UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORN A SAN DIEG 
 
 3 1822027003102
 
 V.. 
 
 LIBRARY 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF 
 CALIFORNIA 
 
 SAN DIEGO 
 

 
 UNIV RSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEG 
 
 1822027003102 
 
 Social Sciences & Humanities Library 
 
 University of California, San Diego 
 Please Note: This item is subject to recall. 
 
 Date Due 
 
 Cl 39 (5/97) 
 
 UCSD Lib.
 
 at f ttMa 
 
 EDITED BY 
 
 SIR WILLIAM WILSON HUNTER, K.C.S.I., C.I.E. 
 
 M.A. (OXFORD) : LL.D. (CAMBRIDGE) 
 
 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK
 
 Jlonbon 
 
 HENRY FROWDE 
 
 OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS WAREHOUSE 
 
 AMEN CORNER, E.G. 
 
 112 FOURTH AVENUE 
 
 [All rights reserved]
 
 %otb William Bentinck 
 
 BY (DEMETRIUS C. BOULGER 
 
 AUTHOR OF 'THE HISTORY OF CHINA,' ETC. 
 
 xforfc 
 
 AT THE CLARENDON PRESS: 1892
 
 fcjrforb 
 
 HORACE HART, PRINTER TO THE UNIVERSITY
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 CHAP. PAGES 
 
 I. EABLY LIFE 7-18 
 
 II. THE GOVEBNOKSHIP OF MADRAS .... 19-39 
 
 III. MILITARY SERVICE AND RETURN TO INDIA . . 40-54 
 
 IV. FINANCIAL REFORMS AND SUPPRESSION OF CRIME . 55-?6 
 V. THE ABOLITION OF WIDOW-BURNING . . . 77-"i 
 
 VI. RENEWAL OF THE COMPANY'S CHABTEB . . . 112-129 
 
 VII. INTERNAL AFFAIRS 130-148 
 
 VIII. EDUCATION 149-164 
 
 IX. EXTERNAL AFFAIRS 165-201 
 
 X. END OF INDIAN CAREER AND LIFE . . . 202-208 
 
 INDEX 209-214 
 
 NOTE 
 
 The orthography of proper names follows the system adopted by the 
 Indian Government for the Imperial Gazetteer of India. That system, 
 while adhering to the popular spelling of very well-known places, such 
 as Punjab, Lucknow, &c., employs in all other cases the vowels with 
 the following uniform sounds : 
 
 a, as in woman : a, as in fathers : i, as in police : i, as in intrigue : 
 o, as in cold : u, as in bttll : u, as in swre : e, as in grey.
 
 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 EARLY LIFE 
 
 THE administration of Lord William Eentinck was 
 one of peace. Following the administrations of 
 Cornwallis, Wellesley, Hastings, and Amherst, and 
 preceding those of Auckland, Hardinge, and Dalhousie, 
 through the absence of foreign adventure and terri- 
 torial conquest his Governor-Generalship may seem 
 commonplace in comparison with conquerors who 
 crushed the Mysore and Maratha confederacies, 
 planted the banners of the Company on the Indus 
 and the Irrawaddy, and put forward the right of the 
 rulers of India to exercise a controlling influence over 
 Afghanistan. But the very contrast between the 
 character of Lord William Bentinck's administration 
 and that of the other British Governor-Generals 
 whom we have named serves to bring into stronger 
 relief the importance of the work he accomplished in 
 the making of the India of to-day.
 
 8 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 The youngest student of the growth of the British 
 power in India does not need to be told that we first 
 went to that country as traders, and that our only 
 representatives were merchants who thought nothing 
 about the politics of the country or of interfering with 
 the Native Powers, and who were exclusively engaged 
 in their counting-houses. That condition of things 
 went on for nearly 150 years, and when the competition 
 with the French, who would have expelled all other 
 European traders if the programme of Dupleix had 
 been realised, resulted in our unexpected triumph, 
 accomplished by the genius of Olive, the East India 
 Company still cherishing above territorial possessions 
 and military glory the commercial monopoly granted 
 by Elizabeth and extended by Anne preserved its 
 character as a society of merchants, esteeming its 
 annual investment in country goods, whether in 
 Bengal, Bombay, or Madras, of far higher importance 
 than matters of administration. 
 
 The East India Company, true to its origin, clung 
 to its pacific vocation to the end, in spite of every 
 temptation to play a sovereign part. Greatness was 
 forced upon it by the many remarkable men who 
 appeared in its service for sixty years after Clive had 
 pointed out the easy and attractive road to wider 
 dominion. It regretted the diversion of money from 
 the legitimate pursuit of trade to the maintenance of 
 armies, and it only reconciled itself to the course 
 because Warren Hastings proved that the execution of 
 a great policy in India did not necessarily entail the
 
 THE EAST INDIA COMPANY 9 
 
 payment of a smaller dividend in Leadenhall Street. 
 The conquest of a fresh province was for many years 
 the cause of as much anxiety as satisfaction to the 
 Honourable Court. 
 
 When the Charter of the East India Company was 
 renewed by Parliament in 1793 those feelings were in 
 full force, and if it had then been renewed with any 
 serious diminution of its commercial privileges it 
 would have been deprived of half its value. Very 
 much the same feeling was prevalent when it was 
 again renewed in 1813, although on this occasion the 
 Company was deprived of the monopoly of the trade 
 with India. It retained however the most favoured 
 position for carrying on this trade, and it preserved 
 the monopoly of that with China. Lord William 
 Bentinck was sent to India when the renewal of the 
 Charter had again become imminent and formed the 
 burning question in Anglo-Indian circles, but a great 
 change had passed over the spirit of the Directors of 
 the East India Company. Certain facts had become 
 patent to even the most prejudiced minds in Leaden- 
 hall Street, and it was recognised that a change was 
 at hand. The maintenance of any commercial 
 monopoly was in antipathy to the free spirit of 
 a trading people like the English. That certain 
 gentlemen trading with China should be privileged, 
 and that the bulk of the nation attempting the same 
 thing should be denounced as interlopers, outside the 
 law, and little better than pirates, was nothing more 
 or less than an anachronism. The Court had begun
 
 10 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 to realise in 1827, when it offered the Governor- 
 Generalship to Lord William Bentinck, that a radical 
 change in its tenure of authority in India was at hand, 
 and that its career might be curtailed if not summarily 
 ended. 
 
 There was no longer any reasonable hope of its 
 retaining an exclusive hold upon China, and as its 
 connection with that country was purely commercial, 
 and as it possessed no territorial base to put it on 
 terms of vantage with outside traders, the withdrawal 
 of the monopoly could not but signify a distinct loss 
 of revenue. This prospect was rendered the more 
 serious because the profits from the Chinese trade 
 were far in excess of its dimensions, and because the 
 capacity of the Chinese for consuming opium and 
 payiDg silver then seemed to be unlimited. At the 
 same moment it happened that the heavy expenses of 
 the first Burmese war had produced a serious deficit 
 in the finances of India, which inspired apprehension 
 for the future. The possible loss of any source of 
 revenue or profit was therefore a cause of the deepest 
 solicitude to the Court, and it consequently became a 
 matter of the first importance to ascertain how far an 
 equilibrium in the finances could be attained by 
 internal economies and a rigid abstention from 
 external adventures. The solution of that difficult 
 problem was entrusted to Lord William Bentinck, and 
 it remains to his enduring credit that he solved it 
 with perfect satisfaction to his employers and to the 
 natives of India.
 
 THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA II 
 
 The withdrawal of its last trading monopoly and 
 the cessation of its commercial character brought the 
 East India Company face to face with grave adminis- 
 trative responsibilities. It is quite true that it had 
 already accepted and accomplished the task of 
 governing India ; but to govern India under the 
 conditions which prevailed when Olive, Warren 
 Hastings, or even Wellesley, ruled supreme, was less 
 difficult than it had become in Bentinck's day or than 
 it is now. In the earlier days public opinion was 
 rarely aroused in Indian matters except to applaud 
 the result, and as the result was always a triumph 
 searching criticism was never called forth. But in 
 these times, and the origin of the method dates from 
 the rule of Lord William Bentinck. every act or measure 
 of the Indian Executive is subjected to the severest 
 and most searching criticism long before it is possible 
 to say what its result will be. During the debates on 
 the renewal of the Charter there were the loudest 
 protestations on both sides that India would suffer if 
 the decision of matters affecting it were to be biassed 
 by the party considerations prevailing in English 
 politics. 
 
 The acceptance of the Government of India by the 
 East India Company in 1833 i Q ^ ne mos t formal 
 manner as the delegate of the British Crown and 
 Parliament, and the recognition of its responsibility 
 for the charge to the House of Commons and public 
 opinion, was a grave and momentous step, as the 
 Company did not possess the machinery necessary to
 
 13 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 discharge its trust with efficiency and with satisfaction 
 to the public conscience. It is true that the cessation 
 of their duties as merchants left the servants of 
 the Company at liberty to devote their time and 
 attention to matters of administration and affairs of 
 State. But their numbers were not sufficient, and the 
 revenue would not admit of their increase, to enable 
 the Indian Government to perform all the duties 
 that were expected of it. The solution of these 
 difficult questions was not found during Lord William 
 Bentinck's administration alone, but he certainly 
 indicated the true direction in which they should be 
 solved, and provided to a great extent the machinery for 
 solving them. The part which Lord William Bentinck 
 took in abolishing certain malpractices and inhumani- 
 ties deserves a tribute of praise, and will be referred 
 to in its proper place ; but the momentous decision to 
 make the English language the official and literary 
 tongue of the Peninsula represents the salient feature 
 in his administration, and makes his Governor- General- 
 ship stand out as a landmark in Indian history. 
 
 His tenure of authority thus represents a turning- 
 point in British rule in India. It includes the period 
 when the East India Company, casting aside its garb 
 as a commercial body, boldly grappled with Indian 
 problems, and became a reigning Government alone. 
 The essential difference in the principle of adminis- 
 tration was well described by the late Sir Charles 
 Trevelyan in his evidence before the Select Committee 
 of 1 853:
 
 THE BENTINCK FAMILY 13 
 
 'To Lord William Bentinck belongs the great praise of 
 having placed our dominion in India on its proper foundation 
 in the recognition of the great principle that India is to be 
 governed for the benefit of the Indians, and that the ad- 
 vantages which we derive from it should only be such as 
 are incidental to and inferential from that course of pro- 
 ceeding.' 
 
 Regarded from a true historical standpoint there 
 is no period in the British rule of India which 
 deserves more attentive study than that which wit- 
 nessed the disappearance of the old trading Company 
 that had originally been started for the exploration of 
 the Indies more than two centuries before, and the 
 formal assumption by the Company of the heavy 
 task of governing the millions of India, as the delegate 
 of the British Crown and Parliament, with absolute 
 justice, impartiality, and efficiency. It is chiefly with 
 regard to this historical metamorphosis that I am 
 about to attempt to bring out the salient features in 
 the life and Governor- Generalship of Lord William 
 Bentinck. The biographical details of his career, 
 although interesting and varied, must be held subor- 
 dinate to the part that he played in the development 
 of the British administration of India. 
 
 The family of Bentinck, which has occupied in 
 English politics and society a prominent and honour- 
 able position during the last two centuries, ranks 
 among the noblest in the Netherlands. The head of 
 the family still resides on the patrimonial property 
 in the province of Overijssel and employs the style
 
 14 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 of Count, a title conferred on his ancestors in the 
 most flourishing days of the Holy Roman Empire. 
 But the greater splendour and wealth of the younger 
 branch, which came to England in the person of Hans 
 William Bentinck in the train of William of Orange, 
 has eclipsed the origin from which it sprang, and the 
 historical interest centres in the Dukes of Portland and 
 not in the Counts Bentinck. Macaulay has described 
 in his brilliant manner the friendship of William of 
 Orange and Bentinck, the growth of Bentinck's for- 
 tunes after his master became King of England, and 
 how, notwithstanding the bitter opposition of the 
 English Parliament, which went so far as to impeach 
 him, Bentinck retained the large estates in England, 
 Wales, and Ireland, and the title of Earl of Portland, 
 conferred on him by his grateful and much attached 
 sovereign. Having passed successfully through the 
 ordeal which was inevitable before even the most 
 favoured Dutch nobleman could be allowed by insular 
 prejudice to take a prominent place in the House of 
 Peers, the Earl of Portland lost no opportunity of 
 ingratiating himself and his family with English 
 opinion and qualifying himself for the requirements 
 of our country life. He had married an English lady 
 long before there appeared any chance of his settling 
 in England. His son (the first Duke of Portland) and 
 his grandson followed his example by marrying into 
 the noble families of Gainsborough and Oxford. 
 
 In the next generation it was almost forgotten that 
 the Bentinck family was one of the few remaining
 
 LORD WILLIAM'S BIRTH 15 
 
 evidences that a Dutch King had reigned over the 
 United Kingdom. The third Duke married Lady 
 Dorothy Cavendish, the only daughter of the fourth 
 Duke of Devonshire, who had played a considerable 
 part in politics during the reign of George the 
 Second and the earlier years of his successor. By 
 this alliance the Dukes of Portland became connected 
 with the most ancient and distinguished families 
 of the kingdom, and from that time to the present 
 their family has been known by the double name of 
 Cavendish-Bentinck. In 1783 the Duke of Portland, 
 more by the exigencies of party and for the sake of 
 his spotless character than for exceptional ability, was 
 promoted to the Prime Ministership, but the events of 
 his administration were unimportant, and perhaps the 
 most interesting fact about his public career was that 
 he was one of the persons supposed to have been Junius. 
 But for us he has a more personal interest in that he 
 was the father of Lord William Bentinck. 
 
 William Cavendish-Bentinck, second son of the 
 third Duke of Portland, was born on J4th September, 
 1774. In 1791 he entered the Coldstream Guards 
 as an ensign, and in the following year he obtained 
 his captaincy in the 2nd Light Dragoons. Two years 
 later he had attained the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel 
 of the 24th Light Dragoons, and in the campaign in 
 Flanders of 1794, which was not creditable to the 
 English arms, he served on the staff of the Duke of 
 York. His zeal for the service was shown by his 
 personal request, made through his father, to serve in
 
 1 6 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 the West Indies while the troops remained in quarters 
 during the winter of 1793-4. 
 
 From one or two passing references, and from the 
 fact that he was mentioned in despatches, we may 
 assume that this youthful colonel and aide-de-camp 
 of twenty showed that he possessed some soldierly 
 qualities. Four years later he was specially selected 
 for the honourable and responsible task of accompany- 
 ing the army of Marshal Suwarrow in its campaign in 
 Northern Italy and Switzerland as the military repre- 
 sentative of England. During the campaign of 1799 
 he acquired a practical experience of the larger opera- 
 tions of war such as was not possessed by many 
 other English officers at that time. After Suwarrow 
 withdrew from Switzerland he remained in the same 
 capacity with the Austrian army l in the north of Italy 
 until the end of 1801. He was present at the decisive 
 battle of Marengo, which established the reputation of 
 Napoleon as one of the greatest military geniuses that 
 the world had ever seen, and throughout the whole of 
 the Italian campaign of 1800-1 he was always to be 
 found wherever the severest fighting was in progress. 
 It is only needful to name the engagements at which 
 he was present. Besides Marengo, he saw, and wrote 
 the official account for the English Government of, 
 the battles of the Trebbia, Novi, Sangliano, and the 
 
 1 In one of his despatches he bore eloquent testimony to the 
 valour and devotion of the Austrian army, which has found far 
 too few to appreciate it. ' It is impossible to do justice to the 
 valour and perseverance of the Austrian army,' he wrote.
 
 MILITARY EXPERIENCES 17 
 
 passages of the Mincio and Adige. He also witnessed 
 the sieges of Alessandria and Coni. Although still quite 
 young, he had had six or seven years' experience of the 
 extensive warfare going on in Europe, and had seen 
 Continental armies as well as English troops engaged 
 with the French. He had also acquired some practical 
 knowledge of the political condition and popular 
 feelings of Northern Italy a fact which explained his 
 action many years later, when he exercised authority 
 in Sicily and appeared as a victor at Genoa. 
 
 From Italy he proceeded to Egypt, where he had 
 been appointed to command the cavalry attached to 
 the force under Sir R. Abercromby, but he arrived 
 too late to take an active part in the war, and the 
 Treaty of Amiens giving brief tranquillity to Europe, 
 Lord William Bentinck was relieved of his duties and 
 returned to England. Very shortly after his return he 
 married on February 19, 1803, Lady Mary Acheson, 
 second daughter of the first Earl of Gosford. Three 
 months after his marriage he was nominated by the 
 East India Company to the Governorship of its 
 Presidency at Fort St. George, Madras ; and thus, as 
 perhaps the youngest Governor ever sent from these 
 shores to rule an Eastern dependency, he commenced 
 that Indian career which twenty-five years later was 
 to be renewed in a loftier position and with wider 
 responsibilities. The Court was probably influenced 
 in making the appointment by the exceptional military 
 experience of Lord William Bentinck, and by the 
 consideration that French designs upon India raised 
 
 B
 
 1 8 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 ever recurring alarms until after the retreat from 
 Moscow. Support is lent to this opinion by the fact 
 that during his Governorship the defence of the coast 
 of Coromandel and of Ceylon against a French descent 
 formed subjects to which he very frequently drew 
 attention. His tenure of power at Madras introduced 
 him at an early age to Indian responsibilities and 
 difficulties, and his experiences there which were, as 
 will be seen, not free from bitterness exercised a 
 marked influence on his subsequent character and 
 career.
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 THE GOVEBNOKSHIP OF MADRAS 
 
 LOED WILLIAM BENTINCK reached Madras on August 
 30, 1803, succeeding in the post of Governor of Fort 
 St. George Lord Clive, the only son of the conqueror 
 of Bengal. Important as this office still was, the 
 centre of English power had been finally shifted from 
 the coast of Coromandel to the valley of the Ganges by 
 the break-up of the Muhammadan dynasty of Mysore, 
 and the questions with which Lord William Bentinck 
 was required to deal were mainly of local interest. 
 Had he reached India only five years earlier he would 
 have had an opportunity of displaying his energy 
 and military talent in the closing scenes of Tipti's 
 remarkable career, but although we were engaged 
 during the period of his Governorship in a keen struggle 
 with the Marathas in the Deccan and Central India, 
 he took only a subsidiary part in the campaigns which 
 placed Lake and Arthur Wellesley in the first rank of 
 Anglo-Indian commanders. The field of action was 
 too far removed from Madras for that Presidency to 
 take the leading part against Holkar as it had done 
 against Haidar and Tipu. Lord William Bentinck 
 was able to render Sir Arthur Wellesley useful assist- 
 ance in regard to supplies, and his co-operation. 
 
 B a
 
 20 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 received official recognition and the expression of 
 gratitude from both the commander in the field and 
 the Governor-General. 
 
 The Governor-General of Fort William in Bengal was 
 then the Marquis Wellesley, one of the ablest and most 
 successful of the British statesmen who have ruled 
 India. When Lord William Bentinck arrived in India 
 the Marquis Wellesley was at the height of his fame, 
 and it may be doubted if any Governor-General ever 
 inspired his subordinates with so much admiration 
 and enthusiasm as he did. He at once Bent Colonel 
 Hoghton, a trusted and confidential officer ' belonging 
 to my family,' to quote the words of the Marquis, 
 to meet the new Governor of Madras on his arrival, 
 and to acquaint him with the exact position of affairs 
 in India, and with the objects of his policy. The first 
 letter Lord William Bentinck addressed to the Marquis 
 Wellesley ten days after his arrival in India, and on 
 Colonel Hoghton's return to Calcutta, is dated 
 September 9, 1803. He says : 
 
 ' I am quite aware of the arduous and important task 
 which I have undertaken. The divided state of this govern- 
 ment, and the opposition and counteraction which my noble 
 predecessor received, are circumstances much to be lamented, 
 and which tend to destroy all the vigour and efficiency so 
 imperiously required in the management of this great un- 
 settled territory.' 
 
 He declared ' a steady and determined resolution to 
 do what is right, uninfluenced by party or prejudice, 
 careless and fearless of the result.'
 
 THE MARQUIS WELLES LEY 21 
 
 The Marquis Wellesley seems to have been pleased 
 with the language of his new colleague, from whom he 
 looked for efficient co-operation in the large schemes 
 engaging his attention, and also for a speedy solution 
 of the difficulties besetting the administration of 
 Fort St. George. He presently sent another officer 
 (Captain Sydenham) to Lord William Bentinck, and 
 dwelt in his despatch of November 19, 1803, on 'the 
 truly British spirit, sound judgment, and hereditary 
 integrity and honour' shown in the letter we have 
 quoted. 
 
 The Governor-General in the following year called 
 attention to what he considered a spirit of faction 
 as being prevalent at Madras, and he also seemed to 
 express some dissatisfaction with Lord William Ben- 
 tinck's mode of dealing with it. Lord William replied 
 admitting that such a state of things did undoubtedly 
 exist, but that ' it was confined to a very few indi- 
 viduals and deserving of the most sovereign contempt.' 
 At the same time he firmly but courteously upheld his 
 right as an independent Governor to deal with such 
 matters in his own way and on his own responsibility. 
 In the relations of these two remarkable men it is 
 more gratifying to turn to the agreeable features than 
 to dwell on the one discordant note which revealed 
 itself. The general admiration of the Anglo-Indian 
 community for Lord Wellesley found expression in 
 addresses presented from all parts of India in the 
 spring of 1804. The Madras address was sent in 
 May, 1804, under a covering letter from Lord William
 
 22 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 Bentinck, which provided him with the opportunity 
 of stating his views on the subject of Indian govern- 
 ment, views to which he was himself to give effect 
 thirty years later. 
 
 ' It is most pleasing to reflect that the result of the war 
 affords a hope of equal benefit to the great mass of the people 
 whose rulers have been conquered. If the annals of Indian 
 histoiy are retraced, and more particularly the events of 
 later years, it will be found that this vast peninsula has 
 presented one continual scene of anarchy and misery. Con- 
 stant revolutions, without even a proposed legitimate object, 
 have succeeded each other. Wars of great and petty 
 chieftains, unwarranted in their origin and unprincipled in 
 their conduct, for the sole object of robbery and plunder, 
 have depopulated and laid waste the general face of this 
 unhappy country. Justice, order, consideration of public 
 and private rights nowhere appear in relief of this 
 melancholy picture. Happily a period has arrived to these 
 barbarous excesses. For the first time the blessings of 
 universal tranquillity may be expected. That system of 
 policy which could embrace the whole of India, which could 
 comprehend in one bond of mutual defence and reciprocal 
 forbearance the predatory chiefs of this great Empire, 
 deserves the admiration of all the civilised world. That 
 system, one of the noblest efforts of the wisdom and pa- 
 triotism of a subject, which has founded British Greatness 
 upon Indian Happiness, demands in a particular manner the 
 thanks and applause of his country.' 
 
 These sentiments would have been praiseworthy 
 from any one at a time when little or no heed was 
 given to the obligations imposed upon us by the 
 gradually extending conquest of India, but coming
 
 FRENCH SCHEMES 2$ 
 
 as they did from a young man who had not com- 
 pleted his thirtieth year, and whose acquaintance 
 with India had only just commenced, they cannot 
 but be considered as remarkable evidence of inde- 
 pendence of character and breadth of view. They 
 show beyond dispute that Lord William Bentinck 
 held clearly defined opinions upon our position in 
 India from the time that he first became connected 
 with it, and that, as he put it, he considered British 
 greatness should be founded on Indian happiness. 
 
 Although the great struggle for supremacy in 
 Southern India was over before Lord William Ben- 
 tinck reached Madras, there was still some anxiety 
 prevalent as to the possible return of the French. 
 French privateers continued to haunt the Indian seas, 
 and although Pondicherry was in our possession, 
 French spies and agents were believed to keep up 
 communications with the native Courts and to send 
 information to France via the Mauritius. Lord 
 William Bentinck's anxiety was increased by the 
 decline in the military strength and efficiency of the 
 Madras army owing to the withdrawal of the Bombay 
 troops, and this weakening of the garrison was the 
 more calculated to stimulate alarm because both at 
 Calcutta and at Madras there was a real fear that the 
 French might attempt a descent either on Ceylon or 
 on the coast of Coromandel. Lord William Bentinck 
 thought such a descent perfectly feasible and easy 
 in the case of Ceylon, which he described as ' unpro- 
 tected without and within.' The threatened danger,
 
 24 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 however, passed off; and the French invasion only 
 gave rise to the trial of M. Collin, a resident at 
 Pondicherry, and described as a man of ability, on a 
 charge of being a secret agent and spy of the French 
 Government. 
 
 No opportunity of giving effect to his political 
 views presented itself during Bentinck's stay at 
 Madras. Internal questions aroused little or no 
 interest except when they referred to the policy of 
 native states or the attitude of the leading chiefs. 
 One of his most important acts related to the 
 prohibition against any European travelling more 
 than fifteen miles from the' city of Madras without a 
 passport, and specified the officials with whom the 
 power of issuing such passports lay. This measure 
 was intended as much as a precaution against French 
 agents as for the maintenance of the Company's com- 
 mercial rights. The land question was the pressing 
 economic subject that presented itself during this 
 period, and Lord William Bentinck was content with 
 regard to it to adopt the opinions of Sir Thomas 
 Munro. In Bengal Lord Cornwallis, when deciding 
 the questions of land tenure and land revenue, had 
 given a 'permanent settlement' and had established, 
 or at least recognised, and strengthened by so doing, 
 the class of the zamindars or landlords. In Madras, 
 where the same problem had to be met and solved 
 only a few years later, exactly the opposite, policy 
 was pursued, and mainly owing to the efforts of Sir 
 Thomas Munro. There we gave no indefeasible
 
 DISPUTES AT MADRAS 25 
 
 rights of tenure, and we recognised as the class 
 identified with the soil not the zamindars, but the 
 cultivators. In Lord William Bentinck's opinion ' it 
 was apparent to him that the creation of zemindars, 
 where no zemindars before existed, was neither 
 calculated to improve the condition of the lower 
 orders of the people, nor politically wise with 
 reference to the future security of this Govern- 
 ment.' 
 
 Reference has been made to the bickerings and spirit 
 of faction displayed at Madras. The correspondence 
 of Lord William Bentinck, which has been discovered 
 after lying for many years in obscurity, contains 
 abundant evidence on the subject, and the discussions 
 between the Governor on the one side and the Chief 
 Justice (Sir Henry Gwillim) and members of the 
 Governor's Council on the other, may be described as 
 scarcely less heated than those that took place thirty 
 years before at the Council-board of Warren Hastings. 
 If there was no duel to compare with that between 
 Hastings and Francis, we have a point blank refusal 
 from the highest judicial authority to accept an 
 invitation to Government House, and the highest 
 administrative authority declining to hold any direct 
 communication with the first of the Judges. 
 
 The difference of opinion between Lord William 
 Bentinck and Sir Henry Gwillim seems to have had 
 its origin in a very trifling matter. A native left a 
 sum of money for a local charity, and the Government 
 had to decide what was the best mode of dealing with
 
 26 LORD WILLIAM BENT1NCK 
 
 the trust. Sir Henry Gwillim was consulted and 
 made certain suggestions for its disposal. The matter 
 seems to have lain dormant, or to have passed from 
 Lord William Bentinck's memory for twelve months, 
 and then to have been brought under his notice 
 with a definite scheme for dealing with it as a fresh 
 matter by some subordinate official. In ignorance 
 of the character of the man with whom he had to 
 deal, Lord William wrote to Sir Henry Gwillim 
 asking him his opinion on this project, and stating at 
 the same time that it had his complete approval. 
 
 The scheme varied in some respects from that 
 recommended by Sir Henry twelve months before, 
 and he at once interpreted Lord William's letter as an 
 intended snub, and replied in terms of great asperity. 
 Lord William Bentinck seems to have completely 
 forgotten the earlier expression of opinion by the 
 Chief Justice, or to have considered that no definite 
 propositions had been put forward for dealing with 
 the trust until that upon which he requested the 
 opinion of Sir Henry Gwillim. The further corre- 
 spondence, which ought to have explained away the 
 difference, was marked by increased bitterness, and 
 an attempt to effect an amicable understanding 
 through an intermediary, Mr. A. Anstruther, member 
 of Council, only resulted in aggravating the feeling 
 of bitterness on both sides. On the one hand, Lord 
 William Bentinck ' declined all further correspondence 
 unless I am addressed in the language of polished 
 intercourse, rather than in that of judicial rebuke,'
 
 SfJ? HENRY GWILLIM 2? 
 
 and described Sir Henry's character to a common friend 
 in the following words ' Sir Henry has something 
 of the constitutional agitation of Holkar. He likes 
 to make war upon his neighbours, not for the pur- 
 pose of stealing their purse, but without an equally 
 innocent intention against their good name.' On the 
 other hand, Sir Henry Gwillim delivered an address 
 to the Grand Jury which breathed defiance and 
 hostility to the Governor, and he refused all invita- 
 tions to Government House. Both however agreed 
 on the main point that the custody of the funds 
 should remain with the Court. 
 
 Lord William Bentinck's relations with several 
 members of his Council were also strained. In 1806 
 he had felt compelled, for reasons which appeared to 
 him convincing, and which there is every ground for 
 believing were excellent, to appoint Mr. Robert 
 Strange member of Council, and to pass over Mr. 
 Thomas Oakes, who held the senior claim. The 
 matter was referred to London for ratification, but 
 the Court overruled Lord William Bentinck's decision, 
 repudiated the appointment of Mr. Strange, and 
 nominated Mr. Oakes to the seat. As Mr. Oakes had 
 been opposed to Lord William Bentiuck, this measure 
 was of a character that he could not but resent, and 
 in a letter to his brother Lord Titchfield, he declared 
 his intention of resigning if the Court did not cancel 
 its orders on the subject. His natural indignation 
 seems to have been mollified by the Court's having 
 exacted some personal promise from Mr. Oakes that
 
 28 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 he would not encourage any factious opposition to 
 Lord William, or display any personal hostility. 
 This promise was not better kept than such promises 
 ever are, and Mr. Oakes showed himself not less 
 hostile in the council-chamber than Sir Henry 
 Gwillim on the bench. 
 
 It is curious to discover that at the very moment 
 when Lord William Bentinck had the best reason to 
 believe that the Court would not support his legitimate 
 authority, and that he might feel it incumbent upon 
 him to resign, there was a possibility of his being 
 elevated to the higher office of Governor-General. 
 This statement is made on the unimpeachable au- 
 thority of the President of the Board of Control. In 
 a letter to Lord William Bentinck, Lord Minto 
 explained that the Government had nominated the 
 Earl of Lauderdale as successor to the Marquis Corn- 
 wallis, and that the Court had absolutely refused to 
 endorse the nomination. The Government did not 
 relish the unqualified rejection of its nominee, but 
 the Court declared its intention to stand firm even 
 to the jeopardy of its Charter. In such conflicts a 
 compromise provides the only remedy, and the transfer 
 of Lord William Bentinck from Fort St. George to 
 Fort William was seriously considered as the best 
 arrangement. As a matter of fact it was not carried 
 out, for the acting Governor-General, Sir George 
 Barlow, was confirmed in his office. But the incident 
 throws a significant side-light on the strangely con- 
 flicting views that must have been held in Leaden-
 
 THE VELLORE MUTINY 29 
 
 hall Street about the merit of Lord William Ben- 
 tinck l . 
 
 But the most important and memorable event in 
 connection with Lord William Bentinck's Governor- 
 ship of Madras w<is that which brought it to a sudden 
 and disagreeable termination the Mutiny at Vellore. 
 The circumstances, relating to this occurrence claim 
 more than passing notice, both from a historical and 
 a biographical point of view. They refer to one of 
 the most remarkable crises in our military history 
 in India before the Mutiny, and they unquestionably 
 exercised a considerable influence on the Indian 
 career and character of Lord William Bentinck. 
 
 Vellore, at all times a considerable military station, 
 lies west of the city of Madras, and not far distant 
 from Arcot, where Clive first revealed his military 
 genius. It had become of increased importance by 
 having been chosen as the place of residence for the 
 family of the famous Tipii Sultan. The sons of that 
 
 1 As evidence bearing on Lord William Bentinck's footing with 
 the East India Company the following passage from a letter from 
 Viscount Castlereagh, dated 8 November, 1805, maybe quoted : ' I 
 have much pleasure in finding a disposition in Leadenhall Street 
 very favourably to consider your Lordship's measures. They are 
 impressed with your determination to act for yourself, to conduct 
 the public business in its accustomed channels, and to treat them 
 with respect. Every man in public life must expect Rubs, more 
 particularly when acting under a body so constituted.' Lord 
 William Bentinck's own opinion was given in a letter based on 
 this communication : ' It is not easy for me to give credit to this 
 assurance, however anxious I may be to do so. For I declare that 
 I have received no opinion of my conduct that has not been the 
 most marked censure.'
 
 30 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 resolute soldier who, following the example of his 
 father Haidar Ali, had endeavoured to compete with 
 us for supremacy lived there in considerable state 
 and luxury, surrounded by the few faithful retainers 
 who had survived the storm of Seringapatam. The 
 bounty of the Company provided the means of 
 enjoyment, and it was only in consonance with 
 human nature if the memory of a former injury was 
 embittered instead of being softened by the material 
 benefits of the hour. But although the Muhammadan 
 colony at Vellore was neither cordially disposed nor 
 well behaved for on several occasions murders and 
 other acts of lawlessness committed by its members 
 gave the Madras Government very serious anxiety 
 and trouble its opportunities of conspiring were 
 too few to altogether justify the opinion that the 
 disturbance was traceable to a systematic plot to 
 restore the family of Haidar to the sovereign position 
 in Mysore. 
 
 At the time of which we are speaking, the Sepoys 
 of Madras still represented the elite of the native 
 army. They were the representatives of the men 
 who had fought under Eyre Coote and put an end to 
 French pretensions at Wandiwash and Porto Novo. 
 They were thought a great deal of by the Government, 
 and the Company had regarded and treated them 
 very much as pampered children. But at the begin- 
 ning of the century new views were coming into 
 force in military circles in India. What had seemed 
 good enough to the old Company officers like
 
 THE MADRAS SEPOYS 31 
 
 Lawrence and Munro, could not find toleration with 
 English officers accustomed to the severer discipline 
 and close attention to minute details in European 
 armies. These changed views bore fruit in the issue 
 of a number of regulations chiefly affecting the dress 
 of the native soldier, and having as their main object 
 the increased smartness of the Sepoy regiments on 
 parade. In making these alterations there can be 
 no doubt that too much consideration was paid to 
 the pipe- clay traditions of European armies, and 
 too little to the prejudices and sentiments of the 
 native soldier. 
 
 On 1 4th November, 1805, an order was issued re- 
 quiring the Sepoys to wear a new turban, the shape 
 of which promised to ensure greater uniformity in 
 the headgear of the Madras army. It was followed 
 by a still more important and less reasonable change 
 in a regulation published early in 1806, forbidding 
 the Sepoys to wear their caste marks and earrings 
 when in uniform. These alterations, authorised with 
 a foolish absence of misgiving, were calculated to 
 hurt the feelings of the Sepoys in their most suscept- 
 ible part, in their religious and race distinctions as 
 well as in social status, and to irritate them against 
 the Government. The Commander-in-Chief of the 
 Madras army, Sir John Cradock, afterwards Lord 
 Howden, was mainly, if not solely, responsible for 
 this interference. 
 
 The dissatisfaction of the Madras Sepoys was not 
 long concealed. In April, 1 806, the second battalion
 
 32 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 of the 4th regiment of Madras Native Infantry, one of 
 the most distinguished regiments in the service, re- 
 fused to wear the new turbans sent for their use. 
 This open act of mutiny occurred at Vellore, where 
 the battalion was quartered, and revealed the dis- 
 content which was prevalent throughout the whole of 
 the Madras army. Although the ill-considered action 
 of the authorities was the cause of the insubordina- 
 tion of a hitherto well-conducted and distinguished 
 corps, it was impossible to overlook a flagrant defiance 
 of orders by soldiers. In May, Sir John Cradock 
 ordered a Court Martial to assemble for the trial of 
 twenty-one Sepoys, who had acted as ringleaders, and 
 in order to overawe the native troops a regiment of 
 English cavalry the I9th Dragoons was sent to 
 Vellore. The result of the trial was that the two 
 principal offenders were sentenced to 900 lashes 
 apiece, and then to be dismissed the army with 
 ignominy, while the others were pardoned. 
 
 Neither the severity to those punished nor the 
 clemency shown to those forgiven, however, allayed 
 the irritation prevalent throughout the native army 
 of Madras. In June, less than one month after the 
 Court Martial, Sir John Cradock was beginning to 
 entertain some apprehension about the scarcely- 
 concealed discontent of the Sepoys, as to which he 
 received alarming reports from more than one com- 
 manding officer. In considerable uncertainty, as well 
 as anxiety of mind, he applied to the Governor of 
 Madras to know what was best to be done, and
 
 OUTBREAK AT VELLORE 33 
 
 his application is susceptible of the construction that 
 he was willing to give way and sanction the with- 
 drawal of the objectionable orders. Lord William 
 Bentinck was in favour of a firmer attitude, stating 
 that, whatever might have been the objection to 
 passing the regulations in question, ; yielding in the 
 face of force was to be avoided.' And thus by the 
 decision of the Government of Madras the unpopular 
 orders were upheld, and the discontent of the Sepoys 
 became more intense. 
 
 On July i oth the native troops at Vellore threw olf 
 all the bonds of discipline and attacked their English 
 officers and the small English force in garrison with 
 them l . The attack was skilfully arranged. Not only 
 were the Europeans surprised at the time when they 
 were least prepared for attack, but the Sepoys cut 
 them off from the arsenal and magazine. For many 
 hours the nucleus of the English force held out against 
 their more numerous assailants without ammunition. 
 A summons was sent to the I9th Dragoons to proceed 
 to Vellore in hot haste, and they arrived in time to 
 relieve the besieged before the Sepoys could add to 
 the massacre of the unarmed officers the overthrow of 
 the small British force. Then a complete and effectual 
 revenge was taken. The native regiments were scat- 
 tered in all directions. Many hundreds of Sepoys 
 were killed along the roads. The ringleaders who 
 were not slain received their deserts from a Court 
 
 1 The details of the fighting will be found in the History of the 
 Madras Army by Lieut. -Colonel W. J. Wilson. 
 
 C
 
 34 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 Martial less lenient than the one that had met a few 
 months earlier. There was a fear for a time that the 
 mutiny might extend from Vellore to Haidarabad ; but 
 all danger at the important station of Secunderabad 
 was fortunately nipped in the bud by the energy and 
 tact of Colonel Montresor. The objectionable orders 
 as to dress, however, were cancelled by the express 
 command of Lord William Bentinck, and the Vellore 
 mutiny was at an end, except so far as it might serve 
 as an historical warning of what happened fifty years 
 later on a far larger and more terrible scale in 
 
 A special Commission was duly appointed to criti- 
 cally examine and formally record all the circum- 
 stances that led up to this mutiny, and after a long 
 examination of witnesses it assigned two causes for 
 the mutiny, (i) the regulations as to dress, and (2) the 
 residence of the Tipii family at Vellore. Sir John 
 Cradock, who would naturally not be disposed to 
 consider the former as the real cause, declared that in 
 his opinion ' the turban grievance ' was a mere pre- 
 text, and that the idea of re-establishing a Muham- 
 madan dynasty was the main motive and object of the 
 mutineers. On the other hand, Sir Thomas Munro, 
 who knew Madras better than any other officer, 
 gave his opinion, when asked by Lord William Ben- 
 tinck, that ' the turban grievance ' was the sole cause 
 of the mutiny, and that there was a popular belief 
 that it was the precursor of a scheme for the forcible 
 conversion of the natives to Christianity. Sir Thomas
 
 THE CENSURE OF THE COURT 35 
 
 Munro held very strongly the opinion that it was not 
 a Muhammadan plot at all, and scouted the idea of 
 the Tipu family having any hand in it. 
 
 But the Honourable Court of Directors were not 
 satisfied with the attitude of their representatives at 
 Madras in face of one of the most unpleasant inci- 
 dents in the whole experience of the Company. It 
 was bad enough that the native soldiers, upon whom 
 they principally relied to support their authority, 
 should show signs of insubordination, but it was 
 infinitely worse that that insubordination should be 
 provoked by acts of their own executive, and that it 
 should be successful in its object, for the obnoxious 
 regulations were withdrawn. The opinion in Leaden- 
 hall Street was not merely that the Madras authorities 
 had not shown themselves equal to the occasion, but 
 that they did not realise the serious consequences 
 that might have arisen from the mutiny at Vellore. 
 That feeling inspired the most severe passages in the 
 censure conveyed by the Court's letter of I5th April, 
 1807: 
 
 ' It seems to us that the Government, considered generally, 
 did not exercise the discernment and vigilance which all the 
 circumstances of the time required. With respect to Lord 
 William Bentinck. Of the uprightness of his intentions and 
 his regard for our service we have no doubt, and we have 
 had pleasure in expressing our satisfaction with different 
 measures of his government, but others, which we felt our- 
 selves obliged in the course of the last year to disapprove, 
 impaired our confidence in him, and after weighing all the 
 considerations connected with the business of Vellore, we felt 
 
 C 2
 
 36 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 ourselves unable longer to continue that confidence to him 
 which it is so necessary for a person holding his situation to 
 possess.' 
 
 This despatch was tantamount to the recall of Lord 
 William Bentinck from the Governorship of Madras, 
 and it was accompanied by peremptory orders 1 for 
 its immediate eifect, which he felt very keenly as 
 amounting, in his 'own words, to 'summary removal.' 
 He ceased to be Governor of Fort St. George on 
 nth September, 1807. He complained bitterly of 
 the want of consideration shown him, 'the orders 
 of the Court being issued without waiting for the 
 explanation of the officials accused,' and no arrange- 
 ments being made for his passage to Europe, which 
 he owed to the courtesy of the captain of a British 
 man-of-war who happened to be on the Madras 
 station. Before leaving Madras, Lord William Ben- 
 tinck, with that regard for the welfare of his friends 
 which never left him, entrusted their interests to Mr. 
 
