Ex Libris C. K. OGDEN IVIORLEYS^ JClBRAfO Messrs. GEORGE ROUTLEDGE & SONS believe that there is in England a very large public demand for good books. They Pp. 26, 27. 32 THE AXALOGY OF RELIGION for any other reason, it may become us to turn our eyes from. Yet there is no doubt but that our eyes were intended for us to see with. So neither is there any doubt but that tlie foreseen pleasures and pains belonging to the passions were intended, in general, to induce mankind to act in such and such manners. Now from this general observation, obvious to every one, that God has given us to understand, He has appointed satisfaction and delight to be the consequence of our acting in one manner, and pain and uneasiness of our acting in another, and of our not acting at all, and that we find the consequences, which we were beforehand informed of, uniformly to follow, we may learn that we are at present actually under His government in the strictest and most proper sense in such a sense as that he rewards and punishes us for our actions. An Author of Nature being supposed, it is not so much a deduction of reason as a matter of experience that we are thus under His govern- ment ; imder His government in the same sense as we are under the government of civil magistrates. Because the annexing pleasure to some actions, and pain to others, in our power to do or forbear, and giving notice of this appointment beforehand to those whom it concerns, is the proper formal notion of government, ^^'hether the pleasure or pain which thus follows upon our behaviour be owing to the Author of Nature's acting upon us every moment which we feel it, or to his having at once contrived and executed his own part in the plan of the world, makes no alteration as to the matter before us. For, if civil magistrates could make the sanctions of their laws take place without inter- posing at all, after they had passed them, without a trial and the formalities of an excution ; if they were able to make their laws execute themselves, or every offender to execute them upon himself, we should be just in the same TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 35 sense under their government then as we are now, but in a much higher degree and more perfect manner. Vain is the ridicule with which one foresees some persons will divert themselves upon finding lesser pains considered as instances of divine punishment. There is no possibility of answering or evading the general thing here intended with- out denying all final causes. For final causes being admitted, the pleasures and pains now mentioned must be admitted too as instances of them. And if they are, if God annexes delight to some actions, and uneasiness to others, with an apparent design to induce us to act so and so, then He not only dispenses happiness and misery, but also rewards and punishes actions. If, for example, the pain which we feel upon doing what tends to the destruction of our bodies — suppose upon too near approaches to fire, or upon wounding ourselves— be appointed by the Author of Nature to prevent our doing what thus tends to our destruc- tion, this is altogether as much an instance of His punish- ing our actions, and consequently of our being under His government, as declaring by a voice from heaven, that if we acted so He would inflict such pain upon us, and inflicting it, whether it be greater or less. Thus we find that the true notion or conception of the Author of Nature is that of a master or governor, prior to the consideration of his moral attributes. The fact of our case, which we find by experience, is, that He actually exercises dominion or government over us at present, by rewarding and punishing us for our actions, in as strict and proper a sense of these words, and even in the same sense, as children, servants, subjects, are rewarded and punished by those who govern them. And thus tlie whole analogy of Nature, the whole present course of things, most fully shows that there is nothing incredible in the general doctrine of religion ; that God will B 34 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION reward and punish men for their actions hereafter — nothing incredible, I mean, arising out of the notion of rewarding and punishing. For the whole course of Nature is a present instance of His exercising that government over us which implies in it re warding -and punishing. But as divine punishment is what men chiefly object against, and are most unwilling to allow, it may be proper to mention some circumstances in the natural course of punishments at present which are analogous to what religion teaches us concerning a future state of punishment ; indeed so analogous that as they add a further credibility to it, so they cannot but raise a most serious apprehension of it in those who will attend to them. It has been now observed that such and such miseries naturally follow such and such actions of imprudence and wilfulness, as well as actions more commonly and more distinctly considered as vicious ; and that these consequences when they may be foreseen are properly natural punish- ments annexed to such actions. For the general thing here insisted upon is, not that we see a great deal of misery in the world, but a great deal which men bring upon them- selves by their own behaviour, which they might have fore- seen and avoided. Now the circumstances of these natural punishments particularly deserving our attention are such as these ; th:it oftentimes they follow, or are inflicted in consequence of, actions which procure many present ad- vantages, and are accompanied with much present pleasure : for instance, sickness and untimely death is the consequence of intemperance, though accompanied with the highest mirth and jollity : that these punishments are often much greater than the advantages or pleasures obtained by the actions of which they are the punishments or consequences : that though we may in^ngine a constitution of nature in TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 35 which these natural punishments which are in fact to follow would follow immediately upon such actions being done, or very soon after, we find, on the contrary, in our world, that they are often delayed a great while, sometimes even till long after the actions occasioning them are forgot ; so that the constitution of nature is such, that delay of punishment is no sort or degree of presumption of final impunity: that after such delay, these natural punishments or miseries often come, not by degrees, but suddenly, with violence, and at once ; however, the chief misery often does : that as certainty of such distant misery following such actions is never afforded persons, so perhaps during the actions they have seldom a distinct full expectation of its following ■} and many times the case in only thus, that they see in general, or may see, the credibility that intem- perance, suppose, will bring after it diseases, civil crimes, civil punishments, when yet the real probability often is that they shall escape ; but things notwithstanding take their destined course, and the misery inevitably follows at its appointed time in very many of these cases. Thus also though youth may be alleged as an excuse for rashness and folly, as being naturally thoughtless, and not clearly foreseeing all the consequences of being untractable and profligate, this does not hinder ; but that these consequences follow, and are grievously felt throughout the whole course of mature life. Habits contracted even in that age are often utter ruin ; and men's success in the world, not only in the common sense of worldly success, but their real happiness and misery, depends, in a great degree and in various ways, upon the manner in which they pass their youth ; which consequences they for the most part neglect to consider, and perhaps seldom can properly be said to believe, beforehand. It requires also to be mentioned * See Part II. chap vi. B 2 36 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION that in numberless cases the natural course of things affords us opportunities for procuring advantages to ourselves at certain times which we cannot procure when we will, nor ever recall the opportunities if we have neglected them. Indeed, the general course of nature is an example of this. If, during the opportunity of youth, persons are indocile and self-willed, they inevitably suffer in their future life for want of those acquirements which they neglected the natural season of attaining. If the husbandman lets his seed-time pass without sowing, the whole year is lost to him beyond recovery. In like manner, though after men have been guilty of folly and extravagance up to a certain degree, it is often in their power, for instance, to retrieve their affairs, to recover their health and character, at least in good measure ; yet real reformation is, in many cases, of no avail at ail towards preventing the miseries, poverty, sick- ness, infamy, naturally annexed to folly and extravagance exceeding that degree. There is a certain bound of impru- dence and misbehaviour, which being transgressed, there remains no place for repentance in the natural course of things. It is further very much to be remarked, that neglects from inconsiderateness, want of attention,^ not looking about us to see what we have to do, are often attended with consequences altogether as dreadful as any active misbehaviour from the most extravagant passion. And, lastly, civil government being natural, the punishments of it are so loo; and some of these punishments are capital, as the effects of a dissolute course of pleasure are often mortal. So that many natural punishments are final" to him * Part II. chap. vi. * The general consideration of a future state of punishment most evidently belongs to the subject of natural religion. But if any of these reflections should be thought to relate more peculiarly to this doctrine as taught in Scripture, the reader is desired to observe that Gentile TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 37 who incurs them, if considered only in his temporal capacity, and seem inflicted by natural appointment, either to remove the offender out of the way of being further mischievous, or as an example, though frequently a disregarded one, to those who are left behind. These things are not what we call accidental, or to be met with only now and then, but they are things of every-day ex- perience. They proceed from general laws, very general ones, by which God governs the world in the natural course of His providence. And they are so analogous to what religion teaches us concerning the future punishment of the wicked, so much of a piece with it, that both would naturally be expressed in the very same words and manner of description. In the Book of Proverbs,^ for instance, wisdom is introduced as frequenting the most public places of resort, and as rejected when she offers herself as the natural appointed guide of human life. " How long," speaking to those who are passing through it, " how long^ ye simple ones, will ye love writers, both moralists and poets, speak of the future punishment of the wicked, both as to the duration and degree of it, in a like manner of expression and of description as the Scripture does. So that all which can positively be asserted to be matter of mere revelation with regard to this doctrine seems to be, that the great distinction between the righteous and the wicked shall be made at the end of this world ; that each shall the7i receive according to his deserts. Reason did, as it well might, conclude that it should, finally and upon the whole, be well with the righteous, and ill with the wicked. But it could not be deter- mined, upon any principles of reason, whether human creatures might not have been appointed to pass through other states of life and being before that distributive justice should finally and effectually take place. Revelation teaches us that the next state of things after the present is appointed for the execution of this justice; that it shall be no longer delayed ; but " the mystery of God," the great mystery of His suffering vice and confusion to prevail, "shall then be finished;" and He will "take to Him His great power and will reign," by rendering to every one according to his works. I Chap. i. 38 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION folly, and the scorners delight in their scorning, and fools hate knowledge ? Turn ye at my reproof. Behold, I will pour out my spirit upon you, I will make known my words unto you." But upon being neglected, " Because I have called, and ye refused, I have stretched out my hand, and no inan regarded. But ye have set at nought all my counsel, and would none of my reproof: I also will laugh at your calamity, I will mock when your fear cometh ; when your fear cometh as desolation, and your destruction cometh as a whirlwind ; when distress and anguish cometh upon you. Then shall they call upon me, but I will not answer; they shall seek me early, but they shall not find me." This passage, every one sees, is poetical, and some parts of it are highly figurative ; but their meaning is obvious. And the thing intended is expressed more literally in the follow- ing words : " For that they hated knowledge, and did not choose the fear of the Lord, therefore shall they eat of the fruit of their own way, and be filled with their own devices. For the security of the simple shall stay them, and the pros- perity of fools shall destroy them." And the whole passage is so equally applicable to v/hat we experience in the present world concerning the consequences of man's actions, and to what religion teaches us is to be expected in another, that it may be questioned which of the two was principally intended. Indeed, when one has been recollecting the proper proofs of a future state of rewards and punishments, nothing, me- thinks, can give one so sensible an apprehension of the latter, or representation of it to the mind, as observing that after the many disregarded checks, admonitions and warnings, which people meet with in the ways of vice and folly and extravagance, warnings from their very nature, from the examples of others, from the lesser inconveniences which they bring upon themselves, from the instructions of wise and virtuous men ; after these have been long despised, scorned, TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 39 ridiculed ; after the chief bad consequences, temporal con- sequences, of their folUes have been delayed for a great while, at length they break in irresistibly, like an armed force ; repentance is too late to relieve, and can serve only to aggravate their distress. The case is become desperate, and poverty and sickness, remorse and anguish, infamy and death, the effects of their own doings, overwhelm them beyond possibility of remedy or escape. This is an account of what is in fact the general constitution of nature. It is not in any sort meant that according to what appears at present of the natural course of things men are always uniformly punished in proportion to their misbehaviour ; but that there are very many instances of misbehaviour punished in the several ways now mentioned, and very dreadful instances too, sufficient to show what the laws of the universe may admit, and if thoroughly considered, suffi- cient fully to answer all objections against the credibility of a future state of punishments from any imaginations that the frailty of our nature and external temptations almost annihilate the guilt of human vices, as well as objections of another sort from necessity, from suppositions that the will of an infinite Being cannot be contradicted, or that He must be incapable of offence and provocation.^ Reflections of this kind are not without their terrors to serious persons, the most free from enthusiasm and of tlic greatest strength of mind. But it is fit things be stated and considered as they really are. And there is in the present age a certain fearlessness with regard to what may be here- after under the government of God, which nothing but an universally acknowledged demonstration on the side~Df Atheism can justify, and which makes it quite necessary that men be reminded, and if possible made to feel, that there is no sort of ground for being thus presumptuous, even upon ^ See chaps, iv. and vi. 40 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION the most sceptical principles. For, may it not be said of any person upon liis being born into the world, he may behave so as to be of no service to it, but by being made an example of the woful effects of vice and folly? I'hat he may. as any one may if he will, incur an infamous execution from the hands of civil justice, or in some other course of extravagance shorten his days, or bring upon himself infamy and diseases worse than death ? So that it had been better for him, even with regard to the present world, that he had never been born. And is there any pretence of reason for people to think themselves secure, and talk as if they had certain proof, that let them act as licentiously as they will, there can be nothing analogous to this with regard to a future and more general interest, under the providence and government of the same God. CHAPTER III. Of the Moral Government of God. As the manifold appearances of design and of final causes in the constitution of the world prove it to be the work of an intelligent mind, so the particular final causes of pleasure and pain distributed amongst His creatures prove that they are under His government, what may be called His natural government of creatures endued with sense and reason. This, however, implies somewhat more than seems usually attended to, when we speak of God's natural government of the world. It implies government of the very same kind with that which a master exercises over his servants, or a TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 41 civil magistrate over his subjects. These latter instances of final causes as really prove an intelligent Governor of the vi^orld, in the sense now mentioned, and before^ distinctly treated of as any other instances of final causes, prove an intelligent Maker of it. But this alone does not appear at first sight to determine anything certainly concerning the moral character of the Author of Nature considered in this relation of governor ; does not ascertain His government to be moral, or prove that He is the righteous judge of the world. Moral government consists not barely in rewarding and punishing men for their actions, which the most tyrannical person may do, but in rewarding the righteous and punishing the wicked; in rendering to men according to their actions, considered as good or evil. And the perfection of moral government consists in doing this with regard to all intelli- gent creatures, in an exact proportion to their personal merits or demerits. Some men seem to think the only character of the Author of Nature to be that of simple absolute benevolence. This, considered as a principle of action and infinite in degree, is a disposition to produce the greatest possible happiness without regard to persons' behaviour, otherwise than as such regard would produce higher degrees of it. And supposing this to be the only character of God, veracity and justice in Him would be nothing but benevolence conducted by wisdom. Now surely this ought not to be asserted unless it can be proved, for we should speak with cautious reve- rence upon such a subject. And whether it can be proved or no, is not the thing here to be inquired into, but whether in the constitution and conduct of the world a righteous government be not discernibly planned out, which necessarily implies a righteous governor. There may possibly be in ' Chap. ii. 42 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION the creation beings to whom the Author of Nature manifests Himself under this most amiable of all characters, this of infinite absolute benevolence; for it is the most amiable, supposing it not, as perhaps it is not, incompatible with justice, but He manifests Himself to us under the character of a righteous governor. He may consistently with this be simply and absolutely benevolent in the sense now explained. But He is, for He has given us a proof in the consitution and conduct of the world, that He is a governor over servants, as He rewards and punishes us for our actions. y\.nd in the constitution and conduct of it, He may also have given besides the reason of the thing and the natural presages of conscience, clear and distinct intima- tions that His government is righteous or moral ; clear to such as think the nature of it deserving their attention, and yet not to every careless person who casts a transient reflec- tion upon the subject.^ Eut it is particularly to be observed that the divine government, which we experience ourselves under in the present state, taken alone, is allowed not to be the perfec- tion of moral government. And yet this by no means hinders but that there may be somewhat, be it more or less, truly moral in it. A righteous government may plainly appear to be carried on to some degree, enough to give us the apprehension that it shall be completed or carried on to that degree of perfection which religion teaches us it shall, ' The objections against religion, from the evidence of it not being universal, nor so strong as miglit possibly have been, may be urged against natural religion as well as against revealed. And therefore the consideration of ihem belongs to the first part of this treatise as \\ell as the second. But as these objections are chiefly urged against I'evealed religion, I chose to consider them in the second part. And the answer to them there (ch. vi.), as urged against Christianity, being almost equally applicable to them as urged against the religion of Nature ; to avoid repetition, the reader is referred to that chapter. TO THE COURSE OF NATURE, 43 but which cannot appear till much more of the divine administration be seen than can in the present life. And the design of this chapter is to inquire how far tliis is the case ; how far over and above the moral natme^ which God has given us, and our natural notion of Him as righteous governor of those His creatures, to whom He has given this nature;" I say how far besides this the principles and beginnings of a moral government over the world may be discerned, notwithstanding and amidst all the confusion and disorder of it. Now one might mention here what has been often urged with great force, that in general less uneasiness and more satisfaction are the natural consequences* of a virtuous than of a vicious course of life, in the present state, as an instance of a moral government established in nature ; an instance of it collected from experience and present matter of fact. But it must be owned a thing of difficulty to weigh and balance pleasures and uneasinesses each amongst themselves, and also against each other, so as to make an estimate with any exactness of the overplus of happiness on the side of virtue. And it is not impossible that, amidst the infinite disorders of the world, there may be exceptions to the happiness of virtue, even with regard to those persons whose course of life from tlieir youth up has been blame- less ; and more with regard to those who have gone on for some time in the ways of vice and have afterwards reformed. For, suppose an instance of the latter case ; a person with his passions inflamed, his natural faculty of self-government- impaired by habits of indulgence, and with all his vices about him, like so many harpies, craving for their accustomed grati- fication ; who can say how long it might be before such a person would find more satisfaction in the reasonableness ^ Dissertation II. ^ Chap. vi. p. icy, &c. " See Lord Shaftesbury's Inquiry concerning Virtue, Part II. ■ 44 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION and present good consequences of virtue than difficulties and self-denial in the restraints of it ? Experience also shows that men can, to a great degree, get over their sense of shame, so as that by professing themselves to be without principle, and avowing even direct villainy, they can support themselves against the infamy of it. But as the ill actions of any one will probably be more talked of and oftener thrown in his way upon his reformation, so the infamy of them will be much more felt after the natural sense of virtue and of honour is recovered. Uneasinesses of this kind ought, indeed, to be put to the account of former vices ; yet it will be said they are in part the consequences of reformation. Still I am far from allowing it doubtful whether virtue, upon the whole, be happier than vice in the present world. But if it were, yet the beginnings of a righteous administration may, beyond all question, be found in nature if we will attentively inquire after them. And, I. In whatever manner the notion of God's moral govern- ment over the world might be treated, if it did not appear whether He were in a proper sense our Governor at all; yet when it is certain matter of experience, that He does manifest Himself to us under the character of a Governor, in the sense explained," it must deserve to be considered whether there be not reason to aj^prehend that He may be a righteous or moral Governor. Since it appears to be fact that God does govern mankind by the method of rewards and punish- ments, according to some settled rules of distribution, it is surely a question to be asked. What presumption is there against His finally rewarding and punishing them, according to this particular rule — namely, as they act reasonably or unreasonably, virtuously or viciously ? Since rendering men happy or miserable by this rule certainly falls in, much more falls in with our natural apprehensions and ' Cliap. ii. TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 45 sense of things, than doing so by any other rule whatever : since rewarding and punishing actions by any other rule would appear much harder to be accounted for by minds formed as He has formed ours. Be the evidence of religion then more or less clear, the expectation which it raises in us that the righteous shall, upon the whole, be happy, and the wicked miserable, cannot, however, possibly be considered as absurd or chimerical ; because it is no more than an ex- pectation that a method of government already begun, shall be carried on, the method of rewarding and punishing actions ; and shall be carried on by a particular rule, which unavoidably appears to us at first sight more natural than any other, the rule which we call distributive justice. Nor, II. Ought it to be entirely passed over that tranquillity, satisfaction, and external advantages, being the natural con- sequences of prudent management of ourselves and our affairs ; and rashness, profligate negligence and wilful folly, bringing after them many inconveniences and sufferings ; these afford instances of a right constitution of nature; as the correction of children, for their own sakes, and by way of example, when they run into danger or hurt themselves, is a part of right education. And thus that God governs the world by general fixed laws, that He has endued us with capacities of reflecting upon this constitution of things, and foreseeing the good and bad consequences of our behaviour, plainly implies some sort of moral government ; since from such a constitution of things it cannot but follow that pru- dence and imprudence, which are of the nature of virtue and vice,' must be, as they are, respectively rewarded and punished. III. From the natural course of things, vicious actions are, to a great degree, actually punished as mischievous to society ; and besides punishment actually inflicted upon this ' See Dissert. II. 46 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION account, there is also the fear and apprehension of it in those persons whose crimes have rendered them obnoxious to it, in case of a discovery ; this state of fear being itself often a very considerable punishment. The natural fear and apprehension of it too, which restrains from such crimes, is a declaration of nature against them. It is ne- cessary to the very being of society that vices destructive of it should be. punished as being so ; the vices of falsehood, injustice, cruelty, which punishment therefore is as natural as society ; and so is an instance of a kind of moral govern- ment, naturally established and actually taking place. And since the certain natural course of things is the conduct of Providence or the government of God, though carried on by the instrumentality of men, the observation here made amounts to this, that mankind find themselves placed by Him in such circumstances as that they are unavoidably accountable for their behaviour, and are often punished, and sometimes rewarded, under His government, in the view of theii being mischievous or eminently beneficial to society. If it be objected that good actions, and such as are beneficial to society, are often punislied, as in the case of persecution and in other cases, and that ill and mischievous actions are often rewarded : it may be answered distinctly, first, that this is in no sort necessary, and consequently not natural in the sense in which it is necessary, and therefore natural that ill or mischievous actions should be punished ; and in the next place, that good actions are never punished considered as beneficial to society, nor ill actions rewarded, under the view of their being hurtful to it. So that it stands good, without anything on the side of vice to be set over against it, that the Author of Nature has as truly directed that vicious actions, considered as mischievous to society, should be punished, and put mankind under a necessity of TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. ■ 47 thus punishing them, as He has directed and necessitated us to preserve our Hves by food. IV, In the natural course of things, virtue as such is actually rewarded, and vice as such punished ; which seems to afford an instance or example, not only of government, but of moral government, begun and established ; moral in the strictest sense, though not in that perfection of degree which religion teaches us to expect. In order to see this more clearly, we must distinguish between actions tliem- selves and that quality ascribed to them which we call virtuous or vicious. The gratification itself of every natural passion must be attended with delight, and acquisitions of fortune, however made, are acquisitions of the means or materials of enjoyment. An action then by which any natural passion is gratified or fortune acquired, procures delight or advantage, abstracted from all consideration of tlie morality of such action. Consequently, the pleasure or advantage in this case is gained by the action itself, not by the morality, the virtuousness or viciousness of it; though it be, perhaps, virtuous or vicious. Thus, to say such an action or course of behaviour procured such pleasure or advantage, or brought on such inconvenience and pain, is quite a different thing from saying that such good or bad effect was owing to the virtue or vice of such action or behaviour. In one case an action abstracted from all moral consideration produced its eftect ; in the other case — for it will appear that there are such cases — the morality of the action, the action under a moral consideration — />., the virtuousness or viciousness of it, produced the effect. Now I say virtue as such naturally procures considerable advan- tages to the virtuous, and vice as such naturally occasions great inconvenience and even misery to the vicious, in very many instances. The immediate effects of virtue and vice upon the mind and temper are to be mentioned as in- 48 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION stances of it. Vice as such is naturally attended with some sort of uneasiness, and not uncommonly with great dis- turbance and apprehension. That inward feeling — which respecting lesser matters and in familiar speech we call being vexed with oneself, and in matters of importance and in more serious language, remorse ; is an uneasiness naturally arising from an action of a man's own, reflected upon by himself as wrong, unreasonable, faulty — i.e.^ vicious in greater or less degrees ; and this manifestly is a different feeling from that uneasiness which arises from a sense of mere loss or harm. What is more common than to hear a man lamenting an accident or event, and adding — but however he has the satisfaction that he cannot blame himself for it ; or, on the contrary, that he has the uneasiness of being sensible it was his own doing ? Thus also the disturbance and fear which often follow upon a man's having done an injury, arise from a sense of his being blame-worthy ; otherwise there would in many cases be no ground of disturbance, nor any reason to fear resentment or shame. On the other hand, inward security and peace, and a mind open to the several gratifications of life, are the natural attendants of innocence and virtue. To which must be added the complacency, satisfaction, and even joy of heart which accompany the exercise, the real exercise, of gratitude, friendship, benevolence. And here, I think, ought to be mentioned the fears of future punishment and peaceful hopes of a better life, in those who fully believe or have any serious apprehension of religion ; because these hopes and fears are present un- easiness, and satisfaction to the mind and cannot be got rid of by great part of the world, even by men who have thought most thoroughly upon that subject of religion. And no one can say how considerable this uneasiness and satisfaction may be, or what upon the whole it may amount to. TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 49 In the next place comes in the consideration that all honest and good men are disposed to befriend honest good men as such, and to discountenance the vicious as such, and do so in some degree, indeed in a considerable degree : from which favour and discouragement cannot but arise considerable advantage and inconvenience. And though the generality of the world have little regard to the morality of their own actions, and may be supposed to have less to that of others, when they themselves are not concerned, yet let any one be known to be a man of virtue, somehow or other he will be favoured, and good offices will be done him, from regard to his character without remote views, occasionally, and in some low degree, I think, by the gene- rality of the world, as it happens to come in their way. Public honours too and advantages are the natural conse- quences, are sometimes at least the consequences, in fact, of virtuous actions, of eminent justice, fidelity, charity, love to our country, considered in the view of being virtuous. And sometimes even death itself, often infamy and external inconveniences, are the public consequences of vice as vice. For instance, the sense which mankind have of tyranny, injustice, oppression, additional to the mere feeling or fear of misery, has doubtless been instrumental in bringing about revolutions, which make a figure even in the history of the world. For it is plain, men resent injuries as implying faultiness, and retaliate, not merely under the notion of having received harm, but of having received wrong ; and they have this resentment in behalf of others as well as of themselves. So likewise even the generality are in some degree grateful, and disposed to return good offices, not merely because such an one has been the occasion of good to them, but under the viev/ that such good offices implied kind intention and good desert in the doer. To all this may be added two or three particular things, which many 5° THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION persons will think frivolous, but to me nothing appears so which at all comes in towards determining a question of such importance as, whether there be or be not a moral institution of government, in the strictest sense moral, visibly established and begun in nature. The particular things are these : that in domestic government, wliich is doubtless natural, children and others also are very generally punished for falsehood and injustice and ill-behaviour, as such, and rewarded for the contrary ; which are instances where veracity, and justice, and right behaviour, as such, are naturally enforced by rewards and punishments, whether more or less considerable in degree ; that, though civil government be supposed to take cognizance of actions in no other viev/ than as prejudicial to society, without respect to the immorality of them ; yet as such actions are immoral, so the sense which men have of the immorality of them very greatly contributes in different ways to bring offenders to justice; and that entire absence of all crime and guilt in the moral sense, when plainly appearing, will almost of course procure, and circumstances of aggravated guilt prevent, a remission of the penalties annexed to civil crimes in many cases, though by no means in all. Upon the whole, then, besides the good and bad effects of virtue and vice upon men's own minds, the course of the world does in some measure turn upon the approbation and disapprobation of them, as such, in others. The sense of well and ill doing, the presages of conscience, the love of good characters and dislike of bad ones, honour, shame, resentment, gratitude, — all these, considered in themselves and in their effects, do afford manifest real instances of virtue as such naturally favoured, and of vice as such dis- countenanced, more or less, in the daily course of human life — in every age, in every relation, in every general cir- cumstance of it. That God has given us a moral nature,^ 1 See Dissert. II. TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 51 may most justly be urged as a proof of our being under his moral government; but that he has placed us in a condition which gives this nature, as one may speak, scope to operate, and in which it does unavoidably operate — i.e., inlluence mankind to act so as thus to favour and reward virtue and discountenance and punish vice — tliis is not the same, but a further additional proof of his moral government, for it is an instance of it. The first is a proof that he will finally favour and support virtue effectually; the second is an example of his favouring and supporting it at present, in some degree. If a more distinct inquiry be made whence it arises that virtue as such is often rewarded and vice as such is punished, and this rule never inverted, it will be found to proceed in part immediately from the moral nature itself, which God has given us, and also in part from his having given us together with this nature so great a power over each other's happiness and misery. For, first, it is certain that peace and delight in some degree and upon some occasions is the necessary and present effect of virtuous practice an effect arising immediately from that constitution of our nature. We are so made that well-doing as such gives us satisfaction at least in some instances, ill-doing as such in none. And secondly, from our moral nature joined with God's having put our happiness and misery in many respects in each other's power, it cannot but be that vice as such, some kinds and instances of it at least, will be infamous, and men will be disposed to punish it as in itself detestable, and the villain will by no means be able always to avoid feeling that infamy, any more than he will be able to escape this further punishment which mankind will be disposed to inflict upon him under the notion of his deserving it. But there can be nothing on the side of vice to answer this, because there is nothing in the human mind, contradictory, as the logicians 52 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION • speak, to virtue. For virtue consists in a regard to what is J right and reasonable as being so in a regard to veracity, justice, charity, in themselves ; and there is surely no such thing as a like natural regard to falsehood, injustice, cruelty- If it be thought that there are instances of an approbation of vice, as such in itself and for its own sake (though it does not appear to me that there is any such thing at all ; but supposing there be), it is evidently monstrous — as much so as the most acknowledged perversion of any passion whatever. Such instances of perversion then being left out as merely imaginary or, however unnatural, it must follow from the frame of our nature and from our condition in the respects now described, that vice cannot at all be, and virtue cannot but be, favoured as such by others upon some occasions, and happy in itself in some degree. For what is here insisted upon is not the degree in which virtue and vice are thus distinguished, but only the thing itself; that they are so in some degree, though the whole good and bad effect of virtue and vice as such is not inconsiderable in degree. But, that they must be thus distinguished in some degree is in a manner necessary ; it is matter of fact of daily experience, even in the greatest confusion of human affairs. It is not pretended, but that in the natural course of things, happiness and misery appear to be distributed by other rules than only the personal merit and demerit of characters. They may sometimes be distributed by way of mere discipline. There may be the wisest and best reasons why the world should be governed by general laws, from whence such promiscuous distribution perhaps must follow, and also why our happiness and misery should be put in each other's power in the degree which they are ; and these things, as in general they contribute to the rewarding virtue and punishing vice as such, so they often contribute also, TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 53 not to the inversion of this, which is impossible, but to the rendering persons prosperous though wicked, afflicted though righteous, and, which is worse, to the rewarding some actions, though vicious ; and pimishing other actions, though virtuous. But all this cannot drown the voice of nature in the conduct of providence, plainly declaring itself for virtue by way of distinction from vice and preference to it. For, our being so constituted as that virtue and vice are thus naturally favoured and discountenanced, rewarded and punished respectively as such, is an intuitive proof of the intent of nature that it should be so, otherwise the constitution of our mind, from which it thus immediately and directly proceeds, would be absurd. But it cannot be said because virtuous actions are sometimes punished, and vicious actions rewarded, that nature intended it. For, though this great disorder is brought about, as all actions are done by means of some natural passion ; yet this may be as it undoubtedly is, brought about by the perversion of such passion implanted in us for other, and those very good purposes. And indeed these other and good purposes^ even of every passion, may be clearly seen. We have then a