passed MT. VERNON 
 S. H., in patrol formation and at a walk, moving eastward on 
 HANOVER ROAD. Apparently not followed by other troops. 
 Will continue reconnaissance towards GETTYSBURG. 
 
 B, 
 By mounted messenger. Lieut. 
 
 You again carefully observe the Hanover road from your posi- 
 tion, this time keeping a careful watch to the east as well as to 
 the west. When satisfied there is no enemy near, you move your 
 patrol to the Hanover road near 530, and again move westward 
 on that road. The two men who bring up the rear move directly 
 to the crest of the road 200 yards east of 530 and remain there 
 until the rest of the patrol passes Spangler when they close up 
 to the usual distance. 
 
 F. Without waiting to verify the information received, you 
 signal to the remaining man of the point to join you, and then 
 move the patrol quickly down the wooded ravine running south 
 from 546 to its junction with the ravine from the northwest, up 
 the latter ravine to the southern slope of hill 567 where you stop 
 to observe the Hanover road. . You see enough of this road, and 
 of dust raised by the marching column, to satisfy you that there 
 is a strong column of the enemy marching eastward. You realize, 
 however, that from your position only a short piece of the road 
 west of 550 can be seen, and that if you remain there you must 
 wait until the entire column passes 550 to determine the enemy's 
 strength and composition. So you move quickly toward Wolf 
 Hill from which, as your map indicates, the Hanover road is 
 visible in places as far as Gettysburg, and where, therefore, you 
 can more quickly judge of the strength and composition of the 
 Red column. Leaving the sergeant and three men in the woods 
 near the trail southeast of Wolf Hill you go with the remaining 
 man, dismounted, to the crest. Here, after a careful examination 
 
[24] 
 
 of all parts of the Hanover road that are visible, you arrive at 
 what you believe to be the true strength and composition of the 
 Red column. 
 
 It is of the utmost importance that what you have learned be 
 communicated to Colonel A without loss of time. But there is still 
 work for the patrol to do, and the information must be sent back 
 by messengers. You write the following message in duplicate : 
 No. 2. Lieut. B's Patrol, 
 
 Wolf Hill, 13 Sept., 9 :05 a. m. 
 To Colonel A: 
 
 Red force of two regiments infantry and a battery of artillery 
 marching eastward on hanover road; head of column now ap- 
 proaching 536. I shall move on their flank by roads south of 
 HANOVER ROAD and keep them under observation. 
 
 B, 
 
 By mounted messenger. Lieut. 
 
 You call up the sergeant and the best man remaining of the 
 patrol, point out to them the enemy, read your message to them 
 and then give each a copy, and direct them to take it to Colonel 
 A at an "urgent" rate of speed. You advise the sergeant to move 
 by the trail to the Baltimore Turnpike, thence to Germantown, 
 and thence northeast through Whitehall to the Blue outpost line. 
 
 G. You determine to keep the Red column under observation 
 with the remainder of your patrol, and to do this move eastward 
 on the roads and trails south of the Hanover road, and across 
 country when necessary. Opportunity is taken to observe the 
 Red column from the high points from which the Hanover road 
 is visible. From near 587 you note that the Red column continues 
 its march eastward from 530. You then move to St. Luke's 
 Church where you wait to assure yourself that the column con- 
 tinues on through Boneauville and eastward from 616 and 617, 
 still on the Hanover road. As the Red column will, upon ap- 
 proaching Square Corner, come under the observation of the 
 security patrols of the Blue outpost, if the latter be still in posi- 
 tion, you may now rejoin your command, so you move at a gallop 
 through Whitehall and 577 to get within your outpost lines. If 
 you find, however, that the Blue force has withdrawn, unless you 
 receive contrary orders, you must still continue to keep the Red 
 column under observation until it goes into camp, or until it gets 
 close to your own lines. 
 
COURSE IN TACTICS— VART I. 
 
 Map Problem No. 2 — Advance Guard. 
 (See Gettysburg and Hunterstown sheets, 3" map.) 
 
 Situation : 
 
 A Blue division, advanced on September 14th, from the west 
 to Gettysburg in hostile territory. 
 
 At 5 a. m. September 15th, Major A, 1st Infantry, receives the 
 following verbal order from his regimental commander : 
 
 "Reliable reports indicate that a hostile column of all arms 
 reached New Oxford at dusk last night, and that about two regi- 
 ments of hostile infantry bivouacked five miles north of York 
 Springs. 
 
 "The division advances today by the York Turnpike on New 
 Oxford. 
 
 This regiment is directed to march by the Harrisburg road to 
 secure the crossings of the Conewago. 
 
 "Your battalion, with the mounted scouts of the regiment, will 
 constitute the advance guard, and will clear the bridge, 474 W, 
 over Rock Creek, by 6:50 this morning. 
 
 "The main body, in the order of march — 2d Bn., Machine Gun 
 Co., 3d Bn., will follow at 700 yards. 
 
 "The field trains will join the division trains on the Gettys- 
 burg — Fairfield road west of Gettysburg at 10 a. m. 
 
 "Messages to the head of the main body." 
 Required : 
 
 1. Major A's estimate of the situation. 
 
 2. His orders. 
 
 3. A sketch showing the order of march of the advance guard, 
 including the routes and positions of all patrols, when the advance 
 party has reached the road crossings 549. 
 
 Note: The regiment camped near the County Almshouse. 
 
 [25] 
 
[26] 
 
 STUDENTS' ERRORS AND INSTRUCTOR'S CRITICISMS. 
 
 Estimate of the Situation. 
 1st Solution. 
 
 States the enemy has about seven miles to go, and Major A's 
 regiment about eight, to reach the crossing of the Conewago. 
 
 Comment: "The enemy has about 11 miles to go, not 7." 
 
 States the enemy will push at daybreak for the crossing of the 
 Conewago. 
 
 Comment: "The 2 regiments may not march towards Gettys- 
 burg after passing York Springs, but may move towards New 
 Oxford to join that column." 
 
 Further comments : "The estimate should consider the terrain 
 as it affects reconnaissance, the division of troops into support 
 and reserve, the duties to be assigned each, and the time for each 
 to start, or to clear a given point." 
 
 "His (Maj. A's) decision upon each of the above matters should 
 be concisely stated." 
 
 Maj. A sends out 3 officers' patrols, 
 
 Lt. A & 5 men toward Table Rock, 
 
 Lt. B & 8 scouts rapidly toward Plainview, 
 
 Lt. C & 6 scouts toward Hunterstown. 
 
 Comments: "The Table Rock patrol is farther out than is 
 necessary for security, and could do more to expedite the march 
 if with the infantry column for local reconnaissance." 
 
 "The Plainview patrol will soon get too far from support, and 
 be of little value." 
 
 "Are Lieuts. A, B & C all mounted.?" 
 
 2nd Solution. 
 
 Decides to place three companies in the support and one in the 
 advance party, to have Sgt. Y with 5 scouts precede the advance 
 party by about 1 mile, to send Lt. C and 6 scouts by the 531-527- 
 Hunterstown-507 W road, and to send Corp. X and 5 scouts by 
 the Carlisle road-511-J. Weaver-581 road. 
 
 Comment: "The mounted scouts had better form part of the 
 Advance Party. All reconnaissance will then be under the direc- 
 tion of the Comdr. of the Advance Part}^, and better coordination 
 will be secured." 
 
[27] 
 
 Decides to keep the (3) remaining scouts with him (Maj. A) 
 for local reconnaissance. 
 
 Comment : "Too few mounted men will be left with the column 
 for nearby patrolling." 
 
 3rd Solution. 
 
 States that Maj. A does not believe he has much to fear on his 
 right flank on account of ground, and route to be taken by Blue 
 Div. 
 
 Comment: "The estimate should consider the possibility of 
 meeting cavalry from New Oxford, and methods of distribution 
 and use of the infantry." 
 
 Decides to use his mounted scouts as advance cavalry, sending 
 them ahead to gain the hills overlooking the Conewago and paying 
 particular attention to the west side of road during the advance. 
 
 Comments: "The detachment of mounted scouts is too weak 
 to be sent so far from support, and doing so leaves the infantry 
 column without mounted men for nearby reconnaissance." 
 
 "The decision should include the disposition adopted, (division 
 into support, reserve, etc.) and the times for the fractions to 
 march." 
 
 4th Solution. 
 
 Considers it better to keep all the scouts (except the point) in 
 his own hands. 
 
 Comment: "It is the business of the support commander to 
 attend to reconnaissance, and therefore better to give him all 
 scouts for that purpose, leaving adv. gd. comdr. free to attend to 
 tactical dispositions." 
 
 5th Solution. 
 
 Comment: "The network of roads should be considered with 
 reference to manner of reconnaissance." 
 
 Decides to use Lt. A & 5 mounted scouts about 500 yards in ad- 
 vance of the dismounted scouts as "advance scouts," and places 
 16 scouts with reserve. 
 
 Comments: "Better not use the mounted scouts as 'Advance 
 Scouts' but assign them to support to be used as a mounted point." 
 
 "Reconnaissance is primarily the function of the support; 
 therefore scouts who are to do most of it should be part of the 
 support." 
 
[28] 
 
 6th Solution. 
 
 States: "There is not much chance of being interrupted by 
 any troops from New Oxford, our division will attend to them on 
 its advance along the York Turnpike." 
 
 Comment: "Cavalry from New Oxford may be sent to screen 
 the movements of the York Springs column, and be met by Maj. 
 A." 
 
 Further comment : "The estimate should include consideration 
 of the best distribution of the infantry, and of the mounted scouts, 
 and times of starting fractions, and should close with a concisely 
 stated decision upon all of these questions." 
 
 7th Solution. 
 
 Decides to use 2 cos. in support and 2 in reserve and to send a 
 platoon and 2 mounted scouts from support along ridge 586-592- 
 607 to cover left flank. 
 
 Comment: "The possibility of meeting an enemy to the west 
 hardly warrants detaching 50 men who will probably be wanted 
 on the Harrisburg road. Proper patrolling by mounted men to 
 the west should give sufficient warning to permit a detachment to 
 be made from the Harrisburg road." 
 
 8th Solution. 
 Decides to send out Co. A, with scouts attached as support. 
 Comment: "The decision should include time of starting to 
 permit compliance with his orders." 
 
 9th Solution. 
 
 Divides advance guard as follows: One company and the 
 scouts as support, three companies as reserve. Ammunition 
 wagons follow the reserve without distance. 
 
 Comments: "The reasons which caused Maj. A to make this 
 division should be stated." 
 
 Reserve is 300 yards distant from support. 
 
 Comment : "This distance is rather short." 
 
 11th Solution. 
 
 Comments: "The estimate should include consideration of 
 various possible uses of mounted men." 
 
 "It is better to have all discussion of 'ways and means precede 
 the decision," 
 
[29] 
 
 12th Solution. 
 
 Places one company and the mounted scouts in the advance 
 party, retaining three companies and one scout as orderly in the 
 support. 
 
 Comment : "A bn. has 3 mounted orderlies, in addition to any 
 scouts that may be with it." 
 
 14th Solution. 
 
 Uses scouts as advance cavalry. 
 
 Comment: "The mtd. scouts are not numerous enough, nor 
 suited for Advance Cav., but see p. 5 where Maj. A decides to as- 
 sign them to the Adv. Party. But see again Maj. A's order p. 8 
 which makes the greater part independent of the Adv. Party. 
 
 "The order as it reads would not carry out the student's in- 
 tentions." 
 
 States that the enemy has only mounted scouts with their in- 
 fantry. 
 
 Comment: "The enemy may have cavalry that was not re- 
 ported or has joined since." 
 
 States that hostile forces near New Oxford need not be con- 
 sidered in this problem. 
 
 Comment: "The possibility of meeting cavalry from New Ox- 
 ford should be considered." 
 
 States that the two hostile regiments near York Springs will 
 undoubtedly move * * * * towards the Conewago. 
 
 Comment: "They may move north of the Conewago to unite 
 with the other column." 
 
 Sends one mtd. man from 581 to 527 to reconnoitre. 
 
 Comment : "Not believed advisable in hostile territory to send 
 one man alone." 
 
 Comment: "The decision should be a concise general state- 
 ment of distribution and use of troops." 
 
 15th Solution. 
 Comments : "The mission should be definitely stated." 
 "The estimate should consider the best distribution of troops to 
 accomplish his mission, the duties to be assigned each fraction, 
 and the use to be made of his mounted men, before coming to a 
 decision upon these points." 
 
[30] 
 
 Decides to use a mounted point. 
 
 Comment : "No orders are given for this mounted point." 
 
 Major A's Orders. 
 1st Solution. 
 
 Instruct patrol leaders: "Concealed observation, rather than 
 combat, must be sought by the officer's patrols." 
 
 Comment: "General instructions for patrolling are out of 
 place in an order." 
 
 Further comment: "By this order Maj. A has changed his 
 patrols from security to reconnaissance patrols. Security is of 
 greater importance here." 
 
 Directs Capt. A to form support and send out the advance 
 party. Forced march to be maintained after first half hour. 
 
 Comments : "Capt. A should know enough to send out an Ad- 
 vance Party without orders to do so." 
 
 "The meaning of 'forced march' here is not clear. If higher 
 rate than 3 mi. an hour is to be maintained, the battalion will not 
 be in the best condition for fighting by the time the enemy is en- 
 countered." 
 
 Directs support to clear 474 W at 6-35 A. M. and reserve to 
 clear same place at 6-50 A. M. 
 
 States : "I will be with the Advance Guard." 
 
 Comments : "If the support clears the bridge @ 6 :35 and the 
 reserve @ 6:50 there will be 15 X 88 — 170 = 1150 yds. bet. 
 the two elements." 
 
 "Paper is lacking in neatness and is on that % very hard to 
 read." 
 
 "Maj. A should tell what part of the Adv. Gd. he will march 
 with." 
 
 2nd Solution. 
 
 Orders Lt. C to patrol the country to the Conewago, and Corp. 
 X to hill 712. 
 
 Comments : "Under these orders the flanking patrols will prob- 
 ably get far in advance of the column's march. They would afford 
 better security by remaining in observation at successive elevated 
 points until the support at least had come opposite them, then 
 trotting ahead to the next elevation." 
 
 "No order for trains." 
 
[31] 
 
 3rd Solution. 
 
 Orders column to form at 6-25 A. M., using two companies in 
 support, and directs support commander to use one company as 
 advance party. Reserve (2 cos.) directed to follow support at 
 400 yards distance. 
 
 Comments: "By this order 3 of the companies are formed 15 
 minutes earlier than they need be." 
 
 "Better let the Support Commander determine how he will form 
 the Adv. Party." 
 
 "The reserve follows the support too closely. South of the 
 Conewago, Cavalry may be met and the distances on that account 
 should be longer." 
 
 4th Solution. 
 
 Orders support (1 co. & 7 scouts) to clear 474 at 6-30 A. M. 
 and to keep about 600 yds. in advance of reserve; the reserve (the 
 remainder of the advance guard) to form at 6-25 A. M. with head 
 200 yds. north of entrance to Almshouse grounds. 
 
 Comment : "The reserve is formed earlier than is necessary." 
 
 6th Solution. 
 
 Orders Lt. X & 7 scouts to scout rapidly along the Harrisburg 
 Road toward York Springs, to learn as early as possible the road 
 the enemy is taking. 
 
 Comment: "It is believed that this patrol had better remain 
 with the column, and assist in the nearby reconnaissance until the 
 Conewago is near at hand. Too few mounted men with the column 
 will enable small hostile mounted commands to seriously delay it." 
 
 Further comment: "If the support clears the bridge (474 W.) 
 @ 6:34 A. M. and the reserve follows @ 500 yds., the advance 
 guard will clear that point long before the time ordered." 
 
 7th Solution. 
 
 Orders Lt. B & 7 scouts to move at 6 A. M. along Harrisburg 
 road, gain contact with the enemy as soon as possible & endeavor 
 to locate his main body. 
 
 Comment: "Better keep these men nearer at hand for local 
 reconnaissance until the column is approaching, say road junc- 
 tion 543. Their absence will probably hamper local reconnais- 
 sance and so delay march." 
 
[82] 
 
 9th Solution. 
 
 Comments: "Major A's orders indicate very little confidence 
 in the ability of his support commander." 
 
 "As the student's note points out, there is too much in the way 
 of general instructions in the order as to the manner of reconnais- 
 sance by the support." 
 
 "It ought not to be necessary to tell the support commander to 
 send out a mounted point." 
 
 States : "It is of great importance to reach the Conewago and 
 take up a strong position * * * *." 
 
 Comment: "It is not now at all certain that a defensive posi- 
 tion will be required when the vicinity of the Conewago is reached." 
 
 Continues the order in the 3d person. 
 
 Comment: "Quote the order." 
 
 10th Solution. 
 
 Comment: "The mounted orderlies (scouts?) would be more 
 readily available for local reconnaissance if ahead of the com- 
 panies." 
 
 Orders: "Lieut. F, upon arrival at 616 you will take five 
 mounted scouts and observe the crossing of the Conewago north 
 of Hershey Mill. Lieut. G, upon our arrival at Plainview, you 
 will take five mounted scouts and observe the crossing of the Cone- 
 wago a little less than a mile southeast of the Harrisburg Road 
 Crossing." 
 
 Comment: "These orders had better not be issued till the 
 column is approaching 616. The situation may have changed so 
 much by that time as to make them inexpedient or execution im- 
 possible." 
 
 Further comment: "Orders for field train." 
 
 11th Solution. 
 
 Orders Capt. A, commanding support, to start his infantry 
 point at 6:20. 
 
 Comments: "Would it not be better to tell the support com- 
 mander at what time he will clear some definite point? He may 
 not form his support exactly as you have calculated, so throwing 
 out your time for marching the reserve." 
 
 "The order should contain directions as to approximate dis- 
 tance to separate Support and Reserve." 
 
[33] 
 
 14th Solution. 
 
 Comments: "The order should mention the hostile column at 
 New Oxford." 
 
 "By reducing the strength of the mtd. pt. practically all lateral 
 patrolling can be done by mounted men." 
 
 "Better let the Sergeant decide as to exact formation of his 
 patrol." 
 
 Tells support commander to reconnoitre on each side the road. 
 
 Comment: "Not necessary to give such instruction about 
 patrolling." 
 
 15th Solution. 
 
 Comment: "It is important for the command to know also of 
 the Blue Division's advance." 
 
 "And the order leaves the greater part of the mounted scouts 
 unaccounted for." 
 
 A Sketch. 
 
 2nd Solution. 
 Comment: "The sketch does not show all of the patrols that 
 were ordered out, and does not indicate any routes." 
 
 3rd Solution. 
 Comment: "Sketch — The hills just west of Hunterstown 
 should be visited by a patrol." 
 
 6th Solution. 
 
 Comment: "Patches of timber make some close-in reconnais- 
 sance necessary." 
 
 8th Solution. 
 
 Uses % Co. as "Advance Party." 
 
 Comment : "Would not an Advance Party of a Section do just 
 as well, and give the captain a greater part of his co. at hand? 
 It is a good plan to have strength of fractions increase successively 
 from front to rear." 
 
 Further comment: "There should be some patrols examining 
 patches of nearb}^ timber. The flanks are rather unprotected as 
 shown." 
 
 11th Solution. 
 
 Comment : "The sketch indicates patrols on lateral roads con- 
 siderable distance ahead of column. Afford better protection if 
 closer in." 
 
[34] 
 
 13th Solution. 
 
 Comment : "It is believed hill 592, west of 549, should be occu- 
 pied by a patrol. Maj. A has no protection at all to the west of 
 support, and timber along Rock Creek cuts off his view within 
 400 yds." 
 
 Places a patrol (Lt. & 7 men) at j^rossing over the Conewago 
 14 iwile southwest of 529. 
 
 Comment: "This patrol would furnish much more in the way 
 of security for the column if still nearer the Hunterstown hills. 
 It is, besides, now about 3 miles from any support." 
 
 15th Solution. 
 
 Comment: "The sketch shows 31 mounted scouts." 
 "There is no nearby flank protection at all." 
 
 AN APPROVED SOLUTION. 
 
 I. Estimate of the Situation : 
 
 Major A has received definite orders as to his time of starting, 
 route, and the strength of his advance guard. He has then but 
 to decide upon the best distribution of his troops, and the duties 
 to be assigned each fraction. 
 
 His command has the usual mission of an advance guard, that 
 is, to provide for the safe and uninterrupted march of the main 
 body. The regiment has been detached to secure the crossings of 
 the Conewago and so to protect the division's flank. Since the 
 enemy has a column whose position threatens those crossings, it 
 is highly important to reach, as quickly as possible, the high 
 ground commanding them. A rapid advance is therefore required, 
 and this it becomes the primary mission of the advance guard to 
 facilitate in every practicable way. 
 
 The Red troops to the northeast are twice the strength of the 
 Blue regiment. Yesterday, they did not have much, if any cavalry 
 and artillery, or the presence of such would have been discovered 
 and reported. Both cavalry and artillery may have joined since. 
 This command may be the advance of a larger command, or it 
 may be a detachment by itself attempting to join or cooperate 
 ^with the New Oxford column, either by marching on Gettysburg, 
 
[35] 
 
 or by the Baltimore Pike from York Springs. If by the latter, 
 the 1st Infantry will not encounter this column today. If towards 
 Gettysburg, the hostile troops will have ten and a half to eleven 
 miles to go before reaching the Conewago, while Major A's com- 
 mand has only about seven and a half miles to march to reach 
 that stream. Major A should therefore arrive more than an hour 
 ahead of the enemy's infantry, provided both columns start at 
 the same hour. That the Red force bivouacked late last evening 
 may indicate an intention to march unusually early today. This 
 consideration increases the importance of an uninterrupted ad- 
 vance by the 1st Infantry; for to find the high ground south of 
 the Conewago already in the possession of a superior enemy, 
 would make the regiment's task an almost impossible one. 
 
 There may be some hostile cavalry in the direction of York 
 Springs. There are certainly twice as many mounted scouts as 
 with Major A. And this enemy may consequently throw a 
 mounted detachment of some sort to the southern side of the 
 Conewago. 
 
 The advance of the Blue division will largely occupy the at- 
 tention of the Red force at New Oxford. Still, some of its cavalry 
 is likely to be detached to cover the hostile right, and screen the 
 movements of the troops now near York Springs. Accordingly, 
 Major A will be prepared to meet hostile mounted detachments 
 before his advance arrives at the Conewago. 
 
 The enemy, in friendly country, should learn of the march of 
 the 1st Infantry soon after that regiment starts. He may, though, 
 have some difficulty in obtaining correct information of its 
 strength. 
 
 The Blue division on the York Turnpike protects Major A's 
 right for the first hour of his march from any considerable force 
 of the enemy, but after that time, he must exercise great care in 
 his reconnaissance to the east. The main body of the regiment 
 follows close at hand, and so Major A is certain of prompt sup- 
 port. 
 
 The march to the Conewago is a short one, over a good road, 
 and consequently can be made at a good gait, and without long 
 halts. 
 
 The Harrisburg road leads over gently rolling country, gener- 
 ally cultivated, but with patches of timber along stream lines, and 
 
[86] 
 
 on hilltops. A number of high points, affording excellent observa- 
 tion, and the many cross and parallel roads facilitate reconnais- 
 sance. The view from the Harrisburg road is, in some places, 
 extended, but, usually, timber cuts it off within easy rifle range, 
 making examination of such patches necessary. 
 
 Three-quarters of a mile west of the Harrisburg road is a low 
 ridge approximately paralleling it, and terminating in the hill, 
 712, near Plainview. From numerous points along this ridge, 
 the country can be seen for another mile to the west. A good 
 road runs generally near its crest. East of the Harrisburg road 
 are the several hills near Hunterstown whence the ground slopes 
 gently north and east to the Conewago. From these elevations 
 extended views can be obtained, and roads and trails render them 
 easily reached by mounted men. With the first ridge west of the 
 Harrisburg road, the hills west of Hunterstown, and the Hunters- 
 town-Plainview road properly covered by Blue patrols, with 
 patrolling also along each of the lateral roads, and examination 
 of the strips of timber for a few hundred yards from the line of 
 march, practically all done by mounted men, the infantry column 
 can make its march in reasonable security. To patrol to greater 
 distances, either laterally or directly towards the enemy, would 
 be to so scatter the available mounted men that the necessary 
 nearby reconnaissance could not be properly attended to. 
 
 Major A has the choice of several courses in the distribution 
 and use of his troops. Considering first his mounted scouts — 
 these may be placed under one of his battalion staff officers, and 
 sent rapidly ahead to the Conewago to hold the Harrisburg road 
 crossing, or beyond, to find, and keep touch with the enemy. A 
 most excellent means for securing the column's march would be 
 never to lose contact with the enemy, and, without doubt, the 
 regimental commander would like the earliest possible news of the 
 enemy's movements. But the scouts would very likely meet su- 
 perior hostile mounted detachments, and would be dispersed or 
 captured without having sent in any commensurate information. 
 Meantime the advance guard would be so hampered by having to 
 do its local reconnaissance with dismounted men that even a small 
 body of hostile cavalry could easily cause serious delay to the 
 whole regiment. While keeping the bulk of the scouts with the 
 infantr}^ column for local reconnaissance, he might send an ofl^cer's 
 
[37] 
 
 patrol to get in touch with the enemy, and this perhaps could slip 
 through v/here the larger body would find it impossible to break 
 through. But even the absence of a half-dozen men would make 
 the nearby reconnaissance more difficult and so lead to delay. It 
 seems better to keep the mounted men all near the column so as 
 to expedite its march, at least until the Conewago has been 
 reached. If the enemy has not been heard of by that time, another 
 situation will then require the solution of a new problem. 
 
 How 'shall Major A distribute his troops .? If he has a reserve 
 he will somewhat lengthen his column, which, since the only likely 
 enemy south of the Conewago is cavalry, is to be desired. One 
 company will be sufficient infantry for the support since almost 
 all of the patrolling will be done by mounted men. Three com- 
 panies will then go to the reserve, giving Major A the bulk of his 
 command, well in hand, for prompt action if an enemy is met. 
 The mounted scouts should all be assigned to the support, so plac- 
 ing all of the reconnaissance under its commander, and leaving 
 the advance guard commander free to attend to the tactical re- 
 quirements of his position. That there may be no mistake, he 
 will, nevertheless, point out the two important parallel roads, and 
 direct reconnaissance by them. 
 
 No necessity exists for sending a flank guard of infantry by 
 either of the paralleling roads, since it is by no means certain 
 that an enemy will be encountered in either direction, and, if en- 
 countered, timely warning by the mounted patrols will enable a 
 detachment to be made when the emergency arises. 
 
 In addition to the scouts. Major A will have the three battalion 
 orderlies for use as connecting files and messengers. 
 
 Since the advance guard is directed to clear 474 W by 6:50 
 a. m., the reserve must leave the County Almshouse, 675 yards 
 675 + 170 
 
 therefrom, = 9% min. before, or at 6:40 a. m. To 
 
 88 
 let the support precede the reserve by about 500 yards, the sup- 
 
 (500 + 170 
 
 port must clear 474 W by 6 :50 = 8 min.) = 6 :42 
 
 ( 88 
 a. m. 
 
[38] 
 
 Major A decides: 
 
 To divide liis advance guard into a support and a reserve. 
 
 To assign Company A, and the mounted scouts to the support, 
 and Companies B, C and D to the reserve. 
 
 To direct the support commander to send mounted patrols to 
 march by the Goodintent S. H. — 581 — 666, and by the 552 — 
 Hunterstown — Woodside S. H. roads. 
 
 To require the support to clear 474 W by 6:42 a. m. preced- 
 ing the reserve by about 500 yards. 
 
 To form the remainder of the battalion by 6 :40 a. m. 
 
 II. His Orders: 
 
 "Reliable reports indicate that a hostile column of all arms 
 reached Xew Oxford at dusk last night, and that about two regi- 
 ments of hostile infantry bivouacked five miles north of York 
 Springs. 
 
 "The division advances today by the York Turnpike on New 
 Oxford. The 1st Infantry is detached to march by the Harris- 
 burg road to secure the crossings of the Conewago. Its main 
 body follows the advance guard at 700 yards. 
 
 "This battalion, with the mounted scouts of the regiment, con- 
 stitutes the advance guard. 
 
 "Company A, with the mounted scouts, will form the support, 
 under Captain B, and wiU clear the bridge, 474 W, at 6:42 a. m., 
 marching by the Harrisburg road. Mounted patrols will be sent 
 via Hunterstown and Woodside S. H. and by Goodintent S. H. — 
 581 — 666. The Battalion Staff will report to Captain B to com- 
 mand patrols. 
 
 "The reserve, in the order — Companies B, C, D, will be formed 
 on the Harrisburg road opposite the Almshouse by 6 :40, and will 
 follow the support at 500 yards. 
 
 "The battalion field train will join that of the regiment by 
 8 :00 a. m. 
 
 "I shall be with the support after 7 :00 a. m." 
 
 Verbally to assembled officers at 6:00 a. m. Report of disposi- 
 tions to regimental commander. 
 
 III. Sketch on bulletin board. 
 
Sketch 
 ADVANCE GUARD 
 
 MAP PROBLEM N0.2 
 
 Yds 500 
 
 liiiiil 
 
 Only Partrols ouf crt this i-irrte art shown. 
 Routes of Mounted Patrols shown — — • 
 
 2 Miles 
 
 _l 
 
COURSE IN TACTICS— FART I. 
 
 Map Problem No. 3 — An Outpost. 
 (See Hunterstown sheet, 3" map.) 
 Sitimtion : 
 
 A Blue division, operating in hostile territory, has detached the 
 Ist Infantry to secure the crossings of the Conewago, and to pre- 
 vent the further advance of an enemy's cohunn of two infantry 
 regiments reported to be in the vicinity of York Springs. 
 
 At 4:00 p. m., September 15th, this regiment is assembled 400 
 yards southwest of 561, on the Harrisburg road, covered by 
 march outposts which are watching the line of the Conewago for 
 some tliree miles on each side of the Harrisburg road. 
 
 The commander of the first Infantry issues verbal orders as 
 follows : 
 
 "Tlic enemy in our front bivouacked about 3:00 p. m. behind 
 an outpost line extending from Hill 687, northwest of Heidlers- 
 burg, through that viUage to the cross-roads 1300 yards east 
 thereof. 
 
 "Our division is in the vicinity of Brush Run confronting a 
 hostile column of all arms intrenched about New Oxford. 
 
 "This regiment will encamp for the night. 
 
 "The 2d Battalion, 1 platoon. Machine Gun Company, and 10 
 mounted scouts, under Major B, will establish an outpost ap- 
 proximately on the line of the Conewago from Hershey Mill to 
 the trail crossing that stream 1300 yards east of Plainview. If 
 attacked, tins line will be held. 
 
 "The remainder of the regiment, under Lieut. Colonel X, will 
 encamp on tlie Gettysburg side of this watercourse. (The one 
 400 yards southwest of 561.) 
 
 "The field trains will move up to the road junction, 53n. .in*! 
 thence will be at the disposal of the battalion commanders. 
 
 "^lessages to this point." 
 Required : 
 
 1. Major B's estimate of the situation. 
 
 2. His orders. 
 
 8. A sketch locating each fraction of the outpost in its night 
 position. 
 
 [40] 
 
[41] 
 
 STUDENTS' ERRORS AND INSTRUCTOR'S CRITICISMS. 
 Major B's estimate of the situation. 
 1st Solution. 
 Comment: "To use the one direct line of advance for the 
 enemy as the dividing line of sectors seems unusually objection- 
 able. If the Harrisburg road is to be properly defended the 
 comdr. of this support (the one guarding the road) must be re- 
 sponsible for at least 400 to 500 yds. west of it." 
 
 2nd Solution. 
 
 States : 'The mission of Maj . A is to hold with his outpost the 
 three crossings of the Conewago embraced within the limits as- 
 signed to the outpost line ***♦,> 
 
 Comment: "An outpost comdr. is responsible for the protec- 
 tion of the flanks of his general line unless the halt order has 
 specifically assigned that duty to some one else. Major B should 
 detach to watch the crossings to the east near 529 and to the west 
 at Bridge S. H.» 
 
 4th Solution. 
 
 Gives line of resistance as, in general, the eastern edge of woods 
 (about 700 yds. south of east from 616) — trail 100 yds. southwest 
 of Plainview— road 605— hill TOT— hill T12. 
 
 Places 1 Co. & 5 scouts as Support No. 1 on road about 100 
 yds. southwest of Plainview, with sector — Trail crossing Conewago 
 east of Plainview to bend of trail 200 yds. west of Hershey Mill 
 both included, and 1 Co. & 5 scouts as Support No. 2 at 666, 
 with sector — bend of trail 200 yds. west of Mill, excluded, to 
 Fidlcr — 588 road included. Places 2 cos. & Machine Guns in re- 
 serve at 561. 
 
 Comments : "The whole outpost is too far from the Conewago, 
 and does not, in general, face the enemy. 
 
 The line of resistance should be on the northern slopes of the 
 high ground north and northwest of Plainview. By going so far 
 back the great advantage of the unfordable stream is lost." 
 
 "The sectors assigned each support are too long for one com- 
 pany." 
 
 "The machine guns should be with the support on the Harris- 
 burg road to cover the most direct lines of advance for the enemy — 
 the Harrisburg road and trail east of Plainview." 
 
[42] 
 
 6th Solution. 
 " Places Co. C (less detachments) and ten scouts on the island 
 at 502 W, with 20 men of Co. C, under an officer, on the island 
 at the ford east of Plainview, and 16 men of Co. C, under an 
 officer, near Hershej Mill. 
 
 Places Co. D across the stream south of Co. C, and the rest 
 of the advance guard in reserve at Plainview. 
 
 Comments: "The best way to hold the crossings during the 
 daytime is by placing supports on the high ground commanding 
 them where a suitable field of fire can be obtained." 
 
 "The support on the Harrisburg road should be south of both 
 bridges. They have practically no field of fire where they are 
 stationed." 
 
 "Major B's division makes one company attempt to cover a 
 front of 2600 yds. — so great that its Captain cannot control its 
 work. Better have 2 supports, one near Plainview, and one west 
 of Plainview on the road to Hershey Mill." 
 
 "There is not sufficient depth to your outpost. The reserve 
 should be somewhere about 616, where the men can be made more 
 comfortable and yet reinforce any part of the line in plenty of 
 time." 
 
 9th Solution. 
 
 Comment : "The Harrisburg road is too important to be made 
 dividing line between sectors." 
 
 10th Solution. 
 
 States: "Major B has no reason to consider the 666-561-544 
 road; that will undoubtedly be guarded from the main body. His 
 line of outposts has been designated with its approximate limits." 
 
 Comment : "There is nothing in the halt order to indicate that 
 the 666-561-544 road will be taken care of by the main body. 
 Unless specifically relieved therefrom by the assignment of other 
 troops to the duty, an outpost commander is responsible for the 
 protection of the flanks of his outpost line." 
 
 11th Solution. 
 Decides to place machine guns with Support No. 2, 600 yds. 
 west of Plainview. 
 
[43] 
 
 Comment : "It is doubtful if the timber will permit the mach- 
 ine guns to fire on the 502 W bridge. They had better be with 
 the No. 1 Support on the direct line of advance for the enemy." 
 
 14th Solution. 
 
 Places reserve of one company and machine guns at Plainview. 
 
 Comment: "The reserve will be in better position to rein- 
 force any part of the line, and obtain more comfort for the men 
 if stationed near 616." 
 
 15th Solution. 
 
 Comment: "The decision should include location of the Re- 
 serve." 
 
 16th Solution. 
 
 Comment: "The estimate should discuss and decide upon the 
 exact line of resistance, the division into sectors, the assignment 
 of supports to the same, location of reserve, determination of 
 how protection must be extended to the flanks, location of de- 
 tached posts, use to be made of mounted men of machine guns, 
 and what to do with wagons." 
 
 States that the river crossings at Hershey Mill, 502 W, and 
 ford east of Plainview are to be held by Maj. B & that the cros- 
 sings above and below these points must continue to be looked 
 after by the march outposts. 
 
 Comments: "Major B's battalion is detailed to relieve the 
 march outposts." 
 
 "The estimate contains no decision." 
 
 17th Solution. 
 
 States that notwithstanding it is fatiguing to the men to put 
 so many on outpost, Maj. B decides that he will hold only one 
 company in reserve. 
 
 Comment: "An outpost behind an impassible object — except 
 a few points — offers an opportunity to economize men, instead of 
 squandering them." 
 
 Further comment: "The estimate should proceed with some 
 system from a consideration of his mission through discussion of 
 possible means to a definite decision. The 1st page of the estimate 
 is almost entirely decision." 
 
[44] 
 
 His Orders. 
 1st Solution. 
 
 Orders : "Capt. B, place your support near 605." 
 
 Comment: "This support should be stationed 400 or 500 
 yds. northwest of 605." 
 
 2nd Solution. 
 
 Places Co. E, as Support No. 2, at trail junction % mile south- 
 east of Hershey Mill with one platoon as outguard at Mill. Places 
 remainder of command, as Support No. 1, at Plainview, with Co. 
 F (less 1 platoon) and Machine Gun Platoon as outguard at 
 southern bridge near 502 W. Places 1 platoon as outguard at 
 ford east of Plainview. Orders scouts to patrol on the north side 
 of the Conewago until sundown & then joins Support No. 1. 
 
 Uses no reserve. 
 
 Comments : "By putting his whole command so far to the front 
 the men will have little rest. Better have a reserve of two com- 
 panies south of 616." 
 
 "The enemy can best be prevented from using the Conewago 
 crossings by placing the line of resistance, in the daytime, on the 
 high ground where a proper field of fire can be obtained. An out- 
 guard of a company & the guns at the Harrisburg crossing is 
 so strong that immediately at that crossing will be the point of 
 resistance." 
 
 "Instructions to Capts. E & F are in too great detail." 
 
 "Landmarks should be named in describing sectors, not points 
 a & b on a sketch." 
 
 "The mounted scouts should have more definite orders." 
 
 3rd Solution. 
 Comment: "The sectors to be covered by each support should 
 have limiting lines or points given." 
 
 4th Solution. 
 Comments: "Time and place of issue (of order) should be 
 
 stated." 
 
 "The support No. 2 is not facing the enemy at all." 
 
 "The instructions for defensive measures and patrolling are 
 
 in too great detail." 
 
[46] 
 
 "Where messages are to be received should be in last para- 
 graph." 
 
 "Information about march outposts should be in first para- 
 graph." 
 
 States that Maj. B sends at night from the reserve a lieutenant 
 and 1 section to ridge 200 yds. N. W. of 544 with orders to post 
 a sentinel and patrol the 507-529 road N. E. 
 
 Comment : "Should be posted near the Conewago." 
 
 6th Solution. 
 Sends wagons to companies. 
 
 Comment: "The wagons should hardly join the companies at 
 the Harrisburg bridges." 
 
 7th Solution. 
 
 Comments : "What the main body (remainder of the regiment) 
 does should be stated." 
 
 "Co. E's sector is not definitely described. There are several 
 farm houses west of Plainview. What farm house.? What bend 
 of trail.?" 
 
 "Co. F's sector not definitely described." 
 
 "Where Capt. H's detached post goes is not clear." 
 
 "There are no orders for machine guns." 
 
 "Pages 9, 10, 11 & 12 give nothing called for by requirements 
 of problem." (These pages describe in detail the action taken by 
 the captains & machine gun platoon commander and give mes- 
 sage Maj. B sends to Regimental Commander.) 
 
 Machine guns have day positions, one on road covering bridges 
 at 502 W, and one on road covering bridge near Hershey Mill. 
 
 Comment: "Machine guns should not be used singly." 
 
 8th Solution. 
 
 Comments: "Major B would probably put his command in 
 march toward 616 at once, and ride rapidly to the high ground 
 near Plainview for a hurried reconnaissance before issuing orders." 
 
 "Information of the reg's. camp should * * * * ^jg 
 given." 
 
 Maj . B states that he does not know how long marching patrols 
 are to remain out. 
 
[46] 
 
 Comment: "March outpost remain out until regular outposts 
 take position. 
 
 Major B had better not make this statement." 
 
 Assigns sectors as follows: Co. A and M. G. Platoon and 3 
 scouts (Support No. 1) from island at ford east of Plainview, in- 
 clusive, to the island about 700 yards north of there, exclusive. 
 
 Co. B and 3 scouts (Support No. 2) from island 350 yards 
 southeast of Harrisburg road crossing, inclusive, to the island 
 600 yards up stream, exclusive. 
 
 Co. C and 3 scouts (Support No. 3) from the island about 350 
 yards east of crossing at Hershey Mill, inclusive, to bend of road 
 about 400 yards northwest of the crossing, inclusive. 
 
 Comments: "The orders seem to leave a considerable gap un- 
 covered between the sectors of Supports 2 and 3." 
 
 "The supports should be assigned stations." 
 
 Places line of resistance approximately on the 540 contour. 
 
 Comments: "In the daytime a better field of fire will be ob- 
 tained by putting the line of resistance further up the hill." 
 
 "The Harrisburg road is the most important line of advance 
 from the enemy's position, and therefore the machine guns should 
 be with Support No. 2." 
 
 10th Solution. 
 
 Places Support No. 1 on road 500 yards north of Plainview. 
 
 Comment: "Decision (on page 5) is 300 yds. north Plain- 
 view." 
 
 Orders Lt. F, commanding detached post of 16 men and 3 
 scouts, to post his scouts at crossing of trail over the Conewago 
 east of Plainview. 
 
 Comments : "Better let Lt. F decide where to post his mounted 
 scouts." 
 
 "No orders for train." 
 
 11th Solution. 
 Orders reserve to bivouac . 
 
 Comment: "They could safely pitch shelter tents." 
 Further comment: "As the student points out, the order goes 
 too much into detail in its directions for patrolling. Major B is 
 supposed to be dealing with efficient and trained officers." 
 
[47] 
 
 12th Solution. 
 Comment: "Order for communication detached posts seems 
 mixed in writing." 
 
 13th Solution. 
 Comment: "The orders should designate posts for the sup- 
 ports." 
 
 14th Solution. 
 Orders that all roads from the crossing near 523 W, inclusive, 
 to the crossing near 529 will be patrolled. 
 Comment: "Patrolling is hardly enough." 
 
 15th Solution. 
 
 Orders supports stationed as follows: Co. E (less 1 plat.) and 
 3 scouts at ford east of Plainview, Co. F at 502 W, 1 plat. 
 Co. E and 3 scouts at Hershey Mill. Orders remainder of com- 
 mand in reserve at 616. 
 
 Comments: "The machine guns should be on the nose north 
 of Plainview to cover the direct line of advance from the hostile 
 position." 
 
 "The supports in the daytime would have a better field of fire 
 if several hundred yards behind where located and on higher 
 ground." 
 
 "The supports had better be arranged to avoid splitting Co. E." 
 
 17th Solution. 
 
 Comment: "What the regiment is to do should be under 1." 
 (Paragraph 1.) 
 
 States: "Organizations will move at once." 
 
 Comment: "Meaning of this is not clear." 
 
 Further comments: "Orders for reserve should follow those 
 for supports." 
 
 "Not clear where reserve is to go." 
 
 Orders Support No. 2 to 616. 
 
 Comments: "Support No. 2 should be stationed nearer the 
 Conewago." 
 
 "Orders for it are hard to follow (understand)." 
 
 "Its Comdr. should be allowed to decide on positions J^of) his 
 outguards." 
 
 Orders mounted scouts to watch crossings. 
 
[48] 
 
 Comments: "The mounted scouts should be sent across the 
 stream, and dismounted outguards posted at crossings — Mtd. 
 scouts should be part of supports in your solution." 
 
 "Orders for Support No. 2 should all be together." 
 
 Quotes: "Watch what you can't block." 
 
 Comment: "Out of place in an order." 
 
 A sketch locating each fraction of the outpost in its night position. 
 
 1st Solution. 
 
 Places 1 machine gun on each side of Harrisburg Road, and 
 about 25 yds. from it, on the ridge northeast of Plainview. 
 
 Comment: "Believed better to bring the machine guns and 
 detachment to the first, southern, bridge." 
 
 Places detachment of 11 men on the road half way down the 
 hill southeast of Hershey Mill. 
 
 Comment : "It is believed the detachment to guard the Hershey 
 Mill crossing should be posted at the southern side, with sentinels 
 at the road junction just north of the stream." 
 
 "And similarly the detachment covering the ford east of Plain- 
 view should be posted at the ford with sentries on the island, or 
 across Con." 
 
 "The Bridge S. H. crossing should be covered by a detachment 
 west of hill 712." 
 
 2nd Solution. 
 
 Comment: "Sentries had better be across the Conewago and 
 the roads should be patrolled towards the enemy." 
 
 3rd Solution. 
 
 Places the machine guns % mile east of Plainview. 
 
 Comment: "It is believed that at night the machine guns 
 should be placed behind a barricade just south of the Harrisburg 
 bridges." 
 
 4th Solution. 
 
 Places outguard of 2 squads near 502 W, and one of 1 squad 
 near ford east of Plainview. 
 
 Comment : "The outguards on the Harrisburg road and on the 
 trail east of Plainview should be much stronger, particularly in 
 view of the great distance to their support." 
 
[49] 
 
 5th Solution. 
 
 Places outguards of 8 men each at crossings. 
 
 Comment: "The outguards at all crossings are too weak." 
 
 Places machine guns at Plainview. 
 
 Comment: "The machine guns at night should be very close 
 to the 1st (southern) bridge, behind a barricade, and the outguard 
 here should be not less than a section." 
 
 6th Solution. 
 
 Comments : "C and D Cos. had better be entirely south of the 
 Conewago except for double sentinels and patrols. There should 
 be no outguards across the stream." 
 
 "The reserve is not shown on sketch." 
 
 9th Solution. 
 Comment: "And it is believed that 2 squads are too weak for 
 the outguards at night on the Harrisburg road and on the trail to 
 the east." 
 
 11th Solution. 
 Places outguards of eight men at the three crossings of the 
 Conewago. 
 
 Comment: "And the outguard at each of the 3 crossings 
 should be strengthened." 
 
 14th Solution. 
 Comment on sketch: "Is not entirely intelligible because the 
 line of the Conewago is not shown." 
 
 15th Solution. 
 Comment: "Nothing but sentinels and patrols should cross 
 the bridges and ford." 
 
 17th Solution. 
 
 Comment: "A cossack post at each crossing is too little at 
 night." 
 
 Places Supports No. 1 near 544, No. 2 near 616, No. 3 in first 
 orchard northwest of 605, and the Reserve on stream northeast 
 of 561. 
 
 Comments: "The reserve should be near 616 and the supports 
 2 and 3 farther forward. 
 
 "Patrols and sentinels should cross the Conewago." 
 
[50] 
 
 AN APPROVED SOLUTION. 
 
 I. Major B's estimate of the situation: 
 
 The halt order gives Major B his approximate line of resistance, 
 and the strength and composition of his outpost. There remains 
 for his decision: The determination of the exact line to be held, 
 division into sectors, assignment of supports to the same, location 
 of reserve, if one is decided upon, determination of distance to 
 which protection must be extended to the flanks, location of de- 
 tached posts, use to be made of his mounted men, of his machine 
 guns, and what to do with his wagons. 
 
 His mission is to secure the undisturbed rest of the main body, 
 unless the enemy attacks in force, in which case it is to hold the 
 line of the Conewago until the main body has made its dispositions 
 for action. 
 
 The enemy in front of Major B may next move towards the 
 southeast to get in touch with, or join the hostile column about 
 New Oxford. The Blue outposts will then not be struck. He 
 may advance by the roads between Newchester and Plainview, by 
 those west of Plainview, or towards Gettysburg by the Harrisburg 
 road. The last, being the shortest route to the Blue command, 
 must be most strongly held. The other routes must be held, or 
 simply observed, in accordance with their relative importance. 
 
 Having already established an outpost line, the enemy will 
 probably do nothing beyond reconnaissance before dark ; and this 
 reconnaissance should be made as difficult as possible by skillful 
 use of the Blue patrols. He may attack during the night. To 
 guard against this, the crossings must then be held by strong 
 outguards, with patrols well to the front to furnish timely warn- 
 ing of an advance, and the night positions must be taken before 
 dark, as the most likely time for attack will be just at dusk in the 
 evening or very early in the morning. 
 
 Major B does not give much thought to the north bank of the 
 Conewago for his line of resistance. He would there place his 
 supports in an exceedingly dangerous position, and give up all 
 of the defensive value of the unfordable Conewago. South of the 
 Conewago the high ground surrounding Plainview offers excellent 
 positions from which the fire of intrenched supports can sweep 
 the three important crossings. To go south of Plainview would 
 be to give up the line of the stream. His line of resistance then, 
 
[51] 
 
 during daylight, will be along the northern slope of the nose 
 west and north of Plainview, and the eastern slope of the nose 
 overlooking the trail crossing east of Plainview. At night strong 
 outguards will be stationed at the crossings themselves with a 
 view to their determined defense, the ground between being simply 
 patrolled. 
 
 In arranging his outpost. Major B begins by placing a support 
 on the Harrisburg road, the direct line to the enemy's position. 
 Another support might be placed east of Plainview to cover the 
 trail crossing in that direction. But by placing a company and 
 the machine guns in one support, it will be made strong enough 
 to cover both the trail crossing and the Harrisburg road bridges. 
 The natural station for this support is at the trail and road 
 junction just north of Plainview. Trenches for the company 
 should then be constructed on the northern slope some 300 yards 
 north and northeast of this point, and on the nose west of the 
 trail crossing. The machine guns, from the nose northeast of 
 Plainview during the daytime, can be of the greatest value in the 
 defense of these two crossings. At night they will be moved for- 
 ward to a position behind a barricade immediately south of the 
 Harrisburg bridges. If not assigned to the support, but stationed 
 with the reserve, the platoon would have to remain in a high degree 
 of readiness, and then would arrive where wanted later than is 
 desirable. 
 
 In deciding upon the western boundary for this sector, it is 
 more than usually important that the division shall not fall on 
 the road. Otherwise, the duty of patrolling the Conewago west 
 of the Harrisburg bridges will fall to another command than the 
 one responsible for the defense of that road. 
 
 This support will have some 2,000 yards of the stream to 
 guard — not too much considering the nature of the stream and 
 the strength of the support. 
 
 The 616 — Hershey Mill road is the next most important one. 
 And consequently a second support will be placed thereon. A 
 suitable location is found south of the orchard at the junction 
 with the farm road about 600 yards northwest of 616. 
 
 Major B has now covered the entire frontage assigned for his 
 general line. And he has two companies left. He prefers to hold 
 these two companies as a reserve in a comfortable camp well back 
 
[62] 
 
 of the line of resistance to be thrown quickly where most needed 
 if attack comes, rather than to increase the strength of the sup- 
 ports already determined upon. South of 616 seems to be a 
 suitably sheltered camp ground with roads radiating in the proper 
 directions for easy reinforcement of the line of resistance. 
 
 Turning to the flanks of his general outpost line, Major B sees 
 that there are two other crossings cri the Conewago, to the east 
 near cross roads 529, and to the west near Bridge S. H., which 
 must be watched if the regiment is to rest in reasonable security. 
 An outpost commander is responsible for the protection of the 
 flanks of his general line unless this duty has been specifically 
 assigned to some one else. No such assignment appears in the 
 halt order. The crossings named are too far away to be included 
 in the general line. They must, therefore, be covered by detached 
 posts. Hill 712 is an excellent observation station which should 
 be occupied for this purpose as well as to cover the roads from 
 the west. The company in support on the 616 — Hershey Mill 
 road has a shorter section and less important crossing to watch 
 than the one northeast of Plainview, and so can spare a detach- 
 ment for this hill. 
 
 A small detachment on the low ridge at 544 will be taken from 
 the reserve. 
 
 The crossing near 529 is so far out that, if possible, mounted 
 men should go to this post. And mounted men are also desirable 
 here to patrol to Belmont S. H. for the early detection of a 
 hostile movement to the southeast. 
 
 Some mounted men must also be with each support for daytime 
 patrolling to the front and orderly duty. 
 
 The field wagons can with safety join even the organizations 
 in support, at least till after supper, when all of the battalion 
 wagons should be assembled off the roads south of the reserve. 
 
 Cooking for all of the companies can be easily done under cover. 
 
 To help in the passive defense of the Conewago, bridge planking 
 should be loosened (not taken up until necessary because patrols 
 will be kept north of the Conewago) and fords prepared for ob- 
 struction. 
 
 Major B decides upon the following distribution of his troops: 
 
 Support No. 1, Company E and the machine gun platoon on 
 the nose northeast of Plainview to cover the sector from the 
 
[58] 
 
 wooded island which the trail running east from Plainview crosses, 
 inclusive, to the western extremity of the island crossed by the 
 Harrisburg road. 
 
 Support No. 2, Company F, at the junction of the farm road 
 and 616 — Hershey Mill road 650 yards northwest of 616, to cover 
 the sector from the western extremity of the island crossed by the 
 Harrisburg road to the intake of the Hershey Mill ditch 800 
 yards west of that mill. 
 
 A detached post of two squads from this support west of hill 
 712 for the observation of crossings at Bridge S. H. 
 
 Reserve, Companies G and H, to camp south of the cross-roads 
 616. 
 
 A detached post of one squad from the reserve at cross-roads 
 544 southeast of this camp. 
 
 A detached post of six scouts, under the battalion adjutant, 
 at the stream crossing near 529. 
 
 Two scouts and one mounted orderly to be sent to each support. 
 
 He further decides to have the wagons join their companies till 
 after supper, and to have the planks of the Conewago bridges 
 loosened and preparations made for obstructing the fords. 
 n. His Orders: 
 
 Immediately upon receipt of the halt order. Major B sets the 
 command in motion for cross-roads 616, riding ahead himself for 
 a hurried reconnaissance from the high ground near Plainview. 
 His orders are issued verbally, near 616, about 4:30 p. m., to 
 the assembled company and detachment commanders and staff. 
 
 "The enemy in our front bivouacked about 3:00 p. m. behind 
 an outpost line extending from hill 687, northwest of Heidlers- 
 burg, through that village to the cross-roads 1,300 yards east 
 thereof. 
 
 "Our division is in the vicinity of Brush Run confronting a 
 hostile column of all arms intrenched about New Oxford. 
 
 "The main body of the regiment goes into camp where it was 
 assembled. March outposts are now watching the line of the 
 Conewago for some three miles on each side of the Harrisburg 
 road. 
 
 "The 2d Battalion, Machine Gun Platoon, and ten mounted 
 scouts, under my command, are directed to establish an outpost 
 to hold the line of the Conewago. 
 
[54] 
 
 "Company E and the Machine Gun Platoon, under Captain E, 
 will constitute Support No. 1, taking post on the nose northeast 
 of Plainview, to occupy the sector from the wooded island crossed 
 by the trail leading east from Plainview, inclusive, to the western 
 extremity of the island crossed by the Harrisburg road. 
 
 "Company F will constitute Support No. 2, taking post near 
 the junction of the farm road and, the 616 — Hershey Mill road, 
 650 yards northwest of 616, to occupy the sector from the 
 western extremity of the island crossed by the Harrisburg road 
 to the intake of the ditch 800 yards west of Hershey Mill. This 
 support will send a detached post of two squads under an officer 
 to the junction of the trail from Hershey Mill and the 666 — 
 Bridge S. H. road to watch the Conewago crossings west of 
 Bridge S. H. 
 
 "Both supports will prepare their positions for defense. Plank- 
 ing of bridges will be loosened, and preparations made to obstruct 
 fords. 
 
 "Patrols will be sent as far as the line, hills 586 — 584. 
 
 "Two scouts and one mounted orderly will be sent to report 
 to each support commander. 
 
 "Lieutenant A (battalion adjutant) and six scouts will take 
 post at the Conewago crossing near 529, patrolling to Belmont 
 S. H. and 574. 
 
 "Companies G and H, in reserve, under Captain G, will camp 
 south of cross-roads 616. 
 
 "The wagons will join their organizations, returning to park 
 south of the reserve by 8 :30 p. m. 
 
 "Messages to the reserve." 
 
 Report of dispositions to the regimental commander. 
 III. Sketch on bulletin board. 
 
Outpos+ Ske+ch 
 NIGHT POSITIONS 
 
 MAP PROBLEM N0.3 
 
 02 
 
 w 
 
 SQUADS & 
 MACHINE GUNS 
 
 Belmont 
 S.H. 
 
 Yds soo o 
 
 iihlilihl 
 
 2 Miles 
 
 J 
 
 Pcrtrols cover Souih Bank ofConewago from 523 Wfo 
 529 inclusive, and North of Stream on Roads to Line Hills 
 566-58^ 
 
COURSE IN TACTICS— TART I. 
 
 Map Problem No. 4. 
 (See New Oxford sheet, 3" map.) 
 Situation: 
 
 Conewago Creek, due to high water, is unfordable. All bridges 
 over the stream in the loop between Newchester and Waldheim are 
 intact; all others for fifteen miles in either direction are either 
 washed away or destroyed. 
 
 The 1st Bn., 1st Blue Inf., in friendly territory, near Husbach, 
 at 8 a. m., September 21st, receives the following message: 
 
 1st Infantry, 
 
 Littlestown, 
 Major A: 21 Sept. '11—6 A. M. 
 
 It is reported by a reliable person that a hostile raiding party 
 consisting of a brigade of infantry is gathering supplies about 10 
 miles north of you, that orders were issued last night for two 
 battalions of that force to move against you at 7 A. M. this morn- 
 ing and destroy the bridges over the Conewago near you. 
 
 This command with my regiment as advance guard will move 
 north today to clear our territory of the enemy but cannot start 
 before 10 A. M. 
 
 X, 
 Required : Col. 
 
 1. Major A's estimate of the situation. 
 
 2. Preliminary arrangements and preparations, if any. 
 
 At 10:15 a. m. the enemy is reported at Oakwood S. H. and 
 just starting to advance in two columns, one on the road leading 
 to southwest, the other through the woods directly south. 
 
 3. Major A's order. 
 
 STUDENTS' ERRORS AND INSTRUCTOR'S CRITICISMS. 
 
 1st Solution. 
 Holds line about 400 yds. north of 520 extending from road 
 520-502 to head of ravine to west. 
 
 [56] 
 
[57] 
 
 Places Co. A on this line, and the other companies in reserve 
 under cover near 520. 
 
 Comments: "By moving to south side of Conewago you give 
 up your mission which is to keep a safe crossing for your force. 
 Now they must force a crossing in the face of 2 bns. likely to 
 prove very costly. 
 
 Considerable clearing would have to be done or troops posted 
 otherwise than you have to prevent small parties creeping up on 
 bridge and possibly destroying it. 
 
 The other bridges should be disabled to prevent your being 
 turned." 
 
 3rd Solution. 
 
 Comment: "Wagons should cross the Conewago. Could pro- 
 tect your right flank better by det. on east side of stream." 
 
 4th Solution. 
 
 Places Co. A about 200 yds. northeast of bridge 463 on the 
 nose that terminates near the road in a steep bank, Co. B in the 
 orchard at the cross roads at bridge north of Waldheim, Cos. 
 C & D on line from northeast point of hill 526 across road 100 
 yards southeast of Husbach. All entrench. Later moves Co. B 
 west along Conewago to first branch stream. 
 
 Comments : "The main blue force does not need all the bridges 
 to enable them to succeed. Believe it better to disable part and 
 concentrate to save at least one. 
 
 By attempting too much you are likely to fail in aU. By your 
 dispositions following the routes you must if enemy advances, it 
 is nearly 2 miles from right to left of your battalion." 
 
 "The wagons should have been parked south of Conewago." 
 
 5th Solution. 
 With three companies holds line Hill 526-Husbach-Ridge 520. 
 Comments : "In your preparation should clear field of fire and 
 especial]}^ provide for woods to N. E. of position." 
 "Line held is a little too long." 
 
 6th Solution. 
 
 Comments: "In estimate terrain is not considered." 
 "2d Requirement, More detail desirable as to clearing field of 
 fire &c." 
 
[58] 
 
 Places Co. A on Hill 526, and Cos. B & C on line from Husbach's 
 to 510-463 road. 
 