 1 The resolution passed by the Board of Directors reads as follows : 
 ' Though the zeal and integrity of our present Governor of Madras, 
 Lord William Bentinck, are deserving of our approbation, yet being 
 of opinion that circumstances which have recently come under our 
 consideration render it expedient for the interests of our service that 
 a new arrangement of our Government of Fort St. George should 
 take place without delay, we have felt ourselves under the necessity 
 of determining that his Lordship should be removed, and we do 
 hereby direct that Lord William Bentinck be removed accordingly.' 
 Lord William Bentinck returned in the Pitt, Captain Bathurst, 
 which vessel was only lent him after he had made a strong personal 
 appeal, on family grounds, to the Admiral on the station, Sir 
 Edward Pellew, afterwards Viscount Exmouth, the captor of 
 Algiers.
 
 MEMORIAL TO THE COURT 37 
 
 William Petrie, senior member of Council, who suc- 
 ceeded him ex officio pending the arrival of his 
 successor. On his return to Europe he sent his native 
 secretary, Mutiah, a gold snuff-box in remembrance of 
 their official connexion. The following extract from 
 a letter from one of the highest civilians at Fort St. 
 George, is of interest as showing what was thought 
 at Madras at the time of the Court's action on the 
 Yellore business : 
 
 ' As it affects the interests of my Honourable Masters 
 under this Presidency I consider it a public misfortune, and 
 as it respects your lordship individually I consider it an 
 unjust and indecorous prejudication of a case not understood.' 
 
 After his return to England he presented in February, 
 1809, a memorial to the Court, of which the following 
 is the most important passage : 
 
 ' The mutiny at Vellore cannot be attributed to me directly 
 or indirectly, but I do assume to myself the merit, by a 
 resolute adherence to a wise principle, an adherence in the 
 lace of obloquy and opposition, of having re-established 
 order and confidence ; of having thus averted the numerous 
 calamities which the adoption of an opposite system of policy 
 would have entailed on India, and ultimately on Great 
 Britain ; and above all of having saved the national char- 
 acter from disgrace. And what has been my recompense ? 
 I have been removed from my situation, and condemned as 
 an accomplice in measures with which I had no further 
 concern than to obviate their ill consequences. My dismissal 
 was effected in a manner harsh and mortifying, and the 
 forms which custom has prescribed to soften the seventy of 
 a misfortune at all events sufficiently severe were on this
 
 38 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 single occasion violated as if for the express purpose of 
 deepening my disgrace. Whatever have been my errors, they 
 surely have not merited a punishment than which a heavier 
 could hardly have been awarded to the most wretched in- 
 capacity or the most criminal negligence. Under these cir- 
 cumstances I present myself to your notice. I take it for 
 granted that the Court of Directors have been misinformed, 
 and that to place the question before them in its true light 
 is to obtain redress. My claims are not extravagant ; I state 
 them, and I trust moderately. I have been severely injured 
 in my character and feelings ; for these injuries I ask re- 
 paration ; if, indeed, any reparation can atone for feelings 
 so deeply aggrieved, and a character so unjustly com- 
 promised in the eyes of the world V 
 
 Notwithstanding this appeal, the Court did not 
 withdraw their censure or offer him the reparation 
 which he claimed at their hands. Their reply stated 
 that ' while again expressing their sense of his lord- 
 ship's uprightness and zeal, and disclaiming any 
 intention of personal disrespect, they still adhered to 
 their original view, and regretted that greater care 
 and caution had not been exercised in examining into 
 
 1 In the year following the presentation of the memorial to the 
 Court Lord William Bentinck published it, stating his reasons in 
 the ' Advertisement.' ' I should think it unjust both to myself and 
 my friends if I neglected to place within the reach of every in- 
 quirer the means of forming a correct judgment on the circum- 
 stances of that event. It will at least be satisfactory to me to 
 know that if the subject should again excite discussion, either 
 private or public, there will not be wanting an authentic testimony 
 of the part which I acted on that occasion, of the principles by 
 which I was guided, and of the manner in which my measures 
 influenced the general course and result of affairs.'
 
 THE AMENDE 39 
 
 the real sentiments and disposition of the Sepoys 
 before measures of severity were adopted to enforce 
 the order respecting the use of the new turban.' 
 But although the Directors of the East India Com- 
 pany rejected Lord William Bentinck's appeal, and 
 refused to grant him the amende he claimed at their 
 hands in 1809, they atoned for this harshness eighteen 
 years later, when they entrusted to his hands the 
 charge, not of a single Presidency, but of the whole 
 of India.
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 MILITARY SERVICE AND RETURN TO INDIA 
 
 BEFORE Lord William Bentinck's petition to the 
 Court of Directors for reparation for his dismissal 
 after the Vellore mutiny had been received and re- 
 jected, he had been entrusted with fresh active em- 
 ployment by the Government of his country, and 
 was thus provided with the best cure for his injured 
 feelings. While governing Madras he had attained 
 in the natural course of promotion the rank of Major- 
 General in the army, and when he reached England 
 in 1808 he found that the preparations were far ad- 
 vanced for assuming a vigorous offensive in Portugal 
 and Spain. During the earlier part of 1808 he com- 
 manded in Essex, but he solicited active employment, 
 and in August of that year he was appointed to the 
 staff of Sir Harry Burrard. Soon after the landing 
 of the force commanded by that officer in Portugal he 
 was sent by Sir Hew Dalrymple on a special mission 
 to Madrid, to concert with the Spanish authorities the 
 more vigorous plan of action rendered necessary by 
 the imminent approach of Napoleon, who left Tilsit, 
 after dividing the sovereignty of the world with
 
 CO RUN N A 41 
 
 Russia, to assume in person the charge of the Spanish 
 campaign. Lord William's efforts were only par- 
 tially successful, as the Spanish commanders proved 
 unequal to devising any hearty or effectual co-opera- 
 tion with us, and the rapid advance of the French 
 on Madrid disarranged the plans that had been formed, 
 and converted all ideas of an intended offensive into 
 those of a strict defensive. 
 
 Under these circumstances the British Commis- 
 sioners could do nothing better than quit the Spanish 
 camp and hasten to join the English army with which 
 Sir John Moore was advancing into Spain from 
 Northern Portugal. Both the inadequacy of Spanish 
 co-operation and the magnitude of the French plans 
 rendered it prudent to convert that advance into 
 a prompt retreat. Bentinck took an active part in 
 the retreat to the coast, and at the battle of Corunna 
 he commanded the brigade composed of the 42nd and 
 5oth regiments, which bore the brunt of the fighting. 
 He was honourably mentioned in the despatches of 
 Sir John Hope, who succeeded to the command on 
 the death of Moore. Having been promoted to the 
 rank of Lieutenant-General, he served in the fol- 
 lowing year under Sir Arthur Wellesley in Portugal. 
 His special knowledge of continental armies led to 
 his being sent to Germany to raise a foreign legion, 
 a task of no ordinary difficulty considering that 
 Napoleon was then master of Central Europe, but 
 which he succeeded in accomplishing. He was con- 
 sequently under Wellington's orders for only a very
 
 42 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 short time, and when he finished his German com- 
 mission he was entrusted with a separate and inde- 
 pendent command of much responsibility. 
 
 The island of Sicily, which was given to Savoy by 
 the Treaty of Utrecht and exchanged by that state 
 for Sardinia with the Neapolitan Bourbons, had been 
 one of the objects of Napoleon's ambition in the 
 Mediterranean. Nelson had prevented the realisation 
 of his plans so far as they were controlled by the sea, 
 but the establishment of the kingdom of Naples under 
 Joseph Bonaparte and his successor Murat compelled 
 the Bourbons to take refuge in Sicily, which thus 
 acquired increased importance from the desire of the 
 French to acquire it and from our measures to thwart 
 them. From the year 1806 to 1815 the independence 
 of Sicily was only preserved by the presence of a 
 considerable English garrison, and the officer in com- 
 mand of this force exercised a sort of discretionary 
 control over all the acts of the Government of the 
 island. 
 
 In 1811 Lord William Bentinck was appointed to 
 the command of the English troops in Sicily. The 
 internal affairs of the island, and the expectations 
 formed as to a diversion from it into Eastern Spain 
 exercising a favourable and decisive influence on the 
 general war in the Peninsula, combined to make 
 the post of special importance and to attract marked 
 attention to its occupant. Lord William Bentinck 
 was thus provided with an opportunity of much 
 personal distinction, and of taking a considerable and
 
 SICILY 43 
 
 definite part in the great struggle which was going 
 on in every quarter of Europe. Perhaps it was his 
 misfortune that his new post held out so many at- 
 tractive opportunities of drawing European attention 
 to his proceedings, and prevented his subordinating 
 all his efforts to Wellington's main scheme in Spain. 
 Had he devoted all his attention to co-operating in 
 Eastern Spain with that commander there is no doubt 
 that he would have placed his military reputation 
 on a firmer basis, and that he would have contributed 
 more largely than he did to the material ends of 
 the war. Napier's estimate of his character here 
 suggests itself, and may explain to the reader how 
 it came about that he disobeyed instructions, and 
 showed an inability to subordinate his will to the 
 plans of others 'a man of resolution, capacity and 
 spirit, just in his actions, and abhorring oppression, 
 but of a sanguine impetuous disposition.' 
 
 The first year of Lord William Bentinck's residence 
 in Sicily was employed in the organisation of the 
 Sicilian army, which was raised to an effective strength 
 of 10.000 men, while the English garrison amounted 
 to half as many more. As the English fleet prevented 
 all possibility of hostile attack, this considerable force 
 was consigned to inaction at a period when it was 
 essential to throw every available man into the field 
 against the despot of the continent. The Italian 
 troops made a good show on the parade ground, and 
 great expectations were formed of their capacity to 
 take a creditable part in the serious operations of
 
 44 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 war. When Lord William Bentinck arrived in Sicily 
 the main task he had to accomplish was to organise 
 as strong an Anglo-Italian expedition as he could, 
 and to make a descent on the coast of Catalonia. 
 There is no doubt that great results were anticipated 
 from this diversion on the French flank, and the 
 disappointment of the Duke of Wellington at the 
 meagre outcome was in proportion to the hopes formed 
 as to its consequences. 
 
 But before Lord William Bentinck could give his 
 attention to military matters he had to compose a 
 political difficulty of a pressing nature, and one with 
 which his character and opinions 1 fitted him pre- 
 eminently to deal. The Queen of Naples, who, under 
 the influence of Lady Hamilton, had rendered such 
 useful service to Nelson while France was still power- 
 ful on the sea, was neither the wisest nor the most 
 forbearing of rulers when left to her own discretion. 
 When that influence was withdrawn she seems to 
 have imbibed an inveterate dislike of the English 
 name and policy, and it has been stated that when 
 she saw an Englishman she felt the guillotine at 
 her neck. An explanation of this changed feeling has 
 been attempted by alleging that after the marriage 
 
 1 Blaquiere, an excellent authority, refers to the excitement in 
 Sicily and the popular hope in the island on Lord William 
 Bentinck's appointment. It is interesting to observe that when 
 he first arrived in Sicily he formed certain definite opinions, and 
 that he then hastened back to England in the Cephalus frigate to 
 impress them upon the Government, and to obtain the necessary 
 authority for his subsequent measures.
 
 THE SICILIAN CONSTITUTION 45 
 
 of Napoleon with the Arch-Duchess Marie Louise 
 she wished to come to terms with him. But a more 
 probable explanation is that she saw in English 
 ascendency in Sicily an insuperable obstacle to the 
 assertion of those privileges which alone rendered 
 the possession of power of any value. For the Italian 
 Bourbons, expelled from their mainland possessions, 
 endeavoured to assert in Sicily, without regard to 
 insular privileges, all the arbitrary power they had 
 exercised at Naples. 
 
 This mode of proceeding gave rise to an amount of 
 popular indignation that threatened to lead to dis- 
 turbances, if not to civil war, and the first duty of 
 the English commander was to terminate these do- 
 mestic troubles and to reorganise the administration. 
 Sicily required nothing less than a new constitution, 
 and it was very much to the credit of Lord William 
 Bentinck that he drew up one which gave general 
 satisfaction, and which averted grave dynastic and 
 popular trouble. The Queen of Naples was deposed; 
 the King, whose incapacity was notorious, voluntarily 
 resigned in favour of his son, and the Crown Prince 
 was raised to the throne, while a House of Parliament 
 was formed on the basis of our own. The Barons 
 were recalled to Palermo, and the Queen was forbidden 
 to enter that city, while Lord William Bentinck was 
 declared Cap tain- General of all the troops. The new 
 constitution was proclaimed amid popular applause 
 to the Sicilian Parliament on July 20, 1812. 
 
 These internal affairs being settled, the projected
 
 46 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 descent on Catalonia then came on for practical con- 
 sideration. But on the eve of the departure of the 
 Sicilian army Lord William Bentinck allowed his 
 attention to be attracted to another object which 
 promised in his eyes to achieve greater results and 
 to exercise a more decisive influence on the European 
 struggle than his active intervention in Spain. He 
 received letters from the Russian Admiral, Tchighachoff, 
 requesting his co-operation with a Russian army then 
 quartered in Southern Russia, but with which he 
 proposed to march across Bulgaria to the Adriatic, 
 and thence crossing the sea to effect the liberation of 
 Italy. It was Lord William Bentinck's favourite idea 
 to promote the emancipation of Italy, and when this 
 visionary scheme was submitted to him for support 
 he yielded to the temptation, and dismissing the 
 thoughts of Catalonia prepared to embark with all 
 his resources on the new Italian adventure suggested 
 by the Czar's representative. Not merely did he 
 thus delay the arrival in Spain of the much-expected 
 and sorely-needed reinforcements from Sicily, but by 
 raising the sum of four million dollars at Gibraltar 
 and Minorca for the benefit of the Russian expedition 
 he depleted the most convenient money market, 
 and added greatly to Wellington's difficulties at the 
 most critical period of the Peninsular War. Wellington 
 was naturally irritated by these occurrences, and he 
 went so far as to call the Italian expedition Quixotic. 
 The liberation of Italy, he said, was all very well, but 
 the practical war after all was in Spain.
 
 CAMPAIGN IN CATALONIA 47 
 
 Nothing came of the proposed Russian descent on 
 Italy. The Russian army did not carry out its march 
 to the Adriatic, and Admiral TchighachofFs plans 
 faded into the air. Lord William Bentinck thus found 
 himself at liberty in the autumn of 1812 to despatch 
 to Catalonia the Anglo- Sicilian expedition which at 
 an earlier date would, to say the least, have arrived 
 more opportunely. Lord William Bentinck did not 
 take personal command of the first expedition in 1812, 
 which was not well managed, and effected little, 
 although the French had the worst of the one engage- 
 ment of any importance, at Alcoy. In the following 
 year, however, he arrived from Sicily with a stronger 
 force, increased by part of the garrison of Minorca. 
 Sir Frederick Adam acted as second in command, and 
 was placed at the head of the advance brigade. 
 Marshal Suchet was detached from the main French 
 army to hold the English expedition in check, and 
 he carried out his instructions with skill and suc- 
 cess. The English were successful in several minor 
 affairs and advanced as far as the pass of Ordal. 
 Here the French army opposed them in force, and after 
 some fighting the English were obliged to retreat. 
 Shortly after this repulse the Anglo-Italian expe- 
 dition sailed back to Sicily re infectd, and it cannot 
 be said that Bentinck's military reputation was en- 
 hanced by this campaign. It may however be stated 
 in fairness that Napier, in his criticism of this side- 
 incident in the war, throws most of the blame on 
 Sir Frederick Adam.
 
 48 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 The return of the Anglo- Sicilian expedition to its 
 starting-point was followed by the revival in a more 
 practical form of the contemplated expedition into 
 Italy. In March, 1814, when Napoleon's fortunes 
 were shattered and he could with despairing courage 
 alone defend the approaches to Paris, Lord William 
 Bentinck, who had previously concluded a convention 
 with Murat for his retention of the kingdom of 
 Naples, landed at Leghorn at the head of 7000 men 
 and called upon the Tuscans to effect the liberation 
 of Italy. He marched rapidly along the coast via 
 Spezia to Genoa, which the French garrison, although 
 nearly as numerous as his own force, surrendered 
 without any resistance. As a military achievement 
 this campaign, in which Lord William Bentinck had 
 the co-operation of an Austrian army under General 
 (afterwards Prince) Nugent, was the most successful in 
 which he was ever engaged. Yet even on this occasion 
 his impulses led him to exceed his instructions. 
 
 His instructions were to observe a very discreet 
 attitude towards the Italian people, whose aspirations 
 towards liberty and unity were beginning to find 
 expression, and to do nothing to fetter the hands of 
 the allies in disposing of Genoa at the general peace. 
 But his ardour outstripped his discretion and in- 
 structions. He was keenly alive to the injuries and 
 aspirations of Italians, and he was one of the first 
 English statesmen to believe that Italy could again 
 be reawakened into a nation. Instead, therefore, of 
 conforming to his instructions, which were dictated
 
 PROCLAMATION AT GENOA 49 
 
 out of consideration for the natural expectations of 
 Austria and the Bourbons, he called on the Tuscans to 
 effect the liberation of Italy, and after the capture of 
 Genoa he not only declared Italy free, but he restored 
 the constitution which had formerly prevailed there. 
 In his stirring address to the Genoese he said : 
 
 ' Warriors of Italy ! only call and we will hasten to your 
 relief, and then Italy by our united efforts shall become 
 what she was in her most prosperous period and what Spain 
 now is.' 
 
 It would take too long, and would be outside the 
 purpose of this volume, to explain how it was that 
 Lord William Bentinck was induced to believe that 
 the moment was opportune for the revival of Italian 
 independence, and that he might take a leading part 
 in executing this scheme. But there is abundant 
 evidence in his correspondence to show that the idea 
 originated with the Sardinian minister, Alessandro 
 Torri, and that it was encouraged by the Duke of 
 Orleans, afterwards Louis Philippe, King of the 
 French. The letters from that prince, who, having 
 married the Princess Marie Amalie of Naples, found 
 his most convenient residence at Palermo, reflect the 
 highest credit on his political intelligence, and are 
 marked by a personal regard for Lord William 
 Bentinck that continued unabated to his death. But 
 the advice they contained was incompatible with the 
 realisation of the military plan, which would have 
 thrown against the French in Spain all the British 
 resources that were to be found in the Mediterranean. 
 
 D
 
 50 
 
 One extract will illustrate the nature of this corre- 
 spondence. In a letter dated 24th January, 1813, he 
 advised Bentinck to ' withdraw his troops from Ali- 
 cante to Mahon, as, whilst at Alicante, you are always 
 exposed to see them pounced upon by the great Eagle 
 of Ciudad Rodrigo ' (Wellington). 
 
 The secret memorandum (2oth January, 1812) with 
 the Hereditary Prince Francis of Sicily, who, as 
 described, was elevated to his father's position under 
 the new constitution, stipulated that the object of 
 a descent on Italy should be the freeing of the whole 
 of Italy, and that the people should be left to select 
 their own constitution. When these views became 
 known at the Foreign Office they were not received 
 with favour, but for a time Lord William Bentinck's 
 explanation that they were necessary to procure the 
 assistance of the people of Italy was accepted. When 
 he wrote, ' hated as Murat is, the old dynasty is more 
 so,' the words were not accepted literally. Lord 
 William Bentinck was assumed to be carrying out 
 his diplomatic mission at the court of the Neapolitan 
 Bourbons, whereas he had been seized with a great 
 idea, and was very much in earnest. 
 
 The more closely the events and relations of the 
 contending parties in Italy at that time are considered 
 the more diffident will any one be to say that Ben- 
 tinck's project was chimerical. If England had made 
 Italy, instead of Spain, the base of its operations 
 against France, the influence we exercised on the 
 continental struggle might have been still more
 
 ITALIAN UNITY 51 
 
 decisive than it was. and from the Italian people we 
 should have received far greater gratitude than we 
 did from the inhabitants of the Iberian peninsula. 
 But grand as was the idea of Italian unity in 1812, 
 and feasible as the project might have become under 
 the auspices of a great military genius like Welling- 
 ton, we are constrained to admit that Lord William 
 Bentinck was not such a commander, and that al- 
 though as a statesman he realised what could be done, 
 he did not possess as a soldier the qualities to carry 
 out his noble project. He was the first English 
 statesman to conceive the idea 1 of a modern kingdom 
 of Italy, and to take some steps towards creating one. 
 But he would have been more practical and better 
 advised if he had subordinated his judgment to the 
 Duke of Wellington and driven Suchet (as he could 
 have done if he had employed all his resources) out of 
 Catalonia in 1812. From a worldly point of view 
 Louis Philippe was a bad adviser when he wrote 
 entreating him to be careful not to let the Anglo- 
 Sicilian forces ' be extracted from their peninsula for 
 the benefit of the other one.' 
 
 1 This was the more remarkable because he was on the most 
 cordial terms with Austrian notabilities. Marshal Count Bellegarde, 
 who commanded in 1813-4 i n Lombardy, refers in his letters to 
 their earlier intercourse in the most cordial terms. Count, after- 
 wards Prince. Nugent was his most attached friend. The Archduke 
 Francis D'Este of Austria, grandson of the Empress Maria Theresa, 
 and, in right of his mother, representative of the last Duke of Este, 
 confided all his plans to him, and when he recovered the State of 
 Modena requested Bentinck's congratulations. His generous recog- 
 nition of the merits of the Austrian army has been already quoted. 
 
 D 2
 
 52 
 
 It must not be supposed that Lord William Ben- 
 tinck's work in Italy was insignificant. After gain- 
 ing possession of Genoa and restoring its independent 
 constitution, he sent a small expedition to Corsica, 
 and a General to act in his name and that of England 
 to Milan. Both missions were crowned with complete 
 success. The Corsicans expressed the wish to become 
 British subjects, and the Milanese supported a pro- 
 position 1 to make the Duke of Cambridge King of 
 Italy, with which scheme it was considered the 
 Emperor of Russia was certain to be sympathetic. 
 It will be seen from these facts that Lord William 
 Bentinck's project was far from visionary, and that 
 the idea of an united Italy was first put forward in a 
 prominent and authoritative manner by Lord William 
 Bentinck. It injured him materially with his Govern- 
 ment. The idea of an independent Italy was incom- 
 patible with the restoration of the status quo effected 
 at Vienna. He ceased to exercise the command over 
 the British forces in the Mediterranean on 24th May, 
 1815, and when he presented himself at Naples in the 
 following September he was refused permission to 
 land; Lord Castlereagh acquiescing in this step on 
 the ground that a dangerous use might have been 
 made of his name. His sustained interest in Italy 
 was shown by his taking up his residence at Florence, 
 his studying the Italian language, and by his corre- 
 spondence and intercourse with some of the most 
 prominent public men of Italy. 
 
 1 General Macfarlane's letter to Lord William Bentinck.
 
 INDIAN OFFERS 53 
 
 He resumed his connexion with English public life 
 as member of Parliament for Lynn, but he seems to 
 have devoted his attention mainly to the affairs of 
 Italy and Sicily, where the constitution he had drawn 
 up was set aside very soon after his departure and 
 the expulsion of the French from Italy. In the year 
 1819 he was offered the Governorship of Fort St. 
 George his old post at Madras but after considera- 
 tion he refused this offer, because he considered that 
 to send him back to the post he had been removed 
 from twelve years before, under circumstances which 
 he felt to be unjust, would be no adequate reparation 
 of a wrong, and would show no proper appreciation of 
 his own progress in political life and public reputation. 
 
 In 1822, when the return of the Marquis of Hastings 
 from Bengal was announced, he made a representa- 
 tion of his claims to be nominated his successor, and 
 he did not conceal from his friends that he would 
 regard his selection as a gratifying vindication of his 
 conduct in 1806. Lord Liverpool did not recognise 
 the connexion between the two passages, and perhaps 
 as the result of his proud declaration x that he took no 
 steps to influence a vote, his claims were ignored in 
 favour of Lord Amherst, who had led our second and 
 abortive Embassy to the Court of China. It was this 
 application that curiously enough brought him into 
 connexion with James Mill, the historian. In Mrs. 
 Grote's Life we are told that 'Mill thought him the 
 
 1 His old friend Louis Philippe wrote of these events, ' You have 
 shown yourself as frank and honourable as you have always been.'
 
 54 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 best candidate, and so did every one else, but feared 
 he had no chance.' The fear proved accurate, but 
 although he was not destined to be Amherst's suc- 
 cessful competitor, he was nominated his successor in 
 1827, an d he was then brought into personal com- 
 munication with Mill, to whom he made the curious 
 confession, ' I must confess to you that what I have 
 ever read amounts to very little, and that it is not 
 without pain that I can read anything.' To Mill, 
 perhaps on account of this confession, he appeared 
 ' a well-intentioned but not a very well-instructed man.' 
 Lord Amherst's Governor-Generalship was marked 
 by the Burmese war, which, on account of its expense, 
 was unpopular with the Court of Directors, and it 
 closed with a large deficit, which was a very un- 
 pleasant fact for the Company to face at a moment 
 when it had to contemplate the reduction of its 
 resources. The absolute necessity of economy and 
 financial reform led it to think of the special care 
 Lord William Bentinck had always shown in regu- 
 lating finances, and to form the conclusion that 
 a reforming and peaceful ruler might be a more 
 useful representative under the prevailing circum- 
 stances than one of the type and temper of Wellesley 
 and Hastings. Accordingly, in the summer of 1827 the 
 Court selected Lord William Bentinck as its Governor- 
 General in succession to Lord Amherst, thus healing 
 the sense of injury in Lord William's mind in a satis- 
 factory manner.
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 FINANCIAL REFORMS AND SUPPRESSION or CRIME 
 
 ALTHOUGH appointed to the Governor- Generalship 
 in July 1 , 1827. it was exactly twelve months later 
 that Lord William Bentinck reached India. His 
 predecessor, Lord Amherst, left India early in March, 
 1828, and in the interval the functions of the head of 
 the administration were discharged by Mr. William 
 Butterworth Bayley, then the chief representative of 
 an Anglo-Indian family which has given many distin- 
 guished men to the public service. On July 4, 1828, 
 the appointment of Lord William Bentinck as Go- 
 vernor-General, and of Viscount Combermere the 
 captor of Bhartpur as Commander- in-Chief, was 
 announced in Calcutta with the accustomed ceremony 
 and salutes. The formal proceeding attached to the 
 assumption of responsibility for the government of 
 India was then of the simplest and least striking 
 character. It consisted of a notice formally recorded 
 among the minutes of Government that ' the Governor- 
 
 1 In this same month died Sir Thomas Munro, Governor of 
 Madras. Lord William Bentinck was in entire agreement with 
 him on the subject of the rayatwa'rf land-settlement, and Munro's 
 opinion on the causes of the Vellore mutiny has already been 
 quoted.
 
 56 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 General acknowledged to have received an extract 
 from a Public General Letter from the Court of 
 Directors, dated April 5, 1793, and expressed his 
 acquiescence thereto.' The proclamation of the new 
 Governor- General was followed by the arrival of the 
 customary letters of congratulation from the princes of 
 India and the neighbouring states, among whom it 
 may be stated that the King of Delhi, the Raja of 
 Nepal, and Ranjit Singh of the Punjab were pro- 
 minent. 
 
 When Lord William Bentinck reached Calcutta, 
 India was enjoying a brief interval of repose after 
 many years of internal and external warfare. But the 
 costly Burmese war had placed a severe strain on the 
 financial resources of the country, and the most press- 
 ing matter of the day was to restore an equilibrium 
 between the revenue and the expenditure. In 1828 
 the expenditure exceeded the receipts by more than- 
 a crore of rupees, or one million sterling. It was 
 essential to remove this deficit, and economy was the 
 first article in the programme of the new ruler, for, to 
 use the words of Sir Charles Metcalfe, 'the Government 
 which allows this to go on in time of peace deserves 
 any punishment.' Although the Court of Directors 
 had been very emphatic in their injunctions to Lord 
 William Bentinck to economise and to restore the 
 finances of India to a satisfactory footing, their in- 
 structions and suggestions as to how this was to be 
 done were exceedingly vague except in one particular. 
 On the subject of the reduction of Batta the Court
 
 THE BATTA QUESTION 57 
 
 gave the most positive and precise instructions, 
 although the amount to be saved was trifling and the 
 umbrage given to a large body of their servants 
 excessive. The Batta difficulty was the first with 
 which Lord William Bentinck had to deal in India, 
 and the personal odium he incurred from faithfully 
 carrying out the orders of his employers does not seem 
 to have wholly left him during the seven years he 
 served in that country. 
 
 Batta, or more correctly Bhat'ha, is a Hindi and 
 Maratha word meaning 'extra or additional pay.' 
 The Company, very soon after it commenced what 
 may be termed its political career, had granted batta 
 to its military officers. The amount varied with the 
 services rendered and the place at which the officer 
 happened to be stationed. Thus full batta was given 
 for active service within the Company's territories. It 
 was doubled during any expedition or service beyond 
 the frontier. When, however, the officer was stationed 
 during- peace at any place where quarters were pro- 
 vided for him, he only received half batta. Long 
 usage had made the officer regard this addition to his 
 pay as his inherent right, and many of the highest 
 authorities on the subject had declared that the Com- 
 pany's officers, especially those of junior rank, could 
 not possibly subsist on their ordinary pay if this 
 allowance were reduced or withdrawn. Both the 
 Marquis of Hastings and Lord Amherst had addressed 
 remonstrances to the Court of Directors when they 
 were directed to reduce the batta allowance, and
 
 58 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 their influence had been sufficient to postpone the 
 change. 
 
 At length the Court of Directors would listen to no 
 further objections, and Lord William Bentinck was 
 peremptorily ordered to carry out the reduction of 
 batta to one-half its fixed amount. He was left no 
 option in the matter, and he could only obey the 
 orders which accompanied his appointment. As Sir 
 Charles Metcalfe truly said, ' the order was one which 
 could not have been disobeyed unless we could tell the 
 Court that we are supreme and they subordinate.' In 
 November, 1828, an order was issued reducing the 
 batta allowance to one-half at Dinapur, Barrackpur, 
 Berhampur, Dum Dum, and eventually at Ghazipur, 
 which were the five principal stations of the Bengal 
 army. It may be easy to imagine, but it is certainly 
 difficult to describe, the commotion caused by this 
 order among the officers of the Company's service. 
 Indignant remonstrances were presented by all the 
 officers affected by the change, couched in language 
 that showed none of the restraint imposed by disci- 
 pline, and accusing the Government of breach of faith. 
 The Commander-in-Chief himself drew up a remon- 
 strance, and these documents were forwarded to London 
 by Lord William Bentinck, who stated in reply to the 
 memorialists that ' it would afford him sincere gratifi- 
 cation if the Court should see fit to reconsider their 
 orders.' 
 
 But the Court of Directors were prepared for' and 
 unmoved by the clamour of their military officers.
 
 THE CALCUTTA PRESS 59 
 
 The tone of the remonstrances was declared to be 
 unbecoming, and they asserted their right to reduce or 
 to increase the pay of all persons in their employ. In 
 their final reply of March, 1 830, they declared that the 
 reduction must be carried out, and that it had the 
 sanction of the Duke of Wellington and the other 
 members of the Government at home. This order was 
 published in India in September of the same year, and 
 definitely settled the question, although it could not 
 allay the irritation of which Lord William Bentinck 
 became the principal mark and victim. The saving 
 effected by this reduction was about 20,000 a year, 
 but it seems possible that the Court at one time 
 thought of abolishing batta altogether, and that the 
 opposition and agitation its first orders excited may 
 not have been barren of result in preventing the exe- 
 cution of a more sweeping measure. In one respect 
 the batta question threw light on Lord William 
 Bentinck' s character. During the whole of the con- 
 troversy from 1828 to 1830 the Calcutta Press teemed 
 with personal attacks on him, often of an abusive 
 nature, but he never thought of using the large re- 
 pressive measures in his power. It was at this time 
 that he said ' he knew of no subject which the Press 
 might not freely discuss.' When, however, the final 
 orders of the Court were to be published, he decided 
 that the season of discussion had passed away, and for 
 the first and only time l in his Indian career he issued 
 
 1 This apparent inconsistency in his Press policy is fully ex- 
 plained by Sir John Kaye in his Life of Lord Metcalfe, pp. 253-4.
 
 60 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 a minute (September 6, 1830) forbidding the Press to 
 comment upon the Court's decree on the subject of batta. 
 
 More important economies remained to be effected 
 than the clipping of military pay, and by reductions in 
 the administration of the land revenue, the Provincial 
 Courts, and the costly settlements in the Straits of 
 Malacca, he proceeded to carry out the principal 
 portion of the mission with which he had been charged, 
 and to restore an equilibrium to the finances. But 
 these measures of detail would have failed to produce 
 a result commensurate with the expectations and ne- 
 cessities of the Company, if there had not been executed 
 at the same time a great reform of principle in the 
 systematic employment of natives of India in adminis- 
 trative offices which had hitherto been reserved 
 exclusively for Englishmen. This important change, 
 which will come under consideration more appro- 
 priately at a later stage of Lord William Bentinck's 
 Indian career, was rendered imperative by the cost of 
 a purely English administration and by the inability 
 of the Indian revenue to meet it. Economy in estab- 
 lishment and efficiency in revenue-collection might 
 have provided a palliative for the evil which arose 
 from the incontestable fact that the conquests of the 
 Company after Clive, however inevitable, were for a 
 time unprofitable from a revenue standpoint. There 
 was no real cure save that applied by Lord William 
 Bentinck, and adopted by the Government and people 
 of England as a cardinal point in their Indian policy. 
 
 Among the measures taken to effect economy may
 
 ECONOMIES 6 1 
 
 be mentioned the appointment of two committees, one 
 military and one civil, to investigate the whole expen- 
 diture and to report wherever reductions could be 
 made. At the same time large reductions were ordered 
 in the military establishments of the three Presidencies. 
 The Provincial Courts of Appeal and Circuit, which 
 had become proverbial for their dilatoriness and un- 
 certainty of decision, were abolished, to the promotion 
 of justice and economy at the same time. While the 
 recommendations of the committee entrusted with the 
 supervision of the civil establishment resulted in the 
 eventual saving, after some years, of an annual sum of 
 half a million sterling, the orders of the Court for the 
 reduction of its military forces retrenched more speedily 
 the sum of one million for the Exchequer. The Go- 
 vernment very rightly looked to an increase of receipts 
 as well as to a decrease of expenses for providing the 
 way out of its difficulties. The settlement of the land 
 revenue in the North- West Provinces, effected by Mr. 
 Robert Merttins Bird, produced beneficial results, which 
 were not diminished by the establishment of a separate 
 Board of Revenue at Allahabad. This measure, from 
 which the greatest benefits ensued, and of which it 
 was said that it 'was completed upon principles 
 equally conducive to the improving resources of the 
 state and the growing prosperity and happiness of 
 the people,' was not finally carried into effect until the 
 year 1833. It proved itself to be a comprehensive and 
 successful scheme for raising an increased revenue 
 from the soil of a large division of India.
 
 62 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 In another direction Lord William Bentinck took 
 important steps of enduring consequence for increasing 
 the revenue from the much-reviled but indispensable 
 item of opium. Over the Bengal produce the East 
 India Company possessed complete control, and as 
 long as Central India was distracted by war the com- 
 petition of the opium-producing districts in that part 
 of the country was not to be feared. But the close of 
 the Maratha wars had led to a large increase in the 
 production of Malwa opium, and unless Bengal opium 
 was to be undersold by that exported from Indian 
 ports not subject to the Company, it was essential for 
 the Government to obtain some share in the profit of 
 that trade and some control over its expansion. The 
 favourite route for the export of Malwa opium was 
 through Rajputana to Karachi, whence it was sent via 
 Diu and Daman in ships flying Portuguese colours to 
 China. It was quite clear that as this opium was sold 
 at a much lower price than that from Patna, the 
 revenue of the Company would be adversely affected 
 unless some measures could be taken to divert the 
 export of Malwa opium to Bombay. 
 
 Several tentative measures had been tried, only 
 however to result in failure, before Lord William 
 Bentinck carried out a plan for licensing the direct 
 conveyance of opium from Malwa to Bombay, thus 
 avoiding the circuitous route to Karachi, and ensuring 
 to the Company some share in the profit. After 
 numerous attempts to coerce the princes and to de- 
 prive the people of their legitimate rights because they
 
 AN OPIUM ARRANGEMENT 63 
 
 encroached on a treasured preserve of the Company, 
 this arrangement put an end to the difficulty, and 
 placed the matter on the satisfactory basis on which 
 it still exists. Like the settlement of the land revenue 
 in the North-West, it deserves all the credit due to 
 a skilful and successful piece of practical administra- 
 tion. In close connexion with this opium arrange- 
 ment, and in some degree emanating from it, was the 
 institution of an inquiry into the question of in- 
 ternal transit duties, which, after Bentinck left India, 
 resulted in the abolition of those fetters on the com- 
 mercial development of the country. The economies 
 described, and the increased revenue raised, resulted, 
 before the departure of Lord William Bentinck, in 
 converting what had been a deficit of one million 
 into a surplus of two millions. 
 
 The measures taken to effect administrative reforms 
 and to introduce native agency into the dispensation 
 of justice claim passing notice, although it is right 
 to state that the proposals upon which the Govern- 
 ment eventually took action were made and approved 
 before Lord William Bentinck arrived in India. The 
 Provincial Courts, saddled with an excess of duties, 
 had proved unable to get through the work entrusted to 
 them. Arrears accumulated, accused persons, whether 
 innocent or not, were detained in prison for an un- 
 necessary period, and the assessment of land could 
 only be fixed after long and tedious delays. W T ith a 
 view to remedying this state of things, magistrates and 
 collectors were placed under the supervision of Com-
 
 64 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 missioners of Revenue and Circuit, who were to make 
 frequent tours within their jurisdiction, and to be 
 in constant touch with the people. Experience 
 showed the wisdom of depriving them of some of 
 their judicial functions, and this led to the increasing 
 importance of the judges in the country, of whom, by 
 a change in the system of appointment, many were 
 to be natives. Lord Cornwallis in his settlement of 
 Bengal had given to Europeans, with insignificant 
 exceptions, the control over the civil and criminal 
 jurisdiction, but it soon became evident that a suffi- 
 cient staff could not be maintained to deal efficiently 
 with the work to be done. Hence the deadlock arose 
 that has been described. The only remedy for the 
 evil was the employment of natives, and after some 
 years' delay in taking what was the very natural 
 course of trying ordinary native offenders by a 
 native tribunal, native magistrates were nominated 
 and permitted to deal with the majority of those 
 who broke the law. In 1827 'nearly nineteen- 
 twentieth s of the original suits instituted in the civil 
 courts throughout the country were already deter- 
 mined by native judicial officers.' On the eve also 
 of Lord William Bentinck's arrival in India a new 
 and higher grade of native judges, with the style of 
 Sadr Amins, was created, qualified to hear appeals 
 from the ordinary Amins. This step was followed 
 up by the establishment of a Court of Sadr Diwani 
 and Nizamat Adalat at Allahabad, with authority to 
 hear appeals that before its creation would have
 
 CHARLES METCALFE 65 
 
 had to be sent to Calcutta. Although not primarily 
 responsible for these measures, Lord William Bentinck 
 cordially approved of them, and supported every 
 project to give increased dignity and confidence to 
 the native judges. In this manner was the co- 
 operation of the natives of India secured in the 
 department of government wherein it would produce 
 the most advantageous consequences, and be attended 
 with the fewest drawbacks. The employment of 
 natives of India in trying their fellow-countrymen, 
 with whose ways and feelings they were thoroughly 
 familiar, was open to no possible objection, and con- 
 duced at the same time to both economy and despatch 
 in the disposal of business. 
 
 It will be appropriate at this stage to refer to 
 the intimate relations which subsisted between Lord 
 William Bentinck and Sir Charles (afterwards Lord) 
 Metcalfe, a man who took a prominent part in the 
 reforms described and those to follow, and who 
 carried out several of the schemes left over for final 
 execution when Lord William Bentinck quitted India 
 in 1835. In the great work of entrusting larger 
 executive and judicial powers to the natives Sir 
 Charles Metcalfe might claim as prominent a place as 
 his chief, and it was he who first defined in the fol- 
 lowing passages the best organisation for the joint 
 European and Native administration of India: 
 
 ' The best form of government with a view to the welfare 
 of the natives of India in their present state I believe to 
 be that which is most simple and most free from artificial 
 
 E
 
 66 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 institutions. The best form of government with a view to 
 the maintenance of British dominion in India I believe to be 
 that which is most conducive to a union of powers and most 
 free from the elements of collision and counteraction.' 
 
 His plan of government was 
 
 ' Native functionaries in the first instance in all depart- 
 ments. European superintendents, uniting the local powers 
 of judicature, police and revenue, in all their branches through 
 the districts over which they preside. Commissioners over 
 them, and a Board over the Commissioners communicating 
 with and subject to the immediate control of the Govern- 
 ment.' 
 
 The relations of these two men with each other did 
 not at first promise to attain the cordiality that they 
 eventually acquired. The entries in his diary show 
 that Sir Charles Metcalfe was favourably impressed 
 with the new ruler of India from the first, but they 
 also bear testimony to the fact that to all appearance 
 Lord William Bentinck did not reciprocate the feeling. 
 Three weeks after the Governor-General reached Cal- 
 cutta Metcalfe wrote, ' I like the little that I have seen 
 of our new Governor-General very much he is a 
 straightforward, honest, upright, benevolent, sensible 
 man ; ' and again he wrote a few days later, he is ' a 
 very benevolent, unaffected, open, candid, kind man 
 whom every one I conceive must like.' But while 
 thus cordially recognising his merits he also notes, 
 with a tone of regret, the absence of all response. 
 ' He and I do not approximate, which is rather sur- 
 prising to me, for many of our sentiments are in
 
 LORD ELLENBOROUGH' S DESPATCH 67 
 
 common with both of us.' The removal of this 
 coolness was due, strangely enough, to the stimulating 
 effect of a despatch from Lord Ellenborough, the Presi- 
 dent of the Board of Control, on the subject of our 
 policy in India, which certainly entitles that often- 
 abused Governor-General to some share in the credit 
 of the reformed administration with which the name 
 of Lord William Bentinck is specially associated. In 
 that despatch it is stated that 
 
 ' We have a great moral duty to perform to the people of 
 India. We must, if possible, give them a good and permanent 
 government. In doing this we confer a greater benefit upon 
 the people of this country than in sacrificing the interests of 
 India to the apparent present interests of England. The 
 real interests of both countries are the same. The con- 
 vulsion which would dissolve their connexion would entail 
 much loss on us and bring desolation upon India.' 
 