declaration, in some degree of present effect, from him wlio is supreme in nature, which side he is of, or what part he takes : a declaration for virtue and against vice. So far therefore as a man is true to virtue, to veracity and justice, to equity and charity, and the right of the case in whatever he is concerned, so far he is on the side of the divine administralion and co-operates with it^ and from hence, to such a man, arises naturally a secret satis- faction and sense of security and implicit hope of Lome- what further. And, V. This hope is confirmed by the necessary tendencies of virtue, which though not of present effect, yet are at present discernible in nature, and so afford an instance of somewhat 54 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION moral in the essential constitution of it. There is, in the nature of things, a tendency in virtue and vice to produce the good and bad effects now mentioned, in a greater degree than they do in fact produce them. For instance, good and bad men would be much more rewarded and punislied as such, were it not that justice is often artifically eluded, that characters are not known, and many wlio would thus favour virtue and discourage vice, are hindered from doing so by accidental causes. These tendencies of virtne and vice are obvious with regard to individuals. But it may require more particularly to be considered that power in a society, by being under the direction of virtue, naturally increases, and has a necessary tendency to prevail over opposite power not under the direction of it; in like manner as power by being under the direction of reason, increases, and has a tendency to prevail over brute force. There are several brute creatures of equal, and several of superior strength, to that of men, and possibly the sum of the whole strength of brutes may be greater than that of mankind ; but reason gives us the advantage and superior- ity over them, and thus man is the acknowledged governing animal upon the earth. Nor is this superiority considered by any as accidental, but as what reason has a tendency, in the nature of the thing to obtain. And yet, perhaps, difficulties may be raised about the meaning as well as the truth of the assertion, that virtue has the like tendency. To obviate these difficulties, let us see more distinctly how the case stands witli regard to reason, which is so readily acknowledged to liave this advantageous tendency. Suppose, then, two or three men, of the best and most im- proved understanding, in a desolate open plain, attacked by ten times the number of beasts of prey, would their reason secure them the victory in this unequal combat ? Power then, though joined witli reason, and under its direction. TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 55 cannot be expected to prevail over opposite power, though merely brutal, unless the one bears some proportion to the other. Again, put the imaginary case, that rational and irrational creatures were of like external shape and manner, it is certain, before there were opportunities for the first to distinguish each other, to separate from their adversaries, and to form an union among themselves, they might be upon a level, or in several respects upon great disadvan- tage, though united they might be vastly superior; since union is of such efficacy, that ten men united might be able to accomplish what ten thousand of the same natural strength and understanding, wholly ununited, could not. In this case, then, brute force might more than maintain its ground against reason, for want of union among the rational creatures. Or suppose a number of men to land upon an island inhabited only by wild beasts ; a number of men who, by the regulations of civil government, the inventions of art, and the experience of some years, could they be preserved so long, would be really sufficient to subdue the wild beasts, and to preserve themselves in security from them. Yet a conjuncture of accidents might give such advantage to the irrational animals as that they might at once overpower, and even extirpate, the whole species of rational ones. Length of tune then, proper scope and opportunities, for reason to exert itself, may be absolutely necessary to its prevailing over brute force. Further still, there are many instances of brutes succeeding in attempts which they could not have undertaken had not their irrational nature rendered them incapable of foreseeing the danger of such attempts, or the fury of passion hindered their attending to it \ and there are instances of reason and real prudence preventing men's undertaking what, it hath appeared afterwards, they might have succeeded in by a lucky rashness, And in certain conjunctures, ignorance and 56 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION folly, weakness and discord, may have their advantages. So that rational animals have not necessarily the superiority over irrational ones, but, how improbable soever it may be, it is evidently possible that in some globes the latter may be superior. And were the former wholly at variance and disunited by false self-interest and envy, by treachery and injustice, and consequent rage and malice against each other, whilst the latter were firmly united among themselves by instinct ; this might greatly contribute to the intro- ducing such an inverted order of things. For every one would consider it as inverted, since reason has, in the nature of it, a tendency to prevail over brute force, notwith- standing the possibility it may not prevail, and the neces- sity, which there is, of many concurring circumstances to render it prevalent. Now I say, virtue in a society has a like tendency to pro- cure superiority and additional power, whether this power be considered as the means of security from opposite power, or of obtaining other advantages. And it has this tendency, by rendering public good an object and end to every member of the society, by putting every one upon consideration and diligence, recollection and self-govern- ment, both in order to see what is the most effectual method, and also in order to perform their proper part for obtaining and preserving it ; by uniting a society within itself and so increasing its strength, and, which is particu- larly to be mentioned, uniting it by means of veracity and justice. For, as these last are i)rincipal bonds of union, so benevolence or public spirit, undirected, unrestrained by them, is, nobody knows what. And sui)pose the invisible world and the invisible dispen- sations of providence to be in any sort analogous to what appears, or that both together make up one uniform scheme, the two parts of which — the part which we see, and TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 57 that which is beyond our observation — are analogous to each other. Then there must be a Hke natural tendency in the derived power throughout the universe, under the direction of virtue, to prevail in general over that which is not under its direction, as there is in reason, derived reason in the universe, to prevail over brute force. But then in order to the prevalence of virtue, or that it may actually produce what it has a tendency to produce, the like concurrences are necessary as are to the prevalence of reason. There must be some proportion between the natural power or force which is and that which is not under the direction of virtue. There must be sufficient length of time for the complete success of virtue, as of reason cannot, from the nature of the thing, be otherwise than gradual. There must be, as one may speak, a fair field of trial, a stage large and extensive enough, proper occasions and opportunities for the virtuous to join together to exert themselves against lawless force, and to reap the fruit of their united labours. Now indeed it is to be hoped that the disproportion between the good and bad, even here on earth, is not so great but that the former have natural power sufficient to their prevaiUng to a considerable degree, if circumstances would permit this power to be united. For much less, very much less power, under the direction of virtue, would prevail over much greater, not under the direction of it. However, good men over the face of the earth cannot unite, as for other reasons, so because they cannot be sufficiently ascertained of each other's characters. And the known course of human things, the scene we are now passing through, particularly the shortness of life, denies to virtue its full scope in several other respects. The natural tendency which we have been considering, though real, is hindered from being carried into effect in the present state, but these hindrances SS THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION may be removed in a future one. Virtue, to borrow the Christian alhision, is millitant here, and various untoward accidents contribute to its being often overborne ; but it may combat with greater advantage hereafter and prevail com- pletely, and enjoy its consequent rewards in some future states. Neglected as it is, perhaps unknown, perhaps despised and oppressed here, there may be scenes in eternity lasting enough, and in every other way adapted to afford it a .sufficient sphere of action, and a sufficient sphere for the natural consequences of it to follow in fact. If the soul be naturally immortal, and this state be a progress towards a future one, as childhood is towards mature age, good men may naturally unite, not only amongst themselves, but also with other orders of virtuous creatures in that future state. For virtue, from the very nature of it, is a principle and bond of union, in some degree, amongst all who are endued with it and known to each other, so as that by it a good man cannot but recommend himself to the favour and protection of all virtuous beings throughout the whole universe, who can be acquainted with his character, and can any way interpose in his behalf in any part of his duration. And one might add, that suppose all this advantageous tendency of virtue to become effect, amongst one or more orders of creatures, in any distant scenes and periods, and to be seen by any orders of vicious creatures throughout the universal kingdom of God, this happy effect of virtue would have a tendency, by way of example, and possibly in other Avays, to amend those of them who are capable of amendment, and being recovered to a just sense of virtue. If our notions of the plan of Providence were enlarged, in any sort proportionable to what late discoveries have enlarged our views with respect to the material world, representations of this kind would not appear absurd or extravagant. However, they are not to TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 59 be taken as intended for a literal delineation of what is in fact the particular scheme of the universe, which cannot be known without revelation, for suppositions are not to be looked on as true, because not incredible ; but they are mentioned to show that our finding virtue to be hindered from procuring to itself such superiority and advantages, is no objection against its having, in the essential nature of the thing, a tendency to procure them ; and the sup- positions now mentioned do plauily show this, for they show that these hindrances are so far from being necessary, that we ourselves can easily conceive how they may be removed in future states, and full scope be granted to virtue. And all these advantageous tendencies of it are to be con- sidered as declarations of God in its favour. This, however, is taking a very large compass, though it is certain that, as the material world appears to be, in a manner, boundless and immense, there must be some scheme of Providence vast in proportion to it. But let us return to the earth, our habitation, and we shall see this happy tendency of virtue, by imagining an instance not so vast and remote, by supposing a kingdom or society of men upon it perfectly virtuous for a succession of many ages, to which, if you please, may be given a situation ad- vantageous for universal monarchy. In such a state there would be no such thing as faction ; but men of the greatest capacity would of course all along have the chief direction of affairs willingly yielded to them, and they would share it among themselves without envy. Each of these would have the part assigned him to which his genius was peculiarly adapted ; and others, who had not any distinguished genius, would be safe, and think themselves very happy, by being under the protection and guidance of those who had. Public determinations would really be the result of the united wisdom of the community, and they would faithfully be 6o THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION executed by the united strength of it. Some would in a higher way contribute, but all would in some way contribute, to the public prosperity: and in it each would enjoy the fruits of his own virtue. And as injustice, whether by fraud or force, would be unknown among themselves, so they would be sufficiently secured from it in their neighbours. For cunning and false self-interest, confederacies in injustice, ever slight, and accompanied with faction and intestine treachery ; these, on one hand, would be found mere childish folly and weakness when set in opposition against wisdom, public spirit, union inviolable, and fidelity on the other, allowing both a sufficient length of years to try their force. Add the general influence which such a kingdom would have over the face of the earth, by way of example particularly, and the reverence which would be paid it. It would plainly be superior to all others, and the world must gradually come under its empire, not by means of lawless violence, but partly by what must be allowed to be just conquest, and partly by other kingdoms submitting themselves voluntarily to it, throughout a course of ages, and claiming its protection, one after another, in successive exigencies. The head of it would be an universal monarch, in another sense than any mortal has yet been ; and the eastern style would be literally appUcable to him, that " all people, nations, and languages should serve him." And though indeed our knowledge of human nature, and the whole history of mankind, show the impossibility, without some miraculous interposition, that a number of men here on earth should unite in one society or government, in the fear of God and universal practice of virtue, and that such a government should continue so united for a succession of ages, yet admitting or supposing this, the effect would be as now drawn out. And thus, for instance, the wonderful power and prosperity promised to the Jewish nation in the Scripture would be in a great TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 6i measure the consequence of what is predicted of them, that the " people should be all righteous and inherit the land for ever;"' were we to understand the latter phrase of a long continuance only, sufficient to give things time to work. The predictions of this kind — for there are many of them — cannot come to pass in the present known course of nature ; but suppose them come to pass, and then the dominion and pre-eminence promised must naturally follow to a very considerable degree. Consider now the general system of religion : that the government of the world is uniform, and one, and moral ; that virtue and right shall finally have the advantage, and prevail over fraud and lawless force, over the deceits as well as the violence of wickedness, under the conduct of one supreme governor ; and from the observations above made it will appear that God has, by our reason, given us to see a peculiar connection in the several parts of this scheme, and a tendency towards the completion of it arising out of the very nature of virtue, which tendency is to be considered as somewhat moral in the essential constitution of things. If any one should think all this to be of little importance, I desire him to consider what he would think if vice had, essentially and in its nature, these advantageous tendencies, or if virtue had essentially the direct contrary ones. But it may be objected, that notwithstanding- all these natural effects, and these natural tendencies of virtue, yet things may be now going on throughout the universe, and may go on hereafter, in the same mixed way as here at pre- sent upon earth — virtue sometimes prosperous, sometimes depressed ; vice sometimes punished, sometimes successful. The answer to which is, that it is not the purpose of this chapter, nor of this treatise, properly to prove God's perfect moral government over the world, or the truth of religion. 1 Is. Ix. 21. 62 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION but to observe what there is in the constitution and course of nature, to confirm the proper proof of it, supposed to be known ; and that the weight of the foregoing observations to this purpose may be thus distincdy proved. Pleasure and pain are indeed to a certain degree, say to a very high degree, distributed amongst us without any apparent regard to the merit or demerit of characters. And were there nothing else concerning this matter discernible in the con- stitution and course of nature, there would be no ground, from the constitution and course of nature, to hope or to fear that men would be rewarded or punished hereafter according to their deserts ; which, hov/ever, it is to be re- marked, implies that even then there would be no ground from appearances to think that vice, upon the whole, would have the advantage, rather than that virtue would. And thus the proof of a future state of retribution would rest upon the usual known arguments for it, which are, I think, plainly unanswerable ; and would be so, though there were no additional confirmation of them from the things above insisted on. But these things are a very strong confirma- tion of tliem. For, Fhsf, They show that the Author of nature is not indif- ferent to virtue and vice. They amount to a declaration from Him, determinate and not to be evaded, in favour of one and against the other ; such a declaration as there is nothing to be set over against or answer on the part of vice. So that were a man, laying aside the proper proof of religion, to determine from the course of nature only, whether it were most probable that the righteous or the wicked would have the advantage in a future life, there can be no doubt but that he would determine the probability to be that the former would. The course of nature then, in the view of it now given, furnishes us with a real practical proof ol the obligations of religion. TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 6^, Secondly, When, conformably to what religion teaches irs, God shall reward and punish virtue and vice as such, so as that every one shall, upon the whole, have his deserts ; this distributive justice will not be a thing different in kind, but only in degree, from what we experience in His present government. It will be that in effect towards which we now see a tendency. It will be no more than the completion of that moral government, the principles and beginning of which have been shown, beyond all dispute, discernible in the present constitution and course of nature. And from hence it follows, T/iirdly, That, as under the natural government of God our experience of those kinds and degrees of happiness and misery which we do experience at present, gives just ground to hope for and to fear higher degrees, and other kinds of both in a future state, supposing a future state admitted ; so under His moral government our experience that virtue and vice are, in the manners above-mentioned, actually rewarded and punished at present in a certain degree, gives just ground to hope and to fear that they may be rewarded and punished in a higher degree hereafter. It is acknowleged indeed that this alone is not sufficient ground to think that they actually will be rewarded and punished in a higher degree rather than in a lower. But then, Lastly, There is sufficient ground to think so, from the good and bad tendencies of virtue and vice. For these tendencies are essential and founded in the nature of things; whereas the hindrances to their becoming effect, are in numberless cases not necessary, but artificial only. Now it may be much more strongly argued that these tendencies, as well as the actual rewards and punishments of virtue and vice, which arise directly out of the nature of things, will remain hereafter, than that the accidental hindrances of them will. And if these hindrances do not remain, those 64 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION rewards and punishments cannot but be carried on much further towards the perfection of moral government — i.e., the tendencies of virtue and vice will become effect, but when or where, or in what particular way, cannot be known at all but by revelation. Upon the whole, there is a kind of moral government implied in God's natural government -^ virtue and vice are naturally rewarded and punished as beneficial and mis- chievous to society," and rewarded and punished directly as virtue and vice.^ The notion then of a moral scheme of government is not fictitious, but natural ; for it is suggested to our thoughts by the constitution and course of nature, and the execution of this scheme is actually begun in the instances here mentioned. And these things are to be con- sidered as a declaration of the Author of nature for virtue and against vice : they give a credibility to the supposition of their being rewarded and punished hereafter, and also ground to hope and to fear that they may be rewarded and punished in higher degrees than they are here. And as all this is confirmed, so the argument for religion from the constitution and course of nature is carried on farthar by observing that there are natural tendencies, and in innumerable cases only artificial hindrances, to this moral scheme being carried on much farther towards perfection, than it is at present.-* The notion then of a moral scheme of government, much more perfect than what is seen, is not a fictitious but a natural notion ; for it is suggested to our thoughts by the essential ten- dencies of virtue and vice. And these tendencies are to be considered as intimations, as implicit promises and threatenings from the Author of nature, ot much greater rewards and punishments to follow virtue and vice than do 1 P. 45 - P. 46. 3 p 45_ ^c- " P. 54, &c. TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 65 at present. And indeed, every fiatural tendency, which is to continue, but which is hindered from becoming effect by only accidental causes, affords a presumption that such ten- dency will some time or other become effect ; a presumption in degree proportionable to the length of the duration through which tendency will continue. And from these things together arises a real presumption that the moral scheme of government established in nature shall be carried on much farther towards perfection hereafter ; and, I think, a presumption that it will be absolutely completed. But from these things, joined with the moral nature which God has given us, considered as given us by Him, arises a prac- tical proof ^ that it will be completed ; a proof from fact, and therefore a distinct one from that which is deduced from the eternal and unalterable relations, the fitness and unfitness of actiors. CHAPTER IV. Of a State of Probation as implying Trial, Difficnlties, atvd Danger. The general doctrine of religion, that our present life is a state of probation for a future one, comprehends under it several particular things distinct from each other. But the first and most common meaning of it seems to be, that our future interest is now depending, and depending upon ourselves ; that we have scope and opportunities here for that good and bad behaviour which God will reward and punish hereafter ; together with temptations to one as well as inducements of reason to the other. And this is, in ^ See this proof drawn out briefly, ch. vi p. 107, ., that God should have miraculously interposed, if at all, in a different manner or higher degree. 170 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION But from the observations made above it is undeniably evident that we are not judges in what degrees and manners it were to have been expected He should miraculously interpose, upon supposition of His doing it in some degree and man- ner. Nor, in the natural course of Providence, are superior gifts of memory, eloquence, knowledge, and other talents of great influence conferred only on persons of prudence and decency, or such as are disposed to make the proper use of them. Nor is the instruction and admonition naturally afforded us for the conduct of life, particularly in our edu- cation, commonly given in a manner the most suited to re- commend it, but often with circumstances apt to prejudice us against such instruction. One might go on to add that there is a great resemblance between the light of Nature and of revelation in several other respects. Practical Christianity, or that faith and be- haviour which renders a man a Christian, is a plain and obvious thing, like the common rules of conduct with respect to our ordinary temporal affairs. The more distinct and particular knowledge of those things, the study of v/hich the Apostle calls gohig on nnto perfection^ and of the prophetic parts of revelation, like many parts of natural and even civil knowledge, may require very exact thought and careful consideration. The hindrances, too, of natural and of supernatural light and knowledge have been of the same kind. And as it is owned the whole scheme of Scripture is not yet understood, so, if it ever comes to be understood, before the restituiion of all things,' and without miraculous interpositions, it must be in the same way as natural know- ledge is come at by the continuance and progress of learn- ing and of liberty, and by particular persons attending to, comparing, and pursuing intimations scattered up and down it, which are overlooked and disregarded by the generality ' Heb. vi. I. " Acts iii. 21. TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 171 of the world. For this is the way in which all improve- ments are made by thoughtful men's tracing on obscure hints, as it were, dropped us by Nature accidentally, or which seem to come into our minds by chance. Nor is- it at all incredible that a book which has been so long in the pos- session of mankind should contain many truths as yet un- discovered. For all the same phenomena, and the same faculties of investigation from which such great discoveries in natural knowledge have been made in the present and last age, were equally in the possession of mankind several thousand years before ; and possibly it might be intended that events, as they come to pass, should open and ascer- tain the meaning of several parts of Scripture. It may be objected that this analogy fails in a material respect, for that natural knowledge is of little or no conse- quence. But I have been speaking of the general instruction which Nature does or does not afford us. And besides some parts of natural knowledge, in the more common restrained sense of the words, are of the greatest consequence to the ease and convenience of life. But suppose the analogy did, as it does not, fail in this respect ; yet it might be abundantly supplied from the whole constitution and course of Nature, which shows that God does not dispense His gifts according to our notions of the advantage and consequence they would be of to us. And this in general, with his method of dispensing knowledge in particular, would together make out an analogy full to the point before us. But it may be objected still further and more generally : " The Scripture represents the world as in a state of ruin, and Christianity as an expedient to recover it, to help in these respects where Nature fails ; in particular, to supply the deficiencies of natural light. Is it credible, then, that so many ages should have been let pass before a matter of such a sort of so great and so general importance was made 172 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION known to mankind ; and then that it should be made known to so small a part of them ? Is it conceivable that this supply should be so very deficient, should have the like obscurity and doubtfulness, be liable to the like perversions, in short, lie open to all the like objections as the light of Nature itself ?'" Without determining how far this in fact is so, I answer, it is by no means incredible that it might be so, if the light of Nature and of revelation be from the same hand. Men are naturally liable to diseases, for which God, in His good providence, has provided natural remedies." But remedies existing in Nature have been unknown to mankind for many ages, are known but to few now ; probably many valuable ones are not known yet. Great has been and is the obscurity and difficulty in the nature and application of them. Circumstances seem often to make them very im- proper, where they are absolutely necessary. It is after long labour and study, and many unsuccessful endeavours, that they are brought to be as useful as they are ; after high contempt; and absolute rejection of the most useful we have; and after disputes and doubts, which have seemed to be endless. The best remedies, too, when unskilfully, much more if dishonestly applied, may produce new diseases ; and with the Tightest apphcation, the success of them is often doubtful. In many cases they are not at all effectual ; where they are, it is often very slowly, and the application of them, and the necessary regimen accompanying it, is not uncommonly so disagreeable that some will not submit to them, and satisfy themselves with the excuse, that if they would it is not certain whether it would be successful. And many persons who labour under diseases, for which there are known natural remedies, are not so happy as to be always, if ever, in the way of them. In a word, the remedies which Nature has provided for diseases are neither certain, ^ Ch, vi. - See ch. v. TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 173 perfect, nor universal. And indeed the same principles of arguing, which would lead us to conclude that they must be so, would lead us likewise to conclude that there could be no occasion for them — i.e., that there could be no diseases at all. And therefore our experience that there are diseases shows that it is credible beforehand, upon supposition Nature has provided remedies for them, that these remedies may be, as by experience we find they are, not certain, nor perfect, nor universal, because it shows that the principles upon which we should expect tlie contrary are fallacious. And HOW, what is the just consequence from all these things ? not that reason is no judge of what is offered to us as being of divine revelation. For this would be to infer that we are unable to judge of anything, because we are unable to judge of all things. Reason can, and it ought to judge, not only of the meaning, but also of the morality and the evidence of revelation. First, it is the province of reason to judge of the morality of the Scripture — i.e.., not whether it contains things different from what we should have expected from a wise, just and good being, for objec- tions from hence have been now obviated ; but whether it contains things plainly contradictory to wisdom, justice or goodness, to what the light of Nature teaches us of God. And I know nothing of this sort objected against Scripture, excepting such objections as are formed upon suppositions, which would equally conclude that the constitution of Nature is contradictory to wisdom, justice or goodness, which most certainly it is not. Indeed, there are some particular precepts in Scripture, given to particular persons, requiring actions which would be immoral and vicious, were it not for such precepts. But it is easy to see that all these are of such a kind as that the precept changes the whole nature of the case and of the action, and both constitutes, and shows that not to be unjust or immoral, which, prior to the 174 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION precept, must have appeared and really have been so, which may well be^ since none of these precepts are contrary to immutable morality. If it were commanded to cultivate the principles, and act from the spirit of treachery, ingratitude, cruelty ; the command would not alter the nature of the case or of the action in any of these instances. But it is quite otherwise in precepts which require only the doing an external action ; for instance, taking away the property or life of any. For men have no right to either life or property but what arises solely from the grant of God ; when this grant is revoked, they cease to have any right at all in either, and when this revocation is made known, as surely it is I)ossible it may be, it must cease to be unjust to deprive them of either. And though a course of external acts, which without command would be immoral, must make an immoral habit ; yet a few detached commands have no such natural tendency. I thought proper to say thus much of the few Scripture precepts which require not vicious actions, but actions which would have been vicious had it not been for such precepts, because they are sometimes weakly urged as immoral, and great weight is laid upon objections drawn from them. But to me there seems no difficulty at all in these precepts, but what arises from their being offences — i.e., from their being liable to be perverted, as indeed they are, by wicked designing men, to serve the most horrid purposes, and perhaps to mislead the weak and enthusiastic. And objections from this head are not objections against revelation, but against the whole notion of religion as a trial, and against the general constitution of Nature. Secondly reason is able to judge, and must, of the evidence of revela- tion, and of the objections urged against that evidence, which shall be the subject of a following chapter,' 1 Ch. vii. TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 175 But the consequence of the foregoing observations is that the question upon which the truth of Christianity depends is scarce at all, what objections there are against its scheme, since there are none against the morality of it ; but what objections there are against its evidence, or what proof there remains of it after due allowances made for the objections against that proof; because it has been shown that the objections against Christianity, as distinguished from objec- tions against its evidence, are frivolous. For surely very little vv^eight^ if any at all, is to be laid upon a way of arguing and objecting, which, when applied to the general constitution of Nature, experience shows not to be conclusive ; and such, I think, is the whole way of objecting treated of throughout this chapter. It is resolvable into principles, and goes upon suppositions which mislead us to think that the Author of Nature would not act as we experience He does or would act in such and such cases, as we experience He does not in like cases. But the unreasonableness of this way of objecting will appear yet more evidently from hence, that the chief things thus objected against are justified, as shall be further shown,' by distinct, particular, and full analogies in the constitution and course of Nature. But it is to be rememberd that, frivolous as objections of the foregoing sort against revelation are, yet, when a supposed revelation is more consistent with itself, and has a more general and uniform tendency to promote virtue than, all circumstances considered, could have been expected from enthusiasm and political views ; tliis is a presumptive proof of its not proceeding from them, and so of its truth ; because we are competent judges what might have been expected from enthusiasm and political views. ^ Ch, iv. latter part, and v. vi. 176 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION CHAPTER IV. Of Christianity, considered as a Scheme or Consiitution, imperfectly coin pre h en dec i. It hath been now shown^ that the analogy of Nature renders it highly credible beforehand, that, supposing a revelation to be made, it must contain many things very different from what we should have expected, and such as appear open to great objections : and that this observation, in good measure, takes off the force of those objections, or rather precludes them. But it may be alleged that this is a very partial answer to such objections, or a very unsatisfactory way of obviating them ; because it doth not show at all that the things objected against can be wise, just, and good ; much less that it is credible they are so. It will therefore be proper to show this distinctly, by applying to these objec- tions against the wisdom, justice and goodness of Chris- tianity, the answer above given to the like objections against the constitution of Nature : before we consider the particular analogies in the latter, to the particular things objected against in the former. Now that wliich aftbrds a sufficient answer to objections against the wisdom, justice and good- ness of the constitution of Nature is its being a constitution, a system, or scheme, imperfectly comprehended ; a scheme in which means are made use of to accomplish ends ; and which is carried on by general laws. For from these things it has been proved, not only to be possible, but also to be credible, that those things which are objected against may be consistent with wisdom, justice and goodness ; nay, may be instances ' In the foregoing chnpter. - Part I. ch. vii. ; to which this all along refers. TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 177 of them : and even that the constitution and government of Nature may be perfect in the highest possible degree. If Christianity then be a scheme, and of the Uke kind, it is evident the Uke objections against it must admit of the Uke answer. And I. Christianity is a scheme quite beyond our comprehen- sion. The moral government of God is exercised by gradually conducting things so in the course of His providence that every one, at length and upon the whole, shall receive according to his deserts, and neither fraud nor violence, but truth and right, shall finally prevail. Christianity is a particular scheme under this general plan of providence, and a part of it, conducive to its completion, with regard to mankind, consisting itself also of various parts, and a mysterious economy, which has been carrying on from the time the world came into its present wretched state, and is still carrying on, for its recovery, by a divine person, the Messiah, who is to " gather together in one, the children of God that are scattered abroad," ' and establish "an everlasting kingdom, wherein dwelleth righteous- ness." "' And in order to it, after various manifestations of things, relating to this great and general scheme of provi- dence, through a succession of many ages : ("for the Spirit of Christ which was in the prophets testified beforehand His sufferings^ and the glory that should follow : unto whom "--it was revealed, that not unto themselves, but unto us they did minister the things which are now reported unto us by them that have preached the Gospel ; which things the angels desire to look into) :" ^ — after various dispensations, looking forward, and preparatory, to this final salvation : in the fulness of time, when infinite wisdom thought fit, He, ■'being in the form of God, — made Himself of no repu- tation, and took upon Him the form of a servant, ami was ^ Jolin xi. 52. - Pet. iii. 13. ^ l Pet. i. 11, I2. 178 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION made in the likeness of men : and being found in fashion as a man, He humbled Himself, and became obedient to death, even the death of the cross : wherefore God also hath highly exalted Him, and given Him a name which is above every name : that at the name of Jesus every knee sliould bow, of things in heaven, and things in the earth, and things under the earth ; and that every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father." ^ Parts likewise of this economy are the miracu- lous mission of the Holy Ghost, and His ordinary assist- ances given to good men ; the invisible government which Christ at present exercises over His Church : that which He Himself refers to in these words, "In My Father's house are many mansions — I go to prepare a place for you :" '' and His future return to judge the world in righteousness, and completely re-establish the kingdom of God. " For the Father judgeth no man ; but hath committed all judg- ment unto the Son : that all men should honour the Son, even as they honour the Father." ^ '' All power is given unto Him in heaven and in earth." ^ " And He must reign till He hath put all enemies under His feet. Then cometh the end, when He shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father ; when He shall have put down all rule, and all authority and power. And when all things shall be subdued unto Him, then shall the Son also Himself be sub- ject unto Him that put all things under Him, that God may be all in all."^ Now little surely need be said to show that this system, or scheme of things, is but imperfectly com- prehended by us. The Scripture expressly asserts it to be so. And indeed one cannot read a passage relating to this great mystery of godliness," but what immediately runs up into something which shows us our ignorance in it ; as everything in Nature shows us our ignorance ^ Phil. ii. - Joh. xiv. 2. "' Joh. v. 22, 23. Matt, xxviii. 18. ^ i Cor. xv. ^ i Tim. iii. 16. TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 179 in the constitution of Nature. And whoever will seriously consider that part of the Christian scheme which is revealed in Scripture will find so much more unrevealed as will con- vince him that, to all the purposes of judging and object- ing, we know as Httle of it as of the constitution of Nature. Our ignorance, therefore, is as much an answer to our objec- tions against the perfection of one as against the perfection of the other.^ II. It is obvious, too, that in the Christian dispensation, as much as in the natural scheme of things, means are made use of to accomplish ends. And the observation of this furnishes us with the same answer to objections against the perfection of Christianity as to objections of the like kind against the constitution of Nature. It shows the credibility that the things objected against, how foolish' soever they appear to men, may be the very best means of accomplish- ing the very best ends. And their appearing foolishness is no presumption against this, in a scheme so greatly beyond our comprehension.