 Comment : "The 463 bridge will be very hard to hold ; believe 
 better to destroy it and concentrate effort on other." 
 
 "Your line is too long for your force." 
 
 7th Solution. 
 
 Comment: "Preliminary arrangements &c might be gone into 
 more fully. Obstacles, wire &c used." 
 
 "It is better, I think, to at least partially disable the 463 
 bridge." 
 
 8th Solution. 
 
 Holds the line 526-Husbach's-520 ridge, with 3 companies. 
 
 Comment: "Bridge 463 cannot be held by your force as dis- 
 posed. Approach to it is too easy for enemy; he may cross a 
 det. there and cut you off. Better destroy it." 
 
 "More attention should be given to clearing your field of fire 
 and use of obstacles." 
 
 9th Solution. 
 
 Holds line from 526 to 510. 
 
 Comments : "The line across loop is too long for one bn," 
 
 "Under 2d Requirement obstacles, ranges &c should be men- 
 tioned." 
 
 10th Solution. 
 
 Comment : "Inf. Cos. should be deployed without Co. support. 
 Barbed wire should be collected and used. You mention obstacles 
 in a general way but this is very important." 
 
 12th Solution. 
 
 Sends Co. A to entrench 200 yds. northeast of 510 & to hold 
 there long enough to cause enemy to deploy, then to return to main 
 line on Hill 526. 
 
 Comment: "The Co. sent to 510 looks somewhat like an ad- 
 vanced post." 
 
 13th Solution. 
 Takes position south of the Conewago on hill between 480 & 448 
 meantime removing planking from bridges at 463 & 434 W. and 
 obstructing crossings at 444 & north of 520. 
 
[59] 
 
 Comments : "For reasons you give Maj or A's mission calls on 
 him to try to save a safe crossing for the Blue main force. To 
 force a crossing in the face of 2 bns. is likely to be a costly opera- 
 tion." 
 
 "A few men should be left at the two dismantled bridges to 
 prevent enemy crossing on stringers." 
 
 "Message should be sent to Col. X that he may know where to 
 march to." 
 
 14th Solution. 
 
 Constructs entrenchments, sufficient to accommodate the bat- 
 talion, from near 463 to near 434. 
 
 Comment: "By trying to save both (463 & 434 W bridges), 
 are liable to lose both by being too scattered." 
 
 "Dig less trench, clear field of fire, and concentrate for defense 
 of one bridge is best show, and one bridge is ample for main body 
 if securely held." 
 
 15th Solution. 
 
 Comment : "2nd Requirement not very complete." 
 
 AN APPROVED SOLUTION. 
 
 From the information Major A has received he knows there is 
 a hostile force to his north and that the main Blue force starts 
 from Littlestown at 10 a. m. to drive them out. Owing to the 
 condition of the Conewago this force must cross on one of the two 
 bridges near Husbach or make a wide detour, causing much delay 
 and allowing friendly territory to be still more overrun by hostile 
 troops. 
 
 To simply protect the bridges from destruction from the south 
 side of the stream would not answer the purpose, for the enemy 
 holding the north exit would make the forcing of a bridge a very 
 costly operation and one taking much time. Major A's mission 
 is therefore to hold a safe crossing of the Conewago for the main 
 Blue force. 
 
 To accomplish his mission Major A has one battalion of in- 
 fantry with him. His main body is at Littlestown, by road about 
 fourteen miles away, and will not start to his support until 10 
 a. m. The remainder of his regiment being the advance guard. 
 
[60] 
 
 and knowing the situation may be counted on to push the march, 
 still Major A cannot count on their arrival before 3 p. m., and 
 probably later. 
 
 Reliable information places the enemy's strength at one brigade 
 of infantry ten miles north of him, but of this force only two bat- 
 talions are at present moving against him, having started at 7 
 a. m., and can be expected to arrive at any time after 10 a. m. 
 
 Major A to successfully carry out his mission must hold off 
 twice his strength for about five hours; with forces of this size it 
 means a decision. 
 
 Major A has the advantage of being in friendly territory with 
 all that means of better information, more familiarity with the 
 country, the effect on his men, and two hours in which to select a 
 position and strengthen it, which the enemy must capture in order 
 to win. Maj or A needs only to hold on. But the enemy can select 
 his line of operation, and to a great extent has the lead. 
 
 The enemy will undoubtedly advance through Oakwood S. H. 
 at least with the bulk of his force, for he would hardly commit his 
 main force to the 519-463 road through the woods. Major A 
 can count on his acting aggressively and attacking vigorously 
 as soon as his enemy is located. If, however. Major A withdraws 
 to the far side of the stream the enemy will probably entrench to 
 cover the northern side and prevent a return. He is not likely to 
 attempt to force a bridge, although he can be counted on to try 
 to destroy them. 
 
 The two bridges in question are located on opposite sides of a 
 bend in the Conewago. This bend is a little over a mile across at 
 the mouth and a little deeper than wide. A ridge running nearly 
 north and south terminates in the loop. The slopes to east and 
 west are gentle and offer no serious impediment to the movement of 
 the troops. About Oakwood S. H. and north of and reaching to the 
 bridge at 463 are large woods ; while both are free from underbrush 
 they would interfere with view and fire and would be a detriment 
 to a weaker force on the defensive. A ravine nearly parallel with 
 526-510 road might prove a slight obstacle, but is more likely to 
 afford the attackers a position in which to reform his lines for a 
 further advance. The little knoll 526 is slightly the highest 
 ground in the loop and has a fair field of fire, except for a narrow 
 strip of open wood to the north and the orchard and buildings of 
 
[61] 
 
 the Husbach farm. The ravine can be enfiladed at short range 
 from the opposite bank of the Conewago. There are no points 
 in the loop affording any but a comparatively short range fire and 
 view in the desired directions. 
 
 Major A has several courses open to him. He could withdraw 
 across the stream and either retreat to meet the main force or 
 take up a position to prevent the destruction of the bridges. In 
 either case he gives up his mission. 
 
 Move north to meet the enemy. The advantages of this course 
 are that he could gain a position with a better field of fire than he 
 could obtain in the loop and might be able to fight in successive 
 positions. The disadvantages are that he gives up his oppor- 
 tunity to prepare and strengthen his position ; he is so inferior in 
 strength that he could be readily turned and might be crowded to 
 east or west and uncover the bridges to a detachment sent to 
 destroy them, thereby losing not only the bridges but his command. 
 He has little faith in his success in attempting a running fight 
 against double his strength and with so short a distance to play 
 it in, especially as he must hold out for five hours at least. He is 
 almost certain to become too closely engaged to successfully break 
 off. 
 
 If he fights in the loop he must first decide whether to attempt 
 to save both bridges intact or only one. These bridges are over a 
 mile apart, he has but one battalion against two. He can not hold 
 any such line. He could divide his force half at each bridge ; this 
 is worse, for the enemy, masking the first with say a company 
 turns his other seven against the second bridge and this taken, 
 with his whole force he gains the last bridge. 
 
 Then the Blue force requires but one bridge to cross, and Major 
 A believes it better to concentrate his efforts to save that one than 
 by attempting too much and accomplishing nothing. 
 
 He therefore decides to try to save but one bridge. 
 
 He considers first the one at 463. The woods come close up 
 to this bridge and he realizes that wherever he takes his position 
 to begin with it must end in a fight in the woods with a very re- 
 stricted field of fire and poor control, the advantage entirely with 
 the stronger force. 
 
 At the other bridge he finds that if he takes up a line from the 
 edge of the woods south of the draw west of 526 to the steep bank 
 
[62] 
 
 at the north end of the knoll he obtains a good field of fire of five 
 hundred yards or more to the west and northwest but to the north 
 and northeast it is not good. He does not like that ravine north 
 of this position. By placing a detached work to his right and rear, 
 thinning out the woods, if necessary to the ravine and constructing 
 obstacles therein he can improve the situation. Opposite the 
 mouth of the ravine a small work could be constructed, that would 
 enfilade the ravine and a hostile line moving southwest, against 
 the main position. This detachment would serve another valuable 
 purpose: If Major A is defeated and driven across the stream, 
 he will require troops in position on that side to assist the with- 
 drawal. This work must be carefully located and so defiladed as 
 to prevent the men being silenced by fire from the north side. 
 
 Major A decides to disable the bridge at 463 and prepare a 
 position about the knoll 526 in which to defend the other bridge 
 to the last extremity. He will supplement this work with a de- 
 tached work opposite the mouth of the ravine and another in the 
 edge of the woods east of his right flank. The left of the main 
 trench will be so placed as to sweep the draw to the west and flank 
 the front of the main position. Abatis and wire entanglements 
 will be constructed as far as time permits. The field of fire will 
 be cleared as much as possible. An effort made to get all the 
 civilian help for this labor practicable. 
 2d Requirement: 
 
 The telephone is used to summon all the civilian help possible. 
 Two mounted patrols are formed, one sent toward Hampton, the 
 other on the road through 519 with instructions to use the tele- 
 phones. If no scouts are available for this purpose the horses of 
 the orderlies, hospital corps men and even mounted officers are 
 taken. 
 
 A squad is assumed to be at Oakwood S. H. as outpost. 
 
 A detachment of an ofl5cer and one section is sent to 463 to dis- 
 able the bridge. 
 
 An officer and one section would be sent to construct the work 
 opposite mouth of ravine and then to remain and occupy it. 
 
 Another section to construct the work east of right flank. 
 
 All the others would be put to work on the main line. 
 
 As the civilians reported they would be put to work. 
 
[63] 
 
 As soon as the trenches were practically finished all extra am- 
 munition would be distributed therein and all empty wagons sent 
 to park off road near Seven Hundred, S. H. 
 
 The messenger that came from Colonel X would be sent back to 
 meet him on the road with a report of Major A's plans. This is 
 necessary to insure his marching on the right bridge. 
 
 Major A would so lay out the work as to have the men as- 
 sembled by 10 o'clock that they may get a little rest before the 
 fight opens. 
 
 At 8:15 Major A assembled all his officers and issued the fol- 
 lowing verbal orders : 
 
 "A hostile brigade is located about ten miles north of here and 
 has detached two battalions to destroy the bridges in this vicinity ; 
 they were to start at 7 a. m. 
 
 "Our main force with the remainder of this regiment as advance 
 guard will start from Littlestown at 10 a. m. for this place for 
 the purpose of expelling the enemy from our territory. 
 
 "This battalion will intrench and must hold a position covering 
 the bridge at 434 for the crossing of our troops. Lieutenant X 
 with one section of Company D, will proceed at once to the bridge 
 at 463 and disable it so that it cannot be repaired by the enemy 
 for several hours, if necessary to accomplish this you may totally 
 destroy it by fire. Rejoin as soon as this work is accomplished. 
 
 "Lieut. Y, with one section of Company D, proceed to a point 
 on the nose opposite the mouth of that ravine (pointing). Select 
 a position from which you can best enfilade the ravine and bring 
 effective fire on the ground to the south of it. Strongly entrench, 
 looking out especially for protection against fire from the north. 
 Determine accurately your ranges. 
 
 "Captain D, have one section of your company strongly in- 
 trenched about one hundred and fifty yards east of the right of 
 the main line. As soon as the trenches are completed and ranges 
 determined, they will construct obstacles and clear the field of fire 
 as far as practicable. You may use all the remaining available 
 men of your company. 
 
 "Captain A, with your company (A) intrench a line along the 
 military crest of this knoll from this road (526-510) northeast 
 to the steep bank there (pointing). 
 
[64] 
 
 "Captain B, with your company (B) prolong the line from this 
 road southwest to the edge of the woods. 
 
 "Captain C, prolong the line west and southwest along the edge 
 of the woods to a short distance south of the head of that draw. 
 
 "In addition to the intrenchments, Companies A, B and C will 
 construct obstacles in their front and clear their field of fire. 
 Ranges will be determined and marked. 
 
 "The field train will be sent to Seven Hundred S. H. and parked 
 off the road. 
 
 "Work should be completed by 10 a. m. and troops assembled 
 east of 526 — the extra ammunition issued and combat train join 
 the field train." 
 
 At 10:15 Major A gave the following verbal order: 
 
 "The enemy is approaching from Oakwood S. H. in two columns, 
 one on the road running southwest; the other south through the 
 woods. 
 
 "We will occupy this position. 
 
 "Company A, the trench they have constructed from this road 
 northeast. 
 
 "Company B, from the road southwest, into the woods to where 
 the line bends to the southwest. 
 
 "Captain D, with one platoon of his company, the remainder 
 of the line, sending a patrol to the farm house near the river west 
 of his position. 
 
 "One section of Company D, Lieut. Y, will continue to occupy 
 the work constructed by it across the Conewago. 
 
 "The other section, Lieut. X, the work east of our right flank. 
 
 "Company C, will be the support and take position in the draw 
 near the road about two hundred yards east. 
 
 "The dressing station will be in the farm house near the road, 
 about four hundred yards east of here. 
 
 "I will be near the bend of the road between the line and the 
 support." 
 
COURSE IN TACTICS— PART I. 
 
 Map Problem No. 5 — A Cavalry Combat. 
 (See Hunterstown-New Oxford sheets, 3" map.) 
 Situation : 
 
 A Blue (western) field army is marching from Chamber sburg 
 via Cashtown to attack a Red (eastern) field army which is en- 
 trenching a position on Cemetery Hill (south of Gettysburg). 
 
 On September 25, an infantry brigade with troops of other arms 
 attached is detached from the Blue field army at Cashtown to take 
 the Mummasburg-Goldenville road and check any advance of the 
 enemy from Harrisburg or Middletown on Gettysburg. The 
 orders of the brigade commander to his cavalry (1st Squadron, 
 1st Cavalry, with one platoon of machine guns) are: "March to 
 Hunterstown and hold a position there till my advance guard 
 comes up; reconnoiter through Heidlersburg, Hampton and New 
 Oxford." 
 
 The 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry, is commanded by Major A; 
 when he reaches 548 (near Goodintent School) he has received the 
 following messages: 1. From 2d Lieut. Q (commanding a patrol 
 of eight men of Troop A) dated Fairview School, 6 :30 a. m. : 
 "Small hostile patrol retreated south from here. All wire fences 
 have been removed from this vicinity; inhabitants say wire was 
 taken for use in defenses of Gettysburg. Am going on to Granite 
 Hill." 2. From 1st Lieut. A (commanding patrol twelve men 
 of Troop A) dated 537, one mile east of Hunterstown, 6 :55 a. m. : 
 "Encountered small patrol Red cavalry at Hunterstown 6:40 
 a. m. and drove it towards Newchester; it has been reinforced and 
 I am now falling back toward Hunterstown delaying the advance 
 of about a half troop of Red cavalry. All wire fences have been 
 removed from vicinity of road between Goodintent School and 
 Hunterstown." 3. From 2d Lieut. B (commanding patrol of 
 eight men of Troop B) dated Belmont School, 6 :58 a. m. : "Valley 
 of Conewago clear of enemy as far east as this point. Corporal 
 K reports seeing column of three troops Red cavalry near New- 
 chester marching toward Hunterstown at 6:35 a. m. Am going 
 on to Newchester." 
 
 [65] 
 
[66] 
 
 Major A is riding with his advance guard (Troop A less one 
 platoon) ; the main body is about 700 yards in his rear marching 
 in the following order: Troop B, Troop C, machine guns, Troop 
 D. The advance guard of the brigade is four or five miles further 
 to the rear. Shortly after passing 548 he hears firing in the direc- 
 tion of Hunterstown and rides rapidly forward to the advance 
 party (one platoon Troop A) overtaking it at the orchard just 
 east of 549; here he sees at 7:25 a. m. Lieut. A's patrol retiring 
 from the ridge 300 yards west of the J. Bell house in the direction 
 of hill 574 ; further to the east he sees mounted Red troops on the 
 road advancing at a trot about 400 yards east of the J. Bell 
 house and in the saddle between hills 602 and 601. He can see no 
 fences. At this time (7:25 a. m.) the support of his advance 
 guard has reached the stream 300 yards west of 549 and the head 
 of the main body has reached 548. 
 Required : 
 
 1. Major A's decision and the considerations upon which it 
 is based. 
 
 2. His action. 
 
 STUDENTS' ERRORS AND INSTRUCTOR'S CRITICISMS. 
 
 Major A's decision and the considerations upon which it is based. 
 
 2nd Solution. 
 States the enemy's advance from Newchester was slow. 
 Comment : "He must have trotted part of the way — ^he was 
 delayed a little by Lieut. A." 
 
 3rd Solution. 
 Comment: "He (Maj. A) is also directed to perform certain 
 reconnaissance which cannot be performed without defeating the 
 hostile cavalry in his front." 
 
 4th Solution. 
 Comment: "Unnecessary to copy the problem." 
 
 6th Solution. 
 States: "Major A's left flank is covered by 2d Lt. B and his 
 right by Lt. Q." 
 
[67] 
 
 Comment: "No, these are not security patrols, they are not 
 covering anything, but are seeking information." 
 
 7th Solution. 
 
 Decides to attack mounted. 
 
 Comment: "The decision to attack is approved. It is prob- 
 ably too early to decide whether the attack should be mounted or 
 dismounted." 
 
 Suggests holding enemy in front and passing around his right 
 flank to reconnoitre in rear. 
 
 Comment: "Difficult to send information back with enemy in 
 rear." 
 
 8th Solution. 
 
 Maj. A decides to send Tr. A to edge of woods north of 549 — 
 Bell road for dismounted action, to send machine guns and Tr. 
 C to vicinity of 542 to attack (mounted by Tr. C) any party that 
 comes within reach of that flank, to rush Tr. B forward to 549 
 using y2 of it as reserve until Tr. D gets up. 
 
 Comments: "Major A does not definitely decide to attack the 
 hostile cavalry, at least it is not so stated; and it does not ap- 
 pear from this solution that he could not have fulfilled his mission 
 by taking up a defensive position or by attempting to evade the 
 enemy." 
 
 Comment upon reply to criticisms : 
 
 "The first requirement of the problem was not definitely com- 
 plied with. It was nowhere stated whether Major A decided to 
 act offensively or defensively. It was not apparent that Major 
 A had a definite policy and there were no reasons stated as a basis 
 for the adoption of any policy. 
 
 Major A at first makes a deployment resembling the occupa- 
 tion of a defensive position, (except that it was faulty on ac- 
 count of being on too broad a front) * * * */> 
 
 "If the enemy continues his advance mounted on the road 
 under the fire of Troop A, he will certainly sustain heavy losses. 
 But it does not appear probable that he will do this." 
 
 Further comments : 
 
 "As soon as the enemy develops the fire from the Blue position 
 he will probably dismount and attack dismounted; if he keeps his 
 
[68] 
 
 men in hand he ought to beat Major A, as Major A has scat- 
 tered his troops over too long a line." 
 
 "If he (the enemy) moves to Hill 574 and attacks Troop A, 
 reenforced by % Troop B, he will probably defeat Major A in 
 detail." 
 
 11th Solution. 
 
 Decides to place machine guns on the road near the orchard 
 east of 549. 
 
 Comment: "M. Guns might be placed under cover in N. E. 
 cor. of orchard." 
 
 States : "He (Capt. A, supporting the guns) will not dismount 
 any of his men unless necessary." 
 
 Comment : "They could dismount & fire & still act as a mounted 
 reserve by mtg. quickly." 
 
 States : "This % Tr. (which pursued Lt. A's patrol) will come 
 under the fire of the machine guns and may be charged by a part 
 of Tr. A, when they are thrown into confusion by that fire." 
 
 Comment: "No, this would disclose Major A's presence pre- 
 maturely." 
 
 15th Solution. 
 
 Comments : "The advance guard can make itself useful : 
 
 1. By holding a pivot covering the deployment; 
 
 2. By fire action supporting the attack ; 
 
 3. Mounting later and acting as mounted reserve." 
 "Machine guns on hill 574 would be masked by woods — besides 
 
 they probably could not reach it in time to be of any use there." 
 
 17th Solution. 
 
 Decides to place guns on 574 where they can fire on the enemy 
 between 601-602 saddle & J. Bell's. 
 
 Comment: "It will take the m.g.'s some time to reach Hill 
 574 — by the time they reach it the enemy may not be in the places 
 named." 
 
 Further comment: «* * * * }^g (Maj. A) cannot yet 
 decide definitely upon the form of attack, as the enemy is in 
 motion." 
 
 States : "It may be that Lt. A's going toward Hill 574 indicated 
 a hostile patrol or more coming toward that hill * * * *," 
 
[69] 
 
 Comment: "Lt. A is clearing Major A's front so as not to 
 impede his movements." 
 
 States that enemy is running right into trouble. 
 
 Comment: "Hostile cavalry is probably seeking trouble — 
 they will probably attack Major A unless he attacks first." 
 
 His action. 
 
 1st Solution. 
 
 Forms Troop A in line at 549. 
 
 Forms remaining troops in line of fours to right front and con- 
 tinues their advance. 
 
 Defers forming for attack until time for action to begin. 
 
 Comments: "The deployment should be made and the or- 
 ganization of the attack, i. e. division into lines, so that when the 
 proper time comes there will be little left to do but order the 
 movement to begin." 
 
 "Major A does not take advantage of features of the ground. 
 A deployment is made west of an orchard (near 549) and a cut in 
 the road, both of which would impede an advance to the east." 
 
 2nd Solution. 
 
 Orders Tr. A to charge along 549 — J. Bell road. When Tr. 
 B comes up, orders it to charge the enemy's main body now near 
 Bell's. Orders Tr. C to charge in support of Tr. B. 
 
 Orders M. G. Platoon to position about 300 yds. east of 542 to 
 open fire. Holds Tr. D in reserve south of road. 
 
 States A & B troops move forward in line of platoon columns. 
 
 Comments : 'Line of platoons in columns of fours.' 
 
 "Troop A is about 700 yards ahead of Troop B." 
 
 "The isolated and practically unsupported charge of Troop A 
 is regarded as an error. The strength of the enemy which it will 
 encounter and the proximity of his supporting troops are not 
 known; the charge will probably result in the loss of the troop, 
 and it is more likely to result in harm than good to the remaining 
 Blue troops." 
 
 "There should be at least a partial deployment as there is 
 danger of the first line being driven back directly upon the second 
 line (B&C)." 
 
 "Troop A is to charge along the road (see P. 6), Troop B is 
 to charge the main body, which is supposed to be on the road. Con- 
 
[70] 
 
 sequently, as all troops come up to 549, they are started out in 
 the trace of each other. Troop C is not told to support either 
 flank. If these troops clear each other it will be due to the ef- 
 forts of the captains. 
 
 Major A should have deployed his attacking line himself." 
 
 "The position selected for the machine guns is too advanced; 
 they could not reach it in time to .support the attack and they 
 would be exposed to capture in case of a reverse." 
 
 "By leaving a troop temporarily with the machine guns, they 
 are rendered reasonably secure from capture. * * * * ^n 
 effort should be made to utilize the fire of the machine guns to in- 
 fluence the decision." 
 
 "Combat patrols should be put out on the flanks. 
 
 The solution should have stated the provisions for the security 
 of the flanks — two or three lines would have been enough for this." 
 
 "A report should be made to the Brigade Comdr." 
 
 3rd Solution. 
 
 Send adjutant galloping back to turn Troops B, C & D at a 
 trot up ravine north of R. Smith's and to send machine guns for- 
 ward at a trot to report to Capt. A. 
 
 Orders Capt. A to place machine guns in orchard near 549 to 
 open fire at signal ; Tr. A to guard the guns and act as reserve. 
 
 Maj. A then joins troops in ravine, assembles their captains, 
 gives them the information of the enemy and action of Tr. A, and 
 orders; "Capt. B you will send your first and second platoons 
 against the advance guard of the Red troops. Your other pla- 
 toons will form the first line and attack the head of the column. 
 Capt. C follow Capt. B in two lines. Capt. D send one platoon 
 along that ridge (300 yards south of R. Smith's) as a combat 
 patrol, and follow Capt. C, charging any formed body of the 
 Red force. Move out as soon as the machine guns open fire 
 
 * * * * 55 
 
 "I will be with the reserve." 
 
 Comments: "The squadron is too much broken up into frac- 
 tions of troops; it is better to initiate the attack with a strong 
 first line (say 2 troops) under command of one officer." 
 
 "A platoon is unnecessarily large for a combat patrol." 
 
[71] 
 
 "It would be better to issue orders in the most expeditious way, 
 get the troops into position as soon as possible and then wait for 
 the opportune moment. Any delay may be the cause of losing an 
 opportunity." 
 
 4th Solution. 
 
 Orders Tr. A to charge at once straight down the road ; signals 
 other stroops to come on rapidly ; directs Tr. B to charge in sup- 
 port of A. 
 
 Troop C & D follow Tr. B as reserve at 400 yds. 
 
 Machine guns are ordered to take position on spur about 250 
 yds. north-west of J. Bell. 
 
 Comments: Machine guns "Probably cannot reach it (the 
 spur) before the fight." 
 
 «* * * * g^gj^ jf 1^ ^rp^ ^^ drives back the Red advance 
 guard it is likely to be defeated and perhaps driven back on the 
 other Blue troops, who are following it." 
 
 "The first line of attack should be stronger and more closely 
 supported." 
 
 «* * * * ^^Q charge in successive lines following in trace 
 is hazardous." 
 
 5th Solution. 
 
 Main body closes up in column of fours on Tr. A. 
 
 Comment : "Line of fours would be better." 
 
 Charges with Tr. A supported by Troop B, follows with re- 
 mainder. 
 
 Comments: "The attacking line should be stronger than % 
 troop. If Troop A (less 1 plat.) is defeated and driven back it 
 will probably be driven directly upon one of the other Blue troops 
 as there does not appear to be any adequate deployment. 
 
 No special provision is made for the security of the flanks. 
 
 The attack would be more certain to succeed if supported by 
 the fire of machine guns." 
 
 6th Solution. 
 
 Assembles officers at 549, (column closed up east of 548), and 
 issues order. 
 
 Comment: "Conditions do not admit of time being taken to 
 halt column for assembly of officers and issue of a combined order." 
 
[72] 
 
 Orders Trs. B & C via creek bottom to hill 574 to charge from 
 that position when enemy has crossed bridge at BelPs. 
 
 Orders Tr. D to support the charge on the left flank. 
 
 Orders Tr. A to act as reserve between 574 and machine gun 
 position. Orders machine guns to open fire from nose 400 yds. 
 N. E. of R. Smith. 
 
 Comments : "This nose is a hollow." 
 
 "The M. Gs. are in an exposed and isolated position — liable 
 to be captured." 
 
 "Major A practically turns his job over to Capt. A. Major, 
 A does not have ground east of 549 scouted to ascertain practi- 
 cability of mounted attack. Major A assigns Capt. B to command 
 reserve, (Troops D & A) ; if Major A is not going with the at- 
 tacking line, he might at least command the reserve." 
 
 7th Solution. 
 
 Orders advance party to charge as foragers as enemy appears 
 on top of ridge in front. 
 
 Orders Tr. A to support the advance party and disperse the 
 hostile advance guard. 
 
 Orders Tr. B to move to ravine about 400 yds. southeast of 
 549, and to attack the left flank of the hostile main body after 
 it comes upon the ridge. Orders Tr. C to move 400 yds. north 
 & to attack right flank of hostile main body when it appears on 
 ridge. 
 
 The machine guns take position in orchard near 549 to fire down 
 the road at signal. Tr. D to be in reserve near the guns. 
 
 Comments: "Advance party seems exposed to certain defeat 
 as it is not closely supported." 
 
 "Troop A is exposed to probable defeat and perhaps destruc- 
 tion without much chance of accomplishing anything, as it is not 
 closely supported." 
 
 "Major A scatters his troops too much, — A Troop seems to 
 be sacrificed unnecessarily. 
 
 An attack with a strong first line (say 2 troops) closely sup- 
 ported by the other troops and by fire might gain a victory with 
 little loss." 
 
 "No ground scouts or combat patrols." 
 
[73] 
 
 "There are good grounds for objections to the cavalry duel — 
 which are well stated by Gen. Haig — but the necessity of obtain- 
 ing information will often make the cavalry duel a necessity." 
 
 "Troop A is sent out to attack the Red advance guard — the 
 Red advance guard probably will be supported by three Red 
 troops while Troop A is not supported. It is not likely that 
 Troop A will be able to attack the Red advance guard and dis- 
 engage itself without coming in contact with other Red troops." 
 
 "A mounted combat is likely to be decided in a minute or two 
 after the collision. The charge of the advance party is likely 
 to terminate in defeat or victory before the support of the ad- 
 vance guard comes up. Lieut. A estimated that he was being 
 forced back by a half troop, so the advance party seems likely to 
 strike double its own number. The fact that the ground is open — 
 the charge is made 1000 yards over open ground — precludes the 
 possibility of the charge being a surprise to the enemy. Even if 
 the advance party (Blue) drives back the first line of the Reds, it 
 will then strike the main body without support. Suppose that the 
 Red advance guard is warned of the approach of the Blue advance 
 party, trots back and joins the main body, which deploys rapidly 
 and charges the Blue advance guard with a front of two troops. 
 
 The Blue advance party will be driven back on the remainder 
 of Troop A ; Troop A in retiring will mask the fire of the machine 
 guns and the Blues will be beaten in detail without having made 
 a strong fight anywhere." 
 
 9th Solution. 
 
 Major A sends back a messenger, on the run, to tell the main 
 body to move forward at a gallop. 
 
 Comment : "He could signal with his saber." 
 
 Orders Tr. A to charge. 
 
 Comment : "The isolated charge of the advance guard (3 plats. 
 Tr. A) is not likely to accomplish important results. Even if 
 it drives back the Red advance guard it will probably be driven 
 back in turn and perhaps cut to pieces. The other Blue troops 
 are not near enough to support its attack and it may be driven 
 directly upon them and throw them into disorder." 
 
 10th Solution. 
 Orders Capt. A to send a non-commissioned officer and 12 men 
 to 597 hill to protect Maj . A's right flank. 
 
[74] 
 
 Comment: "Too large." 
 
 Orders Tr. A at a gallop to position on southern slope of hill 
 574, machine guns to join Tr. A when they come up and assist 
 in the attack. 
 
 Orders Tr. B to southeast along ridge, to charge the center 
 and rear of the enemy's main body. 
 
 Orders Tr. C to follow Tr. B .and charge the head of the 
 enemy's main body with two platoons, and his advance guard with 
 two platoons. Tr. D in reserve. 
 
 Comments: "Orders too complicated and detailed — ^better de- 
 signate Troops B & C as 'attacking line' and order senior captain 
 to 'attack the enemy' or better lead them himself." 
 
 "The position selected for the machine guns is too advanced 
 
 ^ ^ « * 99 
 
 States that Trs. B & C charge in two lines, two platoons of 
 each troop in front followed by the other two platoons at 75 yds. 
 
 Comments : "Attacking line should be stronger." 
 
 "The attacking troops are broken up into too many fractions ; 
 there should be a strong attacking line under command of one 
 officer who should be given some latitude as to the mode of attack." 
 
 States Lt. Q with his 8 men retires and joins party on hill 597. 
 
 Comment: "No, Lt. Q should continue his reconnaissance." 
 
 States that Major A upon receiving his first reports at 548 
 has extra ammunition issued and then orders ammunition wagons 
 and field trains to remain at Herman. 
 
 Comment: "No trains with him and no time for issue of am- 
 munition — ammunition not needed." 
 
 Comment upon reply to criticisms: "There is no reason to 
 believe that the enemy will remain in column and allow the Blue 
 troops to charge different portions of his column at will. The 
 enemy will probably form for attack on a front of two troops and 
 charge. His attacking line will probably strike Troops B & C, a 
 half troop at a time, and ride them down one after the other." 
 
 11th Solution. 
 
 Orders Capt. A * * * * to conduct the secondary at- 
 tack. 
 
 Comments: "Better to avoid the use of technical words of 
 doubtful meaning and tell Capt. A in plain language what is 
 expected of him." 
 
[75] 
 
 "The use of the term 'secondary attack' implies that attacks 
 are always made in the same way and the duties of a 'secondary 
 attack' are definitely fixed. This is far from being the case." 
 
 "If the M. G. Plat, is to fire, some instructions should be given 
 to guide its commander in opening fire, for instance, 'when Troop 
 B advances from that wood' * * * *." 
 
 Adjutant conducts main body via 549. 
 
 Comment: "Could save time by going more directly to their 
 position." 
 
 Major A assembles officers. 
 
 Comment : "He may not have time for the issue of a combined 
 order — as soon as he halts Troops B & C, he should look to see 
 what the enemy is doing." 
 
 12th Solution. 
 
 States in order: "Our machine gun platoon is on 574 but will 
 not fire on the enemy unless we are defeated." 
 
 Comment: "This is a mistake — the machine guns should aid 
 us in gaining the victory." 
 
 Reply: "The reasons for not putting the machine guns in 
 action were as follows : They could be in action for a very short 
 time before they would have to stop firing for fear of injuring 
 their own charging blue cavalry. The peculiar noise of the 
 machine guns would serve as implied notice * * * * to the 
 Red Commander that he was in a cul de sac and that the best thing 
 he could do would be to withdraw as quickly as possible and per- 
 haps make a determined dismounted stand on 601, 602 and 603 
 at Hunters town." 
 
 Comment on reply: "The remarks of Student Officer in re- 
 gard to the employment of machine gun fire are concurred in. The 
 machine guns should not fire before the attack is initiated as 
 their fire would serve as a warning to the enemy; might cause 
 him to dismount and fight on foot which would lead to a long 
 drawn out fire fight probably with indecisive results ; might cause 
 him to make a detour to Hill 574 and attack Major A in flank; 
 or, as suggested, he might retire to hills 601 & 602. 
 
 In the approved solution it is contemplated that the attack will 
 be initiated by Troops B and C. If they attack mounted, the 
 machine guns can be used in support of their attack for only a 
 
[76] 
 
 short time (say one to three minutes) but the effect of their fire 
 may be very valuable in causing confusion in the ranks of the 
 Reds at the decisive moment." 
 
 13th Solution. 
 
 Gives the order to assembled troop commanders at 7 :30 A. M. 
 
 Comment: "What was the adyance guard (Troop A) doing 
 between 7 :25 and 7 :30 A. M..?" 
 
 Further comment: "A distribution of troops is made but it 
 is not apparent in what manner they are formed for the attack." 
 
 Finishes his combined order by directing Capt. A (who is to 
 charge with Troops A & B) to move out at once. 
 
 Comment: "Major A has not seen the enemy for about 10 
 minutes and does not know whether the opportune moment to 
 charge has arrived or not, or indeed whether it is practicable to 
 attack at all or not. 
 
 The conditions do not in this case permit the time to be taken to 
 assemble the officers and issue a combined order." 
 
 14th Solution. 
 
 Orders Tr. A to charge hostile advance guard when it ap- 
 proaches. 
 
 Orders Trs. B & C to move rapidly into woods near 543 to 
 charge enemy's right flank as soon as the latter becomes engaged 
 with Tr. A. 
 
 Holds Tr. D and M. G. P. as reserve near 549. 
 
 Comments: "Troops B & C must go a considerable distance 
 through a wood which will delay them and they may lose their 
 bearings." 
 
 "Reserve should follow or it will not be in supporting distance 
 when needed." 
 
 16th Solution. 
 
 Maj. A assembles his command. 
 
 Comment: "In what formation? (Should be in line of fours.) 
 
 Maj. A announces that he will be with Reserve for the present. 
 
 Comment: "He should reconnoitre to the front and give the 
 signal for the attack." 
 
 "This solution is somewhat too short. Why would it be in- 
 consistent with Major A's mission to take up a defensive posi- 
 
[77] 
 
 tion or to evade the enemy? How does Major A intend to use 
 the machine guns? When is the attack to begin?" 
 
 17th Solution. 
 
 Orders Tr. A to charge right down the road at once, Tr. B 
 comes up and charges on Tr. A's right. Tr. C follows in sup- 
 port, on the left, at 275 yards. Tr. D forms the reserve covering 
 the right flank at 600 yds. 
 
 Machine guns move to Hill 574 and fire into the enemy's rear 
 near 602. 
 
 Comments: "The plan described above is a good one except 
 that it is risky to plan an attack so far to the front and make no 
 allowance for probable delays — Troops C & D are likely to be 
 left too far behind and not in supporting distance." 
 
 "The attacking line should be more completely formed and 
 better organized." 
 
 "Troop A charges about 1000 yards ahead of Troop B — this 
 is too far for support." 
 
 "I cannot accept your position for the M. Gs. as the best. 
 Your field of fire is too restricted, with fair chance that you can- 
 not use the guns for the reason that enemy may have passed the 
 short stretch of road open to effective fire." 
 
 Further comment: "If the Red advance guard continues to 
 advance at a trot until it becomes aware of the charge of the Blue 
 advance guard and then charges in turn, it seems likely that a col- 
 lision between the advance guards will take place in the open 
 ground between 549 and J. Bell (somewhat nearer to J. Bell than 
 to 549). Even if the Blue advance guard drives back the Red, 
 it is not likely to advance east of the J. Bell house before the Red 
 main bod;f reaches that point. So it seems likely that the decisive 
 combat will take place on the open ground west of the J. Bell 
 house. Machine guns on Hill 574 cannot fire on this ground on 
 account of the trees which cover its southern slope. 
 
 The Machine Gun Platoon is about 900 yards in rear of Troop 
 A and reaches 549 while the combat between the two advance 
 guards is taking place. The instructor estimates that the machine 
 guns would require 5 minutes to go from 549 to Hill 574 as they 
 would either take a roundabout route (via 543 and the unim- 
 proved road) or else go through the wood part of the way. The 
 M. G. mules will be out of breath when they reach 549." 
 
[78] 
 
 AN APPROVED SOLUTION. 
 
 1. Major A's decision is to attack the hostile cavalry and, for 
 this purpose, to deploy rapidly. He will use mounted action 
 (or a combination of mounted and dismounted action) if prac- 
 ticable, but the precise mode of attack can not yet be decided. 
 
 His orders direct him to proceed to Hunterstown; he has not 
 yet reached Hunterstown and the enemy has appeared between 
 him and that point. Also, the successful accomplishment of his 
 mission of reconnaissance depends upon his defeating the hostile 
 cavalry and driving it beyond the sector of reconnaissance as- 
 signed to him. Is there a column of Red troops following the 
 Red cavalry? Major A does not know and it is his duty to as- 
 certain whether this is the case or not. Lieutenant B's patrol 
 may gain this information, but if he then finds hostile cavalry in 
 his rear he may be cut off and captured or fail to get messages 
 back; so the information he gains may be useless. But if Major 
 A defeats the Red squadron and drives it back through New- 
 chester he will clear up the situation and will have undisturbed 
 use of the roads for the transmission of messages. 
 
 The Red cavalry can not be closely followed by foot or mixed 
 troops; the rate at which it has traveled from Newchester to 
 Hunterstown (walk and trot) precludes that. And Lieutenant 
 Q's report indicates that it is not likely to be reinforced from 
 Gettysburg. 
 
 The commander of the Red cavalry is aware of the presence of 
 the Blue cavalry; he may have seen part of it from Hill 602, but 
 he may not be aware of its strength. His aggressive demeanor 
 indicates that the only choice which is likely to be offered to 
 Major A will lie between attacking and receiving an attack. 
 Major A's chances of success are much greater if he seizes the 
 initiative and attacks instead of waiting to be attacked. Mounted 
 action or a combination of mounted and dismounted action is pre- 
 ferred, if practicable, because in this way a decision can be gained 
 quickly; and, if Major A is successful, his victory will be more 
 complete and its results more valuable. Major A believes the 
 strength of the hostile cavalry to be about equal to his own. 
 Three troops have been seen in the main body, but the advance 
 guard and other detachments would account for another troop. 
 
[79] 
 
 No machine guns have been reported and Major A may have a 
 preponderance in this respect. 
 
 The orchard southeast of 549 can be used by Major A as a 
 pivot or point of support to protect his deployment, and troops 
 entering it from the west would be screened from the view of the 
 Red cavalry; if his advance guard dismounts and occupies the 
 east end of this orchard it can cover his deployment, support his 
 attack with fire, and, later, mount and act as reserve. The 
 machine guns can reach this orchard in time to support the at- 
 tack, though it is not likely that they would be able to reach a 
 more advanced position in time. South of the orchard there is 
 a small open grove which will afford cover from the view of the 
 enemy and will not impede the movements of small columns, and 
 it can be reached in concealment by moving up the hollow north 
 of the R. Smith house. The ground east of the grove and orchard 
 is open and nearly level for more than a thousand yards. The 
 ground through which the enemy is passing is wooded and hilly; 
 after he passes the J. Bell house he will practically be emerging 
 from a defile. 
 
 Major A will not order the advance guard to charge the enemy 
 without waiting for the main body to come up. It is now 700 
 yards ahead of the main body and would gain still more distance 
 during the charge. Even if it succeeded in driving back the Red 
 advance guard, it would be defeated and might be cut to pieces or 
 driven back upon other Blue troops before it could be supported. 
 
 At least a partial deployment is necessary, for the leading 
 element of the attack may be driven back ; and if it is driven back 
 directly upon other Blue troops, it is likely to check them and 
 perhaps throw them into disorder. 
 
 Major A does not form his attacking line north of 549 because 
 an advance from here is restricted to a narrow space between a 
 wood and an orchard, will come into the sight of the enemy sooner 
 and will mask fire from the orchard. Besides, an attack on the 
 enemy's left front may drive him north of J. Bell and away from 
 the strong points of support near Hunterstown. 
 
 2. It is assumed that when the messages from Lieutenants A, 
 B and Q were received Major A reported their contents promptly 
 to the brigade commander, adding, "It is my intention to attack 
 the hostile cavalry which is advancing from Newchester." 
 
[80] 
 
 At 7:25 a.m. Major A signals with his saber "increase the 
 gait." This is obeyed by the support of the advance guard, and 
 as the main body is keeping the distance from the advance guard 
 (the squadron commander being with the advance guard) the 
 main body also increases the gait. 
 
 At the same time Major A orders Captain A (who is with him) : 
 "Your troop will dismount and hold the east edge of this orchard. 
 The machine guns will join you. The other troops will come up 
 on your right and attack. Support the attack with fire. Have 
 the ground to the east scouted to see if it is suitable for a charge." 
 The work of scouting the ground is done, under direction from 
 Captain A, by the point of the advance guard, which halts on 
 seeing the advance party halt. 
 
 Major A then gallops back to meet the main body, at the 
 same time directing the adjutant : "Tell the machine gun platoon 
 to report to Captain A, and tell Troop D to support the right 
 flank." As soon as the head of the main body crosses the stream 
 300 yards west of 549 Major A directs it to change direction to 
 the right. The column passes near the orchard north of the R. 
 Smith house and then turns east. He halts Troops B and C in 
 line of fours in the grove 400 yards south of 549 and then recon- 
 noiters to the front. While conducting Troops B and C to this 
 position he is riding with Captain B (who is senior to Captain C) 
 and communicates the situation to him, informing him: "We 
 will attack the Red cavalry. Troops B and C under your com- 
 mand will form the attacking line. You are to charge mounted, 
 if the conditions favor it; otherwise the attack will be made dis- 
 mounted. I will let you know. I will take a look to the front, 
 and if I signal 'Forward, March,' and 'Charge Saber,' you are to 
 attack mounted. Troop D will support your right and Troop 
 A and the machine guns are to support you with fire from the 
 orchard." 
 
 Major A's subsequent action will depend upon what he now 
 learns of the enemy and of the ground in his front. 
 
 It is assumed that Troop A, while acting as advance guard, 
 had sent patrols to hill 574 and to the ridge southeast of the R. 
 Smith house. However, Captain B will, without orders, send out 
 a combat patrol on his right flank. The patrols of Lieutenants 
 
[81] 
 
 A, B and Q are reconnoitering (tactical) patrols and are not re- 
 sponsible for the security of the flanks of the squadron. 
 
 Major A does not assemble his officers and issue a combined 
 order to them because he has not sufficient time at his disposal to 
 enable him to do so. It would be hazardous to separate officers 
 from their troops while an aggressive enemy was near and advanc- 
 ing upon him. It is not necessary in this case, because the move- 
 ments ordered are of the simplest character and all parts of the 
 squadron are practically under his personal control. He cannot 
 communicate his plans because he has not yet formed any complete 
 plan; his orders must be brief and based on the situation as it 
 develops. 
 
COURSE IN TACTICS—FART I. 
 
 Map Problem No. 6 — A Field Battery. 
 (See Boneauville sheet, 3" map). 
 Situation : 
 
 On October 11, 1911, a Blue force, consisting of 3d Infantry, 
 Troop A, 2d Cavalry, Battery D, 1st Field Artillery, under com- 
 mand of Colonel A, is marching on Hunterstown via the Littles-, 
 town — Pleasant Hill School House — Boneauville road. The coun- 
 try is hostile to the Blues. 
 
 Battery D is marching near the head of the main body. The 
 reconnaissance officer and scouts are with the reserve of the ad- 
 vance guard. 
 
 At 9:00 a.m. when the head of the main body has reached the 
 small creek four hundred yards N. W. of Pleasant Hill S. H., the 
 cavalry advance party is stopped by infantry fire from the vil- 
 lage of Whitehall. 
 
 Upon hearing the firing. Captain D, commanding battery, rides 
 to the front with Colonel A, who informs him that it is urgent 
 that tlie march be continued and that an attack may be necessary. 
 
 At 9:30 a.m., at the farm house three hundred yards S. E. of 
 Alloway Creek, Captain D receives the following order from Colo- 
 nel A: 
 
 "About a regiment of infantry with a battery of artillery is 
 taking up a position on both sides of this road near 637. A part 
 of our advance guard is in the village of Whitehall. We will at- 
 tack the enemy at once enveloping his left flank. Place your bat- 
 tery in position on this side of Alloway creek and support the at- 
 tack. Develop the enemy's artillery as soon as possible." 
 
 Captain D also hears Colonel A's orders for the disposition 
 of the other troops in the attack. 
 
 The artillery reconnaissance officer reported to Captain D that 
 he had been unable to locate the position of the hostile artillery 
 but that one of his scouts, at 9:15 a.m. had seen artillery near 
 the farm house S. E. of Sweet Home School House and that it was 
 moving towards St. Luke's Church. 
 
 [82] 
 
[83] 
 
 Captain D has with him at this time the reconnaissance officer, 
 two scouts, one musician, and chief of 5th section with B. C. 
 telescope. The battery is halted at 598. 
 Required : 
 
 1. Captain D's estimate of the situation in so far as it relates 
 to the disposition of his battery. 
 
 2. Orders and messages issued by Captain D in getting his 
 battery into position. 
 
 3. A tracing showing positions occupied by firing battery, 
 combat train, field train, limbers, and B. C. station after battery 
 is in action and the route followed by firing battery, combat train 
 and field train. 
 
 4. State disposition and use of agent, scouts, and telephone 
 apparatus while battery is in action. 
 
 STUDENTS' ERRORS AND INSTRUCTOR'S CRITICISMS. 
 
 1st Solution. 
 
 Considers that the 5 foot contours represent twenty foot verti- 
 cal intervals and places firing battery just west of road bend 
 about 600 yds. N. W. of Grawmer's 
 
 Places combat train and limbers 150 yards in rear of guns. 
 
 Comments: "Drawing a line from St. Luke's Church through 
 position selected for Blue battery, it will be seen that the ravines 
 have little depth, and the battery probably will not be defiladed 
 properly." 
 
 "The combat train or limbers in the ravine southeast of firing 
 position are too close and being in direct line of fire will suffer from 
 overs." 
 
 2nd Solution. 
 
 Places firing battery 200 yds., and limbers 450 yards south of 
 Schild's. 
 
 Places combat train at Grawmer's. 
 
 Comments: "Battery does not obtain much defilade at posi- 
 tion indicated." 
 
 "Limbers too close to firing battery considering amount of pro- 
 tection afforded." 
 
[84] 
 
 "Combat train might better be left further back in more pro- 
 tected position." 
 
 "An observing station other than B. C. might be established 
 to front or flank with signal flag communication." 
 
 4th Solution. 
 
 Places firing battery east of Schild's, limbers 300 yds. north of 
 610, combat train east of Hill 627 and Battery Commander's Sta- 
 tion on Hill 627. 
 
 Comments: "The B. C. Station is placed 800 yds. from bat- 
 tery and the observation distance increased by same amount to 
 gain an advantage of elevation of 15 ft. It is thought that hill 
 612 (Schild's) would offer greater advantages, if buildings were 
 also used, for observation purposes." 
 
 "Limbers a little bit too close." 
 
 5th Solution. 
 
 Places firing battery 500 yds. south, and limbers 200 south east 
 of Schild's, with B. C. Sta. near Schild's. 
 
 Comments: "I think if the position of limbers and battery 
 were reversed it would be better arrangement for reasons below : 
 
 An observer on right flank of enemy may see flashes of guns. 
 
 B. C. Sta. nearer to battery." 
 
 6th Solution. 
 
 Places firing battery, limbers and combat train east of Hill 627. 
 
 Comment : "At a range of over 4000 yds. it will be difficult to 
 neutralize the fire of the Red battery. 
 
 The Red Btry. will thus be able to turn its fire on the attacking 
 Blue infantry and perhaps defeat them." 
 
 7th Solution. 
 
 Sends Chief of 5th Section about 800 yds. north to set up Bat- 
 tery Comdr's. telescope. 
 
 Comment: "The Captain would hardly trust the selection of 
 exact position of B. C. Sta. to a N. C. Officer." 
 
 Places firing battery 450 south of Schild's, limbers 300 yds. 
 south west of the battery and combat train near 598. 
 
 Comments: "Limbers too close to firing batteries; would 
 probably suffer when Red battery searches for Blue battery." 
 
[85] 
 
 "The flash of guns in position on sketch would probably be 
 observed by an observing party on Red Battery's right flank, at 
 Newman's for instance." 
 
 8th Solution. 
 
 Places firing battery at Schild's with limbers 200 yds. to their 
 north and the combat train about 800 yds. to their south. 
 
 Comments : "I think combat train might better have been left 
 further back." 
 
 "No observing parties to front of Schild's Hill." 
 
 9th Solution. 
 
 Places firing battery, limbers, and combat train east of Hill 627. 
 
 Comments: "The Red artillery will, in the course of the at- 
 tack, have as objective the Blue infantry at short ranges. To 
 neutralize this hostile artillery fire the Blue artillery will (during 
 the first part of engagement) have to attack the Red battery." 
 
 "It is thought that the position selected is not the best as there 
 are other positions closer in range where flash defilade can be ob- 
 tained." 
 
 "The effectiveness of shrapnel falls off very rapidly after pass- 
 ing 3000 yds. range, and I consider it an error to take a range of 
 over 4000 yds. and attempt to stop a hostile battery from firing 
 on advancing infantry when nearer positions are available. The 
 battery should go forward even if it exposes itself over certain 
 portions of the route." 
 
 10th Solution. 
 
 Places firing battery 350 yds. south of Schild's, limbers in the 
 ravine 400 yds. southwest of battery. 
 
 Places combat train, at first, 240 yds. west of 598, and when 
 fire opens moves it to ravine 600 yds. east of 565. 
 
 Comments: "The guns as shown on sketch appear to be a 
 little near crest to get flash defilade." 
 
 "One objection that might be advanced to this position is that 
 observers on Red right flank could observe flashes of guns." 
 
 "Combat train might better be left with field train behind 627." 
 
 11th Solution. 
 Places firing battery east of trees 300 yds. east of 610, and 
 B. C. Station on Hill 647. 
 
[86] 
 
 Comments: "In an attack it is an advantage for the artillery 
 to get in close, so that it can neutralize , the fire of the hostile 
 Arty. The Red Arty., being in defense, can be some distance be- 
 hind its infantry line and still effectively fire on advancing Blue 
 infantry, in meantime suffering little loss from distant Arty, fire." 
 
 "B. C. Station 900 yds. from Btry. A better location would be 
 hill 627." 
 
 12th Solution. 
 
 States: "Capt. D sends the musician to Lt. X, who is tem- 
 porarily commanding the battery, with the following orders" : 
 (Here follow 87 words). 
 
 Comment: "Orders written or verbal? If verbal too long." 
 
 Places firing battery near 610 with limbers 300 yards north of it. 
 
 Places combat train east of Hill 627 and B. C. station on Hill 
 627. 
 
 Comment: "It is thought that instead of placing B. C. Sta- 
 tion 800 yds. to the rear to gain an advantage of elevation of 15 
 feet, that better results would be obtained on Schild's hill, con- 
 sidering nearness of battery." 
 
 13th Solution. 
 
 Places firing battery 400 yds. east of White Hall S. H., limbers 
 350 yds. west of 599, combat train 400 yds. south of limbers, and 
 B. C. Station 350 yds. south and little west of Schild's. 
 
 Moves north via country road east of Grawmer's thence to 
 stream near 610 and follows stream to position. 
 
 Comments: "To reach this position the battery has to make 
 a detour of about 3000 yds., part of it over probably rough 
 ground." 
 
 "The B. C. station is 850 yds. from battery." 
 
 Comments on reply to criticisms: "The criticism of solution 
 was for passing this position (ground back of Schild's hill) to go 
 1500 yds. farther down a creek bottom, where the chances are 
 that movement will be slow." 
 
 "Route of approach is exposed to view." 
 
 14th Solution. 
 Places firing battery, limbers and combat train east of Hill 
 627 and B. C. Station on Hill 627. 
 
[87] 
 
 Comment: "The principal objection to this position is that in 
 the attack the Blue artillery will have to fire at hostile artillery at 
 a range greater than 4000 yds. and at the hostile infantry at a 
 range greater than 3500 yds. In the meantime the Red artillery 
 will fire at Blue infantry at very short ranges." 
 
 "I think that at least one observer should be further to the 
 front." 
 
 "Limbers too close to firing battery." 
 
 15th Solution. 
 
 Assembles officers when they come up, and issues an order similar 
 to a combined order. 
 
 Comment: "As a rule no orders like this given to battery. 
 Just instructions as to placing battery, and regular firing data." 
 
 Sends message by orderly to Lieutenant to form and prepare 
 for action, route to take and where to place combat train. 
 
 Comment: "Message verbal or written.? If verbal should be 
 sent by officer." 
 
 AN APPROVED SOLUTION. 
 
 1. Estimate of the Situation: 
 
 Captain D must place his battery in position and support the 
 attack. He must develop quickly the hostile artillery and engage 
 its attention while the Blue infantry is advancing within range 
 of the hostile infantry. 
 
 When the Blue infantry gets within effective rifle range Captain 
 D must assist in keeping down the fire of the hostile infantry, and 
 in the preparation for the assault the fire of all his guns must be 
 directed at the hostile infantry line. 
 
 While riding forward with Colonel A and during the interim 
 while waiting for orders, Captain D has been reconnoitering and 
 considering the terrain with a view to its adaptability for artillery 
 purposes. 
 
 When he receives his definite instructions from Colonel A he is 
 ready almost immediately to make his decision as to the disposi- 
 tion of his battery and to issue his orders. 
 
 Colonel A's order limits his selection of a position to the terrain 
 southeast of Alloway creek. This stream is about 2500 yards 
 
[88] 
 
 from 637, near which point the hostile infantry is taking position. 
 The present location of the hostile battery is unknown, but its 
 movements when last seen and the configuration of the terrain 
 leads Captain D to think that it is near St. Luke's Church, either 
 already in position or now taking up a position. The fact that 
 the Reds are taking up a position for defense would indicate that 
 the hostile battery should be placed near a commanding crest. 
 
 Captain D has noted the steep wooded hill 627 and the fact that 
 the northern end is bare, affording a position for direct and in- 
 direct fire; also that it can be approached under cover. The 
 range to 637 is about 3800 yards, and to St. Luke's Church is 
 about 4100 yards. These ranges are somewhat long to get the 
 best results from shrapnel fire. The same objection applies to a 
 position at hill 647 and to a lesser degree to the position at the 
 head of ravine east of Grawmer's. If the Blues were on the de- 
 fensive one of these positions might be used, but under present 
 conditions he rejects them. 
 
 The saddle between hill 627 and Schild's hill is not of sufficient 
 depth to give flash defilade for the guns. The slight elevation of 
 Schild's hill and the standing corn on top of the hill and in the 
 saddle will probably afford concealment for the passage of the 
 battery to the low ground near 610. Here is found a position 
 affording flash defilade, a fairly good observation station on the 
 ridge to west, and cover for limbers in the woods along creek to 
 the north. It offers facility of movement to front, flank, and rear. 
 
 The low ground in ravine northwest of Grawmer's affords a 
 concealed position which can be approached most of the way under 
 cover. The enemy's artillery fire on this position could be ob- 
 served accurately, and it is probable also that the flashes of the 
 Blue artillery could be seen by observers placed well out on the 
 hostile right flank. 
 
 Captain D eliminates from consideration positions farther to 
 front in the valley of Alloway Creek and those south of the road 
 and between the branches of creek. There is not enough cover to 
 permit battery approach w^ithout wide detours and there are no 
 good observing stations close by. 
 
 He decides to place the firing battery 150 yards east of Schild's 
 house and just north of road; limbers under cover of woods to 
 north; battery commander's station on crest near Schild's house 
 
[89] 
 
 with an observer on top of the house. The combat train will take 
 cover east of hill 627. The field train is with the field train of the 
 main body. 
 
 In approaching position the battery will move under cover to a 
 point near Grawmer's and then north through cornfield as indi- 
 cated on sketch. 
 2. Orders and Messages: 
 
 Captain D before receiving orders from Colonel A, had sent the 
 following verbal order by musician to senior lieutenant at battery : 
 "Form and prepare for action and await further orders." 
 
 On account of the danger of being seen while crossing saddle he 
 will have the reconnaissance officer conduct battery to position, so 
 he directs Lieut. B as follows: 
 
 "Ride rapidly to battery and lead it through saddle as I have 
 indicated. Reserve will take cover behind northern end of hill 
 627. Telephone detail to proceed immediately to Schild house." 
 
 Captain D then marks with his two scouts the exact position for 
 firing battery and shows the sergeant of the 5th Section where to 
 set up B. C. telescope. He then proceeds to obtain firing data. 
 
 3. See sketch. 
 
 4. The agent remains with Colonel A to maintain communica- 
 tion with battery commander. 
 
 The reconnaissance officer and one scout establish an auxiliary 
 observing station at house on top of hill 607. The other scout 
 takes position on top of hill 627 and watches both flanks as well 
 as observing the eltect of fire. He has a signal flag to communicate 
 with flagman at B. C. station. 
 
 One telephone is at battery, one at B. C. station, and one at ob- 
 serving station on hill 607. They are all connected on one line. 
 
APPROVED POSITION 
 
 MAP PROBLEM NO. 6 
 
 Yds 500 
 
PART II. 
 
 BRIGADE PROBLEMS. 
 
 (See Getty sburg-Antietem Map.) 
 
COURSE IN TACTICS— FART II. 
 
 Map Problem No. 1. 
 (See Gettysburg sheet, 3" map.) 
 Situation : 
 
 The frontier between two hostile states, Blue north and Red 
 south, is an east and west line about twenty miles north of Gettys- 
 burg. 
 
 A Blue army has invaded the enemy's territory and recently 
 fought a severe but indecisive battle near Hagerstown. Both 
 armies are still in that vicinity. 
 
 Carlisle is a Blue depot fortified and garrisoned. Partisans 
 have recently wrecked the railroad about Gettysburg. 
 
 After the battle the general in chief sent north under command 
 of Major General X, a convoy of wagons to bring up ammunition 
 from Carlisle. Carried in these wagons and in ambulances were 
 about eight hundred sick and not severly wounded. 
 
 The troops under Major General X were: 
 
 1st Brigade, N. Y. Inf. — much depleted and which had been 
 very roughly handled in the last battle and whose time was nearly 
 out. They were going back for muster out. 
 
 Battery A, 1st Connecticut F. A. going back for the same 
 reason and in much the same condition. The remainder of this 
 regiment had been captured. 
 
 The 2d Brigade, N. Y. in excellent condition consisting of the 
 4th, 5th and 6th regiments of infantry reenforced by the 1st 
 Battalion, 2d F. A., and the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, under 
 command of Brigadier General A. General A's command was to 
 form part of the convoy to Carlisle and the escort returning with 
 the ammunition. 
 