 On receiving this despatch Lord William Bentinck 
 at once wrote to Sir Charles Metcalfe in the following 
 terms, and thus began that personal friendship and 
 close political co-operation which continued during 
 the remainder of their public careers : 
 
 ' Anxious as I must be to answer to this call, but sensible 
 at the same time of my own incompetency to the task, I can 
 only obtain the information Lord Ellenborough wants by a 
 recourse to greater experience and knowledge. In this 
 difficulty I confidently apply to you for that assistance 
 which no man in India is better able to afford.' 
 
 From that time forward Sir Charles Metcalfe, who 
 succeeded Mr. Butterworth Bay ley in November, 1829, 
 
 E 2
 
 68 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 as Deputy- Governor and Vice-President of the Council 
 the highest office in the service after the Governor- 
 Generalship was closely associated with Lord William 
 Bentinck in all the acts of administration. His advice 
 was on every occasion respectfully sought, and when 
 Lord William Bentinck laid down in 1 835 the functions 
 of supreme authority, he accorded to this colleague a 
 most generous recognition. At the Calcutta dinner 
 on the eve of his departure he said that he had ' never 
 met with the individual whose integrity, liberality of 
 sentiment, and delicacy of mind excited in a greater 
 degree his respect and admiration.' 
 
 One of the first and not the least important ad- 
 ministrative measures carried out by Lord William 
 Bentinck was the strenuous and systematic effort 
 to suppress the Thags in their practice of murder for 
 the purposes of robbery. The complete success which 
 crowned the steps taken for this purpose in the first 
 year of his administration, and which were maintained 
 with equal energy and vigilance during its whole 
 course, render the suppression of thagi one of the 
 most notable achievements of the Governor-General- 
 ship of Lord William Bentinck. 
 
 The story of the proceedings taken against the 
 Thags is told in the fullest official detail in five 
 volumes of manuscript records preserved in the India 
 Office. Therein will be found not merely particulars 
 of the capture of the different gangs, exact reports of 
 the trials and sentences, and precise returns of the 
 expenditure entailed, but also genealogical tables of
 
 THE THAGS 69 
 
 the principal Thags, showing that their nefarious 
 trade had become a family profession and secret. 
 
 Thag is the Hindustani for ' cheat,' and the name 
 strictly translated gives no indication of their mode 
 of perpetrating the dreadful crime that rendered them 
 the terror of the Indian traveller. The less usual 
 but more correct name of phansi-gar gives a clearer 
 insight into their practices, for phansa means noose, 
 the fatal rope or scarf with which they strangled 
 their unsuspecting and defenceless victims. The 
 phansa plays a prominent part in the Hindu my- 
 thology and is assigned to several gods and goddesses 
 as their favourite weapon. The exact date at which 
 highway robbers adopted it for the purposes of their 
 vocation is uncertain or unknown, but the French 
 traveller Ta vernier, in the middle of the seventeenth 
 century, mentions the stranglers of the highway as one 
 of the dangers of travel in the dominions of the Great 
 Mogul. The troubles of the eighteenth century, when 
 the destinies of India hung at the mercy of military 
 adventurers and lawless hordes of plunderers, added 
 undoubtedly to their numbers, and the whole of Central 
 India from Haidarabad to Oudh, and Bundelkhand to 
 Rajputana, provided a vast and profitable field for 
 the display of their skill as secret murderers. 
 
 Their mode of proceeding may be thus briefly de- 
 scribed. Having performed certain propitiatory rites 
 of a quasi-religious character, and obtained some 
 favourable prognostications as to the result of their 
 enterprise for the fatalism which characterised their
 
 70 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 religious belief and gave fortitude to their proceedings 
 was largely tinged with superstition they set out 
 along one of the main roads frequented by merchants 
 and other travellers. To all appearance they were 
 a party of unarmed and harmless men, either pursuing 
 their business as traders or returning to their native 
 village from a pilgrimage. In those days of open 
 highway robbery travellers were only too glad to 
 meet with companions, and the Thags never ex- 
 perienced any difficulty in picking up one, or more 
 than one, unsuspecting wayfarer en route. There was 
 nothing in their demeanour or conduct to excite 
 suspicion. At the well or the caravanserai they 
 seemed like the most inoffensive of travellers, and the 
 only ground for suspicion was that which least arouses 
 it, a special cheerfulness of manner and a conciliatory 
 attitude towards all strangers. Having once selected 
 the victim their patience in waiting for the most 
 favourable moment to strike the blow was remark- 
 able, and constituted the main secret of their power 
 and protracted impunity. Sometimes they would 
 deem it expedient to strike at once, but more often 
 they would perform a journey of days and weeks 
 together with their intended victim before they would 
 deliver the fatal blow. But in nearly all cases it was 
 done at a moment when the victim would be least 
 prepared and most off his guard either engaged in 
 his prayers or at ablutions and the noose was always 
 used with such deadly precision that the murdered 
 person never had a chance of raising an alarm. The
 
 THE THAG ORGANISATION 71 
 
 larger proportion of victims were single individuals, 
 but if the gang was sufficiently numerous, and some- 
 times the Thags travelled in bands of sixty or seventy, 
 they would not be afraid to entice a considerable 
 body of travellers and to murder as many as a dozen 
 at a single massacre. In all cases they resorted 
 to every precaution to prevent surprise from inter- 
 ruption, and with such success that no instance of 
 failure is recorded. 
 
 The younger members of the family or band served 
 their apprenticeship as scouts, and it was only after 
 many years of experience in this innocent capacity 
 that they were allowed to so much as witness the 
 perpetration of the crime, while the act of throwing 
 the scarf was always entrusted to the most expert 
 and experienced Thag. Their skill in effecting the 
 murder of their victims was matched by the secrecy 
 with which they disposed of their remains, and some- 
 times the most conclusive evidence against a captured 
 Thag was the discovery of the skeletons of the 
 murdered in an unlikely spot, revealed by the con- 
 fession of a confederate. The strictness of the dis- 
 cipline was softened by the ties of family, and the 
 secrets of the brotherhood were preserved by the in- 
 vocation of religion as much as by the terror of the 
 severe punishment meted out to treachery. 
 
 The disturbed condition of India during the whole 
 of the eighteenth century added largely, as has been 
 said, to the number of the Thags, whose reputation 
 was greatly enhanced in the popular mind by the
 
 72 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 practical impunity with which their operations were 
 carried on. If their own account of themselves might 
 be accepted, they originally formed a special colony 
 divided into seven tribes and located near Delhi. In 
 those days they were said to be all Muhammadans, 
 but the beliefs and regulations of the caste were 
 essentially Hindu of a corrupt kind, and when the 
 Thags were brought before British Courts of Justice 
 the majority were found to be of Hindu race. It is 
 probable from this statement that they were at first 
 a local pest in the neighbourhood of the Mughal 
 capital, where their enormities soon attracted notice. 
 The Muhammadan Emperors were strong enough to 
 banish the offenders to a distance from their capital, 
 but not to break up their organisation. They left 
 Delhi, and scattering themselves throughout Central 
 India and the Deccan found a more profitable arena 
 for their exploits. 
 
 They were commencing the career of extended mis- 
 chief which made them known throughout India 
 when the French traveller, Ta vernier, noted their 
 depredations as one of the gravest perils to the 
 traveller in the peninsula. They flourished during 
 the whole of the eighteenth century on the troubles 
 of India, and in the absence of any central power or 
 authority to call them to account. The officials of 
 many of the smaller states, finding themselves unable 
 to cope with the malefactors, made common cause 
 with them, and for a share in the profits accorded 
 them the protection that was provided by their own
 
 PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THAGS 73 
 
 inertness and indifference. Their numbers and their 
 success steadily increased, until at the end of the 
 last century they were brought into contact with 
 our power. The annexations of Mysore and Chitor 
 were followed by the dispersion of some of the most 
 formidable bands, and the majority of the survivors 
 withdrew into the native states of Malwa and Rajpu- 
 tana, where for another thirty years they enjoyed 
 security and immunity from official pursuit. In the 
 time of both Lord Hastings and Lord Amherst several 
 bands were discovered and broken up, but such was 
 the feeling of toleration or fear with which they were 
 regarded by the native courts and officials, that the 
 conviction of the prisoners was by no means the 
 certain consequence of their capture, and it is cor- 
 rect to say that when Lord William Bentinck took 
 up the matter nothing had been done to break 
 up the Thags as an organisation hostile to the com- 
 munity. 
 
 In 1829 special orders and fuller powers were 
 given to Mr. F. C. Smith, Agent to the Governor- 
 General in the Narbada Territories a division cor- 
 responding to the present Central India Agency and 
 Central Provinces combined to proceed against all 
 Thags, and to put down their associations with the 
 strong hand. Major Sleeman, whose name will always 
 be honourably coupled with the disappearance of 
 this crime in India, was given a special appointment 
 as his coadjutor and assistant. Other officers were at 
 a later period entrusted with a similar task, when it
 
 74 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 was found by practical experience that the Thags 
 embraced too wide an area to be deaH with by a 
 single officer or a local department, and among them 
 it is only just that the names of Major (afterwards 
 Sir John) Low in Oudh, of Mr. Wilson in Bundel- 
 khand, and of Colonel Stewart in Haidarabad, should 
 be mentioned as among the most energetic and 
 successful. 
 
 The active operations of the Thag department 
 covered a period of six years, and during that time 
 two thousand Thags were arrested. Of these fifteen 
 hundred were sentenced either to death or to different 
 periods of transportation. Although there had been 
 no attempt on the part of the native governments to 
 proceed against the malefactors, it was gratifying to 
 find that once the British Government took up the 
 matter the darbars of the principal States, such as 
 Haidarabad, Oudh, and Gwalior, hastened to lend their 
 hearty and useful co-operation. This was the more 
 satisfactory and necessary, inasmuch as the head- 
 quarters of some of the largest gangs were to be found 
 within the Native States. The readiness of the Native 
 Governments to associate themselves with us in a 
 work that was not merely beneficial to the com- 
 munity, but which might be termed essential from the 
 point of view of humanity, was not, however, imitated 
 by the Native Courts, where the judges showed a 
 tendency to deal too lightly with captured Thags, 
 and availing themselves of any deficiency in the evi- 
 dence as to murder to evade the infliction of capital
 
 THE THAG COMMISSION 75 
 
 sentences. The possibility of administrative energy 
 being neutralised by judicial timidity was averted by 
 plenary judicial powers being conferred on Mr. Smith, 
 and the sentences passed on convicted Thags were 
 thenceforward in just proportion to the enormity of 
 the crime. 
 
 The final result of these sustained and systematic 
 efforts to suppress the crime was that all the principal 
 bands were broken up, that the reputation of the 
 Thags was destroyed, and that the most formidable 
 murder association which India had ever known 
 passed out of existence. More than fifty years have 
 elapsed since the labours of the Commission presided 
 over by Mr. Smith and Major Sleeman were brought 
 to an end, and, although there have been isolated 
 cases, there has been no attempt to revive the old 
 organisation. 
 
 The family secrets and ties which constituted the 
 strength of the fraternity have died out or been dis- 
 solved by the lapse of time, and it may be doubted 
 whether the crime in its old form could be revived, 
 even were India to pass through another of those 
 troubled periods which formed so large a part of her 
 history, and from which she seems now happily to 
 be rescued. Strictly speaking, the suppression of the 
 Thags was due to the active and energetic measures 
 of the Indian administration rather than to the policy 
 of Lord William Bentinck, but he vigorously sup- 
 ported the measures taken against them, and urged 
 on his lieutenants to make a speedy end of these
 
 j6 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 enemies of the public peace. It must also be noted 
 to his credit that when he took up the reins of office 
 the Thags were more formidable than they had ever 
 been before, and that when he left India they were 
 shattered and practically annihilated.
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 THE ABOLITION OF WTDOW-BUBNING 
 
 A MEMORABLE act of Lord William Bentinck's 
 government, and the one with which his name will 
 be most prominently associated in history, was the 
 abolition of Widow-burning. It is permissible to 
 think that the educational and administrative reforms 
 which he introduced were of more permanent im- 
 portance and exercised a wider influence upon our 
 position in India ; but the abolition by a short 
 resolution of a practice sanctioned by religion and 
 the usage of centuries was more calculated to arrest 
 public attention and to obtain general applause than 
 measures passed from time to time at the Council- 
 board, of which the full effect could only become 
 apparent after the lapse of years. The abolition of 
 sati resembled the suppression of thagi in this respect, 
 that it was also an act of humanity; but whereas 
 the community generally regarded the Thags as 
 murderers and robbers, those who performed the sail 
 were held up as model wives, and as paragons of 
 virtue. With the full acquiescence of the people the
 
 78 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 Thags were destroyed, but it was in opposition to the 
 people and with the support of very few Hindu 
 reformers that sati was abolished through our over- 
 whelming sense of an obligation to humanity. Of 
 that sentiment Lord William Bentinck made himself 
 the exponent and executor. 
 
 The practice of sati 1 from our first appearance 
 on the Ganges, the part of India in which it was most 
 in vogue,' had attracted the attention and roused the 
 disapprobation of our officers. Repugnant as the act 
 of self-immolation was to our ideas, it was rendered 
 worse by the knowledge that the sacrifice was in many 
 cases not voluntary, and that the victim was only 
 rendered capable of playing her part by the use of 
 drugs. But in those days there was a wide gulf 
 between disapprobation and active legislative re- 
 pression. It was the firmest article in the faith 
 of the East India Company that all the customs of 
 the natives should be scrupulously respected, and that 
 nothing should be done to give umbrage to their 
 religious prejudices. The policy thus defined was 
 unquestionably the wisest and the best, and it has 
 been consistently adhered to during the whole of our 
 rule in India. The only departures made from it have 
 been taken under some paramount sense that an 
 
 1 ' The term suttee or sati is strictly applicable to the person, not 
 the rite ; meaning " a pure and virtuous woman," and designates 
 the wife who completes a life of uninterrupted conjugal devotedness 
 by the act of Saha-gamana, accompanying her husband's corpse. 
 It has come in common usage to denote the act.' Wilson, British 
 India, vol. ix. p. 185.
 
 SAT I 79 
 
 outrage not sanctioned by God, and disapproved of 
 by the higher conscience of the Indians themselves, 
 was being perpetrated, shocking to the human mind, 
 and amounting to a scandal on our administration. 
 Such a departure has to be recorded in the measures 
 taken against sati by Lord William Bentinck, for 
 reasons given in the masterly minute which concludes 
 this chapter, and which has never before been printed. 
 The practice of sati had been in force for so 
 many centuries that it was an archaic and useless 
 question for the English administrator to inquire 
 whether it was really in accordance or not with the 
 injunctions of the early Hindu religion. As we always 
 abstained from playing the part of religious in- 
 structors to the people, it mattered little to us 
 whether Widow-burning was part of the original 
 faith of the Hindus, or an innovation and abuse 
 grafted on it by male legislators in a society which 
 ranked female life at a low value, and thought only 
 of enhancing the pride and dignity of the husband. 
 The practice had the sanction of antiquity and the 
 approbation of the Hindu people. It formed an 
 essential feature in their daily religious life, and it 
 would have been absurd for us to interfere with it 
 on the ground that we knew the Hindu religion 
 better than its own priests and followers. Such an 
 argument might be urged by native reformers, like 
 Dwarakanath Tagore and Rammohun Roy, who, 
 moved by their spirit of humanity to detestation of 
 a senseless and brutal sacrifice, strove to convince
 
 8o LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 their countrymen that sati was not enjoined by the 
 code of Manu, and that it was even opposed to the 
 gentle and benign nature of their original faith. 
 
 Our intervention could only be based on the ground 
 of administrative necessity, and on the duty to put 
 down what Hindus might call a sacrifice, but what 
 the rest of the civilised world was agreed in de- 
 nouncing as a crime. The presence of the native 
 reformers named, and the expression, however slow 
 and slight, of what might be called a more educated 
 and higher native opinion under their auspices, 
 supplied an argument in favour of the abolition of 
 sail by suggesting that after all native opinion 
 was not unanimous on the subject, and that the 
 sentiment of the most enlightened Hindus vindicated 
 in anticipation the action of the British Government. 
 But there can be no doubt that even if there had 
 been no native reformers, and no intelligent native 
 opinion, the action of the British Government would 
 not have been deferred. The knell of sati had struck 
 when Lord William. Bentinck reached India. 
 
 Expediency and the reluctance to increase the 
 difficulties with which we had always to cope, by 
 stirring up any popular fermentation, caused the post- 
 ponement of decisive action, but from our earliest 
 appearance in Bengal, our disapprobation of the rite 
 was unqualified. In the time of the Marquis Corn- 
 wallis, British officers, although prohibited from 
 preventing the rite, were specially ordered on all 
 occasions to withhold their consent to its performance
 
 INCREASE OF THE PRACTICE 8 1 
 
 whenever their acquiescence might be invited. They 
 were to show by their attitude that although the 
 British Government did not interfere to stop the sacri- 
 fice, they regarded it with emphatic and unequivocal 
 disapproval. The Marquis Wellesley, notwithstanding 
 the disturbed and hostile condition of India in his 
 time, wished to take steps for its summary suppression 
 without passing any measure of the legislature, but 
 simply by treating every participator as an ordinary 
 offender. With this view he submitted the question 
 to the Nizamat Adalat, but the judges did not fall 
 in with his views, more however on the ground 
 of expediency than of abstract right. Their view 
 was that the abolition of sati might be effected 
 gradually and within a reasonable period, and they 
 made certain suggestions with this object. While 
 respecting the rite as a religious observance, they 
 proposed several enactments calculated to remove the 
 abuses which had grown up around the original office. 
 They would, for instance, have made it a penal offence 
 to drug an intending sati, or to take any part in 
 forcing an unwilling woman to the funeral pyre, and 
 they no doubt anticipated the custom dying a natural 
 death from the absence of voluntary self-immolators. 
 But their suggestions were not incorporated in any 
 legislative measure, and encouraged by the inertness 
 of the British Government, or by its inability to 
 devise a remedy, the practice increased rather than 
 diminished in the valley of the Ganges. 
 
 But the increased prevalence of the practice stirred 
 F
 
 8a LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 the executive into action, and one of the last steps 
 taken by Lord Minto before his departure in 1813 was 
 to incorporate the suggestions made by the Nizamat 
 Adalat eight years before into the form of circular 
 instructions to all the judicial authorities. These 
 ordered the Eritish officials to abandon their former 
 attitude of indifference and rigid abstention from 
 interference. Instead of withholding their consent, 
 their consent was made essential to the performance 
 of the rite. Information of an intended sati had 
 to be given to the nearest magistrate, or failing a 
 magistrate, police officer, and it was their first duty 
 to ascertain whether the widow went to her fate of 
 her own free will, or under any form of compulsion. 
 Other precautions were taken to ensure that the act 
 should be one rather of folly than brutality. No 
 widow was to be immolated who was less than sixteen 
 or who happened to be pregnant ; the use of drugs 
 was strictly prohibited ; and the police were always 
 to be present at the sacrifice, not merely to ensure 
 order, but also to afford the victim the opportunity 
 up to the very last of changing her mind and saving 
 her life. 
 
 However well intentioned these instructions were, 
 they proved in fact quite inadequate to attain their 
 end. The practice of saii continued with unabated 
 vigour, and the attendant abuses, far from disappear- 
 ing, were as rife as before they were issued. The 
 police were often sympathetic to the promoters 
 of the sacrifice, and native ingenuity easily baffled
 
 OPINION OF MARQUIS OF HASTINGS 83 
 
 official inquiry as to age, condition, and the use of 
 intoxicants. The number of satis steadily increased 
 after this change of policy, and the number of widows 
 immolated in a single year in the Lower Provinces 
 alone sometimes exceeded 800, while the average 
 for the ten years prior to 1828 did not fall below 
 600. According to some authorities the stipulation 
 that the consent of the British representative was 
 essential to the performance of the sacrifice strength- 
 ened the hold that the practice had acquired on the 
 Hindu mind, for the report was spread by the priests 
 and easily accepted by the populace that the Govern- 
 ment had made itself a party to the ceremony. Ac- 
 cording to others the increased number of satis was 
 only a matter of more accurate returns owing to 
 the police supervision, or perhaps the result of a 
 greater mortality during the years named. However 
 that may be, the interference (partial and one-sided 
 as it may be termed) of the executive brought to 
 light the fact that the practice of sati was as 
 extensive as report alleged, and that many hundreds 
 of innocent lives were sacrificed brutally and without 
 cause every year. That the attention of the Govern- 
 ment was directed to these facts, and that the need of 
 repressive measures was becoming evident at Calcutta 
 before Lord William Bentinck arrived in India, is 
 clearly shown by the important expression 6f opinion 
 from the Marquis of Hastings quoted in the Minute 
 already referred to. The Marquis of Hastings wrote 
 in reply to Lord William Bentinck's enquiry : 
 
 F 2
 
 84 LORD WILLIAM BENT1NCK 
 
 ' The subject which you wish to discuss is one which must 
 interest one's feelings most deeply, but it is also one of 
 extreme nicety when I mention that in one of the years 
 during my administration of government in India above 
 800 widows sacrificed themselves within the Provinces com- 
 prised in the Presidency of Bengal, to which number I very 
 much suspect that very many not notified to the magistrates 
 should be added. I will hope to have credit for being acutely 
 sensible to such an outrage against humanity. At the same 
 time I was aware how much danger might attend the en- 
 deavouring to suppress forcibly a practice so rooted in the 
 religious belief of the natives. No men of low caste are 
 admitted into the ranks of the Bengal army. Therefore the 
 whole of that formidable body must be regarded as blindly 
 partial to a custom which they consider equally referrible 
 to family honour and to points of faith. To attempt the 
 extinction of the horrid superstition without being supported 
 in the procedure by a real concurrence on the part of the 
 army would be distinctly perilous. I have no scruple to say 
 that I did believe I could have carried with me the assent 
 of the army towards such an object. That persuasion, 
 however, arose from circumstances which gave me peculiar 
 influence over the Native Troops.' 
 
 Lord Hastings expressed in this letter very clearly 
 the prevalent dread that the most serious objection 
 to the suppression of sati was the disturbing effect 
 it might produce on the discipline and allegiance of 
 the Bengal native army, at the same time that he 
 affirmed his own belief that he personally could have 
 influenced the sepoy so far as to induce him to remain 
 passive while he carried out this great reform. His 
 successor, Lord Amherst, shared the same opinion,
 
 OFFICIAL VIEWS OF SATI 85 
 
 while he had no similar confidence in his hold upon 
 the affection of the native troops ; and his views were 
 summed up in the following passage, taken from a 
 letter to the Court : 
 
 ' Nothing but apprehension of evils infinitely greater than 
 those arising from the existence of the practice should induce 
 us to tolerate it for a single day.' 
 
 Before Lord William Bentinck arrived in India 
 there had therefore been from the highest British 
 authorities in that country several expressions of 
 opinion that the practice of mti was an act of 
 inhumanity, and that it ought to be abolished. At 
 the same time they confessed that the danger of 
 arousing native distrust and hostility by an act inter- 
 fering with this religious custom was exceedingly 
 great, and they shrank from making the experiment. 
 They would not have hesitated to face the opposition 
 if it were not coupled, as they feared it would be, 
 with the insubordination of the native army. The 
 effect it would be likely to produce on the Bengal 
 troops was the chief deterrent to passing a necessary 
 reform in the minds of Lord William Bentinck's 
 predecessors, who were as sensible as he was of the 
 inhumanity of sati. 
 
 Such was the position of the question when Lord 
 William Bentinck assumed the reins of office. The 
 weight of experience was against stirring up unneces- 
 sary agitation and danger by grappling with it. The 
 instructions of the Court of Directors, if they did not
 
 86 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 fetter the action of their delegate, at least inculcated 
 the need of caution. The personal experience of Lord 
 William Bentinck, as he somewhat bitterly reminds 
 the reader of his minute in connexion with the 
 Vellore mutiny, was opposed to any hazardous legis- 
 lation. There was no incumbent duty for him to 
 deal with the question at all. He might have passed 
 it on to his successor in the same manner as his pre- 
 decessors had passed it on to him. He might have 
 accepted the dictum of the Marquis of Hastings that 
 it required great personal influence with and a certain 
 ascendency over the native troops to carry such a 
 measure successfully, and he could have truthfully 
 declared that he did not possess the influence of the 
 conqueror of the Marathas and the pacificator of 
 Central India. Or he might have based his refusal 
 to act in the matter on Lord Amherst's not unreason- 
 able ' apprehension of evils infinitely greater than 
 those arising from the existence of the practice.' But 
 he at once, and without hesitation, came to the con- 
 clusion that he could not remain indifferent to this 
 crime and abstain from action against it without 
 himself being guilty of ' the crime of multiplied 
 murder.' 
 
 The vague apprehension of popular discontent and 
 opposition resolved itself, as has been said, into the 
 very definite and precise fear that the Bengal army 
 would revolt as the direct consequence of any measure 
 passed for the abolition of sail. The essential pre- 
 liminary to any safe legislation was to ascertain the
 
 THE BENGAL ARMY 87 
 
 true feelings of that army, and it was in this direction 
 that Lord William Eentinck first took action by 
 addressing a confidential letter to ' forty-nine officers 
 pointed out to me by the Secretary to Government 
 in the Military Department, as being from their judg- 
 ment and experience the best enabled to appreciate 
 the effect of the proposed measure upon the native 
 army.' The replies of these officers were received 
 with the following results: five were opposed to all 
 interference whatever with the practice, twelve were 
 favourable to abolition but averse to absolute and 
 direct prohibition under the authority of the Govern- 
 ment, eight supported abolition by the indirect inter- 
 ference of magistrates and other public officers, while 
 the remaining twenty-four advocated the total, imme- 
 diate, and public suppression of the practice. But 
 the most important and unanimous portion of the 
 evidence furnished from these specially qualified 
 witnesses was that affirming that the sepoy was far 
 less interested than had been supposed in the practice 
 of sati. The best information went to prove that 
 it was almost unknown in the ranks of the Bengal 
 army, and that any interest the sepoy felt in the 
 matter must be indirect and probably remote. The 
 chief peril attendant on the abolition of sati was 
 dispelled when it became realised that it would not 
 affect the favoured sepoy of the Bengal army in any 
 of his practices or privileges. It is true that there 
 was the more remote and contingent danger of irri- 
 tating the high caste race from which that army was
 
 88 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 recruited ; but this might reasonably be hoped to 
 disappear by other means and by the natural effluxion 
 of time. The main objection to legislative action, the 
 risk upon which the Marquis of Hastings and others 
 had laid such stress, was thus found to be not appli- 
 cable in fact, and rather a figment of the imagination 
 than a substantial reality. 
 
 Of the danger from any ebullition of popular 
 antipathy in the Lower Provinces, where the practice 
 of sati was most in vogue, Lord William Bentinck 
 thought and wrote with accurate knowledge and 
 proper scorn. 
 
 The people who were the chief upholders of sati 
 were unwarlike and accustomed to submit without 
 opposition to authority. Even had the abolition of 
 sati been an unjust and unnecessary act, it would 
 not have provoked any rebellious spirit among the 
 races most devoted to the practice. But it was by 
 the admission of every one an act called for in the 
 interests of humanity, and only set on one side tem- 
 porarily by responsible statesmen because of the 
 perils it might entail to the British Government in 
 India. The preliminary investigation set on foot by 
 Lord William Bentinck showed that those perils 
 had either been much exaggerated or were totally 
 non-existent, and with the proof of their unreality 
 disappeared the last objection to the required 
 reform. 
 
 While the commission of officers referred to were 
 diligently collecting information as to the opinion and
 
 THE OPINION OF THE JUDGES 89 
 
 feeling prevalent in the ranks of the native army, and 
 recording their advice individually as to the mode of 
 dealing with the practice, the hands of Lord William 
 Bentinck were much strengthened by the support of 
 the Nizamat Adalat, the Judges of which Court were 
 well aware of the uselessness of the tentative measures 
 taken to remove some of the most objectionable and 
 repulsive features of sati In 1828, before the 
 military officers had begun their work, the Report of 
 the Nizamat Adalat placed on record the strong 
 expression of the opinion of four out of its five 
 Judges that the immediate abolition of the practice of 
 sati was desirable, and that in their opinion it might 
 be accomplished with safety. Twelve months later 
 the fifth Judge came to the same conclusion, and the 
 Report of the Court for 1829 was unanimous to the 
 effect that sati could and should be permanently 
 abolished. 
 
 The expression of such a strong and emphatic opinion 
 in favour of the reform from the highest judicial 
 tribunal in the land could not be ignored, and came 
 as a welcome support to a Governor-General who was 
 most anxious to settle the question in accordance 
 with the dictates of humanity, if also in harmony 
 with the requirements of safe government. Nor did 
 the Judges stand alone* in their expression of confi- 
 dence as to the safety with which the abolition might 
 be effected. What they said was fully borne out by 
 the most experienced police authorities. The Super- 
 intendents of Police in both the Upper and Lower
 
 90 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 Provinces stated in the strongest terms their opinion 
 that the suppression of sati might be ordered without 
 the least danger. Lord William Bentinck asserts 
 that nine-tenths of the public functionaries in the 
 interior were in favour of abolition. When these 
 opinions were added to those recorded by the forty- 
 nine officers to whom the Governor-General wrote, 
 there resulted a general agreement on the part of the 
 persons best qualified to speak that the abolition 
 of sati was desirable on every ground, and that it 
 might be so enacted without the risk of any popular 
 disturbance or military discontent. It enabled Lord 
 William Bentinck to express the hope to his Council 
 that 'they will partake in the perfect confidence 
 which it has given me of the expediency and safety of 
 the abolition.' 
 
 The discussion of the matter in Council did not take 
 long, and one month after Lord William Bentinck s 
 Minute there appeared in the Calcutta Government 
 Gazette. of December 7, 1829, the Regulation, known 
 as No. XVII, and dated December 4, 1829, 'declaring 
 the practice of sati, or of burning or burying alive 
 the widows of Hindus, illegal and punishable by the 
 Criminal Courts.' The Regulation went on to state 
 that -the practice of sati is 'revolting to the feelings 
 of human nature,' and ' nowhere enjoined by the 
 religion of the people as an imperative duty.' It 
 then summarises the previous efforts to deal with the 
 evil, all of which had been barren of result, until at 
 last the Government had been forced to come to the
 
 SAT/ MADE A CRIME 91 
 
 conclusion that there was no remedy left ' without 
 abolishing the practice altogether.' This course was 
 demanded by the ' paramount dictates of justice and 
 humanity.' 
 
 Having decreed the abolition of sati, the practice 
 of that rite was made a crime of culpable homicide, 
 punishable with fine or imprisonment, or with both. 
 The Court was not to be precluded from passing even 
 a sentence of death, and, lastly, all persons were called 
 upon under heavy penalties to give the authorities 
 immediate information of any cases coming within 
 their knowledge. The Regulation referred in the 
 first place to the Presidency of Bengal alone, but in 
 1830 it was extended in different forms, rendered 
 necessary by local requirements, to Madras and 
 Bombay. 
 
 The result of the abolition of sati fully bore out 
 the predictions made as to the degree of safety with 
 which it could be accomplished. No public disorder 
 followed the enactment. If there was any dissatis- 
 faction it was carefully suppressed. The few dis- 
 turbances caused by excited Bengalis were too 
 insignificant to attract comment, and the only serious 
 incident happened some years afterwards in a state 
 in Central India, when on the death of the Raja 
 five of his wives were forcibly burned. If the Ben- 
 galis did not attempt anything so foreign to their 
 nature as violent resistance, they endeavoured to 
 fight the matter in the Courts, and a test case was 
 submitted by them to the Privy Council in London.
 
 92 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 Petitions to the King were drawn up, declaring that 
 the abolition of sati was an infraction of the rights 
 of the peoples of India, which we had bound ourselves 
 to respect. But the weight of these was weakened by 
 counter-petitions signed by eminent leaders of native 
 opinion like Dwarakanath Tagore and Rainmohun 
 Roy, declaring that the resolution of Government was 
 in harmony with their opinion and with the best 
 interpretation of the Hindu religion. 
 
 When the case came before the Privy Council it 
 was regarded and considered purely in its judicial 
 aspect. The rival representatives of Hindu opinion 
 neutralised each other, and although a feeling of 
 reluctance to interfere in any shape or form with 
 what might be considered a religious rite was very 
 prevalent, the decision arrived at was based on 
 legal arguments alone. The case was fully argued in 
 June, 1832, and after careful consideration of the 
 arguments advanced on both sides, the petition of 
 the Hindu appellants was dismissed, and the act of 
 the Government of India received a formal legal 
 ratification. With regard to this case, Mr. Greville 1 , 
 who was Clerk of the Council, declares that ' the 
 Court were half-hearted in the matter, but practically 
 unanimous in thinking that the Governor-General's 
 orders could not be set aside.' 
 
 Before the passing of the measure abolishing sati, 
 the only criticism that was heard was based on the 
 perils attendant upon such a step. But after it had 
 1 Greville Memoirs, vol. ii. pp. 314-5.
 
 SUGGESTED PROVISION FOR WIDOWS 93 
 
 been safely taken, the tendency became to minimise 
 the importance of the measure and to disparage the 
 fortitude and foresight which ensured its success. 
 Expression is given to this feeling by Mr. Shore, who 
 plays the part of candid friend to Lord William 
 Bentinck in regard to several matters, and who 
 seeks to diminish the value of the Kegulation 
 abolishing sati. He wrote in his ' Notes on Indian 
 Affairs ' : 
 
 ' Eegarding the sati question, Lord William Bentinck did 
 not go far enough. In addition to abolishing that horrible 
 rite he should have enacted some lules to provide for the 
 maintenance of widows.' 
 
 But we may venture to assert that no one who 
 takes a practical view of the passing of great reforms 
 will endorse that criticism. Although Lord William 
 Bentinck took every possible step to obtain before- 
 hand the best information as to how his measure 
 would be received by the Hindus, and although the 
 result realised his expectations, it must be remem- 
 bered that there was a possibility of the consequences 
 proving very different, and it would have been a 
 mark of incompetence as a statesman for Lord William 
 Bentinck to have added unnecessarily to the risk of 
 the success of his great reform by insisting that not 
 only should the lives of widows be spared, but that 
 they should be provided for at the expense of the 
 family. All measures of reform must be progressive, 
 and no single legislative act was ever sufficiently 
 comprehensive to include all the points that might
 
 94 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 arise under it. In the matter of sati Lord William 
 Bentinck aimed at ' washing out a foul stain upon 
 British rule,' and in this object he was completely 
 successful. 
 
 The quoting of Lord William Bentinck's own 
 words on this matter suggests a few concluding 
 remarks on the principles underlying our policy in 
 India, which have as much force to-day as they had 
 sixty years ago, when Indian reform was first taken 
 seriously in hand by the abolition of sati. Non- 
 interference with the practice of the natives was the 
 first article of faith with the' East India Company, 
 which, while admitting in their fullest extent the 
 services it rendered to the State, was, after all, a 
 commercial body in its essence. And it may be freely 
 admitted that the determination to show all possible 
 respect and consideration to the practices and preju- 
 dices of the Indian population was, and still is, sound 
 policy. But, after all, there is another side of the 
 question. It may be difficult to draw up on paper 
 the limits of toleration, and to declare beforehand the 
 points at which active intervention should commence. 
 But practical administrators should never have any 
 difficulty in deciding when a Hindu practice must be 
 considered a foul stain on British rule. It is un- 
 justifiable from every point of view except religious 
 bigotry, and impolitic in the extreme, to take steps 
 which point to our desire to convert the Hindus and 
 other Indian creeds to Christianity. Their religion 
 should be as sacred in the eyes of those who govern
 
 THE CASE FOR THE GOVERNMENT 95 
 
 them as it is in their own. When we refuse to re- 
 cognise this truth, and act in contravention of it, 
 we shall have gone far to the loss of our Indian 
 Empire. 
 
 But respect and protection for the special religion 
 of the Hindus cannot and must not allow us to be 
 blind to acts which are in contravention of all religion, 
 and opposed to the most clearly established rights of 
 humanity. No religion can justify the sacrifice of 
 innocent persons. A civilised Government is bound 
 to protect them, or to lose its reputation. It was for 
 that reason that, even if the Hindus had made the 
 abolition of sati an excuse of revolt, we were bound 
 to intervene for the protection of widows, guiltless of 
 all offence, and led too often to an unwelcome as well 
 as a cruel bier. The same considerations that drove 
 Lord William Bentinck to action in 1829 have driven 
 his successor, Lord Lansdowne, to pass a measure 
 against the act of cruelty inseparable from child 
 marriages. 
 
 The enlightened and educated Hindu must realise 
 that the legislation directed against special acts of 
 what can only be considered human cruelty, arising 
 from ignorance sanctioned by long usage, does not 
 injure his religion in the least. With the doctrine 
 and the purely religious ceremonies of Hinduism, the 
 Government of India has no more inclination or 
 intention to meddle than it has with the creeds of 
 the Muhammadans and the Parsis. But a solemn and 
 imperative duty rests upon us to put an end to cruel
 
 96 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 and brutalising acts wherever committed under our 
 jurisdiction, and for these we cannot allow either 
 religion or long usage to be an excuse or a safe- 
 guard. 
 
 MINUTE BY LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK, 
 NOVEMBER STH, 1829. 
 
 Whether the question be to continue or to discontinue the 
 practice of sati, the decision is equally surrounded by an 
 awful responsibility. To consent to the consignment' year 
 after year of hundreds of innocent victims to a cruel and 
 untimely end when the power exists of preventing it is a 
 predicament which no conscience can contemplate without 
 horror. But, on the other hand, if heretofore received 
 opinions are to be considered of any value, to put to hazard 
 by a contrary course the very safety of the British 
 Empire in India, and to extinguish at once all hopes of 
 those great improvements affecting the condition not of 
 hundreds and thousands but of millions which can only be 
 expected from the continuance of our supremacy, is an alter- 
 native which even in the light of humanity itself may be 
 considered as a still greater evil. It is upon this first and 
 highest consideration alone, the good of mankind, that the 
 tolerance of this inhuman and impious rite can in my opinion 
 be justified on the part of the Government of a civilised 
 nation. While the solution of this- question is appalling 
 from the unparalleled magnitude of its possible results, the 
 considerations belonging to it are such as to make even the 
 stoutest mind distrust its decision. On the one side, Keligiou, 
 Humanity, under the most appalling form, as well as vanity 
 and ambition in short, all the most powerful influences 
 over the human heart are arrayed to bias and mislead the
 
 LORD WILLIAM'S MINUTE 97 
 
 judgment. On the other side, the sanction of countless ages, 
 the example of all the Mussulman conquerors, the unanimous 
 concurrence in the same policy of our own most able rulers, 
 together with the universal veneration of the people, seem 
 authoritatively to forbid, both to feeling and to reason, any 
 interference in the exercise of their natural prerogative. 
 In venturing to be the first to deviate from this practice it 
 becomes me to show that nothing has been yielded to feeling, 
 but that reason, and reason alone, has governed the decision. 
 So far indeed from presuming to condemn the conduct of 
 my predecessors, I am ready to say that in the same circum- 
 stances 1 should have acted as they have done. So far from 
 being chargeable with political rashness, as this departure 
 from an established policy might infer, I hope to be able so 
 completely to prove the safety of the measures as even to 
 render unnecessary any calculation of the degree of risk 
 which for the attainment of so great a benefit might wisely 
 and justly be incurred. So far also from being the sole 
 champion of a great and dangerous innovation, I shall be 
 able to prove that the vast preponderance of present 
 authority has long been in favour of abolition. Past ex- 
 perience indeed ought to prevent me, above all men, from 
 coming lightly to so positive a conclusion. When Governor 
 of Madras I saw in the mutiny of Vellore the dreadful con- 
 sequences of a supposed violation of religious customs upon 
 the minds of the native population and soldiery. I cannot 
 forget that I was then the innocent victim of that unfor- 
 tunate catastrophe ; and I might reasonably dread, when the 
 responsibility would justly attach to me in the event of 
 failure, a recurrence of the same fate. Prudence and self- 
 iuterest would counsel me to tread in the footsteps of my 
 predecessors. But in a case of such momentous importance 
 to humanity and civilisation that man must be reckless of all 
 his present or future happiness who could listen to the 
 dictates of so wicked and selfish a policy. With the firm 
 
 G
 
 98 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 undoubting conviction entertained upon this question, I 
 should be guilty of little short of the crime of multiplied 
 murder if I could hesitate in the performance of this solemn 
 obligation. I have been already stung with this feeling. 
 Every day's delay adds a victim to the dreadful list, which 
 might perhaps have been prevented by a more early sub- 
 mission of the present question. But during the whole of 
 the present year much public agitation has been excited, and 
 when discontent is abroad, when exaggerations of all kinds 
 are busily circulated, and when the native army have been 
 under a degree of alarm lest their allowances should suffer 
 with that of their European officers, it would have been 
 unwise to have given a handle to artful and designing 
 enemies to disturb the public peace. The recent measures 
 of Government for protecting the interests of the Sepoys 
 against the late reduction of companies will have removed 
 all apprehension of the intentions of Government ; and the 
 consideration of this circumstance having been the sole 
 cause of hesitation on my part, I will now proceed, praying 
 the blessing of God upon our counsels, to state the grounds 
 upon which my opinion has been formed. 
 
