PHILOSOPHY 
 
 6 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, BART,, 
 
 PEOFESSOE OF LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS IN EDINBUEGH 
 VNIVEESITY ; 
 
 0. W. WIGHT, 
 
 TBANSLATOR OF COUSIN'S " HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY.' 
 
 FOE THE USE OF SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES. 
 
 NoSs ip?) KOI NoCf aKovei, raAXa %(i)$(l KO.I TV<f>\d. 
 
 Mind it seeth, Mind it heareth ; all beside is deaf and blind. 
 
 EPICHAEMOT (?). 
 
 NEW YORK: 
 D. APPLETON & COMPANY, 200 BROADWAY. 
 
 M DCCC Lin. 

 
 Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1853, 
 BY D. APPLETON & COMPANY, 
 
 In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the Southern 
 District of New York.
 
 3 
 
 TO 
 
 REV. LAURENS P. HICKOK, D. D., 
 
 VICE-PRESIDENT OP UNION COLLEGE, LATE PROFESSOR OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY IN 
 
 AUBURN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, AUTHOR OF " RATIONAL 
 
 PSYCHOLOGY," ETC., ETC., 
 
 THIS COLLECTION OF SIR WM. HAMILTON'S 
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL DISCUSSIONS AND DISSERTATIONS, 
 
 %s BeUfcateH; 
 
 2 
 
 O AS A TOKEN OF TUE EDITOR S ADMIRATION OF 
 
 ONE OF THE VERY ABLEST METAPHYSICIANS AMERICA HAS PRODUCED; 
 
 AS 
 A TRIBUTE JUSTLY DUE TO THE FAITHFUL TEACHER, 
 
 WHO HAS DEVOTED 
 
 MANY YEARS OF HIS LIFE TO PREPARING YOUNG MEN FOR 
 HIGH PUBLIC DUTIES, 
 
 O 
 
 t 
 
 O 
 
 THUS FULFILLING TIIE RESPONSIBLE OFFICE OF 
 
 A "KEEPER OF THE KEEPERS." 
 
 43200 S
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 IN this publication we give to the readers and students 
 of philosophy in America all, except part of an unfin- 
 ished Dissertation, that Sir "Wm. Hamilton has pub- 
 lished directly on the subject of metaphysics. The com- 
 pleted supplementary Dissertations on Reid, 1 the foot- 
 notes to Reid that have an enduring interest, and the 
 philosophical portion of the 'Discussions, 2 etc.,' have 
 been used to make up this work. The article on Logic 
 and the Appendix Logical, in the Discussions, might 
 have been added, but these do not properly belong to 
 the metaphysical system of Hamilton, and, moreover, 
 have been reserved for another purpose. The place 
 where each part of this volume may be found in the 
 work from which it is taken, has been designated by a 
 foot-note. 
 
 In our collection and arrangement of Hamilton's Phi- 
 losophy, we have followed a systematic plan. Any ex- 
 planation or vindication of this plan would be, to those 
 who are unacquainted with Sir Wm.'s system, unintel- 
 
 1 The works of Thomas Reid, D. D., now fully collected, with selec- 
 tions from his unpublished letters. Preface, Notes, and Supplementary 
 Dissertations, by Sir Wm. Hamilton, Bart. London and Edinburgh : 
 Third Edition, 1852 : pp. 914 (not completed). 
 
 2 Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education and University 
 Reform. By Sir Win. Hamilton, Bart. London and Edinburgh, 1852: 
 pp. 758.
 
 b PREFACE. 
 
 ligible ; to those who have mastered its principles, su- 
 perfluous. Our foot-notes are not very numerous, and 
 consist mostly in references to other parts of the work, 
 where some point indicated is more fully treated ; and in 
 explanations of a few, more than usually difficult, pas- 
 sages. In a single instance we have expressed our dis- 
 sent from a position taken by Hamilton, the grounds 
 of which we have briefly designated, without entering 
 upon a systematic discussion. A severer study may 
 convince us that Sir Win. is right and that we are 
 wrong. 
 
 Hamilton has promised a General Preface to his Reid, 
 and a Sequel of the Dissertations. When these appear, 
 they will be added to this work in a separate volume, in 
 which the Indices will be given to the whole. 
 
 New York, June, 1853.
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 WE do not propose to give here a resume of Sir Win. Hamilton's 
 philosophy. A correct list, in technical language, of the principles 
 of his system, would not be a clear exposition of his metaphysical 
 doctrines. To attempt to put in a brief introduction the substance 
 of several hundred pages of Hamilton's Philosophical Discussions and 
 Dissertations would be presumptuous and preposterous. A philoso- 
 pher, who thinks like Aristotle ; whose logic is as stern as that of 
 St. Thomas, 'the lawgiver of the Church;' who rivals Muretns as 
 a critic ; whose erudition finds a parallel only in that of the younger 
 Scaliger ; whose subtlety of thought and polemical power remind us 
 of the dauntless prince 1 of Verona ; Avhose penetrating analysis reaches 
 deeper than that of Kant, such a one, it it our pleasure to introduce 
 to the students of philosophy in America ; who, in a style severely 
 elegant, with accuracy of statement, with precision of definition, in 
 sequence and admirable order, will explain a system in many respects 
 new, a system that will provoke thought, that, consequently, carries 
 in itself the germs of beneficial revolutions in literature and educa- 
 tion, in all those things that are produced and regulated by miud 
 in action. True to our plan of making the work as completely 
 Hamilton's as possible, we shall offer, mostly in the language of 
 our author, a few considerations on the utility of the study of phi- 
 losophy. 
 
 Philosophy is a necessity. Every man philosophizes as he thinks. 
 The worth of his philosophy will depend upon the value of his think- 
 ing. ' If to philosophize be right,' says Aristotle, in his Exhortative, 
 we must philosophize to realize the right; if to philosophize be 
 
 1 The elder Scaliger.
 
 8 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 wrong, we must philosophize to manifest the wrong : on any alterna- 
 tive, therefore, philosophize we must." 
 
 No philosopher can explore the whole realm of truth. No single 
 mind can compass the aggregate of what is possessed by all. Every 
 system must, then, he incomplete ; it cannot be taken as an equiva- 
 lent for all that can be thought. The most that any system can do 
 for us is to aid us, to stimulate our minds, to infuse higher intellectual 
 energy. ' If the accomplishment of philosophy,' says Hamilton (Db. 
 p. 39, et seq.), 'imply a cessation of discussion if the result of specu- 
 lation be a paralysis of itself, the consummation of knowledge is the 
 condition of intellectual barbarism. Plato has profoundly defined 
 man " the hunter of truth ;" for in this chase as in others, the pursuit 
 is all in all, the success comparatively nothing. " Did the Almighty, 1 ' 
 says Lessing, " holding in his right hand Truth, and in his left, Search 
 after Truth, deign to proffer me the one I might prefer, in all hu- 
 mility, but without hesitation, I should request Search after Truth." 1 
 We exist only as we energize; pleasure* is the reflex of unimpeded 
 energy ; energy is the mean by which our faculties are developed ; 
 and a higher energy the end which their development proposes. In 
 action is thus contained the existence, happiness, improvement, and 
 perfection of our being ; and knowledge is only previous, as it may 
 afford a stimulus to the exercise of our powers, and the condition of 
 their more complete activity. Speculative truth is, therefore, sub- 
 ordinate to speculation itself; and its value is directly measured by 
 the quantity of energy which it occasions immediately in its dis- 
 covery mediately through its consequences. Life to Endymiou 
 was not preferable to death ; aloof from practice, a waking error is 
 better than a sleeping truth. Neither, in point of fact, is there found 
 any proportion between the possession of truths, and the development 
 of the mind in which they are deposited. Every learner in science 
 is now familiar with more truths than Aristotle or Plato ever dreamt 
 of knowing; yet, compared with the Stagirite or the Athenian, how 
 few among our masters of modern science rank higher than intel- 
 lectual barbarians ! Ancient Greece and modern Europe prove, in- 
 deed, that the " march of intellect" is no inseparable concomitant of 
 
 ' E/ ftiv <f>t\ooo<priTtov, <pi\t>ao(pt)Ttov' xal si ft!) <f>i\i,aoif>i}rio 
 vdvriaf Spa <j>i\ooo$ririov. 
 
 * Aristotle defined happiness, Energizing according to virtue. It results from th 
 healthy, unimpeded activity of every element of eur nature. W.
 
 INTfiODUCTION. 9 
 
 " the march of science ;" that the cultivation of the individual is not 
 to be rashly confounded with the progress of the species. 
 
 ' But if the possession of theoretical facts be not convertible with 
 mental improvement, and if the former be important only as subser- 
 vient to the latter, it follows that the comparative utility of a study 
 is not to be principally estimated by the complement of truths which 
 it may communicate, but by the degree in which it determines our 
 higher capacities to action. But though this be the standard by 
 which the different methods, the different branches, and the different 
 masters of philosophy ought to be principally (and it is the only 
 criterion by which they can all be satisfactorily) tried, it is never- 
 theless a standard by which neither methods, nor sciences, nor phi- 
 losophers, have ever yet been even inadequately appreciated. The 
 critical history of philosophy, in this spirit, has still to be written ; 
 and when written, how opposite will be the rank which, on the 
 higher and more certain standard, it will frequently adjudge to the 
 various branches of knowledge, and the various modes of their culti- 
 vation to the different ages, and countries, and individuals, from 
 that which has been hitherto partially awarded, on the vacillating 
 authority of the lower ! 
 
 ' On this ground (which we have not been able fully to state, far 
 less adequately to illustrate), we rest the pre-eminent utility of meta- 
 physical speculations. That they comprehend all the sublimest ob- 
 jects of our theoretical and moral interest ; that every (natural) con- 
 clusion concerning God, the soul, the present worth and future des- 
 tiny of man, is exclusively metaphysical, will be at once admitted. 
 But we do not found the importance on the paramount dignity ot 
 the pursuit. It is as the best gymnastic of the mind as a mean 
 principally and almost exclusively conducive to the highest education 
 of our noblest powers, that we would vindicate to these speculation 
 the necessity, which has too frequently been denied them. By no 
 other intellectual application (and least of all by physical pursuits) 
 is the soul thus reflected on itself, and its faculties concentrated in 
 such independent, vigorous, unwonted, and continued energy ; by 
 none, therefore, are its best capacities so variously and intensely 
 evolved. " Where there is most life, there is the victory." 
 
 ' Let it not be believed that the mighty minds who have cultivated 
 these studies,, have toiled in vain. If they have not always realized 
 truth, they have always determined exertion ; and in the genial elo- 
 
 1*
 
 10 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 queuce of the elder Scaliger : u Eio subtilitates, quanquam sint auimi.s 
 otiosis atqiie inutiles, vegetis tniueii ingcniis summain cognoscendi 
 afferunt voloptateui,* sitffl, scilicet in fastigio ejus sapiential, qiuo 
 forum oinniuin principia contemplatur. Et quainvis liannn iudagatio 
 non sit utilis ad machinas farinarias conliciendas ; exuit tamen ani- 
 muin iu.scit'ue rubigine, acuitque ad alia. Eo denique splendoro ailicit, 
 ut pncluceat sibi ad uanciscendum primi opiticis similitudinem. Qui, 
 ut oiunia pleue ac perfects cst, at prroter et supra oinuia ; ita eos, 
 qui scientiarum studios! sunt, suos esse voluit, ipsorumque intellectinn 
 reruiu dominum constituit.'" 
 
 'The practical danger which has sometimes been apprehended from 
 metaphysical pursuits, has in reality only been found to follow from 
 their stunted and partial cultivation. The poison has grown up ; the 
 antidote has been repressed. In Britain and in Germany, where 
 speculation lias remained comparatively free, the dominant result has 
 been highly favorable to religion 2 and morals; whilst the evils which 
 arose in France, arose from the benumbing influence of a one effete 
 philosophy ; a and have, in point of fact, mainly been corrected by 
 the awakened spirit of metaphysical inquiry itself.' 
 
 Hamilton again says (' Discussions-,' p. 696, et seq.) : ' Yet is Philoso- 
 phy (the science of science the theory of what we can know and 
 think and do, in a word, the knowledge of ourselves), the object of 
 liberal education, at once of paramount importance in itself, and the 
 requisite condition of every other liberal science. If men are really 
 
 1 Bacon, himself, the great champion of physical pursuits, says: 'Those sciences are 
 not to be regarded as useless, -which, considered in themselves, are valueless, if they 
 sharpen the mind and reduce it to order. Hume, Burke, Knnt, Stewart, &c., might be 
 quoted to the same effect Compare Aristotle, Metapli. I. 2, Eth. Nic. v. 7. 
 
 2 The philosophers of Germany, not as it is generally supposed in this country, and 
 even by those who ought to know, have been more orthodox than the divines. Fichte, 
 who was, for his country and his times, a singularly pious Christian, was persecuted by 
 the theologians, on account of his orthodoxy. IK 
 
 3 'Since the mctaphysic of Locke,' says M. Cousin, in 1S10, 'crossed the channel on 
 the light and brilliant wings of Voltaire's imagination, sensualism has reigned in France 
 without contradiction, and with an authority of which there is no parallel in the whole 
 history of philosophy. It is a fact, marvellous but incontestable, that from the time of 
 Condillac, there has not appeared among us any philosophical work, at variance with 
 his doctrine, which has produced the smallest impression on the public mind. Condillao 
 thus reigned in peace ; and his domination, prolonged even to our own days, through 
 changes of every kind, pursued its tranquil course, apparently above the reach of dan- 
 ger. Discussion had closed : his disciples had only to develop the words of their master : 
 philosophy seemed accomplished.' (Journal des Savan-s.) During the reign of sen- 
 sualism in France, religion languished, for she was deprived of the aid of her most ef- 
 ficient servant philosophy. W.
 
 INTKODUCTION. 11 
 
 to know aught else, the human faculties, by which alone this knowl- 
 edge may be realized, must be studied for themselves, in their extent 
 and in their limitations. To know, we must understand our in- 
 strument of knowing. " Know thyself" is, in fact, a heavenly precept, 
 in Christianity as in heathenism. And this knowledge can be com- 
 passed only by reflection, only from within : " Ne te qusesieris 
 extra." It tells us at once of our weakness and our worth ; it is the 
 discipline both of humility and hope. On the other hand, a knowl- 
 edge, drawn too exclusively from without, is not only imperfect in 
 itself, but makes its votaries fatalists, materialists, pantheists if they 
 dare to think ; it is the dogmatism of despair. " Laudabilior," says 
 Augustin, "laudabilior est animus, cui nota est infirmitas propria, 
 quam qui, ea non respecta, mcenia mundi, vias siderum, ftmdamenta 
 terrarum et fastigia coelorum, etiam cogniturus, scrutatur." We can 
 know God only as we know ourselves. " Xoverim me, noverim Te," 
 is St. Austin's prayer ; St. Bernard : " Principale, ad videndum 
 Deum, est animus rationalis intuens seipsum ;" and even Averroes : 
 " Nosce teipsum, et cognosces creatorem tuum." 
 
 ' ]STor is the omission of philosophy from an academical curriculum 
 equivalent to an arrest on the philosophizing activity of the student. 
 This stupor, however deplorable in itself, might still be a minor evil ; 
 for it is better, assuredly, to be without opinions, than to have them, 
 not only superlatively untrue, but practically corruptive. Yet, even 
 this paralysis, I say, is not accomplished. Eight or wrong, a man 
 must philosophize, for he philosophizes as he thinks ; and the only 
 eifect, in the present day especially, of a University denying to its 
 alumni the invigorating exercise of a right philosophy, is their aban- 
 donment, not only without precaution, but even prepared by debili- 
 tation, to the pernicious influence of a wrong : " Sine vindice prseda." 
 And in what country has a philosophy ever gravitating, as theoretical 
 towards materialism, as practical towards fatalism, been most pecu- 
 liar and pervasive ? 
 
 4 Again : Philosophy, the thinking of thought, the recoil of mind 
 upon itself, is the most improving of mental exercises, conducing, 
 above all others, to evolve the highest and rarest of the intellectual 
 powers. By this, the mind is not only trained to philosophy proper, 
 but prepared, in general, for powerful, easy, and successful energy, 
 in whatever department of knowledge it may more peculiarly apply 
 itself. But the want of this superior discipline is but too apparent in
 
 12 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 English [American] literature, and especially in those very fields of 
 erudition by preference cultivated in England [America]. 
 
 * Of English [American] scholars as a class, both now and for gen- 
 erations past, the observation of Godfrey Hermann holds good : 
 u They read but do not think ; they would be philologers, and have 
 not learned to philosophize." The philosophy of a philology is shown 
 primarily in its grammars, and its grammars for the use of schools. 
 But in this respect, England [America] remained, till lately, nearly 
 two centuries behind the rest of Christendom. If there were any 
 principle in her pedagogical practice, "Gaudent sudoribus artes," 
 must have been the rule ; and applied it was with a vengeance. The 
 English [American] schoolboy was treated like the Russian pack- 
 horse ; the load in one pannier was balanced by a counter-weight 
 of stones in the other. . . . The unhappy tyro was initiated in 
 Latin, through a Latin book ; while the ten declensions, the thirteen 
 conjugations, which had been reduced to three and two by Weller 
 and Lancelot, still continued, among a mass of other abomina- 
 tions, to complicate, in this country, the elementary instruction of 
 Greek. . . . But all has now been changed except the cause : for 
 the same iuertion of original and independent thought is equally ap- 
 parent. As formerly, from want of thinking, the old sufficed; so 
 now, from want of thinking, the new is borrowed. In fact, openly or 
 occultly, honorably or dishonorably, the far greater part of the higher 
 and lower philology published in this country is an importation, 
 especially from Germany : but so passive is the ignorance of our 
 compilers, that they are often (though affecting, of course, opin- 
 ions), unaware even of what is best worthy of plagiarism or trans- 
 plantation. 
 
 ' Theology Christian theology is, as a human science, a philology 
 and history applied by philosophy ; and the comparatively ineffectual 
 character of our British [American] theology has, for generations, 
 mainly resulted from the deficiency of its philosophical element. The 
 want of a philosophical training in the Anglican [American] clergy. 
 to be regretted at all times, may soon, indeed, become lamentably 
 apparent, were they called on to resist an invasion, now so likely, of 
 certain foreign philosophico- theological opinions. 1 In fact, this is the 
 
 1 This invasion has already come with us. Dr. Hickok and a few others, who alone 
 see the real danger, have faced it manfully and well armed. .The spirit of the Absolute, 
 which has found its way hither through various channels, from the country of Scholling
 
 INTRODUCTION. 13 
 
 invasion, and this the want of national preparation, for which even at 
 the present juncture, I should be most alarmed. On the Universities, 1 
 which have illegally dropped philosophy and its training from their 
 course of discipline, will lie the responsibility of this singular and 
 dangerous disarmature.' 
 
 We commend Hamilton's philosophy to educators, not only for its 
 great excellence as a metaphysical system, for its profound thought 
 and affluent erudition, for its spirit of free inquiry, and, consequently, 
 its power' to quicken the mind; but, above all, we commend it for its 
 accordance with the principles of revealed religion. Sir Wm., though 
 metaphysically the ' most formidable man in Europe,' is an humble 
 Christian ; though the most learned of men, he is ready to bow be- 
 fore the spirit that ' informed' the mind of Paul. Hamilton says that 
 he is confident that his philosophy is founded upon truth. ' To this 
 confidence I have come, not merely through the convictions of my 
 own consciousness, but by finding in this system a centre and con- 
 ciliation for the most opposite of philosophical opinions. Above all, 
 however, I am confirmed in my belief, by the harmony between the 
 doctrines of this philosophy, and those of revealed truth. " Credo 
 equidem, nee von fides." The philosophy of the Conditioned is indeed 
 pre-eminently a discipline of humility ; a " learned ignorance," directly 
 opposed to the false " knowledge which puffeth up." I may say with 
 St. Chrysostom : " The foundation of our philosophy is humility."- 
 (Homil. de Perf. Evang.) For it is professedly a scientific demon- 
 stration of the impossibility of that " wisdom in high matters" which 
 the apostle prohibits us even to attempt ; and it proposes, from the 
 limitations of the human powers, from our impotence to comprehend 
 what, however, we must admit, to show articulately why the " secret 
 things of God" cannot but be to man " past finding out." Humility 
 thus becomes the cardinal virtue, not only of revelation, but of reason. 
 This scheme proves, moreover, that no difficulty emerges in theology, 
 which had not previously emerged in philosophy ; that in fact, if the 
 divine do not transcend what it has pleased the Deity to reveal, and 
 wilfully indentify the doctrine of God's word with some arrogant ex- 
 
 and Hegel, will not be exorcised by a solemn reading of creeds, and by repeating some 
 stereotyped theological phrases ; it must be brought into the clear white light of thought ; 
 like every other spectre of the night, it will vanish at the real dawn. W. 
 
 1 Our American colleges, instead of having 'dropped philosophy and its training from 
 their course of discipline,' have never seriously taken it tip. W.
 
 14: INTRODUCTION. 
 
 treme of human speculation, philosophy will bo found the most use- 
 ful auxiliary of theology. For a world of false, and pestilent, and 
 presumptuous reasoning, by which philosophy and theology are now 
 equally discredited, would be at once abolished, in the recognition of 
 this rule of prudent nescience; nor could it longer be too justly said 
 of the code of consciousness, as by reformed divines it has been ac- 
 knowledged of the Bible : 
 
 "This is the book, where each his dogma seeks; 
 And this the book, where each his dogma finds." '
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 PART FIRST. 
 
 THE PHILOSOPHY OP COMMON SENSE ; OR, OUR PRIMARY BE- 
 LIEFS CONSIDERED AS THE ULTIMATE CRITERION OF TRUTH. 
 
 SECTION I. The Meaning of the Doctrine, and Purport of the Argu- 
 ment, of Common Sense 19 
 
 II. The Conditions of the Legitimacy, and legitimate applica- 
 tion, of the argument 86 
 
 III. That it is one strictly Philosophical and scientific 41 
 
 IV. The Essential Characters by which our primary beliefs, or 
 
 the principles of Common Sense, are discriminated 47 
 
 V. The Nomenclature, that is, the various appellations by 
 
 which these have been designated 50 
 
 VI. The Universality of the philosophy of Common Sense; or 
 its general recognition, in reality and in name, shown by 
 a chronological series of Testimonies from the dawn of 
 speculation to the present day , 85 
 
 PART SECOND. 
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 CHAPTER I. ELUCIDATION or REID'S DOCTRINE or PERCEPTION, AND ITS 
 DEFENCE AGAINST SIR THOMAS BROWN 165 
 
 CHAPTER II. PRESEXTATIVE AND REPRESENTATIVE KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 SECTION I. The distinction of Presentative, Intuitive, or Immediate, 
 and of Representative or Mediate cognition ; with the va- 
 rious significations of the term Object, its conjugates and 
 
 correlatives 233 
 
 II. Errors of Reid and other Philosophers, in reference to the 
 
 preceding distinctions 256
 
 16 CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER IIL VARIOUS THEORIES OF EXTERNAL PERCEPTION. 
 
 SECTION I. Systematic Schemes, from different points of view, of the 
 various theories of the relation of External Perception to 
 its Object; and of the various systems of Philosophy 
 
 founded thereon 265 
 
 II. What is the character, in this respect, of Reid's doctrine of 
 
 Perception ? 272 
 
 CHAPTER IV. DOCTRINE OF PERCEPTION MAINTAINED BY THE ABSO- 
 LUTE IDEALISTS. DISCUSSION ON THE SCHEME OF ARTHUR COLLIER.. 285 
 
 CHAPTER V. DISTINCTION OF THE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES OF 
 
 BODY. 
 
 SECTION I. Historically considered 806 
 
 II. Critically considered. Three classes (Primary, Secundo- 
 
 Primary, and Secondary Qualities) established 852 
 
 CHAPTER VI. PERCEPTION PROPER AND SENSATION PROPER. 
 
 SECTION I. Principal momenta of the Editor's doctrine of Perception, 
 (A) in itself, and (B) in contrast to that of Reid, Stewart, 
 Royer-Collard, and other philosophers of the Scottish 
 
 School 412 
 
 II. Historical notices in regard to the distinction of Perceptio* 
 
 proper and Sensation proper 482 
 
 PART THIRD. 
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 
 
 CHAPTER I. REFUTATION OF THE VARIOUS DOCTRINES OF THB UNCON- 
 DITIONED, ESPECIALLY OF COUSIN'S DOCTRINE OF THE INFINITO- ABSO- 
 LUTE 441 
 
 CHAPTER II. LIMITATION OF THOUGHT AND KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 SECTION I. A Doctrine of the Relative ; tho Categories of Thought 484 
 
 II. Philosophical Testimonies to the Limitation of our Knowl- 
 edge, from the Limitation of our Faculties 517
 
 PAET FIRST. 
 
 PHILOSOPHY 
 
 COMMON SENSE.
 
 \\ 
 
 "THERE is nothing that can pretend to judge of Reason but itself: and, 
 therefore, they who suppose that they ran say aught against it, are forced 
 (like jewellers, who beat true diamonds to powder to cut and polish false 
 ones), to make use of it against itself. But in this they cheat themselves as 
 well as others. For if what they say against Reason, be without Reason, 
 they deserve to be neglected ; and if with Reason, they disprove them- 
 selves. For they use it while they disclaim it; and with as much contra- 
 diction, as if a man should tell me that he cannot speak." 
 
 AUTHOR OF HCDIBRAS (Reflections upon Reason).
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE, 1 
 
 OR, 
 
 OUR PRIMARY BELIEFS CONSIDERED AS THE ULTIMATE 
 CRITERION OF TRUTH. 
 
 I. THE MEANING OF THE DOCTRINE, AND PURPORT OF THE 
 
 ARGUMENT, OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 IN the conception and application of the doctrine of Common 
 Sense, the most signal mistakes have been committed ; and much 
 unfounded prejudice has been excited against the argument which 
 it affords, in consequence of the erroneous views which have been 
 held in regard to its purport and conditions. What is the veritable 
 character of this doctrine, it is, therefore, necessary to consider. 
 
 Our cognitions, it is evident, are not all at second hand. Con- 
 sequents cannot, by an infinite regress, be evolved out of ante- 
 cedents, which are themselves only consequents. Demonstration, 
 if proof be possible, behooves us to repose at last on propositions, 
 which, carrying their own evidence, necessitate their own admis- 
 sion ; and which being, as primary, inexplicable, as inexplicable, 
 incomprehensible, must consequently manifest themselves less in 
 the character of cognitions than of facts, of which consciousness 
 assures us under the simple form of feeling or belief. 
 
 Without at present attempting to determine the character, 
 number, and relations waiving, in short, all attempt at an artic- 
 
 1 The Philosophy of Common Sense properly comes first in Hamilton's 
 System, for he sets out from the ultimate facts of consciousness, or the pri- 
 mary beliefs of mankind. The leading Supplementary Dissertation in his 
 edition of Reid, constitutes the first general division in our arrangement of 
 his philosophy. W,
 
 20 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 ulate analysis and classification of the primary elements of cogni- 
 tion, as carrying us into a discussion beyond our limits, and not 
 of indispensable importance for the end we have in view ;* it is 
 sufficient to have it conceded, in general, that such elements there 
 are ; and this concession of their existence being supposed, I shall 
 proceed to hazard some observations, principally in regard to their 
 authority as warrants and criteria of truth. Nor can this as- 
 sumption of the existence of some original bases of knowledge in 
 the mind itself, be refused by any. For even those philosophers 
 who profess to derive all our knowledge from experience, and who 
 admit no universal truths of intelligence but such as are generalized 
 from individual truths of fact even these philosophers are forced 
 virtually to acknowledge, at the root of the several acts of observa- 
 tion from which their generalization starts, some law or principle 
 
 * Such an analysis and classification is however in itself certainly one of 
 the most interesting and important problems of philosophy ; and it is one 
 in which much remains to be accomplished. Principles of cognition, which 
 now stand as ultimate, may, I think, be reduced to simpler clemente ; and 
 some which are now viewed as direct and positive, may bo shown to be 
 merely indirect and negative ; their cogency depending, not on the immedi- 
 ate necessity of thinking them for if carried unconditionally out, {hey are 
 themselves incogitable but in the impossibility of thinking something to 
 which they are directly opposed, and from which they are the immediate re- 
 coils. An exposition of the axiom That positive thought lies in the limita- 
 tion or conditioning of one or other of two opposite extremes, neither of which 
 as unconditioned, can be realized to the mind as possible, and yet of which, 
 as contradictories, one or other must, by the fundamental laws of thought, 
 be recognized as necessary : The exposition of this great but unenounced 
 axiom would show that some of the most illustrious principles are only its 
 subordinate modifications as applied to certain primary notions, intuitions, 
 data, forms, or categories of intelligence, as Existence, Quantity (protensive, 
 Time extensive, Space intensive, Degree) Quality, etc. Such modifications, 
 for example, are the principles of, Cause and Effect, 1 Substance and Phenom- 
 enon, etc. 
 
 I may here also observe, that though the primary truths of facts and the 
 primary truths of intelligence (the contingent and necessary truths of Eeid) 
 form two very distinct classes of the original beliefs or intuitions of conscious- 
 ness ; there appears no sufficient ground to regard their sources as different, 
 and therefore to be distinguished by different names. In this I regret that 
 I am unable to agree with Mr. Stewart. See his Elements, vol. ii. ch. 1, and 
 his account of Reid. 
 
 See Part Third of thia vol. pawira. W.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 21 
 
 to which they can appeal as guaranteeing the procedure, should the 
 validity of these primordial acts themselves be called in question- 
 This acknowledgment is, among others, made even by Locke ; and 
 on such fundamental guarantee of induction he even bestows the 
 name of Common Sense. (See below, in Testimonies, No. 51.) 
 
 Limiting, therefore, our consideration to the question of au- 
 thority ; how, it is asked, do these primary propositions these 
 cognitions at first hand these fundamental facts, feelings, beliefs, 
 certify us of their own veracity ? To this the only possible an- 
 swer is that as elements of our mental constitution as the es- 
 sential conditions of our knowledge they must by us be accept- 
 ed as true. To suppose their falsehood, is to suppose that we are 
 created capable of intelligence, in order to be made the victims 
 of delusion ; that God is a deceiver, and the root of our nature a 
 lie.- But such a supposition, if gratuitous, is manifestly illegiti- 
 mate. For, on the contrary, the data of our original conscious- 
 ness must, it is evident, in the first instance, be presumed true. It 
 is only if proved false, that their authority can, in consequence of 
 that proof, be, in the second instance, disallowed. Speaking, there- 
 fore, generally, to argue from common sense, is simply to show, 
 that the denial of a given proposition would involve the denial of 
 some original datum of consciousness.; but as every original da- 
 tum of consciousness is to be presumed true, that the proposition 
 in question, as dependent on such a principle, must be admitted. 
 
 But that such an argument is competent and conclusive, must 
 be more articulately shown. 
 
 Here, however, at the outset, it is proper to take a distinction, 
 the neglect of which has been productive of considerable error 
 and confusion. It is the distinction between the data or deliver- 
 ances of consciousness considered simply, in themselves, as appre- 
 hended facts or actual manifestations, and those deliverances 
 considered as testimonies to the truth of facts beyond their own 
 phenomenal reality. 
 
 Viewed under the former limitation, they are above all skepti- 
 cism. For as doubt is itself only a manifestation of consciousness,
 
 22 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 it is impossible to doubt that, what consciousness manifests, it 
 does manifest, without, in thus doubting, doubting that we actu- 
 ally doubt ; that is, without the doubt contradicting and there- 
 fore annihilating itself. Hence it is that the facts of conscious- 
 ness, as mere phenomena, are by the unanimous confession of 
 all Skeptics and Idealists, ancient and modern, placed high above 
 the reach of question. Thus, Laertius, in Pyrrh., L. ix. seg. 103 ; 
 Seztus Empiricus, Pyrrh. Hypot, L. i. cc. 4, 10, et passim ; 
 Descartes, Mecl., ii. pp. 13, and iii. p. 16, ed. 1058; Hume, 
 Treatise on Human Nature, vol. i. pp. 123, 370, et alibi, orig. 
 ed. ; Schulze, Aenesidemus, p. 24, Kritik, vol. i. p. 51 ; Plai- 
 ner, Aphor., vol. i. 708 ; Reinhold, Theorie, p. 190 ; ScJtad, 
 in Fichte's Philos. Jour., vol. x. p. 270. See also St. Austin, 
 Contra. Academ., L. iii. c. 11 ; De Trin., L. xv. c. 112 ; Scotm, 
 in Sent., L. i. disk 3, qu. 4, 10 ; Buffier, Prem. Verit., 9 11 
 40; Maynds Essay on Consciousness, p. 177, sq. ; Reid,^. 
 442, b. et alibi ; Cousin, Cours d'Hist. de la Philosophie Mo- 
 rale, vol. ii. pp. 220, 236. 
 
 On this ground, St. Austin was warranted in affirming Ni- 
 hil intelligenti tarn notum esse quam se sentire, se cogitare, se 
 velle, se vivere ; and the cogito ergo sum of Descartes is a valid 
 assertion, that in so far as we are conscious of certain modes of 
 existence, in so far we possess an absolute certainty that we really 
 exist. (Aug. De Lib. Arb., ii. 3 ; De Trin., x. 3 ; De Civ. Dei., 
 xi. 26 ; Desc., 11. cc., et passim.) 
 
 Viewed under the latter limitation, the deliverances of con- 
 sciousness do not thus peremptorily repel even the possibility of 
 doubt. I am conscious for example, in an act of sensible percep- 
 tion, 1, of myself, the subject knowing ; and 2, of something 
 given as different from myself, the object known. To take the 
 second term of this relation : that I am conscious in this act 
 of an object given, as a non-ego' that is, as not a modifica- 
 tion of my mind of this, as a phenomenon, doubt is impossi- 
 
 1 Hamilton always uses ego, and non^eyo, instead of me and not-me, which, 
 though convenient and common, involve a grammatical error. W.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 23 
 
 We. For, as has been seen, we cannot doubt the actuality 
 of a fact of consciousness without doubting, that is subvert- 
 ing, our doubt itself. To this extent, therefore, all skepticism is 
 precluded. But though it cannot but be admitted that the object of 
 which we are conscious in this cognition is given, not as a mode 
 of self, but as a mode of something different from self, it is how- 
 ever possible for us to suppose, without our supposition at least 
 being felo de se, that, though given as a non-ego, this object may, 
 in reality, be only a representation of a non-ego, in and by the 
 ego. Let this therefore be maintained : let the fact of the testi- 
 mony be admitted, but the truth of the testimony, to aught be- 
 yond its own ideal existence, be doubted or denied. How in this 
 case are we to proceed ? It is evident that the doubt does not 
 in this, as in the former case refute itself. It is not suicidal by 
 self-contradiction. The Idealist, therefore, in denying the exist- 
 ence of an external world, as more than a subjective phenome- 
 non of the internal, does not advance a doctrine ab initio null, as 
 a skepticism would be which denied the phenomena of the inter- 
 nal world itself. Yet many distinguished philosophers have fall- 
 en into this mistake ; and, among others, both Dr. Reid, proba- 
 bly, and Mr. Stewart, certainly. The latter in his Philosophical 
 Essays (pp. 6, 7), explicitly states, " that the belief which accom- 
 panies consciousness, as to the present existence of its appropriate 
 phenomena, rests on no foundation more solid than our belief 
 of the existence of external objects." Reid does not make any 
 declaration so explicit, but the same doctrine seems involved in 
 various of his criticisms of Hume and of Descartes (Inq. 1 pp. 100 
 a., 129, 130 ; Int. Pow., pp. 269 a., 442 b). Thus (p. 100 a.) 
 he reprehends the latter for maintaining that consciousness affords 
 a higher assurance of the reality of the internal phenomena, 
 than sense affords' of the reality of the external. He asks Why 
 did Descartes not attempt a proof of the existence of his thought ? 
 and if consciousness be alleged as avouching this, he asks again, 
 
 'The reference is to Hamilton's edition of Reid. W.
 
 24 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 Who is to be our voucher that consciousness may not deceive 
 us ? My observations on this point, which were printed above 
 three years ago, in the foot-notes at pp. 129 and 442 b.,' I am 
 
 1 The following arc the foot-notes referred to : 
 
 "There is no skepticism possible touching the facts of consciousness in 
 themselves. We cannot doubt that the phenomena of consciousness are real, 
 in so far as wo are conscious of them. I cannot doubt, for example, that I 
 am actually conscious of a certain feeling of fragrance, and of certain percep- 
 tions of color, figure, etc., when I see and smell a rose. Of the reality of 
 these, as experienced, I cannot doubt, because they are facts of conscious- 
 ness ; and of consciousness I cannot doubt, because such doubt being 
 itself an act of consciousness, would contradict, and, consequently, annihi- 
 late itself. But of all beyond the mere phenomena of which we are con- 
 scious, we may without fear of self-contradiction at least doubt. I may. 
 for instance, doubt whether the rose I see and smell has any existence be- 
 yond a phenomenal existence in my consciousness. I cannot doubt that I 
 am conscious of it as something different from self, but whether it have, in- 
 deed, any reality beyond my mind whether the not-self \>e not in truth only 
 self that I may philosophically question. In like manner, I am conscious 
 of the memory of a certain past event. Of the contents of this memory, ae 
 a phenomenon given in consciousness, skepticism is impossible. But I may 
 by possibility demur to the reality of all beyond these contents and the 
 sphere of present consciousness. 
 
 " In Eeid's strictures upon Hume, he confounds two opposite things. He 
 reproaches that philosopher with inconsequence, in holding to ' the belief 
 of the existence of his own impressions and ideas.' Now, if, by the existence 
 of impressions and ideas, Eeid meant their existence as mere phenomena of 
 consciousness, his criticism is inept ; for a disbelief of their existence, as such 
 phenomena, would have been a suicidal act in the skeptic. If, again, he 
 meant by impressions and ideas the hypothesis of representative entities dif- 
 ferent from the mind and its modifications ; in that case the objection is 
 equally invalid. Hume was a skeptic ; that is, he accepted the premises af- 
 forded him by the dogmatist, and carried these premises to their legitimate 
 consequences. To blame Hume, therefore, for not having doubted of his 
 borrowed principles, is to blame the skeptic for not performing a part alto- 
 gether inconsistent with his vocation. But, in point of fact, the hypothesis 
 of such entities is of no value to the idealist or skeptic. Impressions and ideas. 
 viewed as mental modes, would have answered Hume's purpose not a whit 
 worse than impressions and ideas viewed as objects, but not as affections of 
 mind. The most consistent scheme of idealism known in the history of phi- 
 losophy is that of Fichte ; and Fichte's idealism is founded on a basis which 
 excludes that crude hypothesis of ideas on which alone Eeid imagined any 
 doctrine of Idealism could possibly be established. And is the acknowl- 
 edged result of the Fichtean dogmatism less a nihilism than the skepticism 
 of Hume? 'The sum total,' says Fichte, 'is this: There is absolutely 
 nothing permanent either without me or within me, but only an unceasing 
 change. I know absolutely nothing of any existence, not even of my own.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 25 
 
 happy'to find confirmed by the authority of M. Cousin. The fol- 
 lowing passage is from his Lectures on the Scottish School, con- 
 stituting the second volume of his " Course on the History of the 
 Moral Philosophy of the Eighteenth Century," delivered in the 
 years 1819, 1820, but only recently published by M. Vacherot. 1 
 " It is not (he observes in reference to the preceding strictures of 
 Reid upon Descartes) as a fact attested by consciousness, that 
 Descartes declares his personal existence beyond a doubt ; it is 
 because the negation of this fact would involve a contradiction." 
 And after quoting the relative passage from Descartes : " It is 
 thus by a reasoning that Descartes establishes the existence of 
 the thinking subject ; if he admit this existence, it is not because 
 it is guaranteed by consciousness ; it is for this reason, that when 
 he thinks let him deceive himself or not he exists in so far as 
 he thinks." 
 
 It is therefore manifest that we may throw wholly out of ac- 
 count the phenomena of consciousness, considered merely in them- 
 selves ; seeing that skepticism in regard to them, .under this lim- 
 itation, is confessedly impossible ; and that it is only requisite to 
 consider the argument from common sense, as it enables us to 
 
 I myself know nothing, and am nothing. Images (Bilder) there are: they 
 constitute all that apparently exists, and what they know of themselves is 
 after the manner of images ; images that pass and vanish without there be- 
 ing aught to witness their transition ; that consist in fact of the images of 
 images, without significance and without an aim. I myself am one of these 
 images ; nay, I am not even thus much, but only a confused image of images. 
 All reality is converted into a marvellous dream, without a life to dream of 
 and without a mind to dream ; into a dream made up only of a dream of 
 itself. Perception is a dream ; thought the source of all the existence and 
 all the reality which I imagine to myself of my existence, of my power, of 
 my destination is the dream of that dream.' 
 
 " In doubting the fact of his consciousness, the skeptic must at least af- 
 firm his doubt ; but to affirm a doubt is to affirm the consciousness of it ; the 
 doubt Vould therefore be self-contradictory i. e. annihilate itself." W. 
 
 'Since the above was written, M. Cousin has himself published the Course 
 of 1819-20, and the Lectures on the Scottish School may now bo found, am- 
 plified, in the fourth volume of his first series. The same thing is stated 
 with precision, clearness, and force, here and there in Cousin's second se- 
 ries, the whole of which we have recently translated and published. W. 
 
 2
 
 26 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 vindicate the truth of these phenomena, viewed as attestations of 
 more than their own existence, seeing that they are not, in this 
 respect, placed beyond the possibility of doubt 
 
 When, for example, consciousness assures us that, in percep- 
 tion, we are immediately cognizant of an external and extended 
 non-ego; or that, in remembrance, through the imagination, of 
 which we are immediately cognizant, we obtain a mediate knowl- 
 edge of a real past ; how shall we repel the doubt in the for- 
 mer case, that what is given as the extended reality itself is not 
 merely a representation of matter by mind in the latter, that 
 what is given as a mediate knowledge of the past, is not a mere 
 present phantasm, containing an illusive reference to an unreal 
 past ? We can do this only in one way. The legitimacy of such 
 gratuitous doubt necessarily supposes that the deliverance of con- 
 sciousness is not to be presumed true. If, therefore, it can be shown, 
 on the one hand, that the deliverances of consciousness must 
 philosophically be accepted, until their certain or probable false- 
 hood has been positively evinced ; and if, on the other hand, it 
 cannot be shown that any attempt to discredit the veracity of 
 consciousness has ever yet succeeded ; it follows that, as philoso- 
 phy now stands, the testimony of consciousness must be viewed 
 as high above suspicion, and its declarations entitled to demand 
 prompt and unconditional assent. 
 
 In the first place, as has been said, it cannot but be acknowl- 
 edged that the veracity of consciousness must, at least in the first 
 instance, be conceded. " Neganti incumbit probatio." Nature is 
 not gratuitously to be assumed to work, not only in vain, but in 
 counteraction of herself; our faculty of knowledge is not, with- 
 out a ground, to be supposed an instrument of illusion ; man, un- 
 less the melancholy fact be proved, is not to be held organized for 
 the attainment, and actuated by the love of truth, only to become 
 the dupe and victim of a perfidious creator. 
 
 But, in the second place, though the veracity of the primary 
 convictions of consciousness must, in the outset, be admitted, it 
 still remains competent to lead a proof that they are undeserving
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 27 
 
 of credit. But how is this to be done ? As the ultimate grounds 
 of knowledge, these convictions cannot be redargued from any 
 higher knowledge ; and as original beliefs, they are paramount in 
 certainty to every derivative assurance. But they are many; 
 they are, in authority, co-ordinate ; and their testimony is clear 
 and precise. It is therefore competent for us to view them in cor- 
 relation ; to compare their declarations ; and to consider whether 
 they contradict, and, by contradicting, invalidate each other. 
 This mutual contradiction is possible, in two ways. 1, It may 
 be that the primary data themselves are directly or immediately 
 contradictory of each other ; 2, it may be that they are medi- 
 ately or indirectly contradictory, inasmuch as the consequences to 
 which they necessarily lead, and for the truth or falsehood of 
 which they are therefore responsible, are mutually repugnant. By 
 evincing either of these, the veracity of consciousness will be dis- 
 proved ; for, in either case, consciousness is shown to be inconsist- 
 ent with itself, and consequently inconsistent with the unity of 
 truth. But by no other process of demonstration is this possible. 
 For it will argue nothing against the trustworthiness of conscious- 
 ness, that all or any of its deliverances are inexplicable are in- 
 comprehensible ; that is, that we are unable to conceive through 
 a higher notion, how that is possible, which the deliverance 
 avouches actually to be. To make the comprehensibility of a 
 datum of consciousness the criterion of its truth, would be indeed 
 the climax of absurdity. For the primary data of consciousness, 
 as themselves the conditions under which all else is comprehended, 
 are necessarily themselves incomprehensible. We know, and can 
 know, only That they are, not How they can be. To ask how 
 an immediate fact of consciousness is possible, is to ask how con- 
 sciousness is possible ; and to ask how consciousness is possible, 
 is to suppose that we have another consciousness, before and above 
 that human consciousness, concerning whose mode of operation we 
 inquire. Could we answer this, " verily we should be as gods." ' 
 
 1 From what has now been stated, it will be seen how far and on what 
 grounds I hold, at once with Dr. Reid and Mr. Stewart, that our original
 
 SJO PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 To take an example : It would be unreasonable in the Cosmo- 
 thetic or the Absolute Idealist, to require of the Natural Realist 1 a 
 reason, througli which to understand how a self can be conscious 
 of a not-self how an unextended subject can be cognizant of an 
 extended object ; both of which are given us as facts by conscious- 
 ness, and, as such, founded on by the Natural Realist. This is un- 
 reasonable, because it is incompetent to demand the explanation 
 of a datum of consciousness, which, as original and simple, is 
 necessarily beyond analysis and explication. It is still further 
 unreasonable, inasmuch as all philosophy being only a develop- 
 ment of the primary data of consciousness, any philosophy, in 
 not accepting the truth of these, pro tanto surrenders its own pos- 
 sibilityis felo de se. But at the hands of the Cosmothetic Ideal- 
 ists and they constitute the great majority of philosophers the 
 question is peculiarly absurd ; for before proposing it, they are 
 themselves bound to afford a solution of the far more insuperable 
 difficulties which their own hypothesis involves difficulties which, 
 so far from attempting to solve, no Hypothetical Realist has ever 
 yet even articulately stated. 8 
 
 This being understood, the following propositions are either 
 self-evident, or admit of easy proof: 
 
 1. The end of philosophy is truth; and consciousness is the 
 instrument and criterion of its acquisition. In other words, phi- 
 losophy is the development and application of the constitutive 
 and normal truths which consciousness immediately reveals. 
 
 2. Philosophy is thus wholly dependent upon consciousness ; the 
 possibility of the former supposing the trustworthiness of the latter. 
 
 3. Consciousness is presumed to be trustworthy, until proved 
 mendacious. 
 
 4. The mendacity of consciousness is proved, if its data, imme- 
 
 beliefs are to be established, but their authority not to be canvassed ; and 
 with M. Jouffroy, that the question of their authority is not to be absolutely 
 withdrawn, as a forbidden problem, from philosophy. 
 
 1 On these terms see the third and fourth chapters of the second part of 
 this vol. W. 
 
 3 For the illustration of this, see chapter first of the second part. W.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 29 
 
 diately in themselves, or mediately in their necessary conse- 
 quences, be shown to stand in mutual contradiction. 
 
 5.*The immediate or mediate repugnance of any two of its 
 data being established, the presumption in favor of the general 
 veracity of consciousness is abolished, or rather reversed. For 
 while, on the one hand, all that is not contradictory is not there- 
 fore true ; on the other, a positive proof of falsehood, in one in- 
 stance, establishes a presumption of probable falsehood in all ; 
 for the maxim, "falsus in uno,falsus in omnibus" must deter- 
 mine the credibility of consciousness, as the credibility of every 
 other witness. 
 
 6. No attempt to show that the data of consciousness are 
 (either in themselves, or in their necessary consequences) mutually 
 contradictory, has yet succeeded ; and the presumption in favor 
 of the truth of consciousness and the possibility of philosophy 
 has, therefore, never been redargued. In other words, an ori- 
 ginal, universal, dogmatic subversion of knowledge has hitherto 
 been found impossible. 
 
 7. No philosopher has ever formally denied the truth or dis- 
 claimed the authority of consciousness ; but few or none have 
 been content implicitly to accept and consistently to follow out its 
 dictates. Instead of humbly resorting to consciousness, to draw 
 from thence his doctrines and their proof, each dogmatic specula- 
 tor looked only into consciousness, there to discover his pre- 
 adopted opinions. In philosophy, men have abused the code of 
 natural, as in theology, the code of positive, revelation; and the 
 epigraph of a great protestant divine, on the book of scripture, is 
 certainly not less applicable to the book of consciousness : 
 
 " Hie liber est in quo qucerit sua dogmata quisque ; 
 Invenit, etpariter dogmata quisque *a." J 
 
 8. The first and most obtrusive consequence of this proceedure 
 has been, the multiplication of philosophical systems in every 
 conceivable aberration from the unity of truth. 
 
 1 " This is the book where each his dogma seeks ; 
 And this the book where each his dogma finds."
 
 30 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 9. The second, but less obvious, consequence has been, the vir- 
 tual surrender, by each several system, of the possibility of phi- 
 losophy in general. For, as the possibility of philosophy sup- 
 poses the absolute truth of consciousness, every system which 
 proceeded on the hypothesis, that even a single deliverance of 
 consciousness is untrue, did, however it might eschew the overt 
 declaration, thereby invalidate the general credibility of conscious- 
 ness, and supply to the skeptic the premises he required to sub- 
 vert philosophy, in so far as that system represented it. 
 
 10. And yet, although the past history of philosophy has, in 
 a great measure, been only a history of variation and error (vari- 
 asse erroris est) ; yet the cause of this variation being known, we 
 obtain a valid ground of hope for the destiny of philosophy in 
 future. Because, since philosophy has hitherto been inconsistent 
 with itself, only in being inconsistent with the dictates of our 
 natural beliefs 
 
 " For Truth is catholic, and Nature one ;" 
 
 it follows, that philosophy has simply to return to natural con- 
 sciousness, to return to unity and truth. 
 
 In doing this we have only to attend to the three following 
 maxims or precautions : 
 
 1, That we admit nothing, not either an original datum of 
 consciousness, or the legitimate consequence of such a datum ; 
 
 2, That we embrace all the original data of consciousness, 
 and all their legitimate consequences ; and 
 
 3, That we exhibit each of these in its individual integrity 
 neither distorted nor mutilated, and in its relative place, whether 
 of pre-eminence or subordination. 
 
 Nor can it be contended that consciousness has spoken in so 
 feeble or ambiguous a voice, that philosophers have misappre- 
 hended or misunderstood her enouncements. On the contrary, 
 they have been usually agreed about the fact and purport of the 
 deliverance, differing only as to the mode in which they might 
 evade or qualify its acceptance.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 31 
 
 This I shall illustrate by a memorable example by one in ref- 
 erence to the very cardinal point of philosophy. In the act of 
 sensible perception, I am conscious of two things ; of myself as 
 the perceiving subject, and of an external reality, in relation with 
 my sense, as the object perceived. Of the existence of both these 
 things I am convinced : because I am conscious of knowing each 
 of them, not mediately, in something else, as represented, but im- 
 mediately in itself, as existing. Of their mutual independence I 
 am no less convinced ; because each is apprehended equally, and 
 at once, in the same indivisible energy, the one not preceding or 
 determining, the other not following or determined ; and because 
 each is apprehended out of, and in direct contrast to the other. 
 
 Such is the fact of perception as given in consciousness, and as 
 it affords to mankind in general the conjunct assurance they pos- 
 sess, of their own existence, and of the existence of an external 
 world. Nor are the contents of the deliverance, considered as a 
 phenomenon, denied by those who still hesitate to admit the truth 
 of its testimony. As this point, however, is one of principal im- 
 portance, I shall not content myself with assuming the preceding 
 statement of the fact of perception as a truth attested by the in- 
 ternal experience of all ; but, in order to place it beyond the pos- 
 sibility of doubt, quote in evidence, more than a competent num- 
 ber of authoritative, and yet reluctant testimonies, and give 
 articulate references to others. 
 
 Descartes, the father of modern idealism, acknowledges, that 
 in perception we suppose the qualities of the external realities to 
 be themselves apprehended, and not merely represented, by the 
 mind, in virtue or on occasion of certain movements of the sen- 
 suous organism which they determine. " Putamus nos videre 
 ipsam tcedam, et audire ipsam campanam : non vero solum sen- 
 tire motus qui ab ipsis proveniunt." De Passionibus art. xxiii. 
 This, be it observed, is meant for a statement applicable to our 
 perception of external objects in general, and not merely to our 
 perception of their secondary qualities. 
 
 De Raei, a distinguished follower of Descartes, frequently ad-
 
 32 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 mits, that what is commonly rejected by philosophers is univer- 
 sally believed by mankind at large " Res ipsas secundum se in 
 sensum incurrere" De Mentis Humanae Facultatibus, Sectio II. 
 41, 70, 89. De Cognitione Humana, 15, 39, et alibi. 
 
 In like manner, Berkeley, contrasting the belief of the vulgar, 
 and the belief of philosophers on this point, says : " The former 
 are of opinion that those things they immediately perceive are the 
 real things ; and the latter, that the things immediately perceived 
 are ideas which exist only in the mind." Three Dialogues, &c., 
 Dial. III. prope finem. His brother idealist, Arthur Collier, might 
 be quoted to the same purport ; though he does not, like Berke- 
 ley, pretend that mankind at large are therefore idealists. 
 
 Hume frequently states that, in the teeth of all philosophy, 
 ' men are carried by a blind and powerful instinct of nature to 
 suppose the very images presented by the senses to be the external 
 objects, and never entertain any suspicion that the one are nothing 
 but representations of the other." Inquiry concerning Human 
 Understanding, Sect. XII., Essays, ed. 1788, vol. ii. p. 154. 
 Compare also ibid. p. 157 ; and Treatise of Human Nature, vol. 
 i. B. i. P. iv. Sect. 2, pp. 330, 338, 353, 358, 361, 369. 
 
 Schilling, in many passages of his works, repeats, amplifies, 
 and illustrates the statement, that " the man of common sense be- 
 lieves, and will not but believe, that the object he is conscious of 
 perceiving is the real one." This is from hi. Philosophische Schrif- 
 ten, I. p. 274 ; and it may be found with the context, translated 
 by Coleridge but given as his own in the " Biographia Litera- 
 ria," I. p. 262. See also among other passages, Philos. Schr., I. 
 pp. 217, 238 ; Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur, Einleit. pp. 
 xix. xxvi. first edition (translated in Edinb. Rev., vol. lii. p. 202) ; 
 Philosophisches Journal von Fichte und Niethhammer, vol. vii. 
 p. 244. In these passages Schelling allows that it is only on the 
 believed identity of the object known and of the object existing, and 
 in our inability to discriminate in perceptive consciousness the 
 representation from the thing, that mankind at large believe in the 
 reality of an external world.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 33 
 
 But to adduce a more recent writer, and of a different school. 
 " From the natural point of view," says Stiedenroth, " the repre- 
 sentation (Vorstellung) is not in sensible perception distinguished 
 from the object represented ; for it appears as if the sense actu- 
 ally apprehended the things out of itself, and in their proper 
 space." (Psychologic, vol. i. p. 244.) " The things the actual 
 realities are not in our soul. Nevertheless, from the psychologi- 
 cal point of view on which we are originally placed by nature, we 
 do not suspect that our representation of external things and their 
 relations is naught but representation. Before this can become a 
 matter of consideration, the spatial relations are so far developed, 
 that it seems as if the soul apprehended out of itself as if it did 
 not carry the image of things within itself, but perceived the 
 things themselves in their proper space" (p. 26*7). " This belief 
 (that our sensible percepts are the things themselves) is so strong 
 and entire, that a light seems to break upon us when we first 
 learn, or bethink ourselves, that we are absolutely shut in within 
 the circle of our own representations. Nay, it costs so painful an 
 effort, consistently to maintain this acquired view, in opposition 
 to that permanent and unremitted illusion, that we need not mar- 
 vel, if, even to many philosophers, it should have been again lost" 
 (p. 270). 
 
 But it is needless to accumulate confessions as to a fact which 
 has never, I believe, been openly denied ; I shall only therefore 
 refer in general to the following authorities, who, all in like man- 
 ner, even while denying the truth of the natural belief, acknowl- 
 edge the fact of its existence. Malebranche, Recherche, L. iiL 
 c. 1 ; Tetens, Versuche, vol. i. p. 375 ; Fichte, Bestimmung des 
 Menschen, p. 56, ed. 1825; and in Philos. Journal, VII. p. 35;. 
 Tennemann, Geschichte der Philosophic, vol. ii. p. 294 .{trans- 
 lated in Edinb. Rev., vol. Hi. p. 202) ; Fries, Neue Kritik, Vorr., 
 p. xxviii. sec. ed. ; Herbart, Allgemeine Metaphysik, II. Th., 
 327 ; Gerlach, Fundamental Philosophic, 33 ; Bencke, Das Ver- 
 haeltniss von Seele und Leib, p. 23 ; and Kant und die Philosc- 
 phische Aufgabe unserer Zeit, p. 70 ; Stoeger, Pruefung, &c., p. 
 
 2*
 
 34: PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 504. To these may be added, Jacobi, Werke, vol. i. p. 119 ; and 
 in vol. ii., his " David Hume" passim, of which see a passage 
 quoted infra in Testimonies, No. 87 c. 
 
 The contents of the fact of perception, as given in conscious- 
 ness, being thus established, what are the consequences to philos- 
 ophy, according as the truth of its testimony (I.) is, or (II.) is not, 
 admitted ? 
 
 I. On the former alternative, the veracity of consciousness, in 
 the fact of perception, being unconditionally acknowledged, we 
 have established at once, without hypothesis or demonstration, the 
 reality of mind, and the reality of matter ; while no concession 
 is yielded to the skeptic, through which he may subvert philoso- 
 phy in manifesting its self-contradiction. The one legitimate doc- 
 trine, thus possible, may be called Natural Realism or Natural 
 Dualism. 
 
 II. On the latter alternative, five great variations from truth 
 and nature may be conceived and all of these have actually 
 found their advocates according as the testimony of conscious- 
 ness, in the fact of perception, (A) is wholly, or (B) partially, 
 rejected. 
 
 A. If wholly rejected, that is, if nothing but the phenomenal 
 reality of the fact itself be allowed, the result is Nihilism. This 
 may be conceived either as a dogmatical or as a skeptical opinion ; 
 and Hume and Fichte have competently shown, that if the truth 
 of consciousness be not unconditionally recognized, Nihilism is 
 the conclusion in which our speculation, if consistent with itself, 
 must end. 
 
 B. On the other hand, if partially rejected, four schemes 
 emerge, according to the way in which the fact is tampered with. 
 
 i. If the veracity of consciousness be allowed to the equipoise 
 of the subject and object in the act, but disallowed to the reality 
 of their antithesis, the system of Absolute Identity (whereof Pan- 
 theism is the corollary) arises, which reduces mind and matter to 
 phenomenal modifications of the same common substance. 
 
 ii., iii. Again, if the testimony of consciousness be refused to
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 35 
 
 the equal originality and reciprocal independence of the subject 
 and object in perception, two Unitarian schemes are determined, 
 according as the one or as the other of these correlatives is sup- 
 posed the prior and genetic. Is the object educed from the sub- 
 ject 1 Idealism ; is the subject educed from the object ? Materi- 
 alism, is the result. 
 
 iv. Finally, if the testimony of consciousness to our knowl- 
 edge of an external world existing be rejected with the Idealist, 
 but with the Eealist the existence of that world be affirmed, we 
 have a scheme which, as it by many various hypotheses, endeav- 
 ors, on the one hand, not to give up the reality of an unknown 
 material universe, and on the other, to explain the ideal illusion 
 of its cognition, may be called the doctrine of Cosmothetic Ideal- 
 ism, Hypothetical Realism, or Hypothetical Dualism. This last, 
 though the most vacillating, inconsequent, and self-contradictory 
 of all systems, is the one which, as less obnoxious in its acknowl- 
 edged consequences (being a kind of compromise between specu- 
 lation and common sense), has found favor with the immense 
 majority of philosophers. 1 
 
 From the rejection of the fact of consciousness in this example 
 of perception, we have thus, in the first place, multiplicity, spec- 
 ulative variation, error ; in the second, systems practically danger- 
 ous ; and in the third, what concerns us exclusively at present, 
 the incompetence of an appeal to the common sense of mankind 
 by any of these systems against the conclusions of others. This 
 last will, however, be more appropriately shown in our special 
 consideration of the conditions of the argument of Common Sense, 
 to which we now go on. 
 
 1 See, in connection with this more general distribution of philosophical 
 systems from the whole fact of consciousness in perception, other more spe- 
 cial divisions, from the relation of the object to the subject of perception, in 
 the second part, chapter iii. W.
 
 36 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 II. CONDITIONS OF THE LEGITIMACY, AND LEGITIMATE APPLI- 
 CATION, OF THE ARGUMENT FROM COMMON SENSE. 
 
 From what has been stated, it is manifest that the argument 
 drawn from Common Sense, for the truth or falsehood of any 
 given thesis, proceeds on two suppositions : 
 
 1. That the proposition to be proved is either identical with, or 
 necessarily evolved out of, a primary datum of consciousness ; 
 and, 
 
 2. That the primary data of consciousness are, one and all of 
 them, admitted, by the proponent of this argument, to be true. 
 
 From this it follows, that each of these suppositions will con- 
 stitute a condition, under which the legitimate application of this 
 reasoning is exclusively competent. Whether these conditions 
 have been ever previously enounced, I know not. But this I 
 know, that while their necessity is so palpable, that they could 
 never, if explicitly stated, be explicitly denied ; that in the hands 
 of philosophers they have been always, more or less violated, 
 implicitly and in fact, and this often not the least obtrusively 
 by those who have been themselves the loudest in their appeal 
 from the conclusions of an obnoxious speculation to the common 
 convictions of mankind. It is not therefore to be marvelled at, 
 if the argument itself should have sometimes shared in the con- 
 tempt which its abusive application so frequently and so justly 
 merited. 
 
 1. That the first condition that of originality is indispens- 
 able, is involved in the very conception of the argument. I 
 should indeed hardly have deemed that it required, an articulate 
 statement, were it not that, in point of fact, many philosophers 
 have attempted to establish, on the principles of common sense, 
 propositions which are not original data of consciousness ; while 
 the original data of consciousness, from which their propositions 
 were derived, and to which, they owed their whole necessity and 
 truth these data the same philosophers were (strange to say !)
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 37 
 
 not disposed to admit. Thus, when it is argued by the Cosmo- 
 tlietic Idealists " The external world exists, because we naturally 
 believe it to exist ;" the illation is incompetent, inasmuch as it 
 erroneously assumes that our belief of an external world is a pri- 
 mary datum of consciousness. This is not the case. That an 
 outer world exists is given us, not as a " miraculous revelation," 
 not as a " cast of magic," not as an " instinctive feeling," not as 
 a " blind belief." These expressions, in which the Cosmothetic 
 Idealists shadow forth the difficulty they create, and attempt to 
 solve, are wholly inapplicable to the real fact. Our belief of a 
 material universe is not ultimate ; and that universe is not un- 
 known. This belief is not a supernatural inspiration ; it is not an 
 infused faith. We are not compelled by a blind impulse to be- 
 lieve in the external world, as in an unknown something ; on the 
 contrary, we believe it to exist only because we are immediately 
 cognizant of it as existing. If asked, indeed How we know 
 that we know it how we know that what we apprehend in sen- 
 sible perception is, as consciousness assures us, an object, external, 
 extended, and numerically different from the conscious subject ? 
 how we know that this object is 'not a mere mode of mind, illu- 
 sively presented to us as a mode of matter ? then indeed we 
 must reply, that we do not in propriety know that what we are 
 compelled to perceive as not-self, is not a perception of self, 
 and that we can only on reflection believe such to be the case, in 
 reliance on the original necessity of so believing, imposed on us 
 by our nature, 
 
 Quas nisi sit veri, ratio quoque falsa fit omnia. 
 
 That this is a correct statement of the fact has been already 
 shown ; and if such be the undenied and undeniable ground of 
 the natural belief of mankind, in the reality of external things, 
 the incompetence of the argument from common sense in the 
 hands of the Cosmothetic Idealist is manifest, in so far as it does 
 not fulfil the fundamental condition of that argument. 
 
 This defect of the argument may in the present example in- 
 
 4S2COS
 
 38 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 deed, be easily supplied, by interpolating the medium which has 
 been left out. But this cannot consistently be done by the Cos- 
 mothetic Idealist, who is reduced to this dilemma that if he ad- 
 here to his hypothesis, he must renounce the argument ; and if 
 he apply the argument, he must renounce his hypothesis. 
 
 2. The second condition, that of absolute truth, requires that 
 he who applies the argument of common sense, by appealing to 
 the veracity of consciousness, should not himself, directly or indi- 
 rectly, admit that consciousness is ever false ; in other words, he 
 is bound, in applying this argument, to apply it thoroughly, im- 
 partially, against himself no less than against others, and not ac- 
 cording to the conveniences of his polemic, to approbate and rep- 
 robate the testimony of our original beliefs. That our immediate 
 consciousness, if competent to prove any thing, must be compe- 
 tent to prove every thing it avouches, is a principle which none 
 have been found, at least openly, to deny. It is proclaimed by 
 Leibnitz : " Si 1'experience interne immediate pouvait nous trom- 
 per, il ne saurait y avoir pour moi aucune verite de fait, j'ajoute, 
 ni de raison. And by Lucretius : 
 
 Denique nt in fabrica si p*rava 'st Regula prim a, 
 Omnia mendosa fieri atque obstipa necessum 'st ; 
 Sic igitur Ratio tibi rerum prava necesse 'st, 
 Falsaque sit, falsis quaccunquo ab Sensibus orta 'st. 
 
 Compare Plotinus, En. V. Lib. v. c. 1 ; Buffier, Pr. Ver., 71 ; 
 Reid, Inq., p. 183, b. I. P. p. 260, b. 
 
 Yet, however notorious the condition, that consciousness unless 
 held trustworthy in all its revelations cannot be held trustworthy 
 in any ; marvellous to say, philosophers have rarely scrupled, on 
 the one hand, quietly to supersede the data of consciousness, so 
 often as these did not fall in with their preadopted opinions ; and 
 on the other, clamorously to appeal to them, as irrecusable truths, 
 so often as they could allege them in corroboration of their own, 
 or in refutation of a hostile doctrine. 
 
 I shall again take for an example the fact of perception, and 
 the violation of the present condition by the Cosmothetic Ideal-
 
 r-r V-, 
 
 w -*- <^ TvU r-m^ 
 
 ^ -^ 
 
 - 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 39 
 
 t -7 ' ~ "' k ~ i /l ~' V*~~' & ^--.<r4-^ >V 'V^- ~ f- V i ft_i - 7 
 
 ists 1, in the constitution of their own doctrine ; 2, in their 
 polemic against more extreme opinions. 
 
 In the first place, in the constitution of their doctrine, nothing 
 can be imagined more monstrous than the procedure of these 
 philosophers, in attempting to vindicate the reality of a material 
 world, on the ground of a universal belief in its existence; and 
 yet rejecting the universal belief in the knowledge on which the 
 universal belief in the existence is exclusively based. Here the 
 absurdity is twofold. Firstly, in postulating a conclusion though 
 rejecting its premises ; secondly, in founding their doctrine partly 
 on the veracity, and partly on the mendacity, of consciousness. 
 
 In the second place, with what consistency and effect do the 
 Hypothetical Realists point the argument of common sense 
 against the obnoxious conclusions of the thorough-going Idealist, 
 the Materialist, the Absolutist, the Nihilist ? 
 
 Take first their vindication of an external world against the 
 Idealist. 
 
 To prove this, do they, like Dr. Thomas Brown, simply found 
 on the natural belief of mankind in its existence ? But they 
 themselves, as we have seen, admitting the untruth of one natu- 
 ral belief the belief in our immediate knowledge of external 
 things have no right to presume upon the truth of any other ; 
 and the absurdity is carried to its climax, when the natural belief, 
 which they regard as false, is the sole ground of the natural be- 
 lief which they would assume and found upon as true. Again, 
 do they like Descartes, allege that God would be a deceiver, were 
 we constrained by nature to believe in the reality of an unreal 
 world ? But the Deity, on their hypothesis, is a deceiver ; for 
 that hypothesis assumes that our natural consciousness deludes us 
 in the belief, that external objects are immediately, and in them- 
 selves perceived. Either therefore maintaining the veracity of 
 God, they must surrender their hypothesis ; or, maintaining their 
 hypothesis, they must surrender the veracity of God. 
 
 Against the Materialist, in proof of our Personal Identity, can 
 they maintain that consciousness is able to identify self, at one
 
 40 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 period, with self, at another ; when, in their theory of percep- 
 tion, consciousness, mistaking self for not-self, is unable, they 
 virtually assert, to identify self with self, even at the same mo- 
 ment of existence ? 
 
 How, again, can they maintain the substantial Individuality 
 and consequent Immateriality of the thinking principle, on the 
 unity of consciousness, when the duality given in consciousness 
 is not allowed substantially to discriminate the object from the 
 subject in perception ? 
 
 But to take a broader view. It is a maxim in philosophy, 
 Tliat substances are not to be multiplied without necessity ; in 
 other words, That a plurality of principles are not to be 
 assumed, when the phenomena can possibly be explained by one. 
 This regulative principle, which may be called the law or maxim 
 of Parcimony, 1 throws it therefore on the advocates of a scheme 
 of psychological Dualism, to prove the necessity of supposing 
 more than a single substance for the phenomena of mind and 
 matter. Further, we know nothing whatever of mind and mat- 
 ter, considered as substances ; they are only known to us as a 
 twofold series of phenomena : and we can only justify, against 
 the law of parcimony, the postulation of two substances, on the 
 ground, that the two series of phenomena are, reciprocally, so 
 contrary and incompatible, that the one cannot be reduced to the 
 other, nor both be supposed to coinhere in the same common sub- 
 stance. Is this ground shown to be invalid ? the presumption 
 against a dualistic theory at once recurs, and a Unitarian scheme 
 becomes, in the circumstances, philosophically necessary. 
 
 Now the doctrine of Cosmothetic Idealism, in abolishing the 
 incompatibility of the two series of phenomena, subverts the 
 only ground on which a psychological Dualism can be maintained. 
 This doctrine denies to mind a knowledge of aught beyond its 
 own modifications. The qualities, which we call material Exten- 
 
 'The rule of philosophizing, which Hamilton felicitously calls the law of 
 parcimony, was often keenly applied hy the logical Occam ; hence it is 
 sometimes designated as " Occam's razor." W.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE 41 
 
 sion, Figure, &c., exist for us, only as they are known by us ; and, 
 on this hypothesis, they are known by us only as modes of mind. 
 The two series of phenomena, therefore, so far from being really, 
 as they are apparently, opposed, are, on this doctrine, in fact, 
 admitted to be all only manifestations of the same substance. 
 
 So far, therefore, from the Hypothetical Dualist being able to 
 resist the conclusion of the Unitarian whether Idealist, Materi- 
 alist, or Absolutist ; the fundamental position of his philosophy 
 that the object immediately known is in every act of cognition 
 identical with the subject knowing in reality, establishes any 
 and every doctrine but his own. On this principle, the Idealist 
 may educe the object from the subject ; the Materialist educe the 
 subject from the object ; the Absolutist carry both up into indif- 
 ference ; nay the Nihilist subvert the substantial reality of either : 
 and the Hypothetical Dualist is doomed to prove, that, while the 
 only salvation against these melancholy results is an appeal to 
 the natural convictions of mankind, that the argument from 
 common sense is in his hands a weapon, either impotent against 
 his opponents, or fatal equally to himself and them. 
 
 III. THE ARGUMENT FROM COMMON SENSE IS ONE STRICTLY 
 
 PHILOSOPHICAL AND SCIENTIFIC. 
 
 We have thus seen, though the argument from common sense 
 be an appeal to the natural convictions of mankind, that it is not 
 an appeal from philosophy to blind feeling. It is only an appeal, 
 from the heretical conclusions of particular philosophies, to the 
 catholic principles of all philosophy. The prejudice, which, on 
 this supposition, has sometimes been excited against the argu- 
 ment, is groundless. 
 
 Nor is it true, that the argument from common sense denies 
 the decision to the judgment of philosophers, and accords it to 
 the verdict of the vulgar. Nothing can be more erroneous. We 
 admit nay we maintain, as D'Alembert well expresses it, " that 
 the truth in metaphysic, like the truth in matters of taste, is a
 
 42 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 truth of which all minds have the germ within themselves ; to 
 which indeed the greater number pay no attention, but which 
 they recognize the moment it is pointed out to them. . . But if, 
 in this sort, all are able to understand, all are not able to instruct. 
 The merit of conveying easily to others true and simple notions 
 is much greater than is commonly supposed; for experience 
 proves how rarely this is to be met with. Sound metaphysical 
 ideas are common truths, which every one apprehends, but which 
 few have the talent to develop. So difficult is it on any subject 
 to make our own what belongs to every one." (Melanges, t. iv. 
 6.) Or, to employ the words of the ingenious Lichtenberg 
 "Philosophy, twist the matter as we may, is always a sort of 
 chemistry (Scheidekunst). The peasant employs all the princi- 
 ples of abstract philosophy, only inveloped, latent, engaged, as the 
 men of physical science express it ; the Philosopher exhibits the 
 pure principle." (Hinterlassene Schriften, vol. ii. p. 67.) 
 
 The first problem of Philosophy and it is one of no easy 
 accomplishment being thus to seek out, purify, and establish, 
 by intellectual analysis and criticism, the elementary feelings 
 or beliefs, in which are given the elementary truths of which 
 all are in possession ; and the argument from common sense 
 being the allegation of these feelings or beliefs as explicated 
 and ascertained, in proof of the relative truths and their neces- 
 sary consequences ; this argument is manifestly dependent on 
 philosophy, as an art, as an acquired dexterity, and cannot, 
 notwithstanding the errors which they have so frequently com- 
 mitted, be taken out of the hands of the philosophers. Common 
 Sense is like Common Law. Each may be laid down as the 
 general rule of decision ; but in the one case it must be left to 
 the jurist, in the other to the philosopher, to ascertain what are 
 the contents of the rule ; and though in both instances the com- 
 mon man may be cited as a witness, for the custom or the fact, 
 in neither can he be allowed to officiate as advocate or as judge. 
 
 f Kplvttv a&afipovat avipat Idoarn' 
 ao<piijv o-o^if idiivci, rlxvas V &i>6Te\vos. 
 
 PHOCYLIDES.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 43 
 
 It must be recollected, also, that in appealing to the conscious- 
 ness of mankind in general, we only appeal to the consciousness 
 of those not disqualified to pronounce a decision. " In saying" 
 (to use the words of Aristotle), " simply and without qualifica- 
 tion, that this or that is a known truth, we do not mean that it 
 is in fact recognized by all, but only by such as are of sound 
 understanding; just as in saying absolutely that a thing is 
 wholesome, we must be held to mean, to such as are of a hale 
 constitution." (Top. L. vi. c. 4. 7.) We may, in short, say 
 of the true philosopher what Erasmus, in an epistle to Hutten, 
 said of Sir Thomas Moore : " Nemo minus ducitur vulgi judi- 
 cio ; sed rursus nemo minus abest a sensu communi" 
 
 When rightly understood, therefore, no valid objection can be 
 taken to the argument of common sense, considered in itself. 
 But it must be allowed that the way it has been sometimes 
 applied was calculated to bring it into not unreasonable disfavor 
 with the learned. (See C. L. Reinhold's Beytrsege zur leichtern 
 Uebersicht des Zustandes der Philosophic, i. p. 61 ; and Nieth- 
 hammer in his Journal, i. p. 43 sq.) In this country in particu- 
 lar, some of those who opposed it to the skeptical conclusions of 
 Hume did not sufficiently counteract the notion which the name 
 might naturally suggest ; they did not emphatically proclaim 
 that it was no appeal to the undeveloped beliefs of the unreflect- 
 ive many ; and they did not inculcate that it presupposed a 
 critical analysis of these beliefs by the philosophers themselves. 
 On the contrary, their language and procedure might even, some- 
 times, warrant an opposite conclusion. This must be admitted 
 without reserve of the writings of Beattie, and more especially 
 of Oswald. But even Reid, in his earlier work, was not so 
 explicit as to prevent his being occasionally classed in the same 
 category. That the strictures on the " Scottish Philosophy of 
 Common Sense" by Feder, Lambert, Tetens, Eberhard, Kant, 
 Ulrich, Jacob, &c., were inapplicable to Reid, is sufficiently proved 
 by the more articulate exposition of his doctrine, afterwards given 
 in his Essays on the Intellectual and Active Powers. But these
 
 44 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 criticisms having been once recorded, we need not wonder at 
 their subsequent repetition, without qualification or exception, by 
 philosophers, and historians of philosophy. 
 
 To take, as an example, the judgment of the most celebrated 
 of these critics. " It is not" (says Kant, in the preface to his 
 Prolegomena) " without a certain painful feeling, that we behold 
 how completely Hume's opponents, Reid, Oswald, Beattie, and, 
 at last, Priestley, missed the point of his problem ; and whilst 
 they, on the one hand, constantly assumed the very positions 
 which he did not allow, and on the other, demonstrated warmly, 
 and often with great intemperance, what he had never dreamt 
 of calling into question, they so little profited by the hint which 
 he had given towards better things, that all remained in the 
 same position as if the matter had never been agitated at all. 
 The question mooted, was not Whether the notion of Cause 
 were right, applicable, and, in relation to all natural knowledge, 
 indispensable ; for of this Hume had never insinuated a doubt ; 
 but Whether this notion were to the mind excogitated a priori, 
 whether it thus possessed an intrinsic truth, independent of all 
 experience, and consequently a more extensive applicability, one 
 not limited merely to objects of experience ; on this Hume awaited 
 a disclosure. In fact, the whole dispute regarded the origin of 
 this notion, and not its indispensability in use. If the former 
 be made out, all that respects the conditions of its use, and the 
 sphere within which it can be validly applied, follow as corolla- 
 ries, of themselves. In order satisfactorily to solve the problem, 
 it behooved the opponents of this illustrious man to have pene- 
 trated deeply into the nature of the mind, considered as exclu- 
 sively occupied in pure thinking : but this did not suit them. 
 They, therefore, discovered a more convenient method, in an 
 appeal to the common understanding of mankind (gemeiner 
 Menschenverstand) " and so forth ; showing that Kant un- 
 derstood by the common sense of the Scottish philosophers, 
 only good sense, sound understanding, <fcc. (Prolegomena, 
 p. 10.)
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 45 
 
 I will not object to the general truth of the statements in this 
 passage ; nor to their bearing in so far as they are applied to the 
 British philosophers in general. For Reid, however, I must 
 claim an exemption ; and this I shall establish with regard to 
 the very notion of Cause to which Kant refers. 
 
 That from the limited scope of his earlier work, the "Inquiry" 
 Reid had not occasion to institute a critical analysis of the notion 
 of Causality, affords no ground for holding that he did not con- 
 sider such analysis to be necessary in the establishment of that 
 and the other principles of common sense. This, indeed, he in 
 that very work, once and again, explicitly declares. " We have 
 taken notice of several original principles of belief in the course 
 of this inquiry ; and when other faculties of the mind are exam- 
 ined we shall find more. * * * * A clear explication and 
 enumeration of the principles of a common sense, is one of the 
 chief desiderata in Logic. We have only considered such of 
 them as occurred in the examination of the Jive senses. r And 
 accordingly in his subsequent and more extensive work, the 
 "Essays on the Intellectual powers," published within two years 
 after Kant's "Prolegomena," we find the notion of Causality, 
 among others, investigated by the very same critical process 
 which the philosopher of Koenigsberg so successfully employed ; 
 though there be no reason whatever for surmising that Reid had 
 ever heard the name, far less seen the works, of his illustrious 
 censor. The criterion the index by which Kant discriminates 
 the notions of pure or a priori origin from those elaborated from 
 experience, is their quality of necessity ; and its quality of neces- 
 sity is precisely the characteristic by which Reid proves that, 
 among others, the notion of causality cannot be an educt of 
 experience, but must form a part of the negative cognitions of 
 the mind itself. It is doubtful, indeed, whether Reid, like Kant, 
 was even indebted to Leibnitz for his knowledge of this touch- 
 stone ; but the fact of its familiar employment by him in the dis- 
 crimination and establishment of the fundamental principles of 
 thought, more especially in his later works, sufficiently shows,
 
 46 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 that the reproach of an uncritical application of the argument 
 from common sense, made against the Scottish philosophers in 
 general, was, at least in reference to him, unfounded. Reid, 
 however and to his honor be it spoken stands alone among 
 the philosophers of this country in his appreciation and employ- 
 ment of the criterion of necessity. 
 
 [Since writing the above, I have met with the following pas- 
 sage in the " Lettere Philosophiche" of Baron Galuppi, one of 
 the two most distinguished of the present metaphysicians of Italy. 
 
 " Tbe philosopher of Koenigsberg makes Hume thus reason : 
 ' Metaphysical Causality is not in the objects observed ; it is, 
 therefore, a product of imagination engendered upon custom.' 
 This reasoning, says Kant, is inexact. It ought to have pro- 
 ceeded thus : ' Causality is not in the things observed ; it is 
 therefore in the observer.' But here Kant does not apprehend 
 Hume's meaning, whose reasoning, as I have stated in the eighth 
 letter, is altogether different. Metaphysical causality, he argues, 
 is not in the things observed ; it cannot, therefore, be in the 
 observer, in whom all is derived from the things observed. Reid 
 fully understands the purport of Hume's argument, and meets it 
 precisely and conclusively with this counter-reasoning : ' Meta- 
 physical Causality is a fact in our intellect; it is not derived 
 from the things observed, and is therefore a subjective law of the 
 observer.' Kant objects, that Reid has not attended to the state 
 of the question. There is no dispute, he says, about the exist- 
 ence of the notion of metaphysical causality; the only doubt 
 regards its origin. This is altogether erroneous. Hume being 
 unable to find the origin of the notion in experience, denied its 
 existence. Kant's criticism of Reid is therefore unjust." P. 225. 
 
 Kant, I think, is here but hardly dealt with. Hume did not, 
 certainly, deny the existence of the notion of causality, meaning 
 thereby its existence as a mental phenomenon ; he only (on the 
 hypothesis of the then dominant doctrine of sensualism) showed 
 that it had no objective validity no legitimate genesis. In dif- 
 ferent points of view, therefore, Hume may be said to deny, and
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 47 
 
 not to deny, its reality. The dispute is a mere logomachy. 
 Kant also stands clear of injustice towards Reid, when it is con- 
 sidered that his strictures on the Scottish philosophers were prior 
 to the appearance of the " Essays on the Intellectual Powers," 
 the work in which Reid first expounded his doctrine of causality.] 
 
 IV. ON THE ESSENTIAL CHARACTERS BY WHICH THE PRINCI- 
 PLES OF COMMON SENSE ARE DISCRIMINATED. 
 
 It now remains to consider what are the essential notes or 
 characters by which we are enabled to distinguish our original 
 from our derivative convictions. These characters, I think, may 
 be reduced to four; 1, their Incomprehensibility 2, their 
 Simplicity 3, their Necessity and absolute Universality 4, 
 their comparative Evidence and Certainty. 
 
 1. In reference to the first; A conviction is incomprehensible 
 when there is merely given us in consciousness That its object 
 is (on s'oVi) ; and when we are unable to comprehend through a 
 higher notion or belief, Why or How it is (Jion stfri). When 
 we are able to comprehend why or how a thing is, the belief of 
 the existence of that thing is not a primary datum of conscious- 
 ness, but a subsumption under the cognition or belief which 
 affords its reason. 
 
 2. As to the second ; It is manifest that if a cognition or 
 belief be made up of, and can be explicated into, a plurality of 
 cognitions or beliefs, that, as compound, it cannot be original. 
 
 3. Touching the third ; Necessity and Universality may be 
 regarded as coincident. For when a belief is necessary it is, eo 
 ipso, universal ; and that a belief is universal, is a certain index 
 that it must be necessary. (See Leibnitz, Nouveaux Essais, L. i. 
 4, p. 32.) To prove the necessity, the universality must, how- 
 ever, be absolute ; for a relative universality indicates no more 
 than custom and education, howbeit the subjects themselves may 
 deem that they follow only the dictates of nature. As St. Jerome 
 has it " Unaquaeque gens hoc legem naturae putat, quyd didicit."
 
 48 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 It is to be observed, that the necessity here spoken of, is of two 
 kinds. There is one necessity when we cannot construe it to our 
 minds as possible, that the deliverance of consciousness should 
 not be true. This logical impossibility occurs in the case of 
 what are called necessary truths truths of reason or intelligence ; 
 as in the law of causality, the law of substance, and still more in 
 the laws of identity, contradiction, and excluded middle. There 
 is another necessity, when it is not unthinkable, that the deliver- 
 ance of consciousness may possibly be false, but at the same 
 time, when we cannot but admit, that this deliverance is of such 
 or such a purport. This is seen in the case of what are called con- 
 tingent truths, or truths of fact. Thus, for example, I can theoreti- 
 cally suppose that the external object I am conscious of in percep- 
 tion, may be, in reality, nothing but a mode of mind or self. I am 
 unable, however, to think that it does not appear to me that 
 consciousness does not compel me to regard it as external as 
 a mode of matter or not-self. And such being the case, I cannot 
 practically believe the supposition I am able speculatively to 
 maintain. For I cannot believe this supposition, without believ- 
 ing that the last ground of all belief is not to be believed ; which 
 is self-contradictory. " Nature," says Pascal, " confounds the 
 Pyrrhonist;" and, among many similar confessions, those of 
 Hume, of Fichte, of Hommel may suffice for an acknowledg- 
 ment of the impossibility which the Skeptic, the Idealist, the 
 Fatalist finds in practically believing the scheme which he views 
 as theoretically demonstrated. The argument from common 
 sense, it jpay be observed, is of principal importance in reference 
 to the class of contingent truths. The others, from their converse 
 being absolutely incogitable, sufficiently guard themselves. 
 
 As this criterion of Necessity and Universality is signalized by 
 nearly the whole series of authorities adduced in the sequel, it 
 would be idle to refer to any in particular. 
 
 4. The fourth and last character of our original beliefs is their 
 comparative Evidence and Certainty. This, along with the third, 
 is well stated by Aristotle. " What appears to all, that we affirm
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 49 
 
 to be; and he who rejects this belief will assuredly advance 
 nothing better deserving of credence" And again : " If we know 
 and believe through certain original principles, we must know and 
 believe these with paramount certainty, for the very reason that 
 we know and believe all else through them." And such are the 
 truths in regard to which the Aphrodisian says, " though some 
 men may verbally dissent, all men are in their hearts agreed." 
 This constitutes the first of Buffer's essential qualities of primary 
 truths, which is, as he expresses it, " to be so clear, that if we at- 
 tempt to prove or to disprove them, this can be done only by 
 propositions which are manifestly neither more evident n.or more 
 certain" Testimonies, nn. 3, 10, 63. Compare the others, passim. 
 A good illustration of this character is afforded by the assur- 
 ance to which we have already so frequently referred that in 
 perception, mind is immediately cognizant of matter. How self, 
 can be conscious of not-self, hoiv mind can be cognizant of matter, 
 we do not know; but we know as little how mind can be per- 
 cipient of itself. In both cases we only know the fact, on the 
 authority of consciousness; and when the conditions of the prob- 
 lem are rightly understood when it is established that it is only 
 the primary qualities of body which are apprehended in them- 
 selves, and this only in so far as they are in immediate relation to 
 the organ of sense, the difficulty in the one case is not more than 
 in the other. This in opposition to the simple Idealists. But the 
 Cosmothetic Idealists the Hypothetical Realists are far less rea- 
 sonable; who, in the teeth of consciousness, on the ground of 
 inconceivability, deny to mind all cognizance of matter, yet bestow 
 on it the more inconceivable power of representing, and truly 
 representing to itself the external world, which, ex hypothesi, it 
 does not know. These theorists do not substitute, in place of the 
 simple fact which' they repudiate, another more easy and intelli- 
 gible. On the contrary, they gratuitously involve themselves in a 
 maze of unwarrantable postulates, difficulties, improbabilities, and 
 self-contradictions, of such a character, that we well may wonder, 
 how the doctrine of Cosmothetic Idealism has been able to enlist 
 
 3
 
 50 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 under its banners, not a few merely, but the immense majority of 
 modern philosophers. The Cosmothetic Idealists, in truth, violate 
 in their hypothesis every condition of a legitimate hypothesis. 1 
 
 V. THE NOMENCLATURE, THAT is, THE VARIOUS APPELLATIONS 
 
 BY WHICH THE PRINCIPLES OF COMMON SENSE HAVE BEEN 
 DESIGNATED. 
 
 It is evident that the foundations of our knowledge cannot prop- 
 erly be themselves the objects of our knowledge ; for as by them 
 we know all else, by naught else can they themselves be known. 
 We know them indeed, but only in the fact, that with and through 
 them we know. This it is, which has so generally induced philos- 
 ophers to bestow on them appellations marking out the circum- 
 stance, that in different points of view, they may, and they may 
 not, be regarded as cognitions. They appear as .cognitions, in so 
 far as we are conscious that (6Vi) they actually are ; they do not 
 appear as cognitions, in so far as in them we are not conscious 
 how (<SioVi) they possibly can be. Philosophers accordingly, even 
 when they view and designate them as cognitions, are wont to 
 qualify their appellation under this character, by some restrictive 
 epithet. For example, Cicero styling them intelligentice does not 
 do so simply ; but i. inchoatce, i. adumbrates, i. obscurw, <fec. A 
 similar limitation is seen in the terms ultimate facts, primary 
 data, <fec., of consciousness ; for these and the analogous expres- 
 sions are intended to show, that while their existence is within our 
 apprehension, the reason or ground of their existence is beyond 
 our comprehension. 
 
 On the other hand we see the prevalence of the opposite point 
 of view in the nomenclatures which seem to regard them not as 
 cognitions wholly within consciousness, but as the bases of cogni- 
 tion, and therefore partly without, and partly within conscious- 
 ness. Such is the scope of the analogical designations applied to 
 
 1 For illustration of this see chapter first of the second part of this vol. W.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 51 
 
 them, of Senses, Feelings, Instincts, Revelations, Inspirations, 
 Suggestions, Beliefs, Assents, Holdings, <fec. It is the inexplica- 
 ble and equivocal character which the roots of our knowledge 
 thus exhibit, to which we ought to attribute the inadequacy, the 
 vacillation and the ambiguity of the terms by which it has been 
 attempted to denote them ; and it is with an indulgent recollec- 
 tion of this, that we ought to criticise all and each of these de- 
 nominations, which, after this general observation, I proceed to 
 consider in detail. In doing this, I shall group them according 
 to the principal points of view from which it would seem they 
 were imposed. 
 
 I. The first condition, the consideration of which seems to have 
 determined a certain class of names, is that of Immediacy. In our 
 primitive cognitions we apprehend existence at once, and without 
 the intervention of aught between the apprehending mind and the 
 existence apprehended. 
 
 Under this head the first appellations are those which, with 
 some qualifying attribute, apply to these cognitions the name of 
 Sense. 
 
 It is hardly necessary to observe, that the words corresponding 
 to the term Sense and its conjugates, have in no language been 
 limited to our perceptions of the external world, or to the feeling 
 of our bodily affections. In every language they have been ex- 
 tended to the operations of the higher faculties. Indeed, it can 
 be shown, in almost every instance, that the names which ulti- 
 mately came to be appropriated to the purest acts of intelligence, 
 were, in their origin, significant of one or other of the functions of 
 our organic sensibility. Such among others is the rationale of 
 the terms moral sense {sensus boni), logical sense (sensus vcri), 
 cesthetical sense (sensus pulchri], which, even in modern philos- 
 ophy, have been very commonly employed, though not employ- 
 ed to denote any thing lower than the apprehensive faculty of 
 intelligence in these different relations. On this transference of 
 the term Sense, see Aristotle (De Anima, L. iii. c. 3) Quintil- 
 ian (Instit L. viii. c. 5) Budaeus (in Pandectas, Tit. i.) Sal-
 
 ' * 
 
 52 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 masius (ad Solinum, p. 141) Grotius (ad Acta Apostolorum, 
 vii. 32, and I. Petri, i. 12) Claubergius (Exercitationes, 83-88) 
 Burmannus (ad Phaedrura, L. ii. Ep. 13) Gronovius (Dia- 
 tribe ad Statium, c. 43) J. A. Fabricius (Programma De Gus- 
 tatu Pulcri, p. 5), <fec., &c. 
 
 This being, in general, premised, we have now to consider in 
 particular: 1, the ancient term Common Sense; and 2, the 
 modern term Internal Sense, as applied to our elementary con- 
 sciousness. 
 
 1. SENSE Common (sensus communis, sensus communes, sensus 
 publicus, sens commun, senso comune, Gemeinsinn), principles, 
 axioms, maxims, truths, judgments, &c., of. 
 
 The Greek tongue was for a long period destitute of any 
 word to denote Consciousness; and it was only after both the 
 philosophy and language of Greece had passed their prime, that 
 the terms rfuvai<rt)avojj,a and rfuvaiVdrio'is were applied, not merely 
 to denote the apperception of sense, but the primary condition of 
 knowledge in general. The same analogy explains how in the 
 Latin tongue the term Sensus Communis came, from a very an- 
 cient period, to be employed with a similar Latitude ; and as Lat- 
 in, even after its extinction as a living language, was long the 
 exclusive vehicle of religion and philosophy throughout western 
 Europe, we need not wonder that the analysis and its expression, 
 the thing and the word, passed not only into the dialects in which 
 the Romanic, but into those also in which the Teutonic element 
 was predominant. But as the expression is not unambiguous, it 
 is requisite to distinguish its significations. 
 
 The various meanings in which the term Common Sense is met 
 with, in ancient and modern times, may I think be reduced to 
 four ; and these fall into two categories, according as it is, or is 
 not, limited to the sphere of sense proper. 
 
 As restricted to sense proper. 
 
 a. Under this head Common Sense has only a single mean- 
 ing ; that, to wit, which it obtained in the Peripatetic philosophy 
 and its derivative systems. Common Sense (XOIVT) aiffSytfis) was
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 53 
 
 employed by Aristotle to denote the faculty in which the various 
 reports of the several senses are reduced to the unity of a common 
 apperception. This signification is determinate. The others are 
 less precisely discriminated from each other. 
 
 (I may observe, however, that a second meaning under this 
 category might be found in the Cwncesthesis, common feeling or 
 sensation, by which certain German physiologists have denomi- 
 nated the sensus vagus or vital sense, and which some of them 
 translate by common sense (Gemeinsinn). But as the term in 
 this signification has been employed recently, rarely, abusively, 
 and without imposing authority, I shall discount it.) 
 
 As not limited to the sphere of sense proper, it comprises three 
 meanings. 
 
 b. The second signification of Common Sense is when it de- 
 notes the complement of those cognitions or convictions which we 
 receive from nature ; which all men therefore possess in common ; 
 and by which they test the truth of knowledge, and the morality 
 of actions. This is the meaning in which the expression is now 
 emphatically employed in philosophy, and which may be, there- 
 fore, called its philosophical signification. As authorities for its 
 use in this relation, Reid (I. P. p. 423-425') has adduced legiti- 
 mate examples from Bentley, Shaftesbury, Fenelon, Buffier, and 
 Hume. The ethers which he quotes from Cicero and Priestley, 
 can hardly be considered as more than instances of the employ- 
 ment of the words; for the former, in the particular passage 
 quoted, does not seem to mean by "sensus communes" more than 
 the faculty of apprehending sensible relations which all possess ; 
 and the latter explicitly states, that he uses the words in a mean- 
 Ing (the third) which we are hereafter to consider. Mr. Stewart 
 (Elements, vol. ii. c. 7, sect. 3, p. 76), to the examples of Reid, 
 adds only a single, and that not an unambiguous instance, from 
 Bayle. It therefore still remains to show that in this signification 
 its employment is not only of authorized usage, but, in fact, one 
 
 1 The reference is to Hamilton's edition of Reid. W.
 
 54 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMO^N SENSE. 
 
 long and universally established. This is done in the series of 
 testimonies I shall adduce principally indeed to prove that the 
 doctrine of Common Sense, notwithstanding many schismatic- 
 aberrations, is the one catholic and perennial philosophy, but 
 which also concur in showing that this too is the name under 
 which that doctrine has for two thousand years been most famil- 
 iarly known, at least, in the western world. Of these Lucretius, 
 Cicero, Horace, Seneca, Tertullian, Arnobius, and St. Augustin ex- 
 hibit the expression as recognized in the language and philosophy 
 of ancient Rome ; while some fifty others prove its scientific and 
 colloquial usage in every country of modern Europe. (See Nos. 
 5-8, 12, 13, 15, 23, 25, 27-29, 31, 32, 34, 36, 38-44, 47, 48, 
 51-53, 55, 56, 58-69, 71-75, 78-85, 90.) 
 
 The objections to the term Common Sense in this its philoso- 
 phical application are obvious enough. It is not unambiguous. 
 To ground an objection it has sometimes unintentionally, more 
 frequently willingly, been taken in the third signification (v. p. 56 
 c.) ; and its employment has even afforded a ground for suppo- 
 sing that Reid and other Scottish philosophers proposed under it 
 a certain peculiar sense, distinct from intelligence, by which truth 
 is apprehended or revealed. See Fries, in Testimonies No. 70, 
 and Franke, Leben des Gefuehls, 42. 
 
 On the other hand, besides that no other expression, to which 
 valid objection may not be taken, has yet been proposed ; and be- 
 sides, that it has itself been ratified by ancient and general usage ; 
 the term Common Sense is not inappropriately applied to denote 
 an original source of knowledge common to all mankind a 
 fountain of truths intelligible indeed, but like those of the senses 
 revealed immediately as facts to be believed, but not as possibili- 
 ties to be explained and understood. On this ground the term 
 Sense has found favor, in this application, with the most ancient 
 and the most recent philosophers. For example Aristotle (Eth. 
 Nic. L. vi. c. 11, and Eth. Eud. L. v. c. 11) says that voug, Intelli- 
 gence proper, the faculty of first principle is, in certain respects, a 
 Sense ; and the ancient Scholiast, Eustratius, in his commentary
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 55 
 
 on the former work (f. 110, b) explains it by observing, "that 
 Intelligence and Sense have this exclusively in common they 
 are both immediate cognitions" Hence it is that Aristotle (Me- 
 taph. xii. Y), Theophrastus (see Test. No. 4), and Plotinus (En. vi. 
 L. vii. cc. 36, 39, L. ix. c. 7) assimilate intellection, the noetic en- 
 ergy, to touching in particular.* In reference to the apprehension 
 
 * Among the Greeks the expression " Common Intellect" was, however, 
 rarely, if ever, used for Common Sense in this its second, or philosophical 
 meaning. The learned Mr. Harris (in a note on his Dialogue concerning 
 Happiness) in stating the doctrine of the Greek philosophers, says " The 
 recognition of self-evident truths, or at least the ability to recognize them, is 
 called icoivds ouj, ' common sense,' 1 as being a sense common to all, except 
 lunatics and idiots." This is inaccurate ; for his statement of what was 
 usual among the Greeks is founded (I presume, for he does not allege any 
 authority) on a single, and singular, example of such usage. It is that of 
 Epictetus (Diss. Arriani, L. iii. c. 6). This philosopher seems in that pas- 
 sage to give the name of common intellect (xotvtis voDf, which H. Wolflus and 
 Upton translate by sensus communis) to the faculty of those common notions 
 possessed by all who are of sound mind. Now were the epithet common 
 here applied to intellect because intellect is the repository of such common , 
 notions or inasmuch as it is common to all men this, however likely a 
 usage, is, I am confident, the only, or almost the only, example to be fo'ird 
 in antiquity of such a nomenclature; for though the expression in question 
 is frequent among the Greek writers, I do not recollect to have elsewhere 
 met with it in a similar import. It is employed in two significations. 1, 
 with vovs in its stricter meaning, for the highest faculty of mind, KOIV&S is 
 used to mark its impersonality, its unity, its general identity in men, or in 
 man and God. 2, With vovs, in its looser meaning Ibr mind in general, it 
 denotes a community of opinion or a community of social sentiment, corres- 
 ponding to Sensus Communis among the Eomans, to be spoken of as the 
 fourth signification. The only second instance, I believe, that can be brought 
 is from the Aphrodisian. (On the Soul, f. 138, ed. Aid.) But there the epi- 
 thet common is given to the natural in opposition to the acquired intellect, 
 exclusively from the circumstance that the former is possessed by all of sound 
 mind, the latter only by some ; nay, from a comparison of the two passages 
 it is evident, that Alexander in his employment of the expression had Epic- 
 tetus and this very instance immediately in his eye. But it is in fact by no 
 means improbable that Epictetus here uses the expression only in the first 
 of its two ordinary significations as a Stoic, to denote the individual 
 intellect, considered as a particle of the universal ; and this even the com- 
 mentators are inclined to believe. See Upton, ad locum. In illustration of 
 this : Plutarch in his treatise ' On Common Notions against the Stoica,' 
 uses (after irapa or Kara) rfiv icoivqv swoiav or rat KOIVUJ iwoi'if at least twenty- 
 three times, and without the adjective rfiv Ivvoiav or rag Ivmlas, at least
 
 56 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 of primary truths, ' the soul,' says Dr. John Smith, ' has its 
 senses, in like manner as the l>ody ' (Select Discourses) ; and his 
 friend Dr. Henry More designates the same by the name of intel- 
 lectual sense. (Test. n. 45.) Jacobi defines Vernunft, his facul- 
 ty of ' intellectual intuitions ' as ' the sense of the supersensible.' 
 (Test. n. 87.) De la Mennais could not find a more suitable ex- 
 pression whereby to designate his theological system of univer- 
 sal consent, or general reason, than that of Common Sense ; 
 and Borger in his classical work ' De Mysticismo ' prefers sensus 
 as the least exceptionable word by which to discriminate those 
 notions, of which, while we are conscious of the existence, we are 
 ignorant of the reason and origin. ' Cum igitur, qui has notiones 
 sequitur, ilium sensum sequi dicimus, hoc dicimus, illas notiones 
 non esse ratione [ratiocinatione] quaesitas,sedomni argumentatione 
 antiquiores. Eo autem majori jure eos sensus vocabulo complecti- 
 mur, quod, adeo obscurae sunt, ut eorum ne distincte quidem no- 
 bis conscii simus, sed eas esse, ex efficacia earuin intelligamus, i. 
 e. ex vi qua animum afficiunt.' (P. 259, ed. 2.) See also of Testi- 
 monies the numbers already specified. 
 
 c. In the third signification, Common Sense may be used 
 with emphasis on the adjective or on the substantive. 
 
 In the former case, it denotes such an ordinary complement of 
 intelligence, that, if a person be deficient therein, he is accounted 
 mad or foolish. 
 
 Sensus communis is thus used in Phaedrus, L. i. 7 ; but Hor- 
 
 'tcenty-one times ; which last, by the by, Xylauder always renders by ' Sen- 
 sus communis.' Now how many timea does Plutarch use as a synonym, 
 icoiviv vovvl Not once. He does, indeed, once employ it and Kenya; Qpi- 
 vaf (p. 1077 of the folio editions); but in the sense of an agreement in 
 thought with others the sense which it obtains also in the only other ex- 
 ample of the expression to be found in his writings. (P. 529 D). 
 
 I see Forcellini (voce Sensus) has fallen into the same inaccuracy as 
 Harris. 
 
 I may here notice that Aristotle does not apply the epithet common to in- 
 tellect at all; for roB KOIVOU (De An. i. S. 5) does not, as Thcrnistius sup- 
 poses, mean ' of the common [intellect]' but ' of the composite,' made up 
 of soul and body.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 57 
 
 ace, Serai i. iii. 66, and Juvenal, Sat. viii. 73, are erroneously, 
 though usually, interpreted in this signification. In modern La- 
 tinity (as in Milton contra Salmasium, c. 8) and in most of the 
 vulgar languages, the expression in this meaning is so familiar 
 that it would be idle to adduce examples. Sir James Mackintosh 
 (Dissertations, &c., p. 387 of collected edition) indeed, imagines 
 that this is the only meaning of common sense ; and on this 
 ground censures Reid for the adoption of the term ; and even Mr. 
 Stewart's objections to it seem to proceed on the supposition, 
 that this is its proper or more accredited signification. See Ele- 
 ments ii. ch. 1, sec. 2. This is wrong ; but Reid himself, it must 
 be acknowledged, does not sufficiently distinguish between the 
 second and third acceptations ; as may be seen from the tenor of 
 the second chapter of the sixth Essay on the Intellectual Powers, 
 but especially from the concluding chapter of the Inquiry. 
 
 In the latter case, it expresses native, practical intelligence, 
 natural prudence, mother wit, tact in behavior, acuteness in the 
 observation of character, &c., in contrast to habits of acquired 
 learning, or of speculation away from the affairs of life. I recol- 
 lect no unambiguous example of the phrase, in this precise ac- 
 ceptation, in any ancient author. In the modern languages, and 
 rc,ore particularly in French and English, it is of ordinary occur- 
 rence. Thus, Voltaire's saying, ' Le sens commun n'est pas si 
 commun ;' which, I may notice, was stolen from Buffier (Meta- 
 physique, 69). 
 
 With either emphasis it corresponds to the xoivo'f XoyirffAoj of 
 the Greeks, and among them to the ot)o X6yo of the Stoics, to 
 the gesunde Menschenverstand of the Germans, to the Bons Sens 
 of the French, and to the Good Sense of the English. The two 
 emphases enable us to reconcile the following contradictions: 
 ' Le bon sens (says Descartes) est la chose du monde la mieux 
 partagee ;' ' Good sense (says Gibbon) is a quality of mind hardly 
 less rare than genius.' 
 
 d. In the fourth and last signification, Common Sense is no 
 longer a natural quality ; it denotes an acquired perception or 
 
 3*
 
 58 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 feeling of the common duties and proprieties expected from each 
 member of society, a gravitation of opinion a sense of conven- 
 tional decorum coramunional sympathy general bienstance 
 public spirit, <kc. In this signification at least as absolutely 
 used it is limited to the language of ancient Rome. This is the 
 meaning in which it occurs in Cicero, pe Orat. i. 3, ii. 16 Or. 
 pro Domo 37 ; in Horace, Serm. i. iii. 66 ; in Juvenal, Sat viii. 
 73; in Quintilian, Instit. i. 2; and in Seneca, Epp. 5, 105, 
 whose words in another place (which I cannot at the moment 
 recover) are ' Sic in beneficio sensus communis, locum, tempus, 
 personam observet.' Shaftesbury and others, misled probably by 
 Casaubon, do not seize the central notion in their interpretation 
 of several of these texts. In this meaning the Greeks sometimes 
 employed xoivoj vovg an ambiguous expression, for which Anto- 
 ninus seems to have coined as a substitute, xoivovoTjfAorfJvT]. To this 
 head may be referred Hutcheson's employment of Sensus Com- 
 munis for Sympathy. Synopsis Metaphysicae, P. ii. c. 1. 
 
 2. SENSE inmost, interior, internal (sensus intimus, interior, 
 internus, sens intime, interne). This was introduced as a con- 
 vertible term with Consciousness in general by the philosophers 
 of the Cartesian school ; and thus came to be frequently applied 
 to denote the source, complement, or revelation of immediate 
 truths. It is however not only in itself vague, but liable to be 
 confounded with internal sense, in other very different significa- 
 tions. We need not therefore regret that in this relation it has 
 not (though Hutcheson set an example) been naturalized in 
 British Philosophy. 
 
 The third appellation determined by the condition of Imme- 
 diacy is that of 
 
 3. INTUITIONS INTUITIVE cognitions, notions, judgments (In- 
 tuitiones Intuitus cognitio Intuitiva Intuitions -faculty In- 
 tuitive Anschauungen. We may add, $ifi/3o\a.i yvutfis xa.ro. 
 s-pwrrjv sVi/3oX>;v. In this sense au-oir"nxo, iifoirrixog are rare. 
 
 The term Intuition is not unambiguous. Besides its original 
 and proper meaning (as a visual perception), it has been em-
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 59 
 
 ployed to denote a kiud of apprehension, and a kind of judg- 
 ment. 
 
 Under the former head, Intuition, or intuitive knowledge, has 
 been used in the six following significations : 
 
 a. To denote a perception of the actual and present, in oppo- 
 sition to the ' abstractive' knowledge which we have of the possi- 
 ble in imagination, and of the past in memory. 
 
 b. To denote an immediate apprehension of a thing in itself, 
 in contrast to a representative, vicarious, or mediate, apprehension 
 of it, in or through something else. (Hence by Fichte, Schelling, 
 and others, Intuition is employed to designate the cognition, as 
 opposed to the conception, of the Absolute.) 
 
 c. To denote the knowledge which we can adequately repre- 
 sent in imagination, in contradistinction to the 'symbolical' 
 knowledge which we cannot image, but only think or conceive, 
 through and under a sign or word. (Hence probably Kant's 
 application of the term to the forms of the Sensibility the 
 imaginations of Space and Time in contrast to the forms or 
 categories of the Understanding.) 
 
 d. To denote perception proper (the objective), in contrast 
 to sensation proper (the subjective), in our sensitive conscious- 
 ness. 
 
 e. To denote the simple apprehension of a notion, in contra- 
 distinction to the complex apprehension of the terms of a propo- 
 sition. 
 
 Under the latter head, it has only a single signification ; viz. : 
 
 f. To denote the immediate affirmation by the intellect, that 
 the predicate does or does not pertain to the subject, in what are 
 called self-evident propositions. 
 
 All these meanings, however, with the exception of the fourth, 
 have this in common, that they express the condition of an 
 immediate, in opposition to a mediate, knowledge. It is there- 
 fore easy to see how the term was suggested in its application to 
 our original cognitions ; and how far it marks out their distinc- 
 tive character. It has been employed in this relation by Des-
 
 60 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 cartes, Leibnitz, Locke, Hemsterhuis, Beattie, Jacobi, Ancillon, 
 Degerando, Thurot, and many others. 
 
 II. The second condition, which, along with their Immediacy, 
 seems to have determined a class of names, is the Incomprehensi- 
 bility or Inexplicability of our original cognitions. 
 
 Under this head there are two appellations which first present 
 themselves Feeling and Belief ; and these must be considered 
 in correlation. 
 
 A thing mediately known is conceived under a representation 
 or notion, and therefore only known as possibly existing ; a thing 
 immediately known is apprehended in itself, and therefore known 
 as actually existing. 
 
 This being understood, let us suppose an act of immediate 
 knowledge. By external or internal perception, I apprehend a 
 phenomenon, of mind or matter, as existing ; I therefore affirm 
 it to be. Now if asked how I know, or am assured, that what I 
 apprehend as a mode of mind may not be, in reality, a mode of 
 matter, or that what I apprehend as a mode of matter may not, 
 in reality, be a mode of mind, I can only say, using the simplest 
 language, ' I know it to be true, because I feel and cannot but 
 feel,' or ' because I believe and cannot but believe it so to be.' 
 And if farther interrogated how I know or am assured that I 
 thus feel or thus believe, I can make no better answer than, in 
 the one case, 'because I believe that I/ee,' in the other, 'because 
 I feel that I believe? It thus appears, that when pushed to our 
 last refuge, we must retire either upon Feeling or upon Belief, or 
 upon both indifferently. And accordingly, among philosophers, 
 we find that a great many employ one or other of these terms 
 by which to indicate the nature of the ultimate ground to which 
 our cognitions are reducible; while some employ both, even 
 though they may accord a preference to one. 
 
 1. FEELING, in English (as Sentiment in French, Gefuehl in 
 German, &c.), is ambiguous : And in its present application 
 (to say nothing of its original meaning in relation to Touch) we 
 must discharge that signification of the word by which we denote
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 61 
 
 the phenomena of pain and pleasure. Feeling is a term prefera- 
 ble to Consciousness, in so far as the latter does not mark so well 
 the simplicity, ultimacy, and incomprehensibility of our original 
 apprehensions, suggesting, as it does, always something of thought 
 and reflection. In other respects, Consciousness at least with a 
 determining epithet may be the preferable expression. In the 
 sense now in question, Feeling is employed by Aristotle, Theo- 
 phrastus, Pascal, Malebranche, Bossuet, Leibnitz, Burner, 
 D'Aguesseau, Berkeley, Hume, Kames, Hemsterhuis, Jacobi, 
 Schulze, Bouterweck, Fries, Koppen, Ancillon, Gerlach, Franke, 
 and a hundred others. In this meaning it has been said, and 
 truly, that ' Reason is only a developed Feeling.' 
 
 2. BELIEF or FAITH (IIioVis, Fides, Croyance, Foi, Crlaube, 
 &c.). Simply, or with one or other of the epithets natural, pri- 
 mary, instinctive, &c., and some other expressions of a similar 
 import as Conviction, Assent, Trust, Adhesion, Holding for true 
 or real, <fec. (Suyxaradsrfis, Assensus, Fuerwahr-und-wirHich- 
 halten, <fec.), have, though not unobjectionable, found favor with 
 a great number of philosophers, as terms whereby to designate 
 the original warrants of cognition. Among these may be men- 
 tioned Aristotle, Lucretius, Alexander, Clement of Alexandria, 
 Proclus, Algazel, Luther, Hume, Reid, Beattie, Hemsterhuis, 
 Kant, Heidenreich, Fichte, Jacobi, Bouterweck, Koppen, Ancil- 
 lon, Hermes, Biunde, Esser, Elvanich, &c., &c. 
 
 Nor can any valid objection be taken to the expression. St. 
 Austin accurately says " We know what rests upon reason ; we 
 believe what rests upon authority." But reason itself must rest 
 at last upon authority ; for the original data of reason do not 
 rest on reason, but are necessarily accepted by reason on the 
 authority of what is beyond itself. These data are, therefore, in 
 rigid propriety, Beliefs or Trusts. Thus it is, that in the last 
 resort, we must, per force, philosophically admit, that belief is the 
 primary condition of reason, and not reason the ultimate ground 
 of belief. We are compelled to surrender the proud Intellige ut
 
 62 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 credas 1 of Abelard, to content ourselves with the humble Crede 
 ut intelligas* of Anselra. 
 
 3. A third denomination, under this head, is that of 
 
 INSTINCTS, rational or intellectual (Instinctus, Impetus sponta 
 nei, instinctus intelligentice, rationales). 
 
 INSTINCTIVE beliefs, cognitions, judgments, &c. 
 
 These terms are intended to express not so much the light as 
 the dark side which the elementary facts of consciousness exhibit. 
 They therefore stand opposed to the conceivable, the understood, 
 the known. 
 
 Notre faible Raison se trouble et se confond ; 
 Oui, la Raison se tait, mais 1'Instinct vous repond. 
 
 Priestley (Examination, <fec., passim) has attempted to ridicule 
 Reid's use of the terms Instinct and Instinctive, in this relation, 
 as an innovation, not only in philosophy, but in language ; and 
 Sir James Mackintosh (Dissert p. 388) considers the term 
 Instinct not less improper than the term Common Sense. 
 
 As to the impropriety, though like most other psychological 
 terms these are not unexceptionable, they are however less so 
 than many, nay than most, others. An Instinct is an agent 
 which performs blindly and ignorantly a work of intelligence and 
 knowledge. The terms, Instinctive belief, -judgment cognition 
 are therefore expressions not ill adapted to characterize a belief, 
 judgment, cognition, which as the result of no anterior con- 
 sciousness, is, like the products of animal instinct, the intelligent 
 effect of (as far as we are concerned) an unknowing cause. In 
 like manner, we can hardly find more suitable expressions to indi- 
 cate those incomprehensible spontaneities themselves, of which 
 the primary facts of consciousness are the manifestations, than 
 rational or intellectual Instincts. In fact if Reason can justly 
 be called a developed Feeling, it may with no less propriety be 
 called an illuminated Instinct : In the words of Ovid, 
 Et quod nunc Ratio, Impetus ante fuit. 
 
 1 " Know that you may believe." W. 
 1 ".Believe that you may know." W.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 63 
 
 As to an innovation either in language or philosophy, this 
 objection only betrays the ignorance of the objector. Mr. Stew- 
 art (Essays, p. 87, 4to ed.) adduces Boscovich and D'Alembert 
 as authorities for the employment of the terms Instinct and In- 
 stinctive in Reid's signification. But before Reid he might have 
 found them thus applied by Cicero, Scaliger, Bacon, Herbert. 
 Descartes, Rapin, Pascal, Poiret, Barrow, Leibnitz, Musaeus, 
 Feuerlin, Hume, Bayer, Kames, Reimarus, and a host of others ; 
 while subsequent to the ' Inquiry into the Human Mind,' besides 
 Beattie, Oswald, Campbell, Fergusson, among our Scottish philos- 
 ophers, we have, with Hemsterhuis in Holland, in Germany Te- 
 tens, Jacobi, Bouterweck, Neeb, Koppen, Ancillon, and many other 
 metaphysicians who have adopted and defended the expressions. 
 In fact, Instinct has been for ages familiarized as a philosophical 
 term in the sense in question, that is, in application to the higher 
 faculties of mind, intellectual and moral. In proof of this, take 
 the article from the ' Lexicon Philosophicum ' of Micraelius, 
 which appeared in 1653 : ' Instinctus est rei ad aliquid tenden- 
 tis inclinatio ; estque alius materialis in corporibus ; alius ratio- 
 nalis in mente ;' and Chauvin is to the same purport, whose 
 'Lexicon Philosophicum' was first published in 1691. In a 
 moral relation, as a name for the natural tendencies to virtue, 
 it was familiarly employed even by the philosophers of the six- 
 teenth century (v. F. Picolominei ' Decem Gradus,' <fec. Gr. iii. 
 c. i. sq.) ; and in the seventeenth, it had become, in fact, their 
 usual appellation (v. Velthuysen De Principiis Justi, &c., p. 
 73 sq.) 
 
 4. REVELATIONS INSPIRATIONS. These expressions are in- 
 tended metaphorically to characterize the incomprehensible man- 
 ner in which we are made suddenly aware of existence ; and, 
 perhaps, to indicate that our knowledge rests ultimately on a 
 testimony which ought to be implicitly believed, however unable 
 we may be explicitly to demonstrate, on rational grounds, its 
 credibility. They have been thus employed, one or both, by
 
 64r PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 Reid, Stewart, Degerando, Cousin, and others, but most emphat- 
 ically by Jacobi. 
 
 5. SUGGESTIONS (Suggestiones, Suggestus). This term with 
 some determining epithet is a favorite word of Reid, and in a 
 similar signification. So also was it of St. Augustin and Tertul- 
 lian. By the vou$ of Aristotle, the latter says " non aliud quid 
 intelligimus quam suggestum animte ingenitum et insitum et 
 nativitus proprium." De Anima, c. 12. See also Testimonies, 
 infra, No. 12 d ; and, supra, p. Ill a, note. 1 
 
 6. FACTS DATA (ultimate primary original, <fcc.) of 
 Consciousness or Intelligence. These expressions have found 
 
 1 The following is the note referred to: 
 
 " ' The word tuggesf (says Mr. Stewart, in reference to the preceding 
 passage) 'is much used by Berkeley, in this appropriate and technical 
 sense, not only in his 'Theory of Vision,' but in his ' Principles of Human 
 Knowledge,' and in his ' Minute Philosopher.' It expresses, indeed, the 
 cardinal principle on which his ' Theory of Vision ' hinges, and is now so 
 incorporated with some of our best metaphysical speculations, that one can- 
 not easily conceive how the use of it was so long dispensed with. Locke 
 uses the word excite for the same purpose ; but it seems to imply an hypoth- 
 esis concerning the mechanism of the mind, and by no means expresses the 
 fact in question with the same force and precision. 
 
 ' It is remarkable, that Dr. Reid should have thought it incumbent on 
 him to apologize for introducing into philosophy a word so familiar to every 
 person conversant with Berkeley's works. ' I beg leave to make use of the 
 word suggestion, because,' &c. ..... 
 
 ' So far Dr. Reid's use of the word coincides exactly with that of Berke- 
 ley ; but the former will be found to annex to it a meaning more extensive 
 than the latter, by employing it to comprehend, not only those intimation* 
 which are the result of experience and habit ; but another class of intima- 
 tions (quite overlooked by Berkeley), those which result from the original 
 frame of the human mind.' Dissertation on the History of Metaphysical 
 and Ethical Science. P. 167. Second edition. 
 
 " Mr. Stewart might have adduced, perhaps, a higher and, certainly a 
 more proximate authority, in favor, not merely of the term in general, but 
 of Reid's restricted employment of it, as an intimation of what he and others 
 have designated the Common Sense of mankind. The following sentence 
 of Tertulliau contains a singular anticipation, both of the philosophy and 
 of the philosophical phraseology of our author. Speaking of the universal 
 belief of the soul's immortality: 'Natura pleraque suggeruntur, quasi de 
 jniblico sensu quo animam Deus ditare dignatus est.' DE ANIMA, c. 2. 
 
 " Some strictures on Reid's employment of the term suggestion may be 
 seen in the ' Vereuche' of Tetens, I. p. 508, sqq." W.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 65 
 
 favor with many philosophers, among whom Fergusson, Fichte, 
 Creuzer, Krug, Ancillon, Gerlach, Cousin, Bautain, may be men- 
 tioned. They are well adapted to denote, that our knowledge 
 reposes upon what ought to be accepted as actually true, though 
 why, or in what manner it is true, be inexplicable. 
 
 III. The third quality, in reference to which our primary 
 cognitions have obtained certain appellations, is their Originali- 
 ty. Under this head : 
 
 1 . FIRST PRIMARY PRIMITIVE PRIMORDIAL ULTIMATE, 
 as epithets applied to truths, principles of thought, laws of intel- 
 ligence, facts or data of consciousness, elements of reason, &c., are 
 expressions which require no comment. 
 
 2. PRINCIPLES ('Ap^aj, Principia, literally commencements 
 points of departure) Principles of Common Sense first, proper, 
 authentic (xupiwraTai) Principles of thought, reason, judgment, 
 intelligence Initia naturae, &c. 
 
 Without entering on the various meanings of the term Princi- 
 ple, which Aristotle defines, in general, that from whence any 
 thing exists, is produced, or is Tcnown, it is sufficient to say that 
 it is always used for that on which something else depends ; and 
 thus both for an original law, and for an original element. In 
 the former case it is regulative, in the latter a constitutive, prin- 
 ciple ; and in either signification it may be very properly applied 
 to our original cognitions. In this relation, Mr. Stewart would 
 impose certain restrictions on the employment of the word. But 
 admitting the propriety of his distinctions, in themselves, and 
 these are not new it may be questioned whether the limitation 
 he proposes of the generic term be expedient, or permissible. 
 See his Elements, ii. c. 1, particularly pp. 59, 93 of 8vo editions. 
 
 3. ANTICIPATIONS PRESUMPTIONS PRENOTIONS (tfpoX^si?, 
 *pou*ap^ou(j'a yvwrfis, anticipationes, prcesumptiones, prcenotiones, 
 informationes anteceptce, cognitiones anticipate, &c.), with such 
 attributes as common, natural, native, connate, innate, &c., have 
 been employed to indicate that they are the antecedents, causes, 
 or conditions of all knowledge. These are more especially the
 
 66 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 terms of ancient philosophy. To this group may be added the 
 expression Legitimate Prejudices, borrowed from the nomencla- 
 ture of theology, but which have sometimes been applied by 
 philosophers in a parallel signification.* 
 
 4. A PRIORI truths, principles, cognitions, notions, judg- 
 ments, <fec. 
 
 The term a priori, by the influence of Kant and his school, is 
 now very generally employed to characterize those elements of 
 knowledge which are not obtained a posteriori, are not evolved 
 out of experience as factitious generalizations ; but which, as 
 native to, are potentially in, the mind antecedent to the act of 
 experience, on occasion of which (as constituting its subjective 
 conditions) they are first actually elicited into consciousness. 
 These like many indeed most others of his technical expres- 
 sions, are old words applied in a new signification. Previously 
 to Kant the terms a priori and a posteriori were, in a sense 
 which descended from Aristotle, properly and usually employed, 
 the former to denote a reasoning from cause to effect the 
 latter, a reasoning from effect to cause. The term a priori came, 
 however, in modern times to be extended to any abstract reason- 
 ing from a given notion to the conditions which such notion 
 involved ; hence, for example, the title a priori bestowed on the 
 ontological and cosmological arguments for the existence of the 
 deity. The latter of these, in fact, starts from experience from 
 the observed contingency of the world, in order to construct the 
 supposed notion on which it founds. Clarke's cosmological 
 demonstration, called a priori, is therefore, so far, properly an 
 argument a posteriori. 
 
 5. CATEGORIES of thought, understanding, reason, &c. 
 
 The Categories of Aristotle and other philosophers were the 
 
 * As by Trcmbley of Geneva. It is manifest, though I have not his trea- 
 tise at hand, that he borrowed this, not over-fortunate, expression from the 
 Prfjug'es Legltimes contre Les Calmnistes of Nicole, the work in which origina- 
 ted the celebrated controversy in which Pajon, Basnage, &c., were engaged. 
 Of this Mr. Stewart does not seem to be aware.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 6Y 
 
 highest classes (under Being) to which the objects of our knowl- 
 edge could be generalized. Kant contorted the term Category 
 from its proper meaning of attribution ; and from an objective 
 to a subjective application ; bestowing this name on the ultimate 
 and necessary laws by which thought is governed in its mani- 
 festations. The term, in this relation, has however found accep- 
 tation; and been extended to designate, in general, all the a 
 priori phenomena of mind, though Kant himself limited the 
 word to a certain order of these. 
 
 6. TRANSCENDENTAL trtiths, principles, cognitions, judg- 
 ments, &c. 
 
 In the Schools transcendentalis and transcendens, were con- 
 vertible expressions, employed to mark a term or notion which 
 transcended, that is, which rose above, and thus contained under 
 it the categories, or summa genera, of Aristotle. Such, for ex- 
 ample, is Being, of which the ten categories are only subdivi- 
 sions. Kant, according to his wont, twisted these old terms into 
 a new signification. First of all, he distinguished them from 
 each other. Transcendent (transcendens) he employed to denote 
 what is wholly beyond experience, being given neither as an a 
 posteriori nor a priori element of cognition what therefore tran- 
 scends every category of thought. Transcendental (transcenden- 
 talis) he applied to signify the a priori or necessaiy cognitions 
 which, though manifested in, as affording the conditions of, expe- 
 rience, transcend the sphere of that contingent or adventitious 
 knowledge which we acquire by experience. Transcendental is 
 not therefore what transcends, but what in fact constitutes, a 
 category of thought. This term, though probably from another 
 quarter, has found favor with Mr. Stewart ; who proposes to ex- 
 change the expression principles of common sense for, among 
 other names, that of transcendental truths, 
 
 7.- PURE (rein) is another Kantian expression (borrowed with 
 a modification of meaning from previous philosophers*) for cogni- 
 
 * Pure knowledge (cognitio pura) was a term employed by the Cartesians 
 nnd Leibnitians to denote that knowledge in which there was no mixture of
 
 68 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 tious, in which there is mingled nothing foreign or adventitious, 
 that is, nothing from experience, and which consequently are 
 wholly native to the mind, wholly a priori. Such elements, 
 however, are obtained only by a process of sundering and 
 abstraction. In actual, or concrete, thinking, there is given 
 nothing pure ; the native and foreign, the a priori and a posteri- 
 ori are there presented in mutual fusion. 
 
 IV. The fourth determining circumstance, is that the cogni- 
 tions in question are natural, not conventional, native, not 
 acquired. Hence their most universal denominations : 
 
 1. NATURE ((putfi? natura) ; as, common Nature of man light 
 of Nature* primary hypotheses of Nature initia Natures, 
 &c. 
 
 NATURAL (^utf/xo^, naturalis) as conjoined with cognitions, 
 notions, judgments anticipations, presumptions, prenotions, beliefs, 
 truths, criteria, &c. 
 
 2. NATIVE, INNATE, CONNATE, IMPLANTED, &c. (svwv, e'fjt,cpuTO, 
 tfupcpwros, innatus, ingenitus, congenitus, insitus, &c.), as applied to 
 cognitions, notions, conceptions, judgments, intellections, beliefs, &c. 
 These terms may be used either to express a correct or an erro- 
 neous doctrine. 
 
 V. The fifth ground of nomenclature, is the Necessity of these 
 cognitions, constituting as they do the indispensable foundations 
 and elementary ingredients of every act of knowledge and thought. 
 Hence they have been called in the one point of view, 
 
 sensible images, being purely intellectual. Using the term Intellect less pre- 
 cisely than the Aristotelians, the Cartesians found it necessary to employ, in 
 ordinary, for the sake of discrimination, the expression pv/re Intellect (intel- 
 lectus purus) in contrast to Sense and Imagination. This term was, how- 
 ever, borrowed from the Schools ; who again borrowed it, through the 
 medium of St. Augustine, from the Platonists. See Scoti Comm. Oxon. in 
 Sen. L. i. dist. iii. qu. 4, 22, Op. V. p. 491. 
 
 * Ligltt of Nature, or Lumen naturale (intellectus sc. agentis) a household 
 expression with the Schoolmen, was, however, used to denote the natural 
 revelation of intelligence, in opposition to the supernatural light afforded 
 through divine inspiration. The analogy of the active Intellect and light 
 was suggested by Aristotle. (De An. iii. 1.)
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 69 
 
 FUNDAMENTAL truths, laws of belief, principles of knowledge, 
 intelligence, reason, &c. ; in the other, 
 
 ESSENTIAL or CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS of reason Original 
 STAMINA, of reason ELEMENTAL laivs of thought, &c. These 
 are Mr. Stewart's favorite denominations. 
 
 VI. The sixth circumstance is, that they afford the conditions 
 and regulative principles of all knowledge. Hence they obtain 
 the name of 
 
 LAWS, or CANONS -fundamental, ultimate, elemental, neces- 
 sary, &c., of human belief, knowledge, thought, &c. 
 
 VII. The seventh circumstance is their Universality ; this 
 being at once the consequence of their necessity, and its index. 
 Hence to designate them the attributes of 
 
 COMMON UNIVERSAL CATHOLIC PUBLIC, &c. (xoivo^, com- 
 munis, xo$oAixo, universalis, publicus], applied to sense, reason, 
 intelligence to cognitions, notions, conceptions, judgments, intel- 
 lections, prenotions, anticipations, presumptions, principles, ax- 
 ioms, beliefs, nature of man, &c., &c. I may observe, however, 
 that a principle, &c., may be called common for one or other, or 
 for all of three reasons : 1, because common to all men (philos- 
 ophers in general) ; 2, because common to all sciences (Aristo- 
 tle, Anal. Post. L. i. c. ii. 5) ; 3, by relation to the multitude 
 of conclusions dependent from it (Calovius, Nool. c. 2). 
 
 VIII. The eighth is their presumed Trustworthiness, either as 
 veracious enouncements, or as accurate tests of truth. Hence, in 
 the one relation, they have been styled 
 
 1. TRUTHS (veritates) first, primary, a priori, fundamental, 
 &c. ; and in the other 
 
 2. CRITERIA (xpiryjpia, normci) natural, authentic, &c. 
 
 IX. The ninth is that the principles of our knowledge must 
 be themselves Knowledges.* 
 
 * Knmvledyes, in common use with Bacon and our English philosophers till 
 after the time of Locke, ought not to be discarded. It is, however, unno- 
 ticed by any English Lexicographer.
 
 70 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 If viewed as cognitions, in general, they have been called 
 
 1. a. COGNITIONS or KNOWLEDGES (yvwrfsfg, cognitiones, noti- 
 tice, informationes, <fec.), with the discriminative attributes, first, 
 primary, ultimate, original, fundamental, elemental, natural, 
 common, pure, transcendental, a priori, native, innate, connate, 
 implanted, <fcc. 
 
 2. b. CONSCIOUSNESS (conscientia, conscience, Bewusstseyii) 
 facts, data, revelations, <fcc., of, have been very commonly em- 
 ployed ; while 
 
 CONSCIOUSNESSES (conscientioe, consciences), with or without 
 an epithet, as connate, innate, has the authority of Tertullian, 
 Keckermann, D'Aguesseau, Huber,~and many others. 
 
 If viewed as incomplex cognitions, they have more properly 
 obtained the names of 
 
 3. NOTIONS, CONCEPTIONS, PKENOTIONS ("vvoiai, swovj/xara, 
 vo>jf/-a<ra, *poX>jvj,ei, notiones, conceptiones, conceptus, &c.), some- 
 times simply, but more usually limited by the same attributes ; 
 though these terms were frequently extended to complex cogni- 
 tions likewise. 
 
 If viewed as complex cognitions they have been designated, 
 either by the general name of 
 
 4. JUDGMENTS, PROPOSITIONS (judicia, cwrocpavo'eif, ^piTao'iif, 
 effata, pronunciata, enunciata, <fcc.), qualified by such adjectives as 
 self-evident, intuitive, natural, common, a priori, &c. ; or by 
 some peculiar name. Of these last there are two which deserve 
 special notice Axiom and Maxim. 
 
 5. AXIOMS (dgiw|u,a<ra, dignitates, pronunciata honoraria, 
 effata fide digna, propositiones illustres, xupiai ogai, rata>, firmcp. 
 sententice, <fec.). 
 
 The term Axiom is ambiguous ; the history of its employment 
 obscure, and uninvestigated ; and the received accounts of its 
 signification, and the reasons of its signification, very erroneous. 
 I am aware of three very different meanings in which it has 
 been used. Of these the first and second are of ancient, and the
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 71 
 
 third of modern usurpation. The verb d|;i6w, originally and 
 properly, means to rate a thing at a certain worth or value, to 
 appreciate, to estimate. Now it is evident, that from this central 
 signification it might very easily be deflected into two collateral 
 meanings. 
 
 a. To rate a thing at its value, seems to presuppose that it 
 has some value to be rated ; hence the verb came very naturally 
 to signify / deem worthy, &c. From it in this signification we 
 have dS-i'wfjux, worth, dignity, authority ; and, applied in a logi- 
 cal relation, a toorthy, an authoritative proposition. But why 
 worthy ? why authoritative ? Either because a proposition 
 worthy of acceptance (-^poTac^ af jo<jn'<3V]) ; or because a proposi- 
 tion commanding and obtaining acceptance (xup/a <%fa, pronuncia- 
 tum honorarium, illustre). But of what nature are the proposi- 
 tions worthy of, or which command, universal credence ? Mani- 
 festly not, at least primarily, those which, though true, and even 
 admitted to be true, shine in a reflected light of truth, as depen- 
 dent on other propositions for their evidence ; but those out of 
 which the truth beams directly and immediately, which borrow 
 not the proof from any which they afford to all, which are 
 deserving of credit on their own authority in a word, self-evident 
 propositions (rpoTatfij^ auro'Tfio'Tat). Hence the application of 
 the term to judgments true, primary, immediate,. common. To 
 this result converge the authorities of Aristotle. Theophrastus, Alex- 
 ander, Themistius, Proclus, Ammonius Hermite, and Philoponus 
 
 In this signification, as I can recollect, the oldest example of 
 the word is to be found in Aristotle. That this philosopher 
 limited the expression Axiom to those judgments which, on occa- 
 sion of experience, arise naturally and necessarily in the conscious 
 mind, and which are therefore virtually prior to experience, can- 
 not, I think, be reasonably doubted. ' Of the immediate princi- 
 ples,' he says, ' of syllogism, that which cannot be demonstrated, 
 but which it is not necessary to possess as the prerequisite of all 
 learning, I call Thesis ; and that Axiom, which he who would
 
 72 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 learn aught must himself bring, [and not receive from his instruc- 
 tor]. For some such principles there are ; and it is to these that 
 we are accustomed to apply this name.' (Anal. Post., L. i. c. 1, 
 14.) And again, distinguishing the Axiom from the Hypothe- 
 sis and Postulate, of the two latter he says ' Neither of these of 
 itself necessarily exists, and necessarily manifests its existence in 
 thought.' (Ibid. c. 10, 7.) He consequently supposes that an 
 Axiom is not only something true, but something that we cannot 
 but think to be true. All this is confirmed by sundry other pas- 
 sages. (Of these, some will be seen in Testimonies, n. 3 ; where 
 also, in a note, is given a solution of what may be said in oppo- 
 sition to the attribution of this doctrine to the Stagirite.) The 
 same is confirmed, also, by the ancient interpreters of the Poste- 
 rior Analytics Themistius (f. 2, a, ed. Aid.), and Philoponus, or 
 rather Ammonius Hermiae (f. 9, b, ed. Aid.) These harbor no 
 doubt in regard to the purport of the texts now quoted ; and 
 the same construction is given to Aristotle's doctrine on this 
 point, by Alexander, elsewhere, but especially in his Commentary 
 on the Topics (p. 12, ed. Aid.), and by Proclus in his Commen- 
 taries on Euclid. (Libb. ii. iii.) 
 
 The following definition by Theophrastus is preserved by The- 
 mistius (1. c.). I translate the context, cautioning the reader that 
 it is impossible to determine whether the latter part of the pas- 
 sage belongs to Theophrastus, or, what is more probable, to The- 
 mistius himself. ' Theophrastus thus defines an Axiom : An 
 axiom is a certain kind of opinion [or judgment], one species of 
 which is [valid] of all things of the same class, as [under the cat- 
 egory, Quantity] If equals be taken from equals, the remainders 
 are equal ; while another is [valid] of all things indifferently, as 
 Between affirmation and negation there is no medium. For these 
 are, as it were, connate and common to all. Whence also the 
 reason of the denomination Axiom [worth, dignity, authority]. 
 For what is set over, either all things absolutely, or certain classes 
 of things universally, that we judge to have precedence, authori- 
 ty, by reference to them.'
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 73 
 
 In this sense the word is universally supposed to have been tech- 
 nically employed by the mathematicians, from a very ancient 
 period. But whether it was so prior to Aristotle, I should be vehe- 
 mently disposed to doubt ; both from the tenor of the former pas- 
 sage of the Posterior Analytics, just quoted, in which the philos- 
 opher seems to attribute to himself this application of the term, 
 and from the absence of all evidence to prove its earlier intro- 
 duction. I am aware indeed of a passage in the Metaphysics 
 (L. iii. [iv.] c. 3), which, at first sight, and as it has always been 
 understood, might appear unfavorable to this surmise ; for men- 
 tion is there made of ' what in mathematics (Iv <roi (xa^fjiarff) 
 are called Axioms.' But this text is, I suspect, misunderstood, 
 and that it ought to be translated ' what in our " Mathematics" 
 are called Axioms.' But did Aristotle write on this subject ? 
 He did, one, if not two treatises ; as appears from the lists of 
 Laertius (L. v. 24) and the Anonymus Menagii. In the former 
 we have Mo&ffMWixev, a, ' On Mathematics, one book;'' in the 
 latter Hegi <z% iv <ro?s f/.a^fjwx.o'iv ourfi'a?, " On the existence treated 
 of in Mathematics.' 1 Nay, the term is not to be found in the 
 writings we possess of those geometricians who ascend the near- 
 est to the age of Aristotle. Euclid, what may surprise the reader, 
 does not employ it. There it stands, certainly, in all the editions 
 and translations of the Elements in ordinary use. But this is 
 only one of the many tamperings with his text, for which the 
 perfidious editors and translators of Euclid are responsible ; and 
 in the present instance the Aristotelizing commentary of Proclus 
 seems to have originally determined the conversion of ' Common 
 Notions' into ' Axioms.' Archimedes (De Sphaera et Cylindro, 
 sub initio) is, after Aristotle, the oldest authority extant for the 
 term, in a mathematical relation ; though Archimedes, who only 
 once .employs it, does not apply it in the Aristotelic limitation, as 
 equivalent to the Common Notions of Euclid, and exclusive of 
 Postulates and Definitions. On the contrary, with him axiom is, 
 if not convertible with definition, used only in the second or Sto- 
 ical sense, for an enunciation in general. Turning indeed to the 
 
 4
 
 74 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 works of the other Greek Mathematicians which I have at hand, 
 I cannot find the term in Apollonius of Perga, in Serenus, Dio- 
 phantus, Pappus, Eutocius, Hero, or the Samian Aristarchus. 
 Sextus Empiricus, in all his controversy with the Mathematicians, 
 knows it not ; nor, except in the second technical meaning, is it 
 to be found in Plutarch. Its application in mathematics was 
 therefore, I surmise, comparatively late, and determined by the 
 influence of Aristotle. This is not the only instance by which it 
 might be shown that the Mathematicians are indebted to the Sta- 
 girite for their language ; who, if he borrowed a part of his Log- 
 ical nomenclature from Geometry, amply repaid the obligation. 
 
 This first meaning is that which Axiom almost exclusively ob- 
 tains in the writings of the Aristotelian, and (though Plato does 
 not philosophically employ the term) of the Platonic school. 
 
 b. To rate a thing at its value, that is, to attribute or not to 
 attribute to it a certain worth, is a meaning which would easily 
 slide into denoting the affirmation or negation of qualities in re- 
 gard to a subject ; for its qualities determine, positively or nega- 
 tively, the value of any thing. Hence, in general, to be of opin- 
 ion, to think so and so, to judge. (In like manner, among othei 
 analogical examples, the Latin verb existimo (that is ex-cestimo), 
 its primary meaning falling into desuetude, was at last almost ex- 
 clusively employed in the secondary, as / think that, or I opine.) 
 From this signification of the verb flowed a second logical mean- 
 ing of the substantive ; Axiom being applied to denote, in gen- 
 eral, an enunciation or proposition (properly a categorical), whether 
 true or false. In this sense it was used, sometimes by Aristotle 
 (v. Top., L. viii. cc. 1, 3 if this work be his et ibi, Alexandrum), 
 and, as far as I am aware, to say nothing of the Epicureans and 
 Skeptics, always by the Stoics though Simplicius (ad. Epict. 
 Ench., c. 58) asserts, that they occasionally employed it, like the 
 Aristotelians, in the first. Laelius, Varro, Cicero, Sergius, Agelli- 
 us, Apuleius, Donatus, Martianus Capella, &c., render it by vari- 
 ous Latin terms, in all of which, however, the present meaning 
 exclusively, is embodied ; and in the same signification the Greek
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 75 
 
 term axloma itself was, in modern times, adopted by Ramus and 
 his school, as their common logical expression for " proposition." 
 
 Thus in neither of its logical significations, I make bold to say, 
 is the word Axiom to be found in any writing extant, prior to 
 Aristotle ; and in its second, only in a work, the Topics, which is 
 not with absolute certainty the production of the Stagirite. I 
 may observe, that there is another account given of the logical 
 applications of the word, but to this I think it wholly needless to 
 advert. 
 
 c. The third and last meaning is that imposed upon the word 
 by Bacon. He contorted Axiom to designate any higher propo- 
 sition, obtained by generalization and induction from the obser- 
 vation of individual instances the enunciation of a general fact 
 an empirical law. 
 
 So much for the meanings of the term Axiom itself now for 
 its translation. 
 
