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FRANCE 
 
 AND THE 
 
 AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
 
 1763-1778 
 
 A thesis presented to the Faculty of Cornell University for the 
 degree of Doctor of Philosophy, June, 1895. 
 
 BY 
 
 LAURA CHARLOTTE SHELDON 
 
 M 
 
 ANDRUS & CHURCH 
 
 ITHACA, N. Y. 
 
 IQOO 
 
sr 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 FORECASTS OF REVOLUTION __ 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 AID FOR AMERICA__ 
 
 3 
 
 CHAPTER HI. 
 THE BEGINNING OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 30 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 THE DEMAND FOR RECOGNITION 46 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 THE CONCLUSION OF THE TREATY.. 60 
 
 J65951 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 In this study of the circumstances which led to the 
 Franco-American alliance of 1778, without hoping to attain 
 minuteness of analysis, I have tried to show the principal 
 motives of France, and to suggest how they were modified 
 by the influence of Spain. In dealing with the American 
 side of the story, [Tio attempt has been made to do more than 
 hint at the political complications which, beginning in this 
 early period, produced their most important results in the 
 later stages of the war. 
 
 The most helpful documents easily accessible for the 
 study of this topic are : on the American side, Wharton s 
 Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence, the Journals of 
 Congress, and the writings of the statesmen concerned ; on 
 the French, Mr. B. F. Stevens great collection of Fac 
 similes, and the original material contained in M. Doniol s 
 important but biased history. These may be supplemented 
 by the manuscript collections of Mr. Jared Sparks and Mr. 
 George Bancroft. The letters published by DeWitt in his 
 study of Jefferson may also be found among the Sparks 
 manuscripts. The Spanish documents have been consulted 
 in English and French translations. 
 
 I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to Mr. Thomas 
 J. Kiernan of the Harvard library, Mr. Wilberforce Eames 
 of the Lenox Library, and Mr. Robbins Little, formerly of 
 the Astor Library, for their kindness in giving me access to 
 valuable collections ; and also to thank the officers of the 
 Cornell Library for favors continued during the revision of 
 this thesis. 
 
 LAURA C. SHELDON. 
 
. I. 
 
 FORECASTS OF REVOLUTION. 
 
 The agreement made between France and the United 
 States in 1778, though a welcome relief to struggling patriots 
 in America and a source of joy to Republican enthusiasts in 
 France, did not, in either country, lack critics to condemn it 
 as an unnatural alliance. In view of the wars which had 
 sundered Frenchmen and Englishmen for nearly a century, 
 the feeling was inevitable ; yet those who deliberately called 
 this union of enemies a natural alliance had wiser political 
 insight. They saw that the transfer of Canada to England 
 in 1763 had opened the way for a friendship between English 
 America and France. 
 
 Early in the series of contests, here and there an onlooker 
 had dimly seen that the relation between England and her 
 thirteen Colonies depended on whether France or England 
 held Canada. Two opposite predictions were made : one, 
 that England, if she should conquer Canada, would follow 
 up the victory by tightening her grasp on her own Colonies ; 
 the other, that she would soon lose them altogether. Toward 
 the close of Queen Anne s War, an enterprising French 
 officer formed a plan for winning the English Colonists to the 
 side of France: namely, to persuade them that the troops 
 which England was sending to their shores were designed, not 
 for the conquest of their enemy, but for their own subjuga 
 tion ; and that, if New France should fall into the hands of 
 England, their liberties would be destroyed. The French 
 colonial minister approved of the scheme. " It is much to 
 be wished," he wrote, " that the Council at Boston could be 
 informed of the designs of the English Court, and shown 
 how important it is for that province to remain in the state 
 of a republic. The King would even approve our helping 
 it to do so." In furtherance of this policy, an emissary was 
 sent to Boston in 1711, to treat with the Colonies as an inde- 
 
2 France and the American Revolution. 
 
 pendent people and arrange a mutual cessation of hostilities, 
 on condition itiifct they should jrive England no more aid; 
 but when he arrived on the enemy s coast, his vessel was 
 seized, and ih&jirjifesipii came to. an ignominious end. 1 
 
 At about this time another Frenchman, with wiser fore 
 sight, was predicting the actual results of the British policy. 
 " Old England," he said, alluding to the possible conquest 
 of Canada and its influence on the thirteen Colonies, " will 
 not imagine that these various provinces will then unite, 
 shake off the yoke of the English monarchy, and erect them 
 selves into a democracy." 2 A generation later, in 1748, the 
 Swedish traveller, Kalm, believed that the presence of the 
 French in Canada was the main security for England s re 
 tention of her Colonies. 3 Before the close of the Seven 
 Years War, French and English statesmen alike were pre 
 dicting that the transfer of Canada to England would be 
 followed by the revolt of the British Provinces ; for their in 
 habitants, released from constant dread of a hostile neighbor 
 and no longer in need of support from England, would be 
 free to nurse their grievances against her. The Count de 
 Vergennes, who was to direct the foreign affairs of France 
 during the American Revolution, foretold the crisis in which 
 he afterward found his opportunity. " England," he said,. 
 " will ere long repent of having removed the only check that 
 could keep her colonies in awe. They stand no longer in 
 need of her protection. She will call on them to contribute 
 toward supporting the burdens they have helped to bring on 
 her, and they will answer by striking off all dependence." 4 
 
 In 1763, the long contest for empire ended in the triumph 
 of England and the expulsion of France from the North 
 American continent. With her chief colonial possessions 
 torn away, her army weakened, and her navy almost 
 destroyed, France suddenly found herself in the position of 
 a minor power. Her humiliation brought with it not even 
 
 1 Parkman, A Half-Century of Conflict, I, pp. 150 if. 
 
 2 Ibid. I, p. 155. Quoted from an anonymous memorial of 1710, 
 1711. 
 
 8 Lecky, England jn the Eighteenth Century, III, p. 291. 
 4 Bancroft, History of the United States, II, p. 564. 
 
Forecasts of Revolution. 3 
 
 the poor comfort of security : for England was. in the eyes 
 of the French Ministry, a treacherous opponent, disposed to 
 take every advantage of a conquered enemy ; ready, for 
 any hope of gain, to reopen the war, under her own prece 
 dent, without the formality of a declaration. If Choiseul, 
 at this time the most influential minister of France, not only 
 tried to strengthen his country by forming alliances and 
 building up a new navy, but watched for an opportunity to 
 strike an underhand blow at England through her Colonies ; 
 if Vergennes, a few years later, built up for her discomfiture 
 a consistent policy of deception, their excuse must be sought 
 in the desperate plight of France and in previous wanderings 
 from the path of international virtue on the part of England. 
 " Power can never render honorable that which is not hon 
 orable," so wrote a contemporary of these men " and in 
 politics, everything which is not avowed, everything which 
 is not clothed with a public character, is intrigue. . . . 
 Separate morals from politics, and politics have no longer 
 any support, but lose themselves in a bottomless abyss." 
 Choiseul and Vergennes employed their pow r er without too 
 keen an eye to international honor ; used means, to avow 
 which would have been insanity ; and, in their dealings 
 with England, sunk moral considerations to a fathomless 
 depth. 
 
 The treaty of 1763 was a disgrace, to be wiped out. 
 Choiseul lost no time and took no chances. He laid plans 
 to thwart the policy of England in India, in the Mediter 
 ranean, in the Eastern islands ; he kept strict watch over the 
 diplomacy of Europe. " There was not a single point," 
 says the biographer of one of his secret emissaries, " where 
 the wary and alert minister had not his agents, spies, and 
 instruments for the aggrandizement of France and the 
 injury of England." From time to time, his animosity 
 broke out freely in his official correspondence. We are in 
 no haste, as you may well imagine," he wrote in 1767 to a 
 member of the embassy at London, " to see a firm ministry 
 
 1 Se*gur, L,e Politique de Tous les Cabinets de 1 Europe, I, p. 119, 
 note ; p. 113, note. 
 
 2 Kapp, Life of Kalb, p. 43. 
 
4 France and the American Revolution. 
 
 established in England. I hope that the anarchy will not 
 soon cease. Would that it might last a century." A year 
 later, he expressed a wish that the popular tumult on behalf 
 of Wilkes might increase. " A rumor is abroad here," he 
 said, " that on the fifteenth there was j a sort of action in the 
 city of London, in which many people perished. I dare not 
 flatter myself that this report is true. The English never 
 destroy one another so fast as we could wish." 
 
 That he might the more safely hasten their destruction, 
 Choiseul fortified his country by diplomacy. He adhered 
 to the sharply criticized Austrian alliance ; chiefly, it is 
 said, to secure neutrality on the continent in case of war 
 with England, and thus to avoid the disadvantage of a 
 double conflict with the navy of Great Britain and the 
 armies of her allies. 3 Before the close of the Seven Years 
 War, he had strengthened the natural bond between France 
 and Spain by the Third Family Compact. This agreement 
 assured France of at least one ally in case her minister 
 should succeed in bringing on the war which he desired. 
 Meanwhile, further negotiation, working on the easily ex 
 cited passions for revenge and acquisition, aroused the 
 Spaniard to eagerness for war. Choiseul was " as sure of 
 Spain," we are told, " as if he had been the prime minister 
 of Charles III." 4 
 
 Choiseul tried to bring about a rupture with England in 
 1765. Three years later he made a second attempt, but his 
 colleagues in the Council overruled him. Papers drawn up 
 by his order are still extant, minutely describing the 
 English coast, with a view to its facilities for landing an 
 army of invasion. 5 The fact that no use was made of this 
 information argues prudence on the part of the King and 
 his advisers, rather than any sentiment of forbearance 
 toward England. Not only the publicly recognized Council 
 
 1 Choiseul to Durand, Aug. 4, 1767. De Witt, Jefferson, p. 420. 
 
 2 Choiseul to du Chatelet, May 23, 1768. Ibid. p. 438. 
 
 3 Se"gur, Le Politique de Tous les Cabinets, I, p. 88, note. Cape- 
 figue, lyouis XVI, II, p. 22. Flassan, Diplomatic Franaise, VI, p. 53. 
 
 *Lacretelle, Histoire de France, IV, p. 191. 
 
 5 Mahon, History of England from the Peace of Utrecht to the Peace 
 of Versailles, V, Appendix, pp. xix, xxii. 
 
Forecasts of Revolution. 5 
 
 but the secret cabinet of Louis XV were intent on prospects 
 of war. A plan for the invasion of England was the only 
 paper spared when the secret correspondence was consigned 
 to the flames by order of Louis XVI, at the opening of his 
 reign. 1 
 
 At the very time when England was adjusting her un 
 stable peace with France, the British Ministry were pre 
 paring measures that could not fail to embroil them with 
 the American Colonies and give France an opportunity for 
 mischief. Seven months after the ratification of the treaty 
 of 1763, the proper commissioners were instructed to pre 
 pare a bill imposing a stamp duty on the Colonists. This 
 bill was laid aside for a year, but in the meantime laws 
 were passed to extend the Navigation Acts and modify 
 American imposts. 2 The news of these measures roused in 
 tense excitement in the Provinces. Tidings of the discon 
 tent reached France, and Choiseul promptly sent his first 
 secret agent to America. 
 
 This emissary, sent out in 1764, was M. de Pontleroy, a 
 lieutenant in the French navy. 3 On his return to Europe 
 in 1766, he made his report to M. Durand, then chief clerk 
 of the French embassy in London. The report comprised 
 an account of the products, occupations, and industrial and 
 military resources of the Provinces, the state of their de 
 fences, the character and the political aspirations of their in 
 habitants. Durand, in forwarding this information to Choi 
 seul, expressed the opinion that the Colonies were too opu 
 lent, ambitious, and conscious of their strength, to remain 
 in obedience, but that a revolution ending in American 
 independence w r ould be a disadvantage to France ; because 
 the Colonies in question, producing, as they did, all the 
 necessaries of life, could absorb at will their southern neigh 
 bors, the producers of sugar, coffee, and cotton. In a word, 
 the independence of America would endanger French rule 
 in the West Indies. Durand was a conservative. He held 
 
 1 Vergennes and du Muy to Louis XVI, Feb. (?) 1775 ; Segur, L,e 
 Politique, I, p.. 106. 
 
 2 Bancroft, III, pp. 55, 73. 
 
 3 De Witt, Jefferson, p. 407, note. 
 
6 France and the American Revolution. 
 
 to the old policy of war against all the English. He spoke 
 of the importance of injuring British commerce, and advised 
 that Pontleroy s instructions for a second mission be framed 
 with that object. 1 
 
 Choiseul, replying briefly, put aside Durand s scheme for 
 attacking the commerce of England. He said that M. de 
 Pontleroy would be instructed, on his second tour through 
 the Colonies, simply to verify his former report. "Our 
 ideas on America, whether military or political," said he, 
 " are infinitely changed within thirty years." 
 
 A few months after this discussion, Benjamin Franklin s 
 published replies to the Parliamentary inquiry on the sub 
 ject of the Stamp Act supplied the French Ministry with 
 another source of information on American affairs. M. 
 Durand, who was acting as minister plenipotentiary at this 
 time, zealously cultivated Franklin s acquaintance, ques 
 tioning him about America, asking for all his political writ 
 ings, and offering him various social attentions. Franklin 
 suspected a hidden motive for these civilities. " I fancy," 
 he wrote to his son, " that intriguing nation would like very 
 well to meddle on occasion, and blow up the coals between 
 Great Britain and her Colonies, but I hope we shall give 
 them no opportunity." 
 
 Durand gathered from Franklin s report, that the opposite 
 commercial interests of England and America were tending 
 to produce an outbreak of hostilities ; but lie thought that 
 England, foreseeing the trouble, would take measures to 
 ward it off. He believed that the revolution would be 
 gradual and would lead, not to a separation of the Colonies 
 from the mother country, but to a union such as that of 
 Scotland with the crown of Great Britain. On this point, 
 too, Choiseul was of a different opinion. He thought that 
 England could hold her Colonies only by absolute control of 
 their commerce ; while, if she tried to maintain this control 
 
 Durand to Choiseul, Aug. 3, 7, 20, 22, 24, 1766. De Witt, Jeffer 
 son, pp. 407, 410, 412, 413, 415. 
 
 2 Choiseul to Durand, Aug. n, Sept. 15, 1766. Ibid. pp. 412, 417. 
 
 3 To William Franklin, Aug. 28, 1767. Works, IV, p. 32. 
 
Forecasts of Revolution. 7 
 
 by imposts, the Colonies would rebel, and she would be un 
 able to subdue them. 1 
 
 Choiseul believed, then, that a revolution in America was 
 approaching. It is clear, from his instructions to his next 
 colonial agent, that he did not fear American independence, 
 and that he was inclined to aid the Colonies The projected 
 second voyage of M. de Pontleroy seems never to have taken 
 place; but on the fourth of October, 1767, the Baron de 
 Kalb, an officer in the French service, who had been secretly 
 gathering American news in Holland, set sail for Philadel 
 phia. Choiseul instructed him to find out what the Ameri 
 can people intended ro do, and what it was advisable to send 
 them for instance, whether they required engineers and 
 cavalry officers ; and also to enquire into their facilities for 
 procuring munitions and supplies, the strength of their de 
 termination to escape from English rule, their military 
 resources and local advantages, the plan of their revolt, and 
 the names of the leaders who would probably take com 
 mand. 2 
 
 Through the year 1768, during his stay in America and 
 after his return, de Kalb made frequent reports. He found 
 the country in a ferment. The excitement caused by the 
 Stamp Act had hardly had time to die out after the repeal, 
 before new taxes caused fresh irritation. The people were 
 entering into non-importation agreements and setting up 
 manufactories for themselves. De Kalb thought that if 
 the Colonies had any easy means of communication or if 
 they were united in their interests, they would soon become 
 independent. Even as it was, this result would come in 
 time. If not produced by British oppression, it would 
 follow from the natural growth of population ; for the 
 country was too large to be governed from a distance. But 
 the people showed no inclination to call on foreign powers 
 for help. In fact, such aid would be an object of greater 
 suspicion to them than the encroachments of England. 
 
 1 Durand to Choiseul, Aug. n, 30, Sept. 3, 1767. Choiseul to 
 Durand, Aug. 24. De Witt, Jefferson, pp. 420, 427, 428, 425. 
 
 2 Kapp, Life of Kalb, p. 46. Colleville, Les Missions Secretes, 
 p. 20. 
 
8 France and the American Revolution. 
 
 Even if they should ask assistance, de Kalb thought it 
 would be unwise to grant it until they had declared their 
 independence, formed a confederation, invited all nations to 
 share their commerce, and established an army and a navy. 
 Premature advances, he thought, would only reconcile the 
 Colonies to England and unite the two countries for an 
 attack on the French territories in America. 1 
 
 While de Kalb was carrying on his researches abroad and 
 making his reports, the discussion at home continued. The 
 new ambassador at London, the Count du Chatelet, showed 
 keen interest in American affairs. In March, 1768, evi 
 dently in ignorance of the measures already taken by 
 Choisetil, du Chatelet advised him to send agents to America 
 to gather information while the peace lasted, and, in case a 
 revolution seemed imminent, to form centers of union and 
 hope, and suggest an appeal for foreign aid. 2 In a letter 
 written in November, du Chatelet discussed the question 
 whether a revolution in the near future was probable. The 
 Colonists were firm in their refusal to trade with England, 
 but many people believed that the mother country would 
 give way under the pressure of industrial distress. Du 
 Chatelet feared that the British Ministry, realizing how 
 hard it would be to subdue the Americans by force, would 
 come to an accommodation with them and then divert their 
 minds from past grievances by operations against France 
 and Spain. He deplored the fact that the Bourbon powers 
 could not profit by the state of affairs in America ; but, like 
 de Kalb, he feared that any advances would lead the 
 Colonists to make peace with England. 3 As time passed, 
 and there "was no sign of change in the British policy, he 
 began to doubt whether a reconciliation was probable, and 
 
 1 De Kalb to Choiseul, Philadelphia, Jan. 15, 20, 1768 ; New York, 
 Feb 25 (or 21) ; Boston, March (or May) 2 ; Philadelphia, Apr. 19 ; 
 Paris (?) Aug. 6; Paris, Sept. 16 (or Oct. 10) ; Nov. 6, 15. Kapp, 
 Life of Kalb, pp. 53-68, passim, and 286 to 295. Colleville, Les 
 Missions Secretes, pp. 43-81. De Witt, Jefferson, pp. 458-464. 
 
 2 Du Chatelet to Choiseul, March 12, 1768. De Witt, Jefferson, 
 
 P- 433- 
 
 3 Du Chatelet to Choiseul, Nov. 11, 18, 1768. Ibid. pp. 445, 448. 
 
Forecasts of Revolution. 9 
 
 to fear a premature declaration of war. Everything de 
 pended on the action of the English Parliament, he wrote 
 early in December, 1768. If it persisted in taxing the 
 Colonies, the revolution would probably break out within 
 six months. In that case, France would find herself face to 
 face with two questions : could the union of the Colonies 
 maintain itself against the power of England, without the 
 support which a foreign war would lend it ; and could 
 France and Spain remain idle spectators of the struggle ? 
 The two nations would be obliged to decide whether they 
 would run the risk involved in supporting the revolution, or 
 leave it to the chance of dying out for want of sustenance. 1 
 
 Choiseul agreed, in the main, with the ambassador s con 
 clusions. He thought a revolution certain unless England 
 changed her colonial policy. 2 But the veto of his war pro 
 ject, occurring at about this time, probably dampened his 
 interest in the Provinces. De Kalb was coldly received on 
 his return from America. For some time, the Minister re 
 fused even to grant him an audience. " It was obvious," 
 says de Kalb, " that his system .... had changed, as he 
 no longer expressed any desire to know what was passing in 
 America." 3 " It was he," Lafayette afterwards wrote of 
 de Kalb, in words which betray characteristic impatience of 
 the minister s seeming apathy, " It was he whom M. de 
 Choiseul sent to visit the English Colonies, and who, on his 
 return, obtained money from him, but no audience; so little 
 did this minister think of the Revolution, the retrospective 
 honor of which some people have assigned to him." 4 
 
 The time for military interference in America had not yet 
 come ; but early in 1769 Choiseul and du Chatelet discussed 
 the feasibility of binding the Colonies to France and Spain 
 by commercial ties. Du Chatelet originated the plan. A 
 bolder design, adapted only to a state of war, had been pro 
 posed to him in a letter of the preceding July, written prob- 
 
 1 Du Chatelet to Choiseul, Dec. 9, 1768. De Witt, Jefferson, p. 449. 
 
 2 Choiseul to du Chatelet, Nov. 22, Dec. 20, 1768. Ibid. pp. 449, 
 
 45i- 
 
 3 Sparks MSS. XXXII, vol. I. 
 
 4 Ibid. LXXXVI, p. 3. 
 
io France and the American Revolution. 
 
 ably by his chief secretary, M. Frances. 1 This may have 
 suggested to the ambassador his own less venturesome 
 scheme. The writer of the letter believed that a com 
 mercial treaty with the Americans would be desirable. 
 Such a treaty, he said, could be proposed to them only at 
 the moment of a rupture with the mother country and, for 
 that reason, ought to be fully discussed in advance. If 
 offered at the critical moment, it might detach the Colonies 
 from England. France and Spain would then profit by the 
 lowering of the British revenues ; while a stipulation of 
 neutrality would free their colonies from the danger of 
 being attacked by the Americans in future wars, and would 
 naturally develop into a treaty of alliance. 
 
 About six months after the receipt of this letter, we find 
 du Chatelet laying before the minister, evidently not for the 
 first time, a plan of collusion with the Americans, suited to 
 a state of peace. 2 He proposed that France and Spain 
 should relax their commercial restrictions, even at the risk 
 of temporary inconvenience to their own citizens. This 
 would encourage trade between Americans and subjects of 
 the King, enable Frenchmen to provide the Colonists with 
 those manufactured articles which they had ceased to obtain 
 from England, and lead to the formation of commercial 
 habits which England, even in case of a reconciliation, 
 would find hard to break. Besides this, France would gain 
 an indirect advantage. The encouragement to American 
 commerce would inspire the Provincials with a desire for 
 independence, while giving them means to carry on the 
 struggle for liberty. In this way, the embarrassment of 
 England would be prolonged. Du Chatelet saw, as his cor 
 respondent of the preceding July had not seen, that, as a 
 counterpoise to these gains, the risk to French and Spanish 
 possessions from enterprising Americans might be increased 
 rather than diminished by helping them to independence. 
 