 We have now before us two reports of the Nizamat 
 Adalat, with statements of satis in 1827 and 1828, ex- 
 hibiting a decrease of 54 in the latter year as compared 
 with 1827, and a still greater proportion as compared with 
 former years. If this diminution could be ascribed to any 
 change of opinion upon the question produced by the pro- 
 gress of education or civilisation the fact would be most 
 satisfactory, and to disturb this sure though slow process of 
 self-correction would be most impolitic and unwise. But I 
 think it may be safely affirmed that though in Calcutta 
 truth may be said to have made a considerable advance 
 among the higher orders ; yet in respect to the population 
 at large no change whatever has taken place, and that from 
 these causes at least no hope of the abandonment of the rite
 
 MINUTE {continued) 99 
 
 can be rationally entertained. The decrease, if it be real, 
 may be the result of less sickly seasons, as the increase in 
 1824 and 1825 wrs of the greater prevalence of cholera. 
 But it is probably in a greater measure due to the mere 
 open discouragement of the practice given by the greater 
 part of the European functionaries in latter years, the effect 
 of which would be to produce corresponding activity in the 
 police officers, by which either the number would be really 
 diminished or would be made to appear so in the returns. 
 
 It seems to be the very general opinion that our inter- 
 ference has hitherto done more harm than good by lending a 
 sort of sanction to the ceremony, while it has undoubtedly 
 tended to cripple the efforts of magistrates and others to 
 prevent the practice. 
 
 I think it will clearly appear from a perusal of the docu- 
 ments annexed to this Minute, and from the facts which I 
 shall have to adduce, that the passive submission cf the 
 people to the influence and power beyond the law which in 
 fact and practically may be and is often exercised without 
 opposition by every public officer is so great that the sup- 
 pression of the rite would be completely effected by a tacit 
 sanction alone on the part of Government. This mode of 
 extinguishing it has been recommended by many of those 
 whose advice has been asked ; and no doubt this in several 
 respects might be a preferable course, as being equally effec- 
 tual while more silent, not exciting the alarm which might 
 possibly come from a public enactment, and from which in 
 case of failure it would be easy to retreat with less incon- 
 venience and without any compromise of character. But 
 this course is clearly not open to Government, bound by 
 Parliament to rule by law and not by their good pleasure. 
 Under the present position of the British Empire, moreover, 
 it may be fairly doubted if any such underhand proceeding 
 would be really good policy. When we had powerful neigh- 
 bours and had greater reason to doubt our own security, 
 
 G 2
 
 100 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 expediency might recommend an indirect and more cautious 
 proceeding, but now that we are supreme my opinion is 
 decidedly in favour of an open, avowed, and general prohibi- 
 tion, resting altogether upon the moral goodness of the act 
 and our power to enforce it ; and so decided is my feeling 
 against any half measure that were I not convinced of the 
 safety of total abolition I certainly should have advised the 
 cessation of all interference. 
 
 Of all those who have given their advice against the 
 abolition of the rite, and have described the ill effects likely 
 to ensue from it, there is no one to whom I am disposed to 
 pay greater deference than Mr. Horace Wilson. I purposely 
 select his opinion because, independently of his vast know- 
 ledge of Oriental literature, it has fallen to his lot, as secre- 
 tary to the Hindu College, and possessing the general esteem 
 both of the parents and of the youths, to have more con- 
 fidential intercourse with natives of all classes than any man 
 in India. While his opportunity of obtaining information 
 has been great beyond all others, his talents and judgment 
 enable him to form a just estimate of its value. I shall state 
 the most forcible of his reasons, and how far I do and do not 
 agree with him. 
 
 ist. Mr. Wilson considers it to be a dangerous evasion of 
 the real difficulties to attempt to prove that satis are not 
 ' essentially a part of the Hindu religion.' I entirely agree 
 in this opinion. The question is not what the rite is but 
 what it is supposed to be, and I have no doubt that the 
 conscientious belief of every order of Hindus, with few excep- 
 tions, regard it as sacred. 
 
 2nd. Mr. Wilson thinks that the attempt to put down the 
 practice will inspire extensive dissatisfaction. I agree also 
 in this opinion. He thinks that success will only be partial, 
 which I doubt. He does not imagine that the promulgated 
 prohibition will lead to any immediate and overt act of 
 insubordination, but that affrays and much agitation of the
 
 MINUTE (continued] 101 
 
 public mind must ensue. But he conceives that if once they 
 suspect that it is the intention of the British Government to 
 abandon this hitherto inviolate principle of allowing the most 
 complete toleration in matters of religion that there will arise 
 in the minds of all so deep a distrust of our ulterior designs 
 that they will no longer be tractable to any arrangement 
 intended for their improvement, and that the principle of a 
 purer morality, as well as of a more virtuous and exalted 
 rule of action, now actively inculcated by European education 
 and knowledge, will receive a fatal check. I must acknow- 
 ledge that a similar opinion as to the probable excitation of 
 a deep distrust of our future intentions was mentioned to me 
 in conversation by that enlightened native, Ram Mohun 
 Roy, a warm advocate for the abolition of sati and of all 
 other superstitions and corruptions engrafted on the Hindu 
 religion, which he considers originally to have been a pure 
 Deism. It was his opinion that the practice might be sup- 
 pressed quietly and unobservedly by increasing the diffi- 
 culties and by the indirect agency of the police. He appre- 
 hended that any public enactment would give rise to general 
 apprehension, that the reasoning would be, 'While the 
 English were contending for power they deemed it politic to 
 allow universal toleration and to respect our religion, but 
 having obtained the supremacy their first act is a violation 
 of their profession, and the next will probably be, like the 
 Muhammadan conquerors, to force upon us their own religion.' 
 
 Admitting, as I am always disposed to do, that much truth 
 is contained in these remarks, but not at all assenting to the 
 conclusions which, though not described, bear the most unfa- 
 vourable import, I shall now inquire into the evil and the 
 extent of danger which may practically result from this 
 measure. 
 
 It must be first observed that of the 463 satis occurring 
 in the whole of the Presidency of Fort William, 420 took 
 place in Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, or what is termed the
 
 102 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 Lower Provinces, and of these latter 287 in the Calcutta 
 Division alone. 
 
 It might be very difficult to make a stranger to India 
 understand, much less believe, that in a population of so 
 many millions of people as the Calcutta Division includes, 
 and the same may be said of all the Lower Provinces, so great 
 is the want of courage and of vigour of character, and such 
 the habitual submission of centuries, that insurrection or 
 hostile opposition to the will of the ruling power may be 
 affirmed to be an impossible danger. I speak of the popula- 
 tion taken separately from the army, and I may add for the 
 information of the stranger, and also in support of my 
 assertion, that few of the natives of the Lower Provinces are 
 to be found in our military ranks. I therefore at once deny 
 the danger in toto in reference to this part of our territories, 
 where the practice principally obtains. 
 
 If, however, security was wanting against extensive popular 
 tumult or revolution, I should ay that the Permanent Settle- 
 ment, which, though a failure in many other respects and in 
 its most important essentials, has this great advantage at 
 least, of having created a vast body of rich landed proprietors 
 deeply interested in the continuance of the British Dominion 
 and having complete command over the mass of the people ; 
 and in respect to the apprehension of ulterior views, I cannot 
 believe that it could last but for the moment. The same 
 large proprietary body, connected for the most part with 
 Calcutta, can have no fears of the kind, and through their 
 interpretation of our intentions and that of their numerous 
 dependents and agents, the public mind could not long 
 remain in a state of deception. 
 
 Were the scene of this sad destruction of human life laid 
 in the Upper instead of the Lower Provinces in the midst of 
 a bold and manly people, I might speak with less confidence 
 upon the question of safety. In these Provinces the satis 
 amount to forty-three only upon a population of nearly twenty
 
 MINUTE (continued] 103 
 
 millions. It cannot be expected that any general feeling, 
 where combination of any kind is so unusual, could be excited 
 in defence of a rite in which so few participate, a rite also 
 notoriously made too often subservient to views of personal 
 interest on the part of the other members of the family. 
 
 It is stated by Mr. Wilson that interference with infanti- 
 cide and the capital punishment of Brahmans offer a fallacious 
 analogy with the prohibition now proposed. The distinction 
 is- not perceptible to my judgment. The former practice, 
 though confined to particular families, is probably viewed as 
 a religious custom ; and as for the latter, the necessity of the 
 enactment proves the general existence of this exception, and 
 it is impossible to conceive a more direct and open violation 
 of their Shasters, or one more at variance with the general 
 feelings of the Hindu population. To this day in all 
 Hindu states the life of a Brahman is, I believe, still held 
 sacred. 
 
 But I have taken up too much time in giving my own 
 opinion when those of the greatest experience and highest 
 official authority are upon our records. In the report of the 
 Nizamat Adalat for 1828, four out of five of the Judges 
 recommended to the Governor-General in Council the imme- 
 diate abolition of the practice, and attest its safety. The fifth 
 Judge, though not opposed to the opinions of the rest of the 
 Bench, did not feel then prepared to give his entire assent. 
 In the report of this year the measure has come up with the 
 unanimous recommendation of the Court. The two Superin- 
 tendents of Police for the Upper and Lower Provinces (Mr. 
 Walter Ewer and Mr. Charles Barwell) have in the strongest 
 terms expressed their opinion that the suppression might be 
 effected without the least danger. The former officer has 
 urged the measure upon the attention of Government in the 
 most forcible manner. No documents exist to show the 
 opinions of the public functionaries in the interior, but I am 
 informed that nine-tenths are in favour of the abolition.
 
 104 LORD WILLIAM BE NT INC K 
 
 How, again, are these opinions supported by practical 
 experience ? 
 
 Within the limits of the Supreme Court at Calcutta not 
 a sati has taken place since the time of Sir John An- 
 struther. 
 
 In the Delhi territory Sir Charles Metcalfe never permitted 
 a sati to be performed. 
 
 In Jessore, one of the districts of the Calcutta Division, 
 in 1824 there were 30 satis; in 1825, 16; in 1826, 3; in 
 1827 and in 1828 there were none. To no other cause can 
 this be assigned than to a power beyond the law exercised 
 by the acting magistrate, against which, however, no public 
 remonstrance was made. Mr. Pigou has been since ap- 
 pointed to Cuttack, and has pursued the same strong 
 interference as in Jessore, but his course, although most 
 humane, was properly arrested, as being illegal, by the Com- 
 missioners. Though the case of Jessore is, perhaps, one of the 
 strongest examples of efficacious and unopposed interposition, 
 I really believe that there are few Districts in which the 
 same arbitrary power is not exercised to prevent the practice. 
 In the last work in the report of the Acting Commissioner 
 (Mr. Smith) he states that in Ghazipur in the last year 
 sixteen, and in the preceding year seven, satis had been 
 prevented by the persuasions, or, rather, it should be said, by 
 the threats, of the Police. 
 
 Innumerable cases of the same kind might be obtained 
 from the public records. 
 
 It is stated in the letter of the Collector of Gayd (Mr. 
 Trotter), but upon what authority I have omitted to inquire, 
 that the Peshwd (I presume he means the ex-Peshw& Baji 
 Rao) would not allow the rite to be performed, and that in 
 Tanjore it is equally interdicted. These facts, if true, would 
 be positive proofs at least that no unanimity exists among 
 the Hindus upen the point of religious obligation. 
 
 Having made inquiries, also, how far satis are permitted
 
 MINUTE (continued] 105 
 
 in the European foreign settlements, I find from Dr. Carey 
 that at Chinsurah no such sacrifices had ever been permitted 
 by the Dutch Government. That within the limits of 
 Chandarnagar itself they were also prevented, but allowed 
 to be performed in the British territories. The Danish 
 Government of Serampur has not forbidden the rite, in 
 conformity to the example of the British Government. 
 
 It is a very important fact that, though representations 
 have been made by the disappointed party to superior 
 authority, it does not appear that a single instance of direct 
 opposition to the execution of the prohibitory orders of our 
 civil functionaries has ever occurred. How, then, can it be 
 reasonably feared that to the Government itself, from whom 
 all authority is derived, and whose power is now universally 
 considered to be irresistible, anything bearing the semblance 
 of resistance can be manifested 1 Mr. Wilson also is of 
 opinion that no immediate overt act of insubordination would 
 follow the publication of the edict. The Regulation of 
 Government may be evaded, the Police may be corrupted, 
 but even hei-e the price paid as hush money will operate as 
 a penalty, indirectly forwarding the object of Government. 
 
 I venture, then, to think it completely proved that from the 
 Native population nothing of extensive combination, or even 
 of partial opposition, may be expected from the abolition. 
 
 It is, however, a very different and much more important 
 question how far the feelings of the Native army might take 
 alarm, how far the rite may be in general observance by 
 them, and whether, as in the case of Yellore, designing 
 persons might not make use of the circumstances either for 
 the purpose of immediate revolt or of sowing the seeds of 
 permanent disaffection. Reflecting upon the vast dispropor- 
 tion of numbers between our Native and European troops, it 
 was obvious that there might be, in any general combination 
 of the forces, the greatest danger to the State, and it became 
 necessary, therefore, to use every precaution to ascertain the
 
 106 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 impression likely to be made upon the minds of the native 
 soldiery. 
 
 Before I detail to Council the means I have taken to 
 satisfy my mind upon this very important branch of the 
 inquiry, I shall beg leave to advert to the name of Lord 
 Hastings. It is impossible but that to his most humane, 
 benevolent, and enlightened mind this practice must have 
 been often the subject of deep and anxious meditation. It 
 was consequently a circumstance of ill omen and some disap- 
 pointment not to have found upon the Records the valuable 
 advice and direction of his long experience and wisdom. It 
 is true that during the greater part of his administration he 
 was engaged in war, when the introduction of such a measure 
 would have been highly injudicious. To his successor, Lord 
 Amherst, also, the same obstacle was opposed. I am, how- 
 ever, fortunate in possessing a letter from Lord Hastings to 
 a friend in England upon satis, and from the following 
 extract, dated 21 November, 1823, I am induced to believe 
 that, had he remained in India, this practice would long 
 since have been suppressed : 
 
 'The subject which you wish to discuss is one which must 
 interest one's feeling most deeply, but it is also one of extreme 
 nicety when I mention that in one of the years during my ad- 
 ministration of government in India about 800 ' widows sacrificed 
 themselves within the Provinces comprised in the Presidency of 
 Bengal, to which number I very much suspect that very many 
 not notified to the magistrate should be added. I will hope to 
 have credit for being acutely sensible to such an outrage against 
 humanity. At th same time I was aware how much danger 
 might attend the endeavouring to suppress forcibly a practice so 
 rooted in the religious belief of the natives. No men of low caste 
 are admitted into the ranks of the Bengal army. Therefore 
 the whole of that formidable body must be regarded as blindly 
 partial to a custom which they consider equally referrible to 
 family honour and to point of faith. To attempt the extinction of 
 the horrid superstition without being supported in the procedure 
 
 1 There must be a mistake in the numbers stated. W. B.
 
 MINUTE (continued) 107 
 
 by a real concurrence on the part of the army would be distinctly 
 perilous. I have no scruple to say that I did believe I could have 
 carried with me the assent of the army towards such an object. 
 That persuasion however arose from circumstances which gave me 
 peculiar influence over the native troops V 
 
 Lord Hastings left India in 1823. It is quite certain 
 that the Government of that time were much more strongly 
 impressed with the risk of the undertaking than is now very 
 generally felt. It would have been fortunate could this 
 measure have proceeded under the auspices of that distin- 
 guished nobleman, and that the State might have had the 
 benefit of the influence which undoubtedly he possessed in 
 a peculiar degree over the native troops. Since that period, 
 however, six years have elapsed. Within the territories all 
 has been peaceful and prosperous, while without, Ava and 
 Bhartpur, to whom alone a strange sort of consequence was 
 ascribed by public opinion, have been made to acknowledge 
 our supremacy. In this interval experience has enlarged our 
 knowledge, and has given us surer data upon which to 
 distinguish truth from illusion, and to ascertain the real 
 circumstances of our position and power. It is upon these 
 that the concurring opinion of the officers of the civil and 
 military services at large having been founded, is entitled to 
 our utmost confidence. 
 
 I have the honour to lay before Council the copy of a cir- 
 cular addressed to forty-nine officers, pointed out to me by 
 the Secretary to Government in the Military Department as 
 being from their judgment and experience the best enabled 
 to appreciate the effect of the proposed measure upon the 
 native army, together with their answers. For more easy 
 reference, an abstract of each answer is annexed in a separate 
 paper and classed with those to the same purport. 
 
 It appears first that of those whose opinions are directly 
 
 1 [This quotation has been separately given for convenience on a 
 previous page. Ed.~\
 
 108 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 adverse to all interference whatever with the practice the 
 number is only five ; secondly, of those who are favourable to 
 abolition but averse to absolute and direct prohibition under 
 the authority of the Government, the number is twelve ; 
 thirdly, of those who are favourable to abolition, to be 
 effected by the indirect interference of magistrates and other 
 public officers, the number is eight ; fourthly, of those who 
 advocate the total immediate and public suppression of the 
 practice, the number is twenty-four. 
 
 It will be observed, also, of those who are against an open 
 and direct prohibition, few entertain any fear of immediate 
 danger. They refer to a distant and undefined evil. I can 
 conceive the possibility of the expression of dissatisfaction 
 and anger being immediately manifested upon this supposed 
 attack on their religious usages, but the distant danger seems 
 to me altogether groundless, provided that perfect respect 
 continues to be paid to all their innocent rites and cere- 
 monies, and provided also that a kind and considerate regard 
 be continued to their worldly interests and comforts. 
 
 I trust, therefore, that the Council will agree with me in 
 the satisfactory nature of this statement, and that they will 
 partake in the perfect confidence which it has given me of 
 the expediency and safety of the abolition. 
 
 In the answer of one of the military officers, Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Todd, he has recommended that the tax on pilgrims 
 should be simultaneously given up, for the purpose of affording 
 an undoubted proof of our disinterestedness and of our desire 
 to remove every obnoxious obstacle to the gratification of 
 their religious duties. A very considerable revenue is raised 
 from this head, but if it were to be the price of satisfaction 
 and confidence to the Hindus and of the renewal of all dis- 
 trust of our present and future intentions, the sacrifice might 
 be a measure of good policy. The objections that must be 
 entertained by all to the principle of the tax, which in 
 England has latterly excited very great reprobation, formed
 
 MINUTE (continued] 109 
 
 an additional motive for the inquiry. I enclose the copy of 
 a circular letter addressed to different individuals at present 
 in charge of the district where the tax is collected, or who 
 have had opportunities, from their local knowledge, of forming 
 a good judgment upon this question. It will be seen that 
 opinions vary, but upon a review of the whole my conviction is 
 that in connection with the present measure it is inexpedient 
 to repeal the tax. It is a subject upon which I shall not 
 neglect to bestow more attention than I have been able to do. 
 An abstract of these opinions is annexed to this minute. 
 
 I have now to submit for the consideration of Council the 
 draft of a regulation enacting the abolition of satis. It is 
 accompanied by a paper containing the remarks and sugges- 
 tions of the Judges of the-Nizamat Adalat. In this paper 
 is repeated the unanimous opinions of the Court in favour 
 of the proposed measure. The suggestions of the Nizamat 
 Adalat are in some measure at variance with a principal 
 object I had in view, of preventing collision between the 
 parties to the gati and the officers of police. It is only in 
 the previous processes, or during the actual performance of 
 the rite, when the feelings of all may be more or less roused 
 to a high degree of excitement, that I apprehend the possi- 
 bility of affray or of acts of violence through an indiscreet 
 and injudicious exercise of authority. It seemed to me 
 prudent, therefore, that the police, in the first instance, should 
 warn and advise, but not forcibly prohibit, and if the sati, 
 in defiance of this notice, were performed, that a report 
 should be made to the magistrate, who would summon the 
 parties and proceed as in any other case of crime. The 
 Indian Court appears to think these precautions unneces- 
 sary, and I hope they may be so, but in the beginning we 
 cannot, I think, proceed with too much circumspection. 
 Upon the same principle, in order to guard against a too 
 hasty or severe a sentence emanating from extreme zeal on 
 the part of the local judge, I have proposed that the case
 
 110 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 should only be cognizable by the Commissioners of circuit. 
 These are, however, questions which I should wish to see 
 discussed in Council. The other recommendations of the 
 Court are well worthy of our adoption. 
 
 I have now brought this paper to a close, and I think 
 I have redeemed my pledge of not allowing, in the considera- 
 tion of this question, passion or feeling to have any part. I 
 trust it will appear that due weight has been given to all 
 difficulties and objections, that facts have been stated with 
 truth and impartiality, that the conclusion to which I have 
 come is completely borne out both by reason and authority. 
 It may be justly asserted that the Government in this act 
 will only be following, not preceding, the tide of public 
 opinion long flowing in this direction ; and when we have 
 taken into consideration the experience and wisdom of that 
 highest public tribunal, the Nizamat Adalat, who, in 
 unison with our wisest and ablest public functionaries, have 
 been year after year almost soliciting the Government to 
 pass this act, the mcral and political responsibility of not 
 abolishing this practice far surpasses, in my judgment, that 
 of the opposite course. 
 
 But discarding, as I have done, every inviting appeal from 
 sympathy and humanity, and having given my verdict, I may 
 now be permitted to express the anxious feelings with which 
 I desire the success of this measure. 
 
 The first and primary object of my heart is the benefit of 
 the Hindus. I know nothing so important to the improve- 
 ment of their future condition as the establishment of a purer 
 morality, whatever their belief, and a more just conception 
 of the will of God. The first step to this better under- 
 standing will be dissociation of religious belief and practice 
 from blood and murder. They will then, when no longer 
 ur.der this brutalizing excitement, view with more calmness 
 acknowledged truths. They will see that there can be no 
 inconsistency in the ways of Providence, that to the com-
 
 MINUTE (continued] in 
 
 mand received as divine by all races of men, ' Xo innocent 
 blood shall be spilt,' there can be no exception ; and when 
 they shall have been convinced of the error of this first and 
 mcst criminal of their customs, may it not be hoped that 
 others, which stand in the way of their improvement, may 
 likewise pass away, and that thus emancipated from those 
 chains and shackles upon their minds and actions, they may 
 no longer continue, as they have done, the slaves of every 
 foreign conqueror, but that they may assume their first places 
 among the great families of mankind ? I disown in these 
 remarks, or in this measure, any view whatever to conversion 
 to our own faith. I write acd feel as a legislator for the 
 Hindus, and as I believe many enlightened Hindus think 
 and feel. 
 
 Descending from these higher considerations, it cannot be 
 a dishonest ambition that the Government of which I form a 
 part should have the credit of an act which is to wash out 
 a foul stain upon British rule, and to stay the sacrifice of 
 humanity and justice to a doubtful expediency; and finally, as 
 a branch of the general administration of the Empire, I may 
 be permitted to feel deeply anxious that our course shall 
 be in accordance with the noble example set to us by the 
 British Government at home, and that the adaptation, when 
 practicable to the circumstances of this vast Indian popula- 
 tion, of the same enlightened principles, may promote here 
 as well as there the general prosperity, and may exalt the 
 character of our nation. 
 
 W. C. BENTINCK. 
 Xovtmber th, 1829.
 
 CHAPTER VI 
 RENEWAL OF THE COMPANY'S CHARTER 
 
 ALTHOUGH the Charter of the East India Company 
 was not renewed until the Governor-Generalship of 
 Lord William Bentinck was drawing to a conclusion, 
 the question of its renewal occupied so much attention" 
 during the whole of this period that it will be con- 
 venient to consider it now, notwithstanding that it is 
 a little out of its chronological order. Lord William 
 Bentinck's appointment as Governor-General was 
 made with a special eye to the Charter debates in the 
 British Parliament, and his success in imparting not 
 merely an equilibrium to the finances but a higher 
 tone to the administration of India, answered the 
 expectations of his employers, and promoted their 
 interests in the legislative assembly of the Empire. 
 As it was quite certain that there would be changes 
 in the extent of the privileges conferred by the 
 Charter, the East India Company was naturally 
 anxious to make out the best possible case for itself 
 against the animadversions of its critics. Nor was 
 it possible to ignore the fact that the impeachment 
 of Warren Hastings had left as its legacy an uneasy
 
 THE COMPANY'S CHARTER 113 
 
 feeling among English public men that we had 
 acquired grave responsibilities as well as increased 
 trade and dominion by our conquests in India, and 
 that perhaps after all a commercial body, such as the 
 East India Company, was not the best qualified to 
 discharge them. The active, pacific, and reforming 
 administration of Lord William Bentinck enabled the 
 Company to make out a far better case than it 
 could otherwise have done, and for this reason his 
 name will be associated with what was in some 
 respects the most important renewal of the Charter 
 originally granted by Queen Elizabeth. 
 
 The renewal of that Charter had often before sug- 
 gested the idea of political combat, but on no previous 
 occasion were the critics of the East India Company 
 more energetic and jubilant than on the eve of the 
 long Parliamentary discussion which was to finally 
 strip it of its little remaining commercial character. 
 Many causes conduced to this result, but perhaps the 
 most significant of them all was the prevalent in- 
 clination for reform, which, fortunately for the East 
 India Company, spent its force on matters more 
 intimately connected with our home affairs than the 
 condition of our trade and empire in the East. Had 
 the energy which was evident when a Select Com- 
 mittee was first asked for in 1829 lasted down to the 
 autumn of 1833, when the Bill renewing the Charter 
 was finally passed, there is every probability that the 
 House of Commons would have been induced to declare 
 that the Company had had its day, and that the time 
 
 H
 
 TI4 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 had arrived for the British Parliament to assume the 
 direct control of India. The interest in the question 
 steadily diminished with each succeeding session, and 
 the Bill was finally discussed and carried in an empty 
 and exhausted House. The apathy of the British 
 Parliament, more than the splendour of the Com- 
 pany's achievements or the skill of its advocates, 
 obtained for the East India Company the desired 
 renewal of its political powers. 
 
 The Charter which was granted by Queen Elizabeth 
 to the old India Company in 1600 had been frequently 
 renewed, and for different periods and purposes. The 
 original Charter conferred on the Company its rights 
 for a period of fifteen years, but when James I 
 granted another in 1 609 the period was left indefinite. 
 Ignoring the charters of the minor companies and asso- 
 ciations which enjoyed the favour of Oliver Crom- 
 well or the Stuarts, and confining our attention to 
 the original India Company into which the rest were 
 ultimately absorbed, we find that one of the first acts 
 of Charles II after the Restoration was to grant the 
 Company a fresh Charter, conferring upon it larger 
 powers, including the right of making peace or war 
 with any of the native states of India. This was the 
 first introduction of what may be called the political 
 element into the life of the East India Company, 
 which had up to that point been a strictly commercial 
 body. 
 
 The next renewal of the Charter was by William 
 III in 1698. This has been called the foundation of
 
 ITS VARIOUS RENEWALS 115 
 
 all the privileges which the Company enjoyed down 
 to its death in 1858. Four years later the Charter 
 of union between the rival companies confirmed these 
 privileges, and left the period of their enjoyment in- 
 definite. In 1733 and again in 1766 the rights of the 
 East India Company were brought under the notice 
 of Parliament, and in 1773 ^ s cnar ter was renewed 
 for the definite period of twenty years. This fact 
 deserves remembrance, for this interval continued to 
 be observed until the last renewal of the Charter in 
 1853. The renewal in 1793 was ma de without any 
 modification, but that in 1813 decreed that the 
 monopoly of the Company of trade with India should 
 cease, and that commerce with that country should 
 be thrown open. It also provided for an ecclesiastical 
 establishment, with a bishop at Calcutta and arch- 
 deacons at Madras and Bombay. A still more im- 
 portant change had been effected by Pitt's India Bill 
 of 1784, which created the Board of Control. This 
 Board, of six members, supervised the acts of the 
 Company, and served as an intermediary between 
 the Government at home and in India. 
 
 The withdrawal of the E. I. Company's monopoly of 
 trade with India in 1813 was followed by an expan- 
 sion of English commerce in Eastern seas that led to 
 a growing demand for the opening of the trade with 
 China. This feeling was greatly strengthened by the 
 very prevalent expectations among English merchants 
 and manufacturers that trade with that empire would 
 rapidly develop and prove most profitable expecta- 
 
 H 2
 
 1 1 6 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 tions, it may be observed, which have been only 
 partially realised at the present day. In the course 
 of the year 1829 petitions were presented to Parlia- 
 ment praying that the Charter might not be renewed, 
 and that if renewed it should not carry with it a 
 monopoly of Chinese trade. In the same session 
 a Select Committee was moved for, but it was not 
 until the following year that it was appointed on 
 a Government motion, Lord Ellenborough moving it 
 in the Lords and Sir Robert Peel in the Commons. 
 The Government, however, distinctly disclaimed all 
 intention of interfering in the matter, leaving it to the 
 calm and dispassionate judgment of Parliament. The 
 questions submitted to the Committee were of the 
 most comprehensive character, and the inquiry neces- 
 sarily covered a wide ground. As Wilson well says 
 in his continuation of Mill's History : 
 
 ' The question, however important to the commerce of the 
 Empire, was not confined to commercial interests ; it involved 
 the whole character of the Government of India, the mode in 
 which it might best be administered for the prosperity and 
 happiness of the people, the reputation of the Legislature, and 
 the dignity and rights of the Crown.' 
 
 The instructions of the Committee stated that it was 
 ' appointed to inquire into the present state of the 
 affairs of the East India Company, and into the trade 
 between Great Britain and China, and to report their 
 observations thereon to the House.' 
 
 The course of the Committee did not run smooth. 
 The death of George IV brought its labours, with
 
 THE PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE 117 
 
 the life of the House of Commons, to a sudden and 
 precipitate close. Reappointed in February, 1831, 
 the early dissolution of Parliament again led to 
 its own breaking up, and although reconstituted in 
 June its inquiries were once more cut short in October 
 by the necessity for a fresh election. Finally recon- 
 stituted in January, 1832, its report was presented 
 to Parliament in the following August, so that the 
 whole of the winter recess was left for the careful con- 
 sideration of the voluminous facts ascertained by the 
 Committee. The information was interesting even 
 when it was contradictory, but there is much reason 
 to suppose that it did not affect the verdict of Parlia- 
 ment, which had already made up its mind on the 
 two main practical points, the trade with China and 
 the administration of India. No one expected the 
 former to be continued, and, indifferent as the House 
 of Commons was to Indian questions, it did not 
 minimise their difficulty, and still shrank from the 
 responsibility of dealing with them. 
 
 The important and practical consideration of the 
 question was carried on by negotiations between the 
 Government and the Court of Directors, which pre- 
 ceded the presentation of the Bill to Parliament. The 
 first clause of the proposed Bill laid down that ' the 
 China monopoly was to cease.' The pros and cons of 
 that branch of the question were considered at some 
 length. On the one hand it was alleged by the Govern- 
 ment, on the strength of the report of the Select Com- 
 mittee, that the profit of the China trade, which
 
 Il8 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 annually exceeded one million sterling, was derived 
 from a tax both unpopular and unjust, paid by the 
 British consumer, and that this fact was proved by 
 the lower prices paid for tea on the continent. It 
 was also alleged that the costliness of the East India 
 Company's establishment at Canton contributed to 
 make the price of tea excessive. The Court disputed 
 these statements, alleging that the lower prices on the 
 continent were due to the inferiority of the article 
 sold, and also that their profit from the trade had 
 been much exaggerated. But although reiterating 
 their view of the case, the Court did not persist in 
 fighting a hopeless battle, and accepted the first clause 
 abolishing the China monopoly in deference to public 
 opinion, and merely stipulated for the short respite 
 necessary to dispose of the stock which they were 
 bound to keep on hand. 
 
 The second clause of the projected Bill proposed 
 that the East India Company should be entrusted 
 with the renewed political control of India. As it 
 was quite clear that this concession was only made 
 because the British Government was unprepared to 
 accept the responsibility itself, it followed that the 
 Company's best device to obtain increased commer- 
 cial privileges was to feign reluctance to accept the 
 great administrative responsibility of ruling India. 
 In support of this reluctance, the Court was able to 
 show that the revenues of India had not sufficed alone 
 to defray all the expenses of governing it, and that 
 the deficit had only been made good out of the profits
 
 THE REVENUES OF THE COMPANY 119 
 
 of the commercial operations of the East India 
 Company. It followed as a necessary consequence 
 that if these operations were abandoned the deficiency 
 would have to be made good from some other quarter, 
 as every one connected with the Company was agreed 
 that competition with private traders would be ruinous 
 and out of the question. Practically speaking the 
 whole question turned on this point, for although 
 there was difference of opinion as to the extent to 
 which the Indian revenues were deficient, and as to 
 whether that deficiency was likely to prove permanent 
 or not, there was complete agreement on the fact that 
 the dividends on the Company's stock were paid not 
 out of Indian revenue, but out of the profits of the 
 China trade. If that trade were abolished it was 
 essential to ascertain whence the Company was to 
 procure its dividend, as it could not be expected to 
 perform the onerous task of governing India without 
 some tangible reward. 
 
 On the great subject of the deficiency of the Indian 
 revenue some facts and figures will be useful and 
 explanatory of the whole situation. From 1823-4 to 
 1828-9 the average annual deficit was not less than 
 ^2,878.000, and taking the longer period of 1814-5 
 to 18289 we find that the total deficiency was 
 ^19,400,000. These figures were the result of con- 
 sidering the Indian revenues as the sole financial 
 resource of the East India Company, and testify to 
 the fact that the Indian revenues alone were at that 
 time unequal to the charge of governing the country
 
 120 LORD WILLIAM BENT INC K 
 
 by means of an European administration. The serious 
 deficit proved to arise from the government of India 
 had been met by a considerable allocation of the 
 profits of trade to the task of administration, and by 
 public loans guaranteed by the Company. It was 
 not an unfair or unexpected demand for the East 
 India Company to ask before accepting the political 
 direction of India for some guarantee as to the funds 
 required for the accompanying expense. 
 
 While there was no room for disputing the main 
 fact, it by no means followed that all the contentions 
 put forward in consequence of it by the Company 
 were well founded. Its advocates made a great point 
 of the question of the home remittances, which then 
 amounted to three millions sterling, alleging that 
 there would be much difficulty in providing for their 
 punctual and satisfactory discharge. The tnodus 
 operandi of the Company had been simply to pur- 
 chase goods in India and China, and to dispose of 
 them in the London market, applying the proceeds 
 to the payment of the home charges. When the com- 
 mercial department of the Company was to be closed 
 it seemed to them that no alternative was left to 
 what was, after all, a very primitive arrangement. 
 The most experienced bankers and merchants had no 
 difficulty in exposing the fallacy of this belief, and in 
 showing that the transmission of the necessary funds 
 by bills would be easy and efficacious ; and it may be 
 pointed out that this arrangement has worked well 
 ever since, and is still in force.
 
 THE RESOURCES OF INDIA 121 
 
 The Company was also on weak ground when 
 assuming that because the revenue of India was 
 insufficient for its purposes in 1829 it must neces- 
 sarily always be so. Lord William Bentinck himself 
 proved that the argument was untenable by converting 
 a deficit of one million into a surplus of two millions, 
 and although that was due to the preservation of 
 peace, and the surplus disappeared when the expense 
 of war in Afghanistan and the Punjab had to be 
 provided for, there was still little or no doubt that 
 the revenues of India, properly husbanded and 
 directed, were fully equal to meeting all legitimate 
 demands, especially when we consider that Lord 
 William Bentinck's policy in the matter of the 
 Malwa opium had practically ensured a valuable 
 contribution, paid for by the Chinese drug-con- 
 sumer, to take the place of the alleged payment to 
 the Company by the English tea-drinker. Moreover 
 no allowance was made for the effects of economy 
 and the wide scope for developing the resources of 
 India, which first began to taste the fruits of internal 
 peace after the campaigns of Lord Hastings. On an 
 impartial consideration of the question it must be 
 allowed that the Company signally failed to prove its 
 contention, that the resources of India must be un- 
 equal to the task of its government. 
 
 But as has been pointed out, the question of the 
 dividend of the proprietors of the Company was 
 apart from that of the administration of India, and 
 on this subject it could reasonably claim every con-
 
 122 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 sideration. As the fight finally resolved itself into 
 deciding what this should be, it is only necessary 
 to summarise here the arrangement come to. The 
 first proposition of the Government was, that the 
 payment of the dividends to the proprietors should 
 be regarded as an annuity chargeable on the terri- 
 torial revenue of India, and redeemable after a period 
 to be decided, and at the option of Parliament, by a 
 payment of ^100 for every five guineas of annuity. 
 The total of the annuities amounted to ^630,000 a 
 year, and it was proposed that all the Company's 
 commercial assets l should be converted into money, 
 with which a sufficient amount of Indian teriitorial 
 debt should be purchased to produce an income of 
 ^630,000 a year. In other words, what was pro- 
 posed was an act of substitution, the revenue of India 
 accepting the responsibility of paying the interest on 
 the Company's stock, and the Company assigning its 
 possessions to the reduction of India's liabilities by 
 a similar amount, so that there should result no 
 addition to the burden borne by the taxpayers of 
 that country. 
 
 As the possessions of the Company would produce 
 a sum sufficient for the payment of the annual 
 dividend or for the redemption of the principal at 
 twenty years' purchase, and as its right to its 
 
 1 These were estimated by the Company at not less than 
 21,103,000, but as 8,428,000 were questionable assets, the net 
 total was 12,675,900, which at 5 per cent, would have produced 
 630,000 a year.
 
 THE COMPANY'S PROPERTY 123 
 
 commercial assets could hardly be disputed, it fol- 
 lowed that the Governments proposition was not 
 received with much approval. But the Government 
 knew its strength and the weakness of the Company, 
 and it brought all the pressure it possessed to bear on 
 the Court of Directors. In reply to the statement of 
 the value of the Company's property, it replied that 
 the proper valuing and realisation of its possessions 
 would take several years, and that the renewal of the 
 Charter had to be settled one way or the other in a 
 few months. If the Charter was to be renewed at all 
 the Company must accept their view of the position. 
 Intimidated by this argument the Court gave way, 
 and agreed to the suggested transfer between com- 
 mercial and territorial claims if the Government 
 undertook to arrange that some collateral security 
 should be provided for the payment of its dividend. 
 Even to this suggestion, which was highly natural 
 under the circumstances, the Government gave only a 
 reluctant consent. In addition to the scheme already 
 provided, it was arranged that the sum of ^"1.300,000 
 should be taken from the commercial assets, invested 
 in British Government stock, and with accumulated 
 interest should form a fund that was to go on in- 
 creasing until it had reached twelve millions, when 
 any further augmentation was to cease. After con- 
 siderable discussion and after a meeting of the pro- 
 prietors of the Company to ratify the action of the 
 Directors, the Government was induced to increase 
 the sum assigned under this arrangement to two
 
 124 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 millions, and with that alteration the arrangement 
 described was carried out. 
 
 The history of these negotiations and the volumi- 
 nous correspondence were placed before the Court of 
 Proprietors at two general meetings held in March 
 and April, 1833. At the latter, a series of resolutions 
 were moved by Sir John Malcolm, the greatest Anglo- 
 Indian of the day, approving the conduct and pro- 
 posals of the Directors, and recommending that the 
 terms of the Government should be accepted. The 
 six resolutions stipulated in their order (i) that the 
 Company should assent to conduct the government of 
 India at the sacrifices demanded, provided they were 
 furnished with sufficient powers, and that their 
 pecuniary rights and claims were adjusted by a fair 
 and liberal compromise ; (2) reiterating the financial 
 arrangement described for providing a collateral 
 security ; (3) that the administration of India should 
 be given for a period of not less than twenty years ; 
 (4) that all measures of expense should originate with 
 the Directors, subject to the control of the India 
 Board ; (5) that the Company should have some 
 means of attracting publicity, through Parliament or 
 otherwise, to its views, in any dispute it might have 
 with the India Board ; and (6) that the Court should 
 retain sufficient power over the commercial assets to 
 enable them to provide for the discharge of all obli- 
 gations, and also for compensation to such of the 
 commercial officers and servants of the Company as 
 might be affected by the new arrangements.
 
 DEBATE IN HOUSE OF COMMONS 125 
 
 The discussion on these resolutions occupied seven 
 days, but in the end they were earned by the large 
 majority of 477 to 52. The complaisance of the 
 Court was rewarded by certain concessions on the 
 part of the Ministers, the principal of which has 
 already been noted in the augmentation of the fund 
 from ^1,300,000 to j'2,ooo,ooo. They also with- 
 drew the veto they had proposed for the India Board 
 on the subject of the recall of Governors and military 
 commanders a proposition which had struck at the 
 self-respect of the Company, and threatened to reduce 
 its authority to a mere shadow. Most of the other 
 suggestions were adopted in accordance with the 
 views of the Company, and a Bill was drafted upon 
 them and submitted in June to the two Houses of 
 Parliament. The debate in the House of Commons 
 calls for no notice. It was distinctly poor, and un- 
 worthy of the magnitude of the subject if one 
 brilliant speech by Macaulay be excepted. Mr. 
 Charles Grant, afterwards Lord Glenelg, apologised to 
 the House for asking its attention to matters at such 
 a distance, and it was to empty benches and an un- 
 interested audience that the scheme was unfolded for 
 entrusting the Company with another twenty years' 
 lease of the government of India. An attempt was 
 made in Committee to contract the period of exten- 
 sion from twenty to ten years, but the precedents 
 from 1773 were too strong to justify the reduction. 
 The Bill was finally read in the House of Commons 
 at the end of July, and sent up to the House of Lords.
 
 J 26 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 The debate in the Upper Chamber was, as is so 
 often the case in dealing with matters of imperial 
 importance, more worthy of a Bill which was de- 
 ciding not merely the fate of the two hundred millions 
 of India, but the destiny of the most famous trading 
 company the world had ever known, and which had 
 made its achievements a part of English history. It 
 was introduced by the Marquis of Lansdowne, the 
 Nestor of the Whig party, supported by Lord Ripon, 
 and approved by the Marquis Wellesley on the state- 
 ment of Lord Lansdowne, but strenuously opposed 
 on various grounds by Lord Ellenborough and the 
 Duke of Wellington, who recorded his views of the 
 great Company as he had known it in the days of 
 Assaye and Argaum. The Court of Proprietors of the 
 East India Company was again convened in August 
 to express its approval of the Bill as passed by the 
 House of Commons. After further discussion it 
 acquiesced in the arrangement by a vote of 173 to 
 64, the reduced numbers showing the diminished 
 interest of the Company itself in its fate, which 
 the majority of the Proprietors may have considered 
 already decided. On aoth of August the Bill re- 
 ceived the royal assent, thus completing the arrange- 
 ments for what was nominally the last but one, 
 but in all important essentials the last, renewal of the 
 Charter granted by Queen Elizabeth 233 years before. 
 