* III. The credibility that the Christian dispensation may have been, all along, carried on by general laws,"* no less than the course of Nature, may require to be more distinctly made out. Consider, then, upon what ground it is we say that the whole common course of Nature is carried on ac- cording to general fore-ordained laws. '\\^e know indeed several of the general laws of matter ; and a great part of the natural behaviour of living agents is reducible to general laws. But we know in a manner nothing by what laws, storms and tempests, earthquakes, famine, pestilence, become the instruments of destruction to mankind. And the laws by which persons born into the world at such a time and place are of such capacities, geniuses, tempers ; the laws by which thoughts come into our mind, in a multi- ^ Pp. 1 16, &c. - I Cor. i. ^ Pp. 120, 121. ^ Pp. 122, £23 i8o THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION tude of cases, and by which innumerable things happen, of the greatest influence upon the affairs and state of the world ; these laws are so wholly unknown to us that we call the events which come to pass by them accidental ; though all reasonable men know certainly that there cannot, in reality, be any such thing as chance, and conclude that the things which have this appearance are the result of general laws, and may be reduced into them. It is then but an exceeding little way, and in but a very few respects, that we can trace up the natural course of things before us, to general laws. And it is only from analogy that we con- clude the whole of it to be capable of being reduced into them, only from our seeing that part is so. It is from our finding that the course of Nature, in some respects and so far goes on by general laws, that we conclude this of the rest. And if that be a just ground for such a conclusion, it is a just ground also, if not to conclude, yet to apprehend, to render it supposable and credible, which is sufficient for answering objections, that God's miraculous interposi- tions may have been all along in like manner by general laws of v/isdom. Thus, that miraculous powers should be exerted, at such times, upon such occasions, in such degrees and manners, and with regard to such persons, rather than others ; that the affairs of the world, being permitted to go on in their natural course so far, should, just at such a point, have a new direction given them by miraculous inter- positions, that these interpositions should be exactly in such degrees and respects only, all this may have been by general laws. These laws are unknown indeed to us ; but no more unknown than the laws from whence it is that some die as soon as they are born, and others live to ex- treme old age ; that one man is so superior to another in understanding; with innumerable more things, which, as was before observed, we cannot reduce to any laws or rules TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. i8i at all, though it is taken for granted they are as much reducible to general ones as gravitation. Now, if the revealed dispensations of Providence and miraculous inter- positions be by general laws, as well as God's ordinary government in the course of Nature, made known by reason and experience, there is no more reason to expect that every exigence, as it arises, should be provided for by these general laws of miraculous interpositions, than that every exigence in Nature should by the general laws of Nature. Yet there might be wise and good reasons that miraculous interpositions should be by general laws, and that these laws should not be broken in upon, or deviated from by other miracles. Upon the whole, then, the appearance of deficiencies and irregularities in Nature is owing to its being a scheme but in part made known, and of such a certain particular kind in other respects. Now we see no more reason why the frame and course of Nature should be such a scheme, than why Christianity should. And that the former is such a scheme, renders it credible that the latter, upon supposition of its truth, may be so too. And as it is manifest that Chris- tianity is a scheme revealed but in part, and a scheme in which means are made use of to accomplish ends like to that of Nature, so the credibiUty that it may have been all along carried on by general laws, no less than the course of Nature, has been distinctly proved. And from all this it is beforehand credible that there might, I think probable that there would, be the like appearance of deficiencies and irregularities in Christianity as in Nature — i.e., that Chris- tianity would be liable to the like objections as the frame of Nature. And these objections are answered by these obser- vations concerning Christianity ; as the like objections against the frame of Nature are answered by the like obser- vations concerning the frame of Nature. i82 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION The objections against Christianity, considered as a matter of fact,^ having in general been obviated in the pre- ceding chapter ; and the same, considered as made against the wisdom and goodness of it, having been obviated in this; the next thing, according to the method proposed, is to show that the principal objections, in particular, against Christianity may be answered by particular and full analogies in Nature. And as one of them is made against the whole scheme of it together, as just now described, I choose to consider it here, rather tfian in a distinct chapter by itself. The thing objected against this scheme of the Gospel is, '' that it seems to suppose God was reduced to the necessity of a long series of intricate means, in order to accomplish His ends, the recovery and salvation of the world ; in like sort as men, for v/ant of understanding or power, not being able to come at their ends directly, arc forced to go roundabout ways, and make use of many perplexed contrivances to arrive at them." Now everything which we see shows the folly of this, considered as an objection against the truth of Christianity, For, according to our manner of conception, God makes use of variety of means, what we often think tedious ones, in the natural course of Providence, for the accomplishment of all His ends. Indeed it is certain there is somewliat in this matter quite beyond our comprehension ; but the mystery is as great in Nature as in Christianity. We know what we ourselves aim at as final ends, and what courses we take, merely as means conducing to those ends. But we are greatly ignorant how far things are considered by the Author of Nature, under the single notion of means and ends ; so as tliat it may be said this is merely an end, and that merely means in His regard. And whether there be not some peculiar absurdity in our very manner of concep- ^ r. lis- TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 183 tion concerning this matter, somewhat contradictory arising from our extremely imperfect views of things, it is impossible to say. However, thus much is manifest, that the whole natural world and government of it is a scheme or system ; not a fixed, but a progressive one ; a scheme in which the operation of various means takes up a great length of time before the ends they tend to can be attained. T'he change of seasons, the ripening of the fruits of the earth, the very history of a flower, is an instance of this ; and so is human life. Thus vegetable bodies, and those of animals, though possibly formed at once, yet grow up by degrees to a mature state. And thus rational agents, who animate these latter bodies, are naturally directed to form each his own manners and character, by the gradual gaining of knowledge and experience, and by a long course of action. Our existence is not only successive, as it must be of necessity ; but one state of our life and being is appointed by God to be a preparation for another; and that to be the means of attaining to another succeeding one : infancy to childhood, childhood to youth, youth to mature age. Men are im- patient and for precipitating things ; but the Author of Nature appears deliberate throughout His operations ; accomplishing His natural ends by slow successive steps. And there is a plan of things beforehand laid out which from the nature of it requires various systems of means, as v/ell as length of time, in order to the carrying on its several parts into execution. Thus, in the daily course of natural providence, God operates in the very same manner as in the dispensation of Christianity ; making one thing subser- vient to another; this, to somewhat farther; and so on, through a progressive series of means, which extend, both backward and forward, beyond our utmost view. Of this manner of operation, everything we see in the course of Nature is as much an instance as any part of the Christian dispensation. 1 84 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION CHAPTER V. Of the particular System of Ckristiattify ; the Appoint nicnt oj a Mediator, and the Redemption of the World by Him. There is not, I think, anything relating to Christianity which has been more objected against than the mediation of Christ, in some or other of its parts. Yet, upon thorough consideration, there seems nothing less justly liable to it. For, J. The whole analogy of Nature removes all imagined pre- sumption against the general notion of a Mediator between God and man.^ For we find all living creatures are brought into the world, and their life in infancy is preserved by the instrumentality of others ; and every satisfaction of it, some way or other, is bestowed by the like means. So that the visible government which God exercises over the world is by the instrumentality and mediation of others. And how far His invisible government be or be not so, it is impossible to determine at all by reason. And the supposition that part of it is so appears, to say the least, altogether as credible as the contrary. There is then no sort of objec- tion, from the light of Nature, against the general notion of a Mediator between God and man, considered as a doctrine of Christianity, or as an appointment in this dispensation , since we find by experience that God docs appoint mediators, to be the instruments of good and evil to us , the instruments of His justice and His mercy. And the ob- jection here referred to is urged, not against mediation in that high, eminent and peculiar sense, in which Christ is our Mediator, but absolutely against the whole notion itself of a Mediator at all. ^ I Tim. ii. 5. TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 185 II. As we must suppose that the world is under the proper moral government of God, or in a state of religion, before we can enter into consideration of the revealed doctrine concerning the redemption of it by Christ, so that supposition is here to be distinctly taken notice of. Now the divine moral government which religion teaches us implies that the consequence of vice shall be misery, in some future state, by the righteous judgment of God. That such consequent punishment shall take effect by His appointment is necessarily implied. But as it is not in any sort to be supposed that we are made acquainted with all the ends or reasons for which it is fit future punishments should be inflicted, or why God has appointed such and such consequent misery should follow vice, and as we are altogether in the dark how or in what manner it shall follow, by what immediate occasions, or by the instrumentality of what means, there is no absurdity in supposing it may follow in a way analogous to that in which many miseries follow such and such courses of action at present; poverty, sickness, infamy, untimely death by diseases, death from the hands of civil justice. There is no absurdity in supposing future punishment may follow wickedness of course, as we speak, or in the way of natural consequence from God's original constitution of the world; from the nature He has given us, and from the condition in which He places us, or, in a like manner, as a person rashly trifling upon a precipice, in the way of natural consequence falls down, in the way of natural consequence breaks his limbs, suppose in the way of natural consequence of this, without help, perishes. Some good men may perhaps be offended with hearing it spoken of as a supposable thing that the future punish- ments of wickedness may be in the way of natural conse- quence, as if this were taking the execution of justice out of the hands of God and giving it to Nature. But they should 1 86 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION remember that when things come to pass according to the course of Nature, this does not hinder them from being His doing, who is the God of Nature. And that the Scripture ascribes those punishments to divine justice which are known to be natural, and which must be called so, when distinguished from such as are miraculous. But after all, this supposition, or rather this way of speaking, is here made use of only by way of illustration of the subject before us. For since it must be admitted that the future punishment of wickedness is not a matter of arbitrary appointment, but of reason, equity and justice, it comes, for aught I see, to the same thing, whether it is supposed to be inflicted in a way analogous to that in which the temporal punishments of vice and folly are inflicted, or in any other way. And though there were a difference, it is allowable, in the present case, to make this supposition plainly not an incredible one ; that future punishment may follow wickedness in the way of natural consequence, or according to some general laws of government already established in the universe. III. Upon this supposition, or even without it, we may observe somewhat much to the present purpose, in the constitution of Nature or appointments of Providence, the provision which is made that all the bad natural con- sequences of men's actions should not always actually follow ; or that such bad consequences as according to the settled course of things would inevitably have followed if not prevented, should in certain degrees be prevented. We are apt presumptuously to imagine that the world might have been so constituted as that there would not have been any such thing as misery or evil. On the contrary, we find the Author of Nature permits it. But then He has provided reliefs, and in many cases perfect remedies for it, after some pains and difticulties ; reliefs and remedies even for that evil which is the fruit of our own misconduct, and TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 187 which, in the course of Nature, would have continued, and ended in our destruction but for such remedies. And this is an instance both of severity and indulgence, in the con- stitution of Nature. Thus all the bad consequences now mentioned, of a man's trifling upon a precipice, might be prevented. And though all were not, yet some of them might, by proper interposition if not rejected, by another's coming to the rash man's relief, with his own laying hold on that relief, in such sort as the case required. Persons may do a great deal themselves towards preventing the bad consequences of their follies ; and more may be done by themselves together with the assistance of others their fellow-creatures, which assistance Nature requires and prompts us to. This is the general constitution of the world. Now suppose it had been so constituted that after such actions were done, as were foreseen naturally to draw after them misery to the doer, it should have been no more in human power to have prevented that naturally consequent misery, in any instance, than it is in all, no one can say whether such a more severe constitution of things might not yet have been really good But that, on the contrary, provision is made by Nature that we may and do to so great degree prevent the bad natural effects of our follies ; this may be called mercy or compassion in the original constitution of the world ; compassion, as distinguished from goodness in general. And the whole known constitution and course of things affording us instances of such compas- sion, it would be according to the analogy of Nature to hope that, however ruinous the natural consequences of vice might be, from the general laws of God's government over the universe, yet provision might be made, possibly might have been originally made, for preventing those ruinous consequences from inevitably following; at least from following universally, and in all cases. i88 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION Many, I am sensible, will wonder at finding this made a question, or spoken of as in any degree doubtful. The generality of mankind are so far from having that awful sense of things which the present state of vice and misery and darkness seems to make but reasonable, that they have scarce any apprehension or thought at all about this matter any way ; and some serious persons may have spoken unadvisedly concerning it. But let us observe what we experience to be, and what, from the: very constitution of Nature, cannot but be the consequences of irregular and disorderly behaviour ; even of such rashness, wilfulness, neglects, as we scarce call vicious. Now it is natural to apprehend that the bad consequences of irregularity will be greater in proportion as the irregularity is so. And there is no comparison between these irregularities and the greater instances of vice, or a dissolute profligate disregard to all religion, if there be anything at all in rehgion. For consider what it is for creatures, moral agents, presumptuously to introduce that confusion and misery into the kingdom of God which mankind have in fact introduced to blaspheme the Sovereign Lord of all, to contemn His authority; to be injurious to the degree they are to their fellow-creatures, the creatures of God ; add that the effects of vice in the present world are often extreme misery, irretrievable ruin, and even death ; and upon putting all this together, it will appear that as no one can say in what degree fatal the unprevented consequences of vice may be, according to the general rule of divine government, so it is by no means intuitively certain how far these con- sequences could possibly in the nature of the thing be prevented, consistently with the eternal rule of right, or with what is in fact the moral constitution of Nature. However, there would be large ground to hope that the universal government was not so severely strict, but that TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 189 there was room for pardon, or for having those penal con- sequences prevented. Yet, IV. There seems no probabiUty that anything we could do would alone and of itself prevent them, prevent their following or being inflicted. But one would think at least it were impossible that the contrary should be thought certain. For we are not acquainted with the whole of the case. We are not informed of all the reasons which render it fit that future punishments should be inflicted, and therefore can- not know whether anything we could do would make such an alteration as to render it fit that they should be remitted. We do not know what the whole natural or appointed con- sequences of vice are, nor in what way they would follow if not prevented ; and therefore can in no sort say whether we could do anything which would be sufficient to prevent them. Our ignorance being thus manifest, let us recollect the analogy of Nature or Providence. For though this may be but a slight ground to raise a positive opinion upon in this matter, yet it is sufficient to answer a mere arbitrary assertion without any kind of evidence, urged by way of objection against a doctrine, the proof of which is not reason but revelation. Consider, then, people ruin their fortunes by extravagance ; they bring diseases upon themselves by excess, they incur the penalties of civil laws, and surely civil government is natural; will sorrov/ for these fellies past and behaving well for the future alone and of itself prevent the natural consequences of them ? On the contrary, men's natural abilities of helping themselves are often impaired ; or if not, yet they are forced to be beholden to the assistance of others, upon several accounts and in different ways ; assistance which they would have had no occasion for had it not been for their misconduct, but which in the disadvan- tageous condition they have reduced themselves to is absolutely necessary to their recovery, and retrieving their I go THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION affairs. Now since this is our case, considering ourselves merely as inhabitants of this world, and as having a temporal interest here, under the natural government of God, which however has a great deal moral in it, why is it not sup- posable that this may be our case also in our more im- portant capacity, as under His perfect moral government, and having a more general and future interest depending ? If we have misbehaved in this higher capacity, and ren- dered ourselves obnoxious to the future punishment which God has annexed to vice, it is plainly credible that, behav- ing well for the time to come, may be — not useless, God forbid — but wholly insufficient alone and of itself to prevent that punishment, or to put us in the condition which we should have been in had we preserved our innocence. And though we ought to reason with all reverence when- ever we reason concerning the divine conduct, yet it may be added that it is clearly contrary to all our notions of government, as well as to what is in fact the general constitution of Nature, to suppose that doing well for the future should in all cases prevent all the judicial bad conse- quences of having done evil, or all the punishment annexed to disobedience. And we have manifestly nothing from whence to determine in what degree and in what cases reformation would prevent this punishment, even supposing that it would in some. And though the efficacy of re- pentance itself alone to prevent what mankind had rendered themselves obnoxious to and recover what they had forfeited is now insisted upon in opposition to Christianity, yet l^y the general prevalence of propitiatory sacrifices over the heathen world, this notion of repentance alone being sufficient to expiate guilt, appears to be contrary to tlie general sense of mankind. Upon the whole, then, had the laws, the general laws of TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 191 God's government, been permitted to operate without any interposition in our behalf, the future punishment, for aught we know to the contrary, or have any reason to think, must inevitably have followed, notwithstanding anything we could have done to prevent it. Now, V. In this darkness or this light of Nature, call it which you please, revelation comes in, confirms every doubting fear which could enter into the heart of man concerning the future unprevented consequence of wickedness, supposes the world to be in a state of ruin (a supposition which seems the very ground of the Christian dispensation, and which, if not provable by reason, yet is in nowise contrary to it) ; teaches us too that the rules of divine government are such as not to admit of pardon immediately and directly upon repentance or by the sole efficacy of it ; but then teaches at the same time what Nature might justly have hoped, that the moral government of the universe was not so rigid but that there was room for an interposition to avert the fatal consequences of vice, which therefore by this means does admit of pardon. Revelation teaches us that the unknown laws of God's more general government no less than the particular laws by which we experience He governs us at present are compassionate,^ as well as good in the more general notion of goodness, and that He hath mercifully provided that there should be an interposition to prevent the destruction of human kind, whatever that destruction unprevented v/ould have been. " God so loved the world, that He gave His only begotten Son, that whoso- ever believeth," not to be sure in a speculative, but in a practical sense, " that whosoever believetli in Him, should not perish."" Gave His Son in the same way of goodness to the world as He affords particular persons the friendly assistance of their fellow-creatures, when without it their 1 P. 186, &c. 2 joi,, iii_ 16^ 192 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION temporal ruin would be the certain consequence of their follies ; in the same way of goodness, I say, though in a transcendent and infinitely higher degree. And the Son of God " loved us and gave Himself for us," with a love which He Himself compares to that of human friendship, though in this case all comparisons must fall infinitely short cf the thing intended to be illustrated by them. He interposed in such a manner as was necessary and eff"ectual to prevent that execution of justice upon sinners Avhich God had appointed should otherwise have been executed upon them, or in such a manner as to prevent that punishment from actually following which, according to the general laws of divine government, must have followed the sins of the world, had it not been for such interposition.* If anything here said should appear upon first thought inconsistent with divine goodness, a second, I am persuaded, will entirely remove that appearance. For were we to ^ It cannot, I suppose, be imacjined, even by the most cursory reader, that it is, in any sort, affirmed or imphed in anything said in this cliapter that none can have the benefit of the general redemption but such as have the advantage of being made acquainted with it in the present life. But it may be needful to mention that several questions which have been brought into tho subject before us, and determined, are not in the least entered into here ; questions wliich liave been, I fear, rashly determined, and perhaps with equal rashness contrariwise. For instance, whether God could liave saved the world by other means than the death of Christ, consistently with the general laws of Mis govern- ment. And had not Christ came into the world, what would have been the future condition of the better sort of men ? those just persons over the face of the earth, for whom, Manasses in his prayer as erts, repentance was not appointed. The meaning of the first of these questions is greatly ambiguous ; and neither of them can properly be ansv/ered without going upon that infinitely absurd .supposition tliat we know the whole of the case. And perhaps the very inquiry, What would have followed if God had not done as He has, may have in it some very great impropriety, and ought not to be carried on any farther than is necessary to help our partial and inadc(pialc conceptions of things. TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 195 suppose the constitution of things to be such as that the whole creation must have perished had it not been for somewhat which God had appointed should be in order to prevent that ruin, even this supposition would not be incon- sistent in any degree with the most absolutely perfect good- ness. But still it may be thought that this whole manner oi treating the subject before us supposes mankind to be natu- rally in a very strange state. And truly so it does. But it is not Christianity which has put us into this state ; whoever will consider the manifold miseries and the extreme wicked- ness of the world, that the best have great wrongnesses within themselves, which they complain of and endeavour to amend ; but that the generality grow more profligate and corrupt with age ; that heathen moralists thought the present state to be a state of punishment ; and what might be added, that the earth our habitation has the appearances of being a ruin ; whoever, I say, will consider all these and some other obvious things, will think he has little reason to object against the Scripture account that mankind is in a state of degradation; against this being the fact — how diflicult soever he may think it to account for, or even to form a distinct conception of the occasions and circumstances of it. But that the crime of our first parents was the occasion of our being placed in a more disadvantageous condition, is a thing throughout and particularly analogous to what we see in tlie daily course of natural providence, as the recovery of the world by the interposition of Christ has been shown to be so in general. VI. The particular manner in which Christ interposed in the redemption of the world, or liis office as Mediator in the largest sense, between God and man, is thus represented to us in the Scripture. He is the light of the world ; ' the revealer of the will of God in the most eminent sense. ^ Joh, i. and viii. 12. 194 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION He is a proiDitiatory sacrifice ;' the Lamb of God ;' and as He voluntarily offered Himself up, He is styled our High Priest.* And which seems of peculiar weight, He is described before- hand in the Old Testament, under the same characters of a Priest and an expiatory victim/ And whereas it is objected that all this is merely by way of allusion to the sacrifices of the Mosaic law, the Apostle, on the contrary, affirms that the law was a shadow of good things to come, and not the very image of the things ; ^ and that the priests that offer gifts according to the law, serve unto the example and shadow of heavenly things as Moses was admonished of God, when he was about to make the tabernacle. "For see,"saith He, "that thou make all things according to the pattern showed to thee in the mount "^ — i.e., the Levitical priesthood was a shadow of the priesthood of Christ ; in like manner as the tabernacle made by Moses was according to that showed him in the mount. The priesthood of Christ and the taber- nacle in the mount were the originals ; of the former of which the Levitical priesthood was a type ; and of the latter, the tabernacle made by Moses Avas a copy. The doctrine of this epistle then plainly is, that the legal sacrifices were allusions to the great and final atonement, to be made by the blood of Christ ; and not that this was an allusion to those. Nor can anything be more express and determinate than the following passage : " It is not possible that the blood of bulls and of goats should take away sin. Wherefore when He cometh into the world He saith. Sacrifice and offering — i.e., of bulls and of goats — thou wouldst not, but a body hast thou prepared me. Lo, I come to do thy will, O God ; by which will we are sanctified through the ^ Rom. iii. 25 and v. II. i Cor. v. 7. Eph. v. 2. I Joh. ii. 2. Matt. xxvi. 28. - Joh. i. 29, 36, and throughout the Book of Revelation. ^ Thioughout the Epistle to the Hebrews. ^ Isai. liii. Dan. ix. 24. Ps. ex. 4. '' Ileb. x. I. ^ viii. 4, 5- TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 195 offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for all." ' And to add one passage more of the like kind : Christ was once offered to bear the sins of many ; and unto them that look for Him shall He appear the second time without sin — i.e., without bearing sin as He did at His first coming, by being an offering for it ; without having our iniquities again laid upon Him, without being any more a sin-offering — unto them that look for Him shall He appear the second time without sin unto salvation.^ Nor do the inspired writers at all confine themselves to this manner of speaking concerning the satisfaction of Christ, but declare an efficacy in what He did and suffered for us, additional to and beyond mere instruction, example and government in great variety of expression. That Jesus should die for that nation, the Jews, and not for that nation only, but that also plainly by the- efficacy of His death. He should gather together in one the children of God that were scattered abroad f that He suf- fered for sins, the just for the unjust;* that He gave His life, Himself a ransom/ that we are bought, bought with a price/ that He redeemed us with His blood, redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us / that He is our advocate, intercessor and propitiation / that He was made perfect or consummate through sufferings ; and being thus made perfect He became the author of salvation f that God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself, by the death of His Son by the cross ; not imputing their trespasses unto them/" and lastly, that through death He destroyed him that had the power of death.'' Christ then having thus humbled ' Heb. X. 4, 5, 7, 9, 10. - ix. 28. ^ joh. xi. 51, 52. ^ I Pet. iii. 18. s Matt. xx. 28. Mark x. 45. i Tim. ii. 6. ^ 2 Pet, ii. I. Rev. xiv. 4. i Cor. vi. 20. "^ I Pet. i. 19 Rev. v. 9. Gal. iii. 13. 8 j^^j^ .^.jj_ 25. i Joh. ii. i, 2. ® Heb ii, 10 and v. 9. '« 2 Cor. v. 19. Rom. v. 10. Eph. ii. 16. '' Heb. ii. 14, See also a remarkable passage in the Book of Job) xxxiii. 24. G 2 ig6 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION Himself and become obedient to death, even the death of the cross, God also hath hij^hly exalted Him and given Him a name which is above every name ; hath given all things into His hands ; hath committed all judgment unto Him ; that all men should honour the Son, even as they honour the Father.' " For worthy is the Lamb that was slain, to receive power, and riches, and wisdom, and strength, and honour, and glory, and blessing. And every creature which is in heaven and on the earth heard I saying. Blessing, and honour, and glory, and power, be unto Him that sitteth upon the throne, and unto the Lamb for ever and ever."^ These passages of Scripture seem to comprehend and express the chief parts of Christ's office, as Mediator between God and man, so far, I mean, as the nature of this His office is revealed ; and it is usually treated of by divines under three heads. First. He was, by way of eminence, the Prophet; that Prophet that should come into the world^ to declare the Di\ ine will. He published anew the law of Nature which men had corrupted; and the very knowledge of which to some degree was lost among them. He taught mankind, taught us authoritatively to live soberly, righteously, and godly in this present world in expectation of the future judg- ment of God. He confirmed the trutli of this moral system of Nature, and gave us additional evidence of it : the evidence of testimony.^ He distinctly revealed the manner in which God would be worshipped, the efficacy of repentance, and the rewards and punishments of a future life. Thus He was a Prophet in a sense in which no other ever was. To which is to be added that He set us a perfect example that we should follow His steps. Secondly. He has a kingdom which is not of this world. ^ Phil. ii. 8, 9. Joh. iii 35 and v. 22, 23. - Rev, v, 12, 13. 3 Joh. VI. 14. •» P. 13S, &c. rO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 197 He founded a church, to be to mankind a standing memorial of reHgion and invitation to it ; which He promised to be with always, even to the end. He exercises an invisible government over it, Himself, and by His Spirit ; over that part of it, which is militant here on earth, a government of discipline, for the perfecting of the saints, for the edifying His body ; till we all come in the unity of the faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ.^ Of this church, all persons scattered over the world, who live in obedience to His laws, are members. For these He is " gone to prepare a place, and will come again to receive them unto Himself, that where He is there they may be also, and reign with Him for ever and ever ;"" and likewise to take vengeance on them that know not God and obey iiot His Gospel.'^ Against these parts of Christ's office I find no objections but what are fully obviated in the beginning of this chapter. Lastly. Christ offered Himself a propitiatory sacrifice, and made atonement for the sins of the world, which is mentioned last, in regard to what is objected against it. Sacrifices of expiation were commanded the Jews, and obtained amongst most other nations from tradition, whose original probably w-as revelation. And they were con- tinually repeated, both occasionally and at the returns of stated times ; and made up great part of the external rehgion of mankind. But now once in the end of the world Christ appeared, to put away sin by the sacrifice of Him- self.^ And this sacrifice was, in the highest degree and with the most extensive influence of that efiicacy for obtaining pardon of sin, which the heathens may be supposed to have ^ Eph. iv. 12, 13. - Joh. xiv. 2, 3. Rev. iii. 21 and xi. 15. 3 ?. Thess. i, S. ■» Heb. ix. 26. 198 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION thought their sacrifices to have been, and which tlie Jewish sacrifices really were in some degree, and with regard to some persons. How and in what particular way it had this efficacy, there are not wanting persons who have endeavoured to explain ; but I do not find that the vScripture has explained it. We seem to be very much in the dark concerning the manner in which the ancients understood atonement to be made — i.e., pardon to be obtained by sacrifices. And if the Scripture has, surely as it has, left this matter of the satisfaction of Christ mysterious, left somewhat in it unrevealed, all conjectures about it must be, if not evidently absurd, yet at least uncertain. Nor has any one reason to complain for want of further information, unless he can show his claim to it. Some have endeavoured to explain the efficacy of what Christ has done and suffered for us, beyond what the Scripture has authorized ; others, probably because they could not explain it, have been for taking it away, and confining His office as Redeemer of the world to His instruction, example and government of the church. Whereas the doctrine of the Gospel appears to be, not only that He taught the efficacy of repentance, but rendered it of the efficacy which it is, by what He did and suffered for us ; that He obtained for us the benefit of having our repentance accepted unto eternal life ; not only that He revealed to sinners that they were in a capacity of salvation, and how they might obtain it ; but moreover that He put them into this capacity of salvation, by what He did and suffered for them ; put us into a capacity of escaping future punishment, and obtaining future happiness. And it is our wisdom thankfully to accept the benefit, by perform- ing the conditions upon which it is offered, on our part, without disputing how it was procured on His. For, TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 199 VII. Since we neither know by what means punishment in a future state would have followed wickedness in this, nor in what manner it would have been inflicted had it not been prevented ; nor all the reasons why its infliction would have been needful ; nor the particular nature of that state of happiness which Christ is gone to prepare for His disciples ; and since we are ignorant how far anything which we could do, would, alone and of itself, have been effectual to prevent that punishment to which we were obnoxious, and recover that happiness which we had forfeited ; it is most evident we are not judges, antece- dently to revelation, whether a Mediator was or was not necessary to obtain those ends, to prevent that future punishment, and bring mankind to the final happiness of their nature. And for the very same reasons, upon sup- position of the necessity of a Mediator, we are no more judges, antecedently to revelation, of the whole nature of His oftice, or the several parts of which it consists ; of what was fit and requisite to be assigned Him, in order to accom- plish the ends of Divine Providence in the appointment. And from hence it follows, that to object against the expediency or usefulness of particular things, revealed to have been done or suffered by Him, because we do not see how they were conducive to those ends, is highly absurd. Yet nothing is more common to be met with than this absurdity. But if it be acknowledged beforehand that we are not judges in the case, it is evident that no objection can, with any shadow of reason, be urged against any particular part of Christ's mediatorial office revealed in Scripture, till it can be shown positively not to be requisite or conducive to the ends proposed to be accomplished, or that it is in itself unreasonable. And there is one objection made against the satisfaction of Christ, which looks to be of this positive kind : that the 200 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION doctrine of His being appointed to suffer for the sins of the world, represents God as being indifferent whether He punished the innocent or the guilty. Now from the fore- going observations we may see the extreme slightness of all such objections ; and (though it is most certain all who make them do not see the consequence) that they conclude altogether as much against God's whole original constitution of Nature, and the whole daily course of Divine Providence in the government of the world — t.e.