 1 De Witt assigns the letter to M. Frances, (Jefferson, p. 440 ;) Ban 
 croft, to Choiseul, ( III, p. 294. ) The request for instructions, and the 
 writer s ignorance of the date at which the treaty with Holland would 
 expire, point to the clerk rather than the minister. 
 
 2 Du Chatelet to Choiseul, Jan. 28, 1769. De Witt, Jefferson, p. 451, 
 
Forecasts of Revolution. n 
 
 France and Spain " must reflect," he said, " whether it is 
 to their interest to second this revolution at the risk of the 
 consequences which might result from it later for the whole 
 new world, and whether the enfeeblement of the common 
 enemy can compensate the risk to which such an example 
 would expose them, from their own Colonies." But the 
 danger was remote, and less impressive than the present 
 advantage. 
 
 This plan was wholly at variance with the conservative 
 policy of the Bourbons ; yet Choiseul recommended it to the 
 Council, all the members present approved of it, and it was 
 sent by the King s order to the Court of Spain. 1 Here, it 
 met with serious opposition. Spain feared that such con 
 cessions would lead to contraband trade with her colonies 
 and to illicit extraction of gold and silver from their mines. 
 She feared, too, that a republican neighbor would indulge 
 in schemes of conquest at her expense. Choiseul was 
 obliged to drop the project for a time, to give the Spanish 
 Court leisure for reflection. 2 He never had an opportunity 
 to resume it, for he was deprived of his office in 1770. The 
 too independent zeal with which he showed his enmity 
 toward England was one of the causes of his downfall. He 
 was plotting with Spain at this time, for a war against the 
 common foe ; and it is said that he inspired the Spanish 
 attack on the British settlement of Port Egmont, in the 
 Falkland Islands. His personal enemies informed King 
 Louis of his secret activity, and the monarch promptly 
 ended his public career by a decree of exile. 3 
 
 The Duke d Aiguillon, who succeeded Choiseul, reversed 
 his foreign policy. In order to oppose the combined 
 powers, Prussia, Russia, and Austria, whose influence in 
 European politics was growing at the expense of France, 
 d Aiguillon cultivated friendly relations with England. 4 Of 
 
 1 Choiseul to du Chatelet, Feb. 6, 1769. De Witt, Jefferson, p. 454. 
 
 2 D Ossun to Choiseul, Feb. 20, 1769. Choiseul to du Chatelet, March 
 14. Ibid. pp. 455, 457. 
 
 3 Lacretelle, Histoire de France, IV, pp. 243, 255. 
 
 4 Flassan, Diplomatic Franaise, VII, p. 45. Soulavie, Me"moires, 
 III, p. 340. 
 
12 France and the American Revolution. 
 
 course he did not meddle in American affairs. It was 
 left to the Count de Vergennes, who was promoted to the 
 head of the foreign department in July, 1774, at a period 
 still more critical for America than that of the Stamp Act, 
 to take advantage of the opportunity which Choiseul had 
 lacked, and conclude a friendly alliance with the Americans. 
 
II. 
 
 AID FOR AMERICA. 
 
 The Council appointed by Louis XVI on his accession to 
 the throne, was not of a character to raise expectations 
 of a vigorous foreign policy. The King himself, without 
 whose consent no important step could be taken, desired 
 peace even with England. Burdened with a conscience, an 
 awkward encumbrance under the circumstances, he had 
 scruples against breaking a treaty without sufficient cause. 
 His prime minister, the Count de Maurepas, was an aged 
 courtier who, after suffering a long exile, had returned to 
 the pleasures of the court with a desire to enjoy them un 
 disturbed. To the pursuit of this end, he brought political 
 skill and incredible lightness of mind, "capable," said a 
 member of his Cabinet, "of sacrificing great interests to a 
 witticism." It could be foretold that he would not 
 willingly make himself responsible for another war with 
 England. Soon after his appointment, Turgot, the econo 
 mist, became minister of finance. Finance ministers do 
 not love war, nor do economists. Tnrgot s voice might 
 safely be counted on the side of peace. 
 
 The policy of the Count de Vergennes, who, as head of 
 the department of Foreign Affairs, would probably have 
 more influence for peace or war than any other man, was 
 less easy to predict. Vergennes had already made a reputa 
 tion in diplomacy ; but his name was not, like those of 
 Choiseul and d Aiguillon, connected with any special sys 
 tem, Austrian or English. Without binding himself to any 
 theory, he had employed his skill in dealing with each 
 problem as it arose. Yet the general direction of his course 
 might perhaps be foreseen from certain facts of his past 
 career. Connected since 1755 with the secret diplomatic 
 service of Louis XV, 2 he had been trained in hostility toward 
 
 1 St. Germain ; quoted by Soulavie, III, p. 170. 
 
 2 Segur, Le Politique, I, p. 97. 
 
14 France and the American Revolution. 
 
 Great Britain ; and when the secret correspondence was 
 burned, he had pleaded for leave to preserve a plan for the 
 debarkation of troops in England. 
 
 During the three and a half years since the downfall of 
 Choisetil, the dispute between the Americans and the 
 mother country had reached a crisis. The Colonies were 
 uniting. Regular communication had been established be 
 tween them through committees of correspondence ; and 
 now, in response to the series of harsh measures by which 
 the British Parliament expressed its disapproval of the 
 Boston tea party, the Provinces were electing delegates to a 
 Continental Congress. The lack of means of communica 
 tion and the absence of any common interest, conditions 
 which de Kalb had noted as obstacles to union, were being 
 overcome ; and the same changes which were preparing the 
 Colonies to unite against England, were making it possible 
 for them to welcome foreign intervention. 
 
 Vergennes moved cautiously. He received reports of the 
 situation from Gamier, the charge d affaires in London, but 
 at first showed no desire to interfere in the quarrel. Merely 
 as a quarrel, whatever its outcome, it was to the interest of 
 France ; for it occupied England, and kept her from troub 
 ling her neighbors. This was an advantage ; for, however 
 busily France might plot against England, she did not at this 
 time desire open war. Vergennes regarded the American 
 conflict as " the surest guaranty of the pacific sentiments of 
 His Britannic Majesty and of his ministers." Some guar 
 anty, he believed, was needed ; for he had no confidence in 
 the peace policy of England. "Let us not deceive our 
 selves in this," said he: "whatever parade the English 
 ministry make of their pacific intentions, we can count on 
 this disposition only so long as their domestic embarrass 
 ments last." 
 
 Vergennes, like many other observers on both sides of the 
 Channel, at first considered the American Revolution the 
 work of the Opposition party in England. " If the King of 
 England governs his Parliament at will, the Opposition 
 
 1 Vergennes to Garnier, Sept. n, 1774. Memoire by Vergennes, 
 Dec. 8. Doniol, I, pp. 13, 19. 
 
A id for A m erica . 1 5 
 
 governs the Colonies no less absolutely." 1 Almost up to 
 the date of Lexington, he believed that the interests of com 
 merce and industry would force an accommodation. Yet he 
 was always on the alert ; and it was probably with his 
 approval that Gamier, conversing with Franklin just before 
 his departure from London, several weeks prior to the out 
 break of the war, significantly reminded him of the aid 
 which France had given the United Provinces in their 
 struggle against Spain. 2 
 
 When war had begun, Vergennes was quick to see the 
 trend of events. Even if the grievances of America had 
 been at first, as he suspected, a mere pretext for the quarrel, 
 the Colonists when once aroused could not be restrained 
 from going beyond the designs of their political abettors in 
 England, and seeking independence. Owing to the nature 
 of the country and the distribution of the population, he 
 thought that England would be unable to reduce the Colo 
 nies by force of arms. The success of a negotiation seemed 
 extremely doubtful, but he believed that England would try 
 this way of adjusting the difficulties. Only when he heard 
 of the British King s proclamation of August, 1775, declar 
 ing the Americans rebels, was he convinced that England 
 had cut herself off from all hope of bringing the contest to 
 a peaceful close. 3 
 
 Before England had taken this decisive step, the war 
 alarm sounded in the French Cabinet. In July, 1775, the 
 Count de Guines, ambassador at London, reported a conver 
 sation in which Lord Rochford had said that some of the 
 members of both political parties were advocating war 
 against France as the surest way to stop the American con 
 flict. 4 Ever since the time of the Stamp Act, the French 
 authorities had feared that England would have recourse to 
 a vigorous foreign policy in order to end her domestic 
 troubles. Now the British foreign secretary, with singular 
 
 1 Vergennes to de Guines, July i, 1775. Doniol, I, p. 83. 
 2 Parton, Life of Franklin, II, p. 67. 
 
 3 Vergennes to Gamier, Jan. 15, 1775. To de Guines, July 10, 29 ; 
 Aug. 20, 27 ; Sept. 3. Doniol, I, pp. 68, 90, 95, 171, 172, 174. 
 
 4 De Guines to Vergennes, July 28, 1775. Ibid. I, p. 116. 
 
16 France and the American Revolution. 
 
 indiscretion, contributed his word of warning. The hint 
 threw France on her guard. Vergennes sent the substance 
 of de Guines dispatch to the ambassador in Spain, and rec 
 ommended a plan of defense. At the first act of open hos 
 tility on the part of England, let France and Spain seize as 
 many of her ships as possible. They might, however, ex 
 empt the vessels of the North American Colonists ; for it 
 would be impolitic to make them regret their war with Eng 
 land, and to force them back under the yoke. Circum 
 stances might arise in which it would be advisable to treat 
 them as an independent people, invite them to visit French 
 and Spanish ports, and offer them freedom of commerce. 1 
 
 Some time before this, de Guines had complained that he 
 could not obtain reliable American news in England, and 
 had suggested the advantage of having an agent in America. 
 For this mission he had recommended M. de Bonvouloir, a 
 French officer who had visited all the British colonies in 
 America, and who desired an opportunity to return. Ver 
 gennes, with the King s approval, now authorized de Guines 
 to send the man. His journey and correspondence were so 
 arranged that the Ministry could not be compromised. His 
 two chief duties were, to report the course of events and the 
 developments of opinion in America, and to teach the peo 
 ple that they had no reason to fear the French. His first 
 instructions, which contained a word of reassurance for the 
 Americans on independence, the destiny of Canada, and 
 commercial facilities in French ports, were considerably 
 modified before he sailed. De Guines heard that the insur 
 gents were proclaiming their hopes of aid from France and 
 Spain; and, taking alarm, he forbade his emissary "even 
 to pronounce the word French," and left him nothing to do 
 but watch and report the progress of affairs. 2 Bonvouloir, 
 as we shall see, ignored this prohibition ; and it is hard to 
 decide whether Vergennes was more pleased or offended by 
 his indiscretion. 
 
 1 Vergennes to d Ossun, Aug. 7, 1775. Doniol, I, pp. 123-7. 
 
 2 De Guines to Vergennes, July i, 28, 1775. Vergennes to de Guines, 
 Aug. 7. Doniol, I, pp. 154, 155. De Guines to Vergennes, Sept. 8. De 
 Witt, Jefferson, p. 475. 
 
A id for A m erica . 1 7 
 
 Bonvotiloir sailed early in September, 1775, arrived at 
 Philadelphia in December, and was cordially^ received. A 
 change of sentiment had gradually taken place in the 
 Colonies since the days of Choiseul, when Franklin met the 
 advances of the French ambassador with suspicion, and 
 when de Kalb became convinced that the Americans would 
 repel all foreign interference. Although the Colonists 
 fought during the first year for redress of grievances and 
 not for independence, there were a few radicals who saw 
 from the beginning that independence would be the natural 
 outcome of the contest, and that this result might be 
 hastened by foreign alliances. In 1774, Patrick Henry pre 
 dicted an alliance with France, Spain, and Holland. 1 At the 
 opening of the Congress of 1775, Samuel and John Adams 
 were convinced that an immediate declaration was necessary. 
 Independence first, said John Adams ; then a last attempt to 
 treat with England ; and in case of failure, overtures to 
 foreign countries. But the conservatives carried the day, 
 and a last petition was sent to the King. Convinced of its 
 uselessness, Adams persisted in urging almost daily a 
 declaration of independence and the adoption of a plan of 
 treaties to be offered to foreign powers, especially France 
 and Spain. In the fall of 1775, probably late in September, 
 Mr. Chase of Maryland moved to send ambassadors to 
 France. The effect of this motion on the nerves of Con 
 gress, says Mr. Adams, was galvanic. " The grimaces, the 
 agitations and convulsions were very great." In the argu 
 ment which followed, many substitutes for the motion were 
 offered, and there were " twenty subtle projects to get rid of 
 it." The debate ended, on the twenty-ninth of November, 
 in a compromise measure : the formation of a committee to 
 correspond with friends "in Great Britain, Ireland, and 
 other parts of the world." 
 
 A fortnight after the Committee of Secret Correspondence 
 was formed, it sent a letter to Dr. Arthur Lee, Franklin s 
 successor in the agency for Massachusetts in London, direct- 
 barton s Franklin, II, p. HI. 
 
 2 Life and Works of John Adams, II, pp. 406 ff. ; I, pp. 200-3 ; 
 II, pp. 503-6. Secret Journals of Congress., II, p. 5. 
 
1 8 France and the American Revolution. 
 
 ing him to find out the disposition of foreign powers toward 
 the Colonies. A week later Franklin wrote in the name of 
 the Committee, to his friend Charles Dumas, a Swiss resi 
 dent of Holland, requesting him to take advantage of his 
 situation at The Hague to find out whether any of the 
 European states would probably be willing to assist the 
 Colonies or enter into an alliance with them. Dumas was 
 empowered to confer with ministers of state, using Frank 
 lin s letter as a credential and taking precautions for keep 
 ing the matter from the ears of the English ambassador. 1 
 
 At this critical time the French agent, Bonvouloir, ap 
 peared in Philadelphia. Making Dr. Franklin s acquaint 
 ance, he obtained several hearings from the Committee of 
 Secret Correspondence. The substance of these interviews 
 may be gathered from his report to de Guines. 2 He made 
 some indefinite offers of service, and was asked how France 
 regarded the Colonies. He answered : he believed that 
 France wished them well. Would she aid them ? Perhaps 
 so. On what footing ? He knew nothing about it ; but if 
 she should do so, it would always be on just and equitable 
 terms. Would it be prudent to send a deputy plenipoten 
 tiary " to France? He thought it would be precipitate, even 
 hazardous. Yet he would not advise them in any way. He 
 was a private individual, a curious traveller ; but he would 
 be charmed to serve them through his acquaintances. When 
 the committee broached the subject of a treaty, Bonvouloir 
 refused to indicate the terms that France might be induced 
 to grant ; but he argued that France was more eligible as an 
 ally than Spain. In consequence of these interviews, he 
 received from the committee a written request for French 
 engineers, leave to procure arms and ammunition in France, 
 and the privilege of entry into French ports. He replied, 
 also in writing, giving some encouragement as to engineers 
 and munitions, but speaking with hesitation about commer 
 cial privileges. 
 
 While one Frenchman was telling Congress that help 
 
 1 Franklin et al. to Arthur Lee, Dec. 12, 1775. Franklin to Dumas, 
 Dec. 19. Diplomatic Correspondence, II, pp. 63, 65. 
 
 2 De Witt, Jefferson, pp. 478 fT. 
 
Aid for America. 19 
 
 might be obtained in France, another was trying to persuade 
 King Louis to grant it. The political and mercantile ven 
 ture of Caron Beaumarchais, courtier, man of letters, and 
 agent in the secret service, his trials and achievements on 
 behalf of America form one of the most romantic episodes 
 of the Revolution. Beanmarchais was in London in 1775, 
 collecting news of American affairs and spying on the British 
 Ministry. His sources of information were varied. He was 
 on friendly terms with Lord Rochford, the English Secretary 
 for Foreign Affairs, and also with Wilkes, the most notori 
 ous leader of the Opposition ; he had dealings with Arthur 
 Lee, the agent for Massachusetts ; and he frequently met 
 travellers from America. Reporting his impressions to 
 King Louis, he repeatedly urged him, for the safety and 
 glory of France, to aid the American insurgents. In case 
 the King decided to grant them money, the breach of neu 
 trality might be hidden by conveying the favors through a 
 fictitious mercantile company. Beaumarchais expressed his 
 willingness to personate this firm. 1 The King objected to 
 the plan, on the ground of justice to England. Beaumar 
 chais, in a long reply, 2 tried to reconcile his project with the 
 "delicate conscientiousness" of the King. "The policy 
 which maintains nations," he argued, "differs almost en 
 tirely from the moral law which governs individuals 
 
 The masterpiece of sound policy is to base your tranquillity 
 on the divisions of your enemies." With unscrupulous 
 plausibility, he argued that no treaty with the English mon 
 arch could justly restrain the King of France ; for it was the 
 English people who desired war, and they would always 
 compel their King to yield. The conscience of Louis was 
 not entirely satisfied with this logic, for we hear that he con 
 tinued to protest ; but pressure, official and unofficial, forced 
 him to give way. 3 
 
 For some time the Americans had been obtaining aid from 
 citizens of France by the channels of commerce. The reports 
 of English spies showed the existence of an active trade in 
 
 1 Deane Papers, I, p. no. 
 
 2 Durand, New Materials, pp. 59, 68, 69. 
 :! Soulavie, Memoires, III, pp. 346-8. 
 
20 
 
 France and the American Revolution. 
 
 arms and ammunition. The British Ministry, believing that 
 the government connived at it, repeatedly called attention to 
 the subject through their embassy. Vergennes protested 
 innocence, saying that military stores could not be shipped 
 from France without special orders, and that the govern 
 ment did not lend such countenance to men who were aiding 
 the insurgents. He would not vouch for all the acts of un 
 ruly individuals, but whatever, the Ministry could prevent 
 should be prevented. England s trouble with her Colonies, 
 he declared, was to nobody s interest ; the consequences of 
 it were as obvious as those of the cession of Canada. The 
 Count de Maurepas added his professions of friendship. 
 " Be sure," said he, " that we are not people who seek to 
 take unfair advantage of circumstances, and to fish in 
 troubled waters." He even hinted that the Americans had 
 forfeited the sympathy of the French in aiming at indepen 
 dence. By their united efforts the two ministers convinced 
 the suspicious ambassador, Lord Storm out, that France was 
 desirous of peace. * 
 
 It was probably not far from the time of these friendly 
 professions that Vergennes secretary, Gerard de Rayjj,eval, 
 drew up an elaborate memorial discussing the interest of 
 France in the affairs of the American Colonies. 2 His argu 
 ment was based on suggestions which different persons had 
 made to Vergennes, some at his request, others of their own 
 initiative. 3 The writer traces the development of the quarrel 
 between England and her Colonies in a manner which shows 
 his sympathy with the Americans. Inquiring whether 
 France ought to desire the independence of America, he an 
 swers that the benefit to France can be measured by the 
 injury to England. Three specific advantages will be 
 gained : a diminution of English power and an increase of 
 French ; loss to English and gain to French trade ; and a 
 chance to recover part of the French possessions in America. 
 To those who fear that the Americans will try to encroach 
 
 St. Paul to Rochford, Sept. 20, 1775. Stormont to Rochford, Oct. 
 31. Stevens Facsimiles, 1303, 1306. 
 2 Reflexions : qy. end of 1775. Ibid. 1310. 
 3 Doniol I, p. 242. 
 
A id for A merica . 2 1 
 
 on the French and Spanish territories, he says that the peo 
 ple will be too much exhausted by the war to think of con 
 quest. This fear "deserves no consideration." But it does 
 not follow that it is best to aid them at once. It would be 
 well to wait and see whether England can conquer them in 
 another campaign. If she is not strong enough for this, 
 France may safely interfere. Meanwhile, let her support 
 the courage of the Americans and flatter them with the hope 
 of assistance. In this way she will avoid compromising her 
 self either with the insurgents or with the English Court. 
 The animus with which this counsel is given is even more 
 significant than its substance. "England is the natural 
 enemy of France," so reads this official document, " and 
 she is a rapacious, unjust, and faithless enemy. The invari 
 able object of her policy is, if not the destruction, at least the 
 abasement of France. This is always the real motive of the 
 wars which she has stirred up against her, and this State 
 reason always prevails over any other consideration ; and 
 when it speaks, all means are lawful, provided they be effi 
 cacious. This disposition, known to all the universe, dis 
 charges France from the obligations which the right of 
 nations has established between countries, and authorizes her 
 to make use of reprisals in order to weaken an enemy who 
 is constantly seeking to injure her." 
 
 While the American question was under consideration in 
 the foreign office, Beaumarchais was urging the government 
 to adopt a decided course. On the last day of February, 
 1776, he addressed to the King a memorial, 1 written to prove 
 the necessity of assisting the Americans, as a measure of 
 self-defense. Whether England obtained peace with her 
 Colonies by victory, defeat, or reconciliation, war between 
 France and England was sure to follow 7 . The only way, 
 then, for France to maintain peace was to keep the Ameri 
 can conflict alive. At nearly the same time with Beau 
 marchais memorial, the government received Bonvouloir s 
 report, 2 containing an assurance that the Americans would 
 welcome the co-operation of France. The arguments of 
 
 1 Peace or War. Beaumarchais and his Times, III, p. 117. 
 
 2 De Witt, Jefferson, p. 478, note. 
 
22 France and the American Revolution. 
 
 these amateur diplomatists were reinforced by urgent mes 
 sages from the Court of Spain. Bound to France by an 
 alliance offensive and defensive, bound to her still more 
 closely by common hatred of England, Spain was as ready 
 for mischief as her ally, and far more eager for gain. At 
 this period, her ambition pointed toward the conquest of 
 Portugal, with whom rival interests in America had brought 
 her into conflict. France had declared her unwillingness to 
 risk a continental war by attacking Portugal in Europe, and 
 had tried to dissuade Spain from a course which would rouse 
 England to hostility and divert her from the American war 
 so advantageous to the Bourbon powers. But when the 
 aggressions of Portugal, prolonged beyond reason, suggested 
 the connivance of England, Spain availed herself of this 
 opportunity to persuade France that their old enemy was 
 preparing for an attack, and that counter-measures were 
 needed. " His Majesty* understands," wrote Grimaldi, the 
 prime minister of Spain, "that it is necessary before all 
 else to decide whether or no we ought to prepare for 
 war, .... whether, calmly relying on our good faith and 
 our upright intentions, we ought to wait until England her 
 self .... strikes a blow at our possessions or those of 
 France in such a way that afterwards it may be almost im 
 possible to recover them." 
 