 In the course of the debate in the House of Lords the 
 Marquis of Lansdowne referred in eloquent words to 
 the good service Lord William Bentinck had rendered
 
 TRIBUTE TO LORD WILLIAM 127 
 
 in India, to whose ' vigour and judgment/ he said, 
 it was due that the expenses of that country had 
 been reduced to such a point as to show that its 
 government could be carried on by means of its 
 own revenue apart from any advantage of trade. 
 The admission of natives to a larger share in the 
 administration, and the unrestricted entrance of 
 Europeans into the country, with rights of domicile, 
 pointed to an increased economy and development, 
 and those innovations had no more consistent or 
 powerful advocate than the Governor-General, who 
 saw in them the only way of establishing an equi- 
 librium between revenue and expenditure in India. 
 His direct participation in the renewal of the Charter 
 does not transpire, although his indirect influence 
 upon its fortunes cannot be doubted. His economies 
 and his confident belief that the Indian territorial 
 revenue could bear the whole cost of administration 
 inspired, on the one hand, the Government with its 
 main reasons for entertaining the same belief, and 
 on the other, the East India Company with an 
 additional motive for accepting and clinging to the 
 government of the country when there seemed no 
 pecuniary advantage to be derived from it. At the 
 same time, the character of his administration had 
 unquestionably enhanced the reputation of the English 
 government in India, and had reached a standard 
 beyond which the most zealous advocate of the rights 
 of India could not at the time aspire. Yet the only 
 part Lord William Bentinck publicly played with
 
 128 LORD WILLIAM BENT INC K 
 
 regard to the renewal of the Charter was to issue 
 a notice in the Calcutta, Gazette, ' calling for a general 
 illumination and a display of fireworks to celebrate 
 the renewal of the Charter,' when the news reached 
 India in October, 1833. 
 
 If the only verdict possible about the renewal 
 of the Indian Charter for another term of twenty 
 years in 1833 is that the result was a foregone con- 
 clusion, in that the Company could not hope to retain 
 the monopoly of the China trade, and that the Govern- 
 ment were resolved not to accept the administration 
 of India, we still must regard it as a landmark in our 
 connexion with the great Indian dependency which 
 places England at the head of the empires of the 
 world. The most unfriendly critic of the East India 
 Company cannot deny that it had done its country 
 excellent service. It had increased the trade of the 
 nation in every quarter of the Eastern continent. 
 The skill and determination of its representatives had 
 driven a powerful rival from the field in France, a 
 service especially valuable at a time when on the 
 continent French arms were more fortunate than 
 ours. In the blackest days of the American rebellion 
 there never failed to come some cheering news from 
 India, reviving the courage of the nation, and proving 
 that the power of winning battles had not departed. 
 The successes of the Peninsula were matched and 
 heightened in their effect by the long succession of 
 victories against some of the most formidable rulers 
 and races of Hindustan that were achieved under
 
 THE COMPANY'S ACHIEVEMENTS 129 
 
 Wellesley and Hastings. In short, for the better part of 
 a century the Company had provided the nation with 
 the material for the greatest satisfaction in adding 
 alike to its self-respect and financial prosperity. There 
 would have been marked ingratitude if, without any 
 cause shown, the country had come to a sudden and arbi- 
 trary conclusion that the Company should cease to exist. 
 Moreover the Company had shown its full in- 
 tention to meet the loftier expectations formed by 
 English public opinion as to our duties towards the 
 inhabitants of India. Lord William Bentinck was 
 sent out as a reforming Governor- General, and he in- 
 stituted many reforms. If the British Parliament had 
 taken over the control of the country it could not 
 have done more for the people than he did. The 
 progress of reform is necessarily slow, and whether 
 the Crown or the Company exercised authority, 
 there were the common obligations of government 
 which could not be evaded by either. Lord William 
 Bentinck's rule was conterminous with one of the 
 brief periods of internal and external peace prior fco 
 the Mutiny. He turned it to the best possible account 
 by introducing necessary economies, by carrying out 
 essential reforms, by spreading education, and lastly 
 by introducing the natives to a share in the work of 
 administration. The Company which sanctioned these 
 measures shared in their credit, and it would have been 
 highly inconsistent, as well as ungrateful, to decree the 
 death of a great institution at the very moment that 
 it was giving fresh evidence of its worthiness to live. 
 
 I
 
 CHAPTER VII 
 INTERNAL AFFAIRS 
 
 WE may now take a comprehensive view and give 
 a brief descriptive account of the general administra- 
 tion of India by Lord William Bentinck. Under this 
 head we have to consider the always delicate and 
 important relations that must subsist between the 
 central Government and the semi-independent States 
 of India, and although his rule was pacific in a marked 
 degree, Lord William Bentinck had to arrange more 
 than one question of difficulty with them. We may 
 also record in chronicle form some of those passages 
 and events in the daily life of his government that 
 seem to possess more than ephemeral interest. Ex- 
 cluding external relations and matters of foreign 
 policy, which will necessarily form the subject of 
 a separate chapter, in this we may attempt to describe 
 the general course of his administration, apart from 
 his three great reforms, in regard to thagi, sati, and 
 education. 
 
 One of his earliest measures was to pass a Govern- 
 ment resolution forbidding the presentation or receipt 
 of official and other presents by servants of the
 
 THE NATIVE RULERS 131 
 
 Company. The practice was in established accord- 
 ance with Eastern usage, but it had led to abuses and 
 was thought to be incompatible with the dignity of 
 the supreme Government. This reform held with 
 regard to the civil service the same relation as the 
 reduction of batta did to the army. It was intended 
 to reduce the perquisites to which the Anglo-Indian 
 official had been accustomed under the laxer system in 
 force when the Company was a purely commercial 
 association, and when nobody thought of closely 
 criticising the conduct of its agents. At the same 
 time Lord William Bentinck received the most precise 
 instructions from the Directors to pursue a policy of 
 non-intervention with the native States generally, and 
 to leave the chiefs to follow their own ways. The 
 intentions of the Directors were good, and the principle 
 of the new policy sound, but its application at that 
 particular moment was premature. The native rulers 
 had not been stimulated by our. example and exhorta- 
 tions to renewed efforts to purify their administration, 
 and when they found that the very slight check we 
 exercised was to be relaxed they not unnaturally 
 relapsed into their old ways. The application of the 
 policy, rather than the policy itseJf, proved unfortunate, 
 and entailed in most cases a more active interven- 
 tion than would have been the case if it had never 
 been withdrawn. But for this the responsibility did 
 not rest with Lord William Bentinck, whose instruc- 
 tions were as precise and positive in this as they had 
 been on the subject of batta. 
 
 I 2
 
 132 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 The control which the East India Company had 
 established over the majority of the native States, and 
 which was based on political and financial reasons 
 rather than administrative, was in no instance more 
 vigorously applied than in that of Haidarabad, the 
 state ruled by the Nizam of the Deccan. From an 
 early period of our presence in Southern India as a 
 militant nation, the Nizam of Haidarabad had been 
 our closely attached and almost constant ally. There 
 had been one period of hesitation, when led away by 
 hostile advisers and by the belief that an army dis- 
 ciplined by Frenchmen might be a match for that 
 created by the English, he opposed us in arms, but 
 the incident was a brief and passing one, and did not 
 produce any durable impression on an alliance which 
 held good during the struggles with the Marathas 
 and with Haidar Ali and his son Tipii in Southern 
 India. The obligation to maintain a considerable 
 contingent force at ojur disposal imposed a severe 
 strain on the financial resources of the Nizam, and as 
 these resources were not wisely dispensed or carefully 
 husbanded, it happened that the payments often fell 
 into arrear, and the disorganised condition of the 
 Haidarabad exchequer even raised a fear lest they 
 might fail altogether. It must not be supposed that 
 the arrangement referred to was one-sided. If the 
 English Government was benefited by the support of 
 the financial and military resources of Haidarabad, 
 the Nizam was saved by the English arms from being 
 annihilated by the Marathas at one time, and by the
 
 THE NIZAM 133 
 
 Muhammadan power of Mysore at another. The ar- 
 rangement may be fairly represented as having been 
 mutually advantageous. With the view of ensuring 
 greater efficiency in the Nizam's service, British officers 
 were introduced into it, and controlled the assess- 
 ment of land and the collection of taxes during the 
 life of Nizam Sikander Jah. 
 
 In May, 1829, Sikander Jah died and was succeeded 
 by his son, Nazir-ud-Daulat. In writing to express 
 his condolences on the death of the Nizam, Lord 
 William Bentinck offered the new ruler his good 
 wishes on ' assuming the sovereignty of Haidarabad,' 
 and he also notified ' the intention of Government to 
 revise the heretofore objectionable style of correspond- 
 ence between the heads of the two Governments.' 
 On July 21 Nazir-ud-Daulat wrote asking the 
 Governor-General to order the discontinuance of the 
 check and control exercised by British officers. One 
 month later the Governor-General replied, granting 
 this request and withdrawing his representatives, and 
 in October the Nizam was left to carry out his 
 sovereign 1 pleasure in his own way. Curiously 
 enough the Nizam, having got rid of English officials, 
 presented a request to the Governor-General to allow 
 him to raise a personal body-guard of fifty English 
 soldiers, but he was induced to withdraw his request. 
 The administration of the finances of Haidarabad did 
 
 1 It will be noted that the term ' sovereignty ' was only used 
 in corresponding with the Nizam among all the princes of India. 
 He was treated more as an ally than a feudatory.
 
 134 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 not improve when the Nizam was left to his own 
 discretion and the advice of Chandu Lall a minister 
 who thought more of exhibiting the power and wealth 
 of his master by a lavish and ostentatious expenditure 
 than of the real interests of the people. In the official 
 records there are frequent references to his 'petty 
 shifts and modes ' of raising revenue a course which 
 resulted after his death in the Indian Government 
 taking over in the time of Lord Dalhousie the Berar 
 districts and applying their revenue to the discharge 
 of the Nizam's obligations towards itself. 
 
 If the harmony of our relations with the largest of 
 the native states was undisturbed, Lord William 
 Bentinck had more cause for anxiety in regard to the 
 affairs of two other states in Southern India, viz. 
 Mysore and Coorg. 
 
 In Mysore the evil arose from maladministration. 
 After the overthrow and death of Tipu Sultan at 
 Seringapatam, we revived the former Hindu regime 
 in the person of a descendant of the old Maharajas, 
 and we gave him as minister and adviser, Purnea, 
 one of the ablest of Indian statesmen. When that 
 minister retired in 1811 he left the government in a 
 flourishing condition. The finances were on a sound 
 basis, and the people were contented and happy. 
 The new minister, Linga Raj, had neither his ability 
 nor his virtue. The exchequer was soon depleted, 
 the people were burdened with taxation, and after 
 twenty years of misgovernment they were ripe for 
 revolt. The exhortations of the Resident, and a
 
 EVENTS IN MYSORE 135 
 
 personal visit by the Governor of Madras, Sir Thomas 
 Munro, brought promises of amendment and post- 
 poned the day of reckoning. But the extortions of 
 the tax-gatherers were resumed after a little time, 
 and the people refusing to submit, broke out in open 
 rebellion and killed several of the Maharaja's officers. 
 In the province of Nagar the rayats rose en masse, 
 and began what might be called a peasants' war. 
 
 The Mysore army, although drilled by English 
 officers, was unable to crush the movement, and 
 a strong force of Madras troops had to be sent against 
 the insurgents. At the same time it was announced 
 that their grievances would be considered in a 
 lenient spirit if they desisted from opposition, and 
 the presence of English officers established confidence 
 in the good faith of this offer. The excesses of the 
 Maharaja had so completely alienated public con- 
 fidence that no reliance was placed on the offers made 
 on paper to grant the peasants what they justly 
 demanded. The people remained under arms, and 
 although no fighting actually took place, it was 
 evident that the only way to put an end to the 
 disorders was to incorporate Mysore for a time with 
 the British dominion. The Maharaja was deposed 
 under clauses in the treaty of 1799, and assigned a 
 place of residence and a pension. An English Com- 
 missioner assumed the control of the administration, 
 and in the course of a little time tranquillity and 
 prosperity returned to the province. Mysore continued 
 to enjoy the advantages of English administration
 
 136 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 down to 1 88 1, when the descendant of the deposed 
 Maharaja was reinstalled, and is the present ruler of 
 that province. 
 
 The second state with which interference became 
 necessary was Coorg. The Raja, whose excesses 
 could only be explained on the supposition that he 
 was out of his mind, refused to hold any rela- 
 tions with us whatever, and plotted to our disad- 
 vantage in Mysore and elsewhere. At last our 
 patience was exhausted, and after a proclamation 
 was issued declaring that ' the conduct of the Raja 
 had rendered him unworthy of the friendship and 
 protection of the British Government,' war was 
 declared against him. Lord William Bentinck, who 
 happened to be staying at Utakamand at the time, 
 assumed the personal direction of the campaign. His 
 arrangements left no room for criticism on the ground 
 of incompleteness or over-confidence. Four divisions 
 were entrusted with the invasion of the difficult 
 country of Coorg. 
 
 Although an ample force was employed in the 
 operations, the invasion of Coorg was not attended 
 with conspicuous military success, and it seemed 
 likely to prove a very tedious business, when for- 
 tunately the Raja, disheartened by the loss of his 
 capital, surrendered himself a voluntary prisoner. 
 He was deposed from power, assigned a residence at 
 Benares and a pension, and Coorg, with the tacit 
 acquiescence of the people themselves, as they at once 
 desisted from hostility, became British territory.
 
 THE GREAT MOGUL 137 
 
 The area of local disturbances covered the whole of 
 India, but it was only in the two cases named that 
 provinces had to be brought under direct British 
 control. With the King of Delhi himself (who still 
 retained the name of the Great Mogul) and with the 
 ruler of Oudh there were constant bickerings and 
 differences. The King of Delhi, who from being the 
 patron had become the dependant of the Company, 
 was dissatisfied with the amount of his allowance, 
 and rinding that there was no hope of obtaining what 
 he wished from the authorities in India, he adopted as 
 a possible remedy the unusual course of sending a 
 special emissary to England, and he selected for this 
 work Rammohun Roy, a Brahman of great intelligence 
 and attainments. The mission was abortive inasmuch 
 as the English Government refused to recognise it, 
 and the Governor-General was naturally irritated by 
 a proceeding which seemed to aim at overriding his 
 authority. The murder of Mr. Fraser, the Political 
 Commissioner at Delhi, by a discontented chief, pro- 
 duced much excitement in that city, which was 
 greatly increased when the criminal was brought to 
 trial and hanged for his crime like an ordinary 
 offender. These passages furnish evidence of the 
 disorganised condition of affairs in the capital of 
 Babar's dynasty. The remembrance of departed 
 power was always present to add bitterness to the 
 existing financial embarrassment, and there is nothing 
 surprising in the end having come twenty-five years 
 later in the Mutiny.
 
 138 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 At the other great Muhammadan capital of India, 
 Lucknow, the state of affairs was still worse, and it 
 was distinctly aggravated by the knowledge that, 
 under the new policy, the Governor-General left the 
 native rulers a free hand in appointing or getting rid 
 of their ministers. The King of Oudh ruling during 
 Lord William Bentinck's term of power had, as heir 
 to the throne, been on terms of hostility with his 
 father's minister, a man of considerable ability, known 
 by his title of Motamid-ud-Daulat. On his father's 
 death he pretended to sink his differences, and to take 
 Motamid into his favour, but this was due rather to 
 fear of the English Resident than to his own inclination. 
 As soon as he realised that the Resident's hands were 
 tied by his new instructions, he dismissed Motamid 
 from office, and began a system of legal persecutions, 
 which undoubtedly shortened the life of that official. 
 The British Government, which had declared its fixed 
 intention to stand aside, was insensibly drawn into 
 the struggle, and the Resident refused to transact 
 business with the incompetent and unworthy ministers 
 by the aid of whom the King sought to carry on the 
 administration. Against its own declared intentions, 
 the Indian Government was thus drawn into con- 
 trolling the King in his choice of a minister, and in 
 the result the King was obliged to send for a former 
 diwdn and reinstate him in power. 
 
 The reforms set on foot by this minister, Mahdi AH, 
 arrested the downward descent of Oudh ; but time 
 was necessary for him to restore so thoroughly dis-
 
 THE CONDITION OF OUDH 139 
 
 organised a State to anything approaching prosperity, 
 and the King took pleasure in thwarting the best 
 arrangements of his minister. The Resident reported 
 that in his opinion there was no remedy for the evil 
 but for us to assume the control of the State for a 
 certain period, and Lord William Eentinck paid a 
 special visit to Lucknow in 1831 to inform the King 
 by word of mouth, and by a written despatch, that his 
 territories must be better governed, or we should be 
 compelled to annex them and depose him from power. 
 Unfortunately we did not follow up this step by 
 consistent action. For a brief space the King was 
 impressed by the action of the Governor-General, but 
 when Mahdi Ali appealed to the Resident for support 
 it was refused on the plea of non-intervention, with 
 the consequence that all his good intentions were 
 never realised. At the same time that obedience 
 was thus paid to the orders of the Directors, the 
 Governor-General showed by his own action, and by 
 the despatches he continually sent home recommend- 
 ing vigorous intervention in Oudh in the event of no 
 amelioration taking place in its government, that 
 the only remedy for maladministration in the native 
 States was the vigilant supervision of the supreme 
 authority, which his instructions forbade him to exer- 
 cise. The vindication of Lord Dalhousie's annexion 
 policy in 1856 would be found in the despatches 
 of Lord William Bentinck in 1831 and 1832 on the 
 subject of the internal condition of Oudh. 
 
 The gravest of all these minor disturbances occurred
 
 140 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 in the Rajput state of Jaipur. In the time of Lord 
 Amherst we had been compelled to intervene in the 
 most energetic manner in the affairs of that state. 
 The Indian Government not only appointed a per- 
 manent Resident, but banished an official named Jota 
 Ram, who exercised a pernicious influence over the 
 mother of the young Raja. Although expelled from 
 the state the influence of Jota Ram remained undi- 
 minished, and his faction formed the most powerful 
 and energetic body in Jaipur. They spared no effort 
 to discredit the minister who acted as Jota Ram's 
 successor and to embarrass the British Resident. 
 They succeeded so well in their machinations that 
 the British Resident felt obliged to recommend the 
 removal of the minister as the step most likely to 
 restore tranquillity to Jaipur. For a time the Rani 
 was content to carry on the government by means 
 of some of his creatures ; but encouraged by her 
 success she at last demanded that Jota Ram should 
 be allowed to return and resume his post. With this 
 request the Government of India also thought it well 
 to comply. The success of the Rani in her dealings 
 with the English did not extend to her relations with 
 the thakurs, or nobles of the State, who feigned no 
 respect for a woman-regent, and who regarded Jota 
 Ram as an adventurer. 
 
 The result of the conflict between the Rani and the 
 thakurs was that the former was continued in the 
 regency, but this arrangement was not concluded 
 until Sir Charles Metcalfe threw the weight of his
 
 THE RAJPUT STATES 141 
 
 personal influence into the scale in support of a 
 pacific settlement. Much of the antipathy of the 
 thakurs was due to the apprehension that the young 
 Raja had been made away with, and the production 
 of the youthful ruler went far to allay the suspicions 
 of his feudatories, and sufficed to procure for the Rani 
 a bare majority of votes when the British Resident sub- 
 mitted to the nobles of Jaipur the question of her re- 
 taining the regency or not. Among the most pathetic 
 incidents of English history in India is the sudden 
 appearance of the Raja a child of eight years old, 
 and the representative of a family whose origin is lost 
 in antiquity from behind the pardah, and his throw- 
 ing himself, with touching confidence in the justice and 
 sympathy of English authority, into the arms of Sir 
 Charles Metcalfe, and begging there protection for 
 himself and respect for his mother. To such an 
 appeal there could only be one answer, and the con- 
 clave of nobles ratified the unexpressed wishes of 
 the British representative. 
 
 Such was the position of affairs in Jaipur when 
 Lord William Bentinck became Governor-General. It 
 is not surprising to find that the new arrangement 
 did not work satisfactorily, and that Jota Ram on 
 his restoration to office behaved worse than he had 
 done before. His one thought was to enrich himself 
 as rapidly as possible at the expense of the peasant ; 
 but at the same time he did not conceal his animosity 
 to those thakurs who had voted against the Rani, and 
 he endeavoured to injure them in every way he could.
 
 142 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 The guarantee of the British Government sufficed to 
 preserve a hollow truce among the contending parties, 
 but it was futile to pacify the unpaid soldiery, who 
 had to be bribed into good-humour. The thakurs 
 remained aloof and defiant, and the elevation of Jota 
 Ram to the post of minister with the sanction of the 
 British Government did not effect that improvement 
 which was expected from this fresh accession of dignity. 
 Jota Ram was encouraged by his success to proceed 
 to extremities against the thakurs. He curtailed 
 their privileges, and attempted to substitute his own 
 troops for theirs in the garrisoning of certain strong- 
 holds. This step provoked a civil war in 1830, and 
 as the non-intervention theory was then in vogue the 
 rival parties were left for a time to fight out their 
 quarrel without our assistance or supervision. Such 
 fighting as took place was of a desultory and un- 
 certain character. It was only when Jota Ram 
 menaced the territory of some of the thakurs whom 
 we had guaranteed in their possessions that anything 
 of a decisive nature took place. In face of the threat 
 of a British force he was compelled to abandon the 
 intention of appropriating the territory of some of 
 the principal nobles. Baffled in this project he had 
 recourse to other designs, in the midst of which, how- 
 ever, he lost the assistance of the Rani, who died in 
 1834. This event proved the beginning of more 
 serious complications in Jaipur, for a few months 
 later the young Raja himself died, and it was strongly 
 suspected from poison.
 
 PLOTS AT JAIPUR 143 
 
 As may be imagined, this event greatly increased 
 the indignation and excitement of the thakurs, who 
 at once proceeded to Jaipur at the head of their 
 armed retainers. Jota Ram offered to resign, and 
 Major Alves, the Political Agent, was ordered to 
 Jaipur to superintend the new arrangements neces- 
 sary for the government of that state. It was quite 
 clear that Jota Ram's offer was insincere, and that he 
 would not resign his power without an effort to retain 
 it ; but the lengths to which he would go for the sake 
 of ambition were only half suspected. His plot was 
 marked by equal astuteness and audacity. He en- 
 deavoured to divert suspicion from himself at the 
 same time that he had recourse to violent measures. 
 By raising a popular disturbance on the very day of 
 the Political Agent's arrival, and by hiring assassins 
 to murder the English officers, he hoped to embroil 
 the thakurs with the Government, and that he might 
 be brought back to power through their being dis- 
 credited. 
 
 The first part of his plot succeeded admirably. 
 His emissaries raised a public disturbance ; the 
 assassins wounded the Agent, whose assistant, Mr. 
 Blake, was killed by the mob, and in the midst of 
 the disorder and alarm some thought that Jota Ram 
 was the only person who could restore order. Un- 
 fortunately for him the assassin had been taken 
 prisoner, and confessed that his instigators were Jain 
 bankers, connected by blood and interest with Jota 
 Ram. Jota Ram and his brother were arrested and
 
 144 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 brought to trial. They were both sentenced to death, 
 but this penalty was commuted to imprisonment for 
 life in British territory. The affairs of Jaipur were 
 finally adjusted by the Council of Regency for the 
 new Raja (who was a mere child) being placed under 
 the protection of a British Resident stationed per- 
 manently at the capital. Thus ended in the full 
 assertion of our power the long period of confusion 
 which had disturbed the most important of the 
 Rajput states during ten years, and it would have 
 been better for it and for us if that step had been 
 taken at a much earlier period. 
 
 Our relations with the other native states of India 
 were not without their gratifying features. Among 
 these may be cited the refusal of the Maharaja of 
 Patiala to accept interest on a loan of twenty lakhs 
 which he had very opportunely made to us. The 
 same chief also sold to us for another tract of territory 
 the remainder of the district of Simla, which was 
 then beginning to be regarded as the most convenient 
 sanitarium in India, and the proper headquarters of 
 the Government during the hot weather. Our con- 
 nexion with the place which is now so famous in 
 Anglo-Indian life was not very old in the time of 
 Lord William Bentinck. A portion of the hill on 
 which it stands was retained by us after the war 
 with Nepal in 1815-6. An English officer erected 
 the first residence (a thatched, wooden cottage) there 
 in 1819, and three years later this building was 
 converted into a substantial house. In 1826 a small
 
 SIMLA AND DARJILING 145 
 
 settlement had sprung up, to which the name of 
 Simla was given, and in 1827 Lord Amherst was the 
 first Governor-General to pay it a visit. In 1830 
 the remainder of the hill was obtained from the 
 Maharaja of Patiala in the manner described ; and 
 thenceforward, irregularly at first, but in the end 
 with unfailing punctuality, the Government of India 
 moved its headquarters to that pleasant resort on the 
 slope of the Himalayas in the hot season of every 
 year. 
 
 Simla was not the only hill sanitarium acquired 
 during the time of Lord William Bentinck. One of 
 his last acts was to purchase from the Raja of Sikkim 
 the site on which Darjiling stands. After the war 
 with the Gurkhas in 1816 we restored that district, 
 which they had seized, to the Raja ; and it was not 
 until 1 835 that we acquired by purchase the territory 
 which was known until the other day as British 
 Sikkim. Lord William Bentinck thus established the 
 two best-known hill stations and sanitaria in Northern 
 India. 
 
 One of the chief characteristics of Lord William 
 Bentinck was his desire to see things for himself. 
 Certainly no English ruler of India had visited so 
 many parts of the peninsula. In the first six months 
 of his Eastern residence he visited Burma, then 
 recently annexed. Every summer saw him on tour, 
 and when the accommodation of Simla was found to 
 be insufficient for the requirements of a headquarter 
 staff he proceeded to Utakamand, the sanitarium of 
 
 K
 
 146 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 Madras. It was in some degree due to this habit of 
 seeing things for himself that he obtained the reputa- 
 tion among Anglo-Indian officials, which finds expres- 
 sion in the pages of Shore, of being ' very suspicious 
 and obstinate.' Indeed, all that somewhat acrid critic 
 can find to say in his favour is that ' under Lord 
 William Bentinck's administration the foundation of 
 much solid improvement has been laid in India ' a 
 grudging and unworthy summary of one of the most 
 brilliant periods of reform in the history of the English 
 in India. 
 
 Reference has been made to the fact that Lord 
 William Bentinck found the Indian exchequer with 
 a deficit of one million, and that he left it with a 
 surplus of two millions. This was not the only 
 financial difficulty with which Re had to cope. 
 Calcutta passed through a grave commercial crisis in 
 the year 1833, when with hardly a sign of warning 
 the five principal mercantile firms of that city failed. 
 Their liabilities, which amounted to several millions, 
 inflicted a most serious and much felt loss on the 
 Company's servants who, attracted by a higher rate 
 of interest, had deposited their savings with them. 
 The cause of their downfall seems to have been their 
 excessive expenditure, with a view of competing with 
 the numerous rivals who appeared on the scene after 
 the first withdrawal of the Company's commercial 
 privileges. The effects of this keen competition were 
 aggravated by the slow development of Indian trade, 
 which did not increase in the manner expected, and
 
 THE CALCUTTA PANIC 147 
 
 which was in the end only stimulated by the intro- 
 duction of steam navigation. That event came too 
 late to avert the crash which destroyed the merchant 
 princes of Calcutta, and the Government was helpless 
 to avert it, or thought more of itself profiting by the 
 occasion. Its efforts to borrow money had never 
 previously succeeded when offering less than five per 
 cent., but Lord William Bentinck was quick to see the 
 opportunity furnished by the discredit of the private 
 firms, and brought out in 1834 a four per cent, loan, 
 which was very readily taken up. The winding 
 up of the affairs of the house of Palmer and Co., 
 of Haidarabad, which had failed in the time of 
 Lord Amherst, produced much litigation during the 
 Governor-Generalship of Lord William, and con- 
 stituted another commercial incident of importance 
 which should be mentioned, although space is not 
 available to enter into the details of an exceedingly 
 intricate and delicate matter. It is curious to note 
 that one portion of the business, that relating to the 
 claims of the representatives of Sir William Rumbold, 
 who was a partner in the firm, was only settled 
 a short time ago by the considerate and generous 
 action of the present reigning Nizam. 
 
 In October, 1833, Lord William Bentinck assumed 
 the command of the army on the retirement of Sir 
 Edward Barnes, and thus combined the functions of 
 Commander-in-Chief and Governor- General. This 
 union of the highest civil and military posts had 
 occurred on two previous occasions, in 1786 when the 
 
 K 2
 
 148 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 Marquis Cornwallis held both offices, and again in 
 1813 in the person of the Marquis of Hastings. 
 
 Mention should not be omitted of Lord William 
 Bentinck's ' magnificent hospitality,' to use the words 
 of Mr. Greville. He was the first English ruler to 
 entertain on a large scale, and under his auspices the 
 breakfasts and receptions at Government House 
 became a recognised function for simplifying the task 
 of administration and for establishing social relations 
 between natives and Europeans. In this portion of 
 his duties he was greatly assisted by his wife, whom 
 Sir Charles Metcalfe described as 'a most engaging 
 woman,' and whose charities were famous during her 
 stay in India, and much missed after her departure. 
 The best description of her character and virtues is 
 that given by Mr. Greville after her death in May, 
 1843. It should be read for the light it throws on 
 the character of one who was most nearly associated 
 with Lord William Bentinck in his public career of 
 forty years, but about whom the records of Govern- 
 ment are unavoidably silent.
 
 CHAPTER VIII 
 
 EDUCATION 
 
 OF all the acts associated with the administration 
 of Lord William Bentinck there was none more im- 
 portant or of greater consequence than the new 
 education policy inaugurated in 1834, which was 
 based on the establishment of English as the official 
 language of the country. This policy was an inno- 
 vation, and was regarded by some of the most 
 experienced men in India as full of danger. The 
 East India Company respected the language as well 
 as the religion and customs of the people, and the 
 Orientalist school predicted innumerable evils and 
 misfortunes from any attempt to interfere with it. 
 To introduce English into the schools and to make 
 it the vehicle of knowledge was represented as 
 destructive of the national learning, and to substitute 
 the tongue of the European conqueror for Persian in 
 the courts of law as certain to be followed by unpopu- 
 larity, if not absolute animosity. In support of these 
 views were to be found such venerable names as the 
 Prinseps ; but they were too far-fetched to carry the 
 weight to which those who held them were entitled
 
 150 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 by their linguistic attainments and sympathy with 
 the natives of India. The English school, as it was 
 termed, was composed of younger men, and repre- 
 sented the more practical side of Indian administration. 
 The late Sir Charles Trevelyan and Mr. Russell Colvin, 
 who was Governor of the North-West Provinces in 
 the first days of the Mutiny, were its principal leading 
 men Sir Charles Metcalfe and others of the leaders, 
 and of the day supported them. 
 
 It may be doubted how the contest would have 
 resulted between these two opposing parties but 
 for the efforts and genius of Macaulay. The Charter 
 Act of 1833 provided for the appointment of an 
 additional or Law-member to the Council of the 
 Governor-General, and the post was offered to 
 Mr. Macaulay, who had shown himself the ablest 
 supporter of the India Bill in the House of Com- 
 mons. He arrived in India before the end of the 
 year, and he at once took a controlling part in 
 the discussion of all matters relating to education 
 and legal reform. It happened that at the moment 
 of his arrival the subject of education was a burn- 
 ing topic on account of the difference of opinion 
 prevailing in the General Committee of Public In- 
 struction. The question in dispute was as to the 
 principles on which the Government subsidies should 
 be allotted to the different colleges that had been 
 established by English initiative since Warren Hastings 
 founded the first of them the Calcutta College in 
 the year 1781. The main principle at stake was the
 
 THE PRINCIPLE AT STAKE 151 
 
 question of the language in which instruction should 
 be given, and the difference between the opposing 
 parties has been summed up thus: 
 
 'Half of the Committee called the "Orientalists" were 
 for the continuation of the old system of stipends tenable for 
 twelve or fifteen years, to students of Arabic and Sanskrit, 
 -and for liberal expenditure on the publication of works in 
 these languages. The other half, called the "Anglicists," 
 desired to reduce the expenditure on stipends held by " lazy 
 and stupid schoolboys of 30 and 35 years of age," and to 
 cut down the sums lavished on Sanskrit and Arabic printing. 
 At this juncture, Government requested the Committee to 
 prepare a scheme of instruction for a college at Agra. The 
 Committee were utterly unable to agree on any plan. Five 
 members were in favour of Arabic, Persian, and Sanskrit 
 learning, and five in favour of English and the vernacular, 
 with just so much of the Oriental learned languages as 
 would be necessary to satisfy local prejudices.' 
 
 Macaulay on arriving in India was appointed Presi- 
 dent of this Committee, but he refused to act as such 
 until the Governor- General had decided upon the lan- 
 guage of instruction. In his capacity of Legislative 
 member of Council, however, he was neither diffident 
 nor inactive, and when the question was brought 
 before Council by the rival parties, who addressed 
 their arguments in the form of letters, dated 2ist and 
 22nd January, 1835, respectively, he expressed his 
 views on the matter in dispute in a masterly minute, 
 dated 2nd February of that year, and from which we 
 must quote the following paragraphs, as it is im- 
 possible to describe the points in dispute in clearer or 
 more expressive language :
 
 152 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 ' It does not appear to me that the Act of Parliament can 
 by any ait of construction be made to bear the meaning 
 which has been assigned to it. It contains nothing about 
 the particular languages or sciences which are to be studied. 
 .... It is argued, or rather taken for granted, that by 
 literature the Parliament can have meant only Arabic and 
 Sanscrit literature, that they never would have given the 
 honourable appellation of " a learned native " to a native who 
 was familiar with the poetry of Milton, the metaphysics of 
 Locke, and the physics of Newton ; but that they meant to 
 designate by that name only such persons as might have 
 studied in the sacred books of the Hindus all the uses of 
 kusa-grass and all the mysteries of absorption into the Deity. 
 This does not appear to be a very satisfactory interpretation. 
 To take a parallel case ; suppose that the Pasha of Egypt, a 
 country once superior in knowledge to the nations of Europe 
 but now sunk far below them, were to appropriate a sum for 
 the purpose of "reviving and promoting literature and 
 encouraging learned natives of Egypt," would anybody infer 
 that he meant the youth of his Pashalic to give years to the 
 study of hieroglyphics, to search into all the doctrines 
 disguised under the fable of Osiris, and to ascertain with all 
 possible accuracy the ritual with which cats and onions were 
 anciently adored ? "Would he be justly charged with in- 
 consistency, if instead of employing his young subjects in 
 deciphering obelisks he were to order them to be instructed 
 iu the English and French languages, and in all the sciences 
 to which those languages are the chief keys ? . . . 
 
 ' The admirers of the Oriental system of education have 
 used another argument which, if we admit it to be valid, is 
 decisive against all change. They conceive that the public 
 faith is pledged to the present system, and that to alter the 
 appropriation of any of the funds which have hitherto been 
 spent in encouraging the study of Arabic and Sanskrit would 
 be downright spoliation. It is not easy to understand by
 
 MACAULAVS MINUTE 153 
 
 what process of reasoning they can have arrived at this 
 conclusion. The grants which are made from the public 
 purse for the encouragement of literature differ in no respect 
 from the grants which are made from the same purse for 
 other objects of real or supposed utility. We found a 
 sanatorium on a spot which we suppose to be healthy. Do 
 we thereby pledge ourselves to keep a sanatorium there if 
 the result should not answer our expectations 1 We com- 
 mence the erection of a pier. Is it a violation of the public 
 faith to stop the works if we afterwards see reason to believe 
 that the building will be useless 1 The rights of property are 
 undoubtedly sacred. But nothing endangers those rights so 
 much as the practice now unhappily too common of attributing 
 them to things to which they do not belong. . . . 
 
 'All parties seem to be agreed on one point, that the 
 dialects commonly spoken among the natives of this part of 
 India contain neither literary nor scientific information, and 
 are moreover so poor and rude that until they are enriched 
 from some other quarter it will not be easy to translate any 
 valuable work into them. It seems to be admitted on all 
 sides that the intellectual improvement of those classes of the 
 people who have the means of pursuing higher studies can 
 at present be effected only by means of some language not 
 vernacular amongst them. What then shall that language 
 be ? One half of the Committee maintain that it should be 
 the English. The other half strongly recommend the 
 Arabic and Sanskrit. The whole question seems to me to 
 be which language is the best worth knowing 1 I have no 
 knowledge of either Sanscrit or Arabic. But I have done 
 what I could to form a correct estimate of their value. I 
 have read translations of the most celebrated Arabic and 
 Sanskrit works. I have conversed both here and at home 
 with men distinguished by their proficiency in the Eastern 
 tongues. I am quite ready to take the Oriental learning at 
 the valuation of the Orientalists themselves. I have never
 
 154 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 found one among them who could deny that a single shelf of 
 a good European library was worth the whole native litera- 
 ture of India and Arabia. The intrinsic superiority of the 
 Western literature is indeed fully admitted by those members 
 of the Committee who support the Oriental plan of education. 
 It will hardly be disputed, I suppose, that the department of 
 literature in which the Eastern writers stand highest is 
 poetry. And I certainly never met with any Orientalist 
 who ventured to maintain that the Arabic and Sanskrit 
 poetry could be compared to that of the great European 
 nations. But when we pass from works of imagination to 
 works in which facts are recorded and general principles 
 investigated the superiority of the Europeans becomes 
 absolutely immeasurable. It is, I believe, no exaggeration 
 to say that all the historical information which has been 
 collected from all the books written in the Sanskrit language 
 is less valuable than what may be found in the most paltry 
 abridgments used at preparatory schools in England. In 
 every branch of physical or moral philosophy the relative 
 position of the two nations is nearly the same. 
 
 ' How then stands the case 1 We have to educate a people 
 who cannot at present be educated by means of their mother 
 tongue. We must teach them some foreign language. The 
 claims of our own language it is hardly necessary to reca- 
 pitulate. It stands pre-eminent even among the languages of 
 the West. It abounds with works of imagination not inferior 
 to the noblest which Greece has bequeathed to us ; with 
 models of every species of eloquence ; with historical 
 compositions which considered merely as narratives have 
 seldom been surpassed, and which considered as vehicles of 
 ethical and political instruction have never been equalled ; 
 with just and lively representations of human life and 
 human nature ; with the most profound speculation on 
 metaphysics, morals, government, jurisprudence, and trade ; 
 with full and correct information respecting every experi-
 
 MACAULAY'S MINUTE 155 
 
 mental science which tends to preserve the health, to increase 
 the comfort, or to expand the intellect of man. Whoever 
 knows that language has ready access to all the vast 
 intellectual wealth which all the wisest nations of the earth 
 have created and hoarded in the course of ninety generations. 
 It may safely be said that the literature now extant in that 
 language is of far greater value than all the literature which 
 300 years ago was extant in all the languages of the world 
 together. Nor is this all. In India, English is the language 
 spoken by the ruling class. It is spoken by the higher 
 class of natives at the seats of Government. It is likely to 
 become the language of commerce throughout the seas of the 
 East. It is the language of two great European communities 
 which are rising, the one in the south of Africa, the other in 
 Australasia ; communities which are every year becoming 
 more important and more closely connected with our Indian 
 Empire. Whether we look at the intrinsic value of our 
 literature or at the particular situation of this country we 
 shall see the strongest reason to think that of all foreign 
 tongues the English tongue is that which would be the most 
 useful to our native subjects. 
 
 ' The question now before us is simply whether, when it 
 is in our power to teach this language, we shall teach 
 languages in which by universal confession there are no 
 books on any subject which deserve to be compared to our 
 own ; whether, when we can teach European science, we 
 shall teach systems which by universal confession whenever 
 they differ from those of Europe differ for the worse ; and 
 whether, when we can patronise sound philosophy and true 
 history, we shall countenance at the public expense medical 
 doctrines which would disgrace an English farrier, astro- 
 nomy which would move laughter in girls at an English 
 boarding-school, history abounding with kings thirty feet 
 high and reigns 30,000 years long, and geography made up 
 of seas of treacle and seas of butter. . . . The languages of
 
 156 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 Western Europe civilised Russia. I cannot doubt that they 
 will do for the Hindu what they have done for the Tartar. . . . 
 ' The fact that the Hindu law is to be learned chiefly from 
 Sanskrit books and the Muhammadan law from Arabic books 
 has been much insisted on, but seems not to bear at all on 
 the question. We are commanded by Parliament to ascertain 
 and digest the laws of India. The assistance of a Law 
 Commission has been given to us for that purpose. As soon 
 as the code is promulgated the Shasters and the Hedaya will 
 be useless to a Munsif or Sadr Amin. I hope and trust 
 that before the boys who are now entering at the Madrasa 
 and the Sanskrit College have completed their studies this 
 great work will be finished. It would be manifestly absurd 
 to educate the rising generation with a view to a state of 
 things which we mean to alter before they reach manhood. 
 
 ' But there is yet another argument which seems even more 
 untenable. It is said that the Sanskrit and Arabic are the 
 languages in which the sacred books of a hundred millions of 
 people are written, and that they are on that account en- 
 titled to peculiar encouragement. Assuredly it is the duty 
 of the British Government in India to be not only tolerant 
 but neutral on all religious questions. But to encourage the 
 study of a literature admitted to be of small intrinsic value, 
 only because that literature inculcates the most serious errors 
 on the most important subjects, is a course hardly recon- 
 cilable with reason, with morality, or even with that very 
 neutrality which ought, as we all agree, to be sacredly pursued. 
 It is confessed that a language is barren of useful knowledge. 
 We are to teach it because it is fruitful of monstrous 
 superstitions. We are to teach false history, false astronomy, 
 false medicine, because we find them in company with a 
 false religion. We abstain, and I trust shall always abstain, 
 from giving any public encouragement to those who are 
 engaged in the work of converting natives to Christianity. 
 And while we act thus can we reasonably and decently bribe
 
 UNANSWERABLE ARGUMENTS 157 
 
 men out of the revenues of the state to waste their youth in 
 learning how they are to purify themselves after touching an 
 ass, or what text of the Vedas they are to repeat to expiate 
 the crime of killing a goat ? . . . 
 