 Dignitas was employed by Boethius to render Axioma in its 
 first or Aristotelic meaning ; and from him came, in this appli- 
 cation, into general use among the Latin schoolmen. But before 
 Boethius, and as a translation of the term in its second or Stoical 
 meaning, I find Dignitas employed by Priscian (Instit. Grammat., 
 L. xvii. c. 1). No lexicographer, however, no philologist has 
 noticed these authorities for the word, while Latin was still a 
 living language. It has, indeed, till this hour, been universally 
 taken for granted by philologers that dignitas in this relation is 
 a mere modern barbarism. 'Inepte faciunt (says Muretus) qui 
 df iojfjia<ra dignitates vocant ; cujus pravae constietudinis Hermo- 
 laus Barbarus auctor fuit.' (Variae Lectiones, L. vi. c. 2.) This 
 is wrong, more especially as regards the author and era of the 
 custom : nay, II. Barbaras is only reprehensible for not always, 
 instead of rarely, translating the term, as it occurs in Themistius, 
 by Dignitas, if translated into Latin it must be ; for his usual ver- 
 sion by Proloquium or Pronuntiatum expressions which only 
 render the word in its Stoical meaning has been the cause of 
 considerable error and confusion among subsequent logicians, who,
 
 76 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 unable to resort to the one rare edition of the original, were thus 
 led to suppose that the nomenclature of Theophrastus and The- 
 mistius were different from that of Aristotle. The authority of 
 Muretus has obtained, however, for his mistake a universal accep- 
 tation ; and what is curious, Nicolaus Loensis (Misc. Epiph., L. i. 
 c. 1), in his criticism of the very chapter in which it occurs, 
 omitting this solitary error, stupidly or perfidiously inculpates 
 Muretus for assertions, which that illustrious scholar assuredly 
 never dreamt of hazarding. 
 
 6. MAXIMS (inaximce, propositiones maxima, supremce, prin- 
 cipales, &c.) 
 
 In Maxim we have the example of a word which all employ, 
 but of whose meaning none seem to know the origin or reason.* 
 Extant in all the languages of Christendom, this term is a bequest 
 of that philosophy, once more extensive than Christianity itself, 
 through which Aristotle, for a thousand years, swayed at once 
 and with almost equal authority, the theology of the Bible and 
 the Koran. But it was not original to the scholastic philosophy. 
 The schoolmen received it from Boethius, who is the earliest au- 
 thor to whom I trace the expression. He propounds it in his 
 two works ' In Topica Ciceronis,' and ' De Differentiis Topi- 
 cis.' The following is one of his definitions : ' Maximas propo- 
 sitiones [which he also styles propositiones supremae, principales, 
 indemonstrabiles, per se notae, <fec.] vocamus quse et universales 
 
 * I have had the curiosity to see how far this ignorance extended. Our 
 English Lexicographers, Johnson, Todd, Webster, are in outer darkness. 
 They only venture to hint at some unknown relation between maxim and 
 " maximum, the greatest /" Richardson is not positively wrong. He is aware 
 (probably from Furetiere or his copyist the Dictionaire de Trevoux, for there 
 is a verbal coincidence in all three) that maxima, was in low Latin used in a 
 similar signification; but his explanation of the reason is not only defective, 
 but erroneous. In other dictionaries, real and verbal, if we find the word 
 noticed at all, we find nothing beyond a bare statement of its actual meaning ; 
 as may be seen in those of Goclenius, Micraelins, Martinius, Ducange, the 
 Zedlcrian Lexicon, to say nothing of our more modern Encyclopedias. Even 
 the great Selden (On Fortescue, c. 8) in attempting to explain the term in 
 its legal application, betrays his uuacquaintance with its history and proper 
 import.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 77 
 
 Bunt, et ita notse atque manifest, ut probatione non egeant, 
 eaque potius quse in dubitatione sunt probent. Nam quse in 
 dubitatse sunt, ambiguorum demonstration! solent esse principia ; 
 qualis est Omnem numerum vel parem vel imparem, et ^Equa- 
 lia relinqui si cequalibus, cequalia detrahuntur, caeteraeque de 
 quarum nota veritate non quaeritur.' 
 
 With Boethius maxima propositio (maxima he never uses abso- 
 lutely) is thus only a synonym for axiom or self-evident judg- 
 ment. He however applies the term specially to denote those 
 dialectical principles, axioms, or canons, those catholic judgments 
 which constitute what in logic and rhetoric have since Aristotle 
 been called common-places, that is, the* sources or receptacles of 
 arguments applicable to every matter, and proper to none. Such 
 propositions, he says, are styled maximce or greatest, because as 
 universal and primary, they implicitly contain the other proposi 
 tions (minores posterioresque), and determine the whole inference 
 of a reasoning (reliquas in se propositiones complectuntur, et per 
 eas fit consequens et rata conclusio).* But he also sometimes in- 
 dicates that they are entitled to this epithet, because, as evident 
 
 * Thus in arguing, that a wise, is not an intemperate, man, by the syllo- 
 gism 
 
 He is wise who controls his passions ; 
 
 He is intemperate who does not control his passions ; 
 
 Therefore a wise, is not an intemperate, man ; the whole reasoning is con- 
 tained under, and therefore presupposes, the proposition To what the defi- 
 nition is inapplicable, to that is inapplicable the thing defined (cui non convenit 
 definitio, non convenit definitum). This proposition (one of six co-ordinates 
 which make up the common-place called of Definition) as containing under 
 it a multitude of others (e. g., Cui non convenit definitio sapientis, nee con- 
 venit nomen ; cui non convenit definitio justi, pulchri, timidi, &c., &c., nee 
 nomen) is not inappropriately styled p. maxima. I may observe, however, 
 that, as thus employed, maxima can only, in strict propriety, qualify a propo- 
 sition relatively, not absolutely, greatest. For every maxim of every dialecti- 
 cal Place is itself contained within the sphere of one or other of the four 
 logical laws of Identity, Contradiction, Excluded Middle, and Eeason and 
 Consequent, of which it is only a subordinate modification. Thus the maxim 
 adduced, is only a special application of the law of Contradiction. To the 
 four laws, therefore, the name of propositiones maximce should be exclusively 
 applicable, if this expression were intended to denote an unconditioned uni- 
 versality.
 
 78 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 in themselves and independent of all others, they afford to the 
 unintuitive judgments they support, their primary proof (anti- 
 quissimam probationem), and their greatest certainty (maximarn 
 fidem). Compare In Top. Cic. L. i. Op. p. 765 De Diff. Top. L. 
 i. p. 859, L. ii. p. 865 sq. Boethius had likewise perhaps Aris- 
 totle's saying in his thought ' that principles, though what are 
 least in magnitude, are what are greatest in power.' 
 
 Maxima propositio, as a dialectical expression, was adopted 
 from Boethius by his friend and brother-consul, the patrician 
 Cassiodorus ; and from these ' ultimi Romanorum' it passed to the 
 schoolmen, with whom so soon as it became established as a com- 
 mon term of art, propositio was very naturally dropt, and maxima 
 thus came to be employed as a substantive by many at last, who 
 were not aware of the origin and rationale of its meaning. Finally, 
 from the Latinity and philosophical nomenclature of the schools, 
 it subsided, as a household word, into all the vernacular languages 
 of Europe ; with this restriction however that in them it is not 
 usually applied except in a practical relation ; denoting a moral 
 apophthegm, a rule of conduct, an ethical, a political, a legal ca- 
 non, &c., and this too, enouncing, not so much what is always and 
 necessarily, but what is for the most part and probably, true. It 
 sounds strange in our ears to hear of a mathematical or logical 
 maxim, in the sense of axiom, self-evident principle, or law 
 though this is the sense in which it was commonly employed, 
 among others, by Locke and Leibnitz. To this restriction, its 
 special employment in Dialectic (the logic of contingent matter) 
 probably prepared the way ; though by the schoolmen, as by Boe- 
 thius, it continued to be used as convertible with axiom. ' Dig- 
 nitas di'citur (says Albertus Magnus) quia omnibus dignior est, eo 
 quod omnibus influit cognitionem et veritatem ; et dicitur Max- 
 ima, eo quod virtute influentise lucis et veritatis omnia excedit 
 immediata principia.' (In i. Post. Anal., c. 1.) St. Thomas and 
 Scotus might be adduced to the same effect; see also P. Hispa- 
 nus (Summulae, tr. v. c. 3, et ibi Versor). At an early period, it 
 was borrowed as a term of art, into the Common Law of Eng-
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 79 
 
 land ; Maxims there denoting what by the civilians were tech- 
 nically denominated Regulce Juris. (Fortescue, De Laudibus 
 legum Anglise, c. 8. Doctor and Student, c. 8.) By Kant 
 Maxim was employed to designate a subjective principle, theo- 
 retical or practical, i. e. one not of objective validity, being exclu- 
 sively relative to some interest of the subject. Maxim and Reg- 
 ulative principle are, in the Critical philosophy, opposed to Law 
 and Constitutive principle. 
 
 Besides the preceding designations under this head, names have 
 been given to the original deliverances of Consciousness, consid- 
 ered as the manifestations of some special faculty ; that is, Con- 
 sciousness as performing this peculiar function has obtained a par- 
 ticular name. In this respect it has been called Reason, and, 
 with greater propriety, Intellect or Intelligence. 
 
 7. REASON (Xoyoff, ratio, raison, Vernunff), truths, principles, 
 belief s, feelings, intuitions, &c., of. 
 
 Reason is a very vague, vacillating, and equivocal word. Throw- 
 ing aside various accidental significations which it has obtained 
 in particular languages, as in Greek denoting not only the ratio 
 but the oratio of the Latins ; throwing aside its employment, in 
 most languages, for cause, motive, argument, principle of proba- 
 tion, or middle term of a syllogism, and considering it only as a 
 philosophical word denoting a faculty or complement of faculties ; 
 in this relation it is found employed in the following meanings, 
 not only by different individuals, but frequently, to a greater or 
 less extent, by the same philosopher. 
 
 a. It has both in ancient and modern times been very com- 
 monly employed, like understanding and intellect, to denote our 
 intelligent nature in general (Xoyixov ^i^s) ; and this usually as 
 distinguished from the lower cognitive faculties, as sense, imagi- 
 nation, memory but always, and emphatically, as in contrast to 
 the feelings and desires. In this signification, to follow the Aris- 
 totelic division, it comprehends 1, Conception, or Simple Ap- 
 prehension (g'vvoia, VO'TJO'IJ TCJV cc&ai^sVwv, conceptus, conceptio, ap- 
 prehensio simplex, das Begreifen) ; 2,- the Compositive and Divi-
 
 80 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 fdve process, Affirmation and Negation, Judgment (<Jvv6e<fis xa< 
 Stct'igettis, d*6<pav<ri, judicium) ; 3, Reasoning or the Discursive 
 faculty (<Jiavoia, X6yo, Xoyi<f|*o, TO tfuXXoyi'^stfdai, discursus, ratio- 
 cinatio) ; 4, Intellect or Intelligence proper, either as the intui- 
 tion, or as the place, of principles or self-evident truths (vou, intel- 
 lectus, intelligentia, mens). 
 
 b. In close connection with the preceding signification, from 
 which perhaps it ought not to be separated, is that meaning in 
 which reason, the rational, the reasonable, is used to characterize 
 the legitimate employment of our faculties in general, in contra- 
 distinction to the irregular or insubordinate action of one or more 
 even of our rational faculties, which, if exercised out of their 
 proper sphere, may be viewed as opposed to reason. Thus the 
 plain sense of one of Moliere's characters complains 
 
 Raisonner est 1'emploi do toute ma maison, 
 Et le raisonnement en hannit la raison. 
 
 c. It has not unfrequently been employed to comprehend the 
 third and fourth of the special functions above enumerated to 
 wit, the dianoetic and noetic. In this meaning it is taken by Reid 
 in his later works. Thus in the Intellectual Powers (p. 425 ab.) 
 he states, that Reason, in its first office or degree [the noetic], i? 
 identical with Common Sense, in its second [the dianoetic], with 
 Reasoning. 
 
 d. It has very generally, both in ancient and modern philos 
 ophy, been employed for the third of the above special func- 
 tions ; Xoyos and Xoyitfju.off, Ratio and Ratiocinatio, Reason and 
 Reasoning being thus confounded. Reid thus applied it in his 
 earlier work the Inquiry. See pp. 100, b., 108, a., 127, a. b. 
 
 e. In the ancient systems it was very rarely used exclusively 
 for the fourth special function, the noetic in contrast to the dia- 
 noetic. Aristotle, indeed (Eth. Nic., L. vi. c. 11 (12), Eth. Eud., 
 L. v. c. 8), expressly says that reason is not the faculty of prin- 
 ciples, that faculty being Intelligence proper. Boethius (De Cons. 
 Phil., L. v. Pr. 5) states that Reason or Discursive Intellect be- 
 longs to man, while Intelligence or Intuitive Intellect is the exclu-
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 81 
 
 sive attribute of Divinity. ' Ratio humani tantum generis est, 
 sicuti Intelligently sola clivini ;' while Porphyry somewhere says 
 ' that we have Intelligence in common with the Gods, and rea- 
 son in common with the brutes.' Sometimes, however, it was 
 apparently so employed. Thus St. Augustine seems to view 
 Eeason as the faculty of intuitive truths, and as opposed to Rea- 
 soning : ' Ratio est quidam mentis adspectus, quo, per seipsam 
 non per corpus, verum intuetur ; Ratiocinatio autem est rationis 
 inquisitio, a certis ad incertorum indagationem nitens cogitatio.' 
 (De Quant. An., 53 De Immort. An., 1, 10.) This, how- 
 ever, is almost a singular exception. 
 
 In modern times, though we frequently meet with Reason, as 
 a general faculty, distinguished from Reasoning, as a particular ; 
 yet until Kant, I am not aware that Reason (Vemunft) was ever 
 exclusively, or even emphatically, used in a signification corres- 
 ponding to the noetic faculty, in its strict and special meaning, 
 and opposed to understanding (Verstand) viewed as comprehend- 
 ing the other functions of thought unless Crusins (Weg. &c. 62 
 sq.) may be regarded as Kant's forerunner in this innovation. In- 
 deed the Vernunft of Kant, in its special signification (for he also 
 uses it for Reason in the first or more general meaning, as indeed 
 nothing can be more vague and various than his employment of 
 the word), cannot without considerable qualification be considered 
 analogous to Nouj, far less to Common Sense ; though his usur- 
 pation of the term for the faculty of principles, probably deter- 
 mined Jacobi (who had originally, like philosophers in general, 
 confounded Vernunft with Verstand, Reason with Reasoning) to 
 appropriate the term Reason to what he had at first opposed to 
 it, under the name of Belief (Glaube). Accordingly in his ma- 
 turer writings, ' Vernunft, Reason ' Vernunft-GlaubeJ Belief of 
 Reason ' Vernunft- Gefmhl] Feeling of Reason 'Rationale 
 AnschauunyJ Rational Intuition ' Sinn, Organ fuer das (Tcber- 
 sinnlichej Sense or Organ of the Supersensible, &c., are the terms 
 by which we may roundly say that Jacobi denominates the noetic 
 faculty or common sense. 
 
 4*
 
 82 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 Kant's abusive employment of the term' Reason, for the faculty 
 of the Unconditioned, determined also its adoption, under the 
 same signification, in the philosophy of Fichte, Schelling, and 
 Hegel; though NoU^, Intellectus, Intelligentia, which had been 
 applied by the Platonists in a similar sense, were (through Ver- 
 stand, by which they had been always rendered into German) 
 the only words suitable to express that cognition of the Absolute, 
 in which subject and object, knowledge and existence, God and 
 man, are supposed to be identified. But even in this, to add to 
 the confusion, no consistency was maintained. For though that 
 absolute cognition was emphatically the act of Reason, it was 
 yet by Fichte and Schelling denominated the Intuition of Intel- 
 lect (intellectuale Anschauung). F. Schlegel was therefore jus- 
 tified in his attempt to reverse the relative superiority of Ver- 
 nunft and Verstand. What were his reasons I know not ; but 
 as they have excited no attention, they were probably of little 
 weight 
 
 Though Common Sense be not therefore opposed to Reason, ex- 
 cept perhaps in its fourth signification, still the term Reason is of 
 so general and ambiguous an import, that its employment in so de- 
 terminate a meaning as a synonym of Common Sense ought to 
 be avoided. It is only, we have seen, as an expression for the 
 noetic faculty, or Intellect proper, that Reason can be substituted 
 for Common Sense ; and as the former is hardly allowable, still 
 less is the latter. 
 
 Besides the more precise employment of Reason as a synonym 
 for Common Sense by the recent German philosophers, it will be 
 found more vaguely applied in the same meaning usually, how- 
 ever, with some restrictive epithet, like common, universal, funda- 
 mental, &c. by many older authorities, of whom Heraclitus, the 
 Stoics, Turretin, Lyons, Bentley, Shaftesbury, De la Mennais, 
 are among the Testimonies adduced in the sequel. 
 
 8. INTELLECT, INTELLIGENCE (vous? intcllcctus, intelligentia, 
 
 1 See below, p. 454. W. * See above, p. 54, b. note. W.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 83 
 
 mens, entendement, intelligence, intellect, Verstand). truths, prin- 
 ciples, axioms, dicta, intuitions, <fcc., of. 
 
 INTELLECTIONS (yoyitsis, intellectiones, intelligentice, intellections, 
 intelligences), primary, natural, common, <fec. 
 
 By Aristotle, from whom it finally obtained the import, which 
 it subsequently retained, the term Nous is used in two principal 
 significations. In the one (like Reason in its first meaning) it de- 
 notes, in general, our higher faculties of thought and knowledge ; 
 in the other it denotes, in special, the faculty, habit, place, of 
 principles, that is, of self-evident and self-evidencing notions and 
 judgments. The schoolmen, following Boerhius, translated it by 
 intellectus and intelligentia ;* and some of them appropriated 
 the former of these terms to its first, or general signification, the 
 latter to its second or special. Cicero does not employ the term 
 intellectus; and the Ciceronian epidemic prevalent after the revival 
 of letters, probably induced the Latin translators of the Greek phi- 
 losophers to render it more usually by the term mens. In one and 
 all of our modern languages the words derived from, or corres- 
 ponding to, Intellectus, Intellectio, Intelligentia, have been so 
 loosely and variously employed, that they offer no temptation to 
 substitute them for that of Common Sense. The case is different 
 with the adjective noetic. The correlatives noetic and dianoetic 
 would afford the best philosophical designations the former for 
 an intuitive principle, or truth at first hand ; the latter for a dem- 
 onstrative proposition, or truth a't second hand. Noology and 
 Noological, Dianoialogy and Dianoialogical would be also tech- 
 nical terms of much convenience in various departments of philos- 
 ophy. On the doctrine of first principles as a department of 
 
 * Intettigentia (like Intelledw) properly denotes the act or energy of Intellec- 
 tus. How it came that the term Intelliij 'entire was latterly applied to denote 
 the higher order of created existences, as angels, &c., is explained by Aqui- 
 nas (S. Th., P. i. qu. 79, art. 10), as an innovation introduced by certain 
 translations from the Arabic. I shall not commemorate the distinction of 
 Intettectus and Inttlligentia given in the contradictory farrago attributed to 
 St. Augustine, under the title De Spiritu et Anima. See cc. 37, 88.
 
 84 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 ' Gnostology,' the philosophy of knowledge, we have indeed du- 
 ring the seventeenth century, by German authors alone, a series 
 of special treatises, under the titles of ' NoologiaJ by Calovius, 
 1651, Mejerus, 1662, Wagnerus, 1670, and Zeidlerus, 1680, 
 and of ' Intelligentia? by Gutkius, 1625, and Geilfussius, 1662. 
 'Archelogia,' again, was the title preferred for their works upon 
 the same subject by Alstedius, 1620, and Micraelius, 1658. Of 
 these treatises, in so far as I have seen them, the execution disap- 
 points the curiosity awakened by the title and attempt. 
 
 In this sense, besides the ordinary employment of Intellectus, 
 and Intelligentia by the ancient and modern Aristotelians ; Cice- 
 ro, St. Austin, and others, in like manner, use Intelligentiw, either 
 simply, or with some differential epithet, as inchoates, adumbrates, 
 complicates, involutes, primes, communes, &c. ; as is done like- 
 wise by Pascal and other French philosophers with the terms In- 
 telligence and Intelligences. 
 
 X. The tenth and last circumstance is, that the native contri- 
 butions by the mind itself to our concrete cognitions have, prior 
 to their elicitation into consciousness through experience, only a 
 potential, and in actual experience only an applied, engaged, or 
 implicate, existence. Hence their designation of 
 
 HABITS (possessions), DISPOSITIONS, VIRTUALITIES, <fec., with 
 some discriminating epithet. Thus, by Aristotle, noetic Intelli- 
 gence is called the (natural) Habit of principles (if i rwv d^wv) ; 
 and principles themselves are characterized by Leibnitz, as natu- 
 ral Habits, Dispositions, Virtualities. As prior to experience, 
 Galen styles them things occult or delitescent (xsx^ujxjas'va), in con- 
 trast to the manifestations made in experience itself (<pavof/,sva). 
 Cicero and others call them Intelligentia;, obscures, inchoatcc, 
 complicates, involutes, &c. To the same head are to be referred 
 the metaphorical denominations they have obtained of Seeds 
 (Xoyoi <r<T|xa<nx(H, semina scientiee, semina cetemitatis, &c.) or 
 Sparks (scintilla:, igniculi, ^wfft^a sva^tf/xara, 0Viv0j, fee.)
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 85 
 
 VI. THE UNIVERSALITY OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON 
 SENSE ; OR ITS GENERAL RECOGNITION, IN REALITY AND 
 IN NAME, SHOWN BY A CHRONOLOGICAL SERIES OF TESTI- 
 MONIES FROM THE DAWN OF SPECULATION TO THE PRESENT 
 
 1. HESIOD thus terminates his Works and Days: 
 
 <I>j7//>j &' oviroTt Tfaftirav dmftXurat rjv nva iroXXol 
 Aaoi tfuinl^ovaC Olds vv rif tirri Kal air^. 
 
 ' The Word proclaimed by the concordant voice 
 Of mankind fails not ; for in man speaks God.' 
 
 Hence the adage ? Vox Populi, vox Dei. 
 
 2. HERACLITUS. The doctrine held by this philosopher of a 
 Common Reason (uvo Xoyoj), the source and the criterion of 
 truth, in opposition to individual wisdom (Wia <po'vrjif), the 
 principle of opinion and error, may be regarded as one of Com- 
 mon Sense. Its symbol rot xoivvj (paivo'fisva rtftra. Sextus Em- 
 piricus thus briefly expounds : ' What appears to all, that is to 
 be believed ; for it is apprehended by the Reason which is Com- 
 mon and Divine ; whereas, what is presented to individual minds, 
 is unworthy of belief, and for the counter cause.' I. Adv. Log. 
 131. 
 
 In so far, however, as our scanty sources of information enable 
 us to judge, Heraclitus mistook the import, and transgressed the 
 boundaries of the genuine doctrine, in the same way as is done 
 
 * In throwing together these testimonies, I had originally in view, merely 
 to adduce such as bore explicitly and directly on the doctrine of Common 
 Sense, word and thing ; subsequently, I found it proper to take in certain 
 others, in which thatdoctrin* is clearly, though only implicitly or indirectly, 
 asserted. These last, I have admitted, in preference, from those schools 
 which ascribe the least to the mind itself, as a fountain of knowledge, and a 
 criterion of truth ; and have, in consequence, taken little cr nothing from 
 the Platonic. I have also been obliged to limit the testimonies, almost ex- 
 clusively, to Common Sense, considered on its speculative side. On its prac- 
 tical, there could have been no end.
 
 86 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 in the system of ' Common Sense,' ' Universal Consent,' or ( Com- 
 mon Reason,' so ingeniously maintained by the eloquent Abb6 
 DeLaMennais (No. 101). Both vilipend all private judgment 
 as opinion ; and opinion both denounce as a disease. Both sac- 
 rifice the intelligence of individual men at the shrine of the 
 common reason of mankind ; and both celebrate the apotheosis 
 of this Common Reason or Sense, as an immediate ray of the 
 divinity. Both, finally, in proclaiming ' that we ought to follow 
 the Common' (SsTv &i(e<f&a.i <rw uvw), mean, that we should resort 
 to this, not merely as a catholic criterion, or a source of element- 
 ary truths, but as a magazine of ready fabricated dogmas. Herac- 
 litus and La Mennais are the first and last philosophers in our 
 series : philosophy would thus seem to end as it began. In re- 
 lation to the former, see Schleiermacher, in Wolf and Butt- 
 mann's Museum, i. pp. 313, seq. ; and Brandis Geschichte der 
 Philosophic, i. 44. In relation to the latter, see his Catechisme 
 du Sens Commun Essais sur L'IndirFerence, fec., passim ; with 
 Bautaiu, Psychologie, i. Disc. Prelim., pp. xliv. seq. ; and Biunde, 
 Fund. Phil, pp. 129, seq. 166. (To these is now to be added the 
 Esquisse d'une Philosophic par F. Lamennais, 1840, L. i. ch. 1. 
 Here the doctrine in question is presented in a far less objection- 
 able form ; but as its previous statements are not withdrawn, I 
 have not thought it necessary to cancel the preceding observa- 
 tions, which were written before I had received this remarkable 
 work.) 
 
 3. ARISTOTLE. He lays it down in general as the condition 
 of the possibility of knowledge that it does not regress to infinity, 
 but depart from certain primary facts, beliefs, or principles true, 
 and whose truth commands assent, through themselves, and 
 themselves alone. These, as the foundations, are not objects, of 
 Science ; as the elements of Demonstration they are themselves 
 indemonstrable. The fountains of certainty to all else, they are 
 themselves pre-eminently certain, and if denied in words, they are 
 still always mentally admitted. The faculty of such principles 
 is not Reason, the discursive or dianoetic faculty (Xoyo?, &avoia),
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 87 
 
 but Intellect or Intelligence proper, the noetic faculty (vouj). 
 Intellect as an immediate apprehension of what is, may be viewed 
 as a Sense (a'/tf^o'ij). Compare Analyt. Post. L. i. cc. 2, 3, 10, 
 32 L. ii. c. ult. Top. L. i. c. 1 Metaph. L. i. c. 7 L. ii. (A 
 minor) c. 2 L. ii. (iii. Duvallio) cc. 3, 4, 6 L. iii. (iv.) c. 6 
 Eth. Nic. L. vi. cc. 6, 11, (12) Eth. Eud. L. v. cc. 6, 8 L. vii. 
 c. 14 Mag. Mor. L. i. c. 35. 
 
 In particular, that Aristotle founds knowledge on belief, and 
 the objective certainty of science on the subjective necessity of 
 believing, is, while not formally enounced, manifest from many 
 passages though he might certainly have been more explicit. 
 Compare Post. Anal. L. i. c. 2, 1, 2, 16, 17, 18 ; c. 10, 7 ; 
 c. 31, 3 ; Top. L. i. c. 1, 6, &c. ; Eth. Nic. vii. c. 3 ; Magn. 
 Mor. L. ii. c. 6. 
 
 ' Since Aristotle,' says the profound Jacobi (Werke ii. p. 11), 
 ' there has been manifested a continual and increasing tendency 
 in the philosophical schools to subordinate, in general, immedi- 
 ate to mediate knowledge the powers of primary apprehension, 
 on which all is founded, to the powers of reflection as determined 
 by abstraction the prototype to the ectype the thing to the 
 Avord the Reason [Vernunft Aristotle's noetic faculty or Intel- 
 lect] to the Intellect [Verstand Aristotle's dianoetic faculty or 
 Reason] ; nay, to allow the former to be wholly subjugated and 
 even lost.' In this Jacobi (and to Jacobi may be added Fries) 
 docs Aristotle the most signal injustice ; for there is no philoso- 
 pher who more emphatically denounces the folly of those ' who 
 require a reason of those things of which there is no reason to 
 be given, not considering that the principle of demonstration is 
 not itself demonstrable.' Metaph. iii. 6. See No. 4 a. In fact 
 Jacobi's own doctrine in its most perfect form, will be found to 
 bear a wonderful analogy to that of Aristotle. See No. 87 d. 
 'In determining indeed the question whether Aristotle does or 
 does not derive all our knowledge from experience and induction, 
 there is some difficulty, from the vagueness with which the 
 problem has usually been stated. In so far, however, as it con-
 
 88 PHILOSOPHY: OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 cerns the doctrine of Common Sense, the opinion of Aristotle 
 admits of no reasonable doubt.* 
 
 * The doctrine of those passages (as Post. An. L. ii. c. ult., Eth. Nic. L. vi. 
 o. 8. Eth. Eud. L. v. c. 8, &c.) in which Aristotle asserts that our knowledge 
 of principles is derived from sense, experience, induction, may bo reconciled 
 with the doctrine of those others in which he makes the intellect itself their 
 source (see above, p. 70 b, and quotations a. b. c. that follow) in two ways. 
 
 The first is that adopted by a majority of his Greek and Latin expositors. 
 They suppose that our knowledge of principles is dependent on both, but in 
 different manners, and in different degrees. On the intellect this knowledge 
 is principally dependent, as on its proximate, efficient, essential cause (atria 
 ytwnriK'ii xotrirticri, causa, causa per se, origo, &c.) On sense, experience, in- 
 duction, it is dependent, as on its exciting, disponent, permissive, manifesta- 
 tive, subsidiary, instrumental, occasional cause (atpopph, tyopp}), Trp6<paeis, alrta 
 tiTovpyij, An'rpif, {nnjp/nt, &c.) Of the Greek interpreter, sec Alexander in 
 Top. pp. 12, 47, 48, ed. Aid. (Test n. 10) Themistius in Post. An. ff. 2, 
 14, 15, and DC An. f. 00, ed. Aid. Philoponus (or Ammonius), in Post. An. 
 f. 100, ed. Aid. and De Anima, Proem. Eustratius in Post. An. f. 63, sq., 
 ed. Aid. in Eth. Nic. f. 89 b, ed. Aid. Of the Latin expositors, among 
 many, Fonseca, in Metaph. L. i. c. 1, q. 4 Conimbricenses, Org. Post. Anal. 
 L. i. c. 1. q. 1 Sonerus in Metaph. L. i. c. 1, p. 67, sq. Of Testimonies 
 infra, see Nos. 10, 20, 21, 22. On this interpretation, Aristotle justly views 
 our knowledge us chronologically commencing with Sense, but logically 
 originating in Intellect. As one of the oldest of nis modern antagonists has 
 incomparably enounced it, ' Cognitio nostra omnis a Mente primam oriyi- 
 nem, a Sensibus exordium habet primum ;' a text on which an appropriate 
 commentary may be sought for in the opening chapter of Kant's Critique of 
 pure Eeason, and in the seventeenth Lecture of Cousin upon Locke. 
 
 The second mode of reconciling the contradiction, and which has not I 
 think been attempted, is that on the supposition of the mind virtually 
 containing, antecedent to all actual experience, certain universal principles 
 of knowledge, in the form of certain necessities of thinking ; still it is ouly 
 by repeated and comparative experiment, that we compass the certainty 
 on the one hand, that such and such cognitions cannot but be thought, and 
 are, therefore, as necessary, native generalities, and on the other, that, such 
 and such cognitions may or may not be thought, and are, therefore, as con- 
 tingent, factitious generalizations. To this process of experiment, analysis, 
 and classification, through which we attain to a scientific knowledge of prin- 
 ciples, it might bo shown that Aristotle, not improbably, applies the term 
 Induction. 
 
 In regard to the passage (De An. L. iii. c. 5) in which the intellect prior 
 to experience is compared to a tablet on which nothing has actually been, 
 written, the context shows that the import of this simile is with Aristotle 
 very different from what it was with the Stoics ; to whom, it may be noticed, 
 and not, as is usually supposed, to the Stagirite, are we to refer the first 
 enouncemeut of the brocard In Intellects, nihil est, quod non pnusfuerit in 
 ^ Scnsu.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 89 
 
 But to adduce some special testimonies. These I shall translate. 1 
 a. Top. L. i. c. 1, 6. ' First truths are such as are believed, 
 not through aught else, but through themselves alone. For in 
 regard to the principles of science we ought not to require the 
 reason Why [but only the fact That they are given] ; for each 
 such principle behooves to be itself a belief in and of itself.' 
 
 b. Pr. Analyt. L. i. c. 3, 4. Maintaining against one party 
 that demonstrative science is competent to man, and against 
 another, that this science cannot itself be founded on propositions 
 which admit of demonstration, Aristotle says ' We assert not 
 only that science does exist, but also that there is given a certain 
 beginning or principle of science, in so far as [or on another 
 interpretation of the term 77 ' by which 1 ] we recognize the im- 
 port of the terms.' On the one interpretation the meaning of 
 the passage is ' We assert not only that [demonstrative] science 
 does exist, but also that there is given a certain [indemonstrable] 
 beginning or principle of science [that is, Intellect which comes 
 into operation], so soon as we apprehend the meaning of the 
 terms.' For example, when we once become aware of the sense 
 of the terms whole and part, then the intellect of itself spontane- 
 ously enounces the axiom The whole is greater than its part. 
 On the other interpretation ; ' We assert not only that [demon- 
 strative] science does exist, but also that there is given a certain 
 [indemonstrable] beginning or principle of science [viz. intellect] 
 by which we recognize the import of the terms,' i. e. recognize 
 them in their necessary relation, and thereupon explicitly enounce 
 the axiom which that relation implies. 
 
 In making intellect a source of knowledge, Aristotle was preceded by 
 Plato. But the Platonic definition of ' Intellection 1 is ' The principle of 
 science ;' and Aristotle's merit is not tbe abolition of intellect as such, but 
 its reduction from a sole to a conjunct principle of science. 
 
 1 The original of the more essential points : Zrirtlv \tynv aipivra; TTJV a'aBrj- 
 CTII/, dfiliiafla TIS l(i liavolaf. Aristotle. IIpo<r/xv ov i(1 irdvra rols Sia fCtv Adyuv, 
 ilAAu iroXXtficif n~i\\ov rots (fiaivoiiivots. Id. Tfj aiaOi'/aei /iaA.W ? ria Aoy<j> iriotv- 
 riov' KOI rots Xoyoif, lav bno\oyovpcva luxvvuri rots' tyaivopivots. Id. 'H aiaQwiS 
 ( fttvafttv. Id
 
 90 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 c. Anal. Post. L. i. c. 2, 16. ' But it is not only necessary 
 that we should be endowed with an antecedent knowledge of 
 first principles all or some but that this knowledge should, 
 likewise, be of paramount certainty. For whatever communicates 
 a quality to other things must itself possess that quality in a 
 still higher degree; as that on account of which we love all 
 objects that partake of it, cannot but be itself, pre-eminently, an 
 object of our love. Hence if we know and believe through cer- 
 tain first principles, we must know and believe these themselves 
 in a superlative degree, for the very reason that we know and 
 believe [all] secondary truths through them.' 
 
 In connection herewith, compare the passages quoted above, 
 p. 70 b. 
 
 d. Rhet. L. i. c. 1. 'By nature man is competently organ- 
 ized for truth ; and truth, in general, is not beyond his reach.' 
 
 e. Metaph. L. ii. (A minor) c. 1. ' The theory of Truth is in 
 one respect difficult, in another easy ; as shown indeed by this 
 that while enough has been denied to any, some has been 
 conceded to all.' 
 
 f. Elh. Nic. L. x. c. 2. Arguing against a paradox of certain 
 Platonists, in regard to the Pleasurable, he says ' But they who 
 oppose themselves to Eudoxus, as if what all nature desiderates 
 were not a good, talk idly. For what appears to all, that we 
 affirm to be ; and he who would subvert this belief, will himself 
 assuredly advance nothing more deserving of credit. Compare 
 also L. vii. c. 13 (14 Zuing.). 
 
 In his paraphrase on the above passage, the Pseudo-Androni- 
 cus (Heliodorus Prusensis) in one place uses the expression com- 
 mon opinion, and in another all but uses (what indeed he could 
 hardly do in this meaning as an Aristotelian, if indeed in Greek 
 at all) the expression common sense, which D. Heinsius in his 
 Latin version actually employs. ' But, that what all beings de- 
 sire is a good, this is manifest to every one endowed with sense' 
 - (ifoitfi TOI tv al<f6v)<tei, ' omnibus communi sensu praeditis'.) See 
 No. 31.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 91 
 
 g. Eth. Eud. L. i. c. 6. ' But of all these we must endeavor 
 to seek out rational grounds of belief, by adducing manifest testi- 
 monies and examples. For it is the strongest evidence of a doc- 
 trine, if all men can be adduced as the manifest confessors of its 
 positions ; because every individual has in him a kind of private 
 organ of the truth. . . . Hence we ought not always to 
 look only to the conclusions of reasoning, but frequently rather 
 to what appears [and is believed] to be.' See Nos. 10, 30. 
 
 h. Ibid. L. vii. c. 14. 'The problem is this: What is the 
 beginning or principle of motion in the soul ? Now it is evident, 
 that as God is in the universe, and the universe in God, that [I 
 read xwsiv xai] the divinity in us is also, in a certain sort, the 
 universal mover of the mind. For the principle of Reason is not 
 Reason, but something better. Now what can we say is better 
 than even science, except God ?' The import of this singular 
 passage is very obscure. It has excited, I see, the attention, and 
 exercised the ingenuity of Pomponatius, J. C. Scaliger, De Raei, 
 Leibnitz, Leidenfrost, Jacobi, &c. But without viewing it as of 
 pantheistic tendency, as Leibnitz is inclined to do, it may be 
 interpreted as a declaration, that Intellect, which Aristotle else- 
 where allows to be pre-existent and immortal, is a spark of the 
 Divinity ; whilst its data (from which, as principles more certain 
 than their deductions, Reason, Demonstration, Science must 
 depart) are to be reverenced as the revelation of truths which 
 would otherwise lie hid from man. That, in short, 
 
 ' The voice of Nature is the voice of God.' 
 
 By the by, it is remarkable that this text was not employed by 
 any of those Aristotelians who endeavored to identify the Active 
 Intellect with the Deity. 
 
 i. Phys. L. viii. c. 3. Speaking of those who from the con- 
 tradictions in our conception of the possibility, denied the fact of 
 motion : ' But to assert that all things are at rest, and to 
 attempt a proof of this by reasoning, throwing the testimony of 
 sense out of account, is a sign not of any strength, but of a cer-
 
 92 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 tain imbecility of reason.' And in the same chapter ' Against 
 all these reasonings, there suffices the belief [of sense] alone.' 
 See Simplicius ad locum, ed. Aid. ff. 276, 277. 
 
 k. De Gen. Anim. L. iii. c. 10. 'We ought to accord our 
 belief to sense, in preference to reasoning; and of reasonings, 
 especially to those whose conclusions are in conformity with the 
 phenomena.' And somewhere in the same work he also says, 
 ' Sense is equivalent to, or has the force of science.' 
 
 1. See also De Ccelo, L. i. c. 3, text 22. 
 
 m. Ibid. L. iii. c. 7, text 61. 
 
 n. Meteor. L. i. c. 13. 
 
 4. THEOPHRASTUS. a. Metaph. c. 8 (ed. Sylb. p. 260, 
 Brand, p. 319). The following testimony of this philosopher (if 
 the treatise be indeed his) is important, both in itself, and as illus- 
 trative of the original peripatetic doctrine touching the cognition of 
 first principles, which he clearly refuses to Sense and induction, and 
 asserts to Intelligence and intuition. It has, however, been wholly 
 overlooked ; probably in consequence of being nearly unintelligible 
 in the original from the corruption of the common text, and in the 
 version of Bessarion also from a misapprehension of his author's 
 meaning. 
 
 Having observed that it was difficult to determine up to what 
 point, and in regard to what things the investigation of causes or 
 reasons is legitimate ; that this difficulty applies to the objects 
 both of Sense and of Intelligence, in reference to either of which 
 a regress to infinity is at once a negation of them as objects of 
 understanding and of philosophy ; that Sense and Intelligence, 
 severally furnish a point of departure, a principle, the one relative, 
 or to us, the other absolute, or in nature ; and that each is the 
 converse of the other, the first in nature being the last to us ; 
 he goes on to state what these counter processes severally avail 
 in the research, or, as he calls it, after Aristotle, the speculation 
 of principles. ' Up to a certain point, taking our departure from 
 the Senses, we are able, rising from reason to reason, to carry on 
 the speculation of principles ; but when we arrive at those which
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 93 
 
 are [not merely comparatively prior but] absolutely supreme and 
 primary, we can no more ; because, either that a reason is no 
 longer to be found, or of our own imbecility, unable, as it were, 
 to look from mere excess of light. [Compare Arist. Metaph. A 
 minor, c. 1 ; which supports the reading, <paivorara.] But the 
 other procedure is probably the more authentic, which accords 
 the speculation of principles to the touch, as it may be called, 
 and feeling of Intelligence (TCJ vtJS di'yovn xai olov a-^a^s'vw). 
 [Comp. Aristot. Metaph. xii. 7.] For in this case there is no 
 room for illusion in regard to these.' He then observes ' That 
 it is even in the sciences of detail, of great, but in the universal 
 sciences, of paramount importance, to determine wherein, and at 
 what point the limit to a research of reasons should be fixed.' 
 And why ? Because they who require a reason for every thing, 
 subvert, at once, the foundations of reason and of knowledge? 
 
 b. See above, p. 74 a, where from his doctrine in regard to 
 first principles it appears that Theophrastus, like Aristotle, founds 
 knowledge on natural Belief. 
 
 5. LUCRETIUS. De Eerum Natura, L. i. v. 423, sq. 
 
 ' Corpus enim per se communis deliquat esse 
 Sensus ; quo nisi prima^^e* fundata valebit, 
 Ha\id erit, occultis de rebus quo referentes, 
 Confirmare animi quicquam ratione queamus.' 
 
 Sensus communis here means Sense, strictly so called, as tes- 
 tifying not only in all men, but in all animals. It is a transla- 
 tion of the expression of Epicurus j ofodqO'ig M itavruv (Laert. 
 x. 39) ; and as in the Epicurean philosophy all our knowledge is 
 merely an educt of Sense, the truth of the derived, depends 
 wholly upon the truth of the original evidence. See L. iv. w, 
 480, sq. 
 
 6. CICERO. a. De Fin. L. iv. c. 19. Speaking of the 
 Stoical paradoxes (' recte facta omnia aequalia, omnia peccata 
 paria,' &c.) he says ' Quse cum magnifice primo dici videntur, 
 considerata, minus probantur. Sensus enim cuj usque [i. e. S. 
 communis] et natura rerum, atque ipsa veritas clamat, quodam
 
 94: PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 modo, non posse adduci, ut inter eas res quas Zeno exaequaret, 
 nihil interesset.' (See No. 7.) 
 
 b. Tusc. Disp. L. i. c. 13. 'Omnia autera in re consensio 
 omnium gentium lex naturae putanda est.' Compare also c. 15. 
 
 c. De Nat. Deor. L. i. c. 16. The Epicurean Velleius there 
 speaking the doctrine of his sect : ' Intelligi necesse est, esse 
 Deos, quoniam insitas eorum, vel potius innatas cognitiones 
 habemus.* De quo autem, omnium natura consentit, id verum 
 esse necesse est. Esse igitur Deos confitendum est.' Compare 
 Plato, De Legibus, L. x. ; Aristotle, De Coelo, L. i. c. 3 ; Plutarch, 
 Amatores; Seneca, Epistolse, 117. 
 
 d. For 'Sensus Communis,' and 'Sensus Communes? as the 
 sources of moral judgment, see the Orations Pro Cluentio 6. Pro 
 Plancio, 13, 14. Pro Domo, 36. 
 
 e. For 'Sensus Communis 1 as criterion of judgment in the 
 arts, see De Orat. L. iii. c. 50 ; quoted by Reid, p. 424, b ; com- 
 pare L. i. c. 3. 
 
 7. HORACE. Sermones, I. iii. 96. Speaking like Cicero 
 (No. 6, a.) of the Stoical paradox, he says 
 
 ' Queis paria esse fere placuit peccata, laborant, 
 Quum ventum ad verum est ; Sensus moresque repugnant.' 
 
 That is, as Aero (to say nothing of Torrentius, Baxter, and other 
 moderns) interprets it ' communis hominum sensus? f 
 
 * It is not to be supposed that the noival fovotat, Qvaixal irpo>//^iy, of the 
 Stoics, far less of the Epicureans (however, as in the present instance, styled 
 innate or implanted), were more than generalizations a posteriori. Yet this 
 is a mistake, into which, among many others, even Lipsius and Leibnitz 
 have fallen, in regard to the former. See Manud. ad Stoic. Philos. L. ii. 
 diss. 11 ; and Nouv. Ess. Pref. 
 
 t This gloss of Aero is not to be found in any of the editions of the two 
 Horatian scholiasts. But I am in possession of extracts made by the cele- 
 uated William Canter, from a more complete MS. of these commentators, 
 than any to which Fabricius and their other editors had access. This codex 
 belonged to Canter himself; and he gives its character, and a few specimens 
 of its anecdota, in his Novaz Lectioneg. The copy of Horace (one of the first 
 editions of Lambinus) in which these extracts are found, contains also the 
 full collation of Canter's 'Manuscript! Codices Antiquissimi' of the poet (two
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 95 
 
 8. SENECA. a. Epist. 117. 'Multum dare solemus prae- 
 sumptioni omnium hominum. Apud nos veritatis argumentum 
 est, aliquid omnibus videri.' 
 
 b. Ep. 9. ' Ut scias autem hos sensus communes esse, natura 
 scilicet dictante, apud poetam comicum invenies, 
 
 " Non est beatus, esse se qui non putet." ' 
 
 c. Ep. 120. 'Natura semina nobis scientiae dedit, scientiam 
 non dedit.' 
 
 9. PLINY the Younger. Paneg., c. 64. 'Melius omnibus 
 quam singulis creditur. Singuli enim decipere et decipi possunt : 
 nemo omnes, neminem omnes fefellerunt.' 
 
 9* QUINTILIAN. Inst., L. v. c. 10, 12. 'Pro certis habe- 
 mus ea, in quse communi opinione consensum est.' 
 
 10. ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS, the oldest and ablest of 
 the interpreters of Aristotle whose writings have come down to 
 us, follows his master, in resting truth and philosophy on the 
 natural convictions of mankind. 
 
 a. On Fate, 2, edd. Lond. et Orell. Ou xevov ou<P aoVo^ov 
 <r' aXi^o'iIf I) xoivii TWV dv0Wtfwv <putfi, x.r.X. ' The common na- 
 ture of man is neither itself void of truth, nor is it an erring in- 
 dex of the true ;* in virtue whereof all men are on certain points 
 mutually agreed, those only excepted, who, through preconceived 
 opinions, and a desire to follow these out consistently, find them- 
 selves compelled verbally f to dissent.' And he adds, that ' An- 
 axagoras of Clazomene, however otherwise distinguished as a 
 physical philosopher, is undeserving of credit in opposing his tes- 
 timony touching fate to the common belief of mankind.' This 
 he elsewhere calls their ' common presumptions? their ' common 
 and natural notions' See 8, 14, 26, of the same work, and 
 
 only, I can prove, and not three, as the Novse Lectiones fallaciously state), 
 and which, from the many remarkable readings to be found exclusively in 
 them, must, in all probability, have perished perhaps in the inundation by 
 which Canter's celebrated library was, in a great measure, destroyed. 
 
 * See Aristotle, No. 3, d. 
 
 t Verbally, not mentally. He has Aristotle (Anal. Post., L. i. c. 10, 7) in 
 7iew. See Burner, No. 63.
 
 96 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 the chapter on Fate in the second book of his treatise On the 
 Soul, f. 161, ed. Aid. 1534. 
 
 b. On the Topics of Aristotle (p. 48, ed. Aid.) ' The induc- 
 tion useful in the employment of axioms is useful for illustrating 
 the application to particulars of the axiomatic rule [read <resgi 
 Xa(jL/3avo/Ava], but not in demonstrating its universality ; for this, 
 as an object of intellect, is self-evident, nor can it, in propriety, be 
 proved by induction at all.' Compare also p. 12. 
 
 1 1 . CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA. Stromata. After stating (L. v., 
 Op. ed. 16&8, p. 544) that there is neither knowledge without be- 
 lief, nor belief without knowledge, and having shown (L. viii. p. 
 771), after Aristotle and others, that the supposition of proof or 
 demonstration being founded on propositions themselves capable 
 of being proved, involves the absurdity of an infinite regress, and 
 therefore subverts the possibility of demonstration, he says ' Thus 
 the philosophers confess that the beginnings, the principles of all 
 knowledge, are indemonstrable; consequently if demonstration 
 there be, it is necessary that there should be something prior, be- 
 lievable of itself, something first and indemonstrable. All demon- 
 stration is thus ultimately resolved into an indemonstrable belief' 
 
 12. TERTULLIAN. a. De Testimonio animae adversus Gentes, 
 c. 5. 'Haec testimonia animae, quanto vera tanto simplicia. 
 quanto simplicia tanto vulgaria, quanto vulgaria tanto communia, 
 quanto communia tanto naturalia, quanto naturalia tanto divina ; 
 non putem cuiquam frivolum et frigidum videri posse, si recogitet 
 naturae majestatem, ex qua censetur auctoritas animae. Quantum 
 dederis magistrae, tantum adjudicabis discipulae. Magistra natu- 
 ra, anima discipula. Quicquid aut ilia edocuit, aut ista perdidi- 
 cit, a Deo traditum est, magistro scilicet ipsius magistrae. Quid 
 anima possit de principali institutore praesumere, in te est aesti- 
 mare de ea quae in te est. . . . Sed qui ejusmodi eruptiones 
 animae non putavit doctrinam esse naturae, et congenita? et inge- 
 nitae. conscientice* tacita commissa, dicet potius de ventilatis in 
 
 * Tertullian is the only ancient writer who uses the word Conscientia in a 
 psychological sense, corresponding with our Consciousness.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 97 
 
 vulgus opinionibus, publicatarum litterarum usum jam, et quasi 
 vitium, corroboratum taliter sermocinandi. Certe prior anima 
 quam littera, et prior sermo quam liber, et prior sensus quam sty- 
 lus, et prior homo ipse quam philosophus et poeta. Nunquid 
 ergo credendum est ante litteraturam et divulgationem ejus, mutos 
 absque hujusmodi pronunciationibus homines vixisse ? . . . 
 Et unde ordo ipsis litteris contigit, nosse, et in usum loquelae dis- 
 seminare, qua? nulla unquam mens conceperat, aut lingua protu- 
 lerat, aut auris exceperat?' He alludes to I. Corinthians ii. 
 9, &c. 
 
 b. De Resurrectione Carnis, c. 3. ' Est quidem et de com- 
 munibus sensibus sapere in Dei rebus. . . . Utar et consci- 
 entia populi, contestantis Deum Deorurn ; utar et reliquis com- 
 munibus sensibus, etc. . . Communes enim sensus simplicitas 
 ipsa commendat, et compassio sententiarum, et familiaritas opini- 
 onum, eoque fideliores existimantur, quia nuda et aperta et omni- 
 bus noto definiunt. Ratio enim divina in medulla est, non in su- 
 perficie, et plerumque semula manifestis.' 
 
 c. Ibid., c. 5. 'Igitur quoniam et rudes quique de commu- 
 nibus adhuc sensibus sapiunt,' &c. 
 
 d. De Anima, c. 2. Speaking of the sources from which 
 a merely human philosophy had derived its knowledge of 
 the mind, he concludes 'Sed et natura pleraque suggerun- 
 tur quasi de publico sensu, quo animam Deus dotare digna- 
 tus est.' 
 
 e. Praescr. 28. ' Quod apud multos unum invenitur, non est 
 erratum sed traditum.' 
 
 13. ARNOBIUS. Adversus Gentes, L. ii. p. 92, ed. 1651. 
 ' Quid est a nobis factum contra sensum judiciumque commune, 
 si rnajora et certiora delegimus, nee sumus nos passi falsorum re- 
 ligionibus attineri ?' Add., pp. 66, 127. 
 
 14. LACTANTIUS. Institut., L. iii. c. 5. 'Debuit ergo Arce- 
 silaus siquid saperet, distinguere, qua? sciri possent, quzeve ne- 
 sciri. Sed si id fecisset, ipse se in populum redigisset. Nam 
 vulgus interdum plus sapit, quia tantum, quantum opus est, sapit.'
 
 98 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 I 
 
 Quaere Had Lactantius the line of Martial in his eye ? 
 ' Quisquis plus justo non sapit, ille sapit ;' 
 
 or tlie precept of St. Paul ? ' Non plus sapere quam oportet sa- 
 pere, sed sapere ad sobrietatem.' 
 
 15. ST. AUGUSTINE. a. De duabus Aniinabus, c. 10. ' Qui- 
 vis enira homines, quos modo a communi sensu generis humani 
 nulla disrupisset amentia,' &c. 
 
 b. De Trinitate., Lib. xiii. c. 1. 'Novimus certissima scientia 
 et clamante Conscientia.' That is, Conscience, not Conscious- 
 ness, as sometimes supposed. 
 
 c. De Magistro, c. 11. 'Ait Propheta [Is., vii. 9], Nisi cre- 
 dideritis non intelligetis ; quod non dixisset profecto, si nihil 
 distare judicasset. Quod ergo intelligo, id etiam credo ; at non 
 omne quod credo, etiam intelligo. Omne autem quod intelligo scio ; 
 non omne quod credo scio. Quare pleraque cum scire non pos- 
 sim, quanta tamen utilitate credantur scio.' 
 
 16. PROCLUS (In Platonis Theologiam, Lib. i. c. 25) has still 
 more remarkable declarations of the truth, that Belief is the 
 foundation of knowledge. Speaking of the faith of the gods, 
 which he describes as anterior to the act of cognition (*ps<f(3i>- 
 rsgw TVS yvutfTixys gve^si'og), he says that it is not only to be dis- 
 tinguished from our belief, or rather error, in regard to things sen- 
 sible ; but likewise from the belief we have of what are called 
 Common Notions, with which it, however agrees, in that these 
 common notions command assent, prior to all reflection or reason- 
 ing: (xcti ya rats xoivafc svvoiaj *o tfavrog Xo'you iritfrew/xsv). See 
 below, Hermes, No. 99. Among other Platonists the same doc- 
 trine is advanced by the pseudo Hermes Trismegistus, L. xvi. sub 
 fine, p. 436, ed. Patricii, 1593. 
 
 17. AMMONIUS HERMIT (as extracted and interpolated by 
 Philoponus) in his Commentary on Aristotle ' On the Soul,' In- 
 troduction, p. 1-3, ed. Trincavelli, 1535. ' The function of Intel- 
 tect (voiJf) is by immediate application [or intuition, a#Xa7j 
 r/], to reach or compass reality, and this end it accom-
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 99 
 
 plishes more certainly than through the medium of demonstra- 
 tion. For as Sense, by applying itself at once to a colored or 
 figured object, obtains a knowledge of it better than through 
 demonstration for there needs no syllogism to prove that this or 
 the other thing is white, such being perceived by the simple ap- 
 pliance of the sense ; so also the Intellect apprehends its appro- 
 priate object by a simple appliance [a simple intuitive jet, cwrX*) 
 sVjSoXT)], better than could be done through any process of demon- 
 stration.' . . . 
 
 ' I say that the rational soul has in, and co-essential with it, 
 the reasons (Xoyouj) of things ; but, in consequence of being 
 clothed in matter, they are, as it were, oppressed and smothered, 
 like the spark which lies hid under the ashes. And as, when the 
 ashes are slightly dug into, the spark forthwith gleams out, the 
 digger not however making the spark, but only removing an im- 
 pediment; in like manner, Opinion, excited by the senses, elicits 
 the reasons of existences from latency into manifestation. Hence 
 they [the Platonists] affirm that teachers do not infuse into us 
 knowledge, but only call out into the light that which previously 
 existed in us, as it were, concealed. ... It is, however, more 
 correct to say that these are Common Notions or adumbrations of 
 the Intellect ; for whatever we know more certainly than through 
 demonstration, that we know in a common notion.' .... 
 Such common notions are ' Things that are equal to the same 
 are equal to one another,' ' If equals be taken from equals the 
 remainders are equal,' ' Every thing must be either affirmed or 
 denied.' 
 
 18. ST. ANSELM professes the maxim 'Crede ut intelligas; 
 which became celebrated in the schools, as opposed to the ' In- 
 tellige ut credas' of Abelard. 
 
 19. ALGAZEL of Bagdad, 'the Imaum of the world,' some- 
 where (in his Destruction of the Philosophers, if I recollect aright) 
 says, as the Latin version gives it ' Radix cognitionis fides.' 
 
 20. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS. a. De veritate ficlei catholic* 
 contra Gentiles, L. i. c. 7, 1. 'Ea quse naturaliter rationi insi-
 
 100 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 ta, verissima esse constut ; intantum, ut nee ea falsa esse possibile 
 
 cogitare Principiorum naturaliter notorum cognitio 
 
 nobis divinitus est indita, cum ipse Deus sit auctor nostne natu- 
 rae. Haec ergo principia etiam divina sapientia continet. Quic- 
 quid igitur principiis liujusmodi contrarium est, est divinae sapi- 
 entiae contrarium : non igitur a Deo esse potest. Ea igitur qua; 
 ex revelatione divina per fidem tenentur, non possunt natural! 
 cognitioni esse contraria.' 
 
 b. Expositio in Libb. Metaph. Aristot. Lect. v. ' Et quia 
 talis cognitio principiorum (those of Contradiction and of Ex- 
 cluded Middle) inest nobis statim a natura, concludit,' &c. 
 
 c. Sumraa Theologiae, P. i. Partis ii. Qu. 51, art. 1. ' Intel- 
 lectus principiorum dicitur esse habitus naturalis. Ex ipsa enim 
 natura animae intellectualis convenit homini, quod, statim cogni- 
 to quid est totum et quid est pars, cognoscat quod omne totum 
 est inajus sua parte, et simile in cseteris. Sed quid sit totum et 
 quid sit pars cognoscere non potest, nisi per species intelligibiles a 
 pbantasmatibus acceptas, et propter hoc Philosophus, in fine Poste- 
 riorum, ostendit quod cognitio principiorum provenit ex sensu.' 
 
 d. De Veritate, Qu. xi. De Magistro, conclusio. ' Dicendum 
 est similiter de scientiae acquisitione, quod pneexistunt in nobis 
 principia quae statim lumine intellectus agentis cognoscuntur, per 
 species a sensibilibus abstractas, sive sint complexa ut diynitates, 
 sive incomplexa, sicut entis et unius et hujusmodi qiue statim 
 intellectus apprehendit. Ex istis autem principiis universalibus 
 omnia principia sequuntur, sicut ex quibusdam rationibus semi- 
 nalibus,' <fec. 
 
 e. Summa Theologiae, P. i. Partis ii. Qu. 5, art. 3. ' Quod 
 ab omnibus dicitur non potest totaliter falsum esse. Videtur 
 enim naturale quod in pluribus est ; natura autem non totaliter 
 deficit.' Compare Nos. 1 and 3, f. 
 
 21. JOANNES DUNS SCOTUS holds a doctrine of Common 
 Sense, with reference, more especially, to necessary truths, in 
 which the genuine doctrine of Aristotle is admirably enounced, 
 and cogently defended.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 101 
 
 On the one hand he maintains (against Averroes) that princi- 
 ples are not, in a certain sense, innate in the Intellect ; i. e. not 
 as actual cognitions chronologically anterior to experience. ' Di- 
 cendum quod non habet aliquam cognitionem naturalem secun- 
 dum naturam suam, neque simplicium, neque complexorura, quia 
 omnis nostra cognitio ortum habet ex sensu. Primo enim move- 
 tur sensus ab aliquo simplici non complexo, et a sensu inoto 
 movetur intellectus, et intelligit simplicia, quod est primus actus 
 intellectus ; deinde post apprehensionem simplicium, sequitur 
 alius actus, qui est componere simplicia ad invicem ; post illam 
 autem compositionem, habet intellectus ex lumine naturali quod 
 assentiat illi veritati complexorum, si illud complexum sit prin- 
 cipium primum.' Qusestt. super libros Metaph. L. ii. q. 1, 2. 
 
 On the other hand he maintains (against Henry of Ghent) 
 that, in a different sense, principles are naturally inherent in the 
 mind. For he shows that the intellect is not dependent upon 
 sense and experience, except accidentally, in so far as these are 
 requisite, in affording a knowledge of the terms, to afford the 
 occasion on which, by its native and proper light (in other 
 words, by the suggestion of common sense), it actually mani- 
 fests the principles which it potentially contained ; and that 
 these principles are certain, even were those phenomena of sense 
 illusive, in reference to which they are elicited. ' Respondeo, 
 quod quantum ad istam notitiam (principiorum sc.), intellectus 
 non habet sensus pro causa [vel origine, as he elsewhere has it], 
 sed tantum pro occasione : quia intellectus non potest habere 
 notitiam simplicium nisi acceptam a sensibus, ilia tamen accepta 
 potest simplicia virtute sua componere et, si ex ratione talium 
 simplicium sit complexio evidenter vera, intellectus virtute pro- 
 pria et terminorum assentiet illi complexioni, non virtute sensus, 
 a quo accipit terminos exterius. Exemplum ; si ratio totius et 
 ratio majoritatis accipiantur a sensu, et intellectus componat 
 istam Omne totum est mams sua parte, intellectus virtute sui 
 et istorum terminorum assentiet indubitanter isti complexioni, 
 et non tantum quia vidit terminos conjunctos in re, sicut assen-
 
 102 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 tit isti Socrates est albus, quia vidit tenninos in re uniri. Immo 
 dico, quod si omnes sensus essent falsi,' &c. In Libros Sent. 
 Comm. Oxon. L. i. Dist. 3, qu. 4, 8. See also 12, 23 ; and 
 Quaestt. super M'etaph., L. i. qu. 4, 3, 4, 5, 11, 12, 14, 16 ; L, 
 ii. qu. 1, 2, 3, et alibi ; where it is frequently repeated that 
 sense and experience are not the cause or origin, but only the 
 occasion on which the natural light of Intellect reveals its prin- 
 ciples or first truths. 
 
 I may observe, that like Locke, the Subtle Doctor divides our 
 acquisition of knowledge between two sources, Sense and Reflec- 
 tion. ' Nihil est in intellectu quin prius fuerit in sensu, vera est 
 de eo quod est, primum intelligibile, scilicet quod quid est [TO oVi] 
 rei materialis, non autem de omnibus per se intelligibilibus ; nam 
 multa per se intelliguntur, non quia speciem faciunt in Sensu, 
 sed per Reflexionem intellectual Qmestt. super Univ. Porph. 
 q. 3. But what Locke was sometimes compelled virtually to 
 confess, in opposition to the general tenor of his doctrine (see 
 No. 51), Scotus professedly lays down as the very foundation of 
 his that Reflection finds in the mind, or intellect itself, princi- 
 ples, or necessary cognitions, which are not the educts of experi- 
 ence, howbeit not actually manifested prior to, or except on 
 occasion of, some empirical act of knowledge.* 
 
 22. ANTONIUS ANDREAS, an immediate disciple of Scotus, 
 the Doctor Dulcifluus. Quaestt. super libros Metaph. L. ii. qu. 1. 
 ' Respondeo, et dico duo. 
 
 'PRIMUM; Quod notitia Primowim Principiorum non est 
 nobis a natura ; quia omnis nostra cognitio intellectiva habet 
 ortum a sensu, et, per consequens, non inest a natura. . . Primo 
 
 * The edition I use, is that by the Irish Franciscans, Lyons, 1639, of the 
 Opera Omnia of Scotus, 12 vols. in folio. This is the only edition in which 
 the Subtle Doctor can be conveniently studied. His editor and commenta- 
 tors of course maintain him to be a countryman ; but the patriotism of 
 Father Maurice (t. iii. p. 254), makes no scruple in holding him out as 
 actually inspired: 'Suppono, cum Moyse in monte hoc vidit, aut cum 
 Paulo ad tertium ccelum ascendit, aut certe cum alio Joanne supra pectua 
 sapientiw recnbuit.'
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 103 
 
 enim motu movetur sensus ab objecto simplici uon complexo ; 
 et a sensu moto movetur intellectus, et intelligit simplicia, qui est 
 primus actus intellectus. Deinde post apprehensionem simplicium 
 sequitur alius actus, qui est componere simplicia ad invicem ; et 
 post istam compositionem habet intellectus, ex lumine naturali ut 
 assentiat illi veritati complex^, si illud complexum sit primum 
 principium. 
 
 'SECUNDUM; Quod notitia Primorum Principiorum [recte] 
 dicitur nobis inesse naturaliter, quatenus, ex lumine naturali 
 intellectus, sunt nobis inesse nota, habita notitia simplici termi- 
 norum, quia " principia cognoscimus inquantum terminos cog- 
 noscimus" (ex primo Posteriorum).' 
 
 To this schoolman we owe the first enouncement of the Princi- 
 ple of Identity. 
 
 Those who are curious in this matter will find many acute 
 observations on the nature of principles in the other schoolmen ; 
 more especially in Averroes on the Analytics and Metaphysics, 
 in Albertus Magnus on the Predicables and Pr. Analytics, and 
 in Hales, 3d and 4th books of his Metaphysics. 
 
 23. BUD^EUS. In Pandectas, Tit. i. ' Ista igitur fere quae 
 juri naturali ascribuntur, id est, quse natura docuisse nos cre- 
 ditur, versantur in Sensu Communi] &c. 
 
 24. LUTHER. Weisheit, Th. iii. Abth. 2. ' All things have 
 their root in Belief, which we can neither perceive nor compre- 
 hend. He who would make this Belief visible, manifest, and 
 conceivable, has sorrow for his pains.' 
 
 25. MELANCHTHOX. a. De Dialectica, ed. Lugd. 1542, p. 
 90. Speaking of the Dicta de Omni et de Nullo ' Neo opus est 
 procul quserere harum regularum interpretationem ; si quis sen- 
 sum communem consuluerit, statim intelliget eas. Nam uf? Arith- 
 metica et alise artes initia summit a sensu communi, ita Dialec- 
 tics principia nobisctim nascuntur.' 
 
 b. Ibid., p. 103. Speaking of the process in the Expository 
 Syllogism, ' Habet causam luec consequentia in natura positam 
 quandam xoiv^v svvoiav, ut vocant, hoc est, sententiam quam om-
 
 104 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 nis natura docet, de qua satis est sensum communem consulere.' 
 And again, ' Est et hujus consequentiae ratio sumpta a com- 
 muni sensu? 
 
 c. Eroteraata Dialectica L. iv. in Loco, ab Absurdo, p. 1040, 
 ed. 3, Strigelii, 1579 ' Absurdum in Philosophia vocatur opinio 
 pugnans cum Sensu Communi, id est vel cum principiis naturae 
 notis, vel cum universal! experientia.' Reid (see n. 79 a) says 
 repeatedly the very same. 
 
 d. Ibid., p. 853. ' Quare Principia sunt certa ? I. Quia noti- 
 tia principiorum est lumen naturale, insitum humanis mentibus 
 divinitus. II. Quia dato opposite sequitur destructio nature.' 
 See also pp. 798, 857, and the relative commentary of Strigelius, 
 What Melanchthon states in regard to the cognition of Principles 
 and Light of Nature is borrowed from the schoolmen. See 
 above, Nos. 20, 21, 22. Consult also his treatise De Anima in 
 the chapters De Intellectu ; more especially that entitled Estne 
 verum dictum, notitias aliquas nobiscum nasci ? 
 
 26. JULIUS CAESAR SCALIGER. De Subtilitate, Exerc. cccvii. 
 18. 'Sunt cum anima nostra quredan cognatce notitice, quse 
 idcirco voZg dicuntur a philosopho. Nemo enim tarn infans est, 
 quern cognitio lateat pluris et paucioris. Infanti duo poma 
 apponito. Uno recepto, alterum item poscet. Ab his principiis 
 actus Mentis, a sensilibus excitatus.' Such principles, he con- 
 tends, are innate in the human Intellect, precisely as the instincts 
 of the lower animals are innate in their highest power. They 
 may therefore be denominated Intellectual Instincts. Compare 
 
 & 91 99 
 8 -41, 4*. 
 
 The doctrine of this acute philosopher was adopted and illus- 
 trated, among others, by his two expositors Rodolphus Goclenius 
 of Marlmrg, and Joannes Sperlingius of Wittemberg ; by the for- 
 mer in his Adversaria and Scaligeri Exercitationes, 1594 (qq. 41, 
 51, 60); by the latter, not indeed in his Meditationes ad Scali- 
 geri Exercitationes, but in his Physica Anthropologica, 1C68 (L. 
 i. c. 3, 8). In these the arguments of Gassendi and Locke for 
 the counter opinion, are refuted by anticipation ; though, in fact,
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE 105 
 
 Locke himself is at last, as we shall see, obliged to appeal to 
 Common Sense, identical with the Intellectus, Mem, and Lumen 
 Naturale of these and other philosophers. (No. 51.) Otto Cas- 
 mann, the disciple of Goclenius, may also be consulted in his 
 Psychologia Anthropologies, 1594. (c. 5, 5.) 
 
 27. OMPHALIUS. Nomologia, f. 72 b. 'Non eget his prse- 
 ceptis [dictis scilicet de ornni et de nullo] qui Sensum Commu- 
 nem consulit. Natura siquidem plerasque xoivaj gvvoiaj animis 
 nostris insevit quibus rerum naturam pervidemus.' 
 
 28. ANTONIUS GOVEANUS. Pro Aristotele Responsio aclver- 
 sus Petri Kami Calumnias. Opera Omnia, ed. Meermaniana, 
 p. 802 a. 'An non ex hominem communi sensu desumptse enun- 
 ciationum reciprocationes hse videntur ? . . . Sumpta hsec 
 Rame, sunt e communi hominum intelligentia, cujus cum mater 
 natura sit, quid est, quaeso, cur negemus naturae decreta hsec et 
 praecepta esse ?' 
 
 29. NUNNESIUS. De Constitutione Dialectics, f. 56 b. ed. 
 1554. ' Sed cum Dialectica contenta sit Sensu Communi? &c. 
 
 30. MURETUS. In Aristotelus Ethica ad Nicornachum Com- 
 mentarius, 1583. Opera Omnia, Ruhnkenii, t. iii. p. 230. 
 
 In proof of the immortality of the soul, in general, and in par- 
 ticular, in disproof of an old and ever-recurring opinion one, in- 
 deed, which agitates, at the present moment, the divines and phi- 
 losophers of Germany that the intellect in man, as a merely pas- 
 sing manifestation of the universal soul, the Absolute, can pretend 
 to no individual, no personal, existence beyond the grave ; he addu- 
 ces the argument drawn from the common sense of mankind, in the 
 following noble, though hitherto unnoticed passage : touching 
 the eloquence of which, it should be borne in mind, that what is 
 now read as a commentary was originally listened to by a great, 
 and mingled auditory, as improvisations from the mouth of him, 
 for whose equal as a Latin orator, we must ascend to Cicero himself. 
 
 ' Neque laborandum est etiamsi -hsec [nisi] naturalibus, argu- 
 mcntis probare nequeamus, neque fortassis dissolvere rationes 
 quasdam, quas afferunt ii, qui contrarias opiniones tuentur. Na-
 
 106 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 turalis enim omnium gentium consensus multo plus ponderis apud 
 nos, quam omnia istorum argumenta, habere debet. Neque quic- 
 quain est aliud gigantum more bellare cum diis, quam repugnare 
 naturae,* et insitas ab ea in omnium animis opiniones acutis ac 
 fallacibus conclusiunculis velle subvertere. Itaque ut senes illi 
 Trojani, apud Homerum, dicebant, pulchram quidam esse Hele- 
 nam, sed tamen ablegandum ad suos, ne exitio esset civitati ; ita 
 nos, si quando afferetur nobis ab istis acutum aliquod argument- 
 urn, quo colligatur .... animos interire una cum corpo- 
 ribus, aut si quid supersit, commune quiddam esse, et ut unum 
 soletB,f ita unum esse omnium men turn, . . . respondeamus : 
 Ingeniosus quidem es, o bone, et eruditus, et in disputando po- 
 tens ; sed babe tibi istas praeclaras rationes tuas ; ego eas, ne 
 mibi exitiosse sint, admittere in animum meum nolo. Accipite, 
 enim, gravissime viri, . . . studiosissimi adolescentes, . . 
 praaclaram, et immortali memoria dignam, summi philosophi 
 Aristotelis sententiam, quam in omnibus hujus generis disputa- 
 tionibus teneatis, quam sequamini, ad quam sensus cogitationes- 
 que vestras perpetuo dirigatis. Ex illius enim divini hominis 
 pectore, tanquam ex augustissimo quodam sapientiae sacrario, 
 hsec prodierunt, quae primo Ethicorum ad Eudemum leguntur 
 Il^otfs^siv oO ds7 ifavra roTg Sia <ruv Xoywv, ctXXa <roXXaxi f^aXXov 
 coif <paivo|a='voi. Convertam hsec in Latinum sermonem, utinain- 
 que possera in omnes omnium populorum linguas convertere, at- 
 que in omnium Lominum animis, ita ut nunquam delerentur, in- 
 sculpere : non semper, neque omnibus in rebus, assentiendum est 
 Us quce rationibus et argumentis probantur ; immo potius ea pic- 
 
 * Cic. De Sen. c. 2. Quid enim est aliud gigantum more bellare cum diis, 
 nisi naturae repugnare ? 
 
 t Had Muretus the following passage of Bessarion in his eye? 'Intelkctum 
 deforis advenire [Aristotle's dictum], Theophrastus, Alexander, Themistius, 
 Avcrroes, ita accipiunt, ut jam quisque orttis, illico intellectus sibi applicatam 
 excipiat portionem, ita extinctus relinquat in commune ; non aliter, ac si 
 quis Sole, nasctns, partieipare dicatur, morient, privari ; et non esse animani 
 pnrticufarem, quae deforis advenit, sed ex communi acceptam applicatio- 
 nem.' In Calumu. Plat. L. iii. c. 27. The simile of the sun is however to 
 be found in Plotinus, and I think in Theinwtius.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 107 
 
 rumque tenenda, quce communi hominum sententia comprdbantur. 
 Quid enim est tarn falsum, tamque abhorrens a vero, ut non ad 
 id probandum ab ingeniosis et exercitatis hominibus argumenta 
 excogitari queant ? . . . . Vidistisne unquam in tenebrosa 
 nocte accensam aliquam facem e longinquo loco micantem ? II- 
 lam, igitur, quamvis dissitam, videbatis ; neque tamen quicquam, 
 in illo longo, interjecto inter oculum vestrum et facem, densis ob- 
 sito tenebris spatio, videre poteratis. Idem putatote animis acci- 
 dere. Ssepa animus noster veritatem alicujus enunciationis tan- 
 quam eminus fulgentem ac collucentem videt, etiamsi propter 
 illam, qua circumfusus est, caliginem, videre ea quse intermedia 
 sunt, et per quse ad earn pervenitur, non potest. ... Si iter ali- 
 quod ingressurus, duas videres vias, quee eodem ferrent ; unara ex- 
 peditam, planam, tutam, et eo quo constituisses, sine ulla erratione, 
 ducentem ; alteram tortuosam, asperam, periculosam, et quam qui 
 sequerentur, propter varies et multiplices anfractus,saepe aberarent ; 
 dubitares utram potius eligeres ? Duee sunt viae quibus homines 
 ad aliquam cognitionem Dei et animi sui pervenire posse se putant. 
 Aut enim eo contendunt disputando, et cur quicquam ita sit sub- 
 tiliter inquirendo ; aut sine dubitatione ulla assentiendo iis, quse 
 majores summo consensu, partim naturali lumine cognita, partim 
 divinitus inspirata, tradiderunt. Illam qui secuti sunt, omnibus sse- 
 culis in multiplices en-ores inciderunt. At hsec illorum signata 
 est vestigiis, quos in coelum sublatos veneramur et colimus.'* 
 31. GIPHANIUS. Commentarii in libros Ethicorum ad Nico- 
 
 * Of none of the great scholars of the sixteenth century the second golden 
 age of Latin letters have the works been so frequently republished, so 
 learnedly annotated, so industriously collected, as those of the pattern critic, 
 the incomparable Muretus. There however still remains a considerable 
 gleaning. I have myself taken note of some twenty scattered anecdota, in 
 prose and verse, in Greek, Latin, and French, which, if the excellent edi- 
 tion (excellent, even after that of Ruhnkenius) of the Opera Omnia, by Pro- 
 fessor Frotschcr of Leipsic, now unfortunately interrupted, be not finally 
 abandoned, I should have great pleasure in communicating to the learned 
 editor. How is it, that whilst Italy, Germany, and Holland have, for centu- 
 ries, been emulating each other in paying homage to the genius of Muretus, 
 France has done absolutely nothing to testify her admiration of so illustrious 
 a son?
 
 108 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 machum, L. x. c. 2. ' Quod omnibus videtur, id (inquit Aristo- 
 teles) esse dicimus. Nam communis hominum sensus et judi- 
 cium est tanquam lex naturae.' See n. 3, f. 
 
 32, MARIANA. De Rege et Regis institutione, L. i. c. 6. ' Et 
 est communis sensus quasi quaedam naturae vox [lex ?] mentibus 
 nostris indita, auribus insonans lex [vox ?] qua a turpi honestum 
 secenrimus.' 
 
 33. SIR JOHN DAVIES. Of the immortality of the Soul, 1 
 ed. 1599, pp. 63, 97. 
 
 ' If then all souls, both good and bad, do teach, 
 
 With general voice, that souls can never die ; 
 'Tis not man's flattering gloss, but nature's speech, 
 Which, like God's oracle, can never lie.' 
 
 ******* 
 
 ' But how can that be false, which every tongue 
 
 Of every mortal man affirms for true ? 
 Which truth has in all ages stood so strong, 
 
 That, loadstone-like, all hearts it ever drew. 
 For not the Christian or the Jew alone, 
 
 The Persian or the Turk, acknowledge this ; 
 This mystery to the wild Indian known, 
 
 And to the Cannibal and Tartar is.' 
 
 These latter stanzas were probably suggested by a passage in 
 the first Dissertation of Maximus Tyrius. This 'learned poet' re- 
 quires and eminently deserves, a commentary. 
 
 34. KECKERMANNUS (Systema Logicum, L. iii. c. 13), treat- 
 ing of Necessary Testimony : ' Testimonium necessarium est vel 
 Dei vel Sensuum.' Having spoken of the former, he proceeds : 
 ' Restat testimonium sensuum, quod suus cuique sensus dictat. 
 Estque vel externum vel intemum. Internum est, quod leges na- 
 turae, tarn theoreticce quam practicce dictant ; itemque conscientia. 
 Externum est, quod sensus externi, ut visus, auditus, &c., recte dis- 
 positi, adeoque ipsa sensualis observatio, et experientia com pro- 
 bat.' In illustration of the testimony of Internal Sense, Conscien- 
 tia, he says : ' Magna est vis testimonii Conscientiae in utramque 
 partem ; et sicut leges seu principia naturee duplicia sunt theo-
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 109 
 
 retica, ut, totum est major suaparte et practica, ut, quod tibi fieri 
 non vis, alteri ne feceris : ita duplex est Conscientia, theoretica 
 nimirum et practica, per quam conclusiones theoreticee et practices 
 firmiter nobis probantur.' 
 
 The employment here of Conscientia, for the noetic faculty or 
 faculty of principles, is (if we except the single precedent of Ter- 
 tullian) unexampled, as far as I have observed, previous to the ex- 
 tension given to the word by Descartes. The internal and ex- 
 ternal sense of Keckermann are, taken together, nearly equivalent 
 to the expression common sense, in the meaning under considera- 
 tion ; an expression, it may be added, which this author had 
 himself, in the same work, previously employed. (L. i. c. 5.) 
 
 35. LORD HERBERT OF CHERBURY. In 1624, at Paris and 
 London, was first published his work ' De Veritate ;' and to the 
 third edition, London, 1645, was annexed his correlative treatise 
 ' De Causis Errorum.' These works, especially the former, con- 
 tain a more formal and articulate enouncement of the doctrine of 
 Common Sense, than had (I might almost say than has) hitherto 
 appeared. It is truly marvellous, that the speculations of so able 
 and original a thinker, and otherwise of so remarkable a man, 
 should have escaped the observation of those who, subsequently, 
 in Great Britain, philosophized in a congenial spirit ; yet he is 
 noticed by Locke, and carefully criticised by Gassendi. The fol- 
 lowing is an abstract of his doctrine strictly in reference to our 
 present subject. The edition I use is the third, that of 1645. 
 
 Lord Herbert makes a fourfold distribution of the human fac- 
 ulties ; into Natural Instinct Internal Sense External Sense 
 and the Discursive faculty (Discursus) p. 37. These names he 
 employs in significations often peculiar to himself. Each of these 
 powers is the guarantee of a certain class of truths ; and there is 
 given no truth which is not made known to us through one or 
 other of these attesting faculties. Let us not, therefore, be wise 
 beyond our powers. (Ne sapiamus ultra facilitates.) 
 
 But of these there is one whose truths are of a relatively higher 
 order, as commanding universal assent, and therefore of indubita-
 
 110 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 ble certainty. This faculty, which he calls Natural Instinct 
 (Instinctus Naturalis), might with more discriminative propriety 
 have been styled Intellectual Instinct ; and it corresponds, as is 
 manifest, with the Nou9 of Aristotle, the Intelligentia of the 
 schoolmen, and the Common Sense of philosophers in general. 
 Natural Instinct may be considered either as a faculty or the 
 manifestation of a faculty. In the former signification, Instinct, 
 or the Noetic faculty, is the proximate instrument of the univer- 
 sal intelligence of God ; in fact, a certain portion thereof ingrafted 
 on the mind of man. In the latter signification, Natural Instincts 
 are those Catholic Cognitions or Common Notions (xoivcu two'tai, 
 notitise communes) which exist in every human being of sound 
 and entire mind ; and with which we are naturally or divinely 
 furnished, to the end that we may truly decide touching the 
 objects with which we are conversant during the present life (pp. 
 27, 29, 44). These Instincts or Common Notions he denomi- 
 nates also Primary Truths Common Principles Received 
 Principles of Demonstration Sacred Principles, against which 
 it is unlawful to contend, &c. These are so far from being mere 
 products of experience and observation, that, without some of 
 them, no experience or observation is possible (pp. 28, 48, 54). 
 But, unless excited by an object, they remain silent ; have then 
 a virtual, not an actual existence (pp. 39, 42). The comparison 
 of the mind to a tabula rasa or blank book, on which objects 
 inscribe themselves, must be rejected ; but it may be resembled 
 to a closed book, only opened on the presentation of objects (p. 54). 
 The sole criterion by which we can discriminate principles, natu- 
 ral or divine, is universal agreement ; though, at the same time, 
 the higher and more necessary the truth, the more liable it is to 
 be alloyed with error (p. 52). Our natural Instincts operate 
 irrationally ; that is, they operate without reasoning or discur- 
 sion ; and Reason (Ratio), which is the deduction of these com- 
 mon notions to their lower and lowest applications, has no other 
 appeal, in the last resort, except to them (p. 42). 
 
 The primary truths, or tniths of Instinct, are discriminated
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. Ill 
 
 from secondary truths (those, to wit, which are not obtained 
 without the intervention of the Discursive faculty) by six charac- 
 ters. 
 
 1. By their Priority. For Natural Instinct is the first, Dis- 
 cursion the last of our faculties. 
 
 2. By their Independence. For if a truth depend upon a 
 common notion, it is only secondary ; whereas a truth is primary, 
 which itself hanging upon no superior truth, affords dependence 
 to a chain of subordinate propositions. 
 
 3. By their Universality. Universal consent is indeed the 
 most unequivocal criterion of an instinctive truth. The Particu- 
 lar is always to be suspected as false, or, at least, as partially 
 erroneous ; whereas Common Notions, drawn, as it were, from 
 the very wisdom of nature, are, in themselves, universal, howbeit, 
 in reasoning, they may be brought down and applied to particulars. 
 
 4. By their Certainty. For such is their authority, that he 
 who should call them into doubt, would disturb the whole con- 
 stitution of things, and, in a certain sort, denude himself of his 
 humanity. It is, therefore, unlawful to dispute against these 
 principles, which, if clearly understood, cannot possibly be gain- 
 said. (Compare No. 25, d.) 
 
 5. By their Necessity. For there is none which does not 
 conduce to the conservation of man. 
 
 6. By the Manner of their Formation or Manifestation. 
 For they are elicited, instantaneously and without hesitation, so 
 soon as we apprehend the significance of the relative objects or 
 words. The discursive understanding, on the other hand, is in 
 its operation slow and vacillating advancing only to recede 
 exposed to innumerable errors in frequent confliction with sense 
 attributing to one faculty what is of the province of another, and 
 not observing that each has its legitimate boundaries, transcend- 
 ing which, its deliverances are incompetent or null (pp. 60, 61).* 
 
 * I was surprised to find an eloquent and very just appreciation of Herbert 
 (for he it is who is referred to), by a learned and orthodox theologian at 
 Cambridge Nathaniel Culvenvell, in his ' Discourse of the Light of Nature,'
 
 112 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 36. JOANNES CAMERON, the celebrated theologian. De EC- 
 clesia iv. Op. ed. 1642, p. . 'Sensus Communis seu Ratio,' <fec. 
 
 37. DESCARTES proclaims as the leading maxim of philosophy 
 a principle which it would have been well for his own doctrine 
 had he always faithfully applied. 'Certum autem est, nihil 
 nos unquam falsum pro vero admissuros, si tantum iis assen- 
 sum prsebearaus quse dare et distincte percipiemus. Certum, 
 inquam, quia cum Deus non sit fallax, facultas percipiendi, quam 
 nobis dedit [sive Lumen Naturae], non potest tendere in falsum ; 
 ut neque etiam facultas assentiendi, cum tantum ad ea, qute clare 
 percipiuntur, se extendit. Et quamvis hoc uulla ratione probare- 
 tur, ita omnium animis a natura impressum est, ut quoties aliquid 
 clare percipimus, ei sponte assentiamur, et nulla modo possimus 
 dubitare quin sit verum.' Princ. i. 43, with 30, 45 ; De 
 Meth. 4 ; Med. iii. iv. ; Resp, ad" Obj. ii. passim. What Des- 
 cartes, after the schoolmen, calls the ' Light of Nature,' is only 
 another term for Common Sense (see Nos. 20, 21, 22, 25); and 
 Common Sense is the name which Descartes' illustrious disciple. 
 Fenelon, subsequently gave it. See No. 60. There are some 
 good observations on Descartes' Light of Nature, <kc. in Gravii 
 Specimina Philosophise Veteris, L. ii. c. 16 ; and in Regis, Meta- 
 physique, L. i. P. i. ch. 12, who identifies it with consciousness. 
 
 That Descartes did not hold the crude and very erroneous doc- 
 trine of innate ideas which Locke took the trouble to refute, 1 
 may have another opportunity of more fully showing. ' Nun- 
 quam scripsi vel judicavi (he says) mentem indigere id eis innatis, 
 qure sint aliquid diversum ab ejus facilitate cogitandi? Notae in 
 Programma (Regii) 12. Compare 13 with Responsiones et 
 Objectiones iii. rr. 5, 10. By innate ideas in general, Descartes 
 means simply the innate faculty we possess of forming or eliciting 
 certain manifestations in consciousness (whether of necessary or 
 
 written in 1C46, p. 93. Culvcrwell does not deserve the oblivion into which 
 he has fallen ; for he is a compeer worthy of More, Spencer, Smith, Cud- 
 worth, and Taylor the illustrious and congenial band by which that univer- 
 sity was illustrated during the latter half of the seventeenth century.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 113 
 
 contingent truths) on occasion of, but wholly different from, both 
 the qualities of the reality affecting, and the movements of the 
 organism affected ; these manifestations or ideas being nothing 
 else than states of the conscious substance itself. On this ground 
 he occasionally calls the secondary qualities innate ; in so far as 
 they are, actually, mere modes of mind, and, potentially, subjec- 
 tive predispositions to being thus or thus modified. 
 
 His doctrine in regard to principles, when fully considered, 
 seems identical with that of Aristotle, as adopted and expounded 
 by the schoolmen ; and I have no doubt that had he and Locke 
 expressed themselves with the clearness and precision of Scotus, 
 their opinions on this subject would have been found coincident 
 both with each other and with the truth. 
 
 38. SIR THOMAS BROWN (Religio Medici, First Part, sect. 36) 
 has ' Common Sense] word and thing. 
 
 39. BALZAC in Le Barbon (Sallengre Histoire de Pierre de 
 Montmauer, t. ii. p. 88, and QEuvres de Balzac), 'Sens Commun,' 
 word and thing. 
 
 40. CHANET (Traite de 1'Esprit, p. 15) notices that the term 
 Common Sense had in French a meaning different from its Scho- 
 lastic or Aristotelic signification, ' being equivalent to common or 
 universal reason, and by some denominated natural logic? 
 
 41. P. IREN^EUS A SANCTO JACOBO, a Thomist philosopher, 
 and Professor of Theology at Rennes. Integra Philosophia, 
 1655 ; Logica c. iv. sectio 4. 2. In reference to the question. 
 ' Quid sit habitus ille primorum principiorum T he says ' Proba- 
 bilior apparet sententia dicentium habitum primorum principio- 
 rum esse lumen naturale, seu naturaliter inditum (intellectus sc.) 
 
 . . . Favet communis omnium sensus, qui diffiteri nequit 
 aliqua esse naturaliter et seipsis cognoscibilia ; ergo principium 
 talis cognitionis debet censeri signatum super nos natures lu- 
 men? 
 
 42. LESCALOPIER. Humanitas Theologica, &c., L. i. p. 87. 
 'Quid gravius in sentiendo, quod sequamur, habere possumus, 
 quam constans naturae judicium, aetatum omnium cana sapien-
 
 114 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 tia et perpetuo suffragio confirmatum ? Possunt errare singuli ; 
 labi possunt viri sapientes sibi suoque arbitrio permissi ; at totam 
 hominis naturam tanta erroris contagio invadere non potest. . . . 
 Quod in communibus hominum sensibus positum, id quoque in 
 ipsa natura situm atque fixum esse, vel ipse Orator coram judice 
 non diffitetur. [Pro Cluentio, c. 6.] Itaque communis ille sensus, 
 naturae certissima vox est ; imnio, ' vox Populi,' ut trito fertur ada- 
 gio, ' vox Dei.' 
 
 43. PASCAL. Pensees ; editions of Bossut and Renouard. 
 
 a. Partie i. art. x. 4 (ch. 31 old editions), 'Tout notre rai- 
 sonnement se reduit a ceder au Sentiment.' 1 This feeling lie, be- 
 fore and after, calls ' Sens Commun.' Art. vi. 17, (ch. 25) 
 art. xi. 2 (wanting in old editions). 
 
 b. Partie ii. art. i. 1 (ch 21). Speaking the doctrine of the 
 Skeptics ' Nous n'avons aucun certitude de la verite" des prmci- 
 pes (hors la foi et la revelation) sinon en ce que nous les sentons 
 naturellement en nous.' .... And having stated their principal 
 arguments why this is not conclusive, he takes up the doctrine of 
 the Dogmatists. 
 
 ' L'unique fort des Dogmatistes, c'est qu'en parlant de bonne 
 foi et sincerement, on ne peut douter des principes naturels. 
 Nous connoissons, disent-ils, la verite, non seulement par rai- 
 sonnement, inais aussi par sentiment, et par une intelligence vive 
 et lumineuse ; et c'est de cette derniere sorte que nous connois- 
 sons les premiers principes. C'est en vain que le raisonnement, 
 qui n'y a point de part, essaie de les combattre. Les Pyrrho- 
 niens, qui n'ont que cela pour objet, y travaillent inutilement. Nous 
 savons que nous ne revons point, quelque impuissance ou nous 
 soyons de le prouver par raison [which he uses convertibly with 
 raisonnement\. Cette impuissance ne conclut autre chose que la 
 foiblesse de notre raison, mais non pas 1'incertitude de toutes nos 
 connoissances, comme ils le pretendent : car la connoissance des 
 premiers principes, comme, par exemple, qu'il y a espace, temps, 
 mouvement, nombre, matiere, est aussi ferme qu'aucune de celles 
 que nos raisonnements nous donnent Et c'est sur ces connois-
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 115 
 
 sances <P intelligence et de sentiment qu'il faut que la raison s'ap- 
 puie, et qu'elle fonde tout son discours. Je sens qu'il y a trois 
 dimensions dans 1'espace, et que les nombres sent infinis ; et la 
 raison demontre ensuite qu'il n'y a point deux nombres carres 
 dont 1'un soit double de 1'autre. Les principes se sentent; les 
 propositions se concluent ; le tout avec certitude, quoique par dif- 
 ferentes voies. Et il est aussi ridicule que la raison demande au 
 sentiment et a F intelligence des preuves de ces premiers principes 
 pour y consentir, qu'il seroit ridicule que V intelligence demandat 
 a la raison un sentiment de toutes les propositions qu'elle de- 
 montre. Cette impuissance ne pent done servir qu'a humilier la 
 raison qui voudroit juger de tout, mais non pas a combattre no- 
 tre certitude, comme s'il n'y avoit que la raison capable de nous 
 instruire. Plut a Dieu que nous n'en eussions au contraire 
 jamais besoin, et que nous connussions toutes choses par instinct 
 et par sentiment ! Mais la nature nous a refuse ce bien et elle 
 ne nous a donne que tres peu de connoissances de cette sorte ; 
 toutes les autres ne peu vent e"tre acquises que par le raison ne- 
 ment.' ... 
 
 ' Qui demfelera cet embrouillement ? La nature confond les 
 Pyrrhoniens, et la raison confond les Dogmatistes. Que devien- 
 drez vous done, 6 homme, qui cherchez votre veritable condition 
 par votre raison naturelle ? Vous ne pouvez fuir une de ces 
 sectes, ni subsister dans aucune. Voila ce qu'est 1'homme a 1'e- 
 gard de la verite.' 
 
 44. LA CHAMBRE. Systeme de 1'Ame, L. ii. c. 3. ' Sens 
 CommunJ word and thing. 
 
 45. HENRY MORE. Confutatio Cabbalte : Opera Omnia, p. 
 528. ' Hoc Externus Sensus, corporeave Imaginatio non dictat, 
 sed Sensus Intellectualis, innataque ipsius mentis sagacitas, inter 
 cujus notiones communes seu axiomata, noematice vel immediate 
 vera, supra numeratum est.' Compare Epistola H. Mori, ad. 
 V. C. 17, Opera, p. 117, and Enchiridion Ethicum, L. i. cc. 
 4,5. 
 
 46. RAPIN. Comparaison de Platon et d'Aristote, ch. vii.
 
 116 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 11. ' Ce consentement general de tous les peuples, est un instinct 
 de la nature qui ne peut estre faux, estant si universe!.' 
 
 47. DUHAMEL. Philosophia Burgundiae, t. i. Disp. ii. in Ca- 
 teg. qu. 4, art. 2. ' Communis Sensus? name and thing. 
 
 48. MALEBRANCIIE. Recherche de la Verite Entretiens sur 
 la Metaphysique Traite de Morale, <fec., passim. 
 
 He holds, 1, that there is a supreme absolute essential Reason 
 or Intelligence, an eternal light illuminating all other minds, con- 
 taining in itself and revealing to them the necessary principles of 
 science and of duty ; and manifesting also to us the contingent 
 existence of an external, extended universe. This Intelligence is 
 the Deity ; these revelations, these manifestations, are Ideas. He 
 holds, 2, that there is a natural Reason common to all men 
 an eye, as it were, fitted to receive the light, and to attend to the. 
 ideas in the supreme Intelligence ; in so far therefore an infallible 
 and ' Common Sense? But, 3o, at the same time, this Reason is 
 obnoxious to the intrusions, deceptions, and solicitations of the 
 senses, the imagination, and the passions ; and, in so far, is per- 
 sonal, fallible, and factitious. He opposes objective knowledge, 
 ' par idee,' to subjective knowledge, ' par conscience,' or ' sentiment 
 interieur.' To the latter belong all the Beliefs ; which, when ne- 
 cessary, as determined by Ideas in the Supernal Reason, are 
 always veracious. It could, however, easily be shown that, in so 
 far as regards, the representative perception of the external world, 
 his principles would refute his theory. A similar doctrine in re- 
 gard to the infallibility and divinity of our Intelligence or Com- 
 mon Sense was held by Bossuet. 
 
 49. POIRET. The objects of our cognitions are either things 
 themselves realities ; or the representations of realities, their 
 shadows, pictures, ideas. Realities are divided into two classes ; 
 corporeal things, and spiritual things. Each of these species of 
 object has an appropriate faculty by which it is cognized. 1, 
 Corporeal realities are perceived by the animal or sensual Intel- 
 lect in a word by Sense ; this is merely passive. 2, Spiritual 
 realities original truths are perceived by the passive or receptive
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 117 
 
 Intellect, which may be called Intelligence ; it is the sense of the su- 
 persensible. [This corresponds not to the passive intellect of Aris- 
 totle, but to his intellect considered as the place of principles and to 
 Common Sense ; it coincides also with the Vernunft of Jacobi and 
 other German philosophers, but is more correctly named.] These 
 two faculties of apprehension are veracious, as God is veracious. 3, 
 The faculty of calling up and complicating Ideas is the active 
 ideal reflective Intellect, or human Reason. [This answers not 
 to the active or efficient, but to the discursive or dianoetic, intel- 
 lect of Aristotle and the older philosophers in general, also to the 
 Verstand of Kant, Jacobi, and the recent philosophers of Germany, 
 but is more properly denominated.] (De Eruditione Solida, &c., 
 ed. 2. Meth. P. i. 43-50, and Lib. i. 4-7, and Lib. ii. 3-8, 
 and Def. p. 468 sq. Cogitationes Rationales, &c., ed. 2, disc, 
 pr. 45, L. ii. c. 4, 2. Fides et ratio, &c., p. 28 sq. p. 81, sq. 
 p. 131 sq. Defensio Methodi, &c. Op. post. p. 113 sq. (Econo- 
 mia Divina, L. iv. c. 20-25. Vera et Cognita, passim.) ' In- 
 nate principles' he indifferently denominates ' Instincts.' (Fides et 
 Ratio, Pr. pp. 13, 45. Def. Meth. Op. post. pp. 131, 133, 136, 
 172. Vindiciffi, ibid. p. 602.) 
 
 This profound but mystical thinker has not yet obtained the 
 consideration he deserves from philosophers and historians of 
 philosophy ; why, is sufficiently apparent. 
 
 50. BOSSUET. OEuvres inedites, Logique, L. iii. c. 22. 
 ' Le Sentiment de genre kumain est considere comme la voix de 
 toute la nature, et par consequent en quelque facon, comme celle 
 de Dieu. C'est pourquoi la preuve est invincible.' Alibi. 
 
 51. LOCKE. Essay, B. i. c. 3. 4. 'He would be thought 
 void of common sense, who asked on the one side, or on the other, 
 went to give, a reason, why it is impossible for the same thing 
 to be or [and] not to be.' In other words Common Sense or 
 intellect, as the source, is the guarantee, of the principle of con- 
 tradiction. There is here a confession, the importance of which 
 has been observed neither by Locke nor his antagonists. Had 
 Locke, not relying exclusively on Gassendi, prepared himself by
 
 118 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE 
 
 a study of the question concerning the origin of our knowledge 
 in the writings of previous philosophers, more especially of Aris- 
 totle, his Greek commentators, and the Schoolmen (see Nos. 3, 
 10, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, <kc.) ; and had he not been led astray in the 
 pursuit of an ignis fatuus, in his refutation, I mean of the Carte- 
 sian theory of Innate Ideas, which, certainly, as impugned by 
 him, neither Descartes, nor the representatives of his school, ever 
 dreamt of holding ; he would have seen, that in thus appealing 
 to common sense or intellect, he was, in fact, surrendering his 
 thesis that all our knowledge is an educt from experience. For 
 in admitting, as he here virtually does, that experience must ulti- 
 mately ground its procedure on the laws of intellect, he admits 
 that intellect contains principles of judgment, on which experience 
 being dependent, cannot possibly be their precursor or their 
 cause. Compare Locke's language with that of the intellect- 
 ualist, Price, as given in No. 78. They are, in substance, identi- 
 cal. What Locke here calls common sense, he elsewhere by 
 another ordinary synonym denominates Intuition (B. iv. c. 2, 
 1, c. 3, 8 et alibi) ; also Self-evidence (13. iv. c. 7, 1, sq.) As 
 I have already observed, had Descartes and Locke expressed them- 
 selves on the subject of innate ideas and principles with due pre- 
 cision, the latter would not so have misunderstood the former, 
 and both would have been found in harmony with each other 
 and with the truth. 
 
 52. BENTLEY. Quoted by Reid, I. P., p. 423 a. ' Common 
 Sense,' word and thing. 
 
 53. SERJEANT, Locke's earliest antagonist. Solid Philosophy 
 Asserted, p. 296. 'These Ideas of Act and Power are so natural 
 that common sense forces us to acknowledge them,' <fec. So alibi. 
 
 53.* ABERCKOMBV. Fur Academicus, Sectt. 2, 30. ' Com- 
 munis hominum Sensm? name and thing. 
 
 54. LEIBNITZ. This great philosopher held a doctrine, on the 
 point in question, substantially corresponding to that of Aristotle, 
 the Schoolmen, and Descartes. It is most fully evolved in his 
 posthumous work the Nouveaux Essais ; which I refer to in the
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 119 
 
 original edition by Raspe. Leibnitz admitted innate trutho, 
 which he explains to be cognitions not actually, but only virtually, 
 existent in the mind, anterior to experience ; by which they are 
 occasioned, excited, registered, exemplified, and manifested, but 
 not properly caused or contributed, or their infallibility and eter- 
 nal certainty demonstrated (pp. 5, 6, 3 7). For, as necessary to 
 be thought, and therefore absolutely universal, they cannot be the 
 product of sense, experience, induction ; these at best being only 
 competent to establish the relatively general (pp. 5, sq. 36, 116). 
 See also Opera by Dutens, t. v. p. 358, and t. vi. p. 2 74. These 
 truths are consequently given ' as natural habitudes, that is, dis- 
 positions, aptitudes, preformations, active and passive, which ren- 
 der the intellect more than a mere tabula rasa 1 (p. 62). Truths 
 thus innate are manifested in two forms ; either as Instincts, or as 
 the Light of Nature (p. 48). But both become known to us as 
 facts of consciousness, that is, in an immediate, internal experi- 
 ence ; and if this experience deceive us, we can have no assurance 
 of any truth, be it one of fact, or be it one of reason (p. 197). 
 Leibnitz's Natural Light and Instinct are, together, equivalent to 
 Common Sense. 
 
 55. TOLAND. Christianity not Mysterious, Sect. i. ch. i. p. 9. 
 Common. Sense, or Reason in general.' See Leibnitz (Opera, t. 
 v. p. 143). This testimony belongs perhaps rather to the third 
 signification of the term. 
 
 56. CHRISTIAN THOMASIUS gave ' Fundamenta Juris Naturae 
 et Gentium ex Sensu Communi deducta;' and in his introduc- 
 tory chapter, 26, he says 'Rogo ut considerent, quod ubique 
 mihi posuerim sequi sensum communem, atque non stabilire in- 
 tenderim sententias, quee multis subtilibus abstractionibus opus 
 liabent, sed quarum veritatem quilibet, si modo paululum atten- 
 tior esse velit, intra se sentit." 1 Compare also his Philosophia 
 Aulica., c. v. 26, 35. 
 
 57. RIDIGER, in 1709 published his work '-De Sensu Veri et 
 Falsi? By this he does not, however, designate the Common 
 Sense of mankind as a natural principle, but the dexterity,
 
 120 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 'qua quid in unaquaque re sit verum, falsumve, sentire quea- 
 raus.' 
 
 58. FKUKRLIN. De genuina ratione probandi a consensu gen- 
 tium existentiam Dei. 'Haec eat praecipui argument! facies: 
 Ad cujuscunque rei existentiam agnoscendam mentes humanse 
 [ab instinctu natural^ to wit, as he frequently states], peculiarem 
 habent inclinationem, ea vere existit,' &c., p. 28. 
 
 59. A. TURRETINUS. Cogitationes et Disputationes Theologi- 
 cae, Vol. i. p. 43, sq. 
 
 ' DE SENSU COMMUNI. 
 
 xv. Religio sensum communem supponit ; nee enim truncos, 
 ant bruta, aut ebrios aut mente captos, sed homines sui compotes, 
 alloquitur. 
 
 xvi. In artibus omnibus atque disciplinis, non modo licet, sed 
 et necesse est adhibere sensum communem. Quis capiat earn so- 
 lam artem, earn solam disciplinam, quee omnium praestantissima 
 est, sensus communis usum adimere ? 
 
 xvii. Nisi supponatur sensus communis, nulla fides, nulla re- 
 ligio, consistere potest : Etenim, quo organo res sacras percipimus, 
 verasque a falsis, sequas ab iniquis, utiles a noxiis, dignoscimus, 
 nisi ope sensus communis? 
 
 xviii. Quomodo gentes notitiam Dei habuerunt, nisi ope sen- 
 sus communis ? Quid est ' Lex in cordibus scripta,' de qua Pau- 
 lus (Rom. ii.), nisi ipsemet sensus communis, quatenus de mori- 
 bus pronuntiat? 
 
 xix. Divinitas Scripturae, quibus argumentis probari potest, 
 nisi argumentis e sensu communi depromptis ? 
 
 xx. Sensus Scripturae, quibus regulis erui potest, nisi regulis 
 ii sensu communi subministratis I 
 
 xxi. Scriptura perpetuo provocat ad sensum communem : ete- 
 uiin quotiescunque ratiocinatur, toties supponit sensum communem 
 esse in nobis, et sensu communi utendum esse. 
 
 xxii. In syllogismis theologicis pene omnibus, quis nescit 
 praemissarum alteram, imo saepissme utramque, a sensu communi 
 desumptam esse ?
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 121 
 
 xxiii. Divinae veracitati non minus repugnat, sensum commu- 
 nem nos fallere, quam Scripturam Sacram aliquid falsum docere ; 
 etenim sensus communis non minus opus Dei quam Scriptura 
 Sacra. t 
 
 xxiv. Pessimum est indicium, cum aliquis non vult de suis 
 placitis ex sensu communi judicari. 
 
 xxv. Nullus est error rnagis noxius, magisque Religion! inju- 
 rius, quam isqui statuit, Religioni credi non posse, quin sensui 
 communi nuntius mittatur. 
 
 xxvi. Nulla datur major absurditas, quam ea quse nullis non 
 absurditatibus portam aperit, quaeque ad eas revincendas omnem 
 praecludit viam : atque talis est eorum sententia, qui nolunt sen- 
 sum communem adhiberi in Religione. 
 
 xxvii. Quse hactenus diximus de sensu communi, a nemine, 
 ut quidem putamus, improbabuntur : at si loco Sensus Commu- 
 nis, vocem Rationis subjiciamus, nrulti illico caperata fronte et 
 torvis oculis nos adspicient. Quid ita ? cum sensus communis, 
 lumen naturale, et ratio, unum idemque sint.' 
 
 60. FENELON. De 1'Existence de Dieu. Partie ii. ch. 2. 
 'Mais qu'est-ce que le Sens Commun? N'est-ce pasf les pre- 
 mieres notions que tons les hommes ont egalement des mfimes 
 choses ? Ce Sens Commun qui est toujours et par-tout le meme, 
 qui previentf tout examen, qui rend 1'examen rnfime de certaines 
 questions ridicule, qui reduit 1'liomme a ne pouvoir douterf quel- 
 que effort qu'il fit pour se mettre dans un vrai doute ; ce Sens 
 Commun qui est celui de tout homme ; ce Sens, qui n'attend que 
 d'etre consulte, qui se montre au premier coup-d'oeil, et qui decou- 
 vre aussitot 1'evidence ou 1'absurdite de la question ; n'est-ce pas 
 ce que j'appelle mes idees ? Les voila done ces idees ou notions 
 generates que je ne puis ni contredire ni examiner, suivant lesquelles 
 au contraire j'examine et'je decide tout : en sort que je ris au lieu 
 de repondre, toutes les fois qu'on me propose ce qui est clairement 
 oppose a ce que ces idees immuables me representent. 
 
 ' Ce principe est constant, et il n'y auroit que son application 
 qui pourroit etre fautive : c'est-a-dire qu'il fciut sans hesiter sui- 
 
 6
 
 122 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 vre toutes mes idces claires ; mais qu'il faut bien prendre garde 
 de ne prendre jamais pour idee clair celle qui renferme quelque 
 chose d'obscur. Aussi veux-je suivre exactement cette regie dans 
 les choses que je vais mediter.' 
 
 Common Sense is declared by Fenelon to be identical with the 
 Natural Light of Descartes. See No. 37. The preceding pas- 
 sage is partly quoted by Reid from a garbled and blundering 
 translation (p. 424). The obeli mark the places where the prin- 
 cipal errors have been committed. Like Melanchthon, Reid, &c. 
 (Nos. 25, 79), Fenelon calls what is contrary to common sense, 
 the absurd. 
 
 61. SHAFTESBURY. Quoted by Reid, I. P. p. 424 a., ' Com- 
 mon Sense,' word and thing. 
 
 62. D'AGUESSEAU. Meditations Metaphysiques, Med. iv. (Eu- 
 vres, 4 t. xi. p. 127. ' Je m'arrete done a ces deux principes, 
 qui sont comme la conclusion generale de tout ce que je viens 
 d'etablir sur 1'assurance ou 1'homme pent etre d'avoir decouvert 
 la verite. 
 
 1 L'un, que cet etat de certitude n'est en lui-meme qu'un senti- 
 ment ou une conscience interieure. 
 
 ' L'autre, que les trois causes que j'en eu distinguees se reduis- 
 sent encore a un autre sentiment. 
 
 1 Sentiment simple, qui se prouve Iui-m6me comme dans ces 
 verites, fexiste, je pense, je veux,je suis libre, et que je puis appel- 
 ler un sentiment de pure conscience. 
 
 1 Sentiment justifie, ou sentiment de 1'evidence qui est dans le 
 chose meme, ou de cette proposition, que tout ce qui est evident 
 est vrai, et je Iflppellerai un sentiment d'evidence. 
 
 ' Enfin, sentiment que peut aussi etre appelle, un sentiment jus- 
 tifie par le poids du temoignage qui 1'excite, et qui a pour fonde- 
 ment une evidence d'autorite. Je 1'appellerai done par cette rai- 
 son, le sentiment d'une autorite evidente.' 
 
 62.* BERKELEY. Quoted by Reid, I. P. pp. 283, 284 ; com- 
 pare p. 423 :u ' Common Sense,' name and reality. 
 
 63. BUFFIER'S ' Traite des Premieres Veritez,' was first pub-
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 123 
 
 lished in 171 7, his ' Elemens de Metaphysique' in 1724. If we ex- 
 cept Lord Herbert's treatise ' De Veritate,' these works exhibit the 
 first regular and comprehensive attempt to found philosophy on cer- 
 tain primary truths, given in certain primary sentiments or feelings : 
 these feelings, and the truths of which they are the sources, he dis- 
 tinguishes into two kinds. One is Internal Feeling (sentiment 
 intime), the self-consciousness of our existence, and of what passes 
 in our minds. By this he designates our conviction of the facts of 
 consciousness in themselves, as merely- present and ideal phe- 
 nomena. But these phenomena, as we have seen, testify also 
 to the reality of what lies beyond themselves ; and to our instinc- 
 tive belief in the truth of this testimony, he gives, by perhaps an 
 arbitrary limitation of words, the name of common natural feel- 
 ing (sentiment commun de la nature), or employing a more famil- 
 iar expression, Common Sense (sens commun). Buffier did not 
 fall into the error of Mr. Stewart and others, in holding that we 
 have the same evidence for the objective reality of the external 
 world, as we have for the subjective reality of the internal. ' If,' 
 he says, ' a man deny the truths of internal feeling, he is self- 
 contradictory ; if he deny the truths of common sense, he is not 
 self-contradictory he is only mad.' 
 
 Common Sense he thus defines: 'J'entens done ici par le 
 Sens Commun la disposition que la nature a mise dans tous les 
 hommes ou manifestment dans la plupart d'entre eux ; pour 
 leur faire porter, quand ils ont ateint 1'usage de la raison ; 
 un jugement commun et uniforme, sur des objets diferens du 
 sentiment intime de leur propre perception ; jugement qui n'est 
 point la consequence d'aucun principe interieur.' Prem. Ver. 
 33. And in his ' Metaphysique,' Le sentiment qui est mani- 
 festement le plus commun aux hommes de tous les temps et 
 de tous les pays, quand ils ont ateint 1'usage de la raison, et 
 des choses sur quoi ils portent leur jugement.' 67. 
 
 He then gives in both works not a full enumeration, but exam- 
 ples, of First Truths or sentiments common to all men. These 
 are more fully expressed in the ' Metaphysique,' from which as
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 the later work, and not noticed by Reid (p. 467 b), I quote, 
 leaving always the author's orthography intact. 
 
 1. II est quelque chose qui existe hors de moi ; et ce qui 
 existe hors de moi, est autre que moi. 
 
 2. II est quelque chose que j'apelle Ame, esprit, pensee, dans 
 les autres hommes et dans moi, et la pensee n'est point ce qui 
 s'apelle corps ou matiere. 
 
 3. Ce qui est connu par le sentiment ou par 1'experience de 
 tous les hommes, doit etre recu pour vrai ; et on n'en peut dis- 
 convenir sans se brouiller avec le sens commun.' 78. 
 
 [These three he calls ' veritez externes, qui soient des senti- 
 ments communs a tous les hommes.' The third is not given in 
 the ' Traito des Premieres Veritez.'] 
 
 ' 4. II est dans les hommes quelque chose qui s'apelle raison 
 et qui est opose a f extravagance ; quelque chose qui s'apelle pru- 
 dence, qui est opose a Fimprudence ; quelque chose qui s'apelle 
 liberte, opose a la necessite d*agir. 
 
 5. Ce qui reunit un grand nombre de parties diferentes pour 
 un effet qui revient regulierement, ne sauroit etre le pur eftet du 
 hazard ; mais c'est 1'effet de ce que nous apellons une intelligence. 
 
 6. Un fait ateste par un tres grand nombre de gens sensez, 
 qui assurent en avoir ete les temoins, ne peut sensement etre 
 revoque en doute.' 82. 
 
 These examples are not beyond the reach of criticism. 
 
 In the Treatise on First Truths he gives a statement and 
 exposition of their three essential characters. The statement is 
 as follows : 
 
 ' 1. Le premier de ces caracteres est, qu'elles soient si claires, 
 que quand on entreprend de les prouver, ou de les ataquer, on 
 ne le puisse faire que par des propositions, qui, manifestement, ne 
 sont ni plus clairs ni plus certaines. 
 
 2. D'etre si universellement reques parmi les hommes en tous 
 terns, en tous lieux, et par toutes sortes d'esprits ; que ceux qui 
 les ataquent se trouvent clans le genre hutnain, etre manifestement 
 moins d'un centre cent, ou mfime contre mille.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 125 
 
 3. D'etre si fortement imprimees dans nous, que nous y con- 
 formions notre conduite, malgre les rafinemens de ceux qui imagi- 
 nent des opinions contraires; et qui eux-memes agissent con- 
 formement, non a leurs opinions imaginees, mais aux premieres 
 veritez universellement recues.' 51-52. Compare Alexander, 
 n. 10 a.* 
 
 * We are now only considering the natural data of consciousness in their 
 most catholic relations, and it would be out of place to descend to any dis- 
 cussion of them in a subordinate point of view. But, though alluding to 
 matters beyond our present purpose, I cannot refrain from doing, by the 
 way, an act of justice to this acute philosopher, to whom, as to Gassendi, his 
 countrymen have never, I think, accorded the attention he deserves. 
 " No subject, perhaps, in modern speculation, has excited an intenser inter- 
 est or more vehement controversy than Kant's famous distinction of Analyt- 
 ic and Synthetic judgments a priori, or, as I think they might with far less of 
 ambiguity be denominated, Explicative and Ampliative judgments. The 
 interest in the distinction itself was naturally extended to its history. The 
 records of past philosophy were again ransacked ; and, for a moment, it was 
 thought that the Prussian sage had been forestalled, in the very ground- 
 work of his system, by the Megaric Stilpo. But the originality (I say noth- 
 ing of the truth) of Kant's distinction still stands untouched ; the origi- 
 nality of its author, a very diiferent question, was always above any reason- 
 able doubt. Kant himself is disposed, indeed, to allow, that Locke (B. iv. 
 ch. 3, 9, sq.) had, perhaps, a glimpse of the discrimination ; but looking 
 tc the place referred to, this seems, on the part of Kant, an almost gratui- 
 tous concession. Locke, in fact, came far nearer to it in another passage (B. 
 i. ch. 2, 19, 20) ; but there although the examples on which the distinc- 
 tion could have been established are stated, and even stated in contrast, the 
 principle was not apprehended, and the distinction, consequently permit- 
 ted to escape. 
 
 But this passage and its instances seem to have suggested, what was 
 overlooked by Locke himself, to Burner ; who, although his name has not, 
 as far as I am aware, ever yet been mentioned in connection with this sub- 
 ject, may claim the honor of having been the first to recognize, to evolve, 
 and even to designate, this celebrated distinction, almost as precisely as the 
 philosopher who erected on it so splendid an edifice of speculation. I can- 
 not now do more than merely indicate the fact of the anticipation ; men- 
 tioning only that, leaving to Kant's analytic judgment its previous title of 
 identical, Buffier preoccupies Kant's designation of synthetic in that of con- 
 junctive (or logical) judgment, which he himself proposes. Those inter- 
 ested in the question will find the exposition in the ' Veritez de Conse- 
 quence,' Log. ii. Art. xxi. 
 
 I may further, however, when on this matter, notice, that before Kant, 
 another philosopher had also signalized the same distinction. I refer to
 
 126 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 I should not have deemed it necessary to make any comment 
 on Buffer's doctrine of Common Sense, were it not that it is 
 proper to warn my readers against the misrepresentations of the 
 anonymous English translator of his Treatise on Primary Truths ; 
 for not only have these never been exposed, but Mr. Stewart has 
 bestowed on that individual an adventitious importance, by laud- 
 ing his ' acuteness and intelligence,' while acquiescing in his 
 1 severe but just animadversions' on Dr. Beattie. (Elements, vol. 
 ii. c. 1, 3, pp. 87, 89, 2 ed.) 
 
 Buffier does not reduce Reason (which he employs for the 
 complement of our higher faculties in general) to Reasoning ; he 
 does not contra-distinguish Common Sense from Reason, of 
 which it is constituent; but while he views the fonner as a nat- 
 ural sentiment, he views it as a sentiment of our rational nature ; 
 and he only requires, as the condition of the exercise of common 
 sense in particular, the actual possession of Reason or under- 
 standing in general, and of tiie object requisite to call that 
 Reason into use. Common Sense, on Buffier's doctrine, is thus 
 the primary, spontaneous, unreasoning, and as it were, instinctive 
 energy of our rational constitution. Compare Pr. Ver. 41, 66 
 -72, 93. Met. 65, 72, 73. 
 
 The translator to his version, which appeared in 1780, has 
 annexed an elaborate Preface, the sole purport of which is to 
 
 Principal Campbell of Aberdeen, in the chapter on intuitive evidence, of 
 his philosophy of Rhetoric (B. i. c. 5, S. 1, p. 1) first published in 1776, 
 and therefore four years prior to the Critique on Pure Reason ; for the dis- 
 tinction in question is to be found, at least explicitly, neither in the treatise 
 ' Ueber die Evidenz,' nor in the Dissertation ' De Mundi Sensibilis atque 
 Inteligibilis forma et principiis,' which appeared in 1763 and 1770. But Camp- 
 bell manifestly only repeats Buffier (with whose works he was intimately ac- 
 quainted, and from which he frequently borrows), and with inferior preci- 
 sion ; so that, if we may respect the shrewdness, which took note, and ap- 
 preciated the value, of the observation, we must condemn the disingenuity 
 which palmed it on the world as his own. Campbell's doctrine, I may finally 
 observe, attracted the attention of Mr. Stewart (El. ii. p. 32 sq.) ; but he 
 was not aware either of its relation to Buffier or of its bearing upon 
 Kant.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 127 
 
 inveigh against Reid, Beattie, and Oswald more especially the 
 two last for at once stealing and spoiling the doctrine of the 
 learned Jesuit. 
 
 In regard to the spoiling, the translator is the only culprit. 
 According to him, Buffier's ' Common Sense is a disposition of 
 mind not natural but acquired by age and time' (pp. iv. xxxiv.) 
 ' Those first truths which arc its object require experience and 
 meditation to be conceived, and the judgments thence derived 
 are the result of exercising reason,' (p. v.) ' The use of Reason is 
 Reasoning;' and Common Sense is that degree of understanding 
 in all things to which the generality of mankind are capable of 
 attaining by the exertion of their rational faculty' (p. xvii.) In 
 fact Buffier's first truths, on his translator's showing, are last 
 truths ; for when ' by time we arrive at the knowledge of an 
 infinitude of things, and by the use of reason (i. e. by reasoning) 
 form our judgment on them, those judgments are then justly to 
 be considered as first truths' /// (p. xviii.) 
 
 But how, it will be asked, does he give any color to so unpar- 
 alleled a perversion ? By the very easy process of 1, throwing 
 out of account, or perverting, what his author does say ; 2, of 
 interpolating what his author not only does not say, but what is 
 in the very teeth of his assertions ; and 3, by founding on these 
 perversions and interpolations as on the authentic words of his 
 author. 
 
 As to the plagiarism, I may take this opportunity of putting 
 down, once and for ever, this imputation, although the character 
 of the man might have well exempted Reid from all suspicion of 
 so unworthy an act. It applies only to the ' Inquiry ;' and there 
 the internal evidence is almost of itself sufficient to prove that 
 Reid could not, prior to that publication, have been acquainted 
 with Buffier's Treatise. The strongest, indeed the sole, presump- 
 tion arises from the employment, by both philosophers, of the 
 term Common Sense, which, strange to say, sounded to many in 
 this country as singular and new ; whilst it was even commonly 
 believed, that before Reid Buffier was the first, indeed the only
 
 128 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 philosopher, who had taken notice of this principle, as one of the 
 genuine sources of our knowledge. See Beattie, n. 82 ; Camp- 
 bell's Philosophy of Rhetoric, B. i. c. 5, part 3 ; and Stewart's 
 Account of Reid, p.* 27. 
 
 After the testimonies now adduced, and to be adduced, it 
 would be the apex of absurdity to presume that none but Buffier 
 could have suggested to Reid either the principle or its designa- 
 tion. Here are given forty-eight authorities, ancient and mod- 
 em, for the philosophical employment of the term Common 
 Sense, previous to Reid, and from any of these Reid may be said 
 to have borrowed it with equal justice as from Buffier; but, taken 
 together, they concur in proving that the expression, in the ap- 
 plication in question, was one in general use, and free as the air 
 to all and each who chose thus to employ it. But, in fact, what 
 has not been noticed, we know, from an incidental statement of 
 Reid himself and this, be it noticed, prior to the charge of 
 plagiarism, that he only became acquainted with the treatise 
 of Buffier, after the publication of his own Inquiry. For in his 
 Account of Aristotle's Logic, written and published some ten 
 years subsequently to that work, lie says ' I have lately met 
 with a very judicious treatise written by Father Buffier,' &c., p. 
 713, b. Compare also Intellectual Powers, p. 468, b. In this 
 last work, however, published after the translation of Buffier, 
 though indirectly defending the less manifestly innocent partners 
 in the accusation, from the charge advanced, his self-respect pre- 
 vents him from saying a single word in his own vindication. 
 
 64. LYONS. About the year 1720 was published the first 
 edition of the following curious, and now rare, work : 
 
 ' The Infallibility of Human Judgment, its Dignity and Excel- 
 lence. Being a New Art of Reasoning, and discovering Truth, 
 by reducing all disputable cases to general and self-evident 
 propositions. Illustrated by bringing several well-known disputes 
 to such self-evident and universal conclusions. With the Supple- 
 ment answering all objections which have been made to it and 
 the design thereby perfected, in proving this method of Reasoning
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 129 
 
 to be as forcibly conclusive and universal as Arithmetick and 
 as easie. Also a Dissertation on Liberty and Necessity. The 
 fourth edition. To which is now added a postscript obviating 
 the complaints made to it, and to account for some things 
 which occurred to it and the author. By Mr. Lyons. London, 
 1724.' 
 
 He gives (p. 83-94) ' A Recapitulation of the whole work, 
 being the principles of a Rationalist reduced to certain stated 
 articles containing the Laws of Reason, the Elements of Religion, 
 of Morals, and of Politicks ; with the Art of reducing all disputes 
 to universal determinations.' From these articles (twenty-three 
 in number) I extract the first three. 
 
 1. 'Reason is the distinguishing excellency, dignity, and beauty 
 of mankind. 
 
 2. ' There is no other use of Reason than to judge of Good 
 and Bad, Justice and Injustice, Wisdom and Folly, and the like ; 
 that a man may thereby attain Knowledge to distinguish Truth 
 from Error, and to determine his Actions accordingly. 
 
 3. ' This Reason is known to us also by the names of Judg- 
 ment, Light of Nature, Conscience, and Common Sense ; only 
 varying its name according to its different uses and appearances, 
 but is one and the same thing.' 
 
 The conclusion of the whole is given in the maxim 'Exert 
 with Diligence and Fortitude the Common Use of Common 
 Sense? 
 
 It is probable that Lyons was not unacquainted with the treat- 
 ise of Turretini. 
 
 65. AMHERST. Terra3 Filius, No. 21. 'Natural reason and 
 common sense] used as convertible terms. 
 
 66. WOLLASTON. Religion of Nature Delineated (ed. 1721, 
 p. 23). ' They who deduce the difference between good and evil 
 from the Common Sense of mankind, and certain principles that 
 are born with us, put,' &c. 
 
 67. VULPIUS (Volpi). Scholae Dua3> p. 45. 'Non certe 
 quod putaret Aristoteles, summos illos viros (Parmenidem et 
 
 6*
 
 130 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 Melissum) tarn longe a communi sensu abhorruisse, ut opinarentur 
 nullam esse omnino rerum dissimilitudinem,' <fec. 
 
 68. Vico frequently employs the terms * communis sensus' 
 and ' senso comune 1 for our primary beliefs. See his Latin and 
 Italian works, passim. 
 
 69. WOLFIUS. Ontologia, 125. 'Veritates ad sensum 
 commnnem reducimus, dum in notiones resolvuntur, quas ad judi- 
 candum utitur ipsum vulgus imperitum naturali quodam acumine, 
 quae distincte enunciata maxime abstracta sunt, in rebus obviis 
 confuse percipiens. ... Id igitur in Philosophia prima agi- 
 mus, ut notiones quae confusae vulgo sunt, distinctas reddamus, et 
 terminis generalibus enunciemus : ita enim demum in disciplinis 
 caeteris, quae sublimia sunt, et a cognitione vulgi remota, ad noti- 
 ones eidem familiares revocare, sicque ad Sensum Communem 
 reducere licebit.' . . . 
 
 245. . . . ' Nemo miretur, quod notiones primas, quas fun- 
 damentales merito dixeris, cum omnis tandem nostra cognitio 
 iisdem innitatur, notionibus vulgi conformes probemus. Miran- 
 dum potius esset, quod non dudum de reductione philosophise ad 
 notiones communes cogitaverint philosophi, nisi constaret singu- 
 lare requiri acumen, ut, quid notionibus communibus insit, dis- 
 tincte et pervidere, et verbis minime ambiguis enunciare vale- 
 amus, quod nonnisi peculiar! et continue quodam exercitio obti- 
 netur in Psychologia exponendo.' See also a curious letter of 
 Wolf among the 'Epistolae Physicae' of Krazenstein, regarding 
 Common Sense. 
 
 70. HUBER. In 1732 appeared the first edition of Le Monde 
 Fou prefere au Monde Sage. This treatise is anonymous, but 
 known to be the work of Mademoiselle Huber. Its intrinsic 
 merit, independently of its interest as the production of a Lady, 
 might have saved it from the oblivion into which it seems to 
 have fallen. Consciousness (conscience) is considered as the 
 faculty of ' uncreated, primary, simple, and universal truths,' in 
 contrast to 'truths created, particular, distinct, limited' (i. pp. 180, 
 220). Consciousness is superior to Reasoning ; and as primitive
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 131 
 
 is above all definition (fc pp. 103, 130, 140). 'Les veritez lea 
 plus simples sont, par leur relation avec la verite primitive si fort 
 audessus des preuves, qu'elles ne paroissent douteuses que parce 
 qu'on entrepend de les prouver ; leur idee seule, ou le sentiment 
 que 1'on en a, prouve qu'elles existent ; 1'existence de la Con- 
 science, par example, est prouve par son langage m6me ; elle se 
 fait entendre, done elle est ; son temoignage est invariablement 
 droit, done il est infaillible, done les veritez particulieres qu'il 
 adopte sont indubitables, par cela seul qu'elles n'ont pas besoin 
 d'autres preuves' (i. p. 189). 
 
 71. GENOVESI. Elementorum Metaphysics, Pars Prior, p. 
 94. In reference to our moral liberty, he says 'Appello ad 
 sensum, non plebeiorum modo, ne tantas res judicio imperitorum 
 judicari quis opponat, sed philosophorum maxime, communem, 
 quern qui eiToris reprehendere non veretur, is vecors sit oportet.' 
 See also Pars Altera, p. 160, et alibi. 
 
 72. HUME. Quoted by Reid, p. 424 b. 'Common Sense' 
 word and thing. 
 
 73. Cnusius. a. Wegzur Gewissheit, 256, et alibi. 'The 
 highest principle of all knowledge and reasoning is That which 
 we cannot but think to be true, is true ; and that ichich we abso- 
 lutely cannot think at all, [?] or cannot but think to be false, is false.' 1 
 
 b. Entwurf nothwendigen Vernunftwahrheiten, Pref. 2 ed. 
 ' The Leibnitio-Wolfian system does not quadrate with the com- 
 mon sense of mankind (sensus communis).' His German expres- 
 sion is ' gemeiner Menschensinn.' 
 
 74. D'ALEMBERT holds that philosophy is an evolution from, 
 and must, if legitimate, be conformed to, the primary truths of 
 which all men are naturally in possession. The complement of 
 these truths is ' sens commun? Compare Melanges, t. iv. 4, 6, 
 pp. 28, 46 t. v. 76, p. 269, ed. Amst. 1763. 
 
 75. OETINGER. Inquisitio in Sensum Communem et Ratio- 
 nem, necnon utriusque regulas, pro dijudicandis philosophorum 
 theoriis, &c. Tubingse, 1753. ' Sensus Communis 1 is defined 
 ( 11), 'Viva et penetrans perceptio objectorum, toti humanitati
 
 132 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 obviorum, ex immediate tactu et intuvtu eorum, quae sunt sim- 
 plicissima, utilissima et maxime necessaria,' &c. 18. . . . 
 ' Objecta Sensus Communis sunt veritates omni tempore et loco 
 omnibus utiles, appreliensu faeiles, ad quas eonservandas Deus 
 illos secreto impulsu indesinenter urget, ut sunt moralia,' <fcc., <fec. 
 So far, so well. The book, however, turns out but a mystical 
 farrago. The author appears to have had no knowledge of Buf- 
 fier's treatise on First Truths. Solomon and Confucius are his 
 staple authorities. The former affords him all his rules; and 
 even materials for a separate publication on the same subject, 
 in the same year ' Die Wahrheit des Sensus Communis in den 
 erklaerten Spruechen Salomonis.' This I have not seen. 
 
 76. ESCIIENBAOH. Sammlung, <fcc. 1756. In the appendix 
 to his translation of the English Idealists, Berkeley and Collier, 
 after showing that the previous attempts of philosophers to 
 demonstrate the existence of an external world were inconclusive, 
 the learned Professor gives us his own, which is one of common 
 sense. ' How is the Idealist to prove his existence as a thinking 
 reality ? He can only say / know that I so exist, because I feel 
 that I so exist. 1 This feeling being thus the only ground on 
 which the Idealist can justify the conviction he has of his exist- 
 ence, as a mind, our author goes on to show, that the same feel- 
 ing, if allowed to be veracious, will likewise prove the existence, 
 immediately, of our bodily organism, and, through that, of a 
 material world. P. 549-552. 
 
 77. GESNER, prelecting on his ' Isagoge in Eruditionem Uni- 
 versalem,' 808> speaking of Grotius, says : 'De jure gentium 
 eleganter scripsit, et auctor classicus est. Imprimis, quod repre- 
 hendunt imperiti, laudandum in eo libro est hoc, quod omnia 
 veterum auctorum locis ac testimoniis probat. Nam ita provoca- 
 tur quasi ad totum genus humanum. Nam si videmus, illos 
 viros laudari, et afferri eorum testimonia, qui dicuntur sensum 
 communem omnium hominum habuisse ; si posteri dicant, se ita 
 sentire,. ut illi olim scripserint : est hoc citare genus humanum. 
 Proferontur enim illi in medium, quos omnes pro sapientibus
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 133 
 
 habuerunt. Verum est, potest unusquisque stultus dicere ; ' Ego 
 habeo sens-urn communem ;' sed sensus communis est, quod con- 
 sensu humano dictum sit per omnia specula. Ita etiam in reli- 
 gione naturali videndum est, quid olim homines communi con- 
 sensu dixerint: nee ea ad religionem et theologiam naturalem 
 referenda sunt, quae aliunde accepimus. Sic egit Grotius in opere 
 praastantissimo. Ostendit, hoc Romanorum, hoc Gallorum, lega- 
 tos dixisse ; hoc ab omni tempore fuisse jus gentium, hoc est, 
 illtid jus, ex quo totse gentes judicari, et agi secum, voluerint. 
 Sermo est de eo jure quod toti populi et illi sapientissimi scrip- 
 tores nomine et consensu populorum totorum, pro jure gentium 
 habuere ; de eo, quo gentes inter se teneantur ; non de jure put- 
 tivo, quod unusquisque sibi excogitavit. Haec enim est labes, 
 hoc est vitium sseculi nostri, quod unusquisque ponit principium, 
 ex quo deducit deinde conclusiones. Bene est, et laudandi sunt, 
 quod in hoc cavent sibi, ut in fine conveniant in conclusionibus ; 
 quod ex diversis principiis efficiunt easdem conclusiones : Sed 
 Grotius provocat simpliciter ad consensum generis humani et 
 sensum communem} 
 
 78. PRICE, in his Review of the principal Questions on Mor- 
 als, 1 ed. 1758, speaking of the necessity of supposing a cause 
 for every event, and having stated examples, says ' I know 
 nothing that can be said or done to a person who professes to 
 deny these things, besides referring him to common sense and 
 reason] p. 35. And again : ' Were the question whether our 
 ideas of number, diversity, causation, proportion, <fec., represent 
 truth and reality perceived by the understanding, or particular 
 impressions made by the object to which we ascribe them on our 
 minds ; were this, I say, the question, would it not be sufficient 
 to appeal to common sense, and to leave it to be determined by 
 every person's private consciousness? p. 65. See also 2 ed. p. 
 81, note : ' Common sense the faculty of self-evident truths.' 
 
 79. REID. a. Inquiry, <fec., p. 108' 'If there be certain 
 
 1 Here, as elsewhere, Hamilton refers to his own edition of Reid. W.
 
 134 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 principles, as I think there are, which the constitution of our 
 nature leads us to believe, and which we are under a necessity to 
 take for granted in the common concerns of life, without being 
 able to give a reason for them ; these are what we call the prin- 
 ciples of common sense ; and what is manifestly contrary to them 
 is what we call absurd. 1 See also p. 209. Compare Melanchthon 
 n. 25, c., Fenelon n. 60, Buffier n. 63. 
 
 b. Intellectual Powers, p. 425. ' It is absurd to conceive that 
 there can be any opposition between Reason and Common Sense. 
 Common Sense is indeed the first-born of Reason ; and they are 
 inseparable in their nature. We ascribe to Reason two offices or 
 two degrees ; the first is to judge of things self-evident ; [this is 
 Intellect, vofe.] The second is to draw conclusions that are not 
 self-evident from those that are ; [this is Reasoning, or &avoia.] 
 The first of these is the province, and the sole province of Com- 
 mon Sense ; and therefore it coincides with Reason in its whole 
 extent, and is only another name for one branch or one degree 
 of Reason.' I have already observed that of these offices, the 
 former (Common Sense) might be well denominated thu noetic 
 function of Reason, or rather Intellect, and the latter (Reasoning) 
 its dianoetic or discursive. See p. 81. 
 
 80. HILLER. Curriculum Philosophize, 1765. Pars iii. 
 34. l Sensus communis* used in its philosophical meaning. 
 
 81. HEMSTERHUIS, 'the Batavian Plato,' founds his philoso- 
 phy on the original feelings or beliefs of our intelligent nature, as 
 on ultimate facts. Feeling, or the faculty of primitive intuition 
 (sentiment, sensation, faculte intuitive) is prior to reasoning ; on 
 which it confers all its validity, and which it supplies with the 
 necessary conditions of its activity. It is not logical inference 
 which affords us the assurance of any real existence ; it is belief 
 feeling the instinctive judgment of the intuitive faculty. (This 
 he sometimes calls common sense sens commun.) Demonstra- 
 tion is the ladder to remoter truths. But demonstrations can 
 yield us information neither as to the ground on which the lad- 
 der rests, nor as to the points on which it is supported. Of his
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 135 
 
 works, see in particular, ' Sophyle' and ' Lettre sur 1'Homme et 
 ses Rapports,' passim. 
 
 82. BEATTIE. Essay on Truth, 1773, p. 40. 'The term 
 Common Sense hath, in modern times, been used by philoso- 
 phers, both French and British, to signify that power of the mind 
 which perceives truth, or commands belief, not by progressive 
 argumentation, but by an instantaneous, instinctive, and irresisti- 
 ble impulse ; derived neither from education nor from habit, but 
 from nature; acting independently of our will, whenever its 
 object is presented, according to an established law, and therefore 
 properly called Sense ; and acting in a similar manner upon all, 
 or at least upon a great majority of mankind, and therefore 
 properly called Common Sense? 
 
 I should hardly have thought it necessary to quote Beattie's 
 definition of common sense any more than those of Campbell, 
 Oswald, Fergusson, and other Scottish philosophers in the train 
 of Reid, were it not to remark that Mr. Stewart (Elements, vol. 
 ii. c. 1, sect. 3), contrary to his usual tone of criticism, is greatly 
 too unmeasured in his reprehension of this and another passage 
 of the same Essay. In fact if we discount the identification of 
 Reason with Reasoning in which Beattie only follows the great 
 majority of philosophers, ancient and modern his consequent 
 distinction of Reason from Common Sense, and his error in 
 regard to the late and limited employment of this latter term, an 
 error shared with him by Mr. Stewart, there is far more in this 
 definition to be praised than censured. The attack on Beattie 
 by the English translator of Buffier is futile and false. Mr. 
 Stewart's approbation of it is to me a matter of wonder. See 
 No. 63. 
 
 83. VON STORCHKNAU. Grundsaetze der Logik, 1774. Com- 
 mon Sense (der allgemeine Menschensinn) defined and founded 
 on, as an infallible criterion of truth, in reference to all matters 
 not beyond its sphere. 
 
 84. STATTLER. Dissertatio Logica de valore Sensus Commu- 
 nis, 1780. A treatise chiefly in reference to the proof of the
 
 136 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 being of a God from the general agreement of mankind. See 
 also his Logica. 
 
 85. HENNERT. Aphorism! philosophici Utrecht, 1781. 
 Sensus Co/nmunis, seu sensus immediate evidential, intimus est 
 sensus,' 112. ' Sensus Communis est cos et norma omnis veri,' 
 2. ' Natura mortalibus tribuit sensum communem, qui omnes 
 edocet quibus in rebus consentire debeant,' &c., 1. 
 
 86. KANT is a remarkable confessor of the supreme authority 
 of natural belief; not only by reason of his rare profundity as a 
 thinker, but because we see him, by a signal yet praiseworthy 
 inconsequence, finally re-establishing in authority the principle, 
 which he had originally disparaged and renounced. His theo- 
 retical philosophy, which he first developed, proceeds on a rejec- 
 tion, in certain respects, of the necessary convictions of mankind ; 
 while on these convictions his practical philosophy, the result of 
 his.maturer contemplations, is wholly established. As Jacobi 
 well expresses it ' The Critical philosophy, first out of love to 
 science, theoretically subverts metaphysic; then when all is 
 about to sink into the yawning abyss of an absolute subjectivity 
 it again, out of love to metaphysic, subverts science' ( Werke ii. 
 p. 44). The rejection of the common sense of mankind as a 
 criterion of truth, is the weakest point of the speculative philos- 
 ophy of Kant. When he says ' Allowing idealism to be as 
 dangerous as it truly is, it would still remain a scandal to phi- 
 losophy and human reason in general, to be forced to accept the 
 existence of external things on the testimony of mere belief (Cr. 
 d. r. V. Vorr.) : yet, that very belief alone is what makes the sup- 
 position of an external world incumbent ; and the proof of its 
 reality which Kant attempted, independently of that belief, is 
 now admitted by one and all of his disciples, to be so inconse- 
 quent that it may reasonably be doubted whether he ever 
 intended it for more than an exoteric disclaimer of the esoteric 
 idealism of his doctrine. But the philosopher who deemed it ' a 
 scandal to philosophy and human reason' to found the proof of a 
 material world in itself to us a matter of supreme indifference
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 137 
 
 on belief; on belief, on feeling, afterwards established the proof 
 of all the highest objects of our interest God Free Will and 
 Immortality. In the character he ascribes to this Feeling and 
 Belief, Kant, indeed, erred. For he ought to have regarded it, 
 not as a mere spiritual craving, but as an immediate manifesta- 
 tion to intelligence ; not as a postulate, but as a datum ; not as 
 an interest in certain truths, but as the fact, the principle, the 
 warrant of their cognition and reality. Kant's doctrine on this 
 point is too prominent and pervading, and withal too well known, 
 to render any quotation necessary ; and I only refer to his Cri- 
 tique of Practical Reason, and his moral treatises in general. 
 See also on Kant's variation in this respect, among others, Jaco- 
 bi's Introduction to his collected philosophical writings (Werke 
 vol. ii. p. 3-126), with the Appendix on Transcendental Idealism 
 (ibid. p. 289-309) ; and Platner's Philosophical Aphorisms (vol. 
 i. Pref. p. vi.) ; to which may be added Schoppenhauer's letter in 
 preface to the first volume of Kant's collected works by Rosen- 
 krantz and Schubert. 
 
 87. JACOBI. The philosophy of Jacobi who from the char- 
 acter and profundity of his speculations merited and obtained the 
 appellation of the Plato of Germany in its last and most per- 
 fect exposition establishes two faculties immediately apprehensive 
 (vernehmend, wahrnehmend) of reality ; Sense of corporeal ex- 
 istence, Reason (Vernunft) of supersensible truths.* Both as 
 primary are inconceivable, being only cognitions of the fact. 
 Both are therefore incapable of definition, and are variously and 
 vaguely characterized as revelations, intuitions, feelings, beliefs, 
 instincts. 
 
 * This last corresponds to the vovf proper of the Greek philosophers ; and 
 the employment of the term Reason in this limitation by Jacobi in his later 
 works (to which he was manifestly led by Kant), is not a fortunate nomen- 
 clature. In his earlier writings lie does not discriminate Reason from Under- 
 standing (Verstand), viewing it as a faculty of mediate knowledge, and as 
 opposed to Belief, in which Jacobi always held that we obtain the revelation 
 of all reality all original cognition. See p. 80.
 
 138 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 The resistless belief or feeling of reality which in either cogni 
 tion affords the surrogate of its truth, is equivalent to the com 
 mon sense of Reid. Reid was an especial favorite with Jacohi ; 
 and through Jacobi's powerful polemic we may trace the influence 
 of the Scottish philosophy on the whole subsequent speculation 
 of Germany. See Preface. 
 
 a. Die Lehre des Spinoza, <fec., 1785, p. 162. sq. Werke, 
 vol. iv. p. 210. ' Dear Mendelsohn, we are all born in belief 
 (Glaube*), and in belief we must remain, as we were all born in 
 society, and in society must remain. How can we strive after 
 certainty, were certainty not already known to us ; and known to 
 us, how can it be unless through something which we already 
 know with certainty ? This leads to the notion of an immediate 
 certainty, which not only stands in need of no proof, but abso- 
 lutely excludes all proof, being itself, and itself alone, the repre- 
 sentation (Vorstellungf ) corresponding with the represented thing, 
 and therefore having its sufficient reason within itself. The con- 
 viction, through proof or demonstration, is a conviction of sec- 
 ond hand ; rests upon comparison ; and can never be altogether 
 sure and perfect. If, then, all assent, all holding for true (Fuer- 
 wahrhalten), not depending on such grounds of reasoning, be a 
 belief; it follows, that the conviction from reasoning itself, must 
 spring out of belief, and from belief receive all the cogency it 
 possesses. 
 