 Vergenues, though averse to premature aggressive meas 
 ures, was keenly alive to a threatened danger. Unwilling 
 to go to the extreme which Spain desired, he chose a course 
 that would leave France uncommitted for the present, but 
 .able at any moment to strike at England or, better still, to 
 provoke England into dealing the first blow. On the 
 twelfth of March, with the approval of the King won with 
 difficulty, as we have seen, by Beaumarchais arguments 
 he submitted his plan to his colleagues in the Council. 
 Rayneval s mcmoire had asserted that France was interested 
 in favoring the insurgents, and that the previous conduct of 
 England would justify such a policy. Vergennes went 
 farther. Like Beaumarchais, he claimed that this course 
 
 1 Grimaldi to d Aranda, Feb. 26, 1776. Doniol, I, p. 336. See other 
 documents in chapters IX and X. 
 
A id for A meriea . 2 3 
 
 was dictated by political necessity. Whatever the outcome 
 of the American contest, war between France and England 
 might result. In case of reconciliation, England might be 
 tempted to use against France the troops set free in America, 
 or the English King might wish to build up arbitrary power 
 at home by the aid of a foreign war. In case of defeat, the 
 ministers would have recourse to such a war, to save their 
 official heads. On the other side was the risk that the 
 Colonies might encroach on their neighbors ; but Vergennes 
 gave this danger only passing mention, and returned to less 
 remote possibilities. If the two Kings did not prefer peace, 
 he said, this would be the time to strike a blow at England, 
 place her in the rank of secondary powers, and " deliver the 
 universe from a rapacious tyrant." In any case, it was de 
 sirable that the present war should last a year, to keep the 
 British forces in America, to prevent a change in the British 
 Ministry, to weaken the British army, and to give France 
 and Spain time for preparation. To ensure this, they must 
 convince the English of their friendship, and at the same 
 time encourage the Americans with vague hopes. "Con 
 tinue to feed dexterously the security of the English Min 
 istry as to the intentions of France and Spain ; " aid the in 
 surgents with money and munitions, but enter into no 
 alliance with them ; above all, increase the forces of France 
 and Spain, and prepare for defense : this was the sum of 
 Vergennes advice. 1 
 
 This memorial drew from Turgot a reply 2 remarkable 
 for its deviation from the political and economic views of 
 the time. The prevailing belief was that a country reaped 
 benefit from its colonies only so long as it monopolized their 
 trade, and that it could secure this ascendancy only by force 
 The aim of the pro- American party in France, as we find it 
 expressed in many writings of the period, was, by severing 
 the political tie which bound the Colonies to England, to 
 deprive her of the prestige and also of the commercial pros 
 perity which she owed to that connection, and thus to bring 
 
 1 Stevens Facsimiles, 1316. 
 
 2 Oeuvres, II, p. 551. 
 
24 France and the American Revolution. 
 
 about her ruin. 1 Turgot, while predicting wide-spread 
 results from the success of the American revolt, threw 
 doubt on its efficacy as a means for the abasement of 
 England. He said that if the British Provinces became in 
 dependent, the colonies of all the other European nations 
 would demand commeicial freedom and, if denied it, would 
 fight for it until they, too, acquired independence. But he 
 maintained that the loss of all the colonies would affect the 
 prosperity of the European nations but little, because 
 only a very small part of the commercial benefit derived 
 from colonies was due to restrictions on trade. In view of 
 the coming revolution, he advised that France should make 
 concessions to her own colonies and thus secure them as 
 friends and allies, instead of waiting to see them become 
 enemies ; and that she should urge Spain to take the same 
 precautions. 
 
 Turgot saw no reason to fear an attack from England ex 
 cept in case of reconciliation with her Colonies. As minister 
 of finance, he objected to beginning a war with army and 
 navy only half prepared and with a yearly deficit of twenty 
 million livres. Besides, he feared that an attack on 
 England would be the signal for an accommodation with her 
 Colonies. Aid to the Americans, he thought, should not 
 transgress the bounds of strict neutrality. French citizens 
 might trade with the insurgents, because the government 
 had no reason to discriminate between them and other 
 British subjects ; but to supply them with money would be 
 a step difficult to conceal, and in case of exposure, would 
 incur the just resentment of England. 
 
 Vergennes memoire, attacked in part by Turgot, was 
 adopted by the majority of theConncil, approved by the King, 
 and submitted to the Court of Spain. The Spanish King had 
 already expressed his willingness to share the expense of 
 aiding the Americans, in order to prolong the revolt and 
 allow England and the Colonies to exhaust one another. 2 
 He thought, with Vergennes, that the two Courts were in 
 terested in prolonging the struggle ; that the Colonists, if 
 
 1 Fiske, American Revolution, II, pp. 5-6, 131-2. 
 
 2 Letter of Grimaldi, March 14, 1776. Doniol, I, 371. 
 
Aid for America. 25 
 
 not aided, would probably soon succumb ; and that, while 
 it was best not to make common cause with them, it would 
 be well to furnish them with what they needed. 1 
 
 In the meantime, the commercial facilities granted to 
 American traders in French ports continued to arouse indig 
 nation in England. Vergennes had more than once issued 
 orders forbidding the exportation of arms by Americans ; 
 but they were sham orders, and the practice continued. In 
 April, 1776, the English discovered through the treacherous 
 mate of an American ship, that several vessels from the 
 Colonies, consigned to merchants of Nantes, were on their 
 way to France to procure arms and ammunition. Beau- 
 marchais, then in London, was questioned by Lord Roch 
 ford, and answered with all the nonchalance of an irrespon 
 sible private citizen : " Why would you wish our adminis 
 tration to take proceedings against the Nantes merchants ? 
 Are we at war with anyone? . . . are not our ports open to 
 all the merchants in the world ? ... On account of a 
 quarrel special to England, and in which we do not, nor do 
 we want to, take part, has England the right to restrict our 
 commerce?" " But, Sir," Lord Rochford answered, " the 
 Americans are rebels and are declared enemies!" "My 
 Lord, they are not ours. . . . Who prevents you from tak 
 ing measures against them ? Cruise on all sides, seize them 
 everywhere ; except under the cannon of our forts, how 
 ever ; we have nothing to do with it." Vergennes, forced 
 by his official position to be more complaisant, ordered that 
 the vessels should not be allowed to take powder and arms 
 on board ; but he conve)^ed to Beaumarchais the King s 
 approval of his reply to Lord Rochford. Powder and arms 
 were objects of commerce, he said ; and it was out of friend 
 ship for England that the King had forbidden their exporta 
 tion. Lord Rochford s tone implied that France was bound 
 to make England s interest her own. l< I do not know of 
 this agreement," said Vergennes ; and, calling to mind the 
 aid which England had given to the Corsicans in their 
 recent struggle against France, he added: "It does not 
 
 1 D Ossun to Vergennes, Apr. i, 1776. Doniol, I, p. 341. 
 
26 France and the American Revolution. 
 
 exist in the example which England gave us at the time 
 when she thought she conld injure us." 
 
 Dissatisfied with Vergennes assumption of neutrality, 
 Beaumarchais urged him to lend the insurgents one or two 
 million livres, and thus gather all the fruits of victory with 
 out a battle. Vergennes began his reply by contrasting the 
 responsibilities of practical statesmen like himself with the 
 freedom of theorists like Beaumarchais, but concluded by 
 assuring him that his advice was not necessarily rejected 
 because not seized with avidity : " Consider the matter well, 
 and you will find me nearer to you than you think." " You 
 were certainly near me," replied Beaumarchais, quick to 
 take the hint, " when I thought you far away." His confi 
 dence was justified. On the very day of the reassuring 
 letter, Vergennes submitted to the King for his signature an 
 order for a million livres, to be used in aiding the English 
 Colonies. 2 The conduct of the enterprise was entrusted to 
 Beaumarchais, who assumed, for the sake of concealment, 
 the style of a commercial firm, Rodrique Hortalez and 
 Company. 
 
 During the next few weeks, between the decision of the 
 Cabinet and the completion of Beaumarchais plans, an agent 
 of the Americans, without proper credentials but with a 
 goodly supply of zeal, was laboring on behalf of his coun 
 trymen and receiving some encouragement from the Minis 
 try. Dr. Barbeu Dubotirg, a friend of Franklin, had been 
 entrusted by an agent of the Committee of Secret Corre 
 spondence with the charge of American interests at Paris 
 and Versailles. Having learned in conversation with the 
 ministers and their friends, that they were devising means 
 of aiding the insurgents, he tried to procure a supply of 
 ammunition. By official connivance, he was allowed to bor 
 row muskets and cannon from the King s arsenals, for sale 
 
 Beaumarchais to Vergennes, Apr. 16, 1776. St. Paul to Wey- 
 mouth, Apr. 17. Vergennes to Beaumarchais, Apr. 26. Stevens 
 Facsimiles, 1322, 1324, 1330. 
 
 2 Beaumarchais to Vergennes, Apr. 26, May n, 1776. Vergennes to 
 Beaumarchais, May 2. Ibid. 1328, 1334, 861. Diplomatic Corre 
 spondence, II, p. 89. 
 
Aid for America. 27 
 
 to the Americans. Knowing that the American army 
 needed engineers, Dubonrg tried to procure them. He also 
 "ventured promises" to one or two officers of artillery, 
 though he doubted the wisdom of employing foreign officers. 
 " I believe this is what you have the least need of," he wrote 
 to Franklin, "as it may disgust your valiant countrymen." 
 He set on foot arrangements with the Farmers General for 
 the reception of American tobacco, and obtained a promise 
 from the Minister of the Navy that his department would 
 purchase supplies from America. He reported that the 
 Ministry in general seemed to be favorably disposed toward 
 the insurgents, but were not inclined to assume any respon 
 sibility for their fortunes. Indeed, these gentlemen were 
 much absorbed in their own concerns. Turgot had just 
 received his dismissal, " and all the others," wrote Dubourg, 
 
 are so teased at this time by the extraordinary cabals of 
 the court," that no one wishes to go outside his own imme 
 diate department. 1 
 
 The change in the ministry of finance did not, of course, 
 affect the decision already reached with regard to the insur 
 gents. On the tenth of June, Beaumarchais received a mil 
 lion livres from the treasury, and he began without delay to 
 collect supplies for shipment to America. 
 
 It is natural to ask, while considering the first acts of 
 France in support of the American cause, whether her plea of 
 self-defense was genuine, or whether she was influenced 
 wholly by a wish to humiliate her rival. Vergennes, in his 
 memoire of March 12, gave prominence to the aggressive 
 motive, the desire to strike a blow at England and restore 
 the former glory of France. As we see him, ostensibly in 
 fear of British designs, draw gradually nearer to an alliance 
 with America, the suspicion recurs again and again that he 
 saw danger ahead because he wished to see it, and that his 
 eye for peril grew keener as France became better prepared 
 for defense. But this suspicion is misleading. No one who 
 reads the letters that passed between the French and Span- 
 
 1 Dubourg to Franklin, June 12-July 2, 1776. Sparks MSS. UI, vol. 
 I, p. i. Stevens Facsimiles, 566, 567, 568, 570, 884. Diplomatic Cor 
 respondence, II, p. 113. 
 
28 France and the American Revolution. 
 
 ish Courts during the early years of the Revolution can fail 
 to see that they were watching England as men watch some 
 dangerous animal crouching for a spring. Every increase 
 in the British naval forces, every movement of a British 
 fleet, was jealously noted. Spain, especially, was uncom 
 fortably conscious that her own colonies were near the 
 revolted Provinces, and that the destination of an English 
 fleet need be changed but little to menace her possessions. 
 Early in 1776 she had special cruisers on the American coast 
 to watch the movements of British ships, and was urging 
 France to co-operate with her in the defense of her colonies. 1 
 Though considerations of safety set the pace of the Bour 
 bon Courts from week to week, as they made haste to antici 
 pate a dreaded attack or held back from provoking an 
 encounter for which they were not quite prepared, we can 
 not doubt that, without regard to the intentions-of England, 
 they desired war, provided they might have it in their own 
 good time. They were eager to wipe out the treaty of 1763, 
 and to regain their lost prestige. Very early in the discus 
 sion, Spain freely hinted her desire for territorial acquisi 
 tions. With France, the chief ambition was to humiliate 
 England and destroy her influence among nations. Ver- 
 gennes has left a clear statement of his ow r n leading motive, 
 and of the means which he intended to employ. A memo 
 rial written by him at the end of his career, contains the 
 following passage : "A nation may experience reverses- 
 and may yield to the imperious law of necessity and of her 
 own preservation ; but when these reverses and the humilia 
 tion which has resulted from them are unjust, when they 
 have had for their principle and their end the pride of an 
 influential rival, she ought, for her honor, her digtiity, and 
 her reputation, to recover herself whenever she finds the 
 opportunity. If she neglects it, if fear overpowers duty, 
 she adds abasement to humiliation ; she becomes the object 
 of scorn of her century and of future races. 
 
 These important truths, Sire, have never left my 
 thoughts. They were already deeply graven in my heart 
 
 1 Grimaldi to d Aranda, Feb. 26, 1776. D Ossun to Vergennes, Apr. 
 29. Doniol, I, 333, 350. 
 
A id for A m erica . 2 9 
 
 when Your Majesty summoned me to your Council ; and I 
 waited with lively impatience an opportunity to follow their 
 impulse. It was these truths that fixed my attention on the 
 Americans, that caused me to watch for and to seize the 
 moment when Your Majesty could assist this oppressed 
 nation with the well-founded hope of effecting their deliver 
 ance. If I had held other sentiments, Sire, other principles, 
 other views, I should have betrayed your confidence and 
 the interests of the State ; I should regard myself as 
 unworthy to serve Your Majesty ; I should regard myself 
 as unworthy to bear the name of Frenchman." 
 
 1 Doniol, I, p. 3. 
 
Ill 
 
 THE BEGINNING OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. 
 
 We have seen that the Committee of Secret Correspond 
 ence wrote in December, 1775, to Arthur Lee and Charles 
 Dumas, requesting them to find out whether any of the 
 European powers were willing to assist the Americans. 
 Lee held several interviews with the French ambassador at 
 London, and indirectly heard from him that aid would 
 be furnished to the Colonies. Dumas obtained an inter 
 view with the French minister at The Hague, 1 and 
 enquired whether the King of France would offer his 
 mediation to end the war ; and, in case of failure to reach 
 an agreement, whether France and Spain would form an 
 alliance with the Colonies. He received the impression 
 that the minister was pleased with the idea of mediation 
 and would not have objected to a treaty except for the 
 danger of a European war. But a few weeks later the same 
 official told Dumas that the King could not mediate while 
 the Colonies were subject to Great Britain, nor ally himself 
 with them nor furnish them aids while he was at peace with 
 England. The King is a true knight," said the minister ;. 
 " his word is sacred." But he promised that strict neu 
 trality should be maintained, and that the Americans should 
 have the same right as " all the other English," to export 
 merchandise, arms, and munitions of war from France. 2 
 
 Early in March, 1776, while Franklin s letter was on its 
 way to Dumas, the Committee of Secret Correspondence 
 appointed Silas Deane, an ex-member of Congress and of the 
 Secret Committee for procuring supplies, commercial agent 
 to France, giving him at the same time an important political 
 
 1 Dumas to Franklin, Apr. 30, 1776. Diplomatic Correspondence, 
 II, p. 86. 
 
 1 Dumas to Committee of Secret Correspondence, May 21, 1776. 
 Ibid. II, p. 91. 
 
The Beginning of Diplomatic Relations. 31 
 
 errand. They instructed him to introduce himself to the 
 Count de Vergennes as a merchant, ask for a supply of arms 
 and ammunition on the credit of Congress and, in case of 
 refusal, request permission to buy in France as large a 
 quantity of these articles as he could pay for or obtain on 
 credit. If received with favor, he was to ask whether the 
 Colonies might hope for an alliance, commercial or defensive, 
 with France ; and at what time she would be ready to 
 recognize them. 1 He was given no power, however, to con 
 clude a treaty. 
 
 On his arrival in France, in June, 1776, Deane was told 
 that he could probably accomplish nothing, as a new reign 
 had lately begun ; several departments of the government, 
 notably that of finance, were deranged ; and the King and 
 his ministers wished to keep the peace. Yet Deane easily 
 obtained an audience with Vergennes, and was partly suc 
 cessful in the commercial half of his errand. Vergennes 
 told him that the Court could not openly encourage the 
 shipping of warlike stores to America, but would place no 
 obstacles in the way. He invited Deane to avail himself of 
 the privilege, open to all American merchants, of carrying 
 on every kind of commerce allowed to the traders of any 
 nation. He refused to discuss the feasibility of a treaty 
 while events were so uncertain, but he questioned Deane 
 about the resources of the Colonies and the strength of their 
 union. 2 
 
 This interview was an auspicious beginning, and Deane 
 soon detected further evidence of ministerial good-will, in 
 an offer of Beaumarchais to procure on credit the supplies 
 which the Colonies had ordered. Deane suspected that 
 Beaumarchais was supported by the government, because 
 he did not, like other merchants, require securities endorsed 
 by a banker or a well-known man of business ; and M. 
 Gerard, Vergennes first secretary, confirmed the suspicion 
 by telling Deane that he could safely rely on Beaumarchais 
 
 1 Committee of Secret Correspondence to Deane, March 3, 1776. 
 Diplomatic Correspondence, II, p. 78. 
 
 2 Deane to Committee of Secret Correspondence, Aug. 18, 1776. 
 Ibid. II, p. 112. 
 
32 / rancc and tlie American Devolution. 
 
 commercial engagements. The two agents soon came to an 
 agreement, Beaumarchais promising to furnish supplies, and 
 Deane pledging the credit of Congress to pay for them in 
 tobacco or other American products. 1 
 
 Beaumarchais knew how to obtain powder and arms from 
 the state arsenals. Because the exportation of this mer 
 chandise was forbidden, and because it could not even be 
 carried to the sea-coast without publicity, he suggested to 
 Deane the advantage of having influential friends at court. 
 With this in view, he advised him to send officers to America 
 with the stores, " and, by fixing on such as should be 
 recommended by persons at court, or of influence by their 
 connections, to procure . . . friends and patrons." It is 
 due to Beaumarchais to state that he also believed the 
 Americans too inexperienced in the art of war to manage 
 artillery without the aid of foreign officers. Deane listened 
 to his advice, and the crowd of officers, " all brave as their 
 swords," who besieged the American agents in Paris, per 
 plexed Congress, and harassed Washington, was a direct re 
 sult of this ingenious scheme. 2 
 
 The Ministry winked at the little emigration, but was 
 careful to avoid responsibility. Of all the officers who 
 crossed the water, four engineers were the only ones sent by 
 the government. 3 
 
 Even with the aid of influential friends, the work of sup 
 plying the American army was not easy. Beaumarchais 
 informed Congress in August that he had procured two 
 hundred brass cannon, a large amount of ammunition, and 
 a quantity of clothing for the troops. Everything promised 
 well, and Deane hoped that the troops would sail in October.* 
 
 1 Diplomatic Correspondence, II, pp. 116 ff. Beaumarchais to 
 Deane, July 18, 1776. Deane to Beaumarchais, July 20, 24. Ibid. II, 
 pp. 99, 102, 105. 
 
 2 Deane s Address to Congress, Dec. 1778. Sparks MSS., LII, vol. 
 I, p. 104. Beaumarchais to Deane, July 26, 1776. Deane to Beaumar 
 chais, July 27. Deane Papers, I, pp. 164, 166. 
 
 3 Memoirs of Lafayette, I, p. 70. 
 
 4 Roderique Hortalez and Co. to Committee of Secret Correspond 
 ence, Aug. 18, 1776. Deane to R. Morris, Sept. 17. Diplomatic Cor 
 respondence, II, pp. 129, 148. 
 
The Beginning of Diplomatic Relations. 33 
 
 But the British ambassador spread a report that Congress 
 was treating with General Howe, and at once the supply of 
 government stores was checked. Soon after this a native of 
 Maryland, in the service of France, insinuated that Deane 
 was trying to bring about a reconciliation with Great Britain 
 and planning to use the supplies against France. These 
 rumors, annoying as they were, caused little delay. A far 
 more serious obstacle was the indifference produced in the 
 Ministry by news of the serious defeat on Long Island. 
 This disaster threatened to wreck American hopes, in France 
 as well as at home. Another reason for ministerial coldness 
 was the delay in receiving news from America. The British 
 were so active at sea that it was November before an official 
 announcement of the Declaration of Independence arrived 
 in France. 1 In the meantime the English were on the watch 
 for suspicious shipments, and, in order to escape the notice 
 of their spies, the government hindered the loading and 
 despatching of Beaumarchais vessels almost as persistently 
 as if it had disapproved the enterprise. At last, "after 
 orders and counter-orders and manceuvers the very history 
 of which," Deane said, " would fill a volume," the Amphi- 
 trite set sail on the fourteenth of December, laden with 
 military stores and carrying a number of officers for the 
 American service. She had been loaded at night, over a 
 hundred men working together in confusion, crowding in 
 stores picked up by lighters from the nearest points of the 
 shore, with little regard to the invoice. 2 The cause of this 
 haste was an indiscretion on the part of Beaumarchais. While 
 superintending the affairs of his mercantile house he had 
 called attention to himself by directing the rehearsals of one 
 of his comedies. The English ambassador had learned 
 where he was, and why ; and the Ministry had been forced 
 to take notice of his doings. A government embargo caught 
 his other ships and detained them in port. Unfortunately, 
 
 1 Deane to Committee of Secret Correspondence, Oct. i, 17, 25, 1776. 
 Diplomatic Correspondence, II, pp. 153, 173, 183. Deane to Ver- 
 gennes, about Nov. 8. Stevens Facsimiles, 592. 
 