^ against the whole scheme of theism, and the whole notion of religion, as against Christianity, For the world is a constitu- tion or system, whose parts have a mutual reference to each other ; and there is a scheme of things gradually carrying on, called the course of Nature, to the carrying on of which God has appointed us in various ways to contribute. And when, in the daily course of natural providence, it is appointed that innocent people should suffer for the faults of the guilty, this is liable to the very same objection as the instance we are now considering. The infinitely greater importance of that appointment of Christianity which is objected against, does not hinder, but it may be, as it plainly is, an appointment of the very same kind with what the world affords us daily examples of. Nay, if there were any force at all in the objection, it would be stronger, in one respect, against natural providence than against Christianity ; because under the former we are in many cases commanded and even necessitated, whether we will or no, to suffer for the faults of others ; whereas the suffer- ings of Christ were voluntary. The world's being under the righteous government of God, does indeed imply that finally, and upon the whole, every one shall receive according to his personal deserts ; and the general doctrine of the whole Scripture is, that this shall be the completion of the Divine government. But during the progress, and, for aught we TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 201 know, even in order to the completion of this moral scheme, vicarious punishments may be fit and absolutely necessary. Men by their follies run themselves into extreme distress, into difficulties which would be absolutely fatal to them, were it not for the interposition and assist- ance of others. God commands by the law of Nature, that we afford them this assistance, in many cases where we cannot do it without very great pains, and labour, and sufferings to ourselves. And we see in what variety of ways one person's sufferings contribute to the relief of another ; and how, or by what particular means, this comes to pass, or follows, from the constitution and laws of Nature which come under our notice ; and, being iamiliar- ized to it, men are not shocked with it. So that the reason of their insisting upon objections of the foregoing kind against the satisfaction of Christ is, either that they do not consider God's settled and uniform appointments as His appointments at all ; or else they forget that vicarious punishment is a providential appointment of every day's experience ; and then, from their being unacquainted with the more general laws of Nature or Divine government over the world, and not seeing how the sufferings of Christ could contribute to the redemption of it, unless by arbitrary and tyrannical will, they conclude His sufferings could not contribute to it any other way. And yet, wiiat has been often alleged in justitication of this doctrine, even from the apparent natural tendency of this method of our redemp- tion ; its tendency to vindicate the authority of God's laws, and deter His creatures from sin ; this has never yet been answered, and is. I think, plainly unanswerable, though I am far from thinking it an account of the whole of the case. But without taking this into consideration, it abundantly appears, from the observations above made, that this objec- tion is not an objection against Christianity, but against the 202 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION whole general constitution of Nature. And if it were to be considered as an objection against Christianity, or consider- ing it, as it is, an objection against the constitution of Nature, it amounts to no more in conclusion tlian this, that a Divine appointment cannot be necessary or expedient because the objector does not discern it to be so ; though he must own that the nature of the case is such as renders him incapable of judging whether it be so or not, or of seeing it to be necessary, though it were so. It is indeed a matter of great patience to reasonable men to find people arguing in this manner; objecting against the credibility of such particular things revealed in Scripture, that they do not see the necessity or expediency of them. For though it is highly right, and the most pious exercise of our understanding, to inquire Avith due reverence into the ends and reasons of God's dispensations, yet when those reasons are concealed, to argue from our ignorance, that such dispensations cannot be from God, is infinitely absurd. The presumption of this kind of objections seems almost lost in the folly of them. And the folly of them is yet greater when they are urged, as usually they are, against things in Christianity analogous or like to those natural dis- pensations of Providence which are matter of experience. Let reason be kept to ; and if any part of the Scripture account of the redemption of the world by Christ can be shown to be really contrary to it, let the Scripture, in the name of God, be given up ; but let not such poor creatures as we go on objecting against an infinite scheme, that we do not see the necessity or usefulness of all its parts, and call this reasoning ; and, which still further heightens the absurdity in the present case, parts which we are not actively concerned in. For it may be worth mentioning, Lastly. That not only the reason of the thing, but the whole analogy of Nature, should teach us not to expect to TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 203 have the hke information concerning the Divine conduct as concerning our own duty. God instructs us by experience (for it is not reason, but experience which instructs us) what good or bad consequences will follow from our acting in such and such manners ; and by this He directs us how we are to behave ourselves. But, though we are sufficiently instructed for the common purposes of life, yet it is but an almost infinitely small part of natural Providence which we are at all let into. The case is the same with regard to revelation. The doctrine of a mediator between God and man, against which it is objected that the expediency of some things in it is not understood, relates only to what was done on God's part in the appointment, and on the media- tor's in the execution of it. For what is required of us in consequence of this gracious dispensation is another sub- ject, in which none can complain for want of information. The constitution of the world and God's natural govern- ment over it, is all mystery, as much as the Christian dis- pensation. Yet under the first. He has given men all things perta,ining to life ; and under the other, all things pertain- ing unto godhness. And it may be added, that there is nothing hard to be accounted for in any of the common pre- cepts of Christianity ; though if there were, surely a Divine command is abundantly sufficient to lay us under the strongest obligations to obedience. But the fact is, that the reasons of all the Christian precepts are evident. Positive institutions are manifestly necessary to keep up and propagate religion amongst mankind ; and our duty to Christ, the internal and external worship of Him ; this part of the religion of the Gospel manifestly arises out of what He has done and suffered. His authority and dominion, and the relation which He is revealed to stand in to us.^ ' P. 143, &c. 204 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION CHAPTER VI. Of the Want of Universality in Revelation; and of the supposed Deficiency in the Proof of it. It has been thought by some persons that if the evidence of revelation appears doubtful, this itself turns into a positive argument against it ; because it cannot be supposed that if it were true, it would be left to subsist upon doubtful evidence. And the objection against revelation, from its not being universal, is often insisted upon as of great weight. Now the weakness of these opinions may be shown by observing the suppositions on which they are founded, which are really such as these : that it cannot be thought God would have bestowed any favour at all upon us, unless in the degree which we think He might, and which, we imagine, would be most to our particular advantage ; and also that it cannot be thought he would bestow a favour upon any, unless he bestowed the same upon all ; supposi- tions which we find contradicted, not by a few instances in God's natural government of the world, but by the general analogy of Nature together. Persons who speak of the evidence of religion as doubtful, and of this supposed doubtfulness as a positive argument against it, should be put upon considering what that evidence indeed is which they act upon with regard to their temporal interests. For, it is not only extremely difficult, but, in many cases, absolutely impossible, to balance pleasure and pain, satisfaction and uneasiness, so as to be able to say on which side the overplus is. There are the like difficulties and impossibilities in making the due allowances for a change of temper and taste, for satiety. TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 205 disgusts, ill-health, any of which render men incapable of enjoying, after they have obtained what they most eagerly desired. Numberless, too, are the accidents, besides that one of untimely death, which may even probably disappoint the best concerted schemes ; and strong objections are often seen to lie against them, not to be removed or answered, but which seem overbalanced by reasons on the other side ; so as that the certain difficulties and dangers of the pursuit are, by every one, thought justly disregarded, upon account of the appearing greater advantages in case of success, though there be but little probability of it. Lastly, every one observes our liableness, if we be not upon our guard, to be deceived by the falsehood of men, and the false appearances of things ; and this danger must be greatly increased if there be a strong bias within, suppose from indulged passion, to favour the deceit. Hence arises that great uncertainty and doubtfulness of proof, wherein our temporal interest really consists ; what are the most probable means of attaining it; and whether those means will even- tually be successful. And numberless instances there are, in the daily course of life, in which all men think it reason- able to engage in pursuits, though the probability is greatly against succeeding ; and to make such provision for them- selves as it is supposable they may have occasion for, though the plain acknowledged probability is, that they never shall. Then those who think the objection against revelation, from its light not being universal, to be of Aveight, should observe that the Author of Nature, in numberless instances, bestows that upon some which He does not upon others, who seem equally to stand in need of it. Indeed, He appears to bestow all His gifts, with the most promiscuous variety, among creatures of the same species : health and strength, capacities of prudence and of knowledge, means of improvement, riches, and all external advantages. Arid 2o6 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION as there are not any two men found of exactly like shape and features, so it is probable there are not any two of an exactly like constitution, temper and situation with regard to the goods and evils of life. Yet, notwithstanding these uncertainties and varieties, God does exercise a natural government over the world : and there is such a thing as a prudent and imprudent institution of life, with regard to our health and our affairs, under that His natural government. As neither the Jewish nor Christian revelation have been universal, and as they have been afforded to a greater or less part of the world at different times, so likewise at difterent times both revelations have had different degrees of evidence. The Jews who lived during the succession of prophets, that is, from Moses till after the Captivity, had higher evidence of the truth of their religion than those had who lived in the interval between the last mentioned period and the coming of Christ. And the first Christians had higher evidence of the miracles wrought in attestation of Christianity than what we have now. They had also a strong presumptive proof of the truth of it, perhaps of much greater force, in way of argument, than many think, of which we have very little remaining; I mean the presumptive proof of its truth, from the influence which it had upon the lives of the generality of its professors. And we, or future ages, may possibly have a proof of it, which they could not have, from the conformity between the prophetic history and the state of the world and of Christianity. And further : if we were to suppose the evidence which some have of religion to amount to little more than seeing that it may be true, but that they remain in great doubts and uncer- tainties about both its evidence and its nature, and great perplexities concerning the rule of life ; others to have a full conviction of the truth of religion, with a distinct knowledge of their duty ; and others severally to have all the inter- TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 207 mediate degrees of religious light and evidence which lie between these two — if we put the case, that for the present it was intended revelation should be no more than a small light in the midst of a world greatly overspread, notwithstanding it, with ignorance and darkness, that certain glimmerings, of, thj.s. light should extend, and be directed to remote distances in such a manner as that those who really partook of it should not discern from whence it originally came, that some in a nearer situation to it should have its light obscured, and, in different ways and degrees, intercepted ; and that others should be placed within its clearer influence, and be much more enlivened, cheered and directed by it ; but yet that even to these it should be no more than a light shining in a dark place : all this would be perfectly uniform and of a piece with the conduct of provi- dence in the distribution of its other blessings. If the fact of the case really Avere that some have received no light at all from the Scripture, as many ages and countries in the heathen w'orld ; that others, though tliey have, by means of it, had essential or natural religion enforced upon their consciences, yet have never had the genuine Scripture- revelation, Avith its real evidence, proposed to their conside- ration ; and the ancient Persians, and modern Mahometans, may possibly be instances of people in a situation somewhat like to this ; that others, though they have had the Scripture laid before them as of Divjne revelation, yet have had it with the system and evidence of Christianity so interpolated, the system so corrupted, the evidence so blended with false miracles, as to leave the mind in the utmost doubtfulness and uncertainty about the whole ; which may be the state of some thoughtful men in most of those nations who call themselves Christian ; and, lastly, that others have had Christianity offered to them in its genuine simplicity, and with its proper evidence, as persons in countries and 2o8 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION Churches of civil and of Christian libert)' ; but however that, even these persons are left in great ignorance in many respects, and have by no means light afforded them enough to satisfy their curiosity, but only to regulate their life, to teach them their duty and encourage them in the careful discharge of it ; I say, if we were to suppose this somewhat of a general true account of the degrees of moral and religious light and evidence, which were intended to be afforded mankind, and of what has actually been and is their situation, in their moral and religious capacity ; there would be nothing in all this ignorance, doubtfulness and uncertainty, in all these varieties, and supposed disadvan- tages of some in comparison of others, respecting religion, but may be paralleled by manifest analogies in the natural dispensations of Providence at present, and considering our- selves merely in our temporal capacity. Nor is there anything shocking in all this, or which would seem to bear hard upon the moral administration in Nature, if we would really keep in mind that every one shall be dealt equitably with ; instead of forgetting this, or explain- ing it away, after it is acknowledged in words. All shadow of injustice, and indeed all harsh appearances, in this various economy of Providence would be lost ; if we would keep in mind that every merciful allowance shall be made, and no more be required of any one, than what might have been equitably expected of him, from the circumstances in which he was placed ; and not what might have been expected had he been placed in other circumstances — i.e.^ in Scripture language, that every man shall be " accepted according to what he had, not according to what he had not."^ This, how- ever, doth not by any means imply that all persons' condi- tion here is equally advantageous with respect to futurity. ' 2 Cor- viii. 12. TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 209 And Providence's designing to place some in greater dark- ness with respect to religious knowledge is no more a reason why they should not endeavour to get out of that darkness, and others to bring them out of it, than why ignorant and slow people in matters of other knowledge should not endeavour to learn or should not be instructed. It is not unreasonable to suppose that the same wise and good principle, whatever it was, which disposed the Author of Nature to make different kinds and orders of creatures, disposed Him also to place creatures of like kinds in dif- ferent situations; and that the same principle which disposed Him to make creatures of different moral capacities, disposed Him also to place creatures of like moral capacities in different religious situations, and even the same creatures in different periods of their being. And the account or reason of this is also most probably the account why the constitution of things is such, as that creatures of moral natures or capacities, for a considerable part of that duration in which they are living agents, are not at all subjects of morality and religion, but grow up to be so, and grow up to be so more and more gradually from childhood to mature age. What in particular is the account or reason of these things we must be greatly in the dark, were it only that we know so very little even of our own case. Our present state may possibly be the consequence of somewhat past which Ave are wholly ignorant of; as it has a reference to somewhat to come, of which we know scarce any more than is ncccs - sary for practice, A system or constitution in its notion implies variety ; and so complicated an one as this world, very great variety. So that were revelation universal, yet from men's different capacities of understanding from the different lengths of their lives, their different educations and other external circumstances, and from their difference of temper and bodily constitution, their religious situations 210 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION would be widely different, and the disadvantage of some in comparison of others perhaps altogether as much as at present. And the true account, whatever it be, why man- kind or such a part of mankind are placed in this condition of ignorance, must be supposed also the true account of our further ignorance injnoi knowing tJi.e reasons why or whence it is that they are placed in this condition. But the follow- ing practical reflections may deserve the serious consideration of those persons who think the circumstances of mankind or their own in the forementioned respects a ground of complaint. First : The evidence of religion not appearing obvious, may constitute one particular part of some men's trial in the religious sense ; as it gives scope for a virtuous exercise or vicious neglect of their understanding in examining or not examining into that evidence. There seems no possible reason to be given why we may not be in a state of moral probation with regard to the exercise of our understanding upon the subject of religion, as we are with regard to our behaviour in common affairs. The former is as much a thing within our power and choice as the latter. And I suppose it is to be laid down for certain that the same character, the same inward principle whicli, after a man is convinced of the truth of religion, renders him obedient to the precepts of it, would, were he not thus convinced, set him about an examination of it upon its system and evidence being offered to his thoughts ; and that in the latter state his examination would be with an impartiality, seriousness and solicitude, proportionable to what his obedience is in the former. And as inattention, negligence, want of all serious concern about a matter of such a nature and such impor- tance, when offered to men's consideration is, before a distinct conviction of its truth, as real immoral depravity and dissoluteness, as neglect of religious practice after such TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 211 conviction, so active solicitude about it and fair impartial consideration of its evidence before such conviction is as really an exercise of a morally right temper as is religious practice after. Thus that religion is not intuitively true, but a matter of deduction and inference ; that a conviction of its truth is not forced upon every one, but left to be by some collected with heedful attention to premises ; this as much constitutes religious probation, as much affords sphere, scope, opportunity for right and wrong behaviour, as any- thing whatever does. And their manner of treating this subject when laid before them shows what is in their heart, and is an exertion of it. Secondly : It appears to be a thing as evident, though it is not so much attended to, that if upon consideration of religion the evidence of it should seem to any persons doubtful in the highest supposable degree ; even this doubt- ful evidence will, however, put them into a general state of probation in the moral and religious sense. For suppose a man to be really in doubt whether such a person had not done him the greatest favour, or whether his whole temporal interest did not depend upon that person ; no one who had any sense of gratitude and of prudence could possibly con- sider himself in the same situation with regard to such per- son as if he had no such doubt. In truth it is as just to say that certainty and doubt are the same, as to say the situa- tions now mentioned would leave a man as entirely at liberty in point of gratitude or prudence as he would be were he certain he had received no favour from such person, or that he no way depended upon him. And thus though the evidence of religion which is afforded to some men should be little more than that they are given to see the system of Christianity or religion in general to be supposable and credible, this ought in all reason to beget a serious practical apprehension that it may be true. And even this will afford 212 TIIF. ANALOGY OF RELIGION matter of exercise for religious suspense and deliberation, for moral resolution and self-government, because the appre- hension that religion may be true does as really lay men under obligations as a full conviction that it is true. It gives occasion and motives to consider further the important subject; to preserve attentively upon tlieir minds a general implicit sense that they may be under Divine moral govern- ment, an awfut solicitude about religion whether natural or revealed. Such apprehension ought to turn men's eyes to every degree of new light which may be had from whatever side it comes, and induce them to refrain in the meantime from all immoralities and live in the conscientious practice of every common virtue. Especially are they bound to keep at the greatest distance from all dissolute profaneness, for this the very nature of the case forbids, and to treat with highest reverence a matter upon which their own whole interest and being and the fate of Nature depends. This behaviour and an active endeavour to maintain within themselves this temper is the business, the duty and the wisdom of those persons who complain of the doubtfulness of religion ; is what they are under the most proper obliga- tions to. And such behaviour is an exertion of and has a tendency to improve in them that character which the practice of all the several duties of religion, from a full con- viction of its truth is an exertion of, and has a tendency to improve in others ; others, I say, to whom God has afforded such conviction. Nay, considering the infinite importance of religion, revealed as well as natural, I think it may be said in general that whoever will weigh the matter tho- roughly may see there is not near so much difference as is commonly imagined, between what ought in reason to be the rule of life to those persons who are fully convinced of its truth, and to those who have only a serious doubting apprehension that it may be true. Their hopes and fears TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 213 and obligations will be in various degrees ; but as the subject-matter of their hopes and fears is the same, so the subject-matter of their obligations, what they are bound to do and to refrain from, is not so very unlike. It is to be observed further, that from a character of understanding or a situation of influence in the world, some persons have it in their power to do infinitely more harm or good by setting an example of profaneness and avowed disregard to all religion, or, on tlie contrary, of a serious though perhaps doubting apprehension of its truth, and of a reverend regard to it under this doubtfulness than they can do by acting well or ill in all the common intercourses amongst mankind. And consequently they are most highly accountable for a behaviour which they may easily foresee is of such importance, and in which there is most plainly a right and a wrong ; even admitting the evidence of religion to be as doubtful as is pretended. The ground of these observations, and that which renders them just and true, is that doubting necessarily implies some degree of evidence for that of wliich we doubt. For no person would be in doubt concerning the truth of a number of facts so and so circumstanced which should accidentally come into his thoughts, and of which he had no evidence at all. And though in the case of an even chance, and where consequently we were in doubt, we should in common language say that we had no evidence at all for either side, yet that situation of things which renders it an even chance and no more that such an event will happen, renders this case equivalent to all others, where there is such evidence on both sides of a question ' as leaves the mind in doubt concerning the truth. Indeed, in all these cases there is no more evidence on one side than on the other; but there is (what is equivalent to) mucli more for either than for the truth of a number of facts 214 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION which come into one's thoughts at random. And thus in all these cases doubt as much presupposes evidence, lower degrees of evidence, as belief presupposes higher, and certainty higher still. Any one who will a little attend to the nature of evidence will easily carry this observation on, and see that between no evidence at all and that degree of it which affords ground of doubt, there are as many intermediate degrees as there are between that degree which is the ground of doubt and demonstration. A.nd though we have not faculties to distinguish these degrees of evidence with any sort of exactness, yet in proportion as they are discerned ihey ought to influence our practice. For it is as real an imperfection in the moral character not to be influenced in practice by a lower degree of evidence when discerned, as it is in the understanding not to discern it. And as in all subjects which men consider they discern the lower as well as higher degrees of evidence, propor- tionably to their capacity of understanding ; so in practical subjects they are influenced in practice by the lower as well as higher degrees of it, proportionably to their fairness and honesty. And as, in proportion to defects in the understanding, men are unapt to see lower degrees of evidence, are in danger of overlooking evidence when it is not glaring, and are easily imposed upon in such cases ; so, in proportion to the corruption of the heart, they seem capable of satisfying themselves with having no regard in practice to evidence acknowledged real if it be not over- bearing. From these things it must follow that doubting concerning religion implies such a degree of evidence for it, as joined with the consideration of its importance, unques- tionably lays men under the obligations before mentioned to have a dutiful regard to it in all their behaviour. Thirdly : The difliculties in which the evidence of religion is involved whicli some complain of, is no more a just TO THE COU'RSE OF NATURE. 215 ground of complaint than the external circumstances of temptation which others are placed in, or than difficulties in the practice ot it after a full conviction of its truth. Temptations render our state a more improving state of discipline ^ than it would be otherwise ; as they give occa- sion for a more attentive exercise of the virtuous principle, which confirms and strengthens it more than an easier or less attentive exercise of it could. Now speculative difficulties are in this respect of the very same nature with these external temptations. For the evidence of religion not appearing obvious, is to some persons a temptation to reject it, without any consideration at all ; and therefore requires such an attentive exercise of the virtuous principle seriously to consider that evidence, as there would be no occasion for but for such temptation. And the supposed doubtfulness of its evidence, after it has been in some sort considered, affords opportunity to an unfair mind of explaining away and deceitfully hiding from itself that evidence which it might see ; and also for men's encouraging themselves in vice from hopes of impunity, though they do clearly see thus much at least that these hopes are uncertain ; in like manner as the common temptation to many instances of folly which end in temporal inflimy and ruin is the ground for hope of not being detected, and of escaping with impunity — i.e., the doubtfulness of the proof before- hand that such foolish behaviour will thus end in infamy and ruin. On the contrary, supposed doubtfulness in the evidence of religion calls for a more careful and attentive exercise of the virtuous principle, in fairly yielding them- selves up to the proper influence of any real evidence though doubtful ; and in practising conscientiously all virtue, though under some uncertainty whether the government in the universe may not possibly be such as that vice may 1 Part I. ch. V. 2i6 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION escape with impunity. And in general, temptation? meaning by this word the lesser allurements, the wrong and difficulties in the discharge of our duty, as well as the greater ones — temptation, I say, as such and of every kind and degree, as it calls forth some virtuous efforts, additional to what would otherwise have been wanting, cannot but be an additional discipline and improvement of virtue, as well as probation of it in the other senses of that word.' So that the very same account is to be given, why the evidence of religion should be left in such a manner as to require in some an attentive, solicitous, perhaps painful exercise of their understanding about it; as why otliers should be placed in such circumstances as that the practice of its common duties, after a full conviction of the truth of it, should require attention, solicitude and pains; or, wliy appearing doubtfulness should be permitted to aftbrd matter of temptation to some ; as why external difficulties and allurements should be permitted to afford matter of temptation to others. The same account also is to be given, why some should be exercised with temptations of both these kinds ; as why others should be exercised with the latter in such very high degrees as some have been, particularly as the primitive Christians were. Nor does there appear any absurdity in supposing that the speculative difficulties in which the evidence of religion is involved, may make even the principal part of some persons' trial. For, as the chief temptations of the generality of the world are the ordinary motives to injustice or unre- strained pleasure ; or to live in the neglect of religion from that frame of mind which renders many persons almost without feeling as to anything distant, or whicli is not the object of their senses ; so lliere are other persons without ^ Part I. cli. iv., and p. 98. TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 217 this shallowness of temper, persons of a deeper sense as to what is invisible and future, who not only see, but have a general practical feeling that what is to come will be present, and that things are not less real for their not being the objects of sense ; and who, from their natural constitution of body and of temper, and from their external condition, may have small temptations to behave ill, small difficulty in behaving well in the common course of life. Now when these latter persons have a distinct full conviction of the truth of religion without any possible doubts or difficulties, the practice of it is to them unavoidable, unless they will do a constant violence to their own minds ; and religion is scarce any more a discipline to them than it is to creatures in a state of perfection. Yet these persons may possibly stand in need of moral discipline and exercise in a higher degree than they would have by such an easy practice of religion. Or it may be requisite, for reasons unknown to us, that they should give some further manifestation' what is their moral character to the creation of God than such a practice of it would be. Thus in the great variety of religious situations in which men are placed, what constitutes, what chiefly and peculiarly constitutes, the probation in all senses of some persons, may be the difficulties in which the evidence of religion is involved ; and their principal and distinguished trial may be how they will behave under and with respect to these difficulties. Circumstances in men's situation in their temporal capacity, analogous in good measure to this respecting religion, are to be observed. We find some persons are placed in such a situation in the world as that their chief difficulty with regard to conduct, is not the doing what is prudent when it is known, for this, in numberless cases, is as easy as the contrary ; but to some the principal 1 P. 97. 2i8 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION exercise is recollection and being upon their guard against deceits, the deceits suppose of those about them, against false appearances of reason and prudence. To persons in some situations, the principal exercise with respect to conduct is attention in order to inform themselves what is proper, what is really the reasonable and prudent part to act. But as I have hitherto gone upon supposition that men's dissatisfaction with the evidence of religion is not owing to their neglects or prejudices, it must be added, on the other hand, in all common reason, and as what the truth of the case plainly requires should be added, that such dissatis- faction possibly may be owing to those, possibly may be men's own fault. For, If there are any persons who never set themselves heartily and in earnest to be informed in religion ; if there are any who secretly v.'ish it may not prove true, and are less atten- tive to evidence than to difficulties, and more to objections than to what is said in answer to them ; these persons will scarce be thought in a likely way of seeing the evidence of religion, though it were most certainly true and capable of being ever so fully proved. If any accustom themselves to consider this subject usually in the way of mirth and sport ; if they attend to forms and representations and inadequate manners of expression, instead of the real things intended by them (for signs often can be no more then inadequately expressive of the things signified), or if they substitute human errors in the room of divine truth ; wiiy may not all or any of these things hinder some men from seeing that evidence which really is seen by others ; as a like turn of mind with respect to matters of common sj^eculation and practice does, we find by experience, hinder them from attaining that knowledge and right understanding in matters of common speculation and practice, which more fair and rO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 219 attentive minds attain to ? And the effect will be the same, whether their neglect of seriously considering the evidence of religion and their indirect behaviour with regard to it proceed from mere carelessness or from the grosser vices, or whether it be owing to this, that forms and figurative manners of expression as well as errors administer occasions of ridicule, when the things intended and the truth itself would not. Men may indulge a ludicrous turn so far as to lose all sense of conduct and prudence in worldly affairs, and even as it seems to impair their faculty of reason. And in general, levity, carelessness, passion and prejudice, do hinder us from being rightly informed with respect to common things ; and they may, in like manner, and perhaps in some further providential manner, with respect to moral ; nd religious subjects, may hinder evidence from being laid before us and from being seen when it is. The Scripture^ does declare that every one shall not understand. And it makes no difference by what providential conduct this comes to pass ; whether the evidence of Christianity was originally and with design put and left so as that those who are desirous of evading moral obligations should not see it, and that honest-minded persons should ; or whether it comes to pass by any other means. Further : the general proof of natural religion and of Christianity does, I think, lie level to common men ; even those the greatest part of whose time from childhood to ^ Dan, xii. 10. See also Is. xxix. 13, 14 ; Matt. vi. 23 ; xi. 25 ; xiii II, 12; Joh, iii. 19; Joh. v. 44; i Cor. ii. 14; 2 Cor. iv. 4; 2 Tim. iii. 13 ; and that affectionate, as well as authorative admonition, so very many times inculcated, "He that hath ears to hear, let him hear." Grotius saw so strongly the thing intended in these and other passages of Scripture of the like sense, as to say that the proof given us of Christianity was less than it might liave been, for this very purpose: " Ut ita sermo Evangelii tanquam lapis effet Lydius ad quem ingenia sanabilia explorarentur." — De Ver. R. C. L. 2, towards the end. 2 20 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION old age is taken up with providing for themselves and their families the common conveniences perhaps necessaries of life ; those, I mean, of this rank, who ever think at all of asking after proof or attending to it. Common men, were they as much in earnest about religion as about their temporal affairs, are capable of being convinced upon real evidence that there is a God who governs the world ; and they feel themselves to be of a moral nature and accountable creatures. And as Christianity entirely falls in with this their natural sense of things, so they are capable, not only of being persuaded, but of being made to see, that there is evidence of miracles wrought in attestation of it, and many appearing completions of prophecy. But though this proof is real and conclusive, yet it is liable to objections, and may be run up into difficulties ; which, however, persons who are capable not only of talking of but of really seeing are capable also of seeing through — />., not of clearing up and answering them, so as to satisfy their curiosity, for of such knowledge we are not capable with respect to any one thing in Nature ; but capable of seeing that the proof is not lost in these dilficulties, or destroyed by these objections. But then a thorough examination into religion with regard to these objections, which cannot be the business of every man, is a matter of pretty large compass, and from the nature of it requires some knowledge as well as time and attention to see how the evidence comes out, upon balanc- ing one thing with another, and what, upon the whole, is the amount of it. Now if persons who have picked up these objections from others, and take for granted they are of weight, upon the word of those from whom they received tliem, or by often retailing of them come to see or fancy they sec them to be of weight, will not prepare themselves for such an examination with a competent degree of know- TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 221 ledge, or will not give that time and attention to the subject which, from the nature of it, is necessary for attaining such information : in this case, they must remain in doubtfulness, ignorance, or error, in the same way as they must with regard to common sciences and matters of common life, if they neglect the necessary means of being informed in them. But still perhaps it will be objected that if a prince or common master were to send directions to a servant, he would take care that they should always bear the certain marks who they came from, and that their sense should be always plain, so as that there should be no possible doubt, if he could help it, concerning the authority or meaning of them. Now the proper answer to all this kind of objections is, that wherever the fallacy lies, it is even certain we cannot argue thus with respect to Him who is the Governor of the world ; and particularly that He does not afford us such in- formation with respect to our temporal affairs and interest as experience abundantly shows. However, there is a full answer to this objection from the very nature of religion. For the reason why a prince would give his directions in this plain manner is, that he absolutely desires such an external action should be done, without concerning himself with the motive or principle upon which it is done — i.e., he regards only the external event or the thing's being done ; and not at all, properly speaking, the doing of it or the action. Whereas the whole of morality and religion consist- ing merely in action itself, there is no sort of parallel between the cases ; but if the prince be supposed to regard only the action — i.e., only to desire to exercise, or in any sense prove, the understanding or loyalty of a servant; he would not always give his orders in such a plain manner. It may be proper to add that the will of God respecting morahty and religion may be considered either as absolute or as only condi- tional. If it be absolute it can only be thus, that we should 22 2 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION act virtuously in such given circumstances ; not that we should be brought to act so by His changing of our circum- stances. And if God's will be thus absolute, then it is in our power, in the highest and strictest sense, to do or to contradict His will ; which is a most weighty consideration. Or His will may be considered only as conditional, that if we act so and so we shall be rewarded ; if otherwise, pun- ished ; of which conditional will of the Author of Nature tlic whole constitution of it affords most certain instances. Upon the whole : that we are in a state of religion necessarily implies that we are in a state of probation ; and the credibility of our being at all in such a state being admitted, there seems no peculiar difficulty in supposing our probation to be, just as it is, in those respects which are above objected against. There seems no pretence, from the reason of the thing, to say that the trial cannot equi- tably be anything ; but whether persons will act suitably to certain information, or such as admits no room for doubt, so as that there can be no danger of miscarriage, but either from their not attending to what they certainly know, or from overbearing passion hurrying them on to act contrary to it. For, since ignorance and doubt afford scope for probation in all senses as really as intuitive conviction or certaint}^ and since the two former are to be put to the same account, as difficulties in practice, men's moral probation may also be, whether they will take due care to inform themselves by impartial consideration, and afterwards, whether they will act as the case requires, upon the evidence which they have, however doubtful. And this wc find by experience is frequently our probation,^ in our temporal capacity. For the information which we want, with regard to our worldly interest?, is by no means always given us of course, without any care of our own. And we are greatly liable to self- J 1>. 