 The night of October 1-2 the command of General X camped 
 about Barlow except Brigadier General A's command which was 
 near J. Musser with outpost (furnished by 6th Inf.) from Mc- 
 Allister Hill west across the Emmitsburg Road. 
 
 The orders were to be ready to march at 6 a. m. October 2. 
 
 At 5 a. m. October 2, General X gave the following order to 
 Brigadier General A: 
 
 [93] 
 
[94] 
 
 "I have just received information that a hostile force of the 
 enemy consisting of two brigades of infantry, one regiment of 
 field artillery and one squadron cavalry, is moving east on the 
 Chamber sburg road and is now in camp six miles west of Gettys- 
 burg. 
 
 "A spy reports that they are moving to cut us off from Carlisle. 
 
 "I shall start the convoy at 6 a. m. via Two Taverns, Boneau- 
 ville. New Oxford, thence via Carlisle-Baltimore road on Carlisle. 
 
 "You will cover this march with your command. 
 
 "The other troops will form the immediate guard for the trains. 
 The combined trains are about three miles long. Your field train 
 will join the convoy." 
 
 Required : 
 
 1. Brigadier General A's estimate of the situation. 
 
 2. His march order. 
 
 STUDENTS' ERRORS AND INSTRUCTOR'S CRITICISMS. 
 
 1st Solution. 
 
 Holds a position in readiness about J. Musser's. 
 
 Comment: "There is hardly enough written here to really 
 determine how you will operate." 
 
 2nd Solution. 
 
 Sends cavalry to gain contact & with remainder of force marches 
 via 522-Baltimore Turnpike-425-473-J. Spangler to 550, where he 
 will mass and await reports from his cavalry. 
 
 Comments : "If the enemy moves via Harrisburg road you will 
 fail in your mission. If by York road very near if not quite fail. 
 
 Gen'l. A is heavily outnumbered. He must fight delaying ac- 
 tions, not to a decision, this requires distance. 
 
 If enemy moves on Boneauville Gen'l. A can not cause delay 
 except in the one position, then he will be back on the convoy ; if 
 the latter is delayed, does not get past there as figured, it is lost. 
 
 Several roads available to enemy radiate from Gettysburg; you 
 cover all these better by getting near the *hub'. 
 
 In your estimate a little more care in computing times and dis- 
 tances would have helped you." 
 
[95] 
 
 3rd Solution. 
 
 Moves via McAllister Hill-425-536-Round Top S. H. road, 
 using advance guard and left flank guard with a platoon of cavalry 
 in each ; the remainder of the cavalry is sent independently through 
 Gettysburg to reconnoitre. 
 
 Comments: "Splitting cav. a mistake; you just equal enemy 
 now." 
 
 "Fuller data as to the roads and times are desirable in your 
 estimate, and if made would probably have led you to a different 
 decision. 
 
 The enemy is in friendly territory and need not fear moving 
 northeast. Being on the line of communications of the Blue army 
 will create great alarm and worry the Blue Comdr., probably draw- 
 ing off more troops from main army. The capture of the convoy 
 is, however, doubtless his main object; it will give him prisoners 
 to exchange. 
 
 Gen'l. A can not fight to a decision; he wanted to gain time. 
 If too close to convoy the time must be gained in one position, 
 otherwise he can use rear guard tactics to gain time." 
 
 4th Solution. 
 
 Moves via Gettysburg to position in readiness east of Benner's 
 Hill. 
 
 Advance Guard (5th Inf.) covers change of direction at Gettys- 
 burg. 
 
 Places artillery combat train under escort of 12 inf. scouts and 
 sends it via Hanover Road to 54^6 to await orders. 
 
 Sends field train to join convoy at Barlow at 7 :30 A. M. 
 
 Comment on order to train: "Won't this be a little late?" 
 
 Further comments: "If enemy move by Harrisburg road on 
 York Springs by deploying so as to envelop your right (north) 
 flank you will be unable to save your convoy. 
 
 A position farther north will better serve your purpose. 
 
 Your sending the Arty, reserves (combat train) to 546 is risky; 
 it may cause much trouble later. You gain too little by it to 
 take the chance. 
 
 Better to have moved to a point on York Turnpike and kept 
 command more together." 
 
[96] 
 
 5th Solution. 
 
 Moves via J. Musser's-479-489-525-530 to 548. Flank guard 
 (6th Inf.) moves via J. Taney & Wolf Ridge to Hanover Road, 
 to take up a position in readiness near J. Spangler's. 
 
 Comment : "By failing to consider possibility of York Springs 
 you were possibly led to your selection of a position in readiness. 
 I do not think you could effectively close that route if enemy 
 selects it. 
 
 Who keeps up the communication with the convoy column, Ad- 
 vance Guard or Cav. ? orders should state. 
 
 Division of force not believed necessary in this case hence 
 weakens you." 
 
 6th Solution. 
 
 Comment : "You do not fully consider the routes open to enemy 
 and their possible use." 
 
 7th Solution. 
 
 Marches provisionally on Gettysburg, later on York Turnpike 
 towards Hill 618. 
 
 Places 800 yds. between advance guard and main body. 
 
 Assembles field train at 7 a. m. 
 
 Comment: "Would start field train a little earlier. 
 
 "Would shorten distance between main body and Ad. Gd. Dan- 
 ger is not in front." 
 
 8th Solution. 
 
 Moves via 479-489-Low Dutch Road to position in readiness 
 near J. Spangler's, with flank guard (4th Inf. less 1 bn.) on the 
 Baltimore Pike-425-452 road. 
 
 Flank guard then ordered to take position near 546 to delay 
 enemy. 
 
 Comment on latter position : "Ad. post." 
 
 Further comment: "You unnecessarily break up your units 
 and command is not well in hand, particularly necessary in this 
 case. 
 
 Your march being a flank march would shorten distance between 
 Ad. Gd. and main body." 
 
 9th Solution. 
 Sends 1 Tr. of Cav. to gain contact. 
 
 Uses 3 troops to escort two batteries via Gettysburg to position 
 on hill 566. 
 
[97] 
 
 Remainder of command moves via country road northwest from 
 McAllister Hill to Hanover Road to take a position in readiness 
 on the line Benner's Hill-618. 
 
 Comments : "You were equal to enemy in cav. ; by your ar- 
 rangement you throw this chance away, and it seems to me un- 
 necessarily. 
 
 Benner's Hill to 618 is a long line and hence order (to take 
 position on this line) becomes indefinite. 
 
 Better march command to one point 'provisionally' and see what 
 develops before designating a position ; you may want to face south 
 i. e. hold a flank position. * * * * it would be better to 
 assemble the whole command at one place, and near York Pike." 
 
 10th Solution. 
 
 Marches provisionally by Gettysburg to vicinity of the J. Kaas 
 house south of Fairview S. H. 
 
 Comment : "You erred in your figures as to the southern routes 
 or I believe you would have taken your first destination a little 
 farther south so as to cover them." 
 
 11th Solution. 
 
 Marches provisionally on 530 via 479-489-525. 
 
 Orders cavalry to cover roads leading out of Gettysburg to 
 east from 545-570 road to Harrisburg Road, both inclusive. 
 
 Places one battery in advance guard. 
 
 Comment: "Would not divide arty." 
 
 Further comment : "You should have gone more into detail as 
 to times and distances in your estimate. More care here I think 
 would have led you to a different decision. 
 
 Your independent cav. should gain contact, reconnoitre west 
 not east. 
 
 If enemy move by York or Harrisburg road you stand no chance 
 of accomplishing your mission. 
 
 Your trains should move at once to join convoy." 
 
 12th Solution. 
 
 Sends cavalry via Gettysburg to gain contact. 
 
 Marches via 479-425 and 536 to 546 on Hanover Road. 
 
 Comments: "Your own estimate it seems to me proves that 
 Gen'l. A should move somewhere west of Wolf Hill ridge near 
 York road. 
 
[98] 
 
 Your march will be slow to 546 and if enemy moves by Harris- 
 burg road you will be late. 
 
 Keeping up communication with convoy is necessary. * * 
 
 13th Solution. 
 
 Sends cavalry via Gettysburg to gain touch and delay enemy's 
 advance. 
 
 Comment: "Without becoming seriously engaged." 
 
 Marches via Gettysburg toward Granite Hill with rear guard 
 following at 800 yds. 
 
 Comment as to rear guard : "Without distance to Gettysburg." 
 
 Sends field train via Diener's and St. Mary's Church to join 
 convo}^ at Two Taverns. 
 
 Comments: "Your trains should join convoy at Barlow. % 
 of a mile of wagons cutting into a column on the march would be a 
 bad arrangement. 
 
 If enemy reaches Gettysburg and finds your command marching 
 on Granite Hill he will probably strike for York Springs and beat 
 you there. 
 
 Starting as you do you probably would not pass 618 until 
 enemy developed but your order says differently." 
 
 14th Solution. 
 
 Sends cavalry to intercept Red cavalry and determine the ad- 
 vance of the Red force. 
 
 Sends 6th Inf. & Arty, to Wolf Hill. 
 
 Moves remainder via Gettysburg to near D. Benners. 
 
 Comments : "In your estimate you do not give enough weight 
 to the York Pike and Harrisburg road. Better measure these 
 again. 
 
 If enemy takes either of these roads Gen'l. A will hardly succeed 
 in carrying out his mission under your plan. 
 
 From a position farther north he flanks the Hanover road and 
 is on north flank of enemy where he must be to save himself. Some- 
 body should be charged with keeping up communication with 
 convoy." 
 
 "Enemy has twice your arty, and it is doubtful if you could 
 reach Wolf Hill so as to prevent his gaining north or northeast 
 of Gettysburg." 
 
[99] 
 
 15tli Solution. 
 
 Takes a platoon away from the cavalry and attaches it to ad- 
 vance guard. 
 
 Comment : "Would use scouts ; you are equal in cav., this will 
 lower Tou." 
 
 Marches via Grettysburg on Benner's HilL 
 
 Comments : "You have ♦ ♦ ♦ * omitted to add to length 
 of Gen'l. X's column, the troops. 
 
 The enemy might move on York Springs via Harrisburg Road ; 
 this should have been considered. 
 
 A position nearer York Turnpike better than Benner's HilL 
 It would be tactically a flank position with reference to Hanover 
 Road, blocks the York and can easily reach the Harrisburg road, 
 is easier to withdraw from.** 
 
 16th Solution. 
 
 Marches via St. Mary's Church & Low Dutch Road to 530. 
 
 Comments : "I think your figures as to times and distances are 
 a little off. Should have considered Harrisburg road. 
 
 You require distance to delay a vastly superior force ; you can- 
 not gain much time in one place ; it must be several delays. If you 
 hold on long in one place you will be ruined. And Gen'L A's 
 brigade is worth more than the convoy." 
 
 17th SohitiOT. 
 
 Comment : "Order poorly written." 
 
 States: "Field train will join convoy." 
 
 Comment : "When— Where ?" 
 
 Marches as flank guard via Gettysburg-York Turnpike, 552, & 
 Xewchester to heights in the vicinity of Husbach. 
 
 Comments: "By your selection of 1st position you entirely 
 leave open the Harrisburg route to York Springs, and I believe 
 are unduly sanguine as to safety if enemy takes more southern 
 routes. 
 
 With so many routes radiating from one point better get nearer 
 the hub. Moreover, Gen'L A is much inferior to enemy and will 
 fight at close quarters only if necessary. He wants time, to fight 
 delaying actions. You are so close to convoy that you can not 
 
[100] 
 
 fail to become closely engaged or fall back directly on convoy too 
 soon. Either will be disastrous. 
 
 Cav. better be sent out independently to gain contact and delay 
 enemy." 
 
 AN APPROVED SOLUTION. 
 
 General A's mission is stated in his order — to cover the march 
 of the convoy in its movement to New Oxford and on toward 
 Carlisle. This means he must keep the enemy beyond artillery 
 range of the trains. 
 
 The manner of doing this is left entirely to General A's judg- 
 ment. 
 
 The force he has to hold back is double his own in infantry and 
 artillery and equal in cavalry; as stated in the problem. A fight 
 to a decision would therefore probably mean the ruin of his com- 
 mand. 
 
 His command is in excellent condition, he can count on good 
 work from it, he is in hostile territory which will be somewhat to 
 his disadvantage and to the advantage of the enemy both in gain- 
 ing information and inspiring the hostile troops striving to expel 
 the invader. 
 
 General A has an advantage in that he does not have to win a 
 battle but merely to cause delay until this flank march of the 
 convoy is beyond the reach of the enemy's guns. 
 
 General A on receipt of his order first studies his map to see 
 in what way the enemy might interfere with the march of the 
 convoy. 
 
 The exact length of General X's column can not be determined 
 from the data given. 
 
 The trains are three miles long. The battery while depleted in 
 strength is probably as long a column as a full battery — 320 yards. 
 A brigade of infantry with combat trains is 2800 yards long. 
 This 1st Brigade is probably not more than half of this or 1400 
 yards. Or troops one mile. Part of these troops will precede 
 the trains as advance guard and as the trains start at 6 a. m. we 
 have 3 miles of wagons-|-3-4 mile of troops+1 mile distances, rear 
 guard, etc. or 4 3-4 miles as length of column from head of train 
 to rear guard. General A considers it as 5 miles in estimating the 
 situation. 
 
[101] C/',;„;;-Okr-.H 
 
 The column is long and cumbersome. Although the wagons are 
 not heavy General A does not believe they can make over 2 1-2 
 miles per hour. 
 
 The tail of the column will therefore leave Barlow at 8 a. m. 
 
 From Barlow to Two Taverns is four miles. The column will 
 have passed that point at 9:36 a. m. From Two Taverns to 
 Boneauville is 3 miles, cleared by column at 9-36+1-12=10-48. 
 
 From Boneauville to New Oxford is 6 miles, cleared by column 
 at 10:48+2:24=1:12 p. m. 
 
 If the enemy starts at 6 a. m. and marches at 2^ miles per hour, 
 to reach Barlow the distance is llj miles, without being delayed 
 he could not reach the convoy with infantry. 
 
 The enemy's distance from Two Taverns is 12 miles or 4 hours 
 48 minutes march. He could reach there by 10:48 a. m., but 
 by shortly after 10 o'clock he could reach a position from which he 
 could fire into the rear of the convoy with artillery. 
 
 If then the enemy should start a little earlier than we have as- 
 sumed or march a little faster or the convoy go slower it could be 
 caught here. 
 
 From enemy's camp via Hanover Road to Boneauville is 11 
 miles, his advance then could reach this point at 10:24 a. m. or 
 24 minutes before cleared by General X's column. 
 
 But from near Mt. Vernon S. H. the artillery could fire on the 
 column for the first mile beyond Boneauville. If the enemy should 
 advance then by the Hanover road he must be delayed for an hour. 
 From the enemy's position to New Oxford via York Turnpike is 
 15f miles; he could reach there a little after 12 noon, about an 
 hour before the convoy can clear the place. From the cross roads 
 584 about 1^ miles west of New Oxford, artillery fire can effec- 
 tively reach New Oxford and for nearly a mile beyond, and from 
 points west of there can reach parts of the road to be travelled 
 by General X between Boneauville and New Oxford; at least two 
 hours delay would have to be caused by this route. 
 
 From the enemy's position to Hampton via Hunterstown is only 
 about one mile further than from Barlow to 'Hampton so that if 
 both columns travel at the same rate they would meet here. If 
 the enemy take this route he would have to be delayed nearly two 
 hours, and then the road through Hampton can be reached by 
 artillery from near Oak Wood S. H. 
 

 [102] 
 
 The Harrisburg Road crosses the Baltimore-Carlisle Road at 
 York Springs. This place is 4 miles nearer for the enemy than 
 for the convoy; a delay of nearly four hours would have to be 
 made if enemy takes this road but the distance is greater. 
 
 General A sees then that if the enemy move direct on Barlow 
 he can not reach the convoy, if he move by the Baltimore Turn- 
 pike he will need to be delayed for a short time to secure the safe 
 retreat of General X. 
 
 If the enemy move by the Hanover Road he must be delayed for 
 an hour. 
 
 If he move by the York Turnpike on New Oxford he must be 
 delayed for nearly two hours and the same time if he moves via 
 Hunterstown on Hampton, and four hours if he move direct on 
 York Springs. 
 
 As the enemy must be assumed to be familiar with the country 
 General A believes he will advance either by the Hanover Road, 
 York Turnpike or via Hunterstown. 
 
 The York Turnpike gives him his best chance, it is a good road, 
 gives him the same margin of time as the Hampton route and 
 nearly double the time margin he would have by the Baltimore 
 Turnpike. Moreover the Hunterstown route is much of it by 
 country road and would bring about the conflict after a two 
 hours longer march, a decided consideration. The move on York 
 Springs may be made but it will involve a longer march, although 
 the margin of time is greater. 
 
 General A realizes that the enemy may start before 6 a. m. and 
 possibly march a little faster than 2i miles per hour until checked. 
 On the other hand General X must appreciate his situation and 
 will push the march to the best of his ability. General A believes 
 that his estimate of times and rates are close enough for making 
 his plan of action. 
 
 The country to be traversed is rolling and therefore favorable 
 to delaying action. But two streams of any size are to be crossed, 
 Rock Creek and the Conewago. The destruction of the bridges 
 over these two streams might cause a little delay in getting the 
 artillery and combat trains across but neither stream is large 
 enough to cause much delay, but every little delay to the enemy 
 is of value. 
 
[103] 
 
 General A is too weak to risk a battle to a decision. He must 
 cause delay without becoming so closely engaged that he can not 
 get away. This will require probably more than one position to 
 be taken. 
 
 General A must cover both the Hanover Road, York Turnpike 
 and the Harrisburg road as they emerge from town. While the 
 Hanover road is not likely to be used it can not be neglected. The 
 York Turnpike will be used at first if enemy goes by Hunterstown. 
 
 General A does not consider practicable any plan that takes 
 him west of town. He looks for a first position from which he 
 can cover the three probable routes of the enemy, and when this 
 position is given up and the enemy's line of advance determined 
 he can still interpose. 
 
 The position about Benner's Hill covers the Hanover Road, 
 and, while held, the York Turnpike. The principal objection ta 
 it is that the enemy, under cover of the town, might turn its right, 
 and while General A might retreat by the Hanover Road he leaves 
 the York Turnpike and Harrisburg Road entirely open to the 
 enemy. 
 
 General A rejects any position in front (west) of Rock Creek. 
 
 The next position that he considers is on the York Turnpike 
 west of Hill 618. Between this hill and the small wood to the 
 southwest a concealed position for his guns can be found from 
 which they can reach with fire all the roads leading out of Gettys- 
 burg. Infantry can secure cover in front of the guns. 
 
 In this position if the enemy attempt to move by the Hanover 
 Road the Blues have an excellent flank position and unless the Reds 
 make a wide turn will force the latter to drive them out before 
 they can proceed. Either the attack or turn will gain about all 
 the time necessary on this road, and besides the Blues can move 
 east and still have a good flank position to again cause delay. 
 
 If the enemy should attempt to go via Harrisburg Road to 
 cross-road 549, thence to Hunterstown, his route is flanked, and 
 after he gets by. General A, having the shorter route, can again 
 interpose. 
 
 If enemy takes the Harrisburg Road, this position covers it 
 fully, and General A in deploying would extend to his right ; roads 
 
[104] 
 
 are convenient and he could easily interpose between enemy and 
 York Springs. 
 
 That the enemy will split his command and send part direct 
 against trains, the rest to deal with General A, does not worry 
 the latter. This would be to Blue advantage. There are enough 
 troops with the convoy to defend it against a small force. 
 
 To take his first position on the Harrisburg Road is not con- 
 sidered by General A because from it he would not eiFectively close 
 the Hanover Road. 
 
 The cavalry must gain touch with the enemy promptly and 
 maintain it; it must therefore be independent at first; if later 
 General A retreats and is pursued, the cavalry will become a part 
 of his rear guard. 
 
 On his march to his first position there can be no use for 
 artillery with the advance guard — the danger is not in the front. 
 
 As soon as his command crosses Rock Creek, all the bridges 
 in the vicinity will be prepared for destruction and destroyed as 
 soon as the Blue cavalry crosses. No matter which way he re- 
 treats he will destroy the bridges in front of the enemy. The delay 
 may not be great, still it will be something. 
 
 Communication must be kept up with General X's column, for 
 General A should do no more fighting than is necessary to enable 
 the trains to escape. 
 
 A strong advance guard is not necessary in the march to first 
 position. It is desirable, however, not to break organizations. 
 General A would put a regiment of infantry in advance guard, but 
 does not want his artillery so far back. 
 
 General A therefore decides to make the cavalry independent and 
 send it toward the enemy to cover his flank and gain information. 
 To march the rest of his command direct to J. Warner's place on 
 York Turnpike and prepare to meet enemy, whatever his route. 
 To have an advance guard of one battalion 4th Infantry with the 
 Machine Gun Platoon and most of the scouts. To use no flank 
 guard except the cavalry, as the enemy is still at some distance 
 and the march short. 
 
 From the cross-roads north of J. Musser to Gettysburg is two 
 and one-half miles and it is nearly one and one-half miles from 
 there to the position. 
 
[105] 
 
 The length of his brigade is 2800 yards 
 
 The Artillery Battalion 1030 yards 
 
 Distance from advance guard 600 yards 
 
 Total 4430 
 
 Less one bn. + interval 230 
 
 4200 yards, 
 or nearly two and one-half miles. 
 
 Then if the advance guard clears the cross-road at 6 a. m. and 
 the main body follows at 600 yards, the tail of the main body will 
 be the equivalent of five miles from Gettysburg. Or, if they move 
 at the same rate as the enemy and start at the same time, there 
 will be but one mile between the two at Gettysburg. 
 
 But the artillery following the 1st Battalion will have reached 
 its position as the leading element of the enemy reaches the ridge 
 one mile west of town and at the same time General A's last ele- 
 ment will be in town. 
 
 This is hardly satisfactory; but General A's column is shorter 
 by half than the enemy's, and he has better roads and a short 
 march. He can push the march faster than the enemy and his 
 cavalry should cause some delay and enable him to practically be 
 in position when the enemy reaches the ridge west of town. 
 
 His general plan is to try to hold the enemy the necessary time 
 without becoming too closely engaged. After first encounter to 
 keep in front of enemy fighting a rear guard action, destroying 
 the bridges and using any means at hand to cause delay until 
 convoy is safe. 
 
 As 6 a. m. was fixed in the orders of the night before as starting 
 time it is not probable General A can get out any earlier. 
 
 At 5 :40 a. m. he assembles his field officers and staif and issues 
 the following verbal order, which, if written, would be as follows : 
 
[106] 
 
 Field Orders ) 
 
 No.— J 
 
 Troops 
 
 (a) Independent 
 
 Cav. 
 
 Major B 
 1st Sq., 4th Cav 
 
 2d Brigade, N. Y. Inf. 
 Camp South of Gettysburg 
 
 2 Oct. '11, 5-40 A. M. 
 
 1. A hostile force of about two bri- 
 gades infantry, a regiment of artillery and 
 squadron cavalry, camped last night 6 
 miles west of here on the CHAMBERS- 
 BURG road. They are believed to have 
 our convoy as objective. 
 
 The convoy, under escort of the 1st 
 Brigade, will march at 6 a. m. via 
 BONEAUVILLE, NEW OXFORD, and 
 CARLISLE-BALTIMORE road on 
 CARLISLE. 
 
 2. This command will cover the move- 
 ment and march provisionally to the J. 
 WARNER farm about IJ miles northeast 
 of GETTYSBURG on the YORK Turn- 
 pike. 
 
 3. (a) The independent cavalry will 
 advance at a trot and gain contact with 
 the enemy, and delay him as much as prac- 
 ticable without becoming closely engaged. 
 
 (b) The advance guard will clear the 
 
 road crossing just north of here by 6 a. m. 
 
 and march through the town and via YORK Turnpike to the 
 
 WARNER place, keeping up communication with the convoy. 
 
 The march will be pushed as rapidly as practicable. 
 
 (c) The main body will follow at a distance of about 600 
 yards. 
 
 (x) The outpost will be relieved as soon as the advance guard 
 has crossed the line of supports, they will then close in on the 
 road and take their place in the column. 
 
 4. The field trains will proceed at once to join the convoy. 
 
 5. Reports will reach me at the head of the main body. 
 
 A, 
 Brig. Genl. 
 Verbally to assembled officers. Copy to General X. 
 
 Note : The first order is assumed to have designated who were 
 to assemble to receive orders. 
 
 (b) Advance Guard 
 
 Major C 
 
 1st Bn. 4th Inf. 
 
 M. G. Plat. 4th Inf. 
 
 Det. 16 Mtd. Scouts 
 
 (c) Main Body (in 
 order of march) 
 
 4th Inf. (less 2 bns., 
 M. G. Plat. & 16 
 Scouts) 
 
 1st Bn. 2d F. A. 
 
 1 Bn. 4th Inf. 
 
 5th Inf. 
 
 6th Inf. 
 
COURSE IN TACTICS— FART II. 
 
 Map Problem No. 2. — A Change in Direction of March. 
 
 (See Hunterstown-New Oxford-Boneauville sheets, 3" map.) 
 Situation : 
 
 The Juniata and Susquehanna Rivers form the boundary be- 
 tween hostile states. 
 
 The 1st Division, 1st Blue Field Army, on November 17th, 1911, 
 had advanced, in friendly territory, via the Chambersburg and 
 Hanover roads towards Brushtown, to drive back a hostile force 
 that had been reported as advancing from Columbia on Hanover. 
 (See Guide Map.) 
 
 General A, with a command consisting of the 1st Brigade, the 
 1st Bn. 1st F. A., the 1st Sq. 1st Cav., and Amb. Co. No. 1, had 
 been detached from the division with orders to march via the 
 Goldenville-Hunterstown-526 road on New Oxford, observing to- 
 wards the crossings of the Conewago. 
 
 At 10 :40 a. m. when General A's advance guard is approaching 
 J. Bell he receives word from some mounted scouts that had been 
 sent towards Guldens that, from that point, at 10:10 a. m. they 
 heard distant artillery firing in the direction of Boneauville. At 
 11:00 a. m. when the column is disposed as follows: 
 
 Point — 1st Plat. Co. A 1st Inf., at eastern exit of Hunterstown. 
 
 Advance Party — Co. A 1st Inf. (less 1st Plat.) 200 yards in 
 rear of point. 
 
 Support — 1st Bn. 1st Inf. (less Co. A) head at point 350 yards 
 west of 554. 
 
 Reserve — 2nd Bn. 1st Inf. & M. G. Co., 1st Inf., head at point 
 500 yards east of J. Bell. 
 
 Head of Main Body at point 500 yards west of J. Bell ; General 
 A who is at the head of the reserve of the advance guard, receives 
 information from an officer's patrol which had been sent to the 
 southeast to gain contact with the division as follows: "The 
 division has encountered the enemy in force. The enemy occupies 
 a position on the high ground about f of a mile west of Square 
 Corner. The division commander was making preparations to 
 attack when we left, about an hour ago." 
 
 [107] 
 
[108] 
 
 At the same time General A receives the following message from 
 the 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry: 
 
 1st Sq., 1st Cav., 
 
 Orchard, south of 594, 
 
 17 Nov. '11. 10-40 A. M. 
 Greneral A : 
 
 Xo enemy at crossings of COKEWAGO west of here. En- 
 countered hostile troop here; drove it back on XEWCHESTER. 
 Apparently a regiment of infantry massed in woods near 573. 
 What appears to be a battery is just south of road near 573. 
 Any attempt to advance on XEWCHESTER is met by rifle fire 
 from lane and wood fence west of 573. Enemy apparently en- 
 trenching this line. A patrol which has just returned from X'EW 
 OXFORD via XEW OXFORD-546-SXYDER road reports 
 nothing seen of the enemy. An officer's patrol which had pushed 
 as far as OAK WOOD S. H. and has just returned reports that 
 inhabitants state that a battery, a troop, and five battalions in- 
 fantry camped last night at HAMPTOX and crossed the COXE- 
 WAGO en route to XEWCHESTER at about 8-50 A. M. today, 
 and that HAMPTOX was unoccupied b^* the enemy. I await in- 
 structions here. 
 
 B, 
 Major, Commanding. 
 
 The field trains are with the trains of the division. 
 Required : 
 
 1st. General A's estimate of the situation. 
 
 2d. General A's orders. 
 
 3d. Any messages and reports General A may send. 
 
 X'oTE : Weather clear, temperature 50 degrees, Conewago and 
 Little Conewago not fordable ; other streams fordable for all arms. 
 
 STUDEXTS' ERRORS AXD IXSTRUCTOR'S CRITICISMS. 
 
 1st Solution. 
 
 States: "Gen'l. A's mission is to protect the left flank of the 
 1st Blue Division." 
 
 Comment: "That was his mission when he started out. His 
 mission now is to assist division to win battle." 
 
[109] 
 
 States that enemy is intrenched in a good position. 
 
 Comment: "But with an unfordable stream practically on 
 three sides." 
 
 States that if the Division Commander needed Gen. A he would 
 send for him. 
 
 Comment: "Orders often miscarry in actual warfare." 
 
 States : "The part he could send to the division would not 
 be of great assistance." 
 
 Comment : " 'A single battalion often decides the battle.' " 
 
 States that Gen. A should use all his force to drive back the 
 enemy and prevent enemy crossing near Newchester. 
 
 Comment : "He thereby allows a smaller force to 'contain' and 
 keep him out of the main fight." 
 
 Marches on Newchester. 
 
 Comment: "O. K. considering what you have assumed to be 
 your mission." 
 
 2nd Solution. 
 
 States Gen. A's force could move towards Cedarridge and Brush 
 Run S. H. for use on the right flank of the red position. 
 
 Comment : "The div. comdr. might want to use him on the left 
 or center of the line of battle." 
 
 Decides to leave a containing force of 1 Regt. of Inf. and 2 Trs. 
 of Cav. on the ridge 632-594 and to change direction of march of 
 remainder to the south at Hunterstown. 
 
 Comments: "He (Gen. A) could let the cavalry observe the 
 enemy, and march on 562. * * * *^ 
 
 By marching on 562 Gen. A has his command where the div. 
 comdr. can easily use it." 
 
 Marches on road fork 1 mile north of Granite Hill. 
 
 Comments: "There is no objection to your choosing a point 
 to march on farther in advance than the one you do." 
 
 "You give no orders for forming a new advance guard for your 
 main body." 
 
 Order of march for main body to be 2d Inf. (less 1 bn.) 1st Bn. 
 1st F. A., 3rd Bn. 2d Inf. etc. 
 
 Comment: "You will have to halt your column while these 2 
 bns. 2d Inf. pass it." 
 
 4th Solution. 
 
 States : "General A decides to turn south at 549, * * * * 
 as 554 is within long artillery range of the Red position." 
 
[110] 
 
 Comment: "But it (554) is in a hollow and covered by woods 
 and ridges to northeast." 
 
 States that Gen. A halted his column. 
 
 Comment: "Time is essential and the column should not have 
 been halted." 
 
 With 1st Inf., the Bn. of Arty. & Sq. of Cav. Gen. A goes to 
 occupy a position on the heights one mile east of Hunterstown 
 to oppose advance of the Red force. Remainder of his force 
 marches via 549-542-592-617 on Boneauville. 
 
 Comments: "It seems that as the enemy at Newchester is not 
 aggressive it would be well to have him observed by the Cav. Sq. 
 and when the latter reports any activity at Newchester force, de- 
 tach to meet it. You will need the art. in the battle." 
 
 "Gen. A ought to go towards the main fight." 
 
 "There is no particular advantage in this route and it separates 
 your main body farther from your containing force than if you 
 had marched via 534." 
 
 Comment on reply to criticisms: "The line of sight from 573 
 to the slope west of Hunterstown passes through woods north of 
 594, elevation 560; The trees, were they but 25 feet high, would 
 obstruct view. Next we have the woods n. e. of Hunterstown, — 
 Trees here but 25 feet high would obstruct view. As 25 feet can- 
 not be considered an exceptional height for a tree I do not believe 
 that the slope in question is visible from the point 573, and there- 
 fore an essential element for accurate artillery fire (observation) 
 is lacking. 
 
 While halts are authorized under some circumstances in order 
 to consider matters, no halt was necessary in this problem, — in 
 fact the conditions indicated that some good rapid marching was 
 necessary. 
 
 In regard to your containing force — cut was given on account 
 of its size. If you had given orders for them to follow the com- 
 mand, that would do very well provided they were not engaged. 
 If they were, however, you would have some difficulty in withdraw- 
 ing them from one fight to get them in another, — an argument 
 for a smaller containing force." 
 
 5th Solution. 
 States: "I (Gen. A) am ordered * * * * observe to- 
 ward the crossings of the Conewago. 
 
[Ill] 
 
 The word observe means go out and stay out and fight if neces- 
 sary to remain in observation." 
 
 Comment : "Provided conditions remain the same as when you 
 were given the orders." 
 
 States Hampton is occupied. 
 
 Comment: "f/^ioccupied, see problem. Always read problem 
 carefully." 
 
 States enemy may retire in which case Gen. A will march to 
 Cedarridge and remain there in observation. 
 
 Comment : "You would do better to march to the sound of the 
 guns in this case." 
 
 Leaves cavalry to keep touch with Newchester Red force ; Sends 
 1st Inf. and the Arty, to position in readiness near cross roads 632. 
 
 Marches remainder of command to position in readiness near 
 600. 
 
 Comments: "You should march the main body to the main 
 fight near Square Corners." 
 
 "You give no orders covering your march on 600 i. e. march 
 of main body." 
 
 6th Solution. 
 
 Leaves cavalry to observe the Reds near Newchester, and with 
 remainder marches on Boneauville via 554-602-588-548-530 and 
 Hanover Road. 
 
 ' Comments: "There is no reason why General A should not 
 march via 554-617-on 572. By the time he got to 572 he would 
 have gotten in touch with the Div. Comdr. and receive orders 
 from him. 
 
 The other road {your road) takes, as you say, more time, and 
 time is an essential element in a fight." 
 
 States : "Information of situation in Conewago Valley not in- 
 cluded (in order) as it does not affect new mission of detachment." 
 
 Comment: "This information should have been given in the 
 order. If it became, later, necessary to detach a reg. and a 
 battery against the force at 573, due to aggressive action on their 
 part, it would be simpler for the commander so detached to have 
 had some information of the situation near Newchester." 
 
 7th Solution. 
 States : "The appearance of the enemy at Newchester has not 
 changed Gen. A's mission * * * *." 
 
[112] 
 
 Comment : "It is thought that Gen. A's mission is changed by 
 the new circumstances confronting him." 
 
 Sends 1st Inf. 1 btry., and Sq. of cav., to attack enemy at 573. 
 Marches remainder on Boneauville via 617 & 562. 
 
 Comment : "If enemy at 573 does not bother Gen. A, it would 
 be better to leave them alone and not attack. By attacking he 
 so commits his containing force that he will not be able to with- 
 draw it and use it in the main battle." 
 
 Forms new advance guard of 1st Bn. 2d Inf. 
 
 Comment: "You will have to halt column to get the 1st Bn. 
 2nd. Inf. past the art." 
 
 Sends copy of order to Div. Comdr. by Tr. A. 
 
 Comment: "Better by an officer." 
 
 8th Solution. 
 
 Comment: "Advancing against the enemy's flank would be 
 alright if you were to run the battle, but the division commander 
 may want to use you at some other point." 
 
 States in order that enemy is intrenched on ridge f mile west 
 of Square Corner. 
 
 Comment: "This not warranted by the situation; see prob- 
 lem." 
 
 Orders: "3 (a) The 1st Squadron 1st cav. will report to 
 Lieut. Col. 'C for orders, (b) A containing force consisting of 
 1st Bn. 1st Inf., M. G. Co. 1st Inf., Btry. A 1st F. A. under com- 
 mand of Lieut. Col. 'C (The Advance Guard Commander), will 
 proceed via 585-537 to the vicinity of Strolich (Strouch) and 
 
 make a demonstration against the Red force at Newchester * * 
 * * ?j 
 
 Comments: "Par. 3 (a) and 3 (b) are not clear. 3 (a) would 
 better read. The 1st Sq. 1st Cav. will continue in observation at 
 
 594. The Sq. Comdr. will report to Lieutenant Col. C at 
 
 for further orders. The way you have it the Sq. Comdr. 8z Squad- 
 ron might leave 594 to report Lt. Col. C. 
 
 In 3 (b) it is not clear just what is meant by a 'demonstration.' 
 It is believed that simply to watch the enemy is better than to pro- 
 ceed against him by an attack. If he starts to leave his trenches 
 attack him, but as long as he is content to remain where he is let 
 him alone." 
 
[113] 
 
 "It seems that the only arm of the service by which the Reds 
 can gain information at any distance from their main body at 
 Newchester has been defeated once today and is outnumbered 
 4 to 1. It looks as though the cav. sq. would be sufficient in this 
 particular case to observe the enemy, report any move of his and 
 keep him from getting information." 
 
 9th Solution. 
 
 Marches via 585 & 537 toward 594. 
 
 Orders cav. to continue to reconnoitre Conewago crossings with 
 small patrols, the remainder to await orders near 594. 
 
 Comment: "Should reconnoitre towards east, York Pike." 
 
 Reinforces adv. gd. by 1 btry. Sz 1 bn. 2d Inf. 
 
 Comment: "General A would do better to reinforce it by the 
 remaining bn. 1st Inf." 
 
 States that main body will halt when it reaches 575 and await 
 orders. 
 
 Comment : "It should be stated whether it will mass or remain 
 in column." 
 
 Further comments: "Message not written in form required. 
 No heading, date, hour, etc. 
 
 By remaining to the north Gen. A allows himself to be contained 
 by a smaller force. Gen. A's mission is to get in the main fight." 
 
 10th Solution. 
 
 Leaves 2 troops to observe the enemy at Newchester. 
 
 Comment: "You leave too small a force to contain enemy. 
 The Sq. would be better." 
 
 Marches remainder via 554-617-562 Low Dutch Road. 
 
 Comment : "Too far in advance ; you might have marched pro- 
 visionally on 562. The div. comdr. would have orders reach you 
 very probably before you got there." 
 
 11th Solution. 
 
 Sends 2 bns. inf. M. G. Co., 2 btrys. and 3 trs. cav. to take up a 
 position in readiness in the vicinity of the Stroud- Weaver houses 
 to prevent enemy moving south. Marches remainder via 554 & 617 
 towards 572. 
 
 Comment: "It seems that as long as the enemy remains pas- 
 sive it would be well to let him alone. The cavalry can by its 
 superiority to the Red Cav. keep the latter in ignorance for some 
 
[114] 
 
 time as to what is taking place to the southwest. Should the 
 enemy at 573 move forward to impede Gen. A's march the latter 
 could easily detach a force then to hold him up, meanwhile he 
 could march to the battle field with his entire command less cav. 
 sq." 
 
 12th Solution. 
 
 States that Gen. A's main objectiye is 601. 
 
 Comment : "This is looking pretty far to the front. The div. 
 commander may want to say something as to where Gen. A's com- 
 mand will be put in the fight. He might want to use him on the 
 right or center of the line." 
 
 Orders : "2. This detachment will turn to the southeast." 
 
 Comment: "and march on via ." 
 
 "You intended to march on 601 ; this should be stated. 
 
 On 601 practically forces your div. comdr. to use you on his 
 left." 
 
 Forms new adv. gd. of 1 bn. 2d Inf. 
 
 Comment: "You will have to halt col. to get adv. gd. by the 
 art." 
 
 States : "I will be with the advance guard." 
 
 Comment: "Support or reserve .f^" 
 
 13th Solution. 
 
 States that Blue division must be superior to enemy opposing 
 it as Blues were making preparations to attack. If not superior 
 would wait until Gen. A's command had arrived. 
 
 Comment: "They may be expecting him." 
 
 States that if division commander wanted Gen. A he should have 
 sent some word. 
 
 Comment: "Orders may have been sent but miscarried, is one 
 thing General A would have to consider in making his estimate." 
 
 States that if Gen. A depends on the squadron of cavalry to 
 cover the movement to the southeast, 'it is most probable the enemy 
 would soon discover the cavalry was not closely supported, would 
 drive the cavalry in and if he once secured the Strouch-632-Hill 
 636 ridge. General A, making a flank march within rifle and ex- 
 cellent artillery range of this position would be in a bad way.' 
 
 Comment: "The cavalry squadron could warn General A in 
 ample time for him to protect himself against such a move." 
 
[115] 
 
 Sends advance guard, reinforced by 1 battery to take position 
 in readiness on the 636-632-Strouch ridge. 
 
 Continues use of cavalry independently. 
 
 Marches remainder of column south via 617 to 572 having lead- 
 ing battalion send two companies forward to gain distance as ad- 
 vance guard as rapidly as possible, attaching 12 mounted scouts 
 2d Infty. to same. 
 
 Comments: "A message should be sent to the division com- 
 mander informing him of your intentions." 
 
 Since cav. sq. and adv. gd. have practically the same mission 
 the cav. would better be placed under comdr. of adv. gd." 
 
 "It would be better to send more mounted scouts with new ad- 
 vance guard. Your march to the southeast causes your left to 
 be exposed to any covering detachment the enemy may have sent 
 out to his right. Warning is necessary in case of an aggressive 
 move of such a detachment of the enemy against you, and it is 
 not believed 12 scouts are sufficient." 
 
 "Gen. A should get into the main fight with as many men as 
 he can. Gen. A is nearer the 636-632-Strouch ridge than any 
 force of the enemy. If he leaves only his squadron to watch enemy 
 and marches to southeast he takes no chance as he can take the 
 ridge you want to hold as soon as enemy begins to threaten it. 
 After he (Gen. A) has passed this ridge it possesses no particular 
 value to the enemy." 
 
 14th Solution. 
 
 States : "By going to Cedar Ridge we do not get much off our 
 road & can continue easily to New Oxford if desirable." 
 
 Comment : "If you decide to take up a new mission i. e. change 
 your mission; change it and don't look back nor let yourself be 
 hampered by your former orders. They were given under dif- 
 ferent circumstances." 
 
 Decides to change direction of march provisionally toward 
 Cedar Ridge ; to march advance guard as flank guard to 506 and 
 have it observe enemy from 571 hill, and to continue cavalry on 
 the flank to screen movement. 
 
 Comments : "It is believed that Cedar Ridge is too far to 
 the front. Suppose the Division Commander wanted to use your 
 brigade on the enemy's left. He would by your action be prac- 
 tically forced to use you where he did not want to. Had you 
 
[116] 
 
 marched on 572 the Division Commander would have been able 
 to send you orders before you arrived there giving you your work 
 in the battle." 
 
 "The force at Newchester is not moving forward and is so 
 far from Gen. A's column that any movement it may make can be 
 reported by the cavalry in time for Gen. A to prepare for it. 
 It would therefore be better for the, 1st Brigade to march with 
 every available man to the southeast, leaving the cav. sq. to 
 observe and delay Newchester force." 
 
 "You make no assumption as to where the art. was marching. 
 If behind the leading bn. main body (3rd Bn. 1st Inf.) your new 
 advance guard formation leaves the art. at the head of the main 
 body." 
 
 15th Solution. 
 
 States that Gen. A's mission is to march on New Oxford. 
 
 Comment: "This was his mission. He now has a new one." 
 
 Sends 1st Inf. and Bn. of Arty, via 585 & 575 against the enemy 
 to push him back across the Conewago. 
 
 Orders cavalry to cover flanks. 
 
 With remainder detachment turns southeast at 585 and marches 
 via 600 & 573 provisionally on 552. 
 
 Comments: "Almost 3 miles from battle field near Newches- 
 ter." 
 
 "If Gen. A is going to attack the Newchester force there is no 
 advantage in turning column off the road at 585 but could con- 
 tinue on to support attacking force." 
 
 "You send one regiment and one art. bn. against five bns. and 
 one battery. If you are going to attack you had better put one 
 more infantry against enemy." 
 
 "This solution does not seem to meet requirements either way. 
 You do not join main fight at Square Corner, and since you de- 
 cided to attack Newchester you do not send sufficient force against 
 it, and separate the attacking force hy your orders a long way 
 from the prospective battle field." 
 
 16th Solution. 
 Sends 1st Inf. 1 battery and 2 troops of cavalry to position 
 in readiness 400 yards northeast of 575 to check any advance of 
 
[117] 
 
 enemy. Turns remainder of column off at 549 to march via 
 542 & 617 on 572. 
 
 Comments : "This involves countermarching a part of your 
 command." 
 
 "The enemy is not aggressive so there seems to be no reason 
 for such a containing force as you detach. You are nearer to any 
 ground from which he can attack you than he is, so you can easily 
 detach when he starts forward." 
 
 "You send out no new advance guard. There should be a small 
 one at least." 
 
 17th Solution. 
 
 Decides to attack enemy at 573, enveloping his left flank. 
 Leaves train at Hunterstown. 
 
 Comments: "Gen. A certainly ought to fight if he meets a 
 superior force, and thereby give his division a chance to get away." 
 
 "Train was with division." 
 
 "You always ought to read the problem 'very carefully. It so 
 happens that in this case your misreading problem in the part 
 relative to trains did not lead to a serious error but in some other 
 problem you may read it so as to completely tie up your solution." 
 
 States that Gen. A cannot abandon his mission in the absence 
 of any call for help from the division commander. 
 
 Comment: "Div. Comdr. is probably pretty well engaged 
 now." 
 
 18th Solution. 
 
 Comment : "You do not write out your decision." 
 
 States in order that scouts heard artillery firing in direction of 
 Boneauville. 
 
 Comment: "Not necessary to insert in order. You know a 
 battle is going on." 
 
 Further comment: "The information of enemy in this order 
 should have been coordinated and condensed." 
 
 Marches 1st Inf. & Bn. of Arty, to position in readiness at 
 Strouch. 
 
 Leaves cavalry where it is. 
 
 Turns remainder of column south at 554 to march on Boneau- 
 ville. 
 
 Comments : "You leave too large a force to contain an inactive 
 
[118] 
 
 "The main body should be covered by a small advance guard." 
 
 States that Gen. A is to be at Strouch. 
 
 Comment: "Gen. A should go towards the main fight. He 
 may get orders at any moment covering his part in the battle 
 near Sq. Corners. The affair at Newchester is insignificant as 
 compared with the division's action." 
 
 AN APPROVED SOLUTION. 
 
 General A's orders required him to march on New Oxford, via 
 the Goldenville-526-New Oxford Road, observing towards the 
 crossings of the Conewago. The orders, which governed this 
 movement, were issued under circumstances entirely different from 
 those which now confront him. Whatever may have been the 
 division commander's idea in originally sending General A's de- 
 tachment by the route chosen the facts are, that, at the present 
 time, circumstances have so changed as to now place General A 
 in a situation where he is called upon to make a decision quickly 
 and to act upon it. 
 
 To the northeast is a force of the enemy weaker than his own 
 reinforced brigade. To the southeast a battle in which his division 
 is engaged is in progress. General A could continue on New Ox- 
 ford but when the order directing him to proceed there was issued, 
 it was evidently the idea of the division commander that the enemy 
 would not be found west of Brushtown, or if found to the north- 
 east he would be in force. It so happens that so far as General 
 A can see the detachment near Newchester is inferior to his own 
 force and apparently unsupported. To move on New Oxford 
 means placing his force between two forces of the enemy, and if 
 the Reds were successful at Square Corner he would have them 
 separating him from his division. 
 
 To move on the force near Newchester would undoubtedly lead 
 to an easy victory, as this force besides being inferior, is prac- 
 tically in a position with a river on three sides and a stronger 
 force in its front. Such a course of action would keep General 
 A's command out of the main fight near Square Corner. 
 
 To move to the sound of the guns seems to be the proper course 
 to pursue, and General A adopts it as his mission. 
 
[119] 
 
 General A's force is as stated in the problem. The division to 
 which he belongs has been weakened to the extent of his detach- 
 ment. Yet the division commander is attacking. General A may 
 infer from this that the division commander realizes that his force 
 is superior to that of the enemy and can easily defeat him or it may 
 be that other circumstances, of which General A has no knowledge, 
 called for an immediate attack. General A may be said to have 
 had a right to have expected orders from the division commander 
 determining his action in the encounter, but here is a situation 
 where he has to act, as is often the case, upon his own initiative. 
 Orders are often issued but never delivered, and General A would 
 properly consider this possibility in connection with his present 
 situation. 
 
 The enemy west of Square Corner is apparently on the defen- 
 sive; this may mean that he realizes his inferiority in strength 
 or he may have assumed that attitude pending the arrival of a 
 heavier column. The enemy near Newchester is very accurately 
 reported to General A and from the reports received he would 
 believe it to be identical with the force that camped at Hampton 
 last night and crossed the Conewago this morning. His strength 
 appears to be about five battalions of infantry, a troop of cavalry 
 and a battery, and he seems to be entrenching near 573. The fact 
 of his entrenching would cause General A to believe that he intends 
 to stay where he is. 
 
 If he is sent out as a containing force with the purpose of keep- 
 ing General A's detachment out of the battle near Square Comer, 
 it is General A's business to avoid him. The fact that a force 
 is not following the 573 detachment closely, may be inferred from 
 the report of the patrol from Oakwood S. H. to the effect that 
 Hampton was not occupied by the enemy, and that New Oxford 
 was also clear. General A could not however accept this as being 
 positively the case — if a heavier column were advancing on Hamp- 
 ton, matters would be somewhat complicated and the division 
 would probably have to withdraw. 
 
 Having come to the conclusion that for the present the main 
 work cut out for him is to get into the fight near Square Corner, 
 General A has to consider other conditions. 
 
 By whatever road he marches to the southeast his left is ex- 
 posed. New Oxford, it is true, was reported clear of enemy, but 
 
[120] 
 
 this town is on one of the main roads leading towards the hostile 
 frontier, and since the patrol that made the report left that place 
 some fifty minutes have elapsed, perhaps more. Hostile troops 
 may be approaching from that direction. If the Red Commander 
 at Square Corner does the right thing, and it is a safe rule to 
 assume that he will, he will be sure to have the flanks of his battle 
 line covered, so that on General A's ifiarch to the southeast should 
 such covering detachments become aware of the movement it would 
 be their duty to oppose the march and delay him as much as pos- 
 sible. For this reason the march to the southeast must be covered 
 by an advance guard. 
 
 General A has to consider whether he will ignore the force at 
 573 and march towards Boneauville with his entire command, or 
 whether he will leave a force to contain them and move to the 
 southeast with the balance. He must take every available man 
 into the battle with him, and at the present time the force at 573 
 does not appear to be very aggressive. It is a question, however, 
 as to what the attitude of this force will be on learning of General 
 A's march towards Boneauville. General A is much superior to 
 the Reds in cavalry and the one Red troop reported has alrea,dy 
 received one reverse this morning. Its reconnaissance, therefore, 
 will not be over energetic, and while it would not be safe to say 
 that the Reds would not receive information of General A's change 
 of direction of march, still it can be assumed that for the present 
 their information will be rather meagre. On the other hand. 
 General A's squadron would be well able to report any move made 
 by the Reds at 573 and at the same time to continue reconnaissance 
 to the east through New Oxford and across the Conewago. 
 
 The high ground north of 632 would appear to be the proper 
 place to delay the Red force in case they move to the southwest 
 before General A has completed his change of direction. This 
 place is about one and one-half miles from General A's advance 
 guard and about two miles from the position of the enemy and 
 moreover is covered by the Blue cavalry. General A can easily 
 reach it by his advance guard or any regiment in his column, 
 should occasion require, especially when it is considered that the 
 cavalry can delay the enemy, should he advance. 
 
 General A concludes that as long as the Reds at 573 do not 
 l^other him he will start his entire force toward the battle field. 
 
[121] 
 
 and let his cavalry continue in observation. Should the enemy 
 become aggressive before the column has gotten well under way 
 to the southeast he will detach a force to stop him. 
 
 As far as roads leading to the southeast are concerned, General 
 A has to consider several. Any change from 549 he rejects as 
 being too far in the rear and his column is already astride the 
 Harrisburg Pike. A route south from 549 would probably in- 
 volve countermarching a part at least of his column. 
 
 The road via the western exit of Hunterstown-592-602, or any 
 route west thereof, is roundabout and would involve a loss of time 
 without any compensating advantage. 
 
 The 554-617-562 fork west of 572 road leads directly to the 
 battle field, but the advance guard is now astride that road. 
 
 The 585-600-573-586-572 road leads to the battle field, but is 
 not a direct road, and as the march to the southeast would have 
 to be covered, there is no convenient road for a flank guard. 
 
 Any road farther to the east will put the detachment in such a 
 position that the division commander would practically be com- 
 pelled to use it on the left flank, whereas he may be anxious to 
 use it at some other part of the line. 
 
 General A considers marching in two columns to the southeast, 
 the main body via 554-617-562 and the advance guard via 585- 
 600-573-586-R. F. Weaver. The Strouch Spur covers both these 
 roads from observation from 573, and the distance is rather far 
 for accurate artillery fire. It is true that the first named road 
 crosses the 637 Hill, but it is screened from view here by the woods 
 and immediately descends into the valley near 617. Before he has 
 arrived at 562 General A would expect orders from his division 
 commander that would determine his further action. By marching 
 in two columns the Blue detachment is in a formation that would 
 facilitate its deploj^ment in case the division commander decides 
 to use it against the Red right; the march is covered from the 
 east and the advance guard will be, for a while at least, in position 
 to be deflected towards the Strouch Spur, should occasion require. 
 Several cross-roads exist whereby communication could be kept 
 up between the two columns and reenforcements be sent to the 
 flank guard, should it become necessary. 
 
 In case of activity on the part of the Red detachment near 
 Newchester after the change in direction of march has taken place, 
 
[122] 
 
 General A can deflect the march of the most convenient unit of his 
 command and drop off a battery to hold him up. 
 
 General A therefore decides to march his command for the main 
 battle field via the 554-617-562 road, sending the advance guard, 
 reenforced by the mounted scouts of 2d and 3d Infantries, as a 
 flank guard via 585-600-573-586-R. F. Weaver-572, and to leave 
 his cavalry to continue in observation of the Red force at 573. 
 
 General A accompanied by his staff, the artillery commander, 
 and advance guard commander gallops forward to Hunterstown 
 and issues orders and messages as follows : 
 Verbally to the advance guard commander — 
 
 "The division is engaged with the enemy in force between 
 Boneauville and Square Corner. A force of about five battalions, 
 one battery and a troop is entrenching just west of 573, near 
 Newchester. Our cavalry remains in observation of the enemy 
 near 573. The main body moves to the southeast via 554 — 617 — 
 562 with a view of joining in the battle near Square Corner. You 
 will march your advance guard, as left flank guard, to the south- 
 east via 585 — 573 — 586 — R. F. Weaver on 572 and cover our 
 march. Mounted scouts of the 2d and 3d Infantries, will be sent 
 to report to you. Messages to me at the head of the main body." 
 
 Message to the cavalry commander — 
 
 Detachment 1st Div. 
 Major B^ Hunterstown, 
 
 Near 594. 17 Nov. '11, 11-10 a.m. 
 
 Division is engaged with the enemy in force between boneau- 
 ville and SQUARE corner. We march towards boneauville via 
 the 554—617—562 road. Flank guard on 585—573—586— 
 R. F. Weaver — 572 road. 
 
 Continue in observation of enemy at 573, report his movements, 
 delay him should he advance; reconnoitre through new oxford 
 towards the east and also towards the conewago. Messages to 
 me at the head of the main body. A, 
 
 Brigadier General, 
 Commanding. 
 
[123] 
 
 Message to the Division Commander : 
 
 Detachment 1st Div. 
 Chief of Staff, Hunterstown, 
 
 1st Blue Div. 17 Nov. '11, 11-15 a.m. 
 
 Near Boneauville. 
 About five battalions of infantry, one battery, and a troop of 
 cavalry are near 573 (southwest of newchester) apparently 
 unsupported and entrenching. I leave cavalry squadron in ob- 
 servation of this force and march towards boneauville. Main 
 body on 554—617—562 road; left flank guard on 585—573— 
 586 — R. F. Weaver — 572 road. Head of main body should 
 reach 562 by 12-20 p.m. 
 
 I march at head of main body. A, 
 
 Brigadier General, 
 Commanding. 
 General A's orders so far as the rest of the command is con- 
 cerned could be verbal and could be transmitted by simply having 
 a staif officer station himself at 554< to see that each unit took up 
 the proper direction and to explain the situation as they passed. 
 The complete order as would be shown by the Brigade Adju- 
 tant's memorandum would be as follows : 
 
 Detachment 1st Division 
 Field Orders { Hunterstown, 
 
 No. 3 j 17 Nov. '11, 11-20 a.m. 
 
 1. Our division is engaged with the enemy in force between 
 boneauville and square corner. A hostile detachment esti- 
 mated at five battalions, a battery, and a troop, apparently un- 
 supported, is entrenching near 573. The 1st Sq. 1st Cav. de- 
 feated the hostile troop near 594 and drove it back towards new- 
 chester. 
 
 2. This command will march southeast to join the division. 
 
 3. (a) The 1st Sq. 1st Cav. will continue in observation of 
 the force near 573, and will reconnoitre through new oxford to 
 the east and also across the conewago. Should the Red force 
 near 573 attempt to advance he will be delayed. 
 
 (b) The advance guard reinforced by the mounted scouts of 
 the 2d and 3d Regiments of Infantry will march southeast via 
 585— 573— 586— R. F. Weaver on 572 and as left flank guard 
 cover the march of the main body. 
 
[124] 
 
 (c) The main body will turn south at 554} and will march via 
 554 — 617 road provisionally on 562. 
 
 The Commanding Officer 3d Bn. 1st Inf. will send forward two 
 companies as new advance guard to precede the main body at 
 about 600 yards. 
 
 The Commanding Officers 2d and 3d Regiments of Infantry will 
 send forward their mounted scouts -to report to the commander 
 of the left flank guard on the 585 — 573 — 586 road. 
 4. Reports to me at the head of the main body. 
 
 A, 
 Brigadier General, 
 Commanding. 
 
COURSE IN TACTICS— PART II. 
 
 Map Problem No. 3 — An Advance, Guard. 
 (See Boneauville sheet, 3" map). 
 Situation : 
 
 The 1st Blue Division, in hostile territory, camps on the night 
 of November 6-7 east of Brushtown. It is advancing to prevent 
 the junction of Red detachments that are believed to be marching 
 from the north and west on Gettysburg. 
 
 The Advance Guard, consisting of the 1st Brigade (1st, 2d, 3d 
 Infantry), 1st Battalion, 1st Field Artillery, Company A Engi- 
 neers, and Ambulance Company No. 1, camps with its main body 
 near the farmhouse of A. Rifle. The 3d Infantry establishes out- 
 posts on the line Marysville — Trostle — Gebhardt. 
 
 During the afternoon of November 6, the 1st Blue Cavalry de- 
 feated the Red Cavalry, about a squadron strong, near Boneau- 
 ville, and drove it southward beyond Two Taverns. Intrenched 
 hostile detachments were developed at the cross-roads 516 on the 
 Low Dutch Road, at the road junction 535, on the nose imme- 
 diately west of Mt. Vernon S. H., and near the orchard west of 
 the road junction 548. The 1st Cavalry came in after dark to 
 camp with the Advance Guard, leaving a reconnaissance troop 
 near Two Taverns. The commander of this troop reported, in 
 the course of the evening, that strong fatigue parties were at work 
 all along the ridge from knoll 567, south of the Hanover road, 
 through road junction 54i6 to knolls 606 and 612 near Rocky 
 Grove S. H. 
 
 This information was promptly transmitted to the division 
 commander, from whom, at 11 :30 p. m., the following message 
 was received: 
 
 "I am reliably informed that a hostile column of all arms, 
 marching south, reached Mt. Holly this afternoon. The Division 
 will advance tomorrow to defeat the enemy now near Gettysburg 
 before he can be reinforced. The Main Body will start from the 
 west exit of Brushtown at 7:00 a. m., marching by the Hanover 
 Road. The Advance Guard, reinforced by the 1st Cavalry, will 
 precede the Main Body by one mile. I will join you by 8 :00 a. m." 
 Required : 
 
 [125] 
 
[126] 
 
 1. General A's estimate of the situation. 
 
 2. His orders to the time of departure of his command. 
 Note: Weather: clear. Highest temperature, Nov. 6, 63; 
 
 lowest, 45. Almanac November 7 : 
 
 Moon rises 5 :34 p. m. Sun rises 6 :52 a. m. 
 