 2 Beaumarchais to Deane, Dec. 17, 1776. Deane Papers, I, p. 424. 
 
 3 
 
34 France and the American Revolution. 
 
 through the selfish caprice of an officer on board the 
 Amphitrite, that ship was brought back to L Orient, and 
 there detained. For several weeks the enterprise remained 
 at a standstill. It was not until the last of January, 1777, 
 that Beaumarchais received the welcome news that three of 
 his vessels had sailed. In February, he despatched a fourth ; 
 early in March, he reported eight ships at sea and one load 
 ing ; in the first \veek of May, the ninth ship sailed, and 
 Beaumarchais heard that three of his cargoes had arrived in 
 America. These supplies came just in time for the campaign 
 of 1777, and were especially welcome b}^ reason of an alarm 
 ing scarcity of guns, due to the fact that many of the soldiers, 
 at the end of their short terms of service, not only refused to 
 re-enlist, but carried home the government property. 1 
 
 It must not be supposed that Beaumarchais first nine car 
 goes, to say nothing of later ones, were paid for out of the 
 million livres which he obtained from the French treasury 
 in June, 1776. In August of the same year, he received an 
 equal amount from Spain, and over a million livres were 
 contributed by France during 1777. 2 Besides this, he bor 
 rowed money, like an ordinary merchant, from wealthy 
 individuals. During one year, he shipped to America stores 
 to the value of five million livres. 
 
 The terms on which the French government advanced 
 the money, especially the first million, have been and are 
 still the subject of much discussion. The disputed question 
 is whether the money was intended as a gift to the Ameri 
 cans or as a loan to Beaumarchais, capable of being con 
 verted into a gift if his losses were so great as to call for 
 some recompense. On the former supposition, the amount 
 ought to have been deducted from the bill which Beau 
 marchais presented to the United States for services ren 
 dered ; on the latter, the United States had no claim on it, 
 and Beaumarchais was responsible only to the French 
 
 Deane to Gerard, Jan. 7, 1777. Beaumarchais to Vergennes, Jan. 
 7, 30 ; Feb. 4, Mar. 7, May 4. Vergennes to Gerard, Jan. 7. Stevens 
 Facsimiles, 617, 912, 916, 1424, 1445, 1526, 618. Deane s Address to 
 Congress, Dec., 1778. Sparks MSS., UI, Vol. I, p. 92. 
 
 2 Beaumarchais and his Times, III, pp. 130, 165. 
 
The Beginning of Diplomatic Relations. 35 
 
 Ministry. The doubt on this point caused dissensions 
 among the American Commissioners in Europe, and fac 
 tional disputes in Congress ; deprived Beaumarchais of the 
 remittances from America, which he claimed in return for 
 his outlay ; and gave rise to a law-suit half a century long, 
 which ended in a compromise between the United States 
 and the heir of Beaumarchais, to the great disadvantage of 
 the claimant. To decide this question, on which congres 
 sional committees and attorneys general of the United States 
 have disagreed, is exceedingly difficult, even with the aid 
 of the documents, both private and official, now open to the 
 public ; but a few facts may be given on either side. 
 
 Against the claim of Beaumarchais we may place, first, 
 the statements of Arthur Lee. Lee said that Beaumarchais 
 told him in 1775 that France would furnish the United 
 States with ,200,000, to be sent by way of the West Indies. 
 He claimed that, after the plan of direct remittance had 
 been changed to that of utilizing a commercial company, 
 the appearance of commerce was only a blind, and no pay 
 was expected in return for the supplies. An entry in Lee s 
 Journal, for October 3, 1777, tells us that M. Grand, a 
 banker with whom the Americans had dealings, coming 
 direct from Vergennes, brought word that Congress " need 
 give themselves no trouble about making returns ; that 
 nothing which we had received or were to receive was lent, 
 but to be considered as given." In line with this testi 
 mony is a letter written by Vergennes to the ambassador in 
 Spain, May 3, 1776, in which the following words occur : 
 "All will be done in the name of a commercial society 
 directed by a merchant of one of our maritime towns, who 
 will take securities not very binding, to be sure ; but will 
 color his zeal with the motive, plausible enough on the part 
 of a merchant, of desiring to attract to himself, the largest * 
 part of the American commissions when the commerce of 
 the Colonies shall be rendered free by the declaration of 
 their independence." The fact that Beaumarchais, in 
 pressing his claim, falsely stated that the supplies were 
 
 1 Life of Arthur Lee, I, p. 336. 
 
 2 Vergennes to d Ossun, May 3, 1776. Doniol, I, p. 375. 
 
 
36 France and the American Revolution. 
 
 bought with his own money, 1 would seem almost conclusive 
 evidence against him, if it had not been impossible for him 
 to explain the matter truthfully without divulging govern 
 ment secrets. 
 
 One of the strongest arguments in favor of Beaumarchais 
 may be drawn from his own plan of operations, submitted to 
 the King in the fall of I775/ 2 He asked the French govern 
 ment to entrust him with a million livres, half of which he 
 would send to America in the form of coin and the rest in 
 powder. He asked leave to buy the powder from the state 
 magazines, at the government rate of from four to six sols a 
 pound ; intending to sell it to the insurgents at the market 
 price of from twenty to thirty sols, and invest the difference 
 in more supplies for the Americans. By a clever calculation, 
 whose weakest point was reliance on remittances that never 
 arrived, he proved that the King, by advancing one million 
 livres, could make enough money to invest three million in 
 the second venture and nine in the third. 3 If it were certain 
 that this plan was adopted, Beaumarchais reputation would 
 be cleared. 
 
 One of the most baffling elements in the puzzle is, that 
 most of the evidence seems to be of little value. Nothing 
 could be more positive than the assertions of Arthur Lee, 
 that all the supplies advanced by the French Court were 
 intended as a gift ; but, after repeating this declaration again 
 and again, Lee finally owned that he did not know whether 
 they were so intended or not. If, as Lee recorded, Vergennes 
 told M. Grand in October, 1777, that no return was expected 
 for the supplies, he also wrote to Gerard in September, 1778 : 
 The Commissioners "insinuate that all, or at least a large 
 portion, of what has been sent is on account of His Majesty. 
 I am about to reply that the King has not furnished any 
 thing ; that he has simply allowed M. de Beaumarchais to 
 provide himself with what he wanted in the arsenals, on con 
 dition of replacing what he took." 4 Again, in 1779, he 
 
 1 Journal of Arthur Lee, Dec. 24, 1777. Life, I, 369. 
 
 2 Possibly in February, 1776. 
 
 3 Deane Papers, I, p. 108. 
 
 4 A Vindication of Arthur Lee, p. 36. 
 
The Beginning of Diplomatic Relations. 37 
 
 declared through Gerard that Beaumarchais was "the credi 
 tor of the United States, and at the same time debtor to the 
 King." These statements might be taken as conclusive if 
 diplomats always spoke the truth. When the United States 
 government, learning by accident that a million livres had 
 been advanced by France, requested an explanation, Ver- 
 gennes merely kept silence and refused to name the person 
 to whom the money had been paid. His successors, unable 
 to conceal the agency of Beaumarchais, stoutly and falsely 
 averred that the money " was for an object of secret political 
 services, the knowledge of which the King had reserved to 
 himself," and that it was unjust " to confound this political 
 object with the mercantile operations of the same individual 
 with Congress." While a witness who perverts the truth 
 ordinarily throws discredit on the cause which he represents, 
 the attempts of the French government, repeated through a 
 period of fifty years, to secure attention to the claim of 
 Beaumarchais, may be regarded as a strong point in his 
 favor. It is hard to imagine why a succession of ministers 
 should have devoted so much effort and prevarication to the 
 support of a groundless demand. 
 
 While Deane, with the aid of Beaumarchais, was obtain 
 ing supplies for the Americans, he did not neglect the polit 
 ical side of his mission. He promptly announced to the 
 French Court the Congressional resolution of May 15, the 
 forerunner of the Declaration of Independence ; and, pre 
 dicting that this resolution would soon be followed by im 
 portant instructions with regard to France, he asked aid 
 for his country. A month later he submitted an elaborate 
 memorial on American trade, in the hope of persuading 
 France to abandon her restrictive system and open her own 
 ports and those of her colonies to American commerce. 3 He 
 did not obtain all the concessions which he desired for his 
 countrymen, but they were liberally treated. The authorities 
 allowed them to import certain prohibited articles and tocon- 
 
 1 Claim of Beaumarchais Heir, p. 4. 
 2 Ibid., p. 8. 
 
 3 July 18, Aug. 15, 1776. Stevens Facsimiles, 572, 577. See Dip 
 lomatic Correspondence, II, p. 126. 
 
38 France and the American Revolution. 
 
 tinue to export arms and ammunition. The registers must 
 not contain any item nor any indication of this connivance, 
 entire liberty being left to the Americans to load and export 
 as they please the articles in question:" such were Ver- 
 gennes significant orders. 1 
 
 Not all the commercial privileges which France gave to 
 the Americans were necessarily violations of international 
 law. The French theory of the rights of neutral trade was 
 broader than the English. It embraced the principle that 
 free ships make free goods ; while England claimed that an 
 enemy s goods, even in a neutral ship, were liable to confisca 
 tion. If the Americans could be considered a separate power 
 at war with England, France, according to her own doctrine, 
 had the right to trade with them. England, of course, de 
 nied both the premise and the conclusion. If, on the con 
 trary, the Americans were colonies, France admitted that 
 England, if powerful enough, might prevent them from 
 trading with French citizens, but denied her right to for 
 bid French citizens to trade with them : a distinction which 
 the Bourbon monarch would hardly have maintained if his 
 own colonies had been the ones concerned. There are two 
 kinds of commerce, said the French authorities : that which 
 confines its dealings to ordinary merchandise, and that which 
 includes contraband articles. Even if our citizens indulge 
 in contraband trade, this constitutes no breach of neutrality, 
 but merely renders the goods subject to confiscation. 2 With 
 this careful definition of the rights in question France veiled 
 her connivance at prohibited trade. 
 
 While playing fast and loose with international obliga 
 tions, the Ministry assumed a defiant attitude in the face of 
 British protest. An unofficial agent of the English govern 
 ment having called the French charge d affaires to account, 
 for the presence of Deane in Paris, Vergennes made this 
 comment : " He surely knows that the King is master in his 
 own house, that he has no account to render to any one con 
 cerning the strangers whom he thinks proper to admit into 
 his States, and that His Majesty does all that Great Britain 
 
 1 Vergennes to Clugny, Sept. 22. Stevens Facsimiles, 1365. 
 
 2 Sparks translation and abridgment of Rayneval s Observations 
 sur le Memoire Justicatif de la Gourde Londres. Sparks MSS., LI. 
 
The Beginning of Diplomatic Relations. 39 
 
 could demand as a favor, in not receiving openly a repre 
 sentative on the part of the English Colonies." 
 
 The expression, even in a private letter, of a sentiment so 
 uncompromising, indicated the approach of a crisis. At 
 this time, France and Spain were seriously considering a 
 declaration of war against England. Spain, on the eve of a 
 contest with Portugal, in which England might be expected 
 to take part with her ally, had one more reason than usual 
 for desiring the co-operation of France. Late in August, 
 the Spanish ambassador d Aranda tried, in an unofficial 
 interview with Maurepas, to persuade him that the time for 
 an attack on England had come. It was believed in Spain 
 that no effort to keep the peace would long be successful ; 
 and that it would be wise to take the offensive and anticipate 
 the dreaded attack. There was no proposal to form an 
 alliance with the Americans. The reason or pretext for 
 hesitation was the advantage of waiting until another cam 
 paign had shown how much aid the Colonists could give to 
 an ally. 
 
 In a memoire laid before the King and Council as a result 
 of the Spanish overtures, Vergennes reviewed the arguments 
 in favor of war, but gave -the ^proposals of France a turn 
 which might easily prove obnoxious to Spain, and so defer 
 the critical moment. Once more, he declared that a war 
 with England could be justified as a measure of self-defense ; 
 for England was so jealous of the increasing naval power of 
 France that only the necessity of concentrating her forces in 
 America restrained her from giving vent to her enmity. He 
 gave the impression that France would welcome a war with 
 Great Britain, if it could be waged without the intervention 
 of other European powers ; and that, unlike Spain, she saw 
 advantage in an alliance with America. In order to 
 avoid the danger of arousing jealousy of the increasing 
 power of France, he suggested that Spain might begin the 
 war, and allow France to enter as her auxiliary. 3 
 
 1 Vergennes to Gamier, Aug. 31, 1776. Doniol, I, p. 583. 
 
 2 Grimaldi to d Aranda, Aug. 26, 1776. Bancroft MSS., Archives 
 Francises, Espagne, 1768-1776, p. 267. 
 
 3 Considerations read to the King in Committee, on the course to be 
 taken with regard to England, Aug. 31, 1776. Stevens Facsimiles, 897. 
 
4O France and the American Revolution. 
 
 Thus called on to act as principal, Spain beat a prompt 
 retreat. Maintaining still that war could not long be 
 avoided, her minister developed a doubt whether the proper 
 moment had arrived. He feared that, while France and 
 Spain were attacking England, she might make peace with 
 America and turn her forces against them. Another reason 
 for objecting to hasty action, a reason ominous of future dis 
 agreement between Spain and her ally, was the necessity of 
 deciding beforehand on some plan of operations. Incident 
 ally, d Aranda expressed a desire to drive the English from 
 Jamaica and Minorca. 1 
 
 Before this reply reached the French Court, Vergennes 
 heard news that made him even less desirous of war than 
 before, that of the American defeat on Long Island. The 
 fate of New York was not known ; but, in its bearing on the 
 foreign policy of France, it was considered immaterial. 
 Even if New York was in the hands of the British there 
 would no longer be any reason for haste in attacking Eng 
 land or declaring for the Americans. They were not likely 
 to submit after one defeat ; and the occupation of their 
 strongholds would keep the common enemy busy. Besides, 
 delay would give France and Spain time for further prepara 
 tion, and at the same time exhaust the resources of England. 
 Meanwhile, it would be possible " to direct the furnishing of 
 aid to the Colonies in such a way as to force the English into 
 becoming the aggressors themselves ; in this capacity," said 
 Vergennes, with his eye on the danger of a continental war, 
 they would lose their right to the interest which several 
 powers might take in not seeing them crushed." 
 
 In this way the military disasters in America fixed, for 
 the time being, the hesitating course of the two European 
 powers. "After all," said a French noble, 3 " France was 
 not fool enough to play such a silly game as Spain did in 
 the last war, when she got so soundly drubbed for espousing 
 a ruined cause." 
 
 1 Grimaldi to d Aranda, Oct. 8, 1776, Doniol, I, pp. 608-612. 
 
 2 Gamier to Vergennes, Oct. n, 1776. Vergennes to the King, Oct. 
 17, 26. Vergennes to d Aranda, Nov. 5. Ibid., I, pp. 615, 618, 620, 
 682-4. 
 
 3 The Duke de Chartres. 
 
The Beginning of Diplomatic Relations. 41 
 
 In the midst of the discussion between the French and 
 Spanish Cabinets, Deane called attention to the Declaration 
 of Independence, the adoption of which was a well-known 
 fact, although it had not been officially announced, and 
 asked for an answer to the questions, whether France would 
 recognize the United States and receive an ambassador from 
 them, and whether they might hope for an alliance. "The 
 moment approaches," wrote Beaumarchais to Vergennes, 
 " when you will have to say yes or no. I would go and 
 hang myself immediately if it were the latter." Beaumar 
 chais was mistaken. The moment was receding. Deane 
 continued to wait for an answer to his questions. He 
 waited, too, in a state of distress " beyond the power of 
 language to paint," for official news of the Declaration of 
 Independence, and power to negotiate a treaty. He at 
 tributed the failure of his efforts to the negligence of Con 
 gress, not knowing that, since the tidings from Long Island, 
 the Americans could hope for only enough aid to keep them 
 from succumbing. 1 
 
 At the moment when the fortune of America was lowest 
 in official circles, the powerful force of public opinion began 
 to make itself felt in our favor. "It is difficult," says a 
 French historian of this period, "for governments, even 
 absolute ones, to resist a movement of public opinion when 
 it extends to all classes, from the summit of society to 
 its lowest foundations." 1 It is more difficult when, in 
 addition to this, the king lacks strength and is desirous of 
 winning popular favor. It is hardest of all when the 
 general cry is for war, and when a popular war- minister in 
 exile has a strong party of friends at court. Choiseul is 
 said to have disapproved of the alliance with the United 
 States, and to have wished merely to use the Americans for 
 the exhaustion of England ; 3 but, however persistently he 
 opposed the measures of Vergennes, every influence in favor 
 of war was pushing the country with almost irresistible logic 
 toward an American alliance. 
 
 1 Memo nre of Deane, Sept. 24, 1776. Stevens Facsimiles, 585. 
 Beaumarchais to Vergennes, Sept. 25. Ibid., 898. 
 
 2 Capefigue, Louis XVI, II, p. 34. 
 
 3 Soulavie, Memoires, III, p. 412. 
 
42 France and the American Revolution. 
 
 During the first months of our Revolution, the French 
 public knew little of Jhe incidents or the merits of the strug 
 gle ; but Deane s attempt to-gain friends-at-court-by con 
 ferring fa-vors on military officers, soon made the insurgent 
 cause popular among the young nobility ; and they, in turn, 
 enlisted the enthusiastic sympathy of the Queen, At the same 
 time the admission of American trader s to French ports en 
 gaged the interest, less conspicuous but equally important, 
 of the mercantile class ; and the struggle of the insurgents 
 for republican^ self-government won the support of the 
 philosophers and their followers, who formed a large and 
 influential body, and who appreciated American political 
 ambitions all the more because they took it for granted that 
 these, aspirations were borrowed from their own writings. 1 
 Radical theories had spread through the entire younger gen 
 eration of French society. The military nobility were 
 attracted toward the American cause, not only through am 
 bition, desire of adventure, weariness of peace, and hatred of 
 England, but through their recently acquired admiration for 
 republican and democratic institutions. Under the influ 
 ence of such motives, Lafayette, among others, determined 
 to offer his services to Washington. Finding that the disas 
 ter of Long Island had placed a serious obstacle in the way 
 of the shipments directed by Deane and Beaumarchais, and 
 that he could not hope to reach America soon on one of their 
 vessels, he offered to buy and equip a ship on his own ac 
 count ; and, eluding the vigilance of the Ministry, he made 
 his way to the scene of action. The escapade of Lafayette 
 greatly increased the popularity of the American cause. As 
 time passed and news of the battles in which he and his 
 companions figured, reached France, the court and even the 
 ministers felt their interest quicken. With the army, " de 
 sertion became a fashion." A friend of Lafayette 2 has 
 recorded that Maurepas said more than once that it was 
 the impetuous ardor of the young courtiers and the French 
 warriors which had cried down the wisdom of the Council 
 
 , Mhnoires, I, pp. 74, 80 ; II, p. 43. 
 2 Ibid., I, p. 80. 
 
The Beginning of Diplomatic Relations. 43 
 
 and, so to speak, forced the government into war." Ac 
 cepting this statement as true of Maurepas and the King, 
 we may believe that Vergennes, though he sometimes vacil 
 lated, followed a consistent policy in the main, and advised 
 the recognition of America for reasons of state. 
 
 The desirability of an alliance had been debated in \ 
 America as well as in France. The question was closely 
 bound up with that of independence. The more radical 
 element in Congress had asserted that the Colonies could 
 hope for no European assistance until they declared their hide- , 
 pendence ; the more cautious members had feared that such a 
 declaration would place them in the power of foreign nations. 
 "France," they said, "will take advantage of us when 
 they see we cannot recede, and demand severe terms of us ; 
 .... she and Spain, too, will rejoice to see Britain and 
 America wasting each other." In spite of these fears, a 
 committee had been appointed on the twelfth of June, 1776, 
 to draw up a plan of treaties for presentation to foreign ( 
 powers. 1 Dr. Franklin and John Adams were the most dis 
 tinguished members. Adams, with all his enthusiasm for 
 independence, saw the threatening danger, and always in 
 sisted that any connection established with foreign powers 
 should be purely commercial. In his work on the com 
 mittee, he held his colleagues rigidly to this principle. On 
 the supposition that France would not accept a distinctly 
 commercial treaty, many motions w r ere offered to insert 
 "articles of entangling alliance, of exclusive privileges, 
 and of warranties of possessions ;" but they were all 
 defeated, 2 and the draft submitted to Congress for debate 
 was that of a perpetual treaty of amity and commerce, 
 drawn up with special reference to France. It contained y 
 a stipulation that if England should attack France in conse 
 quence of the treaty, the United States would not aid 
 England. As some of the members of Congress feared that 
 France would not be satisfied with a mere promise of neu 
 trality, the plan was reconsidered. John Adams was absent 
 at the time ; but in spite of the withdrawal of his restrain- 
 
 1 Secret Journals of Congress, II, pp. 475-7. 
 
 2 Life and Works of John Adams, II, pp. 516-7 ; IX, p. 409. 
 
44 France and the American Revolution. 
 
 ing influence, the concessions which were made did not 
 greatly alter the spirit of the treaty. The Commissioners 
 were instructed to promise, if necessary, that the United 
 States would never acknowledge allegiance to GreatL. Britain 
 nor grant more commercial privileges to her than to France ; 
 and also to stipulate that no treaty for ending the war be 
 tween the United States and Great Britain or between Great 
 Britain and France should take effect until six months after 
 the allies had notified each other. Thus modified, the plan 
 of treaty was agreed to by Congress, September 17, 1776. 
 Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and Silas Deane 
 were chosen Commissioners to treat with France ; but Jeffer 
 son declined to serve, and Arthur Lee was appointed in his 
 place. 1 
 
 Early in November, Deane s painful suspense was relieved 
 by an official announcement of the Declaration of Inde 
 pendence, and news that Congress had a plan of treaty 
 under consideration. On notifying the Ministry, Deane 
 was met by the question : What would the United States 
 gain from the acknowledgement of their independence, 
 unless this were followed by a war against Great Britain ; 
 since they already enjoyed all the other advantages which 
 would accrue to them from such an acknowledgment ? It 
 was intimated that in one respect the change would be a 
 disadvantage : it would place the United States under addi 
 tional obligations to France. 2 
 
 Though the Declaration of Independence had no immedi 
 ate effect on the policy of the government, it justified itself, 
 in France as in America, by its influence on public opinion. 
 Expressing, as it did, the English instinct for liberty in the 
 formulas of French political philosophy, it was sure to in 
 crease the popular enthusiasm for the young republic. 3 
 
 Soon after the Americans had taken the irrevocable step, 
 Vergennes marked out in a tentative way the general lines 
 
 1 Secret Journals of Congress, II, pp. 27 ff. , 31, 35. 
 
 2 Stevens Facsimiles, 592. Deane to Committee of Secret Corre 
 spondence, Nov. 28, 1776. Diplomatic Correspondence, II, p. 197. 
 