 ' Through belief we know that we have a body, and that, ex- 
 ternal to us, there are found other bodies, and other intelligent 
 existences. A truly miraculous [marvellousj] revelation ! For 
 
 * The Germans have only this one word for philosophical Belief and theo- 
 logical Faith. Hence much scandal, confusion, and misrepresentation, on 
 its first employment by Jacobi. 
 
 t Vorstellung in this place might perhaps be rendered presentation. But I 
 adhere to the usual translation ; for Jacobi never seems to have risen to the 
 pure doctrine of Natural Realism. 
 
 J The Germans have only one word, wunder, wunderbar, to express marvel 
 and miracle, marvellous and miraculous. Hence often confusion and ambi-
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 139 
 
 we have only a sensation (Empfinden) of our body, under this or 
 that modification ; and whilst we have a sensation of our body 
 thus modified, we are at the same time, aware or percipient, not 
 only of its changes, but likewise of what is wholly different 
 from mere sensation, or a mere thought we are aware or per- 
 cipient of other real things, and this too with a certainty, the same 
 as that with which we are percipient of our own existence ; for 
 without a Thou an /is impossible. [? See above, p. 19. sq.] 
 
 ' We have thus a revelation of nature, which does not recommend 
 merely, but compels, all and each of us to believe, and, through be- 
 lief, to receive those eternal truths which are vouchsafed to man.' 
 
 P. 223. ' V. We can only demonstrate similarities (coinci- 
 dences, conditioned necessary truths) in a series of identical pro- 
 positions. Every proof supposes, as its basis, something already 
 established, the principle of which is a revelation. 
 
 ' VI. The element of all human knowledge and activity is Be- 
 lief.' 
 
 P. 193. (Given as an aphorism of Spinoza.) ' An immediate 
 cognition, considered in and for itself, is without representation 
 is a Feeling.' The three last words do not appear in the original 
 edition ; and I cannot find their warrant in Spinoza. 
 
 b. From the Dialogue entitled ' David Hume upon Belief, 
 or Idealism and Realism,' which appeared two years later (1787), 
 Werke, vol. ii. p. 143, sq. 
 
 '/. That things appear as external to us, requires no argument. 
 But that these things are not mere appearances in us are not 
 mere modifications of our proper self, and consequently null as 
 representations of aught external to ourselves ; but that as repre- 
 sentations in us, they have still reference to something really ex- 
 ternal and self-existent, which they express, and from which they 
 are taken in the face of this, not only is doubt possible, it has 
 
 fjuity in their theology. The superiority we have over them in the two in- 
 stances noticed in this and the penult note is, however, rare. The making 
 perception a revelation and not an apprehension of existence belongs also to 
 a Cosmothetic Idealism, struggling into Natural Realism.
 
 140 PHILOSOPHY OP COMMON SENSE. 
 
 been often satisfactorily demonstrated, that such doubt cannot be 
 solved by any process of reasoning strictly so denominated. Your 
 immediate certainty of external things would, therefore, on the 
 analogy of my Belief, be a blind certainty.' 1 
 
 (After defending the propriety of the term Glaube employed 
 by him in his previous writings (which, in consequence of the 
 word denoting in German both positive faith and general belief, 
 had exposed him to the accusation of mysticism), by examples of 
 a similar usage of the word Belief, in the philosophical writings 
 of Hume, Reid, <fec. ; he proceeds to vindicate another term he 
 had employed Offenbarung, revelation.) 
 
 ' /. In so far as the universal usage of language is concerned, 
 is there required any special examples or authorities ? We say 
 commonly in German, that objects offenbaren, reveal, i. e. mani- 
 fest, themselves through the senses. The same expression is prev- 
 alent in French, English, Latin, and many other languages. 
 With the particular emphasis which I have laid on it, this expres- 
 sion does not occur in Hume ; among other reasons because he 
 leaves it undetermined, whether we perceive things really external 
 or only as external. . . . The decided Realist, on the contrary, 
 who unhesitatingly accepts an external existence, on the evidence 
 of his senses, considers this certainty as an original conviction, 
 and cannot but think, that on this fundamental experience, all 
 our speculation touching a knowledge of the external world must 
 rest such a decided Realist, how shall he denominate the mean 
 through which he obtains his certainty of external objects, as of 
 existences independent of his representation of them ? He has 
 nothing on which his judgment can rest, except the things them- 
 selves nothing but the fact, that the objects stand there, actually 
 before him. In these circumstances, can he express himself by a 
 more appropriate word than the word Revelation.* And should 
 we not rather inquire, regarding the root of this word, and the 
 origin of its employment. 
 
 * This looks very like Natural Realism.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 141 
 
 ' He. So it certainly appears. 
 
 ' /. That this Revelation deserves to be called truly miracu- 
 lous [marvellous] follows of course. For if we consider suffi- 
 ciently the reasons for the proposition " That consciousness is 
 exclusively conversant with the modifications of our proper self," 
 Idealism will appear in all its force, and as the only scheme 
 which our speculative reason can admit. Suppose, however, that 
 our Realist, notwithstanding, still remains a Realist, and holds 
 fast by the belief that for example this object here, which we 
 call a table, is no mere sensation no mere existence found only 
 in us, but an existence external and independent of our represen- 
 tation, and by us only perceived ; I would boldly ask him for a 
 more appropriate epithet for the Revelation of which he boasts, 
 inasmuch as he maintains that something external to him is 
 presented (sich darstelle) to his consciousness. For the presented 
 existence (Daseyn) of such a thing external to us, we have no 
 other proof than the presented existence of this thing itself ; and 
 we must admit it to be wholly inconceivable, how that existence 
 can possibly be perceived by us. But still, as was said, we main- 
 tain that we do perceive it ; maintain with the most assured con- 
 viction, that things there are, extant really out of us, that our rep- 
 resentations and notions are conformed to these external things, 
 and that not the tilings which we only fancy external are con- 
 formed to our representations and notions. I ask on what does 
 this conviction rest ? In truth on nothing, except on a revela- 
 tion, which we can denominate no otherwise than one truly mi- 
 raculous [marvellous].' 
 
 c. Allwills Briefsammlung, 1792. Werke, vol. i. p. 120. 
 ' "We admit, proceeded Allwill, freely and at once, that we do not 
 comprehend how it is that, through the mere excitation and 
 movement of our organs of sense, we are not only sensitive but 
 sensitive of something ; become aware of, perceive, something 
 wholly different from us ; and that we comprehend, least of all, 
 how we distinguish and apprehend our proper self, and what per- 
 tains to our internal states, in a manner wholly different from all
 
 142 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 sensitive perception. But we deem it more secure here to appeal 
 to an original Instinct, with which every cognition of truth be- 
 gins, than, on account of that incomprehensibility, to maintain 
 that the mind can conceive and represent in an infinitely various 
 fashion not itself, and not other things, but, exclusively and alone, 
 what is neither itself, nor any other thing?* 
 
 d. From the Preface to the second volume of his Works, form- 
 ing the ' Introduction to the author's collected philosophical 
 writings ;' this was published in 1815, and exhibits the last and 
 most authentic view of the Jacobian doctrine. 
 
 P. 58 sq. ' Like every other system of cognitions, Philosophy 
 receives its Form exclusively from the Understanding (Verstand) 
 as, in general, the faculty of Concepts (Begriffe). Without no- 
 tions or concepts there can be no reconsciousness, no conscious- 
 ness of cognitions, consequently no discrimination and compari- 
 son, no separation and connection, no weighing, re-weighing, 
 estimating, of these ; in a word, no seizing possession (Besitzer- 
 greifung) of any truth whatever. On the other hand the con- 
 tents the peculiar contents, of philosophy are given exclusively 
 by the Reason (Vernunft),f by the faculty, to wit, of cognitions, 
 independent of sense, and beyond its reach. The Reason fash- 
 ions no concepts, builds no systems, pronounces no judgments, 
 but, like the external senses, it merely reveals, it merely announces 
 the fact. 
 
 4 Above all, we must consider that as there is a sensible in- 
 tuition, an intuition through the Sense, so there is likewise a ra- 
 tional intuition through the Reason. Each, as a peculiar source 
 of knowledge, stands counter to the other ; and we can no more 
 educe the latter from the former, than we can educe the former 
 from the latter. So likewise, both hold a similar relation to the 
 Understanding (Verstand), and consequently to demonstration. 
 
 * And to be represented, a thing must be known. But ex Jiypothesi, the 
 external reality is unknown ; it cannot therefore be represented, 
 t See note at p. 137 a, and references.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 143 
 
 Opposed to the intuition of sense no demonstration is valid ; for 
 all demonstration is only a reducing, a carrying back of the con- 
 cept to the sensible intuition (empirical or pure), which affords 
 its guarantee : and this, in reference to physical science, is the first 
 and the last, the unconditionally valid, the absolute. On the 
 same principle, no demonstration avails in opposition to the in- 
 tuition of reason, which affords us a knowledge of supersensible 
 objects, that is, affords us assurance of their reality and truth.* 
 
 ' We are compelled to employ the expression rational intuition, 
 or intuition of reason (Vernunft-Anschauung), because the lan- 
 guage possesses no other to denote the mean and the manner, in 
 which the understanding is enabled to take cognizance of what, 
 unattainable by the sense, is given by Feeling alone, and yet, not 
 as a subjective excogitation, but as an objective reality. 
 
 ' When a man says / know, we have a right to ask him 
 Whence he knows ? And in answering our question, he must, in 
 the end, inevitably resort to one or other of these two sources 
 either to the Sensation of Sense (Sinnes-Empfindung), or to the 
 feeling of the Mind (Geistes-Gefuehl). Whatever we know 
 from mental feeling, that, we say, we believe. So speak we all. 
 Virtue consequently, Moral Liberty consequently, Mind and 
 God these can only be believed. But the sensation on which 
 knowledge in the intuition of sense knowledge properly so call- 
 ed reposes, is as little superior to the Feeling on which the 
 knowledge in belief is founded, as the brute creation is to the hu- 
 man, the material to the intellectual world, nature to its creator.f 
 
 ' The power of Feeling, I maintain, is the power in man para- 
 mount to every other ; it is that alone which specifically distin- 
 guishes him from the brutes, that is, which, affording a differ- 
 
 * Compare this with Aristotle's doctrine, No. 8, especially a. b. c. f. and 
 p. 86, b. 
 
 t As will be seen from what follows, Jacob! applies the terms Feeling and 
 Belief to both Sense and Eeason. Sensation, as properly the mere conscious- 
 ness of a subjective sensual state, of the agreeable or disagreeable in our 
 corporeal organism, is a term that ought to have been here avoided.
 
 144 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 ence not merely in degree but in kind, raises him to an incom- 
 parable eminence above them : it is, I maintain, one and the 
 same with reason ; or, as we may with propriety express our- 
 selves what we call Reason, what transcends mere understand- 
 ing solely applied to nature, springs exclusively and alone out of 
 the power of Feeling. As the senses refer the understanding to 
 Sensation, so the Reason refers it to Feeling. The consciousness 
 of that which Feeling manifests, I call Idea. 1 * 
 
 P. 107. 'As the reality, revealed by the external senses, re- 
 quires no guarantee, itself affording the best assurance of its 
 truth ; so the reality, revealed by that deep internal sense which 
 we call Reason, needs no guarantee, being, in like manner, alone 
 and of itself the most competent witness of its veracity. Of neces- 
 sity, man believes his senses ; of necessity, he believes his reason ; 
 and there is no certainty superior to the certainty which this be- 
 lief contains. 
 
 ' When men attempted to demonstrate scientifically the truth 
 of our representations (Vorstellungen) of a material world, exist- 
 ing beyond, and independent of, these representations, the object 
 which they wished to establish vanished from the demonstrators ; 
 there remained naught but mere subjectivity, mere sensation : 
 they found Idealism. 
 
 ' When men attempted to demonstrate scientifically the truth 
 of our representations of an immaterial world, existing beyond 
 these representations, the truth of the substantiality of the hu- 
 man mind, and the truth of a free creator of the universe, dis- 
 tinct from the universe itself, that is, an administrator, endowed 
 with consciousness, personality, and veritable providence ; in like 
 manner the object vanished from the demonstrators ; there re- 
 mained for them mere logical phantasms: they found Nihil- 
 ism. 
 
 ' All reality, whether corporeal, revealed by the senses, or spir- 
 
 * Without entering on details, I may observe that Jacobi, like Kant, lim- 
 its the term Idea to the highest notions of pure intellect, or Reason.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 145 
 
 itual, revealed by the reason, is assured to us alone by Feeling ;* 
 beyond and above this there is no guarantee.' 
 
 Among those who have adopted the principles of Jacobi, and 
 who thus philosophize in a congenial spirit with Reid, besides 
 Koeppen and Ancillon (Nos. 96, 97), I may refer, in general, to 
 Bouterwek, Lehrb. d. philos. Wissensch., i. 26, 27, and Lehrb. 
 d. philos. Vorkent., 12, 27. Neeb, Verm. Schr.,vol. i. p. 154 
 sq. vol. ii. p. 18, 70, 245 sq. 251, vol. iii. p. 141 sq. 
 
 88. HEIDENREICH, one of the most distinguished of the older 
 Kantians. Betrachtungen, &c., P. i. p. 213,227. 'Inasmuch 
 as the conviction of certain cognitions (as of our own existence, of 
 the existence of an external world, &c.), does not depend upon an 
 apprehension of reasons, but is exclusively an immediate innate 
 reliance of the subject on self and nature, I call it natural belief 
 (Natur-glaube). Every other cognition, notion, and demonstra- 
 tion, reposes upon this natural belief, and without it cannot be 
 brought to bear.' 
 
 89. L. CREUZER. Skeptische Betrachtungen, <fec., p. 110. 
 4 We accord reality to the external world because our conscious- 
 ness impels us so f o do That we are 
 
 unable to explain, conceive, justify all this, argues nothing against 
 its truth. Our whole knowledge rests ultimately on facts of con- 
 sciousness, of which we not only cannot assign the reason, but 
 cannot even think the possibility.' He does not however rise 
 above Hypothetical Realism ; see p. 108. 
 
 90. PLAINER. Philosophische Aphorismen, 2d ed. Pref. p.. 
 vi. ' There is, I am persuaded, only one philosophy ; and that the 
 true ; which in the outset of its inquiries departs from the princi- 
 ple, that the certainty of human knowledge is demonstrable, only 
 relatively to our faculty of knowing, and which, at the end of its 
 speculative career, returns within the thoughts Experience, Com- 
 mon Sense, and Morality the best results of our whole earthly 
 wisdom.' 
 
 * In regard to the term Feeling, see p. 60, 
 
 7
 
 146 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 91. FICHTE is a more remarkable, because a more reluctant, 
 confessor of the paramount authority of Belief than even Kant 
 Departing from the principle common to Kant and philosophers 
 in general, that the mind cannot transcend itself, Fichte devel- 
 oped, with the most admirable rigor of demonstration, a scheme 
 of Idealism, the purest, simplest, and most consistent which the 
 history of philosophy exhibits. And so confident was Fichte in' 
 the necessity of his proof, that on one occasion he was provoked 
 to imprecate eternal damnation on his head, should he ever 
 swerve from any, even the least, of the doctrines which he had so 
 victoriously established. But even Fichte in the end confesses 
 that natural belief is paramount to every logical proof, and that 
 his own idealism he could not believe. 
 
 In the foot-note at page 129 b, 1 I have given the result as 
 stated by himself of his theoretical philosophy Nihilism. After 
 the passage there quoted, he thus proceeds : ' All cognition 
 strictly so called (Wissen) is only an effigiation (Abbildung), and 
 there is always in it something wanted, that to which the image 
 or effigies (Bild) corresponds. This want can be supplied through 
 no cognition ; and a system of cognitions is necessarily a system 
 of mere images, destitute of reality, significance, or aim.' These 
 passages are from the conclusion of the second book of his ' Bes- 
 timmung des Menschen,' entitled 'Wissen,' pp. 130, 132, ed. 
 1825. 
 
 But in his Practical Philosophy Fichte became convinced that 
 he had found an organ by which to lay hold on the internal and 
 external worlds, which had escaped from him in his Theoretical. 
 ' I have discovered, he says, the instrument by which to seize on 
 this Reality, and therewith, in all likelihood, on every other. 
 Knowledge (das Wissen) is not this instrument : no cognition can 
 be its own basis and its own proof; every cognition supposes 
 another still higher, as its reason, and this ascent has no termina- 
 tion. The instrument I mean, is Belief (Glaube).' (Ib. book 
 
 1 The. note may be found above p. 24.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 147 
 
 third, entitled 'Glaube,' p. 146.) 'All my conviction is only Be- 
 lief, and it proceeds from Feeling or Sentiment (Gesinnung), not 
 from the discursive Understanding (Verstand).' (Ib. p. 147.) 'I 
 possess, when once I am aware of this, the touchstone of all truth 
 and of all conviction. The root of truth is in the Conscience (Ge- 
 wissen) alone.' (Ib. p. 148.) Compare St. Austin, supra, No. 15, 
 b. See also to the same effect Fichte's ' System der Sittenlehre,' 
 p. 18 ; his work ' Ueber den Begriffder Wissenschaftslehre, p. 21, 
 sq., and the ' Philosophische Journal,' vol. x. p. 7. Still more 
 explicit is the recognition of 'internal sense' and 'belief as an 
 irrecusable testimony of the reality of our perception of external 
 realities, subsequently given by Fichte in his lectures at Erlangen 
 in 1 805, and reported by Gley in his ' Essai sur les Elements de 
 la Philosophic,' p. 141, sq., and in his 'Philosophia Turonensis,' 
 vol. i. p. 237. I regret that I have not yet seen Fichte's 'Hinter- 
 lassene Schriften,' lately published by his son. 
 
 After these admissions it need not surprise us to find Fichte 
 confessing, that 'How evident soever may be the demonstration 
 that every object of consciousness (Vorstellung) is only illusion 
 and dream, I am unable to believe it ;' and in like manner main- 
 taining, that Spinoza never could have believed the system which 
 he deduced with so logical a necessity. (Philos. Journ. vii. p. 35.) 
 
 93. KRUG. The Transcendental Synthetism of this philoso- 
 pher is a scheme of dualism founded on the acceptance of the ori- 
 ginal datum of consciousness, that we are immediately cognizant, 
 at once, of an internal, and of an external world. It is thus a 
 scheme of philosophy, really, though not professedly, founded on 
 Common Sense. Krug is a Kantian ; and as originally promul- 
 gated in his 'Entwurf eines neuen Organons,' 1801 (5), his 
 system was, like Kant's, a mere Cosmothetic Idealism ; for while 
 he allowed a knowledge of the internal world, he only allowed a 
 belief of the external. The polemic of Schulze against the com- 
 mon theory of sensitive representation, and in professed conform- 
 ity with Reid's doctrine of perception, was published in the same 
 year ; and it was probably the consideration of this that deter-
 
 148 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 mined Krug to a fundamental change in his system. For in his 
 treatise 'Ueber die verschiedenen Methoden,' <fec. 1802 (p. 44), 
 and still more explicitly in his ' Fundamental Philosophic,' 1 803 
 ( 68), the mere belief in the unknown existence of external things 
 is commuted into a cognition, and an immediate perception appa- 
 rently allowed, as well of the phenomena of matter, as of the phe- 
 nomena of mind. See also his pamphlet ' Ueber das Verhaelt- 
 niss der Philosophic zum gesunden Menschenverstaude,' 1835, in 
 reference to Hegel's paradox, ' That the world of Common 
 Sense, and the world of Philosophy, are, to each other, worlds up- 
 side down.' 
 
 94. DEGERANDO. Histoire comparee des Systemes de Philo- 
 sophic, t. iii. p. 343, original edition. ' Concluons : la realite de 
 nos connaissances [of the external world] ne se demontre pas ; elle 
 se recommit. Elle se reconnait, par 1'eftet de cette meme conscience 
 qui nous revele notre connaissance elle-me'me. Tel est le privi- 
 lege de l'intelligence*humaine. Elle apercoit les objets, elle s'aper- 
 coit ensuite elle-meme, elle apercoit qu'elle a apercu. Elle est 
 toute lumiere, mais une lumiere qui reflechit indefiniment sur elle- 
 meme. On nous opposera ce principe abstrait: qvfune sensation 
 ne peut nous instruire que de notre propre existence. . . . Sans 
 doute lorsqu'on commence par confondre la sensation avec la per- 
 ception, par definir celle-ci une maniere cTdtre du moi, on ne peut 
 leur attribuer d'autre instruction que celle dont notre propre exis- 
 tence est Pobjet. Mais 6 vitons ici les disputes de mots ; il s'agit 
 seulement de constater un fait; savoir, si dans certains cas, en re- 
 flechissant sur nos operations, en demelant toutes leurs circons- 
 tances, nous n'y decouvrons pas la perception immediate et primi- 
 tive d'une existence etrangere, perception a la quelle on donnera 
 tel nom qu'on jugera convenable. Si ce fait est exact, constant, 
 universel, si ce fait est primitif, il est non seulement inutile, mais 
 absurde, d'en demander le jiourqvoi et le comment. Car nous 
 n'avons aucune donn6e pour 1'expliquer.' 
 
 95. FRIES, a distinguished philosopher of the Kantian school, 
 but whose opinions have been considerably modified by the infiu-
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 149 
 
 ence of the Jacobian philosophy of belief, professes in his Feeling 
 of Truth (Wahrheitsgefuehl) a doctrine of common sense. This 
 doctrine is in every essential respect the same as Reid's ; for Fries 
 is altogether wrong in the assertion which, in different works, he 
 once and again hazards, that, under Common Sense, Reid had in 
 view a special organ of truth a peculiar sense, distinct from rea- 
 son or intelligence in general. See in particular his Krit. vol. i. 
 85. Metaph. 17. Gesch. d. Phil. vol. ii. 172. Anthr. vol. 
 i. 52. ii. Vorr. p. xvi. Log. 84. 
 
 96. KOEPPEN a philosopher of the school of Jacobi. Dars- 
 tellung des Wesens der Philosophic, 11. ' Human knowledge, 
 (Wissen) considered in its totality, exhibits a twofold character. It 
 is either Apprehension (Wahrnehmung) or Conception (Begriff) ; 
 either an immediate conviction, or a mediate insight obtained 
 through reasons. By the former we are said to believe, by the 
 latter to conceive [or comprehend].' After an articulate exposition 
 of this, and having shown, with Jacobi and Hume, that belief as 
 convertible with feeling constitutes the ultimate ground both of 
 action and cognition, he proceeds : ' In a philosophical sense, be- 
 lieved is tantamount to apprehended. For all apprehension is an 
 immediate conviction which cannot be founded upon reflection 
 and conception. In our human individuality we possess a double 
 faculty of apprehension Reason [intelligence, voUj] and sense. 
 What, therefore, through reason and sense is an object of our 
 apprehension is believed. . . . The belief of reason and the belief 
 of sense, are our guarantees for the certainty of what we appre- 
 hend. The former relies on the testimony of reason, the latter on 
 the testimony of sense. Is this twofold testimony false, there is 
 absolutely no truth of apprehension. The combinations of con- 
 ceptions afford no foundation for this original truth. Belief is 
 thus the first in our cognition, because apprehension is the first : 
 conception is the second, because it regards the relations of what is 
 given through apprehension. If, then, I exclusively appropriate 
 to the result of conceptions the name of knowledge (Wissen) still 
 all knowledge presupposes belief, and on belief does the truth of
 
 150 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 knowledge repose. Belief lays hold on the originally given ; 
 knowledge develops the relations of the given, in conformity with 
 the laws of thought,' <fec. 
 
 97. ANCILLON (the Son). German by birth, French by line- 
 age, writing in either language with equal elegance, and repre- 
 senting in himself the highest and most peculiar qualities of both 
 his nations ; we have still farther to admire in the prime minister 
 of Prussia, at once, the metaphysician and moralist, the historian 
 and statesman, the preacher and man of the world. He philoso- 
 phized in the spirit of Jacobi ; and from his treatise Ueber Glaube 
 (On Belief), one of his later writings, I translate the following 
 passages : 
 
 P. 36. ' Existences, realities, are given us. We apprehend 
 them by means of an internal mental intuition (geistige Anschau- 
 ung), which, in respect of its clearness, as in respect of its cer- 
 tainty, is as evident as universal, and as resistless and indubitable 
 as evident. 
 
 4 Were no such internal, immediate, mental intuition given us, 
 there would be given us no existence, no reality. The universe 
 the worlds of mind and matter would then resolve themselves 
 into apparency. All realities would be mere appearances, appear- 
 ing to another mere appearance Man ; whilst no answer could 
 be afforded to the ever-recurring questions What is it (hat ap- 
 pears ? and To whom is the appearance made ? Even language 
 resists such assertions, and reproves the lie. 
 
 'Had we no such internal, immediate, mental intuition, exist- 
 ences would be beyond the reach of every faculty we possess. 
 For neither our abstractive nor reflective powers, neither the anal- 
 ysis of notions, nor notions themselves, neither synthesis nor rea- 
 soning, could ever lead us to reality and existence.'* 
 
 (Having shown this in regard to each of these in detail, he 
 proceeds : p. 40.) ' This root of all reality, this ground of exist- 
 
 * Fichte says the same : ' From cognition to pass out to an object of cog- 
 nition this is impossible ; we must therefore depart from the reality, other- 
 wise we should remain forever unable to reach it.'
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 151 
 
 ence, is the Reason (Vernunft), 1 out of which all reasonings pro- 
 ceed, and on which alone they repose. 
 
 4 The Reason of which I here speak is not an instrument which 
 serves for this or that performance, but a true productive force, a 
 creative power, which has its own revelation ; which does not 
 show what is already manifested, but, as a primary conscious- 
 ness, itself contemplates existence ; which is not content to collect 
 data, and from these data to draw an inference, but which itself 
 furnishes Reality as a datum. This Reason is no arithmetical 
 machine, but an active principle ; it does not reach the truth 
 after toil and time, but departs from the truth, because it finds 
 the truth within itself. 
 
 4 This Reason, this internal eye,* which immediately receives 
 the light of existence, and apprehends existences, as the bodily 
 eye the outlines and the colors of the sensuous world, is an im- 
 mediate sense which contemplates the invisible. 
 
 ' This Reason is the ground, the principle, of all knowledge 
 (Wissen) ; for all knowledge bears reference to reality and exist- 
 ences. 
 
 ' All knowledge must, first or last, rest on facts (Thatsachen), 
 universal facts, necessary facts, of the internal sense ; on facts 
 which give us ourselves, our own existence, and a conviction of 
 the existence of other supersensible beings. 
 
 4 These facts are for us mental intuitions. Inasmuch as they 
 give us an instantaneous, clear, objective perception of reality, 
 they are entitled to the name of Intuition (Anscahaung) ; inas- 
 much as this intuition regards the objects of the invisible world, 
 they deserve the attribute of mental. 
 
 4 Such an intuition, such a mental feeling (Gefuehl), engenders 
 Philosophical Belief. This belief consists in the immediate ap- 
 prehending of existences wholly concealed and excluded from the 
 
 1 On the employment of the word Reason by the German philosophers, su- 
 pra, p. 79, eq. W. 
 
 * Plato, Aristotle, and many philosophers after them, say this of Intelli- 
 gence, voDf.
 
 152 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 senses, which reveal themselves to us in our inmost consciousness, 
 and this too with a necessary conviction of their objectivity 
 (reality). 
 
 'Belief, in the philosophical sense, means, the apprehension 
 without proof, reasoning or deduction of any kind, of those higher 
 truths which belong to the supersensible world, and not to the 
 world of appearances.' .... 
 
 P. 43. ' Philosophical belief apprehends existences which can 
 neither be conceived nor demonstrated. Belief is therefore a 
 knowledge conversant about existences, but it does not know ex- 
 istences, if under knowledge be understood demonstrating, com- 
 prehending, conceiving.' .... 
 
 P. 44. ' The internal intuition which affords us the apprehen- 
 sion of certain existences, and allows us not to doubt in regard to 
 the certainty of their reality, does not inform us concerning their 
 nature. This internal intuition is given us in Feeling and through 
 Feeling.' .... 
 
 P. 48. ' This internal universal sense, this highest power of 
 mental vision in man, seems to have much in it of the instinctive, 
 and may therefore appropriately be styled intellectual Instinct.- 
 For on the one hand it manifests itself through sudden, rapid, 
 uniform, resistless promptings ; and on the other hand, these 
 promptings relate to objects, which lie not within the domain of 
 the senses, but belong to the supersensible world. 
 
 'Let no offence be taken at the expression Instinct. For, 
 Ac.' .... 
 
 P. 50. 'Had man not an intellectual instinct, or a reason 
 giving out, revealing, but not demonstrating, truths rooted in 
 itself, for want of a point of attachment and support, he would 
 move himself in all directions, but without progress; and on a 
 level, too, lower than the brutes, for he could not compass that 
 kind of perfection which the brute possesses, and would be dis- 
 qualified from attaining any other. 
 
 'The immediate Reason elicits internal mental intuitions ; these 
 intuitions have an evidence, which works on us like an intellec-
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 153 
 
 tual instinct, and generates in us a philosophical belief, which 
 constitutes the foundation of our knowledge. To which soever of 
 these expressions the preference be accorded, all their notions 
 have a common character, and are so interlinked together, that 
 they all equally result in the same very simple proposition : 
 There is either no truth, or there are fundamental truths, which 
 admit as little of demonstration as of doubt. 1 .... 
 
 P. 51. 'Had we not in ourselves an active principle of truth, 
 we should have neither a rule, nor a touchstone, nor a standard, 
 of the true. Had we not in ourselves the consciousness of exist- 
 ences, there would be for us no means of knowing, whether what 
 comes from without be not mere illusion, and whether what the 
 mind itself fashions and combines be aught but an empty play 
 with notions. In a word the truth must be in us, as a consti- 
 tutive, and as a regulative, principle ; or we should never attain 
 to truth. Only with determinate points of commencement and 
 termination, and with a central point of knowledge, from which 
 every thing departs, and to which every thing tends to return, 
 are other cognitions possible ; failing this primary condition, 
 nothing can be given us to know, and nothing certain can exist.' 
 
 And in the Preface (p. xi.) he had said : ' The Reason in- 
 vents, discovers, creates, in propriety, nothing ; it enounces only 
 what it harbors, it only reveals what God himself has deposited 
 within it ; but so soon as it is conscious to itself of this, it speaks 
 out with a force which inspires us with a rational belief, a faith 
 of reason (Vernunftglaube), a belief which takes priority of every 
 other, and which serves to every other as a point of departure and 
 of support. How can we believe the word of God, if we do not 
 already believe that a God exists ?' 
 
 Compare also his 'Zur Vermittlung der Extreme,' vol. ii. 
 p. 253, sq., and his ' Moi Hmnain' passim. 
 
 98. GERLACH. Fundamental Philosophic, 16. 'So soon 
 as a man is convinced of any thing be his conviction of the 
 True, of the Good, or of the Beautiful he rests upon his Con- 
 sciousness ; for in himself and in his Consciousness alone does he 
 
 7*
 
 154: PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 possess the elements which constitute the knowledge of things, 
 and it is herein alone that lie finds the necessity of all and each 
 of his judgments. In a word, that only has an existence for us 
 of which we are conscious.' 
 
 99. HERMES, the late illustrious ornament of the Catholic fac- 
 ulty of Theology in Bonn, a thinker of whom any country may 
 well be proud, is the author of a philosophy of cognition which, 
 in its fundamental principles, is one of Common Sense. It is con- 
 tained in the first volume of his ' Introduction to Christian Cath- 
 olic Theology,' a work which, since the author's death, has ob- 
 tained a celebrity, apart from its great intrinsic merits, through 
 the agitation consequent on its condemnation at Rome, for doc- 
 trines, which, except on some notoriously open questions, the 
 Hermesians in Germany, now a numerous and able school 
 strenuously deny that it contains. 
 
 To speak only of his theoretical philosophy. For the terms 
 Feeling of Truth, Belief, &c., Hermes substitutes the term Hold- 
 ing-for-true (Fuerwahrhalten) which is only inadequately express- 
 ed by the Latin assensus, assentio, adhcesio, the Greek <fvyxa.ra&e<fi, 
 or any English term. Holding-for-true involves in it a duplicity ; 
 viz : a Holding-for-frwe of the knowledge, and a Holding-for- 
 real (Fuerwirklichhalteri) of the thing known. Both of these parts 
 are united in the decision that the knowledge and the thing 
 known coincide. 
 
 Holding-for-real is not consequent on reflection ; it is not the 
 result of a recognition ; it is the concomitant, not the consequent 
 of apprehension. It is a constituent element of the primary con- 
 sciousness of a perception external or internal ; it is what, in the 
 language of the Scottish philosophers, might be called an instinct- 
 ive belief. 'This holding-for-real (says Hermes) is manifestly 
 given in me prior to all Reflection ; for, with the first conscious- 
 ness, with the consciousness " that I know," from which all Reflec- 
 tion departs, the consciousness is also there, " that I hold the 
 thing known for real,"' Einl., vol. i. p. 182. See Nos. 3, 15* (at 
 end), 16, <kc.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 155 
 
 The necessity we find of assenting or holding is the last and 
 highest security we can obtain for truth and reality. The neces- 
 sary holding of a thing for real is not itself reality ; it is only the 
 instrument, the mean, the surrogate, the guarantee, of reality. It 
 is not an objective, it is only a subjective, certainty. It constitutes, 
 however, all the assurance or certainty of which the human mind 
 is capable. ' The [necessary] Holding,' says Hermes, ' of some- 
 thing known [for real], can afford no other certainty of the ob- 
 jective existence of what is known but this that I (the 
 subject) must hold the thing known for objectively existent ; or 
 (meaning always by the word subjective what is in me, in the 
 subject) of the objective existence of a thing known there can 
 possibly be given only the highest subjective certainty. But no 
 one who knows what he would be at, will ever ask after any 
 other certainty ; not merely because it is unattainable, but be- 
 cause it is contradictory for human thought : in other words, can 
 a subject be any otherwise certain than that it is certain than 
 that itself, the siibject, is certain ? To be objectively certain (tak- 
 ing the term objective in a sense corresponding to the term sub- 
 jective as here employed) the subject, must, in fact, no longer re- 
 main the subject, it must also be the object, and, as such, be able 
 to become certain ; and yet in conformity to our notion of cer- 
 tainty (Gewissheit) or whatever more, suitable expression may 
 be found for it all questions concerning certainty must be re- 
 ferred to the subject (to the Ego) : the attempt to refer them to 
 the object involves a contradiction.' Ibid. p. 186. 
 
 This is clearly and cogently stated ; and it would seem as if 
 we had only to appeal to the subjective certainty we have, in our 
 being compelled to hold that in perception the ego is immedi- 
 ately cognisant, not only of itself as subject, but of a non-ego as 
 object to prove that the external world being actually known 
 as existing, actually exists. (See above, p. 26, sq.) This 
 Hermes does not, however, do. He seems not, indeed, to have 
 contemplated the possibility of the mind being conscious or im- 
 mediately cognitive of aught but self; and only furnishes us
 
 156 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 with an improved edition of the old and inconclusive reasoning, 
 that an external world must be admitted, as the necessary ground 
 or reason of our internal representation of it. 
 
 100. COUSIN. Fragraens Philosophiques, Third edition, 
 Vol. i. 
 
 a. P. 243. ' Philosophy is already realized, for human 
 thought is there. 
 
 'There is not, and there cannot be, a philosophy absolutely 
 false ; for it would behoove the author of such a philosophy to 
 place himself out of his own thought, in other words out of his 
 humanity. This power has been given to no man. 
 
 ' How then may philosophy err ? By considering thought 
 only on a single, side, and by seeing, in that single side, the total- 
 ity of thought. There are no false, but many incomplete sys- 
 tems ; systems true in themselves, but vicious in their preten- 
 sions, each to comprise that absolute truth which is only found 
 distributed through all. 
 
 'The incomplete, and by consequence, the exclusive this is the 
 one only vice of philosophy, -or rather, to speak more correctly, 
 of philosophers, for philosophy rises above all the systems. The 
 full portrait of the real, which philosophy presents, is indeed 
 made up of features borrowed from every several system ; for of 
 these each reflects reality ; but unfortunately reflects it under a 
 single angle.* 
 
 ' To compass possession of reality full and entire, it is requi- 
 site to sist ourselves at the centre. To reconstitute the intellect- 
 ual life, mutilated in the several systems, it behooves us to re- 
 enter Consciousness, and there, weaned from a systematic and 
 exclusive spirit, to analyze thought into its elements, and all its 
 elements, and to seek out in it tJie characters, and all the diame- 
 ters under which it is at present manifested to the eye of conscious- 
 ness? Du Fait de Conscience. 
 
 b. P. 181. 'The fundamental principle of knowledge and 
 
 * The like has been said by Leibnitz and Hegel ; but not so finely.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE 157 
 
 intellectual life is Consciousness. Life begins with consciousness, 
 and with consciousness it ends : in consciousness it is that we 
 apprehend ourselves ; and it is in and through consciousness 
 that we apprehend the external world. Were it possible to rise 
 above consciousness, to place ourselves, so to speak, behind it, to 
 penetrate into the secret workshop where intelligence blocks out 
 and fabricates the various phenomena, there to officiate, as it 
 were, at the birth, and to watch the evolution of consciousness ; 
 then might we hope to comprehend its nature, and the different 
 steps through which it rises to the form in which it is first actu- 
 ally revealed. But, as all knowledge commences with conscious- 
 ness, it is able to remount no higher. Here a prudent analysis 
 mil therefore stop, and occupy itself with what is given? 
 
 Other testimonies might easily be quoted from the subsequent 
 writings of M. Cousin were this not superfluous ; for I presume 
 that few who take an interest in philosophical inquiries can now 
 be ignorant of these celebrated works. 
 
 100. DE LA MENNAIS. See No. 2. 
 
 OMITTED. 
 
 9**. JEuus ARISTIDES. Platonic Oration, ii. (Opera, ed. 
 Canter, t. iii. p. 249 ; ed. Jebb. t. ii. p. 150) ' That the Many 
 are not to be contemned, and their opinion held of no account; 
 but that in them, too, there is a presentiment, an unerring in- 
 stinct, which by a kind of divine fatality, seizes darkling on the 
 truth ; this we have Plato himself teaching, and ages earlier than 
 Plato, this old Hesiod, with posterity in chorus, in these familiar 
 verses sang: 
 
 ' Tfte Fame, torn of tlie jnany-natiori'd voice 
 Of mankind, dies not ; for it lives as God.'' 
 
 For Hesiod, see No. 1. These verses are likewise adduced by 
 Aristotle as proverbial. (Eth. Nic. vii. 13 [14]). They may 
 be also rendered thus : 
 
 ' The Word, forth sent Iry the conclamant voice 
 Of mankind, errs not ; for its truth is God's.'
 
 158 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 Fame (Public Opinion) had her temple in Athens. See Pausa- 
 nias. 
 
 Plato is referred to in the Laws (L. xii. 5, ed. Bekk. t. ii. 
 p. 950, ed. Steph.). Another passage, in the Crito, which Canter 
 indicates, is irrelevant. In the former, Plato attributes to man- 
 kind at large a certain divine sense or vaticination of the truth 
 (6e7ov <rixai sUoVo^ov), by which, in our natural judgments, we are 
 preserved from error. I did not, however, find the statement 
 sufficiently generalized to quote the context as a testimony. 
 
 15*. THEODORET. The Curative of Greek Affections, Ser- 
 mon i., on Belief. (Opera, ed. Sirmondi, t. iv. p. 178.) ' Belief 
 [or Faith], therefore, is a matter of the greatest moment For, 
 according to the Pythagorean Epicharmus, 
 
 Mind, it seeth ; Mind; it heareth ; 
 All beside is deaf and Uind : 
 
 and Heraclitus, in like manner, exhorts us to submit to the 
 guidance of belief, in these words : Unless ye hope, ye shall not 
 
 find the unhoped for, which is inscrutable and impermeable 
 
 And let none of you, my friends, say aught in disparagement of 
 belief. For belief is called by Aristotle the Criterion of Science ; 
 whilst Epicurus says, that it is the Anticipation of Reason, and 
 that anticipation, having indued Knowledge, results in Compre- 
 hension. But, as we define it, Belief is a spontaneous assent 
 or adhesion of the mind, or the intuition of the unapparent, 
 or the taking possession of the real (ifigi TO ov sWratfis v. 
 Bud. in Pand. et Com. L. G.), and natural apprehension of 
 the unperceivable, or an unvacillating propension established, 
 in the mind of the believer. But, on the one hand, Belief re- 
 quires knowledge, as on the other, Knowledge requires belief. 
 For there can subsist, neither belief without knowledge, nor 
 knowledge without belief. Belief precedes knowledge, knowl- 
 edge follows belief; while desire is attendant upon knowledge, 
 and action consequent upon desire. For it is necessary, to 
 believe first ; then to learn ; knowing, to desire ; and desiring to
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 159 
 
 act . . . Belief, therefore, my friends, is a concern common 
 to all ; . . . for all who would learn any thing must first 
 believe. [So Aristotle.] Belief is, therefore, the foundation and 
 basis of science. For your philosophers have defined Belief a 
 voluntary assent or adhesion of the mind ; and Science an im- 
 mutable habit, accompanied with reason? This is a testimony 
 which I should regret to have totally forgotten. Compare Nos. 
 3, 11, 15, 16, 18, 19, 24, 81, 86, 87, 91, 96, 97, 99, &c. 
 
 17*. SIMPLICIUS. Commentary on the Manual of Epictetus ; 
 and there speaking in the language of the Porch, rather than in 
 that of the Lyceum or the Academy. 
 
 a. C. 33, Heins. 23, Schweigh. 'The Common Notions of 
 men concerning the nature of things, according to which, in place 
 of varying from each other, they are in opinion mutually agreed 
 (as, that the good is useful, and the useful good, that all things 
 desiderate the good, that the equal is neither surpassing nor sur- 
 passed, that twice two is four) these notions, and the like, sug- 
 gested in us by right reason, and tested by experience and time, 
 are true, and in accordance with the nature of things ; whereas 
 the notions proper to individual men are frequently fallacious.' 
 
 b. C. 72, Heins. 48, Schweigh. 'But Reason, according to 
 the proverb, is a Mercury common to all ; for, although, as in 
 us individually, reasons are plural, or numerically different, they 
 are in species one and the same ; so that, by reason all men fol- 
 low after the same things as good, and eschew the same things 
 as bad, and think the same things to be true or to be false.' 
 
 In these passages, Reason, in the vaguer meaning of the 
 Stoics, is employed, where Intellect, in the precise acceptation of 
 the Aristotelians and Platonists, might have been expected from 
 Simplicius. But he is here speaking by accommodation to his 
 author.
 
 160 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 
 
 As a chronological table was luckily omitted at the head of 
 the Series, I here append, ethnographically subarranged, the fol- 
 lowing 
 
 LIST OF THE PRECEDING TESTIMONIES. 
 
 GREEK. 1, Hesiod; 2, Heraclitus; 3, Aristotle; 4, Theophrastus ; 
 9 * *, ^Elius Aristides, see at end ; 10, Alexander Aphrodisiensis ; 
 11, Clemens Alexandrinus ; 15, Theodoret, see at end; 16, Proclus; 
 17, Ammonias Hermise ; 17 *, Simplicius, see at end. 
 
 ROMAN. 5, Lucretius ; 6, Cicero ; 7, Horace ; 8, Seneca ; 9, Pliny 
 the younger; 9*, Quintilian; 12, Tertnllian; 13, Arnobius; 14. 
 Lactantius; 15, St. Augustin. 
 
 ARABIAN. 19, Algazel. 
 
 ITALIAN. 18, St. Anselm (ambiguously French); 20, Aquinas; 
 26, Julius Caesar Scaliger; 67, Vulpius; 68, Vico ; 71, Genovesi. 
 
 SPANISH. 22, Antonius Andreas; 28, Antonius Goveanus (Por- 
 tuguese): 29, Nunnesius; 32, Mariana. 
 
 FRENCH. 23, Budseus ; 27, Omphalius ; 30, Muretus ; 37, Des- 
 cartes ; 39, Balzac ; 40, Chanet ; 41, Irenseus a Sancto Jacobo ; 42. 
 Lescalopier ; 43, Pascal; 44, La Chambre; 46, Le Pere Rapin; 47. 
 Du Ilamel; 48, Malebrauche; 49, Poiret; 50, Bossuet; 59, John 
 Alphonso Turretini (Gencvese)- 60, Fenelon; 62, D'Aguesseau; 63, 
 Buffier; 70, Huber; 74, D'Alembert; 94, Degerando; 100, Cousin: 
 101, De La Mennais. 
 
 BRITISH. 21, Duns Scotus; 33, Sir John Davies; 35, Lord Her- 
 bert; 36, Cameron; 38, Sir Thomas Brown; 45, Henry More ; 51, 
 Locke ; 52, Bentley ; 53, John Serjeant ; 53 *, Abercromby ; 55, 
 Toland; 61, Shaftesbury; 62 *, Berkeley; 64, Lyons; 65, Amherst; 
 66, Wollaston; 72, Hume; 78, Price; 79, Reid; 82, Beattie. (Of 
 these, 21, [?] 36, 53 *, 72, 79, 82, are Scottish.) 
 
 GERMAN. 24, Luther ; 25, Melanchthon ; 34, Keckermann ; 54, 
 Leibnitz; 56, Christian Thomasius; 57, Ridiger; 58, Fuerlin; 69, 
 Christian Wolf; 73, Crusius; 75, (Etinger; 76, Eschenbach; 77, 
 John Matthew Gesner ; 80, Ililler ; 83, Storchenau ; 84, Stattler ; 
 86, Kant ; 87, Jacobi , 88, Heidenreich ; 89, Leonhard Creuzer ; 90.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON SENSE. 161 
 
 Platner; 91, Fichte; 93, Krug; 95, Fries; 96, Kceppen; 97, Ancil- 
 lon, the son ; 98, Gerlach ; 99, George Hermes. 
 
 BELGIAN. 31, Giphanius; 81, Hemsterhuis; 85, Hennert. 
 
 In all, one hundred and six Witnesses. 
 
 We are amazed at such a shoreless sea of erudition, but it has a use beyond 
 mere show, for it is an important contribution to the history of opinion. Our 
 confidence in the Common Sense Philosophy is increased when we see that 
 the greatest thinkers of every age have, directly or indirectly, recognized its 
 principles. The pursuit of Philosophy is ennobled when some higher 
 ground is reached, whereon apparently conflicting systems may be con- 
 ciliated. Bossuet somewhere says, ' Every error is a truth abused.' Cousin, 
 the most catholic of all the historians of Philosophy, continually repeats the 
 same pregnant truth. Hamilton claims that in his own system may be found 
 ' a centre and conciliation for the most opposite of philosophical opinions.' 
 W.
 
 PART SECOND. 
 
 PHILOSOPHY 
 
 PERCEPTION
 
 " No man seeks a reason for believing what he sees or feels ; and, if he 
 did, it would be difficult to find one. But, though he can give no reason for 
 believing his senses, his belief remains as firm as if it were grounded on 
 demonstration. . . . The statesman continues to plod, the soldier to 
 fight, and the merchant to export and import, without being in the least 
 moved by the demonstrations that have been offered of the non-existence 
 of those things about which they are so seriously employed. And a man 
 may a# soon, by reasoning, pull the moon out of her orbit, as destroy the 
 belief of the objects of sense." REID, Essay ii. chap. xx. pp. 278-4.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION, 
 
 CHAPTER I.. 
 
 ELUCIDATION OF EEID'S DOCTKINE OF PEKCEPTION, AND ITS 
 DEFENCE AGAINST SIR THOMAS BEOWN. 1 
 
 WE rejoice in the appearance of this work, 2 and for two rea- 
 sons. We hail it as another sign of the convalescence of Philos- 
 ophy in a great and influential nation ; and prize it as a seasona- 
 ble testimony, by intelligent foreigners, to the merits of a philos- 
 opher whose merits are under a momentary eclipse at home. 
 
 Apart from the practical corruption, of which (in the emphatic 
 language of Fichte) ' the dirt philosophy' may have been the 
 cause, we regard the doctrine of mind, long dominant in France, 
 as more pernicious, through the stagnation of thought which it 
 occasioned, than for the speculative errors which it set afloat. 
 The salutary fermentation which the skepticism of Hume 3 deter- 
 
 1 The substance of this chapter was, originally, an article in the Edinburgh 
 Review for October, 1830. It may be found in 'The Discussions on Philos- 
 ophy, etc.,' pp. 38-98. It has been translated into French by M. Peisse ; 
 into Italian by S. Lo Gatto ; and is contained in Cross's Selections from the 
 Edinburgh Review. W. 
 
 * The work referred to is the ' (Euvres Completes de Thomas Reid, Chef 
 de 1'ficole Ecossaise. Publiees par M. Th. Jouffroy, avec des Fragments de 
 M. Royer-Collard, et une Introduction de 1'Editeur.' Tomes ii.-vi. 8vo., 
 Paris, 1828-9, (not completed). W. 
 
 3 The usual criticism of Hume, as Hamilton well remarks (Reid, p. 444), 
 proceeds upon the erroneous hypothesis that he was a Dogmatist. He was 
 a Skeptic, that is, he accepted the principles asserted by the prevalent Dog- 
 matism ; and only showed that such and such conclusions were, on these prin- 
 ciples, inevitable. Hume destroyed Sensualism (Sensuism is better, and still 
 better is Sensism, as Mr. Brownson lias it) by reducing it to absurdity. Yet
 
 166 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 
 
 mined in Scotland and in Germany, did not extend to that coun- 
 try ; and the dogmatist there slumbered on, unsuspicious of his 
 principles, nay even resigned to conclusions which would make 
 philosophy to man the solution of the terrific oracle to (Edipus : 
 
 ' Mayst thou ne'er learn the truth of what thon art !' 
 
 The present contrast, 1 indeed, which the philosophical enthusi- 
 asm of France exhibits to the speculative apathy of Britain, is 
 any thing but flattering to ourselves. The new spirit of meta- 
 physical inquiry, which the French imbibed from Germany and 
 Scotland, arose with them precisely at the time when the popu- 
 larity of psychological researches began to decline with us ; and 
 now, when all interest in these speculations seems here to be 
 extinct, they are there seen flourishing, in public favor, with a 
 universality and vigor corresponding to their encouragement. 
 
 The only example, indeed, that can be adduced of any interest 
 in such subjects, recently exhibited in this country, is the favor- 
 able reception of Dr. Brown's Lectures an the Philosophy of the 
 Mind. This work, however, we regard as a concurrent cause of 
 the very indifference we lament, and as a striking proof of its 
 reality. 
 
 As a cause : These lectures have certainly done much to jus- 
 tify the general neglect of psychological pursuits. Dr. Brown's 
 high reputation for metaphysical acuteness, gave a presumptive 
 authority to any doctrine he might promulgate ; and the personal 
 relations in which he stood to Mr. Stewart afforded every assu- 
 rance that he would not revolt against that philosopher's opin- 
 
 in the human mind there is something that could see the absurdity, some- 
 thing that could make the absurdity apparent ; ' intelligence supposes prin- 
 ciples, which, as the conditions of its activity, cannot be the results of its 
 operation.' Seizing this higher truth, Eeid and Kant have reared a new 
 philosophy, the last word of which is the incomparable system of Hamilton. 
 W. 
 
 1 We have omitted six paragraphs and part of another, which were omit- 
 ted when the article was first published in the Edinburgh Review. They 
 are, with the exception of a few lines, contained in the Introduction to this 
 volume. See p. 7. W.
 
 , PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 167 
 
 ions, rashly, or except on grounds that would fully vindicate his 
 dissent. In these circumstances, what was the impression on the 
 public mind ; when all that was deemed best established all 
 that was claimed as original and most important in the philoso- 
 phy of Reid and Stewart, was proclaimed by their disciple and 
 successor to be naught but a series of misconceptions, only less 
 wonderful in their commission than in the general acquiescence in 
 their truth ? Confidence was at once withdrawn from a pursuit, 
 in which the most sagacious inquirers were thus at fault ; and 
 the feyr who did not relinquish the study in despair, clung with 
 implicit faith to the revelation of the new apostle. 
 
 As a proof: These lectures afford evidence of how greatly 
 talent has, of late, been withdrawn from the field of metaphysical 
 discussion. This work has now been before the world for ten 
 years. In itself it combines many of the qualities calculated to 
 attract public, and even popular attention ; while its admirers 
 have exhausted hyperbole in its praise, and disparaged every 
 philosophic name to exalt the reputation of its author. Yet, 
 though attention has been thus concentred on these lectures for 
 so long a period, and though the high ability and higher author- 
 ity of Dr. Brown, deserved and would have recompensed the 
 labor ; we are not aware that any adequate attempt has yet been 
 made to subject them, in whole or in part, to an enlightened and 
 impartial criticism. The radical inconsistencies which they 
 involve, in every branch of their subject, remain undeveloped ; 
 their unacknowledged appropriations are still lauded as original ; 
 their endless mistakes, in the history of philosophy, stand yet 
 uncorrected ; and their frequent misrepresentations of other phi- 
 losophers continue to mislead.* In particular, nothing has more 
 
 * We shall, in the sequel, afford samples of these 'inconsistencies,' 
 'mistakes,' 'misrepresentations,' but not of Brown's 'appropriations.' 
 To complete the cycle, and vindicate our assertion, we may here adduce one 
 specimen of the way in which discoveries have been lavished on him, iu 
 consequence of his omission (excusable, perhaps, in the circumstances) to 
 advertise his pupil when he was not original. Brown's doctrine of General-
 
 168 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 I 
 
 convinced us of the general neglect, in this country, of psycholo- 
 gical science, than that Dr. Brown's ignorant attack on Reid, 
 and, through Reid, confessedly on Stewart, has not long since 
 been repelled; except, indeed, the general belief that it was 
 triumphant 
 
 In these circumstances, we felt gratified, as we said, with 
 the present honorable testimony to the value of Dr. Reid's spec- 
 ulations in a foreign country ; and have deemed this a seasonable 
 opportunity of expressing our own opinion on the subject, and of 
 again vindicating, we trust, to that philosopher, the well-earned 
 reputation of which he has been too long defrauded in his own. 
 If we are not mistaken in our view, we shall, in fact, reverse the 
 marvel, and retort the accusation ; in proving that Dr. Brown 
 himself is guilty of that ' series of wonderful misconceptions,' of 
 which he so confidently arraigns his predecessors. 
 
 'Turpe est doctori, cum culpa redarguit ipsum.' 
 
 This, however, let it be recollected, is no point of merely per- 
 sonal concernment. It is true, indeed, that either Reid accom- 
 plished nothing, or the science has retrograded under Brown. 
 But the question itself regards the cardinal point of metaphysical 
 philosophy ; and its determination involves the proof or the refu- 
 tation of skepticism. 
 
 The subject we have undertaken can, with difficulty, be com- 
 pressed within the limits of a single article. This must stand our 
 excuse for not, at present, noticing the valuable accompaniment 
 
 ization is identical with that commonly taught by philosophers not Scot- 
 tish ; and, among these, by authors, with whose works his lectures prove 
 him to have been well acquainted. But if a writer, one of the best informed 
 of those who, in this country, have of late cultivated this branch of philoso- 
 phy, could, among other expressions equally encomiastic, speak of Brown's 
 return to the vulgar opinion, on such a point, as of ' a discovery, <&c., which 
 will, in aXL future ages, be regarded as one of the most important steps ever 
 made in metaphysical science ;' how incompetent must ordinary readers be 
 to place Brown on his proper level how desirable would have been a criti- 
 cal examination of his Lectures to distribute to him his own, and to estimate 
 his property at its true value. See Part ii. chap. v. p. 398, 899, alibi.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 169 
 
 to Reid's Essays on the Intellectual Powers, in the Fragments of 
 M. Royer-Collard's Lectures, which are appended to the third and 
 fourth volumes of the translation. A more appropriate occasion ' 
 for considering these may, however, occur, when the first volume, 
 containing M. Jouffroy's Introduction, appears ; of which, from 
 other specimens of his ability, we entertain no humble expec- 
 tations. 
 
 ' Reid,' says Dr. Brown, ' considers his confutation of the ideal 
 system as involving almost every thing which is truly his. Yet 
 there aie few circumstances connected with the fortune of modern 
 philosophy, that appear to me more wonderful, than that a mind 
 like Dr. Reid's, so learned in the history of metaphysical science, 
 should have conceived, that on this point, any great merit, at least 
 any merit of originality, was justly referable to him particularly. 
 Indeed, the only circumstance which appears to me wonderful, is, 
 that the claim thus made by him should have been so readily and 
 generally admitted.' (Lect. xxv. p. 155.) 
 
 Dr. Brown then proceeds, at great length, to show : 1, That 
 Reid, in his attempt to overthrow what he conceived ' the com- 
 mon theory of ideas,' wholly misunderstood the catholic opinion, 
 which was, in fact, identical with his own ; and actually attrib- 
 uted to all philosophers ' a theory which had been universally, or, 
 at least, almost universally, abandoned at the time he wrote ;' 
 and 2, That the doctrine of perception, which Reid so absurdly 
 fancies he had first established, affords, in truth, no better evi- 
 dence of the existence of an external world, than even the long 
 abandoned hypothesis which he had taken such idle labor to 
 refute. 
 
 In every particular of this statement, Dr. Brown is completely, 
 and even curiously, wrong. He is out in his prelusive flourish, 
 out in his serious assault. Reid is neither 'so learned in the 
 history of metaphysical science' as he verbally proclaims, nt>r so 
 sheer an ignorant as he would really demonstrate. Estimated by 
 
 1 The hopes of Sir William, like those of every mortal, have not all been 
 fulfilled. W.
 
 170 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 aught above a very vulgar standard, Reid's knowledge of Philo- 
 sophical opinions was neither extensive nor exact ; and Mr. Stew- 
 art was himself too competent and candid a judge, not fully to 
 acknowledge the deficiency.* But Reid's merits as a thinker are 
 too high, and too securely established, to make it necessary to 
 claim for his reputation an erudition to which he himself advances 
 no pretension. And be his learning what it may, his critic, at 
 least, has not been able to convict him of a single error ; while 
 Dr. Brown himself rarely opens his mouth upon the older authors, 
 without betraying his absolute unacquaintance with the*natters 
 on which he so intrepidly discourses. Nor, as a speculator, does 
 Reid's superiority admit, we conceive, of doubt. With all admi- 
 ration of Brown's general talent, we do not hesitate to assert, 
 that, in the points at issue between the two philosophers, to say 
 nothing of others, he has completely misapprehended Reid's phi- 
 losophy, even in its fundamental position, the import of the 
 skeptical reasoning, and the significance of the only argument by 
 which that reasoning is resisted. But, on the other hand, as 
 Reid can only be defended on the ground of misconception, the 
 very fact, that his great doctrine of perception could actually be 
 reversed by so acute an intellect as Brown's, would prove that 
 there must exist some confusion and obscurity in his own devel- 
 opment of that doctrine, to render such a misinterpretation pos- 
 sible. Nor is this presumption wrong. In truth, Reid did not 
 generalize to himself an adequate notion of the various possible 
 theories of perception, some of which he has accordingly con- 
 founded: while his error of commission in discriminating con- 
 sciousness as a special faculty, and his error of omission in not dis- 
 criminating intuitive from representative knowledge, a distinction 
 without which his peculiar philosophy is naught, have contrib- 
 uted to render his doctrine of the intellectual faculties prolix, 
 vacillating, perplexed, and sometimes even contradictory. 
 
 Before proceeding to consider the doctrine of perception in 
 
 * (Dissertation, &c., Part ii. p. 107.) [In my foot-notes to Eeid will be 
 found abundant evidence of this deficiency.]
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PEKCEFflON. 171 
 
 relation to the points at issue between Reid and his antagonist, 
 it is therefore necessary to disintricate the question, by relieving 
 it of these two errors, bad in themselves, but worse in the confu- 
 sion which they occasion ; for, as Bacon truly observes, ' citius 
 emergit veritas ex errore quam ex confusione.' And, first, of 
 consciousness. 
 
 Aristotle, Descartes, Locke, and philosophers in general, have 
 regarded Consciousness, not as a particular faculty, but as the 
 universal condition of intelligence. Reid, on the contrary, fol- 
 lowing, probably, Hutcheson, and followed by Stewart, Royer- 
 Collard, and others, has classed consciousness as a co-ordinate 
 faculty with the other intellectual powers; distinguished from 
 them, not as the species from the individual, but as the individual 
 from the individual. And as the particular faculties have each 
 their peculiar object, so the peculiar object of consciousness is, the 
 operations of the other faculties themselves, to the exclusion of the 
 objects about which these operations are conversant. 
 
 This analysis we regard as false. For it is impossible : in the 
 first place, to discriminate consciousness from all the other cogni- 
 tive faculties, or to discriminate any one of these from conscious- 
 ness ; and, in the second, to conceive a faculty cognizant of the 
 various mental operations, without being also cognizant of their 
 several objects. 
 
 We know ; and We knoio that ice know : these propgsitions, 
 logically distinct, are really identical ; each implies the other. 
 We know (i. e. feel, perceive, imagine, remember, &c.) only as we 
 know that we thus know ; and we know that we knoio, only as we 
 know in some particular manner (i. Q.feel, perceive, <fec.). So true 
 is the scholastic brocard : ' Non sentimus nisi sentiamus nos 
 sentire ; non sentimus nos sentire nisi sentiamus' The attempt 
 to analyze the cognition I know, and the cognition / know that I 
 know, into the separate energies of distinct faculties, is therefore 
 vain. But this is the analysis of Reid. Consciousness, which 
 the formula / know that I knoio adequately expresses, he views as 
 a power specifically distinct from the various cognitive faculties
 
 172 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 comprehended under the formula I know, precisely as these facul- 
 ties are severally contradistinguished from each other. But here 
 the parallel does not hold. I can feel without perceiving, I can 
 perceive without imagining, I can imagine without remembering, 
 I can remember without judging (in the emphatic signification), 
 I can judge without willing. One of these acts does not imme- 
 diately suppose the other. Though modes merely of the same 
 indivisible subject, they are modes in relation to each other, 
 really distinct, and admit, therefore, of psychological discrimina- 
 tion. But can I feel without being conscious that I feel ? can I 
 remember, without being conscious that I remember ? or, can I 
 be conscious, without being conscious that I perceive, or imagine, 
 or reason, that I energize, in short, in some determinate mode, 
 which Reid would view as the act of a faculty specifically differ- 
 ent from consciousness ? That this is impossible, Reid himself 
 admits. ' Unde,' says Tertullian, ' unde ista tormenta cruciandae 
 simplicitatis et suspendendae veritatis ? Quis mihi exhibebit sen- 
 sum non intelligentem se sentire ?' But if, on the one hand, con- 
 sciousness be only realized under specific modes, and cannot there- 
 fore exist apart from the several faculties in cumulo ; and if, on 
 the other, these faculties can all and each only be exerted under 
 the condition of consciousness ; consciousness, consequently, is not 
 one of the special modes into which our mental activity may be 
 resolved, but the fundamental form, the generic condition of 
 them all. Every intelligent act is thus a modified consciousness ; 
 and consciousness a comprehensive term for the complement of our 
 cognitive energies. 
 
 But the vice of Dr. Reid's analysis is further manifested in his ar- 
 bitrary limitation of the sphere of consciousness ; proposing to it the 
 various intellectual operations, but excluding their objects. ' I am 
 conscious,' he says, ' of perception, but not of the object I perceive ; 
 I am conscious of memory, but not of the object I remember.' 
 
 The reduction of consciousness to a particular faculty entailed 
 this limitation. For, once admitting consciousness to be cogni- 
 zant of objects as of operations, Reid could not, without ab-
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 173 
 
 surdity, degrade it to the level of a special power. For thus, in 
 the first place, consciousness coextensive with all our cognitive 
 faculties, would yet be made co-ordinate with each ; and, in the 
 second, two faculties would be supposed to be simultaneously 
 exercised about the same object, to the same intent. 
 
 But the alternative which Reid has chosen is, at least, equally 
 untenable. The assertion, that we can be conscious of an act of 
 knowledge, without being conscious of its object, is virtually sui- 
 cidal. A mental operation is only what it is, by relation to its 
 object ; the object at once determining its existence, and specify- 
 ing the character of its existence. But if a relation cannot be 
 comprehended in one of its terms, so we cannot be conscious of 
 an operation, without being conscious of the object to which it 
 exists only as correlative. For example, We are conscious of a 
 perception, says Reid, but are not conscious of its object. Yet 
 how can we be conscious of a perception, that is, how can we 
 know that a perception exists, that it is a perception, and not 
 another mental state, and that it is the perception of a rose, 
 and of nothing but a rose ; unless this consciousness involve a 
 knowledge (or consciousness) of the object, which at once deter- 
 mines the existence of the act, specifies its kind, and distin- 
 guishes its individuality ? Annihilate the object, you annihilate 
 the operation ; annihilate the consciousness of the object, you an- 
 nihilate the consciousness of the operation. In the greater num- 
 ber indeed of our cognitive energies, the two terms of the relation 
 of knowledge exist only as identical ; the object admitting only 
 of a logical discrimination from the subject. I imagine a Hip- 
 pogryph. The Hippogryph is at once the object of the act and 
 the act itself. Abstract the one, the other has no existence : de- 
 ny me the consciousness of the Hippogryph, you deny me the 
 consciousness of the imagination ; ! I am conscious of zero ; I am 
 not conscious at all. 
 
 1 ' Aristotle and Hobbes call imagination a dying sense ; and Descartes 
 is equally explicit.' ' Imagining should not be confounded with Conceiv-
 
 174 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 A difficulty may here be started in regard to two faculties, 
 Memory and Perception. 
 
 Memory is defined by Reid ' an immediate knowledge of the 
 past ;' and is thus distinguished from consciousness, which, with 
 all philosophers, he views as ' an immediate knowledge of the pres- 
 ent? We may therefore be conscious of the act of memory as 
 present, but of its object as past, consciousness is impossible. And 
 certainly, if Reid's definition of memory be admitted, this infer- 
 ence cannot be disallowed. But memory is not an immediate 
 knowledge of the past ; an immediate knowledge of the past is a 
 contradiction in terms. This is manifest, whether we look from 
 the act to the object, or from the object to the act. To be known 
 immediately, an object must be known in itself ; to be known in 
 itself, it must be known as actual, now existent, present. But the 
 object of memory is past not present, not now existent, not ac- 
 tual ; it cannot therefore be known in itself. If known at all, it 
 must be known in something different from itself i. e. mediate- 
 ly ; and memory as an 'immediate knowledge of .the past? is 
 thus impossible. Again : memory 2 is an act of knowledge ; an 
 
 ing, &c. ; though some philosophers, as Gassendi, have not attended to the 
 distinction. The words Conception, Concept, Notion, should not be limited 
 to the thought of what cannot be represented in the imagination, as the 
 thought suggested by the general term. The Leibnitzians call this symbolical, 
 in contrast to intuitive knowledge. This is the sense in which conception and 
 concfptus have been usually and correctly employed. Mr. Stewart, on the 
 other hand, arbitrarily limits conception to the reproduction, in imagination, 
 of an object of sense as actually perceived.' Foot-notes to Reid, pp. 227, 
 860. W. 
 
 1 ' In memory, we cannot possibly be conscious or immediately cognizant 
 of any object beyond the modifications of the ego itself. In perception (if 
 an immediate perception be allowed) we must be conscious, or immediately 
 cognizant, of some phenomenon of the non-ego." 1 ' An immediate knowledge 
 of & past thing is a contradiction. For we can only know a thing immediately, 
 if we know it in itself, or as existing ; but what is past cannot be known in 
 itself, for it is non-existent.' ' The datum of Memory does not stand upon 
 the same ground as the datum of simple Consciousness. In so far as mem- 
 ory is consciousness, it cannot be denied. We cannot, without contradiction, 
 deny the fact of memory as a present consciousness ; but we may, without 
 contradiction, suppose that the past given therein, is only an illusion of the
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 175 
 
 act exists only as present ; and a present knowledge can be im- 
 mediately cognizant only of a present object. But the object 
 known in memory is past ; consequently, either memory is not 
 an act of knowledge at all, or the object immediately known is 
 present ; and the past, if known, is known only through the me- 
 dium of the present ; on either alternative memory is not ' an 
 immediate knowledge of the past? Thus, memory, like our other 
 faculties, affords only an immediate knowledge of the present ; and, 
 like them, is nothing more than consciousness variously modi- 
 fied* 
 
 present.' ' Whatever is the immediate object of thought, of that we are 
 necessarily conscious. But of Alexander, for example, as existing, we are ne- 
 cessarily not conscious. Alexander, as existing, cannot, therefore, possibly be 
 an immediate object of thought ; consequently, if we can be said to think of 
 Alexander at all, we can only be said to think of him mediately, in and 
 through a representation of which we are conscious ; and that representation 
 is the immediate object of thought. It makes no difference whether this im- 
 mediate object be viewed as a terti/um quid, distinct from the existing reality 
 and from the conscious mind ; or whether as a mere modality of the con- 
 scious mind itself as the mere act of thought considered in its relation to 
 something beyond the sphere of consciousness. In neither case can we be 
 said (be it in the imagination of a possible or the recollection of a past exist- 
 ence) to know a thing as existing that is, immediately ; and, therefore, if in 
 these operations we be said to know aught out the mind at all, we can only 
 be said to know it mediately in other words, as a mediate object. The 
 whole perplexity arises from the ambiguity of the term object, that term 
 being used both for the external reality of which we are here not conscious, 
 and cannot therefore know in itself, and for the mental representation which 
 we know in itself, but which is known only as relative to the other. 
 Reid chooses to abolish the former signification, on the supposition that it 
 only applies to representative entity different from the act of thought. In 
 this supposition, however, he is wrong ; nor does he obtain an immediate 
 knowledge, even in perception, by merely denying the crude hypothesis of 
 representation.' Foot-notes to Eeid, pp. 329, 339, 444, 279. W. 
 
 * The only parallel we know to this misconception of Reid's is the opin- 
 ion on which Fromondus animadverts. ' In primis displicet nobis pluri- 
 morum recentiorum philosophia, qui sensuum interiorum operationes, ut 
 phantasiationem, memorationem, et reminiscentiam, circa imagines, recen- 
 tur aut olim spiritibus vel cerebro impressas, versari negant ; sed proxlme 
 circa otgecla quaforis sunt. Ut cum quis meminit se vidisse leporem cur- 
 rentcm ; memoria, inquiunt, non intuetur et attingit imaginem leporis in 
 cerebro asservatam, sed solum leporein ipsum qui cursu trajiciebat campum, 
 &c., &c.' (Pkiks&phia Christiana de Anima. Lovanii. 1649. L. iii. c. 8.
 
 176 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 In regard to Perception : Reid allows an immediate knowledge 
 of the affections of the subject of thought, mind, or self, and an 
 immediate knowledge of the qualities of an object really different 
 from self matter. To the former, he gives the name of conscious- 
 ness, to the latter, that of perception. Is consciousness, as an im- 
 mediate lsno\v\edge, purely subjective, not to be discriminated from 
 perception, as an immediate knowledge, really objective ? A log- 
 ical difference we admit ; a psychological we deny. 
 
 Relatives are known only together : the science of opposites is 
 one. Subject and object, mind and matter, are known only in 
 correlation and contrast, and by the same common act : while 
 knowledge, as at once a synthesis and an antithesis of both, may 
 be indifferently defined an antithetic synthesis, or a synthetic an- 
 tithesis of its terms. Every conception ' of self, necessarily in- 
 volves a conception of not-self : every perception of what is dif- 
 ferent from me, implies a recognition of the percipient subject in 
 contradistinction from the object perceived. In one act of knowl- 
 edge, indeed, the object is the prominent element, in another the 
 subject ; but there is none in which either is known out of rela- 
 tion to the other. The immediate knowledge which Reid allows 
 of things different from the mind, and the immediate knowledge 
 of mind itself, cannot therefore be split into two distinct acts. In 
 perception, as in the other faculties, the same indivisible conscious- 
 ness is conversant about both terms of the relation of knowledge. 
 Distinguish the cognition of the subject from the cognition of the 
 object of perception, and you either annihilate the relation of 
 knowledge itself, which exists only in its terms being comprehend- 
 ed together in the unity of consciousness ; or you must postulate 
 a higher faculty, which shall again reduce to one, the two cogni- 
 tions you have distinguished ; that is, you are at last compelled 
 
 art. 8.) Who the advocates of this opinion were, we are ignorant ; but 
 more than suspect that, as stated, it is only a misrepresentation of the 
 Cartesian doctrine, then on the ascendant. [Lord Monboddo has, how- 
 ever, a doctrine of the sort.]
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 177 
 
 to admit, in an unphilosophical complexity, that common con- 
 sciousness of subject and object, which you set out with denying 
 in its philosophical simplicity. Consciousness and immediate 
 knowledge are thus terms universally convertible ; and if there be 
 an immediate knowledge of things external, there is consequently 
 the consciousness of an outer world.* 
 
 Reid's erroneous analysis of consciousness is not perhaps of so 
 much importance in itself, as from causing confusion in its conse- 
 quences. Had he employed this term as tantamount to imme- 
 diate knowledge in general, whether of self or not, and thus dis- 
 tinctly expressed what he certainly [?] taught, that mind and 
 matter are both equally known to us as existent and in them- 
 selves ; Dr. Brown could hardly have so far misconceived his doc- 
 trine, as actually to lend him the.very opinion which his whole 
 philosophy was intended to refute, viz. that an immediate, and 
 
 * How correctly Aristotle reasoned on this subject, may be seen from 
 the following passage: 'When we perceive (alaQav&psQa 1 the Greeks, 
 perhaps fortunately, had no special term for consciousness) 'when we 
 perceive that we see, hear, &c., it is necessary, that by sight itself we per- 
 ceive that we see, or by another sense. If by another sense, then this also 
 must be a sense of sight, conversant equally about the object of sight, 
 color. Consequently, there must either be two senses of the same object, 
 or every sense must be percipient of itself. Moreover, if the sense per- 
 cipient of sight be different from sight itself, it follows, either that there 
 is a regress to infinity, or we must admit, at last, some sense percipient 
 of itself ; but if so, it is more reasonable to admit this in the original 
 sense at once.' (De Anima, L. iii. c. 2. text. 136.) Here Aristotle ought 
 not to be supposed to mean that every sense is an independent faculty of 
 perception, and, as such, conscious of itself. Compare De Som. et Vlg. c. 2. 
 and Probl. (if indeed his) sect. xi. 33. His older commentators Alexan- 
 der, Themistius, Simplicius follow their master. Philoponus and Michael 
 Ephesius desert his doctrine, and attribute this self-consciousness to a pecu- 
 liar faculty which they call Attention (rd irpo<reKTiK6v). This is the earliest ex- 
 ample we know of this falae analysis, which, when carried to its last absur- 
 dity, has given us consciousness, and attention, and reflection, as distinct 
 powers. Of the schoolmen, satins est silere, quam parum dicere. Nemc- 
 sius, and Plutarchus of Athens preserved by Philoponus, accord this rctlex 
 consciousness to intellect as opposed to sense. Plato varies in his Thea^tetus 
 and Charmides. Some, however, of the Greek commentators on Aristotle, 
 aa I have elsewhere observed, introduced the term ZwaloOrms, employing it, 
 by extension, for consciousness in general. 
 
 8*
 
 178 PHILOSOPHY OF PEECEPTION. 
 
 consequently a real, knowledge of external things is impossible. 
 But this by anticipation. 
 
 This leads us to the second error, the non-distinction of repre- 
 sentative from presentative or intuitive knowledge. 1 The reduc- 
 tion of consciousness to a special faculty, involved this confusion. 
 For had Reid perceived that all our faculties are only conscious- 
 ness, and that consciousness as an immediate knowledge is only 
 of the present and actual, he would also have discovered that the 
 past and possible, either could not be known to us at all, or could 
 be known only in and through the present and actual, i. e. medi- 
 ately. But a mediate knowledge is necessarily a representative 
 knowledge. For if the present, or actual in itself, makes known 
 to us the past and possible through itself, this can only be done 
 by a vicarious substitution or jepresentation. And as the knowl- 
 edge of the past is given in memory (using that term in its vulgar 
 universality), and that of the possible in imagination, these two 
 faculties are powers of representative knowledge. Memory is an 
 immediate knowledge of a present thought, involving an absolute 
 belief that this thought represents another act of knowledge that 
 has been. Imagination (which we use in its widest signification, 
 to include conception or simple apprehension) is an immediate 
 knowledge of an actual thought, which, as not subjectively self- 
 contradictory (i. e. logically possible), involves the hypothetical 
 belief that it objectively may be (i. e. is really possible). 
 
 Nor is philosophy here at variance with nature. 2 The learned 
 
 1 See Part Second, chapter ii. pp. 239-260. W. 
 
 * ' The term Nature, 11 says Hamilton (Reid, p. 216), ' is used sometimes in 
 a wider, sometimes in a narrower extension. "When employed in its most 
 extensive meaning, it embraces the two worlds of mind and matter. When 
 employed in its more restricted signification, it i a synonym for the latter 
 only, and is then used in contradistinction to the former. In the Greek 
 philosophy, the word 06<r5 was general in its meaning ; and the great branch 
 of philosophy styled "physical or physiological," included under it not only 
 the sciences of matter, but also those of mind. With us, the term Nature is 
 more vaguely extensive than the terms, physics, physical, physiology, physio- 
 logical, or even than the adjective natural; whereas, in the philosophy of 
 Germany, Natur, and its correlatives, whether of Greek or Latin derivation,
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 179 
 
 and unlearned agree, that in memory and imagination, naught of 
 which we are conscious lies beyond the sphere of self, and that in 
 these acts the object known is only relative to a reality supposed 
 to be. Nothing but Reid's superstitious horror of the ideal theory, 
 could have blinded him so far as not to see that these faculties 
 are, of necessity, mediate and representative. In this, however, 
 he not only over-shot the truth, but almost frustrated his whole 
 philosophy. For, he thus affords a ground (and the only ground* 
 though not perceived by Brown), on which it could be argued 
 that his doctrine of perception was not intuitive was not pre- 
 sentative. For if he reject the doctrine of ideas not less in mem- 
 ory and imagination, which must be representative faculties, than 
 in perception, which may be intuitive, and if he predicate imme- 
 diate knoioledge equally of all ; it can plausibly be contended, in 
 favor of Brown's conclusion, that Reid did not really intend to 
 allow a proper intuitive or presentative perception, and that he 
 only abusively gave the name of immediate knowledge to the 
 simplest form of the representative theory, in contradistinction to 
 the more complex. But this also by anticipation. 
 
 There exists, therefore, a distinction of knowledge, as immedi- 
 ate, intuitive, or presentative, and as mediate or representative. 
 
 are, in general, expressive of the world of matter in contrast to the world of 
 intelligence.' 
 
 ' Nature,' says the great Pascal, ' confounds the Tyrrhenians, and Kea- 
 son confounds the Dogmatists.' 
 
 'Nature,' says Hume, (Inquiry concerning Human Understanding, 12, 
 part ii.), ' is always too strong for principle ; and, though a Tyrrhenian 
 may throw himself or others into a momentary amazement and confusion 
 by his profound reasonings, the first and most trivial event in life will put to 
 flight all his doubts and scruples, and leave him the same in every point of 
 action and speculation with the philosophers of every other sect, or with 
 those who never concerned themselves in any philosophical researches. 
 When he awakes from his dream, he will lie the first to join in the laugh 
 against himself, and to confess that all his objections are mere amusement, 
 and can have no other tendency than to show the whimsical condition 
 of mankind, who must act, and reason, and believe, though they are not 
 able, by their most diligent inquiry, to satisfy themselves concerning the 
 foundation of the operations, or to remove the objections which may be 
 raised against them.' W.
 
 180 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 The former is logically simple, as only contemplative : the latter 
 logically complex, as both representative and contemplative of 
 the representation. In the one, the object is single, and the word 
 univocal : in the other it is double, and the term aequivocal ; the 
 object known and representing, being different from the object 
 unknown and represented. The knowledge in an intuitive act, 
 as convertible with existence, is assertory ; and the reality of its 
 only object is given unconditionally, as a, fact : the knowledge in 
 a representative act, as not convertible with existence is problem 
 atical ; and the reality of its principal object is given hypothet- 
 ically as an inference. Representative knowledge is purely sub 
 jective, for its object known is always ideal ; presentative may be 
 either subjective or objective, for its one object may be either 
 ideal or material. Considered in themselves : an intuitive cogni- 
 tion is complete, as absolute and irrespective of aught beyond the 
 compass of knowledge ; a representative incomplete, as relative 
 to a transcendent something, beyond the sphere of consciousness. 
 Considered in relation to their objects : the former is complete, 
 its object being known and real ; the latter incomplete, its object 
 known, being unreal, and its real object unknown. Considered 
 in relation to each other : immediate knowledge is complete, as 
 all sufficient in itself; mediate incomplete, as realized only 
 through the other.* 
 
 * This distinction of intuitive or presentative and of representative knowl- 
 edge, overlooked, or rather abolished, in the theories of modem philoso- 
 phy, is correspondent to the division of knowledge by certain of the school- 
 men, into intuitive and abstractive. By the latter term, they also expressed 
 abstract knowledge in its present signification. '^ognitio intuitiva, 1 says 
 the Doctor Jttsolutissimus, ' est ilia quse immediate tendit ad rem sibi prce- 
 sentem objective, secundum ejtts actualem existentiam ; sicut cum video colo- 
 rem existentem in pariete, vel rosam, quam in manu teneo. Akstractiva, 
 dicitur omnis cognitio, quse habetur de re non sic realiter prascnte in ra- 
 tione objecti immediate cogniti.' Now, when with a knowledge of this 
 distinction of which Reid was ignorant, and rejecting equally with him not 
 only species but a representative perception, we say that many of the school- 
 men have, in this respect, left behind them all modern philosophers ; we 
 assert a paradox, but one which we are easily able to prove. Leibnitz 
 spoke truly, when he said ' Aurum latere in stercore illo scholattico bar-
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 181 
 
 So far there is no difficulty, or ought to have been none. The 
 past and possible can only be known mediately by representa- 
 tion. But a more arduous, at least a more perplexed question 
 arises, when we ask : Is all knowledge of the present or actual 
 intuitive 1 Is the knowledge of mind and matter equally imme- 
 diate ? 
 
 In regard to the immediate knowledge of mind, there is now 
 at least no difficulty ; it is admitted not to be representative. 
 The problem, therefore, exclusively regards the intuitive percep- 
 tion of the qualities of matter. 
 
 (To obviate misapprehension, we may here parenthetically 
 observe, that all we do intuitively know of self, all that we 
 may intuitively know of not-self, is only relative. 1 Existence ab- 
 solutely and in itself, is to us as zero ; and while nothing is, so 
 nothing is known to us, except those phases of being which stand 
 in analogy to our faculties of knowledge. These we call qualities, 
 phenomena, properties, &c. When we say, therefore, that a thing- 
 is known in itself, we mean only that it stands face to face, in 
 direct and immediate relation to the conscious mind ; in other 
 words, that, as existing, its phenomena form part of the circle of 
 our knowledge, exist, since they are known, and are known 
 because they exist.) 
 
 If we interrogate consciousness concerning the point in ques- 
 tion, the response is categorical and clear. When I concentrate 
 my attention in the simplest act of perception, I return from my 
 observation with the most irresistible conviction of two facts, or 
 rather, two branches of the same fact, that / am, and that 
 something different from me exists. In this act, I am conscious 
 of myself as the perceiving subject, and of an external reality as 
 the object perceived ; and I am conscious of both existences in 
 the same indivisible amount of intuition. The knowledge of the 
 subject does not precede or follow the knowledge of the object ; 
 neither determines, neither is determined by, the other. The 
 
 1 See Part Third, Philosophy of the Conditioned. W.
 
 182 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 two terms of correlation stand in mutual counterpoise and equal 
 independence ; they are given as connected in the synthesis of 
 knowledge, but as contrasted in the antithesis of existence. 
 
 Such is the fact of perception revealed in consciousness, and as 
 it determines mankind in general in their equal assurance of the 
 reality of an external world, and of the existence of their own 
 minds. Consciousness declares our knowledge of material quali- 
 ties to be intuitive. Nor is the fact, as given, denied even by 
 those who disallow its truth. So clear is the deliverance, that 
 even the philosophers (as we shall hereafter see) who reject an 
 intuitive perception, find it impossible not to admit, that their 
 doctrine stands decidedly opposed to the voice of consciousness 
 and the natural conviction of mankind. [This doctrine is, how- 
 ever, to be asserted only in subordination to the distinction of the 
 Primary, Secundo-primary, and Secondary Qualities of MoMer?] 
 
 According as the truth of the fact of consciousness in percep- 
 tion is entirely accepted, accepted in part, or wholly rejected, six 
 possible and actual systems of philosophy result. We say expli- 
 citly the truth of the fact. For the fact, as a phenomenon of 
 consciousness cannot be doubted; since to doubt that we are 
 conscious of this or that is impossible. The doubt, as itself a 
 phenomena of consciousness, would annihilate itself.* 
 
 1. If the veracity of consciousness be unconditionally admitted, 
 if the intuitive knowledge of mind and matter, and the conse- 
 quent reality of their antithesis be taken as truths, to be ex- 
 plained if possible, but in themselves are held as paramount to 
 all doubt, the doctrine is established which we would call the 
 scheme of Natural Realism or Natural Dualism. 2. If the 
 veracity of consciousness be allowed to the equipoise of the object 
 and subject in the act, but rejected as to the reality of their 
 antithesis,the system of Absolute Identity emerges, which reduces 
 both mind and matter to phenomenal modifications of the same 
 common substance. 3 and 4. If the testimony of consciousness 
 
 1 See Part Second, chapter \. W. * See Part Second, chapter iii. W.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 183 
 
 be refused to the co-originality and reciprocal independence of 
 the subject and object, two schemes are determined, according as 
 the one or the other of the terms is placed as the original and 
 genetic. Is the object educed from the subject, Idealism ; is the 
 subject educed from the object, Materialism, is the result. 
 5. Again, is the consciousness itself recognized only as a phe- 
 nomenon, and the substantial reality of both subject and object 
 denied, the issue is Nihilism. 
 
 6. These systems are all conclusions from an original interpre- 
 tation of the fact of consciousness in perception, carried intrepidly 
 forth to its legitimate issue. But there is one scheme, which, 
 violating the integrity of this fact, and, with the complete ideal- 
 ist, regarding the object of consciousness in perception as only a 
 modification of the percipient subject, or, at- least, a phenomenon 
 numerically different from the object it represents, endeavors, 
 however, to stop short of the negation of an external world, the 
 reality of which and the knowledge of whose reality, it seeks by 
 various hypotheses, to establish and explain. This scheme, 
 which we would term Cosmothetic Idealism, Hypothetical Real- 
 ism, or Hypothetical Dualism, although the most inconsequent 
 of all systems, has been embraced, under various forms, by the 
 immense majority of philosophers. 1 
 
 Of these systems, Dr. Brown adheres to the last. He holds 
 that the mind is conscious or immediately cognizant of nothing 
 beyond its subjective states ; but he assumes the existence of an 
 external world beyond the sphere of consciousness, exclusively on 
 the ground of our irresistible belief in its unknown reality. In- 
 dependent of this belief, there is no reasoning on which the exist- 
 ence of matter can be vindicated ; the logic of the idealist he 
 admits to be unassailable. 
 
 But Brown not only embraces the scheme of hypothetical 
 realism himself, he never suspects that Reid entertained any other 
 doctrine. Brown's transmutation of Reid from a natural to a 
 
 1 See page 292, infra. W.
 
 184 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 hypothetical realist, as a misconception of the grand and dis- 
 tinctive tenet of a school, by one even of its disciples, is without 
 a parallel in the whole history of philosophy : and this portentous 
 error is prolific ; Chimcera chimceram parit. Were the evidence 
 of the mistake less unambiguous, we should be disposed rather to 
 question our own perspicacity, than to tax so subtle an intellect 
 with so gross a blunder. 
 
 Before establishing against his antagonist the true opinion of 
 Reid, it will be proper first to generalize the possible forms under 
 which the hypothesis of a representative perception can be realized, 
 as a confusion of some of these as actually held, on the part both 
 of Reid and Brown, has tended to introduce no small confusion 
 into the discussion. 
 
 The hypothetical realist contends, that he is wholly ignorant 
 of things in themselves, and that these are known to him, only 
 through a vicarious phenomenon, of which he is conscious in 
 
 perception ; 
 
 ' 7?rw7que ignarus, Imayir* gaudet.' 
 
 In other words, that the object immediately known and repre- 
 senting is numerically different from the object really existing and 
 represented. Now this vicarious phenomenon, or immediate object, 
 must either be numerically different from the percipient intellect, 
 or a modification of that intellect itself, If the latter, it must, 
 again, either be a modification of the thinking substance, with a 
 transcendent existence beyond the act of thought, or a modifica- 
 tion identical with the act of perception itself. 
 
 All possible forms of the representative hypothesis are thus 
 reduced to three, and these have all been actually maintained. 
 
 1. The representative object not a modijication of mind. 
 
 2. The representative object a modification of mind, dependent 
 for its apprehension, but not for its existence, on the act of con- 
 sciousness. 
 
 3. The representative object a modijication of mind, non-exist- 
 ent out of consciousness ; the idea and its perception only dif- 
 ferent relations of an act (state) really identical.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 185 
 
 In the first, the various opinions touching the nature and 
 origin of the representative object ; whether material, immate- 
 rial, or between both ; whether physical or hyperphysical ; wheth- 
 er propagated from the external object or generated in the medi- 
 um ; whether fabricated by the intelligent soul or in the animal 
 life ; whether infused by God, or angels, or identical with the 
 divine substance : these afford in the history of philosophy so 
 many subordinate modifications of this form of the hypothesis. 
 In the two latter, the subaltern theories have been determined by 
 the difficulty to connect the representation with the reality, in a 
 relation of causal dependence; and while some philosophers 
 have left it altogether unexplained, the others have been com- 
 pelled to resort to the hyperphysical theories of divine assistance 
 and a pre-established harmony. Under the second, opinions 
 have varied, whether the representative object be innate or facti- 
 tious4 
 
 The third of these forms of representation Reid does not seem 
 to have understood. The illusion which made him view, in his 
 doctrine, memory and imagination as powers of immediate knowl- 
 edge, though only representative faculties, under the third form, 
 has, in the history of opinions regarding perception, puzzled him, 
 as we shall see, in his exposition of the doctrine of Arnauld. He 
 was not aware that there was a theory, neither identical with an 
 intuitive perception, nor with the first or second form of the 
 representative hypothesis ; with both of which he was sufficiently 
 acquainted. Dr. Brown, on the contrary, who adopts the third 
 and simplest modification of that hypothesis, appears ignorant of 
 its discrimination from the second ; and accordingly views the 
 philosophers who held this latter form, as not distinguished in 
 opinion from himself. Of the doctrine of intuition he does not 
 seem almost to have conceived the possibility. 
 
 These being premised, we proceed to consider the greatest of 
 all Brown's errors, in itself and in its consequences, his miscon- 
 
 1 See below, chapter iii. Various Theories of External Perception. W.
 
 186 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEFITON. 
 
 ceptdon of the cardinal position of Reid's philosophy, in supposing 
 that philosopher as a hypothetical realist, to hold with himself the" 
 third form of the representative hypothesis, and not, as a natural 
 realist, the doctrine of an intuitive perception. 1 
 
 In the first place, knowledge and existence are then only con- 
 vertible when the reality is known in itself ; for then only can 
 we say, that it is known because it exists, and exists since it is 
 known. And this constitutes an immediate, presentative, or intu- 
 itive cognition, rigorously so called. Nor did Reid contemplate 
 any other. ' It seems admitted,' he says, ' as a first principle, by 
 the learned and the unlearned, that what is really perceived must 
 exist, and that to perceive ichat does not exist is impossible. So 
 far the unlearned man and the philosopher agree.' (Essays on 
 the Intellectual Powers, p. 142.) 
 
 In the second place, philosophers agree, that the idea or repre- 
 sentative object in their theory, is in the strictest sense ir&nedi- 
 ately perceived. And so Reid understands them. ' I perceive 
 not, says the Cartesian, the external object itself (so far he agrees 
 with the Peripatetic, and differs from the unlearned man) ; but 
 I perceive an image, or form, or idea, in my own mind, or in my 
 brain. / am certain of the existence of the idea ; because I imme- 
 diately perceive it. 1 (L. c.) 
 
 In the third place, philosophers concur in acknowledging, that 
 mankind at large believe, that the external reality itself consti- 
 tutes the immediate and only object of perception So also Reid. 
 'On the same principle, the unlearned man says, / perceive tlie 
 external object, and / perceive it to exist.' 1 (L. c.) ' The vulgar 
 undoubtedly believe, that it is the external object which we imme- 
 diately perceive, and not a representative image of it only. It is 
 for this reason, that they look upon it as perfect lunacy to call in 
 question the existence of external objects' (L. c.) ' The vulgar 
 are firmly persuaded, that the very identical objects which they 
 perceive continue to exist when they do not perceive them ; and 
 
 1 See Part Second, chapter iii. 2. W.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 187 
 
 are no less firmly persuaded, that when ten men look at the sun 
 or the moon they all see the same individual object? (P. 166.) 
 Speaking of Berkeley : ' The vulgar opinion he reduces to this, 
 that the very things which we perceive by our senses do really 
 exist. This he grants? (P. 165.) 'It is therefore acknowl- 
 edged by this philosopher (Hume) to be a natural instinct or pre- 
 possession, a universal and primary opinion of all men, that the 
 objects which we immediately perceive, by our senses, are not 
 images in our minds, but external objects, and that their existence 
 is independent of us and our perception.' (P. 201. See also pp. 
 143, 198, 199, 200, 206.) 
 
 In these circumstances, if Reid: either 1, maintains, that 
 his immediate perception of external things is convertible with 
 their reality ; or 2, asserts that in his doctrine of perception, 
 the external reality stands to the percipient mind face to face, in 
 the same immediacy of relation which the idea holds in the rep- 
 resentative theory of the philosophers ; or 3, declares the iden- 
 tity of his own opinion with the vulgar belief, as thus expounded 
 by himself and the philosophers : he could not more emphat- 
 ically proclaim himself a natural realist, and his doctrine of per- 
 ception, as intended, at least, a doctrine of intuition. And he 
 does all three. 
 
 The first and second. 'We have before examined the rea- 
 sons given by philosophers to prove that ideas, and not external 
 objects, are the immediate objects of perception. We shall only 
 here observe, THAT IF EXTERNAL OBJECTS BE PERCEIVED IMMEDI- 
 ATELY' [and he had just before asserted for the hundredth time 
 that they were so perceived], ' WE HAVE THE SAME REASON TO 
 
 BELIEVE THEIR EXISTENCE, AS PHILOSOPHERS HAVE TO BELIEVE 
 THE EXISTENCE OF IDEAS, WHILE THEY HOLD THEM TO BE THE 
 IMMEDIATE OBJECTS OF PERCEPTION.' (P. 589. See also pp. 118, 
 
 138.) 
 
 The third. Speaking of the perception of the external world 
 1 We have here a remarkable conflict between two contradictory 
 opinions, wherein all mankind are engaged. On the one side
 
 188 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 stand all the vulgar, who are unpractised in philosophical re- 
 searches, and guided by the uncorrupted primary instincts of 
 nature. On the other side, stand all the philosophers, ancient 
 and modern ; every man, without exception, who reflects. IN THIS 
 
 DIVISION, TO MY GREAT HUMILIATION, I FIND MYSELF CLASSED 
 WITH THE VULGAR.' (P. 207.) 
 
 Various other proofs of the same conclusion, could be adduced ; 
 these, for brevity, we omit. Brown's interpretation of the funda- 
 mental tenet of Reid's philosophy is, therefore, not a simple mis- 
 conception, but an absolute reversal of its real and even unambig- 
 uous import. [This is too strong. 1 ] 
 
 But the ground on which Brown vindicates his interpretation, 
 is not unworthy of the interpretation itself. The possibility of an 
 intuition beyond the sphere of self, he can hardly be said to have 
 contemplated ; but on one occasion, Reid's language seems, for a 
 moment, to have actually suggested to him the question : Might 
 that philosopher not possibly regard the material object, as iden- 
 tical with the object of consciousness in perception ? On what 
 ground does he reject the affirmative as absurd ? His reasoning 
 is to this effect : To assert an intuitive perception of matter, is to 
 assert An identity of matter and mind (for an immediacy of knowl- 
 edge is convertible with a unity of existence) ; But Reid was a 
 sturdy dualist : Therefore he could not maintain an immediate 
 perception of the qualities of matter. (Lect. xxv. pp. 159, 160.) 
 In this syllogism, the major is a mere petitio principii, which 
 Brown has not attempted to prove ; and which, as tried by the 
 standard of all philosophical truth, is not only false, but even the 
 converse of the truth ; while, admitting its accuracy, it cannot be 
 so connected with the minor, as to legitimate the conclusion. 
 
 If we appeal to consciousness, consciousness gives, even in the 
 last analysis, in the unity of knowledge, a duality of existence ; 
 and peremptorily falsifies Brown's assumption, that not-self, as 
 known, is identical with self as Jcnowing. Reid therefore, as a 
 
 'See p. 278, below. W.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 189 
 
 dualist, and on the supreme authority of consciousness, might 
 safely maintain the immediacy of perception ; nay, as a dualist 
 Reid could not, consistently, have adopted the opinion which 
 Brown argues, that, as a dualist, he must be regarded to have 
 held. Mind and matter exist to us only in their qualities ; and 
 these qualities exist to us only as they are known by us, i. e., as 
 phenomena. It is thus merely from knowledge that we can infer 
 existence, and only from the supposed repugnance or compatibility 
 of phenomena, within our experience, are we able to ascend to the 
 transcendent difference or identity of substances. Now, on the 
 hypothesis that all we immediately know, is only a state or 
 modification or quality or phenomenon of the cognitive subject 
 itself, how can we contend, that the phenomena of mind and 
 matter, known only as modifications of the same must be the 
 modifications of different substances ; nay, that only on this hy- 
 pothesis of their substantial unity in knowledge, can their substan- 
 tial duality in existence be maintained?* But of this again. 
 
 Brown's assumption has no better foundation than the exagge- 
 ration of a crotchet of philosophers ; which, though contrary to 
 the evidence of consciousness, and consequently not only with- 
 out but against all evidence, has yet exerted a more extensive 
 and important influence, than any principle in the whole history 
 of philosophy. This subject deserves a volume ; we can only 
 afford it a few sentences. Some philosophers (as Anaxagoras, 
 Heraclitus, Alcmaeon) maintained that knowledge implied even a 
 contrariety of subject and object. But since the time of Em- 
 pedocles, no opinion has been more universally admitted, than 
 that the relation of knoivledge inferred the analogy of existence. 
 This analogy may be supposed in two potences. What knows 
 and what is known, are either 1, similar, or, 2, the same ; and 
 if the general principle be true, the latter is the more philoso- 
 phical. This principle it was, which immediately determined the 
 whole doctrine of a representative perception. Its lower potence 
 is seen in the intentional species of the schools, and in the ideas 
 of Malebranche and Berkeley ; its higher in the gnostic reasons of
 
 190 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 the Platonists, in the pre-existing species of Avicenna and the 
 Arabians, in the ideas of Descartes and Leibnitz, in the phenom- 
 ena of Kant, and in the external states of Dr. Brown. It medi- 
 ately determined the hierarchical gradation of faculties or souls 
 of the Aristotelians, the vehicular media of the Platonists, 
 the theories of a common intellect of Alexander, Themistius, 
 Averroes, Cajetanus, and Zabarella, the vision in the Deity of 
 Malebranche, and the Cartesian and Leibnitian doctrines of 
 assistance and predetermined harmony. To no other origin is to 
 be ascribed the refusal of the fact of consciousness in its primitive 
 duality ; and the Unitarian systems of identity, materialism, ideal- 
 ism, are the result. 
 
 But however universal and omnipotent this principle may have 
 been, Reid was at once too ignorant of opinions, to be much in 
 danger from authority, and too independent a thinker, to accept 
 so baseless a fancy as a fact. 'Mr. Norris,' says he, 'is the 
 only author I have met %ith who professedly puts the question, 
 Whether material things can be perceived by us immediately ? 
 He has offered four arguments to show that they cannot. First, 
 Material objects are without the mind, and therefore there can 
 be no union between the object and the percipient. Answer 
 This argument is lame, until it is shown to be necessary, that in 
 perception there should be an union between the object and the 
 percipient. Second, material objects are disproportioned to the 
 mind, and removed from it by the whole diameter of Being. This 
 argument I cannot answer, because I do not understand it. n (Es- 
 says, I. P. p. 202.) 
 
 1 'This confession would, of itself, prove how superficially Reid was versed 
 in the literature of philosophy. Norris's second argument is only the state- 
 ment of a principle generally assumed by philosophers that the relation of 
 knowledge infers a correspondence of nature between the subject knowing, 
 and the object known. This principle has perhaps, exerted a more exten- 
 sive influence on speculation than any other ; and yet it has not been proved, 
 and is incapable of proof nay, is contradicted by the evidence of conscious- 
 ness itself. To trace the influence of this assumption would be, in fact, in 
 a certain sort, to write the history of philosophy ; for, though this influence
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 191 
 
 The principle, that the relation of knowledge implies an anal- 
 ogy of existence, admitted without examination in almost every 
 school, but which Reid, with an ignorance wiser than knowledge, 
 
 has never yet been historically developed, it would be easy to show that the 
 belief, explicit or implicit, that what knows and what is immediately known 
 must be of an analogous nature, lies at the root of almost every theory of 
 cognition, from the very earliest to the very latest speculations. In the more 
 ancient philosophy of Greece, three philosophers (Anaxagoras, Heraclitus, 
 and Alcmseon) are found, who professed the opposite doctrine that the con- 
 dition of knowledge lies in the contrariety, in the natural antithesis, of sub- 
 ject and object. Aristotle, likewise, in his treatise On the Soul, expressly 
 condemns the prevalent opinion, that the similar is only cognizable by the 
 similar ; but, in his Nwomachiani Ethics, he reverts to the doctrine which, 
 in the former work, he had rejected. With these exceptions, no principle, 
 since the time of Empedocles, by whom it seems first to have been explicitly 
 announced, has been more universally received, than this that the relation 
 of knowledge infers an analogy of existence. This analogy may be of two de- 
 grees. What knows, and what is known, may be either similar or the same ; 
 and, if the principle itself be admitted, the latter alternative is the more 
 philosophical. Without entering on details, I may here notice some of the 
 more remarkable results of this principle, in both its degrees. The general 
 principle, not, indeed, exclusively, but mainly, determined the admission of 
 a representative perception, by disallowing the possibility of any conscious- 
 ness, or immediate knowledge of matter, by a nature so different from it as 
 mind ; and, in its two degrees, it determined the various hypotheses, by which 
 it was attempted to explain the possibility of a representative or mediate 
 perception of the external world. To this principle, in its lower potence 
 that what knows must be similar in nature to what is immediately known 
 we owe the intentional species of the Aristotelians, and the ideas of Male- 
 branche and Berkeley. From this principle, in its higher potence that what 
 knows must be identical in nature with what is immediately known there 
 flow the gnostic reasons of the Platonists, the pre-existing forms, or species of 
 Theophrastus and Themistius, of Adelandus and Avicenna, the (mental) 
 ideas of Descartes and Arnauld, the representations, sensual ideas, &c., of 
 Leibnitz and Wolf, the phenomena of Kant, the states of Browa, and 
 (shall we say ?) the vacillating doctrine of perception held by Eeid him- 
 self. Mediately this principle was the origin of many other famous the- 
 ories : of the hierarchical gradation of souls or faculties of the Aristote- 
 lians ; of the vehicular media of the Platonists ; of the hypotheses of a 
 common intellect of Alexander, Themistius, Averroes, Cajetanus, and Za- 
 barella ; of the vision in the deity of Malcbranche ; and of the Cartesian 
 and Leibnitzian doctrines of assistance and pre-established harmony. Fi- 
 nally, to this principle is to be ascribed the refusal of the evidence of con- 
 sciousness to the primary fact the duality of its perception ; and the uni- 
 tarian schemes of Absolute Identity, Materialism, and Idealism, are the ro- 
 Rulta.' Reid, p. 300. W.
 
 192 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 confesses he does not understand ; is nothing more than an irra- 
 tional attempt to explain, what is, in itself, inexplicable. How 
 the similar or the same is conscious of itself, is not a whit less 
 inconceivable, than how one contrary is immediately percipient 
 of another. It at best only removes our admitted ignorance by 
 one step back ; and then, in place of our knowledge simply origi- 
 nating from the incomprehensible, it ostentatiously departs from 
 the absurd. 
 
 The slightest criticism is sufficient to manifest the futility of 
 that hypothesis of representation, which Brown would substitute 
 for Reid's presentative perception ; although this hypothesis, 
 under various modifications, be almost coextensive with the his- 
 tory of philosophy. In fact, it fulfils none of the conditions of a 
 legitimate hypothesis. 
 
 In the first place, it is unnecessary. It cannot show, that the 
 fact of an intuitive perception, as given in consciousness, ought 
 not to be accepted ; it is unable therefore to vindicate its own 
 necessity, in order to explain the possibility of our knowledge of 
 external things. That we cannot show forth, how the mind is 
 capable of knowing something different from self, is no reason to 
 doubt that it is so capable. Every how (&O'TI) rests ultimately on 
 a that (on) ; every demonstration is deduced from something 
 given and indemonstrable ; all that is comprehensible, hangs from 
 some revealed fact, which we must believe as actual, but, cannot 
 construe to the reflective intellect in its possibility. In conscious- 
 ness, in the original spontaneity of intelligence (vws, locus prin- 
 cipiorum), are revealed the primordial facts of our intelligent na- 
 ture. Consciousness is the fountain of all comprehensibility and 
 illustration ; but as such, cannot be itself illustrated or compre- 
 hended. To ask how any fact of consciousness is possible, is to ask 
 how consciousness itself is possible ; and to ask how consciousness 
 is possible, is to ask how a being intelligent like man is possible. 
 Could we answer this, the Serpent had not tempted Eve by an 
 hyperbole : ' We should be as Gods.' But as we did not create 
 ourselves, and are not even in the secret of our creation ; we
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 193 
 
 must take our existence, our knowledge upon trust : and that 
 philosophy is the only true, because in it alone can truth be real- 
 ized, which does not revolt against the authority of our natural 
 
 beliefs. 
 
 ' The voice of Nature is the voice of God.' 
 
 To ask, therefore, a reason for the possibility of our intuition of 
 external things, above the fact of its reality, as given in our per- 
 ceptive consciousness, betrays, as Aristotle has truly said, an 
 imbecility of the reasoning principle itself : 'TouTou Qifrsn Xo^ov, 
 ayevrag <rjv ctitfdrtfi .', appwrfria rig <f<ri &avoi'a.' The natural 
 realist, who accepts this intuition, cannot, certainly, explain it, be- 
 cause, as ultimate, it is a fact inexplicable. Yet, with Hudibras : 
 
 ' He knows whqffs what ; and that's as high 
 As metaphysic wit can fly.' 
 
 But the hypothetical realist the cosmothetic idealist, who rejects 
 a consciousness of aught beyond the mind, cannot require of the 
 natural realist an explanation of how such a consciousness is pos- 
 sible, until he himself shall have explained, what is even less con- 
 ceivable, the possibility of representing (i. e. of knowing) the un- 
 known. Till then, each founds on the incomprehensible ; but the 
 former admits the veracity, the latter postulates the falsehood of 
 tha* principle, which can alone confer on this incomprehensible 
 foundation the character of truth. The natural realist, whose 
 watchword is The facts of consciousness, the whole facts, and 
 nothing but the facts, has therefore naught to fear from his antag- 
 onist, so long as consciousness cannot be explained nor redargu- 
 ed from without. If his system be to fall, it falls only with phi- 
 losophy ; for it can only be disproved, by proving the mendacity 
 of consciousness of that faculty, 
 
 4 Quo; nisi sit veri, ratio quoque falsa fit omnis ;' 
 (' Which unless true, all reason turns a lie.') 
 
 This leads us to the second violation of the laws of a legitimate 
 hypothesis ; the doctrine of a representative perception annihi- 
 lates itself, in subverting the universal edifice of knowledge. 
 Belying the testimony of consciousness to our immediate percep- 
 
 9
 
 194 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 tion of an outer world, it belies the veracity of consciousness alto- 
 gether. But the truth 1 of consciousness, is the condition of the 
 possibility of all knowledge. The first act of hypothetical realism, 
 is thus an act of suicide ; philosophy, thereafter, is at best but an 
 enchanted corpse, awaiting only the exorcism of the skeptic, to 
 relapse into its proper nothingness. But of this we shall have 
 occasion to treat at large, in exposing Brown's misprision of the 
 argument from common sense. 
 
 In the third place, it is the condition of a legitimate hypothe- 
 sis, that the fact or facts for which it is excogitated to account, 
 be not themselves hypothetical. But so far is the principal fact, 
 which the hypothesis of a representative perception is proposed 
 to explain, from being certain ; its reality is even rendered prob- 
 lematical by the proposed explanation itself. The facts, about 
 which this hypothesis is conversant, are two : the fact of the 
 mental modification, and the fact of the material reality. The 
 problem to be solved is their connection ; and the hypothesis of 
 representation is advanced, as the ratio of their correlation, in 
 supposing that the former as known is vicarious of the latter as 
 existing. There is, however, here a see-saw between the hypoth- 
 esis and the fact : the fact is assumed as an hypothesis ; and the 
 hypothesis explained as a fact ; each is established, each is ex- 
 pounded, by the other. To account for the possibility of an 
 unknown external world, the hypothesis of representation is de- 
 vised ; and to account for the possibility of representation, we 
 imagine the hypothesis of an external world. Nothing could be 
 more easy than to demonstrate, that on this supposition, the fact 
 of the external reality is not only petitory but improbable. This, 
 however, we are relieved from doing, by Dr. Brown's own admis- 
 sion, that ' the skeptical argument for the non-existence of an ex- 
 ternal world, as a mere play of reasoning, admits of no reply ;' 
 and we shall afterwards prove, that the only ground on which he 
 attempts to vindicate this existence (the ground of our natural 
 
 1 See Part First, passim. W.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 195 
 
 belief in its reality), is one, not competent to the hypothetical 
 realist. We shall see, that if this belief be true, the hypothesis 
 itself is superseded ; if false, that there is no fact for the hypothe- 
 sis to explain. 
 
 In the fourth place, a legitimate hypothesis must account for 
 the phenomenon, about which it is conversant, adequately and 
 without violence, in all its dependencies, relations, and peculiari- 
 ties. But the hypothesis in question, only accomplishes its end, 
 nay, only vindicates its utility, by a mutilation, or, more prop- 
 erly, by the destruction and re-creation, of the very phenomenon 
 for the nature of which it would account. The entire phenome- 
 non to be explained by the supposition of a representative percep- 
 tion, is the fact given in consciousness, of the immediate knowl- 
 edge or intuition of an existence different from self. This simple 
 phenomenon it hews down into two fragments ; into the existence 
 and the intuition. The existence of external things, which is given 
 only through their intuition, it admits ; the intuition itself, though 
 the ratio cognoscendi, and to us therefore the ratio essendi of their 
 .reality, it rejects. But to annihilate what is prior and constit- 
 utive in the phenomenon, is, in truth, to annihilate the phenom- 
 enon altogether. The existence of an external world, which the 
 hypothesis proposes to explain, is no longer even a truncated fact 
 of consciousness ; for the existence given in consciousness, neces- 
 sarily fell with the intuition on which it reposed. A representa- 
 tive perception, is therefore, an hypothetical explanation of a 
 supposititious fact : it creates the nature it interprets. And in 
 this respect, of all the varieties of the representative hypothesis, 
 the third, or that which views in the object known a modification 
 of thought itself, most violently outrages the phenomenon of con- 
 sciousness it would explain. And this is Brown's. The first, saves 
 the phenomenon of consciousness in so far as it preserves always 
 the numerical, if not always the substantial, difference between 
 the object perceived and the percipient mind. The second does 
 not violate at least the anthithesis of the object perceived and 
 the percipient act. But in the third or simplest form of repre-
 
 196 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 sentation, not only is the object known, denied to be itself the 
 reality existing, as consciousness attests ; this object revealed as 
 not-self, is identified with the mental ego; nay, even, though 
 given as permanent, with the transient energy of thought itself. 
 
 In the fifth place, the fact, which a legitimate hypothesis is 
 devised to explain, must be within the sphere of experience. The 
 fact, however, for which that of a representative perception ac- 
 counts (the existence of external things), transcends, ex hypothesi, 
 all experience ; it is the object of no real knowledge, but a bare 
 ens rationis a mere hyperphysical chimera. 
 
 In the sixth and last place, an hypothesis itself is probable in 
 proportion as it works simply and naturally ; that is in propor- 
 tion as it is dependent on no subsidiary hypothesis, and as it in- 
 volves nothing, petitory, occult, supernatural, as an element of its 
 explanation. In this respect, the doctrine of a representative 
 perception is not less vicious than in others. To explain at all, it 
 must not only postulate subsidiary hypotheses, but subsidiary 
 miracles. The doctrine in question attempts to explain the knowl- 
 edge of an unknown world, by the ratio of a representative per- 
 ception : but it is impossible by any conceivable relation, to apply 
 the ratio to the facts. The mental modification, of which, on the 
 doctrine of representation, we are exclusively conscious in percep- 
 tion, either represents (i. e. affords a mediate knowledge of) a real 
 external world, or it does not. (We say only the reality ; to 
 include all systems from Kant's, who does not predicate even an 
 existence in space and time of things in themselves, to Locke's, 
 who supposes the transcendent reality to resemble its idea, at least 
 in the primary qualities.) Now, the latter alternative is an affir- 
 mation of absolute Idealism ; we have, therefore, at present only 
 to consider the former. And here, the mind either knows the 
 reality of what it represents, or it does not. On the prior alter- 
 native, the hypothesis under discussion would annihilate itself, in 
 annihilating the ground of its utility. For as the end of repre- 
 sentation is knowledge ; and as the hypothesis of a representative 
 perception is only required on the supposed impossibility of that
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 197 
 
 presentative knowledge of external things, which consciousness 
 affirms : if the mind is admitted to be cognizant of the outer 
 reality in itself, previous to representation, the end towards which 
 the hypothesis was devised as a mean, has been already accom- 
 plished ; and the possibility of an intuitive perception, as given 
 in consciousness, is allowed. Nor is the hypothesis only absurd, 
 as superfluous. It is worse. For the mind would, in this case, 
 be supposed to know before it knew ; or, like the crazy Pentheus, 
 to see its objects double, 
 
 (' Et solem geminum et duplices se ostendere Thebas') ; 
 
 and, if these absurdities be eschewed, then is the identity of mind 
 and self, of consciousness and knowledge, abolished ; and my 
 intellect knows, what / am not conscious of it knowing ! The 
 other alternative remains : that the mind is blindly determined 
 to represent, and truly to represent, the reality which it does not 
 know. And here the mind either blindly determines itself, or is 
 blindly determined by an extrinsic and intelligent cause. The 
 former lemma is the more philosophical, in so far as it assumes 
 nothing hyperphysical ; but it is otherwise utterly irrational, in- 
 asmuch as it would explain an effect, by a cause wholly inade- 
 quate to its production. On this alternative, knowledge is sup- 
 posed to be the effect of ignorance, intelligence of stupidity, 
 life of death. We are necessarily ignorant, ultimately at least, of 
 the mode in which causation operates ; but we know at least, that 
 no effect arises without a cause and a cause proportionate to its 
 existence. The absurdity of this supposition has accordingly 
 constrained the profoundest cosmothetic idealists, notwithstanding 
 their rational abhorrence of a supernatural assumption, to em- 
 brace the second alternative. To say nothing of less illustrious 
 schemes, the systems of Divine Assistance, of a Pre-established 
 Harmony, and of the Vision of all things in the Deity, are only 
 so many subsidiary hypotheses, so many attempts to bridge, by 
 supernatural machinery, the chasm between the representation 
 and the reality, which all human ingenuity had found, by natural
 
 198 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 means, to be insuperable. The hypothesis of a representative 
 perception, thus presupposes a miracle to let it work. Dr. Brown, 
 indeed, rejects as unphilosophical, those hyperphysical subsidies. 
 But he only saw less clearly than their illustrious authors, the 
 necessity which required them. It is a poor philosophy that 
 eschews the Deus ex machina, and yet ties the knot which is only 
 soluble by his interposition. It is not unphilosophical to assume 
 a miracle, if a miracle be necessary ; but it is unphilosophical to 
 originate the necessity itself. And here the hypothetical realist 
 cannot pretend, that the difficulty is of nature's, not of his crea- 
 tion. In fact it only arises, because he has closed his eyes upon 
 the light of nature, and refused the guidance of consciousness : 
 but having swamped himself in following the ignis fatuus of a 
 theory, he has no right to refer its private absurdities to the im- 
 becility of human reason ; or to generalize his own factitious igno- 
 rance, by a Quantum est quod nescimus ! The difficulty of the 
 problem Dr. Brown has not perceived ; or perceiving, has not 
 ventured to state, far less attempted to remove. He has es- 
 sayed, indeed, to cut the knot, which he was unable to loose ; 
 but we shall find, in the sequel, that his summary postulate of the 
 reality of an external world, on the ground of our belief in its 
 existence, is, in his hands, of all unfortunate attempts, perhaps the 
 most unsuccessful. 
 
 The scheme of Natural Realism (which it is Reid's honor to 
 have been the first, among not forgotten philosophers, virtually 
 and intentionally, at least, to embrace) is thus the only system, on 
 which the truth of consciousness and the possibility of knowledge 
 can be vindicated ; whilst the Hypothetical Realist, in his effort 
 to be ' wise above knowledge,' like the dog in the fable, loses the 
 substance, in attempting to realize the shadow. ' Lets hommes'' 
 (says Leibnitz, with a truth of which he was not himself aware), 
 ' les hommes cherchent ce qu'ils savent, et ne savent pas ce quails 
 cherchenC 
 
 That the doctrine of an intuitive perception is not without its 
 difficulties, we allow ; but these do not affect its possibility, and
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 199 
 
 may in a great measure be removed by a more sedulous examina- 
 tion of the phenomena. The distinction of perception proper 
 from sensation proper ; in other words, of the objective from the 
 subjective in this act, Reid, after other philosophers, has already 
 turned to good account ; but his analysis would have been still 
 more successful, had he discovered the law which universally 
 governs their manifestation : That Perception and Sensation, 
 the objective and subjective, though both always coexistent, are 
 always in the inverse ratio of each other. But on this matter we 
 cannot at present enter. 1 
 
 Dr. Brown is not only wrong in regard to Reid's own doctrine ; 
 he is wrong, even admitting his interpretation of that philosopher 
 to be true, in charging him with a ' series of wonderful miscon- 
 ceptions,' in regard to the opinions universally prevalent touching 
 the nature of ideas. We shall not argue the case upon the higher 
 ground, that Reid, as a natural realist, could not be philosophically 
 out, in assailing the hypothesis of a representative perception, 
 even though one of its subordinate modifications might be mis- 
 taken by him for another ; but shall prove that, supposing Reid 
 to have been, like Brown, a hypothetical realist, under the third 
 form of a representative perception, he was not historically wrong 
 in attributing to philosophers in general (at least after the decline 
 of the Scholastic philosophy), the first or second variety of the 
 hypothesis. Even on this lower ground, Brown is fated to be 
 unsuccessful ; and if Reid be not always correct, his antagonist 
 has failed in convicting him even of a single inaccuracy. 
 We shall consider Brown's charge of misrepresentation in 
 detail. 
 
 It is always unlucky to stumble on the threshold. The para- 
 graph (Lect. xxvii.) in which Dr. Brown opens his attack on Reid, 
 contains more mistakes than sentences ; and the etymological dis- 
 cussion it involves supposes as true, what is not simply false, but 
 diametrically opposite to the truth. Among other errors : In 
 
 1 See Part Second, chap. vi. W.
 
 200 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 the first place, the term 'idea? was never employed in any sys- 
 tem, previous to the age of Descartes, to denote ' little images 
 derived from objects without.' In the second, it was never used 
 in any philosophy, prior to the same period, to signify the imme- 
 diate object of perception. In the third, it was not applied by 
 the ' Peripatetics or Schoolmen,' to express an object of human 
 thought at all.* In the fourth, ideas (taking this term for spe- 
 
 * The history of the word idea seems completely unknown. Previous to 
 the age of Descartes, as a philosophical term, it was employed exclusively 
 by the Platonists at least exclusively in a Platonic meaning ; and this 
 meaning was precisely the reverse of that attributed to the word by Dr. 
 Brown; the idea was not an object of perception, the idea tea* not derived 
 from witfiout. In the schools, BO far from being a current psychological 
 expression, as ho imagines, it had no other application than a theological. 
 Neither, after the revival of letters, was the term extended by the Aristo- 
 telians even to the objects of intellect. Melanchthon, indeed (who was a 
 kind of semi-Platonist) uses it on one occasion as a synonym for notion, or 
 intelligible species (De Anirna, p. 187, ed. 1555); but it was even to this 
 solitary instance, we presume, that Julius Scaliger alludes (De SubtiKtate, 
 vi. 4), when he castigates such an application of the word as neoteric and 
 abusive. " Melanck." is on the margin. Goclenius also probably founded 
 his usage on Melanchthon. We should have distinctly said, that previous 
 to its employment by Descartes himself, the expression had never been used 
 as a comprehensive term for the immediate objects of thought, had we not 
 in remembrance the Historia Animce Humana of our countryman, David 
 Buchanan. This work, originally written in French, had, for some years, 
 been privately circulated previous to its publication at Paris, in 1636. Here 
 we find the word idea familiarly employed, in its most extensive significa- 
 tion, to express the objects, not only of intellect proper, but of memory, 
 imagination, sense; and this is the earliest example of such an employment. 
 For the Discourse on Method in which the term is usurped by Descartes in 
 an equal latitude, was at least a year later in its publication viz., in June, 
 1637. Adopted soon after also by Gassendi, the word under such imposing 
 patronage gradually won its way into general use. In England, however, 
 Locke may be said to have been the first who naturalized the term in it*> 
 Cartesian universality. Hobbcs employs it, and that historically, only once 
 or twice ; Henry More and Cudworth are very chary of it, even when treat- 
 ing of the Cartesian philosophy ; "Willis rarely uses it ; while Lord Herbert, 
 Reynolds, and the English philosophers in general, between Descartes and 
 Locke, do not apply it psychologically at all. When in common language, 
 employed by Milton and Dryden, after Descartes, as before him by Sidney, 
 Spenser, Shakspeare, Hooker, &c., the meaning is Plutonic. Our Lexi- 
 vographere are ignorant of the difference. 
 
 The fortune of this word is curious. Employed by Plato to express the
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 201 
 
 cies) were not ' in all the dark ages of the scholastic followers of 
 Aristotle' regarded as ' little images derived from without ;' for 
 a numerous party of the most illustrious schoolmen rejected spe- 
 
 real forms * of the intelligible world, in lofty contrast to the unreal images of 
 the sensible ; it was lowered by Descartes, who extended it to the objects of 
 our consciousness in general. When, after Gassendi, the school of Condillac 
 had analyzed our highest faculties into our lowest, the idea was still more 
 deeply degraded from its high original. Like a fallen angel, it was relegated 
 from the sphere of Divine intelligence to the atmosphere of human sense, 
 till at last Ideologic (more correctly Idealogu), a word which could orAy prop- 
 erly suggest an a priori scheme, deducing our knowledge from the intellect, 
 has in France become the name peculiarly distinctive of that philosophy of 
 mind which exclusively derives our knowledge from the senses. Word and 
 thing, ideas have been the crux philosopJiorwn, since Aristotle sent them 
 packing (xatptTiaaav IStai) to the present day. 
 
 A few notes, which we transfer from Hamilton's Reid, will complete the 
 history and definition of the word idea. W. 
 
 Whether Plato viewed Ideas as existences independent of the divine 
 mind, is a contested point ; though, upon the whole, it appears more proba- 
 ble that he did not. It is, however, admitted on all hands, to be his doc- 
 trine, that Ideas were the patterns according to which the Deity fashioned 
 the phenomenal or ectypal world. 
 
 It should be carefully observed that the term Idea, previous to the time 
 of Descartes, was used exclusively, or all but exclusively, in its Plutonic sig- 
 nification. By Descartes, and other contemporary philosophers, it was first 
 extended to denote our representations in general. Many curious blunders 
 have arisen in consequence of an ignorance of this. I may notice, by the 
 way, that a confusion of ideas in the Platonic with ideas in the Cartesian 
 sense has led Reid into the error of assimilating the hypothesis of Plato and 
 the hypothesis of Malebranche in regard to our vision in the divine mind. 
 The Platonic theory of Perception, in fact, bears a closer analogy to the Car 
 tesian and Leibnitzian doctrines than to that of Malebranche. 
 
 Reid, in common with our philosophers in general, had no knowledge 
 of the Platonic theory of sensible perception; and yet the gnostic forms, the 
 cognitive reasons of the Platonis\p, held a far more proximate relation to ideas 
 in the modern acceptation than the Platonic ideas themselves. 
 
 This interpretation 2 of the meaning of Plato's comparison of the cave 
 exhibits a curious mistake, in which Reid is followed by Mr. Stewart and 
 many others, 3 and which, it is remarkable, has never yet been detected. In 
 the similitude in question (which will be found in the seventh book of the 
 Republic), Plato is supposed to intend an illustration of the mode in which 
 
 1 Whether, in the Platonic system, Ideas are or are not independent of the Deity, is, and 
 always has been, a vexata quiestio.$ee Hamilton's Reid, p. 370. W. 
 
 1 The interpretation given in the text of Reid W. 
 
 1 Hamilton has shown in another place that Bacon has also wrested Plato's similitude of 
 the cave from its genuine signification /(". 
 
 9*
 
 202 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 cies, not only in the intellect, but in the sense. In the fifth, 
 'phantasm? in 'the old philosophy,' was not the 'external 
 cause of perception? but the internal object of imagination. In 
 
 the shadows or vicarious images of external things are admitted into the 
 mind to typify, in short, an hypothesis of sensitive perception. On his snji 
 position, the identity of the Platonic, Pythagorean, and Peripatetic theories 
 of this process is inferred. Nothing can, however, ho more groundless than the 
 supposition ; nothing more erroneous than the inference. By his cave, images, 
 and shadows, Plato meant simply to illustrate the grand principle of his philoso- 
 phy that the Sensible or Ectypal world (phenomenal, transitory, yiyv6ntvov, 
 3v xal nit 8c) stands to the Noetic or Archetypal (substantial, permanent, 
 SVTM 8c) in the same relation of comparative unreality in which the shadowx 
 of the images of sensible existences themselves, stand to the things of which 
 they are the dim and distant adumbrations. In the language of an illus- 
 trious poet 
 
 ' An nescis, qutecunque haec sunt, qua) hac nocte teguntur, 
 Omnia res prorsus veras non esse, sed umbras, 
 Aut specula, undo ad nos aliena elucet imago? 
 Terra quidem, et maria alta, atque his circumfluus aor, 
 Et quse consistunt ex iis, hac omnia tenueis 
 Sunt umbrae, humanos quse tanquam somnia qusedam 
 Pcrtingunt animos, fallaci et imagine ludunt, 
 Nunquam eadem, fluxu semper variata pcrenni. 
 Sol autem, Lunseque glohus, fulgentiaque astra 
 Csetera, sint quamvis meliori praedita vita, 
 Et donata sevo immortnli, hsec ipsa tamen sunt 
 uEterni specula, in quae animus, qui est inde profectus, 
 Inspiciens, patriss quodam quasi tactus amore, 
 Ardescit. Verum quoniam licic non perstat et ultra 
 Nescio quid sequitur secum, tacitusquc rcquirit, 
 Nosse licet circum hsec ipsum consistere verum, 
 Non finem: sed enim esse aliud quid, cujus imago 
 Splendet in iis, quod per se ipsum cst, et principinm esse 
 Omnibus seternum, ante omnein numerumque diemque ; 
 In quo alium Solem atque uliam splendescere Lunam 
 Adspicias, aliosquc orbes, alia astra manere, 
 Terramquc, fluviosque alios, atque uora, et ignem, 
 Et nemora, atque aliis errare animalia silvis.' 
 
 And as the comparison is misunderstood, so nothing can be conceived 
 more adverse to the doctrine of Plato than the theory it is supposed to elu- 
 cidate. Plotiuus, indeed, formally refutes, as contrary to the Platonic, the 
 very hypothesis thus attributed to his master. (Enn. IV., 1. vi. cc. 1. 8.) 
 The doctrine of the Platonists on this point has been almost wholly neglect- 
 ed; and the author among them whose work contains its most articulate
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 203 
 
 the sixth, the term ' shadowy film] which here and elsewhere he 
 constantly uses, shows that Dr. Brown confounds the matterless 
 
 development has been so completely overlooked, both by scholars and phi- 
 losophers, that his work is of the rarest ; while even his name is mentioned in 
 no history of philosophy. It is here sufficient to state, that the t"Sa>\a, the 
 Myoi YVUS-IKOI, the forms representative of external things, and corresponding 
 to the species sensiles expresses of the schoolmen, were not held by the Plato- 
 nists to be derived from without. Prior to the act of perception, they have a 
 latent but real existence in the soul ; and, by the impassive energy of the 
 mind itself, are elicited into consciousness, on occasion of the impression 
 (rivals, xdBos, eiKpatris) made on the external organ, and of the vital form 
 ((,<aTiK<>v elSos), in consequence thereof, sublimated in the animal life. The 
 verses of Boethius, which have been so frequently misunderstood, contain 
 an accurate statement of the Platonic theory of perception. After refuting 
 the Stoical doctrine of the passivity of mind in this process, he proceeds: 
 
 ' Mens est efficiens magis 1 
 Longe causa potentior, 
 Quam quaB materias modo 
 Impressas patitur notas. 
 PrcKcedit tamen excitans 
 Ac vires animi movens 
 Vivo in corpore passio, 
 Cum vel lux oculos ferit, 
 Vel vox auribus instrepit: 
 Turn mentis vigor extitus 
 tyuas intus species tenet, 
 Ad motus similes vocans, 
 Notis applicat exteris, 
 Introrsumque reconditis 
 Formis miscet imagines.' 
 
 I cannot now do more than indicate the contrast of this doctrine to the 
 Peripatetic (I do not say Aristotelian) theory, and its approximation to the 
 Cartesian and Leibnitzian hypotheses ; which, however, both attempt to 
 explain, what the Platonic did not how the mind, ex liypothesi, above all 
 physical influence, is determined, on the presence of the unknown reality 
 within the sphere of sense, to call into consciousness the representation 
 through which that reality is made known to us. I may add, that not 
 merely the Platonists, but some of the older Peripatetics held that the soul 
 virtually contained within itself representative forms, which were only 
 excited by the external reality; a* Theophrastus and Themistius, to say 
 nothing of the Platonizing Porphyry, Simplicius and Ammonius Hermiae ; 
 and the same opinion, adopted, probably from the latter, by his pupil, the 
 Arabian Adelandus, subsequently became even the common doctrine of the 
 Moorish Aristotelians.
 
 204 PHILOSOPHY OF PKRCEPFION. 
 
 species of the Peripatetics with the corporeal effluxions of Democ- 
 ritus and Epicurus : 
 
 ' Qua 1 , quasi membrantr, Miiuino do cortice rerum 
 Dcreptas, volitant ultro citroque per auras.' 
 
 Dr. Brown, in short, only fails in victoriously establishing 
 ugainst Reid the various meanings in which ' the old writers' 
 employed the term idea, by the petty fact that the old writers 
 did not employ the term idea at all. 
 
 Nor does the progress of the attack belie the omen of its out- 
 set. We shall consider the philosophers quoted by Brown in 
 chronological order. Of three of these only (Descartes, Arnauld, 
 Locke) were the opinions particularly noticed by Reid ; the 
 others (Hobbes, Le Clerc, Crousaz) Brown adduces as examples 
 of Reid's general misrepresentation. Of the greater number of 
 the philosophers specially criticised by Reid, Brown prudently 
 says nothing. 
 
 Of these, the first is DESCARTES ; and in regard to him, Dr. 
 Brown, not content with accusing Reid of simple ignorance, con- 
 tends ' that the opinions of Descartes are precisely opposite to the 
 representations which he has given of them.' (Lect. xxvii. p. 
 172.) Now Reid states, in regard to Descartes, that this philos- 
 opher appears to place the idea or representative object in per- 
 ception, sometimes in the mind, and sometimes in the brain ; 
 and he acknowledges that while these opinions seem to him con- 
 tradictory, he is not prepared to pronounce which of them their 
 author held, if he did not indeed hold both together. 'Des- 
 cartes,' he says, ' seems to have hesitated between the two opin- 
 ions, or to have passed from one to the other.' On any 
 alternative, however, Reid attributes to Descartes, either the first 
 or the second form of representation. Now here we must recol- 
 lect, that the question is not whether Reid be rigorously right, 
 !>ut whether he be inexcusably wrong. Dr. Brown accuses him 
 of the most ignorant misrepresentation, of interpreting an author, 
 whose perspicuity he himself admits, in a sense 'exactly the
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 205 
 
 reverse 1 of truth. To determine what Descartes' doctrine of per- 
 ception actually is, would be difficult, perhaps even impossible ; 
 but in reference to the question at issue, certainly superfluous. 
 It here suffices to show, that his opinion on this point is one 
 mooted among his disciples ; and that Brown, wholly unac- 
 quainted with the difficulties of the question, dogmatizes on 
 the basis of a single passage nay, of a passage in itself irrele- 
 vant. 
 
 Reid is justified against Brown, if the Cartesian Idea be 
 proved either a material image in the brain, or an immaterial 
 representation in the mind, distinct from the precipient act. By 
 those not possessed of the key to the Cartesian theory, there are 
 many passages* in the writings of its author, which, taken by 
 themselves, might naturally be construed to import, that Des- 
 cartes supposed the mind to be conscious of certain motions in 
 the brain, to which, as well as to the modifications of the intellect 
 itself, he applies the terms image and idea. Reid, who did not 
 understand the Cartesian philosophy as a system, was puzzled by 
 these superficial ambiguities. Not aware that the cardinal point 
 of that system is that mind and body, as essentially opposed, are 
 naturally to each other as zero, and that their mutual intercourse 
 can only be supernaturally maintained by the concourse of the 
 Deity ; f Reid attributed to Descartes the possible opinion, that 
 
 * Ex. gr. De Pass. 35 a passage stronger than any of those noticed by 
 De la Forge. 
 
 t That the theory of Occasional Causes is necessarily involved in Des- 
 cartes' doctrine of Assistance, and that his explanation of the connection of 
 mind and body reposes on that theory, it is impossible to doubt. For while 
 he rejects all physical influence in the communication and conservation of 
 motion between bodies, which he refers exclusively to the ordinary concourse 
 of God (Prime. P. II. Art. 36, etc.} ; consequently he deprives conflicting 
 bodies of all proper efficiency, and reduces them to the mere occasional 
 causes of this phenomenon. But a fortiori, he must postulate the hypothe- 
 sis, which he found necessary in explaining the intercourse of things substan- 
 tially the same, to account for the reciprocal action of two substances, to Mm, 
 of so incompatible a nature as mind and body. De la Forge, Geulinx, Male- 
 branche, Cordemoi, and other disciples of Descartes, only explicitly evolve 
 what the writings of their master implicitly contain. We may observe,
 
 206 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 the soul is immediately cognizant of material images in the brain, 
 But in the Cartesian theory, mind is only conscious of itself; the 
 affections of body may, by the law of union, be the proximate 
 occasions, but can never constitute the immediate objects of knowl- 
 edge. Reid, however, supposing that nothing could obtain the 
 name of image which did not represent a prototype, or the name 
 of idea which was not an object of thought, thus misinterpreted 
 Descartes ; who applies, abusively, indeed, these terms to the 
 occasion of perception (i. e. the motion in the sensorium, unknown 
 in itself and resembling nothing), as well as to the object of 
 thought (i. e. the representation of which we are conscious in the 
 mind itself). In the Leibnitio-Wolfian system, two elements, 
 both also denominated ideas, are in like manner accurately to be 
 contradistinguished in the process of perception. The idea in 
 the brain, and the idea in the mind, are, to Descartes, precisely 
 what the ' material idea 1 and the 'sensual idea 1 are to the 
 Wolfians. In both philosophies, the two ideas are harmonic modi- 
 fications, correlative and coexistent ; but in neither is the organic 
 affection or material idea an object of consciousness. It is merely 
 the unknown and arbitrary condition of the mental representa- 
 tion ; and in the hypotheses both of Assistance and of Pre-estab- 
 lished Harmony, the presence of the one idea implies the con- 
 comitance of the other, only by virtue of the hyperphysical deter- 
 mination. Had Reid, in fact, not limited his study of the Car- 
 tesian system to the writings of its founder, the twofold applica- 
 tion of the term idea, by Descartes, could never have seduced 
 him into the belief that so monstrous a solecism had been com- 
 mitted by that illustrious thinker. By De la Forge, the personal 
 friend of Descartes, the verbal ambiguity is, indeed, not only 
 noticed, but removed ; and that admirable expositor applies the 
 term ' corporeal species' to the affection in the brain, and the 
 
 though we cannot stop to prove, that Tennemann is wrong in denying De la 
 Forge to be even an advocate, far less the first articulate expositor of the 
 doctrine of Occasional Causes.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 207 
 
 terms ' idea] ' intellectual notion] to the spiritual representation 
 in the conscious mind. De rJSsprit, c. 10. 
 
 But if Reid be wrong in his supposition, that Descartes admit- 
 ted a consciousness of ideas in the brain ;* is he on the other 
 alternative wrong, and inexcusably wrong, in holding that Des- 
 cartes supposed ideas in the mind not identical with their percep- 
 tions? Malebranche, the most illustrious name in the school 
 after its founder (and who, not certainly with less ability, may 
 be supposed to have studied the writings of his master with far 
 greater attention than either Reid or Brown), ridicules as ' con- 
 trary to common sense and justice' the supposition that Descartes 
 had rejected ideas in ' the ordinary acceptation.'' and adopted the 
 hypothesis of their being representations, not really distinct from 
 their perception. And while ' he is as certain as he possibly can 
 be in such matters,' that Descartes had not dissented from the 
 general opinion, he taunts Arnauld with resting his paradoxical 
 interpretation of that philosopher's doctrine, ' not on any passages 
 of his Metaphysic contrary to the common opinion' but on his 
 own arbitrary limitation of ' the ambiguous term perception.' 
 (Rep. au Livre des Idtes, passim ; ARNAULD, CEuv. xxxviii. pp. 
 388, 389.) That ideas are ' found in the mind, not formed by 
 it] and consequently, that in the act of knowledge the represen- 
 tation is really distinct from the cognition proper, is strenuously 
 asserted as the doctrine of his master by the Cartesian Roell, in 
 the controversy he maintained with the Anti-Cartesian De Vries. 
 (ROELLI Dispp. ; DE VRIES De Ideis innatis.} But it is idle to 
 multiply proofs. Brown's charge of ignorance falls back upon 
 himself; and Reid may lightly bear the reproach of ' exactly 
 reversing 1 the notorious doctrine of Descartes, when thus borne, 
 along with him, by the profoundest of that philosopher's disciples. 
 
 Had Brown been aware, that the point at issue between him 
 
 * Reid's error on this point is, however, surpassed by that of M. Royer- 
 Collard, who represents the idea in the Cartesian doctrine of perception as 
 txdusivfly situate in the brain. (CEuvres de Jieid, III. p. 384.)
 
 208 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 and Reid was one agitated among the followers of Descartes 
 themselves, he could hardly have dreamt of summarily determin- 
 ing the question by the production of one vulgar passage from 
 the writings of that philosopher. But we are sorely puzzled to 
 account for his hallucination in considering this passage perti- 
 nent. Its substance is fully given by Reid in his exposition of 
 the Cartesian doctrine. Every iota it contains of any relevancy- 
 is adopted by Malebranche ; constitutes, less precisely indeed, his 
 famous distinction of perception (ide) from sensation (sentiment) : 
 and Malebranche is one of the two modern philosophers, admit- 
 ted by Brown to have held the hypothesis of representation in 
 its first, and, as he says, its most ' erroneous'' form. But princi- 
 ples that coalesce, even with the hypothesis of ideas distinct from 
 mind, are not, a fortiori, incompatible with the hypothesis of 
 ideas distinct only from the perceptive act. We cannot, however, 
 enter on an articulate exposition of its irrelevancy. 
 
 To adduce HOBBES, as an instance of Reid's misrepresentation 
 of the ' common doctrine of ideas,' betrays on the part of Brown 
 a total misapprehension of the conditions of the question ; or he 
 forgets that Hobbes was a materialist. The doctrine of represen- 
 tation, under all its modifications, is properly subordinate to the 
 doctrine of a spiritual principle of thought ; and on the supposi- 
 tion, all but universally admitted among philosophers, that the 
 relation of knowledge implied the analogy of existence, it was 
 mainly devised to explain the possibility of a knowledge by an 
 immaterial subject, of an existence so disproportioned to its nature, 
 as the qualities of a material object. Contending, that an imme- 
 diate cognition of the accidents of matter, infers an essential iden- 
 tity of matter and mind, Brown himself admits, that the hypothe- 
 sis of representation belongs exclusively to the doctrine of dual- 
 ism (Lect. xxv. pp. 150, 160) ; whilst Reid, assailing the hypoth- 
 esis of ideas, only as subverting the reality of matter, could hardly 
 regard it as parcel of that scheme, which acknowledges the real- 
 ity of nothing else. But though Hobbes cannot be adduced as 
 a competent witness against Reid, he is however valid evidence
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 209 
 
 against Brown. Hobbes, though a materialist, admitted no 
 knowledge of an external world. Like his friend Sorbiere, he 
 was a kind of material idealist. According to him, we know 
 nothing of the qualities or existence of any outward reality. All 
 that we know is the ' seeming] the ' apparition] the ' aspect] 
 the 'phenomenon] the 'phantasm] within ourselves ; and this 
 subjective object of which we are conscious, and which is con- 
 sciousness itself, is nothing more than the ' agitation 1 of our 
 internal organism, determined by the unknown ' motions,' which 
 are supposed, in like manner, to constitute the world without. 
 Perception he reduces to sensation. Memory and imagination 
 are faculties specifically identical with sense, differing from it 
 simply in the degree of their vivacity ; and this difference of in- 
 tensity, with Hobbes as with Hume, is the only discrimination 
 between our dreaming and our waking thoughts. A doctrine 
 of perception identical with Reid's ! 
 
 In regard to ARNAULD, the question is not, as in relation to the 
 others, whether Reid conceived him to maintain a form of the 
 ideal theory which he rejects, but whether Reid admits ArnaulcTs 
 opinion on perception and his own to be identical. ' To these 
 authors,' says Dr. Brown, ' whose opinions on the subject of 
 perception, Dr. Reid has misconceived, I may add one, whom 
 even he himself allows to have shaken off the ideal system, and 
 to have considered the idea and the perception as not distinct, 
 but the same, a modification of the mind, and nothing more. 
 I allude to the celebrated Jansenist writer, Arnauld, who main- 
 tains this doctrine as expressly as Dr. Reid himself, and makes it 
 the foundation of his argument in his controversy with Malo 
 branche.' (Lecture xxvii. p. 173.) If this statement be not 
 untrue, then is Dr. Brown's interpretation of Reid himself correct. 
 A representative perception, under its third and simplest modifi- 
 cation, is held by Arnauld as by Brown ; and his exposition it- 
 so clear and articulate, that all essential misconception of his 
 doctrine is precluded. In these circumstances, if Reid avow the 
 identity of Arnauld's opinion and his own, this avowal is tanta-
 
 210 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 mount to a declaration that his peculiar doctrine of perception is 
 a scheme of representation ; whereas, on the contrary, if he sig- 
 nalize the contrast of their two opinions, he clearly evinces the 
 radical antithesis, and his sense of the radical antithesis, of 
 the doctrine of intuition, to every, even the simplest form of the 
 hypothesis of representation. And this last lie does. 
 