 Moon sets 7:44 a.m. Sun sets 5:11 p.m. 
 
 STUDENTS' ERRORS AND INSTRUCTOR'S CRITICISMS. 
 
 General A's estimate of the situation. 
 1st Solution. 
 
 Comment: "There should be some consideration for the ad- 
 visability of using a flank guard." 
 
 2nd Solution. 
 
 Decides to send 1 bn. & M. G. Co. 3d Inf. as flank guard from 
 601 via 602— F. X. Noel & 560 toward Gettysburg. 
 
 Comment : "The flank guard is not necessary, and by using it, 
 the advance guard advances on a front so broad as probably to 
 interfere with the deployment of following brigades against the 
 main hostile position." 
 
 3rd Solution. 
 
 Comment: "Without neglecting the necessary reconnaissance, 
 the 1st Cav. could at first be of powerful assistance to General A 
 if used against the left of the hostile outpost line." 
 
 Decides to send one regiment as right flank guard via 537 — 
 Mt. Rocks S. H., Store, 614, 560 & 572. 
 
 Comment: "The division will probably envelope the enemy's 
 right. This flank guard moving so far to the north will interfere 
 with the proper deployment of following brigades." 
 
 Further comment: "Some sort of assembly order must have 
 been issued before 6 :15 A. M." 
 
 4th Solution. 
 Decides to use one troop on left flank, to send two squadrons 
 to northwest via 582-Cedarridge & Hunterstown, and to hold 
 three troops to cover right flank and maintain communication with 
 the two squadrons. 
 
[127] 
 
 Comment: "Better keep all of the 11 troops on the Blue right 
 under one comdr." 
 
 Decides to send a left flank guard of one battalion and a machine 
 gun platoon from Boneauville to march via 572-587-535. 
 
 Comment: "This decision would seem a little premature. In- 
 formation received on the march may very well make it inadvis- 
 able to detach in this manner. And certainly better not to order 
 so far in advance." 
 
 Decides to place the 3d Infantry in the support. 
 
 Comment : "This detail for the support will place tired troops 
 in the first line in the coming engagement." 
 
 5th Solution. 
 
 Decides to send one squadron to Gettysburg via Baltimore 
 Turnpike and parallel roads to drive back hostile squadron de- 
 feated yesterday * * * *, 
 
 Comment: "The most important task for the Cav. lies to the 
 north and every possible man should be sent there." 
 
 Decides to send two squadrons around north flank to reconnoitre 
 enemy's position and cover roads to Gettysburg. Questions pro- 
 priety of delaying the reconnaissance to drive in outposts. 
 
 Comments: "The bulk of the cav. could well assist at first in 
 compelling the prompt evacuation of the hostile outpost line." 
 
 "Reconnaissance is carried on by patrols, backed up by one or 
 two troops. The remainder of the Cav. operates against the out- 
 post line. There is no interference of the two duties with each 
 other since they are carried on simultaneously by different bodies." 
 
 6th Solution. 
 
 Decides to send two squadrons to the northwest towards 
 Guldens and Granite Hill, and to send a flank guard of one squad- 
 ron and one regiment of infantry to the south towards German- 
 town and Two Taverns. 
 
 Comments : "Gen'l. A had better send at least 10 troops to 
 the north, where as great mounted strength as possible is desir- 
 able." 
 
 "Better not order this flank guard until later, after the march 
 is well under way. Developments may make it inexpedient to 
 send." 
 
[128] 
 
 8th Solution. 
 
 States that the advance guard must clear A. Rifle at 6 :40. 
 
 Comment: "A. Rifle is nearly one mile from Brushtown. So 
 the Ad. Gd. will have its distance from the Main Body if it clears 
 A. Rifle at a little before 7:00r 
 
 10th Solution. 
 
 Decides to use the regiment on outpost as leading element in 
 order to gain time. 
 
 Comment: "The advantages of this arrangement hardly seem 
 to compensate for disadvantage of having wearied troops in first 
 line in probably severe engagement to come." 
 
 u* * * * ^jjg 'rule' is not to use outpost troops in the 
 advance next day." 
 
 11th Solution. 
 
 Comment: "It is believed the infy. had better be kept in one 
 column until contact is gained and this morning's information 
 makes its best use certain." 
 
 13th Solution. 
 
 Comment: "The estimate should decide upon disposition of 
 field trains." 
 
 14th Solution. 
 
 Decides to drive in enemy's detachments along the Low Dutch 
 Road, and then send a regiment of infantry and one battery of 
 artillery via 530, 548, 618, 590 & 587 to threaten the Red's left 
 flank. 
 
 Comment: "General A should not come to a decision on this 
 point until the hostile outpost line has been carried. If this de- 
 cision were actually carried into eifect it would constitute a bad 
 case of dispersion. It probably could not be done so near the 
 enemy, and at best would interfere with the proper deployment 
 of the division as a whole." 
 
 Decides to send one squadron to reconnoitre towards the enemy's 
 right flank for the defeated Red squadron near Two Taverns. 
 
 Comments : "One squadron is too much to go to the South." 
 
 Further comment : "The decision should be concisely and com- 
 pletely stated and after all discussion." 
 
 His orders to the time of departure of his command. 
 
[129] 
 
 1st Solution. 
 
 Orders 1st Inf. to be ready to march at 5:25 A. M. Orders re- 
 mainder of troops (less outpost) to be ready to march at 6 A. M. 
 
 Comment : "The troops are required to be ready much earlier 
 than is necessary." 
 
 Orders cavalry out at 5 :30 A. M. to reconnoitre enemy's posi- 
 tion. 
 
 Comment : "Better give the Cav. a route, and direct operation 
 at first against the left of the hostile outpost line. 5:30 is very 
 early to move at this time of the year." 
 
 Further comment : "The location of trenches developed yester- 
 day should be told the command, also * * * * the defeat 
 of the hostile squadron." (in Par. 1) 
 
 Orders support to march at 5 :27 a. m. and reserve at 6 :05 a. m. 
 
 Comments : "The support will precede the reserve by too great 
 a distance. 
 
 And the reserve starting @ 6:05 will precede the Main Body 
 by nearly 2 miles. 
 
 The Cav. and Support under their orders, probably will inter- 
 fere with each other on the Hanover Road." 
 
 States in Par. 4 : "I will be at head of Reserve." 
 
 Comment: "In a march where the enemy will so soon be met 
 the Adv. Gd. Comdr. should be farther forward." 
 
 2nd Solution. 
 
 Issues assembly order at 11 :15 P. M. 
 
 Comment : "This order could hardly have been issued at 11 :15. 
 The Div. C. O.'s order was not rec'd. till 11 :30:' 
 
 Further comments: "In these formal march orders there 
 should be a column of *Troops.' (in margin) 
 
 At least the Cavalry should be told of the Mt. Holly column. 
 
 The distance between Main Body and Advance Guard should 
 appear in order. 
 
 The Bulk of the Cav. in addition to the reconnaissance ordered, 
 (to north & west of enemy's left flank) should at first operate 
 against the left of the enemy's outpost line." 
 
 In assembly order, 3d Inf. (less 1 bn.) joins rear of infantry 
 column at 601. In march order entire reserve is formed with tail 
 at A. Rifle. 
 
[130] 
 
 Comments: "No order for the reserve to march is given, and 
 the support apparently guides on the reserve. 
 
 It is believed there would be considerable difficulty experienced 
 in forming the reserve's column, if there were no one present in 
 authority to give additional orders. 
 
 So far as the 3d Inf. is concerned this order conflicts with the 
 assembly order. The 3d Inf. should not be brought back towards 
 A. Rifle." 
 
 3rd Solution. 
 
 Comment: "Column of Troops (in margin of order) does not 
 % for 1 troop cav. & 1 reg. infty." 
 
 At 6 :15 A. M. orders support to clear A. Rifle's at 6 :25 A. M. 
 
 Comment: "The support in proper formation cannot clear 
 A. Rifle hy6:26 without double timing." 
 
 Starts cavalry at 6 .25 A. M. toward Table Rock. 
 
 Comment: "The Cav. under these orders will interfere with 
 the march of the Flank Guard, or of the Support depending upon 
 the road it follows." 
 
 States that the train will join the division train as soon as the 
 division has passed. 
 
 Comment: "Definite orders giving time & place of assembly 
 are necessary to make sure there is no interference with the divi- 
 sion." 
 
 4th Solution. 
 
 Orders main portion of command to be ready to march at 6 :50 
 A.M. 
 
 Comment: "The command will have to assemble earlier than 
 6:50 to comply with its orders from Div. C. O." 
 
 Further comment: "Word Reserve (in march order) should 
 be followed by 'in order of march.'" 
 
 Designates 1st Cavalry (less 1st Sq.) as "Independent Cav- 
 alry." 
 
 Comment: "Not Independent but Advance Cav. since part of 
 Advance Guard. * * * * Independent Cav. would not be 
 under General A." 
 
 One battalion 2d Inf. is placed at the head of the reserve. The 
 2d Inf., less this battalion, is ordered to follow the artillery. 
 
 Comment : "The Col. of the 2d Inf. should be with his leading 
 bn." 
 
[131] 
 
 Further comments: "The support does not march till 6:40 
 yet it is formed by 6:15." 
 
 "If the Reserve had a separate comdr., that might be told to 
 clear a certain pt. at a certain time, but having no comdr. other 
 than General A, he should tell its leading element when to start." 
 
 "The field train should have a time and place of assembly named 
 so that trains of elements will know where and when to go." 
 
 5th Solution. 
 
 Orders cavalry to start at 5 :25 A. M., the two squadrons on 
 the north to reach, without delay, the roads leading from the 
 north into Gettysburg. 
 
 Comment : "The Cav. goes out at an unnecessarily early hour. 
 Routes should be assigned it, and more definite first missions. 
 Under these orders it may get so far away as not to be available 
 in the approaching engagement." 
 
 Comment on reply to criticism: "A cavalry comdr. is usually 
 given only general instructions because his mission takes him far 
 away. As the Cav. mission brings it nearer to the higher com- 
 mander his orders increase in definiteness. In this case the cavalry- 
 man is going to work only a little farther away from Gen'l. A 
 than will one of his infantry colonels when his, the latter's, regi- 
 ment is deployed. The cavalryman's orders then should be almost 
 as specific as will be the infantryman's. It is not a question of 
 the cavalryman's competency, but of insuring that General A's 
 solution of the problem is followed and not someone else's." 
 
 Places 2d Inf. at the head of the reserve, then the artillery, etc. 
 
 Comment: "The Art. is too far back for an advance into 
 action. Better behind one bn. only of reserve." 
 
 Issues march order at 11-55 P. M. 
 
 States that Gen. A feels that one order is sufficient, so does not 
 issue assembly order the night before the march. 
 
 Comment: "It is believed two orders would be better. More 
 information of enemy is to be expected, and just the middle of 
 the night is the worst time to expect thorough comprehension of 
 a long order." 
 
 Orders reserve to follow the support at 850 yards. 
 
 Comment on reply to criticism: "There will have to be less 
 figuring by the organizations of the reserve as to their starting 
 
[132] 
 
 times if the starting time of the leading unit is given. Gen'l. A 
 had to work this time out in setting the time for his support, and 
 if it appears in his order, will be of some slight assistance to sub- 
 ordinates." 
 
 6th Solution. 
 
 Comment on reply to criticism : "The instructor, after reading 
 par. 3 (a) of the order, was in doubt as to which hostile line the 
 Cav. was to march against. And it is probable the Cav. Col. would 
 have the same difficulty. An order to 'locate his position and as- 
 certain his strength and dispositions' is by no means of the same 
 meaning as one 'to operate against.' The latter it is believed 
 is here required." 
 
 Places flank guard infantry (1 regiment) between the advance 
 party and the remainder of the support, until Boneauville is 
 reached. 
 
 Comment: "Putting a whole reg. between Adv. Party and 
 Support Proper will probably confuse and delay march." 
 
 Comment on reply to this criticism: "The support com- 
 mander's business will certainly not proceed smoothly if a half 
 mile of troops march between the two parts of his command. In 
 last year's problem one bn. & machine guns only were in this posi- 
 tion, and this flank guard was out of the way long before the 
 enemy was likely to be met. Here the student has a regiment and 
 keeps them (the men of this regiment) in the way till within rifle 
 range of where the enemy was yesterday found intrenched." 
 
 Places headquarters of 2d Inf. in rear of the artillery. 
 
 Comment : "The Col. of the 2d Reg. should be where orders for 
 his probably early deployment will most promptly reach him. 
 
 The student should solve each problem on its own merits and 
 not on its resemblance to some other." 
 
 States that the field train will remain parked off the road until 
 the division passes * * * *. 
 
 Comment on reply to criticism : "Keeping the wagons in regi- 
 mental parks (the meaning of Gen'l. A's order without explanation 
 is by no means clear) is not the handiest formation for prompt 
 advance or retreat. They should be assembled in column on a 
 side road." 
 
 Further comment: "Where messages will be rec'd. should be 
 stated." 
 
[133] 
 
 7th Solution. 
 
 Comments: "If the Adv. Gd. clears A. Rifle's @ 6:40 (as 
 ordered), nearly two miles will separate the Adv. Gd. & Main 
 Body." 
 
 "The train should at latest be assembled by 7:20 to be sure it 
 will not interfere with march main body." 
 
 8th Solution. 
 Comment: "General A's subordinates should be told of the 
 hostile detachments along the Low Dutch Road." 
 
 9th Solution. 
 
 Assembly order directs the train to form at 6 A. M. about 300 
 yards west of A. Rifle. 
 
 Comment: "Better not move train till troops of reserve have 
 marched, then assemble before Main Body comes up." 
 
 Comment on reply to criticism: "To form 1620 yds. of train 
 will require considerable movement by the components thereof, and 
 this movement taking place before all the troops have marched is 
 almost certain somewhere to interfere. The trains should stand 
 fast till the tail of the reserve has marched." 
 
 Further comment: "A division of Cav. for the two flanks 
 should be made so that the support will know how those flanks are 
 covered, and route for the Cav. should be designated." 
 
 Comment on reply to criticism: "If Gen'l. A gave the Cav. 
 Col. any other instructions than those in the order those instruc- 
 tions should have been quoted. 
 
 Gaining 'contact with' an enemy has by no means the same 
 meaning as 'operating against.' The first will probably be done 
 by patrols only, the second includes the idea of attack by large 
 bodies. 
 
 To designate a route for a cavalry regiment is no more 'an un- 
 warrantable interference with or gross reflection upon the ef- 
 ficiency' of its colonel, provided Gen'l. A is close enough at hand 
 to know just where he wants that regiment, than is the designation 
 of a route for one of the infantry regiments a reflection upon the 
 infantry colonel. And the student in par. 3 (d) had no hesitation 
 about prescribing in great detail the route for his flank guard 
 
[134] 
 
 A definite route is necessary in this case for the proper under- 
 standing and coordination of all concerned." 
 
 Orders a right flank guard (1 reg. inf.) to march via 537-Mt. 
 Rocks S. H. 606 & 572. 
 
 Comment : "Better move in one column. A flank guard is not 
 necessary and its presence will only impede the deployment of the 
 brigades behind." 
 
 Comment on reply to criticism : "If the advance guard deploys 
 on a greater front than it will afterwards fight on against the 
 main hostile position (and the use of a flank guard is beginning the 
 deployment) that front must later be contracted to give brigade 
 coming abreast of it, its proper place. During this operation of 
 contracting frontage the brigade coming up will be delayed and 
 hampered." 
 
 Further comment: "The Adv. Guard should know about how 
 far away its supporting troops will be. The student states cor- 
 rectly that the exact distance is of little moment." 
 
 10th Solution. 
 
 Comments: "The assembly order directed representatives to 
 assemble @ 6:15. yet Gen'l. A issues this order at 6:05." 
 
 "Gen'l. A here [Par. 3 (a)] orders the Cav. @ 6:05 to move out 
 at once, yet the assembly order did not direct it to be ready till 
 6:20." 
 
 "The Adv. Cav. (2 sqs.) and Left Flank Cav. (3 tps.) have 
 been ordered to use the same road to 601 at the same time." 
 
 Comment on reply to criticism: "Of course when two com- 
 mands attempt to use the same road at the same time, the senior 
 has the right of way, but that fact does not relieve the commander 
 from censure whose orders have caused the conflict. The difficulty 
 in this problem could easily have been avoided." 
 
 Comment on reply to various criticisms: "It is believed the 
 student will recognize the justice of these criticisms if he con- 
 siders what is advisable in the particular situation, without at- 
 tempting to find a resemblance to some other problem, and make 
 a comparison with the measures adopted in that other. The 
 fancied resemblance usually does not exist. No 'practice' is 'ap- 
 proved' that does not best meet the requirements of the particular 
 
[135] 
 
 11th Solution. 
 
 Orders cavalry to operate against enemy's flanks and rear. 
 
 Comment: "General instructions to operate against the 
 enemy's flanks and rear are hardly sufficient in this case. To se- 
 cure proper coordination with the remainder of the advance guard, 
 the cavalry must be directed against a particular flank of a parti- 
 cular line, since there are two rather widely separated ones 
 (lines)." 
 
 "Even if it is preferred to leave the initiative in dividing his 
 regiment to cover the 2 flanks to the Cav. Colonel, what that divi- 
 sion is to be, should appear somewhere in the order for the infor- 
 mation of the command." 
 
 Further comment: "The Support at least should be told 
 exactly where the trenches of the outpost line have been found." 
 
 12th Solution. 
 
 Orders one regiment of infantry and one battery, as right flank 
 guard, to march via 601, 602, 573, F. X. Noel, 560, 572 and 
 Hill 574 to attack left of enemy's outpost line. 
 
 Comments: "By advancing on so broad a front the Adv. Gd. 
 will hamper rather than help the deployment of the division 
 against the hostile main position." 
 
 "The bn. of art. should be kept together." 
 
 13th Solution. 
 
 Does not issue an assembly order. 
 
 Comment: "This (march) order must have been preceded by 
 some sort of directions to troops to be in readiness for marching, 
 and for officers to assemble to receive orders." 
 
 14th Solution. 
 
 Orders command to be prepared to march at 5 :45 A. M. 
 
 Comment: "For most of the organizations this is much too 
 early." 
 
 Orders 1st Bn. on outpost duty to assemble at 6:40 A. M. at 
 601. 
 
 Comment: "The 3rd Inf. (complete) was on outpost duty. It 
 is twice named in column. Troops, and 1st Inf. not at all." 
 
 Further comment: "The assembly order directed the officers 
 to assemble at 5 :00 o'clock to receive orders that were not issued 
 till 6:30." 
 
[136] 
 
 Further comments: "This arrangement (under 'Troops') fails 
 to account for one troop of cavalry." 
 
 "General A decided p. 8, to send one squadron to the south but 
 fails to so order." 
 
 Orders Ambulance Company to follow at rear of reserve. 
 
 Comment : "Needs no special par. Col. 'Troops' shows where 
 it goes." 
 
 Assumed train had rejoined division train after supper. 
 
 Comment : "For trains to do so is hardly warranted by situa- 
 tion." 
 
 15th Solution. 
 
 Orders one battalion, mounted scouts and machine gun com- 
 pany of 1st Inf. to move in advance of the support via Square 
 Corner, 597-560 and 562 as flank guard. 
 
 Comment: "The use of this infty. flank guard is not neces- 
 sary. The Cav. can do anything it could. And the bn. while 
 getting beyond control by Gen'l. A will be directly in the way of 
 the deployment of succeeding brigades." 
 
 Orders both support and reserve to leave 601 at certain time. 
 
 Comment: "With only one road leading to 601, the use of an 
 initial point so far forward will cause considerable confusion in 
 forming the column. 
 
 If the reserves start @ 6:35 there will be more than 1% miles 
 between them and the main body." 
 
 AN APPROVED SOLUTION. 
 
 1. General A's estimate of the situation. 
 
 The Blue division is advancing to defeat the enemy near Gettys- 
 burg before that enemy can be reinforced. The infantry of the 
 northern hostile column having about 20 miles to march, should 
 begin to appear on the battle field in something over eight hours 
 after leaving Mt. Holly. That start may be made tonight or at 
 an unusually early hour tomorrow morning, or the march may 
 have been continued beyond Mt. Holly this afternoon. And the 
 cavalry from this column, and possibly some artillery, may appear 
 well ahead of its infantry. Then, too, the railroad may even be 
 used to some extent, although the fact that the Mt. Holly detach- 
 
[137] 
 
 ment has been marching, and the tenor of the order from the Blue 
 division commander, renders it probable that, for some reason, no 
 considerable number of men is likely to be brought in by rail. 
 Time is, therefore, an important element in the solution of the 
 division's problem. And, consequently General A believes it is 
 the mission of the advance guard promptly to drive in the enemy's 
 outposts, and laying bare the enemy's main position, and so clear 
 up the situation that there need be no delay in the division's at- 
 tack. 
 
 The Red detachments entrenched along the Low Dutch Road are 
 probably the advance troops of the hostile outpost. They are 
 not likely to defend their posts desperately since apparently a 
 main position is being prepared behind them. The outpost line is 
 about two miles in length and is held therefore by two or three 
 battalions. To this, General A's command is so greatly superior 
 that he should have no hesitation about attacking. 
 
 The hostile position in front of Wolf Hill Ridge is about 3000 
 yards long, sufficient in size, consequently, for occupation by a 
 division, and certainly not to be defended in a decisive engagement 
 by less than a strongly reinforced brigade. The column of all 
 arms that reached Mt. Holly today is evidently the "detach- 
 ment" from the north that the Blue division has been advancing 
 to intercept, and therefore is something less than a division. Not- 
 withstanding the local inferiority of the Red cavalry, both Red 
 detachments, operating in friendly country, doubtless have rather 
 full information of the Blue division's strength and movements. 
 That a strong defensive position is apparently being prepared in 
 front of Gettysburg seems to indicate that the enemy has no 
 intention of taking the offensive at once, but will accept battle 
 therein, hoping, while continuing to cover Gettysburg, to post- 
 pone the decision until the Mt. Holly column can assist. But, 
 beyond the necessity for continued careful reconnaissance of both 
 hostile columns General A is not greatly concerned with the main 
 body of either. His immediate objective is the hostile outpost line. 
 
 In arranging for tomorrow's advance, the first question to be 
 answered is, how best to use the Blue cavalry? The defeated 
 hostile squadron has probably drawn back behind the Red in- 
 fantry, tonight, and tomorrow will very likely be found on the 
 enem.y's northern flank seeking to open direct communication. 
 
[138] 
 
 and probably to effect a junction with the cavalry from Mt. Holly. 
 In the attempt to maintain the superiority already gained over 
 the enemy's cavalry, the bulk of the Blue cavalry must tomorrow 
 be sent north. It is highly important also that contact with the 
 Mt. Holly column be gained at once, its rate of advance observed, 
 and perhaps its progress checked. For both tactical and strate- 
 gical reasons General A thinks it probable the division, in attack- 
 ing the hostile main position, will envelope its left. To cover such 
 an envelopment, to assist perhaps in the attack, to take up the 
 pursuit, or to cover a withdrawal, the Blue cavalry will be the most 
 valuable on the right flank. 
 
 While the above is true, the left flank cannot be left entirely 
 without cavalry. The defeated Red squadron may not shift to- 
 morrow to the north but may appear again about Two Taverns. 
 There must be some Blue cavalry in that direction to watch for 
 the Red squadron, and to reconnoitre towards the enemy's right 
 and rear. Giving due consideration to the reduced morale of the 
 Red squadron, the troop at Two Taverns, which can easily be 
 supported by infantry if necessary, should be sufficient for this 
 purpose. 
 
 It does not seem advisable to detach the remainder of the cavalry 
 on any far away mission to the north. Had the Division Com- 
 mander believed such use of the cavalry to be expedient he would 
 himself have so ordered, and General A would not now find it part 
 of the advance guard. In the coming engagement, the Division 
 Commander will want his cavalry, while keeping in touch with the 
 Mt. Holly column by patrols, to be itself so close at hand that it 
 can cover the division's flank, and participate if necessary in the 
 attack. Meantime, the bulk of the cavalry can, at first, be of 
 powerful assistance to General A in compelling a prompt evacua- 
 tion of the hostile outpost line by operating upon the high ground 
 south of Granite Hill, over suitable terrain, against the left and 
 rear of that line. At the same time the early seizure of Granite 
 Hill will be of great assistance in screening the division's deploy- 
 ment, in the prompt reconnaissance of the enemy's main position, 
 and for the support of detachments in touch with the hostile Mt. 
 Holly column. A suitable road is found via Mt. Rocks S. H. — 
 Store— 606— 594— 560. 
 
[139] 
 
 If the Mt. Holly column attempts to send troops to Gettysburg 
 by rail, the cavalry will have to interrupt the railroad. For this 
 reason, and perhaps later to assist by passive means in delaying 
 the march of that column, the mounted detachment of engineers 
 will go with the cavalry. Extensive demolitions should not be 
 ordered by General A without the authority of the Division Com- 
 mander, who very possibly expects to use the rail and wagon roads 
 now in the enemy's possession for his own command. 
 
 No cavalry is needed, or could do much, straight toward Gettys- 
 burg. The mounted men to gain contact via Boneauville, and for 
 the support's nearby reconnaissance, will come from the infantry 
 scouts. 
 
 With the driving in of the enemy's outpost line the function of 
 the advance guard as such will probably cease, and the develop- 
 ment of the attack be taken up under the Division Commander's 
 personal direction. The cavalry then may have new tasks as- 
 signed to it. 
 
 Shall the advance guard march in more than one column.? A 
 flank guard of infantry is certainly not necessary to gain time 
 since no hostile infantry is soon to be expected on either flank. 
 But it is, nevertheless, advisable to march on a broad front in 
 order to hasten deployment against the hostile outposts. Ex- 
 amining the roads leading to the west it is seen that there is none, 
 approximately paralleling the Hanover Road, that leads directly 
 against either flank of the hostile first line. All those not too far 
 out are too roundabout to permit any substantial gain in time of 
 their use. Moreover, the enemy may very possibly make no stand 
 at his outposts, and consequently there will be no reason for de- 
 ploying so soon. By keeping his command in one column General 
 A best retains full control over his men, and his own freedom of 
 action. When the march is taken up, he will probably have had no 
 news of the enemy for some hours. Material changes then may 
 have been made, without his knowledge, in the hostile dispositions. 
 But by the time he has personally reached the road junction 616, 
 overlooking Boneauville, the patrols from his support will be in 
 contact with the enemy over the whole front, and information 
 will quickly be at hand to indicate whether or not he will have to 
 fight for the J. Spangler ridge ; and in case he has to, he will then 
 be in a much better situation for deciding how and when to put 
 
[140] 
 
 in his men. With his command remaining in one column as long 
 as possible, General A has the greatest degree of freedom as to the 
 manner of its final deployment, and can avail himself of the maxi- 
 mum of information concerning the enemy's dispositions, in de- 
 termining whether that deployment should largely be made to the 
 north of the Hanover Road, or largely to the south thereof, or 
 whether on both sides of the road for an attack on a very broad 
 front. 
 
 The Hanover Road is a good one. It may, however, have been 
 obstructed in places, and it is therefore advisable to have the 
 engineer company march with the support. To avoid breaking 
 units, one regiment will be put in the support. The artillery will 
 be wanted as soon as the enemy is encountered, so that one bat- 
 talion only of a second infantry regiment will march in front of it. 
 But, in turn, to facilitate the infantry's deployment, the artillery 
 reserves will go near the tail of the column. The outpost regi- 
 ment will naturally be the last regiment of the reserve. The sup- 
 port will have its own mounted scouts reinforced by those of the 
 second regiment for local reconnaissance. The scouts of the 3d 
 Infantry now on outpost will be assembled at the head of the 
 reserve. 
 
 A convenient initial point for the advance guard is found in the 
 stream crossing west of the Rebert farmhouse. This point is 2,400 
 yards from the western exit of Brushtown which is the initial point 
 for the main body of the division. The head of that main body 
 will reach the crossing west of Rebert at 7 a. m.H" ^^ or about 
 7:27. To precede the main body by one mile, the reserve of the 
 advance guard must clear this point at 7 :27-20 minutes, or 7 :07. 
 The reserve will consist of 
 1st Brigade (less 1 reg.) . .1920 yards 
 
 1st Batt. 1st F. A 1030 yards 
 
 Amb. Company No. 1 . . . . 280 yards 
 
 Total 3230 yards, or t||o = 37 min. long. 
 
 The head of the reserve then must pass the selected initial point 
 at 7:07-37 min. or 6:30 a. m. The outpost regiment will not 
 close in on the reserve's initial point, but the place left for it in 
 the column makes the above figures correct. 
 
[141] 
 
 The support to precede the reserve by, say 900 yards, must 
 clear the initial point at 6:30 a. m. — ^ or about 6:20 a. m. 
 
 The cavalry will move directly from camp towards Mount 
 Rocks S. H. and thence by 582, 606, 594, and 560. Gaining 
 its position at a trot it need not start till a few minutes 
 after the support — that is, by 6:30 a. m. This will not prevent 
 its taking up the reconnaissance towards Mt. Holly at a very 
 early hour, and in order that its commander may have time to get 
 out whatever detachments may be required for this purpose 
 General A will give him instructions at once. It is, of course, 
 probable that Blue officers' patrols are now out and in touch with 
 the northern hostile column. 
 
 The division commander gave no orders regarding the field 
 trains. After the troops leave camp they must be assembled on 
 some side road where they can move promptly in advance or re- 
 treat, and must clear the Hanover road before the main body 
 makes its appearance. The 537-506 road is a suitable one, and 
 7 :20 a. m. will do for the completion of the assembly. 
 
 It is already very late when General A receives his orders. 
 Because further information is likely to come in during the re- 
 mainder of the night, and to disturb as few persons as possible 
 at this time, he will now simply issue an assembly order for the 
 morning of the 7th, reserving his advance guard order till shortly 
 before the first troops are to march. 
 
 Considerable time will elapse after the departure of the regi- 
 ment in the support before it is necessary for the last organization 
 of the advance guard to leave. To give each organization the 
 maximum of rest its place in the column is accordingly taken into 
 consideration in issuing the assembly order. 
 
 The outpost will, of course, remain in place and continue their 
 reconnaissance until the support has marched beyond them. There 
 will then be ample time to close in on the Hanover road and take 
 their places in column. 
 
 General A decides: 
 
 To march in one column by the Hanover road. 
 
 To have the 1st Cavalry (less one troop) march at 6:30 a. m. 
 to the vicinity of Granite Hill to cover the division's right, gain 
 contact with the Red's Mt. Holly column, and at first to operate 
 against the left of the enemy's outpost line. 
 
[142] 
 
 •To have the troop now at Two Taverns cover the Blue left. 
 
 To place the 1st Infantry, Mounted Scouts, 2d Infantry and 
 Engineer Co. (less the mounted detachment which will go with 
 the cavalry) in the support. To have the support clear the 
 stream crossing west of Rebert at 6:20 a. m. 
 
 To cause the reserve to follow at 900 yards, in the order^ — 
 Mounted Scouts 3d Infantry, 2d Infantry (less mounted scouts 
 and 2 bns.), 1st Battalion, 1st F. A. (less reserves), 2d and 3d 
 Battalions, 2d Infantry, 3d Infantry, Art. Reserves, Amb. Co. 
 No. 1. 
 
 To have the field trains assembled by 7 :20 a. m. on the 537-506 
 road. 
 
 To issue an assembly order, and instructions to the Cavalry 
 Colonel at once, and the advance guard order at 5:45 a. m. 
 
 2. His orders to the time of departure of his command. 
 
 At 11:50 p. m., to the Colonel, 1st Cavalry, after that officer 
 has read the division commander's message. 
 
 "The earliest possible information is desired as to the move- 
 ments of the MT. HOLLY column. Your detachments must 
 prevent any hostile use of the PHILADELPHIA-READING 
 railroad to bring troops in to GETTYSBURG. 
 
 "The troop now near TWO TAVERNS will cover left tomor- 
 row. You will operate on our right with the remainder of your 
 regiment, and your main body should be ready to march from 
 camp by 6:20 a. m." 
 
 Advance Guard, 1st Division, Farmhouse 
 A. RIFLE, 1 mile west of BRUSHTOWN 
 
 Field Orders, ) y? xt i. n-i i-k -n iit 
 
 ^r c 6 November, — 11 :55 P. M. 
 
 No. — 3 
 
 1. Organizations will, tomorrow, be ready to march, at their 
 respective camps, as follows : 
 
 1st Infantry, Mtd. Scouts, 2d Infantry, and Co. A, Engrs. 
 
 (less mtd. det.) at 5:30 a. m. 
 2d Infantry (less scouts), 1st Cav. (less Tr. A.), 1st Bn. 
 
 1st F. A., Mtd. Det. Engrs., at 6:20 a. m. 
 3d Infantry and Amb. Co. No. 1 at 6 :50 a. m. 
 
 2. Supports of the outpost will remain in position until further 
 orders. 
 
[143] 
 
 The mounted scouts, 3d Infantry, will join the reserve at 
 SQUARE CORNER at 7 :00 a. m. 
 
 3. Field trains of the 3d Infantry will be at cross roads 537 by 
 5.45 a. m. 
 
 4. Orders will be issued at the RIFLE farmhouse at 5 :45 a. m. 
 
 A, 
 Brig. Gen. Comdg. 
 
 Dictated to officers detailed to receive. 
 
 Advance Guard, 1st Division, Farmhouse 
 
 A. RIFLE, 1 mile west of BRUSHTOWN 
 
 Field Orders, I 
 
 No. — I 
 
 7 November — 5:45 A. M. 
 
 Troops : 
 
 (a) Advance Cav'y. 
 
 (1) Col. A 
 
 1st Cav. (less 1 Tr.) 
 Mtd. Det. Engrs. 
 
 (2) Capt. B 
 Tr. A, 1st Cav. 
 
 (b) Support: 
 Col. C. 
 
 1st Infantry. 
 
 Mtd. Scouts, 2d Inf. 
 
 Co. A, Engrs. (less 
 
 mtd. det.) 
 
 (c) Reserve — in or- 
 der of march: Mtd. 
 Scouts 3d Inf., 2d 
 Inf. (less 2 bns. and 
 mtd. scouts). 1st 
 Bn. 1st F. A. (less 
 reserves), 2d & 3d 
 Bns. 2d Inf., 3d Inf., 
 Art. reserves., Amb. 
 Co. No. 1. 
 
 1. Our cavalry yesterday afternoon 
 defeated the hostile cavalry and drove it to 
 the southward beyond TWO TAVERNS. 
 Intrenched detachments were met at cross 
 roads 516 on the LOW DUTCH road, at 
 the road junction 535, on the nose immedi- 
 ately west of MT. VERNON S. H., and 
 near the orchard west of the road junc- 
 tion 548. Fatigue parties have been work- 
 ing during the night from knoll 567 east 
 of WOLF HILL to ROCKY GROVE 
 S. H. A hostile column of all arms reached 
 MT. HOLLY yesterday afternoon. 
 
 Our division advances to attack the 
 Reds now in front of us. The main body 
 follows this advance guard at one mile. 
 
 2. The advance guard will march by 
 the HANOVER ROAD. 
 
 3. (a) (1) Colonel A's command 
 will leave camp at 6:30 a. m., and trot- 
 ting ahead by MT. ROCKS S. H.-582- 
 STORE-606-504-560 to the neighborhood 
 of GRANITE HILL, from thence will 
 cover the division's right flank, maintain 
 touch with the hostile column to the north, 
 and at first will operate against the left 
 of the hostile lines reported along the 
 
[144] 
 
 LOW DUTCH ROAD. Reconnaissance, also, towards GETTYS- 
 BURG and ROCKY GROVE S. H. 
 
 (2) Captam B, from the neighborhood of the M. RUDISH 
 farmhouse, north of TWO TAVERNS, will cover the division's 
 left flank, and reconnoiter towards WOLF HILL and GETTYS- 
 BURG. 
 
 (b) The support will clear the* stream crossing 100 yards 
 west of the REBERT farmhouse at 6 :20 a. m. 
 
 (c) The head of the reserve will pass the stream crossing 100 
 yards Avest of REBERT'S at 6 :30 a. m. and will follow the sup- 
 port at 900 yards. 
 
 (d) The outpost troops will close on the HANOVER ROAD 
 in time to take their place in the column. 
 
 4. As soon as the tail of the reserve has passed, all field trains 
 will move immediately into the fields north of the HANOVER 
 ROAD, and thence without again touching that road, will as- 
 semble on the 537-506 road, head of the column at 537, by 7:20 
 a. m. 
 
 5. I shall join the support by 7:00 a. m. 
 
 A, 
 Brig. Gen. Comdg. 
 Verbally to commanders regiments, detachments and represen- 
 tative of Troop A. Report to. Division Headquarters. 
 
COURSE IN TACTICS— PART II. 
 
 Map Problem No. 4 — A Retreat. 
 (See Gettysburg-Boneauville sheets, 3" map.) 
 
 Situation : 
 
 At noon on November 28 a Blue (eastern) division in friendly 
 territory is occupying a position on Seminary Ridge, west of 
 Gettysburg; a Red (western) division from Chambersburg is ad- 
 vancing to attack it. 
 
 A Blue brigade, commanded by Brigadier General A, and con- 
 sisting of 1st, 2d and 3d Infantries, 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry 
 (less Troop D), 1st Battalion, 1st Field Artillery, Company A, 
 1st Battalion of Engineers, and the 1st Ambulance Company de- 
 trained at Westminster on the morning of November 28th and 
 marched toward Gettysburg to reinforce the Blue division. 
 
 After passing through Taneytown at 2 p. m. Brigadier General 
 A hears continuous artillery firing to the northwest. He continues 
 his march to the north and bivouacs at nightfall, his troops being 
 greatly fatigued, at Two Taverns. The sound of artillery firing 
 ceased at about 5 p. m. His advance guard, consisting of the 1st 
 Infantry, 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry (less Troop D), Battery A, 
 1st Field Artillery, and Company A, Engineers, halted at the 
 orchard east of 515 and established an outpost (1st Battalion, 1st 
 Infantry, and two platoons Troop A, 1st Cavalry) as follows: 
 Company A, on the Low Dutch Road about one-half mile north 
 of 525, Company B at St. Mary's Rf. Church, Company C at 479 
 and Company D at 525, with cavalry patrols watching the cross- 
 ings of Rock Creek, which are found to be held by hostile troops. 
 Since passing Alloway Creek, at about 4 p. m., the reconnaissance 
 of General A's advance guard has been restricted and its progress 
 retarded by Red cavalry, estimated at five troops with machine 
 guns; this Red cavalry camped at nightfall near Powers Hill. 
 Just before dusk three or four battalions of Red infantry were 
 seen advancing on the road on the north slope of Little Round 
 Top ; they subsequently camped near the Taneytown Road east of 
 Round Top and placed an outpost on Rock Creek. 
 
 At 9 p. m. General A receives a report from a patrol which had 
 reached Wolf Hill and had seen the fires of large camps extending 
 
 [145] 
 
[146] 
 
 two or three miles to the northwest along Rock Creek ; at the same 
 time he receives the following message, dated Headquarters 1st 
 Division, Brush Run, 7 p. m. : "Finding myself confronted by 
 superior numbers of the enemy and my left flank threatened, I am 
 withdrawing to New Oxford where I expect reinforcements to- 
 morrow. The enemy does not appear to be following except with 
 cavalry. As I am not acquainted with the situation of your 
 brigade I am unable to give you detailed instructions, but you 
 should join me tomorrow east of the Little Conewago without 
 becoming seriously engaged with the enemy." 
 
 This message was brought by a motorcyclist who says that he 
 came through Brushtown, Whitehall and Germantown and saw 
 nothing of the enemy ; that two other messengers were sent at the 
 same time by other routes with copies of the same message; and 
 that two or three other messages had been sent to General A before 
 this one. None of these other messages have been received. The 
 sun rises at 7 a. m. 
 Required : 
 
 1. Briffadier General A's estimate of the situation. 
 
 2. His orders. 
 
 STUDENTS' ERRORS AND INSTRUCTOR'S CRITICISMS. 
 
 Brigadier General A's Estimate of the Situation. 
 1st Solution. 
 
 States that battalions which camped near Taneytown Road east 
 of Round Top probably make up a detachment sent out by the 
 Red Division to oppose Gen. A's brigade. 
 
 Comment : "No, it is the outpost or advance guard of the Red 
 brigade which threatened the Blue division's left." 
 
 States that the Harrisburg road may be used by Red troops 
 tomorrow. 
 
 Comment: "Not thought likely — the Blue division was fol- 
 lowed by Red cavalry which will report its whereabouts." 
 
 Decides to start trains at 5 :30 a. m. to Berlin Junction under 
 escort of engineers. 
 
 Comment: "Sending the trains ahead of the advance guard 
 is regarded as hazardous — they are likely to be captured by the 
 
[147] 
 
 Red cavalry which followed the Blue division on the 28th and 
 which captured the division commander's messengers." 
 
 2d Solution. 
 
 States that disappearance of the messengers indicates that the 
 Blue cavalry of the division has not been active west of the Cone- 
 wago, that apparently it has not kept back the enemy's cavalry 
 patrols. 
 
 Comment: "Blue division's cavalry has evidently been de- 
 feated." 
 
 Further comment: «* * * * importance of Hanover 
 Road not fully realized." 
 
 States that Gen. A incidently must delay the enemy as much as 
 possible. Comment: "Gen. A can not delay the enemy because 
 the enemy is (1) overwhelmingly superior & (2) on too broad a 
 front." 
 
 Decides to march at 7 a. m. via Germantown, St. Luke's Church, 
 Square Corner, Store and 521 with troops divided as follows : 
 
 Advance Guard — 2 troops of cavalry & 1 bn. 3d Inf. Main 
 Body — Amb. Co. (less 1 sec.) 3d Inf. (less 5 cos. & mtd. scouts), 
 2d Inf. (less mtd. scouts) Rear Guard all remaining troops (less 
 1 CO.). One company escorts train which moves at 5 a. m. via 
 Brushtown. 
 
 Gen. A marches with the Rear Guard which is to delay the enemy 
 as long as possible without becoming seriously engaged. 
 
 Comments: "The engineers should go with the advance guard 
 or with the train. Gen. A should go with the main body. Gen. A 
 should not attempt to delay the enemy, (at least not before he is 
 across the Hanover Road, which is his greatest source of danger), 
 and should start earlier." 
 
 "The train is exposed to danger of capture as it is separated too 
 far from the brigade with a very small escort." 
 
 "Sufficient provision is not made to block the advance of the 
 enemy on the Hanover Road." 
 
 3d Solution. 
 States that the enemy apparently has cavalry patrols at work 
 east of Rock Creek, but that probably no large bodies have yet 
 crossed. 
 
[148] 
 
 Comment : "Probably a regiment of Red cav. near Brush Run." 
 
 States there is no special mission at a distance from the com- 
 mand for the cavalry, so it will all be added to the rear guard. 
 
 Comment: "Cav. too weak to be made independent." 
 
 Presumes that the colonel at the head of the infantry would see 
 that a small advance guard preceded the main body. 
 
 Comment: "The advance guard should be strong and should 
 be detailed by Gen. A." 
 
 Further comment : "The Blue division was followed by cavalry 
 on the 28th ; this cavalry is probably not less than a regiment, and 
 it is likely to oppose Gen. A's march on the 29th." 
 
 Decides to start leading troops (1st Bn., Mtd. Scouts, & M. G. 
 Co. 3d Inf., & Co. Engrs.) at 4:30 a. m. via Square Corner to 
 vicinity of 606 to prepare position covering the crossing 481 W. 
 The train will be under escort of these troops as far as 556 north 
 west of Irishtown where it will halt and await orders. Main body 
 starts at 6:30 a. m. 
 
 Comments: "Train better go over the divide to Lawrence." 
 
 "606 is too far ahead. Gen. A must first cross the Hanover 
 Road." 
 
 "Leading troops sent too far ahead. Gen. A may find it im- 
 practicable to continue his march on north from Square Corner, 
 and may be compelled to make a change of direction of march to 
 the east. In so doing he will have to hold for a time a strong point 
 of support not far from Boneauville." 
 
 "Gen. A has no advance guard and no infantry at the head of 
 the main body. A platoon of cavalry could halt his main body." 
 
 4th Solution. 
 
 States: "None of the enemy appear to be east of Rock Creek 
 tonight." 
 
 Comment : "Yes, Red Cavy. which followed Blue div., and has 
 intercepted messages sent to Gen. A. In order to 'follow' a division 
 this cavalry must have been a regiment." 
 
 States in reply to criticism that assumptions were as follows: 
 that there was one regiment of cavalry with the Red division; 
 that of this force five troops and the machine guns were accounted 
 for ; that the other seven troops had gone back to Rock Creek for 
 the night. 
 
[149] 
 
 Comments :"**** the Blue division presumably had 
 a regt. of cav. which would have stopped pursuit by a smaller 
 force. 
 
 The 5 troops belonged to the reinforcing brigade. 
 
 Red cavy. stayed out for tactical reasons — at the cost of some 
 inconvenience — in order to keep touch with the retreating Blues. 
 
 In a pursuit touch must be kept at all costs. 
 
 Gen. A (in this solution) made no deductions from the loss of 
 the messages and took no thought what the Red cavalry would 
 do tomorrow." 
 
 States that the advance of the seven troops next morning should 
 be opposed by our divisional cavalry. 
 
 Comment : "Should have been opposed by our div. cav. on the 
 afternoon of 28th — but it was not — reason for supposing that 
 our div. cav. was defeated." 
 
 States that the Red force has our division on the run so we can 
 look for no help from them. 
 
 Comment : "Yes, but they have reinforcements coming up and 
 intend to whip the Reds tomorrow ; especially if Gen. A can bring 
 his strong brigade to them." 
 
 Comment on reply to criticism: "No assistance (for Gen. A) 
 was expected except possible support of artillery near Irishtown." 
 
 States the cavalry which bothered Gen. A on the 28th will cer- 
 tainly do it again on the 29th. 
 
 Comment: "Also the Cav'y. which followed Gen. X, which is 
 much stronger." 
 
 States that the hostile regiment near Little Round Top may be 
 a part of a stronger force which will follow it up and advance 
 through Boneauville tomorrow. 
 
 Comment: "But it is going to advance directly on Two 
 Taverns. There will be another Red column on the Hanover 
 Road." 
 
 States that the cavalry must be part of the rear guard and 
 guard our flanks. 
 
 Comment : "Also must help us push our way through the Red 
 cavalry, which will oppose us, and help us open communication 
 with Gen. X." 
 
 Believes best to put one battery in the rear guard and take the 
 rest of the battalion to hill 627. 
 
[150] 
 
 Comment: "You will need artillery to break up the delaying 
 action of cavalry in your front." 
 
 5th Solution. 
 
 Comment: "He (Gen. A) cannot delay the enemy and should 
 not try to do so except so far as the safety of his own brigade 
 requires it." 
 
 States that conduct of enemy in Gen. A's front indicates that 
 they know of the latter's approach. 
 
 Comment: "Have probably read a copy of div. comdr's. mes- 
 sage." 
 
 6th Solution. 
 
 Comment: "Brush Run is about 9 miles from Seminary Ridge," 
 instead of 17 as stated. 
 
 States: "The first troops of enemy that may become danger- 
 ous are those in his (Gen. A's) immediate front." 
 
 Comment: "No, the Red cav. which followed the Blue div., k 
 inf. & cav. which may advance on Hanover Road are more danger- 
 ous." 
 
 7th Solution. 
 
 States part of Gen. A's mission is to protect Gen. X's left flank. 
 
 Comment : "Gen. X is not in contact with the enemy." 
 
 Decides to leave the outpost battalion out until 7 :30 a. m. and 
 then use it as a flank guard over the M. Rudish-Boneauville-616- 
 601-606 road. 
 
 Comment: "Probably impracticable for outpost to march to 
 the flank after 7:30 A. M. The}^ will probably have to go east 
 at least for a time." 
 
 8th Solution. 
 
 States that artillery firing from 2 p. m. to 5 p. m. continuously, 
 indicates that the division put up a stiff fight. 
 
 Comment: "Much of it was a rear guard action." 
 
 9th Solution. 
 
 States the division is more or less demoralized by its defeat. 
 
 Comment : "Has not been defeated." 
 
 States that the division needs a night's rest and some time next 
 day to get straightened out & to prepare for holding New Oxford, 
 if that is the General's plan. 
 
[151] 
 
 Comment: "General's plan is probably to take offensive when 
 his reinforcements come up — especially if Gen. A joins with his 
 brigade in good shape." 
 
 Decides to march on Brushtown via Baltimore Turnpike, 555, 
 608, Whitehall S. H., 606, 577, 537, without advance guard or 
 flank guard. 
 
 Comment: "Danger of Hanover Road not estimated at its 
 full value; flank guard should be detailed by Gen. A and should 
 have Arty. * * * * a shorter route would improve Gen. 
 A's chances of joining his division; the danger is that hostile 
 cavalry (already in the vicinity of Boneauville) will delay him until 
 hostile arty, and inf. can overtake him. For this reason he needs 
 a strong advance guard, and starting out train with only a small 
 escort (Engrs.) is risky." 
 
 10th Solution. 
 
 Leaves engineers with rear guard. 
 
 Comment: "Engineers more valuable in front." 
 
 Decides to withdraw via 587 & Boneauville towards the Little 
 Conewago. 
 
 Comment: "Gen. A's movement through Two Taverns to 587 
 has the appearance of an advance toward the enemy and of un- 
 necessarily increasing the danger of his position. Two Taverns 
 is a straggling village extending along the Baltimore Pike nearly 
 to Germantown. It is probable that Gen. A's detachment camped 
 along the road east and west of 508. The greater part of the 
 detachment would have to march west on the Baltimore Pike before 
 turning north." 
 
 11th Solution. 
 
 States : "As the enemy did -not advance in force west of the 
 Rock Creek, it appears that his troops are either tired, that he 
 awaits reinforcements or that he awaits more information of the 
 Blues." 
 
 Comment : "Halted on account of lateness of hour of day." 
 
 States : "Gen. A's mission is the governing factor rather than 
 the enemy's movements." 
 
 Comment : "Enemy has initiative." 
 
 States that Gen. A, if forced to, will have a delaying fight at 
 St. Luke's Church. 
 
[152] 
 
 Comment : "Enemy most likely to advance on Hanover Road — 
 very little of Hanover Road can be seen from St. Luke's Ch." 
 
 Decides to have train escorted from 621 to Brushtown by one 
 company. 
 
 Comment: "Gen. A thinks that the country is overrun by 
 hostile cavy. P. 3." 
 
 12th Solution. 
 
 States: "General A's mission is to join the Blue division 
 
 * * * * »> 
 
 Comment: "Regarded as of paramount importance." 
 13th Solution. 
 
 States : "We are tired but so, probably, is the enemy." 
 
 Comment : "Enemy has been in a fight & we have not." 
 
 States the enemy did not push across Rock Creek in close 
 pursuit. 
 
 Comment : "Late hour — Reds halted on account of impending 
 darkness." 
 
 Decides to send train via Germantown, St. Luke's Church, 
 Square Corner & Bridge 481 W. to Lawrence. 
 
 Comment: "Train sent on a road believed to be held by the 
 enemy's cavalry, with a weak escort." (1 co.) 
 
 16th Solution. 
 
 States: "It is not thought likely the main Red force would 
 go south of the Hanover Road. 
 
 Comment: "Troops near Round Top will probably advance 
 on Two Taverns." 
 
 States that the ground at 611 favors the location of the artil- 
 lery. 
 
 Comment: "611 too advanced a position for artillery." 
 
 States: "The enemy is moving in the dark." 
 
 Comment: "His cavalry is strong and active." 
 
 His Orders. 
 1st Solution. 
 Orders advance guard (1 bn.) to clear 508 at 6:30 a. m. and the 
 main body to start from same place at 6:40 a. m. 
 
 Comments: "508 is not a good initial point because it is too 
 far west; some of the troops might have to countermarch to 
 reach it." 
 
[153] 
 
 "Gen. A would have a better chance of joining his division if he 
 started a half hour earlier." 
 
 Orders rear guard (1st Inf., 1st Bn. F. A., 1st Sq. Cav. [less 
 Tro. D] & Mtd. Det. Engrs.) to send 1 bn. and 1 btry. as flank 
 guard from 621 provisionally to Square Corner. 
 
 Comments: "1 bn. inf. too small to escort a battery in close 
 contact with an enemy." 
 
 "Gen. A's flank guard (detached from Rear Guard) is too 
 small — the chief source of danger is the Hanover Road." 
 
 States that the written order only briefly outlines the main 
 points touched upon at this assembly of Gen. A's subordinate 
 ofiicers. 
 
 Comment: "Then this verbal order was entirely too long." 
 
 3d Solution. 
 
 Comment: "Some officer's patrols should be detached for 
 special reconnaissance." 
 
 4th Solution. 
 
 Order provides for engineers as train guard, a battalion and 
 mounted scouts 3d. Inf. for flank guard, a regiment, a battery, 
 the cavalry and detachment ambulance company for rear guard 
 & the remainder of the troops for the main body. 
 
 Orders the main body to clear Two Taverns and march via M. 
 Rudish-531-Sweet Home S. H. to 617, provisionally. 
 
 Orders the flank guard to clear Two Taverns and march via 
 529-Boneauville to 616 on the Hanover Road. 
 
 Comments : "Gen. A should not merely order the main body to 
 'clear' a point — this involves a map problem and Gen. A is the 
 commander of the main body and should work out the map prob- 
 lems of the main body himself. 
 
 The instructor thinks that the flank guard ought to be stronger 
 than the rear guard, for the rear guard can run while the flank 
 will, in all probability, have to stop and fight somewhere near 
 Boneauville until the main body gets across the Hanover Road. 
 
 Gen. A does not employ an advance guard. No inf. at head of 
 main body. The instructor thinks that there is a strong body of 
 Red cavalry, perhaps a regiment, in the vicinity of Boneauville 
 which will attempt to delay Gen. A. 
 
 Gen. A sails too close to the wind — he might have gone through 
 Square Corner instead of through Boneauville. 
 
[154] 
 
 At the start he marches most of his det. west toward the 
 enemy." 
 
 In reply to criticisms states that the rear guard was much more 
 likely to have a scrap than the flank guard. 
 
 Comment : "But a scrap of the flank guard might have serious 
 consequences — that of the rear guard less likely to be serious." 
 
 Further comment: "Some of them (other errors) were; meager 
 estimate of situation, especially of "routes available for Gen. A, 
 poor choice of route involving a detour in the direction of the 
 enemy, poor initial point involving a countermarch, same initial 
 point for flank guard and main body, poorly worded order for 
 march of main body, inadequate provision for delaying advance of 
 enemy on Hanover Road, (the flank guard is so small and so close 
 to the main body that the main body would be involved in the flank 
 guard action), rear guard too far behind, (3 miles)." 
 
 5th Solution. 
 
 Orders the company of engineers to march with the flank guard. 
 
 Comment : "Engrs. should be at head of column ; it is import- 
 ant that Gen. A's march be not delayed." 
 
 Orders the main body to march at 7 a. m. 
 
 Comment: "Gen. A's chances of joining the division without 
 serious fighting would be improved by an earlier start. It will be 
 dayhght after 6 A. M." 
 
 Orders: "Messages will reach me after 9 A. M. at Square 
 Corner." 
 
 Comment: "Gen. A might state where messages are to be sent 
 between 7 and 9 A. M." 
 
 Further comments : "There should be an escort with the train, 
 and the train should not be separated so far from the troops. 
 (Train was to move at 4 a. m.) 
 
 An advance guard should be detailed, the country to the north 
 is occupied by hostile cavalry and it is important that Gen. A's 
 march be not delayed." 
 
 Places all. the artillery in the flank guard. 
 
 Comment: "The artillery ammunition reserve (combat train) 
 should be with the main body or with the train, in order to shorten 
 the flank guard and increase its mobility." 
 
[155] 
 
 Further comment: "The orders to the flank guard are not 
 definite in regard to time of starting, hour of relieving outpost, 
 and reconnaissance." 
 
 6th Solution. 
 
 Comments: "No reconnaissance specially directed. 
 
 Topper Mill probably not a safe place for the train." 
 
 7th Solution. 
 
 The rear guard is ordered to send out a flank guard of one 
 battalion. 
 
 Comment: "Flank guard and rear guard should be independ- 
 ent of each other as their missions are distinct." 
 
 The field train is started at 5 :30 a. m. escorted by one bat- 
 talion of infantry and engineers. 
 
 Comment: "Train thought likely to encounter hostile cavy. 
 near St. Luke's Church." 
 
 Further comments: "Advance guard (one company) not 
 thought strong enough. 
 
 Thought better to put at least one battery (escorted by about 
 a regt. of inf.) in the flank guard." 
 
 8th Solution. 
 Orders leading troops (1 bn. & engrs.) to prepare a defensive 
 
 position on Hill 627. 
 
 Comment: "Hill 627 thought too advanced to hold." 
 Further comment: "No order for rear guard to march. 
 
 Route?" 
 
 10th Solution. 
 
 Orders the rear guard to delay the enemy without becoming 
 seriously engaged. 
 
 Comment: "It may become necessary to sacrifice part of the 
 rear guard." 
 
 Orders field train to precede command by an hour, and without 
 escort, move via Baltimore Turnpike & Tollgate to Brushtown. 
 
 Comment: "The field train is not sent to a place of safety, is 
 widely separated from the detachment and has no escort. If it is 
 found by the hostile cavalry it will be captured." 
 
• [156] 
 
 11th Solution. 
 
 Orders train to halt on road leading eastward from Brushtown 
 with tail at 562. 
 
 Comment : "Not a safe place." 
 
 Does not use a flank guard but orders the cavalry (attached to 
 rear guard) to reconnoitre through Barlow on the south and 
 Granite Hill Station on the north. 
 
 Comment: "Cavalry will have to work in supporting distance 
 of inf." 
 
 Further comments: "Sufficient consideration is not given to 
 probability of pursuit via Hanover Road, nor to opposition (de- 
 laying action) by a strong body of Red cavy. (perhaps a regt.). 
 
 The detachment cannot be considered to have joined the Blue 
 division when it reaches Brushtown." 
 
 12th Solution. 
 
 Orders leading troops (less 1 co.) to prepare a position north 
 of St. Luke's Church and later join the rear guard under direction 
 of rear guard commander. 
 
 Comment: "Orders should not go too far ahead." 
 
 Further comment: "Write order across entire page — below 
 marginal distribution of troops." 
 
 "Orders should be brief." 
 
 Marches via Germantown, Whitehall, Brushtown Sz Irishtown. 
 
 Comments : "The estimate of the situation shows that Gen. 
 A realizes that considerable forces of the enemy (at least of 
 cavalry) may attempt to prevent his junction with the division, 
 but Gen. A exposes his train to capture and makes no provision 
 for the security of the head of his column. 
 
 As Gen. A will probably have to fight his way to the Blue divi- 
 sion it would be an advantage to select a shorter route." 
 
 13th Solution. 
 Comments : "Gen. A takes no measures to especially observe 
 this road (Hanover Road) or to delay the advance of hostile 
 troops upon it. Although he realizes that there may be con- 
 siderable bodies of hostile cavalry to the north he sends his train 
 out in front with a weak escort and rides at the tail of the main 
 body. He does not realize that this cavalry may attempt to 
 
[157] 
 
 capture his train and delay the advance of his main body until 
 Red infantry and artillery can come up with it." 
 
 14th Solution. 
 Orders troops to march to 583. 
 
 Comment: "Better say *Irishtown'; it would be easier to find." 
 Further comments: "The leading troops do not appear to be 
 of any material assistance to Gen. A. 
 
 It is thought that Gen. A should * * * * make some 
 provision for delaying an advance of the enemy on the Hanover 
 Road." 
 
 15th Solution. 
 