 3 Capefigue, Louis XVI, II, p. 38. 
 
The Beginning of Diplomatic Relations. 45 
 
 which the French government afterward tried to follow. 1 
 He wished to postpone the war with England until the end 
 of 1777, when he thought the naval and military prepara 
 tions of France and Spain w ? ould be completed. Even then, 
 they were not to take the aggressive or to call for allies : 
 they would leave that to England. Would it be well, he 
 asked the Spanish minister, to conclude an alliance with the 
 Americans, offensive while the war lasted and defensive 
 from the conclusion of peace? As Spain was betraying 
 solicitude with regard to the objects of the war, he urged 
 that the abasement of England and the destruction of her 
 commerce should be made their primary aim. Thus, by the 
 close of 1776, a fairly definite plan was shaping itself out of 
 the fluctuating counsels of the French Ministry. 
 
 1 Vergennes to d Aranda, Nov. 5, 1776. Vergennes to d Ossun, Dec. 
 8. Sparks MSS., LXXX, vol. I, pp. 116, 133. Plan de measures 
 a eoncerter avec VEspagne, Dec. 1776. Bancroft MSS., Archives 
 Fran^aises, Espagne, 1768-1776, p. 289. 
 
IV. 
 
 THE DEMAND FOR RECOGNITION. 
 
 When the British ambassador heard that Franklin was on 
 the way to Paris he threatened, it is said, to leave without 
 ceremony. Vergennes told him that a message had already 
 been sent to intercept Franklin and forbid him the country ; 
 but that, as his route was uncertain, the courier might fail 
 to meet him. 1 This messenger, if he existed, was con 
 veniently unsuccessful ; for Franklin arrived in Paris in the 
 last part of December. On the following day, he and Deane 
 were joined by Arthur Lee. The Commissioners informed 
 Vergennes of their powers, and asked for an audience. 
 Vergennes received them in secret, renewed his promise of 
 commercial facilities, and presented them to the ambassador 
 of Spain. From this time until the revocation of their com 
 missions, the Deputies labored to obtain aid and recognition 
 for their country. Their success has won them fame. 
 Their most conspicuous failure has been mercifully obscured 
 by time ; namely, their inability to preserve harmony among 
 themselves. The three colleagues had not been long in 
 France when they and two other agents of Congress then in 
 Paris became involved in a lively quarrel, which spread to 
 their constituents in Congress, delayed and complicated the 
 public business, and introduced personal rancor into ques 
 tions of international policy which needed for their decision 
 as clear and unbiased judgment as any problems which have 
 ever confronted the American Congress. Fortunately, it is 
 not necessary to enter into the petty details of these disagree 
 ments ; but whoever desires a complete picture of the life of 
 our representatives in Paris, should remember that they 
 were zealous in their enmities as well as in devotion to their 
 public duties. Franklin was the only one who had self- 
 control ; and this very quality was an added source of ex 
 asperation to his opponents. 
 
 1 Lescure, Correspondance Secrete, I, p. 2. 
 
The Demand for Recognition. 47 
 
 The Deputies not only addressed themselves to the Min 
 istry, but tried to enlist public opinion in favor of the 
 American cause. A large part of their success with the 
 people, however, was unpremeditated. The simplicity of 
 their costumes and manners won the approval of a society 
 enthusiastic for democratic plainness and equality. They 
 were compared to citizens of the ancient republics of Greece 
 and Rome. The most eminent men of the kingdom sought 
 their acquaintance. Franklin, especially, made himself the 
 idol of the hour. Gifted with a natural comprehension of 
 the French character, he won his way with an adroitness 
 which may have been unstudied, but which has been attrib 
 uted to art. "He showed himself little," said a French 
 historian, " as all men do who wish to exert a mysterious 
 influence ; but he made people speak of him a great deal. . 
 . . . His simple air concealed extreme shrewdness ; he un 
 derstood that in France it is necessary to get one s self talked 
 about, and talked about continually, if one wishes to remain 
 master of public opinion, and he did not fail to do it." l 
 
 As soon as possible after their arrival in Paris, the Com 
 missioners submitted the proposed treaty to Vergennes, and 
 asked France to sell eight ships of the line and a supply of 
 munitions to the United States and to provide a convoy at 
 the expense of Congress. 2 
 
 In his surprise at the moderate terms of the treaty, Ver 
 gennes wrote to d Ossun, the ambassador in Spain, with 
 some exaggeration, that the Americans really asked for 
 nothing which they did not already enjoy. "If it is 
 modesty," he said, " if it is fear of being a burden to powers 
 on whose interest they think they can rely, the sentiments 
 are very praiseworthy. But he suspected that they secretly 
 washed to provoke England, by the loss of her commerce, 
 into declaring war ; and, at the same time, to avoid aii3 r en- 
 
 1 Capefigue, Louis XVI, II, pp. 44, 15. 
 
 2 American Commissioners to Vergennes, Dec. 23, 1776, Stevens 
 Facsimiles, 606. Memoire, Jan. 5, 1777. Ibid., 614. Franklin and 
 Deane to Committee of Secret Correspondence, Jan. 17, March 12. 
 Franklin, Deane, and Lee to Vergennes, Jan. 5. Diplomatic Corres 
 pondence, II, pp. 248, 283, 245. 
 
48 France and the American Revolution. 
 
 gagement which would outlast the conflict. The application 
 for ships of the line confirmed his suspicion. This favor 
 was refused, as courteously as possible, and the request for 
 convoy met the same fate. The question how to avoid 
 either accepting or rejecting the proffered treaty, was more 
 serious. At first, Vergennes thought of a declaration of 
 commercial reciprocity, but he feared that it would be con 
 strued as a refusal, and would lead to a reconciliation be 
 tween the contending parties. The reply which was finally 
 given was, that at present France had not enough interest 
 in an alliance with America to justify her in risking a war ; 
 and that, while future events might make an alliance 
 desirable, it was best in the mean time not to anticipate 
 time and events." In a letter to d Ossun, Vergennes went 
 so far as to say that he did not wish an alliance with 
 America. He put no faith in the honor of republics, and 
 he did not see what security France could have for the 
 fidelity of the Americans. But if England should declare 
 war against France or Spain such an alliance might become 
 valuable, and with this contingency in view he left an open 
 ing for future negotiations. 1 
 
 The Spanish Ministry were still more emphatic in their 
 objections to an American alliance, unless in case of an at 
 tack by England. 2 They granted that, if the insurgents 
 were showing themselves capable of respectable resistance, 
 such a connection might be necessary to prevent reconcilia 
 tion with England. But, said Grimaldi, they continually 
 retreat ; the British generals are masters of entire provinces ; 
 it is probable that the Americans must soon submit. Besides, 
 their example is to be dreaded. The King " ought to hesi 
 tate greatly to make a formal treaty with provinces which 
 cannot yet be considered in any other light than that of 
 rebels. . . . The rights of all sovereigns in their respective 
 territories ought to be extremely sacred, and the example of 
 a rebellion is too dangerous for his Majesty to wish to sup 
 port it openly." 
 
 Vergennes to d Ossun, Jan. 4, 12, 1777. Doniol, II. pp. 113, 122. 
 Minutes for the Answer of the French King. Approved. Jan. 9, 
 Stevens Facsimiles, 622, See also 621. 
 
 2 Grimaldi to d Aranda, Feb. 4, Doniol, II, p. 189. 
 
The Demand for Recognition. 49 
 
 While repelling the offer of a treaty, the French Court 
 granted the Americans a loan of two million livres. 1 This 
 gave Congress a little respite from the anxiety which they 
 were beginning to feel about the public credit. The evil 
 results of indiscriminate issues of paper money were already 
 showing themselves in America^ At the close of 1776, 
 specie was worth from two to two and a half times as much 
 as paper ; but a far greater depreciation was necessary to 
 teach our rulers financial wisdom, and many French mil 
 lions were destined to be sunk in this ever-widening gulf. 
 
 Franklin and his colleagues did not relax their efforts be 
 cause of the first rebuffs. Early in February, 1777, on 
 hearing alarming accounts of England s preparations for the 
 next campaign, they again tried to persuade Vergennes that 
 the Bourbon powers would find it advantageous to declare 
 war. At the same time, the Commissioners placed on record 
 in a private written agreement their intention, under certain 
 circumstances, to exceed their instructions, and hazard the 
 censure or the utmost penalty of Congress. That is, if 
 France or Spain should conclude a commercial treaty with 
 the United States, and be drawn into a war with Great 
 Britain in consequence, the Commissioners resolved to 
 stipulate that the United States would not conclude a 
 separate peace, provided the other power concerned would 
 give the same pledge. 2 
 
 Until now, the Commissioners had been acting under their 
 first instructions, without official news from America. On 
 the fourteenth of March, they received letters containing 
 further directions, together with an account of the retreat 
 through the Jerseys. Discouraged by repeated misfortunes, 
 Congress had voted to offer France a treaty of alliance. 
 That this decision did hot meet with unanimous approval is 
 shown by a letter of John Adams, written a few months 
 
 Franklin, Deane, and Lee to Gerard, Jan. 14, 1777. To Committee 
 of Secret Correspondence, Jan. 17. Diplomatic Correspondence, II, 
 pp. 247, 250. 
 
 Franklin, Deane, and Lee to Vergennes, Feb. i, 1777. Personal 
 pledge of Commissioners, Feb. 2. Diplomatic Correspondence, II, 
 pp. 257, 260. 
 
50 France and the American Revolution. 
 
 later. 1 " I must confess," said he, " that I am at a loss to 
 determine whether it is good policy in us to wish for a war 
 between France and Britain, unless we could be sure that no 
 other powers would engage in it. But if France engages, 
 Spain will, and then all Europe will arrange themselves on 
 one side and the other, and what consequences to us might 
 be involved in it, I do not know. ... I have very often 
 been ashamed to hear so many Whigs groaning and sighing 
 with despondency, and whining out their fears that we must 
 be subdued, unless France should step in. Are we to be 
 
 beholden to France for our liberties?" The irritation of 
 
 
 
 self-reliant patriots like Adams could not bring back the day 
 of moderate measures. In order to induce France, if she 
 intended war against England, to open hostilities .sooner, the 
 United States offered to join her in an attack on the British 
 territories and a division of the conquests, and to enter into 
 a stipulation that neither party should conclude a separate 
 , peace. As an inducement to Spain Congress offered not 
 only to declare war against Portugal, if a report that she had 
 insulted American commerce should prove true, but to " con 
 tinue the said war for the total conquest of that kingdom to 
 be added to the dominion of Spain." To such a subversion 
 of their principles, discouragement over military reverses led 
 the representatives of a people who were righting for their 
 own independence. They were saved from the necessity of 
 fulfilling this promise by Spain s rejection of the overtures 
 as premature. 2 
 
 Besides requesting a treaty of alliance, Congress asked for 
 a secret loan of two millions sterling, to be secured by lands 
 on the Mississippi or the Ohio. The Commissioners made 
 special exertions to obtain this favor, but they were told that 
 France could not spare the money. They received permis 
 sion to borrow of private capitalists, on condition that they 
 
 To James Warren, Apr. 27, 1777. Life and Works, IX, p. 462. 
 
 Deane to Vergennes, March 15, 1777. Deane on behalf of himself 
 and B. Franklin, March 18. Stevens Facsimiles, 655, 659. Secret 
 Journals of Congress, II, pp. 36 and 38 ff. Committee of Secret Cor 
 respondence to Commissioners, Dec. 30, 1776. Diplomatic Corres 
 pondence, II, p. 240. D Ossun to Vergennes, March 24. Bancroft 
 MSS., Archives Franc, aises, Espagne, 1777, p. 429. 
 
The Demand for Recognition. 51 
 
 should not offer more than the government rate of interest. 
 In the existing state of American credit, this was equivalent 
 to a prohibition. But the second quarterly installment of 
 the two million livres promised in January was furnished 
 promptly , and the Commissioners were told that payments 
 would be continued even after the full amount had been con 
 tributed. Besides this, the Farmers General entered into a 
 contract, engaging to place two million livres at their dis 
 posal, and to take American tobacco in return.!-. 
 
 At this time, the Ministry were keeping a watchful eye on 
 the Deputies, because of certain interviews with which they 
 were favored by agents of Great Britain. Although the 
 Americans promptly reported these conversations to Ver- 
 gennes, he feared that they might be tempted to listen to 
 secret proposals from the British government. " We cannot 
 conceal from ourselves," he owned, " that what we have 
 done so far for the United Colonies is not enough to engage 
 their gratitude." Far from meditating concessions to Eng 
 land, the Commissioners were in good spirits over the pros 
 pect of a French war. " It is the universal opinion, " they 
 wrote to the Committee at home, " that the peace cannot 
 continue another year." Vergennes shared this conviction. 
 He expected the outbreak of war within a few months, and 
 already thought of warning the fishermen at sea. 3 
 
 The forbearance of England was due to policy, and not to 
 any illusion. The British not only learned through spies 
 the details of ttie intercourse between France and America, 
 
 1 Stevens Facsimiles, 660, 661. Deane to Beaumarchais, Macrh 24, 27, 
 1777. Beaumarchais to Maurepas, March 30. To Vergennes, March 
 30 and Apr. i. Stevens Facsimiles, 1493, 1498, 1499, 1500. Franklin, 
 Deane, and Lee to Committee of Secret Correspondence, Apr. 9. Dip 
 lomatic Correspondence, II, p. 285. Contract, March 24. Stevens 
 Facsimiles, 251. 
 
 2 M. Gerard, Report of information received from Mr. Deane. 
 Stevens Facsimiles, 675. Vergennes to d Ossun, Apr. 7, 1777. (Never 
 sent.) Doniol, II, p. 341. 
 
 3 Commissioners to Committee of Secret Correspondence, Apr. 9, 
 1777. Diplomatic Correspondence, II, p. 289. Inquiry about the pre 
 cautions to be taken against England. Vergennes, Apr. Doniol, II, 
 p. 409. Vergennes to d Ossun, July 18. Ibid., II, p. 451. 
 
52 France and the American Revolution. 
 
 but they penetrated the secrets of the Cabinet. It was at 
 this time that Lord Stormont wrote : The_Courts _of JErance 
 and Spain have had three projects in agitation ; - 1. To ac 
 cede to the requisitions of the Court of London in pre 
 serving an exact neutrality ; 2. To continue the plan formed 
 under the Ministry of the Duke of Choiseul, in seeking to 
 detach the Colonies from the mother country, and to oppose 
 against her a redoubtable rival in the republic formed of the 
 thirteen Colonies . . . ; 3. To deceive equally on both 
 sides, to promise his Britannic Majesty not to afford an 
 asylum to his rebel subjects, and yet to do it under the pre 
 tence of humanity." 1 Lord Stormont s information was 
 probably correct. The French and Spanish correspondence 
 of the time abounds in discussions of the policy of active 
 interference and that of temporizing deception. A French 
 historian 2 informs us that neutrality also was seriously con 
 sidered, and that the price to be demanded was the retro 
 cession of Canada. This statement, surprising because at 
 variance with repeated official declarations of intention with 
 regard to Canada, is confirmed by a memoire* attributed to 
 Vergennes, written during the war. After setting forth the 
 advantages that France would gain by the restitution of 
 Canada and Louisiana, the writer suggests that these trans 
 fers be discussed in a general Congress of European nations 
 at the close of the war, in case the American Colonies ob 
 tain their independence. The main reason given for this 
 advice is the danger, which Vergennes made light of when 
 advocating a more vigorous policy, that the Americans 
 may develop a spirit of conquest. 
 
 With these three plans in view, the Ministry are said to 
 have made their choice from necessity rather than judgment. 
 A contemporary author 4 describes them as halting between 
 the peace policy of the King and the warlike measures urged 
 upon them by public opinion, until they were forced to take 
 a middle course, deceiving England and the Colonies alter- 
 
 1 Capefigue, II, p. 47, note. 
 
 2 Capefigue, II, p. 46. 
 
 3 Memoire Historique et Politique sur la Louisiane. 
 
 4 Se"gur, Memoires, I, p. 109. 
 
The Demand for Recognition. 53 
 
 nately, and failing to reap the advantages of either peace or 
 war. This statement, while true to appearances, probably 
 exaggerates the indecision of the Ministry, especially of 
 Vergennes. He adopted the policy of double-dealing so 
 early and maintained it so steadily that we may say with 
 some confidence, he was not forced into this line of action, 
 but chose it. He predicted the date of the rupture so ac 
 curately, a year ahead, that we can hardly suppose his final 
 decision to have been due solely to a military chance. At 
 least, we must believe the chance was welcomed. On 
 the other hand, it would be misleading to regard Vergennes 
 as a man of unshaken resolution. It cannot be denied that 
 he sometimes vacillated. All that can be claimed for him is 
 a fairly steady adherence to a policy of compromise. It was 
 natural that men like Lafayette, impatient for results and 
 unburdened by responsibility, should complain of the 
 " labyrinth of precautions, of weaknesses, and of dis 
 avowals," in which the foreign department involved itself. 
 But it would have taken a man of iron to remain unmoved 
 in the midst of the influences which surrounded Vergennes : 
 the King, the people, the intriguing friends of Choiseul, the 
 calculating and obstinate Spaniard. 
 
 While Franklin and Deane labored with the French Min 
 istry, Lee had taken a journey to Spain, in hope of procur 
 ing an alliance. He had been warned off from the capital, 
 but had received promises of material aid, which was after 
 ward furnished in moderation. In April, 1777, Spain, under 
 the lead of her new minister, Florida Blanca, brought for 
 ward a new project : that Spain and France, adding to the 
 weight of their influence by strengthening their colonial de 
 fenses, should try to influence the deliberations between the 
 American Provinces and England, and also the relations of 
 the Provinces among themselves. 1 France was not im 
 pressed with the wisdom of her ally. " In order to have the 
 right to meddle in the internal deliberations of the Colonies," 
 Vergennes wrote, "and in the negotiations which they 
 
 1 Bancroft s note on a letter of Florida Blanca to d Aranda, Apr. 7, 
 1777. Bancroft MSS., Archives Francises, Espagne, 1777, p. 443. 
 See Doniol, II, p. 264. 
 
54 France and the American Revolution. 
 
 might have with the metropolis, it would be necessary to 
 bind ourselves so closely to them that our respective interests 
 would be the same. This would be, assuredly, to place our 
 selves in a state of open though undeclared war with Eng 
 land." Florida Blanca had suggested that France and 
 Spain, while acting as mediators, might regain some of their 
 lost territory by negotiation with England. In reply, Ver- 
 gennes gave the reason for the moderate policy which France 
 had already decided to adopt. " If the loss of Canada was 
 felt by her," he said, " she ought to regret it the less since 
 her forced abandonment of it has become the signal for the 
 revolt of the English possessions on the continent. If we 
 should think of reinstating ourselves there, we should arouse 
 again the old uneasiness and jealousies which ensured the 
 fidelity and submission of these same Provinces to England." 
 These Provinces, he said, " are not striving to throw off the 
 yoke of the mother country in order to run the risk of bow 
 ing beneath that of any other power." 
 
 During July and August, ,.777, the relations between 
 France and England became so strained that it appeared 
 doubtful whether the Bourbon powers would retain the 
 choice between peace and war. The principal cause of irri 
 tation was the treatment accorded to American privateers in 
 French ports. In April, 1776, Congress had authorized the 
 capture of English vessels/ and by the summer of 1777, 
 privateering enterprise was at its height. France had en 
 couraged it by ignoring treaty stipulations and allowing the 
 sale of prizes in her ports. 8 The Americans responded by try 
 ing with true Yankee ingenuity to force France into war. 
 Their captains were ordered to fit out privateers in French 
 ports, man them with French sailors, and try to provoke 
 the English to unfair reprisals, in order that France might 
 be involved in the claims to compensation. 4 Encouraged by 
 
 1 Vergennes to d Aranda, Apr. 26, 1777. Doniol, II, p. 273. 
 
 2 Journals of Congress, I, p. 304. 
 
 3 Deane to R. Morris, Aug. 23, 1777. Diplomatic Correspondence, 
 H> P- 379- Beaumarchais to Vergennes, Feb. 20, March 7. Vergennes 
 to Noailles, March 21. Stevens Facsimiles, 919, 1445, 1488. 
 
 *Carmichael to Bingham, June 25-July 6, 1777. Diplomatic Cor 
 respondence, II, pp. 347, 348. 
 
The Demand for Recognition. 55 
 
 the leniency of the French government privateers grew 
 more and more daring. Ships were armed in the ports of 
 France, and returned thither with their prizes ; an English 
 mail packet was carried into Dunkirk ; a small fleet cruised 
 off the coast of England and took seventeen or eighteen 
 captured vessels to France. " For the first time," we are 
 told, " since Britain was a maritime power, the river Thames 
 and other of its ports were crowded with French and other 
 ships, taking in freight, in order to avoid the risk of having 
 British property captured." The English government pro 
 tested angrily against the violations of international law. 
 Vergennes was obliged to act. He rebuked the Commis 
 sioners severely, and apologized for rebuking them ; he had 
 a man imprisoned now and then ; he took securities for 
 good behavior, that failed to secure it. He seriously em 
 barrassed the privateers, but did not produce conviction in 
 the American mind. 
 