 It cannot be maintained that Reid admits a philosopher to 
 hold an opinion convertible with his, whom he states 'to 
 profess the doctrine, universally received, that we perceive not 
 material things immediately, that it is their ideas, which are 
 the immediate objects of our thoughts, and that it is in the idea 
 of every thing tliat we perceive its prvpertie&l This fundamental 
 contrast being established, we may safely allow, that the radical 
 misconception, which caused Reid to overlook the difference of 
 our presentative and representative faculties, caused him likewise 
 to believe that Arnauld had attempted to unite two contradictory 
 theories of perception. Not aware, that it was possibly to main- 
 tain a doctrine of perception, in which the idea was not really 
 distinguished from its cognition, and yet to hold that the mind 
 had no immediate knowledge of external things : Reid supposes, 
 in the first place, that Arnauld, in rejecting the hypothesis of 
 ideas, as representative entities, really distinct from the contem- 
 plative act of perception, coincided with himself in viewing the 
 material reality as the immediate object of that act ; and in the 
 second, that Arnauld again deserted this opinion, when, with the 
 philosophers, he maintained that the idea, or act of the mind 
 representing the external reality, and not the external reality 
 itself, was the immediate object of perception. But Arnauld's 
 theory is one and indivisible ; and, as such, no part of it is iden- 
 tical with Reid's. Reid's confusion, here as elsewhere, is explained 
 by the circumstance, that he had never speculatively conceived 
 the possibility of the simplest modification of the representative 
 hypothesis. He saw no medium between rejecting ideas as 
 something different from thought, and the doctrine of an immedi- 
 ate knowledge of the material object. Neither does Arnauld, as
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 211 
 
 Reid supposes, ever assert against Malebranche, 'that we per- 
 ceive external things immediately,' that is, in themselves.* 
 Maintaining that all our perceptions are modifications essentially 
 representative, Arnauld everywhere avows, that he denies ideas, 
 only as existences distinct from the act itself of perception.f 
 
 * This is perfectly clear from Arnauld's own uniform statements ; and it 
 is justly observed by Malebrancbe, in his Reply to the Treatise on True and 
 False Ideas, (p. 123, orig. edit.) that, 'in reality, according to M. Arnauld, 1 
 ice do not perceive bodies, -we perceive only ourselves. 1 
 
 t (Euvres, t. xxxviii. pp. 187, 198, 199, 389. et passim. It is to be recol- 
 lected that Descartes, Malebranche, Arrumld, Locke, and philosophers in 
 general "before Reid, employed the term Perception as coextensive with Con- 
 sciousness. By Leibnitz, Wolf, and their followers, it was used in a peculiar 
 sense, as equivalent to Representation or Idea proper, and as contradistin- 
 guished from Apperception, or consciousness. Reid's limitation of the term, 
 though the grounds on which it is defended are not of the strongest, is con- 
 venient, and has been very generally admitted. 
 
 1 On this point may be added the following (Reid, p. 296) : ' Arnauld did not allow 
 that perception and ideas are really or numerically distinguished i. e. as one thing 
 from another thing; not even that they arc modally distinguished i. e. as a thing 
 from its mode. He maintained that they are really identical, and only rationally dis- 
 criminated as viewed in different relations ; the indivisible mental modification being 
 called A perception, by Reference to the mind or thinking subject an idea, by refer- 
 ence to the mediate object or thing thought Arnauld everywhere avows that he denies 
 ideas only as existences distinct from the act itself of perception. See (Euwea, t. 
 xxxviii pp. 187, 198, 199, 389.' 
 
 ' The opinion of Arnauld in regard to the nature of ideas was by no means over- 
 looked by subsequent philosophers. It is found fully detailed in almost every systema- 
 tic course or compend of philosophy, which appeared for a long time after its first pro- 
 mulgation, and in many of these it is the doctrine recommended as the true. Arnauld's 
 was indeed the opinion which latterly prevailed in the Cartesian school. From this it 
 passed into other schools. Leibnitz, like Arnanld, regarded Ideas, Notions, Represen- 
 tations, as mere modifications of the mind (what by his disciples were called material 
 ideas, like the cerebral ideas of Descartes, are out of the question), and no cruder 
 opinion than this has ever subsequently found a footing in any of the German systems. 
 
 ' " I don't know," says Mr. Stewart, " of any author who, prior to Dr. Reid, has ex- 
 pressed himself on the subject with so much justness and precision as Father Buffier. 
 in the following passage of his Treatise on ' First Truths :' 
 
 '"If we confine ourselves to what is intelligible in our observations on ideas, we 
 will say they are nothing but mere modifications of the mind as a thinking being. 
 They are called ideas with regard to the object represented; and perceptions with 
 regard to tire faculty representing. It is manifest that our ideas, considered in this 
 sense, are not more distinguished than motion is from abody moved.' (P. 311, English 
 Translation.)" Idem. iii. Add. to vol. i. p. 10. 
 
 ' In this passage, Buffier only repeats the doctrine of Arnauld, in Arnauld's own 
 words. 
 
 Dr. Thomas Brown, on the other hand, has endeavored to show that this doctrine
 
 212 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 Reid was therefore wrong, and did Arimuld less than justice, 
 in viewing his theory 'as a weak attempt to reconcile two incon- 
 sistent doctrines:' he was wrong, and did Arnauld more than 
 justice, in supposing that one of these doctrines is not incompat- 
 ible with his own. The detection, however, of this error only 
 tends to manifest more clearly, how just, even when under its 
 influence, was Reid's appreciation of the contrast subsisting be- 
 tween his own and Arnauld's opinion, considered as a whole ; 
 and exposes more glaringly Brown's general misconception of 
 Reid's philosophy, and Jiis present gross misrepresentation, in 
 affirming that the doctrines of the two philosophers were identi- 
 cal, and by Reid admitted to be the same. 
 
 Nor is Dr. Brown more successful in his defence of LOCKE. 
 
 Supposing always, that ideas were held to be something 
 distinct from their cognition, Reid states it, as that philosopher's 
 opinion, ' that images of external objects were conveyed to the 
 brain ; but whether he thought with Descartes [erratum for Dr. 
 Clarke ?] and Newton, that the images in the brain are perceived 
 by the mind, there present, or that they are imprinted on the 
 mind itself, is not so evident.' This Dr. Brown, nor is he origi- 
 nal in the assertion, pronounces a flagrant misrepresentation. 
 Not only does he maintain, that Locke never conceived the idea 
 to be substantially different from the mind, as a material image 
 in the brain ; but, that he never supposed it to have an existence 
 apart from the mental energy of which it is the object. Locke, 
 he asserts, like Arnauld, considered the idea perceived and the 
 percipient act, to constitute the same indivisible modification of 
 the conscious mind. We shall see. 
 
 In his lan.guo.ge, Locke is, of all philosophers, the most figura- 
 tive, ambiguous, vascillating, various, and even contradictory; 
 
 (which he Identifies with Reid's) had been long the catholic opinion ; nnd that Reid, in 
 his attack on the Ideal system, only refuted what had heen already almost universally 
 exploded. In this attempt he is. however, singularly unfortunate ; for, with the ex- 
 ception of Crousaz, all the examples he adduces to evince the prevalence of Arnauld's 
 doctrine are only so many mistakes, so many instances, in fact, which might be alleged 
 in confirmation of the very opposite conclusion. 1 W.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 213 
 
 as has been noticed by Reid, and Stewart, and Brown himself, 
 indeed, we believe by every author who has had occasion to com- 
 ment on this philosopher. The opinions of such a writer are not, 
 therefore, to be assumed from isolated and casual expressions, 
 which themselves require to be interpreted on the general analo- 
 gy of his system ; and yet this is the only ground on which Dr. 
 Brown attempts to establish his conclusions. Thus, on the mat- 
 ter under discussion, though really distinguishing, Locke verbally 
 confounds, the objects of sense and of intellect, the operation 
 and its object, the objects immediate and mediate, the object 
 and its relations, the images of fancy and the notions of the 
 understanding. Consciousness is converted with Perception, 
 Perception with Idea, Idea with Ideatum, and with Notion, 
 Conception, Phantasm, Representation, Sense, Meaning, &c. Now, 
 his language identifying ideas and perceptions, appears conform- 
 able to a disciple of Arnauld ; and now it proclaims him a fol- 
 lower of Digby, explaining ideas by mechanical impulse, and 
 the propagation of material particles from the external reality to 
 the brain. The idea would seem, in one passage, an organic 
 affection, the mere occasion of a spiritual representation ; in 
 another, a representative image, in the brain itself. In employ- 
 ing thus indifferently the language of every hypothesis, may we 
 not suspect, that he was anxious to be made responsible for 
 none ? One, however, he has formally rejected ; and that is the 
 very opinion attributed to him by Dr. Brown, that the idea, or 
 object of consciousness in perception, is only a modification of 
 the mind itself. 
 
 We do not deny, that Locke occasionally employs expressions, 
 which, in a writer of more considerate language, would imply the 
 identity of ideas with the act of knowledge ; and, under the cir- 
 cumstances, we should have considered suspense more rational 
 than a dogmatic confidence in any conclusion, did not the follow- 
 ing passage, which has never, we believe, been noticed, appear a 
 positive and explicit contradiction of Dr. Brown's interpretation. 
 It is from Locke's Examination of Malebranche's Opinion, which
 
 214 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 as subsequent to the publication of the Essay, must be held au- 
 thentic, in relation to the doctrines of that work. At the same 
 time, the statement is articulate and precise, and possesses all 
 the authority of one cautiously made in the course of a polemical 
 discussion. Malebranche coincided with Arnauld, and conse- 
 quently with Locke, as interpreted by Brown, to the extent of 
 supposing, that sensation proper is nothing but a state or modifi- 
 cation of the mind itself ; and Locke had thus the opportunity 
 of expressing, in regard to this opinion, his agreement or dissent. 
 An acquiescence in the doctrine, that the secondary qualities, ot 
 which we are conscious in sensation, are merely mental states, by 
 no means involves an admission that the primary qualities of 
 which we are conscious in perception, are nothing more. Male- 
 branche, for example, affirms the one and denies the other. But 
 if Locke be found to ridicule, as he does, even the opinion which 
 merely reduces the secondary qualities to mental states, a for tiori, 
 and this on the principle of his own philosophy, he nnist be held 
 to reject the doctrine, which would reduce not only the non- 
 resembling sensations of the secondary, but even the resembling, 
 and consequently extended, ideas of the primary qualities of 
 matter, to modifications of the immaterial unextended mind. In 
 these circumstances, the following passage is superfluously con- 
 clusive against Brown, and equally so, whether we coincide or 
 not in all the principles it involves : ' But to examine their doc- 
 trine of modification a little further. Different sentiments (sensa- 
 tions) are different modifications of the mind. The mind, or 
 soul, that perceives, is one immaterial indivisible substance. Now 
 I see the white and black on this paper, I hear one singing in 
 the next room, I feel the warmth of the fire I sit by, and I taste 
 an apple I am eating, and all this at the same time. Now, I ask, 
 take modification for what you please, can the same unextended, 
 indivisible substance have different, nay, inconsistent and opposite 
 (as these of white and black must be) modifications at the same 
 time ? Or must we suppose distinct parts in an indivisible sub- 
 stance, one for black, another for white, and another for red ideas,
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 215 
 
 and so of the rest of those infinite sensations, which we have in 
 sorts and degrees ; all which we can distinctly perceive, and so 
 are distinct ideas, some whereof are opposite, as heat and cold, which 
 yet a man may feel at the same time ? I was ignorant before 
 how sensation was performed in us : this they call an explanation 
 of it ! Must I say now I understand it better ? If this be to 
 cure one's ignorance, it is a very slight disease, and the charm of 
 two or three insignificant words will at any time remove it ; pro- 
 batum est? (Sec. 39.) This passage, as we shall see, is corre- 
 spondent to the doctrine held on this point by Locke's personal 
 friend and philosophical follower, Le Clerc. (But, what is curi- 
 ous, the suppositions which Locke here rejects, as incompatible 
 with the spirituality of mind, are the very facts on which Ammo- 
 nius Hermiae, Philoponus, and Condillac, among many others, 
 found their proof of the immateriality of the thinking subject.) 
 
 But if it be thus evident that Locke held neither the third 
 form of representation, that lent to him by Brown, nor even the 
 second ; it follows that Reid did him any thing but injustice, in 
 supposing him to maintain that ideas are objects, either in the 
 brain, or in the mind itself. Even the more material of these 
 alternatives has been the one generally attributed to him by his 
 critics,* and the one adopted from him by his disciples.f Nor is 
 this to be deemed an opinion too monstrous to be entertained by 
 so enlightened a philosopher. It was, as we shall see, the com- 
 mon opinion of the age ; the opinion, in particular, held by the 
 most illustrious of his countrymen and contemporaries by New- 
 ton, Clarke, Willis, Hook, &c.J The English psychologists have 
 indeed been generally very mechanical. 
 
 * To refer only to the first and last of his regular critics : see Solid Phi- 
 losophy assarted against the Fancies of the Jdelsts, by J. S. [JonN SERGEANT.] 
 Lond. 1697, p. 161, a very curious book, absolutely, we may say, unknown; 
 and COUSIN, Cours de Philosophic, t. ii. 1829 ; pp. 330, 357, 325, 365 the most 
 important work on Locke since the Nouveaux Essais of Leibnitz. 
 
 t TUCKER'S Light of Nature, i. pp. 15, 18, ed. 2. 
 
 + On the opinion of Newton and Clarke, see Des Maizcaux's Eecueil, i. 
 pp. 7, 8, 9, 15, 22, 75, 127, 169, &e. Genovesi notices the crudity of New-
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 Dr. Brown at length proceeds to consummate his imagined 
 victory by ' that most decisive evidence, found not in treatises read 
 only by a few, but in the popular elementary works of science of 
 the time, the general text-books of schools and colleges.' He 
 quotes, however, only two : the Pneumatology of Le Clerc, and 
 the Logic of Crousaz. 
 
 ' LE CLERC,' says Dr. Brown, ' in his chapter on the nature of 
 ideas, gives the history of the opinions of philosophers on this 
 subject, and states among them the very doctrine which is most 
 forcibly and accurately opposed to the ideal system of perception. 
 " Alii putant ideas et perccptiones idearum easdem esse, licet rela- 
 tionibus differant. Idea, uti censent, proprie ad objectum refer- 
 tur, quod mens considerat; perceptio, vere ad mentem ipsam 
 quae percipit : sed duplex ilia relatio ad unam modificationem 
 mentis pertinet. Itaque, secundum hosce philosophos, nullac sunt, 
 proprie, loquendo, ideas a mente nostra distinctae." What is it, I 
 may ask, which Dr. Reid considers himself as having added to 
 this very philosophical view of perception ? and if he added noth- 
 ing, it is surely too much to ascribe to him the merit of detect- 
 ing errors, the counter statement of ichich had long formed a. part 
 of the elementary works of the schools} 
 
 In the first place, Dr. Reid certainly ' added' nothing 'to this 
 
 ton's doctrine, ' Mentem in certbro prjesidcrc atquc in eo, suo scilicet senso- 
 rio, rerum imagines cemereS On Willis, BOO his work De Anima Jjrvtorum, 
 p. 64, alibi, cd. 1072. On Hook, sec his Lect. on Light, 7. We know not 
 whether it has been remarked that Locke's doctrine of particles and impulse, 
 is precisely that of Sir Kenelm Dighy ; and if Locke adopts one part of so 
 jfross an hypothesis, what is there improbable in his adoption of the other f 
 that the object of perception is, a ' material participation of the bodies 
 that work on the outward organs of the senses' (Digby, Treatise of Bodies, 
 c. 82). As a specimen of the mechanical explanations of mental phenomena 
 then considered satisfactory, we quote Sir Kenelm's theory of memory. 
 ' Out of which it followeth, that the little similitudes which are in the caves 
 of the brain, wheeling and swimming about, almost in such sort -as you see 
 in the washing of currants or rice by the winding about and circular turning 
 of the cook's hand, divers sorts of bodies do go their course for a pretty 
 while ; so that the most ordinary objects cannot but present themselves 
 quickly,' &c., <fcc. (ibidem).
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 217 
 
 very philosophical view of perception,' but he exploded it alto- 
 gether. 
 
 In the second, it is false, either that this doctrine of perception 
 ' had long formed part of the elementary works of the schools? 
 or that Le Clerc affords any countenance to this assertion. On 
 the contrary, it is virtually stated by him to be the novel paradox 
 of a single philosopher ; nay, to carry the blunder to hyperbole, 
 it is already, as such a singular opinion, discussed and referred to 
 its author by Reid himself. Had Dr. Brown proceeded from 
 the tenth paragraph, which he quotes, to the fourteenth, which 
 he could not have read, he would have found, that the passage 
 extracted, so far from containing the statement of an old and 
 familiar dogma in the schools, was neither more nor less, than 
 a statement of the contemporary hypothesis of ANTONY AR- 
 NAULD ! and of Antony Arnauld alone ! ! 
 
 In the third place, from the mode in which he cites Le Clerc, 
 his silence to the contrary, and the general tenor of his statement, 
 Dr. Brown would lead us to believe that Le Clerc himself coin- 
 cides in ' this very philosophical view of perception.' So far, 
 however, from coinciding with Arnauld, he pronounces his opin- 
 ion to .be false ; controverts it on very solid grounds ; and in 
 delivering his own doctrine touching ideas, though sufficiently 
 cautious in telling us what they are, he has no hesitation in 
 assuring us, among other things which they cannot be, that they 
 are not modifications or essential states of mind. ' Non est (idea 
 sc.) modijicatio aut essentia mentis : nam prseterquam quod sen- 
 timus ingens esse discrimen inter ideae perceptionem et sensatio- 
 iiem ; quid habet mens nostra simile monti, aut innumeris ejus- 
 modi ideis ?' (Pneumat., sect. i. c. 5, 10.) 
 
 On all this no observation of GUI'S can be either so apposite or 
 authoritative, as the edifying reflections with which Dr. Brown 
 himself concludes his vindication of the philosophers against 
 Reid. Brown's precept is sound, but his example is instructive. 
 One word we leave blank, which the reader may himself supply. 
 ' That a mind so vigorous as that of Dr. should have 
 
 10
 
 218 PHILOSOPHY OF PEECEPTION. 
 
 been capable of the series of misconceptions which we have traced, 
 may seem wonderful, and truly is so ; and equally, or rather 
 still more wonderful is the general admission of his merit in this 
 respect. I trust it will impress you with one important lesson 
 to consult the opinions of authors in their own works, and not 
 in the works of those who profess to give a faithful account 
 of them. From my own experience I can most truly assure you. 
 that there is scarcely an instance in which / have found the view 
 / had received of them to be faithful. There is usually some- 
 thing more, or something less, which modifies the general result ; 
 and by the various additions and subtractions thus made, so much 
 of the spirit of the original doctrine is lost, that it may, in some 
 cases, be considered as having made a fortunate escape, if it be 
 not at last represented as directly opposite to what it is. 1 (Lect. 
 xxvii. p. 175.) 
 
 The cause must, therefore, be unconditionally decided in favor 
 of Reid, even on that testimony, which Brown triumphantly pro- 
 duces in court as ' the most decisive evidence 1 against him : 
 here then we might close our case. To signalize, however, more 
 completely the whole character of the accusation, we shall call a 
 few witnesses ; to prove, in fact, nothing more than that Brown's 
 own ' most decisive evidence' is not less favorable to himself, 
 than any other that might be cited from the great majority of the 
 learned. 
 
 MALEBRANCHE, in his controversy with Arnauld, everywhere 
 assumes the doctrine of ideas, really distinct from their percep- 
 tion, to be the one ' commonly received ;' nor does his adversary 
 venture to dispute the assumption. (Rep. au Livre des Idees. 
 ARNAULD, CEuv. t. xxxviii. p. 388.) 
 
 LEIBNITZ, on the other hand, in answer to Clarke, admits, that 
 the crude theory of ideas held by this philosopher, was the com- 
 mon. 'Je ne demeure point d'accord des notions vulgaires. 
 comme si les Images des chosen ttoient transporters, par les 
 organes, jusqu'a Vame. Cette notion de la Philosophic Vulgaire 
 n'est point intelligible, comme les nouveaux Cartesiens 1'ont assez
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 219 
 
 montre. L'on ne sauroit expliquer comment la substance imma- 
 terielle est affectee par la matidre : et soutenir une chose non 
 intelligible la-dessus, c'est recourir a la notion scholastique chime- 
 rique de je ne sai quelles esp&es intentionelles inexpliquable, qui 
 passent des organes dans 1'ame.' (Opera, II. p. 161.) Nor does 
 Clarke, in reply, disown this doctrine for himself and others. 
 (Ibid. p. 182). 
 
 BRUCKER, in his Historia PhilosopMca Doctrince de Ideis 
 (1723), speaks of Arnauld's hypothesis as a 'peculiar opinion, 
 rejected by 'philosophers in general (plerisque eruditis),' and 
 as not less untenable than the paradox of Malebranche. (P. 
 248.) 
 
 Dr. Brown is fond of text-books. Did we condescend to those 
 of ordinary authors, we could adduce a cloud of witnesses against 
 him. As a sample, we shall quote only three, but these of the 
 very highest authority. 
 
 CHRISTIAN THOMASIUS, though a reformer of the Peripatetic 
 and Cartesian systems, adopted a grosser theory of ideas than 
 either. In his Introductio ad Philosophiam aulicam (1*702), he 
 defines thought in general, a mental discourse ' about images, by 
 the motion of external bodies, and through the organs of sense, 
 stamped in the substance of the brain. 1 (c. 3. 29. See also 
 his Inst. Jurispr. Div., L. i. c. 1, and Introd. in Phil, ration., 
 c. 3.) 
 
 S'GRAVESANDE, in his Introductio ad Philosophiam (1736), 
 though professing to leave undetermined, the positive question 
 concerning the origin of ideas, and admitting that sensations are 
 ' nothing more than modifications of the mind itself;' makes no 
 scruple, in determining the negative, to dismiss, as absurd, the 
 hypothesis, which would reduce sensible ideas to an equal sub- 
 jectivity. ' Mcntem iftsam has Ideas efficere, et sibi ipsi repre- 
 sentare res, quarum his solis Ideis cognitionem acquirit, nullo 
 modo conc'pi potcst. Nulla inter causam et effectum relatio dare- 
 tur.' ( 279, 282.) 
 
 GENOVESI, in his Elementa Mctaphysicce (1748), lays it down
 
 220 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 as a fundamental position of philosophy, that ideas and the act 
 cognitive of ideas are distinct (' Prop. xxx. Idece et Perceptio- 
 nes non videntur esse posse una eademque res 1 )] and he ably 
 refutes the hypothesis of Arnauld, which he reprobates as a 
 paradox, unworthy of that illustrious reasoner. (Pars II. p. 
 140.) 
 
 VOLTAIRE'S Dictionaire Philosophique may be adduced as rep- 
 resenting the intelligence of the age of Reid himself. ' Qu'est 
 ce qu'une Idee ? C'est une Image qui se peint dans mon cerveau. 
 Toutes vos penstes sont done des images ? Assurement? <fec. 
 (voce Idee.) 
 
 What, in fine, is the doctrine of the two most numerous schools 
 of modern philosophy the LEIBNITIAN and KANTIAN ?* Both 
 maintain that the mind involves representations of which it is 
 not, and never may be, conscious ; that is, both maintain the 
 second form of the hypothesis, and one of the two that Reid 
 understood and professedly assailed. [This statement requires 
 qualification.] 
 
 In Crousaz, Dr. Brown has actually succeeded in finding one 
 example (he might have found twenty), of a philosopher, before 
 Reid, holding the same theory of ideas with Arnauld and him- 
 self.f 
 
 * LEIBNITZ; Opera, Dutensii, torn. ii. pp. 21, 23, 33, 214, pars ii. pp. 
 187, 145, 148. (Enures Philos. par Raspe, pp. 66, 67, 74, 96, ets. WOLF; 
 PsycM. Rat. 10, et-s. Psychol. Emp. 48. KANT Crttik d. r. V. p. 
 376, ed. 2. Anthropologie, 5. With one restriction, Leibnitz's doctrine 
 is that of the lower Platonists, who maintained that the soul actually con- 
 tains representations of every possible substance and event in the world 
 during the revolution of the great year ; although these cognitive reason* 
 are not elicited into consciousness, unless the reality, thus represented, 
 be itself brought within the sphere of the sensual organs. (Plotinus, 
 Enn. V. lib. vii. cc. 1, 2, 3.) 
 
 t In speaking of this author, Dr. Brown, who never loses an opportunity 
 to depreciate Reid, goes out of his way to remark, ' that precisely the same 
 distinction of sensations and perceptions, on which Dr. Reid founds so much, 
 is stated and enforced in the different works of this ingenious writer,' and 
 expatiates on this conformity of the two philosophers, as if he deemed its de- 
 tection to be something new and curious. Mr. Stewart had already noticed 
 it in his Essays. But neither he nor Brown seem to recollect, that Crousaz
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 221 
 
 The reader is now in a condition to judge of the correctness 
 of Brown's statement, 'that with the exception of Malebranche 
 and Berkeley, who had peculiar and very erroneous notions on 
 the subject, ALL the philosophers whom Dr. Reid considered him- 
 self as opposing' (what ! Newton, Clarke, Hook, Norris, Porter- 
 field, <fec. ? these, be it remembered, ALL severally attacked by 
 Reid, Brown has neither ventured to defend, nor to acknowledge 
 that he could not), ' would, if they had been questioned by him, 
 have admitted, before they heard a single argument on his part, 
 that their opinions with respect to ideas were precisely the same as 
 his own? (Lect. xxvii. p. 174.) 
 
 We have thus vindicated our original assertion : BROWN HAS 
 
 NOT SUCCEEDED IN CONVICTING REID, EVEN OF A SINGLE ERROR. 
 
 Brown's mistakes regarding the opinions on perception, enter- 
 tained by Reid and the philosophers, are perhaps, however, even 
 less astonishing, than his total misconception of the purport of 
 Hume's reasoning against the existence of matter, and of the 
 argument by which Reid invalidates Hume's skeptical conclusion. 
 We shall endeavor to reduce the problem to its simplicity. 
 
 Our knowledge rests ultimately on certain facts of conscious- 
 ness, 1 which as primitive, and consequently incomprehensible, are 
 
 only copies Malebranche, re et verbis, and that Reid had himself expressly 
 assigned^ to that philosopher the merit of first recognizing the distinction. 
 This is incorrect. But M. Koyer-Collard (Reid, (Euvres, t. iii. p. 329) is still 
 more inaccurate in thinking that Malebranche and Leibnitz (Leibnitz \) 
 were perhaps the only philosophers before Eeid, who had discriminated per- 
 ception from sensation. The distinction was established by Descartes ; and 
 after Malebranche, but long before Eeid, it had become even common ; and 
 so far is Leibnitz from having any merit in the matter, his criticism of Male- 
 branche shows, that with all his learning he was strangely ignorant of a dis- 
 crimination then familiar to philosophers in general, which may indeed be 
 traced under various appellations to the most ancient times. [A contribu- 
 tion 1 towards this history, and a reduction of the qualities of matter to three 
 classes, under the names of Primary, Secundo-primary, and Secondary, ia 
 given in the Supplementary Dissertations appended to Eeid's Works (p. 
 825-875.)] 
 
 1 See Part First, Philosophy of Common Sense. \V. 
 
 It forms the fifth chapter of the second part of this voL W.
 
 222 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 given less in the form of cognitions than of beliefs. But if con- 
 sciousness in its last analysis in other words, if our primary 
 experience, be a faith ; the reality of our knowledge turns on the 
 veracity of our constitutive beliefs. As ultimate, the quality of 
 these beliefs cannot be inferred ; their truth, however, is in the 
 first instance to be presumed. As given and possessed, they 
 must stand good until refuted; 'neganti incumbit probatio? It 
 is toot to be presumed, that intelligence gratuitously annihilates 
 itself; that Nature operates in vain ; that the Author of na- 
 ture creates only to deceive. 
 
 5' SVITOTI Trdfixav dirdAXuraj, fivnva irdvrtf 
 Aaot $;;(ii'ou(j(' Qcou tv n IOTI xai dvrr/.' 
 
 But though the truth of our instinctive faiths must in the first 
 instance be admitted, their falsehood may subsequently be estab- 
 lished : this, however, only through themselves only on the 
 ground of their reciprocal contradiction. Is this contradiction 
 proved, the edifice of our knowledge is undermined ; for ' no lie 
 is of the truth. 1 Consciousness is to the philosopher, what the 
 Bible is to the theologian. Both are professedly revelations of 
 divine truth ; both exclusively supply the constitutive principles 
 of knowledge, and the regulative principles of its construction. 
 To both we must resort for elements and for laws. Each may be 
 disproved, but disproved only by itself. If one or othfr reveal 
 facts, which, as mutually repugnant, cannot but be false, the 
 authenticity of that revelation is invalidated ; and the criticism 
 which signalizes this self-refutation, has, in either case, been able 
 to convert assurance into skepticism, ' to turn the truth of God 
 into a lie,' 
 
 ' Et \io\KTQficLem primam, et convcllere tola 
 Fundamenta quibus nixatur vita taluzque.' 1 LUCB. 
 
 As psychology is only a developed consciousness, that is, a 
 scientific evolution of the facts of which consciousness is the guar- 
 antee and revelation ; the positive philosopher has thus a primary
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 223 
 
 presumption in favor of the elements out of which his system is 
 constructed ; whilst the skeptic, or negative philosopher, must be 
 content to argue back to the falsehood of these elements, from the 
 impossibility which the dogmatist may experience, in combining 
 them into the harmony of truth. For truth is one ; and the end 
 of philosophy is the intuition of unity. Skepticism is not an ori- 
 ginal or independent method ; it is the correlative and consequent 
 of dogmatism ; and so far from being an enemy to truth, it arises 
 only from a false philosophy, as its indication and its cure. ' Alte 
 dubitat, qui altius credit? The skeptic must not himself estab- 
 lish, but from the dogmatist accept, his principles ; and his con- 
 clusion is only a reduction of philosophy to zero, on the hypothe- 
 sis of the doctrine from which his premises are borrowed. Are 
 the principles which a particular system involves, convicted of 
 contradiction ; or, are these principles proved repugnant to others, 
 which, as facts of consciousness, every positive philosophy must 
 admit ; there is established a relative skepticism, or the conclusion, 
 that philosophy, in so far as realized in this system, is groundless. 
 Again, are the principles, which, as facts of consciousness, philos- 
 ophy in general must comprehend, found exclusive of each other ; 
 there is established an absolute skepticism; the impossibility of 
 all philosophy is involved in the negation of the one criterion of 
 truth. Our statement may be reduced to a dilemma. Either the 
 facts of consciousness can be reconciled, or they cannot. If they 
 cannot, knowledge absolutely is impossible, and every system of 
 philosophy therefore false. If they can, no system which supposes 
 their inconsistency can pretend to truth. 
 
 As a legitimate skeptic, Hume could not assail the foundations 
 of knowledge in themselves. His reasoning is from their subse- 
 quent contradiction to their original falsehood ; and his premises, 
 not established by himself, are accepted only as principles univer- 
 sally conceded in the previous schools of philosophy. On the 
 assumption, that what was thus unanimously admitted by phi- 
 losophers, must be admitted of philosophy itself, his argument 
 against the certainty of knowledge was triumphant. Philosophers
 
 224 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 agreed in rejecting certain primitive beliefs of consciousness as 
 false, and in usurping others as true. If consciousness, however, 
 were confessed to yield a lying evidence in one particular, it could 
 not be adduced as a credible witness at all : ' Falsus in uno. 
 falsus in omnibus.'' But as the reality of our knowledge necessa- 
 rily rests on the assumed veracity of consciousness, it thus rests 
 on an assumption implicitly admitted by all systems of philosophy 
 to be illegitimate. 
 
 ' Faciunt, nee, intelligendo, vt nihil inteUigant P 
 
 Reid (like Kant) did not dispute Hume's inference, as deduced 
 from its antecedents. He allowed his skepticisms, as relative, to 
 be irrefragable ; and that philosophy could not be saved from 
 absolute skepticism, unless his conceded premises could be dis- 
 allowed, by refuting the principles universally acknowledged by 
 modern philosophers. This he applied himself to do. He sub- 
 jected these principles to a new and rigorous criticism. If his 
 analysis be correct (and it was so, at least, in spirit and intention), 
 it proved them to be hypotheses, on which the credulous sequa- 
 city of philosophers, ' philosophorum credula natio ' had 
 bestowed the prescriptive authority of self-evident truths ; and 
 showed, that where a genuine fact of consciousness had been sur- 
 rendered, it had been surrendered in deference to some groundless 
 assumption, which, in reason, it ought to have exploded. Philos- 
 ophy was thus again reconciled with Nature ; consciousness was 
 not a bundle of antilogies ; certainty and knowledge were not 
 evicted from man. 
 
 All this Dr. Brown completely misunderstands. He compre- 
 hends neither the reasoning of skepticism, in the hands of Hume, 
 nor the argument from common sense, in those of Reid. Retro- 
 grading himself to the tenets of that philosophy, whose contra- 
 dictions Hume had fairly developed into skepticism, he appeals 
 against this conclusion to the argument of common sense ; albeit 
 that argument, if true, belies his hypothesis, and if his hypothesis 
 be true, is belied by it. Hume and Reid he actually represents 
 as maintaining precisely the same doctrine, on precisely the same
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 225 
 
 grounds ; and finds both concurring with himself, in advocating 
 that very opinion, which the one had resolved into a negation of 
 all knowledge, and the other exploded as a baseless hypothesis. 
 
 Our discussion, at present, is limited to a single question, to 
 the truth or falsehood of consciousness in assuring us of the reality 
 of a material world. In perception, consciousness gives, as an 
 ultimate fact, a belief of the knowledge of the existence of something 
 different from self. As ultimate, this belief cannot be reduced 
 to a higher principle ; neither can it be truly analyzed into a 
 double element. We only believe that this something exists, be- 
 cause we believe that we know (are conscious of) this something 
 as existing ; the belief of the existence is necessarily involved in 
 the belief of the knowledge of the existence. Both are original, or 
 neither. Does consciousness deceive us in the latter, it neces- 
 sarily deludes us in the former ; and if the former, though a fact 
 of consciousness, be false ; the latter, because a fact of conscious- 
 ness, is not true. The beliefs contained in the two propositions : 
 
 1, / believe that a material world exists ; 
 
 2, / believe that I immediately know a material world existing, 
 (in other words, / believe that the external reality itself '* 
 the object of which I am conscious in perception ) : 
 though distinguished by philosophers, are thus virtually iden- 
 tical. 
 
 The belief of an external world, was too powerful, not to com- 
 pel an acquiescence in its truth. But the philosophers yielded to 
 nature, only in so far as to coincide in the dominant result. They 
 falsely discriminated the belief in the existence, from the belief in 
 the knowledge. With a few exceptions, they held fast by the 
 truth of the first ; but, on grounds to which it is not here neces- 
 sary to advert, they concurred, with singular unanimity, in ab- 
 juring the second. The object of which we are conscious in per- 
 ception, could only, they explicitly avowed, be a representative 
 image present to the mind ; an image which, they implicitly- 
 confessed, we are necessitated to regard as identical with the un- 
 known reality itself. Man, in short, upon the common doctrine 
 
 10*
 
 226 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 of philosophy, was doomed by a perfidious nature to realize the 
 fable of Narcissus ; he mistakes self for not-self, 
 
 'corptu putat esse quod umbra eat.' 
 
 To carry these principles to their issue was easy ; and skepti- 
 cism in the hands of Hume was the result. The absolute veracity 
 of consciousness was invalidated by the falsehood of one of its 
 facts ; and the belief of the knowledge, assumed to be delusive, 
 was even supposed in the belief of the existence, admitted to be 
 true. The uncertainty of knowledge in general, and in particu- 
 lar, the problematical existence of a material world, were thus 
 legitimately established. To confute this reduction on the con- 
 ventional ground of the philosophers, Reid saw to be impossible; 
 and the argument which he opposed, was, in fact, immediately 
 subversive of the dogmatic principle, and only mediately of the 
 skeptical conclusion. This reasoning was of very ancient appli- 
 cation, and had been even long familiarly known by the name of 
 the argument from Common Sense. 
 
 To argue from common sense is nothing more than to render 
 available the presumption in favor of the original facts of con- 
 sciousness, that what is by nature necessarily BELIEVED to be, 
 truly is. Aristotle, in whose philosophy this presumption ob- 
 tained the authority of a principle, thus enounces the argument : 
 ' What appears to all, that we affirm to be ; and he who rejects 
 this belief, will, assuredly, advance nothing better worthy of cred- 
 it.' (JEth. Nic. L. x. c. 2.) As this argument rests entirely on 
 a presumption ;' the fundamental condition of its validity is, that 
 this presumption be not disproved. The presumption iu favor of 
 the veracity of consciousness, as we have already shown, is redar- 
 gued by the repugnance of the facts themselves, of which con- 
 sciousness is the complement; as the truth of all can only be 
 vindicated on the truth of each. The argument from common 
 
 1 ' There is,' says Hamilton (Reid p. 447), ' a presumption in favor of the 
 veracity of the primary data of consciousness. This can only be rebutted by 
 showing that these facts arc contradictory. Skepticism attempts to show 
 this 011 the principles which the dogmatism postulates.' W.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 227 
 
 sense, therefore postulates, and founds on the assumption 
 
 *HAT OUR ORIGINAL BELIEFS BE NOT PROVED SELF-CONTRADIC- 
 TORY. 
 
 The harmony of our primary convictions being supposed, and 
 not redargued, the argument from common sense is decisive 
 against every deductive inference not in unison with them. For 
 as every conclusion is involved in its premises, and as these again 
 must ultimately be resolved into some original belief; the conclu- 
 sion, if inconsistent with the primary phenomena of consciousness, 
 must, ex hypothesi^ be inconsistent with its premises, i. e. be logi- 
 cally false. On this ground, our convictions at first hand, per- 
 emptorily derogate from our convictions at second. ' If we know 
 and believe,' says Aristotle, ' through certain original principles, 
 we must know and believe these with paramount certainty, for the 
 very reason that we know and believe all else through them ;' 
 and he eJseAvhere observes, that our approbation is often rather 
 to be accorded to what is revealed by nature as actual, than to 
 what can be demonstrated by philosophy as possible : ' n^otfe'^siv 
 ou SsT ifaLvTct. <roi Sia, TWV Xoywv, clXXd tfoXXaxit: juuxXXov ToTg <pai- 
 
 ' Novimus certissima scientia, et clamante conscientia 1 (to apply 
 the language of Augustine, in our acceptation), is thus a proposi- 
 tion, either absolutely true or absolutely false. The argument 
 from common sense, if not omnipotent, is powerless : and in the 
 hands of a philosopher by whom its postulate cannot be allowed, 
 its employment, if not suicidal, is absurd. This condition of non- 
 contradiction ' is unexpressed by Reid. It might seem to him too 
 evidently included in the very conception of the argument to re- 
 quire enouncement. Dr. Brown has proved that he was wrong. 
 
 * Jacob! ( Werke, II. Vorr. p. 11, ets.) following Fries, places Aristotle at 
 the head of that absurd majority of philosophers, who attempt to demonstrate 
 every thing. This would not have been more sublimely false, had it been 
 said of the German Plato himself. 
 
 1 The two maxims, wliatever is, is ; and it is impossible for the same thing 
 to be, and not to le, are called the principle of Identity, and the principle of 
 Contradiction, or, more properly, Non- Contradiction. W.
 
 228 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 Yet Reid could hardly have anticipated, that his whole philoso- 
 phy, in relation to the argument of common sense, and that argu* 
 ment itself, were so to be mistaken, as to be actually interpreted 
 by contraries. These principles established, we proceed to their 
 application. 
 
 Dr. Brown's error, in regard to Reid's doctrine of perception, 
 involves the other, touching the relation of that doctrine to 
 Hume's skeptical idealism. On the supposition, that Reid views 
 in the immediate object of perception a mental modification, and 
 not a material quality, Dr. Brown is fully warranted in asserting, 
 that he left the foundations of idealism, precisely as he found 
 them. Let it once be granted, that the object known in percep- 
 tion, is not convertible with the reality existing; idealism re- 
 poses in equal security on the hypothesis of a representative per- 
 ception, whether the representative image be a modification of 
 consciousness itself, or whether it have an existence independ- 
 ent either of mind or of the act of thought. The former indeed 
 as the simpler basis, would be the more secure ; and, in point of 
 fact, the egoistical idealism of Fichte, resting on the third form 
 of representation, is less exposed to criticism than the theologi- 
 cal idealism of Berkeley, which reposes on the first. Did Brown 
 not mistake Reid's doctrine, Reid was certainly absurd in thinking 
 a refutation of idealism to be involved in his refutation of the 
 common theory of perception. So far from blaming Brown, on 
 this supposition, for denying to Reid the single merit which that 
 philosopher thought peculiarly his own ; we only reproach him 
 for leaving, to Reid and to himself, any possible mode of resist- 
 ing the idealist at all. It was a monstrous error to reverse Reid's 
 doctrine of perception ; but a greater still not to see that this 
 reversal stultifies the argument from common sense ; and that 
 so far from 'proceeding an safe ground 1 in an appeal to our 
 original beliefs, Reid would have employed, as Brown has 
 actually done, a weapon, harmless to the skeptic, but mortal to 
 himself. 
 
 The belief, says Dr. Brown, in the existence of an external
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 229 
 
 world is irresistible, therefore it is true. On his doctrine of 
 perception, which he attributes also to Reid, this inference is 
 however incompetent, because on that doctrine he cannot fulfil 
 the condition which the argument implies. / cannot but be- 
 lieve that material things exist : / cannot but believe that the 
 material reality is the object immediately known in perception. 
 The former of these beliefs, explicitly argues Dr. Brown, in 
 defending his system against the skeptic, because irresistible, is 
 true. The latter of these beliefs, implicitly argues Dr. Brown, in 
 establishing his system itself, though irresistible, is false. And 
 here not only are two primitive beliefs, supposed to be 
 repugnant, and consciousness therefore delusive; the very 
 belief which is assumed as true, exists in fact only through 
 the other, which, ex hypothesi, is false. Both in reality are 
 one.* Kant, in whose doctrine as in Brown's the immediate 
 
 * This reasoning can only be invalidated either, 1, By disproving the 
 belief itself of the knowledge, as a fact ; or 2, By disproving its attribute 
 of originality. The latter is impossible ; and if possible, would also anni- 
 hilate the originality of the belief of the existence, which is supposed. The 
 former alternative is ridiculous. That we are naturally determined to be- 
 lieve the object known in perception, to be the external existence itself, 
 and that it is only in consequence of a supposed philosophical necessity, we 
 subsequently endeavor by an artificial abstraction to discriminate these, 
 is admitted even by those psychologists whose doctrine is thereby placed 
 in overt contradiction to our original beliefs. Though perhaps superfluous 
 to allege authorities in support of such a point, we refer, however, to the 
 following, which happen to occur to our recollection. DESCARTES, De Pa#s. 
 art. 26. MALEBRANCHE, Reck. I. iii. c. 1. BERKELEY, Works, i. p. 216, 
 and quoted by Keid, Es. I. P. p. 165. HUME, Treat. H. N. i. pp. 330, 
 338, 353, 358, 361, 369, orig. ed. Essays, ii. pp. 154, 157, ed. 1788. As 
 not generally accessible, we translate the following extracts. SCHELLINU 
 (Ideen zu einer Philosophic der Natw. Einl. p. xix. 1st ed.) ' When (in 
 perception) I represent an object, object and representation are one and tht 
 same. And simply in this our mobility to discriminate the object from tht 
 representation during the act, lies the conviction which the common sense 
 of mankind (gemeine Verstand) has of the reality of external things, although 
 these become known to it, only through representations.' (See also p. 
 xxvi.) We cannot recover, at the moment, a passage, to the same effect. 
 in Kant; but the ensuing is the testimony of an eminent disciple. TEN- 
 NEMANN (Ge*ch. d. Phil. II. p, 294), speaking of Plato: ' The illusion thai 
 tilings in tlum&elue* are cognvzalh, is so natural, that we need not marvel if
 
 230 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 object of perception constitutes only a subjective phenomenon, 
 was too acute, not to discern that, on this hypothesis, philos- 
 ophy could not, without contradiction, appeal to the evidence 
 of our elementary faiths. ' Allowing idealism,' he says, ' to be 
 as dangerous as it truly is, it would still remain a scandal to 
 philosophy and human reason in general, to be compelled to 
 accept the existence of external things on the testimony of mere 
 belief.'* 
 
 even philosophers have not been able to emancipate themselves from the 
 prejudice. The common sense of mankind (gemeine Menschenverstand) 
 which remains steadfast within the sphere of experience, recognizes no distinc- 
 tion between things in themselves [unknown reality existing] and phenomena 
 [representation, object known] ; and the philosophizing reason, commences 
 therewith its attempt to investigate the foundations of this knowledge, and 
 to recall itself into system.' See also JACOBI'S David Hume, passim ( Werlce, 
 ii.) and Aw Allwills Britfsammlung ( Wcrke, \. p. 119, eh.) Ueid has been 
 already quoted. 
 
 * Or. d. r. V. Vorr. p. xxxix. Kant's marvellous acuteness did not how- 
 ever enable him to bestow on his 'Only possible demonstration of the reality 
 of an external world? (ibid. p. 275, fts.), even a logical necessity ; nor prevent 
 his transcendental, from being apodeictically resolved (by Jacobi and Fichte 1 ) 
 into absolute, idealism. In this argument, indeed, he collects more in the 
 conclusion, than was contained in the antecedent ; and reaches it by a double 
 naltus, overleaping the foundations both of the egoistical and mystical 
 idealists. Though Kant, in the passage quoted above and in other places, 
 apparently derides the common sense of mankind, and altogether rejects it 
 as a metaphysical principle of truth ; he at last, however, found it necessary 
 (in order to save philosophy from the annihilating energy of his Speculative 
 Reason) to rest on that very principle of un ulimate belief (which he had orig- 
 inally spurned as a basis even of a material reality), the reality of all the sub- 
 limest objects of our interest God, Free Will, Immortality, &c. His Prac- 
 tical Season, as far as it extends, is, in truth, only another (and not even a 
 
 1 ' The doctrine of Kant has been rigorously proved by Jacobi and Fichte to be, in ita 
 legitimate issue, a doctrine of absolute Idealism ; and the demonstrations which the phi- 
 losopher of Koenigsberg has given of the existence of an external world, have been 
 long admitted, even by his disciples themselves, to be inconclusive. But our Scottish 
 philosophers appeal to an argument which the German philosopher overtly rejected the 
 argument, as it is called, from common sense. In their hands, however, this argument 
 is unavailing; for, if it be good against the conclusions of the Idealist, it is good against 
 the premises which they afford him. The common sense of mankind only assures us 
 of the existence of an external and extended world, in assuring us that we are conscious, 
 not merely of the phenomena of mind in relation to matter, but of the phenomena of
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 231 
 
 But Reid is not like Brown, felo de se in his reasoning from 
 our natural beliefs ; and on his genuine doctrine of perception, 
 the argument has a very different tendency. Reid asserts that 
 his doctrine of perception is itself a confutation of the ideal sys- 
 tem ; and so, when its imperfections are supplied, it truly is. For 
 it at once denies to the skeptic and idealist the premises of their 
 conclusion ; and restores to the realist, in its omnipotence, the ar- 
 gument of common sense. The skeptic and idealist can only found 
 on the admission, that the object known is not convertible with 
 the reality existing ; and, at the same time, this admission, by 
 placing the facts of consciousness in mutual contradiction, denies 
 its postulate to the argument from our beliefs. Reid's analysis 
 therefore in its result, THAT WE HAVE, AS WE BELIEVE WE 
 
 HAVE, AN IMMEDIATE KNOWLEDGE OF THE MATERIAL REALITY, 
 
 accomplished every thing at once.* 
 
 Dr. Brown is not, however, more erroneous in thinking that 
 the argument from common sense could be employed by him. 
 than in supposing that its legitimacy, as so employed, was admit- 
 
 better) term for Common Sense. 1 Fichte, too, escaped the admitted nihilism 
 of his speculative philosophy, only by a similar inconsequence in his practical. 
 (See his Bestimmung des Mensclien.) i Naturam expeUasfwrcaJ &c. 
 
 * [This is spoken too absolutely. Eeid I think was correct in the aim of 
 his philosophy ; but in the execution of his purpose he is often at fault, 
 often confused, and sometimes even contradictory. I have endeavored to 
 point out and to correct these imperfections in the edition which I have not 
 yet finished of his works.] 
 
 matter in relation to mind' in other words that we arc immediately percipient of ex- 
 tended things. 
 
 Reid himself seems to have become obscurely aware of this condition ; and, though 
 he never retracted his doctrine concerning the mere suggestion of extension-, we find. 
 in his "Essays on the Intellectual Powers," assertions in regard to the immediate per- 
 ception of external things, which would tend to show that his later views were more in 
 unison with the necessary conviction of mankind.' Reid, p. 129. If! 
 
 i 'This philosopher, in one of his controversial treatises, imprecates eternal damna- 
 tion on himself not only should he retract, but should he even waver in regard to 
 any one principle of his doctrine; a doctrine, the speculative result of which left him. 
 ns he confesses, without even a certainty of his own existence. It is Varro who speaks 
 of the credulo philosophorwn natio ; hut this is to be credulous even in credulity.' 
 Reid, p. 281. W.
 
 232 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 ted by Hume. So little did he suspect the futility, in his own 
 hands, of this proof, he only regards it as superfluous, if opposed 
 to that philosopher, who, he thinks, in allowing the belief in the 
 existence of matter to be irresistible, allows it to be true. (Lect. 
 xxviii. p. 176.) Dr. Brown has committed, perhaps, more impor- 
 tant mistakes than this, in regard to skepticism and to Hume ; 
 none certainly more fundamental. Hume is converted into a 
 dogmatist ; the essence of skepticism is misconceived. 
 
 On the hypothesis that our natural beliefs are fallacious, it is 
 not for the Pyrrhonist to reject, but to establish their authenti- 
 city ; and so far from the admission of their strength being a sur- 
 render of his doubt, the very triumph of skepticism consists in 
 proving them to be irresistible. By what demonstration is the 
 foundation of all certainty and knowledge so effectually subverted, 
 as by showing that the principles, which reason constrains us 
 speculatively to admit, are contradictory of the facts, which our 
 instincts compel us practically to believe ? Our intellectual na- 
 ture is thus seen to be divided against itself; consciousness stands 
 self-convictsd of delusion. ' Surely we have eaten the fruit of 
 lies!' 
 
 This is the scope of the ' Essay on the Academical or Skeptical 
 Philosophy,' 1 from which Dr. Brown quotes. In that essay, pre- 
 vious to the quotation, Hume shows, on the admission of philos- 
 ophers, that our belief in t/ie knowledge of material things, a* im- 
 possible is false ; and on this admission, he had irresistibly estal>- 
 lished the speculative absurdity of our belief in the existence of 
 an external world. In the passage, on the contrary, which Dr. 
 Brown partially extracts, he is showing that this idealism, which 
 in theory must be admitted, is in application impossible. Specu- 
 lation and practice, nature and philosophy, sense and reason, be- 
 lief and knowledge, thus placed in mutual antithesis, give, as their 
 result, the uncertainty of every principle ; and the assertion of 
 this uncertainty is Skepticism. This result is declared even in 
 the sentence, with the preliminary clause of which, Dr. Brown 
 abruptly terminates his quotation.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 233 
 
 But allowing Dr. Brown to be correct in transmuting the skep- 
 tical nihilist into a dogmatic realist ; he would still be wrong (on 
 the supposition that Hume admitted the truth of a belief to be 
 convertible with its invincibility) in conceiving, on the one hand, 
 that Hume could ever acquiesce in the same inconsequent con- 
 clusion with himself; or, on the other, that he himself could, 
 without an abandonment of his system, acquiesce in the legitimate 
 conclusion. On this supposition, Hume could only have arrived 
 at a similar result with Reid ; there is no tenable medium between 
 the natural realism of the one and the skeptical nihilism of the 
 other. ' Do you follow,' says Hume in the same essay, ' the in- 
 stincts and propensities of nature in assenting to the veracity of 
 sense?' I do, says Dr. Brown. (Lect. xxviii. p. 176, alibi.) 
 ' But these,' continues Hume, ' lead you to believe that the very 
 perception or sensible image is the external object. Do you dis- 
 claim this principle in order to embrace a more rational opinion, 
 that the perceptions are only representations of something exter- 
 nal ? It is the vital principle of my system, says Brown, that 
 the mind knows nothing beyond its own states (Lect. passim) ; 
 philosophical suicide is not my choice ; I must recall my admis- 
 sion, and give the lie to this natural belief. 'You here,' pro- 
 ceeds Hume, ' depart from your natural propensities and more 
 obvious sentiments ; and yet are not able to satisfy your reason, 
 which can never find any convincing argument from experience 
 to prove, that the perceptions are connected with any external 
 objects.' I allow, says Brown, that the existence of an external 
 world cannot be proved by reasoning, and that the skeptical argu- 
 ment admits of no logical reply. (Lect. xxviii. p. 175.) 'But' 
 (we may suppose Hume to conclude) ' as you truly maintain that 
 the confutation of skepticism can be attempted only in two ways 
 (ibid.), either by showing that its arguments are inconclusive, 
 or by opposing to them, as paramount, the evidence of our nat- 
 ural beliefs, and as you now, voluntarily or by compulsion, aban- 
 don both ; you are confessedly reduced to the dilemma, either of 
 acquiescing in the conclusion of the skeptic, or of refusing your
 
 234 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 assent upon no ground whatever. Pyrrhonism or absurdity? 
 choose your horn.' 
 
 Were the skepticism into which Dr. Brown's philosophy is thus 
 analyzed, confined to the negation of matter, the result would be 
 comparatively unimportant The transcendent reality of an 
 outer world, considered absolutely, is to us a matter of supreme 
 indifference. It is not the idealism itself that we must deplore ; 
 but the mendacity of consciousness which it involves. Conscious- 
 ness, once convicted of falsehood, an unconditional skepticism, in 
 regard to the character of our intellectual being, is the melan- 
 choly, but only rational, result. Any conclusion may now with 
 impunity be drawn against the hopes and dignity of human na- 
 ture. Our Personality, our Immateriality, our Moral Liberty, 
 have no longer an argument for their defence. 'Man is the 
 dream of a shadow ;' God is the dream of that dream. 
 
 Dr. Brown, after the best philosophers, rests the proof of our 
 personal identity, and of our mental individuality, on the ground 
 of beliefs, which, as ' intuitive, universal, immediate, and irresisti- 
 ble,' he not unjustly regards as ' the internal and never-ceasing 
 voice of our Creator, revelations from on high, omnipotent [and 
 veracious] as their author.' To him this argument is however 
 incompetent, as contradictory. 
 
 What we know of self or person, we know, only as given in 
 consciousness. In our perceptive consciousness there is revealed 
 asan ultimate fact a self and a not -self ; each given as independ- 
 ent each known only in antithesis to the other. No belief is 
 more ' intuitive, universal, immediate, or irresistible,' than that 
 this antithesis is real and known to be real ; no belief is therefore 
 more true. If the antithesis be illusive, self and not-self, subject 
 and object, I and Thou are distinctions without a difference ; and 
 consciousness, so far from being ' the internal voice of our Crea- 
 tor,' is shown to be, like Satan, ' a liar from the beginning.' The 
 reality of this antithesis, in different 2*irts of his philosophy Dr. 
 Brown affirms and denies. In establishing his theory of percep- 
 tion, he articulately denies, that mind is conscious of aught be-
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 235 
 
 yond itself; virtually asserts that what is there given in con- 
 sciousness as not-self, is only a phenomenal illusion, a modifica- 
 tion of self, which our consciousness determines us to believe the 
 quality of something numerically and substantially different. 
 Like Narcissus again, he must lament, 
 
 ' Me ego sum sensi, sed me mea fallit imago.' 1 
 
 After this implication in one part of his system that our belief 
 in the distinction of self and not-self is nothing more than the 
 deception of a lying consciousness ; it is startling to find him, in 
 others, appealing to the beliefs of this same consciousness as to 
 ' revelations from on high ;' nay, in an especial manner alleg- 
 ing ' as the voice of our Creator,' this very faith in the distinction 
 of self and not-self, through the fallacy of which, and of which 
 alone, he had elsewhere argued consciousness of falsehood. 
 
 On the veracity of this mendacious belief, Dr. Brown establishes 
 his proof of our PERSONAL IDENTITY. (Lect. xii.-xv.) Touching 
 the object of perception, when its evidence is inconvenient, this 
 belief is quietly passed over as incompetent to distinguish not-self 
 from self ; in the question regarding our personal identity, where 
 its testimony is convenient, it is clamorously cited as an inspired 
 witness, exclusively competent to distinguish self from not-self. 
 Yet, why, if in the one case, it mistook self for not-self, it 
 may not, in the other, mistake not-self for self, would appear a 
 problem not of the easiest solution. 
 
 The same belief, with the same inconsistency, is again called in 
 to prove the INDIVIDUALITY OF MIND. (Lect. xcvi.) But if we 
 are fallaciously determined, in perception, to believe what is sup- 
 posed indivisible, identical, and one, to be plural and different 
 and incompatible (self self + not-self) ; how, on the authority 
 of the same treacherous conviction, dare we maintain, that the 
 phenomenal unity of consciousness affords a guarantee of the real 
 simplicity of the thinking principle ? The materialist may now 
 contend, without fear of contradiction, that self is only an illusive 
 phenomenon ; that our consecutive identity is that of the Delphic
 
 236 PHILOSOPHY OF 1'KRCEPTION. 
 
 ship, and our present unity merely that of a system of co-ordinate 
 activities. To explain the phenomenon, he has only to suppose, 
 as certain theorists have lately done, an organ to tell the lie of 
 our personality ; and to quote as authority for the lie itself, the 
 I*erfidy of consciousness, on which the theory of a representative 
 perception is founded. 
 
 On the hypothesis of a representative perception, there is, in 
 fact, no salvation from materialism, on the one side, short of 
 idealism skepticism nihilism, on the other. Our knowledge of 
 mind and matter, as substances, is merely relative ; they 'are 
 known to us only in their qualities ; and we can justify the pos- 
 tulation of two different substances, exclusively on the supposition 
 of the incompatibility of the double series of phenomena to coin- 
 here in one. Is this supposition disproved ? the presumption 
 against dualism is again decisive. ' Entities are not to be multi- 
 plied without necessity* ' A plurality of principles is not to be 
 assumed where the phenomena can be explained by one.' 1 In Brown's 
 theory of perception he abolishes the incompatibility of the two 
 series ; and yet his argument, as a dualist, for an immaterial prin- 
 ciple of thought, proceeds on the ground, that this incompatibility 
 subsists. (Lect. xcvi. pp. 646, 647.) This philosopher denies us 
 an immediate knowledge of aught beyond the accidents of mind. 
 The accidents which we refer to body, as known to us, are only 
 states or modifications of the percipient subject itself ; in other 
 words, the qualities we call material, are known by us to exist, 
 only as they are known by us to inhere in the same substance an 
 t}te qualities we denominate mental. There is an apparent anti- 
 thesis, but a real identity. On this doctrine, the hypothesis of a 
 double principle losing its necessity, becomes philosophically ab- 
 surd ; and on the law of parsimony, a psychological unitarianism, 
 at best, is established. To the argument, that the qualities 
 of the object are so repugnant to the qualities of the sub- 
 ject of perception, that they cannot be supposed the accidents 
 of the same substance ; the Unitarian whether materialist, ideal- 
 ist, or absolutist has only to reply : that so far from the attri-
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 237 
 
 butes of the object being exclusive of the attributes of the subject 
 in this act ; the hypothetical dualist himself establishes, as the 
 fundamental axiom of his philosophy of mind, that the object 
 known is universally identical with the subject knowing. The ma- 
 terialist may now derive the subject from the object, the idealist 
 derive the object from the subject, the absolutist sublimate both 
 into indifference, nay, the nihilist subvert the substantial reality 
 of either ; the hypothetical realist so far from being able to re- 
 sist the conclusion of any, in fact accords their assumptive premi- 
 ses to all. 
 
 The same contradiction would, in like manner, invalidate every 
 presumption in favor of our LIBERTY OF WILL. But as Dr. 
 Brown throughout his scheme of Ethics advances no argument 
 in support of this condition of our moral being, which his philos- 
 ophy otherwise tends to render impossible, we shall say nothing 
 of this consequence of hypothetical realism. 
 
 So much for the system, which its author fondly imagines, ' al- 
 lows to the skeptic no resting-place for his foot, no fulcrum for 
 the instrument he uses ;' so much for the doctrine which Brown 
 would substitute for Reid's ; nay, which he even supposes Reid 
 himself to have maintained. 
 
 ' SCILICET, HOC TOTUM FALSA RATIONS RECEPTUM EST !'* 
 
 * [In this criticism I have spoken only of Dr. Brown's mistakes, and of 
 those only with reference to his attack on Keid. On his appropriating to 
 himself the observations of others, and in particular those of Destutt 
 Tracy, I have said nothing, though an enumeration of these would be 
 necessary to place Brown upon his proper level. That, however, would 
 require a separate discussion.]
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 EEPRESENTATIVE AND PRESENTATIVE KNOWLEDGE. 1 
 
 I. THE DISTINCTION OP PRESENTATIVE, INTUITIVE OR IMME- 
 DIATE, AND OF REPRESENTATIVE OR MEDIATE COGNITION ; 
 WITH THE VARIOUS SIGNIFICATIONS OF THE TERM OBJECT, 
 ITS CONJUGATES AND CORRELATIVES. 
 
 THE correlative terms, Immediate and Mediate, as attributes of 
 knowledge and its modifications, are employed in more than a sin- 
 gle relation. In order, therefore, to obviate misapprehension, it is 
 necessary, in the first place, to determine in what signification it 
 is, that we are at present to employ them. 
 
 In apprehending an individual thing, either itself through 
 sense, or its representation in the phantasy, we have, in a certain 
 sort, an absolute or irrespective cognition, which is justly denom- 
 inated immediate, by constrast to the more relative and mediate 
 knowledge, which, subsequently, we compass of the same object, 
 when, by a comparative act of the understanding we refer it to a 
 class, that is, think or recognize it, by relation to other things 
 under a certain notion or general term. With this distinction we 
 have nothing now to do. The discrimination of immediate and 
 mediate knowledge, with which we are at present concerned, lies 
 within and subdivides what constitutes, in the foregoing division, 
 the branch of immediate cognition ; for we are only here to deal 
 with the knowledge of individual objects absolutely considered, 
 and not viewed in relation to aught beyond themselves. 
 
 This distinction of immediate and mediate cognition it is of the 
 
 1 Hamilton's second Supplementary Dissertation on Reid constitutes this 
 chapter. W.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 239 
 
 highest importance to establish ; for it is one without which the 
 whole philosophy of knowledge must remain involved in ambi- 
 guities. What, for example, can be more various, vacillating, 
 and contradictory, than the employment of the all-important terms 
 object and objective, in contrast to subject and subjective, in the 
 writings of Kant ? though the same is true of those of other re- 
 cent philosophers. This arose from the want of a preliminary 
 determination of the various, and even opposite meanings, of 
 which these terms are susceptible, a selection of the one proper 
 meaning, ; and a rigorous adherence to the meaning thus pre- 
 ferred. But, in particular, the doctrine of Natural Realism can- 
 not, without this distinction, be adequately understood, developed, 
 and discriminated. Reid, accordingly, in consequence of the want 
 of it, has not only failed in giving to his philosophy its precise 
 and appropriate expression, he has failed even in withdrawing it 
 from equivocation and confusion, insomuch, that it even re- 
 mains a question, whether his Doctrine be one of Natural Realism 
 at all. The following is a more articulate development of this 
 important distinction than that which I gave some ten years ago ;' 
 and since, by more than one philosopher adopted. 
 
 For the sake of distinctness, I shall state the different momenta 
 of the distinction in separate Propositions ; and these for more 
 convenient reference I shall number. 
 
 1. A thing is known immediately or proximately, when we 
 cognize it in itself ; mediately or remotely, when we cognize it 
 in or through something numerically different from itself. Imme- 
 diate cognition, thus the knowledge of a thing in itself, involves 
 the/acf of its existence ; mediate cognition, thus the knowledge 
 of a thing in or through something not itself, involves only the 
 possibility of its existence. 
 
 2. An immediate cognition, inasmuch as the thing known 
 is itself presented to observation, may be called a presentative ; 
 and inasmuch as the thing presented is, as it were, viewed by 
 
 1 See previous chapter, p. 178. W.
 
 240 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 the mind face to face, may be called an intuitive* cognition. A 
 mediate cognition, inasmuch as the thing known is held up or 
 mirrored to the mind in a vicarious representation, may be called 
 a representative f cognition. 
 
 3. A thing known is called an object of knowledge. 
 
 4. In a presentative or immediate cognition there is one sole 
 object ; the thing (immediately) known and the thing existing 
 being one and the same. In a representative or mediate cogni- 
 tion there may be discriminated two objects ; the thing (imme- 
 diately) known, and the thing existing being numerically different. 
 
 5. A thing known in itself is the (sole) presentative or intui- 
 tive object of knowledge, or the (sole) object of a presentative or 
 intuitive knowledge. A thing known in and through something 
 else is the primary, mediate, remote,^ real, existent, or represent- 
 
 * On the application of the term Litutiive, in this sense, see in the sequel 
 of this Excursus, p. 256, a. b. 
 
 t The term Representation I employ always strictly, as in contrast to Pre- 
 sentation, and, therefore, with exclusive reference to individual objects, and 
 not in the vague generality of Eepresentatlo or Vorstettung in the Leibnitz- 
 ian and subsequent philosophies of Germany, where it is used for any cogni- 
 tive act, considered, not in relation to what knows, but to what is known ; 
 that is, as the genus including under it Intuitions, Perceptions, Sensations, 
 Conceptions, Notions, Thoughts proper, &c., as species. 
 
 \ The distinction of proximate and remote object is sometimes applied to 
 perception in a different manner. Thus Color (the White of the "Wall for 
 instance), is said to be the proximate, object of vision, because it is seen im- 
 mediately ; the colored thing (the Wall itself for instance) is said to be the 
 remote object of vision, because it is seen only through the mediation of 
 the color. This however is inaccurate. For the Wall, that in which the 
 color inheres, however mediately known, is never mediately seen. It is not 
 indeed an object of perception at all ; it is only the subject of such an otyect. 
 and is reached by a cognitive process, different from the merely percep- 
 tive. 
 
 On the term Heal. The term Real (realis), though always importing 
 the existent, is used in various significations and oppositions. The following 
 occur to me : 
 
 1. As denoting existence, in contrast to the nomenclature of existence, 
 the thing, as contradistinguished from its name. Thus we have definitions 
 and divisions real, and definitions and divisions nominal or verbal. 
 
 2. As expressing the existent opposed to the non-existent, a something iu
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 24:1 
 
 cd, object of (mediate) knowledge, objectum quod ; and a thing 
 tnrough which something else is known is the secondary, imme- 
 
 contrast to a nothing. In this sense the diminutions of existence, to which 
 reality, in the allowing significations, is counterposed, are all real. 
 
 8. As denoting material or external, in contrast to mental, spiritual, or inter- 
 nal, existence. This meaning is improper; so, therefore, is the term Realism, 
 as equivalent to Materialism, in the nomenclature of sorne recent philoso- 
 phers. 
 
 4. As synonymous with actual / and this (a. as opposed to potential, b.) as 
 opposed to possible existence. 
 
 5. As denoting absolute or irrespective, in opposition to phenomenal or rela- 
 tive, existence ; in other words, as denoting things in themselves and out of 
 relation to all else, in contrast to things in relation to, and as known by, in- 
 telligences, like men, who know only under the conditions of plurality and 
 difference. In this sense, which is rarely employed and may be neglected, 
 the Keal is only another term for the Unconditioned or Absolute, T& Syria; tv. 
 
 6. As indicating existence considered as a subsistence in nature (ens extra 
 unimam, ens natures'), it stands counter to an existence considered as a 
 representation in thought. In this sense, reale, in the language of the older 
 philosophy (Scholastic, Cartesian, Gassendian), as applied to esse or ens, is 
 opposed to intentionale, notionale, conceptibile, imaginarvum, rationis,cognitionis, . 
 in anima, in intellectu, prout cognitum, ideale, &c. ; and corresponds with a 
 parte rei, as opposed to aparte intellect/us, with subjectivum, as opposed to oojec- 
 tivum (see p. 240 b. sq. note), with proprium, priiicipale, and fundamentale, 
 as opposed to vkarium, with materiale, as opposed to formale, and with/or- 
 male in seipso, and entitativum, as opposed to representativum, &c. Under 
 this head, in the vascillating language of our more recent philosophy, real 
 approximates to, but is hardly convertible with objective, in contrast to sub- 
 jective in the signification there prevalent. 
 
 7. In close connection with the sixth meaning, real, in the last place, de- 
 dotes an identity or difference founded on the conditions of the existence of 
 a thing in itself, in contrast to an identity or difference founded only on the 
 relation or point of view in which the thing may be regarded by the think- 
 ing subject. In this sense it is opposed to logical or rational, the terms being 
 here employed in a peculiar meaning. Tims a thing which really (re) or in 
 itself is one and indivisible may logically (ratione) by the mind be considered 
 as diverse and plural, and vice versa, what are really diverse and plural may 
 logically be viewed, as one and indivisible. As an example of the former ; 
 the sides and angles of a triangle (or trilateral), as mutually correlative as 
 together making up the same simple figure and as, without destruction of 
 that figure, actually inseparable from it, and from each other, are really one ; 
 but inasmuch as they have peculiar relations which may, in thought be con- 
 sidered severally and for themselves, they are logically twofold. In like man- 
 ner take apprehension and judgment. These are really one, as each involves 
 the other (for we apprehend only as we judge something to be, and we judge 
 only, as we apprehend the existence of the terms compared), and as together 
 
 11
 
 242 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 (Hate, proximate, ideal,* vicarious or representative, object of 
 (mediate) knowledge, objectum quo, or per quod. The former 
 may likewise be styled objectum entitativum. 
 
 6. The Ego as the subject of thought and knowledge is now 
 commonly styled by philosophers simply The Subject ; and Sub- 
 jective is a familiar expression for what pertains to the mind or 
 thinking principle. In contrast and correlation to these, the terms 
 Object and Objective are, in like manner now in general use to 
 denote the Non-ego, its affections and properties, and in general 
 the Really existent as opposed to the Ideally known. These 
 expressions, more especially Object and Objective, are ambiguous ; 
 for though the Non-ego may be the more frequent and obtrusive 
 object of cognition, still a mode of mind constitutes an object of 
 thought and knowledge, no less than a mode of matter. Without, 
 therefore, disturbing the preceding nomenclature, which is not 
 only ratified but convenient, I would propose that, when we wish 
 to be precise, or where any ambiguity is to be dreaded, we should 
 employ on the one hand, either the terms subject-object or subject- 
 ive object (and this we could again distinguish as absolute or as 
 relative) on the other, either object-object, or objective object.\ 
 
 they constitute a single indivisible act of cognition ; but they are logically 
 double, inasmuch as, by mental abstraction, they may be viewed each for 
 itself, and as a distinguishable element of thought. As an example of the 
 latter; individual things, as John, James, Richard, &c., are really (numer- 
 ically) different, as coexisting in nature only under the condition of plu- 
 rality ; but, as resembling objects constituting a single class or notion 
 (man) they are logically considered (generically or specifically) identical 
 and one. 
 
 * I eschew, in general, the employment of the words Idea and Ideal they 
 are BO vague and various in meaning. But they cannot always be avoided, 
 as the conjugates of the indispensable term Idealism. Nor is there, as I use 
 them, any danger from tlieir ambiguity ; for I always manifestly employ 
 them simply for subjective (what is in or of the mind), in contrast to objec- 
 tive (what is out of, or external to, the mind). 
 
 t The terms Subject and Subjective, Object and Objective. I have already had 
 occasion to show, that, in the hands of recent philosophers, the principal 
 terms of philosophy have not only been frequently changed from their orig- 
 inal meanings and correlations, but those meanings and correlations some- 
 times even simply reversed. I have again to do this in reference to the cor-
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 243 
 
 7. If the representative object be supposed (according to one 
 theory) a mode of the conscious mind or self, it may be distin- 
 
 relatives subjective and objective, as employed to denote what Aristotle vaguely 
 expressed by the terifis ra fiplv and rd <p6<ret the things in us, and the things in 
 nature. 
 
 The terms subject and olyect were, for a long time, not sufficiently discrim- 
 inated from each other. Even in the writings of Aristotle rb {nroneiiicvov is 
 used ambiguously for id in quo, the subject proper, and id circa quod, the object 
 proper ; and this latter meaning is unknown to Pluto. The Greek language 
 never, in fact, possessed any one term of equal universality, and of the same 
 definite signification, as object. For the term di-riitti/uvov, which comes the 
 nearest, Aristotle uses, like Plato, in the plural, to designate, in general, the 
 various kinds ofopposites ; and there is, I believe, only a single passage to be 
 found in his writings (De An. ii. c. 4), in which this word can be adequately 
 translated by object. The reason of this, at first* sight, apparent deficiency 
 may have been that as no language, except the Greek, conld express, not by 
 a periphrasis, but by a special word, the object of every several faculty or 
 application of mind (as aia9r)T6v, <j>avTaoT6v,vorjT6v, yviacrrov, firioT^nSv, SoiAi/rdy, 
 ipcKrdv, 6ov\evrdv, TUOT&V, &c., &c.), so the Greek philosophers alone found 
 little want of a term precisely to express the abstract notion of objectivity in 
 its indeterminate universality, which they could apply, as they required it, 
 in any determinate relation. The schoolmen distinguished the subjectum 
 occupationis, from the subjectum inhcKsionis, pr&dicationis, &c., limiting the 
 term objectum (which in classical Latinity had never been naturalized as an 
 absolute term, even by the philosophers) to the former ; and it would have 
 been well had the term subjectum, in that sense, been, at the same time, 
 wholly renounced. This was not, however, done. Even to the present day, 
 the word subject is employed, in most of the vernacular languages, for the 
 materia circa quam, in which signification the term object ought to be exclu- 
 sively applied. But a still more intolerable abuse has recently crept in ; ob- 
 ject has, in French and English, been for above a century vulgarly employed 
 for end, motive, final cause. But to speak of these terms more in detail. 
 
 The term object (objectum, id quod objicitur cognitioni, &c.) involves a 
 two-fold element of meaning. 1, it expresses something absolute, some- 
 thing in itself that is ; for before a thing can be presented to cognition, it 
 must be supposed to exist. 2, It expresses something relative ; for in so 
 far as it is presented to cognition, it is supposed to be only as it is known to 
 exist. Now if the equipoise be not preserved, if either of these elements be 
 allowed Jo preponderate, the word will assume a meaning precisely opposite 
 to that which it would obtain from the preponderance of the other. If the 
 first element prevail, object and objective will denote that which exists of its 
 own nature, in contrast to that which exists only under the conditions of our 
 faculties ; the real in opposition to the ideal. If the second element prevail, 
 object and objective will denote what exists only as it exists in thought ; the 
 ideal in contrast to the real. 
 
 Now both of these counter meanings of the terms object and objective have 
 obtained in the nomenclature of different times and different philosophies,
 
 244 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 guished as Egoistical ; if it be supposed (according to another) 
 something numerically different from the conscious mind or self, 
 
 uay in the nomenclature of the same time und even t^ie same philosophy. 
 Hence great confusion and ambiguity. 
 
 In the scholastic philosophy in which, us already said, object and objective, 
 subject and subjective, were first employed in their high abstraction, and as 
 absolute terms, and, among the systems immediately subsequent, in the Car- 
 tesian and Gassendian schools, the latter meaning was the one exclusively 
 prevalent. In these older philosophies, objectivum, as applied to ens or ease, 
 was opposed loformale and subjectivum ; and corresponded with intentionale, 
 vicarium, representativum, rationale or rations, intellectuale or in inteUectu, 
 proitt cognitum, ideale, &c., as opposed to reale, proprium, principale, funda- 
 mental?, prout in seipso, &c. 
 
 In these schools the esse subjecticum, in contrast to the ease objectivum, de- 
 noted a thing considered as inhering in its subject, whether that subject were 
 mind or matter, as contradistinguished from a thing considered an present to 
 the mind only as an accidental object of thought. Thus the faculty of im- 
 agination, for example, and its acts, were said to have a suJijective existence 
 in the mind ; while its several images or representations had, qua images or 
 objects of consciousness, only an objective. Again, a material thing, say a 
 horse, qua existing, was said to have a subjective being out of the mind ; qua 
 conceived or known, it was said to have an objective being in the mind. 
 Every thought has thus a subjective and an objective phasis ; of which more 
 particularly as follows : 
 
 1. The esse subjectivum, formaU, or proprium of a notion, concept, species, 
 idea, <&c., denoted it as considered absolutely for itself, and as distinguished 
 from the thing, the real object, of which it is the notion, species, &c. ; that is, 
 simply as a mode inherent in the mind as a subject, or as an operation exert- 
 ed by the mind as a cause. In this relation, the esse rtale of a notion, species, 
 &c., was opposed to the following. 
 
 2. The esse objectivum, vicarium, intentionale, ideale, representativum of a 
 notion, concept, specits, idea, &c., denoted it, not as considered absolutely for 
 itself, and as distinguished from its object, but simply as vicarious or repre- 
 sentative of the thing thought. In this relation the esse reale of a notion, 
 &c., was opposed to the mere negation of existence only distinguished 
 it from a simple nothing. 
 
 Hitherto we have seen the application of the term objective determined by 
 the preponderance of the second of the two counter elements of meaning ; 
 we have now to regard it in its subsequent change of sense as determined by 
 the first. 
 
 The cause of this change I trace to the more modern Schoolmen, in the 
 distinction they took of conceptus (as also of notio and intentio) into formalis 
 and objectivus, a distinction both in itself and in its nomenclature, incoiisist- 
 ent and untenable. A. formal concept or notion they defined ' the immedi- 
 ate and actual representation of the thing thought ;' an objective concept or 
 notion they defined' the thing itself which is represented or thought.'
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 245 
 
 it may be distinguished as Non-Egoistical. 1 The former theory 
 supposes two things numerically different : 1, the object repre- 
 
 Now, in the first place, the second of these, is, either not a concept or notion 
 at all, or it is indistinguishable from the first. (A similar absurdity is commit- 
 ted by Locke in his employment of Idea for its object the reality represent- 
 ed by it the Ideatum.) In the second place, the terms formal and objective 
 are here used in senses precisely opposite to what they were when the same 
 philosophers spoke of the esse formale and esse dbjectivum of a notion. 
 
 This distinction and the terms in which it was expressed came however 
 to be universally admitted. Hence, though proceeding from an error, I 
 would account in part, but in part only, for the general commutation latterly 
 effected in the application of the term objective. This change began, I am 
 inclined to think, about the middle of the seventeenth century and in the 
 German schools. Thus Calovius 'Quicquid objective fundamentaliter in 
 natura existit,' &c. (ScriptaPhilosophica, 1651, p. 72.) In the same sense it is 
 used by Leibnitz; e.g. N. Essais, p. 187 ; and subsequently to him by the 
 Leibnitio-Wolfians and other German philosophers in general. This appli- 
 cation of the term, it is therefore seen, became prevalent among his country- 
 men long before the time of Kant ; in the ' Logica ' of whose master Knutzen, 
 I may notice, objective and subjective, in their modern meaning are em- 
 ployed in almost every page. The English philosophers, at the commence- 
 ment of the last century, are found sometimes using the term objective in the 
 old sense, as Berkeley in his ' Siris,' 292 ; sometimes in the new, as Nor- 
 risinhis 'Keason and Faith' (ch. 1), and Oldfield in his 'Essay towards the 
 improvement of Eeason' (Part ii. c. 19), who both likewise oppose it to sub- 
 jective, taken also in its present acceptation. 
 
 But the cause, why the general terms subject and subjective, object and ob- 
 jective, came, in philosophy, to be simply applied to a certain special distinc- 
 tion ; and why, in that distinction, they came to be opposed as contraries 
 this is not to be traced alone to the inconsistencies which I have noticed ; for 
 that inconsistency itself must be accounted for. It lies deeper. It is to be 
 found in the constituent elements of all knowledge itself; and the nomen- 
 clature in question is only an elliptical abbreviation, and restricted applica- 
 tion of the scholastic expressions by which these elements have for many 
 ages been expressed. 
 
 All knowledge is a relation a relation between that which knows (in scho- 
 lastic language, the subject in which knowledge inheres), and that which is 
 known (in scholastic language, the object about which knowledge is conver- 
 sant) ; and the contents of every act of knowledge are made up of elements, 
 and regulated by laws, proceeding partly from its object and partly from its 
 subject. Now philosophy proper is principally and primarily the science of 
 knowledge ; its first and most important problem being to determine What 
 can, we know ? that is, what are the conditions of our knowing, whether 
 
 1 See the next chapter. W.
 
 246 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 sented, 2, the representing and cognizant mind : the latter, 
 three; 1, the object represented, 2, the object representing, 
 3, the cognizant mind. Compared merely with each other, the 
 former, as simpler, may, by contrast to the latter, be considered, 
 
 these lie in the nature of the object, or in the nature of the subject, of knowl- 
 edge? 
 
 But Philosophy being the Science of Knowledge ; and the science of knowl- 
 edge supposing, in its most fundamental and thorough-going analysis, the 
 distinction of the subject and object of knowledge; it is evident, that, to philos- 
 ophy the subject of knowledge would be, by pre-eminence, The Subject, and 
 the object of knowledge by pre-eminence, The Object. It was therefore natu- 
 ral that the object and the objective, the subject and the subjective should be 
 employed by philosophers as simple terms, compendiously to denote the 
 grand discrimination, about which philosophy was constantly employed, and 
 which no others could be found so precisely and promptly to express. In 
 fact, had it not been for the special meaning given to objective in the Schools, 
 their employment in this their natural relation would probably have been of 
 'a much earlier date ; not however that they are void of ambiguity, and have 
 not been often abusively employed. This arises from the following circum- 
 stance : The subject of knowledge is exclusively the Ego or conscious mind. 
 Subject and subjective, considered in themselves, are therefore little liable to 
 equis-ocation. But, on the other hand, the object of knowledge is not neces- 
 sarily a phenomenon of the Non-ego ; for the phenomena of the Ego itself 
 constitute as veritable, though not so various and prominent, objects of cog- 
 nition, as the phenomena of the Non-ego. 
 
 Subjective and objective do not, therefore, thoroughly and adequately dis- 
 criminate that which belongs to mind, and even that which belongs to matter; 
 they do not even competently distinguish what is dependent, from what is 
 independent, on the conditions of the mental self. But in these significations 
 they are and must be frequently employed. Without therefore discarding 
 this nomenclature, which, as fur as it goes, expresses, in general, a distinction 
 of the highest importance, in the most apposite terms ; these terms may by 
 qualification easily be rendered adequate to those subordinate discrimina- 
 tions, which it is often requisite to signalize, but which they cannot simply 
 and of themselves denote. 
 
 Subject and subjective, without any qualifying attribute, I would therefore 
 employ, as has hitherto been done, to mark out what inheres in, pertains 
 to, or depends on, the knowing mind whether of man in general, or of this 
 or that individual man in particular; and this in contrast to object and ob- 
 jective, as expressing what does not so inhere, pertain, and depend. Thus, 
 for example, an art or science is said to be objective, when considered simply 
 as a system of speculative truths or practical rules, but without respect of 
 any actual possessor ; subjective when considered as a habit of knowledge or 
 a dexterity, inherent in the mind, either vaguely of any, or precisely of this 
 or that, possessor. 
 
 But, as has been stated, an object of knowledge imiy be a mode ofmind, or
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 247 
 
 but still inaccurately, as an immediate cognition. 1 The latter of 
 these as limited in its application to certain faculties, and now in 
 fact wholly exploded, may be thrown out of account. 
 
 8. External Perception or Perception simply, is the faculty 
 presentative or intuitive of the phenomena of the Non-Ego or 
 Matter if there be any intuitive apprehension allowed of the Non- 
 Ego at all. Internal Perception or Self -Consciousness is the fac- 
 ulty presentative or intuitive of the phenomena of the Ego or mind. 
 
 9. Imagination or Phantasy? in its most extensive meaning, 
 is the faculty representative of the phenomena both of the exter- 
 nal and internal worlds. 
 
 10. A representation considered as an object is logically, not 
 really, different from a representation considered as an act. Here 
 object and act are merely the same indivisible mode of mind 
 viewed in two different relations. Considered by reference to a 
 (mediate) object represented, it is a representative object ; con- 
 
 it may be something different from mind ; and it is frequently of import- 
 ance to indicate precisely iinder which of these classes that object comes. 
 In this case by an internal development of the nomenclature itself, we might 
 employ, on the former alternative, the term subject-object ; on the latter, the 
 term object-object. 
 
 But the subject-object may be either a mode of mind, of which we are con- 
 scious as absolute and for itself alone, as, for example, a pain or pleasure ; 
 or a mode of mind, of which we are conscious, as relative to, and represen- 
 tative of something else, as, for instance, the imagination of something; 
 past or possible. Of these we might distinguish, when necessary, the one, 
 as the absolute or the real subject-object, the other, as the relative or the ideal 
 or the representative subject-object. 
 
 Finally, it may be required to mark whether the object-object and the svl- 
 ject-object be immediately known as present, or only as represented. In 
 this case we must resort, on the former alternative, to the epithet prefsentatin? 
 or intuitine; on the latter, to those of represented, mediate, remote, primary, 
 principal, &c. 
 
 'This observation has reference to Eeid. See sequel of this chapter, ii. 
 and the following chapter, ii. A, 4. W. 
 
 2 ' The Latin Imayinatio, witli its modifications in the vulgar languages, 
 was employed both in ancient and modern times to express what the Greeks 
 denominated ^avraola. Phantasy, of which Phansy or Fancy is a corruption, 
 and now employed in a more limited sense, was a common name for Imagi- 
 nation with the old English writers.' Reid, p. 379. II'.
 
 248 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 sidered by reference to the mind representing and contemplating 
 the representation, it is a representative act. A representative 
 object being viewed as posterior in the order of nature, but not of 
 time, to the representative act, is viewed as a product ; and the 
 representative act being viewed as prior in the order of nature, 
 though not of time, to the representative object, is viewed as a 
 producing process. The same may be said of Image and Imagi- 
 nation. (Prop. 21, and p. 259, a b, and note.) 
 
 1 1 . A thing to be known in itself must be known as actually 
 existing (Pr. 1), and it cannot be known as actually existing 
 unless it be known as existing in its When and its Where. But 
 the When and Where of an object are immediately cognizable 
 by the subject, only if the When be now (i. e. at the same 
 moment 1 with the cognitive act), and the Where be here (i. e. 
 within the sphere of the cognitive faculty) ; therefore a presenta- 
 tive or intuitive knowledge is only competent of an object present 
 to the mind, both in time and in space. 
 
 12. E converse whatever is known, but not as actually 
 existing now and here, is known not in itself, as the presentative 
 
 1 Time is cognizable and conceivable only as an indefinite past, present, or 
 future. An absolute minimum we cannot fix an infinite division we can- 
 not carry out. We can conceive Time only as a relative. The Present, so 
 far as construable to thought, has no reality. (See p. 488.) Will Sir William 
 then explain to us what he means by the phrase at tht, same moment with? 
 In Extensive Quantity he wisely docs not demand an absolute ' present,' for 
 in that case the Eleatic Zeno's demonstration would hold him motionless. 
 He does seem to demand an absolute present in Extensive Quantity. Abso- 
 lute present, has no place in thought. Perception must take place in time, 
 /. . in an indefinite present. Add that Memory, as Hobbcs, Descartes, and 
 Aristotle call Imagination, is a dying sense ; and what hinders us from say- 
 ing, with Reid, that Memory is an immediate (=non-mediate) knowledge of 
 the past? It seems to us that Hamilton is here crossing a shadow of the 
 Absolute, and that the question may in part be redargued from his own 
 ground of Relativity. We do not mean that Sir William is wrong in making 
 a distinction between Presentative and Representative knowledge, but that 
 the line of demarkation might be shifted. We here speak briefly, and only 
 to the initiated ; and regret that these sheets are passing so rapidly through 
 the press that we cannot discuss the question at some length, for it is one of 
 the most important in philosophy. W.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 249 
 
 object of an intuitive, but only as the remote object of a repre- 
 sentative cognition. 
 
 13. A representative object, considered irrespectively of what 
 it represents, and simply as a mode of the conscious subject, is 
 an intuitive or presentative object. For it is known in itself, as 
 a mental mode, actually existing now and here.* 
 
 * Propositions 10-13 may illustrate a passage in Aristotle's treatise on 
 Memory and Reminiscence (c. 1), which has been often curiously misunder- 
 stood by his expositors ; and as it, in return, serves to illustrate the doctrin* 
 here stated, I translate it : 
 
 ' Of what part of the soul memory is a function, is manifest ; of that, to 
 wit, of which imagination or phantasy is a function. [And imagination had 
 been already shown to be a function of the common sense.] 
 
 ' And here a doubt may be started Whether the affection [or mental 
 modification] being present, the reality absent, that what is not present can 
 be remembered [or, in general, known]. For it is manifest that we must 
 conceive the aifection, determined in the soul or its proximate bodily organ, 
 through sense, to be, as it were, a sort of portrait, of which we say that 
 memory is the habit [or retention]. For the movement excited [to employ 
 the simile of Plato] stamps, as it were, a kind of impression of the total pro- 
 cess of perception! [on the soul or its organ], after the manner of one who 
 applies a signet to wax. . . . 
 
 ' But if such be the circumstances of memory Is remembrance [a cogni- 
 tion] of this affection, or of that from which it is produced? For, if of the 
 latter, we can have no remembrance [or cognition] of things absent ; if of the 
 former, how, as percipient [or conscious of this present affection], can we 
 have a remembrance [or cognition] of that of which we are not percipient 
 [or conscious] the absent [reality] ? Again,! supposing there to be a resem- 
 bling something, such as an impression or picture, in the mind ; the percep- 
 tion [or consciousness] of this Why should it be the remembrance [or cog- 
 nition] of another thing, and not of this something itself? for in the act of 
 remembrance we contemplate this mental affection, and of this [alone] are 
 we percipient [or conscious]. In these circumstances, how is a remembrance 
 [or cognition] possible of what is not present ? For if so, it would seem that 
 what is not present might, in like manner, be seen and heard. 
 
 ' Or is this possible, and what actually occurs ? And thus : As in a por- 
 trait the thing painted is an animal, and a representation (tMv) [of an ani- 
 mal], one and the same being, at once, both (for, though in reality both are 
 not the same, in thought we can view the painting, either [absolutely] as 
 animal, or [relatively] as representation [of an animal]) ; in like manner, the 
 phantasm in us, we must consider, both absolutely, as a phenomenon (Oeu- 
 
 t AitrOtipaTos : this comprehends both the objective presentation atVOi/rdv, <md 
 the subjective energy utodnatf. 
 I I read CTI rf re. Themistius has crt tivt. 
 
 11*
 
 250 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 14. Consciousness is a knowledge solely of what is now and 
 here present to the mind. It is therefore only intuitive, and 
 its objects exclusively presentative. Again, Consciousness is a 
 knowledge of all that is now and here present to the mind : 
 every immediate object of cognition is thus an object of conscious- 
 ness, and every intuitive cognition itself, simply a special form 
 of consciousness. 
 
 15. Consciousness comprehends every cognitive act ; in other 
 words, whatever we are not conscious of, that we do not know. 
 But consciousness is an immediate cognition. Therefore all our 
 mediate cognitions are contained in our immediate. 
 
 16. The actual modifications the present acts and affections 
 of the Ego, are objects of immediate cognition, as themselves 
 objects of consciousness. (Pr. 14.) The past and possible modi- 
 fications of the Ego are objects of mediate cognition, as repre- 
 sented to consciousness in a present or actual modification. 
 
 17. The Primary Qualities* of matter or body, now and here, 
 that is in proximate relation to our organs, are objects of imme- 
 diate cognition to the Natural Realists, 2 of mediate, to the Cos- 
 mothetic Idealists :* the former, on the testimony of consciousness, 
 asserting to mind the capability of intuitively perceiving what is 
 not itself; the latter denying this capability, but asserting to the 
 
 pwa) in itself, and relatively, as a phantasm [or representation] of something 
 different from itself. Considered absolutely, it is a [mere] phenomenon or 
 [irrespecti% r e] phantasm ; considered relatively, it is a representation or recol- 
 lective image. So that when a movement [or mental modification] is in 
 present act; if the soul perceive [or apprehend] it as absolute and for itself, 
 a kind of [irrespective] concept or phantasm seems the result; whereas, if 
 as relative to what is different from itself, it views it (as in the picture) for a 
 representation, and a representation of Coriscus, even although Coriscus has 
 not himself been seen. And here we are differently affected in this mode of 
 viewing [the movement, as painted representation], from what we arc when 
 ' viewing it, as painted animal ; the mental phenomenon, in the one case is, 
 so to say, a mere [irrelative] concept; while in the other, what is remem- 
 bered is here [in the mind], as there [in the picture], a representation.' 
 
 1 On the distinction of the Primary and Secondary Qualities of Matter 
 its history and completion, sec below, chap. v. W. 
 
 * On these Designations, see above, Part I. and the chapter following this.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 251 
 
 mind the power of representing, and truly representing, what it 
 does not know. To the Absolute Idealists 1 matter has no exist- 
 ence as an object of cognition, either immediate or mediate. 
 
 18. The Secondary Qualities* of body now and here, as only 
 present affections of the conscious subject, determined by an 
 unknown external cause, are, on every theory, now allowed to be 
 objects of immediate cognition. (Pr. 16.) 
 
 19. As not now present in time, 3 an immediate knowledge of 
 the past is impossible. The past is only mediately cognizable in 
 and through a present modification relative to, and representative 
 of it as having been. To speak of an immediate knowledge of 
 the past involves a contradiction in adjecto. For to know the 
 past immediately, it must be known in itself; and to be known 
 in itself it must be known as now existing. But the past is just 
 a negation of the now existent : its very notion, therefore, excludes 
 the possibility of its being immediately known. So much for 
 Memory, or Recollective Imagination. 
 
 20. In like manner, supposing that a knowledge of the future 
 were competent, this can only be conceived possible, in and 
 through a now present representation ; that is, only as a mediate 
 cognition. For, as not yet existent, the future cannot be known 
 in itself, or as actually existent. As not here present, an imme- 
 diate knowledge of an object distant in space is likewise impossi- 
 ble. 3 For, as beyond the sphere of our organs and faculties, it 
 cannot be known by them in itself; it can only, therefore, if 
 known at all, be known through something different from itself, 
 that is mediately, in a reproductive or a constructive act of imagi- 
 nation. 
 
 21. A possible object an ens rationis is a mere fabrication 
 of the mind itself; it exists only ideally in and through an act of 
 
 1 On these Designations see above, Part I. and the chapter following this. 
 W. 
 
 2 On the assertions of Reid, Stewart, &c., that the mind is immediately 
 percipient of distant objects, see ii. of this chapter, and ii. of the next 
 chapter. W. 
 
 * See note 1, p. 248. W.
 
 252 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 imagination, and has only a logical existence, apart from that act 
 with which it is really identical. (Pr. 10. and p. 259, a b, with 
 note.) It is therefore an intuitive object in itself; but in so far, 
 as not involving a contradiction, it is conceived as prefiguring 
 something which may possibly exist some-where and some-when 
 this something, too, being constructed out of elements which had 
 been previously given in Presentation it is Representative.' 
 
 Compared together, these two cognitions afford the following 
 similarities and differences. 
 
 A. Compared by reference to their simplicity or complexity, as 
 Acts. 
 
 22. Though both as really considered (re, non ratione), are 
 equally one and indivisible ; still as logically considered (ratione, 
 non re), an Intuitive cognition is simple, being merely intuitive ; 
 a Representative, complex, as both representative and intuitive of 
 the representation. 
 
 B. Compared by reference to the number of their Objects. 
 
 23. In a Presentative knowledge there can only be a single 
 object, and the term object is here therefore univocal. In a Rep- 
 resentative knowledge two different things are viewed as objects, 
 and the term object, therefore, becomes equivocal ; the secondary 
 object within, being numerically different from the primary ob- 
 ject without, the sphere of consciousness, which it represents. 
 
 C. Compared by reference to the relativity of their Ofyects, 
 known in consciousness. 
 
 24. In a presentative cognition, the object known in con- 
 sciousness, being relative only to the conscious subject, may, by 
 contrast, be considered as absolute or irrespective. In a repre- 
 sentative cognition, the object known in consciousness, being, be- 
 sides the necessary reference to the subject, relative to, as vicari- 
 ous of, an object unknown to consciousness, must, in every point 
 
 See the next chapter, i. W.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 253 
 
 of view, be viewed as relative or respective. Thus, it is on all 
 hands admitted, that in Self-consciousness the object is subjective 
 and absolute ; and, that in Imagination, under every form, it is 
 subjective and relative. In regard to external Perception, opin- 
 ions differ. For on the doctrine of the Natural Realists, it is 
 objective and absolute ; on the doctrine of the Absolute Idealists 
 subjective and absolute ; on the doctrine of the Cosmothetic Ideal- 
 ists, subjective and relative. 1 
 
 D. Compared by reference to the character of the existential 
 Judgments they involve. 
 
 25. The judgment involved in an Intuitive apprehension is as- 
 sertory ; for the fact of the intuition being dependent on the fact 
 of the present existence of the object, the existence of the object 
 is unconditionally enounced as actual. The judgment involved in 
 a Representative apprehension is problematic ; for here the fact 
 of the representation not being dependent on the present exist- 
 ence of the object represented, the existence of that object can be 
 only modally affirmed as possible. 
 
 E. Compared by reference to their character as Cognitions. 
 26. Representative knowledge is admitted on all hands to be 
 
 exclusively subjective or ideal ; for its proximate object is, on 
 every theory, in or of the mind, while its remote object, in itself, 
 and except in and through the proximate object, is unknown. 
 Presentative knowledge is, on the doctrine of the Natural Realists, 
 partly subjective and ideal, partly objective and real ; inasmuch 
 as its sole object may be a phenomenon either of self or of not- 
 self ': while, on the doctrine of the Idealists (whether Absolute 
 or Cosmothetic) it is always subjective or ideal ; consciousness, 
 on their hypothesis, being cognizant only of mind and its con- 
 tents. 
 
 F. Compared in respect of their Self-sufficiency or Dependence. 
 2Y. a. In one respect, Representative knowledge is not sclf- 
 
 sufficient, inasmuch as every representative cognition of an object 
 
 1 See the next chapter, i. W.
 
 254 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 supposes i previous presentative apprehension of that same ob- 
 ject. This is even true of the representation of an imaginary or 
 merely possible object ; for though the object, of which we are 
 conscious in such an act, be a mere figment of the phantasy, and, 
 as a now represented whole, was never previously presented to 
 our observation ; still that whole is nothing but an assemblage of 
 parts, of which, in different combinations, we have had an intui- 
 tive cognition. Presentative knowledge, on the contrary, is, in 
 this respect, self-sufficient, being wholly independent on Repre- 
 sentative for its objects. 
 
 28. b. Representative knowledge, in another respect, is not 
 self-sufficient. For inasmuch as all representation is only the 
 repetition, simple or modified, of what was once intuitively appre- 
 hended ; Representative is dependent on Presentative knowledge, 
 as (with the mind) the concause and condition of its possibility. 
 Presentative knowledge, on the contrary, is in this respect inde- 
 pendent of Representative ; for with our intuitive cognitions com- 
 mences all our knowledge. 
 
 29. c. In a third respect Representative knowledge is not 
 self-sufficient ; for it is only deserving of the name of knowledge 
 in so far as it is conformable with the intuitions which it repre- 
 sents. Presentative knowledge, on the contrary, is, in this re- 
 spect, all-sufficient ; for in the last resort it is the sole vehicle, the 
 exclusive criterion and guarantee of truth. 
 
 30. d. In a fourth respect, Representative knowledge is not 
 self-sufficient, being wholly dependent upon Intuitive ; for the 
 object represented is only known through an intuition of the sub- 
 ject representing. Representative knowledge always, therefore, in- 
 volves presentative, as its condition. Intuitive knowledge, on the 
 contrary, is, in this respect, all-sufficient, being wholly independ- 
 ent of representative, which it, consequently, excludes. Thus in 
 different points of view Representative knowledge contains and 
 is contained in, Presentative (Pr. 15). 
 
 G. Compared in reference to their intrinsic Completeness and 
 Perfection.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 255 
 
 31. a. In one respect Intuitive knowledge is complete and 
 perfect, as irrespective of aught beyond the sphere of conscious- 
 ness ; while Representative knowledge is incomplete and imperfect, 
 as relative to what transcends that sphere. 
 
 32. b. In another respect, Intuitive knowledge is complete 
 and perfect, as affording the highest certainty of the highest de- 
 termination of existence the Actual the Here and Now exist- 
 ent ; Representative, incomplete and imperfect, as affording only 
 an inferior assurance of certain inferior determinations of exist- 
 ence the Past, the Future, the Possible the not Here and not 
 Now existent. 
 
 33. c. In a third respect, Intuitive knowledge is complete 
 and perfect, its object known being at once real, and known as 
 real; Representative knowledge, incomplete and imperfect, its 
 known object being unreal, its real object unknown. 
 
 The precise distinction between Presentative and Representative 
 knowledge, and the different meanings of the term Object, the 
 want of which has involved our modern philosophy in great con- 
 fusion, I had long ago evolved from my own reflection, and be- 
 fore I was aware that a parallel distinction had been taken by the 
 Schoolmen, under the name Intuitive and Abstract knowledge 
 (cognitio Intuitiva et Abstractiva, or Visionis et Simplicis Intel- 
 ligentice). Of these, the former they defined the knowledge of 
 a thing present as it is present (cognitio rei prcesentis ut prcesens 
 esf) ; the latter the knowledge of a thing not as it is present 
 (cognitio rei non ut prwsens est). This distinction remounts, 
 among the Latin Schoolmen, to at least the middle of the eleventh 
 century ; for I find that both St. Anselm and Hugo a Sancto 
 Victore notice it. It was certainly not borrowed from the Ara- 
 bians ; for Averroes, at the end of the following century, seems 
 unaware of it. In fact, it bears upon its front the indication of a 
 Christian origin ; for, as Scotus and Ariminensis notice, the term
 
 256 PHILOSOPHY OF PEBCEPTION. 
 
 Intuitive was probably suggested by St. Paul's expression, ' facie 
 adfaciemj as the Vulgate has it (1 Corinth, xiii. 12). For intu- 
 itive, in this sense, the Lower Greeks sometimes employed the 
 terms !#OTTIXO, and au<roir<nxo a sense unknown to the Lexi- 
 cographers ; but they do not appear to have taken the counter 
 distinction. The term abstract or abstractive was less fortunately 
 chosen than its correlative; for besides the signification in ques- 
 tion, as opposed to intuitive, in which case we look away from 
 the existence of a concrete object ; it was likewise employed in 
 opposition to concrete, and, though improperly, as a synonym of 
 universal, in which case we look away from each and every indi- 
 vidual subject of inhesion. As this last is the meaning in which 
 abstract as it was originally, is now exclusively, employed, and as 
 representative is, otherwise, a far preferable expression, it would 
 manifestly be worse than idle to attempt its resuscitation in the 
 former sense. 
 
 The propriety and importance of the distinction is unquestion- 
 able ; but the Schoolmen at least the great majority who held 
 the doctrine of intentional species wholly spoiled it in applica- 
 tion ; by calling the representative perception they allowed of ex- 
 ternal things, by the name of an intuitive cognition, to say noth- 
 ing of the idle thesis which many of them defended that by a 
 miracle we could have an intuitive apprehension of a distant, nay 
 even of a non-existent, object. This error, I may notice, is the 
 corollary of another of which I am soon to speak the holding 
 that external things, though known only through species, are im- 
 mediately known in themselves. 
 
 II. THE ERRORS OF REID AND OTHER PHILOSOPHERS, IN REF- 
 ERENCE TO THE DISTINCTION OF PRESENTATIVE OR IMMEDI- 
 ATE AND REPRESENTATIVE OR MEDIATE KNOWLEDGE, AND 
 OF OBJECT PROXIMATE AND REMOTE. 
 
 The preceding distinction is one which, for the Natural Real- 
 ist, it is necessary to establish, in order to discriminate his own
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 257 
 
 peculiar doctrine of perception from those of the Idealists, Coa- 
 mothetic and Absolute, in their various modifications. This, 
 however, Reid unfortunately did not do ; and the consequence 
 has been the following imperfections, inaccuracies, and errors. 
 
 A. In the first place, he has, at least in words, abolished the 
 distinction of presentative and representative cognition. 
 
 1, He asserts, in general, that every object of thought must 
 be an immediate object (I. P. 427 b). 
 
 2, He affirms, in particular, not only of the faculties whose ob- 
 jects are, but of those whose objects are not, actually present to 
 the mind, that they are all and each of them immediate knowl- 
 edges. Thus he frequently defines memory (in the sense of rec- 
 ollective imagination) ' an immediate knowledge of things past' 
 (I. P. 339 a, 351 b. 357 a); he speaks of an immediate knowl- 
 edge of things future (I. P. 340 b) ; and maintains that the 
 immediate object in our conception (imagination) of a distant 
 reality, is that reality itself (I. P. 374 b). See above, Propp. 10,. 
 11, 12, 19, 20, 21. 
 
 Now the cause why Reid not only did not establish, but even 
 thought to abolish, the distinction of mediate cognition with its 
 objects proximate and remote, was, 1, his error, which we are 
 elsewhere to consider, 1 in supposing that philosophers in the prox- 
 imate object of knowledge, had in view, always, a tertium quid 
 different both from the reality represented and the conscious mind 
 (Inq. 106 a, I. P. 226 b, 369 ab) ; and 2, his failing to observe 
 that the rejection of this complex hypothesis of non-egoistical rep- 
 resentation, by no means involved either the subversion of repre- 
 sentative knowledge in general, or the establishment of presenta- 
 tive perception in particular. (See Prop. 7.") 
 
 But Reid's doctrine in this respect is perhaps imperfectly de- 
 veloped, rather than deliberately wrong ; and I am confident that 
 had it been proposed to him, he would at once have acquiesced in 
 the distinction of presentative and representative knowledge, above 
 stated, not only as true in itself, but as necessary to lay a solid 
 
 1 See next chapter, ii. W. a See next clmpter, i. W.
 
 258 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 foundation for a theory of intuitive perception, in conformity with 
 the common sense of mankind. 
 
 B. In the second place, Reid maintains that in our cognitions 
 there must be an object (real or imaginary) distinct from the op- 
 eration of the mind conversant about it ; for the act is one thing 
 and the object of the act another. (I. P. 292 b, 305 a, also 298 
 b, 373 a, 374 b.) 
 
 This is erroneous at least it is erroneously expressed. Take 
 an imaginary object, and Reid's own instance a centaur. Here 
 he says, ' The sole object of conception (imagination) is an ani- 
 mal which I believe never existed.' It ' never existed ;' that is 
 never really, never in nature, never externally, existed. But it is 
 4 an object of imagination.' It is not therefore a mere non-exist- 
 ence ; for if it had no kind of existence, it could not possibly be 
 the positive object of any kind of thought. For were it an abso- 
 lute nothing, it could have no qualities (non-entis nulla sunt attri- 
 buta) ; but the object we are conscious of, as a Centaur, has qual- 
 ities, qualities which constitute it a determinate something, and 
 distinguish it from every other entity whatsoever. We must, 
 therefore, per force, allow it some sort of imaginary, ideal, repre- 
 sentative, or (in the older meaning of the term) objective, existence 
 in the mind. Now this existence can only be one or other of two 
 sorts ; for such object in the mind, either is, or is not, a mode of 
 mind. Of these alternatives the latter cannot be supposed ; for 
 this would be an affirmation of the crudest kind of non-egoistical 
 representation- the very hypothesis against which Reid so strenu- 
 ously contends. The former alternative remains that it is a 
 mode of the imagining mind, that it is in fact the plastic act c* 
 imagination 1 considered as representing to itself a certain possible 
 form a Centaur. But then Reid's assertion that there is 
 always an object distinct from the operation of the mind convers- 
 
 1 The elements, thus to speak, of the possible form which the imagination 
 in its plastic act, represents to itself, have an objective existence. The form 
 itself, is only a combination of real forms ; the combining of these is the only 
 purely subjective act. W.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 259 
 
 ant about it, the act being one thing, the object of the act ano- 
 ther must be surrendered. For the object and the act are here 
 only one and the same thing in two several relations. (Prop. 21.) 
 Reid's error consists in mistaking a logical for a metaphysical 
 difference a distinction of relation for a distinction of entity. 
 Or is the error only from the vagueness and ambiguity of ex- 
 pression ?* 
 
 C. In the third place, to this head we may refer Reid's inac- 
 curacy in regard to the precise object of perception. This object is 
 not, as he seems frequently to assert, any distant reality (Inq. 
 104 b, 158 b, 159 ab, 160 a, 186 b. I. P. 299 a, 302 a, 303 a, 
 304 a, et alibi) ; for we are percipient of nothing but what is in 
 
 * In what manner many of the acutest of the later Schoolmen puzzled 
 themselves likewise, with this, apparently, very simple matter, may be seen 
 in their discussions touching the nature of Entia Ratlonis. I may mention in 
 general, Fonseca, Suarez, Mendoza, Euvius, Murcia, Oviedo, Arriaga, Carle- 
 ton, &c., on the one hand; and Biel, Mirandulanus, Jandunus, Valesius, 
 Erice, &c., on the other. I may here insert, though only at present, for the 
 latter paragraph in which Reid's difficulty is solved, the following passage 
 from Biel. It contains important observations to which I must subsequently 
 refer : 
 
 'Ad secundum de figmentis dicitur, quod (intelligendo illam similitudinem 
 quaui anima fingit, i. e. abstrahit a rebus) sic figmenta sunt actus intelligen- 
 di, qui habent esse vernm et subjectivum (v. p. 243 a b, note) in anima. 
 Sunt enim qualitates animse inhaerentes; et hi actus sunt naturales similitu- 
 dines rerum a quibus formantur, quaj sunt objecta eorum ; nee oportet po- 
 nere aliquod objectum medium inter cognitionem intellectivam actus, etrealc 
 ejus objectum. 
 
 'Dicuntur autem hujusmodi actus figmenta, quia tales sunt in reprcesen- 
 tdndo rem, quales sunt res repraesentatos. Non autem talia in existendo, i. e. 
 in. qualitatibus realibus ; quia sunt qualitates spirituales, objeeta vero frequen- 
 ter res materiales ; sunt autem naturaliter similes in reprtesentando, qnia rc- 
 praesentant res distincte cum suis habitudinibus sicut sunt realiter ; non au- 
 tem sunt similes in essendo, i. e. quod actus [actu] haberent csse reale ejusdom 
 specie! cum suis objectis. 
 
 ' Quod additur de Chimscra; patet quod aliter chimsora dicitur figmentum, 
 et aliler cognitio ret possibilis. Vcrum conceptus chima?rae, id est actus 
 cognoscendi correspondens huic voci "ChinKera;," estveraqualitas inmente; 
 tamcn illnd quod significat nihil est.' In i. Sent. Dist. ii. Qu. 8. 
 
 The author of the preceding passage, it must be remembered, allowed no 
 intentional species, that is, no representative entities different from the oper- 
 ations of the mind itself.
 
 260 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 proximate contact, in immediate relation, with our organs of 
 sense. Distant realities we reach, not by perception, but by a 
 subsequent process of inference founded thereon : and so far, as he 
 somewhere says (I. P. 284 b), from all men who look upon the 
 sun perceiving the same object, in reality, every individual, in this 
 instance, perceives a different object, nay, a different object in each 
 several eye. The doctrine of Natural Realism requires no such 
 untenable assumption for its basis. It is sufficient to establish the 
 simple fact, that we are competent, as consciousness assures us, 
 immediately to apprehend through sense the non-ego in certain 
 limited relations ; and it is of no consequence whatever, either to 
 our certainty of the reality of a material world, or to our ultimate 
 knowledge of its properties, whether by this primary apprehen- 
 sion we lay hold, in the first instance, on a larger or a lesser por- 
 tion of its contents. 
 
 Mr. Stewart also (Elem. vol. i. ch. i. sect. 2, p. 79 sq. 6 ed.), in 
 arguing against the counter doctrine in one of its accidental forms, 
 maintains, in general, that we may be percipient of distant objects. 
 But his observations do not contemplate, therefore do not meet 
 the cardinal questions ; Is perception a presentative cognition of 
 the non-ego, or only a representative cognition of it, in and 
 through the ego? and if the former, Can we apprehend a 
 thing immediately and not know it in itself? Can we appre- 
 hend it as actually existing ? and, Can we apprehend it as ac- 
 tually existing, and not apprehend it in the When and Where of 
 its existence, that is, only as present ? 
 
 A misapprehension analogous to that of Reid and Stewart, and 
 of a still more obtrusive character, was made by a majority of 
 those schoolmen, who, as non-egoistical representationists, main- 
 tained the hypothesis of intentional species, as media of sensitive 
 perception, imagination, &c. They, in general, held, that the spe- 
 cies is not itself perceived, but the reality through the species, 
 and on the following as the principal grounds : The present ob- 
 jects we perceive by sense, or the absent objects we imagine, are 
 extended, figured, colored, <fec. ; but the species are not themselves
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 261 
 
 extended, figured, colored, &c., they are only representative of 
 these qualities in external objects ; the species are not, therefore, 
 themselves objects of knowledge, or, as they otherwise expressed 
 it, do not themselves terminate the cognition.* See, instar om- 
 nium, De Raconis, Physica, Disp. iii. de An. Sens. A pp. sect. ii. 
 qu. 4, art. 3. Irenaeus, De Anima, c. 2, sect. 3, 3. 
 
 The error of this doctrine did not, however, escape the observa- 
 tion of the acuter even of those who supported the theory of inten- 
 tional species. It is exposed by Scaliger the father ; and his ex- 
 position is advanced as a ' very subtle ' speculation. Addressing 
 Cardan, whose work ' De Subtilitate ' he is controverting, he 
 
 ' Cum tarn praeclare de visu sentires, maximam omisisti subti- 
 litatem. Doce me prius sodes Quid est id quod video ? Dices, 
 " Pnerilem esse interrogationem Rent enim esse, quae videatur." 
 At doce quaeso nos pueros per salebras hasce Naturae perreptantes. 
 Si sensio est receptio ; nee recipitur Res ; demonstrabitur certis- 
 sima demonstration sic ; ergo non sentitur Res. Aiunt " Rem 
 videri per Speciem." Intelligo ; et conclude : Species ergo senti- 
 tur. Rem ipsam haud percipit sensus. Species ipsa non est ea 
 res, cujus est species. Isti vero ausi sunt ita dicere ; " Non vide- 
 ri speciem, sed Rem per Speciem. Speciem vero esse videndi ra- 
 tionem." Audio verba ; rem haud intelligo. Non enim est spe- 
 cies ratio videndi, ut Lux. Quid igitur ? " Per speciem (inquiunt) 
 vides rem ; non potes autem videre speciem, quia necesse esset ut, 
 per speciem, videres." Quse sententia est omnium absurdissima. 
 Dico enim jam ; Rem non videri, sed Speciem. Sensus ergo, 
 recipit speciem ; quam rei similem judicat Intellectus, atque sic 
 rem cognoscit per reflexionem.' (De Subtilitate, Ex. ccxcviii. 
 
 * This doctrine, his recent and very able biographer (M. Huet) finds 
 maintained by the great Henry of Ghent, and he adduces it as both an ori- 
 ginal opinion of the Doctor Solennis, and an anticipation of one of the truths 
 established by the Scottish sohool. There was, however, nothing new in the 
 opinion ; and if an anticipation, it was only the anticipation of an error. 
 Recherches, &c., pp. 130, 119.
 
 262 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 But in correcting one inconsistency Scaliger here falls into 
 another. For how can the reflective intellect judge the species 
 to resemble, that is, correctly to represent the external reality, 
 when, ex hypothesi, the reality itself is unknown ; unknown in 
 its qualities, unknown even in its existence ? This consideration 
 ought to have led ' the Master of Subtilties' to doubt concerning 
 the doctrine of perception by species altogether. 
 
 But long before Scaliger, the error in question had been refu- 
 ted by certain of those Schoolmen who rejected the whole doc- 
 trine of intentional species. I was surprised to find the distinc- 
 tion between an immediate and a mediate object, in our acts 
 cognitive of things not actually present to apprehension, advanced 
 by Gregory of Rimini, in a disputation maintained by him 
 against a certain ' Joannes Scotus' not the Subtle Doctor, who 
 was already gone, but a Scotchman, who appears to have been 
 a fellow Regent with Gregory in the University of Paris. This 
 doctrine did not, however, obtain the acceptation which it merited ; 
 and when noticed at all, it was in general noticed only to be re- 
 dargued even by his brother Nominalists. Biel rejects the par- 
 adox, without naming its author. But John Major, the last of 
 the regular Schoolmen, openly maintains on this point, against 
 the Authentic Doctor, the thesis of his earlier countryman, Joan- 
 nes a thesis also identical with the doctrine of his later coun- 
 tryman, Reid. ' Dico (he says, writing in Paris), quod notitiam 
 abstractivam quam habeo pinnaculi Sanctae Genovefes in Scotia, 
 in Sancto Andrea, ad pinnaculum immediate terminatur ; verum, 
 ob notitiae imperfectionem et naturam, nescio certitudinaliter an 
 sit dirutum exustumve, sicut olim tonitruo conflagravit.' * In 
 Sent. L. i. dist. 3, qu. 2. 
 
 I have omitted however to notice, that the vulgar doctrine of 
 
 * The existence of a Pinnacle of St. Gonevieve in St. Andrew's is now 
 unknown to our Scottish Antiquaries ; and this, I may notice, is one of a 
 thousand curious anecdotes relative to this country, scattered throughout 
 Major's writings, and upon matters to which allusions from a Doctor of the 
 Sorbonne, in a Commentary on the Sentences, were least to be expected.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 263 
 
 the Schools in regard to the immediate cognition of real objects, 
 through their species or representations, was refuted, in anticipa- 
 tion, by Plotinus, who observes 'That if we receive the im- 
 pressed forms (rJirous) of objects perceived, it cannot be that we 
 really perceive the things which we are said to perceive, but only 
 their images or shadows ; so that the things existing are one dis- 
 tinct order of beings, the objects perceived by us, another. 
 (Ennead. v. L. vi. c. 1.) His own doctrine of perception is 
 however equally subjective as that which he assails ; it is 
 substantially the same with the Cartesian and Leibnitzian 
 hypotheses. 
 
 Representationiste are not however always so reluctant to 
 see and to confess, that their doctrine involves a surrender of 
 all immediate and real knowledge of an external world. This 
 too is admitted by even those who, equally with Reid, had 
 renounced ideas as representative entities, different either from 
 the substance of mind, or from the act of cognition itself. Ar- 
 nauld frankly acknowledges this of his own theory of perception ; 
 which he justly contends to be identical with that of Descartes. 1 
 Other Cartesians, and of a doctrine equally pure, have" been no 
 less explicit. ' Nota vero (says Flender, whose verbosity I some- 
 what abridge), mentem nostram percipere vel cognoscere imme- 
 diate tantum seipsam suasque facultates, per intirnam sui consci- 
 entiam ; sed alias res a se distinctas, non nisi mediate, scilicet per 
 ideas. . . Nota porro, quod perceptio sen idea rei spectari dupli- 
 citur : vel in se ipsa, prout est modus cogitandi cujus mens est 
 conscia, quo modo a mente ut causa efficiente fluit ; vel relata 
 
 1 ' I am convinced that in this interpretation of Descartes' doctrine, Ar- 
 nauld is right ; for Descartes defines mental ideas those, to wit, of which 
 we are conscious to be " Cogitationes prout sunt tanquam imagines that is, 
 thoughts considered in their representative capacity ; nor is there any pas- 
 page to be found in the writings of this philosopher, which if properly un- 
 derstood, warrants the conclusion, that, by ideas in the mind, he meant aught 
 distinct from the cognitive act. The double use of the term idea by Des- 
 cartes has, however, led Keid and others into a misconception on this point* 
 Reid; p. 296. W.
 
 264 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 ad objectum quod per cam representatur, prout est cogitatio intel- 
 lectus hanc vel illam rem representans, quo modo forma seu 
 essentia ideae consistit representatione rei, sive in eo quod sit 
 representamen vel imago ejus rei quam concipimus.' (Phosph. 
 Philos. 5.)
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 VAEIOUS THEORIES OF EXTERNAL PERCEPTION. 1 
 
 1. SYSTEMATIC SCHEMES, FROM DIFFERENT POINTS OF VIEW, 
 OF THE VARIOUS THEORIES OF THE RELATION OF EXTERNAL 
 PERCEPTION TO ITS OBJECT, AND OF THE VARIOUS SYS- 
 TEMS OF PHILOSOPHY FOUNDED THEREON.* 
 
 SCHEME I. Table of distribution, General and Special. In 
 the perception of the external world, the object of which we are 
 conscious may be considered either, (I.) as absolute and total 
 or, (II.) as relative and partial, i. e., vicarious or representative 
 of another and principal object, beyond the sphere of conscious- 
 ness. Those who hold the former of these doctrines may be 
 called Presentationists or Intuitionists : those who hold the lat- 
 ter, Representationists.\ Of these in their order. 
 
 I. The Presentationists or Intuitionists constitute the object, 
 of which we are conscious, in perception, into a sole, absolute, or 
 total, object ; in other words, reduce perception to an act of im- 
 mediate or intuitive cognition ; and this either (A) by abolish- 
 ing any immediate, ideal, subjective object, representing ; or, 
 (B) by abolishing any mediate, real, objective object, represented. 
 
 A. The former of these, viewing the one total object of per- 
 ceptive consciousness as real, as existing, and therefore, in this 
 case, as material, extended, external, are Realists, and may dia- 
 
 1 This chapter is Hamilton's third Supplementary Dissertation on Reid. 
 W. 
 
 * Compare the more comprehensive evolution of Philosophical System* 
 from the total fact of Consciousness in perception, given above, p. 28 a, sq. 
 An acquaintance with that distribution is here supposed. 
 
 t On the terms Intuition and Representation, and on the distinction of 
 immediate and mediate, of ideal and real, object, see previous chapter, 1. 
 
 12
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 tinctively be called Intuitional or Presentative Realists, and Rea. 
 Presentationists or Intuitionists ; while, as founding their doc- 
 trine on the datum of the natural consciousness, or common sense, 
 of mankind, they deserve the names of Natural Realists or Nat- 
 ural Dualists. Of this scheme there are no subordinate varie- 
 ties ; except in so far as a difference of opinion may arise, in 
 regard to what qualities are to be referred to the object per- 
 ceived, or non-ego, what qualities to the percipient subject, or 
 ego. Presentative Realism is thus divided (i.) into a philosophi- 
 cal or developed form that, to wit, in which the Primary Qual- 
 ities of body, the Common Sensibles, 1 constitute the objective 
 object of perception ; and (ii.) into a vulgar or undeveloped form 
 that, to wit, in which not only the primary qualities (as Ex- 
 tension and Figure), but also the secondary (as Color, Savor, 
 &c.), are, as known to us, regarded equally to appertain to the 
 non-ego. 
 
 B. The latter of these, viewing the object of consciousness in 
 perception as ideal (as a phenomenon in or of mind), are Ideal- 
 ists ; and as denying that this ideal object has any external pro- 
 totype, they may be styled Absolute Idealists, or Idealist Unita- 
 rians. They are to be again divided into two subaltern classes, 
 as the Idea (i.) is, or (ii.) is not, considered a modification of 
 the percipient mind. 
 
 i. If the Idea be regarded as a mode of the human mind 
 itself, we have a scheme of Egoistical Idealism ; and this again 
 admits of a twofold distinction, according as the idea is viewed 
 (a) as having no existence out of the momentary act of presenta- 
 tive consciousness, with which it is, in fact, identical ; or (b) as 
 having an (unknown) existence, independent of the present act 
 of consciousness by which it is called up, contemplated, but not 
 created. Finally, as in each of these the mind may be deter- 
 mined to present the object either (1.) by its own natural laws, 
 or (2.) by supernatural agencies, each may be subdivided into 
 a Natural and Supernatural variety. 
 
 1 See chapter v. W.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 267 
 
 ii. If, on the other hand, the Idea be viewed not as a mode 
 of the human mind, there is given the scheme of Non-Egoistical 
 Idealism, which, in all its forms, is necessarily hyperphysical. It 
 admits, in the first place, of a twofold distinction, according as 
 the ideal object is supposed (a) to be, or (b) not to be, in the 
 perceiving mind itself. 
 
 a. Of these the former may again be subdivided according 
 as the ideas are supposed (1.) to be connate with the mind and 
 existent in it out of consciousness ; or (2.) infused into it at the 
 moment of consciousness, (a) immediately by God, () by 
 some lower supernatural agency. 
 
 b. The latter supposes that the human mind is conscious of 
 the idea, in some higher intelligence, to which it is intimately 
 present; and this higher mind may either be (1.) that of the 
 Deity, or (2.) that of some inferior supernatural existence. 
 
 All these modifications of Non-Egoistical Idealism admit, how- 
 ever, in common^ of certain subordinate divisions, according as 
 the qualities (primary and secondary) and the phenomena of the 
 several senses may be variously considered either as objective and 
 ideal or as subjective and sensational.* 
 
 II. The JRepresentationists, as denying to consciousness the 
 cognizance of aught beyond a merely subjective phenomenon, 
 
 * The general approximation of thorough-going Kealism and thorough- 
 going Idealism, here given, may, at first sight, be startling. On reflection, how- 
 ever, their radical affinity will prove well grounded. Both build upon the 
 same fundamental fact that the extended object immediately perceived is 
 identical with the extended object actually existing ; for the truth of this fact, 
 both can appeal to the common sense of mankind ; and to the common 
 sense of mankind Berkeley did appeal not less confidently, and perhaps 
 more logically, than Keid. Natural Eealism and Absolute Idealism are the 
 only systems worthy of a philosopher; for, as they alone have any founda- 
 tion in consciousness, so they alone have any consistency in themselves. The 
 scheme of Hypothetical Eealism or Cosmothetic Idealism, which supposes 
 that behind the non-existent world perceived, there lurks a correspondent 
 but unknown world existing, is not only repugnant to our natural beliefs, 
 but in manifold contradiction with itself. The scheme of Natural Kealism 
 may be ultimately difficult for, like all other truths, it ends in the incon- 
 ceivable ; but Hypothetical Realism in its origin -in its development iu 
 its result, although the favorite scheme of philosophers, is philosophically 
 absurd.
 
 268 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 are likewise Idealists ; yet as positing the reality of an external 
 world, they must be distinguished as Cosmothetic Idealists. But, 
 as affirming an external world, they are also Realists, or Dualist*. 
 Since, however, they do not, like the Natural Realists, accept the 
 existence of an external world directly on the natural testimony 
 of consciousness, as something known, but endeavor to establish 
 its unknown existence by a principal and sundry subsidiary hy- 
 potheses ; they must, under that character, be discriminated as 
 Hypothetical Realists or Hypothetical Dualists. This Hypoth- 
 esis of a Representative perception has been maintained under 
 one or other of two principal forms, a finer and a cruder, ac- 
 cording as the representation either (A) is, or (B) is not, sup- 
 posed to be a mode of the percipient subject itself. (And, be it 
 observed, this distinction, in reference to Reid's philosophy, ought 
 to be carefully borne in mind.) 
 
 A. If the immediate, known, or representative, object be re- 
 garded as a modification of the mind or self, we have one va- 
 riety of representationism (the simpler and more refined), which 
 may be characterized as the Egoistical Representationism. This 
 finer form is, however, itself again subdivided into a finer and a 
 cruder; according as the subjective object (i.) is or (ii.) is not, 
 identified with the percipient act. 
 
 i. In the former case, the immediate or ideal object is re- 
 garded as only logically distinguished from the perceptive act ; 
 being simply the perceptive act itself, considered in one of its re- 
 lations, its relation, to wit (not to the subject perceiving, in 
 which case it is properly called a perception, but) to the mediate 
 object, the reality represented, and which, in and through that 
 representation alone, is objectified to consciousness and per- 
 ceived. 
 
 ii. In the latter case, the immediate object is regarded, as a 
 mode of mind, existent out of the act of perceptive conscious- 
 ness, and, though contemplated in, not really identical with, that 
 act. This cruder form of egoistical representationism substan- 
 tially coincides with that finer form of the non-egoistical, which
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 views the vicarious object as spiritual (II. B, i. b.) I have there- 
 fore found it requisite to consider these as identical ; and accord- 
 ingly, in speaking of the finer form of representation, be it ob- 
 served, I exclusively have in view the form of which I have last 
 spoken (II. A, i.) 
 
 This form, in both its degrees, is divided into certain subaltern 
 genera and species, according as the mind is supposed to be de- 
 termined to represent by causes either (a) natural, physical, 
 or (b) supernatural, hyperphysical. 
 
 a. Of these, the natural determination to represent, is 
 either (1.) one foreign and external (by the action of the mate- 
 rial reality on the passive mind, through sense) ; or (2.) one 
 native and internal (a self-determination of the impassive mind, 
 on occasion of the presentation of the material object to sense) ; 
 or finally (3.) one partly both (the mind being at once acted 
 on, and itself reacting). 
 
 b. The hyperphysical determination, again, may be main- 
 tained either to be (1.) immediate and special ; whether this 
 be realized (a) by the direct operation or concourse of God (as 
 in a scheme of Occasional Causes) or () by the influence of in- 
 ferior supernatural agencies : or (2.) mediate and general (as 
 by the predetermined ordination of God, in a theory of Pre- 
 established Harmony). 
 
 B. If the representative object be viewed as something in 
 but not a mere mode of, mind ; in other words, if it be viewed 
 as a tertium quid numerically different both from the subject 
 knowing and the object represented ; we have a second form of 
 Representationism (the more complex and cruder) which may be 
 distinguished as the Non-egoistical. This also falls into certain 
 inferior species : for the ideal or vicarious object has been held 
 (i.) by some to be spiritual ; (ii.) by others to be corporeal ; 
 while (iii.) others, to carry hypothesis to absurdity, have regarded 
 it, as neither spiritual nor corporeal, but of an inconceivable na- 
 ture, intermediate between, or different from, both. 
 
 i. Spiritual. Here the vicarious object may be supposed
 
 270 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 either (a) to be some supernatural intelligence, to which the hu- 
 man mind is present; and this either (1.) the divine, or (2.) 
 not the divine : or (b) in the human mind ; and if so either 
 (1.) connate and inexistent, being elicited into consciousness, on 
 occasion of the impression of the external object on the sensual 
 organ ; or (2.) infused on such occasions, and this either (a) 
 by God, or () by other supernatural intelligences, and of 
 these different theorists have supposed different kinds. 
 
 ii. Corporeal, in the common sensory (whether brain or heart). 
 This either (a) as a propagation from the external reality 
 (1.) of a grosser ; (2.) of a more attenuated nature : or (b) a 
 modification determined in the sensory itself (1.) as a configu- 
 ration ; (2.) as a motion (and this last either (a) as a flow of 
 spirits or (?) as a vibration of fibres or (y) as both a flow and 
 a vibration) ; or (3.) as both a configuration and a motion. 
 
 iii. Neither spiritual nor corjtoreal. This might admit, in 
 part, of similar modifications with B, i. and B, ii. 
 
 All these species of Representationism may be, and almost all 
 of them have been, actually held. Under certain varying restric- 
 tions, however, inasmuch as a representative object may be pos- 
 tulated in perception for all, or only for some of the senses, for 
 all or only for some of the qualities made known to us in the 
 perceptive act. And this latter alternative, which has been most 
 generally adopted, again admits of various subdivisions, accord- 
 ing to the particular senses in which, and the particular qualities 
 of which, a vicarious object is allowed. 
 
 SCHEME II. Table of General Distribution ; with references 
 for details to Scheme I. 
 
 The object of Consciousness in Perception is a quality, mode, 
 or phenomenon either (I.) of an external reality, in immediate 
 relation to our organs ; or (II.) not of an external reality, but 
 either of the mind itself, or of something in the mind, which in- 
 ternal object, let us on either alternative, here call Idea. 
 
 I. The former opinion is the doctrine of real presentative per- 
 ception. (I. A.)
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 271 
 
 II. The latter is the doctrine of ideal perception ; which either 
 
 A supposes that the Idea is an original and absolute present- 
 ment, and thus constitutes the doctrine of ideal presentative per- 
 ception (I. B) ; or 
 
 B supposes that the Idea only represents the quality of a real 
 object ; and thus constitutes the doctrine of ideal representative 
 perception (II.) 
 
 SCHEME III. Merely General Table. 
 
 In relation to our perception of an external world, philosophers 
 are (I.) Realists ; (II.) Idealists. 
 
 I. The Realists are (A) Natural ; (B) Hypothetical (= Cos- 
 mothetic Idealists). 
 
 II. The Idealists are (A) Absolute or Presentative ; (B) Cos- 
 mothetic or Representative (= Hypothetical Realists). See above, 
 p. 266, b, and 30 a. 
 
 Such is a conspectus in different points of view of all the the- 
 ories touching perception and its object ; and of the different sys- 
 tems of philosophy founded thereon, which, as far as they occur to 
 me, have been promulgated during the progress of philosophy. 
 But it is at present only requisite for the student of philosophy to 
 bear in mind the more general principles and heads of distribution. 
 To enumerate the individual philosophers by whom these several 
 theories were originated or maintained, would require a far 
 greater amplitude of detail than can .be now afforded; and, 
 though of some historical interest, this is not required for the 
 purposes which I am here exclusively desirous of accomplishing. 
 Similar tables might be also given of the opinions of philoso- 
 phers, touching the object of Imagination and of Intellect. But 
 the relation of these faculties to their object does not, in like 
 manner, afford the fundamental principles of difference, and there- 
 tore a common starting point, to the great philosophical systems ; 
 while a scheme of the hypotheses in regard to them, would, at
 
 272 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 least in the details, be little more than an uninteresting repetition 
 of the foregoing distribution. There is therefore little induce- 
 ment to annex such tables ; were they not, in other respects, here 
 completely out of place. I have only, at present, two ends in 
 view. Of these the primary, is to display, to discriminate, and 
 to lay down a nomenclature of, the various theories of Perception, 
 actual and possible. This is accomplished. The secondary, is to 
 determine under which of these theories the doctrine of Reid is 
 to be classed. And to this inquiry I now address myself. 
 
 II. OF WHAT CHARACTER, IN THE PRECEDING RESPECT, IK 
 
 REID'S DOCTRINE OF PERCEPTION ? 
 
 As in this part of his philosophy, in particular, Mr. Stewart 
 closely follows the footsteps of his predecessor, and seems even to 
 have deemed all further speculation on the subject superfluous ; 
 the question here propounded must be viewed as common to both 
 philosophers. 
 
 Now, there are only two of the preceding theories of percep- 
 tion, with one or other of which Reid's doctrine can possibly be 
 identified. He is a Dualist ; and the only doubt is whether he 
 be Natural Realist (I. A), or a Hypothetical JRealist, under the 
 finer form of Egoistical Representationism (II. A, i.) 
 
 The cause why Reid left the character of his doctrine ambigu- 
 ous on this the very cardinal point of his philosophy, is to be 
 found in the following circumstances. 
 
 1, That, in general (although the same maybe said of all 
 other philosophers), he never discriminated either speculatively or 
 historically the three theories of Real Presentationism, of Egois- 
 tical, and of Non-Egoistical, Representationism. 
 
 2, That, in particular, he never clearly distinguished the first 
 and second of these, as not only different, but contrasted, theo- 
 ries; though on one occasion (I. P. p. 297 a b) he does seem to 
 have been obscurely aware that they were not identical. 
 
 3, That, while right in regarding philosophers, in general, as
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 273 
 
 Cosmothetic Idealists, he erroneously supposed that they were all, 
 or nearly all, Non-Egoistical Representationists. And 
 
 4, That he viewed the theory of Non-Egoistical Representa- 
 tionism as that form alone of Cosmothetic Idealism which when 
 carried to its legitimate issue ended in Absolute Idealism ; whereas 
 the other form of Cosmothetic Idealism, the theory of Egoistical 
 Representationism, whether speculatively or historically considered, 
 is, with at least equal rigor, to be developed into the same result. 
 
 Dr. Thomas Brown considers Reid to be, like himself, a Cos- 
 mothetic Idealist, under the finer form of egoistical representa- 
 tionism ; but without assigning any reason for this belief, except 
 one which, as I have elsewhere shown, is altogether nugatory.* 
 For my own part, I am decidedly of opinion, that, as the great 
 end the governing principle of Reid's doctrine was to reconcile 
 philosophy with the necessary convictions of mankind, that he 
 intended a doctrine of natural, consequently a doctrine of present- 
 ative, realism ; and that he would have at once surrendered, as 
 erroneous, every statement which was found at variance with such 
 a doctrine. But that the reader should be enabled to form his 
 own opinion on the point, which I admit not to be without diffi- 
 culty ; and that the ambiguities and inconsistencies of Reid, on 
 this the most important part of his philosophy, should, by an artic- 
 ulate exposition, be deprived of their evil influence : I shall now 
 enumerate (A) the statements, which may, on the one hand, be 
 adduced to prove that his doctrine of perception is one of medi- 
 ate cognition under the form of egoistical representationism ; 
 
 * Edinb. Eev., 1 vol. iii. p. 173-175 ; also in Cross and Peisse. In saying. 
 however, on that occasion, that Dr. Brown was guilty of ' a reversal of the 
 real and even unambiguous import' of Keid's doctrine of perception, I feel 
 called upon to admit, that the latter epithet is too strong; for on grounds,, 
 totally different from the untenable one of Brown, I am now about to show, . 
 that Reid's doctrine, on this point, is doubtful. This admission docs not, 
 however, imply that Brown is not, from first to last, is not in one and all of 
 his strictures on Reid's doctrine of perception, as there shown, wholly in 
 error. _^ 
 
 i See above, p. 138. W. 
 12*
 
 274 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 and (B) those which may, on the other hand, be alleged to show, 
 that it is one of immediate cognition, under the form of real pre- 
 sentationism. But as these counter statements are only of import, 
 inasmuch as they severally imply the conditions of mediate or of 
 immediate cognition ; it is necessary that the reader should bear 
 in mind the exposition which has been given of these conditions. 1 
 
 A. Statements conformable to the doctrine of a mediate per- 
 ception, under the form of an egoistical representation, and incon- 
 sistent with that of immediate perception, under the form of a real 
 presentation, of material objects. 
 
 1. On the testimony of consciousness, and in the doctrine of 
 an intuitive perception, the mind, when a material existence is 
 brought into relation with its organ of sense, obtains two con- 
 comitant, and immediate, cognitions. Of these, the one is the 
 consciousness (sensation) of certain subjective modifications in us, 
 which we refer, as effects, to certain unknown powers, as causes, 
 in the external reality ; the secondary qualities of body : the other 
 is the consciousness (perception) of certain objective attributes in 
 the external reality itself, as, or as in relation to our sensible organ- 
 ism ; the primary qualities of body. Of these cognitions, the 
 former is admitted, on all hands, to be subjective and ideal : the 
 latter, the Natural Realist maintains, against the Cosmothetic 
 Idealist, to be objective and real. But it is only objective and 
 real, in so far as it is immediate ; and immediate it cannot be, 
 if either, 1, dependent on the former, as its cause or its occa- 
 sion or, 2, consequent on it, as on a necessary antecedent. But 
 both these conditions of a presentative perception Reid and Stew- 
 art are seen to violate ; and therefore they may be held, virtually, 
 to confess, that their doctrine is one only of representative per- 
 ception. 2 
 
 Touching the former condition : Reid states, that the primary 
 qualities of material existences, Extension, Figure, &c., are sug- 
 gested to us through the secondary ; which, though not the sufficient 
 
 1 See previous chapter, 1. W. 
 
 1 See below, chapter v. \. No. 23. W.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 275 
 
 causes of our conception, are the signs* on occasion of which, 
 we are made to 'conceive' the primary. (Inq. 188 a, 122 a, 
 123 b, 128 b note.) The secondary qualities, as mere sensations, 
 mere consciousness of certain subjective affections, afford us no 
 immediate knowledge of aught different from self. If, therefore, 
 the primary qualities be only ' suggestions] only ' conceptions' 
 (Inq. 183 a, I. P. 318 a b), which are, as it were, 'conjured up 
 by a kind of natural magic' (Inq. 122 a), or ' inspired by means 
 unknown' (Inq. 188 a); these conceptions are only representa- 
 tions, which the mind is, in some inconceivable manner, blindly 
 determined to form of what it does not know ; and as percep- 
 tion is only a consciousness of these conceptions, perception is, 
 like sensation, only an immediate cognition of certain modes 
 of self. Our knowledge of the external world, on this footing, is 
 wholly subjective or ideal ; and if such be Reid's doctrine, it is 
 wholly conformable to that enounced in the following statement 
 of the Cartesian representationism by Silvain Regis : ' We may 
 thus, he says, affirm, that the cognition we have of any individ- 
 ual body which strikes the sense is composed of two parts, of a 
 sensation (sentiment), and of an imagination; an imagination, 
 which represents the extension of this body under a determinate 
 size ; and a sensation of color and light, which renders this exten- 
 sion visible.' (Metaph. L. ii. P. i. ch. 5. Cours, t. i. p. 162, ed. 
 1691.) The statement may stand equally for an enoun cement of 
 the Kantian doctrine of perception ; and it is, perhaps, worth no- 
 ticing, that Regis anticipated Kant, in holding the imagination 
 of space to be the a priori form or subjective condition of per- 
 ception. ' L'idee de 1'Entendus (he says) est nee avec 1'ame,' &c. 
 (ibid. c. 9, p. 171 et alibi). This theory of Suggestion, so ex- 
 explicitly maintained in the 'Inquiry,' is not repeated in the 'Es- 
 
 * This application of the term sign suits the Cosmothetic Idealist, as tho 
 Cartesian Bossuet (Connaissance de Dieu, &c., ch. 8, 8), or the Absolute 
 Idealist, as Berkeley (passim), but not the Natural Realist. In this doctrine 
 of natural signs, I see Reid was, in a manner, also preceded by Hutcheson 
 Syn. Met., P. ii. c. 1 Syst. of Mor., B. i. ch. 1, p. 5).
 
 276 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 says on the Intellectual Powers.' Reid, therefore, as I have 
 already observed, may seem to have become doubtful of the ten- 
 dency of the doctrine advanced in his earlier work ; and we ought 
 not, at all events, to hold him rigorously accountable for the con- 
 sequences of what, if he did not formally retract in his later writ- 
 ings, he did not continue to profess. 
 
 Touching the latter condition : Reid in stating, that ' if sen- 
 sation be produced, the corresponding perception follows even 
 when there is no object' (I. P. 320 b.) and Stewart in stating, 
 that ' sensations are the constant antecedents of our perceptions' 
 (L. i. c. 1, p. 93, ed. 6), manifestly advance a doctrine, which 
 if rigidly interpreted, is incompatible with the requisites of an 
 intuitive perception. 
 
 2. It is the condition of an intuitive perception, that a sensa- 
 tion is actually felt there, where it is felt to be. To suppose that 
 a pain, for instance, in the toe, is felt really in the brain, is con - 
 formable only to a theory of representationism. For if the mind 
 cannot be conscious of the secondary qualities, except at the cen- 
 tre of the nervous organism, it cannot be conscious of the prima- 
 ry, in their relation to its periphery ; and this involves the admis- 
 sion that it is incompetent to more than a subjective or ideal or 
 representative cognition of external things. But such is the doc- 
 trine which Reid manifestly holds. (1. P. 319 b, 320 a b.) 
 