 Comments: "The rallying position at St. Luke's Church is 
 on the road to be taken by the main body & consequently will not 
 protect the march of the main body from hostile fire. It should 
 be in advance of (west of) this road in order to hold the enemy 
 further from it. 
 
 The leading troops and train will probably encounter hostile 
 cavalry, and it is thought that Gen. A underestimates the strength 
 of this cavalry, which may be a regiment. 
 
 Gen. A * * * * push out a flank guard to watch the 
 Hanover Road." 
 
 16th Solution. 
 
 Orders leading troops to march at 5 A. M., and main body at 
 6 :30 A. M. by the Two Taverns-Boneauville Road. 
 
 Orders flank guard to move by the Low Dutch Road. 
 
 Orders field train to march at 5 A. M. via Two Taverns, 579, 
 621, 641, 637 & 481. 
 
 Comments: "Route taken by detachment may bring detach- 
 ment in front of position of division, masking its fire. 
 
 The flank guard is too close to the enemy and might soon be 
 brought to a halt, by an advance of the Reds along the Hanover 
 Road. 
 
 The leading troops and train are too much in advance of the 
 main body producing dispersion. 
 
 The order is too long and not sufficiently definite." 
 
[158] 
 
 AN APPROVED SOLUTION. 
 
 General A's mission is to march his detachment to join the 
 Blue 1st Division. He should execute it without unnecessary de- 
 lay and bring his troops to the division in efficient condition. 
 
 Reconnaissance should, of course, be kept up in order to keep 
 informed of the movements of the Red forces; this information 
 will be of value to the division commander as well as to General A 
 and all important information gained should be promptly reported. 
 Since the Blue division has been in close contact with the Reds, 
 its commander probably already possesses more complete knowl- 
 edge of the strength and composition of the Red forces than 
 General A is likely to be able to gain. 
 
 General A cannot appreciably delay the advance of the enemy 
 both on account of their overwhelming superiority of numbers and 
 because they are on too broad a front. The enemy is likely to 
 advance on the 29th in several columns. General A could delay 
 only one column and while engaged with this might be cut off 
 from his division by another. He would incur risk of being cut 
 off or destroyed without having gained any benefit of commensu- 
 rate importance. 
 
 The Red division from Chambersburg appears to have at- 
 tacked the Blue division on the afternoon of November 28th and 
 during the attack to have received reenforcements which threat- 
 ened the left flank of the Blue division. Perhaps the forces en- 
 gaged on both sides are approximately equal, each division is 
 receiving a reenforcing brigade from the south, and the Red re- 
 enforcement arriving first. The Reds are aggressive, their ad- 
 vance on the 28th seems to have been checked more by the lateness 
 of the hour and impending darkness than by any other cause. But 
 the Reds camped near Gettysburg are not likely to advance at an 
 early hour on the 29th. They constitute the leading troops of 
 the Red division; they probably marched and fought all day on 
 the 28th and did not make camp till dark. Although successful, 
 some disorganization must have taken place in their ranks and 
 they will need time and daylight to restore perfect order, replace 
 lost equipments, replenish ammunition, haversack rations, etc. 
 Besides, their leaders know, from the reconnaissance of their 
 cavalry and from the contents of the message of the Blue division 
 commander to General A (a copy of which has probably fallen 
 
[169] 
 
 into their hands) that the Blues have halted near New Oxford, and 
 they probably realize that an advance from Rock Creek is prac- 
 tically an advance into battle. It would be a remarkable achieve- 
 ment if the Red troops near Gettysburg could advance again as 
 early as sunrise on the 29th ; but since an advance by these troops 
 on the Hanover Road constitutes the greatest source of danger to 
 General A, he must assume that they will advance and make his 
 plans accordingly. 
 
 The Red infantry seen near Round Top is probably the advance 
 guard of some Red force camped west of Round Top. It may 
 be the advance guard of the Red force which threatened the left 
 flank of the Blue division on Seminary Ridge. These troops do 
 not appear to have been closely engaged on the 28th and may 
 advance at an early hour on the 29th; but, if General A marches 
 as early as they do, they will not constitute a source of danger to 
 him unless he is delayed. On the other hand Red troops advanc- 
 ing on the Hanover Road will be a source of danger to him unless 
 their march is delayed. Consequently General A is in greater 
 need of a flank guard than of a rear guard to protect his march 
 on the 29th. 
 
 The Red cavalry which followed the Blue division on the after- 
 noon of November 28th was probably the greater part of a regi- 
 ment, for a smaller force of cavalry could not closely follow a 
 division. It appears to have defeated the Blue divisional cavalry, 
 either before or after the combat on Seminary Ridge, and to have 
 gained close contact with the Blue infantry. Otherwise the Blue 
 divisional cavalry would probably have opened direct communica- 
 tion with General A's detachment. This Red cavalry probably 
 halted for the night with outposts in contact with the outposts 
 of the Blue division on Little Conewago Creek. Its main body 
 may be not far from Cedar Ridge. 
 
 The lost messages from the Blue division commander have prob- 
 ably fallen into the hands of this cavalry and their leader knows 
 the location and strength of General A's detachment and can make 
 a tolerably accurate forecast of his intentions for November 29th. 
 This Red cavalry will probably move on Boneauville or Square 
 Corner tomorrow for the purpose of intercepting General A's de- 
 tachment and delaying its march until Red infantry and artillery 
 advancing on the Hanover Road or Baltimore Pike, or on both. 
 
[160] 
 
 can come up with it. If General A sends his train ahead, beyond 
 supporting distance of his main body with only a small escort, 
 the Red cavalry will capture it. And this cavalry will soon gain 
 contact with the Blue detachment no matter on what road it 
 marches. The longer and more roundabout the road which General 
 A selects the more time and space the Red cavalry will have for 
 its delaying work and the more certainly columns of Red infantry 
 and artillery will overtake him. 
 
 The Blue division has not been defeated, it broke off the engage- 
 ment at Seminary Ridge when it found itself outnumbered. The 
 lateness of the hour enabled it to shake off the Red infantry and 
 retire in good order to New Oxford. The greater part of the 
 artillery firing heard by General A probably took place during 
 the breaking off of the engagement and a subsequent rear guard 
 action. Three or four hours of daylight will be available on the 
 morning of the 29th before the Reds can reach New Oxford and 
 this will enable the Blue division to restore perfect order in its 
 ranks and prepare to meet the Reds in a time and manner ad- 
 vantageous to itself. The total number of Blue troops available 
 may be superior to the Reds, for they are expecting other rein- 
 forcements besides General A's detachment, but they have not 
 completed their concentration. When the reinforcements come 
 up the Blues may then be in a position to take the offensive, es- 
 pecially if General A succeeds in bringing his strong brigade to 
 their assistance in good time and in good condition. 
 
 In view of the difficulty of this task General A considers the 
 advisability of a night march. But in addition to the fact that 
 his troops are fatigued with their long march of the 28th and 
 probably had but little sleep on the train the preceding night, 
 and the apprehension which would be aroused by such an unusual 
 demand upon them, there is to be considered their unfamiliarity 
 with the country and the probability of meeting hostile troops in 
 the darkness. A long march at night in view of the condition 
 of his troops is not to be considered and the shorter routes to 
 New Oxford appear to be held by the enemy. General A has a 
 good map of the country (U. S. Geological Survey) and the enemy 
 which he would encounter may consist only of cavalry pickets; 
 but even good maps are unsatisfactory guides in the darkness 
 and any opposition immensely increases the difficulties of a night 
 
[161] 
 
 march. However, since General A deems it injudicious to make 
 any attempts to delay the advance of the enemy before he comes 
 into supporting distance of his division, except such as are neces- 
 sary for the security of the march of his own detachment, he can 
 give his men a good rest and utilize the last hour of darkness 
 (5-6 A. M.) in assembling his troops and forming them for a 
 march at daylight (6 A. M.) 
 
 In view of the exertions of the detachment on the 28th and the 
 importance of joining the division in good season and with troops 
 as fresh as possible, the distance which must be marched on the 
 29th is important. When it is considered that every foot of this 
 distance may be contested by a strong body of hostile cavalry and 
 that every hour which elapses before the division is reached may 
 increase the danger and difficulty of General A's position, the 
 distance assiunes greater importance. 
 
 If General A retreats to Littlestown and thence to HAnover 
 with a view to taking the Carlisle and Baltimore Pike he will cer- 
 tainly enjoy the advantage of an excellent road; but he will have 
 to march 20 mUes and, even if his march is unmolested, he will not 
 reach the division until late in the day (perhaps after the decisive 
 stage of the battle) and his troops will be practically exhausted. 
 When he reaches Littlestown he wiD be no nearer to New Oxford 
 than he was when he started and has no reason for believing that 
 he can avoid the Red cavalry by this route. He will derive no 
 benefit from being east of the Little Conewago, since (so far as 
 can be judged from the U. S. Geological Survey map) this stream 
 is easily fordable by troops of all arms everywliere above (south 
 of) Aikenrode (522). 
 
 If General A marches through Whitehall or through Whitehall 
 S. H. he will be merely marching parallel with the Hanover Road 
 and postponing the turn to the north which he must make if he 
 is to join the division. The Reds will pursue on a shorter and 
 better road (the Hanover road) and if they come up with General 
 A before he crosses it they will prevent his joining the Blue 
 division and be in a position to attack it themselves. The longer 
 General A postpones his turn to the north the more likely the 
 Reds will be to overtake him or to strike him in flank wbsai he does 
 turn. General A's chances of gaining the distance to the north 
 necessary to ensure his junction with the division are better before 
 the enemy has organized the pursuit than afterwards. 
 
[162] 
 
 General A should not go to New Oxford nor send his train 
 there; he would block roads important for the use of the division 
 by doing so. Neither should he march on any road across the 
 probable front of the division, as, for instance, on the roads 
 through Kohler S. H., as this would embarrass the division and 
 mask its fire. The crossing at 481 W is open to objection on the 
 same score and is moreover commanded within rifle range by Hill 
 609, which the enemy can reach under cover. 
 
 General A's destination is probably the high ground north and 
 west of Irishtown ; at any rate if he reaches Irishtown he will have 
 joined the division. He does not select his route with a view to 
 concealment, especially where it would necessitate a detour to 
 secure it. Time is the factor of the greatest importance and he 
 believes that the enemy already knows his whereabouts and will 
 keep informed of his movements. Besides the distance which 
 General A has to gain is short and his column is not long. If the 
 enemy does not organize a pursuit until he hears that General A's 
 detachment has been seen crossing some exposed ridge. General A 
 will have reached a place of safety before such a pursuit could 
 reach him. 
 
 If the Reds near Round Top advance east, as they are most 
 likely to do, on the morning of the 29th, the Blue outpost can 
 not march by the flank on the Low Dutch Road but must retire 
 directly to its rear (east). 
 
 General A's decision is to start at an early hour on November 
 29th and march without halting via St. Luke's Church on Square 
 Corner with the expectation of fighting his way and the determina- 
 tion not to permit his march to be delayed; to cover his left 
 (western) flank with a flank guard to delay the advance of any 
 hostile troops on the Hanover Road; to march his train on a 
 parallel road ( Whitehall-Mary sville) nearly abreast of his main 
 bod}^ ; and to employ the present outpost as a rear guard. 
 
 General A's decision cannot go any farther for the present. If 
 the enemy does not advance from Gettysburg early enough to 
 seriously threaten his left (western) flank in the vicinity of 
 Boneauville he may continue his march in the same direction and 
 with the same formation, the flank guard via Stopper-606, the 
 main body via Breashner-Store, and the train via Marysville- 
 Irishtown. But if the flank guard becomes engaged with superior 
 
[163] 
 
 forces of the enemy the advance guard may be deployed on Square 
 Corner-Store ridge to support it and the flank guard will fall 
 back toward Square Corner, probably joining the rear guard. 
 The progress of the main body will be controlled by the progress 
 of the train, which must be allowed to precede after crossing the 
 Hanover Road. If necessary the train may be turned off to the 
 east at 601, at Marysville or at Mt. Pleasant S. H. An un- 
 expectedly rapid advance of the enemy might compel General 
 A's detachment to fall back directly from the Square Corner- 
 Store ridge to the Marysville ridge and perhaps also from there 
 to the Centennial ridge but in this case he can shift his troops to 
 the right (north) under cover of the ridges as rapidly as the 
 progress of the train permits. His troops may cross the Little 
 Conewago with deployed lines by fording if conditions require it. 
 
 Once he has gained possession of Square Corner he is not 
 likely to meet with further opposition to the head of his column 
 from the northeast, for if Red cavalry should make an attempt to 
 make a stand northeast of Square Corner they would be in danger 
 of being driven upon the front of the Blue division. Artillery 
 fire from the Blue position will probably reach the Breashner 
 house. 
 
 General A will keep artillery in the main body at the outset. 
 Here it can support the advance guard and break up the delaying 
 action of any Red cavalry which may seek to oppose it, and can, 
 if needed, sweep the front of the train or of the flank guard with 
 fire. If the advance guard and the train meet with but little 
 opposition, the artillery together with the advance guard cavalry 
 can be sent to reinforce the flank guard; this can easily be done 
 by the 617-Garver or on the St. Luke's Church-Sweet Home S. H. 
 roads. 
 
 Since General A's cavalry is weaker than the cavalry which will 
 oppose it. General A does not contemplate any isolated cavalry 
 combat, and does not hesitate to divide it. Part of it will be 
 needed with the advance guard to flank out rapidly small parties 
 of Red cavalry which may attempt to delay it, and to open direct 
 communication with the Blue division as early as possible, and to 
 maintain communication with the flank guard and the train. The 
 remainder of the cavalry will go with the flank guard to cover 
 the left flank and assist in delaying the advance of Reds on the 
 
[164] 
 
 Hanover Road. In view of its inferior strength all of the cavalry 
 will work in supporting distance of the infantry (with the excep- 
 tion of a few reconnoitering patrols). 
 
 The greater part of the infantry will be in the central column 
 (advance guard, main body and rear guard) where it will be 
 under the immediate direction of General A, but enough infantry 
 must be sent with the flank guard to efficiently guard the battery 
 and a strong escort is needed for -the train. The Red cavalry is 
 most likely to concentrate against the advance guard (of the 
 main body), but it is important that the march of the train should 
 not be delayed. 
 
 The Ambulance Company and Artillery Reserves will march 
 at the rear of the train; the main body will be shortened by this 
 arrangement and they are near enough to be readily called on if 
 they are needed. The fighting batteries have as much ammunition 
 as they are likely to use and the infantry regiments have a sanitary 
 equipment which, as General A hopes, will not be taxed to its full 
 capacity. The engineers can be of greatest value with the train 
 as they can prevent its march being delayed by broken bridges 
 or other obstructions ; the mounted detachment will be assigned to 
 the rear guard to destroy, at the proper time, the bridges over 
 Little's Run at Two Taverns and further delay the enemy advanc- 
 ing from Round Top by slashing trees and by other obstructions 
 where practicable. 
 
 General A should ride at the head of the main body; here he 
 can see that his advance guard gains ground rapidly, can support 
 it promptly when necessary and can direct the fire of the artillery 
 in support of the advance guard, flank guard or train. Moreover 
 he will be in a favorable position here to communicate with all 
 parts of his detachment and with the division commander. 
 
 The rear guard and flank guard should be independent of each 
 other because they have distinct missions which are distant from 
 each other. 
 
 2. General A's orders are as follows: 
 Field Orders \ Detachment, 2d Division, Blue Army, 
 
 No. 23. j Two Taverns, Pa., 28 Nov. 10 P. M. 
 
 Troops 1. Our 1st Division marched this after- 
 
 (a) Advance Guard: noon from GETTYSBURG to NEW OX- 
 
[165] 
 
 Col. C. 
 3d Inf. (lesslbn.) 
 Tr. A, 1st Cav. 
 (less 2 plats.) 
 
 (b) Main Body (in 
 order of march) : 
 
 1 bn. 3d Inf. 
 
 1st Bn. 1st F. A. 
 (less Btry. A 
 and reserves). 
 
 2d Inf. (lesslbn.) 
 
 (c) Rear Guard: 
 
 Major A. 
 1st Bn. 1st Inf. ^ 
 
 2 plats. Tr. A, 1st 
 Cav. 
 
 Mtd. Det. Engs. 
 
 (d) Left Flank 
 Guard : 
 
 Col. A. 
 1st Inf. (less 1st 
 
 Bn.) 
 1st Sq. 1st Cav. 
 
 (less Trs. A & 
 
 D). 
 Btry. A, 1st F. A. 
 
 3. Train : 
 
 Major B. 
 1 bn. 2d Inf. 
 Co. A, Engrs. (less 
 
 mtd. det.) 
 Train. 
 
 1st Ambulance Co. 
 Art. Reserves. 
 
 FORD, where it will be reinforced. We 
 also are ordered to join it tomorrow. 
 
 The enemy has camped on ROCK 
 CREEK near GETTYSBURG and has 
 another camp near ROUND TOP. About 
 one squadron of Red cavalry is in camp 
 near POWERS Hill; additional Red 
 cavalry is believed to be near BONEAU- 
 VILLE. 
 
 2. (a) The advance guard will clear 
 MEYER (about 1 mile north of GER- 
 MANTOWN) at 6 A. M. and march via 
 ST. LUKE'S CHURCH on SQUARE 
 CORNER. It will communicate with the 
 flank guard and the train and will open 
 communication with our 1st Division. 
 
 (b) The main body will assemble at 
 5:55 A. M. at the S. H. (school house) 
 north of SNYDER and will follow the ad- 
 vance guard at 600 yards. 
 
 (c) The rear guard, now on duty as 
 outpost, will hold its ground till 6 :10 A. M. 
 and will then follow the route taken by the 
 main body. It will keep touch with the 
 Red troops near ROUND TOP by means 
 of patrols and will reconnoiter the enemy's 
 right flank. 
 
 (d) The left flank guard will march 
 from M. RUDISH (| mile north of TWO 
 TAVERNS) at 6 A. M. on SWEET 
 HOME S. H. It will reconnoiter the HAN- 
 OVER ROAD and not permit the enemy 
 to advance east of BONEAUVILLE be- 
 fore the main body has cleared SQUARE 
 CORNER. 
 
 3. The field train, ambulance company 
 and artillery reserves (in the order 
 named), escorted by one battalion 2d In- 
 fantry and Company A, Engineers (less 
 
[166] 
 
 mounted detachment), will form at 5:50 A. M. on the GERMAN- 
 TOWN-555-WHITEHALL road with the head of the column at 
 BAIR (li miles northeast of GERMANTOWN) and march via 
 the WHITEHALL-601-MARYSVILLE-IRISHTOWN road to 
 REDHILL S. H. 
 
 4. Messages will be sent to the head of the main body. 
 
 A, 
 Brig. Gen. 
 
 Dictated to officers representing organizations. 
 
 No copy of this order is sent to the division commander nor is 
 any written message sent to him, as there is danger of their falling 
 into the hands of the enemy. General A sends a staff officer at 10 
 p. m. via Brushtown to report the situation of his troops and his 
 plans for November 29th to the division commander and to request 
 that the movement be supported by artillery on the hill west of 
 Irishtown. 
 
 The order is issued at night, some hours before the movement- 
 is to begin, in order to give the commanders of the various organi- 
 zations time to find the designated places of assembly, to have the 
 routes which they are to take reconnoitered to some extent, and 
 to prepare their own orders. 
 
COURSE IN TACTICS— FART II. 
 
 Map Problem No. 5. 
 (See Gettysburg-Hunterstown-Boneauville sheets, 3" map.) 
 
 Situation : 
 
 A Blue, Eastern, field army in friendly territory was bivouacked 
 the night of October 5-6 north of the Conewago and east of the 
 Harrisburg road. 
 
 A Red invading army somewhat stronger was a short distance 
 west of them. 
 
 A Blue force consisting of the 1st Brigade (1st, 2d, and 3d 
 Regiments Inf.), 1st Squadron 1st Cavalry, 1st Battalion 1st 
 Field Artillery, 1st Ambulance Company, and a section 1st Signal 
 Co., under command of Brigadier General A, has been detached 
 from the 1st Division of this army to guard Emmitsburg and was 
 relieved October 5 and ordered to rejoin its division near Heidlers- 
 burg. 
 
 General A bivouacked October 5 along the Low Dutch road 
 southwest of Mt. Vernon S. H. 
 
 At 6 a. m. October 6, with the 1st Infantry and the cavalry as 
 advance guard, followed by 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry, Artillery, 
 fighting batteries only, 2d Infantry (less 1st Bn.) 3d Infantry, 
 Artillery Combat trains. Ambulance Company, Field trains, the 
 march was resumed, movement to be via Hunterstown. Cavalry 
 had started at 5 :30. 
 
 At 6:15 some firing was heard to the front and shortly after a 
 message was received from the cavalry to the effect : that a hostile 
 force had been seen moving south past Granite Hill Station and 
 estimated at 4 battalions infantry and 2 batteries. A small force 
 of cavalry estimated at one troop had been encountered and driven 
 in on main column. 
 
 Patrols report no other hostile troops south of Hunterstown 
 and those seen are massing behind ridge southwest of Granite Hill. 
 
 The infantry point of the advance guard has just passed road 
 fork 548. General A at the head of the reserve of the advance 
 guard is at 530 and has halted the column when he receives the 
 following telegram forwarded from Boneauville: 
 
 1st Field Army, 
 ri671 Heidlersburg, 
 
[168] 
 
 Gen'l. A. 6 Oct. '11—6 A. M. 
 
 Enemy advancing evidently to attack. Left of our line will be 
 a short distance west of Belmont S. H. extending thence to north. 
 
 Cavalry reports force of all arms moving southeast. Prevent 
 their reaching our flank or rear and join this army as soon as 
 practicable, preferably so as to strike enemy's right flank. 
 
 X, 
 Chief of Staff. 
 
 Five minutes later (6:40) heavy artillery fire is heard to the 
 north. 
 
 Friendly inhabitants report Swift Run unfordable north of 
 York Turnpike and bridges over this stream gone. 
 Required : 
 
 1. General A's estimate of the situation. 
 
 2. His orders. 
 
 STUDENTS' ERRORS AND INSTRUCTOR'S CRITICISMS. 
 
 1st Solution. 
 
 Orders artillery to support the attack from Rocky Grove S. H. 
 (612). 
 
 Orders: "3 (b) The 1st Inf. will move west to WHITE RUN 
 and up that stream against the front of the enemy's position." 
 
 Orders 2d Inf. to turn west at 516, move up WHITE RUN and 
 its western branch deploy east of the 590-587 road and attack the 
 enemy's right. 
 
 Orders 3d Inf. to follow about 600 yds. in rear of 2d Inf. as 
 reserve. 
 
 Comments: "Order a little indefinite as to 1st Inf. — route — ." 
 
 "Connection should be gained with main army." 
 
 2d Solution. 
 
 Orders artillery to take position in the vicinity of Hill 571 and 
 at once open fire. 
 
 Orders 1st Inf. to advance with its left along the 548-618 road, 
 and cooperate with 2d Inf. 
 
 Orders 2d Inf. to move via Mt. Vernon S. H. and the ravine 
 leading to the northeast and attack enemy's left via hill 574. 
 
[169] 
 
 Orders the cavalry to operate against the enemy's left. 
 
 Comments: "The enemy's left is very strong. Granite Hill 
 acts as traverse to protect the rest of his line from the east, also 
 as a bastion from which the frontal attack on line can be enfiladed 
 at the critical point. 
 
 A few men can hold this hill, the rest are then available for the 
 main line. 
 
 A better Arty, position is found about 1000 yards northwest of 
 550 reached by farm road. 
 
 Your cav. is restricted on that flank by impassable stream. The 
 other flank would be better. If there is any danger it is on that 
 flank, and on that side can do most damage when enemy retreats." 
 
 3d Solution. 
 
 Orders artillery to position near orchard at "Field" west of 
 548, to support the attack. 
 
 Orders 1st Inf. via 548 to 618, covering the artillery, to sup- 
 port the 2d Inf. which is ordered to move northwest from 530 to- 
 ward Reynold's and advance astride the Reynold's 588-657 road. 
 
 Comments : "Your Arty, position is not good. 
 
 Better turn 2d Inf. west at 516, then north." 
 
 4th Solution. 
 
 Orders: "The 1st Sq. 1st Cav. will protect the flanks of the 
 attack and will patrol as far north as HUNTERSTOWN from 
 SWIFT RUN to and including the HARRISBURG ROAD." 
 
 Comment : "Bulk where ? Cav. order indefinite ; the Bulk must 
 be on one side or other." 
 
 5th Solution. 
 
 Orders artillery to covered position near 571, to support the 
 attack. 
 
 Orders 1st Inf. to move forward & form for attack with its left 
 on 548-618 road at orchard 300 yds. west of 548, and to advance 
 to the attack when the 2d Inf. begins its advance. 
 
 Orders 2d Inf. to move forward and form for attack with its 
 right about 300 yds. southwest of orchard 300 yds. west of 548, 
 to advance to the attack as soon as formed, and envelop the 
 enemy's right flank. 
 
 Comments: "A better Arty, position would be about 1000 
 yds. northeast of 548 reached by country road most of the way. 
 
[170] 
 
 Your principal error is in 'troop leading'. Should try to get 
 closer before deploying, a longer march by road will take less 
 time. 
 
 Your estimate is accepted because your conclusions are sound 
 but your reason could have been more fully expressed." 
 
 6th Solution. 
 
 Orders 1st Inf. to advance to the attack between the stream 
 line west of knoll 547 and the "562-617 road, and cooperate with 
 the 2d Inf. 
 
 Orders 2d Inf. to attack north of and parallel with the 548-618 
 road. 
 
 Comment : "Had you swung further to west it would have been 
 better." 
 
 7th Solution. 
 
 Orders artillery to take up a position near 618 and open fire on 
 hostile batteries. 
 
 Comment: "Arty, position too open." 
 
 Orders M. G. Cos. of 1st, 2d & 3d Inf. under Capt. A to take 
 up a position on nose northwest of 562. 
 
 Comment: "Doubtful." 
 
 Orders dressing station established under cover west of hill 574. 
 
 Comment : "Far forward for Amb. Co." 
 
 8th Solution. 
 
 Orders artillery to take position near 574 hill, and support the 
 attack. 
 
 Orders 1st Inf. to turn northwest at 548 and attack hill 657 
 from the southeast at the same time the 2d Inf. attacks. 
 
 Orders 2d Inf. to move in rear of the 574-562 ridge and attack 
 ridge southwest of & including Granite Hill. 
 
 Comment: "It will be extremely difficult to capture (Granite 
 Hill) considering number of enemy thereon. 
 
 A few Reds there will hold you while his main body devotes itself 
 to 1st Inf. 
 
 Your arty, position will be hard to reach under hostile arty, 
 fire. 
 
 Terrain to east is too restricted between hostile position and 
 unfordable stream." (for cavalry). 
 
[171] 
 
 9th Solution. 
 
 Orders artillery to take a position west of 548 and open fire. 
 
 Orders 1st Inf. up the ravine about 400 yds. north of 548 to 
 attack along 548-618 road, supporting the attack of the 2d Inf. 
 
 Orders 2d Inf. to attack via the ravine northwest of 562. 
 
 Comments : "The left flank of the enemy is covered by Granite 
 Hill and is extremely strong. Jutting to the front it would cover 
 a flanking detachment. You could win on other flank probably 
 in less time and with less loss. 
 
 Your line of approach (for the artillery) is too exposed. 
 
 Cav. on left would be on side of any force that might come to 
 help Reds." 
 
 10th Solution. 
 
 States: "It makes no difference from which side I approach 
 the position so far as I am concerned." 
 
 Comment: ".?" 
 
 States : "Our greatest danger is on our right * * * * " 
 
 Comment: ".?" 
 
 Orders : "3 (f) The Signal detachment will maintain communi- 
 cation with our army by wire via Boneauville. 
 
 Lines of information will be established between the detachment 
 commander's position and the artillery, the Ambulance Co. and 
 the reserve." 
 
 Comment: "Can one Section do this.'^" 
 
 11th Solution. 
 
 Orders 1st Inf. to take position north of 618, its left at northern 
 edge of woods just north of 618 and open fire at once joining the 
 line of the 2d Inf. as it attacks. 
 
 Orders 2d Inf. to attack, its right near stream head just south 
 of Granite Hill. 
 
 Orders artillery to take position in vicinity of orchard west of 
 548, and open fire at once on the ridge southwest of Granite Hill. 
 
 Orders Ambulance Co. to hill 574. 
 
 Comments : "Better envelop right flank instead of frontal. 
 
 Arty, position not good. 
 
 Ambulance Co. better wait farther back. 
 
 No orders for signal detachment." 
 
[172] 
 
 12th Solution. 
 
 Orders artillery to position near hill 571, to support the attack. 
 
 Orders 1st Inf. to advance along 548-618 road and attack with 
 2d Inf. 
 
 Orders 2d Inf. to advance under cover via 548 & road west of 
 hill 574, thence up the ravine northwest of hill 574 and attack 
 directing its left on the line from 657 extended through 640. 
 
 Comments: "Your attack is more frontal than enveloping 
 which is better as Granite Hill forms a traverse against a left 
 envelopment. 
 
 It would be better to reach for enemy's right. 
 
 You could probably do it in same time and much cheaper. 
 
 The direction of your attack will have little to do with his line 
 of retreat in this case, he will go north. 
 
 Your (artillery) range is long." 
 
 13th Solution. 
 
 Makes a frontal attack with 1st Inf. on the right, 2d Inf. on 
 the left, with two battalions of 3d Inf. using fire of position from 
 618. 
 
 Orders artillery to take position in the vicinity of Eckenrode's, 
 and open fire at once. 
 
 Comments: "Your estimate is good, but had you studied the 
 Granite Hill position a little more you would have seen the weak- 
 ness of your form of attack. 
 
 It is much better than an envelopment of the left. You should 
 envelop the right. 
 
 Your arty, position is too exposed. 
 
 Too many in fire of position, I think." 
 
 14th Solution. 
 Orders artillery to take position near hill 574, and support the 
 attack. 
 
 Comment: "Arty, position fairly good but may be hard to 
 reach." 
 
 15th Solution. 
 States in order: "2. We are ordered to prevent the detach- 
 ment in our front reaching our army's flank or rear, and to join 
 
[173] 
 
 our army soon as practicable, preferably striking the enemy's 
 right ****.» 
 
 Comment: "Omit." 
 
 Orders artillery into position near Eckenr ode's to at once open 
 fire on the enemy's position, assisting the attack. 
 
 Orders 1st Inf. up ravine west of hill 574, and to later support 
 the enveloping attack. 
 
 Orders 2d Inf. followed by 3d Inf. to turn off the road north of 
 530 and move across country to the woods southeast of Reynold's, 
 and attack with left near 588-567 road. 
 
 Comments: "The route taken by your main attack is hard to 
 understand. Why don't they move west from 516.'' or even 530 
 is as good as your route as far as exposure is concerned, and by 
 road. 
 
 Your arty, position is looked into by enemy." 
 
 16th Solution. 
 
 Orders artillery to take position at Rocky Grove S. H. (612) 
 and open fire at once. 
 
 Orders 1st Inf. to move via road leading to northwest between 
 550 & 548 and attack with its left on north & south road through 
 Reynold's, to open the attack and later support the attack of the 
 2d Inf. on its left. 
 
 Orders 2d & 3d Inf. & Arty, to advance via Hanover Road, 
 Storrick's 8z 587, the 2d Inf. to attack with its right resting on 
 north & south road through Reynold's. 
 
 Comments: "Solution generally good; your routes of ap- 
 proach too much exposed. 
 
 Believe it would have been better to throw 1st Inf. more to 
 north." 
 
 17th Solution. 
 
 Orders artillery to take position about 700 yards west of 548, 
 where the infantry will be supported. 
 
 Comment: "Your arty, position is very exposed and will be 
 hard to reach." 
 
 Orders: "The Third infantry will be responsible for the pro- 
 tection of right flank especially towards Granite Hill and will 
 constitute the reserve." 
 
 Comment: "Not well expressed." 
 
[174] 
 
 Makes a frontal attack using the 1st Inf. for fire of position 
 north of 618, and attacking with 2d Inf. on right of 1st. 
 
 Anticipates swinging a battalion of the 1st Inf. around on the 
 enemy's right flank for an enfilading fire. 
 
 Reply to criticisms: "1. This movement from 618 where the 
 1st Inf. had been sent to develop the enemy, in the heat of the 
 critical attack, might not be seen by the Granite Hill lookout, 
 and the crossing could be made without difficulty near the head- 
 waters of the stream and under cover of the trees. Even if it were 
 seen by the lookout the enemy would be too much committed to 
 withdraw. 
 
 2. This attack has some distinct advantages over coming up 
 through Reynolds or further west, because that would be dis- 
 covered from the beginning by the Granite Hill lookout and the 
 enemy would withdraw, seeing that they were outmaneuvered and 
 heavily outnumbered. The enemy's force would be intact and they 
 would have to be maneuvered out of another position further west 
 for which there was no time. The red force could hang on the 
 rear and flanks of the blues all the way north. 
 
 3. The organized fighting efficiency of the enemy should be 
 ended for the day on ridge 657. The enemy would be enticed into 
 waiting in their position by the apparent prospect of inflicting 
 heavy losses on the blue frontal attack. The Japanese trick of 
 throwing a battalion on the exposed flank at the last moment could 
 be used. The combat patrols of the enemy must be very small. 
 
 4. The casualties in the blue frontal attack would be materially 
 lessened by the oblique fire on the red right flank. 
 
 Comment on reply to criticism: "As I stated to the class final 
 success would result in case of a frontal attack by extending the 
 line to the west. It is assumed that will happen. So additional 
 explanation adds nothing." 
 
 AN APPROVED SOLUTION. 
 
 General A's mission is first to protect the left flank of his own 
 army from any interference by this force now near Granite Hill, 
 second to get into the main battle with his detachment and pre- 
 ferably so as to strike the enemy's right. In other words to help 
 the main army all he can. 
 
[175] 
 
 There is little doubt that the force reported by the Chief of 
 Staff and that seen by his own cavalry are the same, still it is 
 necessary that he keep careful watch and have timely warning if 
 there is another force in his vicinity. 
 
 The hostile force near Granite Hill has 4 battalions of infantry 
 against his 9, 2 batteries against his 3, and 1 troop against his 
 4. General A has a decided superiority in strength and is operat- 
 ing in friendly territory. This latter gives him a decided ad- 
 vantage for with a command of the size of his if defeated and cut 
 oif from the main army he can retreat in any direction and still 
 save his troops. 
 
 The enemy has undoubtedly heard of General A's movement and 
 has sent a weaker force to keep a stronger out of the battle. He 
 has selected his present position as the best in sight and one likely 
 to be attacked, still he is probably holding his men in hand and 
 ready to move to the right or left should General A attempt to 
 march around him. 
 
 The position taken by the enemy is a short ridge extending to 
 the southwest from Granite Hill. The latter well secures his left 
 flank, the other flank of the position is not so well located, it is 
 lower and the field of view and fire is obstructed by the open forest 
 to the southwest. 
 
 From General A's position when he receives the message directly 
 to the position of the enemy is over open ground. Due to the 
 many folds therein an advancing line would get much cover in 
 places but it is such as to make the advance costly. 
 
 From the position east to where Swift Run becomes impassable 
 is only 4500 yards and country that can be looked into from 
 Granite Hill. There are good roads leading around this way by 
 which General A could join his main army if not prevented by 
 enemy. 
 
 Two miles west of General A lies the Wolf Hill ridge, rough 
 and heavily wooded, crossed by the Hanover Road. This wooded 
 ridge ends about IJ miles north of where the road crosses it. 
 Leading north in the western edge of these woods is a wood road 
 by which troops could march and turn the hostile position from 
 the west, and two roads east of this ridge are likewise available 
 but more exposed. By either of the three roads considerable cover 
 can be obtained for troops advancing to the attack. 
 
[176] 
 
 From the hostile position to left flank of Blue army is a little 
 over 5 miles. 
 
 From 530 cross-roads direct to hostile position is about 4000 
 yards. 
 
 West then north by wood road is about 5 miles to hostile posi- 
 tion. 
 
 West then north by road 550-587 is about 4 miles and by road 
 546-588 ^bout 3 miles. 
 
 General A has several courses open to him. In coming to a 
 decision he fully appreciates that the main battle to the north 
 is the important thing and that all detachment fights are of little 
 value except as they contribute to a victory of the main force. 
 That the Red detachment hear Granite Hill is an effort on the 
 part of the Red commander to keep a greatly superior force from 
 the fight with an inferior and thus increase his superiority on the 
 main battle field. 
 
 To march to the northeast, try to avoid a fight and join main 
 army as promptly as possible, two routes are to be considered, to 
 turn to Swift Run and to keep west of it. 
 
 To march around Swift Run and cross the Conewago by bridge 
 requires a march of over 13 miles, in the meantime the hostile 
 detachment is only 5 miles from the Blue left flank. General A 
 rejects this course. 
 
 To move west of Swift Run and east of hostile position. If 
 this could be done without a fight undoubtedly the best. General 
 A sees that unless he marches across rough country off the roads 
 he must cross the York Turnpike within 3000 yards of the enemy's 
 position. A flank march of this kind with an impassable obstacle 
 on the other flank is impracticable. 
 
 To march around the enemy by the other flank is doubly ob- 
 jectionable, it is as long as by the eastern route and would be a 
 flank march between two hostile bodies. 
 
 General A then recognizes that he must drive this hostile de- 
 tachment out of his way before he can join in the main battle. 
 
 He can attack straight to his front. The advantages are that 
 it is direct, simple and can be done quicker than any other. The 
 disadvantages are that it will be very costly. 
 
 He can attack enveloping the enemy's left. This will tend to 
 push the detachment back on their main force. Disadvantages of 
 
[177] 
 
 this plan: The enemy's left flank due to Granite Hill and the 
 woods north thereof is particularly strong, much stronger than 
 the other flank. If the pressure is brought from this side the 
 enemy would probably hold more tenaciously for if forced off he 
 is driven toward his main army. 
 
 On the enemy's right, his flank is weak and the line of advance 
 just as good or better for General A. The enemy is in hostile 
 territory and very inferior in strength. With Swift Run on his 
 right he will naturally be nervous about being driven in that 
 direction and will not hold with the same tenacity. 
 
 General A does not like the forest that will be on his left flank 
 if he attacks this way especially as the enemy's main army is 
 north of it. That he places the hostile detachment partially be- 
 tween himself and his main army is of no importance, if General 
 A draws off enough hostile force to drive the Blue detachment to 
 the southwest he will have done good work and he feels sure he 
 can supply his command and rejoin later. He has the advantage 
 of being in friendly territory. 
 
 Good artillery positions are not plenty but General A decides 
 that near hill 606 will answer his purpose; to reach this the guns 
 must move by the 452 — 550 — 587 road — longer than the road he 
 would use for infantry. An infantry escort will have to be sent 
 with them. 
 
 The 530-550 road is too exposed to be used. It is better to 
 turn at 516 where head of main body now is. 
 
 Some troops will have to be sent against the front to hold the 
 enemy to his position. 
 
 On the west flank the ground is not very favorable to cavalry 
 action yet it is the flank most important to watch. Reenforce- 
 ments must not reach the enemy unexpectedly. Communication 
 must be kept up with the main army; this at present is possible 
 by telegraph through Boneauville, if this means fails then cavalry 
 must be counted on. 
 
 If General A has the frontal attack made by the advance guard 
 continuing on its present road and deploying when necessary, that 
 will answer. The main body turning west can again turn north 
 at 546 or 550. The deployment should be made between these 
 two roads. The artillery will gain position easier and better if it 
 go by the 550 road, but it is longer, and if all the command goes 
 
[178] 
 
 that way, it leaves the advance guard widely separated from the 
 main body. The artillery could go by the 550 road, the infantry 
 by the other, but in this case an escort should accompany the 
 artillery. 
 
 General A therefore decides to attack, enveloping the enemy's 
 right flank. The advance guard regiment to continue its advance 
 toward 618, deploying when necessary, left on the road, and ad- 
 vance against hill 657 when the gther attack is started. The ad- 
 vance party to continue toward Gulden as flank patrol and to keep 
 abreast of the regiment. 
 
 Artillery to go into position near hill 606, the leading battalion 
 of the main body and the artillery to move by 550 road, the in- 
 fantry battalion to escort the artillery, furnish flank protection 
 and form part of the reserve, the remainder of the main body to 
 move north at 546, deploy when necessary with right on this road, 
 and advance to the attack against enemy's right. 
 
 Most of the cavalry will be held on his left, sufficient sent to 
 right for patrolling and to maintain connection with main force 
 if telegraphic communication fails. 
 
 At first the separation of the two attacks is rather great, but 
 by the time fire is opened by the attack they will be much closer. 
 
 It is too early to designate a dressing station. 
 
 General A, having had his regimental and artillery commanders 
 and staff assembled, at 6:50 a. m. issued the following order 
 which, if written, would be as follows: 
 
 Detachment 1st Division, 
 Field Orders Cross Roads near Mt. Vernon S. H., 
 
 No. — . 6 Oct. '11, 6:50 A. M. 
 
 1. A hostile detachment of all arms of not more than half of 
 our strength is taking position near GRANITE HILL. 
 
 Our main body is probably now engaged with the enemy, the 
 line extending from near BELMONT S. H. north. 
 
 2. We will move to attack the detachment near GRANITE 
 HILL and the attack must be pushed vigorously, time is im- 
 portant. 
 
 The previous march conditions now cease. 
 
 3. (a) The artillery, escorted by the 1st Battalion, 2d In- 
 fantry, will move via 452-550 and gain position near Hill 606 and 
 support the attack. 
 
[179] 
 
 The 1st Battalion, 2d Infantry, will provide protection for our 
 left flank. 
 
 (b) The 1st Infantry will advance via 530-618 deploying 
 when it becomes necessary with left on 548-618 road and attack 
 in conjunction with the 2d Infantry. 
 
 The present advance party will continue along the 548-562 
 road and secure our right flank. 
 
 (c) The 2d Infantry (less 1st Bn.) will advance via 452 thence 
 across country and 546-588 road deploying when necessary with 
 right on that road and attack the enemy's right. 
 
 (d) The cavalry will cover our left, reconnoitering well to 
 the north and west. One troop will be sent to our right flank and 
 will maintain communication with our main army by telegraph 
 through BONEAUVILLE if practicable, otherwise by patrols. 
 Six men of this troop will report to me. 
 
 (e) The 3d Infantry will constitute the reserve under my 
 orders. The regiment will follow 2d Infantry until it has to 
 deploy. 
 
 (f) The signal detachment will connect me with the 1st In- 
 fantry. 
 
 4. The field trains will halt off the road where they now are. 
 The Ambulance Company will remain for the present at 530. 
 
 5. I will be with the reserve. 
 
 A, 
 Brig. Genl. 
 Verbally to assembled officers. Copy to Major G, commanding 
 cavalry. Report by telegraph to Chief of Staff. 
 
COURSE IN TACTICS— FART II. 
 
 Map Peoblem No. 6 — Occupation of a Defensive Position. 
 
 (See Hunterstown sheet, 3" map.) 
 Situation : 
 
 Pennsylvania and Maryland are at war. The former is con- 
 centrating troops at Harrisburg, the latter at Frederick. The 1st 
 Division Pennsylvania troops has been sent by rail to York 
 Springs, and on September 20th is detraining there preparatory 
 to moving via Gettysburg towards the border. Information was 
 received the night of September 19th, that a Maryland force of all 
 arms had been pushed northward and was then encamped north 
 of Emmitsburg, near the border, with the evident intention of 
 continuing the march northward the following day. 
 
 As the entire 1st Pa. Division will not be ready to leave York 
 Springs until late September 20th, and possibly not until the 21st, 
 a force of all arms under General A left that place at 8 a. m. 
 September 20th, to secure the crossings over the Conewago. 
 
 The 1st Squadron, 1st Pa. Cavalry, (independent). Major B, 
 started at 7:30 a. m. and reports that it crossed the Cone- 
 wago at 9:00 a. m. and encountered near 616 an inferior force 
 of Marj^land Cavalry which was driven back, but which was 
 stubbornly resisting the advance of the Pa. Cavalry along the 
 Harrisburg road. The last report from the cavalry was dated 
 R. Smith, 10:00 a. m. 
 
 At 10:20 a. m. General A receives at Heidlersburg the following 
 message from an officer's patrol, by telephone from J. Musser : 
 
 "Hostile column four regiments infantry, three or four batteries 
 artillery, marching northward on Emmitsburg road. Point ad- 
 vance guard at 580 (Peach Orchard), at 9:00 a. m. Will keep 
 them under observation." 
 
 At 10:50 a. m. General A receives at Plainview by telephone, 
 the following from the same patrol : 
 
 "Hostile column apparently taking Harrisburg road out of 
 Gettysburg; head at County Almshouse at 10:10 a. m." 
 
 And at 11 a. m. the following from Major B, dated near 543, 
 10:50 a. m. : 
 
 [180] 
 
[181] 
 
 "Hostile column of all arms approaching on Harrisburg road. 
 Infantry of advance guard deploying against me here. Can delay 
 them somewhat, but hostile cavalry is still active." 
 
 At this time, 11 a. m.. General A's command, exclusive of the 
 independent cavalr}^, is halted along the Harrisburg road in the 
 following order: 
 
 Advance Guard — point 400 yards south of 616. 1st Infantry 
 (less 3d Bn.), Company A, Engineers. 
 
 Main Body, in order of march — head 400 yards south of 545 ; 
 3d Battalion 1st Infantry, 1st Battalion 1st Field Artillery (firing 
 batteries only), 2d Infantry, 3d Infantry, Artillery Combat train, 
 1st Ambulance Company, field trains without distance. 
 Required : 
 
 1. General A's plans. 
 
 2. His orders. 
 
 3. Sketch showing location of troops in the position selected. 
 
 STUDEXTS' ERRORS AXD IXSTRUCTOR'S CRITICISMS. 
 
 Greneral A's Plans: 
 
 1st Solution. 
 
 States: "Temporary resistance by advance guard near 607- 
 566 especially if assisted by some artillery will delay the enemy, 
 confuse him, and probably cause his deployment. 
 
 Withdrawal before becoming seriously engaged, without mask- 
 ing fire of main body, along 581-588 road to that running west 
 from 712, thence to position." (707-712 Ridge.) 
 
 Comment : "At best, however, only a half measure. Better de- 
 vote all your energv to strengthening the position you have se- 
 lected." ' 
 
 3d Solution. 
 
 States: "General A decides to occupy the position on the 
 Hdge 616-712." 
 
 Comment: "Too oblique to road." 
 
 States: "The artillery will be placed on hiUs 712 and 707. 
 If the Md. force marches X. E. to the 3 fords from 3000 to 5000 
 yards east of the position, the artillery would be brought down to 
 the vicinity of 616 to get better range." 
 
[182] 
 
 Comment: "This movement of the enemy is unlikely because 
 of conditions given." 
 
 States : "One battery, escorted by mounted scouts and, later, 
 supported by the cav., will take position on hill 566 to force a 
 deployment, then retire and join Art. Bn." 
 
 Comment: "Conditions given do not warrant this. In any 
 event artillery should not be sent this far from inf. support. The 
 cavalry will have its hands full arid should not be tied down to an 
 artillery support." 
 
 5th Solution. 
 
 States that Gen. A's plans are : 
 
 "To take up a defensive position on the ridge Hill 712-616, in- 
 trenching as much as possible." 
 
 Comment. "Too oblique & too near crest on left." 
 
 "To put his artillery in a concealed position on the north slope 
 of 712." 
 
 Comment: "Better on hill 707." 
 
 "To have the 2d Inf. occupy the section from 666 incl. to 616 
 incl." 
 
 Comment: "More than 1100 yds." 
 
 6th Solution. 
 Plans to leave ambulance company and field train north of 
 Heidlersburg. 
 
 Comment: "Better bring your Amb. Co. nearer." 
 
 7th Solution. 
 Comment: "The 1st requirement of the problem is not fully 
 complied with. You give Gen. A's decision, and incidently where 
 he will place his artillery ; but his plans, — how he expects to carry 
 out his decision to hold the 712-616 ridge, — are not given." 
 
 8th Solution. 
 Plans to hasten the march of the advance guard, and have it & 
 one battery seize and temporarily hold a line hills 607-574 long 
 enough to cause enemy to deploy. 
 • Comment: "This is at best only a half-way measure. Better 
 devote all your energy to strengthening the position you have 
 selected." 
 
[183] 
 
 Plans to use 3 troops of cavalry to cover crossings from New- 
 chester to crossing southwest of 529, and one to cover the right 
 flank. 
 
 Comment : "Better not split up your cavalry. They are none 
 too strong now." 
 
 Plans to defend a position from corner of road south of hill 
 712 to point of nose 200 yds. east of 561. 
 
 Comments: "This road, as interpreted by your sketch is on 
 712 or possibly on south slope, but surely not 'south' of it. 
 
 Your line is O.K. on the left, but too near the crest on the right." 
 
 Places artillery reserves (combat train) under cover near 605. 
 
 Comment: "Leave this to Arty. Comdr." 
 
 11th Solution. 
 
 Plans to take up a defensive position north of the Conewago 
 to secure the crossings of that stream. 
 
 Plans to post the artillery near 584, to place the 2d Inf. on 
 nose southwest of hill 584, with intrenchments from near 544 
 towards the southeast. 
 
 Plans to place the 3d Inf. in trenches north of 502 W & running 
 east from 502 W-545 road across the nose near the 560 contour. 
 
 Comments : "You do not appear to have fully considered your 
 mission. The enemy will not attack you in the position you have 
 selected. 
 
 He will be well satisfied with holding the strong ground south 
 of the river and obliging your division to force a crossing. 
 
 Your solution is a good study in the defense of a river line. It 
 would be extremely difficult for even a greatly superior enemy to 
 force a crossing in your front. And this is exactly what the 
 enemy will do, — seize the strong position south of the river and 
 make it very costly to your division to force a crossing, which will 
 be all the more difficult because you have put bridges and fords out 
 of commission. 
 
 Your position is more one in readiness than it is defensive, but at 
 the same time it is consistent with your conception of the prob- 
 lem." 
 
 12th Solution. 
 
 Plans to put line on military crest of ridge 707-712. 
 
 Comment : "Better put it further down slope." 
 
[184] 
 
 14th Solution. 
 . Plans to hold line from road southeast of 616 through 666 to 
 woods just southwest of 712. 
 
 Comments : "You push the limit rather closely here in the ex- 
 tent of your line. 
 
 This (line to west) is somewhat too far up crest." 
 
 States that problem does not state that there is telephone or 
 telegraph communication with York Springs. 
 
 Comment : "Yes, problem shows there is telephone communica- 
 tion hereabouts. York Springs undoubtedly can be reached from 
 Heidlersburg & Plainview where, as problem shows, there are tele- 
 phones." 
 
 15th Solution. 
 
 Plans to have advance guard and one battery delay the enemy 
 from ridge 566-574. 
 
 Comment : "Better devote all your force and energies to taking 
 up and strengthening the position you select. Sending this force 
 forward is not advisable under the conditions given." 
 
 Plans to send a 4 company as combat patrol to southwest edge 
 of woods, southwest of 712. 
 
 Comment : "This could well be a larger detachment." 
 
 Plans to have Amb. Co. halt at the stream 400 yds. south of 
 545. 
 
 Comment: "Better bring Amb. Co. forward to 502 W." 
 
 16th Solution. 
 
 Plans to hold line 712-666-561-544. 
 
 Comment : "Your line is more than 2500 yds. long, very much 
 too long for your force, & you further extend it 700 yds. by 
 directing 3d Inf. to construct intrenchments east from 544. The 
 right of your line is too near the crest. 
 
 It is unnecessary to destroy bridges just now, & especially so 
 to use your engineers for that purpose. 
 
 You need them in strengthening your position. Your Ambu- 
 lance Co. should be brought forward to 502 W, as you are sure 
 to need it." 
 
[185] 
 
 General A's Orders. 
 1st Solution. 
 
 States: "The head of his (enemy's) advance guard was at 
 543 — north of McElheny at 10:50 A. M. where it was being op- 
 posed by our cavalry." 
 
 Comment : "No. As your cavalry was at 543 the head of the 
 hostile adv. gd. must have been some distance south at that time." 
 
 Reply to criticism: "Is this a material error?" 
 
 Comment on reply to criticism : "In your case apparently yes, 
 since it seems to have led you to a wrong conclusion." 
 
 Orders artillery (less 1 btry.) to take up a position under cover 
 of Hill 712. 
 
 Comment : "Better put Arty, back of 707." 
 
 Orders 2d Inf. to occupy the line 616-666 inclusive. 
 
 Comment: "Too near the crest." 
 
 Orders 3d Inf. to occupy the line 666, exclusive, to N. & S. 
 road just west of Hill 712, inclusive. 
 
 Comment: "This position is too oblique to road." 
 
 Orders 2d Inf. M. G. Co. to Bridge S. H. & 3d Inf. M. G. Co. 
 to nose about 1000 yds. east of 616, to cover bridges. 
 
 Comment: "Better keep your machine guns near your line. 
 You may need them." 
 
 Further comment: "Woods on your left flank should be held." 
 
 2d Solution. 
 
 Comment on Par. 1 : "Tell them what your cavalry has done." 
 
 Comment on paragraph assigning section to 1st Inf. : " *Hill 
 707' is rather indefinite as a limit for one of your flanks. Where 
 does this hill begin and end.?" 
 
 Occupies line from 707 to woods at road bend 400 yards south- 
 east of 616. 
 
 Comment : "Your line might be less oblique to road and much 
 father down the slope." 
 
 Further comments: "Strong detachments, or at least strong 
 combat patrols should hold the woods s. & s. e. of Plainview. 
 
 A stronger force (than a few mounted scouts) should be sent 
 to S. W. slope of 712." 
 
 States that the advance guard commander would be warned of 
 the possibility of delay on the part of the main body so that he 
 
[186] 
 
 could take measures to delay the enemy should his approach be- 
 come too rapid. 
 
 Comments : "Security to the front should in any case be pro- 
 vided during the time the position is being occupied. 
 
 Just how do you want Col. 1st Inf. to take over this responsi- 
 bility (to delay the enemy) ? You have already given him definite 
 work to do." 
 
 3d Solution. 
 
 Issues orders at 11 :06 A. M. at 616 to all commanders excepting 
 the colonels of the 2d & 3d infantry regiments and the major of 
 cavalry. Sends 2d Lt. N. to carry verbal orders to the two 
 colonels mentioned. 
 
 Comment: "Your method of transmitting orders is not such 
 as to save time. Col. 1st Inf., Arty. Comdr., C. O. Co. Engrs. 
 and Chief Surgeon are near at hand. From near 616 Gen. A 
 issues his orders verbally to these officers. Gen. A should have 
 already sent for Cols. 2d & 3d Inf. to join him. When they come 
 up he gives them their orders, and they are fully oriented as to 
 situation and plans while their regiments are coming up." 
 
 Orders Engrs. to assist in the entrenching. 
 
 Comment : "This is indefinite. There are many ways in which 
 they might assist." 
 
 4th Solution. 
 
 Comment: "You are required to write your orders in this 
 series no matter how the problem calls for giving them. * * 
 * * In this situation * * * * you send an aide to Maj or 
 B." 
 
 5th Solution. 
 
 Comment: "Detachments should hold the woods on the left 
 flank. A company to the woods about 800 yds. south of Plain- 
 view, and at least a platoon to the woods west of the word 'Cone- 
 wago.' I believe it to be well also to assign a battalion to prepare 
 a position on the S. W. slope of 712. 
 
 How about the security of the command while the position is 
 being prepared .''" 
 
 6th Solution. 
 
 Orders 1st Inf. (less 3d Bn.) to vicinity of knoll 607 near road 
 junction 581 to cover the position on the hills 712 & 707, and to 
 retire along the 581-588 road upon the approach of the enemy. 
 
[187] 
 
 Comment: "One battalion would, I think, be enough to pro- 
 vide security to the front." 
 
 Orders artillery to position 800 yards east of 588. 
 
 Comment : "You cannot cover much of the ground to the east 
 of Harrisburg road from this position." 
 
 7th Solution. 
 
 Orders 1st Inf. to occupy sector from road running southwest 
 from hill 712, to a point 400 yds. west, both inclusive. 
 
 Comment: "Your line is not clearly defined. Part of it has 
 woods in its front." 
 
 States that Gen. A decides not to send forward any troops but 
 to make a stubborn defense all in one place. 
 
 Comment : "Better. Sending any force forward is a half meas- 
 ure at best." 
 
 8th Solution. 
 
 States in Par. 2 of the order: "This detachment will take a 
 position south of the CONEWAGO * * * *." 
 
 Comment : "Where south of Conewago.^^" 
 
 In Par. 3 (a) directs Col. A in what order to withdraw the ad- 
 vance guard and one battery from delaying position (hills 607- 
 574). 
 
 Comment: "Better leave this to Col. A unless he is incompe- 
 tent." 
 
 Orders artillery to take position near saddle of hills 712-707. 
 
 Comment: "Rather cramped and with but little cover. Your 
 sketch shows them in front of orchard, not a good artillery posi- 
 tion." 
 
 Orders the engineers to assist in preparing the position for 
 defense. 
 
 Comment: "How assist.?" 
 
 9th Solution. 
 
 Orders line occupied from 616 to 712. 
 
 Comment: "The line should extend across the Harrisburg 
 road." 
 
 Orders the field train to take the first cross road to the east & 
 halt after clearing the roads for the advancing division and await 
 orders. 
 
[188] 
 
 Comment: "You will want your trains as soon as fight is de- 
 cided. This will be long before the division comes up. Better keep 
 them on the road or near it." 
 
 10th Solution. 
 
 Orders position occupied as follows : 
 
 1st Inf. with its center at 666 & extending about 300 yds. to 
 each side. 
 
 2nd Inf. with its center just south of 616 and extending about 
 300 yds. to each side. 
 
 3d Inf. as reserve under cover north of large orchard on hill 712. 
 
 Artillery behind ridge west of 616, its left near small orchard. 
 
 Cavalry (except 2 platoons) on the right, 2 platoons on the left. 
 
 Comments: "Very little fault can be found with this solution 
 as a whole. I think you will now agree that your line would be 
 stronger if it were farther down the hill, and its left just north of 
 561." 
 
 "I would not weaken the cavalry even to this extent. (2 pla- 
 toons on left.) Use mtd. scouts for your left." 
 
 12th Solution. 
 
 Comment: "Gen. A was at Plainview at 11 A. M. You have 
 him issuing order on hill 712, 5 minutes later. This is Ij miles 
 away." 
 
 Orders cavalry to take position massed under cover 1000 yards 
 west of 712. 
 
 Comment : "This will take your cavalry from the enemy's front 
 at once. Better let them continue to delay him." 
 
 Orders occupation of military crest from 707 to woods just 
 southwest of 712, with artillery north of ridge and about 700 yds. 
 west of 616. 
 
 Comment: "Your line is too oblique to Harrisburg road and 
 too far to the west. The enemy can readily turn your left flank. 
 Because of the way you hold your line, your right flank will not 
 be attacked, as the enemy can reach the 502 W crossing more 
 readily by your left. Furthermore your line can be enfiladed by 
 the enemy's artillery if placed to the S. W." 
 
 13th Solution. 
 Comment: "Better say under what officer" * * * * 
 scouts are combined. 
 
[189] 
 
 Orders destruction of crossings west of Bridge S. H. as far as 
 Table Rock, and the one southwest of 529. 
 
 Comment: "I do not think it necessary to destroy any cross- 
 ings as yet. Only by marching more than 20 miles today can the 
 enemy get north of the Conewago, and there he would be at a 
 decided disadvantage. However, no great harm is done by their 
 destruction." 
 
 14th Solution. 
 
 In order speaks of the enemy's division. 
 
 Comment: "Why do you say 'division'.''" 
 
 Speaks of a hostile reinforced brigade. 
 
 Comment: "It is more than that. It is 4 regts. inf." 
 
 Further comment : "I would prefer to use the engineers farther 
 to the front just now," rather than use them building roads in rear. 
 