 ' To sum up what I have said. I think it clear that we 
 are not fettered by any pledge expressed or implied ; that 
 we are free to employ our funds as we choose ; that we 
 ought to employ them in teaching what is best worth 
 knowing; that English is better worth knowing than 
 Sanskrit or Arabic ; that the natives are desirous to be 
 taught English, and are not desirous to be taught Sanskrit 
 or Arabic ; that neither as the languages of law nor as the 
 languages of religion have the Sanskrit and Arabic any 
 peculiar claim to our encouragement ; that it is possible to 
 make natives of this country thoroughly good English 
 scholars, and that to this end our efforts ought to be 
 directed.' 
 
 The arguments recorded in this masterly Minute 
 are unanswerable, and leave little or nothing further 
 to be said on the subject of making the English lan- 
 guage the vehicle of instruction in India, but the 
 deliberate opinion of a practical Anglo-Indian ad- 
 ministrator like Sir Charles Metcalfe must increase 
 the weight attaching to the logic and acumen dis- 
 played in Macaulay's exposition of the question. 
 And Metcalfe wrote the following plain words on the 
 subject : ' The English language seems to me to be 
 the channel through which we are most likely to 
 convey improvement to the natives of India.' 
 
 Before Macaulay arrived in India, Lord William 
 Bentinck had shown that his sympathies were in 
 favour of English education. Among other acts
 
 158 LORD WILLIAM BENT INC K 
 
 pointing to this conclusion may be cited his invitation 
 to Krishen Rao, head master of the school at Sagar, 
 to visit Calcutta at his own personal expense, so that 
 he might become better acquainted with European 
 ways and civilisation. In such visits and personal 
 contact he saw the best means of opening the minds 
 of natives to the benefits of education. Full ex- 
 pression was given to these views in the celebrated 
 Resolution of March 7, 1835, which finally decreed 
 that English should be the official language of India. 
 
 The Orientalists prided themselves on being the 
 better friends of the Indians, and they considered that 
 the blow dealt to their classical languages would 
 cramp the political future and injure the interests 
 of the natives. Experience has refuted these opinions, 
 if indeed they were ever tenable. There can be no 
 doubt that the students of Sanskrit and Arabic would 
 never have been admitted to the same share with our- 
 selves in the government of India that they now 
 possess as fluent masters of the English language. 
 The Orientalists were in reality the enemies of the 
 Hindu race, and the English reformers, headed by 
 Lord William Bentinck, Macaulay, and Metcalfe, its 
 true friends. The latter were right not only in prin- 
 ciple, but in anticipating that the natives would master 
 our language with ease, and become as fluent in 
 it as the subject Gauls and Africans became in 
 the Imperial language of Rome. Even if the result 
 had furnished a less complete vindication of their 
 views it would still have been impossible to arraign
 
 THE ONLY BOND OF UNION 159 
 
 their policy, for it was the only one capable of satis- 
 fying the requirements of an alien domination such 
 as we had established in India, and at the same time 
 of providing the inhabitants with a legitimate share 
 in the government of their country. There must of 
 necessity be some bond of union between the ruling 
 power and the subject if the relationship is to prove 
 enduring, and in India it is out of the question to 
 expect that either race or religion will supply the 
 desired link. There was left only language, and it 
 cannot be doubted that if English had not been 
 placed in a superior position to every other language 
 spoken in India there would have remained a wide 
 and unbridged abyss between the rulers and the ruled. 
 The educated native of India, whether he be Hindu 
 or Muhammadan, now speaks English with as much 
 fluency as can be expected in the use of a foreign 
 tongue, and there is no doubt that to this cause is 
 mainly due the growing conviction in India that the 
 interests of the two countries are identical. That 
 native opinion has taken this desirable course is 
 largely if not exclusively attributable to the resolution 
 adopted by Lord William Bentinck in March, 1835, 
 to make English the official language of India for 
 admission into the public service and for the dispensa- 
 tion of justice in its higher forms. 
 
 The mention of admission into the public service 
 suggests the consideration of the most important 
 consequence of that resolution. From the evidence 
 produced before the Select Committee in 1853, on the
 
 160 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 occasion of the final renewal of the East India Com- 
 pany's Charter, it appeared that the clause in the 
 Act of 1833 relating to the admission of natives to 
 higher appointments was inserted at the instance of 
 Lord William Bentinck, who never ceased to recom- 
 mend its adoption, and with this positive statement 
 before us it will be readily understood how determined 
 Lord William Bentinck was to make English the 
 basis of education in India. If the education resolu- 
 tion had not been carried into effect the clause in the 
 Charter Act on the subject of the employment of 
 natives would have been a dead letter, and it would 
 have been impossible for Sir Charles Trevelyan to 
 have placed on record in his evidence before the Select 
 Committee of 1853 this important opinion : 
 
 ' To Lord William Bentinck belongs the great praise of 
 having placed our dominion in India on its proper founda- 
 tion in the recognition of the great principle that India is 
 to be governed for the benefit of the Indians, and that the 
 advantages which we derive from it should only be such as 
 are incidental to, and inferential from, that course of 
 proceeding.' 
 
 If English had not been adopted there would have 
 been no possibility of the admission of natives of 
 India to the higher branches of the service, in which 
 they have since shown conspicuous ability, and re- 
 duced the cost of government. The advocacy of the 
 only possible common language formed part of the 
 policy of education and enlightenment which is 
 rightly associated with the name of Lord William
 
 THE PRESS OF INDIA 161 
 
 Bentinck, and was the consummating act of his pro- 
 motion of a knowledge of English literature and 
 science, as well as of the English tongue, among the 
 educated classes of India. As the result it was said 
 that ' the scale of estimation in which natives were 
 held by Europeans was advanced by Lord William 
 Bentinck.' This improvement was rendered the more 
 apparent by the marked decline in the consideration 
 in which natives were held that followed the departure 
 of Lord William Bentinck a decline which showed 
 the inevitable reaction among the official classes, who 
 had not regarded the Governor-General's policy with 
 favour, and who were naturally disinclined to treat on 
 any terms of equality the then uneducated Bengalis. 
 The work of placing the social relations of the two 
 races on a permanently satisfactory basis must be 
 a matter of time, and it is only necessary to state 
 that Lord William Bentinck laid the foundation for 
 a better condition of things. 
 
 The question of the Press is intimately connected 
 with that of education. Sir John Kaye states that 
 'the Press had been practically free for the whole 
 period of the administration of Lord William Ben- 
 tinck,' but his departure left the crowning act in the 
 emancipation of the Press for his devoted lieutenant 
 and temporary successor, Sir Charles, afterwards Lord, 
 Metcalfe. This was effected in June, 1835, by the 
 repeal of the Press Regulations of 1823. Lord 
 William's Press policy had been, with one exception, 
 marked by great liberality and by a breadth of view 
 
 L
 
 162 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 which was not too common in the England of his day. 
 His true sentiments seem to have been expressed when 
 he said that 'he knew of no subject which the Press 
 might not fairly discuss.' The somewhat different 
 line that he took in connexion with the Eatta case, 
 when the final orders of the Court were given, was to 
 be explained by the special circumstances of the time. 
 The feelings of the military officers of the Company 
 were very excited at the proposed reduction of their 
 most cherished perquisite, and it was absolutely neces- 
 sary after a very free discussion of the question during 
 several years to peremptorily close it, when it had 
 been decided beyond possibility of dispute that Batta 
 should be reduced. It was in special relation to 
 this matter and not as a general principle that Lord 
 William Bentinck wrote the sentence which has fur- 
 nished his enemies with a charge of inconsistency, 
 that ' it is necessary in my opinion for the public 
 safety that the Press in India should be kept under 
 the most rigid control.' With regard even to the 
 question as to whether officials should be allowed to 
 contribute to the newspapers he was disposed to take 
 a lenient view and to give them considerable latitude, 
 always provided that they did not make use of 
 official information to criticise the acts of their im- 
 mediate superiors. 
 
 In the three great questions which were really 
 dependent on the selection of English as the language 
 to be used by the Government and its agents, Lord 
 William Bentinck took a prominent and active part
 
 THE POSITION IN INDIA 163 
 
 on the side of native progress. Those questions were 
 the admission of natives to the higher grades of the 
 public service, the dissemination of modern culture 
 among the upper classes of the natives with a view to 
 their admission on terms of friendship into European 
 society, and, thirdly, the emancipation of the Press for 
 the purpose of creating and strengthening a healthy 
 public opinion. It is impossible to measure the 
 magnitude of the service conferred on the Indian 
 peoples by Lord William Bentinck in all these mat- 
 ters. The most severe criticism that can be levelled 
 at his proceedings is not that he was wrong in his 
 policy, or that the principles upon which it was based 
 were untenable, but that he was putting them in 
 practice somewhat before the time was ripe. The 
 financial position of the Indian Government, with its 
 annual deficit and growing responsibilities, forbade 
 the postponement of the admission of natives of India 
 into the public service. It was absolutely indis- 
 pensable to employ the only men who could work for 
 a reasonable payment, and who moreover possessed 
 a perfect knowledge of the character and customs of 
 the governed. A persistence in keeping the adminis- 
 tration of India as an exclusive monopoly for the 
 nominees of the East India Company would have 
 ended in bankruptcy. In the major part of his reform 
 Lord William Bentinck therefore did not act too soon. 
 He opened the gates of the public service partly 
 because he saw that it was a mistaken and impossible 
 policy to exclude the natives of India from a fuller 
 
 L 2
 
 1 64 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 share in the government of the country, and partly 
 because it was necessary to reduce the expenses of 
 government. Both English and native interests 
 were benefited in the long run, and the service 
 to his own country was not less real though less 
 apparent than that rendered to the natives of 
 India. This policy explains and justifies the passage 
 with which Macaulay closes his brilliant essay on 
 Lord Clive when he speaks of ' the veneration with 
 which the latest generation of Hindus will contem- 
 plate the statue of Lord William Bentinck.'
 
 CHAPTER IX 
 
 EXTERNAL AFFAIRS 
 
 ALTHOUGH the Governor - Generalship of Lord 
 William Bentinck was essentially peaceful, and its 
 main interest centred in domestic and administra- 
 tive reforms, it must not be supposed that external 
 affairs presented no features of importance, or that 
 during his tenure of power the foreign policy of 
 India became practically a dead letter. If there was 
 no foreign war, and if tranquillity was maintained 
 on the frontiers, there were still negotiations that 
 exercised a considerable influence on the policy of 
 India and her neighbours in future years, and during 
 the whole of his stay in the country the course of 
 events west of the Indus was carefully watched, 
 and what the best policy would be in certain even- 
 tualities formed a subject of constant discussion in 
 official circles. It may seem strange, but it is none 
 the less a fact, that Anglo-Indians were then divided 
 into schools of forward and stationary policies quite 
 as much as now, and that the possibility of a Russian 
 invasion of India was discussed as freely as it has 
 been since. While some ardent spirits advocated the
 
 1 66 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 annexation of the Punjab and Sind, and wished to 
 have commercial agents at Kabul, Herat, and even 
 Bokhara, others deprecated any advance beyond 
 the Sutlej, and would have left the custody of the 
 Indus (which Akbar called the ditch of Delhi) to 
 the Sikhs. The important Minute with which this 
 chapter is closed shows that Lord William Bentinck 
 was deeply interested in all these questions, and that 
 he had a definite opinion as to how they should be 
 treated. 
 
 The most important branch of the foreign policy 
 of the Government of India in Lord William Bentinck's 
 time was unquestionably the relations to be main- 
 tained with Ran] it Singh, the powerful ruler of the 
 Sikhs. Those relations had subsisted for more than 
 twenty years when he assumed charge of the govern- 
 ment, but the increasing interest in Afghanistan, 
 owing to the prolonged uncertainty as to whether the 
 sovereign power in that state would finally fall to 
 Dost Muhammad or Shuja ul Mulk, rendered them of 
 special interest during the last three years of Lord 
 William's stay in India. In 1805 Ranjit Singh was 
 merely one of the chiefs of the Punjab, but three 
 years later he had become generally known as the 
 Maharaja. W T hen the Indian Government, alarmed 
 by Napoleon's schemes in Persia for the invasion of 
 India, sent in 1808 envoys to Kabul and Teheran, 
 it also resolved to depute an officer to the camp 
 of Ranjit Singh with the view of negotiating a de- 
 fensive alliance and concerting measures for the
 
 RANJIT SINGH 167 
 
 protection of the Punjab and British India. Mr. 
 Metcalfe, then a young man, was entrusted with this 
 mission, and executed it with exceptional tact and 
 ability. But, strange to say, Ranjit Singh, of all 
 the potentates we approached, was the only one in- 
 disposed to play a friendly part. 
 
 Our agent declared that ' our propositions were 
 met by the most striking display of jealousy, distrust, 
 and suspicion,' and that Ranjit Singh thought only 
 of turning the presence of the British mission in his 
 camp to advantage for his own personal ends. His 
 main object was to incorporate in his dominion the 
 Sikh states lying between the Sutlej and the Jumna, 
 but as soon as the Indian Government realised his 
 intentions it forbade his intervention in that quarter 
 by taking the states of Patiala and its neighbours 
 under its own special protection. Although Ranjit 
 Singh resorted to every device within the scope of 
 diplomacy to attain his object, he yielded with a 
 good grace when he found that we were in earnest, 
 and that he could only carry out his policy by 
 appealing to a force which he did not possess. For 
 twenty years after the mission referred to Ranjit 
 Singh preserved a friendly, if vigilant, policy towards 
 us, and if Mr. Metcalfe failed in the immediate object 
 of his mission, he was so far successful that he pro- 
 vided the basis of a more cordial understanding. 
 
 Immediately after the arrival of Lord William 
 Bentinck one of those frontier disputes which cannot 
 be avoided between neighbouring states arose in
 
 1 68 LORD WILLIAM BENT INC K 
 
 connexion with Wadwan, but its satisfactory ar- 
 rangement showed that the Punjab ruler knew 
 how to gracefully retreat when he could not carry 
 his point. This incident sinks into insignificance 
 beside the more important matters that arose out of 
 the attempts of the Durani exile, Shah Shuja ul Mulk, 
 to recover the Afghan throne by the aid of Ranjit 
 Singh and the British Government. In June, 1829, 
 he wrote acquainting the Indian Government with 
 his proposed alliance with Ranjit Singh for the 
 recovery of Kabul, and it so happened that the 
 receipt of this letter coincided with instructions 
 from home to acquire the control of trade on the 
 river Indus. Although we did not then comply with 
 his request, he was not discouraged from his under- 
 taking by the British Government, which provided for 
 him and his family a liberal pension. The first step 
 taken by Lord William Bentinck towards carrying 
 out his instructions was to commence negotiations 
 with the Amirs of Sind for opening the Indus to 
 Indian commerce. The negotiations took some time, 
 but at last a treaty was signed in April, 1832, and a 
 subsequent convention was concluded in December, 
 1 834. At the same time that it negotiated with the 
 power which held the approach to the Indus from 
 the sea, the Indian Government made friendly over- 
 tures to Ranjit Singh, whose attitude had become 
 more conciliatory to us. A special mission under the 
 charge of Alexander Burnes, who was entrusted with a 
 letter from William IV and a present of English horses
 
 SHUJA UL MULK 169 
 
 to the Maharaja, was sent to Lahore in July, 1831, 
 and in the following October Lord William Bentinck 
 had a personal interview with Raujit Singh at Rupar 
 on the Sutlej. This meeting was of a strictly cere- 
 monious character the Maharaja being accompanied 
 by 16.000 picked troops, and the Governor-General's 
 escort consisting of a chosen force of English and 
 native regiments. 
 
 The commercial treaty was not signed by Ranjit 
 Singh until December, 1832, but that the Rupar 
 interview was not devoid of political importance was 
 shown by the increased and more open support ex- 
 tended by the Sikh Maharaja to the projects of 
 Shuja ul Mulk after its occurrence. It is very un- 
 likely that this astute ruler would have shown his 
 hand so freely if he had not felt sure of our acquies- 
 cence and moral support. The result of Lord William 
 Bentinck's diplomacy with the Lion of the Punjab 
 was a great increase in Ranjit's friendliness to us, 
 and the establishment of that understanding which 
 resulted in the alliance a few years later against 
 Afghanistan, and which held good through all the 
 troubles at Kabul ten years afterwards. There is no 
 necessity here to challenge or uphold the wisdom of 
 that policy. It is enough to record Lord William 
 Bentinck's marked success in coming to a satisfactory 
 understanding with Ranjit Singh, who at an earlier 
 period of his career had been hostile and even 
 defiant. 
 
 But something must be briefly said on the subject
 
 170 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 of Shah Shuja's first attempt with Indian resources to 
 reconquer Afghanistan. Equipped with a considerable 
 sum of money by Ranjit Singh, he left Ludhiana at the 
 head of a few hundred men. By the time he reached 
 Shikarpur on the Indus his following had swelled to 
 an army 30.000 strong, but there had also commenced 
 the misfortunes of this ill-starred expedition. 
 
 The Amirs of Sind, imitating the example of 
 Ranjit Singh, had promised him supplies and money, 
 but alarmed at the largeness of the Afghan force they 
 requested Shah Shuja to hasten his departure from 
 their territory. This did not suit his plans or con- 
 venience, and the allies of one day became the bitter 
 opponents of the next. They even resorted to arms, 
 and in a sanguinary battle fought at Rori on the 
 Indus, in January, 1834, the Sind forces suffered a 
 complete overthrow. This battle settled the difficulty, 
 for the Amirs paid up all, and more than all, they 
 had promised, and Shah Shuja hastened on to Kan- 
 dahar. The condition of Afghanistan then was as a 
 house divided against itself. There was no central 
 authority and no single chief. The able Dost Muham- 
 mad ruled in Kabul, and his brothers held possession 
 of the different provinces. But there was no union 
 even against Shuja ul Mulk, and when Dost Muham- 
 mad's request for an alliance (made to the English 
 Government in May, 1833) was rejected, it looked as 
 if the Barakzais could not make any head against 
 Shah Shuja, and the first events of the campaign bore 
 out this assumption. The Kandahar forces were over-
 
 DOST MUHAMMAD 171 
 
 thrown, and close siege was laid to the town, which 
 was on the eve of surrendering when Dost Muhammad 
 arrived at the head of a relieving army. A pitched 
 battle was fought near Kandahar, and the result hung 
 for some time in the balance. Had the whole army 
 fought with the intrepidity of two Hindustani regi- 
 ments led by an English officer named Campbell the 
 result must have been favourable to Shah Shuja, but 
 his Afghan followers had, even in the short space that 
 had elapsed since they left Ludhiana, been alienated by 
 his faults, and they deserted him in the crisis of the 
 battle. His own rashness and want of courage seem 
 to have contributed to his overthrow. He tied the 
 field on the dispersion of his forces, and after several 
 adventures in Baluchistan and Sind he succeeded in 
 regaining the safety of his old refuge at Ludhiana. 
 The main objects of Lord William Bentinck's policy 
 in this quarter were to convert the Indus into the 
 ditch of British India, to associate the Sikhs and the 
 Sind valley with us in its defence, and to create a 
 friendly Afghanistan as a buffer-state between India 
 and any possible invader. 
 
 Lord William Bentinck's attention was directed to 
 the East as well as the West. He was specially 
 interested in the future of Singapur, a position of 
 commanding importance which we owe to the genius 
 of Sir Stamford Raffles, who acquired what might 
 become the Gibraltar of Asia by purchase in 1819. 
 Strangely enough its importance was not realised 
 until a comparatively recent period, and in April,
 
 172 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 1830, and again in September, 1833, we find Lord 
 William Bentinck inviting schemes to increase the 
 population of both Singapur and Penang. In 1832 
 he transferred the capital of the Straits Settlements 
 from Prince of Wales Island to Singapur. The 
 introduction of steam and the growth of trade between 
 India and Australasia have altered all this, and the 
 future prosperity of Singapur may now be deemed 
 assured, but Lord William Bentinck is entitled to all 
 the credit of having realised this when most people 
 were sceptical as to the value of the position. 
 
 There was another matter not immediately con- 
 nected with any place or country, but bearing generally 
 on the external relations of India, in which Lord 
 William Bentinck took a lively concern, and that was 
 the establishment of steam communication between 
 India and England. He encouraged every scheme 
 calculated to promote this object, and it was largely 
 due to his initiation and efforts that success was 
 attained at such an early stage of the question. The 
 receipt of news from Europe by some more rapid con- 
 veyance than a sailing ship had long been an object of 
 prime importance with the East India Company, and 
 during the wars with France many schemes had been 
 tried for this purpose. The agents of the Company 
 and the British Consuls at Bussora, Aleppo, and in 
 Egypt were actively employed in the transmission of 
 despatches to India, sometimes by the Euphrates and 
 the Persian Gulf, and sometimes by the Red Sea. 
 Before Lord William Bentinck reached India the
 
 THE OVERLAND ROUTE 173 
 
 first experiment had also been made in steam naviga- 
 tion between the two countries. A small vessel 
 named ' The Enterprise' sailed in 1825 from England 
 to India, partly by steam and partly by sailing, in 
 less than four months ; but as considerable disap- 
 pointment was felt at the time taken, no further 
 experiment was attempted for a few years. 
 
 In the meantime another question demanded a 
 prompt answer as to the rival claims of the Cape and 
 overland routes. Between the merits of these routes 
 Lord William Bentinck was called upon to decide, 
 and in August, 1830, he gave his unqualified decision 
 in favour of the Red Sea route over that by the Cape 
 for the despatch of letters and news. He was, no 
 doubt, induced to form this conclusion by the success- 
 ful journey of the 'Hugh Lindsay' steamer, which 
 steamed from Bombay to Suez in one month a time 
 that was subsequently reduced to twenty-two days. 
 The Indian Government then hastened to purchase 
 the necessary steamers to keep up communications by 
 this route, and Mr. Waghorn, who had strenuously 
 advocated its advantages, and whose name is gener- 
 ally associated with the origin of this route, was 
 rewarded with the command of one of them. Lord 
 William Bentinck returned to the subject in a minute 
 dated 12 June, 1832, on the question of establishing 
 steam communication between Egypt and England 
 in connexion with that already in progress by the 
 Red Sea from Egypt to India. But his opinion on 
 the subject was given in its most interesting form
 
 174 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 before a Select Committee of the House of Commons 
 in 1837. He said: 
 
 ' It is through the means of a quite safe and frequent 
 communication between all India and England that the 
 natives of India in person will be enabled to bring their 
 complaints and grievances before the authorities and the 
 country; that large numbers of disinterested travellers will 
 have it in their power to report to their country at home 
 the nature and circumstances of this distant portion of the 
 Empire. This result I hope will be to rouse the shameful 
 apathy and indifference of Great Britain to the concerns of 
 India ; and by thus bringing the eye of the British public to 
 bear upon India it may be hoped that the desired amelioration 
 may be accomplished.' 
 
 Reference has been made in the earlier paragraphs 
 of this chapter to the motives which led to the treaties 
 with Eanjit Singh and the Amirs of Sind, and to the 
 encouragement of the Afghan exile, Shuja ul Mulk. 
 It was in Lord William Bentinck's time that the 
 possibility of a Russian invasion of India was fairly 
 faced and discussed, and his parting legacy to the 
 Government of India was a masterly minute in which 
 he reviewed the military position of the country and 
 considered the question of an attack by a Russian 
 army associated with an irregular force of Central 
 Asian and Afghan adventurers. As we had only 
 gained India after a struggle with our old European 
 rivals, the French, it was natural for us to contem- 
 plate the possibility of another European invasion of 
 India, and during the earlier years of this century the
 
 OUR POSITION IN INDIA 175 
 
 ambitious schemes of Napoleon kept us constantly on 
 the alert. In 1^30 fear of France in India at all 
 events had disappeared, but in its place had arisen a 
 keen and not ill-founded apprehension that Russia 
 might prove a more formidable and persistent adver- 
 sary. This sentiment led to two inquiries : first, what 
 was the strength of the position we held in India ; 
 and secondly, what were our resources for meeting an 
 invader ; and they are exhaustively considered in the 
 minute already referred to. But before quoting Lord 
 William Bentinck's opinion some evidence of the 
 prevalent feeling among Anglo-Indian officials may 
 be given, and this cannot be furnished in a better 
 form or with greater authority than by using the 
 words of Sir Charles Metcalfe: 
 
 ' Some say that our Empire in India rests on opinion, 
 others on main force. It in fact depends on both. We could 
 not keep the country by opinion if we had not a considerable 
 force, and no force that we could pay would be sufficient if it 
 were not aided by the opinion of our invincibility. Our 
 force does not operate so much by its actual strength as by 
 the impression which it produces, and that impression is the 
 opinion by which we hold India.' 
 
 Commenting on Lord William Bentinck's minute 
 Sir Charles wrote : 
 
 ' He admits that we have no hold on the affections of our 
 subjects ; that our native army is taken from a disaffected 
 population ; that our European soldiery are too few to be of 
 much avail against any extensive plan of insurrection. This 
 is quite enough and more than I have hitherto alluded to, 
 for it is impossible to contemplate the possibility of dis-
 
 176 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 affection in our army without seeing at once the full force of 
 our danger. As long as our native army is faithful, and we 
 can pay enough for it, we can keep India in order by its 
 instrumentality, but if the instrument should turn against us 
 where would be the British power 1 Echo answers, where ? 
 It is impossible to support a sufficient army of Europeans 
 to take the place of our native army. The late Governor- 
 General appears also to adopt in some measure the just 
 remark of Sir John Malcolm that ' in an Empire like that 
 of India we are always in danger, and it is impossible to 
 conjecture the form in which it may approach.' This senti- 
 ment expresses the reality of the case in perhaps the truest 
 manner. 1 
 
 On another occasion, speaking of ' the instability 
 of our Indian Empire,' he said, ' we were sitting on a 
 barrel of gunpowder in India which might explode at 
 any moment.' With regard to a possible Russian 
 invasion Sir Charles was in* favour of waiting on 
 events, and keeping the military expenditure strictly 
 within the limits of our financial resources. He was 
 in favour of every increase being made in the Euro- 
 pean garrison of India that could be borne by the 
 revenues of that country, and of deferring exceptional 
 measures until the danger had become more tangible 
 and nearer. What is surprising' is that with this clear 
 perception in the highest quarters of the insecurity of 
 our position in India in 1 835, there should have been 
 such rash over-confidence in 1 857, when it was rela- 
 tively weaker, and ' the native army taken from a 
 disaffected population ' constituted more than ever the 
 basis of our power.
 
 THE RUSSIAN MENACE 177 
 
 Sixty years ago the possibility of a Russian in- 
 vasion of India was exceedingly remote, and so many 
 difficulties remained to be overcome, and such was the 
 extent of the intervening distance, that ordinary men 
 might be excused for deeming such a project chimeri- 
 cal. Yet practical and far-seeing statesmen like Lord 
 William Bentinck and Sir Charles Metcalfe not merely 
 discussed the extent and probable date of the arrival 
 of the danger, but laid down the best mode of dealing 
 with it. Sir Charles Metcalfe, who was opposed to 
 even commercial missions to Kabul, and who was the 
 first to prominently advocate the doctrines of ' mas- 
 terly inactivity,' was content to leave the result to the 
 natural course of events being of opinion that the 
 Indian garrison could render a good account of any 
 Russian force likely to reach the frontier. On the 
 other hand, Lord William Bentinck, whose policy was 
 of a more vigorous description, drew up the following 
 minute on the whole aspect of our position in India, 
 and although the facts are altered and events have 
 produced many changes, its value is still very con- 
 siderable, and its historical interest is quite unim- 
 peachable. 
 
 MINUTE BY THE GOVEENOE-GENEBAL AND COMMANDEE- 
 IN-CHIEF, MAKCH ISTH, 1835. 
 
 Before I proceed to describe what the constitution of the 
 army is, and to offer an opinion as to what it ought to be, a 
 preliminary enquiry seems to be necessary as to the specific 
 dangers by which our dominion may be assailed. It is easy 
 
 M
 
 178 LORD WILLIAM BENT INC K 
 
 enough to determine upon the general principles to be fol- 
 lowed and the great end to he attained, viz. that the military 
 body should be so constituted and regulated that by its im- 
 posing moral attitude, by its established fidelity and alle- 
 giance, it should render hopeless all internal rebellion, as also 
 that by the adequacy of its numbers and by its reputation for 
 discipline and valour, it should be able, as well in the general 
 opinion as in the reality, to overcome any foreign attack. 
 But the elements both of our danger and of our security are 
 of more difficult estimation, and without an exact knowledge 
 both of the one and the other, it is very possible that the 
 precautions adopted for our security may become the very 
 means of our subversion. 
 
 Of internal dangers nobody, I believe, entertains less alarm 
 than myself. In answer to those almost universal repre- 
 sentations from authorities of the existence of danger, and of 
 the consequent necessity of maintaining a large native army, 
 I have in vain asked to have pointed out to me what the 
 danger is where are the Horse, Foot, and Artillery by 
 which we are to be ejected ? The most recent document of 
 this kind that I have seen is the minute of the Commander- 
 in-Chief at Madras, who describes disaffection as everywhere 
 prevailing, and argues in consequence against any reduction 
 of the army, and thinks necessary an augmentation of it. 
 Indeed, there are those who contend for the same establish- 
 ment now as when Haidar and Tipu were in the plenitude 
 of their power, and when several substantive states existed 
 in other parts of India. But in Madras, as in Bengal, there 
 no longer exists a single chief, or a combination of chiefs, 
 who possess even the semblance of a military force. Nor are 
 there any large masses of the population who have the least 
 disposition to rebel against our authority. A vague ex- 
 pression is often used that ours is a Government of opinion. 
 Our security rests upon a very much better foundation, 
 upon the fact which every one from his own observation and
 
 LORD WILLIAM'S MINUTE 179 
 
 experience is thoroughly convinced" of, and which is true, that 
 our power is irresistible. 
 
 But though no danger appears in any real or tangible 
 shape, it must be allowed when one hundred millions of 
 people are under the control of a Government which has no 
 hold whatever on their affections, when out of this popula- 
 tion is formed that army upon the fidelity of which we rely 
 principally for our preservation, when our European trcops, 
 of whose support under all circumstances we are alone sure, 
 are so exceedingly limited in number and efficiency as to be 
 of little avail against any extensive plan of insurrection, then 
 indeed the truth of that expression of Sir John Malcolm is 
 not without force, that in an Empire like India we are always 
 in danger, and it is impossible to conjecture the form in 
 which it may approach. This state of uncertainty is greatly 
 aggravated by our conditions of peace, by the spread of know- 
 ledge, and by the operations of the press all of which are 
 tending rapidly as well to weaken the respect entertained 
 for the European character and the prestige of British supe- 
 riority as to elevate the native character, to make these men 
 alive to their own rights and more sensible of their power. 
 Of the dangers of our old position, upon which men's minds 
 continue to harp and against which they see no security but 
 the largest possible native army, I have no apprehension. 
 
 But there is much more reason to fear the changes inci- 
 dental to our new position of peace and more enlightened 
 state of mind, a higher elevation of character, knowledge, 
 improved morality, courage, all concurring causes that must 
 produce effects to be dealt with by a very different philosophy 
 from that which has hitherto obtained. So much for in- 
 ternal evils. 
 
 I shall now consider the danger from without^ thinking 
 of this as of the other, that there is no ground for any 
 present alarm, but that we do not know the time or the 
 quarter, when and where it may appear, but thinking in like 
 
 M 2
 
 l8o LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 manner of both, that it is by immediate preparation only 
 that security can be obtained, and that relief will be too 
 late if we wait, as would be most convenient, the actual 
 occurrence of the mischief. 
 
 The following is a brief abstract of our military position. 
 British India may be assailed from the north by the Gurkhas; 
 from the east by the Burmese ; from the north-west by the 
 Sikhs, the Afghans, and the hordes of Central Asia, in 
 co-operation or otherwise with Persia and Russia ; from the 
 sea on all the other sides of her territory. 
 
 An attack from the Gurkhas might partially succeed as a 
 diversion against our hill provinces, but without cavalry or 
 artillery their efforts on the plains could only terminate in 
 disgrace and defeat. 
 
 The Burmese have proved themselves totally unequal to 
 compete with our forces in the field. 
 
 An attack from the sea, even supposing a momentary 
 uperiority against us on that element, could only produce an 
 insulated debarkation, devoid of all the necessary requisites 
 for taking the field or to subsist in a fixed position. 
 
 The only real danger with which we may be threatened 
 must come from the north-west, and consequently to that 
 important line of operation our main attention should be 
 turned. 
 
 Under its present able and judicious leader it is not 
 possible that the forces of the Punjab will be ever directed 
 against us. Ranjit Singh is old and infirm, and there is no 
 apparent probability that the wisdom of his rule will be 
 inherited by his successor. Troubles, upon his decease, will 
 certainly arise, and it is impossible to foresee the result as 
 relates to the line of conduct which we may be called upon 
 to pursue. 
 
 The present state of Afghanistan presents no cause of 
 alarm to India. The success that attended the wretched 
 army that Shah Shuja had under his feeble guidance affords
 
 MINUTE (continued] 181 
 
 the best proof of the weakness of the Afghan power. The 
 assumption of the supremacy by Dost Muhammad Khan may 
 possibly give greater strength and consolidation to the general 
 confederacy. It is much to be desired that this state should 
 acquire sufficient stability to form an intermediate barrier 
 between India and Persia. 
 
 Persia, in its distracted state since the death of the late 
 King, is unequal to any great effort unassisted by Russia, 
 but the co-operation of 20,000 Russians from the Arms 
 would speedily terminate the civil war, and the advance of 
 the combined force would give them in the first campaign 
 possession of Herat, the key of Kabul. 
 
 It is the interest of Russia to extend and strengthen the 
 Persian Empire, which occupies a central position between 
 the double lines of operation of the Autocrat to the 
 eastward and to the westward, and as Persia can never be a 
 rival of Russia the augmentation of her strength can only 
 increase the offensive means of Russia. 
 
 From the days of Peter the Great to the present time the 
 views of Russia have been turned to the obtaining possession 
 of that part of Central Asia which is watered by the Oxus 
 and joins the eastet-n shore of the Caspian. The latest 
 accounts from Kabul state they are building a fort between 
 the Caspian and Khiva. This is their best line of operation 
 against India, but it can only be considered at present as a 
 very distant speculation. 
 
 The line of operation of a Russo-Persian army to advance 
 upon Herat is short and easy ; the distances are as fol- 
 lows : 
 
 From the Arms to Tabriz .... 60 miles. 
 
 Tabriz to Teheran . . . 300 
 
 Teheran to Muschid . . 60 r 
 
 Muschid to Hera"t . . . 228 
 
 Total . . .1189 
 In the campaigns against the Turks the army of Georgia
 
 1 82 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 supplied Paskewitch with 30,000 men. It may therefore be 
 assumed that the same army could assist Persia with an 
 equal number as an auxiliary force. With a good under- 
 standing between the two Governments, with time for pre- 
 paration, and with good management there could be no 
 difficulty in transporting this force to Herat. The Russians 
 are accustomed to move in countries similarly circumstanced. 
 In Turkey the Russian army always carried with it two 
 months' supply of grain and handmills for grinding it, but 
 they never issue any part of this supply until all other means 
 of obtaining it have failed. 
 
 What the policy of Russia might be after taking possession 
 of Herat it is unnecessary now to consider, but it is im- 
 possible to deny that she might arrive at that point in 
 legitimate support of her ally, the King of Persia, and it is 
 equally difficult to deny that from that point she may pro- 
 claim a crusade against British India, in which she would be 
 joined by all the warlike restless tribes that formed the 
 overwhelming force of Timur. The distances from Herat 
 to Attock are : 
 
 Herat to Kandahar 560 miles. 
 
 Kandahar to Ghazni . 190 
 
 Ghazni to Kabul 82 
 
 Kabul to Attock 200 
 
 1032 
 
 The Afghan confederacy, even if cordially united, would 
 have no means to resist the power of Russia and Persia. 
 They probably would make a virtue of necessity and join the 
 common cause, receiving in reward for their co-operation the 
 promise of all the possessions that had been wrested from 
 them by Ranjit Singh, and expecting also to reap no poor 
 harvest from the plunder of India. But however this may 
 be, it will be sufficient to assume the possibility that a Russian 
 force of 20,000 men fully equipped, accompanied with a body 
 of 100,000 horse, may reach the shores of the Indus, that
 
 MINUTE (continued) 
 
 1*3 
 
 Ranjit Singh has no means to resist their advance, and that 
 the invaders, having crossed the Indus into the Punjab, would 
 find themselves in possession of the parts of India, the most 
 fertile of resources in every kind, and secure on every side 
 from being harassed and attacked even if they had not on 
 their side a body of irregular cavalry much more numerous 
 and efficient than any we have to oppose to them. 
 
 I shall assume, then, that the attack against which we 
 have to provide is to consist of the above-mentioned force. 
 I shall now proceed to inquire into the composition of 
 the army of India, of the physical and moral qualities of 
 the native armies of the different Presidencies, and of the 
 adequacy and efficiency of the present proportion of our 
 European force to our security and defence against all 
 dangers. 
 
 In the margin 1 is inserted an abstract of the rank and file 
 of all descriptions in the native armies of the three Presi- 
 dencies their height and weight, and the countries from 
 whence they are recruited. 
 
 It appears from the annexed statements that the whole of 
 
 1 RANK AND FILE OF THE THREE ARMIES. 
 
 Irregulars. 
 Infantry. 
 
 Regular Infantry. 
 Bengal, 74 regiments . 50.320 
 Madras. 52 . 35,360 
 
 Bombay. 26 . 17,680 
 
 Regular Catalry. 
 Bengal, 10 regiments 
 Madras, 8 ,, 
 
 Bombay, 3 
 
 103,360 
 
 4440 
 3552 
 1332 
 
 9324 
 
 Bengal, 10 regiments 
 Bombay, i 
 
 Cavalry. 
 
 Bengal, 4 regiments 
 Bombay, i 
 
 Total Regular Native Troops 
 Total Irregulars 
 
 1 12,684 
 
 7504 
 680 
 
 8184 
 
 2526 
 832 
 
 3358
 
 1 84 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 the Bengal army, and one-half of that of Bombay, including 
 all the cavalry, are Hindustanis. The Madras army is 
 recruited principally from their own teiritories, and has only 
 a small portion of Bengal men in their ranks. When at 
 Utakamand all the Governments were requested to submit 
 to a Military Committee the following question, ' Whether 
 the order of the Court of Directors, issued about three years 
 ago, restricting the recruiting of each of the three armies to 
 the limits of its own Presidency, had operated beneficially ; or 
 whether it would be better to permit the Madras and Bombay 
 armies to recruit as formerly in the Bengal territory < \ ' the 
 question did not apply to the Bengal army. The Madras 
 Committee recommend that in the cavalry no alteration 
 should be made, the men being chiefly Mussulmans from the 
 Karnatik. The number of Hindus in each regiment amount 
 to about fifty, which it is proposed to increase to an hundred. 
 In the infantry they think that a proportion of Bengal men, 
 about an hundred per regiment, might be introduced with 
 advantage. In the Golundauze one-fourth of the whole are 
 from the Bengal Provinces. 
 
 The Bombay Committee report that the Court's restrictive 
 order has been totally inoperative, because, though the order 
 
 Average of Heights and Weights. 
 BENGAL INFANTKY. 
 
 Height. Weight. 
 
 Recruited generally in the Upper ft. in. st. Ibs. 
 
 Provinces of Bengal . . 5 7-82 9 0-8 
 
 MADRAS INFANTRY. 
 
 Men formerly recruit boys . . 5 6-36 7 9.73 
 
 Madrassis recruited .... 5 6-34 8 i-io 
 
 Hindustanis recruited ... 5 6-59 8 5-28 
 
 BOMBAY INFANTRY. 
 
 Men formerly recruit boys ... 5 4-75 8 5-15 
 
 Konkanis recruited . . . . 5 5.5 8 5-25 
 
 Deccanis . . . . 55-5 8 9-25 
 
 Hindustanis ,, . . . . 5 63 9 0-5
 
 MINUTE (continued] 185 
 
 had been so far obeyed that no recruiting parties had been 
 sent to Bengal, yet the Bengal men having voluntarily 
 presented themselves for enlistment, they had been engaged 
 as before. The only change recommended by the Committee 
 is that, for the purpose of getting a better description of 
 men, recruiting parties shall, as before, be sent to Bengal 1 . 
 
 One of the members, Major Robertson, dissents from his 
 colleagues. He prefers recruiting exclusively from the 
 Bombay territories, with the exception of the cavalry and 
 Golundauze, ' who, requiring a much larger description of 
 men, must have recourse to Hindustan.' 
 
 From the preceding statements it appears that the Hindu- 
 stani is larger and more robust than the native south of the 
 Narbada, and the presumption must be that he is considered 
 a more powerful if not a better soldier. His habits, indeed, 
 are much more military, for not only, as appears above, does 
 he go to seek service in Bombay, but the infantry in the 
 service of the Raja of Nagpur, as well as the Nizam's 
 contingent, consist entirely of Hindustanis. In a late letter 
 from the Resident of HaidarabaM he mentions that one of the 
 Arabs, or of the Horsemen from our Bengal Province of 
 Rohilkhand, was equal to ten or twenty of the other men of 
 the Nizam's force ; and in the attempt recently made by Shah 
 Shuja to recover his territories, it was the battalion of 
 Hindustanis and the Rohillas, under an officer of the name 
 of Campbell, that was particularly distinguished. 
 
 I have not read without surprise the pretensions set forth 
 in behalf of the Madras army. Sir Thomas Munro upon 
 
 1 The following statement would seem to support the opinion 
 that the Hindustanis engaged at Bombay are inferior in stature 
 and character to those of the Bengal army : 
 
 Infantry. Height. 
 
 ft. in. 
 
 Bengal . . . . 5 74fr 
 Bombay .... 5 6^ 
 
 Cavalry, all Hindustanis. 
 Corporal Punishment. 
 Bengal . . i^ per cent. 
 Bombay . . 42 
 
 A more severe discipline is supposed to prevail in the Bombay army.
 