34, 214, 217. TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 223 Jeceit from inward secret prejudices, and also to the deceits of others. So that to be able to judge what is the prudent part often requires much and difficult consideration. Then after we have judged the very best we can, the evidence upon which we must act, if we will live and act at all, is perpetually doubtful to a very high degree. And the con- stitution and course of the world, in fiict, is such as that want of impartial consideration what v/e have to do, and venturing upon extravagant courses because it is doubtful what will be the consequence, are often naturally — i.e., providentially — altogether as fatal as misconduct occasioned by heedless inattention to what we certainly know, or disre- garding it from overbearing passion. Several of the observations here made may well seem strange, perhaps unintelligible, to many good men ; but if the persons for whose sake they are made think so, persons who object as above, and throw off all regard to religion under pretence of want of evidence ; I desire them to consider again whether their thinking so be owing to anything unintelligible in these observations, or to their own not having such a sense of religion and serious solicitude about it, as even their state of scepticism does in all reason require ? It ought to be forced upon the reflection of these persons, that our nature and condition necessarily require us, in the daily course of life, to act upon evidence much lower than what is commonly called probable ; to guard not only against what we fully believe will, but also against what we think it supposable may happen ; and to engage in pursuits, when the probability is greatly against success, if it be credible, that possibly we may succeed in them. 224 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION CHAPTER VII. Of the particular Evidence of Chrisliauity. The presumptions against revelation, and objections against the general scheme of Christianity and paiticular things relating to it, being removed, there remains to be considered what positive evidence we have for the truth of it, chiefly in order to see what the analogy of Nature suggests with regard to that evidence and the objections against it; or to see what is and is allowed to be the plain natural rule of judgment and of action in our temporal concerns, in cases where we have the same kind of evidence and the same kind of objections against it that we have in the case before us. Now in the evidence of Christianity there seem to be several things of great weight not reducible to the head either of miracles or the completion of prophecy in the common acceptation of the words. But these two are its direct and fundamental proofs, and those other things, how- ever considerable they are, yet ought never to be urged apart from its direct proofs, but always to be joined with them. Thus the evidence of Christianity will be a long scries of things reaching, as it seems, from the beginning of the world to the present time, of great variety and compass, taking in both the direct and also the collateral proofs, and making up all of them together one argument ; the conviction arising from which kind of proof may be compared to what they call the effect in architecture or other works of art, a result from a great number of things so and so disposed and taken into one view, 1 shall therefore, first, make some observations relating to miracles, and the appearing com- TO THE COURSE OE NATURE. 225 plelions of prophecy, and consider wliat analogy suggests in answer to the objections brought against this evidence. And, secondly, I shall endeavour to give some account of the general argument now mentioned, consisting both of the direct and collateral evidence, considered as making up one argument ; this being the kind of proof upon which we determine most questions of difficulty concerning common facts alleged to have happened or seeming likely to happen, especially questions relating to conduct. First : I shall make some observations upon the direct proof of Christianity from miracles and prophecy, and upon the objections alleged against it. I. Now the following observations relating to the historical evidence of miracles wrought in attestation of Christianity appear to be of great weight. I. The Old Testament affords us the same historical evidence of the miracles of Moses and of the Prophets as of the common civil history of Moses and the Kings of Israel, or as of the aftairs of the Jewish nation. And the Gospels and the Acts afford us the same historical evidence of the miracles of Christ and the Apostles as of the com- mon matters related in them. This indeed could not have been affirmed by any reasonable man, if the authors of these books, like many other historians, had appeared to make an entertaining manner of writing their aim ; though they had interspersed miracles in their works at proper distances and upon proper occasions. These might have animated a dull relation, amused the reader and engaged his attention. And the same account would naturally have been given of them as of the speeches and descriptions of such authors, the same account in a manner as is to be given why the poets make use of wonders and prodigies. But the facts, both miraculous and natural in Scripture, are related in plain un- adorned narratives ; and both of them appear in all respects H 226 THE AXALOGV OF RELIGION to stand upon the same foot of historical evidence. Further, some parts of Scripture^ containing an account of miracles fully sufficient to prove the truth of Christianity, are quoted as genuine from the age in which they are said to be written down to the present ; and no other parts of them, material in the present question, are omitted to be quoted in such manner as to afford any sort of proof of their not being genuine. And as common history, when called in question in any instance, may often be greatly confirmed by cotemporary or subsequent events more known and ac- knowledged, and as the common Scripture history like many others is thus confirmed, so likewise is the miraculous history of it, not only in particular instances but in general. For the establishment of the Jewish and Christian religions, which were events cotemporary with the miracles related to be wrought in attestation of both, or subsequent to them, these events are just what we should have expected upon supposition such miracles were really wrought to attest the truth of those religions. These miracles are a satisfactory account of those events, of which no other satisfactory account can be given, nor any account at all, but what is imaginary merely and invented. It is to be added that the most obvious, the most easy and direct account of this history, how it came tQ be written and to be received in the world as a true history, is that it really is so ; nor can any other account of it be easy and direct. Now, though an account, not at all obvious, but very far-fetched and in- direct, may indeed be and often is the true account of a matter, yet it cannot be admitted on the authority of its being asserted. Mere guess, supposition and possibility, when opposed to historical evidence, prove nothing but that historical evidence is not demonstrative. Now the just consequence from all this, I think, is that the Scripture history in general is to be admitted as an TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 227 authentic genuine Instory till somewhat positive be alleged sufficient to invalidate it. But no man will deny the con- sequence to be that it cannot be rejected, or thrown by as of no authority, till it can be proved to be of none, even though the evidence now mentioned for its authority were doubtful. This evidence may be confronted by historical evidence on the other side, if there be any ; or general incredibility in the things related, or inconsistence in the general turn of the history, would prove it to be of no authority. But since, upon the face'of the matter, upon a first and general view, the appearance is that it is an authentic history ; it cannot be determined to be fictitious without some proof that it is so. And the following observations, in support of these and coincident with them, will greatly confirm the historical evidence for the truth of Christianity. 2. The epistles of St. Paul, from the nature of epistolary writing, and moreover from several of them being written, not to particular persons, but to churches, carry in them evidences of their being genuine, beyond what can be in a mere historical narrative left to the world at large. This evidence, joined with that w^hich they have in common with the rest of the New Testament, seems not to leave so much as any particular pretence for denying their genuineness considered as an ordinary matter of fact or of criticism — I say particular pretence for denying it, because any single fact of such a kind and such antiquity may have general doubts raised concerning it from the very nature of human affairs and human testimony. There is also to be mentioned a distinct and particular evidence of the genuineness of the epistle chiefly referred to here, the first to the Corinthians, from the manner it which it is quoted by Clemens Romanus, in an epistle of his own to that church.' Now these epistles ^ Clem. Rom. Ep. 1. c. 47. .11 2 2 2S THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION afford a proof of Christianity, detacheil from all others, which is, I think, a thing of weight, and also a proof of a ]iature and kind ijccaliar to itself. For, In them the author declares that he received the (Ios[)cl in general, and the institution of the communion in parti- cular, not from the rest of the Apostles, or jointly together with them, but alone from Christ himself, whom he declares likewise, conformably to the history in the Acts, ihat h.e saw after His ascension.' So that the testimony of St. Paul is to be considered as detached from that of the rest of tlie Apostles. And he declares further that he was endued with a power of working miracles, as what was publicly known to those very people ; speaks of frequent and great variety of miraculous gifts as then subsisting in those very churches, to which he was writing, which he was reproving for several irregularities, and where he had personal opposers. He mentions these gifts incidentally, in the most easy manner, and without effort, by way of reproof to those who had them, for their indecent use of them, and by way of depreciating them, in comparison of moral virtues ; in short, he speaks to these churches of these miraculous powers, in the manner any one would speak to another of a thing which was as familiar and as much known in common to them both as anything in the world.- And this, as hath been observed by several persons, is surely a very consider- able thing. 3. It is an acknowledged historical fact that Christianity offered itself to the world, and demanded to be received, upon the allegation — i.e., as unbelievers would speak, upon the pretence of miracles, publicly wrought to attest the truth cf •" (jal. i. ; I Co), xi. 25, &c. ; i Cur. xv. S. - Rom. XV. 19; I Cur. xii. 8, 9, 10-28, &<;. ; xiii. i, 2, S ; and the whole of ch. xiv. ; 2 Cor, xii. 12, 13; Gal. iii. 2, 5. I TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 229 it in such an age ; and that it was actually received by great numbers in that very age, and upon the professed belief of the reality of these miracles. And Christianity, including the dispensation of the Old Testament, seems distinguished by this from all other religions. I mean, that tliis does not ap{ ear to be the case with regard to any other ; for surely it will not be supposed to lie upon any person to prove by positive historical evidence that it was not. It does in no sort appear that Mahometanism was first received in the world upon the foot of supposed miracles ' — i.e.^ public ones ; for, as revelation is itself miraculous, all pretence to it must necessarily imply some pretence of miracles. And it is a known fact that it was immediately, at the very first, propagated by other means. And as particular institutions, whether in paganism or popery, said to be confirmed by miracles after those institutions had obtained, are not to the purpose : so, were there what might be called historical proof, that any of them were introduced by a supposed Divine command, believed to be attested by miracles, these would not be in anywise parallel. For single things of this sort are easy to be accounted for after parties are formed and have power in their hands, and the leaders of them are in veneration with the multitude, and political interests are blended with religious claims and religious distinctions. But before anything of this kind for a few persons and those of the lowest rank, all at once to bring over such great numbers to a new religion, and get it to be received upon the particular evidence of miracles, this is quite another thing. And I think it will be allowed by any fair adversary that the fact now mentioned, taking in all the circumstances of it, is peculiar to the Christian religion. However, the fact * See the Koran, chaps, xiii. and xvli. 230 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION itself is allowed that Christianity obtained — i.e.^ was professed to be received in the world, upon the belief of miracles, immediately in the age in which it is said those miracles were wrought ; or that this is what its first converts would have alleged as the reason for their embracing it. Now certainly it is not to be supposed that such numbers of men, in the most distant parts of the world, should forsake the religion of their country in which they had been educated, separate themselves from their friends, particu- larly in their festival shows and solemnities, to which the common people are so greatly addicted, and which were of a nature to engage them much more than anytliing of that sort amongst us, and embrace a religion which could not but expose them to many inconveniences, and indeed must have been a giving up the world in a great degree, even from the very first, and before the Empire engaged in form against them — it cannot be supposed that such numbers should make so great, and, to say the least, so inconvenient a change in their whole institution of life, unless they were really convinced of the truth of those miracles, upon the knowledge or belief of which they professed to make it. And it will, I suppose, readily be acknowledged that the generality of the first converts to Christianity must have believed them ; that, as by becoming Christians, they declared to the world they were satisfied of the truth of those miracles, so this declaration was to be credited. And this their testimony is the same kind of evidence for those miracles as if they had put it in writing, and these writings had come down to us. And it is real evidence, because it is of facts, which they had capacity and full opportunity to inform themselves of. It is also distinct from the direct or express historical evidence, thougli it is of the same kind, and it would be allowed to be distinct in all cases. For were a fact e^jpressly related jiy one or more TO THE COURSE OF NATURE, 231 ancient historians, and disputed in after ages, that this fact is acknowledged to have been beUeved by great numbers o^ the age in which the historian says it was done, would be allowed an additional proof of such fact, quite distinct from the express testimony of the historian. The credulity of mankind is acknowledged ; and the suspicions of mankind ought to be acknowledged too ; and their back- wardness even to believe, and greater still to practise, what makes against their interest. And it must particularly be remembered that education and prejudice and authority were against Christianity in the age I am speaking of. So that the immediate conversion of such numbers is a real presumption of somewhat more than human in this matter — I say presumption, for it is not alleged as a proof alone and by itself. Nor need any one of the things mentioned in this chapter be considered as a proof by itself; and yet all of them together may be one of the strongest.^ Upon the whole, as there is large historical evidence, both direct and circumstantial, of miracles wrought in attes- tation of Christianity, collected by those who have written upon the subject, it lies upon unbelievers to show why this evidence is not to be credited. This v/ay of speaking is, I think, just; and what persons who write in defence of religion naturally fall into. Yet, in a matter of such un- speakable importance, the proper question is, not whom it lies upon according to the rules of argument to maintain or confute objections, but whether there really are any against this evidence sufficient in reason to destroy the credit of it. However, unbelievers seem to take upon them the part of showing that there are. They allege that numberless enthusiastic people, in different ages and countries, expose themselves to the same difficulties which the primitive Christians did, and are ready 1 V. 260, &c, 232 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION to give up their lives for the most idle follies imaginable. But it is not very clear to what purpose this objection is brought. For every one surely, in every case, must dis- tinguish between opinions and facts. And though testimony is no proof of enthusiastic opinions, or of any opinions at all, yet it is allowed in all other cases to be a proof of facts. And a person's laying down his life in attestation of facts or of opinions is the strongest proof of his believing them. And if the Apostles and their cotemporaries did believe the facts, in attestation of which they exposed themselves to sufferings and death, this their belief, or rather knowledge, must be a proof of those facts ; for they were such as came under the observation of their senses. And though it is not of equal weight, yet it is of weight, that the martyrs of the next age, notwithstanding they were not eyewitnesses of those facts, as were the Apostles and their cotemporaries, had, however, full opportunity to inform themselves whether they were true or not, and gave equal proof of their believing them to be true. But enthusiasm, it is said, greatly weakens the evidence of testimony even for facts in matters relating to religion ; some seem to think it totally and absolutely destroys the evidence of testimony upon this subject. And indeed the powers of enthusiasm, and of diseases too which operate in a like manner, are very wonderful in particular instances. But if great numbers of men, not appearing in any peculiar degree weak, nor under any peculiar suspicion of negligence, affirm that they saw and heard such things plainly with their eyes and their ears, and are admitted to be in earnest, such testimony is evidence of the strongest kind we can have for any matter of fact. Yet possibly it may be overcome, strong as it is, by incredibility in the things thus attested, or by contrary testimony. And in an instance where one thought it was so overcome, it might be just to consider how far TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 233 such evidence could be accounted for by enthusiasm ; for it seems as if no other imaginable account were to be given of it. But till such incredibility be shown, or contrary testi- mony produced, it cannot surely be expected that so far- fetched, so indirect and wonderful an account of such testimony as that of enthusiasm must be, an account so strange that the generality of mankind can scarce be made to understand what is meant by it ; it cannot, I say, be ex- pected that such account will be admitted of such evidence, when there is this direct, ea^.y and obvious account of it, that people really saw and heard a thing not incredible, which they affirm sincerely and with full assurance they did see and hear. Granting then that enthusiasm is not (strictly speaking) an absurd but a possible account of such testimony, it is manifest that the very mention of it goes upon the previous supposition that the things so attested are incredible, and therefore need not be considered till they are- shown to be so. Much less need it be considered, after the contrary has been proved. And I think it has been proved to full satisfaction that there is no incredibility in a revelation in general, or in such an one as the Christian in particular. However, as religion is supposed peculiarly liable to enthu- siasm, it mayjust be observed that prejudices almost without number and without name, romance, affectation, humour, a desire to engage attention or to surprise, the party-spirit, custom, little competitions, unaccountable hkings and dis- likings, these influence men strongly in common matters. And as these prejudices are often scarce known or reflected upon by the persons themselves who are influenced by them, they are to be considered as influences of a like kind to enthusiasm. Yet human testimony in common matters is naturally and justly believed notwithstanding. It is intimated furthei, in a more refined way of observation, that though it should be proved that the Apostles and first 234 ^^'^^ ANALOGY OF RELIGION Christians could not in some respects be deceived them- selves, and in other respects cannot be thought to have intended to impose upon the world, yet it will not follow that their general testimony is to be believed, though truly handed down to us, because they might still in part — i.e., in other respects, be deceived themselves, and in part also designedly impose upon others, which it is added is a thing very credible, from that mixture of real enthusiasm and real knavery, to be met with in the same characters. And, I must confess, I think the matter of fact contained in this observation upon mankind is not to be denied, and that somewhat very much akin to it is often supposed in Scrip- ture as a very common case, and most severely reproved. But it were to have been expected that persons capable of applying this observation as applied in the objection, might also frequently have met v/ith the like mixed character, in instances where religion was quite out of tlie case. The thing plainly is, that mankind are naturally endued v/ith reason, or a capacity of distinguishing between truth and falsehood ; and as naturally they are endued with veracity, or a regard to truth in Avhat they say ; but from many oc- casions they are liable to be prejudiced and baissed and deceived themselves, and capable of intending to deceive others, in every different degree ; insomuch that, as we are all liable to be deceived by prejudice, so likewise it seems to be not an uncommon thing for persons, who from their regard to truth vi'ould not invent a lie entirely without any foundation at all, to propagate it with heightening circum- stances after it is once invented and set agoing. And others, though they would not propagate a lie, yet, which is a lower degree of falsehood, will let it pass without contra- diction. Eut notwitlistanding all this, human testimony remains still a natural ground of assent; and this assent a natural principle of action. TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 235 It is objected further, that however it has happened, the fact is that mankind have, in different ages, been strangely deluded with pretences to miracles and wonders. But it is by no means to be admitted that they have been oftener or are at all more liable to be deceived by these pretences than by others. It is added, that there is a very considerable degree of historical evidence for miracles, which are on all hands acknowledged to be fabulous. But suppose there were even the like historical evidence for these, to what there is for those alleged in proof of Christianity, which yet is in nowise allowed, but suppose this ; the consequence would not be that the evidence of the latter is not to be admitted. Nor is there a man in the v>'orld Vvho, in common cases, would conclude thus. For what would such a conclusion really amount to but this, that evidence confuted by contrary evidence, or any way overbalanced, destroys the credibility of other evidence, neither confuted nor overbalanced. To argue that because there is, if there were, like evidence from testimony, for miracles acknow- ledged false, as for those in attestation of Christianity, there- fore the evidence in the latter case is not to be credited ; this is the same as to argue that if two men of equally good reputation had given evidence in different cases no way connected, and one of them had been convicted of perjury, this confuted the testimony of the other. Upon the whole then, the general observation that human creatures are so liable to be deceived, from enthusiasm in religion, and principles equivalent to enthusiasm in common matters, and in both from negligence, and that they are so capable of dishonestly endeavouring to deceive others ; this does indeed weaken the evidence of testimony in all cases, but does not destroy it in any. And these things will appear to different men to weaken the evidence of testimony, 236 THE AXAT.OGY OF REUGION in dift'erent degrees ; in degrees proportionable to the obser- vations they have made, or the notions they have any way taken up, concerning the weakness and neghgence and dis- honesty of mankind, or concerning the powers of enthusiasm and prejudices equivalent to it. But it seems to me that people do not know what they say, who affirm these things to destroy the evidence from testimony, which we have of the truth of Christianity. Nothing can destroy the evidence of testimony in any case, but a proof or probability that persons are not competent judges of the facts to which they give testimony ; or that they are actually under some indirect influence in giving it in such particular case. Till this be made out, the natural laws of human actions require that testimony be admitted. It can never be sufficient to overthrow direct historical evidence, indolently to say that there are so many principles from whence men are liable to be deceived themselves and disposed to deceive others, especially in matters of religion, that one knows not what to believe. And it is surprising persons can help reflecting that this very manner of speaking, supposes they are not satisfied that there is nothing in the evidence of which they speak thus, or that they can avoid observing, if they do make this reflection, that it is on such a subject a very material one.* And over against all these objections is to be set the importance of Christianity, as what must have engaged the attention of its first converts, so as to have rendered them less liable to be deceived from carelessness than they would in common matters, and likewise the strong obliga- tions to ver.-.city which their religion laid them under; so that the first and most obvious presumption is, that they could not be deceived themselves, nor would deceive others. ^ See tlic foregoing chapter. TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 237 And this presumption in this degree is pecuhar to the testimony we have been considering. In argument, assertions are nothing in themselves, and liave an air of positiveness whicli sometimes is not very easy; yet they are necessary, and necessary to be repeated, in order to connect a discourse, and distinctly to lay before the view of the reader what is proposed to be proved and what is left as proved. Now the conclusion from tlie fore- going observations is, I think, beyond all doubt, this : that unbelievers must be forced to admit the external evidence for Christianity — i.e.^ the proof of miracles wrought to attest it to be of real weight and very considerable, though they cannot allow it to be sufficient to convince them of the reality of those miracles. And as they must in all reason admit this, so it seems to me that upon consideration they would, in fiict, admit it; those of them, I mean, who know anything at all of the matter : in like manner as persons, in many cases, own they see strong evidence from testimony for the truth of things, which yet they cannot be convinced are true ; cases, suppose, where there is contrary testimony, or things which they think, whether with or without reason, to be incredible. But there is no testimony contrary to that which we have been considering ; and it has been fully proved that there is no incredibility in Christianity in genera], or in any part of it. II. As to the evidence for Christianity from prophecy, I shall only make some i^w general observations which are suggested by the analogy of Nature — i.e., by the acknow- ledged natural rules of judging in common matters, con- cerning evidence of a like kind to this from prophecy. I. The obscurity or unintelligibleness of one part of a prophecy, does not in any degree invalidate the proof of foresight arising from the appearing completion of those 238 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION other ])arts which are understood. For the case is evidently the same as if those parts which are not understood were- lost, or not written at all, or written in an unknown tongue- Whether this observation be commonly attended to or not, it is so evident that one can scarce bring oneself to set down an instance in common matters to exemplify it. However, suppose a writing, partly in cipher and partly in plain words at length and that in the part one understood there appeared mention of several known facts ; it would never come into any man's thoughts to imagine that if he understood the whole, perhaps he might find that those facts were not in reality known by the writer. Indeed, bodi in this example and the thing intended to be exemplified by it our not understanding the whole (the whole suppose of a sentence or a paragraph) might sometimes occasion a doubt whether one understood the literal meaning of such a part ; but this comes under another consideration. For the same reason, though a man should be incapable, for want of learning, or opportunities of inc^uiry, or from not having turned his studies this way, even so much as to judge whether particular prophecies have been throughout completely fulfilled, yet he may see in general that they have been fulfilled to such a degree as, upon very good ground, to be convinced of foresight more than human in such pro- phecies, and of such events being intended by them. For the same reason also, though by means of the deficiencies in civil history and the different accounts of historians, the most learned should not be able to make out to satisfaction that such parts of the prophetic history have been minutely and throughout fulfilled, yet a very strong proof of foresight may arise from that general completion of them which is made out, as much proof of foresight, perhaps, as the Giver of ])rophecy intended should ever be afforded by such parts of prophecy. TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 239 2. A long series of prophecy being applicable to such and such events, is itself a proof that it was intended of them ; as the rules by which we naturally judge and deter- mine in common cases parallel to this will show. This observation I make in answer to the common objection against the application of the prophecies, that considering each of them distinctly by itself, it does not at all appear that they were intended of those particular events to which they are applied by Christians, and therefore it is to be sup- posed that if they meant anything, they were intended of other events unknown to us, and not of these at all. Now there are two kinds of writing, which bear a great resemblance to prophecy with respect to the matter before us ; the mythological, and the satirical where the satire is to a certain degree concealed. And a man might be assured that he understood what an author intended by a fable or parable related without any application or moral, merely from seeing it to be easily capable of such application and that such a moral might naturally be deduced from it. And he might be fully assured that such persons and events were intended in a satirical writing merely from its being appli- cable to them. And agreeably to the last observation he might be in a good measure satisfied of it, though he were not enough informed in affairs, or in the story of such persons, to understand half the satire. For his satisfaction that he understood the meaning, the intended meaning, of these writings would be greater or less in proportion as he saw the general turn of them to be capable of such appli- cation, and in proportion to the number of particular things capable of it. And thus if a long series of prophecy is applicable to the present state of the church and to the political situations of the kingdoms of the world, some thousand years after these prophecies were delivered, and a long series of prophecy delivered before the coming of 2-IO THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION Christ is applicable to Him ; these feehngs are in themselves a proof that the prophetic history was intended of Him and of those events ; in proportion as the general turn of it is capable of such application and to the number and variety of particular prophecies capable of it. And though in all just way of consideration the appearing completion of pro- phecies is to be allowed to be thus explanatory of and to determine their meaning, yet it is to be remembered further that the ancient Jews applied the prophecies to a IMessiah before His coming in much the same manner as Christians do now. And that the primitive Christians interpreted the prophecies respecting the state of the church and of the world in the last ages in the sense which the event seems to confirm and verify. And from these things it may be made appear : 3. That the showing even to a high probability, if that could be, that the prophets thought of some other events, in such and such predictions and not those at all, which Christians allege to be completions of those predictions j or that such and such prophecies are capable of being applied to other events than those to which Christians apply them — that this v/ould not confute or destroy the force of the argument from prophecy, even with regard to those very instances. For, observe how this matter really is. If one knew such a person to be the sole author of such a book, and was certainly assured or satisfied to any degree that one knew the whole of what he intended in it, one shoukj be assured or satisfied to such degree that one knew the whole meaning of that book ; for the meaning of a book is nothing but the meaning of the author. But if one knew a person to have compiled a book out of memoirs which he received from another of vastly superior knowledge in the subject of it, especially if it were a book full of great in- tricacies and difficulties, it would in nowise follow that one TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 241 knew the whole meaning of the book from knowing the whole meaning of the compiler, for the original memoirs — i.e., the author of them, might have, and there would be no degree of presumption in many cases against supposing him to have some further meaning than the compiler saw. To- say then that the Scriptures, and the things contained in them, can have no other or further meaning than those persons thought or had who first recited or wrote them, is evidently saying that those persons were the original, proper, and sole authors of those books — i.e.. that they are not inspired, which is absurd, whilst the authority of these books is under examination — i.e., till you have determined they are of no Divine authority at all. Till this be de- termined, it must in all reason be supposed, not indeed that they have, for this is taking for granted that they are in- spired, but that they may have some further meaning than what the compilers saw or understood, x^nd, upon this supposition, it is supposable also that this further meaning may be fulfilled. Now events, corresponding to prophecies, interpreted in a difterent meaning from that in which the prophets are supposed to have understood them; this affords, in a manner, the same proof that this different sense was originally intended, as it would have afforded if the prophets had not understood their predictions in the sense it is supposed they did; because there is no presumption of their sense of them being the whole sense of them. And it has been already shown that the apparent completions of prophecy must be allowed to be explanatory of its meaning; so that the question is whether a series of prophecy has been fulfilled in a natural or proper — i.e., in any real — sense of the words of it ; for such completion is equally a proof of foresight more than human, whether the prophets are or are not supposed to have understood it in a different sense. I say supposed, for though I think it clear that the prophets 243 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION ciitl not vindcrstrind the full meaning of their predictions, it is another question how far they thought they did, and in what sense they understood them. Hence may be seen to how little purpose those persons busy themselves who endeavour to prove that the prophetic liistory is applicable to events of the age in which it was written, or of ages before it. Indeed to have proved this before there was any appearance of a further completion of it, might have answered some purpose ; for it might have prevented the expectation of any such fm-ther completion. Thus could Porphyry have shown that some principal parts of the Book of Daniel, for instance, the seventh verse of the seventh chapter, which the Christians interpreted of the latter ages, was applicable to events which happened before or about the age of Antiochus Epiphanes \ this might have prevented them from expecting any further completion of it. And, unless there was then, as I think there must have been, external evidence concerning that book more than is come down to us ; such a discovery might have been a stumbling- block in the way of Christianity itself, considering the autho- rity which our Saviour has given to the Book of Daniel, . and how much the general scheme of Christianity presup- poses the truth of it. But even this discovery, had there been any such,* would be of very little weight with reason- able men now ; if this passage, thus applicable to events before the age of Porphyry, appears to be applicable also to events which succeeded the dissolution of the Roman Empire. I mention this, not at all as intending to insinuate ' It nppenrs tlial Porphyry did nothing worth mentioning in this \\?.x. I"i)r Jerome on tlie place says: "Duas jiosteriorcs bcstias — in uno Macedonum regno ponit. " And as to llie ten Kings : " Decern reges cnumerat, qui fucrnnt saevissimi : ip?o>que reges non unius ponit regni, \evbi gratia, Macedonia;, Syrire, Asite, et /Egypti ; .sed de diversis egnis unum efficil regnm ordinem." And in this way of interpretation anything may Ik- made of anything. I TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 243 that the division of this empire into ten parts, for it plainly was divided into about that number, were alone and by itself of any moment in verifying the prophetic history, but only as an example of the thing I am speaking of And thus, upon the whole, the matter of inquiry evidently must be as above put, vv-hether the prophecies are applicable to Christ and to the present state of the world and of the church ; applicable in such a degree as to imply foresight not whether they are capable of any other application, though I know no pretence for saying the general turn of them is capable of any other. These observations are, I think, just; and the evidence referred to in them real, though there may be people who will not accept of such imperfect information from Scripture. Some, too, have not integrity and regard enough to truth lo attend to evidence which keeps the mind in doubt, perha| s perplexity, and which is much of a different sort from what they expected. And it plainly requires a degree of modesty and fairness beyond what every one has, for a man to say, not to the world, but to himself, that there is a real appear- ance of somewhat of great weight in this matter, though he is not able thoroughly to satisfy himself about it; but i[ shall have its influence upon him, in pioportion to its ap- pearing reality and weight. It is much more easy and more falls in with the negligence, presumption and wilfulness of the generality, to determine at once, with a decisive air, there is nothing in it. The prejudices arising from that absolute contempt and scorn with which this evidence is treated in the world I do not mention. For what indeed can be said to persons who are weak enough in their under- standings to think this any presumption against it; or, if they do not, are yet weak enough in their temper to be influenced by such prejudices upon such a subject. I shall now, secondly, endeavour to give some account of 244 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION the general argument for the trutli of Christianity, consisting both, of the direct and circumstantial evidence considered as making up one argument. Indeed, to state and examine this argumert fully would be a work much beyond the compass of this whole treatise ; nor is so much as a proper abridgment of it to be expected here. Yet the present subject requires to liave some brief account "Of it given- For it is the kind ofevidence upon which most questions of difficulty in common practice are determined ; evidence arising from various coincidences which support and confirm each other, and in this manner prove with more or less certainty the point under consideration. And I choose to do it also : first, because it seems to be of the greatest im- portance and not duly attended to by every one, that the proof of revelation is not some direct and express things only, but a great variety of circumstantial things also ; and that though each of these direct and circumstantial things is indeed to be considered separately, yet they are after. wards to be joined together; for that the proper force of the evidence consists in the result of those several things considered in their respects to each other and united into one view ; and in the next place because it seems to me that the matters of lact here set down, which are acknow- ledged by unbelievers, must be acknowledged b}- them also to contain together a degree of evidence of great weight if they could be brought to lay these several things before themselves distinctly, and then with attention consider them together, instead of that cursory thought of them to which we are familarized. For being familiarized to the cur- sory thought of things as really hinders the weight of them from being seen as from having its due influence upon practice. The thing asserted and the truth of which is to be in- quired into is this : that over and above our reason and TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. =45 affections which God has given us for the information of cur judgment and the conduct of our lives, He has also by external revelation given us an account of Himself, and His moral government over the world, implying a future state of rewards and punishments — i.e.