 15th Solution. 
 Comment : "This order is carlessly written, * * * *^ 
 Follow F. S. R. if you must abbreviate." 
 
 16th Solution. 
 
 Comments : "No combat patrols, & none shown in sketch." 
 
 "Your left flank is so much in the air that no doubt the enemy 
 
 will attack that flank. But if such were not the case, would it not 
 
 be best to have your cavalry on the flank opposite to your reserve.? 
 
 Your right flank is also very weak and you have no reserves there." 
 
 17th Solution. 
 
 Comments: "No necessity for closing in mass. Organizations 
 can continue the march while the commanding officers are receiving 
 their orders." 
 
 "Compare this paragraph (1) with that in an approved solu- 
 tion, and see if you, while cutting this down at least one half, do 
 not gain in clearness and definiteness." 
 
 "As colonel of the 1st Inf. I must admit my inability to tell from 
 this paragraph (3. [c]) where my regiment is to go." 
 
 "Would suggest you make a careful study of orders given in 
 Griepenkerl, as also those of all approved solutions given out. 
 Your orders violate the rules laid down in Griepenkerl * * 
 * * in the following particulars : not logically arranged ; not as 
 short as possible; not perfectly clear and intelligible; trespasses 
 on the province of subordinates." 
 
[190] 
 
 Sketch showing location of troops in the position selected. 
 
 1st Solution. 
 
 Places artillery on 712 and infantry supports close behind the 
 712 crest. 
 
 Comment: "Your artillery has insufficient cover. Supports 
 west of 707 too near artillery." 
 
 3d Solution. 
 
 Places line so as to include 616 road crossing and hill 712. 
 
 Places 3 troops of cavalry i mile northeast of 544) and 1 troop 
 i mile northwest of 513. 
 
 Comments: "Your line is at least 2300 yds. long. Rather 
 too extended. 
 
 Better keep your cavalry intact. 
 
 Line taken up too near crest." 
 
 4th Solution. 
 
 Occupies a position approximately along the 680 contour north 
 of 666 to road over west part of 712. 
 
 Comment: "Your position is too oblique to road & too far 
 to the westward. The enemy can readily turn your left flank." 
 
 6th Solution. 
 
 Occupies position from nose north of 666 to the bend of the 
 road 1000 yards south of west of 712. 
 
 Comment: «* * * * if the enemy moves through Hunt- 
 erstown north on the 552-507 W road, he will practically avoid 
 your position and gain, with difficulty, the crossings you wish to 
 cover. 
 
 Your position covers well the 523 W bridge but not the 502 W 
 bridge." 
 
 9th Solution. 
 
 Comment: "If woods between left flank and river are held, 
 the westernmost by a Co. and that near the river by at least a 
 platoon, your flanks are sufficiently well protected." (Cavalry 
 on right.) 
 
[191] 
 
 AN APPROVED SOLUTION. 
 
 1st Requirement, General A's Plans: 
 
 To take up and occupy a defensive position across the Harris- 
 burg road, extending from nose near 561 westerly to the south 
 slope of hill 712; to assign two regiments to the fighting line 
 and to hold the third in reserve near 605 ; to send a battalion to 
 prepare the southwest slope of hill 712 for defense, a company to 
 the woods about 700 yards south of Plainview, and a half company 
 to the woods about 1500 yards southeast of Plainview; to place 
 the artillery in position on the north slope of the ridge and near 
 hill 707; and to entrench and strengthen the position as far 
 as possible. 
 
 To direct the engineers to start work at once on the section 
 assigned to the second regiment; and the 1st Infantry to provide 
 for the security of the command to the front until the position 
 is occupied. 
 
 The cavalry to continue to delay the enemy, and, when obliged 
 to fall back, to cover the right flank; the mounted scouts of the 
 2d and 3d Infantry, joined by those of the 1st when the latter's 
 duty of security to the front ceases, to be united under an officer 
 to operate on the left flank. 
 
 The field train to park off the road immediately north of Wer- 
 man ; the ambulance company to halt and await orders near 502W ; 
 the artillery combat train to rejoin its battalion via the 502W — 
 Hershey Mill road. 
 
 After issuing his orders near 616, General A will take station 
 on hill 712. 
 2d Requirement, General A's Orders : 
 
 Detachment, 1st Pa. Division, 
 Field Orders | Crossroads 616, South of Plainview, 
 
 No. 2 \ 20Sept. '11, 11-15 A.M. 
 
 1. A hostile force of all arms is moving northward on the 
 HARRISBURG road. 
 
 Our cavalry defeated the hostile cavalry near this point this 
 morning, and at 10-50 A. M. was engaged in delaying the enemy 
 near 543 north of McELHENY. 
 
 2. This detachment will take up and occupy a position across 
 the HARRISBURG road near 561 to cover the crossing of the 
 CONEWAGO for our division. March conditions now cease. 
 
[192] 
 
 3. (a) The artillery will take up a concealed position on 
 north slope of ridge and near hill 707. The combat train will 
 proceed to position assigned it via the 602W— HERSHEY MILL 
 road. 
 
 (b) The 1st Infantry will hold the section from a point on 
 the 666-576 road about 400 yards southwest of 666 — westward 
 for about 700 yards. A battalion will prepare the southwest 
 slope of hill 712 for defense. This regiment will proride for the 
 security of the command to the front until the position is occupied. 
 
 The 2d Infantry will hold the section from the left of the Ist 
 Infantry to a point on nose about 200 yards northeast of 561, 
 A company will be sent to woods about 700 yards soath of PLAIN- 
 ATEW, and a half company to the woods about 1500 yards south- 
 east of PLAIXATEW. 
 
 The entire position will be entrenched and strengthened. 
 
 (c) The 3d Infantry will form up near 605 as the reserve. 
 It wiU provide for the security of the bridges near 502W and 
 HERSHEY MILL. 
 
 (d) Company A, Engineers, will start work at oiiee on the 
 section assigned to the 2d Infantry, assisting that re^nnent when 
 it reaches its position, and joining the reserve when the work 
 ceases. 
 
 (e) The cavalry will continue to delay the cuoij, and, when 
 obliged to faD back, will cover the right flank. 
 
 (x) The mounted scouts of the 2d and 3d Infantrj will report 
 to 1st Lieut. X, 2d Infantry, at 529 and will cover the kft flanL 
 The mounted scouts 1st Infantry will join this detiili— iit when 
 the duty of secnritj to the fnmt assigned to the 1st Infantry 
 
 4. The field train will park to the east of the HARRISBLTIG 
 road immediately north of WERMAX. 
 
 The 1st Ambulance Company wiQ await orders nemr 502W. 
 The smaU arms ammunition wagons and raiwnns of the artil- 
 kry whoi emptied will be sent to YORK SPRINGS to lefiH 
 
 5. Messages to hiD 712. 
 
 Brigadier GeneraL 
 
 Terhallj to CoJond 1st Inf^ ArtiOery Cconuuider, Cap«. Co. A 
 Engrs^ and Surgeon, all oi wham are pnbaiilr vdh General A. 
 
[193] 
 
 By aide to Major B, and by messenger to Quartermaster, if latter 
 is with trains. 
 
 At 10:20 a.m., or the latest at 10:50 a.m.. General A, antici- 
 pating this action, should have sent for the Colonels of the 2d 
 and 3d Infantry to join him. The order is given verbally also 
 to them. In the meantime the march of the column continues. 
 General A is in communication, probably by telephone, with the 
 Chief of Staff of his division to whom he transmits all messages 
 he has received, and whom he fully acquaints with his plans. 
 3d Requirement. (Sketch showing location of troops in the posi- 
 tion selected. See sketch on bulletin board.) 
 
 Note — The mounted scouts are united and assigned to the left 
 flank, not because such use of them is generally favored; but 
 because in the situation given no use can be made of them to the 
 front, nor in the immediate vicinity of the position. If there be 
 any field of duty for them here it must be found on the left flank. 
 
9 v;0 
 
COURSE IN TACTICS— FART II. 
 
 Map Problem No. 7 — A Position in Readiness. 
 (See Hunterstown — New Oxford — Boneauville sheets, 3" map.) 
 
 Situation : 
 
 A Blue division detached from the main army at York has been 
 for several days north of Gettysburg watching the mountain passes 
 to the west. 
 
 The country is hostile to the Blues. 
 
 Upon the advance of the Reds east from Chambersburg and 
 Waynesboro the Blue division, under its orders "not to become 
 seriously engaged" has started to fall back. 
 
 It bivouacked last night on the open country around Hunters- 
 town, the 1st and 2d Brigades south of the road and the remainder 
 of the troops and trains north of the road; outposts on the high 
 ground west of the town. It was known that the Reds had 
 occupied Mummasburg (about three miles west of Goldenville) . 
 Orders were issued by the Blue division commander that the com- 
 mand be ready to march at 7 a.m. today. 
 
 At 6:30 a.m. this morning General A, commanding 1st Brigade, 
 received the following orders from the division commander: 
 
 "Reliable information has just been received that a hostile 
 force of all arms, estimated to be a division, passed through Bar- 
 low last evening and bivouacked about two miles east of that 
 place. 
 
 "This command will start at 7 :00 a.m. and march on Abbotts- 
 town via Brush Run and York Turnpike, except the sanitary 
 troops and field, supply and ammunition trains, which will move via 
 537-594-557-491. 
 
 "With your brigade and attached troops you will act as left 
 flank guard and cover the movement. Move out via the 585-573 
 Cedar Ridge road. If there is no unusual delay the division should 
 be across Little Conewago Creek by 11 a.m. 
 
 "The following troops are placed at your disposal: 
 1st Brigade (1st, 2d, 3d Infantry). 
 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry. 
 1st Battalion, 5th Field Artillery. 
 1st Ambulance Company. 
 
 [195] 
 
[196] 
 
 "Your field trains will join at once those of the division at 537." 
 
 At 8:15 a.m. General A's command is on the road and disposed 
 as follows: 
 
 Independent cavalry has gone south through Boneauville to 
 find enemy. 
 
 Point of advance guard at 593. 
 
 Advance party, Company A, 1st Infantry, 200 yards in rear 
 of point. 
 
 Support, 1st Battalion, 1st Infantry (less one company) at 
 573. 
 
 Main body 600 yards in rear of support. 
 
 General A, who has heard distant rifle fire to the south, is at this 
 time riding with the advance party, when he receives the following 
 message : 
 
 1st Sq., 4th Cav., 
 
 Sweet Home School House, 
 
 13 Dec. '11— 8:00 A. M. 
 General A: 
 
 Encountered about a squadron of Red cavalry near 617 and 
 drove them back to ST. LUKE'S CHURCH where they are now. 
 
 Hostile columns are advancing north through TWO TAVERNS 
 and GERMANTOWN ; only infantry seen so far. 
 
 Lieut. B reports that at 7:50 A. M. the point of the advance 
 guard of the western column was about 500 yards north of TWO 
 TAVERNS. At same time advance party of eastern column was 
 entering GERMANTOWN and small groups were seen moving 
 from GERMANTOWN towards 546 and 592, but he could not 
 wait to see which road the rest of the column followed. 
 
 G, 
 Maj. 4th Cav. 
 
 General A also receives a message from the division commander 
 that Reds are advancing east through Mummasburg, and that the 
 York Turnpike is free from enemy except small patrols. 
 Required : 
 
 1. General A's estimate of the situation. 
 
 2. General A's orders. 
 
 Note. — Weather fair; temperature 48°; Little Conewago Creek 
 not fordable. 
 
[197] 
 
 STUDENTS' ERRORS AND INSTRUCTOR'S CRITICISMS. 
 
 1st Solution. 
 
 Takes up a position in readiness as follows: The artillery just 
 north of hill 593, and obtains firing data from that position and 
 also from hill 562; the 1st Inf. north of hill 562, preparing its 
 position for defense ; 
 
 the 2nd & 3d Inf. in mass just north of ridge R. F. Weaver — 
 Hill 593, preparing for defense, 2d Inf. from 593 500 yds. to east, 
 3d Inf. from 593 800 yds. to west. 
 
 Comments: "Enough consideration has not been given to the 
 possible march of enemy via Square Corner-Store or toward 606. 
 
 I think the position is too far to the west ; the enemy will have 
 chance to reach hill 609 W vicinity and interpose between Gen. A 
 and the Little Conewago. It is doubtful if Gen. A can accomplish 
 his mission if he waits very long at the position selected. 
 
 I cannot see how Gen. A is going to get his own brigade across 
 the Little Conewago. 
 
 The advance guard will have to retrace its steps to reach its 
 position." 
 
 States in order: "1. A strong hostile force of all arms camped 
 2 miles east of Barlow last evening * * * *," 
 
 Comment: "This probably has already been made known in 
 march order." 
 
 Uses engineers to assist infantry in preparing position. 
 
 Comment: "No Engineers." 
 
 2nd Solution. 
 
 Takes up a position in readiness as follows: 
 
 the artillery on north end 609 ; 
 
 two battalions 1st Inf. on an east and west line south of orchard 
 at 606, and prepare their position ; 
 
 one battalion and M.G.Pl. to occupy & prepare for defense the 
 grove at 614; the rest of the infantry to form in column of masses 
 about 400 yds. south of Brush Run S.H. 
 
 Comments : "I think the principal objection to holding the 614 
 position is the exposed ground that you would have to retreat 
 over. 
 
 The manner in which Gen. A proposed to hold the line 614-655, 
 m case of attack, should have been discussed more fully in estimate. 
 
[198] 
 
 How will 3d Bn. 1st Inf. act in case of attack? Will it retire or 
 be reinforced? 
 
 Will the whole line from west of 606 to 614 be reinforced in case 
 of attack by right flank? 
 
 Amb. Co. should go farther east." (than 552) 
 
 "Assuming that the red artillery could open fire at 9:15 A. M. 
 as computed, would it not be better to have most of your command 
 concentrated behind 609 hill? The last regiment of blues would 
 at this time be the only one in the open as it would not have had 
 time to reach hill 609." 
 
 Orders: "The Artillery Reserves (Combat train) will be at 
 disposal of Commanding Officer 1st Bn. 5th F.A." 
 
 Comment: "This order is not necessary as unless otherwise 
 ordered the reserves are always at the disposal of Artillery 
 Comdr." 
 
 Speaks of prolonging line of 1st Inf. eastward to abrupt slope 
 in the hillside. 
 
 Comment: "Rather indefinite." 
 
 3d Solution. 
 
 Takes up a position in readiness south of Cedarridge, the artil- 
 lery halting there and selecting positions on hills 609 & 612, & 
 getting firing data to include hills 566, 567, 613, & 611, and the 
 ridge west of them. 
 
 The 1st Inf. to prepare a position on the nose about 100 yds. 
 south of 606, and occupy it with one battalion, placing the other 
 two battalions in the orchard east of 606 in reserve. 
 
 The 2d Inf. to prepare a position on hill 612 and occupy it 
 in like manner, with reserve in the orchard. 
 
 The 3d Inf. to remain in reserve in the small ravine between 
 587 & 552. 
 
 Comments: "Decision (in estimate) not stated separately. 
 
 I think the regiments are separated too much. Would have 
 preferred to see only 2 bns. committed to the line with the 2j 
 regiments massed. 
 
 The artillery, I think, should be east of hill 609. In fact I think 
 that all the troops would be better oif east of Brush Run, and that 
 hill 612 should not be held except for a short delaying action with 
 not more than 1 bn. & 1 btry. arty. 
 
[199] 
 
 As to preparing artillery data to fire on 566-567, 1 think that if 
 the attack comes in that direction that Blue troops will have to be 
 interposed there. 
 
 Also bridge 481 W should not be destroyed for same reason." 
 
 Comment on reply to criticisms : "I think that the assumption 
 of the red cavalry being superior is not correct. 
 
 If the red force marches north from Boneauville it is my opinion 
 that they will be too late to interfere with march of the division. 
 The division will not have to make a wide detour, and will not have 
 to use a northern crossing. 
 
 I do not think Gen. A was justified in destroying bridge 481 W 
 even if he thought his principal stand was to be at hill 612. He 
 could not tell yet whether or not it would be needed by his own 
 infantry or cavalry." 
 
 4th Solution. 
 
 States that hill 612 can be reached by Gen. A's command about 
 the same time the enemy reaches Boneauville. 
 
 Comment: "The head of main body of Gen. A can reach hill 
 612 in about 30 minutes while it will take about 1 hour for head 
 of hostile main body to reach Boneauville marching at same rate." 
 
 Further comments : "I think that more consideration might be 
 given to the possibility of an advance by Square Corner toward 
 606 or Breashner. 
 
 Giving this route due weight would I think force the position in 
 readiness further east. 
 
 Decision should be expressed in full covering use of different 
 arms." 
 
 States in order: "Our division marching on York Turnpike 
 towards ABBOTTSTOWN * * * *." 
 
 Comment: "Omit already known." 
 
 Places order for artillery under paragraph 3 (c). 
 
 Comment: "This should come before order for infantry." 
 
 Writes in order: "The Division Commander informs that 
 
 * * * * jj 
 
 "No other hostile cavalry has been seen." 
 
 «* * * * g^2 Hill from which he can command artillery 
 positions from which the enemy may fire on York Turnpike." 
 These sentences are underscored. 
 
[200] 
 
 Comment: "Orders too long. The parts underscored might 
 be omitted, with slight alterations." 
 
 Takes up position in readiness as follows : 
 
 the artillery in mass, under cover, near positions selected for 
 it on or near hill 612 ; 
 
 the 1st Inf. in column of masses west of orchard southwest of 
 Cedarridge, with one company and the mounted scouts at 606 ; 
 
 the 2d Inf. in same formation east of orchard mentioned; 
 
 the 3d Inf. in same formation north of orchard mentioned, with 
 one company and the mounted, scouts at hill 562; all facing south. 
 
 Comments : "The position should be further east. This valley 
 of Brush Run has to be crossed eventually, and it is better to do 
 so while the enemy is distant. The massed position of Inf. seems 
 somewhat exposed. 
 
 Arty, will have a hard time getting away if it once becomes 
 engaged in place designated. Better position hill 609 as given 
 in order. 
 
 Nothing in front of massed troops except mounted scouts 
 (except cavalry). 
 
 Referring to note after order, it was expected that Gen. A 
 should discuss the measures he would take depending upon prob- 
 able course of enemy. 
 
 This paper fails to give the probable line of resistance to be 
 taken up by Gen. A." 
 
 5th Solution. 
 
 Takes a position in readiness as follows : 
 
 the artillery near 552; 
 
 one battalion and M.G.Plat. 1st Inf. intrenched at hill 566; 
 
 one battalion 1st Inf. intrenched from 594 to 614; 
 
 the rest of the infantry in mass near 552. 
 
 Comments: "If one bn. inf. is placed at 614, I do not think 
 the other one should be sent as far as hill 566. 
 
 With the position in readiness at 522, it would be out of hand at 
 566. In my opinion it should go not further than 606. 
 
 With the battalion intrenched at 566 the cavalry should not be 
 ordered to fall back on 481. 
 
 Arty, better at hill 609." 
 
[201] 
 
 6th Solution. 
 
 States : "By 9 :00 the western column will be about Gallagher 
 Farm." 
 
 Comment : "A little too fast I think." 
 
 Proposes to place a battery in the vicinity of 593 to rake west 
 side of ridge 612-614-601 if enemy approaches along this west 
 slope. 
 
 Comment : "This disposition perfectly proper in order to effect 
 a short delay." 
 
 States artillery will prepare certain positions. 
 
 Comment. "State here where artillery will form in readiness." 
 
 Further comments: "Cavalry patrols should not be diverted 
 to left flank; the duty of cavalry at present too important; use 
 mtd. scouts. 
 
 The 3d Inf. scouts would be better used west of Little Cone- 
 wago for present, (than towards Irishtown) 
 
 With no Engrs. the 2d Inf. would probably have been used to 
 prepare the trenches south of 606." 
 
 7th Solution. 
 
 Takes a position in readiness as follows: 
 
 the firing batteries under cover in ravine west of 606 ; 
 
 the 1st Inf. (less 2d Bn.) on hills 567-566, intrenched; the 2d 
 Bn. 1st Inf. near 614, intrenched; 
 
 the rest of the infantry in mass in rear of the artillery west 
 of 605 ; 
 
 the artillery combat train after issue of ammunition to cross the 
 river and await orders near 481 W; 
 
 the ambulance company halted at 552. 
 
 Comments: "I don't think the 2 bns. should be sent to 567 
 hill. Too many troops committed before direction of advance is 
 known, and they are too widely separated. Dispersion. 
 
 Arty, combat train should not be sent across creek. 
 
 Amb. Co. should go east of hill 609. 
 
 Arty, should be somewhat nearer its positions for firing. I 
 think hill 609 affords better firing positions considering every- 
 thing. 
 
 Should be some intrenchments 606." 
 
[202] 
 
 8th Solution. 
 
 Takes position in readiness behind the ridge 627-613-611 near 
 598. The cavalry continues its reconnaissance. The artillery 
 takes a position in readiness north of 598-601 road, reconnoiters 
 for positions on both flanks of 627-611 ridge and secures firing 
 data. 
 
 Comments : "I think the effect of an advance by enemy through 
 Sq. Corner has not been sufficiently considered. If one column 
 goes that way Gen. A's left flank will be turned and his retreat 
 menaced & perhaps cut off. 
 
 The position in readiness too far south. There will be practi- 
 cally a rencontre fight, with the advantage on side of superior 
 numbers. 
 
 Arty, positions rather far to front to expect to retire in safety." 
 
 9th Solution. 
 
 States : "In case the Two Taverns column comes towards 598 
 sometime before the Germantown column comes up the Square 
 Corner-Store road Gen. A may be able to resist him from the 614 
 ridge, and then falling back to the vicinity of 606 or Kohler S.H. 
 take a position to resist the Germantown column coming via 
 Store." 
 
 Comment: "Would suffer from Arty, fire on the heights to 
 south. I think any force on hill 612 would have to fall back to 
 north. Hence it should be a very small delaying force." 
 
 Orders : "The cavalry from the vicinity of F. X. NOEL will 
 keep touch etc." 
 
 Comment: "I object to this limitation of movement of cav." 
 
 Gives orders for infantry scouts in same paragraph with orders 
 for cavalry. 
 
 Comment: "Better under heading for infantry." 
 
 Directs the order in which firing data for the artillery will be 
 prepared. 
 
 Comment: "A little too much detail." 
 
 Issues order at 8 :30 A. M. 
 
 Comment: "I think by this time 8:30 Gen. A should be able 
 to send out a few covering troops." 
 
 Assembles the artillery east of 552 and the ambulance company 
 north of 552. 
 
[203] 
 
 Comments: "The artillery would be better east of hill 609. 
 Of course that would require troops at 606. 
 
 Anyway the artillery reserves (combat train) & Amb. Co. should 
 be east of hill 609. Otherwise there would be great congestion 
 in vicinity of Brush Run S.H. 
 
 Directs the cavalry to send detachments to destroy bridges at 
 Topper Mill, east of 519, and at 492 W, and to obstruct the stone 
 bridge at 481 W. 
 
 Comments : "I think the cavalry should be diverted in no way 
 from its task in front of enemy. Mtd. Scouts can disable bridges 
 as far as possible. Arty, fire will take care of rest. 481 W. 
 bridge should be left undisturbed for present." 
 
 10th Solution. 
 
 Orders the cavalry :"**** and will reconnoitre to the 
 east through MARYSVILLE Sr to the west through GRANITE 
 HILL keeping in touch with the rear guard of the division.'* and 
 adds that the enemy will be delayed "as much as possible." 
 
 Comment: "I think the underscored might be omitted." 
 
 Fails to state : "Conditions of march cease." 
 
 Orders: "* * * * Intrenchments will be constructed on 
 ridge north of 555, extending about 400 yds. on each side of the 
 road, by 1st Inf. on east & 2d Inf. on west." 
 
 Comment: "Trenches west of road would not be very useful 
 on acct. of woods." 
 
 Orders: "The 3d Inf. will intrench the southwest corner of 
 woods north of 606 * * * *." 
 
 Comments : "Might well be continued south of orchard." 
 
 "The 3d Infantry will do well to get to position before being 
 fired on by enemy's arty. Will have no time for intrenching." 
 
 Orders scouts of 1st & 2d Inf. to patrol the roads toward the 
 enemy. 
 
 Comment : "I think that hill 612 should have been specifically 
 mentioned to the scouts to be taken care of." 
 
 Further comments : "Some attempt to disable bridge at 492 W 
 could be ordered to advantage * *." 
 
 "Trenches west of road north of 555 no use." 
 
 11th Solution. 
 Orders 1 battalion and machine gun platoon 1st Inf. to pre- 
 pare hills 567 & 566 for defense, and 1 company and machine gun 
 
[204] 
 
 platoon 2d Inf. to intrench along the south edge of the woods 
 near the country road north of 606. Remainder of the infantry 
 masses in the open woods near the country road half way between 
 Flickender's and the main road. 
 
 Orders artillery combat train to cross the Little Conewago at 
 522 and await orders. 
 
 Orders infantry combat trains to remain with their battalions. 
 
 Comments: "As it appears that the line at 606 will have to 
 be held in any case, and there is a possibility that 566 & 567 may 
 not have to be held, it seems to-me that a better arrangement would 
 have 1 Co. Inf. at 567 and 1 Bn. Inf. at 606." 
 
 "I believe it would be better not to order the arty, combat 
 train east of the creek. This with Inf. combat trains are practi- 
 cally all the wagons with the column, and there will be little delay 
 in crossing bridges." 
 
 "The order 'The combat wagons of the infantry will remain 
 with their battalions, is now necessary. They will remain there 
 anyway until emptied when they will be sent away to be refilled." 
 
 "Orders might be condensed somewhat, parts underlined have 
 already been made known to command in march order." 
 
 Comment on reply to criticism : "A reading of Von Alten does 
 not change my criticism in regard to superfluous parts of order." 
 
 12th Solution. 
 
 Comments: "I think that covering troops should be sent to 
 606 — say 1 bn. with orders to intrench." 
 
 "The student did well to put in note explanatory of bn. at 
 g22 * * * *, ^ny intention to hold 612 ridge is considered 
 a mistake." 
 
 13th Solution. 
 
 Comment : Orders in Par. 3 for the cavalry, "Should be under 
 heading 'a';" for the artillery, "Should be heading 'b';" for the 
 infantry, "Should be under heading 'c'." 
 
 Orders the artillery (less combat train) to halt in close forma- 
 tion in the angle of roads south of 552. 
 
 Comments : "Estimate very good. Except the consideration of 
 the 'get away' from position at hill 612. 
 
 If the artillery (whole bn.) for instance should occupy a posi- 
 tion on north slope of hill 612, and stay there long enough for 
 
 I 
 
[205] 
 
 enemy's artillery to get a position between Sq. Corner and Gallag- 
 her, it would suffer terribly in crossing the country east of Brush 
 Run in retiring. 
 
 If 612 is held at all it should be only a small force effecting a 
 short delay, and then falling back northward." 
 
 "I think the Bn. of Arty, would be better placed east of hill 
 609." 
 
 Orders scouts of 3d Inf. to keep touch with division. 
 
 Comment : "That all of scouts of 1 reg. are not needed to keep 
 up communication with division." 
 
 14th Solution. 
 
 Comments: "Estimate not as complete as it should be. 
 Especially courses of action open to enemy, and discussion of 
 plans of action open to Gen. A." 
 
 "Scouts should be used for reconnaissance and destroying or 
 disabling bridges." 
 
 "Bridges should be designated." (for destruction). 
 
 "Hill 612 should have mtd. scouts or a patrol on it." 
 
 "Bridge 481 W. should not be destroyed yet." 
 
 15th Solution. 
 
 Comment: "Estimate not a complete discussion of the plans 
 of Gen. A." 
 
 Takes up a position in readiness near Cedarridge. 
 
 Comment : "I think that the infantry and artillery are massed 
 too far west — will suffer badly if they try to hold seriously 612." 
 
 "The bn. of infantry sent south of 606 would better stop at 
 606." 
 
 "The artillery would be better off at hill 609." 
 
 Orders cavalry to delay enemy without becoming seriously en- 
 gaged, and to retire rapidly. 
 
 Comments : "An error I think ; let him become engaged as 
 much as he thinks advisable." 
 
 "Cavalry should not be directed to retire rapidly." 
 
 Orders artillery to fire on enemy's artillery as they go into 
 position on 627 & 611 Ridge. 
 
 Comment: "Unnecessary." (to order this). 
 
[206] 
 
 AN APPROVED SOLUTION. 
 
 General A's mission is to act as flank guard and cover the 
 march of the division. With this end in view he has marched out 
 with a small advance guard, to take up a position from which 
 he can protect the division while it crosses the Little Conewago 
 Creek. 
 
 If there is no interference from the enemy to the southward he 
 will resume his march as flank guard crossing the Creek at Aiken- 
 rode or 481W. 
 
 He has been considering how he can best cover the crossing at 
 DiehPs Mill and other critical points along the route of march 
 of the division. The trains and sanitary troops of the division 
 are marching on a road to the north and their safety is assured. 
 
 The only carriages with the division are those of the artillery 
 and signal troops, and the combat trains of the infantry, so that 
 the division proper is very mobile. 
 
 General A notes that the corner 526, on the York Turnpike, 
 is almost the only danger point along the route of march of divi- 
 sion west of the Little Conewago. This point is exposed to long 
 range artillery fire from the heights northeast of Boneauville, the 
 range being about 3 miles. 
 
 However, if the enemy can be kept off these heights until the 
 artillery of the division has passed 526, there need be little concern 
 felt, for the marching infantry can find safety easily by leaving 
 the roads and marching through the fields. 
 
 General A calculates that the head of the artillery of the division 
 will reach 526 by 8:15 a. m. and that it should be completely by 
 that point at 9:00 o'clock or a little later. 
 
 Up to the present time information in regard to the hostile 
 force to the southwest is limited to that furnished by the division 
 commander, and which is stated by him to be reliable. 
 
 The fact that the march of the enemy was continued into the 
 evening indicates that he has a definite objective, and General A 
 expects that the hostile march may be resumed early this morning. 
 
 It is for the purpose of gaining contact and ascertaining the 
 direction of march of the Red force that the Blue squadron is 
 sent south through Boneauville. 
 
 It is 8:15 a. m. when the message is received from the cavalry 
 commander. 
 
[207] 
 
 This message brings definite information of the enemy's main 
 body, and also indicates that Major C's cavalry is able, for the 
 present anyway, to more than hold its own with the hostile cavalry. 
 
 By means of a surprise or by an energetic attack it has driven 
 the hostile cavalry back for three quarters of a mile and has 
 located the heads of two columns of Red troops. 
 
 General A hopes that his cavalry may retain the advantage 
 it has gained, and later send him additional information of the 
 enemy's movements. 
 
 In the meantime he will have to consider the situation and act 
 promptly. 
 
 His mission remains unchanged. The forces reported as moving 
 northward are in all probability identical with the division which 
 bivouacked east of Barlow. It is probably weak in cavalry as no 
 other force has been seen to the east and the York Turnpike is 
 clear. 
 
 No artillery is reported yet but this is due to lack of oppor- 
 tunity to observe. 
 
 The head of the western column should now be north of 529 
 if no change of direction has been made. The route of march of 
 the eastern column is in doubt. If it proceeded on the road 
 Germantown-St. Luke's Church the point should be near 610; if 
 on the 546-Sweet Home S. H. road the point should be near 531. 
 
 The objective of the hostile force is evidently the retreating 
 Blue division, and there is probably cooperation with the Red 
 forces now reported advancing through Mummasburg. This lat- 
 ter force is too far distant to interfere with General A's plans, 
 but he will keep himself informed of its movements, through the 
 rear guard of the division. 
 
 The question is, which way will the southern force direct its 
 march. The columns may move east through Square Corner and 
 Whitehall with a view to crossing the Little Conewago before 
 striking at the retreating column; or they may continue their 
 present movement north to deliver their blow west of the Little 
 Conewago. 
 
 In the latter case, which is the more probable one, the Red 
 commander has several routes of advance to choose from. 
 
 He may close his columns in together and send the western one 
 through Boneauville-598, and the eastern one through Sweet 
 
[208] 
 
 Home S. H.-Stopper-614, or he may move the western columns on 
 one of those roads and the eastern column via Square Corner- 
 Store. 
 
 He may form his troops on the high ground between Boneau- 
 ville and Square Corner and then push the attack to the north 
 along the ridges. By holding well to the east and moving toward 
 Store or 606 he will menace the Blue line of retreat and at same 
 time be in a better position to interrupt the crossing of the divi- 
 sion at Diehl's Mill. 
 
 The Reds are in friendly territory and doubtless have informa- 
 tion as to the movements of the Blue division. 
 
 General A wishes to make further reconnaissance before choos- 
 ing a position. So he lets the column continue its march, sends 
 for his infantry colonels, and directs Major B, 5th F. A., to make 
 an artillery reconnaissance. 
 
 General A notes the ridge formed by the hills 627-613-611. If 
 he should attempt to occupy this ridge to repel an advance on his 
 right, the chances are that he will become involved in a rencontre 
 fight and his force would have to deploy from the column of march 
 directly into the fight. The advance of the enemy through Square 
 Corner would also interpose between him and Little Conewago 
 Creek. 
 
 A position in readiness at 552 cross roads with a view to holding 
 later either ridge 614-612 or the 609 hill interests him more. 
 
 If then the attack comes from the direction of Boneauville he 
 might hold a line extending from the orchard on 612 hill around 
 the edge of the woods at 614, later falling back to hill 609. 
 
 An advance by the enemy through F. X. Noel or 612 would 
 endanger this line, though, and only a narrow front could be 
 formed across the ridge south of 614. General A believes that he 
 would be forced quickly out of this position and that his command 
 would suffer severely while crossing the valley of Brush Run. This 
 valley is about 1200 yards wide and except for the line of trees 
 along the run is exposed to fire from the heights to the south. 
 
 A position to the east of hill 609 would seem to offer more ad- 
 vantages. It affords cover for the troops; an intrenched line 
 across the saddle near 606 would delay an advance along the 
 ridge from Square Corner; while if the attack should involve an 
 
[209] 
 
 attempt to envelope his right an opposing line could be interposed 
 in a north and south direction along the western slope of the hill. 
 
 If the movement is toward Store troops can be placed quickly 
 on hills 566 and 567. 
 
 The Blue artillery will be able to cover effectively all bridges 
 as far south as 519. 
 
 From this position also the command can retire under cover 
 across the Little Conewago. 
 
 If the hostile force crosses the creek at Topper Mill or farther 
 south the Blue brigade can cross the creek quickly and take posi- 
 tion on the high ground near Irishtown. 
 
 The open ground behind the woods northeast of 606 will be a 
 suitable place for the infantry to mass. 
 
 The support of the advance guard by marching at the rate of 
 3 miles per hour will reach 606 by 8:45 a. m. ; the head of the 
 main body by 8 :55 a. m. ; and the rear of infantry of main body 
 by 9 :25 a. m. 
 
 At 9 :25 a. m. the head of the enemy's main body probably would 
 not be farther north than the line Boneauville-Square Corner. It 
 is possible, though, that it may be preceded by artillery from the 
 advance guard. 
 
 The question now comes up, shall the hill 612 be held at all. 
 The artillery commander reports that the northern slope of this 
 hill offers a good artillery position sufficiently far to the front to 
 make the enemy deploy at long ranges. Another artillery position 
 is near Flickender which is rather far to the rear for a delaying 
 action; also one west of 596 with a field of fire limited by the 
 woods ; and a position north of 555. There is room for a battery 
 in the open field on top of hill 609 but it will have a dead space to 
 the south of about 2300 yards. 
 
 General A is tempted to use an advanced position on hill 612 
 with one battalion of infantry and one battery of artillery. If 
 the enemy advances via Boneauville and Gallagher they will delay 
 him with long range fire and then withdraw via 587 and the cover 
 of the woods along Brush Run. After leaving Brush Run they 
 would be exposed for a half mile in crossing the ridge to the east 
 and might be severely punished. 
 
 As an alternative to this General A may place one battery "in 
 observation" in the bare field on top of hill 609, with orders to 
 
[210] 
 
 delay the enemy at long range and later fall back to the position 
 behind ridge near Flickender. The cavalry then must fall back 
 toward hill 612 delaying the advance of the enemy as much as 
 possible. 
 
 General A thinks this course preferable. 
 
 His decision is to take up a position in readiness near 606; to 
 have his cavalry delay enemy and furnish information, falling 
 back toward hill 612. 
 
 Infantry will mass north of woods north of road 606-555, except 
 two battalions 1st Infantry, which will intrench line across saddle 
 at 606; mounted scouts, 1st Infantry, to Store and disable bridge 
 at 492W; mounted scouts of the 2d Infantry to hill 612 to observe 
 to south and west. One battery artillery "in observation" top of 
 hill 609 ; remainder in readiness near Flickender. Ambulance com- 
 pany to Kohler S. H. 
 
 General A at 8 :30 a. m. has issued the following orders, which, 
 if written, would be as follows : 
 
 Detachment 1st Blue Division, 
 Field Orders Cross Roads near Brush Run S. H., 
 
 No. — . 13 Dec. '11, 8:30 A. M. 
 
 1. A hostile division weak in cavalry is advancing in two 
 columns from the southwest. Heads of columns at 7:50 A. M. 
 were at GERMANTOWN and TWO TAVERNS. 
 
 Our cavalry has driven back the hostile cavalry to ST. LUKE'S 
 CHURCH. 
 
 Our division will be across the LITTLE CONEWAGO at 11 
 o'clock. 
 
 2. This detachment will take a position in readiness near this 
 place to cover the withdrawal of the division. The duties of the 
 advance guard will now cease. 
 
 3. (a) The cavalry will delay the march of the enemy and 
 promptly report his movements. If the enemy continue through 
 BONEAUVILLE cavalry will fall back toward hill 612. 
 
 (b) One battery of artillery will be "in observation" on hill 
 609, prepared to fire at long range in direction of BONEAU- 
 VILLE and SQUARE CORNER. 
 
 Remainder of artillery in readiness near FLICKENDER. 
 
 Firing data will be prepared for positions near FLICKENDER 
 and north of 555. 
 
[211] 
 
 (c) The 1st Infantry (less 1 bn.) will intrench and occupy a 
 line from the house 300 yards northwest of 606, extending south- 
 east along southern edge of orchard to road 606-555. 
 
 Remainder of infantry in mass north of woods north of road 
 606-555, facing south with 3d Bn. 1st Inf. right, 2d Inf. center, 
 3d Inf. left. 
 
 Mounted scouts of 1st Infantry, under an officer, at STORE 
 will observe to south, and disable bridge at 492W. 
 
 Mounted scouts of 2d Infantry, under an officer, at hill 612 
 will observe to west and south. 
 
 4. 1st Ambulance Company will wait at KOHLER S. H. 
 
 5. I shall be at 606. 
 
 A, 
 Brig. General. 
 Verbally to Regimental and Artillery Commanders and Staff. 
 By aide to Cavalry Commander. Copy to Division Commander. 
 General A will send an officer with orderlies to 584 York Turn- 
 pike to connect with division and request that telephone line be 
 established to 606. 
 
COURSE IN TACTICS— FART U. 
 
 Map Problem No. 8 — Advance Guaed Action. 
 (See Gettjsburg-Boneauville sheets, 3" map.) 
 
 War has just been declared between Pennsylvania, Red, and 
 Mar^^land, Blue. 
 
 A Blue force of all arms, concentrating at Westminster, has 
 thrown its 1st Division forward on Gettysburg via Littlestown 
 with orders to seize this impprtant place. The Blues know the 
 main Red force is concentrating at Carlisle and an inferior force 
 of all arms at Chambersburg. Through spies and northern papers 
 the Blues have learned that the Chambersburg Red force, con- 
 sisting of about two brigades of infantry, a regiment of field 
 artillery, three or four regiments of cavalry, and one or two 
 batteries of horse artillery, is soon to advance on Gettysburg. Up 
 to June 30th no forward movement had been made by this force. 
 It is to forestall the expected movement that the 1st Blue Division 
 has been ordered forward. The main Blue force will be ready to 
 move July 2d. 
 
 On the morning of July 1, 1911, the frontier is crossed. Briga- 
 dier General A, in command of an advance guard consisting of the 
 1st Infantr}^ Brigade, 1st Sq. 1st Cavalry (less 2 troops), 1st Bn. 
 1st Field Artillery, Co. A Engineers, and Amb. Co. No. 1, pre- 
 ceded the Division Commander, who at the head of the main body, 
 is following 3 miles in rear of the reser^'e. 
 
 At 8 a. m. the infantry point is about to enter Littlestown 
 when General A, at the head of the support, receives the following 
 message : 
 
 Advance Cavalry, 
 Gidd, Penn., 
 IJuly, '11, 7:40 A.M. 
 Advance Guard Commander: 
 
 On approaching GERMANTOWN was fired upon by dis- 
 mounted men from edge of woods 300 yds. west of SCHWARTZ. 
 Am unable to advance. Will remain in observation. 
 
 A, 
 Major, Comd'g. 
 
 [212] 
 
[213] 
 
 General A cxnitmiies to advance and on readung LittJestown at 
 8^ a. m. recehres the following messages in quick soccessio n : 
 
 OScer^s Patrol, 
 Mt. Vernon S. H. on Hanover Boad, 
 1 Julj, *11, 7:35 A. M. 
 Adrance Gaard Conmiander: 
 
 Red cavalry patrols were seen on BOXEAUVTLLE-TWO 
 TAVERN S a^d LOW DUTCH roads. The HAXOl^'ER road is 
 fne of Reds. Will reconnoiter towards BALTOIORE PIKE. 
 
 B, 
 Ueat. 
 Qflker's Patrvl, 
 
 little Boond Top, 
 lJalj,11,6^0A.lL 
 To Advance Guard Comrnander: 
 
 LITTLESTOWX-BABIX)W-TANEYTOWX roads free of 
 the enemv. Hostile cavalrj patrols observed oorering roads sooth 
 of BALTIMORE PIKE. No troops on roads west and sootfawest 
 of GETTYSBLTIG. Bemain in obserration. 
 
 C, 
 Ueot. 
 Adranee Caralrj, 
 Gidd, 
 IJnly, 11, 8305 A.1L 
 To Advance Gaard Connnander: 
 
 Tlie Reds are in force in oar front. Line crosses tnnqiike just 
 east of GERMAXTOWX. The north flank extends to tibe grore 
 southeast of :MEYER and the south flank to within about 600 
 yards of B. D. SXYDEIL Battery of Bed BL A- was 
 op the ravine just north of W. YOOST. I will ccmtimie to 
 noiter. A^ 
 
 IfAJor, Cond'g. 
 
 Xo report has readied General A from the independent cmwrnhj 
 (1st Cavalry, l^s 2 troops) which had been sent to the north to 
 coiner the crossings of the Conewago and observe towards Cailide. 
 
 General A gadlops to the front where he consohs Major A and 
 looks over the ground. He observes tibe enemy ocn^ying a bnAea 
 line extending in general as Major A had reported, parts of idiidh 
 are r*f hig prepared for defc 
 
[214] 
 
 At 9:00 a. m. General A rejoins the support (1st Inf. and Co. 
 A Engrs.) the head of which is approaching Ash Grove S. H. 
 The head of the reserve is just passing the Littlestown-Lefevre 
 road marching in the following order: 2d Inf. (less 2 bns.), 1st 
 Bn. 1st Field Artillery (fighting batteries only), 2 bns, 2d Inf., 
 3d Inf., Artillery combat trains, Amb. Co. No. 1. 
 Required : 
 
 1. General A's estimate of the situation. 
 
 2. His messages and orders. 
 
 STUDENTS' ERRORS AND INSTRUCTOR'S CRITICISMS. 
 
 1st Solution. 
 Decides to attack, enveloping enemy's left. 
 
 States: "Art. to take position near 575 — to come up and join 
 support at once & open on enemy's art." 
 
 Comment: "Arty. Commander should be permitted to select 
 his target Sz get other firing data at this stage of action. May not 
 see Red Arty. Better stop strengthening of line as soon as pos- 
 sible." 
 
 Sends this message: 
 
 "To Commanding Genl. 
 1st Blue Div. 
 Will attack as soon as reserve comes up, envelop- 
 ing enemy's left. Head of reserve now at Littles- 
 town. 
 
 A Comdg." 
 
 Comment: "Better give more information so Div. Commander 
 will know more of situation." 
 
 States: "C. O. of Cav. * * * * are with him." (Gen. 
 A.) 
 
 Comment: "Major 'A' is at front." 
 
 In Par. 1 of order fails to mention main body. 
 
 Comment : "Supporting trs. should be mentioned." 
 
 Orders artillery to 575. 
 
 Comment : "Too far forward. Too much time before opening) 
 fire." 
 
[215] 
 
 Orders : "The 2nd Inf. will envelop the enemy's left — right of 
 line extending to 1st house north of 575." 
 
 Comment : "Better indicate line of approach under cover." 
 
 Orders: "The Mounted Scouts 1st Inf. will reconnoitre to- 
 wards TRUTLE'S and SNYDER'S." 
 
 Comment: "Cover left." 
 
 Orders: "The Mounted Scouts 2d Inf. will reconnoitre thru 
 BONEAUVILLE towards FINKS, MT. VERNON S. H. and 
 587." 
 
 Comment : "This duplicates duty of cavalry." 
 
 Orders: "The 1st Amb. Co. will take station for the present 
 at the house about 200 yds. south of GIDD'S." 
 
 Comment: "Too far forward." 
 
 Orders : "Reports will reach me at GIDD'S." 
 
 Comment : "Can't see well from Gidd's, 
 
 2d Solution. 
 
 Decides to attack the enemy, enveloping his left flank. 
 
 States in Par. 1 : "Our Div. continues its advance on GETTYS- 
 BURG." 
 
 Comment : "Main body is 3 mi. in rear." 
 
 Places artillery west of 575. 
 
 Comment: "Arty, too far forward. Would be much delayed 
 in getting into action." 
 
 States: "(b) The 1st Inf. will continue its advance along the 
 BALTIMORE PIKE deploying * * * * north & south of 
 555." 
 
 "(c) The 2d Inf. will move via ASH GROVE SCHOOL 
 HOUSE-FARM ROADS-544-575-613 and thence attack the 
 enemy's left flank." 
 
 Comment : "This movement would be under fire Red Arty." 
 
 "Too great extension to the north." 
 
 "Could not use highway near 573." 
 
 States: "(d) The 3d Inf. together with dismounted Engineers 
 will constitute th*e reserve. They will follow the 2d Inf. to Bair 
 Sz there await further instructions." 
 
 Comment: "The main body will be delayed and you leave it 
 partially uncovered." 
 
[216] 
 
 States: "(x) The mounted detachment Co. A, Engineers and 
 the Mounted Scouts of the 1st, 2d & 3d Inf. will be assembled at 
 once at ASH GROVE SCHOOL HOUSE under an officer of the 
 1st Inf. and will cover our right flank." 
 
 Comment : "Don't use special troops unless necessary." 
 
 3d Solution. 
 
 Decides to envelope the enemy's right. 
 
 States: "Frontal attack — impossible." 
 
 Comment : "Not at all impossible. It could succeed in all like- 
 lihood if well delivered." 
 
 States: "He orders the artillery to push forward to its posi- 
 tion as soon as covered by infantry." 
 
 Comment : "Not in (3b) of order below." 
 
 Further comments: "Should state where main body is, — i. e. 
 that remainder of Blue Div. is 3 mi. in rear." 
 
 "Remember that the subordinates would want to know how near 
 the supporting troops are." 
 
 States: "3. (a) The 1st Sq. 1st Cav. (less two troops) will, 
 when the infantry attack commences, withdraw to the right flank. 
 Communication will be maintained with the 1st Div." 
 
 Comment: "This done by mtd. orderlies." 
 
 Continues: «* * * * An officer's patrol will be sent to 
 gain contact with any Red force approaching via GETTYS- 
 BURG." 
 
 Comment : "There is none such reported." 
 
 Reply to comment: "Knowing the force was approaching 
 from Chambersburg, it seemed to me to be only common prudence 
 to ascertain where it was, if it was coming my way." 
 
 Comment on reply: ««**** think, however, it might 
 prove misleading by giving the idea the Reds might be reinforced 
 soon." 
 
 Places artillery south of Baltimore Pike and north of Gouker's. 
 
 Comment : "Difficult to reach this position and to find observa- 
 tion stations. Take valuable time." 
 
 Reply to comment: "I do not see why it would be difficult to 
 reach, it is defiladed from Germantown after passing crossroads 
 573, and the road is good. A good observation station can be ob- 
 tained on the ridge in front." 
 
[217] 
 
 Comment on reply: "Impossible to advance under Red Arty, 
 fire along turnpike. The road is exposed in parts." 
 
 Orders: "(c) The 1st Inf. will take position along PLUM 
 CREEK, right resting on the BALTIMORE TURNPIKE, and 
 advance with the 2nd Inf. I will send an order for this advance." 
 
 Comment: "Omit the last sentence." 
 
 Order continues: "The 2nd Inf. will move southwest via D. 
 SPANGLER'S and attack the Red right flank immediately upon 
 arriving in position." 
 
 Reply to comment about omitting last sentence: "I desired 
 to ensure that the attacks should be properly timed, so that the 
 1st Inf. would start neither too late nor too early." 
 
 Comment on reply: "Because you told them to do two things 
 viz. 1. Attack with 2nd Inf. 2. Attack when ordered. Better 
 omit the last for fear your message to attack might not be de- 
 livered." 
 
 Orders the machine guns of all three regiments via 573 to the 
 ridge west of 575. 
 
 Orders Co. A, Engrs. in reserve near Plum Creek south of Balti- 
 more Pike. 
 
 General comments : "This is a big extension to the south ; it 
 would take time, be subject to Red Arty, fire and after crossing the 
 creek would have 1000 yds. of glacis like slope to pass before 
 reaching Reds. This uncovers the front north of pike except for 
 machine guns." 
 
 "There is objection to too great dispersion of troops. General 
 A must remember that he has command of an Advance Guard, 
 must cover the Division and must not scatter." 
 
 "Not advisable to place machine guns there unsupported." 
 
 "Attacking over extreme front (counting M. Gs.) of 2600 
 yards." 
 
 "Under your order M. Gs. be of no use except in case of counter 
 attack. Better order them to 'Support the attack.' " 
 
 "If Engr. Co. is to be part of reserve it had better go with 
 reserve. Position designated is too close." 
 
 4th Solution. 
 Comment : "The terrain should be discussed." 
 Decides to send artillery forward at a trot to join the support 
 (1st Inf.) and go into action near Gouker. 
 
[218] 
 
 Comment: "Difficult place to reach. It is very close. Obser- 
 vation station hard to find. Long time getting into action." 
 
 Decides to attack enveloping enemy's right flank. The 1st Inf. 
 with its left at Gouker, and one battalion in reserve guarding its 
 left flank & supporting the artillery, to attack the enemy's right 
 flank. The 2d Inf. with its left on Baltimore Pike, and one bat- 
 talion in reserve guarding its right flank, to attack in the direction 
 of the high ground north of Germantown. 
 
 Comments: "This is really a frontal attack. Better have 1st 
 Inf. go into action north of road. Saves time and no movement 
 by flank." 
 
 "I don't like the holding out of 2 bns. to protect flanks. Seems 
 too great proportion for this purpose." 
 
 "Your formation * * * * would not give an envelop- 
 ment of Red right." 
 
 Decides to open dressing station north of road in ravine east of 
 Ash Grove S. H. 
 
 Comment: "Better wait. May find can get better place." 
 
 States in order: "1. The enemy, in force, is occupying a de- 
 fensive position across the BALTIMORE TURNPIKE." 
 
 Comment: "State what you think force is." 
 
 Further comment: "Better send mtd. scouts to left flank." 
 
 Sends message to Div. Comdr. at 9:15 A. M. 
 
 Comments : "Message should be sent at 8 :00 A. M." 
 
 "Gen. A should state his conclusions and give a little more in- 
 formation to Div. C. 0." 
 
 5th Solution. 
 
 Decides : "To have his artillery take position near Bair (near 
 613) with Co. A, Engrs. as escort, and support the attack." 
 
 Comment : "Too far. Take a long time to get into action." 
 
 "To have the 2d & 3d Inf. turn north at 573 move via 544 to 
 575." 
 
 Comment: "Be under arty, fire along turnpike." 
 
 General A "To stay near 584 until the attack begins and then be 
 with the reserve." 
 
 Comment: "Could see little of developments." 
 
 Orders : "2. The advance guard will deploy north of the BAL- 
 TIMORE TURNPIKE and attack." 
 
[219] 
 
 Comment: "This leaves a part of the line uncovered. Should 
 have troops south of turnpike." 
 
 Orders: "3. (e) The 1st Sq. 1st Cav. (less 2 troops) will 
 cover the left of the attacking line." 
 
 Comment : "And patrol to enemy's right and rear." 
 
 6th Solution. 
 
 Comment: "Not sufficient discussion of terrain or possible 
 tactical dispositions." 
 
 Orders the 1st Inf. to deploy with its left on the Baltimore 
 Turnpike near Gidd, 2d Inf. on its right. 
 
 Comment: "This leaves the main body too much uncovered. 
 Gen. A must keep the Div. covered. This is not a simple attack 
 but an advance guard action." 
 
 Orders the 2nd Inf. to march via Tollgate-558 W-564 to vicinity 
 of 613-Bair. 
 
 Comment : "This makes a march of 6000 yds. air line = 4000 
 yds. Too long." 
 
 Orders the artillery to take position near grove east of 575. 
 
 Comments : "Too long to get into position." 
 
 "Difficult to find suitable B. C. S. The observation point would 
 have to be i mile in front or 1 mi. to N. W." 
 
 7th Solution. 
 
 States : "Gen. A sends a message to the Division Commander 
 enclosing the 5 messages received from his Cavalry, by an Aide, 
 while waiting for his Infantry colonels to appear." 
 
 Comments: "Should send message when contact is first es- 
 tablished." 
 
 "Give what his (Red) strength is. Also more detail of your 
 attack plan." 
 
 Orders : "3. (a) The 1st Bn. 1st Field Artillery will trot ahead 
 and take a position in rear of the 1st Infantry south of cross 
 roads 584 and immediately open fire on the hostile firing line." 
 
 Comment : "Too close. Could not trot down highway. 573 is 
 under effective Red Arty. fire. Difficult to get good B. C. S." 
 
 Orders 1st Inf. and 1 bn. 2d Inf. to attack on north of Balti- 
 more Pike; 3d Inf. (less 3d Bn.) to attack on south of Baltimore 
 Pike; 2d Inf. (less 1 bn.) to act as reserve on the right flank using 
 
[220] 
 
 fire of position west of 575 ; 3d Bn. 3d Inf. to act as reserve and 
 escort to artillery. 
 
 Comment: "You break up organizations unnecessarily. You 
 have in reserve 2 bns. of different regiments." 
 
 "Arty, does not need an escort behind the center of the line." 
 
 Orders cavalry (less 2 trs.) to operate on the enemy's left flank. 
 
 Comment : "Should patrol to Red's left and rear." 
 
 Orders: "3. (f) The Engineers will assist in clearing any ob- 
 structions to fire and repair any damage to the road or bridges; 
 it will then move in reserve between the artillery and the highway." 
 
 Comment: "Better simply say will join the reserve. Tasks 
 you give it are vague." 
 
 Orders: "The Artillery reserve will halt near GIDD." 
 
 Comment : "Better turn over to Arty. Co." 
 
 Continues: "The combat train after issue of ammunition will 
 assemble near the artillery reserve." 
 
 Comment: "This is very close." 
 
 States in order : "The field train assumed to be in rear of the 
 Division." 
 
 Comment: "Don't put these assumptions in your order." 
 
 8th Solution. 
 
 Comment on Par. 1 of order : "Give estimated strength. Don't 
 repeat general information sent you." 
 
 Orders: "3. (e) The cavalry will continue to reconnoiter to 
 both flanks & to the enemy's rear & open communication with our 
 division." 
 
 Comment: "Should state to which flank it withdraws." 
 
 Orders: "3. (f) Co. A, Engrs. will be attached to the 1st Inf. 
 & attack with that regiment." 
 
 Comment : "Think you should not kill off the Engineers need- 
 lessly." 
 
 Orders: "4. The 1st Amb. Co. will remain for the present at 
 LITTLESTOWN." 
 
 Comment : "Too far in rear." 
 
 Comment on message to Division Commander: "Should quote 
 verbatim or attach copy of Major A's message." 
 
[221] 
 
 9th Solution. 
 
 Orders artillery to position west of AUoway Creek near 544- 
 575 road. 
 
 Comments: "No good observation station." 
 
 "Better N. W. of hill 607. Get into action sooner; has good 
 point for observing." 
 
 Orders 2d Inf. to attack from the ridge west of 575-Bair road, 
 enveloping the enemy's left flank. 
 
 Comment: "Should give more definite directions as to how to 
 reach this ridge." 
 
 Orders the reserve consisting of the 3d Inf. to cover the right 
 flank of the 2d Inf. at about 600 yds. 
 
 Comment: "Vague when you say * cover'; Does that mean 'fol- 
 low' the right flank at 600 yds?" 
 
 Orders: "3. (e) Co. A, Engrs. will cover the left flank, at first 
 from a position near S. B. FOX-GOUKER road." 
 
 Comment : "These are technical troops. Better send to reserve 
 and let 1st Inf. take care of its flank." 
 
 10th Solution. 
 
 In estimate of the situation states : "To envelope the left flank 
 of the hostile position would probably succeed but the woods near 
 Meyers would interfere with sight of the line of retreat of the 
 enemy and the line of advance is more exposed to the advance of 
 infantry than on the other flank." 
 
 "To enevelope right flank of hostile position while another at- 
 tack is made by fire from the vicinity of 547 seems better." 
 
 Comment: "But best seen from high ground west of Meyer 
 house. If the enemy can be driven out will either flank have much 
 advantage as to seeing?" 
 
 Orders: "3. (a) The 1st Bn. 1st F. A. will take position near 
 house about 200 yards south of GIDD and on west side of road 
 
 * * * * 55 
 
 Comments : "This is not so good an artillery position as some 
 north of pike. Difficult to find good observation stations es- 
 pecially for Red left." 
 
 "Long time to get in action." 
 
 "It is within 2000 yds. of Reds. Be difficult to reach it without 
 being exposed to fire. Could not come down pike." 
 
[222] 
 
 Orders 1st Inf. to attack, with its left near unimproved road 
 north of S. B. Fox, enveloping enemy's right. 
 
 Orders 2d Inf. to attack along Baltimore Pike with its right on 
 Pike. 
 
 Comment: "This leaves part of front uncovered. Certainly 
 should have something on each side of Baltimore Pike. Taking 
 your formation I think it preferable to deploy 1st Inf. along pike; 
 it then covers organizations in rear and does not have to move by 
 flank." 
 
 11th Solution. 
 
 States : "A few losses may occur coming down slope by Foxes 
 but after that blues can get within 1000 yards of red flank with- 
 out further losses from infantry fire." 
 
 "This flank therefore offers quickest results with least losses." 
 
 Comment: "But after crossing Plum Creek there is a glacis 
 slope of 1000 yds. to pass before reaching Reds." 
 
 Orders artillery to take position about 500 yards west of 544 
 and support the attack. 
 
 Comment: "Difficult to find observation station for this low 
 position. Take considerable time to open fire." 
 
 Orders 1st Inf. to move along Pike. 
 
 Comment: "Better seek covered route to north." 
 
 Orders 1st Inf. to deploy north of Baltimore Turnpike, 2d Inf. 
 south of it and to attack, enveloping the enemy's right flank. 
 
 Comment : "In general your order will result in frontal attack 
 with one regt. each side of Pike." 
 
 Sends mounted detachment of Engineers with cavalry to operate 
 on the enemy's left flank, and attack the led horses. 
 
 Comment : "Better not use Engrs. for this." 
 
 Sends Mounted Scouts of 1st, 2nd & 3d Infantry regiments to 
 operate on enemy's right flank and attack the led horses. 
 
 Comment: "You have given them a hopeless job against 3 
 regts. of cavy. A few mtd. scouts could not get near led horses. 
 Better have scouts cover your own flank and reconnoitre." 
 