 The English Ministry were still less convinced. The per 
 sistence with which they made their resentment known sug 
 gested the approach of an ultimatum. This danger, and the 
 constantly recurring fear of an accommodation between Eng 
 land and America, 2 may have been among the reasons which 
 led Vergennes, in July, to advise aggressive measures. 3 He 
 declared that the insufficiency of the aid which France had 
 given to the insurgents would lend countenance to the belief 
 that she merely wished to see England and America wear 
 each other out. As the military preparations of France 
 were nearly complete, it would be well to anticipate the de 
 signs of England by setting an early date for the commence 
 ment of hostilities. " If the two Crowns allow January or 
 February of 1778 to pass," he said, mentioning in advance 
 the very months in which the treaty with the Americans was 
 negotiated, " they will have only to regret the opportunity 
 which they have neglected." The change from their late 
 professions of friendship toward England might seem unduly 
 
 1 Deane s Address to Congress, Dec., 1778. Sparks MSS. LIT, vol. I, 
 p. 124. 
 
 2 Life and Works of John Adams, I, p. 311. 
 
 8 Mhnoire, July 23, 1777, Doniol, II, p. 460. 
 
56 France and the American Revolution. 
 
 abrupt : this he foresaw. But they would have a reason 
 able pretext for their action in England s recent encroach 
 ments on their commerce, while exercising her so-called 
 right to search the ships of neutrals for American goods. 1 
 If they decided on war, they must first of all make sure of 
 the Americans by a treaty ; for "it would be inconsistent," 
 Vergennes said, "to arm ourselves for them and to allow 
 them to lay down their arms." In discussing the plan of 
 sending political agents to the Americans, he suggested the 
 expediency of persuading them that they would need the 
 guaranty of France and Spain. This idea was seized with 
 avidity in Spain. The proposal of a guaranty would test the 
 sincerity of England ; and if she should unexpectedly give 
 her consent, the guarantors might be able to influence the 
 terms of the treaty. 
 
 On ever} 7 other point Spain proved intractable. She ob 
 jected to the date suggested by Vergennes, because a 
 treasure-ship and a troop-ship which she was expecting from 
 America could. not arrive so soon. She doubted the wisdom 
 of aggression, at a time when it seemed probable that the 
 British Ministry would welcome a foreign war as a happy 
 release from their embarrassment. She did not wish an 
 American alliance, and she did wish Gibraltar. In order to 
 make sure of enough causes of complaint to justify a future 
 attack on England, she devised a plan as cold-blooded as it 
 was likely to be effectual. " We will treat the English with 
 justice and dignity . . . while taking care not to give [the 
 Ministry] just motives for complaint, and complaining our 
 selves with firmness but without bitterness, of those which 
 they and their nation give us, so that the complaints, multi 
 plying, may assume more consistence." 2 
 
 The French Ministry consented to postpone the war in 
 deference to the wishes of Spain, and Vergennes took up 
 the problem of inducing the Americans to accept a guaranty. 
 He hoped to effect this through the messengers whom the 
 two Courts were sending to America. He despaired of 
 
 1 Vergennes to d Ossun, July 18, 1777. Doniol, II, p. 451. 
 2 Memoir -e of the Court of Spain, Aug. 8, 1777. Sparks MSS., 
 LXXX, vol. I, p. 281. 
 
The Demand for Recognition. 57 
 
 gaining his point with the Deputies at Paris. They were 
 men who would not lend themselves to interested schemes. 
 Vergennes complained of their suspicion, their unwilling 
 ness to assume any ties unless France engaged to take part 
 in the war, and the calculated indiscretion by which they 
 were apparently trying to commit France in the sight of 
 England. Still, he would have some proposals of a guaranty 
 thrown to them. "If they do not bite at this hook," 
 he says, he has an alternative plan : namely, to per 
 suade them that they cannot trust to an acknowledgment of 
 their independence by England ; and that their best security 
 would lie in commercial treaties, to be concluded with the 
 nations most interested, at the same time with the treaty of 
 peace. 1 For the moment, France halts in the position 
 assumed at first by the Americans : commercial union, but 
 no entangling alliance. 
 
 France had no sooner declared her readiness to wait the 
 pleasure of Spain, than a sudden threat from the British 
 government reminded them both that they did not control 
 the situation. Through a private agent, whose words could 
 be disavowed, the English Ministry demanded that the King 
 should surrender without examination all prizes brought 
 into his ports by the Americans, publish the orders given to 
 his admirals on the subject, and dismiss all the privateers 
 who were then in the ports of France. Vergennes prepared 
 an answer to these demands a refusal, tempered by yield 
 ing some minor points. His report was approved by the 
 King, on August twenty-third. 2 "If these concessions are 
 not enough for England, there can be no further choice." 
 
 Vergennes expected war. He advised that all vessels be 
 detained in port for fifteen days, and despatch boats sent 
 to the fisheries, the French islands, and the Levant. He 
 warned the ambassador at London : " The flame of war is to 
 all appearance ready to burst forth, and will probably have 
 broken out before my letter reaches you. ... I fear much 
 that I shall have the pleasure of seeing you sooner than I 
 
 Vergennes to d Ossun, Aug. 22, 1777. Doniol, II, p. 500. 
 2 Stevens Facsimiles, 706. 
 
58 France and the American Revolution. 
 
 wished." 1 Those Americans who wanted to drag France 
 into war seemed sure of success. But they did not attain it. 
 Lord Stormont, who conversed with Maurepas and Ver- 
 genneson the English demands, carefully refrained from sup 
 porting these by any official sanction. The British demon 
 stration ended in an anti-climax, and war was averted. After 
 this, the treatment of privateers was discussed in a desultory 
 manner, while the increase of armaments for the French and 
 Spanish colonies became the crying grievance of England. 
 The French Court continued to profess friendship for Great 
 Britain, and to give " very essential aids" to the United 
 States. " How long these tw r o parts will continue to be 
 acted at the same time, the Deputies said, in one of their 
 reports, "and which will finally predominate, may be a 
 question. As it is the true interest of France to prevent our 
 being annexed to Britain ... we are inclined to believe 
 the sincerity is toward us." 
 
 In September, the Commissioners found themselves em 
 barrassed for want of funds. They had ordered a large 
 quantity of supplies in anticipation of remittances from 
 America and of money which Spain had promised them ; 
 but the accidents of war had cut off the remittances, and 
 Spain, in irritation at the conduct of some American pri 
 vateers, had suddenly withheld her assistance. Obeying 
 timely orders of Congress, the Deputies appealed to France 
 and Spain for a loan of eight million livres. News of the 
 abandonment of Ticonderoga had recently arrived, and the 
 Commissioners were so discouraged that Vergennes became 
 alarmed. In order to secure their confidence, he advised 
 giving them some compensation for the rigorous treatment 
 to which their privateers had been subjected ; and, on the 
 ground that it was "beneath the dignity of two great 
 powers to lend," he advocated a subsidy. France asked 
 Spain to join her in a contribution of six million livres, on 
 condition that the Deputies solemnly bind themselves not to 
 begin any secret negotiation with England. But the Spanish 
 
 Vergennes to Noailles, Aug. 23, 1777. Stevens Facsimiles, 1656. 
 
 2 Vergennes to Noailles, Aug. 30, 1777. Ibid., 1666. 
 
 3 Sept. 8, 1777. Diplomatic Correspondence, II, p. 388. 
 
The Demand for Recognition. 59 
 
 Ministry, preferring to keep the Americans in expectancy, 
 refused to promise any definite amount. Though all at 
 tempts to change this decision were unsuccessful, France 
 resolved to furnish three million livres during the next 
 year. 1 
 
 France and Spain now carried out their intention of 
 sending emissaries to America. The French agent, M. 
 Holker, was directed to approach the leaders of Congress, 
 inform them of the favors and aids which France had ex 
 tended to the Americans, and impress upon them her 
 interest in their independence. It was hoped that he 
 could persuade them that their liberties would be insecure 
 without a guaranty from France and Spain, and the ex 
 clusion of England from all special commercial privileges. 
 He was instructed to try cautiously to find out their senti 
 ments on the subject of commercial treaties, and to suggest 
 that interest would lead them to favor the powers from 
 which they expected support. He was also to enquire into 
 the state of American resources and the trend of opinion 
 among the people and in the Provincial Congresses, and to 
 find out whether there were any party divisions in Con 
 gress. 2 
 
 Before these instructions were formulated, a decisive 
 event had occurred in America, to convince Vergennes that 
 favors, subsidies, and persuasions were not sufficient to 
 bind the United States to France. During November, 
 rumor said that the fortune of war was turning against the 
 English ; and on December fourth, the Commissioners an 
 nounced the fact of Burgoyne s capitulation. 3 
 
 ^ Memoir e submitted to Vergennes and d Aranda, Sept. 26, 1777. 
 Vergennes to d Ossun, Sept. 26, Nov. 7. Florida Blanca, Oct. 17. 
 Stevens Facsimiles, 1698, 267, 1704, 1711, 1725. 
 
 2 Nov. 25, 1777. Ibid., 1748. 
 
 3 Ibid., 716. 
 
V. 
 
 THE CONCLUSION OF THE TREATY. 
 
 The news of Burgoy lie s defeat impelled the vacillating 
 French Ministry to decisive action. The King authorized 
 more definite overtures to the American Commissioners. 
 Gerard conveyed to them the congratulations of Maurepas 
 and Vergennes, with an intimation that the Court wished a re 
 newal of their proposals for an alliance. 1 At the same time, 
 M. Holker, who had not yet sailed for America, was made the 
 bearer of an open proffer of friendship. 2 The change in the 
 situation was explained to him, for the benefit of the Ameri 
 cans, as inoffensively as possible. It was said that the un 
 willingness of European powers to recognize them had been 
 due chiefly to the uncertainty of their fortunes. A slight 
 cause would have been enough to defeat them, and any na 
 tion which had declared for them would have been compro 
 mised to no purpose. Yet the value of the recent success, 
 it was said, lay not so much in its military as in its political 
 consequences : it would strengthen the credit of the Ameri 
 can leaders and ensure popular support for the cause of in 
 dependence. The time had come for closer contact between 
 the United States and the European powers. " If the Con 
 gress thinks proper to address instructions to its Commis 
 sioners in France," M. Holker was directed to say, "there 
 is every reason to be persuaded that they will speedily re 
 ceive substantial proofs of the favorable disposition of the 
 Courts of the House of Bourbon." 
 
 Statement in the hand of Comte de Vergennes, Dec. 6, 1777. 
 Stevens Facsimiles, 1762. Arthur Lee s Journal, Dec. 6. Life, I, p. 
 357- 
 
 2 M. Gerard. Paper dictated to M. le Ray de Chaumont for M. 
 Holker. Overtures of a more open policy toward America. Stevens 
 Facsimiles, 760. 
 
The Conclusion of the Treaty. 61 
 
 This explanation of the change in the policy of France 
 was incomplete, and hence misleading. Nothing was said 
 of the motive most conspicuous in the official correspondence 
 of those critical days, the fear that defeat would lead Eng 
 land to offer terms which the Americans could accept. The 
 apprehension was not so much that they would be strong 
 enough to wrest their independence from England, as that 
 she would grant it and profit by the concession. Holker s 
 instructions give no indication of the anxiety with which 
 the French Ministry and its embassy at London were watch 
 ing for the effect of the American victory on the tactics and 
 the personnel of the British Cabinet. 1 Beaumarchais, who 
 had the instincts of a diplomatist, was on the alert at once. 
 What is the real meaning of this crisis ? " he wrote to Ver- 
 gennes. " It is, that of two nations, English and French, 
 the first who recognizes American independence will alone 
 gather from it all the fruits, while that independence will be 
 certainly fatal to the one who allows her rival to take the 
 lead." Vergennes adopted his very words. "Let us not 
 be mistaken," he wrote to the ambassador in Spain ; " the 
 Power which first recognizes the independence of the Amer 
 icans will be the first to gather all the fruits of this war." 2 
 
 The Deputies responded promptly to the friendly hints of 
 the Ministry, by formally requesting an answer to their 
 proposal of a treaty. They repeated the well-worn argu 
 ment, that the Americans, uncertain with regard to the in 
 tentions of France and ignorant of the secret aids which 
 she had furnished, might be tempted by the enemy to 
 waver ; and that a treaty concluded at this time would 
 strengthen their resolution. 3 
 
 The French Cabinet, convinced that the Americans could 
 resist England with some hope of success, anxious about 
 the future course of the British Ministry, and besieged by 
 
 Gamier to (qy.) Rayneval, Dec. 5, 1777. Vergennes to Noailles, 
 Dec. 6. Stevens Facsimiles, 1755, 1760. 
 
 2 Beaumarchais to Vergennes, Dec. n, 1777. Vergennes to Mont- 
 morin, Dec. n. Ibid., 1768, 1769. 
 
 3 Franklin, Deane, and Lee to Vergennes, Dec. 8, 1777. Diplo 
 matic Correspondence, II, p. 444. 
 
62 France and the American Revolution. 
 
 the military enthusiasts, had decided to conclude a treaty 
 with the Americans ; and the King, against his will, had 
 given his approval. Vergennes granted the Deputies an 
 audience on the twelfth of December, 1777. The day be 
 fore this meeting, he wrote to supply the ambassador in 
 Spain with arguments for an American alliance. 1 " What 
 have we to put in the way," said he, " to prevent the 
 Americans lending themselves to a reconciliation ? We 
 have no measures, no ties, and no means, in common with 
 them." An accommodation would be all the more 
 dangerous to France, since war with England now seemed 
 inevitable. It would be best to enter on this war in alliance 
 with the Americans ; for, even if they should listen to pro 
 posals from England after they had bound themselves to 
 France, the consequences would not be so serious as those 
 which might be expected from a refusal of their demands. 
 They might desert their ally, but they would hardly be so 
 base as to attack her. 
 
 In a subsequent letter, Vergennes expressed the opinion 
 that Spain s interest in the proposed war was ten times as 
 great as that of France, since the French islands would 
 offer little temptation to the British, in comparison with the 
 Spanish treasures on the mainland. Looking for every 
 argument that would appeal to Spain, he suggested that she 
 might regain Florida by the war. He confessed that he did 
 not know the sentiments of the Americans on this point ; 
 but lie thought it natural to suppose that they did not 
 specially care to possess Florida themselves. 2 
 
 Meeting the Deputies at the appointed time, Vergennes 
 complimented them on the prosperous state of American 
 affairs, and on the conduct of Washington in giving battle 
 to General Howe s army at Germantown ; an unsuccess 
 ful attempt, the boldness of which had impressed him 
 as deeply as the victory at Saratoga. Circumstances, he 
 said, seemed favorable to an understanding between the 
 
 Vergennes to Montmorin, Dec. n, 1777. Stevens Facsimiles, 
 1769. 
 
 2 Vergennes to Montmorin, Dec. 13, 1777. Ibid., 1775. 
 
The Conclusion of the Treaty. 63 
 
 two countries ; and he promised that the King would i 
 examine all the proposals of the Americans and give them 
 as many marks of "affection and interest" as possible, re 
 serving the right to conclude nothing without the King of 
 Spain. In the informal conversation that followed, Ver- 
 gennes enquired into the demands of Congress and indicated 
 the terms that France would accept : all this, with the 
 understanding that the interview should have "no conse- 
 sequences." The Americans at first proposed a mere treaty 
 of amity and commerce ; but Vergennes, reminding them 
 that such a treaty would draw France into war with England, 
 insisted that the agreement between them should have all 
 the solidity of which human institutions are capable." At 
 the same time, he assured them that they could not be secure 
 without the guaranty of France and Spain, as long as Eng 
 land retained any land on the continent. The Commis 
 sioners, in turn, renewed the offer of Congress to guarantee 
 the American possessions of France and Spain. 1 
 
 The reports from England confirmed the government in 
 its policy. The party of the Administration was said to be 
 outdoing the Opposition in proposing concessions to the 
 Americans, while at the same time it asked for unlimited 
 subsidies. If the attempts at conciliation were genuine, for 
 what purpose were the subsidies demanded ? The question 
 was ominous for France. The situation was critical. Lord 
 North might even feel sure enough of support to begin a 
 negotiation without waiting until the measure had been 
 discussed in Parliament. Vergennes was impatient at the 
 length of time that must pass before he could hear from 
 Spain. " 1 will not conceal from you," he wrote to the 
 ambassador, Montmorin, "that the issue makes me 
 tremble." Next came a rumor that the King of England 
 was making overtures to Lord Chatham ; and another, that 
 Lord Germaine was sending his secretary to Paris, to treat 
 with the American Commissioners. "If his offers are pre- 
 
 1 Journal of Arthur Lee. Life, I, p. 360. Statement in the hand of 
 Vergennes, marked by the King, " Approuve" Dec. 6, 1777. Stevens 
 Facsimiles, 1762. Vergennes to Montmorin, Dec. 13. Ibid., 1774. 
 
 2 Dec. 13, 1777. Ibid., 1774. 
 
64 France and the American Revohition. 
 
 cise," said Vergennes, " if those who receive them have the 
 good faith to ask our advice and decision, what shall we 
 reply ? He did not say that France would reply by con 
 cluding a treaty with the Americans ; but he hinted that if 
 she did, Spain would have no right to complain. 1 
 
 It was true that an agent of the British government, 
 Wentworth by name, was busy with the Deputies. Deane 
 reported the conferences to Vergennes. They did not 
 threaten any serious results ; but Vergennes learned from 
 the reports, that the Ministry had instructed the brothers 
 Howe to open a negotiation in America, and that a formal 
 proposition had been made to unite with America against 
 France and Spain. 2 Mr. Wentworth was not the only 
 British agent who communicated with the Americans at this 
 time. The Londoners showed enough interest in Franklin 
 and his colleagues to justify some uneasiness on the part of 
 France ; and it is not strange that, when these attempts 
 failed, Vergennes betrayed an emotion of relief. " I regard 
 it as a special piece of good fortune," this benefactor of 
 America wrote, " and as the effect of the happy star of the 
 House of Bourbon, that the English Ministry in the intoxi 
 cation of its hopes rather than of its successes has so cir 
 cumscribed itself by the acts which it has caused Parliament 
 to pass, that it has no power to grant this independence 
 which it foresees that it will be obliged to let slip." 3 In 
 order to make sure that the overtures on the other side of 
 the water should be equally unsuccessful, a King s frigate 
 carried to Boston despatches of the Deputies, reporting the 
 proposals of the British emissaries, and warning Congress 
 of the advances to be made through the Howes. 
 
 While the interviews between Deane and Wentworth were 
 takingplace, the Commissioners impressed upon Vergennesthe 
 importance of their knowing, at a time when England seemed 
 on the point of proposing peace, what the United States 
 might expect from France and Spain. This was the critical 
 
 1 Vergennes to Montmorin, Evening of Dec. 13, 1777. Stevens 
 Facsimiles, 1776. 
 
 2 Ibid., 1778, 718, 719, 231, 1780, 1781, 1786, etc. 
 
 3 Vergennes to Montmorin, Dec. 19, 1777. Doniol, II. p. 662. 
 
The Conclusion of the Treaty. 65 
 
 question which Vergennes thought would justify him in pro 
 ceeding without the concurrence of Spain. He informed the 
 Commissioners through Gerard, on the seventeenth of De 
 cember, that the King had resolved to acknowledge their in 
 dependence and to make a treaty with them. 1 As His 
 Majesty aimed to found a permanent alliance, advantageous 
 to both peoples, and not to exact concessions because he was 
 dealing with a new nation, the terms of the treaty would be 
 liberal. In supporting the independence of the United 
 States, the Kifig would probably be drawn into war with 
 England ; yet he would ask no compensation, and France 
 would seek her advantage in diminishing the power of Great 
 Britain. The Commissioners, in their report to the Com 
 mittee of Foreign Affairs, 2 represented Gerard as saying that 
 the King would not insist on a stipulation forbidding a 
 separate peace, and would require only that the Americans 
 should not give up their independence. This interpretation 
 of the King s intentions gave rise to one of the earliest de 
 bates of Congress on our duty to our ally. At the time of 
 the discussion, Gerard denied that he had made the state 
 ment ; and it seems more probable that he was misunder 
 stood than that France contemplated any such half-way 
 measure. Gerard did not fix a date for beginning the 
 negotiations, but promised that the treaty should be con 
 cluded as soon as Spain was ready to join the alliance. 
 
 While the Ministry waited for the decision of the Spanish 
 Court, important events were occurring in England. When 
 Parliament adjourned, to meet on the twentieth of January, 
 Lord North announced that he would propose a plan of 
 reconciliation at the opening of the next session. 3 It 
 seemed improbable that the North Ministry would offer 
 America complete independence ; but Vergennes feared that 
 they would gain their point by yielding the substance while 
 withholding the name. Granting that reconciliation on 
 these terms might be difficult if the American government 
 
 Franklin, Deane, and Lee to Committee of Foreign Affairs, Dec. 
 18, 1777. Diplomatic Correspondence, II, p. 452. 
 