^ hath revealed the system of natural religion ; for .natural religion may be externally ^ revealed by God, as the ignorant may be taught it by man- kind their fellow-creatures — that God, I say, has given us the evidence of revelation as well as the evidence of reason to ascertain this moral system ; together with an account of a particular dispensation of Providence which reason could no way have discovered, and a particular institution of religion founded on it for the recovery of mankind out of their present wretched condition, and raising them to the perfection and final happiness of their nature. This revelation, whether real or supposed, may be con- sidered as wholly historical. For prophecy is nothing but the history of events before they come to pass ; doctrines also are matters of fact ; and precepts come under the same notion. And the general design of Scripture, which contains in it this revelation thus considered as historical, may be said to be to give us an account of the world in this one single view as God's world ; by which it appears essentially distinguished from all other books, so far as I have found, except such as are copied from it. It begins with an account of God's creation of the world in order to ascertain and distinguish from all others who is the object of our worship by what He has done ; in order to ascertain who He is concerning whose Providence, commands, promises and threatenings this sacred book all along treats ; the Maker and Proprietor of the world, He whose creatures we are, the God of Nature ; in order likewise to distinguish Him from the idols of the nations, which are either imaginary beings — ^ P. 137. &c. 24-6 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION i.e., no beings at all ; or else part of that creation, the liislorical relation of which is here given. And St. John, not improbably with an eye to this Mosaic account of the creation, begins his Gospel with an account of our Saviour's pre-existence, and that " all things were made by Him ; and without Him was not any thing made that was made ; " ^ agreeably to the doctrine of St. Paul, that God created all things by Jesus Christ.' This being premised, the Scripture, taken together, seems to profess to contain a kind of an abridgment of the history of the world in the view just now mentioned — that is, a general account of the condition of religion and its professors during the continuance of that apostasy from God and state of wickedness which it every- where supposes the world to lie in. And this account of the state of religion carries with it some brief account of the political state of things as religion is affected by it. Reve- lation indeed considers the common affairs of this world, and what is going on in it, as a mere scene of distraction ; and cannot be supposed to concern itself with foretelling at what time Rome or Babylon or Greece, or any particular place, should be the most conspicuous seat of that tyranny and dissoluteness which ail places equally aspire to be ; cannot, I say, be supposed to give any account of this wild scene for its own sake. But it seems to contain some very general account of the chief governments of the world as the general state of rehgion, has been, is, or shall be affected by them from the first transgression, and during the whole interval of the world's continuing in its present state to a certain future period spoken of both in the Old and New Testament, very distinctly, and in great variety of expression : " The times of the restitution of all things ; " " " When the mystery of God shall be finished, as He hath declared to His ^ Joh. i. 3. - Kph. iii. 9. "• Acts iii. 21. TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 247 servants the prophets ; " ^ v/heu " the God of heaven shall set up a kingdom, which shall never be destroyed ; and the kingdom shall not be left to other people,"^ as it is repre- sented to be during this apostasy ; " but judgment shall be given to the saints,"^ and " they shall reign;"'' "and the kingdom and dominion, and the greatness of the kingdom under the whole heaven, shall be given to the people of the saints of the Most High." * Upon this general view of the Scripture, I would remark how great a length of time the whole relation takes up, near six thousand years of which are past ; and how great a variety of things it treats of; the natural and moral system or history of the world, including the time when it was formed, all contained in the very first Book, and evidently written in a rude and unlearned age ; and in subsequent Books, the various common and prophetic history, and the particular dispensation of Christianity. Now all this to- gether gives the largest scope for criticism, and for con- futation of what is capable of being confuted, either from reason or from common history, or from any inconsistence in "its several parts. And it is a thing which deserves, I tliink, to be mentioned, that whereas some imagine the supposed doubtfulness of the evidence for revelation implies a positive argument that it is not true, it appears, on the contrary, to imply a positive argument that it is true. For could any common relation, of such antiquity, extent, and variety (for in these things the stress of what I am now observing lies) be proposed to the examination of the world, that it could not, in an age of knowledge and liberty, be confuted, or shown to have nothing in it, to the satis- faction of reasonable men ; this would be thought a strong presumptive proof of its truth. And indeed it must be a ^ Rev. X. 7. " Dan. ii. •' Dan. vii. 22. * Rev. ^ Dan. vii. 248 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION proof of it, just in proportion to the probability that if it were false it might be shown to be so ; and this, I think, is scarce pretended to be shown but upon principles and in ways of arguing which have been clearly obviated.' Nor does it at all appear that any set of men who believe natural religion are of the opinion that Christianity has been thus confuted. But to proceed. Together with the moral system of the world, the Old Testament contains a chronological account of the beginning of it, and from thence an unbroken genealogy of mankind for many ages before common history begins, and carried on as much further, as to make up a continued thread of his- tory of the length of between three and four thousand years. It contains an account of God's making a covenant with a particular nation, that they should be His people, and He would be their God, in a peculiar sense ; of His often inter- posing miraculously in their affairs, giving them the pro- mise, and long after, the possession of a particular country, assuring them of the greatest national prosperity in it, if they would worship Him in opposition to the idols which the rest of the world worshipped, and obey His commands, and threatening them with unexampled punishments if they disobeyed Him and fell into the general idolatry; insomuch that this one nation should continue to be the observation and the wonder of all the world. It declares particularly that " God would scatter them among all people, from one end of the earth unto the other ; but that when they should return unto the Lord their God, He would have compassion upon them, and gather them from all the nations whither He had scattered them; that Israel should be saved in the Lord with an everlasting salvation, and not be ashamed or con- founded, world without end." And as some of these pro- ^ Chaps, ii. iii. lic. TO THE COURSE OF NATURE 249 mises are conditional, others are as absolute as anything can be expressed, that the time should come, when " the people should be all righteous and inherit the land for ever ;" that " though God would make a full end of all nations, whither He had scattered them, yet would He not make a full end of them ;" that " He would bring again the captivity of His people Israel, and plant them upon their land, and they should be no more pulled up out of their land ;" that "the seed of Israel should not cease from being a nation for ever."* It foretells that God would raise them up a particular Per- son, in whom all His promises should finally be fulfilled, the Messiah, who should be in a high and eminent sense their anointed Prince and Saviour. This was foretold in such a manner as raised a general expectation of such a Person in the nation, as appears from the New Testament and is an acknowledged fact, an expectation of His coming at such a particular time, before any one appeared claiming to be that Person, and when there was no ground for such an ex. pectation but from the prophecies : which expectation, there- fore, must in all reason be presumed to be explanatory of those prophecies, if there were any doubt about their mean, ing. It seems, moreover, to foretell that this Person should be rejected by that nation to whom He had been so long promised, and though he was so much desired by tliem." And it expressly foretells that He should be the Saviour of the Gentiles, and even that the completion of the scheme, contained in this Book and then begun, and in its progress should be somewhat so great, that in comparison with it the restoration of the Jews alone would be but of small account. '' It is a light thing that thou shouldest be my servant to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to restore the ^ Deiit. xxviii. 64; xxx. 2, 3; Isa. xlv. 17 ; Ix. 21 ; Jer. xxx. II xlvi. 28; Amos ix. 15 ; Jer. xxxi. 36. - Isa. viii. 14, 15; xlix. 5; liii. ; Mai. i. 10, 1 1, and ch. iii. 250 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION preserved of Israel; I will also give thee for a light to the Gentiles, that thou mayest be for salvation unto the end of the earth. And in the last days, the mountain of the Lord's house shall be established in the top of the mountains, and shall be exalted above the hills, and all nations shall flow into it — for out of Zion shall go forth the law, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem. And He shall judge among the nations — and the Lord alone shall be -exalted in that day, and the idols He shall utterly abolish."' The Scripture further contains an account, that at tiie time the Messiah was expected, a Person rose up in this nation claiming to be that Messiah, to be the Person wlioni all the prophecies referred to, and in whom they should centre ; that He spent some years in a continued course of miraculous works, and endued his immediate disciples and followers with a power of doing the same, as a proof of the truth of that religion which He commissioned them to publish; that, invested with this authority and power, they made numerous converts in the remotest countries, and settled and established His reli- gion in the world, to the end of which the Scripture pro- fesses to give a prophetic account of the state of this reli- gion amongst mankind. Let us now suppose a person, utterly ignorant of history, to have all this related to him out of the Scripture. Or, suppose such an one, having the Scripture put into his hands, to remark these things in it, not knowing but that the Avhole, even its civil history as well as the other parts of it, might be from beginning to end an entire invention ; and to ask, what truth was in it, and whether the revelation here related, was real or a fiction? And instead of a direct ^ Isa. xlix. 6; ch, ii. ; ch. xi. ; ch. Ivi. 7; Mai. i. 11. To which must be added the other prophecies of the like kind, several in the New Testa- ment, and very many in the Old; which describe what sliall he the Couipletion of tlic revealed plan of Providence, I TO THE COURSE OE NATURE. 251 answer, suppose him, all at once, to be told the following confessed facts ; and then to unite them into one view. Let him first be told, in how great a degree the profession and establishment of natural religion, the belief that there is one God to be worshipped, that virtue is His law, and that mankind shall be rewarded and punished hereafter, as they obey and disobey it here ; in how very great a degree, I say, the profession and establishment of this moral system in the world is owing to the revelation, whether real or supposed, contained in this Book ; the establishment of this moral system, even in those countries which do not acknowledge the proper authority of the Scripture.^ Let him be told also what number of nations do acknowledge its proper authority. Let him then take in the consideration of what importance religion is to mankind. And upon these things he might, I think, truly observe that this supposed revelation's obtaining and being received in the world, with all the circumstances and effects of it, considered together as one event, is the most conspicuous and impor- tant event in the story of mankind ; that a Book of this nature, and thus promulged and recommended to our consideration, demands, as if by a voice from heaven, to have its claims most seriously examined into ; and that, before such examination, to treat it with any kind of scoffing and ridicule, is an offence against natural piety. But it is to be remembered, that how much soever the establishment of natural religion in the world is owing to the Scripture- revelation, this does not destroy the proof of religion from reason; anymore than the proof of Euclid's Elements is destroyed by a man's knowing or thinking that he should never have seen the truth of the several propositions contained in it, nor had those propositions come into his thoughts, but for that mathematician. 1 P. 208. 252 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION Let such a person as we are speaking of be, in llie next jilace, informed of the acknowledged antiquity of the first parts of this Book ; and that its chronology, its account of the time v/hen the earth and the several i)arts of it were first peopled with human creatures, is no way contradicted, but is really confirmed by the natural and civil history of the world, collected from common historians, from the state of tlie earth, and from the late invention of arts and sciences. And as the Scripture contains an unbroken thread of common and civil history from the Creation to the Captivity, for between three and four thousand years ; let the person we are speaking of be told in the next place that this general history, as it is not contradicted, but is con- firmed by profane history as much as there would be reason to expect, upon supposition of its truth ; so there is nothing in the whole history itself to give any reasonable ground of suspicion of its not being, in the general, a faithful and literally true genealogy of men and series of things. I speak here only of the common Scripture-history, or of the course of ordinary events related in it, as distinguished from miracles and from the prophetic history. In all the Scripture narrations of this kind following events arise out of foregoing ones, as in all other histories. There appears nothing related as done in any age, not conformable to the manners of that age ; nothing in the account of a succeeding age, which one would say could not be true or was improbable, from the account of things in the preceding one. There is nothing in the characters which would raise a thought of their being feigned ; but all the internal marks imaginable of their being real. It is to be added also, that mere genealogies, bare narrati\'es of the number of years, which persons called by such and such names lived, do not carry the face of fiction ; perhapii do carry some presumption of veracity ; and all unadorned narratives which have nothing TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 253 to surprise, may be thought to carry somewhat of the Uke presumption too. And the dom.estic and the pohtical history is plainly credible. There may be incidents in Scripture, which taken alone in the naked way they are told, may appear strange — especially to persons of other manners, temper, education. But there are also incidents of un- doubted truth in many or most persons' lives, Avhich in the same circumstances Avould appear to the full as strange. There may be mistakes of transcribers, there may be other real or seeming mistakes, not easy to be particularly accounted for. But there are certainly no more things of this kind in the Scripture than what were to have been expected in books of such antiquity, and nothing in any wise sufficient to discredit the general narrative. Now, that a history claiming to commence from the Creation, and extending in one continued series through so great a length of time and variety of events, should have such appearances of reality and truth in its whole contexture, is surely a very remarkable circumstance in its favour. And as all this is applicable to the common history of the New Testament, so there is a further credibility, and a very high one, given to it by profane authors, many of these writing of the same times, and confirming the truth of customs and events, which are incidentally as well as more purposely mentioned in it. And this credibility of the common Scripture-history gives some credibility to its miraculous history — especially as this is interwoven with the common, so as that they imply each other, and both together make up one relation. Let it then be more particularly observed to this person, that it is an acknowledged matter of fact, whiclr is indeed implied in the foregoing observation, that there was such a nation as the Jews, of the greatest antiquity ; whose govern- ment and general polity was founded on the law, here related to be given them by Moses as from heaven ; that 254 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION natural religion, though with rites additional yet no way- contrary to it, was their established religion, which cannot be said of the Gentile world ; and that their very being as a nation depended upon their acknowledgment of one God, the God of the universe. For, suppose in their captivity in Babylon they had gone over to the religion of their con- querors, there would have remained no bond of union to keep them a distinct people. And whilst they were under their own kings, in their own country, a total apostasy from God would have been the dissolution of their whole govern- ment. They, in such a sense, nationally acknowledged and worshipped the Maker of heaven and earth, when the rest of the world were sunk in idolatry, as rendered tliem, in fact, the peculiar people of God. And this so remarlcable an establishment and preservation of natural religion amongst them, seems to add some peculiar credibility to the historical evidence for the miracles of Moses and the prophets ; because these miracles are a full satisfactory account of this event, which plainly wants to be accounted for, and cannot otherwise. Let this person, supposed wholly ignorant of history, be acquainted further that one claiming to be the Messiah, of Jewish extraction, rose up at the time when this nation, from the prophecies aljove-mentioned, expected the Messiah ; that He was rejected, as it seemed to have been foretold He should, by the body of the people, under the direction of their rulers ; that in the course of a very few years He was believed on, and acknowledged as, the promised Messiah by great numbers among the Gentiles, agreeably to the prophecies of Scripture, yet not upon the evidence of pro- phecy, but of miracles,^ of whicli miracles we also have strong historical evidence : (by wliicli I mean here no more ^ P. 228, &c. TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 255 than must be acknowledged by unbelievers ; for let pious frauds and follies be admitted to weaken, it is absurd to say they destroy our evidence of miracles wrought in proof of Christianity:') that this religion approving itself to the reason of mankind, and carrying its own evidence with it so far as reason is a judge of its system, and being no way contrary to reason in those parts of it which require to be believed upon the mere authority of its Author ; that this religion, I say, gradually spread and supported itself for some hundred years, not only without any assistance from temporal power, but under constant discouragements, and often the bitterest persecutions from it, and then became the religion of the world ; that in the meantime the Jewish nation and government were destroyed in a very remarkable manner, and the people carried away captive and dispersed through the most distant countries, in which state of dis- persion they have remained fifteen hundred years ; and that they remain a numerous people united amongst themselves, and distinguished from the rest of the world as they were in the days of Moses by the profession of his law, and everywhere looked upon in a manner which one scarce knows how distincdy to express but in the words of the prophetic account of it given so many ages before it came to pass : — " Thou shalt become an astonishment, a proverb, and a by-word among all nations whither the Lord shall lead thee."'" The appearance of a standing miracle in the Jews re- maining a distinct people in their dispersion, and the con- firmation which this event appears to give to the truth of revelation, may be thought to be answered by their religion's forbidding them intermarriages with those of any other, and prescribing them a great many peculiarities in their food, by ^ 1*. 231, Cvi;, " Deut. xxviii 37. 256 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION whicli they are debarred from the means of incorporating with the people in whose countries they live. This is not, I think, a satisfactory account of that which it pretends to account for. But what does it pretend to account for.^ The correspondence between this event and the prophecies, or the coincidence of both, with a long dispensation of Providence of a peculiar nature towards that people formerly? No. It is only the event itself which is offered to be tlnis accounted for, which single event taken alone, abstracted from all such correspondence and coincidence, perhaps would not have appeared miraculous ; but that correspondence and coincidence may be so, though the event itself be supposed not. Thus the concurrence of our Saviour's being born at Bethlehem, with a long foregoing series of prophecy and other coincidences is doubtless miraculous, the series of prophecy and other coincidences and the event being admitted, though the event itself, His birth at that place, appears to have been brought about in a natural way, of which, however, no one can be certain. And as several of these events seem, in some degree ex- pressly, to have verified the prophetic history already ; so likewise they may be considered further as having a peculiar aspect towards the full completion of it, as affording some presumption that the whole of it shall, one time or other, be fulfilled. Thus, that the Jews have been so wonderfully preserved in their long and wide dispersion, which is indeed the direct fulfilling of some prophecies, but is now men- tioned only as looking forward to somewhat yet to come ; that natural religion came forth from Judea, and spread in the degree it has done over the world, before lost in idolatry, which, together with some other things, have distinguislied that very place in like manner as the people of it are dis- tinguished ; that this great change of religion over the earth was brought about under the profession and acknow- TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 257 ledgment that Jesus was the promised Messiah, Things of this kind naturally turn the thoughts of serious men towards the full completion of the prophetic history concerning the final restoration of that people ; concerning the establish- ment of the everlasting kingdom among them, the kingdom of the Messiah, and the future state of the world under this sacred government. Such circumstances and events compared with these prophecies, though no completions of them, yet would not, I think, be spoken of as nothing in the argument by a person upon his first being informed of them. They fall in with the prophetic history of things still future, give it some additional credibility, have the ap- pearance of being somewhat in order to the full completion of it Indeed it requires a good degree of knowledge and great calmness and consideration to be able to judge thoroughly of the evidence for the truth of Christianity from that part of the prophetic history which relates to the situation of the kingdoms of the world, and to the state of the church from the establishment of Christianity to the present time. But it appears, from a general view of it, to be very material ; and those persons who have thoroughly examined it, and some of them were men of the coolest tempers, greatest capacities, and least liable to imputations of pre- judice, insist upon it as determinately conclusive. Suppose now a person quite ignorant of history, first to recollect the passages above mentioned out of Scripture, without knowing but that the whole was a late fiction, then to be informed of the correspondent facts now mentioned, and to unite them all into one view ; that the profession and establishment of natural religion in the world is greatly owing, in difterent ways, to this Book and the supposed revelation Avhich it contains ; that it is acknowledged to be of the earliest a-ntiquity ; that its chronology and common I 25B THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION history are entirely credible ; that this ancient nation, tlic Jews, of whom it chiefly treats, appear to have been in fact the people of God in a distinguished sense ; that, as there was a national expectation amongst them, raised from the prophecies, of a Messiah to appear at such a time, so one at this time appeared claiming to be that Messiah ; that He v/as rejected by this nation, but received by the Gentiles, not upon the evidence of prophecy, but of miracles ; that the religion He taught supported itself under the greatest difficulties, gained ground, and at length became the religion of the world ; that in the meantime the Jewish polity was Utterly destroyed, and the nation dispersed over the face of the earth ; that notwithstanding this, they have remained a distinct numerous people for so many centuries even to this day, which not only appears to be the express completion of several prophecies concerning them, but also renders it, as one may speak, a visible and easy possibility that the promises made to them as a nation may yet be fulfilled. And to these acknowledged truths let the person we have been supposing add, as I think he ought, whether every one will allow it or no, the obvious appearances which there are of the state of the world in other respects besides what re- lates to the Jews, and of the Christian church having so long answered, and still answering to the prophetic history. Suppose, I say, these facts set over against the things before mentioned out of the Scripture, and seriously compared with them, the joint view of both together must, I think, appear of very great weight to a considerate reasonable person ; of much greater indeed, upon having them first laid before him, than is easy for us who are so familiarized to diem to conceive without some particular attention for that purpose. All these things and the several particulars contained under them rnjuirc to be distinctly and most thoroughly TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 359 examined into ; that the weight of each may be judged of upon such examination and such conclusion drawn as results from their united force. But this has not been attempted here. I have gone no further than to show that the general imperfect view of them now given, the confessed historical evidence for miracles, and the many obvious appearing completions of prophecy, together with the collateral things^ here mentioned, and there are several others of the like sort ; that all this together, which being fact must be acknowledged by unbelievers, amounts to real evidence of somewhat more than human in this matter: evidence much more important than careless men who have been accustomed only to transient and partial views of it can imagine, and indeed abundantly sufficient to act upon. And these things I apprehend must be acknowledged by unbelievers. For though they may say, they the historical evidence of miracles wrought in attestation of Christianity is not sufficient to convince them that such miracles were really wrought they cannot deny : that there is such historical evidence, it being a known matter of fact that there is. They may say the conformity between the prophecies and events is by accident ; but there are many instances in which such conformity itself cannot be denied. They may say with regard to such kind of collateral things as those above mentioned, that any odd accidental events, without meaning, will have a meaning found in them by fanciful people ; and that such as are fanciful in any one certain way will make out a thousand coincidences which seem to fiivour their peculiar follies. Men, I say, may talk thus, but no one who is serious can possibly think these things to be nothing, if he considers the importance of collateral ^ All the particular things mentioned in this chapter, not reducible lo the head of certain miiaclts, or determinate completions of piophecy- See pp. 224. 225. I 2 26o THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION things and even of lesser circumstances, in the evidence of probability, as distinguished in Nature from the evidence of demonstration. In many cases, indeedj it seems to require the truest judgment to determine with exactness the weight of circumstantial evidence ; but it is very often altogether as convincing as that which is the most express and direct. This general view of the evidence for Christianity, considered as making one argument, may also serve to recommend to serious persons to set down everything which they think may be of any real weight at all in proof of it, and particularly the many seemmg completions of prophecy : and they will find that judging by the natural ruleS; by which we judge of probable evidence in common matters, they amount to a much higher degree of proof upon such a joint review than could be supposed upon considering them separately at different times ; how strong soever the proof might before appear to them upon such separate views of it. For probable proofs, by being added, not only increase the evidence but multiply it. Nor should 1 dissuade any one from setting down what he thought made for the contrary side. But then it is to be re- membered, not in order to influence his judgment but his practice, that a mistake on one side may be in its conse- quences much more dangerous than a mistake on the other. And what course is most safe and what most dangerous is a consideration thought very material, when we deliberate not concerning events but concerning conduct in our temjioral aftairs. To be influenced by this consideration in our judg- ment, to believe or disbelieve upon it, is indeed as much prejudice as anything whatever. And, like other prejudices, it opera'ies contrariwise in difterent men. For some are inclined to believe what they hope, and others what they fear. And it is manifest unreasonableness to apply to men'« passions in order to gain their assent. Liit in deliberations TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 261 concerning conduct there is nothing which reason more requires to be taken into the account than the importance of it. For suppose it doubtful what would be the conse- quence of acting in this or in a contrary manner, still that taking one side could be attended with little or no bad consequence, and taking the other might be attended with the greatest, must appear to unprejudiced reason of the highest moment towards determining how we are to act. But the truth of our religion, like the truth of common matters, is to be judged of by all the evidence taken together. And unless the whole series of things which may be alleged in this argument, and every particular thing in it, can reasonably be supposed to have been by accident (for here the stress of the argument for Christianity lies) ; then is the truth of it proved : in like manner as if in any common case numerous events acknowledged were to be alleged in proof of any other event disputed ; the truth of the disputed event would be proved, not only if any one of the acknow- ledged ones did of itself clearly imply it, but though no one of them singly did so if the whole of the acknowledged events taken together could not in reason be supposed to have happened unless the disputed one were true. It is obvious how much advantage the nature of this evidence gives to those persons who attack Christianity, especially in conversation. For it is easy to show in a short and lively manner that such and such things are liable to objection, that this and another thing is of little weight in itself, but impossible to show in like manner the united force of the whole argument in one view. However, lastly, as it has been made appear that there is no presumption against a revelation as miraculous, that the general scheme of Christianity and the principal parts of it are conformable to the experienced constitution of things, and the whole perfectly credible : so the account now given 262 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION of the positive evidence for it sliows that this evidence is such as from the nature of it cannot be destroyed, though it should be lessened. CHAPTER VIII. Of the Objections 7vhich may be made against arguing from the Analogy of Nature to Religion. If every one would consider, with such attention as they are bound even in point of morality to consider, what they judge and give characters of, the occasion of this chapter would be, in some good measure at least, superseded. Lut . since this is not to be expected — for some we find do not concern themselves to understand even what they write against — since this treatise, in coinmon with most others, lies open to objections, which may appear very material to thoughtful men at first sight, and besides that, seem.s peculiarly liable to the objections of such as can judge without thinking, and of such as can censure without judging, it may not be amiss to set down the chief of these objections which occur to me, and consider them to their hands. And they are such as these : — " That it is a poor thing to solve difficulties in revelation, by saying, that there are the same in natural religion, when what is wanting is to clear both of them, of these their common as well as other their respective difficulties. But that it is a strange way indeed of convincing men of the obligations of religion, to show them that they have as little reason for their worldly pursuits — and a strange way of vindicating the justice and goodness of the Author of Nature, and of removing the objections against both, to which tlie system of religion lies TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 263 open, to show that the like objections lie against natural providence ; a way of answering objections against religion without so much as pretending to make out that the system of it, or the particular things in it objected against, are reasonable— especially perhaps some may be inattentive enough to add, must this be thought strange, when it is confessed that analogy is no answer to such objections. That when this sort of reasoning is carried to the utmost length it can be imagined capable of, it v/ill yet leave the mind in a very unsatisfied state ; and that it must be unaccountable ignorance of mankind, to imagine they will be prevailed with to forego their present interests and pleasures, from regard to religion, upon doubtful evidence." Now, as plausible as this way of talking may appear, that appearance will be found in a great measure owing to half views, which show but part of an object, yet show that indistinctly, and to undeterminate language. By these means weak men are often deceived by others, and ludicrous men by themselves. And even those who are serious and considerate, cannot always readily disentangle and at once clearly see through the perplexities in which subjects themselves are involved, and which are heightened by the deficiencies and the abuse of words. To this latter sort of persons, the following reply to each part of this objection severally, may be of some assistance ; as it may also tend a little to stop and silence others. First: The thing wanted — i.e., what men require, is to have all difficulties cleared. And this is, or at least for any- thing we know to the contrary, it may be the same as requiring to comprehend the Divine nature, and the whole plan of Providence from everlasting to everlasting. But it hath always been allowed to argue from what is acknow- ledged to what is disputed. And it is in no other sense a pool' thing to argue from natural religion to revealed, in 264 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION the manner found fault with, than it is to argue in number- less other ways of probable deduction and inference in matters of conduct, which we are continually reduced to the necessity of doing. Indeed the epithet poor may be applied, I fear, as properly to great part or the wh.ole of human life, as it is to the things mentioned in the objec- tion. Is it not a poor thing for a physician to have so little knowledge in the cure of diseases, as even the most eminent have? To act upon conjecture and guess, where the life of man is concerned ? Undoubtedly it is ; but not in com- parison of having no skill at all in that useful art, and being obliged to act wholly in the dark. Further: since it is as unreasonable as it is common to urge objections against revelation, v/hich are of equal weight against natural religion ; and those who do this, if they are not confused themselves, deal unfairly with others, in making it seem that they are arguing only against revelation or particular doctrines of it, when in reality they are arguing against moral providence ; it is a thing of consequence to show that such objections are as much levelled against natural religion as against revealed. And objections which are equally applicable to both, arc, properly speaking, answered by its being shown that they are so provided the former be admitted to be true. And without taking in the consideration how distinctly this is admitted, it is plainly very material to observe that as the things objected against in natural religion are of the same kind with what is certain matter of experience in the course of Providence, and in the information which God affords us concerning our temporal interest under His government ; so the objections against the system of Christianity and the evidence of it, are of the very same kind with those which are made against the system and evidence of natural religion. However, the reader upon review may sec that TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 265 most of the analogies insisted upon, even in the latter part of this treatise, do not necessarily require to have more taken for granted than is in the former ; that there is an Author of Nature, or natural governor of the world — and Christianity is vindicated, not from its analogy to natural religion, but chiefly from its analogy to the experienced constitution of Nature. Secondly : Religion is a practical thing, and consists in such a determinate course of life, as being what there is reason to think, is commanded by the Author of Nature and will, upon the whole, be our liappiness under His govern- ment. Now if men can be convinced that they have the like reason to believe this as to believe that taking care of their temporal aftairs will be to their advantage, such con- viction cannot but be an argument to them for the practice of religion ; and if there be really any reason for believing one of these and endeavouring to preserve life, and secure ourselves the necessaries and conveniences of it, then there is reason also for believing the other and endeavouring to secure the interest it proposes to us ; and if the interest which religion proposes to us be infinitely greater than our whole temporal interest, then there must be proporuonably greater reason for endeavouring to secure one than the other, since, by the supposition, the probability of our se- curing one is equal to the probability of our securing the other. This seems plainly unanswerable, and has a ten- dency to influence fair minds who consider what our con- dition really is, or upon what evidence we are naturally appointed to act, and who are disposed to acquiesce in the terms upon which we live, and attend to and follow that practical instruction, whatever it be, which is aftbrded us. But the chief and proper force of the argument referred to in the objection, lies in another place. For it is said that the proof of religion is involved in such inextricable 266 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION difficulties as to render it doubtful ; and that it cannot be supposed, that if it were true, it would be left upon doubtful evidence. Here then, over and above the force of each particular difficulty or objection, these difficulties and ob- jections taken together are turned into a positive argument against the truth of religion, which argument would stand thus. If religion were true, it would not be left doubtful and open to objections to the degree in which it is ; there- fore that it is thus left, not only renders the evidence of it weak, and lessens its force in proportion to the weight of such objections, but also shows it to be false, or is a general presumption of its being so. Now the observation, that from the natural constitution and course of things we must in our temporal concerns, almost continually, and in matters of great consequence, act upon evidence of a like kind and degree to the evidence of religion, is an answer to this argument ; because it shows that it is according to the con- duct and character of the Author of Nature to appoint we should act upon evidence like to that which this argument presumes He cannot be supposed to appoint we should act upon. It is an instance, a general one made up of nu- merous particular ones, of somewhat in His dealing with us, similar to what is said to be incredible ; and as the force of this answer lies merely in the parallel which there is between the evidence for religion and for our temporal conduct, the answer is equally just and conclusive, whether the parallel be made out by showing the evidence of the former to be higher, or the evidence of the latter to be lower. Thirdly : The design of this treatise is not to vindicate the character of God, but to show the obligations of men ; it is not to justify His Providence, but to show what belongs to U3 to do. These are two subjects, and ought not to be confounded; and though they may nt length run uj) into each other, yet observations may immediately tend to make TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 267 out the latter, which do not appear, by any immediate con- nection to the purpose of the former, which is less our concern than many seem to think. For, first, it is not necessary we should justify the dispensations of Providence against objections any further than to show that the things objected against may, for aught Ave know, be consistent with justice and goodness. Suppose, then, that there are things in the system of this world, and plan of Providence relating to it, which taken alone would be unjust ; yet it has been shown unanswerably that if Ave could take in the reference Avhich these things may have to other things present, past and to come, to the whole scheme Avhich the things objected against are parts of : these A^ery things might, for aught Ave knoAA^, be found to be not only consistent Avith justice, but instances of it. Indeed it has been shoAvn, by the analogy of AA^hat Ave see, not only possible that this may be the case, but credible that it is ; and thus objections, draAAm from such things, are ansAvered, and Providence is vindicated as far as religion makes its vindication necessary. Hence it appears, secondly, that objections against the Divine justice and goodness are not endeavoured to be removed by shoAving that the like objections, alloAA-ed to be really conclusive, lie against natural providence ; but those objections being supposed and shoAvn not to be conclusive, the things objected against, considered as matters of fact, are further shoAvn to be credible from their conformity to the constitution of Nature ; for instance, that God Avill rcAA'ard and punish men for their actions hereafter, from the obser- vation that He does reAA-ard and punish them for their actions here ; and this, I apprehend, is of Aveight. And I add, thirdly, it aa'ouM be of Aveight, even though those objections were not answered ; for, there being the proof of religion above set doAvn, and religion implying several facts. For instance again, the fact last mentioned that God AAdll reward 268 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION and punish men for their actions hereafter ; the observation that His present method of government is by rewards and punishments shovv's that future fact not to be incredible, whatever objections men may think they have against it as unjust or unmerciful, according to their notions of justice and mercy, or as improbable from their behef of necessity. I say, as improbable, for it is evident no objection against it, as unjust, can be urged from necessity, since this notion as much destroys injustice as it does justice. Then, fourthly, though objections against the reasonableness of the system of religion cannot indeed be answered without entering into consideration of its reasonableness, yet objections against the credibility or truth of it may ; because the system of it is reducible into what is properly matter of fact, and the truth, the probable truth of facts, may be shown without consideration of their reasonableness. Nor is it necessar)', though in some cases and respects it is highly useful and proper, yet it is not necessary to give a proof of the reason- ableness of every precept enjoined us, and of every par- ticular dispensation of Providence which comes into the system of religion. Indeed, the more thoroughly a person of a right disposition is convinced of the perfection of the Di\ine nature and conduct, the further he will advance towards that perfection of religion which St. John^ speaks of; but the general obligations of religion are fully made out by proving the reasonableness of the practice of it. And that the practice of religion is reasonable may be shown, though no more could be proved than that the system of it may be so, for aught we know to the contrary, and even without entering into the distinct consideration of this. And from hence, fifthly, it is easy to see that though the analogy ol Nature is not an immediate answer to objections against the wisdom, the justice or goodness of any doctrine or pre- ^ I Jolin iv. lii. TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 269 cept of religion ; yet it may be, as it is, an immediate and direct answer to -what is really intended by such objec- tions, which is to show that the things objected against are incredible. Fourthly: It is most readily acknowledged that the fore- going treatise is by no means satisfactory, very far indeed from it ; but so would any natural institution of life appear, if reduced into a system together with its evidence. Leaving religion out of the case, men are divided in their opinions, whether our pleasures overbalance our pains, and whether it be, or be not, eligible to live in this world. And were all such controversies settled, which perhaps in speculation would be found involved in great difficulties ; and were it determined upon the evidence of reason, as Nature has determined it to our hands, that life is to be preserved ; )et still the rules which God has been pleased to afford us for escaping the miseries of it and obtaining its satisfactions, the rules, for instance, of preserving health and recovering it when lost, are not only fallible and precarious, but very far from being exact. Nor are we informed by Nature, in future contingencies and accidents, so as to render it at all certain, what is the best method of managing our affairs. What will be the success of our temporal pursuits, in the common sense of the word success, is highly doubtful. And what will be the success of them in the proper sense of the word — i.e.