 States in order: "5. I will be with the 1st Infantry." 
 
 Comment : "A position is better — say at first at hill 607." 
 
 12th Solution. 
 Sends message to Division Adjutant. 
 Comments: "Chief of Staff." 
 
[223] 
 
 "Give more in detail your dispositions as Div. Commander will 
 need information if it becomes necessary to put in reinforcements." 
 
 Deploys 1st Inf. with center on Pike. 
 
 Sends 2d Inf. via north end of hill 607 & 544 to 575 to attack, 
 enveloping enemy's left. 
 
 Comments: "This would not actually result in an envelop- 
 ment." 
 
 "Not definite as to whether or not 1st Inf. moves forward or 
 remains for the present near hill 607. Think advance should be 
 under cover to north." 
 
 Orders cavalry to operate from vicinity of Meyer. 
 
 Comment: "But Meyer is in control of Reds. Better from 
 587 W." 
 
 States: "5. Messages will reach me at GIDD'S for the pres- 
 ent." 
 
 Comment : "He can't see much at Gidd's. Better stay where he 
 is for the time, then to some place say east of 575 where he can 
 see." 
 
 13th Solution. 
 
 States that Gen. A decides to prepare to attack unless otherwise 
 ordered by Gen. X. 
 
 Comments : "He should decide to attack as soon as possible so 
 as not to delay the main body." 
 
 "The intention to attack should be clearly stated and the troops 
 moved to it vigorously and without delay." 
 
 Places reserve northwest of Gidd. 
 
 Orders artillery to position near 584. 
 
 Comment: "The artillery position is too near reserve, too 
 advanced, difficult to find good B. C. S." 
 
 Orders: "(e) Co. A, Engineers will halt in observation at hill 
 607 ; and is especially charged with the protection of the artillery 
 combat train." 
 
 Comment: "No necessity for this. Better send to reserve 
 after preparing crossing of Alloway Creek." 
 
 States that the artillery combat train is not given Arty. Comdr. 
 now as it is not safe to move it down with the batteries. 
 
 Comments : "Naturally, this would not be done if turned over." 
 
 "Combat train should report to Major A, 1st Arty." 
 
[224] 
 
 14th Solution. 
 
 Orders in Par. 2: "* * * * The duties of the advance 
 guard as such now cease." 
 
 Comment: "Better expression would be 'Conditions of march 
 now cease.' The duties of Adv. Gd. still remain to Gen. A. One 
 is to clear the road." 
 
 Orders 1st Inf. to attack with its left on Pike, & 2d Inf. to 
 attack from 300 yards south of Bair. 
 
 Comments: "This leaves half of the Red line uncovered and 
 the main Blue body somewhat exposed. The extension to the north 
 will take time. A very good formation if you were not an advance 
 guard." 
 
 "Should direct the march forward to be under cover. As you 
 have given it the infantry (1st regt. at least) would be under Red 
 artillery fire after passing 607 hill. If you mean to deploy back 
 of the hill this is too far and would take more time than to march 
 400 to 500 yds. to north, thence under cover to the ridge." 
 
 Orders artillery to covered position south of Bair. 
 
 Comment: "The artillery is within 1500 yds. of part of Red 
 line. It would be a long time getting into position. Should open 
 early, thus covering the advance and stopping the work on Red 
 line." 
 
 Orders mounted detachment Engrs. to join the cavalry which 
 takes position near woods at 561 and observes the enemy's right 
 flank. 
 
 Comment: "Why have it join the cavalry.? These are tech- 
 nical troops and it is not advisable to use them for ordinary pur- 
 poses unless there is a special reason. Here I see none since no 
 bridges are to be destroyed or repaired or other engineer work 
 done. Better send to reserve." 
 
 Comment on messages : "Names in messages should be printed." 
 
 15th Solution. 
 Comment: "Estimate not complete. Terrain should be des- 
 scribed; methods, etc." 
 
 Comment on order: 'Should state estimated strength." 
 Orders 1st Inf. to attack with its left on 526-S. B. Fox road, 
 and continues: "The 2d Inf. will advance to the attack in con- 
 junction with the 1st Inf." 
 
[225] 
 
 Comment : "Can't tell whether or not 2d Inf. is north or south 
 of 1st Inf." 
 
 Orders artillery east of Gidd's and east of Alloway creek. 
 
 Comment : "Cannot get good observation stations. Impossible 
 to tell where you mean to place them from description." 
 
 Further comment: "There is no covering force for left flank. 
 Send mtd. scouts there." 
 
 Sends message to cavalry commander. 
 
 Comment: "Gen. 'A' has just been with Major 'A'. No neces- 
 sity for this message. Should send a message when contact first 
 made to Div. Commander." 
 
 16th Solution. 
 
 States that the enemy will probably make a desperate resistance. 
 
 Comment: "Probably only a delaying action to be repeated 
 later." 
 
 Sends artillery to position south of Kuhn's giving careful direc- 
 tions. 
 
 Comments: "Arty, position is not so good as one along 573- 
 544 road, range of latter shorter. Should open at once." 
 
 "Mistake to go into details. The artillery should find a covered 
 way to position." 
 
 Orders 1st Inf. to deploy with right 500 yards south of 
 Schwartz. 
 
 Comment : "This is within 500 yds. of the enemy." 
 
 Orders 2d Inf. to extend on the left of the 1st Inf. 
 
 Comment : "This leaves part of Red front uncovered. Should 
 attack along both sides of pike." 
 
 Orders one co. with M.G. platoon as combat patrol on nose of 
 hill 500 yds. northwest of 584 to use fire of position. 
 
 Comment: "This is not strong enough. Your whole attack 
 might be stopped by vigorous action on part of enemy on this 
 flank." 
 
 Orders the mounted scouts to patrol 520-588 road. 
 
 Comment: "Better cover left as well as patrol." 
 
 Orders dressing station established at Ash Grove S. H. 
 
 Comment: "Too early. Might get better position closer in." 
 
[226] 
 
 AN APPROVED SOLUTION. 
 
 1st Requirement: 
 
 General A's estimate of the situation: 
 
 General A's mission is that of the usual advance guard — to 
 secure the safe and uninterrupted advance of the main body. 
 
 The mission of the Blue division, which is to seize Gettysburg 
 and thus forestall the expected movement of the Red force con- 
 centrating at Chambersburg and reported as about ready to ad- 
 vance, but accentuates the necessity for this advance guard pre- 
 venting any unnecessary delay of' its main body. 
 
 The general situation indicates to General A that the only 
 force he is apt to encounter during the advance on Gettysburg is 
 that one reported to have been at Chambersburg up to June 30th. 
 From authoritative sources it has been learned that this consists 
 of about two brigades of infantry, a regiment of field artillery, 
 three or four regiments of cavalry, and one or two batteries of 
 horse artillery. Since Chambersburg is thirty miles from German- 
 town, General A feels sure that no infantry can be in the Red force 
 reported in his immediate front. The distance is too great for 
 infantry at the outbreak of war to march in twenty-four hours or 
 thereabouts, and there is no direct line of railroad between these 
 towns. 
 
 None of the reports received state definitely that Red infantry 
 has been seen. To be sure, dismounted troops were noted in the 
 vicinity of Germantown, but General A considers that these troops 
 may well be dismounted cavalry whose horses are held in the 
 ravines near Two Taverns. The fact that bodies of cavalry were 
 not met on the Hanover and Littlestown-Barlow-Gettysburg roads 
 does not indicate to General A that the force in his immediate 
 front is not cavalry. 
 
 The most reasonable assumption seems to be that it is a mobile 
 force consisting of three or four regiments of cavalry and one or 
 two batteries of horse artillery reported to have been at Chambers- 
 burg up to yesterday morning; that having heard of the advance 
 of the Blue division on Gettysburg, this Red detachment was sent 
 forward to delay it sufficiently to give the slower moving main 
 Red body time to reach the place. If infantry had been by any 
 means forwarded, it would hardly have moved so far beyond the 
 
[227] 
 
 town, but have taken up a defensive position in the vicinity of 
 Wolf Hill Ridge. 
 
 There are several reasons why General A does not think the 
 force in his front came from the main Red body now concentrating 
 at Carlisle. In the first place, this force is not so far along in 
 its concentration, else in all likelihood this fact would have been 
 reported by the spies and in the newspapers. In addition, the 
 independent Blue cavalry has been sent in the direction of the 
 Conewago to cover its crossings and observe to the north. Nothing 
 has been heard from this cavalry, and therefore General A feels 
 assured no large force of the enemy has moved from Carlisle or is 
 in his vicinity. 
 
 It is evident that there is in his immediate front the mobile force 
 above named. 
 
 General A considers that it is not likely that this detachment 
 expects assistance; that if they do this cannot reach them before 
 mid-day, since Gettysburg is some seven miles away and no other 
 Red troops have been reported in this town or moving toward 
 Germantown. 
 
 The absence of information from the independent cavalry and 
 the reports of the patrols at Mt. Vernon School House and Little 
 Round Top make it appear to General A that he has at present 
 nothing to fear from Red reinforcements. 
 
 General A is in command of a reinforced brigade whose numbers, 
 as stated in the problem, give him a superiority over the troops in 
 his immediate front; in artillery at least as three to two, in rifles 
 available for the firing line four to three. 
 
 The remainder of the Blue division is only three miles behind and 
 therefore can be relied upon to give General A support in case 
 of need. 
 
 Undoubtedly the purpose of this Red detachment is to delay 
 the Blue division until sufficient Red troops can be moved to 
 secure the town. For this purpose it has taken up a position 
 across the pike just east of Germantown. The line extends for 
 some 2,100 yards, its left secured by a wood with underbrush; 
 its right somewhat in the air, but having a very good field of fire 
 to the east and southeast for some 1,000 yards. In the fore- 
 ground lies Plum Creek, to which the distance varies from 1,000 
 yards on the south to 500 on the north. North of the turnpike 
 
[228] 
 
 this obstacle is not of much importance, but south the trees 
 bordering its banks become more numerous and have underbrush. 
 Some 2,200 yards to the southeast Plum Creek flows into Alloway 
 Creek, and near this junction they form considerable of an 
 obstacle. About 900 yards in front of the middle of the position 
 there are two clumps of woods, with underbrush, one north, the 
 other south of the turnpike. The southern clump is small. 
 
 The whole Red line is nearly paralleled by a ridge at an average 
 distance of 1300 yards, the reverse slopes of which would give good 
 cover to any attacking troops from the east. From eighty feet 
 below the Red position to the southeast, this ridge rises until at 
 some 1,200 yards to the northeast it dominates it by forty feet. 
 
 In rear of the Red position the ground is cut up by branch 
 ravines radiating from the main one that passes to the northeast 
 through Two Taverns about a mile to the rear. These would 
 give ample cover to the horses and reserves of the Reds. 
 
 What are the intentions of the Red Commander .f' Is he going 
 to fight to a finish in this position .^^ General A thinks not. He 
 undoubtedly wishes to delay the Blue division as much as possible 
 and has decided to cause first a deployment near Germantown. 
 But he will not wish to become so involved as not to be able to 
 withdraw his mobile force to another position where the operation 
 can be repeated. There are several such available to him between 
 Germantown and Gettysburg, — for example one just east of White 
 Run, another near Topper (to the south of the turnpike) and 
 finally Rock Creek offers good opportunities for a delaying action. 
 
 Only one course seems suitable to the occasion and that is to 
 attack. If General A halts and asks for instructions fT'om the 
 division commander, if he assumes a position in readiness, if he 
 seizes some position and holds it until the main body arrives he 
 will have failed in his mission because the advance of his main body 
 will have been interrupted, perhaps sufficiently so for it to fail in 
 its mission. There is but one thing for General A to do and that 
 is to attack and to attack vigorously for the purpose of thrusting 
 away as soon as possible the Red force, which he considers merely 
 a delaying one. He believes that on making a vigorous advance 
 the Reds will not want to become too much involved, but will 
 hastily withdraw to seek some new position from which to continue 
 the delaying tactics. 
 
[229] 
 
 Even admitting that the Reds may be in force, still General A 
 knows it is his duty as advance guard comander to move forward 
 and develop the situation, and this can be done only by attacking. 
 
 There are three methods of attack open to General A : 
 
 1. A frontal attack with an envelopment of the enemy's right. 
 
 2. A frontal attack with an envelopment of the left. 
 
 3. A frontal attack. 
 
 The following advantages pertain to each: 
 
 1. (a) Lines of approach short and fairly covered. 
 (h) Attack on a flank in the air. 
 
 (c) It best covers the advancing division. 
 
 2. (a) Approach under good cover to a position most favor- 
 
 able for launching the attack within 1,200 yards 
 of the enemy. 
 (h) Leaves clear the left for the remainder of the division, 
 should it be necessary to reinforce the advance 
 guard. 
 
 3. (a) Saves time in getting into action. 
 
 (h) Troops will be more in hand, and therefore can re- 
 sume the advance in less time than they could 
 after a wide envelopment. 
 
 To make the southern envelopment it would be necessary to 
 launch it from the direction of D. Spangler which would entail an 
 advance of 1,400 yards over a most favorable field of fire. Since 
 the northern flank rests on the Meyer wood a real envelopment in 
 that direction would require a march as far north at least as 
 Shue and then this part of the attack would come up against a 
 serious obstacle. Both of these methods of attack would take more 
 time than one down the turnpike, and so would of themselves bring 
 about some of the delay the Red Commander desires. The direc- 
 tion in which this mobile detachment is driven has little weight for, 
 if withdrawn in time, the hostile troopers can quickly move to 
 some other delaying position either across the road or more likely 
 to a flank. 
 
 General A's estimate of the weakness of the enemy is borne out 
 by the fact that only parts of the defensive line are being pre- 
 pared for defense. Realizing that in all probability one of the 
 3 or 4 regiments of Red cavalry is held as a mounted reserve he 
 thinks this line so long it has little strength anywhere. It can be 
 
[230] 
 
 penetrated therefore by a frontal attack with comparatively small 
 loss and with the saving of much time. 
 
 In moving to the attack General A sees that he cannot march 
 in safety his column on the turnpike beyond hill 607. On ap- 
 proaching 573 such troops would be subject to hostile artillery fire 
 at 3,700 yards. The enemy's artillery was reported south of 
 the Baltimore turnpike and no doubt his observation station is 
 near hill 606 from which a clear view of much of this road can be 
 had to as far as 500 yards west of 573. 
 
 For the same reason movements by the flank on the 573-544 
 road must be avoided. It is not well enough covered to be safe 
 against shrapnel fire. 
 
 The 1st Infantry can be moved under cover of hill 607 to the 
 north a few hundred yards, thence under cover to vicinity of 584, 
 and then advance to the attack. The 2nd Infantry can be turned 
 west and marched to the vicinity of Kuhn, thence under cover to 
 vicinity of Gauker and then to the attack. The 3rd Infantry as 
 reserve can follow the 1st Infantry. The artillery should get into 
 action as soon as possible to cover the advance and to stop the 
 work on the Red line. It will be uncovered when the 2nd Infantry 
 leaves the highway, can trot forward and reach under cover a 
 position in the swale 600 yards northwest of hill 607, 3400 yards 
 from the Reds. The cavalry on being relieved by the infantry 
 may be withdrawn to either flank. The ground to the north is 
 more suited to cavalry operations as it is higher, clearer, and the 
 streams are less of obstacles than south of the turnpike. It gives 
 easy access to the Red line of retreat and covers toward Carlisle. 
 
 The cavalry should be united for the further advance, and the 
 bulk of the mounted scouts should cover the Blue left. 
 
 Since the trees are in full leaf and the corn well grown the 
 troops will have little difficulty in reaching Alloway Creek and the 
 crest of the ridge to the west of it under good cover. 
 
 General A therefore decides: 
 
 1. To make a vigorous frontal attack on the hostile detach- 
 ment — 1st Infantry north of Baltimore turnpike; 2nd Infantry 
 south of it ; artillery 600 yards northwest of hill 607 ; cavalry on 
 the right flank ; bulk of mounted scouts on the left ; 3rd Infantry 
 as reserve to follow 1st Infantry to vicinity of 584; the engineers 
 to prepare crossings over Alloway Creek then join the reserve; 
 
[231] 
 
 the ambulance company to halt off the road, 500 yards east of hill 
 607. 
 
 The 1st and 2nd Infantry to march under cover to the ridge 
 through 584 and advance to the attack simultaneously; the artil- 
 lery to fire on enemy as soon as possible. 
 
 2. To send detailed message to Division Commander. 
 2nd Requirement: 
 
 On riding forward General A had ordered the commanders of 
 infantry regiments, and the staff to join the support, where he 
 found them assembled at 9:00 a. m. and issued orders which if 
 written would be as follows : 
 
 Advance Guard, 1st Blue Division, 
 Ash Grove S. H., 
 1 July, '11, 9:05 A. M. 
 Field Orders 
 
 No.—. 
 
 1. A Red detachment consisting of 3 or 4 regiments of cavalry 
 and 1 or 2 batteries of horse artillery is occupying a defensive line 
 across BALTIMORE turnpike just east of GERMANTOWN. 
 
 Our main body is three miles in rear of the reserve. 
 
 2. The Advance Guard will attack along the turnpike and 
 clear the road to GETTYSBURG. 
 
 Conditions of the march now cease. 
 
 3. (a) The 1st Battalion, 1st Artillery, will move at a trot 
 under cover into position about 600 yards northwest of hill 607 
 and open fire on the enemy. Advanced artillery positions will be 
 reconnoitered. 
 
 (b) The 1st Infantry will move under cover of hill 607 to 
 the north about 500 yards, thence west to vicinity of 584, where 
 in conjunction with the 2nd Infantry it will advance to the attack 
 with its left near the BALTIMORE turnpike. 
 
 (c) The 2nd Infantry will move west to the vicinity of KUHN, 
 thence under cover to near GAUKER where it will move to the 
 attack with its right near the BALTIMORE turnpike. 
 
 (d) The 3rd Infantry will follow the 1st Infantry as the 
 reserve and halt near 584. 
 
 (e) The 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry, (less 2 trs.) on with- 
 drawing from the front, will cover our right, patrolling to the ' 
 enemy-s left and rear. 
 
[232] 
 
 (f) Co. A, Engineers, will prepare north of the turnpike, two 
 crossings over ALLOW AY CREEK, and then join the reserve. 
 
 (g) The mounted scouts of the 1st and 2nd Infantry, under 
 Lieut. C, will cover our left, patrolling to the enemy's right and 
 rear. 
 
 4. Ambulance Company No. 1 will halt off the road about 500 
 yards east of hill 607. 
 
 5. I will remain here for the present. Later I will be near 575. 
 
 A, 
 Brigadier General. 
 
 Verbally to assembled officers. Copy by an aide to Chief of 
 Staff. 
 
 Messages, 
 
 Advance Guard, 
 
 Littlestown, 
 1 July, '11, 8:05 A. M. 
 Chief of Staff : 
 
 Major A, 1st Cavalry, reports: "On approaching GERMAN- 
 TOWN was fired upon by dismounted men from edge of woods 
 300 yds. west of SCHWARTZ. Am unable to advance. Will re- 
 main in observation." 
 
 I continue to advance. 
 
 A, 
 Brigadier General. 
 
 Advance Guard, 
 Ash Grove S. H., 
 1 July, '11, 9:10 A. M. 
 Chief of Staff: 
 
 A Red detachment is occupying a line about 2000 yards long 
 across the turnpike 300 yards east of GERMANTOWN. Left 
 rests on grove southeast of MEYER and right is 600 yards north 
 of B. D. SNYDER. I have personally reconnoitered and find 
 the line is being strengthened in parts. Judge the hostile force 
 consists of 3 or 4 regiments of cavalry and 1 or 2 batteries of 
 horse artillery sent forward to delay us. 
 
 I shall attack at once — 1st Infantry north and 2nd Infantry 
 south of BALTIMORE turnpike. Cavalry covers our right. 
 
[233] 
 
 mounted scouts the left, and artillery goes into position 600 yards 
 northwest of hill 607. 
 
 Copies of messages from Officer's Patrols, MT. VERNON S. H. 
 and LITTLE ROUND TOP, and from the Advance Cavalry at- 
 tached hereto. 
 
 A, 
 Brigadier General. 
 ^ 3 ends. \- 
 
COURSE IN TACTICS— FART II. 
 
 Map Problem No. 9 — Outposts. 
 (See Getty sburg-Boneauville sheets, 3" map.) 
 Situation : 
 
 On June 20th, the 1st Blue Field Army, operating in hostile ter- 
 ritory, which, however, contains some disaffected inhabitants, is 
 advancing from the east by way of Hanover and Gettysburg to 
 block the mountain passes west of Gettysburg. 
 
 The 1st Brigade, 1st Division, reenforced by 1st Squadron, 7th 
 Cavalry (less Troop D), 1st Battalion, 4th Field Artillery, and 
 1st Ambulance Company, was detached at Brushtown to march 
 by way of Whitehall and Germantown and thence by the Balti- 
 more Turnpike, keeping abreast of the advance guard, which is 
 on Hanover road. 
 
 The advance guard of the detached force consists of the 1st 
 Infantry and the squadron, under Colonel A. 
 
 At 2 p. m., when the infantry advance party reached Two 
 Taverns, Colonel A received the following order: 
 Field Orders 1st Brigade, 1st Div., 1st Field Army, 
 
 No. — . Germantown, Pa., 20 June — 1 :55 P. M. 
 
 1. Reliable reports show that the enemy, advancing through 
 FAIRFIELD and CASHTOWN, has occupied GETTYSBURG. 
 
 In our immediate front hostile cavalry patrols have been re- 
 ported at F. RUDISELL, F. SWISHER and 450 (f mile south- 
 east of ROUND TOP). Over a hostile troop has just retreated 
 from ST. MARY'S REFORMED CHURCH, which is now held 
 by our squadron. 
 
 Hostile infantry has been seen on WOLF HILL and near 
 POWERS HILL. 
 
 Our army will halt for the night with outposts just west of the 
 TWO TAVERNS-BONEAUVILLE road, the left of its outpost 
 being i mile west of 529. 
 
 2. The brigade will camp at GERMANTOWN, 2d Inf. west 
 of the town, north of the turnpike ; 3d Inf. west of the town, south 
 of the turnpike; Artillery and Amb. Co., east of the town. 
 
 3. The advance guard will establish the outpost, prolonging 
 the outpost of the Army to ROCK CREEK. Half a troop under 
 
 [234] 
 
[235] 
 
 an officer will be at once sent to the vicinity of BARLOW to watch 
 the crossings at that place and J mile to its south throughout the 
 night. 
 
 4. In case of attack the outposts will be supported. 
 
 5. Field trains will join the troops. Those of the advance 
 guard are placed at the disposal of the advance guard commander, 
 but must rejoin the Brigade train, east of GERMANTOWN by 
 4 a. m. tomorrow. 
 
 6. Brigade headquarters will be at the Post Office in GER- 
 MANTOWN. 
 
 X, 
 Brig. Gen. 
 Copy by Lt. Y, Aide. 
 
 Note: — Rock Creek is fordable with difficulty. Weather fair 
 and warm. 
 Required : 
 
 1. Colonel A's order, as advance guard commander. 
 
 2. Outpost commander's order. 
 
 3. Table showing location and strength of each picket and 
 the sentinels and patrols from each, also those furnished direct 
 from the supports. 
 
 STUDENTS' ERRORS AND INSTRUCTOR'S CRITICISMS. 
 
 1st Solution. 
 
 Orders: "3. (a) The 2nd & 3rd Bns. 1st Inf. and Trp. A 1st 
 Cavalry, (Lieut. Col. A) will establish the outpost * * * *." 
 
 Comment: "No use made of scouts." 
 
 Orders: "(c) The 1st Bn. 1st Inf. will go into camp at TWO 
 TAVERNS." 
 
 Comment: "Hq. Band, Scouts, M. G. plat. etc. of 1st Inf. not 
 accounted for." 
 
 Orders : "5. Messages will reach me at TWO TAVERNS." 
 
 Comment: "Better be more exact." 
 
 Further comment : "Copy by Lt. X, bn. Adj . to Brig. Comdr." 
 
 Lt. Col. A posts a support of 2 cos. inf. and a plat. Tr. A at 
 farm house about 200 yds. west of 525. 
 
[236] 
 
 Comment: "In as much as enemy's infantry outpost is so 
 close, I see no need for cavalry here at night." 
 
 Lt. Col. A posts another support of 2 cos. inf. and 3 plats. 
 Tr. A at farm house near 491 (west) to hold line from junction 
 of Rock Creek & White Run exclusive to Barlow's inclusive. 
 
 Comment: "The detachment at Barlow's being sent under 
 orders of Brigade Comdr. is out of your jurisdiction." 
 
 Lt. Col. A adds: "* * * * 2 platoons will be sent at 
 once to BARLOWS * * * *." 
 
 Comment: " 'Have already been sent.' They were ordered 
 sent 'at once' some time ago." 
 
 Lt. Col. A orders: "3 (b) The reserve, Cos. F & G and Cos. 
 L & M will be posted at TOPPER." 
 
 Comment: "Ordinarily better to keep a complete battalion as 
 reserve." 
 
 Further comment: "What to do in case of attack.'"' 
 
 "You have assigned no commanders for your supports or re- 
 serve and have not accounted for either Bn. headquarters." 
 
 Lt. Col. A sends order : "By messenger to C. O. Troop A." 
 
 Comment: "Specify 'copy' or 'verbally', also specify who the 
 messenger was, so that in case of controversy the message or order 
 can be traced." 
 
 Further comment: "First paragraph of situation shows need 
 of examining posts." 
 
 General comments: "Support No. 1 — Two companies, over a 
 mile from reserve and on main route to enemy's position have a 
 front of over 2 miles to cover. This is thought excessive. Also, 
 connection with army's outpost is too weak." 
 
 "By using map (instead of table) you failed to completely 
 answer the 3d requirement which asks for sentinels, etc." 
 
 2d Solution. 
 
 Issues Col. A's order at 2 :10 P. M. 
 
 Comment: "Rather quick work." 
 
 Orders: "2. This advance guard will camp at TWO TAV- 
 ERNS." 
 
 Comment: "Not very explicit." 
 
 Further comment : "Nothing to show what becomes of cavalry 
 at night. If it remains out, distance between hostile forces is too 
 
[237] 
 
 small for such a disposition. If withdrawn at night, you should 
 explicitly order some reconnaissance of enemy by night from sup- 
 port No. 1." 
 
 Outpost Commander posts 1 bn. & 9 scouts about 500 yds. east 
 of St. Mary's Reformed church as Support No. 1, and 2 cos. & 8 
 scouts on hill north of M. Fiscel's as Support No. 2. (Col. A sent 
 itr.to393W.) 
 
 Comment: "393 W-Two Taverns road rather weakly held." 
 Comment on Table: "Sentinels at Support and Outguard.?" 
 
 3d Solution. 
 
 In marginal distribution of troops places in support No. 1, 
 "2 COS. 1st Bn. 1st Inf." 
 
 Comment: "Preferably 1st Bn. 1st Inf. (less 2 Cos.)" 
 
 Under "(c) Detached Post." 
 
 Comment: "Comdr.?" 
 
 Orders all the cavalry in at nightfall, except the J tr. at Barlow. 
 
 Comment: "Some cavalry should be left out to reconnoitre 
 to west & northwest at night." 
 
 Orders the ^ troop to Barlow, with instructions to prepare the 
 bridge there for destruction. 
 
 Comments : "This force was ordered away by brigade order. 
 It would be better to have it move to its place at once and report 
 to Brig. Gen. X for further orders." 
 
 "Destruction of bridges unwarranted except on Gen. X's order." 
 
 Under 3. (b) places Support No. 1 near cross roads 525, cover- 
 ing the front from 529 exclusive to hill northwest of M. Fiscel 
 inclusive. 
 
 Comment: "Covers front of 2^ miles and 2 most important 
 roads leading toward enemy. Too big a job for 2 cos. that are 
 besides IJ miles from supporting troops." 
 
 Places Support No. 2 (2 cos. & 9 scouts) 400 yds. south of J. 
 Schwartz, covering front hill north of Fiscel exclusive to first 
 stream south of hill 487. 
 
 Comment: "Same as under 3 (b) except that nearest support- 
 ing troops are 2J miles away." 
 
 Places reserve [1st Inf. (less 1st Bn.)] 500 yds. west of Two 
 Taverns. 
 
 Comment: "Badly mangled by erasures." 
 
[238] 
 
 General comments: "2700 yards from right of this line to 
 left of army's outpost and entirely uncovers crossings of Rock 
 Creek south of M. Fiscel bridge. The enemy is strong and aggres- 
 sive, as shown by his advancing to meet the Blues. He is in 
 Gettysburg in force with outposts on the hills southeast of the 
 town. An attack at daylight (for example) is not unlikely. Part 
 of the hostile force comes from the southwest. Hence an attack 
 from the west is possible. Under these considerations and with 
 reserve so far away it seems unlikely the line prescribed could be 
 held long, and possible that either of its flanks may be turned by 
 any advance." 
 
 "If all distances were i as great as they really are, your solu- 
 tion would be excellent. Perhaps you forgot to check up your im- 
 pression of the scale of map by occasionally measuring a distance." 
 
 Places Picket No. 2 at 425. 
 
 Comment : "Over a mile from the support, excessive,** 
 
 Places Picket No. 3 on hill north of Fiscel. 
 
 Comment : "Too far from the support." 
 
 Further comment: "From situation it is thought the enemy 
 could not and would not allow any stationary parties west of 
 White Run." 
 
 States: "I have put the entire advance guard on outpost. 
 * * * * This makes the outpost stronger than necessary but 
 the troops can rest just as well in the reserve as they could if 
 camped a little further to the rear * * * *." 
 
 Comment: "No objection to this in itself, but resulting dis- 
 tances, etc., make solution poor." 
 
 States that at night Support No. 1 would be moved up to St. 
 Mary's Reform Church. 
 
 Comment: "This puts it closer to picket but farther from 
 support and does not help much." 
 
 4th Solution. 
 States that the outpost will prolong the outpost of the Army 
 to Rock Creek. 
 
 Comment: "Preferably indicate the general line." 
 States of Field Order No. 1 : "Copy to Col. A." 
 Comment : "Accompanied by sketch." 
 
[239] 
 
 States in Table: "Patrol, 2 mounted scouts to outpost of 
 Army," and sends 2 to cavalry at St. Mary's Ch. & places sentry 
 squad at barn west of 525. 
 
 Comment : "Connection with army's outpost rather too weak." 
 
 Places detached post of i co. near D. F. Plank. 
 
 Comment : "Vicinity of 393 W rather weakly held considering 
 that part of enemy's force came from S. W. and may be behind 
 Round Top." 
 
 Orders: "Standing Patrol, 6 men as far to front as they can 
 get on Balto. Pike." 
 
 Comment : "More reconnaissance of enemy west of Rock Creek 
 seems necessary." 
 
 "Cavalry not well suited for night patrolling forward from 425, 
 enemy is known to be too close here." 
 
 5th Solution. 
 
 Col. A directs 1st & 2d Bns. scouts & M. G. P. under Lt. Col. B 
 to establish an outpost, and the 3d Bn. under Maj. C to constitute 
 the reserve of the outpost. Reserve is directed to camp in Two 
 Taverns. 
 
 Comments: "Conflict. Also division of authority." 
 
 "Will also need some outpost cavalry." 
 
 "Band, Hq., etc., of 1st Inf. not accounted for." 
 
 Outpost Comdr. places Support No. 1 (1 bn. M. G. P. and 7 
 scouts) near 525. He places Support No. 2(1 bn. & 7 scouts) 
 near 546. 
 
 Comment: "The location of this support (No. 2) does not 
 fully comply with the Brigade order. To extend the line to Rock 
 Creek means more than merely to observe to Rock Creek. Both 
 for compliance with Brigade order and for strength of position 
 this support would be better located at 491." 
 
 Support Commander orders : "5. I will be with Support No. 1 
 near 525." 
 
 Comments: "General dispositions. Thought Support No. 2 
 might better be at 491 and reserve could be better located. (With 
 your dispositions stay at TOPPER.) Other main faults' are: 
 
 1°. No reconnaissance of enemy ordered except by day. 
 
 2°. Form of the orders weakens connection between the sup- 
 ports & reserve. 
 
[240] 
 
 3°. Outpost Commander on one flank with poor communica- 
 tion to other, which is of equal importance. In case of attack 
 here an appeal for support would go from 546 to 525 and then to 
 Two Taverns. Total distance for message to go 3 miles." 
 
 6th Solution. 
 
 Times Col. A's order ; 2 :00 P. M. 
 
 Comment : "Impossible." 
 
 Establishes outpost on general line 546-515, connecting the out- 
 post of the main army. 
 
 Advance Guard camps at Two Taverns. 
 
 Orders : "In case of attack the line west of TWO TAVERNS 
 will be held." 
 
 Comments : "Poor line of resistance. Also outpost as a whole 
 lacks depth. No reconnaissance of enemy." 
 
 Places Support No. 1 (2 cos. & M. G. P.) 900 yds. west of 508. 
 
 Places Support No. 2(2 cos. & Sec. Tr. A) near 546 covering 
 from Little's Run exclusive to Barlow exclusive. 
 
 Comment: "Rather weak. A strong hostile patrol should be 
 able easily to penetrate between Support No. 1 and 529." 
 
 Heads Lt. Col's, order: "Det. 1st Inf." 
 
 Comment: "Outpost, 1st Brigade." 
 
 Comment in general: "Front covered {2\ miles) is rather too 
 great for one battalion as supports. You observe to Rock Creek 
 but do not extend the Army's outpost to that place." 
 
 7th Solution. 
 
 Col. A orders : "Messages will reach me at TWO TAVERNS." 
 
 Comment : "Might be a little more definite." 
 
 Lt. Col. B orders: "3. (a) Troop A, 7th Cav. will keep in 
 touch with the enemy, observing the crossings of ROCK CREEK 
 and WHITE RUN from the ford near F. RUDISELL to the ford 
 south of 418." 
 
 Comment : "No reconnaissance of the enemy or to the west." 
 
 Continues : "Communication will be kept up with the detached 
 post at BARLOW." 
 
 Comment : "Not very clear. Capt. of Tr. A may not know the 
 post is at Barlow." 
 
[241] 
 
 Places Support No. 1 (5 scouts & 1st Bn. less Co. D) 700 yds. 
 southeast of 525, and Support No. 2 (10 scouts, M. G. P. and 2d 
 Bn. less Co. H) near 54^6. 
 
 Comment : "Line of resistance very weak." 
 
 Places reserve (Cos. D & H) 800 yds. northwest of 508. 
 
 Comment: "Difficult to reach support No. 2 from here. Also 
 unusual to break up both battalions & put one company from each 
 in the reserve." 
 
 Places 7 men at St. Mary's Church. 
 
 Places 7 men near Fiscel. 
 
 Places 7 men south of Schwartz. 
 
 Comment: "Such small parties might well be attached to the 
 supports in whose close proximity they are posted. The one at 
 St. Mary's Ref. Church should be sent close to bridge at 425 if 
 used at all." 
 
 Further comments : "Bridges over Rock Creek too weakly held. 
 Really you 'observe' Rock Creek but do not comply with order to 
 extend outpost to that stream." 
 
 "3d Requirement asks for sentinels.*' 
 
 8th Solution. 
 
 Col. A orders field trains after joining troops to return to Two 
 Taverns by 8 P. M. today. 
 
 Comment : "Rather too early." 
 
 Lt. Col. A orders the outpost line 515-546 be defended. 
 
 Comment: "Poor line to defend." 
 
 "Line chosen offers no good line of resistance." 
 
 Details Tr. A as advance cavalry, but uses only 20 men. 
 
 Comment : "In as much as you use but one platoon on outpost, 
 you might as well have detailed a platoon for outpost." 
 
 Further comment : "No reconnaissance of enemy during night, 
 and none by day except such as is incident to maintaining contact 
 with that part in your immediate front." 
 
 9th Solution. 
 Col. A fails to designate an officer to command the outpost. 
 States where the artillery and Amb. Co. are to bivouac. 
 Comment : "Not under your command." 
 Outpost Comdr. orders : "2. This command will establish out- 
 
[242] 
 
 posts on the line from the left of the outposts of our army to 
 ROCK CREEK." 
 
 Comment : " — better more explicit here." 
 
 Orders cavalry to picket crossings over Rock Creek. 
 
 Comment: "Hostile forces not far enough apart to warrant a 
 separate cavalry outpost." 
 
 Further comment: "You order no reconnaissance of enemy at 
 night." 
 
 Places detached post of 1 co. & 12 scouts north of King to 
 observe roads through J. Smith, 546-491-393 W. 
 
 Comment : "Considering lie of the roads and fact that part of 
 hostile force comes from southwest it seems necessary to hold 
 vicinity of 393 W more strongly." 
 
 Orders field trains to join companies until an hour before dusk 
 when they will return to TWO TAVERNS. 
 
 Comment : " — rather too early." 
 
 Comment on distribution of orders: "Order, how & to whom 
 issued." 
 
 10th Solution. 
 
 Col. A orders : "2. This advance guard will encamp." 
 
 Comment: "Where.?" 
 
 Places Squadron of Cavalry under outpost commander. 
 
 Comment: "Not necessary to use all the cavalry for outpost. 
 You give no day orders to cavalry except to engage enemy." 
 
 Further comment: "Reconnaissance to west necessary." 
 
 Orders field train to rejoin brigade train east of Germantown 
 by 4 A. M. 
 
 Comment : "Better designate a place & time for them to report 
 to Q. M." 
 
 Orders : "5. Messages will reach me at TWO TAVERNS." 
 
 Comment : "Better be more definite. Two Taverns is a strag- 
 gling village." 
 
 Outpost Comdr. places Detached Post of 1 co. & M. G. P. under 
 Capt. "G" on hill 487 and orders: "It will stop any advance of 
 the enemy on the TANEYTOWN ROAD and to the east of that 
 road." 
 
 Comment: "Badly worded. Main danger here is from west." 
 
 Orders reserve to camp near 515. 
 
 Comment : "Must travel 2 J miles to support Capt. G." 
 
[243] 
 
 Night order leaves 10 men of cavalry under an officer near 457 
 MILLER. 
 
 Comment: "Not probable they can get there." 
 
 Orders cavalry (less i troop & 10 men) to withdraw after des- 
 troying bridges from 393W exclusive to i mile south of Barlow 
 inclusive. 
 
 Comment : ''Not warranted; besides guard of those bridges not 
 under Lt. Col. B's orders. (See situation)." 
 
 Comment on Table: "No observation to cover ford south of 
 418." 
 
 11th Solution. 
 
 Col. A issues order at 2:05 P. M. 
 
 Comment: "Try and see how long it will take you to copy 
 this order, let alone considering the situation & composing it." 
 
 Uses 16 mounted orderlies on outpost. 
 
 Comment : "Rather big proportion if possible to avoid it." 
 
 Outpost Comdr. states his troops will establish an outpost pro- 
 longing the outpost of the army to Rock Creek. 
 
 Comment : "Better add general line of Supports." 
 
 Further comments: "Reconnaissance to west & during night, 
 not sufficient." 
 
 "Support at 546 is too far from bridge which it may have to 
 defend and not in as strong a position anyway as at 491." 
 
 "Table not in good form." 
 
 12th Solution. 
 
 Outpost Comdr. places a detached post of 3 squads and 2 scouts 
 to guard bridge 393W. 
 
 Comment: "On account of enemy having one line of advance 
 pretty well to southwest (coming from Fairfield) it is thought this 
 road 393W-491-546 should be more strongly held. Also the ford 
 south of 418 should be observed." 
 
 Further comment: "Form of table poor." 
 
 13th Solution. 
 
 Comment: "No indication of what is expected of cavalry at 
 night. Is all to stay out or is it to camp some where or is all left 
 to Maj. A?" 
 
 Uses Baltimore Turnpike as a dividing line between supports. 
 
[244] 
 
 Comment : "Poor dividing line between supports." 
 
 Further comment: "No provision for watching ford J mile 
 west of 393W." 
 
 Orders field trains to join companies returning to brigade train 
 east of Germantown by 4 A. M. 
 
 Comment : "Better have them assemble under regimental Q. M. 
 at a fixed time & place and be marched back." 
 
 In table places 1 officer & 9 men at S. Horn and 5 men at 567. 
 
 Comment: "Enemy can't allow this. To order it means to 
 bring on outpost firing." 
 
 Orders outpost to connect with left of army's line. 
 
 Comment: "Might be more definite as to where left of army's 
 outpost is to be found." 
 
 Gives 1st Bn. sector left of army to Baltimore Pike; 2d Bn. 
 from Pike to road passing through Lott. Places a detached post 
 about 500 yds. east of Lott. Places reserve about 1100 yds. n. w. 
 of Two Taverns. 
 
 Comment: "General disposition of supports & reserve makes 
 connection very roundabout at night. The Support near Topper 
 is very far from the party I suppose you intended to put some- 
 where near M. Fiscel. If you did not intend to do so, you left the 
 second most important route practically unguarded, the small post 
 at Diener having practically no resisting power." 
 
 Comment on Table: "Incomplete." 
 
 14th Solution. 
 
 Col. A repeats Brigade Comdr's. order showing where 2d & 3d 
 Inf. camp. 
 
 Comment: "Not necessary." 
 
 Col. A orders: "3. (b) Major C will be camp commander of 
 the reserve, the 3d Bn. 1st Inf." 
 
 Comments: "See 3 (a). You have detailed the outpost. Hence 
 this is main body of advance guard not the 'reserve.' " 
 
 "You do not assign any place for Hq., Band, M. G. Plat.. 
 Scouts, etc., 1st Inf." 
 
 Orders field train to return & join brigade train not later than 
 6 P.M. 
 
 Comment : "Rather too early." 
 
 Heads Outpost Comdr's. order "Advance Guard Detachment." 
 
[245] 
 
 Comment: "Lt. Col. A commands the outpost." 
 
 In margin designates : "Cos. E, F, & G." 
 
 Comment: "2d Bn. (less Co. H)." 
 
 Gives orders to cavalry at Barlow. 
 
 Comment: "Ordered by Brigade Comdr., hence might well be 
 told to report to him for instructions." 
 
 Further comments : "No night reconnaissance of enemy except 
 in your immediate front. Your dispositions serve for protection 
 but do not watch the enemy." 
 
 "No use made of mounted scouts. Some might well be used for 
 interior patrols with outpost. (See your column headed 
 'Troops.')" 
 
 Orders in Par. 3 : "Entrenchments will be prepared by all 
 supports and the detached post." 
 
 Comment : "This is general , . • . should not be placed in orders 
 of Support No. 1." 
 
 Further comment: "You forget that Lt. Col. A is a different 
 man from Col. A 1st Inf." 
 
 In table uses pickets of 10 men. 
 
 Comment : "Would preferably use *Sentry Squad.' " 
 
 States: "The sentries are in most cases about 40 yards in 
 front of the pickets but might be pushed out to 400 yards. " 
 
 Comment: "Single or double.? Are there any at supports & 
 reserve.?" 
 
 States that cavalry patrols stay out and are not pushed out 
 and then withdrawn at night. 
 
 Comment: "See your order. They are ordered to observe 
 stream crossings, not to reconnoitre toward enemy." 
 
 AN APPROVED SOLUTION. 
 
 1st Requirement: 
 
 This order would have been issued verbally to the outpost and 
 battalion commanders and its substance sent the cavalry com- 
 mander in a short message at once, the whole order being sent out 
 when completed for the full information of all concerned. 
 
[246] 
 
 Advance Guard, 1st Brigade, 1st Div., 
 Field Orders Two Taverns, Pa., 
 
 No. — . 20 June — , 2 :20 P. M. 
 
 1. The enemy advancing through FAIRFIELD and CASH- 
 TOWN has occupied GETTYSBURG. In the vicinity of the 
 BALTIMORE TURNPIKE hostile cavalry patrols have been 
 seen at F, RUDISELL, F. SWISHER, and about f mile south- 
 east of ROUND TOP. Over a hostile troop has been driven 
 from ST. MARY'S REFORMED CHURCH by our cavalry 
 which now occupies that place. 'Hostile infantry has been seen 
 on WOLF HILL and near POWERS HILL. 
 
 Our army has halted for the night with its outpost just west 
 of the TWO TAVERNS-BONEAUVILLE road, the left of its 
 outpost i mile west of 529. 
 
 Our brigade camps at GERMANTOWN. 
 
 2. This advance guard will camp at TWO TAVERNS. 
 
 3. (a) The 1st Sq., 7th Cav. (less Tr. D) will continue to 
 cover our front till 7 P. M., when it will withdraw and camp at 
 TWO TAVERNS north of the road and east of LITTLES RUN. 
 Day positions will be resumed at daylight. Half a troop under 
 an officer will be at once sent to the vicinity of BARLOW (on 
 ROCK CREEK) to watch the crossings at that place and ^ mile 
 south of there throughout the night under the orders of the 
 Brigade Commander. One platoon under an officer will be ordered 
 to report to the outpost commander. Special reconnaissance to 
 west and of TANEYTOWN road toward GETTYSBURG. 
 
 (b) Lt. Col. B with 1st and 2d Bns., and 12 mounted scouts 
 1st Inf., and 1 platoon 1st Sq., 7th Cav., will form the outpost 
 on the line from the left of the army's outpost through 525-479- 
 hill 449 to include bridge 393W. Examining posts will be es- 
 tablished on the main roads. 
 
 (c) The remainder of the advance guard will camp at TWO 
 TAVERNS, north of the road and west of LITTLES RUN. 
 In case of attack the outposts will be supported. 
 
 4. The field train will join the troops but must be assembled 
 on the road east of 508 (in TWO TAVERNS) at 3 A. M. tomor- 
 row, when the Q. M., 1st Inf., will conduct it to join the brigade 
 train. 
 
[247] 
 
 5. Messages to the crossroad just west of LITTLES RUN on 
 the BALTIMORE TURNPIKE. 
 By order of Col. A. 
 
 Z, 
 
 Capt. & Adj. 1st Inf. 
 Copies to outpost, battalion and cavalry commanders by Capt. 
 U, Comsy. Verbally to staff and to comdrs. of mtd. scouts, mtd. 
 orderlies and machine guns. By Pvt. Q, mtd. orderly, to brigade 
 commander. 
 2d Requirement : 
 
 On the receipt of the verbal order mentioned at the beginning of 
 the solution to 1st Requirement, Lieutenant Colonel B verbally 
 ordered his supports and reserve to move to their approximate 
 locations and directed them to prepare their suppers. He issued 
 this order from the map alone, if his map was a fairly good one. 
 He then rode around, issuing verbal instructions to support com- 
 manders as he went and later sent out the order given below. 
 
 Outpost, 1st Brigade, 1st Div., 
 
 Farmhouse 1000 yds. south of 
 St. Mary's Reformed Church, Pa., 
 20 June— ,4:20 P. M. 
 1. The enemy advancing through 
 FAIRFIELD and CASHTOWN has oc- 
 cupied GETTYSBURG. In the vicinity 
 of the BALTIMORE TURNPIKE hostile 
 cavalry patrols have been seen at F. 
 RUDISELL, F. SWISHER, and about 
 f mile southeast of ROUND TOP. Over 
 a hostile troop has been driven from ST. 
 MARY'S REFORMED CHURCH by 
 our cavalry which now occupies that place. 
 Hostile infantry has been seen on WOLF 
 HILL and near POWERS HILL. 
 
 Our army has halted for the night with 
 its outpost just west of the TWO TAV- 
 ERNS-BONEAUVILLE road, the left of 
 its outpost 4 mile west of 529. 
 
 Our brigade camps at GERMAN- 
 TOWN. 
 
 Field Order 
 No. 1. 
 
 Troops 
 (a) Supports: 
 No. 1, Maj. C. 
 1st Bn. 1st Inf. 
 
 (less Co. D). 
 6 mtd. scouts. 
 
 No. 2, Capt. D. 
 
 Co. D, 1st Inf. 
 
 3d Plat. Tr. A, 7th 
 Cav. (less 2 
 n. c. o.'s and 6 
 troopers). 
 
 No. 3, Maj. E. 
 2d Bn. 1st Inf. 
 
 (less Cos. E & 
 
 F). 
 
[248] 
 
 2 n. c. o.'s and 6 The main body of our advance guard 
 troopers Tr. A. camps at the cross roads on the BALTI- 
 
 3 mtd. scouts. MORE PIKE just west of LITTLES 
 
 -p *fi T? 1 f scouts, 1st Inf., and 3d Platoon, Tr. A, 
 
 ' J. ' 7th Cav., will establish the outpost con- 
 
 o .J* . necting with the army's outpost i mile 
 
 west of 528 and extending through 525- 
 
 479-hill 449 to include the bridge 393W. Examining posts will 
 
 be established by each support. 
 
 3. (a) Support No. 1 posted just west of 525 will connect 
 with the army's outpost and cover the section stream just south of 
 529-550-516 road, inclusive, ravine 400 yards south of ST. 
 MARY'S REFORMED CHURCH, inclusive. The line of 
 WHITE RUN will be observed. Reconnaissance toward WOLF 
 HILL and along BALTIMORE PIKE toward GETTYSBURG. 
 
 Support No. 2 posted 500 yards west of 479 will cover the sec- 
 tion ravine 400 yards south of ST. MARY'S REFORMER 
 CHURCH exclusive, LITTLES RUN inclusive. The bridge just 
 north of hill 449 will be held. Reconnaissance to the north and 
 northwest from DIENER toward GETTYSBURG. 
 
 Support No. 3 posted at 491 will cover the section LITTLES 
 RUN, exclusive, 491-393W road inclusive. Reconnaissance from 
 418 towards the west. 
 
 Each support will entrench and also establish an examining 
 post. 
 
 (b) The reserve will be at the farm house 1000 yards south of 
 ST. MARY'S REFORMED CHURCH (near 479). 
 
 Connection with support No. 3 will be maintained by patrols. 
 
 In case of an attack the outposts will be supported. 
 
 4. The field train may join the supports and the reserve but 
 will be reported to the Quartermaster, 1st Infantry, as cross 
 roads 508 in TWO TAVERNS, at 3 A. M. 
 
 5. Messages to the reserve and in case of emergency also by 
 a duplicate direct to the advance guard commander at TWO 
 TAVERNS. 
 
 B, 
 Lt. Col. 
 
[249] 
 
 Copies by Lt. T, bn. adj., to support commanders and Maj. 
 H, Cavalry Comdr. Copy by Pvt. R, mtd. orderly to advance 
 guard commander, accompanied by sketch of outpost. 
 
 3rd Requirement : 
 
 Cavalry by day. 
 
 As soon as infantry supports arrived, moved to hill 449, leaving 
 an officer and one platoon at orchard west of St. Mary's Reformed 
 Church to patrol toward Wolf Hill and along Baltimore Pike. 
 
 An officer and a platoon at Diener to patrol toward the west. 
 This leaves If troops at hill 449. 
 
 Cavalry at night combined with supports. 
 
 Support No. 1. DAY NIGHT 
 
 1 officer and mounted orderly to visit pickets 2 2 
 
 2 single sentinels at support 7 7 
 Picket No. 1, Co. A on nose 1500 yds. northeast 
 
 of 525. 
 N. C. O. and single sentinel at picket 4 4 
 
 Sentry squad at end of farm road 500 yds. 
 
 N. E. of picket 8 
 
 Sentry squad on road at house north of picket 8 
 
 Sentry squad 600 yds. west of picket 8 
 
 Patrol, 2 men to connect with left of army's 
 
 outpost 6 
 
 Patrol, 2 men to connect with right of Picket 
 
 No. II, and observe White Run 6 
 
 Picket No. 2, J Co. B, 6 mtd. scouts, at west end 
 
 of orchard west of 489 
 Single sentinel at Picket, also serves as sen- 
 tinel for examining post 3 3 
 Sentry squad at bridge 8 
 Sentry sq. end farm road 500 yds. south of 
 
 picket and connect with Support No. 2 8 
 
 Patrol 2 mtd. scouts north along east bank of 
 White Run and connect with Picket No. 1 6 
 
 Special patrols to reconnoitre enemy, 1 officer, 
 
 2 N. C. O.'s and 6 men 9 
 
[250] 
 
 Support No. 2 
 
 Single sentinel at support 3 3 
 
 Picket No. 1, i Co. at bridge. 
 
 Single sentinel at picket, also serves for ex- 
 amining post 3 
 
 Double sentinel west end of bridge 6 
 
 Sentry squad where farm road crosses White 
 Run (Swartz Estate) and connect with 
 Picket No. 2, Support No. 1 8 
 
 Patrol 2 men, along west bank of Rock Creek 
 
 and connect with right of Support No. 3 6 
 
 Cav. Det. post near Diener to patrol to north 
 and northwest (officer and platoon less 2 
 N. C. O.'s and 6 troopers) all up most of 
 night 13 
 
 Support No. 3 
 
 2 single sentinels, one at support and one at 
 
 crossroad 491 to direct messengers 3 6 
 
 2 N. C. O.'s with above 2 2 
 
 Det. post 2 squads 1100 yds. south of 491 
 
 (at 522) uses 2 sentinels and 2 N. C. O.'s 8 8 
 
 Picket No. 1, i Co. E, near 393 W. 
 
 Single sentinel at picket, also serves for ex- 
 amining post 3 
 
 Double sentinel at west end of bridge 6 
 
 2 N. C. O.'s in charge of both of above 2 
 
 Sentry squad and reliefs for patrol at small 
 orchard west of 487, to patrol west of Rock 
 Creek and connect with left of Support 2 14 
 
 Cav. detached post 2 N. C. O.'s and 6 troopers 
 
 at 413 and patrolling to west 8 
 
 Patrol 3 scouts to Barlow every 3 hrs. 3 
 
 Reserve 
 
 2 single sentinels, 1 at reserve and 1 at cross- 
 roads to direct messengers 3 6 
 
 2 N. C. O.'s with above 2 2 
 
 Patrol of single man to connect with Support 
 
 No. 3 (mtd. scout) 3 
 
 27 185 
 
[251] 
 
 Thus about one-fifth of the outpost or one-ninth of the advance 
 guard will lose sleep if no attack is made by the enemy. 
 
 Comments (not required of the student) : 
 
 The first line northwest of Two Taverns at all possible as a 
 line of resistance is the one chosen. To go farther forward, as to 
 line of White Run, is to make the distance from the main body to 
 the outpost so great as to make prompt support impossible, to 
 get onto a weaker line and to be so close to the enemy as to make 
 outpost skirmishes constant. 
 
 The enemy evidently is holding the line of hills to the west as 
 his outpost. He can not allow our stationary parties to be closer 
 to him than they are placed in the solution, nevertheless recon- 
 naissance of his position by small patrols should be attempted by 
 both day and night. 
 
 The location of the reserve is unusual, but it will be seen to be 
 in easy supporting distance of all the supports by well marked 
 routes, along the fence to No. 1 and by road to the other two. If 
 placed on either road leading toward the enemy it would be beyond 
 supporting distance of 2 of the 3 supports. The outpost front 
 covered is too great for one battalion. Two battalions is of a 
 suitable size but breaks up the regiment. On the other hand, the 
 main body of the advance guard at Two Taverns is really a second 
 reserve and it is well situated to come to the assistance of any part 
 of the outpost. 
 
 Support No. 1 is the most important and has the greatest front, 
 it is therefore the largest. 
 
 Support No. 2 has a small front and is close to support, it is 
 therefore small. 
 
 Support No. 3 might be replaced by a detached post were it 
 not for the fact that it is as likely the enemy advancing from the 
 direction of Fairfield might use this route as any other. For this 
 reason it is made strong. 
 
 The hostile infantry is so close in front that cavalry recon- 
 naissance there will not be likely to bring out more than we already 
 know, viz: that hostile infantry is there. On the other hand, 
 there is danger to the west and northwest. Thus the cavalry's 
 duty is to watch in those directions. It is not brought out in the 
 
[252] 
 
 solution, but the cavalry commander would leave one or more of 
 his day patrols far out to the west at night. 
 
 The destruction of bridges is not warranted without orders 
 from higher authority. 
 
 Picket No. 1, Support No. 1 might be called a support, but 
 its connection with the rest of the battalion would thereby be 
 weakened and it would not be so likely to be promptly supported 
 from 525. Because the ground just in its rear flanks the army's 
 outpost and commands the Baltimore Pike, this portion of the 
 outpost line can not be left to a weak post. 
 
COURSE IN TACTICS— PART II. 
 
 Map Problem No. 10. — Attack of a Rivej^ Line. 
 (See Hunterstown-New Oxford sheets, 3" map.) 
 
 Situation : 
 
 War has been declared between Maryland (Blue) and Penn- 
 sylvania (Red). The Blues are concentrating at Frederick and 
 Baltimore, the Reds at Harrisburg and Lancaster. The Blues, 
 being further advanced in their preparations than the Reds, have 
 crossed the hostile frontier and a Blue division has seized Gettys- 
 burg. On the afternoon of May 15, 19 — , Brigadier General A 
 receives the following orders from his division commander: "It 
 is reported that a Red force of all arms is about to advance from 
 Harrisburg. The movement may have already begun. Owing to 
 delay in forwarding of ammunition and other supplies, the division 
 will not be in readiness to advance from Gettysburg before noon 
 tomorrow. It is of the utmost importance that the crossings of 
 the Conewago at Plainview be secured to cover the crossing of 
 our division. Your brigade, reinforced by the 1st Squadron, 1st 
 Cavalry, 1st Battalion, 1st Field Artillery, Company A, 1st Bat- 
 talion of Engineers, and Ambulance Company No. 1, will start 
 at once and will seize and hold the Conewago crossings north of 
 Plainview. A battery of field howitzers, due to arrive here at 4 
 p. m. today, is placed at your disposal." 
 
 At 6 p. m. of the 15th, General A, at the head of the support 
 of his advance guard, has reached the cross roads at 561 when 
 the following message is handed to him by a trooper: 
 
 1st Sq. 1st Cav. 
 
 Near Plainview, 15 May, — 5:45 P. M. 
 Have received heavy rifle and machine giin fire from woods along 
 left bank of Conewago east and west of 502 and am unable to 
 advance further. About 100 Red cavalry dismounted were driven 
 back from wooded island just south of 502 and island at present 
 held by one of our troops dismounted. Officers' patrols sent via 
 Hershey's Mill and ford about f mile southeast of 502 not yet 
 returned. 
 
 X, 
 Ma j or. 
 [253] 
 
[254] 
 
 A mounted officer sent to hills 707 and 712 reports that dis- 
 mounted troops can be seen along crest of ridge 586 about a mile 
 southwest of Heidlersburg. General A decides to halt and camp 
 for the night. Later reports indicate the arrival at Heidlersburg 
 during the afternoon of 15th of a mixed Red detachment, less 
 than a brigade of infantry and some cavalry and one or two bat- 
 teries. 
 
 Assuming that no more definite information is received during 
 the night — 
 Required : 
 
 General A's decision, his orders, and reasons therefore, be- 
 tween now and sunrise of the following day. 
 
 Note : — Sun rises at 4 :45 A. M. and sets at 7 P. M. All streams 
 swollen from recent heavy rains and Conewago Creek unfordable, 
 except as shown on map. Roads muddy, but passable for all 
 arms. 
 
 STUDENTS' ERRORS AND INSTRUCTOR'S CRITICISMS. 
 
 1st Solution. 
 
 Halt and outpost order places 1 bn. 1 troop and all scouts 
 on outpost. 
 
 Comment: "In view of Gen. A's aggressive mission & the 
 general situation the outpost is weak in infantry." 
 
 Orders: "(x). The engineers will prepare during night 
 several crossings in vicinity of 523 W." 
 
 Comment: "This is liable to indicate to enemy the point of 
 crossing. Hostile outposts must be assumed to be vigilant." 
 "Your order issued at 6:30 would naturally cause the Arty. 
 Comdr. to prepare data but some mention should be made of the 
 necessity therefor." 
 
 Orders: "5. Messages will reach me at D. Wirts." 
 
 Comment: "Better add here "Where orders will issue at — 
 P. M." or words to that effect." 
 
 Sends outpost order "By wire to Genl. X." 
 
 Comment: "0. K. if wire is strictly under military control. 
 If liable to be tapped by Red partisans, dangerous." 
 