 2 Successor to the Committee of Secret Correspondence. 
 
 3 Noailles to Vergennes, Dec. 23, 1777. Stevens Facsimiles, 1793. 
 
 5 
 
66 France and the American Revolution. 
 
 had more influence and stability, he feared that the people, 
 suffering for the necessaries of life, would not continue the 
 war for a point of honor. "The Americans propose that 
 we should conquer the English islands," said he, "and 
 grant them free trade thither. If, on the other hand, the 
 English make the same proposal, will it not be listened to? 
 will it be rejected?" He confessed that the views of the 
 French government had been too restricted ; they had 
 feared a change in the British Ministry, and had not 
 anticipated the consequences of a change in the policy of 
 the Ministry now in power. " England s aim being no 
 longer doubtful," he said, "it seems that neither should 
 our decision be so ; for the question we have to decide is to 
 know whether it is more expedient for us to have war against 
 England and America together, than with America for us 
 against England." In writing to the ambassador at Lon 
 don, he spoke with more hesitancy, as if trying to draw out 
 information. :< What would be important to find out is with 
 what view the Ministry seems to incline to peace ; many 
 people believe, and wish to make us believe, that it would be 
 fatal to us in the present and in the future. ... I confess 
 to you that I am not far from that way of thinking." 2 
 Yielding to these apprehensions, Vergennes engaged Gerard 
 in drawing up a plan of treaty, and Gerard began to dis 
 cuss with the Deputies the several articles of the Congres 
 sional plan. 3 It was not thought worth while even to con 
 ceal their interviews. The customary precautions for en 
 suring secrecy were relaxed, and Franklin was observed in 
 the company of all the ministers in turn, dining and ne 
 gotiating with them. 4 
 
 On the last day of the year, Vergennes received the 
 answer of the Spanish Court. 5 It could hardly have been 
 less complaisant under any circumstances, and it might 
 
 1 Vergennes to Montmorin, Dec. 27, 1777. Stevens Facsimiles, 1805. 
 
 2 Vergennes to Noailles, Dec. 27. Ibid., 1807. 
 
 3 Arthur Lee s Journal, Dec. 29, 1777, and subsequent dates. Life, 
 I, pp. 371 fT. 
 
 4 Correspondance Secrete, I, p. 125. 
 
 ^Florida Blanca to d Aranda, Dec. 23, 1777. Doniol, II, p. 765. 
 
The Conclusion of the Treaty. 67 
 
 have been more so if the Spanish authorities had not heard 
 of the advances which the French Court had already made 
 to the Americans. On receiving this news, Florida Blanca, 
 a statesman characterized by extreme reserve, was betrayed 
 into an explosion of anger. Montmorin assured him that 
 no formal negotiation had been opened, took pains to soothe 
 his injured vanity, and flattered himself that he had suc 
 ceeded and that Spain would soon follow in the steps of 
 France ; but the length of time which elapsed before 
 Spain, on her own exorbitant terms, entered the war, bore 
 witness that she did not easily forget an injury or yield a 
 purpose. 
 
 In his reply to France, 1 Florida Blanca expressed a .strong 
 doubt whether an early reconciliation between Great Bri 
 tain and America was probable. In conversation, just be 
 fore this, he had given England four years to come to 
 terms with her Colonies. He made allowance for the fact 
 that the Americans had an interest in exaggerating the 
 likelihood of an agreement. " The American Deputies are 
 playing their game. Their aim has always been to com 
 promise us with the English." Repeating an argument 
 often used by Spanish statesmen, he said that an alliance 
 between America and the Bourbons would give the British 
 Ministry the best possible excuse for ending the war, the 
 plea of necessity, and of perfidy on the part of France and 
 Spain. The outcome of his argument was that Spain 
 would engage to do nothing except fix the amount of her 
 subsidy to the Americans, offer them her mediation in case 
 of need, and watch the English Ministry. 
 
 On learning the Spanish decision, the advisers of the 
 King carefully discussed the situation. Vergennes then 
 sent the Court of Spain an elaborate reply, 4 and the King 
 added the weight of his influence by a personal letter to his 
 uncle". Vergennes declared the Spanish proposals in- 
 
 1 Montmorin to Vergennes, Dec. 23, 1777. Stevens Facsimiles, 
 1792. 
 
 2 Florida Blanca to d Aranda, Dec. 23, 1777. Doniol, II, p. 765. 
 
 3 Montmorin to Vergennes, Dec. 23. Stevens Facsimiles, 1792. 
 4 Jan. 7, 1778. Ibid., 1824. 
 
68 France and the American Revolution. 
 
 adequate. Pecuniary aid had served to keep up the 
 hopes of the insurgents ; but now that the desired end 
 was within their reach, money would not prevent them 
 from forming a coalition with England. Mediation would 
 be useless and dangerous, for England would regard it as 
 an insult. Besides, she was now offering the Colonies all 
 that France and Spain could procure for them ; for media 
 tion based on absolute independence would amount to a 
 declaration of war against England. To offer a guaranty 
 would be equally useless ; for both England and the Colo 
 nies, if they treated without the intervention of France and 
 Spain, would reject their guaranty. As to watching for a 
 change of ministry in England, Lord North was now more 
 likely to bring about a war against France than Lord 
 Chatham. A treaty, then, was absolutely necessary. 
 France must begin negotiations before the ominous date 
 of the twentieth." 
 
 CX G the independence of America, Vergennes expressed 
 his opinion plainly. "The United States are in fact inde 
 pendent. They have in their hands all that constitutes 
 sovereign power. Our recognition will add nothing to the 
 reality of that possession." Without asserting this inde 
 pendence, France was prepared to assume it for the purposes 
 of the alliance. She desired a treaty consisting of two parts : 
 the first establishing a commercial agreement ; the second 
 providing for an eventual alliance, " to procure absolute and 
 unlimited independence to the United States-." France 
 would require that the Americans should not make peace 
 secretly or without her guaranty ; and the two powers would 
 guarantee each other s American- possessions. The King 
 might be obliged to sign a treaty before hearing from Spain 
 again. In that case, Vergennes promised to reserve the 
 right of Spain to accede to it at any time. One reason for 
 hastening the negotiation was Vergennes suspicion that, 
 even at this late stage, the Deputies were withdrawing their 
 confidence. " What a humiliation . . . if after having the 
 opportunity to attach the Americans to ourselves, we should 
 have reason to reproach ourselves with having attached them 
 to England. ... I do not know," he said, "whether I 
 
The Conclusion of the Treaty. 69 
 
 could survive the shame of signing the passport which the 
 Deputies would ask of me to go to London." 
 
 "As it is not we who will and act, but circumstances 
 which imperiously dictate the law to us," Vergennes wrote 
 to the ambassador in Spain, in this letter of January 8, * to 
 morrow will not pass without my informing the Americans 
 of our disposition and endeavoring to penetrate theirs." He 
 was better than his word. On the evening of the same day, 
 Gerard held a conference with the Commissioners. Binding 
 them to secrecy, he told them that the King had resolved to 
 assist the United States in maintaining their independence. 
 After warning them against the designs of England, Gerard 
 asked them two definite questions : first, what they would 
 regard as sufficient to ensure their rejecting all English pro 
 posals which did not include absolute independence ; second, 
 what they believed necessary to cause Congress to reject all 
 such proposals. The Commissioners replied to the first 
 question, that a treaty of commerce and alliance would be 
 sufficient." Gerard told them that the King, anticipating 
 this answer, had decided to conclude a treaty ; and that the 
 formal negotiations should begin whenever they wished. At 
 their request, he made a brief statement of the terms which 
 would be agreeable to France, following the lines of Ver 
 gennes despatch to the Spanish Court. The policy of the 
 commercial treaty, he said, would not differ materially from 
 that of the Congressional plan. He explained that the King 
 would not require any compensation for his support; and that, 
 since his motive was not desire for conquest, France could 
 not co-operate with America for the reduction of Canada and 
 the West Indies. 3 In spite of this limitation, the Deputies 
 felt that the main object of their endeavor was gained. 
 They " applauded this recital," Gerard reported, "with a 
 sort of transport." 
 
 Three days later, Deane gave Gerard the answer of the 
 Commissioners to his second question. 4 To prevent Con- 
 
 1 Vergennes to Montmorin, Jan. 8, 1778. Doniol, II, p. 719. 
 
 2 Stevens Facsimiles, 774. 
 
 3 Journal of Arthur Lee. Life, I, p. 377. 
 
 4 Jan. 11, 1778. Stevens Facsimiles, 776. 
 
jo France and the American Revolution. 
 
 gress from making peace with England, they said it would 
 be necessary that France should guarantee the territories 
 then in possession of the United States and those acquired 
 during the war, and either declare war against England or 
 provide Congress with enough money to carry on the strug 
 gle until the British should be expelled from the continent. 
 A fleet of six or eight ships of the line would make doubly 
 sure, by procuring the success of the Americans. In 
 making these requests, the Commissioners asked for more 
 than they could hope to obtain ; for they had been told that 
 immediate war formed no part of the King s plan. Ver- 
 gennes was annoyed. "These people," he said, "show 
 themselves infinitely more troublesome and more morose 
 than we could have thought." 1 
 
 After the interview just described, the negotiation went 
 on with little delay. On the eighteenth of January, the 
 treaties drawn up by Vergennes were submitted to the 
 Deputies, who deliberated on them for ten days 2 and, after 
 obtaining some changes in minor points, accepted them. 
 The t principal matter of discussion was the nature of the 
 alliance ; the Americans wishing to make it actual, the 
 French insisting that it must be eventual. Of course the 
 Commissioners were obliged to yield. 
 
 While France was entering on the last stage of her ne 
 gotiation with the Americans, the Spanish Ministry were 
 preparing an elaborate set of questions for discussion. They 
 took this step, apparently, with a double aim : to gain time ; 
 and to give a forcible hint that Spain would not prosecute a 
 war for the mere humiliation of England, but would insist 
 on substantial advantages. 3 This promising document had 
 scarcely been completed, when the French memoir e of Jan 
 uary 8 arrived, to convince the Spaniards that their efforts 
 were useless, for the measure which they were trying to 
 delay had probably been adopted. The natural irritation of 
 the baffled statesmen found vent in criticism of their ally. 
 The Court of France had not performed its agreements ; it 
 
 1 Vergennes to Montmorin, Jan. 16, 1778. Stevens Facsimiles, 1838. 
 
 2 See Arthur Lee s Journal, Jan., 1778. Life, I, pp. 377 ff. 
 
 3 Florida Blanca to d Aranda, Jan. 13, 1778. Doniol, II, p. 775. 
 
The Conclusion of the Treaty. 7 1 
 
 had compelled Spain to change her whole plan of war, with 
 the result that her colonies were ill defended ; it had " ob 
 served neither secrecy, moderation nor neutrality in any re 
 spect as to the Americans. ... In a matter of so grave 
 importance," thus ran the Spanish arraignment, " it has 
 followed no system or plan, since at one time it worked 
 openly and with great zeal in favor of the Colonies, and at 
 another, had resort to condescensions by no means becoming, 
 on the slightest complaint or insinuation of the British Cabi 
 net." In this light, the temporizing policy of France 
 appeared to her ally. Spain was not left long in doubt of 
 the outcome of that policy. On January 30, Vergennes 
 wrote to Montmorin that the treaties were practically com 
 pleted ; and on the sixth of February, the month which, 
 half a year before, Vergennes had set as a limit beyond 
 which delay would be disastrous, they were signed and 
 sealed. 
 
 The Treaty of Amity and Commerce followed, in its main 
 lines, the plan of Congress and the specific modifications 
 contained in the instructions of the Commissioners. The 
 plan provided for mutual exemption from all duties oil: Im 
 ports except rijosej^fii^ 
 
 zens. France declined to become a party. to_this agreement, 
 and the privileges of the most favored nation _were__ substi 
 tuted, each party reserving liberty to admit other nations to 
 the same advantages. An attempt was made to provide for 
 reciprocal exemptions between the United States and the 
 West Indies. This met with objections on the part of one 
 member of the Commission and two of his countrymen who 
 were admitted into the secret. After the discussion had done 
 as much harm as possible by exciting ill feeling among the 
 Americans, an effort was made to have the articles in 
 question omitted. They were left untouched, with the un 
 derstanding that Congress might ratify them or not, without 
 prejudice to the rest of the treaty, and were finally rejected. 
 France reserved her share in the Newfoundland fishery, as 
 
 1 Mhnoire to be read in Council of Ministers, Jan. 22, 1778. Sparks 
 MSS., CII. 
 
72 France and the American Revolution. 
 
 stipulated in the treaty of Paris ; and each nation renounced 
 the right to fish on the grounds belonging to the other. 
 
 More important to the world at large than the commer 
 cial privileges and fishing rights conveyed by the treaty 
 were the rules which it laid down for the regulation of trade 
 in time of war. The principle that " free ships make free 
 goods" was adopted ; and the term contraband was re 
 stricted to arms, munitions, accoutrements, and horses. 1 
 
 A treaty of defensive alliance 2 supplemented the commer 
 cial agreement and ensured protection to the trade thereby 
 authorized. The alliance, eventual in its nature as long as 
 Great Britain and France remained at peace, should become 
 actual on the outbreak of hostilities between them, if this 
 occurred during the American war. The aim of the alliance 
 was declared to be, to maintain effectually the liberty, sov 
 ereignty, and independence of the United States. Each 
 nation bound itself to attack the enemy separately and, on 
 request, to assist its ally as much as possible. The rights of 
 the two powers to conquests in America were defined : the 
 United States claiming any which they might make in the 
 northern part of America, or the Bermuda Islands ; while 
 France reserved the right to take any of the English islands 
 in or near the Gulf of Mexico. The articles containing 
 these reservations were expressed in general terms, although 
 the corresponding passage in the Congressional plan named 
 specifically the territories and islands which the United 
 States desired to possess : among them, Florida, Newfound 
 land, Cape Breton, and St. Johns. This change caused the 
 same men who protested against the reciprocity articles to 
 suspect that France wished " to leave an opening for nego 
 tiating Florida into the possession of Spain " at a general 
 peace, and for excluding the United States from the islands 
 which command the Newfoundland fisheries/ 1 Their ob 
 stinacy in clinging to this suspicion was a source of annoy- 
 
 1 Secret Journals of Congress, II, p. 59. 
 
 2 Ibid., II, p. 82. 
 
 3 Ralph Izard to Arthur Lee, May 18, 1778. A. Lee to Izard, May 
 23. Izard to Henry Laurens, June 28, Sept. 12. John Adams to Izard, 
 Oct 2. Diplomatic Correspondence, II, pp. 586, 594, 629, 713, 753. 
 
77/6 Conclusion of the Treaty. 73 
 
 ance to the negotiators at the time, and has since been treat 
 ed by some of the ablest historians as wholly unjustified ; 
 but the instructions given to Gerard, the first French minis 
 ter to the United States, show that France preferred to see 
 Florida, at least, in the hands of Spain. 1 
 
 The parties to the treaty bound themselves to conclude no 
 peace without mutual consent, and not to lay down their 
 arms until the independence of the United States had been 
 " formally or tacitly" assured. They renounced in advance 
 all claim to compensation. They mutually guaranteed their 
 American possessions ; and France guaranteed the inde 
 pendence of the United States from the moment of a rupture 
 with England or, in case no such breach should occur, from 
 the close of the American war. A separate article gave the 
 King of Spain the right to accede to the treaties at pleasure. 
 
 Vergennes thought at the time of the negotiation that, 
 owing to the natural difficulty of keeping such a secret, the 
 Americans would hear of the treaty by the end of April 
 or the beginning of May ; so he decided to announce it 
 to England at that time. 2 But, before the date set, he 
 began to fear that Congress would not hear of it early 
 enough to prevent them from listening to the British propo 
 sitions. As news reached America more surely and quickly 
 by way of the English newspapers than when sent direct 
 from France, he determined to announce the treaty to 
 England even earlier than he had intended. Rumors of 
 the negotiation had reached England before it was concluded, 
 and news of the signing was promptly conveyed to the 
 British Cabinet by agents who were always ready to 
 carry reports across the Channel. But the existence of the 
 treaty was positively known to only a few people ; and the 
 doubt thrown upon it by the British Ministry indicated that 
 concealment was desired by England and, as a natural con 
 sequence, that an announcement would be advantageous to 
 France. So the ambassador at London received orders to 
 declare the treaty ; and, for fear that the British govern- 
 
 1 Gerard s Instructions, approved March 29. 1778. Vergennes to 
 Gerard, Oct. 26. Doniol, III, pp. 155, 156. 
 
 7 Vergennes to Montmorin, Jan. 30, 1778. Ibid., II, p. 791. 
 
74 France and the American Revolution. 
 
 ment might conceal the facts, he was instructed to let noth 
 ing prevent him from allowing the secret to leak out in 
 private conversation the next day. 1 The announcement 
 was made on the thirteenth of March. The Treaty of 
 Amity and Commerce was communicated with insolent un 
 concern ; and England was informed that France and the 
 United States had also entered into an engagement for the 
 protection of their, commerce. 2 Within a week, both Eng 
 land and France- recalled their ambassadors, and war had 
 virtually begun. 
 
 In announcing the treaty so early, France ignored the re 
 quest of Spain that it be concealed until July, to allow the 
 return of her troops and her treasure-fleet. In this way, 
 another cause of offense was prepared ; but one more was 
 of little consequence, where the points of disagreement were 
 already so many and important. Clearly, if France desired 
 more aid than the minimum secured to her by the Family 
 Compact, she must promote the exorbitant ambition of her 
 ally. With the utmost frankness, d Aranda had exposed 
 the reason why Spain demanded so many advantages as the 
 price of her assistance. Her statesmen feared that, if 
 war should break out and be continued until England 
 made overtures of peace, France would require Spain to 
 comply also, and to be content with the same terms;" 
 they believed that the explanation of the purposes of 
 Spain having preceded, France would be obliged to sustain 
 the undertaking until they should be carried out." 
 
 By the ratification of the treaties, which took place 
 promptly on their arrival in America, France gained two 
 important points : she bound the United States to continue 
 the war until their independence was achieved, and to accept 
 her guaranty. But w^isjtjtiecessary that she should commit 
 herself so decisively and, with reference to her other 
 
 1 Vergennes to Montmorin, March 6, 10, 1 778. Vergennes to Noailles, 
 March 10. Doniol, II, pp. 810, 813, 822, 826. 
 2 Ibid., II, p. 823. 
 3 DAranda to Florida Blanca, Jan. 31, 1778. Sparks MSS., CII. 
 
The Conclusion of the Treaty. 75 
 
 interests^ so prematurely.,, in.. order to secure the end desired ? 
 In other words, was there imminent danger_oLrie_ace between 
 England and America ? 
 
 It is^generally conceded that the United States could not 
 have carried the struggle to a successful issue without the 
 aid of France. Submission must have come at last ; but, 
 for the immediate purpose of counteracting Lord North s 
 Conciliatory Bills, the treaty which Vergennes rushed to a 
 conclusion without the concurrence of Spain, was super 
 fluous. Lord North s propositions were not so conciliatory 
 as Vergennes fears led him to believe : they did not hold in 
 reserve an offer of independence as a last resort. Hurried 
 to America before their first reading in Parliament, they 
 arrived in advance of the French treat) 7 , only to be re 
 jected. 1 France might have postponed her decision without 
 serious danger. 
 
 This decision was of fatal consequence to France. The 
 immediate results were "ot_the_ most serious. The war in 
 which France became involved, her difficult task as guardian 
 of the conflicting interests of the United States and Spain, 
 the restoration of her prestige at the close of the war, 
 trials and gains alike dwindle to incidents, beside the over 
 throw of her tottering finances and the impulse given to 
 revolutionary sentiment at home. Of this result, Spain had 
 warned her ; England herself had warned her. Happily 
 for America, most unhappily for her own interests, she was 
 deaf to the warning. "You are arming, imprudent mon 
 arch ; do you forget in what century, in what circumstances, 
 and over what nation you reign ? . . . The legislaiars-of 
 America are proclaiming themselves disciples of the French 
 philosophers ; they are executing what these have dreamed. 
 Will not the French philosophers aspire to be legislators in 
 their own country ? Will principles which cannot be bent 
 to English laws accord better with those on which your 
 monarchy is based ? How dangerous to place the flower of 
 your officers in communication with men enthusiastic for 
 liberty ! You will take alarm, but too late, when you hear 
 
 Journals of Congress, II, pp. 521 ff. 
 
7 6 France and the American Revolution. 
 
 repeated in your court vague and specious axioms which 
 they have meditated in the forests of America. . . . Eng 
 land will be only too well avenged for your hostile designs, 
 when your government is examined, judged, and condemned 
 according to the principles professed at Philadelphia and 
 applauded in your capital." 
 
 1 Retranslated from the French. Quoted from a pamphlet pub 
 lished in England toward the end of 1777, said to have been inspired 
 by the British Ministry. Lacretelle, Histoire de France, V, p. 82. 
 
A LIST OF THE AUTHORITIES CITED 
 IN THIS THESIS. 
 
 ADAMS, JOHN. The Works of : With a life of the author, notes and 
 illustrations, by Charles Francis Adams. 10 vols. Boston, 1856. 
 
 BANCROFT, GEORGE. History of the United States of America, from 
 the Discovery of the Continent. 6 vols. New York, 1884-5. 
 
 BANCROFT, GEORGE. Manuscripts. Lenox Library, New York. 
 BEAUMARCHAIS, see Chevallie and Lomenie. 
 
 CAPEFIGUE, J. B. H. R. Louis XVI son Administration et ses Rela 
 tions Diplomatiques avec 1 Europe. 4 vols. Bruxelles, 1844. 
 
 CHEVALLIE, P. J. Claim of Beaumarchais Heir against the United 
 States. Washington, 1817. 
 
 COLLEVILLE, VICOMTE BE. Les Missions Secretes du General-Major 
 Baron de Kalb et son Role dans la Guerre de 1 Independance 
 Americaine. Paris, 1855. 
 
 CONGRESS, see Jour^ia^ls..a-n x d Secre-t Journals. 
 CORRESPONDANCE^ECRETE, see de Lescure. 
 CORRESPONDENCE, DIPLOMATIC, see Wharton. 
 
 DEANE PAPERS. Collections of the New York Historical Society for 
 the year 1886. New York, 1887. 
 
 DONIOL, HENRI. Histoire de la Participation de la France a 1 Eta- 
 blissement des Etatfe-Unis d Amerique. Correspondance diplo 
 matique et documents. 5 vols. Paris, 1886-92. 
 
 DURAND, JOHN, editor. New Materials for the History of the Ameri 
 can Revolution. New York, 1889. 
 
 FiSKE, JOHN. The American Revolution. 2 vols. Boston, 1891. 
 
 FLASSAN, GAETAN DE RAXIS, COMTE DE. Histoire Generale et Rai- 
 sonnee de la Diplomatic Francaise, ou de la Politique de la France, 
 depuis la Fondation de la Monarchic, jusqu a la Fin du Regne de 
 Louis XVI. 7 vols. Paris, 1811-29. 
 