^ what happiness or enjoyment we shall obtain by them, is doubtful in a much higher degree. Indeed, the unsatisfactory nature of the evidence with which we are obliged to take up in the daily course of life, is scarce to be expressed. Yet men do not throw away life or disregard the interests of it upon account of this doubtfulness. The evidence of religion then being admitted real, those who object against it as not satisfactory — i.e., as not being what they wish it, plainly forget the very condition of our being, for satisfaction in this i'jo THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION sense does not belong to such a creature as man. And, which is more material, they forget also the very nature of religion. For religion j^resupposes in all those who will embrace it a certain degree of integrity and honesty, which it was intended to try whether men have or not, and to exercise in such as have it, in order to its improvement. Religion presupposes this as much and in the same sense as speaking to a man presupposes he understands the language in which you speak ; or as warning a man of any danger presupposes that he hath such a regard to himself as that he will endeavour to avoid it. And therefore the question is not at all whether the evidence of religion be satisfactory, but whether it be in reason sufficient to prove and discipline that virtue which it presupposes. Now the evidence of it is fully sufficient for all those purposes of probation ; how far soever it is from being satisfactory, as to the purposes of curiosity, or any other ; and indeed it answers the purposes of the former in several respects, which it would not do if it were as overbearing as is required. One might add further, that whether the motives or the evidence for any course of action be satisfactory, meaning here by that word what satisfies a man, that such a course of action will in event be for his good, this need never be, and I think strictly speaking never is, the practical question in common matters. But the practical (juestion in all cases is, whether the evidence for a course of action be such, as taking in all circumstances makes the faculty within us, which is the guide and judge of conduct,' determine that course of action to be prudent. Indeed satisfaction that it will be for our interest or happi- ness, abundantly determines an action to be prudent ; but evidence almost infinitely lower than this determines actions to be so too, even in the conduct of every day. Fifthly : As to the objection concerning the influence ^ See Dissertation I TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 271 which this argument or any part of it, may or may not be expected to have upon men ; I observe as above, that rehgion being extended for a trial and exercise of the moraUty of every person's character, who is a subject of it, and there being as 1 have shown such evidence for it as is sufficient in reason to influence men to embrace it; to object that it is not to be imagined mankind will be influenced by such evidence, is nothing to the purpose of the foregoing treatise. For the purpose of it is not to inquire what sort of creatures mankind are, but what the light and knowledge which is afforded them requires they should be, to show how in reason they ought to behave, not how in fact they will behave. This depends upon themselves, and is their o\yn concern, the personal concern of each man in particular. And how little regard the generality have to it, experience indeed does too fully show. But religion, considered as a probation, has had its end upon all persons to whom it has been proposed with evidence sufficient in reason to influence their practice, for by this meaiis they have been put into a state of probation ; let them behave as they will in it. And thus not only revelation, but reason also, teaches us that by the evidence of religion being laid before men, the designs of Providence are carrying on, not only with regard to those who will, but likewise with regard to those who will not, be influenced by it. However, lastly, the objection here re- ferred to allows the things insisted upon in this treatise to be of some weight ; and if so, it may be hoped it will have some influence. And if there be a probability that it will have any at all, there is the same reason in kind, though not in degree, to lay it before men as there would be if it were likely to have a greater influence. And further, I desire it may be considered with respect to the whole of the foregoing objections that in this treatise I 2-]?. THE AXALOGY OF RELIGION have argued upon the principles of others,' not my own, and have omitted what I tliink true and of the utmost importance, because by others thought uninteUigible or not true. Thus I have argued upon the principles of the fatalists, which I do not believe, and have omitted a thing of the utmost importance, which I do believe, the moral fitness and unfitness of actions prior to all will whatever, which I apprehend as certainly to determine the Divine conduct, as speculative truth and falsehood necessarily determine the Divine judgment. Indeed, the principle of liberty and that of moral fitness so force themselves upon the mind that moralists, the ancients as well as moderns, have formed their language upon it. And probably it may appear in mine, though I have endeavoured to avoid it ; and in order to avoid it have sometimes been obliged to express myself in a manner which will appear strange to such as do not observe the reason for it ; but the general argument here pursued does not at all suppose or proceed upon these principles. Now these two abstract principles of liberty and moral fitness being omitted, religion can be considered in no other view than merely as a question of fact : and in this view it is here considered. It is obvious that Chris- tianity and the proof of it are both historical. And even natural religion is properly a matter of fact. For that there is a righteous Governor of the world is so, and this proposi- tion contains the general system of natural religion. But then several abstract truths, and in particular those two principles, are usually taken into consideration in the proof of it, whereas it is here treated of only as a matter of fact. ' By arguing upon ihe inlnciples of others, the reader will ol)serve is meant, not proving anything from those principles, but notwith- standing them. Thus religion is proved not from the opinion of necessity, which is absurd, but notwithstanding or even though that opinion were admiUed tj be true. TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 273 To explain this, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones is an abstract truth, but that they appear so to Our mind is only a matter of fact. And this last must have been admitted if anything was by those ancient sceptics who would not have admitted the former, but pretended to doubt whether there were any such thing as truth, or whether we could certainly depend upon our faculties of understanding for the knowledge of it in any case. So likewise that there is in the nature of things an original standard of right and wrong in actions independent upon all will, but which unalterably determines the will of God to exercise that moral governnient over the world which religion teaches — i.e., finally and upon the whole to reward and punish •m.en respectively as they act right or wrong, this assertion contains an abstract truth as well as matter of fact. But suppose in the present state every man, without exception, was rewarded and punished in exact proportion as he followed or transgressed that sense of right and Avrong which God has implanted in the nature of every man, this would not be at all an abstract truth, but only a matter of fact. And though this fact were acknowledged by every one, yet the very same difficulties might be raised as are now concerning the abstract questions of liberty and moral fitness ; and we should have a proof, even the certain one of experience, that the government of the world was perfectly moral without taking in the consideration of those questions, and this proof would remain in what way soever they were determined. And thus God having given man- kind a moral faculty, the object of wliich is actions, and which naturally approves some actions as right and of good desert and condemns others as wrong and of ill desert ; that He will finally and upon the whole reward the former and punish the latter is not an assertion of an abstract truth, but of what is as mere a fact as His doing so at present would be. 274 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION 'Ihis fuUire fact I have not indeed proved widi die force widi which it might be proved from the principles of ^iberty and moral fitness, but without them have given, a really conclusive practical proof of it, which is greatly strengdiened by the general analogy of Nature, a proof easily cavilled at, easily shown not to be demonstrative ; for it .is not offered as such, but impossible, I think, to be evaded or answered. And thus the obligations of religion are made out exclusively of the questions concernmg liberty and moral fitness, which have been perplexed with difficulties and abstruse reason- ings as everything may. Hence therefore may be observed distinctly what is the force of this treatise. It will be to such as are convinced of religion, upon the proof arising out of the two last-men- tioned principles, an additional proof and a confirmation of it; to such as do not admit those principles an original proof of it,^ and a confirmation of that proof. Those who believe will here find the scheme of Christianity cleared of objections, and the evidence of it in a peculiar manner strengthened : those who do not believe, will at least be shown the absurdity of all attempts to prove Christianity false, the plain undoubted credibility of it, and^ I hope, a great deal more. And thus, though some jjerhaps may seriously think that analogy as here urged has too great stress laid upon it, and ridicule; unanswerable ridicule, may be applied to show the argument from it in a disadvantageous light ; yet there can be no question but that it is a real one. For religion, both natural and revealed, implying in it numerous facts, analogy being a confirmation of all facts to which it can be applied, as it is the only proof of most, cannot but be admitted by every one to be a material thing, and truly of weight on the i P. 107, &c. 1 \ TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 275 side of religion, both natural and revealed ; and it ought to be particularly regarded by such as profess to follow Nature and to be less satisfied with abstract reasonings. CONCLUSION. Whatever account may be given of the strange inattention and disregard in some ages and countries, to a matter of such importance as religion \ it would, before experience, be incredible that there should be the like disregard in those who have had the moral system of the world laid before them, as it is by Christianity, and often inculcated upon them ; because this moral system carries in it a good degree of evidence for its truth, upon its being barely pro- posed to our thoughts. There is no need of abstruse reasonings and distinctions to convince an unprejudiced understanding that there is a God who made and governs the world, and will judge it in righteousness ; though they may be necessary to answer abstruse difficulties, when once such are raised; when the very meaning of those words, Vi'hich express most intelligibly the general doctrine of religion, is pretended to be uncertain, and the clear truth of the thing itself is obscured by the intricacies of specu- lation. But to an unprejudiced mind, ten thousand thousand instances of design cannot but prove a designer. And it is intuitively manifest that creatures ought to live under a dutiful sense of their Maker, and that justice and charity must be His laws to creatures whom He has made social, and placed in society. Indeed the truth of revealed religion, peculiarly so-called, is not self-evident, but 276 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION requires external truth in order to its being received. Yet inattention among us to revealed religion, will be found to imply the same dissolute immoral temper of mind as inattention to natural religion, because, when both are laid before us in the manner they are in Christian countries of liberty, our obligations to inquire into both, and to embrace both upon supposition of their truth, are obliga- tions of the same nature. For revelation claims to be the voice of God, and our obligation to attend to His voice is surely moral in all cases. And as it is insisted that its evidence is conclusive upon thorough consideration of it, so it offers itself to us with manifest obvious appear- ances of having something more than human in it, and therefore in all reason requires to have its claims most seriously examined into. It is to be added that, though light and knowledge, in what manner soever afforded us, is equally from God, yet a miraculous revelation has a peculiar tendency from the first principles of our nature to awaken mankind, and inspire them with reverence and awe. And this is a peculiar obligation to attend to what claims to be so with such appearances of truth. It is therefore most certain that our obligations to inquire seriously into the evidence of Christianity, and upon s^ipposiiion of its truth to embrace it, are of the utmost importance, and moral in tlie highest and most proper sense. Let us then suppose that the evidence of religion in general, and of Christianity, has been seriously inquired into by all reasonable men among us. Yet we find many professedly to reject both upon speculative principles of infidelity. And all of them do not content themselves with a bare neglect of religion, and enjoying their imaginary freedom from its restraints. Some go much beyond this. They deride God's moral government over the world. They renounce His protection and defy His justice. They TO THE COURSE OF NATURE, 277 ridicule and vilify (Christianity, and blaspheme the Author of it, and take all occasions to manifest a scorn and contempt of revelation. This amounts to an active setting them- selves against religion, to what may be considered as a positive principle of irreligion, which they cultivate within themselves, and, whether they intend this effect or not, render habitual, as a good man does the contrary principle. And others who are not chargeable with all this profligate- ness, yet are in avowed opposition to religion, as if discovered to be groundless. Now admitting, which is the supposition we go upon, that these persons act upon what they think principles of reason, and otherwise they are not to be argued with, it is really inconceivable that they should imagine they clearly see the whole evidence of it, considered in itself, to be nothing at all. Nor do they pretend this. They are far indeed from having a just notion of its evidence — but they would not say its evidence was nothing if they thought the system of it, Avith all its circumstances, were credible, like other matters of science or history. So that their manner of treating it must proceed, either from such kind of objections against all religion as have been answered or obviated in the former part of this treatise, or else from objections and difficulties supposed more peculiar to Christianity. Thus they entertain prejudices against the whole notion of a revelation and miraculous inter- positions. They find things in Scripture, whether in incidental passages or in the general scheme of it, which appear to them unreasonable. They take for granted that, if Christianity were true, the light of it must have been more general, and the evidence of it more satisfactory, or rather overbearing ; that it must and would have been in some wa}', otherwise put and left, than it is. Now this is not imagining they see the evidence itself to be nothing or inconsiderable, but quite another thing. It is bemg fortified 278 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION against the evidence, in some degree acknowledged, by thinking they see the system of Christianity, or somewhat Avhich appears to them necessarily connected with it, to be incredible or false, fortified against that evidence, which might otherwise make great impression upon them. Or, lastly, if any of these persons are, upon the whole, in doubt concerning the truth of Christianity, their behaviour seems owing to their taking for granted, through strange inattention, that such doubting is, in a manner, the same thing as being certain against it. To these persons, and to this state of opinion concerning religion, the foregoing treatise is adapted. For all the general objections against the moral system of Nature having been obviated, it is shown that there is not any peculiar presumption at all against Christianity, either con- sidered as not discoverable by reason, or as unlike to what is so discovered ; nor any worth mentioning against it as miraculous, if any at all ; none, certainly, which can render it in the least incredible. It is shown, that upon supposition of a Divine revelation, the analogy of Nature renders it beforehand highly credible, I think probable, that many things in it must appear liable to great objections, and that we must be incompetent judges of it to a great degree. This observation is, I think, unquestionably true and of the very utmost importance ; but it is urged, as I hope it will be understood, with great caution of not vilifying the faculty of reason, which is "the candle of the Lord within us," ^ though it can afford no light where it does not shine ; nor judge, where it has no principles to judge upon. The objections here spoken of, being first answered in the view of objections against Christianity as a matter of fact, arc in the next place considered as urged, more immediately, ' Prov. XX. 27. TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 279 against the wisdom, justice, and goodness of the Christian dispensation. And it is fully made out, that they admit of exactly the like answer, in every respect, to what the like objections against the constitution of Nature admit of, that as partial views give the appearance of wrong to things, which, upon further consideration and knowledge of their relations to other things, are found just and good ; so it is perfectly credible that the things objected against the wisdom and goodness of the Christian dispensation, may be rendered instances of wisdom and goodness, by their re- ference to other things beyond our view : because Chris- tianity is a scheme as much above our comprehension as that of Nature ; and like that a scheme in which means arc made use of to accomplish ends, and which, as is most cre- dible, may be carried on by general laws. And it ought to be attended to, that this is not an answer taken, merely or chiefly, from our ignorance ; but from somewhat positive, which our observation shows us. For, to like objections, the like answer is experienced to be just in numberless parallel cases. The objections against the Christian dispen- sation, and the method by which it is carried on, having been thus obviated, in general and together ; the chief of them are considered distinctly, and the particular things objected to are shown credible, by their perfect analogy, each apart, to the constitution of Nature. Thus, if man be fallen from his primitive state, and to be restored, and infinite wisdom and power engages in accomplishing our recovery ; it were to have been expected, it is said, that this should have been effected at once ; and not by such a long series of means, and such a various economy of persons and things ; one dispensation preparatory to ano- ther, this to a further one, and so on through an indefinite number of ages, before the end of the scheme proposed can be completely accomphshed : a scheme conducted by 28o THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION infinite wisdom, and executed by almighty power. But now, on the contrary, our finding that everything in the constitution and course of Nature is thus carried on, shows such expectations concerning revelation to be highly unrea- sonable ; and is a satisfactory answer to them when urged as objections against the credibility that the great scheme of Providence in the redemption of the world may be of this kind, and to be accomplished in this manner. As to the particular method of our redemption, the appointment of a Mediator between God and man : this has been shown to be most obviously analogous to the general conduct of nature — i.e., the God of Nature, in appointing others to be the instruments of His mercy, as we experience in the daily course of Providence. The condition of this world, which the doctrine of our redemption by Christ presupposes, so much falls in with natural appearances, that heathen moralists inferred it from those appearances : inferred that human nature v/as fallen from its original rectitude, and, in consequence of this, degraded from its primitive happiness. Or, however this opinion came into the world, these appear- ances must have kept up the tradition, and confirmed the belief of it. And as it was the general opinion, under the light of Nature, that repentance and reformation, alone and by itself, was not sufficient to do away sin, and procure a full remission of the penalties annexed to it, and as the reason of the thing does not at all lead to any such con- clusion ; so every day's experience shows us that reforma- tion is not, in any sort, sufficient to prevent the present disadvantages and miseries which, in the natural course of things, God has annexed to folly and extravagance. Yet there may be ground to think that the punishments, which by the general laws of Divine government, are annexed to vice, may be prevented ; that provision may have been, even orignially, made, that they should be prevented by TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 281 some means or other, though they could not by reformation alone. For we have daily instances of such mercy, in the general conduct of Nature ; compassion provided for misery/ medicines for diseases, friends against enemies. There is provision made, in the original constitution of the world, that much of the natural bad consequences of our follies, which persons themselves alone cannot prevent, may be prevented by the assistance of others ; assistance, which Nature enables and disposes and appoints them to afford. By a method of goodness analogous to this, when the world lay in wickedness and consequently in ruin, " God so loved the world, that He gave His only begotten Son " to save it ; and " He being made perfect by suftering, became the Author of eternal salvation to all them that obey Him."^ Indeed, neither reason nor analogy would lead us to think, in particular, that the interposition of Christ, in the manner in which He did interpose, would be of that efficacy for recovery of the world which the Scripture teaches us it was ; but neither would reason nor analogy lead us to think that other particular nieans would be of tlie efficacy, which experience shows they are in numberless instances. And therefore, as the case before us does not admit of experience, so, that neither reason nor analogy can show, how or in what particular way the interposition of Christ, as revealed in Scripture, is of that efficacy, which it is there represented to be ; this is no kind nor degree of presumption against its being really of that efficacy. Further : the objections against Christianity, from the light of it not being universal, nor its evidence so strong as might possibly be given us, have been answered by the general analogy of Nature. That God has made such variety of creatures, is indeed an answer to the former. But that He dispenses His gifts in such variety, both of degrees and kinds, amongst creatures of the same ^ Serm. at the Rolls, p. 106. - John iii. 16 ; Heb. v. 9. 282 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION species, and even to the same individuals at different times, is a more obvious and full answer to it. And it is so far from being the method of Providence in other cases, to afford us such overbearing evidence, as some require in proof of Christianity ; that, on the contrary, the evidence upon which we are naturally appointed to act in common matters, throughout a very great part of life, is doubtful in a high degree. And admitting the fact that God has afforded to some no more than doubtful evidence of religion, the same account may be given of it as of diffi- culties and temptations with regard to practice. But as it is not impossible,^ surely, that this alleged doubtfulness may be men's own fault, it deserves their most serious consideration whether it be not so. However, it is certain that doubting implies a degree of evidence for that of which we doubt, and that this degree of evidence as really lays us under obligations as demonstrative evidence. The whole, then, of religion is throughout credible ; nor is there, I think, anything relating to the revealed dispen- sation of things more different from the experienced con- stitution and course of Nature than some parts of the constitution of Nature are from other parts of it \ and if so, the only question which remains is, what positive evidence can be alleged for the truth of Christianity. This, too, in general has been considered and the objections against it estimated. Deduct therefore what is to be deducted from that evidence upon account of any weight which may be thought to remain in these objections after what the analogy of Nature has suggested in answer to them ; and then con- sider what are the practical consequences from all this, upon the most sceptical principles one can argue upon (for I am writing to persons who entertain these principles) ; and ^ r. 218, &c. TO THE COURSE OF NATURE. 283 upon such consideration it will be obvious that immorality as little excuse as it admits of in itself, is greatly aggravated in persons who have been made acquainted with Chris- tianity whether they believe it or not ; because the moral system of Nature, or natural religion which Christianity lays before us^ approves itself almost intuitively to a reason- able mind upon seeing it joroposed. In the next place, with regard to Christianity, it will be observed that there is a middle between a full satisfaction of the truth of it and a satisfaction of the contrary. The middle state of mind between these two consists in a serious apprehension that it may be true, joined with doubt whether it be so ; and this, upon the best judgment I am able to make, is as far towards speculative infidelity as any sceptic can at all be supposed to go who has had true Christianity, with the proper evidence of it laid before him, and has in any tolerable measure con- sidered them ; for I would not be mistaken to comprehend all who have ever heard of it, because it seems evident that in many countries called Christian, neither Christianity nor its evidence are ff.irly laid before men. And in places where both are, there appear to be some who have very little attended to either, and who reject Christianity with a scorn proportionate to their inattention, and yet are by no means without understanding in other matters. Now it has been shown that a serious apprehension that Christianity may be true lays persons under the strictest obligations of a serious regard to it throughout the whole of their life, a regard not the same exactly, but in many respects nearly the same, with what a full conviction of its truth would lay them under. Lastly, it will appear, that blasphemy and profaneness, I mean with regard to Christianity, are absolutely without excuse ; for there is no temptation to it but from the wan- tonness of vanity or mirth, and these, considering the in- finite importance of the subject, are no such temptations as 284 THE ANALOGY OF RELIGION. to aftbrd any excuse for it. If this be a just account of things, and yet men can go on to vilify or disregard Chris- tianity, which is to talk and act as if they had a demonstra- tion of its falsehood, there is no reason to think they would alter their behaviour to any purpose, though there were a demonstration of its truth. ;S5 DISSERTATIONS Of Pa-sonal Identity. Whether we are to live in a future state, as it is the most important question which can possibly be asked, so it is the most intelligible one which can be expressed in language. Yet strange perplexities have been raised about the meaning of that identity or sameness of person which is implied in the notion of our living now and hereafter, or in any two successive moments ; and the solution of these diiticulties hath been stranger than the difficulties themselves ; for per- sonal identity has been explained so by some as to render the inquiry concerning a future life of no consequence at all to us, the persons who are making it ; and though few men can be misled by such subtleties, yet it may be proper a little to consider them. Now when it is asked wherein personal identity consists, the answer should be the same as if it were asked wherein consists similitude or equality, that all attempts to define would but perplex it^ yet there is no difficulty at all in ascertaining the idea ; for as, upon two triangles being com- pared or viewed together there arises to the mind the idea of similitude, or upon twice two and four the idea of equality; so likewise, upon comparing the consciousnesses of oneself or one's own existence in any two moments, there as immediately arises to the mind the idea of personal identity ; and as the two former comparisons not only give c 86 DISSER TA TIONS. us the ideas of similitude and equality, but also show us that two triangles are alike, and twice two and four are equal ; so the latter comparison not only gives us the idea of personal identity, but also shows us the identity of our- selves in those two moments ; the present, suppose, and that immediately past, or the present, and that a month, a year, or twenty years past ; or, in other words, by reflecting upon that which is myself now and that which was myself twenty years ago, I discern there are not two, but one and the same self. But though consciousness of what is past does thus ascertain our personal identity to ourselves, yet to say that it makes personal identity, or is necessary to our being the same persons, is to say that a person has not existed a single moment, nor done one action but what he can re- remember, indeed none but what he reflects upon ; and one should really think it self-evident that consciousness of per- sonal identity presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute personal identity any more than knowledge, in any other case, can constitute truth, which it presupposes. This wonderful mistake may possibly have arisen from hence, that to be indued with consciousness is inseparable from the idea of a person or intelligent being. For this might be expressed inaccurately thus, that consciousness makes personality, and from hence it might be concluded to make personal identity. But though present conscious- ness of what we at present do and feel is necessary to our being the persons we now are, yet present consciousness of past actions or feelings is not necessary to our being the same persons who performed those actions, or had those feelings. The inquiry what makes vegetables the same, in the common acceptation oi the word, does not appear to have any relation to this of personal identity, because the word same, when applied to them and t(j person, is not only OF PERSONAL IDENTITY, 287 applied to different subjects, but it is also used in different senses. For when a man swears to the same tree as having stood fifty years in the same place, he means only the same as to all the purposes of property and uses of common life ; and not tliat the tree has been all that time the same, in the strict philosophical sense of the word. For he does not know whether any one particle of the present tree, be the same with any one particle of the tree which stood in the same place fifty years ago. And if they have not one common particle of matter, they cannot be the same tree in the proper philosophic sense of the word same, it being evidently a contradiction in terms to say they are, when no part of their substance and no one of their properties is the same ; no part of their substance by the supposition ; no one of their properties, because it is allowed that the same property cannot be transferred from one substance to another. And therefore, when we say the identity or sameness of a plant consists in a continuation of the same life, communicated under the same organization, to a number of particles of matter, whether the same or not; the word same, when applied to life and to organization, cannot possibly be understood to signify, what it signifies in this very sentence, when applied to matter. In a loose and popular sense then, the life and the organization and the plant are justly said to be the same, notwithstanding the perpetual change of the parts. But in a strict and philo- sophical manner of speech, no man, no being, no mode of being, no anything, can be the same with that with which it hath indeed nothing the same. Now sameness is used in this latter sense when applied to persons. The identity of these, therefore, cannot subsist with diversity of substance. The thing here considered, and demonstratively, as I think, determined, is proposed by jMr. Locke in these words, "whether it" — i.e., the sam.e self or person, " be the 288 DISSERTATIONS, same identical substance ?" And he has suggested what is a much better answer to the question, than that which he gives it in form. For he defines person, "a thinking inteUigent being," &c., and personal identity, " the sameness of a rational being." ^ The question then is, whether the same rational being is the same substance ; which needs no answer, because being and substance, in this place, stand for the same idea. The ground of the doubt, whether the same person be the same substance, is said to be this ; that the consciousness of our own existence, in youth and in old age, or in any two joint successive moments, is not the same individual action" — i.e., not the same consciousness, but different successive consciousnesses. Now it is strange that this should have occasioned such perplexities. For it is surely conceivable that a person may have a capacity of knowing some object or other to be the same now which it was when he contemplated it formerly ; yet in this case, where, by the supposition, the object is perceived to be the same, the perception of it in any two moments cannot be one and the same perception. And thus, though the successive consciousnesses which we have of our own existence are not the sanie, yet are they consciousnesses, of one and the same thing or object; of the same person, self, or living agent. The person, of whose existence the con- sciousness is felt now, and was felt an hour or a year ago, is discerned to be, not two persons, but one and the same person ; and therefore is one and the same. Mr. Locke's observations upon this subject appear hasty, and he seems to profess himself dissatisfied with supposi- tions which he has made relating to it.^ But some of those hasty observations have been carried to a strange length by others, whose notion, when traced and examined to the ^ Locke's Woiks, vol. i. p. 146. - Locke, pp. 146, 147. " Locke, p. 152. OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. 