 3. On the doctrine of Natural Realism, that the ego has an 
 intuitive perception of the non-ego in proximate relation to its 
 organs, a knowledge and a belief of the existence of the external 
 world, is clearly given in the fact of such intuitive perception. In 
 this case, therefore, we are not called upon to explain such knowl- 
 edge and belief by the hypothesis, or, at least, the analogy, of an 
 inspired notion and infused faith. On the doctrine of Cosmo- 
 thetic Idealism, on the contrary, which supposes that the mind is 
 determined to represent to itself the external world, which, ex 
 hypothesi, it does not know ; the fact of such representation can 
 only be conceived possible, through some hyperphysical agency ; 
 and therefore Reid',s rationale of perception, by an inspiration or
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PEKCEPTTON. 277 
 
 kind of magical conjuration, as given in the Inquiry (122 a, 188 
 a ; Stewart, El. i. 64, 93), may seem to favor the construction, 
 that his doctrine is a representationism. In the Essays on the 
 Intellectual Powers he is, however, more cautious ; and the note 1 
 I have appended in that work at p. 257 a, is to be viewed in 
 more especial reference to the doctrine of the Inquiry ; though 
 in the relative passage ' the will of God' may, certainly, seem 
 called as a Deus ex machina, to solve a knot which the doctrine 
 of intuitive perception does not tie. 
 
 4. The terms notion and conception are, in propriety, only 
 applicable to our mediate and representative cognitions. When 
 
 1 The following is the note referred to : 
 
 ' The doctrine of Keid and Stewart, in regard to our perception of external 
 things, bears a close analogy to the Cartesian scheme of divine assistance, or of 
 occasional causes. It seems, however, to coincide most completely with the 
 opinion of Ruardus Andala, a Dutch Cartesian, who attempted to reconcile 
 the theory of assistance with that of physical influence. "Statuo," he says, 
 " nos clarissimam et distinctissimam hujus operation-is et tuiionis posse habere 
 ideanij si modo, quod omnino facere oportet, ad Deum, caussam ejus pri- 
 mam et liberam ascendamus, et ab ejus beneplacito admirandum hunc effec- 
 tum derivemus. Nos possumus huic vel illi motui e. gr. campanse, sic et, 
 hederae suspense literis scriptis, verbis quibuscunque pronunciatis, aliisque 
 signis, varias ideas alligare, ita, ut per visum, vel auditum in mente exciten- 
 tur variae ideaa, perceptiones et sensatioues : annon hinc clare et facile intel- 
 ligimus, Deum creatorem mentis et corporis potuisse instituere et ordinare. 
 ut per varies in corpore motus varise in mente excitentur ideaa et perceptiones ; 
 et vicissim, ut per varias mentis volitiones, varii in corpore excitentur et pro- 
 ducantur motus ? Hinc et pro varia alterutrius partis dispositione altera 
 pars variis modis affici potest. Hoc autem a Deo ita ordinatum et effectum 
 esse, a posteriori, continua, certissima et clarissima experientia docet. Testes 
 irrefragabiles onmique exceptione majores reciproci hujus commercii, opera- 
 tionis mentis in corpus, et corporis in mentem, nee non communionis status, 
 sunt sensii* omnes turn externi, turn interni ; ut et omnes et singular et con- 
 tinufB actiones mentis in corpus, de quibus modo fuit actum. Si quis 
 vero a proprietatibus mentis ad proprietates corporis progredi velit, aut ex 
 natura diversissimarum harum substantiarum deducere motum in corpore, 
 & perceptiones in mente, aut hos effectus ut necessario connexos spectare ; 
 nos is frustra erit, nihil intelliget, perversissime philosophabitur nullamque 
 hujns rei ideam habere poterit. Si vero ad Deum Creatorem adscendamus, 
 eumque vere agnoscamus, nihil hie erit obscuri, hunc effectum clarissime 
 intelligemus, et quidem per caussam ejus primam ; quse perfectissima de- 
 mum est scientia.' W.
 
 278 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 Reid, therefore, says that ' the perception of an object consists of, 
 or implies, a conception or notion of it' (Inq. 183 a, 188 a, I. P. 
 258 a, b, 318 b, 319 a, et alibi) ; there is here, either an impro- 
 priety of language, or perception is, in his view, a mediate and 
 representative knowledge. The former alternative is, however, 
 at least equally probable as the latter ; for Consciousness, which 
 on all hands, is admitted to be a knowledge immediate and intui- 
 tive, he defines (I. P. 327 a) 'an immediate conception of the 
 operation of our own minds,' <fec. Conception and Notion, Reid 
 seems, therefore, to employ, at least sometimes, for cognition in 
 general. 
 
 5. In calling imagination of the past, the distant, <kc., an im- 
 mediate knowledge, Reid, it may be said, could only mean by 
 immediate, a knowledge effected not through the supposed inter- 
 mediation of a vicarious object, numerically different from the 
 object existing and the mind knowing, but through a representa- 
 tion of the past, or real, object, in and by the mind itself; in 
 other words, that by mediate knowledge he denoted a non-egois- 
 tical, by immediate knowledge an egoistical, representation. 1 This 
 being established, it may be further argued 1, that in calling 
 Perception an immediate knowledge, he, on the same analogy, 
 must be supposed to deny, in reference to this faculty, only the 
 doctrine of non-egoistical representation. This is confirmed 2, 
 by his not taking the distinction between perception as a pre- 
 sentative, and Memory, for instance (i. e. recollective imagina- 
 tion), as a representative, cognition ; which he ought to have 
 done, had he contemplated, in the former, more than a faculty, 
 through which the ego represents to itself the non-ego, of which 
 it has no consciousness no true objective and immediate appre- 
 hension. This, however, only proves that Reid's Perception may 
 be representative, not that it actually is so. 
 
 6. The doctrine maintained by Reid (I. P. 199 a, 298 b, 299 
 a, 302 e, 305 b) and by Stewart (Elem. vol. i. c. I. sect 2) that 
 
 1 See previous chapter, 1, Pr. 7, p. 241. W.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 279 
 
 perception is possible of distant objects, is, when sifted, found 
 necessarily to imply that perception is not, in that case, an ap- 
 prehension of the object in its place in space in its Where ; 
 and this again necessarily implies, that it is not an apprehen- 
 sion of the object, as existing, or in itself. But if not known 
 as existing, or in itself, a thing is, either not known at all, or 
 known only in and through something different from itself. 
 Perception, therefore, is, on this doctrine, at best a mediate or 
 representative cognition ; of the simpler form of representation, 
 the egoistical, it may be, but still only vicarious and subjective. 1 
 
 7. In some places our author would seem to hold that Percep- 
 tion is the result of an inference, and that what is said to be per- 
 ceived is the remote cause, and therefore not the immediate object 
 of Perception. If this be so, Perception is not a presentative 
 knowledge. (Inq. 125 a, I. P. 310 a b, 319 a.) In other pas- 
 sages, that perception is the result of inference or reasoning, is 
 expressly denied. (I. P. 259 b, 260 a b, 309 b, 326 a, 328 b, 
 &c.) 
 
 8. On the supposition, that we have an immediate cognition or 
 consciousness of the non-ego, we must have, at the same time, 
 involved as part and parcel of that cognition, a belief of its exist- 
 ence. To view, therefore, our belief of the existence of the exter- 
 nal world, as any thing apart from our knowledge of that world, 
 to refer it to instinct to view jt as unaccountable to consid- 
 er it as an ultimate law of our constitution, &c., as Reid does 
 (Inq. 188 a b, I. P. 258 b, 309 b, 326 a, 327 a, et alibi), is, to 
 say the least of it, suspicious ; appearing to imply, that our cog- 
 nition of the material world, as only mediate and subjective, 
 does not at once and of itself, necessitate a belief of the existence 
 of external things. 
 
 B. Counter statements, conformable to the doctrine of a real 
 presentation of material objects, and inconsistent with that of a 
 representative perception. 
 
 1 See the previous chapter. W.
 
 280 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 1. Knowledge and existence only infer each other when a 
 reality is known in itself or as existing ; for only in that case can 
 we say of it, on the one hand, it is known, because it exists, 
 on the other, it exists, since it is known. In propriety of lan- 
 guage, this constitutes, exclusively, an immediate, intuitive, or 
 real, cognition. This is at once the doctrine of philosophers in 
 general, and of Reid in particular. ' It seems,' he says, ' admit- 
 ted as a first principle, by the learned and the unlearned, that 
 what is really perceived must exist, and that to perceive what 
 does not exist is impossible. So far the unlearned man and the 
 philosopher agree.' (I. P. p. 274 b.) This principle will find 
 an articulate illustration in the three proximately following state- 
 ments, in all of which it is implied. 
 
 2. The idea or representative object, all philosophers, of what- 
 ever doctrine, concur in holding to be in the strictest sense of the 
 expression, itself immediately apprehended; and that, as thus 
 apprehended, it necessarily exists. That Reid fully understands 
 their doctrine, is shown by his introducing a Cosmothetic Ideal- 
 ist thus speaking: 'I perceive an image, or form, or idea, in my 
 own mind, or in my brain. I am certain of the existence of the 
 idea ; because I immediately perceive it.' (Ibid.) Now then, if 
 Reid be found to assert that, on his doctrine, we perceive mate- 
 rial objects not less immediately, than, on the common doctrine 
 of philosophers, we perceive ideal objects ; and that therefore his 
 theory of perception affords an equal certainty of the existence 
 of the external reality, as that of the Cosmothetic Idealist does of 
 the existence of its internal representation ; if Reid, I say, do 
 this, he unambiguously enounces a doctrine of presentative, and 
 not of representative, perception. And this he does. Having 
 repeated, for the hundredth time, the deliverance of common 
 sense, that we perceive material things immediately, and not 
 their ideal representations, he proceeds: 'I shall only here 
 observe that if external objects be perceived immediately, we 
 have the same reason to believe their existence as philosophers 
 have to believe the existence of ideas, while they hold them to
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 281 
 
 be the immediate objects of perception.' (I. P. 446 a b. See 
 also 263 b, 272 b.) 
 
 3. Philosophers even Skeptics and Idealists concur in ac- 
 knowledging that mankind at large believe that the external 
 reality is itself the immediate and only object in perception. 
 Reid is of course no exception. After stating the principle pre- 
 viously quoted (B, st. 1 ), ' that what is really perceived must 
 exist,' he adds ; ' the unlearned man says, I perceive the external 
 object, and I perceive it to exist. Nothing can be more absurd 
 than to doubt it.' (I. P. 274 b.) Again : ' The vulgar un- 
 doubtedly believe, that it is the external object which we imme- 
 diately perceive, and not a representative image of it only. It is 
 for this reason, that they look upon it as perfect lunacy to call in 
 question the existence of external objects.' (Ibid.) Again: 
 ' The vulgar are firmly persuaded that the very identical objects 
 which they perceive continue to exist when they do not perceive 
 them ; and are no less firmly persuaded that when ten men look 
 at the sun or the moon they all see the same individual object.'* 
 (I. P. 284 b.) Again, speaking of Berkeley : ' The vulgar 
 opinion he reduces to this that the very things which we per- 
 ceive by our senses do really exist. This he grants.' (I. P. 284 
 a.) Finally, speaking of Hume : ' It is therefore acknowledged 
 by this philosopher to be a natural instinct or prepossession, an 
 universal and primary opinion of all men, that the objects which 
 we immediately perceive by our senses, are not images in our 
 minds, but external objects, and that their existence is independent 
 of us and our perception.' (I. P. 299 b; see also 275 a, 298 b, 
 299 a b, 302 a b.) 
 
 It is thus evinced that Reid, like other philosophers, attributes 
 to men in general the belief of an intuitive perception. If, then, 
 he declare that his own opinion coincides with that of the vulgar, 
 he will, consequently, declare himself a Presentative Realist. 
 
 * The inaccuracy of this statement* does not affect the argument. 
 >8eep.m W.
 
 282 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 And he does this, emphatically too. Speaking of the Perception 
 of the external world: 'We have here a remarkable conflict 
 between two contradictory opinions, wherein all mankind are 
 engaged. On the one side stand all the vulgar, who are unprac- 
 tised in philosophical researches, and guided by the uncorrupted 
 primary instincts of nature. On the other side, stand all the 
 philosophers, ancient and modern ; every man, without excep- 
 tion, who reflects. In this division, to my great humiliation, I 
 find myself classed with the vulgar? (I. P. 302 b.) 
 
 4. All philosophers agree that self-consciousness is an imme- 
 diate knowledge, and therefore affords an absolute and direct cer- 
 tainty of the existence of its objects. Reid (with whom conscious- 
 ness is equivalent to self-consciousness) of course maintains this ; 
 but he also maintains, not only that perception affords a sufficient 
 proof, but as valid an assurance of the reality of material phe- 
 nomena, as consciousness does of the reality of mental. (I. P. 
 263 b, 269 a, 373, et alibi.) In this last assertion I have shown 
 that Reid (and Stewart along with him) is wrong ; for the phe- 
 nomena of self-consciousness cannot possibly be doubted or 
 denied ;' but the statement at least tends to prove that his per- 
 ception is truly immediate is, under a different name, a con- 
 sciousness of the non-ego. 
 
 5. Arnauld's doctrine of external perception is a purely ego- 
 istical representationism ; and he has stated its conditions and 
 consequences with the utmost accuracy and precision. (I. P. 
 295-298.) Reid expresses both his content and discontent with 
 Arnauld's theory of perception, which he erroneously views as 
 inconsistent with itself (297 a b). This plainly shows that he 
 had not realized to himself a clear conception of the two doctrines 
 of Presentationism and Egoistical Representationism, in them- 
 seives and in their contrasts. But it also proves that when the 
 conditions and consequences of the latter scheme, even in its 
 purest form, were explicitly enounced, that he was then suffi- 
 
 1 See Part First. W.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 283 
 
 ciently aware of their incompatibility with the doctrine which he 
 himself maintained a doctrine, therefore, it may be fairly con- 
 tended (though not in his hands clearly understood, far less 
 articulately developed), substantially one of Natural Realism.* 
 
 To Reid's inadequate discrimination common to him with 
 other philosophers of the different theories of Perception, either 
 as possible in theory, or as actually held, is, as I have already 
 noticed, to be ascribed the ambiguities and virtual contradictions 
 which we have now been considering. 
 
 In the first place (what was of little importance to the Hypo- 
 thetical, but indispensably necessary for the Natural Realist), he 
 did not establish the fact of the two cognitions, the presentative 
 and representative ; signalize their contents ; evolve their sev- 
 eral conditions ; consider what faculties in general were to be 
 referred to each ; and, in particular, which of these was the 
 kind of condition competent, in our Perception of the external 
 world. 
 
 In the second place, he did not take note, that representation 
 is possible under two forms the egoistical and non-egoistical ; 
 each, if Perception be reduced to a representative faculty, afford- 
 ing premises of equal cogency to the absolute idealist and skep- 
 tic. On the contrary, he seems to have overlooked the egoistical 
 form of representationism altogether (compare Inq. 106 a, 128 a 
 b, 130 b, 210 a, I. P. 226 a b, 256 a b, 257 a b, 269 a, 274 a, 
 
 * It will be observed that I do not found any argument on Reid's frequent 
 assertion, that perception affords an immediate knowledge and immediate belief 
 of external things (e. g. I. P. 259 b, 260 a b, 267 a, 809 b, 326 b). For if h'c 
 call memory an immediate knowledge of the past meaning thereby, in ref- 
 erence to it, only a negation of the doctrine of non-egoistical representation, 
 he may also call Perception an immediate knowledge of the outward reality, 
 and still not deny that it is representative cognition, in and by the mind 
 itself.
 
 284 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 277 b, 278 a b, 293 b, 299 a, 318 b, 427 a b) ; and confounded 
 it either with the non-egoistical form, or with the counter doc- 
 trine of real presentatiomsm. In consequence of this, he has 
 been betrayed into sundry errors, of less or greater account. On 
 the one hand ; to the confusion of Presentationism and Non-ego- 
 istical representationism, we must attribute the inconsistencies we 
 have just signalized, in the exposition of his own doctrine. These 
 are of principal account. On the other hand ; to the confusion of 
 Egoistical and Non-egoistical representationism, we must refer 
 the less important errors; 1, of viewing many philosophers 
 who held the former doctrine, as holding the latter ; and 2, of 
 considering the refutation of the non-egoistical form of represen- 
 tation, as a subversion of the only ground on which the skeptic 
 and absolute idealist established, or could establish their conclu- 
 sions.
 
 CHAPTER IV. 1 
 
 DOCTRINE OF PERCEPTION MAINTAINED BY THE ABSOLUTE 
 IDEALISTS. DISCUSSION ON THE SCHEME OF ARTHUR COL- 
 LIER. 
 
 WE deem it our duty to call attention to these publications : s 
 for in themselves they are eminently deserving of the notice of 
 the few who in this country take an interest in those higher spec- 
 ulations to which, in other countries, the name of Philosophy is 
 exclusively conceded ; and, at the same time, they have not been 
 ushered into the world with those adventitious recommendations 
 which might secure their intrinsic merit against neglect. 
 
 The fortune of the first is curious. It is known to those who 
 have made an active study of philosophy and its histoiy, that 
 there are many philosophical treatises written by English authors 
 in whole or in part of great value, but, at the same time, of 
 extreme rarity. Of these, the rarest are, in fact, frequently the 
 most original : for precisely in proportion as an author is in ad- 
 vance of his age, is it likely that his works will be neglected ; and 
 the neglect of contemporaries in general consigns a book, espe- 
 cially a small book; if not protected by accidental concomitants, 
 
 1 This was first published in the Edinburgh Review, for April, 1839, and 
 has recently been published in the ' Discussions,' under the title of Idealism. 
 That portion of it which shows that Catholicism is inconsistent with Ideal- 
 ism is a new, and very important, contribution to the history of philosophy. 
 It also does justice to the name of an almost forgotten idealist, who was 
 scarcely inferior to Berkeley himself. W. 
 
 a The following are the titles of the books reviewed : 
 
 1. Metaphysical Tracts by English Philosophers of the Eighteenth Century. 
 Prepared for the Press by the late Rev. Sam. Parr, D. D. 8vo. London. 1837. 
 
 2. Memoirs of the Life and Writings of the Rev. Arthur Collier, M. A., 
 Rector of Langford MagrM, in the County of Wilts. From A. D. 1704 to A. D. 
 1732. With some Account of his Family. By Robert Benson, M. A. 8vo. 
 London. 1887. W.
 
 286 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 at once to the tobacconist or tallow-chandler. This is more par- 
 ticularly the case with pamphlets, philosophical, and at the same 
 time polemical. Of these we are acquainted with some, extant 
 perhaps only in one or two copies, which display a metaphysical 
 talent unappreciated in a former age, but which would command 
 the admiration of the present. Nay, even of English philoso- 
 phers of the very highest note (strange to say !) there are now 
 actually lying unknown to their editors, biographers, and fellow- 
 metaphysicians, published treatises, of the highest interest and 
 importance : [as of Cudworth, Berkeley, Collins, <fcc.] 
 
 We have often, therefore, thought that, were there with us a 
 public disposed to indemnify the cost of such a publication, a 
 collection, partly of treatises, partly of extracts from treatises, by 
 English metaphysical writers, of rarity and merit, would be one 
 of no inconsiderable importance. In any other country than 
 Britain, such a publication would be of no risk or difficulty. Al- 
 most every nation of Europe, except our own, has, in fact, at 
 present similar collections in progress only incomparably more 
 ambitious. Among others, there are in Germany the Corpus 
 Philosophorum, by Gfroerer ; in France, the Bibliotheque Philo- 
 sophique des Temps Modemes, by Bouillet and Gamier ; and in 
 Italy, the Collezione de* Classici Metafisici, <kc. Nay, in this 
 country itself, we have publishing societies for every department 
 of forgotten literature except Philosophy. 
 
 But in Britain, which does not even possess an annotated edi- 
 tion of Locke, in England, 1 where the universities teach the 
 little philosophy they still nominally attempt, like the catechism, 
 by rote, what encouragement could such an enterprise obtain ? 
 It did not, therefore, surprise us, when wo learnt that the pub- 
 lisher of the two works under review, when he essayed what, 
 in the language of ' the trade? is called ' to subscribe 1 The Meta- 
 physical Tracts, found his brother booksellers indisposed to ven- 
 ture even on a single copy. Now, what was the work which 
 
 1 As much might be said of philosophy in America. W.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 287 
 
 our literary purveyors thus eschewed as wormwood to British 
 taste? 
 
 The late Dr. Parr, whose erudition was as unexclusive as pro- 
 found, had, many years previous to his death, formed the plan of 
 reprinting a series of the rarer metaphysical treatises, of English 
 authorship, which his remarkable library contained. With this 
 view, he had actually thrown off a small impression of five such 
 tracts, with an abridgment of a sixth ; but as these probably 
 formed only a part of his intended collection, which, at the same 
 time, it is known he meant to have prefaced by an introduction, 
 containing, among other matters, an historical disquisition on 
 Idealism, with special reference to the philosophy of Collier, the 
 publication was from time to time delayed, until its completion 
 was finally frustrated by his death. When his library was subse- 
 quently sold, the impression of the six treatises was purchased by 
 Mr. Lumley, a respectable London bookseller ; and by him has 
 recently been published under the title which stands as Number 
 First at the head of this article. 
 
 The treatises reprinted in this collection are the following : 
 
 ' 1. Clams Universalis ; or a new Inquiry after Truth : being a demonstra- 
 ion of the non-existence or impossibility of an external world. By Arthur Col- 
 lier, Rector of Langford Magna, near Sarum. London : 1718. 
 
 ' 2. A specimen of True Philosophy / in a discourse on Genesis, the first 
 chapter and the first verse. By Arthur Collier, Eector of Langford Magna, 
 near Sarum, Wilts. Not improper to be bound up with his Clavis Universa- 
 lis. Sarum: 1730. 
 
 ' 3. (An Abridgment, by Dr. Parr, of the doctrines maintained by Collier 
 in his) Loyology, or Treatise on the Logos, in seven sermons on John i. verses 
 1, 2, 3, 14, together with an Appendix on the same subject. 1732. 
 
 ' 4. Conjectural qucedam de Sensu, Motu, et Idearum generatione. (This was 
 first published by David Hartley as an appendix to his Epistolary Disserta- 
 tion, De Lithontriptico a J. Stephens nuper invento (Leyden, 1741, Bath, 
 1746) ; and contains the principles of that psychological theory which he af- 
 terwards so fully developed in his observations on Man.) 
 
 ' 5. An Inquiry into the Origin of the Human Appetites and- Affections, show- 
 ing how each arises from Association, with an account of the entrance of Moral 
 oil into the world. To which are added some remarks on the independent 
 scheme which deduces all obligation on God's part and man's from certain 
 abstract relations, truth, etc. Written for the use of the young gentlemen 
 at the universities. Lincoln : 1747. (The author is yet unknown.)
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 ' 6. Man in quest of himself ; or a defence of the Individuality of the Human 
 Mind, or Self. Occasioned by some remarks in the Monthly Review for 
 July, 1768, on a note in Search's Freewill. By Cuthbcrt Comment, Gent. 
 London : 1788. (The author of this is Search himself, that is, Mr. Abraham 
 Tucker.)' 
 
 These tracts are undoubtedly well worthy of notice ; but to the 
 first the Clavis Universalis of Collier as by far the most in- 
 teresting and important, we shall at present confine the few ob- 
 servations which we can afford space to make.* 
 
 This treatise is in fact one not a little remarkable in the his- 
 tory of philosophy ; for to Collier along with Berkeley is due 
 the honor of having first explicitly maintained a theory of Abso- 
 lute Idealism ; and the Clavis is the work in which that theory 
 is developed. The fortune of this treatise, especially in its own 
 country, has been very different from its deserts. Though the 
 negation of an external world had been incidentally advanced by 
 Berkeley in his Principles of Human Knoioledge some three 
 years prior to the appearance of the Clavis Universalis, with 
 which the publication of his Dialogues between Hylas and Philo- 
 nous was simultaneous ; it is certain that Collier was not only 
 wholly unacquainted with Berkeley's speculations, but had de- 
 layed promulgating his opinion till after a ten, years' meditation. 
 Both philosophers are thus equally original. They are also nearly 
 on a level in scientific talent ; for, comparing the treatise of 
 Collier with the writings of Berkeley, we find it little inferior in 
 metaphysical acuteness or force of reasoning, however deficient it 
 may be in the graces of composition, and the variety of illustra- 
 tion, by which the works of his more accomplished rival are dis- 
 tinguished. But how disproportioned to their relative merits has 
 been the reputation of the two philosophers ! While Berkeley's 
 became a name memorable throughout Europe, that of Collier 
 was utterly forgotten, it appears in no British biography ; and is 
 not found even on the list of local authors in the elaborate historv 
 
 * [It never rains but it pours. Collier's Clavis was subsequently reprinted, 
 in a very handsome form, by a literary association in Edinburgh. Would 
 that the books wanting reimpression were first dealt with !]
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 289 
 
 of the county where he was born, and of the parish where he was 
 hereditary Rector ! Indeed, but for the notice of the Clavis by 
 Dr. Reid (who appears to have stumbled on it in the College 
 Library of Glasgow), it is probable that the name of Collier would 
 have remained in his own country absolutely unknown until, 
 perhaps, our attention might have been called to his remarkable 
 writings, by the consideration they had by accident obtained from 
 the philosophers of other countries. In England the Clavis Uni- 
 versalis was printed, but there it can hardly be said to have been 
 published ; for it there never attracted the slightest observa- 
 tion ; and of the copies now known to be extant of the original 
 edition, 
 
 i numerus mx est totidem, quot 
 
 TTiebarvm portce vel dimtis ostla Nili? 
 
 The public libraries of Oxford and Cambridge, as Mr. Benson 
 observes, do not possess a single copy. There are, however, 
 two in Edinburgh ; and in Glasgow, as we have noticed, there is 
 another. 
 
 The only country in which the Clavis can truly be said to have 
 been hitherto published, is Germany. 
 
 In the sixth supplemental volume of the Ada. JEruditorum 
 (17 17) there is a copious and able abstract of its contents. 
 Through this abridgment the speculations of Collier became 
 known particularly to the German philosophers ; and we rec- 
 ollect to have seen them quoted, among others, by Wolf and 
 Bilfinger. 
 
 In 1750, the work was, however, translated, without retrench- 
 ment, into German, by Professor Eschenbach of Rostock, along 
 with Berkeley's Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. These 
 two treatises constitute his ' Collection of the most distinguished 
 Writers who deny the reality of their own body and of the whole 
 corporeal world,' treatises which he accompanied with ' Counter 
 observations, and an Appendix, in which the existence of matter 
 is demonstrated :' These are of considerable value. [I have 
 spoken of them, in Stewart's Dissertation, Note SS.] Speaking 
 
 13
 
 290 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 of Collier's treatise, the translator tells us : ' If any book ever 
 cost me trouble to obtain it, the Clavis is that book. Every ex- 
 ertion was fruitless. At length, an esteemed friend, Mr. J. Selk, 
 candidate of theology in Dantzic, sent me the work, after I had 
 
 abandoned all hope of ever being able to procure it 
 
 The preface is wanting in the copy thus obtained a proof that it 
 was rummaged, with difficulty, out of some old book magazine. 
 It has not, therefore, been in my power to present it to the curi- 
 ous reader, but I trust the loss may not be of any great import- 
 ance.' In regard to the preface, Dr. Eschenbach is, however, 
 mistaken ; the original has none. 
 
 By this translation, which has now itself become rare, the work 
 was rendered fully accessible in Germany ; and the philosophers 
 of that country did not fail to accord to its author the honor due 
 to his metaphysical talent and originality. The best comparative 
 view of the kindred doctrines of Collier and Berkeley is indeed 
 given by Tennemann (xi. 399, sq.) ; whose meritorious History 
 of Philosophy, we may observe, does justice to more than one 
 English thinker, whose works, and even whose name, are in his 
 own country as if they had never been ! 
 
 Dr. Reid's notice of the Clavis attracted the attention of Mr. 
 Dugald Stewart and of Dr. Parr to the work ; and to the nom- 
 inal celebrity which, through them, its author has thus tardily 
 attained, even in Britain, are we indebted for Mr. Benson's inter- 
 esting Memoirs of the Life and Writings of Arthur Collier : 
 forming the second of the two publications prefixed to this article. 
 What was his inducement, and what his means for the execution 
 of this task, the biographer thus informs us. 
 
 ****** 
 
 Arthur Collier was born in 1680. He was the son of Arthur 
 Collier, Rector of Langford-Magna, in the neighborhood of 
 Salisbury a living, the advowson of which had for about a cen- 
 tury been in possession of the family, and of which his great- 
 grandfather, grandfather, father, and himself, were successively 
 incumbents. With his younger brother, William, who was also
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 291 
 
 destined for the Church, and who obtained an adjoining benefice, 
 he received his earlier education in the grammar-school of Salis- 
 bury. In 1697 he was entered of Pembroke College, Oxford ; 
 but in the following year, when his brother joined him at the 
 University, they both became members of Balliol. His father 
 having died in 1697, the family living was held by a substitute 
 until 17 04, when Arthur having taken priest's orders, was induct- 
 ed into the Rectory, on the presentation of his mother. In 1707 
 he married a niece of Sir Stephen Fox ; and died in 1732, leav- 
 ing his wife, with two sons and two daughters, in embarrassed 
 circumstances. Of the sons : Arthur became a civilian of some 
 note at the Commons ; and Charles rose in the army to the rank 
 of Colonel. Of the daughters : Jane was the clever authoress 
 of The Art of Ingeniously Tormenting ; and Mary obtained 
 some celebrity from having accompanied Fielding, as his wife's 
 friend, in the voyage which he made in quest of health to Lis- 
 bon. Collier's family is now believed to be extinct. 
 
 Besides the Clavis Universalis (1713), The Specimen of True 
 Philosophy (1730), and the Logology (1732), Collier was the 
 author of two published Sermons on controversial points, which 
 have not been recovered. Of his manuscript works the remains 
 are still considerable, but it is probable that the greater propor- 
 tion has perished. Our author was hardly less independent in 
 his religious, than in his philosophical, speculations. In the lat- 
 ter he was an Idealist; in the former, an Arian.(like Clarke), 
 an Apollinarian, and a High Churchman, on grounds which 
 high churchmen could not understand. Of Collier as a parish 
 priest and a theologian, Mr. Benson supplies us with much inter- 
 esting information. But it is only as a metaphysician that we at 
 present consider him ; and in this respect the Memoirs form a 
 valuable supplement to the Clavis. Besides a series of letters in 
 exposition of his philosophical system, they afford us, what is 
 even more important, an insight into the course of study by 
 which Collier was led to his conclusion. With philosophical lite- 
 rature he does not appear to have been at all extensively conver-
 
 292 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 saut. His writings betray no intimate acquaintance with the 
 works of the great thinkers of antiquity ; and the compends of 
 the German Scheiblerus and of the Scottish Baronius, apparently 
 supplied him with all that he knew of the Metaphysic of the 
 Schools. Locke is never once alluded to. Descartes and Male- 
 branche, and his neighbor Mr. Norris, were the philosophers 
 whom he seems principally to have studied ; and their works, 
 taken by themselves, were precisely those best adapted to conduct 
 an untrammelled mind of originality and boldness to the result 
 at which he actually arrived. 
 
 Without entering on any general consideration of the doctrine 
 of Idealism, or attempting a regular analysis of the argument of 
 Collier, we hazard a few remarks on that theory, simply with 
 the view of calling attention to some of the peculiar merits of 
 our author. 
 
 Mankind in general believe that an external world exists, only 
 because they believe that they immediately know it as existent. 
 As they believe that they themselves exist because conscious of a 
 self or ego ; so they believe that something different from them- 
 selves exists, because they believe that they are also conscious of 
 this not-self, or non-ego. 
 
 In the first place, then, it is self-evident, that the existence of 
 the external world cannot be doubted, if we admit that we do, 
 as we naturally believe we do, know it immediately as ex- 
 istent. If the fact of the knowledge be allowed, the fact of the 
 existence cannot be gainsaid. The former involves the latter. 
 
 But, in the second place, it is hardly less manifest, that if our 
 natural belief in the knowledge of the existence of an external 
 world be disallowed as false, that our natural belief in the exist- 
 ence of such a world can no longer be founded on as true. Yet, 
 marvellous to say, this has been very generally done. 
 
 For reasons to which we cannot at present advert, it has been 
 almost universally denied by philosophers, that in sensitive per- 
 ception we are conscious of any external reality. On the con- 
 trary, they have maintained, with singular unanimity, that what
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 293 
 
 we are immediately cognitive of in that act, is only an ideal object 
 in the mind itself. In so far as they agree in holding this opinion, 
 philosophers may be called Idealists in contrast to mankind in 
 general, and a few stray speculators who may be called Real- 
 ists Natural Realists. 
 
 In regard to the relation or import of this ideal object, philos- 
 ophers are divided ; and this division constitutes two great and 
 opposing opinions in philosophy. On the one hand, the major- 
 ity have maintained that the ideal object of which the mind is 
 conscious, is vicarious or representative of a real object, unknown 
 immediately or as existing, and known only mediately through 
 this its ideal substitute. These philosophers, thus holding the 
 existence of an external world a world, however, unknown in 
 itself, and therefore asserted only as an hypothesis, may be ap- 
 propriately styled Cosmothetic Idealists Hypothetical or As- 
 sumptive Realists. On the other hand, a minority maintain, 
 that the ideal object has no external prototype ; and they accord- 
 dingly deny the existence of any external world. These may be 
 denominated the Absolute Idealists. 
 
 Each of these great genera of Idealists is, however, divided and 
 subdivided into various subordinate species. 
 
 The Cosmothetic Idealists fall primarily into two classes, inas- 
 much as some view the ideal or representative object to be a 
 tertium quid different from the percipient mind as from the rep- 
 resented object ; while others regard it as only a modification of 
 the mind itself, as only the percipient act considered as repre- 
 sentative of, or relative to, the supposed external reality. The 
 former of these classes is again variously subdivided, according 
 as theories may differ in regard to the nature and origin of the 
 vicarious object ; as whether it be material or immaterial, 
 whether it come from without or rise from within, whether it 
 emanate from the external reality or from a higher source, 
 whether it be infused by God or other hyperphysical intelligences, 
 or whether it be a representation in the Deity himself, whether 
 it be innate, or whether it be produced by the mind, on occasion
 
 294: PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 of the presence of the material object within the sphere of sense. 
 <fec., <fec. 
 
 Of Absolute Idealism ' only two principal species are possible ; 
 
 1 'If idealism supposed the existence of ideas as tertia quaedam, distinct at 
 once from the material object and the immaterial subject, these intermediate 
 entities being likewise held to originate immediately or mediately in sense 
 if this hypothesis, I say, were requisite to Idealism, then would Reid's criti- 
 cism of that doctrine be a complete and final confutation. But as this criti- 
 cism did not contemplate, so it does not confute that simpler and more 
 refined Idealism which views in ideas only modifications of the mind itself; 
 and which, in place of sensualizing intellect, intellectualizes sense. On the 
 contrary, Reid (and herein ho is followed by Mr. Stewart), in the doctrine 
 now maintained, asserts the very positions on which this scheme of Ideal- 
 ism establishes its conclusions. An Egoistical Idealism is established, on 
 the doctrine that all our knowledge is merely subjective, or of the mind 
 itself; that the Ego has no immediate cognizance of a Non-Ego as exist- 
 ing, but that the Non-Ego is only represented to us in a modification of the 
 self-conscious Ego. This doctrine being admitted, the Idealist has only to 
 show that the supposition of a Non-Ego, or external world really existent, is 
 a groundless and unnecessary assumption ; for, while the law of parcimo- 
 ny prohibits the multiplication of substances or causes beyond what the 
 phenomena require, we have manifestly no right to postulate for the Non- 
 Ego the dignity of an independent substance beyond the Ego, seeing that 
 this Non-Ego is, ex hypotheti, known to us, consequently exists for us only as 
 a phenomenon of the Ego. Now, the doctrine of our Scottish philosophers 
 is, in fact, the very groundwork on which the Egoistical Idealism reposes. 
 That doctrine not only maintains our sensations of the secondary qualities to 
 be the mere effects of certain unknown causes, of which we are consequently 
 entitled to affirm nothing, but that we have no direct and immediate percep- 
 tion of extension and the other primary qualities of matter. To limit our- 
 selves to extension (or space), which figure and motion (the two other quali- 
 ties proposed by Reid for the experiment) suppose, it is evident that if ex- 
 tension be not immediately perceived as externally existing, extended objects 
 cannot be immediately perceived as realities out, and independent of, the 
 percipient subject ; for, if we were capable of such a perception of such 
 objects, we should necessarily be also capable of a perception of this, the one 
 essential attribute of their existence. But, on the doctrine of our Scottish 
 philosophers, Extension is a notion suggested on occasion of sensations sup- 
 posed to be determined by certain unknown causes ; which unknown causes 
 are again supposed to be existences independent of the mind, and extended 
 their complement, in fact, constituting the external world. All our knowl- 
 edge of the Non-Ego is thus merely ideal and mediate; we have no knowl- 
 edge of any really objective reality, except through a subjective representa- 
 tion or notion ; in other words, we are only immediately cognizant of cer- 
 tain modes of our own minds, and, in and through them, mediately warned 
 of the phenomena of the material universe. In all essential respects, this
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 295 
 
 at least, only two have been actually manifested in the history 
 of philosophy ; the Theistic and the Egoistic. The former sup- 
 poses that the Deity presents to the mind the appearances which 
 we are determined to mistake for an external world ; the latter 
 supposes that these appearances are manifested to consciousness, 
 in conformity to certain unknown laws by the mind itself. The 
 Theistic Idealism is again subdivided into three ; according as 
 God is supposed to exhibit the phenomena in question in his 
 own substance, to infuse into the percipient mind representative 
 entities different from its own modification, or to determine the 
 ego itself to an illusive representation of the non-ego} 
 
 Now it is easily shown, that if the doctrine of Natural Realism 
 be abandoned, if it be admitted, or proved, that we are deceived 
 in our belief of an immediate knowledge of aught beyond the 
 mind ; then Absolute Idealism is a conclusion philosophically 
 inevitable, the assumption of an external world being now an 
 assumption which no necessity legitimates, and which is therefore 
 philosophically inadmissible. On the law of parsimony it must 
 be presumed null. 
 
 It is, however, historically true, that Natural Realism had been 
 long abandoned by philosophers for Cosmothetic Idealism, before 
 the grounds on which this latter doctrine rests were shown to be 
 unsound. These grounds are principally the following : 
 
 1.) In fas, first place, the natural belief in the existence of an 
 external world was allowed to operate even when the natural 
 belief of our immediate knowledge of such a world was argued to 
 be false. It might be thought that philosophers, when they 
 maintained that one original belief was illusive, would not con- 
 tend that another was veracious, still less that they would 
 assume, as true, a belief which existed only as the result of a 
 
 doctrine of Keid and Stewart is identical with Kant's ; except that the Ger- 
 man philosopher, in holding space to be a necessary form of our conceptions 
 of external things, prudently declined asserting that these unknown things 
 are in themselves extended.' Reid, p. 128. W. 
 
 1 For a more detailed view of these distinctions, see the previous chapter. 
 W.
 
 296 PHILOSOPHY OF PEBCEFTION. 
 
 belief which they assumed to be false. But this they did. The 
 Uosmothetic Idealists all deny the validity of our natural belief 
 in our knowledge of the existence of external things ; but we 
 rind the majority of them, at the same time, maintaining that 
 such existence must be admitted on the authority of our natural 
 belief of its reality. And yet the latter belief exists only in and 
 through the former ; and if the former be held false, it is there- 
 fore, of all absurdities the greatest to view the latter as true. 
 Thus Descartes, after arguing that mankind are universally de- 
 luded in their conviction that they have any immediate knowl- 
 edge of aught beyond the modifications of their own minds ; 
 again argues that the existence of an external world must be 
 admitted, because if it do not exist, God deceives, in impressing 
 on us a belief in its reality ; but God is no deceiver ; therefore, 
 <fec. This reasoning is either good for nothing, or good for more 
 than Descartes intended. For, on the one hand, if God be no 
 deceiver, he did not deceive us in our natural belief that we 
 know something more than the mere modes of self ; but then 
 the fundamental position of the Cartesian philosophy is disproved : 
 and if, on the other hand, this position be admitted, God is there- 
 by confessed to be a deceiver, who, having deluded us in the 
 belief on which our belief of an external world is founded, cannot 
 be consistently supposed not to delude us in this belief itself. 
 Such melancholy reasoning is, however, from Descartes to Dr. 
 Brown, the favorite logic by which the Cosmothetic Idealists in 
 general attempt to resist the conclusion of the Absolute Idealists. 
 But on this ground there is no tenable medium between Natural 
 Realism and Absolute Idealism. 
 
 It is curious to notice the different views which Berkeley and 
 Collier, our two Absolute Idealists, and which Dr. Samuel 
 Clarke, the acutest of the Hypothetical Realists with whom they 
 both came in contact, took of this principle. 
 
 Clarke was, apparently, too sagacious a metaphysician not to 
 see that the proof of the reality of an external world reposed 
 mainly on our natural belief of its reality ; and at the same time
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 297 
 
 that this natural belief could not be pleaded in favor of his 
 hypothesis by the Cosraothetic Idealist. He was himself con- 
 scious, that his philosophy afforded him no arms against the 
 reasoning of the Absolute Idealists ; whose inference he was, 
 however, inclined neither to admit, nor able to show why it 
 should not. Whiston, in his Memoirs, speaking of Berkeley and 
 his Idealism, says : ' He was pleased to send Dr. Clarke and 
 myself, each of us a book. After we had both perused it, I went 
 to Dr. Clarke and discoursed with him about it to this effect : 
 That I, being not a metaphysician, was not able to answer Mr. 
 Berkeley's subtile premises, though I did not at all believe his 
 absurd conclusion. I, therefore, desired that he, who was deep 
 in such subtilties, but did not appear to believe Mr. Berkeley's 
 conclusions, would answer him ; which task he declined. 1 Many 
 years after this, as we are told in the Life of Bishop Berkeley, 
 prefixed to his works : ' There was, at Mr. Addison's instance, a 
 meeting of Drs. Clarke and Berkeley to discuss this speculative 
 point ; and great hopes were entertained from the conference. 
 The parties, however, separated without being able to come to 
 any agreement. Dr. Berkeley declared himself not well satisfied 
 with the conduct of his antagonist on the occasion, icho, though 
 he could not answer, had not candor enough to own himself con- 
 vinced? 
 
 Mr. Benson affords us a curious anecdote to the same effect in 
 a letter of Collier to Clarke. From it we learn, that when 
 Collier originally presented his Claris to the Doctor, through a 
 friend, on reading the title, Clarke good-humoredly said : ' Poor 
 gentleman ! I pity him. lie would be a philosopher, but has 
 chosen a strange task ; for he can neither prove his point him- 
 self, nor can the contrary be proved against him.' 
 
 In regard f*o the two Idealists themselves, each dealt with this 
 ground of argument in a very different way ; and it must be 
 confessed that in this respect Collier is favorably contrasted with 
 Berkeley. Berkeley attempts to enlist the natural belief of man- 
 kind in his favor against the Hypothetical Realism of the philos- 
 
 13*
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 ophers. It is true, that natural belief is opposed to scientific 
 opinion. Mankind are not, however, as Berkeley reports, Ideal- 
 ists. In this he even contradicts himself; for, if they be, in 
 truth, of his opinion, why does he dispute so anxiously, so learn- 
 edly against them ? Collier, on the contrary, consistently rejects 
 all appeal to the common sense of mankind. The motto of his 
 work, from Malebranche, is the watchword of his philosophy : 
 ' Vulgi assensus et approbatio circa, materiam difficilem, est cer- 
 ium argumentum falsitatis istius opinionis cut assentitur? And 
 in his answer to the Cartesian argument for the reality of matter, 
 from ' that strong and natural inclination which all men have to 
 believe in an external world ;' he shrewdly remarks on the. incon- 
 sistency of such a reasoning at such hands : ' Strange ! That 
 a person of Mr. Descartes' sagacity should be found in so plain 
 and palpable an oversight ; and that the late ingenious Mr. Nor- 
 ris should be found treading in the same track, and that too upon 
 a solemn and particular disquisition of this matter. That whilst 
 on the one hand, they contend against the common inclination 
 or prejudice of mankind, that the visible world is not external, 
 they should yet appeal to the same common inclination for the 
 truth or being of an external world, which on their principles 
 must be said to be invisible ; and for which, therefore (they must 
 needs have known if they had considered it), there neither is, nor 
 can be, any kind of inclination.' (P. 81.) 
 
 2.) In the second place it was very generally assumed in 
 antiquity, and during the middle ages, that an external world 
 was a supposition necessary to render possible the fact of our 
 sensitive cognition. The philosophers who held, that the imme- 
 diate object of perception was an emanation from an outer real- 
 ity, and that the hypothesis of the latter was requisite to account 
 for the phenomenon of the former, their theory involved the 
 existence of an external world as its condition. But from the 
 moment that the necessity of this condition was abandoned, and 
 this was done by many even of the scholastic philosophers ; from 
 the moment that sensible species or the vicarious objects in per-
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 299 
 
 ception were admitted to be derivable from other sources than 
 the external objects themselves, as from God, or from the mind 
 itself ; from that moment we must look for other reasons than 
 the preceding, to account for the remarkable fact, that it was not 
 until after the commencement of the eighteenth century that a 
 doctrine of Absolute Idealism was, without communication, con- 
 temporaneously promulgated by Berkeley and Collier. 
 
 3.) In explanation of this fact, we must refer to a third 
 ground, which has been wholly overlooked by the historians of 
 philosophy ; but which it is necessary to take into account, 
 would we explain how so obvious a conclusion as the negation of 
 the existence of an outer world, on the negation of our immediate 
 knowledge of its existence, should not have been drawn by so 
 acute a race of speculators as the philosophers of the middle 
 ages, to say nothing of the great philosophers of a more recent 
 epoch. This ground is : That the doctrine of Idealism is in- 
 compatible with the Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist. It is a 
 very erroneous statement of Reid, in which, however he errs 
 only in common with other philosophers, that ' during the 
 reign of the Peripatetic doctrine, we find no appearance of skepti- 
 cism about the existence of matter.' On the contrary, during the 
 dominance of the scholastic philosophy, we find that the possibil- 
 ity of the non-existence of matter was contemplated ; nay, that 
 the reasons in support of this supposition were expounded, in all 
 their cogency. We do not, however, find the conclusion founded 
 on these reasons formally professed. And why ? Because this 
 conclusion, though philosophically proved, was theologically dis- 
 proved ; and such disproof was during the middle ages sufficient 
 to prevent the overt recognition of any speculative doctrine ; foi 
 with all its ingenuity and boldness, philosophy during these ages 
 was confessedly in the service of the church, it was always Phi- 
 losophia ancillans Theologian. And this because the service was 
 voluntary ; a thraldom indeed of love. Now, if the reality of 
 matter were denied, there would, in genera!, be denied the reality 
 of Christ's incarnation ; and in particular the tmnsubstantiatirm
 
 300 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 into his body of the elements of bread and wine. There were other 
 theological reasons indeed, and these not without their weight ; 
 but this was, perhaps, the only one insuperable to a Catholic. 
 
 We find the influence of this reason at work in very ancient 
 times. It was employed by the earlier Fathers, and more espe- 
 cially in opposition to Marcion's doctrine of the merely phenome- 
 nal incarnation of our Saviour. ' Non licet' (says Tertullian in 
 his book De Anima, speaking of the evidence of sense) ' non 
 licet nobis in dubium sensus istus revocare, ne et in Christo de 
 fide eorum deliberetur : ne forte dicatur, quod falso Satanam 
 prospectarit de caelo praecipitatum ; aut falso vocem Patris audi- 
 erit de ipso testificatam ; aut deceptus sit cum Petri socrum 
 
 tetegit Sic et Marcion phantasma eum maluit credere, 
 
 totius corporis in illo dedignatus veritatem.' (Cap. xvii.) And 
 in his book, Adversus Marcionem : ' Ideo Christus non erat 
 quod videbatur, et quod erat mentiebatur ; caro, nee caro ; homo, 
 nee homo : proinde Deus Christus, nee Deus ; cur enim non 
 etiam Dei phantasma portaverit ? An credam ei de interiore 
 substantia, qui sit de exteriore frustratus ? Quomodo verax habe- 
 bitur in occulto, tarn fallax repertus in aperto? . . . Jam nunc 
 quum mendacium deprehenditur Christus caro ; sequitur ut om- 
 nia quae per carnem Christi gesta sunt, mendacio gesta sint, 
 congressus, contactus, convictus, ipsas quoque virtutes. Si enim 
 tangendo aliquem, liberavit a vitio, non potest vere actum credi, 
 sine corporis ipsius veritate. Nihil solid um ab inani, nihil ple- 
 num a vacuo perfici licet. Putativus habitus, putativus actus ; 
 imaginarius operator, imaginariae operas.' (Lib. iii. c. 8.) In 
 like manner, St. Augustin, among many other passages : ' Si 
 phantasma fuit corpus Christi, fefellit Christus ; et si fefellit, veri- 
 tas non est. Est autem veritas Christus ; non igitur phantasma 
 fuit corpus ejus.' (lAber De Ixxxiii. Quoestionibus, qu. 14.) 
 And so many others. 
 
 The repugnancy of the Catholic dogma of transubstantiation 
 with the surrender of a substantial prototype of the species pre- 
 sented to our sensible perceptions, was, however, more fully and
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 301 
 
 precisely signalized by the Schoolmen ; as may be seen in the 
 polemic waged principally on the great arena of scholastic sub- 
 tilty the commentaries on the four books of the Sentences of 
 Peter Lombard. In their commentaries on the first book, espe- 
 cially, will be found abundant speculation of an idealistic tend- 
 ency. The question is almost regularly mooted : May not 
 God preserve the species (the ideas of a more modern philosophy) 
 before the mind, the external reality represented being destroyed ? 
 May not God, in fact, object to the sense the species represent- 
 ing an external world, that ivorld, in reality, not existing ? To 
 these questions the answer is, always in the first instance, affirm- 
 ative. Why then, the possibility, the probability even, being ad- 
 mitted, was the fact denied ? Philosophically orthodox, it was 
 theologically heretical ; and their principal argument for the 
 rejection is, that on such hypothesis, the doctrine of a transub- 
 stantiated eucharist becomes untenable. A change is not, can- 
 not be, (spiritually) real. 
 
 Such was the special reason, why many of the acuter School- 
 men did not follow out their general argument, to the express 
 negation of matter ; and such also was the only reason, to say 
 nothing of other Cartesians, why Malebranche deformed the sim- 
 plicity of his peculiar theory with such an assumptive hors d'oeuvre, 
 as an unknown and otiose universe of matter. It is, indeed, but 
 justice to that great philosopher to say, that if the incumbrance 
 with which, as a Catholic, he was obliged to burden it, be thrown 
 off his theory, that theory becomes one of Absolute Idealism ; 
 and that, in fact, all the principal arguments in support of such 
 a scheme are found fully developed in his immortal Inquiry after 
 Truth. This Malebranche well knew ; and knowing it, we can 
 easily understand, how Berkeley's interview with him ended as 
 it did.* 
 
 * [I cannot, however, concur in the praise of novelty and invention, which 
 has always been conceded to the central theory of Malebranche. His ' Vision 
 of all things in the Deity,' 1 is, as it appears to me, simply a transference to 
 man in the flesh, to the Viator, of that mode of cognition, maintained by
 
 302 PHILOSOPHY OF PEBCEPTION. 
 
 Malebranche thus left little for his Protestant successors to do. 
 They had only to omit the Catholic 1 excrescence ; the reasons 
 vindicating this omission they found collected and marshalled to 
 their hand. That Idealism was the legitimate issue of the Male- 
 branchian doctrine, was at once seen by those competent to meta- 
 physical reasoning. This was signalized, in general, by Bayle, 
 and, what has not been hitherto noticed, by Locke.* It was, 
 
 many of the older Catholic divines,an explanation of how the saints, as dis- 
 embodied spirits, can be aware of human invocations, and, in general, of 
 what passes upon earth. 'They perceive? it is said, 'all things in God. 1 
 So that, in truth, the philosophical theory of Malebranche is nothing but the 
 extension of a theological hypothesis, long common in the schools ; and with 
 scholastic speculations, Malobranche was even intimately acquainted. This 
 Hypothesis I liad once occasion to express : 
 
 1 Quidquid, in his tenelris rite, carne latebat, 
 Nunc leg'u in magno cuncto, beate, DeoS] 
 
 1 ' They (the Catholics) admit that physically the bread and wine are bread 
 and wine ; and only contend that hypervhyticaUy in a spiritual, mysterious, 
 and inconceivable sense, they are really flesh and blood. Those, therefore, 
 who think of disproving the doctrine of transubstantiation, by proving that 
 in the eucharist bread and wine remain physically bread and wine, are guilty 
 of the idle sophism called mutatio elenchi." 1 Reid, p. 518. W. 
 
 * Compare Locke's Examination of P. MalebranchJs Opinion ( 20). 
 
 When on this subject, we may clear up a point connected therewith, of 
 some interest, in relation to Locke and fiewton, and which has engaged the 
 attention of Dr. Reid and Mr. Dugald Stewart. 
 
 Jteid, who has overlooked the passage of Locke just referred to, says, in 
 deducing the history of the Berkeleian Idealism, and after speaking of Male- 
 branche's opinion : ' It may seem strange that Locke, who wrote so much 
 about ideas, should not see those consequences which Berkeley thought so 
 obviously deducible from that doctrine. . . . There is, indeed a single 
 passage in Locke's essay, which may lead one to conjecture that he had a 
 glimpse of that system which Berkeley afterwards advanced, but thought 
 proper to suppress it within his own breast. The passage is in Book IV. c. 
 10, where, having proved the existence of an eternal, intelligent mind, he 
 comes to answer those who conceive that matter also must be eternal, 
 because we cannot conceive how it could be made out of nothing ; and, 
 having observed that the creation of mind requires no less power than the 
 creation of matter, he adds what follows : " Nay, possibly, if we could 
 emancipate ourselves from vulgar notions, and raise our thoughts, as far as 
 they would reach, to a closer contemplation of things, we might be able to 
 aim at some dim and seeming conception, how matter might at first be made 
 and begin to exist, by the power of that eternal first Being ; but to give 
 beginning and being to a spirit, would be found a more inconceivable effect
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 303 
 
 therefore, but little creditable to the acuteness of Norris, that he, 
 a Protestant, should have adopted the Malebranchian hypothe- 
 sis, without rejecting its Catholic incumbrance. The honor of 
 
 of omnipotent power. But this being what would, perhaps, lead us too far 
 from the notions on which the philosophy now in the world is built, it would 
 not be pardonable to deviate so far from them, or to inquire, so far as gram- 
 mar itself would authorize, if the common settled opinion oppose it ; espe- 
 cially in this place, where the received doctrine serves well enough to our 
 present purpose." ' Reid then goes on at considerable length to show that 
 ' every particular Mr. Locke has hinted with regard to that system which he 
 had in his mind, but thought it prudent to suppress, tallies exactly with the 
 system of Berkeley.' (Intellectual Powers, Ess. II. ch. 10.) 
 
 Stewart does not coincide with Reid. In quoting the same passage of 
 Locke, he says of it, that ' when considered in connection with some others 
 in his writings, it would almost tempt one to think that a theory concerning 
 matter, somewhat analogous to that of Boscovich, had occasionally passed 
 through his mind ;' and then adduces various reasons in support of this 
 opinion, and in opposition to Reid's. (Philosophical Essays, Ess. II. ch. 1, 
 p. 63.) 
 
 The whole arcanum in the passage in question is, however, revealed by 
 M. Coste, the French translator of the Essay, and of several other of the 
 works of Locke, with whom, the philosopher lined in the same family, and on 
 the most intimate terms, for the last seven years of his life ; and who, though 
 lie has never been consulted, affords often the most important information in 
 regard to Locke's opinions. To this passage there is in the fourth edition of 
 Coste's translation, a very curious note appended, of which the following is 
 an abstract. ' Ilere Mr. Locke excites our curiosity without being inclined 
 to satisfy it. Many persons having imagined that he had communicated to 
 me this mode of explaining the creation of matter, requested, when my trans- 
 lation first appeared, that I would inform them what it was ; but I was 
 obliged to confess, that Mr. Locke had not made even me a partner in the 
 secret. At length, long after his death, Sir Isaac Newton, to whom I was 
 accidentally speaking of this part of Mr. Locke's book, discovered to me the 
 whole mystery. He told me, smiling, that it was he himself who had imagined 
 this manner of explaining the creation of matter, and that the thought had 
 struck him, one day, when this question chanced to turn up in a conversa- 
 tion between himself, Mr. Locke, and the late Earl of Pembroke. The fol- 
 lowing is the way in which he explained to them his thought: " We may be 
 enabled 1 ' 1 (he said) "to form some rude conception of the creation of matter, if 
 we suppose that God by his power had prevented the entrance of any thing into 
 a certain portion of pure space, which is of its nature penetrable, eternal, neces- 
 sary, infinite ; for henceforward this portwn of space would be endowed with 
 impenetrability ; one of the essential qualities of matter ; and as pure space i-s 
 absolutely uniform, we have only again to suppose that God communicated the 
 same impenetrability to another portion of space, and we should then obtain in 
 a certain sort the notion of the mobility of matter, another quality which i-s also
 
 304 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 first promulgating an articulate scheme of absolute idealism was 
 thus left Co Berkeley and Collier ; and though both are indebted 
 to Malebranche for the principal arguments they adduce, each is 
 also entitled to the credit of having applied them with an inge- 
 nuity peculiar to himself. 
 
 It is likewise to the credit of Collier's sagacity, that he has 
 noticed (and he is the only modern philosopher, we have found, 
 to have anticipated our observation) the incompatibility of the 
 Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist with the non-existence of mat- 
 ter. In the concluding chapter of his work, in which he speaks 
 ' of the use and consequences of the foregoing treatise,' he enu- 
 merates as one ' particular usefulness with respect to religion,' the 
 refutation it affords of ' the real presence of Christ's body in the 
 Eucharist in which the Papists have grafted the doctrine of tran- 
 substantiation.' He says : 
 
 ' Now nothing can bo more evident, than that both the sound and ex- 
 plication of this important doctrine are founded altogether on the suppo- 
 sition of external matter ; so that, if this be removed, there is not any 
 thing left whereon to build so much as the appearance of a question. 
 For if, after this, it bo inquired whether the substance of the bread in this sac- 
 rament, be not changed into the substance of the "body of Christ, the accidents 
 or sensible appearances remaining as before ; or suppose this should be 
 affirmed to be the fact, or at least possible, it may indeed be shown to 
 be untrue or impossible, on the supposition of an external world, from 
 certain consequential absurdities which attend it ; but to remove an external 
 world, is to prick- it in its punctum saliens, or quench its very -vital flame. For 
 if there is no external matter, the very distinction is lost between the 
 substance and accidents, or sensible species of bodies, and these last will 
 become the sole essence of material objects. So that, if these arc supposed 
 to remain as before, there is no possible room for the supposal of any 
 change, in that the thing supposed to be changed, is here shown to be nothing 
 at all.' (P. 95.) 
 
 very essential to it." Thus, then, we are relieved of the embarrassment of 
 endeavoring to discover what it was that Mr. Locke had deemed it advisable 
 to conceal from his readers : for the above is all that gave him occasion to 
 tell us " if we would raise our thoughts as far as they could reach, we might 
 be able to aim at some dim and seeming conception how matter might at 
 first be made," ' &c. This suffices to show what was the general purport of 
 Locke's expressions, and that Mr. Stewart's conjecture is at least nearer to 
 the truth than Dr. Reid's.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 305 
 
 But we must conclude. What has now been said in reference 
 to a part of its contents, may perhaps contribute to attract the 
 attention of those interested in the higher philosophy, to this very 
 curious volume. We need hardly add, that Mr Benson's Memoirs 
 of Collier should be bound up along with it.
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 DISTINCTION OF THE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES 
 OF BODY. 1 
 
 THE developed doctrine of Real Presentationism, the basis of 
 Natural Realism, asserts the consciousness or immediate perception 
 of certain essential attributes of matter objectively existing ; while 
 it admits that other properties of body are unknown in them- 
 selves, and only inferred as causes to account for certain subject- 
 ive affections of which we are cognizant in ourselves. This dis- 
 crimination, which to other systems is contingent, superficial, ex- 
 traneous, but to Natural Realism necessary, radical, intrinsic, co- 
 incides with what, since the time of Locke, has been generally 
 known as the distinction of the Qualities of Matter or Body, using 
 these terms as convertible into Primary and Secondary. 
 
 Of this celebrated analysis, I shall here, in the first place, at- 
 tempt an historical survey ; and in the second, endeavor to place 
 it on its proper footing by a critical analysis ; without however 
 in either respect proposing more than a contribution towards a 
 more full and regular discussion of it in both. 
 
 I. DISTINCTION OF THE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALI- 
 TIES OF BODY CONSIDERED HISTORICALLY. 
 
 In regard to its History 1 this, as hitherto attempted, is at 
 once extremely erroneous, if History may be called the incidental 
 
 1 This is the fourth supplementary Dissertation in Hamilton's Reid. W. 
 
 * Sir William ia exploring a new tract in the history of philosophy. No 
 one has preceded him in this research, and if he has not completed the his- 
 tory of the distinction of the Primary and Secondary Qualities of Body, he 
 has given us, with accurate criticism, the opinions of those most worthy of 
 being consulted. No one, from Brucker to the present time, lias traced the 
 history of particular opinions with such affluent and unerring erudition, as 
 that of Hamilton. In this respect, he stands unrivalled and alone. We
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 307 
 
 notices in regard to it of an historical import, which are occasion- 
 ally to be met with in philosophical treatises. Among the most 
 important of those, are those furnished by Reid himself, and by 
 M. Royer-Collard. 
 
 The distinction of the real and the apparent, of the absolute 
 and the relative, or of the objective and the subjective qualities of 
 perceived bodies is of so obtrusive a character, that it was taken 
 almost at the origin of speculation, and can be shown to have 
 commanded the assent even of those philosophers by whom it is 
 now commonly believed to have been again formally rejected. 
 For in this, as in many other cases, it will be found that while 
 philosophers appear to differ, they are, in reality, at one. 
 
 1. LEUCIPPUS and DEMOCRITUS are the first on record by 
 whom the observation was enounced, that the Sweet, the Bitter, 
 the Cold, the Hot, the Colored, &c., are wholly different, in their 
 absolute nature, from the character in which they come manifested 
 to us. In the latter case, these qualities have no real or inde- 
 pendent existence (ou xcc<rct dX^siav). The only existence they 
 can pretend to, is merely one phenomenal in us ; and this in vir- 
 tue of a law or relation (vofxw), established between the existing 
 body and the percipient mind ; while all that can be denomina- 
 ted Quality in the external reality, is only some modification of 
 Quantity, some particular configuration, position, or co-arrange- 
 ment of Atoms, in conjunction with the Inane. (Aristoteles, Me- 
 taph., L. i. c. 4 Phys. Ausc., L. i. c. 5 De Anima, L. iii. c. 1 
 De Sensu et Sensili, c. 4 De Gen. et Corr., L. i. cc. 2, 7, 8 ; 
 Theophrastus, De Sensu, 63, 65, 67, 69, 73, ed. Schneid. ;-- 
 Sextus Empiricus, adv. Math., vii. 135 Hypot. i. 213 ; 
 Galenus, De Elem., L. i. c. 2, ; Laertius, L. ix. seg. 44 ; Plu- 
 tarchus, adv. Colot,, p. 1110, ed. Xyl. ; Simplicius, in Phys. 
 
 hope that many will follow his example, who, each working in a separate 
 field, will at length complete the history not of philosophers, hot of men, 
 not of systems even, but of the human mind itself, in the various forms of 
 its manifestation. W.
 
 308 PHILOSOPHY OF I'KUCKITION. 
 
 Ausc,, if. 7, 10, 106, 119, ed. Aid.; Pkiloponus, De Gen. et 
 Oorr., f. 32, ed Aid.) 
 
 2, 3. This observation was not lost on PROTAGORAS or on 
 PLATO. The former on this ground endeavored to establish the 
 absolute relativity of all human knowledge ; the latter the abso- 
 lute relativity of our sensible perceptions. (Theaetetus, passim.) 
 
 4. By the CYREN^AN philosophers the distinction was 
 likewise adopted and applied. (Cic. Qu. Acad., iv. c. 24.) 
 
 5. With other doctrines of the older Atomists it was trans- 
 planted into his system by EPICURUS. (Epist. ad Herod, apud 
 Laert., L. x. seg. 54 ; Lucret., L. ii. v. 729 1021.) 
 
 6. In regard to ARISTOTLE, it is requisite to be somewhat 
 more explicit. This philosopher might seem, at first sight, to 
 have rejected the distinction (De Anima, L. iii. c. i.) ; and among 
 many others, Reid has asserted that Aristotle again ignored the 
 discrimination, which had been thus recognized by his predeces- 
 sors. (Inq., 123 a, I. P. 313 b.) Nothing, however, can be more 
 erroneous than the accredited doctrine upon this point. Aris- 
 totle does not abolish the distinction ; nay, I am confident of 
 showing, that to whatever merit modem philosophers may pre- 
 tend in this analysis, all and each of their observations are to te 
 found, clearly stated, in the writings of the Stagirite. 
 
 In the first place, no philosopher has discriminated with 
 greater, perhaps none with equal, precision, the difference of cor- 
 poreal qualities considered objectively and subjectively. These re- 
 lations he has not only contrasted, but has assigned to them dis- 
 tinctive appellations. In his Categories (c. viii. 10, Pachian 
 division, by which, as that usually adopted, I uniformly quote), 
 speaking of Quality, he says : ' A third kind of Quality [Such- 
 ness] is made up of the Affective Qualities and Affections (jrotdrjTi- 
 xeu tfoioTTjTes, -jra^rj). Of this class are Sweetness, Bitterness, 
 Sourness, and the like, also Heat and Cold, Whiteness and Black- 
 ness, <fec. That these are qualities [suchnesses] is manifest. For 
 the subjects in which they are received, are said to be such and 
 such by relation to them. Thus honey is called sweet, as recipi-
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 309 
 
 ent of sweetness, body, white, as recipient of whiteness, and so of 
 the rest. They are called affective [i. e. causing passion or affec- 
 tion*] not because the things to which these qualities belong, 
 have been themselves affected in any way (for it is not because 
 honey, or the like, has been somehow affected that it is called 
 sweet, and in like manner heat and cold are not called affective 
 qualities because the bodies in which they inhere have undergone 
 any affection) ; but they are called affective, because each of the 
 
 * The active-potential term 7ra0i7rr<5j, primarily and properly denotes that 
 which can in itself suffer or be affected ; it is here employed in a secondary 
 and abusive sense (for -ndex** is intransitive), but which subsequently became 
 the more prevalent to signify that which can cause suffering or affection in 
 something else. The counter passive-potential form, jra0/?T<5j, is not, I venture 
 to assert, ever used by Aristotle, though quoted from him, and from this 
 very treatise, by all the principal lexicographers for the last three centuries ; 
 nay, I make further bold to say, there is no authority for it (Menander's is 
 naught), until long subsequently to the age of the Stagirite. [The error, I 
 suspect, originated thus: Tusanus, in his Lexicon (1552), says, under the 
 word ' Vide Fabrum Stapulensem apud Aristotelem in Prsedicamentis ;' 
 meaning, it is probable (for I have not the book at hand), to send us to 
 Faber's Introduction to the Categories, for some observations on the term. 
 The Lexicon Septemvirale (1563), copying Tusanus, omits Faber, and simply 
 refers ' Aristoteli, in Prsedicamentis,' as to an authority for the word ; and 
 this error, propagated through Stephanus, Constantino, Scapula, and subse- 
 quent compilers, stands unconnected to the present day.] But this term, 
 even were it of Aristotelic usage, could not, without violence, have been 
 twisted to denote, in conjunction with noidrris , what the philosopher less 
 equivocally, if less symmetrically, expresses by rrdQos, affection. Patibilis, 
 like most Latin verbals of its class, indiscriminately renders the two poten- 
 tials, active and passive, which the Greek tongue alone so admirably contra- 
 distinguishes. But, in any way, the word is incompetent to Aristotle's 
 meaning, in the sense of affective. For it only signifies either that which 
 can suffer, or that which can be suffered ; and there is not, I am confident, a 
 single ancient authority to be found for it,, in the sense of that which can 
 came to suffer, the sense to which it is contorted by the modern Latin Aris- 
 totelians. But they had their excuse necessity; for the terms passivus, 
 used in the ' Categorise Decem' attributed to St. Augustine, and passibiUs, 
 employed by Boethius in his version of the present passage, are even worse. 
 The words affective and affection, render the Greek adjective and substantive 
 tolerably well. 
 
 This distinction by Aristotle is very commonly misunderstood. It is even 
 reversed by Gassendi ; but with him, of course, only from inadvertence. 
 Phys. Sect. i. Lib. vi. c. 1.
 
 310 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 foresaid qualities has the power of causing an affection in the 
 sense. For sweetness determines a certain affection in tasting, 
 heat in touching, and in like manner the others.' 
 
 Nothing can be juster than this distinction, and it is only to be 
 regretted that he should have detracted from the precision of the 
 language in which it is expressed by not restricting the correlative 
 terms, Affective Qualities and Affections, to the discrimination in 
 question alone. In this particular observation, it is proper to 
 notice, Aristotle had in view the secondary qualities of our mod- 
 ern philosophy exclusively. It suffices, however, to show that no 
 philosopher had a clearer insight into the contrast of such quali- 
 ties, as they are, and as they are perceived ; and, were other proof 
 awanting, it might also of itself exonerate him from any share in 
 the perversion made by the later Peripatetics of his philosophy, 
 in their doctrine of Substantial Forms ; a doctrine which, as 
 Reid (I. P. 316) rightly observes, is inconsistent with the distinc- 
 tion in question as taken by the Atomic philosophers, but which 
 in truth is not less inconsistent with that here established by Aris- 
 totle himself.* It may be here likewise observed that Andronicus, 
 
 * The theory of what are called Substantial Forms, that is, qualities 
 viewed as entities conjoined with, and not as mere dispositions or modifica- 
 tions of matter, was devised by the perverse ingenuity of the Arabian phi- 
 losophers and physicians. Adopted from them, it was long a prevalent doc- 
 trine in the Western schools, among the followers of Aristotle and Galen ; 
 to either of whom it is a gross injustice to attribute this opinion. It was the 
 ambiguity of the word oiiaia, by which the Greeks express what is denoted 
 (to say nothing of Arabic) by both the Latin terms essentia and substantia, 
 that allowed of, and principally occasioned the misinterpretation. 
 
 I may likewise notice, by the way, that Aristotle's doctrine of the assimi- 
 lation, in the sensitive process, of that which perceives with that which is 
 perceived, may reasonably be explained to mean, that the object and subject 
 are then so brought into mutual relation, as, by their coefficient energy, to 
 constitute an act of cognition one and indivisible, and in which the reality is 
 to us as we perceive it to be. This is a far easier, and a far more consistent 
 interpretation of his words than the monstrous doctrine of intentional forms 
 or species; a doctrine founded on one or two vague or metaphorical expres- 
 sions, and for which the general analogy of his philosophy required a very 
 different meaning. For example, when Aristotle (Do Anima, iii. 1), in 
 showing that an objection was incompetent, even on ite own hypothesis,
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 311 
 
 as quoted by Simplicius (Categ. f. 55 ed. Velsii), explicitly states, 
 that the Affective Qualities are, in strict propriety, not qualities 
 but powers (Q-J ifoia, dXXex, croi^Tixa). Aristotle himself, indeed, 
 accords to these apart from perception, only a potential existence ; 
 and the Peripatetics in general held them to be, in their language 
 not #a0/]<nx<2, formally, subjectively, but JvSyijrixw, virtually, 
 eminently, in the external object. Locke has thus no title what- 
 ever to the honor generally accorded to him of first promulgating 
 the observation, that the secondary qualities, as in the object, are 
 not so much qualities as poioers. This observation was, however, 
 only borrowed by Locke from the Cartesians. But of this here- 
 after. 
 
 In the second place, Aristotle likewise notices the ambiguity 
 which arises from languages not always affording different terms 
 by which to distinguish the potential from the actual, and the 
 objective from the subjective phases, in our perception by the dif- 
 ferent senses. Thus, he observes (De Anima, L. iii. c. 1) that, 
 ' Though the actuality or energy of the object of sense and of the 
 sense itself be one and indivisible, the nature, the essence, of the 
 energy is, however, not the same in each ; as, for example, sound 
 in energy, and hearing in energy. For it may happen, that what 
 has the power of hearing does not now hear, and that what has 
 the power of sounding does not always sound. But when what 
 has the faculty of hearing, on the one hand, operates, and what 
 
 dialectically admits ' that what sees color is, in a certain sort, itself colored ;' 
 is this more than a qualified statement of what modern philosophers have 
 so often, far less guardedly, asserted that color is not to be considered 
 merely as an attribute of body, since, in a certain respect, it is an affection of 
 mind ? And when he immediately subjoins the reason ' for each organ of 
 sense is receptive of its appropriate object,' or, as he elsewhere expresses it, 
 ' receptive of the form without the matter ;' what is this but to say that our 
 organs of sense stand in relation to certain qualities of body, and that each 
 organ is susceptible of an affection from its appropriate quality ; such qual- 
 ity, however, not being received by the sense in a material efflux from the 
 object, as was held by Deraocritus and many previous philosophers ? Yet 
 this is the principal text on which the common doctrine of Intentional Spe- 
 cies is attributed to Aristotle.
 
 312 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 has the faculty of sounding, on the other, sounds, then the actual 
 hearing and the actual sounding take place conjunctly ; and of 
 these the one may be called Audition, the other Sonation ; the 
 subjective term, hearing, and the objective term, sound, as he 
 afterwards states, being twofold in meaning, each denoting ambig- 
 uously both the actual and the potential. ' The same analogy,' 
 he adds, ' holds good in regard to the other senses and their re- 
 spective objects. For as affection and passion are realized in the 
 patient, and not in the efficient, so the energy of the object of 
 sense (aiV^rov), and the energy of t\\n faculty of sense (aiV0j<nx6v) 
 are both in the latter ; but whilst in certain of the senses they 
 have obtained distinct names, (as Sonation and Audition), in thf 
 rest, the one or the other is left anonymous. For Vision denotes 
 the energy of the visual faculty, whereas the energy of color, it* 
 object, is without a name ; and while Gustation expresses the act 
 of what is able to taste, the act* of that capable of being tasted 
 is nameless. But seeing that of the object, and of the faculty, of 
 sense the energy is one and the same, though their nature be dif- 
 ferent, it is necessary, that hearing and sound, as actual (and the 
 same is the case in the other senses), should subsist and perish 
 together ; whereas this is not necessary, in so far as these are con- 
 sidered as potentially existing.' 
 
 He then goes on to rectify, in its statement, the doctrine of the 
 older physical philosophers ; in whom Philoponus (or Ammonius) 
 contemplates Protagoras and hft followers, but Simplicius, on bet- 
 ter grounds, the Democriteans. ' But the earlier speculators on 
 nature were not correct in saying, that there is nothing white or 
 
 * In English, and in most other languages, there are not distinct words 
 to express as well the objective as the subjective, coefficient in the senses, 
 more particularly of Tasting and Smelling ; and we are therefore obliged 
 ambiguously to apply the terms taste and smell (which are rather subjective 
 in signification) in an objective sense, and the terms savor, flavor, &c. (which 
 have perhaps now more of an objective meaning), in a subjective significa- 
 tion. In reference to the sense of touch, the same word is often equivocally 
 used to denote, objectively, a primary quality, and subjectively, a secondary. 
 Aa Tiardneti, roughness, &c.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 313 
 
 black, apart from sight, and nothing sapid apart from taste. This 
 doctrine is, in certain respects, right, in certain respects, wrong. 
 For sense and the object of sense having each a two-fold significa- 
 tion, inasmuch as they may severally mean either what is poten- 
 tially, or what is actually, existent ; in the latter case, what is 
 here asserted, takes place, but not so in the former. These spec- 
 ulators were therefore at fault, in stating absolutely what is only 
 true under conditions.' (De Anima, iii. c. 1.) 
 
 This criticism, it is evident, so far from involving a rejection of 
 the distinction taken by Leucippus and Democritus, is only an 
 accommodation of it to the form of his own philosophy ; in 
 which the distinction of the Potential and Actual obtain as 
 great, perhaps an exaggerated importance. And it is sufficiently 
 manifest that the older philosophers exclusively contemplated the 
 latter. 
 
 But, in the third place, not only did Aristotle clearly establish 
 the difference between qualities considered absolutely, as in the 
 existing object, and qualities considered relatively, as in the sen- 
 tient subject ; and not only did he signalize the ambiguity which 
 arises from the poverty of language, employing only a single 
 word to denote these indifferently : he likewise anticipated Des- 
 cartes, Locke, and other modern philosophers, in establishing, and 
 marking out by appropriate terms, a distinction precisely analo- 
 gous with that taken by them of the Primary and Secondary 
 Qualities of Matter. The Aristotelic distinction which, in its re- 
 lation to the other, has been wholly overlooked, is found in the 
 discrimination of the Common and Proper Percepts, Sensibles. or 
 objects of Sense (aiV^ro, xoiva xai J'&a). It is given in the two 
 principal psychological treatises of the philosopher ; and to the 
 following purport. 
 
 Aristotle (De Anima, L. ii. c. 2, L. iii. c. 1, and De Sensu et 
 Sensili, c. 1) enumerates five percepts common to all or to a plu- 
 rality of the senses, viz, Magnitude (Extension), Figure, Motion, 
 Rest, Number. To these in one place (De Anima, iii. 1) he adds 
 Unity ; and in another (De Sensu et Sensili, c. 4), he states, as 
 
 14
 
 314 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 common, at least to sight and touch, besides Magnitude and 
 Figure, the Rough and the Smooth, the Acute and the Obtuse. 
 Unity however he comprises under Number ; and the Rough and 
 Smooth, the Acute and Obtuse, under Figure. Nay, of the five 
 common sensibles or percepts, he gives us (De Anima, iii. l)a 
 further reduction, resolving Figure into Magnitude ; while both 
 of these, he says, as well as Rest and Number, are known through 
 Motion ; which last, as he frequently repeats, necessarily involves 
 the notion of Time ; for motion exists only as in Time. (Com- 
 pare Phys. Ausc. L. iv. passim.) His words are ' All these we 
 perceive by Motion.* Thus Magnitude (Extension) is apprehended 
 by motion, wherefore also Figure, for figure is a kind of magni- 
 tude ; what is at Rest by not being moved ; Number, by a nega- 
 tion of the continuous,! even in the sensations proper to the sev- 
 
 * This doctrine of Aristotle is rejected by Thcophrastus, as wo learn from 
 the fragments concerning Sense preserved in the rare and neglected treatise 
 of Priscianus Lydus, p. 285. Many modern philosophers when they 
 attempted to explain the origin of our notion of extension from motion, and, 
 in particular, the motion of the hand, were not aware that they had the 
 Stagirite at their head. It is to be remembered, however, that Aristotle 
 does not attempt, like them, to explain by motion our necessary concept of 
 space, but merely our contingent perception of the relative extension of this 
 or that particular object. 
 
 This, however, takes it for granted, that by motion (tclvrjan}, Aristotle 
 intends local motion. But motion is with him a generic term, comprising 
 four, or six species ; and, in point of fact, by motion Aristotle may here, us 
 in many, if not most, other places of his psychological writings, mean a sub- 
 jective mutation (dAAotatnj) or modification of the percipient. This, too, is 
 the interpretation given to the passage by the great majority, if not the 
 whole of the ancient expositors by Plutarchus of Athens, Ammonius or 
 Philoponus, Simplicius, and Priscianus Lydus ; Themistius alone is silent. 
 I say nothing of the sequacious cloud of modern commentators. It is there- 
 fore remarkable that Dr. Trendelenburg, in his late valuable edition of the 
 De Anima, should have apparently contemplated the interpretation by local 
 motion, as the only one proposed or possible. This may, however, adduce 
 in its favor the authority of Theophrastus, among the ancients among the 
 moderns, of the subtle Scaliger. From both interpretations, however, a 
 defensible meaning can be elicited. 
 
 t This explicitly shows that by Number, Aristotle means only the neces- 
 sary attribution of either unity or plurality to the object of sense. Divisibil- 
 ity (in extension, intension, pretension) is thus contained under Num-
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 315 
 
 eral senses, for each of these is itself percipient of what is one.' 
 This attempt at simplification was followed out by his disciples. 
 Thus St. Thomas (Summa Theologise, P. i. Qu. 78, art. 3), in 
 showing that the common sensibles do not primarily, and of them- 
 selves, act upon and affect the sense, carries them all up into 
 modifications of Quantity (Quantitatis) ; and in another book 
 (De Sensu et Sensibili, Lect. ii.) by a variation of the expression 
 (for in both cases he contemplates only the Extended) into species 
 of the Continuous. To quote the latter : ' Sensibilia communia 
 omnia pertinent aliquo modo ad Continuum ; vel secundum inen- 
 suram ejus, ut Magnitude ; vel secundum divisionem, ut Nu- 
 merus ; vel secundum terminationem, ut Figura ; vel secundum 
 distantiam et propinquitatem, ut MotusS 
 
 Aristotle indeed (De Anima, L. ii. c. 6) virtually admits, that 
 the common are abusively termed sensibles at all : for he says, 
 'the proper alone are accurately, or pre-eminently, objects of 
 sense' (TO, ISict xu^i'wg sdn cc5(rt)*jra) ; and the same seems also to 
 be involved in his doctrine, that the common percepts (which in 
 one place he even says are only apprehended per accidens) 
 are, in fact, within the domain of sense, merely as being the 
 concomitants or consequents (axoXoudouvra, i*ofisva) of the 
 proper.* (Ibid. L. iii. cc. 1, 4.) See also Alexander on the Soul. 
 (A. ff. 130 b, 134 a b B. ff. 152, 153, ed. Aid.) 
 
 ber. Number in the abstract is, of course, a merely intellectual concept, as 
 Aristotle once and again notices. See Philoponus on 63 text of second 
 book De Anima, Sign. i. 8 ed. Trine. 1535. Of this again under Locke, No. 
 19 ; and Koyer-Collard, No. 25. 
 * I have already noticed that Hutcheson, 1 in saying that ' Extension, Fig- 
 
 1 ' It is not easy,' says Hutcheson, ' to divide distinctly our several sensations into 
 classes. The division of our External Senses into the five common classes, seems very 
 imperfect. Some sensations, received without any previous idea, can either he reduced 
 to none of them such as the sensations of Hunger, Thirst, Weariness, Sickness; or if 
 we reduce them to the sense of Feeling, they are perceptions as different from the other 
 ideas of Touch such as Cold, Heat, Hardness, Softness as the ideas of taste or smell. 
 Others have hinted at an external sense, different from all these.' [This allusion has 
 puzzled the Scottish psychologists. Hutcheson evidently refers to the sixth sense, or 
 sense of venereal titillation, proposed by the elder Scaliger, and approved of by Bacon, 
 Button, Voltaire, &c.] 'The following general account may possibly be useful. (1)
 
 316 PHILOSOPHY OF. PERCEPTION. 
 
 The more modern Schoolmen (followed sometimes unwittingly 
 by very recent philosophers) have indeed contended, that on the 
 principles of Aristotle the several common sensibles are in reality 
 apprehended by other and higher energies than those of sense. 
 Their argument is as follows : Motion cannot be perceived with- 
 
 urc, Motion, and Rest, seem to l>e more properly ideas accompanying the 
 sensations of Sight and Touch than the sensations of either of these senses' 
 only, mediately or immediately, repeats Aristotle ; to whom is therefore due 
 all the praise which has been lavished on the originality and importance of 
 the observation. [I might have added, however, that Hutcheson does not 
 claim it as his own. 1 For in his System of Moral Philosophy (which is to be 
 
 That certain motions raised in our bodies are, by a general law, constituted the occasion 
 of perceptions in the mind. (2) These perceptions never come entirely alone, but 
 have some other perception joined with them. Thus every sensation is accompanied 
 with the idea of Duration, and yet duration is not a sensible idea, since it also 
 accompanies ideas of internal consciousness or reflection: so the idea of Number 
 may accompany any sensible ideas, and yet may also accompany any other ideas, as 
 well as external sensations. Brutes, when several objects are before them, have probably 
 all the proper ideas of sight which we have, without the idea of number. (S ) Some 
 ideas are found accompanying the most different sensations, which yet are not to be 
 perceived separately from some sensible quality. Such are Extension, Figure, Motion 
 and Rest, which accompany the ideas of Sight or Colors, and yet may be perceived 
 without them, as in the ideas of Touch, at least if we move our organs along the part* 
 of the body touched. Extension, Figure, Motion, or Rest, seem, therefore to be more 
 properly called ideas accompanying the sen-nations of Sight and Touch, than the 
 sensations of either of these senses; since they can be received sometimes without the 
 ideas of Color, and sometimes without those of Touching, though never without the one 
 or the other. The perceptions which are purely sensible, received each by its proper 
 sense, are Tastes, Smells, Colors, Sound, Cold, Heat, fcc. The universal concomitant 
 ideas which may attend any idea whatsoever, are Duration and Number. The ideas 
 which accompany the most different sensations, are Extension, Figure, Motion, and Rest, 
 These all arise without any previous ideas assembled or compared the concomitant 
 ideas are reputed images o/ something external.'' Sect I., Art 1. The reader may, 
 likewise consult the same author's 'Synopsis Metaphysicte,' Part II., cap. I., 8. W. 
 
 ' Hamilton says, refering to the passage from Hutcheson: 'But here I may observe, 
 in the first place, that the statement made in the preceding quotation (and still more 
 articulately in the "Synopsis"), that Duration or Time is the inseparable concomitant 
 both of sense and reflection, had been also made by Aristotle and many other philoso- 
 phers; and it is indeed curious how long philosophers were on the verge of enunciating 
 the great doctrine first proclaimed by Kant that Time is a fundamental condition, 
 form, or category of thought In the second place, I may notice that Hutcheson is not 
 entitled to the praise accorded him by Stewart and Royer-Collard for his originality in 
 " the fine and important observation that Extension, Figure, Motion, and Rest, arc- 
 rather ideas accompanying the perceptions of touch and vision, than perceptions of these 
 senses, properly so called." In this, he seems only to have, with others, repeated Aris- 
 totle, who, in his treatise on the Soul (Book II., Ch. 6, Text 64, and Book III., Ch. 1. 
 Text 186), calls Motion and Rest, Magnitude (Extension), Figure, and Number 
 (Hutcheson's very list), the common concomitants (<jcoXow0ai<ra xal KOIVO) of sight and 
 touch, and expressly denies them to b<- impressions of sense the sense having no passive
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 317 
 
 out the collation of past and present time, without acts of mem- 
 ory and comparison. Rest, says Aristotte, is known as a priva- 
 tion, but sense is only of the positive; let it, however, be consid- 
 ed as a state, and as opposed to motion, still this supposes com- 
 parison. Number in like manner as a negation, a negation of 
 the continuous, is beyond the domain of sense ; and while Aris- 
 totle in one treatise (Phys. iv. 14) attributes the faculty of nu- 
 meration to intelligence ; in another (Problem, sect. 30, 5, if 
 this work be his), he virtually denies it to sense, in denying it to 
 the brutes. Magnitude (extension), if considered as comparative, 
 is likewise manifestly beyond the province of mere sense ; Aris- 
 totle, indeed, admits that its apprehension, in general, presup- 
 poses Motion. Finally, Figure, as the cognition of extension 
 terminated in a certain manner, still more manifestly involves an 
 act of comparison. (Scaliger, De Subtilitate, Ex. Ixvi. and 
 ccxcviii. 15. Toletus, in lib. de Anirna, L. ii. c. 6. Conim- 
 bricences, ibid. Irenceus, De An. p. 40. Compare Gassendi, 
 Phys. Sect. iii. Memb. Post. L. vi. c. 2. Du ffamel, Philos. Ve- 
 tus et Nova, Phys. P. iii. c. 4. and Royer-Collard, in (Euvres 
 de Reid, t. iii. p. 428 sq. to be quoted in the sequel, No. 25.) 
 
 annexed to the other references) he speaks of ' what some call the Concomi- 
 tant ideas of Sensation.' (B. i. c. 1, p. 6)]. Dr. Price extols it as 'a very 
 just observation of Hutcheson.' (Eev. p. 56, ed. 1.) Mr. Stewart calls it 'a 
 remark of singular acuteness' 'a very ingenious and original remark' and 
 ' a sentence which, considering the period at which the author (Hutcheson) 
 wrote, reflects the highest honor on his metaphysical acuteness.' (Essays 
 pp. 31, 46, 551, 4 cd.) M. Royer-Collard says 'Hutcheson est le premier 
 les philosophes modernes qui ait fait cette observation aussi fine que juste 
 que,' &c. (CEuvres de Reid, t. iii. p. 431.) 
 
 I may here observe that Philippson ("Y\ij avBpwirivii, p. 335) is misled by an 
 ambiguous expression of Aristotle in stating that he assigned the common 
 sensible* as objects to the Common, Sense. See the Commentaries of Philopo- 
 nus and Simplicius on the 134 common text of third book De Anima. But 
 compare also Alexander, in his treatise on the Soul, first Book, in the chap- 
 ter on the Common Sense, f. 134, ed. Aid. 
 
 affection from these qualities. To these five common concomitants, some of the school- 
 men added also (but out of Aristotle), Place, Distance, Position, and Continuity.' 
 lieid, p. 124. W.
 
 318 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 The common sensibles thus came, in fact, to be considered by 
 many of the acutest Aristotelians, as not so much perceptions of 
 sense (in so far as sensible perception depends on corporeal afl'ec- 
 tion) as concomitant cognitions to which the impression on the 
 organ by the proper sensible only afforded the occasion. ' Sensi- 
 bile Commune dicitur (says Compton Carleton) quod vel percipi- 
 tur pluribus sensibus, vel ad quod cognoscendum, ab intellectu 
 vel imaginatione desumitur occasio ex variis sensibus ; ut sunt 
 Figura, Motus, Ubicatio, Duratio, Magnitude, Distantia, Nume- 
 rus,' <fec. (Philosophia Universa, De Anima Disp. xvi. Sect. 2, 
 
 8i.) 
 
 But before leaving Aristotle, I should state, that he himself 
 clearly contemplated, in his distinction of Common and Proper 
 Sensibles, a classification correspondent to that of the Primary 
 and Secondary Qualities of bodies, as established by the ancient 
 Atomists. This is expressly shown in a passage wherein he 
 notices that 4 Democritus, among others, reduced the proper sen- 
 sibles to the common, in explaining, for example, the differences of 
 color 'by differences of roughness and smoothness in bodies, and 
 the varieties of savor by a variety in the configuration of atoms.' 
 (De Sensu et Sensili, c. 4.) 
 
 Of a division by Aristotle, in a physical point of view, of the 
 Qualities of body into Primary and Secondary, I shall speak in 
 the sequel, when considering this nomenclature, as adopted, and 
 transferred to the psychological point of view, by Locke, No. 1 9. 
 
 7. GALEN, whose works are now hardly more deserving of 
 study by the physician than by the philosopher, affords me some 
 scattered observations which merit notice, not merely in reference 
 to the present subject. Sensitive perception, he well observes, 
 consists not in the passive affection of the organ, but in the dis- 
 criminative recognition the dijudication of that affection by the 
 active mind. *E<JVi Ss a!<f&i}<Jt$ oJx aXXoiwtfis, dXXa Sia-yvuffig 
 aXXoiwtfso)^ . This function of diagnostic apprehension he accord* 
 to the dominant principle (<ro ^C/JLOVIXOV) that is, the imaginative, 
 recollective, and ratiocinative mind. (De Placit. Hipp, et Plat.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 319 
 
 L. vii. cc. 14, 16, 17.)* Again: 'The objects in propriety 
 called Sensible, are such as require for their discriminative recog- 
 nition no other faculty but that of sensitive perception itself: 
 whereas those objects are improperly called sensible, whose rec- 
 ognition, besides a plurality of the senses, involves memoiy and 
 what is called the compositive and collective (generalizing) rea 
 son. [I read tfuvOs-rjxcj and xefpaXaiwrixw.] Thus Color is an 
 object proper of sense, and Savor and Odor and Sound ; so like- 
 wise are Hardness and Softness, Heat and Cold, and, in a word, 
 all the Tactile qualities.' Then, after stating that no concrete 
 object of sense an apple for instance is fully cognizable by 
 sense alone, but, as Plato lias it, by opinion with the aid of 
 sense ; and having well shown how this frequently becomes a 
 source of illusion, in all which he is closely followed by Neme- 
 sius, he goes on : ' But to carry sense into effect in all its 
 various applications, is impossible without the co-operation of 
 memory and connumeration (tfuvapj^rjo'ij), and this, which like- 
 wise obtains the name of summation (rfuyxspaXajwoV, conceiving, 
 thinking under a class), is an. act neither of sense nor of memory, 
 but of the discursive or dianoetic faculty of thought. (Com. i. in 
 Hipp. Lib. De Medici Officina, text. 3.) In another work we 
 have the same doctrine applied to solve the question By what 
 faculty is Motion apprehended ? and it affords the result, ' That 
 all motion is manifestly recognized, not by a mere act of sensi- 
 tive perception, not even by sense with the aid of memory, but 
 principally by a compositive act of thought' (cCuXXo/KJ'jxw). This 
 is a fourth synonym for the three other convertible terms which 
 occur in the previous passage. They are Platonic. (De Digno- 
 scendis Pulsibus, L. iii. c. 1.) 
 
 8. A remarkable but neglected passage relative to the pres- 
 ent subject is to be found in the Saggiatore of GALILEO, a work 
 first published in 1023. Mamiani della Rovere is the only phi- 
 
 * The annotators of Nemesius have not observed that this philosopher is 
 indebted to Galen, really and verbally, for the whole of his remarkable doc- 
 trine of sense. See his treatise De Nat. Horn. c. 6-11, ed. Matthiao.
 
 320 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 losopher, as far as I am aware, who has ever alluded to it. Gali- 
 leo there precedes Descartes in the distinction, and anticipates 
 Locke in its nomenclature. The following is an abstract of his 
 doctrine, which coincides with that of the ancient Atomists, in 
 some respects, and with that of Kant, in others. 
 
 In conceiving moMer or corporeal substance we cannot but 
 think that it is somehow terminated, and therefore of such and 
 such a figure ; that in relation to other bodies it is large or small ; 
 that it exists in this or that place ; in this or that time ; that it 
 is in motion or at rest ; that it does or does not touch another 
 body ; that it is single or composed of parts ; and these parts 
 either few or many. These are conditions from which the mind 
 cannot in thought emancipate the object. But that it is white or 
 red, bitter or sweet, sonorous or noiseless, of a grateful or ungrateful 
 odor ; with such conditions there is no necessity for conceiving 
 it accompanied.* Hence Tastes, Odors, Colors, <fec., considered 
 as qualities inherent in external objects, are merely names ; they 
 reside exclusively in the sentient subject. Annihilate the animal 
 percipient of such qualities, and you annihilate such qualities 
 themselves ; and it is only because we have bestowed on them 
 particular names different from those by which we designate the 
 other primary and real affections of matter (primi e reali acci- 
 denti), that we are disposed to believe that the former are in 
 objects truly and really different from the latter. 
 
 Having illustrated this doctrine at considerable length in rela- 
 tion to the senses of Touch, Taste, Smell, and Hearing; and, in 
 imitation of Aristotle, shown the analogy which these severally 
 hold to the elements of Earth, Water, Fire, and Air, he adds : 
 'Ma che ne' corpi esterni per eccitare in noi i sapori, gli odori, e i 
 
 * But, as Aristotle has observed, we cannot imagine body without all color, 
 though we can imagine it without any one. In like manner where the qual- 
 ities are mutual contradictories, we cannot positively represent to ourselves 
 an object without a determination hy one or other of these oppositcs. Thus 
 we cannot conceive a body which is not cither sapid or tasteless, either sono- 
 rous or noiseless, and so forth. This observation applies likewise to the first 
 class.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 321 
 
 suoni, si richiegga altro, que grandezze, figure, moltitudini, e mo- 
 vimenti tardi o veloci, io non lo credo. lo stimo, clie tolti via gli 
 orecchi, le lingue, e i nasi, restino bene ]e figure, i numeri, e i 
 moti, ma non gia gli odori, ne i sapori, ne i suoni, li quali fuor 
 dell' animal vivente, non credo che sieno altro che nomi, come 
 appunto altro che nome non e il solletico, e la titillazione, rimosse 
 1' ascelle,e la pelle in torno al naso ; e come a i quattro sensi con- 
 siderati hanno relazione i quattro element], cosi credo, che per la 
 vista, senso sopra tutti gli altri eminentissimo, abbia relazione la 
 luce, ma nou quella proporzione d' eccellenza, qual' e tra '1 finite, 
 e 1' infinite, tra '1 temporaneo, e 1' instantaneo, tra '1 quanto, e 
 1' indivisible, tra la luce, e le tenebre.' 
 
 He then applies this doctrine to the case of Heat, and says, 
 ' Ma che oltre alia figura, moltitudine, moto, penetrazione, e toc- 
 camento, sia nel fuoco altra qualita, e che questa sia caldo, io non. 
 lo credo altrimenti, e stimo, che questo sia talmente nostro, che 
 rimosso il corpo animate, e sensitive, il calore non resti altro che 
 un semplice vocabolo.' (Opere, t. ii. p. 340 sq. ed. Padov. 1T44.) 
 
 9. DESCARTES is always adduced as the philosopher by whom 
 the distinction in question was principally developed; and by 
 whom, if not first established, it was, at least in modern times, 
 first restored. In truth, however, Descartes originated nothing. 
 He left the distinction as he found it. His only merit is that of 
 signalizing more emphatically than had previously been done, the 
 different character of the knowledge we are conscious of in refer- 
 ence to the two contrasted classes ; although this difference is not, 
 as he thinks, to be explained by a mere gradation in the clearness 
 of our perceptions. But neither of the one nor of the other is hi* 
 enumeration of the contents exhaustive ; nor did he bestow dis- 
 tinctive appellations on the counter classes themselves. His ' Me- 
 ditationes' were first published in 1641, his 'Principia' in 1644: 
 and in these works his doctrine upon this matter is contained. 
 
 In the latter, he observes ' Nos longe alio modo cognoscere 
 quidnam sit in viso corpore Magnitude, vcl Figura, vel Motus 
 (saltern localis, philosophi enim alios quosdam motus a locali 
 
 14*
 
 322 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 diversos affingendo, naturam ejus sibi minus intelligibilcm reddi- 
 derunt), vel Situs, vel Duratio, vel Numerus, et similia, quae in 
 corporibus olare percipi jam dictum est; quam quid in eodein cor- 
 pore sit Color, vel Dolor, vel Odor, vel Sapor, vel quid aliud ex 
 iis, quae ad sensus dixi esse referenda. Quamvis enim videntes 
 aliquod corpus, non magis certi simus illud existere, quatenus ap- 
 paret figuratum, quam quatenus apparet coloratum ; longe tamen 
 evidentius agnoscimus, quid sit in eo esse figuratum, quam quid 
 sit esse coloratum.' (Princ. i. 69.) 
 
 Of the former class we find enumerated by a collation of differ- 
 ent passages, Magnitude (or Extension in length, breadth, and 
 thickness), Figure, Locomotion, Position, Duration, Number, Sub- 
 stance, and the like ; all (with the exception of Substance, which 
 is erroneously and only once enumerated) corresponding with the 
 Common Sensibles of the Peripatetics. Of the latter class, he 
 instances Colors, Sounds, Odors, Savors, the Tactile qualities* in 
 general, specially enumerating, as examples, Heat, Cold, Pain, 
 Titillation, and (N. B.) Hardness, Weight ; all conformable to 
 the Proper Sensibles of Aristotle. In the one class we have an 
 idea of the property, such as it exists, or may exist (' ut sunt, aut 
 saltern esse possunt'), in the external body ; in the other, we have 
 only an obscure and confused conception of a something in that 
 body which occasions the sensation of which we are distinctly 
 conscious in ourselves, but which sensation does not represent to 
 us aught external does not afford us a real knowledge of any 
 thing beyond the states of the percipient mind itself. (Princ. P. 
 i. 70, 71, P. iv. 191, 197, 199. Medit. iii. p. 22, vi. pp. 
 43, 47, 48. Resp. ad. Med. vi. p. 194, ed. 1658.) Of these 
 two classes, the attributes included under the latter, in so far as 
 
 * I am not aware that Descartes, any where> gives a full and formal list ot 
 the Tactile qualities. In his treatise De Homine, under the special doctrine 
 of Touch ( 29, 30) wo, have Pain, Titillation, Smoothness, Roughness, Heat, 
 Cold, Humidity, Dryness, Weight, ' and the like. 1 He probably acquiesced 
 in the Aristotelic list, the one in general acceptation, viz., the Hot and Cold, 
 Dry and Moist, Heavy and Light, Hard and Soft, Viscid and Friable, Rough 
 and Smooth, Thick and Thin. De Gen. et Corr. ii. 2.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 323 
 
 they are considered as residing in the objects themselves of our 
 sensations, Descartes, like Democritus and Galileo, held to be only 
 modifications of those contained under the former. ' Exceptis 
 Magnitudine, Figura et Motu, quse qualia sint in unoquoque cor- 
 pore explicui, nihil extra nos positum sentitur nisi Lumen, Color, 
 Odor, Sapor, Sonus, et Tactiles qualitates ; quse nihil aliud esse in 
 objectis, quam dispositions quasdam in Magnitudine, Figura et 
 Motu consistentes, hactenus est demonstratum. (Princ. P. iv. 
 199. Med. Resp. vi. p. 194.) This distinction, by their mas- 
 ter, of the two classes of quality, was, as we shall see, associated 
 by the Cartesians with another, taken by themselves, between 
 Idea and Sensation. 
 
 I have previously shown, that Aristotle expressly recognizes the 
 coincidence of his own distinction of the proper and common sen- 
 sibles with the Democritean distinction of the apparent and real 
 properties of body. I have now to state that Descartes was also 
 manifestly aware of the conformity of his distinction with those 
 of Aristotle and Democritus. Sufficient evidence, I think, will be 
 found of the former, in the Principia, P. iv. 200, and De Ho- 
 mine, 42 ; of the latter, in the Principia, P. iv. 200- 
 203. All this enhances the marvel, that the identity of these 
 famous classifications should have hitherto been entirely over- 
 looked. 
 
 10. The doctrine of DERODON an acute and independent 
 thinker, who died in 1664 coincides with that of Aristotle and 
 his genuine school ; it is very distinctly and correctly expressed. 
 Sensible qualities, he says, may be considered in two aspects ; as 
 they are in the sensible object, and as they are in the sentient ani- 
 mal. As in the latter, they exist actually and formally, consti- 
 tuting certain affections agreeable or disagreeable, in a word, sen- 
 sations of such or such a character. The feeling of Heat is an 
 example. As in the former, they exist only virtually or poten- 
 tially ; for, correctly speaking, the fire does not contain heat, and 
 is, therefore, not hot, but only capable of heating. ' Ignis itaque, 
 proprie loquendo, non habere calorem, atque adeo non esse calidum
 
 324 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 sed calorificum ;* nisi vocabalum caloris sumatur pro virtute pro- 
 ducendi calorem in animali. Scd pliilosophi (he refers to the scho- 
 lastic Aristotelians with their substantial Forms, and Intention- 
 al Species, though among them were exceptions) sed pliilosophi 
 sunt prorsus inexcusabiles, qui volunt calorem, sumptum pro vir- 
 tute calefaciendi, quse est in igne, aut potius identificatur cum ipso 
 igne, et calorem productum in animali, esse ejusdem speciei, na- 
 turae et essentisD ; nam calor moderatus productus in animali con- 
 sistit iu aliqua passione et quasi titillatione grata quse sentitur ab 
 animali, qua3 passio non potest esse in igne.' And so forth in re- 
 gard to the other senses. (Philos. Coutr. Phys., p. 190.) 
 
 11. I may adduce to the same purport GLANVILLE, who, in his 
 'Vanity of Dogmatizing' (1661, p. 88 sq.), and in his 'Scepsis 
 Scientifica' (1665, p. 65 sq.), though a professed, and not over- 
 scrupulous antagonist of Aristotle, acknowledges, in reference to 
 the present question, that ' the Peripatetic philosophy teaches us, 
 that Heat is not in the body of the sun, as formally considered, 
 but only virtually, and as in its cause.' I do not know whether 
 Glanville had Aquinas specially in view ; but the same general 
 statement and particular example are to be found in the Summa 
 contra Gentes, L. i. cc. 29, 31, of the Angelic Doctor. 
 
 12. It is remarkable that Mr. BOYLE'S speculations in regard 
 to the classification of corporeal Qualities should have been wholly 
 overlooked in reference to the present subject ; and this not only 
 on account of their intrinsic importance, but because they proba- 
 bly suggested to Locke the nomenclature which he has adopted, 
 but, in adopting, has deformed. 
 
 In his treatise entitled ' The origin of Forms and Qualities,' 
 published at Oxford in 1666, Boyle denominates 'Matter and Mo- 
 tion' ' the most Catholic Principles of bodies.' (P. 8.) ' Magni- 
 tude (Size, Bulk, or Bigness), Shape (Figure), Motion or Rest,' to 
 
 * The chemists have called Caloric what they ought to have called Calo- 
 rific. The Lavoiserian nomenclature, whatever it merits in other respects, 
 is a system of philological monstrosities, in which it is fortunate when the 
 analogies of language are only violated, and not reversed.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 325 
 
 which he afterwards adds ' Texture,' he styles ' the Primitive 
 Moods or Primary Affections of bodies, to distinguish them from 
 those less simple Qualities (as Colors, Tastes, Odors, and the like) 
 that belong to bodies upon their account' (p. 10). The former 
 of these, he likewise designates ' the Primitive or more Catholic 
 Affections of Matter 1 (pp. 43, 44) ; and in another work (Tracts 
 1671, p. 18), l the Primary and most Simple Affections of Mat- 
 ter.' 1 To the latter he gives the name of ' Secondary Qualities, 
 if (he says) I may so call them' (p. 44). 
 
 In reference to the difficulty, ' That whereas we explicate colors, 
 odors, and the like sensible qualities, by a relation to our senses, 
 it seems evident that they have an absolute being irrelative to us ; 
 for snow (for instance) would be white, and a glowing coal would 
 be hot, though there were no man or any other animal in the 
 world' (p. 42). And again (p. 49) : ' So if there were no sen- 
 sitive Beings, those bodies that are now the objects of our senses, 
 would be so dispositively, if I may so speak, endowed with Colors, 
 Tastes, and the like, but actually only with those more catholic 
 affections of bodies, Figure, Motion, Texture, &c.' Is this intend- 
 ed for an Aristotelic qualification of the Democritean paradox of 
 Galileo ? 
 
 In his Tracts, published at Oxford, 1671 in that entitled ' His- 
 tory of particular Qualities,' he says : ' I shall not inquire into 
 the several significations of the word Quality, which is used in 
 such various senses, as to make it ambiguous enough. But thus 
 much I think it not amiss to intimate, that there are some things 
 that have been looked upon as Qualities, which ought rather to 
 be looked on as States of Matter or complexions of particular 
 Qualities ; as animal, inanimal, <fec., Health, Beauty. And there 
 are some other attributes namely, Size, Shape, Motion, Rest, that 
 are wont to be reckoned among Qualities, which may more con- 
 veniently be esteemed the Primary Modes of the parts of Matter, 
 since from these Simple Attributes or Primordial Affections, all 
 the Qualities are derived' (p. 3). This is accurate ; and it is to 
 be regretted that Locke did not profit by the caution.
 
 326 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 13. DE LA FOROK, whose able treatise ' De 1'Esprit de 1'Homme 
 was first published in 1666, contributes little of importance to the 
 observation of Descartes, of whose psychology he there exhibits a 
 systematic view. To the ideas of the primary attributes, enumer- 
 ated by Descartes, he inconsistently adds those of Solidity and 
 Fluidity ; and among the secondary he mentions the sensations of 
 the Dry and the Humid (ch. 10). In showing that our sensations 
 of the secondary qualities afford us no knowledge of what these 
 are, as in the external object ; and in explanation of the theories 
 of Aristotle and Descartes, he says : ' Mais sans examiner ici le- 
 quel a le mieux rencontre, je ne pense pas qu'aucun des sectateurs 
 de 1'un ni de 1'autre fassent difficulte, d'avotier que le Sentiment 
 qu'excitent en lui les corps chauds ou froids, et Vldge qu'il en a ne 
 lui represente rien de tout cela.' He thus correctly places the 
 Aristotelians and Cartesians on a level, in admitting that both 
 equally confess our ignorance of what the secondary qualities are 
 in themselves, an ignorance which is commonly regarded as a 
 notable discovery of Descartes alone. 
 
 14. GEULINX, a Cartesian not less distinguished than De la 
 Forge, and who with him first explicitly proclaimed the doctrine 
 of Occasional Causes, died in 1669 ; but his ' Annotata' and ' Dic- 
 tata' on the 'Principia' of Descartes were only published in 1690 
 and 1691. In these works, like most other Cartesians, he uses 
 the term Idea, in reference to body, exclusively to denote the rep- 
 resentations of its primary qualities ; but he adopts the schola**- 
 tic term Species, instead of Sensatio (sensation, sentiment) as em- 
 ployed by them, to express our consciousness of the secondary. 
 (Species, De la Forge had made a better use of, in relieving an 
 ambiguity in the philosophical language of Descartes, who had 
 sometimes abusively usurped the word idea for the organic mo- 
 tion in the brain, to which the idea proper the intellectual repre- 
 sentation in the mind itself, was by the law of union attached.) 
 Geulinx is the Cartesian who, from the occasional paradox of his 
 expression, has afforded the most valid foundation for the charge 
 so frequently, but so erroneously, preferred against the sect, of
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 327 
 
 denying all objective reality to the secondary qualities of 
 matter. 
 
 15. ROHAULT, another illustrious Cartesian, whose 'Physique' 
 was first published in 1671 (and which continued until about the 
 middle of last century to be a College text-book of philosophy in 
 the University of Newton), may be adduced in disproof of this 
 accusation an accusation which will be further refuted in the se- 
 quel by the testimonies of Malebranche and Sylvain Regis. 
 Speaking of Heat and Cold, he says, ' Ces deux mots ont chacun 
 deux significations. Car, premierement, par la Chaleur et par la 
 Froideur on entend deux sentimens particuliers qui sont en nous, 
 et qui resemblent en quelque facon a ceux qu'on nomme douleur 
 et chatouillement, tels que les sentimens qu'on a quand on ap- 
 proche du feu, ou quand on touche de la glace. Secondement, 
 par la Chaleur et par la Froideur on entend le pouvoir que cer- 
 tains corps ont de causer en nous ces deux sentimens dont je viens 
 de parler.' He employs likewise the same distinction in treating 
 of Savors (ch. 24) of Odors (ch. 25) of Sound (ch. 26) of 
 Light and Colors (ch. 27). 
 
 16. DUHAMEL. I quote the following passage withouj the 
 comment, which some of its statements might invite, from the 
 treatise ' De Corpore Animate,' 1673, of this learned and ingeni- 
 ous philosopher. It contains the most explicit (though still a 
 very inadequate) recognition of the merits of Aristotle, in refer- 
 ence to our present subject, with which I am acquainted. ' Quo- 
 circa, ut id, quod sentio, paucis aperiam. Corpus omne sensibile 
 vim habet in se, qua sensum moveat ; sed forma ipsa, qua perci- 
 pimus, vel est motus, vel effluvium, vel quidam substantiae modus, 
 quern possumus qualitatem appellare. Nee sensibile solius quali- 
 tatis prsedicamento continetur, sed per omnia fere vagatur genera. 
 Corporum enim Figurae, Dimensiones, Motus, et varia? Positiones 
 sensum impellunt. Itaque Humor Siccitas, Durities, Figura, at- 
 que alii modi, tales surit, quales a nobis percipiuntur. Rotunditas 
 enirn circuli, vel terra siccitas a sensuum cognitione non pendet. 
 Idem fortassis erit de Colore, Luce, atque aliis activis qualitatibus
 
 328 PHILOSOPHY ( OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 judicium. Sonus vero nihil est quam percussio organi ex motione 
 ae'ris, aut conflictu corporum orta. Sapor item et Odor positi 
 sunt in sola sensus impressione. Tolle animalia, nullus erit sapor, 
 nullus odor. Quanquam, ut mihi videtur, rem totam optime dis- 
 tinguit Aristotcles, cum Patibilem Qualitalem vocat id quod in 
 objecto est sensibili, Passionem vero eandern vocat qualitatem, ut a, 
 nobis percipitur? (Lib. i. c. 3, 11.) 
 
 17. In the following year (1674), was first published the cel- 
 ebrated ' Recherche de la Verit6' of MALEBRANCHE. The admis- 
 sions already quoted of his immediate predecessor might have 
 guarded him, at least on the point under consideration, from the 
 signal injustice of his attack on Aristotle, the philosophers, and 
 mankind in general as confounding our subjective sensations with 
 the objective qualities of matter ; and it is only by a not unmerit- 
 ed retribution, that he likewise has been made the object of a 
 counter accusation, equally unfounded, by authorities hardly infe- 
 rior to himself. Buffier,* Reid,f Royer-Collard,J and many be- 
 sides, reproach Descartes, Malebranche, Locke, and others, with 
 advancing it^ without qualification, as a new and an important 
 truth, that the sensible or secondary qualities have no existence, in 
 external objects, their only existence being as modes of the percipient 
 mind. The charge by Malebranche in the following passage, has 
 been already annihilated, through what has been previously ad- 
 duced ; and the passage itself sufficiently disproves the charge 
 against Malebranche. ' As regards the terms expressive of Sen- 
 sible ideas, there is hardly any one who recognizes that they are 
 equivocal. On this Aristotle and the ancient philosophers have 
 not even bestowed a thought. [!] What I state will be admitted 
 by all who will turn to any of their works, and who are distinctly 
 cognizant of the reason why these terms are equivocal. For there 
 is nothing more evident, than that philosophers have believed on 
 this subject quite the contrary of what they ought to have be- 
 lieved. [! !] 
 
 * Logique, 222, Coure, p. 819. t P. 181. 
 
 J (Euvres de Reid, t. iii. pp. 386, 447.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 329 
 
 ' For example, when the philosophers say that fire is hot, the 
 grass green, the sugar sweet, <fec., they mean, as children and the 
 vulgar do, that the fire contains what they feel when they warm 
 themselves ; that the grass has on it the colors which they be- 
 lieve to be there : that the sugar contains the sweetness which 
 
 ' O 
 
 they taste in eating it ; and thus of all the objects of the different 
 senses. It is impossible to doubt of it in reading their writings. 
 They speak of sensible qualities as of sensations ; they mistake 
 motions for heat ; and they thus confound, by reason of the am- 
 biguity of these terms, the modes in which bodies with the modes 
 in which minds, exist. [! ! !] 
 
 ' It is only since the time of Descartes that those confused and 
 indeterminate questions whether fire be hot, grass green, sugar 
 sweet, &c., have been answered by distinguishing the ambiguity 
 of the terms in which they are expressed. If by heat, color, sa- 
 vor, you understand such a motion of the insensible parts, then 
 fire is hot, grass green, and sugar sweet. But if by heat and 
 the other sensible qualities, you mean what I feel when near the 
 fire, what I see when I look at the grass, &c., in that case the 
 fire is not hot, nor the grass green, &c. ; for the heat I feel and 
 the color I see are only in the soul.' (Recherche, liv. vi. P. ii. 
 c. 2.) 
 
 Malebranche contributed to a more precise discrimination be- 
 tween the objective or primary, and the subjective or secondary 
 qualities, by restricting the term Idea to the former, and the term 
 Sensation to the latter. For though the other Cartesians soon 
 distinguished, more accurately than Descartes himself, Idea from 
 Sensation, and coincided with Malebranche, in their application 
 of the second ; yet in allowing Ideas of the modes, both of ex- 
 tension and of thought, they did not so precisely oppose it to 
 sensation as Malebranche, who only allowed ideas of extension and 
 its modes. (See Recherche, L. iii. P. ii. cc. 6, 7, and relative 
 Eclaircissement). It has not, I believe, been observed that Locke 
 and Leibnitz, in their counter-criticisms of Malebranche's theory, 
 have both marvellously overlooked this his peculiar distinction,
 
 330 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 and its bearing on his scheme ; and the former has moreover, 
 in consequence of neglecting the Cartesian opposition of Idea and 
 Sensation altogether, been guilty of an egregious mulatto elenchi 
 in his strictures on the Cartesian doctrine of Extension, as the 
 essential attribute of body. (Essay, B. ii. c. 13, 25.) 
 
 18. The ' Systeme de Philosophic' of the celebrated Cartesian 
 SYLVAIN REGIS appeared in 1690. The following, among other 
 passages of a similar import, deserve quotation from the precision 
 with which the whole ambiguity of the terms expressive of the 
 secondary qualities in their subjective and objective relations, is 
 explained and rectified. 
 
 ' It is evident that savors, taken formally, are nothing else than 
 certain sensations (sentimens) or certain perceptions of the soul, 
 which are in the soul itself; and that savors, taken for the physi- 
 cal cause of formal savors, consist in the particles themselves of 
 the savory bodies, which according as they differ in size, in figure, 
 and in motion, diversely affect the nerves of the tongue, and there- 
 by cause the sensation of different savors in the soul in virtue of 
 its union with the body.' This doctrine, as the author admits, 
 is conformable to that of Aristotle, though not to that of his 
 scholastic followers, ' who maintain that savor in the savory body 
 is something similar to the sensation which we have of it.' 
 (Phys. L. viii. P. ii. ch. 4.) 
 
 The same, mutatis mutandis, is repeated in regard to Odors 
 (ch. 5), and to Sounds (ch. 7) ; and so far, the distinction with 
 its expression of formal as opposed to virtual is wholly borrowed 
 from the Aristotelians. 
 
 But a more minute analysis and nomenclature are given in 
 regard to Light and to Color. 
 
 ' The word Light is not less equivocal than those of Savor, 
 Smell, and Sound ; for it is employed sometimes to express the 
 peculiar sensation which the soul receives from the impression 
 made by luminous bodies on the eye, and sometimes to denote 
 what there is in those bodies by which they cause in the soul this 
 peculiar sensation.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 331 
 
 ' Moreover, as luminous bodies are not applied immediately to 
 the eye, and as they act by the intervention of certain interme- 
 diate bodies, as air, water, glass, &c., whatsoever that may be 
 which they impress on these media is also called Light, but light 
 Secondary and Derived, to distinguish it from that which is in 
 the luminous body, which last is styled Primitive or Radical 
 Light.' (ch. 9.) 
 
 * We call the Sensation of Color, Formal color ; the quality in 
 bodies causing this Sensation, Radical color ; and what these 
 bodies impress on the medium, Derivative color.' (ch. 17.) 
 
 But this acute subdivision of objective Light and Color into 
 primitive or radical, and into secondary or derivative, is not ori- 
 ginal with Regis, nor indeed with any Cartesian at all. It is 
 evidently borrowed from the following passage of Gassendi : 
 ' Lumen, ut Simplicius ait, est quasi baculus qui uno sui extreme 
 a sole motus, alio extreme oculum moveat : sicque motio in ipso 
 sole (non movit quippe nisi moveatur) est ipsa radicalis et quasi 
 fontana lux ; motio vero perspicui per omnia spatia a sole ad 
 terram extensa, est lux difiusa derivataque ; et motio in oculo 
 est perceptio conspectiove ipsius lucis.' (Animadv. in x. lib. Diog. 
 Laertii, p. 851.) Though apparently the whole sentence is here 
 given as a quotation from Simplicius (or, as I suspect, Priscianus) 
 in his commentary on the De Anima of Aristotle ; the compari- 
 son of the staff (or more correctly of the lever) is alone his ; and 
 therefore the merit of the distinction in question would belong 
 to Gassendi, were it not that the term radical was an expression 
 common in the Schools as a synonym of fundamental, and as 
 opposed to actual or formal. The distinction is thus substan- 
 tially Aristotelian. 
 
 19. The Essay of LOCKE on the Human Understanding was 
 published in the same year with the Systeme de Philosophic of 
 Regis, in 1690. His doctrine in regard to the attributes of 
 bodies, in so far as these have power to produce sensations, or 
 perceptions, or simple ideas in us, contains absolutely nothing 
 new ; and it is only in consequence of the prevalent ignorance in
 
 332 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 regard to the relative observations of previous philosophers, that 
 so much importance has been attached to Locke's speculations 
 on this matter. The distinction is, however, far more correctly 
 given by him than by many of those who subsequently em- 
 ployed it 
 
 Neglecting what Locke calls qualities mediately perceivable, 
 but which lie altogether beyond the sphere of sense, being in re- 
 ality powers, which, from the phenomena manifested in certain 
 bodies, we infer to exist in other bodies of producing these phe- 
 nomena as their effects neglecting these, the following is an ab- 
 stract of the doctrine given, at great length, and with much repe- 
 tition, in the eighth chapter of the second book of the Essay. 
 
 a. Locke discriminates the attributes of sensible objects into 
 the same two classes which had been established by all his prede- 
 cessors. 
 
 b. To the one of these he gives the name of Primary, to 
 the other that of Secondary, Qualities ;* calling likewise the for- 
 mer Real or Original, the latter Imputed, Qualities. 
 
 Remark. In this nomenclature, of which Locke is universally 
 regarded as the author, there is nothing new. Primary or Ori- 
 ginal and Secondary or Derived Qualities had been terms applied 
 by Aristotle and the Peripatetics to mark a distinction in the at- 
 tributes of matter ; a distinction, however, not analogous to that 
 of Locke, for Aristotle's Primary and Secondary qualities are 
 exclusive of Locke's Primary.f But Galileo had bestowed the 
 
 * The term Quality ought to have been restricted to the attributes of the 
 second class ; for these are the properties of body as such or such body (cor- 
 poris ut tale corpus), whereas the others arc the properties of body as body 
 (corporis ut corpus) ; a propriety of language which Locke was among the 
 first to violate. 
 
 t Corporeal qualities, in a physical point of view, were according to Aris- 
 totle (Do Gen. et Corr. L. ii. and Meteor. L. iv.) and the distinction became 
 one classical in the Schools divided into Primary and Secondary ; the for- 
 mer being original, the latter derived. 
 
 The Primary are four in number, and all tactile Hot and Cold, Humid 
 (Liquid) and Dry ; and arc subdivided into two classes the two former being 
 iftive, the two latter passive. 
 
 The Secondary arc cither less or more properly secondary. The former arc
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 33'3 
 
 names of Primary or Real on the same class of attributes with 
 Locke, leaving, of course, the correlative appellations of Seconda- 
 ry, Intentional, Ideal, &c., to be given to the other ; while Boyle 
 had even anticipated him in formally imposing the names of Pri- 
 mary and Secondary on the counter- classes. It is indeed wholly 
 impossible to doubt, from many remarkable coincidences of 
 thought and expression, that Locke had at least the relative trea- 
 tises of his countryman, friend, and correspondent under his eye ; 
 and it is far more probable, that by Boyle, than by either Aris- 
 totle or Galileo, were the names suggested, under which Locke 
 has had the honor of baptizing this classical distinction. 
 
 c. To the first class belong Extension (or Bulk), Solidity (or 
 Impenetrability), Figure, Motion and. Rest, (or Mobility), Num- 
 ber ;* and to these five (or six) which he once and again formally 
 enumerates, he afterwards, without comment, throws in Situation 
 and Texture. 
 
 common to elementary and to mixed bodies ; and are all potentially objects 
 of touch. Of these Aristotle enumerates fourteen the Heavy and Light, the 
 Dense and Rare, the Thick and Thin (Concrescent and Fluid), the Hard and 
 Soft, the Viscid and Friable, the Rough and Smooth, the Tenacious and 
 Slippery. The latter are Color, Savor, Odor [to which ought to be added 
 Sound] the potential objects of the senses of Sight, Taste, Smell [and 
 Hearing]. 
 
 This whole distinction of Qualities, Primary and Secondary, is exclusive 
 of Locke's class of Primary. To these, Aristotle would not indeed have 
 applied the term Quality at all. 
 
 Cicero also may have given the hint. ' Qualitaturn aliae principes (vclpri- 
 mce), alise ex iis ortse,' &c. The former are the corporeal elements, the latter 
 the bodies constituted by them. (Acad. i. 7.) 
 
 * Locke borrowed Number (i. e. Unity or Plurality) from the Cartesians 
 Descartes from Aristotle. It corresponds in a sort with Divisibility, for 
 which it has latterly been exchanged. See Nos. 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25. Locke 
 is not therefore primarily liable to Mr. Stewart's censure for the introduction 
 of Number among the Primary Qualities, were that censure in itself correct. 
 But it is not ; for Mr. Stewart (with M. Royer-Collard, No. 25) has misap- 
 prehended the import of the expression. (Essays p. 95 4 ed.) For Num- 
 ber is not used only for the measure of discrete quantity, but likewise for 
 the continuation (unity) or discontinuation (plurality) of a percept. The 
 former is an abstract notion ; the latter is a recognition through sense. 1 
 
 1 See above, p. 814, note t, and below, chapter vi. i. W.
 
 334 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 Remark. In all this there is nothing original. To take the 
 last first : Situation (relative Position or Ubication) was one of 
 the Common Sensibles current in the Schools. Texture is by 
 Boyle, in like manner, incidentally enumerated, though neither 
 formally recognized as a co-ordinate quality, nor noticed as redu- 
 cible to any other. Solidity or Impenetrability is, to go no higher, 
 borrowed from Gassendi ; De la Forge's Solidity is only the con- 
 trast of Fluidity. But Solidity and Extension ought not thus to 
 be contradistinguished, being attributes of body only, as consti- 
 tuting its one total property that of occupying space.* The 
 other attributes are those of Aristotle, Descartes, and the philoso- 
 
 * The term Solidity (rd <rrtptv, solidmn), as denoting an attribute of body, 
 is a word of various significations ; and the non-determination and non-dis- 
 tinction of these have given rise to manifold error and confusion. 
 
 First Meaning. In its most unexclusive signification, the Solid is that 
 which fills or occupies space (rd I-TI^OV r6irov). In this meaning it is simply 
 convertible with Body; and is opposed, 1, to tho unextended in all or in 
 any of the three dimensions of space, and 2, to mere extension or empty 
 space itself. This we may call Solidity simply. 
 
 But the filling of space may be viewed in different phases. The conditions it 
 involves, though all equally essential and inseparable, as all involving each 
 other, may, however, in thought, be considered apart ; from different points 
 of view, the one or the other may even be regarded as the primary ; and to 
 these parts or partial aspects, the name of the unexclusive whole may be 
 conceded. The occupation of space supposes two necessary conditions ; 
 and each of these has obtained the common name of Solidity, thus constitu- 
 ting a second and a third meaning. 
 
 Second Meaning. What is conceived as occupying space, is necessarily 
 conceived as extended in, the three dimensions of space (rd rft\n Itaarardv). 
 This is the phasis of Solidity which the Geometer exclusively contemplates. 
 Trinal extension has accordingly, by mathematicians, been emphatically 
 called the Solid ; and this first partial Solidity we may therefore distinguish 
 as the Mathematical, or rather the Geometrical. 
 
 Third Meaning. On the other hand, what is conceived as occupying 
 space, is necessarily conceived as what cannot be eliminated from space. 
 But this supposes a power of resisting such elimination. This is the 
 phasis of solidity considered exclusively from the physical point of view. 
 Accordingly, by the men of natural science the impossibility of com- 
 pressing a body from an extended to an unextended has been emphati- 
 cally styled Solidity ; and this second partial solidity we may therefore dis- 
 tinguish as the Physical. The resisting force here involved has been called 
 the Impenetrability of matter ; but most improperly and most ambiguously.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 335 
 
 phers in general ; their legitimacy will be considered in the 
 sequel. 
 
 d. The principle which constitutes the preceding qualities into 
 
 It might more appropriately be termed its Ultimate or Absolute Incompressi- 
 Wity. 1 
 
 In each of these its two partial significations, Solidity denotes an essential 
 attribute of body; and which soever of these attributes be sisted as the 
 prior, the other follows, as a necessary consequent. In regard to their pri- 
 ority, opinions are divided. Precedence is accorded to trinal extension by 
 Descartes, at the head of one body of philosophers ; to impenetrability by 
 Leibnitz, at the head of another. Both parties are right, and both are 
 wrong. Each is right as looking from its peculiar point of view ; each is 
 wrong in not considering that its peculiar is only a partial point of view, and 
 neither the one sole, nor even the one absolutely preferable. From the psy- 
 chological point of view, Descartes is triumphant ; for extension is first in the 
 order of thought. From the physical point of view, Leibnitz is victorious ; 
 for impenetrability is the more distinctive attribute of body. The two 
 properties, the two points of view, ought not, in truth, to be disjoined ; and 
 the definitions of body by the ancients are, as least exclusive, still the most 
 philosophical that have been given ; TO circxov rtiirov, and rb Tpi\fj SiaaTarbv 
 /xtr' avriTvirias, and oyfos avTirv~o; ocrov e(f>' four<3. 
 
 Locke is therefore wrong, really and verbally. Really he is wrong, in dis- 
 tinguishing trinal extension and impenetrability (or ultimate incompressibil- 
 ity) as two primary and separate attributes, instead of regarding them only 
 as one-sided aspects of the same primary and total attribute the occu- 
 pying of space. Each supposes the other. The notion of a thing trinally 
 extended, eo ipso, excludes the negation of such extension. It therefore 
 includes the negation of that negation. Bat this is just the assertion of its 
 ultimate incompressibility. Again, the notion of a thing as ultimately 
 incompressible, is only possible under the notion of its trinal extension. 
 For body being, ex hypothesi, conceived or conceivable only as that which 
 occupies space ; the final compression of it into what occupies no space, goes 
 to reduce it, either from an entity to a non-entity, or from an extended to an 
 unextended entity. But neither alternative can be realized in thought. Not 
 the former ; i'or annihilation, not as a mere change in an effect, not as a mere 
 resumption of creative power in a cause, but as a taking out from the sum 
 total of existence, is positively and in itself incogitable. Not the latter; for 
 the conception of matter, as an unextended entity, is both in itself inconceiv- 
 able, and ex hypothesi absurd. Verbally, Locke is wrong, in bestowing the 
 name of solidity, without a qualification, exclusively on the latter of these 
 two phases ; each being equally entitled to it with the other, and neither so 
 well entitled to it, without a difference, as the total attribute of which they 
 are the partial expressions. But these inaccuracies of Locke are not so 
 important as the errors of subsequent philosophers, to which, however, they 
 
 1 See below, p. 356. W.
 
 336 PHILOSOPHY OF PEKOEPTION. 
 
 a separate class, is that the mind finds it impossible to think any 
 particle of matter, as divested of such attributes. 
 
 Remark. In this criterion Locke was preceded by Galileo. 
 
 seem to have afforded the occasion. For under the term Solidity, and on 
 the authority of Locke, there have been introduced as primary, certain 
 qualities of body to which in common language the epithet Solid is applied, 
 but which have no title whatever to the rank in question. Against this 
 abuse, it must be acknowledged, Locke not only guarded himself, but even 
 to a certain extent, cautioned others ; for he articulately states that Solidity, 
 in his sense, is not to be confounded with Hardness. (B. ii. c. 4, 4.) It 
 must, however, also be confessed, that in other passages he seems to iden- 
 tify Solidity and Cohesion ; while on Solidity he, at the same time, makes 
 ' the mutual impulse, resistance and protrusion of bodies to depend.' (Ibid. 
 5.) But I am anticipating. 
 
 In a psychological point of view and this is that of Locke and 
 metaphysicians in general no attribute of body is primary which is 
 not necessary in thought; that is, which is not necessarily evolved 
 out of, as necessarily implied in, the very notion of body. And such is 
 Solidity in the one total and the two partial significations heretofore enu- 
 merated. But in its physical application, this term is not always limited to 
 denote the ultimate incompressibility of matter. Besides that necessary 
 attribute, it is extended, in common language, to express other powers of 
 resistance in bodies of a character merely contingent in reference to thought. 
 (See ii.) These may be reduced to the five following : 
 
 Fourth Meaning. The term Solid is very commonly employed to denote 
 not merely the absolutely, but also the relatively incompressible, the Dense, 
 in contrast to the relatively compressible, the Eare, or Hollow. (In Latin, 
 moreover, Solldus was not only employed, in this sense, to denote that a 
 thing fully occupied the space comprehended within its circumference ; but 
 likewise to indicate, 1, its entireness in quantity that it was whole or com- 
 plete ; and, 2, its entireness in quality that it was pure, uniform, homoge- 
 neous. This arose from the original identity of the Latin Kolidum with the 
 Oscan sollum or solam, and the Greek oW. See Festus or Verrius Floccns, 
 vv. Solitavrilia and Sotto ; also J. C. Scaliger, De Subtilitate, ex. 76.) 
 
 Fifth Meaning. Under the Vis Inertia, a body is said to be Solid, i. e. 
 Inert, Stable, Immovable, in proportion as it, whether in motion or at 
 rest, resists, in general, a removal from the place it would otherwise occupy 
 in space. 
 
 Sixth Meaning. Under Gravity, & body is said to be Solid, i. e. Heavy, in 
 proportion as it resists, in particular, a displacement by being lifted up. 
 
 The two following meanings fall under Cohesion, the force with which 
 matter resists the distraction of its parts ; for a body is said in a 
 
 Seventh Meaning, to be Solid, i. e. Hard, in contrast to Soft ; and in &n 
 
 Eighth Meaning, to be Solid, i. e. Concrete, in opposition to Fluid. 
 
 The term Solidity thus denotes besides the absolute and necessary prop- 
 erty of occupying space, simply and in its two phases of Extension and Im- 
 penetrability, also the relative and contingent qualities of the Dense, the
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 337 
 
 Bat it does not, alone, suffice to discriminate the primary from 
 the secondary qualities. For, as already noticed, of two contra- 
 dictory qualities, one or other must, on the logical principle of ex- 
 cluded 1 middle, be attributed to every object. Thus, odorous or 
 inodorous, sapid or tasteless, &c., though not primary qualities, 
 cannot both be abstracted in thought from any material object ; 
 and, to take a stronger example, color, which, psychologically 
 speaking, contains within itself such contradictions (for light and 
 darkness, white and black, are, in this relation, all equally colors) 
 is thus a necessary concomitant of every perception, and even 
 every imagination, of extended substance ; as has been observed 
 by the Pythagoreans, Aristotle, Themistius, and many others. 
 
 e. These attributes really exist in the objects, as they are 
 ideally represented to our minds. 
 
 Remark, In this statement Locke followed Descartes ; but 
 without the important qualification, necessary to its accuracy, 
 under which Descartes advances it. On the doctrine of both phi- 
 losophers, we know nothing of material existence in itself; we 
 know it only as represented or in idea. When Locke, therefore, 
 is asked, how he became aware that the known idea truly repre- 
 sents the unknown reality ; he can make no answer. On the 
 first principles of his philosophy, he is wholly and necessarily 
 ignorant, whether the idea does, or does not, represent to his 
 mind the attributes of matter, as they exist in nature. His as- 
 sertion is, therefore, confessedly without a warrant ; it transcends, 
 
 Inert, the Heavy, the Hard, the Concrete ; and the introduction of these lat- 
 ter, with their correlative opposite^, into the list of Primary Qualities was 
 facilitated, if not prepared, by Locke's vacillating employment of the vague 
 expression Solid; in partial designation of the former. By Kaines, accord- 
 ingly, Gravity and Inertia were elevated to this rank ; while Cohesion, in its 
 various modifications and degrees, was, by Kames, Eeid, Fergusson, Stew- 
 art, Royer-Collard, and many others, not only recognized as Primary, but 
 expressly so recognized as in conformity with the doctrine of Locke. See 
 the sequel of this and ii. 
 
 1 It is an axiom in Logic, that of two contradictory propositions, if one be 
 false, the other must be true. This is called the principle of Excluded Mid- 
 dle; i. e. between two contradictories. W. 
 
 15
 
 333 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 ex hypothesi, the sphere of possible knowledge. Descartes is 
 more cautious. He only says, that our ideas of the qualities in 
 question represent those qualities as they are, or as they may ex- 
 ist ; ' ut suut, vel saltern esse possunt.' The Cosmothetic Ideal- 
 ist can only assert to them a problematical reality. 
 
 f. To the second class belong those qualities which, as in ob- 
 jects themselves, are nothing but various occult modifications of 
 the qualities of the former class ; these modifications possessing, 
 however, the power of determining certain manifest sensations or 
 ideas in us. Such, for example, are colors, sounds, tastes, smells, 
 &c., all, in a word, commonly known by the name of Sensible 
 Qualities. These qualities, as in the reality, are properly only 
 powers ; powers to produce certain sensations in us. As in us, 
 they are only sensations, and cannot, therefore, be considered as 
 attributes of external things. 
 
 Remark. All this had, long before Locke, become mere philo- 
 sophical commonplace. With the exception of the dogmatical 
 assertion of the hypothetical fact, that the subjective sensations 
 of the secondary depend exclusively on the objective modifica- 
 tions of the primary qualities, this whole doctrine is maintained 
 by Aristotle ; while that hypothetical assertion itself had been ad- 
 vanced by the ancient Atomists and their followers the Epicure- 
 ans, by Galileo, by Descartes and his school, by Boyle, and by 
 modern philosophers in general. That the secondary qualities, 
 as in objects, are only powers of producing sensations in us this, 
 as we have seen, has been explicitly stated, after Aristotle, by al- 
 most every theorist on the subject. But it was probably borrow- 
 ed by Locke from the Cartesians. 
 
 It is not to be forgotten, that Locke did not observe the pro- 
 priety of language introduced by the Cartesians, of employing 
 the term Idea, in relation to the primary, the term Sensation, in 
 relation to the secondary, qualities. Indeed Locke's whole philo- 
 sophical language is beyond measure vague, vacillating, and am- 
 biguous ; in this respect, he has afforded the worst of precedents, 
 and has found only too many among us to follow his example.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 339 
 
 20. PURCHOT'S doctrine on this subject deserves to be no- 
 ticed which it never has been. It struck me from its corres- 
 pondence, in certain respects, with that which I had myself pre- 
 viously thought out. The first edition of his Institutiones Philo- 
 sophicae did not appear at Paris until a year or two after the pub- 
 lication of Locke's Essay, the second was in 1698; but the 
 French cursualist does not appear to have been aware of the spec- 
 ulations of the English philosopher, nor does he refer to Boyle. 
 His doctrine which is not fully stated in any single place of his 
 work is as follows : 
 
 a. The one Primary Affection or Attribute of Body is Exten- 
 sion. Without this, matter cannot be conceived. But in the 
 notion of Extension as an attribute is immediately involved that 
 of Solidity or Impenetrability, i. e. the capacity of filling space to 
 the exclusion of another body. 
 
 b. But extended substance (eo ipso, solid or impenetrable) 
 
 1", Necessarily exists under some particular mode of Extension, 
 in other words, it has a certain magnitude ; and is Divisible into 
 parts ; 
 
 2, Is necessarily thought as capable of Motion and Rest ; 
 
 3, Necessarily supposes a certain Figure ; and in relation to 
 other bodies a certain Position ; 
 
 These five, 1, Magnitude or measure of extension, involving 
 Divisibility ; 2, Motion ; 3, Rest ; 4, Figure ; 5, Position or 
 Situation,^ styles the simple and secondary attributes, affections, 
 or qualities which flow immediately from the nature of Body, i. e. 
 Extension. 
 
 c. Out of these Primary Affections of Body there are educed, 
 and as it were compounded, other affections to which the name 
 of Quality in a more emphatic and appropriate sense belongs ; 
 such among others are Light, Colors, Sounds, Odors, Tastes, 
 and the Tactile qualities, Heat, Cold, Moisture, Dryness, &c. 
 These he denominates the secondary and composite qualities or 
 affections of Body. (Instit. Philos. t ii. Phys. Sectt. i. iv. v. pp. 
 87, 205, 396, ed. 4.)
 
 340 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 21. LE CLERC does not borrow his doctrine on this head from 
 his friend Locke ; and his point of view is not purely pschycologi- 
 cal. The five properties common to all bodies Extension Di- 
 visibility Solidity (Impenetrability) Figure Mobility he 
 very properly does not denominate Qualities, but reserves that 
 name for what serves to distinguish bodies from each other. Un- 
 der this restriction, he divides Qualities into Primitive and Deriv- 
 ative. By Primitive he designates those occult qualities in body 
 which are known to us only in their effects ; as, for example, the 
 cause of Solidity. The Derivative, he says, are those which flow 
 from the Primitive and affect our senses, as color, savor, odor, 
 &c. His doctrine is, however, neither fully evolved nor unambig- 
 uously expressed. (Clerici Opera Philos. Phys., L. v. cc. 1, 6.) 
 
 22. LORD KAMES, in the first edition of his ' Essays on the 
 principles of Morality and Natural Religion,' (1751), touches only 
 incidentally on the present subject. He enumerates Softness, 
 Hardness, Smoothness, Roughness, among the Primary Qualities 
 (p. 248) ; and he was, I am confident, the only philosopher be- 
 fore Reid, by whom this amplification was sanctioned, although 
 Mr. Stewart has asserted that herein Reid only followed the clas- 
 sification of most of his immediate predecessors.* (Essays, 
 p. 91.) The second edition I have not at hand. In the third 
 and last (1779), there is introduced a chapter expressly on 
 the distinction, which is treated of 'in detail. He does not here 
 repeat his previous enumeration ; but to Size, Figure, Solidity 
 (which he does not define), and Divisibility, he adds, as primary 
 qualities, Gravity, the Vis Inertice, and the Vis Incita ; the two 
 last being the Vis Incita or Vis Inertine of Kepler and Newton 
 divided into a double power. See Reid's Correspondence, pp. 55, 
 56. Eames unwittingly mixes the psychological and physical 
 
 * Mr. Stewart also says that Berkeley ' employs the word Soliditity as 
 synonymous with Hardness and Resistance.' This is not correct. Berkeley 
 does not consider hardness and resistance as convertible; and these he 
 mentions as two only out of three significations in which, he thinks, the 
 term Solidity is used.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 341 
 
 points of view ; and otherwise, his classification in so far as origi- 
 nal, is open to manifold objections. See the foot-note * at p. 334 
 c. and ii. 
 
 23. REID. We have seen that Descartes and Locke, to say 
 nothing of other metaphysicians, admitted a fundamental differ- 
 ence between the primary and the secondary qualities: the one 
 problematically, the other assertorily, maintaining, that the pri- 
 mary qualities, as known, correspond with the primary qualities, 
 as existent : whereas that the secondary qualities, as sensations in 
 us, bear no analogy to these qualities as inherent in matter. On 
 the general doctrine, however, of these philosophers, both classes of 
 qualities, as known, are confessedly only states of our own minds ; 
 and, while we have no right from a subjective affection to infer 
 the existence, far less the corresponding character of the existence, 
 of any objective reality, it is evident that their doctrine, if fairly 
 evolved, would result in a dogmatic, or in a skeptical, negation of 
 the primary, no less than of the secondary qualities of body, as 
 more than appearances in and for us. This evolution was ac- 
 cordingly soon accomplished ; and Leibnitz, Berkeley, Hume, 
 Condillac, Kant, Fichte, and others, found no difficulty in demon- 
 strating, on the principles of Descartes, and Locke, and modern 
 Representation] sts in general, that our notions of Space or Exten- 
 sion, with its subordinate forms of Figure, Motion, &c., has no 
 higher title to be recognized as objectively valid, than our sensa- 
 tions of Color, of Savor, of Odor ; and were thus enabled tri- 
 umphantly to establish their several schemes of formal or virtual 
 idealism. Hence may we explain the fact that this celebrated 
 distinction is overlooked or superseded in the speculation, not of 
 some merely, but of all the more modern German Schools. 
 