 FRANKLIN, THE COMPLETE WORKS OF. John Bigelow, editor. 10 
 vols. New York and London, 1887-8. 
 
 FRANKLIN, see Parton. 
 
7 8 France and the American Revolution. 
 
 JOURNALS OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS. From 1774 to 1778. 4 vols. 
 Washington, 1823. 
 
 KALB, see Colleville and Kapp. 
 
 KAPP, FRIEDRICH. The Life of John Kalb, Major-General in the 
 Revolutionary Army. New York, 1884. 
 
 LACRETELLE, CHARLES. Histoire de France pendant le Dix-huitieme 
 Siecle. 6 vols. Paris, 1810. 
 
 LAFAYETTE, Memoirs, Correspondence and Manuscripts of. Pub 
 lished by his family. New York, 1837. 
 
 LECKY, W. E. H. A History of England in the Eighteenth Century. 
 8 vols. New York, 1878. 
 
 LEE, ARTHUR. See Lee, Charles Henry and Richard Henry. 
 
 LEE, CHARLES HENRY. A Vindication of Arthur Lee, Former Rep 
 resentative of the Province of Massachusetts Bay, at London. 
 Richmond, Va., 1894. 
 
 LEE, RICHARD HENRY. Life of Arthur Lee. 2 vols. Boston, 1829. 
 
 LESCURES, M. F. A. DE. Correspondance Secrete Inedite sur Louis 
 XVI, Marie Antoinette, la Cour, et la Ville, de 1777 a 1792. 2 
 vols. Paris, 1866. 
 
 LOMENIE, Louis DE. Beaumarchais and his Times. Sketches of 
 French society in the eighteenth century, from unpublished doc 
 uments. Translated by Henry S. Edwards. 4 vols. London, 
 1856. 
 
 MAHON, LORD. (Stanhope. ) History of England from the Peace of 
 Utrecht to the Peace of Versailles. 7 vols. London, 1851. 
 
 MANUSCRIPTS, see Bancroft, Sparks and Stevens. 
 MEMOIRS, see Lafayette, Segur, Soulavie, and Vergennes. 
 PARKMAN, FRANCIS. A Half-Century of Conflict. 2 vols. Boston, 
 
 1893- 
 PARTON, JAMES. Life and Times of Benjamin Franklin. 2 vols. 
 
 Boston. 
 SECRET JOURNALS OF THE ACTS AND PROCEEDINGS OF CONGRESS. 
 
 2 vols. Boston, 1820-1821. 
 
 SEGUR, Louis PHILIPPE, LE COMTE DE. Memoires ou Souvenirs et 
 Anecdotes. 2 vols. Paris, 1844. 
 
 SEGUR, Louis PHILIPPE, L AINE. Politique de Tous les Cabinets de 
 PEurope, pendant les Regnes de Louis XV et de Louis XVI. 3, 
 vols. Paris, 1801. 
 
Authorities Cited in this Thesis. 79 
 
 , JEAN Louis, i/AiNE. Memoires Historiques et Politiques 
 du Regne de Louis XVI, depuis son Manage jusqu a sa Mort. 
 Paris, 1801. 
 SPARKS, JARED. Manuscripts. Library of Harvard University. 
 
 STEVENS, B. F. Facsimiles of Manuscripts in European Archives 
 Relating to America, 1773-1783. 23 vols. 1889-1895. 
 
 TURGOT, OEUVRES. Editeurs, Eugene Daire et Hippolyte Dussard. 
 2 vols. Paris, 1844. 
 
 VERGENNES, MEMOIRE HISTORIOUE ET POUTIQUE SUR I V A LOUISI- 
 ANE. 
 
 WHARTON, FRANCIS, editor. The Revolutionary Diplomatic Corre 
 spondence of the United States. 6 vols. Washington, 1889. 
 
 WiTT, CORNEUS DE. Thomas Jefferson. Etude Historique sur la 
 Democratic Americaine. Paris. 1861. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 ADAMS, JOHN, advises Declaration 
 of Independence and treaties 
 with foreign powers, 17 ; mem 
 ber of Committee on plan of 
 treaty, wishes commercial treaty 
 only, 43 ; objects to alliance, 50. 
 
 Adams, Samuel, advises Declara 
 tion of Independence, 17. 
 
 Aiguillon, d , foreign policy of , u. 
 
 Alliance between France and 
 America, measures leading to, 
 advocated in 1768, 10 ; not de 
 sired by Spain, 39 ; considered 
 by Vergennes, 39, 44 ; nrged by 
 Beaumarchais, 41 ; objections of 
 Vergennes and Grimaldi, 48 ; of 
 fered by Congress, 49 ; France 
 wishes proposals for, 60 ; nature 
 of, actual or eventual, 63, 65, 70 ; 
 Florida Blanca objects to, 67 ; 
 terms of, 72. See Treaty. 
 
 Ambassadors, motion to send to 
 France, 17 ; withdrawn by En 
 gland and France, 74. 
 
 Amphi trite, 33-34. 
 
 Aranda, d , 39, 40, 46, 74. 
 
 Armaments, a cause of jealousy, 58. 
 
 BEAUMARCHAIS, collects informa 
 tion, 19 ; urges the King to aid 
 America, 19, 21 ; replies to Lord 
 Rochford, 25 ; advises a loan 
 to the Americans, 26 ; receives 
 1,000,000 livres from French 
 Treasury, 27 ; agreement with 
 Deane, 31 ; obtains supplies from 
 royal arsenals, 32 ; advises send 
 ing French officers to America, 
 32 ; sends cargoes to America, 
 32, 33 ; receives money from 
 Spain and France, 34 ; claim 
 against United States, 34-37 ; 
 plan for aiding Americans, 36 ; 
 desires recognition of Ameri 
 cans, 41 ; comment on capitula 
 tion of Burgoyne, 61. 
 
 Bermuda Islands, right of conquest 
 reserved to United States, 72. 
 
 Bonvouloir, instructions, 16 ; sails 
 for America, 17 ; meets the Com 
 mittee of Secret Correspondence, 
 1 8 ; report reaches France, 21. 
 
 British Ministry, measures dis 
 please American Colonists, 5 ; 
 distrusted by Vergennes, 14 ; 
 protest against prohibited trade, 
 20 ; may desire foreign war, 23 ; 
 to be cajoled, 23 ; learn secrets 
 of French Cabinet, 51-52 ; pro 
 test against tolerance of Ameri 
 can privateers, 55 ; demand re 
 versal of policy, 57 ; conduct, a 
 cause of satisfaction to Vergen 
 nes, 64 ; change of policy feared, 
 73 ; throw doubt on French 
 treaty, 73. 
 
 Burgoyne s capitulation, 59 ; effect 
 on French Ministry, 60. 
 
 CANADA, effect of cession to En 
 gland, 1,2; mentioned in Bon- 
 vouloir s instructions, 16 ; de 
 mand for retrocession consid 
 ered, 52, 54 ; King will not aid 
 Americans to conquer, 69. 
 
 Chase, of Maryland, moves to send 
 ambassadors to France, 17. 
 
 Chatelet, du, discusses American 
 affairs with Choiseul, 8, 9 ; plans 
 informal commercial agreement 
 with Americans, 10. 
 
 Chatham, Lord, 63, 68. 
 
 Choiseul, enmity toward England, 
 3, 4, ii ; alliances with Austria 
 and Spain, 4 ; sends agents to 
 America, 5,7; hints at new plans 
 with reference to America, 6 ; 
 predicts American Revolution, 
 7 ; receives de Kalb coldly, 9 ; 
 recommends commercial rela 
 tions with Americans, 11 ; goes 
 into exile, 1 1 ; opposes Vergen 
 nes, 41 ; policy, 52. 
 
 Colonies, Turgot s views of, 23-24. 
 
 Commercial intercourse between 
 French and American citizens 
 proposed by Frances and du 
 Chatelet, 10 ; approved by Coun 
 cil, ii ; opposed by Spain, 11 ; 
 existence of, known, 19; British 
 protests against, 25. 
 
 Commissioners to France, appoint 
 ed, 44 ; audience with Vergennes, 
 46 ; dissensions, 46 ; popularity, 
 
82 Index. 
 
 47 ; submit proposed treat} to ment, 44 ; influence on public 
 Vergennes, 47 ; additional in- i opinion in France, 44. 
 structions, 48 ; urge France to Deputies. See Commissioners, 
 declare war, 49 ; personal pledge Dubourg, obtains aid for America, 
 of, 49 ; expect war, 51 ; Vergen- 26. 
 
 nes complains of, 57 ; ask loan, Dumas, instructed by Committee 
 58 ; congratulated by King, 60 ; of Secret Correspondence, 18 ; 
 request answer to their proposals, requests mediation of France, 30. 
 6r, 64 ; important conferences Durand, discusses effect of a revo- 
 with Gerard, 65, 69 ; answer lution in America, 5 ; cultivates 
 question about Congress, 70; Franklin s acquaintance, 6; 
 deliberate on the treaties, 70. thinks revolution will be grad- 
 
 Committee of Foreign Affairs, 65. ual, 6. 
 
 Committee of Secret Correspond 
 ence, formation of, 17 ; instruc- j FAMILY COMPACT, Third, 4, 22, 74. 
 tions to Arthur Lee, 17 ; to Farmers General, approached by 
 Charles Dumas, 18 ; appoint Silas Dubourg, 27; contract with 
 Deane commercial and political American Commissioners, 51. 
 agent, 30. j Florida, Vergennes tempts Spain 
 
 Committee to draw up plan of with, 62; suspicion that France 
 treaties, 43. wished Spain to possess, 72 ; evi- 
 
 Congress, Continental, delegates j dence, 73. 
 
 elected, 14 ; debates on inde- Florida Blanca, plan of interven- 
 pendence and foreign alliances, j tion in American quarrel, 53 ; 
 17 ; Beaumarchais writes to, 32; ! suggests recovery of territory, 
 said to be treating with Howe, 54 ; anger at French policy, 67 ; 
 33 ; Resolution of May 15, 37 ; thinks peace between England 
 debates on alliance, 43 ; relieved and America unlikely, 67. 
 by French loan, 49 ; offers alii- Franklin, Benjamin, suspicious of 
 ance to France, 49 ; inducements France, 6 ; receives friendly hint 
 to France and Spain, 50 ; author- \ from Gamier, 15; member of 
 izes capture of British vessels, Committee on plan of treaty, 43 ; 
 54 ; measures necessary to pre- i joint Commissioner to France, 
 vent from making peace, 69-70. 44 ; arrives in Paris, 46 ; popu- 
 See Committee. larity, 47 ; negotiates with the 
 
 Contraband, defined in Treaty of Ministry, 66. See Commissioners. 
 1778, 72. 
 
 i GARNIER, 14, 15. 
 
 DEANE, SII,AS, sent to France by Gerard, endorses Beaumarchais, 
 Committee of Secret Correspond- 31 ; receives explanation from 
 ence, 30 ; instructions, 31 ; audi- ; Vergennes, 36 ; gives informa- 
 ence with Vergennes, 31 ; agree- tion about Beaumarchais, 37 ; re- 
 ment with Beaumarchais, 32 ; ports King s decision to Corn- 
 announces Resolution of May missioners, 65 ; statement about 
 15, 37 ; memorial on American I separate peace, 65 ; draws up 
 trade, 37 ; asks recognition for plan of treaty, 66 ; important 
 United States, 41 ; joint Com- conference with Commissioners, 
 missioner to France, 44 ; notifies i 69 ; instructions, on Florida, 73. 
 France of Declaration of Inde- Germaine, Lord, 63. 
 pendence, 44 ; interviews with j Germantown, Battle of, impresses 
 British agent, 64. See Commis- Vergennes, 62. 
 sioners. Gibraltar, desired by Spain, 56. 
 
 Declaration of Independence, de- j Grand, statement about supplies 
 sired by John and Samuel Adams, sent by Beaumarchais, 35. 
 17 ; delay in receiving news of, Grimaldi, suggests attack on En- 
 33,41 ; Resolution of May 15,37 \ gland, 22 ; objects to American 
 feared by cautious members of alliance, 48. 
 Congress, 43 ; official announce- Guaranties in Treaty of 1778, 73. 
 
Index. 
 
 Guaranty of American rights by | 
 France and Spain, suggested by 
 Vergennes, 56 ; approved by 
 Spain, 56; no hope of, through 
 Commissioners, 57 ; Holker sin- [ 
 structions on, 59 ; proposed as i 
 part of treaty, 63 ; offer of, with 
 out treaty, useless, 68. 
 
 Guines, de, 15, 16. 
 
 Gulf of Mexico, islands near, right 
 of conquest reserved to France, < 
 72. 
 
 HENRY, PATRICK, predicts alli 
 ance with France, Spain, and 
 Holland, 17. 
 
 Holker, instructions of, 59-61. 
 
 INDEPENDENCE OF THE UNITED : 
 STATES, foreseen, i, 2, 5, 6, 9; 
 interest of France in, 5, 7, TO, 11, 
 20 ; mentioned in Bonvouloir s 
 instructions, 16 ; advantage of 
 recognizing, 61 ; King ready to 
 acknowledge, 65 ; Vergennes as 
 serts, 68 ; France anxious to se 
 cure, 69 ; object of alliance of 
 1778, 72; guaranteed, 73. See 
 Declaration. 
 
 JAMAICA, 40. 
 
 Jefferson, Thomas, declines ap 
 pointment as joint Commissioner 
 to France, 44. 
 
 Jerseys, retreat through, effect on 
 Congress, 49. 
 
 KAI.B, DE, secret mission to Ameri 
 ca, 7 ; reports, 7-8 ; cold recep 
 tion on return, 9. 
 
 LAFAYETTE, comment on Choi- 
 seul s treatment of de Kalb, 9 ; 
 goes to America, 42 ; criticizes 
 Vergennes, 53. 
 
 Lee, Arthur, instructed by Com 
 mittee of Secret Correspondence, 
 17 ; interviews with French am 
 bassador, 30 ; statements bearing 
 on Beaumarchais claim, 35, 36 ; 
 joint Commissioner to France, 
 44 ; arrives in Paris, 46 ; goes to 
 Spain, 53. See Commissioners. 
 
 Loan, by France, 49 ; requested and 
 refused, 50 ; obtained from Farm 
 ers General, 51 ; requested by 
 Congress, 58. See Subsidy. 
 
 Long Island, Battle of, effect on 
 French Ministry, 33, 40, 41. 
 
 Louis XVI, character, .13 ; Council, 
 13 ; opposes plans of Beaumar 
 chais, 19 ; approves Vergennes 
 memoire on America, 24 ; influ 
 enced by public opinion, 42-43 ; 
 advised by Grimaldi, 48 ; author 
 izes overtures to Commissioners, 
 60 ; resolved to recognize Ameri 
 can independence, 65 ; intentions 
 as to separate peace, 65 ; personal 
 letter to King of Spain, 68 ; in 
 tentions reported to Commis 
 sioners, 69. 
 
 MAUREPAS, character, 13 ; replies 
 to British complaint, 20 ; urged 
 to attack England, 39 ; remark 
 on influence of public opinion, 
 42 ; conversation with Lord Stor- 
 mont, 58 ; congratulates Com 
 missioners, 60. 
 
 Mediation between England and 
 America, requested of France by 
 Dumas, and refused, 30 ; sug 
 gested by Florida Blanca, 53 ; 
 idea rejected by Vergennes, 53, 
 68 ; Spain willing to offer, 67. 
 
 Merchants, interested in American 
 success, 42. 
 
 Military class, republican theories, 
 enthusiasm for America, 42. 
 
 Minorca, 40. 
 
 Montmorin, 63, 67, 71. 
 
 NEUTRALITY, advised by Turgot, 
 24 ; considered by French Min 
 istry, 52. 
 
 Neutrals, rights of, 38 ; under 
 Treaty of 1778, 72. 
 
 Newfoundland fishery, in Treaty 
 of 1778, 71 ; suspicion that France 
 wished to exclude United States 
 from, 72. 
 
 North, Lord, 63 ; announces plan 
 of reconciliation, 65 ; likely to 
 cause war with France, 68 ; terms 
 rejected by Congress, 75. 
 
 OFFICERS, French, sent to America 
 by advice of Beaumarchais, 32. 
 Ossun, d , 47, 48. 
 
 PAPER MONEY, 49. 
 Personal pledge of Commissioners, 
 49- 
 
84 
 
 Index. 
 
 Philosophers, sympathize with 
 Americans, 42. 
 
 Pontleroy, mission to America, 5. 
 
 Portugal, French co-operation in 
 conquest of, desired by Spain, 
 22, 39 ; Congress offers to declare 
 war against, 50. 
 
 Privateering, American, 54 ; British 
 demands for its repression, 57 ; 
 these demands not official, 58. 
 
 Public opinion in favor of Ameri 
 cans, 41 ; effect on French Min 
 istry, 42, 52. 
 
 QUEEN, sympathizes with Ameri 
 cans, 42. 
 
 RATIFICATION OF TREATY OF 1 778, 
 
 74- 
 
 Rayneval, Memorial on the Ameri 
 can question, 20. 
 
 Reconciliation between England 
 and America, fear of, 8, 23, 33, 
 40, 5i, 55, 58, 61-65, 68, 73, 75. 
 
 Rochford, Lord, 15, 19, 25. 
 
 Rodrique Hortalez and Company, 
 26. 
 
 SECRET AGENTS sent to America, 
 unknown officer, i ; Pontleroy, 
 5 ; de Kalb, 7 ; Bonvouloir, 16 ; 
 Holker, 59. 
 
 Secret Cabinet of Louis XV, plans 
 invasion of England, 5. 
 
 Secret proposals of peace from 
 England, 51, 64. 
 
 Separate Article, Treaty of 1778, 73. 
 
 Separate peace, Commissioners re 
 solve to stipulate against, 49 ; 
 King s intentions, 65 ; forbidden 
 by treaty, 73. 
 
 Spain, enters Family Compact, 4 ; 
 warlike spirit aroused, 4 ; objects 
 to trade relations with English 
 Colonies, n ; desires aid of 
 France against Portugal, and 
 war with England, 22 ; willing 
 to aid Americans, 24 ; fear of 
 England, 28 ; desires territory, 
 28, 54, 70 ; entrusts money to 
 Beaumarchais, 34 ; wishes war 
 with England, 39 ; objects to 
 American alliance, 39, 48, 67 ; 
 postpones war, 40 ; rejects ad 
 vances of Congress, 50 ; proposes 
 offer of mediation, 53 ; wishes to 
 guarantee American rights, 56 ; 
 refuses to declare war, 56; wishes 
 
 Gibraltar, 56 ; irritation at priva 
 teers, 58 ; sends agent to America, 
 59 ; refuses to fix amount of sub 
 sidy, 59 ; criticism of France, 70- 
 71 ; right to accede to Treaty of 
 J 778, 73 ; requests concealment 
 of Treaty, 74 ; reason for de 
 mands, 74. 
 
 Stamp Act, 5, 6. 
 
 Stormont, Lord, persuaded that 
 France wishes peace, 20 ; pro 
 tests against Beaumarchais ship 
 ments, 33 ; threatens to leave, 
 46 ; discovers secrets of French 
 Cabinet, 52 ; avoids an ultima 
 tum, 58. 
 
 Subsidy to Americans, 59. See 
 Beaumarchais. 
 
 i TICONDEROGA, abandonment of, 
 58. 
 
 | Treaty of 1763, 3, 28. 
 
 I Treaty of 1778, Congressional plan, 
 43-44 ; resolved on by French 
 Cabinet and King, 61-62 ; wishes 
 of France concerning, 68 ; sub 
 mitted to Commissioners, de 
 bated, accepted, 70 ; signed, 71 ; 
 terms of, 71-73 ; announced, 74 ; 
 ratified, 74 ; consequences to 
 France, 75. 
 
 Turgot, minister of finance, 13 ; 
 views about colonies, 23 ; advises 
 neutrality, 24 ; is dismissed, 27. 
 
 VERGENNES, predicts result of ces 
 sion of Canada, 2 ; policy of de 
 ception, 3 ; enters Cabinet, 12 ; 
 
 previous career, 
 
 distrust of 
 
 England, 14 ; foresees American 
 independence, 15 ; advises de 
 fensive measures against En 
 gland and concessions to Ameri 
 cans, 1 6 ; replies to British com 
 plaint, 20 ; advises aid for Ameri 
 cans, 22-23 ; forbids exportation 
 of arms to America, 25 ; explains 
 his motives, 28 ; receives Deane, 
 31 ; letter on manner of helping 
 Americans, 35 ; statements about 
 supplies for America, 36-37 ; re 
 fuses information to United 
 States government, 37 ; justifies 
 reception of Deane, 38 ; proposes 
 war as auxiliary of Spain, 39 ; 
 guards against continental war, 
 40 ; motives, 43 ; outlines policy 
 of France, 45 ; audience to Com- 
 
Index. 
 
 missioners, 46 ; opinion of their 
 proposals, 47 ; replies to them, 
 48 ; objection to American alli 
 ance, 48 ; fears effect of British 
 proposals, 51 ; expects war, 51 ; 
 memorial on Canada and Louisi 
 ana, 52 ; policy of compromise, 
 53 opposes Spanish proposals, 
 checks American privateers, 
 wishes early date for war, 
 desires American alliance, 
 56, 62 ; suggests and plans for 
 guaranty of American rights, 56 ; 
 criticizes Deputies, 57 ; prepares 
 to refuse British demands, and 
 expects war, 57 ; advises subsidy 
 
 to Americans, 58; discusses terms 
 of treaty, 62 ; glad that British 
 Ministry cannot grant independ 
 ence, 64 ; informs Commissioners 
 that the King will treat, 65 ; re 
 monstrates with Spain, 67-68 ; 
 states wishes of France concern 
 ing treaty, 68 ; annoyed at Ameri 
 can demands, 70 ; reasons for an 
 nouncing treaty, 73. 
 
 WENTWORTH, 64. 
 
 West Indies, King will not help 
 Americans conquer, 69 ; discus 
 sion of duties on products, 71. 
 
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