289 bottom, amounts, I think, to this :' " that personality is not a permanent but a transient thing ; that it hves and dies, begins and ends continually ; that no one can any more remain one and the same person two moments together, than two successive moments can be one and the same moment; that our substance is indeed continually changing, but whether this be so or not, is, it seems, nothing to the purpose, since it is not substance, but consciousness alone, which constitutes personality ; which consciousness, being successive, cannot be the same in any two moments, nor consequently the personality constituted by it." And from hence it must follow, that it is a fallacy upon ourselves to charge our present selves with anything we did, or to imagine our present selves interested in anything which befell us yesterday ; or that our present self will be inter- ested in what will befall vis to-morrow ; since our present self is not in reality the same with the self of yesterday, but another like self or person coming in its room and mistaken for it, to which another self will succeed to- morrow. This, I say, must follow ; for if the self or person of to-day, and that of to-morrow, are not the same, but only like persons, the person of to-day is really no more interested in what will befall the person of to-morrow than in what will befall any other person. It may be thought, perhaps, that this is not a just representation of the opinion we are speaking of, because those who maintain it allow that a person is the same as far back as his remembrance reaches. And indeed they do use the words, idc7itUy and same person. Nor will language permit these words to be laid aside, since if they were, there must be, I know not what ridiculous periphrasis, substituted in the room of them. But they cannot consistently with themselves mean that the ^ See "An Answer lo Dr. Clarke's Third Defence of his Letter to Ml- Dodwell," 2nd ed. pp. 44, 56, &c. K 290 DISSER TA TIONS. person is really the same. For it is self-evident that the personality cannot be really the same, if, as they expressly assert that in which it consists, is not the same. And as consistently with themselves, they cannot, so, I think it appears, they do not mean that the person is really the same, but only that he is so in a fictitious sense ; in such a sense only as they assert, for this they do assert, that any number of persons whatever may be the same person. The bare unfolding this notion, and laying it thus naked and open, seems the best confutation of it. However, since great stress is said to be put upon it, I add the follow- ing things. First : This notion is absolutely contradictory to that certain conviction, which necessarily and every moment rises within us, when we turn our thoughts upon ourselves, when we reflect upon what is passed, and look forward upon what is to come. All imagination of a daily change of that living agent, which each man calls himself, for another, or of any such change throughout our whole present life, is entirely borne down by our natural sense of things. Nor is it possible for a person in his wits to alter his conduct, with regard to his health or affairs, from a suspicion, that though he should live to-morrow, he should not, however, be the came person he is to-day. And yet, if it be reasonable to act, with respect to a future life, upon this notion that personality is transient, it is reasonable to act upon it with respect to the present. Here then is a notion equally applicable to religion and to our temporal concerns, and every one sees and feels the inexpressible absurdity of it in the latter case ; if. therefore any can take up with it in the former, this cannot proceed from the reason of the thing, but must be owing to an inward unfairness and secret corruption of heart. Secondly : It is not an idea, or abstract notion, or OF PERSONAL IDENTITY. 291 quality, but a being only, which is capable of life and action, of happiness and misery. Now all beings confessedly continue the same, during the whole time of their existence. Consider then a living being now existing, and which has existed for any time alive ; this living being must have done and suffered and enjoyed, what it has done and suffered and enjoyed formerly (this living being, I say, and not another), as really as it does and suffers and enjoys, what it docs and suffers and enjoys this instant. All these successive actions, enjoyments and sufferings are actions, enjoyments and sufferings of the same living being. And they are so, prior to all consideration of its remembering or forgetting — since remembering or forgetting can make no alteration in the truth of past matter-of-fact. And suppose this being endued v/ith limited powers of knowledge and memory, there is no more difficulty in conceiving it to have a power, of knowing itself to be the same living being which it was some time ago, of remembering some of its actions, sufferings, and enjoy- ments, and forgetting others, than in conceiving it to know or remember or forget anything else. Thirdly : Every person is conscious that he is now the same person or self he was, as far back as his remembrance reaches, since when any one reflects upon a past action of his own, he is just as certain of the person who did that action — namely, himself, the person who now reflects upon it, as he is certain that the action was at all done. Nay, very often a person's assurance ot an action having been done, of which he is absolutely assured, arises v/hol!y from the consciousness that he himself did it. And this he, person, or self, must either be a substance, or the property of some substance. If he, if person, be a substance, then consciousness that he is the same person is consciousness that he is the same substance. If the person, or he, be the property of a substance, still consciousness that he is the 292 DISSER TA TIONS. same property is as certain a proof that his substance remains the same, as consciousness that he remains the same substance would be — since the same property cannot be transferred from one substance to another. But though we are thus certain that we are the same agents, living beings, or substances, now, which we were as far back as our remembrance reaches, yet it is asiied whether we may not possibly be deceived in it ? And this question may be asked at the end of any demonstration whatever, because it is a question concerning the truth of perception by memory. And he who can doubt whether perception by memory can in this case be depended upon, may doubt also whether perception by deduction and reasoning, which also include memory, or indeed whether intuitive perception can. Here then we can go no further. For it is ridiculous to attempt to prove the truth of those perceptions whose truth we can no otherwise prove than by other perceptions of exactly the same kind with them, and which there is just the same ground to suspect ; or to attempt to prove the truth of our faculties, which can no otherwise be proved, than by the use or means of those very suspected faculties themselves. 293 II. Of the Nature of Virtue. That which renders beings capable of moral government, is their having a moral nature, and moral faculties of per- ception and of action. Brute creatures are impressed and actuated by various instincts and propensions, so also are we. But additional to this, we have a capacity of reflecting upon actions and characters, and making them an object to our thought ; and on doing this we naturally and unavoidably approve some actions, under the peculiar view of their being virtuous and of good desert, and disapprove others as vicious and of ill desert. That we have this moral approving and disapproving^ faculty, is certain from our experiencing it in ourselves, and recognizing it m each other. It appears from our exercising it unavoidably in the approbation and disap- probation even of feigned characters ; from the words, right ^ This way of speaking is taken from Epictetus,* and is made use of as seeming the most full, and least liable to cavil. And the mora) faculty may be understood to have these two epithets, ooKi/j.a(TTiKri and dTroSoKifj-auTiKT], upon a double account : because, upon a survey of actions, whether before or after they are done, it determines them to be good or evil ; and also because it determines itself to be the guide of action and of life, in contradistinction from all other faculties or natural principles of action : in the very same manner as specidative reason directly and naturally judges of speculative truth and falsehood; and, at the same time, is attended with a consciousness upon reflection that the natural right to judge of them belongs to it. * Arr. Epict. L. i. ch. i. 294 DTSSERTATIONS. and wrong, odious and amiable, base and worthy, widi many others of Hke signification in all languages, applied to actions and characters ; from the many written systems of morals which suppose it ; since it cannot be imagined that all these authors, throughout all these treatises, had absolutely no meaning at all to their words, or a meaning merely chimerical ; from our natural sense of gratitude, which implies a disdnc- tion between merely being the instrument of good, and intending it ; from the like distinction every one makes between injury and mere harm which Hobbs says is peculiar to mankind ; and between injury and just punishment, a distinction plainly natural, prior to the consideration of human laws. It is manifest great part of common language, and of common behaviour over the v/orld, is formed upon supposition of such a moral faculty, whether called con- science, moral reason, moral sense, or divine reason; whether considered as a sentiment of the understanding, or as a perception of the heart, or which seems the truth as including both. Nor is it at all doubtful in the general what course of action this faculty, or practical discerning power within us, approves, and what it disapproves. For as much as it has been disputed wherein virtue consists, or whatever ground for doubt there may be about particulars, yet in general there is in reality an universally acknowledged standard of it. , It is that which all ages and all countries have made profession of in jjublic, it is that which every man you meet puts on the show of, it is that which the primary and funda- mental laws of all civil constitutions, over the face of the earth, make it their business and endeavour to enforce tlie practice of upon mankind : namely, justice, veracity, and regard to common good. It being manifest then in general that we have such a faculty or discernment as this, it may be of use to remark some things, more distinctly, concern- ing it. OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE: 295 First : It ought to be observed that the object of this faculty is actions,' comprehending under that name active or practical principles, those principles from which men would act if occasions and circumstances gave them power ; and which when fixed and habitual in any person, we call his character. It does not appear that brutes have the least reflex sense of actions, as distinguished from events ; or that will and design, which constitute the very nature of actions as such, are at all an object to their perception. But to ours they are, and they are the object, and the only one, of the approving and disapproving faculty. Acting, conduct, behaviour, abstracted from all regard to what is in fact and event, the consequence of it, is itself the natural object of the moral discernment ; as speculative truth and falsehood is of speculative reason. Intention of such and such consequences indeed is always included, for it is part of the action itself; but though the intended good or bad consequences do not follow, we have exactly the same sense of the action as if they did. In like manner we think well or ill of characters, abstracted from all consideration of the good or the evil which persons of such characters have it actually in their power to do. We never in the moral way applaud or blame either ourselves or others, for what Ave enjoy or what we suffer, or for having impressions made upon us which we consider as altogether out of our power ; but only for what we do, or would have done had it been in our power, or for what we leave undone which we might have done, or would have left undone though we could have done it. Secondly : Our sense or discernment of actions as morally good or evil implies in it a sense or discernment of them as of good or ill desert. It may be difficult to explam this ^ ou5e y\ dpeTij Kal KaKia — ii' Treiaei. dWa c:'tpyela. M. Anion, L, 9. t6. Virtutis lau5 omnis in aclioue consistit. Cic. Off 1. I. c. 6. 296 DISSER TA TIONS. perception so as to answer all the questions which may be asked concerning it ; but every one speaks of such and such actions as deserving punishment, and it is not, I suppose, pretended that they have absolutely no meaning at all to the expression. Now the meaning plainly is, not that we conceive it for the good of society that the doer of such actions should be made to suffer. For if unhappily it were resolved that a man who by some innocent action was infected with the plague should be left to perish, lest by other people's coming near liim the infection should spread, no one would say he deserved this treatment. Innocence and ill desert are inconsistent ideas 111 desert always supposes guilt, and if one be not part of the other, yet they are evidently and naturally connected in our mind. The sight of a man in misery raises our compassion towards him, and if this misery be inflicted on him by another, our indignation against the author of it. But when we are in- formed that the sufferer is a villain and is punished only for his treachery or cruelty, our compassion exceedingly lessens, and in many instances our indignation wholly subsides. Now what produces this effect is the conception of that in the sufferer which we call ill desert. Upon considering then, or viewing together our notion of vice and that of misery, there results a third, that of ill desert. And thus there is in human creatures an association of the two ideas, natural and moral evil, wickedness and punishment. If this association were merely artificial or accidental, it were nothing; but being most unquestionably natural, it greatly concerns us to attend to it, instead of endeavouring to explain it away. It may be observed further, concerning our perception of good and of ill desert, that the former is very weak with re- spect to common instances of virtue. One reason of which may be that it does not appear to a spectator how far such instances of virtue proceed from a virtuous principle, or in OF THE NATURE OF VIRTLE. 297 what degree this principle is prevalent ; since a very weak regard to virtue may be sufficient to make men act well in many common instances. And, on the other hand, our per- ception of ill desert in vicious actions lessens in proportion to the temptations men are thought to have had to such vices. For vice in human creatures, consisting chiefly in the absence or want of tlie virtuous principle, though a man be overcome, suppose by tortures, it does not from thence appear to what degree the virtuous principle was wanting. All that appears is that he had it not in such a degree as to prevail over the temptation ; but possibly he had it in a degree which would have rendered him proof against common temptations. Thirdly : Our perception of vice and ill desert arises from and is the result of a comparison of actions with the nature and capacities of the agent. For the mere neglect of doing what we ought to do would, in many cases, be determined by all men to be in the highest degree vicious. And this determination must arise from such comparison and be the result of it, because such neglect would not be vicious in creatures of other natures and capacities as brutes. And it is the same also with respect to positive vices, or such as consist in doing what we ought not. For every one has a different sense of harm done by an idiot, madman or child, and by one of mature and common understanding, though the action of both, including the intention which is part of the action, be the same; as it may be, since idiots and madmen, as well as children, are capable not only of doing mischief but also of intending it. Now this difference must arise from somewhat discerned in the nature or capacities of one, which renders the action vicious, and the want of which in the other renders the same action innocent or less vicious ; and this plainly supposes a comparison, whether reflected upon or not, between the action and capacities of 2 98 DISSER TA TIONS. the agent previous to our determining an action to be vicious. And hence arises a proper appHcatiou of the epithets, incongruous, unsuitable, disproportionate, imfit, to actions which our moral faculty determines to be vicious. Fourthly : It deserves to be considered whether men are more at liberty in point of morals to make themselves miserable without reason than to make other people so ; or dissolutely to neglect their own greater good for the sake of a present lesser gratification, than they are to neglect the good of others whom Nature has committed to their care. It should seem th?t a due concern about our own interest or happiness, and a reasonable endeavour to secure and promote it, which is, I think, very much the meaning of the word prudence in our language ; it should seem that this is virtue, and the contrary behaviour faulty and blamable; since, in the calmest way of reflection, we approve of the first and condemn the other conduct, both in ourselves and others. This approbation and disapprobation are altogether different from mere desire of our own or of their happiness, and from sorrow upon missing it. For the object or occa- sion of this last kind of perception is satisfaction or uneasi- ness ; whereas the object of the first is active behaviour. In one case what our thoughts fix upon, is our condition ; in the other, cxiu- conduct. It is true indeed that Nature has not given us so sensible a disapprobation of imprudence and folly either in ourselves or others, as of falsehood; injustice and cruelty ; I suppose because that constant habitual sense of private interest and good which v/e always carry about with us render such sensible disapprobation less necessary, less wanting to keep us from imprudently neglecting our own happiness and foolishly injuring ourselves, than it is necessary and wanting to keep us from injuring others, to whose good we cannot have so strong and constant a regard ; and also because imprudence and folly, appearing to bring OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 299 its own punishment more immediately and constantly than injurious behaviour, it less needs the additional punishment which would be inflicted upon it by others had they the same sensible indignation against it as against injustice and fraud and cruelty. Besides, unhappiness being in itself the natural object of compassion, the unhappiness which people bring upon themselves, though it be wilfully, excites in us some pity for them ; and this of course lessens our dis- pleasure against them. But still it is matter of experience that we are formed so as to reflect very severely upon the greater instances of imprudent neglects and foolish rashness, both in ourselves and others. In instances of this kind men often say of themselves with remorse, and of others with some indignation, that they deserved to sufler such calamities because they brought them upon themselves and would not take warning. Particularly when persons come to poverty and distress by a long course of extravagance, and after frequent admonitions, though without falsehood or injustice ; we plainly do not regard such people as alike objects of compassion with those who are brought into the same condition by unavoidable accidents. From these things it appears that prudence is a species of virtue, and folly of vice ; meaning by folly somewhat quite different from mere incapacity ; a thoughtless want of that regard and attention to our own happiness which we had capacity for. And this the word properly includes, and as it seems in its usual acceptation ; for we scarce apply it to brute creatures. However, if any person be disposed to dispute the matter, I shall very willingly give him up the words virtue and vice, as not applicable to prudence and folly ; but must beg leave to insist that the faculty within us, which is the judge of actions, approves of prudent actions and disapproves im- prudent ones ; I say prudent and imprudent actions as such, 30O niSSER TA TIOXS. and considered distinctly from the happiness or misery which they occasion. And by the way, this observation may help to determine what justness there is in that ob- jection against religion that it teaches us to be interested and selfish. Fit'thly : Without inquiring how far and in what sense virtue is resolvable into benevolence, and vice into the want of it, it may be proper to observe that benevolence and the want of it, singly considered, are in no sort the whole of virtue and vice ; for if this were the case, in the review of one's own character or that of others, our moral understanding and moral sense would be indifferent to every- thing but the degrees in which benevolence prevailed, and the degrees in which it was wanting. That is, we should neither approve of benevolence to some persons rather than to others, nor disapprove injustice and falsehood upon any other account than merely as an overbalance of happiness was foreseen likely to be produced by the first, and of misery by the second. But now, on the contrary, suppose two men competitors for anytliing whatever, which would be of equal advantage to each of them, though nothing indeed would be more impertinent than for a stranger to busy himself to get one of them preferred to the other ; yet such endeavour would be virtue, in behalf of a friend or benefactor, abstracted from all consideration of distant consequences ; as that examples of gratitude and the culti- vation of friendship would be of general good to the world. Again, suppose one man should, by fraud or violence, take from another the fruit of his labour with intent to give it to a third, who, he thought, would have as much pleasure from it as would balance the pleasure which the first possessor would have had in the enjoyment, and his vexation in the loss of it ; suppose also that no bad consequences would follow, yet such an action would surely be vicious. Nay, OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 301 further, were treachery, violence and injustice no otherwise vicious than as foreseen likely to produce an overbalance of misery to society ; then, if in any case a man could procure to himself as great advantage by an act of injustice, as tlie whole foreseen inconvenience likely to be brought upon others by it would amount to; such a piece of injustice would not be faulty or vicious at all, because it would be no more than in any other case for a man to prefer his own satisfaction to another's in equal degrees. The fact then appears to be, that we are constituted so as to condemn falsehood, unprovoked violence, injustice, and to approve of benevolence to some preferably to others abstracted from all consideration, Avhich conduct is likeliest to produce an overbalance of happiness or misery; and therefore, were the Author of Nature to propose nothing to Himself as an end but the production of happiness, were His moral character merely that of benevolence; yet ours is not so. Upon that supposition indeed the only reason of His giving us the above-mentioned approbation of benevolence to some persons rather than others, and disapprobation of falsehood, unprovoked violence and injustice, must be that He foresaw this constitution of our nature would produce more happiness than forming us widi a temper of mere general benevolence. But still, since this is our constitution, falsehood, violence, injustice, must be vice in us, and bene- volence to some preferably to others, virtue, abstracted from all consideration of the overbalance of evil or good which they may appear likely to produce. Now if human creatures are endued with such a moral nature as we have been explaining, or with a moral faculty the natural object of which is actions ; moral government must consist in rendering them happy and unbapjDy, in re- warding and punishing them as they follow, neglect, or de- part from the moral rule of action interwoven in their nature, 302 DISSERTATIONS. or suggested and enforced by this moral faculty/ in rewarding and punishing them upon account of their so doing. I am not sensible that I have, in this fifth observation, contradicted what any author designed to assert. But some of great and distinguished merit have, I think, expressed themselves in a manner which may occasion some danger to careless readers, of imagining the whole of virtue to con- sist in singly aiming, according to the best of their judgment, at promoting the happiness of mankind in the present state, and the whole of vice in doing what they foresee, or might foresee, is likely to produce an overbalance of unhappiness in it ; than which mistakes, none can be conceived more terrible. For it is certain that some of the most shocking instances of injustice, adultery, murder, perjury, and even of persecution, may in many supposable cases not have the appearance of being likely to produce an overbalance of misery in the present state ; perhaps sometimes may have the contrary appearance. For this reflection might easily be carried on, but I forbear — the happiness of the world is the concern of Him who is the Lord and the Proprietor of it ; nor do we know what we are about when we endeavour to promote the good of mankind in any ways but those which He has directed, that is indeed in all ways not con- trary to veracity and justice. I speak thus upon supposi- tion of persons really endeavouring in some sort to do good without regard to these. But the truth seems to be, that such supposed endeavours proceed almost always from ambition, the spirit of party, or some indirect principle concealed perhaps in great measure from persons them- selves. And though it is our business and our duty to endeavour within the bounds of veracity and justice to contribute to the ease, convenience, and even cheerfulness and diversion of our fellow- creatures ; yet from our short 1 P. 112. OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE. 303 views it is greatly uncertain whether this endeavour will in particular instances produce an overbalance of happiness upon the whole, since so many and distant things must come into the account. And that which makes it our duty is, that there is some appearance that it will, and no posi- tive appearance sufficient to balance this on the contrary side, and also that such benevolent endeavour is a cultiva- tion of that most excellent of all virtuous principles, the active principle of benevolence. However, though veracity as well as justice is to be our rule of life, it must be added, otherwise a snare will be laid in the way of some plain men, that the use of common forms of speech generally understood cannot be falsehood ; and in general that there can be no designed falsehood without designing to deceive. It must likewise be observed, that in numberless cases a man may be under the strictest obligations to what he foresees will deceive without his in- tending it For it is impossible not to foresee that the words and actions of men in different ranks and employ- ments, and of different educations, will perpetually be mistaken by each other ; and it cannot but be so whilst they will judge with the utmost carelessness, as they daily do, of what they are not perhaps enough informed to be com- petent judges of, even though they consider it with great attention. Appendix. Ox the title page of his Analogy Butler placed as a motto the sentence from Quintilian: " Ejus (Analogise) hcec vis est, lit id quod dubium est ad aliquid simile, de quo non qureritur, referat, ut incerta certis probet." '• The force of Analogy is this, that it refers what is doubtful to something like it, which is not in question, that it may prove things imcertain by things certain." Argument from analogy does not claim to have equal force with a strict logical induction. " Analogical reasoning," said John Stuart Mill in his Logic, "may be reduced to this formula: two things resemble each other in one or more respects ; a certain proposition is true of the one : therefore it is true of the other. But we have here nothing to discriminate analogy from induction, since this type will serve for all reasoning from experience. In the most rigid induction, c(iually with the faintest analogy, we conclude because A resembles B in one or more pro- perties, that it does so in a certain other property. The difference is, that in the case of a real induction it has been previously shown, by a due comparison of instances, that there is an invariable conjunction between the former pro- perty or properties and the latter property ; but in what is called analogical reasoning, no such conjunction is made out." 3o6 APPENDIX. Butler dwells in his "Analogy," as Pope does in his " Essay on Man," and as Leibnitz did before them in his "Theodicee," upon the error of that ''' reasoning pride," which looked for a System of Religion and a Constitution and Course of Nature that should lie wholly within the view of human reason. No good theologian has ever admitted that there could be discord between Reason and Revelation, or that the Reason of which man has a share differs, in healthy exercise, from that which shaped the world. Butler argued, as Pope did, that we can know only in part, and cannot have full under- standing of the part without a knowledge of the whole. We advance in knowledge only by slow course of observation, and probability becomes to us the very guide of life. Butler does not attempt to prove the existence of God. Assuming a creator spirit as the Great First Cause, assuming also the existence in each human being of an individual soul as a distinct entity, his purpose is to show by Analogy that in the plan of Religion ascribed to them there are not more difiiculties than are to be found in the Course and Constitution of Nature, and that in each case the difficulties are such as may fairly be caused by the inevitable limita- tion of our knowledge. The doubter who does not recog- nise God in Nature denies a postulate essential to Butler's argument. Butler's argument was not to the Atheists, but to the Deists of his time. He wrote to persuade those who could find God in Nature but could not find Him in a scheme of Religion that appeared to them unreasonable. He sought only to persuade men that such schemes were not necessarily unreasonable, and that analogies with Nature made it probable that they were true. But he did not propose to himself to do more. Within limits of human APPENDIX. 307 knowledge we have to be content with Hke measure of difficulty and uncertainty whether our study be of Religion or Nature. Analogy of Nature accords with faith in immor- tality, with faith also in the dependence of our future state upon our present actions. Analogies of Nature make it pro- bable that happiness is to the good ; and that we are in a state of trial by temptation, which may fairly have relation not to the present only, but also to the future. Some thmgs in Nature, as in Religion, lie wholly beyond the Umits of our understanding. If there is such difficulty in reasoning upon Nature, it must be greater in reasoning on Revelation, where all lies beyond our limits of experience. If we are satisfied with the historical evidence of its authority, Analogy of Nature and of Natural Religion will only confirm our faith in Revelation. But by works faith is made perfect. While assuming the existence of God, Butler never attempts to define Him, or to shape for Him divine attributes, in accordance with an ideal that can rest only on human experience. He seeks only to learn what he can from Nature and the Bible, and since man cannot by searching find out God, he is always content to accept, humbly and reverently, as imperfect knowledge that suffices for all needs on earth, such testimonies as he finds. Reasoning his way along one appointed path of thought, Butler never would be tempted eitlier into an inviting by-path? or to a high-road of theology. The "usual known argu- ments/' as to a future state "are," he says, "plainly unanswerable." But he leaves others to state them. He abides always strictly by the argument against improbability derived from observations of Analogy, and in so doing keeps strictly within bounds of the known. He suggests the 3o8 APPENDIX. question whether we may not suppose from Analogy that " things may be now going on throughout the Universe, and may go on hereafter, in the same mixed way as here at present upon earth ?" He replies by showing that the " mixed way" abounds with indications of a divine plan greater than we can now comprehend, for the well-being of a universe in which man is only part of a great whole. Everywhere Butler argues for a God who is the only good, and from whom men turn when they do evil. He was impressed, as in his time all great writers were, with the corruption of human society, and desired that crowning of Arthur by which the chief English poet of our own day represented the allegiance of all man's passions and desires to conscience, as the blame- less king. The following note upon Butler's Ethical System, as set forth in his Rolls Sermons, is taken from the Preface by Dr. Samuel Halifax, then Bishop of Gloucester, to an edition of Butler's Analogy published by him in 1786. " There is," as our Autlior with singular sagacity has observed, "a much more exact correspondence between the natural and moral world, than we are apt to take notice of.''* The inward frame of man answers to his outward condition ; the several propensities, passions, and affec- tions, implanted in our hearts by the Author of Nature, are, in a peculiar manner, adapted to the circumstances of life in which he hath placed us. This general observation, properly pursued, leads to several important conclusions. The original internal constitution of Man, com- pared with his external condition, enables us to discern what course of action and behaviour that constitution leads to, what is our duty re- specting that condition, and furnishes us besides with the most powerful arguments to the practice of it. What the inward frame and constitution of Man is, is a question of fact ; to be determined, as other facts are, from experience, from our internal feelings and external senses, and from the testimony of others- * Sermon VI. APPENDIX. 309 Whether human nature and the circumstances in which it is placed might not have been ordered otherwise, is foreign to our inquiry, and none of our concern ; our province is, taking boih of these as tliey are, and viewing tlie connection between them, from that connection to discover, if we can, what course of action is fitted to that nature and those circumstances. From contemplating the bodily senses, and the organs or instruments adapted to them, we learn that the eye was given to see with, the ear to hear with. In like manner, from considering our inward percpptions and the final causes of them, we collect that the feeling of shame, for instance, was given to prevent the doing of things shameful ; compassion, to carry us to relieve others in distress ; anger, to resist sudden violence offered to ourselves. If, continuing our inquiries in this way, it should at length appear, that the nature, the whole nature, of man, leads him to and is fitted for that particular course of behaviour which we usually distinguish by the name of virtue ; we are authorized to conclude, that virtue is tlie law we are born under, that it was so intended by the Author of our Being ; and we are bound by the most intimate of all obligations, a regard to our own highest interest and happiness, to conform to it in all situations and events. Human nature is not simple and uniform, but made up of several parts ; and we can have no just idea of it as a system or constitution, unless we take into our view the respects and relations which these parts have to each other. As the body is not one member, but many, so our inward structure consists of various instincts, appetites, and pro- pensions. Thus far there is no difference between human creatures and brutes. But besides these common passions and affections, there is another principle, peculiar to mankind, tliat of conscience, moral sense, reflection, call it what you please, by which they are enabled to review their whole conduct, to approve of some actions in themselves, and to disapprove of others. That this principle will of course have some influence on our behaviour, at least at times, will hardly be disputed ; but the particular influence wliich it oiight to have, the precise degree of power in the regulating of our internal frame that is assigned it by Him who placed it ihere, is a point of the utmost consequence in itself, and on the determination of which the very hinge of our Author's moral system turns. If the faculty here spoken of be, indeed, what it is asserted to be, in nature and kind superior to every other passion and affection : if it be given, not merely that it may exert its force occasionally, or as our present humour or fancy may dispose us, but that it may at all times exercise an uncontrollable authority and government over all the rest ; it will then follow, that in order to complete the idea of human nature* 3IO APPENDIX. as a system, we must not only take in each pai'ticular bias, propension, instinct, which are seen to belong to it, but we must add besides the principle of conscience, together with the subjection that is due to it from all the other appetites and passions ; just as the idea of a civil constitution is formed, not barely from enumerating the several members and ranks of which it is composed, but from these considered as acting in various degrees of subordination to each other, and all under the direction of the same supreme authority, whether that authority be vested in one person or more. The following citations are taken from the editions of Butler's Analogy by Dr. William Fitzgerald, Bishop of Cork, Cloyne and Ross. Part I., Chapter V., page 94. — "Against this whole notion of moral discipline, it may be objected in another way ; that so far as a course of behaviour, materially virtuous, proceeds from hope and fear, so far it is only a discipline and strengthening of self-love.'' The reference here is no doubt to Lord Shaftesbury's Inquiry concerning Virtue, Part III., S. 3:— "If there be a belief or conception of a Deity who is considered only as powerful over his creatures, and enforc- ing obedience to his absolute will by particular rewards and punish- ments ; and if on this account, through hope merely of reward or fear of punishment, the creature be incited to do the good he hates, or restrained from doing the ill to which he is not otherwise, in tlie least degree, averse ; there is in this case (as has been already shown) no virtue or goodness whatsoever. The creature, notwithstanding his good conduct, is intrinsically of as little worth as if he acted in his natural way, when under no dread or terror of any sort. There is no more of rectitude, piety or sanctity in a creature thus reformed, than there is meekness or gentleness in a tiger strongly chained ; or innocence and sobriety in a monkey under the discipline of the whip. For however orderly and well those animals, or man himself on like terms, may be induced to act, whilst the will is neither gained, nor the inclination wrought upon, but awe alone prevails and forces obedience, the obedience is servile, and all which is done through it merely servile. The greater degree of APPENDIX. 311 such a submission or obedience is only the greater servility, whatever inay be the object. For whether such a creature has a good master or an ill one, he is neither more nor less servile in his own nature. Be the master or superior ever so perfect or excellent, yet the greater submission caused in this case, through this sole principle or motive, is only the lower and more abject servitude, and implies the greater wretchedness and meanness in the creature who has those passions of self-love so predominant, and is in his temper so vicious and defective as has been explained." But Shaftesbury adds, "notwithstanding the injury which the principle of virtue may possibly suffer by the increase of the selfish passion, in the way we have been mentioning, it is certain, on the other side, that the principle of fear of future punishment and hope of future reward, how mercenary and servile soever it may be accounted, is yet, in many circumstances, a great advantage, security, and support to virtue. It has already been considered that, notwithstanding there may be implanted in the heart a real sense of right and wrong, a real good affection towards the species or society ; yet by the violence of rage, lust, or any other counter- working passion this good affection may frequently be controlled and overcome. Where, therefore, there is nothing in the mind capable to render such ill passions the objects of its aversion, and cause them earnestly to be opposed, it is apparent how much a good temper in time must suffer, and a character by degrees change for tlie worse. But if religion, interposing, creates a belief that the ill passions of this kind, no less than their consequent actions, are the objects of a Deity's animadversion, it is certain that such a belief must prove a seasonable remedy against vice, and be, in a particular manner, advantageous to virtue. For a belief of this kind must be supposed to tend considerably towards the calming of the mind, and disposing or fitting the person to a better recollection of himself, and to a stricter observance of that good and virtuous principle, which needs only his attention to engage him wholly in its party and interest." Part I., Conclusion. — " The very notion of an intelligent Author of Nature, proved by particular final causes, implies a will and a character." Compare the note to Butler's Sermon XV., "On the Ignorance of Man :" — " Suppose some very complicated piece of work, some system or constitution, formed for some general end, to which each of the parts had a reference. The perfection or justness of this work or constitution would consist in the reference and respect which the several parts have to the general design. This reference of parts to the general desigia may be infinitely various both in degree and kind. Thus one 3 1 2 APPENDIX. part may only contribute and be subservient to another; tliis to a third, and so on through a long series, the last part of which, alone, may contribute, immediately and directly, tu the general design. Or a part may have this distant reference to the general design, and may also contribute immediately to it. For instance, if the general design and end for which the complicated frame of nature was brought into being, is happiness, whatever affords present satisfaction, and likewise tends to cany on the course of things, hath this double respect to this general design. Now, suppose a spectator of that work or constitution was, in a great measure, ignorant of such various reference to the general end, whatever that end be ; and that upon a very slight and partial view which he had of the work, several of the things appeared to his eye disproportionate and wrong ; others just and beautiful : what would he gather from these appearances? He would immediately conclude there was a probability, if he could see the whole reference of the parts appearing wrong to the general design, that this would destroy the appearance of wrongness and disproportion ; but there is no probability that the reference would destroy the particular right appearances, though that reference might show the things already appearing just, to be so likewise in a higher degree or anotlier manuer. There is a pro- bability tliat the right appearances were intended ; there is no proba- bility that the wrong appearances were. We cannot suspect irregularity and disorder to be designed^. The pillars'of a building appear beautiful, but their being likewise its support does not destroy tliat beauty ; there still remains a reason to believe that the architect intended the beautiful appearance, after we have found out the reference, support. It would be reasonable for a man of himself, to think thus upon the first piece of architecture he ever saw." 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