 It is therefore manifest that the fundamental position of a con- 
 sistent theory of dualistic realism is that our cognitions of Ex- 
 tension and its modes are not wholly ideal ; that although Space 
 be a native, necessary, a priori, form of imagination, and so far, 
 therefore, a mere subjective state, that there is, at the same time, 
 competent to us, in an immediate perception of external things,
 
 342 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 the consciousness of a really existent, of a really objective ex- 
 tended world. To demonstrate this was therefore prescribed, as 
 its primary problem to a philosophy which, like that of Reid, 
 proposed to re-establish the philosophy of natural realism of 
 common sense, on a refutation of every idealism overt or implied. 
 Such is the problem. It remains for us to see how it was dealt 
 with. 
 
 Reid's doctrine, in regard to the Primary and Secondary Qual- 
 ities, is to be found in the Inquiry, ch. 5, sect. 46, p. 123-126, 
 and in the Intellectual Powers, Essay ii. ch. 17, p. 313-318. 
 
 In his enumeration of the Primary qualities Reid is not invari- 
 able; for the list in the Inquiry is not identical with that in the 
 Essays. In the former, without professing to furnish an exhaust- 
 ive catalogue, he enumerates Extension, Figure, Motion, Hard- 
 ness and Softness, Roughness and Smoothness. The four last are, 
 as we have seen, to be found, for the first time, in the earliest edi- 
 tion of Lord Kames's Essays on Morality, which preceded Reid's 
 Inquiry by thirteen years. In the latter he gives another list, 
 which he does not state to be an altered edition of his own, but 
 which he apparently proposes as an enumeration identical with 
 Locke's. ' Every one,' he says, ' knows that Extension, Divisibil- 
 ity, Figure, Motion, Solidity, Hardness, Softness, and Fluidity, 
 were by Locke called primary qualities of body.' In reference to 
 himself this second catalogue omits Roughness and Smoothness, 
 which were contained in his first : and introduces, what were 
 omitted in the first, Divisibility (which Kames had also latterly 
 added), Solidity, and Fluidity. In reference to Locke this and 
 the former list are both very different from his. For, allowing 
 Divisibility to replace Number, and say nothing in regard, either 
 to the verbal inaccuracy of making Motion stand for Mobility, or 
 to the real inaccuracy of omitting Rest as the alternative of Mo- 
 tion ; we find in both lists a series of qualities unrecognized as 
 primary by Locke ; or, as far as I know, by any other philosopher 
 previous to Lord Kames and himself. These are Roughness and 
 Smoothness in the Inquiry ; Fluidity in the Essays ; and Hard-
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 343 
 
 ness and Softness in both. But these five qualities are not only 
 not to be ascribed to the list of primary qualities by Locke ; they 
 ought not to be viewed as co-ordinate with Extension, Solidity 
 (which Reid more rigorously than Locke limits to the ultimate in- 
 compressibility of matter), Figure, Mobility, and Divisibility, i. e. 
 not as primary qualities at all. Of these five qualities, the last 
 three, as he himself states (p. 314 a), are only different degrees 
 of Cohesion ; and the first two are only modifications of Figure 
 and Cohesion combined. But Cohesion, as will be shown ( ii.), 
 is not a character necessarily involved in our notion of body ; for 
 though Cohesion (and we may say the same of Inertia), in all its 
 modes, necessarily supposes the occupation of space, the occupa- 
 tion of space while it implies a continuity does not necessarily 
 imply a cohesion of the elements (whatever they may be) of that 
 which occupies space. At the same time, the various resistances 
 of cohesion and of inertia cannot be reduced to the class of Sec- 
 ondary qualities. It behooves us therefore, neither with Locke 
 and others, to overlook them ; nor to throw them in without 
 qualification or remark, either with Descartes among the Second- 
 ary, or with Reid among the Primary, qualities. But of this 
 again. 
 
 Independently of these minor differences, and laying also out 
 of account Reid's strictures on the cruder forms of the represen- 
 tative hypothesis, as held by Descartes and Locke, but which 
 there is no sufficient ground to suppose that Descartes, at least, 
 adopted ; Reid's doctrine touching the present distinction cor- 
 responds, in all essential respects, with that maintained by these 
 two philosophers. He does not adopt, and even omits to notice, 
 the erroneous criterion of inseparability in thought, by which 
 Locke attempts to discriminate the primary qualities from the 
 secondary. Like Descartes, he holds that our notions of the pri- 
 mary qualities are clear and distinct ; of the secondary, obscure 
 and confused ; and, like both philosophers, he considers that the 
 former afford us a knowledge of what the corresponding qualities 
 are (or, as Descartes cautiously interpolates, may be) in themselves,
 
 344 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 while the latter only point to the unknown cause or occasion of 
 sensations of which we are conscious ourselves. Reid therefore 
 calls the notion we have of the primary qualities, direct ; of the 
 secondary, relative. (I. P. 313 b.) On this subject there is, thus, 
 no important difference of opinion between the three philoso- 
 phers. For if we modify the obnoxious language of Descartes 
 and Locke ; and, instead of saying that the ideas or notions of 
 the primary qualities resemble, raerely assert that they truly rep- 
 resent, their objects, that is, afford us such a knowledge of their 
 nature as we should have were an immediate intuition of the ex- 
 tended reality in itself competent to man, and this is certainly 
 all that one, probably all that either philosopher, intended, Reid's 
 doctrine and theirs would be found in perfect unison. The whole 
 difficulty and dispute on this point is solved on the old distinction 
 of similarity in existences and similarity in representation, which 
 Reid and our more modern philosophers have overlooked. Touch- 
 ing this, see, as stated above, the doctrine of those Schoolmen 
 who held the hypothesis of species (p. 257 a b) ; and of those 
 others who, equally with Reid, rejected all representative entities 
 different from the act itself of cognition (p. 257 b. note). 
 
 But much more than this was called for at Reid's hands. His 
 philosophy, if that of Natural Realism, founded in the common 
 sense of mankind, made it incumbent on him to show, that we 
 have not merely a notion, a conception, an imagination, a sub- 
 jective representation of Extension, for example, 'called up or 
 suggested? in some incomprehensible manner to the mind, on oc- 
 casion of an extended object being presented to the sense ; but 
 that in the perception of such an object, we really have, as by 
 nature we believe we have, an immediate knowledge or conscious- 
 ness of that external object, as extended. In a word, that in sen- 
 sitive perception the extension, as known, and the extension, as 
 existing, are convertible ; known, because existing, and existing, 
 since known. 
 
 Reid, however, unfortunately, did not accomplish did not at- 
 tempt this. He makes no articulate statement, even, that in per-
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 345 
 
 ception we have an immediate knowledge an objective conscious- 
 ness, of an extended non-ego, actually existing ; as in imagina- 
 tion we have a subjective consciousness of a mode of the ego, rep- 
 resenting such an extended non-ego, and thereby affording us a 
 mediate knowledge of it as possibly existing. On the contrary 
 were we to interpret his expressions rigidly, and not in liberal con- 
 formity with the general analogy of his philosophy, we might, as 
 repeatedly noticed, found on the terms in which he states his doc- 
 trine of the primary qualities, and, in particular, his doctrine con- 
 cerning our cognition of extension, a plausible argument that his 
 own theory of perception is as purely subjective, and therefore as 
 easily reducible to an absolute Idealism, as that of any of the 
 philosophers whom he controverts. 
 
 Thus when Reid, for example (Inq. 123 b), states 'that Exten- 
 sion ' is a quality suggested to us by certain sensations,' i. e. by 
 certain merely subjective affections ; and when (324 b) he says 
 that Space [Extension] whether tangible or visible, is not so 
 properly an object of sense as a necessary concomitant * of the 
 objects both of sight and touch ;' he apparently denies us all im- 
 mediate perception of any extended reality. But if we are not 
 percipient of any extended reality, we are not percipient of body 
 as existing ; for body exists, and can only be known immediately 
 and in itself, as extended. The material world, on this supposi- 
 tion, sinks into something unknown and problematical ; and its 
 existence, if not denied, can, at best, be only precariously affirmed, 
 as the occult cause, or incomprehensible occasion, of certain sub- 
 jective affections we experience in the form, either of a sensation 
 of the secondary quality, or of a perception of the primary. 
 
 1 'According to Eeid, Extension (Space) ia a notion a posteriori, the result 
 of experience. According to Kant, it is a priori; experience only affording 
 the occasions required by the mind to exert the facts, of which the intuition 
 of space is a condition. To the former it is thus a contingent: to the latter, 
 a necessary mental possession.' W. 
 
 * ' It seemingly requires but little to rise to Kant's view of the conception 
 of space as an a, priori, or native form of thought.' W. 
 
 15*
 
 34:6 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 Thus interpreted, what is there to distinguish the doctrine of Reid 
 from the undeveloped idealism of Descartes or of Kant ? ' 
 
 Having noticed the manifest incongruity of Reid's doctrine on 
 this point with the grand aim of his philosophy, an incongruity 
 which I am surprised has not been long ago adverted to either 
 by friend or foe, I may take this opportunity of modifying a 
 former statement (p. 123 b, note*), 8 that, according to Reid, 
 Space is a notion a posteriori, the result of experience. On re- 
 considering more carefully his different statements on this subject 
 (Inq. 123 sq. I. P. 324 sq.), I am now inclined to think that his 
 language implies no more than the chronological posteriority of 
 this notion ; and that he really held it to be a native, necessary, a 
 priori form of thought, requiring only certain prerequisite condi- 
 tions to call it from virtual into manifest existence. I am con- 
 firmed in this view by finding it is also that of M. Royer-Collard. 
 Mr. Stewart is however less defensible, when he says, in opposi- 
 tion to Kant's doctrine of Space 'I rather lean to the common 
 theory which supposes our first ideas of Space or Extension to be 
 formed by oilier qualities of matter.' (Dissertation, <fec. p. 281, 
 2d ed.) 
 
 Passing over the less important observations of several inter- 
 mediate philosophers in the wake of Reid, I proceed to the most 
 distinguished of his disciples. 
 
 24. STEWART, while he agrees with his master in regard to 
 the contrast of Primary and Secondary Qualities, proposes the 
 following subdivision, and change of nomenclature in reference to 
 the former. ' I distinguish,' he says, ' Extension and Figure by 
 the title of mathematical affections of matter', restricting the 
 phrase primary qualities to Hardness and Softness, Roughness 
 and Smoothness, and other properties of the same description. 
 The line which I would draw between primary and secondary 
 qualities is this ; that the former necessarily involve the notion of 
 
 1 Sec above, chapter iii. ii. p. 270, sq. W, 
 * See note 1, on the preceding page. W.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 34T 
 
 extension, and consequently of externality or outness ; whereas 
 the latter are only conceived as the unknown causes of known 
 sensations ; and when first apprehended by the mind do not im- 
 ply the existence of any thing locally distinct from the subjects of 
 its own self-consciousness.' (Essays, p. 94.) 
 
 The more radical defects of this ingenious reduction are, as they 
 appear to me, the following : 
 
 1. That it does not depart from the central notion of body 
 from Solidity Absolute, the occupying of space. .(See p. 334 c, 
 note *.) In logical propriety Extension and Figure are not prox- 
 imately attributes of body but of space ; and belong to body only 
 as filling space. Body supposes them ; they do not suppose 
 body; and the inquiry is wholly different in regard to the nature 
 of extension and figure as space, and of the extended and figured 
 as body. 
 
 2. This original defect in the order of evolution, has led, how- 
 ever, to more important consequences. Had Mr. Stewart looked 
 at Extension (Solidity Mathematical), as a property of body, in 
 virtue of body filling space, he would not only not have omitted, 
 but not have omitted as an attribute co-ordinate with extension, 
 the Ultimate Incompressibility or Impenetrability of body (Sol- 
 idity Physical). 
 
 3. But while omitting this essential property, the primary 
 qualities which, after Reid, he enumerates (Hardness, Softness, 
 Roughness, Smoothness), are, as already noticed, and to be here- 
 after shown, not primary, not being involved in the necessary 
 notion of body. For these are all degrees or modifications of 
 Cohesion ; but a Cohesion of its ultimate elements it is not ne- 
 cessary to think as a condition or attribute of matter at all. See 
 ii. Moreover, Roughness and Smoothness, as more than the 
 causes of certain sensations in us, therefore only secondary quali- 
 ties, are modifications, not only of Cohesion, but of Figure, and 
 would, therefore, on Mr. Stewart's distribution, fall under the cat- 
 egory of the Mathematical Affections of Body. 
 
 As regards the great problem of Natural Realism, to prove
 
 348 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 that we have an immediate perception of the primary qualities of 
 body, this was left by Mr. Stewart where it was left, by Reid. 
 
 25. The last philosopher to be adduced is the illustrious 
 founder of the Scoto-Gallican School, M. ROYER-COLLARD. The 
 sum of his doctrine touching the Primary Qualities is given in 
 the following passage, which I translate from the Fragments of 
 his Lectures, published by M. Jouffroy as Appendices to his ver- 
 sion of the Works of Reid (Vol. iii. p. 429 sq.) ; Fragments 
 which, with M. Jouffroy's general Preface, I have reason to hope 
 will be soon given to the British public by a translator eminently 
 qualified for the task. My observations I find it most convenient 
 to subjoin in the form of notes ; and admiring as I do both the 
 attempt itself and the ability of its author, I regret to differ here 
 so widely, not only from the doctrines which M. Royer-Collard 
 holds in common with other philosophers, but from those which 
 are peculiar to himself. On the former, however, in so far as, 
 with his more immediate predecessors, he confounds in one class 
 qualities which I think ought to be discriminated into two, I 
 deem it unnecessary to make any special comment ; as this mat- 
 ter, which has been already once and again adverted to, is to be 
 more fully considered in the sequel. ( ii.) As to the latter, it 
 will be seen that the more important differences arise from the 
 exclusive point of view from which M. Royer-Collard has chosen 
 to consider the Qualities in question. 
 
 ' Among the Primary Qualities, that of Number is peculiar to 
 Locke.* It is evident that Number, far from being a quality of 
 matter, is only an abstract notion, the work of intellect and not 
 of sense.f 
 
 * Number is, with Locke, common to Aristotle and the Aristotelians, 
 Galileo, Descartes, and the Cartesians, &c. 
 
 t Number, as an abstract notion, is certainly not an object of sense. But 
 it was not as an abstract notion intended by the philosophers to denote an 
 attribute of Body. This tnisprision was expressly guarded against by the 
 Aristotelians. See Tolctus in Arintotelcm Do Anima, L. ii. c. 6, qn. 15. 
 Number may be said to correspond to Divisibility ; see p. 315 a, and p. 884 
 a. If it cannot be said that sense is percipient of objocte as many, it can-
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 349 
 
 ' Divisibility is proper to Reid.* On this quality and Mobility 
 I will observe, that neither ought to have been placed among the 
 qualities manifested through sense ; and yet this is what Reid un- 
 derstands by the Primary Qualities, for he distinguishes them 
 from the Secondary by this that we have of the former a direct 
 notion.f Divisibility is known to us by division ; and a body 
 divided is known to us, as such, by memory. For did we not 
 recollect that it had previously been one, we should not know that 
 it is at present two ; we should be unable to compare its present 
 with its past state ; and it is by this comparison alone that we 
 become aware of the fact of division. Is it said that the notion 
 of Divisibility is not acquired by the fact of division, but that it- 
 presents itself immediately to the mind prior to experience ? In 
 this case it is still more certain that it is not a cognition proper to 
 sense.J 
 
 not be said to be percipient of an object as one. Perception, moreover, is a 
 consciousness, and consciousness is only realized under the condition of plu- 
 rality and difference. Again, if we deny that through sense we perceive a 
 plurality of colors, we must deny that through sense we perceive a figure or 
 even a line. And if three bodies are not an object of sense, neither ia a tri- 
 angle. Sense and intellect cannot thus be distinguished. 
 
 * Sundry philosophers preceded Eeid in making Divisibility (which cor- 
 responds also to Number) one of the Primary Qualities. See Nos. 20, 21, 22. 
 
 t M. Eoyer-Collard not only takes his point of view exclusively from 
 Sense ; but sense he so limits, that, if rigorously carried out, no sensible 
 perception, as no consciousness, could be brought to bear. The reason he 
 gives why Eeid must be held as of the same opinion, I do not understand. 
 Psychologically speaking, an attribute would not be primary if it could be 
 thought away from body ; and the notion of body being supposed given, 
 every primary quality is to be evolved out of that notion, as necessarily in- 
 volved in it, independently altogether of any experience of sense. In this 
 respect, such quality is an object of intellect. At the same time, a primary 
 quality would not be an attribute of body, if it could not, contingently, to 
 some extent, at least, be apprehended as an actual phenomenon of sense. In 
 this respect, such quality is an object of perception and experience. 
 
 t I am afraid that this, likewise, is a misapprehension of the meaning of 
 the philosophers. Divisibility, in their view, has nothing to do with the pro- 
 cess of dividing. It denotes either the alternative attribute, applicable to all 
 body, of unity or plurality; or the possibility that every single body may, as 
 extended, be sundered into a multitude of extended parts. Every material 
 object being thus, though actually one, always potentially many, it is thus 
 convertible with Number ; see foot-note t.
 
 350 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 
 
 ' As to the notion of Mobility it is evidently posterior to that 
 of motion ;* that of motion supposes not less evidently the exer- 
 cise of memory and the idea of time ; it is thus not derived exclu- 
 sively from sense.f As Divisibility also supposes motion, this 
 again is an additional proof that the notion of divisibility is not 
 immediate. 
 
 ' Figure is a modification of Extension. 
 
 ' Solidity, Impenetrability, Resistance, are one and the same 
 thing ;:}: Hardness, Softness, Fluidity, are modifications of Solid- 
 ity and its different degrees ; while the Roughness and Smooth- 
 ness of surfaces express only sensations attached to certain per- 
 ceptions of Solidity. 
 
 'The Primary Qualities may be thus generalized, if I may so 
 express myself, into Extension and Solidity. 1 
 
 The distinction of these different classes of material qualities 
 has, as already noticed, no real importance, no real foundation, 
 on the hypothesis of Idealism, whether absolute or cosmothetic, 
 in no philosophy, indeed, but that of Natural Realism ; and 
 its recognition, in the systems of Descartes and Locke, is, therefore, 
 with them a superficial observation, if not a hors d'oeuvre. It 
 was, accordingly, with justice formally superseded, because virtu- 
 ally null, in the philosophy of Leibnitz, the complement of the 
 Cartesian, and in the philosophy of Condillac, the complement 
 
 * Mobility, as applied in this relation, is merely a compendious expression 
 for the alternative attributions of motion or rest; and both of these, as possi- 
 ble attributes, are involved in the notion of body. See ii. of this Excursus. 
 
 t Compare above pp. 312-314. But Perception can no more be separated 
 from all memory than from all judgment; for consciousness involves both. 
 
 J This is only correct from M. Royer-Collard's exclusive point of view 
 from sense alone. On the various meanings of the term Solidity, see p. 334, 
 note *. The confusion also resulting from the ambiguity of the word Impen- 
 etrability as denoting both a resistance absolute and insuperable, and a resist- 
 ance relative and superable, both what is necessary, and what is contingent 
 to body, is here shown, either in the reduction to a single category of quali- 
 ties of a wholly heterogeneous character, or in the silent elimination of the 
 higher.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 351 
 
 of the Lockian. The Kantian system, again, is built on its pos- 
 itive negation, or rather its positive reversal. For Kant's tran- 
 scendental Idealism not only contains a general assertion of the 
 subjectivity of all our perceptions ; its distinctive peculiarity is, 
 in fact, its special demonstration of the absolute subjectivity of 
 Space or Extension, and in general of the primary attributes of 
 matter ; these constituting what he calls the Form, as the Second- 
 ary constitutes what he calls the Matter, of our Sensible intuitions. 
 (See, in particular, Proleg., 13, Anm. 2.) This, I repeat, may 
 enable us to explain why the discrimination in question has, both 
 in the intcllectualism of Germany and in the sensualism of 
 France, been so generally overlooked ; and why, where in rela- 
 tion to those philosophers by whom the distinction has been 
 taken, any observations on the point have been occasionally 
 hazarded (as by Tetens with special reference to Reid), that these 
 are of too perfunctory a character to merit any special commem- 
 oration.* 
 
 Such, then, are the forms under which the distinction of the 
 
 * To this also are we to attribute it, that the most elaborate of the recent 
 histories of philosophy among the Germans, slur over, if they do not positive- 
 ly misconceive, the distinction in question. In the valuable expositions of 
 the Cartesian doctrine by the two distinguished Hegelians, Feuerbnch and 
 Erdmann, it obtains from the one no adequate consideration, from the 
 other no consideration at all. In the Lectures on the History of Philosophy 
 by their illustrious master, a work in which the erudition is often hardly less 
 remarkable than the force of thought, almost every statement in reference to 
 the subject is, to say the least of it, inaccurate. Hegel, as he himself em- 
 ploys, apparently makes Aristotle and Descartes employ, the term Solidity 
 simply for Hardness. This, however, neither one nor other ever does; while 
 by Locke, the terms are even expressly distinguished. (Vol. iii. pp. 360, 
 431.) He confounds Descartes' distinction (baptized by Locke that) of the 
 Primary and Secondary qualities, with Descartes' distinction of the Primi- 
 tive and Derivative attributes of body ; distinctions not coincident, though 
 not opposed. Figure, for example, in the one is primary, but not in the 
 other primitive. In regard to his criticism of Locke (p. 431), suffice it to 
 say, that Locke, so far from opposing, in fact follows Descartes in making 
 'Figure and so forth' primary qualities; nor does Descartes denominate 
 any class of qualities 'secondary.' (pp. 359, 430.) Finally Aristotle's dis- 
 tinction of 'external qualities' into primary and secondary, if this be re- 
 ferred ta, corresponds with that so styled by Locke only in the name.
 
 352 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 Primary and Secondary Qualities of the Body has been pre- 
 sented, from its earliest promulgation to its latest development. 
 In this historical survey, I have to acknowledge no assistance 
 from the researches of preceding inquirers; for what I found 
 already done in this respect was scanty and superficial, even 
 when not positively erroneous. Every thing had thus anew to 
 be explored and excavated. The few who make a study of philos- 
 ophy in its sources, can appreciate the labor of such a research ; 
 and from them, at least, I am sure of indulgence for the imper- 
 fections of what I offer not as a history, but as a hasty collection 
 of some historical materials. 
 
 II. DISTINCTION OF THE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES 
 
 OF BODY CRITICALLY CONSIDERED. 
 
 From what has been said in the foregoing section, it will be 
 seen that I am by no means satisfied with the previous reduction 
 of the Qualities of Body to two classes of Primary and Secondary. 
 Without preamble, I now go on to state what I deem their true 
 and complete classification ; limiting the statement, however, to 
 little more than an enouncement of the distribution and its princi- 
 ples, not allowing myself to enter on an exposition of the correla- 
 tive doctrine of perception, and refraining, in general, from much 
 that I might be tempted to add, by way of illustration and 
 support. 
 
 The Qualities of body I divide into three classes. 
 
 Adopting and adapting, as far as possible, the previous nomen- 
 clature the first of these I would denominate the class of Pri- 
 mary, or Objective, Qualities ; the second, the class of Secundo- 
 Primary, or Subjective- Objective, Qualities ; the third, the class 
 of Secondary, or Subjective, Qualities. 
 
 The general point of view from which the Qualities of Matter 
 are here considered is not the Physical, but the Psychological. 
 But, under this, the ground of principle on which these qualities 
 are divided and designated is, again, two-fold. There are, in
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 353 
 
 fact, within the psychological, two special points of view ; that of 
 Sense, and that of Understanding. Both of these ought to be 
 taken, but taken separately, into account in a classification like 
 the present ; and not, as has been often done, either one only 
 adopted, or both fortuitously combined. Differing, however, as 
 these widely do from each other, they will be found harmonious- 
 ly to conspire in establishing the three-fold distribution and no- 
 menclature of the qualities in question which I have ventured to 
 propose. 
 
 The point of view chronologically prior, or first to us, is that 
 of Sense. The principle of division is here the different circum- 
 stances under which the qualities are originally and immediately 
 apprehended. On this ground, as apprehensions or immediate 
 cognitions through Sense, the Primary are distinguished as 
 objective, not subjective,* as percepts proper, not sensations 
 proper ; the Secundo-primary, as objective and subjective, as per- 
 cepts proper and sensations proper ; the Secondary, as subjective, 
 not objective, cognitions, as sensations proper, not percepts 
 proper. 
 
 The other point of view chronologically posterior, but first in 
 nature, is that of Understanding. The principle of division is 
 here the different character under which the qualities, already 
 apprehended, are conceived or construed to the mind in thought. 
 On this ground, the Primary, being thought as essential to the 
 notion of Body, are distinguished from the Secundo-primary and 
 Secondary, as accidental ; while the Primary and Secundo-pri- 
 mary, being thought as manifest or conceivable in their own 
 nature, are distinguished from the Secondary, as in their own 
 
 * All knowledge, in one respect, is subjective; for all knowledge is an 
 energy of the Ego. But when I perceive a quality of the Non-Ego, of the 
 object-object, as in immediate relation to my mind, I am said to have of it 
 an objective knowledge ; in contrast to the subjective knowledge, I am said to 
 have of it when supposing it only as the hypothetical or occult cause of an 
 affection of which I am conscious, or thinking it only mediately through a 
 subject-object or representation in, and of, the mind. But see below, in 
 foot-note to Par. 15, and first foot-note to Par. 18.
 
 354 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 nature occult and inconceivable. For the notion of Matter having 
 been once acquired, by reference to that notion, the Primary 
 Qualities are recognized as its a priori or necessary constituents ; 
 and we clearly conceive how they must exist in bodies in know- 
 ing what they are objectively in themselves ; the Secuudo-primacy 
 Qualities, again, are recognized as a posteriori or contingent 
 modifications of the Primary, and we clearly conceive how they 
 do exist in bodies in knowing what they are objectively in their 
 conditions ; finally, the Secondary Qualities are recognized as a 
 posteriori or contingent accidents of matter, but we obscurely 
 surmise how they may exist in bodies only as knowing what they 
 are subjectively in their effects. 
 
 It is thus apparent that the primary qualities may be deduced 
 a priori, the bare notion of matter being given ; they being, in 
 fact, only evolutions of the conditions which that notion neces- 
 sarily implies : whereas the Secundo-primary and Secondary 
 must be induced a posteriori ; both being attributes contingent- 
 ly superadded to the naked notion of matter. The Primary 
 Qualities thus fall more under the point of view of understand- 
 ing, the Secundo-primary and Secondary more under tho point 
 of view of Sense. 
 
 Deduction of the Primary Qualities. Space or extension is a 
 necessary form of thought. We cannot think it as non-existent ; 
 we cannot but think it as existent. But we are not so necessi- 
 tated to imagine the reality of aught occupying space ; for while 
 unable to conceive as null the space in which the material uni- 
 verse exists, the material universe itself we can, without difficulty, 
 annihilate in thought. All that exists in, all that occupies space, 
 becomes, therefore, known to us by experience : we acquire, we 
 construct, its notion. The notion of space is thus native, or a 
 priori ; the notion of what space contains, adventitious, or a pos- 
 teriori. Of this latter class is that of Body or Matter. 
 
 But on the hypothesis, always, that body lias been empirically 
 apprehended, that its notion has been acquired ; What are the 
 a priori characters in and through which we must conceive that
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 355 
 
 notion, if conceived it be at all, in contrast to the a posteriori 
 characters under which we may, and probably do, conceive it, but 
 under which, if we conceive it not, still the notion itself stands 
 unannihilated ? In other words, what are the necessary or essen- 
 tial, in contrast to the contingent or accidental properties of 
 Body, as apprehended and conceived by us ? The answer to this 
 question affords the class of Primary, as contradistinguished from 
 the two classes of Secundo-primary and Secondary Qualities. 
 
 Whatever answer may be accorded to the question How do 
 we come by our knowledge of Space or trinal extension ? it will 
 be admitted on all hands, that whether given solely a priori as a 
 native possession of the mind, whether acquired solely a posteri- 
 ori as a generalization from the experience of sense, or whether, 
 as I would maintain, we at once must think Space as a necessary 
 notion, and do perceive the extended in space as an actual fact ; 
 still, on any of these suppositions, it will be admitted, that we are 
 only able to conceive Body as that which (I.) occupies space, and 
 (II.) is contained in space. 
 
 But these catholic conditions of body, though really simple, are 
 logically complex. We may view them in different aspects or 
 relations, which, though like the sides and angles of a triangle, 
 incapable of separation, even in thought, supposing as they do 
 each other, may still, in a certain sort, be considered for them- 
 selves, and distinguished "by different appellations. 
 
 I. The property of filling space (Solidity in its unexclusive 
 signification, Solidity Simple) implies two correlative conditions : 
 (A) the necessity of trinal extension, in length, breadth, and thick- 
 ness (Solidity geometrical) ; and (B) the corresponding impossi- 
 bility of being reduced from what is to what is not thus extended 
 (Solidity Physical, Impenetrability). 
 
 A. Out of the absolute attribute of Trinal Extension may be 
 again explicated three attributes, under the form of necessary re 
 lations : (i.) Number or Divisibility ; (ii.) Size, Bulk, or Mag- 
 nitude ; (iii.) Shape or Figure. 
 
 i. Body necessarily exists, and is necessarily known, either as
 
 356 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 one body or as many bodies. Number, i. e. the alternative attri- 
 bution of unity or plurality, is thus, in a first respect, a primary 
 attribute of matter. But again, every single body is also, in dif- 
 ferent points of view, at the same time one and many. Consid- 
 ered as a whole, it is, and is apprehended, as actually one ; con- 
 sidered as an extended whole, it is, and is conceived, potentially 
 many. Body being thus necessarily known, if not as already 
 divided, still as always capable of division, Divisibility or Num- 
 ber is thus likewise, in a second respect, a primary attribute of 
 matter. (See p. 314 a.) 
 
 ii. Body (multo majus this or that body) is not infinitely ex- 
 tended. Each body must therefore have a certain finite exten- 
 sion, which by comparison with that of other bodies must be less^ 
 or greater, or equal ; in other words, it must by relation have a 
 certain Size, Bulk, or Magnitude ; and this, again, as estimated 
 both (a) by the quantity of space occupied, and (b) by the quan- 
 tity of matter occupying, affords likewise the relative attributes 
 of Dense and Rare. 
 
 iii. Finally, bodies, as not infinitely extended, have, conse- 
 quently, their extension bounded. But bounded extension is ne- 
 cessarily of a certain Shape or Figure. 
 
 B. The negative notion the impossibility of conceiving the 
 compression of body from an extended to an unextended, its elim- 
 ination out of space affords the positive notion of an insupera- 
 ble power in body of resisting such compression or elimination. 
 This force, which, as absolute, is a conception of the understand- 
 ing, not an apprehension through sense, has received no precise 
 and unambiguous name ; for Solidity, even with the epithet 
 Physical, and Impenetrability and Extreity are vague and equiv- 
 ocal. (See p. 334 c, note *.) We might call it, as I have said, 
 Ultimate or Absolute Incompressibility. It would be better, 
 however, to have a positive expression to denote a positive no- 
 tion, and we might accordingly adopt, as a technical term, Autan- 
 titypy. This is preferable to Antitypy (avriruiria), a word in 
 Greek applied not only to this absolute and essential resistance
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PEKCEPTTON. 357 
 
 of matter, qua matter, but also to the relative and accidental re- 
 sistances from cohesion, inertia, and gravity. 
 
 II. The other most general attribute of matter that of being 
 contained in space in like manner affords, by explication, an 
 absolute and a relative attribute : viz. (A) the Mobility, that is, 
 the possible motion, and, consequently, the possible rest, of a 
 body ; and (B) the Situation, Position, Ubication, that is, the 
 local correlation of bodies in space. For 
 
 A. Space being conceived as infinite (or rather being incon- 
 ceivable as not infinite), and the place occupied by body as finite, 
 body in general, and, of course, each body in particular, is con- 
 ceived capable either of remaining in the place it now holds, or 
 of being translated from that to any then unoccupied part of space. 
 And 
 
 B. As every part of space, i. e. every potential place, holds a 
 certain position relative to every other, so, consequently, must 
 bodies, in so far as they are all contained in space, and as each 
 occupies, at one time, one determinate place. 
 
 To recapitulate : The necessary constituents of our notion of 
 Matter, the Primary Qualities of Body, are thus all evolved from 
 the two catholic conditions of matter (I.) the occupying space, 
 and (II.) the being contained in space. Of these the former af- 
 fords (A) Trinal Extension, explicated again into (i.) Divisibility, 
 (ii.) Size, containing under it Density or Rarity, (iii.) Figure ; 
 and (B) Ultimate Incompressibility : while the latter gives (A) 
 Mobility ; and (B) Situation. Neglecting subordination, we 
 have thus eight proximate attributes ; 1, Extension ; 2, Divisi- 
 bility ; 3, Size ; 4, Density, or Rarity ; 5, Figure ; 6, Incompres- 
 sibility absolute ; 7, Mobility ; 8, Situation. 
 
 The primary qualities of matter thus develop themselves with 
 rigid necessity out of the simple datum of substance occupying 
 space. In a certain sort, and by contrast to the others, they are, 
 therefore, notions a priori, and to be viewed, pro tanto, as prod- 
 ucts of the understanding. The others, on the contrary, it is 
 manifestly impossible to deduce, i. e. to evolve out of such a given
 
 358 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 notion. They must be induced, i. e. generalized from expe- 
 rience ; are, therefore, in strict propriety, notions a posteriori, 
 and, in the last resort, mere products of sense. The following 
 may be given as consummative results of such induction in the 
 establishment of the two classes of the Secundo-primary and Sec- 
 ondary Qualities. 
 
 Induction of the Class of Secundo-primary Qualities. This 
 terminates in the following conclusions. These qualities are mod- 
 ifications, but contingent modifications, of the Primary. They 
 suppose the Primary ; the Primary do not suppose them. They 
 have all relation to space, and motion in space ; and are all con- 
 tained under the category of Resistance or Pressure. For they 
 are all only various forms of a relative or superable resistance to 
 displacement, which, we learn by experience, bodies oppose to 
 other bodies, and, among these, to our organism moving through 
 space ; a resistance similar in kind (and therefore clearly con- 
 ceived) to that absolute or insuperable resistance, which we are 
 compelled, independently of experience, to think that every part 
 of matter would oppose to any attempt to deprive it of its space, 
 by compressing it into an inextended. 
 
 In so far, therefore, as they suppose the primary, which are 
 necessary, while they themselves are only accidental, they exhibit, 
 on the one side, what may be called a quasi primary quality ; 
 and, in this respect, they are to be recognized as percepts, not 
 sensations, as objective affections of things, and not as subjective 
 affections of us. But, on the other side, this objective element is 
 always found accompanied by a secondary quality or sensorial 
 passion. The Secundo-primary qualities have thus always two 
 phases, both immediately apprehended. On their primary or 
 objective phasis they manifest themselves as degrees of resistance 
 opposed to our locomotive energy ; on their secondary or sub- 
 jective phasis, as modes of resistance or pressure affecting our 
 sentient organism. Thus standing between, and, in a certain 
 sort, made up of the two classes of Primary and Secondary qual- 
 ities, to neither of which, however, can they be reduced ; this
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 359 
 
 their partly common, partly peculiar nature, vindicates to them 
 the dignity of a class apart from both the others, and this under 
 the appropriate appellation of the Secundo-primary qualities. 
 
 They admit of a classification from two different points of view. 
 They may be physically, they may be psychologically, distrib- 
 uted. Considered physically, or in an objective relation, they 
 are to be reduced to classes corresponding to the different sources 
 in external nature from which the resistance or pressure springs. 
 And these sources are, in all, three : (I.) that of Co-attraction ; 
 (II.) that of Repulsion ; (III.) that of Inertia. 
 
 I. Of the resistance of Co-attraction there may be distin- 
 guished, on the same objective principle, two subaltern genera ; 
 to wit (A) that of Gravity, or the co-attraction of the particles of 
 body in general ; and (B) that of Cohesion, or the co-attraction 
 of the particles of this and that body in particular. 
 
 A. The resistance of Gravity or Weight according to its de- 
 gree (which, again, is in proportion to the Bulk and Density of 
 ponderable matter) affords, under it, the relative qualities of 
 Heavy and Light (absolute and specific). 
 
 B. The resistance of Cohesion (using that term in its most 
 unexclusive universality) contains many species and counter- 
 species. Without proposing an exhaustive, or accurately subor- 
 dinated, list ; of these there may be enumerated (i.) the Hard 
 and Soft ; (ii.) the Firm (Fixed, Stable, Concrete, Solid), and 
 Fluid (Liquid), the Fluid being again subdivided into the Thick 
 and Thin ; (iii.) the Viscid and Friable ; with (iv.) the Tough 
 and Brittle (Irruptile and Ruptile) ; (v.) the Rigid and Flexible ; 
 (vi.) the Fissile and Inftssile ; (vii.) the Ductile and Inductile 
 (Extensible and Inextensible) ; (viii.) the Rectractile and Irretrac- 
 tile (Elastic and Inelastic) ; (ix.) (combined with Figure) the 
 Rough and Smooth ; (x.) the Slippery and Tenacious. 
 
 II. The resistance from Repulsion is divided into the counter 
 qualities of (A) the (relatively) Compressible and Incompressible ; 
 (B) the Resilient and Irresilicnt (Elastic and Inelastic). 
 
 III. The resistance from Inertin (eoinbnH with Bulk and
 
 360 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 Cohesion) comprises the counter qualities of the (relatively) 
 Movable and Immovable. 
 
 There are thus, at least, fifteen pairs of counter attributes 
 which we may refer to the Secundo-primary Qualities of Body ; 
 all obtained by the division and subdivision of the resisting 
 forces of matter, considered in an objective or physical point of 
 view. [Compare Aristotle, Meteor. L. iv. c. 8.] 
 
 Considered psychologically, or in a subjective relation, they are 
 to be discriminated, under the genus of the Relatively resisting, 
 [I.] according to the degree in which the resisting force might 
 counteract our locomotive faculty or muscular force ; and, [II.] 
 according to the mode in which it might affect our capacity of 
 feeling or sentient organism. Of these species, the former would 
 contain under it the gradations of the quasi-primary quality, the 
 latter the varieties of the secondary quality these constituting 
 the two elements of which, in combination, every Secundo-primary 
 quality is made up. As, however, language does not afford us 
 terms by which these divisions and subdivisions can be unambig- 
 uously marked, I shall not attempt to carry out the distribution, 
 which is otherwise sufficiently obvious, in detail. So much for 
 the induction of the Secundo-primary qualities. 
 
 But it has sometimes been said of the Secundo-primary quali- 
 ties as of the Primary, that they are necessary characters in our 
 notion of body ; and this has more particularly been asserted of 
 Gravity, Cohesion, and Inertia. This doctrine, though never 
 brought to proof, and never, I believe, even deliberately main- 
 tained, it is, however, necessary to show, is wholly destitute of 
 foundation. 
 
 That Gravity, Cohesion, Inertia, and Repulsion, in their various 
 modifications, are not conceived by us as necessary properties of 
 matter, and that the resistances through which they are mani- 
 fested do not therefore, psychologically, constitute any primary 
 quality of body: this is evident, 1, from the historical fact of 
 the wavering and confliction of philosophical opinion, in regard 
 to the nature of these properties ; and, 2, from the response
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 361 
 
 afforded to the question by our individual consciousness. These 
 in their order : 
 
 1. The vascillation of philosophical opinion may be shown 
 under two heads ; to wit, from the Psychological, and from the 
 Physical, point of view. 
 
 As to the Psychological point of view, the ambiguous, and at 
 the same time the unessential, character of these qualities, is 
 shown by the variation of philosophers in regard to which of the 
 two classes of Primary or Secondary they would refer them ; for 
 the opinion, that philosophers are in this at one, is an error aris- 
 ing from the perfunctory manner in which this whole subject has 
 hitherto been treated. Many philosophers in their schemes of 
 classification, as Galileo, Boyle, Le Clerc, overlook, or at least 
 omit to enumerate these qualities. In point of fact, however, 
 they undoubtedly regarded them as Sensible, and therefore, as we 
 shall see, as Secondary, qualities. The great majority of philos- 
 ophers avowedly consider them as secondary. This is done, im- 
 plicitly or explicitly, by Aristotle and the Aristotelians, by Galen, 
 by Descartes* and his school, by Locke,f by Purchot, &c. ; for 
 these philosophers refer Hardness, Softness, Roughness, Smooth- 
 ness, and the like, to the Tactile qualities the sensible qualities 
 of Touch ; while they identify the sensible qualities in general, 
 that is, the sensations proper of the several senses, with the class 
 of Secondary, the percepts common to more than a single sense, 
 with the class of Primary, qualities. In this Aristotle, indeed, is 
 
 * See, besides what is said under Descartes, No. 9, Eegis, Phys. L. viii. 
 P. ii. ch. 2. Spinosa, Princ. Philos. Cartes. P. ii. Lem. 2, pr. 1. 
 
 t Compare Essay, B. ii. c. 3, 1, and c. 4, 4, and c. 8, 14, 23; 
 with Lee's Notes, B. ii. c. 8, 4, p. 56. Looking superficially at certain 
 casual ambiguities of Locke's language, we may, with Kames, Reid, and 
 philosophers in general, suppose him to have referred the qualities in 
 question to the class of Primary. Looking more closely, we may hold 
 him to have omitted them altogether, as inadvertently stated at p. 341 b. 
 But looking critically to the whole analogy of the places now quoted, and, 
 in particular, considering the import of the term ' sensible qualities,' as 
 then in ordinary use, we can have no doubt that, like the Peripatetics 
 and Descartes, he viewed them as pertaining to the class of Secondary. 
 
 16
 
 362 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 found not always in unison with himself; or rather, at different 
 times he views as proximate the different phases presented by the 
 qualities in question. For though in general he regards the 
 Rough and the Smooth as sensations proper to Touch (De Gen. 
 et Corr. ii. 2, et alibi), on one occasion he reduces these to the 
 class of common percepts, as modifications of Figure (De Sensu 
 et Sensili, c. 4). Recently, however, without suspecting their con- 
 fliction with the older authorities, nay, even in professed confor- 
 mity with the doctrine of Descartes and Locke, psychologists 
 have, with singular unanimity, concurred in considering the qual- 
 ities in question as Primary. For to say nothing of the anom- 
 alous and earlier statements of De La Forge and Du Hamel 
 (Nos. 13, 14), and passing over, as hardly of psychological import, 
 the opinion of Cotes (Praaf. ad Newtoni Princ. ed. 2), this has 
 been done by Kames, Reid, Fergusson, Stewart, and Royer-Col- 
 lard philosophers who may be regarded as the authors or prin- 
 cipal representatives of the doctrine now prevalent among those 
 by whom the distinction is admitted. 
 
 Looking, therefore, under the surface at the state of psychologi- 
 cal opinion, no presumption, assuredly, can be drawn from the 
 harmony of philosophers against the establishment of a class of 
 qualities different from those of Primary and Secondary. On the 
 contrary, the discrepancy of metaphysicians, not only with each 
 other, but of the greatest even with themselves, as to which of 
 these two classes the qualities 1 call Secundo-primary should be 
 referred, does, in fact, afford a strong preliminary probability that 
 these qualities can with propriety be reduced to neither ; them- 
 selves, in fact, constituting a peculiar class, distinct from each, 
 though intermediate between both. 
 
 As to the Physical point of view, I shall exhibit in detail the 
 variation of opinion in relation to the several classes of those qual- 
 ities which this point of view affords. 
 
 a. Gravity. In regard to weight, this, so far from being uni- 
 versally admitted, from the necessity of its conception, to be an 
 essential attribute of body, philosophers, ancient and modern,
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 363 
 
 very generally disallow all matter to be heavy ; and many have 
 even dogmatically asserted to certain kinds of matter a positive 
 levity. This last was done by Aristotle, and his Greek, Arabian, 
 and Latin followers ; i. e. by the philosophic world in general for 
 nearly two thousand years. At a recent period, the same doctrine 
 was maintained, as actually true, by Gren and other advocates of 
 the hypothesis of Phlogiston, among many more who allowed its 
 truth as possible ; and Newton had previously found it necessary 
 to clothe his universal ether with a quality of negative gravity 
 (or positive lightness), in order to enable him hypothetically to 
 account for the phenomenon of positive gravity in other matter. 
 
 Of Gravity, some, indeed, have held the cause to be internal 
 and essential to matter. Of these we have the ancient Atomists 
 (Democritus, Leucippus, Epicurus, <fec.), with Plato and a few in- 
 dividual Aristotelians, as Strato and Themistius ; and in modern 
 times a section of the Newtonians, as Cotes, Freind, Keill, with 
 Boscovich, Kant, Kames, Schelling, and Hegel. But though 
 holding (physically) weight to be, de facto, an essential property 
 of matter, these philosophers were far from holding (psychologi- 
 cally) the character of weight to be an essential constituent of the 
 notion of mattter. Kant, for example, when speaking psychologi- 
 cally, asserts that weight is only a synthetic predicate which ex- 
 perience enables us to add on to our prior notion of body (Or. d. 
 r. Vern. p. 12, ed. 2 Proleg. 2, p. 25, ed. 1.) ; whereas, when 
 speaking physically, he contends that weight is a universal attri- 
 bute of matter, as a necessary condition of its existence (Met. 
 Anfangsgr. d. Naturwiss. p. 71, ed. 2). 
 
 But the latter opinion that weight is only, in reality, as in 
 thought, an accident of body is that adopted by the immense 
 majority, not only of philosophers, but of natural philosophers. 
 Under various modifications, however ; some, for example, hold- 
 ing the external cause of gravity to be physical, others to be hy- 
 perphysical. Neglecting subordinate distinctions, to this class 
 belong Anaxagoras, Democritus, Melissus, Diogenes of Apollonia, 
 Aristotle and his school, Algazel, Avicembron, Copernicus, Bruno,
 
 364 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 Kepler, Gilbert, Berigardus, Digby, Torricelli, Descartes, Gas- 
 send i, Lana, Kircher, Andala, Malebranche, Rohault, De Guer- 
 icke, Perrault, H. Moore,Cudwortb, Du Hamel, Huygens, Sturmius, 
 Hooke, Is. Vossius, Newton, S. Clarke, Halley, Leibnitz, Saurin, 
 Wolf, Mueller, Bilfinger, the Bernoullis James and Jobn, Canz, 
 Harnberger, Varignon, Villemot, Fatio, Euler, Baxter, Colden, 
 Saussure, Le Sage, L'lluillier, Prevost, De Luc, Monboddo, Hors- 
 ley, Drummond, Playfair, Blair, <fec. In particular this doctrine 
 is often and anxiously inculcated by Newton who seems, indeed, 
 to have sometimes inclined even to an immaterial cause ; but this 
 more especially after his follower, Cotes, had ventured to announce 
 an adhesion to the counter theory, in his preface to the second 
 edition of the 'Principia,' which he procured in 1713. See New- 
 ton's letter to Boyle, 1678 Letters, second and third, to Bentley, 
 1693 ; Principia, L. i. c. 5. L. iii. reg. 3, alibi ; in particular, 
 Optics, ed. 1717, B. iii. Qu. 21. 
 
 b. Cohesion, comprehending under that term not only Cohe- 
 sion proper, but all the specific forces (Adhesion, Capillarity, 
 Chemical Affinity, &c.), by which the particles of individual bod- 
 ies tend to approach, and to maintain themselves in union Co- 
 hesion is even less than Gravity, than the force by which matter 
 in general attracts matter, a character essential to our notion of 
 body. Upon Gravity, indeed, a majority of the earlier Newto- 
 nians maintained Cohesion, in some inexplicable manner, to de- 
 pend ; and the other hypotheses of an external agency, all pro- 
 ceed upon the supposition that it is merely an accident of matter. 
 Cohesion, the cause of which Locke wisely regarded as inconceiv- 
 able, Descartes attempted to explain by the quiescence of the ad- 
 joining molecules ; Malebranche (as an occasional cause), by the 
 agitation of a pervading invisible matter ; Stair, by the pressure 
 (whence, he does not state) of the physical points, his supposed 
 constituents of body, to a common centre ; and James Bernoulli, 
 by the pressure of a circumambient fluid an hypothesis to which 
 Newton likewise seems to have inclined : while a host of others, 
 following Algazel and Avicembron, Biel and D'Ailly, spurned all
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 365 
 
 mechanical media, these being themselves equally inexplicable as 
 the phenomenon in question, and resorted to the immediate 
 agency of an immaterial principle. The psychologists, therefore, 
 who (probably from confounding hardness with solidity, solidity 
 with impenetrability) have carried up the resistance of cohesion 
 into the class of primary qualities, find but little countenance for 
 their procedure, even among the crude precedents of physical 
 speculation. 
 
 c. Vis Inertice. But if, on the ground of philosophical agree 
 ment, Gravity and Cohesion are not to be regarded as primary 
 qualities of matter ; this dignity is even less to be accorded to 
 that force by which bodies resist any change of state, whether that 
 be one of quiescence or of motion. This, variously known under 
 the names of Vis Inertise, Inertia, Vis Insita Resistentiae, Resisten 
 tia Passiva, &c., was, indeed, if not first noticed, only first gener 
 alized at a comparatively recent period to wit, by Kepler; 
 while the subsequent controversies in regard to its nature and 
 comprehension, equally concur in showing that there is no neces- 
 sity for thinking it as an essential attribute of matter. The Car- 
 tesians, among others, viewed it as a quality not only derivative, 
 but contingent ; and even those Newtonians, who, in opposition 
 to Newton, raised Gravity to the rank of a primary quality, did 
 not, however, venture to include inertia under the same category. 
 (See Cotes's Preface to the second edition of the Principia.) 
 Leibnitz, followed, among others, by Wolf, divided this force into 
 two ; discriminating the vis activa or matrix, from the vis pas- 
 siva or inertia. The former they held not to be naturally inher- 
 ent in, but only supernaturally impressed on, matter. Without 
 reference to Leibnitz, a similar distinction was taken by D'Alem- 
 bert, in which he is followed by Destutt de Tracy ; a distinction, 
 as we have seen, which also found favor with Lord Kames, who 
 in this, however, stands alone among metaphysicians, that he 
 places both his vis inertice and vis incita among the primary qual- 
 ities of body. 
 
 Finally, Physical speculators, in general, distinguish Inertia and
 
 366 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 Weight, as powers, though proportional, still distinct. Many, 
 however, following Wiedeburg, view the former as only a modifi- 
 cation or phasis of the latter. 
 
 d. Repulsion, meaning by that terra more than the resist- 
 ance of impenetrability, gravity, cohesion, or inertia, has, least 
 of all, authority to plead in favor of its pretension to the 
 dignity of a primary quality. The dynamical theories of mat- 
 ter, indeed, view Attraction and Repulsion not merely as fun- 
 damental qualities, but even as its generic forces ; but the 
 ground of this is the necessity of the hypothesis, not the neces- 
 sity of thought. 
 
 2. But the voice of our individual consciousness is a more di- 
 rect and cogent evidence than the history of foreign opinion ; 
 and this is still less favorable to the claim in question. The only 
 resistance which we think as necessary to the conception of body, 
 is a resistance to the occupation of a body's space the resistance 
 of ultimate incompressibility. The others, with their causes, we 
 think only as contingent, because, one and all of them we can 
 easily annihilate in thought. 
 
 Repulsion (to take them backwards) a resistance to the 
 approximation and contact of other matter we come only by a 
 late and learned experience to view as an attribute of body, and 
 of the elements of body ; nay, so far is it from being a character 
 essential in our notion of matter, it remains, as apparently an ac- 
 tio in distans, even when forced upon us as a fact, still inconceiv- 
 able as a possibility. Accordingly, by no philosopher has the re- 
 sistance of Repulsion been psychologically regarded as among the 
 primary qualities. 
 
 Nor has Inertia a greatly higher claim to this distinction. 
 There is no impossibility, there is little difficulty, in imagining a 
 thing, occupying space, and therefore a body ; and yet, without 
 attraction or repulsion for any other body, and wholly indifferent 
 to this or that position, in space, to motion and to rest ; opposing, 
 therefore, no resistance to any displacing power. Such imagina- 
 tion is opposed to experience, and consequently to our acquired
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 367 
 
 habitudes of conceiving body ; but it is not opposed to the neces- 
 sary conditions of that concept itself. 
 
 It was on this psychological ground that Descartes reduced in- 
 ertia to a mere accident of extension. Physically reasoning, Des- 
 cartes may not perhaps be right ; but Karnes is certainly, as he 
 is singularly wrong, in psychologically recognizing Inertia as a 
 primary attribute of body. 
 
 Of the two attractions, Cohesion is not constituent of the notion 
 of what occupies, or is trinally extended in space. This notion 
 involves only the supposition of parts out of parts ; and although 
 what fills an uninterrupted portion of space, is, pro tanto, consider- 
 ed by us as one thing ; the unity which the parts of this obtain in 
 thought, is not the internal unity of cohesion, but the external 
 unity of continuity or juxtaposition. Under the notion of reple- 
 tion of space, a rock has not in thought a higher unity than a pile 
 of sand. Cohesion, consequently, is not, in a psychological view, 
 an essential attribute of body. [In saying this, I may notice pa- 
 renthetically, that I speak of cohesion only as between the ulti- 
 mate elements of body, whatever these may be ; and fortunately 
 our present discussion does not require us to go higher, that is, to 
 regard cohesion in reference to our conception of these considered 
 in themselves. In forming to ourselves such concept, two counter 
 inconceivabilities present themselves, inconceivabilities from the 
 one or other of -which, as speculators have recoiled, they have em- 
 braced one or other of the counter theories of Atomism and Dy- 
 namism.] But if cohesion be not thought as an essential attribute 
 of body, Kames, Reid, Fergusson, Stewart, Royer-Collard, and 
 other recent philosophers, were wrong to introduce the degrees of 
 cohesive resistance among the primary qualities ; either avowedly 
 under the explicit titles of the Hard, the Soft, <fec., or covertly, 
 under the ambiguous head of Solidity. But though Locke did 
 not, as they believe, precede them in this doctrine, his language, 
 to say the least of it, is unguarded and inaccurate. For he em- 
 ploys cohesion and continuity as convertible terms ; and states, 
 without the requisite qualification, that ' upon the solidity [to him
 
 368 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 * I 
 
 the impenetrability or ultimate incompressibility] of bodies de- 
 pend their mutual impulse, resistance, and protrusion.' (ii. 4, 5.) 
 
 As to Weight, we have from our earliest experience been ac- 
 customed to find all tangible bodies in a state of gravitation ; and 
 by the providence of nature, the child has, even anteriorly to 
 experience, an instinctive anticipation of this law in relation to 
 his own. This has given weight an advantage over the other 
 qualities of the same class ; and it is probably through these influ- 
 ences, that certain philosophers have been disposed to regard 
 gravity, as, physically and psychologically, a primary quality of 
 matter. But instinct and consuetude notwithstanding, we find 
 no difficulty in imagining the general co-attraction of matter to 
 be annihilated ; nay, not only annihilated, but reversed. For as 
 attraction and repulsion seem equally actiones in distans, it is not 
 more difficult to realize to ourselves the notion of the one, than 
 the notion of the other. 
 
 In reference to both Cohesion and Gravity, I may notice, that 
 though it is only by experience we come to attribute an internal 
 unity to aught continuously extended, that is, consider it as a sys- 
 tem or constituted whole ; still, in so far as we do so consider it, 
 we think the parts as held together by a certain force, and the 
 whole, therefore, as endowed with a power of resisting their 
 distraction. It is, indeed, only by finding that a material conti- 
 nuity resists distraction, that we view it as more than a fortuitous 
 aggregation of many bodies, that is, as a single body. The mate- 
 rial universe, for example, though not de facto continuously ex- 
 tended, we consider as one system, in so far, but only in so far, as 
 we find all bodies tending together by reciprocal attraction. But 
 here I may add, that though a love of unity may bias us, there is 
 no necessity for supposing this co-attraction to be the effect of any 
 single force. It may be the result of any plurality of forces, pro- 
 vided that these co-operate in due subordination. Thus we are 
 not constrained to view the universe of matter as held together by 
 the power of gravity alone. For though gravity be recognized as 
 the prime, proximate, and most pervading principle of co-attrac-
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 369 
 
 tion, still, until the fact be proved, we are not required to view it 
 as the sole. We may suppose that a certain complement of 
 parts are endowed with weight ; and that the others, immediate- 
 ly and in themselves indifferent to gravitation, are mediately 
 drawn within its sphere, through some special affinity or attrac- 
 tion subsisting between them and the bodies immediately subject- 
 ed to its influence. Let the letters A, B, C, x, y, z, represent in 
 general the universe of matter ; the capital letters representing, in 
 particular, the kinds of matter possessed of, the minor letters re- 
 presenting the kinds of matter destitute of weight. Of themselves, 
 A, B, C will, therefore, gravitate ; x, y, z will not. But if x have 
 a peculiar affinity for A, y for B, and z for C ; x, y, z, though in 
 themselves weightless, will, through their correlation to A, B, C, 
 come mediately under the influence of gravitation, and enter along 
 with their relatives, as parts, into the whole of which gravity is 
 the proximate bond of unity. To prove, therefore, a priori, or on 
 any general principle whatever, that no matter is destitute of 
 weight, is manifestly impossible. All matter may possibly be 
 heavy : but until experiment can decide, by showing, in detail, 
 that what are now generally regarded as imponderable fluids, are 
 either in truth ponderable substances, or not substances at all, we 
 have no data on which to infer more than a conjectural affirma- 
 tive of little probability. On the dynamical theories of matter, 
 the attempts made from Boscovich to Hegel, to demonstrate that 
 weight is a catholic property, as a fundamental condition of mat- 
 ter, are all founded on petitory premises. This is justly ac- 
 knowledged by Hegel hims'elf of the Kantian deduction (Werke, 
 vol. vii. p. i. 262) ; and, were the proof of psychological con- 
 cernment, the same might no less justly be demonstrated of his 
 own.* 
 
 * Since writing the above, I am indebted to the kindness of Mr. Whewell 
 for his ' Demonstration that all Matter is Heavy,' published in the Transac- 
 tions of the Cambridge Philosophical Society, Vol. vii. Part ii. ; an author 
 whose energy and talent all must admire, even while convinced the least by 
 the cogency of his reasoning. As this demonstration proceeds not on a 
 mere physical ground, but on the ground of a certain logical or psychologi- 
 
 16*
 
 370 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 Induction of the Secondary Qualities. Its results are the fol- 
 lowing. The Secondary as manifested to us, are not, in propriety, 
 qualities of Body at all. As apprehended, they are only sub- 
 
 eal law, and as it is otherwise diametrically opposed to the whole tenor of 
 the doctrine previously maintained, I shall briefly consider it in its general 
 bearing; which Mr. "Whewell thus states, afterwards illustrating it in 
 detail : 
 
 ' The question then occurs, whether we can, by any steps of reasoning, 
 point out an inconsistency in the conception of matter without weight. This 
 I conceive we may do, and this I shall attempt to show. The general mode 
 of stating the argument ia this : The quantity of matter is measured by 
 those sensible properties of matter [Weight and Inertia] which undergo 
 quantitative addition, subtraction, and division, as the mutter is added, sub- 
 tracted, and divided. The quantity of matter cannot be known in any other 
 way. But this mode of measuring the quantity of matter, in order to be 
 true at all, must be universally true. If it were only partially true, the 
 limits within which it is to be applied would be arbitrary ; and, therefore, the 
 whole procedure would be arbitrary, and, as a method of obtaining philo- 
 sophical truth, altogether futile.' [But this is not to be admitted. ' We 
 must suppose the rule to be universal. If any bodies have weight, all bod- 
 ies must have weight.'] 
 
 1. This reasoning assumes in chief that we cannot but have it in our 
 power, by some means or other, to ascertain the quantity of mutter as a 
 physical truth. But gratuitously. For why may not the quantity of matter 
 be one of that multitude of problems, placed beyond the reach, not of human 
 curiosity, but of human determination ? 
 
 2. But, subordinate to the assumption that some measure we must have, 
 the reasoning further supposes that a measure of the weight (and inertia) is 
 the only measure we can have of the quantity of matter. But is even this 
 correct? We may, certainly, attempt to estimate the quantity of matter by 
 the quantity of two, at least, of the properties of matter; to wit a) by the 
 quantity of space of which it is found to resist the occupation ; and b) by 
 the quantity of weight (and inertia), which it manifests. We need not 
 inquire whether, were these measures harmonious in result, they would, in 
 combination, supply a competent criterion ; for they are at variance ; and, 
 if either, one must be exclusively selected. Of the two, the former, indeed, 
 at first sight, recommends itself as the alone authentic. For the quantity of 
 matter is, on all hands, admitted to be in proportion to the quantity of space 
 it fills, extension being necessarily thought as the essential property of body ; 
 whereas it is not universally admitted that the quantity of matter is in pro- 
 portion to its amount of weight and inertia ; these being, on the contrary, 
 conceivable and generally conceived as adventitious accidents, and not, 
 therefore, as necessary concomitants of matter. But then it may be compe- 
 tently objected, The cubical extension of compressed bodies cannot be 
 taken as an authentic measure of the quantity of space they fill, because we 
 are not assured that the degree of compressing force which we can actually
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 371 
 
 jective affections, and belong only to bodies in so far as these are 
 supposed furnished with the powers capable of specifically deter- 
 mining the various parts of our nervous apparatus to the peculiar 
 action, or rather passion, of which they are susceptible ; which 
 determined action or passion is the quality of which alone we are 
 immediately cognizant, the external concause of that internal 
 effect remaining to perception altogether unknown. Thus, the 
 Secondary qualities (and the same is to be said, mutatis mutan- 
 dis, of the Secundo-primary) are, considered subjectively, and 
 considered objectively, affections or qualities of things diamet- 
 rically opposed in nature of the organic and inorganic, of the 
 sentient and insentient, of mind and matter : and though, as mu- 
 tually correlative, and their several pairs rarely obtaining in com- 
 mon language more than a single name, they cannot well be con- 
 sidered, except in conjuction, under the same category or general 
 class ; still their essential contrast of character must be ever care- 
 fully borne in mind. And in speaking of these qualities, as we 
 are here chiefly concerned with them on their subjective side, I 
 
 apply is an accurate index of what their cubical extension would be in a 
 state of ultimate or closest compression. But though this objection must be 
 admitted to invalidate the certainty of the more direct and probable crite- 
 rion, it does not, however, leave the problem to be determined by the other ; 
 against which, indeed, it falls to be no less effectually retorted. For as lit- 
 le, at least, can we be assured that there is not (either separately, or in com- 
 bination with gravitating matter) substance occupying space, and, therefore, 
 material, but which, being destitute of weight, is, on the standard of pon- 
 derability, precisely as if it did not exist. This supposition, be it observed, 
 the experiments of Newton and Bessel do not exclude. Nay, more ; there 
 are, in fact, obtruded ou our observation a series of apparent fluids (as 
 Light, or its vehicle, the Calorific, Electro-galvanic, and Magnetic agents), 
 which, in our present state of knowledge, we can neither, on the one hand, 
 denude of the character of substance, nor, on the other, close with the attri- 
 bute of weight. 
 
 3". This argument finally supposes, as a logical canon, that a presumption 
 from analogy affords a criterion of truth, subjectively necessary, and objec- 
 tively certain. But not the former ; for however inclined, we are never 
 necessitated, a posteriori, to think, that because some are, therefore all the 
 constituents of a class must be, the subjects of a predicate a priori contingent. 
 Not the latter; for though a useful stimulus and guide to investigation, 
 analogy is, by itself, a very doubtful guarantee of truth.
 
 372 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 request it may be observed, that I shall employ the expression 
 Secondary qualities to denote those phenomenal affections deter- 
 mined in our sentient organism by the agency of external bodies, 
 and not, unless when otherwise stated, the occult powers them- 
 selves from which that agency proceeds. 
 
 Of the Secondary qualities, in this relation, there are various 
 kinds ; the variety principally depending on the differences of the 
 different parts of our nervous apparatus. Such are the proper 
 sensibles, the idiopathic affections of our several organs of sense, 
 as Color, Sound, Flavor, Savor, and Tactual sensation ; such are 
 the feelings from Heat, Electricity, Galvanism, &c. ; nor need it 
 be added, such are the muscular and cutaneous sensations which 
 accompany the perception of the Secundo-primary qualities. 
 Such, though less directly the result of foreign causes, are Titil- 
 lation, Sneezing, Horripilation, Shuddering, the feeling of what is 
 called Setting-the-teeth-on-edge, &c., <fec.^ such, in fine, are all 
 the various sensations of bodily pleasure and pain determined by 
 the action of external stimuli. So much for the induction of the 
 Secondary Qualities in a subjective relation. 
 
 It is here, however, requisite to add some words of illustration. 
 What are denominated the secondary qualities of body, are, I 
 have said, as apprehended, not qualities of body at all ; being 
 only idiopathic affections of the different portions of our nervous 
 organism affections which, however uniform and similar in us, 
 may be determined by the most dissimilar and multiform causes 
 in external things. This is manifest from the physiology of our 
 senses and their appropriate nerves. Without entering on details, 
 it is sufficient to observe, that we are endowed with various as- 
 sortments of nerves ; each of these being astricted to certain defi- 
 nite functions; and each exclusively discharging the function 
 which specially belongs to it. Thus there are nerves of feeling 
 (comprehending under that term the sensations of cutaneous 
 touch and feeling proper, of the muscular sense, and of the vital 
 sense, or sensus vagus, in all its modifications), of seeing, of hear- 
 ing, of smelling, of tasting, <fec.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 373 
 
 The nerves of feeling afford us sensations to which, in opposite 
 extremes, we emphatically, if not exclusively, attribute the qual- 
 ities of pain and pleasure. Acute pain pain from laceration 
 may, indeed, be said to belong exclusively to these ; for the 
 nerves appropriated to the other and more determinate senses, 
 are, like the brain, in this respect altogether insensible ; and it is 
 even probable that the pain we experience from their over-excite- 
 ment is dependent on the nerves of feeling with which they are 
 accompanied. Now pain and pleasure no one has ever attributed 
 as qualities to external things : feeling has always been regarded 
 as purely subjective, and it has been universally admitted that its 
 affections, indicating only certain conscious states of the sentient 
 animal, afforded no inference even to definite causes of its produc- 
 tion in external nature. So far there is no dispute. 
 
 The case may, at first sight, seem different with regard to the 
 sensations proper to the more determinate senses ; but a slight 
 consideration may suffice to satisfy us that these are no less sub- 
 jective than the others ; as is indeed indicated in the history al- 
 ready given of the distinction of Primary and Secondary quali- 
 ties. As, however, of a more definite character, it is generally, I 
 believe, supposed that these senses, though they may not pre- 
 cisely convey material qualities from external existence to internal 
 knowledge, still enable us at least to infer the possession by 
 bodies of certain specific powers, each capable exclusively of exci- 
 ting a certain correlative manifestation in us. But even this is 
 according greatly too large a share in the total sensitive effect to 
 the objective concause. The sensations proper to the several 
 senses depend, for the distinctive character of their manifestation, 
 on the peculiar character of the action of their several nerves ; and 
 not, as is commonly supposed, on the exclusive susceptibility of 
 these nerves for certain specific stimuli. In fact every the most 
 different stimulus (and there are many such, both extra and in- 
 tra-organic, besides the one viewed as proper to the sense), which 
 can be brought to bear on each several nerve of sense, determines 
 that nerve only to its one peculiar sensation. Thus the stimulus
 
 374 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 by the external agent exclusively denominated Light, though the 
 more common, is not the only stimulus which excites in the vis- 
 ual apparatus the subjective affection of light and colors. Sensa- 
 tions of light and colors, are determined among other causes, from 
 within, by a sanguineous congestion in the capillary vessels of 
 the optic nerve, or by various chemical agents which affect it 
 through the medium of the blood ; from without, by the applica- 
 tion to the same nerve of a mechanical force, as a blow, a com- 
 pression, a wound, or of an imponderable influence, as electricity 
 or galvanism. In fact the whole actual phenomena of vision 
 might be realized to us by the substitution of an electro-galvanic 
 stimulus, were this radiated in sufficient intensity from bodies, 
 and in conformity with optical laws. The blind from birth are 
 thus rarely without all experience of light, color, and visual ex- 
 tension, from stimulation of the interior organism. The same is 
 the case with the other senses. Apply the aforementioned or 
 other extraordinary stimuli to their several nerves ; each sense 
 will be excited to its appropriate sensation, and its appropriate 
 sensation alone. The passion manifested (however heterogeneous 
 its external or internal cause) is always of the auditory nerves, 
 a sound, of the olfactory, a smell, of the gustatory, a taste. But 
 of the various common agencies which thus excite these several 
 organs to their idiopathic affection, we are manifestly no more 
 entitled to predicate the individual color, sound, odor, or savor of 
 which, in each case, we have a sensation, than we are to attrib- 
 ute the pain we feel to the pin by which we are pricked. But if 
 this must per force be admitted of the extraordinary external 
 causes of these sensations, it is impossible to deny it of the ordi- 
 nary. 
 
 In this respect Aristotle (and the same may also be said of 
 Theophrastus) was far in advance of many of our modern philos- 
 ophers. In his treatise on Dreams, to prove that sensation is 
 not a purely objective cognition, but much more a subjective 
 modification or passion of the organ, he shows, and with a detail 
 very unusual to him, that this sensible affection does not cease
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 375 
 
 with the presence, and, therefore, does not manifest the quality, 
 of the external object. ' This (he says) is apparent so often as we 
 have the sensation of a thing for a certain continuance. For then, 
 divert as we may the sense from one object to another, still the 
 affection from the first accompanies the second ; as (for example) 
 when we pass from sunshine into shade. In this case we at first 
 see nothing, because of the movement in the eyes still subsisting, 
 which had been determined by the light. In like manner if we 
 gaze for a while upon a single color, say white or green, whatev- 
 er we may now turn our sight on will appear of that tint. And 
 if, after looking at the sun or other dazzling object, we close our 
 eyelids, we shall find, if we observe, that, in the line of vision, 
 there first of all appears a color such as we had previously beheld, 
 which then changes to red, then to purple, until at last the affec- 
 tion vanishes in black ;' -with more to the same effect (C. 2.) 
 And in the same chapter he anticipates modern psychologists in 
 the observation that ' Sometimes, when suddenly awoke, we 
 discover, from their not incontinently vanishing, that the images 
 which had appeared to us when asleep are really movements in 
 the organs of sense ; and to young persons it not unfrequently 
 happens, even when wide awake, and withdrawn from the excite- 
 ment of light, that moving images present themselves so vividly, 
 that for fear they are wont to hide themselves under the bed- 
 clothes.' (C. 2.) See also Ockham, in Sent., L. ii. qq. 17, 18. 
 Biel, in Sent., L. ii. Dist. iii. q. 2. Berigardus, Circulus Pisa- 
 nus, P. vi. Circ. 12, ed. 2. ffobbes, Human Nature, ch. ii. 7- 
 10. Boerhaave, Prselectiones in proprias Institutions, 284, 
 579. Sprenr/el, Semiotik, 770-773 ; Pathologic, vol. ii. 719. 
 Qruithuisen, Anthropologie, 449. Sir Charles Bell, An 
 Idea, <fec. (in Shaw's Narrative, p. 35, sq.) ; The Hand, <kc., p. 
 175, sq. Plateau, Essai d'une Theorie, <fec., p. . J. Mueller, 
 Physiology, Book v., Preliminary Considerations, p. 1059, sq., 
 Engl. Transl. 
 
 Such being the purely subjective character of the secondary 
 qualities, as apprehended or immediately known by us, we must
 
 376 
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 reject as untenable the doctrine on this point, however ingenious- 
 ly supported, of the celebrated Neapolitan philosopher, Baron 
 Galluppi ; who, while, justly I think, dissatisfied with the opinion 
 of Reid, that the perception of the primary qualities is a concep- 
 tion instinctively suggested on occasion of our sensation of the 
 secondary, errs on the opposite extreme, in his attempt to show 
 that this sensation itself affords us what is wanted, an immedi- 
 ate cognition, an objective apprehension, of external things. The 
 result of his doctrine he thus himself states : ' Sensation is of 
 Its very nature objective ; in other words, objectivity is essential 
 to every sensation.' 1 Elementi di Filosofia, vol. i.e. 10, ed. 4, 
 Florence, 1837. The matter is more amply treated in his Criti- 
 ca della Conoscenza, L. ii. c. 6, and L. iv. a work which I have 
 not yet seen. Compare Bonelli, Institutiones Logico-Metaphysi- 
 cae, t. i. pp. 184, 222, ed. 2, 1837. 
 
 Such is the general view of the grounds on which the psycho- 
 logical distinction of the Qualities of Bodies, into the three classes 
 of Primary, Secundo-primary, and Secondary is established. It 
 now remains to exhibit their mutual differences and similarities 
 more in detail. In attempting this, the following order will be 
 pursued. I shall state of the three relative classes, (A) What 
 they are, considered in general ; then, (B) What they are, consid- 
 ered in particular. And under this latter head I shall view 
 them, (1) as in Bodies : (2) as in Cognition ; and this (a) a* 
 in Sensitive Apprehension ; (b) as in Thought ; (c) as in both. 
 For the conveniency of reference the paragraphs will be num- 
 bered/ 
 
 A. What they are in general. 
 
 1. The Primary are less properly denominated Qualities (Such- 
 nesses), and deserve the name only as we conceive them to dis- 
 tinguish body from not-body, corporeal from incorporeal sub- 
 stance. They are thus merely the attributes of body as body, 
 corporis ut corpus. The Secundo-primary and Secondary, on 
 the contrary, are in strict propriety denominated Qualities, for
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 377 
 
 they discriminate body from body. They are the attributes of 
 body as this or that kind of body, coporis ut tale co/yws.* 
 
 2. The Primary rise from the universal relations of body to 
 itself; the Secundo-primary from the general relations of this 
 body to that ; the Secondary from the special relations of this 
 kind of body to this kind of animated or sentient organism. 
 
 3. The Primary determine the possibility of matter absolutely ; 
 the Secundo-primary, the possibility of the material universe as 
 actually constituted ; the Secondary, the possibility of our rela- 
 tion as sentient existences to that universe. 
 
 4. Under the Primary we apprehend modes of the Non-ego ; 
 under the Secundo-primary we apprehend modes both of the Ego 
 and of the Non-ego ; under the Secondary we/apprehend modes 
 of the Ego, and infer modes of the Non-ego. (See par. 15.) 
 
 5. The Primary are apprehended as they are in bodies ; the 
 Secondary, as they are in us ; the Secundo-primary, as they are 
 in bodies, and as they are in us. (See par. 15.) 
 
 6. The term quality in general, and the names of the several 
 qualities in particular, are in the case of the primary, univocal, 
 one designation unambiguously marking out one quality ;f in the 
 case of the Secundo-primary and Secondary, equivocal, a single 
 term being ambiguously applied to denote two qualities, distinct 
 though correlative that, to wit, which is a mode of existence in 
 bodies, and that which is a mode of affection in our organism.}. 
 (See par. 24.) 
 
 * Thus in the Aristotelic and other philosophies, the title Quality would 
 not be allowed to those fundamental conditions on which the very possibility 
 of matter depends, but which modern philosophers have denominated its 
 Primary Qualities. 
 
 t For example, there is no subjective Sensation of Magnitude, Figure, 
 Number, &c., but only an objective Perception. (See par. 15-19.) 
 
 % Thus, in the Secundo-primary the term Hardness, for instance, denotes 
 both a certain resistance, of which we are conscious, to our motive energy, 
 and a certain feeling from pressure on our nerves. The former, a Perception, 
 is wholly different from the latter, a Sensation ; and we can easily imagine 
 that we might have been so constituted, as to apprehend Resistance as we do 
 Magnitude, Figure, &c., without a corresponding organic passion. (See par. 
 18.) In the Secondary the term Heat, for example, denotes ambiguously both
 
 378 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 7. The Primary, and also the Secundo-primary qualities, are 
 definite in number and exhaustive; for all conceivable relations 
 of body to itself, or of body to body merely, are few, and all these 
 found actually existent. The Secondary, on the contrary, are in 
 number indefinite ; and the actual hold no proportion to the pos- 
 sible. For we can suppose, in an animal organism, any number of 
 unknown capacities of being variously affected ; and, in matter, 
 any number of unknown powers of thus variously affecting it ;* 
 and this though we are necessarily unable to imagine to ourselves 
 what these actually may be. 
 
 B. What they are in particular ; and 1, Considered as in 
 
 Bodies, 
 
 8. The Primary are the qualities of body in relation to our or- 
 ganism, as a body simply ; the Secundo-primary, are the qualities 
 of body in relation to our organism, as a propelling, resisting, co- 
 hesive body ; the Secondary are the qualities of body in relation 
 to our organism, as an idiopathically excitable and sentient body. 
 (See p. 374 b 376 a.) 
 
 9. Under this head we know the Primary qualities immedi- 
 ately as objects of perception ; the Secundc-priinary, both imme- 
 diately as objects of perception and mediately as causes of sen- 
 sation ; the Secondary, only mediately as causes of sensation. 
 In other words : The Primary are known immediately in them- 
 selves ; the Secundo-primary, both immediately in themselves and 
 mediately in their effects on us ; the Secondary, only mediately 
 in their effects on us. (See par. 15.) 
 
 10. The Primary are known under the condition of sensations ; 
 the Secundo-primary, in and along with sensations ; the Second- 
 ary, in consequence of sensations. (See par. 20.) 
 
 the quality which we infer to be in bodies and the quality of which we are 
 conscious in ourselves. 
 
 * Sextus Empiricus, Montaigne, Voltaire, Hemsterhuis, Krueger, &c., no- 
 tice this as possible ; but do not distinguish the possibility as limited to the 
 Secondary Qualities.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 379 
 
 11. The Primary are thus apprehended objects ; the Secondary, 
 inferred powers ; the Secundo-primary, both apprehended objects 
 and inferred powers. 
 
 12. The Primary are conceived as necessary and perceived as 
 actual ; the Secundo-primary are perceived and conceived as 
 actual ; the Secondary are inferred and conceived as possible. 
 
 13. The Primary are perceived as conceived. The Secundo- 
 primary are conceived as perceived. The Secondary are neither 
 perceived as conceived, nor conceived as perceived ; for to per- 
 ception they are occult, and are conceived only as latent causes to 
 account for manifest effects. (See par. 15, and foot-note *.) 
 
 14. The Primary may be roundly characterized as mathemat- 
 ical ; the Secundo-primary, as mechanical; the Secondary, as 
 physiological. 
 
 2. Considered as Cognitions ; and here (a) As in Sensitive 
 Apprehension, or in relation to Sense. 
 
 15. In this relation the Primary qualities are, as apprehended, 
 unambiguously objective (object-objects) ; the Secondary, unam- 
 biguously subjective (subject-objects) ;* the Secundo-primary, 
 both objective and subjective (object-objects and subject-objects). 
 In other words : We are conscious, as objects, in the Primary 
 qualities, of the modes of a not-self; in the Secondary, of the 
 modes of self;* in the Secundo-primary, of the modes of self and 
 of a not-self at once.f 
 
 * How much this differs from the doctrine of Reid, Stewart, &c., who hold 
 that in every sensation there is not only a subjective object of sensation, but, 
 also an objective object of perception, see Note D*, I. 1 
 
 t In illustration of this paragraph, I must notice a confusion and ambigu- 
 ity in the very cardinal distinction of psychology and its terms the distinc- 
 tion I mean otevbfecti/M and olgective, which, as far as I am aware, has never 
 been cleared up, nay, never even brought clearly into view. 
 
 Our nervous organism (the rest of our body may be fairly thrown out of 
 account), in contrast to r.ll exterior to itself, appertains to the concrete human 
 Ego, and in this respect is subjective, internal; whereas, in contrast to the 
 
 Chapter vL below, in this vol. W.
 
 380 PHILOSOPHY OF PEBCEPTION. 
 
 16. Using the terms strictly, the apprehensions of the Primary 
 are perceptions, not sensations ; of the Secondary, sensations, not 
 perceptions ; of the Secundo-primary, perceptions and sensations 
 together. (See par. 15, foot-note *.) 
 
 abstract immaterial Ego, the pure mind, it belongs to the Non-ego, and in 
 this respect is objective, external. Hero is one source of ambiguity sufficiently 
 perplexing ; but the discrimination is here comparatively manifest, and any 
 important inconvenience from the employment of the terms may, with prop- 
 er attention, be avoided. 
 
 The following problem is more difficult. Looking from the mind, and not 
 looking beyond our animated organism, are the phenomena of which we are 
 conscious in that organism all upon a level, i. e., equally objective or equally 
 subjective ; or is there a discrimination to be made, and some phenomena to 
 be considered as objective, being modes of our organism viewed as a mere por- 
 tion of matter, and in this respect a Non-ego, while other phenomena are to 
 be considered as subjective, being the modes of our organism as animated by 
 or in union with the mind, and therefore states of the Ego? Without here 
 attempting to enter on the reasons which vindicate my opinion, suffice it to 
 say, that I adopt the latter alternative ; and hold further, that the discrim- 
 ination of the sensorial phenomena into objective and subjective, coincides 
 with the distinction made of the qualities of body into Primary and Second- 
 ary, the Secundo-primary being supposed to contribute an element to each. 
 Our nervous organism is to be viewed in two relations ; 1, as a body simply, 
 and 2, as an animated body. As a body simply it can possibly exist, and 
 can possibly be known as existent, only under those necessary conditions of 
 all matter, which have been denominated its Primary qualities. As an ani- 
 mated body it actually exists, and is actually known to exist, only as it is sus- 
 ceptible of certain affections, which, and the external causes of which, have 
 been ambiguously called the Secondary qualities of matter. Now, by a law 
 of our nature, we are not conscious of the existence of our organism, conse- 
 quently not conscious of any of its primary qualities, unless when we are 
 conscious of it, as modified by a secondary quality, or some other of ite 
 affections, as an animated body. But the former consciousness requires the 
 latter only as its negative condition, and is neither involved in it as a part, 
 nor properly dependent on it as a cause. The object in the one conscious- 
 ness is also wholly different from the object in the other. In that, it is a con- 
 tingent passion of the organism, as a constituent of the human self; in 
 this, it is some essential property of the organism, as a portion of the uni- 
 verse of matter, and though apprehended by, not an affection proper to, the 
 conscious self at all. In these circumstances, the secondary quality, say a 
 color, whicli the mind apprehends in the organism, is, as a passion of self, 
 recognized to be a subjective object; whereas the primary quality, extension, 
 or figure, or number, which, when conscious of such affection, the mind 
 therein at the same time apprehends, is, as not a passion of self, but a com- 
 mon property of matter, recognized to be an objective object. (See par. 16-19, 
 with foot-note t, and par. 18, with foot-note %.)
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 381 
 
 17. In the Primary there is, thus, no concomitant Secondary 
 quality ; in the Secondary there is no concomitant primary qual- 
 ity ; in the Secundo-primary, a secondary and quasi-primary qual- 
 ity accompany each other. 
 
 18. In the apprehension of the Primary qualities the mind is 
 primarily and principally active; it feels only as it knows. In 
 that of the Secondary, the mind is primarily and principally pas- 
 sive ; it knows only as it feels.* In that of the Secundo-primary 
 
 * Thus in vision the secondary quality of color is, in the strictest sense, a 
 passive affection of the sentient ego ; and the only activity the mind can be 
 said to exert in the sensation of colors, is in the recognitive consciousness 
 that it is so and so affected. It thus knows as it feels, in knowing that it feels. 
 
 But the apprehension of extension, figure, divisibility, &c., which, under 
 condition of its being thus affected, simultaneously takes place, is, though 
 necessary, wholly active and purely spiritual ; inasmuch as extension, figure, 
 &c., are, directly and in their own nature, neither, subjectively considered, 
 passions of the animated sensory, nor, objectively considered, efficient qual- 
 ities in things by which such passion can be caused. The perception of parts 
 out of parts is not given in the mere affection of color, but is obtained by 
 a reaction of the mind upon such affection^Tt is merely the recognition of 
 a relation. But a relation is neither a passion nor a cause of passion ; and, 
 though apprehended through sense, is, in truth, an intellectual, not a sensi- 
 tive cognition ; unless under the name of sensitive cognition^we compre- 
 hend, as I think we ought, more than the mere recognition of an organic 
 passion. 1 The perception of Extension is not, therefore, the mere conscious- 
 ness of an affection a mere 'sensation. This is still more manifest in regard 
 to Figure, or extension bounded. Visual figure is an expanse of color 
 bounded in a certain manner by a line. Here all is nothing but relation. 
 ' Expanse of color' is only colored extension ; and extension, as stated, is only 
 the relation of parts out of parts. ' Bounded in a certain manner,' 1 is also 
 only the expression of various relations. A thing is 'bounded,' only as it 
 has a limited number of parts; but limited, number, and parts, are, all three, 
 relations : and, further, l in a certain manner' denotes that these parts stand 
 to each other in one relation and not in another. The perception of a thing 
 as bounded, and bounded in a certain manner, is thus only the recognition 
 of a thing under relations. Finally, ' by a line 1 still merely indicates a rela- 
 tion ; for a line is nothing but the negation of each other, by two intersect- 
 ing colors. Absolutely considered, it is a nothing; and so far from there 
 being any difficulty in conceiving a breadthless line, a line is, in fact, not a 
 line (but a narrow surface between two lines) if thought as possessed of 
 breadth. In such perceptions, therefore, if the mind can be said to feel, it 
 can be said to feel only in being conscious of itself as purely active ; that is, 
 aa spontaneously apprehensive of an object-object or mode of the non-ego, 
 
 i See the next chapter, i. W.
 
 382 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 the mind is equally and at once active and passive ; in one re- 
 spect, it feels as it knows, in another, it knows as it feels.* 
 
 and not of a subject-object or affection of the ego. (See par. 16-19, and rel- 
 ative foot-note t.) 
 
 The application of the preceding doctrine to the other primary qualities is 
 even more obtrusive. 
 
 To prevent misunderstanding, it may be observed, that in saying the mind 
 it active, not passive, in a cognition, I do not mean to say that the mind is free 
 to exert or not to exert the cognitive act, or even not to exert it in a deter- 
 minate manner. The mind energizes as it lives, and it cannot choose but live ; 
 it knows as it energizes, and it cannot choose but energize. An object being 
 duly presented, it is unable not to apprehend it, and apprehend it, both in it- 
 self, and in the relations under which it stands. We may evade the present- 
 ation, not the recognition of what is presented. 1 But of this again. 
 
 * This is apparent when it is considered that under the cognition of a 
 secundo-primary quality are comprehended both the apprehension of a sec- 
 ondary quality, i. e. the sensation of a subjective affection, and the appre- 
 hension of a quasi-primary quality, i. e. the perception of an objective force. 
 Take, for example, the Secundo-primary quality of Hardness. In the sen- 
 sitive apprehension of this we are aware of two facts. The first is the fact 
 of a certain affection, a certain feeling, in our sentient organism (Muscular 
 and Skin senses). This is the sensation, the apprehension of a feeling conse- 
 quent on the resistance of a body, and which in one of its special modifica- 
 tions constitutes Hardness, viewed as an affection in us ; a sensation which 
 we know, indeed, by experience to be the effect of the pressure of an un- 
 yielding body, but which we can easily conceive might be determined in us 
 independently of all internal movement, all external resistance ; while we 
 can still more easily conceive that such movement and resistance might be 
 apprehended independently of such concomitant sensation. Here, there- 
 fore, we know only as we feel, for here we only know, that is, are conscious 
 that we feel. The second is the fact of a certain opposition to the voluntary 
 movement of a limb to our locomotive energy. Of this energy we might 
 be conscious, without any consciousness of the state, or even the existence, 
 of the muscles set in motion ; and we might also be conscious of resistance 
 to ita exertion, though no organic feeling happened to be its effect. But as 
 it is, though conscious of the sensations connected both with the active state 
 of our muscular frame determined by its tension, and of the passive state in 
 our skin and flesh determined by external pressure ; still, over and above 
 these animal sensations, we are purely conscious of the fact, that the overt 
 exertion of our locomotive volition is, in a certain sort, impeded. This con- 
 sciousness is the perception, the objective apprehension, of resistance, which 
 in one of its special modifications constitutes Hardness, as an attribute of 
 body. In this cognition, if we can be said with any propriety to feel, we 
 can be said only to feel as we know, because we only feel, i. e. are conscious, 
 that we know. (See par. 18, foot-note t, and par. 25, first foot-note, Parti.) 
 
 See Cousin's History of Philosophy, second series, lecture xxv. W.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 383 
 
 19. Thus Perception and Activity are at the maximum in the 
 Primary qualities ; at the minimum in the Secondary ; Sensation 
 and Passivity are at the minimum in the Primary, at the maxi- 
 mum in the Secondary ; while, in the Secundo-primary, Percep- 
 tion and Sensation, Activity and Passivity, are in equipoise. 
 Thus too it is, that the most purely material phenomena are ap- 
 prehended in the most purely inorganic energy.* 
 
 * The doctrine of paragraphs 16-19 seems to have been intended by Aris- 
 toile (see above, page 314 b), in saying that the Common Sensibles (= the 
 Primary Qualities) are percepts concomitant or consequent on the sensation 
 of the Proper (= the Secondary Qualities), and on one occasion that the 
 Common Sensibles are, in a certain sort, only to be considered as apprehen- 
 sions of sense per accidens. For this may be interpreted to mean, that our 
 apprehension of the common sensibles is not, like that of the proper, the 
 mere consciousness of a subjective or sensorial passion, but, though only 
 exerted when such passion is determined, is in itself the spontaneous energy 
 of the mind in objective cognition. 
 
 Tending towards, though not reaching to, the same resiilt, might be ad- 
 duced many passages from the works of the Greek interpreters of Aristotle. 
 In particular, I would refer to the doctrine touching the Common Sensibles, 
 stated by Simplicius in his Commentary on the De Anima (L. ii. c. 6, f, 35 a, 
 L. iii. c. 1, f, 51 a, ed. Aid.), and by Priscianus Lydus, in his Metaphrase of 
 the Treatise of Theophrastus on Sense (pp. 274, 275, 285, ed. Basil. Theoph.) : 
 but (as already noticed) these books ought, I suspect, from strong internal 
 evidence, both to be assigned to Priscianus as their author ; while the doc- 
 trine itself is probably only that which lamblichus had delivered, in his lost 
 treatise upon the Soul. It is to this effect : The common sensibles might 
 appear not to be sensibles at all, or sensibles only per accidens, as making 
 no impression on the organ, and as objects analogous to, and apprehended 
 by, the understanding or rational mind alone. This extreme doctrine is not, 
 however, to be admitted. As sensibles, the common must be allowed to 
 act somehow upon the sense, though in a different manner from the proper. 
 Comparatively speaking, the proper act primarily, corporeally, and by caus- 
 ing a passion in the sense ; the common, secondarily, formally, and by elicit- 
 ing the sense and understanding to energy. But though there be, in the 
 proper more of passivity, in the common more of activity, still the common 
 are, in propriety, objects of sense per se ; being neither cognized (as sub- 
 stances) exclusively by the understanding, nor (as is the sweet by vision) 
 accidentally by sense. 
 
 A similar approximation may be detected in the doctrine of the more 
 modern Aristotelians. (See page 315 a.) Expressed in somewhat different 
 terms, it was long a celebrated controversy in the schools, whether a certain 
 class of objects, under which common sensibles were included, did or did 
 not modify the organic sense ; and if this they did, whether primarily and 
 of themselves, or only secondarily through their modification of the proper
 
 384 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 20. In the Primary, a sensation of organic affection is the 
 condition of perception, a mental apprehension ; in the Secundo- 
 primary, a sensation is the concomitant of the perception ; in the 
 Secondary, a sensation is the all in all which consciousness ap- 
 prehends. (See par. 10.) 
 
 21. In the Primary, the sensation, the condition of the percep- 
 tion, is not itself caused by the objective quality perceived ; in 
 
 sensiblcs, with which they were associated. Ultimately, it became the prev- 
 alent doctrine, that of Magnitude, Figure, Place, Position, Time, Relation in 
 general, &c., 'nullam esse cfficaciam vcl actionem :' that is, these do mt, 
 like the affective qualities (qualitatcs patibiles) or proper Benaiblcs, make 
 any real, any material impress on the sense ; but if they can be said to act 
 at all, act only, either, as some held, spiritually or intentionally, or as others, 
 by natural resultance (vel spiritualiter sivo intentioualiter, vel per naturalem 
 resnltantiam). See Tbletus, Comm. De Anima, L. ii. c. 6, qq. 14, 15 ; Za- 
 barella, Comm. De Anima, L. ii. Text. 65 ; De Eebus Naturalibus, p. 939 sq., 
 De Sensu Agcnte, cc. 4, 5 ; ffocUnius, Adversaria, q. 55 ; Suaree, Meta- 
 physicae Disputationes, disp. xviii. sec. 4 ; Scheibler, Metaphysica, L. ii. c. 
 5, art. 5, puuct. 1 ; De Anima, P. ii. disp. ii. 24 ; Liber Sententiarum, Ex. 
 vi. ax. 4, Ex. xii. ax. 10. 
 
 The same result seems, likewise, confirmed indirectly, by the doctrine of 
 those philosophers who, as Condillac in his earlier writings, Stewart, Brown, 
 Mill, J. Young, &c., hold that extension and color are only mutually con- 
 comitant in imagination, through the influence of inveterate association. 
 In itself, indeed, this doctrine I do not admit ; for it supposes that we could 
 possibly be conscious of color without extension, of extension without color. 
 Not the former; for we are only, as in sense, so in the imagination of sense, 
 aware of a minimum visible, as of a luminous or colored point, in contrast 
 to and out of a surrounding expanse of obscure or differently colored sur- 
 face ; and a visual object, larger than the minimum, is, ex hypothesi, pre- 
 sented, or represented, as extended. Not the latter; for, as I have already 
 observed, psychologically speaking, the sensation of color comprehends con- 
 tradictory opposites ; to wit, both the sensation of positive color, in many 
 modes, and the sensation of a privation of all color, in one. But of contra- 
 dictory predicates one or other must, by the logical law of excluded middle, 
 be attributed in thought to every object of thought. We cannot, therefore, 
 call up in imagination an extended object, without representing it either at 
 somehow positively colored (red, or green, or blue, &c.), or as negatively 
 colored (black). But though I reject this doctrine, I do not reject it as ab- 
 solutely destitute of truth. It is erroneous, I think ; but every error is a 
 truth abused ; and the abuse in this case seems to lie in the extreme recoil 
 from the counter error of the common opinion, that the apprehension 
 through sight of color, and the apprehension through sight of extension and 
 figure, are as inseparable, identical cognitions of identical objects. See Keid, 
 Inq. 145.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 385 
 
 the Secundo-primary, the concomitant sensation is the effect of 
 the objective quality perceived : in the Secondary, the sensation 
 is the effect of an objective quality supposed, but not perceived. 
 In other words : In the apprehension of the Primary, there is 
 no subject-object determined by the object-object ; in the Secun- 
 do-primary, there is a subject-object determined by the object- 
 object ; in the Secondary, a subject-object is the only object of 
 immediate cognition. 
 
 22. In the Primary, the sensation of the secondary quality, 
 which affords its condition to the perception of the primary, is 
 various and indefinite ;* in the Secundo-primary, the sensation 
 
 * The opinions so generally prevalent, that through touch, or touch and 
 muscular feeling, or touch and sight, or touch, muscular feeling, and sight, 
 that through these senses, exclusively, we are percipient of extension. 
 &c., I do not admit. On the contrary, I hold that all sensations whatsoever, 
 of which we are conscious, as one out of another, eo ipso, afford us the con- 
 dition of immediately and necessarily apprehending extension : for in the 
 consciousness itself of such reciprocal outness is actually involved a percep- 
 tion of difference of place in space, and consequently, of the extended. 
 Philosophers have confounded what supplies the condition of the more 
 prompt and precise perception of extension, with what supplies the condi- 
 tion of a perception of extension at all. 
 
 And be it observed, that it makes no essential difference in this doctrine, 
 whether the mind be supposed proximately conscious of the reciprocal out- 
 ness of the sensations at the central extremity of the nerves, in an extended 
 sensorium commune, where each distinct nervous filament has its separate , 
 locality, or at the peripheral extremity of the nerves, in the places them- 
 selves where sensations are excited, and to which they are referred. From 
 many pathological phenomena the former alternative might appear the more 
 probable. In this view, each several nerve, or rather, each several nervous 
 filament (for every such filament has its peculiar function, and runs isolated 
 from every other), is to be regarded merely as one sentient point ; which 
 yields one indivisible sensation, out of and distinct from that of every other, 
 by the side of which it is arranged ; and not as a sentient line, each point 
 of which, throughout its course, has for itself a separate local sensibility. 
 For a stimulus applied to any intermediate part of a nerve, is felt not as 
 there, but as if applied to its peripheral extremity ; a feeling which continues 
 when that extremity itself, nay, when any portion of the nerve, however 
 great, has been long cut off. Thus it is that a whole line of nerve affords, at 
 all its points, only the sensation of one determinate point. One point, there- 
 fore, physiologically speaking, it is to be considered. (See Plutarch, De 
 Plac. Philos. L. iv. c. 23 ; Nemesius, De Horn. c. 8 ; Fabriclua Ifildanus, 
 Obs. Cent. iii. obs. 15 ; Descartes, Princ. P. iv. 196 \-Blancard, Coll. Med. 
 
 17
 
 386 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 of the secondary quality, which accompanies the perception of 
 the quasi primary, is under the same circumstances, uniform and 
 definite ; in the Secondary, the sensation is itself definite, but its 
 
 Phys. cent. vii. obs. 15 : Stuart, De Motu Muse. c. 5 ; Kaau Boerhaaw, 
 Imp. fac. 368 sq. ; Sir Ch. Bell, Idea, &c. p. 12 ; The Hand, p. 159 ; Ma- 
 yendie, Journ. t. v. p. 88 ; Mueller, Phys. pp. 692-696, Engl. tr.) 
 
 Take for instance a man whose leg has been amputated. If now two nerv- 
 ous filaments be irritated, the one of which ran to his great, the other to his 
 little toe he will experience two pains, as in these two members. Nor is 
 there, in propriety, any deception in such sensations. For his toes, as all 
 his members, arc his only as they are to him sentient ; and they are only 
 sentient and distinctly sentient, as endowed with nerves and distinct nerves. 
 The nerves thus constitute alone the whole sentient organism. In these 
 circumstances, the peculiar nerves of the several toes, running isolated from 
 centre to periphery, and thus remaining, though curtailed in length, unmu- 
 tilated in function, will, if irritated at any point, continue to manifest their 
 original sensations ; and these being now, as heretofore, manifested out of 
 each other, must afford the condition of a perceived extension, not less real 
 than that which they afforded prior to the amputation. 
 
 The hypothesis of an extended sensorium commune, or complex nervous 
 centre, the mind being supposed in proximate connection with each of its 
 constituent nervous terminations or origins, may thus be reconciled to the 
 doctrine of natural realism ; and therefore what was said at page 276 a, No. 
 2, and relative places, with reference to a sensorium of a different character, 
 is to be qualified in conformity to the present supposition. 
 
 It is, however, I think, more philosophical, to consider the nervous sys- 
 tem as one whole, with each part of which the animating principle is equal- 
 ly and immediately connected, so long as each part remains in continuity 
 with, the centre. To this opinion may be reduced the doctrine of Aristotle, 
 that the soul contains the body, rather than the body the soul (De An. L. 5. 
 c. 9, 4) a doctrine on which was founded the common dogma of the 
 Schools, that the Soul is all in the whole body, and all in every of its parts, 
 meaning, thereby, that the simple, unextended mind, in some inconceivable 
 manner, present to all the organs, is percipient of the peculiar affection 
 which each is adapted to receive, and actuates each in the peculiar function 
 which it is qualified to discharge. See also St. Gregory of Nyssa (De Horn. 
 Opif. cc. 12, 14, 15), the oldest philosopher I recollect by whom, this dogm; 
 is explicitly enounced. Compare Galen, De Sympt. Causis. L. ii. c. 01 
 modern authorities to the same result, are Perrault (Du Mouv. dee Yeux, p. 
 591, and Du Toucher, p. 531) ; Tabor (Tract, iii. c. 3) ; Stuart (De Motu 
 Muse. c. 5); Leidenfrost (De Mente Humana, c. iii. 11, 14, 15); Tiede- 
 mann (Psychologic, p. 809, sq.) ; Berard, (Rapports &c. ch. i. 2) ; JS. G. 
 Carus (Vorles ueb. Psychologic, passim) ; Urnbreit (Psychologic, c. 1, and 
 Beilage, passim) ; F. FUclter (Ueb. d. Sitz d. Seele, passim, and Psychologic, 
 c. 4). The two last seem to think that their opinion on this matter is some- 
 thing new ? Bosmini also maintains the same doctrine, but as I have not
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 387 
 
 exciting cause, the supposed quality in bodies, various and indefi- 
 nite. (See p. 374 b 376 a.) 
 
 23. The Primary and Secondary qualities are, in this relation, 
 
 yet obtained his relative works, I am unable to refer to them articulately. 
 See Bibl. Univ. de Geneve, No. 76, June, 1842, p. 241 sq. 
 
 As to the question of materialism this doctrine is indifferent. For the 
 connection of an unextended with an extended substance is equally incom- 
 prehensible, whether we contract the place of union to a central point, or 
 whether we leave it coextensive with organization. 
 
 The causes why the sensations of different parts of the nervous apparatus 
 vary so greatly from each other in supplying the conditions of a perception of 
 extension, &c., seem to me comprehended in two general facts, the one con- 
 stituting a physiological, the other a psychological, law of perception ; iawa, 
 neither of which, however, has yet obtained from philosophers the consid- 
 eration which it merits. 
 
 The Physiological law is That a nervom point yields a sensation felt as lo- 
 cally distinct, in proportion, as it is isolated in its action from any othw. Phys- 
 iological experiment has not yet been, and probably never may be, able to 
 prove anatomically the truth of this law which I have here ventured to 
 enounce ; physiologists indeed, seem hitherto to have wholly neglected the 
 distinction. So far, however, is it from being opposed to physiological 
 observation, it may appeal in its confirmation to the analogy of all the facts to 
 which such observation reaches (see par 25, first note, III.) ; while the psycho- 
 logical phenomena are such as almost to necessitate its admission. To say 
 nothing of the ganglionic fusions, which are now disproved, the softness and 
 colliqueseeiice of the olfactory nerves and nervous expansion, for example, 
 correspond with the impossibility we experience, in sinell, of distinctly ap- 
 prehending one part of the excited organism as out of another ; while the mar- 
 vellous power we have of doing this in vision, seems, by every more minute 
 investigation of the organic structure, more clearly to depend upon the iso- 
 lation, peculiar arrangement, and tenuity of the primary fibrils of the retina 
 and optic nerve ; though microscopical anatomy, it must be confessed, has 
 not as yet been able to exhibit any nervous element so inconceivably small 
 as is the minimum visibile. Besides the older experiments of Porterfield, 
 Haller, &c., see Treviranus, Beytraege, 1835, p. 63 sq. ; Volkmann, Neue 
 Beytraege, 1836, pp. 61 sq., 197 sq. ; Mueller, Phys. 1838, pp. 1073 sq., 1121 
 sq. Engl. tr. ; also Boer, Anthropologie, 1824, 153. Of Touch and Feel- 
 ing I am to speak immediately. 
 
 And here I may say a word in relation to a difficulty which has perplexed 
 physiologists, and to which no solution, I am aware of, has been attempted. 
 The retina, as first shown by Treviranus, is a pavement of perpendicular 
 rods terminating in papillas ; a constitution which may be roughly repre- 
 sented to imagination by the bristles of a thick-set brush. The retina is, 
 however, only the terminal expansion of the optic nerve ; and the rods 
 which make up its area, after bending behind to an acute angle, run back as 
 the constituent, but isolated fibrils of that nerve, to their origin in the brain.
 
 388 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 simple and self-discriminated. For in the perception of a prima- 
 ry, there is involved no sensation of a secondary with which it 
 can be mixed up ; while in the sensation of a secondary there is 
 
 On the wmnllcr size of the papillae and fibrils of the optic nerve, principally 
 depends, as already stated, the greater power we possess, in the eye, of dis- 
 criminating one sensation as out of another, consequently of apprehending 
 extension, figure, &c. But here the difficulty arises : Microscopic observa- 
 tions on the structure of the retina give the diameter of the papillae, as uhont 
 the eight or nine thousandth part of an inch. Optical experiments, again, 
 on the ultimate capacity of vision, show that a longitudinal object (as a hair), 
 viewed at such a distance that its breadth, as reflected to the retina, is not 
 more than the six hundred thousandth or millionth of an inch, is distinctly 
 visible to a good eye. Now there is here 1, a great discrepancy between 
 the superficial extent of the apparent ultimate fibrils of the retina, and the 
 extent of the image impressed on the retina by the impinging rays of light, 
 the one being above a hundred times greater than the other ; and, 2, it is 
 impossible to conceive the existence of distinct fibrils so minute as would be 
 required to propagate the impression, if the breadth of the part affected 
 were actually no greater than the breadth of light reflected from the object 
 to the retina. To me the difficulty seems soluble if we suppose, 1, that the 
 ultimate fibrils and papilla} are, in fact, the ultimate units or minima of sen- 
 sation ; and, 2, that a stimulus of light, though applied only to part of a 
 papilla, idiopnthically affects the whole. This theory is confirmed by the 
 analogy of the nerves of feeling, to which I shall soon allude. The objec- 
 tions to which it is exposed I see; but I think that they may easily be an- 
 swered. On the discussion of the point I cannot however enter. 
 
 The Psychological law is Tliat though a perception be only possible under 
 condition of a sensation .; still, that above a certain limit the more intense tht 
 sensation or subjective consciousness, the more indistinct tlie perception or object- 
 ive consciousness. 
 
 On this, which is a special case of a still higher law, I have already inci- 
 dentally spoken, and shall again have occasion to speak. 1 
 
 1. That we are only conscious of the existence of our organism as a phys- 
 ical body, under our consciousness of its existence as an animal body, and 
 are only conscious of its existence as an animal body under our conscious- 
 ness of it as somehow or other sensitively affected. 
 
 2 . That though the sensation of our organism as animally affected, is, as 
 it were, the light by which it is exhibited to onr perception as a physically 
 extended body ; still, if the affection be too strong, the pain or pleasure too 
 intense, the light blinds by its very splendor, and the perception is lost in 
 the sensation. Accordingly, if we take a survey of the senses, we shall find, 
 that exactly in proportion as each affords an idiopathic sensation more or less 
 capable of being carried to an extreme either of pleasure or of pain, does it 
 afford, but in an inverse ratio, the condition of,an objective perception more 
 or less distinct. In the senses of Sight and Hearing, as contrasted with those 
 
 ' See the next chapter. W.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PEPvCKPTION. 389 
 
 no perception of a primary at all. Thus prominent in themselves, 
 and prominently contrasted as mutual extremes, neither class can 
 be overlooked, neither class can be confounded with the other. 
 
 of Taste and Smell, the counter-proportions are precise and manifest ; and 
 precisely as in animals these latter senses gain in their objective character 
 as means of knowledge, do they lose in their subjective character as sources 
 of pleasurable or painful sensations. To a dog, for instance, in whom the 
 sense of smell is so acute, all odors seem, in themselves, to be indifferent. In 
 Touch or Feeling the same analogy holds good, and within itself; for in this 
 case, where the sense is diffused throughout the body, the subjective and ob- 
 jective vary in their proportions at different parts. The parts most subject- 
 ively sensible, those chiefly susceptible of pain and pleasure, furnish precisely 
 the obtuscst organs of touch ; and the acutest organs of touch do not possess, 
 if ever even that, more than an average amount of subjective sensibility. I 
 am disposed, indeed, from the analogy of the other senses, to surmise, that the 
 nerves of touch proper (the more objective) and of feeling proper (the more 
 subjective) are distinct; and distributed in various proportions to different 
 parts of the body. I should also surmise, that the ultimate fibrils of the former 
 run in isolated action from periphery to centre, while the ultimate fibrils of the 
 latter may, to a certain extent, be confounded with each other at their terminal 
 expansion in the skin; so that for this reason, likewise, they do not, as the 
 former, supply to consciousness an opportunity of so precisely discriminating 
 the reciprocal outness of their sensations. The experiments of Weber have 
 shown, how differently in degree different parts of the skin possess the power 
 of touch proper; this power, as measured by the smallness of the interval at 
 which the blunted points of a pair of compasses, brought into contact with the 
 skin, can be discriminated as double, varying from the twentieth of an En- 
 glish inch ut the tip of the tongue, and a tenth on the volar surface of the 
 third finger, to two inches and a half over the greater part of the neck, back, 
 arms, and thighs. (De Pulsu, &c., p. 44-81, in particular, p. 58. An ab- 
 stract, not altogether accurate, is given by Mueller, Phys. p. 700). If these 
 experiments be repeated- with a pair of compasses not very obtuse, and ca- 
 pable, therefore, by a slight pressure, of exciting a sensation in the skin, it 
 will be found, that while Weber's observations, as to the remarkable differ- 
 ence of the different parts in the power of tactile discrimination, are correct ; 
 that, at the same time, what he did not observe, there is no corresponding 
 difference between the parts in their sensibility to superficial pricking, 
 scratching, &c. On the contrary, it will be found that, in the places where 
 objectively, touch is most alive, subjectively feeling is, in the first instance 
 at least, in some degree deadened ; and that the parts the most obtuse in 
 discriminating the duplicity of the touching points, are by no means the 
 least acute to the sensations excited by their pressure. 
 
 For example ; the tip of the tongue has fifty, the interior surface of the 
 third finger twenty-fine, times the tactile discrimination of the arm. But it 
 will be found, on trial, that the arm is more sensitive to a sharp point ap- 
 plied, but not strongly, to the skin, than either the tongue or the finger,
 
 390 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 The Secundo-primary qualities, on the contrary, are, at once, 
 complex and confusive. For, on the one hand, as perceptions 
 approximating to the primary, on the other, as sensations identi- 
 
 and (depilated of course) at least as alive to the presence of a very light body, 
 an a hair, a thread, a feather, drawn along the surface. In the several places 
 the phenomena thus vary : In those parts where touch proper prevails, a 
 subacute point, lightly pressed upon the skin, determines a sensation of 
 which we can hardly predicate either pain or pleasure, and nearly limited 
 to the place on which the pressure is made. Accordingly, when two such 
 points are thus, at the same time, pressed upon the skin, we are conscious 
 of two distinct impressions, even when the pressing points approximate 
 pretty closely to each other. In those parts, on the other hand, where feel 
 ing proper prevails, a subacute point, lightly pressed upon the skin, deter- 
 mines a sensation which we can hardly call indifferent; and which radiates, 
 to a variable extent, from the place on which the pressure is applied. Ac- 
 cordingly, when two such points are thus, at the same time, pressed upon 
 the skin, we arc not conscious of two distinct impressions, unless the pres- 
 sing points are at a considerable distance from each other; the two impres- 
 sions, running, as it were, together and thus constituting one indivisible 
 sensation. The discriminated sensations in the one case, depend manifest- 
 ly on the discriminated action, through the isolated and unexpandcd termi- 
 nation of the nervous fibrils of touch proper; and the indistinguishable sen- 
 sation in the other, will, I have no doubt, be ultimately found by microsco- 
 pic anatomy to depend, in like manner, on the nervous fibrils of feeling 
 proper being, as it were, fused or interlaced together at their termination, or 
 rather, perhaps, on each ultimate fibril, each primary sentient unit being 
 expanded through a considerable extent of skin. The supposition of such 
 expansion seems, indeed, to be necessitated by these three facts : 1", that 
 every point of the skin is sensible ; 2, that no point of the skin is sensible 
 except through the distribution to it of nervous substance ; and, 3, that the 
 ultimate fibrils, those minima, at least, into which anatomists have, as yet, 
 been able to analyze the nerves, are too large, and withal too few, to carry 
 sensation to each cutaneous point, unless by un attenuation and diffusion of 
 the finest kind. Within this superficial sphere of cutaneous apprehension, 
 the objective and subjective, perception and sensation, touch proper and 
 feeling proper, are thus always found to each other in an inverse ratio. 
 
 But take the same places, and puncture deeply. Then, indeed, the sense 
 of pain will be found to be intenser in the tongue and finger than in the 
 arm ; for the tongue and finger are endowed with comparatively more nu- 
 merous nerves, and consequently with a more concentrated sensibility, than 
 the arm ; though these may either, if different, lie beneath the termination 
 of the nerves of touch, or, if the same, commence their energy as feeling 
 only at the pitch where their energy as touch concludes. lie this, however, 
 as it may, it will be always found, that in proportion as the internal feeling 
 of a part becomes excited, is it incapacitated for the time, as an organ of ex- 
 ternal touch.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 391 
 
 fied with the secondary, they may, if not altogether overlooked, 
 lightly be, as they have always hitherto been, confounded with 
 the one or with the other of these classes. (See pp. 361 b, 363 a.) 
 
 24. In the same relation a Primary or a Secondary quality, 
 as simple, has its term univocal. A Secundo-primary, on the 
 contrary, being complex, its term, as one, is necessarily equivocal. 
 For, viewed on one side, it is the modification of a primary ; on 
 the other, it is, in reality, simply a secondary quality. (How, in 
 a more general point of view, the Secondary qualities are no less 
 complex, and their terms no less ambiguous than the Secundo- 
 primary, see par. 6.) 
 
 25. All the senses, simply or in combination, afford conditions 
 for the perception of the Primary qualities (par. 22, note) ; and 
 all, of course, supply the sensations themselves of the Secondary. 
 As only various modifications of resistance, the Secundo-primary 
 qualities are all, as percepts proper, as quasi-primary qualities, ap- 
 prehended through the locomotive faculty,* and our conscious- 
 
 I do not therefore assert, without a qualification, that touch and feeling 
 are everywhere manifested in an inverse ratio ; for both together may be 
 higher, both together may be lower, in one place than another. But whilst I 
 diffidently hold that they are dependent upon different conditions that the 
 capacity of pain and pleasure, and the power of tactual discrimination, which 
 a part possesses, are not the result of the same nervous fibres ; I maintain, 
 with confidence, that these senses never, in any part, coexist in exercise in 
 any high degree, and that wherever the one rises to excess, there the other 
 will be found to sink to a corresponding deficiency. 
 
 In saying, in the present note, that touch is more objective than feeling, I 
 am not to be supposed to mean, that touch is, in itself, aught but a subject- 
 ive affection a feeling a sensation. Touch proper is here styled objective, 
 iiot absolutely, but only in contrast and in comparison to feeling proper; 1, 
 inasmuch as it affords in the cycle of its own phenomena a greater amount of 
 information ; 2, as it affords more frequent occasions of perception or objec- 
 tive apprehension ; and, 3, as it is feebly, if at all, characterized by the sub- 
 jective affections of pain and pleasure. 
 
 * I. On the Locomotive Faculty and Muscular Sen#e, in relation, to Percep- 
 tion. I say that the Secundo-primnry qualities, in their quasi-primary pha- 
 is, are apprehended through the locomotive faculty, and not the muscular 
 sense; for it is impossible that the state of muscular feeling can enable us to 
 be immediately cognizant of the existence and degree of a resisting force. On 
 the contrary, supposing all muscular feeling abolished, the power of mov- 
 ing the muscles at will remaining, however, entire, I hold (as will anon be
 
 392 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 nesft of its energy ; as sensations, as secondary qualities, they are 
 apprehended as modifications of touch proper, and of cutaneous 
 and muscular feeling.* 
 
 shown) that the consciousness of the mental motive energy, and of the 
 greater or less intensity of such energy requisite, in different circumstances, 
 to accomplish our intention, would of itself enable us always to perceive the 
 fact, and in some degree to measure the amount, of any resistance to our 
 voluntary movements ; howbeit the concomitance of certain feeling's with 
 the different states of muscular tension, renders this cognition not only 
 easier, but, in fact, obtrudes it upon our attention. Scaligcr, therefore, in re- 
 ferring the apprehension of weight, &c., to the locomotive faculty, is, in my 
 opinion, far more correct than recent philosophers, in referring .it to the 
 muscular sense. (See II. of this foot-note.) 
 
 We have here to distinguish three things : 
 
 1. The still immanent or purely mental act of will : what for distinction's 
 sake I would call the Jiyperorganic volition to move ; the actio tliclta of the 
 schools. Of this volition we are conscious, even though it do not go out 
 into overt action. 
 
 2. If this volition become transeunt, be carried into effect, it passes into 
 the mental effort or nisns to move. This I would call the enorganic volition, 
 or, by an extension of the scholastic language, the actio imperans. Of this 
 we are immediately conscious. For we are conscious of it, though by a nar- 
 cosis or stupor of the sensitive nerves we lose all feeling of the movement 
 of the limb; though by a paralysis of the motive nerves, no movement in 
 the limb follows the mental effort to move ; though by an abnormal stimu- 
 lus of the muscular fibres, a contraction in them is caused even in opposi- 
 tion to our will. 
 
 8. Determined by the enorganic volition, the cerebral influence is trans- 
 mitted by the motive nerves ; the muscles contract or endeavor to contract, 
 so that the limb moves or endeavors to move. This motion or effort to move 
 I would call the organic movement, the organic nisux ; by a limitation of the 
 scholastic term, it might be denominated the act'w imperata. 
 
 It might seem at first sight, 1, that the organic movement is immediate- 
 ly determined by the enorganic volition ; and, 2, that we are immediately 
 conscious of the organic nisus in itself. But neither is the case. Not the 
 former: for even if we identify the contraction of the muscles and the overt 
 movement of the limb, this is only the mediate result of the enorganic voli- 
 tion, through the action of the nervous influence transmitted from the brain. 
 The mind, therefore, exerts its effort to move, proximatcly in determining 
 this transmission ; but we are unconscious not only of the mode in which 
 this operation is performed, but even of the operation itself. Not the lat- 
 ter : for all muscular contraction is dependent on the agency of one set of 
 nerves, all feeling of muscular contraction on another. Thus, from the ex- 
 clusive paralysis of the former, or the exclusive stupor of the latter, the one 
 function may remain entire, while the other is abolished ; and it is only be- 
 cause certain muscular feelings are normally, though contingently, associated 
 with the different muscular states, that, independently of the consciousness
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 393 
 
 b) As in Thought ; as in relation to Intellect. 
 
 26. As modes of matter, the Primary qualities are thought as 
 necessary and universal ; the Secundo-primary, as contingent and 
 common ; the Secondaiy, as contingent and peculiar. 
 
 of the enorganic volition, we are indirectly made aware of the various de- 
 grees of the organic nisus exerted in our different members.* But though 
 indirect, the information thus forced upon us is not the less valuable. By 
 the associated sensations our attention is kept alive to the state of our mus- 
 cular movements ; by them we are enabled to graduate with the requisite 
 accuracy the amount of organic eifort, and to expend in each movement pre- 
 cisely the quantum necessary to accomplish its purpose. Sir Charles Bell 
 records the case of a mother who, while nursing her infant, was affected with 
 paralysis or loss of muscular motion on one side of her body, and by stupor 
 or loss of sensibility on the other. With the arm capable of movement she 
 could hold her child to her bosom ; and this she continued to do so long as 
 her attention remained fixed upon the infant. But if surrounding objects 
 withdrew her observation, there being no admonitory sensation, the flexor 
 muscles of the arm gradually relaxed, and the child was in danger of falling. 
 (The Hand, p. 204.) 
 
 These distinctions in the process of voluntary motion, especially the two 
 last (for the first and second may be viewed as virtually the same), are of 
 importance to illustrate the double nature of the secundo-primary qualities, 
 each of which is, in fact, the aggregate of an objective or quasi-primary qual- 
 ity, apprehended in a perception, and of a secondary or subjective quality 
 caused by the other, apprehended in a sensation. Each of these qualities, 
 each of these cognitions, appertains to a diiferent part of the motive process. 
 The quasi-primary quality and its perception, depending on the enorganic 
 volition and the nerves of motion; the secondary quality and its sensation, 
 depending on the organic nisus and the nerves of sensibility. 
 
 * I must here notice an error of inference, which runs through the experiments by 
 Professor Weber of Leipsic, in regard to the shares which the sense of touch proper 
 and the consciousness of muscular effort have in the estimation of weight, as detailed 
 in his valuable ' Annotationes de Pulsu, Resorptione, Audita etTactu,' 1S34, pp. 81-113, 
 1.34, 159-161. Weight he supposes to be tested by the Touch alone, when objects are 
 laid upon the hand, reposing, say, on a pillow. Here there appears to me a very palpa- 
 ble mistake. For without denying that different weights, up to a certain point, produce 
 dift'erent sensations on the nerves of touch and feeling, and that consequently an expe- 
 rience of the difference of such sensation may help us to an inference of a difference of 
 weight; it is manifest, that if a body be laid upon a muscular part, that we estimate its 
 weight proximately and principally by the amount of lateral pressure on the muscles, 
 and this pressure itself, by the difficulty we find in lifting the body, however imper- 
 ceptibly, by a contraction or bellying out of the muscular fibres. When superincum- 
 bent bodies, however different in weight, are all still so heavy as to render this contrac- 
 tion almost or altogether impossible ; it will be found, that our power of measuring 
 their comparative weights becomes, in the one case feeble and fallacious, in the other 
 null. 
 
 17*
 
 394 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 27. Thought as necessary, and immediately apprehended as 
 actual, modes of matter, we conceive the Primary qualities in 
 what they objectively are. The Secundo-primary, thought in 
 
 The quasi-primary quality is, always, simply a resistance to our enorganic' 
 volition, as realized in a muscular effort. But, be it remembered, there may 
 be muscular effort, even if a body weighs or is pressed upon a part of our 
 muscular frame apparently at rest. (See foot-note * of page 293.) And how 
 is the resistance perceived ? I have frequently asserted, that in perception 
 we are conscious of the external object immediately and in itself. This is 
 the doctrine of Natural Realism. But in saying that a thing is known in 
 itself, I do not mean that this object is known in its absolute existence, that 
 is, out of relation to us. This is impossible; for our knowledge is only of 
 the relative. To know a thing in itself or immediately, is an expression I 
 use merely in contrast to the knowledge of a tiling in a representation, or 
 mediately. 1 On this doctrine an external quality is said to be known in it- 
 self, when it is known as the immediate and necessary correlative of an in- 
 ternal quality of which I am conscious. Tims, when I am conscious of the 
 exertion of an enorganic volition to move, and aware that the muscles are 
 obedient to my will, but at the same time aware that my limb is arrested in 
 ito motion by some external impediment ; in this case I cannot be conscious 
 of myself as the resisted relative without at the same time being conscious, 
 being immediately percipient, of a not-self as the resisting correlative. In 
 this cognition there is no sensation, no subjectivo-organic affection. I sim- 
 ply know myself as a force in energy, the not-self as a counter force in ener- 
 gy. So much for the quasi-primary quality, as dependent on the enorganic 
 volition. 
 
 But though such pure perception may be detected in the simple appre- 
 hension of resistance, in reality it does not stand alone ; for it is always ac- 
 companied by sensations, of which the muscular nisus or quiescence, on the 
 one hand, and the resisting, the pressing body, on the other, are the causes. 
 Of these sensations, the former, to wit, the feelings connected with the states 
 of tension and relaxation, lie wholly in the muscles, and belong to what lias 
 sometimes been distinguished as the muscular sense. The latter, to wit the 
 sensations determined by the foreign pressure, lie partly in the skin, and 
 belong to the sense of touch proper and cutaneous feeling, partly in the flesh, 
 and belonging to the muscular sense. These affections, sometimes pleasur- 
 able, sometimes painful, are, in either case, merely modifications of the sen- 
 sitive nerves distributed to the muscles and to the skin ; and, as manifested 
 to us, constitute the secondary quality, the sensation of which accompanies 
 the perception of every sccundo-primary. 
 
 Although the preceding doctrine coincide, in result, with that which M. 
 Maine de Biran, after a hint by Locke, has so ably developed, more espe- 
 cially in his ' Nouvelles Considerations sur les Rapports du Physique et du 
 Moral de 1'Homme ;' I find it impossible to go along with his illustrious ed- 
 
 I See chapter ii. above. W.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 395 
 
 their objective phasis, as modifications of the Primary, and, in 
 both their objective and subjective phases, immediately appre- 
 hended, we conceive them in what they objectively, as well as in 
 
 itor, M. Cousin (p. xxv. of Preface), in thinking that his examination of 
 Hume's reasoning against the deduction of our notion of Power from the 
 consciousness of efficacy in the voluntary movement of our muscles, 'leaves 
 nothing to desire, and nothing to reply.' On the contrary, though always 
 dissenting with diffidence from M. Cousin, I confess it does not seem to me, 
 that in any of his seven assaults on Hume, has De Biran grappled with the 
 most formidable objections of the great skeptic. The second, third, and sev- 
 enth, of Hume's arguments, as stated and criticised by Biran, are not pro- 
 posed, as arguments, by Hume at all ; and the fourth and fifth in Biran's 
 array constitute only a single reasoning in Hume's. Of the three arguments 
 which remain, the first and sixth in Biran's enumeration are the most im- 
 portant. But, under thejirst, the examples alleged by Hume, from cases of 
 sudden palsy, Biran silently passes by; yet these present by far the most 
 perplexing difficulties for his doctrine of conscious efficacy. In another and 
 subsequent work (Eeponses, &c., p. 386) he, indeed, incidentally considers 
 this objection, referring us back for its regular refutation to the strictures on 
 Hume, where, however, as stated, no such refutation is to be found. Nor 
 does he in this latter treatise relieve the difficulty. For as regards the argu- 
 ment from our non-consciousness of loss of power, prior to an actual attempt 
 to move, as shown in the case of paralysis supervening during sleep, this, 
 it seems to me, can only be answered from the fact, that we are never con- 
 scious of force, as unexerted or in potentia (for the ambiguous term power, 
 unfortunately after Locke employed by Hume in the discussion, is there 
 equivalent to force, vis, and not to mere potentiality as opposed to actuality), 
 but only of force, as in actu or exerted. For in this case, we never can pos- 
 sibly be conscious of the absence of a force, previously to the effort made to 
 put it forth. The purport of the sixth argument is not given, as Hume, not- 
 withstanding the usual want of precision in his language, certainly intended 
 it ; which was to this effect : Volition to move a limb, and the actual 
 moving of it, are the first and last in a series of more than two successive 
 events ; and cannot, therefore, stand to each other, immediately, in the re- 
 lation of cause and effect. They may, however, stand to each other in the 
 relation of cause and effect, mediately. But, then, if they can be known in 
 consciousness as thus mediately related, it is a necessary condition of such 
 knowledge, that the intervening series of causes and effects, through which 
 the final movement of the limb is supposed to be mediately dependent on 
 the primary volition to move, should be known to consciousness immediate- 
 ly under that relation. But this intermediate, this connecting series is, con- 
 fessedly, unknown to consciousness at all, far less as a series of causes and 
 effects. It follows therefore, a fortiori, that the dependency of the last on 
 the first of these events, as of an effect upon its cause, must be to conscious- 
 ness unknown. In other words : having no consciousness that the volition 
 10 move is the efficucious force (power) by which even the event immediately
 
 396 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 what they subjectively are. The Secondary being neither 
 thought as necessary, nor immediately apprehended in their ex- 
 ternal reality, we conceive adequately what they are in their 
 
 consequent on it (say the transmission of the nervous influence from bruin 
 to muscle) is produced, such event being in fuct itself to consciousness oc- 
 cult ; inulto minus can we have a consciousness of that volition being the 
 efficacious force, by which the ultimate movement of the limb is mediately 
 determined ? This is certainly the argument which Hume intended, and as 
 a refutation of the doctrine, that in our voluntary movements at least, we 
 have an apprehension of the causal nexus between the mental volition as 
 cause and the corporeal movement as effect, it seems to me unanswerable. 
 But as stated, and easily refuted, by De Biran, it is only tantamount to the 
 reasoning That as we arc not conscious how we move a limb, we cannot be 
 conscious of the feeling that we do exert a motive force. But such a feeling 
 of force, action, energy, Hume did not deny. 
 
 II. Historical notices touching the recognition of tht. Locomotive FafuU'j 
 its a medium of perception, and of the Muscular Sense. That the recognition 
 of the Locomotive Faculty, or rather, the recognition of the Muscular Sense 
 as a medium of apprehension, is of a recent date, and by psychologists of this 
 country, is an opinion in both respects erroneous. As far as I am aware, this 
 distinction was originally taken by two Italian Aristotelians, some three 
 centuries ago ; and when the observation was again forgotten, both France 
 and Germany are before Scotland in the merit of its modern revival. 
 
 It was first promulgated by Julius Caesar Scaliger about the middle of the 
 sixteenth century (1557). Aristotle, followed by philosophers in general, had 
 referred the perception of weight (the heavy and light) to the sense of 
 Touch ; though, in truth, under Touch, Aristotle seems to have compre- 
 hended both the Skin and Muscular senses. See Hist. An. i. 4. De Part. 
 An. ii. 1. 10. De Anima, ii. 11. On this particular doctrine, Scaliger, inter 
 alia, observes : ' Et sane sic videtur. Namque gravitas et levitas tangendo de- 
 prchenditur. Ac nemo est, qui non putet, attrectatione sese cognoscere gra- 
 vitatem et levitatem. Mihi tamen baud persuadetur. Tactu motum depre- 
 hcndi fateor, gravitatem nego. Est autem maximum argumentum hoc. 
 (iravitas est objectum motivse potestatis : cui sane competit aclio. At tactus 
 non fit, nisi patiendo. Gravitas ergo percipitur a motiva potestate, non a 
 tactu. Nam duo cum Bint instrumenta (de nervis atque spiritibus loquor), 
 ad senstim et ob motum, a se invicem distincta : male confunderernus, quod 
 est motricis objectum, cum objecto motae. Movetur enim tactus, non itgit. 
 Motrix autem inovet grave corpus, non autem movetur ab eo. Idque mani- 
 testum est in paralysi. Sentitur calor, non sentitur gravitas Motrici namque 
 instrumenta sublata sunt. An vero sentitur gravitas ? Sentitnr quidem a 
 motrice, atque ab ea judicalur : quemadmodum difficile quippiam enunciatu 
 [enunciatur ?] ab ipsa intellectus vi : qua? tauien agit, non patitur, cum enun- 
 ciat. Est enim omnibus commune rebus nostratibus hisce, quse pendent a 
 materia: ut agendo patiantur. Poterit aliquid objici de compressione. Nam 
 etc. ...Sunt pneterea duae rationes. Quando et sine tactu sentimus gravita-
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 397 
 
 subjective effects, but inadequately what they are as objective 
 causes. 
 
 28. Our conceptions of the Primary are clear and distinct ; of 
 
 tern, et quia tactu non sentimus. Nempe cuipiam gravi corpori manus im- 
 poslta contingit illud : at non sentitgravitatem. Sine tactu, vero, virtus motrix 
 sentiet. Appensum filo plumbum grave sentitur. Manus tamen filum, non 
 plumbum tanget. Deinde hoc. Brachium suo pondere cum deorsum fertur, 
 sentitur grave. At nihil tangit.' (De Subtilitate, contra Cardanum, ex. 109.) 
 
 It should, however, be noticed, that Scaliger may have taken the hint for 
 the discrimination of this and another sense, from Cardan. This philosopher 
 makes Tonch fourfold. One sense apprehending the four primary qualities, 
 the Hot and Cold, the Dry and Humid ; a second the Pleasurable and Pain- 
 ful ; a third the Venereal sensations ; a fourth the Heavy and Light. (De 
 Subtilitate, L. xiii.) 
 
 This doctrine did not excite the attention it deserved. It was even redar- 
 gued by Scaliger's admiring expositor Goclenius. (Adversaria, p. 75-89) ; nor 
 do I know, indeed, that previous to its revival in very recent times, with the 
 exception to be immediately stated, that this' opinion was ever countenanced 
 by any other philosopher. Towards the end of the seventeenth ceutury it is 
 indeed commemorated by Chauvin, no very erudite authority, in the first 
 edition of his Lexicon Philosophicum (vv. Tactile and &ravitos), as an opin- 
 ion that had found supporters ; but it is manifest from the terms of the 
 statement, for no names are given, that Scaliger and Scalier only is referred 
 to. In the subsequent edition the statement itself is omitted. 
 
 By another philosophical physician, the celebrated Ctesalpinus of Arezzo, 
 it was afterwards (in 1569) still more articulately shown, that only by the ex- 
 ercise of the motive power are we percipient of those qualities which I de- 
 nominate the Secundo-Primary ; though he can hardly be said, like Scaliger, 
 to have discriminated that power as a faculty of perception or active appre- 
 hension, from touch as a capacity of sensation or mere consciousness of pas- 
 sion. It does not indeed appear that Csesalpinus was aware of Scaliger's 
 speculation at all. 
 
 ' Tactus igitur si unus est sensus, circa unam erit contrarietatem, reliqute 
 autem ad ipsam redncentur. [Compare Aristotle, De Anima, ii. 11.] Patet 
 autem Caliduni et Frigidum maxime proprie ipsius tactus esse ; solum enim 
 tangendo comprehcnduntur. Humidum autem et Siccum (Fluid and Solid), 
 Durum et Molle, Grave et Leve, Asperum et Lene, Earurn et Densum, alia- 
 que hujusmodi, ut tactu comprehendantur, non satis est ea tangere, sed necesse 
 est motum quendam adhibere, aut comprimeudo, autimpellendo, aut trahendo, 
 aut alia ratione patiendi potentiam experiendo. Sic enim quod proprium 
 terminurn non retinet, et quod facile dividitur, Humidum esse cognoscimus ; 
 quod autem opposite modo se habet, Siccum : et quod cedit comprimenti, 
 Molle, quod non cedit, Durum. Similiter autem et rcliquce tactivai qualitates 
 sine motu non percipiuntur. Idcirco et a reliquis sensibus cognosci possunt, 
 ut a visa. [But not immediately.] Motus enim inter cornmunia seusibilia 
 ponitur. [There is here through ambiguity a mutatio elenchi.] Nihil autem
 
 398 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 the Secundo-primary, both as secondary and quasi-primary qual- 
 ities, clear and distinct : of the Secondary, as subjective affec- 
 tions, clear and distinct, as objective, obscure and confused. For 
 
 refert, an motus in organo an in re fiat.' [?] (Quastionos Peripatetic, L. 
 iv. qn. 1.) 
 
 In more recent times, the action of the voluntary motive faculty and its rel- 
 ative sense in the perception of Extension, Figure, Weight, Resistance, &c., 
 was in France brought vaguely into notice by Condillac, and subsequently 
 about the commencement of the present century more explicitly developed, 
 among others, by his distinguished follower M. Destutt de Tracy, who estab- 
 lished the distinction between active and passive touch. The speculations of 
 M. Maine de Biran on muscular effort (from 1803) I do not here refer to ; as 
 these have a different and greatly higher significance. ( Condillac, Traite" de 
 Sensations, P. ii. cc. 8, 12. De Tracy, Ideologic, t. i. cc. 9-13 ; t. iii. cc. 5, 9. 
 Compare Deyerando, Histoire des Systemes, t. iii. p. 445, pq. orig. ed., and 
 Labouliniere, Precis, p. 322, sq.) In Germany, before the conclusion of the 
 last century, the same analysis was made, and the active touch there first ob- 
 tained the distinctive appellation of the Muscular Sense (Muskel Sinn.) The 
 German physiologists and psychologists not only what had been previously 
 done professedly demonstrated the share it had in the empirical apprehen- 
 sion of Space, &c., and established its necessity as a condition even of the 
 perceptions of Touch proper the Skin Sense ; they -likewise for the first time 
 endeavored to sho^r how in vision we are enabled to recognize not only figure, 
 but distance, and the third dimension of bodies, through the conscious ad- 
 justment of the eye. (Tittel, Kantische Denkformen (1787), p. 188, sq. 
 Tiedemann, in Hessische Beytracge (1789), St. i. p. 119, sq. ; Theaetet(1794), 
 passim ; Idealistische Briefe (1798), p. 84, sq. ; Psychologic (1804), p. 405, sq. 
 Schulz, Pruefung (1791), i. p. 182, sq. Engel, in Memoires de 1' Academic dc 
 Berlin (1802). GruUhuisen, Anthropologie (1810), pp. 180, sq. 361, sq. and 
 the subsequent works of Herbart, JIartmann, Lenkossek, Tourtual, Beneke, 
 and a host of others.) But see Reid, 188, b. 
 
 Britain has not advanced the inquiry which, if we discount some result- 
 lens tendencies by Hartley, Wells, and Darwin, she was the last in taking up ; 
 and it is a curious instance of the unacquaintance with such matters preva- 
 lent among us, that the views touching the functions of the will, and of the 
 muscular sense, which constitute, in this relation certainly, not the least val- 
 uable part of Dr. Brown's psychology, should to the present hour be regarded 
 as original, howbeit these views, though propounded as new, are manifestly 
 derived from sources with which all interested in psychological disquisitions 
 might reasonably be presumed familiar. This is by no means a solitary in- 
 stance of Brown's silent appropriation ; nor is he the only Scottish metaphy- 
 sician who has borrowed, without acknowledgment, these and other psycho- 
 logical analyses from the school of Condillac. De Tracy may often equally 
 reclaim his own at the hands of Dr. John Young, Professor of Philosophy 
 in Belfast College, whose frequent coincidences with Brown are not the mar- 
 vels he would induce us to believe, when we know the common sources from
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 399 
 
 the Primary, Secundo-primary, and Secondary, as subjective aft'ec- 
 tions, we can represent in imagination ; the Secondary, as objec- 
 tive powers, we cannot. 
 
 which the resembling doctrines are equally derived. It must be remembered, 
 however, that the Lectures of both Professors were posthumously published ; 
 and are therefore not to be dealt with as works deliberately submitted to 
 general criticism by their authors. Dr. Young, it should likewise be noticed, 
 was a pupil of the late Professor Mylne of Glasgow, whose views of mental 
 philosophy are well known to have closely resembled those of M. De Tracy. 
 I see from M. Mignet's eloquent eloge that this acute philosopher was, like 
 Kant, a Scotsman by descent, and ' of the clan Stutt,' (Stott ?) 
 
 These notices of the gradual recognition of the sense of muscular feeling, 
 as a special source of knowledge, are not given on account of any importance 
 it may be thought to possess as the source from which is derived our notion 
 of Space or Exteffeion. This notion, I am convinced, though first manifest- 
 ed in, cannot be evolved out of, experience ; and what was observed by Eeid 
 (Inq. p. 126, a), by Kant (Cr. d. r. V. p. 38), by Schulz (Pruef. i. p. 114), and 
 Stewart (Essays, p. 564), in regard to the attempts which had previously 
 been made to deduce it from the operations of sense, and in particular, from 
 the motion of the hand, is equally true of those subsequently repeated. In 
 all these attempts, the experience itself is only realized through a substitution 
 of the very notion which it professes to generate ; there is always a conceal- 
 ed petitio principii. Take for example the deduction so laboriously essayed 
 by Dr. Brown, and for which he has received such unqualified encomium. 
 (Lectt. 28 and 24). Extension is made up of three dimensions ; but Brown's 
 exposition is limited to length and breadth. These only, therefore, can be 
 criticised. 
 
 As far as I can find his meaning in his cloud of words, he argues thus : 
 The notion of Time or succession being supposed, that of longitudinal ex- 
 tension is given in the succession of feelings which accompanies the gradual 
 contraction of a muscle ; the notion of this succession constitutes, ipso facto, 
 the notion of a certain length ; and the notion of this length [he quietly takes 
 for granted] is the*notion of longitudinal extension sought (p. 146 a). The 
 paralogism here is transparent. Length is an ambiguous term ; and it is 
 length in space, extensive length, and not length in time, protensive length, 
 whose notion it is the problem to evolve. To convert, therefore, the notion 
 of a certain kind of length (and that certain kind being also confessedly only 
 length in time) into the notion of a length in space, is at best an idle begging 
 of the question. Is it not ? Then I would ask, whether the series of feelings 
 of which we are aware in the gradual contraction of a muscle, involve the 
 consciousness of being a succession or length (1), in time alone ' or (2) in 
 space alone ? or (8) in time and space together ? These three cases will be 
 allowed to be exhaustive. If the first be affirmed, if the succession appear 
 to consciousness a length in time exclusively, then nothing has been accom- 
 plished ; for the notion of extension or space is in no way contained in the 
 notion of duration or time. Again, if the second or the third be affirmed,
 
 400 PHILOSOPHY OF 1'KRCEPTION. 
 
 29. Finally The existential judgments are of the Primary 
 assertory ; of the Secundo-primary, in both their aspects, assert- 
 ory ; of the Secondary, as modes of mind, assertory, as modes of 
 matter, problematic. (See par. 11, 12, 13.) 
 
 if the series appear to consciousness a succession of length, either in space 
 alone, or in space and time together, then is the notion it behooved to generate 
 employed to generate itself. 
 
 In the deduction of the notion of superficial extension he is equally illog- 
 ical ; for here, too, his process of evolution only in the end openly extracts 
 what in the commencement it had secretly thrown in. The elements, out of 
 which he constructs the notion of extension, in the second dimension, he 
 finds in the consciousness we have of several contemporaneous series of 
 muscular feelings or lengths, standing in relation to each other, as proximate, 
 distant, intermediate, fec. Proximate! In what? In time? No; for the 
 series are supposed to be in time coexistent; and were it OTherwise, the pro- 
 cess would be unavailing, for proximity in time does not afford proximity in 
 space. In space, then ? Necessarily. On this alternative, however, the no- 
 tion of space or extension is already involved doubly deep in the elements 
 themselves, out of which it is proposed to construct it ; for when two or 
 more things are conceived as proximate in space, they are not merely con- 
 ceived as in different places or out of each other, but over and above this 
 elementary condition in which extension simply is involved, they are con- 
 ceived as even holding under it a secondary and more complex relation. 
 But it is needless to proceed, for the petition of the point in question is even 
 more palpable if we think the series under the relations of the distant, the 
 intermediate, &c. The notion of Space, therefore, is not shown by this ex- 
 planation of its genesis to be less a native notion than that of Time, which it 
 admits. Brown's is a modification of De Tracy's deduction, the change being 
 probably suggested by a remark of Stewart (1. c.) ; but though both involve 
 a paralogism, it is certainly far more shrewdly cloaked in the original. 
 
 III. Historical notices in regard to the distinction of Nerves and nervous 
 Filaments into Motive and Sensitive ; and in regard to the peculiarity of func- 
 tion, and absolute isolation, of tJte ultimate nervous Filaments. The important 
 discovery of Sir Charles Bell, that the spinal nerves are the organs of motion 
 through their anterior roots, of sensation through their posterior; and the 
 recognition by recent physiologists, that each ultimate nervous filament is 
 distinct in function, and runs isolated from its origin to its termination ; 
 these are only the last of a long series of previous observations to the same 
 effect, observations, in regard to which (as may be inferred from the recent 
 discussions touching the history of these results) the medical world is, in a 
 great measure, uninformed. At the same time, as these are the physiolog- 
 ical facts with which psychology is principally interested ; as a contribution 
 towards this doctrine and its history, I shall throw together a few notices, 
 which have for the most part fallen in my way when engaged in researches 
 for a different purpose. 
 
 The cases of paralysis without narcosis (stupor), and of narcosis without
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 401 
 
 c) As both in Sensitive Apprehension and in Thought ; as in 
 relation both to Sense and Intellect. 
 
 30. In the order of nature and of necessary thought, the Pri- 
 
 paralysis for the ancient propriety of these terms ought to be observed 
 that is, the ciises in which either motion or sensibility, exclusively, is lost, 
 were too remarkable not to attract attention even from the earliest periods ; 
 and at the same time, too peremptory not to necessitate the conclusion, that 
 the several phenomena are, either the functions of different organs, or, if of 
 the same, at least regulated by different conditions. Between these alterna- 
 tives all opinions on the subject are divided ; and the former was the first, as 
 it has been the last, to be adopted. 
 