 1 86 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 many occasions advocates their occupation of the whole of 
 the Peninsula south of the Narbada. I submit the following 
 extracts from his correspondence (A.D. 1820) : 
 
 ' The Narbada is unquestionably the proper boundary between 
 Bengal and Madras, not only on account of its natural barrier 
 formed by the river and the broad range of hills which accompany 
 it, but of its being the line of separation between the Deccan and 
 Hindustan, and between natives speaking different languages. 
 The Bengal army, composed of men from Hindustan, dislike 
 serving south of the Narbada, and do not readily assimilate 
 either with the natives of the country or with the Madras troops.' 
 
 I must presume that the Bombay army was at that time 
 upon a very low establishment, and had no Hindustanis in 
 its ranks. The dislike of the natives of Hindustan to serve 
 south of the Narbada has subsequently been proved to be 
 entirely unfounded. The Government and army of Bombay 
 are quite disregarded. Again (A.D. 1820): 
 
 'When Haidarabad and Nagpur were great foreign and indepen- 
 dent states ' (and more likely to act against us than with us) ' the 
 immediate control of Bengal was right, more especially as it did 
 not affect the authority of the Madras Government over its army, 
 of which only two battalions were several years at Haidarabad, but 
 both Haidarabad and Nagpur are as completely dependent upon us 
 as Mysore. They must at some period or other fall entirely into 
 our hands, and the internal administration must in the meantime 
 be chiefly directed by our Resident. At present the discipline of 
 our army is much injured by our having 20,000 men beyond our 
 frontier removed in a great measure from our control 1 .' 
 
 Again (A. D. 1804) : 
 
 ' I am sorry to hear it reported that it had been in agitation to 
 relieve the subsidiary force at Haidarabad with Bengal troops, 
 I think there are many strong public grounds for having no 
 Bengal troops either there or at Poona. It is easier to carry on 
 war in all the countries south of the Narbada from Mysore than 
 from Bengal. Where troops are in all respects equal there is still an 
 advantage in having those who are to act together drawn from one 
 
 1 This will be in part obviated by the transfer of a General Officer 
 from the ceded districts to Haidarabad.
 
 MINUTE (continued) 
 
 187 
 
 and not from different establishments, but the local troops are 
 perhaps in some respects superior to those of Bengal. They are 
 more regular, more tractable, more patient under privations, and 
 they have been more accustomed to military operations.' 
 
 These remarks are more applicable to 1804 than to 1835. 
 There are no enemies to war against. The greater experience 
 in military operations now rather belongs to the Bengal 
 troops, and the preference assigned to the Madras sepoy for 
 certain qualities would not now be as readily admitted. 
 
 I have quoted largely from Sir Thomas Munro because I 
 consider his authority superior to all others, but allowance 
 must be made in the present case for a spirit of partiality, if 
 not of partizanship, which as a Madras officer it was natural 
 for him to feel. But it is impossible for any dispassionate 
 observer who has seen the Madras sepoys not to say that 
 their physical defects and delicate frame, supposing all other 
 qualities equal, render them very inferior to the Northern 
 Hindustanis, and that consequently as a body of men they 
 are inferior to either of the other armies. The regulated 
 standard of each army is noted in the margin l . 
 
 I come next to the Bombay army, composed in equal pro- 
 portions of Hindustanis and of men from their own proper 
 territories. It would have been satisfactory if the Committee, 
 who do not recommend any change in this divided com- 
 
 1 BENGAL. 
 
 M.C., 8 August, 1796, Car- 
 rol's code, chap. Ix, sec. 42. 
 No sepoy is to be entertained 
 who is not 5 ft. 5 in. high, or 
 who is under 16 or above 30 
 years of age, unless in the 
 latter case he shall have 
 served before. 
 
 MADRAS. 
 
 The standard of 
 the Madras army 
 was raised in 1829 
 from 5 ft. 4 in. to 5 ft. 
 6 in. for Horse Artil- 
 lery and Cavalry, 
 and to 5 ft. 5 in. for 
 Infantry of the line. 
 Before 1829 the 
 standard for all ap- 
 pears to have been 
 5 ft. 4 in. 
 
 BOMBAY. 
 The lowest 
 standard for the 
 Cavalry is 5ft. 
 6 in., age 24 yrs. 
 For Infantry 
 5 ft. 3 in., age not 
 above 22 yrs. 
 For Grenadiers 
 5 ft. 6 in. and 
 upwards.
 
 1 88 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 position, had stated their reasons for it. The Bombay men 
 seem to have no advantage in strength and size over the 
 Madras sepoy. 
 
 I have often had occasion to remark upon the expensive 
 character of the Bombay establishment, urging always the 
 expediency of a compulsory order for the adjustment of their 
 expenditure to their income. And in no instance has this 
 assertion such strong confirmation as in respect to the forma- 
 tion of the Military Establishment. The army of Bombay 
 consists of: 
 
 Native Infantry 17,680 
 
 Cavalry 1,322 
 
 19,002 
 
 To superintend this small force they have one Lieutenant- 
 General and three Major-Generals, the same general staff as 
 in the other Presidencies, with all the appendages of com- 
 missariat, ordnance establishments, pay and audit depart- 
 ments, &c. belonging to a large army. I beg a reference 
 to the general distribution abstract of the Bengal army 
 furnished by the Quartermaster-General, in which it will 
 appear that there are three divisions almost equal in amount 
 to the whole Bombay army under the charge of one Major- 
 General, viz. : 
 
 Presidency ...... 17,308 
 
 Cawnpur ...... 11,798 
 
 Meerut ....... 16,551 
 
 This arrangement was caused by a different order of things 
 when the Bombay Presidency was disconnected with the 
 others, and when separate establishments were indispensable 
 to its efficiency. The necessity no longer exists, and it seems 
 practicable to substitute for it another which will save a very 
 great charge, and will, I venture to think, not be unacceptable 
 to all the individuals concerned. 
 
 I would propose that the Bombay army as such should be 
 at once abolished, the Hindustani half of it being trans-
 
 MINUTE (continued} 189 
 
 ferred in complete regiments to the Bengal army, the Bombay 
 half 1 to remain as a separate corps to be recruited always 
 within the territories ; to be commanded by a Major-General 
 with the same staff as any other division of the army, and 
 the commissariat and ordnance departments being incor- 
 porated with those of Bengal or Madras as may be convenient. 
 I am of course supposing the previous adoption of the general 
 equalisation of all allowances. 
 
 To the officers I conceive that the larger field of employ- 
 ment and the superior healthiness of many of the stations in 
 the Upper Provinces would be agreeable. To the men it 
 would be much more satisfactory to be brought nearer their 
 homes, and to be saved the danger of the long journey which 
 has been so fatal to many when returning on furlough. The 
 State, besides the saving from the reduction of the staff, would 
 make a great gain in the comparative cheapness of all camp 
 establishments, of followers, &c. It is an extraordinary fact 
 not yet accounted for that in all the stations occupied alter- 
 nately by Madras, Bombay, and Bengal troops, the Bazaar 
 prices have invariably fallen with the last and risen with the 
 two former. 
 
 The Bombay division would under this alteration occupy 
 only the stations within their frontier, transferring the 
 southern Maratha country to Madras, Nagpur 2 and Disu 
 to Bengal. 
 
 In considering the question of internal danger those officers 
 most conversant with India affairs who were examined before 
 the Parliamentary Committee apprehend no danger to our 
 dominion as long as we are assured of the fidelity of our 
 
 1 As this separate corps would be liable to degenerate into a sort 
 of militia it might perhaps be a better arrangement to incorporate 
 the Bombay half in the Madras army, in the same manner as the 
 Hindustani half would be drafted into that of Bengal. 
 
 2 The following table of distances shows that Nagpur is as 
 conveniently placed for support from three of the great military
 
 190 LORD WILLIAM BENT INC K 
 
 native troops. To this opinion I entirely subscribe. But 
 others again view in the native army itself the source of our 
 greatest peril. In all ages the military body has been often 
 the prime cause, but generally the instrument, of all revolu- 
 tions ; and proverbial almost as is the fidelity of the native 
 soldier to the chief whom he serves, more especially when he 
 is justly and kindly treated, still we cannot be blind to the 
 fact that many of those ties which bind other armies to their 
 allegiance are totally wanting in this. Here is no patriotism, 
 no community of feeling as to religion or birthplace, no 
 influencing attachment from high considerations, or great 
 honours and rewards. Our native army also is extremely 
 ignorant, capable of the strongest religious excitement, and 
 very sensitive to disrespect to their persons or infringement 
 of their customs. 
 
 I shall quote from the evidence a few of those passages 
 bearing upon this subject which appear to me to have the 
 greatest force and truth. Mr. Henry Russell observes : 
 
 'The greatest danger we have to apprehend is from, our native 
 army ; our military force is the exclusive tenure by which we hold 
 the government, and the fidelity of the troops of whom that force 
 is composed is necessarily precarious. They are foreigners and 
 mercenaries. They are attached to a Government that pays them 
 well and treats them kindly, &c.. but we have no hold upon them 
 through either national honour or national prejudices, and cannot 
 expect from them what we do from English soldiers fighting for 
 English objects. They are peculiarly susceptible of being practised 
 
 stations in Bengal as from Bombay, and much nearer to the 
 divisions in Malwa and Sagar than even to Bombay : 
 
 Nagpur to Miles. 
 
 Bombay .... 560 
 Madras .... 735 
 Mhow (a) ... 351 
 Nimach (&) . . . 505 
 
 Nagpur to Miles. 
 
 Sagar (c) . . . . 181 
 Benares .... 446 
 Allahabad . . . 450 
 Agra 669 
 
 (a) Left cantonment of the Rajputana force. 
 (6) Centre of the Rajputaiia force. 
 (c) Head-quarters of Sagar division.
 
 MINUTE (continued) 191 
 
 upon, and may be induced either by our own mismanagement or by 
 the artifices of designing persons to turn against us those very 
 arms which now constitute our only strength.' , 
 
 This intelligent officer makes a remark too true at the 
 present day with respect to the Madras army : 
 
 ' The details of the army had for the first time in India fallen 
 into the hands of a school which thought that everything depended 
 on show, and that no sacrifice was too great for the attainment of 
 outward smartness and uniformity.' 
 
 There are parts of Mr. Holt Mackenzie's evidence well 
 worthy of attention, for no man of his time in India possessed 
 the same general knowledge or could form a more accurate 
 and enlightened judgment upon all subjects connected with 
 our rule. He observes : ' I do not think the sepoys have any 
 attachment to the English as a nation ; on the contrary, I 
 apprehend that a considerable number of that part which 
 consists of Moslems must generally have a national, or rather 
 I should say a religious, dislike to the English.' He thinks 
 ' the sepoys have a great deal of attachment to their officers, 
 but that this rests upon personal character rather than on 
 anything that may be called attachment to the nation 
 generally.' He thinks ' the sepoys, as long as they are well 
 paid, will have so strong a sense of the duty of being faithful 
 to those who so pay them as to be only overcome by some 
 powerful cause of discontent or excitement.' He thinks a 
 larger native army is quite essential for maintaining the 
 tranquillity of the country, but he would be 'very sorry to see 
 its defence entrusted to them without a large European 
 force.' He is not aware of any circumstances causing imme- 
 diate danger, but he thinks ' on general principles that there 
 is much prospective danger.' 
 
 It is only since I recorded different minutes enforcing the 
 precedence and expediency of bettering the condition of the 
 native army and of preventing discontent by timely conces- 
 sion and precaution that I have read a passage in a letter 
 from Sir Thomas Munro, written in 1817, in which I find a
 
 192 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 view of our future situation and the consequences appertain- 
 ing to it quite in unison with the sentiments I have so often 
 expressed. He observes : ' But even if all India could be 
 brought under the British dominion, it is very questionable 
 whether such a change, either as it regards the natives or our- 
 selves, ought to be desired. One effect of such a conquest 
 would be that the Indian army, having no longer any warlike 
 neighbours to control, would gradually lose its military habits 
 and discipline, and that the native troops would have leisure 
 to feel their own strength, and, for want of other employ- 
 ment, to turn it against their European masters.' He 
 concludes a long and able argument upon the question 
 whether in the event of our conquest of the whole of India 
 the condition of the people would be better than under their 
 native princes, which he doubts, with this remark : ' There is 
 perhaps no example of any conquest in which the natives 
 have been so completely excluded from all share in the 
 government of their country as in British India.' The only 
 conclusion that I wish to establish from the preceding 
 remarks, which contain indisputable truths, is that in the 
 native army alone rests our internal danger, and that this 
 danger may. involve our complete subversion. But the 
 fidelity of our native army, though wonderfully great and 
 deserving of high confidence, cannot be considered exempt 
 from the possibility of seduction, and thus an adequate 
 European force is the sole security against this, the greatest 
 evil that could befall us. What should be the proportion of 
 our European to our native force will be presently con- 
 sidered. 
 
 The external danger comes next under review. The 
 capability of the native army to meet it, and the manner in 
 which the native military means of India can be turned to 
 the greatest advantage, are subjects of the first magnitude. 
 
 As far as experience can teach us, the prospect is dis- 
 couraging as to any great degree of direct and positive
 
 MINUTE (continued) 193 
 
 assistance in the field, that is in actual conflict, to be 
 expected from the sepoy in a contest with the stronger and 
 bolder races of Central Asia, with or without the co-operation 
 of a Russian force. Mr. Holt Mackenzie has given an 
 opinion upon the question before us, which quite coincides 
 with my view of it : 
 
 ' My impression is that as far as regards any Indian enemy the 
 native army may be considered to be very efficient. I am not 
 equally confident of this efficiency if placed in any new and un- 
 usual position and exposed to encounter enemies that may possibly 
 come upon us from without. I think the result of the war with the 
 Burmese seems to show that when brought against enemies superior 
 in physical strength to those with whom they have been accustomed 
 to contend, and required to surmount obstacles of a different kind 
 from what they have been accustomed to surmount, the native 
 troops, however well led, will be found to want resolution and 
 nervous vigour so as to be inferior to European troops in a degree 
 not ordinarily to be perceived in Indian warfare. Consequently I 
 should apprehend that if they were called upon to meet an European 
 enemy in the north of India they might fail partly from the want 
 of physical strength and partly from the want of moral energy.' 
 
 The defects of the native of India are a want of physical 
 strength and of moral energy. The first is beyond our 
 remedy. It only depends upon ourselves to raise the latter 
 to a much higher standard. Our system has, I fear, tended 
 to depress it. 
 
 The late wars have brought the sepoy in contact with 
 enemies of masculine character, and have shown the justice of 
 the preceding opinion. 
 
 Sir David Ochterlony, in his confidential report to Govern- 
 ment during the Nepal war, has recorded his opinion that 
 the sepoys were unequal to contend with the Gurkhas in 
 the hills. 
 
 The Burmese war was exclusively carried on by British 
 troops. The Madras troops entirely failed. It is understood 
 that Sir Archibald Campbell was strongly prejudiced against 
 them, and when granting the request of their officers to be 
 
 H
 
 1Q4 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 permitted to lead their men to the attack, he neglected the 
 practice invariably adopted upon all other occasions of 
 joining with them a proportion of European troops. To 
 this their ill-success may be in part owing. My own im- 
 pression is also that in the short war against Coorg the 
 Madras sepoys showed the same want of energy. 
 
 With respect to the inability of the sepoys to contend 
 with a European enemy, the concurrent opinion of 'all the 
 evidence, to which may be added the inference to be drawn 
 from all our own conquests in India, seems to be decisive 
 upon the question. 
 
 For my own part I am not quite disposed to come to the 
 same desponding conclusion, because if the bolder and larger 
 man of the north were mixed with a due proportion of 
 European troops, and excited to acts of valour by sufficient 
 encouragement, I know not why he should not acquire the 
 same superior bearing as the Portuguese and the Neapolitans 
 under British and French direction. But of the sepoys of 
 the south of India, of those of the territories proper of 
 Madras and Bombay, I entertain no such hope. Their case 
 cannot be more favourably put for them than by supposing 
 them to be Europeans, and to have all the advantages of the 
 European character, and then let it be asked if men of such 
 physical inferiority would be received as recruits in any 
 European army, or if an army so constituted would not be 
 considered perfectly inefficient. 
 
 All these facts and opinions seem to me to establish incon- 
 trovertibly that a large proportion of European troops is 
 necessary for our security under all circumstances of peace 
 and war. It surprises me to find how little attention was 
 paid by the Committee to one of the most important parts of 
 the inquiry, the relative proportions between the native and 
 European force. But we fortunately possess the opinion of 
 Sir Thomas Munro, the first of authorities, confirmed by 
 another only second to his, that of Colonel John Munro, who
 
 MINUTE (continued] 195 
 
 filled the office of Quartermaster-General when I was at 
 Madras. The opinions on both these questions are worthy 
 of being noticed. 
 
 ' The native troops are in an excellent state of discipline, but of 
 course the Europeans are always superior to the natives. Question 
 is, What should be the relative proportions of the European 
 infantry to the native infantry ? Answer : I should say one-third 
 of European ; that was th*e proportion observed at Madras, indeed 
 we have sometimes rather more, now we have considerably less." 
 
 I once conversed with Sir Thomas Munro on that point, and 
 he expressed his opinion very decidedly that there should be 
 that proportion. This is also my own opinion, but I think 
 that it would suffice at present to fix it at one-fourth, being 
 careful that the establishment should be always kept com- 
 plete, and that on the most remote indications of danger it 
 should be increased to one-third. 
 
 The statements annexed to this Minute show the actual 
 propoi tion of Europeans to natives in the army of each presi- 
 dency, and in the whole army. 
 
 The raising the European proportion to one-fourth would 
 require an establishment of 28,171 rank and file. The 
 present establishment of King's troops consists of twenty 
 regiments of infantry and four of cavalry. The numbers 
 wanting to complete amount to 1945 rank and file, and 
 the effective strength consists only of 15,587 rank and 
 file. The three European regiments in the Company's 
 service amount to 2429 rank and file. They exceed their 
 complement. The total effective force, both King's and 
 Company's, amounts to 18,016 rank and file, and the deficit 
 required to complete the whole to one-fourth would be 10,155 
 rank and file, of which 8599 would be in excess of the 
 present establishment, supposing the King's regiments to be 
 complete and the Company's European corps reduced to 
 their complement. In order to maintain the proportion of 
 one-fourth in a state of efficiency, it is necessary to advert 
 
 N 2
 
 196 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 to the very great difference there is, and must always be, 
 between the apparent and the real force, that is between the 
 number of men actually borne on the rolls, and those if the 
 regiment took the field who would be forthcoming. Many 
 from the effects of climate must be left behind in hospital 
 and quarters. 
 
 I called on Dr. Burke, the Inspector-General of Hospitals, 
 an officer of great experience and intelligence, for an opinion 
 of the deductions that ought to be made on this score. His 
 answer gives 8 per cent, for sick left behind and 4 per 
 cent, more for the effects of even a long march on a very 
 short service. In order to keep up this one-fourth to its 
 proper quota I think the establishment of rank and file 
 should be fixed at 25,000 infantry and 5000 cavalry, and to 
 effect it at the least possible charge I would raise each of 
 our twenty-three regiments of infantry to 1000 rank and 
 file, and add to our establishment two regiments of King's 
 infantry. The cavalry, as I have already proposed in a 
 former minute, should be raised to 800 rank and file, and 
 the establishment augmented from three to five regiments, 
 being 1000 men short of the force proposed. 
 
 I would station these two additional regiments of infantry 
 and two of cavalry as follows one of infantry at Bangalore, 
 making three regiments at that station, which I consider as 
 the most convenient position for a reserve, to be applicable to 
 all exigencies in India ; one regiment of infantry and one of 
 cavalry to be placed in the great centrical cantonment, 
 Rajputana, proposed to be established on the Beas river, 
 and the other regiment of cavalry at Haiderabad. 
 
 In Rajputana there are above 10,000 native troops with- 
 out any European force, which I consider to be highly 
 objectionable in many points of view. This tract of country 
 between the Narbada and Jumna, or rather between Nagpur 
 and Agra, is by far the most important in the whole line of 
 our military occupation.
 
 MINUTE (continued] 197 
 
 I do not feel called upon to suggest the means by which 
 this extra expense shall be defrayed. My duty is performed 
 in stating the imperfections of our present military defence 
 and the measures that are necessary for the security of our 
 empire. At the same time it appears to me that the reduc- 
 tion of one captain in every regiment of native infantry and 
 cavalry may be made without any compromise of efficiency. 
 When two companies were reduced in each regiment the 
 former complement of officers remained unaltered. I consider 
 the establishment of European officers in a native regiment 
 to be far more than is necessary, and it is their number and 
 high pay which swell to such an immense amount the mili- 
 tary expenditure. Men differ very much as to the proper 
 proportion, some contending that the amount cannot be too 
 great ; others, again, that the sepoy army was never in a 
 better state than when there were not more than three or 
 four officers with each corps. I am much inclined to be of 
 this opinion. The connection between European and native 
 officers was much closer, their dependence upon each other 
 greater, and a more cordial intimacy existed between all 
 ranks. I believe the sepoys liave never been so good as they 
 were in the earliest part of our career ; none superior to 
 those under De Boigne, and at the present day none better than 
 the Nizam's contingent, where the same proportion, I believe, 
 about six officers, is maintained. There is one fact that is 
 universally admitted, that no number of European officers 
 will make a sepoy corps equal to an European regiment, and 
 in my opinion that establishment would be sufficient that 
 allowed the presence of one officer to a company. The saving 
 proposed would go far to meet the charge, in addition to the 
 changes that have been suggested in respect to the Bombay 
 army. 
 
 There are two points adverted to in the reports of the 
 Committee that are well deserving of early consideration. 
 
 Both the Madras Committee and the Adjutant-General
 
 198 LORD WILLIAM BENT INC K 
 
 and Quartermaster-General of the Bengal army have recom- 
 mended the augmentation of each native centre to 1000 men, 
 without any increase of officers, and I would strongly support 
 its adoption as soon as the finances will allow. It would give 
 great relief to the duty devolving upon all sepoy corps, whicli 
 is often very harassing and distressing as military duty, and 
 increased by the interference and interruption often caused 
 to their religious customs. This increase would permit the 
 extension of a much valued indulgence, that of furlough, to 
 a much larger proportion of every regiment say one-fifth, 
 and for a longer period say a year. I should think it would 
 in any new general regulation be advisable to reduce the 
 amount of pay received during absence. There is at this 
 time a great difference of practice in this respect between 
 the Bengal sepoys and those of Madras and Bombay, to the 
 advantage of the latter. 
 
 The same Bengal officers have urged the formation of a 
 portion of the regular regiments into light infantry. As 
 there is not a single chief in India or on the frontier who 
 can resist us in line, an army formed principally for that 
 purpose is in a great degree useless. Within our territories 
 all insurrection must be confined to hills or the jungles. 
 Without we have either the Nepal Hills or the jungles and 
 stockades of Ava, where soldiers well trained in irregular 
 fighting and in the expert use of a light musket can alone be 
 useful. I am of opinion that one cause of the defeat of the 
 two columns in the late Coorg war may be ascribed to the 
 ignorance of both men and officers in this species of warfare, 
 which requires a particular and constant instruction as well 
 as experience. 
 
 The irregular cavalry is the arm of all others in India that 
 may be placed on a par with any of the military means that 
 we could command for our defence against foreign invasion 
 not even excepting the European cavalry. I need not repeat 
 what has been so often stated, that the Rohillas and all the
 
 MINUTE (continued] 199 
 
 other highest caste and bravest men in India who will not 
 enter our ranks from dislike to our rigid discipline, and from 
 the fear of personal disrespect from our young inconsiderate 
 officers, have no repugnance to serve in the irregular cavalry. 
 The irregular cavalry is of peculiar importance in India. It 
 is the favourite arm of the native. It attaches him to our 
 service by the strong ties of interest and affection. It 
 prevents his being engaged against us, and if the system 
 were sufficiently extended it would, at a trifling expense, 
 afford us all the advantages, moral and military, which the 
 Russians have derived from the Cossacks, who, from being the 
 bitterest enemies of Russia in the time of Peter the Great, 
 have become the most faithful subjects of the empire. This 
 force should be increased to 20,000 men. 
 
 Steam power must be included among the most powerful 
 means of reducing the difficulties of protection and support 
 to such extensive and distant lines of defence and of multi- 
 plying the military resources that we already possess. In 
 illustration of the practical use that might be made of this 
 power, I take the liberty of introducing here an opinion that 
 I have elsewhere expressed : 
 
 ' But an efficient marine steam establishment in India is called 
 for by considerations more powerful even than those of commercial 
 advantage or improved political control. It would multiply in a 
 ratio little understood the defensive means of the Empire. Let me 
 advert to an event, the particulars of which are within your recol- 
 lection, the Burmese war. If five powerful steamers had then been 
 at our command to bring up in quick succession all necessary rein- 
 forcements and supplies, the war would probably have terminated 
 in a few months, and many millions of treasure, many thousands 
 of lives, and extraordinary misery and sickness would have been 
 spared. Allow me to submit another estimate of advantage, of 
 the correctness of which you all can likewise judge. The proper 
 station for the principal reserve of our European troops in India is 
 at Bangalore, Madras the place of embarkation. In a few days, at 
 any period of the monsoons, the same five steamers would carry 
 this force to the most distant part of the shores of the Empire. In 
 five weeks with the aid of the river-steamers this reserve would
 
 200 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 reach Allahabad, the most centrical point of our territories, and 
 one of our most commanding positions. The same steam power 
 that would enable us to baffle any invader in war would be ample 
 in times of peace to carry into complete execution the whole plan of 
 the Bengal Steam Committee, for which I continue to be a decided 
 advocate.' 
 
 I will only offer a remark that if such power be provided 
 it should be exclusively appropriated to the transport of troops 
 and to the maintenance of the communication with Europe. 
 From all purposes of less utility as passage or tug vessels 
 it should be interdicted as being uselessly expensive, and as 
 affecting without any adequate return of benefit the efficiency 
 and readiness for constant service of the steam machinery. 
 
 I shall only now take the liberty of suggesting the advan- 
 tage that would accrue from including the military establish- 
 ments of Ceylon in those entertained for the defence of our 
 Indian Empire. Ceylon could well spare one regiment of 
 infantry, which would be pro tanto a relief to her finances. 
 For the ordinary duties of the colony a sepoy corps at one half 
 of the expense would probably answer every purpose, and in 
 case of more urgent service the regiment at Trichinopoli 
 might be held at the disposal of the Government of Ceylon, 
 and would be able to cross the straits in a very short time. 
 The Ceylon regiment, if stationed at Bangalore, would be of 
 much more extended benefit, could march down to replace 
 the Trichinopoli regiment if necessary, and could move on to 
 Ceylon in case of increasing urgency. There is a Malay 
 corps in Ceylon, an element of defence, not known in our 
 Indian establishment, and which might be most usefully 
 employed in our provinces on the Eastern coast, and perhaps 
 in the Lower Provinces, which are so hateful to the up-country 
 sepoy. If the experiment succeeded, this corps would afford 
 a nucleus for the foundation of a larger force. It is a great 
 desideratum in our military arrangements, the obtaining 
 a mode of defence for Bengal proper at once efficient for the 
 State and satisfactory to the individuals employed. I had
 
 MINUTE (continued) 201 
 
 much conversation with Sir Edward Barnes on the subject. 
 I possess, indeed, a written memorandum from him strongly 
 concurring in the view here taken, but I cannot immediately 
 lay my hand upon it. 
 
 I regret that these observations should have run to such 
 extreme length, but no one before me has had the opportunity 
 of a season of peace to reflect upon the alterations that the 
 union of our Presidencies into one Government, and of our 
 territories into one Empire, imperatively call for. It would 
 have ill become me, upon a subject so momentous as the safety 
 of this great possession, to have been prevented by any motive 
 of delicacy from the full development of my opinion. I fear- 
 lessly pronounce the Indian army to be the least efficient and 
 most expensive in the world. The realisation of the hypothesis 
 with which I started, of the presence of 20,000 Russian 
 infantry on the Indus, with its accompanying multitudes, 
 would now find us in a state utterly unable to resist them. 
 The national resources at home might possibly rescue us from 
 the impending ruin, but we must recollect that we are not 
 likely to have again the same large armies to supply us with 
 great reinforcements, and that men recruited for the occasion 
 would be very inefficient and quite inadequate to bear the 
 effects of the climate. 
 
 But even if we could command this aid, it would be utterly 
 inexcusable if, with ample time for preparation, with the sum 
 of ten millions sterling appropriated to our military estab- 
 lishments, we were not able to secure ourselves against every 
 calculable danger. 
 
 W. C. BESTIHCK. 
 
 Calcutta, March I3th, 1835.
 
 CHAPTER X 
 END OF INDIAN CAREER AND LIFE 
 
 THE Indian career of Lord William Bentinck lias 
 now been considered in all its bearings, and an at- 
 tempt has been made to explain the influence he 
 exercised over the development of British power in 
 India. Considering that he had wielded authority in 
 that country for a period of nearly seven years under 
 circumstances of great anxiety, it is not surprising to 
 find that his health suffered during the last few months 
 of bis stay there, but we cannot suppose that this fact 
 greatly shortened his tenure of power, which, with the 
 exception of Lord Hastings and Lord Dalhousie, was 
 longer than that of any Governor-General in this 
 century. His departure on 2oth March, 1835, in the 
 full height of his reputation, and when the task of 
 reform in India had reached its end, not to be taken 
 up for another generation, contrasted with the circum- 
 stances of his sudden and enforced exit from Madras 
 in 1807. Even the sore feeling in the Services from 
 his interference with what were regarded as cherished 
 perquisites did not prevent their cordial expression of 
 the opinion that he had done good work in India, and
 
 STATUE AT CALCUTTA 203 
 
 that his administration formed an epoch in the history 
 of our government of the country. Among the natives 
 the feeling of regret was naturally more acute, and 
 found louder expression because in him they lost the 
 friend and vindicator who, first among their English 
 rulers, held out to them the prospect of equal rights 
 and an honourable share in the government. Ex- 
 pression was given to their gratitude by the statue 
 erected by public (and chiefly native) subscription to 
 his memory, which forms a prominent ornament of 
 the city of Calcutta, and which bears an inscription l 
 prepared by his friend and coadjutor, Macaulay. 
 
 Lord William Bentinck went to India as a reformer, 
 and he fully and honourably realised the character in 
 which he was sent out by the East India Company. 
 
 1 The following is the full text of this inscription : 
 
 To 
 
 WILLIAM CAVEKDISH BEKTLSCK, 
 who during seven years ruled India with eminent prudence, 
 
 integrity, and benevolence ; 
 who, placed at the head of a great Empire, never laid aside the 
 
 simplicity and moderation of a private citizen ; 
 
 who infused into Oriental despotism the spirit of British freedom : 
 
 who never forgot that the end of government is 
 
 the happiness of the governed ; 
 
 who abolished cruel rites ; 
 
 who effaced humiliating distinctions ; 
 
 who gave liberty to the expression of public opinion ; 
 
 whose constant study it was to elevate the intellectual and 
 
 moral character of the nation committed to his charge. 
 
 This Monument 
 
 was erected by men 
 
 who, differing in race, in manners, in language, and in religion, 
 
 cherish with equal veneration and gratitude 
 the memory of his wise, reforming, and paternal administration .
 
 204 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 He began his work by placing the impaired finances of 
 the Indian Government on a firm and satisfactory 
 basis, not merely by converting a deficit into a surplus, 
 but by effecting permanent economies and creating 
 new sources of revenue. He carried out several great 
 measures of reform which were necessary, not only in 
 the interests of governed and governing, but also in 
 order to demonstrate the earnest desire of the Company 
 to consider the welfare of its subjects. He was the first 
 to put in practice the loftier ideal of Indian government, 
 which had insensibly grown up after the Warren 
 Hastings trial. 
 
 If Lord William Bentinck had many admirers, it is 
 not surprising, considering the acts of his administra- 
 tion, to find that he had also enemies and detractors. 
 No one can forcibly reform the established order of 
 things without incurring the enmity of those who are 
 interfered with, and Lord William Bentinck certainly 
 interfered with a good many people. Perhaps the 
 writer who gave the most extreme expression to these 
 injured feelings was Mr. Thornton in his History, con- 
 cluding a long indictment of Bentinck's administration 
 with an attack on his personal character, in which he 
 said there was 'added the treachery of the Italian 
 to the caution of the Dutchman 1 .' But it is strange 
 to find a writer like Greville, who was a shrewd judge 
 of human character, and who was, moreover, Ben- 
 tinck's own nephew, giving expression to what was 
 
 1 A forcible and eloquent reply to Thornton's attack was pub- 
 lished in the first volume of the Calcutta Beview, and deserves to be read.
 
 LORD WILLIAM'S CHARACTER. 205 
 
 after all the antipathy to Lord William Bentinck felt 
 by a very small class in India. We may assume that 
 it was rather prejudice caused by his home politics, 
 than objection to Bentinck's work in India, that led 
 him to pen the following lines as his summing up 
 of the character of his uncle : 
 
 ' He is a man whose success in life has been greater than 
 his talents warrant, for he is not right-headed, and has com- 
 mitted some great blunder or other in every public situation 
 in which he has been placed, but he is simple in his habits, 
 popular in his manners, liberal in his opinions, and magnifi- 
 cently hospitable in his mode of life. These qualities are 
 enough to ensure popularity.' 
 
 The most unfriendly critics of Lord William Ben- 
 tinck have not ventured to deny that he accomplished 
 the work entrusted to him, and that he satisfactorily 
 solved the problems which came before him. Their 
 criticism is not directed against the manner of the 
 worker, but against the work itself. The decision to 
 diminish the expense of government, to give the 
 governed a larger share in it, and to elevate it for the 
 benefit of the millions in India and the English reputa- 
 tion, was come to because those steps could be no longer 
 put off. They originated not with Lord William Ben- 
 tinck so much as in England under the pressure 
 of an aroused, if still sluggish, public opinion, and if 
 they had not been carried out by an officer of the East 
 India Company, the neglect would have entailed the 
 speedier fall of that institution and the transfer of its 
 duties to the British Crown and Parliament.
 
 206 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 But there is no justification for the loose state- 
 ment so frequently made that the object of Lord 
 William Bentinck was to facilitate the transfer of the 
 government from English to native hands. He saw 
 clearly, and long before he was Governor-General, 
 that the administrative services would have to be 
 recruited from the natives, and he recognised on 
 principle the justice of this measure. He carried out 
 what he approved, and what the Company itself saw to 
 be necessary, in an expeditious and practical manner 
 that provided an enduring and satisfactory remedy 
 for the difficulty. Every subsequent step taken by 
 the Qovernment of India in the extension of the 
 branches open to the natives of the country has been 
 the direct consequence of Lord William Bentinck's 
 policy. We have been told very often that this was 
 a misfortune rather than a benefit, and that by so 
 doing the seeds were planted of our overthrow. The 
 prediction may be verified at some remote date, as to 
 which no one but a rash prophet will attempt now 
 to vaticinate. 
 
 But what would have been the stability of the 
 English position in India if we had persisted in 
 governing the country with a mere handful of our 
 own officials, excluding the native from all superior 
 administrative work, and either augmenting our 
 expenses or diminishing our revenue in accordance 
 as we kept many or few European officials ? It would 
 be going too far to assert that to-day there would not 
 be a British India at all. We content ourselves by
 
 LORD WILLIAM'S SUCCESS 207 
 
 saying that it would be a British India of which we 
 should have less reason to be proud than of that 
 which exists, and also that it would be less secure. 
 
 Very little consideration was necessary to prove 
 to thoughtful persons that two hundred millions of 
 people, composed of many highly intelligent and 
 spirited races, could not be kept permanently in a 
 state of subjection without either voice or share in 
 their own government. There is no instance in 
 history of any race of capable conquerors having 
 attempted so hopeless a task, and all Lord William 
 Bentinck did was to prove that the Company, having 
 thrown aside its commercial character, was prepared 
 to discharge its duties as a purely governing body in 
 a worthy manner. It was impossible to accomplish 
 this task without giving umbrage to influential 
 classes, and the completeness of Lord William 
 Bentinck's success was certainly calculated to em- 
 bitter the feeling against him among the old servants 
 of the Company. But the allegation that his policy 
 was calculated to undermine British power in India 
 is one that will not bear examination. 
 
 It was indispensable. By enabling the revenues 
 of India to meet all the charges of a foreign govern- 
 ment he added to the strength and durability of our 
 position in India, and his anxiety to augment our 
 military forces in the country, and to oppose a 
 Russian advance on India with a suitable foreign 
 policy, showed that he would be no party to anything 
 tending to weaken our hold upon the country. The
 
 208 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK 
 
 more carefully Lord William Bentinck's Indian career 
 is considered, the more evident will it appear that his 
 part in consolidating British authority in India was 
 a great and honourable one. To him we feel it to be 
 due that the peoples of India were first convinced that 
 a main factor in our policy was a disinterested desire 
 for their own welfare. 
 
 The closing years of Lord William Bentinck's life, 
 which was not long extended after the termination of 
 his Indian administration, only call for brief notice. 
 After his return to England in the autumn of 1835 he 
 was offered a peerage, which he declined, partly 
 because he had no children to inherit a title, and 
 partly because he wished to return to active political 
 life in the House of Commons. In the election of 
 1837 he was elected Member for the city of Glasgow 
 in the Liberal interest. He spent a good deal of his 
 time in France, where his Palermo friend of more 
 than twenty years before had become Louis Philippe, 
 King of the French, and he died at Paris on 
 June 17, 1839, at the age of 65. The part of his 
 life-work which will endure was performed in India, 
 and although to him fell less of the pomp and cir- 
 cumstance of war which has formed so prominent a 
 feature of our history in that country, and more of 
 unattractive internal reform, he can never be excluded 
 from the list of eminent rulers who made India 
 a British possession, and who have kept it so, as 
 much by the tacit assent of the subject population as 
 by superior force.
 
 INDEX 
 
 ABERCROMBY, Sir E., 17. 
 
 ACHESON, Lady Mary, 17. 
 
 ADAM, Sir Frederick, 47. 
 
 ADIGE, passage of, 17. 
 
 AKBAE, 166. 
 
 ALCOY, 47. 
 
 ALEPPO, 172. 
 
 ALLAHABAD, 61. 
 
 ALVES, Major, 143. 
 
 AMHERST, Lord, 53, 54, 55, 57, 
 
 84-5, 140, 145, 147. 
 Annans, Treaty of, 17. 
 ANSTRCTHER, A., 26. 
 AUSTRIAN ARMY, tribute to, 16 w. 
 
 BARAKZAIS, the, 1 70. 
 BARLOW, Sir George, 28. 
 BARNES, Sir E., 147. 
 BARRACKPCR, 58. 
 BATHURST, Captain, 36 . 
 BATTA, ^6: meaning of word, 57, 
 
 58, 59- 
 
 BAYLEY, W. B., 55, 67. 
 
 BELLEGABDE, ^larshal, 51 n. 
 
 BENGAL, 62, 64. 
 
 BENTINCK FAMILY, the, 13, 14. 
 
 BENTINCK, Hans William, Earl 
 of Portland, 14. 
 
 BENTINCK, Lady William, 17, 
 148. 
 
 BENTINCK, Lord William Charles 
 Cavendish, birth of, 15 : early 
 military career, 15-16: attached 
 to Suwarrow's army, 16 : at Mar- 
 engo, &c., ibid. : opinion of Aus- 
 trian army, 16 n. : appointed to 
 command cavalry in Egypt, 1 7 : 
 
 marries Lady Mary Achesou, 
 ibid. : nominated Governor of 
 Madras, ibid. : reaches Madras, 
 19 : correspondence with Mar- 
 quis Wellesley, 20-21 : enun- 
 ciates his views on Indian 
 Government, 22 : his opinion of 
 possibility of French descent 
 on Madras and Ceylon, 23 : holds 
 Sir Thomas Munro's opinion on 
 land question, 24-25 : dispute 
 with Chief Justice, 25-27 : his 
 differences with Members of 
 Council, 27-28 : his name sug- 
 gested for Governor-General- 
 ship, 28 : his relations with 
 Court, 29 n. : consulted by Sir 
 John Cradock on first Mutiny 
 at Vellore, 32-3 : cancels ob- 
 jectionable orders, 34 : censured 
 by Court, 35 : removed from 
 office, 36 : returns to England, 
 36 n. : his regard for his friends, 
 37 : presents Memorial to 
 Court, 37-8 : publishes Me- 
 morial, 38 n. : returns to mili- 
 tary work, 40 : sent on special 
 mission to Madrid, ibid. : com- 
 mands a brigade at Corunna, 
 41 : appointed to command in 
 Sicily, 42 : Napier's estimate of 
 his character, 43 : organises 
 army in Sicily, ibid. : arranges a 
 new Constitution for the island, 
 44-5 : entertains a scheme from 
 Russian Admiral Tchighachoff, 
 46 : favours project of emanci-
 
 INDEX 
 
 pating Italy, 46-7 : sends ex- 
 pedition to Eastern Spain, 47 : 
 lands at Leghorn with small 
 army, 48 : his proclamation at 
 Genoa, 49 : his relations with 
 Louis Philippe, ibid. : his con- 
 vention with Prince Francis, 50: 
 his policy in Italy, 50-52 : his 
 relations with Austrian nota- 
 bilities, 51 n. : refused per- 
 mission to land at Naples, 52 : 
 resides at Florence, ibid. : mem- 
 ber for Lynn, 53 : offered and 
 refuses Governorship of Ma- 
 dras, ibid. : applies for Governor- 
 Generalship, il)id. : James Mill's 
 opinion of him, 54 : selected as 
 Governor-General, ibid. : arrives 
 in India, 55 : ordered to reduce 
 Batta, 56 : his proceedings on 
 that subject, 56-59 : forbids 
 press to comment on Court's 
 decree, 60 : effects various 
 economies, ibid. : institutes re- 
 ductions in army, 61 : his 
 arrangements about Malwji 
 opium, 62 : turns deficit of one 
 million into a surplus of two 
 millions, 63 : his relations with 
 Sir Charles Metcalfe, 65-68 : 
 receives Lord Ellenborough's 
 despatch, 67 : takes in hand 
 suppression of thags, 68 : his 
 measures, 75 : abolishes widow- 
 burning, 77 et seq. : receives 
 letter on Sat i from Lord Hast- 
 ings, 84 : his decision, 86 : 
 addresses confidential letter to 
 officers, 87 : his perfect confi- 
 dence as to abolition, 90 : his 
 Minute on Satl, 96-111 : Lord 
 Lansdowne's tribute to, 126-7 : 
 character of his rule, 129: 
 forbids presents to or by ser- 
 vants of the company, 130 : his 
 policy towards Native States, 
 131 : corresponds with the 
 N izam, 133: withdraws control 
 fromHaideraba'd.ibiV/.: hispolicy 
 in Maisore, 134-5 : directs cam- 
 
 paign in Coorg, 136 : visits 
 Lucknow, 139 : his despatches 
 on condition of Oudh, ibid. : 
 establishes sanitarium at Simla . 
 145 : and at Darjiling, ibid. : his 
 desire to see things for himself, 
 ibid.: issues first4p.c.loan, 147 : 
 assumes command of the arm} 7 , 
 ibid. : character of Lady William, 
 148 : supports English edu- 
 cation, 1578 : his Resolution of 
 March, 1835, 159-160: his 
 Press policy, 161-2 : his policy 
 in India, 163 : his foreign 
 policy, 1 66 : negotiates with 
 Amirs of Sind, 168 : his inter 
 view with Ranjft Singh, 169 : 
 interest in Singapur, 171-2 : 
 supports overland route, 172- 
 3 : ' reviews position in India, 
 174: full text of his Minute 
 on the subject, I77~ 2 oi : leaves 
 India, 2 02 : statue to, 203 and n. : 
 his work in India, 205-7 : 
 elected member for Glasgow, 
 208 : his death at Paris, ibid. 
 