 Issues attack order at 6:30 P. M. 
 
[255] 
 
 Comment: "This is very early to issue an attack order for 
 the following day. Very little was known of the enemy at ,6 :00 
 P. M. & Gen. A was not likely to get the information furnished by 
 "later reports" in one half hour." 
 
 Orders cavalry to attack dismounted. 
 
 Comment: "Generally better to give Cavy. Comdr. his task & 
 let him arrange the details — as to whether he will attack mounted 
 or dismounted &c. — His orders require him to attack thru 529, 
 not necessarily to cross there, so that he may ford the creek 
 below & a dismounted attack thru 529 may not be necessary." 
 
 Orders 1st Inf. (less 1 bn.) 2d Inf. 3d Inf. and Engrs. to as- 
 semble at 4:00 A. M. near Bridge S.H. (3d Inf. as reserve) and 
 attack thru 523 W. when ordered. 
 
 Comment : "As a rule better to give hour of starting and route 
 to be followed. Avoids misunderstandings, delays, confusion, mix- 
 ing up of units &c." 
 
 Orders : "The Ambulance Company will take station for the 
 present in ravine i mi. west of BRIDGE S.H." 
 
 Comment : "Order not clear. If literally obeyed would require 
 Amb. Co. to start out at once. No need of moving Amb. Co. until 
 attack is well started, and some estimate can be made as to where 
 heaviest losses will occur, and then place where they can do the 
 most good." 
 
 Orders : "The field train will assemble at 4 :30 A. M. on 549 — 
 J. BELL road with tail at orchard east of 549." 
 
 Comment : "If head were at 549 with tail in vicinity of J. Bell, 
 the field train would then be ideally located, on a side road, out 
 of the way, well back and ready to move in either direction." 
 
 General comment: "A stronger inf. attack (than 1 bn.) at 
 502 W, with bulk of cavy. crossing west of 523 W. and protecting 
 your left flank in the advance towards 586 Ridge, believed better, 
 although your plan thought likely to succeed." 
 
 2d Solution. 
 In halt order states: "3. (b) The main body will camp at 
 this point (crossroads 561) the 3d Bn. 1st Inf. and 2d Inf. in 
 north east angle of cross roads, the 3d Inf. in northwest angle of 
 cross roads, the Ambulance Company in southeast angle and 
 Artillery southwest of 561." 
 
[256] 
 
 Comment: "This order is good & camp is compact, well ar- 
 ranged, & handy to wood & water, but, under the circumstances, 
 seems unnecessarily far to the front, and more or less exposed to 
 view & possible Arty, fire, from east and n. east." 
 
 In assembly order states : "4. Field trains will park southwest 
 of 561 and await further orders." 
 
 Comment: "Liable to be exposed to hostile Arty, fire here. 
 Hour when they will park not given." 
 
 In attack order directs 2d. Inf. 3d Inf. and 3d Bn. 1st Inf. under 
 Col. B. to move along wood road running southwest from 712 
 thence by wood road running northwest towards Hill 586. At 
 daylight to push across Conewago at crossing 1100 yds. west of 
 523 W. and attack enemy's right flank. 
 
 Orders artillery to take position west of 666. 
 
 Comment: "The Inf. column (about 25 minutes of march in 
 length even in daylight) ordered to march across front of arty, 
 position. To be sure the inf. is ready to march at 3 :30, and arty, 
 not assembled in camp until 3 :45, but, unless the tail of the column 
 has passed the arty's. position by the time the arty, is ready to fire, 
 either the arty, will have to delay opening fire or else column liable 
 to receive hostile arty, fire which will probably or possibly reply 
 promptly to Blue Arty. * * * *." 
 
 Orders Cav. (less 1 tr.) and Engrs. to occupy ridge just north 
 and west of Plainview and open fire on enemy north of and in 
 vicinity of crossings." 
 
 Comment: "Believe engrs., or some of them at least, might well 
 be used to attempt the construction of additional crossings in con- 
 nection with attack." 
 
 "Your use of cavy. to fire on 502 W. & H. Mill crossings open to 
 two objections, 
 
 1. Mere fire liable to accomplish little, an attach is needed to 
 make any impression, although, of course, position fire often a 
 valuable adjunct. 
 
 2. Reconnaissance of roads running north in rear of Red force 
 important; the small force of cavy. you have left for this task 
 will probably not accomplish much in this line if enemy's cavy. 
 is active, also the latter case probably give Col. B. more or less 
 trouble." 
 
[257] 
 
 Further comment: "Think you rather overestimate the disad- 
 vantages of the 523 W. crossing & the advantages of the one west 
 thereof." 
 
 3d Solution. 
 
 Camps Field Arty, near 561 and Field Howitzers near 552. 
 
 Camps Amb. Co. at R. Smith. 
 
 Comments: "These camps seem rather unprotected and iso- 
 lated especially with the crossings west of Br. S.H. left open. 
 
 Unusual to camp artillery so far from the rest of command; 
 better have it back with or near the infy." 
 
 "Positions should be reconnoitered & firing data prepared before 
 dark; also arty, fire might be employed in case favorable targets 
 are presented north of the Conewago. May be necessary to oppose 
 attempts of Reds to construct intrenchments, to assist the out- 
 post troops in securing approaches to crossings &c." 
 
 Camps main body near 507 W and cavalry near 517. 
 
 Comment: "Cavy. is camped up-stream from the inf. Should 
 be below them." 
 
 In attack order, orders 1st Inf. to make demonstration with 
 2 cos. at 502 W, and 6 cos. at Hershey Mill. 
 
 Comment: "These demonstrations not likely to accomplish 
 much, it needs, or will probably need a good vigorous attack to 
 cause enemy to throw in his reserves. The ridge 586 n. e. of 
 Hershey Mill a strong position difficult to take by a frontal 
 attack." 
 
 Orders 2d and 3d Inf. to force crossing near 529. 
 
 Comment. "No reserve held out under Gen. A's command. At 
 the outset he assigns the entire inf. brigade to command of sub- 
 ordinates with nothing held out under his own command to in- 
 fluence the action, or cover withdrawal in case of a repulse." 
 
 Orders : "The field trains will form at R. SMITH." 
 
 Comment : "Hour not given." 
 
 Further comment: "No specific instructions to outpost. A 
 guard should be maintained at crossings within the limits 523 W — 
 529 when no attack is in progress." 
 
 4th Solution. 
 In discussion states : "The heavy artillery might be placed on 
 the island south of 502 but it is not thought advisable." 
 
[258] 
 
 Comment: "It would be an inexcusable mistake." 
 
 In halt order directs 1st Inf. to camp south of 707 hill and estab- 
 lish outposts, the 2d Inf. to camp 500 yds. south of 707, and the 
 3d Inf. just south of 712. 
 
 The arty, to camp south of the 3d Inf., and the engrs. and Amb. 
 Co. near 561. 
 
 Comment: "Too far forward — exposed to hostile arty, fire — 
 troops and trains getting into camp liable to be observed from the 
 east & north east (left bank of the Conewago)." 
 
 Orders: "* * * *, The f.our bridges and one ford near 
 PLAINVIEW will be watched * * * *." 
 
 Comment: "Apparently the 523 W— Hershey Mill— 502 W 
 and 529 bridges are the ones meant but to avoid mistake they 
 should be specified in the order. They should be more than 
 "watched" — a strenuous effort, supported if necessary by arty, 
 fire, to seize & hold them should be made, at least so far as the 
 southern approaches are concerned." 
 
 In Par. 3 orders reconnaissance to both flanks and states: 
 "Sufficient cavalry to carry out this reconnaissance will report to 
 the outpost commander at PLAINVIEW." 
 
 Comment: "The amount should be specified." 
 
 Further comment: "Whenever practicable the halt order 
 should prescribe time and place of issue of the next order. See 
 Par. 6 of order, top of page 421, Griepenkerl. (Edition 1908). 
 
 States attack order was issued verbally. 
 
 Comment: "A written order preferable when time permits." 
 
 Comment on Attack Order: "Command ordered to march at 
 3 A. M. Arty, does not open fire until 4 :00. The first attack does 
 not start until 4:15 and troops detailed to make it have less than 
 2 miles to march (except possibly some of the Mtd. Scouts). The 
 2d. Inf. ordered to attack at 4 :40 has only about 2 miles to march. 
 Seems a mistake to get troops up and then keep them waiting." 
 
 Attacks Hershey Mill crossing at 4:15 A. M. by reserve bn. 1st 
 Inf. and mounted scouts of 1st 2d and 3d Inf. 
 
 Comments: "Better have used them (mtd. scouts) for recon- 
 naissance." 
 
 "This rather weak attack made only 30 minutes before sunrise 
 not liable to accomplish much at the H. Mill crossing." 
 
[259] 
 
 Orders 2d Inf. to attack bridge at 502 W at 4 AO A. M. 
 
 Comments: "I would not specify the hour. Have them form 
 up in readiness in a concealed position as near as possible to bridge 
 and attack when ordered." 
 
 "No instructions as to support of attack at 502 W which is 
 likely to fail unless strongly supported by arty, fire." 
 
 Further comments : "If field artillery had been ordered to 
 "support the attack" at 502 W. think there would not be any 
 danger to Blue troops engaged in the attack there, especially as 
 attack was not to start until 4 :4<0 A. M. within 5 minutes of sun- 
 rise, broad daylight. Such an order puts it up to the arty, comdr. 
 to communicate with inf. comdr. in some way, and arrange details 
 where necessary." 
 
 "Some measures should have been taken for security and recon- 
 naissance on Gen. A's left flank. If the two companies sent to 
 support the artillery are to attend to security along the 561-534 
 road, & roads west, that fact should have been noted." 
 
 "The two attacks are believed to be too close together for the 
 reason that hostile reserves, located at a central point, can readily 
 be moved to meet either one. 
 
 Moreover the H. Mill position can be strongly defended by the 
 Reds & your attack there may not succeed in drawing anything 
 away from the Red reserves which could thus be held to oppose the 
 attack at 502 W." 
 
 5th Solution. 
 
 In halt order directs 3d Bn. 1st Inf. to bivouac 400 yds. north of 
 561, 2d Inf. east of road and south of 561 and 3d Inf. west of 
 road and south of 561, the arty, near 535; field trains to join 
 the organizations. 
 
 Comment: "The inf. camp is too far to the front and all the 
 camps or bivouacs except cavy. and amb. co. are more or less 
 exposed to view and possible long range arty, fire from the n. east 
 (left bank of the Conewago). Also within range of hostile arty, 
 north of 586 Ridge (n. e. of Hershey Mill). Troops and wagons 
 getting into camp liable to be seen and your strength estimated 
 by Reds." 
 
 Orders 3d Inf. to send a platoon and a few mounted men to 
 guard the bridges at Bridge S.H., and a similar force to guard 
 the bridge southwest of 529. 
 
[260] 
 
 Comment: "These detachments should patrol the creek cross- 
 ings west of Bridge S.H. & southeast of 529." 
 
 States: «****& the troops are so accessible that 
 there is no need of designating an hour for commanders (&c) to 
 report for orders." 
 
 Comment : "Believed better practice to do it, however." 
 
 Comment on the assembly order : "This order seems to require 
 some of the troops composing the column to make a retrograde 
 movement in order to get into column, — not a serious error per- 
 haps but should be avoided." 
 
 Orders field trains to assemble after their organizations are 
 formed. 
 
 Comment: "How long after.'' There is no hurry about this." 
 
 In attack order directs the field arty, to go into position north 
 and south of 605. 
 
 Comment : "Seems a poor arty, position when so much better 
 ones are available." 
 
 Orders 1st Inf. (less 3d Bn.) to attack at 502 W, and 2d and 3d 
 Inf. (less 3d Bn.) to attack at the island ford. 
 
 Comment : "This plan open to the objections which are obvious 
 to an attack at the ford, but main objection is that troops in- 
 trenched along the slope n. e. and east of 502 W can fire on both 
 attacks from same trench; — the attacks are too near together — 
 hostile reserves can be used with almost equal facility to oppose 
 both — if you advance against 584 you are flanked by the ridge 
 south of 545 & if against the latter then by troops on the 584 
 Ridge — The squadron may create some diversion (on enemy's 
 right) but may be delayed in crossing at 523 W. and in any event, 
 as they are "not to incur heavy losses" can probably be held by 
 a comparatively small force at 586 — Also the Hershey Mill cross- 
 ing is obviously too difficult for the diversion there to be taken 
 very seriously by the Reds." 
 
 Further comment : ^^Reconnaissance of hostile flanks and rear 
 should be ordered and something should be kept out to guard 
 your right flank." 
 
 Orders engrs. to follow 3d Inf. and when attack begins to con- 
 struct foot bridge over the Conewago. 
 
 Comment : "A detach of Engrs. might have been sent with the 
 force ordered to attack at 502 W. to assist in removing obstruc- 
 tions, preparation of additional crossings &c." 
 
[261] 
 
 Orders dressing station established south of 616. 
 
 Comment: "Too early yet to order the establishment of a 
 dressing station — wait until you are sure where you are going to 
 need it." 
 
 6th Solution. 
 
 In halt order directs 1st Inf. to bivouac in Plainview, and 2d 
 and 3d Inf. to bivouac in the angle south of 616. 
 
 Comment : "Camps are unnecessarily far forward * * * *." 
 
 In attack order states: "The 1st Bn. 1st F. A. will for the 
 present fire on the enemy at 502." 
 
 Comment: "From what position? 
 
 Your statement "near Plainview" * * * * too indefinite." 
 
 Continues : "As soon as the Artillery of the enemy is located 
 all batteries will turn their fire on it at once." 
 
 Comment: "An unsafe order; if literally obeyed might cause 
 the failure of an attack in which infantry was engaged." 
 
 Orders 1 bn. and M.G.P. to attack at 502, 1 bn. to attack 
 at Hershey Mill, and 2 regiments (less 1 bn.) to attack at ford 
 I mile south of 502. 
 
 Comment: "The attack at ford enfiladed from the edge of 
 woods, and from spur north & n. east of 502 W, and can be reached 
 by hostile arty, in vicinity of Heidlersburg. An attack at 502 W. 
 and one at the Ford can be opposed by troops from the same 
 trench on spur n. e. of 502 W. 
 
 Your plan might succeed but I believe at greater cost than had 
 some other plan been followed." 
 
 7th Solution. 
 
 In halt order directs the advance guard to relieve the cavalry 
 near 502 W. and reconnoitre the crossings of the Conewago as far 
 east as its junction with Beaver Dam Creek. 
 
 Comment: "Some effort should be made to reconnoitre north 
 of the Conewago and find out more about the enemy. With the 
 exception of patrol sent to Bender's Ch. I cannot find that this was 
 done." 
 
 Orders 2d Inf. to camp west of 666 and 3d Inf. north 666. 
 
 Comment : "Camp selected seems unnecessarily far to the front, 
 in an exposed position — to view, and possible long range arty. 
 
[262] 
 
 fire, from the east and north — and not handy to water. As Blues 
 are operating in enemy's country Gen. A's camping place is likely 
 to become known to the enemy and therefore for him ("A") to 
 camp bulk of his force on direct road to the 523 W crossing would 
 seem likely to indicate to the enemy where the attack is to fall 
 tomorrow." 
 
 Orders the artillery to obtain firing data for a position near 
 the 712-616 ridge. 
 
 Comment: "Somewhat indefinite." 
 
 Orders : "4. The train will not proceed further than 666 & 616 
 otherwise they will be at the disposal of the troops * * * */> 
 
 Comment: "Do not believe any part of the train should go 
 further forward than 561." 
 
 In attack order directs 1st Inf. to attack at 4:45 A. M. by way 
 of 502. 
 
 Comment : "This attack is late — it has been light for some 
 time." 
 
 Uses engineers at 523 W. 
 
 Comment: "A detachment from the Engr. Co. might have 
 been assigned to force attacking at 502." 
 
 Orders train to move to 561. 
 
 Comment: "Should be further back." 
 
 Further comment: "Position of Comdr. not stated." 
 
 States in reasons : "Time is not so important." 
 
 Comment : "Seems to me important in view of possible arrival 
 of hostile reenforcements." 
 
 Further comment : "No decision except as indicated in orders." 
 
 8th Solution. 
 
 In halt order directs: "3. (a) The 1st Sq., 1st Cav., will, as 
 soon as the outpost is in position, withdraw and camp near 
 BRIDGE S.H. * * * *." 
 
 Comment : "This camp seems unnecessarily exposed to view and 
 fire of the enemy from n. bank of the Conewago." 
 
 Orders: "The 2nd Inf. and 1 Bn., 3d Inf., will take position 
 before daylight in the woods southeast of the ford east of PLAIN- 
 VIEW and will attack this ford when I so order." 
 
 Comment: "Better to give hour of starting and route to be 
 followed. Avoids misunderstandings, delays, confusion, mixing 
 up of units &c." 
 
[263] 
 
 Orders: "The outposts at the several crossings will remain in 
 position until the respective attacks begin." 
 
 Comment : "What will they then do ? 
 
 Better leave them on at 523 W and 529." 
 
 The 1st Inf. makes a demonstration at 502 W and attacks at 
 Hershey Mill bridge. 
 
 The 2d Inf. and 1 bn. 3d Inf. attacks at the ford east of 
 Plain view. 
 
 Comment: "There are some objections to an attack at the 
 ford such as — can be enfiladed from spur n. e. of 502 W & arty, 
 near Heidlersburg ; troops must first take the 584 Ridge if same 
 is held before advancing against the spur n. of 502; ground near 
 ford (right bank of creek) exposed. Also the position n. of 
 Hershey Mill a strong one & a frontal attack there very costly. 
 With your superiority in arty. & adequate reserve the attack may 
 succeed but I believe at greater cost than had some other plan 
 been followed." 
 
 9th Solution. 
 
 In halt order states that the enemy is reported to have occupied 
 Heidlersburg this afternoon. 
 
 Comment : "This was not known at 6 :20 — should have been in 
 attack order." 
 
 The 1st Inf. is ordered to outpost from ford J of a mile south 
 east of 502 W inclusive to Bridge S.H. (523 W) inclusive. 
 
 Comment: "Believed that crossings should be watched and 
 creek patrolled west of 523 W at least as far as Fidler's, also the 
 529 crossing and s. e. thereof ; — Hostile country & enemy presum- 
 ably with an aggressive mission." 
 
 In attack order directs the artillery to go into position on hills 
 712 & 707 and open fire on the high ground northwest of 523 W. 
 
 Comment: "I would not simply open fire on the "ground" 
 unless or until I knew from patrols, or otherwise, that there were 
 hostile troops or trenches there." 
 
 Orders Engineers (less Mtd. Det.) to woods just north of 
 Plainview. 
 
 Comment : "A detach, of Engrs. might have been sent with the 
 1st Inf. to assist in removing obstructions, construction of addi- 
 tional crossings &c." 
 
[264] 
 
 Directs 1st Inf. (less 1 bn.) to attack via 523 W, 2 cos. 1st 
 Inf. to make a demonstration at Hershey Mill and the 2d and the 
 3d Inf. (less 1 bn.) to attack via 502 W. The cavalry and mtd. 
 det. Engrs. attack in the direction of hill 584 covering the right. 
 
 Comments: "Some cavy. or at least a detach, of mtd. inf. 
 scouts, should cover the left flank of the 1st Inf." 
 
 "A larger reserve (than 1 bn.) believed advisable with which to 
 influence action or cover withdrawal in case of repulse." 
 
 "No need of moving field trains quite so early." (4 :30) 
 
 Further comment: ^'Decision: not given, as to the attack &c., 
 except as it is contained in the order." 
 
 10th Solution. 
 
 In halt order in 3. (a) directs: "The crossings of the CONE- 
 WAGO from BRIDGE S.H. to 529 will be guarded and their 
 destruction prevented." 
 
 "Contact with the enemy will be maintained throughout the 
 night." 
 
 Comments : "Believed measures should be taken to patrol creek 
 and watch crossings west of Br. S.H., at least as far as Fidler." 
 
 "Reconnaissance of hostile flanks, and to hostile rear should be 
 undertaken and ordered." 
 
 Reply to comments: "The object in attaching a troop of 
 cavalry to the outpost and ordering that contact with the enemy 
 be maintained throughout the night was to have the advance guard 
 commander instead of Gen. A cause the creek to be patrolled, 
 crossings watched, and hostile flanks and rear reconnoitered. Cav- 
 alry with an outpost in such close contact as this one could only 
 be used to advantage on the flanks, and contact under these 
 conditions would necessarily be maintained by cavalry patrols on 
 the hostile flanks and rear. In my "Reasons" I state that details 
 of the outpost duty were left to the advance guard commander. 
 He is presumably an officer of experience, familiar with the situa- 
 tion, and could, I think, be given general instructions only. If his 
 report indicated lack of ability to act properly under these 
 general instructions, more detailed orders could then be given." 
 
 Comment on reply: "The order [par. 3 (a)] fixes the extent 
 of the outpost line and specifies the crossings to be guarded. It is 
 true that the outpost comdr. may not follow strictly the letter 
 
[265] 
 
 of his order, and may patrol & observe crossings west of Br. S. H. 
 & s. e. of 529, but if he failed to do so Gen. A would have to shoul- 
 der the responsibility. When desired to guard any point, and any 
 doubt exists as to the possibility of its being guarded, always 
 permissible & generally better to give specific instructions in halt 
 order with force of this size." 
 
 "Again true that an efficient outpost comdr. with an ample 
 force of cavy. at his disposal, should, and probably will, recon- 
 noiter to enemy's flanks & rear. But where such reconnaissance 
 so vital as in this case, believed better for Gen. A himself to make 
 sure that it is done by giving a specific order to that effect." 
 
 Camps 2d Inf. east of farm house north of 535, 3d Inf. west of 
 this farm house, artillery south of 2d Inf. and amb. co. south of 
 3d Inf. 
 
 Comment: "A camp less exposed to view, and possible long 
 range arty, fire from the north east (left bank of the Conewago), 
 could have been found further west." 
 
 "Firing data should be prepared — arty, positions selected — and 
 fire of artillery should be employed in case favorable targets offer 
 north of the Conewago, — all before dark. 
 
 May be necessary to use arty, to keep enemy from intrenching 
 or to assist the outpost in securing and holding crossings." 
 
 In attack order places the field arty, and howitzers near 616. 
 
 Comment: "Within effective range of hostile arty, near Bel- 
 mont S.H. and exposed to view. No mention of supporting attack 
 at 529. 
 
 The Howitzers with their long range & high angle fire could 
 have been held further to the rear, say along road running n. e. 
 from 507 W." 
 
 States : "5. I will be with the reserve." 
 
 Comment: "If this force is under Gen. A's orders, and it 
 should be, the order should so state." 
 
 Reply to comment: "As paragraph 5 of the attack order 
 states that Gen. A will be with the reserve, it is not understood 
 how there could be any doubt as to its being under his orders, nor 
 any necessity for stating that it was. 
 
 With Gen. A on the spot it is hardly probable that any one 
 would give orders to the reserve." 
 
[266] 
 
 Comment on reply: 
 
 "While the form as given in this solution is often found, it is 
 nevertheless believed better for the Detach. Comdr. to state in 
 connection with the reserve, that it is under his orders." 
 
 The 1st Inf. (less 1 bn.) attacks via Hershey Mill, the 2d via 
 529. 
 
 Comment: "Hershey Mill crossing can be so strongly de- 
 fended by the Reds that, as you say, the attack there does not 
 hold out much promise of success. Nor is it likely to cause Reds 
 to make much additional effort' to meet it. Had your effort been 
 made at 502 W. either a sufficient force must be held by Reds to 
 oppose it or else, if reserves are sent to oppose the attack at 529, 
 then the one at 502 W has a chance of going through, in which 
 case your two attacks would be separated to the extent they are 
 at present." 
 
 11th Solution. 
 
 As part of "Decision" states: "That contact with the enemy 
 be secured and retained." 
 
 Comment: "Contact has already been secured and, owing to 
 probable aggressive mission of the enemy, will doubtless be re- 
 tained." 
 
 In halt order in Par. 3 directs : "The crossings of the CONE- 
 WAGO will be secured at once and protected from injury by the 
 enemy." 
 
 Comment: "What crossings? Order should specify. The 
 general line of the outpost does not include the 529 crossing which 
 should be held." 
 
 Continues : "In case of attack the outpost will be reenforced." 
 
 Comment : "Better state the line to be held in case of attack." 
 
 Further comment: "A part of the duty assigned the Cavy. 
 comes within the sphere of the outpost comdr." 
 
 Continues: "5. Headquarters at 535." 
 
 Comment : "Officers to receive orders should be informed as to 
 time and place of issue of assembly order and ordered to report, or 
 notified when and where they will receive same." 
 
 In assembly order directs: "2. The troops will be prepared 
 to march at 3:30 A. M. tomorrow." 
 
 Comment : "Better give definite place of assembly." 
 
[267] 
 
 Continues: "3. The field train will park off the road, just 
 south of 543 at 4:30 A. M. in readiness to move at any time." 
 
 Comment : "No hurry about parking field train, will probably 
 not be needed for some time." 
 
 In attack order directs: 
 
 "3 — At 4 A. M. Col. A 1st Infantry, will make a demonstration 
 against the 502 W and HERSHEY MILL crossings with two 
 battalions and machine gun platoon. The 3rd Batt. will be held 
 east of PLAINVIEW in readiness to support with fire of position 
 the attack to be made on left bank. * * * *." 
 
 Comment : "Believe that this should be an attack to have neces- 
 sary effect." 
 
 Further comment: "A better position for the artillery than 
 616, avoiding the large target offered by student's arrangement, 
 can be found." 
 
 Orders the 2d Inf. to force a passage 900 yds. south of 529 
 and attack the ridge west of Belmont S.H. and adds: "The 
 COXEWAGO will be crossed by 4 A. M." 
 
 Comment: "Would hardly get there at that hour. The 2d 
 Inf. should move to a covered position near the crossing and there 
 await Gen. A's order to attack. For a crossing to be made with- 
 out waiting for the attack at 502 W. to have some effect would be 
 to be partly lost the benefit of that attack. Gen. A himself can 
 best decide when the attack on 529 should begin." 
 
 Further comment: "Cavy. ordered to assemble ("be prepared 
 to march"), and to cross the Conewago, at same hour." (3:30 
 A. M.) 
 
 Orders : "4. The Ambulance Company at 5 a.m. will proceed to 
 crossings west of 529." 
 
 Comment : "Amb. Co. had better await developments, either in 
 its camp or in some centrally located point." 
 
 Further comment: "Where is Gen. A to be.?*" 
 
 States in note that Gen. A during the night ordered Engrs. to 
 construct a crossing near bend of road 900 yds. south of 529. 
 
 Comment: "Liable to apprise the enemy of Gen. A's inten- 
 tions." 
 
 12th Solution. 
 
 Under "reasons" states relative to terrain north of the crossings 
 west of 502 W: "Also it offers very steep broken ground for the 
 deployment of the division * * * *." 
 
[268] 
 
 Comment : 'T)ivision ma v not have any occasion to deploy. ** 
 
 Reply to comment: "The Division may not but it aho may 
 have occasion to deploy. And Gen. Griepenkerl says Page 199 
 to cover a crossing you should allow for room for the deployment 
 of your following force." 
 
 Under "Reasons" continues : "* * * * and Gen. A even if he 
 gets a foothold with heavy loss would have difficulty in dri^nng the 
 enemy back over this ground out of artillery range of the cros- 
 ings.^ 
 
 Comment: "Do not understand this as the F. A. bn. can fire 
 effectively to or beyond the 554-609 road and the How. Btry. on 
 Heidlersburg." 
 
 Decides to force a crossing by the ford north of 513. 
 
 Comment: "Eventually however it would appear that Gen. A 
 must attack & carry the hostile positions between Heidlersburg 
 and Plainview if he is to carry out his mission." 
 
 In halt order directs that a detached post be sent to 534. 
 
 Comment : "May not be able to get there." 
 
 Camps 1st Inf. in ravine west of Plainview, 2d Inf. north of 
 507 W, 3d Inf. in ravine south of 561, Howitzer Battery near 
 cross roads 666, Bn. F. A. south of 507 W and cavalry at Cash- 
 man. 
 
 Comment: "The troops are unnecessarily dispersed. The 3d 
 Inf. camp more or less exposed to view & possible long range arty, 
 fire from north-east (left bank of Conewago). The How. Btry. & 
 1st Inf. camps within effective range of hostile arty, on ridge 586 
 (n. e. of Hershey Mill)." 
 
 Directs cavalry to observe the river from the bridge north west 
 of Xewchester to the mouth of the Little Conewago. 
 
 Comment : "Seems unnecessary to go so far east." 
 
 Further comment: "Xo camp assigned to Co. A, Engrs.*' 
 
 States at the end of the halt order that Cols. B and C the 
 Arty. Comdr. and Maj. X 1st Sq. 1st Cav. are directed to report 
 to Gen. A at once etc. 
 
 Comment: "Major X has his hands full at present. Better 
 to send him his orders now and confer with him later." 
 
 In attack order directs CoL B with 2 bns. 1st Inf. to open a 
 demonstration against the crossings 523W — Hershey Mill — and 
 502W. The 3d Bn. and M.G.P. under Gen. A at first occupy the 
 
[269] 
 
 ridge n. w. of Plainview and support the demonstration by fire of 
 position. 
 
 Comment: "These demonstrations made at three different 
 places by the two bns. on a front of 3000 yards (approx.) not 
 liable to accomplish much." 
 
 Reply to comment: "If these bridges are all lightly guarded, 
 they will keep the enemy guessing as to the main attack, and it 
 seems to me if a demonstration is ever of any use, it could be used 
 here with say 2 cos. covering each bridge and the reserve Bn. and 
 M.G.P. and a battery of Art. on ridge west of Plainview and the 
 siege battery on 707, as I ordered. It seems to me anything more 
 would have been a real attack, which I did not wish, because I con- 
 sidered 502 W could not be attacked without terrific losses, and 
 could not be carried (prior to one of the other bridges) without 
 vastly superior forces. I think this would keep strong covering 
 forces near these bridges and the bulk of his reserve not far away, 
 and the demonstration accomplish its purpose." 
 
 Comment on reply : " 'Demonstrations' will no doubt keep 
 small forces covering crossings occupied. Doubtful if they will 
 cause a keen commander to hold out reserves to meet them." 
 
 Orders 2d and 3d Inf. and F. A. (less one btry.) to force cross- 
 ing by the fords north of 513. 
 
 Comments: "I am opposed to dividing the artillery and plac- 
 ing a part of it under one of the inf. cols. It should be kept under 
 the Arty. Major who, under Gen. A's orders, (who should assign 
 to the arty, its mission, and its approximate position or positions) 
 will handle the batteries and coordinate their work with that of 
 the infantry. Moreover by thus sending two btrys. with Col. C 
 to cross the Conewago they will be delayed for some time in open- 
 ing fire and one of Gen. A's chief advantages — his superiority in 
 artillery, — is for a time suspended." 
 
 "Gen. A should himself assure arty, support of the crossing at 
 529. He cannot be sure that Col. C will not attempt to cross his 
 entire column before gaining fire superiority and thus lose at the 
 outset the great advantage now given to Gen. A by his superior 
 artillery, or even run the risk of losing, or having immobilized 
 these two batteries." 
 
 "Nearly or quite 3 miles from the camp of the 3rd Inf. to the 
 crossing you have selected, which they will hardly reach before 
 
[270] 
 
 5 A. M. In the meantime Red scouts and patrols have been busy 
 and the movement should have become known to the Red force." 
 
 Reply to last comment: "True but it's much more than 3 
 miles from Heidlersburg to the crossing, and it takes some time to 
 get messages back and troops in motion." 
 
 Further comment: "From the outset Gen. A disposes of all 
 but one of his battalions and of two of his four batteries, he has 
 little left with which to influence the action or to cover withdrawal 
 in case of a repulse." 
 . Reply to comment: "I had decided that if I could not carry 
 it at the place selected, I could not carry it anywhere, therefore 
 I gave Col. C 2 whole regiments. * * * *^ 
 
 In neither the approved solution or mine could 502 be carried 
 before the main one selected, without a terrible and unnecessary 
 sacrifice so why not give Col. C the two regts. to start off with. 
 The river will cover withdrawal in case of defeat." 
 
 Further comments: "Apparently nothing to be gained by 
 crossing so far away from Plainview where the rest of the command 
 is. It has occassioned considerable delay and you still have a 
 fight on your hands even though you meet with no opposition 
 before arriving at the Belmont Ridge." 
 
 "A better arty, position could have been found." 
 
 13th Solution. 
 
 Comment on halt order : 
 
 "Cavalry and Co. A. Engrs. not assigned to camp grounds." 
 
 In attack order directs Engrs. to proceed at 2 A. M. to con- 
 struct foot bridges near 529. 
 
 Comment : "Liable to indicate Gen. A's intentions to the enemy. 
 Hostile outposts & patrols must be assumed as vigilant. A detach, 
 of Engrs. might have been assigned to the force ordered to attack 
 at 502 W." 
 
 14th Solution. 
 
 Comment on halt order: 
 
 "The Arty. Bn. camped further up stream than the 3rd Inf. 
 and must pass thru inf. camp to get water for animals or else go 
 around." 
 
 Directs howitzer battery to fire on Heidlersburg during the 
 night. 
 
[271] 
 
 Comment : 
 
 "All you know is that they 'arrived' at Heidlersburg during 
 afternoon of 15th; they may not be there now. I question the 
 advisability of 'shooting up' the town in this way so early in the 
 campaign. It is sure to arouse the bitter hostility of the inhabi- 
 tants and material results accomplished will probably be very 
 slight, so far as Red force is concerned. Also you must consider 
 the expenditure of ammunition, which will be needed for the work 
 of the following day. There is of course some reason for firing on 
 ridge 586, especially if enemy attempt to intrench there." 
 
 In the attack order directs Col. B with 2 bns. i Co. Engrs. 
 and 2 btrys. arty, to attack at 502 W. Directs Col. C with 1 bn. 
 1st Inf. 2nd Inf. 3d Inf. 4 Co. Engrs. and 1 btry. to cross south- 
 east of hill 586 and at 523 W. 
 
 Comment : 
 
 "Better to leave the artillery under one comdr., the Arty. Bn. 
 Comdr., who, under Gen. A's orders, is the one to coordinate the 
 task of the arty, which is to support both attacks and to silence 
 hostile arty." 
 
 Reply to comment : 
 
 "Is not this more of a matter of opinion than an error? I 
 observe that the artillery is separated and not controlled by one 
 man in Prob. 9, Part III, this year." 
 
 Comment on reply: 
 
 "In Prob. 9, Part III, the artillery is very properly separated. 
 You are in error in supposing that it may not still be controlled 
 by one man. Separating the batteries of a battalion of arty., 
 and turning them over to the infantry colonels, two very different 
 things." 
 
 Further comments: 
 
 "As long as this btry. has been turned over to Col. C to support 
 his attack the time of opening fire had best be left to Col. C and 
 the btry. comdr." 
 
 "Seems better for Gen. A to hold out a reserve and thus 
 retain more influence over the action." 
 
 Directs cavy. to cross at first open crossing southeast of 502 W 
 and attack enemy's left flank dismounted. 
 
 Comment : 
 
 "Cavy. commander should not be restricted in his method of 
 attack. Chances might offer, favorable for mounted action, and 
 
[272] 
 
 besides, the cav. comdr., being on the ground, is better able to 
 judge." 
 
 Directs outposts to join regiment as the latter passes them. 
 
 Comment : 
 
 "Better to leave guard over crossings where no attack is in 
 progress." 
 
 Reply to comment: 
 
 "In my solution this applies only to the ford at Hershey Mill 
 and east of Plainview and these are provided for as the outposts 
 are only relieved by the order when their regiments pass them. 
 Here they do not pass them and so must remain." 
 
 Comment on reply : 
 
 "In accordance with general rule, when an order is obscure 
 as to its meaning, the worst construction is taken. Certainly 
 there is a reasonable doubt as to whether the outguards at Hershey 
 Mill & crossing east of Plainview would not consider themselves 
 as relieved by your order after the attacks at 523 W. and at 
 502 W. begin." 
 
 Directs that the field train be parked off the road at 543. 
 
 Comment: "At what hour.?" 
 
 Under "Reasons" states: "Very little cavalry is needed with 
 Col. C as his left will be protected by Chestnut Hill." 
 
 Comment : 
 
 "Which may however be occupied by hostile cavalry." 
 
 Reply to comment: 
 
 "Chestnut Hill does not seem suitable for cavalry operations. 
 It, the cavalry, could be used to better advantage elsewhere, so 
 Gen. A should assume that it was not there. Col. C's scouts would 
 soon find it out anyway if the cavalry were there." 
 
 15th Solution. 
 
 Camps 2d and 3d infantry northeast of road fork 535. 
 
 Comment: "Camp well located so far as your plans for fol- 
 lowing day are concerned, but more or less exposed to view and 
 possible long range hostile arty, fire from 584 ridge. On this 
 account it would seem better to camp west of the Heidlersburg 
 road." 
 
 Further comments: "Instructions in case of attack?" 
 
[273] 
 
 "Enemy being on his own ground and his mission presumably 
 an aggressive one it would seem that some measure should be taken 
 to watch creek crossings west of 523 W. at least as far as Fid- 
 dlers and, depending on enemy's activity, southeast of the 529 
 crossing." 
 
 In attack order directs 1 bn. 1st Inf. to attack the 502 W 
 crossing. 
 
 Comment: "This is rather weak and liable to be detected and 
 not accomplish much." 
 
 Directs cavalry to attack dismounted at 523 W. 
 
 Comment : "Better as a rule to give the cavy. comdr. his task 
 and let him use his judgment as to method, i. e. as to whether 
 he will attack dismounted or mounted &c. In this case there is 
 some reason for ordering a dismounted attack however." 
 
 Directs 2d and 3d Inf. to force the crossing south west and 
 west of 529. 
 
 Comment: "Orders to these two regts. not very definite, i.e. 
 what are they to do after crossing .f^" 
 
 Further comment: "Position selected for the F.A. Bn. should 
 be noted. Has important bearing on the general plan." 
 
 States that Col. 1st Inf. will have verbal instructions as to 
 disposition and time outposts join as reserve under Gen. A. 
 
 Comment: "These instructions should have been given in the 
 order." 
 
 Further comment: "The first thing to do is to defeat the 
 enemy. While the needs of the division must certainly be kept 
 in mind the immediate problem for Gen. A is largely tactical and 
 the solution that offers the greater tactical advantages should, in 
 view of the difficulty of the undertaking, be selected. There are 
 certain disadvantages pertaining to the crossing at 529 that are 
 not considered in your solution, also certain advantages to cross- 
 ing a larger force at 523 W. that you have failed to note." 
 
 AN APPROVED SOLUTION. 
 
 The following composition and distribution of the detachment 
 is assumed: 
 
 Independent Cavalry: 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry. 
 
[274] 
 
 Advance Guard: 1st Inf. and Co. A, 1st Bn. Engrs. 
 Main body in order of march: 
 
 1st Bn. 2d Infantry 
 
 1st Bn. 1st. F.A. (less reserves) 
 
 2d Infantry (less 1st Bn.) 
 
 3d Infantry 
 
 Howitzer Battery 
 
 Artillery Reserves 
 
 Ambulance Co. No. 1 
 
 Field Train 
 At 6 P. M. the detachment is disposed as follows: 
 Independent Cavalry — near Plainview. 
 
 Point of Advance Guard — at orchard 325 yards southwest of 616. 
 Head of Support — at 561. 
 Head of Reserve — ^just north of 535. 
 
 Head of Main Body — at edge of woods just northeast of 543. 
 Tail of Main Body — just south of cross-road 501. 
 Field Train — follows main body at one-half mile. 
 
 Upon receipt of information as given in statement of problem, 
 and pursuant to decision to halt and camp for the night, General 
 A issues the following orders, in order named. If combined and 
 written they would be as follows: 
 No. 1 (Verbal). To Adv. Guard Commander (Col. B) : 
 
 The detachment bivouacks for the night south of 712-616 
 Ridge. The Advance Guard will establish outpost along general 
 line BRIDGE S. H.-PLAINVIEW-FORD f mile east of PLAIN- 
 VIEW. You will at once secure and hold crossings of CONE- 
 WAGO from BRIDGE S. H. inclusive to FORD inclusive. One- 
 half troop will report to me here without delay, remainder of 1st 
 Squadron, under your orders until dark when it will withdraw and 
 bivouac southwest of D. WIRT. 
 No. 2 (Verbal). To Art. Bn. Commander (Maj. Y) : 
 
 You have heard my orders to Colonel B. The howitzer battery 
 is under your orders. The Field Artillery Battalion will at once 
 proceed via 543-581 to HILL 707. Secure firing data for hostile 
 positions north of CONEWAGO from BRIDGE S. H. through 
 HEIDLERSBURG to east of HEIDLERSBURG road and the 
 creek crossings within this area. Howitzer Battery to head of 
 draw just east of D. WIRT and secure firing data. You will 
 
[275] 
 
 open fire on favorable targets appearing north of the CONE- 
 WAGO and oppose any attempt by the enemy to intrench, or 
 secure crossings. 
 
 The main body having been halted on the road the following 
 order is then dictated to staff and delivered by aide and messengers 
 to officers commanding separate organizations including officer 
 in charge of Field Train: 
 
 No. 3. Detachment — Blue Division, 
 
 Cross-roads at 561, south Plainview, Pa. 
 Field Orders | 15 May, '11, 6 :15 P. M. 
 
 No. — . ] 
 
 1. Our cavalry has encountered rifle and machine gun fire 
 from north bank of CONEWAGO east and west of 502W. About 
 100 Red cavalry have been driven from the wooded island just 
 south of 502W and island now held by our troops. Dismounted 
 Red troops have been seen along the 586 RIDGE northwest of 
 502. The advance guard, reinforced by 1st Squadron, 1st Cav- 
 alry, has been ordered to secure and hold the crossings from 
 BRIDGE S. H. inclusive, to FORD east of PLAINVIEW in- 
 clusive. 
 
 2. The detachment will halt and bivouac for the night as 
 follows : 
 
 Reserve of Adv. Guard and Co. A, Engineers — west of 561. 
 3d Infantry — between 581-576 road and stream west thereof. 
 2d Infantry — on west bank of stream west of 3d Inf. 
 Field Artillery Battalion — east of HILL 607 on west bank of 
 
 stream. 
 Howitzer Battery — head of draw east of D. WIRT. 
 Cavalry — southwest of D. WIRT on east bank of stream. 
 Ambulance Company — south of 2d Infantry. 
 
 The Commanding Officer, 3d Infantry, will provide for security 
 on. the 588-FIDLER road and country road 570 yards northeast 
 thereof, sending details of mounted scouts to the creek crossings, 
 who will maintain communication with outpost at BRIDGE S. H. 
 and the platoon of cavalry at TABLE ROCK. 
 
 3. One platoon of cavalry will be sent by me to farmhouse 
 about one-half mile southwest of the bridge near 529 to patrol 
 creek from ford east of PLAINVIEW, exclusive, to mouth of 
 BEAVERDAM CREEK, inclusive, reconnoitering to enemy's left 
 
[276] 
 
 iiank and rear thru BELMONT S. H., and one platoon will 
 be sent to TABLE ROCK reconnoitering thru 582 cross- 
 roads towards HEIDLERSBURG. Reports will be made to me 
 at cross-roads 552. 
 
 4. The advance guard has been ordered to establish outpost 
 along general line BRIDGE S. H.-PLAINVIEW-FORD | mile 
 east of PLAINVIEW. In case of attack this line will be held and 
 the advance guard will be supported. Contact with enemy will be 
 maintained thruout the night." 
 
 5. Field trains will join their organizations except that of the 
 advance guard which will remain subject to disposition of advance 
 guard commander at D. WIRT. 
 
 6. Messages to cross-roads 552, where orders will issue at 
 9 P. M. 
 
 A, 
 Brig. Gen. 
 
 Substance in report to Division Commander at Gettysburg. 
 
 As soon as the one half troop reports to General A, or to his 
 representative, at 561, the two platoons will bo informed as to 
 the above order and given any further instructions that may be 
 necessary regarding their duties for the night, including informa- 
 tion as to location of friendly troops in their vicinity and the 
 necessity of maintaining communication with them. 
 
 General A sends for the commander of the engineer company 
 and directs him to make personal reconnaissance of the crossings 
 at Bridge S. H. and 502W with a view to the construction of 
 improvised crossings at those places on the following morning. 
 He then rides to the front with such of his staff and regimental 
 commanders as are not already engaged, for the purpose of making 
 a hasty reconnaissance of the country in the vicinity while day- 
 light lasts. 
 
 After sufficient information has been received to enable General 
 A to form some idea as to the enemy's strength, and an approxi- 
 mate estimate as to his dispositions and intentions, he arrives at 
 the following decision: 
 
 To assemble his troops before dawn and to attack and force a 
 crossing at Bridge S. H., and later at 502W, as follows : 
 
[277] 
 
 The 2d Infantry and one section Company A, Engineers, to 
 cross at 523W, afterwards forming and advancing to the east 
 against enemy's position north of the Hershey Mill crossing. 
 
 The 1st Infantry and Company A, Engineers (less one section), 
 to form under cover near 502W and to attack when ordered. 
 
 The 3d Infantry to form under cover as a general reserve, to be 
 used as the situation demands. 
 
 The cavalry to cross west of 523W and cover the left flank, 
 operating against enemy's right and rear between Chestnut hill 
 and the 554-609-Heidlersburg road. 
 
 The field artillery battalion and howitzer battery to support 
 both attacks. 
 
 As to whether or not the attack order can be issued the night 
 before depends largely on the rapidity with which situation in 
 General A's front is cleared up. Definite information as to enemy's 
 strength and dispositions will seldom or never be obtainable with- 
 out a fight, and the decision will have to be based largely on the 
 general situation. Information will continue to come in from 
 various sources during the night, and it is impossible to say at 
 just what hour General A will be able to definitely plan his attack 
 and formulate his attack order. In this solution an assembly order 
 is issued at 9 p. m. and the attack order the following morning, 
 though there certainly can be no serious objection to omitting 
 the assembly order, or rather to combining the two orders and 
 issuing them the night of the 15th. The assembly order follows: 
 
 Detachment — Blue Division, 
 Cross Roads 552 near Plainview, Pa. 
 Field Orders | 15 May '11, 9 :00 P. M. 
 
 No. — . J 
 
 1. Reports from our front indicate the arrival at HEID- 
 LERSBURG this afternoon of a mixed Red detachment which 
 has less than brigade of infantry, some cavalry and one or two 
 batteries. 
 
 2. This detachment will be in readiness to march from the 
 respective camp sites at 3 :15 A. M. tomorrow. 
 
 3. The Advance Guard Commander will send one section. Com- 
 pany "A", Engineers, to report to Colonel C, 2d Infantry, at the 
 farm house near the 2d Infantry camp, 1000 yards east of 588, 
 at 3 A. M. 
 
[278] 
 
 4. The outpost will remain in position until further orders. 
 
 5. The Field Train will assemble in column of route at 6 A. M. 
 tomorrow, on the 581-543 road with head of column at 543 and 
 in the same order as yesterday. 
 
 6. Officers commanding separate organizations will report for 
 orders at 576 at 3 A. M. tomorrow. 
 
 . ^' 
 
 Brig. Gen. 
 The order for the attack follows: 
 
 Detachment — Blue Division, 
 
 Cross-Roads 552, 
 Field Orders | 16 May, 3 :00 A. M. 
 
 No. — . J 
 
 1. No further information of the enemy or of our division. 
 
 2. This detachment will attack the enemy along the line of 
 the CONEWAGO from BRIDGE S. H. to BRIDGE 502W north- 
 east of PLAINVIEW. 
 
 3. (a) The 2d Infantry and 1 section, Company A, En- 
 gineers, under Colonel C, will move at once via country road east 
 of and parallel to the 588 FIDLER-BENDER'S CHURCH road, 
 and will attack and cross at or near 523W, moving thence east 
 against the enemy on the 586 RIDGE north of HERSHEY 
 MILL. 
 
 The 1st Infantry and Company A, Engineers, (less 1 section), 
 under Colonel B, will move at once to covered position off the road 
 near PLAINVIEW and will attack when ordered at 502W. 
 
 The outposts (less detachments guarding crossings at HER- 
 SHEY MILL and FORD) will join the regiment as the attack 
 begins. 
 
 The 3d Infantry (less Co. M) will move at once via 576-666 to 
 a covered position near 605 and there form in readiness subject to 
 my orders. 
 
 Company M, 3d Infantry, will at once report to Major Y, 1st 
 Field Artillery, to protect the Howitzer Battery and a detachment 
 from this company will be sent to relieve the cavalry platoon at 
 farmhouse near 529. 
 
 (b) The Field Artillery Battalion and the Howitzer Battery, 
 under Major Y, will support both attacks. The Field Artillery 
 Battalion will move at once via 552 and take position west of 
 
[279] 
 
 cross-roads at 561 ; the Howitzer Battery will move at once via 
 517-507W to a position near WOODSIDE S. H. Fire will first 
 be opened in support of attack at 523 W, Major Y arranging with 
 Colonel B as to details. 
 
 (c) The 1st Squadron, 1st Cavalry (less 1 plat.) will cross 
 the CONEWAGO west of BRIDGE S. H. and operate against 
 enemy's right covering our left flank. The platoon near 529, 
 when relieved by detachment Co. M, 3d Inf., will cross the CONE- - 
 WAGO at or southeast of 529 and cover our right flank. Recon- 
 naissance will be at once undertaken of enemy's flanks and rear. 
 Roads leading north must be observed as far west as CENTER 
 MILLS and as far east as BOWLDER. 
 
 (d) The Engineer troops, under Colonels B and C, will under- 
 take the construction of additional crossings at 523W and 502W 
 as soon as respective attacks begin. 
 
 4. Ambulance Company No. 1 will move to D. WIRT at 5 
 A. M. and there await orders. 
 
 5. Messages to 707 Hill. 
 
 A, 
 Brig. Gen. 
 Reasons: Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 3. 
 
 General A's decision to halt and camp for the night, whether 
 justified or not by the situation existing at 6 p. m., must be 
 accepted. With that decision we have nothing further to do and 
 there remains to consider the reasons for his further action. 
 
 His mission is to secure the crossings of the Conewago at Plain- 
 view, to cover the crossing of the remainder of the division. Hav- 
 ing decided to halt and camp for the night on the near side of the 
 creek, and being in contact with an enemy whose mission is likely 
 to be as aggressive as his own, obviously General A's first duty is 
 to take active measures to secure the southern approaches to the 
 crossings which he is liable to need on the following day. This is 
 provided for in the orders to the advance guard and artillery com- 
 manders. 
 
 General A is in hostile territory in immediate contact with an 
 enemy whose force is liable to be increased at any moment. Active 
 measures for the security of his command, for reconnaissance, and 
 for preventing the enemy's reconnaissance, are demanded. More- 
 over, the troops of the detachment should be camped in as shel- 
 
[280] 
 
 tered a location as is consistent with the proper degree of readiness 
 to defend themselves in case of attack, and convenience for the 
 tasks which will be assigned to them the following morning. 
 Specifically General A must : 
 
 1. Seize the crossings in his immediate front, secure them for 
 the passage of his own troops and bar them to those of the enemy. 
 
 2. Establish a proper system of outposts. 
 
 3. Conduct such reconnaissance as will enable him to determine 
 as far as possible the enemy's strength, disposition and move- 
 ments. 
 
 4. Prevent hostile reconnaissance. 
 
 5. Establish his command for the night in a location secure 
 from view and fire of the enemy, with due regard to their distribu- 
 tion in column of march, their proximity to the line selected for 
 defense, and the part to be taken by them in the operations of the 
 following day. 
 
 6. Reconnoiter the ground to the front with a view to selecting 
 the points most favorable to forcing a crossing, and to familiarize 
 himself and his subordinates with those features of the terrain 
 which will affect the following day's operations. 
 
 The measures to be adopted for security and reconnaissance 
 admit of various solutions. Those presented are open to the objec- 
 tion that the responsibility is divided, but it is believed that the 
 outpost commander will be fully occupied in taking care of the 
 line assigned to him. Any further extension of this line increases 
 the difficulty of coordinating the work of the outpost and might 
 lead to a neglect, either of the important task of guarding the 
 immediate front, or the hardly less important one of securing the 
 flanks. No cavalry has been assigned to the outpost it being 
 understood that the infantry mounted scouts of the regiment 
 furnishing the outpost would be used for nearby reconnaissance. 
 Moreover, as much of the cavalry as possible has been spared for 
 the work of the following day. 
 
 An examination of the location selected for camp sites will show 
 that, with the exception of the advance guard which is already 
 well forward, and whose further task demands its exposure, the 
 various commands can be turned off the highway and marched to 
 their camps under cover, that they are located on roads leading to 
 
[281] 
 
 the front and are conveniently assigned with reference to the 
 following day's operations. 
 
 The measures for security directed of the Colonel 2d Infantry, 
 are such as are necessary for the immediate protection of his own 
 command and are therefore liable to be effectively performed. 
 
 The cavalry commander would be directed to furnish protection 
 for the howitzer battery in case conditions rendered any further 
 protection for their right flank or rear advisable or necessary. 
 
 The other features of the orders noted do not seem to call for 
 particular comment. 
 
 The Assembly Order : Has already been referred to ; the situa- 
 tion alone can determine whether or not such order is advisable, 
 the main reason for such order being to avoid the inexpediency of 
 issuing an attack order which further developments in the situa- 
 tion may require to be changed. 
 Decision and order for the attack : 
 
 The general situation and General A's mission cajl for an at- 
 tempt to force a crossing, defeat the Red force and drive it back 
 through Heidlersburg to the north, thus uncovering the bridges 
 and fords near Plainview for the crossing of the Blue Division. 
 General A's immediate task is a purely tactical one. He must first 
 defeat the Red force and drive it back. If a victory is secured 
 there will then be time to consider further measures for covering 
 the advance of the division, which may have no occasion to deploy 
 before it reaches Harrisburg. Without a victory the advance of 
 the division is successfully barred, for the time being at least, and 
 General A's mission is lost. 
 
 Time is an important element as the Red force may be re- 
 enforced at any moment so that an attack that may succeed now, 
 may be quite hopeless a few hours later. A plan must be adopted 
 that combines the surest with the speediest results. It is evident 
 at a glance that no one attack, or combination of attacks, can 
 be made that is free of objections, or that promises a certainty 
 of success. At best some chances must be taken. 
 
 The enemy will at first be uncertain as to which direction the 
 attack is coming from and therefore full advantage must be taken 
 of the element of surprise. Points in General A's favor are his 
 marked superiority in artillery and the commanding ground which 
 favors his attack. 
 
[282] 
 
 The following reasons have governed the selection of the points 
 chosen for attack and the plan adopted. 
 
 1. Superiority of -fire. Without this the attack has little 
 chance of success. General A's artillery has been located so as to 
 bring a powerful converging and cross fire on the chosen objec- 
 tives. Whatever plan is adopted the hostile position northeast 
 of 502W must eventually be cleared of Red troops and the available 
 positions for the field artillery seem to favor a movement of the 
 Blues to the west rather than to the east. 
 
 2. Ease of execution. Any plcCn which calls for the movement 
 of troops before daylight must be as simple and easily executed as 
 it is possible to make it, otherwise failure is liable to result from 
 delays, confusion, and misunderstandings. For this reason the 
 regiment selected to make the attack at Bridge S. H. has been 
 ordered to move by the country road rather than by the slightly 
 more direct and less exposed route via the draw just west of the 
 666-Bridge S. H. road. Darkness is relied upon to cover the 
 movement until the troops arrive at or near the crossing. Unless 
 the command is camped south of the ridge running east from D. 
 Wirt-535, any movement of troops to attack at 529 involves 
 either a considerable detour or else a movement across country — a 
 thing to be avoided in the darkness if possible. 
 
 3. Tactical Advantages. The movement via 523W aifords 
 cover for a screened approach, and troops can advance from a 
 concealed position behind the ridge running southwest from Hill 
 712 within eleven to twelve hundred yards of the crossing, so that 
 the enemy must be in doubt for some time as to whether or not 
 more troops are to follow those first sent over. After crossing is 
 forced and possession gained of Hill 586 west of 534, the wooded 
 Opossum Creek and the rising ground on its left bank afford cover 
 in which to form for a further advance to the east. The high 
 ground on the south bank of the Conewago at this point lends itself 
 to fire of position to cover the advance of troops across the creek. 
 The creek is narrower here than east of the Heidlersburg Road 
 and presumably shallower and easier to bridge than at points 
 further down. Good artillery support can be had from behind 
 the 712-707 Ridge. The timber about 800 yards east of the 
 534-554 road screens the movement of troops against the 586 
 Ridge and affords a supporting point for the first troops who 
 
[283] 
 
 effect a crossing. Finally, any movement of Red troops sent either 
 from the 586 position or from anywhere east of there to oppose 
 this movement must be exposed to the fire of Blue artillery at 
 effective ranges unless made so far to the north, via Chestnut Hill, 
 as practically to defeat its object. 
 
 4. The attack at the 502W Bridge, while less promising than 
 the one via Bridge S. H., is by no means hopeless if made with 
 strong fire support of machine guns, artillery and fire of position 
 from the south bank. The latter should be able to control any fire 
 that may be directed on this attack either from the orchard and 
 vicinity northeast of Hershey Mill, or from the edge of the woods 
 just west of 502 W. While it is true that these woods with their 
 undergrowth afford cover for Red troops concealed therein, it 
 must be remembered that, in order to fire effectively, troops must 
 get where they can see the target, which means that they must 
 approach to or near the edge of the wood, thus exposing themselves 
 to an effective fire in return. The woods referred to, while afford- 
 ing cover for the enemy, also screen the left flank of the Blue 
 attack from fire of troops on the 586 Ridge. The left flank of the 
 Red position is open and exposed to an effective fire from the Blue 
 artillery which can also reach the ravines in rear. Finally it is 
 proposed to make this attack at a time when the Red force north of 
 502, by this time apprehensive of the attack coming against their 
 right flank, will be less prepared to resist than had the first effort 
 been made in their direction. 
 
 5. General A holds out a strong reserve in the event that, 
 whichever attack succeeds, it may be promptly and strongly sup- 
 ported. If the 586 Ridge is carried by the 2d Infantry, it may 
 then be possible to send the reserve directly across at Hershey 
 Mill and push the movement to the enemy's right and rear while 
 holding him in front. If the attack at 502W fails, it can still hold 
 the enemy at that point and troops be sent to follow up and re- 
 inforce those first crossing at Bridge S. H. 
 
 A full discussion as to the relative advantages and disadvantages 
 connected with an attack at the other available points of crossing 
 is not thought necessary. 
 
 The position north and northeast of Hershey Mill is capable 
 of a strong defense by the Reds, the approach is exposed, and a 
 
[284] 
 
 frontal attack there would be very costly, and is to be avoided if 
 possible. 
 
 The approach to the ford east of Plainview is also exposed and 
 an attack there has many disadvantages. Red reserves have a 
 screened approach via the ravine running northwest from 539 and 
 an attack at the ford would in all probability involve an attack 
 against Red troops on the Belmont S. H.-584 Ridge which attack 
 would thus be exposed to a flank fire from the Red position north- 
 east of 502W. Furthermore, the 584 Ridge having been occupied 
 the Reds must still be driven from the 502W position. 
 
 The attack via the stone bridge near 529 has already been re- 
 ferred to. It offers some advantages, but is believed to promise 
 less certain and less speedy results than the one to the west via 
 Bridge S. H. While it is true that the terrain on the east bank of 
 the Conewago between the 529 crossing and Heidlersburg is favor- 
 able to Blue movements, it is also favorable to those of the Red 
 forces. Hostile artillery in the vicinity or south of Heidlersburg 
 can effectively oppose the crossing, the approach to which is rather 
 open. Fire superiority, so essential to the success of the Blue 
 attack, can be less readily secured during all stages of the action 
 and coordination of an attack via 529 with one against any other 
 point that may be selected, seems less certain than in the case of 
 the plan adopted. 
 
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 UNIVERSITY OF CAUFORNIA LIBRARY 
 
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