 No sooner had the nervous system been recognized as the ultimate organ 
 of the animal and vital functions, and the intracranial medulla or encephalos 
 (encephalon is a modern misnomer) ascertained to be its centre, than Erasis- 
 tratus proceeded to appropriate to different parts of that organism the func- 
 tions which, along with Herophilus, he had distinguished, of sensibility and 
 voluntary motion. He placed the source of the former in the meninges or 
 membranes, of the latter in the substance, of the encephalos in general, that 
 is, of the Brain-proper and After-brain or Cerebellum. And while the nerves 
 were, mediately or immediately, the prolongations of these, he viewed the 
 nervous membranes as the vehicle of sensation, the nervous substance as the 
 vehicle of motion. (Eufus Ephesius, L. i. c. 22; L. ii. cc. 2, 17.) This the- 
 ory which is remarkable, if for nothing else, for manifesting the tendency 
 from an early period to refer the phenomena of motion and sensation to dis- 
 tinct parts of the nervous organism, has not obtained the attention which it 
 even intrinsically merits. In modern times, indeed, the same opinion has 
 been hazarded, even to my fortuitous knowledge, at least thrice. Firstly by 
 Fernelius (1550, Physiologia, v. 10, 15); secondly by Eosetti (1722, Raccolta 
 d'Opuscoli, &c., t. v. p. 272 sq.) ; thirdly by Le Cat (1740, Traite des Sensa- 
 tions, CEuv. Phys. t. i. p. 124, and Diss. sur la Sensibilite des Meninges, i.) 
 By each of these the hypothesis is advanced as original. In the two last 
 this is not to be marvelled at; but it is surprising how the opinion of Era- 
 sistratus could have escaped the erudition of the first. I may observe, that 
 Erasistratus also anticipated many recent physiologists in the doctrine, that 
 the intelligence of man, and of animals in general is always in proportion to 
 the depth and number of the cerebral convolutions, that is, in the ratio of 
 the extent of cerebral surface, not of cerebral mass. 
 
 The second alternative was adopted by Galen, who while he refutes ap- 
 parently misrepresents the doctrine of Erasistratus ; for Erasistratus did not, 
 if we may credit Kufus, an older authority than Galen, derive the nerves 
 from the membranes of the encephalos, to the exclusion of its substance ; or 
 if Galen be herein correct, this is perhaps the early doctrine which Erasis- 
 tratus is by him said in his maturer years to have abandoned ; a doctrine, 
 however, which, under modifications, has in modern times found supporters 
 in Kondeletius and others. (LaurentiiJkt. Anat. iv. qu. 13.) Recognizing,.
 
 402 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 mary qualities are prior to the Secundorprimary and Secondary ; 
 but in the order of empirical apprehension, though chronologi- 
 cally simultaneous, they are posterior to both. For it is only 
 
 what has always indeed been done, the contrast of the two phenomena of 
 sensibility and motion, Galen did not, however, regard them as necessarily 
 the products of distinct parts of the nervous system, although, de facto, dif- 
 ferent parta of that system were often subservient to their manifestation. 
 As to the problem Do the nerves perform their double function by the con- 
 veyance of a corporeal fluid, or through the irradiation of an immaterial 
 power? Galen seems to vacillate ; for texts may be adduced in favor of each 
 alternative. He is not always consistent in the shares which he assigns to 
 the heart and to the brain, in the elaboration of the animal spirits ; nor is he 
 even uniform in maintaining a discrimination of origin, between the animal 
 spirits and the vital. Degrading the membranes to mere envelopments, he 
 limits every peculiar function of the nervous organism to the enveloped sub- 
 stance of the brain, the after-brain, the spinal chord and nerves. But as the 
 animal faculty is one, and its proximate vehicle the animal spirits is homo- 
 geneous, so the nervous or cerebral substance which conducts these spirits 
 is in its own nature uniform and indifferently competent to either function ; 
 it being dependent upon two accidental circumstances, whether this sub- 
 stance conduce to motion, to sensation, or to motion and sensation together. 
 
 The first circumstance is the degree of hardness or softness ; a nerve 
 being adapted to motion, or to sensation, in proportion as it possesses the 
 former quality or the latter. Nerves extremely soft are exclusively compe- 
 tent to sensation. Nerves extremely hard are pre-eminently, but not exclu- 
 sively, adapted to motion ; for no nerve is wholly destitute of the feeling of 
 touch. The soft nerves, short and straight in their course, arise from the 
 anterior portion of the cncephalos (the Brain proper) ; the hard, more devi- 
 ous in direction, spring from the posterior portion of the brain where it 
 joins the spinal chord (Medulla oblongata?) the spinal chord being a contin- 
 uation of the After-brain, from which no nerve immediately arises ; the 
 hardest originate from the spinal chord itself, more especially towards its in- 
 ferior extremity. A nerve soft in its origin, and, therefore, fitted only for 
 sense, may, however, harden in its progress, and by this change become 
 suitable for motion. 
 
 The second circumstance is the part to which a nerve is sent ; the nerve 
 being sensitive or motive as it terminates in an organ of sense, or in an or- 
 gan of motion a muscle ; every part being recipient only of the virtue 
 appropriate to its special function. 
 
 This theory of Galen is inadequate to the phenomena. For though loss 
 of motion without the loss of sense may thus be accounted for, on the sup- 
 position that the innervating force is reduced so low as not to radiate the 
 stronger influence required for movement, and yet to radiate the feebler influ- 
 ence required for feeling ; still this leaves the counter case (of which, though 
 less frequently occurring, Galen has himself recorded some illustrious ex- 
 amples) not only unexplained, but even renders it inexplicable. In this the-
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 403 
 
 under condition of the Sensation of a Secondary, that we are per- 
 cipient of any Primary quality. 
 
 31. The apprehension of a Primary quality is principally an 
 
 ory Galen is, likewise, not always consistent with himself. The distinction 
 of hard and soft, as corresponding with the distinction of motory and sensi- 
 tive, nerves, though true in general, is, on his own admission, not absolutely 
 through-going. (I must observe, however, that among other recent anat- 
 omists this is maintained by Albinus, Malacarne, and Eeil.) And to say noth- 
 ing of other vacillations, Galen, who in one sentence, in consistency with his 
 distinction of cerebral and (mediately) cerebellar nerves, is forced to accord 
 exclusively to those of the spine the function of motion ; in another finds 
 himself compelled, in submission to the notorious fact, to extend to these 
 nerves the function of sensation likewise. But if Galen's theory be inade- 
 quate to their solution, it never leads him to overlook, to dissemble, or to 
 distort, the phenomena themselves ; and with these no one was ever more 
 familiarly acquainted. So marvellous, indeed, is his minute knowledge of 
 the distribution and functions of the several nerves, that it is hardly too 
 much to assert, that, with the exception of a few minor particulars, his pa- 
 thological anatomy of the nervous system is practically on a level with the 
 pathological anatomy of the present day. (De Usu Partium, i. 7, v. 9, 7, 14, 
 viii. 3, 6, 10, 12, ix. 1, xii. 10, 11, 15, xiii. 8, xvi. 1, 3, 5, xvii. 2, 3. De Causis 
 Sympt., i. 5. De Motu Muse., i. 13. De Auat. Adm., vii. 8. Ars parva, 
 10, 11. De Locis Aff., i. 6, 7, 12, iii. 6, 12. De Diss. Nerv., 1. De Plac. 
 Hipp, et Plat. ii. 12, vii. 3, 4, 5, 8.) 
 
 The next step was not made until the middle of the fourteenth century, 
 subsequent to Galen's death ; when Bondeletliis (c. 1550), reasoning from 
 the phenomena of paralysis and stupor, enounced it as an observation never 
 previously made, that ' All nerves, from their origin in the brain, are, even 
 in the spinal marrow itself, isolated from each other. The cause of paraly- 
 sis is therefore not so much to be sought for in the spinal marrow, as in 
 the encephalic heads of the nerves ; Galen himself having indeed, remarked, 
 that paralysis always supervenes, when the origin of the nerve is obstructed 
 or diseased.' (Curandi Methodus, c. 32.) 
 
 This observation did not secure the attention which it deserved ; and 
 some thirty years later (1595), another French physiologist, another cele- 
 brated professor in the same university with Rondelet, I mean Laurentius of 
 Montpellier, advanced this very doctrine of bis predecessor, as 'a new and 
 hitherto unheard-of observation.' This anatomist has, however, the merit 
 of first attempting a sensible demonstration of the fact, by resolving, under 
 water, the spinal chord into its constituent filaments. ' This new and admira- 
 ble observation,' he says, ' explains one of the obscurest problems of nature ; 
 why it is that from a lesion, say of the cervical medulla, the motion of the 
 thigh may be lost, while the motions of the arms and thorax shall remain 
 entire. In the second edition of his Anatomy, Dulaurens would seem, how- 
 ever, less confident, not only of the absolute originality, but of the absolute 
 accuracy, of the observation. Nor does he rise above the Galenic doctrine,
 
 404 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 intellectual cognition, in so far as it is, in itself, a purely mental 
 activity, and not the mere sensation of an organic passion ; and 
 secondarily, a sensible cognition, in so far as it is the perception 
 
 that sensibility and motion may be transmitted by the same fibre. In fact, 
 rejecting the discrimination of hard and soft nerves, he abolishes even the 
 accidental distinction which had been recognized by Galen. (Compare Hist. 
 Anat., later editions, iv. c. 18, qq. 9, 10, 11 ; x. c. 12, with the relative 
 places in the first.) 
 
 The third step was accomplished by Varottius (1572) who showed Galen 
 to be mistaken in holding that the spinal chord is a continuation of the 
 After-brain alone. He demonstrated, against all previous anatomists, that 
 this chord is made up of four columns, severally arising from four ence- 
 phalic rools ; two roots or trunks from the Brain-proper being prolonged 
 into it anterior, and two from the After-brain into its posterior columns. 
 (Anatomia, L. iii: De Nervis Opticis Epistolee.) 
 
 At the same time the fact was signalized by other contemporary anato- 
 mists (as Colter, 1572, Laurentius, 1595), that the spinal nerves arise by 
 double roots ; one set of filaments emerging from the anterior, another from 
 the posterior, portion of the chord. It was in general noticed, too (as by 
 Gnter, and G. Jlauhinug, 1590), that these filaments, on issuing from the 
 chord, passed into a knot or ganglion ; but, strange to say, it was reserved 
 for the second Monro (1783), to record the special observation, that this gan- 
 glion is limited to the fibres of the posterior root alone. 
 
 Such was the state of anatomical knowledge touching this point at the 
 close of the sixteenth century ; and it may now seem marvellous, that aware 
 of the independence of the motory and sensitive functions, aware that of 
 these functions the cerebral nerves were, in general, limited to one, while 
 the spinal nerves were competent to both, aware that the spinal nerves, the 
 nerves of double function, emerged by double roots and terminated in a two- 
 fold distribution, and, finally, aware that each nervous filament ran dis- 
 tinct from its peripheral extremity through the spinal chord to its central 
 origin; aware, I say, of all these correlative facts, it may now seem marvel- 
 lous that anatomists should have stopped short, should not have attempted 
 to lay fact and fact together, should not have surmised that in the spinal 
 nerves difference of root is correspondent with difference of function, should 
 not have instituted experiments, and anticipated by two centuries the most 
 remarkable physiological discover}- of the present day. But our wonder 
 will be enhanced, in finding the most illustrious of the more modern schools 
 of medicine teaching the same doctrine in greater detail, and yet never pro- 
 posing to itself the question May not the double roots correspond with the 
 double function of the spinal nerves? But so has it been with all the .most 
 momentous discoveries. When Harvey proclaimed the circulation of the 
 blood, he only proclaimed a doctrine necessitated by the discovery of the 
 venous valves ; and the Newtonian theory of the heavens was but a final 
 generalization, prepared by foregone observations, and even already partially 
 enounced.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 405 
 
 of an attribute of matter, and, though not constituted by, still 
 not realized without, the sensation of an organic passion. The 
 apprehension of a Secondary quality is solely a sensible cogni- 
 
 The school I refer to is that of Leyden the school of Boerhaave and his 
 disciples. Boerhaave held with Willis that the Brain-proper is the organ of 
 aniraality ; a distinct part thereof being destined to each of its two func- 
 tions, sense and voluntary motion; that the After-brain is the organ of 
 vitality, or the involuntary motions : and that the two encephalic organs 
 are prolonged, the former into the anterior, the latter into the posterior, 
 columns of the spinal chord. In his doctrine all nerves are composite, 
 being made up of fibrils of a tenuity, not only beyond our means of ob- 
 servation, but almost beyond our capacity of imagination. Some nerves 
 are homogeneous, their constituent filaments being either for a certain 
 kind of motion alone, or for a certain kind of sensation alone ; others are 
 heterogeneous, their constituent fibrils being some for motion, some for 
 sensation; and of this latter class are the nerves which issue from the 
 spine. On Boerhaave's doctrine, however, the spinal nerves, in so far as 
 they arise from the anterior column, are nerves both of the sensation and 
 voluntary motion of animality ; in so far as they arise from the poste- 
 rior column, are nerves of involuntary motion of vitality. A homoge- 
 neous nerve does not, as a totality, perform a single office ; for every ele- 
 mentary fibril of which it is composed runs from first to last isolated 
 from every other, and has its separate sphere of exercise. As many dis- 
 tinct spheres of sensation and motion, so many distinct nervous origins 
 :md terminations ; and as many different points of local termination in the 
 body, so many different points of local origin in the brain. The Senso- 
 rium Commune, the centre of sensation and motion, is not therefore an 
 indivisible point, not even an undivided place ; it is, on the contrary, the 
 aggregate of as many places (and millions of millions there may be) as 
 there are encephalic origins of nervous fibrils. No nerve, therefore, in pro- 
 priety of speech, gives oflf a branch ; their sheaths of dura mater alone 
 are ramified ; and there is no intercourse, no sympathy between the ele- 
 mentary fibrils, except through the sensorium commune. That the nerves 
 are made up of fibrils is shown, though inadequately, by various anatom- 
 ical processes ; and that these fibrils are destined for distinct and often 
 different purposes, is manifested by the phenomena of disjoined paralysis 
 and stupor. (De Morbis Nervorum Prselectiones, by Van Eems. pp. 261, 
 490-497, 696, 713-717. Compare Kaau Hoerhaave, Impetum faoiens, 197 
 -200.) 
 
 The developed doctrine of Boerhaave on this point is to be sought for, 
 neither in his Aphorisms nor in his Institutions and his Prelections on 
 the Institutions the more prominent works to which his illustrious disci- 
 ples, HaUer and Van Swiften, appended respectively a commentary. The 
 latter adopts, but does not advance the doctrine of his master. (Ad Aph. 
 701, 711, 774, 1057, 1060.) The former, who in his subsequent writings 
 silently abandoned the opinion that sensation and motion are conveyed
 
 406 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 tion ; for it is nothing but the sensation of an organic passion. 
 The apprehension of a Secundo-primary quality is, equally and 
 at once, an intellectual and sensible cognition ; for it involves 
 
 by different nervous fibrils, in two unnoticed passages of his annotations 
 on Boerbaave (1740), propounds it as a not improbable conjecture that a 
 total nerve may contain within its sheath a complement of motory and 
 of sensitive tubules, distinct in their origin, transit, and distribution, but 
 which at their peripheral extremity communicate ; the latter, like veins, 
 carrying the spirits back to the bruin, which the former had, like arteries, 
 carried out. (Ad. Boerh. Instil. 288, n. 2, 298, n. 2.) 
 
 The doctrine of the school of Leyden, on this point, was however still 
 more articulately evolved by the younger (Bernard Siegfried) Alinnvs ; 
 not in any of his published works, but in the prelections he delivered 
 for many years, in that university, on physiology. From a copy in my 
 possession of his dictata in this course, very fully taken after the middle 
 of the century, by Dr. William Grant (of Kothiemurcus), subsequently a 
 distinguished medical author and practical physician in London, compared 
 with another very accurate copy of these dictata, taken by an anonymous 
 writer in the year 1741 ; I am enabled to present the following general 
 abstract of the doctrine taught by this celebrated anatomist, though obliged 
 to retrench both the special cases, and the reasoning in detail by which 
 it is illustrated and confirmed. 
 
 The nerves have a triple destination as they minister (1.) to voluntary 
 motion, (2.) to sensation, (3.) to the vital energies secretion, digestion, 
 <fcc. Albinus seems to acquiesce in the doctrine, that the Brain-proper 
 is the ultimate organ of the first and second function, the After-brain of 
 the third. 
 
 Nerves, again, are of two kinds. They are cither such in which the func- 
 tion of each ultimate fibril remains isolated in function from centre to peri- 
 phery (the cerebro-spinal nerves) ; or such in which these are mutually 
 confluent (the ganglionic nerves). 
 
 To speak only of the cerebro-spinal nerves, and of these only in relation 
 to the functions of motion and sensation ; they are to be distinguished 
 into three classes according as destined, (1.) to sense, (2.) to motion, (3.) to 
 both motion and sensation. Examples of the first class are the olfactory, 
 the optic, the auditory, of which last he considers the portio mollis and the 
 portio dura to be, in propriety, distinct nerves ; of the second class, are the 
 large portion of those passing to muscles, as the fourth and sixth pairs: 
 of the third class are the three lingual nerves, especially the ninth pair, 
 fibrils of which he had frequently traced, partly to the muscles, partly to 
 the gustatory papillae of the tongue, and the subcutaneous nerves, which 
 are seen to give off branches, first to the muscles, and thereafter to the tac- 
 tile papillae of the skin. The nervous fibres which minister to motion are 
 distinct in origin, in transit, in termination, from those which minister to 
 sensation. This is manifest, in the case of those nerves which run from their 
 origin in separate sheaths, either to an organ of sense (as the olfactory and
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 407 
 
 both the perception of a quasi-primary quality, and the sensation 
 of a secondary. (See par 15, sq. 1 ) 
 
 optic), or to an organ of motion (as the fourth and eixth pairs, which go to 
 the muscles of the eye) ; but it is equally, though not so obtrusively true, 
 in the case where a nerve gives off branches partly to muscles, partly to the 
 cutaneous papillae. In this latter case, the nervous fibrils, or fistulae, are, 
 from their origin in the medulla oblongata to their final termination in the 
 skin, perfectly distinct. The Medulla Oblongata is a continuation of the 
 encephalos ; made up of two columns from the Brain-proper, and of two 
 columns from the After-brain. Immediately or mediately, it is the origin, 
 as it is the organ, of all the nerves. And in both respects it is double ; for 
 one part, the organ of sense, affords an origin to the sensative fibrils ; whilst 
 another, the organ of motion, does the same by the motory. In their pro- 
 gress, indeed, after passing out, the several fibrils, whether homogeneous or 
 not, are so conjoined by the investing membranes as to exhibit the appear- 
 ance of a single nerve ; but when they approach their destination they 
 separate, those for motion ramifying through the muscles, those for sensa- 
 tion going to the cutaneous papillae or other organs of sense. Examples of 
 this are afforded in the ninth pair, the fibres of which (against more mod- 
 ern anatomists), he holds to arise by a double origin in the medulla, and 
 which, after running in the same sheath, separate according to their differ- 
 ent functions and destinations ; and in the seventh pair, the hard and soft 
 portions of which are respectively for motion and for sensation, though 
 these portions, he elsewhere maintains, ought rather to be considered as 
 two distinct nerves than as the twofold constituents of one. 
 
 The proof of this is of various kinds. In the first place, it is a theory 
 forced upon us by the phenomena ; for only on this supposition can we ac- 
 count for the following facts: (1) That we have distinct sensations trans- 
 mitted to the brain from different parts of the same sensitive organ (as the 
 tongue) through which the same total nerve is diffused. (2) That we can 
 send out from the brain a motive influence to one, nay, sometimes to a part 
 of one muscle out of a plurality, among which the same total nerve (e. g. the 
 ischiatic) is distributed. (3) That sometimes a part is either, on the one 
 hand, paralyzed, without any loss of sensibility ; or, on the other, stupefied, 
 without a diminution of its mobility. 
 
 In the second place, we can demonstrate the doctrine, proceeding both from 
 centre to periphery, and from periphery to centre. Though ultimately divid- 
 ing into filaments beyond our means of observation, we can still go far in 
 following out a nerve both in its general ramifications, and in the special dis- 
 tribution of its filaments, for motion to the muscles and for sensation to the 
 skin, <fcc. ; and how far soever we are able to carry our investigation, we al- 
 ways find the least fibrils into which we succeed in analyzing a nerve, equally 
 distinct and continuous as the chord of which they were constituent. And 
 again, in following back the filaments of motion from the muscles, the fila- 
 
 1 And the next chapter, 1. W.
 
 408 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 mcnta of sensation from the skin, we find them ever collected into larger 
 and larger bundles within the same sheath, bat never losing their individu- 
 ality, never fused together to form the substance of a larger chord. The 
 nerves are thus not analogous to arteries, which rise from a common trunk, 
 convey a common fluid, divide into branches all similar in action to eacli 
 other and to the primary trunk. For even- larger nerve is only a comple- 
 ment of smaller nerves, and every smallest nerve only a fasciculus of nervous 
 fibrils ; and these not only numerically different, but often differing from 
 each other in the character of their functions. 
 
 In the third place, that in the nerves for both motion and sensation are en- 
 veloped distinct nerves or fibrils for these several functions this is an infer- 
 ence supported by the analogy of those nerves which are motive or sensitive, 
 exclusively. And in regard to these latter, it becomes impossible, in some 
 cases, to conceive why a plurality of nerves should have been found neces- 
 sary, as in the case of the two portions of the seventh pair, in reality distinct 
 nerves, if we admit the supposition that each nerve, each nervous fibril, is 
 competent to the double office. 
 
 In the fourth place, the two species of nerve are distinguished by a differ- 
 ence of structure. For he maintains the old Galenic doctrine, that the nerves 
 of motion are, as compared with those of sensation, of a harder and more 
 fibrous texture ; a diversity which he does not confine to the homogeneous 
 nerves, but extends to the counter filaments of the heterogeneous. This 
 opinion, in modern times, by the majority surrendered rather than refuted, 
 has been also subsequently maintained by a small number of the most accu- 
 rate anatomists, as Malacarne and Reil ; and to this result the recent observa- 
 tians of Ehrenberg and others seem to tend. (See memoirs of the Berlin 
 Academy for 1836, p. 605, sq. ; Mueller's Phys. p. 598.) 
 
 Finatty, to the objection Why has nature not, in all cases as in some, in- 
 closed the motive and the sentient fibrils in distinct sheaths ? as answer, and 
 fifth argument, he shows, with great ingenuity, that nature does precisely 
 what, in the circumstances, always affords the greatest security to both, more 
 especially to the softer, fibrils ; and he might have added, as a sixth reason 
 and second answer with the smallest expenditure of means. 
 
 The subtilty of the nervous fibres is much greater than is commonly sus- 
 pected ; and there is probably no point of the body to which they are not 
 distributed. What is the nature of their peripheral terminations it is, how- 
 ever, difficult to demonstrate ; and the doctrines of Ruysch and Malpighi in 
 this respect are, as he shows, unsatisfactory. 
 
 The doctrine of Albinus, indeed, of the whole school of Boerhaave, in re- 
 gard to the nervous system, and, in particular, touching the distinction and 
 the isolation of the ultimate nervous filaments, seems during a century of 
 interval not only to have been neglected but absolutely forgotten ; and a coun- 
 ter opinion of the most erroneous character, with here and there a feeble 
 echo of the true, to have become generally prevalent in its stead. For, 
 strange to say, this very doctrine is that recently promulgated as the last con- 
 summation of nervous physiology by the most illustrious physiologist in 
 Europe. 'That the primitive fibres of all the cerebro-spinal nerves are to 
 be regarded as isolated and distinct from their orign to their termination, and 
 as radii issuing from the axis of the nervous system,' is the grand result, as
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PEECEPTION. 409 
 
 stated by himself, of the elaborate researches of Johann Mueller ; and to the 
 earliest discovery of this general fact he carefully vindicates his right against 
 other contemporary observers, by stating that it had been privately commu- 
 nicated by him to Van der Kolk, of Utrecht, so long ago as the year 1830. 
 (Phys. p. 596-603.) 
 
 In conclusion, I may observe that it is greatly to be regretted that these 
 Prelections of Albinus were never printed. They present, not only a full and 
 elegant digest of all that was known in physiology at the date of their deliv- 
 ery (and Albinus was celebrated for the uncommon care which he bestowed 
 on the composition of his lectures) ; but they likewise contain, perdue, many 
 original views, all deserving of attention, and some which have been subse- 
 quently reproduced to the no small celebrity of their second authors. The 
 speculation, for example, of John Hunter and Dr. Thomas Young, in regard 
 to the self-contractile property of the Crystalline lens is here anticipated ; 
 and that pellucidity and fibrous structure are compatible, shown by the anal- 
 ogy of those gelatinous mollusca, the medusae or sea-blubbers, which are not 
 more remarkable for their transparency, than for their contractile and dila- 
 tive powers. 
 
 As I have already noticed, the celebrity of the Leyden School far from 
 commanding acceptance, did not even secure adequate attention to the doc- 
 trine of its illustrious masters ; and the Galenic theory, to which Haller lat- 
 terly adhered, was, under the authority of Cullen and the Monros, that which 
 continued to prevail in this country, until after the commencement of the 
 present century. Here another step in advance was then made by Mr. Alex- 
 ander Walker, an ingenious Physiologist of Edinburgh ; who, in 1809, first 
 started the prolific notion, that in the spinal nerves the filaments of sen- 
 sation issue by the one root, the filaments of motion by the other. His attri- 
 bution of the several functions to the several roots sensation to the anterior, 
 motion to the posterior with strong presumption in its favor from general 
 analogy, and its conformity with the tenor of all previous, and much subse- 
 quent observation, is, however, opposed to the stream of later and more pre- 
 cise experiment. Anatomists have been long agreed that the anterior col- 
 umn of the spinal marrow is in continuity with the brain-proper, the poste- 
 rior, with the after-brain. To say nothing of the Galenic doctrine, Willis 
 and the School of Boerhaave had referred the automatic, Hoboken and Pou- 
 teau the automatic and voluntary, motions to the cerebellum. Latterly, the 
 experiments of Rolando, Flourens, and other physiologists, would show that 
 to the after-brain belongs the power of regulated or voluntary motion ; while 
 the parallelism which I have myself detected, between the relative develop- 
 ment of that part of the encephalos in young animals and their command over 
 the action of their limbs, goes, likewise, to prove that such motion is one, at 
 least, of the cerebellic functions. (See Munro's Anatomy of the Brain, 1831, 
 p. 4r-9.) In contending, therefore, that the nervous filaments of sensation 
 ascend in the anterior rachitic column to the brain-proper, and the nervous 
 filaments of motion in the posterior, to the after-brain ; Mr. Walker origin- 
 ally proposed, and still maintains, the alternative which, independently of 
 precise experiment, had the greatest weight of general probability in its 
 favor. (Archives of Science for 1809 ; The Nervous System, 1834, p. 50, sq.) 
 
 In 1811, Sir Charles Bell, holding always the connection of the brain- 
 
 18
 
 410 PHILOSOPHY OF PKRCEPTION. 
 
 proper with the anterior, of the after-bruin with the posterior, column of 
 the spinal chord, proceeding, however, not on general probabilities, but on 
 experiments expressly instituted on the roots themselves of the spinal nerves, 
 first advanced the counter doctrine, that to the filaments ascending by the 
 posterior roots belongs exclusively the function of sensation ; and thereafter, 
 but still, as is now clearly proved, previously to any other physiologist, he 
 further established by a most ingenious combination of special analogy and 
 experiment, the correlative fact, that the filaments descending by the ante- 
 rior roots are the sole vehicles of voluntary motion. These results, con- 
 firmed as they have been by the principal physiologists throughout Europe, 
 seem now placed above the risk of refutation. It still, however, remains to 
 reconcile the seeming structural connection, and the manifest functional op- 
 position, of the after-brain and posterior rachitic column ; for the decussation 
 in the medulla oblongata, observed, among others, by Rolando and Solly, 
 whereby the cerebellum and anterior column are connected, is apparently too 
 partial to reconcile the discordant phenomena. (BeWa Nervous System ; 
 Shaw's Narrative; MueUer's Physiology, &c.) 
 
 As connected with the foregoing notices, I may here call attention to a re- 
 markable case reported by M. Key Regis, a medical observer, in his ' Histoire 
 Naturelle de 1'Ame.' This work, which is extremely rare, I have been un- 
 able to consult, and must therefore rely on the abstract given by M. de Biran 
 in his ' Nouvelles Considerations,' p. 96, sq. This case, us far as I am aware, 
 has escaped the observation of all subsequent physiologists. In its phe- 
 nomena, and in the inferences to which they lead, it stands alone ; but 
 whether the phenomena are themselves anomalous, or that experiments, with 
 the same intent, not having been made, in like cases, they have not in these 
 been brought in like manner into view, I am unable to determine. A man 
 lost the power of movement in one half of his body (one lateral half, proba- 
 bly, but in De Biran's account the paralysis is not distinctly stated as hemi- 
 plegia) ; while the sensibility of the parts affected remained apparently en- 
 tire. Experiments, various and repeated, were, however, made to ascertain 
 with accuracy, whether the loss of the motive faculty had occasioned any 
 alteration in the capacity of feeling ; and it was found that the patient, though 
 as acutely alive as ever to the sense of pain, felt, when this was secretly in- 
 flicted, as by compression of his hand under the bed-clothes, a sensation of 
 suffering or uneasiness, by which, when the pressure became strong, he was 
 compelled lustily to cry out ; but a sensation merely general, he being alto- 
 gether unable to localize the feeling, or to say from whence the pain pro- 
 ceeded. Jt is unfortunately not stated whether he could discriminate one 
 pain from another, say the pain of pinching from the pain of pricking; but 
 had this not been the case, the notice of so remarkable a circumstance could 
 hardly, I presume, have been overlooked. The patient, as he gradually re- 
 covered the use of his limbs, gradually also recovered the power of localizing 
 his sensations. It would be important to test the value of this observation 
 by similar experiments, made on patients similarly affected. Until this be 
 done, it would be rash to establish any general inferences upon its facts.
 
 th 
 
 till 
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 411 
 
 I may notice also another problem, the solution of which ought to engage 
 the attention of those who have the means of observation in their power, 
 the sensation of heat dependent upon a peculiar set of nerves ? This to 
 
 ie seems probable ; 1, because certain sentient parts of the body are in- 
 sensible to this feeling ; and, 2, because I have met with cases recorded, in 
 which, while sensibility in general was abolished, the sensibility to heat re- 
 mained apparently undiminished. 1 
 
 i Here may be added a curious item, from the foot-notes to Reid (p. 246) : ' However 
 astonishing, it is now proved beyond all rational doubt, that, in certain abnormal states 
 of the nervous organism, perceptions are possible through other than the ordinary 
 channels of the senses.' W.
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 PERCEPTION PROPER AND SENSATION PROPER.* 
 
 I. PRINCIPAL MOMENTA OF THE EDITOR'S DOCTRINE OF 
 PERCEPTION. 
 
 A) In itself: 
 i. Perception in general. 
 
 I. Sensitive Perception, or Perception simply, is that act of 
 Consciousness whereby we apprehend in our body, 
 
 * A word as to the various meanings of the terms here prominent 
 Perception, Sensation, Sense. 
 
 \. Perception. (Perceptio ; Perception ; Percezione; Perception, Wahrneh- 
 mung) has different significations; but under all and each of these, the term 
 has a common ambiguity, denoting as it may, either 1 the perceiving Facul- 
 ty, or 2 the Perceiving Act, or 8 the Object perceived. Of these the only 
 ambiguity of importance is the last ; and to relieve it I would propose the 
 employment, in this relation, of Percept, leaving Perception to designate both 
 the faculty and its act ; for these it is rarely necessary to distinguish, as what 
 is applicable to the one is usually applicable to the other. 
 
 But to the significations of the term, aa applied to different faculties, acts, 
 and objects ; of which there are in all four 
 
 1. Perceptio which has been naturalized in all the principal languages of 
 modern Europe, with the qualified exception of the German, in which the 
 indigenous term Wahrnehmung has again almost superseded it Perceptio. 
 in its primary philosophical signification, as in the mouths of Cicero anil 
 Quintilian, is vaguely equivalent to Comprehension, Notion, or Cognition in 
 general. 
 
 2. From this first meaning it was easily deflected to a second, in which it 
 corresponds to an apprehension, a becoming aware of, in a word, a conscious- 
 ness. In this meaning, though long thus previously employed in the schools, 
 it was brought more prominently and distinctively forward in the writings 
 of Descartes. From him it passed, not only to his own disciples, but, like 
 the term Idea, to his antagonist, Gassendi, and, thereafter, adopted equally 
 by Locke and Leibnitz, it remained a household word in every subsequent 
 philosophy, until its extent was further limited, and thus a third signification 
 given to it. 
 
 Under this second meaning it is, however, proper to say a word in regard
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 4:13 
 
 a.) Certain special affections, whereof as an animated organism 
 it is contingently susceptible ; and 
 
 b.) Those general relations of extension under which as a ma- 
 terial organism it necessarily exists. 
 
 to the special employment of the term in the Cartesian and Leibnitzio-Wol- 
 fian philosophies. Perception the Cartesians really identified with Idea (using 
 this term in its unexclusive universality, but discounting Descartes' own 
 abusive application of it to the organic movement in the brain, of which the 
 mind has, ex hypothesi, no consciousness) and allowed them only a logical 
 distinction ; the same representative act being called Idea, inasmuch as we 
 regard it t as a representation, i. e. view it in relation to what through it, 
 as represented, is mediately known, and Perception, inasmuch as we regard 
 it as a consciousness of such representation, i. e. view it in relation to Jhe 
 knowing mind. The Leibnitzio-Wolfians, on the other hand, distinguished 
 three acts in the process of representative cognition : 1 the act of repre- 
 senting a (mediate) object to the mind ; 2 the representation, or, to speak 
 more properly, representamen, itself as an (immediate or vicarious) object 
 exhibited to the mind ; 3 the act by which the mind is conscious, immedi- 
 ately of the representative object, and, through it, mediately of the remote 
 object represented. They called the first Perception ; the last Apperception ; 
 the second Idea sensual, to wit, for what they styled the material Idea was 
 only an organic motion propagated to the brain, which, on the doctrine of 
 the pre-established harmony, is in sensitive cognition the arbitrary concom- 
 itant of the former, and, of course, beyond the sphere of consciousness or 
 apperception. 
 
 3. In its third signification, Perception is limited to the apprehensions of 
 Sense alone. This limitation was first formally imposed upon the word by- 
 Reid, for no very cogent reason besides convenience (222 b) ; and thereafter 
 by Kant. Kant, again, was not altogether consistent ; for he employs ' Per- 
 ception 1 in the second meaning, for the consciousness of any mental presenta- 
 tion, and thus in a sense corresponding to the Apperception of the Leibnitz- 
 ians, while its vernacular synonym ' Wahrnehmung' he defines in conform- 
 ity with the third, as the consciousness of an empirical intuition. Imposed 
 by such authorities, this is now the accredited signification of these terms, 
 in the recent philosophies of Germany, Britain, France, Italy, &c. 
 
 4. But under this third meaning it is again, since the time and through 
 the authority of Eeid, frequently employed in a still more restricted accep- 
 tation, viz. as Perception (proper) in contrast to Sensation (proper). The 
 import of these terms, as used by Eeid and other philosophers on the one 
 hund, and by myself on the other, is explained in the text. 
 
 ii. Sensation (Svnsntio ; Sensation, Sentiment; Sensazionc; Empfindung) 
 has various significations ; and in all of these, like Perception, Conception, 
 Imagination, and other analogous terms in the philosophy of mind, it is am- 
 biguously applied ; 1, for a Faculty 2, for its Act 3, for its Object. 
 Here there is no available term like Percept, Concept, &c., whereby to dis- 
 criminate the last.
 
 414 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 Of these Perceptions, the former, which is thus conversant about 
 a subject-object, is Sensation proper ; the latter, which is thus 
 conversant about an object-object, is Perception proper. 1 
 
 2. All Perception is an act of Consciousness ; no Perception, 
 therefore, is possible, except under the conditions under which 
 Consciousness is possible. The eight following conditions are 
 partly common to perception with the other acts of Consciousness ; 
 partly proper to it as a special operation. 
 
 3. The first is a certain concentration of consciousness on an ob- 
 ject of sense ; an act of Attention, however remiss.* 
 
 4. The second is (independently of the necessary contrast of a 
 svfbject and an object), a plurality, alteration, difference on the 
 part of the perceived object or objects, and of a recognition or 
 
 There are two principal meanings in whfch this term has been employed. 
 
 1. Like the Greek oRtithe-si-s, it was long and generally used to comprehend 
 the process of sensitive apprehension both in its subjective and its objective 
 relations. 
 
 2. As opposed to Idea, Perception, &c., it was limited, first in the Carte- 
 sian school, and thereafter in that of Reid, to the subjective phasis of our 
 sensitive cognitions ; that is, to our consciousness of the affections of our 
 animated organism, or on the Neo-Platonic, Cartesian, and Leibnitzian hy- 
 potheses, to the affections of the mind corresponding to, but not caused by, 
 the unknown mutations of the body. Under this restriction, Sensation 
 may, both in French and English, be employed to designate our corporeal 
 or lower feelings, in opposition to Sentiment, as a term for our higher, i. e. 
 our intellectual and moral, feelings. 
 
 iii. Sense (Sensns ; Sens ; Senso ; Sinn) is employed in a looser and in a 
 stricter application. 
 
 Under the former head it has two applications ; 1, a psychological, as a 
 popular term for Intelligence : 2, a logical, as a synonym for Meaning. 
 
 Under the latter head, Sense is employed ambiguously ; 1, for the Fac- 
 ulty of sensitive apprehension ; 2 n , for its Act ; 3, for its Organ. 
 
 In this relation, Sense has been distinguished into External and Internal ; 
 but under the second term, in so many vague and various meanings, that 1 
 cannot here either explain or enumerate them. 
 
 On the analogical employments of the word, see above, p. 878 sq. 
 
 * St. Jerome 'Quod ment* videat et mens audiat, et quod nee audire 
 quidpiam nee videro possumus, nisi sensus in ea quas cernimus et audimus 
 intentug, vetus sententia.' (Adv. Jovin. ii. 9.) See Aristotle (Probl. xi. 33), 
 whom Jerome manifestly had in his eye ; Strato Physicus, as quoted by 
 Plntarch (Dc Sol. An. Opera, t. ii. p. 961); and Plutarch himself (ibid.) 
 
 1 See p. 880. W.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 415 
 
 discrimination thereof on the part of the perceiving subject.* 
 This supposes the following : Quality proper ; Quantity, Pro- 
 tensive (Time), Extensive (Space), Intensive (Degree) ; and Rela- 
 tion. Therefore 
 
 5. The third is Quality, quality strictly so called. For one 
 affection is distinguished from another as it is, or is not, such and 
 such ; in other words, as it has, or has not, this or that quality 
 (suchness). 
 
 6. The fourth is Time ; which supposes Memory, or, to speak 
 more correctly, a certain continuous representation of the late and 
 latest past, known with and in contrast to our apprehension of 
 the passing present. For without such continuity of conscious- 
 ness, no consciousness is possible. 
 
 7. The fifth is Space. For we are only conscious of perceiv- 
 ing, as we are conscious of perceiving something as discriminated 
 from other 'coexistent things. But this in perception is to be 
 conscious of one thing as out of another, that is, as extended, that 
 is, as in space. 
 
 8. The sixth is Degree. For all sensations are, though possi- 
 bly of any, actually of one definite intensity ; and distinguished 
 not only by differences in Quality, Time, Space, but also by differ- 
 ences in Degree. 
 
 9. The seventh is Relation. For discrimination, which all per- 
 ception supposes, is a recognition of a relation, the relation of 
 contrast ; and differences in Quality, Time, Space, Degree, are only 
 so many various kinds of such relativity. 
 
 1 0. Finally, the eighth is an Assertory Judgment, that within 
 the sphere of sense an object (a) exists, and (b) exists thus or thus 
 conditioned.^ All consciousness is realized tfi the enunciation 
 
 * It has been well said by Hobbes, in regard to the former, ' Sentire sem- 
 per idem, et non sentirc, ad idem recidunt' (Eleni. Philos. P. iv. c. 25, 5); 
 and by Galen and Nemesius in reference to the latter, ' Sensation is not an 
 alteration (affection, modification), but the recognition of an alteration.' 
 
 t Aristotle in various passage? asserts that Sensitive perception is a dis- 
 crimination or & judgment. (Anal. Post. L. ii. c. 19, 5. Top. L. ii. c, 4,
 
 416 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 That is there (or This is here). All Perception consequently 
 enounces That is there; but in this case, there is especially 
 understood by the That an object manifested through one or 
 more qualities, Secondary, Secundo-primary, Primary ; and by 
 the is there apprehended in, or in immediate relation to, our 
 organism.* 
 
 1 1 . Such being the general conditions of Perception, it is man- 
 ifestly impossible to discriminate with any rigor Sense from Intel- 
 ligence. Sensitive apprehension is, in truth, only the recognition 
 by Intelligence of the phenomena presented in or through its or- 
 gans^ 
 
 2. De An. L. iii. c. 1, 10 ; c. 10, 1; alibi.) And the Aphrodisian : ' Al- 
 though sensation be only brought to benr through certain corporeal passions, 
 yet Sensation itself is not a passion, but ajudymentS (On the Soul, f. 138 b, 
 ed. Aid.) Eeid has the merit among modern philosophers of first approxi- 
 mating to the recognition of judgment as an element or condition of con- 
 sciousness in general, in laying it at the root of Perception, Sensation, Mem- 
 ory, and [Self] Consciousness ; though he unfortunately fell short of the truth 
 in refusing an existential judgment also to the acts of the representative fac- 
 ulty, his Conception, Imagination, or Simple Apprehension. 
 
 * In this qualitative judgment there is only the consciousness of the qual- 
 ity perceived in itself as a distinct object. The judgment, again, by which 
 it is recognized of such a class or such a name, is a higher energy, and ought 
 not, as is sometimes done, to be etyled Perception ; it is Judgment, emphati- 
 cally so called, a simple act of, what I would call, the elaborative, or diano- 
 etic, or discursive faculty, the faculty of relations, or comparison. 
 
 t Tertullian : ' Non enim et sentire -intelligere est, et intelligere, sentire. 
 At quid erit Sensus, nisi ejus rei qu& sentitur intetteclus? Quid erit intellcc- 
 tus, nisi ejus rei quse intelligitur sensus? Unde ista tormeuta cruciandae 
 simplicitatis, et suspendendse veritatis ? Quis mini exhibebit sensum non in- 
 telligentem quod seutit ; aut intellectum non sentientem quod intelligit?' 
 (De Anima, c. 18; compare De Carne Christi, c. 12.) To the same effect 
 St. Gregory of Nyssa. (De Opif. Horn. cc. 6, 10; and De Anima et Kesur., 
 Opera, t. ii. p. 623 ed. Paris, 1615.) See also St. Jerome as quoted in note 
 * 414. But this doctrine we may trace back to Aristotle and his school, and 
 even higher. 'There is extant,' says Plutarch, 'a discourse of Strato Phys- 
 icus, demonstrating That a sensitive apprehension is wholly impossible with- 
 out an act of Intellect.' (Op. Mor. p. 961.) And as to Aristotle "himself: 
 ' To divorce (he says) Sensation from Understanding, is to reduce Sensation 
 to an insensible process ; wherefore it has been said Intellect sees, and In- 
 tellect hears.' (Probl. xi. 33.) 
 
 This saying, as recorded by Aristotle, constitutes in the original (a differ-
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 417 
 
 12. All perception is an immediate or presentative cognition : 
 and has, therefore, in either form, only one univocal object ; that, 
 to wit, which it apprehends as now and here existent. 1 
 
 ence of dialect discounted) the first hemistich of the famous verse of Epi- 
 charmus : 
 
 Nets bptj xai Notif aKoi'ei. ruAAa Ktixpd xai rv^Aa. 
 Mind it seeth, Mind it heareth ; all beside is deaf and blind ; 
 or less literally 
 
 What sees is Mind, what hears is Mind ; 
 The ear and eye are deaf and Hind. 
 
 Though overlooked as a quotation, by both the commentators on the Prob- 
 lems, by Erasmus, and many others, it has never been suspected that these 
 words, as quoted, are not a quotation from the Syracusan poet. This nega- 
 tive I, however, venture to maintain, at least, as a probable thesis ; for I am 
 inclined to think that the line, however great its merit, does not ascend to 
 Epicharmus, but was forged and fathered on him in an age considerably 
 later than Aristotle's. My reasons are these : 
 
 1. Epicharmus was a Pythagorean philosopher and a Doric poet. But to 
 fabricate Pythagorean treatises in the Doric dialect seems to have become 
 in the latter ages a matter of exercise and emulation among the Greek So- 
 phistae and Syncretists. In fact, of the numerous fragments under the 
 names of Pythagoras, Theano, Timasus, Ocellus, Archytas, Hippodamus, 
 Euryphamus, Hipparchus, Theages, Metopus, Clinias, Crito, Polus, Lysis, 
 Melissa, Mya, &c. ; there are hardly any to a critical eye not manifestly spu- 
 rious, and none whatever exempt from grave suspicion. On general grounds, 
 therefore, forgeries on Epicharmus are not only not improbable, but likely. 
 
 2. And that such were actually committed we are not without special evi- 
 dence. We know from Athenasus (L. xiv.), that there were many Pseudce~ 
 picharmia in circulation. Besides Apollodorus, he cites, as authorities for 
 this, Aristoxenus (who was a scholar of Aristotle) in the eighth book of his 
 Polity, and Philochorus (who lived about a century later) in his treatise on 
 Divination. Among the more illustrious fabricators, the former of these 
 commemorates Chrysogonus the flute-player ; the latter, Axiopistus of Lo- 
 crus or Sicyon, with the names of his two supposititious works, the Canon 
 and the Gnomce. Of either of these, judging from their title, the line in 
 question may have formed a part ; though it is not improbably of a still 
 more recent origin. 
 
 8. The words (and none could be more direct and simple) which make up 
 the first hemistich of the verse, we find occasionally quoted as a proverbial 
 pbilosopheme, subsequently to the time of Plato. To Plato's doctrine, and 
 his language, I would indeed attribute its rise ; for it is idle to suppose, with 
 Jacobs, that Sophocles ((Ed. T. 889) and Euripides (Hel. 118) had either the 
 verse or dogma in their eye. Aristotle, at least, the author of the Problems, 
 
 > See chapter iii. i. 4, S, 11. W. 
 18*
 
 418 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 13. All Perception is a sensitive cognition : it, therefore, appre- 
 hends the existence of no object out of its organism, or not in 
 immediate correlation to its organism ; for thus only can an ob- 
 ject exist, now and here, to sense. 
 
 is the oldest testimony for such a usage ; and long after Aristotle, after, in- 
 deed, the line had been already fathered on Epicharmus, wo have Pliny (II. 
 N. xi. 87), Cassius Felix (Pr. 22), St. Jerome (Adv. Jovin. ii. 9), the manu- 
 scripts of Stobaeus (iv. 42), and the Scholiast of Aristophanes (PI. 48), all ad- 
 ducing it only as an adage. It is not, however, till nearly six centuries after 
 Epicharmus, and considerably more than four centuries after Aristotle, that 
 we find the saying either fully cited as a verse, or the verse ascribed to the 
 Syracusan. But from the time of Plutarch, who himself thrice alleges it, its 
 quotation in either fashion becomes frequent ; as by Tertullian, Clement of 
 Alexandria, Maximus Tyrius, Julian, Theodoret, Olympiodorus (twice), and 
 Tzetzes (four times). Porphyry (thrice) records it but as a saying of Py- 
 thagoras ; and lamblichus, as a dictum of the Pythagorean School. These 
 authors both had learning, though neither, certainly, was ever critical in its 
 application. Their statements can only, therefore, be held to favor the opin- 
 ion that they were unaware of any decisive evidence to vindicate the verse 
 to Epicharmus. 
 
 4. But if improbable, even at first sight, that such a verse of such an au- 
 thor, should not, if authentic, have been adduced by any writer now extant, 
 during the long period of six hundred years, the improbability is enhanced 
 when we come to find, that during that whole period it is never quoted, 
 even under circumstances when, had it been current as aline of Epicharmus, 
 it could not but have been eagerly appealed to. Plato, as observed by Alci- 
 raus and Laertius, was notoriously fond of quoting Epicharmus ; and there 
 were at least two occasions in the Thewtetus ( 102, sq.), and in the Phsedo 
 ( 25 [11 Wytt.]) when this gnome of his favorite poet would have confirmed 
 and briefly embodied the doctrine he was anxiously inculcating. Could he fail 
 to employ it ? In fact, it comes to this ; these passages must either be held to 
 follow, or to found, the philosopheme in question. In like manner Cicero, in 
 his exposition of the first passage (Tusc. i. 20), couldhardly have avoided as- 
 sociating Epicharmus with Plato, as Tertullian and Olympiodorus have done in 
 their expositions of the second had the line been recognized in the age of the 
 former, as it was in the age of the two latter. Nor could such an apothegm of 
 such a poet have been unknown to Cicero, to Cicero, so generally conver- 
 sant with Hellenic literature, and who, among other sayings of Epicharmus 
 himself, adduces in Greek, as his brother Quintus paraphrases in Latin, the 
 no less celebrated maxim 
 
 Be softer, and to doubt incUn'd : 
 . These are the very joints of mind ; 
 or on the other reading 
 
 Be cool, and eke to doubt prepense : 
 These are the sinews of good seme.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 419 
 
 ii. Sensation proper and Perception proper, in correlation. 
 
 14. In perception proper there is a higher energy of intelli- 
 gence, than in Sensation proper. For though the latter be the 
 apprehension of an affection of the Ego, and therefore, in a certain 
 sort, the apprehension of an immaterial quality ; still it is only 
 the apprehension of the fact of an organic passion ; whereas the 
 former, though supposing Sensation as its condition, and though 
 only the apprehension of the attributes of a material Non-ego, is, 
 however, itself without corporeal passion, and, at the same time, 
 the recognition not merely of a fact, but of relations. (See 22, 29, 
 and p. 379 notef.) 
 
 15. Sensation proper is the conditio sine qua non of a Percep- 
 tion proper of the Primary qualities. For we are only aware of 
 the existence of our organism, in being sentient of it, as thus or 
 thus affected ; and are only aware of it being the subject of exten- 
 sion, figure, division, motion, <fec., in being percipient of its affec- 
 tions, as like or as unlike, and as out of, or locally external to, 
 each other. 
 
 16. Every Perception proper has a Sensation proper as its con- 
 dition ; but every Sensation has not a Perception proper as its 
 conditionate unless, what I think ought to be done, we view the 
 general consciousness of the locality of a sensorial affection as a 
 Perception proper. In this case, the two apprehensions will be 
 always coexistent. 
 
 17. But though the fact of Sensation proper, and the fact of 
 Perception proper imply each other, this is all, for the two cog- 
 nitions, though coexistent, are not proportionally coexistent. On 
 the contrary, although we can only take note of, that is perceive, 
 the special relations of sensations, on the hypothesis that these 
 sensations exist ; a sensation, in proportion as it rises above a low 
 degree of intensity, interferes with the perception of its relations, 
 by concentrating consciousness on its absolute affection alone. It 
 may accordingly be stated as a general rule That, above a cer- 
 tain point, the stronger the Sensation, the weaker the Perception ;
 
 420 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 and the distincter the perception the less obtrusive the sensation ; 
 in other words Though Perception proper and Sensation proper 
 exist only as they coexist, in the degree or intensity of their exist- 
 ence, they are always found in an inverse ratio to each other. (See 
 387 b, sq.) 
 
 18. The organism is the field of apprehension, both to Sensa- 
 tion proper and Perception proper ; but with this difference, 
 that the former views it as of the Ego, the latter, as of the Non- 
 ego ; that the one draws it within, the other shuts it out from the 
 sphere of self. As animated, as the subject of affections of which 
 I am conscious, the organism belongs to me ; and of these affec- 
 tions, which I recognize as mine, Sensation proper is the appre- 
 hension. As material, as the subject of extension, figure, divisi- 
 bility, and so forth, the organism does not belong to me, the con- 
 scious unit ; and of these properties, which I do not recognize as 
 mine, Perception proper is the apprehension.* (See 38, 39, and 
 p. 379 a f.) 
 
 19. The affections in Sensation proper are determined, (a) by 
 certain intra-organic, or (b) by certain extra-organic causes. The 
 
 * It may appear, not a paradox merely, but a contradiction to say, that the 
 organism is, at once, within and without the mind ; is, at once, subjective 
 and objective ; is, at once, Ego and Non-ego. But so it is ; and so we must 
 admit it to be, unless on the one hand, as MateriHlists, we identify mind 
 with matter, or, on the other, as Idealists, we identify matter with mind. 
 The organism, as animated, as sentient, is necessarily ours ; and its affec- 
 tions are only felt as affections of the indivisible Ego. In this respect, and 
 to this extent, our organs are not external to ourselves. But our organism 
 is not merely a sentient subject, it is at the same time an extended, figured, 
 divisible, in a word, a material, subject ; and the same sensations which are 
 reduced to unity in the indivisibility of consciousness are in the divisible or- 
 ganism recognized as plural and reciprocally external, and, therefore, as ex- 
 tended, figured, and divided. Such is the fact: but how the immaterial can 
 be united with matter, how the unextended can apprehend extension, how 
 the indivisible can measure the divided, this is the mystery of mysteries to 
 man. ' Modus (says the Pseudo-Augustin) Modus quo corporibus adhse- 
 rent spiritus, omnino mirus est, nee comprehend! ab hominibus potest; et 
 hoc ipse homo est.' Thus paraphrased by Pascal : ' Man is, to himself, the 
 mightiest prodigy of nature. For he is unable to conceive what is Body, 
 still less what is Mind, and, least of all, how there can be united a body and 
 * mind. This is the climax of his difficulties ; yet this is his peculiar nature.'
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 421 
 
 latter, as powers in bodies, beyond the sphere of perception, and 
 their effects in us, the objects of Sensation, are both (therefore 
 ambiguously) denominated, either, in the language of modern 
 philosophers, the Secondary Qualities of Matter, or, in the lan- 
 guage of Aristotle and his school, the Proper Sensibles. 1 
 
 20. Sensation proper has no object but a subject-object, i. e. the 
 organic affection of which we are conscious. The cause of chat 
 affection, whether without organism or within, that is, whether 
 or not a secondary quality of body, is immediately or in its own 
 nature unknown ; being known only, if known it ever be, me- 
 diately, by observation, induction, inference, conjecture. Even in 
 the perception of the Secundo-primary qualities, where there is 
 the perception proper of a quasi-primary quality, in some degree 
 of resistance, and the sensation proper of a secondary quality, in 
 some affection of the sentient organism, its effect ; still to Sensa- 
 tion proper there is no other object but the subjective affection ; 
 and even its dependence, as an effect, upon the resistance, as a 
 cause, is only a conclusion founded on the observed constancy of 
 their concomitance. (See 36, 37, and p. 376 b, sq.) 
 
 21. Nay, the Perception proper, accompanying a sensation 
 proper, is not an apprehension, far less a representation, of the 
 external or internal stimulus, or concause, which determines the 
 affection whereof the sensation is the consciousness. Not the 
 former ; for the stimulus or concause of a sensation is always, in 
 itself, to consciousness unknown. Not the latter ; for this would 
 turn Perception into Imagination reduce it from an immediate, 
 and assertory, and objective, into a mediate, and problematic, and 
 subjective cognition. In this respect, Perception proper is an 
 apprehension of the relations of sensations to each other, prima- 
 rily in Space, and secondarily in Time and Degree. (See 31.) 
 
 iii. Sensation proper. 
 
 22. Sensation proper, viewed on one side, is a passive affection 
 
 1 See previous chapter. W.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 of the organism ; but viewed on the other, it is an active apper- 
 ception, by the mind, of that affection. And as the former only 
 exists for us, inasmuch as it is perceived by us; and as it is 
 only perceived by us, inasmuch as it is apprehended, in an 
 active concentration, discrimination, judgment, of the mind ; 
 the latter, an act of intelligence, is to be viewed, as the principal 
 factor in the percipient process, even in its lower form, that of 
 Sensation proper.* (See 4, 10, 11, 14, with notes.) 
 
 iv. Perception proper. 
 
 23. In Perception proper, the object-object perceived is, always, 
 either a Primary quality, or the quasi-Primary phasis of a 
 Secundo-primary. (See p. 376 b, sq.) 
 
 24. The primary qualities are perceived as in our organism ; 
 the Quasi-primary phasis of the Secundo-primary as in correla- 
 tion to our organism. (See 394 a.) 
 
 25. Thus a perception of the Primary qualities does not, 
 
 * This is the true doctrine of Aristotle and his school, who are, however, 
 not unfrequently misrepresented by relation to the extreme counter-opinion 
 of the Platonists, as viewing in the cognitions of Sense a mere passion a mis- 
 representation to which, undoubtedly, a few of the Latin Schoolmen have 
 afforded grounds. It is, indeed, this twofold character of the Sensitive pro- 
 cess that enables us to reconcile the apparent confliction of those passages of 
 Aristotle, where (as De Anima, L. ii. c. 4, 8; c. 5, 2; c. 11, 14; c. 12, 
 1 ; De Sensu et Sensili, c. 1, 5; Physica, L. vii. c. 8. 12, Paciari division) 
 he calls Sensation a passion or alteration of the Sentient ; and those other* 
 where (as De Anima, L. iii. c. 8, 2) he asserts that in Sensation the Sen- 
 tient is not passively affected. In the former passages the sentient faculty is 
 regarded on its organic side, in the latter on its mental. Compare De Somuo 
 et Vigilia, c. 1, 6, where it is said, that 'Sensation is a process belonging 
 exclusively neither to the soul nor to the body, but, as energy, a motion of 
 the soul, through the [medium of the] body ;' a text which, however, may 
 still be variously expounded. See Alexander, in note t, P- 415; who, with 
 the other Greek interpreters, Ammonius, Simplicins, Philoponus, solves the 
 difficulty by saying, that it is not the sentient mind that suffers, but the sen- 
 tient organ. To the same effect are Galen and Nemesius, as quoted in note 
 *, p. 415. Eeid is partly at one with the Peripatetics ; with whose doctrine, 
 indeed, he is more frequently in accordance than he is always himself aware. 
 (Inq. 114 a.)
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 423 
 
 originally and in itself, reveal to us the existence, and qualitative 
 existence, of aught beyond the organism, apprehended by us as 
 extended, figured, divided, &c. 
 
 26. The primary qualities of things external to our organism 
 we do not perceive, i. e. immediately know. For these we only 
 learn to infer, from the affections which we come to find that 
 they determine in our organs ; affections which, yielding us a 
 perception of organic extension, we at length discover, by obser- 
 vation and induction, to imply a corresponding extension in the 
 extra-organic agents. 
 
 27. Further, in no part of the organism have we any apprehen- 
 sion, any immediate knowledge of extension in its true and abso- 
 lute magnitude ; perception noting only the fact given in sensa- 
 tion, and sensation affording no standard, by which to measure 
 the dimensions given in one sentient part with those given in 
 another. For, as perceived, extension is only the recognition of 
 one organic affection in its outness from another ; as a minimum 
 of extension is thus to perception the smallest extent of organism 
 in which sensations can be discriminated as plural : and as in 
 one part of the organism this smallest extent is, perhaps, some 
 million, certainly some myriad times smaller than in others ; it 
 follows that, to perception, the same real extension will appear, 
 in this place of the body, some million or myriad times greater 
 than in that.* Nor does this difference subsist only as between 
 sense and sense ; for in the same sense, and even in that sense 
 which has very commonly been held exclusively to afford a 
 
 * This difference in the power of discriminating affections, possessed by 
 diffcrent parts of the body, seems to depend partly on the minuteness and 
 isolation of the ultimate nervous fibrils, partly on the sensation being less 
 or more connected with pleasure and pain. In this respect the eve greatly 
 transcends all the other organs. For we can discriminate in the retina sen- 
 sations, as reciprocally external, more minutely than we can in touch as 
 over the greater part of the body two million five hundred thousand fold 
 as at the most sensitive place of the hand, a hundred thousand fold as at 
 the tip of the tongue, where tactile discrimination is at its maximum, fifty 
 thousand fold. I am, however, inclined to think, for reasons already given, 
 that we must reduce millions to myriads. (See p. 887, note.)
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 knowledge of absolute extension, I mean Touch proper, the min- 
 imum, at one part of the body, is some fifty times greater than 
 it is at another. (See p. 389 ab, note.) 
 
 28. The existence of an extra-organic world is apprehended, 
 not in a perception of the Primary qualities, but in a perception 
 of the quasi-primary phasis of the Secundo-primary ; that is, in 
 the consciousness that our locomotive energy is resisted, and not 
 resisted by aught in our organism itself. For in the conscious- 
 ness of being thus resisted is involved, as a correlative, the con- 
 sciousness of a resisting something external to our organism. 
 Both are, therefore, conjunctly apprehended. (See p. 394 a, 
 note.) This experience presupposes, indeed, a possession of the 
 notions of space and motion in space. 
 
 29. But on the doctrine that space, as a necessary condition, 
 is a native element of thought ; and since the notion of any one 
 of its dimensions, as correlative to, must inevitably imply the 
 others ; it is evident that every perception of sensations out of 
 sensations will afford the occasion, in apprehending any one, of 
 conceiving all the three extensions ; that is, of conceiving space. 
 On the doctrine, and in the language of Reid, our original cogni- 
 tions of space, motion, <fec., are instinctive ; a view which is con- 
 firmed by the analogy of those of the lower animals, which havr 
 the power of locomotion at birth. It is truly an idle problem to 
 attempt imagining the steps by which we may be supposed to 
 have acquired the notion of extension; when, in fact, we are 
 unable to imagine to ourselves the possibility of that notion not 
 being always in our possession. 
 
 30. We have, therefore, a twofold cognition of space : a) an a 
 priori or -native imagination of it, in general, as a necessary con- 
 dition of the possibility of thought ; and b) under that, an o 
 posteriori or adventitious percept of it, in particular, as contin- 
 gently apprehended in this or that actual complexus of sensations.* 
 
 * This doctrine agrees with that of Kant and Reid in the former ; it dif- 
 fers certainly from that of Kant, and probably from that of Reid, in the lat- 
 ter. But see chapter i.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 425 
 
 B.) Editor's doctrine of Perception, in contrast to that of Reid, 
 Stewart, Royer-Collard, and other philosophers of the Scottish 
 School* 
 
 31. Perception (proper) is the Notion or Conception of an 
 object, instinctively suggested, excited, inspired, or, as it were, 
 conjured up, on occasion or at the sign of a Sensation (proper).f 
 Reid, Inq. Ill b, 121 a, 122 a, 123 b, 128 b, note, 130 b, 159 a, 183 
 a, 188 a. I. P. 258 ab, 259 b, 260 b,. 318 ab, 327 a; Stewart, 
 El. vol. i. pp. 92, 93 ; Royer-Collard, in Jouffroy's Reid, vol. iii. 
 pp. 402, 403. 
 
 * I here contrast my own doctrine of perception with that of the philosophers 
 in question, not because their views and mine are those at farthest variance 
 on the point, but, on the contrary, precisely because they thereon approxi- 
 mate the nearest. I have already shown that the doctrine touching Percep- 
 tion held by Eeid (and in the present relation lie and his two illustrious fol- 
 lowers are in almost all respects at one) is ambiguous. For while some of 
 its statements seem to harmonize exclusively with the conditions of natural 
 presentationism, others, again, appear only compatible with those of an ego- 
 istical representationism. . Maintaining, as I do, the former doctrine, it is, of 
 course, only the positions conformable to the latter, which it is, at present, 
 necessary to adduce. 
 
 t This is not the doctrine, at least not the language of the doctrine of real 
 presentationism. It is the language, at best, of an egoistical representa- 
 tionism; and, as a doctrine, it coincides essentially with the theory of 
 mediate perception held by the lower Platonists, the Cartesians, and the 
 Leibnitzians as properly understood. The Platonizing Cudworth, in differ- 
 ent parts of his works, gives, in fact, nearly in the same terms, the same 
 account of the process of Sensitive Perception. He signalizes, firstly, the ' 
 bodily affection, determined by the impression of an external something 
 [precisely as Ecid] ; secondly, the sympathetic recognition thereof by the 
 soul [Reid's Sensation] ; thirdly, to quote his expressions, ' whereby accord- 
 ing to nature's instinct, it hath several Seemlngs or Appearances begotten in 
 it of those resisting objects, without it at a distance, in respect of color, mag- 
 nitude, figure, and local motion.' [Reid's Conceptions or Notions of which 
 Perception is made up.] (Imm. Mor. B. v. ch. 2, 3. Compare B. iii. ch. 
 1, 5.) See also above, the Neoplatonic doctrine as stated, p. 387 b, note; 
 the Cartesian Sylvain Regis, as quoted, p. 275 a; and the Cartesian Andala, 
 as quoted, p. 377 b, note ; and to these may be added the Aristotelian 
 Oompton Carlton (who did not reject the doctrine of a representative percep- 
 tion of the Common Sensiblcs), as quoted, p. 318 a. But that Reid might 
 possibly employ the terms notion and conception in a vague and improper 
 sense, for cognition in general, see p. 318, b, 4.
 
 426 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 On the contrary, I hold, in general, that as Perception, in either 
 form, is an immediate or presentative, not a mediate or represent- 
 ative cognition, that a Perception proper is not, and ought npt to 
 be called a Notion or Conception. And, I hold in particular, 
 that, on the one hand, in the consciousness of sensations, out of 
 each other, contrasted, limited, and variously arranged, we have a 
 Perception proper, of the primary qualities, in an externality to 
 the mind, though not to the nervous organism, as an immediate 
 cognition, and not merely as a notion or concept of something 
 extended, figured, &c. ; and on the other, as a correlative contain- 
 ed in the consciousness of our voluntary motive, energy resisted, 
 and not resisted by aught within the limits of mind and its 
 subservient organs, we have a Perception proper of the secundo- 
 primary quality of resistance, in an extra-organic force, as an imme- 
 diate cognition, and not merely as a notion or concept, of a resisting 
 something external to our body, though certainly in either 
 case, there may be, and probably is, a concomitant act of imagi- 
 nation, by which the whole complex consciousness on the occasion 
 is filled up. (See 21.)' 
 
 32. On occasion of the Sensation (proper), along with the notion 
 or conception which constitutes the Perception (proper), of the ex- 
 ternal object, there is blindly created in us, or instinctively determin- 
 ed, an invincible belief in its existence. (Reid, Inq. 159 a, 122 ab, 
 183 a, I. P. 258 a, 327 a, alibi ; Stewart and Royer-Collard, 11. cc.) 
 
 On the contrary, I hold, that we only believe in the existence 
 of what we perceive, as extended, figured, resisting, <fec., inasmuch 
 as we believe that we are conscious of these qualities as existing ; 
 consequently, that a belief in the existence of an extended world 
 external to the mind, and even external to the organism, is not a 
 faith blindly created or instinctively determined, in supplement of 
 a representative or mediate cognition, but exists in, as an integral 
 constituent of, Perception proper, as an act of intuitive or imme 
 diate knowledge. 
 
 1 And chapter ii. ii. W.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 427 
 
 33. The object of Perception (proper) is a conclusion, or infer- 
 ence, or result (instinctive, indeed, not ratiocinative), from a Sen- 
 sation proper. (Reid, Inq. 125 a, 186 b, I. P. 310 ab, 319 a ; 
 Royer-Collard, ]. c.) 
 
 On the contrary, I hold, that the object of Perception proper 
 is given immediately in and along with the object of Sensation 
 proper. 
 
 34. Sensation (proper) precedes, Perception (proper) follows. 
 (Reid, Inq. 186 b, 187 b. I. P. 320 b ; Stewart and Royer- 
 Collard, 11. cc.) 
 
 On the contraiy, I hold, that though Sensation proper be the 
 condition of, and therefore anterior to, Perception proper in the 
 order of nature, that, in the order of time, both are necessarily co- 
 existent, the latter being only realized in and through the pres- 
 ent existence of the former. Thus visual extension cannot be 
 perceived, or even imagined, except under the sensation of color ; 
 while color, again, cannot be apprehended or imagined, without, 
 respectively, a concomitant apprehension or phantasm of exten- 
 sion. 
 
 35. Sensation (proper) is not only an antecedent, but an arbi- 
 trary antecedent, of Perception (proper.) The former is only a 
 sign on occasion of which the latter follows ; they have no neces- 
 sary or even natural connection ; and it is only by the will of God 
 that we do not perceive the qualities of external objects indepen- 
 dently of any sensitive affection. This last, indeed, seems to be 
 actually the case in the perception of visible extension and figure. 
 (Reid, Inq. Ill b, 121 a, 143 b, 122 a, 123 b, 187 b, 188 a. I. 
 P. 257 b, 260 b, alibi; Stewart and Royer-Collard, 11. cc.) 
 
 On the contrary, I hold that Sensation proper is the universal 
 condition of Perception proper. We are never aware even of the 
 existence of our organism except as it is somehow affected ; and 
 are only conscious of extension, figure, and the other objects of 
 Perception proper, as realized in the relations of the affections of 
 our sentient organism, as a body extended, figured, &c. As to 
 color and visible extension, neither can be apprehended, neither
 
 428 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 can be even imagined apart from the other. (V. 320 a, foot- 
 note, et alibi.) 
 
 36. In a Sensation (proper) of the secondary qualities, as affec- 
 tions in us, we have a Perception (proper) of them as properties 
 in objects and causes of the affections in us. (Reid, I. P. 310 ab, 
 ;md Inq. passim ; Royer-Collard, 1. c.) 
 
 On the contrary, I hold, that as Perception proper is an imme- 
 diate cognition ; and as the secondary qualities, in bodies, are 
 only inferred, and therefore only mediately known to exist as oc- 
 cult causes of manifest effects ; that these, at best only objects of 
 a mediate knowledge, are not objects of Perception. (See 20, 21, 
 and p. 378.) 
 
 37. In like manner, in the case of various other bodily affec- 
 tions, as the toothache, gout, <fec., we have not only a Sensation 
 proper of the painful feeling, but a conception and belief, i. e. a 
 Perception (proper] of its cause. (Reid, I. P. 319 a, alibi.) 
 
 On the contrary, and for the same reason, I hold, that there is 
 in this case no such Perception. 
 
 38. Sensation (proper) is an affection purely of the mind, and 
 not in any way an affection of the body. (Reid, Inq. 105 a, 159 
 ab, 187 a, I. P. 229 ab, 310.) 
 
 On the contrary, I hold with Aristotle (De An. i. 5, De Som. 
 c. 1, 6), indeed, with philosophers in general, that Sensation is 
 an affection neither of the body alone nor of the mind alone, but 
 of the composite of which each is a constituent ; and that the 
 subject of Sensation may be indifferently said to be our organism 
 (as animated) or our soul (as united with an organism). For in- 
 stance, hunger or color, are, as apprehended, neither modes of mind 
 apart from body, nor modes of body apart from mind. (See 1 8.) 
 
 39. Sensations (proper) as merely affections of the rnind, have 
 wo locality in the body, no locality at all. (Reid, I. P. 319 ab, 
 320 ab.) From this the inference is necessary, that, though con- 
 scious of the relative place and reciprocal outness of sensations, we 
 do not in this consciousness apprehend any real externality and 
 extension.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 42-9 
 
 On the contrary, I hold, that Sensation proper, being the con- 
 sciousness of an affection, not of the mind alone, but of the mind 
 as it is united with the body, that in the consciousness of sensa- 
 tions, relatively localized and reciprocally external, we have a veri- 
 table apprehension, and consequently, an immediate perception of 
 the affected organism, as extended, divided, figured, &c. This 
 alone is the doctrine of Natural Realism, of Common Sense. 
 (See 18.) 
 
 40. In the case of Sensation (proper) and the Secondary qual- 
 ities, there is a determinate quality in certain bodies, exclusively 
 competent to cause a determinate sensation in us, as color, odor, 
 savor, &c. ; consequently, that from the fact of a similar internal 
 effect, we are warranted to infer the existence of a similar external 
 concause. (Reid, Inq. 137-142. I. P. 315, 316, alibi.) 
 
 On the contrary, I hold, that a similar sensation only implies 
 a similar idiopathic affection of the nervous organism ; but such 
 affection requires only the excitation of an appropriate stimulus ; 
 while such stimulus may be supplied by manifold agents of the 
 most opposite nature, both from within the body and from with- 
 out. 
 
 41. Perception excludes memory ; Perception (proper) cannot 
 therefore be apprehensive of motion. (Royer-Collard, supra 
 352 ab.) 
 
 On the contrary, I hold, that as memory, or a certain contin- 
 uous representation, is a condition of consciousness, it is a condi- 
 tion of Perception ; and that motion, therefore, cannot, on this 
 ground, be denied as an object apprehended through sense. 
 (See 6.) 
 
 42. An apprehension of relations is not an act of Perception 
 (proper). (Royer-Collard [apparently], ibid.) 
 
 On the contrary, I hold, in general, that as all consciousness is 
 realized only in the apprehension of the relations of plurality and 
 contrast ; and as perception is a consciousness ; that the appre- 
 hension of relation cannot, simpliciter, be denied to perception : 
 and, in particular, that unless we annihilate Perception proper, by
 
 430 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 denying to it the recognition of its peculiar objects, Extension, 
 Figure, and the other primary qualities, we cannot deny to it the 
 recognition of relations ; for, to say nothing of the others, Exten- 
 sion is perceived only in apprehending sensations out of sensa- 
 tions a relation ; and Figure is only perceived in apprehending 
 one perceived extension as limited, and limited in a certain man- 
 ner by another a complexus of relations. (See 9, pp. 352 a, 
 380 a.) 
 
 43. Distant realities are objects of Perception (proper). Reid, 
 Inq. 104 b, 145 a, 158 b, 159 ab, 160 a, 186 b; I. P. 299 a, 
 302 a, 303 a, 304 a, 305 b; Stewart, El. i. 79 sq.) 
 
 On the contrary, I hold, that the mind perceives nothing exter- 
 nal to itself, except the affections of the organism as animated, 
 the reciprocal relations of these affections, and the correlative in- 
 volved in the consciousness of its locomotive energy being resisted. 
 (See pp. 260, 270.) 
 
 44. Objects not in contact with the organs of sense are per- 
 ceived by a medium. (Reid, Inq. 104 b, 186 ab, 187 b; I. P. 
 247 ab.) 
 
 On the contrary, I hold, that the only object perceived is the 
 organ itself, as modified, or what is in contact with the organ, as 
 resisting. The doctrine of a medium is an error, or rather a con- 
 fusion, inherited from Aristotle, who perverted, in this respect, 
 the simpler and more accurate doctrine of Democritus. 
 
 45. Extension and Figure are first perceived through the sen- 
 sations of Touch. (Reid, Inq. 123-125, 188 a; I. P. 331; 
 Stewart, El. i. 349, 357 ; Ess. 564.) 
 
 On the contrary, I hold, that (unless by Extension be under- 
 stood only extension in the three dimensions, as Reid in fact seems 
 to do, but not Stewart) this is erroneous, for an extension is ap- 
 prehended in the apprehension of the reciprocal externality of all 
 sensations. Moreover, to allow even the statement as thus re- 
 stricted to pass, it would be necessary to suppose, that under Touch 
 it is meant to comprehend the consciousness of the Locomotive 
 energy and of the Muscular feelings. (See 390 b, sq.)
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 431 
 
 46. Externality is exclusively perceived on occasion of the sen- 
 sations of Touch. (Reid, Inq. 123, 124, 188, a ; I. P. 332 and 
 alibi ; Roy er- Collar d, Jouffroy's Reid, iii. 412.) 
 
 On the contrary, I hold, that it is, primarily, in the conscious- 
 ness of our locomotive energy being resisted, and, secondarily, 
 through the sensations of muscular feeling, that the perception of 
 Externality is realized. All this, however, might be confusedly 
 involved in the Touch of the philosophers in question. (See 28.) 
 
 47. Real (or absolute) magnitude is an object of perception 
 (proper) through Touch, but through touch only. (Reid, I. P. 
 303.) 
 
 On the contrary, I hold, that the magnitude perceived through 
 touch is as purely relative as that perceived through vision or 
 any other sense ; for the same magnitude does not appear the 
 same to touch at one part of the body and to touch at another. 
 (303 b, note ; 863 ab, note ; and n. 27.) 
 
 48. Color, though a secondary quality, is an object not of Sen- 
 sation (proper) but of Perception (proper) ; in other words, we 
 perceive Color, not as an affection of our own minds, but as a 
 quality of external things. (Reid, Inq. 137 ab, 138 a; I. P. 
 319 b.) 
 
 On the contrary, I hold, that color, in itself, as apprehended or 
 immediately known by us, is a mere affection of the sentient 
 organism ; and therefore like the other secondary qualities, an 
 object not of Perception, but of Sensation, proper. The only dis- 
 tinguishing peculiarity in this case, lies in the three following 
 circumstances : a) That the organic affection of color, though 
 not altogether indifferent, still, being accompanied by compara- 
 tively little pleasure, comparatively little pain, the apprehension 
 of this affection, qua affection, i. e. its Sensation proper, is, con- 
 sequently, always at a minimum. b) That the passion of color 
 first rising into -consciousness, not from the amount of the intensive 
 quantity of the affection, but from the amount of the extensive 
 quantity of the organism affected, is necessarily apprehended un- 
 der the condition of extension. c) That the isolation, tenuity,
 
 432 PHILOSOPHY OF PKRCKPTION. 
 
 and delicacy, of the ultimate filaments of the optic nerve, afford 
 us sensations minutely and precisely distinguished, sensations real- 
 ized in consciousness only as we are conscious of them as out of 
 each other in space. These circumstances show, that while in 
 vision Perception proper is at its maximum, and Sensation pro- 
 per at its minimum (17), the sensation of color cannot be real- 
 ized apart from the perception of extension : but they do not 
 warrant the assertions, that color is not, like the other secondary 
 qualities, apprehended by us as a mere sensorial affection, and, 
 therefore, an object not of Sensation proper but of Perception 
 proper. 
 
 II. HISTORICAL NOTICES IN REGARD TO THE DISTINCTION OF 
 PERCEPTION PROPER AND SENSATION PROPER. 
 
 This distinction is universally supposed to be of a modern date ; 
 no one has endeavored to carry it higher than Malebranche ; and, 
 in general, the few indications of it noticed previous to Reid, have 
 been commemorated as only accidental or singular anticipations.* 
 This is altogether erroneous ; the distinction is ancient ; and 
 
 * The only attempt of which I am aware, at any historical account of the 
 distinction in hand, is by Mr. Stewart, in Note F of his Essays. It contains, 
 however, notices, and these not all pertinent, only of Hutchcson, Crousaz, 
 Baxter, and D'Alembert, and none of these have any title to an historical 
 commemoration on the occasion. For Hutchcson (as already once and again 
 mentioned) only repeats, indeed, only thought of repeating, Aristotle ; while 
 the others, at best, merely re-echo Malebranche and the Cartesians. 
 
 I may here observe, that in that Note, as also repeatedly in the Disserta- 
 tion, Mr. Stewart (who has been frequently followed) is wrong in stating, uri- 
 exclusively, that Keid's writings were anterior to Kant's ; founding thereon 
 a presumption against the originality of the latter. The priority of Reid is 
 only true as limited to the ' Inquiry ;' but, on the ground of this alone there 
 could be proved, between the philosophers, but little community of thought, 
 on points where either could possibly claim any right of property. But 
 though Kant's first ' Critik' and ' Prolegomena' preceded Keid's ' Kssays' 
 by several years, no one will assuredly suspect any connection whatever be- 
 tween these several works. In general, 1 must bo allowed to say, that the 
 tone and tenor of Mr. Stewart's remarks on the philosopher of Koenigsberg 
 are remarkable exceptions to the usual cautious, candid, and dignified charac- 
 ter of his criticism.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 433 
 
 adopting, for the standard, my own opinion of what the distinc- 
 tion ought to be, I find it taken more simply and less incorrectly 
 by Aristotle than by any modern philosopher whatever. 
 
 Aristotle's discrimination of the Common and Proper Sensibles 
 or Percepts (which, has been already explained, 312 b, sq.) embod- 
 ies not only the modern distinction of the Primary and Secondary 
 Qualities of matter, but also the modern distinction of the two Per- 
 ceptions, Perception proper and Sensation proper. The generaliza- 
 tion of these two correlative distinctions into one, constitutes indeed 
 the first peculiar merit of Aristotle's analysis and nomenclature. 
 But a second is, that in his hands at least, the Common Sensibles, 
 the immediate objects of Perception proper, are viewed as the object- 
 objects of an intuitive, and not perverted into the subject-objects 
 of a representative cognition. For in the writings of Aristotle 
 himself I can find no ground for regarding him as other than a 
 presentationist or natural realist. In this respect his doctrine 
 stands distinguished from all the others in which the distinction 
 in question has been recognized ; for the Neo-Platonic, the Neo- 
 Aristotelic, the Scholastic (with certain exceptions), and the Car- 
 tesian, all proceed on the ideality or representative character of the 
 objects of which we are conscious in Perception proper. Even 
 Reid himself, as we have seen, and the Scottish School in general, 
 can only with doubt and difficulty be held as qualified excep- 
 tions. 1 
 
 Nay, the canon I have endeavored to establish of the univer- 
 sal coexistence in an inverse ratio of Perception proper and Sen- 
 sation proper (and in general of Feeling and Cognition), though 
 not enounced in its abstract universality by Aristotle, may still be 
 detected as supposed and specially applied by him. In his trea- 
 tise On the Soul (ii. 9, 1), speaking of the sense of Smell, and of 
 the difficulty of determining the nature and quality of its objects 
 odors, he says : ' The cause is, that we do not possess this sense 
 in any high degree of accuracy, but are, in this respect, inferior 
 
 1 See I. B of this chapter, and II. of chapter iii. W. 
 19
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 to many of the brutes ; for man smells imperfectly, and has no 
 perception of things odorous, unaccompanied by either pain or 
 pleasure ; the organ of this sense not being nicely discriminative.' 
 And the same is implied, in what he adds touching the vision of 
 the sclerophthalma. Does not this manifestly suppose the prin- 
 ciple that in proportion as a sense rises as a mean of informa- 
 tion, it sinks as a vehicle of pleasure and pain ? Galen, I may 
 notice, has some remarkable observations to the same effect. In 
 considering ' the causes of pleasure and pain in the several senses ;' 
 and after stating, in general, the order of intensity in which these 
 are susceptible of such affections, to wit, Touch or Feeling Taste 
 Smell Hearing Vision ; he goes on to treat of them in de- 
 tail. And here it is evident, that he also deems the capacity of 
 pain and pleasure in a sense to be inversely as its power of cog- 
 nitive discrimination. For, inter alia, he says of Hearing : ' The 
 pleasurable is more conspicuous in this sense [than in that of 
 Vision], because it is of a coarser nature and constitution ; but 
 the pleasurable becomes even more manifest in the sensations of 
 Smell, because the nature and constitution of this sense is coarser 
 still.' (De Symt. causis L. i. c. 6.) 
 
 The distinction of the Common and Proper Sensibles, and vir- 
 tually, therefore, the distinction in question, was continued, with 
 some minor developments, by the Greek and Latin Aristotelians. 
 (See 318 a, 385 ab.) As to the interesting doctrine, on this 
 point, of those Schoolmen who rejected intentional species in 
 Perception, I may refer, instar omnium, to Biel. (Collect. L. ii. 
 dist. 3. qu. 2.) 
 
 Sensation proper and Perception proper were, however, even 
 more strongly contradistinguished in the system of the lower 
 Platonists. They discriminated, on the one hand, in the body, 
 the organic passion and its recognition that is, Sensation proper ; 
 and on the other in the impassive soul, the elicitation into conscious- 
 ness (through some inscrutable instinct or inspiration) of a gnos- 
 tic reason, or subjective form, representative of the external object 
 affecting the sense that is, Perception proper. There might also
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 435 
 
 be shown, in like manner, an analogy between the distinction in 
 question, and that by the Schoolmen of the species impressa et 
 expressa ; but on this I shall not insist. Nor on the Neo-Pla- 
 tonic theory of Perception which has rarely been touched upon> 
 and when touched on almost always misrepresented (even Mr. 
 Harris, for instance, has wholly misconceived the nature of 
 the gnostic reasons) ; nor on this can I now enter, though, as 
 recently noticed, it bears a striking analogy to one phasis of the 
 doctrine of Reid. In special reference to the present distinction 
 I may, however, refer the reader to a passage of Plotinus. (Enn. 
 
 in. vi. 2.) 
 
 In the Cartesian philosophy, the distinction was virtually taken 
 by Descartes, but first discriminated in terms by his followers. 
 In general, Perception proper, and the Primary qualities as per- 
 ceived, they denoted by Idea ; Sensation proper, and the Second- 
 ary qualities as felt by Sensation (sensatio, sentiment). See De 
 Raei (Clavis, &c., p. 299, alibi, ed. 1677) ; De la Forge (De 
 1'Esprit, ch. 10, p. 109 sq., ch. 17, p. 276, ed. Amst. et supra 
 328 a) ; Geulinx (Dicfe~~ Principia, pp. 45, 48, alibi, et supra 
 ,328 a) ; Rohault (Physique, passim) ; Malebranche (Recherche, 
 L. iii. P. ii. ch. 6 and 7, with Ecclairc. on last, et supra 330 b) ; 
 Silvain Regis (Cours, t. i. pp. 60, 61, 72, 145); Bossuet (Con- 
 naisance de Dieu, ch. iii. art. 8); while Huffier, S" 1 Gravesande, 
 Crousaz, Sinsert, Keranflech, Genovesi, with a hundred others, 
 might be adduced as showing that the same distinction had been 
 very generally recognized before Reid ; who, far from arrogating 
 to himself the credit of its introduction, remarks that it had been 
 first accurately established by Malebranche. 
 
 As already noticed (330 b), it is passing strange that Locke, 
 but truly marvellous that Leibnitz, should have been ignorant of 
 the Cartesian distinction of Sensation and Idea (Sentiment, Idee). 
 Locke's unacquaintance is shown in his ' Essay,' besides other 
 places, in B. ii. ch. 13, 25, but, above all, in his 'Examination 
 of P. Malebranche's Opinion ;' and that of Leibnitz, elsewhere, 
 and in L. ii. ch. 8 of his ' Nouveaux Essais,' but more particularly
 
 436 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 in the ' Examen du Sentiment clu P. Malebranche,' both of which 
 works he wrote in opposition to the relative treatises of Locke. 
 As for Locke, he seems wholly unaware that any difference sub- 
 sisted in the Cartesian school, between Idea and Sensation ; 
 while Leibnitz actually thinks that Malebranche ' entend par sen- 
 timent une perception d'imagination !' In his own philosophy, 
 Leibnitz virtually supersedes the discrimination. I am, therefore, 
 doubly surprised at the observation of M. Royer-Collard, that 
 ' Malebranche is the first among modem philosophers, and, with 
 Leibnitz, perhaps the only one before Reid, who accurately dis- 
 tinguished perception from the sensation which is its forerunner 
 and sign.' (Jouffroy's Reid, iii. 329.) 
 
 In the Kantian school, and generally in the recent philosophy 
 of Germany, the distinction is adopted, and marked out by the 
 terms Anschauung or Intuitio for the one apprehension, and 
 Empfindung or Sensatio for the other. In France and Italy, on 
 the other hand, where the distinction has been no less universally 
 recognized, Reid's expressions, Perception and Sensation, have 
 become the prevalent; but their ambiguity, I think, ought to 
 have been avoided, by the addition of some such epithet as 
 proper. 
 
 Since generalizing the Law of the coexistence, but the coexist- 
 ence in an inverse ratio, of Sensation and Perception, of the sub- 
 jective and objective, and, in general, of feeling and cognition ; I 
 have noticed, besides those adduced above from Aristotle and 
 Galen, other partial observations tending to the same result, by 
 sundry modern philosophers. Sulzer, in a paper published in 
 1759 (Vermischte Schriften, vol. i. p. 113), makes the remark, 
 that ' a representation manifests itself more clearly in proportion 
 as it has less the power of exciting in us emotion ;' and confirms 
 it by the analogy observed in the gradation of the agreeable and 
 disagreeable sensations. Kant in his Anthropologie (1798, 14), 
 in treating of the determinate or organic senses (Seusus fixi), 
 says : ' Three of these are rather objective than subjective i. e. 
 as empirical intuitions, they conduce more to the cognition of the
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 437 
 
 external object, than they excite the consciousness of the affected 
 organ ; but two are rather subjective than objective i. e. the 
 representation they mediate is more that of enjoyment [or suffer- 
 ing] than of the cognition of the external object. . . . The 
 senses of the former class are those 1) of Touch (tactus), 2) of 
 Sight (visus), 3) of Hearing (auditus) ; of the latter, those a) 
 of Taste (gustus), b) of Smell (olfactus).' This and the Galenic 
 arrangement will appear less connective, if we recollect, that 
 under Touch Galen comprehends Feeling proper, whereas Feeling 
 proper is by Kant relegated to his vital sense or sensus vagus, 
 the coenaesthesis or common sense of others. See also Meiners, 
 Untersuchungen, i. p. 64 ; Wetzel, Psychologic, i. 225 ; Fries, 
 N. Kritik, i. 14-19 ; Anthropologie, i. 27, 28, &c., &c. 
 
 M. Ravaisson, in an article of great ability and learning on the 
 4 Fragments de Philosophic' which M. Peisse did me the honor 
 to translate, when speaking of the reform of philosophy in France, 
 originating in Maine de Hira^s recoil against the Sensualistic 
 doctrine, has the following passage : ' Maine de Biran commence 
 par separer profondement de la passion I'activite, que Condillac 
 avait confondue avec elle sous le titre commun de Sensation. 
 La sensation proprement dite est une affection tout passive; 
 1'etre qui y serait reduit irait se perdre, s' absorber dans toutes 
 ses modifications ; il deviendrait successivement chacune d'elles, 
 il ne se trouverait pas, il ne se distinguerait pas, et jamais ne se 
 connaitrait lui-mfime. Bien loin que la connaissance soit la sen- 
 sation seule, la sensation, en se melant a elle, la trouble et 1'ob- 
 scurcit, et elle eclipse a son tour la sensation. De la, la loi que 
 M. Hamilton a signalee dans son remarquable article sur la theo- 
 rie de la perception : la sensation et la perception, quoique instpa- 
 rables, sont en raison inverse Vune de Tautre. Cette loi fonda- 
 mentale, Maine de Biran 1'avait decouverte pres de trente ans 
 auparavant, et en avait suivi toutes les applications ; il en avait 
 surtout approfondi le principe, savoir, que la sensation resulte de 
 la passion, et que la perception resulte de 1'action.' (Revue des 
 Deux Mondes, Nov. 1840.) It is perhaps needless for me to say,
 
 438 PHILOSOPHY OF PERCEPTION. 
 
 that when I enounced the law in question (in 1830), I had never 
 seen the printed memoir by De Biran, which, indeed, from the 
 circumstances of its publication, was, I believe, inaccessible 
 through the ordinary channels of the trade, and to be found in 
 no library in this country ; and now I regret to find that, through 
 procrastination, I must send this chapter to press before having 
 obtained the collective edition of his earlier works, which has 
 recently appeared in Paris. All that I know of De Biran is 
 comprised in the volume edited in 1834 by M. Cousin, from 
 whose kindness I received it. In this, the ' Nouvelles Conside- 
 rations sur les Rapports du Physique et du Moral de 1'Homme,' 
 the treatise in which, as his editor informs us, the full and final 
 development of his doctrine is contained, was for the first time 
 published. But neither in that, nor in any other of the accom- 
 panying pieces, can I discover any passage besides the following, 
 that may be viewed as anticipating the law of coexistence and 
 inversion : ' Souvent une impression perdue a tel degre cesse de 
 l'6tre a un degr6 plus eleve ou lorsqu'elle s'avive au point d'ab- 
 sorber la conscience ou le moi lui-meme qui la devient. Ainsi 
 plus la sensation serait 6minemment animale, moins elle aurait 
 le caractere vrai d'une perception humaine.'
 
 PART THIRD. 
 
 PHILOSOPHY 
 
 OF THE 
 
 CONDITIONED,
 
 "Laudabilior est animus, cui nota est infirmitas propria, quam qui, eu 
 non respecta, racenia mundi, vias siderum, fundamenta terrarum et fastigia 
 coelorum, etiam cogniturns, scrutatur." ST. AUGUSTINE, (De Uhitate, proem 
 to the fourth book.)
 
 CHAPTER I. 1 
 
 EEFUTATION OF THE VAEIOUS DOCTRINES OF THE UNCONDI- 
 TIONED, ESPECIALLY OF COUSIN'S DOCTEINE OF THE INFI- 
 NITO-ABSOLUTE.* 
 
 THE delivery of these Lectures 2 excited an unparalleled sensa- 
 tion in Paris. Condemned to silence during the reign of Jesuit 
 ascendency, M. Cousin, after eight years of honorable retirement, 
 
 1 This was originally published in the Edinburgh Review, for October, 
 1829. It has since been republished in the Discussions, pp. 1-37. W. 
 
 s Hamilton is reviewing a work entitled, ' Cours de Philosophic, par M. 
 Victor Cousin, Professeur de Philosophie a la Faculte" des Lettres de Paris. 
 Introduction d. VHistoire de la Philosophie, 8vo. Paris, 1823.' See our trans- 
 lation of ' Cousin's History of Philosophy,' vol. i. W. 
 
 * [Translated into French, by M. Peisse ; into Italian, by S. Lo Gatto : 
 also in Cross's Selections from the Edinburgh Review. 
 
 This article did not originate with myself. I was requested to write it by 
 my friend, the late accomplished Editor of the Review, Professor Napier. 
 Personally I felt averse from the task. I was not unaware, that a discussion 
 of the leading doctrine of the book would prove unintelligible, not only 
 to ' the general reader,' but, with few exceptions, to our British metaphysi- 
 cians at large. But, moreover, I was still farther disinclined to the undertak- 
 ing, because it would behoove me to come forward in overt opposition to a 
 certain theory, which, however powerfully advocated, I felt altogether una- 
 ble to admit ; whilst its author, M. Cousin, was a philosopher for whose 
 genius and character I already had the wannest admiration, an admiration 
 which every succeeding year has only augmented, justified, and confirmed. 
 Nor, in saying this, need I make any reservation. For I admire, even where 
 I dissent ; and were M. Cousin's speculations on the Absolute utterly abol- 
 ished, to him would still remain the honor, of doing more himself, and of 
 contributing more to what has been done by others, in the furtherance of an 
 enlightened philosophy, than any other living individual in France I might 
 say in Europe. Mr. Napier, however, was resolute ; it was the first number 
 of the Review under his direction ; and the criticism was hastily written. 
 In this country the reasonings were of course not understood, and naturally, 
 for a season, declared incomprehensible. Abroad, in France, Germany, 
 Italy, and latterly in America, the article has been rated higher than it de- 
 serves. The illustrious thinker, against one of whose doctrines its argument 
 
 19*
 
 442 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 
 
 not exempt from persecution, had again ascended the chair of 
 Philosophy ; and the splendor with which he recommenced his 
 academical career, more than justified the expectation which his 
 recent celebrity as a writer, and the memory of his earlier prelec- 
 tions, had inspired. Two thousand auditors listened, all with ad- 
 miration, many with enthusiasm, to the eloquent exposition of 
 doctrines intelligible only to the few ; and the oral discussion of 
 philosophy awakened in Paris, and in France, an interest unex- 
 ampled since the days of Abelard. The daily journals found it 
 necessary to gratify, by their earlier summaries, the impatient cu- 
 riosity of the public ; and the lectures themselves, taken in short- 
 hand, and corrected by the Professor, propagated weekly the 
 influence of his instruction to the remotest provinces of the king- 
 dom. 
 
 Nor are the pretensions of this doctrine disproportioned to the 
 attention which it has engaged. It professes nothing less than to 
 be the complement and conciliation of all philosophical opinion ; 
 and its author claims the glory of placing the key-stone in the 
 arch of science, by the discovery of elements hitherto unobserved 
 among the facts of consciousness. 
 
 Before proceeding to consider the claims of M. Cousin to ori- 
 ginality, and of his doctrine to truth, it is necessary to say a few 
 words touching the state and relations of philosophy in France. 
 
 After the philosophy of Descartes and Malebranche had sunk 
 
 is directed, was the first to speak of it in terms which, though I feel their 
 generosity, I am ashamed to quote. I may, however, state, that maintaining 
 always his opinion, M. Cousin (what is rare, especially in metaphysical dis- 
 cussions) declared, that it was neither unfairly combated nor imperfectly 
 understood. In connection with this criticism, the reader should compare 
 what M. Cousin has subsequently stated in defence and illustration of his 
 system, in his Preface to the new edition of the Introduction a PHistoire de 
 la Philosophie, and Appendix to the fifth lecture ((Euvres, Serie II. Tome i. 
 pp. vii. ix., and pp. 112-129) ; in his Preface to the second edition, and his 
 Advertisement to the third edition of the Fragments PhilosopMques ((Euvres 
 8. III. T. iv.) and in his Prefatory Notice to the Pensies de Pascal ((Euvres, 
 8". IV. T. i.) On the other hand, M. Peisse has ably advocated the counter- 
 view, in his Preface and Appendix to the Fragments de Philosophic, &c.]
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 443 
 
 into oblivion, and from the time that Condillac, exaggerating the 
 too partial principles of Locke, had analyzed all knowledge into 
 sensation, Sensualism (or, more correctly, Sensuism), as a psycho- 
 logical theory of the origin of our cognitions, became, in France, 
 not only the dominant, but almost the one exclusive opinion. It 
 was believed that reality and truth were limited to experience, 
 and experience was limited to the sphere of sense ; while the 
 very highest faculties of mind were deemed adequately explained 
 when recalled to perceptions, elaborated, purified, sublimated, 
 and transformed. From the mechanical relations of sense with 
 its object, it was attempted to solve the mysteries of will and 
 intelligence ; the philosophy of mind was soon viewed as, cor- 
 relative to the physiology of organization. The moral nature 
 of man was at last formally abolished, in its identification with 
 his physical : mind became a reflex of matter ; thought a secre- 
 tion of the brain. 
 
 A doctrine so melancholy in its consequences, and founded 
 on principles thus partial and exaggerated, could not be perma- 
 nent : a reaction was inevitable. The recoil which began about 
 twenty years ago, has been gradually increasing ; and now it is 
 perhaps even to be apprehended, that its intensity may become 
 excessive. As the poison was of foreign growth, so also has been 
 the antidote. The doctrine of Condillac was, if not a corruption, 
 a development of the doctrine of Locke ; and in returning to a 
 better philosophy, the French are still obeying an impulse com- 
 municated from without. This impulsion may be traced to two 
 different sources, to the philosophy of Scotland, and to the 
 philosophy of Germany. 
 
 In Scotland, a philosophy had sprung up, which, though pro- 
 fessing, equally with the doctrine of Condillac, to build only on 
 experience, did not, like that doctrine, limit experience to the 
 relations of sense and its objects. Without vindicating to man 
 more than a relative knowledge of existence, and restricting the 
 science of mind to an observation of the fact of consciousness, it, 
 however, analyzed that fact into a greater number of more im-
 
 444 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 
 
 portent elements than had been recognized in the school of Con- 
 dillac. It showed that phenomena were revealed in thought 
 which could not be resolved into any modifications of sense, 
 external or internal. It proved that intelligence supposed prin- 
 ciples, which, as the conditions of its activity, cannot be the 
 results of its operation ; that the mind contained knowledges, 
 which, as primitive, universal, necessary, are not to be explained 
 as generalizations from the contingent and individual, about 
 which alone all experience is conversant. The phenomena of 
 mind were thus distinguished from the phenomena of matter ; 
 and if the impossibility of materialism were not demonstrated, 
 there was, at least, demonstrated the impossibility of its proof. 
 
 This philosophy, and still more the spirit of this philosophy 
 was calculated to exert a salutary influence on the French. And 
 such an influence it did exert. For a time, indeed, the truth 
 operated in silence, and Reid and Stewart had already modified 
 the philosophy of France, before the French were content to 
 acknowledge themselves their disciples. In the works of Dege- 
 rando and Laromiguiere, may be traced the influence of Scottish 
 speculation ; but it is to Royer-Collard, and, more recently, to 
 Jouffroy, that our countrymen are indebted for a full acknowl- 
 edgment of their merits, and for the high and increasing estima- 
 tion in which their doctrines are now held in France. M. Royer- 
 Collard, whose authority has, in every relation, been exerted only 
 for the benefit of his country, and who, once great as a professor, 
 is now not less illustrious as a statesman, in his lectures, advo- 
 cated with distinguished ability the principles of the Scottish 
 school ; modestly content to follow, while no one was more 
 entitled to lead. M. Jouffroy, by his recent translation of the 
 works of Dr. Reid, and by the excellent preface to his version of 
 Mr. Dugald Stewart's ' Outlines of Moral Philosophy,' has like- 
 wise powerfully co-operated to the establishment, in France, of a 
 philosophy equally opposed to the exclusive Sensualism of Con- 
 dillac, and to the exclusive Rationalism of the new German 
 school.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 445 
 
 Germany may be regarded, latterly at least, as the metaphysi- 
 cal antipodes of France. The comprehensive and original genius 
 of Leibnitz, itself the ideal abstract of the Teutonic character, had 
 reacted powerfully on the minds of his countrymen ; and Ra- 
 tionalism (more properly Intellectualism*}, has, from his time, 
 always remained the favorite philosophy of the Germans. On 
 the principle of this doctrine, it is in Reason alone that truth and 
 reality are to be found. Experience affords only the occasions 
 on which intelligence reveals to us the necessary and universal 
 notions of which it is the complement ; and these notions con- 
 stitute at once the foundation of all reasoning, and the guaran- 
 tee of our whole knowledge of reality. Kant, indeed, pro- 
 nounced the philosophy of Rationalism a mere fabric of delusion. 
 He declared that a science of existence was beyond the compass 
 of our faculties ; that pure reason, as purely subjective,! and con- 
 
 * [On the modern commutation of Intellect or Intelligence (Nous, Mens, In- 
 teUectvs, Verstand), and Reason (A.6yos, Ratio, Vernunft), see Dissertations on 
 Eeid, pp. 668, 669, 693. (This has nothing to do with the confusion of Rea- 
 son and Reasoning. ) Protesting, therefore, against the abuse, I historically 
 employ the terms as they were employed by the philosophers here commem- 
 orated. This unfortunate reversal has been propagated to the French philos- 
 ophy, and also adopted in England by Coleridge and his followers. I may 
 here notice that I use the term Understanding, not for the noetic faculty, 
 intellect proper, or place of principles, but for the dianoetic or discursive fac- 
 ulty, in its widest signification, for the faculty of relations or comparison ; 
 and thus in the meaning in which Verstand is now employed by the Ger- 
 mans. In this sense I have been able to be uniformly consistent.] 
 
 t In the philosophy of mind, subjective denotes what is to be referred to 
 the thinking subject, the Ego; objective what belongs to the object of 
 thought, the Non-Ego. It may ba safe, perhaps, to say a few words in 
 vindication of our employment of these terms. By the Greeks the word 
 kroKttitcvov was equivocally employed to express either the object of knowledge 
 (the materia circa quam), or the subject of existence (the materia in qua). 
 The exact distinction of subject and object was first made by the schoolmen ; 
 and to the schoolmen the vulgar languages are principally indebted for what 
 precision and analytic subtilty they possess. These correlative terms cor- 
 respond to the first and most important distinction in philosophy ; they em- 
 body the original antithesis in consciousness of self and not-self, a distinc- 
 tion which, in fact, involves the whole science of mind ; for psychology is 
 nothing more than a determination of the subjective and the objective, in 
 themselves, and in their reciprocal relations. Thus significant of the prima- 
 ry and most extensive analysis in philosophy, these terms, in their substan-
 
 446 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 
 
 scious of nothing but itself, was therefore unable to evince the 
 reality of aught beyond the phenomena of its personal modifica- 
 tions. But scarcely had the critical philosopher accomplished 
 the recognition of this important principle, the result of which 
 was, to circumscribe the field of speculation by narrow bounds ; 
 than from the very disciples of his school there arose philoso- 
 phers, who, despising the contracted limits and humble results 
 of a philosophy of observation, re-established, as the predomi- 
 nant opinion, a bolder and more uncompromising Rationalism 
 than any that had ever previously obtained for their countrymen 
 the character of philosophic visionaries 
 
 ' Gens ratione ferox, et mentem pasta chimseris.'* 
 (' Minds fierce for reason, and on fancies fed.') 
 
 live and adjective forms, passed from the schools into the scientific language 
 of Telesius, Campanella, Berigardus, Gassendi, Descartes, Spinosa, Leib- 
 nitz, Wolf, &c. Deprived of these terms, the Critical philosophy, indeed 
 the whole philosophy of Germany, would be a blank. In this country, 
 though familiarly employed in scientific language, even subsequently to the 
 time of Locke, the adjective forms seem at length to have dropt out of the 
 English tongue. That these words waxed obsolete was perhaps caused by 
 the ambiguity which had gradually crept into the signification of the sub- 
 stantives. Object, besides its proper, signification, came to be abusively 
 applied to denote motive, end, final cause (a meaning not recognized by John- 
 son). This innovation was probably borrowed from the French, in whose 
 language the word had been similarly corrupted after the commencement of 
 the last century (Diet, de Trevoux, voce olget). Subject in English, as sujet 
 in French, had been also perverted into a synonym for object, taken in its 
 proper meaning, and had thus returned to the original ambiguity of the cor- 
 responding term in Greek. It is probable that the logical application of the 
 word (subject of attribution or predication) facilitated or occasioned this con- 
 fusion. In using the terms, therefor!, we think that an explanation, but 
 no apology, is required. The distinction is of paramount importance, and of 
 infinite application, not only hi philosophy proper, but in grammar, rheto- 
 ric, criticism, ethics, politics, jurisprudence, theology. It is adequately 
 expressed by no other terms ; and if these did not already enjoy a prescrip- 
 tive right, as denizens of the language, it cannot be denied, that, as strictly 
 analogical, they would be well entitled to sue out their naturalization. [Not 
 that these terms were formerly always employed in the same signification 
 and contrast which they now obtain. For a history of these variations, see 
 Part II. chapter ii. p. 243 sq. Since this article was written, the words have 
 in this country re-entered on their ancient rights ; they are now in common 
 use.] 
 * [This line, which was quoted from memory, has, I find, in the origiixal,
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 447 
 
 Founded by Fichte, but evolved by Schelling, this doctrine re- 
 gards experience as unworthy of the name of science ; because, as 
 only of the phenomenal, the transitory, the dependent, it is only 
 of that which, having no reality in itself, cannot be established 
 as a valid basis of certainty and knowledge. Philosophy must, 
 therefore, either be abandoned, or we must be able to seize the 
 One, the Absolute, the Unconditioned, immediately and in itself. 
 And this they profess to do by a kind of intellectual vision.* 
 In this act, reason, soaring above the world of sense, but beyond 
 the sphere of personal consciousness, boldly places itself at the 
 very centre of absolute being, with which it claims to be, in fact, 
 identified ; and thence surveying existence in itself, and in its re- 
 lations, unveils to us the nature of the Deity, and explains, from 
 first to last, the derivation of all created things. 
 
 M. Cousin is the apostle of Rationalism in France, and we are 
 willing to admit that the doctrine could not have obtained a more 
 eloquent or devoted advocate. For philosophy he has suffered ; 
 
 ' furens;' therefore translated 'Minds mad with reasoning and fancy-fed.' 
 The author certainly had in his eye the ' ratione insanias ' of Terence. It is 
 from a satire by Abraham Eemi, who in the former half of the seventeenth 
 century, was professor Eoyal of Eloquence in the University of Paris ; and 
 it referred to the disputants of the Irish College in that illustrious school. 
 The ' Hibernian Logicians' were, indeed, long famed over the continent of 
 Europe, for their acuteness, pugnacity, and barbarism ; as is recorded by 
 Patin, Bayle, Le Sage, and many others. The learned Menage was so de- 
 lighted with the verse, as to declare that he would give his best benefice 
 (and he enjoyed some fat ones) to have written it. It applies, not only 
 with real, but with verbal accuracy, to the German Rationalists ; who in 
 Philosophy (as Aristotle has it), ' in making reason omnipotent, show their 
 own impotence of reason,' and in Theology (as Charles II. said of Isaac 
 Vossius), ' believe every tiling but the Bible.'] 
 
 * [' InteUectuelle Anschauung." 1 This is doubly wrong. 1, In grammatical 
 rigor, the word in German ought to have been ' intellectual.' 2, In phi- 
 losophical consistency the intuition ought to have been called by its authors 
 (Fichte and Schelling), intellectual. For, though this be, in fact, absolutely 
 more correct, yet relatively it is a blunder ; for the intuition, as intended by 
 them, is of their higher faculty, the Reason (Vernunft), and not of their 
 lower, the Understanding or Intellect (Verstand). In modern German 
 Philosophy, Verstand is always translated by Intettecfaa ; and this again cor- 
 responds to NoBj.]
 
 448 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 
 
 to her ministry he has consecrated himself devoted without 
 reserve his life and labors. Neither has he approached the 
 sanctuary with unwashed hands. The editor of Proclus and 
 Descartes, the translator and interpreter of Plato, and the prom- 
 ised expositor of Kant, will not be accused of partiality in the 
 choice of his pursuits ; while his two works, under the title of 
 Philosophical Fragments, bear ample evidence to the learning, 
 elegance, and distinguished ability of their author. Taking him 
 all in all, in France M. Cousin stands alone : nor can we contem- 
 plate his character and accomplishments, without the sincerest 
 admiration, even while we dissent from the most prominent prin- 
 ciple of his philosophy. The development of his system, in all its 
 points, betrays the influence of German speculation on his opin- 
 ions. His theory is not, however, a scheme of exclusive Ra- 
 tionalism ; on the contrary, the peculiarity of his doctrine con- 
 sists 1n the attempt to combine the philosophy of experience, and 
 the philosophy of pure reason, into one. The following is a con- 
 cise statement of the fundamental positions of his system. 
 
 Reason, or intelligence, has three integrant elements, affording 
 three regulative principles, which at once constitute its nature, 
 and govern its manifestations. These three ideas severally sup- 
 pose each other, and, as inseparable, are equally essential and 
 equally primitive. They are recognized by Aristotle and by 
 Kant, in their several attempts to analyze intelligence into its 
 principles ; but though the categories of both philosophers com 
 prise all the elements of thought, in neither list are these elements 
 naturally co-arranged, or reduced to an ultimate simplicity. 
 
 The first of these ideas, elements, or laws, though funda- 
 mentally one, our author variously expresses, by the terms unity, 
 identity, substance, absolute cause, the infinite, pure thought, &c. ; 
 (we would briefly call it the unconditioned.) The second, he 
 denominates plurality, difference, phenomenon, relative cause, 
 the finite, determined thought, <fec. ; (we would style it the con- 
 ditioned.) These two elements are relative and correlative. The 
 first, though absolute, is not conceived as existing absolutely in
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 449 
 
 itself ; it is conceived as an absolute cause, as a cause which can- 
 not but pass into operation ; in other words, "the first element 
 must manifest itself in the second. The two ideas are thus con- 
 nected together as cause and effect ; each is only realized through 
 the other ; and this their connection, or correlation, is the third 
 integrant element of intelligence. 
 
 Reason, or intelligence, in which these ideas appear, and which, 
 in fact, they make up, is not individual, is not ours, is not even 
 human ; it is absolute, it is divine. What is personal to us, is 
 our free and voluntary activity ; what is not free and not volun- 
 tary, is adventitious to man, and does not constitute an integrant 
 part of his individuality. Intelligence is conversant with truth ; 
 truth, as necessary and universal, is not the creature of my voli- 
 tion ; and reason, which, as the subject of truth, is also universal 
 and necessary, is consequently impersonal. We see, therefore, by 
 a light which is not ours, and reason is a revelation of God in man. 
 The ideas of which we are conscious, belong not to us, but to ab- 
 solute intelligence. They constitute, in truth, the very mode and . 
 manner of its existence. For consciousness is only possible under 
 plurality and difference, and intelligence is only possible through 
 consciousness. 
 
 The divine nature is essentially comprehensible. For the three 
 ideas constitute the nature of the Deity ; and the very nature of 
 ideas is to be conceived. God, in fact, exists to us, only in so far 
 as he is known ; and the degree of our knowledge must always 
 determine the measure of our faith. The relation of God to the 
 universe is therefore manifest, and the creation easily understood. 
 To create, is not to make something out of nothing, for this is 
 contradictory, but to originate from self. We create so often 
 as we exert our free causality, and something is created by us, 
 when something begins to be by virtue of the free causality which 
 belongs to us. To create, is, therefore, to cause, not with nothing 1 , 
 but with the very essence of our being with our force, our will, 
 our personality. The divine creation is of the same character. 
 God, as he is a cause, is able to create ; as he is an absolute cause,
 
 450 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 
 
 he cannot but create. In creating the universe, he does not draw 
 it from nothing ; he draws it from himself. The creation of the 
 universe is thus necessary ; it is a manifestation of the Deity, but 
 not the Deity absolutely in himself; it is God passing into activ- 
 ity, but not exhausted in the act. 
 
 The universe created, the principles which determined the cre- 
 ation are found still to govern the worlds of matter and mind. 
 
 Two ideas and their connection explain the intelligence of 
 God ; two laws in their counterpoise and correlation explain the 
 material universe. The law of Expansion is the movement of 
 unity to variety ; the law of Attraction is the return of variety to 
 unity. 
 
 In the world of mind the same analogy is apparent. The 
 study of consciousness is psychology. Man is the microcosm of 
 existence ; consciousness, within a narrow focus, concentrates a 
 knowledge of the universe and of God ; psychology is thus the 
 abstract of all science, human and divine. As in the external 
 world, all phenomena may be reduced to the two great laws of 
 Action and Reaction ; so, in the internal, all the facts of con- 
 sciousness may be reduced to one fundamental fact, comprising, 
 in like manner, two principles and their correlation ; and these 
 principles are again the One or the Infinite, the Many or the 
 Finite, and the Connection of the infinite and finite* 
 
 In every act of consciousness we distinguish a Self or Ego, and 
 something different from self, a Non-ego ; each limited and mod- 
 ified by the other. These, together, constitute the finite element. 
 But at the same instant, when we are conscious of these exist- 
 ences, plural, relative, and contingent, we are conscious, likewise, 
 of a superior unity in which they are contained, and by which 
 they are explained ; a unity absolute as they are conditioned, 
 substantive as they are phenomenal, and an infinite cause as they 
 are finite causes. This unity is GOD. The fact of consciousness 
 is thus a complex phenomenon, comprehending three several 
 terms : 1, The idea of the Ego and Non-ego as Finite; 2, The 
 idea of something else as Infinite ; and, 3, The idea of the Rela-
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 451 
 
 tion of the finite element to the infinite. These elements are 
 revealed in themselves and in their mutual connection, in every 
 act of primitive or Spontaneous consciousness. They can also be 
 reviewed by Reflection in a voluntary act; but here reflection 
 distinguishes, it does not create. The three ideas, the three cate- 
 gories of intelligence, are given in the original act of instinctive 
 apperception, obscurely, indeed, and without contrast. Reflection 
 analyzes and discriminates the elements of this primary synthesis ; 
 and as will is the condition of reflection, and will at the same 
 time is personal, the categories, as obtained through reflection, 
 have consequently the appearance of being also personal and 
 subjective. It was this personality of reflection that misled Kant : 
 caused him to overlook or misinterpret the fact of spontaneous 
 consciousness ; to individualize intelligence ; and to collect under 
 this personal reason all that is conceived by us as necessary and 
 universal. But as, in the spontaneous intuition of reason, there 
 is nothing voluntary, and consequently nothing personal ; and as 
 the truths which intelligence here discovers, come not from our- 
 selves ; we have a right, up to a certain point, to impose these 
 truths on others as .revelations from on high ; while, on the con- 
 trary, reflection being wholly personal, it would be absurd to 
 impose on others what is the fruit of our individual operations. 
 Spontaneity is the principle of religion ; reflection of philosophy. 
 Men agree in spontaneity ; they differ in reflection. The former 
 is necessarily veracious ; the latter is naturally delusive. 
 
 The condition of Reflection is separation : it illustrates by dis- 
 tinguishing ; it considers the different elements apart, and while 
 it contemplates one, it necessarily throws the others out of view. 
 Hence, not only the possibility, but the necessity of error. The 
 primitive unity, supposing no distinction, admits of no error; 
 reflection in discriminating the elements of thought, and in con- 
 sidering one to the exclusion of others, occasions error, and a 
 variety in error. He who exclusively contemplates the element 
 of the Infinite, despises him who is occupied with the idea of the 
 Finite ; and vice versa. It is the wayward development of the
 
 452 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 
 
 various elements of intelligence, which determines the imperfec- 
 tions and varieties of individual character. Men under this par- 
 tial and exclusive development, are but fragments of that human- 
 ity which can only be fully realized in the harmonious evolution 
 of all its principles. What Reflection is to the individual, History 
 is to the human race. The difference of an epoch consists exclu- 
 sively in the partial development of some one element of intelli- 
 gence in a prominent portion of mankind ; and as there are only 
 three such elements, so there are only three grand epochs in the 
 history of man. 
 
 A knowledge of the elements of reason, of their relations and 
 of their laws, constitutes not merely Philosophy, but is the con- 
 dition of a History of Philosophy. The history of human rea- 
 son, or the history of philosophy, must be rational and philo- 
 sophic. It must be philosophy itself, with all its elements, in all 
 their relations, and under all their laws, represented in striking 
 characters by the hands of time and of history, in the manifested 
 progress of the human mind. The discovery and enumeration of 
 all the elements of intelligence enable us to survey the progress 
 of speculation from the loftiest vantage ground ; it reveals to us 
 the laws by which the development of reflection or philosophy is 
 determined; and it supplies us with a canon by which the 
 approximation of the different systems to the truth may be finally 
 ascertained. And what are the results ? Sensualism, Idealism, 
 Skepticism, Mysticism, are all partial and exclusive views of the 
 elements of intelligence. But each is false only as it is incom- 
 plete. They are all true in what they affirm, all erroneous in 
 what they deny. Though hitherto opposed, they are, conse- 
 quently, not incapable of coalition ; and, in fact, can only obtain 
 their consummation in a powerful Eclecticism a system which 
 shall comprehend them all. This Eclecticism is realized in the 
 doctrine previously developed ; and the possibility of such a 
 catholic philosophy was first afforded by the discovery of M. Cousin, 
 made so long ago as the year 181*7, ' that consciousness contained 
 many more phenomena than had previously been suspected.'
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 453 
 
 The present course is at once an exposition of these principles, 
 as a true theory of philosophy, and an illustration of the mode 
 in which this theory is to be applied, as a rule of criticism in the 
 history of philosophical opinion. As the justice of the applica- 
 tion must be always subordinate to the truth of the principle, 
 we shall confine ourselves exclusively to a consideration of M. 
 Cousin's system, viewed absolutely in itself. This, indeed, we 
 are afraid will prove comparatively irksome ; and, therefore, soli- 
 cit indulgence, not only for the unpopular nature of the discus- 
 sion, but for the employment of language which, from the total 
 neglect of these speculations in Britain, will necessarily appear 
 abstruse not merely to the general reader. 
 
 Now, it is manifest that the whole doctrine of M. Cousin is 
 involved in the proposition, that the Unconditioned, the Abso- 
 lute, the Infinite, is immediately known in consciousness, and this 
 by difference, plurality, and relation. The unconditioned, as an 
 original element of knowledge, is the generative principle of his 
 system, but common to him with others ; whereas the mode in 
 which the possibility of this knowledge is explained, affords its 
 discriminating peculiarity. The other positions of his theory, as 
 deduced from this assumption, may indeed be disputed, even if 
 the antecedent be allowed ; but this assumption disproved, every 
 consequent in his theory is therewith annihilated. The recogni- 
 tion of the absolute as a constitutive principle of intelligence, our 
 author regards as at once the condition and the end of philoso- 
 phy ; and it is on the discovery of this principle in the fact of 
 consciousness, that he vindicates to himself the glory of being 
 the founder of the new eclectic, or the one catholic, philosophy. 
 The determination of this cardinal point will thus briefly satisfy 
 us touching the claim and character of the system. To explain 
 the nature of the problem itself, and the sufficiency of the solu- 
 tion propounded by M. Cousin, it is necessary to premise a state- 
 ment of the opinions which may be entertained regarding the 
 Unconditioned, as an immediate object of knowledge and of 
 thought.
 
 454 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 
 
 These opinions may be reduced to four. 1, The Uncondi- 
 tioned is incognizable and inconceivable ; its notion being only 
 negative of the conditioned, which last can alone be positively 
 known or conceived. 2, It is not an object of knowledge ; but 
 its notion, as a regulative principle of the mind itself, is more 
 than a mere negation of the conditioned. 3, It is cognizable, 
 but not conceivable ; it can be known by a sinking back into 
 identity with the absolute, but is incomprehensible by conscious- 
 ness and reflection, which are only of the relative and the dif- 
 ferent. 4, It is cognizable and conceivable by consciousness and 
 reflection, under relation, difference, and plurality. 
 
 The first of these opinions we regard as true ; the second is 
 held by Kant ; the third by Schelling ; and the last by our 
 
 author. 
 
 
 
 1. In our opinion the mind can conceive, and consequently 
 can know, only the limited, and the conditionally limited. The 
 unconditionally unlimited, or the Infinite, the unconditionally 
 limited, or the Absolute, cannot positively be construed to the 
 mind ; they can be conceived, only by a thinking away from, or 
 abstraction of, those very conditions under which thought itself 
 is realized ; consequently the notion of the Unconditioned is only 
 negative, negative of the conceivable itself. For example, on 
 the one hand we can positively conceive, neither an absolute 
 whole, that is, a whole so great, that we cannot also conceive it 
 as a relative part of a still greater whole ; nor an absolute part, 
 that is, a part so small, that we cannot also conceive it as a rela- 
 tive whole, divisible into smaller parts. On the other hand, we 
 cannot positively represent, or realize, or construe to the mind (as 
 here understanding and imagination coincide),* an infinite whole, 
 
 * [The Understanding, thought proper, notion, concept, &c., may coincide 
 or not with Imagination, representation proper, image, &c. The two facul- 
 ties do not coincide in a general notion ; for we cannot represent Man or 
 Horse in an actual imago without individualizing the universal ; and thus 
 contradiction emerges. But in the individual, say, Socrates or Bucephalus, 
 they do coincide ; for I sec no valid ground why we should not think, in the 
 strict sense of the word, or conceive the individuals which we represent. In
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 455 
 
 for this could only be done by the infinite synthesis in thought 
 of finite wholes, which would itself require an infinite time for 
 its accomplishment ; nor, for the same reason, can we follow out 
 iu thought an infinite divisibility of parts. The result is the 
 same, whether we apply the process to limitation in space, in time, 
 or in degree. 1 The unconditional negation, and the uncondition- 
 al affirmation of limitation ; in other words, the infinite and the 
 absolute, properly so called* are thus equally inconceivable to us. 
 
 like manner there is no mutual contradiction between the image nnd the 
 concept of the Infinite or Absolute, if these be otherwise possible ; for there 
 is not necessarily involved the incompatibility of the one act of cognition 
 with the other.] 
 
 * It is right to observe, that though we are of opinion that the terms, 
 Infinite and Absolute, and Unconditioned, ought not to be confounded, and 
 accurately distinguish them in the statement of our own view; yet, in 
 speaking of the doctrines of those by whom they are indifferently employed, 
 we have not thought it necessary, or rather, we have found it impossible, to 
 adhere to the distinction. The Unconditioned in our use of language de- 
 notes the genus of which the Infinite and Absolute are the species. 
 
 [The term Absolute is of a twofold (if not threefold) ambiguity, correspond- 
 ing to the double (or treble) signification of the word in Latin. 
 
 1. Absolutam means what is freed or loosed ; in which sense the Absolute 
 will be what is aloof from relation, comparison, limitation, condition, depen- 
 dence, Ac., and thus is tantamount to rd oTnJAurov of the lower Greeks. In 
 this meaning the Absolute is not opposed to the Infinite. 
 
 2. Absulutum means finished, perfected, completed ; in which sense the Ab- 
 solute will be what is out of relation, &c., as finished, perfect, complete, 
 total, and thus corresponds to rd S\ov and rb r/Atiov of Aristotle. In this 
 acceptation, and it is that in which for myself I exc-liisively use it, the Ab- 
 solute is diametrically opposed to, is contradictory of, the Infinite. 
 
 Besides these two meanings, there is to be noticed the use of the word, 
 for the most part in its adverbial form ; absolutely (absolute) in the sense of 
 simply, simpliciter (<JjrA<Ds), that is, considered in and for itself considered 
 not iii relation. This holds a similar analogy to the two former meanings 
 of Absolute, which the Indefinite (T& adpiarov) does to the Infinite (rd 
 airitpov). It is subjective as they arc objective ; it is in our thought as they 
 are in their own existence. This application is to be discounted, as here 
 irrelevant.] 
 
 1 The distinction between the absolute and the infinite is one of the most 
 important points in Hamilton's philosophy. Inasmuch as it is somewhat 
 difficult to apprehend this distinction, we will illustrate it, with reference to 
 the three species of quantity that constitute the relation of Existence. In 
 regard to time ; the distinction may be made in three ways : 1, we cannot 
 conceive it as having an absolute commencement, or nn infinite non-com-
 
 456 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 
 
 As the conditionally limited (which we may briefly call the 
 conditioned) is thus the only possible object of knowledge and of 
 positive thought thought necessarily supposes conditions. To 
 think is to condition ; and conditional limitation is the funda- 
 mental law of the possibility of thought For, as the greyhound 
 cannot outstrip his shadow, nor (by a more appropriate simile) 
 the eagle out-soar the atmosphere in which he floats, and by 
 which alone he may be supported ; so the mind cannot transcend 
 that sphere of limitation, within and through which exclusively 
 the possibility of thought is realized. Thought is only of the 
 conditioned ; because, as we have said, to think is simply to 
 condition. The absolute is conceived merely by a negation of 
 conceivability ; and all that we know, is only known as 
 
 ' won from the void and formless infinite. 1 
 
 How, indeed, it could ever be doubted that thought is only of the 
 conditioned, may well be deemed a matter of the profoundest 
 admiration. Thought cannot transcend consciousness ; conscious- 
 ness is only possible under the antithesis of a subject and object 
 of thought, known only in correlation, and mutually limiting 
 each other ; while, independently of this, all that we know either 
 of subject or object, either of mind or matter, is only a knowl- 
 edge in each of the particular, of the plural, of the different, of 
 the modified, of the phenomenal. We admit that the conse- 
 quence of this doctrine is, that philosophy, if viewed as more 
 than a science of the conditioned, is impossible. Departing from 
 
 mencement; 2, we cannot conceive it as having an absolute termination, or 
 an infinite non-termination ; 3, we cannot conceive it as an absolute mini- 
 mum, or as one of the parts of an infinite division. In regard to space ; the 
 distinction may be made in two ways : 1, we cannot conceive it as a whole, 
 absolutely bounded, or infinitely unbounded ; 2, we cannot conceive it as a 
 part, which is absolutely indivisible, or is the product of an infinite division. 
 In regard to degree; the distinction may also be made in two ways : 1, we 
 cannot conceive it as absolutely greatest, or, in increase, as infinitely unlimit- 
 ed ; 2, we cannot conceive it as an absolute least, or, in diminution, as infi- 
 nitely without limit. The mind takes cognizance of no other quantities, and 
 it is impossible to carry the distinction any further. W.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 457 
 
 the particular, we admit that we can never, in our highest gener- 
 alizations, rise above the finite ; that our knowledge, whether of 
 mind or matter, can be nothing more than a knowledge of the 
 relative manifestations of an existence, which in itself it is our 
 highest wisdom to recognize as beyond the reach of philosophy, 
 in the language of St. Austin, ' cognoscendo ignorari, et igno- 
 rando cognpsci? 
 
 The conditioned is the mean between two extremes, two in- 
 conditionates, exclusive of each other, neither of which can be 
 conceived as possible, but of which, on the principles of contra- 
 diction and excluded middle, one must be admitted as necessary. 
 On this opinion, therefore, reason is shown to be weak, but not 
 deceitful. The mind is not represented as conceiving two propo- 
 sitions subversive of each other, as equally possible ; but only, as 
 unable to understand as possible, either of two extremes ; one 
 of which, however, on the ground of their mutual repugnance, it 
 is compelled to recognize as true. We are thus taught the salu- 
 tary lesson, that the capacity of thought is not to be constituted 
 into the measure of existence ; and are warned from recognizing 
 the domain of our knowledge as necessarily coextensive with the 
 horizon of our faith. And by a wonderful revelation, we are 
 thus, in the very consciousness of our inability to conceive aught 
 above the relative and finite, inspired with a belief in the exist- 
 ence of something unconditioned beyond the sphere of all com- 
 prehensible reality.* 
 
 2. The second opinion, that of KANT, is fundamentally the 
 same as the preceding. Metaphysic, strictly so denominated, the 
 
 * [True, therefore, are the declarations of a pious philosophy : ' A God 
 understood would be no God at all ;' ' To think that God is, as we can 
 think him to be, is blasphemy.' The Divinity, in a certain sense, is re- 
 vealed ; in a certain sense is concealed : He is at once known and unknown. 
 But the last and highest consecration of all true religion, must be an altar 
 1 Ayviaarrif Gcia ' To the unknown and unknowable God. 1 In this consumma- 
 tion, nature and revelation, paganism and Christianity, are at one ; and from 
 either source the testimonies are so numerous that I must refrain from quo- 
 ting any. Am I wrong in thinking that M. Cousin would not repudiate 
 this doctrine ?] 
 
 20
 
 458 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 
 
 philosophy of Existence, is virtually the doctrine of the uncondi- 
 tioned. From Xenophanes to Leibnitz, the infinite, the absolute, 
 the unconditioned, formed the highest principle of speculation ; 
 but from the dawn of philosophy in the school of Elea until the 
 rise of the Kantian philosophy, no serious attempt was made to 
 investigate the nature and origin of this notion (or notions) as a 
 psychological phenomenon. Before Kant, philosophy was rather 
 a deduction from principles, than an inquiry concerning princi- 
 ples themselves. At the head of every system a cognition figured 
 which the philosopher assumed in conformity to his views ; but 
 it was rarely considered necessary, and more rarely attempted, to 
 ascertain the genesis, and determine the domain, of this notion 
 or judgment, previous to application. In his first Critique, Kant 
 undertakes a regular survey of consciousness. He professes to 
 analyze the conditions of human knowledge, to mete out its 
 limits, to indicate its point of departure, and to determine its 
 possibility. That Kant accomplished much, it would be preju- 
 dice to deny ; nor is his service to philosophy the less, that his 
 success has been more decided in the subversion of error than in 
 the establishment of truth. The result of his examination was 
 the abolition of the metaphysical sciences, of rational psycholo- 
 gy, ontology, speculative theology, <fec., as founded on mere peti- 
 tianes principiorum. Existence is revealed to us only under spe- 
 cific modifications, and these are known only under the condi- 
 tions of our faculties of knowledge. ' Things in themselves,' Mat- 
 ter, Mind, God, all, in short, that is not finite, relative, and phe- 
 nomenal, as bearing no analogy to our faculties, is beyond the 
 verge of our knowledge. Philosophy was thus restricted to the 
 observation and analysis of the phenomena of consciousness ; and 
 what is not explicitly or implicitly given in a fact of conscious- 
 ness, is condemned, as transcending the sphere of a legitimate 
 speculation. A knowledge of the unconditioned is declared im- 
 possible ; either immediately, as a notion, or mediately as an in- 
 ference. A demonstration of the absolute from the relative is 
 logically absurd ; as in such a syllogism we must collect in the
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 459 
 
 conclusion what is not distributed in the premises : And an im- 
 mediate knowledge of the unconditioned is equally impossible. 
 But here we think his reasoning complicated, and his reduction 
 incomplete. We must explain ourselves. 
 
 While we regard as conclusive, Kant's analysis of Time and 
 Space into conditions of thought, we cannot help viewing his de- 
 duction of the ' Categories of Understanding,' and the ' Ideas of 
 Speculative Reason,' as the work of a great but perverse inge- 
 nuity. The categories of understanding are merely subordinate 
 forms of the conditioned. Why not, therefore, generalize the 
 Condition Existence conditioned, as the supreme category, or 
 categories, of thought? and if it were necessary to analyze this 
 form into its subaltern applications, why not develop these im- 
 mediately out of the generic principle, instead of preposterously, 
 and by a forced and partial analogy, deducing the laws of the 
 understanding from a questionable division of logical proposi- 
 tions ? Why distinguish Reason ( Vernunft) from Understand- 
 ing ( Verstand), simply on the ground that the former is conver- 
 sant about, or rather tends towards, the unconditioned ; when it 
 is sufficiently apparent, that the unconditioned is conceived only 
 as the negation of the conditioned, and also that the conception 
 of contradictories is one ? In the Kantian philosophy both facul- 
 ties perform the same function, both seek the one in the many ; 
 the Idea (Idee) is only the Concept (Begriff) sublimated into 
 the inconceivable ; Reason only the Understanding which has 
 ' overleaped itself.' Kant has clearly shown, that the idea of the 
 unconditioned can have no objective reality, that it conveys no 
 knowledge, and that it involves the most insoluble contradic- 
 tions. But he ought to have shown that the unconditioned had 
 no objective application, because it had, in fact, no subjective af- 
 firmation, that it afforded no real knowledge, because it con- 
 tained nothing even conceivable, and that it is self-contradicto- 
 ry, because it is not a notion, either simple or positive, but only 
 a fasciculus of negations negations of the conditioned in its op- 
 posite extremes, and bound together merely by the aid of Ian-
 
 460 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 
 
 guage and their common character of incomprehensibility. And 
 while he appropriated Reason as a specific faculty to take cogni- 
 zance of these negations, hypostatized as positive, under the Platon- 
 ic name of Ideas ; so also, as a pendant to his deduction of the cat- 
 egories of Understanding from a logical division of propositions, 
 he deduced the classification and number of these ideas of Reason 
 from a logical division of syllogisms. Kant thus stands interme- 
 diate between those who view the notion of the absolute as the 
 instinctive affirmation of an encentric intuition, and those who 
 regard it as the factitious negative of an eccentric generaliza- 
 tion. 
 
 Were we to adopt from the Critical Philosophy the idea of 
 analyzing thought into its fundamental conditions, and were we 
 to carry the reduction of Kant to what we think its ultimate sim- 
 plicity, we would discriminate thought into positive and negative, 
 according as it is conversant about the conditioned or uncondi- 
 tioned. This, however, would constitute a logical, not a psycho- 
 logical distinction ; as positive and negative in thought are known 
 at once, and by the same intellectual act. The twelve Categories 
 of the Understanding would be thus included under the former ; 
 the three Ideas of Reason under the latter ; and to this intent the 
 contrast between understanding and reason would disappear. 
 Finally, rejecting the arbitrary limitation of time and space to the 
 sphere of sense, we would express under the formula of The 
 CONDITIONED in TIME and SPACE a definition of the conceiv- 
 able, and an enumeration of the three categories of thought. 1 
 
 The imperfection and partiality of Kant's analysis are betrayed 
 in its consequences. His doctrine leads to absolute skepticism. 
 Speculative reason, on Kant's own admission, is an organ of 
 mere delusion. The idea of the unconditioned, about which it is 
 conversant, is shown to involve insoluble contradictions, and yet 
 to be the legitimate product of intelligence. Hume has well ob- 
 
 1 See the next chapter, I., for a more matured view of these categories or 
 conditions of thought. W.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 461 
 
 served, ' that it matters not whether we possess a false reason, or 
 no reason at all.' If ' the light that leads astray, be light from 
 heaven,' what are we to believe ? If our intellectual nature be 
 perfidious in one revelation, it must be presumed deceitful in all ; 
 nor is it possible for Kant to establish the existence of God, Free- 
 will, and Immortality, on the presumed veracity of reason, in a 
 practical relation, after having himself demonstrated its mendacity 
 in a speculative. 
 
 Kant had annihilated the older metaphysic, but the germ of a 
 more visionary doctrine of the absolute, than any of those refuted, 
 was contained in the bosom of his own philosophy. He had slain 
 the body, but had not exorcised the spectre of the absolute ; and 
 this spectre has continued to haunt the schools of Germany even 
 to the present day. The philosophers were not content to aban- 
 don their metaphysic ; to limit philosophy to an observation of 
 phenomena, and to the generalization of these phenomena into 
 laws. The theories of Bouterweck (in his earlier works), of Bar- 
 dili, of Reinhold, of Fichte, of Schelling, of Hegel, and of sundry 
 others, are just so many endeavors, of greater or of less ability, 
 to fix the absolute as a positive in knowledge ; but the absolute, 
 like the water in the sieves of the Danaides, has always hitherto 
 run through as a negative into the abyss of nothing. 
 
 3. Of these theories, that of SCHELLING is the only one in re- 
 gard to which it is now necessary to say any thing. His opinion 
 constitutes the third of those enumerated touching the knowledge 
 of the absolute ; and the following is a brief statement of its prin- 
 cipal positions : 
 
 While the lower sciences are of the relative and conditioned, 
 Philosophy, as the science of sciences, must be of the absolute 
 the unconditioned. Philosophy, therefore, supposes a science of 
 the absolute. Is the absolute beyond our knowledge ? then is 
 philosophy itself impossible. 
 
 But how, it is objected, can the absolute be known ? The ab- 
 solute, as unconditioned, identical, and one, cannot be cognized 
 under conditions, by difference and plurality. It cannot, there-
 
 462 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 
 
 fore, be known, if the subject of knowledge be distinguished 
 from the object of knowledge ; in a knowledge of the absolute, 
 existence and knowledge must be identical ; the absolute can only 
 be known, if adequately known, and it can only be adequately 
 known, by the absolute itself. But is this possible ? We are 
 wholly ignorant of existence in itself : the mind knows nothing, 
 except in parts, by quality, and difference, and relation ; con- 
 sciousness supposes the subject contradistinguished from the ob- 
 ject of thought ; the abstraction of this contrast is a negation of 
 consciousness ; and the negation of consciousness is the annihi- 
 lation of thought itself. The alternative is therefore unavoidable : 
 either finding the absolute, we lose ourselves ; or retaining self 
 and individual consciousness, we do not reach the absolute. 
 
 All this Schelling frankly admits. He admits that a knowledge 
 of the absolute is impossible, in personality and consciousness: 
 he admits that, as the understanding knows, and can know, only 
 by consciousness, and consciousness only by difference, we, as con- 
 scious and understanding, can apprehend, can conceive only the 
 conditioned ; and he admits that, only if man be himself the 
 infinite, can the infinite be known by him : 
 
 1 Nee aentire Deum, nisi qtii pars ipse Deornm est;'* 
 (' None can feel God, who shares not in the Godhead.') 
 
 * [This line is from Manilius. But as a statement of Schelling's doctrine 
 it is inadequate ; for on his doctrine the Deity can be known only if fully 
 known, and a full knowledge of deity is possible only to the absolute deity 
 that is, not to a sharer in the Godhead. Manilius has like wiso'anothcr (poet- 
 ically) laudable line, of a similar, though less exceptionable, purport: 
 ' Exemplumquo Dei quisque est in imagine parva;" 
 (' Each is himself a miniature of God.') 
 
 For we should not recoil to the opposite extreme ; and, though man be not 
 identical with the Deity, still is he 'created in the image of God.' It is, in- 
 deed, only through an analogy of the human with the Divine nature, that we 
 are percipient and recipient of Divinity. As St. Prosper has it : ' Nemo 
 possidet Deum, nisi qui possidetur a Deo.' So Seneca: 'In unoqnoque 
 virorum bonorum habitat Deus.' So Plotinus : ' Virtue tending to consum- 
 mation, and irradicatcd in the soul by moral wisdom, reveals a God ; but a 
 God destitute of true virtue is an empty name.' So Jacobi ; ' From the 
 enjoyment of virtue springs the idea of a virtuous ; from the enjoyment of 
 freedom, the idea of a free ; from the enjoyment of life, the idea of a living;
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 463 
 
 But Schelling contends that there is a capacity of knowledge 
 above consciousness, and higher than the understanding, and that 
 this knowledge is competent to human reason, as identical with 
 the Absolute itself. In this act of knowledge, which, after Fichte, 
 he calls the Intellectual Intuition, there exists no distinction of 
 subject and object, no contrast of knowledge and existence ; all 
 difference is lost in absolute indifference, all plurality in abso- 
 lute unity. The Intuition itself, Reason, and the Absolute are 
 identified. The absolute exists only as known by reason, and 
 reason knows only as being itself the absolute. 
 
 This act (act !) is necessarily ineffable : 
 
 ' The vision and the faculty divine,' 
 
 to be known, must be experienced. It cannot be conceived by 
 the understanding, because beyond its sphere ; it cannot be de- 
 scribed, because its essence is-identity, and all description supposes 
 discrimination. To those who are unable to rise beyond a philos- 
 ophy of reflection, Schelling candidly allows that the doctrine of 
 the absolute can appear only a series of contradictions ; and he 
 has at least the negative merit of having clearly exposed the im- 
 possibility of a philosophy of the unconditioned, as founded on a 
 knowledge by difference, if he utterly fails in positively proving 
 the possibility of such a philosophy, #s founded on a knowledge 
 in identity, through an absorption into, and vision of, the absolute. 
 
 from the enjoyment of the divine, the idea of a godlike and of a God.' 
 So Goethe: 
 
 4 Waer nicht das Auge sonnenhaft, 
 
 Wie koennten wir das Licht erblicken ? 
 
 Lebt' nicht in uns des Gottes eigne Kraft, 
 
 Wie koennte uns das Goettliches entzuecken?' 
 
 So Kant and many others. (Thus morality and religion, necessity and 
 atheis7n, rationally go together.) The Platonists and Fathers have indeed 
 finely said, that ' God is the life of the soul, as the soul is the life of the 
 body.' 
 
 ' Vita Animse Deus est ; hsec Corporis. Hue fugiente, 
 
 Solvitur hoc ; peril hsec, clestituente Deo.' 
 
 These verses are preserved to us from an ancient poet by John of Salisbury, 
 and they denote the comparison of which Buchanan has made so admirable 
 a use in his Calvini Epicedium.]
 