 BERHAMPUR, 58. 
 
 BHARTPUR, 55. 
 
 BIRD, R. M.,*6i. 
 
 BLAKE, Mr., murder of, 143. 
 
 BLAQUIERE, 44 n. 
 
 BOARD OF CONTROL, 115. 
 
 BOKHARA, 166. 
 
 BOMBAY, 62. 
 
 BOURBONS, the Neapolitan, 42, 45. 
 
 BURNES, Sir Alexander, 168. 
 
 BORRARD, Sir Harry, 40. 
 
 BUSSORA, 172. 
 
 CALCUTTA, 55, 65, 68 : commercial 
 
 crisis at, 146-7. 
 CALCUTTA COLLEGE, the, 150. 
 CALCUTTA GOVERNMENT GAZETTE, 
 
 90, 128. 
 
 CALCUTTA REVIEW, the, 204 n. 
 CAMBRIDGE, Duke of, 52. 
 CAMPBELL, 171. 
 CANTON, 118. 
 
 CASTLEREAGH, Lord, 29 n., 52. 
 CATALONIA, 44, 46, 47, 51.
 
 INDEX 
 
 211 
 
 CAVENDISH, Lady Dorothy, 15. 
 
 ' CEPHALCS,' the, 44 n. 
 
 CEYLON, 23. 
 
 CHANDU LALL, 134. 
 
 CHARLES THE SECOND, 114. 
 
 CHARTER of East India Company, 
 the, 9-11, 112, 113: Queen 
 Elizabeth's Charter,! 14 : James' 
 and others, ibid. : length of re- 
 newals, 115 : withdrawal of 
 monopoly of Indian trade, 1 15 : 
 public opinion on Chinese mo- 
 nopoly, 116 : Chinese monopoly 
 to cease, 117: financial conse- 
 quences of loss of Chinese 
 monopoly, 119-25: terms of 
 renewal of, 1 24 : debate in 
 Parliament, 125-6 : royal as- 
 sent, 126. 
 
 CHINA, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119. 
 
 CHITOR, 73. 
 
 CLIVE, second Lord, 19. 
 
 COLLIN, M., 24. 
 
 COLVIN, Russell, 150. 
 
 C'OMBERMERE, Lord, 55. 
 
 COMMITTEE of 1853, 160. 
 
 COMMITTEES of inquiry, 61. 
 
 COMMONS, House of, 113: Com- 
 mittee of, 116-7: debate in, 125. 
 
 COORG, 1 34 : the mad RiijiC of, 
 136: war with, ibid.: annexation 
 of, ibid. 
 
 COOTE, Eyre, 30. 
 
 CORNWALLIS, Marquis, 24, 64, 80, 
 148. 
 
 CORSICA, 52. 
 
 CORUNNA, 41. 
 
 COURT OF DIRECTORS, and Vellore 
 Mutiny, 35-9. 
 
 COURTS, the Provincial, 63. 
 
 CRADOCK, Sir John, 31, 32, 33. 
 
 CROMWELL, Oliver, 114. 
 
 DALRYMPLE, Sir Hew, 40. 
 
 DAMAN, 62. 
 
 DARJILING, purchase of, 145. 
 
 DELHI, King of (the Great Mo- 
 gul), 137 : sends emissary to 
 England, ibid. 
 
 DlNAPUR, 58. 
 
 ' DITCH OF DELHI,' the, 166. 
 Diu, 62. 
 
 DOST MUHAMMAD, 170, 171. 
 DUM-DUM, 58. 
 DWARAKANATH TAGORE, 79. 
 
 EAST INDIA COMPANY, 78 : its 
 dividend, 119, 122, 123, 124, 
 125: national services of, 128-9. 
 
 ECCLESIASTICAL ESTABLISHMENT, 
 
 US- 
 EDUCATION, rival schools of, 149. 
 EGYPT, 172, 173, 
 ELIZABETH, Queen, 114. 
 ELLENBOROUGH, Lord, 67, 116, 
 
 .126. 
 ENGLISH, use of, 149, 150, 151, 
 
 157 : its consequences, 158-9, 
 
 160. 
 ' ENTERPRISE,' the, 173. 
 
 FORT ST. GEORGE, 17, 19, 53. 
 FRANCIS D'ESTE, Archduke, 51 n. 
 FRASER, murder of Mr., 137. 
 FRENCH, the, 23. 
 
 GANGES, 78, 81. 
 
 GENOA, 48, 49. 
 
 GEORGE THE FOURTH, 116. 
 
 GHAZIPUR, 58. 
 
 GLASGOW, 208. 
 
 GOSFORD, Earl of, 17. 
 
 GRANT, Charles (Lord Glenelg), 
 
 125. 
 GREVILLE, Mr. Charles, 92 and 
 
 n., 148, 204, 205. 
 GROTE, Mrs., 53. 
 GWALIOR, 74. 
 GWILLIM, Sir Henry, 25, 26, 27. 
 
 HAIDAR ALI, 30, 132. 
 HAIDARABAD, 74, 132, 147. 
 HAMILTON, Lady, 44. 
 HASTINGS, Marquis of, 53, 57 : 
 
 letter from, 84, 148. 
 HASTINGS, Warren, 8, 112, 150. 
 HERAT, 166. 
 HOGHTON, Colonel, 20. 
 HOME REMITTANCES, question of, 
 
 1 20. 
 
 O 2
 
 212 
 
 INDEX 
 
 HOPE, Sir John, 41. 
 
 ' HOGH LINDSAY,' the, 1 73. 
 
 INDIA, revenue of, 121. 
 INDIA BILL, Pitt's, 115. 
 INDIA OFFICE RECORDS, 68. 
 INDUS, opening of to commerce, 
 
 1 68. 
 ITALY, 46 : a United, 49, 51. 
 
 JAIPUB, 140 : intrigues at, ibid. : 
 pathetic scene at, 141 : renewed 
 trouble at, 142 : attack on our 
 agent at, 143 : settlement of its 
 affairs, 144. 
 
 JAMES THE FIRST, 114, 
 
 JOTA RAM, 140 : his schemes, ibid. : 
 restored to office, 141 : his war 
 with the Tha"kur3, 142 : his plot, 
 143 : arrested and punished, 
 144. 
 
 KABUL, 166, 168, 169, 177. 
 KANDAHAR, 170, 171. 
 KARACHI, 62. 
 KAYE, Sir J., 59 ., 161. 
 KRISHEN RAO, 158. 
 
 LAKE, Lord, 19. 
 LANSDOWNE, Marquis of, 1 26. 
 LAUDERDALE, Earl of, 28. 
 LAWRENCE, 31. 
 LEGHORN, 48. 
 LINGA RAJ, 134. 
 LIVERPOOL, Lord, 53. 
 LOAN, first 4 per cent., 147. 
 LORDS, House of, debate in, 1 26. 
 Louis PHILIPPE, 49 : letter from, 
 
 5> 5i 5 2 > 53 > 208. 
 Low, Sir John, 74. 
 LUCKNOW, 138, 139. 
 LUDHIANA, 170, 171. 
 LYNN, 53. 
 
 MACAULAY, 125 : arrives in India, 
 150: President of Education 
 Committee, 151 : his Minute, 
 152-7 : opinion of Lord William, 
 164: inscription on his statue, 
 203. 
 
 MACFARLANB, General, 52 n. 
 MAHDI ALI, 138, 139. 
 MALCOLM, Sir John, 1 24. 
 MALWA, 62. 
 MANU, code of, 80. 
 MABENGO, 16. 
 
 MARIE AM ALIE, Princess, 49. 
 MAR IK LOUISE, Archduchess, 
 
 45- 
 
 METCALFE, Sir Charles (after- 
 wards Lord), 56, 58 : his rela- 
 tions with Lord William, 65-7 : 
 his idea of government for 
 India, 65-6 : his share in ad- 
 ministration, 67-8 : Lord Wil- 
 liam's opinion of, 68 : at Jaipur, 
 140-1 : his description of Lady 
 William, 148-50 : his opinion 
 of use of English language, 157 : 
 emancipates Press, 161 : sent 
 to Ranjft Singh, 167 : his 
 opinion of our position in India, 
 175-6- 
 
 MILAN, 52. 
 
 MILL, James, 53, 54. 
 
 MINCIO, passage of, 17. 
 
 MlNOBCA, 46, 47. 
 
 MINTO, Lord, 28, 82. 
 
 MINUTES, on Salt, 96-111 : on 
 
 Education, 152-57 : on position 
 
 in India, 177-201. 
 MONTBESOB, Colonel, 34. 
 MOORE, Sir John, 41. 
 MOTAMID-UD-DAULAT, 138. 
 MUNBO, Sir Thomas, 24, 34, 55 n., 
 
 135- 
 
 MUBAT, 48, 50. 
 MUTIAH, 37. 
 
 MYSORE, 73 : maladministration 
 in, 134 : popular rising in, 135 : 
 deposition of Maha'ra'ja', ibid. : 
 English administration in, 1 36 : 
 restoration of present ruler, 
 ibid. 
 
 NAPIER'S HISTORY, 43, 47. 
 NAPLES, Queen of, 44, 45. 
 NAPOLEON, 40, 45. 
 NAZIB-UD-DAULAT, Nizam, 133. 
 NIZAH, the, 132 : our relations
 
 INDEX 
 
 213 
 
 with him, 132-4: correspond- 
 ence with Lord William, 133 
 and n. 
 
 XIZAM, the present reigning, 
 generous act of, 147. 
 
 NIZAMAT ADALAT, 81, 82, 89. 
 
 NORTH-WEST PROVINCES, 61. 
 
 Novi, 1 6. 
 
 NUGENT, Prince, 48, 51 n. 
 
 OAKES, Thomas, 27, 28. 
 
 OPIUM, 62, 63. 
 
 ORDAL, 47. 
 
 ORIENTALISTS, the, 151, 158. 
 
 OCDH, 74: king of, 138: pro- 
 position to assume control of, 
 139 : vindication of Lord 
 Dalhousie's policy in, ibid. 
 
 OVERLAND ROUTE, the, 172-4. 
 
 PALERMO, 45, 49. 
 
 PALMER & Co., 147. 
 
 PARIS, 208. 
 
 PASSPORTS IN INDIA, 24. 
 
 PATIALA, Maharaja of, refuses 
 
 interest on loan, 144 : sells site 
 
 of Simla, ibid. 
 PEEL, Sir R., 116. 
 PELLEW, Sir E., 36 n. 
 PENANG, 172. 
 PETRIE, William, 37. 
 PHAXSA, 69. 
 PHANSI-GAR, 69. 
 PITT,' the, 36 n. 
 
 PONDICHERRY, 23. 
 
 PORTLAND, third Duke of, 15. 
 
 PORTO Novo, 30. 
 
 PRESS, the, in India, 59 and n., 
 
 161-2. 
 
 PBIXSEPS, the, 149. 
 PRIVY COUNCIL, the, 91, 92. 
 PURNAITA, 134. 
 
 BAFFLES, Sir Stamford, 171. 
 
 RAMMOHUN ROT, 79, 137. 
 
 RANJIT SINGH, 56 : growth of his 
 power, 1 66 : mission to, 167 : dis- 
 pute with, 168 : second mission 
 to, 168-9 : Lord William's in- 
 terview with, 169: helps Shall 
 
 Shnja, {bid.: fits ont Afghan 
 
 expedition, 170. 
 RAYATWARI, 55 n. 
 RIPON, Lord, 126. 
 RORI, 170. 
 
 RUMBOLD, Sir W., 147. 
 RUPAR, 169. 
 RCSSIA, first reference to menace 
 
 from, 165, 177, 181-3, 199, 
 
 201 
 
 SADR AMTNS, 64. 
 
 SADR DIWANI, and NIZAMAT 
 ADALAT, court of, 64. 
 
 SAGAR, 158. 
 
 SANGLIANO, 16. 
 
 Sati, 77: practice of, 78: precise 
 meaning of, 78 n. : English 
 attitude towards, 78-9 : its 
 knell, 80: proposed abolition, 
 8 1 : the police and, 82 : number 
 of cases, 83: prevalence in 
 Bengal army, 84, 87 : official 
 view of, 85 : ' crime of multi- 
 plied murder,' 86 : only reasons 
 for delay in suppressing it, 88 : 
 opinion of the Judges about, 
 89 : of the police, 89-90 : 
 regulations as to Sail, 90-1 : 
 isolated cases of, 91 : test 
 appeal to Privy Council, 91-2 
 and ., 93, 94: policy of its 
 suppression, 94-6: Minute on, 
 96-111. 
 
 SEPOYS, of Madras, 30: orders 
 issued to, 31. 
 
 SHIKARPCR, 170. 
 
 SHORE'S Notes on Indian Affairs. 
 
 93, M 6 - 
 
 SHTTJA UL MULK, exile in India, 
 1 68 : forms alliance with Ranjit, 
 ibid. : sets out to recover 
 Afghanistan, 170: bis quarrel 
 with Sind Amirs, ibid. : de- 
 feated at Kandahar, 171 : re- 
 turns to India, ibid. 
 
 SICILY, 42, 43 : new constitution 
 
 in,45- 
 
 SIKAXDER JAH, Nizam, 133. 
 SIKKDT, Raja of, 145.
 
 214 
 
 INDEX 
 
 SIMLA, acquisition and growth of, 
 
 144-5- 
 
 SIND, Amirs of, 168, 170. 
 SINGAPUB, 171-2. 
 SLEEMAN, Major, 73, 74. 
 SMITH, F. C., 73, 75. 
 SPEZIA, 48. 
 STEWART, Colonel, 74. 
 STRANGE, Robert, 27. 
 SUCHET, Marshal, 47, 51. 
 SUTLEJ, 166, 169. 
 SUWARROW, Marshal, 16. 
 SYDENHAM, Captain, 21. 
 
 TAVERNIER, 69, 72. 
 
 TCHIGHACHOFF, Admiral, 46, 47. 
 
 THAGI, 68 : history of, ibid. 
 
 THAGS, the, meaning of name, 69 : 
 their mode of proceeding, 69-71 : 
 their increased numbers, 71-3 : 
 steps against, 73-5 : number 
 arrested, 74 : break-up of fra- 
 ternity, 75. 
 
 THORNTON'S HISTORY, 204 and n. 
 
 TILSIT, 40. 
 
 TIPU SULTAN, family of, 29, 30, 
 34, 35, 132, 134. 
 
 TITCHFIELD, Lord, 27. 
 
 TORRI, Alessandro, 49. 
 
 TREBBIA, 16. 
 
 TREVELYAN, Sir Charles, 12, 150, 
 1 60. 
 
 UTAKAMAND, 136, 145. 
 
 VELLORE, its position, 29 : first 
 Mutiny at, 32 : dragoons sent 
 to, ibid. : second Mutiny at, 33 
 and n. : court-martial at, 34 : 
 commission of inquiry at, 34. 
 
 WADWAN, 168. 
 WAGHORN, Mr., 173. 
 WANDIWASH, 30. 
 WELLESLEY, Sir Arthur, 19, 41 : 
 
 see WELLINGTON. 
 WELLESLEY, Marquis, 20, 21, 22, 
 
 81, 126. 
 WELLINGTON, Duke of, 46, 50, 51, 
 
 59, 126. 
 
 WIDOW-BURNING, 77: see Safl. 
 WILLIAM THE THIRD, 114. 
 WILLIAM THE FOURTH, 168. 
 WILSON'S BRITISH INDIA, 78 n., 
 
 116. 
 WILSON, Colonel, his history of 
 
 the Madras army, 33 n. 
 WILSON, Mr., 74.
 
 RULERS OF INDIA 
 
 THE CLARENDON PRESS SERIES OF INDIAN 
 
 HISTORICAL RETROSPECTS 
 Edited by SIR W. W. HUNTER, K.C.S.I., C.I.E. 
 
 Price 28. 6d. each 
 
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 SIR WILLIAM HUNTER'S 'DALHOUSIE.' 
 
 ' An interesting and exceedingly readable volume Sir William 
 
 Hunter has produced a valuable work about an important epoch in 
 English history in India, and he has given us a pleasing insight into 
 the character of a remarkable Englishman. The " Rulers of India " 
 series, which he has initiated, thus makes a successful beginning in his 
 hands with one who ranks among the greatest of the great names which 
 will be associated with the subject.' The Times. 
 
 ' To no one is the credit for the improved condition of public intelli- 
 gence [regarding India] more due than to Sir William Hunter. From 
 the beginning of his career as an Indian Civilian be has devoted a rare 
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 OPINIONS OF THE PRESS ON 'DALHOUSIE' (continued}. 
 
 of England's greatest dependency .... By inspiring a small army of 
 fellow-labourers with his own spirit, by inducing them to conform to his 
 own method, and shaping a huge agglomeration of facts into a lucid and 
 intelligible system, Sir W. Hunter has brought India and its innumer- 
 able interests within the pale of achievable knowledge, and has given 
 definite shape to the truths which its history establishes and the 
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 be taken as a matter of course, because their highest merit is to conceal 
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 they raise the whole level of public intelligence, and generate an 
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 and presumption dwindle and disappear. . . . No one we think, who fairly 
 studies Sir W. Hunter's exact and lucid narrative of these transactions, 
 can question the result which he seeks to establish namely, that Lord 
 Dalhousie merely carried out with moderation and skill a policy 
 deliberately adopted by the Government before his arrival in the country 
 a policy the strict legality of which cannot be disputed, and which was 
 inspired by the growing sense that sovereigns exist, not for their own 
 enjoyment, but for the happiness of their subjects.' Saturday Review. 
 
 ' Admirably calculated to impart in a concise and agreeable form a clear 
 general outline of the history of our great Indian Empire.' Economist. 
 
 ' A skilful and most attractive picture. . . . The author has made good 
 use of public and private documents, and has enjoyed the privilege of 
 being aided by the deceased statesman's family. His little work is, 
 consequently, a valuable contribution to modern history.' Academy. 
 
 ' The book should command a wide circle of readers, not only for its 
 author's sake and that of its subject, but partly at least on account of 
 the very attractive way in which it has been published at the moderate 
 price of half-a-crown. But it is, of course, by its intrinsic merits alone 
 that a work of this nature should be judged. And those merits are 
 everywhere conspicuous. ... A writer whose thorough mastery of all 
 Indian .subjects has been acquired by years of practical experience and 
 patient research.' The Athenaeum. 
 
 ' Never have we been so much impressed by the great literary abilities 
 of Sir William Hunter as we have been by the perusal of "The Marquess 
 of Dalhousie." . . . The knowledge displayed by the writer of the motives 
 of Lord Dalhousie's action, of the inner working of his mind, is so com- 
 plete, that Lord Dalhousie himself, were he living, could not state them 
 more clearly. In the next place the argument throughout the book is so 
 lucid, based so entirely upon facts, resting upon official documents and 
 other evidences not to be controverted, that the opponents of Lord 
 Dalhousie's policy will be sorely put to it to make a case against him. 
 . . . Sir William Hunter's style is so clear, his language so vivid, and 
 yet so simple, conveying the impressions he wishes so perspicuously that 
 they cannot but be understood, that the work must have a place in 
 every library, in every home, we might say indeed every cottage.' 
 Evening News. 
 
 ' Sir William Hunter has written an admirable little volume on 
 " The Marquess of Dalhousie " for his series of the " Rulers of India." 
 It can be read at a sitting, yet its references expressed or implied 
 suggest the study and observation of half a life-time.' The Daily News.
 
 flDpimon0 of tbe Press 
 
 ON 
 
 SIR WILLIAM HUNTER'S 'LORD MAYO.' 
 
 ' Sir William W. Hunter has contributed a brief but admirable 
 biography of the Earl of Mayo to the series entitled " Rulers of India," 
 edited by himself (Oxford, at the Clarendon Press).' The Times. 
 
 ' In telling this story in the monograph before us. Sir William 
 Hunter has combined his well-known literary skill with an earnest 
 sympathy and fullness of knowledge which are worthy of all commenda- 
 tion. . . . The world is indebted to the author for a fit and attractive 
 record of what was eminently a noble life.' The Academy. 
 
 ' The sketch of The Man is full of interest, drawn as it is with com- 
 plete sympathy, understanding, and appreciation. But more valuable 
 is the account of his administration. No one can show so well and 
 clearly as Sir William Hunter does what the policy of Lord Mayo con- 
 tributed to the making of the Indian Empire of to-day.' The Scotsman. 
 
 ' Sir William Hunter has given us a monograph in which there is a 
 happy combination of the essay and the biography. We are presented 
 with the main features of Lord Mayo's administration unencumbered 
 with tedious details which would interest none but the most official of 
 Anglo-Indians ; while in the biography the man is brought before us, 
 not analytically, but in a life-like portrait.' Vanity Fair. 
 
 ' The story of his life Sir W. W. Hunter tells in well-chosen language 
 clear, succinct, and manly. Sir W. W. Hunter is in sympathy with 
 his subject, and does full justice to Mayo's strong, genuine nature. 
 Without exaggeration and in a direct, unaffected style, as befits his 
 theme, he brings the man and his work vividly before us.' The 
 Glasgow Herald. 
 
 ' All the knowledge acquired by personal association, familiarity with 
 administrative details of the Indian Government, and a strong grasp of 
 the vast problems to be dealt with, is utilised in this presentation of 
 Lord Mayo's personality and career. Sir W. Hunter, however, never 
 overloads his pages, and the outlines of the sketch are clear and firm.' 
 The Manchester Express. 
 
 ' This is another of the " Rulers of India" series, and it will be hard 
 to beat. . . . Sir William Hunter's perception and expression are here at 
 their very best.' TAe Pall Noll Gazette. 
 
 'The latest addition to the "Rulers of India" series yields to none of 
 its predecessors in attractiveness, vigour, and artistic portraiture. . . . 
 The final chapter must either be copied verbally and literally which 
 the space at our disposal will not permit or be left to the sorrowful 
 perusal of the reader. The man is not to be envied who can read it with 
 dry eyes.' Allen's Indian Mail. 
 
 ' The little volume which has just been brought out is a study of Lord 
 Mayo's career by one who knew all about it and was in full sympathy 
 with it. ... Some of these chapters are full of .spirit and fire. The 
 closing passages, the picture of the Viceroy's assassination, cannot fail 
 to make any reader hold his breath. We know what is going to 
 happen, but we are thrilled as if we did not know it, and were still 
 held in suspense. The event itself was so terribly tragic that any 
 ordinary description might seem feeble and laggard. But in this 
 volume we are made to feel as we must have felt if we had been on 
 the spot and seen the murderer " fastened like a tiger " on the back of 
 the Viceroy.' Daily 'News, Leading Article.
 
 Opinions of tbe Press 
 
 MR.W.S.SETON-KARR'S'CORNWALLIS.' 
 
 ' This new volume of the " Rulers of India " series keeps up to the 
 high standard set by the author of " The Marquess of Dalhousie." For 
 dealing with the salient passages in Lord Cornwallis's Indian career no 
 one could have been better qualified than the whilom foreign secretary 
 to Lord Lawrence.' The Atheiuzum. 
 
 ' Lord Corn wallis has been very properly included in the list of those 
 "Rulers of India" whose biographies are calculated to illustrate the 
 past growth and present development of the English administration in 
 that country. His name is connected with several great measures, 
 which more, perhaps, than any others have given a special colour to our 
 rule, have influenced the course of subsequent legislation, and have made 
 the Civil Service what it at present is. He completed the administrative 
 fabric of which Warren Hastings, in the midst of unexampled difficulties 
 and vicissitudes, Lad laid the foundation.' The Saturday Review. 
 
 ' We hope that the volumes on the " Rulers of India " which are 
 being published by the Clarendon Press are carefully read by a large 
 section of the public. There is a dense wall of ignorance still standing 
 between the average Englishman and the greatest dependency of the 
 Crown, although we can scarcely hope to see it broken down altogether, 
 some of these admirable biographies cannot fail to lower it a little. . . . 
 Air. Seton-Karr has succeeded in the task, and he has not only pre- 
 sented a large mass of information, but he has brought it together in an 
 attractive form. . . . We strongly recommend the book to all who wish 
 to enlarge the area of their knowledge with reference to India.' New 
 York Herald. 
 
 ' The " Rulers of India " series. This outcome of the Clarendon 
 Press grows in value as it proceeds. The account of Cornwallis is from 
 the pen of Air. W. Seton-Karr, who was formerly Foreign Secretary to 
 the Government of India, and whose acquaintance with Eastern affairs 
 has been of obvious service to him in the compilation of this useful 
 manual.' The Globe. 
 
 ' One might almost say that the history of our great Indian Empire 
 might be read with comparative ease in the excellent " Rulers of India 
 Series," published at the Clarendon Press at Oxford. ... Of Cornwallis 
 it might be said he transformed the East India Company's servants 
 from merchants to administrators, and determined to place them above 
 jobbery, which he despised.' The Independent. 
 
 ' We have already expressed our sense of the value and timeliness of 
 the series of Indian historical retrospects now issuing, under the editor- 
 ship of Sir W. W. Hunter, from the Clarendon Press. It is somewhat 
 less than fair to say of Mr. Seton-Karr's monograph upon Cornwallis 
 that it reaches the high standard of literary workmanship which that 
 series has maintained. . . . His accurate and lucid summary of the necessi- 
 ties which dictated Cornwallis's policy, and the methods by which he 
 initiated and, to a great extent, effected, the transformation of our rule 
 in India from the lines of an Oriental despotism to those with which we 
 are now familiar, is as attractive as it is instructive.' The Literary 
 World.
 
 Opinions of tjje 
 
 COLONEL MALLESON'S 'DUPLEIX.' 
 
 In the character of Dupleix there was the element of greatness 
 that contact with India seems to have generated in so many European 
 minds, French as well as English, and a broad capacity for govern- 
 ment, which, if suffered to have full play, might have ended in giving 
 the whole of Southern India to France. Even as it was, Colonel 
 Malleson shows how narrowly the prize slipped from French grasp. 
 In 1783 the Treaty of Versailles arrived just in time to save the 
 British power from extinction.' Times. 
 
 1 Colonel Malleson's Life of Dupleix, which has just been published, 
 though his estimate of his hero differs in some respects from Lord 
 Stanhope's and Lord Macaulay's, may be accepted as, on the whole, a 
 fairly faithful portraiture of the prophetic genius to whom the possi- 
 bility of a great Indo-European Empire first revealed itself. Had the 
 French profited by all the advantages they possessed when Clive 
 exchanged the counting-house for the army, the history of India, and 
 perhaps of Europe also, might have been different.' Standard 
 (leading article). 
 
 ' The " Rulers of India " series, edited by Sir W. W. Hunter, and 
 published at the Clarendon Press, Oxford, is one of the very best of 
 the serial collections which are now so popular. All the writers of 
 these little volumes are well-known and acknowledged authorities on 
 the subjects with which they deal. Not the least interesting volume 
 in this particular series is Colonel Malleson's biography of Dupleix . . . 
 It was to Dupleix, and not to Clive, that the idea first occurred of 
 founding a European Empire in India ... It is a stirring story, and 
 full of moral for the administrators of India at this hour.' Echo. 
 
 ' One of the best of Sir W. Hunter's interesting and valuable series. 
 Colonel Malleson writes out of the fulness of familiarity, moving with 
 ease over a field which he had long ago surveyed in every nook and 
 corner. To do a small book as well as this on Dupleix has been done, 
 will be recognised by competent judges as no small achievement. 
 When one considers the bulk of the material out of which the little 
 volume has been distilled, one can still better appreciate the labour 
 and dexterity involved in the performance." Academy. 
 
 1 Colonel Malleson has here written a most compact and effective 
 history of the French in India in a little handbook of 180 pages. He 
 gives a brief summary of French enterprise in India from the first, 
 and clearly outlines the grand designs that rose in the fertile brain of 
 Dupleix. Colonel Malleson's chapter on the " Downfall of Dupleix " 
 is as touching as anything we remember to have recently read, and his 
 chapter on Clive and his work may be read with interest and pleasure, 
 even after the glowing and brilliant account of Macaulay.' Noncon- 
 formist. 
 
 ' Well arranged, lucid and eminently readable, an excellent addition 
 to a most useful series.' Record.
 
 Opinions of t&e 
 
 COLONEL MALLESON'S 'AKBAR.' 
 
 ' Colonel Malleson's interesting monograph on Akbar in the "Rulers 
 of India " (Clarendon Press) should more than satisfy the general 
 reader. Colonel Malleson traces the origin and foundation of the 
 Mughal Empire ; and, as an introduction to the history of Muhamma- 
 dan India, the book leaves nothing to be desired.' St. James's Gazette. 
 
 1 Akbar was certainly a great man. Colonel Malleson has done well 
 to tell his story thus succinctly and sympathetically : hitherto it has been 
 mostly buried from the mass of readers. The book is in our idea a 
 piece of thoroughly well-executed work, which cannot fail to recommend 
 still further a series which has begun right well.' Nonconformist. 
 
 ' The chief interest of the book lies in the later chapters, in which 
 Colonel Malleson presents an interesting and singularly pleasing 
 picture of the great Emperor himself and the principles which governed 
 his enlightened and humane administration.' Literary World. 
 
 ' It is almost superfluous to say that the book is characterised by 
 the narrative vigour and the extensive familiarity with Indian history 
 to which the readers of Colonel Malleson's other works are accus- 
 tomed.' Glasgow Herald. 
 
 ' This volume will, no doubt, be welcomed, even by experts in 
 Indian history, in the light of a new, clear, and terse rendering of an 
 jid, but not worn-out theme. It is a worthy and valuable addition 
 to Sir W. Hunter's promising series.' Athenceum. 
 
 ' Colonel Malleson has broken ground new to the general reader. 
 The story of Akbar is briefly but clearly told, with an account of what 
 he was and what he did, and how he found and how he left India. . . . 
 The native chronicles of the reign are many, and from them it is still 
 possible, as Colonel Malleson has shown, to construct a living portrait 
 of this great and mighty potentate.' Scots Observer. 
 
 ' Akbar is, after Mohammed himself, the most striking and interest- 
 ing figure in Mussulman history. Few men of any age or country 
 have united in equally successful measure the gifts of the conqueror, 
 the organiser, and the philosophic statesman . . . His personal charac- 
 ter is even more exceptional among Oriental rulers than his intel- 
 lectual brilliance . . . He is the only great Mussulman ruler who 
 showed himself capable of rising out of the narrow bigotry of Islam to 
 a lofty and comprehensive view of religious truth. The life and rule 
 of such a man is a noble theme for a great historian.' Speaker. 
 
 ' The brilliant historian of the Indian Mutiny has been assigned in 
 this volume of the series an important epoch and a strong personality 
 for critical study, and he has admirably fulfilled his task. A luminous 
 exposition of the invasions of India by Babar, Akbar's grandfather, 
 makes a good introduction to Asiatic history of the sixteenth century. 
 Akbar's own career is full of interest, and to the principles of his in- 
 ternal administration Colonel Malleson devotes in the final chapter more 
 than a quarter of the pages of his book. Alike in dress and style, this 
 volume is a fit companion for its predecessor.' Manchester Guardian.
 
 Opinions of tfje 
 
 ON 
 
 MAJOR-GENERAL SIR OWEN BURNE'S 
 'CLYDE AND STRATHNAIRN.' 
 
 'In ' Clyde and Strathnairn," a contribution to Sir William Hunter's 
 excellent "Rulers of India" series (Oxford, at the Clarendon Press), 
 Sir Owen Burne gives a lucid sketch of the military history of the 
 Indian Mutiny and its suppression by the two great soldiers who give 
 their names to his book. The space is limited for so large a theme, but 
 Sir Owen Burne skilfully adjusts his treatment to his limits, and rarely 
 violates the conditions of proportion imposed upon him.' . . . ' Sir Owen 
 Burne does not confine himself exclusively to the military narrative. 
 He gives a brief sketch of the rise and progress of the Mutiny, and 
 devotes a chapter to the Reconstruction which followed its suppression.' 
 . . . ' well written, well proportioned, and eminently worthy of the 
 series to which it belongs.' The Times. 
 
 'Sir Owen Biirne who, by association, experience, and relations with 
 one of these generals, is well qualified for the task, writes with know- 
 ledge, perspicuity, and fairness.' Saturday Review. 
 
 ' As a brief record of a momentous epoch in India this little book is 
 a remarkable piece of clear, concise, and interesting writing.' The 
 Colonies and India. 
 
 'In this new volume of the excellent "Rulers of India" series, 
 Major-General Burne gives in a succinct and readable form an account 
 of the Mutiny, its causes, its nature, and the changes in army organisa- 
 tion and civil administration which followed upon it.' Glasgow Herald. 
 
 ' Like the rest of the book, this part is not only excellently written, 
 but is excellently reasoned also.' The National Observer. 
 
 ' Sir Owen Burne, who has written the latest volume for Sir William 
 Hunter's " Rulers of India " series, is better qualified than any living 
 person to narrate, from a military standpoint, the story of the suppres- 
 sion of the Indian Mutiny.' Daily Telegraph. 
 
 ' Sir Owen Burne' s book on " Clyde and Strathnairn " is worthy to 
 rank with the best in the admirable series to which it belongs.' 
 Manchester Examiner. 
 
 'The book is admirably written; and there is probably no better 
 sketch, equally brief, of the stirring events with which it deals.' 
 Scotsman. 
 
 1 Sir Owen Burne, from the part he played in the Indian Mutiny, and 
 from his long connexion with the Government of India, and from the 
 fact that he was military secretary of Lord Strathnairn both in India 
 and in Ireland, is well qualified for the task which he has undertaken.' 
 The Athenceum. 
 
 ' Sir W. W. Hunter acted wisely in commissioning Sir Owen Tudor 
 Burne to write the lives of "Clyde and Strathnairn" for this series 
 (Clarendon Press). Neither of these generals was, strictly speaking, a 
 Ruler of India : still the important period of the Mutiny is so contained 
 in the story of their exploits, that perhaps it was as well to choose them 
 as the personages round whom might be grouped the history of that 
 stirring period. ... Sir 0. T. Burne's book is well worthy of a place in 
 the most valuable of the many series now issuing from the Press.' The 
 Header.
 
 Opinions of tbe 
 
 ON 
 
 MR, KEENE'S 'MADHAVA RAO SDTOHIA.' 
 
 ' The life of such a man should be interesting to all those who have en- 
 tered, however remotely, into the inheritance of his labours: andMr.Keene 
 is well qualified, both by his knowledge of Indian history and his literary 
 dexterity in its treatment, to do justice to his subject.' The Times. 
 
 ' Mr. Keene has the enormous advantage, not enjoyed by every 
 producer of a book, of knowing 'intimately the topic he has taken up. 
 He has compressed into these 203 pages an immense amount of informa- 
 tion, drawn from the best sources, and presented with much neatness and 
 effect . . . Such a life was worth tracing in connection with the general 
 history of the times ; and that is the task which Mr. Keene has so well 
 fulfilled in this concise, yet attractive, little volume.' The Globe. 
 
 ' In this brief monograph Mr. Keene goes over the ground already tra- 
 versed by him in his " Fall of the Moghul Empire." But the particular 
 work which gives Sindhia his place in Indian history ... is here made 
 more clearly manifest,while the book deals almost as much in general his- 
 tory as in biography . . It is valuable as bringing out the originality as well 
 as the greatness of the unacknowledged ruler of Hindustan . . . The book 
 is interesting . . . and forms a valuable addition to the series.' Scotsman. 
 
 ' Mr. Keene tells the story with knowledge and impartiality, and also 
 with sufficient graphic power to make it thoroughly readable. The 
 recognition of Sindhia in the " Rulers " series is just and graceful, 
 and it cannot fail to give satisfaction to the educated classes of our 
 Indian fellow-subjects.' North British Daily Mail. 
 
 ' This is probably the most romantic volume in the whole series, and 
 the Sindhia's difference in attitude towards De Boigne and Warren 
 Hastings is very interestingly stated. The history of the foundation of 
 our Indian Empire receives much elucidation from this admirable 
 volume.' Liverpool Mercury. 
 
 ' Mr. H. G. Keene, C.I.E., M. A., has added a very acceptable volume to 
 the popular half-crown series of works on former potentates in England's 
 vast Indian dependency . . . From the signal defeat of the Marathas at 
 Panipat, in 1761, in which engagement Sindhia, after fighting valiantly, 
 very nearly lost his life, until his death in 1 794, his varying fortunes are 
 traced. The important affairs in which he figured so prominently, as also 
 the intrigues and machinations that were directed against him, are re- 
 corded, whilst the desirable effect of his policy in assuaging the fierce 
 passions and civilising the habits of the people is depicted. The volume 
 bears incontestable proofs of the expenditure of considerable research 
 by the author, and sustains the reputation he had already acquired 
 by his " Sketch of the History of Hindustan." ' Freeman ' Journal. 
 
 ' Among the eighteen rulers of India included in the scheme of Sir 
 William Hunter only five are natives of India, and of these the great 
 Madhoji Sindhia is, with the exception of Akbar, the most illustrious. 
 Mr. H. G. Keene, a well-known and skilful writer on Indian questions, 
 is fortunate in his subject, for the career of the greatest bearer of the 
 historic name of Sindhia covered the exciting period from the capture 
 of Delhi, the Imperial capital, by the Persian Nadir Shah, to the occu- 
 pation of the same city by Lord Lake. . . . Mr. Keene gives a lucid 
 description of his subsequent policy, especially towards the English 
 when he was brought face to face with Warren Hastings. The conclu- 
 sion of his hostility to us was the real beginning of his own political 
 career in India.' The Daily Graphic.
 
 of tfje 
 
 ON 
 
 SIR HENRY CUNNINGHAM'S 'EARL 
 CANNING.' 
 
 ' The life of Earl Canning, the Viceroy of the Indian Mutiny, affords 
 an excellent subject for a biographer who knows his business, and 
 therefore we need hardly say that " Earl Canning," by Sir H. S. 
 Cunningham, K.C.I.E., is an admirable contribution to the series of 
 the "Eulers of India" edited by Sir W. W. Hunter (Oxford, at the 
 Clarendon Press). Sir Henry Cunningham's rare literary skill and his 
 knowledge of Indian life and affairs are not now displayed for the first 
 time, and he has enjoyed exceptional advantages in dealing with his 
 present subject. Lord Granville, Canning's contemporary at school 
 and colleague in public life and one of his oldest friends, furnished his 
 biographer with notes of his recollections of the early life of his friend. 
 Sir Henry Cunningham has also been allowed access to the Diary of 
 Canning's private secretary, to the Journal of his military secretary, 
 and to an interesting correspondence between the Governor-General 
 and his great lieutenant, Lord Lawrence. Of these exceptional ad- 
 vantages he has made excellent use, and the result is a biography 
 second in interest to none in the series to which it belongs.' The Times. 
 
 ' Sir Henry Cunningham's " Earl Canning " is a model monograph. 
 The writer knows India, as well as Indian history, well ; and his story 
 has a vividness which none but an Anglo-Indian could so well have 
 imparted to it. It has also the advantage of being founded to a large 
 extent on hitherto unused material.' The Globe. 
 
 'Sir H. S. Cunningham has succeeded in writing the history of a 
 critical period in so fair and dispassionate a manner as to make it 
 almost a matter of astonishment that the motives which he has so 
 clearly grasped should ever have been misinterpreted, and the results 
 which he indicates so grossly misjudged. Nor is the excellence of his 
 work less conspicuous from the literary than from the political and 
 historical point of view. The style is clear and vivid, the language 
 well chosen and vigorous, the disposition of details and accessories 
 striking and artistic, and, indeed, under whatever aspect the work be 
 considered, it reaches the high standard of workmanship which, from 
 the outset, has been a distinguishing feature of the series.' Glasyow 
 Herald. 
 
 ' Sir H. S. Cunningham was fortunate, in a literary sense, in the 
 particular Viceroy and period of Indian history allotted to his pen in 
 the important and valuable series of biographical volumes on " Rulers 
 of India," being published at the Clarendon Press, Oxford, under the 
 editorship of Sir William Wilson Hunter. In Earl <'niini/n/, first 
 Viceroy of India, Sir H. S. Cunningham had a subject sufficiently 
 inspiring to all who admire honour, courage, patience, wisdom, all the 
 virtues and qualities which go to the building up of the character of an 
 ideal English gentleman ; while the episode of the Mutiny, culminating 
 in the fall of Lucknow, lends itself to the more picturesque and 
 graphic description. Sir H. S. Cunningham has treated his subject ade- 
 quately. In vivid language he paints his word-pictures, and with calm 
 judicial analysis he also proves himself an able critic of the actualities, 
 causes, and results of the outbreak, also a temperate, just appreciator 
 of the character and policy of Earl Canning.' The Court Journal. /
 
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