 464 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 
 
 Out of Laputa or the Empire it would be idle to enter into an 
 articulate refutation of a theory, which founds philosophy on the 
 annihilation of consciousness, and on the identification of the un- 
 conscious philosopher with God. The intuition of the absolute 
 is manifestly the work of an arbitrary abstraction, and of a self- 
 delusive imagination. To reach the point of indifference, by 
 abstraction we annihilate the object, and by abstraction we anni- 
 hilate the subject, of consciousness. But what remains ? Noth- 
 ing. ' Nil conscimus nobis.' We then hypostatize the zero ; we 
 baptize it with the name of Absolute ; and conceit ourselves that 
 we contemplate absolute exigence, when we only speculate abso- 
 lute privation.* This truth has been indeed virtually confessed 
 by the two most distinguished followers of Schelling. Hegel at 
 last abandons the intuition, and regards 'pure or undetermined 
 existence 1 as convertible with 'pure nothing ;' whilst Oken, if he 
 adhere to the intuition, intrepidly identifies the Deity or Absolute 
 with zero. God, he makes the Nothing, the Nothing, he makes 
 God; 
 
 ' And Naught 
 Is every thing, and every thing is Naught.'t 
 
 * [The Infinite and Absolute are only the names of two counter imbecili- 
 ties of the human mind, transmuted into properties of the nature of tilings, 
 of two subjective negations, converted into objective affirmations. We tire 
 ourselves, either in adding to, or in taking from. Some^ more reasonably, 
 call the thing uufinishable infinite ; others, less rationally, call it finished 
 absolute. But in both cases, the metastasis is in itself irrational. Not, how- 
 ever, in the highest degree ; for the subjective contradictories were not at first 
 objectified by the same philosophers ; and it is the crowning irrationality of 
 the Infinite-absolutists, that they have not merely accepted as objective what 
 is only subjective, but quietly assumed as the same, what are not only differ- 
 ent but conflictive, not only conflictive, but repugnant. Seneca (Ep. 118) has 
 given the true genealogy of the original fictions ; but at his time the consum- 
 inative union of the two had not been attempted. ' Ubi animus aliquid diu 
 protulit, et magnitudinein ejus sequendo lassatus est, infinitum, coepit vocari. 
 Eodem modo, aliquid difficulter secari cogitavimus, novissime, crescente 
 difficultate, insecdbtte inventum est.'] 
 
 t [From the Rejected Addresses. *Their ingenious authors have embodied 
 a jest in the very words by which Oken, in sober seriousness, propounds the 
 first and greatest of philosophical truths. Jacobi (or Neeb ?) might well say, 
 that, in reading this last consummation of German speculation, he did not
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 465 
 
 Nor does the negative chimera prove less fruitful than the posi- 
 tive ; for Schelling has found it as difficult to evolve the one into 
 the many, as his disciples to deduce the universe and its contents 
 from the first self-affirmation of the ' primordial Nothing.' 
 
 ' Hiri homines ! NiMl esse aliquid statuantve negentve ; 
 Quodque negant statuunt, quod statuuntque negant.' 
 
 To Schelling, indeed, it has been impossible, without gratuitous 
 and even contradictory assumptions, to explain the deduction of 
 the finite from the infinite. By no salto mortale has he been able 
 to clear the magic circle in which he had inclosed himself. Un- 
 able to connect the unconditioned and the conditioned by any 
 natural correlation, he has variously attempted to account for the 
 phenomenon of the universe, either by imposing a necessity of 
 self-manifestation on the absolute, i. e. by conditioning the uncon- 
 ditioned ; or by postulating a fall of the finite from the infinite, 
 i. e. by begging the very fact which his hypothesis professed its 
 exclusive ability to explain. The veil of Isis is thus still unwith- 
 drawn ;* and the question proposed by Orpheus at the dawn of 
 speculation will probably remain unanswered at its setting : 
 
 ' FI5f 1 noi tv TI T& itdvr' eirrai /cat ^wptj txaffrov ;' 
 (' How can I think each, separate, and all, one?') 
 
 In like manner, annihilating consciousness in order to recon- 
 
 kn'ow whether he were standing on his head or his feet. The book in which 
 Oken so ingeniously deduces the All from the Nothing, has, I see, been lately 
 translated into English, and published by the Eay Society (I think). The 
 statement of the paradox is, indeed, somewhat softened in the second edi- 
 tion, from which, I presume, the version is made. Not that Oken and Hegel 
 are original even in the absurdity. For as Varro right truly said : ' Niliil 
 tarn absurde dici potest, quod non dicatur ab aliquo philosophorum ;' so the 
 Intuition of God = the Absolute, = the Nothing, we find asserted by the 
 lower Platonists, by the Buddhists, and by Jacob Boehme.] 
 
 * [Isis appears as the jEgypto-Grecian symbol of the Unconditioned. 
 ( T Iojj 'I(rta Qtiaia: "lorctov, yvSiais rov Svrof. Plut. I. CtO.) In the temple 
 of Athene-Isis, at Sais, on the fane there stood this sublime inscription : 
 
 I AM ALL THAT WAS, AND IS, AND SHALL BE ; 
 NOB MY VEIL, HAS IT BEEN WITHDRAWN BY MORTAL. 
 
 (' 'Ey<5 tlpi ttav TO yeyovbs, *at Sv, Kal iffdftivov, Kat rbv tfidv vliihor obSeli ira 
 Ovqri); dirdXvi//e.')] 
 
 20*
 
 466 
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 
 
 struct it, Schelling has never yet been able to connect the faculties 
 conversant about the conditioned, with the faculty of absolute 
 knowledge. One simple objection strikes us as decisive, although 
 we do not remember to have seen it alleged. ' We awaken,' says 
 Schelling, l from the Intellectual Intuition as from a state of death ; 
 we awaken by Reflection, that is, through a compulsory return to 
 ourselves.'* We cannot, at the same moment, be in the intel- 
 lectual intuition and in common consciousness ; we must there- 
 fore be able to connect them by an act of memory of recollection. 
 But how can there be a remembrance of the absolute and its intu- 
 ition ? as out of time, and space, and relation, and difference, it 
 is admitted that the absolute cannot be construed to the under- 
 standing. But as remembrance is only possible under the con- 
 ditions of the understanding, it is consequently impossible to re- 
 member any thing anterior to the moment when we awaken into 
 consciousness ; and the clairvoyaiice of the absolute, even granting 
 its reality, is thus, after the crisis, as if it had never been. We 
 defy all solution of this objection. 
 
 4. What has now been stated may in some degree enable the 
 reader to apprehend the relations in which our author stands, 
 both to those who deny and to those who admit a knowledge of 
 the absolute. If we compare the philosophy of COUSIN with the 
 philosophy of Schelling, we at once perceive that the former is a 
 disciple, though by no means a servile disciple, of the latter. 
 The scholar, though enamored with his master's system as a 
 whole, is sufficiently aware of the two insuperable difficulties of 
 that theory. He saw that if he pitched the absolute so high, it 
 was impossible to deduce from it the relative ; and he felt, prob- 
 ably, that the Intellectual Intuition a stumbling-block to him- 
 self would be arrant foolishness in the eyes of his countrymen. 
 Cousin and Schelling agree, that as philosophy is the science of 
 the unconditioned, the unconditioned must be within the com- 
 pass of science. They agree that the unconditioned is known, 
 
 * In Fichte's u. Nicthhammcr's Phil. Journ., vol. iii. p. 214.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 467 
 
 and immediately known ; and they agree that intelligence, as 
 competent to the unconditioned, is impersonal, infinite, divine. 
 But while they coincide in the fact of the absolute, as known, 
 they are diametrically opposed as to the mode in which they 
 attempt to realize this knowledge ; each regarding, as the climax 
 of contradiction, the manner in which the other endeavors to 
 bring human reason and the absolute into proportion. Accord- 
 ing to Schelling, Cousin's absolute is only a relative ; according 
 to Cousin, Schelling's knowledge of the absolute is a negation of 
 thought itself. Cousin declares the condition of all knowledge 
 to be plurality and difference ; and Schelling, that the condition, 
 under which alone a knowledge of the absolute becomes possible, 
 is indifference and unity. The one thus denies a notion of the 
 absolute to consciousness ; whilst the other affirms that conscious- 
 ness is implied in every act of intelligence. Truly, we must view 
 each as triumphant over the other ; and the result of this mutual 
 neutralization is that the absolute, of which both assert a 
 knowledge, is for us incognizable.* 
 
 * [' Quod genus hoc pugnse, qua victor victus uterque !' 
 
 is still further exhibited in the mutual refutation of the two great apostles 
 of the Absolute, in Germany Schelling and Hegel. They were early 
 friends contemporaries at the same university occupiers of the same 
 bursal room (college chums) : Hegel, somewhat the elder man, was some- 
 what the younger philosopher ; and they were joint editors of the journal in 
 which their then common doctrine was at first promulgated. So far all was 
 in unison ; but now they separated, locally and in opinion. Both, indeed, 
 stuck to the Absolute, but each regarded the way in which the other pro- 
 fessed to reach it as absurd. Hegel derided the Intellectual Intuition of 
 Schelling, as a poetical play of fancy ; Schelling derided the Dialectic of 
 Hegel as a logical play with words. Both, I conceive, were right; but 
 neither fully right. If Schelling's Intellectual Intuition were poetical, it was 
 a poetry transcending, in fact abolishing, human imagination. If Hegel's 
 Dialectic were logical, it was a logic outraging that science and the condi- 
 tions of thought itself. Hegel's whole philosophy is indeed founded on two 
 errors ; on a mistake in logic, and on a violation of logic. In his dream of 
 disproving the law of Excluded Middle (between two Contradictories), he 
 inconceivably mistakes Contraries for Contradictories ; and in positing pure 
 or absolute existence as a mental datum, immediate, intuitive, and above 
 proof (though, in truth, this be palpably a mere relative gained by a process 
 of abstraction), he not only mistakes the fact, but violates the logical law
 
 468 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 
 
 In these circumstances, we might expect our author to have 
 stated the difficulties to which his theory was exposed on the one 
 side and on the other ; and to have endeavored to obviate the 
 objections, both of his brother absolutists, and of those who alto- 
 gether deny a philosophy of the unconditioned. This he has not 
 done. The possibility of reducing the notion of the absolute to 
 a negative conception is never once contemplated ; and if one or 
 two allusions (not always, perhaps, correct) are made to his doc- 
 trine, the name of Schelling does not occur, as we recollect, in the 
 whole compass of these lectures. Difficulties, by which either the 
 doctrine of the absolute in general, or his own particular modifi- 
 cation of that doctrine, may be assailed, are either avoided or 
 solved only by still greater. Assertion is substituted for proof; 
 facts of consciousness are alleged, which consciousness never 
 knew ; and paradoxes, that baffle argument, are promulgated as 
 intuitive truths, above the necessity of confirmation. With every 
 feeling of respect for M. Cousin as a man of learning and genius, 
 we must regard the grounds on which he endeavors to establish 
 his doctrine as assumptive, inconsequent, and erroneous. In vin- 
 dicating the truth of this statement, we shall attempt to show : 
 in the first place, that M. Cousin is at fault in all the authorities 
 he quotes in favor of the opinion, that the absolute, infinite, 
 unconditioned, is a primitive notion, cognizable by our intellect ; 
 in the second, that his argument to prove the correality of his 
 three ideas proves directly the reverse ; in the third, that the 
 conditions under which alone he allows intelligence to be possi- 
 ble, necessarily exclude the possibility of a knowledge, not to say 
 a conception, of the absolute ; and in the fourth, that the abso- 
 lute, as defined by him, is only a relative and a conditioned. 
 
 which prohibits us to assume the principle which it behooves us to prove. 
 On these two fundamental errors rests Hegel's dialectic ; and Hegel's dialec- 
 tic is the ladder by which he attempts to scale the Absolute. The peculiar 
 doctrine of these two illustrious thinkers is thus to me only another mani- 
 festation of an occurrence of the commonest in human speculation ; it is 
 only a sophism of relative self-love, victorious over the absolute love of 
 truth : ' Quod volant sapiunt, et nolunt sapcre quse vera sunt.']
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 469 
 
 In the first place, then, M. Cousin supposes that Aristotle and 
 Kant, in their several categories, equally proposed an analysis of 
 the constituent elements of intelligence; and he also supposes 
 that each, like himself, recognized among these elements the 
 notion of tlie infinite, absolute, unconditioned. In both these 
 suppositions we think him wrong. 
 
 It is a serious error in a historian of philosophy to imagine 
 that, in his scheme of categories, Aristotle proposed, like Kant, 
 ' an analysis of the elements of human reason.' It is just, how- 
 ever, to mention that in this mistake M. Cousin has been pre- 
 ceded by Kant himself. But the ends proposed by the two phi- 
 losophers were different, even opposed. In their several tables : 
 Aristotle attempted a synthesis of things in their multiplicity 
 a classification of objects real, but in relation to thought ; Kant, 
 an analysis of mind in its unity a dissection of thought, pure, 
 but in relation to its objects. The predicaments of Aristotle are 
 thus objective, of things as understood ; those of Kant subjective, 
 of the mind as understanding. The former are results a poste- 
 riori the creations of abstraction and generalization ; the latter, 
 anticipations a priori the conditions of those acts themselves. 
 It is true, that as the one scheme exhibits the unity of thought 
 diverging into plurality, in appliance to its objects, and the other 
 exhibits the multiplicity of these objects converging towards unity 
 by a collective determination of the mind ; while, at the same 
 time, language usually confounds the subjective and objective 
 under a common term ; it is certainly true, that some elements 
 in the one table coincide in name with some elements in the 
 other. This coincidence is, however, only equivocal. In reality, 
 the whole Kantian categories must be excluded from the Aristo- 
 telic list as entia rationis, as notiones secundce in short, as deter- 
 minations of thought, and not genera of real things ; while the 
 several elements would be specially excluded, as partial, privative, 
 transcendent, <kc. But if it would be unjust to criticise the cate- 
 gories of Kant in whole, or in part, by the Aristotelic canon, 
 what must we think of Kant, who, after magnifying the idea of
 
 470 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 
 
 investigating the forms of pure intellect as worthy of the mighty 
 genius of the Stagirite, proceeds, on this false hypothesis, to blame 
 the execution, as a kind of patchwork, as incomplete, as confound- 
 ing derivative with simple notions ; nay, even, on the narrow 
 principles of his own Critique, as mixing the forms of pure sense 
 with the forms of pure understanding ?* If M. Cousin also were 
 correct in his supposition that Aristotle and his followers had 
 viewed his categories as an analysis of the fundamental forms of 
 thought, he would find his own reduction of the elements of rea- 
 son to a double principle anticipated in the scholastic division of 
 existence into ens per se and ens per accidens. 
 
 Nor is our author correct in thinking that the categories of 
 Aristotle and Kant are complete, inasmuch as they are coexten- 
 sive with his own. As to the former, if the Infinite were not 
 excluded, on what would rest the scholastic distinction of ens cat- 
 egoricum and ens transcendens ? The logicians require that pre- 
 dicamental matter shall be of a limited and finite nature ;f God, 
 as infinite, is thus excluded : and while it is evident from the 
 whole context of his book of categories, that Aristotle there only 
 contemplated a distribution of the finite, so, in other of his works, 
 he more than once emphatically denies the infinite as an object 
 not only of knowledge, but of thought ; TO awsipov ayvwcvov 77 
 a.<Kipov TO ewrsipov ours vorjrov, OUTS ditfdrjTov.J But if Aristotle 
 thus regards the Infinite as beyond the compass of thought, Kant 
 views it as, at least, beyond the sphere of knowledge. If M. 
 
 * See the Critik d. r. V. and the Prolegomena. 
 
 t [M. Peisse, in a note here, quotes the common logical law of categorical 
 entities, well and briefly expressed in the following verse : 
 
 'Entia per scse^finita, realia, tota.' 
 
 He likewise justly notices, that nothing is included in the Aristotelic cate- 
 gories but what is susceptible of definition, consequently of analysis.] 
 
 J Phys. L. iii. c. 1JO, text. 66, c. 7, text. 40. See also Mctaph. L ii. c. 2, 
 text. 11. Analyt. Post. L. i. c. 20, text. 39 et alibi. [Aristotle's definition 
 of the Infinite (of the avttpov in contrast to the a6ptarov) ' that of which there 
 is always something beyond,'' may be said to be a definition only of the Indefi- 
 nite. This I shall not gainsay. But it was the only Infinite which he con- 
 templated ; as it is the only Infinite of which we can form a notion.]
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 4:71 
 
 Cousin indeed employed the term category in relation to the 
 Kantian philosophy in the Kantian acceptation, he would be as 
 erroneous in regard to Kant as he is in regard to Aristotle ; but 
 we presume that he wishes, under that term, to include not only 
 the ' Categories of Understanding,' but the ' Ideas of Reason.'* 
 But Kant limits knowledge to experience, and experience to the 
 categories of the understanding, which, in reality, are only so 
 many forms of the conditioned ; and allows to the notion of the 
 unconditioned (corresponding to the ideas of reason) no objective 
 reality, regarding it merely as a regulative principle in the 
 arrangement of our thoughts. As M. Cousin, however, holds 
 that the unconditioned is not only subjectively conceived, but 
 objectively known ; he is thus totally wrong in regard to the one 
 philosopher, and wrong in part in relation to the other. 
 
 In the second place, our author maintains that the idea of the 
 infinite, or absolute, and the idea of the finite, or relative, are 
 equally real, because the notion of the one necessarily suggests 
 the notion of the other. 
 
 Correlatives certainly suggest each other, but correlatives may, 
 or may not, be equally real and positive. In thought contradic- 
 tories necessarily imply each other, for the knowledge of contra- 
 dictories is one. But the reality of one contradictory, so far from 
 guaranteeing the reality of the other, is nothing else than its ne- 
 gation. Thus every positive notion (the concept of a thing by 
 what it is) suggests a negative notion (the concept of a thing by 
 what it is not) ; and the highest positive notion, the notion of the 
 conceivable, is not without its corresponding negative in the no- 
 tion of the inconceivable. But though these mutually suggest 
 
 * [' The Categories of Kant are simple forms or frames (schemata) of the 
 Understanding ( Verstand), under which, an object to be known, must be 
 necessarily thought. Kant's Jd-eas, a word which he expressly borrowed 
 from Plato, are concepts of the Reason ( Vernunft) ; whose objects transcend- 
 ing the sphere of all experience actual or possible, consequently do not fall 
 under the categories, in other words, are positively unknowable. These 
 ideas are God, Matter, Soul, objects which, considered out of relation, or in 
 their transcendent reality, are so many phases of the Absolute.' 1 M. Peisse.]
 
 472 PHILOSOPHY OF THE COXDFTIONED. 
 
 >ach other, the positive alone is real ; the negative is only an 
 abstraction of the other, and in the highest generality, even an 
 abstraction of thought itself. It therefore behooved M. Cousin, 
 instead of assuming the objective correality of his two elements on 
 the fact of their subjective correlation, to have suspected, on this 
 very ground, that the reality of the one was inconsistent with the 
 reality of the other. In truth, upon examination, it will be found 
 that his two primitive ideas are nothing more than contradictory 
 relatives. These, consequently, of their very nature, imply each 
 other in thought ; but they imply each other only as affirmation 
 and negation of the same. 
 
 We have already shown, that though the Conditioned (condi- 
 tionally limited) be one, what is opposed to it as the Uncondition- 
 ed, is plural : that the unconditional negation of limitation gives 
 one unconditioned, the Infinite ; as the unconditional affirmation 
 of limitation affords another, the Absolute. This, while it coin- 
 cides with the opinion, that the Unconditioned in either phasis is 
 inconceivable, is repugnant to the doctrine, that the uncondition- 
 ed (absoluto-infinite) can be positively construed to the mind. 
 For those who, with M. Cousin, regard the notion of the uncondi- 
 tioned as a positive and real knowledge of existence in its all-com- 
 prehensive unity, and who consequently employ the terms Abso- 
 lute, Infinite, Unconditioned, as only various expressions for the 
 same identity, are imperatively bound to prove that their idea of 
 the One corresponds either with that Unconditioned we have dis- 
 tinguished as the Absolute or with tliat Unconditioned ice have 
 distinguished as the Infinite or that it includes both, or that 
 it excludes both. This they have not done, and, we suspect, have 
 never attempted to do. 
 
 Our author maintains, that the unconditioned is known under 
 the laws of consciousness ; and does not, like Schelling, pretend 
 to an intuition of existence beyond the bounds of space and time. 
 Indeed, he himself expressly predicates the absolute and infinite 
 of these forms. 
 
 Time is only the image or the concept of a certain correlation
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 473 
 
 of existences of existence therefore, pro tanto, as conditioned. It 
 is thus itself only a form of the conditioned. But let that pass. 
 Is, then, the Absolute conceivable of time ? Can we conceive time 
 as unconditionally limited ? We can easily represent to ourselves 
 time under any relative limitation of commencement and termina- 
 tion ; but we are conscious to ourselves of nothing more clearly, 
 than that it would be equally possible to think without thought, 
 as to construe to the mind an absolute commencement, or an ab- 
 solute termination, of time ; that is, a beginning and an end, 
 beyond which, time is conceived as non-existent. Goad imagina- 
 tion to the utmost, it still sinks paralyzed within the bounds of 
 time ; and time survives as the condition of the thought itself in 
 which we annihilate the universe : 
 
 ' Sur les mondes detruits le Temps dprt immobile.' 
 
 But if the Absolute be inconceivable of this form, is the Infinite 
 more comprehensible ? Can we imagine time as unconditionally 
 unlimited ? We cannot conceive the Infinite regress of time ; for 
 such a notion could only be realized by the infinite addition in 
 thought of finite times, and such an addition would, itself, require 
 nn eternity for its accomplishment. If we dream of affecting this, 
 we only deceive ourselves by substituting the indefinite for the in- 
 finite, than which no two notions can be more opposed. The ne- 
 gation of the commencement of time involves likewise the affir- 
 mation, that an infinite time has at every moment already run ; 
 that is, it implies the contradiction, that an infinite has been com- 
 pleted. For the same reasons we are unable to conceive an infi- 
 nite progress of time ; while the infinite regress and the infinite 
 progress, taken together, involve the triple contradiction of an in- 
 finite concluded, of an infinite commencing, and of two infinites, 
 not exclusive of each other. 
 
 Sp&ce, like time, is only the intuition or the concept of a cer- 
 tain correlation of existence of existence, therefore, pro tanto, 
 as conditioned. It is thus itself only a form of the conditioned. 
 But apart from this, thought is equally powerless in realizing a
 
 4T4 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 
 
 notion either of the absolute totality, or of the infinite immensity, 
 of space. And while time and space, as wholes, can thus neither 
 be conceived as absolutely limited, nor as infinitely unlimited ; s*. 
 their parts can be represented to the mind neither as absolutely 
 individual, nor as divisible to infinity. The universe cannot be 
 imagined as a whole, which may not also be imagined as a part ; 
 nor an atom be imagined as a part, which may not also be im- 
 agined as a whole. 
 
 The same analysis, with a similar result, can be applied to 
 cause and effect, and to substance and phenomenon. These, how- 
 ever, may both be reduced to the law itself of the conditioned. 1 
 
 The Conditioned is, therefore, that only which can be positive- 
 ly conceived ; the Absolute and Infinite are conceived only as ne- 
 gations of the conditioned in its opposite poles. 
 
 Now, as we observed, M. Cousin, and those who confound the 
 absolute and infinite, and regard the unconditioned as a positive 
 and indivisible notion, must show that this notion coincides 
 either, 1, with the notion of the Absolute, to the exclusion of the 
 infinite ; or 2, with the notion of the Infinite, to the exclusion ot 
 the absolute ; or 3, that it includes both as true, carrying their, 
 up to indifference ; or 4, that it excludes both as false. The last 
 two alternatives are impossible, as either would be subversive ot 
 the highest principle of intelligence, which asserts, that of two 
 contradictories, both cannot, but one must, be true. It only, 
 therefore, remains to identify the unity of the Unconditioned with 
 the Infinite, or with the Absolute with either, to the exclusion 
 of the other. But while every one must be intimately conscious 
 of the impossibility of this, the very fact that our author and 
 other philosophers a priori have constantly found it necessary to 
 confound these contradictions, sufficiently proves that neither 
 term has a right to represent the unity of the unconditioned, to 
 the prejudice of the other. 
 
 The Unconditioned is, therefore, not a positive concept ; nor 
 
 1 Bee the next chapter, I. for the applications of that doctrine. W.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 475 
 
 has it even a real or intrinsic unity ; for it only combines the Ab- 
 solute and the Infinite, in themselves contradictory of each other, 
 into a unity relative to us by the negative bond of their incon- 
 ceivability. It is on this mistake, of the relative for the irre- 
 spective, of the negative for the positive, that M. Cousin's theory 
 is founded : And it is not difficult to understand how the mistake 
 originated. 
 
 This reduction of M. Cousin's two ideas of the Infinite and Fi- 
 nite to one positive conception and its negative, implicitly anni- 
 hilates also the third idea, devised by him as a connection be- 
 tween his two substantive ideas ; and which he marvellously iden- 
 tifies with the relation of cause and effect. 
 
 Yet before leaving this part of our subject, we may observe, 
 that the very simplicity of our analysis is a strong presumption 
 in favor of its truth. A plurality of causes is not to be postula- 
 ted, where one is sufficient to account for the phenomena (Entia 
 non sunt multiplicanda prceter necessitatetn) ; and M. Cousin, in 
 supposing three positive ideas, where only one is necessary, brings 
 the rule of parsimony against his hypothesis, even before its un- 
 soundness may be definitely brought to light. 
 
 In the third place, the restrictions to which our author subjects 
 intelligence, divine and human, implicitly deny a knowledge 
 even a concept of the absolute, both to God and man. ' The 
 condition of intelligence,' says M. Cousin, l is difference ; and an 
 act of knowledge is only possible where there exists a plurality 
 of terms. Unity does not suffice for conception ; variety is ne- 
 cessary ; nay more, not only is variety necessary, there must like- 
 wise subsist an intimate relation between the principles of unity 
 and variety; without which, the variety not being perceived by 
 the unity, the one is as if it could not perceive, and the other as 
 if it could not be perceived. Look back for a moment into your- 
 selves, and you will find, that what constitutes intelligence in our 
 feeble consciousness, is, that there are there several terms, of 
 which the one perceives the other, of which the other is perceived 
 by the first : in this consists self-knowledge, in this consists self-
 
 476 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 
 
 comprehension, in this consists intelligence : intelligence with- 
 out consciousness is the abstract possibility of intelligence, not in- 
 telligence in the act ; and consciousness implies diversity and dif- 
 ference. Transfer all this from human to absolute intelligence ; 
 that is to say, refer the ideas to the only intelligence to which 
 they can belong. You have thus, if I may so express myself, the 
 life of absolute intelligence ; you have this intelligence with the 
 complete development of the elements which are necessary for it 
 to be a true intelligence ; you have all the momenta whose rela- 
 tion and motion constitute the reality of knowledge.' In all this, 
 so far as human intelligence is concerned, we cordially agree ; for 
 a more complete admission could not be imagined, not only that 
 a knowledge, and even a notion, of the absolute is impossible for 
 man, but that we are unable to conceive the possibility of such a 
 knowledge, even in the Deity, without contradicting our human 
 conceptions of the possibility of intelligence itself. Our author, 
 however, recognizes no contradiction ; and, without argument or 
 explanation, accords a knowledge of that which can only be 
 known under the negation of all difference and plurality, to that 
 which can only know under the affirmation of both. 
 
 If a knowledge of the absolute were possible under these con- 
 ditions, it may excite our wonder that other philosophers should 
 have viewed this supposition as utterly impossible ; and that 
 Schelling, whose acuteness was never questioned, should have 
 exposed himself gratuitously to the reproach of mysticism, by his 
 postulating for a few, and through a faculty above the reach of 
 consciousness, a knowledge already given to all in the fact of con- 
 sciousness itself. Monstrous as is the postulate of the Intellectual 
 Intuition, we freely confess that it is only through such a faculty 
 that we can imagine the possibility of a science of the absolute ; 
 and have no hesitation in acknowledging, that if Schilling's 
 hypothesis appear to us incogitable, that of Cousin is seen to be 
 self-contradictory. 
 
 Our author admits, and must admit, that the Absolute, as ab- 
 solutely universal, is absolutely one ; absolute unity is convertible
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 477 
 
 with the absolute negation of plurality and difference ; the abso- 
 lute, and the knowledge of the absolute, are therefore identical. 
 But knowledge, or intelligence, it is asserted by M. Cousin, sup- 
 poses a plurality of terms the plurality of subject and object. 
 Intelligence, whose essence is plurality, cannot therefore be iden- 
 tified with the absolute, whose essence is unity ; and if known, 
 the absolute, as known, must be different from the absolute as 
 existing ; that is, there must be two absolutes an absolute in 
 knowledge, and an absolute in existence, which is contradictory. 
 
 But waiving this contradiction, and allowing the non-identity 
 of knowledge and existence, the absolute as known must be 
 known under the conditions of the absolute as existing, that is, 
 as absolute unity. But, on the other hand, it is asserted, that the 
 condition of intelligence, as knowing, is plurality and difference ; 
 consequently the condition of the absolute, as existing, and under 
 which it must be known, and the condition of intelligence, as ca- 
 pable of knowing, are incompatible. For, if we suppose the ab- 
 solute cognizable : it must be identified either, 1, with the 
 subject knowing ; or, 2, with the object known ; or, 3, with the 
 indifference of both. The first hypothesis, and the second, are 
 contradictory of the absolute. For in these the absolute is sup- 
 posed to be known, either as contradistinguished from the know- 
 ing subject, or as contradistinguished from the object known ; in 
 other words, the absolute is asserted to be known as absolute 
 unity, i. e. as the negation of all plurality, while the very act by 
 which it is known, affirms plurality as the condition of its own 
 possibility. The third hypothesis, on the other hand, is contra- 
 dictory of the plurality of intelligence ; for if the subject and the 
 object of consciousness be known as one, a plurality of terms is 
 not the necessary condition of intelligence. The alternative is 
 therefore necessary : Either the absolute cannot be known or 
 conceived at all ; or our author is wrong in subjecting thought to 
 the conditions of plurality and difference. It was the iron neces- 
 sity of the alternative that constrained Schelling to resort to the 
 hypothesis of a knowledge in identity through the intellectual
 
 478 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 
 
 intuition ; and it could only be from an oversight of the main 
 difficulties of the problem that M. Cousin, in abandoning the in- 
 tellectual intuition, did not abandon the absolute itself. For how 
 that, whose essence is all-comprehensive unity, can be known by 
 the negation of that unity under the condition of plurality ; how 
 that, which exists only as the identity of all difference, can be 
 known under the negation of that identity, in the antithesis of 
 subject and object, of knowledge and existence : these are con- 
 tradictions which M. Cousin has not attempted to solve, contra- 
 dictions which he does not seem to have contemplated. 
 
 In the fourth place. The objection of the inconceivable nature 
 of Schelling's intellectual intuition, and of a knowledge of the 
 absolute in identity, apparently determined our author to adopt 
 the opposite, but suicidal alternative, of a knowledge of the 
 absolute in consciousness, and by difference. The equally insu- 
 perable objection, that from the absolute defined as absolute, 
 Schelling had not been able, without inconsequence, to deduce 
 the conditioned, seems, in like manner, to have influenced M. 
 Cousin to define the absolute by a relative ; not observant, it 
 would appear, that though he thus facilitated the derivation of 
 the conditioned, he annihilated in reality the absolute itself. By 
 the former proceeding, our author virtually denies the possibility 
 of the absolute in thought ; by the latter, the possibility of the 
 absolute in existence. 
 
 The absolute is defined by our author, ' an absolute cause, a 
 cause which cannot but pass into act.'' Now, it is sufficiently 
 manifest that a thing existing absolutely (i.e. not under relation), 
 and a thing existing absolutely as a cause, are contradictory. 
 The former is the absolute negation of all relation, the latter is 
 the absolute affirmation of a- particular relation. A cause is a 
 relative, and what exists absolutely as a cause, exists absolutely 
 under relation. Schelling has justly observed, that ' he would 
 deviate wide as the poles from the idea of the absolute, who 
 would think of defining its nature by the. notion of activity.'' * 
 
 * Bruno, p. 171.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 479 
 
 But he who would define the absolute by the notion of a cause, 
 would deviate still more widely from its nature ; inasmuch as 
 the notion of a cause involves not only the notion of a determi- 
 nation to activity, but of a determination to a particular, nay a 
 dependent kind of activity, an activity not immanent, but 
 transeunt. What exists merely as a cause, exists merely for the 
 sake of something else, is not final in itself, but simply a mean 
 towards an end ; and in the accomplishment of that end, it con- 
 summates its own perfection. Abstractly considered, the effect 
 is therefore superior to the cause. A cause, as cause, may indeed 
 be better than one or two or any given number of its effects. 
 But the total complement of the effects of what exists only as a 
 cause, is better than that which, ex hypothesi, exists merely for 
 the sake of their production. Further, not only is an absolute 
 cause dependent on the effect for its perfection, it is dependent 
 on it even for its reality. For to what extent a thing exists 
 necessarily as a cause, to that extent it is not all-sufficient to 
 itself ; since to that extent it is dependent on the effect, as on 
 the condition through which alone it realizes its existence ; and 
 what exists absolutely as a cause, exists, therefore, in absolute 
 dependence on the effect for the reality of its existence. An 
 absolute cause, in truth, only exists in its effects : it never 
 is, it always becomes ; for it is an existence in potentia, and 
 not an existence in actu, except through and in its effects. 
 The absolute is thus, at best, a being merely inchoative and 
 imperfect. 
 
 The definition of the absolute by absolute cause, is, therefore, 
 tantamount to a negation of itself; for it defines by relation 
 and conditions that which is conceived only as exclusive of both. 
 The same is true of the definition of the absolute by substance. 
 But of this we do not speak. 
 
 The vice of M. Cousin's definition of the absolute by absolute 
 cause, is manifested likewise in its applications. He maintains 
 that his theory can alone explain the nature and relations of the 
 Deity ; and on its absolute incompetency to fulfil the conditions
 
 480 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 
 
 of a rational theism, we are willing to rest our demonstration of 
 its radical unsoundness. 
 
 ' God,' says our author, ' creates ; he creates in virtue of his 
 creative power, and he draws the universe, not from nonentity, 
 but from himself, who is absolute existence. His distinguishing 
 characteristic being an absolute creative force, which cannot but 
 pass into activity, it follows, not that the creation is possible, but 
 that it is necessary? 
 
 We must be very brief. The subjection of the Deity to a 
 necessity a necessity of self-manifestation identical with the 
 creation of the universe, is contradictory of the fundamental pos- 
 tulates of a divine nature. On this theory, God is not distinct 
 from the world ; the creature is a modification of the creator. 
 Now, without objecting that the simple subordination of the 
 Deity to necessity, is in itself tantamount to his dethronement, 
 let us see to what consequences this necessity, on the hypothesis 
 of M. Cousin, inevitably leads. On this hypothesis, one of two 
 alternatives must be admitted. God, as necessarily determined 
 to pass from absolute essence to relative manifestation, is deter- 
 mined to pass either from the better to the worse, or from the 
 worse to the better. A third possibility, that both states are equal, 
 as contradictory in itself, and as contradicted by our author, it is 
 not necessary to consider. 
 
 The first supposition must be rejected. The necessity in this 
 case determines God to pass from the better to the worse ; that 
 is, operates to his partial annihilation. The power which com- 
 pels this must be external and hostile, for nothing operates wil- 
 lingly to its own deterioration ; and, as superior to the pretended 
 God, is either itself the real deity, if an intelligent and free 
 cause, or a negation of all deity, if a blind force or fate. 
 
 The second is equally inadmissible : that God, passing into 
 the universe, passes from a state of comparative imperfection, 
 into a state of comparative perfection. The divine nature is 
 identical with the most -perfect nature, and is also identical with 
 the first cause. If the first cause be not identical with the most
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 481 
 
 perfect nature, there is no God, for the two essential conditions 
 of his existence are not in combination. Now, on the present 
 supposition, the most perfect nature is the derived ; nay the uni- 
 verse, the creation, the yivo'fisvov, is, in relation to its cause, the 
 real, the actual, the ovrws ov. It would also be the divine, but 
 that divinity supposes also the notion of cause, while the uni- 
 verse, ex hypethesi, is only an effect. 
 
 It is no answer to these difficulties for M. Cousin to say, that 
 the Deity, though a cause which cannot choose but create, is not 
 however exhausted in the act ; and though passing with all the 
 elements of his being into the universe, that he remains entire in 
 his essence, and with all the superiority of the cause over the 
 effect. The dilemma is unavoidable : Either the Deity is in- 
 dependent of the universe for his being or perfection ; on which 
 alternative our author must abandon his theory of God, and the 
 necessity of creation : Or the Deity is dependent on his manifes- 
 tation in the universe for his being or perfection ; on which alter- 
 native, his doctrine is assailed by the difficulties previously 
 stated. 
 
 The length to which the preceding observations have extended, 
 prevents us from adverting to sundry other opinions of our 
 author, which we conceive to be equally unfounded. For exam- 
 ple (to say nothing of his proof of the impersonality of intelligence, 
 because, forsooth, truth is not subject to our will), what can be 
 conceived more self-contradictory than his theory of moral liber- 
 ty ? Divorcing liberty from intelligence, but connecting it with 
 personality, he defines it to be a cause which is determined to act 
 by its proper energy alone. But (to say nothing of remoter 
 difficulties) how liberty can be conceived, supposing always a 
 plurality of modes of activity, without a knowledge of that plu- 
 rality ; how a faculty can resolve to act by preference in a par- 
 ticular manner, and not determine itself by final causes ; how 
 intelligence can influence a blind power, without operating as an 
 efficient cause ; or how. in fine, morality can be founded on a 
 liberty which, at best, only escapes necessity by taking refuge 
 
 21
 
 482 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 
 
 with chance : these are problems which M. Cousin, in none 
 of his works, has stated, and which we are confident he is unable 
 to solve. 
 
 After the tenor of our previous observations, it is needless to 
 say that we regard M. Cousin's attempt to establish a general 
 peace among philosophers, by the promulgation of his Eclectic 
 theory, as a failure. But though no converts to his Uncondi- 
 tioned, and viewing with regret what we must regard as the mis- 
 application of his distinguished talents, we cannot disown a strong 
 feeling of interest and admiration for those qualities, even in their 
 excess, which have betrayed him, with so many other aspiring 
 philosophers, into a pursuit which could only end in disappoint- 
 ment : we mean his love of truth, and his reliance on the pow- 
 ers of man. Not to despair of philosophy is ' a last infirmity of 
 noble minds.' The stronger the intellect, the stronger the confi- 
 dence in its force ; the more ardent the appetite for knowledge, 
 the less are we prepared to canvass the uncertainty of the frui- 
 tion. ' The wish is parent to the thought.' Loth to admit 
 that our science is at best the reflection of a reality we cannot 
 know, we strive to penetrate to existence in itself; and what we 
 have labored intensely to attain, we at last fondly believe we 
 have accomplished. But, like Ixion, we embrace a cloud for a 
 divinity. Conscious only of, conscious only in and through, lim- 
 itation, we think to comprehend the infinite ; and dream even of 
 establishing the science the nescience of man, on an identity 
 with the omniscience of God. It is this powerful tendency of 
 the most vigorous minds to transcend the sphere of our faculties, 
 which makes a ' learned ignorance' the most difficult acquire- 
 ment, perhaps, indeed, the consummation of knowledge. In 
 the words of a forgotten, but acute philosopher, ' Mayna, 
 immo maxima pars sapicntice est, qucedam cequo animo nescire 
 
 1 See the next chapter, 2, for testimonies in regard to the limitation of 
 our knowledge. W.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 
 
 483 
 
 Hie mundus est infinites. 
 
 Infinitas et totus est, 
 
 (Nam mente numquam absolveris ;) 
 
 Infinitas et illius 
 
 Pars quselibet, partisque pars. 
 
 Quod tangis est infinitas ; 
 
 Quod cernis est infinitas ; 
 
 Quod non vides corpusculum, 
 
 Sed mente sola concipis, 
 
 Corpusculi et corpusculum, 
 
 Huj usque pars corpusculi, 
 
 Partisque pars, hujusque pars, 
 
 In hacque parte quicquid est, 
 
 Infinitatem coutiuet. 
 
 INJTNITAS! 
 
 Secare mens at pergito, 
 Numquam secare desine ; 
 In sectione qualibet 
 Infinitates dissecas. 
 Quiesce mens heic denique, 
 Arctosque nosce limites 
 Queis contineris undique ; 
 Quiesce mens, et limites 
 In orbe cessa quserere. 
 Quod quaeris in te repperis: 
 In mente sunt, in mente sunt, 
 Hi, quos requiris, termini ; 
 A rebus absunt limites, 
 In hisce tantum infinitas, 
 INITNITAS ! INHNITAS ! 
 
 Proh, quantus heic acervus est ! 
 
 Et quam nihil quod nostra mens 
 
 Ex hoc acervo intelligit ! 
 
 At ilia Mens vah, qualis est, 
 
 Conspecta cui stant omnia ! 
 
 In singulis quse perspicit 
 
 Qusecunque sunt in singulis 
 
 Et singulorum singulis !']
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 LIMITATION OF THOUGHT AND KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 I. A DOCTRINE OF THE RELATIVE : THE CATEGORIES OF 
 THOUGHT. 
 
 THINKING (employing that terra as comprehending all our cog- 
 nitive energies') is of two kinds. It is either A) Negative or B) 
 Positive. 
 
 A.) Thinking is NEGATIVE (in propriety, a negation of thought), 
 when Existence is not attributed to an object. It is of two kinds ; 
 inasmuch as the one or the other of the conditions of positive 
 thinking is violated. In either case, the result is Nothing. 
 
 I.) If the condition of Non-contradiction be not fulfilled, there 
 emerges The really Impossible, what has been called in the schools, 
 Nihil purum. 
 
 II.) If the condition of Relativity be not purified, there results 
 The Impossible to thought ; that is, what may exist, but what we 
 are unable to conceive existing. This impossible, the schools have 
 not contemplated ; we are, therefore, compelled, for the sake of 
 symmetry and precision, to give it a scholastic appellation in the 
 Nihil cogitabile. 
 
 B.) Thinking is POSITIVE (and this in propriety is the only 
 real thought), when Existence is predicated of an object. By ex- 
 istence is not, however, here meant real or objective existence, but 
 
 1 ' Thought and thinking are used in a more, and in a less, restricted signi- 
 fication. In the former meaning they are limited to the discursive energies 
 alone ; in the latter, they are co-extensive with consciousness. In the Car- 
 tesian language, the term thought included all of which we are conscious.' 
 Keid, pp. 222, 270. W.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 485 
 
 only existence subjective or ideal. Thus, imagining a Centaur or 
 a Hippogryph, we do not suppose that the phantasm has any 
 being beyond our imagination ; but still we attribute to it an ac- 
 tual existence in thought. Nay, we attribute to it a possible ex- 
 istence in creation ; for we can represent nothing, which we do 
 not think, as within the limits of Almighty power to realize. 
 Positive thinking can be brought to bear only under two condi- 
 tions ; the condition of I) Non-contradiction, and the condition 
 of II) Relativity. If both are fulfilled, we think Something. 
 
 I. NON-CONTRADICTION. This condition is insuperable. We 
 think it, not only as a law of thought, but as a law of things ; 
 and while we suppose its violation to determine an absolute im- 
 possibility, we suppose its fulfilment to afford only the Not-im- 
 possible. Thought is, under this condition, merely explicative or 
 analytic ; and the condition itself is brought to bear under three 
 phases, constituting three laws : i.) the law of Identity ; ii.) 
 the law of Contradiction ; iii.) the law of Excluded Middle. 
 The science of these laws is Logic ; and as the laws are only ex- 
 plicative, Logic is only formal. (The principle of Sufficient Rea- 
 son* should be excluded from Logic. For, inasmuch as this prin- 
 ciple is not material (material = non-formal), it is only a deriva- 
 tion of the three formal laws ; and inasmuch as it is material, it 
 coincides with the principle of Causality, and is extra-logical.) 
 
 Though necessary to state the condition of Non-contradiction, 
 there is no dispute about its effect, no danger of its violation. 
 When I, therefore, speak of the Conditioned, I use the term in 
 
 1 Sufficient Reason=Sum of Causes. ' The principle of the Sufficient Rea- 
 son (p. rationis sufficientis). called, likewise, by Leibnitz, that of the Deter- 
 mining Reason (p. rationis determinantis) of Convenience (p. convenientwi) 
 of Perfection (p. perfectionis) and of the Order of Existences (p. existentia- 
 rum) is one of the most extensive, not to say ambiguous, character. For it 
 is employed to denote, conjunctly and severally, the two metaphysical or real 
 principles 1, Why a thing is (principium or ratio essendi) ; 2, Why a 
 thing becomes or is produced (p. or r.Jiendi) ; and, 3, the logical or ideal 
 principle, Why a thing is known or conceived (p. or r. cognoscendi).'' Reid, 
 p. 464. W.
 
 486 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 
 
 special reference to Relativity. By existence conditioned, is meant, 
 emphatically, existence relative, existence thought under relation. 
 Relation may thus be understood to contain all the categories and 
 forms of positive thought. 
 
 II.) RELATIVITY. This condition (by which, be it observed, is 
 meant the relatively or conditionally ' relative, and, therefore, not 
 even the relative, absolutely or infinitely) this condition is not 
 insuperable. We should not think it as a law of things, but 
 merely as a law of thought ; for we find that there are contradic- 
 tory opposites, one of which, by the rule of Excluded Middle, 
 must be true, but neither of which can by us be positively thought, 
 as possible. Thinking, under this condition, is ampliative or syn- 
 thetic. Its science, Metaphysic (using that term in a comprehen- 
 sive meaning) is therefore material, in the sense of non-formal. 
 The condition of Relativity, in so far as it is necessary, is brought 
 to bear under three principal relations ; the first of which springs 
 from the subject of knowledge the mind thinking (the relation 
 of Knowledge) ; the second and third from the object of knowl- 
 edge the thing thought about (the relations of Existence). 
 
 (Besides these necessary and original relations, of which alone 
 it is requisite to speak in an alphabet of human thought, there 
 are many relations, contingent and derivative, which we frequently 
 employ in the actual applications of our cognitive energies. Such 
 for example (without arrangement), as True and False, Good 
 and Bad, Perfect and Imperfect, Easy and Difficult, Desire and 
 Aversion, Simple and Complex, Uniform and Various, Singular 
 and Universal, Whole and Part, Similar and Dissimilar, Congru- 
 
 1 We can know, we can conceive, only what is relative. Our knowledge 
 of qualities or phenomena is necessarily relative ; for these exist only as they 
 exist in relation to our faculties. The knowledge or even the conception, of a 
 substance in itself, and apart from any qualities in relation to, and therefore 
 cognizable or conceivable by, our minds, involves a contradiction. Of such 
 we can form ordyanegative notion ; that is, we can merely conceive it as incon- 
 ceivable. But to call this negative notion a relative notion, is wrong ; 1, be- 
 cause all our (positive) notions are relative ; and 2, because this is itself a 
 negative notion i. e. no notion at all simply because there is no relation. 
 Reid, p. 828. W.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 487 
 
 ent and Incongruent, Equal and Unequal, Orderly and Disorderly, 
 Beautiful and Deformed, Material and Immaterial, Natural and 
 Artificial, Organized and Inorganized, Young and Old, Male and 
 Female, Parent and Child, &c., <fec. These admit of classification 
 from different points of view ; but to attempt their arrangement 
 at all, far less on any exclusive principle, would here be manifestly 
 out of place.) 
 
 i.) The relations of Knowledge are those which arise from the 
 reciprocal dependence of the subject and of the object of thought, 
 SELF AND NOT-SELF {Ego and Non-ego, Subjective and Object- 
 ive). Whatever comes into consciousness, is thought by us, either 
 as belonging to the mental self, exclusively (subjective-subjective), 
 or as belonging to the not-self, exclusively (objectivo-objective), 
 or as belonging partly to both (subjective-objective). It is diffi- 
 cult, however, to find words to express precisely all the complex 
 correlations of knowledge. For in cognizing a mere affection of 
 self, we objectify it ; it forms a subject-object or subjective object, 
 or subjective-subjective object : and how shall we name and dis- 
 criminate a mode of mind, representative of and relative to a 
 mode of matter ? This difficulty is, however, strictly psycholo- 
 gical. In so far as we are at present concerned, it is manifest that 
 all these cognitions exist for us, only as terms of a correlation. 
 
 The relations of Existence, arising from the object of knowledge, 
 are twofold ; inasmuch as the relation is either Intrinsic or Ex- 
 trinsic. 
 
 ii.) As the relation of Existence is Intrinsic, it is that of SUB- 
 STANCE AND QUALITY (form, accident, property, mode, affection, 
 phenomenon, appearance, attribute, predicate, &c.) It may be 
 called qualitative. 
 
 Substance and Quality are, manifestly, only thought as mutual 
 relatives. We cannot think a quality existing absolutely, in or 
 of itself. We are constrained to think it, as inhering in some 
 basis, substratum, hypostasis, or substance ; but this substance 
 cannot be conceived by us, except negatively, that is, as the un-
 
 488 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 
 
 apparent the inconceivable correlative of certain appearing qual- 
 ities. If we attempt to think it positively, we can think it only 
 by transforming it into a quality or bundle of qualities, which, 
 again, we are compelled to refer to an unknown substance, now 
 supposed for their incogitable basis. Every thing, in fact, may 
 be conceived as the quality, or as the substance of something else. 
 But absolute substance and absolute quality, these are both in- 
 conceivable, as more than negations of the conceivable. It is 
 hardly requisite to observe, that the term substance is vulgarly 
 applied, in the abusive signification, to a congeries of qualities, 
 denoting those especially which are more permanent, in contrast 
 to those which are more transitory. (See the treatise De Mundo, 
 attributed to Aristotle, c. iv.) 
 
 What has now been said, applies equally to Mind and Matter. 
 
 As the relation of Existence is Extrinsic, it is threefold ; and 
 as constituted by three species of quantity, it maybe called quan- 
 titative. It is realized in or by: 1. Protensive quantity, Pro- 
 tension or Time ; 2. Extensive quantity, Extension or Space ; 
 3. Intensive quantity, Intension or Degree. These quantities 
 may be all considered either as Continuous or as Discrete ; and 
 they constitute the three last great relations which we have here 
 to signalize. 
 
 iii.) TIME, Protension or protensive quantity, called likewise 
 Duration, is a necessary condition of thought. It may be consid- 
 ered both in itself and in the things which it contains. 
 
 Considered in itself. Time is positively inconceivable, if we 
 attempt to construe it in thought ; either, on the one hand, as 
 absolutely commencing or absolutely terminating, or on the other, 
 as infinite or eternal, whether ab ante or a post ; and it is no 
 less inconceivable, if we attempt to fix an absolute minimum or 
 to follow out an infinite division. It is positively conceivable : 
 if conceived as an indefinite past, present, or future ; and as an 
 indeterminate mean between the two unthinkable extremes of 
 an absolute least and an infinite divisibility. For thus it is 
 relative.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 489 
 
 In regard to Time Past and Time Future there is compara- 
 tively no difficulty, because these are positively thought as pro- 
 tensive quantities. But Time Present, when we attempt to 
 realize it, seems to escape us altogether to vanish into nonen- 
 tity. The present cannot be conceived as of any length, of any 
 quantity, of any pretension, in short, as any thing positive. It 
 is only conceivable as a negation, as the point or line (and these 
 are only negations) in which the past ends and the future begins, 
 in which they limit each other. 
 
 ' Le moment ou je parle, est d6jil loin de moi.' 
 
 In fact, we are unable to conceive how we do exist ; and, specu- 
 latively, we must admit, in its most literal acceptation ' Victuri 
 semper, vivimus nunquam.' The Eleatic Zeno's demonstration 
 of the impossibility of Motion, is not more insoluble than could 
 be framed a proof, that the Present has no reality ; for however 
 certain we may be of both, we can positively think neither. So 
 true is it as said by St. Augustin : ' What is Time, if not asked. 
 t know ;. but attempting to explain, I know not.' 
 
 Things in Time are either co-inclusive or co-exclusive. Things 
 co-inclusive if of the same time are, pro tanto, identical, appa- 
 rently and in thought ; if of different times (as causes and effect, 
 causoK et causatum), they appear as different, but are thought as 
 identical. Things co-exclusive are mutually, either prior and pos- 
 terior, or contemporaneous. 
 
 The impossibility we experience of thinking negatively or as 
 non-existent, non-existent, consequently in time (either past or 
 future), aught, which we have conceived positively or as existent, 
 this impossibility affords the principle of Causality, &c. (Spe- 
 cially developed in the sequel.) 
 
 Time applies to both Substance and Quality ; and includes the 
 other quantities, Space and Degree. 
 
 iv.) SPACE, Extension or extensive quantity is, in like man- 
 ner, a necessary condition of thought ; and may also be consid- 
 ered, both in itself, and in the things which it contains. 
 
 21*
 
 490 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 
 
 Considered in itself. Space is positively inconceivable : as a 
 whole, either infinitely unbounded, or absolutely bounded ; as a 
 part, either infinitely divisible, or absolutely indivisible. Space 
 is positively conceivable : as a mean between these extremes ; 
 in other words, we can think it either as an indefinite whole, or 
 as an indefinite part. For thus it is relative. 
 
 The things contained in Space may be considered, either in 
 relation to this form, or in relation to each other. In relation to 
 Space : the extension occupied by a thing is called its place ; and 
 a thing changing its place, gives the relation of motion in space, 
 space itself being always conceived as immovable, 
 
 'stabilisque manens dat cuncta mover!.' 
 
 Considered in relation to each other. Things, spacially, are 
 either inclusive, thus originating the relation of containing and 
 contained ; or co-exclusive, thus determining the relation of posi- 
 tion or situation of here and there. 
 
 Space applies, proximately, to things considered as Substance ; 
 for the qualities of substances, though they are in, may not oc- 
 cupy, space. In fact, it is by a merely modern abuse of the term, 
 that the affections of Extension have been styled Qualities. It 
 is extremely difficult for the human mind to admit the possibility 
 of unextended substance. Extension, being a condition of posi- 
 tive thinking, clings to all our conceptions ; and it is one merit 
 of the philosophy of the Conditioned, that it proves space to be 
 only a law of thought, and not a law of things. The difficulty 
 of thinking, or rather of admitting as possible, the immateriality 
 of the soul, is shown by the tardy and timorous manner in which 
 the inextension of the thinking subject was recognized in the 
 Christian Church. Some of the early Councils and most of the 
 Fathers maintained the extended, while denying the corporeal, 
 nature of the spiritual principle ; and, though I cannot allow, 
 that Descartes was the first by whom the immateriality of mind 
 vra& fully acknowledged, there can be no doubt that an assertion
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 491 
 
 of the inextension and illocality of the soul, was long and very 
 generally eschewed, as tantamount to the assertion that it was a 
 mere nothing. 
 
 On space are dependent what are called the Primary Qualities 
 of body, strictly so denominated, and Space combined with De- 
 gree affords, of body, the Secundo-primary Qualities. 1 
 
 Our inability to conceive an absolute elimination from space of 
 aught, which we have conceived to occupy space, gives the law 
 of what I have called Ultimate Incompressibility, <fec. 2 
 
 v.) DEGREE, Intension or intensive quantity, is not, like Time 
 and Space, an absolute condition of thought. Existences are not 
 necessarily thought under it ; it does not apply to Substance, but 
 to Quality, and that in the more limited acceptation of the word. 
 For it does not apply to what have (abusively) been called by 
 modern philosophers the Primary Qualities of body ; these being 
 merely evolutions of Extension, which, again, is not thought un- 
 der Degree. 3 Degree may, therefore, be thought as null, or as 
 existing only potentially. But thinking it to be, we must think 
 it as a quantity ; and, as a quantity, it is positively both incon- 
 ceivable and conceivable. It is positively inconceivable : abso- 
 lutely, either as least or as greatest ; infinitely, as without limit, 
 either in increase or in diminution. On the contrary, it is posi- 
 tively conceivable ; as indefinitely high or higher, as indefinitely 
 low or lower. The things thought under it ; if of the same in- 
 tension are correlatively uniform, if of a different degree, are cor- 
 relatively higher or lower. 
 
 Degree affords the relations of Actuality and Potentiality, of 
 Action and Passion, of Power active, and Power passive, &c., &c. 
 
 Degree is, likewise, developed into what, in propriety, are 
 called the Secondary Qualities of body; and combined with 
 Space, into the Secundo-primary. 1 
 
 1 On this distinction, see Part Second, chapter iii. pp. 852, 870. W. 
 Ib. p. 856. W. Ib. p. 854. W. * Ib. p. 870, p. 858, sq. W.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 
 
 So much for the Conditions of Thinking, in detail. 
 
 If the general doctrine of the Conditioned be correct, it yields 
 as a corollary, that Judgment, that Comparison is implied in 
 every act of apprehension ; and the fact, that consciousness can- 
 not be realized without an energy of judgment, is, again, a proof 
 of the correctness of the theory, asserting the Relativity of 
 Thought. 
 
 The philosophy of the Conditioned even from the preceding 
 outline, ia, it will be seen, the express converse of the philosophy 
 of the Absolute, at least, as this system has been latterly evolved 
 in Germany. For this asserts to man a knowledge of the Uncon- 
 ditioned, of the Absolute and Infinite ; while that denies to him 
 a knowledge of either, and maintains, all which we immediately 
 know, or can know, to be only the Conditioned, the Relative, the 
 Phenomenal, the Finite. The one, supposing knowledge to 
 be only of existence in itself, and existence in itself to be appre- 
 hended, and even understood, proclaims ' Understand that you 
 may believe' (' Intellige ut credos') ; the other, supposing that 
 existence, in itself, is unknown, that apprehension is only of phe- 
 nomena, and that these are received only upon trust, as incompre- 
 hensibly revealed facts, proclaims, with the prophet, ' Believe 
 that ye may understand' (' Crede ut intelligas.' Is. vii. 9, sec. 
 Ixx.) But extremes meet. In one respect, both coincide ; for 
 both agree, that the knowledge of Nothing is the principle or re- 
 sult of all true philosophy : 
 
 ' Scire NihU, stadium, quo nos Isetamur utrique.' 
 
 But the one doctrine, openly maintaining that the Nothing 
 must yield every thing, is a philosophic omniscience ; whereas the 
 other, holding that Nothing can yield nothing, is a philosophic 
 nescience. In other words : the doctrine of the Unconditioned 
 is a philosophy confessing relative ignorance, but professing ab- 
 solute knowledge ; while the doctrine of the Conditioned is a phi-
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 493 
 
 losophy professing relative knowledge, but confessing absolute ig- 
 norance. Thus, touching the absolute : the watchword of the 
 one is, ' Noscendo cognoscitur, ignorando ignoratur ;' the watch- 
 word of the other is, ' Noscendo ignoratur, ignorando cognosci- 
 tur.' 
 
 But which is true ? To answer this, we need only to examine 
 our own consciousness ; there shall we recognize the limited ' ex- 
 tent of our tether.' 
 
 ' Tecum habita, et noris quam sittibi curta supellex.' 
 
 But this one requisite is fulfilled (alas ! ) by few ; and the same 
 philosophic poet has to lament : 
 
 1 Ut nemo in sese tentat descenders, nemo ; 
 Sed precedent! spectator mantica tergo !' 
 
 To manifest the utility of introducing the principle of the Con- 
 ditioned into our metaphysical speculations, I shall (always in 
 outline) give one only, but a signal illustration of its importance. 
 Of all questions in the history of philosophy, that concerning 
 the origin of our judgment of Cause and Effect is, perhaps, the 
 most celebrated ; but strange to say, there is not, so far as I am 
 aware, to be found a comprehensive view of the various theories, 
 proposed in explanation, not to say, among these, any satisfactory 
 explanation of the phenomenon itself. 
 
 The phenomenon is this : When aware of a new appearance, 
 we are unable to conceive that therein has originated any new 
 existence, and are, therefore, constrained to think, that what now 
 appears to us under a new form, had previously an existence 
 under others. These others (for they are always plural) are 
 called its cause ; and a cause (or more properly causes) we cannot 
 but suppose ; for a cause is simply every thing without which the 
 effect would not result, and all such concurring, the effect cannot 
 but result. We are utterly unable to construe it in thought as 
 possible, that the complement of existence has been either increased 
 or diminished. We cannot conceive, either, on the one hand, 
 nothing becoming something, or, on the other, soniothinj; becoming
 
 494 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 
 
 nothing. When God is said to create the universe out of nothing, 
 we think this, by supposing, that he evolves the universe out of 
 himself; and in like manner, we conceive annihilation, only by 
 conceiving the creator to withdraw his creation from actuality into 
 
 power. 
 
 ' Nil posse creari 
 De Nihilo, neque quod genitu 'st ad Nil revocari ;' 
 
 .' Gigni 
 
 De Nihilo Nihil, in Nihilum Nil posse reverti :' 
 
 these lines of Lucretius and Persius enounce a physical axiom 
 of antiquity ; which, when interpreted by the doctrine of the Con- 
 ditioned, is itself at once recalled to harmony with revealed truth, 
 and expressing, in its purest form, the conditions of human thought, 
 expresses also, implicitly, the whole intellectual phenomenon of 
 causality. 
 
 The mind is thus compelled to recognize an absolute identity 
 of existence in the effect and in the complement of its causes, 
 between the causatum and the causa. We think the causes to 
 contain all that is contained in the effect ; the effect to contain 
 nothing but what is contained in the causes. Each is the sum of 
 the other. ' Omnia mutantur, nihil intent,' is what we think, 
 what we must think ; nor can the change itself be thought without 
 a cause. Our judgment of causality simply is : We necessarily 
 deny in thought, that the object which we apprehend as begin- 
 ning to be, really so begins ; but, on the contrary, affirm, as we 
 must, the identity of its present sum of being, with the sum of its 
 past existence. And here, it is not requisite for us to know, under 
 what form, under what combination this quantum previously ex- 
 isted ; in other words, it is unnecessary for us to recognize the 
 particular causes of this particular effect. A discovery of the 
 determinate antecedents into which a determinate consequent 
 may be refunded, is merely contingent, merely the result of 
 experience ; but the judgment, that every event should have its 
 causes, is necessary, and imposed on us, as a condition of our 
 human intelligence itself. This necessity of so thinking, is the 
 only phenomenon to be explained.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 495 
 
 Now, throwing out of account the philosophers, who, like Dr. 
 Thomas Brown,* quietly eviscerate 1 the problem of its sole diffi- 
 culty, and enumerating only the theories which do not accommo- 
 date the phenomenon to be explained to their attempts at expla- 
 nation, these are, in all, seven. 
 
 1, And, in the first place, they fall into two supreme classes. 
 The one (A) comprehends those theories which consider the causal 
 judgment as adventitious, empirical, or a posteriori, that is, as 
 derived from experience ; the other (B) comprehends those which 
 view it as native, pure, or a priori, that is, as a condition of intel- 
 ligence itself. The two primary genera, are, however, severally 
 subdivided into various species. 
 
 2, The former class (A) falls into two subordinates ; inas- 
 much as the judgment is viewed as founded either on an original 
 (a) or on a derivative (b) cognition. 
 
 3, Each of these is finally distributed into two ; according as 
 the judgment is supposed to have an objective or a subjective ori- 
 gin. In the former case (a) it is objective, perhaps objectivo- 
 objective, (1) when held to consist in an immediate apprehension 
 of the efficiency of causes in the external and internal worlds ; 
 and subjective, or rather subjectivo-objective, (2) when viewed as 
 given through a self-consciousness alone of the efficiency of our 
 own volitions. In the latter case (b) it is regarded, if objective 
 (3), as a product of induction and generalization ; if subjective 
 (4), as a result of association and custom. 
 
 4, In like manner, the latter supreme class (B) is divided 
 into two, according as the opinions under it, view in the causal 
 judgment, a law of thought : either ultimate, primary (c) ; or 
 secondary, derived (d). 
 
 * The fundamental vice of Dr. Brown's theory has been, with great acute- 
 ness, exposed by his successor, Professor Wilson. (See Blackwood's Maga- 
 zine, July 1836, vol. xl. p. 122, sq.) 
 
 1 ' In this theory, the phenomenon to be saved is silently or in effect evac- 
 uated of its principal quality the quality of Necessity ; for the real problem 
 is to explain how it is that we cannot but think that all which begins to be has 
 not an absolute but only a relative commencement. These pliilosophers do 
 not anatomize but truncate? Reid, p. 604. W.
 
 496 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 
 
 5, It is a corollary of the former doctrine (c), (which is not 
 subdivided), that the judgment is a positive act, an affirmative 
 deliverance of intelligence (5). The latter doctrine (d), on the 
 other hand, considers the judgment as of a negative character ; 
 and is subdivided into two. For some maintain that the princi- 
 ple of causality may be resolved into the principle of Contradic- 
 tion, or, more properly, non-contradiction (6); whilst, though 
 not previously attempted, it may be argued that the judgment 
 of causality is a derivation from the Condition of Relativity in 
 Time (7). 
 
 First and Second theories. Of these seven opinions, the first 
 has always been held in combination with the second ; whereas, 
 the second has been frequently held by those who abandon the 
 first Considering them together, that is, as the opinion, that we 
 immediately apprehend the efficiency of causes external or inter- 
 nal ; this is obnoxious to two fatal objections. 
 
 The first is, that we have no such apprehension, no such ex- 
 perience. It is now, indeed, universally admitted, that we have 
 no perception of the causal nexus in the material world. Hume 
 it was, who decided the opinion of philosophers upon this point. 
 But though he advances his refutation of the vulgar doctrine as 
 original, he was, in fact, herein only the last of a long series of 
 metaphysicians, some of whom had even maintained their thesis 
 not less lucidly than the Scottish skeptic. I cannot indeed be- 
 lieve, that Hume could have been ignorant of the anticipation. 
 But whilst surrendering the first, there are many philosophers who 
 still adhere to the second opinion ; a theory which has been best 
 stated and most strenuously supported by the late M. Maine de Bi- 
 ran, one of the acutest metaphysicians of France. I will to move 
 my arm, and I move it. When we analyze this phenomenon, says 
 De Biran, the following are the results : 1, the consciousness of 
 an act of will ; 2, the consciousness of a motion produced ; 3, 
 the consciousness of a relation of the motion to the volition. And 
 what is this relation ? Not one of simple succession. The will 
 is not for us an act without efficiency ; it is a productive energy ;
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 497 
 
 so that, in a volition, there is given to us the notion of cause ; and 
 this notion we subsequently project out from our internal activities 
 into the changes of the external world. But the empirical fact, 
 here asserted, is incorrect. For between the overt fact of corpo- 
 real movement, which we perceive, and the internal act of the 
 will to move, of which we are self-conscious, there intervenes a 
 series of intermediate agencies, of which we are wholly unaware ; 
 consequently, we can have no consciousness, as this hypothesis 
 maintains, of any causal connection between the extreme links of 
 this chain, that is, between the volition to move and the arm 
 moving. 1 
 
 But independently of this, the second objection is fatal to the 
 theory which would found the judgment of causality on any em- 
 pirical apprehension whether of the phenomena of mind or of the 
 phenomena of matter. Admitting the causal efficiency to be cog- 
 nizable, and perception with self-consciousness to be competent 
 for its apprehension, still as these faculties can inform us only of 
 individual causations, the quality of necessity and consequent 
 universality by which this judgment is characterized remains 
 wholly unexplained. (See Cousin on Locke.) So much for the 
 two theories at the head of our enumeration. 
 
 As the first and second opinions have been usually associated, 
 so also have been the third and fourth. 
 
 Third theory. In regard to the third opinion it is manifest, 
 that the observation of certain phenomena succeeding certain 
 other phenomena, and the generalization, consequent thereon, 
 that these are reciprocally causes and effect, it is manifest that 
 this could never of itself have engendered, not only the strong, 
 but the irresistible, conviction, that every event must have its 
 causes. Each of these observations is contingent, and any num- 
 ber of observed contingencies will never impose upon us the con- 
 sciousness of necessity, that is, the consciousness of an inability to 
 think the opposite. This theory is thus logically absurd. For it 
 
 1 See p. , above. W,
 
 498 PHILOSOPHY OF THE ' CONDITIONED. 
 
 would infer as a conclusion, the universal necessity of the causal 
 judgment, from a certain number of actual consecutions ; that is, 
 it would collect that all must be, because some are. Logically 
 absurd, it is also psychologically false. For we find no difficulty 
 in conceiving the converse of one or of all observed consecutions ; 
 and yet, the causal judgment which, ex hypothesi, is only the re- 
 sult of these observations, we cannot possibly think, as possibly 
 unreal. We have always seen a stone returning to the ground 
 when thrown into the air ; but we find no difficulty in represent- 
 ing to ourselves some or all stones rising from the earth ; nay, we 
 can easily suppose even gravitation itself to be reversed. Only, 
 we are unable to conceive the possibility of this or of any other 
 event, without a cause. 
 
 Fourth opinion. Nor does the fourth theory afford a better 
 solution. The necessity of so thinking, cannot be derived from 
 a custom of so thinking. The force of custom, influential as it 
 may be, is still always limited to the customary ; and the custom- 
 ary never reaches, never even approaches, to the necessary. As- 
 sociation may explain a strong and special, but it can never ex- 
 plain a universal and absolutely irresistible belief. On this theory, 
 also, when association is recent, the causal judgment should be 
 weak, and rise only gradually into full force, as custom becomes 
 inveterate. But we do not find that this judgment is feebler in 
 the young, stronger in the old. In neither case, is there less and 
 more ; in both cases the necessity is complete. Mr. Hume pat- 
 ronized the opinion, that the causal judgment is an offspring of 
 experience engendered upon custom. But those have a sorry in- 
 sight into the philosophy of that great thinker who suppose, like 
 Brown, that this was a dogmatic theory of his own, or one con- 
 sidered satisfactory by himself. On the contrary, in his hands it 
 was a reduction of the prevalent dogmatism to palpable absurd- 
 ity, by showing out the inconsistency of its results. To the 
 Lockian sensualism, Hume proposed the problem, to account 
 for the phenomenon of necessity in our thought of the causal 
 nexus. That philosophy afforded no other principle than the
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 499 
 
 custom of experience, through which even the attempt at a solu- 
 tion could be made ; and the principle of custom Hume shows 
 could never account for the product of any real necessity. The 
 alternative was plain. Either the doctrine of sensualism is false ; 
 or our nature is a delusion. Shallow thinkers admitted the latter 
 alternative, and were lost ; profound thinkers, on the contrary, 
 were determined to build philosophy on a deeper foundation than 
 that of the superficial edifice of Locke ; and thus it is, that Hume 
 has, immediately or mediately, been the cause or the occasion of 
 whatever is of principal value in the subsequent speculations of 
 Scotland, Germany, and France. 
 
 Fifth theory. In regard to the second supreme genus (B), 
 the first of the three opinions which it contains (the fifth in gen- 
 eral) maintains that the causal judgment is a primary datum, a 
 positive revelation of intelligence. To this are to be referred the 
 relative theories of Leibnitz, Reid, Kant, Stewart, Cousin, and 
 the majority of recent philosophers. To this class Brown like- 
 wise belongs ; inasmuch as he idly refers what remains in his 
 . hands of the evacuated phenomenon to an original belief. 
 
 Without descending to details, it is manifest in general, that 
 against the assumption of a special principle, which this doctrine 
 makes, there exists a primary presumption of philosophy. This 
 is the law of parsimony ; which prohibits, without a proven ne- 
 cessity, the multiplication of entities, powers, principles, or 
 causes ; above all, the postulation of an unknown force where a 
 known impotence can account for the phenomenon. We are, 
 therefore, entitled to apply ' Occam's razor' to this theory of 
 causality, unless it be proved impossible to explain the causal 
 judgment at a cheaper rate, by deriving it from a common, and 
 that a negative, principle. On a doctrine like the present is 
 thrown the burden of vindicating its necessity, by showing that 
 unless a special and positive principle be assumed, there exists 
 no competent mode to save the phenomenon. The opinion can 
 therefore only be admitted provisorily ; and it falls, of course, if 
 what it would explain can be explained on less onerous conditions.
 
 500 PHILOSOPHY OK THK CONDITIONKD. 
 
 Leaving, therefore, this theory, which certainly does account 
 for the phenomenon, to fall or stand, according as either of the 
 two remaining opinions be, or be not, found sufficient, I go on to 
 this consideration. 
 
 Sixth opinion. Of these, the former, that is, the sixth theory, 
 has been long exploded. It attempts to establish the causal judg- 
 ment upon the principle of Contradiction. Leibnitz was too 
 acute a metaphysician to attempt the resolution of the principle 
 of Sufficient Reason or Causality, which is ampliative or syn- 
 thetic, into the principle of Contradiction, which is merely ex- 
 plicative or analytic. But his followers were not so wise. Wolf, 
 Baumgarten, and many other Leibnitians, paraded demonstrations 
 of the law of Sufficient Reason on the ground of the law of Con- 
 tradiction; but the reasoning always proceeds on a covert as- 
 sumption of the very point in question. The same argument is, 
 however, at an earlier date, to be found in Locke, while modifi- 
 cations of it are also given by Hobbes and Samuel Clarke. Hume, 
 who was only aware of the demonstration, as proposed by the 
 English metaphysicians, honors it with a refutation which has 
 obtained even the full approval of Reid ; whilst by foreign phi- 
 losophers, the inconsequence of the reduction, at the hands of the 
 Wolfian metaphysicians, has frequently been exposed. I may 
 therefore pass it in silence. 
 
 Seventh opinion. The field is thus open for the last theory, 
 which would analyze the judgment of causality into a form of 
 the mental law of the Conditioned. This theory, which has not 
 hitherto been proposed, comes recommended by its cheapness and 
 simplicity. It postulates no new, no express, no positive princi- 
 ple. It merely supposes that the mind is limited ; the law of 
 limitation, the law of the Conditioned constituting, in one of its 
 applications, the law of Causality. The mind is astricted to 
 think in certain forms ; and, under these, thought is possible only 
 in the conditioned interval between two unconditioned contradic- 
 tory extremes or poles, each of which is altogether inconceivable, 
 but of which, on the principle of Excluded Middle, the one or the
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 501 
 
 other is necessarily true. In reference to the present question, it 
 need only be recapitulated, that we must think under the condi- 
 tion of Existence, Existence Relative, and Existence Relative 
 in Time, But what does existence relative in time imply ? It 
 implies, 1, that we are unable to realize in thought : on the one 
 pole of the irrelative, either an absolute commencement, or an 
 absolute termination of time; as on the other, either an infinite 
 non-commencement, or an infinite non-termination of time. It 
 implies, 2, that we can think, neither, on the one pole, an abso- 
 lute minimum, nor, on the other, an infinite divisibility of time. 
 Yet these constitute two pairs of contradictory propositions ; 
 which, if our intelligence be not all a lie, cannot both be true, 
 whilst, at the same time, either the one or the other necessarily 
 must. But, as not relatives, they are not cogitables. 
 
 Now the phenomenon of causality seems nothing more than a 
 corollary of the law of the conditioned, in its application to a 
 thing thought under the form or mental category of existence 
 relative in time. We cannot know, we cannot think a thing, ex- 
 cept under the attribute of existence ; we cannot know or think 
 a thing to exist, except as in time ; and we cannot know or think 
 a thing to exist in time, and think it absolutely to commence. 
 Now this at once imposes on us the judgment of causality. And 
 thus : An object is given us, either by our presentative, or by 
 our representative, faculty. As given, we cannot but think it ex- 
 istent, and existent in time. But to say, that we cannot but think 
 it to exist, is to say, that we are unable to think it non-existent, 
 to think it away, to annihilate it in thought. And this we 
 cannot do. We may turn away from it ; we may engross our 
 attention with other objects ; we may, consequently, exclude it 
 from our thought. That we need not think a thing is certain ; 
 but thinking it, it is equally certain that we cannot think it not 
 to exist. So much will be at once admitted of the present ; but 
 it may probably be denied of the past and future. Yet if we 
 make the experiment, we shall find the mental annihilation of an 
 object, equally impossible under time past, and present, and fu-
 
 502 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 
 
 ture. To obviate, however, misapprehension, a very simple 
 observation may be proper. In saying that it is impossible to 
 annihilate an object in thought, in other words, to conceive as 
 non-existent, what had been conceived as existent, it is of course 
 not meant, that it is impossible to imagine the object wholly 
 changed in form. We can represent to ourselves the elements of 
 which it is composed, divided, dissipated, modified in any way ; 
 we can imagine any thing of it, short of annihilation. But the 
 complement, the quantum, of existence, thought as constituent of 
 an object, that we cannot represent to ourselves, either as in- 
 creased, without abstraction from other entities, or as diminished, 
 without annexation to them. In short, we are unable to construe 
 it in thought, that there can be an atom absolutely added to, or 
 absolutely taken away from, existence in general. Let us make 
 the experiment. Let us form to ourselves a concept of the uni- 
 verse. Now, we are unable to think, that the quantity of exist- 
 ence, of which the universe is the conceived sum, can either be 
 amplified or diminished. We are able to conceive, indeed, the 
 creation of a world ; this indeed as easily as the creation of an 
 atom. But what is our thought of creation ? It is not a thought 
 of the mere springing of nothing into something. On the con- 
 trary, creation is conceived, and is by us conceivable, only as the 
 evolution of existence from possibility into actuality, by the fiat 
 of the deity. Let us place ourselves in imagination at its very 
 crisis. Now, can we construe it to thought, that the moment after 
 the universe flashed into material reality, into manifested being, 
 that there was a larger complement of existence in the universe 
 and its author together, than, the moment before, there subsisted 
 in the deity alone ? This we are unable to imagine. And what 
 is true of our concept of creation, holds of our concept of anni- 
 hilation. We can think no real annihilation, no absolute sink- 
 ing of something into nothing. But, as creation is cogitable by 
 us, only as a putting forth of divine power, so is annihilation by 
 us only conceivable, as a withdrawal of that same power. All 
 that is now actually existent in the universe, this we think and
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 503 
 
 must think, as having, prior to creation, virtually existed in the 
 creator ; and in imagining the universe to be annihilated, we can 
 only conceive this, as the retractation by the deity of an oVert 
 energy into latent power. In short, it is impossible for the human 
 mind to think what it thinks existent, lapsing into non-existence, 
 either in time past or in time future. 
 
 Our inability to think what we have once conceived existent 
 in time, as in time becoming non-existent, corresponds with our 
 inability to think, what we have conceived existent in space, as in 
 space becoming non-existent. We cannot realize it to thought, 
 that a thing should be extruded, either from the one quantity or 
 from the other. Hence, under extension, the law of ultimate 
 incompressibility ; under protension, the law of cause and effect. 
 
 I have hitherto spoken only of one inconceivable pole of the 
 conditioned, in its application to existence in time, of the absolute 
 extreme, as absolute commencement and absolute termination. 
 The counter or infinite extreme, as infinite regress or non-com- 
 mencement and infinite progress or non-termination, is equally 
 unthinkable. With this latter we have, however, at present 
 nothing to do. Indeed, as not obtrusive, the Infinite figures far 
 less in the theatre of mind, and exerts a far inferior influence in 
 the modification of thought, Jhan the Absolute. It is, in fact, 
 both distant and delitescent ; and in place of meeting us at every 
 turn, it requires some exertion on our part to seek it out. It is 
 the former and more obtrusive extreme it is the Absolute alone 
 which constitutes and explains the mental manifestation of the 
 causal judgment. An object is presented to our observation 
 which has phenominally begun to be. But we cannot construe 
 it to thought, that the object, that is, this determinate complement 
 of existence, had really no being at any past moment ; because, in 
 that case, once thinking it as existent, we should again think it 
 as non-existent, which is for us impossible. What then can we 
 must we do ? That the phenomenon presented to us, did, as 
 a phenomenon, begin to be this we know by experience ; but 
 that the elements of its existence only began, when the phenome-
 
 504: PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 
 
 non which they constitute came into manifested being this we 
 are wholly unable to think. In these circumstances how do we 
 proceed ? There is for us only one possible way. We are com- 
 pelled to believe that the object (that is, the certain quale and 
 quantum of being), whose phenomenal rise into existence we have 
 witnessed, did really exist prior to this rise, under other forms. 
 But to say, that a thing previously existed under different forms, 
 is only to say, in other words, that a thing had causes. (It 
 would be here out of place to refute the error of philosophers, in 
 supposing that any thing can have a single cause ;' meaning 
 always by a cause that without which the effect would not have 
 been. I speak of course only of second causes, for of the divine 
 causation we can form no conception.) 
 
 I must, however, now cursorily observe, that nothing can be 
 more erroneous in itself, or in its consequences more fertile in 
 delusion than the common doctrine, that the causal judgment is 
 elicited, only when we apprehend objects in consecution, and uni- 
 form consecution. No doubt, the observation of such succession 
 prompts and enables us to assign particular causes to particular 
 effects. But this assignation ought to be carefully distinguished 
 from the judgment of causality absolutely. This consists, not in 
 the empirical and contingent attribution of this phenomenon, as 
 cause, to that phenomenon, as effect ; but in the universal neces- 
 sity of which we are conscious, to think causes for every event, 
 whether that event stand isolated by itself, and be by us referrible 
 to no other, or whether it be one in a series of successive phe- 
 nomena, which, as it were, spontaneously arrange themselves 
 
 1 ' There is no reason why whatever is conceived as necessarily going to the 
 constitution of the phenomenon called the effect in other words, why all 
 rvnd each of its coefficients may not be properly called causes, or rather con- 
 cause*; for there must always be more causes than one to an effect. This 
 would be more correct than to give exclusively the name of Cause to any 
 partial constituent or coefficient, even though proximate and principal. In 
 this view, the doctrine of Aristotle and other ancients, is more rational thau 
 that of our modern philosophers.' Reid, p. 607. W.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OP THE CONDITIONED. 505 
 
 under the relation of effect and cause. On this, not sunken, 
 rock, Dr. Brown and others have been shipwrecked. 
 
 The preceding doctrine of causality seems to me the one pref- 
 erable, for the following, among other reasons. 
 
 In the first place, to explain the phenomena of the casual 
 judgment, it postulates no new, no extraordinary, no express 
 principle. It does not even proceed on the assumption of a posi- 
 tive power ; for while it shows, that the phenomenon in question 
 is only one of a class, it assigns, as their common cause, only a 
 negative impotence. In this respect, it stands advantageously 
 contrasted with the only other theory which saves the phenome- 
 non, but which saves it, only on the hypothesis of a special prin- 
 ciple, expressly devised to account for this phenomenon alone. 
 But nature never works by more, and more complex instruments 
 than are necessary ^Sev fSptrrZis : and to excogitate a particu- 
 lar force to perform what can be better explained on the ground 
 of a general imbecility, is contrary to every rule of philoso- 
 phizing. 
 
 But, in the second place, if there be postulated an express and 
 positive affirmation of intelligence, to account for the mental 
 deliverance, that existence cannot absolutely commence ; we 
 must equally postulate a counter affirmation of intelligence, posi- 
 tive and express, to explain the counter mental deliverance, 
 that existence cannot infinitely not commence. The one neces- 
 sity of mind is equally strong as the other ; and if the one be a 
 positive datum, an express testimony of intelligence, so likewise 
 must be the other. But they are contradictories ; and, as con- 
 tradictories they cannot both be true. On this theory, therefore, 
 the root of our nature is a lie. By the doctrine, on the contrary, 
 which I propose, these contradictory phenomena are carried up 
 into the common principle of a limitation of our faculties. In- 
 telligence is shown to be feeble, but not false ; our nature is, 
 thus, not a lie, nor the author of our nature a deceiver. 
 
 In the third place, this simpler and easier doctrine, avoids a 
 most serious inconvenience which attaches to the more difficult 
 
 22
 
 506 PHILOSOPHY OF THK CONDITIONED 
 
 and complex. It is this. To suppose a positive and special prin- 
 ciple of causality, is to suppose that there is expressly revealed 
 to us, through intelligence, an affirmation of the fact, that there 
 exists no free causation ; that is, that there is no cause which is 
 not itself merely an effect, existence being only a series of deter- 
 mined antecedents and determined consequents. But this is an 
 assertion of Fatalism. Such, however, many of the partisans of 
 that doctrine will not admit. An affirmation of absolute neces- 
 sity is, they are aware, virtually the negation of a moral universe, 
 consequently of the moral governor of a moral universe. But 
 this is Atheism. Fatalism and Atheism are, indeed, convertible 
 terms. 1 The only valid arguments for the existence of a God, 
 and for the immortality of the human soul, rest on the ground of 
 man's moral nature ; consequently, if that moral nature be anni- 
 hilated, which in any scheme of thorough-going necessity it is, 
 every conclusion, established on such a nature, is annihilated like- 
 wise. Aware of this, some of those who make the judgment of 
 causality a positive dictate of intelligence, find themselves com- 
 pelled, in order to escape from the consequences of their doctrine, 
 to deny that this dictate, though universal in its deliverance, 
 should be allowed to hold universally true ; and accordingly, they 
 would exempt from it the facts of volition. Will, they hold to 
 be a free cause, a cause which is not an effect ; in other words, 
 they attribute to it the power of absolute origination. But here 
 their own principle of causality is too strong for them. They 
 say, that it is unconditionally promulgated, as an express and 
 positive law of intelligence, that every origination is an apparent 
 only, not a real, commencement. Now to exempt certain phe- 
 nomena from this universal law, on the ground of our moral con- 
 sciousness, cannot validly be done. For, in the first place, this 
 
 1 ' It can easily be proved to those who are able and not afraid to reason, 
 that the doctrine of Necessity is subversive of religion, natural and reveal- 
 ed ; and, Fatalism involving Atheism, the Necessitarian who intrepidly fol- 
 lows out his scheme to ita consequences, however monstrous, will consist- 
 ently reject every argument which proceeds upon the supposition of a Deity 
 and divine attributes.' Reid, p. 617. W.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 507 
 
 would be an admission, that the mind is a complement of con- 
 tradictory revelations. If mendacity be admitted of some of our 
 mental dictates, we cannot vindicate veracity to any. If one be 
 delusive, so may all. ' Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus.' Ab- 
 solute skepticism is here the legitimate conclusion. But, in the 
 second place, waving this conclusion, what right have we, on this 
 doctrine, to subordinate the positive affirmation of causality to 
 our consciousness of moral liberty, what right have we, for the 
 interest of the latter, to derogate from the former ? We have 
 none. If both be equally positive, we are not entitled to sacri- 
 fice the alternative, which our wishes prompt us to abandon. 
 
 But the doctrine which I propose is not obnoxious to these 
 objections. It does not maintain, that the judgment of causality 
 is dependent on a power of the mind, imposing, as necessary in 
 thought, what is necessary in the universe of existence. On the 
 contrary, it resolves this judgment into a mere mental impotence, 
 an impotence to conceive either of two contradictories. And 
 as the one or the other of contradictories must be true, whilst 
 both cannot ; it proves that there is no ground for inferring a 
 certain fact to be impossible, merely from our inability to conceive 
 it possible. At the same time/ if the causal judgment be not an 
 express affirmation of mind, but only an incapacity of thinking 
 the opposite ; it follows that such a negative judgment cannot 
 counterbalance the express affirmative, the unconditional testi- 
 mony, of consciousness, that we are, though we know not how, 
 the true and responsible authors of our actions, not merely the 
 worthless links in an adamantine series of effects and causes. It 
 appears to me, that it is only on such a doctrine, that we can 
 philosophically vindicate the liberty of the human will, that we 
 can rationally assert to man ' fatis avolsa voluntas.' How the 
 will can possibly be free, must remain to us, under the present 
 limitation of our faculties, wholly incomprehensible.' We are 
 
 1 ' To conceive a free act, is to conceive an act which, being a came, is not 
 itself an effect ; in other words, to conceive an absolute commencement. But 
 is such by us conceivable ?' Reid, p. 602. PT.
 
 508 PHILOSOPHY OK THE CONDITIONED. 
 
 unable to conceive an absolute commencement ; we cannot, 
 therefore, conceive a free volition. A determination by motives, 
 cannot, to on* understanding, escape from necessitation. 1 Nay, 
 
 1 ' A motive, abstractly eoittulwvt!, L v!!yil -in *.*l or^nal cause. It was 
 well denominated in the Greek philosophy, rd Ivtua o{ that for the sake of 
 which. A motive, however, in its concrete reality, is nothing apart from the 
 mind ; only a mental tendency.' 
 
 ' If Motives " influence to action," they must co-operate in producing a 
 certain effect upon the agent ; and the determination to act, and to act in a 
 certain manner is that effect. They are thus, on Reid's own view, in this 
 relation, causes, and efficient causes. It is of no consequence in the argu- 
 ment whether motives be said to determine a man to act or to influence (that 
 is to determine) him to determine himself to act. It does not, therefore, 
 seem consistent to say that motives are not causes, and that they do not act.'' 
 
 ' I shall now,' says Leibnitz, in his controversy with Clark, ' come to an 
 objection raised here, against my comparing the weights of a balance with 
 the motives of the Will. It is objected, that a balance is merely passive, 
 and moved by the weights ; whereas agents intelligent and endowed with 
 will, are active. To this I answer, that the principle of the want of a suffi- 
 cient reason, is common both to agents and patients. They want a sufficient 
 reason of their action, as well as of their passion. A balance does not only 
 not act when it is equally pulled on both sides, but the equal weights like- 
 wise do not act when they are in an equilibrium, so that one of them cannot 
 go down without the other rising up as much. 
 
 ' It must also be considered that, properly speaking, motives do not act 
 upon the mind as weights do upon a balance ; but it is rather the mind that 
 acts by virtue of the motives, which are its dispositions to act. And, there- 
 fore, co pretend, as the author does here, that the mind prefers sometimes 
 weak motives to strong ones, and even that it prefers that which is indiffer- 
 ent before motives this, I say, is to divide the mind from the motives, as if 
 they were without the mind, as the weight is distinct from the balance, and 
 as if the mind had, besides motives, other dispositions to act, by virtue of 
 which it could reject or accept the motives. Whereas, in truth, the motives 
 comprehend all the dispositions which the mind can have to act voluntarily ; 
 for they include not only the reasons, but also the inclinations arising from 
 passions or other preceding impressions. Wherefore, if the mind should 
 prefer a weak inclination to a strong one, it would act against itself, and oth- 
 erwise than it is disposed to act. Which shows that the author's notions, 
 contrary to mine, are superficial, and appear to have no solidity in them, 
 when they are well considered. 
 
 ' To assert, also, that the mind may have good reasons to act, when it has 
 no motives, and when things are absolutely indifferent, as the author ex- 
 plains himself here this, I say, is a manifest contradiction ; for, if the mind 
 has good reasons for taking the part it takes, then the things are not indif- 
 ferent to the mind.' Collection of Papers, <fcc., Leibnitz's Fifth Paper, 
 14-16.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 509 
 
 were we even to admit as true, what we cannot think as possible, 
 still the doctrine of a motiveless volition would be only casual- 
 ism ; and the free acts of an indifferent, are, morally and ration- 
 ally, as worthless as the pre-ordered passions of a determined 
 will. How, therefore, I repeat, moral liberty is possible in man 
 or God, we are utterly unable speculatively to understand. 1 But 
 
 ' The death of Leibnitz terminated his controversy with Clarke ; but a de- 
 fence of the fifth and last paper of Leibnitz against the answer of Clarke, by 
 Thummig, was published, who, in relation to the point in question, says 
 " The simile of the balance is very unjustly interpreted. No resemblance 
 
 is intended between scales and motives It is of no consequence 
 
 whether, in their reciprocal relations, the scales are passive, while the mind 
 is active, since, in this respect, there is no comparison attempted. But, in 
 so far as the principle of Sufficient Eeason is concerned, that principle ap- 
 plies equally to actions and passions, as has been noticed by Baron Leibnitz. 
 
 It is to philosophize very crudely concerning mind, and to 
 
 image every thing in a corporeal manner, to conceive that actuating reasons 
 are something external, which make an impression on the mind, and to dis- 
 tinguish motives from the active principle (principio actionis) it3elf." (In 
 Koehler's German Translation of tliese Papers.) 
 
 ' On the supposition that the sum of influences (motives, dispositions, ten- 
 dencies) to volition A, is equal to 12, and the sum of influences to counter 
 volition B, equal to 8 can we conceive that the determination of volition A 
 should not be necessary ? We can only conceive the volition B to be deter- 
 mined by supposing that the man creates (calls from non-existence into ex- 
 istence) a certain supplement of influences. But this creation as actual, or, 
 in itself, is inconceivable, and even to conceive the possibility of this incon- 
 ceivable act, we must suppose some cause by which the man is determined 
 to exert it. We thus, in thought, never escape determination and necessity. 
 It will be observed, that I do not consider this inability to the notion, any 
 disproof of the fact of Free Will.' Eeid, pp. 607, 610-11. W. 
 
 1 Is the person an original undetermined cause of the determination of his 
 will ? If he be not, then is he not a free agent, and the scheme of Necessity 
 is admitted. If he be, in the first place, it is impossible to conceive the pos- 
 sibility of this ; and, in the second, if the fact, though inconceivable, be al- 
 lowed, it is impossible to see how a cause, undetermined by any motive, can be 
 a rational, moral, and accountable, cause. There is no conceivable medium 
 between Fatalism and Casualism ; and the contradictory schemes of Liberty 
 and Necessity themselves are inconceivable. For, as we cannot compass in 
 thought an undetermined cause an absolute commencement the fundamental 
 hypothesis of the one ; so we can as little think an infinite series of determined 
 causes of relative commencements the fundamental hypothesis of the other. 
 The champions of the opposite doctrines, are thus at once resistless in as- 
 sault, and impotent in defence. Each is hewn down, and appears to die
 
 510 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 
 
 practically, the fact, that we are free, is given to us in the con- 
 sciousness of an uncompromising law of duty, in the conscious- 
 ness of our moral accountability ; and this fact of liberty cannot 
 be redargued on the ground that it is incomprehensible, for the 
 philosophy of the conditioned proves, against the necessitarian, 
 that things there are, which may, nay must be true, of which 
 the understanding is wholly unable to construe to itself the pos- 
 sibility. 1 
 
 But this philosophy is not only competent to defend the fact of 
 our moral liberty, possible though inconceivable, against the as- 
 under the home-thrusts of his adversary ; but each again recovers life from 
 the very death of his antagonist, and, to borrow a simile, both are like the 
 heroes in Valhalla, ready in a moment to amuse themselves anew in the 
 same bloodless and interminable conflict. The doctrine of Moral Liberty 
 cannot be made conceivable, for we can only conceive the determined and 
 the relative. As already elated, all that can be done, is to show 1, That for 
 ihefact of Liberty, we have, immediately or mediately, the evidence of con- 
 sciousness ; and, 2, That there are, among the phenomena of mind, many 
 facts which we must admit as actual, but of whose possibility we are wholly 
 unable to form any notion. I may merely observe, that the fact of Motion 
 can be shown to be impossible, on grounds not less strong than those on 
 which it is attempted to disprove the fact of Liberty ; to say nothing of 
 many contradictories, neither of which can be thought, but one of which 
 must, on the laws of Contradiction and Excluded Middle, necessarily J.' 
 Reid, p. 602. W. 
 
 1 We must be -unable to conceive the possibility of the fact of Liberty. But, 
 though inconceivable, this fact is not therefore false. For there are many 
 contradictories (and, of contradictories, one must, and one only can, be true) 
 of which, we are equally unable to conceive the possibility of either. The 
 philosophy, therefore, which I profess, annihilates the theoretical problem- 
 How is the scheme of Liberty, or the scheme of Necessity, to be rendered 
 comprehensible ? by showing that both schemes are equally inconceivable ; 
 but it establishes Liberty practically as a fact, by showing that it is either 
 itself an immediate datum, or is involved in an immediate datum of con- 
 sciousness. 
 
 Hommel, certainly one of the ablest and most decided fatalists, says, ' I 
 have a feeling of Liberty even at the very moment when I am writing against 
 Liberty, upon grounds which I regard as incontrovertible. Zeno was a fatal- 
 ist only in theory ; in practice, he did not act in conformity to that convic- 
 tion.' 
 
 Among others, Reid's friend, Lord Kames, in the first edition of his ' Es- 
 says on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion,' admitted this natu- 
 ral conviction of freedom from necessity, maintaining it to be illusive. On 
 this melancholy doctrine,
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 511 
 
 sault of the fatalist ; it retorts against himself the very objection 
 of incomprehensibility by which the fatalist had thought to tri- 
 umph over the libertarian. It shows, that the scheme of free- 
 dom is not more inconceivable than the scheme of necessity. For 
 whilst fatalism is a recoil from the more obtrusive inconceivability 
 of an absolute commencement, on the fact of which commence- 
 
 ' Man fondly dreams that he is free in act : 
 Naught is he but the powerless, worthless plaything 
 Of the blind force that in his Will itself 
 Works out for him a dread necessity.' 
 
 All necessitarians do not, however, admit the reality of this deceitful expe- 
 rience, or fallacious feeling of liberty. ' Dr. Hartley,' say3 Mr. Stewart, ' was 
 I believe, one of the first, if not the first, who denied that our consciousness 
 is in favor of free agency ;' and in this assertion, he observes, ' Hartley was 
 followed by Priestley and Belsham.' Speaking of the latter, ' We are told,' 
 he says, ' by Mr. Belsham, that the popular opinion that, in many cases, it 
 was in the power of the agent to have chosen differently, the previous cir- 
 cumstances remaining exactly the same, arises. either from a mistake of the 
 question, or from aforaetfulness of the motives by which our choice was deter- 
 mined.' (Philosophy of the Active Powers, ii. p. 510.) 
 
 To deny, or rather to explain away, the obnoxious phenomenon of a sense 
 of liberty, had, however, been attempted by many Necessitarians before 
 Hartley, and with far greater ingenuity than either he or his two followers 
 displayed. Thus Leibnitz, after rejecting the Liberty of Indifference, says, 
 'Quamobrem ratio ilia, quam Cartesius adduxit, ad probandum actionum nos- 
 trarum liberarum indepcndentiam, ex jactuto quodam mvido sensu interne, 
 vim nullam habet. Non possumus proprk expe-r-iri independentiam nostram, 
 nee caitsas a quibus electio nostra pendet semper percipimus, utpote ssepe sen- 
 sum omnem fugientes. [He here refers to his doctrine of latent mental 
 modifications.] Et perinde est ac si acus magnetica versus polum converti 
 leetaretur ; putaret enim, se illuc converti independenter a quacunque alia causa, 
 cum non perciperet motus insensibiles material, magneticce.' 1 But, previously to 
 Leibnitz, a similar solution and illustration, I find, had been proposed by 
 Bayle his illustration is a conscious weather-cock , but both philosophers 
 are, in argument and example, only followers of Spinoza. Spinoza, after 
 supposing that a certain quantity of motion had been communicated to a 
 stone, proceeds ' Porro concipe jam si placet, lapidem dum moveri pergit 
 cogitare et scire, se quantum potest conari ut moveri pergat. Hie lapis sane, 
 quando quidem sui tantum modo conatus est conscius et minime indifferens, 
 se liberrimum esse et nulla alia cle causa in motu perseverare credet quam 
 quia vult. Atque h<zc humana ilia libertas est quam omnes habere jactant, et 
 qu<K in hoc solo consi-stit quod homines sui appetibu sunt con-scii, et causarum a> 
 quibus determinants ignari." 1 Chrysippus's Top or Cylinder is the source. 
 Reid, pp. 599, 616, 617. W.
 
 512 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 
 
 ment the doctrine of liberty proceeds ; the fatalist is shown to 
 overlook the equal, but less obtrusive, inconceivability of an in- 
 finite non-commencement, on the assertion of which non-com- 
 mencement his own doctrine of necessity must ultimately rest. 
 As equally unthinkable, the two counter, the two one-sided, 
 schemes are thus theoretically balanced. But practically, our 
 consciousness of the moral law, which, without a moral liberty in 
 man, would be a mendacious imperative, gives a decisive pre- 
 ponderance to the doctrine of freedom over the doctrine of 
 fate. We are free in act, if we are accountable for our actions. 
 Such ((pwvavrct tfuvsrorrfiv) are the hints of an undeveloped phi- 
 losophy, which, I am confident, is founded upon truth. To this 
 confidence I have come, not merely through the convictions of 
 my own consciousness, but by finding in this system a centre and 
 conciliation for the most opposite of philosophical opinions. Above 
 all, however, I am confirmed in my belief, by the harmony be- 
 tween the doctrines of this philosophy, and those of revealed truth. 
 ' Credo equidem, nee vana fides.' The philosophy of the Condi- 
 tioned is indeed pre-eminently a discipline of humility ; a ' learn- 
 ed ignorance,' directly opposed to the false ' knowledge which puf- 
 feth up.' I may indeed say with St. Chrysostom : ' The founda- 
 tion of our philosophy is humility.' (Homil. de Perf. Evang.) 
 For it is professedly a scientific demonstration of the impossibility 
 of that ' wisdom in high matters ' which the Apostle prohibits us 
 even to attempt ; and it proposes, from the limitation of the hu- 
 man powers, from our impotence to comprehend what, however, 
 we must admit, to show articulately why the ' secret things of 
 God' cannot but be to man ' past finding out.' Humility thus 
 becomes the cardinal virtue, not only of revelation but of reason. 
 This scheme proves, moreover, that no difficulty emerges in the- 
 ology which had not previously emerged in philosophy ; that, in 
 fact, if the divine do not transcend what it has pleased the Deity 
 to reveal, and wilfully identify the doctrine of God's word with 
 some airogant extreme of human speculation, philosophy will be
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 513 
 
 found the most useful auxiliary of theology. For a world of false, 
 and pestilent, and presumptuous reasoning, by which philosophy 
 and theology are now equally discredited, would be at once abol- 
 ished, in the recognition of this rule of prudent nescience ; nor 
 could it longer be too justly said of the code of consciousness, as 
 by reformed divines it has been acknowledged of the Bible : 
 
 ' This is the book, where each his dogma seeks ; 
 And this the book, where each his dogma finds.' 
 
 Specially ; in its doctrine of causality this philosophy brings us 
 back from the aberrations of modern theology, to the truth and 
 simplicity of the more ancient church. It is here shown to be as 
 irrational as irreligious, on the ground of human understanding, 
 to deny, either, on the one hand, the foreknowledge, predestina- 
 tion, and free grace of God, or, on the other, the free will of man ; 
 that we should believe both, and both in unison, though unable 
 to comprehend either even apart. This philosophy proclaims with 
 St. Augustin, and Augustin in his maturest writings : ' If there be 
 not free grace in God, how can He save the world ; and if there 
 be not free will in man, how can the world by God be judged !' 
 (Ad Valentinum, Epist. 214.) Or, as the same doctrine is per- 
 haps expressed even better by St. Bernard : 'Abolish free will, 
 and there is nothing to be saved ; abolish free grace, and there is 
 nothing wherewithal to save.' (De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio. c. 
 i.) St. Austin repeatedly declares, the conciliation of the fore- 
 knowledge, predestination, and free grace of God with the free 
 will of man, to be ' a most difficult question, intelligible only to a 
 few.' Had he denounced it as a fruitless question, and (to un- 
 derstanding) soluble by none, the world might hare been spared 
 a large library of acrimonious and resultless disputation. This 
 conciliation is of the things to be believed, not understood. The 
 futile attempts to harmonize these antilogies, by human reasoning 
 to human understanding, have originated connective systems of 
 theology, divided the Church, and, as far as possible, dishonored 
 
 22*
 
 514 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 
 
 religion. It must however be admitted, that confessions of the 
 total inability of man to conceive the union, of what he should 
 believe united, are to be found ; and they are found, not, per- 
 haps less frequently, and certainly in more explicit terms among 
 Catholic than among Protestant theologians. 
 
 Of the former, I shall adduce only one testimony, by a prince 
 of the Church ; and it is the conclusion of what, though wholly 
 overlooked, appears to me as the ablest and truest criticism of the 
 many fruitless, if not futile, attempts at conciliating * the ways of 
 God' to the understanding of man, in the great articles of divine 
 foreknowledge and predestination (which are both embarrassed by 
 the self-same difficulties), and human free-will. It is the testimo- 
 ny of Cardinal Cajetan, and from his commentary on the Sum- 
 ma Theologise of Aquinas. The criticism itself I may take another 
 opportunity of illustrating. 
 
 Thus elevating our mental eye to a loftier range [we may suppose that], 
 God, from an excellence supernally transcending human thought, so foresees 
 events and things, that from his providence something higher follows than 
 evitability or inevitability, and that his passive prevision of the event docs 
 not determine the alternative of either combination. And can we do so, the 
 intellect is quieted ; not by the evidence of the truth known, but by the in- 
 accessible height of the truth concealed. And this to my poor intellect 
 seems satisfactory enough, both for the reason above stated, and because, as 
 Saint Gregory expresses it, " The man has a low opinion of God, who believes 
 of Him only so much as can be measured by human understanding." Not 
 that we should deny aught, that we have by knowledge or by fuith of the 
 immutability, actuality, certainty, universality, and similar attributes of God ; 
 but I suspect (hat there is something here lying hid, either as regards the rela- 
 tion between the Deity and event foreseen, or as regards the connection be- 
 tween the event itself and its prevision. Thus, reflecting that the intelli- 
 gence of man [in such matters] is as the eye of the owl [in the blaze of day 
 (he refers to Aristotle)], I find its repose in ignorance alone. For it is more 
 consistent, both with Catholic faith and with philosophy, to confess our 
 blindness, than to assert, as things evident, what afford no tranquillity to the 
 intellect; for evidence is tranquillizing. Not that I would, therefore, accuse 
 all the doctors" of presumption; because, stammering, as they could, they 
 have all intended to insinuate, with God's immutability, the supreme and 
 eternal efficiency of His intellect, and will, and power, through the infalli- 
 ble relation between the Divine election and whatever comes to pass. Noth- 
 ing of all this is opposed to the foresaid suspicion that something too deep 
 for lies hid herein. And assuredly, if it were thus promulgated, no Chris- 
 tian would err in the matter of Predestination, as no one errs in the doctrine
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 515 
 
 of the Trinity ;* because of the Trinity the truth is declared orally and in 
 writing, that this is a mystery concealed from human intellect, and to which 
 faith alone is competent. Indeed, the best and most wholesome counsel in 
 this matter is : To begin with those things which we certainly know, and 
 have experience of in ourselves ; to wit, that all proceeding from our free- 
 will may or may not be performed by us, and therefore are we amenable to 
 punishment or reward ; but how, this being saved, there shall be saved the 
 providence, predestination, &c., of God, to believe what holy mother 
 Church believes. For it is written, "Altiora te ne qusesieris" ("Be not 
 wise in things above thee") ; there being many things revealed to man above 
 thy human comprehension. And this is one of those.' (Pars. I. q. xxii., 
 art. 4.) 
 
 Averments to a similar effect, might be adduced from the writ- 
 ings of Calvin ; and, certainly, nothing can be conceived more 
 contrary to the doctrine of that great divine, than what has lat- 
 terly been promulgated as Calvinism (and, in so far as I know, 
 without reclamation), in our Calvinistic Church of Scotland. For 
 it has been here promulgated, as the dogma of this Church, by 
 pious and distinguished theologians, that man has no will, agency, 
 moral personality of his own, God being the only real agent in 
 every apparent act of his creatures ; in short (though quite the 
 opposite was intended), that the theological scheme of the abso- 
 lute decrees implies fatalism, pantheism, the negation of a moral 
 governor, and of a moral world. For the premises, arbitrarily 
 assumed, are atheistic ; the conclusion, illogically drawn, is Chris- 
 tian. Against such a view of Calvin's doctrine, I for one must 
 humbly though solemnly protest, as not only false in philosophy, 
 but heterodox and ignorant in theology. 
 
 * This was written before 1507 ; consequently long before Servetus and 
 Campanus had introduced their Unitarian heresies.
 
 516 
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 517 
 
 II. PHILOSOPHICAL TESTIMONIES TO THE LIMITATION OF OUR 
 KNOWLEDGE, FROM THE LIMITATION OF OUR FACULTIES. 
 
 THESE, which might be indefinitely multiplied, I shall arrange 
 under three heads. I omit the Skeptics, adducing only speci- 
 mens from the others. 
 
 I. Testimonies to the general fact that the highest knowledge is a 
 consciousness of ignorance. 
 
 There are two sorts of ignorance : we philosophize to escape 
 ignorance, and the consummation of our philosophy is ignorance ; 
 we start from the one, we repose in the other; they are the 
 goals from which, and to which, we tend ; and the pursuit of 
 knowledge is but a course between two ignorances, as human 
 life is itself only a travelling from grave to grave. 
 
 ' 'T/j |3foj ; 'Eic Tvpfioio Oop&v, i-rrl rvufiov bSc6<aS 
 
 The highest reach of human science is the scientific recognition 
 of human ignorance ; ' Qui nescit ignorare, ignorat scire.' This 
 ' learned ignorance' is the rational conviction by the human 
 mind of its inability to transcend certain limits ; it is the knowl- 
 edge of ourselves, the science of man. This is accomplished 
 by a demonstration of the disproportion between what is to be 
 known, and our faculties of knowing, the disproportion, to wit, 
 between the infinite and the finite. In fact, the recognition of 
 human ignorance, is not only the one highest, but the one true, 
 knowledge ; and its first fruit, as has been said, is humility. 
 Simple nescience is not proud ; consummated science is positively 
 humble. For this knowledge it is not, which ' puffeth up ;' but 
 its opposite, the conceit of false knowledge, the conceit in truth, 
 as the Apostle notices, of an ignorance of the very nature of 
 knowledge : 
 
 ' Nam nesciens quid scire sit, 
 Te scire cuncta jactitas.'
 
 518 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 
 
 But as our knowledge stands to Ignorance, so stands it also 
 to Doubt. Doubt is the beginning and the end of our efforts 
 to know ; for as it is true, ' Alte dubitat qui altius credit,' so it 
 is likewise true, ' Quo magis quaerimus magis dubitamus.' 
 
 The grand result of human wisdom, is thus only a consciousness 
 that what we know is as nothing to what we know not (' Quan- 
 tum est quod nescimus !') an articulate confession, in fact, by 
 our natural reason of the truth declared in revelation, that 
 ' now we see through a glass, darkly.' 
 
 1. DEMOCBITUS (as reported by Aristotle, Cicero, Sextus Empiricus, 
 <fec.) : ' We know nothing in its cause [or on a conjectural reading in 
 truth] ; for truth lies hid from us in depth and distance.' 
 
 2. SOCRATES (as we learn from Plato, Xenophon, Cicero, <tc.) was d- 
 clared by the Delphic oracle the wisest of the Greeks ; and why ? B* 
 cause he taught, that all human knowledge is but a qualified ignorance 
 
 3. ABISTOTLE (Metaphysica, L. ii., c. 1). ' A theory of Truth, is 
 partly easy, partly difficult. This is shown by the fact that no one 
 has been wholly successful, no one wholly unsuccessful, in its acqui- 
 sition ; but while each has had some report to make concerning nature, 
 though the contributions, severally considered, are of little or no avail, 
 the whole together make up a considerable amount. And if so it be, we 
 may apply the proverb " Who can miss the gate ?" In this respect a 
 theory of Truth is easy. But our inability to compass some Whole and 
 Part [or, to c. both W. and P.], may evince the difficulty of the inquiry ; 
 (Td i' 8Xov ri (or r') l^civ *i pfpos nn fdvaaOai, Sti\ol rd \a\fnbv airi/f.) 
 As difficulty, however, arises in two ways ; [in this case] its cause may 
 lie, not in things [as the objects known], but in us [as the subjects 
 knowing]. For as the eye of the bat holds to the light of day, so the 
 intellect [vovs, which is, as it were (Eth. Nic. i. 7), the eye] of our soul, 
 holds to what in nature are of all most manifest.' * 
 
 * In now translating this passage for a more general purpose, I am strong- 
 ly impressed with the opinion, that Aristotle had in view the special doc- 
 trine of the Conditioned. For it is not easy to see what he could mean by 
 saying, that ' we are unable to have [compass, realize the notions of] Whole 
 and Part,' or of ' some Whole and Part ;' except to say, that we are unable 
 to conceive (of space, or time, or degree) a whole, however large, which is 
 not conceivable as the part of a still greater whole, or a part, however small, 
 which we may not always conceive as a whole, divisible into parts. But this 
 would be implicitly the enouncement of a full doctrine of the Conditioned.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 519 
 
 4. PLINY. (Historia Naturalis, L. ii. c. 32.) ' Omnia incerta ratione, et 
 in naturae maj estate abdita.' 
 
 5. TEETULLIAN. (Adversus Haereticos, N. iv.) ' Cedat curiositas fidei, ce- 
 dat gloria saluti. Certe, aut non obstrepant, aut quiescant adversus regulam 
 Nihil scire omnia scire est.' (De Anima, c. 1 .) ' Quis revelabit quod 
 Deus texit ? Unde scitandum ? Quare ignorare tutissimum est. Prses- 
 tat enim per Deum nescire quia non revelaverit, quam per hominera scire 
 quia ipse praesumpserit.' 
 
 6. ARNOBIUS. (Contra Gentes, L. ii.) ' Quae nequeunt sciri, nescire 
 noa confiteamur ; neque ea vestigare curemus, quaa non posse compre- 
 hend! liquidissimum est.' 
 
 7. ST. ACGUSTIN. (Sermo xxvii. Benedictine Edition, vol. v.) ' Quaeris 
 tu rationem, ego expavesco altitudinem. (" altitudo divitiarura sapientiae 
 et scientiae Dei !") Tu ratiocinare, ego mirer ; tu disputa, ego credam ; 
 altitudinem video, ad profundum non pervenio. .... Ille dicit, 
 " Inscrutabilia sunt judicia ejus :" et tu scrutari venisti ? Ille dicit, " In- 
 iuvestigabiles sunt vise ejus :" et tu investigare venisti ? Si inscrutabilia 
 scrutari venisti, et ininvestigabilia investigare venisti ; crede, jam peristi.' 
 (Sermo xciii.) ' Quid inter nos agebatur ? Tu dicebas, Intelligam, ut 
 credam ; ego dicebam, Ut intelligas, crede. Nata est controversia, venia- 
 mus ad judicem, judicet Propheta, immo vero Deus judicet per Prophetam; 
 Ambo taceamus. Quid ambo dixerimus, auditum est. Intelligam, inquis, 
 ut credam ; Crede, inquam, ut intelligas. Respondeat Propheta : " Nisi 
 credideritis, non intelligetis." ' [Isaiah vii. 9, according to the Seventy.] 
 (Sermo cxvii.) ' De Deo loquimur, quid mirum, si non comprehendis ? Si 
 enim comprehendis, non est Deus. Sit pia confessio ignorantice magis quam 
 temeraria professio sciential. Adtingere aliquantum mente Deum, magna 
 beatitude est ; comprehendere autem, omnino impossible.'* (Sermo clxv.) 
 ' Ideo multi de isto profundo quaerentes reddere rationem, in fabulas 
 vanitatis abierunt.' [Compare Sermo cxxvi. c. i.] (Sermo cccii.) ' Con- 
 Be this however as it may, Aristotle's commentators have been wholly una- 
 ble to reach, even by a probable conjecture, his meaning in the text. Alex- 
 ander gives six or seven possible interpretations, but all nothing to the 
 point ; whilst the other expositors whom I have had patience to look into 
 (as Averroes, Javellus, Fonseca, Suarez, Sonerus), either avoid the sentence 
 altogether, or show that they, and the authorities whom they quote, had no 
 glimpse of a satisfactory interpretation. I have been unable to find (on a 
 hurried search) in the able and truly learned ' Essay on the Metaphysics of 
 Aristotle,' by M. Eavaisson, a consideration of the passage. 
 
 * A century before Augustin, St. Cyprian had said : ' We can only justly 
 conceive God in recognizing Him to be inconceivable.' I cannot, however, 
 at the moment, refer to the passage except from memory.
 
 520 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 
 
 fessio ignorantise, gradus est scientiae.' (Epistola cxc. vol. ii.) ' Qua 
 nullo sensu carnis explorari possunt, et a nostra experientia longe rcmota 
 aunt, atque in abditisshni* naturae finibus latent, non erubesceudum est 
 in 'mini confiteri se nescire quod nescit, ne durn se scire mentitur, nunquam 
 scire mereatur.' (Epistola cxcvil) ' Magis eligo cautam ignorantiam con- 
 fiteri, quam falsam scientiam profited.' 
 
 8. ST. dm YSOSTOM. ( .) ' Nothing is 
 
 wiser than ignorance in those matters, where they who proclaim that they 
 know nothing, proclaim their paramount wisdom ; whilst those who busy 
 themselves therein, are the most senseless of mankind.' 
 
 9. THEODOKET. (Therapeutica, <fcc., Curative of Greek Affections, Ser- 
 mon 1.) ' The beginning of science is the science of nescience ;' or ' The 
 principle of knowledge is the knowledge of ignorance.' 
 
 10. ST. PETER CHRYSOLOGUE. (Sermo li.) ' Nolle omnia scire, summa 
 scientiae est.' 
 
 11. 'THE ARABIAN SAGE.' (I translate this and the two following from 
 Drusius and Gale) : ' A man is wise while in pursuit of wisdom ; a fool, 
 when he thinks it to be mastered.' 
 
 . 12. A RABBI : ' The wiser a man, the more ignorant does he feel ; as 
 the Preacher has it [L 18] " To add science is to add sorrow." ' 
 
 13. A RABBI : ' Who knows nothing, and thinks that he knows some- 
 thing, his ignorance is twofold.'* 
 
 14. PETRARCH. (De Contemptu Mundi, Dial, ii.) ' Excute pectus tuum 
 acriter ; invenies cuncta quae nosti, si ad ignorata referantur, earn propor- 
 tionem obtinere, quam, collatus oceano, rivulus aestivia siccandus ardoribus : 
 quamquam vel multa nosse, quid revelat ?' 
 
 16. CARDINAL DE CUSA. (Opera ed. 1565 ; De Docta Iguorantia, L. L 
 c. 3, p. 3.) ' Quidditas ergo rerum, quae est entium veritas, in sua. puritate 
 inattingibilis est ; et per omnes Philosophos investigata, sed per neminem, 
 
 * Literally: 
 
 ' Te, tenebris jactum, ligat ignorantia duplex ; 
 
 Scis nihil, et nescis to modo scire nihil.' 
 
 Or, with reference to our German evolvers of the Nothing into the Every- 
 thing ; and avoiding the positio debilis : 
 
 ' Te, sophia insanum, terit insipientia triplex; 
 Nil sapis, et nil non to sapuisse doces !'
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 521 
 
 nti est, reperta ; et quanto in hac ignorantia profundius docti fuerimus, 
 tanto magis ad ipsam accedemus veritatem.' (Ib. c. 17, p. 13). ' Sublata 
 igitur ab omnibus entibus participatione, remanet ipsa simplicissima enti- 
 tas, quae est essentia omnium entium, et non conspicimus ipsara talem en- 
 titatem, nisi in doctissima ignorantia, quoniam cum omnia participantia 
 entitatem ab animo removeo, nihil remanere videtur. Et propterea mag- 
 nus Dionysius [Areopagita] dicit, intellectum Dei, magis accedere ad 
 nihil, quam ad aliquid. Sacra autem ignorantia me instruit, hoc quod 
 intellectui nihil videtur, esse maximum incomprehensibile.' (Apologia 
 Doctae Ignorantise, p. 67.) ' Augustinus ait : " Deum potius ignorantia 
 quam scieutia attingi." Ignorantia enim abjicit, intelligentia colligit ; doc- 
 ta vero ignorantia omnes modos quibus accedi ad veritatem potest, unit. 
 Ita eleganter dixit Algazel in sua Metaphysica, de Deo : " Quod quisque 
 scit per probationem necessariam, impossibilitatem suam apprehendendi 
 eum. Ipse sui est cognitor, et apprehensor ; quoniam apprehendit, scire 
 ipsuin a nullo posse comprehend!. Quisquis autem non potest apprehen- 
 dere, et nescit necessario esse impossibile eum apprehendere, per proba- 
 tionem prsedictam, est ignorans Deum : et tales sunt omnes homines, ex- 
 ceptis dignis, et prophetis et sapientibus, qui sunt profundi in sapientia." 
 Hsec ille.' See also: De Beryllo, c. 36, p. 281 ; De Venatione Sapientiae. 
 c. 12, p. 306 ; De Deo Abscondito, p. 338 ; &c., &c.* 
 
 * So far, Cusa's doctrine coincides with what I consider to be the true pre- 
 cept of a ' Learned Ignorance.' But he goes farther : and we find his profes- 
 sion of negative ignorance converted into an assumption of positive knowledge; 
 his Nothing, presto, becoming every thing ; and contradictions, instead of 
 standing an insuperable harrier to all intellectual cognition, employed in lay- 
 ing its foundation. In fact, I make no doubt that his speculations have ori- 
 ginated the whole modern philosophy of the Absolute. For Giordano Bruno, 
 as I can show, was well acquainted with Cusa's writings ; from these he bor- 
 rowed his own celebrated theory, repeating even the language in which its 
 doctrines were originally expressed. To Cusa, we can, indeed, articulately 
 trace, word and thing, the recent philosophy of the Absolute. The term 
 XisoZfe(Absolutum), in its precise and peculiar signification, he every where 
 employs. The Intellectual Intuition, (Intuitio Intellectualis) he describes and 
 names ; nay, we find in him, even the process of Hegel's Dialectic. His 
 works are, indeed, instead of the neglect to which they have been doomed, 
 well deserving of attentive study in many relations. In Astronomy, before 
 Copernicus, he had promulgated the true theory of the heavenly revolutions, 
 with the corollary of a plurality of worlds ; and in the science of Politics, he 
 was the first perhaps to enounce the principles on which a representative 
 constitution should be based. The Germans have, however, done no justice 
 to their countryman. For Cusa's speculations have been most perfunctorily 
 noticed by German historians of philosophy; and it is through Bruno that 
 he seems to have exerted an influence on the Absolutist theories of the 
 Empire.
 
 522 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 
 
 16. ./ENEAS SYLVIOS. (Piccolomini, Pope Pius II. lihet. L. ii.) 'Oui 
 plura nosse datum est, euni majora dubia sequuntur.' 
 
 17. PALINGENIUS. (Zodiacus Vitse, Virgo v. 181, sq.) 
 ' Tune mea Dux tandem pulcro sic incipit ore : 
 Simla coelicolum* risusque jocusque Deorum est 
 Tune homo, quum temere ingenio confidit, et audet 
 Abdita naturae scrutari, arcanaque Divum, 
 Cum re Tera ejus crassa imbecillaque sit mens. 
 Si posita ante pedes nescit, quo jure videbit 
 Quie Deus et natura sinu occuluere profundo ? 
 Omnia se tamen arbitratur noscere ad unguem 
 Garrulus, infelix, caecus, temerarius, amens ; 
 Usque adeo sibi palpatur, seseque licetur.' 
 
 18. 'Multa tegit saero involucro natura, neque ullia 
 Fas est scire quidem mortalibus omnia ; multa 
 Admirare modo, nee non venerare : neque ilia 
 Inquires qme sunt arcanis proxima ; namque 
 In manibus quo; sunt, linr. nos vix scire putandum. 
 Est procul a. nobis adeo praesentia veri !'f 
 
 (' Full many a secret in her sacred veil 
 Hath Nature folded. She vouchsafes to knowledge 
 Not every mystery, reserving much, 
 For human veneration, not research. 
 Let us not, therefore, seek what God conceals ; 
 
 * The comparison of man as an ape to God, is from Plato, who, while he 
 repeatedly exhibits human beings as the jest of the immortals, somewhere 
 says ' The wisest man, if compared with God, will appear an ape.' Pope, 
 who was well read in the modern Latin poets, especially of Italy, and even 
 published from them a selection, in two volumes, abounds in manifest imi- 
 tations of their thoughts, wholly unknown to his commentators. In his 
 line 
 
 ' And show'd a Newton as we show an ape' 
 
 he had probably this passage of Palingenius in his eye, and not Plato. 
 Warburton and his other scholiasts are aware of no suggestion. 
 
 t I know not the author of these verses. I find them first quoted by Fer- 
 nelius, in his book ' De Abditis Rerum Causis' (L. ii. c. 18), which appeared 
 before the year 1551. They may be his own. They are afterwards given by 
 Sennertus, in his Hypomnemata, but without an attribution of authorship 
 By him, indeed, they are undoubtedly taken from Fernelius. Finally, they 
 are adduced by the learned Morhof in his Polyhistor, who very unlearnodly 
 however, assigns them to Lucretius. They are not by Palingenius. nor Pale- 
 anus, nor Hospitalius, all of whose versification they resemble ; for the last, 
 indeed, they are almost too early.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 
 
 For even the things which lie within our hands 
 These, knowing, we know not. So far from us, 
 In doubtful dimness, gleams the star of truth !') 
 
 19. JULIUS C^ESAE SCALIGEE. (De Subtilitate, Ex. cclxxiv.) ' Sapientia 
 est vera, nolle nimis sapere.' (Ib. ex. cccvii, sect. 29.; and compare Ex. 
 cccxliv. sect. 4.) ' Humanae sapientiae pars est, quaedam aaquo animo 
 nescire velle.'* (Ib. Ex. lii.) ' Ubique clamare soleo, nos nihil scire.' 
 
 20. JOSEPH JUSTUS SCALIGER. (Poemata : Iambi GnomicL xxi.) 
 ' Ne curiosus quaere causas omnium. 
 Qusecunque libris vis Prophetarmn indidit 
 Afflata ccelo, plena veraci Deo, 
 Nee operta sacri supparo silentii 
 Irrumpere aude, sed pudenter praeteri. 
 Nescire velle, quce magister maximus 
 Docere non vult, erudita inscitia est.'^ 
 
 21. GBOTIUS. (Poemata ; Epigrammata, L. i.) 
 
 ERUDITA IGNORANTIA. 
 ' Qui curiosus postulat Totum suae 
 Patere menti, ferre qui non sufficit 
 Mediocritatis conscientiam suae, 
 Judex iniquus, aestimator est malus 
 Suique naturaeque. Nam rerum parens, 
 Libanda tantum quae venit mortalibus, 
 Nos scire pauca, multa mirari jubet. 
 Hie primus error auctor est pejoribus. 
 Nam qui fateri nil potest incognitum, 
 Falso necesse est placet ignorantiam ; 
 Umbrasque inanes captet inter nubilia, 
 Imaginosaa adulter Ixion Deae. 
 Magis quiescet animus, errabit minus, 
 Contentus eruditione parabili, 
 Nee quaeret illam, siqua quaerentem fugit. 
 Nescire qucedam, magna pars Sapientia: est'\ 
 
 * I meant, in another place, to quote this passage of Scaliger, but find that 
 my recollection confused this and the preceding passage, with, perhaps, the 
 similar testimony of Chrysologus (No. 10). Chrysologus, indeed, anticipates 
 Scaliger in the most felicitous part of the expression. 
 
 t It is manifest that Joseph, in these verses, had in his eye the saving of 
 his father. But I have no doubt, that they were written on occasion of the 
 controversy raised by Gomarus against Arminius. 
 
 J In this excellent epigram, Grotius undoubtedly contemplated the corre- 
 sponding verses of his illustrious friend, the Dictator of the Kepublic of
 
 524 I'urr.osopHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 
 
 22. PASCAL. (Pensees, Partie I. Art. vi. sect. 26.) ' Si llionune com- 
 mengoit par s'ltudicr lui-meme, il verroit combien il est incapable de pas- 
 aer outre. Comment pourroit-il tie faire qu'une partie connut le tout '.'* 
 . . . . ' Qui ne croiroit, a nous voir composer toutes chases d'esprit et d 
 corps, que ce melange-la nous seroit bien comprehensible ? C'est ne"an- 
 moins la chose que Ton comprend le moins. L'homme est a lui-meme le 
 plus prodigieux objet de la nature ; car il ne peut concevoir ce que c'est 
 que corps, et encore raoins ce quec'est qu'esprit, et moins qu'aucune chose 
 comment un corps peut 6tre uni avec un esprit. C'est la le comble do 
 sea difficult^, et cependant c'est son propre fitre : Modus, quo corporibux 
 adhceret spiritus, comprchcndi ab horninibus nonpotest ; et hoc tamenhomn 
 
 II. Testimonies to the more special fact, that all our knowledge, 
 whether of Mind or of Matter, is only phenomenal. 
 
 Our whole knowledge of mind and of matter is relative, con- 
 ditioned, relatively conditioned. Of things absolutely or in 
 themselves, be they external, be they internal, we know nothing, 
 or know them only as incognizable ; and Ave become aware of 
 their incomprehensible existence, only as this is indirectly and 
 accidentally revealed to us, through certain qualities related to 
 our faculties of knowledge, and which qualities, again, we cannot 
 think as unconditioned, irrelative, existent in and of themselves. 
 All that we know is therefore phenomenal, phenomenal of the 
 
 Letters ; but, at the same time, he, an Arminian, certainly had in view the 
 polemic of the Remonstrants and anti-Remonstrants, touching the Divine 
 Decrees. Nor, apparently, was he ignorant of testimonies Nos. 17, 18. 
 
 * This testimony of Pascal corresponds to what Aristotle says : ' There is 
 no proportion of the Infinite to the Finite.' (De Ccelo, L. i. cc. 7, 8.) 
 
 t Pascal apparently quotes these words from memory, and, I have no 
 doubt, quotes them from Montaigne, who thus (L. ii. ch. 12.) adduces them 
 as from St. Augustin : ' Modus, quo corporibus adherent spiritns, omnino 
 minis est, nee comprehendi abhomine potest ; et hoc ipse homo est.' Mon- 
 taigne's commentator, Pierre Coste, says that these words are from Augustin, 
 De Spiritu ct Anima. That curious farrago, which is certainly not Augustin's, 
 does not however contain either the sentence or the sentiment ; and Coste 
 himself, who elsewhere gives articulate references to the quotations of his 
 author, here alleges only the treatise in general.
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 525 
 
 unknown.* The philosopher speculating the worlds of matter 
 and of mind, is thus, in a certain sort, only an ignorant admirer. 
 In his contemplation of the universe, the philosopher, indeed, 
 resembles ^Eneas contemplating the adumbrations on his shield ; 
 as it may equally be said of the sage and of the hero, 
 
 ' Miratur ; Rerumque ignarus, Imagine ga/udet." 1 
 
 Nor is this denied ; for it has been commonly confessed, hat as 
 substances, we know not what is Matter and are ignorant of what 
 is Mind. With the exception, in fact, of a few late Absolutist 
 theorizers in Germany, this is, perhaps, the truth of all others 
 most harmoniously re-echoed by every philosopher of every 
 school ; and, as has so frequently been done, to attribute any 
 merit, or any singularity to its recognition by any individual 
 thinker, more especially in modern times, betrays only the igno- 
 rance of the encomiasts. 
 
 1. PROTAGORAS (as reported by Plato, Aristotle, Sextus Empiricus, 
 Laertius, <fcc.). 'Man is [for himself] the measure of all things.' (Se 
 Bacon, No. 14.) 
 
 2. ARISTOTLE. (Metaphysica, L. vii., c. 10.) ' Matter is incognizable 
 absolutely or in itself.' (De Anima, L. iii., c. 5.) 'The intellect knows 
 itself, only in knowing its objects.' The same doctrine is maintained at 
 length in the Metaphysics, b. xii. cc. 7 and 9, and elsewhere. 
 
 3. ST. AUGUSTIN. (De Trinitate, L. ix., cc. 1, 2.) The result is ' Ab 
 utroque notitia paritur; a cognoscente et cognito.' (Ib. L. x., cc, 3-12.) 
 Here he shows that we know Mind only from the phenomena of which we 
 are conscious ; and that all the theories, in regard to the substance of what 
 thinks, are groundless conjectures. (Confessionum, L. xii. c. 5.) Of our 
 attempts to cognize the basis of material qualities he says ; ' Dura sibi 
 
 * Hypostasis in Greek (of oMa I do not now speak, nor of hypostasis in 
 its ecclesiastical signification), and the corresponding term in Latin, Substan- 
 tia (per se subsistens, or substam, i. e. accidentibus, whichever it may mean), 
 expresses a relation a relation to its phenomena. A basis for phenomena, 
 is, in fact, only supposed, by a necessity of our thought ; even as a relative 
 it is not positively known. On this real and verbal relativity, see St. Angus- 
 tin (De Trinitate, 1. vii., cc. 4. 5, 6). Of the ambiguous term Sufyect 
 (faoicelptvov) I have avoided speaking.
 
 526 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 
 
 haec (licit humana cogitatio, conetur earn, vel nosse ignorando, vcl ignorare 
 noecendo.' 
 
 4. BOETHIUS. (De Consolatione Philosophise, L. v., pr. 4.) ' Omne quod 
 cognoscitur, non secundum sui vim, sed secundum cognoscentium potius 
 comprehenditur facultatem.' {Pr. 6.) ' Omne quod scitur, non ex sua, sed 
 ex comprehendentium, imtura cognoscitur.' 
 
 5. AVERROES. (In Aristotelem De Anhna, L. ill Text 8.) ' Intellectus 
 intelligit seipsum modo accidentall' 
 
 6. ALBERTUS MAGNUS. (Contra Averroem de Unitate Intellectus, c. 7.) 
 ' Intellectus non intelligit seipsum, nisi per accidens fiat intelligible ; ut 
 materia cognoscitur per aliquid, cujus ipsa est fundament am. Et si ali- 
 qui dicant intellectum intelligi per hoc, quia per essentiam est praesens 
 sibi ipsi, hoc tamen secundum philosophiam non potcst dici.' (See also 
 Aquinas (Summa Theologize, P. i. Qu. 89, Art. 2; De Veritate, Qu. 10, 
 Art. 8) and Ferrariensis (Contra Gentes, L. iii. c. 46.) 
 
 7. GERSON. (De Concordia Metaphysicse.) ' Ens quodlibet dici potest 
 habere duplex Esse ; sumendo Esse valde transcendentaliter. Uno modo, 
 sumitur Ens, pro natura rei in seipsa ; alio modo, prout habet esse, objec- 
 tale seu reprsesentativum, in ordine ad intellectum creatum vel increatum. 
 Haec autem distinctio non conficta est vel nova ; sed a doctoribus, tarn 
 metaphysicis quam logicis subtilibus, introducta. Ens consideratum seu 
 relictum prout quid absolutum, seu res quaedam in seipsa, plurimum 
 
 differt ab esse, quod habet objectaliter apud intellectum. 
 
 Ens reale non potest constituere scientiaua aliquam, si non consideretur in 
 suo esse objectali, relate ad ipsum ens reale, sicut ad primarium et princi- 
 pale objectum.' 
 
 8. LEO HEBR^EUS. (De Amore, Dial i.) ' Cognita res a cognoscente, 
 pro viribus ipsius cognoscentis, baud pro rei cognitse dignitate recipi solet.' 
 
 9. MELANCHTHON. (Erotemata Dialectices, L. i. Pr. Substantia.) ' Mens 
 humana, per accidentia, agnoscit substantiam. Non enim cernimus oculis 
 substantias, tectas accidentibus, sed mente eas agnoscimus. Cum videmus 
 aquam manere eandem, sive sit frigida, sive sit calida, ratiocinamur : aliud 
 quiddam esse formas illas discedentes, et aliud quod eas sustinet." 
 
 10. JULIUS CAESAR SCALIGER. (De Subtilitate, Ex cccviL 12.) 
 ' Nego tibi ullam esse formam nobis notam plene, et plane : nostramque 
 scientiam esse umbram in sole [contendo]. Formarum enim cognitio est 
 rudis, confusa, nee nisi per Ttifiardatn. Neque verum est, formae substan 
 tialis speciem recipi in intellectum. Non enim in sensu unquam fuit.' 
 (Ib. Ex. cccvii. 21.) ' Substantias non sua specie cognosci a nobis, sed 
 per earum accidentia. Quis enim me doceat, quid sit substantia, nisi illis
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 527 
 
 miseris verbis, res subsistens? Quid ipsa ilia substantia 
 
 sit, plane ignoras ; sod, sicut Vulpes elusa a Ciconia, lambimus vitreutn 
 vas, pultem baud attingimus.' 
 
 11. FRANCIS PICCOLOMINI. (De Mente Humana. L. i. c. 8.) 'Mens in- 
 telligit se, non per se primo, sed cum castera intellexerit ; ut dicitur in L. 
 iii. de Anima, t. 8, et in L. xii. Metaphysics, t. 38.' 
 
 12. GIORDANO BRUNO. (De Imaginum, Signorum et Idearum Compo- 
 sitione ; Dcdicatio.) ' Quemadmodum, non nosmetipsos in profundo et 
 individuo quodam consistentes, sed nostri quffidani externa de superficie 
 (colorem, scilicet, atque figtiram), accidentia, ut oculi ipsius similitudinem 
 in speculo, videre posumus : ita etiam, neque intellectus noster se ipsam in 
 se ipso, et res ipsas omnes in seipsis, sed in exteriore quadam specie, simu- 
 lacro, imagine, figura, signo. Hoc quod ab Aristotele relatum, ab antiquis 
 prius fuit expressum ; at a neotericorum paucis capitur. Intelligere nos- 
 trum (id est, operationes nostri intellectus), aut est pbautasia, aut non sine 
 phantasia. Rursum. Non intelligimus, nisi pbantasmata speculamur. Hoc 
 est, quod non in simplicitate quadam, statu et unitate, sed in compositione, 
 collatione, terminorum, pluralitate, mediante discursu atque reflexione, 
 comprebendimus.'* 
 
 13. CAMPANELLA. (Metaphysica. L. i. c. 1, dub. 3, p. 12.) 'Ergo, non 
 . videntur res prout sunt, neque videntur extare nisi respectus.' 
 
 14. BACON. (Instauratio Magna ; Distr. Op.) ' Informatio sensus sem- 
 per est ex analogia hominis, non ex analogia universi ; atque magr.o 
 prorsus errore asseritur, sensum esse mensuram rerum.' (See Protago- 
 ras, n. 1.) 
 
 15. SPINOZA. (Ethices, Pars II. Prop, xix.) 'Mens humana ipsum hu- 
 manum corpus non cognoscit, nee ipsum existere scit, nisi per ideas affec- 
 tionum quibus corpus afficitur.' (Prop, xxiii.) 'Mens se ipsam non cog- 
 noscit, nisi quatenus corporis affectionum ideas percipit.' Et alibi. (See 
 Bruno, n. 12.) 
 
 16. SIR ISAAC NEWTON. (Principia, Schol. lilt.) ' Quid sit rei alicujus 
 substantia ; minime cognoscimus. Videmus tantum corporum figuras et 
 colores, audimus tantum sonos, tangiinus tantum superficies externas, 
 olfacimus odores solos, et gustamus sapores : intimas substantias nullo 
 sensu, nulla actione reflexa, cognoscimus.' 
 
 * Had Bruno adhered to this doctrine, he would have missed martyrdom 
 as an atheist ; but figuring to posterity, neither as a great fool (if we believe 
 Adelung), nor as a great philosopher (if we believe Schelling). Compare 
 the parallel testimony of Spinoza (15), a fellow Pantheist, but on different 
 grounds.
 
 528 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 
 
 17. KANT. (Critik der reinen Vernunft, Vorr.) ' In perception every 
 thing is known iu conformity to the constitution of our faculty.' And a 
 hundred testimony to the same truth might be adduced from the phi- 
 losopher of Koenigsberg, of whose doctrine it is, in fact, the foundation. 
 
 III. The recognition of Occult Causes. 
 
 This is the admission that there are phenomena which, though 
 unable to refer to any known cause or class, it would imply an 
 irrational ignorance to deny. This general proposition no one, I 
 presume, will be found to gainsay ; for, in fact, the causes of all 
 phenomena are, at last, occult. There has, however, obtained a 
 not unnatural presumption against such causes ; and this pre- 
 sumption, though often salutary, has sometimes operated most 
 disadvantageous^ to science, from a blind and indiscriminate 
 application ; in two ways. In the first place, it has induced men 
 lightly to admit asserted phenomena, false in themselves, if only 
 confidently assigned to acknowledged causes. In the second 
 place, it has induced them obstinately to disbelieve phenomena, 
 in themselves certain and even manifest, if these could not at 
 once be referred to already recognized causes, and did not easily 
 fall in with the systems prevalent at the time. An example of 
 the former is seen in the facile credence popularly accorded, in 
 this country, to the asserted facts of Craniology ; though even 
 the fact of that hypothesis, first and fundamental the fact, most 
 probable in itself, and which can most easily be proved or dis- 
 proved by the widest and most accurate induction, is diametri- 
 cally opposite to the truth of nature ; I mean the asserted cor- 
 respondence between the development and hypothetical function 
 of the cerebellum, as manifested in all animals, under the various 
 differences of age, of sex, of season, of integrity and mutilation. 
 This (among other of the pertinaciously asserted facts) I know, by 
 a tenfold superfluous evidence, to be even ludicrously false. An 
 example of the latter, is seen in the difficult credence accorded in 
 this country to the phenomena of Animal Magnetism ; pheno- 
 mena in themselves the most unambiguous, which, for nearly
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITIONED. 529 1 
 
 half a century, have been recognized generally and by the highest 
 scientific authorities in Germany ; while, for nearly a quarter of a 
 century, they have been verified and formally confirmed by the 
 Academy of Medicine in France. In either case, criticism was 
 required, and awanting. 
 
 So true is the saying of Cullen : ' There are more false facts 
 current in the world than false theories.' So true is the saying 
 of Hamlet : ' There are more things in heaven and earth, Hora- 
 tio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy.' But averse from 
 experiment and gregariously credulous 
 
 ' L'homme est de glace aux verites ; 
 II est de feu pour les mensonges.' 
 
 1. JULIUS C^ESAE SCALIGEK.* In his commentary on Theophrastus 
 touching the Causes of Plants, he repeatedly asserts, as the Aristotelic 
 doctrine, the admission of Occult Causes. Thus (L. ii. c. 5) ' Hoc dixit 
 (Theophrastus), nequis ab eo nunc exigat occultas illarum, quas subticet, 
 causas. Quasi dicat, Sapienti multa licet ignorare.' In like manner 
 (L. iv. c. 13). 'Hunc quoque locum simul cum aliis adducere potes 
 adversus eos qui negant Peripateticis ab occulta proprietate quicquam 
 fieri. Apud hunc philosophum saepe monuimus inveniri. Est autem 
 asylum humanse imbecillitatis, ac simile perfugium illi Periclis, tls ra 
 Kovra.' This we may translate ' Secret service money.' The same he 
 had also previously declared in his book De Subtilitate; where, for 
 example (Ex. ccxviii., 8), he says : ' Ad manifestas omnia deducere, 
 qualitates summa impudentia est ;' for there are many of these, ' quae 
 oinnino latent animos temperatos, illudunt curiosis ;' and he derides those, 
 ' qui irrident salutare asylum illud, occultae proprietatis.' 
 
 2. ALSTEDIUS. (PHYSICA (1630), Pars. I. c. xiii., reg. 4.) ' Quod Augus- 
 tinus ait, " Multa cognoscendo ignorari, et ignoratulo, cognosci," hie impri- 
 
 * I have quoted the elder Scaliger under all the three heads of this article, 
 for a truth in his language is always acutely and strikingly enounced. The 
 writings of no philosopher, indeed, since those of Aristotle, are better worthy 
 of intelligent study ; and few services to philosophy would be greater than a 
 eystematic collection and selection of the enduring and general views of this 
 illustrious thiriker. For, to apply to him his own expressions, these ' zopyra,' 
 these 'semina seternitatis,' lie smothered and unfruitful in a mass of matters 
 of merely personal and transitory interest. I had hoped to have attempted 
 this in the appendix to a work ' De vita, genere et genio Scaligerorum ;' but 
 this I hope no longer. 
 
 23
 
 530 PHILOSOPHY OF THE CONDITION KO. 
 
 mis habet locum, ubi agitur do Occultis Qualitatibus, quaruni inventiga- 
 tio dicitur Magi a Naturalis, id est, praastantissima naturae indagatio in 
 qua verbum modestise, Nescio, subinde usurpandum est. Vi-rbum mo- 
 destise dico, non autem stultiti;t.' 
 
 8. VOLTAIRE. (Dictiouuaire Philosophique, voce Occultes.) 'Qualitf- 
 ( >ccultes. On s'est moque fort longtemps des qualites occultes ; on doit 
 se moquer de ceux qui n'y croient pas. R6p^tons cent fois, que tout 
 principe, tout premier ressort de quelque oeuvre que ce puisse Atre du 
 ^rand Demiourgos, est occulte et cacb^ pour jamais aux mortela.' And 
 so forth. (Physique Particuliere, ch. xxxiii.) ' II y a done certainement 
 des lois eternelles, iuconnues, suivant lesquelles tout s'opere, sans qu'on 
 puisse les expliquer par la matiere et par le mouvement. . . . II y a 
 dans toutes les Academies une chaire vacante pour les ve'rite's inconnuea 
 comme Athenes avait un autel pour les dieux ignores.'* 
 
 * Besides the few testimonies adduced, I would refer, in general, for sonu- 
 excellent observations on the point, to Fernelius ' De Abditis Rerum Caufis ' 
 and to the ' Hypomnemata' of Scnnertus. 
 
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